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## Army Doctrine From Cantigny to the Future

Morris J. Boyd

*Brig. Gen. Morris J. Boyd is Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia. This article, which is derived from a speech General Boyd gave in early March 1995, was submitted to Army History by Dr. Susan Canedy, TRADOC History Office.*

Early in May 1918, in France, the command of the AEF's (American Expeditionary Forces) 1st Infantry Division was transferred to the French X Corps. About midmonth, the decision was made to dislodge the Germans from their positions near Cantigny. The 28th Infantry of the 1st Division was selected to carry out the attack and for several days rehearsed its plans. On 28 May the assault was launched. All objectives were gained despite heavy resistance. The Germans counterattacked with a vengeance, but the Americans held fast. The capture of Cantigny was the first large offensive operation by an American division. It was considered a brilliant exploit, a concrete example of the fighting ability of American troops.

Recently, I had the opportunity to attend a symposium entitled, "How World War II was Really Won," sponsored by U.S. Naval Institute and the McCormick Tribune Foundation and held at the McCormick Estate in Cantigny, Illinois. The symposium provided me with the opportunity to work with the Headquarters, TRADOC, historians in preparation, and to broadly review Army doctrine since that time.

The battle for Cantigny in 1918 was the first major victory for the United States in the Great War. Looking back from today's perspective, it heralded the dominant role American forces would play throughout the century. It gives us a glimpse of what we would see time and again—the ingenuity and bravery of soldiers, excellence of battle leaders, and the invaluable support of the nation.

The questions for now are, what did we learn from Cantigny? From World War I? From any later conflict? What vehicle does our Army use to prepare for its role in the future?

To answer this, we again return to history, to look at World War II and its aftermath, and to do this from a doctrinal perspective.

The body of fundamental principles which guide Army actions in support of national objectives is Army doctrine. It provides the basic fundamentals of organization, equipment, training, and employment of forces to achieve victory. Doctrine outlines what the service is capable of doing and sets in motion those processes and programs that will enable it to deal with the future. The U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan, has characterized doctrine as the engine of change.

One of the major sources we look to in deriving our doctrine is history. History, national security strategy, technology, current operations, and future forecasting—these set the base plate of ideas that allow the Army to develop the organizations, procedures, equipment, and people to remain relevant today and into the future.

A review of events leading to World War II and its aftermath illustrate that doctrine has not always enjoyed the prominence it is given today. For the United States, "ad hoc-ery" characterized the war doctrinally. New amphibious concepts, ground-air liaison, infantry-tank cooperation, and the combined arms were elements of doctrine that were literally developed on the move to meet new, pressing, and unprecedented needs.

That doctrine was focused on sustained land dominance and increasingly in the context of employment with the other services. Throughout the war, the basis for sustained land dominance clearly was the joint air-land-sea effort. The massive marshaling of naval

power in Operation Neptune-Overlord, employing artificial harbors and facilitating the new tactics and equipment of amphibious assault assured the success of the initial stage of what historian Charles MacDonald would call "The Mighty Endeavor." Tactical air over Normandy, tactical air in support of the breakout and pursuit across France, and tactical air at the Battle of the Bulge, together with the strategic bombing of enemy logistics and transportation—all were indispensable elements of victory.

Joint forces were critical contributors to the battles and campaigns that established and sustained American land dominance. They were critical to the U.S. Army's invasion and defeat of German land power on German soil in 1945. But again, much of the doctrine was ad hoc—developed through necessity of battle rather than a before-the-fact statement of how that battle would be fought.

The interwar years were noteworthy as a hallmark of neglect of military preparedness. After all, the major powers had just fought the "war to end all wars." The resultant neglect included doctrine.

There were a few bright spots, however. Interwar doctrinal work in 1935 by the Infantry School's assistant commandant, Col. George Marshall, resulted in the distillation of 125 situational vignettes of World

War I battle actions into an influential doctrinal text, *Infantry in Battle*.

Marshall, who had been a part of General John J. Pershing's staff in World War I, remembered that the staff seemed to specialize in highly elaborate, tightly knit operational plans that had little to do with realities in the trenches. In his view, the Army's most perishable skills were those learned at the point of a bayonet. But those skills had to be placed in context. Marshall, therefore, felt a thorough knowledge of military history was essential to the development of a professional soldier.

Following World War I, under Maj. Gen. Fox Conner's tutelage, Dwight D. Eisenhower learned to read history—especially that of decisionmaking by the great leaders of the Civil War—not just for the facts or what happened but *why*. Together with George S. Patton, Jr., he began to explore the tank as an offensive weapon, and along with other emerging leaders of the interwar years, saw the value of combined arms operations and the necessity of joint and combined operations.

Other far-seeing soldier-thinkers, such as Billy Mitchell and Adna Chaffee, likewise were pushing against the interwar imagination envelope. Mitchell's concepts of aerial attack on naval vessels would prove



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prophetic. Chaffee's vision of a mechanized land fighting force set the most revolutionary trend ahead in future land battles.

In a desperate attempt to prepare for what seemed inevitable intervention in the second of the great European wars, Marshall, then Army Chief of Staff, ordered mass corps- and army-level maneuvers in 1940. The Louisiana and Carolina Maneuvers served as vehicles for developing command, doctrine, leadership, and equipment.

The U.S. Army, however, still entered the war in 1941 substantially unprepared. Armored and combined arms warfare, already being demonstrated by German forces in Western and Eastern Europe, had no ready doctrinal equivalent in the American Army, which also lacked the equipment to carry it out.

It is ironic that no institutional lesson-learning procedure pointing toward modernized doctrine came directly out of the vast American warfighting experience of World War II. It was historical studies—the extensive “green book” volumes of *The U.S. Army In World War II* series, for example—that documented what went right and wrong and why during that conflict.

Today's Army uses a variety of methods to learn from itself and its actions. Over the years, it has built a substantial lesson-learning apparatus, which includes sending historians and other observers onto the battlefield to document activities. The Center for Army Lessons Learned has sent teams of historians and observers to every conflict since DESERT STORM.


The Army's learning and doctrine system of today is rooted in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Recognizing the importance of history and lessons learned, solid training, leader development, and modern equipment, the Army reorganized in 1973 and created the Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC was established as the Army's overall development command for training, doctrine, organization, and materiel requirements. The creation of TRADOC set in motion the 1970s-80s period of Army modernization and reform. Doctrine, informed by history, led the way.

Staff exercises using historical battles, predominantly from World War II, were the norm in the Army schools. As a captain, I did staff analysis of fire support issues involving Anzio; as a major, Normandy and the Bulge, and since, several more. We studied Agincourt, Bull Run, Gettysburg, Cantigny, Normandy, the Bulge, Leyte, and Iwo Jima. And we walked the ground. In Europe, many of our officers and noncommissioned officers have walked the famous battlefields of World

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DENNIS J. REIMER  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

Official:

  
YVONNE M. HARRISON  
Administrative Assistant to the  
Secretary of the Army

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Chief of Military History  
Brig. Gen. John W. Mountcastle

Managing Editor  
Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., Ph.D.

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War II, studying tactics, techniques, and procedures—not just what, but, like Eisenhower, why. Today, the Chief of Staff of the Army holds key leader discussions on Civil War battle sites to ensure that as we look to the future we remember the powerful leverage we gain from our past.

In the face of the strategic crisis in Europe precipitated by the massive Soviet arms buildup, TRADOC based doctrine and training reform on lessons learned from the most applicable recent conflict—the 1973 Mideast War.

That intense and short armored conflict demonstrated modern war's greatly increased battle tempo and materiel destructiveness. It was suggestive most of all of what a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense against the Warsaw Pact threat might bring. TRADOC consequently developed a NATO-focused Active Defense doctrine, which it evolved into a deep-striking and more initiative-oriented AirLand Battle doctrine by the early 1980s.

Today's Army doctrine comes out of the worldwide strategic changes of 1989-91 that ended the Cold War, reunited Germany, broke up the Soviet Union, and revealed, in the 1991 Gulf War, the suggestive evidence of a new technological face of battle. The collapse of Soviet power in Europe and worldwide opened up a new strategic era, a world no longer bipolar, but for the United States characterized by a wide diversity of security interests and concerns.

At the same time, the waging of the Gulf War pointed to new military-technological horizons and to new battle dynamics. Those considerations led to development by TRADOC, at Chief of Staff of the Army direction, of a new fundamental operations doctrine published in *Field Manual 100-5* (June 1993).

The 1993 doctrine introduced versatility in operations, capitalized on force dominance, emphasized lethality and survivability, outlined operations at greater

tempo to dominate the adversary in battle, and spelled out requirements for continuous battle and for operations short of war.

Doctrine today must be fully developed and robust to enable the armed forces to train and prepare for, and mobilize and deploy to, a variety of situations and operations. In today's information age, time and technology on the battlefield move at such a speed that strategic, operational, and tactical planning and execution are compressed. There is no opportunity to develop doctrine or campaign plans over a period of months and years for future battles. The doctrine must be historically informed. The plans must be ready to execute now, and history must be embedded in all that we do.

So while our doctrine is written for today's environment, it is based on historical analysis of battles and is taught in our schoolhouses and in our units to gain insights that will better inform the process of change leading us to the future.

Looking to the future, TRADOC has written and published a new pamphlet, *TP 525-5, Force XXI Operations*. General Gordon R. Sullivan termed it the intellectual underpinnings to move the Army into the twenty-first century. It analyzes the strategic landscape and the rapid pace of technological change, and envisions a highly adaptive, versatile, flexible total force as part of a joint team being able to wage war in a high-tech information age. And while preparing for cyber war, reflecting on the past reminds us that war will largely be a human endeavor—tough, uncompromising, and often final.

As before, doctrine applies to the heart and soul of the fighting force, which as from Cantigny through Normandy and further through the Cold War's end, still depends for its success on uncommon courage, committed leadership, and the nation's support.

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### New Book on the Buffalo Soldiers Available

Students of the role of African-Americans in the U.S. Army now have a new book to consider: *On the Trail of the Buffalo Soldier: Biographies of African-Americans in the U.S. Army, 1866-1917* by Frank N. Schubert. Dr. Schubert, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint History Office, examined both official and unofficial military reports and other documents, seeking information on "buffalo soldiers." His sources include annual reports of the Secretary of War, weekly papers serving African-American audiences, the journal of NAACP, and Veterans Administration files. The book is 520 pages in length and is priced (cloth only) at \$125.00. For more information, contact Scholarly Resources, Inc., 104 Greenhill Ave., Wilmington, DE 19805-1897. Phone: (800) 772-8937 or FAX (302) 654-3871.

A.G. Fisch

## The Chief's Corner

John W. (Jack) Mountcastle

"You will conduct a passage of lines, seize designated objectives, and, on order, continue the advance."

I was talking with a group of junior officers recently about the difficulties of advancing mechanized forces in a movement to contact. Our discussion got me thinking about the number of times Armor officers like me have received orders such as the one above. The FRAGO, or "fragmentary order," often is used to pass mission-type instructions quickly and effectively to military organizations that already are in action or on the brink of being committed to action. These orders usually are short on details and long on responsibility for the commander ordered to execute the mission. The headquarters issuing the orders must have a great deal of faith in the unit carrying them out. We at the Center have received a great many of these FRAGOs in the last three months.

I truly feel as though the Army History Program has now begun its "movement to contact" into the future. Without knowing precisely what obstacles await our coming, or what may challenge our safe passage forward, we nevertheless are determined to execute our missions in the best possible manner and to maintain the momentum of our advance.

Since we published our last edition of Army History, the Center of Military History has been on the move. We have completed the complex staff action leading to the Chief of Staff's decisions regarding reflagging the ten-division Army; held a conference for those museum directors affected by the changes in unit designations and locations; and supported the Army Staff in the myriad of detailed actions it has undertaken pursuant to the Chief's decision on the size and shape of the future Army.

We have been decisively engaged in the major action designed to declassify the ten million pages of operational records from the Gulf War. This mission serves as a focal point for a great deal of interest from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Executive Branch. Lt. Col. Steve Dietrich has taken charge of a special task force, which eventually will number thirty-five to forty employees working at the Skyline Building near Baileys Crossroads to scan, digitize,

redact, and clear these vast holdings. We will, of course, depend in a major way on the superb work that already has been done by Dr. Rick Morris and his Army Knowledge Network staff at Fort Leavenworth.

The Center staff was deeply involved in supporting the highly successful commemoration of the Korean War that was carried out in Washington a few short months ago. It was an honor for me to meet the hundreds of veterans with whom I spoke during the four-day event. Jeb Bennett's Museum Division went out of their way to provide interesting artifact displays for the veterans.

Dr. Ed Drea's Research and Analysis Division, with support from Production Division, and Museum Division, and Histories Division put together a great series of briefings, displays, and talks on World War II in the Pacific for the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of Defense, and the President. All three of these notables were planning to be in Hawaii for the V-J Day commemorations.

Finally, to return to my analogy of the movement to contact on the basis of a FRAGO, I want to mention that we have continued to march even as we change the manning of the Center. New this past summer to the Center were Col. Steve Wilson (Deputy Commander); Col. Clyde Jonas, replacing Tom Bowers in Histories Division; Lt. Col. Stu Kinniburgh, our new Operations Officer; and Ms. Cheryl Eddens, Security Officer. Each of them will contribute mightily to our success as we move confidently into the future.

As we drive forward, we must be mindful not only of the challenges that await us, but also of the genuine blessings that we enjoy. Clearly, our people rank at the top of our list of benefits. That is why it is hard to lose any of our team. One of the finest professionals ever to serve at the Army Center of Military History, Mr. Ralph "Tony" Johnson, passed away most unexpectedly on 17 August, leaving his family behind. Tony had been totally involved in the demanding task of establishing the DESERT STORM Declassification Team and in assisting the Army Staff in its response to Executive Order 12958, which mandates declassification of documents after twenty-five years. Those of us who were privileged to know him feel his

loss most keenly. Only forty-two years of age, Tony was an extraordinarily gifted team member and an inspiring leader. Similarly, we had only recently bid farewell to Billy Mossman, one of those truly great members of the Center team from previous years.

And still, we press on. One of the abiding notions that I live with daily and have shared with my colleagues is that the coming fiscal year is our best chance to prove conclusively that the future Army, FORCE XXI, truly needs the best history program we can collectively provide. It is critical that we pass the "So

What?" test this year. The funding cuts programed for FY 97 and beyond are severe. "Nice-to-have" programs will be deleted. We must do our utmost to ensure that future generations of students, soldiers, scholars, and national leaders are not deprived of the value we represent. In that regard, I solicit any suggestions or ideas that you may have that will enable all of us, Army-wide, to provide even better support to all of those who deserve the best we can give them. Call, write, send a FAX or e-mail. Share your thoughts with us.

## **Call for Papers**

### **Society for Military History, Sixty-third Annual Meeting**

**18-21 April 1996**

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) will host the Society for Military History's sixty-third annual meeting, 18-21 April 1996, at the Key Bridge Marriott, Rosslyn, Virginia, across the Potomac from Washington, D.C. The CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence has chosen the theme, "Intelligence and National Security in Peace, Crisis, and War." Over the next three years the United States will mark the fiftieth anniversaries of the end of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1945, President Harry Truman's creation of the Central Intelligence Group in 1946, and its transformation into the Central Intelligence Agency by the National Security Act of 1947.

CIA has declassified virtually all of the OSS papers, which have been open to researchers at the National Archives since the late 1980s. Significant groups of declassified records from the Central Intelligence Group and the early CIA, along with most of the CIA's National Intelligence Estimates on the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1985, also have been released to the National Archives. Prospective Papers—which may treat the meeting's theme in any historical period or area—include such topics as the tactical and strategic uses of intelligence, intelligence in defense policy and politics, comparative studies of intelligence services, counterintelligence operations and spy scandals, controversies between civilian and military intelligence establishments, the military's role in covert action operations, and the variety of intelligence collection methods, such as human intelligence, signal and communication intelligence, and satellite imagery.

As in the past, papers and panels on other military history subjects in any period or place—in addition to topics focusing on the meeting's theme—are welcome. Proposals should be postmarked no later than 1 November 1995.

To propose either a complete session or an individual paper, please submit: a one-page abstract for each paper; a one-page statement of session purpose for a panel; and a brief vita for each presenter, to Dr. Kevin C. Ruffner, SMH 1996 Program Coordinator, History Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. 20505. Phone (703) 351-2621, or FAX (703) 522-9280.

## Writing History for the Army A Cold War View

John L. Romjue

There are a hundred reasons why historians commit themselves to their profession: history's longer horizons, its rich diversity, its drama and romance, and the complex of keys and clues it offers to the understanding of our own time. But what is the special appeal of military history? For me, born between the two great wars, and coming of age during the great civilizational crisis of the Cold War, it was the overwhelming seriousness of the twentieth century world that drew me to military history. To have lived in any part of our century is to grasp the centrality of military power in the fate of nations. If that is so, what field of history is more demanding of our attention in our violent century than the most decisive arena of all?

Looking forward from the midcentury, we knew that the military power balance would be the force that determined our civilization's future. What did that future hold? A totalitarian world? Nuclear holocaust? Or a long, twilight struggle whose end no one could foretell, as Winston Churchill so accurately forecast in his 1946 "Iron Curtain" speech at Westminster College?

Like the outlook of many Americans of the middle generations of the twentieth century, my outlook was shaped by the Cold War. Future historians may well see that dangerous and protracted conflict now past as the crisis point of modern history, more consequential for the world even than the great world wars of our century. For as long as revolutionary Soviet power and the Cold War lasted, the threat hung over the world that a brutal totalitarian superstate, declaring its revolutionary creed to embody mankind's final stage of development, would win effective domination of the globe. Had that happened, with the West strategically disarmed and with Soviet nuclear missiles ranged to control every capital on the globe, all of humanity would have passed into a new dark age.

It was our hope—and sometimes our despairing hope—that the free and independent nations of the world could sustain the moral will and military strength to deter and ultimately to prevail over that hideous possibility. Our hope was realized. And although the

reasons why will be sorted out for many years to come, there can be no doubt that chief among the causes of the historic collapse of Communism was the recovery of American will and the reform and buildup of our armed forces in the critical era following the fall of Vietnam.

It has been my privilege to work as a historian for the U.S. Army for most of my professional career. Army historians know that it is their commission to place at the disposal of our military leadership the most accurate and insightful record of which we are capable. We must do that so that today's leaders and commanders and tomorrow's can weigh their decisions, not only against new and altered military-strategic realities, but also against what has been remembered and passed on from the experienced counsel of preparedness and war.

What questions should a historian ask? We are compelled to ask, what is the special nature of the institution that embodies American military land power? What makes it succeed or fail in battle and war and, in so doing, preserve the nation's freedom or place it in jeopardy? What is it in that institution that self-commits its members to lives of sacrifice and mortal peril? What are the best ways to prepare, mobilize, train, deploy, maneuver, and supply and sustain the manifold structure of men, weapons and weapons systems, and tactical units? What are the best training methods and training technologies? What are the leadership principles that cause soldiers to endure under conditions of maximum danger, and to succeed? And how were these elements of the fighting force developed, and how and why have they changed or not changed over the course of time? The machine of war on which our security depends—what were the internal and external causes of its readiness and unreadiness over the bicentennial of our national life—but particularly in the twentieth century? Are there lessons in that long story—the battle story and the institutional story—that should be remembered?

The United States Army was a central component of the armed and technologically advanced, resolute, and ready strength in the face of which Communist totalitarianism crumbled in the years 1989-91. The

## Editor's Journal

The number of inquiries the Center is receiving about World War II is declining, signaling that we are in the waning days of the fiftieth anniversary. Still, the commemoration generated considerable interest in that war, as well as a number of fine articles yet to appear in *Army History*. This issue includes Mark Clark's admonition to World War II veterans that it is still not too late to capture their military memoirs.

Our lead article, by Brig. Gen. Morris Boyd, examines the connection between history and doctrine—the importance of America's military leaders thinking "in time."

In his Chief's Corner, General Mountcastle calls our attention to the fact that, while our last issue was at the press, the Center lost two respected colleagues and friends. Mr. Billy Mossman succumbed to cancer on 3 July. He was laid to rest at Arlington National Cemetery. When I first arrived in 1979, Billy already was a respected fixture of the Center, and I recall him fondly. Ralph (Tony) Johnson, who passed away suddenly on 17 August, was a colleague in the same division where we prepare *Army History*, and was a friend to all. He was a valued member of our declassification effort. Both will be remembered for their pleasant manner and their professionalism.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

winning of the Cold War was made possible through the recovery and resurgence of the American armed services in the years following the strategic defeat in Vietnam. A major part of what military writer Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr., has called the "remarkable renaissance" of the U.S. armed forces was the 1970-80s modernization and reform of the Army. That period saw the greatest physical and intellectual institutional change in the United States Army since the beginning of World War II. As a historian with the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), headquartered at Fort Monroe, Virginia, I have been privileged to help bring to publication documented histories of how that happened—how the Army reformed its fighting doctrine and training and how it modernized its weaponry and fighting units in the period of recovery following the fall of Saigon.

Established on 14 June 1775, the Army is older

even than the 218-year-old republic it serves. The Army and its sister armed services are the guardian power of American liberty. In the twentieth century, it has been the U.S. Army that provided the major force that has kept free the Western democracies. If, in a small way, Army historians will have assisted Army leaders to know and to understand the Army's past, so that its readiness in peacetime deters and its will to conquer in war prevails, then we have been on the side of the angels.

*Mr. John L. Romjue, who served with the Cold War-era Army in Germany, is Chief, Historical Studies and Publications, Office of the Command Historian at headquarters, TRADOC. He is the author of The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army, and From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973-1982.*



## Reminiscences of the War

Joel Colton

*This article is derived from Dr. Joel Colton's memoir of his wartime experiences as it first appeared in Duke Magazine (July-August 1995). Professor Colton wishes to express his gratitude to Jeffrey J. Clarke, Chief Historian at the Center, for information and materials he shared with the author about the crossing at Remagen.*

### Prelude: The Bridge at Remagen

On 8 March 1945, the day after troops of the American 9th Armored Division discovered the Ludendorff railroad bridge at Remagen intact, I crossed the bridge and formed part of the small bridgehead on the east bank of the Rhine. Only a week before, the Rhine had loomed as the last formidable natural barrier to be overcome by the Western Allies before reaching the industrial heartland of Germany. To the north, the British Second and American Ninth Armies were preparing a large-scale naval and engineering operation. The Germans, as a defensive measure, had systematically blown up all forty-seven bridges spanning the river, or so they thought. On 7 March, while probing the area, a column of the First Army's 9th Armored Division—to its utter amazement—came upon the Ludendorff railroad bridge at Remagen, twenty-five miles south of Bonn, still standing undamaged. Explosives had been set, but the dynamite had failed to detonate, apparently by accident, possibly through negligence or the result of a stray bullet, certainly not because of any underground German resistance effort, as some later claimed. Radioing its find, the platoon immediately crossed the river. It was the daring overture to a historic breakthrough. First Army headquarters, with General Dwight D. Eisenhower's authorization, at once redirected all its major operating units to converge on Remagen. That day, and on the following days, troops and units moved across the bridge, delayed only by intermittent German artillery shells, severe traffic congestion, and wrecked vehicles.

The Germans, recovering from the shock of the breakthrough, soon made intensive efforts to destroy the bridge, bringing up heavy artillery to the hills on the east bank and using *Stuka* dive bombers, but without success. The American antiaircraft fire and artillery on the west bank protected it. Under cover of smoke

screens, engineers constructed two ponton bridges to aid the flow of troops and arms. Although dangerous, it was easier to go over on the first two days than on subsequent days when the German bombing efforts, the artillery shelling, and the American antiaircraft fire grew even more intense.

When I crossed the bridge in the late afternoon of 8 March, I had only shortly before joined the Counterintelligence Corps Detachment of the 78th Infantry ("Lightning") Division, which had been rushed to Remagen, my unit attached to the headquarters of its 311th Regiment. A new member of the unit, I was a young second lieutenant who, like many others, had been moved quickly into the war zone—from Christmas in New York with my wife to a perilous walk across a bridge on the drizzly March day into unknown, enemy territory. Our detachment's mission was to move forward with the troops and to screen selected prisoners of war, interrogate suspicious civilians, question displaced persons (many of them brought by the Nazis from all over Europe as forced laborers), analyze captured documents and papers, and apprehend Nazi officials (party, government, and military, including SS officers) who might be seeking to escape by blending into the confusion of the battle area.

The American bridgehead gradually widened and deepened, not without cost to our troops. The infantry fought its way north and east on the west bank of the Rhine through the deep valleys and high cliffs of the famed *Siebengeberge*, or Seven Mountain chain. It was a breathtakingly beautiful area, rich in legend and mythology, the inspiration for Teutonic folktales and Wagnerian opera. But it was not a time for sightseeing, or for thoughts of folklore or music. A graduate student in European history, I had hoped to visit the Rhineland but not under such circumstances.

Only later did I realize that we were the first troops to have crossed the Rhine in combat since Napoleon's day. The importance of the crossing itself was described and appreciated even at the time. General George C. Marshall wrote of the bridge's discovery: "Such a windfall had been hoped for but not expected." He called it one of the "turning points" of the war in Europe. General Eisenhower sent a message of congratulations: "Please tell all ranks how proud I am."

Speaker Sam Rayburn wired gratitude and congratulations—"unanimously expressed"—on behalf of Congress.

General Marshall described the discovery and the bridgehead on the east bank of the Rhine, originally a few thousand troops, as "a diversion of incalculable value," facilitating the main Rhine crossing in the north two weeks later, as planned by British and American naval and engineering units. The bridgehead ensured the Allied goal of capturing the industrial Ruhr and developed, again in Marshall's words, into "a springboard for the final offensive" against Germany that culminated in the German surrender in May. As teacher and historian, I often have wondered whether any of my students in later years ever suspected that the mild-mannered bespectacled professor lecturing to them or guiding their seminar discussions may have once been armed with a carbine, survived on field rations, and more than once took cover from enemy fire in carrying out an intelligence mission. Not exactly the groves of academe.

My wife remembers Remagen in a different way. Traveling that week in March on a New York subway to her job in Manhattan, she was so visibly shaken when reading in the *New York Times* that my unit was among those forming part of the tiny Remagen bridgehead now on the other side of the Rhine that a fellow passenger turned to ask if something was wrong. Not until the end of the war did I allow myself to describe in retrospect what it was like to be under artillery shelling and aircraft fire. At the time I wrote only: "We are going through momentous events, but some things

are best left unsaid."

There were always lighter moments in combat. There were the chickens rounded up from local farmers and roasted for us while we waited in a rear area for our turn to cross the bridge. There was the wine we found on the other side of the Rhine in the cellars of the richly appointed Muser estate (the home of the famous munitions manufacturer), which became our regimental headquarters on 10 March until we moved out to make way for division headquarters. The following week our search of the deserted Swiss consulate near Honnef yielded Suchard Swiss chocolate bars. Such for us were the small spoils of war. But it was the documents we found, the arrests we made, and the liaisons we established with the civilian population, although our contributions were small compared to the sacrifices of our infantry soldiers, that made the risks worthwhile.

Despite the German failure to make a direct hit, the bridge at Remagen was so weakened that ten days later, on 17 March, it collapsed and was never rebuilt. For a long time visitors after the war saw only the iron pilings on the west bank, without any other identifying signs. When I visited with my family in 1971, German residents in the area were reticent about the episode, but a pre-World War II photo of the bridge was available for purchase at a nearby kiosk. On the fortieth anniversary, in 1985, a plaque was dedicated to mark the crossing. In 1995, on the fiftieth anniversary, American military veterans and German officials gathered at the site to commemorate the event. Present at the reunion was the son of the German officer in command of the bridge, who had been executed as a

### **Defense Technical Information Center Conference Set**

The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) will present its Annual Users Meeting and Training Conference, 30 October-2 November 1995. The conference will be held at the Stouffer Renaissance Hotel, Arlington, Va. This year's conference will include a variety of speakers and sessions addressing the numerous types of information available to the Department of Defense community through the Internet, as well as from DTIC and other government agencies. DTIC's latest products and services will be highlighted in the exhibit area.

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traitor by a German firing squad a few days after the American crossing. Because of other commitments, I was unable to attend the fifty-year commemoration of the crossing, but a half century has not dimmed my memories of those March days.

### The Occupation

As the war in Europe drew to a close that spring and we prepared for the military occupation of Germany, I received orders in April to report to the Counterintelligence Corps Detachment of the 102d ("Ozark") Division, which had fought its way through to Gardelagen in north-central Germany, not far from the Elbe River, where, by General Eisenhower's orders, it was to draw up and meet the Russians.

To reach my new post I had to leave the combat zone in the Rhineland and travel west to a replacement depot in Verviers, Belgium, for reassignment. There I remained for over two weeks because of a delay in my transportation orders. At first the delay was not unwelcome. Like royalty and aristocracy of old, I took the baths at nearby Spa, practiced my French, and followed the progress of our continuing Allied advances via our indispensable army newspaper, *Stars and Stripes*. But all this time my mail from home was being directed to my new unit, and momentous events were taking place. I chafed at the delay.

It was at Verviers that I learned of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's death on 12 April. Sadly, he had not lived to see the war's end. That Sunday I attended a solemn memorial service conducted by the town in both French and English. There ran through my mind Walt Whitman's lines about Abraham Lincoln, which I had once memorized as a schoolboy: "I mourned, and yet shall mourn with ever returning spring...." Not without his faults, Roosevelt had been a profound inspiration for many of my generation in Depression and war.

Finally, my transportation orders arrived. I traveled for the last leg of my journey on a nearly empty French cattle train of World War I vintage—a "forty and eight, *quarante hommes et huit chevaux*"—each car designed in pre-1914 years to transport forty men and eight horses to the front. It was my personal link to the carnage of World War I.

The Germans were now surrendering en masse to the Western Allies in the Rhineland and in the Ruhr, and to the Soviets in the east, where the Russians already were occupying Berlin. It was on my cattle train traveling eastward on 8 May that I learned the news of V-E Day and the formal German surrender. I

had been traveling for thirty-six hours on the train, which seemed to move for one hour and stop for six. I thought to myself (and wrote home): "I am seated in a box car surveying beaten Germany on this all-important day." Because I was traveling virtually alone, I could not share my joy with others.

My heart quickened when I saw freight trains similar to mine traveling westward, flower-decorated and jammed with newly liberated prisoners of war, wartime forced laborers, and other displaced persons en route back to their homes. For them, the separation and anguish of the six years of the war in Europe were over. We greeted each other and exchanged V-for-Victory signs. I can still see the signs painted on the sides of the trains: "*Deutschland unter Alles!*" and, in a lighter vein, "*Cinquante Mois Privés D'Amour!*" (Fifty Months Deprived of Love!).

My real celebration of V-E Day came after I joined my new unit on 12 May in Gardelagen, northeast of Brunswick and a few miles west of the Elbe. We were invited to a victory celebration with the Russians at the Elbe. And what a celebration it was—memorable for the toasts we drank (several each to *Tovarich* Stalin, *Tovarich* Truman, and *Tovarich* Churchill!), the rousing speeches, and especially the entertainment—a stirring concert by a Red Army dance and song ensemble, climaxed by a joint effort to sing in Russian and in English, "Don't Sit Under the Apple Tree With Anyone But Me!"

We had scarcely settled in the area, I with a subdetachment of my own at Osterburg, when we had to transfer our duties to the British and move some miles to the south. Here, in Thuringia, I headed a subdetachment in Ohrdruf, a small city on the edge of the magnificent Thuringian Forest, near Gotha, within driving distance of the other historic cities of Erfurt, Jena, and Weimar (all of which in later years became part of the Soviet-dominated German Democratic Republic, the *DDR*, of unlamented memory).

It was shortly after arriving in Ohrdruf that I saw my first Nazi concentration camp, the very first to have been liberated by American troops. It had been overrun on 4 April. Ohrdruf is not as well known as Buchenwald or Dachau in Germany, or the mass death camps in Nazi-conquered Eastern Europe like Auschwitz, where prisoners were systematically put to death in gas chambers (12,000 a day in Auschwitz alone). But here too, in this smaller camp, Jews, Slavs, Gypsies, political and social prisoners classified by the Nazis as undesireables or as "*Untermenschen*," were set to work at impossibly arduous tasks with meager rations.

They collapsed and perished. Within a few days after the liberation, General Eisenhower personally visited Ohrdruf to see for himself the emaciated skeletal faces and figures of the pitiful survivors, and the mass graves of those who had died. For me, my first camp visit (I later visited others) was a wrenching sight, brutal evidence of the cruelty and bestiality of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich. Not surprisingly, the Jews were the principal victims. Hitler and the Nazis had committed themselves to an ideology of anti-Semitism for decades and, when they could, they put into practice with ruthless efficiency their program of annihilation—the "Final Solution." The heated debate among professional historians between "intentionalists" and "functionalists"—that is, as to whether the slaughter came about as a result of long-term planning or of incremental bureaucratic decisions—has always seemed to me incidental. As to those who would deny the Holocaust, their arguments fly in the face of the overwhelming eyewitness evidence of those who were in Europe at the time.

My new detachment was a congenial one. To my immense relief they accepted me, even though they had gone through many months of battle ordeal together. (It helped that I had crossed the Remagen Bridge in combat!) As with other counterintelligence units, the officers and the enlisted men came from a variety of civilian backgrounds, falling mainly into three categories: native-speaking German-born refugees whose families had fled Germany for the United States in the 1930s; those who, like myself, had some academic or professional training; and individuals with police or investigative experience. Our detachment captain, already a journalist, later became the travel editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature*. He had already been responsible for uncovering an egregious set of Nazi atrocities at Gardelagen.

Unlike most of the army, the counterintelligence detachments worked together closely with little or no distinction between officers and enlisted men. The enlisted men and noncommissioned officers were authorized to wear U.S. insignia with no indication of rank, and could be taken for civilians in uniform, which proved useful in dealing with the Germans or, on rarer occasions, with our own Army personnel on security matters. The detachment's folklore included one amusing (and embarrassing) episode. Its ebullient, red-headed sergeant, former Boston policeman Joe O'Toole, received a direct battlefield commission as second lieutenant for extraordinary leadership in combat during the advance eastward—until then with his U.S.

insignia he had hobnobbed with the field-grade majors and colonels!

To our regular personnel the detachment added others, notably a young Dutch displaced worker named Miel Maasen, who had fought in the underground resistance in the Netherlands. Maasen spoke perfect English and German. It was he who retrained a former *Gestapo* German shepherd dog, Asta, so that she too became a member of the detachment, gentle and obedient (but who could turn intimidating if called upon to play that role). Two survivors of Ohrdruf now joined us, informally attaching themselves to our unit, there being much latitude in such matters at the time. One was Leo Koch (known to all as Cookie), Munich-born, half-Catholic, half-Jewish, who had endured the war years as a forced laborer. The second was Henry Ehrenberg, of Polish-Jewish background, who had been moved from one concentration camp to another and who bore his tattooed number on his forearm. He had escaped from the camp at Ohrdruf in the last days of the fighting in the area and desperately wished now to serve with the U.S. troops. The two proved invaluable as interpreters and as liaison contacts with the local population, and the temporary arrangements proved more permanent than might have been predicted.

One shattering experience befell us that spring. We had taken into custody a suspect denounced independently by a number of local inhabitants as an informant for the *Gestapo*, responsible for a number of arrests and disappearances. But before he could be transported to Frankfurt for further questioning, he hanged himself in the attic room in which we were detaining him. For our official report, we took photographs before the body was cut down. It was a grisly experience. But I must confess also that for years after the war I carried in my wallet a print of one of those photographs, an uneasy token of my personal revenge over the Third Reich. To be sure, our suspect deserved a more judicial assessment of the evidence against him and fair judicial proceedings, but our hatred of the Nazis was so strong, intensified by the steadily accumulating evidence of the concentration camp atrocities, that we felt few qualms at the tragic episode. We hoped only that the Nuremberg Trials, about to open in November 1945, would document and punish the Nazis' crimes against their own people and against humanity. For all its imperfections, the Nuremberg Trials would set a precedent for future generations, and the procedures themselves, one could argue, represented more than merely "victors' justice."

Our mission in the occupation, which our detachment helped to carry out in its own small way in Ohrdruf and in our subsequent stations in Bavaria (at Passau) and in Baden-Württemberg in southwest Germany (at Pforzheim, Vaihingen, Weinheim, and Mannheim) was not only to continue the search for ex-Nazi activists (including SS officers), but also to work now with the military government in carrying out the Allied de-Nazification program. We were to screen prospective *Bürgermeisters*, police chiefs, and other municipal officials, teachers, journalists, etc., checking the veracity of the questionnaires (or *Fragebogen*) they were required to fill out. Tensions developed with our military government colleagues, who were primarily concerned with getting local activities back to normal, to ensure food, water, and medical supplies, transportation, the opening of schools, and the like. Anyone who could carry out these functions received their blessings. Yet, our mandate was to bar from future public activities men and women who had played an active role in the Nazi regime.

We fought a losing battle. The totalitarian controls of the Third Reich were such that almost all Germans with advanced education or technical training had become members of the party, and at a local level, even officials of the party. In some towns and villages the party officials whom we interrogated were indeed small fry. Anyone with a reasonable level of literacy or who could keep financial accounts or maintain mailing lists had become part of the local bureaucracy—*Ortsgruppenleiter*s, *Amtsleiter*s, *Kassenleiter*s, etc. Those whom we sought to reject—or even to detain under our automatic arrest instructions—had not necessarily been the most fanatical Nazis. That category was now rapidly disappearing, melting into the population in the larger cities, some even fleeing the country.

No one we spoke to in the spring of 1945 defended the regime. To the question why someone had joined the *NSDAP* the answer, almost monotonously received, was pressure—political and economic—to keep one's job, to survive in the community. "*Ich müsste*" (I had to) was the invariable response. Those who had joined before 30 January 1933, when Hitler became chancellor, and we encountered many, had a harder time with their explanations. As to atrocities, the local inhabitants in Ohrdruf and elsewhere expressed complete ignorance of the concentration camps in their area, even though the prisoners in their striped garb worked on numerous projects outside the camps.

In our weekly reports and political assessments we

generally described the population as acquiescent and docile, and as frequently expressing gratitude that the Americans had behaved toward them in a relatively humane way. Repeatedly we heard, somewhat to our annoyance, how pleased they were that we had arrived first, and not the Russians, whose behavior, as the Red Army had advanced in Eastern Europe, and especially in Berlin, had been brutal. Many of us were still too grateful for the Soviet contributions to the winning of the war to feel much sympathy for the Germans. Yet we all knew inwardly that older crimes should not be an excuse for new wrongdoings. We resented most the satisfaction that some Germans were taking at the growing rift between the Western Allies and the Soviets.

Our detachment's stay in Ohrdruf came to an end in July 1945. Thuringia was located in what had been agreed upon at Yalta and Potsdam as the Soviet occupation zone, and the British and Americans were to move south and west. As we prepared to leave Ohrdruf in a small convoy of jeeps, the question came up of what to do with Cookie and Henry, our faithful retainers, who pleaded to accompany us. I tried to argue, although only half-convinced myself, that they had nothing to fear from the Russians, but they multiplied their entreaties. Relenting at the last moment, I looked the other way, and the two left with us as part of our convoy.

We next set up shop in Passau, a small Bavarian city where the Danube is joined by the Inn and other rivers to begin its long journey to the Black Forest and then to the Black Sea. Passau is not far from Regensburg and from the Czech border, nor from Braunau, where Hitler's father had served as a customs officer. By August we were officially part of the occupation forces, no longer affiliated with a division, but a unit in a CIC region.

It was here, in August, that we learned that our aircraft had dropped an "atomic" bomb, and then a second, on Japan. Although we were now separated from any divisional affiliation, we were almost all resigned to shipment to the Pacific in the near future to take part in the last phases of the war there. Everyone expected a last-ditch suicidal stand by the Japanese when we invaded their home islands, the kind they had shown themselves capable of at Iwo Jima earlier in 1945. Any word that the Japanese government was crumbling and quietly suing for peace would have been news to us, and to many at home as well. When, in August, word came that we had dropped the atomic bombs, truth to tell, we had a strange feeling of satis-

faction. There was a sense of awe about the new weapon, but little shame, remorse, or guilt. As we saw it, the Japanese and Germans had begun the bombing of civilian populations, horrible as that was, and we had been compelled to retaliate. The new and mysterious weapon seemed only to be a more powerful one, capable of hastening the war's end, but not qualitatively or morally different from other weapons of war. Yet I did have a sense of foreboding. I wrote home at the time: "The incredible atomic bomb is so awe-inspiring and terrifying that one hardly dares to think of its implications—but please, let one of them be a shortening of the war!"

Only in later years did many of us in retrospect wonder whether the bomb might not have been dropped for demonstration purposes on some uninhabited island instead of causing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children (not to speak of the radioactive aftereffects for those who survived). But little of this troubled any of my comrades-in-arms, nor, I suspect, our families at home. Even for the gentlest among us, war blunts one's sensitivities.

The next eight months, from the end of hostilities in August 1945 to late April 1946, when I began my journey home, passed slowly. Our detachment moved from Bavaria west to Baden-Württemberg in southwest Germany, where I headed units in and near Mannheim, Pforzheim, and Stuttgart. In each case we occupied comfortable villas requisitioned from the Germans. None of us, I am ashamed now to confess, knew who the owners were or where they had gone. We lived well, with a German kitchen staff who creatively transformed our army provisions.

During my stay in the Mannheim area I witnessed the beginnings of the *Wirtschaftswunder*, the German "economic miracle." The city had been devastated by Allied bombing and had been reduced to rubble when we first saw it. But slowly and skillfully the Germans in these initial stages of reconstruction—well before the Marshall Plan—had begun rebuilding. Before I left, the reconstruction was beginning to be visible. Incredibly, the Germans also were absorbing a flood of refugees from the east, expelled by the Soviets from the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia and from East Prussia.

The time came in late April 1946 when I had accumulated enough "points" for my departure and return to civilian life. When I left Germany I had no address for either Leo Koch or Henry Ehrenberg, and all they knew about me was that I was returning to New York. But, within a year, I left New York. In 1947 my wife and I moved to Durham, North Carolina, where I

began my teaching at Duke University. In periodic research trips to Europe, beginning in 1958 when I had a Guggenheim fellowship, I made sporadic efforts to locate my wartime friends, but no systematic search. My wife knew how devoted I was to them as "my personal survivors" of the Nazis. Meanwhile, memories of the war faded. At times I wondered if I would ever see them again. Then came an unexpected chain of events.

In 1974, after many years at Durham, I returned to New York on an extended leave from Duke so that I might serve with the Rockefeller Foundation as director of its humanities program. Sometime in the late 1970s came an unexpected telephone call to our New York apartment; a heavily accented male voice asked if I were the Joel Colton who served in Germany during World War II. Not surprisingly I answered hesitantly, but in the affirmative. It was Leo Koch, who, while visiting New York, had located me in the Manhattan telephone directory. It was over thirty years since we had said goodbye in Weinheim. He now ran a leather manufacturing business, lived in Weinheim, and had a villa in Majorca. Henry Ehrenberg, he recounted (and I soon learned for myself), had become an outstandingly successful businessman. Before long Henry was in touch with me and soon arrived in New York with his wife. While we were in Passau, he reminded me, in the fall of 1945, concentration camp survivors from all over Europe were arriving in Vienna, and I had helped him to travel there to locate his sister. What I had not known was that a second survivor who had grown up in the same Polish town also had arrived on that train—and had become Henry's wife. My wife and I soon visited Knittlingen, a small town not far from Vaihingen and Stuttgart, for the first of several reunions. To my embarrassment, a framed photograph of myself in uniform hangs on a wall in his study. Before I left Germany after the war, I had established contacts for Henry with military government officials who had placed him in charge of an expropriated Nazi plant which produced equipment for the sterilization and pasteurization of dairy products. From that time on, his career had taken off.

From these modest beginnings he had built a small "stainless steel empire," manufacturing steel equipment for all kinds of products, including biochemicals, with many factories abroad, even in the United States and, after reunification in 1990, in formerly East Germany. So much a benefactor had he been to his adopted town, where he still lives and where his company is located, that one of its principal squares in the mid-

1980s was formally dedicated in his honor and re-named Henry-Ehrenberg Platz. Financially successful beyond description, an honored citizen of Knittlingen, an honorary trustee of Tübingen University, selected by the government to represent the surviving German-Jewish community at the time of Pope John Paul II's visit to Germany, he nonetheless remains haunted by the memory of the Holocaust. Could anyone of his generation, he asks, ever be comfortable in Germany, democratic and peaceful though the Federal Republic of Germany now was? His spiritual home is Israel, where one son and two daughters live with their families, and which he visits periodically. Early in 1995, as the fiftieth anniversary of Ohrdruf's liberation approached, he wrote to me, "It was for me, and for my physical welfare and good fortune, a stroke of luck that I met with a person like yourself of so much understanding and warmth after the bitter, painful times in Auschwitz, Buchenwald, and Ohrdruf. The older I become the more frequently I ask myself how it was possible for human beings to have created such an inferno."

To this day, each holiday season, a smoked salmon arrives at our home, a gift from "Haus Ehrenberg" to "Haus Colton." As to my own feelings, I have never regretted that spring day in 1945 when I "looked the other way."

My discharge papers in 1946 simply detailed my military activities in general terms: enlistment (drafted, with greetings from the President), August 1942; service in the continental United States, 1942-1944, administering intelligence and literacy tests; promotions, private to technician fourth grade (staff sergeant); military intelligence training at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, June 1944-January 1945; commissioned, October 1944; overseas service January 1945-June 1946; promotion to first lieutenant; two combat stars. What was omitted was the human dimension—being plucked from civilian life to spend four years in uniform, never one's own master, and never knowing what the next day would bring. Do I regret the four "lost" years—studies interrupted, career delayed, family life disrupted? The veteran learns, from ancient times on, that in later years no one cares who served in uniform, or in the combat zone, or indeed in combat itself. Yet, in retrospect, we can take pride and satisfaction in having been part of the cohort of men and women who served in uniform in those years.

Some fifty years ago (26 April 1945) I wrote in a letter home:

I have been reading Catherine Drinker Bowen's biography of Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, *Yankee from Olympus*. I don't think that I've come across a more morale-raising thought than this sentence by Holmes reflecting on his own three years in uniform in the American Civil War, when he was approximately my age: 'Life is action and passion. I think it is required of a man that he should share the action and passion of his time at peril of being judged not to have lived.'

It may have been easier for us in World War II to have accepted our role because the Axis—Nazism in Germany, Fascism in Italy, and militarism in Japan—were so palpably menacing to all that we cherished. Our American democracy neither was nor is perfect or complete. (The Soviets, for all their militarism, never threatened us directly in the interwar years). But we were not deceived about the threat from the Axis and the need to fight the war. What is sad is that so many in 1945 (not unlike 1919) believed that democracy and peace were safe once the Axis powers were gone. That was not to be.

No new world war erupted, but there did follow the breakup of the Western-Soviet coalition, the ensuing Cold War, the escalation of nuclear armaments of unparalleled destructive power, and new wars. Many at the opening of the twentieth century had seen that time as the inevitable continuation of an age of progress and had predicted that it would be the best century yet. How misguided and naive such predictions were. But all who helped, even in a small way, as civilians, or as civilians in uniform, to bring down the Axis tyrannies in the midpoint in our century can take pride in that accomplishment. Peace in 1945 meant that we could at least once again think of creating a better world.

*Dr. Joel Colton began teaching European history at Duke University in 1947, and chaired the Department of History from 1967 to 1974. He became professor emeritus in 1989. While on leave from Duke (1974-1981) he served as Director for Humanities, the Rockefeller Foundation, New York, N.Y. He is the author of numerous books and articles, including Leon Blum: Humanist in Politics, and, with R.R. Palmer, he coauthored the well-known college text, A History of the Modern World, which has been translated into seven languages and which is now in its eighth edition.*

## A Staff Ride at the Joint Readiness Training Center

Paul H. Herbert

As a senior observer-controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, I was challenged to provide relevant leader development training to my infantry observer-controller task force of some thirty captains and two majors. All of these officers were bright and talented and, because they spent two to two-and-a-half weeks of every month in the field "on rotation," had limited time for training. One of the teaching devices I used was the staff ride, a visit to a historic battlefield following a systematic study of the operation. While my approach to the staff ride was hardly unique, the experience confirmed in my mind the legitimacy of this leader development tool. From this experience, I can make several observations to guide others in the use of the staff ride in developing leaders for the Army of the future.

I was drawn to the staff ride for several reasons. First, my previous experience as a staff ride participant and leader in various assignments, and my background as a military history instructor at West Point, predisposed me to consider the integration of military history into our overall leader development program. Second, the fortuitous proximity of Fort Polk to the scene of Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks' Red River campaign of April 1864 afforded an opportunity that was logistically simple. I was pleased to find that the terrain is largely unchanged since the Civil War and that the battle sites have been preserved largely intact by the State of Louisiana and by private entities. Third, I thought that a staff ride could build on and utilize the skills of the observer-controllers, who are trained in the arts of tactical analysis and of the after-action review. Thus, the staff ride could serve the dual purposes of supporting our mission essential task list (METL) proficiency as well as contributing to the development of my officers for their future responsibilities.

Having decided that a staff ride was a feasible training exercise for my unit, I set about the practical matter of organizing it. I found the service of the post library at Fort Polk to be invaluable. To my very great surprise and pleasure, an enterprising reference librarian there, Mr. Freeman Schell, had recognized that persons assigned to Fort Polk likely would be interested in the Civil War, and had acquired a complete set

of the *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (OR)*. Also, the library arranged through interlibrary loan to borrow several key primary and secondary sources from nearby Northwestern State University in Natchitoches, Louisiana. Finally, the library set aside all of our acquired references on closed reserve for the duration of our exercise.

Because there was precious little time between rotations, as well as many other demands on my officers, an early start was imperative. We collected the needed references and published the staff ride directive in February 1994, but did not conduct the actual terrain walk until the following June. This interval permitted the officers to integrate successfully their research and preparation with their other activities. The organization of the staff ride followed the concepts laid out in the Center of Military History's publication, *The Staff Ride*, by William G. Robertson, which we obtained at no cost from the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The staff ride consisted of preliminary study, field study, and the integration phase. The field study was subdivided further into "stands," or stops at important sites arranged to follow the campaign chronologically.

The central purpose of this staff ride was "to train officers in the art of war by critically examining a historical military campaign in great detail," and this purpose drove all the particulars of actual execution. (1) I wanted the officers to improve their tactical and operational judgment through the vicarious experience of combat that one can achieve during a staff ride. To do this, I wanted them to analyze critically the leadership on both sides—at several key junctures in the campaign—by placing themselves as historical actors into the given situation. In this way, I hoped to convey to them the powerful dynamics of warfare, where issues such as logistics, intelligence, morale, and so forth, are not separate, but are interdependent and simultaneous influences on the opposing forces physically locked in their respective commanders' contest of wills.

Several requirements derived directly from this goal and defined our preliminary study phase. First,



the officers had to appreciate the art of the possible in 1864. I found that some selective reading in Jack Coggins' *Arms and Equipment of the Civil War* made them sufficiently familiar with weapons, organization, logistics, communications, and tactical doctrine. Second, each officer needed to comprehend the historical context of the campaign. Alvin Josephy's *The Civil War in the American West* provided two excellent chapters to fulfill this purpose. (2) Third, I wanted the officers to study from primary sources, principally the *OR*. This led to some frustration, as anyone who has worked in the *OR* will understand, but it was compensated for by the opportunity to consider the actual participants' words. Fourth, I assigned each stand to a team that consisted of one or more officers to represent each side, Union and Confederate, at that particular point.

I enjoined the officers to focus on leadership and command by asking the right questions of the sources: What was the mission? What was the situation, actual and perceived? What actions did the leaders take, if any? Why? What other choices did they have? What was the outcome of their action or inaction? Why? By addressing these questions of decisionmaking in teams, from the simultaneous and comparative perspective of each combatant, I hoped to capture some of the "force on force" dynamics of combat. Each team opened its stand by briefing what happened there as a prelude to general discussion and group analysis. This technique allowed us to feel the campaign unfold as we followed it chronologically from stand to stand on the actual ground.

It is not my purpose to recount the Red River campaign, except as may be necessary to illustrate some points about the opportunities and pitfalls of the staff ride. Because it was a campaign of relatively little consequence in the Civil War, and because Union General Banks retains a well deserved reputation for having fumbled its execution rather thoroughly, I at first feared that there might be little my officers could learn.

At first glance, the campaign seemed simple enough: General Banks set out from New Orleans, Louisiana, in the spring of 1864 to seize Shreveport, in the northwest corner of the state, by advancing up the Red River, accompanied by a flotilla of gunboats and transports under Rear Adm. David Porter. Just above Natchitoches, more than two-thirds of the distance to Shreveport, Banks' army left the immediate river bank to follow a single track road west and north through the forest. There they encountered three Confederate

divisions hastily concentrated from Arkansas and Texas and under the command of Maj. Gen. Richard Taylor. In two sharp fights at Sabine Crossroads and Pleasant Hill, the Union forces were narrowly defeated, withdrew and eventually retreated all the way to New Orleans, never to threaten Confederate Louisiana, or Texas, again. The two main battlefields, though well preserved, are very small compared to any of those most often the focus of staff rides.

As I studied the campaign as a prospective staff ride subject, my first impressions of relative infertility gave way to cautious optimism and then to enthusiasm (abetted, no doubt, by the absence of alternatives!). The campaign was rich in potential teaching points, probably the more so because it was a failure—for the Union certainly, and nearly so, ironically, for the Confederacy. While not all the teaching points could be captured in our staff ride, thinking about them helped me organize the stands, guide the preparatory efforts of my officers, and contribute to and stimulate discussion as we walked the ground. Even the brief duration and limited geographic scope of the culminating days of the campaign were a benefit, as they made feasible a very adequate field study phase in a single day.

Although the actual campaign took place over several weeks and hundreds of miles, we concentrated on the culminating days in April that led to the two decisive battles and to Banks' withdrawal. The events of those days took place from the point at Grande Ecore, Louisiana, where Banks moved his army west and away from the Red River, north to the site of the battle at Sabine Crossroads near Mansfield, Louisiana. Our first stand was along the route the Union Army took prior to any significant contact with the enemy. At this point, we discussed several major issues. (3)

First, we considered Banks' plan of campaign, discussing and critiquing his stated and apparent objectives. These are not clear today, probably because they were not entirely clear to Banks himself at the time, thus providing us with a wonderful opportunity to consider such concepts as commander's intent, strategic and operational objectives, and center of gravity. We briefly considered the lack of any formal command relationship between Banks and the commander of his naval component, Potter, and the reasons why these two men might perceive the campaign in different terms. We considered the problems of coordinating the movements of Union forces in Arkansas—also independently commanded—and the problems and opportunities that interior operational lines presented to the

Confederates. Finally, because it became such a significant factor in the later conduct of the battles, we took a detailed look at Union combat service support (CSS) arrangements.

One of our officers made the point with an excellent, detailed diagram based on original research in the *OR* that Banks' army was barely fully deployed along the road from Grande Ecore when its lead elements made contact; that it was stretched out along twenty miles of crude road with dense woods on either side; and that the bulk of that length was the trains of the various leading elements, there being no overall organization or doctrine for battlefield CSS. Here is an example of how the staff ride can serve to give us the sort of detail that makes our history come alive, while at the same time confronting us with issues of immediate relevance. As observer-controllers, we had seen time and again how inattention to the organization of a unit's CSS had frustrated execution of an otherwise good plan. To see the same phenomenon in a historical setting helps confirm the validity of one's perceptions, while providing a basis for comparison that sharpens judgment—exactly the sort of effect I intended.

Our next two stands, at Wilson's Farm and Carroll's Mill, were the scenes of relatively minor skirmishes between leading Union cavalry and covering Confederate cavalry, both casually reinforced with infantry and artillery. These were very important stands for my purposes, because they enabled us to consider the actions of commanders attempting to develop an unknown situation. This situation leads us to the twin issues of intelligence and organization of the reconnaissance effort. Such stands are tailor made for the investigation of tactical command.

Because there was very little recorded about these actual engagements, we focused on the decisions, actions, and reports of commanders senior to those engaged. At the tactical level, we investigated how one "develops" the situation. What are—and what should be—the actions a commander takes as his lead units make contact? What are the sources of friction? Were these accounted for in advance by the organization of and orders to the lead elements? We looked at intelligence at higher levels. What can initial contacts tell a commander about the enemy and how does this new information affect his decisionmaking? Did the commander anticipate probable enemy dispositions and organize his reconnaissance to confirm or to refute them, or did he just stumble into the enemy? In this instance, it appears that Banks did not envision where he might encounter the enemy and did not expect more

from his lead cavalry than security.

The Confederate perspective was no less instructive as we considered the delay mission executed by Brig. Gen. Hamilton Bee's cavalry. Here, understanding of intent, organization of terrain, innovative tactics, and an excellent, even audacious, sense of timing were the key factors. I believe that the situation of two forces in motion making initial contact with each other is one of immense instructional value in the development of tactical and operational leaders, and in the Civil War *OR* we have nearly complete records of both sides in the same language. This situation is ideally suited to the comparative situational decision-making model of conducting a staff ride described earlier.

Our longest stand, and the centerpiece of our staff ride, was at the scene of the battle of Sabine Crossroads (or Mansfield), now a Louisiana State Commemorative Area. I had arranged for the park historian, Mr. Scott Dearman, to accompany us as a participant and resident expert, and his services were invaluable. I made it clear, however, that I did not want him to serve as a tour guide. I have experienced so-called staff rides where the military officers nearly are passive players, escorted about the battlefield by a historian who may or may not fully appreciate the learning objectives of such a group. While time and circumstance may necessitate such tours on occasion—and they have merit—officers gain the most from their own research and analysis. Park historians can add immeasurable value to the experience by confirming or challenging officer conclusions, contributing points of fact and detail that add realism and color, and by otherwise participating with the group as resident experts, but they should not be enlisted as tour guides.

On the battlefield itself, General Taylor drew up his three divisions astride the road leading north to Mansfield so as to confront the Union army. The site chosen was one of the few clearings along the route. Taylor arranged his forces in an "L" shape in the wood lines on the northern side of the clearing, facing the reverse slope of a gentle east-west ridge line called Honeycutt Hill, which the Union army had to cross as it moved north. The Union forces detected the Confederate positions and began to organize their line of battle along this ridge. Before they could complete their deployment, however, the Confederates attacked, first on the Union right with Brig. Gen. Alfred Mouton's division, and then generally all along the line. The result was a double envelopment of the leading third of Banks' army (two divisions of Brig. Gen. Thomas E.G. Ransom's XIII Corps) and its pursuit off the battle-

field. Banks was not able to reinforce his units in contact because of the congestion along the single road created by the long line of wagon trains. Panic ensued when assaulting Confederate infantry reached these men, and the Union forces generally fled some fourteen miles south to the village of Pleasant Hill.

As with any major engagement, a vast number of issues can be studied about this battle. The team assigned the stand did an excellent job of capturing the more salient points. Probably the richest discussion of the day centered around the question of commander's intent. We asked ourselves what Taylor intended by selecting this particular site, allowing the Union army to deploy for two hours, and then launching the attack at the time and in the manner he did. General Taylor, of course, has not answered this question in the documents and, therefore, much must be carefully coaxed from the available evidence. Although this is the historian's craft, it also is highly instructive to the professional officer, and is the sort of experience where the historian and the soldier both can benefit.

The evidence that a staff ride offers is in the terrain, and this is a factor that must be considered on site for one truly to appreciate the probable minds of the commanders. To this end, two points are important. First, military or U.S. Geological Survey topographical maps help tremendously in confirming historical locations, by allowing one to compare with historical maps. Second, as is the case at Mansfield, historical vegetation patterns often have changed dramatically and must be identified for staff ride participants to appreciate cover, concealment, intervisibility, trafficability, and fields of fire. These are important considerations for the preliminary study phase, as well as a potential service to a local park historian.

Our stands next followed the retreating Union and pursuing Confederate forces back along the route by which they (and we) had advanced in the morning. The Confederate assault at Sabine Crossroads took place at about 1600, and so the resulting pursuit occurred in the fading light of 8 April. We convened a stand at a spot called Pleasant Grove, some two miles south of the main battlefield, where Brig. Gen. William H. Emory's 1st Division, XIXth Corps, was able to form a line of battle and check the Confederate pursuit, buying time for the Union commanders to gain control of their fractured and demoralized forces. Here a number of issues allowed our group to feel the dynamics of combat.

From the Confederate perspective, we considered whether a pursuit actually had been intended or or-

dered, or simply resulted from initial momentum gained and the desire of zealous, successful frontline commanders and soldiers to keep an enemy on the run. It appears that it was the latter. We identified five factors that most likely ground the pursuit to a halt: the terrain did not lend itself to rapid chase, because the only road was congested with now captured Union trains; the Confederates lost control of many of their forward elements, as the soldiers stopped to loot the trains; there was no resupply of water; daylight was fading; and, of course, some Union forces resisted. That Taylor appears not to have anticipated the magnitude of his success by organizing an immediately available pursuit force bears on his original intent discussed earlier. It is this sort of example that adds the very real friction of war to the officer's doctrinal repertoire, and makes military history on location so instructive. General Emory's Union soldiers at Pleasant Grove must get very high marks for courage and steadiness under the worst of conditions. He and his brigade commanders left us an excellent, firsthand account of their withdrawal under pressure and clandestine disengagement. (4)

The trail element in General Banks' long column was the XVI Corps under Maj. Gen. A.J. Smith. (5) Hearing the sound of battle to his front on 8 April, he moved into position at the village of Pleasant Hill, a piece of high ground dominating the road junction where the trail back to Grande Ecore met the north-leading road on which the Union army had advanced. He thus provided Banks with an organized force on which to fall back and organize a defense. This is what took place on the night of 8 April, setting up the battle of Pleasant Hill on 9 April, our next stand.

The battle of Pleasant Hill was much less a set piece affair than had been the battle at Sabine Crossroads. The undulating terrain, patchwork of woods and fields, and the village itself, made for a very dissected battlefield. Neither force was ready when the engagement began at 1500 on 9 April. Many Union soldiers were still straggling into position from the previous day's disaster, and elements of the XVI and XIX Army Corps were intermingled. The Confederates were in little better shape, the two assaulting divisions having conducted a forced march from north of Mansfield during the night. (6) The resulting battle was loosely coordinated and became a melee of vicious small unit actions on both sides. The Confederates, despite a desperate attempt and heavy casualties, neither seized the road junction nor destroyed the Union force and so broke off the fight that night, exhausted, to regroup. To

their considerable surprise, Banks negated the prospect of a battle the following day by ordering a general retreat during the night back to Grande Ecore, leaving many of his dead and wounded on the field.

Once again, the battle provided more teaching points than could easily be covered in a staff ride. The most valuable lessons in this stand involved small unit actions and the generalship of Nathaniel Banks in making the decision to withdraw. To the degree that the Confederates were able to mount a coordinated attack on the Union position, it was during an attempted envelopment of the Union left flank by a division under Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Churchill. This command became misdirected in the dense undergrowth, and turned too early toward what they presumed was an open Union left flank. Although they overran an isolated Union brigade, they emerged from the woods in front of Union troops and were themselves taken under enfilading fire, counterattacked in flank, and driven from the field. This action appears to have been at the initiative of Col. William F. Lynch, commanding the 1st Brigade, 3d Division, of A.J. Smith's corps, luckily posted far to the Union left. Meanwhile, on the other side of the battlefield, what amounted to a Confederate supporting attack overran the forward Union elements, causing the 32d Iowa Infantry Regiment, under Col. John Scott, to be surrounded and forced to make its way back to Union lines by moving with the Confederate attack. Such actions bring the real fog and friction of the battlefield into the participants' study of leadership, and provide inspiration as well as instruction.

As night settled on the battlefield, the Confederates withdrew six miles north to regroup and to consider their options. General Banks elected almost immediately to retreat to Grande Ecore. This sort of situation presents an outstanding opportunity, because both the Confederate and Union decisions can be analyzed and critiqued in the light of available evidence concerning the situation both commanders faced. In retrospect, Banks' reasons do not seem compelling.

In his report to Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, recently appointed commanding general of the Union armies, Banks cited the extent of casualties, lack of water, his inability to communicate with Porter's fleet, and the belief that he lacked the relative combat power to continue his advance toward Shreveport. (7) These factors should not have blinded him to the advantage he now held, however. He was in possession of the battlefield. The Confederates had, at least temporarily, exhausted their available combat formations. He had

relatively fresh troops in the commands of A.J. Smith and Brig. Gen. T. Kilby Smith's provisional division still embarked on Porter's flotilla. His subordinate commanders seemed to expect exploiting their advantage with a pursuit the next morning. That Banks could not bring himself to order anything of the kind underscores several continuing themes in his generalship of this campaign.

Banks' intelligence and reconnaissance were poor, probably because Banks himself did not think about his enemy very much, and so did not demand information. He did not know the enemy's situation. He was unable to overcome logistical difficulties such as the shortage of water, rations and ammunition, and the encumbrance of large numbers of dead and wounded, because he had given little thought to the organizational details of sustaining his forces in the field. Although he showed personal courage on more than one occasion on the battlefield, he seemed to lack the warrior's instinct for taking the fight to the enemy.

In fairness, several external factors weighed on Banks that are highly instructive for illustrating the difference in perspective between the operational commander that he was and his subordinates occupying the tactical level. He had a fast-approaching suspense date for releasing A.J. Smith's corps back to Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's command at Vicksburg, Mississippi; he knew the water in the Red River was falling, thus threatening the fleet with capture and making the problem of sustaining his force at Shreveport—should he get there—problematic; and he had been ordered by an impatient General Grant to complete his expedition by 30 April, even if it meant giving up the objective. These circumstances cannot excuse Banks, however, because they clearly were foreseeable and should have been fully considered in his decision to launch the expedition in the first place. He committed his forces, not on the basis of a deliberately accepted risk, but on wishful optimism, and then lacked both the technical competence and tenacity to prevail over the enemy. That many soldiers died as a result is a powerful condemnation. Such insights help young officers grasp some of the essentials of generalship, made all the more clear by a negative example. (8)

Our final stop was back at Grande Ecore. The entrenched position Banks occupied for another ten days on a bluff above the Red River is still very visible in the largely undeveloped land. We gathered at a vantage point above the river not far from where Banks' headquarters probably sat, and conducted what Dr. William G. Robertson called the "integration phase,"

and what observer-controllers would know as the after-action review. It was a retrospective summing up of what we had individually and collectively gained from our experience on the battlefields. The lessons for each officer were many: leadership, generalship, logistics, intelligence, campaign planning, joint operations, discipline and training of troops, audacity, combined arms, perseverance, as well as other issues. An equally important number of issues, not explored in this essay, await future staff riders of the Red River campaign.

It seems fitting, then, to make some brief observations about the staff ride as a leader-development tool in a military unit. The staff ride can be a great training multiplier. It takes some planning and organization, but the doctrine for all of that is available in Dr. Robertson's staff ride book (CMH Pub 70-21) in readily usable form. With a little imagination, a staff ride can be tailored to a particular unit's needs. (9) Because staff rides may be viewed by some participants as an extra-curricular activity distracting from the primary mission, they should be relevant, fun, and fairly painless, but without transferring the burden for professional growth away from the participant. The leader can help tremendously by carefully arranging the source material and by directing the preliminary study phase to avoid wasted time. Staff rides can include very valuable public relations opportunities, but these should not become the proverbial dog-and-

pony show that distracts from the objective, which is learning.

Perhaps the most cogent lessons I took away from the experience were those about the profession of arms and how to develop those who follow it. First, past military operations involving thousands of soldiers and sailors cannot fail to be valuable learning experiences, if properly approached. No matter that they may not be the best known or most studied, or may not have involved any of our legendary great soldiers. Second, the 10,000 or so Americans of both sides who died for cause and country in the failed Red River campaign make even the hard-scrabble pinewoods of western Louisiana hallowed ground, and profoundly underscore the moral imperative of competence in our chosen profession. Few training techniques can underscore these points as clearly or profoundly as the well-conducted staff ride.

*Lt. Col. Paul H. Herbert is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College, and holds a Ph.D. in history from the Ohio State University. Colonel Herbert is the author of Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations (Leavenworth papers, no. 16).*

## Notes

1. Memo, Paul H. Herbert to All Officers, Task Force 1, sub: Staff Ride, 14 June 1994, 18 Feb 94.
2. In addition to the *OR*, other titles in our preliminary study phase included Norman D. Brown, ed., *Journey to Pleasant Hill: The Letters of Captain Elijah Petty*; Ludwell Johnson, *Red River Campaign*; John D. Winters, *The Civil War in Louisiana*; and Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. 4, *Retreat with Honor*.
3. Throughout this paper, I use current doctrinal terms to describe actions that took place in 1864. One must be careful of the inherent tendency in a staff ride to impose modern doctrine on historical events, which is why the preliminary study phase must establish a baseline knowledge among the participants of the historical art of the possible. With this caveat in mind, the historical action can be of tremendous value in sharpening our judgment about our own doctrine.
4. See rpts of Brig. Gens. William H. Emory, James W. MacMillan, and William Dwight (nos. 60, 68, and 69

respectively) in *OR*, series 1, part 34, vol. 1, pp. 389-424.

5. XVI Army Corps was on loan to Banks from Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's Army of the Tennessee at Vicksburg, Mississippi, and was due to be returned to Sherman not later than April.

6. The two divisions were Churchill's and Walker's. They were held back from the action at Sabine Crossroads until too late by Lt. Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, [ed: not to be confused with Union Gen. T. Kilby Smith, mentioned in text] Taylor's superior, illustrating the interior lines dilemma Smith faced by the simultaneous but uncoordinated advance of Union General Steele's force south from Arkansas. Released to Taylor's control late on 8 April, these divisions made a hard march of forty or so miles to be at Pleasant Hill on 9 April. The timing of their release was one of several disagreements that were sources of acrimony between Taylor and Smith for the remainder of the war and afterwards.

7. N.P. Banks to Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant, 13 Apr 64, *OR*, series 1, part 34, vol. 1, pp. 181-85.

8. My officers were quick to conclude from this critique that Banks' failure can be attributed to his status as a "political" general, unschooled in the profession of arms. This judgment, of course, overlooks the many instances in our history of citizen soldiers mastering command very successfully. The issue

provides the opportunity to discuss the duality in our army of professionalism and militia roots, and to emphasize that competence, however gained, is the issue.

9. I have conducted staff rides for soldiers and sergeants, faculty members, combat leaders, Reserve Component officers, and advisers in a Readiness Group.

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## Native Americans in World War II

Thomas D. Morgan

In 1936, President Franklin D. Roosevelt said, "This generation has a rendezvous with destiny." When Roosevelt said that he had no idea of how much World War II would make his prophecy ring true. More than fifty years later, Americans are remembering the sacrifices of that generation, which took up arms in defense of the nation. Part of that generation was a neglected minority, Native American Indians, who flocked to the colors in defense of their country. No group that participated in World War II made a greater per capita contribution, and no group was changed more by the war. As part of the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of World War II, it is fitting for the nation to recall the contributions of its own "first citizens."

### The Vanishing American

At the time of Christopher Columbus' arrival in the New World, the Native American population living in what is now the United States was estimated at about one million. By 1880, only 250,000 Indians remained and this gave rise to the "Vanishing American" theory. By 1940, this population had risen to about 350,000. During World War II more than 44,000 Native Americans saw military service. They served on all fronts in the conflict and were honored by receiving numerous Purple Hearts, Air Medals, Distinguished Flying Crosses, Bronze Stars, Silver Stars, Distinguished Service Crosses, and three Congressional Medals of Honor. Indian participation in World War II was so extensive that it later became part of American folklore and popular culture.

### The Warrior Image

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor seemed to

waken an ancestral warrior spirit in many Native Americans. Thousands of young Indians went into the armed forces or to work in the war production plants that abruptly emerged during military and industrial mobilization. A 1942 survey indicated that 40 percent more Native Americans voluntarily enlisted than had been drafted. Lt. Ernest Childers (Creek), Lt. Jack Montgomery (Cherokee), and Lt. Van Barfoot (Choctaw)—all of the famed 45th "Thunderbird" Infantry Division—won Medals of Honor in Europe. Childers had first distinguished himself in Sicily, where he received a battlefield commission. Later in Italy, unaided and despite severe wounds, he destroyed three German machine gun emplacements. During the Anzio Campaign in Italy, Montgomery attacked a German strongpoint single-handed, killing eleven of the enemy and taking thirty-three prisoners. During the breakout from Anzio to Rome, Barfoot knocked out two machine gun nests and captured seventeen prisoners. Subsequently, he defeated three German tanks and carried two wounded men to safety. All of these exploits reinforced the "warrior" image in the American mind. Maj. Gen. Clarence Tinker, an Osage and a career pilot, was the highest ranking Indian in the armed forces at the beginning of the war. He died leading a flight of bombers in the Pacific during the Battle of Midway. Joseph J. "Jocko" Clark, the first Indian (Cherokee) to graduate from Annapolis, participated in carrier battles in the Pacific and became an admiral. Brumett Echohawk (Pawnee), a renowned expert in hand-to-hand combat, trained commandos.

### A Tradition as Fighters

The Iroquois Confederacy, having declared war on Germany in 1917, had never made peace and so auto-

matically became party to World War II. The Navajo and other tribes were so eager to go to war that they stood for hours in bad weather to sign their draft cards, while others carried their own rifles so they would be ready for battle when they joined up. Unwilling to wait for their draft numbers, one-fourth of the Mescalero Apaches in New Mexico enlisted. Nearly all the able-bodied Chippewas at the Grand Portage Reservation enlisted. In a story that has been attributed to many other tribes as well, Blackfeet Indians mocked the need for a conscription bill. "Since when," their members cried, "has it been necessary for Blackfeet to draw lots to fight?"

The annual enlistment for Native Americans jumped from 7,500 in the summer of 1942 to 22,000 at the beginning of 1945. According to the Selective Service in 1942, at least 99 percent of all eligible Indians, healthy males aged 21 to 44, had registered for the draft. War Department officials maintained that if the entire population had enlisted in the same proportion as Indians, the response would have rendered Selective Service unnecessary. The overwhelming majority of Indians welcomed the opportunity to serve. On Pearl Harbor Day, there were 5,000 Indians in the military. By the end of the war, 24,521 reservation Indians, exclusive of officers, and another 20,000 off-reservation Indians had served. The combined figure of 44,500 was more than ten percent of the Native American population during the war years. This represented one-third of all able-bodied Indian men from 18 to 50 years of age. In some tribes, the percentage of men in the military reached as high as 70 percent. Also, several hundred Indian women served in the WACS, WAVES, and Army Nurse Corps.

### The "Chiefs" Go to War

In spite of years of inefficient and often corrupt bureaucratic management of Indian affairs, Native Americans stood ready to fight the "white man's war." American Indians overcame past disappointment, resentment, and suspicion to respond to their nation's need in World War II. It was a grand show of loyalty on the part of Native Americans and many Indian recruits were affectionately called "chiefs." Native Americans responded to America's call for soldiers because they understood the need to defend one's own land, and they understood fundamental concepts of fighting for life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.

Even the clannish Pueblo tribe, whose members exhibited a historical suspicion of the white world,

contributed 213 men, 10 percent of their population of 2,205, to the armed forces. Wisconsin Chippewas at the Lac Orelles Reservation contributed 100 men from a population of 1,700. Nearly all the able-bodied Chippewas at the Grand Portage Reservation enlisted. Blackfeet Indians enlisted in droves. Navajo Indians responded by sending 3,600 into military service; 300 lost their lives. Many volunteered from the Fort Peck Sioux-Assinibois Reservation in Montana, the descendants of the Indians that defeated Custer. The Iroquois took it as an insult to be called up under compulsion. They passed their own draft act and sent their young braves into National Guard units.

There were many disappointments as well-intentioned Indians were rejected for the draft. Years of poverty, illiteracy, ill-health, and general bureaucratic neglect had taken its toll. A Chippewa Indian was furious when rejected because he had no teeth. "I don't want to bite 'em," he said, "I just want to shoot 'em!" Another Indian, rejected for being too fat to run, said that he had not come to run, but to fight.

### The *Swastika* Shadow Over Native Americans

World War II signalled a major break from the past and offered unparalleled opportunities for Indians to compete in the white man's world. Because the Choctaw language had befuddled German code-breakers in World War I, the German government feared the likelihood of Indian communications specialists as World War II loomed. During the 1930s, Nazi agents posing as anthropologists and writers on reservations tried to subvert some Indian tribes and learn their language. Pan-Nazi agitators from the German-American Bund tried to persuade Indians not to register for the draft. Third Reich Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels predicted Indians would revolt rather than fight Germany because the *Swastika* was similar to an Indian mystical bird symbol depicting good luck.

Goebbels went so far as to declare the Sioux to be "Aryans," but the Indians knew that as a Mongoloid race, they would be enslaved by the Nazis. Fascist attempts to convert Indians to their cause not only met with failure, but it may have encouraged Indians to register for the draft in the large numbers they did. About 20 percent of the Indian population, 80,000 men and women, marched off to fight in the armed forces and at the home front against Adolph Hitler, a man they called, "he who smells his moustache." Benito Mussolini fared little better, as the Indians called him "Gourd Chin."



*Dan Waupoose, a Menominee chief, posed in 1943 with rifle and headdress for a U.S. Navy photograph. (Photo credit: National Archives, 80-G-153531), copy in author's files.*

Indians saw the Axis Powers as a threat to their liberty, and the Indian tribes responded patriotically. The Chippewa and Sioux joined the Iroquois in declaring war on the Axis. Indians took extreme measures to get into the war. Illiterate Papago Indians memorized a few English phrases and learned to write their names when called to the induction centers. The Navajo, also rejected in large numbers for not speaking English, were extremely determined to serve. They organized remedial English training on their reservations to qualify for service in the armed forces.

The draft created a structure within which Indians and whites had to operate together for the defense of their country. The draft set Indians on a new course where they would be integrated into military life with their white counterparts. Their lives and their land-based society would never be the same. The Indians' success in weakening racial barriers in the armed forces during World War II presaged the rise of the Civil Rights movement later.

### **The Home Front**

Well-known American humorist Will Rogers, a Cherokee from Oklahoma, said, "The United States never broke a treaty with a foreign government and

never kept one with the Indians." Nevertheless, the government of the United States found no more loyal citizens than their own "first Americans." When President Roosevelt mobilized the country and declared war on the Axis Powers, it seemed as if he spoke to each citizen individually. Therefore, according to the Indians' way of perceiving, all must be allowed to participate. About 40,000 Indian men and women, aged 18 to 50, left reservations for the first time to find jobs in defense industries. This migration led to new vocational skills and increased cultural sophistication and awareness in dealings with non-Indians.

The purchase of Treasury Stamps and Bonds by Indian tribes and individuals was considerable. By 1944, war bond sales to Indians had reached \$50 million. Indians also made generous donations to the Red Cross and other organizations, giving what they had. All of this from a minority group at the bottom rung of the economic ladder.

Some 2,500 Navajos helped construct the Fort Wingate Ordnance Depot in New Mexico, and Pueblo Indians helped build the Naval Supply Depot in Utah. Because of their hunting, survival, and navigational skills in the harsh regions of the north, Alaskan Indians were involved in territorial defense. The entire football



team at the Santa Fe Indian School volunteered for the armed forces after the 1942 homecoming game.

Women took over traditional men's duties on the reservation, manning fire lookout stations, and becoming mechanics, lumberjacks, farmers, and delivery personnel. Indian women, although reluctant to leave the reservation, worked as welders in aircraft plants. Many Indian women gave their time as volunteers for American Women's Volunteer Service, Red Cross, and Civil Defense. They also tended livestock, grew victory gardens, canned food, and sewed uniforms. A wealthy Kiowa woman in Oklahoma sent a \$1,000 check to the Navy Relief signed with her thumbprint. Alaskan women trapped animals to earn war bond money. By 1943, the YWCA (Young Women's Christian Association) estimated that 12,000 young Indian women had left the reservation to work in defense industries. By 1945, an estimated 150,000 Native Americans had directly participated in industrial, agricultural, and military aspects of the American war effort.

The Indian Service sent 1,119 of its 7,000 employees into military service. Of these, 22 died, while 7 won Silver or Bronze Stars. In 1942, the Japanese captured 45 Aleuts on Attu. Only 24 returned from captivity in Japan, where they had worked in clay pits.

The federal government designated some Indian lands and even tribes themselves as essential natural resources, appropriating tribal minerals, lumber, and lands for the war effort. After the war, Native Americans discovered that their service for the war effort had depleted their resources without reward. Indian lands provided essential war materials such as oil, gas, lead, zinc, copper, vanadium, asbestos, gypsum, and coal. The Manhattan Project used Navajo helium in New Mexico to make the atomic bomb. The war effort depleted the Blackfeet's tribal resources of oil.

### **Tell it to the Marines**

German soldiers during World War I had been befuddled by Indians who transmitted messages over field phones in the Choctaw language. The 32d Infantry Division, Third Army, used Indians from Michigan and Wisconsin to work with microphones and to transmit messages in the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1940. During World War II, the U.S. Marine Corps recruited Navajo Indians for the same purpose. Navajo marines used their language as a battlefield code that the Japanese never broke. The Navajo Code Talkers became the most celebrated and publicized of the radio units.

Marines were "elite" fighters and welcomed Indi-

ans because of their warrior reputation. The Navajo marines ended their ceremonial chants by singing the Marine Corps Hymn in Navajo. Their eloquence came naturally to Indians because theirs is an oral culture. Navajos formed special all-Navajo Marine Corps signal units that encoded messages in their native tongue. Taking advantage of the flexibility and range of the Navajo language, they worked out translations of military and naval terms so that orders and instructions could be transmitted by voice over the radio in a code the Japanese were never able to break. They were used first in late 1942 on Guadalcanal. Special Code Talker units were eventually assigned to each of the Marine Corps' six Pacific divisions. By war's end, over 400 Navajo had served as Code Talkers. Untold numbers of Marines owe their lives to the Navajo Code Talkers.

Indians also excelled at basic training. Maj. Lee Gilstrap of Oklahoma, who trained 2,000 Native Americans at his post, said, "The Indian is the best damn soldier in the Army." Their talents included bayonet fighting, marksmanship, scouting, and patrolling. Native Americans took to commando training; after all, their ancestors invented it. One Sioux soldier, Kenneth Scisson of South Dakota, became an American commando unit's leading German-killer. On a single patrol, Scisson added ten notches to his Garand rifle. Native Americans endured thirst and lack of food better than the average soldier. They had an acute sense of perception and excellent endurance, along with superior physical coordination.

Indians first saw action in the Pacific theater. Over 300 Indians, including a descendant of the famed Apache chief Geronimo, took part in the defense of Bataan and Corregidor. Over 2,000 Indian farmers, workers, and businessmen in Oklahoma and New Mexico trained and fought as part of the 45th Infantry Division for 511 days of combat in Italy and Central Europe. The "Thunderbirds" had the highest proportion of Indian soldiers of any division, but Indians served conspicuously in the 4th and 88th Divisions, the 19th and 180th Infantry Regiments, and the 147th Field Artillery Regiment, and in sundry Oklahoma National Guard units.

For Native Americans, World War II signalled a major break from the past. Many Indians in the military made a decent living for the first time in their lives. By 1944, the average Indian's annual income was \$2,500, up two and one-half times since 1940. Military life provided a steady job, money, status, and a taste of the white man's world. Indians learned assertiveness they could use in their fight for equal rights after the war.

### The Warriors and War Workers Return

The war, therefore, provided new opportunities for American Indians, and these opportunities disrupted old patterns. The wartime economy and military service took thousands of Indians away from the reservations. Many of these Indians settled into the mainstream, adapting permanently to the cities and to a non-Indian way of life. Moreover, thousands returned to the reservation even after they had proved themselves capable of making the adjustment to white America. Those who left traditional cultures did not necessarily reject their heritage. Instead, they forged a new Pan-Indian identity to cope with the differences they perceived between themselves and whites.

World War II became a turning point for both Indians and Caucasians because its impact on each was so great and different. Whites believed that World War II had completed the process of Indian integration into mainstream American society. Large numbers of Indians, on the other hand, saw for the first time the non-Indian world at close range. It both attracted and repelled them. The positive aspects included a higher standard of living, with education, health care, and job opportunities. The negatives were the lessening of tribal influence and the threat of forfeiting the security of the reservation. Indians did not want equality with whites at the price of losing group identification. In sum, the war caused the greatest change in Indian life

since the beginning of the reservation era and taught Native Americans they could aspire to walk successfully in two worlds.

A good deal of credit must go to the Native Americans for their outstanding part in America's victory in World War II. They sacrificed more than most—both individually and as a group. They left the land they knew to travel to strange places, where people did not always understand their ways. They had to forego the dances and rituals that were an important part of their life. They had to learn to work under non-Indian supervisors in situations that were wholly new to them. It was a tremendously difficult adjustment; more than for white America, which had known modern war and mobilization before. But in the process, Native Americans became Indian-Americans, not just American Indians.

*Lt. Col. Thomas D. Morgan, USA (Ret.), is a military operations analyst at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, with a leading defense contractor. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he was commissioned in the Field Artillery, and served on active duty at various assignments in the United States, Germany, Vietnam, Panama, and Belgium. He holds an M.P.A. degree from the University of Missouri and an M.A. degree in History from Pacific Lutheran University.*

### Chronology

1918 - Iroquois Indians declare war on Germany. Since they were not included in the 1919 Peace Treaty, they simply renewed their Declaration of War in 1941 and included Italy and Japan.

1919 - Indian soldiers and sailors receive citizenship.

1924 -The Snyder Act grants full citizenship to all American Indians.

1938 -Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) estimates number of potential registrants for a draft in case of war.

1939 - BIA updates male Indian age groups.

Jun 1940-The Navajo tribe announces that any un-American activity among its people will be dealt with severely.

Aug 1940- BIA Commissioner John Collier meets with

Selective Service representatives to determine how to register Indians.

Sep 1940- Congress passes Selective Service Act.

Oct 1940 - Congress passes Nationalities Act granting citizenship to all Native Americans without impairing tribal authority.

- For the first time, American Indians register for the draft.

Jan 1941- The Fourth Signal Company recruits thirty Oklahoma Comanche Indians to be part of a special Signal Corps Detachment.

Oct 1940- The armed forces have inducted 1,785 Native Americans.

Dec 1941- There are 5,000 Native Americans in the

armed forces when Japanese forces attack Pearl Harbor.

Jan 1942 - According to Selective Service officials, 99 percent of all eligible Native Americans had registered for the draft. This ration set the national standard for the nation.

Jan 1942 - The Navajo Tribal Council calls a special convention to dramatize their support for the war effort; 50,000 attend.

Jul 1942 - The Six Nations (Mohawks, Oneida, Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, 1942 and Iroquois) declare war on the Axis Powers.

1942-1943- The Army Air Corps runs a literacy program in Atlantic City, N.J., for native Americans who could not meet military literacy standards.

Apr 1943- Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes announces that Indians have bought \$12.6 million in war bonds.

1944 - Over 46,000 Indian men and women have left their reservations for defense-related jobs.

Nov 1944- Fifty tribes establish the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) in Denver, Colorado.

Jan 1945- John Collier resigns as Indian Commissioner after years of political controversy.

1946 - The Truman Commission on Civil Rights urges more humanitarian consideration for Native Americans.

-Indian Claims Commission Act created by Congress to adjudicate Indian land claims in the aftermath of WWII.

1947 - Army Indian Scouts discontinued as a separate element of the U.S. armed forces. They had last been used on border patrol duties.

1957 - Utah becomes the last state to permit Indians to vote.

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## Military Memoirs of World War II It is Not Too Late to Write One

Mark Edmond Clark

The years 1991-95 have marked the fiftieth anniversary of World War II for Americans. Around the nation, private organizations, various associations, and agencies of government at all levels have commemorated the occasion. This has been true especially for the Department of Defense and the armed services. During these years, many military historians have offered new works on this period of American and world history. Articles recounting battles, great and small, and other notable events and personalities have been provided. Some journals and other periodicals have placed special features in their issues for 1991-95, such as *Army History's* "World War II Chronology."

For many researchers, an ideal source of information on the war has been the many military memoirs that have been provided over the past fifty years by veterans. Good military memoirs provide both interesting and informative accounts of events. Many even offer instruction for professional soldiers. Nevertheless, this appreciation for military memoirs is certainly not unanimous. Some historians consider a great number of the military memoirs which have been produced to be of little value. Indeed, memoirs that have been written two decades or more after the war's end can expect to receive a very wary reception. However, one should not be biased against more recent memoir efforts. Such works by our veterans should be greatly encouraged, rather than ignored.

Perhaps one of the strongest negative perspectives on the writing of post-World War II military memoirs was put forth by Douglas Southall Freeman (1886-1953). Freeman was considered to be one of the great military biographers of his time. In his introduction to Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.'s *War as I Knew It*, he wrote:

About 1960, Americans may expect more deliberate works of a character similar to the memoirs of Grant, of Sherman, and of Sheridan. Some of these future volumes will be more accurate historically than the military autobiographies issued immediately after the war. Gain in this respect may be offset by the failures of memory and by the treacherous and

irradicable [*sic*] impulse of a certain type of mind to read into the planning of military operations a purpose that could not have been foreseen. After 1965 or 1970 glamour will begin to envelop memoirs. Few will be valuable; most of them will deceive more than they will enlighten. (1)

Freeman's comments certainly deserve consideration. However, a brief review of the nature of military memoirs published since he made his observation greatly weakens his argument or similar ones.

Memoir writers use many resources. Memory is a primary one. Memories of events can sometimes overwhelm one with the power to evoke a vivid past that virtually displaces the present moment. Yet, regardless of when a memory is evoked, the individual is much more likely to remember only the outline of an event, or one's general feelings, and a few small details. Great effort must be made to fill the gaps. Further, whatever is remembered must be included in the memoir. Military memoir writers whose works have been published after 1965 have had success in using memory alone when writing about their wartime experiences.

General Douglas MacArthur is said to have completed his memoir, *Reminiscences*, published in 1964, on pad after pad of legal size paper. (2) The manuscript is rather remarkable in that there are almost no erasures or deletions. (3) The prose flowed from him in an even, immutable stream. (4) His book has provided great insight into his leadership and his capabilities. Beyond the military memoirs of such great commanders of the war, many works that recount the wartime experiences of individuals at the company, platoon, and squad levels, have been produced from memory. In *Company Commander*, published in 1978, Charles B. MacDonald provides a classic account of infantry combat in World War II. (5) MacDonald led I Company of the 23d Infantry Regiment, during the Battle of the Bulge. The book serves as a memoir of that experience. It is held in high regard in the U.S. Army, and normally is recommended reading for cadets at the United States Military Academy and in the Reserve Officers' Train-

ing Corps. From these and other similar examples, it should be clear that time is not a critical factor in the quality of a military memoir, and that a correlation between time and the tendency of a memoir writer to exaggerate or to be insincere does not really exist.

While focusing on memory, it does not appear that Freeman considered the potential positive impact of journals and diaries on the modern military memoir writer. Whether a record of the intellectual or spiritual development of an individual (a journal), or a day-to-day record of events in one's life (a diary), these records are useful resources for the memoir writer. The more frequent the entries are, the better the quality of the journal or diary. The memoir writer can feel free to come back to a previous entry in these standing records to refocus and replace what he has done. The nexus of the entry to the event helps ensure greater accuracy. Many of the more familiar military memoirs of the war were prepared from journals and diaries.

Although *War as I Knew It* was written in 1945, General Patton preferred to draw upon several extracts from his wartime diary to develop his work, rather than to rely solely on his memory. (6) Freeman, himself, noted that a careful comparison of the two documents indicates nothing of significance with respect to the planning and execution of Patton's campaigns was omitted. (7) The result, in spite of its publication so soon after the war, was an excellent discussion of World War II, the art of war, and a soldier's life. Clay Blair notes in *A General's Life* that it generally was held that Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley was not a very good writer. (8) His military memoir, *A Soldier's Story*, published in 1951, is said to have been ghosted by his aide, Chester B. Hansen. (9) If so, it also can be presumed that Hansen worked from a diary which he kept for the general. That record, along with Bradley's own commentaries, resulted in an informative memoir and history of how the war was waged on the field, as seen from Bradley's command post.

The deliberate effort to revise impressions and "to read into the planning of military operations a purpose that could not have been foreseen" would obliterate the credibility of a military memoir much as Freeman warned. (10) This problem would point to the reliability and sincerity of the memoir's author as much as to anything else. From a legal perspective, the *Federal Rules of Evidence* sets forth standards of basic reliability to establish the competency of those giving testimony regarding events. Among them, an individual must have the capacity to observe, to recollect, to communicate, and to appreciate the obligation to speak

truthfully. (11) Along with sincerity, these are the key abilities. Further, a witness to an event must have personal knowledge of the matter about which he has testified. (12) The requirement of personal knowledge means that the witness must have observed the matter and must have a present recollection of his observation. Certainly, there can be little doubt that the great commanders were able to observe, to recollect, to communicate, and to speak truthfully about events in which they were involved. As officers, these qualities were required. Beyond their own recollections, moreover, these commanders were subject to verification through the recollections of those veterans who served with these leaders during the war. Those military memoir writers from the company, platoon, and squad levels who relied on their memories also have been subject to the recollections of their comrades in arms who were aware of their activities.

Moreover, the consideration which truly speaks for the sincerity and good intentions of military memoir writers of World War II, both before and after 1965, is the conscious effort to contribute to the body of knowledge on the war, and especially to provide lessons for future generations of America's professional soldiers. Much in keeping with this point of view, Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer wrote in his 1958 military memoir, *Wedemeyer Reports!*: "I was impelled both by the desire to make some slight contribution to historical knowledge and by the hope that my experience and reflections may contribute to a better understanding of the present and the formation of a viable strategy for the future." (13) Despite any alleged ghost writing by his aide, General Bradley's intent for producing *A Soldier's Story* was expressed by the statement: "How, then, did we reach our critical decisions? Why and how did we go where we did? These are the questions I have been asked most often. And these are the questions that give me justification for writing this book." (14)

Some authors of contemporary military memoirs have been accused of insincerity or of deliberately attempting to mislead, despite their otherwise positive intentions. In many cases, simple confusion or varying perspectives, and not revisions of history, have been found to be the true cause of disagreements. This was the situation with *The Men of Company K* by Harold Leinbaugh and John Campbell, published in 1985. (15) During the war, the two authors were veterans of Company K, 333d Infantry Regiment, 84th Infantry Division. Leinbaugh, the company commander, and Campbell, a platoon leader, sought to tell the story of

Company K's war by taking into account all the recollections of veterans of the company. (16) Eventually, they collected enough material for four volumes. The memoir was praised by veterans and historians such as Charles B. MacDonald, John S. D. Eisenhower, and General Bruce Clarke. However, the long-time editor of *Infantry*, Albert N. Garland, who was commander of Company L of the 334th Infantry, fighting beside Company K, found fault with the book. He was particularly critical of Leinbaugh and Campbell's account of the unit's efforts at Verdenne, Belgium, during the Battle of the Bulge. [ed: CMH usage is "Company K," but in WW II, GIs said "K Company,"—see quotes which follow. So the usage varies between text and the GIs quoted.]

Apparently, on 25 December 1944, Company K of the 333d Infantry was ordered to locate an American force which, after being sorely pressed, was holding a defensive line to the west of Verdenne. (17) That force consisted of Company K, 3d Battalion, 334th Infantry, and Company B, 771st Tank Battalion. Acting in conjunction, they were to launch an attack to retake Verdenne and to remove the threat posed by German forces to the Marche-Hotton road. (18)

In a 1990 letter to this author, Garland wrote that his perspective of that situation and the events which ensued was quite different from that of Leinbaugh and Campbell. Garland explained:

The German unit involved had broken through at Verdenne which had been held by only a small element of I Company of the 334th Infantry Regiment. Once through, it was contained in a wooded pocket by other units of the 334th Infantry Regiment. On the other side of the pocket, L Company of the 334th Infantry Regiment, still held on to the small village of Marenne, which was on the road between Marche, Verdenne, and Menil. Leinbaugh's company, with the attached tanks, was a counterattack force. Unfortunately, Leinbaugh never mentions his tanks. In short, there is too much missing from the story to make a coherent whole. (19) Garland's criticism, that Leinbaugh and Campbell's account is incomplete, seems strong. It does not, however, invalidate the book. It seems that the real differences in their perspectives may result from the manner in which the text of the book was presented, rather than from the historical events themselves.

Leinbaugh and Campbell clearly noted in their text that the counterattack against Verdenne occurred much as Albert Garland had explained. Moreover, they confirmed that Verdenne was taken by Company L,

which had been in reserve, and by other American troops and tanks in the woods. In the text, they state: "Locating the American tanks, L Company [333d Infantry] joined forces with K Company of the 334th, which by that time was down to forty men. Following close behind a heavy barrage, the GIs rushed the village. A grim house-to-house fight ensued with heavy losses on both sides...With daylight, fighting around the village intensified. Tanks from the 84th's attached 771st Tank Battalion knocked out nine counterattacking Panthers, and the rifle companies in Verdenne, although heavily outnumbered, hauled in between three hundred and four hundred German prisoners." (20)

As authors, Leinbaugh and Campbell clearly decided to limit their discussion on the actual attack on Verdenne. Very much to the dissatisfaction of Albert Garland, they preferred to focus throughout the memoir on events centered around Company K. Indeed, they give a considerable amount of attention to an event that occurred before the movement against Verdenne, during which Company K, alone, encountered a column of German tanks.

There certainly could be some concern that, at this point in time, any new military memoirs produced by World War II veterans would be of little real military significance. Accounts of relatively minor incidents might be considered irrelevant to the modern battles the U.S. may face in the future. However, much of the face of battle will not change. Human nature probably will not change much either. Professional soldiers have much to learn from World War II. At the present time, there is uncertainty over where the United States will employ its forces in the future. World War II was a worldwide conflict. Its engagements were fought in practically every existing environment, from the jungle to the desert, from the deep woods to the arctic. At a minimum, memoirs by veterans who fought in all those environments will continue to provide information on combat and on the performance of common tasks in such varied terrain.

Veterans of World War II certainly should be encouraged to write memoirs of their wartime experiences. However, in writing these memoirs, they must not write with their goal limited merely to reminiscing. They should seek to provide the best possible history. They also should choose to use their memoirs to teach. Veterans must use facts, consciously and diligently avoiding exaggeration. In this way, their memoirs can overcome the concerns expressed by Freeman and others, and they can help ensure that the history of their

great sacrifices will never be forgotten.

Mark Edmond Clark is an instructor at the College of New Rochelle and a frequent contributor to *Army*

*History and to other periodicals. He holds an M.A. in American history from Columbia and a J.D. degree from Georgetown Law Center.*

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3. *Ibid.*, p. 703.
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8. Omar N. Bradley, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 9.
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10. Patton, *War as I Knew It*, p. xv.
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12. *McCormick on Evidence*, p. 91.
13. Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1958), p. 433.
14. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story*, p. ix.
15. Harold Leinbaugh and John Campbell, *The Men of Company K* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1985).
16. *Ibid.*, pp. vii-ix.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 130, 137.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
19. Ltr, Albert N. Garland to author, 6 Mar 90. Includes his comments on *The Men of Company K*.
20. Leinbaugh and Campbell, *The Men of Company K*, pp. 137-38.

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### Letters to the Editor

Editor:

As one of the ASTP (Army Specialized Training Program) trainees, I found Louis Keefer's fine article on the program (Winter 1995, No. 33) stirred up poignant memories I had long forgotten. I was at Michigan State University struggling with engineering, for which I knew in my heart I had little talent, but deathly afraid that if I flunked differential and integral calculus I would find myself in the trenches. Before that could happen, the program folded and I found myself on the way to the South Pacific. Ah, but while it lasted.... As the much later song has it: "Those were the days my friend, we thought they'd never end...."

As to the blue and gold shoulder patch, depicting the sword of valor superimposed on the lamp of learning, I suspect Mr. Keefer knew (but thought it improper in a publication such as this) to set down our informal description of the patch: The Flaming Pisspot.

Douglas Pike  
Director, Indochina Archive  
Institute of East Asian Studies  
University of California, Berkeley

## Book Reviews

### Book Review

by Judith A. Bellafaire

#### *The Manhattan Project: A Secret Wartime Mission*

Edited by Kenneth M. Deitch

Discovery Enterprises, Ltd. 64 pp. \$4.95.

*The Manhattan Project: A Secret Wartime Mission* is a small, pocket-sized volume in the Perspectives on History series of Discovery Enterprises, Ltd. The book includes a fifteen-page introduction by Deitch, followed by nine "eye-witness" accounts of the project, all of which were written forty to fifty years ago and published previously in autobiographies and magazine and newspaper articles. The reminiscences cover a variety of perspectives, and include those of General Leslie Groves, the Army officer in charge of the Manhattan Project; Laura Fermi, wife of the scientist Enrico Fermi, working at Los Alamos; newspaper reporter William Laurence, who witnessed the first test of the atomic bomb in the New Mexican desert; Colonel Paul Tibbets, commander of the "Enola Gay," the B-29 which dropped the first bomb on Hiroshima; Dr. Terufumi Sasaki, on duty at the Red Cross Hospital in Hiroshima on the day the atomic bomb fell; and Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, the civilian scientist and leader of the Manhattan Project.

Deitch's introduction distills complex scientific theories used in the development of the atomic bomb into several remarkably cogent paragraphs which any layman can understand. This alone is probably worth the price of the book. But the introduction also covers the scientific discoveries which led to the ability to develop the bomb, and succinctly describes the activities at each of the five different Manhattan project sites in the United States: Los Alamos, New Mexico; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; the University of Chicago; the University of California at Berkeley; and the Hanford Engineer Works on the Columbia River in the state of Washington.

The introduction thus fills a significant gap in historical studies of the Manhattan Project. Few non-scientific studies, or even summaries, of the Manhattan project as a whole exist. Varied perspectives make this small book a boon to students, and the general reader.

The insightful excerpt from Laura Fermi's book *Atoms in the Family: My Life With Enrico Fermi*, first printed in 1954 by the University of Chicago Press,

describes the lifestyle and atmosphere at Los Alamos. Fermi quotes General Groves as saying "At great expense we have gathered together on this mesa the largest collection of crackpots ever seen," and deftly brings the reader to a clear understanding of how the needs of this group of brilliant, egocentric scientists working under intense pressure in extremely isolated and primitive conditions led to the development of a decidedly paternalistic atmosphere. Fermi explains that even "unskilled" wives were encouraged to work on the project. Clerical help was desperately needed at Los Alamos, and those in charge felt that busy wives would be kept "out of mischief."

William L. Laurence, the science reporter allowed to witness the first test of the atomic bomb, captured the tense uncertainty leading to instantaneous drama of the first moment it was apparent that the explosion was a success. "The little groups that had hitherto stood rooted to the earth like desert plants broke into dance—they clapped their hands as they leaped from the ground—the rhythm of primitive man dancing at one of his fire festivals at the coming of spring." This section also includes a copy of a newspaper article prepared by the Army and given to the Associated Press to supply an explanation for the explosion, which was seen by people in the Arizona towns of Silver City, Gallup, and Albuquerque. The article states that an ammunition dump at Alamogordo Airbase containing a "considerable amount of explosives and pyrotechnics" was ignited by lightning. Laurence's reminiscences are excerpted from *Men and Atoms: The Discovery, the Uses and the Future of Atomic Energy* published in 1959 by Simon and Schuster.

The selection by Paul Tibbets is reprinted from an article which ran in the Saturday Evening Post in 1946 by Wesley Price. Price quotes Tibbets as saying "The bomb dropped. I pulled the antiglare goggles over my eyes. I couldn't see out of them. I was blind. I threw them to the floor. A bright light filled the plane. The first shock wave hit us. We were eleven and a half miles slant range from the atomic explosion, but the whole airplane crackled and crinkled from the blast."

The story of Dr. Terufumi Sasaki as told by John Hersey in his book *Hiroshima*, published by Albert Knopf, Inc., in 1946 is equally dramatic. Dr. Sasaki was a surgeon at the Red Cross Hospital in Hiroshima. Sasaki was carrying a patient's blood sample to laboratory when the bomb hit. The Red Cross Hospital was



1,650 yards from the center of the explosion. Sasaki lost his glasses and shoes in the blast. He was the only doctor in the hospital who was not hurt, and only ten nurses out of two hundred survived. The ambulatory hospital staff worked days on end treating hospital patients wounded in the blast and those residents of the city who were able to make their way to the hospital.

Unfortunately, the few pages taken from General Leslie Groves' autobiography, *Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project*, published in 1962, do not do justice to the strength and dynamism of this remarkable leader. Numerous other sections of the autobiography could have been utilized to better understand how Groves worked and his impact on the Manhattan Project.

Robert Oppenheimer's vague and awkwardly written philosophical discourse on the development of the atom bomb is a similarly ill-chosen conclusion to this valuable if uneven little book. A conclusion written by Deitch himself would undoubtedly have provided a more lucid and thought-provoking analysis of the impact of the atom bomb on modern society.

*Dr. Judith A. Bellafaire is a historian in the Field and International Branch of the Center's Field Programs and Historical Services Division. Throughout the fiftieth anniversary commemoration of World War II, Dr. Bellafaire has served as coordinator for incoming queries to the Center regarding that conflict.*

#### **Book Review by Michael Bellafaire**

*Close to Glory: The Untold Stories of WWII by the GIs Who Saw and Reported the War—Yank Magazine*

by Art Weithas  
Eakin Press (Sunbelt Media, Inc.). 288 pp., \$24.95

This volume is a compilation of reminiscences and anecdotes written by *Yank* correspondents (writers, artists, and photographers) during World War II and its immediate aftermath. These stories are derived from original correspondence exchanged between the reporters and their stateside editor, Joe McCarthy.

In his preface, Weithas states that he did not want to repeat or compete with the several anthologies which already have been done on *Yank*, in which selected, dramatic stories have been reprinted. Instead, he wanted to tell the "behind the scenes stories" from the perspectives of the correspondents themselves—how they got their stories and how they got them

published. Weithas, a *Yank* artist and photographer, is uniquely qualified for this task.

The introduction, written by the official *Yank* historian, Annie Davis Weeks, provides a brief overview of the weekly pictorial newspaper, and stresses the fact that *Yank* was a newspaper for enlisted men and written by enlisted men, with no editorial oversight by officers or Army leaders. The introduction carefully delineates the differences between *Yank* and its sister newspaper, *Stars and Stripes*, a daily newspaper, written and edited by Army officers. Weeks also reminds the reader that *Yank* was a worldwide enterprise, with editorial offices in every theater of the war, publishing some twenty-one separate editions.

The body of the book consists of a series of reminiscences from forty different *Yank* correspondents. Unfortunately, these are not presented in any particular order, i.e., chronologically or by theater. This problem stems from the fact that many of the correspondents worked in various theaters. As the narratives are organized around the correspondents, the reader finds himself moving from the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt to the battle for Guadalcanal, and from Douglas MacArthur's return to the Philippines to the battles for Attu and Kiska. The reader cannot follow the ordinary story of World War II in this book.

For the most part, the book sticks to reminiscences and "the stories behind the stories." In a couple of cases, however, Weithas does include actual reprinted stories from *Yank*. These exceptions usually involve interviews with theater commanders. Ed Cunningham's interview with General Joseph Stilwell and Newt Oliphant's interview with Admiral Chester Nimitz are presented along with their explanations of how these interviews were obtained. Cunningham discovered that Stilwell was in the habit of going to the latrine at the same time every morning, and was disposed to talk while the two men were sitting side by side.

There were significant differences between the experiences of the enlisted *Yank* correspondents and those of the civilian correspondents from other newspapers and from radio networks. For example, when Ozzie St. George and fellow correspondent Dick Hanley were covering the invasion of Cape Gloucester, New Britain, with the 1st Marine Division, the two men were "volunteered" by a marine sergeant to haul ammunition from the beaches to division headquarters. The same sergeant then ordered the two to stand guard that night between 2200 and 2400, armed with two borrowed M1s and a grenade apiece. Neither man had ever stood guard duty before. The sergeant instructed

them in the use of a grenade: "You hold the bleeping lever there and put your bleeping finger in the bleeping ring and then you bleeping throw it." During their watch, St. George and Hanley heard something moving around in underbrush ahead of them. Despite fears of an impending *banzai* charge, the two correspondents nonetheless did not challenge the "intruders" or throw their grenades, but merely waited out the morning.

William Barrett McGurn described being wounded at Bougainville while he was on assignment interviewing medics. According to McGurn, he saw a bush in front of him explode, and felt like he had been "hit by a baseball bat." Looking for his pocket notebook, he looked down at his chest and saw blood all over the paper. His first thought was "How can I write—how can I take notes?" He ended up in the hands of the medics he had come to interview.

Four *Yank* correspondents were killed while covering the war: Capt. Red (Basil) D. Gallagher, Sgt. Pete Paris, Sgt. John Bushemi, and Sgt. Robert Krell. The book includes photographer Bushemi's last report from Kwajalein in February 1944, where he was attempting to get action shots and movie films of the combat operations. In the last paragraph of his letter, Bushemi states, "I shot about a thousand feet of movie film, but concentrated on stills this time, because I was anxious to do a better job than my trip to the Gilberts." Bushemi was killed on the island of Eniwetok just days after writing his report from Kwajalein.

Dave Richardson's assignment had him on the move with "Merrill's Marauders" in Burma. Richardson marched sixty miles through the jungle with the Marauders and witnessed the battle for Myitkyina airstrip. He then parachuted behind Japanese lines in Burma and participated in training Shan guerrillas in the use of bazookas, mortars, and machine guns. Richardson used his experiences covering the infantry for *Yank* to disguise the fact that he was not proficient in the use of these weapons.

Correspondents also sent in reports from the home front. Mack Morriss, for example, wrote a story about a German prisoner of war camp in Alva, Oklahoma. To get the story, he interviewed guards as well as German officers and enlisted men. One officer told Morriss why the prisoners refused to grow a garden. They believed that by doing so they would contribute in some small way to the American war effort: "Even though the produce would be consumed by us, the food that you would not have to provide us would go to your own soldiers...."

From a historian's point of view, the reader might learn more if the reminiscences and anecdotes had been presented alongside the *Yank* stories the correspondents were talking about. The reader of this book misses a great deal of the information and detail included in the published stories. For example, correspondent Walter Bernstein's letter to Joe McCarthy from Algiers on 8 May 1944, describes a walking trip behind enemy lines for a rare interview with Tito, leader of the partisan guerrilla forces in Yugoslavia. Bernstein's letter provides details about how he and his guides avoided German sentries, but the letter leaves the reader with a desire to see the actual *Yank* story. What did Tito say? What were his goals? Why was he fighting? What was he like? And what was Bernstein's opinion of him—was he a hero or a tyrant?

Weithas does not provide the book with a conclusion or summary. Instead, he uses the words of *Yank* photographer Bill Young, assigned to the Tokyo, Japan, office, to wrap up the book: "How many times I thought every minute would be my last, I tried to live it up to the limit, by God." The reader is left looking for a synthesis that would draw all these disparate accounts together. It is doubtful whether Young's words succeed.

Civilian correspondents who covered World War II and Korea have written numerous books about their experiences. How is this book different? *Yank* and civilian correspondents had the same kinds of adventures, difficulties, and dangers, resulting in similar vignettes, victories, and journalist scoops. The perspective of this book is unique in that it represents the experiences of the enlisted man as war correspondent. Although a few redoubtable civilian reporters made it to the front lines and experienced enemy fire, they did not stand guard duty, and were not "volunteered" to haul ammunition. They did not train guerrillas. *Yank* correspondents were in uniform and were subject to military regulations, orders, and discipline. Their reports were valued by soldiers because, as enlisted men, they shared the fears, frustrations, and camaraderie of military life.

*Michael P. Bellafaire is a historian with Office of History, U.S. Army Materiel Command in Alexandria, Virginia. Previously, he served as Curator of Military Engineering, Office of History, HQ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.*

**Book Review**  
by Stanley L. Falk

***With Only the Will to Live: Accounts of Americans in Japanese Prison Camps, 1941-1945***

Robert S. LaForte, Ronald E. Marcello, and Richard Himmel, eds.

Scholarly Resources Books. 286 pp., \$24.95

This is the third volume of World War II personal accounts to be drawn from the large collection of interviews conducted over the past twenty-five years by the University of North Texas Oral History Program. The first two volumes, edited by Drs. Robert LaForte and Ronald Marcello, included testimony by American veterans of the Pearl Harbor attack, and by former American prisoners of war who had been forced by the Japanese to work on the infamous Siam-Burma railway. The present volume, with the additional coediting of Prof. Richard Himmel, is a broad effort to cover the whole range of American POW experience in the Pacific. Most of the interviews were conducted by the editors, who have done an impressive job of organizing and explaining the material presented.

*With Only the Will to Live* invites comparison with Donald Knox's earlier oral history, *Death March: The Survivors of Bataan* (1981). Knox's work was limited to those Americans captured in the Philippines in 1942, but since they constituted 85 percent of all Americans held prisoner by the Japanese, their stories are representative of almost the entire POW experience. LaForte, Marcello, and Himmel include statements by those captured elsewhere as well, and thus provide some information not found in the Knox book. Because of my own close association with the latter, I will not offer a qualitative comparison of the two books, but merely will point out a few differences.

*With Only the Will to Live* is organized topically, with the material arranged according to a variety of key subject areas and subareas. *Death March* is organized more or less chronologically, allowing the reader to follow in general the course of combat, capture, captivity, and liberation. Both volumes contain background and explanatory material, but LaForte *et al.* provide greater analysis. Knox's compilation is larger and in some ways more comprehensive, including testimony by medical personnel as well as statements about the defense of Bataan. *With Only the Will to Live*, while lacking this material, nevertheless contains reports of some types of experiences not found in *Death March*

and also a useful index and bibliography, which Knox omitted. Neither volume includes statements by B-29 crews shot down over Japan: Knox for obvious reasons, LaForte *et al.* for no stated reason. The two books, in fact, complement each other but are, by the same token, overlapping and duplicative.

The story of the American prisoners of Japan has been told many times before: in published memoirs and diaries, in the Knox and earlier LaForte-Marcello oral histories, and in secondary accounts. *With Only the Will to Live* thus adds little of significance to material already in print. It is, however, handy, well organized, and enhanced by thoughtful editorial comments—a useful reference for readers not already familiar with its subject.

*Dr. Stanley L. Falk formerly was chief historian of the U.S. Air Force. He is the author of a number of books about World War II in the Pacific, including Bataan: The March of Death and, as editor, Foo, A Japanese-American Prisoner of the Rising Sun: The Secret Prison Diary of Frank "Foo" Fujita.*

**Book Review**  
by Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

***The American Military Tradition: From Colonial Times to the Present***

John M. Carroll and Colin F. Baxter, eds.

Scholarly Resources. 246 pp., \$15.95 (paperbound)

Professors John Carroll and Colin Baxter are alumni of the TRADOC (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) ROTC workshop in military history, a postgraduate program to provide civilian college professors with the academic tools needed to enhance their presentations to ROTC cadets. While attending the session at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, their discussions led them to conclude that a supplement to the standard works in U.S. military history was needed. The result is a collection of eleven essays written with the undergraduate in mind.

Spanning the three hundred years from the colonial wars in America to DESERT STORM—with an afterword speculating on the future of warfare—in so short a volume means that each essay treats only the most salient features of each period covered. This level of coverage is perfectly understandable and, on the whole, works well. *The American Military Tradition*

reads easily and should be a welcome addition to the military history literature, particularly for nonmilitary history majors. Any such collection of essays is bound to be uneven, however, and this book is no exception; some of the offerings simply are better conceived and crafted than others, but all of them have something to offer.

Certain items may prompt individual readers to cavil. We learn that Frederick von Steuben "...taught the Prussian drill at Valley Forge...." (p. 25). It could be clearer that the Prussians relied on the French system, especially since we are told (p. 26) that the French became America's military tutors *after* the American Revolution. In "The Pacific War" the author relies on statistics (p. 172) to convey the horror of the battle for Okinawa. The horror was real; the numbers probably less exact than as presented. This up-to-date volume includes Joseph A. Stout, Jr.'s excellent essay on "The United States and the Native Americans," but nineteen pages are devoted to this "...exciting but unpleasant chapter of American history..." (p. 114), yet curiously just over eighteen pages to "The Pacific War." These are all quibbles, nothing more. Instructors faced with introducing undergraduates to American military history might well consider adopting *The American Military Tradition* for their classes.

*Dr. Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., is chief of the Center's Field and International Branch and managing editor of Army History. He is the author of Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950.*

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