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The Forca Expedicionaria Brasileira in the Italian Campaign, 1944-45

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Today, most United States citizens are surprised to learn that Brazil committed troops in World War II. Those of the war generation may have a dim recollection, but among Americans born after the war, those who do know that there was a *Forca Expedicionaria Brasileira* (FEB) on the Italian front usually learned of it from a relative who served in the 10th Mountain Division, the IV Corps, or somewhere else in the Fifth Army. Histories of the war rarely make mention of it or, indeed, of Brazil's other contributions to the Allied cause. In truth, the FEB did not alter the course of the Italian campaign or of the war in Europe. Its significance lies less in the history of the war than in the history of Brazilian-American relations and in the history of Brazil. In these two areas of history it has considerable weight, even if the American public and most scholars are ignorant of it. But the FEB did provide the American and Brazilian Armies with experience in the creation and functioning of international military forces.

The FEB was unusual in American military history. It was not a colonial force, as were the British Indian units, or a Commonwealth military, such as Canada, New Zealand, or South Africa, nor a Free "this or that," such as the Polish or French contingents; no, this was a division drawn from the army of an independent, sovereign state that voluntarily placed its men under United States command. But it was not just command that was involved in the relationship; the FEB was American advised, trained, equipped, uniformed, shod, and fed. The relationship could not have been closer and still have maintained the integrity of the force's command structure. Despite the high level

of integration, the FEB never lost its identity as Brazilian, and the Americans never thought of it otherwise.

Why an FEB?

The first question Americans (and young Brazilians) usually ask is why was there an FEB? There are several reasons: the emotional response of the Brazilian people to the war; the objectives of the Brazilian civilian and military leaders; and United States objectives. The Brazilian people were angered at the Axis submarine sinking of national vessels that led to the recognition of a state of war with Germany and Italy in August 1942; the FEB was an act of revenge, a way to reestablish national honor, while contributing to the great struggle to save civilization—at least that was the way government propaganda presented it.

President Getulio Vargas and his foreign minister, Oswaldo Aranha, were looking toward the peace table, to the postwar reorganization of the world, and remembering the difficulties that Brazil faced after World War I, in which the nation did not participate militarily. They opted for commitment. Franklin D. Roosevelt encouraged this line of thinking by telling Vargas during their February 1943 meeting in Natal that he wanted him at his side at the peace conference. Moreover, Vargas likely hoped to distract the military, to give himself more political space in which to organize a populist base to continue what he considered the gains of his dictatorial regime. His opponents soon saw the FEB as a guarantee that the regime would not survive the war. They argued that Brazilians could not fight against tyranny abroad and continue to live under it at home.

Foreign Minister Aranha saw the war and the FEB as a way to expand Brazil's historic cooperation with the United States into "a true alliance of destinies." That policy of cooperation had been, Aranha noted, "a source of security" for Brazil, since by giving the

United States assurance of Brazil's support in international questions, Brazil could "count on them in [South] American ones." The FEB would, in his view, convince the Americans that Brazil was committed to an alliance "materially, morally, and militarily." The alliance was his strategy for gaining United States assistance in Brazilian industrialization, which he saw as "the first defense against external and internal danger." He argued that the FEB was the start of a wider collaboration involving Brazil's total military reorganization. Moreover, he did not believe that the Brazilians could restrict themselves solely to an expeditionary force if they wanted to ensure American involvement in other Brazilian military matters, such as development of the navy and air force, and the defense of southern Brazil. Looking ahead, he believed that Brazil would have to keep its forces mobilized for sometime after the peace to help maintain the postwar order. Along with fellow cabinet members, he asserted that they should work to convince the Americans that

"having chosen the road to follow and our companions for the journey, we will not alter our course or hesitate in our steps." (1)

For some Brazilian officers, especially the Military School graduates of the Class of 1917, committing troops was vindication for not having fought in World War I. It was also a way to avenge the deaths of friends and colleagues killed in Axis submarine attacks, and, perhaps more important, it was a way to increase the army's and air force's effective strength and ability to deal with various contingencies. Among the latter were the strong United States military and naval bases in northeast Brazil, which the Brazilians wanted to ensure that the Americans would vacate after the war; the German immigrant populations in southern Brazil, which they wanted to be able to control; and the ever-present fear of Argentina, which was then under a military regime. But the army was not about to ship overseas and trust that all would be well at home or on the frontiers. Its leaders were particularly concerned



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about Argentina. In July 1943 Minister of War General Eurico Dutra declared that whatever number of troops went abroad, he wanted an equivalent force left in Brazil to guarantee sovereignty, order, and tranquillity. Clearly, the home front had to be secure, but to achieve that objective Brazilian leaders would have to pry sufficient weapons from the Americans, who then were struggling to arm their own troops and to produce arms for the Allies. The Brazilian government decided that it would have to send troops to the battlefield.

The FEB attracted American government support because if the largest Latin American country fought with the Allies, it would enhance the image of the United States as the leader of the Western Hemisphere. Washington also hoped that it would make Brazil a pro-American bulwark in South America. Secretary of State Cordell Hull saw Brazil as a counterweight to Argentina. Both the Brazilians and the Americans artfully used the other's worries about Argentina to buttress their policy aims. But, of course, the closer Brazil and the United States became, the more nervous the Argentines grew. (2)

Some U.S. Army leaders had to be persuaded to accept the Brazilian offer of troops. Their willingness to accommodate the Brazilians was in direct proportion to what they wanted from them. By the end of 1942 the Army had its Brazilian air bases and related supply lines through them to North Africa, so why worry about the Brazilians? A debate took place among American military and diplomatic personnel over the merits of accepting or deflecting Brazilian desires. Earlier in 1942 the two sides discussed having the Brazilians occupy French and Dutch Guiana, and at Natal in February 1943 Roosevelt suggested to Vargas that Brazil replace Portugal's troops in the Azores and Madeira, so that the Portuguese could reinforce their home defenses. Nothing came of these ideas, but after the Natal Conference, it was not a question of *if* Brazil would send troops, but where they would go.


In mid-April 1943 the Brazilian military representative in Washington, General Estevao Leitao de Carvalho, told Chief of Staff George Marshall that Brazil wanted to form a three- or four-division corps, and in May the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the idea. (3)

The important point to remember is that the FEB was a Brazilian idea, that it resulted from a deliberate policy of the Vargas government and not from a U.S. policy to involve Brazil directly in combat.

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How Was the FEB Put Together?

There was some difference of opinion between the Brazilians and the Americans over which troops should be used to form the expeditionary force. The Americans, and the Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission, thought it logical to use the units in the northeast, but the Brazilians looked at the 15,000 U.S. personnel at bases in that region and thought differently. Minister Dutra wanted to build three regional training camps to prepare three divisions simultaneously, thereby creating useful installations for the postwar era. But the United States could not provide the weapons and equipment necessary to outfit three camps, i.e., 50 percent of the equipment for three divisions. Moreover, since neither Brazil nor the United States had enough ships to carry even one full division all at once, the Pentagon came up with the idea of providing 50 percent of a division's equipment for training, which would be left behind for the training of each successive division. They would all be armed and equipped in the theater of operations.

Just before he visited the United States in August 1943, Minister of War Dutra, who wanted to command the planned corps, sounded out various generals regarding their interest in leading one of the divisions. General Joao Baptista Mascarenhas de Moraes, who had commanded the northeastern military region (the 7th) from June 1940 to January 1943, responded immediately, while the others hesitated. Eventually two other division commanders were designated and preparations begun, but these plans were never fully implemented, and the FEB was fixed at one division. (4)

The Brazilian Army of 1943 did not have standing divisions ready for intensified training and transportation, but rather was organized in static geographic regional commands presiding over dispersed regimental-size units. These in turn were quartered in barracks that often had scant room to receive additional mobilized troops and little space for training of the sort the U.S. Army was then receiving. Moreover, most of the barracks were in urban areas. Because the troops mainly were drafted from the locality, to form a division from one region would place a politically unacceptable sacrifice on that region. So the unwillingness to use the northeastern units was related to more than worry about the U.S. presence.

To form the FEB division, units were ordered up from across the map of Brazil. On the negative side, this meant that these units were not accustomed to working together. On the positive side, it could be argued that since the army since 1919 had been trained and organized on a French model, it would be easier to

shift to an American model if the division was composed of units which had no previous joint experience. Perhaps they would adapt more quickly.

Curiously, instead of using the combat experience to enhance the professionalization of a maximum number of regular junior officers, the army called up a considerable number of reserve officers, many of whom were professional men in civilian life. Of the 870 infantry line officers in the FEB, at least 302 were reservists. Happily for historians, a group of them produced one of the most useful books on the FEB. (5) It is not clear whether the use of reservists was a political decision or a purely administrative one. But it does seem that there were not enough junior officers to staff the expeditionary force. Later in Italy, referring to the shortage of military school graduates and to the professional deficiencies of the reserve officers, General Mascarenhas requested, as late as April 1945, authorization to commission sixty infantry sergeants to serve as platoon leaders. (6)

There was also considerable difficulty filling the ranks of the designated units. Lacking military police units, the army took in policemen from Sao Paulo. It created signal units with men from electric and telephone companies and organized a nursing detachment by public recruitment of interested women. The fact that draftees were being sent overseas encouraged many to seek ways of escaping service, but the army had always had large numbers who evaded duty since the draft was imposed in 1916. In the 7th Military Region in northeast Brazil, for example, while Mascarenhas was commander, the 1941 call-up of 7,898 men had an evasion rate of 48.9 percent, and of those who did present themselves, fully 41 percent were medically unfit. Indeed, this was an improvement: the previous year the evasion rate had been 68 percent. Among the 3,434 volunteers in that region, 2,201 or 64 percent were found unfit for service. These figures can be taken as fairly typical for the national experience. The rejection rate for medical and health reasons was high for both draftees and troops already on active duty. In forming one of the later FEB echelons, 18,000 soldiers in regular units were examined to obtain 6,000 men. In the case of the fourth echelon, the 10,000 soldiers examined netted only 4,500 physically fit for embarkation. The author has discussed elsewhere in more detail the recruitment and medical examinations of the FEB. Suffice to note here that the difficult encounter with the nation's poor health contributed to the decision not to continue with the mobilization. In January 1945 Maj. Gen. Ralph Wooten observed that the Brazilian Army was "near

the bottom of the barrel" in providing combat personnel and that it was "a mistake to expect any additional assistance from Brazil in this respect." (7)

The training functioned on multiple levels. Brazilian officers had been sent to the United States for courses since 1938, mostly in coast artillery and aviation. Indeed, in early 1941, well before Pearl Harbor, Brazil was sending groups of officers for training in a variety of specialties. The pace continued to accelerate to the point that by the end of 1944 a bit over 1,000 Brazilian military personnel had gone to the United States. A special Brazilian course was created at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth that enrolled 259 officers, the largest contingent of any one foreign nation to pass through its classrooms. The school commandant said that Brazilians, who had already completed their own three-year general staff course, "knew more than most of his instructors." (8)

The troops sent to Italy in five echelons eventually totaled 25,334. In July 1944 the first echelon arrived in Naples. After some delays with equipment and training, on 15 September the 6th Infantry Regiment and support troops, under Brig. Gen. Euclides Zenobio da Costa, went into the line of the IV Corps of the U.S. Fifth Army. Army commander Mark Clark decided on this partial commitment because he needed to beef up the IV Corps, which had declined to barely the level of a reinforced division, as units were detached in July for the Seventh Army's invasion of southern France. Fifth Army had lost fully seven divisions to the French operation, so the Brazilians' arrival at that moment was opportune. The American Fifth and British Eighth Armies were readying a drive on the Germans' Gothic Line in an attempt to reach the Po Valley and Bologna before Christmas. The Fifth Army's three corps (from west to east: U.S. IV, U.S. II, and British XII) were to attack with the II Corps as spearhead and the IV Corps immobilizing and harassing the Germans before it. Clark thought that this scenario would give the Brazilians a relatively smooth introduction to combat.

It is interesting to note the different reactions of the Brazilians and the Americans to the subsequent action. The Brazilians moved along nicely, pursuing retreating German units from 16 September to 30 October, when they suffered a sudden counterattack, which they held back for about ten hours until they ran short of ammunition and were forced to fall back. From the U.S. records, one can see that this was perceived as a normal combat occurrence, but the accounts published by the Brazilian officers are full of finger pointing and acrimony. On the scene, Mascarenhas blamed and

reprimanded the troops for their lack of caution and for fleeing before a "demoralized enemy." Of course, he was anxious that they do well, and he was still a bit inexperienced himself in the nature of that war. Actually, they had done about as well as anyone could have under the circumstances. The U.S. 92d Division, which replaced them when they moved over to the Reno Valley, likewise was unable to drive the Germans from the ridge line that they held for the next five months. (9)

How Did the FEB Perform?

The foregoing leads into the next question commonly asked about the FEB: how did it perform? The short answer is, quite well indeed, but history looks beyond the short answers.

The FEB's role was a tactical one, and the bulk of its combat experience was at the platoon level. The division's combat diary is largely a summary of patrol actions, as was the case for Fifth Army generally in the autumn and winter of 1944-45. The Brazilians recognized this, not claiming that their role or its impact was strategic. In his memoirs, the division's chief of staff, Floriano de Lima Brayner, observed that "at no time did the FEB engage in strategic-level operations." (10) After the war, to symbolize the level of the role they had played, the army erected a monument to the FEB lieutenants at the Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how one division could have played anything but a tactical role in the campaign in northern Italy.

Some observers have lost sight of this point. One such journalist is William Waack, whose *As duas faces da glória: A FEB vista pelos seus aliados e inimigos* seems based on the premise that the Brazilians claimed a greater importance for the FEB than they actually did. (11) He contrasts some German veterans' lack of knowledge and remembrance of the Brazilian force and the sharp criticism of U.S. liaison and inspection reports with the "grandiloquence" of Brazilian narratives on the FEB. Because this book was published by one of Brazil's leading presses and because it had some impact in academic circles, some comments on Waack's use (or misuse) of evidence are in order.

One the face of it, Waack filled a gap in the bibliography available in Portuguese by looking at German and American documents and by interviewing survivors of the German units. Very reasonably, he set out to discover what they thought of the FEB. Unhappily, he approached his project the way many journalists do stories, digging into a body of evidence without first reading the existing literature, which would en-

able him to understand what was new and would give him the ability to put it in proper perspective. Moreover, he was satisfied with finding some interesting documents and did not question their completeness.

He learned that the principal German division facing the Brazilians had a large number of very young and rather old soldiers and was commanded by officers who had served long years and had survived the rigors of the Russian front. He portrayed these men as worn out, when he could have argued that tired, or even battle fatigued, they were veterans who had immeasurably more combat experience than their Brazilian opponents. If he had read more about the Italian campaign, he would have found that he had not discovered anything new. After all, the Germans were fighting on three fronts in 1944-45 and were putting every available male into the line.

Waack spent several pages on the importance of the FEB's taking an elevation known as Monte Castello, which he referred to as "the greatest glory of the contemporary history of the Brazilian Army." He wrote that "there is a pronounced tendency to consider the conquest of Monte Castello as an important step in the Allied advance into the north of Italy, at times attributing to it decisive strategic importance." He wrongly mentions as an example Lima Brayner's book, which, as noted earlier, carefully limits the significance of such battles beyond the Brazilian context. Oddly, considering the huge bibliography by FEB veterans, he quotes as a recent example of this tendency a source-poor 1982 doctoral thesis done at the Universidade de Sao Paulo, to the effect that "Monte Castello...was the key to a defense system...at the door of the legendary Po River plain." (12)

He then goes on to question the importance of the victory by showing that for the Germans, "Monte Castello" did not exist; "its name," he said, "does not appear in any official communication of the divisions, armies and...voluminous 'War Diaries' of the *Wehrmacht*." For them it was merely point "101/19" on their war maps. The Germans considered their mountain positions fundamental to the defense of the Po Valley and, Waack says, they regarded their "nerve line" as running from Monte Belvedere through the elevations to the east. The key point for them was not Monte Castello, but Belvedere. He thinks that he is setting the historical record straight. But if he had bothered to check beyond the few American documents that he read to examine the FEB war diary, he would have noted that the combat of late 1944 that stalled not only the FEB but also the IV Corps and Fifth

Army found the FEB attacking the "M. TORRACCIA-M. BELVEDERE Ridge." The first mention of "M. CASTELLO" came on 21 February 1945, when the FEB "attacked along the southern slopes of the terrain saddle between BELVEDERE and M. della TORRACCIA" to capture "M. CASTELLO (568192), the hill mass just northwest of ABETAIA." The fact is, it would be natural for the Brazilians to give more importance to the names of the terrain they faced than did either the defending Germans or the Americans concerned with the broader front. The American liaison detachment diarist went on to comment that "this feature had been the objective of two previous Brazilian attacks, in which they suffered considerable casualties. Its capture was a distinct loss to the enemy, since it deprived him of his last good observation of BAGNI della PORRETTA." (13)

Waack also sought to minimize the importance of the victory by saying that the German veterans told him they rarely had more than fifty men at any one position in that region. (14) He did not take into account the fact that those groups of fifty controlled heights from which they fired along preset trajectories that covered the upward approaches. It is such a commonplace of military lore that fewer men are needed to defend such heights than are needed to seize them that it is almost embarrassing to emphasize the point. In any case, Waack's information was not new: the IV Corps history analyzing the German defenses mentioned that the *232d Grenadier Division* "was thinly spread along an 18-mile front."

Waack failed to note the type of armament that the Germans were using to defend the heights. According to the IV Corps history, photo intelligence revealed that "the Germans also realized the tactical importance of this ridge and had massed a large number of artillery pieces in the Campiano-Belvedere-Castello area; in all, 97 guns were spotted." (15) Much of the corps battle plan was based on careful targeting of artillery fire to destroy the German guns, but, significantly, this would take place *during* the attack on 18 February, not in preparation for it, so as to preserve the element of surprise for the initial infantry offensive. With its firing data prearranged, the corps artillery would concentrate fire on German artillery as it became active. The stress placed on artillery in the corps battle plan indicates the degree of importance the Americans attributed to the German armament and to its positioning.

Waack summarized his critique of Monte Castello by declaring that "based on the German narrative" and

the topography, "the Brazilians at Monte Castello fulfilled a secondary tactical mission, a maneuver supporting the principal attack...[and] it was not the decisive struggle, nor did it fundamentally influence the outcome of the battle." Curiously, he notes something that would have made a professional historian very cautious, namely that the German records pertaining to the fall of Belvedere, Castello, and Torracia had all been destroyed after the war in a fire. (16)

Now, without doubt, much was made of Monte Castello by the "Febianos" and by the Brazilian military. For them the successful engagement had great symbolic importance. Their part in the taking of Belvedere-Castello convinced the Brazilians that they were up to the task they had undertaken. Perhaps one could make a rough comparison to the importance of Belleau Wood (June 1918) for the Americans in World War I. The fact is that the FEB and the U.S. 10th Mountain Division were effective in the joint operation that drove the Germans off important elevations, thus allowing the spring offensive to move forward. If either of the two divisions had failed, that offensive would have been delayed. (17)

What did the Americans think of the FEB? This is a question that first must be responded to with interrogatives: which Americans, when, what, and why? The U.S. military studied and reported on the origins, formation, personnel, readiness, and functioning of the Brazilian forces from beginning to end. Anyone familiar with the American military and its archives would find nothing unusual in this. All aspects of the formation and functioning of American units were also followed closely and reported. But using this material for historical purposes requires careful attention to context. One should expect that reports mid-way through a training cycle will likely contain negative comments, so the careful historian will look for final reports that tell how the process turned out.

William Waack "discovered" reports of the Fifth Army's Brazilian Liaison Detachment (which this author used in his 1973 *Brazilian-American Alliance*) and, observing that these had not been published in Brazil, wondered if the Brazilian Army at the time knew that there was a "contradiction between the public praise of the generals and the severe criticisms written by American officers charged with accompanying or instructing the Brazilian military." He quotes at length from these documents, contrasting U.S. attitudes with Brazilian ones. These reports contain strong language, written by men who were concerned about the quality of training that the FEB was receiving.

They do not hesitate to point to incompetence where they found it, to errors, or to suggested solutions. Their most common complaint was that the Brazilian troops were not sufficiently trained, and their solution to nearly every shortcoming was cooperation and training. The U.S. Army, like the society that produced it, believed in education—the language of the schoolhouse was ever present. (18)

It would be wrong to assume, however, that the Americans kept the content of these reports to themselves. The liaison unit that prepared them was subordinate to the U.S. Army Forces-South Atlantic, headquartered at Recife, Brazil, under Maj. Gen. Ralph H. Wooten, who at the very least summarized their contents orally for Minister of War General Eurico Dutra. In a January 1945 conversation, he told Dutra that the operations in Italy had revealed a "lack of leadership in the lower officer and noncommissioned officer grades" that required "more decentralization of authority" and that there was a need of "more training in the care and maintenance of equipment, vehicles, and other technical equipment, further training in sanitary control, and the necessity for establishing a more adequate inspection and follow-up system." Dutra replied that he recognized the need to pay closer attention to these matters and that he would take steps to correct them. (19)

Waack was correct in saying that the American military's ideology was that victory was possible if the necessary means were employed properly, and proper employment was the result of "training, training, and more training." His resentment of American "paternalism" and "arrogance" (*As duas faces da gloria*, p. 154) was matched during the campaign by some of the Brazilian officers, such as division chief of staff Lima Brayner, who regarded U.S. demands for constant training of even troops in the line as a humiliating imposition on soldiers who had not had a day's rest in four months. What needs to be admitted is that these troops were trained unevenly—some indeed were sent to Italy without basic training—and that within the FEB itself some officers recognized this and others did not. Colonel Brayner was engaged in his own bureaucratic war with the division's operations officer, Col. Humberto Castello Branco, who argued for constant training. The FEB commander, General Mascarenhas, referring to replacements trained in the rear area in Italy, admitted to American officers that the force's only trained troops had never entered combat. By taking reports out of context and laying them before the Brazilian public with the implied suggestion that they

represented the true—albeit secret—American opinion of the FEB, Waack did violence to historical accuracy and missed the opportunity to raise the level of sophistication in the historiography of Brazil's participation in the war. (20)

The American reports indicated a deep desire for the FEB to succeed. U.S. officers were aware that success or failure would affect the future relations between the two countries. Fifth Army commander, Lt. Gen. Mark Clark, noted in his diary that "handling" the Brazilians "is a very delicate subject and must be done right." (21) Of course, failure also would taint the American officers working with the Brazilians, so it was in their own personal interest to see them succeed. As an example of this concern, in late 1944 the entire staff of IV Corps regularly "visited, conferred with and attempted to give advice to, and assist[ed] the Brazilian staff and unit commanders...to create a highly efficient organization." Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenger, corps commander, maintained such close, personal contact with General Mascarenhas that, in November alone, he visited him twenty times and consulted with him by telephone six times. The Americans believed that close supervision, "further training," and absorption of the "bitter lessons learned in combat" would bring forth the division's potential capabilities. In the opinion of the IV Corps staff, the "majority of troops" were "intelligent and not lazy" and, in time, would "make good hardened soldiers." (22)

Evaluation of the Brazilian performance is muddled somewhat by the demands of diplomacy. Vernon Walters, who as Fifth Army's Portuguese-speaking liaison officer with the FEB probably knew the division's strengths and weaknesses better than any other American, commented in his memoirs that the Brazilian soldiers "had justified the faith placed in them" and had been in "continuous combat...without relief" for 239 days. (23) Mark Clark's public statements were always flattering, but his diary and interviews with a biographer reveal his dissatisfaction at having to include in his command a division whose junior officers had difficulty holding their poorly trained troops together under fire. His biographer reported that Clark considered Mascarenhas a "mercurial, a code word for unreliable" officer who "made excuses, and saw the presence of the Brazilians in Italy as a means of gaining prestige; they were not there, he told Clark frankly, to be cut to pieces." Privately, Clark even took credit for managing the push into the Po Valley so that the FEB took the surrender of major enemy units. (24) However, after the war he went to Brazil to participate

in the FEB's homecoming and returned again in 1949 exuding enthusiasm on both occasions.

What Lucian K. Truscott, Clark's successor as commander of the Fifth Army, thought about the Brazilians is unclear. In his book about the final days of the campaign he described the FEB defeat of the *148th* as "spectacular," and in the preface to the Brazilian edition, he naturally praised the FEB's contribution. (25) Yet his relations with the Brazilians were cool, if correct. FEB chief of staff Floriano de Lima Brayner considered him "taciturn," "withdrawn," and displaying "limited confidence" in the Brazilian troops. He compared Truscott unfavorably to Clark, who stimulated the Brazilians by demanding a lot from them, while he seemed less than enthused about them. "For us Latinos, he was a poor psychologist. He didn't know how to smile." (26) Perhaps because of this lack of enthusiasm, the Brazilian Army did not invite Truscott to accompany Clark and Crittenger to Rio de Janeiro for the FEB's 18 July 1945 homecoming. When they attempted to make up for the slight with a later invitation, he referred the matter to the War Department, saying that "to visit Brazil under these circumstances seems unnecessary unless reasons of higher policy indicate the contrary. I do not desire to attend any celebration in Brazil and can only be embarrassed thereby. ...I hope that you will not look with favor upon it." (27) Coalition warfare is at its base a relationship of personalities and national styles, and it takes determined effort and understanding on all sides to make it work.

The FEB completed all the missions confided to it and compared favorably with the U.S. divisions of IV Corps. It is lamentable that the heavy symbolism of Monte Castello has distracted analysis away from the FEB's victory at Montese on 16 April, in which it took the town after suffering 426 casualties in a grueling four-day battle. (28) Over the next few days it fought to a standstill the German *148th Division* and the Fascist Italian *Monte Rosa*, *San Marco*, and *Italia Divisions*. The *148th Division* surrendered to General Mascarenhas on 29-30 April. In a matter of days the Brazilians trapped and took the surrender of 2 generals, 800 officers, and 14,700 troops. It is doubtful that Clark could have "managed" the Brazilians in such a way as to bring this about, but he clearly wanted them to stop the *148th Division's* retreat. Indeed, his comment could be linked to the fact that the *148th* was the only intact German division to surrender on that front. In any case Mascarenhas made a point of waiting until he had taken the surrender and had the prisoners under

guard before notifying the American headquarters of the success. (29) What seems clear is that although they had little preparation and served under foreign command, against a combat-experienced enemy, the "Smoking Cobras" had shown, as one of their songs put it, the "fiber of the Brazilian Army" and the "*grandeza de nossa gente*" (greatness of our people). (30)

Conclusion

The FEB was enough of a success for U.S. leaders to hope it would stay in Europe as part of the occupation forces, but Brazilian military and civilian leaders rejected that role. Unhappily, over American objections, the Brazilian government decided to disband the FEB upon its return to Brazil. The American military had hoped that the division would be kept together to form the nucleus for a complete reformation of the Brazilian Army. FEB veterans, such as Humberto de Castello Branco, would slowly introduce the lessons of the war

into the General Staff School and Military School curricula. But the chance to use the FEB experience to project Brazilian influence into the postwar order was lost. Those making the rapid decisions in late 1945 that led to the FEB's demise could not know how quickly the United States would demobilize, or how quickly the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union would collapse. Perhaps if Brazil had maintained occupation troops in Europe and a standing cadre of combat-hardened troops at home, it might have had a very different postwar position.

Brazil's rejection of further overseas military operations in the Korean and Vietnam Wars is partly related to a national perception that the United States did not adequately appreciate its contribution in World War II, and that perception is related to the way the history of that war is understood, both in Brazil and in the United States.

Notes

ACS	Army Chief of Staff
CDOC-EX	Centro de Documentacao do Exercito, Brasilia
CPDOC	Centro de Pesquisa e Documentacao de Historia Contemporanea do Brasil, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro
GS	General Staff
MID	Military Intelligence Division
MMB	Modern Military Branch
NARA	National Archives, Washington
OPD	Operations Plans Division
RG	Record Group

1. Ltr, Oswaldo Aranha to Eurico Dutra (Minister of War), 11 Aug 43, Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha, CPDOC. Aranha wrote this to Dutra who was visiting the United States to negotiate details of the FEB. He admitted that such a close alliance carried dangers potentially incompatible with Brazilian sovereignty and interests, but he believed that it was the course with the fewest risks and greatest security. It was a lesser evil, and they would have to be constantly vigilant to avoid pitfalls.

2. Ronald C. Newton, *The 'Nazi Menace' in Argentina, 1931-1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 299. He notes that the United States "artfully generated" the Argentine "alarms of war with Brazil," which were increasing in "frequency and intensity" in 1943. For Brazilian views of Argentina, see Gary Frank, *Struggle for Hegemony in South America: Ar-*

gentina, Brazil, and the United States During the Second World War (Coral Gables: University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1979), pp. 45-60.

3. Frank D. McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 349-53.

4. Carlos de Meira Mattos, *O Marechal Mascarenhas de Moraes e sua epoca* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exercito, 1983), pp. 89-90; interview, author with Meira Mattos, December 1991 in Rio. The other two divisions were to be led by Generals Newton Cavalcanti and Heitor Borges.

5. Democrito Cavalcanti de Arruda, et al., *Depoimento de Oficiais de Reserva Sobre a F. E. B.* (Rio de Janeiro: Cobraci Publicacoes, 1949). Regarding the number of reservists, see McCann, *Brazilian-American Alliance*, p. 368, n. 40.

6. Msg, J.B. Mascarenhas to E. Dutra, Cifrado # 33-G.1, 7 Apr 45, Cifrados FEB, de 15/9/44 a 5/7/45, 433.40, "1944/1945," MG665c, CDOC-EX, Brasilia. He saw the FEB's prestige at stake. The Americans also were concerned about junior officers. Mascarenhas' report as commander of the 7th Military Region indicated a shortage of lieutenants (165 authorized, but only 123 on duty). Joao B. Mascarenhas de Moraes, "Relatorio apresentado as Exmo. Sr. General de Divisao Ministro de Guerra pelo General de Brigado Joao Batista Mascarenhas de Moraes Comandante da 7a. Regiao Militar, Ano de 1941" (Recife, 12 Fevereiro

- de 1942), CDEX-Brasilia, p. 25. Maj. Gen. Ralph Wooten, who played a large role in relations with the Brazilians, called General Dutra's attention "to the lack of leadership in the lower officer and noncommissioned officer grades," suggesting various remedies. See Msg, Maj Gen Ralph H. Wooten to ACS OPD, Recife, 23 Jan 45, sub: Resume of Situation in This Theater, OPD 336 Latin American Section IV, Cases 80-93, RG 165, MMB, NARA.
7. For the recruitment data on the 7th Military Region, see Mascarenhas, "Relatorio...1941," pp. 32-34. On FEB selection, see Lt. Col. Carlos Paiva Goncalves, *Selecao Medica do Pessao da F.E.B., Historico, Funcionamento e Dados Estatisticos* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exercicio, 1951), pp. 67-142. See also Rpt, Maj Gen Ralph H. Wooten to ACS OPD, Recife, 23 Jan 45, sub: Resume of Situation in This Theater; Msg, Col Charles B.B. Bubb to CG MTOUSA (Mediterranean Theater), Rio, 6 Dec 44, sub: Medical Report on the Fourth Echelon of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, OPD336.2 Brazil 9 Sec IV), RG 165, MMB, NARA; McCann, *Brazilian-American Alliance*, pp. 369-72.
8. Msg, Gen Eurio Dutra to Col Edwin L. Sibert, Rio, 8 Jan 41, 2257 K18/247; and Col Edwin L. Sibert to ACS G2, Rio, 18 Mar 41, No. 2650, sub: Student Officers from Brazil to US Service Schools, 2257 K18/306, RG 165, WD, GS, MID, NARA; McCann, *Brazilian-American Alliance*, pp. 353-54, n. 18. By comparison, the Chinese sent 249 officers to Fort Leavenworth, the British 208, the Venezuelans 73, the Mexicans 60, and the Argentines 31. Command and General Staff School commander General Truesdell's comment about quality of Brazilian officers was reported by Maj. Gen. J. G. Ord in a speech to the staff of the Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs, 11 Aug 44, BDC 5400, RG 218 (Records of the U.S. JCS), NARA.
9. Combat Diary, Rpt 1/Inf. Div. BEF, entries for 30-31 Oct 44, Center of Military History, Washington; Jose Alfio Piason, "Alguns Erros Fundamentais Observados na FEB," *Depoimento de Oficiais da Reserva*, pp. 103-07. Piason was a subcommander of one of the companies involved (3d Co. 1/6 IR). See also Mascarenhas, *Memorias*, I, pp. 183-88. On an aerial observer's report of a German buildup prior to the action, see Elber de Mello Henriques, *A FEB Doze Anos Depois* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Biblioteca do Exercicio, 1959), pp. 72-74. The most balanced account is Manoel Thomaz Castello Branco, *O Brasil na II Grande Guerra* (Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exercicio, 1960), pp. 206-14.
10. Floriano de Lima Brayner, *A Verdade Sobre a FEB: Memorias de um Chefe de Estado-Major, na Campanha da Italia, 1943-1945* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Civilizacao Brasileira, 1968), p. 234.
11. Willaim Waack, *As Duas Faces da gloria: A FEB vista pelos seus aliados e inimigos* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1985). The underlying tone of the book questions the importance of the FEB. It is interesting that the Germans took the FEB seriously enough to broadcast a daily radio program called "Ouro e Verde" over Radio Victoria from near Como, Italy, using two Brazilian nationals as commentators—Margarida Hirschmann and Emilio Baldino. Both were tried and given jail sentences after the war. See Msg, Daniels to SecState, Rio, 9 Dec 46, 832.203/12-946, RG 59, NARA.
12. Waack, *As Duas Faces*, pp. 88-89. The thesis is that of Francisco Pinto Cabral, "Um batalhao no Monte Castello" (Ph.D. diss., Universidade de Sao Paulo, 1982), p. 7. Waack should not have taken this thesis so seriously, as it is based entirely on a dozen or so published sources. The author is amazed that it passed the examiners at Sao Paulo. Waack also quotes a journalist who covered the FEB as saying that Monte Castello was "the most important tactical-strategic objective—aside from its moral aspect—at a determining moment of the Italian campaign." Joel Silveira and Thassilo Mitke, *A Luta dos Pracinhas: A Forca Expedicionaria Brasileira—FEB na II Guerra Mundial* (Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1983). This is a journalistic memoir by civilian observers.
13. Waack, *As Duas Faces*, pp. 90-93; FEB Combat Diary, entry for 21 Feb 45, p. 35, in Report on the 1st Infantry Division Brazilian Expeditionary Forces in the Italian Campaign from 16 July 1944 to the Cessation of Hostilities in May 1945, 301 (BEF)-033, NARA.
14. Waack, *As Duas Faces*, p. 93.
15. Typescript MS, "History of the Fourth Corps," U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., pp. 509-11.
16. Waack, *As Duas Faces*, pp. 94-95.
17. It may be worth noting that this was the 10th Mountain Division's "first major engagement with the enemy." "History of Fourth Corps," p. 512.
18. For a fascinating discussion of the "school of the soldier," see Paul Fussell, *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 52-65.
19. Msg, Maj Gen Ralph H. Wooten to ACS OPD, Recife, 23 Jan 45, sub: Resume of Situation in This Theater, OPD 336 Latin American Section IV, Cases

- 80-93, RG 165, MMB, NARA. The conversation took place in Rio, 19 January 1945.
20. Waack, *As Duas Faces*, pp. 13, 143-44, 154; Floriano de Lima Brayner, *A Verdade Sobre a FEB*, pp. 331-33; Capt Frank T. Cameron, Historical Report of the Brazilian Replacement Depot, p. 6 in Report on the 1st Infantry Division...1945, 301 (BEF)-033, NARA.
21. Quoted in Martin Blumenson, *Mark Clark: The Last of the Great World War II Commanders* (New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984), p. 226.
22. Msg, HQ IV Corps to CG, Fifth Army, sub: Coordination with BEF, 14 Dec 44, IV Corps papers, U.S. Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
23. Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1978), p. 138.
24. Blumenson, *Mark Clark*, pp. 236, 247, 261.
25. Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., *19 Dias dos Apeninos aos Alpes* (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1950), p. 71.
26. Lima Brayner, *A Verdade Sobre a FEB*, p. 439.
27. Msg, Truscott (CG, Fifth Army) to Gen Thomas T. Handy (OCSA), Fifth Army Command Post, 24 Jul 45, OPD 336.2 Brazil, Sec. V, Case 85, Box 967, RG 165, MMB, NARA. General Cordeiro de Farias informed Truscott of the possible invitation, saying that they had not invited him on the first trip because they wanted to give him special recognition.
28. Newton C. de Andrade Mello, *A Epopeia de Montese* (Curitiba: Imprensa Oficial do Estado, 1954).
29. Mascarenhas ordered his men: "Only after the Germans are here we will inform the Americans." Aspasia Camaargo and Wadler de Goes, *Meio Seculo de Combate: Dialogo com Cordeiro de Farias* (Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Nova Fronteira, 1981), p. 368.
30. On the songs of the Febianos, see McCann, *Brazilian-American Alliance*, pp. 432, 435; and the recording "20 Anos Depois: Expedicionarios em Ritmos," Chantecler Records, Sao Paulo, release CMG 2397, 1965.

Editor's Journal

As we continue to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of World War II, this issue of *Army History* takes a slightly different perspective, examining the impact within the Western Hemisphere of that conflict. Dr. Frank D. McCann investigates the role of the *Forca Expedicionaria Brasileira* in Italy (1944-45), while Brazilian Army Col. (Ret.) Claudio Moreira Bento takes a broader, reflective look at Brazil's involvement in World War II. Dr. Charles Hendricks examines the work of the Army Corps of Engineers in building bases in the Atlantic. Finally, the Archaic Archivist helps us document hemispheric defense through the holdings of the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Recalling a different war, I also want to highlight in this issue the article on Task Force Smith, excerpted from the Center's series on the Korean War.

When the publication of *Army History* # 24 was delayed at the end of 1992 while the Center awaited funding, our World War II Chronology fell behind the contemporary commemoration of events. To move ahead of the power curve, so to speak, we have included a six-month—rather than a three-month—chronology in this issue. I hope that Mr. Ned Bedessem's chronologies will continue to play an important part in the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S. Army in World War II.

We continue to receive good items for our future issues. Please be patient if your article or book review does not appear right away, and *please*, if at all possible, include a disk (double sided/double density 5.25 inch or double sided/high density 3.5 inch) with your contribution in WordPerfect 5.1 or 5.0 or an ASCII data file. This will greatly speed up the inclusion of your article and reduce the chances of typos.

A.G. Fisch, Jr.

The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

Today's Army is going through a period of rapid change as the nation adjusts to a "new world order." All of our senior officers could be characterized as members of the Cold War Generation. Their youthful images of service were shaped by the Berlin airlift and the Korean War, they perfected their combat skills in Vietnam, and they mastered planning challenges along the inter-German border. They transformed an Army composed of draftees into a volunteer force, and they improved the readiness of the total force—Active, National Guard, and Reserve units.

They proved their competence by conducting decisive operations in such far-flung theaters as Panama and Iraq. Their cumulative experience shaped a remarkably capable leader group. Still, their historians have to remind these leaders that history must supplement their own experiences if they are to comprehend fully the challenges America's Army now faces.

Historians know that the last fifty years can be seen as an anomaly in the history of our Army. The nation maintained relatively large forces and invested large sums in defense modernization because there was broad consensus on the military dimension of the Cold War threat. Now we are entering a period of dwindling federal budgets with an ill-defined military threat. In the 1890s and 1920s, a strong economy could have invested heavily in America's Army, but little was done because political leaders saw no threat requiring a strong Army. In the early 1930s a weak economy combined with the lack of a perceived military threat to drive the Army budget to extremely low levels. While no one expects the future to match the 1930s, we can look back at the many periods in America's history when the threat was ill defined and resources were scarce and make a few generalizations.

We know that in past periods of ill-defined threat the Army was not the primary figure in the defense establishment. Traditionally the Navy has been perceived as the first line of defense; the long lead times in ship construction and concerns about technological advances combined to foster investments in naval

construction at times when a minuscule Regular Army was neglected. With no proximate threat, the nation's preference for militia also contributed to that neglect of the Regular Army. While civilian leaders might support the militia with strong rhetoric, actions and budgets seldom matched the words. As a result, citizen-soldiers and soldier-citizens might both share an ethic of selfless service, but recruiting and retaining enough quality people to fill the ranks of militia or regular formations were extremely difficult. In that environment, militia organizations tended to give up readiness while retaining force structure, while regulars often were forced to sacrifice some of their relatively expensive manpower authorizations to maintain a modicum of readiness. And, of course, Congress gave the Army missions, equipment, and bases it did not want while refusing budget authority for programs that could have made it stronger.

Even when resources are scarce, "pork" tends to get in the way of progress. In past periods of spartan Army budgets, the fight for money has exacerbated tensions between the militia and the regulars, and parochial views within the Army, e.g., cavalry vs. infantry or armor vs. airborne, have made the budget battle bloodier. Satisfying existing demands soon consumed virtually all of the available resources, leaving little capacity for introducing new technology.

Today's Army has been scrimping along on relatively tight budgets for several years, so significant progress has been made in learning to live with the traditional problems associated with scarce resources. Whether the accommodations currently planned or in place would work well in a climate of further severe cutbacks remains to be seen. But by briefing these historical tendencies to senior commanders, I have tried to help them appreciate our Army's unique history so that they can better cope with adverse trends. The thinking and approaches that won the Cold War may not be sufficient for the times facing us now, but our nation's history holds many potential lessons that our leaders can use as they invent the future.

Mars and Clio in the Netherlands The Military History Section, RNLA

P. H. Kamphuis

Doctor Kamphuis' article is derived from a paper he presented in Washington, D.C., at the Conference of Army Historians, June 1992.

My purpose is to create an accurate impression through this presentation of how military history is recorded in the Netherlands.

Military history in my country is virtually the exclusive field of military historians employed by the Ministry of Defense. Although one can see increased interest in this field at universities, military history is not formally recognized in the structure of the curriculum, and there are no professors' chairs officially devoted to it.

Within the Ministry of Defense, recording military history is the responsibility of the various branches of military service. In addition to the Military History Section of the Royal Netherlands Army, there is also a Naval Historical Section and an Air Force Historical Section. The same sort of arrangement exists for military museums.

The Military History Section, established in 1891, can justly be considered the senior section in terms of age, size, and reputation. It is generally regarded as the single most important research center in the field of military history in the Netherlands.

The space available does not permit me to reach into the vast treasure trove of our military history, nor to discuss in detail the developments that have taken place in the profession in the last fifty years. I would refer those of you who are interested in those developments to the recently published English edition of our magazine, *Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis*, an international edition of which is devoted entirely to the subject: *Mededelingen van de Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis. Centenary Issue. Military History Around the World 14* (1991).

The Mission

An independent section within the Dutch Army Staff, the Military History Section is answerable directly to the deputy commander in chief. Its tasks consist of more than merely carrying out military-historical research and publishing the results of that study. Broadly stated, the section's mission can be

described as a mandate to produce and provide high-quality military-historical knowledge, insights, and services.

Functioning in and for the Royal Netherlands Army means that there must be an unambiguous relationship between the activities of the section and the history of the Dutch armed forces. In practice, this means that our "hunting grounds" are limited.

The Mission Area

The Military History Section is concerned with: (1) the history of Dutch Army forces, both within and outside of Europe; (2) the actions taken by foreign forces on Dutch soil (or what used to be Dutch territory). In other words, the section devotes its attention to the States Army as it has developed—from its establishment under Prince Maurice through its development under Frederick Hendrik to the modern, successful fighting force it is today; from the British-Dutch-Prussian stand at Waterloo to the work of the Royal Netherlands Army today in Yugoslavia, Cambodia, the Sinai, and elsewhere. The history of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army also falls within our area of responsibility. Indeed, the military aspects of the period 1945-1950—the decolonization of Indonesia—when more than 150,000 Dutch service personnel engaged in a war against the new republic, is one of our primary areas of research. An example of the second mission area would be the American troops who were involved in the fighting on Dutch soil in 1944-45.

These mission areas limit our activities—in terms of time—to the period beginning with the Dutch revolt against Philip II of Spain in 1568 and ending with today.

The Tasks

The Army Council, the highest decision-making organ within the Royal Netherlands Army, on 29 October 1991 specified the section's tasks as follows:

(1) Acquiring scientifically sound knowledge of and insights into both the history of Dutch Army forces inside and outside of Europe and actions taken by foreign troops on what is or was Dutch soil;

(2) Collecting and making available military-historical data and audiovisual material that is of impor-

tance to the existing historical records of the Royal Netherlands Army forces, and collecting up-to-date documentation (including audiovisual material) for the purpose of recording the history of the Dutch Army forces in the future; and

(3) Acquainting others with the history of the Dutch Army forces by means of publications, presentations, battlefield tours, and the like, and by disseminating information.

To summarize briefly, the Military History Section is the research, (image) documentation, and information center for military history within the Royal Netherlands Army.

Organization and Personnel

Our research and documentation tasks are reflected in the organizational structure of the section. The same may be said for the Naval and Air Force Historical Sections. The section consists of an administrative staff, a research and publications office, and a documentation and information office. The total number of staff members is twenty-one. These personnel are all relatively young, with an average age of thirty-five and have a relatively high level of education (we try to recruit the best and the brightest). The majority of the staff members are civilians—only three have military status. This was not always the case. Until the late 1970s, the section consisted chiefly of officers who, in the twilight of their military careers, turned their attention to battle history. Under the leadership of my predecessor, Dr. Cees Schulten, now president of the Commission Internationale d'Histoire Militaire (ICMH), a process of professionalization took place. Staff members were required to have at least a university degree and also had to be willing to commit themselves to the section for a number of years. Our experience is that this method of selecting personnel results ultimately in more historical "bang for the buck" spent.

Fewer regular military personnel does mean, however, that the section is not as adequately represented in informal networks as it had been—connections at the Royal Military Academy with bonds of friendship which often were lifelong. We have compensated for this disadvantage by participation in mess hall activities at headquarters and (I would add that this is essential) by active participation in the programs offered at the Royal Military Academy and the War College, through which new generations have been introduced to the section and to military history. And, beginning two years ago, the section assumed respon-

sibility for the military-historical training offered at the Royal Military Academy.

Returning to the section's organization, one finds that the Documentation and Information Office has three responsibilities. The first is to support the research group. To accomplish this mission, the office has facilities which include a specialized reference library with 25,000 volumes and subscriptions to more than 100 periodicals; more than 500 linear meters of documentary files, including, for example, battle reports from Dutch troops during May 1940, from troops in the Dutch East Indies, and from the Dutch detachment in Korea, intelligence reports from resistance groups during World War II, and classified quarterly reports from the Royal Netherlands Army in the 1970s; image files with more than 60,000 photographs; and an extensive collection of military maps.

This collection is open to the public, a fact that brings us to the Documentation and Information Office's second task, that of offering services to the general public. Each day the section is flooded with letters and phone calls bringing questions from the public. The office also offers assistance to visitors.

Finally, the Documentation and Information Office is responsible for documenting publications concerning the Royal Netherlands Army both of today and in history.

I have not mentioned military archives because the military historical sections are not repositories for archives. Since 1961 the Ministry of Defense has had its own, separate Archives Department. In the Netherlands, we work on a fifty-year schedule, i.e., the ministry must turn over government records that are more than fifty years old to the General State Archives in the Hague. These archives are open to the public, and the policy of the state archives is oriented to the needs of the public. The archives are well catalogued and readily accessible.

For government records more recent than fifty years, researchers must consult the archives section of the relevant ministry. Access is often restricted because of rules of confidentiality, and permission must be obtained for access. In practice, generally a thirty-year rule applies. The minutes of cabinet meetings held in 1962, for example, can now be consulted by researchers. The Dutch Freedom of Information Act of 1978 allows professional researchers access to the archives of the Ministry of Defense in most cases; access to relatively recent records may be denied for reasons of confidentiality, or to prevent the risk of endangering Dutch foreign relations, the unity of the

Crown, or the security of the state. If and when access is denied, the researcher can appeal to the highest judicial authority in the Netherlands.

The Military History Section, therefore, does not have formal access to government files, although we do have at our disposal the personal papers and files of numerous defense employees. For example, one of my staff members is compiling a book about the late Lt. Gen. Michael Rudolph Hendrik Calmeyer—a military man and politician who played an important role in the reconstruction of the Royal Netherlands Army in the 1950s. Calmeyer's diaries are a rich and vital source of information.

The military historians in the Research and Publications Office have unlimited access to all Ministry of Defense archives. Accessibility is not a problem for them, but they do struggle with the problems of selection that all contemporary historians face: how to find the right file in those miles and miles of archives? An even more thorny question is how to process classified information. To state it bluntly: when does the company historian stop being a historian and start acting like a policy official? To illustrate with an example, two of my employees were preparing a manuscript discussing the history of the Royal Netherlands Army from 1945 to 1990. They used classified material during their research. Now we are struggling with the problem of how to cite the material used. Naturally, the authors want their story explained in as much detail as possible, but they are aware of the fact that this is not always possible and that "open sources" must sometimes be quoted instead of the authentic documents.

The "fighting force" of our section is found primarily inside the Research and Publications Office. The core activity of this office is, of course, research and publications. Before elaborating on that mission, I would like to mention briefly the other products and activities of our military historians: (1) policy recommendations—in terms of policy relating to veterans, to maintaining of traditions, memorials, etc.; (2) military education programs; (3) staff rides—for educational institutions and for foreign guests of the Royal Netherlands Army; (4) ghost writing—for the chief of staff and various ministers; and (5) historical recommendations—for editors, exhibitors, etc.

Research, however, is by far the most important activity. In planning research, I sometimes feel like a tightrope walker, constantly trying to maintain a balance—a balance between the need for a continuous stream of publications and for long-term basic research, and a balance between easily recognizable

publications for the Royal Netherlands Army (e.g., corps histories on their anniversaries) and less accessible scientific publications. Even in this latter, more complicated work, we apply Thomas Hardy's notion that "war makes rattling good reading."

In short, research planning must continually take into account four different target audiences: the Ministry of Defense/Royal Netherlands Army, the media, the scientific community, and the general public. So far as possible, we try to select research topics in such a way that we will be able to use the results to serve more than one of these audiences. For example, between 1981 and 1990, one staff member concentrated all of her efforts on studying the effectiveness of the Dutch military performance in Indonesia. Her book is now a standard reference work in both the Netherlands and Indonesia, and her expertise is applied almost every day in making policy recommendations. At the same time, for the media she is the top expert on the subject in the Netherlands, which means that a staff member of the Royal Netherlands Army is constantly in the papers or on television when an expert opinion is required. This is considered excellent public relations for the Royal Netherlands Army.

We have applied the same philosophy in our preparations for the fifty-year *Fall Gelb* [the German operation, Case Yellow] anniversary. Because we knew that our own organization—as well as the media and the general public—would turn to the section for help in the memorial activities, considerable attention was devoted to studying those days in May 1940. In so doing, we left the existing literature and returned to the 1940 sources, both Dutch and German. The results were amazing. We discovered that there was an enormous gap in the existing perception of May 1940 and the factual image that the military historian can document. The resultant book we published caused quite a sensation.

Both the book about the fighting in Indonesia and the one about May 1940 drew emotional reactions from a number of veterans and their representatives. Because of the more critical portions, we were accused of soiling our own nest, so to speak. These publications, however, have established the section's reputation with the media and with universities as an independent research institution. What is striking in this is that the army staff, despite the often emotional pleas to take action, has never restricted our freedom in any way. The moral of this story is that, being a company historian in the Netherlands, you must place *even higher* demands on your research and the manner in

which you phrase your results than your academic colleagues.

In conclusion, I would like to summarize the topics to which we will be devoting our attentions in the next five years. We are giving top priority to recent military history. Actual projects include an overview of the liberation of the Netherlands, 1944-45, and a study of Dutch prisoners of war in Japanese camps, including their repatriation to the Netherlands East Indies and their subsequent—almost immediate—call to active duty against the Indonesian nationalists. Other projects, in addition to the books I have already mentioned about the Royal Netherlands Army, 1945-90, and General Calmeyer, include research into the histories of the artillery and the engineer corps on the occasion of their

anniversaries. The relationship between the armed forces and society will be discussed in a diachronic study of the history of compulsory military service in the Netherlands. Finally, we will be continuing to publish our scientific magazine and small brochures chiefly intended for regular military personnel.

Leo Tolstoy once commented that “historians are like deaf people who go on answering questions that no one has asked them.” Through this paper, I hope to make clear that army historians in the Netherlands go through life bubbling with activity, with their eyes and ears wide open.

Dr. P. H. Kamphuis is head of the Military History Section of the army staff, Royal Netherlands Army.

Calls for Papers

Siena College is sponsoring an international, multidisciplinary conference on the fiftieth anniversary of World War II, to be held 2-3 June 1994 at the college. This annual conference will focus on 1944, although papers dealing with broad issues of earlier years are welcome. Suggested topics include, but are not limited to: fascism and nazism; resistance and collaboration; the air war; the Italian campaign—Anzio, Casino, etc.; the North Atlantic and the naval war in the Pacific; “island hopping”; the Russian front; Normandy and the ETO (European Theater of Operations) thereafter; the Warsaw rising; the Holocaust; literature, art, and film; diplomatic, political, and military history and biography; popular culture; minority affairs; women’s studies; and Asian, African, Latin American, and Near Eastern topics. Religion, pacifism, conscription, draft resistance and dissent, and events on the home front, as well as postwar planning, would also be of interest. All these and other relevant topics are welcome.

The deadline for submissions is 1 December 1993.

The 1994 annual meeting of the Society for Military History (formerly the American Military Institute) will be held 8-10 April 1994 in Washington, D.C. The theme for the meeting will be “Civil-Military Relations.” This theme allows for a wide-ranging examination of the interaction of war, society, and the military in a historical context from ancient times to the present.

Proposals for individual papers and complete sessions addressing Civil-Military Relations are solicited. Interested parties should, by 1 October 1993, send an abstract of no more than a single page to the program chairman: Dr. Timothy K. Nenninger, Society for Military History 1994 Meeting, P.O. Box 4762, McLean, VA 22103.

General Gordon R. Sullivan on the Importance of History to the Army

Billy A. Arthur

On 26 March 1993, Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan sent a message to the major commands (MACOMs) as an endorsement of military history and museum programs in the Army. This message exempts no one from the wise use of resources, nor does it protect history or museum programs that do not contribute to accomplishing the mission of their commands. The purpose of the message is to bring the long-term worth of history and museums to the attention of MACOM commanders and to challenge historians to be valued staff officers who bring historical information and insights to the decision-making process.

General Sullivan's message assigns a key role to history in the restructuring of the Army and requests that commanders follow AR 5-3 (October 1992 edition) and AR 870-5 (as revised) in organizing their staffs. It provides support from the top in these turbulent times and challenges each of us to use our expertise on the past to its fullest.

The full text of the message is as follows:

"R 262000Z MAR 93
FM DA WASHINGTON DC//DACS-ZA//
TO AIG 7406
UNCLAS
SUBJECT: MILITARY HISTORY OPERATIONS IN THE ARMY
A. AR 5-3 (Oct 1992) Installation Management and Organization
B. AR 870-5 Military History (final draft)

"1. In the continuing reshaping of the Army we have to make hard decisions concerning manpower. I am concerned that pressure to reduce staffing is causing commanders to place their command historians and museum curators at risk. Recently revised, the above referenced regulations specify history as a separate staff office on the commander's staff and expand its responsibilities. Often a one-person office and lacking visibility among the staff, the historian is frequently first to be nominated for reduction or elimination in times of limited resources. Museum staffs are similarly small, vulnerable targets when cuts are being considered. My view is that we can neither restructure the Army correctly nor record the resulting changes objectively without the contributions we must get from these experts on the Army's past.

"2. Military history must play a key role in current and future decision-making. History's long-term worth to the Army is inestimable, and your command historian should be one of your most productive and valued staff officers, providing information, perspective, and insights not available from any other source. Consequently, I request that you follow the guidance in these revised regulations and use your historian to his or her fullest capability. Likewise, your museums contain irreplaceable relics of the Army's heritage which must be preserved for future generations of soldiers.

"3. My historian BG Harold W. Nelson and his staff at the Center of Military History stand ready to support your command's historical program in any way possible. They may be reached at DSN 285-5400."

Building the Atlantic Bases

Charles Hendricks

This article originally appeared as an essay in Builders and Fighters: U.S. Army Engineers in World War II. Reprinted with permission of the general editor, Dr. Barry W. Fowle.

The rapid German military victories in western Europe in the spring of 1940 isolated Great Britain as the sole remaining European combatant opposing Hitler's military machine. The capitulation of France and the installation of the Fascist Vichy regime there in June ended a season in which German armies had also occupied and overthrown the democratic governments of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Only the survival of Britain's arms, including the maintenance of its dominant naval power, separated the advancing German forces from possible inroads in the New World. The heavy air attack which the Germans waged on Britain in the summer of 1940 raised the specter of an assault on that island that would leave American security interests in the Western Hemisphere gravely exposed. While the British demonstrated more tenacity in the face of this onslaught than Americans had at first anticipated, the defeat in September of a combined British and Free French attack on Vichy land and naval forces in the French West African port of Dakar made the German menace to the not-so-distant eastern bulge of South America all the more vivid.

Despite the gravity of the threat to American security posed by these developments, the American public and its elected leaders, disillusioned by the aftermath of United States participation two decades earlier in a European conflict which President Woodrow Wilson had described as "a war to end all wars," sought to avoid direct involvement in the renewed combat in Europe. Thus while Congress in mid-1940 approved large new appropriations for American military mobilization, it forbade the administration to sell any American ships, weapons, or munitions of war unless it could certify them as nonessential to the defense of the United States. When this legislation was adopted in June 1940, many Americans feared that Britain, like France, might capitulate to the Germans and that American munitions that the British had obtained might then be turned against the United States.

Wishing to respond positively to British Prime

Minister Winston Churchill's plea in July 1940 for forty or fifty destroyers and other naval boats and planes, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, taking up the suggestion of a New York group supporting aid to Britain, proposed to exchange fifty aging destroyers for the right to establish American naval and air bases in an arc of seven British possessions in the Western Hemisphere. These possessions stretched from Newfoundland in the north to the South American territory of British Guiana and included the island possessions of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Santa Lucia, and Trinidad. Diplomatic notes exchanged by the American and British foreign secretaries on 2 September effected accords along those lines, including a British promise never to surrender the warships to the Germans and provisions for 99-year American leases on its new bases. The destroyer-base agreement, which proved broadly popular in the United States, expanded the bonds of British and American strategic cooperation and provided the United States with new opportunities to develop forward lines of Atlantic defense.

Although the War Department had not yet transferred responsibility for air base construction in the United States from the Quartermaster Corps to the Corps of Engineers, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall immediately assigned the work in the British territories to the engineers. In October, Chief of Engineers Maj. Gen. Julian Schley began to create the organizational structure to handle the new assignment. Schley named Lt. Col. Joseph Arthur as engineer of the new Eastern Division and placed him in overall charge of the new work. Arthur was an experienced manager of engineering projects, having spent a full decade successively leading three engineer districts. The Newfoundland and Bermuda Districts, headed by Maj. Philip Bruton and Maj. Donald White, respectively, would be reporting to the Eastern Division. In December 1940, new Jamaica and Trinidad Districts were added to the Eastern Division to oversee the work required in the Caribbean.

Before much construction could begin at the sites contemplated in the destroyer-base agreement, the Corps obtained a further base construction responsibility beyond the nation's borders. Using authority granted by a June military appropriations act, the War Depart-

ment on 2 November 1940 entered into a secret contract with Pan American Airways to build or expand commercial airfields in Central and South America and the Caribbean in accord with War Department specifications. Under the contract, the United States government would provide full funding for the work, and a Corps of Engineers officer would oversee the project from the United States. The fields would be designed to accommodate both commercial and military planes, but the use of a commercial airline as construction agent obviated any need for formal military understandings with the host nations.

The danger of an extension of German military power in the North Atlantic from Norway to the islands of Iceland and Greenland also worried President Roosevelt. Americans feared that a German attack on the cryolite mine at Ivigtut in southern Greenland might disrupt the supply of a metal crucial to the production of Canadian aluminum on which Allied aircraft manufacturers depended heavily. Britain occupied Iceland in May 1940, soon after the German conquest of Denmark, to whose king Iceland had paid fealty. The United States acted to protect the North Atlantic the following year. On 9 April 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull signed a defense agreement with Free Danish authorities under which the Americans guaranteed the security of Greenland in exchange for broad authority to construct air bases and other facilities on the island. Hoping to free British forces in Iceland for more pressing military requirements elsewhere, the United States on 1 July 1941 also accepted Iceland's invitation to take over its defense. Engineer troops initiated American base construction efforts on both Iceland and Greenland.

Base construction in the harsh climates of the North Atlantic, where ice and snow could interfere with winter work and supply, generally proved more difficult than did the construction jobs in the island and mainland territories to the south, but the engineers pursued the northern work with no less vigor. American engineers came first to Newfoundland. Major Bruton arrived on the island in mid-October 1940 and in the following month began building temporary housing at Camp Alexander outside the island colony's capital, St. John's, using locally hired workmen. Construction began at Fort Pepperrell, destined to become the major American installation protecting that city, in the last days of 1940. Located on a rocky, coastal hillside, the post would eventually accommodate 5,500 troops. Fort McAndrew, located eighty miles to the west across the Avalon Peninsula, saw the start of

construction in March 1941. This post protected the large air and sea base that the U.S. Navy built at nearby Argentia.

At the war's outset, Newfoundland possessed in Gander Field a facility adequate to the strategic needs of both Canadian and American military aircraft. The Canadians operated this field during the war, although U.S. troops assisted with maintenance. The Corps of Engineers supplemented Gander by building Harmon Field at Stephenville on Newfoundland's west coast. Originally planned as an emergency landing field, the site was expanded beginning in 1942 into a permanent field with facilities for 2,800 troops and four tanker anchorages. The Air Corps judged Harmon to have 10 percent clearer weather than Gander, and it eventually became the primary American air ferry landing site on the island.

Beginning in April 1941, a consortium of four American contractors led by two Minnesota firms undertook the bulk of the Newfoundland work. In a pattern typical of Atlantic base construction efforts, the contractors recruited most of their labor locally but imported the bulk of the materials they used from the United States. An administrative shift occurred in June 1941 when the Eastern Division was reorganized as the Caribbean Division and the Corps of Engineers placed the Newfoundland District under the North Atlantic Division. By the time the Corps' construction efforts in Newfoundland were completed in April 1943, the cost of its projects there amounted to \$60.3 million, including \$750,000 worth of materials lost at sea.

Elements of the 21st Engineers, the Army's first specialized airfield construction regiment, initiated base construction in both Iceland and Greenland. Engineer troops arrived in Greenland in July 1941 with the first shipment of United States forces there, and they initially concentrated on erecting housing and anchorage facilities. The arrival that September of civilian construction crews provided by two of the contractors already engaged in the Newfoundland work enabled the engineer troops to concentrate on the construction of the primary Greenland field, code-named BLUEWEST 1, at the head of Tunugliarfik Fjord in southwestern part of the island. The contractors obtained workers accustomed to cold winter weather from a recruiting office they opened at Superior in northern Wisconsin. Troops and civilian workers alike lived that winter in prefabricated buildings erected a few feet off the ground. Twelve-seat latrines, blasted out of the frozen soil and sanitized weekly by spraying with oil and igniting, served each company.



Pavers work both ends of a 25-foot-wide slab on runway at Harmon Field on Newfoundland's west coast.

The field at BLUIE WEST 1 would by 1943 include a 6,500-foot concrete runway and a 5,000-foot asphalt strip, but as early as September 1941 troops began laying a pierced-steel landing mat on a 3,500-foot-long temporary runway, an early use of this technology. The companies of the 21st Engineers in Greenland sailed back to the United States in June 1942, and civilian crews replaced them. Directed by area engineers under the North Atlantic Division of the Corps and, after December 1942, its Greenland District, the contract workers also built the BLUIE WEST 8 field at the head of Sondre Stromfjord on Greenland's west coast just north of the Arctic Circle and the BLUIE EAST 2 field near Angmagssalik on the island's eastern coast at Iceland's latitude. Construction progressed year-round despite delays caused by shipping problems and winter storms with winds as high as 165 miles per hour. By the end of 1943, the Army had 5,300 troops in its Greenland garrison.

While the elements of the 21st Engineers that landed in Iceland in August 1941 comprised the first Army engineer contingent there, they arrived a month after a 4,100-man U.S. Marine force. The Americans joined a 24,000-man British garrison that had already met its housing needs and developed air bases at Reykjavik, the capital, and Kaldadharnes, thirty-five

miles to the southeast. The forty-one bombers and nine fighters at these fields protected the island and adjacent Atlantic shipping lanes, and when thirty American planes joined them in August 1941 the fields became decidedly crowded. The air strength was essential, however, for Iceland lay within range, albeit barely, of the sixty to ninety German bombers based in Norway.

Iceland Base Command Engineer Lt. Col. Clarence Iry, who came to the North Atlantic after serving as district engineer at the Fort Peck Dam project on the Missouri River, directed both Army and Marine troops in erecting the housing that would be needed by a rapidly growing American garrison. He was aided, in 1941, by the British contribution of some corrugated iron-roofed Nissen huts and the contract labor needed to erect them and, the following year, by the evacuation of almost all of the British garrison on the island. However, as American troop strength in Iceland grew by early 1943 to 41,000, roughly double the size of the departing British contingent, additional building was required.

As elsewhere in the Atlantic, the engineers' most important task in Iceland was airfield construction. Finding the existing fields too small for the volume of air traffic expected and unsuitable for heavy B-24 bombers, the 21st Engineers began in 1942 the con-

struction near Keflavik of the new Meeks Field for bombers and the adjoining fighter base, Patterson Field. American civilian construction workers joined the effort in May, but they were replaced by two Navy construction battalions later in the year. The fighter base progressed quickly, and two of its three runways could accommodate the fighter planes of the Eighth Air Force that landed in Iceland en route to Britain in July 1942. Meeks Field opened the following March with the landing of a B-18 carrying Iceland Base Commander Maj. Gen. Charles Bonesteel. Paving was complete at both fields by August 1943. U.S. Army engineers also expanded the asphalt runway at the British-built field near Akureyri, Iceland's second largest population center located on the north side of the island, making it available to medium bombers. Despite the heavy workload, engineer soldiers who spent several years in Iceland grew tired of their isolation and bleak surroundings. The officers of one engineer battalion sought to combat the soldiers' boredom by issuing an ample supply of harmonicas.

The American decision, taken soon after the United States entered the war, to deploy Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz's Eighth Air Force to Britain put the North Atlantic facilities constructed by the Corps to an early test. Radioing from BLUIE WEST 1 in Greenland while crossing the Atlantic in mid-June 1942, Spaatz ordered

the movement to begin. The P-38 and P-39 fighters, piloted by combat crews that had been given special training in long-distance flying, received escorts from the longer-range B-17 bombers. With stops at the Canadian-built base at Goose Bay in Labrador, BLUIE WEST 1 in southern Greenland, and Reykjavik or Keflavik in Iceland, the planes could fly from the new Presque Isle field in northern Maine to Prestwick Field in Scotland with no leg of the journey longer than 850 miles. Use of the northernmost BLUIE WEST 8 field in Greenland involved a thousand-mile hop from Goose Bay but provided an alternate landing site when the weather was bad in southern Greenland. A few planes arrived at BLUIE WEST 8 from the western United States via the Crimson route, a line of fields stretching from Manitoba to Baffin Island in northern Canada that the Canadians and the North Atlantic Division of the Corps built in 1942 and 1943. All told 920 warplanes attempted the North Atlantic crossing during 1942, and with the aid of the fields built by the Corps, 882—roughly 95 percent—arrived safely.

Bermuda, a small British island territory located just six hundred miles off the North Carolina capes, anchored the center of the Atlantic defenses of the United States. The dearth of land on the 21-square-mile island group led the Corps to build Kindley Field on some 29 million cubic yards of dredged coral and fill



Kindley Field, built primarily on dredge fill in Castle Harbor adjacent to Long Bird Island, Bermuda, as it appeared in April 1942.

in Castle Harbor. A contractor's dredge boat began work in March 1941, and Jacksonville District's hydraulic dredge *Welatka* joined the effort that summer. While an emergency runway was ready by July 1941, the contractors did not complete the last of the three permanent runways, which were 8,300, 5,800, and 5,000 feet long, respectively, and the field's supporting facilities until August 1944. The contractors, who employed some 3,000 workers on Bermuda, also built housing facilities for 2,700 men at the 270-acre Fort Bell and for another 625 at the U.S. Navy's new naval air station in the colony. While Kindley Field quickly became one of the largest Atlantic airfield projects built by the Corps of Engineers, it was not used at first as an air ferry station due to Portugal's refusal, until December 1943, to permit Allied planes to land in the Azores.

Like the North Atlantic bases, the facilities built by the Corps in the Caribbean and South America supported both the military security of those areas, challenged early in the war by German submarines, and the ferrying of aircraft across the Atlantic. American airfield construction began in the British possessions of Antigua, Santa Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana in January and February 1941 and in Jamaica in May. The Corps also assumed responsibility for the construction of Borinquen Field, Puerto Rico, from the Quartermaster Corps in January 1941. Unlike Greenland and Iceland where engineer troops would initiate work that summer, civilian contractors undertook the major Caribbean construction tasks from the start.

The island of Trinidad, strategically positioned just north of Venezuela at the southern gateway to the Caribbean, received the largest wartime Army construction effort in the region outside of the Canal Zone. Waller Field and the adjoining Army post of Fort Read, occupying a 17,000-acre tract in the interior of the island, became the principal Army base in Trinidad. After removing a thick canopy of jungle vegetation, crews of the joint venture formed by the Walsh Construction Company and the George F. Driscoll Company opened a temporary runway at Waller Field in the summer of 1941 and two mile-long concrete runways the following January and June. They also erected housing for 8,500 men and fifty-one aviation-fuel storage tanks. The heavy demand for local labor caused by this project and the simultaneous construction of a large Navy facility on the island led the Corps contractors to import two thousand workers from the neighboring island of Barbados.

While the \$52.4 million Waller Field was the most expensive Atlantic base built by Corps contractors, it did not meet all the needs of the burgeoning Trinidad garrison. The Corps thus had its Trinidad contractors begin work in December 1941 on a 5,000-foot runway at Edinburgh Field twelve miles to the southwest and, in 1942, on a similar runway at adjoining Xeres Field. They completed the new runways in June 1942 and April 1943, respectively. Engineer contractors also oversaw the construction of coast artillery positions and base facilities at Chacachacare and Monos Islands between Trinidad and Venezuela. The Caribbean Defense Command took over supervision of the Trinidad and Jamaica Districts in April 1942, leading the Corps to abolish its Caribbean Division at that time.

Construction of \$10-16 million fields in the other British sites in the Caribbean followed largely similar timetables, with Corps contractors opening temporary runways in Antigua, Santa Lucia, and British Guiana in June 1941 and concrete runways the following year. A Minneapolis contractor completed two mile-long concrete runways at Antigua's Coolidge Field by September 1942, but the area engineer there directly hired the workers who built the housing for 2,200 men which was completed the following May. Minden Construction of Chicago finished the two 5,000-foot concrete runways at Beane Field near the community of Vieux Fort, Santa Lucia, even more quickly, opening them in February and April 1942. The engineers at Santa Lucia made full use of locally available materials, employing molasses as a stabilizing agent for the surface of the temporary runway.

While work on the other islands proceeded smoothly, progress at Vernam Field on Jamaica lagged. The Jamaica district engineer found the joint venture responsible for the first year's construction there to be inefficient and in April 1942 replaced it with the McLane Corporation. Three runways, one a 6,000-foot concrete strip and the other two-mile-long asphalt runways, formed the center of this field which was designed to house a heavy bombardment squadron.

The relatively large Atkinson Field, located twenty-six miles south of Georgetown, the capital of British Guiana, included housing for 4,000 men, 3 permanent hangars, and a 7,430-foot main concrete runway. A lack of adequate land transportation routes hampered the construction effort. Boats carried rock for the project from a quarry seventy-five miles up the Demerara River, and other construction supplies came upstream from Georgetown.

The United States added several bases in the Car-

ibbean area after it entered the war. Under agreements negotiated with the exiled Netherlands regime, U.S. Army ground and air troops went to Dutch Guiana (now Surinam) in November 1941 and to the Dutch Caribbean islands of Curacao and Aruba off Venezuela in February 1942. Using the Walsh-Driscoll joint venture, the Trinidad district engineer expanded Zandery Field in Surinam, which Pan American had built in 1941, and had the KLM Royal Dutch Airline runways at Hato Field on Curacao and Dakota Field on Aruba resurfaced and extended to five thousand feet, roughly doubling their length. In June 1942 Cuba furnished a 2,000-acre tract thirty miles southwest of Havana, and the Cayuga Construction Company, under contract with the Corps' North Atlantic Division, built Batista Field on it. The \$17.4 million air base featured two 7,000-foot runways and housing for 3,500 men. A final Atlantic base site was added in March 1943 when the governor of French Guiana, who had adhered to the Vichy regime, declared his support for the Allies and invited American troops into the territory. During the next ten months, the Trinidad District Engineer had a 6,000-foot concrete landing strip built at Rochambeau Field in that territory at the behest of the commander of U.S. Forces, South America. Fifty emergency landings would be made at this field during the last year and a half of the war.

The airfields that Pan American constructed in northern Brazil formed, with the Caribbean bases, an essential link in the South Atlantic air ferry route. Construction began at Amapa, Belem, and Sao Luis in the underdeveloped regions near the mouth of the Amazon in the spring of 1941. At Sao Luis, teams of oxen hauled away uprooted trees, and one thousand burros carried off dirt in raffia panniers. Work began that summer at Natal and Recife on Brazil's eastern tip, but with labor and equipment more readily available there, it progressed more rapidly. Prior to March 1942, when Brazil first authorized the Corps to send Lt. Col. Manuel Asensio to oversee Pan American's work from within the country, the commercial firm received only such Corps support as its offices in New York and Washington could provide. Federal funds allotted to this work, moreover, were meager. Nonetheless, by the time of Asensio's arrival, Pan American had readied a good 5,000-foot runway at Natal, along with temporary runways at half a dozen fields along Brazil's northern coast.

The Corps of Engineers substantially expanded its Brazilian construction effort in late 1942 and 1943. To accomplish its growing mission, it created a Recife

District under Col. Alvin Viney in December 1942, four months after Brazil's entry into the war. With the comparatively small sum of \$44.6 million, the district produced, by the end of 1943, three modern fields at Belem, Natal, and Recife, each featuring a pair of 6,000-foot runways; new airfield facilities at four other locations on the north Brazilian mainland; and, most impressively, a 6,000-foot asphalt runway on the island of Fernando de Noronha, a craggy outcrop of rock two hundred miles northeast of Natal along the 1,600-mile transatlantic route to Africa. The fields built by the Recife District not only met the needs of the Army but also provided most of the air facilities employed by the U.S. Navy in Brazil. The district also constructed housing, offices, and medical facilities in Brazil, including the headquarters of Maj. Gen. Robert Walsh's U.S. Forces, South America, and a 150-bed hospital, both in Recife.

Early in 1942 Britain authorized the United States to build an airfield on Ascension Island, a 34-square-mile mass of volcanic rock that pierced the surface of the South Atlantic conveniently close to the midpoint of the flight from Natal to Accra in the British Gold Coast. Col. Robert Coughlin brought his 38th Engineers to the island in February 1942 to build Wide-awake Field. One of his battalion commanders was Maj. Frederick Clarke, a future Chief of Engineers. Carrying supplies and equipment to shore by barge or lighter on this harborless island, the regiment began construction of the 6,000-foot runway in mid-April and opened it to traffic three months later.

A large tern rookery at the end of the runway posed a real threat to air traffic at Ascension Island, however, as takeoffs flushed huge flocks of birds into flight paths. Air transport officers used smoke candles, dynamite blasts, and a planeload of cats in a series of unavailing efforts to convince the terns to relocate. They soon learned that strong-beaked booby birds on the island found the cats an appetizing treat. Only the destruction of some forty thousand eggs at the suggestion of ornithologist James Chapin, whom the Air Force finally brought in from the American Museum of Natural History, induced the birds to leave the runway area and join other colonies on the island. The engineers derived some value from the birds, however, as they used guano bricks in the construction of installation housing.

The South Atlantic air route from Miami, Florida, to the Middle East, using fields in the Caribbean, Brazil, and Central Africa, opened in September 1941 when Lt. Col. Caleb Haynes used it to fly a B-24

carrying Maj. Gen. George Brett, chief of the Air Corps, to Cairo, Egypt. Although this trip covered roughly 10,000 miles, far longer than the 2,700-mile North Atlantic route from Maine to Scotland, the better weather on the southern route and its easier access to the busy theaters of operations in the Mediterranean, eastern Europe, and Asia led it to carry more air traffic across the ocean than did its northern counterpart in the early years of the war. After the Japanese disrupted the Pacific air supply route passing through Midway and Wake Islands in the autumn of 1941, the Air Corps routed airplanes destined for the Far East over the South Atlantic, Africa, and South Asia to Australia. The Japanese seizure of Singapore in February 1942 broke the connection, however, and made a South Pacific route essential. Thereafter planes ferried across the South Atlantic reached destinations in China, India, the Soviet Union, and the Mediterranean. When winter weather closed the North Atlantic air route, planes that had crossed the Atlantic from Brazil went on to Britain from North Africa.

The Air Corps used the South Atlantic air ferry route in 1942 to deliver 240 planes to the Soviets under the American lend-lease program. The nearly two dozen B-24Ds which began the Air Corps' European combat with a June 1942 bombing raid on Rumania's Ploesti oil fields reached the area over this route as well. President Roosevelt used the South Atlantic fields built by the Corps of Engineers when traveling to and from the Casablanca and Teheran conferences in January and November 1943. The South Atlantic ferry traffic, always heaviest in winter, peaked in March 1944 when a monthly total of 1,675 Army tactical planes passed eastward through Natal.

The little-heralded Atlantic air base construction work undertaken by the Corps of Engineers during World War II helped secure the Western Hemisphere from attack. Protecting islands and transoceanic routes of vital importance to the security of the nation, the bases facilitated the shipment of planes and air cargo to Europe, Asia, and Africa and provided support for antisubmarine patrols in the Atlantic. Although the February 1942 German U-boat attack on oil refineries at Aruba and the brief establishment of German weather-data stations in isolated locations in Greenland and Labrador represented the only Axis incursions from the Atlantic onto lands in this hemisphere, heavy German submarine activity made the defense of the

area imperative for the United States. Those attacks caused the loss of 270 ships in the Caribbean area in 1942, sending 1.25 million tons of cargo to the bottom. While the Navy conducted most of the antisubmarine campaign, Army planes also chalked up kills from new bases in Puerto Rico and Ascension Island.

Beyond their immediate value, moreover, the Atlantic bases of the early 1940s initiated the expansion of American defense installations beyond the United States and its territories. In the new age of air power, the concept of building advance bases for the extension of American power overseas spread from the Atlantic bases to a network of American installations in foreign territories around the globe. The valuable work of the Corps of Engineers in creating these wartime defensive bases led it to be called upon again after the war for this important construction assignment.

Dr. Charles Hendricks, formerly with the Center of Military History, has been a historian with Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, since 1981. He is the editor of Bridging the Imjin (1989).

Sources for Further Reading

Stetson Conn, Rose Engelman, and Byron Fairchild's *Guarding the United States and Its Outposts* (Washington, 1964) surveys the wartime development of U.S. Army bases and garrisons in the Western Hemisphere. A second book, Conn and Fairchild's *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, 1960), examines the diplomatic and strategic underpinnings of that base development and devotes greater attention to Brazil. An account of the wartime air ferry and transport operations which those bases facilitated may be found in volume 1, *Plans and Early Operations* (Chicago, 1948), and volume 7, *Services Around the World* (Chicago, 1958), of W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate's *The Army Air Forces in World War II*.

More detailed information is contained in separate contemporary monographs on base construction in Greenland, Newfoundland, Bermuda, and the Caribbean Defense Command in the collections of the Army Center of Military History and in a wartime history of the South Atlantic Division, Air Transport Command (see RG 77, box 1, entry 305A, NARA, Suitland, Md.).

The Archaic Archivist

The defense of the Western Hemisphere is an important aspect of the history of World War II. Several manuscript holdings of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5008, relate to that subject. Researchers also should check with the Institute's library and with the Special Collections Branch's printed and pictorial holdings, respectively.

From the pre-1941 period, war plans to defend the Western Hemisphere and intelligence evaluations of countries and colonies in North and South America can be found in the curricular archives of the U.S. Army War College.

Once the war came, the most overt threat to the North American mainland was the Japanese incursion into the Aleutian Islands. The memoirs of Maj. Gen. Charles H. Corlett and the papers of Brig. Gen. Charles D. Y. Ostrom pertain to American operations in those islands. Col. John H. Fye's family letters recount his service in Alaska in the immediate aftermath of that campaign. Alaskan service is also reflected in the World War II survey files of veterans of the 53d, 87th, and 159th Infantry Regiments. General William M. Hoge's oral history transcript and Maj. Gen. Kenneth B. Bush's wartime papers shed light on the construction of the ALCAN Highway and on the operations of the Northwest Service Command.

Others who pulled tours of duty in northerly climes include Lt. Col. Harold P. Henry (Newfoundland); General Charles H. Bonesteel III (Iceland); and veterans of the 118th Infantry Regiment, the 959th Army Air Forces Bases Security Battalion (Iceland), and the Army Air Forces in Greenland. They are represented by documents, an oral history transcript, and World War II Survey donations, respectively. The autobiography and papers of Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry, Jr., give considerable attention to his service as Senior U.S. Army Member of the Permanent Joint Board on the Defense of the United States and Canada.

General Henry's writings also summarize his similar service on the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission. Indeed, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central and South America—a large part of the Western Hemisphere needing protection from overt and

covert Axis operations—received considerable attention from U.S. defense planners. World War II Survey donations concerning the 33d and 65th Infantry Regiments and Albrook Field relate to the defense of the Panama Canal. The papers of Lt. Donald J. Coan deal with Task Force Tuna to Jamaica. The memoirs of Col. Albert L. Hoffman cover Dutch Guiana. And official reports on veterinary and remount service for the Peruvian cavalry may be found in the papers of Brig. Gen. Russell McNellis.

As the largest and most easterly South American country, Brazil formed a critical link in the air defense of the New World and in the air bridge to West Africa and thence throughout the Old World. Oral history transcripts of General Matthew B. Ridgway and General Lucius D. Clay describe their service in Brazil just before and just after Pearl Harbor. The Institute also has the diaries of Lt. Gen. George Grunert, who was designated to head the Brazilian Theater of Operations—a command that was never established. Service at air bases in Brazil is recounted in the World War II Survey files, including a box of letters of Sgt. John V. Schmidt of the 1152d Army Air Forces Base Unit at Natal. The memoirs and papers of Maj. Carl I. Aslakson cover his wartime service in SHORAN (short-range navigation) mapping of air routes in Brazil and elsewhere in South America. And the Leah and Lena Reynolds Collection contains their correspondence with many veterans, including some stationed in Brazil (1216th Military Police Company) and in the Canal Zone (Albrook Field).

Besides helping protect the Western Hemisphere, Brazil sent a large expeditionary force to Italy. The oral history transcript of Fifth Army commander Mark W. Clark; the wartime papers of IV Corps commander Willis D. Crittenger, Sr.; and an unpublished history of the IV Corps include references to Brazilian service in the Mediterranean theater.

These and other manuscript holdings relate to the war in Italy and to the defense of North, Central, and South America and the outlying islands. Researchers are welcome to study these collections of personal and official papers at the Military History Institute.

1943

April - September

7 Apr - In Tunisia, advance patrols of the 9th Infantry Division establish contact with the British Eighth Army along the Gafsa-Gabes road south of Djebel Chemsî.

-Bolivia declares war on Germany, Italy, and Japan.

8 Apr - The 34th Infantry Division and elements of the British 46th Infantry Division open a British 9th Corps assault on Fondouk, Tunisia.

9 Apr - In Tunisia, U.S. troops advance through Faid Pass, site of their retreat in February.

15 Apr - Command of II Corps passes from Maj. Gen. George S. Patton to Maj. Gen. Omar Bradley, as Patton assumes responsibility for planning the invasion of Sicily.

- The 17th Airborne Division is activated at Camp Mackall, North Carolina. The 66th Infantry Division is activated at Camp Blanding, Florida, and the 75th Infantry Division is activated at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

22 Apr - Operation VULCAN, the final offensive to take Tunis and Bizerte and end the Tunisia Campaign, is launched. Over the next several days the Allies make reasonable advances against stiff enemy resistance.

29 Apr - Responsibility for the Civil Air Patrol is transferred to the War Department from the Office of Civilian Defense.

30 Apr - The United States severs relations with Martinique because of that nation's ties with Vichy France.

1 May - The enemy begins a withdrawal in the II Corps area in Tunisia.

3 May - Elements of the 1st Armored Division secure Mateur as the Germans withdraw from the town. Mateur provides the only rail link between Tunis and Bizerte.

7 May - The Allies capture Bizerte and Tunis.

9 May - The enemy in the II Corps area of Tunisia surrenders unconditionally. Among the thousands of prisoners taken are six general officers.

10 May - Lt. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, commanding general of the European Theater of Operations, is killed in a plane crash in Iceland. Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers is named to succeed General Andrews.

11 May - The 7th Infantry Division invades the island of Attu in the Aleutians. Aided by dense fog, the division achieves complete tactical surprise.

12 May - German *Army Group Africa* commander, Col. Gen. Juergen von Arnim, surrenders in North Africa.

- President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill open the TRIDENT conference in Washington. The meeting results in the selection of 1 May 1944 as the date for the invasion of Europe and the decision to force Italy out of the war as soon as possible.

13 May - With the surrender of General Giovanni Messe and his *Italian First Army*, the Tunisia Campaign draws to a close. More than 200,000 Axis troops are taken prisoner.

15 May - The 69th Infantry Division is activated at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

30 May - In the Aleutians, organized resistance ends on Attu. Approximately 1,500 U.S. casualties are incurred during the fighting for Attu. Planning begins for the invasion of Kiska.

3 Jun - The War Department announces that Japan is holding 11,307 American soldiers as prisoners of war, Germany is holding 3,312, and Italy 2,464.

4 Jun - Omar Bradley is promoted from major general to lieutenant general.

11 Jun - The Italian island of Pantelleria, in the Mediterranean Sea between Tunisia and Sicily, surrenders

Chronology

after a month of intense air bombardment and naval blockade.

12 Jun - The Italian island of Lampedusa capitulates.

15 Jun - The 63d Infantry Division is activated at Camp Blanding, Florida. The 70th Infantry Division is activated at Camp Adair, Oregon.

18 Jun - Preinvasion bombardment of Sicily begins.

30 Jun - Operation CARTWHEEL opens with a series of amphibious assaults on the central Solomons, Trobriands, and New Guinea.

2 Jul - The 43d Infantry Division lands on New Georgia, Solomon Islands.

9-10 Jul - In the first major airborne operation by the Allies in World War II, the 505th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and elements of the 504th RCT, both part of the 82d Airborne Division, are dropped behind enemy lines on Sicily during the night.

10 Jul - The full-scale invasion of Sicily is launched, to the apparent surprise of the defending Axis troops. About 160,000 Allied troops land on the first day alone.

14 Jul - The 42d Infantry Division (the famous "Rainbow" division of World War I) is activated at Camp Gruber, Oklahoma.

15 Jul - The 10th Light Division is activated at Camp Hale, Colorado. Composed largely of skiers recruited by the National Ski Patrol System, division personnel also include mountain climbers, forest rangers, and park and wildlife servicemen. In November 1944 the division will be redesignated as the 10th Mountain Division, reflecting the extensive training its members have received in conducting operations in snow and mountainous terrain.

- The 16th Armored Division is activated at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas. The 71st Light Division (later the 71st Infantry Division) is activated at Camp Carson, Colorado.

22 Jul - The 2d Armored Division enters Palermo, Sicily, unopposed.

25 Jul - Benito Mussolini is overthrown. Marshal Pietro Badoglio assumes the leadership of the Italian government.

28 Jul - The Japanese garrison on Kiska is quietly evacuated by sea. Unaware of the withdrawal, the United States continues its planning for the invasion of the island.

5 Aug - The XIV Corps captures New Georgia's Munda airfield, one of the primary objectives in the central Solomons.

12 Aug - In an attempt to bypass the strong Japanese presence on Kolombangara Island, an advance landing party is placed on the Solomons island of Vella Lavella to prepare for a full-scale landing on the 15th. At the same time, Company L, 169th Infantry, attempts a landing on Baanga Island, but is forced to withdraw, leaving thirty-four men stranded on Baanga.

13 Aug - The 13th Airborne Division is activated at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

14 Aug - The QUADRANT conference opens in Quebec. The 1 May 1944 date for the invasion of France is confirmed, and plans are set for a two-pronged, island-hopping drive to Japan in the Pacific. One route will be through the Gilberts and Marshalls and the other through the Philippines.

-The 3d Battalion, 169th Infantry, succeeds in establishing a small beachhead on Baanga. Company L suffers heavy casualties when it tries to attack beyond the beachhead to rescue its stranded men and is surrounded by the enemy.

15 Aug - A joint American-Canadian invasion force lands on the west coast of Kiska, still unaware that the Japanese have deserted the island.

- The 35th Regimental Combat Team lands on Vella Lavella unopposed.

(Cont'd. on p.28)

- The survivors of Company L, 169th Infantry, make their way back to the beachhead on Baanga, which has been expanded by the addition of the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry.

16 Aug - The 65th Infantry Division is activated at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

17 Aug - The Sicily Campaign ends as the 7th Regimental Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, occupies Messina.

20 Aug - The troops on Baanga, having been reinforced by elements of the 172d Infantry, succeed in clearing the island of Japanese.

25 Aug - Following the withdrawal of Japanese forces to Kolombangara and Arundel Islands, the action on New Georgia Island draws to a close.

27 Aug - Elements of the 172d Infantry land on Arundel Island.

3 Sep - The British Eighth Army invades the Calabrian coast of Italy in a largely unsuccessful attempt to draw German forces away from the main invasion site of Salerno.

- On Sicily, a representative of Marshal Badoglio, General G. Castellano, signs an armistice agreement. The armistice will be made public when it becomes effective on 8 September.

4 Sep - Major offensive operations are begun to capture Lae, New Guinea.

5 Sep - The 503d Parachute Infantry makes an unopposed jump at Nadzab, northwest of Lae.

- Invasion forces begin leaving North Africa for the Gulf of Salerno.

8 Sep - General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Marshal Badoglio announce the Italian armistice, signaling Italian troops, ships, and aircraft to rendezvous at

prearranged locations for surrender to the Allies.

9 Sep - The Fifth Army invades Italy south of Salerno.

10 Sep - The British 46th Infantry Division captures Salerno.

15 Sep - After several days of strong German counter-attacks which nearly split the beachhead in two, forcing the Fifth Army to commit its reserves and service troops, enemy activity wanes, allowing positions to be consolidated. Some units begin to return to the offensive.

16 Sep - As the Germans commence a withdrawal to better defensive positions and the Allied offensive begins to regain momentum, elements of the Fifth Army and British Eighth Army make contact, forming an Allied line across southern Italy.

- Australian troops enter Lae, New Guinea.

21 Sep - Arundel Island is cleared of enemy. The Japanese determine that the central Solomons must be relinquished to the Allies.

- The 15th Army Group commander, General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, outlines a four-phase plan for operations in Italy. First, positions are to be consolidated along the existing line from Salerno to Bari. Next, attacks will be mounted to take Naples and Foggia, followed by a major campaign to capture Rome. The final phase calls for the capture of Leghorn, Florence, and Arezzo.

29 Sep - The Italian surrender is finalized as General Eisenhower and Marshal Badoglio sign the surrender document aboard the battleship H.M.S. *Nelson*, anchored off Malta.

30 Sep - The 3d Infantry Division captures Avellino.

This chronology was prepared by Mr. Edward N. Bedessem of the Center's Historical Services Division.

Brazil's Involvement in World War II The Fiftieth Anniversary

Claudio Moreira Bento

Brazil's active involvement in World War II as one of the Allies began on 22 August 1942, when that nation declared war on Germany and Italy, and ended with victory in Europe on 8 May 1945, V-E Day.

The sheer size of Brazil (the fifth largest nation in the world), its geopolitical position with respect to the Atlantic Ocean and to Africa, and its sense of American continental solidarity—all these were crucial factors in the decision not to remain a neutral nation during World War II.

The Brazilian armed forces, therefore, took part in the Atlantic and Mediterranean theaters of operations. A Brazil-United States bilateral defense agreement was signed in May 1942, and joint military commissions, with offices in both Washington and Rio de Janeiro, coordinated hemisphere defense.

The Brazilian armed forces participated in the Allied war effort in a variety of ways. The army defended its military installations in the war zone and prepared to defend the national territory, especially the northeast (the states of Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba, Pernambuco, and Alagoas) and an Atlantic triangle formed by the Fernando de Noronha archipelago, Natal, and Recife. Brazil sent troops, the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (*FEB*) to the Mediterranean, where they were integrated into the U.S. Fifth Army in Italy.

The Brazilian Navy defended port cities, patrolled the Atlantic coast, and took part in escorting convoys, while the air force participated in ocean patrolling and escort duties. The Brazilian Air Force also sent the 1st Fighter Group (*Senta a Pua*) to join the Allied air forces in the Mediterranean and Italy and a liaison and observation air squadron (the 1st *ELO*) under FEB control.

To compensate the Brazilians and to help them fulfill their mission, the United States provided all the necessary armament and equipment under lend-lease agreements. U.S. forces also trained Brazil's personnel in antisubmarine warfare, convoy and escort procedures, aerial combat, antiaircraft and coastal defenses, and division-size infantry tactics.

The Brazilian armed forces' initial military effort was to defend the northeast of the country. This coastal area, together with the coast of Senegal in Africa, formed the Natal-Dakar Strait, through which the Axis

forces—before their defeat in North Africa—could have launched naval, aerial, or commando-style raids against the Brazilian northeast.

The northeast, with the Parnamirim Air Base in Natal and the Belem do Para Air Base, became a strategic connection for U.S. military flights between Natal and Dakar. This air route was decisive for the Allied efforts in North Africa and the Middle East from November 1942 through May 1943. It was also an important link for the invasion of Italy and even for U.S. military operations in Asia.

Brazilian cooperation with the Allied forces, therefore, had strategic implications and was characterized by the defense of the Brazilian northeast against an Axis invasion through the Natal-Dakar Strait; the capture by the FEB of 20,753 enemy troops; the supply of strategic raw materials, such as carnauba wax, balata gum, quartz, and rubber, collected by the "rubber soldiers" in the Amazon jungle; and the temporary use of Natal and Belem Air Bases, which supported the Allied victories in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East as thousands of U.S. military planes made nonstop flights to Africa and beyond to Europe and Asia.

Brazil played a key role in the British victory at El Alamein because American support to the British troops would have been far more difficult without Brazilian facilities. Indeed, the Brazilian northeast, where the historic Natal Parnamirim Air Base was located, came to be nicknamed the "Victory Springboard."

During World War II Brazil lost 1,889 soldiers, 31 merchant ships and 3 warships sunk, and 22 fighter planes shot down. Twenty-one million *cruzeiros* (in the currency of the time) were spent supporting the war effort.

Brazilians count among their most important military victories the combat actions of Monte Costello, Castelnuevo, Montese, and Colechio-Fernovo. The Brazilian Air Force supported the FEB's most significant victories, while the Brazilian Navy transported the force to and from the theater.

During the war the Brazilian armed forces underwent a modernization process. Through lend-lease arrangements Brazil's forces were equipped with the

most modern items: fighters, bombers, submarine chasers, destroyer escorts, mine sweepers, tanks, field artillery, antitank guns, antiaircraft and coastal artillery, radars, sonars, jelly gas, and other equipment. The ordnance was both increased and improved. Brazil's military training was updated, based on U.S. armed forces standards and on the operational military experience acquired by the Brazilian forces serving with the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and the U.S. Fifth Army in Italy.

As a result of the war, the development of aeronautics had an important impact on the accelerated modernization and expansion of Brazilian civil aviation.

Brazil was the only Latin American country to participate in Allied actions overseas during World War II. Brazil's expeditionary forces contributed to the successful fight against the Axis and to the defense of democracy and world freedom. After the successful conclusion of the war, as part of Allied deterrence, Brazil posted a military mission in occupied Germany from 1945 to 1950.

Claudio Moreira Bento is a colonel (retired) in the Brazilian Army. His article was submitted to Army History by Maj. Gen. Werlon Coaracy de Roure, the Brazilian military attache in Washington.

Archival Detectives and Authorial Joy

Lewis Sorley

Six years of research for a biography of the late General Creighton Abrams took me to some wonderful repositories—the Lyndon B. Johnson and John F. Kennedy Presidential Libraries; the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford, California, and the Indochina Archives at the University of California-Berkeley; the U.S. Army Center of Military History and the Marine Corps Historical Center in Washington, D.C.; the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; and—of course—the National Archives facility at Suitland, Maryland.

One disappointment was my visit to the Federal Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri. The people there were wonderful to deal with, enthusiastic about the project, and extremely helpful, but there was a problem. I went to review the personnel files of General Abrams. Given his thirty-eight years of service and the fact that he reached the highest level of his profession (dying in office while serving as Army Chief of Staff), his records were formidable. I thus spent an entire day going through two very thick folders. By mid-afternoon, however, it became apparent that the file was lacking one essential set of documents—General Abrams' officer efficiency reports. I conferred with the staff, telephone calls were made, and finally I was told that the missing reports were held at an office in Washington.

Early the following week I presented myself at the Pentagon and was given the reports to review. They did indeed include all reports rendered on Abrams as a general officer, thus covering the last eighteen years of

his service, but still missing were the invaluable reports from his early days in the horse cavalry and the years of World War II when his tank battalion led General George S. Patton's Third Army in the campaign across Europe, including effecting relief of the encircled 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne.

Nobody seemed to know where those reports were. Everyone believed, however—or at least hoped—that they were not gone, just misplaced or misfiled. I sought help from Brig. Gen. (now Maj. Gen.) William Stofft, then Army Chief of Military History and an old friend, who did everything he could. I wrote to Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono, who had been my company-mate when we were cadets at West Point, and he too tried to help. But despite the best efforts of all those I approached with my problem, no trace of the missing reports could be found.

Perhaps two years later, I was working at the National Archives at Suitland, where Richard Boylan helped me find my way through the World War II records of Abrams' outfit. Finding him exceptionally interested and helpful, I mentioned my problem with the missing efficiency reports in St. Louis. He knew some of the people there, and mentioned Deborah Haberman as an especially knowledgeable and resourceful archivist. At his suggestion, I wrote to her, describing the records I sought and my long but unsuccessful efforts to locate them.

Some time went by, and I had almost forgotten that letter, when one morning I received a telephone call. On the other end of the line was William Seibert, an

archivist in St. Louis, who announced, "I have your records." I can scarcely describe my relief and joy at hearing that wonderful news. I tried to convey my thanks and some idea of how important those materials were to my research, but I am sure that in my surprise and excitement I did an inadequate job on both counts. Finally, I asked the obvious question: how did he manage what no one else had been able to do?

Seibert described a procedure whereby certain records, identified as being of particular importance because of the celebrity of the subject, are moved from the open stacks into a more secure area. When this is done—and Abrams' file had been given this treatment—a new registry number is assigned. (Since 1960 the facility has been on a registry system, which means that records are filed not alphabetically but by registry number. The registry numbers for the center's seventy million records are kept in a large mainframe computer.) At the time Abrams' file was moved, no record had been maintained linking its old and new registry numbers—a procedure since changed.

What happened, it now appears, is that when Abrams' bulky file was moved to the vault area, the part containing his efficiency reports was inadvertently left behind. There it rested, where it had always been, but since there was no remaining association of Abrams' name with the number on that file, no one knew where to look for it. Then along came William Seibert, archivist extraordinaire and a man of demonstrated resourcefulness and persistence. He sat down

with the entire file of collateral records pertaining to General Abrams, including letters about him and his records. There he found a record of a telephone conversation having to do with the Abrams records. At the top a clerk had made a penciled notation of a number that looked promising. Could it be the original registry number? Seibert sent a clerk to look in that location. Indeed it could be, for soon the man came back carrying two large folders and wearing an even bigger grin. Seibert had found the missing link to the orphan file that had been left behind. Minutes later he was on the phone to me.

I traveled some 60,000 miles in the course of the Abrams project and had many small triumphs of discovery along the way, the kinds of things that make historical research so exciting and absorbing. But nothing equaled my joy when Bill Seibert, whose diligence and resourcefulness produced long-sought essential documents, called to tell me that he had hit pay dirt.

Lewis Sorley is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point who has served in Vietnam, with NATO forces, and as a Pentagon staff officer. He has taught at West Point and at the U.S. Army War College and has written widely. He is the author of Thunderbolt, From the Battle of the Bulge to Vietnam and Beyond: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times.

New Book Recounts Raid on Schweinfurt

In a new book published late this spring, Lt. Col. George C. Kuhl, U.S. Army (Ret.), recounts his experiences as a pilot with the 305th Bomb Group of the Eighth Air Force's 1st Bombardment Division. *Wrong Place, Wrong Time: The 305th Bomb Group & the 2nd Schweinfurt Raid, October 14, 1943*, describes an air battle lasting over three hours between the *Luftwaffe* and the Eighth Air Force's unescorted B-17s. Based on documents as well as numerous interviews with surviving crew members, the author seeks to explain how the 1st Bombardment Division lost 45 of its 60 B-17s that day.

Colonel Kuhl's book is available in hard cover for \$24.95 from Schiffer Publishing, Ltd., 77 Lower Valley Road, Atglen, PA 19310. Phone: (215) 593-1777.

Reflections on Task Force Smith

More than once since taking office, Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan has pledged that Army units will never in the future be committed to combat situations without the means to carry out their mission successfully. The historical analogy with which he drives home this point is his declaration that there will be "no more Task Force Smiths." For those readers who are unfamiliar with Task Force Smith, Army History offers the following extract (less footnotes) from Roy E. Appleman's South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, chapter 6, "American Ground Forces Enter the Battle."

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself, but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

Across the Korea Strait events of importance were taking place in Japan that would soon have an impact on the Korean scene. In Tokyo, General [Douglas] MacArthur on 30 June instructed General [Walton] Walker, commander of the Eighth Army, to order the 24th Infantry Division to Korea at once. Its proximity to Korea was the principal reason General MacArthur selected it for immediate commitment. General Walker gave Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, Commanding General, 24th Division, preliminary verbal instructions concerning the division. These instructions were formalized in an Eighth Army Operation Order at 0315 1 July which provided that (1) a delaying force of two rifle companies, under a battalion commander, reinforced by two platoons of 4.2-inch mortars and one platoon of 75-mm. recoilless rifles was to go by air to Pusan and report to [Brig. Gen. John H.] Church for orders; (2) the division headquarters and one battalion of infantry were to go to Pusan by air at once; (3) the remainder of the division would follow by water; and (4) a base was to be established for early offensive operations. The mission of the advance elements was phrased as follows: "Advance at once upon landing with delaying force, in accordance with the situation, to the north by all possible means, contact enemy now advancing south from Seoul towards Suwon and delay

his advance." The order also stated that General Dean would assume command of all U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) upon his arrival there.

In the next eight days Eighth Army transferred a total of 2,108 men to the 24th Division from other units to bring it up to full authorized strength, most of them from the other three infantry divisions. The division, thus readied for the movement to Korea, numbered 15,965 men and had 4,773 vehicles.

Task Force Smith Goes to Korea

On the evening of 30 June, Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division, went to bed at 9 o'clock in his quarters at Camp Wood near Kumamoto, Kyushu, tired and sleepy after having been up all the previous night because of an alert. An hour and a half later his wife awakened him, saying, "Colonel Stephens is on the phone and wants you." At the telephone Smith heard Col. Richard W. Stephens, Commanding Officer, 21st Infantry, saying to him, "The lid has blown off—get on your clothes and report to the CP." Thus began Task Force Smith as seen by its leader. Colonel Smith had been at Schofield Barracks, Oahu, on 7 December 1941 when the Japanese hit Pearl Harbor, causing him hurriedly to take D Company, 35th Infantry, to form a defense position on Barbers Point. Now, this call in the night vividly reminded him of that earlier event.

At the regimental command post, Colonel Stephens told Smith to take his battalion, less A and D Companies, to Itazuke Air Base; it was to fly to Korea at once. General Dean would meet him at the airfield with further instructions.

Colonel Stephens quickly arranged to lend Smith officers from the 3d Battalion to fill gaps in the rifle platoons of B and C Companies. By 0300 1 July Colonel Smith and his men were on trucks and started on the seventy-five mile drive from Camp Wood to Itazuke. They rode in a downpour of rain, the same monsoon deluge that descended on General Church and his ADCOM [Advanced Command and Liaison Group in Korea] party that night on the road from Suwon to Taejon. Smith's motor convoy reached Itazuke at 0805.

General Dean was waiting for Smith at the airfield. "When you get to Pusan," he said to him, "head for

Taejon. We want to stop the North Koreans as far from Pusan as we can. Block the main road as far north as possible. Contact General Church. If you can't locate him, go to Taejon and beyond if you can. Sorry I can't give you more information. That's all I've got. Good luck to you, and God bless you and your men."

Thus, the fortunes of war decreed that Colonel Smith, a young infantry officer of the West Point Class of 1939 who had served with the 25th Division in the Pacific in World War II, would command the first American ground troops to meet the enemy in the Korean War. Smith was about thirty-four years of age, of medium stature, and possessed a strong, compact body. His face was friendly and open.

Assembled at Itazuke, Colonel Smith's force consisted of the following units and weapons of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment: 2 understrength rifle companies, B and C; one-half of Headquarters Company; one-half of a communications platoon; a composite 75-mm. recoilless rifle platoon of 4 guns, only 2 of which were airlifted; and 4 4.2-inch mortars, only 2 airlifted. The organization of B and C Companies included 6 2.36-inch bazooka teams and 4 60-mm. mortars. Each man had 120 rounds of .30-caliber rifle ammunition and 2 days of C rations. In all, there were only 440 men, of whom only 406 were destined to be in the group airlanded in Korea that day.

Smith's force had a liberal sprinkling of combat veterans from World War II. About one-third of the officers had had combat experience either in Europe or in the Pacific. About one-half of the noncommissioned officers were World War II veterans, but not all had been in combat. Throughout the force, perhaps one man in six had had combat experience. Most of the men were young, twenty years old or less.

Only six C-54 planes were available for the transport job. The first plane was airborne at 0845. The first and second planes upon arrival over the small runway near Pusan found it closed in with fog and, unable to land, they returned to Japan. Colonel Smith was on the second plane but he could not land in Korea until the tenth flight—between 1400 and 1500. Colonel [Rollins] Emmerich, who the previous afternoon had received instructions to have the airstrip ready, a few other KMAG officers, and a great number of South Korean civilians met the first elements when they landed about 1100.

A miscellaneous assortment of about a hundred Korean trucks and vehicles assembled by Colonel Emmerich transported the men of Task Force Smith the seventeen miles from the airstrip to the railroad station

in Pusan. Cheering crowds lined the streets and waved happily to the American soldiers as they passed. The city was in gay spirits—flags, banners, streamers, and posters were everywhere. Korean bands at the railroad station gave a noisy send-off as the loaded train pulled out at 2000.

The train with Task Force Smith aboard arrived at Taejon the next morning, 0800 2 July. There Lt. Col. LeRoy Lutes, a member of ADCOM, met Colonel Smith and took him to General Church's headquarters where the general was in conference with several American and ROK officers. Church greeted Smith and, pointing to a place on the map, explained, "We have a little action up here. All we need is some men up there who won't run when they see tanks. We're going to move you up to support the ROKs and give them moral support."

Colonel Smith then suggested that he would like to go forward and look over the ground. While his men went to their bivouac area, Smith and his principal officers got into jeeps and set out over the eighty miles of bad, bumpy roads to Osan. All along the way they saw thousands of ROK soldiers and refugees cluttering the roads and moving south.

Three miles north of Osan, at a point where the road runs through a low saddle, drops down, and bends slightly northwest toward Suwon, Smith found an excellent infantry position which commanded both the highway and the railroad. An irregular ridge of hills crossed the road at right angles, the highest point rising 300 feet above the low ground which stretched northward toward Suwon. From this high point both the highway and railroad were in view almost the entire distance to Suwon, eight miles to the north.

After looking over the ground, Smith issued verbal orders for organizing a position there. A flight of enemy fighters, red stars plainly visible on their wings, passed overhead, but their pilots apparently did not see the few men below. Its purpose accomplished, the group returned to the Taejon airstrip well after dark.

That night, 2 July, Smith received an order to take his men north by train to P'yongt'aek and Ansong. The former is 15 miles south, and the latter 20 miles southeast of Osan. Smith loaded his men into trains and they rolled north into the night. One company dug in at P'yongt'aek; the other at Ansong 12 miles away. Smith established his command post with the group at P'yongt'aek on the main highway.

The next day at P'yongt'aek Colonel Smith and his men witnessed a demonstration of aerial destructiveness. A northbound ammunition train of nine boxcars

on its way to ROK units pulled into P'yongt'aek. While the train waited for further instructions, four Mustangs flown by Royal Australian Air Force pilots made six strafing runs over it firing rockets and machine guns. The train was blown up, the station demolished, and parts of the town shot up. All night ammunition kept exploding. Many residents of P'yongt'aek died or were injured in this mistaken air strike.

That same afternoon friendly air also attacked Suwon and strafed a South Korean truck column near the town. ROK rifle fire damaged one plane and forced the pilot to land at Suwon Airfield. There, KMAG and ROK officers "captured" a highly embarrassed American pilot. One KMAG officer with the ROK Army headquarters at Suwon said he was under attack by friendly planes five different times on 3 July. This same officer in a letter to a friend a few days later wrote of these misplaced air attacks, "The fly boys really had a field day! They hit friendly ammo dumps, gas dumps, the Suwon air strip, trains, motor columns, and KA [Korean Army] Hq." In the afternoon, four friendly jet planes made strikes on Suwon and along the Suwon-Osan highway setting fire to gasoline at the railroad station in Suwon and destroying buildings and injuring civilians. On the road they strafed and burned thirty South Korean trucks and killed 200 ROK soldiers. Because of these incidents throughout the day, General Church sent a strong protest to FEAF, asking that air action be held to Han River bridges or northward.

The next day, 4 July, Smith's divided command reunited at P'yongt'aek, and was joined there by a part of the 52d Field Artillery Battalion. This artillery contingent comprised one-half each of Headquarters and Service Batteries and all of A Battery with 6 105-mm. howitzers, 73 vehicles, and 108 men under the command of Lt. Col. Miller O. Perry. It had crossed from Japan on an LST 2 July, disembarking at Pusan late that night. Two trains the next day carried the unit to Taejon. There General Church ordered Perry to join Smith at P'yongt'aek, and about 2100 that night Perry's artillery group entrained and departed northward. Because of the destroyed railroad station at P'yongt'aek, the train stopped at Songhwan-ni, where the artillerymen unloaded and drove on the six miles to P'yongt'aek before daylight.

Meanwhile, the 34th Infantry Regiment loaded at Sasebo during the night of 1 July, and arrived at Pusan the next night. After Task Force Smith had left Japan the rest of the 21st Infantry Regiment, except A and D Companies which sailed from Moji, loaded at Sasebo

3 July and departed for Pusan, arriving there early the next morning.

General Dean also was on his way to Korea. Failing on 2 July to land at Taejon because his pilot could not find the airstrip in the dark, General Dean the next morning at Ashiya Air Base joined Capt. Ben L. Tufts on his way to Korea by [Maj.] Gen. [Edward] Almond's order to act as liaison between Army and the press. Tufts' pilot knew the Taejon airstrip and landed his plane there about 1030, 3 July. General Dean and Captain Tufts went directly to the two-story yellow brick building serving as General Church's ADCOM Headquarters.

That afternoon a message from General MacArthur notified General Dean that United States Army Forces in Korea was activated under his command as of 0001 4 July. General Dean assumed command of USAFIK during the day and appointed General Church as Deputy Commander. Twenty-two other officers were named General and Special Staff officers of USAFIK. ADCOM provided most of the officers for the USAFIK staff, but some KMAG officers also served on it. Most of the KMAG officers who had left Korea by air on 27 June returned aboard the ammunition ship *Sergeant Keathley* on 2 July. By this time the ROK Army had assembled and partly reorganized about 68,000 men.

Task Force Smith at Osan

Colonels Smith and Perry, and some others, went forward in the late afternoon of 4 July to make a final reconnaissance of the Osan position. At this time Perry selected the positions for his artillery. On the road ROK engineer groups were preparing demolitions on all bridges.

Back at Taejon General Dean, a big six-footer with a bristling crew cut cropping his sand-colored hair, and beanpole General Church, slightly stooped, always calm seemingly to the point of indifference, discussed the probability of imminent American combat with the enemy. The third general officer to come to the forward area in Korea, Brig. Gen. George B. Barth, acting commanding general of the 24th Division artillery, now arrived at Taejon in the early afternoon. General Dean decided to send Barth forward to represent him, and with instructions for Task Force Smith. So, at 1500 4 July, General Barth started north by jeep for P'yongt'aek. When he found Smith, General Barth relayed his orders to "take up those good positions near Osan you told General Church about."

A little after midnight the infantry and artillery of Task Force Smith moved out of P'yongt'aek. Colonel

Smith had to commandeer Korean trucks and miscellaneous vehicles to mount his men. The native Korean drivers deserted when they found that the vehicles were going north. American soldiers had to take over in the drivers' seats. General Barth and Colonel Smith followed the task force northward. On the way, General Barth tried to halt the ROK demolition preparations by telling the engineer groups that he planned to use the bridges. At one bridge, after talk failed to influence the ROK engineers, Barth threw the boxes of dynamite into the river. It was only twelve miles to Osan, but it took two and a half hours to get there because ROK soldiers and civilians fleeing south filled the road and driving was under blackout conditions.

About 0300 on 5 July, the delaying force reached the position which Smith had previously selected. The infantry units started setting up weapons and digging in at the predesignated places. Colonel Perry moved his guns into the positions behind the infantry that he had selected the previous afternoon. All units were in place, but not completely dug in, before daylight.

In seeking the most favorable place to pass through the ridge, the railroad bent eastward away from the highway until it was almost a mile distant. There the railroad split into two single-track lines and passed over low ground between hills of the ridge line. On his left flank Colonel Smith placed one platoon of B Company on the high knob immediately west of the highway; east of the road were B Company's other two rifle platoons. Beyond them eastward to the railroad tracks were two platoons of C Company. This company's third platoon occupied a finger ridge running south, forming a refused right flank along the west side of the railroad track. Just east of the highway B Company emplaced one 75-mm. recoilless rifle; C Company emplaced the other 75-mm. recoilless rifle just west of the railroad. Colonel Smith placed the 4.2-inch mortars on the reverse, or south, slope of the ridge about 400 yards behind the center of B Company's position. The infantry line formed a 1-mile front, not counting the refused right flank along the railroad track. The highway, likely to be the critical axis of enemy advance, passed through the shallow saddle at the infantry position and then zigzagged gently down-grade northward around several knoblike spurs to low ground a little more than a mile away. There it crossed to the east side of the railroad track and continued on over semi-level ground to Suwon.

Two thousand yards behind the infantry, Colonel Perry pulled four 105-mm. howitzers 150 yards to the left (west) off the highway over a small trail that only

jeeps could travel. Two jeeps in tandem pulled the guns into place. Near a cluster of houses with rice paddies in front and low hills back of them, the men arranged the guns in battery position. Perry emplaced the fifth howitzer as an antitank gun on the west side of the road about halfway between the main battery position and the infantry. From there it could place direct fire on the highway where it passed through the saddle and the infantry positions.


Volunteers from the artillery Headquarters and Service Batteries made up four .50-caliber machine gun and four 2.36-inch bazooka teams and joined the infantry in their position.

The infantry parked most of their miscellaneous trucks and jeeps along the road just south of the saddle. The artillerymen left their trucks concealed in yards and sheds and behind Korean houses along the road just north of Osan. There were about 1,200 rounds of artillery ammunition at the battery position and in two trucks parked inside a walled enclosure nearby. One or two truckloads more were in the vehicles parked among the houses just north of Osan. Nearly all this ammunition was high explosive (HE); only 6 rounds were high explosive antitank (HEAT), and all of it was taken to the forward gun. When the 52d Field Artillery was loading out at Sasebo, Japan, the battalion ammunition officer drew all the HEAT ammunition available there—only 18 rounds. He issued 6 rounds to A Battery, now on the point of engaging in the first battle between American artillery and the Russian-built T34 tanks.

At the Osan position as rainy 5 July dawned were 540 Americans: 389 enlisted men and 17 officers among the infantry and 125 enlisted men and 9 officers among the artillerymen. When first light came, the infantry test-fired their weapons and the artillerymen registered their guns. Then they ate their C ration breakfasts.

In spite of the rain Smith could see almost to Suwon. He first saw movement on the road in the distance near Suwon a little after 0700. In about a half an hour a tank column, now easily discernible, approached the waiting Americans. In this first group there were eight tanks. About 0800 the men back in the artillery position received a call from the forward observer with the infantry for a fire mission.

At 0816 the first American artillery fire of the Korean War hurtled through the air toward the North Korean tanks. The number two howitzer fired the first two rounds, and the other pieces then joined in the firing. The artillery took the tanks under fire at a range of approximately 4,000 yards, about 2,000 yards in



front of the American infantry. The forward observer quickly adjusted the fire and shells began landing among the tanks. But the infantrymen saw the tanks keep on coming, undeterred by the exploding artillery shells.

To conserve ammunition Colonel Smith issued orders that the 75-mm. recoilless rifle covering the highway should withhold fire until the tanks closed to 700 yards. The tanks stayed in column, displayed little caution, and did not leave the road. The commander of the enemy tank column may have thought he had encountered only another minor ROK delaying position.

General Barth had gone back to the artillery just before the enemy came into view and did not know when he arrived there that an enemy force was approaching. After receiving reports from the forward observer that the artillery fire was ineffective against the tanks, he started back to alert the 1st Battalion of the 34th Infantry, whose arrival he expected at P'yongt'aek during the night, against a probable breakthrough of the enemy tanks.

When the enemy tank column approached within 700 yards of the infantry position, the two recoilless rifles took it under fire. They scored direct hits, but apparently did not damage the tanks which, firing their 85-mm. cannon and 7.62-mm. machine guns, rumbled on up the incline toward the saddle. When they were almost abreast of the infantry position, the lead tanks came under 2.36-inch rocket launcher fire. Operating a bazooka from a ditch along the east side of the road, 2d Lt. Ollie D. Connor fired twenty-two rockets at approximately fifteen yards' range against the rear of the tanks where their armor was the weakest. Whether they were effective is doubtful. The two lead tanks, however, were stopped just through the pass when they came under direct fire of the single 105-mm. howitzer using HEAT ammunition. Very likely these artillery shells stopped the two tanks, although the barrage of close-range bazooka rockets may have damaged their tracks.

The two damaged tanks pulled off to the side of the road, clearing the way for those following. One of the two caught fire and burned. Two men emerged from its turret with their hands up. A third jumped out with a burp gun in his hands and fired directly into a machine gun position, killing the assistant gunner. This unidentified machine gunner probably was the first American ground soldier killed in action in Korea. American fire killed the three North Koreans. The six rounds of HEAT ammunition at the forward gun were soon

expended, leaving only the HE shells which ricocheted off the tanks. The third tank through the pass knocked out the forward gun and wounded one of its crew members.

The tanks did not stop to engage the infantry; they merely fired on them as they came through. Following the first group of 8 tanks came others at short intervals, usually in groups of 4. These, too, went unhesitatingly through the infantry position and on down the road toward the artillery position. In all, there were 33 tanks in the column. The last passed through the infantry position by 0900, about an hour after the lead tanks had reached the saddle. In this hour, tank fire had killed or wounded approximately twenty men in Smith's position.

Earlier in the morning it was supposed to have been no more than an academic question as to what would happen if tanks came through the infantry to the artillery position. Someone in the artillery had raised this point to be answered by the infantry, "Don't worry, they will never get back to you." One of the artillerymen later expressed the prevailing opinion by saying, "everyone thought the enemy would turn around and go back when they found out who was fighting." Word now came to the artillerymen from the forward observer that tanks were through the infantry and to be ready for them.

The first tanks cut up the telephone wire strung along the road from the artillery to the infantry and destroyed this communication. The radios were wet and functioning badly; now only the jeep radio worked. Communication with the infantry after 0900 was spotty at best, and, about 1000, it ceased altogether.

The tanks came on toward the artillery pieces, which kept them under fire but could not stop them. About 500 yards from the battery, the tanks stopped behind a little hill seeking protection from direct fire. Then, one at a time, they came down the road with a rush, hatches closed, making a run to get past the battery position. Some fired their 85-mm. cannon, others only their machine guns. Their aim was haphazard in most cases for the enemy tankers had not located the gun positions. Some of the tank guns even pointed toward the opposite side of the road. Only one tank stopped momentarily at the little trail where the howitzers had pulled off the main road as though it meant to try to overrun the battery which its crew evidently had located. Fortunately, however, it did not leave the road but instead, after a moment, continued on toward Osan. The 105-mm. howitzers fired at ranges of 150-300 yards as the tanks went by, but the shells only

jarred the tanks and bounced off. Altogether, the tanks did not average more than one round each in return fire.

Three bazooka teams from the artillery had posted themselves near the road before the tanks appeared. When word came that the tanks were through infantry, two more bazooka teams, one led by Colonel Perry and the other by Sgt. Edwin A. Eversole, started to move into position. The first tank caught both Perry and Eversole in the rice paddy between the howitzers and the highway. When Eversole's first bazooka round bounced off the turret of the tank, he said that tank suddenly looked to him "as big as a battleship." This tank fired its 85-mm. cannon, cutting down a telephone pole which fell harmlessly over Eversole who had flung himself down into a paddy drainage ditch. A 105-mm. shell hit the tracks of the third tank and stopped it. The other tanks in this group went on through. The four American howitzers remained undamaged.

After these tanks had passed out of sight, Colonel Perry took an interpreter and worked his way up close to the immobilized enemy tank. Through the interpreter, he called on the crew to come out and surrender. There was no response. Perry then ordered the howitzers to destroy the tank. After three rounds had hit the tank, two men jumped out of it and took cover in a culvert. Perry sent a squad forward and it killed the two North Koreans.

During this little action, small arms fire hit Colonel Perry in the right leg. Refusing to be evacuated, he hobbled around or sat against the base of a tree giving orders and instructions in preparation for the appearance of more tanks.

In about ten minutes the second wave of tanks followed the last of the first group. This time there were more—"a string of them," as one man expressed it. They came in ones, twos, and threes, close together with no apparent interval or organization.

When the second wave of tanks came into view, some of the howitzer crew members started to "take off." As one present said, the men were "shy about helping." The officers had to drag the ammunition up and load the pieces themselves. The senior noncommissioned officers fired the pieces. The momentary panic soon passed and, with the good example and strong leadership of Colonel Perry and 1st Lt. Dwain L. Scott before them, the men returned to their positions. Many of the second group of tanks did not fire on the artillery at all. Again, the 105-mm. howitzers could not stop the oncoming tanks. They did, however, hit another in its tracks, disabling it in front of the artillery position. Some of the tanks had one or two infantrymen

on their decks. Artillery fire blew off or killed most of them; some lay limply dead as the tanks went by; others slowly jolted off onto the road. Enemy tank fire caused a building to burn near the battery position and a nearby dump of about 300 rounds of artillery shells began to explode. The last of the tanks passed the artillery position by 1015. These tanks were from the *107th Tank Regiment* of the *105th Armored Division*, in support of the *N.K. 4th Division*.

Colonel Perry estimates that his four howitzers fired an average of 4 to 6 rounds at each of the tanks, and that they averaged perhaps 1 round each in return. After the last tank was out of sight, rumbling on toward Osan, the score stood as follows: the forward 105-mm. howitzer, and 2.36-inch bazookas fired from the infantry position, had knocked out and left burning 1 tank and damaged another so that it could not move; the artillery had stopped 2 more in front of the artillery position, while 3 others though damaged had managed to limp out of range toward Osan. This made 4 tanks destroyed or immobilized and 3 others slightly damaged but serviceable out of a total of 33.

For their part, the tanks had destroyed the forward 105-mm. howitzer and wounded one of its crew members, had killed or wounded an estimated twenty infantrymen, and had destroyed all the parked vehicles behind the infantry position. At the main battery position the tanks had slightly damaged one of the four guns by a near miss. Only Colonel Perry and another man were wounded at the battery position.

Task Force Smith was not able to use any of its antitank mines—one of the most effective methods of defense against tanks—as there were none in Korea at the time. Colonel Perry was of the opinion that a few well-placed antitank mines would have stopped the entire armored column in the road.

After the last of the tank column had passed through the infantry position and the artillery and tank fire back toward Osan had subsided, the American position became quiet again. There was no movement of any kind discernible on the road ahead toward Suwon. But Smith knew that he must expect enemy infantry soon. In the steady rain that continued throughout the morning, the men deepened their foxholes and otherwise improved their positions.

Perhaps an hour after the enemy tank column had moved through, Colonel Smith, from his observation post, saw movement on the road far away, near Suwon. This slowly became discernible as a long column of trucks and foot soldiers. Smith estimated the column to be about six miles long. It took an hour for the head

of the column to reach a point 1,000 yards in front of the American infantry. There were three tanks in front, followed by a long line of trucks, and, behind these, several miles of marching infantry. There could be no doubt about it, this was a major force of the North Korean Army pushing south—the *16th and 18th Regiments* of the N.K. *4th Division*, as learned later.

Whether the enemy column knew that American ground troops had arrived in Korea and were present in the battle area is unknown. Later, Sr. Col. Lee Hak Ku, in early July operations officer of the N.K. *II Corps*, said he had no idea that the United States would intervene in the war, that nothing had been said about possible U.S. intervention, and that he believed it came as a surprise to North Korean authorities.

With battle against a greatly superior number of enemy troops only a matter of minutes away, the apprehensions of the American infantry watching the approaching procession can well be imagined. General MacArthur later referred to his commitment of a handful of American ground troops as "that arrogant display of strength" which he hoped would fool the enemy into thinking that a much larger force was at hand.

When the convoy of enemy trucks was about 1,000 yards away, Colonel Smith, to use his own words, "threw the book at them." Mortar shells landed among the trucks and .50-caliber machine gun bullets swept the column. Trucks burst into flames. Men were blown into the air; others sprang from their vehicles and jumped into ditches alongside the road. The three tanks moved to within 200-300 yards of the American positions and began raking the ridge line with cannon and machine gun fire. Behind the burning vehicles an estimated 1,000 enemy infantry stopped and waited. It was now about 1145.

The enemy infantry began moving up the finger ridge along the east side of the road. There, some of them set up a base of fire while others fanned out to either side in a double enveloping movement. The American fire broke up all efforts of the enemy infantry to advance frontally. Strange though it was, the North Koreans made no strong effort to attack the flanks; they seemed bent on getting around rather than closing on them. Within an hour, about 1230, the enemy appeared in force on the high hill to the west of the highway overlooking and dominating the knob on that side held by a platoon of B Company. Smith, observing this, withdrew the platoon to the east side of the road. Maj. Floyd Martin, executive officer of the 1st Battalion, meanwhile supervised the carrying of available ammu-

nition stocks to a central and protected area back of the battalion command post. The 4.2-inch mortars were moved up closer, and otherwise the men achieved a tighter defense perimeter on the highest ground east of the road. In the exchange of fire that went on an increasing amount of enemy mortar and artillery fire fell on the American position. Enemy machine guns on hills overlooking the right flank now also began firing on Smith's men.

Earlier, Colonel Perry had twice sent wire parties to repair the communications wire between the artillery and the infantry, but both had returned saying they had been fired upon. At 1300 Perry sent a third group led by his Assistant S-3. This time he ordered the men put in a new line across the paddies east of the road and to avoid the area where the earlier parties said they had received fire.

About 1430, Colonel Smith decided that if any of his command was to get out, the time to move was at hand. Large numbers of the enemy were now on both flanks and moving toward his rear; a huge enemy reserve waited in front of him along the road stretching back toward Suwon; and his small arms ammunition was nearly gone. A large enemy tank force was already in his rear. He had no communications, not even with Colonel Perry's artillery a mile behind him, and he could hope for no reinforcements. Perry's artillery had fired on the enemy infantry as long as the fire direction communication functioned properly, but this too had failed soon after the infantry fight began. The weather prevented friendly air from arriving at the scene. Had it been present it could have worked havoc with the enemy-clogged road.

Smith planned to withdraw his men by leapfrogging units off the ridge, each jump of the withdrawal covered by protecting fire of the next unit ahead. The selected route of withdrawal was toward Osan down the finger ridge on the right flank, just west of the railroad track. First off the hill was C Company, followed by the medics, then battalion headquarters, and, finally, B Company, except its 2d Platoon which never received the withdrawal order. A platoon messenger returned from the company command post and reported to 2d Lt. Carl F. Bernard that there was no one at the command post and that the platoon was the only group left in position. After confirming this report Bernard tried to withdraw his men. At the time of the withdrawal the men carried only small arms and each averaged two or three clips of ammunition. They abandoned all crew-served weapons—recoilless rifles, mortars, and machine guns. They had no alternative

but to leave behind all the dead and about twenty-five to thirty wounded litter cases. A medical sergeant, whose name unfortunately has not been determined, voluntarily remained with the latter. The slightly wounded moved out with the main units, but when enemy fire dispersed some of the groups many of the wounded dropped behind and were seen no more.

Task Force Smith suffered its heaviest casualties in the withdrawal. Some of the enemy machine gun fire was at close quarters. The captain and pitcher of the regimental baseball team, 1st Lt. Raymond "Bodie" Adams, used his pitching arm to win the greatest victory of his career when he threw a grenade forty yards into an enemy machine gun position, destroying the gun and killing the crew. This particular gun had caused heavy casualties.

About the time B Company, the initial covering unit, was ready to withdraw, Colonel Smith left the hill, slanted off to the railroad track and followed it south to a point opposite the artillery position. From there he struck off west through the rice paddies to find Colonel Perry and tell him the infantry was leaving. While crossing the rice paddies Smith met Perry's wire party and together they hurried to Perry's artillery battery. Smith had assumed that the enemy tanks had destroyed all the artillery pieces and had made casualties of most of the men. His surprise was complete when he found that all the guns at this battery position were operable and that only Colonel Perry and another man were wounded. Enemy infantry had not yet appeared at the artillery position.

Upon receiving Smith's order to withdraw, the artillerymen immediately made ready to go. They removed the sights and breech locks from the guns and carried them and the aiming circles to their vehicles. Smith, Perry, and the artillerymen walked back to the outskirts of Osan where they found the artillery trucks as they had left them, only a few being slightly damaged by tank and machine gun fire.

Perry and Smith planned to take a road at the south edge of Osan to Ansong, assuming that the enemy tanks had gone down the main road toward P'yongt'aek. Rounding a bend in the road near the southern edge of the town, but short of the Ansong road, Smith and Perry in the lead vehicle came suddenly upon three enemy tanks halted just ahead of them. Some or all of the tank crew members were standing about smoking cigarettes. The little column of vehicles turned around quickly, and without a shot being fired, drove back to

the north edge of Osan. There they turned into a small dirt road that led eastward, hoping that it would get them to Ansong.

The column soon came upon groups of infantry from Smith's battalion struggling over the hills and through the rice paddies. Some of the men had taken off their shoes in the rice paddies, others were without head covering of any kind, while some had their shirts off. The trucks stopped and waited while several of these groups came up and climbed on them. About 100 infantrymen joined the artillery group in this way. Then the vehicles continued on unmolested, arriving at Ansong after dark.

There was no pursuit. The North Korean infantry occupied the vacated positions, and busied themselves in gathering trophies, apparently content to have driven off the enemy force.

The next morning, 6 July, Colonel Smith and his party went on to Ch'onan. Upon arrival there a count revealed that he had 185 men. Subsequently, Capt. Richard Dashmer, C Company commander, came in with 65 men, increasing the total to 250. There were about 150 men killed, wounded, or missing from Colonel Smith's infantry force when he took a second count later in the day. The greatest loss was in B Company. Survivors straggled in to American lines at P'yongt'aek, Ch'onan, Taejon, and other points in southern Korea during the next several days. Lieutenant Bernard and twelve men of the reserve platoon of B Company reached Ch'onan two days after the Osan fight. Five times he and his men had encountered North Korean roadblocks. They arrived at Ch'onan only half an hour ahead of the enemy. A few men walked all the way from Osan to the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. One man eventually arrived at Pusan on a Korean sampan from the west coast.

None of the 5 officers and 10 enlisted men of the artillery forward observer, liaison, machine gun, and bazooka group with the infantry ever came back. On 7 July 5 officers and 26 enlisted men from the artillery were still missing.

The N.K. *4th Division* and attached units apparently lost approximately 42 killed and 85 wounded at Osan on 5 July. A diary taken from a dead North Korean soldier some days later carried this entry about Osan: "5 Jul 50...we met vehicles and American PWs. We also saw some American dead. We found 4 of our destroyed tanks. Near Osan there was a great battle."

Letters to the Editor

Editor:

James R. Arnold complains (*Army History*, no. 24, p. 41) that by not "engaging the reader" Douglas Kinnard (in *The Certain Trumpet: Maxwell Taylor and the American Experience in Vietnam*) may have "surrender[ed] the field to dry-as-dust history that merely records the facts." On the other hand, we do seem to have plenty of late-twentieth century historians with various axes to grind. Given a choice, some of us prefer the view enunciated by television's Sgt. Joe Friday of the L.A.P.D.: "just the facts, ma'am."

"The first law of the historian is that he shall never dare utter an untruth. The second is that he shall suppress nothing that is true. Moreover, there shall be no suspicion of partiality in his writing, or of malice."

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.)

Robert P. Fairchild
Lt. Col., U.S. Army National Guard

Editor:

As always, I enjoyed the Fall/Winter 1992/1993 issue [no. 24] of *Army History*. I do, however, have a bone to pick with Mark E. Hubbs concerning a statement in his article, "A Pandemonium of Torture and Despair: The Capture of St. Charles & Explosion of the Mound City." In the first paragraph, he asserts, "A month after the defeat at Elkhorn, Confederate General Albert S. Johnston was killed and his army driven from the field at Shiloh." The Confederate army was not "driven" from the field. After inflicting a crushing defeat on the Federal forces on the first day of the battle, the Confederates were forced to retire the following day in the face of Grant's overwhelming force, reinforced by Buell's fresh troops that had arrived during the night. Even so, the Federals did not "drive" the Southern army before them: the Confederates marched off the field in good order, while the Union troops were content merely to follow along at a distance, loath to press a pursuit.

Captain Hubbs' frequent use of the term "rebel" to describe the Confederates is unfortunate and could betray an anti-southern bias. If he chooses to call the Confederates "rebels," he should also refer to the

Federals as "yankees" from time to time.

These criticisms may seem petty, but a professional forum such as *Army History* should enforce rigorous standards of objectivity if it wishes to maintain its credibility.

Thomas Evan Miller
Modern Wars Historian
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Department of Military Affairs
Division of Veterans Affairs

Editor:

As an Army historian with over twenty years experience, seventeen with the Army Materiel Command (AMC), I looked forward to the AMC Focus on the Field article in the Summer 1992 issue [no. 23]. However, after reading the article, I find areas of disagreement. First, Dr. Robert Darius states that in 1985 the AMC history program was "dormant."

In 1985 the Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) at Rock Island, Illinois, had eight people at the Rock Island site, two at the Armament Research and Development Center, and two at the Chemical Research and Development Center. This group finished up a backlog of annual histories at Rock Island, collected the largest number of Army historical records outside of the Center of Military History and the Military History Institute, wrote arguably the most read historical work ever produced by AMC on the Rock Island Prison Barracks, and served as the AMC staff supervisor for museums. As an AMC major subordinate command, we were not "dormant."

Since 1985 the AMC history program has lost more than 50 percent of its personnel strength. Several of the major subordinate commands are now without historians, and almost all of the commands have endured the loss of spaces. Most of the commands are behind with their annual histories, and monograph production is down. To be sure, the Army is taking personnel cuts across the board, but it is difficult to find many programs that have had to endure personnel losses of 50 percent.

The article also discusses three AMC museums, but fails to mention the fourth museum at Watervliet, New York. This is an interesting coincidence, because the article does not talk much about the then AMC

commander, General Richard H. Thompson. In 1985 a question came up about the Watervliet museum. General Thompson called the AMCCOM commander and "counseled" him on the importance of museums. That solved the problem. General Thompson gave strong support to the history and museum programs.

Given the omissions in the article and the current state of the AMC history program, it is difficult to accept the author's characterization of the pre-1985 AMC history program as dormant. As a member of the pre-1985 program, I take umbrage at that characterization.

James R. Cooper, Jr.
Command Historian
U.S. Army Space and Strategic
Defense Command

Editor:

The Focus on the Field entry in the Summer 1992 edition of *Army History*, which treats the AMC historical program, contains two very disturbing sentences. Both are in the seventh paragraph of page 31. The first, which is the most troublesome, states "In late 1985...[the] chief of staff of AMC...initiated the move to revamp the dormant AMC history program." The second, which immediately follows, continues this line: "In 1986 he [the chief of staff] directed the new AMC historian to 'keep pushing our history program.'"

The two sentences, collectively, depict the pre-1986 AMC historical program as sound asleep—"dormant"—and, since then, as one that constantly needed to be prodded—"keep pushing"—just to stay awake and accomplish something. This description is not flattering. Indeed, some might find it offensive.

As an historian in one of the AMC elements, the Aviation and Troop Command, an amalgam of the AVSCOM and of the TROSCOM noted in the article, I can assure you that, whatever its merits, the program here in St. Louis was not, nor is, asleep. Prior to 1985, usually working as a lone historian, I wrote two annual historical reviews each year (two commands, one effort), initiated and maintained a microfiche program, wrote two books, and executed all of the other tasks associated with a complete endeavor—interviews, requests, and so forth. From 1986 to the present, I have continued to do all of these historical chores, to include the publication of four more books (with yet another under way), and all of this when, collectively, the strength of the historical staff here fell from four

historians and three assistants to one historian and one editorial assistant today.

During all this period, no one from the AMC Headquarters appeared here and inserted any sort of pole into one of Samuel Clemens' caves and jabbed in the direction of the snores. What someone from said headquarters apparently has done, however, is attempt, via Focus on the Field, not only to rewrite history, but to rewrite the writing of history.

Howard K. Butler, Ph.D.
Command Historian
U.S. Army Aviation and Troop
Command

Editor:

I liked Tom Slattery's story on the Rock Island Arsenal [no. 24, p. 7] very much, and, please, I do not wish to detract from it whatever...but, as I've written a book about Italian prisoners in America, my eye is prompt to note even a slight error in the reporting of their experience.

Mr. Slattery's error is slight indeed, and I'm not surprised at it. In discussing the Italian POWs working at the arsenal in the 39th and 40th Italian Quartermaster Service Companies he says (p. 10): "Technically they were no longer prisoners of war since Italy had earlier surrendered and joined the Allied Forces against Nazi Germany."

Actually, it was the reverse. Technically, they *did* remain prisoners of war right up to the time they were repatriated in 1945. This is a long story that I'll try to keep short.

The Allies never really trusted Italy, even after Mussolini was deposed (25 July 1943), Italy surrendered (3 September 1943), and then declared war on Germany (10 October 1943). Italy never became an "ally," but only—and begrudgingly—a "co-belligerent" (although several thousand Italians did fight in Italian units, under Allied command, against the Germans in the Italian campaign).

Of the 50,000 or so Italian POWs brought to America—most of them after the final battle for Tunisia—almost 35,000 joined Italian Service Units (ISUs) such as those described by Mr. Slattery. They did, however, absolutely remain prisoners of war and subject to all of the rules and regulations of the Geneva Convention. ISUs were established 13 March 1944 by order of Maj. Gen. J. A. Ulio, U.S. Army Adjutant General, acting on behalf of Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell,

commanding general of the Army Service Forces, in which the ISUs would serve. Part of that order read:

"In order to utilize to the maximum the services of Italian prisoners of war who are loyal to the cause of the United Nations, they will be organized under United States Army Tables of Organization and Equipment into service units without arms.... Italian personnel assigned to the units will remain prisoners of war but will be released from stockades and placed in the custody of American officers attached to the units."

Everything else that Mr. Slattery wrote about the Italian POWs is totally accurate, and it's true they contributed significantly to the Allied war effort. They

never got much credit for their work, and they had to be returned to Italy, even though many would have preferred to stay in America. In some cases, the women they met while they were POWs went to Italy after the war, married them, and brought them home as the spouses of American citizens. Several hundred of them can still be found living around the areas where they once were prisoners. In researching my book, *Italian Prisoners of War in America, 1942-1946: Captives or Allies?* (Praeger: New York, 1992), I had the pleasure of interviewing several dozen of them. None ever had any doubts that they remained POWs.

Louis E. Keefer
Reston, Virginia

Book Reviews

Book Review
by Theresa L. Kraus

The United States Army: A Dictionary
Edited by Peter Tsouras, Bruce W. Watson, and Susan Watson
Garland Publishing. 898 pp., \$125.00

The military tends to speak and write using acronyms, abbreviations, and jargon—a language few outsiders ever really understand. *The United States Army: A Dictionary*, edited by Peter Tsouras, Bruce W. Watson, and Susan Watson, tries to help make the Army's language intelligible to the nonmilitary user. Realizing that "the military has a penchant, indeed a mania, for acronyms," the editors have defined hundreds of Army terms in an easy to use reference work.

The dictionary is divided into two major sections. The first part provides a list of acronyms and what they stand for. The second section defines not only those acronyms, but also other commonly used military terms and phrases. Many of those terms are cross-referenced. Each definition is followed by a list of pertinent bibliographic references. An extensive bibliography follows. The bibliography itself is interesting in that it lists a variety of sources, from a Tom Clancy novel to current publications of the National

Strategy Information Center and U.S. Army field manuals.

In compiling the dictionary, the editors have focused on the post-World War II period, with an emphasis on the present. Although it would have increased the size of the book, the inclusion of pre-World War II terms would have been beneficial. Historians, in particular, often find it difficult to identify quickly those earlier acronyms and terms.

Naturally, a work of this nature can never be complete. Compared, for example, with the list of terms included in FMs 101-5-1 and 100-5, the dictionary's acronym list does not include AASLT (air assault), CL (coordination line), DDSM (defense distinguished service medal), LTD (laser target designator), PIR (priority intelligence requirements), OCA (offensive counter air), and ROARD (Reorganization Objective Army Division), among others. A quick survey of the dictionary also found terms such as pentomic, Chinook, REDEYE, MAULER, LANCE, and Sheridan missing. The editors, however, cannot be faulted for such omissions, given the military's penchant for adopting new and discarding old acronyms and phrases.

Overall, *The United States Army: A Dictionary* is a very useful tool for both the civilian and military user. It compiles in a one-volume work some of the most

commonly used terms and acronyms, providing the reader with a quick and handy reference. It is a valuable resource to anyone with an interest in the Army and a desire to understand the military and its unique language.

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Book Review

by G. A. LoFaro

SLAM: The Influence of S.L.A. Marshall on the United States Army

by Maj. F.D.G. Williams

Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). 138 pp.

In his monograph, Lt. Col. (then Maj.) F.D.G. Williams provides an overview of the career of America's foremost battlefield reporter, Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall (SLAM), and the influence he had on the United States Army especially through his two works, *Men Against Fire* and *The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation*. As such, Colonel Williams' book is not an all-encompassing biography of Marshall, but provides a solid introduction to Marshall's works as well as a useful exposition of the major theories he advanced during a career that spanned several wars.

In the first two chapters Williams addresses Marshall's journalistic beginnings and the process by which he slowly transformed himself from a reporter into a combat historian. During this transformation Marshall, ever with an eye for a good tale and a journalist's desire to uncover the real story, discovered and honed his after-action combat interview technique. Following the 27th Division ashore at Makin Island in November 1943, Marshall quickly realized that he could not garner a true picture of the operation simply by remaining in the rear headquarters and reporting unit actions as they occurred on the map, for he found that the map did not always contain the whole story. After one particularly hard-fought and confusing battalion engagement, Marshall was able to gather the participants together and have each explain what happened from his point of view, thereby clarifying what actually went on during the night's intense combat. More group interviews followed, and these Marshall

combined with the larger picture gathered from more traditional sources to write his story of the Makin Island fight. Commanders quickly realized the immediate utility of Marshall's technique and, armed with information Marshall gained, were able to assess not only their own unit's strengths and weaknesses but also to secure valuable intelligence about the enemy that stood them in good stead in the future.

Though Marshall gained renown for his after-action combat interview technique, later authors and historians attacked Marshall on several fronts. Some questioned the accuracy of Marshall's writings, while others suggested that he subverted the group interview process by using it merely to gather evidence to support his preconceived notions. Colonel Williams addresses both points by comparing Marshall's notes on three books, *The River and the Gauntlet*, *Night Drop*, and *Ambush*, against the published versions. In the end, Williams writes, Marshall "occasionally increased the numbers of men or the distance involved by twenty or fifty percent," but most often "the story followed the notes exactly." As to the matter of Marshall's preconceived ideas, Williams quotes two of Marshall's compatriots, John Westover and Forrest Pogue, who see SLAM as an intuitive thinker whose ideas were usually correct, despite a lack of objectivity, and whose main concern was for a good story rather than flawless accuracy. In this manner, Marshall the journalist had little time for "pedantic" historians; he was after a good story.

Williams contends that Marshall made his biggest impact through his seminal works *Men Against Fire* and *The Soldier's Load*. In the former, Marshall set forth his controversial assertion that only 25 percent of soldiers engaged in combat actually fired their weapons. To remedy the situation, Marshall proposed both realistic combat training and constant communication by leaders with their soldiers. Once contact with the enemy was gained, wrote Marshall, soldiers went to ground and all interpersonal communication and contact were lost. Men who had not been trained to expect such conditions often froze. According to Marshall, in these circumstances leaders had to assert themselves to reestablish interpersonal links and deploy men and equipment not as they relate to the ground, but as they relate to other soldiers in the unit.

In *The Soldier's Load*, Marshall explored the link between fear and fatigue. Having experienced temporary loss of self-control himself on Makin Island due to dehydration, Marshall formed an initial opinion on the matter which he finally substantiated during his group

interviews with soldiers who had landed on OMAHA Beach on D-day. Having been loaded down with everything overzealous staff officers imagined they might require, the soldiers in the initial waves ashore at Normandy remembered nothing as vividly as the sheer exhaustion that gripped them as they attempted to make their way inland. With this evidence in hand, Marshall challenged the existing orthodoxy that erred on the side of caution by loading the soldier with every manner of bean and bullet he could carry, lest he run out. To Marshall, soldiers were not pack mules but warriors whose mental capacity to deal with fear was directly affected by their level of fatigue. Soldiers who were overloaded, wrote Marshall, were more prone to fear, and scared soldiers tired more quickly. Overloading thus initiated a descending spiral that directly detracted from individual and, by extension, unit combat performance.

Williams reports that both of the above works had a significant impact on the U.S. Army. As a result of *Men Against Fire*, the Army adopted the two-man fighting position and changed from training marksmanship on known-distance ranges to ranges incorporating silhouettes that approximated human forms. Additionally, the Command and General Staff College included much of what Marshall wrote in its text entitled *Military Psychology. The Soldier's Load* provided the impetus toward the reconfiguration of individual combat loads and spurred research and development in new individual load-carrying equipment. Marshall himself was a principal contributor to an Army board examining the latter.

If there is a weakness in Williams' presentation, it lies in his coverage of Marshall's early life and the unanswered questions about many of Marshall's claims about himself. In the introduction to Williams' work, Dr. Susan Canedy cites assertions by Harold P. Leinbaugh, World War II veteran and author of *The Men of Company K*, that Marshall lied about his service in World War I. Among other things, Canedy points out that, though Marshall contended he won a battlefield commission during the Great War, he was in reality not commissioned until after the armistice. Additionally, while Marshall claimed to have completed two years of college at Texas School of Mines, school records indicate that he completed but one semester of work. Williams fails to address either subject and hence sideslips the overarching question of Marshall's veracity.

Nevertheless, Williams' monograph is a balanced and well-researched account of the impact of Marshall's

own writings. He draws extensively on the S.L.A. Marshall Military History Collection housed at the University of Texas, El Paso, library and augments these documents with interviews with soldiers and historians who knew Marshall. Williams also includes appendixes that outline Marshall's group interview technique, a useful tool for anyone interested in imitating it. Williams acknowledges that he drew much of his material on his subject's background from Marshall's autobiography, *Bringing Up the Rear*, but adds the caveat that, since it is an autobiography, he "treated it as such" and double-checked the material contained therein before including any in his work. In the end, Colonel Williams succeeds in achieving what he set out to do—examine "how someone who was neither a participant nor a scholar wrote books and articles which profoundly influenced the US Army."

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Book Review by Boyd L. Dastrup

Caissons Across Europe: An Artillery Captain's Personal War
by Richard M. Hardison
Eakin Press. 306 pp., \$18.95

Those looking for the glory of war, the futility of combat, or the excitement of combat action will not find it in Richard Hardison's account. The story begins with a few of the author's memories of Colorado City, Texas, where he grew up, and his last days at Texas A&M and concludes when he returned to that same institution almost five years later.

Hardison's Army experience began when he completed college in June 1941 and attended the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. After graduating and spending additional time at Fort Sill, he was transferred in February 1943 to Camp Campbell, Kentucky, and assigned to the 399th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 8th Armored Division. He served with this unit until it was disbanded in Czechoslovakia after the fighting stopped in mid-1945. He was then reassigned to the 301st Field Artillery Battalion, 94th Infantry Division.

In moving prose, Hardison tells an intriguing, emotional story of a young man caught up in the vicissi-

tudes of World War II. He writes about freezing in winter, encountering people displaced by the war, fighting boredom, and striving to maintain his personal integrity in an environment devoid of that characteristic. Hardison also writes frankly about fellow officers by examining their successes and failings, and about the horrors of war. He discusses an instance where a disgrunteled American soldier casually shoots and kills a German civilian, apparently without cause. To balance his account, Hardison points to numerous examples of compassion, as concerned soldiers helped the civilian victims of the war.

Although the author uses after-action reports, other written primary sources, and solid secondary material, he also relies heavily upon his recollections and those of his fellow officers and soldiers. This reliance raises questions about the accuracy of the stories that are recounted in vivid detail after the passage of forty-five years. Notwithstanding, Hardison's book effectively tells a story that is worth reading.

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Book Review

by **Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.**

V-1/V-2: Hitler's Vengeance on London
by **David Johnson**
Scarborough House. 203pp., \$10.95

Lest the reader miss the relevance of this paperback edition, the publisher has added a sticker proclaiming "Forerunners of Saddam's SCUDS" to the cover. Adolf Hitler's *Vergeltungswaffen* (vengeance weapons) and the SCUD missiles that continue to be stockpiled in Southwest Asia are similar indeed. Today's SCUDs and Nazi Germany's V-2s are alike in their technical capacities and in their utility, since both are far more effective as instruments of public terror than as strategic weapons. These contemporary comparisons are left to the reader; David Johnson's story, first appearing in 1981 (Stein & Day), focuses on the impact of Hitler's rockets on London in 1944.

If Hitler's rocket attacks had limited strategic and even tactical impact, they did achieve one major goal by forcing General Dwight D. Eisenhower to divert 20 percent of the Allied bombing effort toward the launch sites and away from German cities and industrial

centers. London's industrial war production also fell dramatically, an important consideration since 40 percent of Great Britain's 1,000-pound high-explosive bombs came from London's factories.

Moreover, the psychological impact of the German attacks was real. After Londoners' experiences with the *Blitz*, the frequent alerts and the incessant pounding of the antiaircraft fire (usually ineffective against V-weapons) took their toll on morale.

The historical narrative of the German rocket program and the technical details are also here, but they have been available before. In addition to the sources Johnson cites, there is an unpublished manuscript (1954) in the Center of Military History's collection, "The Employment of V-Weapons by the Germans During World War II," by Lt. Col. M. C. Helfers, which understandably is not mentioned.

But the real contribution in Johnson's account is the colorful insights he gathered through oral interviews with London's survivors of the "doodlebug" attacks. To these anecdotes he adds the personal recollections of Dutch citizens in the launching area and of German members of the launching crews. The photographs accompanying his account are an excellent addition to the narrative. His maps, though crude, also are effective.

This relatively brief volume, with its human interest touches and its focus on war's impact on civilians, should appeal to a variety of readers.

Dr. Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., is managing editor of Army History and chief of international programs at the Center. He has a special interest in German military history.

Book Review

by **Burton Wright**

A Murder in Wartime: The Untold Spy Story That Changed the Course of the Vietnam War
by **Jeff Stein**
St. Martin's Press. 414 pp., \$22.95

Throughout its history, the United States has participated from time to time in controversial military actions. By all odds, one of the most controversial conflicts in American history was the war in Vietnam. The controversy often focused not on the big picture, but on smaller snapshots of that struggle.

In 1969 an incident involving the murder of a purported Vietnamese double agent by members of the Special Forces fascinated the American public. Groups supporting the Green Berets as well as those against them quickly formed, and the publicity the case received threatened to engulf the administration of President Richard Nixon in a particularly unpleasant situation.

The Green Beret Murder Case, as it came to be known in the contemporary press, is the subject of a new and intriguing book by Jeff Stein. This is the second book published on the subject. In the early 1970s a very short and superficial book entitled *Those Gallant Men* appeared that was very favorable to the defendants.

Mr. Stein's book is far more scholarly and even-handed. It is worth the time to read and comprehend the often counterproductive results of engaging in covert, low intensity conflicts. Sometimes questions of who is the enemy and what to do about him are not readily answerable.

In early 1969, after a fire at a town called Bu Mia Map, Special Forces personnel discovered a roll of film on the body of a Viet Cong casualty. It was sent to the 5th Special Forces base at Nha Trang for processing. When the photos were developed, one in particular drew the interest of Special Forces Sgt. Alvin Smith. He thought he recognized someone in the photo as one of his subagents, Thai Khac Chuyen by name. The sergeant took his suspicions to superiors, and Chuyen was called in for questioning. After several days of interrogation, suspicion arose among 5th Special Forces personnel that the man was perhaps a double agent working for both the Special Forces and the North Vietnamese. Still, there was nothing definite.

In an attempt to determine precisely Chuyen's guilt or innocence, a Special Forces doctor was brought in to administer sodium pentothal. After questioning the alleged agent under the influence of the truth drug, the interrogators believed him guilty, even though the subject still gave no direct evidence of his guilt. According to the author, however, Chuyen lied in several important instances about his contacts with the North Vietnamese.

Senior officers of the 5th Special Forces Group, including its commander, much-decorated Col. Robert B. Rehaul, discussed several possible alternatives for dealing with the suspected double agent. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with which the Special Forces had a special relationship at the time, was

consulted. CIA personnel advised that termination (killing) seemed advisable.

Colonel Rehaul, in consultation with the officers working on the case, agreed to terminate the agent. This was done on a dark night by three Special Forces officers, and the body of the agent, appropriately weighted, was dumped into the South China Sea.

The disappearance of Thai Khac Chuyen came to the attention of higher authority, eventually involving General Creighton Abrams, the commander in Vietnam. Abrams called in Colonel Rehaul and asked him point-blank if the agent had been terminated. Rehaul denied the charge, saying that Chuyen currently was out on a mission.

According to the author, Abrams immediately sensed that he had been lied to and became so angry that he pushed for a full investigation. CID (Criminal Investigation Division) personnel were sent from Saigon to Nha Trang to investigate. Colonel Rehaul and his subordinates hurriedly developed a cover story to account for the disappearance and falsified records to support it. Sergeant Smith, now afraid that he might be eliminated by others in the conspiracy because of his initial involvement, fled to Saigon and asked for protection. He told CID all he knew about the killing.

CID investigators eventually developed enough circumstantial evidence to support the supposition that a murder had been committed, and Colonel Rehaul and several subordinate officers involved were taken into custody and confined to the infamous Long Binh Jail.

The now-imprisoned officers wrote letters home, energizing their families to obtain support. Civilian lawyers traveled to Vietnam to assist in a defense when it became apparent that a full-fledged court-martial was about to begin. A raucous pretrial hearing, in which each of the seven defendants had a military counsel and several, including Rehaul, had civilian lawyers, was convened amid charges that the defendants were being "set up." Because of the classified nature of the Green Berets' work, the trial was held behind closed doors guarded by MPs.

Because the author obtained and read the hundreds of pages of trial transcript, this hearing forms the heart of the book. As the reader becomes more engrossed in the trial, the ambiance of that hot crowded courtroom becomes almost overpowering. You can feel the tension of the accused and the pressure on the prosecutors and the trial counsel.

When the negative publicity of the case moved it toward the center stage of American public discussion,

Richard Nixon's interest immediately picked up. According to the author, the president and his advisers were worried that if the case went to trial, it could uncover a host of very embarrassing undisclosed problems (e.g., the secret bombings of Cambodia, the incursions into neutral states such as Laos, and the My Lai massacre).

Ultimately, the charges were dropped and the men freed from confinement. Some, like Rehaul, ended their careers immediately. Others continued in the service and retired after a time.

General Abrams' supposed hatred for the Green Berets is discussed in the book, but the author is unable to document Abrams' attitude one way or the other. General Abrams, who remained silent on his reasons for supporting the prosecution of Colonel Rehaul and his subordinates when the available evidence was circumstantial, died of cancer shortly after the end of the Vietnam War.

Mr. Stein does the thoughtful reader a great favor. He does not sermonize or make value judgments. That approach alone makes the book valuable. Should the officers who allegedly planned and carried out the execution of Thai Khac Chuyen be condemned or should they be decorated for carrying out a necessary, if harsh, action in a wartime situation? The reader is left to judge.

Dr. Burton Wright is currently the Deputy Branch Historian, U.S. Army Warfighting Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

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