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Military History in the United States Army

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A U.S. Army-Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force Military History Exchange was held 17-21 September 1990 at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. The Combat Studies Institute hosted the exchange. COL Richard Swain, director of the Institute, presented a paper, which is excerpted here for Army History:

It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to address you on the subject of military history in the United States Army. The topic occurred to me when I took part in the last Military History Exchange. I was then head of the delegation, but new to my post as director of the Combat Studies Institute, and therefore somewhat reluctant to address that assembly. Now that I am entering my third year as the senior history teacher at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, I beg your indulgence to accept me as a speaker as well as head of the U.S. side.

As I indicated, the idea of this topic occurred to me at the last conference. I was struck on the one hand by the similarity of our dual callings as historians and soldiers, a combination that has not always rested easy on the holder. The high quality of the papers presented and their adherence to a common style of scholarship were interesting as well. I wondered how far this apparent similarity extended. I was curious first of all about the extent to which the structure in which my hosts operated approximated my own. More to the point, I was curious about how far our views on the role of history in our respective military forces were similar or dissimilar. Consequently, I proposed this topic as a means of stimulating a dialogue to address these questions.

The contemporary historian in the United States Army is faced with two related but opposite problems. On the one hand he is confronted by those individuals Anthony Hartley has called the "new Prometheans." (1) These confident souls, undoubting in their ability

to reduce any problem to its constituent parts and, usually with the aid of computer simulation, to produce a finite and comprehensive answer to any question, are contemptuous of the past as irrelevant to their immediate concerns. For them military history begins whenever they themselves took the oath of office. As confident in their conceptual models and in the powers of technology, particularly high technology, as were their Freudian predecessors of the early twentieth century, or social-Darwinist ancestors of the late nineteenth, they have failed to learn Clausewitz's most fundamental lesson—that war is a social, a human, not a mechanical activity. Blind to the human element in war, ignoring the simple fact that they themselves determine the output of the computer with their inputs, they have largely contributed to the loss of one war and, no doubt, will do so again. Because they reject the utility of any knowledge of the past *a priori*, they are in fact the least difficult with which to deal. In the main, they are beyond redemption.

By far the more difficult challenge for the historian is the officer who, like most in the western tradition since Thucydides, looks to history for lessons, for a guide for behavior. (2) To him, the contemporary historian—trained in the university in the inadequacy of history as a predictive tool—is inevitably disappointing, what with his insistence on the consideration of context, the uniqueness of events and danger of facile analogy, and other qualifications. Indeed, he stands the danger of driving military officers into the camp of the new Prometheans by default. Why is this? The answer lies in the influence of the "new military history," a product largely of the post-World War II generation of military historians. These have turned from traditional military history in their rejection of impediments to the independent human will (antideterminism), the insistence on the uniqueness of events, the importance of context, and the demand for comprehensiveness in the re-creation of the past. Because

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Army historians, both civilian and military, increasingly have received professional academic training in the university, it is not surprising they have been affected by the values of this group.

The "new military history" is characterized best by its insistence on high standards of scholarship, its perceived purpose (to educate rather than guide), the scope of its works, and often, I would argue, a concern for the rational limitation of war. Although some antecedents can be seen springing up in the 1930s, temporally the new military history is a product of the post-World War II era, the natural interest in war generated by the experience in that conflict, maintained by the Cold War, and supported by the great explosion of university degrees consequent to the G.I. Bill.

The "new military historian" tends to be at home at the university—professionally trained and therefore increasingly concerned with adherence to the canons of professional scholarship in which he has been educated. Generally, he is a one-of-a-kind practitioner, either writing military history while teaching other courses, or the sole professor of a specialized subject. Often he has found himself having to defend the right to a place for his subdiscipline in an antipathetic liberal academic curriculum, hence the need often to be more scrupulous in his standards of scholarship than the most scrupulous generalist. At the same time, his professional credentials and scrupulous scholarship

seldom have been recognized by the public acceptance accorded historians outside the university who continue, almost without abatement, the tradition of "drum-and-trumpet" history directed toward the general readership. This has often led to a certain harshness of tone in the criticism of popular historians whose major sin would often seem to be that their books sell. (3)

The most marked departure of the new military history is the view that the study of war cannot be limited to the conduct of military operations. Dr. Russell Weigley, in a retrospective of the late Professor Walter Millis, credits him with being a principal innovator in the transformation of American military history, providing in his classic, *Arms and Men*, a new emphasis on "military institutions, military thought, the military in politics, and the military in the larger society." (4) Weigley argues that "if the historian is to confront the problem of war in society he can hardly isolate his examination of battles from the rest of history." (5)

Millis' book was first published in 1956. That same year in England a young lecturer at the University of London, a veteran of World War II teaching in the history department, saw the need to defend his subject in an academic journal. Michael Howard, in an article titled "Military History 'as a University Study'," described the military historian's problem as "how societies organize themselves for and conduct war." Accepting the propensity of staff colleges to concentrate

on traditional campaign history, Howard argued that for the university such study was necessary but far too narrow. "Unless it is informed and directed by a humane curiosity about wider issues," he wrote, "and by a sense of its relevance to the nature and development of society as a whole, it will appear, to all save a handful of enthusiastic antiquarians, as a desiccated and insignificant by-way leading to a dead end." The study of war, then, "must, if properly pursued contribute directly to that general understanding of the nature of historical development and of the past at which all historians ultimately aim." (6) Weigley's later assessment would characterize the new military history as "dealing with armed forces and war as *phenomena integral to modern society.*" (7)

Now, Howard was clearly concerned with making military history compatible with the university curriculum, but he was also concerned with the Jominian faith of many military historians that operations could be treated in isolation from their political, economic, and social context—a point he has reiterated consistently. (8) This view of war, acceptable in the eighteenth century and generally through the Battle of Waterloo, ceased to have any meaning after the outbreak of the American Civil War, when the enhanced capabilities of weapons and the sheer magnitude of the forces involved drew all aspects of the national existence into the scales of war and the ability to maintain the struggle, no less than tactical virtuosity, determined the final outcome. That Howard has also acknowledged the place of learning lessons from history in staff colleges and military establishments would seem to be polite condescension more than agreement with the utility or value of such distilled wisdom. (9)

Among the most important departures of the new military history is its limitation of purpose. Although historians and the readers of history had long held to the proposition that there was an instrumental value to the study of the past, the new military historians take a far more limited view, that the purpose of history is the education of the mind, in the words of Jacob Burckhardt, quoted by Michael Howard in his essay "The Use and Abuse of Military History": "not to make men clever for next time; it is to make them wise for ever [*sic*]." (10) This view is consistent with a general trend among historians in the postwar era, to reject determinist models of history, motivated in part, no doubt, by the evident mischief such models had produced in the first half of the century, and the increasingly evident contradictions within the one remaining ideological camp during the Cold War. The principal articles of faith in this rejection focus on the independ-

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ence of the human will and thus human action in the face of the major movements of history, the uniqueness of historical events, and the importance of context. The result is the contingency school of history so well represented in James MacPherson's instant classic in the Oxford History of the United States, *Battle Cry of Freedom*. (11)

That this view has been widespread during the postwar era is evidenced by the fact that it has been influential not only in the United States and Britain, but perhaps most cogently explained by the late Professor Raymond Aron, a French philosopher and sociologist with deep roots in German philosophic and sociological traditions. In a classic formulation of the contingency theory of history, Aron characterized its subject as "pure continuity, diversity aligned along the flow of time." He rejected historical determinism and cyclical theories of history while accounting for both individual initiative (even perverse) and accident, concluding that "History as a train of events belongs by nature to what we have called *probabilistic determinism*." (12) This is merely to say that while events may have momentum of their own, a tendency in one direction or the other, their direction or pace can be, and frequently are, changed by minority individual initiative or accident. Can anyone who has lived through the last five years doubt that this is so—that *the man* does matter, or as Shakespeare wrote, there are tides in the affairs of men?

The belief that the purpose of history is the education of the mind rather than the creation of instrumental lessons is derived both from ideas about the purpose of the university where most new military historians reside and ideas about the limitations of history, although the two sets of beliefs do intertwine. Michael Howard has argued eloquently that "only a knowledge of the past enables us fully to understand the present, and...a failure to read the past correctly warps our capacity to act intelligently in the contemporary world." (13) The real justification of history, he says, is that "from that study we learn what we have been, understand what we are, and gain intimation of what we might become." (14) Aron wrote that only a knowledge of the past makes dialogue and choice possible, that those ignorant of their past are passively subject to its consequences. (15) This natural concern for a broad education is matched by the appropriate suspicion of fatal selectivity, where the historian has gone to the record of the past to prove something. In our Army the desire in the late 1970s to prove that one can fight outnumbered and win often produced such selectivity, seldom examining the alternative or the reasons for the

more intuitive outcomes. Elsewhere, Howard notes the futility of trying to prove any specific assertion from history, observing: "The past is infinitely various, an inexhaustible storehouse of events from which we can prove anything or its contrary." (16) This acknowledges implicitly the differences between proving the possibility of some desired outcome and its necessity or probability—and the frequently ignored need to distinguish between the two.

There are two reasons for this. The first is the independence of human will; man's power to choose. Man at any given time may not have an infinite range of choices, but he ordinarily has alternatives. Often, indeed usually, he chooses based upon incomplete and inadequate information, not just in war, but in everyday life. Moreover, he often chooses perversely; confounding the idea of rationality in interpretation and action. Certainly the Watergate affair of recent memory, as perverse a set of decisions as ever there was, which has had and continues to have long-standing and worldwide consequences, is evidence enough of the independence of human will and its infinite possibilities.

A second limitation, and perhaps the most important, is the uniqueness of events, allusion to which has already been noted. Human actions take place within particular circumstances that are unlikely ever to be replicated in their entirety or, for that matter, fully known or understood, even at the time they occur. In war, one of the major contexts is the presence of an independent enemy with an agenda of his own and an interpretation of existing circumstances quite independent of one's own. This is the underlying truth in Alfred von Schlieffen's observation that a Cannae requires both a Hannibal and a Terentius Varro. (17) Howard warned against easy analogy and the danger of failing to account for changed circumstances, arguing that "unintelligent study of military history which does not take account of these changes may quite easily be more dangerous than no study at all." (18)

The final point, the assertion that the new military historians are concerned by and large with the rational limitation of war, is by necessity impressionistic. It is made in disagreement with Professor Weigley, who argued in his 1988 essay on Walter Millis that Millis' work stood apart from that of most new military historians in its rejection of the latter's "almost exuberant acceptance of military power as an appropriate instrument of American world policy." (19) This may have been true of the historians of the 1950s, but hardly of the 1980s. Certainly many military historians accept war as a regular feature of human life, but

Millis' recognition that a nuclear war was very likely to be the last, and that the decisive Napoleonic campaign was a historical aberration by the mid-nineteenth century, is hardly unique any more. Certainly the tendency of the new historians to dwell on the cost in lives of human fallacy and the human dimension of war contrasts sharply with the heroic vision of the nineteenth century. Even popular historians such as Martin Middlebrook, John Keegan, and William Manchester have sought to raise the issue of human suffering to the popular conscious, not to mention the "bitter veteran" mass market pulp viewpoint to which so many forests have been sacrificed since Vietnam achieved the status of the "bad old war" of choice. Millis may or may not have set the intellectual trend, but he hardly remains a voice in the wilderness in the company of military historians today.

A more cogent criticism, also made by Weigley in the introduction of his seminal work, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*, is that the new military history has, by and large, avoided venturing into the heat of battle. It has been Clio armed in which military readers have been most interested since the Greeks and Romans. (20) It is this neglect, consequent to the general liberalism of the university scholar, that has led to the skepticism of the military audience in the utility of much of what the new military history has to offer. Unlike his civilian counterpart, the soldier's interest in history is—and must be—practical. He is a man with real, immediate problems; both the survival and maintenance of the viability of his service, and its preparation for war. He wants to know what history can do for him. Why should he invest his time in its study if it does not provide direct answers to his immediate questions? Like Professor C. Vann Woodward, the professional soldier reminds the uniformed historian that it is "the quick and not the dead they are addressing. The dead, of course, could not care less, and the quick tend to lose interest if they are not themselves addressed." (21) Upon the historian's answer rests his continued presence at the military council table.

Notes

1. Anthony Hartley, "Barbarian Sentiments & Civilized Advice," *Encounter* 74 (April 1990): 76.
2. See Sir Michael Howard, "Structure and process in history," *Times Literary Supplement* (23-29 June 1989), p. 687.
3. See for example Professor Peter Paret, "Hans Delbrück on Military Critics and Military Historians," *Military Affairs* (Fall 1966) 30: 148-52 and, by the same author, "John Keegan's The Price of Admiralty

and Popular History," *The Journal of Military History* (April 1990) 54: 227-31.

4. Russell F. Weigley, "In Retrospect; Walter Millis and the Conscious of the Military Historian," *Reviews in American History*, vol. 16 (September 1988), p. 500.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Michael Howard, "Military History 'as a University Study'," *History* 41 (February-October 1956): 186.
7. Weigley, "In Retrospect," p. 500. Emphasis added.
8. Michael Howard, "The Demand for Military History," *The Times Literary Supplement* (13 November 1966), p. 1294. See also by the same author, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution* (February 1962) 107: 4-10; *The Lessons of History; An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the Vice-Chancellor and Fellows of the University of Oxford on Friday 6 March 1981* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 7; and "Structure and process in history," pp. 687-89.
9. Howard, "Military History 'as a University Study'," p. 186, and *The Lessons of History*, pp. 6-8.
10. Jacob Burckhardt, quoted in Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," p. 8.
11. James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom; The Civil War Era*, vol. 6 in the Oxford History of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
12. Raymond Aron, "Three Forms of Historical Intelligibility," in *History, Truth, Liberty; Selected Writings of Raymond Aron*, ed. by Franciszek Dzus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 41.
13. Michael Howard, "Structure and process in history," p. 687.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 689.
15. Raymond Aron, "The Philosophy of History," in *Politics and History; Selected Essays by Raymond Aron*, trans. & ed. by Miriam B. Conant (New York: The Free Press, 1980), p. 5.
16. Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History* p. 8.
17. Count Alfred von Schlieffen, *Cannae* (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: The Command and General Staff School Press, 1931), p. 305.
18. Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of History," p. 7.
19. Russell Weigley, "In Retrospect," p. 501.
20. Russell Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants; The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1981), p. xv.
21. C. Vann Woodward, *The Future of the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. ix.

The Chief's Corner

Harold W. Nelson

In the last few months I have had the opportunity to travel to Germany and Korea to do the Army's history business. In both cases all of my opening sessions were with counterparts in the historical profession within the host nation's army. This seems to be indicative of an important trend: as the world changes, Army historians play an important role in our nation's growing bilateral relations.

We assume this role easily because we have long been part of international organizations, and the tenets of our profession transcend national boundaries. When the thaw of the detente years chilled after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we were still able to maintain contact with our Soviet counterparts at the International Congress of Military Historians, and those narrow, formal relationships have broadened immensely in the last few years. The nations of Central Europe that followed the Soviet lead are now exploring approaches to official history similar to the Western tradition, and this fosters far more productive exchanges that promise a new era in international conferences. Meetings that were once hampered by doctrinaire posturing and little true dialogue may soon be transformed into more substantive exchanges among historians who seek a common goal of improved understanding through broader and deeper use of primary sources. With this hope in mind, and with the reminder that international organizations are our best insurance in times of diplomatic strife, the Center of Military History will continue to do all it can to contribute to the international efforts to study military history.

At the same time we recognize that there is significant need to open new bilateral relations and strengthen existing ties. Traditional international organizations tend to be Europe-centered, but the United States has many interests elsewhere in the world. Our bilateral contacts with Korea and Japan are each very important, and it is not difficult to foresee the day when we would transform them into some type of multilateral arrangement. We look forward to developing each of these relationships in its own way and using the resulting success in tailored sustained bilateral relationships as an example in our dealings with other armies where our progress has only begun.

In the Pacific region we are getting strong support from USARPAC because senior leaders realize that many nations of the Pacific region look to their armies

as the principal service in their defense structure, and those armies often can learn from us in the preservation and use of historical materials. The U.S. Army takes justifiable pride in its museums, education programs, publications, and staff application of military history. All of these dimensions can be discussed with foreign counterparts, and tangible manifestations of improved relations can result. Many foreign armies have much to teach us, and our Army has always been eager to learn or borrow from others. Our historians are especially aware of this, so they naturally enter into collaborative relationships without assuming a superior role.

This is especially important as we explore ways to expand our relationships in the Western Hemisphere. Because our international associations have been largely Europe-based, an East-West bias has been perceived in our programs in the past. Preliminary work with the Inter-American Defense Board and the Inter-American Defense College reveals tremendous potential for using history in broadened bilateral work with army historians of the Western Hemisphere, but the initial steps have been slow and tentative.

Within the Western Hemisphere our Army's plans for the 50-year commemoration of World War II offer important opportunities for collaborative work and detailed discussions. Hemisphere defense was an important topic for U.S. Army planners before and during the war, and the active roles played by other nations in this strategic endeavor are not widely known in the United States.

Of course World War II commemorative activities will carry us far beyond the Western Hemisphere, and our international contacts will almost always encompass far more than that brief period. As we work within a coalition framework again in DESERT SHIELD we are reminded that our Army's history is intertwined with the history of other nations in important ways in peace and war. While our primary efforts at chronicling DESERT SHIELD focus on our own Army, the time will come when we will need to study the broader context. Our ongoing effort to strengthen ties with counterpart historians will inevitably be reinforced by that effort. The potential for exchanging ideas, publications, and material objects to improve the study of military history throughout the world has never been better.

A Genius for Training Baron von Steuben and the Training of the Continental Army

Stephen C. Danckert

General George Washington had a right to be skeptical of the new arrival. A paunchy, balding officer in his mid-forties, the newcomer spoke no English. Moreover, he had arrived at Valley Forge accompanied by a young former actor, an Italian greyhound, and, of all things, a Parisian chef.

He bore letters of recommendation from Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin, the American representatives in Paris. But Deane and Franklin had misjudged before—recommending any number of incompetents and martinets for high positions in the Continental Army. Indeed, the able officers they recruited sometimes were worse than the buffoons. Washington had enough egomaniacs to deal with in the Continental Congress; he had no desire to serve with them in the field army as well.

Still, the gentleman was identified as a lieutenant general in the service of Frederick the Great. Even if that proved to be an exaggeration, the man was a Prussian officer, recently retired from the finest army in the world. (1) He was charming and possessed of great self-confidence. More importantly, he had offered to serve as a volunteer—that is, without a command—in whatever capacity Washington saw fit. Here was no glory-seeking mercenary, but a professional soldier seeking to advance the patriot cause. Washington assigned his most trusted aides, Alexander Hamilton and John Laurens, to assist the newcomer.

Within a few weeks the new arrival gained the respect of Washington's entire military family. Washington assigned him the task of improving and standardizing the Continental Army's drill. It was a fateful decision. General von Steuben would soon take a band of courageous but inept volunteers and forge it into the Continental Army.

Frederick William Baron von Steuben was born 17 September 1730 in Magdeburg, Prussia. (2) The son of an engineer captain, Steuben seemed destined for a military life. When he was only fourteen years old, he accompanied his father to the siege of Prague. He entered the University of Breslau where the Jesuit fathers imbued him with a lifelong love of learning. (3)

He entered the Prussian Army as a lance corporal. With the coming of the Seven Years' War in Europe, he secured a commission in the elite Lestwitz Regiment. The commander of his regiment, General von Lestwitz, considered him "no good as a manager, but clever." (4)

In 1758 he was detached from his regiment to serve with the crack "free battalion" of General Johann von Mayr. Free battalions were all-arms commands formed by Frederick the Great to conduct raids and other special missions. Steuben served as Mayr's adjutant until Mayr's death in 1759. Steuben's experience with this elite group of volunteers broadened his staff expertise while it honed his skills as a trainer. (5)

In 1761 Steuben transferred to the Prussian general headquarters, serving on the general staff for plans and operations (quartermaster) of Frederick the Great. After the war, Steuben was one of thirteen officers selected for personal instruction in the art of war by Frederick himself.

With the war over, however, Frederick demobilized, and Steuben found himself out of the army. The "von" notwithstanding, Steuben was not of noble lineage, and it was not unusual for even the best young officers to find themselves surplus after a war if their family lacked noble blood. (6) There is some evidence that Steuben may have had a falling out with another member of Frederick's staff that speeded Steuben's departure.

Steuben then served for several years in the court of a German count, but when the count went bankrupt, Steuben once again was forced to seek employment elsewhere. He tried to enter the service with the Spanish and Austrian Armies, but to no avail. Finally, he contacted his old friend, the Comte de St. Germain, then minister of war in France, about a possible post in the French Army. The American colonies were then in revolt. St. Germain did not have a position for his old friend, but he did introduce him to Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin, who were in Paris to recruit foreign officers for the Continental Army.

Franklin, it seems, was immediately taken with

Steuben's Prussian bearing and affable personality. Recognizing that Steuben's resume did not match the young captain's potential, Franklin contrived to have Steuben appear as a lieutenant general in the king of Prussia's service. "Deputy to the quartermaster general," Steuben's last position in Frederick's army, was now rendered "Lieutenant General de Quatiermaitre" in French: the ruse was too witty for Franklin and too useful to Steuben to let pass. (7)

Steuben eventually debarked at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, with a Stephen Duponceau, actor-cum-translator, his personal aide; an Italian greyhound named Azor; and a French chef from Paris. (8) Together they made their way overland to the Continental Army encampment at Valley Forge.

At Valley Forge Steuben faced a challenge greater than any he had ever known. Lesser men would not have attempted his assignment: in a few short months, under the most arduous conditions, he had to turn a collection of disparately trained units into a battle-ready, well-disciplined army.

A number of problems confronted the Continental Army at Valley Forge, but the greatest of these was the Army's inability to stand up to the British line in open combat. The importance of fighting the British on their own terms is often misunderstood by Americans of the current generation. The romantic myth of American riflemen defeating cumbersome British formations persists into the present day. In fact, rifles were little known in the colonies, particularly in New England, which contributed most of Washington's troops. While riflemen could delay and harass the enemy, they could not seize and hold terrain. As the Battle of Bunker Hill had shown, holding terrain required disciplined ranks and volley fire. A well-drilled unit could close with the enemy rapidly to deliver volley of .69- or .75-cal. fire at near point-blank range. The unit would then launch a bayonet charge to break the enemy's ranks.

Moreover, British General Sir William Howe had had quite enough of the colonials' Indian-style tactics. Having lost many good men already, he was not about to chase the Americans through every narrow wood. He waited instead for open combat. Unlike the Americans, the British could hold out for a long war of attrition. Their soldiers served for life, and their supply system was adequate to an army of occupation.

There is reason to believe that open combat was the linchpin of Howe's strategy. A member of Parliament, Howe was a Rockingham Whig, and sympathetic toward the colonies. He accepted his assign-

ment to crush the rebellion only after some soul-searching. He intended to defeat the Continental Army in the open field and thereby to shatter the Revolution. England could then offer generous peace terms and redress the colonies' grievances with honor. A short, violent campaign would enable both parties to "sit down like two schoolboys with bloody noses and black eyes' and shake hands and be friends again." (10)

With the enemy commander refusing to give battle on Washington's terms, the Americans suffered from a sort of Fabian tactic in reverse. The British would expose themselves only during open battle, and the Americans were not prepared to endure that style of combat. Although courageous and bloodied, the Continental Army had limited experience in open, European-style warfare. When Steuben arrived at Valley Forge, most American units could only march in Indian file. Regiments stretched out for miles and made tactical maneuvers—such as wheeling on line—almost impossible. The defeats at Brandywine and Germantown have been blamed on the late arrival of various regiments. In truth, however, the first men of the regiments arrived on time—the regiments were simply unable to come on line quickly and effectively. (11)

The inability to wage linear combat was not the Army's only shortcoming. Indeed, "the Army" was something of a misnomer. Each state had its own military doctrine. Some had been trained on the British system, some on the French, and some on the Prussian. The individual companies might battle valiantly, but battalion and regimental maneuvers were out of the question.

The officers were the only soldiers with significant combat experience and they, taking after their British counterparts, left the training of their soldiers to the noncommissioned officers. The Continental Army, however, unlike the British Army, had yet to develop a professional noncommissioned officer corps. Training suffered accordingly.

Steuben did not waste time worrying about the Army's problems, but immediately set about to correct them. He developed a three-pronged approach to improving the Army.

First, he simplified and then standardized Prussian drill, for example, reducing the loading steps from seventeen to nine. This enabled the Americans to reload faster than their British counterparts and eased the training burden on unit officers. The standardized drills enabled the Army to move and mass rapidly,

giving field commanders real firepower when and where it was needed. He further emphasized bayonet practice, at last permitting the Continentals to meet their enemy on more even terms.

Second, he developed a series of standard lesson plans, which later were to form his "Blue Book." Each night he wrote up the lesson plan for the following day. He would write it out in French, and Duponceau would translate it into proper English. Hamilton and Laurens then copied the lesson plans for the regiments, providing American idioms as required. Regimental secretaries then produced sufficient copies for each company. The standard lesson plans enabled unit officers to rely on a written reference instead of on their own memories. It also contained helpful hints for unit officers and noncommissioned officers. The Blue Book served as the basic drill manual for American forces until 1812 and beyond.

Finally, Steuben established a model drill company, which he trained personally. Washington's own honor guard—the so-called Life Guard—served as the nucleus for the model company. After attaining proficiency, the soldiers from the Life Guards were returned to their parent units to teach their newfound skills.

Steuben was not a disinterested demigod, casually observing the pace of training from afar. He personally instructed the Life Guard, and saw to it that other officers trained their men. Riding through camp one day, he came upon a colonel training a private in the proper use of his musket. "Do you see that?" he asked his escort. "I thank God for it." Steuben believed that the bonds forged between officers and their men during training would pay off in combat.

That belief was certainly justified in his own case. Steuben had an engaging personality, and the troops took to him quickly. On his first drill with the Life Guard, he tried giving his commands at first in English, but soon lost track, leaving the soldiers confused. As he tried to correct the orders, the soldiers became still more confused, and Steuben flew into a rage of profanity in French and German. Finally, Capt. Benjamin Walker of the New York Regiment stepped forward and addressed Steuben in fluent French, offering assistance. Walker became an aide and a lifelong friend.

The drill continued under Steuben's unique instructional methods. Despite the constant marching and the difficult weather, "Steuben made the whole thing fun by his ebullient temperament, ecstasy when maneuvers went well, and at mistakes, hysterical rages, which the troops came to expect and relish." (12)

Steuben's array of oaths became legendary. "*Viens, Walker, mon ami, mon bon ami! Sacre! Goddam de gaucheries of dese badauts. Je ne puis plus. I can curse dem no more.*" A contemporary suggested that the first English word Steuben learned was "goddam." "When his artillery of foreign oaths was exhausted, he would call on one of his assistants to curse in English for him." (13)

Although irregular, Steuben's methods were highly effective. No doubt many of these scenes were pure theatrics: Steuben was too good a trainer to be so quickly overcome by his students' errors. He had a great appreciation for the strengths and weaknesses of the American character. "The genius of this nation," he wrote to a friend in Europe, "is not the least to be compared with the Prussians, the Austrians, or the French. You say to your soldier, 'Do this,' and he doeth it, but I am obliged to say, 'This is the reason that you ought to do that' and he does it." (14)

Steuben's American colleagues admired his ability to focus on the trainee. John Laurens wrote to his father, "...he seems to be perfectly aware of the disadvantages under which our army has labored from short enlistments and frequent changes; seems to understand what our soldiers are capable of and is not so staunch a systematist as to be averse from adapting established forms to stubborn circumstances. He will not give us the perfect instructions absolutely speaking, but the best which we are in a condition to receive." (15)

Steuben took particular care to train the officers. In his instructions he advises the unit commanders that "A captain cannot be too careful of the company which the state has committed [*sic*] to his charge.... His first object should be, to gain the love of his men, by treating them with every possible kindness and humanity. He should know every man of his company by name and character." (16) His instructions to the lieutenants were similar: "The lieutenant...should often visit [the men] at different hours; inspect into their manner of living; see that their provisions are good and well-cooked; and as far as possible oblige them to take their meals at regulated hours. He should pay attention to their complaints, and when well founded, endeavor to get them redressed; but discourage them from complaining on every frivolous occasion." (17)

In a few short weeks after his arrival, even the Baron himself could see results. The Army was marching to a regular step, and could execute battalion and even regimental maneuvers. Officers had a better appreciation of their duties, and morale, despite the

hardships of winter, was running at an all-time high.

An officer at Valley Forge put it this way in the camp newspaper: "The Army grows stronger every day. It increases in numbers...and there is a spirit of discipline among the troops that is better than numbers." (18)

The army that emerged from Valley Forge was a skilled, disciplined force. Skilled in open combat, maneuver, and the use of the bayonet, the Continental Army retained its earlier Indian-fighting skills of raid and ambush. It was now able to fight the British on any terms. It was to prove its newfound ability soon at the Battle of Monmouth. (19)

Steuben's achievement is difficult to measure. General John M. Palmer, his biographer, regarded him as one of two men—Washington was the other—who was indispensable to American independence. It is not too bold an assertion. As surely as Washington inspired and led the army to victory, Steuben trained its ranks and coached its officers.

The principles that informed his approach to training—respect for the dignity of the individual soldier, flexibility in training approach, and a relentless insistence on officers' personal involvement with training—still serve as a guide today. The breadth of his achievement can inspire still.

Baron von Steuben died in 1794. His contribution to his adopted country serves as an example to all soldiers. A paunchy, balding, unemployed Prussian captain had trained a mixed assortment of volunteers to defeat one of the finest standing armies in the world. It was an achievement beyond reckoning; at once ennobling and somehow typically American.

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Notes

1. Actually, Steuben had left Frederick's service more than a decade earlier. Only Deane and Franklin, however, were privy to that information (see below).
2. Steuben was not of noble lineage. The "von" was added by Steuben's grandfather to advance the family's social prospects. Nonetheless, Steuben could claim some noble blood through his maternal grandmother.
3. John M. Palmer, *General Von Steuben* (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1966), p. 32.

This is a reprint of the 1937 edition.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
6. Christopher Duffy, *The Military Experience in the Age of Reason* (New York: Atheneum, 1988), p. 44. This is a superb study of 18th century warfare—scholarly, yet readable.
7. Some scholars argue that Steuben himself authored the hoax. That seems unlikely. As his biographer, General Palmer, notes, Steuben met Deane and Franklin through Comte de St. Germain. St. Germain was well aware of Steuben's military record. Also, Steuben borrowed money from Silas Deane to buy lieutenant general's uniforms. This means that Deane and Franklin either were coconspirators or foolish men. Once in America Steuben did point out that his generalship was from one of the German principalities, not from the king of Prussia. Finally, anyone even remotely familiar with Franklin's wit can see his footprints all around the ruse.
8. One should not conclude from this that Steuben was a fop. Such a retinue would have been appropriate to a lieutenant general in a European army. Franklin's hoax was flimsy enough. If Steuben had traveled in America alone, the Americans might well have grown suspicious. The Parisian chef, incidentally, took one look at the kitchen facilities in Valley Forge and departed.
9. John M. Galvin, *The Minutemen* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), p. 76.
10. Noel F. Busch, *Winter Quarters: George Washington and the American Army at Valley Forge* (New York: Liveright, 1976), p. 36. This is the best book on Valley Forge the author has read.
11. John Trussell, Jr., *Birthplace of an Army* (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1976), p. 56.
12. Thomas B. Flexner, *Washington: The Indispensable Man* (New York: Signet, 1988), p. 118.
13. Palmer, *General Von Steuben*, p. 148.
14. Flexner, *Washington*, p. 118.
15. Palmer, *General Von Steuben*, p. 135.
16. Frederick William Baron von Steuben, *Baron Von Steuben's Revolutionary War Drill Manual* (New York: Dover, 1985), p. 138.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
18. Palmer, *General Von Steuben*, p. 153.
19. The Battle of Monmouth was fought in what is now Freehold, New Jersey, on 28 June 1778. American forces met the British in open combat and (possibly for the first time since Saratoga) held their own.

Lesley J. McNair

Training Philosophy for a New Army

Charles E. Kirkpatrick

Between 1940 and 1945 the United States Army expanded from 10 understrength divisions to the greatest size in its history, fielding 89 divisions of a projected total of more than 200. Such unprecedented growth generated an enormous training challenge, as the small prewar Army struggled to turn millions of civilians into soldiers. The Army had a very limited number of trained professionals available to instruct the mass of fresh recruits passing through the induction centers—a handicap compounded by serious shortages in training areas, troop barracks, and military equipment and weapons. The prewar training system based on the regiment could never meet the need. Regimental training was too slow, too cumbersome, did not allow the training of the various arms and services in combined arms battle, and could not possibly cope with the numbers of new soldiers that would be inducted into the wartime Army. To expand to war strength, the U.S. Army needed a way to school very large numbers of new soldiers quickly and efficiently.

To deal with the obvious problems and to supervise Army training, the Army chief of staff called upon veteran field artilleryman Lesley J. McNair, in 1940 a brigadier general and commandant of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. After General George C. Marshall brought him to Washington, McNair became chief of staff of the General Headquarters of the Army and then established and commanded Army Ground Forces (AGF), the headquarters that took charge of organizing and training the Army for war. Building the ground army was a complex organizational task, of which training was only one part. It was in training, however, that McNair left his greatest imprint on the Army that successfully fought World War II. (1)

Training and Doctrine: A Basic Concept

McNair's governing consideration was that training had to proceed from the correct battle doctrine. That involved certain changes in the way the Army had traditionally trained. Until World War II the U.S. Army's principal mission was defense of the Western Hemisphere. Mobilization plans envisioned creation of a force that would be organized, equipped, trained,

and deployed to deal with warfare in the Americas. (2) Over much of the continent, particularly in Latin America, the traditional organization of the infantry-artillery team remained appropriate because of the difficult terrain. But an army organized to operate in the Western Hemisphere could not hope to fight the mechanized and armored divisions of the Axis successfully, as it appeared likely to many, even in 1940, that the United States would eventually do. The consequent demand for new types of units generated the need to revise the Army's training program. Building an army that would fight overseas carried with it various new training requirements. Soldiers had to be taught to live and fight in extremes of climate, from the tropical to the arctic, and in terrain that included mountain, tundra, desert, and jungle. Because the World War I advantage of friendly French ports no longer existed, Army units had to be able to conduct amphibious operations and perhaps even airborne operations, just to be able to bring the enemy to battle. As he surveyed training needs in 1940, General McNair found that the large training establishment he would build also needed to be qualitatively different from what had gone before, because it had to accommodate the faster pace and increasing technology of modern war. (3)

While General McNair acknowledged the diverse requirements the modern Army had to meet, particularly the need to exploit new mechanical means of mobility and striking power, he thought also that an army could become too specialized, frittering away its combat manpower in too many single-mission units. He believed that new technology did not demand new techniques of warfare, but that the basic principles of war remained sound. Greater mobility gave new meaning to old tactical ideas of surprise, flexibility, and concentration, but did not change them. Greater freedom of maneuver increased the traditional need for unity of command, and the high cost of mechanized and armored equipment made it even more urgent to observe the principle of the economy of force. McNair therefore sought a balance between the old and the new, emphasizing basic military principles and skills as he concentrated on welding together the powerful

new combined arms task forces. (4)

Those considerations underlay the basic principles of McNair's training philosophy. The United States Army had to train for a modern, mechanized war in overseas theaters, in varying climates, and in all sorts of terrain—a style of battle that influenced, but did not supersede, the principles of war as traditionally understood. To prepare for such a war, McNair directed his staff to lay training plans that focused on combat training for every soldier; that used tactical units as the schoolrooms of the Army; that trained together for combined arms battle; that trained realistically; and that emphasized good leadership as the first essential of sound training. (5)

Innovation in Methods of Training

The Army's replacement training centers conducted the individual combat training every man received upon entering the Army. McNair clearly understood that modern warfare increased the number of technicians required to sustain the combat forces in action. He also appreciated the need for various types of specialist units, including parachute, airborne, mountain, amphibious, and technical. Nonetheless, he firmly believed in the principle that every soldier was first and foremost a warrior, regardless of his eventual assignment. The task, therefore, of basic training of the soldier was to turn every man into a tough, versatile, and skilled fighter. Victory in battle, McNair repeatedly told his staff, is won in the forward areas by men with brains and fighting hearts, not by machines. Modern war machines gave individual soldiers greater power, but high technology was only a means to an end—the effect on the enemy. Speaking to antiaircraft artillery officers in 1942, McNair urged the entire Army to think in terms of combat. "Do not allow yourself to become a technician only," he said. "Become first and last a fighting man." (6) He absolutely rejected the idea that there should be a distinction between a soldier and a technician. In basic training, then, all soldiers were to assimilate the warrior mentality.

Fighting soldiers functioned in units, rather than alone, and McNair believed that it was important to create those units as early as possible. Schools were important, but he insisted that the tactical unit was by far the best school, both of troops and of their officers. He believed in having men trained from the earliest possible moment as members of the teams with which they would go into battle. Many benefits, he felt, accrued to combat units that maintained their integrity

while in training, including higher morale and the early development of unit cohesion and teamwork. Because he saw the division as the basic tactical element in battle, McNair identified it as the basic tactical element for training. He also prescribed a progressive training program for newly formed divisions.

McNair's plan called for a division to move from basic small unit training through battalion and regimental exercises in the course of a year. Combined arms training followed unit training, with the objective of welding the different types of units into a division team that could fight together in all sorts of conditions. For the end of the training cycle, McNair's scheme prescribed maneuvers that pitted one division against another. The division itself administered tests at the very end of every major phase of training and critiqued both units and individuals on their performance. Remedial training followed tests, and the division paid close attention to general soldierly proficiency as the prerequisite for good unit performance. The result of the year of training was a division made up of battalions that were familiar with each other and that knew how to maneuver as a team. (7)

A second important reason that the division became the basic training unit of the Army was that the division was the basic combined arms organization in the field army. Because he identified combined arms operations as the key to winning on the modern battlefield, McNair wanted soldiers to train that way from the beginning. Mechanized warfare and the air-ground style of battle the Germans used so effectively in 1939 and 1940 convinced McNair that the Army's earlier training practices were as obsolete as the style of war for which they prepared soldiers. It was, for example, no longer adequate for each branch to conduct its own training independently of the other branches. McNair directed that the combat arms instead should organize and train for combined arms operations that centered around the power weapons of mobile warfare: the tank and the airplane. (8) The remaining consideration was the training environment, which had to be realistic.

Both in unit training and in combined arms training, General McNair continually stressed the need for realism. As he surveyed the reports of his overseas observers in 1943, he concluded that American troops were not ready for the stresses of battle, and that unfamiliarity with the sights, sounds, and sensations of battle diminished the individual soldier's effectiveness. Allowing men to become acclimated to warfare during actual battle was a risky proposition, so McNair

Division Training Cycle
(One year allocated for battle preparation)

Phase I: 17 weeks **BASIC SMALL UNIT TRAINING**, up through and including battalions.

Phase II: 13 weeks **PROGRESSIVE UNIT TRAINING**, squad through regimental level, inclusive, with stress on field exercises, designed to develop each unit into a fighting team. Phase included combat firing proficiency tests.

Phase III: 14 weeks **COMBINED ARMS TRAINING** to weld units of the division together into a division team. Began with regimental combat team exercises, including field artillery support, and concluded with maneuvers of one division against another.

Basic assumption: soldiers had a satisfactory state of basic individual training when they arrived in divisions.

ordered training schemes to accomplish that task before men met the enemy. As far as possible, he wanted to simulate the noise, confusion, and violence of battle in training, so that the soldier could learn to act calmly and with sound judgment in moments of stress. Thus he introduced live fire into training exercises, had troops practice attacks under real artillery barrages, and subjected infantrymen to being overrun in their fighting positions by tanks. Tough, realistic training provided the essential mental conditioning for battle. (9)

A second element of realism in training was the unscripted maneuver. Earlier Army maneuvers had been formal, highly structured events with frequent pauses for assessments and discussions. They also ran along predictable courses, each unit following a prescribed series of tactical exercises against a similarly programmed foe. Unrealistic simulations compounded the problem. An infantry unit, told that a bridge was destroyed, had only to wait the specific amount of time umpires estimated construction of a new bridge would require, rather than actually wait for engineers to build a new bridge. In major maneuvers, one army headquarters let a contract for a civilian telephone line to coordinate its units, rather than rely on tactical com-

munications.

McNair scrapped such formalized field problems and substituted the free maneuver, which did not proceed according to any particular plan. Commanders of opposing units received missions to carry out and were then free to operate as they thought best. This, McNair thought, was a good test of the division commanders' initiative and tactical acumen, as well as the most realistic training for their troops. He also did away with all but the most essential simulations in maneuver. If a unit ran out of gas, the commander had to figure out a way to refuel. If a bridge was declared destroyed, a new one had to be built. If communications were needed, the signal units had to provide them. As early as 1940, McNair's goal was maneuvers that had all of the complexity and realism of actual warfare, but without the destruction and casualties. (10)

The central proposition of McNair's training philosophy was that sound leadership was as important to training as it was to battle itself. (11) He attributed early training and morale problems in the Army to poor leaders and was determined to eliminate poor officers. (12) He believed that no unit could ever be well trained if it had poor leadership, because he saw the commander as the keystone in the arch of effectiveness in battle. McNair visited class after class of young West Point and officer candidate school graduates to advise them of their duties. The American soldier, he told them, could be led but not driven; properly led, Americans were capable of great feats of arms. The leader must teach his troops, but also had to supply that spark that "infuses his men with his spirit and carries them individually and collectively along with him." McNair emphasized that a leader proves himself in training, as well as in combat. (13) A diploma, he warned a graduating class at Leavenworth in 1942, is only a letter of introduction. "If you can deliver," he told them, "you need no diploma; if you cannot deliver, the diploma will not save you." (14) Army Ground Forces therefore instituted a rigorous policy of weeding out officers who were too old, incompetent, or unqualified for field duty. (15) Free maneuver training, in addition to being the most effective training vehicle for divisions, also helped to identify those officers who could not make decisions, who could not endure the stress of leadership in the field, or who were otherwise unfit. Only strong and versatile leaders could use strong and versatile soldiers effectively. Inadequately trained officers, McNair pointed out, cannot train troops effectively.

The emphasis on sound tactical leadership was the

essence of the entire wartime training system. McNair determined the Army's training philosophy and his staff produced training programs, guidance, and literature. But McNair rejected the idea that his headquarters could—or should—supervise and evaluate training. A high-level staff was too far out of touch with the business of soldiering accurately to determine how well men were trained. The division commander, he believed, was a far better judge of the state of training of soldiers under his command than a staff officer from Washington could ever be. McNair therefore concentrated on getting the best men into command and then trusting them to do their jobs. The role of Army Ground Forces was to give the commanders the training facilities and equipment they needed, along with the proper guidance and training literature. He intentionally kept a small staff that spent much of its time visiting units to observe training and combat operations, to keep training procedures in line with the demands of combat. (16)

Assessments

There is always a gap between conception and reality. Army training in World War II did not proceed exactly in accordance with McNair's early plans. In part, this was a product of the accelerating pace of the war and the stresses placed on the training establishment by the demand to get American soldiers into battle. But the language of Army Ground Forces training directives also masked the fact that, in some of the most basic of his tactical ideas, McNair still thought in the conservative terms of the previous World War.

McNair's emphasis on training divisions as units, laudable though it was, did not long survive the first flush of mobilization. Few had the chance to train as Army Ground Forces directives specified. More made promising starts to their training programs, but then were essentially taken apart, some more than once, to provide cadres for newly forming divisions. The Army never squared the circle of creating new divisions while simultaneously conducting combat operations. In the attempt, the goal of fielding units that had developed together through a year-long training cycle suffered.

The idea of pooling specialized units and attaching them to divisions as needed seemed an efficient one, but the experience of war showed the desirability of habitual association between units that had to cooperate in combat. It is unclear whether General McNair saw pooling as an objectively good idea, or whether he was merely bowing to the inevitable pressures of lack

of production and shipping space. One may argue either side of the question.

The Army Ground Forces training program was also inconsistent because it produced both good units and bad. The same training base created the successful 1st Infantry and the 82d Airborne Divisions, on the one hand, and units that suffered notable defeats, such as the 90th Infantry and the 106th Infantry, on the other. Various explanations may be advanced to account for this phenomenon, but at base the cause of poor unit performance is almost always poor leadership. If this is the case, then it is evidence that McNair's policy of weeding out poor officers was not as successfully implemented as he might have hoped, or that the procedures that selected battalion, regimental, and division commanders were neither as good nor as evenly applied as he might have desired.

If lack of time accounts for the Army's failure to put every division through the rigorous training cycle McNair envisioned, defects in the training program itself help to explain subsequent problems in performance. McNair used the rhetoric of combined arms warfare, but it appears that he understood it in a traditional sense, rather than in the way that the warring powers were then conducting battle in Europe. For McNair, combined arms meant the traditional infantry-artillery team, a powerful but plodding concept of warfare. While he gave lip service to the mechanized arms, it appears that he never truly grasped the ways that they could be used to increase the pace of battle. This fact stands out in surveys of division training and maneuvers, where the emphasis was always on the infantry and artillery battalions. Creative training involving the other arms and supporting services was rare, increasingly so as the pressure increased to ship units to overseas theaters. In fact, after 1941 divisions rarely trained with the units that were habitually attached in combat—the antiaircraft, engineer, armor, and tank destroyer battalions. Nor, indeed, were the major Army maneuvers quite as realistic as their publicity suggests. (17)

Neither Army Ground Forces headquarters nor the AGF commander was correct in every decision made. The experience of battle pointed to the need for improvements in doctrine and organization of troop units, as well as in training procedures, corrections that the various Army staffs made as they learned the lessons of war. The men who administered Army training had little to reproach themselves for, however many adjustments to procedures eventually became necessary. It was a remarkable achievement for the tiny United



Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair

States Army of 1940 to have created the 89-division force, deployed it overseas, and sustained it in battle by 1944. General McNair and his staff produced a ground army that could defeat the best of the Japanese and German armies.

Many of McNair's ideas on training may be characterized as innovative, however successful or not they were at the time. His major contribution, however, was his insistence that good leadership lay at the heart of good training. He probably talked more about high-quality leadership than about any other aspect of training, and hammered the point repeatedly with his superiors, with his staff, with units in training, and with young officers, officer candidates, and cadets. McNair also took the next essential step. He not only said that

he believed in good leadership, but he also trusted Army leaders to do a good job.

His decentralization of training had many benefits that were reflected in the war army. In the first place, it removed the tension of always having someone looking critically over the tactical commander's shoulder. Thus the commander concentrated on training, not on making the higher headquarters happy. Secondly, it reinforced the trust the Army placed in its commanders, spurring them to better efforts and getting them used to making key decisions on their own. Much of the independence of American commanders in battle can probably be traced back to their independence in building and training their units. Finally, decentralized training was simply quicker and more efficient. McNair was correct that the division commander was a better judge of the state of training of his unit than any staff officer could ever be.

McNair's essential contribution to victory in World War II was that he correctly identified the training problems and then applied vigorous solutions to them. Under his guidance the Army did more than efficiently assimilate masses of draftees; it also did its best to prepare those citizen-soldiers for modern, mechanized warfare. McNair essentially invented realistic training as the Army practices it today. His unwavering drive for superbly trained units placed into the hands of field commanders a reliable weapon with which to fight the country's enemies. (18)

Maj. Charles E. Kirkpatrick is a historian with the Center's Histories Division. He read a shorter version of this paper at the Missouri Valley History Conference in 1989. The author wishes to thank those colleagues at the Center of Military History who read and commented on early drafts. He is particularly indebted to Dr. Robert H. Berlin of the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, whose thoughtful comments were invaluable in the revision.

Notes

1. For biographical data on General McNair, see E. J. Kahn, Jr., *McNair: Educator of an Army* (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1945). The only existing biography of McNair, this book is brief, laudatory, uncritical, and, ultimately, unsatisfactory. For highlights of McNair's career, see *General Cullum's Register*, various editions of *Who's Who*, and decennial editions

of the *Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the United States Military Academy* (West Point: Association of Graduates, USMA). Historical Reference Branch of the U.S. Army Center of Military History holds a 201 file extract on General McNair that contains a resume, several biographical sketches, correspondence concerning the general's death, and several

photographs. The Lesley J. McNair Papers at the Library of Congress Manuscript Division contain scrapbooks that give some details of his life in the 1940s.

2. That was the assumption of the Protective Mobilization Plan of 1939.

3. These issues are discussed in a general way in Robert R. Palmer, "Organization and Training of New Ground Combat Elements" (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, Study No. 9, 1946), pp. 1-3.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3, which quotes in whole, Memorandum, McNair for the Chief of Staff, sub: Evaluation of Modern Battle Forces, 12 March 1941.

5. The essence of McNair's training focus is contained in a series of letters of instruction issued between 1940 and 1942. See letter, McNair to Commanding General, 1st Army, sub: Army Maneuvers, 1941, 30 March 1940, in War Plans Division File 4116, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Record Group (RG) 165. Also, GHQ, Letter to Army Commanders, sub: Corps and Army Training, 15 January 1941; GHQ Letter to Army Commanders, sub: Combined Training, n.d., but 1941; GHQ Letter to Army Commanders, sub: Training of Newly Activated Infantry Divisions; and Letter, AGF to Army Commanders, sub: Training Divisions 1 June-31 Oct 1942, 23 April 1942, in War Plans Division File 4245.2, NARA RG 165.

6. Address by Lt Gen Lesley J. McNair to Antiaircraft Candidate School, Camp Davis, N.C., 29 October 1942, in Lesley J. McNair Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Box 3, Speech File, 1941-1942.

7. On the details of divisional training, see Bell I. Wiley, "The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions" (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, Study No. 12, 1946).

8. See, for example, McNair's address to the 1942 graduating class at West Point, in which he stressed the combined arms approach to battle. Lesley J. McNair Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Box 3, Speech File, 1941-1942. McNair also had access to the periodic G-2 assessments of Allied and Axis military organizations and summaries of the progress of the war, which stressed the successes of mechanized warfare.

9. McNair addressed the issue of realistic training in many of his directives, and in almost every after-action review of maneuvers. See "Brief of Remarks Before National Defense Committee of American Legion, Washington, D.C., 11 January 1943," in which McNair stressed the need to reproduce the "sounds, sights, and sensations of battle," in Lesley J. McNair

Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Box 3, Speech File, 1941-1942.

10. On realism in training and the use of maneuvers, see McNair's remarks in: "Critique of the First Phase, GHQ-Directed Maneuvers, Carolina Area, November 16-21, 1941," which is typical of his reviews of troop and staff performance in maneuvers. Also see, for example, Letter, L. J. McNair to Commanding General, 1st Army, sub: Army Maneuvers, 1941 in NARA RG 165, File WPD 4116.

11. Typical of McNair's insistence on leadership as the key element of training are his remarks on that subject in "Critique of Second Phase of GHQ-Directed Maneuvers, Carolina Area, November 25th to 28th, 1941," in Lesley J. McNair Papers, Box 3, Speech File, 1941-1942.

12. Speech to graduating class at Ft. Leavenworth, 14 Feb 1942. McNair said that lack of enough trained officers when mobilization started was a crucial problem. Lesley J. McNair Papers, Box 3, Speech File, 1941-1942.

13. Many speeches echo that theme. See, for example, Address by Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair to the 1942 Graduating Class at West Point; Speech to Engineer Officer Candidate School, Ft. Belvoir, September 30, 1942; Address by Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair to Antiaircraft Candidate School, Camp Davis, N.C., October 29, 1942; Armistice Day Address to Troops of the Army Ground Forces, over Blue Network from Washington, 10:15 p.m., E.S.T., Wednesday, Nov. 11, 1942; Speech to officers and cadets at West Point, 8 January 1943; Speech to OCS Graduation, Camp Hood, Texas, 21 January 1943; in Lesley J. McNair Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Box 3, Speech File, 1941-1942.

14. Speech before graduating class at Ft. Leavenworth, 14 February 1942, in Lesley J. McNair Papers, Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Box 3, Speech File, 1941-1942.

15. McNair continued to be concerned with this problem throughout the war. See Memorandum, McNair for the Chief of Staff (Attn: G-3), sub: Relief from Active Duty of Worn-out and Inefficient Officers, 13 June 1944, in which he was still fighting the problem. He wrote that "Nothing is gained by playing on words. An officer 'whose services are no longer desired' is plainly unsatisfactory and should be dealt with as such." McNair could be as ruthless as he was blunt. In another letter in this file, he wrote to the Adjutant General, asking that a major general be reduced to his permanent grade of colonel and retired for ineffi-

ciency.

16. AGF regularly gleaned reports from abroad for relevant doctrinal and tactical lessons that had impacts on training, organization, and equipment of ground forces. See, for example, reports concerning foreign military developments collected by AGF observers and evaluated at HQ AGF, in Hq Army Ground Forces, Commanding General. General Decimal File, 1940-1944, NARA RG 337, Entry 58, Box 3. Observer reports were used for similar purposes, as well as to assess the effectiveness of training. By 1943, this process became newsworthy, as AGF observers, including McNair, reported on combat in North Africa. See, for example, McNair, "Learning the Hard Way," Charleston, S.C., *Post*, 6 March 1943; "Tunisian Errors Will Save Lives in the Future," Dayton, Ohio, *Journal*, 11 March 1943; "Army Revises Training Plan," Washington, D.C., *Times-Herald*, 12 March 1943; "American Army Capitalizing on Tunisia Errors. Training Plans Revised by Gen. McNair," Chicago *Tribune*, 12 March 1943; "Training Vindicated By Tu-

nisia Drive, Gen. McNair Says," *Washington Evening Star*, 15 May 1943; "McNair Emphasizes Artillery's Vital Role," *Washington Post*, 15 May 1943; "McNair Hints Training Is Going to Be Tougher," *Washington Daily News*, 15 May 1943; "McNair Defends Work of U.S. Troops in Africa," *Washington Times-Herald*, 15 May 1943; "Our Training Program OK, General McNair Reports," *Army Times*, 22 May 1943; "The Real Thing," *Army Times*, 6 May 1943; "McNair Visits Third Army Maneuvers! Second Army Applies Tunisia Lessons," *Army Times*, 6 May 1943.

17. On this point, see Christopher R. Gabel, "The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941," (Ohio State University, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1981, available through University Microfilms International).

18. McNair's impact on the Army was noted by many columnists and commented upon at length, both when he was wounded and at his death. For representative comments, see an editorial entitled "A Brainy Soldier," Tulsa, Oklahoma, *World*, 3 May 1943.

Editor's Journal

The whirlwind events of 1990 in central and eastern Europe reminded us that we live in extraordinary times. The new openness that emerged offers additional opportunities for Army historians to learn a little more about military history efforts in other countries. As a small beginning we include two articles by Col. Igor N. Venkov, archivist of the Soviet Union's general staff, in this issue of *Army History*. Future issues will feature additional foreign military historians as *Army History* seeks to expand our international contacts.

Meanwhile, events overseas increasingly are drawing our attention away from eastern Europe to Operation DESERT SHIELD and the American commitment in southwest Asia. The Center has circulated information papers to the Army Staff and prepared book lists and "push packages" of titles for the forces in Saudi Arabia. During August-September 1990 Maj. William W. Epley and Dr. Richard

Hunt deployed to MacDill AFB at the request of Headquarters, USCENTCOM, to augment its historical office. As of this writing other colleagues are engaged in direct support as historians on the ground in Saudi Arabia: Col. Richard Swain arrived shortly after New Year's at USARCENT-MAIN; Maj. Larry Heystek and the 44th MHD have been at that location since mid-September; and Maj. Glen Hawkins arrived at Support Command (Provisional) in late December. Dr. Robert K. Wright and Capt. Melida McGrath also deployed as command historians with their units, the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 101st Airborne Division, respectively.

In the spring 1991 issue we will cover the Army historical community's support of DESERT SHIELD in detail.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.

Military History

A View from the Schoolhouse

Donald A. Carter

During the last few years the Army has experienced a renaissance in the study of military history. Since the end of the Vietnam War we have tried to institutionalize history within our officer and enlisted education programs. We have now reached a critical point in the development of history as a teaching tool within the Army. As diminishing resources force us to train more efficiently, we must take care not to lose the long-term benefits of historical study for the sake of a short-term training expediency.

As an instructor I am frequently challenged by young officers who question the usefulness of history. It is tempting to fall back upon the well-rehearsed, traditional responses to this challenge. The question deserves a more thoughtful consideration. The Army has been inundated with technology that is newer and more complex than ever before. The requirement to train young soldiers and officers to proficiency on this equipment or that system threatens to push aside such nontechnical studies as military history. Many of the Army's leaders concede that history is valuable, but that it is less vital than the technical skills students must learn to be proficient. Given the threat to curtail or eliminate the study of history within the Army, it is time to reexamine what we want from it. The intangible benefits we have long credited to historical study are no longer enough. Students want to know why they should invest large portions of their most precious resource, time, to a pursuit with little immediate return.

I have been surprised at the high percentage of junior officers who already express an interest in reading military history. Perhaps because of interests developed in precommissioning classes, sixty to seventy percent of my Artillery Officers Basic Course students have indicated that they enjoy reading history. The most popular reading material, by a wide margin, is the Tom Clancy-Harold Coyle range of contemporary fiction. While these authors are not examples of traditional military history, they do serve to pique interest in other related fields. The "I was there in Vietnam" genre is also very popular, with James McDonough's *Platoon Leader* being the overwhelming favorite. Also preferred is David Hackworth's recently published *About Face*. As popular as

these books are, they present a problem in our approach to teaching military history. Too many student reviews accept an author's arguments completely, with little or no critical interpretation. It is fairly easy for a young officer to fall under the spell of a charismatic warrior-author: "If...said it in his book, it must be true." Our historical studies must develop the critical analytical skills these officers will need to survive the flood of information they face.

With more experienced officers, such as lieutenants and captains who return for the Officers Advanced Course, I have seen a different problem. These are junior leaders who have spent the last three to five years competing in the "real Army." Their world has been maintenance, supply, gunnery, and fire support. To most of them military history is fluff at best, and more often a boring waste of time. What little free time a battery executive officer has is spent with family and friends, not reading "from old books about dead people"—as I have heard history characterized. When an officer reaches the Advanced Course, the curriculum does little to alter this perception. The institutional requirement to prepare these officers for battery command precludes almost all "nonessential" instruction. By the time students work their way through maneuver tactics, fire support, maintenance, and gunnery, the time remaining for such abstract considerations as military history is limited.

The most common argument we have offered for the study of history is to learn the lessons of the past and to avoid mistakes made by others. In a classic essay on the subject, historian Jay Luvaas once asked, "If military history cannot provide such answers, why study it?" It is this approach to the discipline, however, that causes the Army the most concern. The increasing complexity of warfare has rendered the tactics and technology of previous wars obsolete. It is difficult to convince young officers that they have much to learn from the Vietnam conflict, let alone the American Civil War. The search for lessons often leads us to a dead end. To continue the Luvaas argument, "If there is a lesson here for us, it is simply that solutions to problems are not to be viewed as interchangeable parts." Studying General Robert E. Lee's successful

use of cavalry in a particular battle is not likely to assist the modern general in his own deployments. The more specifically we try to remove useful lessons from their historical context, the less likely we are to succeed, yet without clearly defined answers, students question the practicality of military history.

If we cannot learn specific lessons from history, what tangible good can come from its study? In an Introduction to Military History class I try to convince students of three solid benefits to be gained. The first, and I think most important, is the study of leadership. History provides a leadership laboratory for officers without a great deal of personal experience. Next, studying history serves to expose readers to viewpoints beyond their own. The complexities of modern warfare require an understanding of, if not agreement with, other points of view. Finally, history fosters the tradition and esprit essential to a combat organization.

Most new officers come to their branch Basic Course with little if any practical leadership experience. By reading the experiences of others, they can at least develop a frame of reference for their own experiences yet to come. The Advanced Course students are a bit more difficult to deal with. As seasoned veterans of the company grade wars, many are convinced they have seen it all; and yet, military history has much to offer them. Human beings react differently in combat. Battle creates stresses and emotional responses that are difficult to replicate in a training environment. Nobody will argue that reading history alone prepares a leader for battle, but—rather than starting a war in which we can all practice—it is an acceptable alternative. In the days ahead, as budget constraints curtail or cancel large-scale training exercises, detailed study of military history may be the most viable alternative.

As with any large organization, the armed forces tend to guide thinking along fairly well defined paths. Such is the nature of doctrine, an agreed-upon set of principles to guide the employment of armed forces. Reading history helps to develop the critical analytic skills required to break out of this channelization. Books such as Hackworth's *About Face* and Neil Sheehan's *A Bright Shining Lie* force readers to examine different interpretations of previously covered ground. No book should be taken at face value, but all should cause the reader to think and to challenge his own assumptions. This process not only broadens one's perspective, but also develops analytical skills.

These skills honed through historical analysis are the same as those used to assess the courses of action in an operations order.

As long as there have been armies, commanders have used history to foster a sense of tradition and esprit within their organizations. I believe that it is an appreciation of its heritage as much as the regimental system that has maintained the cohesion within the British Army for so long. Likewise, the U.S. Marine Corps has always been effective at turning its historical traditions into military esprit. Perhaps the sheer size of the Army works to its disadvantage, but we do not use history as effectively. Those units that consciously emphasize their past exploits—the 82d Airborne Division comes most readily to mind—seem to benefit from the morale and spirit their traditions generate.

Until quite recently the Cold War and American membership in NATO for years have focused the Army's attention on Europe. We have designed our doctrine and our technology towards the possibility of facing the Soviet Union in a major land war. A reliance upon technology to overcome other disadvantages has produced a generation of officers firmly focused on the future rather than on the past. Although we have included historical study in most of our organizational and professional schools, time devoted there is limited. Many senior officers, whose task it is to prepare soldiers and officers for war, challenge even this limited study. Their emphasis is understandable, but a purely technological focus has dangerous implications. We expect our leaders to be more than mere technicians. They must also be able to think, to solve complex problems as they arise in peace and war. History offers no textbook solutions and few clear lessons. The benefits of historical study tend to be long term, rather than the immediate return of technical training. History does, however, teach one how to think, to question, and to analyze. Those attributes are as important as the understanding of modern technology. We owe it to our Army's future to promote the study of the past.

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How the Berlin Garrison Surrendered

2 May 1945

Igor N. Venkov

The surrender of the Berlin garrison on 2 May 1945 occupies a central place among the most important events of the final days of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). The apparatus controlling the German state and military was paralyzed once and for all with the fall of Berlin. Germany lost any chance of continuing the fight in an organized way, thereby accelerating our victory. At midnight on 8 May—six days after the fall of Berlin—Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel signed the “Act of Military Surrender” of Germany on behalf of the German High Command. (1)

In view of the complexity of events surrounding the surrender, I have attempted to examine only certain aspects of it, namely: the situation which led the Fascist leadership to surrender, the German leadership’s attempts to arrange a truce, the negotiations between the German envoys and the Soviet command, and the surrender process itself. These aspects of the surrender have not received the proper attention in our literature, and what has been discussed is not historically reliable, since it was not based on genuine documents.

The Berlin Garrison, 9 March-24 April 1945

On 9 March Lt. Gen. Hellmuth Reymann, Commandant of Berlin, signed an order concerning defense preparations for the capital of the Reich. The basic mission of the forces in Berlin was to “defend the capital to the last man and the last shell.”

Adolf Hitler attributed great importance to the defense of the approaches to Berlin and the city itself. On 19 March he signed a scorched earth order, requiring the destruction of all roads, means of communication, industrial complexes, and other facilities in Germany which might be of use to the Soviet forces. Cities were to be transformed into fortresses. Hitler’s headquarters report of 12 April, signed by Armed Forces High Command (OKW) chief Keitel, S.S. Reichsfuehrer Heinrich Himmler, and party chancellery director Martin Bormann, noted the personal responsibility of military commandants for the defense of the cities. They were subject to the death penalty if a city fell.

The Germans applied the lowest, basest, harshest measures to the officers and soldiers ordered to defend

Berlin. As a scare tactic, corpses of German soldiers dangled from ropes in many of Berlin’s streets with placards such as: “I am a deserter,” “I am hanging here because I didn’t believe in the Fuehrer,” etc. To force the troops to fight to the end, Hitler issued a special order on 16 April to the armed forces, stating specifically: “Anyone who orders you [soldiers] to retreat is subject to immediate arrest or, if necessary, is to be shot, regardless of his rank.” (2) To raise the morale of the Berlin garrison personnel, Joseph Goebbels was named commissar of defense for Berlin. (3) But all of the orders, special steps, and the draconian measures taken, attested to the fact that Berlin was doomed to destruction and the population to annihilation.

While there was relative calm in Berlin during the first half of April, panic literally broke out later in the month among the Fascist and militarist elite. (4) For example, the OKW log records an episode on 21 April as follows: “When the breakthrough to Berlin by Marshal [Georgi K.] Zhukov’s forces became obvious, and when refugees from the east appeared in the grip of panic in the streets...Goebbels was the first to lose control of himself. At 1100, under the wail of sirens signaling a tank attack, his associates gathered in the film room of his private residence for their regular meeting...Goebbel’s face was deathly pale.... He was the first to see that the end had come.... His inner stress poured out in a terrible paroxysm of hate.... ‘The German people,’ he cried, ‘...what can be done with such a people, if they do not want to fight anymore.... All the plans of National Socialism, its ideas and goals were too lofty, too noble for this people. They were too fainthearted to accomplish them. In the east they run. In the west they will not let the soldiers fight and they meet the enemy with white flags. The German people deserve the fate which now awaits them....’” (5) Goebbels’ frantic assessment prompted this note in the OKW log: “The final act of the dramatic ruin of the German armed forces is beginning for the High Command.” (6)

The Berlin Garrison, 25-30 April 1945

Forces of the Fourth Guards Tank Army of the First Ukrainian Front (Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan S. Konev, commanding) joined the Forty-Sev-

enth and Second Guards Tank Armies of the First Belorussian Front (Marshal Zhukov, commanding) west of Berlin, in the area of Potsdam, on 25 April and thereby completed the encirclement of Berlin. The Berlin defense group numbered less than two hundred thousand troops, three thousand guns and mortars, and two hundred-fifty tanks and assault guns. An order from Hitler had named General Helmuth Weidling, commander of the 56th Tank Corps (which was among the surrounded units), as commander of the defenses of Berlin. (7) On the same day (25 April) Soviet and American forces came together for the first time in the area of Torgau on the Elbe. By the time Berlin was surrounded, the enemy had put into action the All-Army Group of S.S. Obergruppenfuehrer Steiner (S.S. Third Corps commander) and Hitlerjugend formations. Battalions and divisional groups were hastily organized from odd units.

Despite the catastrophic situation, Hitler still believed that the struggle for Berlin was not lost. At 19:15 on 25 April he sent a radiogram to Admiral Karl Doenitz in which he called the fight for Berlin the "battle for the fate of Germany." (8) He ordered Doenitz to renounce all immediate missions of the navy and to support the struggle for Berlin by transferring troops by air to the city itself and also by water and land to reinforce Berlin's defenders.

The attempts by the Fascist leadership to halt the advance of the Soviet forces were unsuccessful, which heightened the panic among Hitler's ruling clique even more. Hermann Goering was arrested and expelled from the party, and Heinrich Himmler was suspected of treason, but he was still feared, since the S.S. troops remained in his hands. (9)

On 26 April Soviet forces occupied all the suburbs, and a battle developed for the central districts of the city. Breaking up the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the Soviets divided the surrounded German forces into three small groups, which were isolated from one another and cut off from communicating with the High Command. Their situation became absolutely hopeless. On 27-28 April the situation had become critical for the enemy defenders, a situation made even worse by the fact that the encircling perimeter had moved thirty to fifty kilometers west of the city, so that no help could be expected from the outside.

Hitler, however, demanded that the surrounded units fight to the last soldier and that the attempt to advance reinforcements to Berlin continue. General Hans Krebs at 12:30 on 28 April ordered all troops engaged between the Elbe and Oder to go on the attack

and to advance without delay to relieve the city. Field Marshal Keitel was personally dispatched to the troops north of Berlin to direct operations. (10)

At 23:00 on 29 April in Dobbetin (in southern Mecklenburg) Jodl received the following radiogram from Hitler: "I order you to report to me immediately: 1. Where are Wenck's spearheads? 2. When will they attack again? 3. Where is the Ninth Army? 4. To where is it breaking through? 5. Where are Holste's [XXXXI Panzer Corps] spearheads?" (11) After prolonged reflection Keitel answered the radiogram as follows: "To 1. Wenck's point is stopped south of Schwielow Lake. Strong Soviet attacks on the whole east flank. To 2. As a consequence Twelfth cannot continue the advance to Berlin. To 3 and 4. Ninth Army is encircled. A Panzer group has broken out west. Location unknown. To 5. Corps Holste is forced to go on the defensive...." (12)

In view of the hopelessness and impossibility of further fighting, General Weidling, commander of the Berlin defenses, proposed to Hitler a plan for the city garrison to break out of the encirclement. Hitler rejected the plan, however, and ordered him to defend and hold Berlin at any price. Hitler then put his political testament in writing on 29 April, naming Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz his successor as president of the Reich and supreme commander of the armed forces of Germany.

The Berlin Garrison After 30 April

Despite the measures taken by the Fascist leadership, the situation in Berlin remained extremely difficult. The main German Panzer force, still in Wilmersdorf but with some units south of the Reichssportfeld, had been smashed. Radio sets from individual sectors had stopped checking in. Only a single telephone connection was operational to one of the anti-aircraft artillery bunkers at the Tiergarten, in front of which there were already more than ten Soviet tanks. Hitler, afraid of being taken prisoner and being made to answer for all his crimes, committed suicide on 30 April.

Peacemaking Attempts by the Fascist Leaders

After all the irreparable harm they had done, the Fascist leaders, instead of surrendering, took steps toward conciliation. General Weidling described these actions as follows: "At the Reich Chancellery, I was taken directly to the Fuehrer's room. Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels, Reichsleiter Bormann and General Krebs were present. (13) General Krebs explained the fol-

lowing to me: 1. ...the Fuehrer had committed suicide during the second half of the day, about 15:15; 2. His body had been buried in a shell hole in the garden of the Reich Chancellery; 3. The strictest silence had to be preserved concerning the Fuehrer's suicide.... 4. Of the outside world, only Marshal [Joseph] Stalin had been informed by radio of the Fuehrer's suicide; 5. Lieutenant Colonel Zeifert, a sector commander subordinate to Brigadenfuehrer Monke, had already received the order to establish communication with local Russian commanders, who would be requested immediately to conduct General Krebs to the Russian high command; 6. General Krebs was to report the following to the Russian high command:

a) the Fuehrer's suicide;

b) the contents of his testament, which specified a new German government as follows: Reich President-Grand Admiral Doenitz; Reich Chancellor-Dr. Goebbels; Minister for Party Affairs-Reichsleiter Bormann; Minister of Internal Affairs-Seyss-Inquart; War Minister-Field Marshal Schoerner;

c) a request for a truce until the new government could gather in Berlin....

"On 1 May between 02:00 and 03:00 it was finally possible to move General Krebs through our lines.... He returned about 12:00. As any sensible person might assume, his negotiations with the Russian high command concerning a truce were unsuccessful. The high command demanded the unconditional surrender of Berlin. On that condition it was promised that the government named by the Fuehrer could be assembled in Berlin. Then followed the statement that everything possible would be done on the part of the Russians to deliver Grand Admiral Doenitz to Berlin quickly, and that the Russian radio would be used for this purpose.

"... Goebbels continued to cling to the Fuehrer's order forbidding surrender.... It was quite clear to me personally what the answer must be. Nevertheless, I did not want to take this important step independently, and I asked my closest colleagues to state their opinions openly.... (14)

"We managed to establish radio contact with the local Russian command posts. I crossed the Landwehrkanal at 05:00.... From the Russian division headquarters we went on to the army headquarters. There for the last time I gave the order to down their weapons to the German soldiers who were still fighting in some parts of Berlin. The order was sent out with my staff officers, accompanied by Russian interpreters.

"When we arrived at army headquarters, a delegation from the German propaganda ministry appeared.

Dr. Fritzsche, a ministry councillor, also called upon all German soldiers to stop fighting immediately in the interests of the population of Berlin. The Russian command authorities assisted us with great courtesy in ending the senseless, insane fighting as quickly as possible.... Helmuth Weidling." (15)

Weidling was a Fascist general. It is possible that what he has said includes inaccuracies and departures from the truth. Even so, his information lets us see the Fascist leaders in their last days and hours.

Negotiations of the German Envoys With Representatives of the Soviet Command

For a long time we believed that the negotiations were conducted at many command levels, including the staffs of the Fifth Shock Army (Colonel-General N. Berzarin, commanding) and the Ninth Rifle Corps and the 301st Rifle Division of this army. As archive documents reveal, however, these staffs did not conduct negotiations. The negotiations with representatives of the Nazi German command on the surrender of Berlin were carried on by the command of the Eighth Guards Army. (16) Extracts from documents of the Fifth Shock Army, the Ninth Rifle Corps, and the 301st Rifle Division reveal the following:

From the Combat Operations Log of the Fifth Shock Army (17)

"At 23:00 on 30 April 1945, in the sector of the boundary between the 1050 Rifle Regiment of the 301 Rifle Division and the 102 Rifle Regiment of the 35 Rifle Division of the Eighth Guards Army, deployed in front of the stone wall of block '152' (the Gestapo building), the first truce envoys (one lieutenant colonel, two lieutenants and an interpreter) from the enemy side appeared with a white flag and were accompanied by an officer (the first to approach them) of the 102 Rifle Regiment of the 35 Rifle Division to the headquarters of his regiment for preliminary negotiations...Note: All negotiations were held at the Eighth Guards Army HQ...."

From the Combat Operations Log of the Ninth Rifle Corps

"A truce envoy (lieutenant colonel) arrived from the enemy in the sector of the 1050 Rifle Regiment for surrender negotiations at 00:00 [*sic*] on 1 May 1945. In connection with this, firing ceased on both sides at 01:30. The chief of staff of the enemy garrison (a general) was called upon for talks, and the chief of intelligence of the Eighth Guards Army conducted ne-

gotiations with him by authority of Marshal G. K. Zhukov....”

From the Combat Operations Log of the 301st Rifle Division of the Ninth Rifle Corps

“During the night of 30 April the division prepared for a decisive assault on the Gestapo building and the Ministry of Aviation and brought up artillery, rear units and reserves. The command post of the 1050 Rifle Regiment was located in the building of the Danish consulate. Assault groups of the First Battalion had tried that day to penetrate the stone wall surrounding the Gestapo building but had failed. Lieutenant Colonel Gumerov, commander of 1050 Rifle Regiment, ordered a ten-minute softening up by the artillery, after which the Germans raised a white flag.... A few minutes later our soldiers noticed a group of truce envoys and reported to Captain Yaprincev, battalion senior adjutant. The group of envoys was noticed at the same time by an officer of the 102 Rifle Regiment of the 35 Rifle Division. The officer took the envoys to his HQ....”

Archival documents of the Fifth Shock Army and its Ninth Rifle Corps and 301st Rifle Division thus fail to confirm that they conducted negotiations with German truce envoys concerning the surrender of the Nazi German garrison of Berlin. Moreover, the documents contain references indicating that such negotiations were conducted by the command of the Eighth Guards Army.

Archival Documents of the Eighth Guards Army and the 35th Guards Rifle Division Concerning the Negotiations

The combat operations logs, communiques, and dispatches of headquarters of the Eighth Guards Army and its 35th Guards Rifle Division describe in detail not only the negotiations per se, but also the actions of the parties in organizing these negotiations. The compilers of the documents, realizing the historic significance of the negotiations, attempted to leave nothing out; actions were described in great detail with meticulous accuracy. Of all the material available, we shall examine only those aspects which describe the process as it really happened.

At 23:30 on 30 April 1945 truce envoy Lieutenant Colonel Zeifert came to the forward line of the 102 Guards Rifle Regiment of the 35 Guards Rifle Division with a packet addressed to the command of the Soviet forces.

Documents presented to Colonel Smolin, com-

mander of the 35 Guards Rifle Division, and Colonel Lebed, chief of staff of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps, certified that Lieutenant Colonel Zeifert was authorized by the German high command to negotiate with the Soviet command to establish the place and time for General of Infantry Krebs to cross the front line in order to deliver to our command a message of special importance. The conditions for crossing the front line were established at 03:00 on 1 May, and General Krebs, accompanied by general staff Colonel von Dueffing, an interpreter, and one soldier, was brought to the 35 Guards Rifle Division headquarters.

A combat dispatch of the 35 Guards Rifle Division for 1 May 1945 reports the following: “... At 01:00 on 1 May 1945, in the area of the 102 Guards Rifle Regiment, a German truce envoy with the rank of lieutenant colonel crossed the front line accompanied by an interpreter and two soldiers. The lieutenant colonel stated that he was authorized by the German command to request of the Soviet command an agreement to enter negotiations on the question of surrender. Receiving a positive response, the lieutenant colonel reported to his commanders, and at 05:00 a German general arrived at our position and was taken to the division commander's observation post. The deputy commander of the 4 Guards Rifle Corps and the deputy commander of the Eighth Guards Army arrived there also and after a brief discussion with the German general left with him to see the commander of the Eighth Guards Army....”

The German general mentioned in the dispatch was General Krebs. He stated that he had been commissioned by Goebbels and Bormann to deliver a message of special importance to the Russian high command. At 03:30 on 1 May 1945 General Krebs and Colonel von Dueffing were taken to Colonel-General Chuykov, commander of the Eighth Guards Army, who received the message of the German envoy by authority of Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov. A document signed by Goebbels and Bormann and delivered by Krebs officially reported Hitler's suicide, the formation of a new government and the authorization of Krebs to negotiate for a truce.

After familiarizing himself with the documents, Colonel-General Chuykov stated that he was not authorized to conduct negotiations of any kind with the German government. Only the unconditional surrender of the Berlin garrison could be discussed. He reported to Marshal Zhukov on the meeting and the contents of the documents. Zhukov and Krebs had a telephone conversation at 05:00 on 1 May 1945.

Zhukov confirmed the proposal of unconditional surrender of the Nazi German forces and told Krebs that he would report to his government on the course of the negotiations.

General of the Army Vasili D. Sokolovskiy, deputy commander of forces of the First Belorussian Front, arrived at Eighth Guards Army headquarters and proposed that General Krebs send Colonel von Dueffing with a representative of the Soviet command to Goebbels to present the demands of the Soviet command and to establish telephone contact through the front line. Colonel von Dueffing dutifully reported to Goebbels and then telephoned Krebs to summon him back on behalf of Goebbels.

Before his departure General Krebs requested that the Soviet proposals be put into final form, which was done by General of the Army Sokolovskiy. The gist of these proposals was that cessation of military operations would be possible only after the unconditional surrender of the Nazi German forces to all the Allies (the Nazi leaders were playing for time by proposing a truce and cessation of combat operations in Berlin only). Further resistance by the Berlin garrison would result in needless bloodshed and death among the innocent citizens of Berlin.

After the negotiations Krebs left at 14:00 on 1 May to report to Goebbels. An S.S. colonel arrived at 18:00 with a packet containing the German government's reply, signed by Bormann and Krebs, which declined the Soviet commander's demand for unconditional surrender. The Nazi leaders once again demonstrated their recklessness and total indifference to the lives of millions of ordinary Germans who had blindly entrusted their fate to them.

In the face of such a response the Soviet command was forced to renew combat operations to take Berlin. At 19:15 on 1 May, after forty-five minutes of heavy artillery fire, a general attack by Soviet forces began, after which telephone communication with the Germans was broken off. The assault on the surrounded garrison in the central part of Berlin did not cease during the night.

The Process of the Berlin Garrison Surrendering

At 00:40 on 2 May the radio unit of the 79 Guards Rifle Division intercepted a message in Russian from a portable radio set of the 56 Panzer Corps: "Hello, Hello! This is the 56 Panzer Corps. Please cease fire. We are sending truce envoys to the Potsdam Bridge.... They will be identified by a white flag on a red background. We await your reply." The message was

reported to the army commander, who ordered a cease-fire in the sector and that the envoys be received.

At the appointed time the German truce envoys, headed by Colonel von Dueffing were met. Von Dueffing stated that they had been authorized by General Weidling, commander of the 56 Panzer Corps, to announce the cessation of resistance and the surrender of the corps. The commander of the 47th Guards Rifle Division, after determining the time the 56 Panzer Corps would require for complete disarmament and the organized transfer of personnel, sent von Dueffing to General Weidling with the Soviet command's reply, i.e., that the surrender was accepted; the units of the corps were to be completely disarmed and transferred to the Soviet command by 07:00 on 2 May—General Weidling and his staff were to give themselves up by 06:00. This Soviet demand was met.

At 06:00 General Weidling and two other general officers crossed the front line and surrendered. They were taken to the command post of Colonel-General Chuykov, who checked their documents and asked them a few questions. Then the army commander suggested that Weidling sign an order of surrender for the entire Berlin garrison and deliver the order to the defenders using officers of the 56 Panzer Corps with Soviet representatives.

General Weidling composed the following order: "Every hour of fighting increased the terrible suffering of the civilian population of Berlin and our wounded; anyone who falls for Berlin dies in vain. On agreement with the high command of the Soviet forces, I demand that the fighting cease immediately." This order was announced by radio through an amplifier for the enemy garrison, which had continued its resistance.

Representatives from the First Deputy Minister for Propaganda, Dr. Fritzsche, arrived at the commander's command post. They stated that Goebbels had committed suicide during the night of 2 May and that Fritzsche was the only representative of the Nazi regime left in Berlin. Dr. Fritzsche sent word of his agreement to give the order of surrender for the Berlin garrison and the entire German Army. A lieutenant colonel, representing the Soviet command, was sent to Fritzsche with a response and a demand that Fritzsche issue an order for unconditional surrender of the entire German Army, and that he come to Eighth Guards Army command post for further negotiations.

Dr. Fritzsche accepted the demand, issued the order for surrender, and presented himself with his aides at the command post. All resistance by the Berlin garrison had ceased by the evening of 2 May. Archi-

val documents of both the Eighth Guards Army and the Fifth Shock Army, therefore, confirm that the command of the Eighth Guards Army received the German truce envoys. No battle was waged by forces of the Soviet Army for direct capture of the Reich Chancellery building. The German garrison defending the chancellery had surrendered along with the forces of the 56 Panzer Corps defending the government block in Berlin before the moment of general surrender on 2 May 1945.

Col. Igor N. Venkov, archivist of the Soviet General Staff, is a member of the editorial staff of the National Book of Memory.

Notes

1. USSR TsAMO [Ministry of Defense Central Archives], stock 233, list 2356, document 804, leaves 155-56.
2. Bankrotstvo strategii germanskogo fashizma [The Bankruptcy of the Strategy of German Fascism], II (Moscow: "Nauka" Publishing House, 1973), p. 584.
3. Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945) was one of the main German Fascist war criminals—an ideologist of racism, violence, and wars of aggression. He headed the propaganda apparatus of Fascist Germany beginning in 1933 and became Reich commissioner for total mobilization in 1944. He committed suicide after Soviet forces entered Berlin.
4. On 19 April forces of the First Belorussian Front managed to breach the enemy's defenses on the Oder line and rushed toward Berlin.
5. Bankrotstvo strategii germanskogo fashizma, pp. 584-585.
6. Sovershenno sekretno! Tol'ko dlya komandovaniya! [Absolutely Secret! For the Commander's Eyes Only!], (Moscow: "Nauka Publishing House, 1967), p. 575.
7. USSR TsAMO, stock 233, list 2356, document 804, leaf 129.
8. Karl Doenitz (11891-1980) was a German Fascist admiral. He was submarine fleet commander 1936-1943 and navy commander in chief 1943-1945. Reich chancellor and supreme commander from the beginning of May 1945. He was sentenced to ten years in prison by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.
9. TsAMO, stock 233, list 2356, document 805, leaf 314.
10. TsAMO, stock 233, list 2356, document 804, leaf 478. Wilhelm Keitel (1882-1946), Field Marshal of the German Fascist Army (1940), was Hitler's closest military adviser. Chief of staff of the OKW, 1938-1945, he was judged by the International Military Tribunal to be one of the principal war criminals and was executed.
11. As the Soviet forces approached Potsdam the OKH [Army High Command] and the staff of the operations directorate of the German OKW [Armed Forces High Command] that were located there, headed by General Jodl, successfully evacuated southwest to Bavaria.
12. TsAMO, stock 233, list 2356, document 804, leaf 147.
13. General of Infantry Krebs, chief of the OKH, in place of Heinz Guderian, who was removed from this position at the end of March 1945.
14. General Weidling, as documents attest, gathered all the officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers of the defense district command post in his room. More than a hundred men stood around him. He sketched for them the events of the last twenty-four hours, the situation in Berlin, and his intentions. In conclusion, he gave each man the right to select freely a different course of action for himself, but none could see any way out other than surrender.
15. Sovershenno sekretno!, pp. 624-28.
16. Colonel-General V.I. Chuykov was commander of the Eighth Guards Army.
17. Material presented hereinafter is based on archival documents: USSR TsAMO, stock 113, list 1448, document 29, leaves 38-45.

Command Decisions Chapters Available

Here's a "stop press" from *Army History*: The Center of Military History has reprinted the twenty-three individual chapters (essays) of *Command Decisions*, edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield.

Instructors and other Army historians interested in any of these separate *Command Decisions* chapters may order directly by individual chapter title and CMH Pub number (CMH Pub 70-7-1 through 70-7-23) from the depot in Baltimore, using their command's standard requisition form (DA Form 4569). The address: Army Publications Distribution Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220-2896.

1941

JANUARY - MARCH

6 Jan - In his State of the Union address, President Franklin D. Roosevelt cites four "essential human freedoms" which must be protected from the Axis powers: the freedom of speech and worship and the freedom from want and fear.

8 Jan - In a message to Congress, Roosevelt requests defense appropriations of \$10,811,000,000 for the 1942 fiscal year.

9 Jan - Prime Minister Winston Churchill says that "the future of the whole world...depend(s) upon the relations between the British Empire...and the United States of America."

10 Jan - Roosevelt's bill to aid the Allies is introduced in both houses of Congress. Designed primarily with the president's concept of Lend-Lease aid to Britain in mind, the bill gives the president broad power to distribute American defense materials to other countries. Some feel it gives the president too much power. Congressman Hamilton Fish, R., N.Y., says "It looks as if we are...setting up a Fuhrer [*sic*] here."

- Export control regulations are extended to include copper, bronze, brass, zinc, nickel, and potash.

12 Jan - Wendell L. Willkie, who ran against Roosevelt in the 1940 presidential campaign, comes out in support of the Lend-Lease bill, although he suggests a time limit be incorporated.

13 Jan - The 3d and 4th Armored Divisions are constituted.

16 Jan - Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson testifies before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in support of the Lend-Lease bill.

- Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson predicts that by June the Army will have 1,418,000 men equipped, but they will not be ready for commitment before 1942.

21 Jan - Roosevelt denies that he intends to use his powers under the Lend-Lease bill to order U.S. Navy

convoy protection for merchant ships bound for Great Britain.

22 Jan - Workers at the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, which has \$26,000,000 in defense contracts, go on strike for higher wages.

24 Jan - The War Department awards contracts equaling more than \$100,000,000.

25 Jan - The War Department announces the call-up of 20,700 more National Guardsmen.

29 Jan - Workers at an International Harvester plant go on strike.

30 Jan - Hitler threatens to torpedo "every ship with or without convoy that comes within range of our torpedo tubes," if the U.S. attempts to send aid to Britain.

31 Jan - Roosevelt threatens to impose government control of any plant in the country if necessary to maintain defense production.

- Workers at a Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation plant in Elizabeth, N.J., go on strike, delaying work on \$30,000,000 worth of Army and Navy contracts.

1 Feb - Phelps Dodge strike ends pending a Labor Relations Board election.

4 Feb - Export control extended to oil-well drilling and refining machinery, radium, uranium, and calf skins.

8 Feb - The Lend-Lease bill is passed in the House.

11 Feb - Wendell L. Willkie testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of the Lend-Lease bill, saying "it offers the best clear chance for us to keep out of the war."

12 Feb - The War Department announces that 34,500 more National Guardsmen will be inducted into the Army by June.

13 Feb - Steel workers at the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company of Youngstown, Ohio, go on strike.

Chronology

19 Feb - Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, the Japanese ambassador to the United States, says there will be a war between Japan and the United States only if the U.S. initiates it.

22 Feb - Germany claims to have sunk the *Canadian Cruiser*, a British freighter sailing under the U.S. flag.

24 Feb - Roosevelt requests that Congress appropriate \$3,812,311,197 for the Army.

25 Feb - Export controls are extended to aircraft pilot trainers, shoe and belt leather, graphite, electrodes, belladonna, and atropine.

26 Feb - 14,000 Bethlehem Steel Corporation workers go on strike. Although the disputes are settled the next day, fears are increasing of critical deficiencies in the nation's defense readiness if major strikes hit key defense industries.

1 Mar - The United States establishes a force of destroyers and patrol aircraft to be used for protection of convoys in the North Atlantic.

3 Mar - Workers involved in the construction of a \$13,000,000 antiaircraft firing range at Camp Davis, North Carolina, go on strike.

- Workers for the Penner Installation Corporation halt electrical installations at Wright Field, Ohio, when they go on strike.

4 Mar - In a rare intervention in labor disputes, the War Department orders Penner Installation Corporation workers back to work at Wright Field. The strike at Camp Davis is settled.

5 Mar - To protect the Panama Canal during the European war, Panama agrees to allow the U.S. to establish air and antiaircraft bases on Panamanian soil.

8 Mar - The Lend-Lease bill is passed in the Senate.
- The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates Germany's war expenditures at \$28,800,000,000.

10 Mar - A survey is released showing that \$75,000,000 worth of defense contracts are being held up by 28,000 striking workers across the country.

- Total strength of the Army reaches 1,003,500.

11 Mar - Roosevelt signs the Lend-Lease bill into law.

12 Mar - Roosevelt requests \$7,000,000,000 from Congress to be used to bring the nation's defense industry to maximum production, establishing in America the "arsenal of democracy" under the Lend-Lease bill.

- Prime Minister Churchill thanks America for its commitment to aid the Allies.

15 Mar - Roosevelt vows to increase aid steadily to the Allies until the war is won.

16 Mar - Predicting British defeat within the year, Hitler claims that "no power nor aid in the world" can save Britain.

19 Mar - The House passes the Lend-Lease appropriations bill and forwards it to the Senate.

- Roosevelt establishes the National Defense Mediation Board to deal with the problem of strikes in the defense industry.

21 Mar - The Army makes a call for volunteers to form the Air Corps' first black unit, the 99th Pursuit Squadron.

- The British aviation journal *Aeroplane* reports that Great Britain received 1,875 U.S. planes in 1940, 1,575 more than in 1939.

24 Mar - The Senate passes the \$7,000,000,000 Lend-Lease appropriations bill.

26 Mar - The Department of the Navy and the Office of Production Management order the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company to reopen its plant in Milwaukee, which had been closed since 22 January due to a strike.

27 Mar - President Roosevelt signs the Lend-Lease appropriations bill.

30 Mar - Two German, 28 Italian, and 35 Danish ships in American ports are seized by the U.S. government. The Danish ships were under German control.

Focus on the Field

Office of the Command Historian Military Traffic Management Command Don E. McLeod, Command Historian

The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) is celebrating its silver anniversary this year as the Department of Defense's (DOD) single traffic manager. A function assigned after World War II to a variety of agencies by the Secretary of Defense, DOD traffic management was finally given in 1965 solely to the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service Command, the forerunner of MTMC. Over the years MTMC transporters have executed their single-manager responsibilities, in part, by reviewing past transportation performance for guidance in making future operations more efficient, safer, and cheaper. For twenty-five years the MTMC history function has complemented this effort by maintaining an inherited document collection from predecessor commands, collecting additional records, and preparing an exhaustive annual historical review.

The Military Traffic Management Command represents a unique command relationship within the Department of Defense organizational structure. Under the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it is a component of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), one of eleven unified and specified commands reporting to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on strategic mobility issues. At the same time, MTMC is a jointly staffed, industrially funded, major Army command. It is through MTMC that the secretary discharges his responsibilities as the DOD single manager for traffic management, common-user ocean terminals, transportation engineering, and intermodal containers. MTMC executes its peace and wartime missions with a melding of operational and management activities, meeting military transportation requirements while emphasizing service and economy. The Military Traffic Management Command recognizes that projecting a forceful and rapid response to any hostile threat is the core of the nation's defense posture.

Operation DESERT SHIELD challenged the command's capacity to perform in an emergency environment. Ninety-five percent of the deployed unit material was transported by ship, a gargantuan task illustrating MTMC's unique ability to orchestrate the movement of massive amounts of material in a short

period of time. Thirty days into the operation, nearly 24,000 measurement tons of ammunition and 900,000 measurement tons of materiel, including 44,000 pieces of equipment, were moved to seventeen ports by approximately 2,950 rail cars and 4,200 trucks, and loaded onto 59 ships for shipment to Saudi Arabia.

DESERT SHIELD also challenged the MTMC history program, a single-person office that continues to be responsible for the normal range of major Army command history program services, such as conducting oral interviews, producing studies, leading staff rides, providing information and responding to staff requests, introducing automation, supervising subordinate command history efforts, and handling the "ash and trash" of office administration. As with most small Army offices, a concentration of effort is called for if the MTMC historian is to win the hearts and minds of the command's upper-level managers. The office's focus is on oral history, studies and monographs, staff rides, and the annual historical review. Exploring the ways in which automation can make the program more efficient is an ongoing priority.

Through the exit interview process the historian establishes a dialogue with command managers and learns the command business. This forum also provides insights, tests judgments, and can give visibility and legitimacy to a somewhat misunderstood staff function. For the staff, the corpus of interviews offers a unique medium for the exchange of ideas, opinions, and analyses, as well as a review of where the command has come—and a chance for speculation as to where it is going.

Interviews also offer the MTMC historian insights for monograph and study topics. They focus the historian's study efforts more precisely on what historical analysis MTMC decision makers require as they deal with present and future command issues and challenges. Study projects also bridge the gap between oral history and the documents collection program by directing records collection efforts more precisely.

Staff rides provide the historian with an additional bridge to management. They offer the commander and his staff new perspectives, provide enrichment, and take advantage of the Army chief of staff's leadership initiative. Unfortunately, this effort often becomes a bill payer for other more pressing command history functions.

Although the annual historical review (AHR) is

less exciting than interviews, studies, and staff rides, it is the workhorse of the MTMC history office. As with most Army history offices, the AHR is not an end in itself, but serves as a reference for most information requests, represents the starting point for many studies and monographs, and is used as the guide to many major command history office document collections. In sum, the AHR is a prerequisite for much of the serious historical work produced by the MTMC history office. One goal of that office is to spend less time with the AHR so that more time can be spent on more professional functions having a higher priority.

The history office is experimenting with d-Base III plus, exploring several possibilities for gathering, organizing, manipulating, and indexing information to reduce the time spent in AHR production. The historian indexes, using events and dates derived from the command's weekly summaries of significant events and from reading files. Other index categories include directorates, key words (such as functional areas), prioritized events (assigning values from one to five), key documents, and action officers. Benefits include the capability to prioritize events for a highlight chapter, create an index based on key words (for instance in the case of MTMC: strikes, exercises, quality control, cost savings, etc.), and establish a chronology. In the long run, this application may prove too costly in terms of time, but the realities of the new budget compel the command historian to explore this and other labor-saving programs and measures.

The Military Traffic Management Command history office, like many others, reaches out to other related history programs to exchange information, test ideas, and seek assistance. These efforts involve considerable contact with USTRANSCOM, the Department of Transportation, and the MTMC subordinate command historians, as well as with the many other historians facing the similar challenge of deliv-

ering quality historical services to their commands. The fruit of these cooperative efforts has appeared during operations such as JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD.

As a small history effort, the MTMC history office also relies upon the talented historians and specialists at the Center of Military History, who are ever ready to drop what they are doing to help out the single-historian offices. This support covers the gamut from the Center's response to the MTMC historian's numerous requests for information, to reviewing a critical job description, to the more general opportunity for professional development offered by the Center's seminars and this year's Army Historians' Conference.

The requirements for assistance never really end. If the MTMC historian's office had a "wish list" from the Center, it would include publication of the long-awaited Army regulation on history (AR 870-5), and establishment of a standard staffing pattern for Army history offices. MTMC would also like to see the Center's Field and International Division continue to evaluate the AHRs and, for good measure, would add to that a review of Army history records collection categories—which differ in every individual history office.

Each Army field historian—but especially those in the smaller offices—works with the same variables to develop a plan that is right for his or her command. As the Army's Table of Distribution and Allowances organizations face almost certain future reductions, the MTMC history office would like to do more than just survive. Coordinating with kindred government history offices and with the Center of Military History in this new, post-Cold War era, the MTMC historian is refining and integrating the historical function to assist Military Traffic Management Command managers with their future decision-making responsibilities.

Spotlight on a New Combat Studies Institute Publication

Just in time for those who are focusing their attention on DESERT SHIELD, the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth offers *Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Aqeila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars* (Research Survey No. 7) by Dr. George W. Gawrych. Drawing upon interviews with participants from both Israel and Egypt, as well as on original sources in Arabic, Professor Gawrych provides a new perspective on maneuver warfare in the desert. We hope to provide a brief review of this historical survey in the next issue.

Key to the Sinai is available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office.

A.G. Fisch

Eyes in the Sky: A History of Liaison Aircraft and Their Use in World War II

Herbert P. LePore

The Nascence and Dynamics of Liaison Aircraft in War

When people think of military aviation, what comes to mind in most instances are high-performance, single or multiengine tactical aircraft. Such aircraft were essential in the winning of World War II and have been a major factor in the maintenance of our nation's security since the end of that conflict. We must be careful, however, not to fall prey to the belief that only this type of aircraft contributed to America's victory in World War II.

In actuality, the nascence of fixed-wing aircraft in a combat milieu took place in the early days of World War I when both the Allied and Central Powers used single-engine aircraft for aerial observation.

The first recorded use of aerial observation took place during the American Civil War, when both the Union and Confederate armies used balloons for aerial observation and artillery adjustment. During the Spanish-American War the United States Army again used observation balloons. Concomitant to the use of fixed-wing observation aircraft by the combatants during World War I was the use of observation balloons and dirigibles. On 19-20 January 1915 London was bombed by a German dirigible. It was not until 3 September 1916, however, that the first German dirigible (or *Zeppelin*) was shot down by a British airplane.

The use of fixed-wing aircraft to destroy a dirigible was significant because it spelled the ostensible end to the use of airships and balloons as tactical weapons of war and, conversely, the emergence of the airplane as a weapons platform. It was during World War I that aircraft technology was developed to meet the tactical exigencies of the war. Machine guns and bombs were placed on airplanes, and this meant that death and destruction no longer emanated strictly as the result of hostile action on the ground. Ground commanders acquired the capability to use aircraft to bomb military and-- at times--civilian targets. Warfare now took on an added dimension: that of both indiscriminate and discriminate killing of innocent civilians. Pilots also acquired the means to engage one another in aerial combat in what became known as "dogfights." It was during World War I that the sobriquet "ace" had its inception. A pilot who de-

stroyed five or more enemy airplanes was honored with such a title. Ironically, a degree of romanticism was associated with being a fighter pilot during World War I, and many historical and literary examples exist concerning the conviviality among pilots and between combatants. (1)

Although fighter and bomber aircraft flew the majority of tactical sorties in World War I, observation aircraft nevertheless played a most significant role, especially for ground commanders. During that conflict aerial observation was at best crude. There were no radios—at least in most of the aircraft—and what aircraft radios existed had very limited transmitting and receiving capabilities. In lieu of radios, pilots, observers, and ground personnel used arm and hand signals, flags, and dropped messages to communicate. The result was ineffective and untimely tactical communications and, subsequently, a compromised mission. With the absence of any discernible doctrine during World War I concerning aerial observation, especially over the immediate battlefield (which was at times as narrow as fifty meters or as broad as several kilometers), it became imperative that something be done to fill this doctrinal vacuity.

It was not until December 1917 that an effort was made to address this problem. It was then that General Henri Phillippe Petain, French commander of the Allied armies in the north and northeast, sent a memo to the commander in chief of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France, General John J. Pershing, giving his opinion on how observation aircraft should be used. General Petain's statement, though not submitted *in camera*, was not widely disseminated. His comments were incisive, however. He stipulated that observation aircraft should be used primarily for the adjustment of artillery fire, including counter-battery fire, and for liaison missions, but not for reconnaissance purposes. The question as to what constituted observation vis-a-vis reconnaissance caused a degree of polemic at the time, because a number of ground commanders believed that observation dealt with the immediate battlefield, while reconnaissance denoted long-range surveillance and scouting of the enemy behind the lines as far back as the corps or theater areas. Other commanders, however, believed observation and reconnaissance could and should be

done by the same aircraft, thereby making better use of time and resources. The question evoked a degree of concern among the Allied Powers during World War I as to who was responsible for the implementation of aerial observation over the battlefield. At times it seemed that the respective powers simply performed aerial observation over their own sectors with the Allies. General Petain attempted to ameliorate this problem by suggesting that the number of observation aircraft be proportional to the size of the ground units they were serving and that these aircraft have the opportunity of aerial observation and artillery fire adjustment in sectors other than their own. He also said that observation aircraft should come under the suzerainty of ground commanders. World War I ended before his suggestions could be implemented; however, the above concept was employed by the United States ground forces in World War II. (2)

The Interim Period of Military Aviation--the 1920s and 1930s

World War I ended on 11 November 1918. If there was a military victory, it was at best a pyrrhic one. The armies and noncombatants from both sides suffered irrevocably from "the war to end all wars." Besides bringing death and destruction to much of Europe, World War I served as a portent of how future wars would be fought. As an adjunct to that war, the airplane acquitted itself only too well as an inanimate "merchant of death," and thereby guaranteed its participation in subsequent wars.

As with most nations, the United States became caught up in the winds of isolationism in the 1920s and 1930s. Since there was no longer a need for a large standing Army or Navy, U.S. armed forces were reduced markedly. Congress also imposed noticeable fiscal constraints on military spending throughout most of the period between World Wars I and II. The Army did, however, fortuitously receive funding to develop and expand its fledgling air arm, known initially as the Army Air Corps, which had its genesis in 1926. (In 1941 the Army Air Corps became known as the Army Air Forces, and then in 1947, the Air Force.)

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the Army procured and tested a number of tactical aircraft; had bombing and gunnery ranges built; developed training and tactical doctrine; and, finally, the Air Corps built a worldwide aircraft communications system that emphasized air-to-ground and ground-to-air capabilities. Although the Army Air Corps had mostly tactical

aircraft in its inventory during the interwar years, it emphasized as part of its training and doctrine an ever-widening role for aerial reconnaissance and observation.

Problems surfaced during the above period because Army aviators and ground commanders had divergent views as to what constituted aerial observation and reconnaissance and what type of aircraft should be used to execute those missions. One school of thought that prevailed among the Army hierarchy was that aerial observation should be limited to the immediate or adjacent battlefield areas and used primarily for the adjustment of artillery fire. This approach called for the use of slow-flying aircraft that could loiter over the target area. Detractors of this thesis made the rejoinder that such aircraft would be vulnerable to antiaircraft and small arms fire and susceptible to enemy airplanes. These same individuals also said that slow-flying unarmed observation airplanes would have to have escort fighter aircraft over the target area. This contention never really abated; in fact, it was further exacerbated during World War II. The countervailing school of thought, which consisted mostly of Air Corps officers, promoted the concept that aerial observation should also include short-range aerial and photographic reconnaissance. These officers were also of the mind-set that aerial observation and reconnaissance would be most effective if undertaken by fast, high-performance aircraft which by their very speed would attenuate the effectiveness of hostile fire—be it by ground units or enemy aircraft. Also noteworthy was the belief of these Air Corps officers that observation and reconnaissance should be under the hegemony of the Air Corps/Air Force, and not ground forces, as postulated by other Army officers. (3)

The Clouds of War and the Genesis of Organic Army Aviation

After 11 November 1918, war was no longer the apotheosis that nations had believed it to be. Most nations strove earnestly to maintain what at best was a tenuous and short-lived peace because of the realization that there were few if any winners in war. World War I in a most cogent fashion had proven that.

Numerous arms agreements and peace pacts among nations during the 1920s and into the early 1930s served as a testimony that nations ostensibly believed they were capable of overcoming their innate nationalism and antipathy toward one another. How wrong they were. By the mid-1930s fascism was well entrenched in Germany and Italy; the Soviet Union and

its concomitant Communist ideology caused concern in Europe; and on the other side of the world, Japan was flexing its military muscle as it moved ominously throughout peripheral areas of the Far East. During this time, the United States attempted to maintain its averred neutrality and isolationism. The months and days, however, were figuratively and literally numbered until the world was enveloped in the most destructive war in history—World War II.

During the 1930s and at the outbreak of hostilities the United States was anything but prepared for war. Its Army numbered approximately 190,000 men, including those in the Army Air Corps. Much of the Army's weaponry was outdated, and what modern weapons existed in its active inventory were too few to be of any consequence in the eventuality of war. This meant the War Department (later to be the Department of the Army) had the Herculean task of preparing the Army for the likelihood of war. One way to do this was by military maneuvers in 1941 and early 1942 to test extant and new battlefield tactics.

It was during these maneuvers that the Army decided to test the efficiency of using certain aircraft for aerial observation and artillery spotting. Once again, the Army Air Corps and the Army Ground Forces had countervailing opinions as to what aircraft should be used and why. The Army Ground Forces hierarchy favored a small, light aircraft, relatively inexpensive, and one that would serve as nothing more than a vertical extension of the artillery observation post. In essence, such an aircraft would not be required to penetrate enemy lines in depth—though in actuality such aircraft subsequently during the war flew on a routine basis over enemy territory. The Air Corps, of course, continued to promulgate the thesis that observation missions required modified combat aircraft because of the necessity to perform aerial reconnaissance with a modicum of risk from hostile fire, be it from the ground or air.

The Army Ground Forces decided to proceed with testing the efficacy of small aircraft for artillery spotting, aerial observation, command, control, and communication, wire laying, and medical evacuation. In the summer maneuvers of 1941 the Army tested commercially built aircraft, which unofficially were called liaison or "L" aircraft, and which in April 1942 were officially designated as liaison aircraft. This was done to eliminate confusion as to who would perform what mission. These small, two-seat, single-engine airplanes were equipped with two-way radios. The crew consisted of a pilot and an observer. Commercial

aircraft companies such as Piper, Taylorcraft, and the Stinson Division of the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation built the liaison airplanes used by the Army Ground Forces during World War II. The Piper Company built the ubiquitous L-4, which was the primary aircraft used during the war. Taylorcraft manufactured the L-2 and L-3. Consolidated Vultee produced the L-5 in 1943, which the Army Air Forces used in conjunction with the Army Ground Forces for the "Horsefly" mission (more on that mission later). These various "L" planes were what the Army needed for its ground forces. They were inexpensive to operate; performed well aerodynamically; and could land practically anywhere, which caused them to be given the sobriquets of "puddle jumpers" and "grass-hoppers." By February 1942 the Army had on order 1,600 of these aircraft, with the stipulation that they be used primarily for artillery spotting and remain at least 1,800 yards within friendly territory. That stipulation sounded almost plausible, but begged the rhetorical question: how could a pilot discern the actual measured boundaries of the battlefield?

Alas, most World War II liaison pilots were often too busy keeping out of the range of anti-aircraft fire or enemy aircraft to discern friendly territory boundaries. The War Department skirted the problem by ostensibly allowing liaison pilots to determine for themselves, if possible, what constituted 1,800 yards of friendly territory. On 6 June 1942, the War Department established an organic Army aviation program. This provided to the Army Ground Forces two pilots and a mechanic for each division field artillery battalion, and one or two pilots for the division artillery headquarters. Divisions were to have as few as six aircraft and six pilots and as many as ten planes and pilots. By August 1945 organic Army aviation was to be reorganized to the extent that Army divisions could have as many as sixteen aircraft for each division. During World War II the Army Air Forces (AAF) received the responsibility for the procurement of liaison airplanes, for the field artillery, and for spare parts, repair materials, and auxiliary flying equipment. (4)

World War II and the Use of Organic Army Aircraft

On 7 December 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. On 11 December Germany, an ally of Japan, declared war on the United States. Early in 1942 the Army established the Department of Air Training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and in June of that

year began to organize organic Army aviation. The Department of Air Training's primary function was to train pilots to fly fire adjustment missions for the field artillery. Lt. Col. William F. Ford, an artillery officer and pilot, was selected to be the department's first director. In addition to Fort Sill, flight training was also done at Pittsburg, Kansas, and Denton, Texas. By the end of World War II several thousand liaison pilots were trained by the department. Although the Army Ground Forces had trained a group of liaison aircraft pilots in early 1942 in a class known later as the "Class Before One," the first class of pilots to begin training at Fort Sill subsequent to the directive establishing organic Army aviation did so on 1 August 1942. It was known as Class One and comprised nineteen students. The class completed its training and graduated on 18 September. The first five classes at Fort Sill were composed of officers and enlisted men from the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces. During 1943, however, the Army discontinued bringing enlisted men into its organic aviation program because the Army's personnel needs were such that qualified enlisted men were being sent to officer candidate schools to fill vacancies in branches such as infantry, armor, and artillery. This meant that during 1943 fewer liaison pilots were trained. The Army compensated, in part, for the dearth of pilots by using the training slots to train liaison aircraft mechanics, who upon completion of their schooling were assigned to division aviation sections to care for liaison aircraft. Liaison pilots in turn were given some cursory maintenance training to be able to perform some repairs as needed on their planes. (5)

World War II Combat Initiation of Liaison Aircraft

The initial use of Army liaison aircraft in combat during World War II took place in North Africa. On 9 November, 1942 three L-4s under the command of Army Capt. Ford E. Allcorn took off from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS *Ranger*, positioned off the coast, to participate in the invasion of North Africa. The L-4 crews took off from the carrier without difficulty and were instructed to maintain radio silence until they arrived at their destination, a landing strip near the coast. They were airborne only a short time, however, before they suddenly came under antiaircraft fire from the ships of the invasion fleet, whose gun crews believed they were firing at German airplanes. Still maintaining radio silence, the L-4s took evasive action and proceeded toward the assigned landing

strip. Upon reaching the coast of North Africa the three liaison aircraft had the misfortune of once again coming under fire, this time from units of the American 2d Armored Division, who mistakenly believed the planes to be German. The pilots employed all their flying skills once again to evade withering fire. Captain Allcorn had his windshield and part of his cockpit shot away, but he managed to make a safe landing, only to be wounded by machine gun fire from Vichy French forces. Friendly civilians rescued him and took him to an American aid station. (6)

A number of problems surfaced during the North African campaign regarding the use of Army liaison aircraft. One significant problem was the shortage of these planes. There simply were not enough to be used for artillery spotting. Coupled with this apparent paucity was the fact that these aircraft at times were used for other missions, such as command, control, and communication, thereby precluding their use for much-needed artillery adjustment. Many ground commanders became frustrated at what to them was a total misuse of liaison aircraft, especially when there was a critical need for ongoing fire support missions for infantry and armored units. A second critical problem was the shortage of trained aerial observers in the North African campaign. Army commanders in North Africa—with varying degrees of success—attempted to ameliorate this by training some ground personnel such as cooks, clerks, infantrymen, artillerymen, and aircraft mechanics to become aerial observers. It was not until the Department of Air Training expanded its flight program in 1943 and early 1944 to include the training of observers that the shortage of such personnel was finally addressed. A third problem that brought about a very visible degree of antagonism between the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces dealt with the old problem areas of aerial reconnaissance and battlefield observation. The fluid battlefield of North Africa in late 1942 and early 1943 necessitated ongoing aerial reconnaissance and observation. At times these missions were difficult to achieve, because liaison aircraft were susceptible to enemy air and ground fire. The Army Air Forces pressed the issue of the difficulty of liaison aircraft being able to perform battlefield observation because of their vulnerability. Lt. Gen. Carl W. Spaatz, the Army Air Forces commander of the Northwest African Air Forces, which served as the primary command for Allied tactical and strategic air operations against the *Afrika Korps*, believed that close air support and aerial reconnaissance could only be maintained by

gaining air superiority over the *Luftwaffe*. This necessitated the use of Allied fighter aircraft to fly cover for high-speed photo-reconnaissance aircraft capable of both observing and photographing ground activity. The Army Ground Forces, of course, did not have the above capability, so control of observation and aerial reconnaissance was relinquished to the Army Air Forces. By doing this the Army Ground Forces attenuated its loss of liaison aircraft to hostile fire and enemy aircraft, while still being able to maintain its mission of adjusting artillery fire.

The North African campaign served somewhat as a test bed for other uses of liaison aircraft such as wire-laying, medical evacuation, and supply drops, and for command, control, and communications purposes. Deployment of liaison aircraft initially was at best desultory because ground commanders were not given ready accessibility to them and also were often not certain on how best to use them. By the end of the fighting in North Africa, however, coordination between ground commanders and liaison aircraft section commanders had improved, thereby enhancing the use of these aircraft. (7)

The Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces Conflict in World War II

As previously noted, the Army Ground Forces and the Army Air Forces tended to be at times rather disputatious toward each other during World War II, especially concerning the use of liaison aircraft. The Army Air Forces had never been favorably disposed to the Army Ground Forces' having organic aviation units, believing that the Army Air Corps (as it was then known) should be totally responsible for all the Army's aviation requirements. There was a certain degree of logic to this premise, particularly since after World War II the Army divested itself of the Army Air Forces, which became a separate service, and which in turn assumed a greater portion of the Army's tactical and logistical aviation exigencies.

In view of the fact that the Army Air Forces and the Army Ground Forces were essential elements of the Army, their seeming lack of comity was predicated not so much on intraservice rivalries as on their divergent ideas concerning doctrine. For example, in early 1944 Commanding General of the Army Air Forces General Henry 'Hap' Arnold and Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, became embroiled in a controversy about whether liaison aircraft should be under the hegemony of the Army Air Forces. General Arnold used the North


Africa and Sicily campaigns as examples of what he thought to be the misuse of L-4s in combat. He stated that General Spaatz believed the Army needed a liaison aircraft that had higher performance capabilities than the L-4, and also that there should be better coordination between ground commanders and aircraft providing close air support. General Arnold felt this could be achieved if Army Air Forces pilots and liaison pilots took turns flying as pilot and observer on these missions, during which the observer would call in the mission to the fighter-bombers providing close air support after receiving ground coordinates from the ground commander(s). (8)

General Arnold emphasized that liaison airplanes should have no less than 100-horsepower engines, which would more closely align them with tactical aircraft. He got his wish with the inception of the 190-horsepower Stinson L-5 liaison aircraft into the Army Air Forces inventory in the spring of 1944.

General Arnold further promoted the idea that if the Army Air Forces assumed control of the artillery spotting and liaison missions, it would allow the Army Ground Forces to relinquish the responsibility of having to provide men and aircraft for artillery adjustment, when the Army Air Forces could obviously perform this mission with its personnel and planes. (9)

On 16 February 1944, General McNair issued a rebuttal. He stated that contrary to General Arnold's opinion concerning control of organic Army aviation, it was imperative that the Army Ground Forces retain control of its own aircraft, because ground commanders could better determine the use of liaison aircraft assets than could air forces commanders. McNair commented further that the War Department had created the ground forces air element with the acquiescence of the Army Air Forces because the latter recognized its inability adequately to perform battlefield aerial observation and adjustment of artillery fire. There was no immediate resolution of the apparent doctrinal discord between Generals Arnold and McNair. On 25 July 1944, while watching American Eighth Air Force bombers providing close support to American ground forces near St. Lo, France, General McNair was killed (along with a large number of American soldiers) by bombs dropped too close to the American lines as a result of a miscalculated drop zone. (10)

Later in the summer of 1944 the War Department reviewed the arguments of the two commands and after careful examination of the allegations and facts accepted the premises of the Army Ground Forces. The War Department, however, granted to the Army



Observation aircraft, using skis, preparing for takeoff from a Belgium pasture (December 1944).

Air Forces the right to have its request for a larger role in the liaison aircraft mission reexamined in the event organic Army aviation was expanded, which it was in August 1945. Because of the surrender of Japan on 14 August, however, the War Department never did address the Air Forces' request when it came. (11)

The Horsefly Missions

In the spring of 1944 the L-5 Stinson observation aircraft was introduced into the Italian campaign. The Army Air Forces procured a large number of these aircraft for use as an adjunct of the close air support mission. Faster and more powerful than the L-4, the L-5 could take more effective evasive action against antiaircraft fire and other aircraft than the L-4 and had greater range. The L-5 also was equipped with a powerful radio that enhanced its air-to-ground and air-to-air communications capabilities.

Because of its above capabilities, the L-5 was cross-utilized by the Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces in Italy. A number of L-5s were flown by Army Air Forces pilots with Army Ground Forces pilots as observers who would direct by radio American fighter-bombers (P-51s and P-47s) on strafing and bombing runs to designated ground targets. Conversely, these missions were also flown with Army liaison pilots at the controls and with Army Air Forces pilots as observers. These operations in Italy, known as "Horsefly" missions, were quite successful. The L-


5 was also used in the Pacific during World War II. (12)

The Final Drive: The Use of Liaison Aircraft in the European Theater of Operations

The role of liaison aircraft in combat in Europe was markedly expanded after the Normandy invasion of 6 June 1944. From that day to 8 May 1945, liaison airplanes proved their mettle in the Allied armies' drive across Central Europe. They performed 97 percent of all artillery adjustment missions in the European Theater of Operations (ETO). The aircraft were also responsible for a high percentage of battlefield observation missions—complemented in part by Army Air Forces reconnaissance aircraft. Because of the open, rolling terrain of the European countryside, aerial observation and artillery spotting were fairly easy. German soldiers, therefore, whenever seeing or hearing an L-4 or L-5, would seek shelter as quickly as possible, knowing only too well it would not be long before a murderous artillery barrage would be upon them.

Liaison pilots found that fields and farm roads in the European terrain served well as makeshift landing strips. During the months of June and July 1944 the fluidity of the battlefield was such that liaison pilots, attempting to return to the landing strips from which they had earlier taken off, often found their original strips in the hands of the enemy. This meant that another field or road had to be found.

By the autumn of 1944 the tactical advantage had



Artillery spotter plane takes off from rice field in the Philippines (January 1945).

swung over to the side of the Allied forces, thereby bringing opportunities for more effective use of liaison aircraft. Better coordination between artillery batteries and spotter aircraft brought quicker response times to fire mission requests by ground commanders. Inclement weather in Europe during late 1944 and early 1945, however, attenuated the combat effectiveness of liaison airplanes. The extremely harsh winter grounded most aircraft for fairly lengthy periods of time—including spotter aircraft. Anecdotes abounded about individual L-4 and L-5 pilots braving the elements long enough to fly fire support missions to help beleaguered American units during the Battle of the Bulge. (13)

During World War II, particularly in Europe, liaison aircraft pilots had to deal with the threat of enemy aircraft. As previously mentioned, one of the most vociferous arguments the Army Air Forces raised against the retention of the liaison aircraft by the Army Ground Forces was the inherent vulnerability of these planes to enemy fighters. The Army Air Forces' contention was certainly correct: L-4s and L-5s were no match for the swift, deadly German ME-109 and FW-190 fighter aircraft they might encounter. In addition, the German Army High Command put something of a bounty on American liaison aircraft. *Luftwaffe* pilots were awarded various types of air medals and points for destroying American airplanes; the most prestigious air medals and points were given

to those fliers who destroyed liaison aircraft. During 1944 and early 1945 a number of L-4s and L-5s were lost to German fighters and anti-aircraft fire in the advance across France and into Germany. The liaison pilots were at times able to use a degree of aerial chicanery against enemy aircraft. When set upon by ME-109s or FW-190s, the L-4 and L-5 pilots would fly as slowly and low to the ground as possible, thus forcing the pursuing plane(s) into a stall from which recovery was almost impossible, or causing the enemy pilot to disengage rather than risk not being able to pull out of a dive. Liaison pilots also attempted to lure German fighters over American lines where they would suddenly encounter heavy anti-aircraft fire. In actuality, the best defense liaison planes could muster was that of total avoidance of enemy aircraft, if possible. Discretion was the better part of valor.

In early 1945, after blunting the German counter-attack of the previous December, Allied forces resumed the offensive against Germany. The inclement weather that had plagued the Allies since late 1944 lifted in January, thereby allowing the resumption of aerial surveillance of the battle area and the adjustment of artillery fire by liaison aircraft. As the Allied armies moved inexorably towards the German heartland, Lt. Gen. George Patton, Commander of the American Third Army, entertained the idea of using a number of L-4s and L-5s to airlift infantry across the Rhine River to capture a bridge and establish a beachhead on the

German side. Combat engineers from the American First Army, however, found two bridges intact over the Rhine, which American forces quickly seized and secured, thereby canceling General Patton's plan. (14)

Once across the Rhine River Allied forces accelerated their ever-widening advance through Germany and into Austria and Czechoslovakia. On 25 April 1945, units of the American First Army linked up with Soviet Army units at the Elbe River. On 8 May Germany formally capitulated, and the war in Europe was over. (15)

The Use of Liaison Aircraft in the Pacific War

As in the European Theater of Operations, liaison aircraft performed a significant role in the war in the Pacific, albeit on a lesser scale. The reason for this difference was that, unlike the conflict in Europe, warfare in the Pacific was predicated primarily upon island-by-island amphibious operations, supported by extensive naval gunfire and aerial bombardment. This meant that L-4s and L-5s often were brought ashore in crates after the landing beach or strip had been secured and then unpacked and assembled. Because of the tactical situation, however, the above aircraft might not be off-loaded until several days after D-day. Some of the liaison aircraft used in the amphibious operations were flown off jury-rigged flight decks on converted Navy tank landing ships (LSTs), which had sheets of steel matting placed over the decks to serve as seaborne runways. L-4s and L-5s were then able to take off fairly easily. Once airborne, however, they could not land back on the LST's deck. The first time Army liaison aircraft were flown successfully off the deck of a converted LST was in January 1944 during the Anzio landing in Italy.

The use of LSTs as seaborne runways for organic Army airplanes led to the introduction of an apparatus instrumental in the recovery of aircraft flown off these vessels. Named after its inventor, Navy Lt. James Brodie, the Brodie Device was used during the battle of Okinawa in April 1945. It consisted of four masts extended over the water from the deck of an LST and was supported by a strong horizontal steel cable. A trolley with an attached sling underneath ran along the cable and, in turn, the sling caught a hook attached to a moving L-4 or L-5. If properly arrested by the sling the plane would stop immediately in mid-air and could then be lifted to the deck level of the LST and hoisted aboard. A specially reconfigured LST launched and retrieved a number of liaison planes off its deck during the Okinawa campaign without either loss of an



Liaison aircraft taking off from makeshift runway on an LST during Anzio landing (January 1944).

aircraft or a pilot. This was the only time during World War II that the Brodie Device was ever used in combat. (16)

As in Europe, liaison aircraft in the Pacific acquitted themselves with distinction, performing a myriad of functions including the calling in of naval gunfire during amphibious operations. With the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in August 1945, and the simultaneous declaration of war against Japan by the Soviet Union, the Japanese government sued for peace.

Reflections

In all likelihood, World War II has had more written about it than any other conflict. Not much has been chronicled, however, about the small, slow, unarmed, single-engine "L" aircraft flown by Army Ground Forces pilots. These airplanes added a valuable dimension to both artillery spotting and battlefield observation. They provided artillery batteries and field commanders much-needed information about targets and enemy positions and movements more rapidly than had been obtained in World War I—thereby reducing response times to mission requests for artillery support. They also served well in capacities such as medical evacuation aircraft, command, communications and control, and wire-laying. True,

the liaison aircraft was an easy target and a number of these aircraft were lost in combat, but it was a relatively small number compared to the more than 3,500 of these planes actually used in World War II. Liaison aircraft served in every theater of that conflict with distinction. Just how essential they were to the winning of World War II might be a rhetorical question; however, to thousands of American fighting men whose lives were saved by timely and accurate spotted artillery fire or who were warned in time of impending danger by liaison fliers, the little "L" planes were an extremely significant factor.

These unaesthetic-looking aircraft have faded somewhat from the corporate memory of World War II, but not entirely. So long as there are Army veterans of that war there will be anecdotes about the "grasshoppers" or "puddle jumpers" and the young men who flew them over battlefields who will never be forgotten.

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In the next issue of *Army History*...

Billy A. Arthur's summary to date of the Army's historical activities in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD.

Raymond A. Mentzer's article on military history detachments in wartime Korea.

Lt. Col. Laszlo Bencze's article on the negative impact of Soviet-inspired policies and practices in the Hungarian People's Army, 1947-1954.

Book review of 1st Lt. Clarence Briggs III's *Operation JUST CAUSE, Panama December 1989: A Soldier's Eyewitness Account*.

Book review of Dr. George W. Gawrych's *Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Aqeila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars* (Research Survey No. 7) by the Combat Studies Institute.

And much more...

The National Book of Memory

Igor N. Venkov

There are events in history that put nations and peoples to severe tests. One such great world event was the Second World War (1939-1945), unleashed by German fascism. Freedom-loving people won the victory in that war, with the Soviet people playing a decisive role.

Victory had a high price—50,000,000 human lives. The Soviet Union bore the heaviest losses, more than 20,000,000 people, or 40 percent of the lives lost in World War II. The Soviet armed forces suffered more than 3,000,000 casualties among its servicemen, either killed, wounded, or missing in action while liberating the peoples of Europe and Asia. The losses amounted to more than 1,000,000 killed on the field of battle while carrying out their mission of liberation: the remains of 500,000 Soviet servicemen are held in Polish soil, about 70,000 gave their lives in Rumania, more than 140,000 are resting forever in Hungary, more than 140,000 gave their lives to free Czechoslovakia, more than 100,000 died in Germany, 26,000 fell in Austria, about 8,000 are resting in Yugoslavian soil, and about 13,000 Soviet servicemen are buried in China and North Korea.

The Soviet people hold sacred the memory of the dead. In cities and villages, on country roads and in fields and forest rise monuments as a permanent reminder of those who failed to return from the war. Among the living, the grateful memory of the fallen is expressed in legends and tales, songs, books, and memorials.

A totally new manifestation of the desire to preserve these memories is the publication of the *National (All-Union) Book of Memory*, scheduled for completion by the fiftieth anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, i.e., by 1 January 1995. The family names of all the servicemen who died during the Great Patriotic War, guerrilla fighters, underground members, and certain other Soviet citizens who, according to reliable information, perished in battles for the Motherland, are being listed in the book. This kind of memory preserves the heroic past and restores to their native land forgotten and lost names. These memories are a force for the moral health of society and a lesson for the armed forces personnel of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, civilian young people, and the whole Soviet people in

the spirit of citizenship, patriotism, and constant readiness to come to the defense of the Motherland and protect it as their fathers and grandfathers did.

In structure the *National Book of Memory* will be made up of district, province, and republic books of memory and will represent a unique memorial publication, unlike anything else.

A summary volume to include information about the number of dead by district and republics as a whole, indicating military categories, nationality, party affiliation, and other characteristics of the dead, is scheduled to be compiled in the Union republics as a supplement to such books. Later, in the final stage, a single, richly illustrated one-volume edition is to be published based on the district, province, and republic books that will include summary information and a number of memorial documents for the country as a whole.

The district, province, and republic books of memory are to be kept at local soviets and military registration offices and exhibited in museums, libraries, memorial complexes, and other institutions, and one copy of each of these books, as well as the single-volume edition with summary information for the country as a whole, are to be collected and exhibited at the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 in Moscow. All this together makes up the *National Book of Memory*.

A public editorial staff, of which Hero of the Soviet Union and General of the Army I.N. Shkadov is chairman, has been charged with overall management of the preparation and publication of the *National Book of Memory*. The editorial staff is made up of more than twenty representatives of publishing organizations and institutions, including marshals, generals, and officers, prominent scientists, and cultural figures. The working organ of the editorial staff is the state scientific methods center created under the auspices of the "Sovetskaya entsiklopediya" publishing house. Lt. Gen. (Ret.) V. S. Ryabov has been named director.

The books of memory in the provinces and districts are to be composed according to the former place of residence (point of induction into the armed forces) of the deceased. They will include Soviet servicemen killed in battles for the Motherland in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and foreign countries, who

died of wounds and various diseases during evacuation and in hospitals, those missing for periods from 22 June 1941 to 9 May 1945 and 9 August to 2 September 1945, and those who died in hospitals before the end of 1945. In cases where it is impossible to establish the place of induction of the deceased, he will be entered in the *Book of Memory* according to the place of burial, as has been done in the Vologodskaya district.

The following are the requirements for the *National Book of Memory*: comprehensiveness in covering all those who died, and truthfulness, reliability, and accuracy of information. The following is being established for each casualty: military rank, family name, first name and patronymic, date and place of birth, nationality, military registration center at which induction took place, place and time of death, and place of burial.

As preliminary work has demonstrated, meeting these requirements presents a number of problems. The main ones are the following:

-The large number of nameless burials. At many military cemeteries, communal graves, and monuments, there are inscriptions such as the following: Captain (name unknown); unknown soldier; Hero of the Soviet Union Major Gonchar, Ivan Alekseyevich and eight unknown soldiers (this one in eastern Germany); eternal honor to unknown servicemen who have fallen for the Motherland, etc. For example, more than 1,670,000 Soviet citizens are buried in Poland, including about 500,000 Soviet servicemen, of whom only 89,000 are known by name. The names of 709,000 dead servicemen remain unknown in Belorussia. Of 126,000 servicemen buried in the Moscow district, the names of 90,000 have not been established. There are 18,000 Soviet servicemen buried at the Zmeyevskoye Cemetery in Rostov-na-Donu, and many of their names are unknown and unrecorded. The situation is the same in a number of other districts and republics;

-Discrepancies in information about the buried. The discrepancies in family names and ranks of the dead are especially great. The family names in the lists do not correspond to names on grave markers, monuments, and obelisks. In eastern Germany, for example, 80 to 90 percent of the lists of the buried at military commanders' offices and city offices need to be corrected. The picture is similar in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia;

-The low percentage of unburied casualty remains identified by name. For example, the National Mem-

ory Watch conducted a survey from 29 April to 9 May 1989 in the Novgorodskaya district (near the village of Myasnoy Bor) at the sites of battles in which the Second Shock Army and the 52d and 59th Armies of the Volkhov Front of 1941-1942 participated—trackers were able to find and bury with honors 3,129 fallen soldiers, but recovered only 125 identification tags, of which only 89 could be deciphered to yield the names of the dead;

-An almost total lack of information about Soviet servicemen who died in actions in resistance detachments in a number of countries in Western Europe. Thousands of Soviet servicemen died in Hitler's concentration camps, and their names are unknown.

The difficulty of the work of collecting information on irretrievable losses and entering them into computers is also the result of inconsistency of the composition and content of documents that provide the information about these losses, and the poor way in which the documents are prepared, e.g., filled out in pencil, handwritten, on nonstandard forms.

Information about casualties is often inaccurate and requires checking to avoid the possible duplication of persons already named at an earlier or later date. Moreover, information on the geography of the place of residence entered in the documents for 1941-1945 is outdated because of the changes in administrative divisions of the country and requires serious, careful processing to correct the information to reflect current administrative realities. All this requires attentive processing of the information to verify and correct it and to record the data in computer format for preparing the books of memory.

With all the difficulties the fundamental problem remains the same—to discover and identify all the dead.

The sources for identifying the dead for subsequent listing in the *Book of Memory* are extremely varied. The most effective include: registers (cards) of inductees to active military service kept by military registration centers; military archival documents recording personnel losses; alphabetical registers from the registration centers assigning pensions to the deceased servicemen; burial registers; court (or other) census registers of village councils of people's deputies; registration cards kept by housing administrations of residents of buildings; archival materials of local governmental organs and institutions, educational institutions, enterprises and organizations, local museums, local study associations, and individuals who write popular works.

Newspaper and magazine publications have been organized to promote the work of preparing the *National Book of Memory* and to keep the Soviet people informed about the project. Identifying all the dead and listing them in the *National Book of Memory* is the business of each and every one of us. Discovering the fate of casualties and preserving their memory will help their loved ones find inner peace and overcome the pain of loss.

Publication of the *National Book of Memory* by the fiftieth anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people

in the Great Patriotic War will promote improvement in the level of military patriotic and international work, will be a tribute to our deep respect for the dead, and will help bring to life and make a reality the motto "No one is forgotten; nothing is forgotten."

Col. Igor N. Venkov, introduced through his earlier article on the Berlin garrison, is a member of the editorial staff working on the National Book of Memory.

BOOK REVIEWS

United States Intelligence: An Encyclopedia
edited by Bruce W. Watson, Susan M. Watson, and
Gerald W. Hoppie
Garland Publishing, Inc., 750 pp., \$95.00

This is a thick and handsomely produced book that attempts to fill an important void within intelligence literature. However, its chronology of intelligence milestones in American history does not begin until 1941, a choice not likely to be made by most students of the subject. Its biographical entries are limited and the selection a bit aberrant: we find a good many spies and traitors listed, but not the historically important figures of American intelligence. The book's almost exclusive focus on the present and recent past means that there are no entries for George Washington, Benjamin Tallmadge, Allen Pinkerton, Lafayette Baker, Arthur Wagner, George Van Deman, Dennis Nolan, William Friedman, or George Goddard, among others.

The book's entries are voluminous, consisting of short definitions of assorted intelligence- and Department of Defense-related terms and brief descriptions of various organizations within the intelligence community. The editors are necessarily limited to open source references, and in the intelligence field, secondary sources are often inadequate and sometimes misleading. Although this in itself is not a fault, the manner in which the editors make use of their sources suggests that they approach their subject from an outsider's perspective. The entry for "cipher" does not differentiate between ciphers and codes; the entry under "U.S. Army Intelligence Agency" has that entity merging with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security

Command in 1975 and then being "reactivated" in 1985—not exactly what happened. Some entries—such as those for "battalion landing team" and "beachhead"—seem more suited to a Marine Corps dictionary than an intelligence encyclopedia. There are various entries explaining the phrases one finds in spy novels, but coverage of real-world tradecraft terms is less than complete.

However, if *United States Intelligence: An Encyclopedia* is less than a definitive text, it is not without its uses as a reference tool. The editors have collected a good deal of information and presented it in an accessible format. If past personalities have been scanted, the numerous organizations, past and present, within the fragmented intelligence community have received better treatment. The entries on the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Naval Intelligence are particularly well done. The book does include a helpful list of acronyms, for which, as the editors correctly note, "the Intelligence Community has a penchant, indeed, a mania...." Finally, the volume's appendixes include valuable documentation, including the texts of the various Executive Orders that have shaped the intelligence community. In short, although this book is not required reading for either the historian or practitioners of the intelligence trade, it does serve as a handy introductory guide for those unfamiliar with intelligence sources, methods, and vocabulary or with the organizational structure of the national intelligence community.

James L. Gilbert is command historian of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Buffalo Soldiers: The 92nd Infantry Division and Reinforcements in World War II, 1942-1945

by Thomas St. John Arnold

Sunflower University Press, 246 pp., photographs, maps, appendixes, index, \$15.95

The 92d Infantry Division held the left flank of the Allied line during the final offensives through Italy, moving north as part of Fifth Army. Most of the major fighting took place outside of the division's area of operations. All told, the 92d did not play a major role in the Italian fighting.

What set the 92d apart was race. It was the only division in the American army of World War II to be composed entirely of black enlisted men and the last racially segregated organization of that size. So Thomas St. John Arnold tells us in his introduction to *Buffalo Soldiers: The 92nd Infantry Division and Reinforcements in World War II, 1942-1945*. A white graduate of Virginia Military Institute and a lieutenant colonel at the time of the Italian campaign, Arnold served on the division staff of Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond as the plans and operations officer (G-3).

Given that the racial composition of the 92d rather than its contribution in battle was exceptional, one might expect this book to concentrate on the experience of the soldiers as black Americans in uniform. In fact, earlier volumes in the official history of the United States Army in World War II, notably Ernest F. Fisher's *Cassino to the Alps* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1977) and Ulysses Lee's *The Employment of Negro Troops* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), did just that. Arnold's title, *Buffalo Soldiers*, almost identical to that of William Leckie's history of the black cavalry in the Indian wars (*The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West*), alludes to the specific history and tradition of the black units. So the book initially holds out the promise that it too might focus on the special experience of the black soldiers. It does not.

Considerable controversy surrounds the role and reputation of the 92d, which did not perform with distinction. To some, it seemed to lack the will to fight. Certainly, as the only black combat division, it received a large number of lower categories of draftees, compared to other divisions. White draftees in the lower categories were distributed over a larger force and therefore did not have such a strong impact on their units. Because of this relatively high concentration of less capable soldiers and racial attitudes in general, white officers avoided service with the 92d. So in

addition to not getting the best soldiers, the division did not get the best officers.

A vicious cycle of declining competence and morale seemed to mark its history. As Ulysses Lee wrote in *The Employment of Negro Troops*, "it was a problem of faith and the lack of it—the wavering faith of commanders in the ability and determination of subordinates and enlisted men, and the continuation in the minds of enlisted men of training period convictions that they could not trust their leaders." (p. 549) There was ample evidence of individual courage and heroism, Lee noted, but there was also a distinct lack of the mutual trust and confidence that is so critical to success. Enlisted men did not believe in their leaders or their missions, sometimes even fearing that they were being deliberately sent out to die. Given the utter breakdown of morale, the division's lackluster record is understandable.

Unfortunately, Arnold adds nothing to discussions of the division's performance and the reasons therefor. He does not even indicate an awareness that such matters might merit consideration, although as the division operations officer he was very near the center of the command system in which the soldiers put so little trust. He avoids the issue of race in general, and quotes black enlisted men only once. In that anecdote, he resorts to an Amos-and-Andy dialect to tell a story that suggests that black soldiers preferred the comfort and security of fortified positions to advancing toward the enemy. Inadvertently, perhaps, this story might indicate his own position on the fighting ability of the 92d.

In general, Arnold as a writer preferred the comfort and security of official reports in constructing his narrative. He follows the division up the west coast of Italy from line to line and offensive to offensive. Unfortunately, not much happened in front of the 92d. On the other hand, a lot happened inside the 92d. Important issues concerning race, command, and belief in the mission emerged and evolved within the division. These get no attention, so this is a disappointing book.

In addition to the major conceptual failing, the book contains numerous small errors that lessen confidence in both the writing and the production. Edward L. Brooke, the former senator from Massachusetts, was not named Brooks, nor was he the first black senator (p. 208). Hiram R. Revels and Blanche K. Bruce preceded him by nearly a century. In addition, the picture on page 210 purports to show Colonel Frank Barber in 1945, a year after he died. The index also has problems, with entries for Fretter-Pico, Briga-

dier General Otto, and for Pico, Brig. Gen. Fretter. Both the author and the publisher could have done better.

Dr. Schubert is currently employed in the Field and International Programs Division at the Center of Military History. He has written extensively on the exploration of the American West and on the experience of black soldiers in the United States Army. His book Building Air Bases in the Negev: The United States Army Corps of Engineers in Israel, 1979-1983, is scheduled for publication jointly by the Corps of Engineers and the Center of Military History in 1991.

Bayonets in the Streets: The Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances

edited by Robin Higham

Sunflower University Press, 268 pp., \$11.95

Save for revisions in the introduction and concluding chapter, the 1989 edition of Robin Higham's *Bayonets in the Streets* remains virtually the same book that first appeared twenty years ago. It comprises a fascinating anthology of scholarly essays and expert studies on the employment of state and federal troops to quell riots and other domestic disturbances from 1794 (the Whiskey Rebellion) to 1967 (the Detroit race riot). The last chapter summarizes the others and very briefly reviews the domestic use of troops during the riots and demonstrations of the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War era.

The editor, Robin Higham, warns the reader that the book is merely an introduction, not a comprehensive study. In lieu of the latter, *Bayonets* contains an extensive bibliography, now in need of updating, and a list of issues to launch new studies on the subject. In 1988 Robert W. Coakley, one of the authors, published the first volume in a comprehensive three-volume series by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Coakley's volume covers the period from 1789 to 1878. The second and third volumes will treat the employment of troops respectively from 1878 to 1945 and from 1945 to the 1970s.

The types of troops used to end U.S. civil disorders from 1794 to the 1970s varied in many particulars, but may be conveniently grouped into certain categories. They were either state militias or National Guardsmen, under state authority, or state or federal troops under federal authority. When invoked, federal authority extended down a military chain of command from the president, as commander in chief of the armed forces,

down to local commanders, or before the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, from federal marshals directly to troops acting as law enforcement officers.

Over two centuries the nature of the disturbances varied, but certain types prevailed according to the era in which they occurred. From the Whiskey Rebellion through Reconstruction, the president and federal marshals used troops to enforce unpopular national or local laws that regional authorities could or would not enforce. After Reconstruction and through World War II, federal forces generally dispersed participants in violent labor disputes and racial "outrages." The post-World War II era gave rise to civil rights disturbances, first in the South and later in larger cities of the North. As the latter wound down in the late 1960s, anti-Vietnam War protests erupted in cities and on campuses throughout the country.

The essays in *Bayonets in the Streets* may be grouped into three categories: essays that describe in detail the use of the militias and National Guard; essays that view the domestic use of troops, at best, as a necessary evil; and essays that commend the use of highly trained troops as the most efficient, and usually the most merciful, way to end violence beyond the control of civil officers or poorly trained National Guardsmen.

Robert W. Coakley, Jim Dan Hill, and Clarence C. Clendenen narrate the history of the militias and National Guardsmen from medieval English times to the 1960s. Hill traces the origins of state militias and their law enforcement role back to the Anglo-Saxon fyrd and the militias of Elizabethan England and Colonial America. Coakley continues the story from the federal period and recounts how the Regular Army gradually displaced the militias in suppressing the larger disorders until the organization of the National Guard by the Dick Act of 1903. Clendenen surveys the establishment of the Guard and its use in the twentieth century. Clendenen goes beyond narration to urge that, at the outset of a riot, National Guardsmen be allowed to use lethal force ("One dead rioter at the beginning will save a thousand lives.").

In contrast to Clendenen, three more "liberal" historians—Paul J. Scheips, Arthur Ekirch, Jr., and T. Alden Williams—sometimes tend to depict the domestic use of troops, federal or state, as a lamentable misapplication of men trained to apply maximum force against well-armed foreign enemies. Such use, they argue, not only weakens the twin traditions of civilian supremacy and civilian law enforcement, but sometimes threatens needless loss of life. In the process, domestic use of troops demoralizes the troops

themselves and degrades their capabilities for battle-field combat.

James High, Charles P. Stone, and Roger Baumont display few qualms about dispatching Regular troops to the scene of a violent confrontation when local police or Guardsmen are either unable or unwilling to restore law and order. High sketches the Marine Corps' long pre-World War II experience as a very effective means of crowd control and law enforcement overseas and, occasionally, within the United States. He notes, however, that the Marine Corps' postwar image as the masters of amphibious assault and maximum force make it politically untenable to employ marines in domestic disorders.

In an excellent analysis of the socioeconomic origins of the Detroit riot of 1967, Baumont notes that the Regular troops commanded by Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone proved most effective in bringing the violence to an early end. As a former military policeman, however, Baumont would prefer the use of military police to airborne troops. The former, he explains, are more accustomed to restraining their use of lethal firepower and to chasing and apprehending small scattered groups of rioters, the type that characterized the Detroit riot. Airborne troops, on the other hand, are better prepared for assaulting buildings and advancing in formation against massed rioters of the type that prevailed in earlier times, before the advent of tear gas, automatic weapons, armored cars, and tanks. General Stone, the commander of Task Force Detroit in 1967, prefers the use of highly trained Regular troops for riot duty, but also sees a major role in that same duty for specially trained and equipped National Guardsmen, including members of the Air National Guard.

With republication of *Bayonets in the Streets* in 1989, John K. Mahon has added new material that summarizes the findings of the others and comments on the disturbances of the 1970s and early 1980s: Kent State, Ohio (1970); Baton Rouge, Louisiana (1972); Seabrook (New Hampshire) Nuclear Plant (1979-1980); State Penitentiary of New Mexico (1980); Fort Chaffee, Arkansas (1980); and Dakota City, Nebraska (1982). Mahon sympathizes with the constitutional ideal that would leave pacification strictly to civilian law enforcement officers, but notes that police and deputies, when left to their own devices in confrontations with armed mobs or scattered snipers, have rarely succeeded. Like High, Baumont, and Stone (and this reviewer)—and with the advantage of twenty years of additional hindsight—Mahon concludes: "In spite of their distaste for action against disorderly citizenry, the professionals are good at it. They have the best

record of all types of armed forces at dominating crowds.... As long as the Republic has vitality, citizens in crowds or mobs will now and again take to the streets in direct action...all levels of government will have to employ the force at their disposal. To insure that the military will never menace liberty, the nation will be obliged to rely on a tradition that has kept out militarism for more than 300 years...that a free society depends on civil control of the military." (pp. 231-232)

Dr. Ronald H. Cole, formerly with the Center of Military History, is a historian with the Historical Division, Joint Staff, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is coauthor of the forthcoming second volume of the Center's three-volume series on civil disorders.

In War and Peace: An American Military History Anthology

by Edward K. Eckert

Wadsworth Publishing Co., 444 pp., \$19.95

From the Childe Hassam painting of American flags on the cover to the photograph on page 444 of Hiroshima on 5 August 1945, this is an eloquent and elegant collection of writings covering American military history from the colonial period through the Grenada operation. The author, Professor Edward K. Eckert of Saint Bonaventure University, has gathered some of the finest writing on American wars and assembled it in a logical and useful manner. Selections include both significant primary documents and pieces which give a "taste of battle."

Professor Eckert accurately describes his anthology as "a collection of essential documents on U. S. military history, one that emphasizes the personal experience of war." Selections have been carefully chosen to highlight great military literature, allow readers to experience what combat felt like through the words of soldiers, and challenge readers to think about significant aspects of military conflict. The anthology is aimed at students in undergraduate military history courses, such as the one Professor Eckert teaches. To my knowledge, it is the best available collection of readings on American military history and should prove useful for students in military history and ROTC courses. It makes an ideal supplement to the standard military history survey texts: The Center of Military History's *American Military History* and *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* by Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski.

In War and Peace deserves a wider audience than

undergraduate military history students, for the collection offers readers an opportunity to explore the width and breadth of American military history. Readers can renew acquaintance with classic writings by Francis Parkman, Herman Melville, Ulysses S. Grant, Emory Upton, Ernie Pyle, and S.L.A. Marshall while also finding some little-known or forgotten selection such as Micah McDonough's letter of 1791 describing St. Clair's defeat and E. C. Leonard's account of an aerial battle in 1918. All of the selections are readable and relevant.

The book is divided into ten chapters and contains a total of sixty-one selections. The chronologically arranged chapters cover the Colonial and Revolutionary wars, the early Republic, the Civil War, the rise of professionalism (which included readings by Alfred Thayer Mahan and Emory Upton), World Wars I and II, Korea and the Cold War, and the Vietnam War. A chapter on contemporary issues includes readings on the M16 controversy, Grenada, women cadets at the U.S. Military Academy, and the all-volunteer Army. An Epilogue examines the romance of war with a reading by William Broyles, Jr.

Considerable care is evident in aspects of this volume beyond the well-chosen readings. The selections are logically arranged and while emphasis is on land warfare, sea and air warfare are recognized. Each chapter begins with a brief, clear introduction. Photo-

graphs and illustrations are well chosen, intelligently placed, and have specific, relevant captions. Each chapter concludes with an annotated bibliography. These are fairly extensive, although some significant books have been excluded, including those by David Trask on the Spanish-American War and Clay Blair, Jr., on the Korean War. Still, the bibliographies provide plenty of excellent suggestions for additional reading.

In War and Peace is mainly about war; the logical focus for an American military history anthology. The book's readings ably convey the exhilaration and the horror of war and enable readers to gain a greater understanding of both American military history and the human reaction to organized violence. After reviewing the writings of Americans on war, Professor Eckert concludes his anthology with a photograph of the atomic cloud at Hiroshima and the pessimistic comment that "the history of our violent past offers us little hope for the future." War does destroy illusions. Professor Eckert's efforts to open readers' minds to the realities of war provide a stimulating tour of America's military past.

Dr. Robert H. Berlin is chief of historical services at the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Drums and Bugles Corner

A much-publicized demonstration of Lester P. Barlow's liquid oxygen-carbon explosive (Glmite) was conducted at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 25 May 1940, in the presence of U.S. senators, members of the House of Representatives, gentlemen of the press, photographers, and skeptical ordnance experts of the Army and Navy. In addition, the test was witnessed by 96 goats tethered at various distances from 200 to 1,000 feet from the 1,000-pound charge of the explosive, which was detonated by the inventor.

Among other extravagant boasts it had been claimed that living tissue could not survive some peculiar vibratory action of the air waves, unknown to the laws of physics, which this Barlow concoction was alleged to bring about. The goats were tethered, the other distinguished onlookers looked on from points of safety, the glmite was hoisted upon a pole, the still cameras clicked, the movie cameras ground, the charge detonated. Blast meters 500 feet distant were shattered...but the goats continued to nibble away at the rye of the good Maryland Free State. Not a goat (tethered) was injured. Mr. Barlow was quoted as saying: "I'm licked on it, but I had to try to find out."

The goats, both *Homo sapiens* and *Capra hircus*, then went on about their business. The former returned to their ponderous deliberations of state. The latter (untethered), continued to nibble the rye of the good Maryland Free State, could wag their tails and grin at the plight of the distinguished statesmen...[and their] combined batting average as biological chemists... .

Reprinted from *Army Ordnance*, July-August 1940, p. 45.
Contributed by Larry "Ted" Ballard.

Professional Events

Ethics Reform Act of 1989—Serious Impact on Government Historians?

Public Law 101-194 (30 November 1989), embodying the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, contains a number of prohibitions on government employees engaged in work outside the office. The law, which takes effect on 1 January 1991, prohibits the acceptance of all honoraria for a "speech, article or appearance" by any member of the federal government, with a few exceptions, e.g., the Vice President and other members of the U.S. Senate. An honorarium is defined as "a payment of money or anything of value for an appearance, speech or article...excluding any actual and necessary travel expenses...."

Concerned about the implications for Army historians writing or presenting papers, General Nelson asked the Army's Office of the Judge Advocate General for a legal interpretation. Col. William J. Lehman responded, noting that the "restriction is absolute; there is no necessity for there to be a relationship between the honorarium and the recipient's official duties or status. For example, the restrictions would prohibit the receipt of honoraria in the following instances: a labor relations specialist who authors an article on baseball;...a doctor who conducts independent research during an approved outside activity and who writes a medical journal article on the research...." However, Colonel Lehman goes on to note that the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) believes that the restrictions include conduct beyond that which the government legitimately should be regulating. OGE, in conjunction with the Department of Defense General Counsel, has proposed legislation that would amend the definition of "honorarium" in Public Law 101-194 such that, to be prohibited, the honoraria would have to be offered because the subject of the speech or article is related to the individual's official duties, or is paid because of the individual's government status.

Unless and until the language of the law is successfully modified, however, Colonel Lehman concludes that "on 1 January 1991 the restrictions on honoraria imposed by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 will apply....There will be no exceptions, even when appearing in a personal capacity and concerning matters totally unrelated to the individual's official position." Watch this space....

Revisions to AR 870-5

By the time you receive this issue of *Army History* the final draft of AR 870-5, *Military History: Responsibilities, Policies, and Procedures*, should have arrived at the MACOM history offices for formal staffing. If not, you can expect it sometime in early 1991. The Center hopes to obtain concurrences/comments, resolve them, and publish and distribute the revised regulation by the end of this year. Until then you should use the draft regulation as guidance for planning historical programs. We would appreciate any assistance MACOM historians can lend to speeding the staffing process.

World War I Records of First Division, A.E.F., Available

Free postpaid to a good home: *World War Records, First Division, A.E.F., Regular*. Complete twenty-five volume set, prepared in 1928, containing mimeographed copies of all important documents relative to the First Division's participation in World War I is available to any institution interested in building its Army research collection. Office of the Chief of Engineers historians have extracted on microfiche the sections of the set appropriate to their purposes and now wish to pass the set on to another repository. POC: Dr. Martin K. Gordon, CEHO-SR, Office of History, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5577. Voice: (703) 355-3558; Fax: (703) 355-2005.

Applying for Historian Positions in USAREUR

Applications are being accepted on an open, continuous basis for historian (GS-170) in USAREUR. Specific vacancies are not announced; referral lists are made up from names on file at the Civilian Recruitment Center. All interested career or career conditional Department of the Army employees eligible for transfer and reinstatement eligibles should forward SF-171, copy of SF-50, SF-181 (optional), and transcripts (if applicable) to U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, HQ 1st PERSCOM, Civilian Recruitment Center, ATTN: AEUPE-CRC, APO New York 09403-0101. For additional information stateside applicants can call the Job Information Center, Leimen, Germany, at 011-49-6224-76091. Within Germany call (civilian) 06224-76091.

News of Our Colleagues...

Forrest C. Pogue was recently honored by the Association of the United States Army (AUSA). AUSA presented its Award for Distinguished Service to Dr. Pogue at the association's annual meeting and banquet on 19 October 1990. A distinguished alumnus of the Center of Military History, he is recognized as the foremost authority on General George Catlett Marshall. Professor Pogue's books include *The Supreme Command* and his authoritative four-volume study *George C. Marshall*.

At the same time we note Dr. Pogue's honor, we are saddened by the loss of three of our colleagues, Roger D. White, Robert Ross Smith, and Charles B. MacDonald. Mr. White, assistant command historian at the Army Air Defense Center at Fort Bliss, was killed 24 October in a tragic automobile accident. Roger White was associated with Fort Bliss, Texas, for many years, first as a soldier and then as a dedicated civil servant.

Robert Ross Smith, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, died at his home in West Virginia on 11 November. A former branch chief in the Center of Military History's Histories Division, Mr. Smith authored or coauthored three of the Center's "green books": *The Approach to the Philippines*, *Triumph in the Philippines*, and *The Riviera to the Rhine*.

Charles B. MacDonald, a retired Army Reserve colonel, died 4 December after a long illness. Mr. MacDonald joined the Army's military history section

in 1948 and retired from the Center of Military History in 1980 as deputy chief historian for Southeast Asia. Mr. MacDonald authored or coauthored more than half a dozen books, but is probably best remembered for his military history classic, *Company Commander*, which details his combat experiences as a young captain during the Battle of the Bulge.

Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Announces 1991 Training Schedule

The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation will be offering sixteen training sessions in fifteen cities during 1991. The Council's three-day course, *Introduction to Federal Projects and Historic Preservation Law*, is designed to teach federal, state, local, and tribal officials and consultants the basics of the project review process, usually referred to as "Section 106 Review," that is mandated by Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act. The council co-sponsors the course with the General Services Administration Interagency Training Center. Cost is \$210. Participants will learn exactly what Section 106 review is, when it applies, and what they need to do to carry it successfully to completion.

For further information, contact the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (Ms. Shauna Holmes), The Old Post Office Building, 1100 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, #809, Washington, D.C. 20004, phone (202) 786-0505.

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