



STORMSHIELD



Stormshield Network Security

UTM / NG-Firewall Software Suite

Version 2.2

EAL3+ Security Target

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1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this section is to provide accurate identification and reference information for this document and the product being evaluated, as well as the appropriate statements regarding compliance with the Common Criteria and other applicable baselines. It also provides an overview of the features on the Stormshield appliance.

1.1 Identifying the security target

<u>Title:</u>	Security Target - UTM / NG Firewall Software Suite version 2.2 EAL3+ Security Target
<u>Reference of the ST:</u>	SN_ASE_sectarget_v2
<u>Version of the ST:</u>	2.9a
<u>Target of evaluation:</u>	UTM / NG Firewall Software Suite for Stormshield appliances
<u>Version of the TOE:</u>	2.2.6 (S, M, L, XL)
<u>Security assurance package:</u>	EAL3 augmented with ALC_CMS.4, ALC_CMC.4, ALC_FLR.3 and AVA_VAN.3.

1.2 Statements of compliance

The applicable version of the Common Criteria is version 3.1 revision 4 of July 2009.

The security functions of the target of evaluation are "Strictly Compliant with Part 2 extended of the Common Criteria" with the introduction of the FMT_MTD.BRS component.

The security assurance measures implemented on the target of evaluation are "Strictly Compliant with Part 3 of the Common Criteria".

No statement of compliance for any Protection Profile or any other security requirement package other than the package selected has been made.

The security assurance package selected is an extension of the augmented EAL3 package of the ALC_CMS.4, ALC_CMC.4, ALC_FLR.3 and AVA_VAN.3 components.

This package of assurance requirements includes all the assurance requirements needed in for the standard qualification [QUALIF-STD].

1.3 Summary of the Stormshield appliances features

Stormshield Network Security UTM / NG-Firewalls are appliances that provide security features allowing the interconnection between one or several trusted networks and an **uncontrolled network**, without compromising the level of security of the trusted networks.

The main features of the Stormshield UTM / NG-Firewall Software Suite, which equips these appliances, consist of two main groups:

- the firewall feature grouping: filtering, attack detection, bandwidth management, security policy management, audit, accountability and strong authentication of administrators,
- the VPN (Virtual Private Network: encryption and authentication) feature implementing [ESP] in IPSec tunnel mode and securing the transmission of confidential data between remote sites, partners or mobile salespersons.



ASQ (Active Security Qualification) is a real-time intrusion prevention technology embedded in all Stormshield appliances in the Stormshield Network Security range. Based on a multi-layer analysis, ASQ detects and prevents the most sophisticated attacks without affecting the performance of the Stormshield appliance and considerably lowers the number of false positives. This technology is backed up by alarm features which can be fully customized.

In order to offer strong authentication features for administrators, the Stormshield UTM / NG-Firewall integrates a user database and offers authentication services with it.

Via an intuitive and user-friendly graphical interface, the Stormshield Web Manager administration tool allows installing and configuring Stormshield appliances, and offers simplified monitoring and reporting features.

1.4 Applicable and reference documents

1.4.1 Common Criteria references

- [CC-01] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 - Part 1: Introduction and general model, CCMB-2012-09-001, September 2012.
- [CC-02] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 - Part 2: Security functional components CCMB-2012-09-002, September 2012.
- [CC-03] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 - Part 3: Security assurance components CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012.
- [CEM-02] Common Criteria - Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4 – Evaluation Methodology CCMB-2012-09-004, September 2012.

1.4.2 Reference for the Standard Qualification

- [QUALIF-STD] General Security Baseline
Qualification process of a security product – standard level
Version 1.2.
- [RGS-CRYPTO] General Security Baseline Version 2.0
Appendix B1 Cryptographic mechanisms
Rules and recommendations regarding the choice and size of cryptographic mechanisms
Version 2.03 February 21 2014
- [RGS-GC] General Security Baseline Version 2.0
Appendix B2 Management of cryptographic keys
Rules and recommendations regarding the management of keys used in cryptographic mechanisms
Version 2.00 June 8 2012
- [RGS-AUTH] General Security Baseline
Appendix B3 Authentication
Rules and recommendations regarding authentication mechanisms
Version 1.00 January 13 2010



1.4.3 RFCs and other standards supported

[IP]	P. Almquist, Type of Service in the Internet Protocol Suite, RFC 1349, July 1992.
[ICMP]	Postel, J., Internet Control Message Protocol - DARPA Internet Program Protocol Specification, RFC 792, USC/Information Sciences Institute, September 1981.
[IGMP]	Cain, B., Deering, S., Kouvelas, I., Fenner, B. and A. Thyagarajan, <i>Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 3</i> , RFC 3376, October 2002.
[UDP]	Postel, J., <i>User Datagram Protocol</i> , STD 6, RFC 768, August 1980.
[TCP]	Postel, J., <i>Transmission control protocol</i> , STD 7, RFC 793, September 1981.
[IPSec]	Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, <i>Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol</i> , RFC 2401, November 1998.
[ESP]	Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, <i>IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)</i> , RFC 2406, November 1998.
[ISAKMP]	Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M., and J. Turner, <i>Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)</i> , RFC 2408, November 1998.
[IKEv1]	Harkins, D., and D. Carrel, <i>The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</i> , RFC 2409, November 1998.
[IKE-MODP]	T. Kiniven, M. Kojo; More Modular (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE), RFC 3526, May 2003.
[IKE-XAUTH]	S. Beaulieu and R. Pereira, Extended Authentication within IKE (XAUTH), draft-beaulieu-ike-xauth-02, October 2001
[IKE-MCFG]	D. Dukes and R. Pereira, <i>The ISAKMP Configuration Method</i> , draft-dukes-ike-mode-cfg-02, September 2001
[ISAKMP-HAUTH]	M. Litvin, R. Shamir and T. Zegman, <i>A Hybrid Authentication Mode for IKE</i> , draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-hybrid-auth-05, August 2000
[IKEv2]	Kaufman, Hoffman, Nir, Eronen, Kivinen, Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2), RFC 7427, October 2014.
[FTP]	Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, <i>File Transfer Protocol (FTP)</i> , STD 9, RFC 959, October 1985.
[FTP-security]	Allman, M., Ostermann, S., <i>FTP Security Considerations</i> , RFC 2577, May 1999
[FTP-feature]	Hethmon, P., Elz, R., Feature negotiation mechanism for the File Transfer Protocol, RFC 2389, August 1998
[FTP-IPV6]	Allman, M., Ostermann, S. and C. Metz, <i>FTP Extensions for IPv6 and NATs</i> , RFC 2428, September 1998.
[HTTP]	Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frysyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P. and T. Berners-Lee, <i>Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1</i> , RFC 2616, June 1999.
[WEBDAV]	Goland, Y., Whitehead, E., Faizi, A., Carter, S. and D. Jensen, <i>HTTP Extensions for Distributed Authoring - WEBDAV</i> , RFC 2518, February 1999.
[WEBDAV-extensions]	Clemm, G., Amsden, J., Ellison, T., Kaler, C. and J. Whitehead, <i>Versioning Extensions to WebDAV (Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning)</i> , RFC 3253, March 2002.
[DNS-1]	Mockapetris, P., <i>Domain names - Concepts and Facilities</i> , STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.



[DNS-2]	Mockapetris, P., <i>Domain Names - Implementation and Specification</i> , STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RIP-1]	Hedrick, C., <i>Routing Information Protocol</i> , RFC 1058, Rutgers University, June 1988.
[RIP-2]	Malkin, G., <i>RIP Version 2</i> , STD 56, RFC 2453, November 1998.
[DSCP]	K. Nichols, Differentiated Services Field, RFC 2474, December 1998.
[MGCP]	F. Andreassen and B. Foster, Media Gateway Control Protocol, RFC 3435, January 2003.
[SIP]	<i>Session Initiation Protocol</i> , RFC 3261, June 2002.
[RTP]	RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications, RFC 3550, July 2003.
[RTCP]	Real Time Control Protocol (RTCP) attribute in SDP, RFC 3605, October 2003.
[TLS]	T. Dierks and C. Allen, <i>The TLS Protocol Version 1.0</i> , RFC 2246, January 1999.
[TLS-AES]	P. Chown, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites Transport Layer Security (TLS), RFC 3268, June 2002.
[DH]	Rescorla, <i>Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method</i> , RFC 2631, June 1999.
[RSA]	RSA Laboratories. PKCS #1 v2.1: RSA Encryption Standard. June 2000.
[AES]	NIST, FIPS PUB 197, <i>Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)</i> , November 2001.
[DES]	NIST, FIPS PUB 46-3, <i>Data Encryption Standard (DES)</i> , October 1999.
[Blowfish]	B. Schneier, <i>Fast Software Encryption</i> , Cambridge Security Workshop Proceedings (December 1993), Springer-Verlag 1994, pp. 191-204.
[CAST]	Adams, C., <i>The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm</i> , RFC 2144, May 1997.
[HMAC]	Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, <i>HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication</i> , RFC 2104, February 1997.
[MD5]	Rivest, R., <i>The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm</i> , RFC 1321, April 1992.
[SHA]	NIST, FIPS 180-1, <i>Secure Hash Standard</i> , April 1993.
[SHA2]	NIST, FIPS 180-2, <i>Secure Hash Standard</i> , February 2004.
[SMB2]	MS-SMB2, Server Message Block (SMB) Version 2 Protocol Specification, December 30, 2010
[ITSEC]	<i>Critères d'évaluation de la sécurité des systèmes informatiques</i> Commission des Communautés Européennes, version 1.2, juin 1991.



1.5 Glossary

TOE

Target of Evaluation

ST

Security Target.

IT

Information technology.

EAL

Evaluation Assurance Level.

SFR

Security Functional Requirement.

TSF

TOE Security Functionality

CEM

Common Evaluation Methodology for information technology security

CC

Common Criteria for the evaluation of security.

RGS

General Security Baseline (*Référentiel Général de Sécurité*)

Administrator

Personnel qualified to perform certain administrative security operations and responsible for the proper execution of such operations.

Auditor

Administrator qualified to perform security audit operations and audit log management and responsible for the proper execution of such operations.

Entity

IT agent or human user likely to set up information flows with other entities.

Stormshield appliance

Stormshield Network Security equipment placed at the boundary between the uncontrolled network and one or several trusted networks, dedicated to the implementation of the information flow control policy. This is the device on which the core of the Stormshield software suite's security functions run.

IPSec Security Association (IPSec SA)

One-way connection at the transport level that implements security services on the information flow that it transports. From the point of view of an entity participating in a VPN tunnel, an IPSec SA may be incoming or outgoing. Outgoing SAs are used for encapsulating and protecting outgoing IP datagrams, while incoming SAs are used for decapsulating and monitoring incoming IP datagrams.

Traffic / tunnel endpoints

In the case of a VPN tunnel, traffic endpoints are entities that make up the endpoints of information flows partially passing through the tunnel, as opposed to tunnel endpoints which are devices between which the tunnel was set up. In encrypted ESP in tunnel mode, the confidentiality of IP address of traffic endpoints is protected from attackers who are able to listen on information flows on the network segments where the tunnel has been set up. These attackers will only be able to see the IP addresses of tunnel endpoints.

VPN peer

Remote entity that makes up the other endpoint of the tunnel.

**Local/remote entity**

In the case of a VPN tunnel, local entities are traffic endpoints whose traffic reaches the Stormshield appliance encapsulated in ESP, and which need to be so before being re-sent to the other traffic endpoint via the VPN peer. Remote entities are those whose traffic reaches the Stormshield appliance via the VPN peer and are encapsulated in ESP.

Local console

Terminal physically connected to a Stormshield appliance, used for performing installation or maintenance operations on this appliance's firmware.

Security administration operations

Operations performed on Stormshield appliances, under the responsibility of an **administrator** in the scope of the internal security policy of the organization using trusted networks. These operations may be governed by the internal security policy (e.g. audit revenues) or by the need to maintain the TOE in nominal operating conditions (e.g. modification of the configuration of the information flow control function, audit log purge, shutdown/restart of the appliance). Typically, their purpose is to modify the behavior of the TOE's security functions.

Filter policy

Set of technical rules describing which entities are entitled to set up information flows with which entities. This arises from the concatenation of **implicit rules**, the **global filter policy**, and the **local filter policy**.

Global filter policy

Set of technical rules describing which entities are entitled to set up information flows with which entities. This set is defined by an administrator with the objective of coherence in the **filter policy** for a set of Stormshield appliances.

Local filter policy

Set of technical rules describing which entities are entitled to set up information flows with which entities. This set is defined by an administrator with the aim of adjusting the **global filter policy** according to specific needs for a Stormshield appliance.

Implicit rule

Set of rules automatically generated by the Stormshield appliance in order to ensure the proper running of services that an administrator has configured and started.

Encryption policy

Set of technical rules describing the encryption processes to apply to certain types of information flows for the purpose of protecting their confidentiality and integrity.

Information flow control policy

Set of technical rules comprising the filter policy and the encryption policy.

Pseudo-connection

- 1^o) Set of UDP datagrams associated with the same application exchange
- 2) Set of ICMP messages associated with a request/response exchange in the context of use of this protocol (e.g.: 'echo request' / 'echo reply').

Trusted network

A network is considered trusted if, due to the fact that it is under the control of the TOE operator, the internal security policy does not imply that there is a need to be protected from information flows originating from it, but on the contrary, implies that there is a need to protect information flows going to it.

Uncontrolled network

A network is considered uncontrolled if it is not under the control of the TOE operator, meaning that users need to be protected from information flows set up with devices from this network (the internet, for example).

Remote administration workstation

Workstation connected to a trusted or uncontrolled network, dedicated to administration operations relating to the security of one or several Stormshield appliances through secure administration sessions.



Super-administrator

Administrator possessing full privileges over the configuration of Stormshield appliances, the only person allowed to log on using the local console, to define the profiles of other administrators, and who must accomplish this task only outside operating phases (i.e. installation or maintenance).

User

Person using IT resources on trusted networks protected by the TOE from other trusted networks or from the uncontrolled network.

IPSec User

VPN peer using a mobile client with an authentication method that is HybridAuth+XAuth.

Data table

Set of tables containing data (interfaces, etc) needed for the proper operation of the TOE. The Stormshield appliance automatically fills in these tables when it runs normally.

Incoming IP packet

Incoming IP packet that needs to be compared against the **filter policy**. As a result, this refers to an IP packet that does not belong to a connection or **pseudo-connection** detected and allowed earlier.

Knowledge base

Set of control points, defined by **TOE** version, allowing the proper operation of the **intrusion prevention function**.

Active Update

Service enabling the automatic and regular update of the signature bases of various modules using such bases in order to optimize their effectiveness. This includes in particular IPS and NVM (Seismo), Antivirus, Antispam, URL filter signatures, etc.

2 DESCRIPTION OF THE TARGET OF EVALUATION

The aim of this section is to expand on the concepts that will be used later in presenting the security issues addressed by the TOE, the security objectives and security requirements of the TOE. It will also serve to specify the scope and limits of the evaluation.

2.1 IT security characteristics of the TOE

2.1.1 Overview

The process of securing the interconnection between trusted networks belonging to an organization and an **uncontrolled network** requires the organization's ISS manager to define an **internal security policy**, summarizing or referencing the "laws, regulations and practices that govern how assets, especially sensitive information, are managed, protected and shared" in the organization [ITSEC].

The internal security policy may impose technical requirements on the network and restrictions on physical, personnel-related or organizational measures in its operating environment. The **Stormshield UTM / NG-Firewall Software Suite**, in the context of the evaluation, aims to meet the technical requirements of information flow control through advanced filter functions and VPN encryption features.




Illustration 1: Example of use of the TOE.



In the network infrastructure example shown above, Stormshield appliances are deployed to the boundary between a **trusted network** and an **uncontrolled network**. They protect workstations and the servers connected to the trusted networks, by controlling information flows that passes through this boundary.

They also implement VPN tunnels on the uncontrolled portion of the network where such information flows are transmitted, between both appliances as well as between an appliance and a mobile workstation equipped with a VPN client connected to the uncontrolled network.

Remote administration workstations can log on to the uncontrolled network or to a trusted network.

2.1.2 Information flow control

The above set of requirements is the reason that UTM products exist. The internal security policy must enable one to deduce:

- which **entities (users or IT agents)** are entitled to set up information flows with which other entities, in what is called the **filter policy**.
- from among the streams of authorized information flows, which ones require the protection of confidentiality and integrity, and the nature of such protection (protocols and encryption algorithms), in what is called the **encryption policy**.

Depending on each case, the rules of this **encryption and filter policy**, also known as the **information flow control policy**, can be expressed in more or less sophisticated criteria: source and destination IP addresses, number of the IP protocol used, source/destination TCP/UDP port.

The Stormshield UTM / NG-Firewall Software Suite provides the following **filter features**:

- Filtering of traffic between appliances (*stateful inspection*) based on characteristics at the IP and transport level: IP protocol number, source and destination IP addresses, source and destination TCP/UDP ports.
- Traceability of information flows to entities that initiated it through the generation of audit data.

The **encryption functions** are the ones provided in standard by ESP in IPsec tunnel mode [ESP, IPsec] associated with the protocol for negotiating security settings and IKE session keys ([IKEv1, ISAKMP] or [IKEv2]):

- Confidentiality of the contents of information flows;
- Anonymity of traffic endpoint devices;
- Integrity of traffic contents: integrity of packets, protection against replay, authentication of the sender of the encrypted packet;
- Mutual authentication of tunnel endpoints (i.e. the portion of information flows on which encryption has been applied).

The interoperability of the VPN module of Stormshield UTM / NG-Firewall Software Suite allows interconnecting disparate IPsec encryption systems.

Both of these large functional sets are completed by **alarm features** that the administrator can define based on all the security events that the firewall is likely to detect (events relating to filtering and encryption, or raised by the ASQ engine (cf. §2.1.3), low-level system events (shutdown/startup of the appliance, hardware errors, etc.)).



2.1.3 Protection against attacks coming from Internet

Monitoring information flows between several trusted networks and the uncontrolled network makes it possible to deny obvious attempts to set up illicit information flows with respect to the information flow control policy.

However, even within the limits of an information flow control policy adapted to the network and correctly implemented in firewall, there remains the following possibilities for attackers that have access to the uncontrolled network:

- Bypassing the information flow control policy implemented by the firewall,
- And/or “attacking” devices in the trusted networks by taking advantage of particularities and errors in the design and implementation of the network protocols (IP, TCP, UDP, application protocols).

The effects of such attacks may include:

- An intrusion, meaning unauthorized access to a service, or to functions in an appliance's operating system;
- Blocking or restarting an appliance, causing a denial of service;
- Flooding of network equipment, causing a denial of service;
- Divulgence of the topology and/or technical details of equipment on the trusted network with the aim of obtaining additional unauthorized access from the first successful intrusion.

To counter this risk, the Stormshield UTM / NG-Firewall Software Suite offers an **intrusion prevention function**, based on **ASQ technology**. This technology includes a dynamic scan at the IP, transport and application levels, with rule optimization allowing the swift and secure application of information flow control policy. It enables:

- The detection of attacks without connection contexts, for example:
 - IP spoofing by mapping the source IP address to the interface on which packets are received,
 - Counterfeit packets such as ‘xmas tree’ (all TCP options enabled) or ‘land’ (the source and destination addresses are identical) which aim to cause breakdowns on the target appliances,
 - Fragment overlaps with the purpose of causing breakdowns on target appliances or bypassing the information flow control policy,
 - Buffer overflow attempts at the application level;
- The detection of attacks with a connection context, such as:
 - The use of incorrect or exceeded TCP sequence numbers,
 - Brute force attacks on FTP passwords;
- The detection of global attacks requiring the characteristics of many distinct streams of information flows to be cross-referenced, for example:
 - Flooding of resources on servers, by sending an excessive amount of requests to open unacknowledged TCP connections (*SYN flooding*),
 - Attempts to probe the internal topology of trusted networks with nmap or queso utilities.

Appendix B, §8 contains an exhaustive list of attacks currently handled by the ASQ filter engine.



2.1.4 Risks of improper use

The definition of a **flow control policy**, as well as the operation of an appliance (audits, reactions to alarms, etc.) are generally complex tasks requiring specific skills and presenting risks of errors.

These risks make it preferable to separate administrative roles in order to guarantee that only persons who are qualified to carry out certain operations are those specifically qualified and trained to do so. This is why Stormshield UTM / NG-Firewall Software Suite **controls access to administrative security operations** based on privileges defined through administrator profiles. The definition of profiles is the duty of a special administrator – the “super-administrator” – who acts only during installation and maintenance phases, and is the only person authorized to connect to the local console.

A **configuration backup and restoration function** reduces the risk of errors by making it possible to keep configuration templates that address well-defined issues, and to backtrack in the event of an error.

The **quality of documentation** concerning operation and the **ease of use** of interfaces also have an impact on this type of risk.

2.1.5 Protection of the TOE itself

Assuming that the security functions of the TOE are effective in implementing the network security policy and countering attacks, and are correctly configured, the only solution for beating an attack is to modify the behavior of the TOE:

- Either by disabling the security functions or by modifying their configuration, through a local or remote attack exploiting vulnerabilities that may allow bypassing the function that monitors access to administration operations, without the need for special privileges;
- Or by obtaining legitimate **administrator** access (by colluding with an **administrator**, by guessing his password, etc.).

To counter this risk, measures have to be taken for the physical and logical security of Stormshield appliances as well as remote administration workstations (premises with controlled access, prohibition from using a local console during production, etc.). The function to monitor access to administrative operations mentioned in §2.1.4 is supported by **administrators' strong authentication mechanisms based on: mutual authentication by X.509 certificate (TLS) or login/password authentication (TLS)**. Moreover, since remote administration can be done from an uncontrolled network, the Stormshield UTM / NG-Firewall Software Suite provides a **function that protects the confidentiality and integrity of administration sessions** based on cryptographic encryption operations. These functions make up a distinct set of IPsec encryption functions and are therefore provided in all cases.

2.2 Perimeter of the TOE:

2.2.1 Logical limits of the TOE

The evaluation covers the **Stormshield UTM / NG-Firewall Software Suite** which consists of:

- the **Stormshield Firmware** embedded on Stormshield appliances,
This firmware applies the filter and encryption policy defined by the administrator,
It includes a FreeBSD kernel adapted and refined by Stormshield, and exists in four different builds (S, M, L and XL), each build corresponding to a hardware platform type,
- the **Stormshield Web Manager** administration tool, a graphical interface that allows:
 - administering and configuring Stormshield appliances,
 - supervising and monitoring one or several appliances,
 - analyzing logs and reporting.




Illustration 2: Logical limits of the TOE

The following are outside the scope of the evaluation:

- the hardware section of appliances, administration workstations and mobile workstations.
- the VPN client software used on the mobile workstation,

2.2.2 Architecture and interfaces of the TOE

A TOE in operation is a product distributed over several Stormshield appliances, and one or several remote administration workstations. The figure below illustrates the interfaces existing between these components as well as with other IT entities outside the TOE and users.




Illustration 3: Components and interfaces of the TOE.

2.2.3 Physical interfaces

The physical interfaces of the TOE are made up, according to platforms, of the following components:

- RJ45 connectors;
- RS-232 serial interface;
- VGA port;
- PS2 mini-din port;
- USB port.
- SD-Card drive



2.3 Evaluation environment

2.3.1 Configurations and usage modes subject to the evaluation

The usage mode subject to evaluation has the following characteristics:

- The evaluation covers the Stormshield UTM / NG-Firewall Software Suite installed on all versions of Stormshield appliances, from the SN200 to SN6000 range, the suite existing in 4 distinct compilations (S, M, L and XL build) according to the appliance's position in the range. Certain models (S build: SN200 to SN300) do not have large local log storage capacities and have to send events via syslog.
- Stormshield appliances have to be stored in a location with secured access. Such measures, as well as organizational procedures for the operating environment, have to guarantee that the only physical access to the Stormshield appliances take place under the surveillance of the **super-administrator**.
- The local console is not used in production. Only the super-administrator can log on to it, and hypothetically, such interventions are performed only when a decision has been made to make an exception to the operating context – to conduct a maintenance operation or a re-installation.
- Workstations on which the Stormshield Web Manager will be launched are secured, dedicated to such use, and up to date on all patches concerning the respective operating systems and the applications installed on them.
- All administrators are subject to an identification/authentication stage provided by the TOE and which may use: login/password authentication in a TLS channel or mutual authentication by X.509 certificate in a TLS channel.
- Certificates and CRLs are distributed manually (importing).
- The VPN client software is not part of the evaluation; besides, users can use an IPSec client of their choice. However, these client workstations have to be secured as rigorously as remote administration workstations.
- When log events are sent via syslog, the server that receives them is not part of the evaluation.
- The usage mode subject to evaluation excludes the fact that the TOE relies on services other than PKI, DNS and DHCP servers and proxies. The optional modules provided by Stormshield to manage these services are disabled by default and have to stay that way¹. Specifically, these are:
 - modules that allow handling external servers (e.g.: Kerberos, RADIUS, etc),
 - the dynamic routing module,
 - the internal public key infrastructure (PKI),
 - the SSL VPN module (Portal and Tunnel),
 - DNS cache,
 - antivirus engine (ClamAV or Kaspersky),
 - Active Update module,
 - SSH, DHCP, MPD and SNMPD servers,
 - the DHCP client and NTP daemon,
 - the DHCP relay,
 - the HTTP proxy cache.
- Even though it is supported, the IPv6 routing feature is disabled by default and has to stay that way throughout the duration of the evaluation.

¹Administration and monitoring tools provide a way of checking at any moment during operation, that this is indeed the case



- Administrators and IPsec users are managed by an LDAP base included in the Stormshield UTM / NG-Firewall firmware and which is part of the TOE. The usage mode subject to evaluation excludes the fact that LDAP clients outside the Stormshield appliance can log on to this base.
- Audit logs – depending on the model – are either stored locally or sent by Syslog. In the latter case, the encryption of Syslog messages is not a security function subject to evaluation.
- ASQ technology implements contextual analyses at the application level, with the purpose of verifying compliance with the RFCs and countering attacks at the application level. Application analysis functions that are the focus of the evaluation are those associated with FTP, HTTP (including WEBDAV extensions), SIP, SMTP and DNS.
- The ability provided by the filter policy to associate each filter rule with an application inspection (HTTP, SMTP, POP3 and FTP proxies) and a schedule falls outside the scope of this evaluation and must not be used.
- The ability provided by the filter policy to associate the “decrypt” action (SSL proxy) with a filter rule falls outside the scope of this evaluation and must not be used.
- The following features may be used, but are not considered security functions:
 - address translation (network address translation or NAT).
 - the vulnerability management module;
 - the high availability module;
 - the feature for viewing embedded reports;
 - the use of “Config Mode” options [IKE-MCFG] by VPN clients for the IPsec section in IKEv1 mode.
- The cryptographic algorithms implemented are those in the default configuration:
 - Authentication/Integrity: 256-bit SHA-2
 - Key negotiation: Diffie-Hellman group 14
 - Encryption: 256-bit AES in CBC mode
 - PFS (Perfect Forward Secrecy): activated
- On SN200 to SN900 models, which typically have non-Intel processors, the use of a built-in cryptographic coprocessor is disabled.

2.3.2 Test platform used during the evaluation




Illustration 4: Test platform used during the evaluation.

The Stormshield appliances under evaluation are the following models:

- SN200, SN300, U30S and U70S (entry-level),
- SN500, SN510, SN700, SN710, SN900, SN910, U150S, U250S and U500S (mid-range),
- SN2000, SN3000 and SN6000 (high-end).

The operating system of the remote administration workstation is a Professional edition 32-bit Microsoft Windows Seven with all the latest patches published by Microsoft.

The web browser used for Stormshield Web Manager is Microsoft Internet Explorer version 9 with all the latest patches published by Microsoft.

The software on workstations and servers comprises representative mass market products (e.g. browsers, mail clients, web servers) and applications that have been specifically developed for the purpose of compliance or penetration testing (scripts, attack programs, etc). The mobile client workstation is also equipped with the Stormshield Network Security VPN client (not subject to evaluation).

Laptops equipped with “probe” programs are used for listening on information flows in order to gauge the compliance of the Stormshield appliance’s behavior at the network interface level, and for conducting penetration testing by counterfeiting packets. They may be connected at various points on the network.



2.3.3 Minimum characteristics of operating platforms

The **Stormshield Firmware** uses the following “open-source” components with updated patches under evaluation conditions:

- FreeBSD in version 9.3
- Ipsec-tools in version 0.8.0
- Strongswan in version 5.2.2
- OpenLDAP in version 2.4.35
- OpenSSL in version 1.0.1t
- Launched in version 106.3
- Libevent in version 2.0.22

For the remote administration workstation hosting Stormshield Web Manager

- CPU with a minimum of 2 GHz;
- 1 GB of RAM;
- 100 or 1000 Mbps Ethernet network card;
- Microsoft Internet Explorer 9 or higher or Mozilla Firefox 28 or higher.



3 SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE TARGET OF EVALUATION

The purpose of this section is to describe the security issue that the TOE must address in the form of a set of threats that the TOE must counter and rules of the security policy that the TOE must satisfy. This specification is made subject to assumptions on the security characteristics of the environment in which the TOE is expected to be used as well as on its expected usage mode.

3.1 Typographical convention

For a better understanding of the following paragraphs, we will explain the typographical conventions used for naming assumptions, threats, policies and objectives:

- Assumptions on the security environment of the TOE have names beginning with the following prefixes:
 - AH. Prefix for Assumptions relating to **H**uman agents,
 - AP. Prefix for Assumptions relating to **P**hysical measures,
 - AO. Prefix for Assumptions relating to **O**rganizational security measures,
 - AIT. Prefix for Assumptions relating to the **I**T security environment.
- Threats on the security environment of the TOE or the security of the TOE itself have names beginning with the prefix **T**.
- The organization's security Policies have names beginning with the prefix **P**.

3.2 Identification of sensitive assets

3.2.1 Assets protected by the TOE

The Stormshield UTM / NG-Firewall contributes to the protection of the following sensitive assets, subject to a proper and feasible definition of the information flow control policy to be implemented globally in the information system (cf. AO.GOOD_PCFI):

- Application services offered by servers of trusted networks (confidentiality, integrity and availability);
- Programs launched on devices in trusted networks (servers, browsers, etc.), and the configuration of such programs (integrity and confidentiality);
- The contents of information flows passing through the uncontrolled network, for which the implementation of the VPN is possible (confidentiality and integrity);
- Information about the network's topology (confidentiality), against probe attempts based on the use of internet protocols contrary to best practices.

3.2.2 Assets belonging to the TOE

With the aim of protecting these external sensitive assets, the various components of the Stormshield UTM / NG-Firewall Software Suite also protect their own confidentiality and integrity security settings during exchanges between each other (administration sessions).

Furthermore, sensitive assets of the TOE comprise data relating to the security functions of the TOE (TSF-Data).



TSF-Data is made up of:

- configuration settings of the TOE,
- data control policies implemented by the TOE,
- contexts of use,
- records of events of the TOE,
- authentication data of IPSec administrators and users.

3.3 Threats and rules of the security policy

The threats and rules of the security policy follow the plan taken for the description of the TOE's IT security characteristics.

The various threat agents are:

- internal attackers: entities belonging to the trusted network
- external attackers: entities not belonging to the trusted network

Administrators are not considered hackers.

3.3.1 Information flow control

P.FILTERING

The TOE must apply the **filter policy** defined by the **administrator**. This policy is expressed in terms of authorization or rejection of information flows according to their characteristics at the IP level (source and destination address, type of IP protocol) and transport (source and destination TCP or UDP port).

P.VPN

The TOE must apply the encryption policy defined by the administrator. This policy is expressed in terms of:

1. the application of the encryption function on information flows according to their characteristics at the IP level (source and destination address, type of IP protocol),
2. conditions under which IPSec sessions are established (pre-shared key or certificate, expected identity of the VPN peer),
3. ESP parameters used (authentication and encryption algorithms of frames and length of associated keys).

P.AUDIT_ALARM

The TOE must:

1. Generate filter (including information flows and denials) and encryption events that the administrator has deemed sensitive and for appliances that are able to record events, it must provide the means to attribute them later in an audit to the entities that initiated them;
2. Raise security alarms for filter, encryption, contextual analysis events (cf. P.ANALYSIS) or events relating to the activity of Stormshield appliance firmware, specified as such by the administrator.

P.CRYPTO

Key management and the cryptographic and authentication mechanisms used in the TOE have to comply with the ANSSI baseline ([RGS_CRYPTO], [RGS_CLES] and [RGS_AUTH]) with regard to the standard resistance level,



3.3.2 Protection against Internet attacks

P.ANALYSIS

The TOE must analyze information flows passing through Stormshield appliances, detect and destroy it where necessary without forwarding the following types of information flows, which may be potentially dangerous for the receiving entity:

1. Information flows that may expose the network topology (e.g.: route recording option),
2. Information flows valid in respect to Internet protocols but which are incompatible with certain best practices (e.g.: ICMP redirect),
3. Information flows that may cause software issues on destination appliances,
4. Information flows that may flood communication and processing capacities on destination appliances.

T.IP_SPOOFING

An unauthorized entity on the uncontrolled network bypasses information flow control policies by counterfeiting the source IP address of packets that it sends in order to usurp the identity of an entity on the authorized network.

3.3.3 Risks of improper use

T.IMPROPER_USE

The security functions of the TOE do not behave in harmony with the internal security policy (cf. 2.1.1), due to the fact that an administrator does not correctly exercise the responsibilities associated with his role, either by incorrectly configuring the TOE or by acting in a manner that is contrary to his responsibilities or to proper usage. This would allow a hacker to exploit a vulnerability or poor configuration in order to access assets protected by the TOE on the trusted network.

P.BACKUP_RESTORATION

The TOE must provide a way to back up its configuration, and to restore it later for the purpose of easing the administrator's job.

3.3.4 Protection of the TOE itself

T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN

An entity belonging or not to the trusted network manages to perform illegal administration operations by bypassing the information flow policies, usage contexts, authentication data of administrators as well as the configuration settings of the TOE.

T.ADMIN_USURP

An entity belonging or not to the trusted network manages to establish an administration session on a Stormshield appliance by usurping the identity of an administrator after repeated random attempts, or by analyzing intercepted authentication sequences. Threatened assets affect administrators' authentication data.

T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN_SESSION

An entity belonging or not to the trusted network reads, modifies or deletes the contents of an administration session set up between a Stormshield appliance and a remote administration workstation using an administrator account. The assets threatened are information flow control policies and usage contexts.

Note: T.ADMIN_USURP and T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN_SESSION are requirements (non-exhaustive) that allow the threat T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN to be carried out.



T.AUDIT_LOSS

An entity belonging or not to the trusted network prevents security events from being generated by depleting the TOE's storage or sending capacity for these events, with the purpose of masking a hacker's illegal actions.

3.4 Assumptions

3.4.1 Assumptions on physical security measures

AP.PROTECT_APPLIANCES

Stormshield appliances are installed and stored according to the state of the art regarding sensitive security devices: premises with protected access, shielded twisted pair cables, labeling of cables, etc.

3.4.2 Assumptions on organizational security measures

AO.SUPER_ADMIN

A particular administrator role, the super-administrator, displays the following characteristics:

1. The super-administrator is the only administrator allowed to log on via the local console on Stormshield appliances, and only during the installation of the TOE or for maintenance operations, and not during production;
2. He is in charge of defining the profiles of other administrators;
3. All access to the premises in which Stormshield appliances are stored must be under his watch, whether the cause for such access is an intervention on the appliances or on other equipment. All interventions on Stormshield appliances shall be conducted under his responsibility.

AO.PASSWORD

The passwords of IPSec administrators and users must be chosen in a way that delays attacks aiming to crack them, via a password creation and/or control policy (e.g.: mix of alphanumeric characters, minimum length, inclusion of special characters, no dictionary words, etc).

Administrators have been made aware of these best practices in exercising their function and it is their responsibility to create awareness in IPSec users.

AO.GOOD_PCFI

The information flow control policies to be implemented, for all appliances on the trusted networks to be protected, are defined as such:

1. full: standard usage scenarios have all been considered during the definition of rules and their authorized limits have been defined,
2. strict: only the necessary usage scenarios have been authorized,
3. correct: rules do not contradict each other,
4. unambiguous: the list of rules provides all the relevant elements for the direct configuration of the TOE by a qualified administrator.

AO.CRYPTO_EXT

Cryptographic keys that were generated outside the TOE and injected into it must be generated according to the recommendations in the ANSSI's baseline ([RGS-CRYPTO] and [RGS-GC]) with regard to the standard resistance level,



3.4.3 Assumptions relating to human agents

AH.PERSONNEL

Administrators are non-hostile, competent persons with the necessary means for accomplishing their tasks. They have been trained to launch operations for which they are responsible. In particular, their skills and organization imply that:

1. Different administrators with the same privileges do not perform contradictory administrative actions (e.g. inconsistent modifications to the information flow control policy);
2. Logs are used and alarms are processed within the appropriate time frames.

3.4.4 Assumption on the IT security environment

AIT.INTERPOSITION

Stormshield appliances are installed in compliance with the current network interconnection policy and are the only passage points between the various networks on which the information flow control policy has to be applied. They are sized according to the capacities of adjacent devices or these devices limit the number of packets per second, set slightly below the maximum processing capacities of each Stormshield appliance installed in the network architecture.

AIT.STRICT_USAGE

Besides the application of security functions, Stormshield appliances do not provide any network service other than routing and address translation (e.g.: no DHCP, DNS, PKI, application proxies, etc.). Stormshield appliances are not configured to forward IPX, Netbios, AppleTalk, PPPoE or IPv6 information flows.

AIT.AUTONOMOUS

The TOE does not depend on external "online" services (DNS, DHCP, RADIUS, etc.) to apply the information flow control policy.

AIT.PROTECT_WORKSTATIONS

Remote administration workstations are secured and kept up to date on all known vulnerabilities affecting operating systems and hosted applications. They are installed in premises with protected access and are dedicated exclusively to the administration of the TOE and the storage of backups.

AIT.PROTECT_VPN_PEER

Network appliances with which the TOE sets up VPN tunnels are subject to restrictions regarding physical access control, protection and control over their configuration, equivalent to the restrictions placed on Stormshield appliances in the TOE.

AIT.PROTECT_VPN_CLIENTS

Workstations on which the VPN clients of authorized users are launched are subject to restrictions regarding physical access control, protection and control over their configuration, equivalent to the restrictions placed on workstations in trusted networks. They are secured and kept up to date on all known vulnerabilities affecting operating systems and hosted applications.



4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES

The aim of this section is to concisely present the expected response to the security issue, in the form of security objectives. Security objectives are normally classified as security objectives for the TOE and as security objectives for the environment. The rationale for security objectives must show that the security objectives for the TOE and for the environment are linked to the identified threats that need to be countered or to the rules of the security policy and assumptions that need to be satisfied by each objective.

4.1 Typographical convention

For a better understanding of the following paragraphs, we will explain the typographical conventions used for objectives:

- Security **O**bjectives for the TOE have names beginning with the prefix **O**.
- Security **O**bjectives for the **E**nvironment of the TOE have names beginning with the **OE**.

4.2 Overview

The presentation of security objectives for the TOE follows the plan for the description of the TOE's IT security characteristics and the threats and rules of the security policy.

The rationale for each security objective of the TOE is provided immediately after the description of the objective, instead of in a separate section. A table summarizing this rationale is provided at the end of this section.

With regard to security objectives O.PCAOA, O.PCAOA_I&A_ADMIN and O.RESIST_AUTH_ADMIN, it is important to note that the control policy for access to security administration operations contributes to both:

- The prevention of improper use, by allowing the separation of administration tasks adapted to the responsibility and skills of each administrator to be implemented, governed by the restrictions of the organization using the trusted networks,
- The protection of the TOE itself, since it prevents illegal administration operations.

As such, these three objectives cover the issues described in §4.5 as well as §4.6.

All of the assumptions mentioned in the description of the TOE's security environment must be considered components of the security objectives for the environment. When security objectives for the environment comprising the assumptions specifically support security objectives of the TOE, these assumptions are directly indicated in the rationale for the security objectives of the TOE concerned. When security objectives for the environment directly counter threats, or when their support is generalized, this will be presented at the end of this section (§4.7).

4.3 Information flow control objectives

O.PCFI_FILTERING

The TOE must provide information flow control between the networks connected to it, by filtering information flows according to the rules configured by the **administrators** based on the following characteristics:

- The source interface of the information flow,
- The destination interface of the information flow,
- Machines at the traffic endpoints,
- Type of IP protocol,



- For ICMP: type of message,
- For TCP and UDP: type of service,
- Type of DSCP service.

Rationale: O.PCFI_FILTERING is mainly dedicated to the satisfaction of the P.FILTERING policy.

O.PCFI_APPLICATION_CONTEXT

The TOE must maintain tracking contexts of application sessions for which “child” connections are necessary, and must allow opening child connections relating to these sessions only when the context requires it.

Note: The most common case of a “child connection” is in FTP data connections, whose characteristics (destination port) cannot be known in advance and is the result of the contents of the command session.

Rationale: O.PCFI_APPLICATION_CONTEXT supports O.PCFI_FILTERING in order to cover the P.FILTERING policy. During an applicative session, the characteristics of child connections result from the product of the session’s contents. If there is no tracking on these contents, in case of doubt, the filter policy should authorize all the possible variations of these characteristics so that the application protocols considered may function. This objective therefore allows applying the most restrictive filter policy possible.

O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION

The TOE must provide VPN services on information flows exchanged with certain remote devices in order to ensure the mutual authentication of endpoints, as well as the confidentiality and integrity of such information flows.

Rationale: O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION is mainly dedicated to the satisfaction of the P.VPN policy.

In order to effectively support this objective, potential hackers have to be deterred from accessing the VPN session keys for the purpose of violating the P.VPN policy for this encrypted information flow (by decrypting it thereafter, or modifying it, replaying it or inserting data into it). This protection is ensured:

- On the TOE side, by AP.PROTECT_APPLIANCES which prevents physical access to appliances,
- On the VPN peer side by AIT.PROTECT_VPN_PEER and AIT.PROTECT_VPN_CLIENTS, depending on whether the VPN clients are static network devices or mobile clients.

The application of an encryption policy is the most effective way to counter IP address spoofing (T.IP_SPOOFING), by imposing strong authentication on entities at information flow endpoints. Cf. O.IPS_ATTACK_DETECTION for cases in which the setup of an encryption policy is not feasible for countering this threat.

O.LAA_PCFI²

The TOE must:

- Log events relating to the application of the information flow control policy (filtering and encryption),
- Allow auditing logs of these events, and
- Raise alarms to the administrator when events that have been specified by the administrator as critical have been detected.

Rationale: O.LAA_PCFI is mainly dedicated to the satisfaction of the policy P.AUDIT_ALARM. It covers the aspect “recording of filter and encryption events deemed sensitive by the administrator” (P.AUDIT_ALARM.1).

² ‘LAA’ = logging, audit and alarms.



O.CRYPTO

The TOE must implement cryptographic functions and manage cryptographic keys in compliance with the requirements for the standard level of robustness in the ANSSI's cryptographic baselines [RGS_CRYPT0], [RGS_CLES] and [RGS_AUTH].

Rationale: O. CRYPT0 is mainly dedicated to the satisfaction of the P.CRYPTO policy. By covering the requirement of compliance with the RGS, it also contributes to the safe implementation of the P.VPN encryption policy and countering the T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN threat.

4.4 Objectives of protection against Internet attacks

O.IPS_ATTACK_DETECTION

The TOE must be able to analyze packets associated with information flows as well as the application requests/commands/responses included in this information flow, in order to detect and *block attacks on devices in trusted networks*.

Rationale: O.IPS_ATTACK_DETECTION is mainly dedicated to the satisfaction of the policy P.ANALYSIS. The detection of attacks covers in particular the correlation between the IP addresses of incoming packets and the interface on which they are presented, thereby making it possible to counter IP address spoofing attempts (T.IP_SPOOFING) conducted with addresses not included in the range associated with the receiving interface.

Note: All information flows allowed to pass through the TOE are analyzed, even those whose destination is the TOE. This is a particular case and is not the reason for O.IPS_ATTACK_DETECTION.

O.IPS_RFC_COMPLIANCE

The TOE must be able to analyze packets associated with information flows as well as the application requests/commands/responses included in this information flow, in order to detect and block packets and application information flows that do not comply with the RFCs.

Rationale: O.IPS_RFC_COMPLIANCE is dedicated to the satisfaction of the policy P.ANALYSIS, particularly to prevent contraventions of best practices (P.ANALYSIS.2).

O.LAA_IPS

The TOE must:

- Log events relating to the detection of potential intrusions,
- Allow auditing logs of these events, and
- Raise alarms to the administrator when events that have been specified by the administrator as critical have been detected.

Rationale: O.LAA_IPS is mainly dedicated to the satisfaction of the policy PAUDIT_ALARM. It covers the aspects of this policy specifically associated with the recognition of potential intrusions. This objective supports O.IPS_ATTACK_DETECTION and O.IPS_RFC_COMPLIANCE by providing a way to consequently control the effectiveness of the intrusion prevention function's configuration, and to recognize possible false positives for what they are.



4.5 Improper use prevention objectives

O.PCAOA

The TOE must monitor administrators' access to security administration operations according to their individual privileges associated with various administration tasks.

Rationale: O.PCAOA is dedicated to:

- *The prevention of T.IMPROPER_USE, since it allows implementing the separation of tasks adapted to each administrator's responsibility and skills,*
- *The prevention of illegal administration operations (T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN), since it allows preventing certain illegal administration operations (for which access control is technically feasible, cf. O.LAA_PCAOA).*

O.PCAOA_I&A_ADMIN

The TOE must require administrators to be identified and authenticated before granting them access to the security administration function.

Rationale: O.PCAOA_I&A_ADMIN provides a way to base the access control specified by O.PCAOA and the accountability specified by O.LAA_PCAOA on the identity of administrators, in order to counter T.IMPROPER_USE and T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN.

O.LAA_PCAOA

The TOE must: log events relating to security administration operations performed by each authorized administrator,

- allow auditing and attributing logs of these events, and
- log and raise alarms to the administrator when events that have been specified by the administrator as critical have been detected, in particular attempts to open unauthorized administration sessions.

Rationale: In many operating contexts, it is not preferable or technically possible to prevent administrators from performing certain security administration operations, but rather to train them and foster a sense of responsibility with regard to the effects of these operations, while ensuring consequently that they perform them sensibly. This is the context in which O.LAA_PCAOA, with the support of AH.PERSONNEL, completes O.PCAOA when the prevention of T.IMPROPER_USE and T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN cannot be carried out by controlling technical access to security administration operations.

O.BACKUP_RESTITUTION

The TOE must provide means to back up the current configuration of its security functions, and to restore it subsequently.

Rationale: O.BACKUP_RESTITUTION contributes to the prevention of improper use (T.IMPROPER_USE) by making it possible to keep and restore configuration templates that have been validated with regard to well-defined security issues, and to backtrack in the event of an error. This objective is dedicated to the satisfaction of the policy P.BACKUP_RESTITUTION.



4.6 Protection objectives of the TOE

O.RESIST_AUTH_ADMIN

The TOE must provide authentication mechanisms that prevent the reuse of data originating from the authentication of administrators that have been authorized to log on remotely and/or the counterfeiting of authentication data allowing a hacker to spoof the identity of an authorized administrator.

Rationale: O.RESIST_AUTH_ADMIN is dedicated to the prevention of the threat T.ADMIN_USURP, which is a possible requirement for the execution of T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN.

O.PROTECT_LOGS

The TOE able to locally store logs must be able to implement file rotation functions for security event log files, shut down the logging of such events or fully block information flows when potential file saturation arises.

Rationale: O.PROTECT_LOGS is dedicated to the prevention of the threat T.AUDIT_LOSS. It supports the objectives O.LAA_PCFI, O.LAA_IPS and O.LAA_PCAOA to counter violations of the P.AUDIT_ALARM policy and to counter the threats T.IMPROPER_USE and T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN.

O.PROTECT_ADMIN_SESSIONS

The TOE must provide mechanisms that allow protecting the contents of remote administration sessions from hackers' attempts to view, alter or delete data.

Rationale: O.PROTECT_ADMIN_SESSIONS is dedicated to the prevention of the threat T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN_SESSION, which is a possible requirement for the execution of T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN.

4.7 Security objectives for the environment

OE.PROTECT_APPLIANCES

Objective making it possible to ensure the reality of the assumption AP.PROTECT_APPLIANCES.

Rationale: This security objective is dedicated to the prevention of the physical aspect of T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN. It eliminates the possibilities of performing illegal security administration operations from local access to Stormshield appliances in the absence of the super-administrator.

OE.SUPER_ADMIN

Objective making it possible to ensure the reality of the assumption AO.SUPER_ADMIN.

Rationale:

- 1. The result of centralizing the ability to carry out the installation or maintenance of Stormshield appliances in the power of the super-administrator (AO.SUPER_ADMIN.1) is the guarantee of the overall proper operation of the TOE's security functions. AO.SUPER_ADMIN.1 therefore supports all security objectives specified for the TOE to counter threats and satisfy the rules of the security policy.*
- 2. The result of centralizing the ability to implement the policy of separating administration tasks in the power of the super-administrator (AO.SUPER_ADMIN.2) is the guarantee of the proper operation of the security functions dedicated to O.PCAOA and O.LAA_PCAOA. AO.SUPER_ADMIN.2 therefore supports these security objectives specified for the TOE to counter the threats T.IMPROPER_USE and T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN.*



3. Furthermore, the fact that all interventions in the premises where the Stormshield appliances are stored are carried out under the supervision and responsibility of the super-administrator (AO.SUPER_ADMIN.3) eliminates the possibilities of performing illegal security administration operations from local access to Stormshield appliances in the presence of the super-administrator. AO.SUPER_ADMIN.3 therefore complements AP.PROTECT_APPLIANCES to counter T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN.

OE.PASSWORD

Objective making it possible to ensure the reality of the assumption AO.PASSWORD.

Rationale: This security objective supports O.PCAOA_I&A_ADMIN to counter T.IMPROPER_USE and T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN by guaranteeing that administrators' identification / authentication function cannot be circumvented by obtaining the password of an authorized administrator.

OE.GOOD_PCFI

Objective making it possible to ensure the reality of the assumption AO.GOOD_PCFI.

Rationale: This security objective is dedicated to the prevention of T.IMPROPER_USE.

OE.CRYPTO_EXT

Objective making it possible to ensure the reality of the assumption AO.CRYPTO_EXT.

Rationale: by imposing the condition that the operational environment provides the keys complying with the RGS, this objective contributes to the satisfaction of the policy P.CRYPTO. It also supports a safe implementation of the encryption policy P.VPN. and contributes to countering T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN.

OE.PERSONNEL

Objective making it possible to ensure the reality of the assumption AO.PERSONNEL.

Rationale: This security objective is dedicated to the prevention of T.IMPROPER_USE.

OE.INTERPOSITION

Objective making it possible to ensure the reality of the assumption AIT.INTERPOSITION.

Rationale: This security objective supports all the security objectives specified to counter the threats and to satisfy the rules of the security policy associated with information flow control and protection from Internet attacks, since it allows preventing the bypass of security functions dedicated to these objectives by prohibiting the setup of information flows subject to the PCFI but which, owing to the fact that it does not pass through any StormShield appliances, would not be subject to these security functions.

OE.STRICT_USAGE

Objective making it possible to ensure the reality of the assumption AIT.STRICT_USAGE.

Rationale: This security objective is dedicated to the prevention of T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN. It eliminates the possibility of performing illegal security administration operations, or of modifying the behavior of Stormshield appliances in any other way, through unauthorized access based on possible vulnerabilities on software launched on the appliances and not subject to the evaluation. The prohibition of protocols other than IP (AppleTalk, IPX, etc.) allows preventing the bypass of the information flow control policy in a manner similar to OE.INTERPOSITION.



OE.AUTONOMOUS

Objective making it possible to ensure the reality of the assumption AIT.AUTONOMOUS.

Rationale: This security objective eliminates the risk of bypassing security functions through the intrusion or substitution of external devices on which the TOE may depend in order to carry out its functions. It therefore supports all the security objectives specified for the TOE to counter threats and satisfy the rules of the security policy.

OE.PROTECT_WORKSTATIONS

Objective making it possible to ensure the reality of the assumption AIT.PROTECT_WORKSTATIONS.

Rationale: This security objective is dedicated to the prevention of T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN.

OE.PROTECT_VPN_PEER

Objective making it possible to ensure the reality of the assumption AIT.PROTECT_VPN_PEER.

Rationale: This security objective supports O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION to satisfy P.VPN by guaranteeing that the focus of the encryption policy (protection of the confidentiality and integrity of information flows) cannot be bypassed by retrieving session keys on remote devices.

OE.PROTECT_VPN_CLIENTS

Objective making it possible to ensure the reality of the assumption AIT.PROTECT_VPN_CLIENTS.

Rationale: This security objective supports O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION to satisfy P.VPN by guaranteeing that the focus of the encryption policy (protection of the confidentiality and integrity of information flows) cannot be bypassed by retrieving session keys on remote devices



4.8 Rationale of security objectives

The way security objectives prevent threats and satisfy rules in the security policy is expressed in the “Rationale” sections that accompany the description of each security objective. The link between security objectives and threats or rules of the security policy is summarized below.

		P.FILTERING	P.VPN	P.AUDIT_ALARM	P.ANALYSIS	P.CRYPTO	T.IP_SPOOFING	T.IMPROPER_USE	P.BACKUP_RESTITUTION	T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN	T.ADMIN_USURP	T.ILLEGAL_ADMIN_SESSION	T.AUDIT_LOSS
O.PCFI_FILTERING		X											
O.PCFI_APPLICATION_CONTEXT		S											
O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION			X				X						
O.LAA_PCFI				X									
O.CRYPTO			S			X				S			
O.IPS_ATTACK_DETECTION					X		X						
O.IPS_RFC_COMPLIANCE					X								
O.LAA_IPS				X	S		S						
O.PCAOA								X		X			
O.PCAOA_I&A_ADMIN								X		X			
O.LAA_PCAOA								X		X			
O.BACKUP_RESTITUTION								X	X				
O.RESIST_AUTH_ADMIN										X	X		
O.PROTECT_LOGS				S				S		S			X
O.PROTECT_ADMIN_SESSIONS										X		X	
OE.PROTECT_APPLIANCES										X			
OE.SUPER_ADMIN	1	S	S	S	S		S	S	S	S	S	S	S
	2							S		S			
	3									S			
OE.PASSWORD								S		S			
OE.GOOD_PCFI								X					
OE.CRYPTO_EXT			S			X				S			
OE.PERSONNEL								X					
OE.INTERPOSITION		S	S	S	S		S						
OE.STRICT_USAGE		S	S	S	S		S			X			
OE.AUTONOMOUS		S	S	S	S		S	S	S	S	S	S	S
OE.PROTECT_WORKSTATIONS										X			
OE.PROTECT_VPN_PEER			S										
OE.PROTECT_VPN_CLIENTS			S										

Legend:

- X: the objective is dedicated to the prevention of the threat / the satisfaction of the rule of the security policy.
- S: the objective supports other objectives to prevent threats / satisfy rules of the security policy.



4.9 Links between assumptions and the security objectives for the environment

The table below shows the link between the security assumptions for the environment and the associated objectives.

	AP.PROTECT_APPLIANCES	AO.SUPER_ADMIN	AO.PASSWORD	AO.GOOD_PCFI	AO.CRYPTO_EXT	AH.PERSONNEL	AIT.INTERPOSITION	AIT.STRICT_USAGE	AIT.AUTONOMOUS	AIT.PROTECT_WORKSTATIONS	AIT.PROTECT_VPN_PEER	AIT.PROTECT_VPN_CLIENTS
OE.PROTECT_APPLIANCES	X											
OE.SUPER_ADMIN		X										
OE.PASSWORD			X									
OE.GOOD_PCFI				X								
OE.CRYPTO_EXT					X							
OE.PERSONNEL						X						
OE.INTERPOSITION							X					
OE.STRICT_USAGE								X				
OE.AUTONOMOUS									X			
OE.PROTECT_WORKSTATIONS										X		
OE.PROTECT_VPN_PEER											X	
OE.PROTECT_VPN_CLIENTS												X

Legend:

X: the objective is linked to the security assumption for the environment.

5 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

The aim of this section is to set out the security requirements for information technologies, which arise from the refinement of security objectives, as well as an Rationale demonstrating that this refinement has been correctly carried out.

The IT security requirements comprise the security requirements for the TOE and the security requirements for the environment, which, if satisfied, will guarantee that the TOE can meet its security objectives.

The CC divides security requirements into two categories: functional requirements and assurance requirements. Functional requirements relate to functions of the TOE that specifically contribute to IT security and which guarantee the desired behavior in terms of security. Assurance requirements relate to actions that the developer needs to perform, the evidence to produce and the actions to be taken by the evaluator.

5.1 Introduction

5.1.1 Overview

The TOE's security functional requirements are divided into the following function sub-sets:




Illustration 5: Functional subsets of the TOE.

5.1.2 Typographical conventions

In order to present security requirements in a way that makes them easy to read and use, they have been drafted by transposing Common Criteria concepts (such as “TSF” or “subjects” and “objects”) in terms corresponding to the product, in the form of operations assigning, selecting and refining the Common Criteria. The operations have not been identified in the text of this section’s requirements, only the names that result from their application have been indicated in bold.

However, only the wording extracted from [CC-02] and [CC-03] has prescriptive value and acts as a reference. Furthermore, operations performed have to be accurately identified. Appendix C, §9, has been specially drafted for this purpose and makes up the element of proof to be taken into account as set out in the IT security requirements.



The extended security requirements have been drafted in the same manner in this chapter. Appendix D, §10, sets out these extended security requirements in a format similar to the one in [CC-02].

Format for labeling security requirements:

- Security Assurance Requirements have the same labels as the ones used in [CC-03];
- Security Functional Requirements have labels in the following format:

FCC_FFF.component.<iteration>n

- FCC is the three-letter acronym of the class;
- FFF is the three-letter acronym of the family;
- *component* is the component's identifier: either a number for components extracted from [CC-02], or a three-letter acronym for extended security requirements;
- *iteration* is a label that allows identifying the various iterations of the same component inside various functional sets;
- *n* is the item number.

IKE protocol:

The TOE implements versions 1 and 2 of the IKE negotiation protocol. When the terms of a function or security requirement refers to this protocol without specifying its version, this means that the function or requirement applies to both versions.

In order to simplify the terms:

- The term "SA Phase 2" from IKEv1 will also be used to refer to a "child SA" from the IKEv2 protocol,
- An "ISAKMP SA" from the IKEv1 protocol will be called "IKE SA".

5.1.3 Presentation of security data

Attributes of IP packets concerned by filter and encryption rules

- The receiving interface of the packet;
- The destination interface of the packet;
- The source and destination IP address of the packet and, based on that, the packet's source and destination machine;
- The IP protocol number;
- The value of the DSCP field;
- The ESP security index;
- The source and destination TCP/UDP port or the type of ICMP message.

Concept of slots

The behavior of security functions is described with the help of "slots", which are an abstract representation that administrators of the Stormshield appliance's configuration files will be able to interpret. Slots describe well-defined security behaviors that can be saved and reused. They can be enabled on demand

In the scope of the evaluation, we will focus on two types of slots: filter slots and encryption slots (also known as "VPN slots"):

- A filter slot is a list of filter and address translation rules. The filter policy applied is a sequence of two filter slots – the global filter slot then the local filter slot. During operation, there is always at least one active local filter slot.
- An encryption slot is a set of VPN tunnels.

Parameters of filter rules

- Rule ID;
- (criterion) The receiving interface of IP packets covered by the rule;
- (criterion) The destination interface of IP packets covered by the rule;
- (criterion) The machine(s) at the source of the information flows covered by the rule;
- (criterion) the IP protocol(s), DSCP field, TCP/UDP services or types of ICMP messages of information flows covered by the rule;
- (criterion) The destination machine(s) of information flows covered by the rule;
- The action: 'none', 'pass', 'block', 'reinitialize', 'delegate';
- The generation of an audit log and the alarm level assigned, if any;
- The Quality of Service policy associated with the information flows covered by the rule;
- The maximum rate of open connections / pseudo-connections associated with the rule;
- The profile of Internet attacks associated with connections covered by the rule.

Parameters of a connection / pseudo connection

- (criterion) The source IP address, destination IP address;
- (criterion) The type of protocol (TCP, UDP or ICMP);
- (criterion) For TCP and UDP: source and destination ports;
- (criterion) For ICMP: the 'type' and 'code' fields of the ICMP message;
- For UDP and ICMP: the age of the pseudo-connection;
- For TCP: the status of the connection, windows (for the purpose of rejecting packets that do not conform).

Characteristics of IPSec users

- The user's login name;
- Information about the user (last name, first name, telephone number, e-mail address, etc.);
- The reference password.

Privileges of IPSec users

- The user's login name;
- The fact that the user is authorized to authenticate (a user can be revoked without deleting his account).

Parameters of VPN tunnels

A VPN tunnel consists of a trusted path (the IKE SA) between the Stormshield appliance and a VPN peer, as well as a set of encryption rules to be applied to information flows that have to pass through the tunnel. The application of these rules requires the negotiation and establishment of security contexts that are IPSec SAs.

The VPN tunnel settings are the following:

- The local interface on which the tunnel has to be set up;
- The IP address of the other tunnel endpoint (the VPN peer);
- The mutual authentication mechanism: pre-shared key (PSK) or certificates (PKI) or HybridAuth+XAuth;
- In an authentication by certificate or HybridAuth+XAuth: the X509 certificate presented by the StormShield appliance;
- In an authentication by pre-shared key: the IP address of the Stormshield appliance;



- The encryption rules associated with the tunnel;
- The current IKE SA pair associated with the VPN tunnel;

Parameters of an IKE SA

- The VPN peer;
- The current age of the SA;
- Its lifetime;
- The effective authentication algorithm and its key;
- The effective encryption algorithm and its key;

Encryption rule (SPD entry)

- (criterion) The local machine(s) covered by the rule;
- (criterion) The remote machine(s) covered by the rule;
- (criterion) The type of protocol covered by the rule;
- The acceptable proposals during the SA negotiation:
 - Authentication algorithms and key sizes;
 - Encryption algorithms and key sizes;
 - SA lifetime.
- The current IPsec SA pairs associated with the rule.

Parameters of an IPsec SA

- (criterion) The SPI (*Security Parameter Index*) ;
- The current age of the SA;
- Its lifetime;
- Whether it is incoming or outgoing;
- The effective authentication algorithm and its key;
- The effective encryption algorithm and its key;

Characteristics of VPN peers managed by the Stormshield appliance

- Either an X509 certificate or a CA (with the associated CRL) in an authentication by certificate;
- Or the login (IP address), associated with a pre-shared key;
- Or the login associated with the user's password.

Profile of Internet attacks

- Name;
- The associated action: block or let the packet through (not always configurable);
- The desired alarm level: ignore, minor or major.

Profile of system events

- Name;
- The desired alarm level: ignore, minor, major or system

Characteristics of administrators

- The administrator's login name;
- Information about the administrator (last name, first name, telephone number, e-mail address, etc.);
- The fact that the administrator is authorized to authenticate (an administrator can be revoked without deleting his account);



- The authentication mechanism³;
- The reference password.

Administrator privileges

- The administrator's login name;
- The group to which the administrator belongs;
- The list of the administrator's privileges.

Administrators are managed in the same local database used for non-administrator users, but they are assigned an explicit administrator role as well as a profile built from a modification privilege ('M') and privileges associated with various domains of security management. The details of various privileges are provided in Appendix A, §7.

The privileges assigned to administrators and IPSec users are managed in distinct files in the local administrator and user database.

The term 'auditor' is used to refer to administrators tasked with performing audits and managing audit logs. These auditors are administrators with the 'L' privilege.

5.2 Security requirements for the TOE

This section sets out the refinement of the TOE's functional requirements. The formal description of these requirements is given in Chapter 9, The extended functional requirement is described in Chapter 10. To ensure traceability, the titles of the functional requirements concerned are indicated here in square brackets (e.g.: [FDP_IFC.2.1]).

5.2.1 Information flow control requirements

Filter function

FDP_IFC.2 – Full filtering of information flows

[FDP_IFC.2.1]

The filter function must apply the filter policy to incoming IP packets.

[FDP_IFC.2.2]

The filter function must guarantee that all incoming IP packets are covered by the filter policy.

Rationale: FDP_IFC.2 supports FDP_IFF.1.Filtering to satisfy O.PCFI_FILTERING, by defining the filter policy and requiring that it applies to all incoming IP packets.

FDP_IFF.1.Filtering – Filter function

[FDP_IFF.1.Filtering.1]

The filter function must apply the filter policy according to the following types of security attributes of *Incoming IP packets*:

- a. The receiving interface,**
- b. The destination interface,**
- c. The source and destination IP address of the packet and, based on that, the source and destination host of the packet,**
- d. The IP protocol number,**
- e. The value of the DSCP field,**
- f. If the protocol is TCP or UDP: the source and destination port,**
- g. If the protocol is ICMP: the message's 'type' and 'code' fields,**

³ Mandatory login / password (TLS) or Certificate (TLS) in the usage mode subject to evaluation.



[FDP_IFF.1.Filtering.2]

The filter function must authorize an incoming IP packet if the following rules apply:

- a. Prior to the application of the filter rules, the packet is compared against all connections / pseudo-connections currently set up and having been allowed by the filter rules;
- b. If the packet corresponds to one of these connections / pseudo-connections, it can pass through without being subject to filter rules;
- c. Otherwise, the packet will be allowed if the action of the first applicable filter rule is 'pass'.

[FDP_IFF.1.Filtering.3]

The filter function must apply the following complementary rules:

- a. the only purpose of filter rules with a 'none' action is to generate audit logs and are not taken into account in packet filtering.
- b. the only purpose of filter rules with a 'delegate' action is to skip the evaluation of the end of the global filter slot to go back to the beginning of the local slot and are not taken into account in packet filtering.

FDP_IFF.1.Filtering.4]

The filter function must explicitly authorize an incoming IP packet according to the following rules:

- a. Sessions associated with protocols requiring child connections are tracked so that these child connections will be authorized according to the status of the main session;
- b. The firewall can generate implicit filter rules together with the configuration of other security functions. These are rules corresponding to:
 - i. The remote administration of the firewall,
 - ii. VPN setup.

[FDP_IFF.1.Filtering.5]

The filter function must explicitly prohibit an incoming IP packet according to the following rules:

- a. The action of the first applicable filter rule is 'block' or 'reinitialize';
- b. No filter rules have allowed the packet to pass through.

Rationale: FDP_IFF.1.Filtering is dedicated to the satisfaction of the objective O.PCFI_FILTERING. Point FDP_IFF.1.Filtering.4.a also covers the objective O.PCFI_APPLICATION_CONTEXT.

Encryption function

FDP_IFC.1 – Encryption of information flows

[FDP_IFC.1.1]

The encryption function must apply the encryption policy to incoming ESP datagrams and outgoing IP datagrams covered by an encryption rule.

Rationale: FDP_IFC.1 supports FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1 and FDP_IFF.1.Encryption to satisfy O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION, by defining the encryption policy.

FDP_UCT.1 – Confidentiality of the contents of information flows

[FDP_UCT.1.1]

The **encryption function** must apply the **encryption policy** to be able to **send and receive IP datagrams** in a way that protects them from unauthorized disclosure.

Rationale: FDP_UCT.1 is dedicated to the satisfaction of the “confidentiality” aspect of the objective O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION.

FDP_UIT.1 – Integrity of the contents of information flows

[FDP_UIT.1.1]

The **encryption function** must apply the **encryption policy** to be able to **send and receive IP datagrams** in a way that protects them from **modification, insertion or replay** errors.

[FDP_UIT.1.2]

The **encryption function** must be able to determine when receiving **incoming ESP datagrams** whether they any **modification, insertion or replay** has taken place.

Rationale: FDP_UIT.1 is dedicated to the satisfaction of the “integrity” aspect of the objective O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION.

FDP_IFF.1.Encryption – Encryption function

[FDP_IFF.1.Encryption.1]

The **encryption function** must apply the encryption **policy** according to the following types of security attributes of incoming **ESP datagrams and outgoing IP datagrams covered by an encryption rule:**

Incoming ESP datagrams:

- a. Security Parameter Index (*SPI*),

Outgoing IP datagrams:

- b. The source IP address and destination of the packet, and based on that, the packet’s source and destination machine,
- c. The type of IP protocol.

[FDP_IFF.1.Encryption.2]

The **encryption function** must authorize an **incoming ESP packet** if the following rules apply:

- a. an incoming ESP datagram can be attached to an active incoming IPsec SA,
- b. the packet encapsulated in the ESP datagram corresponds to the criteria of the encryption rule associated with the IPsec SA.

[FDP_IFF.1.Encryption.3]

The **encryption function** must apply the following complementary rules:

- a. on outgoing IP datagrams, use the effective authentication and encryption algorithms specified by the outgoing IPsec SA associated with the first applicable encryption rule.
- b. launch a renegotiation attempt if an outgoing IP datagram is covered by an encryption rule without an active IPsec SA and no other attempt is in progress. The datagram will be destroyed.

[FDP_IFF.1.Encryption.4]

(not applicable).

[FDP_IFF.1.Encryption.5]

(not applicable).

Rationale: FDP_IFF.1.Encryption supports FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1 and FTP_TRP.1.Peer to satisfy O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION:



- *by guaranteeing that the encryption function is applied to outgoing IP datagrams covered by the encryption policy,*
- *by directing the incoming ESP datagrams to the integrity and decryption control processes specified by the applicable incoming IPsec SA,*
- *by turning to the use of the trusted path if the outgoing IP datagram is covered by an encryption rule without an applicable outgoing IPsec SA.*

SA establishment function

FTP_TRP.1.Peer – Trusted path with VPN peers

[FTP_TRP.1.Peer.1]

The SA establishment function must provide a communication channel between the **Stormshield appliance and VPN peers** that is logically distinct from the other communication channels and which guarantees the identification of its endpoints and the protection of transferred data from **modification or disclosure**.

[FTP_TRP.1.Peer.2]

The SA establishment function must allow the **Stormshield appliance and VPN peers** to initiate communication via the trusted path. **The establishment of the trusted path corresponds to phase 1 of the IKE protocol.**

[FTP_TRP.1.Peer.3]

The SA establishment function must require the use of the trusted path for:

- **the initial mutual authentication of tunnel endpoints (phase 1 of the IKE protocol),**
- **the negotiation of IPsec SAs (phase 2 of the IKE protocol).**

Rationale: FTP_TRP.1.Peer is dedicated to the satisfaction of the “mutual authentication of endpoints” aspect of the objective O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION.

FIA_UAU.5.Peer – Multiple authentication mechanisms of VPN peers

[FIA_UAU.5.Peer.1]

The SA establishment function must provide the **following authentication mechanisms** to participate in the authentication of the **VPN peer of a given tunnel, in the context of an initial mutual authentication of the endpoints of this tunnel during IKE phase 1:**

- **X509 certificates,**
- **pre-shared key.**

[FIA_UAU.5.Peer.2]

The SA establishment function must authenticate the announced identity of any **VPN peer** according to the **authentication mechanism specified for the VPN tunnel.**

Rationale: FIA_UAU.5.Peer supports FTP_TRP.1.Peer to satisfy the objective O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION.



FPT_TDC.1 – Negotiation of IKE and IPSec SAs

[FPT_TDC.1.1]

The SA establishment function must offer the possibility of negotiating ISKAMP and IPSec SA parameters during the establishment of VPN tunnels between the Stormshield appliance and VPN peers.

[FPT_TDC.1.2]

The SA establishment function must use the following rules to negotiate ISAKMP or IPSec SA parameters with VPN peers:

- a. If the Stormshield appliance is the initiator, propose the parameters of the IKE or IPSEC SA, and accept the responses that are as strict as one of the proposals made;
- b. If the Stormshield appliance is the responder, accept only proposals that are as strict as one of the local proposals.

Rationale: FPT_TDC.1 supports:

- Firstly FTP_TRP.1 to satisfy the “mutual authentication of endpoints” aspects of the objective O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION, by allowing the negotiation of parameters that will enable mutual authentication,
- And FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 to satisfy the “confidentiality” and “integrity” aspects of the objective O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION by allowing the negotiation of encryption and authentication algorithm parameters.

Log, audit and alarm function

FAU_GEN.1 – Generation of audit data

[FAU_GEN.1.1]

The log function must be able to generate an audit log of the following auditable events:

- Startup and shutdown of the log function,
- and the auditable events set out in the table in chapter 5.2 (after FAU_GEN.1.2)

[FAU_GEN.1.2]

The log function must record at least the following information in each audit log:

- date and time of the event,
- type of event,
- source IP address,
- result (success or failure) of the event,
- alarm level (if it is one),
- for each type of log event, the complementary audit information listed in the table below:

Component	Auditable events	Audit information
FDP_IFF.1.Filtering	Application of a filter rule for which the generation of an audit log has been specified.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Name of the receiving interface, • Name of the destination interface, • Action applied. • rule ID, • Type of protocol, • ICMP type, • Source port • IP address and destination



		port,
FTP_TRP.1.Peer and FPT_TDC.1	Attempt to establish an IKE and IPsec SA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IKE phase (1 or 2), • If failure: reason for the failure (if possible).
FAU_STG.3	Limit exceeded	•
FAU_SAA.4	Detection of potential internet attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Name of the receiving interface, • Action applied. • Attack name • Type of protocol, • ICMP type, • Source port • IP address and destination port,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MTD.1, FTP_TRP.1.Admin	Accomplishment of a security administration operation (including attempts to open administration sessions)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Type of operation, • Parameters, • Administration session ID,

Rationale: FAU_GEN.1 is dedicated to the satisfaction of the “log” aspects (point 1) of the objectives O.LAA_PCFI, O.LAA_IPS and O.LAA_PCAOA. For events associated with FDP_IFF.1.Filtering and FAU_SAA.4, the result (success or failure) associated with the event corresponds to the action that the Stormshield appliance has applied.

FAU_GEN.2 – User identification

[FAU_GEN.2.1]

For any audit event resulting from the actions of identified **administrators**, the log function must be able to associate this **auditable event linked to security administration operations** with the identity of the **administrator** who caused this event.

Rationale: FAU_GEN.2 is dedicated to the satisfaction of “accountability” aspects (point 2) of the objective O.LAA_PCAOA.

FAU_SAR.1 – Audit review

[FAU_SAR.1.1]

The audit function has to offer **auditors** the ability to read **all audit information** from **log files**.

[FAU_SAR.1.2]

The audit function must present **log files** in a way that would allow the **auditor** to interpret them.

Rationale: FAU_SAR.1 is dedicated to the satisfaction of the “audit” aspects (point 2) of the objectives O.LAA_PCFI, O.LAA_IPS and O.LAA_PCAOA.

FAU_STG.3 – Action in the event of possible loss of audit data

[FAU_STG.3.1]

The log function must carry out **one of the following actions**:

- a. Rotate files: the most recent audit logs erase the oldest audit logs,**
- b. Stop writing files: audit logs are no longer recorded,**
- c. Shut down the firewall: the Stormshield appliance does not really shut down but blocks all information flows except the web manager’s administration sessions from the internal network.**

If an existing log file (excluding the use of Syslog) exceeds 5 MB.

Rationale: FAU_STG.3 is dedicated to the satisfaction of the objective O.PROTECT_LOGS. It does not apply to a TOE that is unable to log events locally.

FAU_ARP.1.Alarms – Automatic response to alarms

[FAU_ARP.1.Alarms.1]

The alarm function must transmit the alarm to connected real-time monitors as soon as the generation of an audit log to which an alarm level has been assigned.

Rationale: FAU_ARP.1.Alarms is dedicated to the satisfaction of the “alarm” aspects (point 3) of the objectives O.LAA_PCFI, O.LAA_IPS and O.LAA_PCAOA. It should be noted that the dependence with FAU_GEN.1 will be implicitly satisfied since it affects audit logs.

5.2.2 Requirements of protection from Internet attacks

Intrusion prevention function

FAU_SAA.4 – Heuristics of complex attacks

[FAU_SAA.4.1]

The intrusion prevention function must be able to maintain a knowledge base⁴ of the following attack types that may indicate a potential Internet attack:

- a. IP packets whose source addresses are inconsistent with the receiving interface,
- b. packets, datagrams or IP, ICMP, IGMP, TCP or UDP segments that do not comply with the RFCs, or abuse of the possibilities offered by these protocols,
- c. application commands, requests or responses that do not comply with the general syntax of commands/requests/responses defined by the RFCs, or abuse of the possibilities offered by these protocols,
- d. attacks based on known vulnerabilities of application servers,
- e. attempts to retrieve information concerning the configuration of application servers (*fingerprinting, port scanning, etc.*),
- f. exceeding the number of connections opened for a filter rule.

[FAU_SAA.4.2]

The intrusion prevention function must be able to compare the status of the various contexts associated with each incoming and outgoing IP packet against types of attacks in the knowledge base.

[FAU_SAA.4.3]

The intrusion prevention function must be able to indicate a potential internet attack when the status of one or several contexts associated with an incoming IP packet corresponds to a type of attack in the knowledge base.

Rationale: FAU_SAA.4 is dedicated to the satisfaction of the objective O.IPS_ATTACK_DETECTION as well as the implementation of compliance with the RFCs specified by O.IPS_RFC_COMPLIANCE (points FAU_SAA.4.1.b and FAU_SAA.4.1.c).

FAU_ARP.1.IPS – Automatic response to potential internet attacks

[FAU_ARP.1.IPS.1]

Upon the detection of an Internet attack potentially conveyed by an incoming IP packet, the intrusion prevention function must:

- a. apply to the packet the action associated with the type of attack,

⁴ The knowledge base is a set of controls defined by TOE version



- b. if an alarm level has been specified for this type of attack, generate an audit log for the event, by assigning this level of alarm to it.

Rationale: FAU_ARP.1.IPS supports FAU_SAA.4 for the satisfaction of the objective O.IPS_ATTACK_DETECTION and for the implementation of compliance with the RFCs specified by O.IPS_RFC_COMPLIANCE. Furthermore, FAU_ARP.1.IPS is specifically dedicated to point 3 of the objective O.LAA_IPS.

5.2.3 Requirements of prevention of improper use

Function for the control of access to security administration operations

FMT_SMF.1 – Security administration function

[FMT_SMF.1.1]

The security administration function must be able to perform the following security administration functions:

- a. **The function for the control of access to security administration operations;**
- b. **The administration session protection function**
- c. **The audit function**
- d. **The backup/restoration function**

Rationale: FMT_SMR.1 supports FMT_MOF.1 and FMT_MTD.1 to satisfy the objective of controlling access to administration operations specified by O.PCAOA. It also ensures the implementation of FTP_ITT.1, FAU_SAR.1 and FMT_MTD.BRS

FMT_SMR.1 – Role of the security administrator

[FMT_SMR.1.1]

The function for the control of access to security administration operations must manage the “administrator” and “super administrator” roles.

[FMT_SMR.1.2]

The function for the control of access to security administration operations must be able to associate roles with users according to the following rules:

- a. **There is only one super-administrator, distinct from other administrators, and who possess all privileges;**
- b. **Administrators are persons to whom this role has been explicitly assigned.**

Rationale: FMT_SMR.1 supports FMT_MOF.1 and FMT_MTD.1 to satisfy the objective of controlling access to administration operations specified by O.PCAOA. FMT_SMR.1 also supports FTP_TRP.1.Admin to satisfy the objective O.PCAOA_I&A_ADMIN.



FDP_ACC.2 – Control of full access to security administration operations

[FDP_ACC.2.1]

The function for the control of access to security administration operations must apply the policy controlling access to security administration operations to all security administration operations performed by the administrator.

[FDP_ACC.2.2]

The function for the control of access to security administration operations must guarantee that all security administration operations performed by the administrator are covered by the policy controlling access to security administration operations.

Rationale: FDP_ACC.2 supports FMT_MOF.1 and FMT_MTD.1 to satisfy the objective of controlling access to administration operations specified by O.PCAOA, by guaranteeing that the policy controlling access to administration operations is applied to all operations.

FMT_MOF.1 – Administration of the behavior of security functions

[FMT_MOF.1.1]

The function for the control of access to security administration operations must restrict the ability to enable, disable, perform or modify the security functions in the table below to administrators, according to the privileges below:

Security functions	Operations / necessary privileges
Filter function	Enable/Disable: (F or GF) +M
Encryption and SA establishment function	Enable/Disable: V+M
Backup function	Perform: Ma
Restoration function	Perform: Ma+M

Rationale: FMT_MOF.1 is dedicated to the satisfaction of the objective O.PCAOA. This component covers the administration tasks that set off security functions.

FMT_MTD.1 – Administration of security data

[FMT_MTD.1.1]

The function for the control of access to security administration operations must restrict the ability to read, modify or delete the security functions in the table below to administrators, according to the privileges below:

Security data	Operations / necessary privileges
Characteristics of IPSec users and administrators	Read: all administrators Modify: U+M
Assignment of the administrator role and administrative privileges to a user	Read: super-administrator Modify: A+M
Configuration of interfaces and network routes	Read: all administrators Modify interfaces: N+M Modify routes: R+M
Objects describing the network topology: machines, networks, protocols and predefined services	Read: all administrators Modify: (O or GO) +M
Filter slots: contents	Read: F Modify: F+M
Global filter slots: contents	Read: GF Modify: GF+M
Encryption slots: contents	Read: V Modify: V+M
Log files of security events	Read (and audit): L Erase: L+M
Monitoring data	Read (and audit): L Modify: L+MW
Log and alarm parameters including profiles of	Read: all administrators



system events.	Modify: *+M
Dynamic analysis parameters, including profiles of Internet attacks	Read: As Modify: As+M
Configuration backup and restoration	Backup: Ma Restoration: Ma+M
Time base	Read: all administrators Modify: Ma+M

Rationale: FMT_MTD.1 is dedicated to the satisfaction of the objective O.PCAOA. This component covers administrative tasks that consist of modifying security data.

Backup and restoration function

FMT_MTD.BRS – Backup and restoration of security data

[FMT_MTD.BRS.1]

The backup/restoration function must be able to back up security data on the administration workstation’s hard disk.

[FMT_MTD.BRS.2]

The backup/restoration function must allow restoring security data saved on the administration workstation’s hard disk.

Rationale: FMT_MTD.BRS is dedicated to the satisfaction of the objective O.BACKUP_RESTORE. Resorting to this explicit component was necessary as the components of [CC-02] do not allow specifying the backup or restoration of security data.

5.2.4 TOE protection requirements

Administration session protection function

FPT_ITT.1 – Basic protection of the contents of administration sessions

[FPT_ITT.1.1]

The administration session protection function must protect the contents of administration sessions from disclosure and modification when they are sent between administration workstation and the Stormshield appliance.

Rationale: FPT_ITT.1 is dedicated to the satisfaction of the objective O.PROTECT_ADMIN_SESSIONS.

FTP_TRP.1.Admin – Trusted path for remote administration

[FTP_TRP.1.Admin.1]

The administration session protection function must provide a communication channel between administrators and the Stormshield appliance that is logically distinct from the other communication channels and which guarantees the identification of its endpoints and the protection of transferred data from modification or disclosure.

[FTP_TRP.1.Admin.2]

The administration session protection function must allow administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.

[FTP_TRP.1.Admin.3]

The administration session protection function must require the use of the trusted path for:

- a. the initial mutual authentication of the administrator and the Stormshield appliance,**
- b. remote security administration operations.**

Rationale: FTP_TRP.1.Admin is dedicated to the satisfaction of the objective O.PCAOA_I&A_ADMIN. Furthermore, it supports FPT_ITT.1 to satisfy O.PROTECT_ADMIN_SESSIONS by providing the means to protect administration sessions.



FIA_UAU.5.Admin – Authentication mechanism for administrators

[FIA_UAU.5.Admin.1]

The administration session protection function must provide the **TLS protocol** to participate in the authentication of the administrator.

[FIA_UAU.5.Admin.2]

The administration session protection function must authenticate the announced identity of any administrator according to the **SRP protocol or TLS protocol (login / password or X.509 certificate)**.

*Rationale: FIA_UAU.5.Admin supports FTP_TRP.1.Admin to satisfy the objective O.PCAOA_I&A_ADMIN. The strength of mechanisms associated with the SRP and TLS protocols enable the satisfaction of the objective O.RESIST_AUTH_ADMIN. For SRP, protection against replay and counterfeiting of authentication data is guaranteed by the use of a challenge/response method based on ephemeral keys with entropy higher than 2048 bits and generated in a way that prevents reference attacks on reference authentication secrets (“v” password verification value, cf. [SRP]). For the TLS protocol, protection against replay and counterfeiting of authentication data is guaranteed by the exclusive use of CipherSuite **TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA** (cf. [TLS-AES])*

5.2.5 Other supporting security requirements

Other supporting functions

FCS_COP.1 – Cryptographic function

[FCS_COP.1.Key_preparation]

The cryptographic function must prepare keys according to the cryptographic algorithm **specified below** and with the cryptographic key sizes **specified below**, in compliance with the **standards set out below**.

Algorithm	Key size	Ref. of the standard	Requirements supported
Diffie-Hellman	2048, 3072, 4096	[DH], [IKEv1], [IKE-MODP], [IKEv2],	FIA_UAU.5.Admin, FIA_UAU.5.Peer.

[FCS_COP.1.Signature_Encryption]

The cryptographic function must sign and perform asymmetrical **encryption/decryption** according to the cryptographic algorithm **specified below** and with the cryptographic key sizes **specified below**, in compliance with the **standards set out below**.

Algorithm	Key size	Ref. of the standard	Requirements supported
RSA	2048, 4096	[RSA]	FIA_UAU.5.Peer (X509)

[FCS_COP.1.Hashing]

The cryptographic function must conduct one-to-one hashing according to the cryptographic algorithms **specified below** and with the cryptographic key sizes **specified below**, in compliance with the **standards set out below**.

Algorithms	Key size	Ref. of the standard	Requirements supported
HMAC-SHA1	160	[HMAC], [SHA1]	FTP_TRP.1.Peer, FIA_UAU.5.Peer, FDP_UIT.1
HMAC-SHA2	256, 384, 512	[HMAC], [SHA2]	FTP_TRP.1.Peer, FIA_UAU.5.Peer, FDP_UIT.1
SHA2	256, 384,	[SHA2]	FTP_TRP.1.Peer, FIA_UAU.5.Peer



	512		
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[FCS_COP.1.Encryption_VPN]

The cryptographic function must perform symmetrical encryption/decryption of VPN packets according to the cryptographic algorithms specified below and with the cryptographic key sizes specified below, in compliance with the standards set out below.

Algorithms	Key size	Ref. of the standard	Requirements supported
AES	128, 192, 256	[AES]	FTP_TRP.1.Peer, FDP_UCT.1
Triple DES	168	[DES]	
Blowfish	128 to 256	[Blowfish]	
CAST	128	[CAST]	

[FCS_COP.1.Encryption_sessions]

The cryptographic function must perform symmetrical encryption/decryption of administration sessions according to the cryptographic algorithm specified below and with the cryptographic key sizes specified below, in compliance with the standards set out below.

Algorithm	Key size	Ref. of the standard	Requirements supported
AES	128, 256	[AES]	FPT_ITT.1

[FCS_COP.1.Integrity_sessions]

The cryptographic function must check the integrity of administration sessions according to the cryptographic algorithm specified below and with the cryptographic key sizes specified below, in compliance with the standards set out below.

Algorithm	Key size	Ref. of the standard	Requirements supported
HMAC-SHA2	256, 384	[HMAC], [SHA1]	FPT_ITT.1

Rationale: FCS_COP.1 satisfies the objective O.CRYPTO by specifying the cryptographic mechanisms that comply with the RGS and supports all requirements specified in the right column for the satisfaction of their respective security objectives.

FPT_STM.1 – Reliable time base

[FPT_STM.1.1]

The Stormshield appliance’s internal clock must be able to provide reliable time stamping for its own use.

Rationale: this component supports FAU_GEN.1, for the satisfaction of objectives O.LAA_PCFI, O.LAA_IPS and O.LAA_PCAOA.



5.3 Security assurance requirements for the TOE

This section presents the selected package of assurance requirements. Chapter 9.2 sets out the operations on these requirements.

The level of assurance that the TOE aims for is an augmented EAL3 level for the components ALC_FLR.3, AVA_VAN.3, ALC_CMC.4 and ALC_CMS.4 associated with expertise in the implementation of the cryptography described in [QUALIF-STD].

The table below provides details of the coverage of assurance requirement dependencies.

Components		Comment
ADV_ARC.1	Security architecture description	EAL3
ADV_FSP.3	Functional specification with complete summary	EAL3
ADV_TDS.2	Architectural design	EAL3
AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance	EAL3
AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures	EAL3
ALC_CMC.4	Production support, acceptance procedures and automation	+
ALC_CMS.4	Problem tracking CM coverage	+
ALC_DEL.1	Delivery procedures	EAL3
ALC_DVS.1	Identification of security measures	EAL3
ALC_FLR.3	Systematic flaw remediation	+
ALC_LCD.1	Developer defined life-cycle model	EAL3
ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims	EAL3
ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition	EAL3
ASE_INT.1	ST introduction	EAL3
ASE_OBJ.2	Security objectives	EAL3
ASE_REQ.2	Security requirements	EAL3
ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition	EAL3
ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification	EAL3
ATE_COV.2	Analysis of coverage	EAL3
ATE_DPT.1	Testing: basic design	EAL3
ATE_FUN.1	Functional testing	EAL3
ATE_IND.2	Independent testing - sample	EAL3
AVA_VAN.3	Focused vulnerability analysis	+



5.4 Security requirements rationale

5.4.1 Satisfaction of security objectives

The satisfaction of security objectives is expressed in the “Rationale” sections that come with the description of each security requirement. The link between requirements and security objectives is summarized below.

“S”: The requirement supports the objective, “X”: The requirement attains the objective

	O.PCFI_FILTERING	O.PCFI_APPLICATION_CONTEXT	O.PCFI_ENCRYPTION	O.LAA_PCFI	O.CRYPTO	O.IPS_ATTACK_DETECTION	O.IPS_RFC_COMPLIANCE	O.LAA_IPS	O.PCAOA	O.PCAOA_I&A_ADMIN	O.LAA_PCAOA	O.BACKUP_RESTITUTION	O.RESIST_AUTH_ADMIN	O.PROTECT_LOGS	O.PROTECT_ADMIN_SESSIONS
FDP_IFC.2	S														
FDP_IFF.1.Filtering	X	X													
FDP_IFC.1			S												
FDP_UCT.1			X												
FDP_UIT.1			X												
FDP_IFF.1.Encryption			S												
FTP_TRP.1.Peer			X												
FIA_UAU.5.Peer			S												
FPT_TDC.1			S												
FAU_GEN.1				X				X			X				
FAU_GEN.2											X				
FAU_SAR.1				X				X			X				
FAU_STG.3														X	
FAU_ARP.1.Alarms				X				X			X				
FAU_SAA.4						X	X								
FAU_ARP.1.IPS						S	S	X							
FMT_SMF.1									S		S	S			S
FMT_SMR.1									S	S					
FDP_ACC.2									S						
FMT_MOF.1									X						
FMT_MTD.1									X						
FMT_MTD.BRS												X			
FPT_ITT.1															X
FTP_TRP.1.Admin										X					S
FIA_UAU.5.Admin										S			X		
FCS_COP.1.Key_preparation			X		X					X			S		S
FCS_COP.1.Signature_Encryption			X		X					X			X		S
FCS_COP.1.Hashing			X		X										
FCS_COP.1.Encryption_VPN			X		X										
FCS_COP.1.Encryption_sessions					X					X					X
FCS_COP.1.Integrity_sessions										X			S		X
FPT_STM.1				S				S			S				



5.4.2 Mutual support and non contradiction

All dependencies have been satisfied or the inability to satisfy them has been justified. Security requirements therefore make up a set of dependencies that mutually support each other and do not present any contradiction.

5.4.3 Satisfaction of the dependencies of SFRs

The table below summarizes the dependencies of security requirement components and justifies how they have been satisfied or why they have not been satisfied.

<i>Component</i>	<i>Dependencies</i>	<i>Satisfaction</i>
FDP_IFC.2	FDP_IFF.1	FDP_IFF.1.Filtering
FDP_IFF.1.Filtering	FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFC.2
	FMT_MSA.3	The security attributes of IP packets are deduced from the contents of IP and transport headers. Under these conditions, the concept of the “restrictive value of attributes” is not clear and in any case these attributes are not under the control of the TSF. The dependency is therefore not applicable.
FPT_STM.1	None	
FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFF.1	FDP_IFF.1.Encryption
FDP_UCT.1	FTP_ITC.1 FTP_TRP.1	FTP_TRP.1.Peer
	FDP_ACC.1 FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFC.1
FDP_UIT.1	FTP_ITC.1 FTP_TRP.1	FTP_TRP.1.Peer
	FDP_ACC.1 FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.1.Encryption	FDP_IFC.1	FDP_IFC.1
	FMT_MSA.3	The security attributes of IP packets are deduced from the contents of IP and transport headers. Under these conditions, the concept of the “restrictive value of attributes” is not clear and in any case these attributes are not under the control of the TSF. The dependency is therefore not applicable.
FTP_TRP.1.Peer	None	
FIA_UAU.5.Peer	None	
FPT_TDC.1	None	
FAU_GEN.1	FPT_STM.1	Yes
FAU_GEN.2	FAU_GEN.1	Yes
	FIA_UID.1	The administrator is unable to perform any sort of administrative operation without being authenticated. The authentication function is therefore the only operation that can be carried out during a connection to the administration server. The dependency is therefore not applicable.
FAU_SAR.1	FAU_GEN.1	Yes
FAU_STG.3	FAU_STG.1	Audit logs can only be deleted or modified with the “admin” account and only via the local console. There is no administration function to perform these operations. The dependency is therefore not applicable.
FAU_ARP.1.Alarms	FAU_SAA.1	FAU_SAA.4
FAU_SAA.4	None	
FAU_ARP.1.IPS	FAU_SAA.1	FAU_SAA.4
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1	The administrator is unable to perform any sort of administrative operation without being authenticated. The authentication function is therefore the only operation that can be carried out during a connection to the administration server. The dependency is therefore not applicable.
FDP_ACC.2	FDP_ACF.1	All access to administration operations are controlled by a set of administration privileges. These privileges are grouped by functional category. It is therefore impossible to allow or deny access to a particular element in a functional category. The

<i>Component</i>	<i>Dependencies</i>	<i>Satisfaction</i>
		dependency is therefore not applicable.
FMT_MOF.1	FMT_SMR.1	Yes
	FMT_SMF.1	Yes
FMT_MTD.1	FMT_SMR.1	Yes
	FMT_SMF.1	Yes
FMT_SMF.1	None	
FMT_MTD.BRS	FMT_MTD.1	Yes
	FMT_SMF.1	Yes
FPT_ITT.1	None	
FTP_TRP.1.Admin	None	
FIA_UAU.5.Admin	None	
FCS_COP.1.Key_preparation	FDP_ITC.1 FDP_ITC.2 FCS_CKM.1	Not applicable: the operation <u>is</u> a key generation method.
	FCS_CKM.4	Not applicable: keys are not physically or logically accessible to hackers. They therefore do not need to be deleted in any particular manner.
FCS_COP.1.Signature_Encryption	FDP_ITC.1 FDP_ITC.2 FCS_CKM.1	Not applicable as it is outside the scope of the TOE. The administrator downloads certificates on the Stormshield appliance.
	FCS_CKM.4	Not applicable as it is outside the scope of the TOE
FCS_COP.1.Hashing	FDP_ITC.1 FDP_ITC.2 FCS_CKM.1	Satisfied by FCS_COP.1.Key_preparation FCS_COP.1.Signature_Encryption. When keys are required, they are generated or exchanged without being physically or logically accessible to hackers.
	FCS_CKM.4	Not applicable: keys are not physically or logically accessible to hackers. They therefore do not need to be deleted in any particular manner.
FCS_COP.1.Encryption_VPN	FDP_ITC.1 FDP_ITC.2 FCS_CKM.1	Satisfied by FCS_COP.1.Key_preparation FCS_COP.1.Signature_Encryption. When keys are required, they are generated or exchanged without being physically or logically accessible to hackers.
	FCS_CKM.4	Not applicable: keys are not physically or logically accessible to hackers. They therefore do not need to be deleted in any particular manner.
FCS_COP.1.Encryption_sessions	FDP_ITC.1 FDP_ITC.2 FCS_CKM.1	Satisfied by FCS_COP.1.Key_preparation FCS_COP.1.Signature_Encryption. When keys are required, they are generated or exchanged without being physically or logically accessible to hackers.
	FCS_CKM.4	Not applicable: keys are not physically or logically accessible to hackers. They therefore do not need to be deleted in any particular manner.
FCS_COP.1.Integrity_sessions	FDP_ITC.1 FDP_ITC.2 FCS_CKM.1	Satisfied by FCS_COP.1.Key_preparation FCS_COP.1.Signature_Encryption. When keys are required, they are generated or exchanged without being physically or logically accessible to hackers.
	FCS_CKM.4	Not applicable: keys are not physically or logically accessible to hackers. They therefore do not need to be deleted in any particular manner.



5.4.4 Satisfaction of SAR dependencies

The assurance level of the evaluation that is the focus of this security target is a standard augmented qualification of the components ALC_CMS.4 and ALC_CMC.4.

The dependency of AVA_VAN.3 with the components ADV_FSP.4, ADV_IMP.1 and ADV_TDS.3 is not satisfied by building an assurance package of the QS, or the current assurance package has been built to cover at least all the assurance components of the QS, so all the unsatisfied dependencies of the QS's assurance package will be taken as such.

Only the unsatisfied dependencies (if any) of augmentations made to the assurance package of the QS are justified (Cf. CC part 3 V3.1r3 page 225 of 232)

- ALC_CMS.4: There are no dependencies.
- ALC_CMC.4: Dependencies are satisfied by the components ALC_CMS.1, ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_DVS.1 included in the QS's assurance package.



6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATIONS

The aim of this section is to provide a high-level definition of IT security functions that are supposed to satisfy security functional requirements, and of security assurance measures taken to satisfy security assurance requirements.

6.1 IT security functions

The presentation of IT security functions follows the plan taken for the description of the TOE's security functional requirements.

6.1.1 Filter function

ASQ technology includes a dynamic packet filter engine (*stateful inspection*) with rule optimization allowing the safe and quick application of the **filter policy**. The implementation of the filter function is based on the comparison of the attributes of each IP packet received against the criteria of each rule in the active filter slot. Filtering applies to all packets without any exceptions. The criteria of filter rules are:

- The receiving or destination interface of IP packets covered by the rule;
- The machine(s) at the source of the information flows covered by the rule;
- The IP protocol(s), DSCP field, TCP/UDP services or types of ICMP messages of information flows covered by the rule;
- The destination machine(s) of information flows covered by the rule;

The attributes of IP packets that are compared against the first four criteria above are obviously taken from Ethernet, IP, ICMP, UDP or TCP frame headers.

Each filter rule may specify a control action and logging action. The latter is described in §6.1.4. There are five possible values for the control action:

- 'pass': the packet is accepted and not compared against the rules that follow;
- 'block': the packet is destroyed without the sender's knowledge and will not be compared against the rules that follow in the filter policy;
- 'reinitialize': the packet is destroyed and a TCP RST (for TCP) or ICMP unreachable (for UDP) signal will be sent to the sender;
- none: the packet is compared against the rules that follow (used only for specifying a logging action).
- 'delegate': the packet is compared against filter rules in the local slot (used for getting out of the evaluation of the global filter policy in order to allow delegating a subset of it to a local administrator via the local filter slot). This action is only available for rules in the global slot.

If no filter rule applies to the packet, or if the only ones that do have specified 'none' for the control action, the packet is destroyed without the sender's knowledge and will not be compared against the rules that follow in the filter policy.

It is important to note that, strictly speaking, for a set of IP packets linked to the same exchange at the transport layer (TCP connection, UDP or ICMP pseudo-connection), the Stormshield appliance only compares the initial packet from the exchange against rules of the current filter slot. Upon receiving any IP packet, prior to the application of rules from the current filter slot, the packet will be compared against currently established connections / pseudo-connections. If the attributes and parameters of the packet correspond to the criteria and status of one of these connections / **pseudo-connections**, it will be allowed to pass through without being subject to the filter rules. This mechanism allows in particular managing two-way exchanges (especially TCP connections) without having to define a filter rule in both directions on the firewall.

The firewall generates implicit filter rules together with the configuration of other security functions. This refers to the rules corresponding to: remote firewall administration and the setup of VPNs. At the same time, dynamic filter rules are also generated for protocols requiring child connections.

The filter policy is the result of a sequence of implicit rules, filter rules contained in the global filter policy (if there is one) then filter rules contained in the local filter policy.

Do note that at any moment while the Stormshield appliance is running, there is always an active **filter policy**.

Rationale: the filter function satisfies FDP_IFC.2 and FDP_IFF.1.Filtering.

6.1.2 Encryption function

The encryption function on the Stormshield appliance implements IPSec ESP to provide authentication and encryption services for datagrams exchanged with a VPN peer (or another Stormshield appliance) with equivalent features.

The authentication algorithms supported by the Stormshield appliance are: HMAC-SHA1 (160 bits) and HMAC-SHA2 (256, 384, 512 bits).

The encryption algorithms supported by the Stormshield appliance are: AES (128, 192 or 256 bits), Triple-DES (168 bits), Blowfish (128 to 256 bits) and CAST (128 bits).

The Stormshield appliance implements ESP in tunnel mode. This means that the encryption function may not necessarily be implemented on end-to-end traffic, but only on a portion of the network that supports the information flows, physically marked off by VPN peers, typically the uncontrolled network. On this portion, the IP datagrams that need to be protected are fully encrypted, signed and encapsulated in ESP datagrams whose source and destination IP addresses are the ones used for VPN peers. Therefore, the IP addresses of real traffic endpoint hosts will be inaccessible to hackers listening on the uncontrolled network. VPN peers are called tunnel endpoints, as opposed to real traffic endpoint hosts located “behind” VPN peers from the viewpoint of the uncontrolled network, and which are called traffic endpoints.




Illustration 6: ESP in tunnel mode.

In ESP, each datagram exchanged between two given VPN peers is attached to a one-way connection that implements security services, called the Security Association or SA. Each ESP datagram possesses a Security Policy Identifier or SPI which identifies the IPSec SA to which it is attached.

An IPSec SA specifies the encryption and authentication algorithms to be applied to the datagrams that it covers, as well as the associated secret keys. From the point of view of a VPN peer, an IPSec SA may either be incoming or outgoing.




Illustration 7: Contents of an ESP datagram

For a given two-way exchange (e.g.: a TCP connection), VPN peers set up a pair of IPSec SAs (one for each direction), each IPSec SA being outgoing for one peer and incoming for the other. The setup of IPSec SA pairs is the focus of a specific functional security set (cf. IKE phase2: setup of the IPSEC SA at §).

An IPSec SA has a lifetime that needs to be renegotiated after it expires. The VPN peer can also push for the re-negotiation of the IPSec SA by applying other criteria (e.g.: volume of data exchanged).

At any given moment, the Stormshield appliance is able to manage a multitude of IPSec SA pairs. It is relatively easy to find the incoming IPSec SA associated with an incoming ESP datagram (thanks to the security index), but for each outgoing IP datagram IP, the selection of the outgoing IPSec SA requires the comparison of the datagram's attributes against the criteria of each rule in the active encryption slot. The criteria of encryption rules⁵ are:

- The machine(s) at the source of the information flows covered by the rule;
- The IP protocol(s);
- The host(s) at the destination of the information flows covered by the rule.

Unlike the encryption function, if the outgoing IP datagram does not match any rule, it will continue checking against the other rules in the stack. It will then be subject to the filter function. Another difference: at any given moment, it is possible to not have any active encryption slot.

Every encryption rule is usually associated with an IPSec SA pair. If the outgoing IP datagram matches an encryption rule that has a valid outgoing IPSec SA, the processes of this IPSec SA will be applied to the datagram. Otherwise, the outgoing IPSec SA will be negotiated (or re-negotiated). If the negotiation fails, the packet will be destroyed.

The authenticity of incoming ESP datagrams is monitored before they are decrypted. Once they are decapsulated, the attributes of the IP packet obtained will also be checked to ensure that they do indeed comply with the criteria of the encryption rule associated with the IPSec SA.

It is important to note that we referred to IP or ESP “datagrams” throughout this section. Indeed, in fragmentation, outgoing IP packets or incoming ESP packets are reassembled before the application of the encryption function.

Note regarding application: DES (56 bits) and HMAC-MD5 (128 bits) algorithms are also supported but not excluded from the usage mode subject to evaluation. Likewise CAST and Blowfish algorithms can be configured with key sizes lower than 128 bits, but this deviates from the usage mode subject to evaluation.

⁵ Encryption rules can be considered to correspond to *Security Policy Database* entries in RFC 2401 [IPSec], apart from the fact that SPD, such as it is defined in the RFC, thoroughly covers encryption and filter rules.



Rationale: the encryption function satisfies FDP_IFC.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1 and FDP_IFF.1.Encryption.

The use of HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA2 algorithms for the IPsec SA's confidentiality services satisfies the section FCS_COP.1.Hashing which supports FDP_UIT.1.

The use of AES, Triple DES, Blowfish and CAST algorithms for the IPsec SA's confidentiality services satisfies the section FCS_COP.1.Encryption_VPN which supports FDP_UCT.1.

6.1.3 SA establishment function

IKE phase 2: establishment of IPsec SAs

The establishment of an IPsec SA between two VPN peers requires a phase to negotiate key parameters and establishment in order to ensure that both tunnel endpoints consistently apply the encryption rule associated with the IPsec SA. The negotiation of IPsec SAs is based on phase 2 of the IKE protocol [IKEv1, IKEv2].

The authentication algorithms that can be negotiated are SHA1 (160 bits) and SHA2 (256, 384 and 512 bits). The shared secret algorithm that can be negotiated is Diffie-Hellman with groups 14 – MODP 2048 bits, 15 – MODP 3072 bits, 16 – MODP 4096 bits [IKE-MODP]. The encryption algorithms that can be negotiated are AES (128, 192 or 256 bits), Triple DES (168 bits), Blowfish (128 à 256 bits) and CAST (128 bits).

As the responder, the Stormshield appliance selects a response that is at least as strict as its local proposals.

Note regarding application: the administrator may configure other policies, but they are excluded from the usage mode subject to evaluation.

Rationale: proposal-response messages satisfy FPT_TDC.1 regarding IPsec SAs. The IKE SA constitutes a trusted path (cf. IKE phase1: establishment of IKE SAs and mutual authentication at §SA establishment function) whose use, through phase 2 of the IKE, for the negotiation of IPsec SAs satisfies FTP_TRP.1.Peer.3.b.

The use of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm satisfies FCS_COP.1.Key_preparation regarding the section of this requirement which supports FIA_UAU.5.Peer.

The SHA1 and SHA2 algorithms are used, in compliance with RFC 2409, to generate the secret keys of the IPsec SA and authentication codes, which satisfies the section FCS_COP.1.Hashing which supports FTP_TRP.1.Peer. This algorithm is also used for the integrity services of the IKE SA (cf. §SA establishment function), which satisfies the section FCS_COP.1.Hashing which supports FTP_TRP.1.Peer.1.

The AES, Triple DES, Blowfish and CAST algorithms are used for the confidentiality services of the IKE SA (cf. §SA establishment function), which satisfies the section FCS_COP.1.Encryption_VPN which supports FTP_TRP.1.Peer.1.

IKE phase 1: establishment of IKE SAs and mutual authentication

The establishment of an IKE SA between two VPN peers requires the mutual authentication of VPN peers. This is followed by the phase in which the parameters and the establishment of secret keys for authentication, encryption and derivation of the IKE SA are negotiated, in order to sure that both tunnel endpoints consistently apply the communication protection rule.

In IKEv1 :

- The Xauth extension of the “Mode Config” protocol [IKE-MCFG] which is described in [IKE-XAUTH] allows the authentication of the IPsec “client” after phase 1. Xauth exchanges are consequently protected by the IKE SA that was set up. The level of security of the XAuth mode therefore essentially relies on the level in phase 1.



- The HybridAuth extension [ISAKMP-HAUTH] allows the asymmetrical authentication of peers during phase 1 of IPsec. It is therefore possible to have a peer proving his identity via an X.509 certificate, and another IPsec peer who proves his identity using a pre-shared secret, or even a peer who does not prove it at all during phase 1. The main advantage of this extension is its use in correlation with XAuth.
- IKE SAs can be negotiated in “main” mode as defined in phase 1 of the IKE protocol [IKEv1].

The table below specifies the nature of the login and the protection applied to the identity, according to the mode and authentication method:

Method Mode	pre-shared key	X509 certificate	HybridAuth+XAuth
IKEv1 'main' mode	Login: IP address Identity protection: encryption of the IKE SA.	Login: X509 certificate Identity protection: peer's public key.	Login: user's login Identity protection: peer's public key.
IKEv2	Login: IP address Identity protection: encryption of the IKE SA.	Login: X509 certificate Identity protection: peer's public key.	

Note regarding application: RSA and Diffie-Hellman algorithms with keys strictly lower than 2048 bits as well as the negotiation of the IKE SA in “aggressive” mode are also supported but excluded from the usage mode subject to evaluation.

Rationale: the trusted path specified by the component FTP_TRP.1.Peer is implemented by phase 1 of the IKE, which satisfies the element FTP_TRP.1.Peer.2. Mutual authentication, which guarantees the identification of endpoints (element FTP_TRP.1.Peer.1), is established at the end of the last pass in each mode. The confidentiality and integrity services (element FTP_TRP.1.Peer.1) are effective after the fifth message in main mode. The use of the trusted path for the initial mutual authentication of VPN peers satisfies FTP_TRP.1.Peer.3.a.

Both authentication mechanisms are those specified by FIA_UAU.5.Peer.

Proposal-response messages satisfy FPT_TDC.1 regarding IKE SAs.

The use of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm satisfies FCS_COP.1.Key_preparation regarding the section of this requirement which supports FIA_UAU.5.Peer.

In X509 mode, the use of the RSA algorithm satisfies FCS_COP.1.Signature_Encryption.

The SHA1 and SHA2 algorithms are used, in compliance with RFC 2409, to generate the secret keys and authentication codes, which satisfies the section FCS_COP.1.Hashing which supports FIA_UAU.5.Peer. This algorithm is also used for the integrity services of the IKE SA, which satisfies the section FCS_COP.1.Hashing which supports FTP_TRP.1.Peer.1.

The AES, Triple DES, Blowfish and CAST algorithms are used for the confidentiality services of the IKE SA, which satisfies the section FCS_COP.1.Encryption_VPN which supports FTP_TRP.1.Peer.1.

6.1.4 Log, audit and alarm function

Log function

The Stormshield appliance – depending on the model – may or may not store audit events locally, especially models in the S build family (SN200 to SN300), which only have the possibility of sending them via Syslog. Where local storage is not possible, the Stormshield appliance will manage a certain number log files meant for collecting events detected by the log function. The files involved in security events are:

- Filter: events relating to the application of the filter function;
- VPN: events relating to the establishment of SAs;
- Alarms: events relating to the application of the intrusion prevention function;
- Histo Manager: events relating to the authentication of administrators and security administration operations;



- System: startup/shutdown of the log function. More generally: this is the log that will record events relating directly to the system: startup/shutdown of the appliance, system errors, etc. shutting down and starting the log function correspond to shutting down and starting the daemons that generate logs.

All log files share a global storage space. The administrator who has '*+M' privileges may specify the maximum percentage that each of the log files can occupy in this total space. When the maximum limit is reached, the Stormshield appliance will perform one of the three actions configured for each file:

- Rotate files: the most recent logs will erase the oldest logs,
- Stop writing files: logs will no longer be recorded on the firewall,
- Shut down the firewall: the firewall will not exactly shut down but will block all information flows except connections by Web Manager from the internal network.

Rationale: the log function satisfies FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2. The detailed justification of the satisfaction of each requirement placed on audit information saved in each type of log will be provided during the evaluation. Limits on the size of log files and the associated actions satisfy the requirement FAU_STG.3 for these files.

Audit function

The audit function on Firewall Reporter allows the auditor to display the events stored in each log file by:

Selecting from periods predefined in relation to the current date ('today', 'this week, etc.) or defined manually;

Sorting (ascending/descending order) by the value of each field in recorded security events;

Hierarchical grouping according to the value of one or several fields in recorded security events;

The Firewall Monitor also allows viewing the most recent events.

Rationale: the audit function satisfies FMT_SMF.1.c, FAU_SAR.1.

Alarm function

The alarm function allows – after recording a security event that has an alarm level – displaying the alarm in Firewall Monitor.

Rationale: the alarm function satisfies FAU_ARP.1.Alarms.

6.1.5 Intrusion prevention function

ASQ technology includes an intrusion prevention system (IPS) allowing the detection of attacks:

Without context, meaning that they use only one IP packet;

With connection context, meaning that they involve the analysis of several packets associated with the same TCP connection / UDP or ICMP pseudo-connection;

or with a global context, meaning that they require the contexts of several TCP connections / UDP or ICMP pseudo-connections to be cross-referenced.

A plugin-based technology allows carrying out checks at the application level with the aim of implementing RFC compliance, adhesion to best practices and the prevention of known attacks on application servers.

Details of potential attacks detected are provided in Appendix B, §8. For each of these attacks, the administrator with 'As+M' privileges may define whether incriminated packets have to be sent or destroyed and whether there is a need to generate a security event possessing a level of alarm automatically saved in the 'Alarms' log.



Rationale: the intrusion prevention system satisfies the requirements of FAU_SAA.4. Appendix B, §8 associates each potential attack with six types listed in FAU_SAA.4.1. The indication of a potential attack (FAU_SAA.4.3) may be represented by an action on the incriminated packet (which satisfies FAU_ARP.IPS.1.a) and/or the generation of an alarm (which satisfies FAU_ARP.IPS.1.b).

6.1.6 Function controlling access to administration operations

In order to allow several persons to access the Stormshield appliance, the super-administrator may assign reading or writing privileges to users defined in the local base, which makes them administrators.

All administration privileges are listed in Appendix A §7

The particular privilege BASE (B) serves as an explicit administrator role. Users who do not have the 'B' privilege are not considered administrators and cannot open administration sessions.

The MODIFY (M) privilege complements all other privileges assigned to an administrator in order to allow him to read and modify security data.

There is a second data modification privilege reserved for Monitoring (MW). This privilege allows administrators, through the real-time monitor, to perform operations without interfering with an administrator who has the M privilege and is logged on to the Stormshield appliance at the same time.

For each basic security administration operation, the necessary privileges are defined in detail (details are given during the examination of the high-level design). All security administration operations performed by administrators are therefore covered by the access control policy that these privileges implement.

The account whose login is 'admin' is always defined by default and is not managed in the local base. This account is called the "super-administrator". It possesses all privileges as well as a special ADMIN (A) privileges, and is the only one able to perform certain operations (creating a user and assigning administration privileges to him, restoring the configuration, etc.)

Note regarding application: Please be reminded that in the usage mode that is the focus of the evaluation, the super-administrator is not supposed to log on to the Stormshield appliance during production except for the promotion of a user to administrator.

Rationale: the privilege system described above satisfies the requirements of FMT_SMF.1.a, FMT_MTD.1 and FMT_MOF.1. The fact that all security administration operations are subject to access control satisfies FDP_ACC.2. The definition of administrators and super-administrator given above satisfies FMT_SMR.1.1. The association of the 'admin' account with the super-administrator satisfies FMT_SMR.1.2.a. The need to assign the 'B' privilege explicitly to administrators satisfies FMT_SMR.1.2.b.

6.1.7 Backup and restoration function

The administrator with the 'Ma' privilege can back up in a file on the administration workstation either the full configuration or a sub-set.

Sub-sets may be one of the following examples:

- The network configuration of the Stormshield appliance (addresses of the Firewall, routers, etc); ;
- Objects (hosts, networks, services and each group);
- The filter rules;
- LDAP base (local user base).

Restoring the configuration from a backup requires modification (M) privileges in addition to maintenance (Ma) privileges.



The backup file may also be secured by encryption. In this case, the restoration of the backup requires the restitution of the encryption key.

Rationale: the backup and restoration function satisfies FMT_SMF.1.d and FMT_MTD.BRS.

6.1.8 Administration session protection function

Encryption and authentication of administration sessions

Sessions set up between the administration tool (Web Manager) and the Stormshield appliance are encrypted with the AES 128 to 256 bit algorithm. The confidentiality of their contents is protected.

The integrity of the contents of administration sessions is monitored with the help of the HMAC-SHA2 algorithm, with a key length of 256 or 384 bits.

The authentication and encryption keys of remote administration sessions are derived from the session key set up during the establishment of a TLS channel, whether it is with or without mutual authentication by X.509 certificate (Web Manager).

Note - the exact list of TLS cypher suites available is :

- ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
- DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256
- ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
- DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
- ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
- DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256
- ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384
- DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256

Rationale: the AES 128/256 bit encryption of administration sessions satisfies FPT_ITT.1 and FCS_COP.1.Encryption_sessions. The integrity control by HMAC-SHA2 256/384 bits satisfies FPT_ITT.1 and FCS_COP.1.Integrity_sessions. The need for the administrator to authenticate by login / password through the TLS protocol, or to authenticate by X.509 certificate through the TLS protocol satisfies FMT_SMF.1.b, FTP_TRP.1.Admin.3.b.

Authentication of administrators and preparation of the encryption key by the TLS protocol

The TLS protocol [TLS] allows a “client” (in our case: administration tools such as Web Manager) to authenticate a “server” (the Stormshield appliance) and to authenticate (optional) with the same server. In both cases, the TLS protocol also allows negotiating a session key used for protecting later exchanges.

When the profile of each administrator is being created, the authentication method that will be used can be specified (login / password or X.509 certificate)

Note regarding application: further detail is given in RFC 2246 [TLS]. In Web Manager’s use of the TLS protocol, the connection is set up by the web browser on the administration workstation which is out of scope. Likewise the TLS protocol itself is outside the scope of this evaluation.

Rationale: the trusted path between the administrator and the Stormshield appliance specified par FTP_TRP.1.Admin is implemented by the TLS protocol, as specified by FIA_UAU.5.Admin. In this protocol, the authentication initiative returns to the administrator, which satisfies FTP_TRP.1.Admin.2. Mutual authentication, which guarantees the identification of endpoints (element FTP_TRP.1.Admin.1), is established in the TLS protocol (when X.509 certificates are used) or after the TLS connection has been set up (if a login/password has been used). The use of the trusted path for the initial mutual authentication of the administrator and the Stormshield appliance satisfies FTP_TRP.1.Admin.3.a and FMT_SMF.1.b

The use of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm with ephemeral keys with 2048-bit entropy satisfies FCS_COP.1.Key_preparation regarding the section of this requirement which supports FIA_UAU.5.Admin.



6.1.9 Other supporting functions

The cryptographic function is presented with functional security sub-sets that it supports, as well as the justification of the various basic requirements specified by FCS_COP.1.

The Stormshield appliance's internal clock provides a reliable time base (FPT_STM.1). Only the super-administrator is allowed to modify it.



7 APPENDIX A – ADMINISTRATION PRIVILEGES

This section aims to list all administration privileges on the Stormshield appliance that could be assigned to users, as defined in FMT_MOF.1.1 and FMT_MTD.1.1

Privileges regarding functions or security data:

- **ADMIN (A)**: super-administrator (“admin” login)
- **BASE (B)**: minimum administration, all access necessary for administration
- **LOG (L)**: access to log files and the audit function.
- **LOG_READ (LR)**: access log files and the audit function in read-only mode.
- **FILTER (F)**: access to filter slots.
- **FILTER_READ (FR)**: access to filter slots in read-only mode.
- **GLOBALFILTER (GF)**: access to the filter slots of the global configuration.
- **VPN (V)**: access to VPN slots, pre-shared keys, certificate (Stormshield appliance).
- **VPN_READ (VR)**: access to VPN slots, pre-shared keys, certificate (Stormshield appliance) in read-only mode.
- **OBJECT (O)**: adding and deleting objects (network configuration).
- **GLOBALOBJECT (GO)**: adding and deleting objects of the global configuration.
- **USER (U)**: user management.
- **NETWORK (N)**: management of the network configuration (interfaces, bridges, dialups, VLANs, etc)
- **ROUTE (R)**: management of routing (default route, static routes, trusted networks)
- **ASQ (As)**: consultation of the ASQ stateful engine’s configuration
- **MAINTENANCE (Ma)**: access to maintenance operations
- **MODIFY (M)**: modification of security data including configuration.
- **MON_WRITE (MW)**: modification of data reserved for Monitoring.
- **CONTENT_FILTERING (CF)**: definition of application filter policies (url, smtp, antispam, antivirus, and ssl).

Other privileges that do not concern security functions or data:

- **PKI**: management of the internal PKI (issuance, revocation, etc)
- **HA**: high availability (internal, prohibited to users).
- **PVM**: vulnerability management (consultation, modification)
- **REPORTING (R)**: access to embedded rapports.
- **REPORTING_READ (RR)**: access to embedded rapports in read-only mode.



8 APPENDIX B – ATTACKS HANDLED BY ASQ

This section aims to list all attacks that the ASQ filter engine handles and to associate them to the types of attacks defined by the basic requirement FAU_SAA.4.1.

Level of analysis	Attack name	Id	Type of attack
IP	IP loopback address spoofing	0	a
	IP address spoofing	1	a
	Broadcast Packet	2	b
	Multicast Packet	3	b
	Address from experimental class	4	b
	Bad IP options	5	b
	Unknown IP options	6	b
	Unanalyzed IP protocol	7	b
	Unknown internal network host	8	b
	Oversized fragment	9	b
	Overlapped fragment	10	b
	Multicast address with TCP	18	b
	Land style attack	21	b
	Source routing	23	b
	Detection of the filter policy	26	e
	Possible port scan	27	e
	Zero sized fragment received	33	b
	Tiny fragment	57	b
	Port probe	63	e
	IP address spoofing on bridge	70	a
	Broadcast address with TCP	71	b
	Filter alarm	72	-
	"Link local" addresses (RFC 3330)	83	b
	Broadcast address used in source address	89	b
	Possible attack on resources	91	b
	Invalid IP protocol	92	b
	Blacklisted address	93	-
	Whitelisted address	94	-
	Packet for destination on the same interface	95	-
	Wrong IP checksum	96	b
	Quality of service drop	101	-
	IP fragment analyze	102	-
IP address spoofing on IPSec interface	108	a	
Connection lost	210	-	
TCP	Invalid TCP option	14	b
	Unknown TCP option	15	b
	Wrong TCP sequence number	16	b
	Wrong TCP checksum	17	b
	Xmas tree attack	20	b
	Nmap OS probe	24	e



<i>Level of analysis</i>	<i>Attack name</i>	<i>Id</i>	<i>Type of attack</i>
	Queso OS probe	25	e
	Possible TCP SYN flooding	29	f
	Port 0 used as service	34	b
	Windows OOB data bug	35	d
	Possible small MSS attack	36	b
	Misplaced TCP option	58	b
	TCP data evasion	65	b
	TCP data queue overflow	84	b
	Interactive connection detection	85	b
	Invalid TCP packet for current connection state	97	b
	Invalid TCP protocol	98	b
	Datatracking problem	99	-
	Unauthorized protocol detected	110	-
	Urgent unauthorized data in TCP information flows	162	c
	Desynchronization of TCP information flows	211	b
	Managed by synproxy	212	-
	Desynchronization status of TCP information flows	213	b
	Cisco WAN information flow optimizer detected	247	-
	Possible TCP request flooding	253	f
	RFC 2385 MD5 signature for TCP	302	d
	Number of connections allowed per host reached	364	f
	Number of connections allowed per host per interval reached	365	f
UDP	Possible UDP flooding	29	f
	UDP port loopback	31	b
	Port 0 used as service	34	b
	Invalid UDP checksum	73	b
	Datatracking problem	99	-
	Invalid UDP protocol	100	b
	Unauthorized protocol detected	110	-
	Possible UDP request flooding	253	f
ICMP	Unknown ICMP type	11	b
	ICMP reply without request	12	b
	ICMP redirect	22	b
	Possible ICMP flooding	28	f
	XProbe OS probe	66	e
	Invalid ICMP message	67	b
	ICMP 'timestamp' request	68	b
	ICMP 'mask' request	69	b
	Invalid ICMP checksum	75	b
	Possible small MTU attack	81	b
	ICMP 'information' request	103	b
	Allowed by ICMP analyze	107	b
	Modification of ECHO ICMP data	109	b
	Protocol not analyzed in an ICMP message	112	b
IGMP	Unknown IGMP type	19	c
	Non-multicast address in IGMP query	61	c
	Invalid IGMP packet	62	c
	Invalid IGMP checksum	74	c
DNS	DNS label recursion	32	d
	DNS id spoofing	38	c
	DNS zone change	39	c
	DNS zone update	40	c
	DNS cache poisoning	60	d



<i>Level of analysis</i>	<i>Attack name</i>	<i>Id</i>	<i>Type of attack</i>
	Bad pointer in packet	86	c
	Possible buffer overflow using DNS string	87	c
	Bad DNS protocol	88	c
	Contradictory DNS query field	151	c
	Targeted DNS spoofing	152	c
	Possible 'DNS rebinding' attack	154	c
	Duplicated DNS response	159	c
FTP	Possible FTP bounce attack	37	d
	FTP PASV insertion attack	41	c
	Unknown FTP command	42	c
	Buffer overflow on FTP USER/PASSWORD	43	d
	Buffer overflow on FTP command	44	d
	Brute force attack on FTP password	45	c
	Command execution using SITE EXEC	46	c
	FTP PASV DoS	59	c
	Invalid FTP Protocol	76	c
	Invalid PORT command	123	c
	User not allowed	313	-
	Blacklisted user	314	-
HTTP	Invalid %u encoding char in URL	47	c
	Evasion using %u encoding char in URL	48	d
	Invalid escaped char in URL	49	c
	Escaped NULL char in URL	50	d
	Escaped percent char in URL	51	d
	Evasion using UTF-8 encoding	52	d
	Invalid HTTP protocol	53	c
	Possible buffer overflow on URL	54	d
	Possible buffer overflow on HTTP request	55	d
	Tunneling using CONNECT method	56	c
	Multiple slashes in URL	78	d
	Directory self-reference	79	c
	Directory traversal	80	c
	Bad UTF-8 encoding in URL	82	c
	Possible malicious code in HTTP header	90	d
	Directory traversal outside root folder	124	d
	Bounce by redirect	148	d
	304 response with data	149	c
	Additional data at end of reply	150	c
	HTTP parameter pollution attempt	160	d
	Unicode character to change reading direction in HTTP URL	161	d
	Too many HTTP headers in request	232	c
	Unexpected HTTP/1.1 response for this User-Agent	242	c
	Decoding of HTML field failed, invalid code	243	c
	Recursion detected in decoding of HTML field	244	c
	HTTP redirection to local file	249	d
	Too many ranges in HTTP request	251	c
	Malformed ranges in HTTP request	252	c
	Compressed HTTP content	254	d
	The URL contains non-ASCII "8bit in request" characters	256	c
	RFC 2817 method TLS UPGRADE detected	300	d
	RFC 6455 method WebSocket UPGRADE detected	301	d
	Capacity exceeded in an HTML attribute	303	c
SIP	Invalid SIP protocol	131	c



<i>Level of analysis</i>	<i>Attack name</i>	<i>Id</i>	<i>Type of attack</i>
	Overflow in SIP protocol	132	c
	Possible malicious code in SIP header	133	c
	Missing necessary SIP header	134	c
	Spoofed SIP request	135	c
	Missing necessary SDP field in the SIP protocol	136	c
	Invalid SIP expires field	137	c
	Bad UTF-8 encoding in the SIP protocol	138	c
	SIP operation limit exceeded	139	d
	Missing purpose parameter in the SIP protocol	140	c
	Bad Via field in the SIP protocol	141	c
	Binary packet in the SIP protocol	142	c
	Invalid value in SIP Max-Forward header	153	c
	Missing SIP Max-Forwards header	248	c
	The SIP request contains an invalid "Contact field" "From field" URI	306	c
SMTP	Invalid SMTP protocol	121	c
	Invalid characters in SMTP header	122	c
	Overflow in the SMTP protocol	217	c
	Invalid parameters for the SMTP BDAT command	218	c
	Empty SMTP command line or response	219	c
	Invalid base64 data in an AUTH SMTP command SMTP	220	c
	SMTP DATA command with parameters	221	c
	SMTP command not supported by the server	223	c
	SMTP BDAT command disabled	224	-
	Exchange Server SMTP commands disabled	225	-
	SMTP EXPN command used	226	e
	SMTP VRFY command used	227	e
	SMTP TURN, ATRN, ETRN commands disabled	228	-
	Forbidden SMTP command found	229	c
	SMTP message with too many header bytes	230	c
	SMTP subject header contains non-ASCII characters	231	c
	Brute force attack on SMTP authentication	255	-
	Sending of e-mail through an anonymous SMTP connection	305	-



9 APPENDIX C – IDENTIFICATION OF OPERATIONS PERFORMED ON IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

This section aims to accurately identify the operations performed on IT security requirements, as required by ASE_REQ.2.3C. It must be considered “the list of IT security requirements provided as part of the ST”, required by ASE_REQ.2.1D,

9.1 Introduction

In addition to the four types of operations defined in the Common Criteria (cf. [CC-01], § C.4, p. 77), two additional types of modifications to the original version of IT security requirements have been introduced:

Systematic refinement: this refers to a uniform refinement of all the elements of a component;

Layout: this refers to the transformation of the grammatical structure of an element, to make it more legible, or to delete superfluous text without changing the meaning of the element in any way. This corresponds to the concept of *editorial refinement* set out in [CC-01], § C4.4, p. 80.

Les opérations ont été effectuées sur le texte anglais original des exigences de sécurité des TI, mais elles ont pour effet de remplacer ces termes anglais par des termes français, et/ou à ajouter des termes français à un patron original en anglais. Malgré leur difficulté d'emploi, ces exigences en « franglais » constituent en tout état de cause l'élément de preuve requis par l'élément ASE_REQ.2.1D, alors que les exigences énoncées au §5.2 du présent document ne sont qu'une reformulation du contenu de cette section, fournie dans le but de faciliter la compréhension de l'énoncé des exigences de sécurité des TI.

In the identification of operations, refinements that consist of substituting one term with another, assignments and selections are identified by the symbol “:=”. Refinements that consist of adding text are identified by the symbol “+”. Format changes are identified by the symbol “→” for substitutions and “” for deletions.

Iterations are identifiable with the help of labels, as explained in §5.1.2.

IT security requirements are presented as follows:

- For each component used, the systematic refinements made to the elements of this component,
- For each element of the component:
 - The original text of the element in English, as extracted from [CC-02] or [CC-03],
 - The list of operations performed on the element.



9.2 Security requirements for the TOE

This section presents the functional requirements of the TOE according to a formal description. The link to chapter 5 is made by maintaining the same title for the functional requirements concerned.

9.2.1 Information flow control requirements

Filter function

FDP_IFC.2 – Full filtering of information flows

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the filter function</i>
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FDP_IFC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects and information] and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.

Assignment	<i>information flow control SFP:= the filter policy</i>
Assignment	<i>list of subjects and information:= devices on networks interconnected by the Stormshield appliance (subjects) and IP packets (information)</i>
Refinement	<i>all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP:= all transfers (operations) of IP packets between devices on networks interconnected by the Stormshield appliance</i>
Layout	<i>devices on networks interconnected by the Stormshield appliance, IP packets and all transfers of IP packets between the devices on networks interconnected by the Stormshield appliance → Incoming IP packets</i>

FDP_IFC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.

Refinement + layout	<i>all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE:= all transfers of packets and devices on networks interconnected by the Stormshield appliance → all Incoming IP packets</i>
Refinement	<i>an information flow control SFP:= the filter policy</i>

FDP_IFF.1.Filtering – Filter function

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the filter function</i>
Systematic refinement	<i>information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation:= Incoming IP packets</i>

FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes].

Assignment	<i>information flow control SFP:= the filter policy</i>
Refinement + layout	<i>subject and information:= devices on networks interconnected by the Stormshield appliance (subjects), IP packets (information) → Incoming IP packets</i>



Assignment	<p><i>list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and, for each, the security attributes :=</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The receiving interface, b. The destination interface, c. The source and destination IP address of the packet and, based on that, the source and destination host of the packet, d. The IP protocol number, e. The value of the DSCP field, f. If the protocol is TCP or UDP: the source and destination port, g. If the protocol is ICMP: the 'type' and 'code' fields of the message.
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FDP_IFF.1.2 *The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes].*

Assignment	<p><i>for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes :=</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Prior to the application of filter rules, the packet is compared against all connections / pseudo-connections currently established and having been authorized by the filter rules; b. If the packet corresponds to one of these connections / pseudo-connections, it will be allowed to pass through without being subject to filter rules; c. Otherwise, the packet will be allowed if the action of the first applicable filter rule is 'pass'.
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FDP_IFF.1.3 *The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules].*

Assignment	<p><i>additional information flow control SFP rules :=</i></p> <p>the following complementary rules:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The filter rules whose action is 'none' serve only to generate audit logs and are not taken into account in packet filtering. b. the only purpose of filter rules with a 'delegate' action is to skip the evaluation of the end of the global filter slot to go back to the beginning of the local slot and are not taken into account in packet filtering.
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FDP_IFF.1.4 *The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise information flows].*

Assignment	<p><i>rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise information flows :=</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Sessions associated with protocols requiring child connections are tracked so that these child connections will be authorized according to the status of the main session; b. The firewall can generate implicit filter rules together with the configuration of other security functions. This refers to the rules corresponding to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. the remote administration of the firewall, ii. VPN establishment.
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FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows].

Assignment	rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows := a. The action of the first applicable filter rule is 'block' or 'reinitialize'; b. No filter rule has allowed the packet.
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Encryption function

FDP_IFC.1 – Encryption of information flows

Systematic refinement	The TSF:= the encryption function
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FDP_IFC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects, information, and operations that cause controlled information to flow to and from controlled subjects covered by the SFP].

Assignment	information flow control SFP:= the encryption policy
Assignment + layout	list of subjects, information, and operations that cause controlled information to flow to and from controlled subjects covered by the SFP:= VPN peers and traffic endpoints (TOE side and VPN peer side) (subject), incoming ESP datagrams and outgoing IP datagrams covered by an encryption policy (information), reception of incoming ESP datagrams originating from VPN peers and sending of outgoing IP datagrams covered by an encryption policy (operations)→ incoming ESP datagrams and outgoing IP datagrams covered by an encryption rule

FDP_UCT.1 – Confidentiality of the contents of information flows

Systematic refinement	The TSF:= the encryption function
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FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to [selection: transmit, receive] user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.

Assignment	access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s):= the encryption policy
Selection	transmit, receive:= transmit and receive
Refinement	user data:= IP datagrams

FDP_UIT.1 – Integrity of the contents of information flows

Systematic refinement	The TSF:= the encryption function
-----------------------	-----------------------------------

FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to [selection: transmit, receive] user data in a manner protected from [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay] errors.

Assignment	access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s):= the encryption policy
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Selection	<i>transmit, receive:= transmit and receive</i>
Refinement	<i>user data:= IP datagrams</i>
Selection	<i>modification, deletion, insertion, replay:= modification, insertion, replay</i>

FDP_UIT.1.2 *The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether [selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay] has occurred.*

Refinement	<i>user data:= incoming ESP datagrams</i>
Selection	<i>modification, deletion, insertion, replay:= modification, insertion, replay</i>

FDP_IFF.1.Encryption – Encryption function

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the encryption function</i>
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FDP_IFF.1.1 *The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes].*

Assignment	<i>information flow control SFP:= the encryption policy</i>
Refinement + layout	<i>subject and information:= VPN peers and traffic endpoints (TOE side and VPN peer side) (subject), incoming ESP datagrams and outgoing IP datagrams covered by an encryption policy (information)→ incoming ESP datagrams and outgoing IP datagrams covered by an encryption rule</i>
Assignment	<i>list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes:=Incoming ESP datagrams: a. The Security Parameter Index (SPI), Outgoing IP datagrams: b. The source and destination IP address of the packet and, based on that, the source and destination host of the packet, c. The type of IP protocol.</i>

FDP_IFF.1.2 *The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes].*

Refinement	<i>information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation:= incoming ESP packet</i>
Assignment	<i>for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes := a. an incoming ESP datagram can be attached to an active incoming IPsec SA, b. the packet encapsulate in the ESP datagram corresponds to the criteria of the encryption rule associated with the IPsec SA.</i>

FDP_IFF.1.3 *The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules].*

Assignment	<i>additional information flow control SFP rules:= the following complementary rules: a. on outgoing IP datagrams, use effective authentication and</i>
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	<p>encryption algorithms specified by the outgoing IPsec SA associated with the first applicable encryption rule.</p> <p>b. launch a renegotiation attempt if an outgoing IP datagram is covered by an encryption rule without an active IPsec SA. The datagram will be destroyed if the negotiation fails.</p>
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FDP_IFF.1.4 *The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise information flows].*

Assignment	<i>rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise information flows:= No rule</i>
Layout	From the element

FDP_IFF.1.5 *The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows].*

Assignment	<i>rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows:= No rule</i>
Layout	From the element

SA establishment function

FTP_TRP.1.Peer – Trusted path with VPN peers

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the SA establishment function</i>
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FTP_TRP.1.1 *The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [selection: remote, local] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [selection: modification, disclosure, [assignment: other types of integrity or confidentiality violation]].*

Selection	<i>remote, local:= remote</i>
Refinement	<i>Itself := the StormShield appliance</i>
Refinement	<i>remote users:= VPN peers</i>
Assignment	<i>other types of integrity or confidentiality violation:= none</i>
Selection	<i>modification, disclosure, none:= modification or disclosure</i>

FTP_TRP.1.2 *The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, local users, remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path.*

Selection	<i>the TSF, local users, remote users:= the TSF and remote users</i>
Refinement	<i>the TSF and remote users:= the Stormshield appliance and VPN peers</i>
Refinement	<i>communication via the trusted path:= the establishment of the trusted path corresponds to phase 1 of the IKE protocol.</i>

FTP_TRP.1.3 *The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection: initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required]].*

Selection	<i>initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required] := a. initial user authentication,</i>
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	<i>other services for which trusted path is required]</i>
Refinement	<i>initial user authentication:= the initial mutual authentication of tunnel endpoints (phase 1 of the IKE protocol)</i>
Assignment	<i>other services for which trusted path is required:= the negotiation of IPSec SAs (phase 2 of the IKE protocol)</i>

FIA_UAU.5.Peer – Multiple authentication mechanisms of VPN peers

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the SA establishment function</i>
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FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms] to support user authentication.

Assignment	<i>list of multiple authentication mechanisms := the following authentication mechanisms: X509 certificates, pre-shared keys</i>
Refinement	<i>user:= the VPN peer of a given tunnel, in the scope of the initial mutual authentication of this tunnel's endpoints during phase 1 of the IKE.</i>

FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication].

Assignment + layout	<i>rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication:= rules of the authentication mechanism specified for the VPN tunnel → the authentication mechanism specified for the VPN tunnel</i>
Refinement	<i>user:= VPN peer</i>

FPT_TDC.1 – Negotiation of IKE and IPSec SAs

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the SA establishment function</i>
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FPT_TDC.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret [assignment: list of TSF data types] when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product.

Assignment	<i>list of TSF data types:= parameters of ISKAMP and IPSec SAs</i>
Refinement	<i>consistently interpret parameters of ISKAMP and IPSec SAs:= negotiate the parameters of ISKAMP and IPSec SAs</i>
Refinement	<i>when shared between the TSF and another trusted IT product:= when establishing VPN tunnels between the Stormshield appliance and VPN peers</i>

FPT_TDC.1.2 The TSF shall use [assignment: list of interpretation rules to be applied by the TSF] when interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product.

Assignment	<i>list of interpretation rules to be applied by the TSF:= the following rules: a. If the Stormshield appliance is the initiator, propose the parameters of the IKE or IPSEC SA, and accept the responses that are as strict as one of the proposals made; b. If the Stormshield appliance is the responder, accept only proposals that are as strict as one of the local proposals.</i>
Refinement	<i>interpreting the TSF data from another trusted IT product:= negotiate IKE or IPSEC SA parameters with VPN peers</i>

**Log, audit and alarm function**FAU_GEN.1 – Generation of audit data

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the log function</i>
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FAU_GEN.1.1 *The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:*

- a) *Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;*
- b) *All auditable events for the [selection: choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] level of audit; and*
- c) *[assignment: other specifically defined auditable events].*

Selection	<i>minimum, basic, detailed, not specified := not specified</i>
Layout	<i>From Item b)</i>
Assignment	<i>other specifically defined auditable events:= auditable events listed in the table in chapter 5.2 after FAU_GEN.1.2</i>
Refinement	<i>audit functions:= log function</i>

FAU_GEN.1.2 *The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:*

- a) *Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable) and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and*
- b) *For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: other audit relevant information]*

Refinement	<i>subject identity:= source IP address</i>
Assignment	<i>other audit relevant information:= alarm level (if it is an alarm), complementary audit information listed in the table in chapter 5.2</i>
Layout	<i>“Factoring” of “alarm level (if it is an alarm)”</i>

FAU_GEN.2 – User identification

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the log function</i>
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FAU_GEN.2.1 *For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.*

Refinement	<i>user := administrator</i>
Refinement	<i>auditable event:= auditable event linked to security administration operations</i>

FAU_SAR.1 – Audit review

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the audit function</i>
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FAU_SAR.1.1 *The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to read [assignment: list of audit information] from the audit records.*

Assignment	<i>authorised users:= auditors</i>
Assignment	<i>list of audit information:= all audit information</i>



Refinement	<i>audit records:= log files</i>
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FAU_SAR.1.2 The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.

Refinement	<i>audit records:= log files</i>
Refinement	<i>user:= auditor</i>

FAU_STG.3 – Action in the event of possible loss of audit data

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the log function</i>
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FAU_STG.3.1 The TSF shall [assignment: actions to be taken in case of possible audit storage failure] if the audit trail exceeds [assignment: pre-defined limit].

Assignment	<i>actions to be taken in case of possible audit storage failure := one of the following actions: a. Rotate files: the most recent audit logs erase the oldest audit logs, b. Stop writing files: audit logs are no longer recorded, c. Shut down the firewall: the Stormshield appliance does not really shut down but blocks all information flows except Web Manager’s administration sessions from the internal network.</i>
Refinement	<i>audit trail:= an existing log file (excluding the use of Syslog)</i>
Assignment	<i>pre-defined limit:= exceeds 5 MB.</i>

FAU_ARP.1.Alarms – Automatic response to alarms

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the alarm function</i>
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FAU_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [assignment: list of actions] upon detection of a potential security violation.

Assignment	<i>list of actions:= transmit the alarm to connected real-time monitors</i>
Refinement	<i>detection of a potential security violation:= generation of an audit log to which an alarm level has been assigned</i>

9.2.2 Requirements of protection from Internet attacks

Intrusion prevention function

FAU_SAA.4 – Heuristics of complex attacks

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the intrusion prevention function</i>
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FAU_SAA.4.1 The TSF shall be able to maintain an internal representation of the following event sequences of known intrusion scenarios [assignment: list of sequences of system events whose occurrence are representative of known penetration scenarios] and the following signature events [assignment: a subset of system events] that may indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.

Refinement	<i>internal representation:= knowledge base</i>
Layout	<i>the following event sequences of known intrusion scenarios [assignment: list of sequences of system events whose occurrence</i>



	<p><i>are representative of known penetration scenarios] and the following signature events [assignment: a subset of system events] that may indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.</i></p> <p><i>→ the following signature events and event sequences of known intrusion scenarios [assignment: list of system events or sequences of system events whose occurrence are representative of known penetration scenarios] that may indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.</i></p>
Assignment	<p><i>list of system events or sequences of system events whose occurrence are representative of known penetration scenarios := the following attack types:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. IP packets whose source addresses are inconsistent with the receiving interface, b. packets, datagrams or IP, ICMP, IGMP, TCP or UDP segments that do not comply with the RFCs, or abuse of the possibilities offered by these protocols, c. application commands, requests or responses that do not comply with the general syntax of commands/requests/responses defined by the RFCs, or abuse of the possibilities offered by these, d. attacks based on known vulnerabilities of application servers, e. attempts to retrieve information concerning the configuration of application servers (<i>fingerprinting, port scanning, etc.</i>), f. exceeding the number of connections opened for a filter rule.
Refinement	<p><i>potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs:= potential internet attack</i></p>

FAU_SAA.4.2 *The TSF shall be able to compare the signature events and event sequences against the record of system activity discernible from an examination of [assignment: information to be used to determine system activity].*

Refinement	<p><i>signature events and event sequences:= types of attacks in the knowledge base</i></p>
Assignment	<p><i>information to be used to determine system activity:= incoming and outgoing IP packets</i></p>
Refinement	<p><i>the record of system activity discernible from an examination of incoming and outgoing IP packets:= the status of one or several contexts associated with each incoming and outgoing packet</i></p>

FAU_SAA.4.3 *The TSF shall be able to indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs when system activity is found to match a signature event or event sequence that indicates a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.*

Refinement	<p><i>potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs:= potential internet attack</i></p>
Refinement	<p><i>system activity:= the status of one or several contexts associated with an incoming packet</i></p>
Refinement	<p><i>signature event or event sequence that indicates a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs:= type of attack in the knowledge base</i></p>

FAU_ARP.1.IPS – Automatic response to potential internet attacks

Systematic refinement	<p><i>The TSF:= the intrusion prevention function</i></p>
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FAU_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [assignment: list of actions] upon detection of a potential security violation.

Assignment	<i>list of actions</i> := a. apply to the packet the action associated with the type of attack, b. if an alarm level has been specified for this type of attack, generate an audit log for the event, by assigning this level of alarm to it
Refinement	<i>potential security violation</i> := internet attack potentially conveyed by an incoming IP packet

9.2.3 Requirements of prevention of improper use

Function for the control of access to security administration operations

FMT_SMF.1 – Security administration function

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF</i> := the security administration function
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FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF].

Assignment	<i>list of management functions to be provided by the TSF</i> := a. The function for the control of access to security administration operations; b. The administration session protection function c. The audit function d. The backup/restoration function
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FMT_SMR.1 – Role of the security administrator

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF</i> := The function for the control of access to security administration operations
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FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorised identified roles].

Assignment	<i>the authorised identified roles</i> := “administrator” and “super administrator”
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FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

Refinement	+ according to the following rules: a. There is only one super-administrator, distinct from other administrators, and who possess all privileges; b. Administrators are persons to whom this role has been explicitly assigned
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FDP_ACC.2 – Control of full access to security administration operations

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF</i> := The function for the control of access to security administration operations
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FDP_ACC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: access control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects and objects] and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.



Assignment	<i>access control SFP:= the policy controlling access to security administration operations</i>
Assignment	<i>list of subjects and objects:= administrators (subjects), data and security functions (objects)</i>
Refinement	<i>all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP:= all security administration operations</i>
Layout	<i>administrators, data and security functions and all security administration operations → all security administration operations performed by the administrator</i>

FDP_ACC.2.2 *The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.*

Refinement + layout	<i>all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF:= all security administration operations between administrators and data and security functions→ all security administration operations performed by the administrator</i>
Refinement	<i>an access control SFP:= the policy controlling access to security administration operations</i>

FMT_MOF.1 – Administration of the behavior of security functions

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= The function for the control of access to security administration operations</i>
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FMT_MOF.1.1 *The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of] the functions [assignment: list of functions] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles].*

Selection	<i>determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the behaviour of:= disable, enable, modify the behaviour of</i>
Refinement	<i>modify the behaviour of:= perform, modify</i>
Assignment	<i>list of functions:= the security functions in the table below</i>
Assignment	<i>the authorised identified roles:= administrators</i>
Refinement	<i>According to the privileges below</i>

FMT_MTD.1 – Administration of security data

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= The function for the control of access to security administration operations</i>
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FMT_MTD.1.1 *The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorised identified roles].*

Selection	<i>change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations] := query, modify, clear</i>
Assignment	<i>list of TSF data:= the security functions in the table below</i>
Assignment	<i>the authorised identified roles:= administrators</i>
Refinement	<i>+ according to the privileges below</i>



Backup and restoration function

FMT_MTD.BRS – Backup and restoration of security data

Systematic refinement	The TSF:= The backup/restoration function
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FMT_MTD.BRS.1 The TSF shall be able to back up [assignment: list of TSF data] into a storage device.

Assignment	list of TSF data:= security data
Refinement	a storage device:= administration workstation’s hard disk

FMT_MTD.BRS.2 The TSF shall allow restoration of TSF data backed up into a storage device.

Refinement	TSF data:= security data
Refinement	a storage device:= administration workstation’s hard disk

9.2.4 TOE protection requirements

Administration session protection function

FPT_ITT.1 – Basic protection of the contents of administration sessions

Systematic refinement	The TSF:= the administration session protection function
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FPT_ITT.1.1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from [selection: disclosure, modification] when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

Refinement	TSF data:= the contents of administration sessions
Selection	disclosure, modification := disclosure, modification
Refinement	separate parts of the TOE:= the administration workstation and the Stormshield appliance

FTP_TRP.1.Admin – Trusted path for remote administration

Systematic refinement	The TSF:= the administration session protection function
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FTP_TRP.1.1 The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and [selection: remote, local] users that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from [selection: modification, disclosure, [assignment: other types of integrity or confidentiality violation]].

Refinement	itself := the StormShield appliance
Selection	remote, local := remote
Refinement	remote users:= administrators
Assignment	other types of integrity or confidentiality violation := none
Selection	modification, disclosure, none := modification or disclosure

FTP_TRP.1.2 The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, local users, remote users] to initiate communication via the trusted path.

Selection	the TSF, local users, remote users := remote users
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Refinement	<i>remote users := administrators</i>
<i>FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection: initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required]].</i>	
Selection	<i>initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required] := initial user authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is required]</i>
Refinement	<i>initial user authentication:= the initial mutual authentication of the administrator and the Stormshield appliance</i>
Assignment	<i>other services for which trusted path is required:= remote security administration operations</i>

FIA_UAU.5.Admin – Authentication mechanism for administrators

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the administration session protection function</i>
<i>FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms] to support user authentication.</i>	
Assignment	<i>list of multiple authentication mechanisms := the TLS protocol</i>
Refinement	<i>user:= administrator</i>
<i>FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication].</i>	
Refinement	<i>user:= administrator</i>
Assignment + layout	<i>rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication:= rules of the TLS protocol (login / password or X.509 certificate) → TLS protocol (login / password or X.509 certificate)</i>

9.2.5 Other supporting security requirements

Other supporting functions

FCS_COP.1 – Cryptographic function

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF:= the cryptographic function</i>
<i>FCS_COP.1.Key_preparation The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].</i>	
Assignment	<i>list of cryptographic operations:= key preparation</i>
Assignment	<i>cryptographic algorithm:= the cryptographic algorithm ☒ specified below</i>
Assignment	<i>cryptographic key sizes:= cryptographic key sizes ☒ specified below</i>
Assignment	<i>list of standards:= standards set out below</i>



FCS_COP.1.Encryption_signature The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

Table with 2 columns: Assignment, list of cryptographic operations:= signature and encryption/decryption, cryptographic algorithm:= the cryptographic algorithm specified below, cryptographic key sizes:= cryptographic key sizes specified below, list of standards:= standards set out below

FCS_COP.1.Hashing The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

Table with 2 columns: Assignment, list of cryptographic operations:= one-to-one hashing, cryptographic algorithm:= cryptographic algorithms specified below, cryptographic key sizes:= cryptographic key sizes specified below, list of standards:= standards set out below

FCS_COP.1.Encryption_VPN The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

Table with 2 columns: Assignment, list of cryptographic operations:= symmetrical encryption/decryption of VPN packets, cryptographic algorithm:= cryptographic algorithms specified below, cryptographic key sizes:= cryptographic key sizes specified below, list of standards:= standards set out below

FCS_COP.1.Encryption_sessions The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

Table with 2 columns: Assignment, list of cryptographic operations:= symmetrical encryption/decryption of administration sessions, cryptographic algorithm:= the cryptographic algorithm specified below, cryptographic key sizes:= cryptographic key sizes



	⊗ specified below
Assignment	<i>list of standards:= standards set out below</i>

FCS_COP.1.Integrity_sessions The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].

Assignment	<i>list of cryptographic operations:= checking the integrity of administration sessions</i>
Assignment	<i>cryptographic algorithm:= the cryptographic algorithm</i> ⊗ specified below
Assignment	<i>cryptographic key sizes:= cryptographic key sizes</i> ⊗ specified below
Assignment	<i>list of standards:= standards set out below</i>

FPT_STM.1 – Reliable time base

Systematic refinement	<i>The TSF := the Stormshield appliance's internal clock</i>
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FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

10 APPENDIX D – EXTENDED SECURITY REQUIREMENT


This section aims to set out the extended security requirement with the purpose of complementing existing requirements in part 2 and 3 of the Common Criteria.

10.1 Introduction

The extended security requirement set out in this security target is functional.

10.2 FMT_MTD - Management of TSF data

Component levelling



Backup and restoration of TSF data specifies the capacity to spare the configuration of the TSF, or part of it, into a separate storage device, and to restore it thereafter.

Management: FMT_MTD.BRS

- a) Managing the group of roles that can perform backup.
- b) Managing the group of roles that can perform restoration.

Audit: FMT_MTD.BRS

The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the PP/ST:

- a) Basic: Use of the backup functions.
- b) Basic: Use of the restoration functions.

10.2.1 FMT_MTD.BRS Backup and restoration of TSF data

Hierarchical to: no other component.

Dependencies: FMT_MTD.1: Management of TSF data
 FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions

FMT_MTD.BRS.1 The TSF shall be able to back up [assignment: list of TSF data] into a storage device.

FMT_MTD.BRS.2 The TSF shall allow restoration of TSF data backed up into a storage device.

Application notes

Operations

Assignment:

In FMT_MTD.BRS.1, the PP/ST author should specify the TSF data that can be backed up. In particular, it should be specified whether partial backup is possible.