


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U.S. Marine Corps. 4th Division

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FOURTH
MARINE DIVISION
OPERATIONS REPORT
TINIAN
24 JULY TO 1 AUGUST
1944

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FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT - TINIAN

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FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT - TINIAN

B A S I C R E P O R T

SECTION I

PLANNING

1. (a) Preliminary studies and anticipatory planning for the seizure of TINIAN were initiated prior to the execution of the plan for Phase I (SAIPAN). Through the medium of conferences with the staff of the Commanding General, Northern Troops and Landing Force, the Division was kept informed of the formulation of decisions and tentative plans. Preparation of the final plan, however, was delayed until completion of the SAIPAN Phase.

(b) Upon being advised of the general scheme of maneuver, and before receiving the detailed plan, the Division Staff, RCT and BLT Commanders, and a number of other selected officers were afforded an opportunity to make an aerial reconnaissance of the objective. The plan of the Commanding General, Northern Troops and Landing Force, was received on 13 July. At this time all units of the Division were assembled in their rehabilitation areas, commanders of reinforcing elements and Navy control personnel were readily available, and the problem of coordination was comparatively simple.

(c) The Division Operation Order (No. 34-44), based on the plan of the Commanding General, Northern Troops and Landing Force, was completed on 17 July, except for certain annexes the preparation of which was necessarily held in abeyance pending further conferences for coordination. Major subordinate units received prompt information of all supplementary decisions and were continuously advised of the progress of planning within the Division. Accordingly, planning along the chain of command could be and was carried on simultaneously.

2. Most of the activities on the Distribution List of this report have been furnished copies of Division Operation Order No. 34-44, with annexes and appendices. The principal features of the operation order and its execution are discussed in Section III.

3. The speedy success of the operation demonstrated the soundness of the basic decision. There was no opportunity for rehearsal, but, with the employment of experienced amphibious units, the availability of unusual artillery support from SAIPAN, the effectiveness of the preliminary bombardment, and the complete mutual understanding and cooperation of all personnel involved, success of the landing attack was assured.

SECTION II

TASK ORGANIZATION

1. The Division was reinforced for the attack on TINIAN by attachment of the following units:

1st Bn., 10th Mar.
2d Bn., 10th Mar.
Prov. LVT Gp., VPhibCorps (less Dets)
2d Armored Amph Bn. (Marine)
2d Amph Trac Bn. (Marine)
5th Amph Trac Bn. (Marine)
*10th Amph Trac Bn. (Reinf) (Marine)
*708th Amph Tk Bn. (Army)
715th Amph Trac Bn. (Army)
*773d Amph Trac Bn. (Army)
*534th Amph Trac Bn. (Army)
*1st JASCO.
1341st Engr Bn. (Army)
1st Amph Trk Co.
*2d Amph Trk Co.
*1st Prov Rocket Det.
2d Tank Bn.
*VMO-4.
*4th Bn. (105mm) Corps Arty.

*Units which participated with the 4th Marine Division in the SALPAN Operation.

2. (a) The Operation Order (DivOpnO No. 34-44) prescribed the following task organization for the Division (Reinforced):

TASK ORGANIZATION

(1) RCT 25 - Col. M. J. Batchelder, USMC.
25th Mar.
1st Band Sec.
Co A, 4th Tk Bn. (14 M Tks, 1 Retriever) plus
Det Co D (3 flame thrower tks).
Co A, 20th Mar.
Coll Sec, Co A, 4th Med Bn.
2d Bn, 20th Mar (SP).

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1st Plat, 4th MP Co.
Det 1st JASCO.
708th Amph Tk Bn. (34 amph tks).
773d Amph Trac Bn. (Reinf) (92 LVT(2)'s and
44 LVT(4)'s).
Det 4th MT Bn. (7 2-1/2 ton trks).
1 Sec, Prov Rocket Det (4 1-ton trks).
FO Det, 14th Mar.

(2) RCT 24 - Col. F. A. Hart, USMC.

24th Mar.
2d Band Sec.
Co B, 4th Tk Bn. (14 M Tks, 1 Retriever)
plus Det Co D (3 flame thrower tks).
Co B, 20th Mar.
Coll Sec, Co B, 4th Med Bn.
1341st Engr Bn. (Army) (SP).
Det H&S, 20th Mar (CP).
2d Plat, 4th MP Co.
Det 1st JASCO.
2d Armd Amph Bn. (34 LVT(A)'s).
2d Amph Trac Bn. (Reinf) (96 LVT(2)'s and
40 LVT(4)'s).
Det 4th MT Bn. (7 2-1/2 ton trks).
1 Sec, Prov Rocket Det (4 1-ton trks).
FO Det, 14th Mar.

(3) RCT 23 - Col. L. R. Jones, USMC (Div Res).

23d Mar.
3d Band Sec.
Co C, 4th Tk Bn. (14 M Tks) plus Det Co D
(3 flame thrower tks).
Co C, 20th Mar.
Coll Sec, Co C, 4th Med Bn.
3d Plat, 4th MP Co.
Det 1st JASCO.
10th Amph Trac Bn. (Reinf) (104 LVT(2)'s and
32 LVT(4)'s).
Det 4th MT Bn. (7 2-1/2 ton trks).
FO Det, 14th Mar.

(4) Div Arty - Col. L. G. DeHaven, USMC.

14th Mar. (less 3d and 4th Bns).
1st and 2d Bns, 10th Mar.
1st and 2d Amph Trk Co.

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SECTION II - TASK ORGANIZATION

4th Bn (105mm) Corps Arty

- (5) Div Engrs - Lt. Col. N. K. Brown, USMC.
20th Mar. (less Cos A, B and C, and less
2d Bn).
- (6) Support Gp - Col. O. H. Wheeler, USMC.
Hq Bn. (less Dets).
4th MT Bn. (less Dets).
4th Tk Bn. (less Cos A, B and C, and Dets
Co D).
4th Med Bn. (less Dets).
4th Serv Bn.
VMO-4.
1st JASCO (less Dets).
2d Tk Bn.
Prov LVT Gp, V Phib Corps (less Dets).
5th Amph Trac Bn. (less Dets).
715th Amph Trac Bn. (less Dets).
534th Amph Trac Bn. (less Dets).

- (b) 2d Tank Bn was released to 2d Marine Division on Jig-plus-one. 1st and 2d Bn, 10th Mar were released to 2d Marine Division on Jig-plus-two.

RCTs on landing released amphibian tractor units. Medium, light and amphibian tanks were assembled under parent control for maintenance, and reassignment as dictated by the tactical situation.

Artillery and all units of the Support Group, except the 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment, and the 4th Motor Transport Battalion were retained under Division control throughout the operation.

SECTION III

SHORE TO SHORE OPERATION

1. LANDING AND CONTROL PLANS

(a) Landing Plan

(1) General

The Operation Plan of NTLF involved the landing of two divisions over two very narrow beaches, White 1 and White 2, on the northwest coast of TINIAN. The beaches were not contiguous, being separated by a distance of about 900 yards. The divisions were to land in column, 4th Marine Division leading. The scheme of landing contemplated that each division with its organizational equipment and initial supplies would be landed in one day, and that by the end of the third day a sufficient reserve of ammunition, water and rations could be landed to support the assault operations inland. The plan required the rapid landing of the leading division and its seizure of an initial beachhead, about 2500 yards in depth (O-1 line), which included the first high ground that commanded the landing area. The attack was to continue, on Division order, to seize the remainder of the high ground (MT LASSO) and was designed to cover the landing and assembling of the 2d Marine Division for further combined operations to capture the remainder of the island.

(2) The Beaches and Landing Area

In addition to forcing a landing on narrow beach fronts against enemy resistance in prepared positions, the landing presented a serious problem due to the existing hydrographic conditions. Both beaches had a fringing coral reef which varied in width from 60 yards at White 1 to about 175 yards at White 2. Preliminary reconnaissance by UDT and Corps Reconnaissance Company personnel indicated that the reef surface was reasonably smooth but that the edge was rugged and deeply fissured. Mines were found on White 2.

On White 1 the beach area useable for passage of amphibious tractors and vehicles was about 60 yards in width. The shore line on either side of the beach proper was rough coral ledged. This ledge, for a distance of some 50 yards on either side, varied in height from 1 to 6 feet and was broken by fairly wide crevices leading inland. These conditions indicated that

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troops could be landed over the reef and, with the LVTs stopping close against the ledge, the men and light equipment could be debarked and moved inland over the ledge or through crevices. This extended the landing area for assault personnel on White 1 to about 200 yards.

On White 2, the sandy area of the beach was about 160 yards in width but only a center section of some 65 yards was free of coral boulders and coral ledges. The remainder of this sandy beach was studded with boulders and fringed with a ledge of 1 to 4 feet in height. On this beach, as on White 1, additional areas, varying in width from 100 to 150 yards, existed on either flank, where the ledge was from 4 to 6 feet high. This gave a total personnel landing area on White 2 of about 400 yards. It was realized that the main difficulty on both beaches would be in landing tanks, half tracks and other vehicles from LCMs, LCVPs, etc. The problem was further complicated by the rough terrain immediately inland which was formed of coral outcroppings covered with heavy undergrowth and strewn with coral boulders, and by the limited routes of egress from the beaches, which were mere paths or trails. Further, in view of the mines on White 2, it was extremely likely that these paths and trails would also be mined and would require clearing before they could be widened for use.

The Naval Plan provided that pontoon causeways, brought over from SAIPAN, were to be constructed on the beaches and ready for operation within 24 hours of the landing. In addition 9 special ramps, transported by LVTs, were to be landed behind the personnel waves and secured in the low ledge area of the landing beaches for the landing of vehicles. (These ramps had been designed and tested on SAIPAN and gave promise of successful use.)

(3) Landing Craft and Vehicles

The preliminary plans of NTLF provided for a Provisional LVT Group which contained all serviceable LVTs available on SAIPAN. This LVT Group and two amphibious truck companies (DUKWs) were attached to the 4th Marine Division for the initial landing attack. On 17 July the assignment of landing craft to the Division was received and provided the following for the shore to shore movement and assault:

LSTs	-	37
LSDs	-	2
LCTs	-	15

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LCMs	-	88
LCVPs	-	100
LVT(A)s	-	68
LVT(2)s & (4)s	-	450
DUKWs	-	132

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The Division plan for allocation of LVTs and DUKWs, and the assignment of landing craft, was formulated simultaneously with the tactical plan for the landing. The final allocation and assignment was made on 19 July as follows:

RCT 25

<u>CRAFT</u>		
LSDs	-	1
LSTs	-	10
LCTs	-	4
LCMs	-	18
LCVPs	-	30

VEHICLES

773d Amph Trac Bn-Reinforced(Army)		
92 LVT(2)s & 44 LVT(3)s	-	136
708th Armd Amph Bn-less 2 Cos. (Army)		
34 LVT(A)s	-	34

RCT 24

<u>CRAFT</u>		
LSDs	-	1
LSTs	-	10
LCTs	-	4
LCMs	-	18
LCVPs	-	30

VEHICLES

2d Amph Trac Bn-Reinforced(Marine)		
96 LVT(2)s & 40 LVT(4)s	-	136
2d Armd Amph Bn-less 2 Cos (Marine)		
34 LVT(A)s	-	34

RCT 23

<u>CRAFT</u>		
LSTs	-	7
LCTs	-	5
LCMs	-	17
LCVPs	-	30

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VEHICLES

10th Amph Trac Bn-Reinforced (Marine & Army)
104 LVT(2)s & 32 LVT(4)s - 136

DIVISION ARTILLERY

CRAFT

LSTs - 7

VEHICLES

1st Amph Trk Co (Marine) DUKWs - 66
2d Amph Trk Co (Marine) DUKWs - 66
Prov Plat, LVT Group LVT(2) - 5

SUPPORT GROUP & ENGINEERS

CRAFT

LSTs - 3
LCTs - 2
LCMs - 35
LCVPs - 10

VEHICLES

Prov LVT Gp-less dets (Marine & Army)
14 LVT(2)s & 23 LVT(4)s - 37

The above allocation provided for the embarkation, and preloading in LVTs or DUKWs, of all combat elements of the Division plus certain essential support units. It should be noted that LVT(4) tractors were so allocated as to assure the landing of essential light vehicles and equipment such as TCS Jeeps, 37mm guns, etc. Thirty of the LCMs assigned to the Support Group were to be preloaded with tanks of the 2d Tank Battalion and these were to be embarked in the second trip of the two LSDs. All other craft and vehicles were to be moved on the first trip. Approximately one-third of the landing craft initially assigned were to be available to the Division for a second trip and these were allocated proportionally for the movement of rear echelon personnel and equipment. For further details, see Annexes How and Like to Division Opn Order No. 34-44.

(4) Division Plan of Landing

From the tactical factors involved and the inherent natural difficulties of the landing area, it was apparent that the success of the operation would depend on the rapid landing of all essential combatant personnel and equipment on Jig-day. It followed as a corollary of this premise that the landing plan

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must provide for:

The landing of all BLTs of the assault RCTs on as tight a time schedule as beach conditions permitted.

The debarking of personnel and equipment of the assault RCTs on the beach without delay, and their rapid clearance of the beach area.

The landing of supporting tanks and half tracks at the earliest possible time consistent with a reasonable assurance of getting them ashore and inland without blocking the beach areas.

The landing of the four 75mm Pack Howitzer Battalions to afford direct support for the assault inland as soon as a minimum beachhead permitting their deployment had been secured.

The taking of positive measures to prevent congestion on the beaches and reef through the stranding of landing craft or vehicles; or through attempting to land vehicles which could not clear the beach and move inland promptly.

Based on the above considerations, the Division plan directed the simultaneous landing of two RCTs on the selected beaches in the assigned zone of action. RCT 24 on White Beach 1 and RCT 25 on White Beach 2. The scheme of landing for the two RCTs differed but the landing of their assault BLTs was coordinated and all waves of these units were to land on the same time schedule.

On White 2, RCT 24 was to land in a column of battalions (each battalion in a column of companies), with the first two BLTs landing on a fixed time schedule for all waves. The second personnel wave was formed by one company of the second BLT to land. This landing of one company of the second BLT immediately behind the first company of the leading BLT was to allow the formation of a two battalion front immediately after passage through the narrow beach area. The leading company of the second BLT was to advance rapidly inland and form a covering force within the assigned zone of action for the deployment of the remaining units of the second BLT as they landed. The Reserve BLT of RCT 24 was to land on a time schedule if the beach condition and the situation permitted, otherwise it was to land on call.

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On White 2, where the landing area had greater width, RCT 25 was to land with two BLTs abreast (right BLT in a column of companies and the left BLT with two companies abreast and one in reserve), and with both of the leading BLTs formed in the same number of waves and on the same time schedule as the leading battalion on White 1. The Reserve BLT of RCT 25 was to land on call. The leading assault wave on each beach was to be formed of LVT(A)s. One company (less one platoon - 11 LVT(A)s) on White 2 and one platoon (6 LVT(A)s) on White 1. The remaining LVT(A) units were to remain embarked on their assigned LSTs prepared to land on order if they could be utilized ashore. These leading assault waves of LVT(A)s were not to land. On passing through the LCI(G)s, which were to lead the approach of the assault waves, the LVT(A)s were to open fire on the beach area with all available weapons and, when approximately 300 yards from the beaches, the unit on White 1 was to turn left and those on White 2 were to turn right, take station on the flanks, and continue fire on the flanks of their respective beaches until the leading personnel waves reached the beach. Fires thereafter were to be on the call of troop commanders ashore. If their services could not be utilized ashore, these LVT(A)s were to reembark in LSTs designated by the Central Control Officer.

a. Assault Echelons - The three leading BLTs (less such attachments as tanks, half tracks, etc., which could not be embarked in LVTs), were to be formed in seven waves and on White 1 the remainder of the second BLT were to be formed in four additional waves. On White 1 each personnel wave consisted of eight LVTs, and on White 2 sixteen LVTs (eight for each BLT). Based on an average LVT speed of four knots per hour in the water, all personnel waves of these units were to land on a limited time schedule as follows:

Wave	Number of LVTs		Time of Landing	Number of Personnel
	White 1	White 2		
1 - LVT(A)s	6	11	H-Hour	Not landed
2	8	16	H / 4 min	480
3	8	16	H / 9 min	480
4	8	16	H / 14 min	480
5	8	16	H / 21 min	480
6	8	16	H / 28 min	480
7	8	16	H / 33 min	480
8	8		H / 48 min	160
9	8		H / 53 min	160
10	8		H / 58 min	160
11	8		H / 65 min	160

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This gave one personnel LVT for every 25 yards of landing area. As in the SAIPAN landings, the average personnel load was 20 men. This would place about 2900 men ashore in 38 minutes and, on White 1, 350 additional men ashore in another 27 minutes, or a total of 3550 assault personnel and their equipment ashore in about one hour.

b. Assault RCT Reserves - Due to the availability of sufficient LVTs, the Reserve BLTs of the two assault RCTs could be launched preloaded and no transfer from landing craft to LVTs would be necessary. This made these units available for landings immediately behind the assault echelons if the situation ashore permitted and the plans of the RCTs provided for this contingency. These units were to be formed and ready on their respective LDs by H-Hour.

c. Tanks and Half-tracks - All tanks were to be preloaded in LCMs except one company of mediums reinforced by light flame throwers which were to be loaded in three LCTs. The thirty tanks of the 2d Tank Battalion were to be moved to TINIAN in the second trip of the LSDs. All other tanks were to be moved over on the first trip, thirty-six in the two LSDs, and the remainder directly in LCMs and the three LCTs. Those in the LSDs were to be launched, and together with the others that had moved separately, were to be in designated assembly areas behind their LDs by H-Hour, prepared to land on either or both beaches on order. The necessity of landing these units behind the assault BLTs as soon as possible was recognized but, as noted before, it was also realized that they were the most difficult piece of combat equipment to land without blocking the beach areas. Detailed plans were made to provide various expedients to assure landing of at least some of them during the early assault phase when their support would be needed most urgently.

At SAIPAN, experience had shown that LCTs could beach on reefs with rough edges and discharge vehicles when LCMs could not, so some tanks were loaded in LCTs. Also, one LCT in each group assigned to assault RCTs was specifically designated for loading of Shore Party engineer equipment only, and the bulldozers were to be loaded in the forward part of each craft. If beach conditions were such as to prevent the rapid clearance of the beach and movement inland, these LCTs were to be landed first, the bulldozers and operators debarked, and the LCTs retracted. (The Navy planned to have salvage vessels standing by to assure getting them off the reef if necessary). After the bulldozers had prepared the beach and a passage for egress inland, the tanks would be landed either from LCMs or the LCTs. Reconnaissance units (Engineer and

SECTION III - SHORE TO SHORE OPERATION

UDT personnel) with demolition equipment, were to land with the rear elements of the assault BLTs. Their first duty was to get information back to the beach control vessels as to landing conditions and then prepare the surface and edge of the reefs for beaching the LCTs (LCMs) for the landing of the tanks. Half tracks, also preloaded in LCMs, were to be landed in the same manner as tanks but on a lower priority. The governing factor in landing these units was that in no case were they to be permitted to block either beach to such an extent as to preclude the continuous landing of RCT Reserves, the Division Reserve and the artillery.

d. Artillery - The four battalions of 75mm Pack Howitzers preloaded in DUKWs, each battalion embarked on an LST, were to be launched and rendezvoused in the vicinity of their designated Beach Control Vessels by H / 2 hours, prepared to land on Division order. DUKWs preloaded with ammunition in two more LSTs were to be launched and rendezvoused in the same manner by H / 3 hours. After their initial landings all DUKWs, except those needed for unloading (equipped with "A" frames), were to continue unloading ammunition and remaining artillery personnel. The artillery originally had seven LSTs assigned but one (LST 246) became nonavailable on Jig-2 day. The loading of the LSTs assigned the Division Support Group was rearranged and the bulk of the 14th Marines Headquarters preloaded in LVTs and DUKWs was embarked on LST 224 with some of the Division troops. The remainder of the regimental headquarters was embarked on the two LSTs carrying ammunition. This unit was to be launched in time to join the leading battalion of the 14th Marines in their rendezvous area. The 105mm Battalions remained on SAIPAN under Corps Artillery control (attached). They were emplaced on southern SAIPAN and were to support the assault on TINIAN in conjunction with other Corps Artillery. They were to be moved to TINIAN, by battalions, when the situation permitted.

e. Division Reserve - The availability of LVTs and LSTs permitted the embarkation, preloaded in LVTs, of the entire Division Reserve (RCT 23). This obviated the necessity of early launching with the resultant long period afloat before landing. Landing instructions directed that RCT 23 be prepared to launch on order after H / 30 minutes. Each BLT was to be formed in alternate waves of eight and nine LVTs (each LST load to form two waves) and landed on designated beach(es) on order.

f. Division Headquarters and Division Support Group - The Division Headquarters (less certain elements) was embarked on LST 42. This LST, which carried Company D, 2d Armored Amphibian Battalion, had a clear top deck. This permitted the top

SECTION III - SHORE TO SHORE OPERATION

deck loading of TCS Jeeps, etc., of the headquarters. After this LVT(A) unit was launched, (it formed the leading assault wave for both beaches), this LST became a "free boat" and could move as the Division Commander desired. The Advance Division CP and, in turn the remainder of the Headquarters Operation Section, were to be landed in LVT(4)s dispatched to the LST for loading by the Central Control Vessel on call. The ADC with staff and communication group was embarked on PC-1080. This vessel was also a "free boat" and could operate as directed. The ADC group were to be landed, on order, in the same manner as the Division CP group.

The Division Support Group (less the Division Headquarters, and 2d Tank Battalion - to be moved in the second trip of the two LSDs - and VMO-4 - operating initially from ASLITO Airfield on SAIPAN) was embarked in three LSTs. The more essential elements were preloaded in LVTs, and were to be prepared to launch and land on designated beaches on order. The remaining personnel and equipment were to debark and land, on order, in LVTs dispatched to the LSTs by Control Vessels on call.

g. Miscellaneous - All organizations had heavy and light vehicles and equipment loaded in LCTs, LCMs, and LCVPs. These craft were formed in groups and moved to TINIAN, escorted by Navy guide and control boats, and assembled in designated areas seaward of the LD by H-Hour. They were to be landed on request of organization commanders transmitted through Beach Control Vessels and approved by Central Control. It was understood that none would be landed, particularly LCVPs, until essential combat personnel and equipment were ashore, and only then if beach and reef conditions indicated their beaching would not block the landing area. Annexes How and Item to Division Operation Order No. 34-44 contained detailed instructions for the landing of all units.

Provision was made for the reloading of 170 LVTs on 10 designated LSTs immediately after the landing of the assault BLTs. These LSTs, with LVTs, were to return to SAIPAN for embarkation of one RCT of the 2d Marine Division.

(b) The Control Plan

(1) The control plan for the TINIAN landing was the same as that used for the SAIPAN Operation. A Central and two Beach Control Vessels, PC(S)s, were employed for overall control. These ships had been similarly employed at SAIPAN and the ships officers and crews were experienced. LCCs, which were to act initially as leading wave guides, were again to be employed as traffic control vessels from close-in positions off the two beaches. The Naval con-

SECTION III - SHORE TO SHORE OPERATION

Control officers employed in Central and Beach Controls were not the same as those with whom the troop control groups had worked at SAIPAN, but all had been involved in some capacity in the control organization for that landing and were familiar with the system. The naval communication control officers had been similarly employed at SAIPAN and the Force and Group Beachmasters were also the same. This all tended to simplify and facilitate the coordination of the landing and control plans. Frequent conferences between the naval and troop officers involved were held during the planning period. On Jig-minus-2 a final conference was held at the Headquarters of the Division on SAIPAN. The final operation order, including the landing and control plans, was outlined. All interested troop commanders, including LVT and DUKW units, and representatives of the naval units involved including the major control groups, were present. At this time the final adjustments and coordination of the landing and control plans were effected. For details of the control plan and location of LST and landing craft assembly areas, see Annexes Item and Jig to Operation Order No. 34-44.

2. EMBARKATION AND MOVEMENT

(a) Embarkation

The loading and embarkation for TINIAN required the use of all beaches, from Red to Yellow inclusive, on the west coast of SAIPAN plus the piers and seaplane ramps in Tanapag Harbor. The embarkation of troops and the loading of equipment and vehicles, except certain tank units, was to be accomplished on 23 July (Jig-minus-1). Prior to this all but three of the 37 LSTs employed had been preloaded with ammunition, water and rations, including six preloaded with 75mm Pack Howitzer ammunition. The two LSDs had been preloaded with water, rations, and tank ammunition; and, on 21 July, had embarked 56 medium tanks in LCMs. As the LSTs had completed their preloading, all except the last 7, which remained at the Tanapag Pier, were anchored in groups off the beaches from which they were to embark their troops.

On 20 July special instructions were issued which prescribed the assignment of all landing ships and craft, and designated their loading points by organization and unit. (These instructions with supplementary modifications were appended as Annex How to Division Operation Order No. 34-44.) On 22 July the Division issued a Movement Order (No. 2-44) which prescribed assembly areas, routes of movement thereto for all units, and time of embarkation and loading. Embarkation of troops and essential equipment was accomplished on 23 July as planned by preloading LVTs and DUKWs at as-

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signed assembly areas, and, when loaded, the LVTs and DUKWs proceeded to designated LSTs over assigned beach areas and embarked. Assignment of beach areas for this purpose was as follows:

RCT 25 - Beach Yellow 3 and half of 2
RCT 24 - Beach Yellow 1 and half of 2
RCT 23 - Beaches Red 1 and 2
Div Arty - Beaches Blue 1 and 2

The Division Support Group and the 708th and 2d Armored Amphibian Battalions were embarked directly in their assigned LSTs at TANAPAG Pier. The Division Headquarters assigned to LST 42 also embarked at TANAPAG Pier. The ADC Group embarked on PC-1080 by boat from the pier at CHARAN-KANOA.

Loading of assigned landing craft was accomplished as follows on a prescribed time schedule:

15 LCTs - with tanks and heavy equipment - from Seaplane ramps at TANAPAG.
10 LCMs - with heavy vehicles - from Seaplane ramp at TANAPAG.
All other LCMs - with vehicles and equipment - from designated areas on Beaches Green 1 and 2 and Beach Red 3.
All LCVPs - with light vehicles and equipment - from designated areas on Beaches Green 1 and 2.

In all cases, drivers and operating personnel were embarked with the vehicles and equipment loaded.

Loading and embarkation started promptly at 0630 and progressed rapidly. All RCTs and the Division Artillery were embarked by 1700. The ADC Group embarked on PC-1080 at 1530. The Division Control Group embarked at 1400 on the Central Control Vessel by boat from the pier at CHARAN-KANOA. The Commanders and staffs of the assault RCTs embarked on their respective Beach Control Vessels at 1800 in the same manner. The Division Commander and staff embarked on LST 42 at 1500 and at this time the Division CP opened aboard and closed ashore. Embarkation and loading of all elements of the Division was completed by 1800. By 2000 all ships and landing craft had been moved to designated anchorage areas off SAIPAN in preparation for the movement to TINIAN.

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(b) Movement to Objective

The anchorage areas of the various units of the naval force had been selected with a view to facilitating their early departure and arrival off the landing area in the proper order. The distance from the anchorage area off SAIPAN to the LST and landing craft assembly areas off the selected beaches on TINIAN was only five miles and presented no problem. Preceded by a screen that included the Central and Beach Control Vessels, the LST units carrying the assault RCT got under way as scheduled and were followed by the remaining units as planned.

3. THE LANDING AND INITIAL SHIP TO SHORE OPERATION

(a) The Landing

(1) General

Central and Beach Control Vessels were on assigned stations on the LD (4000 yards off beaches) with communications established by 0530. The LST Groups carrying the assault RCTs arrived in assigned areas seaward of the LD off their respective beaches about the same time (0530) and commenced launching LVTs. The leading assault waves began forming behind the line of departure by 0630. At 0700, Commander Naval Attack Force announced that How-hour, set for 0730 was delayed 10 minutes. By 0705 the first 3 assault waves were formed and ready, with the others forming rapidly. Preceded by LCI(G)s, and on signal from Central Control, the first 2 assault waves crossed the LD for both beaches at 0718 and 0722 respectively.

(2) Assault RCTs

After departure of the 2 leading assault waves, White 1 and White 2 Controls dispatched the remaining "timed" waves as scheduled. The leading wave of LVT(A)s maneuvered as planned and the first personnel waves (2d waves) landed simultaneously on both beaches about 0750. The landing of the assault waves was executed with excellent control and precision. Resistance at the beaches was light and the troops debarked quickly and the initial advance inland was rapid. With the usual slight differences in time of landing, the succeeding waves of the 3 assault BLTs landed, debarked personnel, and the LVTs cleared the beach and reef expeditiously. All elements of the leading BLTs had completed landing by 0820. On White 1 the second BLT in column continued the landing as planned and all elements were ashore by 0846. Although the leading

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personnel wave had landed 6 minutes late, it had been dispatched 10 minutes too late from the LD to make its planned landing time of 0744. Favorable sea and wind conditions had permitted increased LVT speed and the loss of time was cut 4 minutes. These favorable conditions continued and resulted in the 3 leading BLTs landing within 2 minutes of, and all assault BLTs landing within 1 minute of, the prescribed time. There were no LVT casualties on White 1 and all personnel landed. On White 2, three LVTs were destroyed by mines and some casualties suffered, otherwise all personnel landed. These LVTs were quickly cleared from the beach and no congestion resulted.

While the assault BLTs were landing the Reserve BLTs of both assault RCTs were being formed behind the LD and both were ready to land by 0815. By the time the assault BLTs had completed landing, the difficult terrain inland and increased enemy resistance had somewhat slowed the advance and there was some congestion immediately inland of the beaches. However, reports indicated a steady advance was being maintained and the beach conditions remained favorable, so both assault RCTs commenced landing their reserve BLTs. The leading waves of these units landed on both beaches about 0850 and all elements of both reserve BLTs were ashore by 1010. RCT headquarters and support groups continued to land on both beaches as the situation permitted and both assault RCTs had advanced CPs ashore by 1230. The last elements of both RCTs were established ashore by 1430.

(3) Tanks and Half Tracks

Initial information, supplemented by personal reconnaissance of the reef areas by a troop control officer, indicated that beach conditions for landing tanks were as bad as anticipated. A decision had to be made promptly, and at 0900 Central Control issued orders directing the LCTs with shore party equipment to land on both beaches. At the same time tanks in LCMs and LCTs were ordered to move from their assembly areas to vicinity of their respective LDs for landing on call. The shore party LCTs beached and unloaded across the reef about 1030. On White 1 no difficulties were encountered and the LCT quickly unloaded the bulldozers, retracted, and returned to vicinity of White 1 Control Vessel to await orders to reland and unload balance of SP equipment. On White 2 the operation was not as successful. The reef edge was very rough and had wide deep fissures. Two bulldozers were gotten ashore with difficulty but a third fell into a fissure and was lost. The LCT was retracted with difficulty and moved to White 1 where the balance of the bulldozers were unloaded and moved overland to White 2. This took considerable time and consequently delayed the clearance of the

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beach and development of access routes on White 2. White 1 proved to be the better beach and development here was rapid. Tanks in LCMs started landing on this beach as soon as the SP LCT was retracted. Initially only 1 LCM could unload at a time but by 1300 the beach had been improved so that 2 LCMs or 1 LCM and 1 LCT could unload simultaneously and the tanks moved quickly inland. On receiving a more favorable report, one LCM was sent in to White 2 about 1100 and succeeded in landing its tank. It took 45 minutes to get this tank across the reef to the beach. To relieve the load on White 1, landings on White 2 were continued, one LCM at a time, and one tank company was finally landed over this beach. Half tracks were landed on White 1 after all tanks had been landed. All organic tanks and all half tracks were ashore and with their parent organizations by 1850 on Jig-day, except the half tracks of the Division Reserve, RCT 23 (these were landed early in the morning of Jig-plus-1). The landing of these units was so conducted that at no time was either beach blocked to the continued landing of personnel in LVTs or artillery in DUKWs.

(4) Artillery

At 0940 information from shore indicated that the situation was progressing favorably and Central Control ordered the LSTs of the artillery group to launch DUKWs. The two leading Pack Howitzer Battalions, 1/14 and 2/14, were launched by 1130 and formed on their respective LDs by 1245. 1/14 commenced landing on White 2 at 1315 and was completely ashore and in position by 1430. 2/14 commenced landing on White 1 at the same time but had to cross the reef and beach in a single column of DUKWs due to the landing of tanks in LCMs. This slightly delayed its landing and it was not completely landed and in position until 1515. 14th Marine Regimental Headquarters landed on White 2 and was established ashore by 1535. The remaining 2 Pack Howitzer Battalions, 1/10 and 2/10, were launched and formed in assembly areas in vicinity of their respective LDs by 1400. 2/10 landed on White 1 and was completely ashore and in position by 1630. 1/10 was landed on White 2 at same time and was in position by 1635.

(5) Division Reserve

The LST Group carrying the Division Reserve, RCT 23, was assembled in its assigned area by 0700 ready to launch LVTs on order. At 0900, Division issued orders directing it to be prepared to launch on one hours notice. At 1030, on order, all BLTs were launched preloaded in LVTs, and by 1130 the leading BLT was being formed in waves on the LD for White 2 according to plan. At

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1110 Division issued an order to RCT 23 and Division (troop) Control for the Division Reserve to land on White 2 as soon as ready. Central Control immediately directed White 2 Beach Control to comply with this order. The first wave of the leading BLT crossed the LD at 1205 and two more waves had crossed by 1215 while others were being formed to the seaward of the LD. However, about 1230 the landing of the leading BLT was stopped, with the leading waves about halfway between the Beach Control Vessel and the Traffic Control Vessel (LCC) off White 2. Action was immediately taken to ascertain why the landing was stopped and to have it resumed as soon as possible. Information was received that the landing had been stopped on the orders of the BLT Commander and that the RCT Commander, who had been delayed in arrival at the Beach Control Vessel until 1220 due to a broken down LVT, was taking immediate action to continue the landing. Unfortunately there was some misunderstanding and communications delay of orders issued by RCT 23. Also during this period, Central Control had ordered the movement of both Beach Control Vessels about 1500 yards to the southward (they had not been able to anchor and had drifted out of correct position). Due to these factors the landing of the leading BLT was considerably delayed. The leading wave of this BLT landed at 1400 and the entire unit was ashore by 1430. From then on, the landing of the remaining elements progressed rapidly and troops were ashore by 1630. The Advance RCT CP opened ashore at 1535. The remainder of the RCT Headquarters landed and was established ashore by 1745. Between the time the orders to land had been issued and the time the leading BLT actually landed, the situation ashore had so developed that the delay in landing the Division Reserve had no adverse effect on the attack.

(6) Division Headquarters and Troops

a. Preliminary plans had anticipated the landing of some 2d Marine Division Infantry elements on Jig-day if the situation was favorable. Two RCTs of 2d Marine Division, embarked in APAs, had been in an assigned Transport Area off the landing beaches since 1200. (This Transport Group had conducted a diversionary demonstration off TINIAN Harbor from sunrise until about 1015.) At 1530 Division issued an order to Division Control to be prepared to land one BLT of RCT 8. This unit was debarked into LCVPs and sent to the LD for White 1. Landing of LCTs and LCMs was temporarily suspended on this beach and BLT 1/8 landed directly in LCVPs. Landing was effected by sending in 2 LCVPs at a time and the leading elements landed about 1630. By 1850 all elements were ashore and assembled, as Division Reserve, in the zone of action of RCT 24.

b. No element of Division Headquarters was landed

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on Jig-day. The Advance CP group was scheduled to land about 1750 but due to late arrival of LVT(4)s to land necessary radio equipment (TCS Jeeps) the landing was delayed. The Advance CP group debarked from LST 42 at 0700 and landed on White 2 about 0745 on Jig-plus-1. The Division Commander with the remainder of the Headquarters Group debarked in LVTs at 1000, landed on White 2, and Division CP opened ashore at 1115. ADC Group debarked from PC-1080 in LVTs and landed on White 2 at 1330.

c. The only element of the Division Support Group to land on Jig-day was the H&S and Company D of the 4th Medical Battalion. These units, preloaded in LVTs, debarked and landed on White 1 about 1650. The remaining units debarked in LVTs and landed beginning in the early morning of Jig-plus-1. The first element to land was the Division Reconnaissance Company which landed on White 2 about 0845 and immediately established Division CP and rear area security. Other elements were landed as availability of LVTs permitted and all were ashore by early afternoon of Jig-plus-1.

(7) Shore and Beach Parties

Advance elements of the shore and beach parties landed with the assault BLTs and were ashore with communications established by 0830. All remaining personnel of these units on both beaches were landed with succeeding personnel LVT waves and were completely ashore by 1000. The remaining shore party equipment embarked on the 2 LCTs, which had been beached initially to unload bulldozers only, were again called in after most of the tanks had been landed on White 1, and beached in succession and completely unloaded. All shore party equipment was completely unloaded by 1400. The equipment for the shore party on White 2 was moved overland to that beach without any trouble. The Division Shore Party Commander and Group Beachmaster were initially embarked on the CAMBRIA. A radio-equipped tender was assigned for their use and they covered the activities on both beaches by personal supervision and radio contact during Jig-day. They made frequent visits to the Central and Beach Control Vessels to make personal reports on existing beach condition during the day. They embarked for the night on SC-1012 with the Force Beachmaster. The Division Shore Party Commander landed with the Group Beachmaster on the morning of Jig-plus-1 and established headquarters ashore between White 1 and White 2 by 1300.

(8) Miscellaneous

a. None of the 100 LCVPs carrying light vehicles and equipment, and 8 LCTs and 5 LCMs carrying heavy trucks, were landed on Jig-day. They could only be landed on White 1 and this beach was fully occupied with landing tanks and, late in the day, BLT 1/8 in LCVPs. These craft started unloading early in the morning of

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Jig-plus-1 and all vehicles and equipment were ashore by evening of Jig-plus-2.

b. The 2d Tank Battalion, preloaded in LCMs, arrived with the second trip of the 2 LSDs on the afternoon of Jig-day. The tanks were not launched, and reverted to the control of the 2d Marine Division on the morning of Jig-plus-1. They were landed under the control of their parent organization.

c. Ten special ramps mounted on LVTs were brought over from SAIPAN in the second trip of the LSDs. Two were launched about 1700 on Jig-day and sent in with a view of utilizing them in the area south of White 1. One was lost when the LVT struck a coral head on the edge of the reef and turned over. The other was landed successfully and used by LVTs landing supplies. The remaining 8 ramps were launched on the afternoon of Jig-plus-1. Two were swamped and sank on the way in to the beach but the crews were saved. The remaining 6 were landed and placed in operation. The ramps were used to land vehicles until the pontoon causeways were established. Their use in this operation, to the limited extent available, was reasonably successful.

d. Two pontoon causeway piers were towed over from SAIPAN and arrived off the beaches about 1800 on Jig-day. During the night and early morning they were placed in position. On White 1 the pier was ready by 0600 on Jig-plus-1 and greatly facilitated the landing of personnel and equipment over this beach. On White 2 the operation was not so successful and this pier was not used until the afternoon of Jig-plus-3.

e. A special Control Vessel (LCC) was used to supervise and direct the evacuation of casualties in LVTs. This vessel followed the last waves of the assault BLTs and took station close in to the reef. LVTs evacuating casualties went direct to this vessel and transferred the wounded to special LCVFs which operated directly under the Medical Officer on the Casualty Control Vessel. The LCVFs then transferred them to designated APAs. This system worked excellently and its use in future operations is recommended.

f. The Division Command Ship, LST 42, all control vessels, and certain designated LSTs remained in the landing area during the night of Jig-day. All other vessels and landing craft retired to SAIPAN for the night. Sufficient supplies of ammunition, water and rations were landed prior to darkness. The performance of Naval Control personnel was highly satisfactory. LVT operations after the initial landing of assault troops were greatly improved over the

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SAIPAN landing. This improvement was principally due to experience and the fact that LVT control personnel exercised general overall supervision from the Central Control Vessel. It is considered that the landing and control plans were successfully executed. All combatant and essential supporting elements of the Division were ashore, firmly established in an adequate beachhead, and the beaches were cleared and ready for the continued landing of the 2d Marine Division on the morning of Jig-plus-1.

SECTION IV

NARRATIVE OF THE ASSAULT

The movement to the objective and the preliminary phases of the landing are discussed in the preceding section.

The following narrative is based on the records maintained by the third section of the Division executive staff. Some of the details are at variance with those contained in available reports of higher and subordinate echelons. However, as most of the discrepancies are of a minor nature, no attempt will be made to reconcile them.

Jig-day (24 July)

Shortly after arrival in the LST Areas at 0530, LST's began launching LVT's as firing ships and Corps artillery, emplaced on the southern shores of SAIPAN, began a heavy preliminary bombardment.

While elements of the Naval Attack Force, with the 2d Marine Division embarked, conducted a demonstration off TINIAN Town, LVT waves were formed in rear of the line of departure, some 3000 yards off the beaches. Intermittent 20mm and 40mm fire was received in the LST and rendezvous areas during this period. As the waves moved toward the line of departure, guide planes with distinctive markings on their wings began making their runs to insure that leading waves maintained proper course toward beaches then totally obscured by smoke and dust from the increasing tempo of the artillery, air, and naval gunfire bombardment.

How-hour had been designated as 0730, but at 0700 a delay of ten minutes was announced. At this time eleven battalions of artillery, 2 BB's, 1 CA, and 2 DD's intensified their fires and began to lay down a close support preparation on the landing beaches and adjacent areas. The first wave of LVT's carrying assault troops cleared the line of departure at 0718.

Preceded by armored amphibian tanks and supported by 30 LCI gunboats firing rockets and automatic cannon, leading waves of both RCT's hit the beach simultaneously at 0750; troops debarked, struggled up the jagged coral ledges, and pushed inland against moderate small arms and mortar fire.

All assault waves were ashore at 0820 with congestion on the

Section IV - NARRATIVE OF THE ASSAULT (cont'd)

rough, restricted beaches becoming acute. Beach White TWO was reported heavily mined and several LVT's were destroyed in attempting to move inland.

At 0900 one of the Division air observers, operating in a TBM, was in collision with a ship's OS2U, which crashed. The air observer was able to return safely to base.

After landing, the attack was continued toward O-1 and at 0940 the right had pushed 500 yards inland, the left had advanced 350 yards, and RCT's were in contact. Reserve BLT's of both assault RCT's were ashore by 1030 and RCT 23, the Division reserve, was ordered to land on Beach White TWO.

Division artillery, consisting of four 75mm battalions pre-loaded in DUKWs, was ashore, in position, and firing by 1635. One and a half units of fire had been landed prior to darkness.

RCT 23, after undergoing some difficulty caused by confusion in orders and control, completed landing at 1630, took over the right sector of RCT 25's zone of action, and continued the attack to O-1.

Due to the condition of Beach White TWO, the 4th Tank Battalion had been directed to land over Beach White ONE. Landing proceeded until at 1850 all tanks of the 4th Tank Battalion were ashore, having succeeded in landing one company over White TWO.

BLT 1/8, 2d Marine Division, had completed landing by 1850 and went into Division reserve in an assembly area in rear of RCT 24. BLT 3/23, in the southern sector, was also in Division reserve.

The attack had progressed favorably against moderate resistance, RCT 24 reaching O-1 within its zone of action except on its left flank which was anchored on the shore some 400 yards short of O-1. RCT's 23 and 25 were approximately 1000 yards short of O-1 when consolidation for the night was made. Firm contact was established between units and extensive defensive preparations made for an enemy counterattack expected during the night.

A successful landing on rugged, restricted beaches against moderate resistance had gained a beachhead of 1500 yards in depth with minimum casualties (15 KIA and 225 WIA) and the Division was prepared to continue enlargement of the beachhead the following morning.

Section IV - NARRATIVE OF THE ASSAULT (cont'd)

Jig-plus-1 (25 July)

Beginning at 0200 the enemy in force progressively initiated a general organized counterattack against sectors on our beach-head. It was there and then that the 4th Marine Division broke the Jap's back in the battle for TINIAN. While the enemy main effort was against the left and the center, a mechanized attack accompanied by infantry developed on the right.

The enemy struck on the left in two spear heads. One, the more serious, hit the Division left flank which was anchored on the coast line. Fierce fighting ensued continuing until about 0545 when it appeared to be breaking under the combined fires of infantry-artillery, and the action, at daybreak, of supporting medium tanks. Remnants of the enemy fought on with typical fanaticism but by 0700 the situation was well in hand, as evidenced by the dead Japs in the area of this position. The other thrust initially was projected at a point which turned out to be the boundary between RCTs (RCT 24 and RCT 25), then subsequently shifted into the RCT 25 zone. It, too, was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy, after hot fighting.

While the fight was in progress a sizeable Jap group filtered the perimeter defense, attacking battery positions of the Division artillery. One battery of a battalion fought off the attackers killing 99, while the remainder continued in fire support of the front line left which was heavily engaged.

On the right the front was active throughout the night with Jap patrols. By sound and activity it was entirely evident that some sort of a mechanized attack, which developed at 0330, was being assembled. In total darkness Jap tanks carrying, and accompanied by, infantry bore down the white coral main road in column. They were stopped "cold" by short range fire, including 37mm canister and bazooka. Five out of six tanks were knocked out and by count 200 enemy lay dead in front of the position at dawn.

Parenthetically it is noted that this general counterattack was not a surprise to the 4th Marine Division. It had been anticipated for that night, and prepared for. The entire assault elements of the Division had been put ashore over these unprecedented narrow beaches, and committed on Jig-day to establish, as one tactical entity, a Jap-proof perimeter defense to meet any counterattack on Jig-night.

By 0900 elements of RCT 8, 2d Marine Division, which had put one BLT ashore on Jig-day and was progressively landing, augmented the Division reserve and reinforced the left flank. This BLT

Section IV - NARRATIVE OF THE ASSAULT (cont'd)

(BLT 1/8) remained attached for operational control.

There being some resupply of ammunition and reorganization desirable before continuing the attack that morning, King-hour was delayed from 0700 to 1000 when the Division, preceded by an intense fifteen minute artillery, naval gunfire and air preparation, jumped off to complete the seizure of O-1. Corps and organic artillery based on SAIPAN, 3 miles distance, thickened the preparation fires.

The objective included one of the most formidable sheer cliff lines encountered in this campaign. Detailed air reconnaissance prior to Jig-day by commanders, down to and including the small units, had fixed its features in their minds and mentally all hands were prepared.

In formation of RCTs 8, 24, 25 and 23 were abreast from left to right. Initially the attack progressed rapidly. It continued so except in the center where RCT 25 encountered the cliff. A double envelopment was employed by this RCT. While one BLT contained the cliff, the other two reached the heights around either flank and after a short fight closed the pincers on the plateau above, establishing firm central contact.

The Division Advance Message Center debarked from LST 42 at 0700 and opened ashore 400 yards inland, midway between Beaches White ONE and TWO, at 0930. The command post, with the Division Commander ashore, opened in the same location at 1115.

O-2 was secured on the left by 1500, O-1 in the center by 1715, while on the right a position in advance of O-1 was secured before dark after considerable resistance along the west(right) coast line.

Jig-plus-2 (26 July)

In accordance with Division Operation Order No. 36-44 the Division continued the attack against a disorganized enemy at 0800. A ten minute artillery preparation was fired.

RCT 25 and RCT 23 were abreast, RCT 23 on the right. BLT 2/24 (reinforced) was attached to RCT 25 as of 0730. RCT 24 (less BLT 2/24), which had been relieved by elements of the 2d Marine Division on the Division left by 0745, reverted to Division reserve and assembled 400 yards east of RJ 64-1 in woods. BLT 1/24 later in the day (1555) was designated as NTLF reserve. The 2d Marine Division was abreast in attack on the Division left.

On the left of the Division zone O-3 was reached at 1100 and

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Section IV - NARRATIVE OF THE ASSAULT (cont'd)

on Division order, preceded by a short artillery preparation, the attack to O-4(A) was initiated at 1300. Mount LASSO, the highest elevation on TINIAN, was seized and the objective, forward of the mountain, was consolidated for the night at 1630. Contact was firm with the 2d Marine Division on the plains below to the left (east).

On the right of the Division zone, extending from approximately the main north-south highway to the west coast, a local operation initiated by RCT 23 resulted in seizure of ground, to adjust the line, prior to King-hour. In the general advance O-3 was seized at 1201 and at 1300 in coordinated continuation of attack, the line progressed through heavy cane field, reaching favorable ground in the vicinity of O-4 at 1430.

O-3 and O-4(A), which included Mount LASSO, were seized. Casualties were light and morale high.

Jig-plus-3 (27 July)

In conjunction with the 2d Marine Division on the left, the Division, as directed by NTLF, attacked at 1000 (King plus 2-1/2 hours). BLT 1/24 remained in NTLF reserve. With slight opposition and no change in formation the objective, O-4, was reached by 1200. BLT 2/24 (attached to RCT 25) on the left was pinched out. Patrols sent forward could make no contact with the enemy. Displacement from SAIPAN of the remainder of the Division artillery units was in progress. BLT 1/24 was released from NTLF reserve and passed to parent RCT control at 1540. O-4 was secured.

Jig-plus-4 (28 July)

NTLF ordered continuance of the attack (NTLF Operation Order 34-44) to further extend the force beachhead, with King-hour at 0700, 2d and 4th Marine Divisions abreast, 4th on the right. The 2d Marine Division was ordered to advance beginning King plus 3 hours. The main effort was directed to be made by the 4th Marine Division, with XXIV Corps Artillery massing its fires in support of the main effort. Initially two 105mm artillery battalions of the 2d Marine Division were on call of the 4th Marine Division.

A dispatch warning order preceded the Division attack order (Operation Order No. 39-44), which shifted the boundary between the two assault RCTs, (RCT 25 and RCT 23 abreast, RCT 23 on the right) to the westward (right) by approximately 600 yards, in order to effect a more equitable parceling of RCT fronts. It called for relief of left elements of RCT 23 by RCT 25 prior to King-hour. BLT 2/24 remained attached to RCT 25, while RCT 24 (loss

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BLT 2/24) remained in Division reserve. The objective was O-5.

The terrain in the zone of advance was rolling farm country; sugar cane fields as far as the eye could reach studded with patches of woods and uniformly criss-crossed by farm lanes. A north-south main highway paralleled the coast inland. On the right was the more rugged cliff line coast fringed with woods. Progressively the island bulged out to the east from the O-4 line to the O-5 line, thus increasing the Division zone from 4000 yards to 4600 yards in width. Beyond the O-5 line approximately two miles, a bay cut into the coast narrowing sharply the future Division zone of action.

After the adjustment of RCT zones at dawn, the attack, preceded by a 10 minute preparation, jumped off at 0700. Two successive artillery concentrations of five minutes each followed; the first at 1500, and the second at 2000 yards in front of the line of departure. O-5, after light resistance, was reached "standing up" at 1250. In anticipation of a future tactical advantage, the Division had requested and secured permission to immediately advance to its own conceived O-6(A) line in order to take advantage of the resultant shortening of the line created by the bay indentation. Permission was granted, orders issued at 1030. RCT 24 (less 2/24) was committed in column of BLTs between RCTs 25 and 23; the attack was launched at 1325; and, by 1730, O-6(A) was reached. On the right RCT 23 was now pinched out by the bay indentation and reverted to Division reserve with one BLT engaged in mopping up the rear coast area, particularly the airfield area which had been seized just short of O-6(A). BLT 2/24 was detached from RCT 25 and ordered into WTLF reserve at 1800.

Two military and two hundred eighty five civilian prisoners were captured from whom information was gained of retirement of the enemy to the southern peninsula. Colonel Ogata's reported headquarters was the target of a heavy air strike.

The Division command post displaced to a pine woods on high ground west of MT LASSO during the morning, opening in new location at 1345.

Throughout the day organic tanks led the attack. The entire artillery regiment displaced to keep pace with the fast moving situation.

Support aircraft carried out close and deep support missions. Naval ships provided illumination during the night; intense ten minute preparation fires at 1300; fired call missions, and engaged cave and other targets along the coast by direct close range fire.

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Casualties were light, morale very good.

The 2d Marine Division had reached O-5 by 1145. The 4th Marine Division secured O-6(A), having advanced approximately 7000 yards on the right, 4000 in the center and 3000 on the left.

Jig-plus-5 (29 July)

NTLF Operation Order No. 35-44 designated 0700 as King-hour and provided for continuing the attack to O-6, which overlooked TINIAN Town and the valley extending across the entire island. After a short delay, occasioned by adjusting the time for air strikes, and against light resistance, the attack was rapid initially, though progressively was slowed down by the heavy cane fields containing small groups of the enemy. All Division artillery was on call, no preparation being fired. Tanks led the attack.

Contact with the 2d Marine Division which simultaneously attacked on the left was firm until just before noon when one company of the 2d Marine Division closed a gap on the Division boundary.

RCT 24 and RCT 25 were abreast, RCT 24 on the right along the coast line. BLT 2/24, which had been in NTLF reserve, reverted to parent control at 0600. RCT 23 (less BLT 2/23) was in Division reserve, while BLT 2/23, which had been released to NTLF at 0600, was reconnoitering routes of approach to both division zones of action of the Force. Division reserve displaced twice during the day.

By sanction of NTLF the Division consolidated its position at 1545 on favorable terrain in advance of O-6 to take advantage of more suitable ground for further operations and to facilitate better contact with the 2d Marine Division.

O-6 was secured. Morale and combat efficiency was very satisfactory. The troops were "heading for the barn".

Jig-plus-6 (30 July)

With no contact with the enemy in force the Division continued the attack as directed by NTLF in dispatch Operation Order No. 36-44 at 0745 to seize O-7. There was no change in formation.

A ten minute preparation was fired by the artillery from King minus 10 minutes to King-hour, followed by two successive 5 minute concentrations at 5 minute intervals, 400 yards increased

Section IV - NARRATIVE OF THE ASSAULT (cont'd)

range in each case.

TINIEN Town, along the west coast in the valley, lay beyond an inland coastal plain cliff line which caused the right of the Division line difficulty. Japs "holed up" in the caves were liquidated by the infantry-tank team using assault weapons, particularly demolitions and flame-throwers.

The town itself, in ruins, was reached at 1420 and offered no resistance. The TINIEN Town beach was heavily mined.

BLT 2/23 reverted from, and BLT 3/23 passed to, NTLF reserve at 1000 on request of the Division, the new NTLF assembly area being closer to BLT 3/23.

At 1535 the 2d Marine Division reported that it had reached O-7 and was ordered by NTLF to extend its right flank to a new boundary between divisions, to be accomplished by 1800. RCT 8 was committed to accomplish this.

On the 4th Marine Division right, O-7 was reached at 1400. On the Division left, O-7 was reached at 1430. RCT 25 was relieved by RCT 8 on its left and by RCT 23 on its right from 1600 to 1800. It assembled in NTLF reserve, less BLT 3/25, which passed to Division reserve, on being relieved on O-7 at 1600. BLT 3/23 passed from NTLF reserve to parent control at 1600.

An intense naval gunfire concentration was fired on selected targets on the southern edge of the island at 1000 to 1030 and at 1400 to 1430.

The troops reorganized on O-7, prepared to continue the attack the next day. Combat efficiency continued to be very satisfactory.

Jig-plus-7 (31 July)

NTLF ordered the resumption of attack at 0830, with no tactical changes.

Preceded by a coordinated and intense air, artillery and naval gunfire preparation, troops moved forward from the valley in attack against the high, cliff-faced plateau to the front.

The 2d Marine Division, on the left, met strong resistance from the wooded cliffs in their zone, but reported some troops on top at 1700.

Section IV - NARRATIVE OF THE ASSAULT (cont'd)

The 4th Marine Division attacked at 0830 in accordance with its Operation Order No. 43-44, RCTs 24 and 23 abreast, RCT 24 on the right, with RCT 25 (less BLT 3/25) in NTLF reserve and BLT 3/25 in Division reserve.

From light to moderate resistance in the morning, the enemy became stubborn, slowing the advance in the afternoon. Difficult caves, anti-tank guns and mines, and the cliff line itself, were major blocks.

On the left, contact was lost with the 2d Marine Division. From the open gap the troops were pinned down by fire from the cliff line and the small village, both in the other division zone of action. In the center fire was being received from large caliber guns. At 1745 the heights were gained, but along the hair-pin road leading up the escarpment, mine fields protected by machine guns halted the advance. One company made a right envelopment, reaching the high ground above the road. BLT 3/25 was attached to RCT 23, to be committed only with Division permission. For night defense, elements on the high ground formed a perimeter defense with their backs to the cliff and contact patrols were sent to the left to close the gap with the 2d Marine Division. The units at the foot of the road contained the enemy in the cliff road valley. Hostile groups on the passed-over low land were active during the night but were taken care of by this RCT and troops of BLT 3/25, which, in addition, formed a perimeter defense around the tank and service vehicles.

On the right, while maintaining contact with left elements, the attack moved around the coastal plain under the shadow of the plateau escarpment. Thick undergrowth covered the plain, hampering tank operations. A local counterattack was repulsed at 1000 near the beach. LVT(A)s afloat provided support along the shore line. Progressively, the dense undergrowth and rugged terrain made progress more difficult. Flame thrower tanks burned away the growth and roasted the cave defenders. At about 1600 heavy resistance from the ridge developed. Half tracks and tanks could not negotiate the mined road in this sector. Contact was reestablished and the troops dug in for the night on the least unfavorable ground.

The Division had penetrated the last ditch island defenses along the southern high plateau.

Jig-plus-8 (1 August)

NTLF ordered continuation of the attack by dispatch Operation Order No. 38-44, with King-hour set for 0700. Line of departure was the present front lines, no other change.

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Section IV- NARRATIVE OF THE ASSAULT (cont'd)

The coordinated attack jumped off at 0800, there having been a delay of one hour due to the early morning counterattack in the 2d Marine Division zone. O-8, the remainder of the island, was the objective.

The Division artillery fired a five minute preparation, 600 yards in advance of the line of departure at 0755, and two successive three minute concentrations beginning at 0805 and 0813, nine hundred yards and twelve hundred yards, respectively, in advance of the line of departure.

RCTs were abreast in formation; RCT 24 (less BLT 2/24) and RCT 23 (BLT 3/25, reinforced, attached), RCT 24 on the right. BLT 2/24 was in Division reserve. BLT 3/25, reinforced by one platoon of tanks, was attached to RCT 23, not to be committed without Division authority.

Moderate resistance, consisting principally of machine gun and mortar fire from isolated groups, was encountered during the initial stages of the attack. During the day the attack progressed favorably over difficult terrain with mines, road blocks, cliffs, dense brush and rocky ground.

At 1300 BLT 2/24 reverted to parent control from Division reserve and BLT 3/25 was designated Division reserve.

On the right, three distinct cliff levels were encountered which stepped down from the plateau to the sea. RCT 24 lines had to be adjusted by placing one BLT on each level, before resuming the attack. Intermittent enemy machine gun and rifle fire continued, but to a lesser degree. The advance was slow but steady.

On the left of the Division zone, after a preliminary action to reduce road blocks on the east road up the plateau, a local move, forward and laterally, was made to secure a better position for advance. By 1330 the advance to O-8 began and reached the sheer cliff overlooking the short southern coastal plain. Patrols reconnoitered forward for routes to the low ground and reported the cliff honeycombed with caves and recesses occupied by the enemy.

All organized resistance had ceased and at 1855 TINIAN was officially declared secured.

Subsequent Operations (2 to 7 August)

At dawn on 2 August and until 7 August, mopping up operations continued. Equipment was salvaged, burial parties operated

Section IV - NARRATIVE OF THE ASSAULT

for own and enemy dead, and Jap dumps were secured. Each day, snipers were located and destroyed.

Jap military and civilians were reluctant to surrender. Individual, group, and mass suicide in varying forms was not uncommon. Persistent efforts by voice and written pleas to surrender brought, at times, encouraging results. Final surrender was set for 0830, 4 August. By 0900 some had surrendered. At 0930, half tracks, medium tanks and mortars covered the cliff face, after which patrols were sent through the area with grenades, flame throwers and demolitions. At 1600 all known areas of enemy resistance within the zone were mopped up.

RCT 23 (with one composite battalion of RCT 24) was assigned the responsibility for the Division zone and continued mopping up. On 5 August the composite battalion of RCT 24 was released to parent control.

On August 7 RCT 8, 2d Marine Division relieved the 4th Marine Division in the zone of responsibility.

The Division assembled north of TINIAN Town for rehabilitation and reembarkation.



FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT - TINIAN

ANNEX A

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ADMINISTRATION

1. PERSONNEL:

(a) Morale.

During the Battle of Tinian, morale was very high despite the fact that officers and men were still fatigued from the Saipan Operation.

The rationing of personnel, with cigarettes and toilet articles a part of the ration, was most successful during the Tinian Operation and, added to the splendid mail service; the provision of daily press news both from ships and by publication of a Division Press News; the furnishing of several issues of Time by the Administrative Command, V Amphibious Corps, did much to maintain morale at a very high level.

(b) Casualties.

Casualties of the Battle of Tinian, by combat teams and regiments were as follows:

	KIA		W(Ev)		W(Non-Ev)		Sick(Ev)		MSG		TOTAL	
	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E
RCT 23	2	52	13	159	1	14	12	244	0	0	28	469
RCT 24	5	57	6	219	4	24	4	197	0	1	19	498
RCT 25	4	55	9	260	2	28	4	210	0	0	19	553
14thMarines	5	11	4	22	0	52	0	47	0	0	9	132
20thMarines	0	7	2	31	-	-	-	-	0	0	2	38
SupGrp	1	13	5	38	0	4	-	-	0	1	6	56
USN(MD)	0	12	4	26	-	7	1	27	0	0	5	72
TOTALS	17	207	43	755	7	129	21	725	0	2	88	1818

This Division's newly developed system for reporting casualties, successfully tried out during the Battle of Saipan operated even more successfully on Tinian. One reason, of course, was the shorter operation and the greatly reduced number of casualties to report.

Recommendations:

The recommendations previously submitted under this heading in the Saipan report are reiterated.

(c) Replacements.

Replacements of 26 officers and 784 enlisted men were received on J plus 2. These replacements, ultimately destined for the Second Marine Division were met by the Division Classification Officer and two noncommissioned officers of the D-1 Section who went aboard the ship bearing the replacements the day before they were landed. Using an allotment plan previously worked out according to specification numbers, this detail assigned officers and

men to their regiments while still aboard ship. On 26 July, two days after the initial assault on Tinian, replacements were landed on the beach at that island and immediately turned over to representatives of the regiments to which assigned.

On 6 August, as previously planned, replacements (less casualties) were sent with their staff returns to the 2nd Marine Division.

12 Officers and 208 enlisted men evacuated from their organizations on Tinian to ships and to field hospitals on both Tinian and Saipan as sick and wounded were returned to duty with the Division during the Battle of Tinian.

2. PRISONERS OF WAR:

A total of 2011 prisoners were processed thru the Division Stockade in the Tinian operation. This figure included 1962 civilians and 49 prisoners of war. Many more were captured after 3 August, but these were all taken directly to the Island Commander's Stockade and no separate count made then of 4th Marine Division prisoners of war.

D-2 Section furnished interpreters for screening all prisoners and thus they were able to separate the prisoners of war from the civilians. As time permitted these civilians were later separated into the various racial groups.

Due to a shortage of Military Police, prisoners of war were kept in the same stockades as civilians but were further separated within the stockade itself by means of additional barbed wire enclosures.

In this operation, the Island Commander set up a central stockade and on 3 August, 1944, took over all prisoners including prisoners of war from the Divisions.

Lack of transportation and dire need of trained personnel in handling prisoners, including prisoners of war, was overcome in part by using any available transportation going to the rear and the assistance given by the Military Police.

3. POSTAL:

The superlative postal services provided the Division by the Division Postal Officer throughout the Battle of Saipan and following the securing of that island, continued during the Battle of Tinian. While the main post office facilities of this Division remained at Charon Kanoa near the airport and port facilities, a branch post office of the Division was opened on White Beach on J plus 3. This branch handled the mail of the 2nd Marine Division in addition to that of this Division.

As on Saipan, the forwarding of mail to wounded and evacuated personnel was unsatisfactory.

4. MILITARY POLICE:

For this operation the Military Police Company was kept forty-four (44) enlisted men overstrength, in order to assist the Civil Affairs Officers in handling the civilian problem. In addition to this work they carried out their normal missions of:

- (a) Concentration and handling of prisoners of war.
- (b) Straggler Control.
- (c) Traffic Control.
- (d) Command Post Security.
- (e) Returning casualties to their combat units.
- (f) Providing sentries for water dumps, ration dumps, advance message center and medical companies.

One Military Police Platoon was attached to each combat team to take care of the civilian internee problem. During this operation these platoons did excellent work.

Recommendations:

The recommendation previously submitted under this heading in the Saipan report is reiterated.

5. CIVIL AFFAIRS:

V Amphibious Corps attached two officers to this Division to supervise Civil Affairs work on Tinian. The Division had but one Civil Affairs Officer, but using one of the officers from Corps; together with the officer already detailed to the duty plus an officer who became available for the assignment after the Saipan operation, each combat team moved into the campaign with a Civil Affairs Officer detailed for the sole duty of taking care of internees. One of these officers was wounded upon arrival at the beach, but the other two justified this method of procedure by the results achieved.

Insistence by the Division caused the establishment of stockades by each combat team to handle civilians coming under their care. As the combat teams moved forward, these enclosures were taken over first, for a Division stockade, then an island stockade when on 3 August, 1944, the Island Commander took over control of internees.

Prior to the operation which immediately preceded the Battle of Tinian this Division was not civil affairs conscious and was not fully prepared for the great influx of civilians who in many instances were either sick or wounded. Slight improvement could be made on Tinian in the light of the Saipan experiences in handling internees due to continued shortage of transportation and personnel. However, considering lack of trained civil affairs personnel, military police, transportation and equipment, outstanding work was accomplished by the medical personnel and the four civil affairs officers. Again credit was earned by the Military Police Platoons for their invaluable assistance.

In future operations the civil affairs question will be of paramount importance and the early establishment of combat team stockades with sufficient trained personnel, etc., will lend itself to increase the combat efficiency of the various combat teams and in the end to the progress of the Division.

Recommendations:

The recommendations previously submitted under this heading in the Saipan report are reiterated.

6. PUBLIC RELATIONS:

The coverage by the Public Relations of this Division apparently left one glaring omission. This Division so far as is known never got credit in the initial news releases for what might well be termed on the finest achievements of any military force, - the initial taking by the 4th Marine Division alone of tiny beaches and expanding them into a usable beachhead, much of the construction under fire. Otherwise the coverage was in general excellent and the procedure set up for the release of news, both pictures and stories, was satisfactory.

Recommendations:

The recommendation previously submitted under this heading in the Saipan report is reiterated.

7. RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES:

All chaplains of the Division landed with their individual units and served in whatever capacity they could to assist their units and to get necessary work done.

One chaplain was immediately assigned to Graves Registration where he remained throughout the period spent on the island. He performed religious burial rites and assisted in the conduct of the burials through the operation. Chaplains of the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish faiths visited the cemetery whenever possible in order to conduct burial rites for the men of their faith. In order to avoid in the future some of the difficulties experienced in this regard, it is recommended that increased effort be made to see that each man's identification tags have on them the letter which indicates his religious faith, C - for Catholic; J - for Jewish; and P - for Protestant. This was not always found on the identification tags of the men buried.

Several groups of men came to the cemetery with their chaplains for brief memorial services. The final dedication and memorial ceremonies were held Sunday, 6 August, 1944 with officers and men from the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions attending. Chaplains of the Jewish, Protestant and Catholic faiths from the two Divisions participated in the ceremony and conducted the formal grave services which followed the dedication ceremony.

One chaplain went ashore with the Medical Evacuation Unit and remained with them throughout the entire operation administering to the wounded and dying.

Another chaplain went with the Field Hospital and remained there during the entire time.

Regimental chaplains were with their men at or near the front administering to the spiritual needs and conducting religious services when possible, and distributing rosaries, prayer books and testaments to those who wanted them.

8. GRAVES REGISTRATION:

In the Tinian operation, the cemetery for the 4th Marine Division was established on J plus 1, and subsequently became a joint cemetery for the 2nd and 4th Marine Division, in charge of the 4th Marine Division Burial Officer and staffed by personnel of both Graves Registration Sections. Despite the wounding and evacuation of the assistant Burial Officer at the beginning of the work, the service functioned smoothly and continued its arduous and efficient work. It buried 347 marines and sailors and in cooperation with the various regiments buried 4233 enemy dead.

Greatest difficulty was the absence, then the continuing grave shortage of transportation to bring dead to the cemetery. It was difficult to induce regiments to utilize transportation which brought forward ammunition, rations and water, to return Marine bodies to the cemetery on its return trip to the beach.

One practice of the graves registration personnel will be corrected on future operations. That was painting the name on the headboard when there was sufficient evidence of identity to convince the Graves Registration Section of identity, but insufficient upon which to base a report of death to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Due to the rocky nature of the ground and the impossibility of digging with hand tools to the required depth a mode of burial new to the 4th Marine Division was inaugurated. First bull dozers were obtained after considerable difficulty and the top soil removed to bed rock, in this locality about three feet. Bodies were then placed in these depressions, lined up with surveying instruments, top soil replaced and the entire plot built up with an additional three feet of soil. The hard and intelligent work of all concerned, particularly the 4th Marine Division Burial Officer, Captain Lewis M. Nutting, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, resulted in a military cemetery, complete with flagpole and shrubbery, with headboards lined up with absolute precision when viewed from any angle, that surpassed many military cemeteries years in the building.

9. POST EXCHANGE:

There was no Post Exchange established on Tinian. The cigarettes, soap, et cetera, issued as part of the ration did much to promote morale. The few extra items brought by the Post Exchange Officer as personal baggage were a welcome addition to the supplies included with the ration.

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FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT - TINIAN

ANNEX B

I N T E L L I G E N C E

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I. GENERAL

A. INTELLIGENCE

1. RECONNAISSANCE

(a) Patrols.

Patrols were used more frequently and more effectively on TINIAN than on SAIPAN. The crushing defeat sustained by the enemy in his counter-attack during the early morning of J-plus-1-day and his consequent withdrawal to the southern end of the Island, coupled with the fact that the terrain was less rugged than that on SAIPAN, permitted the daily operation of patrols 500 to 1000 yards in front of our lines. Normally, when our front lines were stabilized for the night the patrols would conduct their reconnaissance and return before dark.

The Division Reconnaissance Company twice contacted appreciable groups of enemy and made valuable observations on the enemy's withdrawal from the Mt. LASSO Area during night reconnaissance. Had the Division Reconnaissance Company been equipped with armored mechanized transportation, it is conceivable that it could have kept contact with the enemy forces as they withdrew to the high ground at the southeastern end of the Island. This contact would have permitted complete exploitation of our initial success in destroying the enemy's counterattack and would have made our advance even more rapid.

Intelligence patrols, usually in groups of four to six, were used freely throughout the operation. Patrols from intelligence sections of all echelons were sent out to search rear areas for enemy tanks, weapons, emplacements, caches of documents, enemy CP's, field hospitals, burial places, etc. One set of patrols was sent out to observe and report on the effect of the new napalm incendiary bombs. After the Island was declared secured, a patrol from Division Intelligence Section, accompanied by volunteers from the POW's who were in a position to know, took two days to make a tour of all the CP's which were used by Japanese Army and Navy headquarters during the operation. Due to the fact that enemy troops on TINIAN were more security conscious than those on SAIPAN, little documentary material was obtained on this tour, but confirmation of the POW's story of the enemy's actions was established.

Mopping-up patrols were also used frequently, particularly along the ridge in the southern part of the Island after the Island had been declared secured.

(b) Air

(1) Visual

Comments in the SAIPAN report concerning the desirability of an interview by an intelligence officer of pilots making the early reconnaissance runs over the Island are reemphasized.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN

Following the SAIPAN operation, while the Division was still on SAIPAN completing plans for TINIAN, the Commanding General of the Division made a personal flight over TINIAN in order to obtain accurate and complete knowledge of the terrain of the Island. The value of this reconnaissance was so great that arrangements were made for all staff officers, all commanding officers of the RCT's and BLT's and some company commanders to make the same aerial reconnaissance. This proved of extreme value in completing and carrying out the plans for the operation. It is believed to be the first time in the Pacific Area where such personal reconnaissance by all key personnel was made prior to the operation.

While the Division was still on SAIPAN and throughout the actual operation, the Division Air Observers continued to give their steady flow of information concerning the enemy, his positions and activities, our own lines, and the terrain to our front. Regiments tuned in on the Air Observer net and received this information direct. As the planes operated from the airfield on SAIPAN, there was no opportunity for personal conference between the Intelligence Section and the Air Observers.

(2) Photographic.

Photographic coverage of TINIAN received prior to June 15 (D-day for SAIPAN) was good. Comments on similar coverage for SAIPAN are relevant.

Photographic coverage of TINIAN taken between June 15 and July 24 (J-day for TINIAN) was excellent. Much additional information was obtained from these photos, which were obtained in sufficient quantities to be distributed to battalions. The 1:10,000 aerial mosaic was virtually cloudless and far superior to the half-tone mosaic of SAIPAN. The annotated obliques showing the landing beaches were highly valuable.

Aerial photo interpretation reports from higher echelon were also improved and were received in time to transmit information to lower units. The only criticism to be made is that the API reports tended to call every shell hole or ground scar some form of enemy position.

For further discussion of aerial photographs, see paragraph I, C, 2, infra.

(c) Other Agencies.

Preliminary night reconnaissance of the landing beaches was conducted on July 10-11 and 11-12 by Corps Reconnaissance Battalion and Underwater Demolition Teams Five and Seven. Considerable use was made of the information obtained by this reconnaissance and the annotated photographs of the landing beaches.

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ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN

2. OP's

(a) Organization and Establishment.

The organization of battalion, regimental and Division OP's varied little from that of the SAIPAN operation. Experience gained on SAIPAN had indicated the most appropriate form of organization and changes were made only as required by loss of personnel. Conduct of the OP's was somewhat different, however, due to the difference in the nature of the terrain. There were few high points on the Island which could be regarded as satisfactory positions for OP's, and the rolling character of the land made accurate or detailed observation to the front very difficult. As a result OP's had to move frequently and were usually very close to the front lines. The rapid advance of our troops also added to the difficulties of maintaining the OP's. Once again, lack of transportation to place, maintain and relieve OP teams was a serious and difficult problem.

The one position on the Island properly suited for an OP location was the high ground northeast of TINIAN Town. Here, observation could be had of the whole valley to the south and all along the northern and western side of the ridge line in the southern part of the Island, where the enemy made his final stand. On this high ground, Division and all three RCT's established OP's which were able to maintain exceptional observation of activity to their front until our troops had reached the top of the ridge. Making use of powerful captured Japanese glasses, the Division OP spotted several Japanese guns (including one six-inch gun) which were firing on our troops and directed counter-battery fire from a 75mm gun on a half-track on these positions until they were all silenced. The positions could not be seen with the use of standard Marine Corps issue glasses.

(b) Communications.

Communication between the Division CP and OP was difficult to maintain. The distances involved and the frequent movement made wire-laying impossible. Using the same radios that failed on SAIPAN gave little satisfaction on TINIAN. The OP's obtained the information but it was frequently delayed in reaching Division, due to poor radio equipment.

3. PRISONERS OF WAR

(a) Procedure.

Armed with the experience gained and the lessons learned during the SAIPAN operation, the mechanics of POW collection and interrogation were generally much smoother and much better planned on TINIAN.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN

The single greatest improvement was the establishment of mobile stockades with each regimental combat team, operated by a Marine Civil Affairs Officer and guarded by one platoon of MP's. Here regimental interpreters were able to function efficiently, screening and interrogating, unmolested by the innumerable details which accompany the physical problems of stockade operation.

Only one Division stockade was in operation, but due to the nature of the terrain and fighting on TINIAN, it was adequate. This stockade moved forward three times following the advance of the units in contact with the enemy. It began with a small enclosure just inland from the WHITE Beaches, took up new positions at the northwest base of Mt. LASO on J-plus-2-day, and finally, two days later, established a large permanent stockade in the village of CHURO. The CHURO stockade, although built around the crude and shell-torn homes of the village, provided the most adequate facilities yet obtained by this Division in combat. Prior to 3 August a total of 1962 civilians had been screened at the 4th Division stockade. Because of the advantages of the CHURO site, Northern Troops and Landing Force at this time assumed command of the stockade and began using it as a reception center for all civilian internees and military POW's taken on the Island. Thereafter the stockade was flooded by hundreds of civilians captured by both the 2d and 4th Divisions during the mop-up phase of the operation and an accurate day-to-day count of the civilians captured by this Division was not possible. A great majority of the civilians were Korean laborers and their families, employed by the South Seas Development Company on TINIAN.

Military POW's captured by the 4th Division for the entire operation totaled 49.

Division interrogation at the CHURO stockade was largely carried on by two competent JICPOA interpreters, both of whom had spent many years in JAPAN. These two officers were of invaluable assistance.

(b) Value of Information.

The results of POW interrogation on TINIAN reiterate all the difficulties experienced on SAIPAN, where the isolation and disintegration of units, prior to the capture of enemy soldiers, decreased the amount of information to be derived from POW's. Still another factor on TINIAN operated against interrogators, who were attempting to piece together a picture of the enemy's plan of withdrawal, his remaining available installations and the number of effective troops. That factor was the speed of movement of our own advance. By the time prisoners were thoroughly interrogated, the enemy situation had usually radically changed. The disintegration of the enemy was so complete that often POW's fresh from the front lines were unable to account for opposition in other sectors. It seems a reasonable conclusion that the value of information to be obtained from enemy POW's varies inversely with the speed of your own forces.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN

In spite of the handicaps it is believed that POW information was extremely valuable. With a background of intelligence information on TINIAN garnered on SAIPAN and with captured documents from TINIAN, the interpreters selected POW's best qualified to provide information and succeeded in piecing together the enemy's story, his plan prior to our landing, his dispositions and actions following our landing and finally the plans and disposition of his forces still to our front.

4. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL

(a) Evaluation Procedure - Documents.

The handling of documents on TINIAN followed much the same pattern as that adopted on SAIPAN. Again we found it an efficient way to process the huge bulk of captured enemy papers. Division of labor among the interpreter officers enabled them to work speedily at their assigned tasks, confident in their understanding of the job at hand, whether it be maps, order of battle or routine translations.

The D-2 document evaluation center operated for only 36 hours at the first Division CP inland from WHITE beaches. Then, in the interest of occupying larger and more adequate facilities, the center was moved to an abandoned Japanese field hospital at Target Area 634K, on the main road leading to the northern airports. Although this location was later separated from the Division CP by as much as three miles, it had the compensating asset of being situated "next door" to Northern Troops and Landing Force Headquarters. It also provided a large enough storage and crating room for the attached JICPOA team, which again utilized the captured Japanese truck which had been transported from SAIPAN to TINIAN. Close liaison was kept with D-2 and G-2 by telephone, truck and runner.

Dengue fever made heavy inroads on Division interpreter strength during the operation, hospitalizing two officers, one enlisted man, and the one attached Korean-Hawaiian civilian. Luckily, JICPOA reinforcements which arrived after the SAIPAN operation helped to offset their loss.

(b) Value of Information.

From intelligence captured on SAIPAN we believed we had a fairly accurate order of battle and plan of defense of the TINIAN forces. The accuracy of this information was verified during the operation. Translated captured documents permitted the establishment of the order of battle as well as complete details of the enemy's plan for the defense of the Island. An officer's register of all Army units on TINIAN proved of considerable value to interrogators in tracing enemy units.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN

A day-by-day check of the number of enemy guns and tanks captured and a record of the identification of units engaged and destroyed were maintained. This gave the Division a reasonably accurate picture of the enemy's strength to our front.

A continuous series of profitable targets was furnished to both air and artillery from translated enemy maps and documents.

As on SAIPAN great quantities of valuable documents of technical and strategic nature were found. All were forwarded to Northern Troops and Landing Force or JICPOA.

(c) Equipment and Material.

As in the SAIPAN operation the Division Intelligence Section endeavored to collect and evaluate enemy equipment and material. However, the speed of the advance of our forces created an impossible situation. Advancing as much as 7000 yards in one day, we naturally overran far too much equipment to be collected by our one captured Jap truck.

Quantities of small arms, MG's, aviation, photographic and miscellaneous gear were recovered, evaluated and shipped to JICPOA.

Separate reports were submitted to higher echelons on ordnance and tanks, indicating location, description and condition. This subject is further discussed under paragraph 5, E, 3, "Enemy - Equipment".

5. PERSONNEL

(a) Organization

No material change was made in the organization of the intelligence sections from that described in the SAIPAN report. Loss of personnel and a few replacements involved very slight modifications.

(b) Training

The SAIPAN operation provided the best possible training for the TINIAN operation. Some new replacements were received by the R-2 and Bn-2 Sections, but they were mixed with the old men and easily worked into the organization.

B. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN

See the counterintelligence plan as outlined in the SAIPAN report. Very little change was required to adapt it to the TINIAN operation.

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN

2. SECRECY DISCIPLINE

Plans for the TINIAN operation were completed on SAIPAN under field conditions. While the fact that the Division was preparing for another operation could not be concealed from the troops and while TINIAN was the obvious objective, there was no leak of plans from units within the Division. This is indicated by the fact that the enemy was completely surprised by our landing on WHITE Beaches and had made no adequate plans for our landing there. POW interrogation and captured documents indicate, too, that the enemy did not expect us to undertake the operation against TINIAN as early as we did by several weeks.

3. CONCEALMENT.

Use of concealment and cover was adequate. The rapidly moving situation and the complete lack of enemy air attack and absence of enemy artillery after J-plus-1-day diminished the need for spending an undue amount of time on cover and concealment.

4. TACTICAL MEASURES.

While the demonstration executed for a landing at TINIAN Town may have momentarily confused the enemy, his prompt ordering of his reserve battalion north to the WHITE Beach area to counterattack is an indication that he was not long in doubt as to our real landing point.

5. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY.

Comments in the SAIPAN report apply.

6. COUNTERPROPAGANDA.

None was needed.

C. STAFF WORK

1. UTILIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL.

No material change was made in the use of intelligence personnel in any of the echelons within Division. See report on SAIPAN operation. Liaison work was again hampered by lack of transportation.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN

The photographic section again had assigned photographers to each regiment. Photographic coverage included 4650 feet of 16mm kodachrome-moving picture film and approximately 600 still photos, which included our loading at SAIPAN, landings, actions throughout the operation and shots of purely intelligence nature such as enemy tanks, guns, planes, mines, etc.

2. MAPS, AERIAL PHOTOS AND MODELS.

The standard 1:20,000 target square map was used almost exclusively during the operation. Despite some known errors, particularly in regard to the high cliff lines throughout the Island, it proved very satisfactory. On contours it was subject to correction by the reproduction of the captured Japanese map, which was more accurate in this respect. This latter map was used by the artillery for vertical control.

Some use was made of the few copies of the 1:10,000 map received by Division, but no practical benefit was obtained from the others (1:62,500, 2" equals 1 nautical mile and 1" equals 1 nautical mile).

Aerial photographs during both the planning phase and the actual operation maintained a high standard. Throughout the operation they proved of immense value to all echelons and demonstrated the way in which they should be used by combat troops. The one complaint which could be made was that sets were not delivered in sufficient quantity for distribution to companies.

Virtually all the deficiencies reported in the SAIPAN operation were overcome on the TINIAN operation.

An excellent cloudless photographic mosaic at a scale of 1:10,000 was furnished.

Verticals and obliques taken during east-west runs from north to south were supplied. These parallel strips, always taken looking toward the enemy, could easily be separated for distribution so that each unit could be supplied with photos of the terrain to its immediate front. Copies were delivered in time for distribution down to the battalions. A flight plot for quick orientation was included.

Regiments and battalions reported uniformly that aerial photographs furnished during this operation were of extreme value.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN

Relief maps, prepared before the Division left the HAWAIIAN area, were used for planning and briefing purposes. Aerial reconnaissance over the Island itself by all major unit commanders, however, meant that the relief models were not needed as much as they otherwise would have been.

Distribution of maps did not prove an extremely difficult problem for the TINIAN operation as it was completely finished while all units were still on SAIPAN.

D. PROPAGANDA

1. OWN

The propaganda used on the TINIAN operation was largely written by a Japanese officer captured on SAIPAN. It appears to have been written more with a view to Japanese psychology. There is some evidence that it was more effective than that on SAIPAN. Several members of the military surrendered because of the propaganda, and an appreciable number of civilians were apparently affected by it. It was dropped from planes in a more effective manner than formerly, but there were still many cases where the leaflets fell behind our lines. Method of drop needs to be the basis of a careful study, and more persistent use of propaganda is desirable. For further discussion, together with recommendations for improvement in the use of propaganda, see the corresponding section of the Intelligence Report on SAIPAN.

During the latter part of the operation, when enemy forces and civilians were compressed to the high ridge in the southern peninsula of the Island a powerful public address system, borrowed from Northern Troops and Landing Force was used very effectively to entice civilians to come out of caves and other hiding places and surrender. Sets of this sort could have been used to advantage on this operation far more frequently if they had been available, and they are a necessity for any future operation.

2. ENEMY

Enemy propaganda was confined to broadcasts from JAPAN. The music was highly appreciated and the news broadcasts very entertaining. An example of the latter is the TOKYO broadcast this week that the battle on TINIAN is still raging, a full month after the Island was secured.

E. ENEMY

1. MORALE

TINIAN was under continuous bombardment from air, sea and land after 13 June, with increased volume and tempo just prior to our landing. The troops on the Island know that SAIPAN had fallen and that the attack would come on TINIAN sooner or later. Despite all this, morale of the enemy troops on TINIAN was still high.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN

The counterattack on the night of J-day was all-out, with Army and Navy units both throwing themselves on our lines, with utter disregard of life, in an effort to drive us into the sea.

Troops of the 50th Infantry particularly, were well trained, superior in marksmanship and security conscious. In their retreat to the south they effectively destroyed or removed all identifications so that we lacked conclusive proof that they had even been committed in force until we had reached the southern ridge. Camouflage discipline was exceptional.

There were comparatively few troops to surrender. Thought of the ultimate outcome of the battle was apparently not the concern of the individual soldier. His duty was simply to fight until death. There was an indication, however, that some units were informed in the last days of the operation that the Japanese fleet was coming to their relief. This message may have been sent from TOKYO, but probably was invented by unit commanders to bolster morale.

2. ORDER OF BATTLE

Since a complete order of battle of enemy forces on TINIAN was compiled by Northern Troops and Landing Force, this detailed information will not be duplicated in this report. The information was obtained from initial intelligence and from documentary and POW sources on SAIPAN prior to the landing on TINIAN. These preliminary identifications were found to be highly accurate and included:

- (a) 50th Infantry Regiment, including three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion and miscellaneous unit attachments.
- (b) 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry, composed of headquarters platoon, three companies and a battalion gun platoon. This battalion was attached to the 50th Regiment.
- (c) 29th Division Field Hospital Detachment.
- (d) Tank Company, 18th Infantry Regiment (12 light model 1935 tanks).
- (e) 56th Naval Guard Force. This unit is believed to have had under its jurisdiction the 82nd and 83rd AA Units and the 233rd Construction Unit.
- (f) Administrative Command of 1st Air Fleet, Rear Admiral KAKUDA, Commander in Chief.
- (g) 523rd Naval Air Group, later known as the 302d Air Group, consisting of some 600 men.
- (h) Parts of the 343rd, 261st Naval Air Groups.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN.

Added to this were many small miscellaneous units such as airbase and construction units. As had been the case on SAIPAN there were a number of sundry units and quite an array of unidentifiable code names and numbers found on captured documents and presumably among the units on TINIAN at the time of our landing.

The enemy force totaled approximately 9,000. About 5,000 were Army and 4,000 Naval Personnel.

On TINIAN as on SAIPAN three civilian loyalty organizations were discovered, the Civilian Militia (ZUIGOCUMJIN), the Home Guard organization (KEIBODAN), and the Youth Organization (SEINENDAN). Among these units the Civilian Militia was most prominent, but none of the organized civilians accomplished much for the Japanese military. Most of the civilian men thought first of their families and fled with them. They received no weapons to fight with in their official capacity, although some procured grenades from the soldiers to be used on themselves if necessary. No evidence was found that these civilian groups had done any fighting or helped in any material way after our landing.

3. EQUIPMENT

From the enemy's standards his equipment was good and in sufficient quantity for his defensive forces. A brief resume of general observations concerning the enemy's equipment follows:

(a) Ordnance


The following were located within the Division's zone of action:

(1) Coast defense guns.

- 3 6-inch (Armstrong and Whitworth) guns.
- 2 8cm guns.
- 3 14cm guns.
- 10 12cm guns.

(2) AA (and in some instances dual purpose).

- 6 75mm mountain guns.
 - 15 25mm twin-mount machine cannon.
- Several aircraft, turret-mounted, 20mm Oerlikon guns.



SHADED AREA CAPTURED BY 4th MAR. DIV.

DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS PLOTTED FROM
 GROUND OBSERVATION BY JIGPOA TEAMS
 24 JULY TO 5 AUG.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN.

(3) Artillery.

- 7 75mm mountain guns.
- 2 70mm howitzers.
- 2 47mm AT guns (1941 model).
- 2 37mm AT guns.

(4) MG's and small arms.

These guns included all the conventional types with a high percentage of aircraft weapons. Captured guns included 22 FTG's (Hotchkiss type) and 40 LMG's (assorted). Many other MG's were found too badly demolished for identification. Nearly all rifles were 7.7mm Model 99 (1939) and were generally new.

(5) Mortars.

A few 81mm mortars were seen. The 50mm "knee mortar" was generally employed.

(6) Grenades

The conventional grenades were employed in profuse quantities.

(7) Ammunition

While the cached stocks were in no way comparable to those found on SAIPAN the stock was ample and considerable quantities of unexpended ammunition were captured.

(b) Tanks

Eight model 1935 light tanks were captured. These tanks were the subject of a separate report in D-2 Special Intelligence Report # 5, to Northern Troops and Landing Force on 8 August, 1944.

They were powered with a six-cylinder, four-cycle, inline, air-cooled diesel engine. Armament included a 37mm gun and a 7.7 MG. The suspension was a modified British Garden-Lloyd system. One captured tank was in running condition and was delivered to Headquarters, Northern Troops and Landing Force.

(c) Fire Control Equipment.

Fixed positions included fire control equipment, data computers, etc. Range finders and binoculars were of high quality.

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ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN.

(d) Radar, Radio and Telephone Equipment.

While much radar and radio equipment was captured, no effort is made in this report to cover this technical equipment. As on SAIPA, these installations were completely smashed by our naval gunfire and artillery or by the efforts of the enemy. Captured diagrams and field phones indicated that the entire Island was well wired for phone service.

(e) Trucks.

A small number of Japanese light rear-wheel-drive trucks of Chevrolet type were apparently the only transportation the enemy had. These vehicles were also employed as prime movers for the artillery.

(f) Aircraft.

The aircraft captured, although demolished, included several types which were particularly interesting from an intelligence standpoint. They included:

(a) An IRVING, two-engine, radar-equipped night fighter armed with four 20mm cannon, in fixed pair mounts firing above and below the fuselage at 30° angles.

(b) A FRANCES, 14-cylinder two-engine type, armed with a 20mm cannon flexibly mounted on a ball and socket joint in the nose.

(c) A LIZ, four-engined land plane formerly used as a bomber.

(d) A SAIUN, the Navy's carrier-borne reconnaissance plane, one of JAPAN's fastest, radar-equipped, single-engine, with a four-blade propeller.

(g) Mines.

There was a profuse variety of mines. They included sea mines, horned mines, yardstick mines and tape measure mines. Aerial bombs and ordinary dynamite charges were also used as mines, and booby traps were freely scattered through some areas.

(h) Miscellaneous Equipment.

As TINIAN was a base for a reconnaissance group, considerable supplies were captured of aerial cameras and supplies.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN.

(i) Supplies, Water and Logistics.

While food supplies cached on TINIAN were in no way comparable to SAIPAN, ample food stocks were on hand and were fairly well distributed. The exodus of civilians to the southern end of the Island caused acute food shortages there toward the close of the operation.

Water came from extensive wells in the MARPO Area (southeast part of the Island) and from Lake HAGOI in Target Area 640NSX (northwest part of the Island). Water was distributed by means of diesel pumps through cement pipes, joined with a flanged Dresser type coupling. Both pipes and pumps were badly damaged by our attacks and water distribution was difficult, according to POW's. However, the brief heavy tropical showers which occurred frequently during the TINIAN operation gave the enemy sufficient water.



The road net covering the Island was excellent. Nearly all the roads ran north-south or east-west and were laid on a hard coral base. Tree lines bordering all the roads afforded excellent concealment for trucks and vehicles.

Captured maps disclosed the water sources and pumping stations, the communication lines, ammunition and supply dumps and CPs. All were subjected to destructive artillery fire.

4. ORGANIZATION


The Island was divided into three main defensive sectors, northern, western and southern (see diagram). The three battalions of the 50th Regiment were each assigned a sector for defense: The 2d Battalion to the northern sector, the 1st Battalion to the western and the 3d Battalion to the southern. The 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry, which had been on an amphibious exercise from SAIPAN and which was caught on TINIAN by our attack on SAIPAN, constituted the reserve and was held in the MARPO area (southeast part of Island).

Each Battalion of the 50th Infantry was supported by one battery from the Mountain Artillery Battalion. These batteries were located as follows: the 2d Battery supporting the 2d Battalion in the northern sector, covered YELLOW Beach in ASIGA Bay; the 1st Battery, supporting the 1st Battalion deployed initially from FAIBUS SAN HILO Point to the vicinity of USHI Airport on the north; and the 3rd Battery, supporting the 3d Battalion, 50th Infantry had its guns disposed to cover the TINIAN beaches, one gun at Target Area 526M and three guns at Target Area 514R, X and Y, respectively.



W. S. HAN





TINIAN ISLAND

SHOWING ENEMY DEFENSE SECTORS

SCALE: 1:125,000



SECRET

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN

The tank company, with 12 tanks, was to be held in reserve, prepared to support a counterattack on any beachhead which we might establish.

The three possible beach areas on the Island were covered by fixed naval guns, with a maximum size of six inches, and manned by naval personnel. The two principal airfields were defended by naval personnel.

The 56th KEIBITAI (Naval Guard Force) manned the 25 coast defense batteries and AA guns. A subdivision, the SUIKEITAI (Coastal Security Force) was charged with laying beach mines and operating small coastal patrol boats.

The KIKUCHI Butai and the SATO Butai manned the AA guns on the USHI Airfield, while the KUSAKA Butai manned the AA guns on the GURGUAN Point Airfield.

A few of the coast defense guns were close to the beaches in relatively open positions, but most were artfully concealed in caves reinforced with concrete, with only the barrel projecting. Field pieces were concealed in tree lines and caves, often with prepared alternate positions.

Several 25mm twin mount batteries of four guns each were so placed as to be employed as AA or AB guns. These were in circular revetted and camouflaged emplacements but generally so established that they could not be used for a land attack to their rear.

Entrenchments, pillboxes and rifle pits were built in profusion surrounding the beaches of TINIAN Town and YELLOW Beach at ASIGA Bay, and in lesser extent, near WHITE Beaches, were camouflaged and concealed.

The enemy employed a few sea mines, a quantity of land mines and some booby traps. Generally the land mines and booby traps were employed in a hasty and haphazard fashion. While there were many horned mines on the beaches, their pattern of laying was poor and many were unarmed. Yard stick mines were employed on beach exits and tape measure mines were employed on beach exits and tape measure mines were scattered inland from the beach horned mines. Beaches were booby-trapped with radial and lineal wires to 10-12 pound dynamite charges.

Horned type mines were also used inland in cane fields and on roads, seldom with a pattern. Aerial bombs were found buried on roads, though frequently the fuses were not armed. Often anti-boat, tape-measure, yard-stick and magnetic mines were found in the open on roads or partially buried. They were also frequently unarmed.

Booby traps, while more frequent than on SAIPAN, were crude and poorly concealed. There were a few mined road blocks.

SECRET

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN

The apparent lack of knowledge of mine laying and the careless manner of placing the installations was astonishing.

Captured documents showed that the defense plan called for observation of all coast lines, a decisive defense at the beach line, mutual support between sectors and in the event of a successful landing at any point a strong counterattack. This was confirmed by POW interrogation and by the actual defensive action.

In spite of our long and continued air, naval gunfire and artillery preparations the enemy's casualties were surprisingly low, and a majority of his guns and emplacements were intact at the commencement of our landings on J-day.

Captured documents called for a flexible defense to meet the point of our attack. The enemy regarded the most likely place of attack as RED, BLUE, and GREEN Beaches at TINIAN Town harbor. YELLOW Beach at ASIGA Bay was considered next. Believing this a good secondary beach, the enemy heavily mined it and covered it by fire and observation.

WHITE Beach 2 was considered as our least likely landing place, due to its limited size. WHITE Beach 1, while protected by coast defense guns and entrenchments, was not included in the plan, obviously because it was only 65 yards long.

5. TACTICS

After our attack on SAIPAN the enemy forces on TINIAN knew it was just a matter of time before they too would be attacked. From captured documents and POW interrogation we learned that the enemy dug in and prepared for our landings. But he had least expected our attack to be on WHITE Beaches and did not expect our attack for another month. He still hoped to have the Japanese Fleet and Air Force come to his succor, and, curiously enough, he entertained hopes of defeating our landing attempt when it came.

The 50th Regiment, the backbone of the defense, were veterans of MANCHURIA.

On J-day Colonel OGATA early decided that our main landing effort was to be made over the WHITE Beaches. At 1000 he issued orders for his reserve, the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry, in the MARPO Area, to assemble in the vicinity of the radio towers at Target Area 605U, and from there to move north to the Mt. LASSO Area in order to support the planned counterattack. This movement was effected on foot during the day and night of J-day. Utilizing the tree lines bordering the roads the movement was completed unobserved by our ever present air observers and reflects considerable credit on the enemy's use of cover and concealment.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN.

Meanwhile the northern defense sector forces, supported by artillery and coast defense guns, strongly contested our landings. As on SAIPAN the enemy did not mass his artillery fire, generally firing one gun at a time. He failed to take advantage of bracket adjustment gained and except in a few instances on WHITE Beaches did not use time fire. With the advantage of good OP sites on Mt. LASSO and pre-registration data, he continued to lay harrassing fire on our beaches and the area adjacent thereto during the day and night.

Most of his shore defenses and entrenchments adjacent to the beaches were rendered untenable by our preliminary fires. The extensive mining of WHITE Beach 2 proved a troublesome barrier, limiting its use on J-day.

According to plan all available enemy forces were concentrated for the counterattack which commenced on J-plus-1-day at about 0230.

Enemy forces participating in the counterattack consisted of the reserve from the MARPO Area (the 1st Battalion, 135th Regiment); the western sector defense force, which initially opposed our landing (the 1st Battalion, 50th Regiment); and about two companies of the northern sector defense force (the 2d Battalion, 50th Regiment). A company of engineers acting as infantry and all the available naval personnel of miscellaneous units from USHI Airfield also took part. The attack was supported by the 2d Artillery Battery, already in position, and the 1st Battery, which displaced forward from the ASIGA Bay Area after nightfall of J-day. The attack was also supported by the Tank Company.

The attack was not too closely coordinated and lasted for two and one-half hours. Battalions 1/135 and 2/50 attacked generally north, striking our right flank. Six tanks, some with troops riding on them and others with tree foliage as camouflage, moved due north in column on the road and were taken under direct fire by our forces. The tanks never had an opportunity to deploy and all but one were destroyed. The latter was reported to be burning as it retired from sight. The balance of the enemy's forces, attacking in a westerly direction, engaged our left flank and entire front.

The attacking troops were armed with new rifles. All carried grenades and many carried improvised explosive charges. They were fully equipped and all carried gas masks.

From the standpoint of the forces defending the Island it was a powerful counterattack. It was completely repulsed on all fronts. A small breakthrough occurred, but the charge was destroyed by our 75mm pack howitzers at point-blank range of a few hundred yards.

As a result of the counterattack, the 1st Battalion, 135th Regiment, was destroyed with most of the 2d Battalion, 50th Regiment. Nearly all

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN.

The naval personnel connected with USHI Airfield were annihilated. Five out of six tanks were destroyed and both artillery batteries were knocked out by counter-battery fire.

Bordering the immediate front of the Division were 1241 enemy dead. Our morning advance disclosed many more. The remaining forces retired south as we advanced, fighting small delaying actions.

The discipline and training of the MANCHURIAN veterans was evident. They made excellent use of cover and concealment; they meticulously destroyed all unit identifications; they carried away, burned and buried their dead, making unit identifications difficult and making an estimate of their total casualties impossible. Their marksmanship was notably accurate, with rifle and MG fire delivered low.

With the enemy units badly mauled, transportation and communications largely destroyed, and dumps and water points constantly under fire, organized resistance was over until the forces reached the high cliff line area bordering the southeastern end of the Island. Here, from caves and jungle terrain resembling SAIPAN, the enemy made a tenacious fight, gradually hastening the end by piecemeal night counterattacks.

The following intelligence with reference to the movements of the senior officers on the Island was gleaned from POW interrogation:

Colonel OGATA's CP was originally in a house near the HINODE Shrine, at Target Area 628V. About 11 June, when our air attacks commenced, the CP was moved into the field and established on Mt. LASSO. Here he functioned until after our landing. On July 26-27, the CP was displaced to a cave in the vicinity of Target Area 548RQV. The following day the CP was again displaced to another cave in the vicinity of Target Area 511IJON. On the night of August 2, Colonel OGATA was reported killed in a night attack between Target Areas 516 and 511.

Navy Captain OYA, C.O. of the 56th KEIBITAI, initially had his CP in a concrete school building in TINIAN Town. About a week prior to J-day the CP was moved to a cave in the cliff line overlooking TINIAN Town near Target Area 535P. On July 26-27 the CP was again moved to a cave near the shoreline in Target Area 506. The following day Captain OYA moved up on the cliff to Target Area 507UQ, where he established his CP in a cistern. On July 29 he assembled his remaining force, approximately 600, in the vicinity of Target Area 507. A line was established through Target Areas 510 and 515. This group was nearly destroyed the same night by our forces. The remaining forces retired to Target Area 507, where on the following night they were entirely destroyed as they counterattacked. Captain OYA was last seen alive just after the counter-attack was repulsed.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN.

Rear Admiral KAKUDA, Commander in Chief, 1st Air Fleet, gathered with his Chief of Staff and 150 flight personnel of the RYU, TAKA and WASEI Air Units at Target Area 506L on 15 July. Here every night through 21 July, they assembled collapsible boats and rowed out beyond the reefs in the direction of AGUIJAN Island in an attempt to rendezvous with a submarine and escape. Contact was never effected, and on 22 July, prior to our attack, the entire party returned to dugouts in Target Area 532. Movements of the Admiral after this are not known, but POW's believe that he committed suicide sometime after our landing.

In general, although intelligence indicates that original plans and orders called for a unified defensive command under Colonel OGATA and stressed coordination between Army and Navy, it appears that there was little if any coordination between these commands after the main counter-attack was repulsed. Colonel OGATA and Captain OYA issued conflicting orders for their forces and paid scant heed to each other's plans. Though he was senior in rank, Rear Admiral KAKUDA, since he was an airman, had little to do with the conduct of the defense of the Island.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

Following Division's return to base camp a series of conferences was held to discuss the SAIPAN and TINIAN operations. The full intelligence recommendations resulting were not completed in time to be embodied in the Division's operation report on SAIPAN but are now submitted in detail.

A. GENERAL

1. That when bombing and photographic missions are conducted over our future objective, Division or higher echelon intelligence officers interrogate the pilots and that the information obtained be furnished Division.
2. That sufficient Japanese interpreters be allocated to Civil Affairs to ease the burden on D-2 interpreters and permit more time for intelligence work.
3. That so far as practicable code names be more widely used for target data during the planning phase of a coming operation.
4. That uniform censorship regulations be promulgated by higher echelon for future operations, governing in general all phases starting with embarkation through to the return to a base or rest camp.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN.

5. That the following be considered on map preparation for future operations:

(a) That maps be prepared of the following scales:

- 1:5000, of the landing area.
- 1:10,000, for issue to smaller tactical units.
- 1:20,000, for general use.

(b) That a simple map, free of detail, be prepared for use as a firing chart for artillery.

(c) That Division be notified well in advance of the number, scale, type and name of the maps to be issued.

(d) That Division receive the full allowance of maps at least two weeks before our first elements embark.

6. That recommendations concerning propaganda embodied in the Fourth Marine Division Operations Report, SAIPAN, Annex B (Intelligence), pages 22-23, be adopted.

7. That adequate preparations be made to assure good and plentiful aerial photos before and during the next operation.

8. That great care be exercised in making a better selection of junior officers for API schooling and that they be made available to Division, to bring it up to T/O strength.

9. That Division be brought up to T/O strength in enlisted Japanese interpreter personnel.

10. That careful consideration be given to equip and train the Division Reconnaissance Company for armored motorized reconnaissance.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONS TO TABLES OF ORGANIZATION

These represent the composite opinion of major unit commanders, Division and regimental intelligence officers.

Rank and duties of additional personnel needed for future combat operations above present T/O strength.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TIMIAN.

D-2 SECTION

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Duties</u>
1 Lieutenant	Reports and Research
1 Lieutenant	Counterintelligence
1 Warrant Officer	Lithographer
1 Corporal or Private First Class	Artist

Artillery Regiment
Regimental H & S Battery

1 Lieutenant Asst. R-2 and Air Observer

Infantry Regiments

Scout and sniper platoons 1 per each Inf. Regt. (3)
1 per each Inf. Bn. (9)
Scout and sniper platoon 1 officer and 28 enl. men
(Add one Corpsman and one Radio operator with SCR 300 Radio)

1 Lieutenant
1 Gunnery or Platoon Sergeant
2 Sergeants
5 Corporals
20 Privates or Privates First Class

The platoon will consist of a platoon headquarters and two (2) scout sniper sections.

Platoon Headquarters

1 Lieutenant
1 Gunnery or Platoon Sergeant
1 Corporal
4 Privates or Privates first class

Scout Sniper Sections (2)

1 Sergeant
2 Corporals
8 Privates or Privates first class

If the scout sniper platoon is not approved, provide four (4) additional intelligence personnel for each battalion intelligence section.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONS TO PRESENT
TABLE OF BASIC ALLOWANCES
FOR REGIMENTAL INTELLIGENCE SECTIONS

This represents the composite opinion of major unit commanders, Division and regimental intelligence officers.

1. Each infantry regiment to be equipped with a powerful jeep mounted public address system.
2. All OP personnel be furnished with 7 x 50 powered field glasses in place of present 6 x 30 glass.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONS AND CHANGES TO
TABLE OF BASIC ALLOWANCES
FOR THE DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SECTION

1. Additions to present allowances.
 - (a) 1 truck, 1-ton, 4 x 4, reconnaissance.
 - (b) 2 trailers, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 2 wheel, cargo.
 - (c) 5 public address systems, including 1 powerful one to be mounted on a jeep and 4 hand megaphone type.
 - (d) 3 radios, type SCR 300.
 - (e) 2 CP tents (Army type)
 - (f) 1 chest, typewriter standard, complete.
 - (g) 1 mimeograph machine, hand operated, portable field type.
2. Changes and replacements.
 - (a) Replace 7 pairs of glasses, spotting, field, 6 x 30, for OP personnel by 12 7 x 50 (or approximate equivalent in power) glasses.
 - (b) Replace 12 carbines or M-1's for photographic personnel with 12 .45 caliber automatic pistols.
3. Discussion of recommendations.
 - (a) Additions.

(1) Truck and two trailers. The D-2 Section has two jeeps as organic allotted transportation. In the final report of the SAIPAN and TINIAN operations the three infantry regiments and the artillery regiment all referred to the difficulties of getting intelligence material to D-2 and all recommended that D-2 establish regular collection runs. If we are to seek maximum benefit from captured intelligence material, it must be expedited to D-2 for evaluation. Experience has disclosed that

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN.

a jeep by itself does not have the carrying capacity for material collected from the R-2's. During the recent operations R-2's were frequently forced to leave guard details from their limited personnel, when their CP displaced forward, to guard captured material until D-2 could beg or borrow transportation to collect this material.

In addition, the establishment, replacement and daily maintenance of two six-men Division OP teams requires transportation other than that now available to D-2. During the SAIPAN and TINIAN operations these teams, posted miles apart, frequently were forced to undergo unnecessary privations and were often short of food and water due to lack of transportation to contact them. The teams with field equipment, such as spotting scopes, radios, etc., require larger transportation than jeeps. This transportation must be readily available so that the OP may be moved forward to a new position as soon as the advance of the troops renders this desirable.

(2) Public address systems. The recent operations unquestionably proved the great value of public address systems to talk to pockets of resistance and to civilians, to induce them to surrender. This Division has none and had to borrow them from the 2d Division and V Amphibious Corps when they could spare them. The borrowed sets saved the lives of many Marines. Regardless of what the regiments may recommend or receive in the way of public address systems, D-2 with its pool of interpreters should be equipped and ready to furnish PA systems and interpreters on short notice to vital spots. The recommendations include, (1) a powerful set which would be mounted on a jeep, and (2) 4 hand megaphone sets, similar to those employed by the Navy, for use by interpreters in places inaccessible to the heavier jeep-mounted equipment.

(3) Radios. Three SCR 300 radio sets are minimum requirements for the maintenance of two OP's. It is further hoped that this set will be adopted to provide an intelligence net for the Division.

(4) CP tents. Two CP blackout tents are required, one for CP operations and one for reproduction work. D-2 used one of these tents during the entire TINIAN operation and found it most satisfactory.

(5) Typewriter. No provision is made for a typewriter for the Japanese interpreters. The great amount of translation requires a typewriter for full time use in this department. The two typewriters now allotted to the D-2 Section are completely inadequate for the work of the Section.

(6) Mimeograph. A portable mimeograph machine for field purposes is a necessity. Periodic reports, if they are to be of any value, must be distributed to higher and adjacent echelons, and down to battalions.

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, TINIAN.

Translations of captured documents and other intelligence information must also be distributed. A portable, hand operated drum-type machine is needed.

(b) Changes and Replacements.

(1) Field glasses. During the SAIPAN and TINIAN operations the enemy with more powerful flasses could spot our OP's before being spotted by us. Early in the SAIPAN operation superior glasses belonging to the enemy were captured and used throughout both operations by Division OP's. In one instance on TINIAN the officer in charge of the Division OP used the powerful captured glasses to spot a troublesome enemy gun cleverly conealed in a cave and to direct fire from a 75mm equipped half-track to destroy the enemy installation. The gun and cave could not even be seen with our issue glasses. As the new T/O increases the D-2 observer group from 8 to 30 it is therefore recommended that 12 pairs of glasses of greater power than the 6 x 30 type be furnished. The 7 x 50 powered glassed have been used and found satisfactory.

(2) Pistols. Photographers are normally armed with either a carbine or an M-1. Realizing the impossibility of photographers handling a camera and rifle, arrangements were made to rearm D-2 photographers with .45 caliber automatic pistols. While they are now equipped with pistols by authority of the Quartermaster it was deemed advisable to record this recommendation that pistols be listed as their normal allotted weapon.

Lt. Col. McCormick
GOODERHAM L. MCCORMICK
Lt. Col., USMCR,
Asst. Chief of Staff, D-2.

FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT - TINIAN

ANNEX C

OPERATIONS

ANNEX C - OPERATIONS

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OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL.

(a) Operational features of the shore-to-shore phase are discussed in Section III of the basic report. A day-to-day account of the progress of the attack is contained in Section IV. The comments on the organization, equipment and employment of infantry outlined in the report on the SAIPAN operation are, to a great extent, applicable to the operation against TINIAN. Insofar as possible measures were taken to preclude the recurrence of mistakes. The efficiency and team work with which the latter operation was conducted clearly indicates the value of experience.

(b) This annex is devoted to the parts played by organic and attached supporting arms. Additional information on the details of employment and performance will be found in the reports of subordinate units.

2. NAVAL GUNFIRE

(a) Planning.

(1) Since 12 June TINIAN Island had received systematic bombardment designed to prevent enemy installations thereon from interfering with operations against SAIPAN. After the capture of SAIPAN, bombardment was intensified and the island was divided into zones of responsibility for Corps Artillery, Air, and Naval Gunfire. Corps Artillery was allotted that portion of the island north of the OO grid line, while naval gunfire covered the remainder of the island south of that line. Air engaged those targets in either zone which could not be effectively covered by the other two arms. Since Corps Artillery possessed more adequate intelligence agencies, this unit coordinated all intelligence information received and prescribed daily targets to be engaged. This plan remained in effect until Jig-minus-one day when the bombardment was carried out in accordance with an intensified schedule.

(2) Shortly before Jig-day, Shore Fire Control personnel were detailed to go aboard their assigned firing ships and LCI(G)'s in order to more thoroughly familiarize the NLO's and spotters with fire control methods and problems. This procedure was beneficial in insuring mutual understanding of the shore fire control problem and should be continued as normal practice.

(3) The bombardment plan organized firing ships into five (5) units, each to operate initially in a separate fire support sector during Jig-minus-one and Jig-days. Task Organization was as follows:

~~SECRET~~
ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

Fire Support Unit 1 - 1 CA & 3 DD's
Fire Support Unit 2 - 1 CL & 3 DD's
Fire Support Unit 3 - 1 BB, 1 CL & 4 DD's
Fire Support Unit 4 - 2 BB's & 3 DD's
Fire Support Unit 5 - 1 CA, 1 CL & 3 DD's

(b) Scheduled Bombardment.

(1) Fires for Jig-minus-one day were designed to thoroughly cover all known existing targets, to engage targets of opportunity as they appeared, and to provide protective fire for minesweeping and underwater demolition team operations. Particular attention was given to the western slopes of MT. LASSO where a formidable escarpment overlooked the landing beaches. During this period Corps Artillery delivered scheduled fires north of the 00 grid line and low altitude air strikes were coordinated with this phase of the bombardment.

(2) Discovery of three well-camouflaged large caliber guns on FABIUS SAN HILO Point, sited to command the landing beaches, led to the assignment of this important mission to the COLORADO with initial allowance of 20 rounds 16-inch HC ammunition, later increased to 60 rounds. By late afternoon this mission was reported successfully accomplished. Night harassing and interdiction fires and coverage of the night reconnaissance of White Beaches were conducted by one CL and five DD's.

(3) Prior to How-minus 30 on Jig-day, Corps Artillery covered areas located roughly 1000 yards inland from the northwest coast while two BB's and one CA stood 2000 yards off White Beaches and delivered slow, deliberate, main, secondary and 40mm battery fires on the beaches and flanks. Other fire support units covered assigned targets inland, some ships firing air bursts on likely troop concentration areas.

(4) During the close support phase (How minus 30 to How minus 2), beach preparation fires were intensified by two BB's, one CA and two DD's, while Corps Artillery massed the fires of eleven battalions of artillery on the landing beaches to a depth of 500 yards inland.

(5) LCI(G)'s were organized into two groups. One group consisting of 15 LCI(G)'s preceded the leading wave by 100 to 200 yards, delivering 20mm, 40mm, and rocket fire on the beaches and flanks when within effective range. The remaining group of 15 LCI(G)'s, divided into 2 units, took position outside the respective boat lanes and at How-hour proceeded toward shore delivering close supporting fires on the flanks of the landing beaches. This group proceeded along the shore northeastward and southwestward continuing to fire rockets and automatic weapons.

~~SECRET~~
ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

(3) Close support ships had been stationed in such positions to afford maximum supporting fire prior to being masked by the LCI(G)'s. Upon the completion of the beach preparation, fires were shifted to the flanks while Corps Artillery and other fire support units continued neutralization fires on inland areas.

(c) Shore Fire Control Parties.

(1) Ships were assigned to shore fire control parties initially as follows:

BLT 1/24	CONWAY
BLT 2/24	TENNESSEE
BLT 3/24	EATON
BLT 1/25	PRINGLE
BLT 2/25	WALLER
BLT 3/25	CALIFORNIA

(2) Several spotters and MLOs were able to establish communication with the assigned firing ship prior to reaching the line of departure and, in some cases, fired their ships on targets of opportunity while enroute to the beach. Considerable difficulty was experienced by three spotters in establishing communication with their assigned ships after landing. These failures to establish communication were due to break downs of equipment ashore.

(3) The scheme of landing of shore fire control parties was in conformity with standard doctrine, except that spotters were boated with the Battalion Headquarters Section, usually with Battalion OP personnel. This proved very satisfactory.

(d) Tactical Employment of Naval Gunfire.

(1) Ship assignments to BLTs of the Division were as follows:

Jig-day	6	Jig plus 5 day	2
Jig-night	6	Jig plus 5 night	3
Jig plus 1 day	7	Jig plus 6 day	3
Jig plus 1 night	7	Jig plus 6 night	3
Jig plus 2 day	4	Jig plus 7 day	2
Jig plus 2 night	3	Jig plus 7 night	2
Jig plus 3 day	4	Jig plus 8 day	2
Jig plus 3 night	3	Jig plus 8 night	2
Jig plus 4 day	5		
Jig plus 4 night	2		

(2) Call fire doctrine proved to be sound and with the experience gained in the SAIPAN operation more effective fire

ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

support was provided assault units. It was again found that the spotter must be periodically relieved by the Battalion NLO to insure that both call fire during the day and illumination at night are carried out.

(3) Preparation fires were generally utilized prior to the jump off for an attack and consisted of direct support ships executing close support fires in conjunction with artillery, while additional ships covered deeper areas. Corps coordinated the deep support requests of the two divisions. The coordination of requests for preparation fires within the Division still left much to be desired due to the lack of a workable regimental MGF radio net and due to the time element after the receipt of attack orders.

(4) Improvement in the coordination of air, artillery, and naval gunfire for counterbattery was again indicated in the TINIAN operation. The most serious consequences of enemy gunfire were the effective fire received on Jig morning from 6-inch coast defense guns located south of TINIAN Town and the shelling of the beaches on Jig-plus-one morning by large caliber guns on FABIUS SAN HILO Point. Both of these installations had previously been engaged and reportedly destroyed. In addition the Japanese were able to displace mobile artillery during the night of Jig-day and used it in conjunction with the early morning counterattack. SFC parties were able to silence several of these mobile pieces during Jig-plus-one morning. An intense artillery and naval gunfire preparation, to be fired by eleven ships and seventeen battalions of artillery, had been scheduled prior to 0700, King-hour for the attack. Due to the necessity for reorganization after the early morning counterattack, the attack was delayed and the preparation was accordingly postponed three hours. It was during this period that enemy artillery and coast defense guns opened up. Counterbattery measures were initiated but were not as effective as would have been the scheduled preparation.

(5) Illumination was more effectively handled by SFC parties of the Division during the TINIAN operation. Better coordination between battalions was achieved resulting in economy of illumination. On only one occasion were units of the Division harassed by empty star shell cases fired by ships assigned to the adjacent division.

(6) Communications were again unsatisfactory in many respects. The need for a light portable radio for the spotter and a regimental control net was reemphasized. This was the third operation for most of the radio equipment assigned the SFC parties and some sets were badly in need of replacement by the end of the operation.

(e) Comments and Recommendations.

~~SECRET~~
ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

(1) During the TINIAN operation, marked improvement in the employment of naval gunfire over that experienced in SAIPAN was noted. This was due primarily to the following factors:

a. Simplification of the control problem in that the landing force consisted of only two divisions instead of three.

b. Availability of Corps Artillery prior to and during the initial stages of the assault which relieved naval gunfire of some of the preparatory burden.

c. Improved indoctrination of all hands in the proper use of naval gunfire.

d. More favorable terrain.

(2) In the naval gunfire organization as in any other military or naval organization, a definite chain of command exists and, unless all hands rigidly adhere to these established channels, confusion invariably results. This is particularly true in requesting assignment of firing ships. It is the duty of the regimental NCO to coordinate all matters relative to the employment of naval gunfire within the regiment and to deal normally with only the next higher echelon, Division. The same procedure holds true for the Division NCF officer who should refer all matters to Corps, except in cases of emergency. Thus, the Naval Attack Force Commander deals with only one echelon - the Corps. Traffic on the Naval Gunfire Control Net is thereby reduced to a minimum, and better all-around coordination is effected.

(3) It is believed that an effective system of counterbattery could be established by observing the following principles:

a. Make every effort to insure that all personnel become "counterbattery conscious" by requiring the immediate transmission of any evidence of enemy artillery activity to designated authority. To expedite reports of enemy shelling, a campaign is being instituted within this Division with the object of indoctrinating all hands with the importance of promptly reporting every instance of enemy shelling and the proper manner in which this report should be made.

b. Maintain a special "counterbattery preparation" during the landing and the initial push inland, this preparation to be based on located and suspected enemy artillery positions and to be in addition to the beach preparation. When beach fires are lifted they should thicken this "counterbattery preparation" with the same intensity as that used on the beach.

ANNEX C - OPERATIONS (cont'd)

c. Prior to and during the assault phase, it is believed the Landing Force NGF Officer, working in close cooperation with the MAF Gunnery Officer and Support Air Commander, should assume the role of "Counterbattery Officer". His duties would consist of assigning missions, maintaining complete and up-to-date records on all enemy batteries discovered; the counterbattery measures employed and results of those measures, and working in close harmony with the Photo Interpreter on the Landing Force staff.

d. Upon the establishment ashore of the Landing Force (Corps) Artillery, the functions of "Counterbattery Officer" should pass to the Landing Force Artillery Commander who would then be responsible for coordinating air, artillery and naval gunfire in executing the counterbattery mission.

(4) In order that all NLO's and spotters may have better appreciation of the ship fire control problem and thus be able to more effectively employ naval gunfire ashore, it is recommended that a policy be established whereby each NLO and spotter will be required to attend the Fleet Gunnery School for instruction in modern fire control methods and ship's gunnery technique.

(5) Prior to an operation it has been found desirable, when time permitted, for the Division NGF Officer to construct a graphical representation of the scheduled bombardment phase of the NGF support plan on overlays, showing areas to be covered, the number of rounds allotted to each area, and the position of firing ships. These overlays proved invaluable in briefing troop commanders on the detailed fire support plan.

3. AVIATION

(a) Air Support.

(1) Planning and Preparation.

The air plan for the TINIAN operation was prepared by CSA TF 52. The arrangement in the air plan of scheduled air strikes and flights on call in tabular form was particularly convenient for use ashore. A rough draft of the plan was made available to the Division Air Liaison Officer and suggestions and recommendations were requested. The final plan incorporated most of the suggestions. The inclusion of a heavy Jig-day air strike against the beaches aided materially in reducing casualties in our initial assault battalions. An arrangement was made (although not included in the plan) that, whenever possible, small "Roaming Patrols" of aircraft would be assigned to "search out and attack" enemy artillery and mortars firing on our troops and also to patrol enemy rear areas for targets of opportunity.

ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

When advised that the 2d Marine Division and 27th Infantry Division would follow a specific radio procedure on the SAR net a memorandum covering this procedure was distributed to air liaison officers of the Division. Appendices to the air plan of NTLF reached the Division late and subordinate units did not receive the complete Division air support plan in time to permit adequate briefing. However, the experienced air liaison officers attached to these units had been advised of the development of the air support and air communication plans and were not seriously affected by late distribution.

On 20 July, CSA TF 52 and NTLF advised that a new type of "fire bomb" filled with napalm mixture could be made available for burning cane fields and thickly-wooded areas on the objective. The Commanding General concurred in the decision to try out the new incendiary and estimates were submitted that approximately two hundred bombs could be prepared for use. There was no rehearsal for the operation but air liaison officers visited Isley Field, familiarized themselves with the characteristics and capabilities of the napalm bomb and the P-47's and also briefed many of the pilots on the type of close support required for the operation.

At the request of the Commanding General, CSA TF 52 provided TBM's for aerial reconnaissance of the objective. Beginning 18 July, the Commanding General, ADC, and most of the Division staff were flown over TINIAN and were able to get an excellent view of the type of ground formations and enemy installations to be encountered. The RCT and BLT commanders and many of the principal staff officers of regiments, battalions, and supporting units also flew over the objective. It is felt that the knowledge of the terrain gained during these flights contributed materially to making sound military decisions both during the preparation and during the conduct of operations.

(2) Air Liaison Parties.

a. Organization - The air liaison parties were organized and attached to units for the TINIAN operation in the same manner, generally, as they had been for SAIPAN. Two additional officers, however, were added to the Division party to assist in operating on the SAO, Reconnaissance and Artillery Air Spot radio nets.

b. Training - There was no opportunity for additional training prior to the TINIAN operation.

c. Equipment - The air liaison signal equipment was the same as that used in the SAIPAN operation. Upon conclusion of the SAIPAN operation the air liaison parties were ordered to

ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

secure repair or replacement of their signal equipment through the Division Signal Supply and Repair Sections. This arrangement worked very satisfactorily for the TINIAN operation, both during the preparatory and operational stages.

d. Embarkation - The air liaison parties were embarked on the same LST with the Headquarters of the units to which they were attached. The Division Party embarked on an LST which had been designated as Headquarters ship for the Division.

(5) Communications

a. Communication Plan - The air support communication plan for the TINIAN operation was basically the same as for SAIPAN. An alternate emergency procedure was included, however, which would have prevented the battalion air liaison officers from requesting air support from CSA on the SAR net. This procedure would have required battalion parties to call regimental officers by land wire or some other radio net in order to initiate a request for air support. (This emergency procedure was not used).

A "Special Radio Procedure" was provided for the SAR net in an effort to improve net discipline and prevent "Urgent" calls from overloading the net. This procedure gave a special use and meaning to the words "Urgent", "Cancellation", and "Priority Target" and set forth certain rules for expediting traffic on the SAR net.

b. Functioning in Combat - The SAR net functioned very efficiently during the TINIAN operation as compared with SAIPAN. The net was seldom overcrowded, for the following reasons:

A "Special Radio procedure was used which contributed materially to the efficiency of the net.

The air plan provided an additional net ("Inter-Support Air") for administrative traffic and control of support aircraft from Isley Field.

Only three battalions landed in the initial assault.

No more than two Divisions were employed at any time in the TINIAN operation.

The tactical situation did not at any time become critical enough to cause a flood of requests for air support.

(4) Functioning of Air Liaison.

In general the air liaison parties functioned in the same way as they had during the SAIPAN operation. Utilizing their recent battle experience, they carried out their duties in a particularly efficient manner, calling (via the SAR net) many direct support missions against enemy artillery, mortars and troop concentrations.

The Division Party (augmented to a total of 4 officers and 5 enlisted men) embarked the SCR 399 (half-track), 2 officers and 3 men in an LCM for the shore-to-shore operation. The jeep-mounted SCR 193 and the SCR 284 were taken aboard the Division Headquarters ship by 2 officers and 2 enlisted men. Using their own equipment, together with that supplied by the 4th Signal Company, the air liaison personnel manned 3 nets aboard ship (SAR, SAO and Reconnaissance) under the direction of the Air Officer. Ashore these same nets continued to be manned by air liaison personnel who also on occasion monitored the Artillery Air Spot Net.

(5) Tactical Employment of Air Support.

a. Air Cover - Aircraft from 1 CV, 2 CVL's, and 5 CVE's, as well as Army P-47's and B-25's from Isley Field, were available to provide cover and support for the assault on TINIAN. Daylight fighter coverage was largely provided by P-47's, night coverage by P-61's and Marine F4U's; all based on Isley Field. During the week preceding the landing all enemy air fields on or within range of the objective were effectively neutralized by carrier-based planes and fighter-bomber P-47's. This neutralization continued throughout the operation. Our control of the air was complete. During the entire operation no enemy planes appeared over the objective.

b. Air Support Prior to H-hour. - Preliminary air strikes against the northern portion of the objective were limited to targets defiladed from SAIPAN-based artillery and from naval gunfire. Against the southern portion air missions were carried out with progressive strength for a week preceding the landing. Aerial photo coverage of the objective was repeated almost daily during the preliminary stage. Napalm and gasoline-oil "fire bombs", along with thermite, magnesium, and incendiary-cluster bombs were used to burn buildings, canefields, and wooded areas including the scrub-wood areas close to the landing beaches. Enemy activities, particularly in the vicinity of the airfields, were attacked repeatedly and very few enemy installations on the island were operative at the time of the assault.

Carrier-based planes from TF 58 were particularly

ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

useful in carrying out heavy preliminary attacks against TIMIAN Town and enemy installations in that area. These attacks also had the effect of drawing enemy troops away from the actual beaches to be assaulted, as the enemy apparently expected a landing at or near the town. On 23 July (Jig minus 1) the progressive strength of the preliminary air bombardment reached its peak. On this day over one hundred tons of bombs and rockets fell on TIMIAN Island.

On Jig-day, since the beach areas were under heavy and accurate artillery fire from SAIPAN, the usual strafing attack to cover the initial assault waves was not carried out. Instead, an early-morning strafing and bombing attack was directed against the beaches. In addition to neutralizing enemy beach positions this attack was successful in detonating several land mines on Beach White Two. As the assault waves left the line of departure, two P-47 guide planes directed them toward the beaches through the smoke and dust clouds blowing out to sea from the heavy bombardment.

c. Air support after How-hour - Within a short time after the troops landed enemy artillery and mortar fire began falling in the beach area. Air liaison officers aided by air observers and the Air Coordinator were able to direct effective air attacks against these targets. During the next few days, as our lines moved forward on the USHI Point plain toward the airfield and toward MT. LASSO, close air support continued to knock out enemy mortar and artillery positions. In addition, our planes practically "isolated the battlefield" during this period by interdicting enemy troop and vehicular traffic attempting to move northward in reinforcement of the hard-pressed troops resisting the expansion of our beachhead.

As our front swung rapidly southward day by day from the MT. LASSO plateau, air support was effectively used to supplement artillery preparations for the scheduled attacks and to knock out defiladed artillery or mortars holding up our advance. Air strikes were also directed against TIMIAN Town, road and rail-road intersections, troop concentrations and targets of opportunity in enemy rear areas.

On Jig plus six the remaining enemy strength had withdrawn to the southern plateau section of the island, where heavily-wooded defiles and a perimeter escarpment gave temporary cover and concealment. A carefully coordinated bombardment of this area by air, artillery and naval gunfire was planned for the morning of Jig plus seven.

CSA TF 52 was allotted forty minutes during the bombardment in which all available aircraft were to attack the

ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

plateau and then clear the area for the resumption of artillery and naval gunfire for a period just before the jump-off. A detailed air support plan for this attack was prepared by CSA and distributed on Jig plus six, by echelon, to all units ashore that were to participate in the assault.

At 0715 on Jig plus seven all artillery and naval gunfire ceased in order to permit the air strike. During the next thirty-eight(38) minutes one hundred and ten (110) aircraft dropped sixty-nine (69) tons of bombs on the target and cleared the area exactly on schedule. Pows reported that the shock effect of this attack was almost unbearable. Large areas were blasted clear of underbrush, and clouds of smoke and dust rose over the plateau, blinding and confusing the defenders. An examination of the terrain after its capture indicated that the blast and fragmentation effect of the bombs had contributed heavily toward breaking the defensive strength of the enemy in his last bastion.

After our troops had assaulted and occupied the southern plateau the territory remaining in enemy hands was so small that only a few carefully-controlled strafing and fire-bomb attacks could be carried out; these were directed into the southernmost extremities of the island to assist mopping-up operations.

c. Summary of Air Strikes and Bomb Tonnage - Beginning on Jig minus one day, when TINIAN received its heaviest air strike, until Jig plus eight, when the island was secured, four hundred fifty-seven (457) tons of bombs, twelve hundred seventy (1270) rockets and ninety-six (96) "fire bombs" fell on the objective. Of the one hundred fifty-four (154) missions flown during the nine days of actual assault, eighty-two (82) were flown in support of the advance of this Division, as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Close Support</u>	<u>Deep Support</u>
Jig-day	8	4
Jig plus 1	4	11
Jig plus 2	5	12
Jig plus 3	1	9
Jig plus 4	4	11
Jig plus 5	2	3
Jig plus 6	1	4
Jig plus 7	1	1
Jig plus 8	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
	27	55

(6) General Comments.

a. Availability and Adequacy of Close Support - There were generally enough aircraft available and on station to support the advance of the Division. Carrier-based planes alter-

ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

nated with fighter-bomber P-47's every hour and one-half on call for close support missions. Preliminary briefing of many of the pilots, together with experience over SAIPAN, resulted in more effective close support on TINIAN. There was still too much delay in securing strikes when planes were on station. This was largely caused by attempting to lift artillery on a wide front when a strike was being organized against a single target or small area ahead of one battalion.

b. Napalm Bombs - Napalm and gasoline-oil "fire bombs" were used to burn canefields and wooded areas as well as against personnel in caves and open trenches. While more effective than WP and thermite against canefields and wooded areas with a high moisture content, they still did not produce the prolonged flame desired for such targets.

c. Air Transport from Captured Airfields - USHI POINT Airfield was captured on Jig plus two. An examination of the field with a view to rapid repair for emergency use was made by the Division Air Officer and recommendations sent by dispatch to WPLF. The few bomb and shell craters on the runway were rapidly filled by the 121st Naval Construction Battalion which had the field operational within twenty-four hours after work commenced. On Jig plus four the first U. S. plane (a P-47) landed on USHI POINT Field and regular C-47 evacuation of wounded, air transport and cargo service with SAIPAN began on Jig plus six. A radio jeep was maintained at the field on the Division Reconnaissance net to coordinate VMO-4 inter-island flights carrying priority dispatches and staff officers on urgent missions.

(7) Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

a. Close support aviation for TINIAN was far more "flexible" a weapon than for SAIPAN but was still somewhat restricted by delay and inaccuracy in getting strikes on enemy sources of fire. A study of the TINIAN operation confirms conclusions concerning air support arrived at by this Division after an analysis of the SAIPAN operation. These conclusions and the recommendations for improvement of close air support in large-scale landings against heavy opposition are set forth in the Division's report on SAIPAN.

b. The TINIAN operation indicated that as soon as a beachhead is established free from enemy artillery fire, air support for the advance inland on a two-division front can be handled, under favorable conditions, on one SAR net. This does not affect the conclusions dictated by the SAIPAN operation, that during the initial assault phase of a large-scale landing, one SAR net should be allocated to each division participating. If the SAR net is not overcrowded an air liaison party on the beach with a single

ANNEX C OPERATIONS (Cont'd)

portable radio can ask CSA for "Search out and attack" as well as "Attack" missions and thus expedite air attack against enemy artillery hidden from ground observers. Under this system, and with small air groups or "Roving Patrols" allocated to each division, air support becomes the "flexible" weapon required for support of the initial stage of landings on a large scale against heavy opposition.

c. Experience at TINIAN continued to indicate that in the Pacific Theater RCT and BLT air liaison parties require two radio transmitters; namely, a light-weight portable to be carried ashore in the initial assault and to be used at exposed observation posts, and a vehicular radio powerful enough to overcome terrain and range limitations of the portable type and to be used during the advance inland.

d. TINIAN experience also confirmed SAIPAN experience that the Division air liaison party needs the SCR 299 type of radio as well as a personnel group of at least two officers and seven men.

e. The permanent attachment of the air liaison section to the Division, as recommended in the SAIPAN report, appears feasible, particularly in view of the satisfactory radio maintenance and replacement service supplied air liaison parties by the Division Signal sections during the TINIAN operation.

f. The foregoing conclusions and recommendations are in addition to those contained in Annex E.

(b) Air Observation

(1) Plans and Preparations

a. Training of Air Observers - There was little opportunity to train between the SAIPAN and TINIAN operations, however all of the observers flew over TINIAN prior to Jig-day, to familiarize themselves with the terrain.

b. Plans for employment. - Plans for the employment of observers included the period before Jig-day, the approach and landing of the assault waves and the phase during the advance inland. Sufficient personnel was available to furnish tactical observation, naval gunfire and artillery spotting as called for by the Division.

(2) Activities During Combat

a. Naval Gunfire Spot - Two artillery observ-

ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

ers began spotting for naval gunfire on 16 July and continued until Jig-day. TBM aircraft were used during this time, operating from Isley Field. Results were reported to be highly satisfactory by both the air observers and ships concerned. These observers flew a total of twenty-four-and-one-half hours during this phase of the operation.

b. Artillery Air Spot - On 17-18 July our artillery observers adjusted the Corps artillery on base points and directed concentrations. VMO-2 furnished the planes and pilots while the 4th Marine Division supplied the observers. During the progress of the operation a total of one hundred twenty three and one half (123-1/2) hours were flown on artillery missions over TINIAN.

Air spot, from the observer's viewpoint, was generally satisfactory. Base points and targets were easily located and registrations were usually made in three shifts. Communications were generally satisfactory although some trouble was still encountered on frequency 5090.

It was found necessary to fly over the front lines in most instances in order to adjust fire satisfactorily. In most cases it was possible to observe from the adjoining sea area, but the majority of spotting time was spent over enemy territory. On 30 July, the OY-1 from which First Lieutenant W. C. Jones was spotting artillery fire was hit by an enemy 77mm antiaircraft shell. Both he and the pilot, Second Lieutenant J. A. Cameron were killed when the plane crashed.

c. Tactical Observation - Two observers were on station prior to How-hour on Jig-day, 24 July. One tactical observer in an OY-1 kept the Division Headquarters informed of the progress of the assault waves during the landing. The other in a TBM searched out enemy artillery that opened up against the beach area. Rockets or bombs were not carried by the TBMs during the TINIAN operation. All tactical flights were made from Isley Field. On 27-28 July B-25's were furnished by the USAAF and used for observation. Despite the very willing cooperation of the pilots, this type plane proved to be unsuitable for close observation. It was not sufficiently maneuverable for so small a land mass as TINIAN.

Improved liaison and coordination with CSA was obtained through his representative on Isley Field. Propaganda leaflets were obtained from the CSA representative and dropped in great numbers over enemy territory.

In addition to the TBM's, OY-1's were simultaneously kept on station during most of the operation. The

ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

TBM's were used chiefly to search out enemy installations deep in enemy territory. The OY-1's were used to observe and spot over front lines. During the mopping up phase OY-1's were used in conjunction with ground forces to observe heavily wooded areas and caves.

Antiaircraft fire encountered over TINIAN was moderate. Enemy small arms and antiaircraft fire hit our planes on several occasions, wounding or narrowly missing personnel in the planes.

A total of 258.7 hours were flown by tactical observers:

76.8 hours in TBM's
19.5 hours in B-25's
162.4 hours in OY-1's

d. Liaison on the Ground - Observers continued to base with VMO-4 on Isley Field, SAIPAN.

(3) Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions and recommendations contained in the SAIPAN Air Observation Report apply in general to the TINIAN operation.

(c) VMO-4

(1) Plans and Preparations for Operations.

Observation missions on the Island of SAIPAN were completed on 15 July, 1944. During the following eight days all aircraft of VMO-4 were overhauled. At the beginning of the TINIAN operation there remained only six pilots and eight airplanes in the squadron.

(2) Activities During Operations

Observation missions were begun on Jig-day at How minus 30 minutes. From then on flights were made for artillery spotting and infantry reconnaissance. Throughout the TINIAN operation VMO-4 was based at Isley Field.

By 5 August, 1944, the squadron completed flying combat missions. On 10 August, 1944, the remaining planes were flown to CHARAN-KANOVA Strip. The planes were disassembled, placed aboard LCM's and then loaded aboard a Merchant Marine ship for return to the Hawaiian Area.

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ANNEX C - OPERATIONS (cont'd)

(3) Summary and Conclusions

During this operation aircraft maintenance problems increased greatly since no replacements were available after SAIPAK. The aircraft were actually wearing out, and had been damaged by enemy fire. The available supply of gasoline and oil was very small. This squadron was permitted to take no organic transport vehicles.

(4) Recommendations

Besides the recommendations made in the SAIPAK report, which pertain to this operation, it is recommended that:

a. The squadron be increased in size to provide for battle casualties.

4. ARTILLERY.

(a) Corps Artillery-Division Artillery Coordination.

All coordination between Corps and Division Artillery was attained through the Corps Artillery Liaison Officer at the Division Artillery Command Post. Preparation and close-in defensive fires were, of necessity, coordinated by radio communication, due to Corps Artillery being on SAIPAN. After the Corps Artillery Command Post moved to TINIAN, no change in methods of coordination was effected.

No survey control or information was received by Division Artillery from Corps Artillery. There was no exchange of survey information between 2d and 4th Marine Division Artillery.

(b) Organization for Combat.

Division Artillery consisted of 1st Battalion, 14th Marines, 2d Battalion, 14th Marines, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines and 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, all of which were 75mm Pack Howitzer battalions. The battalions landed under regimental control with 1st Battalion, 14th Marines direct support for RCT 25, 2d Battalion, 14th Marines direct support for RCT 24, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines reinforcing 1st Battalion, 14th Marines and 2d Battalion, 10th Marines reinforcing 2d Battalion, 14th Marines.

On Jig-plus-2, 1st and 2d Battalions, 10th Marines reverted to control of 10th Marines and the 3d Battalion, 14th Marines (105mm How) displaced from SAIPAN to TINIAN. On Jig-plus-3, 4th 105mm Howitzer Battalion, V Phib Corps Artillery displaced to TINIAN. The usual organization for combat was an artillery battalion in direct support of an RCT, and as Division Artillery never consisted of more than four battalions, one or two 105mm howitzer battalions were in general support.

Each 75mm battalion was preloaded in DUKWs and embarked on an LST. Ammunition was preloaded in DUKWs embarked aboard two additional LSTs. Thus the landing on Jig-day was accomplished promptly with sufficient personnel, equipment, and ammunition to support the attack.

(c) Infantry-Artillery Liaison.

It was a disadvantage to the RCT and to the 105mm battalion concerned when it was necessary to place a 105mm battalion in direct support of an RCT. This disadvantage was due to a shortage of officers available to act as liaison officers and forward observers. This undesirable situation could be remedied

ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

by increasing officers in the 105mm Howitzer firing battery to include two forward observers.

(d) Counter-Battery.

No sound unit was available to Division Artillery. A sound unit would have been of inestimable value in locating enemy artillery that shelled the landing beaches on Jig-day and the morning of Jig-plus-1.

Flash ranging was used by Division Artillery but the enemy artillery pieces firing from well defiladed positions and caves could not be located.

It is recommended that Division Artillery be furnished a sound unit for use in early stages of a landing operation and that as soon as Corps Artillery is established ashore, the sound ranging units revert to Corps. This would permit Division Artillery to fire counter-battery until Corps Artillery is ready to assume the mission.

(e) Displacements.

The displacement of a battalion of Division Artillery presented a transportation problem of considerable gravity. It was necessary to utilize DUKWs to displace the battalions. DUKWs were needed to haul ammunition from ship to shore and should not have been used for inland movements. It is recommended that Division Artillery be allowed sufficient shipping to move necessary transportation to the theatre of operations.

(f) Maps.

The Air and Gunnery Target Map, 1:20,000, was more accurate on TINIAN than on SAIPAN and was used successfully as a firing chart. This map was used for horizontal control and a reproduction of a captured Jap map was used for vertical control.

(g) Security.

Experience dictated that close-in defense be stressed and, as in the SAIPAN operation, the artillery battalions experienced enemy infiltration. During the counterattack of the night of Jig-day, 99 enemy were killed by machine gun and small arms fire in front of a firing battery position. This was accomplished by a direct support battalion without an interruption in firing close support for the infantry.

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ANNEX C OPERATIONS (Cont'd)

5. TANKS

(a) TINIAN afforded much more suitable tank terrain than had SAIPAN. Except for MT. LASSO, the high ground leading thereto, and the plateaus and cliffs at the extreme southern end of the island, excellent opportunity was afforded for a well directed and excellently coordinated tank-infantry attacks. Experience gained on SAIPAN was utilized to the fullest extent and the technique of operation was modified to conform with the lessons learned.

(b) All tanks operated as RCT attachments throughout the operation, and since one RCT was usually in reserve, the maximum use of tanks at all times was not attained. However, since the mechanical condition of two-thirds of this Division's tanks was poor due to extended operations on SAIPAN, this method proved very efficient in that one company was able to engage in much-needed maintenance while the other two were in combat.

(c) Flame thrower equipped light tanks were used extensively on caves and in mopping up operations.

(d) Due to suitable maintenance periods, and relatively weak anti-tank fire, tank losses were relatively small. The chief enemy weapon was the magnetic anti-tank mine.

(e) For further details, see Annex "K", Formal Report, TINIAN Operation, Commanding Officer, Fourth Tank Battalion.

6. ROCKETS

The 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment was tactically disposed for TINIAN by attachment of each of the two sections to an assault RCT. Operations were conducted in direct support of BDTs or under RCT control in coordination with the Regimental Weapons Company. Supply was maintained on a unit distribution basis using the Ammunition and Supply Section, consisting of six (6) Marines and two motor vehicles and trailers. A rocket ammunition dump was established under Division control, but re-supply was very limited. Seven barrage missions were fired in the TINIAN operation entirely at cave emplacements and shelters. Twelve hundred and sixty (1260) rockets were landed and expended. The Rocket Detachment could well have been employed on profitable targets during TINIAN had there been more ammunition available.

7. COMBAT ENGINEERS

(a) In the preparatory phase of the TINIAN operation, the combat engineer companies were returned to parent control for

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ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

a period of five days after the combat teams had moved into their assigned bivouac areas on SAIPAN. This period was used to replace shortages in uniform and equipment, to prepare engineer and other equipment designated to be carried for the operation, and to train the engineer platoons in recognition, removal, and disarming of Japanese land mines.

(b) To assure that the combat engineer companies attached to combat teams would have their initial requirements in transportation and engineer equipment, a minimum number of trucks, trailers, and one bull dozer were allocated to each company as organic equipment. The remainder of engineer equipment and engineer organic transportation was held under the control of the Division Engineer for assignment as required.

(c) Engineer companies were attached to the combat teams several days prior to embarkation at SAIPAN. These attachments remained in effect throughout the operation and the return to base camp. Engineer platoons were employed normally as attachments to the BLTs and as such were used on front line assault missions as demolitions and flame thrower operators, in mopping up, night front line security, combat patrols, and for removal of enemy mines and booby traps. Due to the excellent road net found on TINIAN and the short span of the operation, road and bridge construction and repair were at a minimum. Engineer supply in general was effected through the Engineer Battalion Headquarters to the Engineer Company Headquarters to the Engineer Platoon.

(d) Enemy land mines were encountered along numerous roads and in adjacent fields and on most beaches. Red and Green beaches were particularly well protected by mines and booby traps. Type of mines employed were: hemi-spherical horn-type anti-boat mines, truncated cone horn-type anti-boat mines, yard stick anti-vehicular mines, and tape measure land mines. The effect of the yard stick mine on a vehicle, upon actuating, is noteworthy. In nearly every case, the wheel and tire, which passed over and set off the mine, was blown off or destroyed. The vehicle was easily placed back on the road by installing the spare tire and wheel in place of the one destroyed. Some beach mines were joined together at the sensitive horns by long steel reinforcing rod, thus increasing the danger zone. No record is available to indicate that any of these connected mines were activated.

(e) For more details on operation of the combat engineers, see Appendix 3, to Annex G.

8. FIRST JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY

(a) Preparation.

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Annex C - OPERATIONS (cont'd)

(1) The interval between the close of the SAIPAN operation and embarkation for the TINIAN operation was spent in reequipping and reorganizing the Air Liaison and Shore Fire Control Parties. The personnel of these two sections had done an excellent job in looking after and caring for their equipment during the SAIPAN operation, and outside of new batteries, combat wire, and minor radio repairs, there was very little that they needed.

(2) Inasmuch as the entire Shore Fire Control Party of BLT 3/25 was a casualty, a new party had to be formed. A Spotting Officer, an Army Captain, was obtained from the 27th Infantry Division, and NTLF supplied the Naval Liaison Officer. Ten enlisted personnel were obtained from the Shore Party section of the First Joint Assault Signal Company. These men were senior non-commissioned officers who had not been transferred to the Division. A naval gunfire officer was obtained from NTLF and assigned to BLT 2/23 to replace the naval officer casualty in that BLT. Replacements for the spotting officer casualties of BLT 3/23 and BLT 2/24 were not available and these units went through the TINIAN operation without spotting officers. The assistant Regimental Air Liaison Officer of RCT 23 was moved down to BLT 3/23 to replace the Air Liaison Officer casualty in that unit.

(3) Due to attachments to the organic signal units of the Division and replacements in the Air Liaison and Shore Fire Control Parties, there were insufficient personnel remaining in the First Joint Assault Signal Company to form complete Shore Party Communication Teams for the TINIAN operation.

(4) The Shore Party for RCT 24 on Beach White One was the 1341st Army Engineer Battalion, and the Pioneer Battalion of the 20th Marines was the Shore Party for RCT 25 on Beach White Two. The communication platoon of each of these battalions was formed into a Shore Party Communication Team and one officer and two senior non-commissioned officers of the First Joint Assault Signal Company were assigned to each.

(5) Two (2) officers and three (3) non-commissioned officers of the First Joint Assault Signal Company were detached on temporary duty to the V Amphibious Corps Signal Battalion for further assignment to the NTLF Shore Party.

(6) As in the SAIPAN operation, the headquarters of the First Joint Assault Signal Company was attached to the Division Headquarters and embarked aboard the same LST.

(b) Activities During the TINIAN Operation.

(1) During the TINIAN operation, as at SAIPAN, the

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ANNEX C OPERATIONS (cont'd)

headquarters of the First Joint Assault Signal Company was located in the Division Command Post and operated in an administrative capacity only.

(2) The subject of Air and Naval Gunfire is covered in the reports of the Air Liaison and Naval Gunfire Officers.

(3) First Joint Assault Signal Company casualties for the TIKIAN operation were as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
Killed in action	0	0
Missing in action	0	0
Wounded, evacuated	2	3
Wounded, not evacuated	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
	3	3

(c) Conclusions and Recommendations.

(1) It is recommended that when units such as the JASCO teams and parties are attached to RCTs and BLTs, that it be the responsibility of these units to re-equip these units with clothing and 782 items.

(2) In view of the experience gained, it is suggested that personnel of the Shore Party Communication Teams of the various JASCO's, after they have completed their job on the beach, be considered as a reserve pool and be used as replacements for BLT and RCT communication personnel casualties.

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FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT - TINIAN

ANNEX D

S U P P L Y A N D E V A C U A T I O N

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HEADQUARTERS,
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE,
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

20 September, 1944.

Annex DCG to Division Final Report - TINIAN

SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

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B.	Embarkation	Page 2.
C.	Debarkation and Unloading	Page 4.
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G.	Salvage	Page 9.
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I.	Recommendations	Page 11.

APPENDICES

1. Shore Party
2. Ammunition Expenditures
3. Report of Ordnance Salvage
4. Report of Artillery Repair
5. Medical Report.

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HEADQUARTERS,
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
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20 September, 1944.

Annex DCG to Division Final Report - TINIAN

SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

A. Planning and Pre-embarkation.

1. Upon completion of the SAIPAN operation elements of the Fourth Marine Division moved into rehabilitation camps on the eastern side of the island in the general vicinity of MAGICIENNE BAY. In addition to getting much needed rest, troops were afforded an opportunity for bathing and for cleaning their clothing and equipment. Equally important was the fact that during this short period assault units were fed their first "B" rations. This period was the only time during the entire FORAGER operation that troops had an opportunity to use their seabags, but even during this period many seabags could not be found or made available. The Division Quartermaster drew clothing and replacement equipment, as available, from the Seventh Field Depot, and made distribution to all units. All repair facilities of the Division were utilized to the utmost in the rehabilitation of equipment to be used on TINIAN.

2. In planning for the coming shore to shore operation, it was recognized that the greatest handicap to the successful completion of the operation would be the difficulty encountered in the landing of large numbers of troops and vast amounts of supplies over the most restricted of beaches. White Beach One was 60 yards long. White Beach Two was 160 yards in length, but only 60 yards of this was smooth enough for immediate use. The ground rose rather steeply from the beaches and no routes of egress were present. In view of this situation a supply plan was adapted by Northern Troops and Landing Force which prescribed that all equipment and supplies to be landed on TINIAN must be mobile-loaded and must cross the funnel-like beaches without handling. In addition to developing the beaches and providing necessary services on the beaches, the Shore Party was to be charged with the additional duty of unloading supplies into Division dumps. Initial supply was the responsibility of the Division; resupply was the responsibility of Northern Troops and Landing Force.

3. In order to facilitate the movement of supplies and equipment from SAIPAN to TINIAN, subsequent to the initial movement, a rear echelon remained on SAIPAN to assemble and deliver to designated beaches such items as were required. This echelon was charged with the additional duties of caring for the equipment to be left behind, of turning in to the Seventh Field Depot equipment as directed, and of preparing the remaining equipment for possible re-embarkation.

Annex DCG to Division Final Report - TINIAN (Cont'd).

B. Embarkation

1. Embarkation of the Fourth Marine Division for the TINIAN operation was accomplished during the period 13-23 July, 1944. As this Division was to make the initial assault, it was given priority of landing craft which were allocated as follows:

<u>RCT - 25</u>	<u>RCT - 24</u>	<u>RCT - 23</u>
10 LST	10 LST	8 LST
1 LSD (18 LCM)	1 LSD (18 LCM)	5 LCT
4 LCT	4 LCT	5 LCM
30 LCVP	30 LCVP	30 LCVP
	<u>ARTILLERY</u>	<u>SUPPORT GROUP</u>
	6 LST	3 LST
		4 LCT
		5 LCM
		10 LCVP

2. Ten of the above LSTs were assigned Fourth Marine Division for its initial supply, 10 were to return to SAIPAN for embarkation of Second Marine Division troops and be used by that Division for initial supply, and 10, which were loaded by Northern Troops and Landing Force, were to remain as resupply ships. All of these LSTs were in general loaded alike.

3. The Fourth Marine Division loaded the following supplies on its 10 infantry LSTs, so distributing these supplies as to make a standard load on each LST.

Class I -

- (1) Rations
 - Type "C" 1 day
 - Type "K" 2 days
- (2) Water
 - 2 gallons per man per day for 3 days.

Class III

- 300 drums 100 octane gasoline.
- 20 drums diesel fuel.
- 20 drums flame thrower fuel.

Class IV

- 100,000 sand bags
- 500 rolls concertina wire
- 200 rolls barbed wire

Annex DCG to Division Final Report - TINIAN (Cont'd).

Class V

2 Division U/F (CinCPCA) less artillery.

All of the above supplies were deck loaded. The well decks of the LSTs were loaded to capacity with LVTs and DUKWs.

4. The following additional supplies were carried preloaded in organizational vehicles:

(1) Class II - organizational equipment.
(Minimum)

(2) Class IV

Medical	3 days
Chemical Warfare	3 days
Signal	3 days

5. Two U/F (CinCPCA) for 4 75mm Howitzer Battalions plus small quantities of rations and water were loaded aboard 4 artillery LSTs.

6. Each LST was equipped with a cherry picker crane on the main deck. Supplies were loaded into cargo nets, 2 net loads to each truck. Trucks were driven onto LSTs and cargo nets were lifted therefrom by crane and hoisted to the main deck. The crane then moved loaded cargo nets into position on the main deck leaving all supplies, insofar as practicable, in nets in order to facilitate its unloading.

7. Six LSTs were made available to this Division for loading at TANAPAG HARBOR on 13 July. Supplies embarked were hauled by truck from dumps south and east of CHARAN-KANCA, a distance of approximately 10 miles. Loading of these LSTs was completed 16 July. The remaining 4 LSTs were scheduled to begin loading on 18 July, but due to failure of LSTs to arrive on schedule, work was not begun until 19 July. Loading was completed on 20 July.

8. Artillery LSTs were loaded by DUKWs off Blue beaches commencing 19 July, and completing 20 July.

9. LSDs were loaded with medium tanks in LCMs from Red and Green beaches on 21 July.

10. LCTs were loaded with vehicles and tanks at the seaplane ramp, TANAPAG HARBOR, on 23 July. LCVFs and LCMs were loaded from Green beaches on the same date. Troops were embarked in LSTs using LVTs over Red, Blue and Yellow beaches on 23 July.

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Annex D.G to Division Final Report - TINIAN (Cont'd).

11. Return trips were scheduled for 5 LCTs, 5 LCMs and 35 LCVPs. These were reloaded at initial loading points on 24 July.

12. Refueling of LVTs and DUKWs was provided for by loading 9 pontoon barges with 100 and 80 octane gasoline. These were loaded on 19 July and anchored off White beaches on JIG day.

13. Loading of LSTs at TANAPAG HARBOR was slowed by congestion on the highway from CHARAN-KANOA to TANAPAG, and by sniper fire at vehicles and at loading personnel in the harbor area after nightfall.

C. Debarcation and Unloading.

1. In debarking and landing, troops carried the following:

- (a) Normal arms.
- (b) One U/F insofar as practicable.
- (c) Two filled canteens.
- (d) Gas masks.
- (e) Rations and additional equipment as prescribed by Major Unit Commanders.

2. It is significant to note that Major Unit Commanders did not prescribe the pack, and that troops carried only the following rations and additional equipment: emergency rations, a spoon, a pair of socks, and a bottle of Skat in their pockets, and a poncho on the belt.

3. The control system used for the operation against TINIAN was essentially the same as that used in the operation at SAIPAN. A secondary PC(S) was stationed off each of the White beaches. Each of the Control boats had aboard representatives of the Combat Team landing upon the beach which the vessel controlled. A primary control boat, PC(S), was stationed midway between the two beaches and had aboard Division representatives and LVT control personnel.

4. Shore Party equipment was landed on Beach White One at approximately 1045, JIG day, and on Beach White Two at 1200, JIG day. Due to the necessity of preparing beach exits prior to landing of supplies, very few supplies were unloaded on JIG day.

5. Division artillery was ordered to launch for landing at 1000, JIG day. Landing was completed at approximately 1745, JIG day.

Annex DCG to Division Final Report - TINIAN (Cont'd).

6. Two infantry LSTs were retained in the area on the night of JIG day, the remainder withdrawing to SAIPAN for the night. Unloading, except in cases of emergency, was not attempted during the night. Upon the return of the LSTs to the area, general unloading was begun on the morning of JIG plus one. Unloading continued throughout the day utilizing LVTs and DUKWs.

7. Considerable difficulty was encountered in unloading vehicles from small craft. Beach White One could be used at low tide only to beach LCMs and LCTs for unloading vehicles on the fringing reef. Beach White Two could not be used at all for this purpose. The installation of pontoon causeways, although delayed by surf and reef conditions, somewhat alleviated this situation.

8. The Second Marine Division began landing troops over White Beach one at 0600 JIG plus one thus closing this beach to the landing of supplies. In spite of this, unloading progressed at a rapid rate and by 1400 the 4 artillery LSTs were completely unloaded and the 10 infantry LSTs comprising the floating dump were unloaded to an average of approximately 75%. As of this time, all available LCTs and LCMs were completely unloaded and approximately 50% of the LCVPs had been discharged.

9. At nightfall on JIG plus one, LSTs were again withdrawn to SAIPAN except for two which were left in the area for emergency supply. General unloading was resumed the morning of JIG plus two, and unloading of initial supplies was completed by 1800.

10. The unloading of these vessels completed the debarkation of the initial combat supplies. However, additional equipment and motor vehicles continued to be shuttled from SAIPAN.

D. Supply Ashore.

1. Due to the extremely narrow beaches, the Shore Party's primary concern was to clear the beach areas and establish graded exits therefrom in order to facilitate the movement of mobile-loaded supplies across the beaches into beach dumps (established 200 yards inland) and to forward positions.

2. DUKWs were employed in the landing of artillery pieces and artillery ammunition and in the evacuation of casualties. The attachment of an additional DUKW Company to Division considerably reduced the time required to land and put into operation the 4 75mm Battalions of the Division. These DUKWs were sent from the LSTs directly to the gun positions and battalion dumps. They were so efficiently employed that as of 1400 JIG plus one the 4 artillery LSTs were completely unloaded.

Annex DCG to Division Final Report - TINIAN (Cont'd).

3. After the landing of the assault troops, LVTs were employed in the unloading of supplies from the 10 infantry LSTs. The LVTs moved across the beaches directly to dumps or units inland. As was the case on SAIPAN, the LVTs proved invaluable.

4. Beach dumps were operated by the Shore Party until the Division Quartermaster assumed control on JIG plus one. On JIG plus three Division dumps were established farther inland, and while levels of supply were being built up in these dumps, issues continued from beach dumps until these were depleted.

5. Service and Supply and Ordnance personnel to be employed on TINIAN, were not attached to the Combat Teams for this operation, but remained with their parent organizations and were therefore immediately available to Division for employment. This factor enabled the Division Quartermaster to assume control on JIG plus one of beach dumps and to immediately begin establishment and development of Division dumps. This also allowed ammunition technicians to be used at the outset in the supervision and control of all ammunition dumps. As was the case at SAIPAN, operation of dumps was hindered by a shortage of equipment, particularly cranes.

6. The method of supply on the TINIAN operation was dictated by the narrow beaches. All supplies and equipment were of necessity mobile-loaded and crossed the beaches without re-handling proceeding directly to inland dumps or units.

7. Initial supply was "on call" from floating dumps and delivery was made by LVTs and DUKWs to front line units without rehandling on the beach. The 10 infantry LSTs, 4 artillery LSTs, 2 LSDs and "first trips" of LCTs assigned to Fourth Marine Division constituted its initial supply. All of the above were unloaded without incident, and unloading was completed on JIG plus two. Thereafter resupply was to be undertaken by Northern Troops and Landing Force to Division dumps with Northern Troops and Landing Force maintaining prescribed levels of supply therein. Due to the extremely rough surf conditions resulting from the storm, the landing of resupply items was greatly impeded. As a result of this, Northern Troops and Landing Force was never able to attain prescribed levels of supply.

8. As beach and Division dumps became established, issues were made therefrom. Division took over the delivery of rations to assault units on JIG plus three and of water on JIG plus four.

9. Artillery ammunition was delivered by DUKWs from LSTs and ammunition ships directly to gun positions. In some instances during critical periods of unloading when DUKWs were vitally needed in the shuttling of other supplies, ammunition was carried

Annex DCG to Division Final Report - TINIAN (Cont'd).

only as far as Division dumps. During these periods it became necessary for the artillery units to use their organic transportation in the moving of ammunition from Division dumps to gun positions or battalion dumps.

10. In the case of small arms and mortar ammunition, delivery by Division to regiments was not undertaken. During the first days of the operation, regimental dumps were within a few hundred yards of Division dumps. Regiments drew from Division dumps and delivered directly to battalions. As the operation progressed this system was continued in order to avoid movement of large regimental dumps in the fast moving operation.

11. With few exceptions the supply and resupply of major items was considered adequate. The supply of 60mm mortar illuminating was critical at all times. 81mm mortar light and 75mm gun, HE, ammunition was not available in sufficient quantities. An ammunition expenditure report is appended hereto as appendix 2.

12. Beginning JIG plus four and continuing throughout the remainder of the operation, 80 octane gasoline and lube oils were critically short. During the first days of the operation, the vehicles ashore were operated on the gasoline and lube oils carried on the vehicles plus such small quantities as were landed during that period. Due to surf conditions the resupply of 80 octane gasoline and lube oils was greatly impeded, and units ashore became dependent upon such Japanese aviation gasoline as could be located.

13. The only fresh water sources on TINIAN were in the southern sector of the island and did not come within friendly lines until shortly before the island was secured. Due to the time necessary to obtain proper biological tests of this water, purification units could not be made operative until 4 August. Consequently throughout the operation, the Division was dependent for its water upon its initial supply and the output of its 15 distillation units.

14. The Division Quartermaster assumed control of all water dumps on JIG plus one. With the installation of distillation units on JIG plus two a plan of supply was put into effect whereby the Engineer Regiment delivered to the Division water dump filled water cans in exchange for empty cans. Water distribution was then made from the Division water dump on a pro-rata basis by exchange of filled for empty cans. This plan proved highly satisfactory and continued throughout the operation except that after JIG plus three Division took over the delivery of water to all but rear area units.

Annex DCG to Division Final Report - TINIAN (Cont'd).

15. As had been the case at SAIPAN, Division received repeated requests for fruits and juices to augment the field rations which had become monotonous and unappetizing to the troops. Requests were also received for coffee, sugar and milk, as units desired to provide hot drinks for men who, because of early morning "jump offs" did not have time to prepare individual cups of coffee.

16. Division could not fill these requests except by drawing from and "unbalancing" the "B" ration. Due to the urgency of the need for these items, this was done in small quantities.

17. Beginning JIG plus four, bread was delivered from bakeries previously established on SAIPAN and issues were made on a pro-rata basis. Daily delivery of bread was made throughout the remainder of the operation when surf conditions permitted the docking of boats.

18. In many instances throughout the operation the Fourth Marine Division was called upon to supply water, rations, and ammunition to other than Division and attached units. Corps and Garrison troops were landed without adequate provisions having been made for the supply of rations and water to these troops, and they were completely dependent for their very existence upon supplies of the assault echelons. This placed an extra responsibility on the Division's already overtaxed service personnel, and limited the amount of supplies available for our own troops. This was not critical except in the case of water, where excessive demands upon our limited equipment forced the institution of the strictest control measures and reduced the water allowance to three quarts per man per day in some instances.

19. Due to the heavy seas and other circumstances beyond their control, the Seventh Field Depot was unable to establish itself and commence operations on TINIAN until well after the island was secured. Upon the opening of docking facilities and beaches at TINIAN TOWN, the bulk of all supplies for the island entered through this port and were placed in Fourth Marine Division dumps. Thus, it devolved upon service personnel of this Division to make equitable distribution of all these supplies to all units operating on the island. This situation continued until re-embarkation of the Fourth Marine Division was well under way.

E. Motor Transport.

1. For the TINIAN operation, 7 2½ ton, 6x6, cargo trucks were attached to each Combat Team. These trucks remained under Combat Team control throughout the operation, and were used primarily in the movement of supplies from regiment to battalion dumps and for

Annex DCG to Division Final Report - TINIAN (Cont'd).

the displacement forward of battalion and regimental installations. By JIG plus two, Motor Transport Battalion had ashore and in operation an additional 27 $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks. These trucks were employed in the movement of supplies to Combat Teams, transporting of the load to the cemetery, and for various other miscellaneous uses.

2. The many problems that were present in the SAIPAN operation such as extremely long lines of communication, frequent break down of vehicles, rugged terrain, poor condition of roads, etc., were not present on the TINIAN operation. Consequently, despite the limited number of vehicles available, Motor Transport Battalion was able to cope with the many necessary tasks they were called upon to perform.

3. As on the SAIPAN operation, the repair and maintenance of vehicles was excellent.

F. Repair of Roads; Traffic Circulation.

1. The Japanese had established an excellent road net on TINIAN. This, coupled with the fact that little if any damage was done to roads by Naval gunfire or aircraft bombing, eliminated the necessity for any considerable amount of road construction or repair during the actual operation.

2. With the exception of the removal of a few road blocks, no road repair was performed by the Engineer companies attached to the Combat Teams. Headquarters and Service company of the 20th Marines (Engineer) constructed a road connecting White Beach One and White Beach Two. It cleared a road in TINIAN TOWN from the North Pier, across the railroad and to the main road of TINIAN TOWN, and it cleared numerous roads through dump areas in order to facilitate movement of vehicles therein.

3. The designation, well in advance of the landing, of routes alongside roads for use of grouser-equipped vehicles aided materially in the preservation of roads.

4. In view of the extensive road net and its excellent condition the circulation of traffic presented no problem. Roads were wide and straight, and no one way traffic was necessary.

G. Salvage.

1. The Salvage Section of Service and Supply company and the Ordnance company were landed and began salvage and repair operations on JIG plus one. The fact that they landed as a unit and not as attachments to Combat Teams enabled them to undertake full scale

Annex DCG to Division Final Report - TINIAN (Cont'd).

operations immediately and further enabled them to keep pace with the tactical situation throughout the operation.

2. The employment of the Salvage Section and Ordnance company in this manner was indicative of the fact that these agencies are able to operate more efficiently as units than as attachments to Combat Teams.

3. For lists of materials salvaged and repaired, see Appendices three and four.

H. Evacuation.

1. During the initial phases of the TINIAN operation, evacuation was rendered difficult by the congestion on the narrow beaches. As in the SAIPAN operation, initially casualties were evacuated by amphibious vehicles. However, in this instance, jeep ambulances were landed in LVT(4)s early in the afternoon of JIG day. As a result, as the beachhead was expanded, it was possible to continue to evacuate the casualties rapidly. Casualties were removed from TINIAN and transferred to APAs, hospital ships, or directly to SAIPAN.

2. Due to high seas and heavy surf, evacuation by water was severely curtailed after JIG plus two, and was finally abandoned. After the capture of TINIAN TOWN, evacuation by sea was begun from that point on 1 August.

3. On 31 July, USHI AIRFIELD became operational, and air evacuation of casualties to SAIPAN was begun. This method was rapid and extremely efficient. It served as the primary means of evacuation of serious casualties during the remainder of the operation.

4. Overland evacuation of casualties from the front to Division hospitals was expedited by the excellent road-net. The number of ambulance jeeps assigned to battalions and regiments was increased by using the vehicles of the 3 Medical companies not committed to the TINIAN operation. The expeditious return of wounded from the front to the hospital is proof of the desirability of a permanent increase in this type of vehicle for all echelons of the Medical Department.

5. For additional details on Evacuation, see Medical Report, Appendix 5 hereto.

I. Recommendations.

Many of the recommendations dictated by this operation are embodied in comments on items contained in the questionnaire of Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops. The following additional recommendations are submitted for consideration:

1. That where practicable in a similar operation a specified number of landing craft (LCTs, LCMs and LCVPs) remain under Division control until all organic transportation and equipment to be used on the operation has been landed.
2. That the use of loaded pontoon barges as refueling points for amphibious vehicles be continued.
3. That where cargo is landed in amphibious vehicles it be left in nets in order to facilitate unloading on beaches or in dumps.
4. That sufficient cranes, preferably the swing type "Trackson" tractor crane, be provided for more expeditious handling of cargo on beaches and in dumps.
5. That the designation in advance of an operation of traffic routes for greaser-equipped vehicles be continued.
6. That coffee, milk and sugar be supplied Division to supplement the present emergency ration, as it has been found that the individual is frequently unable to prepare the hot drink provided in the ration, and it is believed that the daily preparation of a hot drink in bulk by units is practicable and advisable.

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Appendix 1 to Annex "DOG" to Division Final Report - TINIAN

Shore Party

A. For the shore-to-shore movement involved in the TINIAN operation, Shore Party Battalions were assigned initially to the assault combat teams as follows: to CT25-2nd Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineer); to CT24 - the 1341st Engineer Battalion (Army). The Shore Party Commander on each Combat Team beach was the Battalion Commander of the Shore Party Battalion initially supporting the CT landing over that beach.

At 1510 on J plus 1 day, 4th Marine Division assumed control of the Shore Parties on TINIAN and all shore party operation on the island was coordinated by the Division Shore Party Commander through the 4th Division Shore Party Command Group. This group was composed of Regimental Headquarters, 20th Marines, plus some communications personnel of 1st Battalion, 20th Marines.

At 1000, J plus 2 day, NT&LF assumed directive control of the Shore Party on TINIAN, the NT&LF Shore Party Headquarters remaining on SAIPAN and operating through an advanced CE on TINIAN.

When heavy ground swells forced the final closing of Beach White Two on J plus 7 day, the Division Shore Party less the 1341st Engineer Battalion (Army) moved, on J plus 8 day, to TINIAN TOWN to open beaches and piers there. The 1341st Engineer Battalion continued operating on Beach White One under NT&LF Shore Party Headquarters control.

B. As the beaches selected for the assault were so narrow, approximately 75 yards usable, great pains were taken to assure rapid transit of the beach by landing vehicles and amphibious craft. After mines had been removed on Beach White Two, no appreciable congestion was apparent on either beach. No supplies were unloaded on the beaches, but were dispatched, in the vehicle in which they were landed, directly to the using unit or to beach dumps located from 200-500 yards from the beach. Beach White Two was unsatisfactory for the landing of landing craft or LSTs on the reef at any tidal condition. Beach White One was used at

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low tides to beach LCMs and LCTs for unloading vehicles and personnel on the fringing reef. On the latter beach, due to the extreme depth of water off the end of the ramp and the ground swell, it was impractical to beach landing craft at high tides.

Pontoon causeways were constructed on Beaches White One and White Two by Naval Pontoon Causeway Erection Platoons. The causeway on White One was available for use on J plus 1 day and was utilized to land pre-loaded trucks and personnel from LSTs and landing craft until J plus 5 day when heavy ground swells prevented its further employment. The causeway on White Two was not available for use until J plus 4 day, except for landing of pontoon barges, for several reasons: (1) Japanese mortar and artillery fire knocked out the bulldozers necessary in the construction and most of the Causeway Erection Platoon and the Platoon Commander during the night of J-day and the morning of J plus 1 day; (2) The point selected to span the reef involved more pontoon strips than were immediately available on TINIAN. On J plus 5 day, after several LCTs and an LST had unloaded equipment and supplies across the pontoon causeway, heavy ground swells also rendered this pier inoperative. After the assault, DUKWs were used extensively to land emergency supplies across the beaches, LVTs to a limited extent only. DUKWs were most successful in negotiating the heavy surf on the reef on each beach, only two having been observed to capsize, one on each beach. Beach White Two was the more dangerous of the two beaches as the surface of the reef was badly cut up by deep crevices. Consequently, after J plus 6 day, all amphibious craft were landed over White One Beach.

The prescribed beach defense was furnished by the Shore Party with no incidents worthy of note.

On J plus 7 day, the South Pier in TINIAN TOWN was opened. On the following morning, the 4th Division Shore Party, less 1341st Engineer Battalion, plus an Underwater Demolitions Team, and a beach party moved to TINIAN TOWN. The South Pier and the beach immediately south thereof were in operation on J plus 8 day for landing craft of all types.

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A new 4th Division Dump was established east of the town and thereafter divisional supplies were received there. On J plus 10 day, South Pier and the adjacent beach were turned over to the Garrison Force for operation for the landing of garrison personnel, equipment, and supplies. On this date, the 4th Division Shore Party began operating the North Pier which the Division Engineers had repaired and freed of booby traps.

C. The Shore Party assisted in the embarkation into LSTs and landing craft of 4th Division troops and equipment over both piers until J plus 16 day. On J plus 17 day, the 4th Division Shore Party was disbanded and all troops were embarked for return to base camp.

D. For further details on the operation of the Shore Party see also Annex "GEORGE", (20th Marines Report).


N. K. BROWN.

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Appendix 2 to Annex DCG to Division Final Report - TINIAN

Report of Ammunition Expenditure - TINIAN

<u>AMMUNITION</u>	<u>EXPENDED</u>	<u>AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES</u>
Cartridges, Carbine, cal..30, M1.	313,710	31,371
Cartridges, ball, cal..30, 5-rd clips.	1,338,800	133,880
Cartridges, ball, cal..30, 2-rd clips.	807,200	80,720
Cartridges, tracer, cal..30.	23,000	2,300
Cartridges, AP & T, cal..30, 1-4.	2,344,000	234,400
Cartridges, ball, cal..45.	19,800	1,980
Cartridges, AP, cal..50.	200,700	20,070
Cartridges, tracer, cal..50.	83,450	8,345
Cartridges, incendiary, cal..50.	none	
Links, metallic belt, cal..50, M2.	174,800	17,480
Caps, blasting, electric.	6,000	600
Caps, blasting, non-electric.	22,600	2,260
Cord, detonating, 100ft. spools, spools.	453	45
Explosive, C-2, lbs.	8,000	800
Explosive, TNT, 1/2 lb blocks, lbs.	900	90
Fuze, blasting, time, ft.	28,510	2,851
Mines, AT, HE, M1.	none	
Mines, anti-personnel, M2.	1,890	189
Torpedo, Bangalore, M1.	1,182	118
Shaped Charges, M1.	6	1
Demolition Blocks, chain of 8.	630	63
Grenades, hand, fragmentation, M1 M1A1.	5,650	565
Grenades, hand, offensive, w/f M6A3.	850	85
Grenades, hand, incendiary, M14.	2,575	257
Grenades, hand, smoke, HC-M8.	5,175	517
Grenades, smoke, colored, M-16.	169	17
Grenades, AT, M9A1.	5,165	516
Cartridges, grenade, M6.	252	25

Appendix 2 to Annex DOG to Division Final Report - TINIAN (Cont'd)

<u>AMMUNITION</u>	<u>EXPENDED</u>	<u>AVERAGE DAILY ISSUES</u>
Rockets, AT, 2.36 in. M6A1.	1,200	120
Shells, shotgun, 12gg, #00.	1,620	162
Shells, fixed, H.E., M63, w/fuze B.D., M58, 37MM Gun.	6,320	632
Shot, fixed, A.P., M74, w/tracer, 37MM Gun.	6,380	638
Canisters, fixed, 37MM Gun, M2.	4,068	407
Shells, HE, M49A2, w/fuze, PD, M52, 60MM Mortar.	9,060	906
*Shells, illuminating, M83, w/ fuze, M65, 60MM Mortar.	2,748	275
Shells, HE, M48, w/fuze PD, M48, 75MM Pack How.	17,981	1,798
Shells, HE, M48, w/fuze T-SQ, M54, 75MM Pack How.	12,151	1,215
Shells, HE, AT, M66, w/fuze BD, M62, 75MM Pack How.	133	13
Shells, smoke, WP, M64, w/fuze, PD, M57, 75MM Pack How.	1,617	162
*Shells, HE, M48 & M54, 75MM Gun.	5,407	541
Shells, APC, M61, w/fuze BD, M66A1, 75MM Gun.	1,249	125
Shells, smoke, WP, MK 2, NC, w/fuze PD, M46, 75MM Gun.	355	35
*Shells, HE, M43A1, w/fuze PD, M52, 81MM Mortar.	13,106	1,311
Shells, smoke, WP, M57, w/fuze, PD, M52, 81MM Mortar.	1,379	138
Shells, HE, M1, w/fuze, PD, M48, 105MM How.	10,000	1,000
Shells, HE, M1, w/fuze, T-SQ, M54, 105MM How.	13,248	1,325
Shells, HE, AT, M67, w/fuze BD, M62, 105MM How.	90	9
Lights, signal, Very, asstd.	3,090	309
Signals, ground, asstd.	1,685	168
4.5" Rocket Bodies, TNT Loaded.	1,180	118
Rocket Motors, for 4.5" BR.	1,180	118
Rocket Fuzes, MK-137, for 4.5" BR.	1,180	118

* Indicates supply was exhausted during operation.

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Appendix 3 to Annex DOG to Division Final Report - TINIAN

Report of Ordnance Salvage - TINIAN

31 Launchers, rocket, A.T.
65 BAR's
592 Rifles, cal..30, M1
389 Rifles, cal..30, carbine, M1
10 60mm mortars, complete
6 BMG, cal..30, 1917A1
5 Mounts, MG, 1917A1
22 Mounts, MG, M2
4 Shotguns
27 BMG, cal..30, 1919A4
2 MG, cal..50,
3 Mounts, MG, M3
6 81mm mortars
104 Scabbards
101 Bayonets
4 Receivers, MG, cal..30, 1917A1
2 Receivers, MG, cal..50
9 BAR magazines
16 Carbine magazines
3 75mm Pack Howitzers
2 37mm Gun, AT
150 Spare barrels, MG, cal..30, heavy
45 Spare barrels, MG, cal..30, light
1 60mm mortar sight
2 60mm mortar base plate
1 105mm Howitzer
12 Spare barrels, MG, cal..50, heavy

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Appendix 4 to Annex DOG to Division Final Report - TINIAN

Report of Artillery Repair - TINIAN

The below listed repairs to artillery were effected by the Ordnance Company, 4th Marine Division, on TINIAN:

1. First Battalion, Fourteenth Marines
 - (1) Replaced wheel and tire, 75mm Pack Howitzer.
 - (2) Repaired front trail.
 - (3) Repaired elevating mechanism.
 - (4) Replaced broken extractor.
 - (5) Replaced axle traversing mechanism.
 - (6) Repaired three (3) panoramic telescopes, M1.

2. Second Battalion, Fourteenth Marines
 - (1) Repaired sight mount bracket.
 - (2) Repaired recoil mechanism.
 - (3) Welded and reinforced rear trail.
 - (4) Repaired piston rod stop.
 - (5) Repaired recoil cylinder yoke.
 - (6) Repaired respirator.
 - (7) Repaired recoil mechanism stirrup and screw.
 - (8) Replaced screws on piston rod stop and welded.
 - (9) Replaced recoil mechanism.
 - (10) Repaired leaks and low friction in old recoil mechanism.
 - (11) Repaired four (4) panoramic telescopes, M1.
 - (12) Repaired one (1) sight mount.
 - (13) Repaired one (1) gunner's quadrant.

3. Third Battalion, Fourteenth Marines
 - (1) Replaced damaged range quadrant.
 - (2) Cleaned and removed burns on face of chamber.
 - (3) Repaired firing mechanism.
 - (4) Cleaned and polished chamber.
 - (5) Repaired operating handle.
 - (6) Replaced cross head.
 - (7) Straightened and welded two trails.
 - (8) Removed rough flange from face of chamber.
 - (9) Replaced two (2) operating handles complete.
 - (10) Repaired traversing mechanism.
 - (11) Replaced traversing mechanism collar.

Appendix 4 to Annex DOG to Division Final Report - TINIAN (Cont'd.)

- (12) Replaced damaged Howitzer with new one.
 - (13) Repaired four sights, M12A2.
 - (14) Repaired one (1) gunner's quadrant.
4. Fourth Battalion, Fourteenth Marines
- No repair.
5. Fifth Battalion, Fourteenth Marines
- (1) Replaced traversing mechanism.
 - (2) Repaired elevating mechanism.
 - (3) Repaired two (2) purging plugs.
 - (4) Replaced broken trail.
 - (5) Replaced sight box.
 - (6) Issued new gun cover.
 - (7) Repaired four (4) sights, M12A2.
 - (8) Replaced two (2) gunner's quadrants.
6. Regimental Weapons, 23rd Marines
- (1) Repaired half-track.
 - (2) Replaced damaged 37mm, AT, gun.
7. Regimental Weapons, 25th Marines
- (1) Replaced 37mm, AT, gun.
 - (2) Repaired recoil mechanism for 37mm, AT, gun.
8. Artillery repair for Second Division.
- (1) Replaced rear trail and elevating mechanism.
 - (2) Straightened and repaired rear trail.
 - (3) Repaired recoil mechanism sleigh for 37mm, AT, gun.
 - (4) Repaired operating latch catch.
 - (5) Repaired top sleigh.
 - (6) Repaired rear trail.
 - (7) Replaced top sleigh.
 - (8) Repaired recoil mechanism.
 - (9) Welded and reinforced three (3) rear trails.
 - (10) Welded and reinforced two (2) top sleighs.

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Appendix 5 to Annex DOG to Division Final Report - TINIAN

Medical Report

PREPARATORY PHASE

1. Following the successful completion of the Saipan Operation, the Fourth Marine Division withdrew to a rest area located on Magicine Bay, Saipan Island. The seven days spent in the area were ones of intensive rehabilitation for the impending Tinian Operation. The troops were screened as well as possible in order to remove individuals suffering with hitherto undetected illnesses or wounds.

2. In accordance with Division Order, Medical personnel in excess of 80% normal complement were transferred from organic units to a pool created in H&S Company, Fourth Medical Battalion; thence transfers were effected to those units whose Medical Department personnel strenght was below the required 80% Table of Organization strength.

3. During the same period, Regimental Surgeons were re-supplied with essential medical supplies by the Division Medical Dump and the 7th. Field Depot. They in turn, resupplied battalions. Distribution of supplies was made on a basis of a 25% to 30% casualty expectancy. Eight hundred litters remaining from the Saipan Operation were available. Redistribution of jeep ambulances was effected, allowing two additional vehicles to each Regimental Surgeon.

4. The Medical Plan was drawn up in accordance with the limitations imposed by the Operation Order. The Medical Task Organization is quoted from Annex "Baker" to Division Administration Order No. 33-44, Medical Plan:

- "a. Med. Bn. (less dets) under Div Control.
- b. Coll Sect A Med Co attchd 25th Mar.
Coll Sect B Med Co attchd 24th Mar.
Coll Sect C Med Co attchd 23rd Mar.
- c. D and E Med Cos will be embarked initially,
prepared to land on order and establish Div Hosp.

- ~~SECRET~~
- d. A Med Co (less dets) will be prepared on 6 hrs notice to embark and land on Div Order on and after Jig plus two day.
 - e. B and C Med Cos (less dets) will be prepared on 24 hrs notice to embark and land on Div Order on and after Jig plus three day."

ASSAULT PHASE

1. All organic Medical Units were embarked at Saipan with the assault teams on LST's, to be reembarked on LVT's for the landing at Tinian on 24 July, 1944.

2. Company aid men landed with their platoons. The Battalion and Regimental Medical Sections with equipment went in with their respective Command Posts. The designated collecting sections landed at approximately the same time as Regimental Surgeons, and functioned under their supervision throughout the operation. "D" Medical Company landed on the afternoon of Jig Day, and "E" Medical Company landed on the morning of Jig / 1. These early landings were necessary in order to clear the beaches for the following elements of the Second Marine Division.

3. On Jig / 1 day, Medical Battalion personnel functioned as additional aid stations just off the beaches. On Jig / 2 day, the Division Hospital was established about 1500 yards from the beaches, and 1000 yards to the rear of the front lines. The site selected was in defilade, and near an excellent road. It was not necessary to move from this site during the operation.

4. Shore Party Evacuation Stations were set up on Beaches White One and White Two, soon after the assault waves landed on Jig Day. They functioned smoothly and efficiently, and were able to keep both beaches clear of casualties throughout Jig Day. Evacuation was materially aided by the early landing of jeep ambulances which were brought ashore in LVT(4)'s. Initially, amphibious vehicles were used to transport casualties from the front to a transfer point located at the Medical Control Vessel just outside the fringing reef. Later, as the beachhead was expanded, casualties were transported in ambulances to the beach evacuation stations from the front.

5. The Division Hospital was set up as an emergency surgical unit only. All medical cases and walking wounded were evacuated directly to the rear echelon Division Hospital on Saipan. As surgical cases convalesced to a degree that allowed for safe transfer, they were evacuated to Saipan, or to hospital ships.

6. Evacuation from Tinian by sea was markedly curtailed after Jig / 2, and finally stopped because of severe surf conditions. On 29 July, an LST anchored off White Two pontoon causeway pier, and approximately two hundred seventy-five (275) medical cases and light casualties were loaded aboard. Before loading operations could be completed, a severe storm arose which caused the LST to go aground on the fringing reef. The following day it was necessary to transfer these casualties to another ship via breeches buoy. This was accomplished without incident. Further evacuation by sea was impossible because of the unfavorable surf conditions.

7. On 31 July, the Ushi Airfield became operational, and movement by air of all types of casualties capable of transfer to Saipan was begun. The beach evacuation sections transferred to a new location at the airfield and continued supervision of evacuation for the Second and Fourth Marine Divisions. Three hundred sixty (360) casualties were evacuated on the first day. One hundred sixty-seven (167) of these were members of the Fourth Division. During the ensuing week, the majority of evacuation from Tinian was by means of air transport. Air evacuation was found to be extremely rapid and efficient.

8. By 1 August, evacuation by sea was resumed from the harbor of Tinian Town. However, LCT's returning to Saipan were the only craft available, and evacuation was limited to White cases only, during the operation.

9. Throughout the operation, Battalion and Regimental Aid Stations were set up in close proximity to their respective Command Posts. They moved frequently, but were able to function efficiently, due to the increased number of jeep ambulances which had been made available to them for this operation.

10. Throughout the initial phase of the Tinian Operation, sanitation was elemental due to the rapidity of the tactical movement. Straddle trenches were used almost universally. Unit sanitation was on the whole very good. Individual mosquito repellent measures were the only ones that could be utilized until after the Island was secured.

Upon completion of the operation, the Division went into a bivouac area on high ground on the westward side of Tinian Island. In this location, sanitation was vastly improved. Barrel-topped heads were widely used. They were composed of empty enemy fuel drums with both ends removed, and sunk into the ground. A prefabricated ply-wood cover was provided. This type was found to be fly-proof and very efficient.

Galleys were set up in the bivouac area, and were flyproofed with captured Japanese materials. At no time did the fly problem on Tinian approach the proportions it had assumed on Saipan.

Aedes mosquitoes were numerous in the vicinity of Tinian Town. Since this was developed into the main port of entry and exit for the Island, many cases of Dengue Fever among the troops were traceable to this area.

Dysentery was never a serious problem, since relatively few cases were encountered on Tinian.

Burial of our own and enemy dead was carried out expeditiously, under the direction of the Division Burial Officer and Graves Registration Section. All bodies, as well as the areas on which they lay, were sprayed with oil and sodium arsenite.

11. As ships became available, elements of the Fourth Marine Division were embarked from Tinian Town, and returned to a base camp. The long voyage back to the rest area provided a natural quarantine period, and by exercise of strict sanitary control of troops embarked, they arrived at base camp in excellent condition.

12. Casualty Statistics:

The following figures represent the Division casualty rates for Tinian:

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>MARINES</u>	<u>MEDICAL PERSONNEL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Head - - - - -	215	10	225
Chest - - - - -	132	7	139
Abdomen - - - - -	113	6	119
Buttocks - - - - -	38	0	38
Extremities - - - - -	592	27	619
Concussion - - - - -	<u>53</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>55</u>
	1143	52	1195
Dengue - - - - -	219	14	233
Combat Fatigue - - - - -	53	1	54
Dysentery - - - - -	120	6	126
Fungus Infection - - - - -	6	0	6
Psychoneurosis - - - - -	8	3	11
Other Diseases - - - - -	<u>338</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>352</u>
	744	38	782

GRAND TOTAL: 1977

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The following figures indicate the number and type of casualties who were admitted to the Division Hospital ("D" and "E" Medical Companies):

<u>INJURIES</u>		<u>DISEASE</u>	
Head - - - - -	39	Dengue - - - - -	88
Chest - - - - -	17	Combat Fatigue - - - - -	13
Concussion - - - - -	6	Dysentery - - - - -	55
Abdomen - - - - -	15	Psychoneurosis - - - - -	4
Buttocks - - - - -	10	Fungus's - - - - -	8
Others - - - - -	27	Others - - - - -	130
Extremities - - - - -	<u>184</u>		<u>298</u>
	298		

GRAND TOTAL: 596

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The reallocation of personnel which placed collecting sections of Medical Companies under control of Regimental Surgeons proved to be an efficient use of these personnel.

2. The necessity for more ambulances in Infantry Regiments was emphasized in this operation, as on Saipan. In this instance, more transportation had been added from Medical Companies not committed, and the high peak of efficiency reached in evacuation indicated the desirability of a permanent increase in Table of Organization allowances of all types of vehicles for the entire Medical Department.

3. The necessity for having highly trained officers and men in charge of Shore Party Evacuation Stations was again emphasized during the Tinian Operation. The successful evacuation of all casualties over very narrow and extremely congested beaches, under artillery fire, can be attributed directly to the presence of such officers and men in this Division's Shore Party Evacuation Stations.

4. The successful use of a Medical Control Vessel at the transfer point off the beaches, indicates the desirability for continuation of this practice. From this vessel, a Medical Officer directs the apportionment of casualty-carrying amphibious vehicles to the evacuation stations on the beaches as needed, and supervises the transfer of casualties from the amphibious vehicles to LCVP's for the trip to casualty-carrying APA's in the Transport Area. Since it is sometimes necessary to take aboard the control vessel those cases which demand

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immediate, supplemental treatment at the transfer point, i.e., those cases in whom hemorrhage has re-commenced, or those who have gone into shock, because of the rough passage from the beach, it is recommended that suitable facilities be provided for caring for these cases at the transfer point.

5. The need for a ship of the type APH was re-emphasized on this operation. LST's are not adequate for the reception of casualties without extensive modification and increase of personnel, especially Medical.

6. The successful use of a Division Hospital, formed by pooling the resources of two Medical Companies, indicates the desirability of this practice in the Tinian type of operation. The extreme flexibility of the Medical Company as now set up in Table of Organization is a very decided advantage, since without disturbing its essential organization, it can be used successfully for many different types of missions.

7. The work of the Medical Record Section was performed under very adverse conditions. It is recommended that, in order to be of the greatest service to the Division, the allowances be modified to include a mimeograph machine and standard typewriters, instead of the portable models.

8. Since this operation followed closely on the heels of the exhausting Saipan Operation, the need for the wide-spread and prolonged use of supplementary vitamin therapy was readily evident. It is recommended that large quantities of multiple vitamins be made available on similar operations, and that resupply of this item be given a high priority. An easy method of distribution of multiple vitamin and salt tablets would be to include them in "K" and "C" rations.

9. It was generally observed that troops will not consume the entire "K" and "C" rations, but rather choose only a few items which appeal to them, the remainder of the ration being discarded. This results in a serious imbalance of diet, of which avitaminosis is a prominent sequel. It is recommended that both rations be modified so as to be made more palatable, with the inclusion of salt and vitamin tablets, (see Par. #8 above).

10. Particular attention was paid to proper cleansing of water containers before both the Saipan and Tinian Operations. Live steam was used. In practically every instance the success of this procedure was demonstrated by the fact that the water was extremely palatable.

11. It is recommended that the agency designated for medical care of prisoner of war and civilian casualties be set up to function early in the operation. As in the Saipan Operation, personnel from the Division Hospital were of necessity assigned to this work, thereby reducing the number of Medical Officers and men available for work in the Division Hospital.

12. It is recommended that a radio-wire communication section be added to Regimental Sections, Medical Companies, and the Division Surgeon. Breaks in wire communication were responsible on occasions, for slowing up of evacuation.

13. By and large, the supplies and field equipment were excellent; however, experience gained in the past two operations lead the Medical Department to strongly recommend the addition of the following items to each Medical Company:

- a. One (1) Portable field orthopedic table.
- b. Six (6) Intestinal clamps.
- c. Seventy-two (72) tubes Atraumatic catgut.
(With straight and curved needles.)
- d. Six (6) Airways.
- e. Six (6) Tracheotomy tubes.
- f. Twenty-five (25) Oxygen (Small) cylinders.
- g. Two (2) Oxygen airflow meters.
- h. Thirty-six (36) Hemostats (Kocher and Kelly type.)
- i. Some type of refrigeration unit should be adopted for the storage of biologicals, as it is not always practicable to transport the present heavy and bulky refrigerator.

W. C. BATY

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FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT - TINIAN

ANNEX E

SPECIAL COMMENTS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Reference: (a) CTF 56, Secret Serial 001453, 9 May 1944
(b) Operations Report - SAIPAN (CG, 4th Mar Div)

(a) PLANS

(1) Adequacy of Expeditionary Troops and Landing Force operation plans and annexes.

Expeditionary Troops and Landing Force operations plans and annexes were adequate in content. The time factor for dissemination of formal orders by chain of command to the lower units was not adequate. Early warning orders followed by fragmentary orders as fast as decisions are formulated would be desirable in a fast planning situation such as TINIAN.

(2) Recommendations for improvement of planning phase of operations.

a. It is recommended that during planning phases a Division Liaison Group be maintained at Corps Headquarters or vice versa to keep the Division Commander abreast of the planning situation. It is believed that the presence of such a group during planning for FORAGER would not only have expedited the transmission of Corps' basic planning decisions but would have kept Corps and Division mutually clarified on planning and interpretation of details from day to day.

b. In view of the fact that code names and actual names of the objectives were used interchangeably and that security could be compromised thereby, it is recommended that only code names (or only clear names) for objectives and geographic features be employed.

(b) ADMINISTRATION

(1) Recommendations for simplification of casualty reports and reports of WIA and KIA.

See reference (b).

(2) Comment on morale of troops and methods to maintain high morale throughout the operations.

See reference (b).

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SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

(c) INTELLIGENCE

- (1) Comment on type of maps and photos furnished, adequacy and completeness, with recommendations for improvement.

a. Maps

See reference (b).

As TINIAN was generally flat, the problems of vertical error were not as serious in this operation as they had been on the rugged island of SAIPAN. The reproduction of the captured Japanese map proved very useful, particularly because of the more accurate contouring.

b. Photos

The aerial photographic mosaic issued proved excellent and of great value. The vertical and oblique photos furnished were improved one hundred percent over those in the SAIPAN operation and were extensively used to advantage by the RCTs. All of the errors of the SAIPAN operation were corrected.

- (2) Comment on distinctive or special enemy tactics observed.

The weight of our combined naval gunfire, aerial bombardment, artillery and infantry attack never permitted the enemy to employ any major tactics except in the counter-attack on the morning of Jig-plus-1-day. He endeavored to follow his plan as indicated by translations of captured documents; To defeat us at the beach; to defeat us by counterattack on our beachhead if we succeeded in landing; to harass us by infiltration and by occasional artillery fire from concealed positions; to use artillery during times when our artillery fired, hoping to create the impression in our troops that our artillery was firing shorts; and to deliver final banzai attacks at the end, in an effort "to die gloriously and cause us 7 deaths to 1".

The enemy employed all his usual ruses and endeavored to defend both forward and reverse slopes. He used cover and concealment to its best advantage. His tanks were nearly always employed and destroyed on roads. While he had a quantity and variety of artillery, including 37mm 47mm, 70mm and 75mm guns and howitzers he did not mass

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

his fires and failed to take advantage of bracket adjustment obtained. He fired principally one gun at a time and seldom used time fire. His 8cm, 12cm, 14cm, and 6" guns were all on fixed mounts for coast defense and their fields of fire were restricted.

The whole plan of defense was based on the likelihood of our landing at TINIAN Town or on Beach Yellow 1. Our landing in force on the White Beaches, according to POWs was unexpected. They had inadequate plans for this attack and consequently fell back. Again the enemy endeavored to burn, bury and hide his dead, making estimates of casualties inflicted and identification of units most difficult. He followed the same plan on SAIPAN and fought from concealment and was never seen in force.

- (3) Comment on enemy use of smoke, gas or chemicals; enemy preparations against possible use of chemicals by our troops, including decontamination doctrine and facilities.

See reference (b).

Nearly all of the enemy killed in the counterattack carried their gas masks. Several cases of decontamination powders and liquids were found as well as a few paper-like individual protective covers.

- (4) Comment on enemy intelligence organization, doctrine and practice, particularly in instances where the enemy may have anticipated our action and taken counter measures.

Generally there was evidence that the enemy was reasonably careful to hide, or destroy records which would have been of value to us. Radio sets were meticulously smashed, and enemy unit identifications were obviously made difficult to obtain. The 50th Infantry Regiment was particularly disciplined in this respect. The enemy's intelligence on when and where we would land was poor. Several POWs said they did not expect our attack for about three months after the SAIPAN operation. All expected us to land at TINIAN Town or on Beach Yellow 1.

- (5) Comment on accuracy and completeness on hydrographic information furnished.

Hydrographic information was very complete and accurate. Annotated photographs, beach studies and information obtained from the Corps Reconnaissance Company were excellent and proved of immense value.

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

- (6) Comment on counterintelligence measures and precautions which were taken, and offer suggestions for improvement for our own security system.

Security of planning operations is indicated by the surprise of enemy troops at our landing so early and at our use of White Beaches.

Two incidents were reported of Japanese patrols using our password in an effort to infiltrate our lines. Whether the nature of the password had anything to do with this is not known. The use of words difficult for the Japanese to pronounce would improve security.

See reference (b) for comment on censorship.

- (7) Were the interpreters (Japanese) qualified and effective?

The interpreters (Japanese) both officers and enlisted men, performed a highly creditable job. They were qualified in every degree and performed tirelessly and to great advantage in translation, interrogation, assisting in the civilian stockades and talking civilians out of caves.

- (8) Was the procedure set up for the recovery of captured enemy documents and material effective?

Transportation was an unsurmountable problem. The physical collection of this material cannot be effected without vehicles. On the TINIAN operation, we were permitted to retain the captured Jap truck used on SAIPAN. Although transportation was still a problem a better collecting system was effected than during the SAIPAN operation.

- (9) Was the procedure set up for handling news releases satisfactory?

See reference (b).

- (10) Comment on system of handling prisoners, natives, civilians, etc., and methods of interrogation of same.

As we had far fewer civilians and POWs on this operation than on SAIPAN the problem of handling them was much less difficult. Likewise, both Corps and Division benefited by the experience gained on SAIPAN and as a result the whole operation ran more smoothly.

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

- (11) Comment on effectiveness or ineffectiveness of our propaganda leaflets, with suggested improvements.

Propaganda leaflets on TINIAN appeared to be better composed and to be somewhat more effective with both soldiers and civilians than on SAIPAN.

Distribution still was not adequate. Large numbers of both civilians and soldiers had not seen our leaflets. More frequent dropping of leaflets has been recommended by the regiments. A translation should be printed on all leaflets and information concerning the text should be distributed to lower echelons.

A borrowed public address system was used to good advantage. Loud speakers should be made available to Division.

- (12) Comment on intelligence liaison of G-2 with unit, with suggestions for improvement.

See reference (b).

- (13) Was intelligence, disseminated to you by G-2, timely, effective, sufficient?

See reference (b).

- (14) Comment on Japanese military organization of Jap civilian population.

On TINIAN as on SAIPAN three civilian loyalty organizations were discovered, the Civilian Militia (ZAIJOGUNJIN), the Home Guard organization (KEIBODAN), and the Youth Organization (SEIENDAN). Among these units the Civilian Militia was most prominent, but none of the organized civilians accomplished much for the Japanese military. Most of the civilian men thought first of their families and fled with them. They received no weapons to fight with in their official capacity, although some procured grenades from the soldiers to be used on themselves if necessary. No evidence was found that these civilian groups had done any fighting or helped in any material way after our landing.

- (15) What was the most valuable service rendered you by G-2 during the operation?

See reference (b).

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SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

(a) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

- (1) Comment upon rehearsal exercises and make recommendations for improvement with a view to better indoctrination of all hands, with adequate details of the plans and technique to be followed in the actual operations.

No formal rehearsal was held for TINIAN. All personnel involved, except a few replacements, having just participated in the SAIPAN attack, conferences and briefing were considered sufficient in the short elapsed time between the two operations. See reference (b).

- (2) What methods were used to guide tanks across the reefs to the beach?

Favorable reef approaches made guides less necessary than heretofore.

The use of LVTs as guides has been unsuccessful, the lack of communication and control being the reason. Individual men preceding the tanks by wading are highly vulnerable, and frequently find themselves beyond wading depth.

The tank company reconnaissance party should rendezvous with the tank units at the control area after beach reconnaissance, to guide tanks ashore. Early reconnaissance information is critical to tank units. Both the organic reconnaissance party and the underwater demolition team should provide this intelligence at the control vessel and to the tank commander early in the debarkation stage of landing.

- (3) Which weapons, types of ammunition, and fuze settings were found to be most effective against fortified installations?

75mm half-tracks and medium tanks were the most effective. See reference (b).

- (4) Were the number of flame throwers sufficient?

One portable flame thrower per rifle platoon was sufficient. See reference (b).

- (5) Comment on any deficiencies in amphibious training.

From the standpoint of the troops in amphibious training

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SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

a larger proportion of the training period should be allotted to operations inland to the Force Beachhead. See reference (b).

- (6) How can the time interval for transfer of troops from the transport to LST's or LVT's be reduced?

There was no transfer of 4th Marine Division personnel from transports in the TINIAN shore-to-shore movement. See reference (b).

- (7) What was the percentage and causes for LVT casualties?

See special LVT report.

- (8) What recommendations can be made for the employment of the LVT(A) (4)?

LVT(A)(4)'s are best employed in firing on appropriate shore targets from seaward, especially in furnishing close support on flanks of landing beach, both by firing on beaches prior to the landing of the assault wave and protecting the flanks by fire after the assault wave has landed. LVT(A)'s may also be used to support front line units ashore by taking defiladed positions where their fire power can be used without exposing their underside. LVT(A)(4)'s were employed fairly effectively during the latter stages of the operation in reducing hostile resistance in water line and beach caves.

- (9) Was the improved armor plate on LVT's effective?

The improved armor plate on LVT's was effective.

- (10) Did the new organization of infantry battalions and regiments (Marine) provide a more flexible and better fighting unit than the old organization? Comment.

The flexibility and self-sufficiency of small units justified the new T/O. See reference (b).

- (11) What method of anti-aircraft defense was provided by ground units prior to landing of anti-aircraft units?

The sole means were organic .30 and .50 caliber machine guns, together with passive measures.

- (12) What tactical use was made of War Dogs?

No war dog units were attached to this Division. See

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SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

, reference (b).

- (13) How were the flame thrower equipped light tanks employed?

See reference (b), and Annex K, this report.

- (14) Do you have any changes to suggest in the flame thrower equipped light tank?

See reference (b), and Annex K, this report.

- (15) Do you have any recommended changes in the tank battalion?

See reference (b), and Annex K, this report.

- (16) How was your tank battalion used?

Division Tank Battalion was tactically employed by attachment of medium tank companies to RCTs. One platoon of light tanks was normally attached to each medium tank company.

- (17) Comment on anti-tank defense measures taken.

Half-tracks, 57mm AT guns, bazookas, AT grenades, and friendly tanks provided anti-tank defense. Artillery sited pieces for AT defensive fire.

(c) ARTILLERY

- (1) Was the artillery suitably loaded to execute the prescribed scheme of maneuver?

The loading plan for the four 75mm battalions that landed in support of the 4th Marine Division on TINIAN was excellent. Each battalion was loaded on an LST with twenty-two preloaded DUKWs aboard. Ammunition (two units of fire) was deck loaded on each of these LSTs and two additional LSTs carried DUKWs preloaded with 75mm ammunition. This loading provided sufficient equipment and personnel and ammunition ashore on the afternoon of Jig-day for efficient functioning of the artillery units assigned to support the initial phase of the assault. The 105mm battalions remained on SAIPAN under NTLF control until released on landing which commenced on Jig-plus-two.

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SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

- (2) Comment on the ship to shore movement of artillery and artillery ammunition. What amount and type of ammunition was taken initially with each piece and was the amount satisfactory?

Each 75mm battalion landed with 105 rounds per piece and was augmented immediately by ammunition from ten preloaded DUKWs. This brought the ammunition level up to approximately one unit of fire. This supply was adequate.

- (3) How was artillery fire controlled? Was air spot used?

On TINIAN, ground and air observation were used continuously.

The special Air and Gunnery Target Map, 1:20,000, of TINIAN was used as a firing chart. A reproduction of a captured Japanese map was used for vertical control.

Air spot was used extensively and effectively throughout the TINIAN operation and was invaluable.

- (4) Comment on artillery communications.

Communication was continuous from the time radio silence was lifted. During ship to shore movement, radio nets were established on SCR 300 for regimental command and battalion command.

Normal wire nets were established within the battalions and with regiment and forward observers on Jig-day. Wire nets were difficult to maintain due to large numbers of tracked vehicles cutting wires on the surface.

The SCR 300 was used by forward observers as primary means of communication. When long distances were involved a TCS with the artillery liaison officers at infantry regimental command posts was used as a relay station between forward observers and direct support battalion Fire Direction Centers. The TCS was used on air spot net and Corps artillery net.

- (5) What changes, if any, were necessary for the efficient functioning of the fire direction center?

See reference (b).

- (6) Was use made of sound and flash ranging?

On TINIAN the regiment established and maintained flash

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

ranging teams.

The system of flash ranging employed is satisfactory.

- (7) What types of ammunition were fired? Total expended? What were normal rates of fire? Recommend proportions of each type ammunition for future operations.

Types of ammunition used:	Shell HE M48
	Shell HE M54
	Shell WP M57

Total expended:	HE (105)	23248
	HE (75)	31565
	WP (105)	none
	WP (75)	3205

Normal rate of fire: 105mm 2 rds./gun/min
75mm 4 rds./gun/min

Recommended proportions for future operations:

Shell HE M48	-	40%
Shell HE M54	-	50%
Shell WP M57	-	10%

- (8) Comment on maintenance of artillery material during action and during lulls in action.

See reference (b).

- (9) What material deficiencies, if any, were noted?

See reference (b).

- (10) Was liaison with the infantry satisfactory?

Liaison with the infantry was satisfactory.

- (11) Comment on any special training or artillery technique that should be stressed during the preliminary training for landing against hostile opposition.

See reference (b).

- (12) Comment on the organization for combat of the artillery with the Corps during the various phases of the operation.

Corps artillery was in general support during initial phases of landing on TINIAN. Forward observers of the

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SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

1st Battalion, 14th Marines had communication with a Corps 155mm howitzer battalion to be utilized as direct support, prior to landing of the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines. Forward observers of the 2d Battalion, 14th Marines had communication with a Corps 105mm howitzer battalion to be utilized as direct support until the 2d Battalion, 14th Marines landed. On Jig-plus-three, two 155mm howitzer battalions were landed on TINIAN and were utilized as general support artillery to reinforce the 14th Marines on call.

- (13) Comment on the artillery survey established over the Corps sector. Was it adequate and was it established early enough to be effective?

See reference (b).

- (14) Comment on the counter-battery organization. Responsibility? Technique? Effectiveness?

See reference (b).

- (15) What displacement of the artillery was necessary?

The first displacement of the regiment on TINIAN was made to get battalions off the beaches. Thereafter displacement was made as advance of the infantry dictated. Two displacements of the regiment plus an additional displacement of the two 75mm battalions were made on TINIAN.

- (16) What liaison was established by Corps artillery?

Corps artillery had a liaison officer with radio communication at the regimental command post during the action.

- (17) To what extent was fire massed on a single target by the various artillery echelons? What was the average number of battalions used on a single target by each headquarters?

Battalions normally fired three batteries on targets, as the majority of the fires were on area targets. Normally only one battalion was used on a target although frequently two or three battalions were massed.

(f) AIR

- (1) Comment on the manner in which air liaison parties performed their duties with respect to advising unit commanders, maintaining liaison with naval gunfire and artillery teams, requesting close support missions, directing air

~~SECRET~~
SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

attacks, and maintaining radio communications with Support Aircraft Control.

Air liaison parties performed their duties efficiently throughout the operation, requesting and directing (via the SAR net) close support missions for their unit commanders and advising them of the air support situation. Adequate safety limits were observed in making requests and great care was taken to prevent air strikes from causing casualties among our own troops. Good radio communication was maintained except for periods when failure of radio equipment on the Headquarters Ship necessitated other stations taking over net control. Adequate liaison was maintained with artillery and naval gunfire teams. Delays in lifting artillery fire to permit air strikes were generally caused by CSA requesting artillery to be lifted on the whole Division front to permit an air strike on a single target or against a limited area ahead of one battalion.

(2) Were air attacks delivered on time? Cease on time?

Air attacks continued to be late in starting but generally ceased on time. Air liaison officers were successful in all cases in stopping delayed attacks which endangered our advancing troops.

(3) What was the average time for action on requests?

CSA was prompt in acting on requests for strikes but delays in securing actual execution would still average between twenty to thirty minutes, even with planes on station. If planes were not on station, delays of upwards of an hour were common. Actual execution of the strikes were generally carried out efficiently since the pilots had benefitted considerably from close support experience over SAIPAN and had been carefully briefed by air liaison officers at Isley Field between operations.

(4) Were any air strikes directed by air liaison parties?

No air strikes were directed by air liaison parties on the SAD net. Coaching via the SAR net was still necessary for protection of the troops but dummy runs were eliminated in many cases. The SAR net was still tied up on a two-division front for all other communications except coaching whenever an air strike was going on.

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

(5) Were the radio nets overcrowded?

The air support radio nets were not overcrowded. A "Special Radio Procedure" assisted in preventing "Urgent" calls from tying up the SAR net which, however, during the initial assault stage had only three battalion air liaison parties on the air.

(6) Was the radio equipment sufficiently waterproofed?

All radio equipment was satisfactorily waterproofed for the landing. Heavier rainfall during this operation increased the tendency of microphones to malfunction in wet weather. The antenna socket for the SCR 284 also continued to give trouble.

(7) Comment on the use of panels.

Fluorescent panels continued to be used successfully for marking front lines although they were frequently difficult to observe even at medium altitudes if surrounding foliage was verdant and thick. Panels were not used for target designation.

(8) Comment upon the use of pyrotechnics in target designation and front-line marking.

WP mortar shells were used occasionally to designate targets. Pyrotechnics were not used to mark front lines.

(9) Additional comments and recommendations.

Additional comments and recommendations in reference (b) are applicable in general to the TINIAN operation.

(g) NAVAL GUNFIRE

(1) Was the shore fire control party adequate and did it deliver support fires expeditiously?

Enlisted casualties incurred during the SAIPAN operation were replaced by utilizing personnel from the shore party communication teams. Each shore fire control party went into the TINIAN operation with ten men, five each for the NLO and spotter. Replacement NLO's and one spotter were obtained prior to the operation but two BLT's were short spotters throughout the operation. Call fires were delivered expeditiously.

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

(2) Were fires adjusted quickly and properly?

The speed with which adjustments were made depended upon the efficiency of communications, the proficiency of the firing ship, and the observation possessed by the spotter. Proper adjustments were generally obtained.

(3) Did call fires produce the desired effect?

Assault troops generally desired destruction of important targets. In only a few instances was destruction obtained due to the characteristics of naval gunfire, but usually adequate neutralization was effected. WP did not produce the desired effect as an incendiary agent on cane fields and TINIAN Town.

(4) Describe the effect of naval gunfire on various types of fortified positions.

Experience on TINIAN indicated that main batteries of battleships and cruisers firing AP ammunition were effective against fortified installations. Enemy guns emplaced in caves, the front of which had been closed except for a gun port, gave considerable trouble and required a large expenditure of ammunition to reduce.

(5) Any recommendations for future employment of naval gunfire in support of troops landing against hostile opposition.

See reference (b) and Annex C; this report.

(h) BASE DEFENSE

No comment.

(i) SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION

(1) Were DUKWs able to negotiate coral reefs satisfactorily?

Yes, the DUKWs used in this operation were able to negotiate coral reefs in a highly satisfactory manner. This was true even during periods of rough weather on the beaches. After use initially in landing artillery and transporting ammunition for artillery, DUKWs were pressed into service to bring in other supplies when shortages became critical and the landing of boats was made impossible by adverse weather. The contribution which DUKWs made to the success of this operation cannot be overemphasized.

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (2) What portion of supplies to be used during the assault phase should be palletized?

In the initial stages of the assault phase no supplies should be palletized. In later stages of the assault phase approximately 30% of supplies may be palletized. It must be borne in mind that palletization involves a considerable increase in shipping space requirements, it limits transfer from one type landing craft to another, it requires that shipment be available for handling of pallets, it is not suited for use where dumps are located more than 500 yards inland, and it is not practicable where reefs are to be encountered. Reef condition precluded use of pallets at any time on White Beaches, PINIAN.

- (3) Were vehicle and tank waterproofing kits satisfactory?

Waterproofing kits were satisfactory.

- (4) Was the allowance of ammunition, including hand grenades, adequate or excessive?

It is considered that the allowance of the following ammunition was inadequate:

60mm Mortar, illuminating
75mm Gun, HE
81mm Mortar, HE, light
75mm and 105mm Howitzer, WP
Colored Smoke Grenades
Offensive Hand Grenades
Detonators, 15-second delay

The allowance of the following items is considered excessive:

60mm Mortar, HE
81mm Mortar, HE, Heavy, M56
75mm Gun, APC
75mm and 105mm Howitzer, HEAT
50 caliber, incendiary
Small Arms, generally

- (5) Were various types of supplies available upon call when required?

Generally, yes. Adverse surf conditions interfered with normal landing, and at times supply of some items, such as petroleum products, became alarmingly short. However, at no time, did supply break down.

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (6) What changes should be made in the types and quantities of supplies to be embarked on APA's?

No APAs utilized by 4th Marine Division in TINIAN operation.

- (7) Were flame thrower and squad demolition kits effective, adequate, or excessive in quantity?

Flame throwers and squad demolition kits were adequate and effective.

- (8) What items were carried in the combat pack? What changes should be made?

In the TINIAN operation the carrying of packs was optional with the units. It is significant that in the vast majority of cases the pack was not carried by assault troops. The landing ration, change of socks and a spoon were carried in the mens' pockets, and the poncho and entrenching tool were carried on the belt. In small island warfare it is recommended that troops embark with full pack equipment and land with no packs. Packs should be landed later in much the same manner that sea bags are handled now. Sea bags should not be embarked.

- (9) Were palletized equipment and supplies damaged by water or rough handling?

Supplies were not palletized.

- (10) Comment on quantity and type of rations carried ashore by individuals in assault units.

Personnel landed with 1/3 "K" and 2/3 "D". This is considered a good balance, and provides one good meal without too much bulk.

- (11) Comment on quantity of "B" rations put ashore for use of assault troops. Were "B" rations fully unloaded for the use by units after assault phase? Were ration dumps set up, rations segregated, guarded and properly issued?

"B" rations were landed slowly, due to adverse surf conditions, and were not available in quantity until the island was secured. They were available in sufficient quantity after the island was secured and by the time galleys were set up. Ration dumps were set up on Jig plus one; rations were segregated, guarded and properly issued.

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

- (12) Were the post exchange components of the "B" ration furnished with the rations? Were they adequate until regular post exchange facilities could be established?

Post exchange components of the "B" ration were furnished with the ration and were generally adequate.

- (13) Was galley equipment unloaded and put into use during the assault phase? When should galley equipment be landed?

No, galley equipment was not landed or put in operation during the assault phase. Galley equipment should be landed with baggage but not put in operation until fly-proof galleys can be established, nor until the tactical and logistical situation permits adequate cleaning and sterilizing of mess gear.

(j) ENGINEERS

- (1) Did engineers remain attached to landing teams, or did they revert to engineer control?

At no time during the TINIAN operation did the engineers revert to the engineer tactical control.

- (2) What was the engineer composition of the landing force?

Engineer composition was as follows:

Division Engineers-----Hq & Serv Co, 20th Marines
Hq Co, 1st Bn, 20th Marines

Attached Engineers-----"A" Co to RCT 25
"B" Co to RCT 24
"C" Co to RCT 23

Pioneer Battalion-----Attached to RCT 25 initially.

1341st Engineer Battalion (Army)-----Attached to RCT 24
initially.

- (3) Was this composition supplemented by Garrison Engineers? If so, when? What missions were assigned those engineers?

Garrison Engineers supplemented the Division Engineers beginning on Jig-day. They were assigned the following tasks:

- (a) Construction of LVT ramps.
(b) Construction of pontoon causeways.

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (c) Construction of track vehicle roads paralleling main supply roads.
- (d) Repair and maintenance of all captured airfields.
- (e) Construction, repair, and maintenance of all rear area roads.

(4) What general missions were assigned to engineers?

The attached engineers were assigned general assault missions, employing flame throwers and explosives, demolitions in forward and rear areas, clearing mine fields and road blocks in forward areas, constructing roads to front line troops, supplementing the infantry in security positions at night, burying enemy dead, and assisting infantry in setting up bivouac areas for infantry troops. Additional tasks assigned included water supply, camouflage, Division command post construction, rear area road repairs, pier repair and reconstruction and beach clearance.

(5) What major items of engineer equipment were landed? Was the landing priority sufficiently high?

- 15 distillation units
- 4 TD-14 dozers
- 1 TD-18 dozer
- 1 TD-18 utility tractor
- 4 TD-9 shovel loaders
- 3 TD-9 dozers
- 1 TD-9 utility
- 6 TD-9 cranes
- 2 TD-14 bullclans
- 1 TD-6 utility
- 1 3/8 yard shovel
- 1 pull grader

The landing priority was sufficiently high.

(6) What estimated percentage of engineer equipment was landed?

All engineer equipment landed on TINIAN from SAIPAN as planned.

(7) What quantity of explosives was loaded? How much of it was landed?

Two (2) units of fire. 100% landed.

(8) Did underwater obstacles interfere with the landing operation?

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

Coral reefs interfered with the landing of supplies. No man made obstacles except mines interfered with the landing on beaches selected.

- (9) Where were underwater obstacles located?

Along the beaches between the edge of reef and shore.

- (10) What type of obstacle was most effective?

None could be considered effective since the mines were removed before any great delay was encountered.

- (11) Were engineers employed in the removal of underwater obstacles? If so, when and how was it accomplished? What recommendations can be made?

None employed.

- (12) Describe the beach defenses.

The beach defenses on TINIAN consisted of machine guns, anti-boat guns, anti-tank guns, and mortars located at strong points--in caves, pill boxes, and fire trenches, so as to be mutually supporting. Various types of horned mines, yardstick mines and plato mines were found along beach.

- (13) Comment on pill box construction.

No large concrete pill boxes such as were encountered on SAIPAN were found on TINIAN. Pill boxes generally consisted of developed natural caves, coral cavities, and hastily fortified positions. TINIAN Town in particular consisted of many mutually supporting wooden shelters primarily placed at each street corner in the town and directly in rear of the beach.

- (14) Were pill boxes so located as to give mutual support?

Generally, yes.

- (15) Comment on permissible angles of fire obtainable from pill boxes.

Due to the hasty field fortifications there can be no definitely stated angle of fire that was common to all. It is estimated that the average angle of fire obtainable was between 120 and 150 degrees.

~~TOP SECRET~~
SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

(16) Comment on construction of enemy gun emplacements.

Many of the gun positions were hastily constructed of rice bags, soil, sod, stone, rough lumber and logs. Very little concrete was used in construction of gun emplacements on TINIAN.

(17) Comment on other emplacements, giving available construction details.

Numerous shelters for tanks, trucks, supplies and personnel were dug into the bluffs along the main supply roads. Individual shelters covered with two to three feet of earth and logs were prevalent.

(18) Were mines and booby traps used?

The beaches were heavily mined and booby traps were used extensively in TINIAN Town.

(19) Comment on enemy mine fields, giving location and pattern.

Mine fields found were as follows:

TA 506 H, I - Road blocked with 15 horn-type mines placed in groups of 5 with groups 15 yards to 25 yards apart.

TA 510 K, L, Q, W - Road blocked with large horn-type mines laid in the road in groups of 5 spaced in square pattern; one mine in corner with one in center of square. The mines in the field were spaced 5 to 8 feet apart and the groups were spaced from 25 to 35 yards apart. Mines were also used in the cane fields adjacent to the road; these were laid in a hasty 3 row pattern with mines spaced 18 feet apart in rows and the rows were spaced 10 to 12 feet apart. Total number of mines removed: 40.

Red and Green Beaches - These beaches were mined with large horned-type mines laid in a hasty 3 row pattern. The mines were about 18 feet apart in rows spaced on an average of about 10 to 12 feet apart. Yard-stick mines were placed on vehicle approach routes along beaches and tape mines were scattered at random in the area to the rear of the horned mines. Principal streets leading from the beaches were blocked and mined with horn, tape and yard-stick mines laid at random. The horn mines were tied together in each row with 3/4" round rods so that the mines would be detonated by vehicles which crossed the beach at any point. These beaches were booby-trapped with 10 to 12 pound charges of dynamite placed along the

~~SECRET~~
SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

beaches with trip wires attached to them.

TA 509 T - The road and adjacent cane fields were mined with large horn-type mines; no pattern. Total number of mines removed: 45.

TA 534 G - Beach mined with large horn-type mines. Pattern similar to mine-fields on Red and Green Beaches; no booby traps used.

White Beach 2 - This beach was mined with large horn-type mines laid in a 4 row and 3 yards between rows. Mines in each row were connected with steel reinforcing rods as noted for Red and Green Beaches.

Hill 440- An area approximately 1400 yards long by 30 yards deep was mined with dynamite about 18 sticks to the charge. The charges were placed about 5 yards apart in rows with the rows about 15 yards apart. The field was wired to be detonated electrically from a control point at TA 620 P.

TA 612 A, F - Tape and yard-stick mines scattered over area; no pattern.

TA 546 P, Q, R, S, T - This area was mined with large horn-type mines in rows. Mines were approximately 8 feet apart and rows were spaced about 18 feet apart. Total number of mines removed: 100.

Mines in most fields were poorly concealed and no mines found were booby trapped.

Where mine fields were partially removed by engineers and completed by other personnel the total number of mines removed has been shown as not known. The reports of the Bomb Disposal Officers will very likely fully cover all mine-fields.

(20) Comment on enemy mines examined.

The landing beaches were mined with many horned mines and scattered plate and yardstick mines. No new mines were found on TINIAN that were not previously discovered on SAIPAN. For a more complete discussion of mines found on TINIAN, see Appendix 1 of Annex G and Annex 2 of reference (b).

(21) Were floating mines used? Comment on type of mine and mine field.

~~SECRET~~
SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

No floating mines were observed.

- (22) Comment on enemy wire entanglements and state their location, type, and effectiveness.

In general there were no deliberate wire entanglements found on the TINIAN operation that were comparable to those found on SAIPAN. On the beach south of TINIAN Town low wire of the plain and barbed types was found, however, this wire was in many cases tied into a mine.

- (23) Comment on tank traps, ditches and barriers.

Tank ditches, log barricades, and timber cribs filled with stone constituted the tank traps and barriers found on TINIAN. TINIAN Town in particular had many barriers across the streets, however, it is very doubtful whether any observed would stop a medium tank. The engineer bulldozers eliminated these barriers expeditiously.

- (24) Comment on air raid shelters.

Due to the sub-surface coral formation peculiar to TINIAN Island, air raid shelters for both military and civilian personnel were excellent. Very little reinforced concrete was used, however, on TINIAN. Caves and rock cavities provided shelters that required direct hits to neutralize.

- (25) Were engineers assigned assault missions? What missions were assigned what engineer units?

Yes. Each RCT had one engineer company attached, of which one platoon was attached to each landing team, for performing assault missions, mopping up strong points, blasting caves, and providing security at command posts, dumps and sections of front lines. All companies were used much the same way. H&S Company, 20th Marines (Engineer), performed engineer missions in the rear area. Road construction, pier repair, beach clearance, and minor construction constituted the missions assigned.

- (26) What engineer equipment was used in coordination with the assault?

Hand tools, demolition packs, and bull dozers.

- (27) Did tactics involve other arms or services, and, if so, what units? Describe sections.

The infantry, tanks, and engineers were used together as a team in the assault.

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

- (28) Were any weaknesses discovered in the enemy emplacement? If so, what were they?

Flanking movements against emplacements were very effective since most weapons had fixed positions. Due to this fallacy, practically all of the emplacements in TINIAN Town had to be evacuated by the Japanese since all weapons were trained to repel an attack from the beach.

- (29) What recommendations can be made for future engineer assault training?

Assault missions formerly assigned to the engineers are now an infantry responsibility.

- (31) How were wire entanglements ashore passed?

No effective wire entanglements were observed on TINIAN.

- (32) Comment on how mine fields were passed.

Mines were disarmed and removed; a very few were blown in place.

- (33) Describe traffic circulation plan.

The Shore Party controlled traffic in the vicinity of the beaches. The forward areas on TINIAN had very good two-way roads, and presented no traffic control problem.

- (34) Comment on road maintenance and repair.

The existing road net on TINIAN required little or no repair or maintenance. Rear area road construction consisted primarily of short access roads to the piers in TINIAN Town and a few roads through the 4th Division dump in TINIAN Town.

- (35) Were road barriers encountered? Comment on removal method employed, if any.

Road barriers consisting of craters, mines, timber, and stone-filled log cribs were encountered on TINIAN. Blocked road areas were first checked for mines and the barriers were cleared with bull-dozers and hand tools, supported by friendly fire and security details where necessary.

- (36) Were roads mined or cratered?

Roads were mined, however, the craters that existed in the

~~SECRET~~
SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

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- (36) Were roads mined or cratered?

Roads were mined, however, the craters that existed in the

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

roads were probably the result of our own bombing and artillery fire.

- (57) What was the total strength of the landing force Shore Party?

Division Shore Party - 1050.

- (38) Were men allocated so as to provide for reliefs?

Yes, whenever possible.

- (39) What was the strength of the Shore Party ashore and of the on-ship unloading detail?

750 ashore
300 on ship

- (40) Was the Shore Party strength sufficient to perform its mission?

Despite the fact that many men had long tours of duty at times, the Shore Party strength was sufficient.

- (41) Approximately what amount of tonnage of supplies were unloaded?

Appendix 2 of Annex G lists in detail the major items of supply that were landed over the 4th Marine Division operated beaches.

- (42) How many working hours were required to complete the mission?

536 hours.

- (43) Comment on effect of tidal changes on Shore Party operation?

At high tide on TINIAN on the fringing reef on Beach White 1, vehicles that had not been waterproofed drowned out due to the depth of the water.

- (44) Was night unloading involved?

Very little night unloading was involved in this operation.

- (45) Were unloading operations retarded by the Shore Party operations?

~~SECRET~~
SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

Unloading operations were slowed primarily because of the reef barrier and the high ground swells.

(46) Comment on seaward approach to beach.

The seaward approach to the narrow beaches was a difficult one due to the fringing coral reef. The reef on White 1 was not so difficult to cross as the one on White 2 due to the crevices that existed in the latter reef particularly at the outer lip.

(47) Comment on inshore dispersal areas, access routes, and camouflage.

Area inshore was ample for dispersal of supplies and bivouac areas. Construction of access routes to tie into existing road net was easily accomplished. Natural camouflage material was limited. Little camouflage of dumps was attempted or necessary.

(48) What was the average number of boats that could be beached simultaneously?

None were able to be beached, however, at low tide a few LCT's were able to lower their ramps on the reef of White Two Beach.

(49) Comment on beach improvements undertaken.

Beaches on TINIAN were demined, cleared of debris, widened, and, in several cases, surfaced with coral. Both piers at TINIAN Town were repaired, the north pier, which was completely put out of commission by our own and enemy action, requiring 1-1/2 days for repair.

(50) Were pallets used and for what percent of cargo?

No pallets were used on this operation.

(51) Comment on beach roadway improvements undertaken.

Two main road construction tasks were completed on the beaches of TINIAN. One between Beach White 1 and 2 and the second from the north pier, across the railroad yard, to the main water front road in TINIAN Town.

(52) Comment on wharfs, piers, pontoons, etc., used. What improvements were required? When did utilization begin?

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On TINIAN, pontoon causeways and piers were used extensively. The pontoon causeway on Beach White 1 was emplaced during the evening of Jig-day and early morning of Jig-plus-one-day and operated for four days. The pontoon causeway on Beach White 2 was emplaced by the afternoon of Jig-plus-two-day and was used to unload 100 barrels of 100 octane gasoline, moved to a more favorable location on Jig-plus-three-day, and was in operation during the afternoon of Jig-plus-four-day and continued until the evening of Jig-plus-five-day at which time the high ground swells rendered it unusable. The south pier at TINIAN Town required very little repair work. This pier was operating the day after the town was secured. The north pier was severely damaged and extensively booby-trapped. The pier itself received many hits with one particularly large crater 50 feet wide and 10 feet deep. This crater was directly in the center of the pier. The wooden decking was completely torn out. This pier was put in operation with a road leading from it to the parallel beach road in one and one half days.

- (53) Was the Shore Party labor adequately controlled?

Shore Party battalion commanders on the beaches adequately controlled the Shore Party labor.

- (54) Comment on Shore Party camouflage.

Very little camouflage was attempted on the TINIAN operation by the Shore Party.

- (55) Comment on provisions for local defense.

Local defense was considered adequate. Each Shore Party battalion provided its own beach defense.

- (56) What air raid alarm system was provided?

Shore Party radio guarded Air Warning net. Siren used at Shore Party command post in conjunction with telephone and radio to pass air raid alarm to lower echelon.

- (57) Comment on the number and size of tractors used by Shore Party.

With the exception of a scarcity of tractor swing cranes the number and size of tractors taken on the operation were adequate. All engineer tractor equipment less three TD-14 dozers were available and used by the Shore Party.

~~SECRET~~
SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

(58) What equipment was used on the beach by the Shore Party?

All 20th Marines' tractor equipment as listed in (j)(5) less 3 TD-14 dozers, plus the following equipment from the 1541st Engineer Battalion (Army):

3 D-7 tractors armed with blade
3 D-8 tractors with blade
3 TD-9 tractors with crane

(59) Were landing priorities sufficiently high on tractors and other equipment required?

Landing priority of the Shore Party equipment was considered sufficiently high.

(60) Were any improvements over standard methods noticed?

The TINIAN beaches were always free of supplies. This was due to the manner in which the pre-loaded supplies were ferried from SAIPAN to TINIAN and also due to the use of amphibious tractors and DUKWs which crossed the beach and moved inland to the dump areas.

(61) Were Shore Parties under centralized control of Senior Shore Party Commander? Was the work of the various Shore Parties coordinated?

From 1510, Jig-plus-1-day until the completion of the Shore Party phase the Shore Parties were under the centralized control of the Division Shore Party Commander. The work of the Shore Party Battalion was coordinated.

(62) Were Shore Party troops used for other than Shore Party missions?

No.

(63) When were shore based water supply facilities developed? Comment on supply and type of water available.

Shore based distillation units began operating shortly after landing on Jig-plus-2-day. The engineers trucked the water to the Division ration dump where it was rationed equally to the consumers. The water was excellent and free from salt. For more details on water supply, see Annex G.

~~SECRET~~
SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

- (64) Comment on water supply equipment landed, installed, and time it was put in operation.

The Badger water distilling units were highly satisfactory. All units were dug in rapidly, dispersed, and operating by Jig-plus-3-day before any shortage of water developed.

- (65) Was water supply equipment landing priority sufficiently high?

Water supply equipment was landed when requested. No priority was placed on its time of landing because its installation depended upon the tactical situation.

- (66) Did water points selected provide sufficient camouflage?

Camouflage of the water supply points on TINIAN did not require as much camouflage as those on SAIPAN due to the absence of enemy aerial or terrestrial observation points, however, they were carefully dug in individually.

- (67) Comment on operation of Shore Party water point.

All water points were controlled by the Utility Section of Headquarters and Service Company, 20th Marines. Operation was satisfactory.

- (68) Comment on general features of airfields.

Detailed information concerning the airfields on TINIAN is not available since the Division Engineers were not required to repair or maintain the runways or buildings. The Ushi Point Airfield runway was in very good condition, requiring only sweeping and minor repairing of small holes. The surrounding ditches for run-off water had received a few hits. The buildings were, in general, badly damaged, with the exception of the operations office.

- (69) When were the fields captured? What repairs were required and when started? When were fields placed in operation?

Ushi Point Airfield was captured on Jig-plus-1-day (25 July). All airfield repair work was assigned to garrison forces.

- (70) Comment on units and equipment assigned to airfield repair.

No comment.

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SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

- (71) Comment on enemy plans and supply revetments, and degree of effectiveness.

No comment.

- (72) Was engineer assistance requested in the layout of the initial defense plans?

No.

- (73) What disposition was made of engineer troops for defensive purposes?

Generally the AOT employed engineers for defense purposes as follows:

Headquarters Platoon - Command post and dump security.
Engineer Platoons - Supplemented the infantry security of positions during the night.

(k) ORDNANCE

- (1) The number of weapons employed in the operation.

(a)	8035 carbines	(j)	42 37mm guns, AT or Tank
(b)	9 rifles, .03	(k)	117 60mm mortars
(c)	4721 rifles, M1.	(l)	40 81mm mortars
(d)	350 BAR's	(m)	42 75mm guns, SP or Tank
(e)	420 MG, cal..50	(n)	24 75mm Pack How, Field or Amph Trac.
(f)	24 shotguns, 12-ga.	(o)	24 105mm How
(g)	300 pistols, cal..45	(p)	none
(h)	10 Thompson SMG	(q)	none
(i)	240 BMG, cal..50	(r)	24 launchers, 4.5", BR

- (2) The total number of rounds of ammunition of each type expended or lost for each of the above weapons

(a)	313, 710	Cartridges, Carbine, cal..30
(b)		none
(c)	807,200	Cartridges, ball, cal..50, 3 rd clips.
(d)	1,338,800	Cartridges, ball, cal..50, 5 rd clips
(e)	2,544,000	Cartridges, ball & tracer, cal..50 (belted 1-4)
(f)	1,520	Shells, shotgun, 12-ga., #00 buckshot.
(g)	5,000	Cartridges, ball, cal..45
(h)	14,800	Cartridges, ball, cal..45
(i)	200,700	Cartridges, AP, cal..50
	85,450	Cartridges, tracer, cal..50

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(j) 6,320 Shells, 37mm gun, HE, M65
6,380 Shot, AP, 37mm gun, M74
4,068 Canister, 37mm gun, M2
(k) 9,060 Shells, 60mm mortar, M49A2
2,748 Shells, 60mm mortar, illuminating
(l) 13,106 Shells, 81mm mortar, M43A1
1,379 Shells, 81mm mortar, WP, smoke
(m) 5,407 Shells, 75mm gun, HE
1,249 Shells, 75mm gun, APC w/BB fuze M66A1.
355 Shells, 75mm gun, WP (smoke)
(n) 30,132 Shells, 75mm pack how, HE
133 Shells, 75mm pack how, HE-AT
1,617 Shells, 75mm pack how, WP (smoke)
(o) 23,248 Shells, 105mm how, HE
90 Shells, 105mm how, HE-AT
(p) none
(q) none
(r) 1,150 Rocket Bodies, 4.5", BR
1,150 Rocket Motors, for 4.5" BR
1,150 Rocket Fuzes, MX-137, for 4.5" BR

(3) The number of days of battle employment of the weapons.

The weapons as listed in paragraph (1) were used for approximately ten (10) days.

(4) The number, type, and caliber of enemy weapons salvaged.

All enemy weapons were collected by the D-2 section.

(5) The number, type, and caliber weapons lost or damaged beyond repair.

50 Carbines.
200 Rifles, M1.

(6) The amount, type and caliber of enemy ammunition salvaged.

All enemy ammunition was collected by JICPOA.

(7) Malfunctions of ammunition or weapons, explain in detail.

None reported.

(8) Recommendations for new proportions of ammunition types.

See reference (b).

(9) Recommendations for new types of weapons.

~~SECRET~~
SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

See reference (b).

- (10) Were adequate amounts of ammunition furnished.

The following item of ammunition was critically short at all times:

60mm Mortar, Illuminating.

(1) CHEMICALS

- (1) Comment on the difficulties encountered in combat loading of defensive chemical warfare equipment and supplies. How were the difficulties solved?

Defensive chemical warfare equipment was crated and marked "Battalion Decontamination Equipment" and was moved to TINIAN in the initial stage of the operation.

- (2) Is packing of chloride of lime satisfactory?

Packing of chloride of lime was satisfactory.

- (3) Were gas masks carried throughout the operation? If not, what disposition was made?

Gas masks were carried on the initial landing and advance inland. In the latter stages of the operation, some units collected gas masks under unit control ready for immediate distribution on call.

- (4) Are there any recommendations for changes in expenditure rates authorized in TBA?

Changes in the TBA are now the subject of study by a board of officers in the Division.

- (5) Were vehicular mounted 1-1/2 quart decontaminating apparatus filled with DANC before going ashore?

The 1-1/2 quart decontaminating apparatus, in most cases, were filled with DANC before going ashore.

- (6) Would 4.2 Chemical Mortars be of value in amphibious operations?

The TINIAN operation again indicated that the 4.2 Chemical Mortar, with its accurate and effective firing characteristics, would be a valuable asset to the RCT for

~~SECRET~~
SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

the projecting of HE and WP. A careful study is necessary, from both a tactical and logistical point of view, before a definite recommendation can be made for its adoption. A study is now being made and recommendations will be submitted under separate cover.

(7) Comment on friendly use of smoke and chemical munitions.

WP artillery shells proved invaluable against personnel both as a casualty agent, for its psychological effect, and as a screening agent. Its incendiary effect in firing of buildings, cane fields and dumps was disappointing. 81mm WP shells proved effective, in some cases, for igniting underbrush. Smoke and incendiary grenades, as before, proved an effective weapon for the clearing of caves and dugouts. Screening smoke was used successfully in covering hostile points of observation. Some units made use of smoke in attacks against high ground with excellent results

(m) MEDICAL

(1) Comment on sanitary conditions of heads, living quarters, mess halls, galleys, cooks and messmen aboard transports.

See reference (b).

(2) When were medical troops and equipment debarked, with what wave, how boated, and when landed?

Company aid men with equipment were debarked with platoons. Battalion and Regimental Medical Sections were debarked with respective command posts. "D" Medical Company, and a section of H&S Company, 4th Medical Battalion, landed on Jig-day afternoon. "E" Medical Company landed on Jig-plus-1. The Medical Companies were combined, and prepared to set up and operate a Division Hospital. Collecting sections of Companies "A", "B" and "C" were attached to RCTs 25, 24, and 25 respectively, and functioned throughout the operation under the control of the Regimental Surgeons. Medical sections of Companies "A", "B", and "C" remained on SAIFAI throughout the operation.

(3) Where were medical installations set up with regard to roads or trails, cover, dispersion, proximity to other medical installations, proximity to critical points, and natural lines of drift of walking wounded?

See reference (b)

~~SECRET~~
SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

- (4) What protective measures were taken for medical installations for local security, cover and/or concealment of personnel or patients?

See reference (b).

- (5) Comment on type and amount of medical equipment and supplies carried, adequacy of supplies and equipment, suitability of present types. What improvements are suggested?

See reference (b).

- (7) Comment on the adequacy, state of training, and functioning of medical personnel. What number of casualties were suffered by medical personnel?

The medical personnel functioned in an excellent manner, revealing an excellent state of training. A fine spirit was shown throughout the operation by all medical personnel. The following casualties were sustained by the medical department:

One (1) Dental Officer killed in action
One (1) Medical Officer wounded and evacuated.
Two (2) Medical Officers wounded, not evacuated.
Fourteen (14) enlisted killed in action.
Thirty (30) enlisted wounded and evacuated.
Six (6) enlisted wounded, not evacuated.

- (8) Was the evacuation means adequate?

Yes. The Division utilized ambulances and transportation of Companies "A", "B", and "C", which did not take part in the operation.

- (9) How was medical resupply effected?

See reference (b).

- (10) What special sanitation measures were put into effect?

See reference (b).

- (11) How were our and the enemy dead disposed of?

See reference (b).

- (n) SIGNAL COMMUNICATION

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

- (1) Was Hagelin Cryptographer (M209-GSP 1500) employed?

Hagelin Cryptographer was not employed.

- (2) Was Joint Operations Code (CCBP 0130-D1) satisfactory?

Joint Operations Code (CCBP 0130-D1) was not entirely satisfactory. It should include more common phrases and sentences such as are used in operation orders.

- (3) What interference on radio frequencies were encountered?

No interference encountered during TINIAN operation.

- (4) Is basic system of fewer radio nets (circuits) sound?
What other nets (circuits) can be combined?

Do not recommend fewer radio circuits nor combination of circuits.

- (5) When was radio silence lifted by Battalion Landing Teams?

Radio silence was lifted by BLTs at various times - from King minus 4 to King minus 2.

- (6) What LVT's were used as command vehicles for infantry, naval gunfire, and air support communications?

LVT(2) command vehicles, in some cases, were used by naval gunfire spotters to contact the firing ship during the approach to the beach. By using the TCS radio in these vehicles the necessity for exposing the SCR 284 to water was obviated. After losing radio equipment during the landing, some SFC parties utilized the TCS in LVT(2)'s on the beach until replacement radios could be provided. During the TINIAN operation some radio sets SCR 284 were set up and operated in LVT's.

- (7) Was basic system of assigning call word and call sign to battalions (as to lowest echelon) sound?

Basic system of call word and call sign sound.

- (8) Should the use of panels (except for front line markings and pyrotechnics) be discontinued?

Panels and pyrotechnics should not be discontinued.

- (9) Regarding naval gunfire, what communication delays were involved in spotting ships' fire?

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

Delays in spotting ships' fire were due, in most cases, to the inability of the spotter to contact the firing ship when the ship was initially assigned. This was particularly true during the latter stages of the operation when the radio equipment was badly in need of servicing.

- (10) What was the interval between the time the Shore Fire Control Parties landed and the time they were set up, ready to operate?

Whereas the time interval between the time the Shore Fire Control Parties landed and the time they were set up ready to operate on SAIPAN averaged one hour; this time interval for the TINIAN operation was greatly reduced due to absence of enemy small arms fire on the beaches.

- (11) What Naval Liaison Officers (Shore Fire Control Party) were able to set a watch on the Fire Support Command net?

The only Naval Liaison Officers able to set a watch on the Naval Gunfire Control net were those assigned to RCTs.

- (12) How many Shore Fire Control Parties did not know what frequency to use?

As far as can be determined Shore Fire Control Parties were constantly informed of the frequency to be used and universally communicated with their firing ship on that frequency.

- (13) What delay was involved in procuring fire support ships?

Any delay in procuring fire support ships was that which is inherent in the system used. All requests for fire support ships were coordinated through Division and it is believed that but one delay occurred.

- (14) What methods other than radio were used to designate shore targets for fire support ships?

No methods other than radio were used to designate shore targets for fire support ships.

- (15) What delay was involved in procuring requests for air support?

See Air Comments.

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd)

- (16) Was Landing Force Commander able to utilize any of the prospective Island Base Commanders' communication equipment during the ten days following Jis-day?

No comment by Division.

- (17) Was Island Commanders' communication equipment with assault troops?

No comment by Division.

(o) TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER

- (1) Recommend any changes which appear desirable in the current procedure of effecting embarkation of troops.

Current procedure of embarkation of troops appears satisfactory.

- (2) Number of tons of troop cargo loaded on ship.

Approximately one hundred and seventy-five (175) tons of supplies were loaded on each LST.

- (3) Time required for unloading landing boats on beaches into LVTs during various phases of the operation.

Approximately fifteen (15) minutes were required for the unloading of landing craft on beaches and into LVTs.

- (4) Time required to open hatches on respective transports.

Not applicable.

- (5) Time required to re-rig to initiate unloading.

Not applicable.

- (6) Type of rig used at each hold.

Not applicable.

- (7) Average time for boat trips to the respective transports, and cargo ships.

Approximately fifteen (15) minutes.

- (8) Time required to debark troops

Approximately fifteen (15) minutes.

SPECIAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (9) Total elapsed time required to unload troop cargo from ship showing amounts of time lost through interruptions of any nature.

Twenty-four (24) hours.

- (10) Comments of the feasibility and adequacy of the time schedule for loading as it was set forth.

Time schedule was adequate for loading.

- (11) Any other data that might be of value in reducing the time required to unload ships.

None. See reference (b).

~~SECRET~~
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT - TINIAN

ANNEX F

R E P O R T O F 1 4 T H M A R I N E S

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE, C/O FLEET POST OFFICE,
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

31 August, 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, 4th Marine Division.
Subject: Final report of action, TINIAN Operation.
Reference: Division Special Order No. 140-44.
Enclosure: (A) Diary - TINIAN.

1. In accordance with the above reference the following report is submitted:

(a) Plans and preparations prior to TINIAN operation.

- (1) Division Operation Plan No. 34-44 was received in fragmentary form from 15 to 22 July, 1944, and Regimental Operation Plan No. 4-44 prepared accordingly. This latter plan was completed and issued to units concerned on 18 July, 1944. This plan was inadequate as regarded embarkation of units. The embarkation plan was not definite until the evening prior to date of embarkation. Insufficient information was received from higher echelon to make plans and orders definite in this respect. Otherwise, all planning and orders were adequate.
- (2) The embarkation plan for movement from SAIPAN to TINIAN was excellent. Due to short time troops were to remain aboard, each battalion of pack howitzers was embarked on an LST. All battalion ordnance and about one unit of fire per battalion was preloaded in twenty-two DUKWs on each of four LSTs. Two regimental ammunition LSTs were each loaded with twenty-two DUKWs preloaded with 75mm pack howitzer ammunition. This loading provided for rapid movement ashore with good control. Each battalion landed with sufficient personnel, equipment and ammunition to go into position rapidly and give adequate support to the infantry during the afternoon and night of D-day. The only flaw in the plan was that regimental headquarters was split among three LSTs. It was impossible to move the headquarters ashore as a unit as two of the LSTs would not launch the DUKVs containing personnel and equipment of regimental headquarters when this launching was desired.


Final report of action, (TINIEN), (Cont) 31 August, 1944.

(b) Detailed activities during the operation.

(1) See Enclosure (A).

(c) Summary, conclusions and recommendations.

- (1) The loading plan for the artillery was good. For the next operation it is recommended that each battalion of the regiment preload ordnance in DUKWs or LVT(4)s on LSTs and that each battalion further be assigned an ammunition carrying LST on which DUKWs or LVT(4)s preloaded with ammunition can be embarked. All overflow personnel of the battalions should be embarked aboard an APA with regimental headquarters.
- (2) It is recommended that the artillery regiment be allotted more space in which to load vehicles. The minimum number of vehicles with which the battalions can efficiently function would include prime movers, six ammunition trucks per battalion, six reconnaissance vehicles per battalion, one ambulance and all radio 1/4 ton trucks (TCS or 608). Regimental Headquarters should be allotted space for four radio 1/4 ton trucks, three 1/4 ton trucks, six 1 ton trucks, an ambulance and wrecker as a minimum.
- (3) It is recommended that prior to combat, artillery units engage in night firing. Due to limited training allowance of ammunition, this regiment did less night firing than was desirable, as this appeared to be a waste of ammunition. However, it is apparent now that night tactical firing is a vital part of training and the next artillery range used by this regiment will be equipped to permit night firing at lights, shell bursts, visible objects, etc., by forward observers, flash teams and OPs.


L. G. DeHAVEN.

DIARY - TINIAN OPERATION

23 July, 1944 - Headquarters and Service Battery embarked aboard LST 224 in TANAPAG Harbor off the Island of SAIPAN. Detachments of Regimental H&S were also embarked aboard LSTs 130 and 124.

1st Battalion, 14th Marines embarked aboard LST 483. 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines, embarked aboard LST 340. 1st Battalion, 10th Marines (attached to 14th Marines) embarked aboard LST 127. 2nd Battalion, 10th Marines, (attached to 14th Marines) embarked aboard LST 484. The Regimental ammunition ships were LST 150 and 124.

All the above units embarked during the ~~afternoon~~ ^{Day} and moved to position off ~~TINIAN~~ ^{SAIPAN} Island, ~~this Division objective~~. For the purpose of this operation, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 10th Marines, 2nd Marine Division, were attached to this Regiment for the initial landing, only 75mm Pack Howitzers were used in the landing with 105s and 155s supporting the attack from positions on recently captured SAIPAN Island.

24 July, 1944 -- JIG day. HOW hour at 0730. LSTs were at anchor off TINIAN Island. Under cover of a devastating barrage layed down by Naval Gun Fire and artillery from SAIPAN, the first waves of Infantry landed as scheduled. Light resistance was at first reported from shore. Beaches and coral reefs in the vicinity of Beaches White 1 and 2 were reported heavily mined. At 1145 Regimental Headquarters was launched in DUKWs from LST 224 and proceeded to LST 483 to pick up two DUKWs aboard that ship. However, before the above mentioned DUKWs could be launched, we were ordered to head for White Beach 2 to be landed. In compliance with this order, Regimental Headquarters proceeded in line to White Beach 2.

At 1535 the DUKWs arrived and crossed the coral reef off the aforesaid beach, no fire from the enemy was encountered in this landing. At 1600 in TS 639D, a Regimental Command Post was set up organized behind the abandoned railroad embankment north of Beach White Two. The 1st Battalion 14th Marines was the first unit of this regiment ashore and reported their CP in TS 639R. The 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines was laid and ready to fire at 1610. The 1st Battalion, 10th Marines (atchd 14th Mar) landed at 1635 and reported their CP in TS 639N. The 2nd Battalion, 10th Marines (atchd 14th Mar) landed at 1630 and reported

TINIAN Diary, (Cont)

their CP in TS 640 P.

During the night, at approximately 2300, DOG-battery of our 2nd Battalion killed 99 Japs who had attempted infiltration. Enemy artillery and mortar fire commenced at approximately 2400.

The following number of rounds were fired by the regiment this date:

TYPE OF FIRE	ROUNDS
Targets of opportunity	1281
Registration	549
Harrassing fires	316
TOTAL	2146

The following number of casualties were sustained by the regiment this date:

KILLED			WOUNDED			CAUSE
OFF	WO	FNL	OFF	WO	FNL	
	(None)				1	Shrapnel.

25 July, 1944 -

Heavy artillery and mortar fire continued throughout the night and early morning. The objective of this shelling appeared to be the partially constructed pier being worked on by members of the seabees in the vicinity of White Beach 2. Several casualties were sustained by that organization. At 0900, one man was wounded by shrapnel when entering the CP tent. At 0920 a direct hit was reported on the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines Fire Direction Center and Message Center, killing the Battalion Commander, Battalion 2 and 3 officers and seven other members of the Fire Direction center. In addition to the above, 14 other members of the battalion headquarters were wounded. Counter-battery fire was directed at caves in the face of MT. LASSO. During the period from 2400, Corps Artillery based on SAIPAN was called on to lay down defensive fires. At dawn an air strike started which continued for about an hour during which time 8 planes strafed and dive bombed enemy gun positions at the base of MT. LASSO. Air spot reported two guns had been destroyed as a result of the air strike. It was presumed that these guns were the ones that shelled the beach and pier the previous night. However, during the afternoon, fire was again received from enemy artillery. Shells landed in the vicinity of the pier and our immediate position. This fire lasted for approximately five minutes during which time one DUKW was set afire and a

TINIAN Diary, (Cont)

few casualties inflicted on the beach. The remainder of the day was devoted to normal missions by the battalions. No further enemy fire was received.

At 1740, forward Observers reported that the infantry had reached the O-1 line and O-2 line.

The following number of rounds were fired by the regiment this date:

<u>TYPE OF FIRE</u>	<u>ROUNDS</u>
Defensive fires	298
Targets of Opportunity	2364
Preparation	1638
Harrassing fire	464
Registration	190
Total	4954

The following casualties were sustained by the regiment this date:

<u>KILLED</u>			<u>WOUNDED</u>			<u>CAUSE</u>
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WC</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WC</u>	<u>ENL</u>	
3		10	4	1	17	Shrapnel

26 July, 1944 - In the early morning Operation Plan #34 was received from Division Headquarters for the continuation of the attack as follows.

0750-0800 - Preparation

1/14 - direct sup 25th Mar.

2/14 - direct sup 23rd Mar.

2/14 - come up on 3/14 frequency until FOs from 2/14 join 23rd Mar.

LD - present front lines.

Boundaries - 23-25 Mar. 632-A G R - 627 I.

23rd on right, 25th on left, 24th in reserve.

Objective - O-3 line at 627 H K - 626

F - 619 A - 618 G - 617 N - 616 R.

1st and 2nd Battalions, 10th Marines, left 14th Marines control and reverted to control of the 2nd Division at 0630. At 1230 Operation Plan #37 was received from Division Headquarters and regimental operation order issued as follows:

NT&LF continues atk to seize O-4. 2nd Mar Div atks and captures Div obj.

4th Mar Div cont atk on order and captures O-4(a) prepared for further opns to seize O-4 within its zone of action.

King-hour - 1300

LD, Obj, zone of action - see overlay.

RCT 23 atk and seize O-4(a) within zone of action.

RCT 25 (2/24 atched) atk and seize O-4(a) within zone of action.

RCT 24 (less 2/24) cont div res present assembly area cont mopping up opns as previously

directed.

1/14 direct support 25th Mar.

2/14 direct support 23rd Mar.

Preparation from 1255 to 1300.

At 1200 the 3rd Battalion, 14th Marines landed and reported their Command Post in TS 632 P. At 1315, 3rd Battalion, 14th Marines was given mission of general support.

The evening of 26 July was uneventful with the exception of slight infiltration by the enemy reported from the battalions.

The following number of rounds were fired by the regiment this date:

<u>TYPE OF FIRE</u>	<u>ROUNDS</u>
Targets of Opportunity	2736
Defensive fires	32
Harrassing fires	580
Registration	125
Total	3473

The following number of casualties were sustained by regiment this date:

<u>KILLED</u>			<u>WOUNDED</u>			<u>CAUSE</u>
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WC</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WC</u>	<u>ENL</u>	
(none)			(none)			

27 July, 1944 - At 0500 Operation Plan from Division Headquarters was received and regimental operation order for continuation of attack issued as follows:

4th Mar Div less 1/24 cont atk at King-hour /2 hours 30 minutes and seize O-4 within zone of action.

LD - present front lines.

RCT 23 - atk in zone of action

RCT 25 - (2/24 attached) atk in zone of action.

RCT 24 - (loss 1/24 and 2/24) div res cont mopping up.

Div Arty sup atk. 2/14 direct sup RCT 23.

1/14 direct sup RCT 25 3/14-4/14 in general support. No preparation.

At 1430 the Regimental Command Post was displaced to 631 I.

The 1st Battalion, 14th Marines continued direct support of the 25th Marines. During the day they fired Forward Observer and Air Observer missions. The battalion displaced from 639 R to 624 E at 1230 and were in position ready to fire at 1600. 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines displaced from 645 Q to 632 P at 1150 and were in position ready to fire at 1500. At 1200, 5th Battalion, 14th Marines (Corps Artillery) closed station on SAIPAN and was underway to TINIAN. They landed at 1605 and completed registration at 1810 in position at TA 639 K Y. The remainder of the day was spent

TINIAN Diary, (Cont)

on normal missions.

The following number of rounds were fired by the regiment this date:

<u>TYPE OF FIRE</u>	<u>RCUNDS</u>
Targets of Opportunity	1679
Defensive fires	70
Harrassing fires	1721
Preparation	2417
Registration	273
Total	6160

The following number of casualties were sustained by the regiment this date:

<u>KILLED</u>			<u>WOUNDED</u>			<u>CAUSE</u>
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	
(none)					1	shrapnel

28 July, 1944 - On this date the Operation Order from Division was received from which the following Regimental order was issued:

1. NT&LF cont atk at King-hour 28Jul44
2nd Mar Div atks at K/3 hours
4th Mar Div atks at King-hour.
2. 14th Mar sup 4th Mar Div atk.
3. (a) 1/14 direct sup 25th Mar. Z/f z/a.
25th Mar.
(b) 2/14 direct sup 23rd Mar. Z/f z/a
23rd Mar.
(c) 3/14 reinf 2/14 during prep. Thereafter general sup. Z/f z/a 4th Mar Div.
(x) (1) Prep will be fired as follows:
from K-5 to K hr on Rn line 1
from K/5 to K/10 on Rn line 2
from K/15 to K/20 on Rn line 3
FOs will adjust prep fires on Rn line 1 prior to K-5. Targets on Rn lines will be selected by Infantry, forward observers or Arty Bns in that order. Suggest concentrations as shown on overlay.
(2) VMC-4 will place 2 observation planes on station from K-30 until secured by Regiment. Planes operating on frequency 4965 will work 5/14 on general support target after K/20.
(3) LD - present front lines
Boundaries and obj - see overlay
(4) King-hour - 0700

TINIAN Diary, (Cont)

- (5) When Bns have a lull in firing check registration.
- (6) During an anticipated prolonged lull in firing check boresight.
- 4. (a) Ammo will continue to be hauled from ammo ship to Battalion position areas.
- (b) no change.
- 5. (a) CPs - 14th Mar - 631 I
 - 1/14 - 624 D
 - 2/14 - 631 X
 - 3/14 - 632 P
 - 5/14 - 639 V.

On 27 July the Infantry was moving forward very rapidly, having seized the O-5 and O-6 line. Due to this rapid advance, the Regiment was ordered to displace. The displacement of the Regimental Headquarters was effected at 1430 to TS 602 L. The battalions displaced at the following times to the TS set next to their respective battalions:

- 1/14 - 1400 to 603 V
- 2/14 - 1500 to 590 J
- 3/14 - 1335 to 579 C
- 5/14 - 1300 to 591 A.

Upon arrival at the new position areas no activity was reported with the exception of the battalions who reported snipers in their position areas. During the evening and up to 2400, the 2nd battalion, 14th Marines, captured 6 civilian prisoners. The 1st battalion captured 3 civilian prisoners.

The following number of rounds were fired by the regiment this date:

<u>TYPE OF FIRE</u>	<u>ROUNDS</u>
Registration	292
Targets of Opportunity	4163
Defensive fires	436
Harassing fires	1041
Preparation	<u>256</u>
Total	6188

29 July, 1944 - At 0600 the following order was issued from this headquarters by telephone:

King-hour - 0700

No preparation to be fired.

1/14 direct sup 25th Mar.

2/14 general sup

3/14 general sup

5/14 direct sup 24th Mar.

An overlay was issued with this order and forwarded to the battalions. At 0630, the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines, reported 8 Japanese

TINIAN Diary, (cont)

soldiers killed in their position area during the early morning hours. The 1st Battalion was ordered to displace and moved to TS 557 T. The 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines, displaced to TS 556 Q.

The following order was issued by this Headquarters to the battalions:

Regt will sweep the area 1000 yds in front of our lines to O-7 from div boundary to the coast. Area to be covered lightly using 2 rds per bn on each 200x200 yd concentration. Concentrations to be fired between 1800 and 1900 tonight. Use air burst when time is under 18 seconds and if bn has good registration for time fire. Use unobserved fire if adjustment is impractical. Bns fire slow and deliberate to guard against short rounds in the front lines.

A heavy rain came up and Command Post was flooded. Rain continued throughout the night. At 1230, the Division order for the continuation of the attack for 30Jul44 was received.

The following number of rounds were fired by the regiment this date:

<u>TYPE OF FIRE</u>	<u>ROUNDS</u>
Interdiction fire	638
Targets of Opportunity	6807
Defensive fires	561
Registration	581
Harrassing fires	2804
Preparation	2050
Total	13933

The following casualties were sustained by the regiment this date:

<u>KILLED</u>			<u>WOUNDED</u>			<u>CAUSE</u>
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WC</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WC</u>	<u>ENL</u>	
(none)					2	Shrapnel

30 July, 1944 - The following order was issued to bns derived from the Division Operation order #42 for continuation of the atk.

- (a) 1/14 direct sup 25th Mar.
- (b) 2/14 general sup. Reinf 5/14 during prep
- (c) 3/14 general sup. Reinf 1/14 during prep
- (d) 5/14 direct sup 24th Mar.

All battalions fired preparation from 0735 to 0745 from 0750 to 0755 from 0800 to 0805.

During the day the 1st Battalion, 14th Marines, fired normal missions. The 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines fired defensive fires and harrassing fires. The 3rd battalion, 14th Marines, fired deep harrassing fires. Reinforced the 5th Battalion, 14th Marines, (Corps Artillery), on enemy

TINIAN Diary, (cont)

personnel massing for a counter-attack, dispersed the enemy troops.

The following number of rounds were fired by the regiment this date:

<u>TYPE OF FIRE</u>	<u>ROUNDS</u>
Targets of opportunity	6217
Harrassing fires	4272
Registration	1030
Preparation	<u>3674</u>
Total	15193

The following number of casualties were sustained by the regiment this date:

<u>KILLED</u>			<u>WOUNDED</u>			<u>CAUSE</u>
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	
1				(none)		plane crash.

31 July, 1944 - At dawn the following order was issued by this headquarters:

- 1/14 reinf 2/14
- 2/14 direct sup 23rd Mar
- 3/14 general sup (reinf 5/14 during prep)
- 5/14 direct sup 24th Mar
- 3/14 fire conc fr 0050 to 0055
- repeat fire at 0200 to 0205
- repeat fire at 0305 to 0310
- 5/14 fire conc fr 0050 to 0055
- repeat fire at 0200 to 0205
- repeat fire at 0305 to 0310
- 2/14 fire the following times fire concentrations:
- 514 J and 515 K from 0050 to 0055
- repeat fire at 0200 to 0205
- repeat fire at 0305 to 0310
- 1/14 fire the following time fire concentrations:
- 515 B C from 0050 to 0055
- repeat fire at 0200 to 0205
- repeat fire at 0305 to 0310
- No firing between 0700 and 0820 - Air strike.

The following number of rounds were fired by the regiment this date:

<u>TYPE OF FIRE</u>	<u>ROUNDS</u>
Targets of Opportunity	688
Preparation	2419
Harrassing fire	2323
Normal Barrage	128
Defensive fires	362
Registration	<u>51</u>
Total	5971

TINIAN Diary, (cont)

The following number of casualties were sustained by the regiment this date:

<u>KILLED</u>			<u>WOUNDED</u>			<u>CAUSE</u>
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	
(none)					3	Rifle fire and shrapnel.

11 August, 1944 - Harrassing fires were delivered by the battalions during the night.

The operation order for 1 August was received by Regiment from Division Headquarters at 0040. From this order, the following was issued to the battalions from this headquarters:

1. 4th Mar Div (reinf) less RCT 25 less 3/25 cont atk at 0700 on 1 August and seizes O-8 line within zone of action.

Sup and adjacent units no chg.

LD - present frontlines.

Bds, no chg.

RCT 24 less 2/24 and RCT 23 with 3/25 and 1 Plat Co A 4th Tk Bn atchd complete mission assgd in Div Opn Order #43. 3/25 not to be committed without Div auth. 2/24 remain in present area in Div res and await orders.

2. Division Artillery support the attack.
3. (a) Division Arty will fire 5 min prep 600 yds in advance of LD beginning at 0655. Fire 2 and 3 min concentrations beginning 0705 and 0713, 900 yds and 1200 yds respectively in advance of the line of departure. Thereafter all fires on call.
- (b) Other units - no chg.

4. No chg.

5. No chg.

At 0654 an order to delay King-hour to 0800 was received. At 1900, 1 August, 1944, the following message was received from the Commanding General, 4th Marine Division:

Organized resistance ceased at 1855.

TINIAN Island secured. Mopping up small groups and cleaning out caves along southern coast line continues.

The following order was issued to the battalions:

Artillery will fire in emergencies only and then only with permission of this headquarters.

Types of fires and rounds fired by this regiment as recorded herein were delivered from 1600 under the day listed to 1600 the following day. There were no casualties reported this date.

FINIAN Diary, (cont)

RECAPITULATION:

Total rounds fired 58018 rds.

<u>TYPES OF FIRE</u>	<u>NO OF ROUNDS</u>
Targets of Opportunity	26427
Registration	3091
Harassing fires	13521
Defensive fires	1759
Preparation	12454
Interdiction fire	638
Normal Barrage	128
Total	<u>58018</u>

Total casualties

<u>KILLED</u>			<u>WOUNDED</u>		
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WC</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WC</u>	<u>ENL</u>
4	10		4	1	24

Total Killed 14. Total wounded 29.

L. G. DeHaven
L. G. DeHAVEN,
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding.

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FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT - TINIAN

ANNEX G

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I Task Organization

1. The basic task organization, Division Engineers, was constituted as follows:

Regimental Headquarters, 20th Marines (Engr).
Headquarters and Service Company, 20th Marines (Engr).
Battalion Headquarters, 1st Bn., 20th Marines (Engr).
Headquarters Company, 1st Bn., 20th Marines (Engr).

2. Basic strength of this group was 26 officers and 244 enlisted men.

3. The three engineer companies of the 1st Bn., 20th Marines, were attached to the combat teams and never reverted to parent control during the operation.

4. The Shore Party Battalions designated were as follows:
White One Beach - 1341st Engineer Battalion (Army), initially attached to RCT 24 but was reverted to Division Shore Party control on Jig plus one day; Shore Party Commander - Lt. Col. H. A. Gould (CE), AUS, Bn. C. O. White Two Beach - 2nd Battalion, 20th Marines, initially attached to RCT 25 but was reverted to Division Shore Party control on Jig plus one day; Shore Party Commander - Major J. H. Partridge, USMC, Bn. C. O.

5. At 1510, 25 July, 4th Division assumed control of the Shore Parties and the following task organization was in force:

4th Division S. P. Command Group - RHq., 20th Marines
Division S. P. Commander - Lt. Col. N. K. Brown, USMC.
White One Beach - 1341st Engineer Bn. (Army).
S. P. Commander - Lt. Col. H. A. Gould (CE) AUS.
White Two Beach - 2nd Bn., 20th Marines.
S. P. Commander - Major J. H. Partridge, USMC.

6. At 1000, 26 July, NT&LF assumed control of the Shore Party on Tinian, the only change in the above task organization being the superimposing of NT&LF S. P. Hq. upon that of the 4th Division Shore Party.

7. At 0600, 1 August, upon order of NT&LF S. P. Comdr., Division Engrs plus 2/20 moved to Tinian Town to prepare and operate piers and beaches in that town for movement ashore of supplies and equipment of assault and garrison forces. At this time, control over the 1341st Engr Bn. was relinquished by this Headquarters.

No. II Plans and Preparations prior to the operation

1. Time allotted for the planning stage was limited but considered ample for this operation. Many conferences involving key officer personnel were held to discuss general plans, and the necessary preparations required, before written orders were received. Close liaison was maintained during this period with the 1341st Engineer Bn., then attached to the 27th Division (Army), as only one company of this battalion had previous S. P. experience in combat.

2. Due to the extremely narrow beaches selected for the landings, special stress was laid on the necessity for the maintenance of unobstructed exits from these beaches and the Shore Party's responsibilities in this connection. In addition, emphasis was placed upon the early development of roads from the beach inland and lateral roads between beaches. Two LCT's were provided in the plans, one for each assault RCT, to assure early landing of S. P. dozers and tractors for the accomplishment of these tasks.

3. A number of conferences was held with the NT&LF Shore Party Headquarters Staff. The reports required by NT&LF S. P. were discussed and necessary forms procured and distributed.

4. Engineer equipment of this regiment was allocated as follows for this operation:

Each Engineer Company attached to RCT.

- 1 Heavy tractor w/blade
- 2 Dump trucks
- 1 Reconnaissance truck
- 1 Jeep, w/dump trailer
- 1 Water trailer

Allotted spaces in 1st trip of Landing Craft of RCT.

2/20

All organic trucks, dozers, and tractor cranes

Allotted space in 1st trip of Landing Craft by RCT 25.

Division Engineers Task Organization.

Remainder of trucks, tractors and cranes.

Heavy equipment trailer

Wrecker

Distillation plants

Portable water purification units

Spare parts trailer

Road grader

Gasoline shovel (crane rigged)

On call in Saipan at a beach dump near loading-out beaches under regimental TQM.

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5. All Engineer Companies were given special instruction by a Bomb Disposal Officer in the de-activation of Japanese land mines of the types encountered on Saipan.

III Activities during the Operation

1. Division Engineers embarked on board LST 224 with Support Group troops at Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, in the morning of 23 July. CP afloat established at 1000.
2. At 1220, 24 July, Jig Day, upon receipt of a message from the Division Engineer on board Division Control Boat, PC 1452, two Bomb Disposal Teams left the ship with orders to land on Beach White Two to aid in removal of the many mines found on that beach. Some of these mines had been spotted in reconnaissance flights made prior to date of the landing and special preparation had been made for their removal. The Engineer Companies, Pioneer Companies, Underwater Demolitions Teams, and Bomb Disposal Teams all collaborated to assure the expeditious clearance of the block which prevented, temporarily, the employment of this beach to its fullest extent for the unloading of vehicles across it. One hundred horned mines were removed from this beach and transported to a bomb and unexploded ordnance dump which was established south of White Two Beach. This dump ultimately held four hundred mines of the same type together with plate mines, yard stick mines, and improvised mines removed from various sections of the 4th Division zone of action. This dump area was encircled with a barbed wire fence and marked with red flags to discourage souvenir hunters.
3. By 1730 on Jig day no word had been received to land the Division Engineers. A message was sent to the division at this time requesting landing instructions; these arrived at 0120, 25 July. Between 0800 and 1000 on Jig plus one day, the Division Engineers landed as ordered.
4. At 1345 on the 25th of July, a command post had been selected at 645Y (See Target Area Map of Tinian) and preparation was made to assume control of the Shore Parties on White One and Two Beaches. At 1510 the 4th Marine Division assumed control of the Shore Party and the Division Engineer became the Division Shore Party Commander.
5. The Shore Party functions were capably handled upon each beach by the battalions assigned. All supplies had been loaded in prime movers prior to the time they reached the beach and initially only a few checkers were stationed on the beach. The bulk of the Shore Party was inland, initially, in the division dumps unloading the LVT's and trucks. Unloading crews from the Shore Party Battalions were aboard ten LST's as ship platoons to load the LVT's with the preloaded supplies placed on those LST's. Upon completion of the unloading of these LST's, ship platoons were transferred to five other LST's after which on Jig plus two they reported ashore to unload in the dumps.

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6. NT&LF required various reports such as a daily report of supplies landed across the beaches, an hourly report of the number of artillery pieces which were landed over the beaches, an immediate report of the time each LCT or LST departed from the ponton causeways, a consolidated daily report of the contents, time of arrival and departure of each LCT and LST. All reports were sent to NT&LF Shore Party after 1000, 26 July, at which time the Division Shore Party came under control of the NT&LF Shore Party.

7. The method of unloading changed as did the conditions on the beach. Initially LVT's and DUKW's were used principally for the landing of supplies. By Jig plus one day, the pontoon causeway on White One was operative and by Jig plus four day the causeway on White Two was functioning. These piers were used to unload preloaded and other vehicles directly from LCT's and LST's until heavy ground swells on Jig plus five day rendered the causeways unuseable. Shore Party work then consisted of sending working parties to LCT's and pontoon barges afloat to unload into DUKW's which then crossed the beach and went inland to the division dumps.

8. Due to the unsatisfactory surface condition of the reef on White Two beach all DUKW's were sent over White One beach after Jig plus six day. (An engineer tractor was lost through a crevice in the reef on White Two beach on Jig day.) This condition caused a major control problem in that supplies were to be evenly divided between the 2nd and 4th Division dumps. This entailed stopping of each DUKW, checking the contents, and dispatching the drivers to the appropriate dump area. Many road signs were prepared and posted to control this traffic, it being impracticable to furnish a guide for each vehicle. The priority for the dispatching of DUKW's to the two division dump areas was received from the NT&LF Shore Party.

9. After the Corps Artillery came ashore the problem of dispatching of the DUKW's became more acute; for example, on Jig plus seven day from dawn until 1000 all DUKW's loaded with rations were ordered to 2nd Division dumps, from 1000 to 1300, all DUKW's were divided between the 2nd and 4th Division dumps, from 1300 until dusk the DUKW's were to be divided equally among the 2nd and 4th Divisions and the Corps Artillery dump.

10. By Jig plus two day, fifteen Badger Distillation units had arrived and were put into operation immediately. Three water point sites were chosen, marked, and locations sent to division. Each water point site selected was suitable for one water squad of nine men and five distillation plants plus required purification equipment.

Distillation plants were revetted and the surrounding area policed carefully to eliminate contamination of output. Suitable roads were prepared through the sand to permit one-way traffic circulation. In accordance with the suggestion proposed by the regiment and with the approval of the 4-section, the rationing of water and issue of same became the responsibility of the quartermaster personnel in the division dump area. This system functioned perfectly from the standpoint of the engineers. The Utilities Section H & S Co., produced the water, a detail of twenty-four men from H & S company, 20th Marines, transported full cans in the regimental cargo trucks from the water points to the division dump and returned with empty cans and water trailers. Here-to-fore, no satisfactory system of issue of drinking water had been established, each having developed into a "first come, first served" proposition; however, by having the issue of water under the control of the quartermaster, the new system enabled each unit to obtain its ration of water in accordance with its daily strength. Engineer personnel involved in production and delivery to division dump of distilled and purified water totalled fifty-two. Five distillation plants were maintained in operation, but on call, in Saipan for the rear echelon.

11. Received orders from NT&LF Shore Party Commander at 1930, 31 July, 1944 to move the 4th Division Shore Party less 1341st Engineer Battalion to the vicinity of Tinian Town to open up the south pier and operate the beach south of the pier. This had to be accomplished in time to unload an LCT loaded with rations at 1300, 1 August. Moved CP, checked beach for mines, cleared beach, pier, and designated streets of Tinian Town for trucks to travel to and from dumps, selected site for dumps, bull-dozed road through dump areas, and received first LCT upon arrival off beach at 1130, 1 August. One pierced-plank roadway was laid across the beach and the remainder of the beach was surfaced with coral.

12. 2nd Battalion, 20th Marines, operated beach south of pier and also south pier. Beaches White One and Two were closed at this time. Headquarters and Service Company built a road from north pier to lateral beach road, filled in craters, replaced timber deck section, and removed several booby-traps in north pier. Also cleared a beach between north and south pier sufficiently wide to accommodate fifteen LCM's simultaneously. This beach was surfaced with coral over its full width and depth requiring one hundred eighty-six loads of coral from coral pit operated by H & S Co. at TAS 544S.

13. On 3 August, 2/20 secured from the south pier and began operating north pier. The south pier and beach south thereof were turned over to Garrison Force personnel who by then had sufficient equipment to operate. Garrison Force began operating the LCM and LCVP beach between north and south pier as of 4 August.

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14. Received report from Officer-in-Charge of the division laboratory on 4 August to the effect that the Marpo Well water was safe for consumption after proper filtration and chlorination. The Utility Section installed water purification units during afternoon of 3 August and were purifying water in morning of 4 August. As the output of this well and purifying equipment available would more than accomodate the division, distillation water points were closed out and that equipment was prepared for shipment.

15. Shore Party aided 4th Division personnel in boarding LSTs for departure until 9 August and embarked on 10 August.

16. Comments on bomb disposal, mine fields, and booby traps, see Appendix One.

IV Summary

1. The entire Tinian Operation required the Division Engineers to devote nearly all personnel, equipment, and time to the task of the operation of the Shore Party under the direction of the NT&LF Shore Party Commander. Balance of personnel was employed on Division Water Supply.
2. Water supply squads and equipment functioned in a highly satisfactory manner. Camouflage was of less importance on the Tinian Operation as compared to Saipan. Bomb disposal teams functioned in their normal capacity on call at all times.
3. The Construction Section of Headquarters and Service Company served as the only strictly engineer unit under the control of the Division Engineer. This section handled the maintenance and construction of necessary roads in the Shore Party area, furnished carpenters for construction at Division Command Post; and the repair by this section of the north pier was effected in a most expeditious manner.
4. The Motor Transport Section functioned as a repair and maintenance section in an excellent manner keeping all tractors and vehicles in running condition despite the shortage of tractor parts and proper lubricants.
5. This basic report has not included the operations of "A", "B", or "C" Companies of the Engineer Battalion since at no time during the operation did the engineer companies revert to the control of the Engineer Battalion Commander. See appendix three.

V Comments

Shore Party

1. During this operation the functioning of the Shore Party was different in many respects than on previous operations. A similar operation may never occur again; however, some comment is deemed appropriate to fully explain the position of the battalion commanders who were actually on the beaches and who had the working details under their control. Initially each battalion commander was functioning as the Shore Party Commander for a RCT. Then, upon order, the Division Engineer, having been detailed as Division Shore Party Commander, assumed the function of coordinating the work of the Shore Parties on both beaches. And finally, one more staff, that of the NT&LF Shore Party entered the scene which meant that information to one or both of the two battalion commanders on the beach passed from the Corps to the Division Shore Party and thence to the Shore Party Battalions. In the future in a similar situation, it would appear desirable to eliminate one of the higher echelon headquarters for simplicity's sake and to save time.

2. Much difficulty was experienced also in the manner in which supplies were sent from the beach to the two division dumps. The responsibility apparently rested upon the shore party to see that each division received a proportionate share of rations and ammunition. The unloading conditions and rate were somewhat different due to the condition of the respective beaches. In order to be certain that each division received its share, DUKW's crossing White One and Two were ordered to be dispatched alternately to the 2nd and 4th Division dumps. In general, the 4th Division dumps were inland from White Two and the 2nd Division dumps were inland from White One. A simpler arrangement as far as the Shore Party is concerned would have been the establishment of one ration dump, one ammunition dump, etc., from which both divisions could have drawn. This would entail early landing of the higher echelon supply elements or the improvisation of a supply unit not organically part of either division.

3. The dump details for the 4th Division came from 2/20 as did the working parties aboard some of the LST's whereas the 2nd Division had their Pioneer Battalion exclusively for dump details except in an emergency. All 2/20 details were accomplished in a manner equal to their previous high standard. The 1341st Engineer Battalion operated on LST's, LCT's, gas barges, and on the beach on White One, and initially in Division dump inland of White One and later in 4th Division dump. The performance of this battalion was excellent throughout.

4. For Consolidated Report of Supplies Landed from 25 July to 7 August, see Appendix Two.

5. The plan of supply conceived for this shore-to-shore operation had much merit and but for several unpredictable stumbling blocks would have functioned smoothly. When vehicles could be landed, trucks were slow in returning from division dumps. When heavy ground swells arose, no vehicles could be landed.

Water Supply

1. The distribution of water to the consumers is not a function of the water supply squads. They function purely as operators of the equipment and are responsible for the maximum efficiency of the distilling plants and the potability of the water upon delivery to the containers. The issue of water as outlined previously in this report functioned well and is recommended for future operations.

2. Security for water points in forward areas must come from RCT's if engineers remain attached thereto, as water points once used by the Japanese will be visited again by the Japs after ejection, either because of water shortage or through their desire to destroy the water point to prevent our using it. The ease with which chemicals could be added to a water source at night is a contingency to be constantly borne in mind when considering security requirements for water points. The removal of chemicals from a contaminated source of water has never been satisfactorily achieved by field methods. The only infallible method is the development of a new water source and abandonment of the old. On Saipan and Tinian fresh water sources, such as wells and springs, of any capacity were rare.

VI Recommendations

1. Shore Party

(a) In a similar future operation, it is recommended that supply during the assault phase be maintained by transfer of selected preloaded supplies from ships, LST's, LCT's, and LCM's to DUKW's rather than by preloading motor vehicles on the near shore. By the recommended method, the tonnage capacity of landing ships and crafts can be efficiently employed and a ferry service so dependent on the caprices of the weather will not have to be maintained. DUKW's were most effective from the Shore Party viewpoint in Tinian.

(b) During this operation, Shore Party was responsible for unloading supplies in the division dumps. This would be a simple proposition if the load contained all one type of supplies. Where the contrary was true, dump keepers held a truck or DUKW and its working party and routed them from dump to dump until unloaded. Many valuable daylight hours were lost by this practice. It is recommended that division supply personnel establish in the future, a staging dump for expeditious unloading of mixed loads so that critical transportation may be released.

2. Supply

Distribution of rations, water, ammunition, and fuels is a responsibility of supply echelons. If the highest echelon Shore Party is to assume responsibility for distribution of supplies, quartermaster units should be part of the Shore Party task organization. In any event, some method of maintaining one central ration dump is recommended.

3. Water

(a) Either water equipment and personnel should be provided for supplying Corps Troops or divisions should be issued necessary additional equipment so that they may supply Corps Troops without seriously limiting water supply to their own units.

(b) It is recommended that the issue of water be continued as a function of the Division Quartermaster; delivery of water to division dumps to be a responsibility of the engineers.

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N. K. BROWN

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Enemy Bombs:

All of the enemy bombs found were those in a stored condition. A large percentage of these had been subjected to either blast or fire. One particularly large dump was investigated at Ushi Point Airfield. An explosion of most of this dump's contents had devastated the storage shelters, scattering bombs over a thousand yard radius. Bombs of all types, being used currently by the enemy, were recognized. No effort was made by this unit to dispose of this dump for the following reasons:

- (1) The limited time available.
- (2) No installations or construction projects nearby.
- (3) No danger of a detonation except by deliberate action.

In all cases of enemy bombs found in a stored condition an investigation was made, but in no instance were they disposed of, because all were in a rather secluded and safe area.

Enemy Aerial Torpedoes:

Many aerial torpedoes were investigated and moved to central disposal dumps. With the exception of a few cases these aerial torpedoes were not fused, but consisted only of the warhead. The motor sections were found stored in separate dumps.

Approximately five torpedoes were found fused and completely assembled. These were at an assembly shop one mile southeast of the Ushi Point Airfield. Fuses were removed and the torpedoes : moved to a central disposal dump.

Seven aerial torpedo warheads were found in Tinian Town. Apparently these had been brought there for use in constructing road blocks, but only one was found so employed--it was wired to be detonated electrically. All were moved to a central disposal dump.

Enemy Land Mines:

Two types of anti-boat mines and the tape measure mine were employed as anti-tank and anti-vehicle mines. This unit dealt only with those mines found on landing beaches, the beach area at Tinian Town, and immediate areas surrounding these beaches.

In general, the tactical employment of these mines was of the same haphazard fashion as on Saipan. One new development was discovered, however. A one inch steel rod approximately twenty feet in length was secured to the horns of the anti-boat type mines--the principle behind this being that if pressure were applied to any part of the rod, two or three of the mines would detonate simultaneously thus increasing the length of protection afforded by either two or three mines (three mines per rod was the most discovered). It is not known whether this mine attachment actually functioned.

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On beaches White One and White Two, anti-boat mines were found buried at varying depths up to four feet. It is believed that the covering action of the surf caused this. Mine detectors were used during several stages of beach improvement in order to discover the deeply buried mines. A large number of the deeply buried ones were found unarmed and unable to operate.

All mines discovered were made safe and removed to a central disposal dump.

Enemy Booby-Traps:

Booby-traps were employed quite extensively in Tinian Town, particularly along the water front. All were of an improvised type, and were very ineffective--only one known accident resulting from a detonated booby-trap.

Component parts were: box of black powder or dynamite; pressure, release, and pull firing devices (fitted into holes bored through the walls of the explosive container); trip wire; small square of straw matting; and in some cases broken glass packed about the walls of explosive container. The pressure and pull devices were standard types, whereas the release device (only one found) was of an improvised nature.

The boxes of explosive were buried about one-half inch below surface of the ground, a small square of straw-matting placed over the top, and a very small amount of earth spread on top of the matting for camouflage. Many trip wires were strung, however, in most cases very carelessly. Generally, the pressure and pull devices had not been armed. All booby-traps investigated were made safe and removed to a central disposal dump.

Miscellaneous, enemy:

The quantity of stored hand grenades, mortar shells, artillery projectiles and small caliber ammunition was smaller than found on Saipan. This ordnance was left in a stored condition unless a specific request was made for removal.

U. S. Bombs:

Twenty 500 pound bombs of the 4-5 or 8-11 second type were disposed of, none of which were buried.

It is believed that the cause of failure was that the fuse vanes did not begin rotation (too tightly assembled) upon release. Normally, this type of fuse is completely armed in twenty-five feet of free flight.

Ten 100 pound bombs were disposed of. Remarks as to cause of failure are same as for the 500 pound bombs. None of these bombs were buried.

All bombs had fuses extracted and were moved to a central disposal dump.

One 100 pound bomb was discovered buried at an unknown depth. Disposal was not effected because of insufficient time, however, the location was carefully marked for the garrison forces.

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A peculiarity noticed was that no unexploded fragmentation bombs were discovered. On past operations a minimum number were disposed of. No reason for this peculiarity can be advanced from this source.

U. S. Projectiles:

A very small number of naval projectiles were disposed of. All discovered were five inch projectiles. This was also an unusual occurrence considering past experiences. Fuses were extracted (if possible) and the projectiles were moved to a central dump.

Also a very small number of artillery projectiles were disposed of, but reason for failure to function is unknown.

U. S., Miscellaneous:

Five 4.5 inch beach barrage rockets were disposed of. All rockets were buried approximately two feet in the earth.

APPENDIX TWO

CONSOLIDATED RECEIPT OF SUPPLIES LANDED

FROM 25 JULY TO 7 AUGUST

TINIAN

The following supplies landed over beaches White One and Two, north and south pier, and the beach south of the south pier;

RATIONS: (cases)

D 990

C,K 26,600

B 1,246

10 in 1 3,060

WATER:

In drums & cans:

7,953 - 5 Gal cans

614 - 15 Gal cans

1,787 - 55 Gal drums

FUEL: (55 Gal drums)

Av Gas 2,000

Leaded Gas 1,287

Unleaded Gas 45

Diesel Fuel 1,229

Lubricants 147

Kerosene 19

VEHICLES:

$\frac{1}{4}$ -T, 4x4 289

1-T, 4x4 139

$2\frac{1}{2}$ -T, 6x6 cargo 199

$2\frac{1}{2}$ -T, 6x6 dump 40

Tractors w/blade 13

Tractors w/crane 27

Tractor, misc. 35

Trailers 151

AMMUNITION & EXPLOSIVES:

.30 cal. 6,703 cases 1500/case

.30 cal. carbine 758 cases 3000/case

.45 cal. 11 cases 2000/case

.50 cal. 1,927 cases 350/case

Hand grenades 6,397 boxes 25/box

Rifle grenades 616 boxes 10/box

At Rockets 780 boxes

20 mm _____

37 mm 1,424 boxes

40 mm 111 boxes

60 mm mortar 6,071 boxes 18/box

75 mm how 18,782 cl. 3/cloverleaf

75 mm gun 4,016 cl. 3/cloverleaf

81 mm mortar 7,802 boxes 6/box

90 mm 433 rounds

105 mm 26,588 cases 2/case

155 mm how 6,833 rounds

155 mm gun _____

Flamethrower fuel 119 drums

Hydrogen, nitrogen 91 cylinders

TNT, C-2 558 boxes 50#/box

Bangalore Torpedoes 333 cases

155 mm powder 967 cases

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MISCELLANEOUS SUPPLIES

Pickets _____ 1,625 bundles
Mines _____ 466 boxes
White Star Clusters _____ 7 boxes
Metallic links _____ 183 boxes
Barbed wire _____ 447 rolls
Sand bags _____ 146,100
Concertina _____ 1,275
Caps _____ 42 boxes
Fuse detonators _____ 2 boxes
Mine detonators _____ 6 boxes
Safety fuse _____ 3 boxes
Time fuse _____ 4 boxes
Detonating cord _____ 9 boxes
Organizational gear _____ 2,366 boxes
Iron stakes _____ 2,000
Px supplies _____ 147 boxes
CO2 cylinders _____ 16
Communication wire _____ 452 rolls
Acetylene cylinders _____ 71
Incendiary bombs _____ 10 boxes
A.P. mines _____ 50 boxes
Rocket fuses _____ 10 boxes
Lime _____ 75 drums

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MISCELLANEOUS SUPPLIES (CONT'D)

Cement _____ 7 bags

Bleach _____ 200 drums

Tents _____ 79

Tarpaulins _____ 72

APPENDIX THREE

COMBAT ENGINEER REPORT

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BATTALION
20TH MARINES (ENGINEER), 4TH MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
IN THE FIELD.

31 August, 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer, 20th Marines (Engineer).
Subject: Combat Engineer Report - TINIAN.
Reference: (a) CMC letter CONFIDENTIAL serial #047344.
Map: Special Air and Gunnery Target Area Map - Tinian 1:20,000.

I. Plans and Preparation

A. Training

The combat engineer companies reverted to and were under engineer control for five days prior to the assault on Tinian. During this period each company was given a one day course in the removal and disarming of Japanese land mines. The course was conducted by the assistant bomb disposal officer and was based upon detailed information received from the handling of Japanese mines during the battle of Saipan. Each company was furnished with a set of tools designed to remove the firing mechanism of the horn type mine and selected personnel were given thorough instruction in the technique of employing these tools.

B. Equipment and Supply

It was anticipated that the combat engineer companies during the battle of Tinian would be employed primarily in infantry assault, mopping up, and mine removal missions. The vehicles carried by the combat companies were, therefore, bed loaded almost exclusively with engineer property designed for the accomplishment of such missions. The loads were comprised of demolition equipment, infantry entrenching implements, and engineer hand tools. All property was carried by one trip of the vehicles allocated to each company.

The transportation and heavy engineer equipment assigned organically to each engineer company was as follows:

- 1 Tractor, TD-14, with angle-dozer
- 1 Trailer, 1/2 ton, 2 wheel, dump
- 1 Trailer, 1 ton, 2 wheel, water
- 1 Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4
- 1 Truck, 1 ton, 4x4
- 2 Trucks, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, dump

Additional engineer equipment was held available to the combat engineer companies as required by the Division Engineer Officer.

II. Detailed Record of Events

A. The activities of the combat engineers while engaged in the Tinian operation were as follows:

1. Combat period (24 July - 1 August)

(a) The units of the First Battalion, 20th Marines (Engineer) detailed and attached as follows for this period:

- 1. Headquarters Company detailed to operate with the Division Engineers.
- 2. Company "A" attached to RCT 25 with one platoon attached to each landing team; leaving the company headquarters with the headquarters of the combat team.

3. Company "B" attached to RCT24 with one platoon attached to each landing team initially; leaving the company headquarters with the headquarters of the combat team.
 4. Company "C" attached to RCT23 with one platoon attached to each landing team initially; leaving the company headquarters with the headquarters of the combat team.
 5. All heavy engineer equipment belonging to the engineer companies, except one TD-14 bulldozer per company, was initially under the control of the Division Engineer Officer. The engineer companies were committed to the attack with one bulldozer per company and with a sufficient supply of hand tools, demolitions equipment, and transportation for the operation.
- (b)
1. Company "A" less company headquarters, and Company "B" landed on J-Day as attached and were committed to the attack from the time they reached the beach until the landing teams were withdrawn for reorganization or rest.
 2. Company "C" landed on J-Day as attached and was committed to the attack at 1600.
 3. Headquarters Company landed on J-plus-one-day; set up a command post with the Headquarters & Service Company of the 20th Marines (Engineer), and began to collect and assemble the equipment and supplies which it was anticipated would be needed by the combat companies in the forward areas.
 4. As the engineer companies moved forward in the attack, they organized supply sections from their company headquarters and left them in the rear as supply and maintenance sections. These sections repaired and maintained equipment for the companies, repaired and serviced flame throwers for the combat teams, and moved equipment and supplies furnished by the quartermaster of L-20 to the elements of the companies in the forward areas.
- (c)
1. During the combat period the platoons of the engineer companies were used in the attack for general assault on the front lines, flame thrower operators, demolition parties, mopping up details, front line security details at night, combat patrols, and for removing mine fields and booby traps. The company headquarters of each company were used as a supply and maintenance section for each company, security details for the RCT command posts, and for burying enemy dead.
 2. Many mine fields were encountered during the operation. The engineer companies cleared or removed mine fields as follows:
 - TA506H,I - Road blocked with large horn-type mines; approximately 15 mines.
 - TA510K,L,Q,W - Road blocked with large horn-type mines; approximately 40 mines.
 - Red and Green Beaches - Mined with large horn-type mines, yard-stick mines, tape mines, and booby traps.
 - TA509T - Road and adjacent field mined with large horn-type mines; approximately 45 mines.

Combat Report on Tinian Operation (cont'd)

TA534G - Beach mined with large horn-type mines.
White Beach 2 - Beach mined with large-horn type mines.
Hill 440 - An area approximately 400 yards long by 30 yards deep mined with electrically controlled dynamite charges.
TA612A,F - Tape and yard-stick mines scattered over area.
TA619K,R,Y - Tape and yard-stick mines scattered over area.
TA546P,Q,R,S,T - This area was mined with large horn-type mines; approximately 100 mines.

3. The roads on the island were good and required very little maintenance. However, the streets, beaches, and piers in Tinian Town were considerably damaged by naval gun fire, artillery, and by aerial bombardment. These were repaired, improved, and cleared as follows:
Company "B" cleared and repaired the streets in the vicinity of the South Pier, constructed a new access road to the beach immediately south of the pier, and assisted in repairs to the South Pier.

2. Mopping up and Reorganization Period (2 August - 10 August)

(a) The battalion was assigned and attached the same as for the combat period.

(b) During this period the battalion was used as follows:

1. Headquarters Company remained on Tinian Island until 10 August and during this time aided the combat engineer companies with their supply, communications, transportation, and reorganization until the companies embarked aboard ship with the combat teams.
2. The engineer companies aided the infantry in mopping up and were withdrawn from action along with their respective combat teams. After being withdrawn from action, they were employed by the combat teams to improve bivouac areas. In addition to the above Company "C" furnished security details for the main water supply point from 4 August to 7 August. By 9 August all engineer companies had embarked aboard ship with their respective combat teams.
3. During the entire operation Headquarters 1-20 acted as a supply and coordinating agency for the combat companies. The Bn-4 kept on hand or procured engineer property and materials for the use of the forward units as required.
4. Communications Section, Headquarters Company 1-20, initially supplemented the communications personnel of Regimental Headquarters, 20th Marines, on the beach and in their normal communications duties. One SCR #300 w/operator was furnished each engineer company for the company's use in communicating with the RCT to which attached and with Headquarters 1-20.
5. The Commanding Officer 1-20 kept in close personal contact with the engineer companies during all phases of the operation by making daily trips to the command posts of the companies and combat teams. This contact made it possible for him to anticipate the needs of the companies.

Combat Report on the Tinian Operation (cont'd)

ics and enabled the Bn-4 to supply them through the rear area supply section without delay.

6. Command Posts 1-20 were established on dates and in areas as indicated: 25 July - TA645Y 1 Aug - TA527S.

III. Comment and Recommendations

Before any definite recommendations based upon the experience gained from the Tinian Operation can be put forth, a statement of policy concerning the future employment of the combat engineers is essential. The recommendations which follow are, therefore, based upon assumptions as indicated:

- A. Assumption No. 1: The combat engineers will be used in the future primarily in the performance of infantry assault, demolitions and mopping up missions with combat engineer functions, excepting mine clearance, relegated to a position of secondary importance. This in brief was the role of the combat engineer companies in the Tinian Operation.

Recommendations:

1. The engineer companies remain attached to the RCTs during the entire course of the operation.
 2. The engineer companies be armed and equipped in such a manner as to most effectively carry out their primary functions.
 3. The company headquarters carry engineer property and equipment required solely for its own employment on combat engineer missions. This equipment should include as a minimum, regardless of other Division requirements, 1 bulldozer, 2 dump trucks, 1 reconnaissance car, 1 jeep w/trailer.
 4. In the performance of their primary missions outlined above and a particularly in the clearance of mine fields forward of the front lines, the engineer units be furnished appropriate infantry security and support in the nature of combat patrols.
 5. The RCTs be definitely apprised of the fact that all the combat engineers are attached to the combat teams and requests for additional engineer personnel are justified only when all their attached engineers are committed to the performance of engineer missions.
 6. The engineer company commander be employed in his capacity as a special staff officer of the RCT commander and consulted on all matters pertaining to the performance of engineer duties and the employment of engineer personnel.
- B. Assumption No. 2: The combat engineers will be employed in the performance of strictly combat engineer missions with the infantry exclusively responsible for the execution of assault, demolitions and mopping up missions. This assumption is consistent with the policy of the Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps, as stated in reference (a).

Recommendations:

1. All combat engineer activities be coordinated and executed under the direct supervision and control of the senior engineer command echelon after the landing of that headquarters.
2. There normally be no attachment of engineer platoons to battalion landing teams and the attachment of engineer companies to regimental combat teams be only for the purpose of transportation.
3. All engineer troops revert to engineer control on the landing of the senior engineer command echelon.

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1975 NKB/wrs 1st Endorsement 31 August, 1944.
20TH MARINES (ENGINEER), 4TH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

From: The Commanding Officer,
To: The Commanding General, 4th Marine Division,
Fleet Marine Force.

Subject: Combat Engineer Report - Tinian.

1. Approved and forwarded.

2. Strictly engineer problems on Tinian were minor in nature and were tailor-made to fit the capabilities of the Engineer Company; all of these problems were of immediate effect to the individual combat team having an Engineer Company attached. With the probability of larger land masses in future operations, engineer missions will undoubtedly be of greater scope than any encountered here-to-fore. Problems, formerly of local concern only, may be expected in the future to be of divisional proportion. Moreover, larger land masses means a countryside of more meager development with more extensive road construction required, more and larger bridges to repair or construct and involving complications in material, personnel, design, and more man hours. All of the foregoing indicates need for a concentration of engineer force to expedite urgent engineer missions. Concentration of engineer effort at a time when all combat teams, together with their engineer attachments, are committed, will be difficult if not impossible of achievement. Should combat teams due to their remoteness from the rest of the division require close engineer support, attachment by the division and physical movement of the required motorized engineer troops can be readily accomplished. It is, therefore, recommended that attachment of engineer troops be made, normally, only for overseas transportation and the initial beach-head assault.

N. K. Brown
N. K. BROWN

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FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT - TINIAN

ANNEX H

R E P O R T O F R C T 2 3

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HEADQUARTERS
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

20 September, 1944

From: The Commanding General.
To: All Holders, Commanding Officer, 23d Marines
Top Secret Serial 148-44, dated 7 September, 1944.
Subject: Reclassification of Special Action Report - TIMIAN
(CO, 23d Mar Top Secret Serial 148-44, 7 Sep 44)
Reference: (a) Par. 5 (b), Art. 76, NR.

~~SECRET~~
1.
The subject report is hereby reclassified as

C. B. CATES

AUTHENTICATED:

W. W. Wensinger
W. W. WENSINGER
Colonel, USMC
D-3

~~TO:~~
1975

WEG-gfk

HEADQUARTERS, TWENTY-THIRD MARINES,
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO,
CALIFORNIA.

Serial #148-44.

7 September, 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commanding General, 4th Marine Division.
Subject: Special action report, Tinian Island, Forager
Phase III.
Reference: (a) Div Special Order No 140-44.
Enclosure: (A) Staff sections special action report, Tinian
Island, Forager Phase III.

1. In compliance with reference (a), the following report is submitted:

a. The following in addition to recommendations and comments in section reports is considered worthy of note and corrective measures in future operations.

(1) A message was received from division directing that personnel of the CT be prepared to embark and launch LVTs on one hour's notice, yet at 1027 on Jig-Day orders were received from the Navy to launch LVTs at 1030. This did not give sufficient time.

(2) The CT Commander was delayed in arrival on the control boat for Beach White II due to breakdown of LVT4 but upon receiving message requesting that this CT be landed when ready, dispatched a message to the control boat stating the position of the advanced battalion with respect to the control boat. Upon arrival on the control boat, the CT Commander was informed that three waves of LT 2 had been dispatched to the beach. The PC control vessel was found to be about 1200 yards out of position and the report that three waves had been dispatched proved to be untrue. A message was sent to LT 2 directing it to land and take position in assembly (assembly area based on information received from CT 25) since orders as to action of the CT upon landing had not at that time been received. Due to communication difficulties, the latter message had to be relayed through various stations and was not received until about 45 minutes after being dispatched.

(3) Upon landing, this CT was directed to take over a sector from the advanced CT, pass through the latter and continue the attack. Tanks were not available, prime movers were not available for AT guns, and no information was received as to what unit might be called upon for artillery support.

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Special action report, Tinian Island, Forager Phase III. (Cont).

(4) Boat group commanders, wave commanders, the landing team and the PC control vessel were not in close coordination. This evidently was due in part to lack of trained control personnel and also due to lack of previous clearing up of mutual problems.


L. R. JONES

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R C T 2 3

S P E C I A L A C T I O N R E P O R T

F O R A G E R P H A S E I I

T I N I A N I S L A N D

E N C L O S U R E (A).

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

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* * * * *

R-1 - TINIAN OPERATION

I Planning:

a. A rear echelon of one officer and fourteen enlisted men was left on Saipan Island to guard equipment not needed for the Tinian Operation. This rear echelon was in addition to the base rear echelon which was composed of ten officers and one hundred two enlisted.

b. The RCT was assigned 8 LSTs, 2 LCTs, 5 LCMs and 30 LCVs. Troops of the RCT were embarked as follows:

LST - 225
RCT Hq and Support Group.
Total Troops: 39 Officers, 375 Enlisted men.

LST - 275
BLT-1
BLT-2
Total Troops: 15 Officers, 326 Enlisted men.

LST - 23
BLT-1
Total Troops: 14 Officers, 392 Enlisted men.

LST - 40
BLT-1
BLT-3
Total Troops: 25 Officers, 268 Enlisted men.

LST - 485
BLT-2
Total Troops, 10 Officers, 375 Enlisted men.

LST - 272
BLT-2
Total Troops, 22 Officers, 382 Enlisted men.

LST - 487
BLT-3
Total Troops: 13 Officers, 382 Enlisted men.

LST 222
BLT-3
Total Troops: 16 Officers, 351 Enlisted men.

The LCTs, LCMs and LCVs were used to land Combat equipment and troops.

R-1 - TINIAN OPERATION.

II Embarkation:

a. Troops embarked from Beach Red One, Saipan Island. LVTs were used to carry troops to the LSTs.

III Operation:

a. No trouble was encountered with casualties on Tinian Island. Daily reports were submitted to Division Headquarters. The total casualties for the operation were: Killed in action, 2 Officers and 51 Enlisted men. Wounded in action and evacuated 13 Officers, 159 Enlisted men. Sick evacuated, 12 Officers, 244 Enlisted men. Wounded in action non-evacuated, 1 Officer, 14 Enlisted men. Missing in action, 3 Enlisted men.

b. Morale throughout the operations was excellent.

c. On 27 July, 1944, received 5 Officers and 296 enlisted replacements. They were assigned to BLTs so that the strength in the BLTs was about the same.

d. Reports were consolidated by the R-1 Section for the RCT, and the only difficulty encountered was that often higher echelon did not allow enough time for preparation and delivery of the reports.

e. Prisoners on Tinian were handled with fewer difficulties than on Saipan. The RCT had an MP platoon assigned which maintained a forward stockade and was able to take the prisoners from the assault BLTs relieving them of guarding prisoners. Still the problem of transportation existed, of transporting the prisoners to the Division stockade.

f. The Unit Journal was kept by the R-1 Section, and all information necessary for the Journal was turned in to the R-1 Section from all other staff sections of the RCT.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Recommend early dissemination of operation orders of higher echelons so staffs of lower echelons may have sufficient time for proper staff functions. Often the order was received late causing trouble in preparation, reproduction and dissemination.
2. Lower echelons be given more time for preparation and delivery of reports.
3. That some means of transportation be allocated for the purpose of handling prisoners.

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I. General: The operation to secure Tinian Island followed so closely the seizure of Saipan that little time could be devoted to briefing personnel. The Intelligence Section was kept busy preparing and distributing maps, overlays, photographs and other material. However with the excellent aerial photo coverage, the information secured from POWs and captured documents, and the reports from Division, the Regiment had more complete information than ever before concerning the enemy.

a. Intelligence: The speed of the operation, the experience gained from Saipan, and the type of terrain encountered combined could make all Intelligence agencies within the RCT work more smoothly and advantageously.

1. Reconnaissance: Of paramount importance in gaining information were the various reconnaissance agencies.

(a). Patrols: Prior to Jig Day, no patrols in the RCT echelon made reconnaissance of the intended area of operations. However, information from a reconnaissance by the Corps Reconnaissance unit was made available.

(1) Combat-Reconnaissance patrols:

For the most part, the terrain on Tinian was not as well suited to patrolling as it had been on Saipan. Except for the southern portion of the island, there were no points within the RCT area where good observation was available, and the continuous cane fields made it impossible for patrols to determine the exact extent of enemy positions.

Combat and reconnaissance patrols-or a combination of the two-were used to determine the amount of enemy resistance ahead of the troops prior to moving troops forward to a jump off line. These patrols went up to 1,000 yards ahead of the troops and found few traces of enemy activity.

In the mopping up phase, combat patrols were used extensively through the area seaward of the southern ridge. Their mission was to find the enemy and either capture or destroy them.

Intelligence personnel accompanied most of these patrols.

For communication with patrols the size of a platoon or smaller, working in this manner, the SCR 536 proved extremely effective since the patrols seldom got out beyond the range of this set. For larger patrols operating in more inaccessible terrain, the SCR 300 proved invaluable.

R-2 REPORT TINIAN OPERATION.

(b) Intelligence Patrols: The practice of sending out patrols from the R-2 section was continued on Tinian. They generally consisted of an officer, an interpreter, from two to four scouts and observers, and generally a photographer. This patrol was equipped whenever possible, with an SCR 300 on the RCT Command net frequency.

This type of patrol proved especially valuable in tracing down and confirming reports of enemy weapons and installations, in covering terrain inaccessible to the RCT CP, and supplying the necessary personnel for questioning or "Calling out" POW's in the assault Battalion areas, in confirming location of front lines, and in providing first hand information concerning the terrain ahead of the RCT.

As long as sufficient personnel are available, this type of patrol is recommended as a permanent source of information and confirmation. Communications with it should be the best available.

(c) One other type of patrol was used several times during the operation. That was the anti-sniper and infiltration patrol, which was used particularly during the night of Jig plus 4-5 day to cover the large area of responsibility of the RCT. This type of patrol maintained watch over the coast line west and south of "Airfield #2". It is felt, however, that in most cases, when the enemy is disorganized, night patrolling is most dangerous to the patrols than to the enemy.

b. Air: Nearly continuous air observation and frequent aerial photographs provided a great deal of information concerning the enemy's activity.

(1) Air observation: Two main sources of air observation were available: that received through the Air Liaison Party Net, and that from the Division Reconnaissance Net. The ALP received a constant flow of information concerning enemy activity in all parts of the Island as Air strikes were being called. Such information was immediately relayed to the R-2 Section. The Division Air Observer was available to the R-2 on the TCS for special observation missions except when employed to spot artillery or other fires. The R-2 Section listened in on his reports by means of an RBZ. This system provided a large part of the information received concerning the enemy.

(2) Photographs: The quantity, quality, and frequency of the aerial photographs received by the RCT on Tinian were far superior to those received on Saipan. Obliques proved to be of more value than verticals, and those taken at about 500 foot elevation were extremely satisfactory, though insufficient in quantity to reach the assault company commanders.

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R-2 REPORT TINIEN OPERATION.

(3) Other agencies: As was to be expected, the majority of information received came from the Battalion 2 Sections, the OP's and the R-2 scouts and observers attached to each Battalion. The Liaison officers of the Tank Co and the Artillery, when attached, of the R/W Co, the NGF Party, the adjacent units, and contact with the D-2 Section all provided information at various times which helped to complete our knowledge of the enemy's activities.

2. OP's: The west side of Tinian Island was not suited to the employment of observation posts until the high ground north of the uncompleted airstrip near Tinian Town had been secured. North of that area, lack of elevation and the extensive cane fields prevented wide observation. From the high ground north of Tinian Town it was possible to cover the advance of all units to the summit of the southern ridge. The only well established OP used by the R-2 Section was set up on this high ground.

(a) Organization and conduct: It had been expected that the same OP system used on Saipan could be employed with equal success on Tinian. The difference in terrain cancelled the plan, however. It was obvious that the OP would be on the move almost continuously to keep the troops under observation. Therefore, wire laying was an impossibility. The OP became another roving patrol which followed the assault companies in either Battalion sector where the observation was best. This OP patrol consisted usually of an NCO and 2-4 men depending on the number free from other duties. It was evident early in the operation that very few Japanese, if any, had managed to escape the mopping up operations, and the OP could be limited in numbers particularly as it worked right with the companies. On some occasions extra men were needed to make reconnaissance into areas which could not be covered as the OP moved.

The main mission of the OP during the first five days of the operation was to gain information concerning the terrain, enemy activity, positions of our own units, and any other information of intelligence value. The personnel returned to the RCT CP each evening to render a full report of the activities. This system was not entirely satisfactory particularly when the CP was over 1000 yards in rear of the lines for it took too long for the OP to return in the morning.

Beginning on Jig plus 5 Day, the OP was set up on the elevation north of Tinian Town to cover the advance to the summit of the southern ridge. Here, for the first time on Tinian, the high powered tripod glasses (15 x 20) were used. Also, for the first time, wire communications with the OP were established.

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R-2 REPORT TINIAN OPERATION.

After Jig plus 7 Days, a patrol took the place of the OP again, to cover the final mopping up on the SE coast.

(b) Communications: Communications with the OP continued to be a ticklish point on Tinian as they had on Saipan. It had been planned that the OP team would continue to lay its own wire, but as stated above, the speed of the advance, and the amount of traffic along the routes of approach made wire an impossibility to lay or keep in repair. Therefore, it was necessary to maintain contact by radio, if at all.

The question of radio contact was complicated by the fact that the TBY's used for that purpose on Saipan proved unserviceable on Jig plus 1. SCR 536's were tried, and worked successfully as long as the CP was within 1000 yards of the companies, but too often the range was too great and other stations blanketed the transmissions. On two occasions, the SCR 300 was utilized, and that proved excellent as on previous occasions. During the majority of the first five days ashore, communications were contrived through a Battalion or company telephone if at all. That was, of course, unsatisfactory because of the long delays and the impossibility of reaching the OP except when it called in.

5. POW's: 801 POW's were captured by the RCT 23 on Tinian: 7 military, and 794 civilian POW's. A new system of handling and evacuating POW's was employed on Tinian as a result of the failure of the system used on Saipan. The MP platoon remained attached to the RCT. This platoon set up and maintained a RCT stockade which was moved forward behind the Battalions along the main route of advance. A group of from 2-4 MP's were attached to each Battalion to facilitate the evacuation of the POW's to the stockade. R-1 and R-4 received an account of the number of POW's and handled the care and the evacuation of the prisoners to the Division stockade, with no difficulties. The system worked excellently.

The final clean-up of enemy soldiers and civilians was much speeded up by the use of a jeep-carried powerful P.A. system which was used by the Language officers with great success. The final area was subjected to a long period of broadcasting one afternoon which brought out 267 civilians. The next morning, the procedure was repeated for a little more than an hour with the added threat that at a certain time the whole area would be subjected to intense fire. Another large group of civilians came out. The efforts of the interpreters were effectively augmented by the use of a civilian POW of some importance on the Island. In this case, a foreman at the Sugar Mill spoke over the P.A. system and advised the civilians to surrender.

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R-2 REPORT TINIAN OPERATION.

However, it was again evident that many civilians were either too well trained in the Japanese theories, or held by the soldiers for many failed to come out and had to be blown out.

(a) Interrogation: The Language Officers and enlisted men from the R-2 section were forced to confine their interrogation to tactical questioning because of the lack of time and facilities. The usual questions asked military personnel included: name, rank, unit (this in particular); location of artillery, guns and tanks; location and numbers of civilians. The prisoners captured, however, usually had lost contact with their own units some hours previously and had little information either of them or of other units. Most of them were ignorant of defenses in any areas except their own. They were so badly disorganized - and had been since Jig Day - that they had little or no idea as to the location of tanks, artillery, etc. - or else they would report the areas in which artillery had been emplaced prior to our landing. Yet, most of them seemed willing to talk and to tell whatever they knew concerning the subject of the questions.

The civilian POW's generally had little idea of the strength and activities of the enemy. One or two out of every group captured were interrogated especially concerning the location of other civilians. Some refused to talk at all, but the majority were Koreans and talked freely. As on Saipan, several civilians went back into the area where captured to bring others out. This was effective. Only one or two instances were reported where such persons failed to return.

The ideal place for this type of interrogation was at or near the point of capture. This proved impossible in many cases due to the number of POW's, and the widely diverse spots where they were captured, and it was impossible to get interrogators to the scene fast enough. Most of the interrogation, therefore, was completed at either a Co or Battalion CP, or at the stockade.

(b) Value of Interrogation: The information received from interrogation on Tinian did not prove very valuable tactically because most of the military prisoners taken were captured during the mopping up phase. Interrogation did give general information as to the morale, withdrawal, and disorganization of the enemy, but very few definite facts could be picked up and the reports were often conflicting due to the ignorance of the civilians.

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R-2 REPORT TINIAN OPERATION.

4. Documents: Quantities of documents and material of every type were captured during the operation, especially near "#2 airfield". The Battalion 2 Sections and the companies did the majority of collection aided by personnel from the R-2 and D-2 Sections.

(a). Evaluation: This material was hastily evaluated by the Language Officers and if of immediate importance, as in the case of attack orders, operation or defense overlays, or defense plans, was rushed to the Division Language Section for complete translation and dissemination. Other material was retained until a regular run was made.

(b). Value of Documents: RCT 23 captured a set of the latest defense plans, several attack orders listing the units on the island, and several overlays of defenses which had some tactical value. However, it is impossible for this echelon to determine the ultimate value of the documents and material turned in.

5. Personnel: The R-2 Section consisted of 4 officers and 19 enlisted on Jig Day. There were 5 photographers from Division and Corps attached. Since RCT 23 was in reserve, no special attempt was made to split the personnel going in to the beach other than for a safety factor. One NCO was sent to each of the assault regiments for liaison purposes, and the scouts were detailed to their Battalions for the landing. The remainder came ashore in four LVT's.

(a). Organization: The R-2 Section was organized as follows:

(1) Scouts: (6). 2 scouts were sent in with each of the Battalions, and until the final stages of the operation worked with their Battalion daily. In order to receive a complete report daily from them, the scouts returned to the RCT CP each night at dark. This system worked excellently except for a short period when the Battalions were too far forward for the scouts to return to the CP at night and get back to the Battalion in time for the attack the following morning. The information gained from the scouts covered the terrain ahead, the enemy activities during the day, and other miscellaneous or special information. These facts coupled with the reports from other agencies were correlated and the scouts took overlays and reports to the Battalion each morning. In most cases, the scouts arrived at their destination early enough to permit complete dissemination prior to the day's assault.

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R-2 REPORT TINIAN OPERATION.
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On Tinian the scouts generally covered as much of the Battalion area as possible daily. In many cases, they accompanied the Battalion CO in his OP and moved with it to the areas where there was activity of intelligence interest. At times, the scouts were employed carrying articles of captured material and documents back to the RCT CP.

On Tinian as on Saipan, it was found that the means of communication between the scouts and the RCT CP were insufficient. It generally was impossible to contact Regiment except from the Battalion CP, so reports at the end of the day were an absolute necessity.

(2) The OP: (3-5 men). See above.

(3) Language personnel: (3). The two officers and 1 enlisted language personnel did an excellent job on Tinian. Their work was made easier by the fact that on Tinian relatively few POW's had to be called out, and few were taken prior to the last phase of the operation. The stockade, under the control of the R-1, and managed by the MP platoon, eliminated the delays which were exasperating on Saipan.

Generally, the enlisted man stayed at the stockade when there were any POW's there in order to give a hand squaring them away. He also acted as a guide and MP when prisoners were evacuated back to the Division Stockade. At other times, he assisted in calling out and handling POW's in the Battalion areas.

At various times, one or both officers were at the stockade, also. Usually, one or both officers were with the roving patrol, hunting identifications and documents, and on call to any unit needing an interpreter.

(4) CP: (4-6). Generally at the CP was a group of one officer and 4 men: the clerk, the draftman, the Section Chief, and another man. This number of personnel was necessary to keep the journal, post a listening watch on the radio net, and handle dissemination of information.

It was found essential to keep as complete a journal as possible, and this was used as a Work Sheet. In order to make complete dissemination, it was necessary that a man be on the phone constantly. Radio was a great help in this line, also.

(5) PR and EP personnel: (4). On Tinian, a Combat Correspondent was sent to each Battalion to cover the activities of that unit. (One man was attached from Division for that purpose).

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R-2 REPORT TINIAN OPERATION

The photographers worked mainly as a team with one 4 x 5 Speed-Graflex Camera and a 35mm camera. The latter proved unfit for service as the negatives are too small and processing laborious. The photographers covered as much area as possible, taking shots of weapons, emplacements, enemy activity, and friendly activity. In addition, the photographers were also used from time to time to augment the CP force or to put in a patrol.

Both the CC's and the photographers were given as free a hand as possible and for the most part worked independently, reporting their whereabouts, and returning to the CP only for more film, to turn in or write copy, and for food and rest. No pictures were developed during the Tinian Operation as no facilities were readily available.

(b). Training: No other training than the combat experience on Saipan was received for the Tinian Operation. It proved sufficient.

b. Counterintelligence:

1. No counterintelligence plan was made by R-2 for the Tinian operation.

2. Secrecy discipline was enforced by censorship. There was little chance, however, that information would get to Tinian before the operation.

3. The combat experience on Saipan provided the necessary training in camouflage discipline and the use of cover.

4. No tactical measures were used in the RCT echelon to insure surprise.

5. Signal communications security: The communication personnel were cognizant of and employed signal communications security measures. Staff Officers of all echelons, however, in voice radio and telephone transmission violated such measures frequently, and showed the need for further training along such lines.

6. No counter-propaganda was necessary.

c. Staff Work: The experience gained on Saipan made possible the efficient staff work and cooperation which was shown on Tinian.

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R-2 REPORT TINIAN OPERATION.

1. Utilization of Intelligence Personnel: Intelligence personnel prepared and disseminated maps, photos and overlays during the planning phase, and followed the same procedure as necessary during the operation.

2. Maps, Photos, etc: Maps, photographs and models were received from Division 2 Section as they were available there. Some of the maps had been issued prior to the Saipan Operation. This resulted in a shortage of those types so issued when the Tinian landings were made, for many had been lost during the Saipan Operation. This was especially true in the case of the relief models which were never seen after the landings on Saipan.

The photographs, however, were mainly received after the Saipan Operation. They were recent, and proved valuable, especially those of the landing beaches.

There was only one type of map widely used on Tinian: the 1/20,000 Air and Naval Gunfire Target Square map. Experience on Saipan had proved this to be an adequate, although not always accurate map. The other types of maps issued were of assistance during planning, and for special areas, but were not much used by any except staff personnel.

The photographs received during the operation were extremely valuable, but of insufficient quantity for distribution to the units which had most use for them. The obliques, in particular, were used to good advantage.

d. Propaganda: No propaganda was used by or against the RCT echelon during the Tinian operation. Leaflets were dropped, by Division and Corps.

1. Own: Leaflets, or surrender tickets were dropped several times by air on Tinian, both prior to and during the operation. This system did not prove entirely satisfactory because many leaflets landed behind our own personnel, and because the enemy forces prevented the civilians from using them. Some of the POW's brought in surrender tickets, however, some of which had been dropped in June.

The use of the P.A. system by the interpreters when the enemy was disorganized and cornered, was very worth while and should be put into use as often as possible.

2. Enemy: In so far as is known, the enemy had no means or ability to use any type of propaganda against us. He had, however, convinced many civilians that they should allow the Japanese forces to kill them or commit suicide rather than surrender. Several cases of this were noted on the SE end of the island.

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e. Enemy: The enemy encountered on Tinian had been under almost constant fire for over a month, yet there were many evidences that his discipline and morale were still good even after our landing. Captured documents showed that the Army troops, in particular, were veterans.

1. Morale: The counterattack on the night of Jig Day, the retreat to the southern end of the island, the absence of identifications, on the dead, and the reports of prisoners up through Jig plus 6 all gave proof of the fact that the enemy morale was good, up to that time.

2. Order of Battle: See translations of captured documents by D-2 and Corps 2 Sections.

3. Organization: No new organizations were noted.

4. Equipment: It was reported that an individual protective cover was being carried by the Japanese soldiers. A new type of twin engined plane was found on #2 airfield.

5. Tactics: All the enemy plans, according to captured documents, were predicated on our landing either at Tinian Town or on the East Coast of the island. The Japanese were never able to reorganize their forces sufficiently to counter attack. The enemy forces available put up as much resistance as possible at and near White Beaches, and according to doctrine, a strong counterattack to drive us out was launched against our positions on the night of Jig Day. The counter-attacking forces were supported by six tanks and consisted of a mixture of Army and Naval personnel.

After the counterattack failed, the enemy withdrew to the southern end of the island. At night some infiltration was attempted. Some cases were reported of Japanese holding up in caves through our area in attempts to be by-passed and then create trouble. In the main, however, the enemy withdrew all of his forces to the south end of the island, as soon as his counterattack had failed. His forces had been badly depleted and were insufficient to hold any line across the island.

Some booby traps were found on the beaches, a few areas had been mined, and many dead were found with demolition charges on their bodies. No real defenses against our direction of attack were found, however.

The enemy evacuated his own dead and wounded admirably. His personnel seldom carried identification and on Jig plus 7 it was still not certain that the 50th Reg't had been committed. POW's stated that at no time after the first day was

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it possible for the enemy to organize units larger than platoons due to the intense fire received. His final, fanatical stand was made in the caves and brush in and near the cliffs facing the south eastern shore of the island.

These were not new tactics after Saipan. Resistance at the beach, counterattack, infiltration, withdrawal, attempts to be by-passed, fanatical willingness to die were all employed on Saipan. However, it was reported several times that the forces on Tinian were more accurate in shooting, better disciplined, and not as disorganized as those on Saipan.

6. Emplacements: Several types of emplacements and entrenchments were noted on Tinian.

(a) Dugouts: Along each tree line, near every dwelling, and scattered in other places there was always some type of bomb shelter. These ranged from crude caves to concrete structures. Some were used as pill-boxes, but the majority were simply shelters.

(b) Around and near the airfields were a series of uncompleted gun emplacements for weapons with calibres from 20mm to 40mm. It is probable that they would have been completed in concrete and camouflaged.

The naval guns along the western shore midway down the island were dug into caves with only the muzzles showing. Ammunition and quarters for the personnel were either behind the guns or near-by. Elaborate trenches surrounded this battery of "3/5-8" naval guns. Farther down the island, in the cliffs east of Tinian, was another battery of two guns which were emplaced in the same manner. The elaborate trench system, however, was missing.

(c) All tree lines, brush, and most of the cane fields had the usual series of fox-holes and hasty trenches.

7. Logistics: No information.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. Throughout the Tinian Operation, the Intelligence Section of the Regiment, suffered from lack of communications facilities. Wire was out of the question except for one OP because of the rapidity of movement, and the distances involved. The R-2 Section had been accustomed to laying and maintaining its own wire on Saipan. Even there, however, it was necessary that a crew of men be out checking the line almost continuously. The Section has neither the men or equipment to lay wire over

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the long distances necessary or to maintain it without the use of some form of transportation.

As a result, radio had to be depended upon as the main means of communication. The SCR 300 was excellent, and TBY's would likewise have proved satisfactory. Communication through the agencies of the Battalions proved almost useless, as the lines were in almost constant use, and the radios likewise. Too much time was consumed attempting to get connections with the R-2 Section through the Battalions.

It was likewise evident that the R-2 scouts suffered from a lack of communications facilities.

It is imperative that if Intelligence information is to reach its point of dissemination and be acted on in time to be of use that sure means of communication be made always available.

1. First, it is recommended that an Intelligence Net be set up within each Regiment with six stations on it: the D-2 Section, R-2, the RCT OP, and each Battalion. This Net should utilize either the SCR 300, preferably, or the TBY. With all these stations on the net, it would reduce the problem of dissemination of information considerably, as each party would receive the transmissions of all the others.

2. Second, it is recommended that a second Intelligence net be set up with the following stations upon it: the OP as the control station, and each group of scouts attached to a Battalion. This Net should utilize a set similar to the SCR 536. Making the OP the control station would minimize the possibility of the scouts going out of range. However, the frequency should be such that there will be no danger of being forced off the air by other stations (Air, NGF, etc) as happened on Tinian.

B. It is recommended that the Air Observers be trained to report the type of terrain and vegetation confronting attacking forces along with information of the enemy. In many instances on Tinian, the observation was so poor that Company Commanders knew little or nothing about the terrain ahead of them, and the map could not show the type of vegetation, or minor ground configurations.

C. Photos: Excellent annotated vertical and oblique aerial photos were available and used during the planning phase of the Tinian Operation. It is recommended that such be made available, in so far as possible for every landing.

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It was found that for purposes of orientation and location, oblique photographs were of more use than verticals. It is recommended that if possible obliques in the direction of the attack be taken every day or two, the critical features annotated to correspond with those on the map used, or the photos gridded like the map, and then distributed in sufficient quantity (minimum 4 per Bn) to reach the companies. While this would increase the number of individual photos to be made, it would not be necessary to pass down complete sets of photos. In many cases on Tinian, one such photo, or at most two, covered a Battalion's area of responsibility for 24 hours.

D. It is recommended that the R-2 Section be equipped with at least one small sound powered hand megaphone similar to those used by beachmasters, and that a high powered portable P.A. system be on call to the RCT from Division. These P.A. systems proved extremely valuable during the work of securing POW's from caves and other inaccessible places.

E. It is recommended that the R-2 Section be provided with a jeep and trailer. Such transportation could be used effectively to lay wire to the OP, to pick up and take to Division important captured material and documents, to get interpreters to the point where needed rapidly, to evacuate POW's and to make hasty reconnaissances.

F. It is recommended that the handling and evacuation of POW's by the system used on Tinian be continued in any operation where it is expected that civilians will be dealt with. No Civil Affairs Officer is necessary in the RCT echelon.

G. It is suggested that a total of three Language Officers be attached to each RCT for the purpose of handling POW's and captured documents. This system was used on Saipan and worked to great advantage. If three officers are available, one can be sent to work directly with each assault Battalion, and the other can handle any details which come into the stockade or elsewhere in the RCT area.

H. Maps: Except for the 1/20,000 map used on Tinian, it is felt that the quantities of other types received were wasted. The situation maps, the 1/62,500 terrain map, and all but one mosaic were received in large numbers for distribution. It is recommended that such maps which are excellent for planning be issued in the future in sufficient quantity for staff distribution only.

1. It is recommended that the RCT be notified at the beginning of future planning phases as to the types of maps to be used, and that advance copies of these maps be received for orientation and planning early in the planning phase.

R-2 REPORT TINIAN OPERATION.

2. It is recommended that any future Target Square Map have a more contrasting color system.

3. It is recommended that Corps carry the necessary equipment and materials to complete the printing of a new map for use by troops when later photos show the map originally intended for use to be inaccurate in many points. i.e., the map of Tinian was known to be inaccurate in regard to the cliff lines even while the operations to secure Saipan were being carried on. Another, and better map of Tinian, correcting those inaccuracies on the old map should have been made and issued prior to the Tinian operation.

I. It is recommended that the practice of dropping propaganda leaflets prior to and during an operation be continued in so far as circumstances permit. However, it is recommended that the units be notified in advance of the type of and time that these leaflets are to be dropped.

J. Training: It is recommended that training for future operations include for all hands the following subjects: Map reading, signal communication security measures. In the training of Intelligence personnel for future operations the following subjects should be especially stressed: Use of communications facilities including visual, wire and radio means; a good knowledge of a few simple phrases and questions which were always needed on Tinian; such as "Are there any more civilians or soldiers there?", "Where is the artillery?", etc; a thorough study of the theatre of operations; a thorough knowledge of Japanese tactics, weapons, traits, and equipment, which can be gained by studying the various manuals available; field work using aerial photos for maps, and using terrain unfamiliar to the personnel, with missions of terrain reconnaissances, and route reconnaissances; a thorough knowledge of Japanese T/O, military and naval insignia and Order of Battle.

R-3 - - TINIAN OPERATION

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I. Planning Phase.

a. After completion of the Saipan Operation, RCT 23 had six days in which to effect reorganization, reequip personnel and prepare plans for Tinian. Needless to say, the time allocated to accomplish all of this was far too little. The CT was able to prepare operation orders and alternate plans, but BLTs had only enough time to issue fragmentary plans and orders. The briefing of all personnel prior to the operation was not as complete as it should have been considering the size and importance of the operation.

II. Loading and Embarkation.

a. During this period, information as to the number of LSTs and other craft to be furnished was indefinite. Furthermore, the embarkation and loading point was changed several times with the usual resultant state of confusion. No definite instruction or coordination was provided to facilitate the planning of the CT during this phase.

b. The LSTs assigned were loaded from beach red two at Saipan. An assembly area was selected beforehand in the vicinity of the loading point and troops were moved to bivouac in this area on 22 July. Embarkation aboard the LSTs commenced at 0630, 23 July, and was completed at 1700.

III. Plan of Landing.

a. The plan of landing was three BLTs in column. BLT 2 leading followed in order by BLT 1 and BLT 3. Troops of each BLT were boated in LVT(2)s and LVT(4)s. The first four waves of each BLT consisted of 8 LVT(2)s; the fifth wave for BLT 2 and BLT 3 was comprised of 8 LVT(4)s; 7 LVT(4)s constituted the fifth wave for BLT 1. The attached 37mm guns of each BLT were loaded in LVT(4)s on the basis of 2 guns per vehicle; other LVT(4)s were utilized for landing high priority radio jeeps.

b. The number of amphibian tractors assigned for use was entirely adequate since the CT was operating at reduced strength. The average load per LVT was 16 men with equipment; some space was used for water, rations and ammunition. No discomfort or overcrowding of the vehicles was experienced.

c. LSTs and troops assignments were as follows:

<u>LST</u>	<u>Troop Unit</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
225	RCT Hq and Sp Gp	39	275
275	BLT 1	10	234
23		14	292
40		19	160

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

<u>LST</u>	<u>Troop Unit</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
485	BLT 2	10	375
272		22	382
275		5	92
40	BLT 3	6	108
487		13	382
222		16	351

d. The number of LSTs provided was sufficient and the sanitary conditions of these ships were excellent. Due to the LVT loading plan it was necessary to make duplicate assignments of certain LSTs.

e. The plan for the assault on Tinian prescribed the landing of troops from LSTs pre-loaded with LVT(2)s and LVT(4)s in groups of 17 per LST. A total of 103 LVT(2)s and 32 LVT(4)s were assigned for use of the CT. LVT and LCVP allocation for the landing was as follows:

	<u>LVT(2)</u>	<u>LVT(4)</u>	<u>LCVP</u>
RCT Hq and Sp Gp	7	9	14
BLT 1	32	7	6
BLT 2	32	8	5
BLT 3	32	8	5

f. Other landing craft employed for the operation were; 2 LCTs for trucks and trailers; 5 LCMs for halftracks and 2 LSDs which were used in conjunction with other CTs for loading tanks. In order to expedite the landing of all transportation and equipment two trips of the LCVPs and LCTs were required.

IV. Narrative of the Assault on Tinian.

Jig day, 24 July:

a. As division reserve RCT 23 was prepared to execute a landing on either beach white one or white two. Primarily the CT was prepared to execute the preferred plan whereby, on order, it would land on beach white two and pass through CT 25, or pass through the right elements of CT 25 and continue the attack to O-1.

b. Weather conditions on Jig day were favorable for the landing, except for intermittent rain squalls and choppy sea. At 0730, all troops were boated in assigned LVTs, prepared to launch on order. However, in view of the fact that it would be some time before the reserve CT would be committed to land, the troops were permitted to stay on top side of the LSTs. This was considered

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

expedient in order to prevent the possibility of troops becoming nauseated and sick from prolonged stay in the well deck of the LSTs. Previous experience has indicated that if troops stay in the well deck for any period greater than thirty minutes they are subject to sickness caused by the fumes of the LVTs. At 1030, all BLTs were ordered to load troops in LVTs and to commence launching immediately.

c. At this time no definite instructions had been received from division as to which beach to land the reserve CT. Upon request, it was learned that Beach White Two was the intended beach for the CT, but yet no time had been set for the actual execution of a landing order. At 1035, the CT Commander and members of his staff left LST 225, to go to PC 1455 at beach white two. Unfortunately, the LVT assigned for use of the command party was a mechanical wreck, and because of repeated mechanical failure the arrival of the command party at PC 1445 was delayed until 1220. Confusing and unconfirmed reports were received from the control officer on the PC to the effect that part of BLT 2 (first three waves) had already landed and that other waves were in the process of landing. After a careful check had been made it was determined that no elements of BLT 2 had as yet landed.

d. In the meantime no definite order had been issued for this CT to execute the landing of its elements. The only basis for any landing preparations to be made was the following message:

PinUp V Orlando Info Optimist SCR 608
241100 K
REQUEST OPTIMIST BE LANDED WHITE TWO AS SOON AS READY
PREPARED FOR ACTION IN ZONE OCEANIC X (TOD 1130)

e. It is to be noted that the above message was addressed to CT 23 for information, and furthermore on the basis of its text no action was required except preparations to land which had already been effected.

f. At 1300, the following message was received:

Optimist V Orlando
241155 K
ON LANDING TAKE OVER RIGHT SECTOR ZONE OCEANIC FROM TA639
ROGER 632 WILLIAM 625 MIKE AND CONTINUE ATTACK TO O-1 X
RES BN IN DIV RES VICINITY TA639 WILLIAM ON LANDING X
(TOD 1300)

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

g. On the basis of the above message orders for the landing of BLT 2 were issued. Beach conditions were none to favorable at this time and division was advised accordingly.

h. For some still undetermined reason the message was delayed enroute because it had to be relayed through other stations before receipt of BLT 2. Furthermore, there was some misinterpretation of orders between boat control officers and the BLT officers. An unknown station by the call sign of "Spicket", issued conflicting orders which further delayed the execution of the landing order. Waves of BLT 2 hit the beach as follows:

<u>Wave</u>	<u>Landed</u>
1	1401
2	1409
3	1415
4	1420
5	1430

i. On the basis of information taken from RCT 25 situation map on the PC, an assembly area ashore was designated for BLT 2, to which it was to proceed upon landing for reorganization prior to continuing the attack.

j. It is probably fortunate for all concerned that elements of RCT 23 did not land on white two any sooner than they did. The beach at the time was hardly suitable, or prepared to accept the landing of the division reserve. There was considerable confusion on the reef approach to the beach; traffic across the beach proper was impeded by vehicles and troops that were attempting to land all at the same time; considerable difficulty was being experienced in locating and removing all the mines from the beach exits; routes away from the beach were completely blocked and no semblance of organized attempts, or efforts, were in evidence to control the beach area or to make a clear passage for troops and vehicles. Combined with all of the above, the beach itself was not suited for the landing of more than one BLT at a time. Further congestion and confusion on the beach area was occasioned by the fact that elements of RCT 25, artillery units, and tanks were still in the process of landing when the first waves of RCT 23 approached the beach. The landing in general was not too well organized or controlled, with the result that many LVTs filled with troops were milling around within easy range of small arms fire from the beach, as well as offering a splendid target for enemy artillery or mortars had the Japs been in a position to employ these weapons to advantage.

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

k. At 1535, the advance CT CP was established ashore while under MG and artillery fire on beach white two. BLT 2 upon landing proceeded to its assigned assembly point at 632 AB, and had to fight against heavy MG and rifle fire before reaching its area. BLT 1 was ordered to land at 1415 and to assemble in 639 UV in support of BLT 2 and to protect the right flank and area along the coast. BLT 3 was ordered to land at 1500 and to assemble in division reserve at 639 R. By 1630, all troops of this CT were ashore (less vehicles). At 1649, members of the CT staff aboard the PC started for the beach. Again mechanical failure of the LVT caused considerable confusion and delayed the landing of the command party. It became necessary to transfer all personnel and equipment from the LVT to a DUWK which took the command group to LST 225 where another LVT was obtained. The CT Commander and party landed at 1745. At this time the situation ashore was favorable. BLT 2 had advanced against heavy opposition and had passed through the right elements of RCT 25 to establish and maintain contact with 2/25 at 632 M. BLT 1 was disposed along the coast for protection of this flank and BLT 3 had assembled in division reserve at 639 W. Positions had been well established for the night; all troops were dug in and contact with adjacent units was good. During the night there was considerable activity on the CT front and especially in the zone of BLT 2. A Jap counterattack against the position occupied by BLT 2 was repulsed and an estimated 250 Japs destroyed; four enemy tanks were knocked out and a fifth, which was believed to have been damaged during the attack was verified the following morning to have been destroyed. Enemy artillery of large caliber, fired intermittently during the night at the beach area causing several casualties and considerable damage to equipment on the beach.

Jig plus 1, 25 July.

a. Shortly after daylight, tanks attached to the CT flushed out and destroyed numerous Japs in the area to the front of BLT 2 and BLT 1. BLT 1 at dawn mopped up the areas along the coast as far back as the beach. Continually during the morning hostile artillery fired into the CP area inflicting several casualties in the medical section. BLT 1 relieved BLT 2 in position and continued the attack against light opposition through heavy cane fields and dense underbrush. BLT 2, upon being relieved, passed to division reserve. O-1 was seized at 1637. BLT 3, in support of BLT 1 during the attack moved up and relieved the left elements of BLT 1 and occupied positions on a line abreast for the night. Defenses were well established and coordinated. Some activity was reported during the night in the form of infiltrating bands of Japs which were destroyed. Prepared and distributed operation order #14-44 for continuation of the attack on 26 July.

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

Jig plus 2, 26 July.

a. Operations continued at 0700, with BLT 1 making a short advance by independent action prior to 0800, to seize ground for a favorable LD and to straighten out the line for continuation of the attack. At King hour, 0800, the attack jumped off to seize O-3. BLT 1 and BLT 3 abreast, BLT 1 on the right. Forward progress was slow because of the many thick cane fields and the densely wooded areas along the coast. BLT 2, upon being relieved from division reserve, supported the attack by mopping up the rear areas as the attack progressed. At 1201, objective O-3 was secured and at 1300, after hasty reorganization, the attack continued to seize the most favorable ground in vicinity of O-4. The same units were maintained in the line with BLT 2 mopping up the rear of the assault elements. The advance was made against very light opposition consisting mainly of MG and sniper fire from cane fields and wooded areas. Favorable ground in the vicinity of O-4 was secured at 1430, and positions were consolidated on the commanding ground. No enemy activity was reported during the night.

Jig plus 3, 27 July.

a. At 0950, continued the attack in conjunction with RCT 25 on the left. No enemy resistance was encountered and the attack to O-4 was rapid. At 1050, upon seizure of the objective both BLT 1 and BLT 3 sent patrols forward of the O-4 line to a limit of 1,000 yards. The patrols reported no enemy activity to the front. Positions were consolidated on O-4 for the night. Operation Order #15-44 for the continuation of the attack on 28 July was issued to the BLTs at 1700.

Jig plus 4, 28 July.

a. Continued the attack from LD (O-4) at 0700; BLT 1 on the right, BLT 3 on the left; BLT 2 assigned the mission of mopping up the rear of the assault units. Initial coordination of the attack was excellent on the 2500 yard front. The advance was rapid with light resistance being encountered and O-5 was seized at 1232. RCT 24 passed through the left elements of BLT 3 narrowing the CT front and requiring an adjustment in the boundary between the two assault LTs. At 1325, the advance continued from O-5, with the assigned mission of seizing O-6A. Moderate opposition was encountered in the advance from Jap knee mortars which were quickly reduced by tanks. At 1420, the east west airstrip in the CT zone of action was secured, and at 1651, the assault LTs reported the seizure of O-6A. Upon reorganization on the objective, RCT 23 passed to division reserve and continued mopping up the area and

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

patrolled the coast line in the zone of action. The advance during the day was accomplished in blitz fashion with troops riding on tanks and in halftracks. The total ground gain for the day was 7300 yards.

Jig plus 5, 29 July.

a. Remained in division reserve and at 0600, BLT 2 was released on order to NT&LF reserve to assemble in 602 V. BLT 1 and BLT 3 at 0600, were moved on division order to new assembly areas and closed in respective areas prior to 0800. At 1551, BLT 1 was again moved to a newly assigned area.

Jig plus 6, 30 July:

a. RCT 23 (less 2/23) remained in division reserve. At 1000, 2/23 was relieved as NT&LF reserve by the 3/23; 2/23 then passed to division reserve. CT 23 (less 3/23) relieved elements of CT 25 on O-7 at 1600, at which time 3/23 reverted to CT control. Positions on O-7 were organized for the night and no enemy activity reported.

Jig plus 7, 31 July.

a. At 0530, issued Operation Order #16-44 for the continuation of the attack at 0830. Units jumped off at 0833, after heavy air and artillery preparation on the high ground to the front. BLT 2 and BLT 1 abreast, with BLT 2 on the right, BLT 3 in reserve. The attack progressed with no contact with the 2d Marine Division on the left which had not come up on a line abreast as was scheduled. Little opposition was encountered until the exposed left flank of BLT 1 was pinned down by enemy MG and mortar fire from the cliff line on the left flank and the town in 522 H, in the 2d Marine Division zone of action. On the right, BLT 2 ran into heavy gun fire from a large caliber weapon believed to be a 5" naval gun which knocked out one medium tank. The forward progress of the assault BLTs was impeded by continued enemy fire from the high cliff line on the left flank. At 1430, both assault units were in the process of gaining the high ground. BLT 1 made favorable progress and secured the high ground and cliff area in its zone of action at 1745. BLT 2 on the right was held up by a strong pocket of resistance at 510 KL, which consisted of a mine field on the road well protected by hostile MG and rifle fire. The forward movement of BLT 2 was halted for the night at this point. Elements of BLT 2, less one company remained in this area to contain the hostile groups and to prevent infiltration into the rear areas during the night. The remaining company of BLT 2 was

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

sent around through BLT 1 zone of action to gain a position on the high ground. BLT 3, less one company moved to the rear of BLT 1 on the high ground to tie in defenses for the night; the remaining company of BLT 3, maintained its position on the low ground for the protection of the left flank and to contain Japs that still remained in the gap between the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions. 3/25 in division reserve was assigned to CT 23 and remained in position on the low ground. Units on the high ground established a perimeter of defense with flanks bent back and anchored on the cliff line. Patrols from units of BLT 3 on the high ground were sent out in an attempt to establish contact with the 2d Marine Division on the left, but were unable to locate any elements of the 2d Marine Division in order to make contact.

b. During the day one section of 37mm guns and a one ton truck were knocked out by the intense fire from 515HD; a cave on the cliff line in the 2d Division zone which had been by-passed by elements of the 2d Division. One 37mm was later retrieved by a half-track which went into the area under heavy fire. The remaining 37mm was dismantled and abandoned. Positions on the high ground were well established for the night but on the low land hostile groups still remained active in caves in the cliff line in the rear areas. One company of 3/25 was moved in the vicinity of 515 D to contain the Japs there. The remainder of 3/25 remained in position for the protection of tank attachments which had assembled on the low ground. Activity during the night was confined to persistent sniper fire and small attempts at infiltration. Numerous small groups of Japs were destroyed.

Jig plus 8, 1 August.

a. At 0400, a radio message from division was received to continue the attack at 0800, to seize objective O-8. At 0600, CT Commander issued an oral order from CT OP to unit commanders. Preliminary action was instituted to effect adjustment of lines prior to 0800. BLT 2, by independent action cleaned out the pocket at 510 KL and protected engineers in the removal of the mine field in order to establish clear and safe passage on the road to the high ground in the CT zone of action. BLT 1 and BLT 3 shifted lines by lateral action to seize O-7A as an LD for continuation of the attack at 0800. In the preliminary action by all units, heavy MG and sniper fire was encountered which made the adjustment of lines slow. At 1045, BLT 2 had reduced the resistance in the pocket; the mined area was cleared, and safe for the movement of tanks and vehicles to the high ground. By 1145, BLT 1 had gained possession of hill 540 in 507 M, after reducing moderate enemy resistance. At 1330, BLT 1 and

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

BLT 3 continued the attack from O-7A against MG fire from cane fields and tree lines in the zone of advance. By 1715, both BLTs had reached the line of farthest possible advance, which was a cliff line perpendicular to the front and overlooking the sea on the east coast. Patrols were sent forward to reconnoiter routes to the low ground in front of the cliff and along the coast. Patrols reported the area to be honey-combed with caves and deep recesses which were occupied by the enemy. One company of BLT 2 was ordered to remain in the vicinity of 510 KL to maintain safe passage on the road; BLT 2 less one company moved to the high ground and occupied positions on hill 540 for the night. 3/25 reverted to division reserve, and was ordered to clean out the pocket of Japs at 515 HD in the 2d Division zone. Positions were held for the night with little enemy activity reported. The abandoned 37mm gun and the one ton truck were regained by personnel from R/W Company; both the gun and truck had been rigged with elaborate booby traps by the Japs during the night.

Jig plus 9, 2 August.

a. Continued operations at dawn to mop up area along the coast and the cliff line which contained many caves and ravines inaccessible to infantry and tanks. BLT 1, was assigned to the area below the cliff and along the coast. BLT 3 mopped up the area on the high coastal plateau, while BLT 2 conducted operations on the low lands along the west coast and the rear of the CI zone. Salvage of equipment; burial of own and enemy dead; location of Jap dumps was continuous by all units with the mopping up duties. During the day many snipers were located and destroyed. Numerous POWs were captured in the area along the coast, with many more yet remaining in caves reluctant to give themselves up.

Jig plus 10, 3 August.

a. Continued mopping up operations from dawn until 1700 by patrol action throughout the entire zone of responsibility. Jap civilians and military were reluctant to surrender, and made the progress of mopping up operations slow and bothersome. Several freak incidents occurred during the day. (1) Jap children thrown over cliff into ocean; (2) Military grouped civilians in numbers of 15 to 20, and attached explosive charges to them, blowing them into bits; (3) Both military and civilians lined up on the cliff line and hurled themselves into ocean; (4) Many civilians pushed over cliff by soldiers. Operations during the entire day were colored by the mass suicide of the Japs and the capture of several hundred prisoners. At the close of the day the Japs were warned through use of a PA system that final surrender would be set at 0830 on the following day, after

R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

which time grenades and explosives would be placed in all caves. All organized resistance had been reduced in the CT zone of action.

Jig plus 11, 4 August.

a. Mopping up operations continued at dawn with patrols sent through the area with a PA system and interpreters in an attempt to call out remaining small groups and induce them to surrender. Some prisoners were taken prior to the established dead line of 0900. At 0915, an intensive barrage of rockets, halftracks, 75mm guns from tanks, and mortars covered the entire area below the cliff line with heavy fire until 0930, after which patrols were sent through the area with grenades, flame throwers and demolitions to clean out all the remaining places of hiding. At 1600, the entire zone of responsibility was completely mopped up. Upon a division order, CT 23 assumed responsibility for the security and final mopping up of the entire division zone. A composite battalion of CT 24 was attached to CT 23 and remained in control of CT 24 zone of responsibility for mopping up operations. No enemy activity was reported during the day or night in CT 23 zone. However, snipers and infiltrating groups caused considerable trouble in the CT 24 zone which had not been completely mopped up. It was necessary to request that the strength of the Composite battalion of CT 24 be increased by 100 men in order to expedite mopping up operations and the salvage and burial of own and enemy dead in this area. BLT 2 was released from its area and moved back to rear assembly and rest area.

4 August to 7 August.

a. Continued mopping up operations in the division zone of responsibility. BLT 2 in rear rest area was dispatched on division order to locate and destroy snipers along the west coast near the division assembly area. On 5 August, released the Composite Battalion, of 24th to parent control and assumed responsibility for the area which had not at this time been completely mopped up. On 7 August, elements of CT 8, 2d Marine Division, relieved BLT 1 and BLT 3 in zones of responsibility and all units moved back to rear rest and assembly area to prepare for embarkation. One platoon of 2/23 was dispatched to clean out a cave with snipers in the island garrison forces area near Tinian Town.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON FORAGER PHASE III TINIAN.

a. RCT 23 as division reserve never received a definite order to execute the landing of its LTs at a specific time. Considerable ambiguity was attached to orders received by this headquarters for the landing on Tinian. Initially no information or

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

instructions were issued as to which beach the division reserve would land on. Only after request by CT headquarters to the division was this information received.

b. LSTs of reserve units should be moved as close to the LD as possible. This would eliminate early launching of LVTs and avoid the long trip to the LD.

c. LVT drivers should make frequent inspection and check of vehicles prior to launching. The percentage of LVT casualties due to mechanical trouble on Tinian operation was far in excess of normal expectancy.

d. The discharging of troops from LVTs was generally slow because of congestion on the beach.

e. There is greater need for increased training of infantry with LVTs. It is recommended that periodically during training phases that LSTs and LVTs sufficient for one BLT be made available for training.

f. Tractor drivers should be instructed to move LVTs in a position for disembarkation which will least expose the troops to enemy fire.

g. There is need for an established rule of the road for LVTs and DUWKS travelling laterally along the beach and also on return trips from the beach.

h. LVT(A) was not exploited to its fullest extent. They preceded the 1st assault waves and rendered support initially by maintaining fire superiority and neutralization of the beach area prior to landing of troops but failed to render maximum benefits by supporting fire when troops were established ashore.

i. Infantry artillery coordination was far superior to Saipan operation.

j. Infantry tank teams reached a peak of perfection on Tinian. Tanks were employed with 75 halftracks, LVT(A)s and infantry in close support. Infantry tank cooperation was for the most part a rapid continuous movement by-passing light resistance which was mopped up by support elements following closely behind assault units.

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

k. In general, the control and coordination of the operation by higher authority was far superior than on Saipan. The attacks were halted soon enough before darkness to permit the development of favorable ground for night defense. Orders for the continuation of the attack were received in sufficient time to permit preliminary reconnaissance by lower echelon.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON JAP TACTICS, WEAPONS ETC.

I. The comments expressed herein are to be considered as a composite of personal observations of Marine Officers and men during the Saipan and Tinian operations. For the most part, these comments are characteristic of operations on both islands and cannot be accurately defined or limited to either Saipan or Tinian individually.

a. These views are put in writing as part of the special action report primarily to serve as informational value for organizations preparing for future operations against the Japanese forces.

II. Jap Military Encountered.

a. Jap forces encountered on both of these operations were elements of the Japanese Army and Naval units. It is uniformly agreed that the enemy did not show characteristics of a first class defensive fighter.

b. Collectively the enemy lacked a spirit of initiative; failed to operate offensively and blundered in the utilization of terrain and weapons.

c. Individually the hostile forces encountered indicated a firm vigor and spirit to die willing for the cause. The tenacious fighting capacity of the individual Jap and his undaunted spirit of self sacrifice is a strong weapon in the hands of our Pacific enemy. Not all Jap soldiers will fight "to the death." It is surprising to note that many of the Jap military surrendered willingly on both Saipan and Tinian.

d. The Japs are easily trapped and very susceptible to a surprise move which is in opposition to their normal expectancy.

e. Physically the individual Jap is capable of great endurance and shows a marked ability to survive for days and even weeks on greatly reduced rations and water.

f. No quarter can be given to the Jap soldier. He will employ every trick or ruse possible that will profitably yield several American lives for the sacrifice of his own.

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

g. The Jap rifleman is a good marksman at close in ranges between 200 and 300 yards. Snipers have an uncanny ability to shoot Marines in the head at reasonable ranges.

III. Weapons and Equipment.

a. The majority of the weapons and equipment captured were in excellent condition and bore indications of excellent care.

b. Japanese equipment is of superior quality and in most cases remained in excellent condition after weeks of exposure to tropical sun and rain.

c. Jap ammunition is smokeless and generally the flash is concealed. The only detection as to location of weapons is for the most part by sound.

d. The Nambu MG is an excellent weapon, extremely accurate with a high capacity for sustained rapid fire. The heavy MG has the same qualifications. Many Jap MGs were equipped with telescopic sights. Fields of fire for Jap automatic weapons are narrow, limited and well defined. There were no indications of pre-selection of alternate fields of fire by Jap machine gunners. Primarily, fields of fire are good and usually sighted to cover routes of approach. The fire is generally directed about 18" above the ground. Only one or two cases are known where Jap MGs were employed to deliver interlocking bands of fire. It appeared that Jap MGs were never employed in mutual support of each other.

e. The knee mortar is brutal and the Japs employ this weapon with exceptional ability. The accuracy of this weapon up to 200 yards is deadly. Japs are specialists in the employment of knee mortars and when used in groups of 5 or 6 at a time, the volume of fire is destructive. Individually the knee mortar is not too effective requiring a direct hit for maximum damage. A Jap specialty is to place knee mortar fire on troops that bunch up in groups of four or more.

f. Jap artillery is good but the basic employment is not directed to produce maximum destructive power.

IV. Tactics.

a. No organized Japanese offensive tactics were encountered except for the initial counterattacks on the morning of D plus 1 on Saipan, and Jig plus 1 on Tinian. These counterattacks were well

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

organized in force, but their offensive power was not directed at the weakest point of the initial beachhead where a possible penetration could have been effected. The only other indications of an offensive spirit indicated by the enemy were Banzai attacks. The Japanese Military logic behind Banzai attacks cannot be explained. These fanatical and suicidal thrusts always occur during hours of darkness and are generally directed frontally against a defensive position.

b. Infiltration by small groups of Japs is active and continuous also during hours of darkness. Infiltration tactics are directed mainly to pierce a flank or a gap in the front line defense. Invariably, infiltrating bands will follow a well defined route such as; a railroad or trail. Frequently too, infiltrating groups will travel along the side of a road, but keeping off the road proper. This is particularly true of roads through cane fields. Infiltrating bands often work in groups of two or three with one group making noises to attract attention so as to allow the other groups to proceed unnoticed. In one special instance, Japs crowed like roosters in order to conceal their movement through a cane field. The strength of infiltrating parties is variable and may range from 2 Japs, to groups of 25 or 40. Jap infiltrating groups are "SUCKERS" for trip wire devices such as offensive, fragmentation and thermite grenades. Explosive charges with attached trip wires serve well in this purpose. Ample time prior to darkness should be allowed for the construction of these warning and destructive devices in front of forward positions.

c. On both operations the enemy had been steadily driven back to the sea where the majority of Japs holed up in caves and fought for days until each individual cave and dugout was located and destroyed.

d. On both Saipan and Tinian, the Japs took advantage of the peculiar ground structure of the islands by using caves and dugouts for defensive positions. The enemy was well established in positions inaccessible to infantry and supporting weapons. In the early stages of Saipan, troops were confused as to the location of enemy weapons. It was necessary for the Japs to fire first in order to determine what action to take. Often where several caves were in the same area it was more difficult to determine the exact location of enemy fire because occupants in different caves would fire in rotation. However, troops soon came to locate where caves and dugouts were located and how to effectively reduce these positions. Daily, troops became progressively aware of logical and possible Jap hiding places and proceeded more cautiously through certain areas.

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

e. Few caves were so perfect naturally that supporting fires were possible from these hiding places. There were only few indications of man made defenses around natural caves or dugouts for the purposes of mutual defense.

f. There were numerous occasions of troops receiving heavy fire from positions that could not be located, either because the sound of weapons was muffled, or amplified by caves and failed to reveal the exact locations. Generally troops had to locate the source of enemy fire by trial and error methods and frequently at the cost of many casualties.

g. Fighting during the latter phases of both operations resolved into cave to cave warfare, until every cave was located and its occupants destroyed.

h. It was soon learned through successive stages of these operations that captured caves and dugouts must be guarded or the entrance sealed up by a bulldozer to prevent further occupation by infiltrating Japs.

i. Towards the end of both operations the outward physical appearance of some POWs indicated suffering from lack of sufficient food and water. Others, were apparently in excellent physical condition having had access to hidden stores of rations and water located in caves.

j. Several road blocks and mine fields were encountered on both operations. The tactical location of these obstacles was excellent. Mine fields were placed on roads that constituted the main avenue of approach to high ground and in cases were supplemented by road blocks. No distinctive form of road block was encountered; usually a bridge blown out by Japs, or a large crater caused by a demolition charge was all that was prepared as an obstacle. However, the location of these obstacles tactically was excellent. Furthermore, they were well protected by MG and small arms fire from pre-disposed positions on high ground overlooking the tactical obstacle.

k. On both operations Japs used their tanks at night with the counterattacking ground forces. Usually, 2 or 3 Jap soldiers rode on the tanks and were armed with LMGs. Tanks being naturally road bound at night followed roads or defined routes of approach to our front line positions. Little difficulty was experienced in knocking out Jap tanks at night. The bazooka and 37mm gun will stop the enemy tank.

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R-3 - Tinian Operation: (Cont).


1. On one occasion on Saipan a Jap tank was dug in on high ground with only the turret above ground with a fire traverse of 180°. The camouflage work on the tank turret blended perfectly with surrounding background. The fire from this turret gun was terribly effective and caused considerable damage before it was located and destroyed.

R-3 TINIAN OPERATION

TASK ORGN (ALL units less Fr Ech).

- (a) BLT 1 Lt Col Haas, USMC
1st Bn, 23d Mar
1st Plat, R/W Co
1st Plat, Co C, 20th Mar
Det, 1st JASCO
FO Det, 14th Mar
Det, 10th Amph Trac Bn
Det, Coll Sec Co C, 4th Med Bn
Det, (Int) H&S, 23d Mar
- (b) BLT 2 Lt Col Dillon USMC
2d Bn, 23d Mar
2d Plat, R/W Co
2d Plat, Co C, 20th Mar
Det, 1st JASCO
FO Det, 14th Mar
Det, 10th Amph Trac Bn
Det, Coll Sec Co C, 4th Med Bn
Det, (Int) H&S, 23d Mar
- (c) BLT 3 Maj Treitel, USMC
3d Bn, 23d Mar
3d Plat, R/W Co
3d Plat, Co C, 20th Mar
Det, 1st JASCO
FO Det, 14th Mar
Det, 10th Amph Trac Bn
Det, Coll Sec Co C, 4th Med Bn
Det, (Int) H&S, 23d Mar
- (d) SUPPORT GP Lt Col Lenigen, USMC
H&S Co, 23d Mar (less Dets)
3d Band Sec
R/W Co, 23d Mar (less AT Plats)
Co C, 20th Mar (less 1st, 2d and 3d Plats)
Co C, 4th Tk Bn plus Det Co D, 4th Tk Bn
3d Plat, 4th MP Co
Det, 1st JASCO
10th Amph Trac Bn (less Dets)
Det, 4th MT Bn
Ln Det, 14th Mar

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R-4 - - TINIAN OPERATION

I. The Plan.

a. Release of plans of higher echelon.

(1) Undoubtedly due to the shortage of time, plans were not released to the RCT by higher echelon far enough in advance to ensure accurate planning. Six days were allowed between the withdrawal of the RCT from the field of the SAIPAN operation, and movements to embarkation for the TINIAN operation. In this interval, reorganization and re-equipping of the RCT, and completion of plans for the TINIAN operation had to be completed.

(2) Assignment of ships and boats, and loading points, was subject to repeated change.

b. The Loading Plan.

(1) Supplies:

(a) Supplies to support the operation in its initial phases were loaded on LSTs by higher echelon, ten being loaded by the 4th Division.

(b) To supplement these supplies, and to ensure immediate availability of critical supplies on the beach:

1. All vehicles were landed combat loaded. BLT vehicles carried balanced loads of supplies established by the BLTs; RCT vehicles carried balanced loads augmenting these supplies.

2. Water, ammunition, explosives and medical supplies were loaded into the LVTs used as vehicle and personnel carriers.

(c) Calls for resupply during the assault phase were forwarded by radio to the RCT control boat; these supplies were obtained and forwarded to the beach via Division control.

(2) Equipment:

(a) Available to load the personnel and equipment of the RCT were 8 LSTs, 2 LCTs, 5 LCM's, 30 LCVP's, 134 LVT's. The LCT's were scheduled for two trips.

1. 32 of the LVTs were LVT(4)s; these were used to carry 37mm guns (loaded two to each LVT), radio jeeps, wire jeeps, and 2-ton trailers carrying mortar ammunition.

2. The remaining vehicles of the regiment were loaded on the LCTs (the last of the vehicles being loaded on the second trip), LCMs and LCV(P)s.

R-4--TINIAN OPERATION

c. The Unloading Plan.

(1) Due to the limitations of the beaches, no supplies could be landed by boat; all supplies were landed mobile-loaded in trucks or LVTs.

(2) This regiment being in reserve for the landing, it was expected that the LVTs would be able to discharge troops and cargo at an assembly area clear of the beach.

(3) Control:

(a) By higher echelon order, all troops had landing priority over equipment other than tanks and guns.

(b) Control personnel:

1 Control for the landing of division personnel and equipment was centralized under the division control officer. In order to land any of the RCT equipment, it was necessary to obtain authority from the division control.

2 Small boats, after loading, were held under the control of naval boat officers; orders to them had to clear through the division control.

3 In order to expedite the landing of the RCT vehicles, the Regimental Loading Officer and the R-4 took station on the control boat for the RCT beach. The Loading Officer remained afloat until the last of the RCT equipment had been landed.

d. The Shore Party.

(1) Since this RCT was in reserve for the landing no shore party was attached to it.

II. The Operation.

a. Uniform and Individual Equipment:

(1) Uniform:

(a) Uniform was prescribed by lower echelon commanders. In general, troops landed in utility with steel helmets, with head-nets.

(2) Individual Equipment:

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R. 4. TINIAN OPERATION

(a) Also prescribed by lower echelon commanders, troops landed with normal arms, cartridge belt, 2 canteens, and with poncho slung over back of the belt. In addition, they carried gas masks, and 2/3 "D", 1/3 "K" ration and extra ammunition; these were prescribed by the RCT.

(b) This equipment was adequate for the landing, and suited to the climatic conditions.

(3) Baggage: Baggage was left with the rear installations on SAIPAN, and was forwarded at the end of the TINIAN operation.

b. Supply:

(1) General:

(a) Supplies were landed in accordance with the plan outlined above, and the plan was executed satisfactorily, except that:

1 Troop-carrying LVTs were not able to penetrate inland. As a result, supplies carried with the troops were in large part left on the beach; these were collected by the Regimental Quartermaster prior to night-fall on D-day.

2 Delays in landing the RCT combat-loaded vehicles disrupted the supply plan, and necessitated calls for supplies from the LSTs afloat.

3 Beach conditions delayed the establishment of the Division dumps; this again led to emergency calls.

(b) Control:

1 Control was effected satisfactorily and according to plan, except that control by boat officers was in some cases ineffective.

a Boats containing three of the RCT's vehicles became lost from their boat groups. This led to confusion and long searches for the missing boats.

b Boat groups did not appear to be under effective control. On the afternoon of Dog plus one, when the RCT's LCV(F)-loaded vehicles were released to RCT control, only about half of the boat groups appeared.

(2) Rations:

(a) The supply of rations was adequate throughout the operations. However, since the bulk of rations available were of the "C" type, troops grew very tired of them.

R-4 - TINIAN OPERATION

(b) Shortages encountered:

Shortages in mortar shell, 60mm, illuminating, and 81mm, HE, M43a1, and in gun shell, 75mm, HE (all marks), developed prior to the end of the operation.

(c) Recommendations:

The following changes in the CinCPOA unit of fire are recommended, based on the experience of the SAIPAN and TINIAN operations:

1 Small arms: It is recommended that for future operations all .30 and .50 caliber machine-gun ammunition be packed belted, and in chests.

2 Mortar shell:

a 60mm: Illuminating shell should not be calculated as a fixed percentage of the unit of fire. Since expenditures of illuminating shell will normally be uniform, the allowance should be based on the number of nights contemplated for the operation. The amount recommended is ten rounds per mortar per night.

b 81mm: The present percentages should be changed to 70 rounds shell, HE, M43a1, 20 rounds shell, HE, M56, and 10 rounds shell, WP, M57.

3 Gun shell:

a 37mm: The present percentages should be changed to 40 rounds shell, HE, 40 rounds shell, cannister, and 20 rounds shot, AP.

b 75mm:

1. Shot, fixed, AP, supercharged, w/tracer, w/fuse BD, M66a1, should entirely replace shot, fixed, AP, M61, supercharged, w/tracer.

2. For both tank and self-propelled gun, the percentage of types should be 70 rounds shell, HE, 20 rounds shot, AP, and 10 rounds smoke.

4 Explosives:

a Although explosives were not as heavily used on TINIAN as they were on SAIPAN, the experience of the two operations

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R-44 - TINIAN OPERATION

indicates that the present standard allowances should be doubled for the initial phases. The amount available on TINIAN was adequate.

b Packaging: All C2 should be packaged in the present 18-lb block bandoliers. The $\frac{1}{2}$ -lb block packages of C2 duplicate the packaging of TNT and serve no useful purpose.

(6) Engineer:

(a) Kit, demolition, infantry, M1:

It is recommended that this kit be modified so as to eliminate the chest and its contents of explosives. Troops will not carry the bulky chest; explosives can be readily supplied through normal channels. A small kit, capable of being carried on the cartridge belt, and containing crimpers, jackknife, blasting caps, twine and friction tape should be substituted.

(b) Wire:

Requests for barbed wire were generally limited to prepared concertinas. Stocks were exhausted prior to the end of the operation.

(7) Dumps:

(a) The regimental dump was maintained in the vicinity of the regimental command post during most of the operation.

(b) Levels were held at a minimum; this promoted rapid displacement. No rear echelon equipment - such as galleys - was carried.

c. Equipment:

(1) The blanket priority of troops over equipment for the landing phase led to excessive delay in the landing of the RCT vehicles and equipment.

(a) The first trip of LCTs was unloaded on the morning of D plus one.

(b) A portion of the LCV(P)s carrying vehicles were unloaded late in the afternoon of D plus one.

(c) Remaining vehicles, which included the bulk of the heavy transport, were not unloaded until D plus two, landing of them being completed by early afternoon.

(2) It is recommended that the RCTs be permitted to land their vehicles earlier than was permitted here. These vehicles, and the supplies and equipment they carry, are vitally needed.

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R. 4 - - TINIAN OPERATION

d. Ordnance:

(1) Weapons:

(a) Performance: The performance of all weapons was uniformly excellent.

(b) Spare parts: Spare parts were not available.

(c) Shortages: No shortages were encountered.

(d) Accessories: Waterproof covers for individual weapons, issued prior to the SAIPAN operation, had been destroyed or were lost. No re-supply was available; re-issue of these would have helped to maintain the weapons.

(2) Repair and servicing:

As in the SAIPAN operation, the major portion of the repair and servicing of weapons was executed by the Division Ordnance Company. The regiment carried a small stock of weapons on hand, and replaced weapons turned in by the battalions for repair. These were in turn exchanged with division.

e. Chemical Warfare:

Although gas masks were picked up by the battalions after landing, and carried in their dumps, many were lost or were damaged by water.

f. Motor Transport:

(1) Organic transport:

(a) Available during the operation:

1. The following was available to the regiment:

Trucks:	½-ton, 4x4, cargo - - - - -	20
	½-ton, 4x4, RE - - - - -	10
	1-ton, 4x4, cargo - - - - -	7
Trailers:	½-ton, 2-wheel - - - - -	9
Ambulances:	½-ton, 4x4 - - - - -	5

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RL4 - - TINIAN OPERATION

2 Three of the 37mm guns of the Regimental Weapons Company were without prime movers; though still limited in transportation, supply was better able to function on TINIAN than on SAIPAN due to shorter distances and more favorable terrain.

- (b) No organic transport was lost during this operation.
(2) Assigned transport:

(a) Throughout this operation a platoon of 24-ton 6x6 trucks was regularly assigned by the MT Bn to this regiment. Normally, one of these trucks assigned to each battalion, and the rest used under regimental control.

(b) Due to the regular interchanging of the platoons assigned, drivers were often unfamiliar with the routes in the regimental zone. It is recommended that transportation assigned in the future be assigned on a permanent basis.

- (3) Maintenance:

- (a) Through organic means:

Throughout the operation, the regimental maintenance section performed very well. Many vehicles suffered severe damage in the operation due to enemy fire; all were successfully retrieved and repaired. A Japanese motor-cycle with side-car, captured early in the operation, provided maintenance personnel with the means of quickly locating damaged vehicles, and procuring the necessary repair equipment.

- (b) Through higher echelon:

Excellent service was rendered by the Motor Transport Battalion in executing repairs beyond the capacity of the regimental section.

- (4) Assignment of LVTs during the initial phase of the operation:

As in the SAIPAN operation, the regiment was not able to land its own vehicles quickly. To provide a means of carrying over this period, LVTs should be assigned the regiment immediately after landing the troops.

- g. Salvage:

No continuous program of salvage was effected. Salvage operations were conducted by the battalions while in reserve, each sending patrols to cover the zone through which it had passed.

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R-4 -- TINIAN OPERATION

h. Casualties:

(1) Evacuation was adequately handled through normal medical channels.

(2) Returned casualties, forwarded from higher echelon, often arrived at the regiment without proper clothing or equipment. These should be re-equipped by the Division Quartermaster prior to being returned to the regiments.

i. Burial:

(1) Friendly dead:

Collection and burial of friendly dead was expeditiously handled throughout, under the supervision of the Regimental Burial Officer acting in coordination with the Division Burial Officer.

(2) Enemy dead:

The bulk of the enemy dead were collected and buried by the assault troops, although materially aided by prisoner working parties. Special sanitary units should be provided by higher echelon. These, even if not adequate to complete the burial of enemy dead, should at least be equipped with spray apparatus and an arsenical solution, in order to minimize the fly-breeding and the spread of disease.

j. Communications:

In order to ensure adequate dependable communications, it is recommended that sufficient radio equipment and personnel be provided to establish an administrative net linking the battalions with the regiment, and the regiments with the division. For these nets, either the SCR 610 or the TCS would be suitable. The regimental net should have the following five stations: R-4, Regimental Quartermaster, and the three Bn-4s. The division net should have a station each for the D-4 and the Division Quartermaster, and a station with each regiment.

COMMUNICATIONS REPORT TINIAN OPERATION

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I It is felt that in general communications were very effective on the Tinian Island operation. Use of available electrical agencies by commanders and staffs showed that with the improvements in equipment now used in the field, these officers have come to realize the importance of putting to optimum employment all communications facilities available to them. Intelligent use by these officers and collaboration with the communication officer on problems that arose resulted in rapid transmission and reception of messages and greatly aided the dissemination of operational and administrative information to and from higher, lower, and adjacent units. Specific comments follow:

II Planning Phase

a. Since the Tinian operation followed so closely the campaign on Saipan there was little time available for added planning. And since during the Saipan operation the communication methods employed had produced satisfactory results all that was necessary was to make minor changes in standing operating procedure.

b. Signal annexes were the same as for the Saipan operation, the only major change being that different voice call signs were assigned.

c. Signal gear damaged or lost in the previous operation was replaced so that all units of RCT 23 were fully equipped before embarkation in LSTs.

d. The Saipan operation taught that some items of signal gear called for by the TBA were of no use during actual combat and such items which had been brought along from the advance base were left on Saipan.

e. Radios were calibrated, dials locked, and correct dial settings recorded prior to embarkation.

III SHIPBOARD PHASE

a. The Combat Team embarked in LSTs on July 23d and debarked July 24th.

b. Temporary message center setup was made.

c. The TBX and SCR 610 on the Division command net and the Regimental control station on SCR 610 and SCR 300 radios were operated from the deck of the LST.

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COMMUNICATIONS REPORT TINIAN OPERATION.

IV. OPERATIONAL PHASE.

- a. RCT 23 was the reserve combat team of the 4th Mar Div.
- b. The regimental communication platoon initially carried ashore a sufficient amount of wire and dry batteries to resupply the three landing teams over a four day period. This method of insuring such resupply was adopted to guard against the possibility that for some reason the ships would have to put out to sea before completely unloading.
- c. The SCR 300 and the SCR 610 aboard the primary control vessel failed to function properly.
- d. During the entire operation ashore all radio sets functioned effectively. The SCR 300 sets again provided excellent channels of communication. The Regimental command net employing the SCR 610 again proved valuable. This net should be retained. Continuous watch was maintained on both the TBX Division command net and the TBX Regimental Command net. These nets are thoroughly reliable and though the equipment is bulky and requires more operators than frequency modulated equipment, they cannot be dispensed with as yet.
- e. Radio voice procedure and net discipline was of high caliber.
- f. Many places on Tinian it was impossible to overhead wire lines without lance poles. The Jar telephone poles in the area of RCT 23 were made of steel. Wires were overheaded along such pole lines by use of a ladder. The basket weave should be employed on steel poles.
- g. Wire communication from regiment to Division was 90% effective; from Regiment to Battalion 70% effective.
- h. Terrain on Tinian was less rugged than on Saipan and wiremen could operate behind our own lines with much greater safety from sniper fire.
- i. Navajo talkers were used on few occasions and proved unsatisfactory. Use of the Joint Assault code for enciphering long, regularly drafted messages is highly inefficient. The CSF 1500 was not used.
- j. Signal supply from Division to regiment was regular and satisfactory. Regiment encountered difficulties in getting signal gear to battalions because of lack of transportation.

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COMMUNICATIONS REPORT-TINIAN OPERATION

V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS.

a. That commanding officers and staff officers be allowed, even encouraged, to use the SCR 300 and SCR 610 as a radio-telephone under certain circumstances and that they be given complete orientation in voice procedure and security measures by the unit communication officer.

b. That each landing team be provided with nine (9) SCR 300 radios in order that two may be kept as spares ready as instant replacements for sets that cease to function within the battalion. The time element involved in sending a faulty set to Division, the repair of the set, and its return to battalion is so considerable that loss of the set for such a period might adversely effect the efficiency of the battalion. Hence the need for spares. One of the nine sets might well be given to the platoon leader of the 81mm mortar platoon.

c. That each landing team be furnished with three SCR 610 radio sets. Two to be placed with one channel on the regimental command frequency and one channel on the Division common frequency. The third set to be utilized by the battalion quartermaster dump with one channel on the Regimental Command frequency and one channel on a Regimental Supply frequency.

d. That each combat team be furnished with three SCR 610s for same purposes as in above recommendation. It is felt that a radio channel connecting the battalion and regimental supply dumps would be an improvement over attempting to install and maintain overlong wire lines to them.

e. That each combat team be provided with lance poles in order that they may overhead wire lines in the beach area. It is recognized that this would entail allowance of more boat spaces in the initial phase of the landing and that more wiremen are needed to handle this equipment and to consolidate and improve wire lines laid by the assault landing teams. However, it is felt that the value of having a reasonable expectancy of telephonic communication during the first few days of an amphibious operation is highly desirable.

f. That the Regimental communication platoon be provided with a one ton truck. It is more practicable in combat for the Regiment to transport to the battalions their needs in the way of signal gear than for each battalion to return to the regiment to draw its own equipment. In addition, some form of transportation is necessary to move the advance elements with the required equipment to a forward command post, often a move of 3000 yards or farther. As frequently as two or three times daily it

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COMMUNICATIONS REPORT TINIAN OPERATION.

is necessary for the regiment to send radio gear to Division for repair and often no transportation is available. For these reasons a one ton truck would be of great value, and in an operation covering large areas, a necessity to the Regimental Communication Platoon.

g. That the radio section of the battalion communication platoon be increased to twenty men.

h. That the wire section of the Regimental communication platoon be increased to twenty-five men.

MEDICAL REPORT-TINIAN OPERATION

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1. Medical personnel were debarked from the LST in three LVT2s; a medical officer with each group. One ambulance jeep, combat-loaded, was debarked in an LVT4. All personnel reached the beach with the regimental CP section at approximately 1615. An aid station was established near the beach, and a minor number of casualties were handled during the remainder of the evening. The collecting sections from C medical company, and the remainder of the ambulance jeeps were debarked from Saipan in LCVPs on D plus 1 day, and reached the beach on Tinian Island the evening of D plus 1 day. This delay was unfortunate as the need for transportation and personnel to evacuate casualties was acute during D plus 1 day. However six by six trucks were used satisfactorily, as 8-10 litter cases could be handled in one load, and walking wounded could reach the beach under their own power.

a. Resupply of medical equipment was obtained from division medical supply and C medical company prior to leaving Saipan. Equipment obtained proved to be very adequate throughout the operation. Ambulance jeeps were combat-loaded, and personnel carried portable supplies ashore as before.

b. Only the collecting sections and two ambulance jeeps from C medical company were sent to Tinian, and they were maintained under regimental control. Collecting sections were sent forward each morning to the battalions in assault. Two ambulance jeeps were sent forward with each section; one to remain with the battalion and the other to remove casualties accumulated during the night. An attempt was made to maintain a minimum of three ambulance jeeps in reserve for emergency requests. However, the frequent requests to displace battalion aid stations, and the long lines of evacuations over rough roads kept most of the ambulances in use. Some evacuation was done after dark. All casualties were evacuated through the regimental aid station for screening, logging, redressing, and blood plasma as indicated. All cases of combat fatigue, heat exhaustion, dengue fever, and minor non-battle casualties were retained for treatment at the regimental aid stations. Recoveries were restored to duty as nearly as practicable. The majority of dengue fever cases had to be sent to the division hospital later, but a large number of fatigue and dysentery cases were restored to duty within 24-72 hrs. Some cases of combat fatigue were returned to duty too early as attest their relapse. It was found that the best procedure with these cases was to maintain fairly heavy sedation for 48 hours, restore fluid balance, and feed them as tolerated. In the management of battle casualties blood plasma was used freely but not wasted. This undoubtedly accounted for the excellent condition in which some cases reached the division hospital over rough roads. On one day during the latter stage of the assault, a detail from the regimental aid station was sent forward of the regimental CP to a road junction with one of the main roads of the island. Their function was the same as before except that casualties were re-routed over a shorter and smoother line of evacuation. Occasional minor difficulty was encountered in delivering medical cases to the rear.

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MEDICAL REPORT-TINIAN OPERATION.

The division hospital being overloaded could not accept them, and they were shunted back and forth between the north airport and the beach until finally accepted at the beach. For the most part, evacuation of casualties functioned more smoothly and rapidly than on Saipan.

2. Communication with the battalion aid stations was for the most part excellent. On several occasions however there was duplicate and even triplicate reports of Bn aid station requests relayed to the regimental aid station. This led to some confusion until the cause was recognized. Also there were instances of staff officers, other than medical officers, wording messages from the Bn aid stations. These often carried a misinterpretation of requirements, and were occasionally sent some time after the situation had changed. This might have been eliminated by having explicit messages originated only by the medical officer concerned, and also having a higher priority rating for this type of message. A much better solution would be direct radio communication between the regimental, and battalion aid stations.

3. Sanitary measures employed were adequate but not elaborate. Fly control, except in rest areas, was impossible because of the abundance of crushed sugar cane, presence of unsprayed dead, and general filth of surroundings. Slit trenches were used throughout the operation. Garbage was burned or buried. Field rations (types K,C,D, 10 in one) were used by assault units except in rest areas. The water supply was at all times adequate. It was never necessary to resort to field sterilization of local water for supply. Wells cisterns were used for bathing and laundry. Facilities for removing the dead were inadequate and functioned too slowly. No attempt was made to spray bodies in the field, principally because personnel and equipment was not available. Body disposal was by burial. In this connection it was noted that in many instances good stretchers were used for handling and transporting the dead. Such usage ruined these stretchers for further medical employment as it was practically impossible to clean them. No attempt was made at mosquito control other than the use of repellent and head nets. In the rest areas, screened galleys were used for preparing B rations. Screening was not adequate to include screened mess halls. Heads had box type covers, and were screened with Japanese mosquito netting when available.

4. Comments and Recommendations:

a. The manner in which C medical company was employed by the regimental commanding officer was very highly satisfactory. Maximum aid was given the battalion aid stations, and evacuation of casualties functioned as smoothly and swiftly as the terrain permitted.

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MEDICAL REPORT-TINIAN OPERATION.

b. The close cooperation of the commanding officer and personnel of C medical company, and the work done by them in behalf of this regiment cannot be too highly praised.

c. The sanitary units established within the battalions cannot function properly during the active phases of an operation. It is suggested that units of 4-6 men be assigned, by higher echelon to each battalion during an operation, the main functions of which is to spray the dead and provide for disposal; maintain fly and insect control; and supervise general field sanitation. They should have adequate equipment and independent transportation.

d. Adequate screening materials, and adequate supplies of insecticides such as naphthalene should be provided for general use. Gasoline, or gas and waste oil mixtures were not satisfactory. Waste oil will not burn alone, and diesel oil was not readily available.

e. Folding type litters should be provided for exchange at the beach. Pole litters are not satisfactory for field use except in vehicles.

f. An ambulance jeep, or preferably a cargo jeep and trailer should be assigned each battalion aid station. Battalion aid stations cannot function entirely portable except over very short distances and for a few hours at a time. Vital ambulance transportation was used routinely in forward displacements of aid stations either because organic transportation was not adequate, or not available at the proper time.

g. Direct radio communication between the battalion aid stations and the regimental aid station would be extremely valuable, and need put no extra burden on communication personnel.

h. Small blackout tents should be provided for treating casualties after dark.

i. Care (other than first aid) and evacuation of wounded civilians, or wounded POWs should not be a function of the Bn aid station, Reg. aid station, or supporting medical company as vital supplies, and particularly transportation can be seriously depleted.

j. Unit 13s should be revised to provide greater accessibility to contents.

k. Bard-Parker type blades and handles would be greatly preferred in the field instrument cases to the present non-detachable.

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AIR LIAISON -- TINIAN OPERATION

I. Air Liaison Party R-1, attached to RCT 23, landed with the RCT command group, D-day at 1800 on Beach White 2. The portable radio (SCR-284) was set up immediately on the SAR circuit and a continuous watch maintained on this circuit during the hours of daylight, throughout the operation. In addition, the RBZ receiver and jeep radio (SCR-193), as available, were used periodically to guard the SAO and SAD nets whenever this could be done to advantage.

a. Air observation reports, information on air missions called by adjacent units, reports of front lines and other pertinent information were relayed as received to the RCT staff for their information and guidance. Recommendations for close support missions were submitted to the CO and R-3 of RCT 23, battalion air liaison officers informed, and requests submitted to CSA as approved. Air support requests submitted by Bn AGLOs were monitored and cleared with R-3.

b. Naval Gunfire and artillery fires controlled within the RCT were coordinated on all air support requests. Adequate safety limits for front line troops were observed in making requests. There was one reported casualty to our troops from the air missions called on Tinian. A man 600 yards in rear of a bomb drop was hit by a fragment from a 500 pound bomb.

c. Several general missions were requested on D plus 1 covering reported enemy tanks and enemy artillery fire falling within our lines. While we were not in a position to observe accurately the effect of air strikes on D-day and D plus 1, it would appear that a more effective job (Than on Saipan) was done by the supporting arms in locating and knocking out enemy artillery positions firing on beach areas. (See later comments regarding air support during the preliminary stage).

d. On D plus 2 we requested a bombing and strafing attack to precede the infantry attack. This was observed and controlled by BLT 1 with satisfactory results.

e. Principal strike missions after D plus 2 were initiated and controlled by BLT air liaison parties in view of the rapid movement of our front line troops. Several missions requested by BLTs on targets of opportunity were later cancelled because of the time element in getting the strikes organized. (See later comments on air support).

f. The major preparation strike against the cliff line on D plus 7 was well executed and most effective although in our sector approximately 35% of the bombs landed in the valley north of the proposed target line.

II. Air Liaison Procedure and the SAR net. Comments and Recommendations.

~~(S)~~

Air Liaison - Tinian Operation: (Cont).

a. The SAR net was not too crowded for the requirements of this operation and ALPs followed simplified procedure as agreed upon prior to the operation. However, see comments and recommendations in Saipan report covering operations where there are more than four RCTs in assault.

III. Air Liaison Radio Equipment. Comments and Recommendations.

a. All air liaison radio equipment worked satisfactorily although some repairs were required during the operation on the SCR-284 radio. The jeep radio was used only as an auxiliary due to generator difficulties. No 12 volt brushes were available on the island so that permanent generator repairs could not be accomplished.

b. Waterproof covers for microphones and some means of waterproofing the antenna mount on the SCR-284 radio would be helpful during operating periods on land.

c. It is believed that a major change in the equipment of air liaison parties could be made, in order to simplify operation and reduce the amount of radio equipment carried by battalion parties. (See Appendix A).

IV. Direct Air Support; Comments and recommendations.

a. Air support as operated did not prove to be the "flexible" weapon we believed it should and could be.

b. During the first two days of landings it is seldom possible for ground units to locate and call strikes accurately on enemy artillery and mortar fire which may be falling on them. Air should be the "flexible" weapon to search out and strike these priority targets. We suggest "roving" patrols consisting of an air observer plane and about six striking aircraft, for each division sector, with the mission of knocking out enemy artillery firing during the first two days, the strike to be called and led in by the air observer (or coordinator). Ground units would only keep SAC informed of their front lines and advise when artillery is falling on their lines.

c. It was our experience that a minimum of one half hour was needed to schedule an air attack at a designated time when aircraft was available and on station. (This includes the time required for designating front lines; for checking artillery and naval gunfire; for dummy runs etc.). This time element should be reduced.

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Air Liaison - Tinian Operation; (Cont).

d. One cause of the delay was the time required to coordinate Corps artillery and artillery and naval gunfire being fired by adjacent units. We believe that it should be possible to coordinate all fires within a RCT sector at the regimental CP prior to calling the mission and that in most cases the air mission might be so directed that it would not be necessary to check the fires of adjacent units. However, if it is essential to shut off all firing at the time of air strikes it might be advantageous to predesignate a 15 minute period during each hour when all artillery and naval gunfire in a division sector would be knocked off, in favor of direct support air strikes. A separate 15 minute period might be designated for each front line division thus also solving to some degree the question of priority of air support between divisions. Dummy runs should be employed only on very close support missions due to the time requirement.

V. Cooperation of Ground Units, Comments and Recommendations.

a. Cooperation by front line companies in using panels has been good. They were carried and laid out whenever lines were stabilized. Difficulty was apparently encountered in spotting panels in dense foliage.

b. The use of smoke for designating targets apparently worked out satisfactorily when employed. Some difficulty was experienced in coordinating the use of smoke on the ground when troops were attacking.

c. Cooperation of RCT staff in providing all needed information as to operation plans, our own and the enemy situation, and front lines of all units, was excellent.

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APPENDIX A TO SAIPAN AND TINIAN REPORTS OF ALP R-1.

Subject: Revised Equipment for Air Liaison Parties.

I. Present complement of personnel and equipment carried by Air Liaison parties within an RCT is as follows:

a. 1 - Regimental Team:

1 SCR-284 Radio.
1 Jeep with 1 SCR-542 and 1 SCR-193.
1 RBZ receiver.
2 536 Radios.
1 EES phone and remote control unit.
(1 officer - 5 enlisted).

b. 3 - Battalion Teams:

(each team)
1 SCR-284 Radio.
1 Jeep with 1 SCR-542 and 1 SCR-193.
1 RBZ receiver.
2 536 Radios.
1 EES phone and remote control unit.
(1 officer - 5 or 6 enlisted).

II. We suggest a revised complement of equipment and personnel as follows:

a. 4 Teams (1 regimental and 3 battalion).

(each team)
1 SCR-300 Radio*
1 RBZ receiver.
(1 officer - 2 enlisted.)
**

b. 1 Regimental Relay Team:

1 SCR-300 Radio*
1 SCR-284 Radio
1 Jeep with SCR-542 and SCR-193
1 EES phone and remote control unit.
(1 SSGT and 4 Pfc)

c. Net reduction of personnel and radio equipment per RCT.

9 Enlisted
3 SCR-284 Radios
8 SCR-536
3 EES phones and remote control
3 Jeeps with 1 SCR-542 and 1 SCR-193

d. Net additional equipment required.

5 SCR-300 Radios*
**

Appendix A to Saipan and Tinian Reports of ALP R-1. (Cont).

* SCR-300 is specified to illustrate type of radio required. If channels are not available, any single unit portable set capable of reliable transmissions for 3 miles would be satisfactory. (The SCR-536 is not good enough).

** Jeeps may be provided battalion teams for transportation of men and equipment where substantial movement inland is expected.

III. Procedure:

a. The regimental relay team would be landed with one of the assault battalions, set up near the beach and revert to regimental control after the regimental CP is set up.

b. Battalion AGLOs would transmit mission requests via SCR-300 to the regimental relay team who will clear the request with the regimental CP, if ashore, and immediately relay to CSA on the SAR net.

c. Actually there is no loss of efficiency or speed in this procedure. The battalion AGL officer is generally with the BLT commander at the OP or CP and normally relays his request via SCR-536 or ground wire to his own radio team. Instead he will merely relay through the regimental relay team. This procedure will also provide for prompt clearance and coordination of NGF and artillery within the entire RCT sector.

d. Battalion teams can monitor the SAR net on the RBZ receiver, however important communications and observation reports from CSA should also be relayed over the SCR-300 circuit by the RCT relay team.

IV. The advantages of this revision are as follows:

a. Increased "mobility" of battalion parties.

b. Reduction of personnel and of equipment to be carried and maintained.

c. Reduced number of stations on the SAR net and simplification of procedure.

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FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT - TINIAN

ANNEX I

R E P O R T O F R C T 2 4

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HEADQUARTERS, TWENTY-FOUR MARINES,
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

30 August, 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, Fourth Marine Division.
Subject: Final Report on TINIAN Operation.
Reference: (a) Division Special Order No. 140-44.
Enclosure: (A) Final Report on TINIAN Operation, Regimental
Combat Team 24.

1. The following report covering the activities of
Combat Team Twenty-Four during the TINIAN Operation, from in-
ception to conclusion, is herewith submitted, together with ob-
servations and recommendations resulting therefrom.

F. A. Hart
F. A. HART

Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps,

Log No 320
Acc Source R-11
Date 20 Sept 44
Copy No 2

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SECTION I

PRELIMINARIES

1. On completion of the mopping up phase of the SAIPAN Operation, RCT 24 moved to a bivouac area on SAIPAN in the vicinity of TA 131 J on 13 July, 1944, for rest and reorganization, pending the TINIAN Operation. During this period, operations were limited to patrolling the coastline along MAGICIENNE Bay in our zone of responsibility.

2. On 11 July, 1944, 9 officers and 244 enlisted were received as replacements. This brought the strength of the Regiment to 104 officers and 1881 enlisted.

SECTION II

PLANNING

1. While rest and reorganization were in progress, plans were formulated for the TINIAN Operation. No rehearsal was possible under the circumstances, and orientation of the troops consisted of only a few hours briefing.

2. In the course of preparation for the operation, conferences were held with the Commanding General and the Division Staff, Battalion Commanders and their staff members, and with the Commanding Officers of supporting units by the Regimental Commander and his staff. An aerial reconnaissance was made over TINIAN by the Regimental and Battalion Commanders, and key RCT staff officers.

3. An operation order was prepared, and the following task organization was set up by RCT 24 for the TINIAN Operation:

a. BLT 2/24

LtCol. R. Rothwell, USMC.

2nd Bn, 24th Mar

Det, 2nd Band Sec

Det, Co B, 20th Mar (plus Det 1341st Eng Bn (Army))

Det Coll Sec, Co B, 4th Med Bn

Det, 1st JASCO

F.O Det, 14th Mar

Det, 2nd Amph Trac Bn

Planning, Cont'd

b. BLT 1/24

LtCol. O. Lessing, USMCR

1st Bn, 24th Mar
Det, 2nd Band Sec
Det, Coll Sec, Co B, 4th Med Bn
Det, Co B, 20th Mar (plus Det 1341st Eng Bn (Army))
Det, 1st JASCO
Det, 2nd Amph Trac Bn
F.O. Det, 14th Mar

c. BLT 3/24

LtCol. A. A. Vandegrift, USMC

3rd Bn, 24th Mar
Det, 2nd Band Sec
Det, Coll Sec, Co B, 4th Med Bn
Det, 1st JASCO
Det, 2nd Amph Trac Bn
Det, Co B, 20th Mar (plus Det 1341st Eng Bn (Army))
F.O. Det, 14th Mar

d. SUPPORT GROUP

Col. F. A. Hart, USMC

H&S Co, 24th Mar
Regt Wons Co, 24th Mar
Co B, 4th Tank Bn
Co B, 20th Mar (less Dets)
1341st Eng Bn (Army)(less Dets)(plus CP Det H&S,
20th Mar
2nd Plat, 4th MP Co
Det, 1st JASCO
Det, 2nd Amph Trac Bn
2nd Armd Amph Trac Bn
Det, 4th MT Bn
Det, Prov Rocket Det
F.O. Det, 14th Mar.

This task organization proved to be both adequate and satisfactory. The total RCT strength was 191 officers and 3368 enlisted.

4. EMBARKATION PLAN

a. The reef off the beach selected for the landing precluded use of LCVP's, and plans were made to land in LVT's from LST's. For this purpose, the following LST's, LSD's, and landing craft had been allotted to RCT 24:

Planning, Cont'd.

13 LST's 4 LCT's (for 1 trip only)
 1 LSD (1) LCT (for 2nd trip)
 96 LVT(2)'s 30 LCVP's (for 1 trip only)
 40 LVT(4)'s (12) LCVP's (for 2nd trip)

It was decided that these craft would be employed by the RCT as follows:

	<u>LST's</u>	<u>LSD's</u>	<u>LCT's</u>	<u>LVT's</u>		<u>LCVP's</u>
				(2)'s	(4)'s	
<u>Troops</u>	8			96	40	
<u>LVT(A)'s</u>	2					
<u>Tanks</u>		1				
<u>Supplies</u>	3					
<u>Vehicles and weapons not landed with troops</u>			4			30
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>30</u>

b. On each LST designated as a troop carrier two companies, or equivalent unit were embarked with their combat equipment, together with the LVT's assigned them. Miscellaneous attached units were distributed throughout the eight LST's.

c. The major part of the LVT(4)'s were employed primarily for transporting vehicles and heavier equipment to be landed with the troops. The balance of the LVT(4)'s and all of the LVT(2)'s were used for landing personnel.

d. Beach Yellow 1 was designated as the embarkation assembly area for troops. Because of reefs in the vicinity of this beach, troops were to embark in their LVT groups on the beach and move out to assigned LST's. LVT's were then to embark on the same LST with their respective troop units.

e. The seaplane ramp at TANAPAG Harbor was designated the assembly area for the embarkation of LVT(A)'s.

f. Tanks were to load on the assigned LSD from an assembly area at Beach Green.

~~SECRET~~
Planning, Cont'd.

g. Replenishments of ammunition, water, rations, and other supplies which were to be preloaded and landed when the tactical situation permitted, were directed to load at Beach Red 1.

h. Vehicles, half-tracks, bulldozers, and 37mm guns which were not to be landed with the troops were directed to load on the LCT's and LCVP's allotted the RCT, and from the loading point at TANAPAG Harbor, proceed directly to TINIAN Island to land on call.

5. LANDING PLAN

a. The Division Operation Order provided simultaneous landings of RCT 24 on Beach White 1 and RCT 25 on Beach White 2 about 800 yards south of White 1. The beach proper at White 1 was an unobstructed sandy area about seventy yards in width. The coastline on either side of the beach was flanked by shelving rock four to six feet above water. It was assumed, and later proved correct, that troops could climb onto the shelving rock from LVT's and thus get ashore. This shelf area, plus the open beach, gave a total possible troop landing front of about three hundred yards. Because landing on a broad front was not possible, it was decided to land the RCT in column of BLT's, each BLT in column of companies.

b. Each wave was to consist of eight LVT's in which would be embarked an entire company or unit of an equivalent size. It was further planned to form sixteen waves, each to land on a fixed time schedule with an interval between waves ranging from four to ten minutes. The time interval between waves was based on an estimate of the time required for each wave to clear the beach, taking into consideration the weapons and equipment carried ashore. An additional free wave, comprising the RCT Command Group, was to land as the situation permitted or demanded.

c. Since it was felt that the selection of the landing beach would obtain tactical surprise, it was planned to land as many troops on the beach in the shortest possible time before the enemy could recover and reinforce his defenses with troops from other sectors. The above landing plan would enable the entire RCT (excluding tanks, vehicles not landed with the troops, half-tracks, and two platoons of 37mm guns which were to land on call) to be landed in 102 minutes.

Planning, Cont'd.

d. The landing schedule was planned to be flexible in order to permit a speeding up or slowing down of waves if the situation demanded. In order to prevent too much congestion on the beach, the following procedure was followed. The executive officers of the two leading assault BLT's were to embark on the LCC, equipped with a radio, set up on their respective battalion net. They were to move to a point within 1500 yards of the beach, observe the landing of each wave, and keep the Regimental Commander and Operations Officer aboard the PC for Beach White 1, informed of the situation. In this way, it would be possible to slow down, or stop, the landing of waves if congestion occurred.

e. Supporting LVTA's were directed to precede the assault waves to a point 300 yards from Beach White 1, at which time they would move to both flanks and be prepared to provide fire support.

6. OPERATION PLAN

a. RCT 24 was designated as the left assault combat team of the Division. With its main effort on the right, the RCT's mission was to seize O-1 within its zone of action; then, on Division order, was to advance within its zone and seize the most favorable ground along O-2 from which it could assist RCT 25 and cover the landing area. It was to protect the Division's left flank, reorganize on O-2, and prepare for further operations.

b. BLT 2/24 was to land one company (company "E") in the first wave, move inland and obtain a foothold on the beach. The second wave landed was to be one company (company "A") from BLT 1/24. This company was to move immediately to the RCT's left boundary and protect that flank. The third wave (company "G") was to land and move immediately to the right boundary, establish contact with RCT 25 on the right and tie in on the left with company "E".

c. Following the third wave, the remainder of BLT 2/24 was to land with instructions to tie in with its companies ashore and attack through the right half of the regimental zone of action. BLT 1/24 (less the one company in the second wave) was to follow BLT 2/24 ashore and tie in with its company already ashore and holding the left flank of the beach. BLT 3/24 in RCT reserve, was to immediately follow BLT 1/24 ashore and support the attack with particular attention to BLT 2/24 on the right. BLT 3/24 was also to be in readiness for release to RCT 25 control on Division order.

Planning, Cont'd.

d. Tanks, half-tracks, and two platoons of 37mm guns were to be landed, on order, and support the attack.

e. Items included in paragraph 3 (x) of the Operation Order were identical to those set forth in 4thMarDiv OpnOrder No. 34-44.

f. In addition to the Operations Order, a Support Group Memorandum, setting forth detailed instructions for all support units, was issued. An administrative order and the following annexes were prepared: Task Organization; Operation Overlay; Signal Communications; LST Assignment and Landing Craft Allocation Schedule; Landing Diagram and Schedule; Distribution List.

g. One hundred thirty copies of the operation order and annexes were prepared and distributed to forty-two different units and individuals.

SECTION III

EMBARKATION

1. On 23 July movement of troops commenced at 0700 from the bivouac area to an assembly area near the beach in the vicinity of Yellow 1.

2. Loading commenced from the assembly area about 0900, and was accomplished expeditiously. All supporting LVT's had been lined up ashore in the vicinity of the assembly area in a wave formation identical to the proposed landing scheme. Boat signs had been placed in each LVT. As each unit arrived in the assembly area, it was loaded in its respective LVT group and proceeded, without delay, to its assigned LST. Since the arrival of units in the assembly area had been staggered, no confusion in loading resulted. Embarkation from other designated areas proceeded according to plan. By 1600, the embarkation of RCT 24 on assigned LST's had been completed, and the LST Division got underway.

~~SECRET~~
Embarkation, Cont'd.

3. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Some units experienced difficulty in transferring from LVT's to LST's because of poor nets. Many nets were too short, some were in poor repair while others lacked proper spreaders.

RECOMMENDATION: That suitable debarkation nets be provided and maintained on LST's.

SECTION IV

NARRATIVE OF THE ASSAULT

24 July - All LST's carrying troops of RCT 24 embarked troops into LVT's and launched them about 0600. LVT's proceeded to the Rendezvous Area, formed up and moved, on order, to the Line of Departure. During the movement to the Line of Departure intermittent automatic 20mm or 40mm fire was received from the beachhead area. Waves were dispatched from the Line of Departure to Beach White 1 in accordance with the Landing Schedule.

The landing proceeded according to plan, with the first wave landing on Beach White 1 at 0750. Small arms, mortar, and artillery fire opposed the landing, but the attack was pushed vigorously, and a beachhead was quickly established. The heaviest resistance was encountered near the beach on the RCT left flank in the zone of action of BLT 1/24. At 1415 the "FREE" wave of the RCT landed. This was the last wave of the landing formation, and had been held up in order to allow the tanks and artillery to land without congesting the beach.

After the landing, the attack, supported by 8 medium tanks, was continued towards O-1. BLT 2/24, on the right, had little difficulty in moving forward, meeting only small arms fire during its advance. However, heavy enemy resistance in thick brush and caves near the beach on the left flank held up the advance of BLT 1/24.

Narrative of Assault, Cont'd.

At approximately 1600 the O-1 line was reached by all elements except those on the extreme left flank, where continued heavy resistance prevented the advance. Stubborn enemy groups still held out in caves near the water's edge and LVTA's were employed from the water on the left to fire into these caves. Flame thrower tanks were used in the brush. At 1630, BLT 3/24, which had been in reserve, was ordered forward to fill in a gap between BLT's 1/24 and 2/24 along the O-1 line. Units then dug in for the night. During the night, 8 medium tanks remained in the lines to augment the defense against the expected counter-attack. Shortly before dark, BLT 1/8 landed as Division Reserve and went into an assembly area in rear of BLT 2/24.

25 July - During the early part of the night the only enemy activity consisted of intermittent artillery and mortar fire. However, about 0300 the enemy launched a strong counterattack at 2 places in the RCT sector.

One drive struck the RCT left flank, which was anchored on the coastline, and proved to be the more serious of the two drives. There was fierce fighting in this sector. The other drive, which was of a more or less secondary nature, struck on the RCT right flank initially. Later this drive shifted to the left of the RCT 24 sector.

Support against the counterattack was being fired from battery positions of 2/14. While the counterattack was in progress, a large enemy group filtered in from the Division's right and attacked these positions. In order to maintain these supporting fires, it was necessary for 2/14 to immobilize one battery to fight off the attackers. At about 0445, one company of 1/8 was sent to augment the defense of the artillery position. The artillery support was maintained and most of the infiltrating group was annihilated.

The enemy counterattack on the left flank continued until approximately 0545, when it appeared to be breaking under the coordinated fires of our infantry weapons and supporting artillery. At this point, it was possible to further employ our supporting medium tanks. Although some fire was still being received from remnants of the enemy force until about 0700, the situation appeared to be well in hand, and it became evident that the enemy had suffered heavy losses. LVTA's were again used along the beach area in mopping up the scattered enemy groups that still remained.

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Narrative of Assault, Cont'd.

Little enemy activity took place during the night in the center of the RCT sector, which was occupied by BLT 3/24.

Although the hour originally set by Division for the continuation of the attack was 0700, mopping-up operations and reorganization caused a delay, and RCT 24 jumped off at 1000. After a 15 minute artillery preparation, elements of RCT 8, which had landed on Beach White 1 at about 0600, passed through BLT 1/24 and the latter then reverted to RCT Reserve.

The advance, supported by tanks, progressed at a fairly rapid pace. BLT 3/24 was on the left and in contact with RCT 8, and BLT 2/24 was on the right and in contact with RCT 25. By 1500, our front line units had reached the O-2 line. A gap had developed on the left flank, however, during the later stages of the advance to O-2, and in order to re-establish contact it was necessary to commit BLT 1/24 between BLT 3/24 and RCT 8.

At nightfall, all units dug in on a line generally along O-2. The left flank was tied in with RCT 8 in the vicinity of USHI Point Airfield. The right flank was tied in with RCT 25. Supporting tanks remained with the front line units. One platoon from the Division Reconnaissance Company was attached for the night and was employed as a combat outpost covering an important road junction near the RCT right flank.

26 July - The night was relatively quiet, except for a brief skirmish between an enemy patrol and the combat outpost manned by the attached platoon from the Division Reconnaissance Company.

In accordance with Division order, BLT's 1/24 and 3/24 were relieved in their zones of action by elements of the 2nd Marine Division, and BLT 2/24 was attached to RCT 25 as of 0730. The RCT (less BLT 2/24) then reverted to Division Reserve, and moved to an assembly area in the general vicinity of 633 F.

Mopping-up operations, in the Division rear areas, were commenced by RCT 24 about 1000. LVTA's, tanks, demolitions, and flame throwers were employed in cleaning out the caves and heavy undergrowth. Some intelligence material and enemy weapons were found, but few enemy were encountered. It soon became apparent that the enemy had almost completely evacuated the beach-head area. Mopping-up operations were completed at approximately 1540.

Narrative of Assault, Cont'd.

During the afternoon, 9 officers and 266 enlisted men were received as replacements and were assigned to units within the Regiment.

BLT 1/24 was designated as NT&LF Reserve at 1555, and ordered to remain in its assembly area.

The RCT spent the remainder of the day in rest and reorganization.

27 July - The RCT (less BLT's 1/24 and 2/24) remained in Division Reserve; rest and reorganization continued. At 1500, movement was made to a new assembly area at 618 V, in accordance with Division orders.

BLT 1/24 reverted to RCT 24 control at 1540, but remained in its assembly area at 633 F. The balance of the day was uneventful.

28 July - BLT 1/24 moved into the new RCT assembly area at 0730 and took up a position at 618 Q.

On Division order, RCT 24 (less BLT 2/24) displaced to an assembly area at 590 V, from which it moved into an attack position between RCT's 23 and 25. The attack jumped off at 1300, with RCT 23 on our right.

The advance was made initially in column of BLT's with BLT 1/24 in assault preceded by one platoon of tanks. As the advance progressed, however, the expected gap between our left and RCT 25 developed and as preplanned BLT 3/24 was committed on the left of BLT 1/24, in order to maintain contact. The advance was rapid, only light resistance was encountered, and the objective (O-6(A)) was reached at 1730.

With the seizure of O-6(A), RCT 23 had been pinched out on the Division right flank and reverted to Division Reserve. This placed RCT 24 on the Division right flank, its right on the coast, with RCT 25 on the left. Contact was maintained with RCT 25 and lines were consolidated for the night along O-6(A).

29 July - During the night, BLT 3/24 suffered several casualties from enemy artillery fire, but no other hostile activity was in evidence.

Narrative of Assault, Cont'd.

The attack continued at 0700, on Division order, with RCT's 24 and 25 abreast, RCT 24 on the right. BLT's 1/24 and 3/24 were abreast, BLT 1/24 on the right. BLT 2/24, which had reverted to RCT 24 control at 0600, followed in reserve. Supporting tanks preceded the advance. No resistance was encountered until 0900, when the O-6 line was reached.

Units reorganized on O-6 and the advance was continued. At approximately 0930, BLT 1/24 ran into a well organized and camouflaged enemy strong point. After meeting stubborn resistance, tanks and infantry overran the position, and the advance was again progressing rapidly by 1300.

One company from BLT 2/24 was committed at 1500, in order to fill in a gap which had developed between BLT 1/24 and BLT 3/24.

At 1525 orders were issued to dig in on the most advantageous terrain in the vicinity of the front lines at that time. Contact was established on left with RCT 25.

30 July - RCT 24 jumped off in a continuation of the attack at 0745 with artillery supporting the attack. BLT 1/24 was on the right with its flank on the coastline; BLT 3/24 was on the left and maintained contact with RCT 23. BLT 2/24 followed in RCT Reserve.

Little resistance was encountered initially. After the attack had progressed about 500 yards, the left flank of BLT 1/24 was stopped by heavy machine gun and rifle fire from the face of a cliff which ran parallel to the direction of the advance. This resistance was overcome with help of supporting medium tanks. Flame thrower tanks, assisted by LVTA's, were used to clean out the caves. One tank was knocked out by enemy artillery fire. At 1000, BLT 2/24 was committed in column of companies, between BLT's 1/24 and 3/24, in the vicinity of the cliff line. When the advance continued at 1100, BLT 2/24 was assigned the mission of following the assault and mopping up.

In the meantime, BLT 3/24, attempting to maintain contact on the left with RCT 25, which had continued forward, had become echeloned well forward. Contact was lost within the unit because of an over-extension of its lines. As a result, a gap developed temporarily within BLT 3/24.

Narrative of Assault, Cont'd.

The advance reached the outskirts of TINIAN Town at approximately 1420. In passing through, it was found that the town had been all but leveled by naval gun fire, artillery, and aerial bombardments. Only one Japanese soldier was found. Some fire, believed to have come from enemy tanks in the distance, fell in the right of our sector, but did no damage. An investigation of the beaches in the vicinity of TINIAN Town revealed that they were very heavily mined.

By 1700, the ruins had been thoroughly combed, and all units had occupied the O-7 line, south of the town. Contact was established on the left with RCT 23 which had passed through and relieved RCT 25 in its zone of action. Reorganization then took place and lines were consolidated for the night.

31 July - No enemy activity was in evidence during the night. RCT 24 continued the attack in accordance with Division order. Preparation consisted of intense air, naval, and artillery bombardment laid on the northern ridge line of the southern end of the island.

BLT's 1/24 and 3/24, abreast, moved out at 0830, with BLT 1/24 continuing on the right along the coastline. BLT 2/24, in Division Reserve, but under RCT 24 control, followed the advance at 600 yards. Contact was maintained with RCT 23 on the left. Supporting tanks preceded the attack.

At about 0945 resistance began to develop on the RCT right flank, and light artillery fire was received. At 1000, the right company of BLT 1/24 received a local counterattack near the beach area. The resistance was heavy for a short time, but by 1100, the enemy local counterattack had been broken up and the resistance overcome. One company of BLT 1/24 was left to mop up in rear, and the advance continued. Dense undergrowth and occasional enemy groups in the rugged terrain made progress on the right very difficult. Flame thrower tanks were used to burn out caves and heavy underbrush.

BLT 3/24 encountered only sporadic sniper and machine gun fire on the RCT left during the early stages of the advance. About noon a gap developed on the left, however, contact was re-established at 1300.

Narrative of Assault, Cont'd.

About 1600, BLT 3/24 encountered heavy resistance comprised of machine gun and rifle fire from the ridge line to the left front. Tanks and half-tracks were employed in overcoming the resistance, but because the road leading to the high ground had been heavily mined, our armour could not be effectively used. The mines were removed by the engineers.

Further advance was deemed inadvisable, and orders were given for units to dig in on the most favorable terrain in the vicinity of the front lines at that time. Contact was established with RCT 23 on the left, and positions were consolidated for the night.

1 August - On Division order, the attack was continued at 0800. RCT 24 remained on the Division right and RCT 23 on the left. Disposition of units within the RCT was the same as the day before; BLT's 1/24 and 3/24 were abreast, BLT 1/24 on the right. BLT 2/24 was still in Division Reserve.

The day was almost a prototype of the day before. Tanks led the assault, and movement was greatly retarded by dense brush and rocky terrain. Because artillery support was impractical in such restricted area, fire support was obtained from the tanks, half-tracks, and 37mm guns. Resistance was limited to isolated enemy groups which fought stubbornly from caves, crevasses, and other natural terrain features.

BLT 2/24 was released to RCT 24 control at 1300.

The terrain in the RCT zone of action was now of a pallsade-like nature, being comprised of three distinct levels which stepped down from the highest point along the cliff line to the sea. Lines were readjusted within the RCT and all three BLT's were placed abreast. BLT 3/24 occupied the high ground on the RCT left, BLT 2/24 occupied the center level, and BLT 1/24 remained on the lowest level, its right flank on the coastline.

After the adjustment had been made, the advance continued at 1500, swinging from a southward to an easterly direction around the tip of the island. The LVTA's were now able to move into the water across a beach from which the mines had been removed, and a few were employed by BLT 1/24 to fire into caves at the water's edge. Many POW's, the major part of whom were

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Narrative of Assault, Cont'd.

civilians, were now being turned in. Intermittent enemy machine gun and rifle fire continued, but to a lesser degree than before. The advance continued slowly, and at 1855 TINIAN was officially declared secured, all organized resistance having ceased.

Lines were consolidated along the general line 502 K,F,A, - 504 U,P,Q,L at 1800, and BLT 3/24 was in contact with RCT 23. Naval gun fire provided star shell illumination for the night on a larger scale than heretofore.

2 August - At 0700 mopping-up was continued. LVTA's supplemented the supporting tanks. Flame thrower tanks and demolitions were used to great advantage in cleaning out caves, etc. No organized resistance was encountered, but fire was received during most of the day from scattered enemy elements in all sectors.

Large numbers of civilians, who were in hiding with the enemy soldiers, complicated mopping-up operations in the same manner as they had on SAIPAN. However, by 1430, RCT 24 had accomplished complete coverage of its zone of responsibility on TINIAN.

A line was formed generally along 504 P,U, -502 A,F for the night and contact maintained with RCT 23. Additional star shell illumination was requested for the night.

3 August - The situation in the area was similar to that of the previous day. The mopping-up operations continued because scattered fire was still being received from "holed up" Japanese. Flame throwers and demolitions were again employed. Civilians and soldiers in large numbers were being induced to surrender.

Orders were received from Division to move into an assembly area in the north-central portion of the island, at 601 F, to await relief and evacuation. This movement was in progress from 1400 to 1700.

A composite battalion, comprised of one company from each BLT, was left in the RCT 24 zone of responsibility on the southern end of the island. This composite battalion was attached to RCT 23, and was assigned the mission of final mopping-up and the burial of our own and enemy dead.

SECTION V

OPERATIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I

SHIP TO SHORE

1. This was the third time RCT 24 had used LVT's for an opposed landing, but it was the first time they were used successfully. At NAMUR the LVT's assigned to this RCT had been employed in the previous days landing and because sufficient tractors were not available at the right time the scheduled landing plan could not be executed. Again, at SAIPAN, when this RCT landed in reserve, the transfer to LVT's was not accomplished as planned, because of insufficient tractors. On TINIAN adequate LVT's were originally assigned and the landing was accomplished as intended.

2. The LVT control plan worked well. The LVT Commander was stationed on the control boat, had excellent communications with his LVT's and knew at all times the number of tractors that had hit the beach and their operational casualties.

3. LVT(4)'s were satisfactory as personnel and vehicle carriers. Sufficient tractors were provided to prevent overcrowding and to supply spare tractors to care for operational losses. Officers in charge of guide boats had been able to confer with LVT officers the day before the landing and they were therefore mutually working to the same end. Boat groups were numbered from left to right in waves and this facilitated control and recognition.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. There were several instances where LVT's landed too far to the right and left of the defined landing area. This was contrary to the instructions of the senior troop commander aboard.

RECOMMENDATION: That all LVT drivers and crew chiefs must be indoctrinated with the necessity of landing their loads where directed, beach conditions permitting. They must be taught that the success or failure of securing a beachhead may depend on their obedience to orders at the critical landing phase.

b. The landing plan worked excellently. The three BLT's were on the beach in slightly over the allotted time with no undue congestion on the beach.

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Operational Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

RECOMMENDATION: That in future operations a similar control plan be utilized.

RECOMMENDATION: That LVT(4)'s replace LVT(2)'s as both personnel and vehicle carriers whenever possible.

PART II

TACTICAL

1. The landing plan and plan of assault after hitting the beach proved sound. It developed that the enemy did not anticipate a landing of such force on this narrow beach. The speed with which the landing was effected prevented the enemy from moving sufficient reinforcements and supporting fire to effectively oppose it.

2. While the enemy retired to both flanks of the beach proper, the left flank caused the most difficulty. Here the enemy was reinforced by other troops of sufficient strength to stop our advance short of O-1 on the left flank. However, this flank held and permitted the landing of the entire RCT, allowing its other units to make contact with RCT 25 on the right and the securing of the balance of O-1 the first day.

3. Tactics employed on SAIPAN and TINIAN were similar -- infantry attacks supported by tanks, artillery, naval gunfire, and air strikes. Improvement was noted in the use and coordination of all arms. The application of lessons gained from experience combined with less difficult terrain were contributing factors toward a much smoother running operation.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Same as report on SAIPAN Operation with the following modifications:

- (1) More time was available for reconnaissance before the attack but still not enough.
- (2) Widths of frontages in attack and zones of responsibility in the defense were reduced and were more in keeping with the number of effectives available.
- (3) Attacks were generally better coordinated by higher echelons so as not to expose flanks.

PART III

INFANTRY

1. Infantry was employed on the operation in the same manner as on SAIPAN. Organization of defenses for the night were better planned, more use was made of defensive wire and covering fire. Battle fatigue was prevalent in all units during the last several days of the attack.

2. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Same as SAIPAN report with the following modifications:

(1) The use of the same tank company throughout the operation led to improvement in tank-infantry coordination.

3. INFANTRY WEAPONS:

a. All comments and recommendations made in report on SAIPAN Operation are applicable to the TINIAN Operation.

PART IV

SUPPORTING UNITS

1. REGIMENTAL WEAPONS COMPANY:

a. On the TINIAN Operation the functions of the Weapons Company were the same as on SAIPAN. They were used constantly in direct support of assault infantry in both the attack and defense.

b. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) 37MM GUN: Same as report on SAIPAN with the addition that these guns proved invaluable in stopping several counterattacks. The canister shell was used almost exclusively for these missions.

(2) 75MM HALF-TRACKS: As on SAIPAN, the half-tracks again proved themselves an excellent infantry supporting weapon. In many instances when firing on caves in cliffs, personnel were exposed to plunging fire.

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Operational Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

RECOMMENDATION: That the present HALF-TRACK be replaced by a unit such as the Carriage, Motor, 76mm Gun, M-18.

(3) ROCKETS: Only two rocket missions were fired on TINIAN because of ammunition shortage. These were both fired on two ridges of known enemy concentrations in support of BLT 3/24. Results were unobserved but were believed to have been effective.

(4) 50 CALIBER MACHINE GUN: Not used to any extent in this operation.

2. ARTILLERY:

a. Artillery support of this RCT, as on SAIPAN, continued to be excellent throughout the operation. All comments and recommendations in the report on SAIPAN Operation are applicable to TINIAN.

3. TANKS:

a. Comments and recommendations in report on SAIPAN Operation apply with the following modifications:

(1) The task organization assignment of one reinforced medium tank company totaling eighteen medium tanks was augmented by a platoon of four flame thrower tanks and two M5A1's upon landing. This same tank organization supported the RCT throughout the operation, thus, the disadvantages of having different tank units assigned the RCT from time to time, as on SAIPAN, were overcome. The number of tanks available was adequate.

(2) Infantry-tank attacks were better coordinated and there was more time for reconnaissance and briefing. However, adequate time was still not provided. Dispersal areas were properly located. They were closer to the front lines, generally between the front lines and the Regiment CP.

4. COMBAT ENGINEERS:

a. One platoon of Engineers was assigned each BLT in setting up the RCT task organization. Company Headquarters remained under regimental control. This distribution of the Engineer Company remained in effect throughout the operation, platoons reverting to company control only when the RCT was in Division reserve.

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Operational Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

b. The activities and employment of Engineers was the same as on SAIPAN. They were engaged in blowing caves, emplacements and dugouts, clearing mine fields and preparing demolitions. Company Headquarters and heavy equipment, however, were seldom used as the road net on TINIAN was comparatively good.

c. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Same as report on SAIPAN Operation with the following modifications:

(1) It was seldom necessary to use the Engineers in the capacity of infantry in the assault or defense. This variance over SAIPAN was a result of reduced fronts in the attack, lesser zones of responsibility in defense, more infantry effectuals available and the nature of the opposition.

(2) Transportation was normally provided to carry explosives for demolition teams, thus, eliminating the necessity for back-packing heavy loads by the Engineers.

5. SHORE PARTY ENGINEERS:

a. The 1341st Engineer Battalion (Army) was assigned this RCT as Shore Party and carried out their assigned tasks and missions in an excellent manner. This unit was detached from the RCT the second day of the attack. The following questionnaire report was submitted by this unit prior to the RCT's departure from TINIAN.

(1) The 1341st Engineer Battalion was attached to RCT 24 as Shore Party and reverted to control of the Fourth Marine Division Engineer at 1510 on J plus one. It was not attached to RCT 24 during the SAIPAN operation.

(2) The 1341st Engineer Battalion was employed as Shore Party. Two lettered companies and Headquarters Company landed for Shore Party work and one lettered company was employed as ship's parties on five LST's. The bulk of the truck and equipment operators remained on SAIPAN on call.

(3) The general missions assigned this battalion were shore party operation, beachhead defense, initial construction of approaches to a pontoon pier and LVT ramps, and construction of a POW cage.

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Operational Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

(4) Shore party equipment landed was: 3 D7's; 3 D8's; 3 traction cranes; 1 compressor; and 3 dump trucks.

Three caterpillar D-7 bulldozers with armored cabs were landed on call. This brought them ashore at approximately H plus 100. This was the ideal time and is believed to be the best method of bringing equipment ashore.

(5) All Shore Party Engineer equipment afloat prior to H-Hour was landed on J-Day. All other Shore Party Engineer equipment was left on SAIPAN to be sent over on call. Three D-8 dozers were landed on J plus 4 and two dump trucks came ashore on J plus 9.

(6) Approximately 1000 pounds of explosives was loaded on dozers and landed for use in opening the beach exits.

(7) The only underwater obstacles encountered were two horned mines located just under the high water line. These did not interfere with the landing as they were removed by the Shore Party mine removal team in the third wave immediately after landing.

(8) The beach defenses consisted of one coral rock pill box just off the left flank and riflemen and a few light machine guns placed in natural caves in the coral along the shore. Beach obstacles consisted of twelve horned mines, (some of which did not have the safety pins pulled) and light trees and branches placed on the crest of the beach with the points seaward.

(9) The only pill box encountered near beach was hastily constructed of natural coral rocks. This pill box had a narrow sector of fire which covered only the right beach exits.

(10) Mines discussed in paragraphs (7) and (8) above were encountered and also four aerial bombs of approximately one hundred pounds were found along the road leading from White Beach 1 to the airfield. These bombs were armed and probably intended for use as mines but had not actually been placed. They had a larger fuse than those encountered on SAIPAN.

(11) All mines encountered were laid without regard for pattern on the existing beach exits and were the common type already known - no floating mines were used.

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Operational Comments and Recommendations, Con'd.

(12) The total strength of the 1341st Engineer Battalion on SAIPAN was 27 officers and 576 enlisted men. One officer and fifteen enlisted men from the Fourth Marine Division were attached as a communications team and three officers and fourteen enlisted men from the Fourth Marine Division were attached as a beach evacuation center.

(13) Total strength of the Shore Party, including attachments, ashore was 22 officers and 338 men. The ships unloading detail consisted of 5 officers and 130 men. Balance of battalion was left on SAIPAN on call if need arose; they were never landed.

(14) The Shore Party personnel was divided into two twelve hour shifts and the strength was sufficient to perform its mission.

(15) From J-Day to J plus 6 day, 4,406 tons of supplies and 3,801 tons of vehicles and equipment were landed across White Beach 1.

(16) The landing of RCT 24 was followed by Fourth and Second Marine Division troops and supplies and thus there had been no halt in landing operations except that caused by adverse surf conditions. Tide had no effect on landing operations. Unwaterproofed vehicles landed at high tide were stalled and thus had to be towed ashore.

(17) Night unloading was involved to a limited extent only. Unloading operations were not retarded by the Shore Party operations. A reef 200 yards wide precluded boat landings on beach at any tide. One LCT or two LCM's could be landed on the edge of the reef at the same time.

(18) The area inshore was ample for the dispersal of supply dumps and bivouac areas. Construction of access routes to tie in to the existing road was easily accomplished. There was no natural camouflage available.

(19) One narrow beach exit was expanded into a 60 yard beach exit, i.e., a vehicle could land anywhere on the beach and could be routed to any desired dump or arterial road. This was accomplished by blasting a ten to twelve foot coral ledge and dozing the earth down to the beach so that approximately a 5% grade on beach exits was created.

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Operational Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

A naval underwater and demolition crew blew projections and coral heads from the reef.

(20) Pallets were not used.

(21) One pontoon pier and LVT ramps were installed on White Beach 1 by N.C.B. One LVT only was used for a very short period. The pontoon causeway was used extensively until washed out by heavy surf. Access roads to these ramps and the pontoon pier were cut by the Shore Party. Utilization of the ramps and causeway began on J plus one.

(22) Shore Party labor was adequately controlled.

(23) The beachhead perimeter defense was established in coordination with adjoining units. The armament in the perimeter defense consisted of 18 bazookas, 8 cal. .50 machine guns, and 12 .30 cal. heavy machine guns and riflemen.

(24) Air raid warnings were to be given by voice.

(25) Shore Party tractors consisted of:

- 3 caterpillar D-7's (armored) with blade.
- 3 caterpillar D-8's with blade.
- 3 TD-9 roustabouts (trackson swing crane).

(26) Tractors were used on the beach for salvage work. D-8 dozers and an air compressor were used for improving the beach.

(27) Landing priorities were sufficiently high on tractors and other equipment required. See paragraph (4).

(28) The Shore Parties were not under centralized control of Senior Shore Party Commander. The work of the various Shore Parties were not coordinated.

6. AIR OBSERVATION:

a. Few direct requests for air observation were made by this RCT during the TINIAN Operation. Reports as picked up on the radio nets were disseminated to interested units as received.

b. Comments and recommendations as contained in the report on SAIPAN Operation apply.

Operational Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

7. LVTA's:

a. Used initially on Jig day to precede the assault waves, LVTA(4)'s placed fire on the beach area. After sending an officer ashore to assist in directing fire and upon establishing visual communication with the left assault BLT, LVTA(4)'s fired several direct support missions at enemy concealed in fissures along the shore. Thereafter, LVTA(4)'s were generally held in reserve ashore until the RCT reached the area beyond TINIAN Town. With the RCT's right flank moving along the coast line, LVTA(4)'s were put into the water and supported the assault by firing into caves and brush on the beach line.

b. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Same as in report of SAIPAN Operation.

SECTION VI

SPECIAL REPORTS

PART I

INTELLIGENCE

1. TRAINING:

a. During the short space of time between the SAIPAN and TINIAN operations there was little time spent in training. The men used the first five days to re-equip, reorganize and rest. At this time the Regimental Scout Sniper platoon was broken up and used to bring the Bn-2 sections up to strength. The R-2 section received three men from this platoon. The section landed on TINIAN five men under strength. This RCT suffered twenty-nine casualties in its intelligence sections on SAIPAN and eight on TINIAN.

RECOMMENDATION: Sufficient replacements should be sent out to re-supply Intelligence units as well as line units.

~~SECRET~~
Intelligence, Cont'd.

b. Training of Intelligence sections consisted of a review of all our operations on SAIPAN, followed by a critique designed to improve the functioning of all sections on the TINIAN operation. Considerable time was spent on the map study of TINIAN and trying to "G-2" the forthcoming operation.

2. PLANNING:

a. The planning phase was very simple and of short duration. Maps and excellent photographs were available. It is suggested that higher echelons consider the advisability of using one good map such as the 1:20,000 Special Air and Gunnery Target Map and eliminating many of the other items usually disseminated prior to an operation.

RECOMMENDATION: That careful study be given to the worth of each item that is reproduced for an operation. That R-2's be called upon for their views and recommendations about what RCT's use and do not use in the planning and on operations.

3. OPERATION:

a. The functioning of all Intelligence sections on the TINIAN operation was smoother than on SAIPAN. The R-2 section was once again hampered by lack of transportation; furthermore, it was five men under strength. As on SAIPAN, the pattern of continuous attack every day was followed. Even though this regiment was in a reserve status for two and one half days the R-2 section daily manned OP's and used its personnel to check rear areas for intelligence matter.

b. CP procedure improved greatly over SAIPAN. The Bn-2 reports were received from all three battalions every day and dispatch and telephonic reports were frequent. A studied effort was made on the part of this regiment to maintain close telephone liaison with adjacent regimental R-2 sections. This proved to be successful with one unit but communication difficulties prevented this with other units.

RECOMMENDATION: R-2 sections within a division should increase the flow of information between regiments.

c. TINIAN did not offer the nearly ideal OP sites as did SAIPAN. This necessitated following closely the front line units by the OP teams on numerous occasions.

Intelligence, Cont'd.

RECOMMENDATION: An Intelligence and Reconnaissance platoon could have been used to advantage on TINIAN. The mobility of such a section on terrain such as was met on TINIAN is highly desirable.

d. The optical instruments available to Intelligence sections on TINIAN were no better than those on SAIPAN.

RECOMMENDATION: Better field glasses must be obtained for OP work.

e. Improvement was noted in map reading and terrain appreciation.

RECOMMENDATION: Great stress must be laid on these subjects in training.

f. Aerial photo coverage on TINIAN was far superior to that of SAIPAN both prior to and during the operation. Even so, many of the best photos received during the battle came too late. Our troops had already passed over most of the ground photographed.

RECOMMENDATION: Same as in SAIPAN report.

g. The handling of civilian POW's was greatly improved on TINIAN. A civil affairs officer was attached to Regimental Headquarters and he coordinated the transportation and supply problems. The MP platoon attached to the RCT proved very effective and efficient in handling the stockade. This platoon furnished details to prevent looting in TINIAN Town.

RECOMMENDATION: A Civil Affairs officer should be attached to the RCT to take charge of civilian POW's. An MP platoon should also be attached to every RCT.

h. The same comments apply to military POW's on TINIAN as on SAIPAN. Two language officers per regiment is not sufficient.

RECOMMENDATION: At least one enlisted linguist per BLT is needed and transportation must be procured for their activities.

i. A public address system was again used on TINIAN as on SAIPAN. Mechanically speaking the unit used was far superior to the one used on SAIPAN. The results obtained were again satisfactory.

~~SECRET~~

Intelligence, Cont'd.

RECOMMENDATION: That one public address system be furnished each RCT; it should be of the portable type such as used on TINIAN.

j. The photographers and combat correspondents were split between the assault BLT's.

RECOMMENDATION: That copy and photographs should be sent to the States more rapidly for public consumption.

k. The personnel and tactics employed by the Japanese on TINIAN differed little from those on SAIPAN. The counterattack on the early morning of J plus 1 was expected and repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. From that time on no organized body of Japanese numbering more than one hundred was met at any time. Smaller groups defended fiercely key road junctions and passes into the extreme southern portion of the island. The beaches in the areas near TINIAN Town were thoroughly mined as were passes onto the southern plateau. Enemy artillery offered little difficulty and their use of automatic weapons was fair. The Japanese did booby trap certain areas on TINIAN. As on SAIPAN they again were driven into caves and fought fiercely to the end.

PART II

COMMUNICATIONS

1. SHIP TO SHORE:

a. During the ship to shore movement from SAIPAN to TINIAN all radio nets operated in an excellent manner and a large amount of traffic was handled. The principal radios used were the SCR-608, SCR-610, SCR-300, and the TCS radio jeep. Radios were operated from LVT's and the beach control boat during this movement and no interference resulted.

2. OPERATION ASHORE:

a. Radio:

(1) On TINIAN the same radio nets were maintained as shown in the SAIPAN report. Radio communication was much better, however, because of the flatness of terrain. The SCR-608, SCR-610, SCR-300, and SCR-536, worked almost continually throughout this ten day operation without interference from hills or mountains.

~~SECRET~~
Communications, Cont'd.

(2) Before leaving SAIPAN each battalion was issued eight (8) SCR-536 radios for use within rifle companies. These radios were used with great success.

(3) The comments and recommendations on radio procedure, security, repair, and communication with attached units, as set forth in the SAIPAN report, apply equally as well for TINIAN.

b. Message Center Operation:

(1) Battalions did not follow normal procedure in message center operation, as the major portion of battalion staffs operated from an OP most of the time.

(2) The regimental message center maintained a complete log and file of all messages for the entire operation. A total of 1139 outgoing and incoming messages were handled during the ten day TINIAN Operation. Staff sections were assigned runners to take messages to the message center, whereas in the SAIPAN Operation they had called the message center to come and pick up their messages. This corrected procedure naturally permitted the message center to function much more efficiently.

(3) At times it was difficult for the unit runners in the regimental message center to keep up with the location of their respective units because of the rapid displacements of those units. When this situation arose, subordinate units were called and new runners were sent back to the regimental CP.

c. Wire:

(1) Whereas wire communication had been extremely difficult to maintain on SAIPAN, it was very easy on TINIAN. There was an abundance of Japanese telephone poles along the roads with which to overhead wire lines. Where poles were lacking, there were hedge lines. Wire was overheaded wherever possible, and as a result, very little trouble was experienced with tanks and amphibian tractors cutting the lines. The axis of signal communication was known throughout the operation. This fact made it possible for switching centrals to be set up well forward behind front line battalions with all wire lines overheaded. Wire communication was very effective on TINIAN.

3. All recommendations made in report on SAIPAN Operation apply to TINIAN Operation.

PART III

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

1. BLT's 2/24 and 3/24 found no occasion to use naval gunfire during the TINIAN Operation. All fire on this island was conducted by the fire control party of BLT 1/24.

2. The following is a chronological record of fires conducted:

a. JIG DAY: Conducted fire along beach and shoreline 500 yards north of Beach White 1 and areas running north for 1000 yards. Direct fire was used. On the night of Jig Day, counter-battery fire was delivered on enemy piece firing from the eastern slope of Mt. LASSO. Spotting was done by an artillery FO and spots relayed to the Naval Gunfire Officer at the 1st Battalion CP. Some 400 rounds were fired during this mission. This method of spotting worked out very well and we received no more enemy fire that night. Fired about 200 rounds of star shells for illumination. One company commander asserted that the illumination had been a major factor in breaking up the enemy counterattack that night.

b. JIG PLUS 1, 2, 3, DAY: No naval gunfire was used as battalion was in reserve.

c. JIG PLUS 4 DAY: No firing was conducted during the day. Harassing fire was delivered at 2000, 2400 and 0400, direct against reported enemy troops on high ridge at the southern end of the island. Some 500 rounds were expended during this mission. The spotting was done by a 60mm mortar platoon leader and worked out very well. Star shell illumination was provided.

d. JIG PLUS 5 DAY: Fired on TINIAN Town, sugar mill and ridge at southern end of island. About 1100 rounds were expended on this mission. Star shell illumination was provided that night.

e. JIG PLUS 6 DAY: Our battalion was assigned a cruiser to fire preparation fires at TINIAN Town in support of the attack. This ship fired about 400 rounds at the town until relieved by a destroyer. The destroyer was instructed to fire in areas 509, 507, and 506. Star shell illumination was provided that night.

~~S~~
Naval Gunfire Support, Cont'd.

f. JIG PLUS 7 DAY: Ship delivered direct fire into caves and shoreline in target areas 506 G, L, H, and M. It also covered the coastline from area 509 down to 503, using 5", 40mm and 20mm. The spotting officer of the 1st Battalion was aboard the firing ship on this day to aid in directing the fire. This mission was in support of the attack made by the 1st Battalion, in which the troops advanced down the coast. The ship moved to about 1000 yards from shore and delivered 5", 40mm and 20mm fire into caves and wooded areas. First Battalion provided star shell illumination on this night.

g. JIG PLUS 8 DAY: There was no firing during the day because of the proximity of friendly troops to targets. Star shell illumination was provided on this night. Searchlight illumination was also attempted, but did not prove to be satisfactory.

3. Comments and recommendations made for the SAIPAN Operation apply to the TINIAN Operation, except that on the TINIAN Operation there was a sufficient supply of star shells at all times.

PART IV

AIR SUPPORT

1. ORGANIZATION:

a. The four Air Liaison Parties, whose participation in the TINIAN Operation is covered by this report, were attached as follows:

Air Liaison Party R-2	with	RCT 24
Air Liaison Party 2.1	with	BLT 1/24
Air Liaison Party 2.2	with	BLT 2/24
Air Liaison Party 2.3	with	BLT 3/24

b. The three BLT parties consisted of one officer and six enlisted men each; the RCT party of one officer and five enlisted men. Each team, except for Air Liaison Party 2.2, was equipped with one SCR-284 radio, two SCR-536 radios, and a radio jeep mounting one SCR-193 radio and one SCR-542 radio; Air Liaison Party 2.2 did not have the radio jeep; its equipment consisting of one SCR-284 radio and two SCR-536 radios. Except for team R-2, each Air liaison Party was equipped with one RBZ radio receiver.

Air Support, Cont'd.

2. NARRATIVE:

a. All four teams landed on J day with the command echelons of their respective units. Air Liaison R-2 went ashore with its radio jeep and driver; the radio jeep and driver of Air Liaison Party 2.1 went ashore on J / 1 day, and that of Air Liaison Party 2/3 on J / 2 day. The SCR-284 radio of Air Liaison Party 2.3 was drowned out during the landing and was replaced by the corresponding set of the RCT as soon as Air Liaison Party R-2 reached the beach; thereafter, Air Liaison Party R-2 depended entirely on the jeep mounted SCR-193 radio. All four teams remained with their respective units throughout the operation

b. As on SAIPAN, the Air Liaison Officers were able from time to time to undertake functions not strictly concerned with close air support. These extra activities included supplying intelligence information, securing supplementary data on the situation of adjacent units, acting as assistants to their respective intelligence and operations sections and, in one case, as liaison officer to a supporting unit.

3. AIR MISSIONS:

Air Liaison Party R-2	-	None
Air Liaison Party 2.1	-	5 Accomplished 2 Denied
Air Liaison Party 2.2	-	2 Accomplished
Air Liaison Party 2.3	-	1 Accomplished 1 Denied

4. CASUALTIES:

Air Liaison Party R-2	-	None
Air Liaison Party 2.1	-	None
Air Liaison Party 2.2	-	1 Wounded and evacuated
Air Liaison Party 2.3	-	None

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Radio Procedure:

(1) USA continued the practice, initiated on SAIPAN, of closing down the SAR net while arrangements were being made for an air strike and while the strike was in progress. On one occasion, it was well over an hour before one of the Air Liaison

~~SECRET~~
Air Support, Cont'd.

Parties could even get on the air to submit a request for an air strike, to take place at a later time. Even though the request in question was ultimately denied, it was important that the Commanding Officer know promptly whether or not he can anticipate air support in order to make full use of other supporting arms.

RECOMMENDATION: That, if possible, the Air Liaison Party initiating an air strike come up on another net (such as the SAD) while the strike is in progress, in order to maintain a clear channel of communication with CSA. If this procedure cannot be followed, the SAR net should not be closed down longer than the few minutes that the supporting planes are actually over the target.

(2) There were times when CSA signally failed to give consideration to the order in which requests had been submitted. One Air Liaison Party was forced to wait 19 hours before securing the request support planes, in spite of assurances that the strike would be accomplished much sooner.

RECOMMENDATION: That CSA's log of submitted requests be as closely followed as possible. That careful consideration be given the exigencies of the tactical situation before a mission be accomplished for a higher echelon at the expense of a front line Air Liaison Party in a different organization.

b. AIR SUPPORT:

(1) All flights of support planes were arranged on a time basis, each flight being scheduled to be on station $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours after the preceding flight. Consequently, there were occasions when no support planes were on station, a flight having expended all its ammunition and bombs and returned to base long before the expiration of the $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours.

RECOMMENDATION: That, in the case of land based planes at least flights be scheduled on the basis of need rather than a predetermined, arbitrary length of time. A similar basis for scheduling flights should be used for carrier based planes if the facilities for the handling of the planes could be organized accordingly.

6. Additional recommendations contained in report on SAIPAN operation apply to this report.

PART V

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION

1. LOADING:

a. Preliminary Plans:

(1) All vehicles except those to be landed in LVT(4)'s were waterproofed.

(2) Impedimenta was reduced to an absolute minimum consistent with the operation.

(3) All portable flame throwers and related equipment were pooled with the Shore Party for issue and servicing as required.

b. Assignment of Ships:

(1) This RCT was assigned three LCT(6)'s and one LCT (5) and thirty LCVP's for transporting vehicles; one LCT and twelve LCVP's making an additional trip. This was adequate except for two trucks, 2 1/2-ton, cargo, 6x6, which were landed later.

(2) Changes in assignment of landing craft and failure to finally determine the exact type of LCT's in sufficient time prior to loading, precluded the preparation of definite loading plans until loading had commenced.

c. Loading:

(1) Loading was accomplished at designated beaches within the minimum time.

(2) Three days supplies had been pre-loaded by Corps and Division on ten LST's to serve as floating dumps. Supplies were deck loaded and placed in cargo nets for expeditious transfer into LCT's or DUKW's on call.

2. UNLOADING:

a. Initial Phase:

(1) Supplies were initially on call by Landing Team or Combat Team Commander to control officer and were landed in LVT's or DUKW's. No supplies were manhandled on the beach but were moved direct to the troops under the supervision of unit supply representative.

Supply and Transportation, Cont'd.

b. General Unloading:

(1) General unloading, once commenced, proceeded expeditiously. Supplies were moved directly to dumps established off the beach by the Shore Party. Cranes were used for unloading supplies from LVT's or DUKW's where nets had been furnished. Regimental Quartermaster took over control of dump on Jig plus 1.

(2) Vehicles called for on Jig plus 1 were not landed until Jig plus 2 or later.

(3) Only a part of the waterproffed vehicles were required to be landed through the surf. Results were mostly successful. Only one truck was reported to have been "drowned". This was reportedly due to the driver's actions and not to defective waterproofing.

RECOMMENDATION: That drivers be given more training in operating waterproofed vehicles.

3. COMBAT SUPPLY:

a. Beach Dump Control:

(1) RCT 24 relinquished control of Beach White 1 dumps to Second Division on Jig plus 2 and began establishment of RCT dump off Beach White 2.

(2) A platoon of LVT(4)'s was made available to the Regimental Quartermaster on Jig plus 1 for supply purposes. These vehicles were utilized to the fullest extent until motor transportation equipment was landed.

(3) Division supply personnel obtained control of beach dumps much earlier than on the SAIPAN Operation and performed their supply functions in a highly commendable manner insofar as this RCT was concerned.

b. Transportation:

(1) The landing of a platoon from Company "B", 4th Motor Transport Battalion early in the operation greatly facilitated the movement of supplies. The Division Quartermaster's representative began delivery of supplies quite early in the operation with the result that supply procedure was much more efficiently and satisfactorily accomplished than on the SAIPAN Operation.

~~SECRET~~
Supply and Transportation, Cont'd.

(2) Enemy trucks were not available for recovery and use by combat troops, as on the SAIPAN Operation; nor, were oxen and ox carts as plentiful. The lack of adequate transportation for use by companies and BLT's was as evident, as on the SAIPAN Operation.

RECOMMENDATION: That a minimum of eleven (11) "jeeps" with trailers be provided for Infantry Battalions operating on large island, or land masses.

c. Communications:

(1) Little or no consideration having been given to communications for supply agencies, none had been provided for the SAIPAN Operation and none was therefore available for the TINIAN battle. The need for communications between BLT Headquarters and BLT dumps was equally apparent in both operations. Much time, transportation and duplicated effort would have been avoided had it been possible to maintain communication between the BLT CP and RCT Dp. Also between the RCT CP and Regimental Dp.

RECOMMENDATION: That suitable radio equipment together with operating personnel be made available to provide reliable communications between BLT CP's and BLT dumps and between RCT CP and RCT dump.

4. GENERAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Water:

(1) Recovery of empty water cans with limited personnel and transportation by Battalion Quartermaster personnel was a difficult problem. Failure of troops to cooperate by assembling empty cans in accessible spots aggravated the problem.

RECOMMENDATION: That troops be made aware of the difficulties resulting from careless disposition of empty water containers and that corrective measures be taken, namely, increasing the number of men available to the Battalion Quartermaster and also the transportation.

(2) Carelessness in regards to closing empty water cans was as prevalent as on the SAIPAN Operation. This resulted in cans being dirty and unfit for refilling without rinsing. The old type can with small spout could not be readily inspected or cleaned.

Supply and Transportation, Cont'd.

RECOMMENDATION: That clean habits relative to handling water containers be stressed in training and that the newer wide mouthed water can be adopted exclusively for water.

b. Rations:

(1) Hot coffee, when available, was prepared in RCT dump and forwarded to front lines once daily. Fruit and fruit juices were not available to supplement the 'K' and 'C' rations as on the SAIPAN landing. Fresh bread in limited quantities was issued by Division as available. The "10-in-1" rations were issued as available and were considered quite appropriate for front line use, when troops establish defensive positions prior to darkness. The meal cycle should begin with supper in order that the two bulky meals, supper and breakfast, are consumed in position and the 'K' component for dinner may be carried by the individual when jumping off in attack in the morning. All items of the "10-in-1" ration may be consumed cold. Heating, if at all practicable, is highly desirable.

RECOMMENDATION: That heat tabs and grills or other type of heating equipment be included within the "10-in-1" ration container.

c. Ammunition:

(1) There was an immediate shortage of 81mm light and an over-supply of 81mm heavy mortar shells. Tactical preference for the light and lack of transportation to move the heavy shells were the causes.

(2) The suicidal counter attacking and infiltration tactics of the Jap requires more illumination mortar shells within company zones than are provided by CinCPOA Unit of Fire.

RECOMMENDATION: That for attacks on Atolls no change be made; that for large islands the Unit of Fire for 81mm light be considerably increased and also for the 60mm illuminating. (See definite recommendation on SAIPAN Operation).

d. Clothing:

(1) Although many persons discarded the canvas legging soon after landing, others retained it for ankle support. Those without leggings frequently pulled socks up over trousers for protection against mosquitoes.

Supply and Transportation, Cont'd.

RECOMMENDATION: That trousers be provided with means for securing same at ankle.

(2) The need for traveling as light as possible did not indicate a need for additional voluminous pockets on utility garments, rather an improvement and relocation of the present pockets and the addition of one utility pocket on blouse for use when combat pack is not carried.

RECOMMENDATION: That a bellows type pocket with buttoned flap be placed on back of utility coat high and centrally located for use when packs are not carried; side pockets with flaps high on trousers, otherwise no change.

e. Equipment:

(1) Metal fittings of web equipment is in general much inferior to normal peace time equipment fittings. Metal tips on straps will frequently not readily enter buckle openings. Canteen cover hooks rust and do not readily engage with the eyelets on the belts.

RECOMMENDATION: A return to brass fittings for web equipment as soon as practicable.

(2) The new flare-rimmed canteen cup was available in limited quantities and was highly satisfactory for drinking hot liquids, due to the thin edge not holding heat like the rolled rim cup.

(3) There was a definite need for additional "communication tents" for use of RCT and BLT operations officers and medical officers during blackouts or in rainy weather.

RECOMMENDATION: That eight (8) additional communication tents be authorized per Infantry Regiment.

PART VI

MEDICAL

1. ORGANIZATION:

a. Casualties at SAIPAN had reduced the medical complement of RCT 24. Personnel landed at TINIAN was as follows:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>CORPSMEN</u>	<u>MARINE DRIVERS</u>
H&S Co	1 Medical 1 Dental 1 Hospital Corpsman 1 Medical (B Med)	11	5 Drivers
1st Bn	2 Medical	32(24th) 8(B Med)	8 Bandsmen 2 Drivers (B Med)
2nd Bn	2 Medical	32(24th) 8(B Med)	8 Bandsmen 2 Drivers (B Med)
3rd Bn	2 Medical	32(24th) 8(B Med)	8 Bandsmen 2 Drivers (B Med)

The RCT landed 7 jeep ambulances; 5 were organic and 2 had been assigned from Co B, 4th Med Bn. These were distributed as follows:

BLT 1	-	2
BLT 2	-	1
BLT 3	-	2
H&S	-	2

2. LANDING:

a. Company corpsmen within BLT's landed with their respective companies. Remaining medical and collecting section personnel, with BLT and RCT Headquarter units landed as follows:

BLT 1/24	-	4th wave of BLT
BLT 2/24	-	4th wave of BLT
BLT 3/24	-	4th wave of BLT
H&S Co	-	16th wave of RCT and "free" wave

~~Medical~~
Medical, Cont'd.

b. All jeep ambulances were combat loaded, and landed as follows: BLT 1/24, one ambulance landed with BLT Headquarters in their 4th wave, one on call; BLT 2/24, one landed with BLT Headquarters; BLT 3/24, one landed with BLT Headquarters, one on call; H&S, one landed in "free" wave with RCT Headquarters, one failed to land until the day after the landing, because of LVT malfunctioning. There were 5 jeep ambulances operating ashore on the day of the landing.

3. SUPPLIES:

a. In preparation for the operation, excess supplies were collected from the battalions and necessary additional supplies were drawn from Division.

b. Based on experience in the SAIPAN Operation, the amount of initial supplies carried ashore was reduced to immediate essentials; the remainder was brought in by the Regimental Quartermaster. All initial supplies and equipment were landed either back-packed or in combat loaded jeep ambulances.

c. Throughout the operation it was possible to fill all requirements of the RCT from its own stock; it was not necessary to draw from Division.

4. EVACUATION:

a. Evacuation was made directly to the beach initially. From the beach, casualties were transported to hospital ships in LVT's.

b. During the SAIPAN operation difficulty was experienced in locating hospital ships off the beach, particularly at night. To overcome this for the TINIAN operation, specific LST's were designated as subsidiary hospital ships, and were used when the regular hospital ships could not be located. All LVT drivers were advised of the designation and location of these LST's. Doctors and corpsmen from supporting LVT units were set up in these ships to care for casualties. The system worked satisfactorily.

~~SECRET~~
Medical, Cont'd.

c. After the second day of the operation, casualties were evacuated to Companies D and E of the 4th Medical Battalion, set up on TINIAN. The distance between the Regimental Aid Station and the Field Hospitals gradually increased, as it had on SAIPAN, to a distance of almost 12 miles. This caused an increase of morbidity, with a less favorable prognosis.

d. The jeep ambulances from Company B, 4th Medical Battalion were called in by Division while they were still needed to evacuate casualties.

RECOMMENDATION: That before withdrawing ambulances from assault units, higher echelon evaluate the needs of lower units.

5. AID STATIONS:

a. Aid stations were set up in accordance with normal procedure.

b. All dengue and diarrhea cases came to the Regimental Aid Station for treatment. This method was unsatisfactory, in that it was not possible to provide proper shelter for the patients. Treatment was given to 25 diarrhea and 14 dengue cases at the Regimental Aid Station. Only the very sick were evacuated.

RECOMMENDATION: That all cases of diarrhea and dengue be treated at field hospitals, where better facilities exist.

6. SANITATION: After completion of operations on TINIAN, the RCT moved into a previously prepared bivouac area. This was a distinct improvement over SAIPAN, where the area had not been prepared. Excellent galleys and heads had been constructed, but fly proof shelters in which the troops could eat were not erected.

RECOMMENDATION: That pre-planning provide for fly proof mess tents or shelters for bivouac areas.

7. CASUALTIES:

a. There were no casualties among officer medical personnel. Enlisted casualties in the RCT totaled 3 corpsmen and 1 driver killed, 4 corpsmen wounded.

~~SECRET~~
Medical, Cont'd.

8. CARE OF THE DEAD:

a. Method used was identical to that used on SAIPAN.

9. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: Same as report on SAIPAN Operation with the following modifications:

a. A different method in landing initial and re-supplies was used as noted in paragraph 3 above.

b. Jeep ambulances were given first priority and brought ashore sufficiently early.

c. There was little trouble in locating ships to receive casualties as noted in paragraph 4 b. above.

d. There was an adequate supply of litters at all times.

e. Collecting sections and litter bearers landed with assault units and were available immediately.

PART VII

ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND REPLACEMENTS

1. ADMINISTRATION:

a. Administration on TINIAN was carried out in the same manner as on SAIPAN.

b. A rear echelon of two officers and fifteen men was left on SAIPAN to carry out administrative duties and keep surveillance over the baggage dump. The rear echelon administrative section was charged with rejoining men discharged from the hospital and sending them to TINIAN.

c. The RCT landed on TINIAN with 191 officers and 3368 enlisted men. Total RCT casualties for the operation were: Killed in action, 6 officers and 59 enlisted. Wounded in action and evacuated, 11 officers and 275 enlisted. Sick and evacuated, 6 officers and 231 enlisted. Wounded in action not evacuated, 4 officers and 24 enlisted. Missing in action, 1 enlisted.

Administration, Morale and Replacements, Cont'd.

d. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Same as in report on SAIPAN operation, except as noted below:

(a) The type of strength reports used on TINIAN separated W&E and S&E, giving a correct picture of battle casualties.

(b) There was little delay in picking up our dead by burial parties. This was due to the excellent road system on TINIAN and less casualties.

2. MORALE:

a. Morale during the operation was excellent. All recommendations made in SAIPAN report apply.

3. REPLACEMENTS:

a. On TINIAN 9 officers and 266 enlisted were received as replacements late in the afternoon on 26 July, 1944. At this time RCT 24 less BLT 2/24 was in reserve; BLT 2/24 was attached to RCT 25 and was in reserve for RCT 25. All units received their replacements that night.

b. All replacements received were earmarked for the Second Marine Division and all were to be transferred to that division upon the completion of the TINIAN operation.

c. After replacements were received on TINIAN and absorbed by the companies the RCT had 2 rifle companies with over 60% of the men replacements and 1 company had about 50% replacements. This combined with the fact that the overall strength of a company at this time was only 65% T.O. strength reduced the effectiveness of these companies tremendously.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. It is recommended that prior to a major operation such as SAIPAN, each unit be built up to 10% over T.O. strength to allow for initial replacements.

Administration, Morale, and Replacements, Cont'd.

b. Additional replacements be fed continually into the units as casualties occur in order for them to be assimilated, oriented and absorbed.

c. Replacements be sent to a unit when it is in reserve in order that reorganization may be facilitated.

d. Replacements arrive at the RCT CP prior to noon in order that when assigned to the lower units the replacements will have time to become acquainted with his leaders and members of his squad and platoon.

e. Replacements when sent to a unit should remain with the unit with which they fought their first engagement and not be sent there earmarked for another organization.

FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT - TINIAN

ANNEX J

R E P O R T O F R C T 2 5

SECRET

FINAL REPORT TINIAN OPERATION

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WFT/efk

HEADQUARTERS
TWENTY FIFTH MARINES, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,
FLEET MARINE FORCE,
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

18 August 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer, 25th Marines (Reinf.)
To: The Commanding General, 4th Marine Division (Reinf.)
Subject: Final Report TINIAN Operation.
Reference: Division Special Order Number 140-44.
Enclosure: (B) Final Report TINIAN Operation.

1. In accordance with the above reference the following report is submitted.

2. The report is detailed in nature in order to clearly show the operational functions of subordinate staff sections and units of this Combat Team.

M. J. Batchelder
M. J. BATCHELDER

T I N I A N O P E R A T I O N

ENCLOSURE "3"

FINAL REPORT TINIAN OPERATION

(Compiled by R-3 Section)

(a) Planning

See SAIPAN Report.

(b) Training and Rehearsal

No comment.

(c) Task Organization

The Task Organization in this operation was adequate and proved satisfactory. Recommendations same as those shown in SAIPAN Report.

(d) Embarkation

The Plan of Embarkation employed in this operation proved satisfactory with the exception of the landing of organic transportation and equipment. It is strongly recommended that where practical RCT's be assigned small landing craft to include LCVP's, LCM's and LCT's to remain under direct control of the unit until all gear has been landed. This would permit orderly and satisfactory control of equipment thereby preventing loss and theft.

(e) Movement to Objective

No comment.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) RCT-25 Col. M. J. Batchelder, USMC., Comdg.
25th Marines (Reinf).

(b) BLT-1 Lt. Col. H. U. Mustain, USMC

1st Bn., 25th Marines
1st Plat., R/W Co (.37mm AT)
1st Plat., Co "A", 20th Marines
Co "D", 2-20
Det., 1st JASCO
Det., 773d Amph Trac Bn
FO, Det., 14th Marines

(c) BLT-2 Lt. Col. L. C. Hudson, USMC

2d Bn., 25th Marines
2d Plat., R/W Co (.37mm AT)
1st Sect., 4th Plat., R/W Co (2-.75mm H/T)
2d Plat., Co "A", 20th Marines
Co "E", 2-20. (SP)
Det., 1st JASCO
Det., 773d Amph Trac Bn
FO, Det., 14th Marines

(d) BLT-3 Lt. Col. J. M. Chambers, USMCR

3d Bn., 25th Marines
3d Plat., R/W Co (.37mm H/T)
2d Sect., 4th Plat., R/W Co (2-.75mm H/T)
3d Plat., Co "A", 20th Marines
Co "F", 2-20. (SF)
Det., 1st JASCO
Det., 773d Amph Trac Bn
FO, Det., 14th Marines

(e) RCT-25 Support Group Col. M. J. Batchelder, USMC

H&S Co (Plus 1st Band Sect)
R/W Co (Less Dets)
Co "A", 4th Tank Bn (14 Medium, 1 Retriever) (Plus
Det. Co "D", 3 Flame-Throwers)
Hq, Co "A", 20th Marines
Hq, 2-20, (SP)
Collection Sect., Co "A", 4th Med Bn.
1st Plat., 4th M.F. Co.
Det., 1st JASCO
Co " ", 2d Arm Tank Bn (Less One Plat)
773d Amph Trac Bn (Reinf) (Less Dets)
Det., 4th M.T. Bn.
1st Sect., Div. Rocket Det.
FO, Det., 14th Marines
708th Amph Tank Bn.

(f) Narrative of assault on TINIAN

Phase I of the FORAGER Plan (The attack and capture of SAIPAN ISLAND) having been completed and participating units rehabilitated, the Fourth Marine Division (Reinforced) in accordance with plans entered upon Phase III, the attack and seizure of TINIAN ISLAND. The plan of attack was to land two RCT's abreast on the NW coast of the island, RCT-24 on the left, RCT-25 on the right, on Beach White 1 and White 2 respectively, and RCT-23 in Division Reserve to be landed on order.

This Regiment (Reinforced) landed beginning at 0750, 24 July 1944, with two BLT's abreast each in a column of Companies on Beach White 2 with the initial objective of seizing a limited beachhead approximately 2000 yards inland, 3/25 on the left, 2/25 on the right. The landing was successfully made against strong enemy opposition and most adverse terrain features. Beach White 2 proper was extremely limited (frontage 165 yards) necessitating the landing of personnel over a coral reef and a four to eight foot coral ledge at the waters edge. Because of the difficulties and opposition encountered the attack was greatly retarded and the Regiment was unable to secure the originally planned objective (O-1), however, a sufficiently large beachhead was gained to permit the landing of all of RCT-25 and the Division Reserve (RCT-23) and two Battalions of artillery prior to darkness.

The advance inland throughout the day was against strong organized enemy opposition consisting of small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, and observed artillery fire resulting in heavy casualties to the Regiment. This condition, in addition to the reduced strength of Battalions of this Regiment (average effective strength per Battalion, 565), necessitated the reduction of the Regimental frontage and units of RCT-23 were ordered to relieve our right flank. This permitted reorganization and the establishment of reasonably strong defense positions for the night.

Jig plus 1 (25 July). Enemy artillery fire continued to fall within the beachhead area throughout the night and at 0200, 25 July, a strong enemy counterattack was launched along our entire front. This attack was successfully repulsed resulting in exceptionally heavy losses to the enemy. During the night a Division Order (DivOpnOr #33-44) was received for the continuation of the attack (Jig plus 1 day) 25 July at 0730 to O-1. Due to the night counterattacks and changing information this was later delayed to 1000 to permit reorganization.

The terrain to our immediate front offered a precipitous circular cliff line (See sketch) and in order to successfully continue the attack it was necessary to employ all three of the Regimental BLT's. The scheme of maneuver employed here was for the center BLT (2/25) to hold facing the cliff line, containing the enemy to its immediate front. 1/25 relieved 3/25 on the Regimental left prior to 0900 with orders to continue the attack at 1000 around the left of the cliff line to objective O-1. 3/25 was ordered to attack at King hour (1000) around the right or western slopes of the cliff and secure O-1. Upon reaching the higher level contact between 1/25 and 3/25 was made mutual.

The attack was continued in accordance with orders against slight enemy opposition and the objective was gained at 1600.

On this date the Regimental CP was displaced forward. (See sketch).

Jig plus 2 (26 July). In accordance with DivOpnOr#36-44, the Regiment continued the attack at 0900 to seize O-3 with two BLT's abreast, 1/25 on the left, 3/25 on the right. 2/24 was attached to this Regiment at 0730 and was immediately committed on the left flank of the Regiment with the mission of maintaining contact with the 2d Marine Division on the left and cleaning out the cliff line to their right front. 2/25 engaged in mopping up the bypassed cliff line in the Regimental zone of action on O-1, completing this mission by 1200. (Note: Mention is made that in the Regimental zone of action there were three distinct ground levels to be captured).

Objective O-3 was reached at 1100 and on Division Order (DivOpnOr#37-44) the Regiment continued the attack to O-4a at 1300. This objective was inclusive of MOUNT LASSO in the left of the Regimental zone of action which was the highest elevation in the northern end of THIAN ISLAND. The objective was reached at 1630 and the Regiment ordered to dig in for the night. 2/24 remained in position on the low ground protecting the Division left flank. 2/25, now in Regimental reserve, was moved during the afternoon to the high ground approximately 1000 yards in rear of our front lines.

Jig plus 3 (27 July). The Regiment continued the attack with two BLT's abreast (1/25 on the left and 3/25 on the right) at 1000 in accordance with DivOpnOr#38-44 to seize O-4. Objective was reached at 1200. The advance of the 2d Marine Division on the left during the day closed the previously existing gap on our left flank pinching out 2/24 which was immediately assembled and moved into Regimental reserve. During the advance this date, 2/25 followed the assault BLT's at 500 yards.

Regimental CP displaced forward. (See sketch).

Jig plus 4 (28 July). In accordance with DivOpnOr#39-44, 2/25 relieved the left unit of RCT-23 on our right (Frontage approximately 600 yards) at dawn and the Regiment continued the attack to O-5 with three BTL's abreast (2/25 on the right, 3/25 in the center and 1/25 on the left) at 0700. 2/24 in Regimental reserve followed the advance at 600 yards. Objective was reached at 1145 and in accordance with DivOpnOr#40-44 the attack was continued with no change in formation to O-6a at 1300. This objective was reached at 1530 and defense positions were prepared for the night. Enemy opposition this date was extremely light and unorganized.

2/24 reverted to NT&LF control 1800 this date.

Regimental CP was displaced forward. (See sketch).

Jig plus 5 (29 July). With no change in formation the Regiment continued the attack to O-6 at 0700 in accordance with DivOpnOr#41-44. The objective was seized and overrun approximately 600 yards to take advantage of favorable terrain by 1600. Enemy opposition throughout the advance very light.

Jig plus 6 (30 July). In accordance with DivOpnOr#42-44, with no change in formation the Regiment continued the attack to O-7 at 0745. This objective was reached at 1430 after encountering slight enemy opposition.

During the afternoon RCT-25 was ordered relieved by elements of RCT-23 and the 2d Marine Division and RCT-25 (-) placed in NT&LF reserve, with 3/25 in 4th Marine Division reserve. Regimental CP displaced in accordance with NT&LF orders. (See sketch).

Jig plus 7 (31 July). RCT-25 (-) in NT&LF reserve displaced in accordance with orders. (See sketch):

3/25, under Division control, was attached to RCT-23 at 1800.

Jig plus 8 (1 August). RCT-25 (-) remained in NT&LF reserve. 3/25 detached from RCT-23 reverted to 4th Marine Division control.

Island declared officially secured 1855.

Jig plus 9 (2 August). RCT-25 (-) reverted to Division control, 3/25 reverted to parent control. RCT-25 placed in 4th Marine Division reserve.

Jig plus 10 (3 August). RCT-25 ordered into assembly area to prepare for reembarkation. Assembly area and Recimental CP, (see sketch.)

Jig plus 11 (4 August). RCT-25 remained in assembly area and received warning order for reembarkation.

Jig plus 12 (5 August). Regiment embarked on USAT ADABELLE LYKES and USS CAPE JOHNSON.

(g) Operational Features

1. Ship to Shore

a. LVT's.

Attached to this RCT for PHASE III were 136 LVT's (773d Amph Trac Bn (Reinf), 82 LVT2's and 44 LVT4's) plus 34 LVTA's (708th Arm Amph Tank Bn) embarked in LST's in accordance with the Division Embarkation Plan. All personnel of this RCT, less rear echelon and control personnel were embarked in the same LST's in accordance with Division Embarkation Plan. This plan proved completely satisfactory. The 34 LVTA's embarked in two separate LST's (17 each) were not employed in this landing. These tractors were not employed because of the limited beach areas and approaches.

In this landing there was no LCVP-LVT transfer problem. The second trip of LVT's from LST to beach landing support personnel and supplies was accomplished satisfactorily.

Comments

See Final Report SAIPAN Operation.

b. Control

The control plan employed in this operation was the same as that employed in the SAIPAN Operation and proved satisfactory.

c. Scheme of Landing

This Regiment landed with two BLT's abreast, each Battalion in a column of Companies. The assault waves landed on a time schedule. The reserve BLT and Regimental Headquarters, plus supporting units were landed on order of the Regimental Commander.

This scheme of landing was adopted in view of the extremely limited beach and in order that control could be rapidly gained once troops were ashore. It proved highly satisfactory.

d. Operation ashore (initially)

In the landing the approach waves were well controlled. Assault troops were landed as rapidly as beach conditions permitted. In this operation all personnel were debarked at the beach, beach approaches being such as to prohibit the advance of LVT's.

Enemy resistance throughout the Regimental zone of action was strong, consisting of small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, and observed artillery fire from well prepared defensive positions. The overrunning of these positions proved most difficult and the advance inland was slow. However, by H plus two and one half hours all personnel of the two assault BTL's and the RCT reserve BTL had been landed and control gained. Because of beach and reef conditions, great difficulty was encountered in the landing of supporting weapons and it was not until approximately 1700 that all tanks and 37mm guns were ashore.

By 1700 our front lines had advanced inland approximately 1000 yards with the Regimental right flank resting on the west coast and the left flank physically tied in with RCT-24 on the left. This position was considerably short of the planned first objective, however, the situation was reported to Division and the Regiment was ordered to prepare defensive positions for the night.

2. Naval Gunfire Support
See Final Report SAIPAN Operation.
3. Air Support
See Final Report SAIPAN Operation.
4. Artillery
See Final Report SAIPAN Operation.
5. Tanks
See Final Report SAIPAN Operation.
6. Infantry
See Final Report SAIPAN Operation.
7. Japanese Tactics and Defenses
See Final Report SAIPAN Operation.

8. Intelligence

The Intelligence information furnished by Division and higher echelons prior to the TINIAN operation was extremely valuable and in sufficient quantities. A distinct improvement was noticed in the quality and timeliness of delivery of photos in this operation as compared to the SAIPAN Operation. Excellent obliques of the beaches as well as inland objectives were obtained and distributed. These obliques contributed in no small way to the success of the operation. The photos received were good and were distributed in time to be of most use. RCT-25 was also furnished with a reproduction of a Japanese Map of TINIAN which had been captured on SAIPAN. This map showed a tentative plan of defense of the island and terrain features not shown on the standard Target Map, and was of valuable assistance.

RECORD OF EVENTS

24 July 1944. (Jig day)

Landings were made at Beach White 2. Beach defenses were quickly knocked out. They consisted of two pill boxes, located on either flank of the beach, mounting anti-tank and anti-boat guns and protected by rifle and MG pits. After these were cleaned up the enemy gave ground, resisting our advance with small-arms and mortar-fire. The landing and advance inland was under intermittent mortar and artillery fire for 36 hours after our landing. RCT-25 CP was hit several times with small arms and artillery fire. The reef, beach, and approaches inland were heavily mined with various types of mines. Several of our personnel and vehicles were injured or rendered inoperative.

Identifications were made by the interpreters from dogtags and captured documents. One map, found on D plus one in a tank, proved particularly valuable, for it gave the plan of defense of the island.

25 July 1944. (Jig plus 1 day)

Enemy artillery fire continued to fall within our lines throughout the night of Jig day and early the following morning. At about 0200 we received a determined counterattack in our zone of action, which was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. In this attack the enemy employed tanks in support of infantry, and four or possibly five of the tanks were knocked out. Quantities

of MG's, mortars and other arms were captured as the enemy retired. These were veteran Manchurian troops, well armed and disciplined.

The enemy continued shelling the CP and beach installations during the morning, inflicting a large number of casualties.

26 & 27 July 1944. (Jig plus 2 & 3 day)

After the dawn counterattack of Jig plus 1 day, the enemy offered no serious resistance. Pockets of resistance were met but there was no organized defense. Sniper fire was always present. Enemy vehicles and troop concentrations were quickly dispersed by friendly air support.

28 & 29 July 1944. (Jig plus 4 & 5 day)

During the advance this date our units reported the use of anti-tank mines by the enemy. Apparently their supply was limited, for in some instances, fuzed dynamite was employed as a make-shift obstacle. Enemy resistance was spotty and showed lack of organization. Infiltration tactics were used to harass our troops. One P.O.W., a medical officer who surrendered, stated that he had been ordered to kill his patients, but had refused.

A downed Jap Zero was found and attempts had been made to remove the MG's.

30 July 1944. (Jig plus 6 day)

A map was captured showing defensive installations on AGUIJAN ISLAND. A captured P.O.W. stated all enemy naval guns had been knocked out prior to our landing.

One of our planes dropping propaganda leaflets was shot down by AA fire.

Winchester .30 cal. Ball ammo (dated Dec. 9, 1941) was found near Jap grave.

Enemy artillery fire continued falling throughout the day from southern positions. Otherwise very light resistance.

31 July 1944. (Jig plus 7 day)

Enemy continued to retire and was not encountered in force this date.

1 August 1944. (Jis plus 8 day)

The enemy counterattacked at 0300 in 2d Marine Division area. The attack was repulsed after hard fighting until dawn. During the night three Japs entered the bivouac area of 2/23 Mortar Platoon, using password "Joe". They wounded two men with hand grenades, before they were recognized. Two were killed, the third escaped.

No organized enemy resistance encountered this date.

Identification of troops on island continued to be made by interpreters.

At 1855, TINIAN declared secured (officially).

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) See Final Report SAIPAN Operation.
- (2) P.O.W.'s - Civil Affairs - Interpreters.

Great improvement in the Civil Affairs program and the method of handling P.O.W.'s was noticed in this operation as opposed to SAIPAN. The problem of handling P.O.W.'s has become one of prime importance and will increase the closer we approach the mainland.

a. It is recommended that a ship or LST be designated to handle all P.O.W.'s during the first day or two of an operation, until a beachhead has been established. Such a plan would relieve confusion and congestion and eliminate the need of a stockade on a beach which may be needed for tactical purposes.

b. Civil Affairs representatives should operate more closely with the RCT, establish a stockade, preferably within walking distance of the front lines. Some transportation should be provided for the sole purpose of transporting the non-walking wounded to the stockade. This would relieve congestion in forward areas and solve the acute transportation problems. Each stockade should have at least one interpreter and corpsman attached, since during an operation, the Regiment and Battalions cannot release such personnel from other duties.

c. Service rendered on TINIAN by the Military Police Platoon was excellent. This unit assisted in the collecting and movement of P.O.W.'s from the front lines to the stockade and their service proved most valuable.

d. The attachment of at least one enlisted interpreter to each Battalion proved to be very valuable in handling of prisoners, sorting of documents and expediting delivery of same to the Regiment for questioning and evaluation.

e. Distribution of captured enemy information and orders of battle at an early phase of the TINIAN operation was decidedly helpful in the evaluation of subsequent captured documents as well as interpreting the probable course of action to be taken by the enemy. Daily information of this nature is considered very valuable.

f. Propaganda leaflets dropped on TINIAN were effective. Civilian P.O.W.'s complied, for the most part, with the written instructions. It is recommended that such leaflets, be reduced to the simplest Japanese, i.e. "KATAKANA". Some of the prisoners could not read the "KANJI". Translations and complete information regarding pamphlets should be given to all elements, including the troops in the front lines. In the TINIAN operation very few of the personnel involved were aware of the use and the text of the pamphlets. It is urged that propaganda leaflets be dropped continuously throughout a campaign. Repetition tends to make the facts believed.

(3) Miscellany

Much improvement in the distribution by higher echelon of Intelligence information was noted in the TINIAN operation, as compared to SAIPAN. It is recommended that early details be sent to the lower echelons by dispatch, messenger, or in terse summary form by the most expeditious means. Information regarding the activities of adjacent and higher units is particularly desirable. This was not always forthcoming in this operation. It is requested that each RCT be furnished each day with at least one (1) copy of the Corps (G-2) Periodic Report.

9. Communications

a. Plan

The plan for communication on TINIAN differed from that for SAIPAN in the following respects:

1. Battalion commander use of LVT4's with their TCS, radio jeeps.

2. The Company commander of the Tank Company attached to the Regiment was given a "300" to operate in the Regimental Command Net.

3. An advance CP from Regimental Headquarters was to go ashore before the Commanding Officer and set up a CP and establish communications before we arrived.

4. Regiment would carry only combat wire, approximately 20 miles, ashore in the landing.

b. Operation

Communication agencies operated as follows:

1. Ship-to-shore communication was as in the SAIPAN operation. Battalion commanders did not ride in the LVT4's with the TCS radio jeep. That means of communication was available, since the radio came ashore at approximately the same time as the commanding officer, but the Infantry Common Net with Air Observer, on which the TCS's were set was too crowded to permit traffic between Regiment and the Battalions. As in the SAIPAN operation the "300" gave dependable communication between Battalions and Regiment, and the "610" was the most used for contact with Division.

2. Radio communication ashore on TINIAN was the same as on SAIPAN. But here initially traffic between Regiment and Battalions was handled by the "300"; and then as distances increased the TCS became the main channel of communication. TCS operation was excellent, with the exception of one evening and night when a severe electrical storm caused considerable interference. In this operation "536" radios were not lost, broken, or discarded in the landing as they were on SAIPAN. The sets proved to be invaluable.

3. Telephone communication on TINIAN operated as follows:

a. In the beach area the same difficulties were encountered as on SAIPAN. Wire communication was therefore practical and dependable only at night, when no tractors or tanks were in the area. From the experience on SAIPAN, Battalions did not attempt to lay wire to Companies in the assault. (The plan had not been successful on SAIPAN). Wire was always laid from Battalion Headquarters to Companies, to Platoon Headquarters of attached Regimental Weapons, and to adjacent Battalions wherever possible, as soon as the attack was halted for the day. In this operation Division was not as successful in keeping an advanced switching central abreast of the Regimental CP, and this, in one case, made contact difficult. Regiment, in advancing its CP approximately three miles, without an advanced switching central from Division in the forward area, extended its existing Division line. Since contact was so important, the line was laid with care, overheaded wherever possible. Three hours were taken to extend the line, and then it was found to be shorted as it was put into the switchboard. To locate the trouble took approximately another four hours; and during this time there was no telephone communication with Division Headquarters. The same situation arose later when the Regiment was in Corps Reserve. The advance then was approximately two miles, under the same conditions; but a different plan was followed which was more successful; here Regiment continued two lines, but laid them much more rapidly along the road; Corps wiremen followed and overheaded the lines with two-by-four poles. The result was much more rapid, dependable telephone communication. This system took approximately one and one half hours.

4. No difficulties were encountered with supply.

5. Messenger service was used a great deal, as on SAIPAN.

c. Comments and Recommendations

See Final Report SAIPAN Operation.

10. Liaison

See Final Report SAIPAN Operation.

11. Supply

With the exception of 60mm mortar, illuminating ammunition, which was not available in sufficient quantities for the TINIAN operation, the ordnance supply, in general, was adequate. One third (1/3) "K" ration and one third (1/3) "D" ration per man proved sufficient for the first day and a half, after which full rations were supplied. Two (2) canteens of water were adequate. No plans however, were made to supply clothing and it developed, in the later stages of the operation that the troops were in dire need of socks, shoes, and utility clothes. Since there was no supply of clothing either in the floating dumps or in the shore dumps, it was necessary for this unit to send to SAIPAN for this item. The fact that the clothing, especially socks, were not readily available caused a delay of 24 to 36 hours in supplying them to lower units.

This RCT preloaded one LCT with seven balanced loaded 2 1/2 ton 6x6 trucks, which were landed at dusk on Jig day. This did more toward alleviating supply shortages in the initial stage of the operation than any other single factor.

There was a marked improvement in the transportation problem on TINIAN over the SAIPAN operation. This was due, (1) very low operational losses in jeeps and trailers of the lower units in the initial landing. (2) The Regiment had at its disposal seven (7) 2 1/2 ton trucks for the entire operation. (3) Better roads and less traffic.

a. Criticism and Phases of Supply

Two LST's were initially assigned this RCT to serve as floating dumps but higher units failed to furnish the RCT with a complete list of the supplies aboard each LST furnished. This should have been done to facilitate expedition of unloading and acquaint the unloading officer with the supply he had available.

Throughout Jig day and Jig plus one day there was a shortage of LVT's for unloading the LST's and because of the reef only LVT's could be used for this purpose. The control seemed to be satisfactory but the shortage was probably due to operational losses of LVT's in the initial landing and reassignment to other units. Beginning the morning of Jig plus two days, at which time many LVT's were again placed in operation, and others reverted to our control, there were enough of LVT's assigned to each floating dump to maintain a constant flow of supplies to the beach. The fact

that a liaison officer of the Amphibian Tractor Battalion was working with the Shore Party Commander unquestionably assisted in the control of the tractors. This liaison officer was appointed as a result of experience in the SAIPAN operation.

After the supplies reached the beach the loaded tractors proceeded inland and unloaded at the Battalion dumps. Later a shore party dump was established near the beach, and served as the Regimental dump, which was later taken over by higher echelon. This procedure proved highly satisfactory and facilitated the movement of supplies to the forward units.

On Jig plus four days the Regimental dump moved inland from the original location and from that time on Division, using its own transportation delivered rations and supplies to the Regimental dump as requested, except in cases of emergencies when organic transportation was utilized. This enabled Regiment to use its available transportation for the movement of supplies from its dump forward to the Battalions, thereby maintaining a steady flow of supplies from the beach to the forward elements. This was a vast improvement on the SAIPAN operation in which Regiment had to move supplies all the way from the beach to its dump and then to the Battalions, which in several instances proved to be too great a distance for the limited transportation available.

It is suggested that the steady flow of adequate supplies to the front in the operation was due in part to the fact that the front line units were given the order to dig in and prepare for the night early enough so that their transportation could be used to supply their front lines before nightfall. When the attack continues until late in the evening organic transportation of the forward Battalions is not enough to perform the numerous duties in connection with the attack and to build up necessary supply reserves in the Companies at the same time. Especially is this true when it is desired to have enough mortar and belted .30 cal. ammo as well as other types in the Company dumps to repel the night counterattack.

b. The evacuation of wounded, dead and P.O.W.'s presented no problem on the TINIAN operation since the Regiment was in reserve at the time most P.O.W.'s were brought back. The casualties were light after Jig plus one day and were easily handled. However, it is suggested that the evacuation of the P.O.W. be turned over entirely to the Regimental Intelligence Section and that transportation from the Regimental CP to rear echelon be supplied by higher echelon. This, because the Intelligence Section initially handles and questions

the P.O.W. and because the transportation normally at the disposal of the Regiment is entirely inadequate to maintain supply and at the same time transport them to the rear.

The problem of supply and evacuation insofar as the TINIAN operation is concerned were solved, in general, as well as could be expected under combat conditions. Most of the bottlenecks which occurred on the SAIPAN operation (See SAIPAN Report) were noticeably absent on TINIAN and this is attributed to one thing: On TINIAN sufficient transportation was available early in the operation. It is indeed difficult to conceive of a problem of supply which could not be remedied by adequate transportation. Transportation is all important and operational losses must be considered during the planning phase.

c. Recommendations

1. That lower echelons be furnished a list of all supplies preloaded on ship on which they are embarked, broken down by specific items.
2. That the current table of units of fire be revised to allow a large increase in 81mm HE mortar ammunition and 60mm illuminating mortar ammunition.
3. That at least six (6) LST's be designated as supply vessels per RCT in the initial phases of the operation.
4. That DUKW's replace 2 1/2 ton 6x6's and LVT's as supply vehicles in initial phases.
5. That each RCT be assigned a unit of Motor Transport consisting of no less than a Motor Transport Company and be allowed to keep it throughout the operation.
6. That no more than two-thirds (2/3) of an emergency ration be issued assault troops to last for at least 36 hours and no other rations be landed until D plus one day thereby relieving unnecessary congestion on the beaches.
7. That the T.O. be changed to provide each Regiment with at least five (5) additional one ton trucks for supply purposes, these to be assigned Regiment, two; each Battalion one.
8. That troops, such as Shore Party, Motor Transport, etc. revert to higher echelon only after unit distribution has been instituted.

9. That sea bags be omitted in any future operation and the cargo space be utilized by Division for carrying sufficient clothes and post exchange supplies to make necessary issues when the situation is static enough to warrant.

10. That during combat no previously evacuated troops or replacements be returned or assigned a RCT until they have been equipped and clothed for combat.

11. That Military Police or reliable personnel be especially trained, instructed, and assigned in order to prevent looting of individual and organizational equipment.

12. That the RCT be allowed to take all organizational transportation on operations.

13. That the RCT be assigned one (1) LCT to preload at the staging area with at least seven (7) preloaded 2 1/2 ton trucks.

14. That a supply communications net be established between BLT's and RCT's, and Division with SCR "300"s.

15. That the concept of evacuation be changed in that P.O.W. be the responsibility of the Section.

16. That Division establish a salvage center and laundry for clothing discarded after new issue. This could then be reissued.

17. That combat operations cease early enough in the day so that the functions of supply have time to provide all necessities to take care of any emergency.

12. Engineer (including Shore Party)

See Final Report SALPAN operation.

13. Medical

Sufficient supplies were secured for this operation in anticipation of a two weeks stay, plus a large number of casualties. Medicinal supplies were given a high priority because we felt that a number of men were in the incubation period of diseases such as dysentery or dengue. Also many of the men already had minor cuts and bruises and the possibility of these becoming more serious under combat was great. Sufficient supplies such as plasma, battle dressing, splints, morphine and sulfanilamide were carried to take care of approximately 1000 casualties. The above mentioned articles were placed in sea bags to facilitate handling. To insure early arrival on shore each corpsman was given one to be brought in when he came ashore. The ambulance jeeps were loaded with extra plasma, splints, dressings and medical cases. The only notable shortage in medical supplies was in litters and combat covers. However, we carried a sufficient supply of blankets which could substitute for the combat covers and could also if need be used as temporary litters.

The evacuation of casualties on this operation was good, showing a marked improvement over that of the SAIPAN operation. Ambulance jeeps were given a high priority, and four of the Regiment's five ambulance jeeps landed early on Jig day. The 3d Battalion's ambulance jeep landed early on Jig plus one day. On Jig and Jig plus one day all casualties were evacuated to the beach.

This Regiment used its ambulance jeeps to evacuate from the front lines to the beach. Due to the short distance from the beach to the front lines many casualties could be evacuated in a short period of time. On the beach the casualties were turned over to the Shore Party who in turn immediately placed all casualties in LVT's or DUKWs and directed them to a medical control ship. This ship then directed the casualties to a proper ship serving as a hospital.

The Collecting Section also aided greatly in the evacuation on this operation. This Regiment had the Collecting Station of Company "A", 4th Medical Battalion assigned to it. This consisted of 13 Corpsmen, 2 Marine Drivers, 2 ambulance jeeps and one Chief Pharmacist Mate. This Collecting Section was under the direction of the Regimental Surgeon. The addition of two ambulance jeeps of the Collecting Section was a great aid in fast evacuation of casualties. At no time was it necessary to seek aid from other sources for sufficient transportation of casualties.

On Jig plus two day all surgical cases were evacuated to "D" and "E" Medical Company while we continued to evacuate medical cases to the beach. On Jig plus five until the end of the operation all cases were evacuated to the Medical Companies.

In summation it may be said that the evacuation of casualties on the TIMIAN operation showed marked improvement over that of the SAIPAN operation for the following reasons:

1. High priority given to ambulance jeeps.
2. Addition of Collecting Section with vehicles.
3. The rapid setting up of the Medical Companies, thus shortening the lines of evacuation.

As in the SAIPAN operation the Corpomen did their respective jobs very well. Although handicapped by a shortage of personnel the work about the Aid Station continued to be good. The usual number of Corpomen per Battalion is 40. However, for this operation each Battalion began with 32 men while Regimental H&S Company had 12 instead of 14. The reason for this was due to a generalized shortage through the Division. The total casualties among Hospital Corpomen including those of the Collecting Section were: Dead, 5; Wounded and Evacuated, 19; Wounded and Not Evacuated, 3; Sick and Evacuated, 9. Total, 36.

There was no replacement of Hospital Corpomen during this operation.

On two occasions the Assistant Regimental Surgeon replaced a Battalion Surgeon in an effort to give them a much needed rest. There were no casualties among the Medical Officers.

Sanitary measures employed were similar to those used on SAIPAN. Slit trenches were used for the disposal of human wastes. It was impracticable to use constructed heads in so mobile a situation. All trash and cans were burned and buried and a strong effort was made to keep the areas in proper police at all times.

No galleys were set up, "C" and "K" rations and occasionally 10 in 1 rations being used exclusively. Only water carried ashore or distilled ashore was used for drinking purposes.

During the operation we evacuated 66 cases of diarrhea. This is a definite decline over the SAIPAN operation where 156 cases had to be evacuated. We had 55 cases of Dengue fever. A good many of these undoubtedly were infected on SAIPAN and were now showing signs for the first time.

The medical supplies were adequate and sufficient although we began the operation with a shortage of litters we were able to obtain sufficient quantities from the Shore Party. We also put into effect a system of trading litter for litter and blanket for blanket and this maintained our supply at all times. There was no shortage of plasma, battle dressings or splints. The Regimental Aid Station was able to supply the Battalions with needed supplies at all times. There was never any actual shortage of any necessary medical supplies throughout the TINIAN operation.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Medical supplies and equipment for this operation was adequate. Supplies and ambulance jeeps were landed early on Jig day which increased the efficiency of the Medical Department in the early critical stages of the operation.
2. The evacuation of casualties in this operation was good. This was due to early arrival of ambulance jeeps, the addition of a Collecting Station for the Regiment, the early establishment of a hospital and the moderately short lines of evacuation.
3. Casualties among Corpsmen again ran about 25%. This speaks for the need of carrying excess Corpsmen in an effort to keep each unit up to sufficient effective strength.
4. Sanitary measures suitable to a quickly moving unit had to be utilized. Of necessity these were simple but effective. There was a decrease in cases of diarrhea as compared to the SAIPAN operation, but an increase in Dengue cases. There was no alarming outbreaks of any transmissible diseases during the operation.

14. Civil Affairs

See Intelligence Report.

15. Public Relations

No comment.

16. R-11 Report

(a) Plans and preparations prior to the operation were limited almost exclusively to instruction of personnel representatives of all units in the manner of preparation, the form, and the time of submission of required strength and casualty reports. A meeting was held at which all reports were explained, including certain changes specified by Division. The code for use in reporting by radio was explained orally, although such code had been in use in slightly different form during the SAIPAN operation. The effect of this meeting was evident in the quality of reports subsequently rendered, but its effect was lessened by the absence of the representatives of two attached units with whom there was no communication at the late hour when task organization finally became settled.

No embarkation rosters were required or submitted.

(b) Activities of this Section during the operation were identical with the activities set forth in the SAIPAN operation, except that much less difficulty was experienced in obtaining prompt reports.

There follows a summary of the strength of this Regiment plus the First Band Section during the TINIAN operation. These figures are exclusive of the rear echelon left on SAIPAN.

		<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>MEN</u>	
Embarkation		96	1993	
Joined		2	17	
Temporarily attached		<u>10</u>	<u>184</u>	
		108	2194	
Less casualties:				
	KIA	3	50	
	MIA		9	
	W&E	9	242	
	S&E	2	230	
	W&NE	<u>2</u>	<u>25</u>	
		<u>16</u>	<u>556</u>	
		92	1638	
Less detached		<u>10</u>	<u>338</u>	
		82	1300	
Plus casualties returned to duty		<u>7</u>	<u>164</u>	
Effective strength 4 Aug. 44.		89	1464	
		<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Casualties on J day		6	181	187

(c) Conclusions and recommendations are identical with those set forth for the SAIPAN operation with the additional recommendation that an effort be made in the future to impress upon attached units the importance of prompt and accurate strength and casualty reports to the Combat Team, whether the parent organization requires them or not. It is entirely within the realm of possibility that the failure to supply this information could adversely effect a tactical decision of the Combat Team Commander, and thereby threaten the success of the whole operation.

(h) Summary of recommendations

See Final Report of SAIPAN Operation.

(i) Conclusions

See Final Report of SAIPAN Operation.

COLONEL M. J. BACHELDER, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commanding

C. J. O'DONNELL,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,
Executive Officer.

OFFICIAL:

Wm. Frank Thyson, Jr.
WM. FRANK THYSON, JR.,
Lieut. Colonel, USMCR,
R-3

~~SECRET~~

FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT -- TINIAN

ANNEX K

R E P O R T O F 4 T H T A N K B A T T A L I O N

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

SECTION I

- A - Plans and Preparations.
- B - See Enclosures.
- C - Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations.

SECTION II (Enclosures)

- A - Formal Report, TINIAN Operation, Company A.
- B - Formal Report, TINIAN Operation, Company B.
- C - Formal Report, TINIAN Operation, Company C.
- D - Formal Report, TINIAN Operation, Company D.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS,
FOURTH TANK BATTALION, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,
FMP, c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

22 August, 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, Fourth Marine Division.
Via: (1) The Commanding Officer, Division Support
Group, Fourth Marine Division.

Subject: Formal Report, Tinian Operation.

Reference: (a) DivSplOrder #140-44, dated 3Aug44.
(b) Marine Corps Tables Of Organization
F76, F79, and F80.
(c) Formal Report, CO, 4thTkBn, Saipan Operation,
dated 20Aug44.

Enclosures: (A) Formal Report, same subject, CO, Co. "A", 4thTkBn
(B) Formal Report, same subject, CO, Co. "B", 4thTkBn
(C) Formal Report, same subject, CO, Co. "C", 4thTkBn
(D) Formal Report, same subject, CO, Co. "D", 4thTkBn

1. In accordance with reference (a), the follow-
ing report is submitted:

A. PLANS and PREPARATIONS:

(1) The brief time available between the Saipan and Tinian Operations was entirely used for maintenance on the vehicles of this organization, which, due to the tactical requirements on Saipan, had operated for twenty-five consecutive days without even the proper preventive maintenance measures.

(2) Thirteen (13) new M4A2 medium tanks were received by this organization from the Seventh Field Depot. All were in excellent condition and complete.

(3) Three (3) old M4A2 medium tanks were received by this organization from the Second Tank Battalion. These tanks, due to the vigorous use to which they had been subjected during the Saipan Operation, were in poor mechanical condition, and were short vital articles of equipment.

(4) The thirteen (13) new tanks and one old tank were equipped with SCR 508 and 528 radios. Due to the fact that these are FM sets, and can not work or be worked by any other set in the Marine Division, these fourteen (14) tanks were all put in Company "B". The Battalion Communication Officer, his assistant, and the enlisted men under his charge did an outstanding job installing several 508 radios in jeeps to provide the proper liaison and in instructing the radio operators of Company "B" in the use of the 500 series radios.

(5) Deep water fording kits for all medium

Subject: FORMAL REPORT, TINIAN OPERATION.....(Cont'd.).

Tanks were received from the Seventh Field Depot, and maintenance sections of the three medium companies worked night and day for four days to install these prior to embarkation.

(6) Plans were worked out by the Bn-4 and the Tank Company Commanders in order that the battalion supply section might function properly in the impending operation.

B.

(1) See Enclosures (A), (B), (C) and (D).

(2) Headquarters and Service Company was embarked on an LST and was landed late in the afternoon of "J" Day. The Battalion Executive Officer picked a bivouac area near an artillery battalion, and during the night of "J" - "J" plus one, Headquarters and Service Company helped repel an enemy counter-attack. Battalion dumps were established and were moved forward as the tactical situation permitted. This was accomplished with one 2½ ton 6X6, and one 1 ton 4X4, but all companies, though they remained Regimental Combat Team attachments throughout the operation, were adequately supplied with fuel, rations, water and ammunition by the Tank Battalion. On "J" plus four day, Headquarters and Service Company moved to a new area on the southwest slope of Mt Lasso, and on "J" plus ten day, the Tank Companies were reverted to battalion control and the battalion went into an assembly area just south of Airfield No. 2.

(3) The Battalion Commander, Operations Officer, Communication Officer, and two radio operators were embarked on the Division Command Ship along with one TCS and SCR 508 equipped "jeep". The Operations Officer landed with the Advance Message Center on the morning of "J" plus one, and the Commanding Officer and Communication Officer landed with the "jeep" with the Division Staff at about noon on "J" plus one. The Commanding Officer and Bn-3 remained at the Division Command Post until "J" plus four, when the Commanding Officer returned to the Battalion Command Post, and the Bn-3 continued to function as Tank Liaison Officer at the Division Command Post. Since the Tank Companies never reverted to parent control until after Tinian was secured, Headquarters and Service Company, except for the Assistant Bn-4 and the forward dump detail, fulfilled no missions and might just as well have remained on Saipan.

(4) After Tinian was secured, all Tank Companies started maintenance work, and prepared for reembarkation. The thirteen (13) new M4A2 tanks; three (3) cars, half-track, M2; two (2) vehicles, tank recovery, M32B2; one (1) flame thrower equipped M3A1 light tank and three (3) M5A1 light tanks plus all wheeled vehicles were turned in to the Seventh Field Depot. Company "B" embarked aboard the S.S. Sea Corporal;

Subject: FORMAL REPORT, TINIAN OPERATION.....(Cont'd.).

Company "D" with its remaining tanks embarked aboard the S.S. Jean LaFitte; Headquarters and Service Company plus detachment of Company "C", aboard the S.S. Typhoon and "A" Company plus Company "C", less detachment, embarked aboard LST 175 with the remaining medium tanks.

C.

(1) SUMMARY:

(a) The tactical elements of this organization were assigned as normal combat team attachments, (i.e. Company "A" to Regimental Combat Team 25; Company "B" to Regimental Combat Team 24 and Company "C" to Regimental Combat Team 23). In addition, the First Platoon of Company "D" was attached to Company "A"; Second Platoon to Company "B" and Third Platoon to Company "C". Headquarters and Service Company plus Company "D" less detachments was a part of the Division Support Group. All attachments remained in effect until after the island was secured.

(b) Company "A" landed in LCMs from LSD 8 on Beach White 2 after considerable delay caused by the blocking of the beach exits by engineer equipment and apparent confusion on the White 2 Control Boat. The tanks of this company experienced considerable difficulty crossing the rough and creviced reef of White 2, but no vehicles were lost.

(c) Company "B" landed in LCMs from LSD 1 on Beach White 1 and contrary to expectations, experienced no difficulty.

(d) Company "C" landed in LCTs on Beach White 1 without casualties.

(e) Tinian was much more suitable tank terrain than Saipan, and little trouble was encountered by tank units during the entire operation. Many enemy were killed in the open by medium tanks leading infantry attacks, and flame thrower tanks were of considerable value in mopping up enemy resistance in caves. Due to the fact that one tank company was out of operation most of the time, (i.e. the Regimental Combat Team to which it was attached was in reserve), few mechanical failures were encountered in spite of the very poor mechanical condition of three-fourths of the vehicles.

(2) CONCLUSIONS:

(a) The SCR 500 series FM push-button type radio is definitely the solution to most tank communication problems.

(b) Aside from (a) above, no conclusions

Subject: FORMAL REPORT, TINIAN OPERATION.....(Cont'd.).

not contained in reference (c) were arrived at, and no facts were discovered which would make any of the previous conclusions seem unjustified.

(3) RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) That, since according to reference (b) SCR 500 series radios are now standard in Marine Corps Tank Battalions, in all future operations every effort be made to secure seventeen (17) frequencies within the SCR 500 band for the use of the Tank Battalion. These frequencies would be assigned as follows:

- 1 - Company "A" Command.
- 1 - First Platoon, Company "A" Command.
- 1 - Second Platoon, Company "A" Command.
- 1 - Third Platoon, Company "A" Command.
- 1 - Fourth Platoon, Company "A" Command.
- 5 - Similarly for Company "B".
- 5 - Similarly for Company "C".
- 1 - Fourth Tank Battalion Command.
- 1 - Fourth Tank Battalion Reconnaissance and Liaison and Alternate Command.

(b) No recommendations, except for (a) above, not already contained in reference (c) are made as the result of experience gained in the Tinian Operation. There was no new experience on Tinian which showed any previous recommendation to be faulty or unjustified.


R. K. SCHMIDT.

OHW/tvw: First Endorsement 22 August, 1944.
HEADQUARTERS, DIVISION SUPPORT GROUP, FOURTH MARINE DIVISION,
FMF, c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, Fourth Marine Division.

- 1. Forwarded.

O. H. WHEELER.

COMPANY "A", FOURTH TANK BATTALION,
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

9 September, 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commanding Officer, Fourth Tank Battalion.
Subject: Formal Report, Tinian Operation.

1. (A) On Jig minus 2 days this company embarked at Saipan Island on the LSD 2 along with six tanks of Company "C". The retriever tank, dozer tank, three radio jeeps, two six by six trucks, a half track and Company Headquarters were embarked on an LCT. The two trucks were loaded with 220 gals of fuel each and two thirds of a unit of fire for the tanks.

(B) This company in support of CT 25 was ordered to land on beach white 2, on order of the Commanding Officer, CT 25. Upon landing the third platoon would report to BLT 2-25; the second platoon would report to BLT 3-25; the company headquarters and the first platoon would go into a predetermined assembly area and await orders; the one platoon from Company "C" would land with this company and revert to Company "C" upon arrival at the beach. Communication between the CT and the tank Company Commander was established by a borrowed SCR 300. Reconnaissance and liaison parties were attached to each assault BLT for the landing and the operation during Jig Day. This company was launched in 19 LCM's from the LSD in time to arrive at a rendezvous area 1000 yards west of the LST area at H-Hour. Two LCM's containing two tanks of the third platoon had mechanical failures and were unable to land until two days later. No boat officers were available to this company. It was planned to land in three waves due to the small beach. The beach was reported mined and congested which in turn held up the order for the tanks to land. At H/3 the order was received to attempt to land one tank. The order was complied with and it required 45 minutes from the time the LCM reached the coral reef until the tank was on the beach. Most of the time was spent trying to locate a suitable route for the rest of the tanks. When this tank finally reached the beach, it was discovered the beach was not completely clear of mines. One member of this tank crew and a reconnaissance man were wounded when a jeep ran over and detonated one of the undiscovered mines. At about H/5½ the rest of the company was ordered in. The engineers had a path marked by men to guide the tanks in over the coral reef and around pot holes. No tanks were lost in this operation. At H/7½ all the tanks of this company and the six from Company "C" were landed. Much time was lost because it was necessary to land only one tank at a time. The order of CT 25 was then carried out.

ENCLOSURE "A"

Subject: FORMAL REPORT, TINIAN OPERATION....(Cont'd.).

The second platoon stood by with BLT 3-25 for the rest of the day. The two remaining tanks of the third platoon supported the attack of BLT 2-25 to the O-A until dusk. One tank was rendered inoperative by rifle fire through one of its radiators.

(C) Jig Night: The predetermined assembly area for this company was taken by the artillery thus the tanks moved to an area in the center of CT 25 zone of action about 500 yards inland along a railroad track with a thin tree line as cover. The assembly area was located between the assault BLT and the reserve BLT. Before dark the dozer tank, retriever tank, and two radio jeeps joined the company. Also a platoon of light tanks, three flame throwers and two M5 tanks, were attached to this company for the operation. The three flame thrower tanks were in turn attached one to each of the three platoons and the two M5's held in reserve. Local security was established. At approximately 0300 an enemy counter attack started and continued until day light. Mortar, artillery, and small arms fire were received. A certain amount of friendly fire was received from the rear elements. One man was wounded by enemy mortar fire.

2. Jig # 1. At 0500 the second platoon reported to BLT 3-25 to assist in repulsing an enemy counter-attack already in progress. This platoon led Company K to make contact with CT 24 on its left. Numerous enemy troops were encountered and annihilated by 75 MM and machine gun fire delivered by the tanks. Upon returning to the BLT assembly area and replenishing the supply of ammunition the second platoon supported BLT 3-25 in an attack to the O-1 line. The platoon was reinforced for this attack by the dozer tank from Company Headquarters. Light enemy resistance was encountered and overcome by tank and infantry weapons. The first platoon reported to BLT 1-25 at 0600, then in reserve. This BLT passed through BLT 3-25's left flank and drove on to the O-1 line. During this advance the tanks led the infantry and delivered fire into caves on the high ground to their right flank. Very little resistance was encountered. The two remaining tanks of the third platoon remained in the Company's assembly area. From this position they observed gun flashes coming from the high ground 900 yards to their front with the shells hitting 400 yards to their rear. They immediately went into action and put the enemy pieces out of action with 75 MM fire. This action took place about 0700. All tanks and personnel returned to the company assembly area by 1845. During the day's operation, the Company Commander and Executive Officer along with the reconnaissance personnel with radio jeeps worked with the two assault BLT commanders. This afforded the maximum control and communication between the infantry and tanks.

Subject: FORMAL REPORT, TINIAN OPERATION.... (Cont'd.).

3. Jig / 2. The second platoon attached to BLT 3-25, and the first platoon attached to BLT 1-25 supported the attack to the regimental objective which included Mount Lasso 1500 yards from the LD. No enemy personnel were encountered by the tanks. The tanks then cut down cane fields for fields of fire for the infantry's final defense line for the night. The tanks were released at 1815.

4. Jig / 3. With the first and second platoons attached to the same BLTs, the company led the infantry to the O-4 line, an advance of 1000 yards. No enemy were encountered. The company returned to a new assembly area t 1600.

5. Jig / 4. The first and second platoons were again attached to BLT 1-25 and 3-25. The third platoon was attached to BLT 2-25 and went into position on the CT's right. The tanks led the advance of the CT to the O-5 an advance of between 3500 and 4500 yards. Only scattered resistance in the form of snipers and light machine gun nests were encountered. The tanks crushed cane fields with the assistance of the flame thrower tanks for the purpose of opening fields of fire for the infantry's night defenses.

6. Jig / 5. The platoons of this company were attached to the BLT's of CT 25 as in the previous day. The tanks led the infantry from the O-5 line to the O-6 line, an advance of 1800 yards. The only resistance of any importance was met by the second platoon which was attached to BLT 3-25. Numerous enemy machine gun nests and riflemen were encountered in open fields as well as in cane fields. One light tank was knocked out by a mine. The crew was evacuated with one casualty. One medium tank threw a track in enemy territory and this crew was also evacuated. Both tanks were stripped of guns, radio parts, and maps by the crews. The medium tank was retrieved and put back into action the following morning. The remaining tanks delivered fire on the enemy positions until they were neutralized. The company returned to its assembly area at 1600.

7. Jig / 6. The attachments of this company remained the same as the day previous. The tanks led the elements of CT 25 to the O-7 line, an advance of about 3000 yards. In the beginning of the advance, some mines were encountered in the zone of BLT 3-25. Engineers preceded the tanks and disarmed the mines. Upon reaching the O-7 line enemy artillery opened up along the CT's front lines which came from the high ground 1800 yards to the front. The tanks along with the artillery, naval gun fire, and air support delivered fire into the enemy gun positions to the front. At 1700, CT 25 was relieved by CT 23. This company then went into Division Reserve along with CT 25. A new assembly area for the tanks was assigned by the Division.

Subject: FORMAL REPORT, TINIAN OPERATION....(Cont'd.).

8. Jig / 7. This company remained in Division Reserve. Its assembly area was moved to a point 500 yards in rear of the front lines. No tanks of this company operated this day.

9. Jig / 8. The third platoon was assigned to Company "C", 4th Tank Battalion. Its mission included mopping up operations with BLT 3-25. Isolated centers of resistance were wiped out. Two tanks were hit with magnetic mines. One engine of one tank was knocked out but it was able to return to safe territory on one engine. A mine on the second tank was placed on the tank commanders hatch which killed the tank commander, but the tank and rest of its crew returned to safety. The other tanks of the company did not operate.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Deep water fording kits were installed on the tanks of this company. The water over this particular reef was between 1 and 1½ feet deep, but the kits provided good insurance in the event of pot holes or breaks in the coral.

2. Liaison and reconnaissance between the tanks and infantry units during this operation functioned satisfactory. Each assault LT was provided a radio jeep, a reconnaissance party and a liaison officer from the tanks, which provided for better tank infantry coordination. A liaison officer definitely should be with each assault LT Commander at all times, especially, to assist in the planning of an attack at which time the details concerning the tanks may be clearly understood by all units concerned.

3. The terrain in this operation was ideal for tank operation. However due to the cane fields and numerous tree lines, it was impossible for the Company Commander to observe more than one platoon of tanks at any one time. This in turn gave the platoon leaders considerable trouble in controlling the tanks in his own platoon since the platoon leader had to use his tank in the line to fight. The solution to the problem would be an increase in the number of tanks in the platoon in order that the platoon leader's tank might stay in rear of the rest of the platoon for control purposes. Also the platoon leader would be in a better position to confer with the infantry company commanders as the situation developed. A satisfactory company organization would include four platoons with five tanks and one flame thrower tank each; a dozer tank and one other tank in company headquarters. With the frontage assigned the ICT's in this operation at no time was there a sufficient number of tanks to properly support the attack.

Subject: FORMAL REPORT, TINIAN OPERATION....(Cont'd.).

4. The twin diesel engines of the M4A2 tank is the most satisfactory power plant. Not only for the minimum fire hazard, but for the insurance of being able to operate on one engine. This one factor saved the lives of a crew plus the tank when one engine was knocked out or failed due to mechanical trouble, but still could operate to the extent of moving to an area of safety.

5. Flat surfaces of the tank covered with wood and pouring sand in between the wood and armor plate should neutralize the magnetic mine as well as minimize the effect of anti-tank fire. Special attention should be paid to the hatches in protection against magnetic mines.

6. A better means of vision for the tank commander must be established. Seventy-five percent of the time the platoon leader must have his head out of the turret to observe and control his tanks. Whether a new type periscope or a protected tank commanders turret is the answer depends upon the speed and the amount of experimentation necessary to solve the problem.

7. The Company Commander of a tank company should hold the rank of Major. This would provide the Company Commander with the authority that is necessary in the employment of his tanks. Generally the tank company commander operates with either a CT Commander or a BLT Commander, and this added authority would carry more weight in accomplishing the task at hand.

8. Communications: See Saipan Operation Report.

9. Supply during this operation was improved 100%. The Bn 4 of the Tank Battalion had dumps of fuel and ammunition near the zone of operations. This saved the company property personnel from wasting time combing dumps along the beach. The battalion dumps enabled the company to move its assembly area on short notice without moving large amounts of supplies.

Stephen Horton, Jr.
STEPHEN HORTON, JR.

First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve,
Commanding.

S F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
COMPANY "B", FOURTH TANK BATTALION
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer, Fourth Tank Battalion.
Subject: Formal Report, Tinian Operation.
Reference: (a) DivSplOrder #140-44, dated 3Aug44.
(b) Map; Saipan-Tinian Area: 1:20,000.
(c) Formal Report, CO, Co."B", 4thTkn, Saipan
Operation, dated 25Aug44.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted.

A. (1) This company was attached to the 24th Marines for the initial landing and throughout the remainder of the operation. The company (14 tanks) and one platoon of "C" Company, (4 tanks), were loaded on the LSD-1. The Liaison group was loaded on a LST with the 24th Marine Headquarters. The reconnaissance group was loaded on an LST with the Headquarters 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines to land with that unit and determine the possible use of Beach White One to land tanks.

(2) On J - day, this company was disembarked from the LSD-1 and proceeded to the assigned LCM area arriving there at H-15. The company commander proceeded to the White One control boat and stood by there for further orders. Tanks were ordered in and all landed successfully on Beach White One after fording $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 feet of water for 25 yards at H plus 3 hours. The company dispersal area was located at TA 646 R. A platoon of four flame throwers and two M5A1's joined this unit at the dispersal area and remained attached for the remainder of the operation.

(3) Eight tanks were in the assault in an attack from TA 646 WSN to the O-1 line at TA 646 E; 647 FU; 641 F. Two flame throwers and one M5A1 were used against the enemy in caves and brush at TA 646 HD.

(4) The Commanding Officer, 24th Marines ordered tanks to the front lines for the night. Two tanks covered the 2nd Battalion and six tanks the 1st and 3rd Battalions. Some enemy artillery fire was received during the night with no damage or casualties within this unit.

B. J plus 1 day.

(1) Fourteen tanks available for action plus four flame throwers and two M5A1's. At dawn one platoon moved from their front line position on the west and proceeded to

S. [REDACTED]

Subject: FORMAL REPORT, TINIAN OPERATION... (Cont'd)

TA 646 I to help repel an enemy counter-attack. This platoon remained there and later led an attack to the north along the beach. The 1st Battalion with which they were working was relieved by the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines at 1000. The tanks remained with this unit until they were relieved by another tank platoon at 1300. This new platoon of tanks led the attack to TA 652 N; 653 U when they were released at 1800.

2. One platoon was assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines and was in the assault during the attack to O-2 at TA 627 AJ. This platoon returned to the dispersal area to refuel and rearm at 1700. It was ordered to return to the front lines for the night by the Commanding Officer, 24th Marines.

C. J plus 2 day.

1. Fourteen tanks available for action plus four flame throwers and two M5A1s. The platoon on the front with the 2nd Battalion remained there and led an attack to the base of Mount Lasso at TA 620-RT. This platoon was relieved at 1400 by another platoon. This new platoon again remained on the front lines for the night by order of the Commanding Officer, 24th Marines. The 24th Marines less the 2nd Battalion reverted to Division reserve.

2. The company dispersal area was moved to TA 640-QV. Normal maintenance was conducted on all tanks not committed to action.

D. J plus 3 day.

1. Fourteen tanks available for action, plus four flame throwers and two M5A1s. The platoon that remained on the front lines the previous night was released at 1000 when the 2nd Battalion was relieved in the lines by the 2nd Division. The entire company remained in reserve the remainder of the day.

2. Normal maintenance was conducted on all tanks. The company remained in the dispersal area for the night.

E. J plus 4 day.

1. Fourteen tanks available for action plus four flame throwers and two M5A1s. The company remained in reserve until 1300. At this time one platoon led an attack from TA 577 NO across the air strip to TA 555 V; 556 G. By order of the Commanding Officer, 24th Marines all tanks of this company protected the 24th CP during the night at TA 556-F.

2. The company dispersal area was moved to TA 590-F.

SECRET

Subject: FORMAL REPORT - TINIAN OPERATION... (Cont'd)

F. J plus 5 day.

1. Fourteen tanks available for action plus four flame throwers and two M5A1s. The 24th Marines attacked on a two Battalion front. One platoon was attached to the 3rd Battalion on the left and one to the 1st Battalion on the right. The headquarters section remained between the Battalions. Tanks led the advance from TA 555 V; 556 G to TA 543 O; 545 L. Very heavy resistance was received at TA 544 G. This area contained well concealed and dug in positions, and had to be over run twice by tanks. Tanks were released at 1730 and returned to the dispersal area for the night.

G. J plus 6 day.

1. Fourteen tanks available for action plus four flame throwers and two M5A1s. All tanks, lights and mediums, were under company control to lead the attack from TA 343 O; 545 L. Heavy resistance was received from caves in the cliff at TA 534 O. Tank fire and flame throwers knocked out this resistance. One tank was knocked out from enemy artillery fire while in this area. The attack pushed ahead through Tinian Town and continued until 1800 reaching TA 521 FT. Tanks returned to the dispersal area to rearm and refuel and assembled in the reserve battalion area at TA 534 T for the night.

H. J plus 7 day.

1. Thirteen tanks available for action plus three flame throwers and two M5A1s. The attack continued with the same organization as the day before at 0830. Heavy resistance and mines were encountered along the beach at TA 514 MRW. Flame throwers were used against caves at TA 509 R. Resistance and mines were encountered at TA 509 T. Flame throwers burned caves in this area and the engineers removed 45 mines in an area 30 yards long on the road. Terrain did not permit bypassing the mined area. The attack advanced to TA 509 U; 510 U.

2. While one infantry platoon and two tanks were securing the left flank at TA 510 F, the enemy made a counter attack in that area. The infantry withdrew 100 yards to consolidate their lines, leaving the two tanks, which were in the assault, uncovered long enough for the enemy to swarm over one tank. Fortunately the enemy used no magnetic AT mines or explosives.

3. All tanks assembled at TA 514-O for the night after their release at 1815. Fuel and ammunition was brought forward from the dispersal area. Maintenance pulled and repaired the radiator of one tank.

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Subject: FORMAL REPORT - TINIAN OPERATION... (Cont'd)

I. J plus 8 day.

1. Fourteen tanks available for action plus three flame throwers and two M5A1s. Continued the attack with the same organization as day before. Tanks remained in support until the infantry reached the area at TA 506 ST. From this position, tanks led the assault to TA 504 UP. Upon release, tanks returned to forward assembly area at TA 514 O for the night. The island was declared secured, except for scattered resistance at 1855.

J. J plus 9 day.

1. One platoon remained at TA 504 U in support of mopping up operations until 1300. All flame throwers and light tanks were used effectively against caves and grass covered coral pits in the area TA 502.

2. The light platoons remained at an assembly area at TA 506 X for the night. The remainder of the company assembled at TA 527 L.

K. J plus 10 day.

1. The light platoons remained in support of 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines until 1700 when they were released. This company reverted to Battalion control at 1600 this date.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Fording kits proved unnecessary during the landings in this operation.

2. After all LCM's had assembled in their proper area prior to landing, the company commander moved his LCM and tank to the vicinity of the White One control boat. The tank radio's were used to call the LCM's to the LD and to start the waves towards the beach. The co-ordination between the company commander and the Commanding Officer, 24th Marines aboard this control boat avoided any possible confusion and bypassed the complicated navy communication system.

3. Tank communication was excellent. All command tanks were equipped with an SCR 508 FM (Two receivers) radio while the remaining tanks were equipped with the SCR 528 FM (One receiver) radio. The company was assigned five frequencies. One was set aside for company-battalion communication, one for platoon-company communication, and one to each platoon for interplatoon communication. This system was a great improvement over the one company frequency allowed on the GF/RU radio used previously. No interference was encountered and reception was excellent at all times except at close

Subject: FORMAL REPORT - TINIAN OPERATION... (Cont'd)

range. The ICS was louder and clearer than that of the GF/RU.

4. Tanks were used on the front lines at night against the recommendations of this company commander. A tank has limited vision during daylight hours, and is completely blind at night. During the night, the crew is required to remain in the tank ready for action. This throws a great physical strain on the crew as no rest can be had in the tank. After a day of operation in a hot tank, filled with foul air, the crew needs a good night's rest to regain their stamina for the next day's operation. Tanks require daily maintenance that cannot be performed if the tanks remain on the front lines at night. The infantry has weapons of the same fire power that can more readily cover and conceal themselves on the front lines at night.

5. See Combat Report - Saipan, Summary and Conclusions; Par., 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The SCR 500 series radio should be adopted as the standard tank radio for all tank units.

2. Tanks should not be used for defense on the front lines at night unless the situation requires it as a last resort.

3. The "Ten-in-One" rations issued this company were far more satisfactory than other ans should be adopted for future operations; Also fruit juices should be issued to tank crews as an energy food to be used when the situation does not permit time for noon meals.

4. See Combat Report - Saipan; Recommendations; Par., 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.

Roger F. Seasholtz
ROGER F. SEASHOLTZ

SECRET

COMPANY "C", FOURTH TANK BATTALION
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

ENCLOSURE "D".

10 September, 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commanding Officer, 4th Tank Battalion.
Subject: Formal Report, Tinian Operation.

1. A. At Saipan preparatory to the attack on Tinian Island one platoon of this company was loaded on board an LSD with Able Company, one platoon on board an LSD with Baker Company, one platoon and Company Headquarters plus two flame thrower tanks were loaded on board LCT's, also one radio jeep and a utility jeep were loaded on board the same LCT's as the tanks, making a load of four medium tanks one flame thrower tank and one jeep in each LCT. An armored half-track used as an ammunition carrier, two 2½ ton six by six trucks plus some trailers were loaded at Saipan late Jig day aboard LCT's that had already discharged their first cargo on Tinian. One additional radio jeep went aboard an LST at Saipan with Battalion Headquarters and was landed on Tinian in an LVT.2. A reconnaissance section of six men went aboard an LST with an infantry company of BLT 2/23. The infantry company was scheduled to land on Beach White Two. It was originally planned that the tanks of this company would also land on Beach White Two after the infantry of RCT 23. Thus, the reconnaissance section would land ahead of the tanks, and prepare to lead the tanks through mine fields on the beach and to reconnoiter for routes of exit from the beach and routes of approach to the assigned assembly area. A company liaison party consisting of one officer and a communications sergeant embarked on the same LST and went into the beach in the same landing craft as the Commanding Officer of RCT 23.

B. This company was initially attached to RCT 23 for the landing on Tinian and it remained so attached till Jig plus 15 when mopping up operations were completed. RCT 23 was to be the reserve regiment in the landing on Tinian. Because of that it was decided that the platoon of this company aboard the LSD with Able Company would land on Beach White Two with that company and remain attached to that company and in support of RCT 25 until RCT 23 got ashore at which time the platoon would revert to parent control. Likewise, the platoon on board the Baker Company LSD would be initially attached to Baker Company in support of RCT 24 and was to land on Beach White One. The platoon on board the LCT's plus Company Headquarters would land when ordered on whatever beach proved most satisfactory for tanks.

C. The first tanks to land on Tinian were those of Baker Company plus the attached platoon of this company and they were landed as scheduled on Beach White One. The beach was so narrow that the 19 LCMs had to pull up to the beach, discharge their cargo, and withdraw one at a time. Thus, over an hour was consumed in unloading the LCM's. However, each LCM was able to get to within fifteen yards of the beach and the tanks all succeeded in getting ashore

with no difficulty. The water through which the tanks had to pass was never over three feet deep. Prior to the landing of the tanks on Beach White One, a bull-dozer got ashore and built a road from the beach inland. This road enabled the tanks to get off the beach and inland with no difficulty.

D. Able Company's tanks plus the attached platoon from this company were unable to land on Beach White Two on schedule because of the presence of considerable numbers of mines on the beach. Meanwhile, the tanks, jeeps, and personnel of this company who were embarked on LCT's landed with no difficulty, one LCT at a time, right behind Baker Company on Beach White One. The Commanding Officer of this company was embarked on an LCT and landed in his tank on Beach White One at about 1530. Before landing the Commanding Officer of this company received an order from the Commanding Officer of RCT 23 to assemble his tanks as soon as possible, after landing, at the previously designated assembly area in order to join a proposed attack of BLT 2/23. This assembly area was just inland and south of Beach White Two. When the Commanding Officer of this company reached Beach White One he was met by two members of the reconnaissance party that had landed earlier on Beach White Two. As soon as the LCT's were unloaded, the reconnaissance men guided the tanks and jeeps of this company, less the platoon still afloat with Able Company, to the assigned assembly area south of Beach White Two. Elements of BLT 2/23 were still entering the assembly area when this company arrived there at about 1600, and the area was still in front of the front line perimeter established by the two assault regiments. Almost immediately after the tanks of this company reached the area an attack to the south, involving BLT 2/23 and two platoons of this company, was organized and gotten underway. Just as the attack was started the remaining platoon of this company reached the area after landing with Baker Company on Beach White Two and went into a reserve position. It was then about 1630.

E. Almost as soon as the attack was started the assault companies of BLT 2/23 and the assembly area which they had just left came under very heavy enemy machine gun fire from almost point blank range. This fire was so intense that practically the whole battalion of RCT 2/23 was pinned down, and the underbrush, woods, and sugar cane that made up the area was so heavy that it was almost impossible to locate the hostile guns. For almost an hour while BLT 2/23 was pinned down this company's tanks, including the platoon initially left in reserve, cruised through the entire area. Some enemy machine guns were eventually flushed out by the tanks and this caused the fire to lift sufficiently for BLT 2/23 to dig in and organize defenses for the night. By that time it was rapidly getting dark and all plans for a further advance had to be postponed till the next morning. As soon as the infantry of BLT 2/23 were dug in, the tanks of this company withdrew to an area between BLT 2/23 and BLT 1/23, and dug in for the night. RCT 23 was at this time in a column of battalions and the tanks were approximately two hundred yards behind the front lines.

2. A. At 0600 on Jig plus 1, two platoons of this company cruised over the area generally in front of the lines of BLT 2/23 with the express purpose of killing any live Japs remaining in that area after the pre-dawn enemy counter attack. Though the area was littered with enemy dead, a good many live enemy were encountered and killed. One tank ran over a dead Jap who apparently was carrying a bangalore torpedo when killed. As the tank ran over the Jap the torpedo was detonated and blew six blocks off of the left track. The crew of this tank remained in their vehicle firing their guns at targets of opportunity. After this phase of the day's operation was completed, a tank retriever from Able Company helped the crew of the damaged tank to repair it on the spot. During the same action, a Jap who had been lying amongst a group of enemy dead suddenly got up as the tanks passed him and succeeded, before he was shot down, in placing a magnetic mine against the side of one tank. A curious fact is that this tank was the only tank present whose sides were not covered with lumber as an anti-magnetic mine measure. The detonation of the magnetic mine caused a leak in one of the fuel tanks of the tank against which it was placed and the concussion of the explosion blew all the fuel out of the tank of the auxillary generator without actually springing a leak or doing the generator any other damage! At about 0900 the tanks withdrew to their assembly area of the previous night in order to rearm preparatory to an attack to the O-2 that was to start at 1000.

B. Shortly before 1000, just as the tanks finished re-arming, several high velocity field guns began to shell the general Beach White Two area including the RCT 23 assembly area. Gun flashes were observed to the south along the top of the ridge that was RCT 23's O-2. Almost immediately the tanks started to shell the ridge line. This was followed by an air strike and an artillery concentration on that same ridge after which the attack jumped off. Two battalions of RCT 23 were in the assault during this attack and each battalion was proceeded by a platoon of six tanks. Actually, the first and second platoons, which were the tank platoons involved, consist of only five tanks each, but a tank from the third platoon was attached to each of the other platoons giving them a total of six tanks apiece and leaving the remaining tanks of the third platoon in company and RCT reserve.

C. In this attack, as in all subsequent attacks on Tinian the support given the tanks by the infantry was excellent. In the case of each platoon, a line of five tanks was out about fifteen yards in front of the infantry while the platoon leader was in the middle of the first line of the infantry in the control tank. An infantry officer, generally a company commander, walked beside each control tank and was always in direct communication with the platoon leader inside the tank by means of the tank radio telephone that had been installed on the back of each tank. Meanwhile, the tank company Commanding Officer riding in a radio jeep followed the right battalion staying always with that battalion's Commanding Officer. The Tank Company Commanding Officer had contact with both tank platoons via his TCS radio and also had contact

with the Commanding Officer of RCT 23 via the tank liaison officer who also had a TCS radio and who remained always with the Commanding Officer of RCT 23. At approximately 1500, the attack reached its objective where numerous dugouts were located. At this point the tanks fired considerable amounts of HE into the dugouts. After almost each hit several enemy would run out only to be shot by infantry and tank small arms fire. After the infantry units were dug in the tanks returned to their assembly area of the previous night, refueled, rearmed, and prepared to remain there that night. It had previously been decided by the RCT Commander that the tanks would withdraw each night to positions behind the front lines and in the general vicinity of the RCT 23 Command Post. With the exception of two nights, this company assembled each night in an area close to the RCT 23 Command Post.

D. During the attack on Jig plus 1 it eventually became apparent that five tanks were not able to adequately cover a battalion front of the yardage assigned. This was particularly true on Tinian where sugar cane made it difficult if not impossible to see more than a few yards ahead or to the side. Therefore, in all attacks after Jig plus 1 all tanks were put into action with no tanks remaining in reserve. Even with all the tanks employed, the fronts were so wide that amphibian tanks were called upon to support the tanks during the next three days advances.

3. A. At 0600 on Jig plus 2, the first platoon of this company supported a preliminary attack by the right flank company of RCT 23. This right flank company, attacking over difficult terrain, was not yet quite up to the O-2 and this preliminary attack brought them abreast of the other companies so that the entire RCT was able to jump off from the same Line of Departure at the start of the general division advance. RCT 23 was to advance with two battalions in the assault. After the preliminary attack was completed, half the tanks of the first platoon, plus two LVTA's remained with the right flank company. The second platoon and two LVTA's supported the balance of the right battalion while the third platoon and the balance of the first platoon and two LVTA's supported the left battalion. A platoon of flame thrower tanks was attached to this company during the morning and remained so attached till mopping up operations were completed. When the flame thrower tanks arrived, two of them were sent to work with the tanks supporting the right flank company because the nature of the terrain over which that company was advancing made their advance primarily a mopping up operation. The other flame thrower tanks were held in reserve and followed the tank company commander who remained again with the Commanding Officer of the right battalion. Also, by now, the half-track ammunition carrier had landed and it too followed behind the Company Commander. From time to time, the half-track rearmed the tanks. From that day on the tanks never had to be withdrawn to be rearmed but were always rearmed by the half-track at the front.

B. By about 1600 all units of the RCT had reached the day's objective. After the defense lines for the night had been laid out, the tanks spent about forty-five minutes cruising through the sugar cane in front of the infantry lines knocking down the cane for a distance of about 500 yards to the front. This practice of knocking down cane to give the infantry a clear field of fire was engaged in every time the day's advance ended in or in front of a cane field. After the cane was knocked down, the tanks withdrew to their assembly area in the vicinity of the RCT Command Post which by now had moved well forward of that day's Line of Departure. Ammunition and fuel had been hauled to this new area during the day by this company's six by six trucks and the tanks refueled and re-armed that night in their new assembly area.

4. During the balance of the advance on Tinian, the tanks of this company continued to lead almost every attack made by RCT 23, with the exception of a few occasions when mine fields were encountered and engineers had to go in head of the tanks to clear lanes. During each advance, the infantry support of the tanks was excellent, and close communication and liaison was maintained between tanks and infantry by the methods already described.

5. During each day's advance whenever hostile strong points were encountered, the infantry would take cover as best they could and at the same time continue to support the tanks with fire while the tanks sought out the enemy positions and destroyed them or flushed the enemy personnel into the open whereupon the infantry cut them down. After the elimination of a strong point, the advance with the tanks in the lead would be resumed till the next strong point was encountered.

6. On a few occasions tanks poured considerable fire into cliffs which could be reached only by fire. But not nearly as much ammunition was expended daily as on Saipan and tanks seldom fired at anything but an identified target. Tanks advanced without firing unless they actually saw enemy personnel or installations or unless requested by the infantry to bring fire to bear on a given area. On Jig plus 7 the tanks of this company came under close range high velocity anti-tank fire for the first and only time on Tinian. Two tanks were hit. The first tank to be hit received seven hits, one of which penetrated the turret and the balance of which failed to come completely through. All hits on the first tank were received either on the turret or the front slope plate, the two strong points of the tank armor. The other tank received six hits, three of which were on the side below the turret and all three of those hits penetrated. On the second tank one projectile entered the left fuel tank and caused the fuel to leak out but failed to set the diesel oil on fire. The other two projectiles that penetrated the second tank entered the fighting compartment, wounding the loader, tank commander, and gunner. One of the projectiles that entered the fighting compartment hit and severed two HE shells in the ammunition racks, the other projectile hit and cut off the nose of a smoke shell and continued on to hit and destroy a radio junction box. None of the ammunition hit by penetrating projectiles was detonated, and no damage was thus done other than to the shells

themselves and the junction box. Before the two tanks were hit their platoon had been advancing in front of the left battalion of RCT 23 with their left flank along a tree line that paralleled the route of advance. RCT 23 was at this time on the Division left flank. Elements of the Division on its left were approximately 600 yards to the rear, leaving RCT 23's left flank exposed for that distance. Suddenly, the left flank tank received six hits in rapid succession. As soon as the tank commander realized that his tank had been hit and penetrated, he backed off about 15 yards to a defiladed spot. The commander of the hit tank believed the gun which had fired was located in the cliff to his left front. He then fired two smoke shells at the cliff, bracketing the area in which he believed the enemy gun to be. Then rockets, naval gun-fire, and the tanks delivered a short but very heavy concentration to the area indicated. After the firing was over, the tanks resumed their advance, this time with another tank on the left flank. The tank that had already been hit travelled about 10 yards behind the left flank tank. As soon as the new left flank tank reached the spot where the first tank had been hit, it received six very rapid hits, three of which penetrated. However, this time both the first and second tanks to be hit spotted the gun about 30 yards to their left beyond the tree line. The second tank to be hit immediately threw a smoke shell in front of the gun while the first tank to be hit maneuvered around behind the gun, knocking it out and killing, by machine gun fire, approximately 20 Japs who ran out of the gun emplacement. Before knocking out the gun, the tank received its seventh hit which glanced harmlessly off the front slope plate. After the gun was knocked out, the attack was resumed. Later examination of the gun and emplacement showed the gun to be a 47 mm anti-tank gun. The emplacement was made of concrete, enclosed on three sides and on top with the open side facing away from the tree line. The gun fired from a small aperture facing the tree line. The fire lane, which ran perpendicular to the tree line and the route of advance was only about ten yards wide where it crossed the tree line.

7. Later that same day, the platoon leading the right battalion of RCT 23 ran into a heavily mined area that was under light enemy small arms fire. Engineers were employed to clear lanes through the field for each tank of the platoon and two engineers walked in front of each tank removing the mines as they were encountered. Suddenly, very heavy small arms fire was received from a trench running directly across and perpendicular to the route of advance and located about twenty yards from the tanks. The engineers as well as the rest of the infantry were pinned down. All tanks then took the trench under fire and one tank was ordered to move up to the end of the trench to fire down the length of it. This tank appeared to be in a section of the area that was least heavily mined and it was thought that it might, with careful driving, negotiate the fifteen or twenty yards to the end of the trench. The tank moved up firing on the trench as it advanced, but when it was about five yards from the trench it hit a mine. This mine was of a semi-circular or cone shape, about fifteen inches at the base, about twelve inches high, and about five inches across the top,

with a four inch long cylinder of about $\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter protruding through the top. The mine was powerful enough to completely shatter the tank's suspension system, severely injuring the driver and also wounding the tank commander and assistant driver. Japs now appeared in large numbers and all tanks fired into them rapidly. Soon, due to the point blank tank fire, many enemy were dead and their survivors were pinned down. At this point another tank then pulled up directly behind the disabled tank and took aboard the crew of the disabled tank. The evacuated crew abandoned its vehicle and entered the other vehicle safely by using the escape hatch located on the deck of the driving compartment. The remaining tanks continued to shell the area and since Japs continually tried to set up machine guns in the disabled tank, the other tanks took the damaged tank under fire and blew it up, thus denying the protection of its armor to the enemy. As it was by then getting dark, the infantry battalion Commanding Officer left one infantry company there to dig in for the night and contain the enemy forces in that pocket, while the balance of the battalion moved around to the left and climbed the cliff behind the Japs. The tanks remained with the containing company till that company's defenses were set up, and then withdrew to join the balance of the tank company for the night. The following morning the pocket was cleared of Japs by excellent tank, infantry, and artillery coordination.

Combat Report-Tinian Operation

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It became quite apparent on Tinian, where the terrain was such that tanks had ample room to maneuver, but where high sugar cane restricted visibility to a few yards, that the present tank company does not provide sufficient tanks to adequately support a RCT. The Table of Organizations adopted since the conclusion of the Forager Operation does provide one additional platoon for each tank company but the total number of tanks in a company has been increased only by one. When operating against the enemy, tanks must always keep within sight of each other in order to adequately cover each other. Therefore, when operating over terrain covered with dense foliage such as jungle or sugar cane, tanks must keep within a few yards of each other. Usually, in terrain such as was encountered on Tinian, tanks must remain within 10 or 15 yards of each other. On Tinian, a normal RCT front was usually at least 1000 or 1500 yards wide and frequently much wider. Assuming a supporting tank company had no vehicle casualties, and assuming that it kept no vehicles in mobile reserve, and used no control tanks, it could at best advance with a front of 200 to 300 yards. Due to vehicle casualties and breakdowns, a tank company seldom has the use of all of its tanks at any one time, in addition to which it is desirable for a tank company to keep a few vehicles, perhaps a platoon, in mobile reserve. Also the already described system of using the platoon leader's tank as control tank, which is extremely desirable, reduces the number of tanks on the line. Thus a tank company of only 15 tanks cannot hope to adequately cover a normal regimental front when operating over heavily wooded or other densely covered terrain. Therefore it is recommended that the number of tanks in a tank company be increased to the extent of adding at least two tanks to each platoon.

2. In the Marine Corps a tank company commander holds a position of extreme responsibility. The equipment under the direct command of a tank company commander, who according to the present Table of Organizations is a Captain, is far greater than that under the command of a Regimental Weapons Company commanding officer who holds the rank of Major. With 15 tanks under his command a tank company commander has control of almost as many 75 mm guns as a battalion of light artillery, plus 30 .30 caliber machine guns and 15 .50 caliber machine guns in addition to the vehicles themselves. A tank company commander has command of one of the key weapons of a RCT. The company commander of a tank company of a RCT is in a position to know more about the capabilities and limitations of his extremely strategic weapon than anyone else in the RCT. It is up to the tank company commander to decide, or at least to recommend, how his vehicles should be used. Because of the responsibility that is his, and because of the fact that recommendations of such importance as he has to make should have behind them the weight of an officer of field rank, it is recommended that commanders of medium tank companies hold the rank of Major. The undersigned has served as the commanding officer of a medium tank

Combat Report-Tinian Operation

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company in combat both as a Captain and as a Major and is acutely aware of the fact that in his dealings with staffs of BLT's and RCT's his recommendations received much more serious attention during those campaigns when he held the rank of Major than during the campaign when he was a Captain.

Robert M. Neiman
ROBERT M. NEIMAN,
Major, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

COMPANY "D", FOURTH TANK BATTALION,
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

31 August, 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer, Fourth Tank Battalion.

Subject: Formal Report, Tinian Operation.

Reference: (a) DivSplOrder #140-44, dated 3Aug44.
(b) Marine Corps Tables of Organization,
F76, F79, and F80.
(c) Formal Report, CO, Co "D", 4thTkBn, Saipan
Operation, dated 25Aug44.
(d) Map; Saipan - Tinian Area, 1:20,000.

1.
1. In accordance with reference (a), the following
report is submitted.

2. Company "D", 4th Tk Bn, was divided among the
three medium tank companies during this operation.

The first platoon was attached to Co. "B", 4thTkBn,
which in turn, was attached to RCT-24. The second platoon was
attached to Co. "C", 4thTkBn, which in turn was attached to RCT-
23. The third platoon was attached to Co. "A", 4thTkBn, which
in turn, was attached to RCT-25.

For the first three days the Headquarters and Maint-
enance Sections established and maintained a supply dump for the
companies. Thereafter the Headquarters and Maintenance Sections
maintained maintenance facilities and assisted in coordination
and movement of supplies to the front lines.

The following is a day by day account of combat
operation by platoons:

J Day

A. The first platoon attached to RCT-24 made a shore
to shore movement in LCM's, joining Co "B", medium tanks in the
LCM rendezvous area off White Beach one. The platoon landed at
1345 on White Beach one with two M5 tanks and 4 flame throwers.
Immediately, upon landing, one M5 and 2 flame throwers were dis-
patched to 1-24, in the area just north of White Beach one. The
flame throwers were used to route several groups of the enemy re-
maining in the rocks, fringing upon the ocean, in this area. Can-
nister from the M5 assisted in cleaning out the heavy underbrush.
At 1600 all tanks returned to the assembly area and remained for
the night.

B. The second platoon attached to RCT-23, made a shore
to shore movement in an LCT and 1 LCM and landed on White Beach one
from the LCM rendezvous area off White Beach one at 1430 with Co.
"C", medium. At 1530 this platoon supported 2-23 in their landing
on White Beach two. Enemy machine guns, which were inflicting cas-
ualties, were wiped out by 75mm, .30 caliber, and 37mm fire. No
flame throwers were used.

Subject: FORMAL REPORT, TINIAN OPERATION.....(Cont'd).

C. The third platoon joined Co. "A", medium tanks in the LCM rendezvous area at 0600, off White Beach two. Thereafter the shore to shore movement was completed in the LCM's. This platoon landed at 1630, proceeded to the bivouac area located at 639X, and remained there for the night. They received heavy mortar fire during the night.

J / 1 Day.

A. The first platoon remained in the assembly area.

B. At 1000, one M5 and one flame thrower of the second platoon moved out with a medium platoon supporting Co. "C", attached to 1-23. Until 1300 an M5 acted as liaison between the infantry and medium tanks. One M5 hit an enemy infantryman slipping up behind a medium tank. A flame thrower burned out one bunker, which had a light MG in it. An M5 fired on houses with 37mm H.E.

C. The third platoon was operating with RCT-25. At 0250 this platoon helped repulse a counter-attack of enemy infantry and tanks. At 1000 one M5 and two flame throwers moved out to operate with 1-25. They followed mediums to 626D. No opportunity was found to use flame throwers or M5's. They returned to the assembly area at 1700.

J / 2 Day

A. The first platoon remained in the assembly area.

B. The second platoon operated with RCT-23. At 1000 one flame thrower was sent out with each medium platoon. One M5 acted as liaison between one medium platoon and three LVTA's. One flame thrower attempted to burn out a cave and some woods, the attempt to burn the woods was unsuccessful.

B. The third platoon was attached to RCT-25. One M5 and two flame throwers were attached to 3-25. They helped make a push from 626A to 619X, firing H.E. at designated targets. No use was found for the flame throwers. The enemy attempted a counter-attack at 1600, but planes broke it up before they reached the O-4 line. One M5 and one flame thrower operated with 1-25. Five of the enemy were killed by firing 37mm cannister into a cave. The flame thrower was called upon to burn out the cave. Due to a faulty ignition, it did not function properly. The cave was investigated further and found empty.

J / 3 Day

A. The first platoon moved forward to a new assembly area in target area 143. No flame throwers were employed.

B. The second platoon stood by. No use was found for the flame throwers.

Subject: FORMAL REPORT, TINIAN OPERATION.....(Cont'd).

C. The third platoon moved up to the forward area. Our lines moved forward but no resistance was encountered. There were no objectives found for the flame throwers. The platoon moved its assembly area from 639X to 619X, operating most of the day under heavy rainfall.

J / 4 Day

A. The first platoon remained in reserve.

B. The second platoon worked with RCT-23 in a line, including one M5, two flame throwers, and two LVTA's. They advanced 2 1/2 miles along the coast on the right flank. A few natives were seen. No enemy fire was encountered. Flame throwers were not used. At 1300 they fell back to reserve because of a narrowed front, and returned to a new assembly area at 1700.

C. One M5 and one flame thrower of the third platoon operated with 3-25. Several snipers were burned out of caves and underbrush. One flame thrower was attached to 1-25. This flame thrower had to return to the assembly area, as it locked in gear. The RCT moved from 0-4 to the rail junction at 568U. The assembly area was moved from 619X to 579G.

J / 5 Day

A. The first platoon moved its assembly area to an area just north of the uncompleted airfield on the west coast.

B. The second platoon with RCT-23 was in reserve.

C. The third platoon with 3-25 moved out from target area 568U and contacted the 2ndMarDiv near the radio towers. Mediums and M5's fired upon enemy infantrymen dug in along a row of trees in the vicinity of 558X. One M5 was disabled by a mine and the driver seriously wounded. The tank was disarmed and later retrieved. Flame throwers were used in cane fields.

J / 6 Day

A. The first platoon saw no action.

B. The second platoon moved up to the front lines, but was not used.

C. The third platoon remained on call throughout the day.

J / 7 Day

A. The first platoon supported the advance of 3-24 along the cliff line north west of Tinian town. Flame throwers burned the cliff for a distance of 150 yards. The enemy was destroyed and forced to leave his position throughout the area. M5's were used on the flanks affording protection to the flame throwers and directing them against the objective. Crews were in tanks for a period of approximately 12 hours.

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Subject: FORMAL REPORT, TINIAN OPERATION.....(Cont'd).

B. The second platoon advanced across Airport No. 4 and up to a cliff with G Company 3-23. The tanks received anti-tank fire, but none were hit. Flame throwers were not used.

C. The third platoon saw no action.

J / 8 Day

A. The first platoon advanced to the last high ground. Two flame throwers were used to burn out snipers in caves.

B. The second platoon worked with 3-23 in mopping up. One flame thrower burned out a bunker. One M5 destroyed 6 of the enemy with cannister. The objective was taken. Mortar fire began falling around the flame throwers and they were withdrawn to a new assembly area.

C. The third platoon was in reserve.

J / 9 Day

A. The first platoon used M5's, extensively, firing 37mm cannister into cane fields. Flame throwers were not used.

B. The second platoon had one M5 and two flame throwers standing by with 1-23, but they were not used.

C. The third platoon saw no action.

J / 10 Day.

A. The first platoon routed enemy in caves in RCT-24 area.

B. The second platoon had one M5 in support of a 1-23 patrol. The tank fired 37mm H.E. and MG's into cliffs and bushes.

C. J / 11 Day

A. The first platoon burned out snipers in cliffs. In the afternoon all tanks were released.

B. The second platoon remained in assembly area.

C. The Third platoon remained in assembly area.

J / 12 Day

A. One tank of the second platoon fired into caves with cannister.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The entire operation was well coordinated and certain definite improvements were put into effect as a result of experience on Saipan.

REMARKS

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Subject: FORMAL REPORT, TINIAN OPERATION.....(Cont'd).

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Crews should be allowed at least thirty days to train with equipment before going into combat.
2. On an operation of this kind, this company should have two TCS's; at least 3 trucks, 6x6; one utility jeep with 1/4 ton trailer; 2 water trailers; and at least one machine shop per battalion.
3. Mount flame throwers in medium tanks, M10 gun carriers, or half tracks.
4. Headquarters and Maintenance personnel should come in with the main body of the shore party to work in conjunction with the shore party in getting supplies to the individual unit, and set up a maintenance area in conjunction with the supply dump.
5. At least one machine shop trailer per Tank Battalion and three spare parts trailers with tools, should be made available. At least three electric and three acetylene welders per battalion should be made available. One tank truck per flame thrower company should be made available for hauling fuel to forward areas.
6. Refueling hoses should be equipped with rubber expansion connection to prevent burring of the present connections.
7. The Army 508 radio set would be a great improvement for tank communications.
8. Traverse of the gun should be increased to 360°, or at least 90° to left and right.
9. Na Palm fuel should be provided for flame throwers.
10. Some system should be devised to determine if CO-2 bottles are full before installing them in the flame throwers.
11. The control box should be mounted so that it may be reached quickly and easily.

GORMAN T. WEBB,

-----Captain-----

FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATIONS REPORT - TINIAN

ANNEX L

R E P O R T O F S I G N A L O F F I C E R

ANNEX L

R E P O R T O F S I G N A L O F F I C E R

T I N I A N O P E R A T I O N

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OFFICE OF THE DIVISION SIGNAL OFFICER,
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FMF,
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

18 September, 1944.

From: The Division Signal Officer.
To: The Commanding General.
Subject: Final Report, TINIAN Operation.
Reference: (a) Div Spl Ord. No. 140-44.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following is a report of the TINIAN Operation:

PLAN:-

The same communication plan as used for the attack on Saipan was employed in the attack on Tinian. There were minor changes in codes, call signs and changes in frequencies as necessary to suit the nature of the shore-to-shore movement where it differed from the ship-to-shore movement. Some changes in disposition of personnel and equipment of the Signal Company were affected due to the administrative and supply activities that remained on Saipan, and the VMO-4 Squadron basing on Saipan, required additional radio equipment and personnel.

Since only two shore parties were involved the 1st. JASCO personnel were used in BLT and CT communication platoons, and the shore party communication teams were composed of personnel mainly from the 20th Marines plus eight wiremen from an attached Army Engineer Battalion.

The Division Signal Quartermaster furnished necessary equipment for these two shore party communication teams. The major items of equipment of each consisted of the following:

- 2 TBX radios
- 2 SCR 300 radios
- 1 BD-72 switchboard
- 10 Telephones
- 10 miles wire, W-110.

PERSONNEL:-

Considering replacements received from Northern Troops and Landing Force and utilization of 1st. JASCO personnel throughout the Division, the strength of communication personnel was at approximately 85% upon commencement of the TINIAN operation. The total communication personnel casualties for the Tinian operation were eighty-five,

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Subject: Final report, TINIAN Operation, Cont'd.

EMBARKATION:-

The Division Headquarters was embarked aboard an LST. Division radio equipments, both vehicular and portable, were top-deck loaded and operated from the LST. Approximately one-half of the Division Signal Company was so embarked with Division Headquarters and about one-third the total available signal supplies were loaded on this ship. The remainder of the company was embarked on another LST and all vehicle drivers stayed with their vehicles and embarked on LCM's, LCT's, etc., as they became available.

Division Headquarters operated aboard the LST until noon of D plus one day when the CP moved ashore. The Advance Message Center had gone ashore early on the morning of D plus one and was established ashore prior to noon the same day.

OPERATION:-

Wire:-

Initially a TC-4 switchboard was installed at the Advance Message Center, and no changeover took place upon the Advance Message Center becoming the CP. At the initial landing point the lack of enemy pole line construction in that area made necessary the use of large numbers of 2" x 4" lumber poles to overhead telephone lines. Although, as on Saipan, enemy pole lines became available along the axes of advance, laterals and lines perpendicular to this pole line had to be overheaded on make-shift lance poles.

The Division CP moved only once during the Tinian operation and from the new location six trunk lines on enemy poles were run to a switching central which stayed abreast of the regimental CP's as far as practicable. A TC-4 switchboard was used at the Switching Central.

Radio:-

Excellent radio communication was obtained on Tinian. The nature of the terrain was such that land masses did not interfere with any VHF equipments and all types of equipment functioned very well.

Message Center:-

Division Message Center afloat was established on Jig minus one day. Routine operational and administrative traffic was handled until How minus-four-hours. From How minus-four until Jig plus-one-day, the Division Message Center handled approximately five-hundred (500) messages.

Subject: Final Report, TINIAN Operation. Cont'd.

At 0930 on Jig plus one, Division Advance Message Center ashore was established. During the period Jig day to Jig plus three the volume of traffic was extremely heavy with a gradual decrease after this time.

Scheduled messenger runs were established at 1300 Jig plus two with four runs being made daily to the regiments at 0600, 1000, 1300, 1700; two runs to the service elements were made at 0900 and 1500.

Scheduled officer messenger runs to Northern Troops and Landing Force CP were made at 0700 and 1730 daily.

Special runs were made as often as required.

As on Saipan, difficulty was experienced with officer messenger material not being coordinated by the various staff sections and material which arrived at the Message Center after an officer had already left, required a special run to be made. There was improvement in this matter, however, and the situation was decidedly better than on Saipan.

During the Tinian Operation an innovation was made in the form of an Administrative Clerk who handled all administrative paper work and messages sent by hand. The separation of operational and administrative traffic alleviated the burden and confusion on the incoming and outgoing clerks inherent in the old system.

Coded traffic was held to a minimum due to the maximum use of voice circuits and because in most cases the time involved caused speed to outweigh security.

CCBP-0130-D (Combined Assault Code) when used caused an average delay in messages of one hour.

CSP 1500 (Hagelin Cryptographer) was used sparingly between Northern Troops and Landing Force and Division prior to installation of the teletypewriter; but it was not used between Division and lower units.

It appears from this operation that use of the Hagelin device between Division and lower units might be discontinued.

An increased use of talkers was made and proved very successful. However, in some instances some "talkers" did not know their language equivalents for military terms and resultant repetitions were the cause of delay.

It is believed that putting all Navajos in the Signal Company for training prior to an operation would solve this problem.

Teletype was not established with Northern Troops and Landing Force until Jig plus-five.

In echeloning Command Posts, a personnel shortage was encountered. It has been found that over an extended period of time, with furnishing the D-3 section with runners, and the number of runners required to deliver and pick up messages from widely dispersed circuits, an increase of ten men is required.

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Subject: Final Report, TINIAN Operation, Cont'd.

It was further found that non CP drivers as part of the message center platoon are not necessary and should be substituted by CP messengers.

Experience on both Saipan and Tinian proved it mandatory that a situation map be kept up to date in the Message Center.

The MG-3 unit proved to be of no use in the Division Message Center. Two additional chests, stationery, and chests, BC-5, and one field desk would help increase efficiency in the Division Message Center.

The Division Message Center employed pyramidal tents modified so as to be blacked out at night. This proved fairly satisfactory, but the Army type CP tent is more desirable.

Supply:-

The entire Division was brought up to strength on all major items of signal equipment prior to the Tinian Operation.

No difficulties were experienced in Signal Supply due to early landing of vehicles and supplies, and experience gained on Saipan by all units. Regiments consolidated requests and drew issues for all battalion and attached units.

Repair:-

Repair Section and vehicles contributed mainly to the successful operation of this section on Tinian.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:-

The comments and recommendations submitted on the SAIPAN Operation apply in general to the TINIAN Operation. For supplementary comments see Annex E.

H. J. Revane

H. J. REVANE,
