

● PSF

Safe: Great Britain

2

NAVAL DISPATCH
NAVY DEPARTMENT

g. B.

FROM: ALUSNA LONDON 231300CR984

TO: OPNAV

INFO:

RELEASE: X-Y-MCM

DATE: 23 APRIL 1940

PRECEDENCE: TELETYPE

TOR CODE ROOM: 1506

ON THE 17TH HMS SUFFOLK BOMBARDED STAVANGER AIRDROME X SHE WAS PROBABLY ALONE EXCEPT FOR AN ANTI-SUBMARINE SCREEN X SHE FIRED 217 ROUNDS USING 5 RAF PLANES FOR SPOTS X THE FIGHTER PATROL NEVER ARRIVED X THIS WAS HELD PARTIALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMB HIT SHE RECEIVED X THIS SINGLE HIT WHICH WAS AFT, THE RESULT OF 33 DIVE BOMBING ATTACKS IN WHICH 82 BOMBS WERE DROPPED (WITH SEVERAL NEAR MISSES) KILLED 27, WOUNDED 34, REDUCED SPEED, AND DISABLED THE STEERING GEAR X SHE WAS BEACHED IN SCAPA FLOW THE NEXT DAY TO PREVENT HER SINKING, AFTER HAVING REACHED THERE UNDER HER OWN POWER WITH THE STERN AWASH. UNDERSTAND BRITISH NAVAL ATTACHE KNOWS THIS.

DISTRIBUTION

16 ACTION

10 11...13...NAVAIDE...FILE...

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DECLASSIFIED

DDO Wt 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 6/3/69

Signature- *Y. M. D.*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE: ANY REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE SHOULD BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66 OF THE "INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING THE USE OF NAVAL COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AT WASHINGTON D.C."

BF Safe: Gt. Britain HE

2227

Viscount Halifax

Marquess of Lothian

IMMEDIATE.

1.5 a.m. September 12th [1940]

10.15 p.m. " 11th

Following received from Stockholm telegram No. 1011 of September 5th begins.

In view of the expressed views of H.M. Government on continuing the war, he begged me not to refuse at least to hear what W. had to say and pointed out that my refusal to meet him would certainly be reported to Hitler. Finally I asked for time to reflect before deciding. He asked me to at the latest by Saturday morning.

Please telegraph most immediately whether I may meet W. I should of course say nothing to encourage him but it might be of interest to listen.

GS

2228
of September 11th

IMMEDIATE

Lord Halifax

Lord Lothian

2.10 a.m. September 12th 1940

10.40 p.m. " 11th "

Following received from Stockholm telegram No. 1016 of September 7th. Begins.

I duly informed intermediary on September 7th that I could not see W. and that in any case the interview seemed to me useless in view of publicly declared attitude of H. M. Government.

A few hours later the intermediary in whose trustworthiness and disinterestedness I have full confidence, returned in a state of excitement and said he was convinced that the matter was of the first importance and that W. was acting at the instigation of Hitler in person. Only two men in Germany knew of his mission. Following were the main points of the proposal:

1. World to be divided into two economic spheres, one continental organized by Germany, the other maritime and colonial organized by the British Empire and the United States.
2. Political independence of European countries now occupied by Germany to be restored, including "a Polish State" but excluding Czechoslovakia. Economic division of Europe must, however, be brought to an end.
3. British Empire to retain all Colonies and such mandates as are needed for its political and military interests. Germany possibly to receive some compensation elsewhere.
4. Questions concerning the Mediterranean Egypt and French, Belgian and Dutch Colonies to be open to discussion.

This was "the last chance" and the alternative to peace was a continuance of war on an intensified scale; special mention was made here of the loss to Great Britain of Egypt, the Middle East and ultimately India.

I gave the intermediary no encouragement whatsoever to believe that I should have any message for him but he has since twice returned to the charge obviously at W.'s instigation and informed me that W. has decided to prolong his stay here until September 12th as he is desperately anxious not to return empty-handed. He would stay here longer if it were any use. Any talks he said could/

could continue for the present through neutral personage.

I have reported all this more fully in personal letters to you and I have no reason to expect that the proposals are of interest to H. M. Government. At the same time since the date of departure of the bag is uncertain I have ventured to telegraph this summary in case you may wish me to make a further move before W. leaves. His final remark to the intermediary was that the absence of any message from me would be taken in Berlin as a definite refusal.

COPY

Tel. No. 2229 of September 12th.

from: Viscount Halifax

to : Marquess of Lothian

Following addressed to Stockholm
telegram No. 726 of September 6th.

You should not yourself meet Weissauer
in view of the obvious danger of misconstruction.

Moreover it would be quite useless for
you to do so as you could not enter into a
discussion and could only receive a message from
him which it is always open to him to pass
to you through the President of the High Court
or any other channel. The attitude of His
Majesty's Government has been made quite plain
in reply to the King of Sweden (see my telegram
1660) in which we alluded to the necessity of
words being effectively guaranteed by deeds.

COPY

No. 2233

of September 11th.

From: Viscount Halifax
To: Marquess of Lothian

Addressed to Stockholm telegram No. 737 of
September 11th repeated to Washington telegram No. 2233.

Your telegram No. 1016.

Personal and ~~Secret~~.

You should return a reply to the intermediary
as follows:-

His Majesty's Government did not enter into this war for self defence aims, but for facts and general purposes affecting the freedom and independence of many states in Europe. Their position was defined at length towards German peace offers in maturely-considered statement made by Mr. Chamberlain, then Prime Minister, in the House of Commons on October 12th, 1939. Nothing that has happened since then has led His Majesty's Government to recede in any way from the principles and resolves which were then so clearly set forth. On the contrary, the intention of all the people of the British Empire is to prosecute the war and has been strengthened by the many horrible crimes committed by the rulers of Nazi Germany against the smaller states on her border, and by indiscriminate bombing of London without the slightest relation to military objectives. His Majesty's Government do not wish to prolong the war for a day longer than is necessary. It therefore lies with the German Government to make proposals by which the wrongs that Germany has inflicted upon other nations may be redressed. Moreover, it would be necessary before any such proposals could be considered, that effective guarantees by deeds not words should be forthcoming from Germany which would ensure in a general peace the restoration of freedom to France, and to other countries which have been deprived of it, as well as the security of Great Britain and the British Empire.

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By Authority of British

Govt, Telegram 1/12/72
FEB 8 1972

By *[Signature]* Date

Safe: Lt. Britain

COPY

From: Viscount Halifax
to Marquess of Lothian

IMMEDIATE

Tel. No. 2234 of
September 11th.

Personal and ~~Secret~~

You should inform the President in confidence of the contents of Stockholm telegrams Nos. 1011 and 1016 and of my telegrams to Stockholm Nos. 726 and 737.

I feel that the President should know at this moment when Hitler is battering London with indiscriminate attacks from the air he is also following his familiar technique of trying to seduce us with superficial fair promises of an illusory peace at the expense of everyone but ourselves. I am sure that the President understands that we are not unmindful of our responsibilities and that we shall meet all attacks and all blandishments with firm resolve to rid the world of this scourge.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of British

Govt. telegram, 1-12-72

By JA Date FEB 8 1972

PSF Safe: Gt Britain

AS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

London

Dated October 26, 1940

Rec'd 9:26 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

3536, October 26, 2 p.m.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.~~

Following is extract from telegram received by the Foreign Office which informs me full telegram was cabled to Washington for communication to you through British Embassy. (BEGIN GRAY) "The following comes from an absolutely sure source which must on no condition be compromised.

German peace terms for France:

For Italy: Department of Alpes Maritimes, half Algeria and Tunisia.

For Spain: Morocco.

For Japan: Indo-China.

For Germany: Alsace-Lorraine plus an internationalized zone from Switzerland to the sea. Naval and air bases in north France for the duration of hostilities.

French

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AS-2- No.3536, Oct. 26, 2 p.m., from London.

French fleet at the service of the Axis.

A tripartite France-German-Italian mandate over all French colonies and at the moment of the cessation of hostilities the relaxation of colonial conditions imposed on France.

Pétain has refused but his ministers are equally divided. (END GRAY).

Lord Halifax would greatly appreciate it if the foregoing alleged German peace terms for France may be telegraphed to the American Consul General at Algiers with the request that if possible he communicate them urgently to General Weygand.

JOHNSON

WWC

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PSF Safe; St. Britain

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1940


My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our telephone conversation, I am enclosing herewith the letter with enclosure which was left with me this morning by Mr. Butler.

I am also enclosing the London Embassy's telegram of this morning which covers the same ground.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "A. M. Kelly". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed phrase "Faithfully yours,".

The President,
The White House.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 26th, 1940

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein the text of a telegram received in the Foreign Office yesterday from the British Ambassador in Madrid.

I have been instructed when informing you of this message to call particular attention to Sir Samuel Hoare's remarks about the press. I have also been asked to inform you that the Foreign Office are endeavouring to convey information regarding the German terms to General Weygand via Tangier.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Harold Butler

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

Telegram from the British Ambassador
in Madrid to the Foreign Office
dated October 25th, 1940.

Following comes from an absolutely sure
source which must on no account be compromised.

German peace terms for France:

For Italy: Departments of Alpes Maritimes,
half Algeria, and Tunis.

For Spain: Morocco

For Japan: Indo-China.

For Germany: Alsace-Lorraine plus an
internationalised zone from
Switzerland to the sea. Naval and
air bases in North France for the
duration of hostilities. French
fleet at the service of the Axis.

A tripartite Franco-German-
Italian mandate over all the French
Colonies and at the moment of
cessation of hostilities the
relaxation of Colonial conditions
imposed on France.

Petaïn has refused but his Ministers are
equally divided. I think that Petaïn, reinforced by
The King's letter, will win. Please have British and
American press ready to intervene heavily on his side
if he does not but do not let them take action until
I wire. In the meantime keep them friendly to him.

Could you possibly transmit terms urgently
to General Weygand? If you can, please conceal
Madrid source.

~~File~~

PSF safe: Gt Britain

AS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SO)

London

Dated December 6, 1940

Rec'd 9:10 a.m., 7th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3984, December 6, midnight.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE
UNDER SECRETARY AND FOR TRUITT MARITIME COMMISSION.

My 3965, December 5th.

The shipping situation is less favorable than it appears on the surface.

Vessels under the British flag aggregated 17,750,000 tons before the war. On October 27 the figure was 17,639,000, an apparent net loss of only 111,000 gross tons.

These figures do not indicate the true position, however. Neutral vessels which worked for Britain in the last war either are not available or are included in the foregoing figures. Moreover, 4,200,000 gross tons are currently under repair. This means that the working merchant marine at present consists of 11,739,000 gross tons. Some of this tonnage, however, must work in trades away from the United Kingdom. The total now available

to

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AS-2- No. 3984, Dec. 6, midnight, from London.

to serve the needs of this country is believed to be about 9,500,000 gross tons, all of which is, of course, greatly reduced in carrying capacity as a result of wartime conditions.

Please inform Truitt that more detailed figures were contained in a dispatch sent by the Naval Attaché to the Navy Department on December 5.

JOHNSON

TFV

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Safe: Gt. Britain

Copy No. 1

BRITISH SUPPLY COUNCIL IN NORTH AMERICA

Willard Hotel
Washington DC

January 5, 1941

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I inclose for transmission to the President the new statement of British Requirements during 1941 and 1942 of -

Merchant Ships
Aircraft
Ordnance
Steel
Machine Tools

- which statement was promised in the Prime Minister's letter to the President of December 8th, 1940, paragraph 16, and again in his cable of January 3, 1941.

Very truly yours,

Arthur B. Davis
Chairman

The Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington,
D. C.

STATEMENT OF BRITISH REQUIREMENTS
of Merchant Ships, Aircraft, Ordnance, Steel and Machine Tools
for delivery from the United States
during 1941 & 1942

	Unit of Measurement	Estimated deliveries from orders already placed or under negotiation in United States		Deficiencies to be provided for from United States		Total Deliveries Required from United States	
		1941	1942	1941	1942	1941	1942
SHIPS (other than Warships)							
Merchant ships & cargo liners, with engines.....	gross tons	50,000	250,000	3,200,000	2,650,000	3,250,000	2,900,000
Small Motor Craft.....	single	150	-	150	200	300	200
Marine engines.....	units	1,700	-	200	1,900	1,200	1,900
AIRCRAFT							
Bombers & General Reconnaissance.....	units	4,500	2,300	3,300	14,300	7,500	16,300
Pursuit.....	incl.	4,900	700	1,500	7,300	5,500	8,200
Flying Boats.....	spares	200	100	100	600	300	700
Miscellaneous.....		-	-	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Total Operational.....		8,700	2,800	5,600	23,900	14,300	25,700
Trainers.....		1,100	350	2,600	5,950	3,700	6,300
Grand Total.....		9,800	3,150	8,200	28,950	18,000	32,000
TANKS & TANK EQUIPMENT							
Infantry and Cruiser Tanks.....	single	2,300	1,350	3,000	-	5,700	1,350
Universal Carriers.....	items	-	-	3,200	5,000	3,200	5,000
ORDNANCE							
Field Guns.....		400	550	2,400	-	2,800	550
Medium Guns.....		-	80	1,200	-	1,200	80
Heavy Guns.....		-	-	400	-	400	-
Naval Guns (16 inch - 2 pounder).....	single	-	-	5,800	800	5,800	800
Tank & Anti-Tank Guns.....	items	5,100	3,700	11,150	2,700	16,200	6,400
Anti-aircraft Heavy Guns.....		-	-	4,200	-	4,200	-
Anti-aircraft Light Guns.....		80	600	4,200	-	4,100	600
20 mm. Aircraft Cannons.....		4,500	16,000	-	2,000	4,500	18,000
20 mm. Oerlikon Guns (Naval).....		1,000	1,000	6,000	2,200	7,000	3,000
.50 Machine Guns.....	single	23,000	49,000	23,500	31,200	44,500	80,000
.303 Machine Guns.....	items	-	-	168,300	-	168,300	-
.30 Machine Guns.....		48,000	42,000	27,000	-	75,000	42,000
Sub-machine Guns.....		92,000	4,500	64,000	-	160,000	4,500
Rifles.....		350	400	1,850	50	2,300	450
Revolvers.....		165	25	45	25	210	50
Anti-Tank Rifles.....		-	-	50	10	50	10
AMMUNITION							
Field Gun.....		7,600	9,200	-	19,800	7,600	29,200
Medium Gun.....		1,600	1,850	-	3,000	1,600	4,850
Heavy Gun.....		400	-	300	3,950	700	3,950
Heavy Anti-aircraft.....	thousands	-	-	5,950	650	5,950	650
Light Anti-aircraft.....		1,500	1,200	3,600	400	4,900	1,600
Tank & Anti-Tank.....		6,800	6,100	-	1,400	6,800	7,500
Aerial Bombs.....		550	10				
				not yet defined		not yet defined	
20 mm. Aircraft.....		10	15	10	150	210	165
.50.....		85	165	115	75	200	240
.303.....	millions	730	-	2,120	3,000	2,850	3,000
.30.....		650	1,100	110	360	760	1,460
Pistol Calibre (excluding sub-machine gun).....		12	-	-	-	12	-
.55 Anti-Tank Rifle.....		-	-	25	20	25	20
IRON & STEEL							
Ordinary Iron & Steel.....		6,500	6,500	-	-	6,500	6,500
Alloy & Special Purpose Steel.....	thousand	700	725	-	-	700	725
Drop Forgings.....	tons	18	18	222	192	240	210
Pig Iron.....		900	900	-	600	900	1,500
Steel & Iron Scrap.....		900	900	-	100	900	1,000
Machine Tools.....	\$ million	100	-	-	100	100	100

NOTES ON REQUIREMENTS:

- A. Merchant Ships. Based on maintenance of United Kingdom merchant fleet at existing level, i.e., after allowance for present rate of losses.
- B. Aircraft. Based on present British Air Staff estimate of squadron requirements to give preponderance over enemy.
- C. Tanks. }
D. Ordnance. }
E. Ammunition. } Based on British War Office strategic calculations.
- F. Steel. Based on United Kingdom deficiency as a result of loss of Continental sources of supply.
- G. General. All of the above estimates assume the maintenance of British output.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 13, 1941.


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

filed Japan folder

The attached despatches from the Naval
Attache at Tokyo and the American Consul at
Malta are forwarded as being of possible
interest to the President.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DATE: 11/27/89 (9/27/58)

Date- 6/3/09

Signature- yvl

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE BEST
AVAILABLE. EVERY TECHNICAL
EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO
INSURE LEGIBILITY.

To *Franklin D. Roosevelt Library*

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DOD Dth. 5200.9 (8/1 AR)

Date- 6/3/69

Signature- *John Doe*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

301 WASHINGTON DC JAN 11 OPNAV FROM STATE ; RESTRICTED
FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM AMERICAN CONSUL AT MALTA ; QUOTE 4 JAN 11
4 PM YESTERDAY BRITISH CRUISER WITH CONVOY OFF PANTELLERIA SANK
ITALIAN DESTROYER OF VEGA CLASS . ILLUSTRIOUS ATTACKED BY MORE THAN
40 GERMAN DIVE BOMBERS FROM SICILY WITH CONSTANT BOMBING FOR 7
HOURS . TORPEDO ATTACKS MISSED BUT THOUSAND POUND BOMB MADE A HOLE
IN FLIGHT DECK MORE THAN 20 FEET SQUARE AND FOUR OTHER BOMBS
STRUCK VESSEL . MORE THAN 20 AIRPLANES DESTROYED AND ABOUT 100
KILLED . DAMAGE TO VESSEL CONSIDERABLE . FLEET AIR ARM DESTROYED
SIX GERMAN BOMBERS AND PROBABLY THREE OTHERS . DESTROYER GALLANTRY
STRUCK MINE OFF PANTELLERIA LOST BOW BOWED TO MALTA . CONVOY
ARRIVED SAFELY . AMERICANS ALLEN OF ASSOCIATED PRESS AND LT COM
HARTMAN ON BOARD ILLUSTRIOUS ESCAPED INJURY SSB HENRY
ACTION138

10/11..12...13...16...NAVAI...OPNAV DO...FILE...

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Franklin D. Roosevelt Library January 17, 1941.


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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

This is an interesting account
of German dive bomber attacks, forwarded by
our Naval Observer with the British Mediterranean
Fleet.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

SI15

SD WASHINGTON DC JAN 16:

OPNAV FROM STATE:

CONFIDENTIAL:

FOLLOWING IS A PRAPHRASE TELEGRAM NO 13 FROM LEGATION, CAIRO
SENT JANUARY 14, 1941, NOON. RECD 550 AM 15TH.

QUOTE FROM OPIE FOR THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

1. THE JANUARY 7 TO 13 MEDITERRANEAN SWEEP WAS MADE
UP OF COVERING USUAL CONVOYS TO PIRAEUS AND TO AND
FROM MALTA, LIKEWISE FOUR MERCHANT VESSELS, HURRICANE
PLANES NUMBERING TWELVE, ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS NUMBERING
TWENTY-FOUR FOR MALTA, AND TANKS, PLANES, GUNS, AND
PERSONNEL OF THE R.A.F. TO GREECE TO PASS THROUGH THE
STRAITS OF SICILY. FROM ALEXANDRIA TO MALTA THE FLEET
WAS CONTINUOUSLY SHADOWED. HOWEVER, THE FLEET WAS NOT
THE SUBJECT OF ANY AIR ATTACKS.

TWO ITALIAN DESTROYERS AT DAWN ON THE 10TH OF JANUARY
ATTACKED THE SOUTHAMPTON, BONAVENTURA AND
THE GLOUCESTER AS WELL AS FOUR DESTROYERS, WHICH
VESSELS HAD ESCORTED WITH SUCCESS THE CONVOY THROUGH THE STRAITS.
ONE DESTROYER WAS SUNK BY THE BONAVENTURA,
WHILE THE OTHER, ALTHOUGH HIT, ESCAPED. THE PANTELLERIA
SHORE BATTERIES DID NOT OPEN FIRE, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE
IN RANGE OF THE BRITISH CRUISERS. THE RETREATING
DESTROYER WAS ATTACKED BY A BRITISH ANTI-SUBMARINE
PATROL PLANE. HOWEVER, NO HITS WERE MADE.

THE DESTROYER GALLANT WHICH WAS ON THE STARBOARD
BOW OF THE BATTLESHIPS AND SCREENING THEM HAD, AT NINE
OCLOCK IN THE MORNING, HER BOW BLOWN OFF TO NUMBER 1

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 6/5/69
Signature- [Handwritten Signature]

GUN A SUBMARINE TORPEDO. THIS TORPEDO WAS AIMED AT THE WARSPIRE. HOWEVER, FORTUNATELY, IT HIT THE GALLANT WHICH WAS NOT RUNNING AT THE DEPTH IT WOULD HAVE BEEN. HAVING BEEN TAKEN IN TOW, THE CRUISERS SUCCESSFULLY ESCORTED THE GALLANT TO MALTA DESPITE ATTACKS BY BOMBING AND AIR TORPEDO.

80 15
SHEET TWO

TWO TORPEDO PLANES OF ITALIAN NATIONALITY ATTACKED OUT OF THE SUN AT TWELVE-THIRTY PM. THEY THEN FIRED TORPEDOES AT FIFTEEN HUNDRED YARDS, ONE HUNDRED FEET OFF THE WATER, FOLLOWING WHICH HAVING TURNED NINETY DEGREES THEY DEPARTED. THE EMERGENCY TURNED AWAY THE BATTLESHIPS, NARROWLY AVOIDING THE TORPEDOES. ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE OF AN INTENSE NATURE WAS NOT ABLE TO BRING THESE AIRPLANES DOWN.

THE BATTLESHIPS WERE LEFT WITH NO FIGHTER PROTECTION WHEN THREE FIGHTERS WERE SENT IN PURSUIT OF THE TORPEDO PLANES, THE TWO OTHER FIGHTERS BEING OVER THE CONVOY. WHEN THIS TOOK PLACE, APPROXIMATELY 24 GERMAN DIVE BOMBERS (JUNKERS-88) CAME INTO VIEW. FOR THE PAST TWENTY MINUTES THESE PLANES HAD BEEN CLOSING IN ON THE FLEET. THE ILLUSTRIOUS WAS THE MAIN OBJECT OF THEIR ATTACK, ALTHOUGH THEY ALSO ATTACKED THE VALIANT AND THE WARSPITE. SINCE THE ATTACKS WERE DETERMINED AND PRESSED HOME, THE PLANES MUST HAVE BEEN PILOTED BY GERMANS. THE PLANES ATTACKED FROM THE QUARTER OR THE STERN, AND WHEN THEY DIVED THEY EITHER SPIRALED OR DIVED AT 70 DEGREE ANGLES AND MANEUVERED FROM 14,000 FEET TO 4,000 FEET. THEY PULLED OUT OF THE DIVE AT ABOUT 1,000 FEET, DROPPING DELAYACTION ARMOR-PIERCING BOMBS, EACH WEIGHING 1,000 POUNDS. ALL SHIPS RECEIVED VERY CLOSE AND NUMEROUS NEAR MISSES. SIX HITS

WERE RECEIVED BY THE ILLUSTRIOUS, THE AFT AND FORE
ELEVATORS WERE WRECKED AND HER ARMORED FLIGHT DECK WAS
DAMAGED, AND A NUMBER OF FIRES, DESTROYING SIXTEEN PLANES,
WERE STARTED. THE STEERING GEAR WAS DAMAGED, THE
OFFICERS QUARTERS WERE WRECKED, AND THE SHIP, AFTER BEING
FLOODED FROM FRAME 136 AFT, SETTLED DOWN BY THE STERN
EIGHT FEET. 60 WERE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED, 40 SLIGHTLY AND 83 WERE KILLED.
ALTHOUGH DIVE BOMBED BY TWELVE PLANES,
BOMBED BY SIX PLANES FROM A HIGH LEVEL AND TORPEDO ATTACKED
BY TWO PLANES, SHE WAS ABLE TO REACH MALTA BY STEERING BY HER
ENGINES. THE HAWSE-PIPE OF THE WARSPITE WAS HIT AND
ABOUT TEN MEN WERE WOUNDED ON BOTH BATTLESHIPS.

EIGHT FULMER FIGHTERS BROKE UP AN ATTACK ON THE
CONVOY BY BRINGING DOWN SEVEN OUT OF TOTAL OF ABOUT
TEN DIVE BOMBERS WHICH MADE ONLY NEAR MISSES.

TWELVE OF THE SAME TYPE BOMBERS LATE IN THE AFTER-
NOON ATTACKED THE TWO BATTLESHIPS, ALTHOUGH HXXX THE VALIANT
WAS PARTICULARLY CONCENTRATED ON. LUCKILY NO HITS AND
ONLY VERY NEAR MISSES WERE MADE BUT THE ATTACK WAS
D_TETERMINED, THE PLANES PULLING OUT AS LOW AS 100
(REPEAT 100) FEET AFTER DIVING AT 70 DEGREE ANGLES.

THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE AGAINST
DETERMINED MASS FORMATIONS WAS AGAIN PROVEN BY THE
FACT THAT ONLY ONE PLANE WAS BROUGHT DOWN IN ALL ATTACKS
BY HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE BY ALL AVAILABLE GUNS FROM
ALL SHIPS. THE ONLY SOLUTION IS FIGHTER PROTECTION.

ABOUT 200 MILES FROM ITALY AT 3 PM ON JANUARY 11,
AFTER BEING SHADOWED DURING THE MORNING, THE SOUTHAMPTON
AND GLOUCESTER WERE SURPRISED COMPLETELY BY AN ATTACK OUT OF THE SUN

BY SEVERAL ITALIAN HIGH LEVEL BOMBERS
AND APPROXIMATELY TWELVE GERMAN DIVE BOMBERS. THE AFTER
ENGINE ROOM OF THE SOUTHAMPTON WAS HIT AND SEVERAL
FIRES WERE STARTED THERE AND IN THE SURROUNDING OIL
TANKS AND TURRET NUMBER THREE. THE SHIP BECAME UNTENABLE
AND HAD TO BE ABANDONED AND SUNK WITH A LOSS OF ABOUT
FIFTY LIVES BECAUSE THE FIRES COULD NOT BE GOT UNDER
CONTROL AND THE MAGAZNEXXXXXX THE MAGAZINES COULD NOT BE FLOODED.

SD 15
SHEET FOUR

THE FORWARD DIRECTOR TOWER OF THE GLOUCESTER WAS
HIT BUT THE BOMB FORTUNATELY DID NOT EXPLODE. NO ATTACK
WAS MADE ON THE GLOUCESTER DURING THE TRANSFER OF
THE SURVIVORS OF THE SOUTHAMPTON, ALTHOUGH SHE WAS
SHADOWED CONTINUALLY.

2. A CRITICAL SITUATION FOR THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
FLEET IS PRESENTED BY THE APPEARANCE OF A NUMBER, WHICH
IS BELIEVED TO BE ABOUT TWO HUNDRED, OF GERMAN DIVE
BOMBERS CAPABLE OF A RADIUS OF THREE HUNDRED MILES.

WARSHIPS AND CONVOYS TO GREECE AND MALTA AND THOSE PASSING
THROUGH THE STRAITS OF SICILY ARE IN GRAVE DANGER, AS
SCREENS CAN GIVE BUT LITTLE FIGHTER PROTECTION. THAT THE
FIGHTERS AND BOMBERS AT MALTA WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO
LOCATE AND TO ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THESE GERMAN DIVE BOMBERS
IS REVEALED BY PERSONAL CONFERENCE WITH ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM.
EVEN MUSSOLINI'S FLEET WILL BXXXXX WILL PUT TO SEA IF FURTHER DAMAGE
IS SUFFERED BY THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN FLEET, AND
BRITISH MIDDLE EASTERN GAINS COULD BE LARGELY COUNTERACTED.
THAT THE FORMIDABLE, NOW AT BERMUDA, WILL BE SENT
TO THE MEDITERRANEAN, IS EXPECTED BY THE ADMIRAL, BUT THERE
WILL STILL BE A LACK OF FIGHTERS. THE ADDITIONAL
FORCE WHICH IS CONSIDERED NECESSARY BY HIM TO FOLD UP

THE ITALIANS BY JUNE IS TWO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, SIX CRUISERS,
AND TWENTY-FOUR DESTROYERS.

30 15
SHEET FIVE

IT IS URGENTLY RECOMMENDED THAT THERE SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY GIVEN TO THE BRITISH, TO BE PLACED IN THE FORMIDABLE AND BROUGHT TO THE MEDITERRANEAN, ABOUT FIFTY OF THE LATEST UNITED STATES NAVY FIGHTERS, WITH AMMUNITION AND FULLY EQUIPPED. REQUEST INFORMATION WHETHER THIS CAN BE DONE.

3. RECOMMENDATION HAS BEEN MADE TO THE ADMIRALTY BY ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM THAT, FOR THE PURPOSE OF OBSERVING CARRIER OPERATIONS AND TRAINING METHODS, FLIGHT COMMANDER ROBERTSON OF THE ILLUSTRIOUS BE SENT TO THE UNITED STATES. AS THE WAR EXPERIENCE OF ROBERTSON WILL BE OF GREAT VALUE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT APPROVAL BE COMMUNICATED DIRECT TO THE ADMIRALTY.

4. SYDNEY HAS RETURNED TO AUSTRALIA. BONAVENTURE IS HERE ONLY TEMPORARILY. PERTH IS NOW HERE AS A PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT.

5. IT IS EXXX IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A STUDY OF ALMOST-WITHIN-REACH- FIRES BE MADE IN ORDER THAT THE SAME MAY BE FOUGHT UNDER CONDITIONS OF FIRE MAINS DAMAGED, OIL TANKS RUPTURED, DENSE SMOKE, AND HEAT.

6. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT, BY MEANS OF THE FOLLOWING DRILL, DEFENSE BE TESTED AGAINST DIVE BOMBERS AND TORPEDO ATTACKS: HAVE ONE DIVISION OF HEAVY SHIPS ATTACKED BY TORPEDO PLANES OR DIVE BOMBERS, AND USE OBSERVING PARTIES. MOONLIGHT ATTACKS USING FLARES ARE ALSO RECOMMENDED. IT IS BELIEVED THAT CAMERA CHECK SIGHTS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED. EXPERIMENTS USING FIGHTERS ON CRUISERS ARE SUGGESTED. (SGD) FISH. UNQUOTE.

TOD 624P JAN 16:

SD 15

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ACTION....16

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secret

AIDE MEMOIRE.

Lord Halifax has told us that the President, after full consideration of the suggestions which His Majesty's Government have put forward for dealing with M. Stalin's demand for the recognition of his 1941 frontiers in Finland, the Baltic States and Roumania, as a condition for signing an agreement for co-operation with us in post-war problems, did not feel able to approve either the acceptance of these demands or the two alternative proposals submitted to him. We understand that the President felt that both of these alternative proposals were difficult to reconcile with the Atlantic Charter and that it was premature to attempt detailed treatment of the problem.

2. Lord Halifax has also told us that the President feels confident of being able to reach agreement direct with M. Stalin and proposes to set about doing so, through M. Litvinov in the first instance, supporting his action later through Admiral Standley. We understand that the line the President might propose to take is that he entirely recognises the justice of M. Stalin's claim for security and that this can be met in a variety of ways in regard to which it is difficult for the moment to take a final decision.

3. As Lord Halifax stated to Mr. Sumner Welles, when the latter informed him of the President's attitude, His Majesty's Government would naturally feel nothing but satisfaction if the President could in fact reach agreement with M. Stalin. At the same time His Majesty's Government feel that they should, in the light of their own experiences in the Moscow talks and elsewhere, put before the United States Government their own view of the problem and some suggestions.....

suggestions as to how it might be handled. Admittedly no easy solution is at hand.

4. It is true enough that one of the chief aims of Soviet policy has been and no doubt still is to obtain the maximum guarantees of Russia's "security" so that the Soviet Government can work out their own social and economic experiment without danger of foreign intervention or war. But this is by no means the chief motive which lies behind M. Stalin's present demand for the recognition of his 1941 frontiers. We cannot therefore help feeling that the President is unduly optimistic in supposing that some other form of security in lieu of the reoccupation of the Baltic States will prove acceptable to M. Stalin. Since M. Stalin has decided that the Soviet Union's security requires that the Baltic States should be in the Union, he will not be willing to discuss the rights and wrongs of this decision.

5. M. Stalin's view undoubtedly is that having taken this decision, he is merely asking us to assist him to recover these territories at the Peace Settlement, if the need arises - ancient Russian territories which had been regained by the Soviet Union before Hitler's attack on Russia. As for the Atlantic Charter, he would argue that the frontier which he wishes us to recognise in Finland was one that was settled in due form by a treaty between the Soviet and Finnish Governments, that the Baltic States voted for inclusion in the Soviet Union by means of plebiscites, thus fulfilling the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina were handed back to Russia by Roumania in accordance with the provisions of a treaty concluded between the Soviet and Roumanian Governments. Moreover, M. Stalin signed the Atlantic.....

Atlantic Charter on the assumption that it only became effective for the Soviet Union on the basis of the frontiers of 1941.

6. It is true that we have suggested two alternative proposals to the President based on Russia's security needs, but we doubt whether they would satisfy M. Stalin even if they could be shown to have the support of the United States of America and were accepted as a contribution towards sincere co-operation between our three countries at the peacemaking and after the war. But these alternative proposals contained concrete offers, whereas the President would appear to be of the opinion that it is premature to attempt a detailed treatment of the problem.

7. As to the procedure which should now be followed, clearly it would be to the common advantage if conversations between President Roosevelt and M. Stalin were to result in agreement being reached between all three powers. The way would then be open for us to sign a treaty with M. Stalin. We think, however, that we should put to President Roosevelt some of the difficulties which we see in this procedure. As it is with His Majesty's Government and not with the United States Government that M. Stalin wishes to conclude a treaty and as it is from His Majesty's Government that he wishes to obtain recognition of his territorial claim, it would seem inappropriate to him that we should not be a party to these exchanges. We fear that if the President were to argue this matter alone with M. Stalin, the latter might suspect that we had agreed to this procedure in order that the United States Government might bring pressure to bear upon him, and he might resent it accordingly. Moreover, as we have not ourselves expressed any opinion to M. Stalin
on.....

on this subject since the Moscow meeting, if he were now to learn the result of our exchanges of views with the United States Government through the President and not through us he might misinterpret this procedure as indicating that His Majesty's Government had disinterested themselves in this European problem.

8. An alternative method has therefore occurred to us, and we should like to suggest it to President Roosevelt. M. Stalin, by putting forward his condition, has touched upon an issue which is of equal interest to the United States and ourselves, and therefore it would seem that all three Powers should get together to discuss this difficulty. The virtue in this procedure is that such consultation would not only help to overcome this particular difficulty, but might lead in the future to close co-operation, both for the conduct of the war and in the period after the war, between the three principal Powers. We believe that such a prospect would be welcomed by M. Stalin. If the President would consider the proposal favourably, we should therefore like to propose that tripartite conversations should ensue in London on Mr. Winant's return.

FOREIGN OFFICE.

25th February, 1942.

AIDE MEMOIRE.

Lord Halifax has told us that the President, after full consideration of the suggestions which His Majesty's Government have put forward for dealing with M. Stalin's demand for the recognition of his 1941 frontiers in Finland, the Baltic States and Roumania, as a condition for signing an agreement for co-operation with us in post-war problems, did not feel able to approve either the acceptance of these demands or the two alternative proposals submitted to him. We understand that the President felt that both of these alternative proposals were difficult to reconcile with the Atlantic Charter and that it was premature to attempt detailed treatment of the problem.

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FOREIGN OFFICE.

25th February, 1942.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 27, 1941.

~~SECRET~~

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
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached is a summation of
despatches received from Naval Attache
London.

I thought the information important
enough to bring to the President's attention.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

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DOD Ltr. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

February 27, 1941

Date- 6/2/69

Signature- *SEC [Signature]*

In reply refer to No.

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN CALLAGHAN

At a recent conference attended by the heads of all Admiralty Divisions, First Sea Lord, CINC Coastal Command, CINC Western Approaches, Adm. Subs, Vice Chief Naval Staff, Asst. Chief Naval Staff, Representatives CINC Plymouth, Operations Officer Home Fleet, and First Lord of Admiralty, the critical shipping situation was discussed and emphasized. The First Sea Lord (Admiral Pound) stated that the shipping losses for February were exceedingly serious, and he inferred that another month of such losses might be critical. This latter was concurred in by the Director of Trade Division. When questioned by Admiral Pound, the Director of Trade Division stated that the problem of air attacks was of more immediate seriousness than that of submarines.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Alexander) inquired of Air Marshal Bowhill (Head of Coastal Command) as to whether or not the Coastal Command could assure him that planes would be made available to counter the attacks on shipping by Nazi long range bombers. Air Marshal Bowhill stated in reply that there were no suitable planes available, and that even though large numbers of long range bombers from the Bomber Command were utilized as fighters, they could not successfully cope with the German long range bombers. The First Lord of the Admiralty then stated that he would have to tell the prime minister that the Coastal Command could not protect ships against the Condor bombers, and he inferred that a solution must be found at once. He further stated that he could not take the responsibility for losses that were beyond the control of the Navy.

When these Nazi long range bombers are attacking ships in the Atlantic, they make a very low approach parallel to the course of the ship being bombed, and practically lay the bombs on the deck, thus insuring a high percentage of hits. The British believe that a great number of short range anti-aircraft guns could defeat this attack, but the guns are not available. It was stated by the vice chief of Naval staff that the British could use ten thousand Oerlikon guns. Every merchant ship should be provided with at least four of this type of gun in order to

provide for four cornered defense. The Admiralty continues to stress the need for more and more short range anti-aircraft guns. Because of the seriousness of the threat of long range German bombers to British shipping, and the scarcity of the type of AA gun needed, it is suggested that serious consideration be given by us to the possibility of tentative plans to supplement the destroyers and patrol planes of our support force with carriers to meet the immediate dangerous situation.

Dictated by Lieutenant Mott
Typed by R. Bulloch

[Faint, illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]

[Handwritten signature]

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Paraphrase of Code Cablegram
Received at the War Department
at 11:29, June 23, 1941

Date- 6/3/69

Signature- J. D. [Signature]

London, filed 17:00, June 23, 1941.

The strength and disposition of the Russian Air Force is currently estimated by the British as follows: 1600 aircraft in the area of Vladivostok, 4800 along the Western front. The ratio of bombers and fighters is about two to three. Most of the fighters are of the type of the British Gladiator. Of the Hurricane class they have around 1000 aircraft. Naval aircraft number about 200. Most of the Russian bombers, known as the SB, are similar to the Blenheim and have a speed of 250 miles per hour. Their long range bomber, called the DB-3, has a range of 1600 miles and carries 3000 pounds of bombs. The reserve of the Russian Air Force is estimated at thirty percent. The morale of the pilots is thought to be good, but they are not considered well trained, most of their training having been concerned with defensive operations.

1. British Air Activity over the Continent.

a. Night of June 21-22. During this night British bombers dropped 49 tons of high explosive and 5900 incendiaries bombs on Dusseldorf, 1100 incendiaries and 48 tons of high explosive bombs, including one bomb of 4000 pounds, on the railway center at Cologne, 26 tons of high explosive bombs and 3800 incendiaries on the industrial area at Cologne, 40 tons of high explosive bombs on Boulogne and 15 on Dunkirk.

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b. Day of June 22. The railway center at Hazebrouch was attacked by 17 Blenheims. Fighter protection for this operation was furnished by 12 squadrons of fighters. Patrols off the Atlantic coast of France and attacks upon enemy shipping were performed by 24 aircraft of the Coastal Command.

c. Night of June 22-23. Sent to attack the railway center at Bremen were 54 bombers, to the Bremen shipyards 26, to the industrial area of Wilhelmshaven 27, to Dusseldorf 1 and to Emden 3.

2. German Air Activity over Britain.

a. Day of June 21. Over the continent the Germans maintained defensive patrols with a force of 350 fighters.

b. Night of June 21-22. The Germans operated with 15 fighters and 60 long range bombers.

c. Night of June 22-23. During this night German aircraft operated over the Thames Estuary, the Bristol Channel, over Essex, the East Coast and that of Cornwall.

3. Aircraft Losses Reported.

a. British losses. During daylight operations of June 22 the Royal Air Force lost two fighters. One bomber crashed in England and two were lost by enemy action during the night of June 22-23.

b. Axis losses. Reported shot down during the day of June 22 were 29 ME-109's, probably destroyed were 5 and damaged were 7. Fifteen of those destroyed were ME-109F's.

4. British Air Activity, Other Theaters.

a. Middle Eastern Theater. Nothing new reported.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date-

6/3/69

Signature-

JHL

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5. Axis Air Activity, Other Theaters.

a. North African Theater. Slight damage was caused by an attack of enemy aircraft on the harbor of Alexandria during the night of June 20-21.

Message filed 17:00, June 23, 1941.

The strength and disposition of the Luftwaffe Air Force is

Distribution:

- THE PRESIDENT
- Secretary of War
- State Department
- Under Secretary of War
- Chief of Staff
- War Plans Division
- Office of Naval Intelligence (2)
- GHQ
- G-3
- Air Corps

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DOD DIR 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 6/3/69

Signature- JWR

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DOD L... 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 6/3/69

Signature- *JWL*

Paraphrase of Code Cablegram
Received at the War Department
at 09:50, July 10, 1941.

London, filed 15:25, July 10, 1941.

1. With reference to your cabled instruction to send forward the digest of General Wavell's operations in Greece and Crete by mail, please be advised that it left here by air on July 2.

2. Russia.

a. Under the command of General Golikov, a Soviet military mission, containing officers of all branches, arrived in London the night of July 8-9 and was welcomed with enthusiasm by press and public.

b. Responsible informants here report that Stalin, in a conversation with the British Ambassador on July 9, claimed that although the Soviet position was strained it was none the less true that they had not yet set in motion their best defensive plans.

3. The following is a summary of British Military Intelligence information to the morning of July 10:

a. Syria. On July 4, British troops attained Kamichlive on the Turkish border in the neighborhood of Tel Kfuchek. In the valley of the Euphrates, Empire forces reached Raqqa on July 5. A flanking movement to the east around Damour has placed the British in a position to control the Beirut-Damour road. On July 9, General Dentz, High Commissioner of the Vichy Syrian Government, asked for terms of capitulation. No reports are available here concerning the provisions of the proposed agreement or if they have been accepted by General Dentz.

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b. Russia. The main German objectives seem at present to be towards Kiev from the direction of Novograd, Volynsk and and Shepetovka and in the neighborhood of Ostrov and Polotsk.

c. Libya. On July 8, minor detachments of Axis armored cars were repulsed by British advanced troops south of Bir Sheferzen (25 miles southwest of Sollum). The Axis blasting operation in the Halfaya-Sojum district, commented on in two of our cables, is now thought to reveal formation of defence positions containing deep shelters in the rocks of the escarpment. This would seem evidence that the Axis in that part of the border sector are taking up a defensive attitude.

LEE

Distribution:

THE PRESIDENT
Secretary of War
State Department
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
G. H. Q.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

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DOO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 6/3/69

Signature- *W. L. ...*

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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July 22, 1941.


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This summary, showing the marked increase of British air activity over the continent, is forwarded as being of possible interest to the President.

Respectfully,


J. R. BEARDALL

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ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial F-10-541
(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-30, 3-40)

Monograph Index Guide No. 1005-600
(To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From Div. of Naval Intelligence at Washington Date July 16, 1941
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference NA and MA reports received in DNI.
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source Compilation from references Evaluation RELIABLE
(As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with—identify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject GREAT BRITAIN - AIR OPERATIONS IN WEST EUROPEAN THEATRE
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

Summary.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

BRIEF: A pronounced increase has taken place in the tempo and intensity of British night bombing operations against German-occupied Western Europe. Comparing the first ten days of July with the first ten of June, five to ten times as many bombers were sent out, and three to five times as many tons of high explosive and nearly ten times as many incendiaries were dropped.

Summary data are:

Date	Number of Bombers sent out	Tons of High Explosive dropped	Number of Incendiary Bombs dropped	(Number of Bombers reported lost in combat)
June 1-10	237 †	354 †	14,490 †	4
11-20	1,571 †	881 †	22,900 †	25
21-30	1,126	1,029	81,080	45
July 1-10	1,664	1,643	138,400	55

NOTE: The present compilation is the first of its sort issued by D. N. I. It is issued at this time, mid-July, because there are now sufficient (and corroborative) data to make a reasonable and interesting evaluation. The marked increase of British air activity over the continent is clearly shown in this study. This gives further credibility to the claim of British air superiority - at least temporarily - over Germany in the Western Theatre.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)

Date- 6/9/69

Signature- *J. H. [unclear]*

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BRITISH BOMBING RAIDS AT NIGHT AGAINST WEST EUROPE

Date (Night)	Number of Bombers sent out	Tons of High Explosive dropped	Number of Incendiaries dropped	Number of Bombers reported lost in combat
JUNE				
1/2	None	-	-	0
2/3	186	167	14,490	4
3/4	None	-	-	0
4/5	None	-	-	0
5/6	None	-	-	0
6/7	None	-	-	0
7/8	14	73	-	0
8/9	37	?	?	0
9/10	?	?	?	0
10/11	?	114	?	0
11/12	149	169	12,900	8
12/13	339	165	-	6 (a)
13/14	173	155	-	0
14/15	164	?	?	0
15/16	?	?	?	2
16/17	222	?	?	4
17/18	193	64	1,600	1
18/19	163	173	2,400	0
19/20	40	42	6,000	2
20/21	128	113	-	2
21/22	125	178	10,800	1
22/23	111	86	6,700	2 (b)
23/24	144	161	10,400	2
24/25	136	106	15,500	3
25/26	131	72	4,000	4
26/27	102	130	5,700	4
27/28	156	126	16,000	12
28/29	17	minelaying	-	0
29/30	136	106	4,980	13
30/01	68	64	7,000	4
JULY				
1/2	57	69	-	3
2/3	161	162	16,000	4
3/4	162	123	15,500	7
4/5	149	202	-	4
5/6	208	246	17,300	4
6/7	215	200	7,700	6
7/8	301	297	27,200	9
8/9	139	116	33,800	10
9/10	140	121	11,900	6
10/11	132	107	9,000	2

Notes: (a) Two additional bombers crashed in England this night.
 (b) One additional bomber crashed in England this night.

Evaluation: The above figures are incomplete, especially for early June, and they are certainly inexact. Reports on the same night's operations from different observers rarely if ever agree in numerical detail. Bomber losses in combat are probably reported in full as shown above, but losses due to accidental bad landings and take-offs are almost never reported.

The figures as presented herein are regarded by DNI as the best available. There can be no doubt that the trend in air operations is accurately shown.

The figures are summarized for ten-day periods on the preceding page.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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Doc ID: 6200.9 (9/27/88) - 2 -

Date: 6/3/09 JVA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1941
C. B. Burt

Up to October 1st of this year, the total orders placed in the United States for the account of the British Government amounted to \$1,600,000,000 and additional orders ready to be placed approximate another \$3,239,000,000. Of the \$1,600,000,000 of orders already placed, \$237,000,000 represents capital commitments for the purposes of plant expansion, personnel training, and the like. A capital commitment of \$100,000,000 has been allocated to the aircraft industry alone, while the remainder of \$137,000,000 has been committed for expanding the facilities of powder, munitions, and other industrial enterprises engaged upon the production of war material.

The British Government as of October 1st has placed orders for more than 11,000 airplanes and 27,000 engines. Additional orders to be placed by the British Government for aircraft and engines equal those already outstanding.

With respect to other war materiel the British have already placed orders for 68,489 tons of explosives and propellants; 1,105,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition; and 254,117 small arms of various types, as well as for other items including tanks, tank engines, small boats, marine engines, and raw materials, especially iron and steel. In addition to the foregoing, the British Government is in the process of placing

orders for 1,175,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition; 1,850 field guns; 22,600 medium guns; 54,275 small arms; 2,000 tanks; and other miscellaneous items.

Between June and October of this year certain surplus materiel was sold or exchanged by the United States Army and Navy for more modern equipment. All of this surplus materiel was eventually purchased for the account of the British and Canadian Governments from domestic corporations.

In summary, this surplus materiel included 890,000 rifles, 20,500 revolvers, and 86,583 machine guns, with 144,790,000 rounds of ammunition for the same; 895 field guns with ammunition; 316 three-inch mortars with ammunition; 8,500 tons of T.N.T.; 4,860 tons of powder; and 6,600 aircraft bombs. In addition to these items there were included large quantities of accessory equipment, such as ammunition chests, magazines, spare barrels, caissons, etc. All of this materiel so purchased for the account of the British and Canadian Governments was delivered just after the evacuation at Dunkirk.

In addition to the expansion in our own production capacity resulting from British orders, we have also obtained plans and specifications of British war materiel, such as the Rolls Royce Merlin engine, the power-driven aircraft turret, and

detailed technical information concerning anti-aircraft measures, anti-submarine measures, etc. Further, the use by the British of American-made planes and guns has given us valuable information as to the effectiveness of these weapons under actual combat conditions.

PSF
Safe File
Gr. Britain

Draft note from His Majesty's Ambassador
to Mr. Cordell Hull.

1.

Sir,

I have the honour under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to refer to the speech made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on August 20th. In that speech Mr. Churchill stated that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had decided some months ago that the interests of both the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations required that the United States should have facilities for the naval and air defence of the western hemisphere against the attack of a hostile power which might have acquired temporary but lengthy control of a large part of western Europe and its resources.

I have now been instructed to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in agreement with His Majesty's Government in Canada, are happy to give the assurance that in the hope of furthering and making still more cordial and enduring the existing good relations between Great Britain and the United States, and as a free contribution on their part towards the defence of the Americas, and the inhabitants thereof, they are ready to make available immediately to the United States Government naval and air facilities in certain areas in

Newfoundland/

Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana, needed for the purpose of hemispheric defence, such areas to be leased to the United States Government for a period of 99 years.

His Majesty's Government do not desire rent or any other payment in return for the grant of these facilities or in consideration of the leases.

His Majesty's Government suggest that if their offer is acceptable to the United States Government, the two Governments should immediately determine by agreement the exact location of the areas within the territories abovementioned to be leased to the United States Government for its naval and air purposes, and the powers to be exercised within these areas by the United States authorities.

Draft note from Mr. Cordell Hull to
His Majesty's Ambassador.

2.

Sir,

I have received your note of _____
of which the text is as follows:-

(Here insert the text of the Ambassador's reply.)

The United States Government have noted with most grateful appreciation the readiness of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in agreement with His Majesty's Government in Canada, to make immediately available to the United States Government naval and air facilities in certain areas in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana.

This assurance on the part of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will certainly increase the national security of the United States and greatly strengthen its ability to cooperate effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the defence of the western hemisphere, and the offer of His Majesty's Government is gladly accepted.

The Government of the United States will immediately designate Commissioners to meet with Commissioners designated by His Majesty's Government to decide upon the exact location of the areas within which the suggested naval and air facilities are to be extended, the nature of those facilities, and the powers/

powers to be exercised within these areas by the United States authorities.

The United States Government note with appreciation that His Majesty's Government do not desire rent or any other payment in return for the grant of these facilities or in consideration of the leases to be granted to them.

At the same time, in view of the very material addition which this action by His Majesty's Government will make to the security of the United States, the United States Government wish for their part to make some contribution towards the security of the United Kingdom and the defensive strength of the British Navy in the Atlantic. They have therefore decided immediately to transfer to His Majesty's Government the following naval and military material:-

50 destroyers

20 motor torpedo boats

A certain number of aircraft
and rifles.

The United States Government wish to make it clear that they do not desire any payment in return for this naval and military material.

Safe - Mr. Britain

Mr. Britain

PSF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will recall that you approved recently a draft Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and Great Britain. This draft Agreement was handed to the British Ambassador and has been the subject of extensive conversations between the Department of State and Lord Halifax. I am informed that Lord Halifax feels strongly that the British Government should agree to sign this draft at once in its present form and that he has strongly represented this point of view to the British Government.

A responsible officer of the British Government informed an officer of the State Department yesterday that in his opinion it would be exceedingly helpful if you expressed an interest in this Agreement to Mr. Churchill upon his return to Washington. He added that in his opinion if you suggested to Mr. Churchill that he discuss this matter with Lord Halifax the Agreement could be signed in its present form without further delay.

CH

TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Hand Pri:

Box

C O P Y

Copy No. 28

To: Washington for Combined Chiefs of Staff.
London for Chiefs of Staff.
Prime Minister Australia.
Army Australia.

From: ABDACOM No. 01226 of 15th February, 1942.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

Following just received from SINGAPORE.

"Owing to losses from enemy action, water, petrol, food and ammunition practically finished. Unable therefore to continue the fight any longer. All ranks have done their best and are grateful for your help".

RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION.

U.S.Chiefs of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE FEB 19 1974

AM DI 3

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

FILED 19/114P

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 19 1942

G. P. ...
U R G E N T

'822A

M.

From LONDON

To MILID

~~SECRET~~

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1996 FEBRUARY 19TH

PERSONAL AND ~~MOST SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM
HARRIMAN CLN PRESENT GOVERNMENT RESIGNING TONIGHT WITH NEW
GOVERNMENT TO BE RECONSTRUCTED AND ANNOUNCED IN PRESS
TOMORROW MORNING UNDER CHURCHILL AS PRIME MINISTER WITH WAR
CABINET AS FOLLOWS CHURCHILL PRIME MINISTER ATLEE DASH
DOMINIONS OFFICE CMA RETAINING DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER PD
CRIPPS DASH LEADER OF THE HOUSE PD OLIVER LYTTTELTON DASH
WITHOUT PORTFOLIO PD EDEN DASH FOREIGN OFFICE PD BEVIN DASH
LABOR PD ANDERSON DASH LORD PRESIDENT PD BEAVERBROOK OUT
OF THE GOVERNMENT ENTIRELY PD MORE FOLLOWS PD

MCCLURE

~~SECRET~~
RECEIVED
FEB 19 1942
STATE DEPT. OF WAR

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

Action Copy

AM DI 4

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

FILED 19/135P

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.
FEBRUARY 19 1942

U R G E N T

~~SECRET~~

844A

M.

From LONDON

To MILID

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1996 SECTION TWO FEBRUARY 19TH
PART TWO PD OTHER MINISTERIAL CHANGES NOT FULLY
SETTLED BUT UNDERSTAND LORD MOYNE IS OUT CMA WITH CRANBORNE
MOVING FROM DOMINIONS TO COLONIAL OFFICE PD MARGESSON MAY
GO OUT IF STRONG SUCCESSOR CAN BE DECIDED ON IN TIME PD
MOST OF THE OTHER MINISTERS CMA HOWEVER CMA WILL REMAIN
CMA INCLUDING DUNCAN CMA MOORE DASH BRABAZON CMA LEATHERS
CMA ALEXANDER CMA SINCLAIR CMA MORRISON CMA LLEWELLYN CMA
AND WOOLTON MORE WILL FOLLOW

MCCLURE

~~SECRET~~
RECEIVED
FEB 19 1942

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

Action Copy

AM DI 5

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 19 1942

9:27 A.M.

From AMEMBASSY LONDON

To MILID

~~SECRET~~ URGENT

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1996 SECTION THREE FEBRUARY 19TH URGENT
THIRD PART PD LYTTTELTONS ACTIVITIES NOT YET
CLEARLY DEFINED PD WILL PROBABLY PRESIDE AT CHIEF OF STAFFS
MEETINGS AND CERTAIN OTHER COMMITTEE AND COUNCIL MEETINGS
WHICH HAVE PREVIOUSLY TAKEN SO MUCH OF PRIME MINISTERS TIME
PD WILL GENERALLY ASSIST PRIME MINISTER IN THE DIRECTION OF
THE WAR CMA PERHAPS INCLUDING SUPPLY CMA BUT THE PRIME
MINISTER RETAINS COMPLETE CONTROL PD PARA

POSITION OF MINISTER OF PRODUCTION MAY BE ABANDONED
WITH SOME OTHER SYSTEM OF COORDINATION SET UP PD
PARA

IT IS DIFFICULT TO APPRAISE FULLY REASONS FOR
BEAVERBROOKS RESIGNATION PD PRIME MINISTER OFFERED HIM
ALMOST ANY POSITION IF HE WOULD STAY CMA LORD PRIVY SEAL
AND AIR MINISTRY PD PARA

UNDOUBTEDLY HIS HEALTH IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR PD
THIS IS TO BE GIVEN AS THE PUBLIC REASON PD OTHER REASONS
UNDOUBTEDLY INCLUDE THAT HE IS TIRED OUT AND REALIZES THAT
HIS BAD TEMPER INTERFERES WITH THE SMOOTH WORKING OF THE
CABINET AS A TEAM

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

MCCLURE

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

15

AM DI '6

CABLEGRAM

AC-4

FILED 19/222P

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 19 1942

URGENT

935A M.

From LONDON

To MILID

Bausbrook

~~SECRET~~ URGENT

Copies furnished as noted:

NO. 1996 SECTION THREE PART TWO FEBRUARY 19TH
PD HE MAY DOUBT WHETHER THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS
REALLY STRONG ENOUGH AND MAY WANT TO RETIRE FOR A TIME
CMA EXPECTING TO COME BACK AT A LATER DATE WITH INCREASED
HEALTH CMA VIGOR AND PRESTIGE PD THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT
IT IS HIS PRESENT SINCERE INTENTION TO SUPPORT CHURCHILL
IN HIS PRESS AND OTHERWISE PD PARA HE PLANS TO LEAVE FOR
AMERICA IN ABOUT A WEEK OR TEN DAYS ON A TRIP FOR HIS
HEALTH PD PARA HIS WITHDRAWAL WILL BE WELCOMED BY SOME
BUT A SURPRISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT TO THE PUBLIC GENERALLY

MCCLURE



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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

~~SECRET~~

Action Copy

Great Britain

CABLEGRAM

ADI 12
:23 P

Bot

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

FEBRUARY 20, 1942

4:28 P M.

From LONDON

To THE PRESIDENT

~~SECRET~~

Copies furnished as noted:

NUMBER 2014 FEBRUARY 20, 1942

PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM
HARRIMAN CLN SUPPLEMENTING MY CABLE FEBRUARY NINETEEN
REGARDING CABINET CHANGES IT NOW DEVELOPS THAT ON
ACCOUNT OF BEAVERBROOKS RETIREMENT LYTTLETONS ACTIVITIES
WILL BE LARGELY ON PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY PARA THE
PRIME MINISTER TOLD ME TODAY THAT BEAVERBROOKS SPECIFIC
RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON HAD NOT YET BEEN DEFINED
PD TAKING CARE OF HIS HEALTH WILL BE THE FIRST CONSIDER-
ATION PD THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE HOPED TO HAVE
HIM BACK IN THE CABINET AT A FUTURE DATE

MCCLURE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

Action Copy

Safe: GB Britain

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

19th Feb: 1942.

My dear Harry

The President may
like to see this private telegram
which I got from Archibald.
I have sent Marshall a copy
but otherwise have given it no
distribution because of its extreme
secrecy.

Yours truly
Jack Dill

MOST IMMEDIATE

FROM: Mideast

TO: War Office rptd British Army Staff,
Washington.

No: C.S/744 18th Feb.

Cairo, 18th February, situation review.

Private for Field Marshal Sir John DILL, from General AUCHINLECK.

1. 15 Feb enemy moved forward German Afrika Corps of 15 and 21 Armoured and part 90 Light Divisions on North in area MARTUBA TMIMI TEMRAD and Italian Mobile Corps of Ariete and Trieste (believed to have absorbed Trento) Divisions to South round MECHILI.
2. Enemy advanced on broad front in relatively small columns each comprising some tanks lorried infantry and artillery. Generally enemy columns withdrew when engaged by our fighting patrols and mobile columns which have been most active and successful in keeping close touch with enemy movements throughout but on 14 Feb they pushed forward and shelled at long range our forward troops in Northern sector GAZALA position without effect.
3. Enemy air forces were also active divebombing and machinegunning our forward troops and also attacking rear installations particularly TOMRUK port and EL ADEM aerodrome. Our Air Force scored signal success against them and on 14 Feb out of formation 30, 20 enemy aircraft destroyed, 2 probably destroyed and 10 damaged mostly Italian. Enemy is using DERNA and MARTUBA as forward landing grounds.
4. On 15 Feb enemy forward troops withdrew from TEMRAD area apparently North West into GESEL AKDAR while Italians retired to MECHILI whence considerable south west movement observed by air reconnaissance. This movement continued 17 Feb and by evening country south of line GAZALA MECHILI was reported by ground reconnaissance clear of enemy through MECHILI seemed held in some strength. Afternoon 17 Feb South African armoured cars reported NO enemy seen track TMIMI MECHILI. Enemy air force inactive yesterday possibly due bad weather.

DECLASSIFIED

J.C.S. [redacted] Memo, 1-17-43

By RHP Date MAR 28 1973

/(5)...

577

5. Enemy intentions still obscure. If his movements were reconnaissance in force results almost certainly negligible. If he intended to launch blitz attack with object breaking through to TOBRUK and throwing us in confusion he has apparently changed plan for time being at any rate. Possible that enemy plan was to entice our armoured forces forward and then attack them on ground favourable to him out of support range of GAZALA positions. Enemy apparently so far unable use DERNA as supply port probably owing destruction carried out before we withdrew on BENGHASI which is being mined constantly by R.A.F. and his maintenance difficulties probably considerable.

6. Meanwhile our positions on line GAZALA BIR HACHEIM much strengthened and many minefields laid especially in most Northern sector and round BIR HACHEIM which is now strongly defended locality. Precaution against breakthrough by armoured forces ACROMA and EL ADEM converted into defended localities and entrances of TOBRUK perimeter also held.

7. Dispositions 13 Corps. Round GAZALA and South of escarpment 1 South African Division with 1 and 2 South African Inf Bde Gps and Polish Bde Gp under command. Next 150 Inf Bde Gp. 50 Division which has relieved French Bde Gp on left of Poles. 4 Ind Div with 5 and 11 Ind Inf Bdes Gps holds left sector main position to about 18 miles South of GAZALA.

1 Armd Div comprising 2 Armd Bde Gp and 200 Gds Motor Bde Gp to Southeast 4 Ind Div. 2 Armd Bde cruiser and General Stuarts with one regt of 50 Valentines of 1 Army Tank Bde temporarily attached. Free French Bde Gp BIR HACHEIM. 29 Ind Inf Bde Gp with 38 Ind Inf Bde under command holding TOBRUK and environs. 5 NZ Inf Bde Gp at EL ADEM pending relief by 50 Div from SYRIA and IRAQ. 50 Matildas 1 Army Mk Bde attached to Infantry Divs in GAZALA sector. Tank strength in forward area rising slowly but steadily as tanks are reconditioned and sent forward. 2 SA Div (3 Bdes) working on SALUM CAPUZZO defensive area and 7 Ind Inf Bde on MADDALENA defensive area.

8. Railway reached CAPUZZO 16 Feb.

9. General RITCHIE intends follow up enemy closely with fighting patrols and mixed columns while continuing strengthen intensively GAZALA - BIR HACHEIM - TOBRUK position, to form firm base for future operations and secure TOBRUK. Meanwhile offensive striking force will be built up as rapidly as possible in forward area.

10. During these operations estimated from ground and air reports that enemy tank strength in forward area 100/120 German/Italian all types. Total enemy medium tank strength as estimated by Intelligence Staff 50/60 German 50 Italian. This does NOT rpt NOT include Italian Littorio Arm'd Div whose HQ now identified TRIPOLI and whose 140 Medium tanks may have reached LIBYA or be coming shortly.
11. Casualties to date CYRENAICAN campaign round figures Officers Men British 780 and 7500. Indian 60 and 1200. New Zealand 310 and 4200. Union Defence Force 220 and 4300. Polish 20 and 300. Australia 9 and 100. By categories killed 3300 wounded 7700 missing 8100 total 19100. Above NOT rpt NOT for publication in any form. Enemy prisoners to date passed through ALEXANDRIA or in Base Hospital German 260 and 9100 Italian 1080 and 22000. Total 32500.
12. Situation 9th and 10th Army fronts unchanged. Defensive areas finally settled and work proceeding well.
13. Political situation EGYPT improving though some soreness over recent events persists among officers of Army.
14. Relations with Free French good and improving.
15. NO immediate prospect arrival Polish contingent from Russian TURKISTAN.
16. Internal condition Greek and Yugoslav contingents thoroughly unsatisfactory owing internal dissension but hope may improve soon.
17. Political situation SYRIA PALESTINE IRAQ reasonably satisfactory but food shortage may complicate matters.
18. Position in IRAN NOT so good but Minister of State has this in hand.

Box

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Submit

February 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

THIS IS VERY INTERESTING
READING.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

COPY

BRITISH EMBASSY, ANNEXE,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

11th February, 1942

Dear Harry,

I have just got the attached telegram which was sent to me for transmission to the President at the request of the American Ambassador in London.

Would you be so very kind as to pass it to the President.

Yours ever,

/s/ JACK DILL

Harry Hopkins, Esq.,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE FEB 19 1974

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO, 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE FEB 19 1974

COPY

COPY NO. 1

From: Troopers

To: Britman

No. 69606 M.1.3 (c) of 9th February

Personal for Field Marshal Dill from C.I.C.S.

Following is summary of military conversations held in Russia in December 1941 and report of MASON MACFARLANE on visit to Russian Front in January 1942. Full text follows by bag.

1. M. STALIN was informed that on conclusion of operations in LIBYA it had been hoped to send 10 squadrons of Hurricanes to the Russian Front but owing to changed situation in the Far East that was now impossible. Supply of tanks and aircraft however would continue. He fully understood we could not help in the way we had proposed.
2. STALIN enquired as to likelihood of opening second front in Europe. We replied that we should not be able to in immediate future but that one of the objects of the Libyan campaign was to secure a base from which we could attack ITALY.
3. Policy of Russians had been to fight continuous rearguard action thereby tiring the German troops. They were now able to make a counter-offensive which they proposed to continue throughout the winter. However they expected the Germans to attack again in the spring as the Germans still had a great superiority in tanks, whereas the Russians had only a slight superiority in the air.
4. When asked how he would view the situation if Russia became engaged on the Eastern Front STALIN replied that he would regard it without enthusiasm but by the spring troops that had been withdrawn from that theatre would be replaced by new formations so that it would then be as strong as it was previously. He believed the Japanese would attack the Soviet Union before the spring but if this did not repeat not happen he was prepared to resume conversations as to the advisability of Russia declaring war on Japan.
5. Russians suggested an operation to seize PETSANO, the Russians providing the land forces while we provided naval and some air forces. (This plan has subsequently been dropped at Russian instigation).
6. Transportation facilities on the PERSIAN GULF supply route were discussed. The Russians asked for capacity of 60,000 tons per month rising to 90,000 or 120,000 tons by April. Maximum we could offer was 90,000 by April. With regard to taking material by road to TABRIZ it was pointed out that we were trying to obtain vehicles for this but they would have to come from the U.S.A.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT, DATE FEB 19 1974

7. GENERAL NYE states "There was a general feeling of confidence in MOSCOW and morale of the army was high. MARSHAL SHAPODHHNIKOV (CGS) appeared to be clear headed, capable staff officer with all the qualities of a commander whereas GENERALS TIMOSHENKO and VOROSHILOV although they had great drive and energy did not repeat not impress him as having much intellect or general ability. STALIN'S confidence struck a more sober note and in private conversation he stated that Russia's strength would be so improved next year and the German army so shaken by its experiences that he thought it possible that war might be over by autumn 1942. GENERAL NYE felt that the Russians were inclined to over estimate not so much their resources as their military skill vis-a-vis the Germans and that they are only likely to obtain striking successes offensively if the morale of the German army cracks.

Following is a summary of GENERAL MASON MACFARLANE'S report on his visit to 16th Division of 5th Army on the MOZHAISK sector 26th to 28th January.

General Situation. 5th Army attacking on 37 mile front astride MOSCOW SMOLESK Road 6 miles east of GZHATSK. Considerable resistance especially in centre where Germans hold positions in considerable depth which they clearly intended holding. 5th Army apparently intend to maintain pressure on centre while right wing conforms to southerly movement by next army on right.

Climatic Conditions. Temperature minus 40 degrees Fahrenheit and snow 2 feet 6 inches in open country and from 3 to 5 feet in forests. Medium and heavy tanks can get across country slowly and with difficulty. Cavalry, Artillery and Infantry largely confined to proximity of roads.

German Defensive Tactics. Germans hold towns and villages linked up by small defended localities. In retirement Germans employ tanks and anti-tank guns on all roads leading to their positions. Before withdrawing everything is scorched. On front of 5th Army are five infantry and one Panzer divisions, latter's tanks being distributed among all divisions.

Russian Offensive Tactics. Consist chiefly of infiltration of Infantry and Ski Troops. Latter work round defended localities and pin down garrison while infantry attack. Russians do lot of night fighting at which they excel. Russian Artillery was deployed in depth along main road.

Air. German activity on this front almost negligible while Russians showed considerable activity.

Russian Commissariat. Troops had no blankets but their clothing provided adequate protection. All troops wear felt not leather boots. Endeavors made always to provide two hot meals a day also have haversack ration.

Miscellaneous. All German light tanks have been withdrawn. Prisoners interrogated by GENERAL MACFARLANE were ill-clad and depressed. Russians say captured letters show low morale of home front. GENERAL MACFARLANE much impressed by senior Commanders and Commissars, also by group of partisans he met.

General Impressions. Seven months of war had made veterans of Russians. Russians started war with relatively untrained staffs but their officers are neither uneducated nor unintelligent. No signs of bragging or of under-estimating Germans but healthy confidence that tide has turned. Under present climatic conditions Red Army is definitely superior to Germans. Their equipment apparently still adequate and no shortage of man power. Possibility of German comeback realized but High Command intends giving them no respite. Definite deterioration of German fighting ability since beginning of campaign. Danger exists that Red Army may outrun its transportation but leaders intend to keep contact with enemy and not let him disengage to refit and regroup. Russian staff work and administration typically Russian and gets progressively worse higher up but end is usually achieved. Red Army in bad way in autumn but its tail is now up.

Full summary of telegrams follow by air mail.

DISTRIBUTION:

Field Marshal Sir John Dill (2)
Admiral Little
General Wemyss
Air Marshal Evill
Secretariat
Admiral Stark
General Marshall
Admiral King
General Arnold

DECLASSIFIED
JCS MEMO. 1-17-73
BY RT. DATE FEB 19 1974

~~SECRET~~

CABLEGRAM

MARCH 11, 1942

8:10 A.M.

From LONDON
To MILID

LONDON NO. 2150 MARCH 11

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT COLON BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER
AND CRIPPS ARE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT RESULTS OF CRIPPS GOING
TO INDIA REPRESENTING WAR CABINET TO NEGOTIATE PROPOSALS
PD PARA I GATHER THAT THERE WERE SOME DIFFICULTIES
IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND
CRIPPS DURING THE EARLY DAYS OF HIS MEMBERSHIP ON WAR
CABINET PD NOW CMA HOWEVER CMA THE PRIME MINISTER IS
WELL SATISFIED WITH THE RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS DEVELOPED
BETWEEN THEM AND FEELS CRIPPS IS OF REAL HELP TO HIM
PD HE REGRETS THAT CRIPPS HAS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY
AT THIS TIME BUT THE MISSION IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE
PD FROM HARRIMAN

MCCLURE

The making of an exact copy of this message is
forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary
will be made and marked SECRET. This copy will be safe-
guarded with the greatest care and will be returned to the
A. C. of S., G-2, without delay

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

~~SECRET~~

By J. Schauble Date FEB 4 1972

A M
War Room

14.3.42.

DETAILED DAMAGE REPORT NO. K. 1274.

Photographs taken by No. 1 R.R.U.
on 4.3.42 and 6.3.42.

SORTIE N/380.

SORTIE N/392.

F. 24", F. 14", F. 5".

F. 40", F. 8".

Low Obliques.
Flying height: 500 ft.
Mean time of photography: 1250 hrs.

Contact scale: 1/7,000.
Flying height: 23,600 ft.
Mean time of photography: 1530hrs.

LOCALITY: S.W. SUBURBS OF PARIS.

MOTOR ARMAMENT PLANT (RENAULT): BILLANCOURT.

Damage resulting from recent night attack upon the target is assessed from excellent low obliques taken on the following day and poor quality verticals of a reasonable scale taken 4 days later. There is ample evidence supplied by these two sorties of the high degree of success obtained in the operation. Damage is distributed very evenly over the entire area of the Works and considering the scale and intensity of the attack the proportion of civilian damage is surprisingly small and concentrated mainly at the boundaries of the target.

PROBABLE EFFECT OF DAMAGE.

It is now considered that the destruction caused will probably mean that it will be impossible to use the Plant again on anywhere near the same scale as before until large scale repairs and re-construction are completed. If this is attempted, which is unlikely, it will undoubtedly take a period of years to accomplish since many vital parts of the plant, such as special tools, casting machinery etc., will have to be replaced.

The only sections of the Plant which appear to be either intact or suffering from only slight damage are the Diesel Engine Assembly Shop, the Artillery, part of the Tyre Manufacturing Plant and a few other less important departments. It is interesting to note that the least damaged shops lie on the extreme eastern boundary of the Ile Seguin and the main Works on the N. Wing.

It is also interesting to note the amount of damage which has been caused by fire, and since the number of incendiaries carried was not considerable, it appears likely that H.E. falling on Sections of the Plant, such as furnaces, heat processing, cellulose paint spraying etc., resulted in burning material being distributed over a wide area, causing many heavy fires. Owing to this fact it is extremely difficult to differentiate between damage caused by fire and by H.E.

NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHS.

An attempt has been made to analyse the fire tracks on the films of the night photographs and to tie them up with the actual damage seen. In all, approximately 70 fire tracks were analysed and 30 approximate plottings of fires attempted. The information obtained is in most cases very approximate and is mainly used for confirmation.

In most cases fires are seen to spread in any ONE direction and in some cases the spread is very rapid indeed, which indicates that the strength of the wind was very suitable for fire attack. It is quite obvious from the number of fire tracks which are seen to be diminishing towards the end of the attack that the A.R.P. Services were making efforts to obtain control, but the damage on the day photographs proves that the scale and accuracy of the attack proved too much for them.

/ DETAILS OF DAMAGE

DECLASSIFIED
J.C.S. [redacted] Memo 1-17-43

By RT Date APR 5 1973

DETAILS OF DAMAGE

1/380
Print No.

Index to Damage Mosaics.

Before. After.

THE SEQUIN.

A. 1.

THERMIC POWER STATION (65,000 K.W.).

Roof damage is seen to the Power Station apparently caused by blast. The building gives the appearance that internal damage has been caused, in which case the plant on the island will have been put out of action (quite apart from other damage caused).

An oblique view of the same damage. 1/18
Item 1.

B. 2.

WOODWORKING SHOP.

The roofs at the western end show signs of damage and it is possible to see down into the building. At the eastern end lighter roof damage is apparent

3.

Crater on waste land west of shops. Blast from this near miss may be responsible for some of the roof damage seen.

This damage can be seen more clearly on 1/18 the oblique view. Item 2.

C. 5.

BOLY PRESS SHOP.

The roof of this shop appears intact except one point towards the western end.

This shows what appears to be the seat of a fire. The roof is scorched across the entire width of the shed.

Shows another view of these shops of the damage referred to above. It can also be seen on this print that the roofs of the shed covering the western half of the island bear distinct charring marks, indicating that there is probably severe internal damage. 2/37
Item 1.

D. 6.

TANK ASSEMBLY SHOPS.

Heavy destruction has been caused at the western end of these shops.

Close up illustrating the same damage. 12/37
Item 2.

Severe damage should have been done to the overhead travelling assembly system.

Night Photograph Evidence.

This fire was seen in progress on night photographs at 2205 hrs. From then onwards it appears to diminish and is seen as a very light track later. It does not appear to register on prints taken after 2230 hrs. This

/would appear to

Before. After.

would appear to indicate that some measure of control was obtained. Although the area is large and the damage is severe it must be remembered that the shops contain cellulose spraying cabins and stores of paint, and that the resulting fire would have been difficult to overcome.

7. Severe damage at the eastern end of the same shops.

A close-up of the damage.

3/1
Item 1.

Several turretless frames, probably A.P.Vs, most of which appear wrecked.

Item 2.

Charring marks and severe destruction of the roof is seen far away from the seat of the fire, proving that probably the entire work-shops have been destroyed.

Item 3.

Night Photo. Evidence.

From a close study of the night photographs it is considered that this fire began at 2205 hrs. with a very large explosion (undoubtedly the result of H.E). A wide double fire-track is seen at 2210 hrs. and persists throughout many of the night photographs taken in the field until about 2230 hrs.

E.

THE DIESEL ENGINE ASSEMBLY SHOP.

8.

With the exception of some minor roof damage at the western end of this shop the building appears intact. However, the proximity of the heavily damaged assembly shops leaves little doubt that interior damage has been done.

THE SOUTH BANK.

F.

TYRE MANUFACTURING PLANT.

9.

Some severe damage has been caused to a small section of this plant at the western end. The entire shed appears to have been burnt out.

An oblique view of the same damage.

2/37
Item 3.

10.

Damage to the west end of one of the main sheds, probably by fire.

An oblique print illustrating the same damage.

2/37
Item 4.

11.

Further roof damage to the plant which suggests internal destruction. There is no certain confirmation of a fire in this area on night photographs.

/ G.

EXPORT PACKING DEPT.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Before. After.

G.

EXPORT PACKING DEPT.

11 A.

With the exception of the extreme western end, the three sheds reported to be in the Export Packing Dept. have been destroyed, apparently by both fire and H.E. 10 craters are seen in the road and on open ground S.W. of the building.

Night Photo. Evidence.

The fire track at approximately this point is seen at 2145 hrs. and persisting throughout the raid. It is of a fairly constant intensity but decreases considerably towards the end. It is last seen on a photograph taken at 2224 hrs.

THE NORTH BANK.

H.

THE ARTILLERY.

12.

From both vertical and oblique photographs no damage is apparent to this part of the Works with the exception of some minor roof damage. No fire tracks are seen on night photographs in the area.

I.

REPAIR SHOPS.

13.

This building is seen to be completely destroyed. The damage has probably been done by fire.

Oblique view showing the damaged repair shops at the N. end.

1/33
Item 1.Night Photo. Evidence.

From night photographs it can be seen that these fires started at the S. end of the shops and gradually spread N. until the whole building was ablaze. No fire tracks are seen on photos. taken during the early part of the attack but they were visible at approximately 2202 hrs. when they appear as a double fire. At 2230 hrs. they still appear as a double fire but the point of origin appears to be moving N. through the building. At 2220 hrs. the fire track is still apparent, but diminishing in size and at 2232 hrs. it appears to have been extinguished (or alternatively it may have been obscured by dense smoke).

J.

ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS.

14.

The Southern end of a block of offices belonging to the Administrative Buildings has been badly damaged. This appears to be a hit by H.E. although it may have been further complicated by fire. The roof appears intact for at least 3/4 of its length.

Oblique view of the damaged end of block of offices.

1/33
Item 2.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Before. After.Night Photo. Evidence.

It is fairly certain that this fire is seen as a track on night photos. It may have started from H. E. or may have been a continuation of the fire in the Repair Shops. •

15. Note: Unidentified Building.

The large 6-bay building in the E. also appears to have been severely damaged by fire which may have originated from the same source.

16. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES - MAIN BLOCK.

This building is considered to have been completely destroyed by fire.

Prints showing the damaged offices with the fire still burning in the N. W. corner.

1/33
Item 3.

Another oblique view of the damaged offices.

1/15
Item 1.

Night Photo. Evidence.

This fire is first seen in progress at 2200 hrs. and is seen burning at 2232 hrs. It appears to be linked very much in its history with a fire burning at the S. end of the COMPONENT SHOPS. Sometimes these are seen as one fire; sometimes as two developing in intensity together.

K.

COMPONENT SHOPS.

17. Shows damage to the S. part of the shops although it is almost certain that destruction has been caused to the entire building.

An oblique view showing the damage. The seat of the fire appears to have been at the S. E. and E. sections.

1/15
Item 2.

Night Photo. Evidence.

See notes on the fire in the Administrative buildings.

L.

AIRCRAFT COMPONENT SHOPS.

18. The S. part of the shops do not appear to have sustained material damage although the roof is severely charred at the W. end indicating that the fire in the adjacent Component Shops has spread Eastward beneath the roof before control was obtained.

Oblique view of the damage.

1/33
Item 4.

/ Shows severe damage

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Before. After.

19. Shows severe damage to the Northern shops in this department.
20. A very large fire has occurred at this point and finally 6 bays of the building have collapsed.
- An oblique view of the collapsed building.

3/13
Item 1.Night Photo. Evidence.

The damage at 19 and 20 can be linked up with fire tracks seen on photos. At 2201 hrs. they were seen as a group of small fires, probably incendiaries taking hold on the roofs. At 2205 hrs. they were seen as one large wide fire track. This evidence indicates a very rapid speed of spread. The fire appears to have continued on the same scale throughout the period during which night photos. were taken and is seen as one of the largest fires burning during the attack.

M.

MOTOR VEHICLE REPAIR SHOP.

21. Severely charred roof indicates fire damage. This framed building appears to have received a direct hit. The roof is probably composed of reinforced concrete. There is an indication of a hole in which the bomb may have fallen and penetrated several floors before exploding. Debris is seen in the yard at the foot of the wall.

1/33
Item 5.Night photo. Evidence.

A small fire track is seen at approximately this point on a print taken before 2200 hrs. but is not seen on subsequent prints.

N.

DELIVERY DEPARTMENT.

22. Shows one of the largest buildings in the plant with severe damage by H.E. and probable fire at the S.E. corner.
- An oblique view showing major part of the damaged sheds. No fires were traced in this area on night photographs.

3/13
Item 2.

O.

SPARE PARTS SHOP.

23. Considerable damage has occurred at the West end of the shops. It is not considered that the shops are completely destroyed although there are indications of damage by blast and falling debris throughout its whole length.

P.

HOT STAMPING SHOP.

24. Only the girder skeleton of the roofs of this shop appears to remain. The damage was probably caused by fire spreading Northwards from the Press Shop.

Before. After.

Night Photo. Evidence.

A fire track at this point was seen burning at 21.42 and again at 22.32 with about the same intensity! Occasionally on the night photographs it disappears. This may be due to the effect of drifting smoke.

Q.

PATTERN SHOP.

- 25 Two sheds appear to have been gutted by fire.
The same damage seen on an oblique photograph. 3/13
Item 3.
- 26 The site of a H.E. incident at the Eastern section of the Pattern Shop. A small building has collapsed and much damage has been done by blast and falling debris.
The damage of the Pattern Shop is seen more clearly on two oblique views. 1/15.
Item 4.

R.

ENGINE SHOPS.

- 27 All the shops appear to have been damaged severely, practically none of the roofing remaining intact. 3/13
Item 4.
- 28 An area of extensive destruction caused by H.E., probably during the progress of a fire.
- 29 Two other severely damaged incidents in the area. A low oblique showing the intensity of the damage to the Engine Shops. 1/15
Item 5.
The two severely damaged points referred to above which are typical of H.E. incidents. 1/15
Item 6.

Night Photo. Evidence.

Large volumes of smoke were seen drifting from approximately this point on night photos, after 22.15 hours.

S.

THE METAL STORES.

30. While the roof appears to have been severely damaged, the girder structure is intact and rigid. It is considered that the damage here is not as severe as elsewhere, and it has been caused by blast. The contents of the sheds should not be of an easily destructible nature.

T.

POWER STATION.

31. Severe damage is apparent to the Power Station. There are one or two large holes in the roof. The frame of the buildings appears intact and there are no definite signs of charring. The damage is probably due to neighbouring blast. The two chimney stacks are still standing.

Night Photo. Evidence.

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Before. After.Night Photo. Evidence.

The fire was seen to start during the attack at 2200 hrs. and continues to 2205 hrs. It has spread and is last seen on a print at 2220 hrs. NOTE: This evidence is contradictory to the damage seen on day photographs and it is possible that the fire cannot be pinpointed correctly.

U.

THE FURGE.

32.

The roof and interior have been severely damaged at the S. W. corner. Although the remainder of the roof of the Southern portion appears more or less intact, it is probable that the interior damage is intensive.

33.

This is apparently the site of a severe fire which has caused considerable internal damage.

The damaged point at the S. W. corner seen from oblique view.

2/35
Item 1.

The damage at the North end of the building can be seen more clearly. The Northernmost shed appears severely damaged.

2/35
Item 2.

On the road North of the shops there is debris and men can be seen handling fire-hose or rope.

2/35
Item 3.

V.

IRON AND STEEL FOUNDRY.

34.

Very extensive damage has been done to this part of the works. Damage to the roof of the E. section seen at 5 main points probably the result of H. E. The section contains the seat of what must have been an enormous fire. The roofs of most of the sheds have collapsed. Local debris damage suggests additional H. E.

A close-up showing damage to E. end of foundry.

2/35
Item 4.

This shows a clearer view of the section of what was probably one of the most severe fires during the attack.

Item 5.

Night Photo. Evidence.

Fire tracks on night photos. suggest that the fire began in the S. W. corner as a group of scattered incidents which appear to spread Northwards. They were first seen on a print at 2200 hrs. and at 2220 hrs. they were seen as a double track.

X.

PRESS SHOPS.

35.

It can be seen that the Press Shops are almost completely destroyed. Considerable damage

/ has been done

Before. After.

has been done by H.E. which has undoubtedly caused fires.

The oblique view of the damaged Press Shops.

2/35
Item 6.Night Photo Evidence.

The night photo. evidence appended to the damage notes on the hot stamping shop relates closely to the fires seen in this area.

Y.

CHEMICAL PRODUCTS SECTION.

36.

Destruction to this section of the plant is on the same severe scale and the buildings appear to be completely burnt out.

This shows an oblique view of the damage with fire still burning.

2/35
Item 7.

Z.

KELLNER TANK ASSEMBLY SHOPS.

This part of the plant is said to be entirely under German control, manned by German engineers and workmen.

Damage appears to have been caused to the main shops and to a number of small sheds within the area of the assembly shops.

37.

It seems probable that the main sheds were severely damaged by the end of a stick of H.E. The stick appears to have been laid diagonally.

38.

The gas-holder which appears to have received a direct hit caused a fire. Although the cradle does not appear to have been damaged, the container itself is buckled.

39.

This shows what may be the other end of the H.E. stick. Damage by H.E. to the GEAR and GEAR SHOPS.

This shows the damaged shops with tanks parked in the yards. One damaged heavy tank has been thrown by blast into the centre of the yard.

Close up of the damaged Kellner Shops.

1/18
Item 3.

LL.

THE GEAR AND GEAR BOX SHOPS.

40.

The broad area of damage is visible across the centre of these shops. With the exception of one or two points the roof girders appear unbroken. This suggests that damage was caused by a combination of H.E. and fire.

Night Photo Evidence.

The night photos, generally show a fire in roughly this position spreading laterally which conforms approximately to the shape of the

Before. After.

damage. The position of the fire track indicated that the fire tended to spread W. rather than to the E. and that it probably began in the E.

BB.

REPAIR SHOPS.

- 41. Extensive damage is seen and there is considerable charring and fire damage at the N. end.

Night Photo. Evidence.

One or two smallish fires are seen at different times in the "charred" area and these remain small to the end. Unfortunately this is inconsistent with the damage seen since one would have expected a heavy fire track.

CC.

WESTERN TANK ASSEMBLY SHOPS.

This is reported to be a new extension of the Renault works undertaken by the Germans. There is some evidence of recent constructional activity but this has been very slow. Undoubtedly the shops are being used for tank assembly. Tanks are seen in the yards and damaged shops, some fully equipped, others turretless.

- 42. Stick of H.E. through the yard which has caused severe damage to adjacent sheds and among the parked tanks.

- 43. Direct hits on N. sheds.

- 44. Near misses to the Works.

Close up of the damaged sheds.

2/24
Item 1.

The crater in the road E. of the sheds.

The N. sheds with broken girders are clearly visible. Tanks, some parked, can be seen ranked on the floors.

2/24
Item 2.

Night Photo. Evidence.

At 2145 hrs. a fair sized 3-point fire is seen which is still visible as a 2 or 3 track fire at 2232 hrs., diminishing later.

DD.

BRONZE AND ALUMINIUM FOUNDRY.

This foundry is operated on a complicated chain system which if damaged would be extremely difficult to repair.

- 44. Severe roof damage is visible with hardly any charring which suggests that blast was the primary cause. It is impossible to say to what extent the plant has sustained interior damage though some has obviously been caused.

/ EE. SPRING SHOPS.

Before. After.EE.SPRING SHOPS.

45A.

Damage does not appear to be very extensive although the near miss on the road W. of the shops must have affected the building laterally.

FF.COLD STAMPING SHOP.

46.

The hole is seen in the roof at the N. end where it is possible that H. E. caused severe internal damage.

47.

Another large hole at the N.W. corner where the girders do not appear to be broken. The remainder of the roofs of these shops appear to have suffered only slight damage by blast and debris.

Night Photo. Evidence.

At 2145 hrs. at approximately this point a fairly large double track is seen on night photo. films which later breaks into two smaller fires which continue throughout the period night photos. were taken.

SECRET.P. A. F. STATION,
NEEDHAMHAM

K/EMG/C.

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U.S. 22

DETAILED INTERPRETATION REPORT NO. K.1312

Photographs taken by 1 P.R.U. on 26.4.42
and 27.4.42.

SORTIE A/655 & A/666

Scale: 1/7,800 and 1/8,000

LOCALITY: ROSTOCK.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.

Both sorties are of good scale and excellent quality and the town and environs are well covered, though most of the centre and western parts of the town are obscured by smoke on 26.4.42 and some fires are still seen burning on 27.4.42. Where not otherwise stated, print numbers quoted refer to Sortie A/666.

PERIOD UNDER REVIEW.

This report covers damage which occurred on the nights of 25/26.4.42 and 26/27.4.42; the result of the raids of 23/24 and 24/25.4.42 was seen on Sortie A/644 (Interpretation Report No. K.1310).

GENERAL STATEMENT ON DAMAGE.

The whole of the town with the exception of parts of the western and southern suburbs has now suffered severely. Damage in the centre of the town is soon to be extremely heavy and over 70% of the old town has been devastated.

The three HEINKEL factories have all been damaged, and the aerodrome at MARIENHE is temporarily unserviceable.

Further damage has been caused to warehouses on the water-front and a number of large sheds most of which probably contain stocks of timber have been totally destroyed.

Both the CENTRAL RAILWAY STATION and the FRIEDRICH FRANZ STATION have been extensively damaged and there are a number of points of damage to railway tracks and roads.

DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGE.

Damage from the first two raids was mainly localised to the west and south-east of the old town; and some damage to buildings in the HEINKEL Factory at MARIENHE was seen. There was little damage to the centre of the town.

The raids of 25/26 and 26/27.4.42 have resulted in very heavy and concentrated damage to the Old Town, to residential areas immediately to the west and south, and to commercial property to the east.

There is further damage to the HEINKEL Works at MARIENHE, and a number of sticks of bombs have fallen in and near the housing estate at SCHULTOW to the South-West of the factory.

A number of craters and scattered incidents are seen to the S.W., E. and N. of the town and the village of DIERNOW, 1½ miles N.N.E. of ROSTOCK has been badly damaged by fire.

NOTE: A damage plot showing the total damage to the town from all four raids is distributed with this report.

DETAILS OF DAMAGE.

1. RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL.

(a) OLD TOWN.

This part of the town has been the most severely damaged, 5/121
approximately 130 acres of nearly $\frac{2}{3}$ of the old town having 5/123
been devastated.

No statistics are available concerning the type and density of buildings in ROSTOCK, but it is estimated that at least 1000 houses have been destroyed or damaged beyond repair in the Old Town area alone.

The devastated area stretches the whole length of the Old Town
/and continues....

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J.C.S. Memo 1-17-73

By RT Date APR 5 1973

and continues beyond it to the West; this area is about a mile long at its greatest length and $\frac{1}{2}$ mile wide at its greatest width. It can be roughly divided into two approximately equal areas at either end of the town, connected by a narrow strip which is somewhat obscured by smoke.

This damage was almost entirely caused by the raids of 25/26 and 26/27.4.42, and is largely the result of fire, though some H.B. incidents are also seen. The old town area is much obscured by smoke on 26.4.42 and some fires are still burning on 27.4.42 though they are probably under control.

Three churches, the Head Post and Telegraph Office, the Law Courts, the Supreme Court and the Hospital, are among the buildings destroyed.

(b) TOWN AREA OUTSIDE THE OLD TOWN.

5/121 & 123.

There is an area of devastation by fire about 700 yds. long and 50-200 yds. wide on both sides of FRIEDRICH FRANZ STRASSE immediately south of the old town.

South of this is a second area between AUGUSTEN and PAUL STRASSE about 500 yds. long and of varying width.

Many smaller areas and single points of damage are seen in this part of the town, between the old town and the main Railway Station.

Considerable further damage including one area of approximately 220 by 150 yds. is seen to the already badly damaged district west and north west of KARLSTR. at the Western end of the old town. Many houses have been destroyed, and a brewery has been damaged.

(c) SUBURBS.

Several bombs have fallen on both sides of the LUBECKER STRASSE in the suburb of BARNSTORF (North), and a number of tenement houses or blocks of flats have been damaged by blast. 4/655
5/48

Over 50 bombs have fallen in or near the suburb of SCHUTOW/REUTERS-
HAGEN S.W. of the main HEINKEL factory. Several houses have been destroyed or damaged, but the majority of bombs have fallen in open ground. 5/23,
48.

(d) OTHER DAMAGE.

Five large barns, possibly for grain storage, and several farm buildings and dwelling houses in the village of DIERKOW 1 1/2 miles N.N.E of ROSTOCK have been burnt out, and bombs have fallen in the housing estate adjoining the village demolishing one house and damaging others.

Three or four scattered farm houses have been destroyed.

East of the river WERNOW several small factories have been destroyed or damaged mostly by fire, including a paste factory south of the KASSEBOHMER WIESEN.

2. HEINKEL AIRCRAFT FACTORIES.

(a) MAIN FACTORY AT MARIENHE.

5/130.

Considerable damage to the factory is visible.

A stick of heavy bombs has fallen diagonally across the Main Assembly Hangar destroying the roof over an area of at least 305 x 135'. The damage extends possibly over a larger area as the strip camouflage which covered the roof has remained in position over the edges of the hole.

The Assembly Shop for the final assembly of prototypes has been damaged by blast and several craters are seen on the terrace immediately outside.

Part of the Machine Shop has been destroyed by fire.

The Paint Shop has been hit by a medium bomb and partly destroyed.

/Part of the Store.....

Part of the Store for Chemical Products has been destroyed by a direct hit, and blast has affected the rest of the buildings. Two large workshops have been damaged by blast.

Other buildings destroyed or damaged include the Canteen and Medical Office, the Technical School Main Building, and a number of sheds, smaller buildings and living Quarters.

(See Appendix A. for annotation of print distributed). 5/130

(b) SUB-FACTORY SOUTH OF NEPTUNE YARDS. 5/141

The main building has been hit at the S.E. corner by the second bomb of a stick of three; there is a hole in the roof approximately 70 x 40 feet and the roof has been affected by blast over an area of approximately 150 feet square.

The first bomb of the stick has fallen in open ground about 25 yds. West of the building, and the third has demolished dwellings to the West of the factory.

(c) SUB-FACTORY ADJOINING THE GAS WORKS. 5/121

One of the factory buildings was burnt out during the raid of 25/26.4.42.

After the raid of 26/27.4.42 the roof of the Main Building is seen to be discoloured and slightly damaged, either by blast or scorching.

Many of the Heinkel Dwelling Houses adjoining the South end of the factory have been burnt out.

3. PORT AND STORAGE FACILITIES.

(a) NEPTUNE SHIPBUILDING YARD.

Two buildings have suffered slight roof damage from blast. 5/141.

A large shed, possibly included in the NEPTUNE Yard, has been badly damaged by a direct hit.

(b) QUAYSIDE NORTH OF OLD TOWN. 5/121, 123.

Several small buildings in and adjacent to OTTER LUDEWIG & J. MOLLERS Shipbuilding Yard have been burnt out.

Two further warehouses on the Town Quay have been destroyed.

The large storage Depot at the West end of the Town Quay has been burnt out except for a few buildings at the Western end.

A vessel thought to be an icebreaker is seen with her stern submerged to the East of the Coaling Quay. A/655, 5/95.

(c) EAST OF THE TOWN. A/866, 5/121

Practically the whole of the extensive storage facilities to the East of the town have been destroyed by fire.

Twelve storage sheds, some of them large, have been completely burnt out in the Timber Store North of the PETRIDAMS, and the smaller store South of the PETRIDAMS has been further damaged.

The large storage depot to the South of this, which included four very large storage sheds, has been almost completely destroyed by fire.

4. COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) CENTRAL RAILWAY STATION. A/655, 5/39, A/666, 5/123.

The Main Railway Station was severely damaged in the raid of 25/26.4.42. The entrance hall, booking office, etc. have been burnt out, and a large part of the roofing over the platforms has also been destroyed by fire. It is likely that debris blocked the line temporarily.

(On both.....)

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both dates evacuation was in progress, and large numbers of people were seen on the platforms and outside the station.

(b) FRIEDRICH FRANZ RAILWAY AND GOODS STATION. A/655, 5/67, A/666, 5/121

All station buildings have been destroyed by fire.

The Booking Hall and Offices were seen burning on 26.4.42 and by the following day all the Goods Station buildings were also burnt out.

(c) RAILWAY TRACKS.

Railway tracks have been damaged in a number of places. Considerable damage to the lines N.W. of the Main Railway Station was visible on 25.4.42.

Lines leading from the FRIEDRICH FRANZ Station were also seen damaged on 26.4.42 and further damage was caused here during the night of 26/27.4.42.

On 26.4.42, a direct hit on the level crossing of the main ROSTOCK-STRALSUND line at WEISSES KREUZ, S.E. of ROSTOCK was visible, and repair work was already in progress.

The railway line which runs alongside the Heinkel Works at MARIENHEIM was seen to be damaged in two places on 27.4.42; repair work was already in progress to the more southerly of these points.

Several other small items of damage to tracks are noted; these would all however be easily repaired.

NOTE: Full details of damage to railway facilities are included in Interpretation Report F.252).

(d) ROADS.

There have been a number of scattered hits on minor roads.

(e) CRATERS.

A number of craters are seen in open country all round the town particularly to the North, West and South west of the town. A number of these appear to have been aimed at gun positions.

The country to the east and south east of the town is not well covered.

Damage Plot and Sortie A/666 prints 5/121, 5/123 and 5/130 distributed; prints 5/122 and 5/131 included for stereo examination.

See Appendix "A" for details of annotation.

SECRET	DISTRIBUTION		Reports	Prints.
R.A.F. STATION MEDMENHAM	H.Q.B.C.			
LAW/LNB/A	C. in C.		1	1
	G/C Ops. for S.A.S.C.		1	1
	Intelligence		1	-
	P.I. Sub-Section		4	3
	Narrative Officer		2	-
	Groups and Stations		98	98
	Ops 1 (b)		1	1
	W/Cdr. Navigation.		1	1
	W/Cdr. T.A.I.		1	-
	C.R.S.		1	1
	E.C.C.C.			
	A.D.Y. (Ph)		1	1
	Intelligence		1	1
	Air Ministry			
	F.A. to C.R.S.		1	1
	War Room		2	2
	D.B. Ops.		2	2
	A.I.3 (c) (S/Ldr. Burgess)		1	1
	D.D.A.T.		1	1
	D.D. Photos.		2	1
	D.F.R.		2	2
	A.D.I. (Ph)		6	6

APPENDIX "A."

REFERENCE TO ANNOTATION OF PRINTS DISTRIBUTED

OLD TOWN AND VICINITY.

Print Nos.

5/121 and 5/123.

- A. Main area of devastation.
B. Area of devastation on both sides of FRIEDRICH FRANZ STRASSE.
C. Area of devastation between AUGUSTEN and PAUL STR.

1. Small factory gutted. 5/121.
2. Destruction of storage facilities at East of town.
3. OTTER LUDWIG and J. MOLLER. Buildings in shipbuilding yard and adjoining destroyed.
4. Warehouses on Town Quay burnt out.
5. Lawcourts destroyed by fire.
6. Head Post and Telegraph Office gutted.
7. FRIEDRICH FRANZ Station. Offices etc. gutted.
8. FRIEDRICH FRANZ Station. Goods station buildings burnt out.
9. HEINKEL sub-factory. Factory building gutted.
10. HEINKEL sub-factory. Main factory building roof damaged.
11. HEINKEL dwellings gutted.
12. Craters nearby.
13. Further damage to Gasworks (already severely damaged in previous raids).
14. Hit on edge of railway. Damage to tracks and buildings.
15. Hit on small quay adjoining MUHLEN DAMM.

1. Main Railway Station etc. gutted. 5/123.
2. Central part of Main Railway station destroyed.
3. Damage to tracks and buildings alongside caused in previous raids.
4. Hospital burnt out.
5. Supreme Court burnt out.
6. Warehouses and storage sheds destroyed by fire.
Note: All other fresh areas or points of damage to residential property are outlined or indicated by arrows. 5/121
5/123.

HEINKEL FACTORY AT MARIENEHE.

1. Damage to Main Assembly shop and crater nearby. 5/130
2. Assembly shop for final assembly of Prototypes: damage by blast.
3. Craters nearby.
4. Slight blast damage to two large workshops.
5. Badly damaged sheds.
6. Damage by fire to Machine shop.
7. Long building destroyed by fire.
8. Sheds and buildings destroyed by fire.
9. Craters and buildings damaged by blast.
10. Damage to railway. Workmen repairing tracks.
11. Technical School main building damaged.
12. Offices partly destroyed by fire.
13. Direct hit on Paint shop.
14. Damage to railway from near miss.
15. Damage by fire and H.E. to Canteen and Medical Office.
16. Store for chemical products damaged by blast.
17. Damaged aircraft.
18. Craters on landing ground.
19. Buildings destroyed in the two previous raids.

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