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virsight hearing - Motor Vehicle Hazard Archive Project

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SEATBIII.T SAFETY: NHTSA ()VIRSIGHT<br />

HEARING<br />

BDFORE A<br />

SIIBCOMMITTD]' OF TIIE<br />

COM]VIITTEE ON<br />

GOYDRNMDNT OPDRATIONS<br />

HOUSE OF RI]PRESENTATWES<br />

ONE HUNDREYTH CONGRESS<br />

SECOND SESSION<br />

JUNE 23, 1988<br />

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations<br />

U,A, COVERNMENT PRTNIINC OPFICE<br />

for sl. tv lh" surrint nd.nr of l){*unn'nu Orntns$nrl sdl$ l)llrr<br />

tIs Ii,'rrrtm.{t l\intiqr t)mct. WtBhi'qtur' lX irl'4|'r'<br />

tj


SEATBELT SAFETY: NHTSA OVERSIGHT<br />

THURSDAY' JUNE 23' T988<br />

Housr oF RnPnnsENTATlvEs'<br />

GovnnxunNr AcrlvrrlEs AND<br />

TuxsPonrluoN SuscoMv ITTrr<br />

op rHn C,onrMlrrnn oN GovnnNr'lxNr OrenerloNs'<br />

Washington, DC.<br />

The subcommrttee mei, pursuant to notice, at 1-0:05 3m''<br />

in room<br />

2rdi:'fffii,.;'Cffi""dh'[" e'iiaing, Hon' cardiss collins (chair-<br />

*ornutr " oi th" subcommittee) presiding'<br />

P;;;;ni, Representatives Citaiis C5ttins, Gerald D Kleczka' and<br />

Howard "lil;-t;";l;- C. Nielson.<br />

john Gallowav, staff director: Michael Skrak' prof";;i;i'";ff<br />

;"tn*.; C"c"tiu uorton, clerk; and Ken salaets' mrir',i.it"J'i't.'r*il;;;i<br />

itan' Committee on Government Operatrons'<br />

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHATRWOMAN COLLINS<br />

Mrs. Cot-urls' Good morning This <strong>hearing</strong>.-of the Government<br />

eJii.,iii""J."1 r.u"ip".t"tio" Subcommittee i,ill come to order' Although<br />

most consumers u." "oiu*uiJ of it' all cars man-ufactured<br />

liitii'ig?a ir:."-",ilii,p.i *itrr a"cttor points to permit the installation<br />

"' of rear seat shoulder belts<br />

efJ].',i"lt6*" b most consumers' shoulder. belts in combination<br />

*ifr"i;fi:Tk";ii;ii*i""- t-r'" p."t.ction of lapbelts.?]91: -+Tnuullv<br />

almoct 2,000 rear seat aubmobile passengers are killed and 200'000<br />

ir6'1":ii"J itt-ittis' "ou"ttv. Maiv of [hose deaths and iniuries<br />

could have been preventeo ..;;;;'h ;it"';;; oi-iear seat lai and<br />

shoulder "^'i"a-"iJ belts.<br />

""gofrtions on rear seal..s+ty. are, ambigloul pe'v $o<br />

,roi'r-"q;t" ;u"ofacturers to in-stall shorllde1 belus Simple lapbelis<br />

ilb;;t;;;';ft old'"u.. u'" iuii[i"nt on the o^ther hand' httings<br />

;?"";.,iiJi;;ll;.iil.k -u""t*iured since 19'73 to permit the installation<br />

of rear seat tnouro"iiiiupu to supplemeni federally re<br />

quired " "iri'ii3-iJ"iltiions laPbelts'<br />

do not, however' lequ i re man u fac t u rers.to p-rg<br />

'idil;; i;U;ii;i-t -.ii"ia6.'=ti"ps rhit. in turn' has ry19::{-*<br />

all but impossible lbr consu;;J'in -u"v-"*tt i9 oyl:ly "nd<br />

f,'i"" -iir.iiirlii Triut iire-saving feature To further comPound,mathave<br />

e1l:iii::ffi d;;U;;Httfi c;';;iir*ygl'JlI':,-'"^1"?"^1tl1,l\l<br />

"r;;-;;;i F:'::id*,:il*df<br />

ittouia"t :Ii*J""*t':yr"rk"\?t*'51;:ti,:ldf<br />

straPs' assuming their a Tli<br />

i;<br />

l-iTehter #i-i# side, Siii durins..the ii.".iitiit'" P*! piii v9,1't,Tl-"1 i"u', m6s.t car companies,have an-<br />

11l-cl<br />

;ffiffid iffi ,h"ii r 't oiunta"titv install rear seai shoulder belts<br />

in new cars.<br />

(1)<br />

l<br />

t'


Clearly, t}e superiority of "nlrta", straps over laponly type<br />

belts is no longer at issue. Our <strong>hearing</strong> todiv has bein colled io<br />

consider means to encourage the greater availability of rear seat<br />

shoulder belts for cars already on the road. In particular, we will<br />

consider: (1) The failure of car companies to educate consumers on<br />

the need for rear seat shoulder belts; (2) the failure of certarn car<br />

companies, such as Volkswagen and Ford, to provide rear seat<br />

shoulder straps for certain models; and (3) the refusal of new car<br />

dealers thr


3<br />

tems in American automobiles, .?.1<br />

i8s"9 yhi"ll-tI::l:ll-t:*1"*<br />

i""Jf""" "lpo"ut" to- h.arm for,millions of Amertcan consumera'<br />

'-<br />

ihe lnetiiut€ for Injury Reduction was. organized to carry^out re<br />

'i;;;;i,c"tion -ani<br />

*;;;;,<br />

public "ducatlon- involving h.e<br />

-t ^product<br />

dmign, performan"" u"o.u* *-hLh contributes needlessly to deaths<br />

iri""u'lri*. Ft.auct related injuries includinq t^t-"F'::g-:l<br />

l$i<br />

iii-tt*Iv' ct""tto are a. wide, lCading cause ol death<br />

.and,serlous<br />

iniurv. Unlbrtunat€ly tnouSn' -oti ""o""utn"* and most folks that<br />

i'i'ii itt "ut" sre unaware of thoee rieks'<br />

It is the job ol the uover"*""i t"gut"mty qgenci1,1lctr..as the<br />

Nuiio"uf Fiighwuy Traffirc Safety Administration. are<br />

-whlchi/ou<br />

i,"1r.-ri-nir itii"t"a;i, to .<br />

p rom ul gate an d e n force v e h I c I e pe r I orm ance<br />

i."uluiio.t"'",fti"h will assisf in -a developing min im.um-.basrc per-<br />

,<br />

i;il;;;; ;tt"li;ii" to assutu minimurn level or safetv in all<br />

motor vehicles.<br />

The institute rs commrtreo to reducing the maJhtmtn<br />

l!1-hiCl:<br />

*;;" G;i-;;t be indirecttv caused bv produci'. desrgn' rs our<br />

-rr<br />

thouehtthatbetterProductaesig"cai'ieduceinjury'andleseen<br />

;ilffi&'i;; tn" "*G i-potJ "'po" societv bv thCse injuries and<br />

death6. "irr'i<br />

-o-"nt, Mr' Kelley will describe to ygu. ouT work-involving<br />

t";; ;;;l;-p.;iy petfortiance -oGutotnbbiles as compared to harnegs<br />

'Ehoulder<br />

Derformance in the rear ""tf<br />

Also we will<br />

.todal<br />

5;;;;i; v* the testimonv oi Mr' Sa^k"va" dealing with some<br />

verv real incidents to oemonJtraL ihe eifectliueness or lack^of effec'<br />

ii,&l"J'"i *-"-i"r"ty systems provided in automobiles in America<br />

The immediate ,t".o t t"*"'"Gp" to rectify -a. very. serious safety<br />

d;fi ii;;i;;;hicles manufactured and sold in this country was<br />

hishlisht€d bv the report or i'tte f'{tss i" 1986 w-hich accounted for<br />

;"";fil;-"ii.;ielti"tv setio"t iniuti"" and deaths in cars beins<br />

used *ii;;;;;iil; in this country.<br />

liistorv of automobile safetv tq"lTgl'ry-3"d *e"l";;;;i;;;ly<br />

.it-o*" tttul.]-"ticans are exposed to an unnecessary<br />

risk which rtre all take *n""'-*" [ui[i" up ior safety with only lap<br />

otifnrt"<br />

t, is true, as Mr' Nielson mentioned' that w€arlng a laP<br />

belt is better than.none ar ali- itt tost occasions'. and ii is clearly a<br />

correct statement -t,t .t n" ttt'ni ieats of automobil-":.t3.tl:Yt"i -lI<br />

nins into the windshield .in a cras-h' the dynamics t"<br />

-oJ -Il:'.J*""*<br />

the rear seat of automobrles-is diff*t"ttt and the injuries that we're<br />

seeins are not a result ot "*iig "i""t"a and not a iesult of striking<br />

a windshield. but are a.result"oi'peopi" in thos€ cars Y""tilg-lif<br />

il"iii"i.i l"iiti lnjured bv the lapbeli svst€m that thev re wearmg'<br />

From the outset or t* ;;g"Ei"ty ictivity in the,late sixties'<br />

l.rirbEi l"i""J"a tnat its '"'&nJaidl *ould- require lap/shoulder<br />

belt protection to. '"u' "",ui-i.'iUouta *"uputtt" as wefl as front<br />

seat outboard occupanu' t"Lltiii"t thoughi had its foundation in<br />

research that goes p-ut* to uit"*i fg64 Ii some attachments that<br />

I've included wii'h the ttutil*Tioaty'. tJrele i1a report from Dr'<br />

il;;#" c;;pb;-l1 *i',o **ii'i'iuLJ"*ith tt'" cornell.lnstitute in<br />

which he pleadeo, rn t"t+*ttt"ui.. -u""f*turers include^ lap and<br />

-<br />

shoulder harness le-tt 'yt""'oi--it' all automobiles' in the front as<br />

*LiiJ ltt" back of those vehicles<br />

:l<br />

! l


4<br />

Not surprisingly, the manufacturers have known about the value<br />

of those systems at least since the midsirtiea. AlBo attached to the<br />

material ar€ some internal documents from some Ford enAineerr<br />

responsible for studying injury in crashes and their conclusi,on, obvlouq<br />

-as it iE to uE Eitting here today, is that wearing a lap and<br />

shoulder harness system -provides superior protection to lap- only,<br />

and it was recornmended by the Ford engrneera that lap and shoulder<br />

harness systeme be included in all outboard positions.<br />

In the lat€ sixties in Europe, Governmente paiaed regulations requiring<br />

that manufacturers install lap snd ihoulder harneso syetemE<br />

in the rear as well as the front seats of automobiles. Attsched<br />

to the material are regulations from the Swedish Government from<br />

1968 dealing with that very issue. Also attached and interestingly,<br />

are the design standards of the Ford <strong>Motor</strong> C,o. which manuiaitured<br />

and sold automobiles in Europe with lap and shoulder harness<br />

syst€ms because the Government required those Bystems.<br />

For those reasons, the institute recommends lhe fo[owinc: That<br />

initially and immediately, a statement be made to the public dealing<br />

with the danger imposed upon the users of laponly systems in<br />

the rear of automobiles. Second, that automobile manufac[urers<br />

specihcally send to their consumers warnings dealing with the risk<br />

of harm resulting from wearing lap-only systems in the rear of<br />

automobiles. Third, that manufacturers immediately notify all consumers<br />

directly that retrofit kits will be made available, and are<br />

available, and will be installed in vehicles at no cost to the conaumer.<br />

Fourth, that NHTSA immediately issue a regulation requiring<br />

retrgfi_t kiF be made readily available, and I emphasize "ieadily<br />

available." Fifth, that a three.point rear seatbelt system regulation<br />

be immediately imposed u pon- manufacturers for ihe rear ieats of<br />

automobiles. While automobile manufacturers have said thev will<br />

voluntarily install these systems, they are slow (o do so. As df this<br />

y9al, perhaps four or five model cars out of perhaps 200 sold in the<br />

United States have rear lap and shoulder syitems.<br />

We implore the committee to make thise recommendations rc<br />

NHTSA to in turn make these recommendations and these regulations<br />

to the industry immediately.<br />

Mr. CoBEN. Thank you.<br />

Mr. Kr.nczx.t [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Coben, for your testimony.<br />

[The prepared statement of Mr. Coben followsl


o<br />

TESlll'loNY 0F LAIRY t, CosEtl<br />

CHAINiU . IilSTTTUTI FOR JIIJURY REDUCTIOI{<br />

ETFORI I HTARIIIG OF THE<br />

GowRl ,lE lr AcTl!tTIts Aflo TRAIISPoRTAT]0N 5U!C0R'{!TTEE '<br />

HousE GovtRilllENT 0PERlTlolis coflll I TTt€<br />

lflT0<br />

'SEAT<br />

SELT SAFTTY: liHTSl oVIRSIG}{l'<br />

JUHI 23. 1988<br />

Itrda|n Cir lrudtunr ltsnbtr3:<br />

I rn !.rry E, Cob.n, r trltl lttomiy lr(' tiltlftlpltl!' Plilttylvlnl!, 'nd ihc<br />

chiimdn of the tntllt!t€ fof lnJury R.ductlon. I !m tp!.!rinq t0d!v 'l.your<br />

liiiiiiii"" t"-ilriJii ii'e t'r,rr oi'"i'''urt belt lvstdns 1n Aro ri(!n lutrnobll'3<br />

-. ii- tssue $tih piescntly involvcs nc.dl.3! .xpo3ure to hari for hllllons of<br />

Th. lnstltute for InJ!ry Rcduction r.s fornl!6 !!rly thls ye'r !o c'Fy out<br />

r.r.olar"'-it'"ariitition- rnd publlc educ!tlon lnvolvlng prod!ct. d'!l9n'<br />

;;;;;:i;.. iiJi,iJir,tcl rnrv contrttutr r..dr.s3lv to d!r!h! !nd inJuFler'<br />

Prodlct-r!lit.d injurjts, includinP llto!! 3u3t.ln.d 111 cl'131's-' !<br />

-dirtt<br />

l1ghl:I .l,r'<br />

firilini ""rt"-or<br />

ln rlc lJil!.d s!!t.3 -- . fr't which 13 not rldGlv<br />

;il;;;i"J b" .n. oori.. It i5 thr job o{ sov'rflnlnt 'caul!tor} 'q'nci!3'.ruch<br />

ii-ir,l ttittoi,ri tl;hx!y rrrffic 5!f.tv Adnlnrrtr!tion. 'ehlch vou !rr ov'rilgn!!ng<br />

ilaiJ- i"-i"ii,r"it.'rno cntorcc !.hjc1o p.rfomrnc' stand'rd3 rhlch ri,lll ' !t<br />

ililii p-"iti-iiit;r" listi protccttor tor YrlrclG ulcri, 'nd th'r'bJ 'ff!ct1vllt<br />

reauce itre ltotr nonber ot lnjurle3 and delths on our h1ghtlys.<br />

IIR te.ts to bulld.n lopmvld b!!. ol knorl.dge and publlc 'n!t'n'!s of -groduct<br />

iiirii!i'.ii iJ.iJa -iteiii""*"tti i; luPport of iil3 6!r'tv rllrlon -our lo!nd'r3<br />

iii ii'iir-ittiii-.ii rrri irrorO tholr irrctlccs hrve lerncd th' rr&nt to ritch<br />

d.fratlva products, ln.dequlla u3.r l;3trlrctlons lnd l'ck of ullnln!! hurt rnd<br />

iirr ..nori- rh.v !r! co;lttid to seelng itre rrryhsi rlducld. Ti' lntcgrltv of<br />

;;; a;;;' ror-'pioauii, ll.btl{tJ 3v;tri riu't be pr"'rY'd' lt<br />

-.99"tI:'<br />

;iltit';i;; oni o'r -ir,i<br />

fer r.Intlitng- indlYtdu.l lib'rtl€s ln thl3 cdipl'r<br />

iiiiiiv,--a-ilt*.<br />

loi thc frlt conicnrrtl-on of- e'rsonr. lnjlf'd !v<br />

-product<br />

iiirinl our connon llt tvltern and the f.d.rtl rcaullilon oJ groduct !!fl!y hlv'<br />

;;;i:;""il #'iil;; ;;;il.ch "ri Juniilonco r-s tntcnord-' Ho!!lt'-'-,'f--tt th'<br />

ln!titute r.all!a thlt. - fiof. lgg.csslre approrch to !tf!tJ c!n rlduc' thlg<br />

i'jiiiiii "iri-i.-. i-.-.lritiv' iiirrrore. ttic IIR r!! +ttt'd wlth the thouent<br />

tlrii- l"ttci proouct ocsrgn crn raotcj tnlr'rry rnc l'3!'n th' n"d fo!'-product<br />

itruttiw ctotr.. lln nanbershlD l3 opln to 'voFyone '- 'ttorntys.' lngln"rr'<br />

cil;i;i;:;;;;; sll,ir;i Dublti -- rho !upDort3 our D0bllc-h'rlth obJltuvc'<br />

oriiii-"i'niii..'i;l';liiirtti rcrutts !r. !v.ll!bl€ to 'nv orgrnlrrtl0n or.ptr'ton<br />

'tu<br />

;; ;il;;;;; il;:- triii"r,"*t t-o 'v-tirtt-nv 1r id€ti{l'd d'lcriPtlon of<br />

lln'c structur! rnd !trslon. )<br />

In . oomnt l{r. l(ell.y tl1ll drtcrlb. ln d't'll our rcrk i'volvln! rc'r_t'!t'<br />

iip-"iiJ i.]t prrfomr'nce -'-|ork !h!t rtll'cts our-conclrn. rt th'.'rtlnt to<br />

rfilch th.3€ bclt !v!t.nst unrrxe rrorcrtv d!!t9ned l!D-shouldcl. !'lt 'yitrr"<br />

o..i.ni " ootintl"i for s€riout or trtli tn'turi to thclr r!'r'r!. ln-cn3h's'<br />

iiiil ir'J -lii-;li-o;rtv ot &'|.rlcln crrt Dn th! r;!ds lnd ln lhc dr'r'r. 'norrodB<br />

ifi; ;;-";;;.;;;;;i'scat lap rhouldcr or1t3, th't eotentlll 'lre'dv.h'3<br />

.brcd'p<br />

i";ir'i- ;":.fiiii- r; r nv rcir-crat octuprnt! -- lncludlng childron 'e!rlnt


l.r.onl, b!ltr. S.v.r.l tr.aic ex.Dpl?s ot lnjur.y.nd death to oor ch dr.n rfll<br />

1,. rt.rcrlb.d by ir. S.l.yrn thjs borning,<br />

6<br />

Ihr rnrtt.t r!3..rch !rotect undertrlen b-v the lnstltutr ,6s borne<br />

t.u!tr.tron<br />

out of<br />

€rr..!t1no trm thp frjture of the funerican Autorob e Indugtry<br />

!.ruhtrrll,<br />

to<br />

d,srtn Ind snt' rhelr Droducts Nith necpls.ry i* *"t r "",.i .*t<br />

orrr sysr?nr. tr1( .rustraUon haq<br />

-bppn cohlounded by "c l{.tl.n/t -rohr.,<br />

Iriffic s.fety Adninistrdtion,s refusat ro prdiutgrte reqlutatjoni,lii",r : p"r"t<br />

3eat be-lt systens lland.tory ln the rear se.ts ot moto. vetricies ,oi,t tn<br />

Unlted<br />

rn"<br />

Stat€s. The jmpdidtc need ro tate_steps to rectify. very - serrolrs -ir,"--ioiion"r ,dret),<br />

d€sisn fln|' ias hjgl'))qhtpd b-v tne Juty 2S, t986 rJport oi<br />

Tr.nspDrtation Saf?ty Bnard, i; Hhjch tt revi;eed the Jit"-o ,ni.it.t. toce<br />

today becnuse all Aoericai-n.de v€hictes inctude top u"fti *itf,ori ,"r,outo"|.<br />

harnesses<br />

1n the redr s€ats,<br />

A,revier of,the historv of auto{Dbile sifety bett technology.nd regul.r,ron !Dt!s<br />

cle.r a nurnber of ba5ic points that bear directlv on ttre concern of_this hp.rln9,<br />

an( Hhich .re covered ih detait in Attachm€nt hB;:<br />

-- Automotive, e.nginee.rs a-nd Dhysrcians have lo.g recoonired thp haz.rds<br />

rrthr.rap-berr_cnr).<br />

:::"!:!l:9<br />

sfst€ris and the suoerjor protectjon afforded by<br />

D€rt syst_ems. As e.rty as the njd-1960's the car compnnies ,€re<br />

oPrno DUt on notice o. thc need for lap-shouldpr bet! systefis in a]] outooaro<br />

se.tin9 positions, both front .nd r€nr.<br />

-- Froih the outset of i t-s r'oul.tory activity io the'tite 1960,s, NHTSA jnt?nded<br />

rnat rts s!andards iould require lap-shoulde. balt p.otectjon far reir_seat<br />

outboard occupants! .s rcll as front-seat outboard occuDants.<br />

In July, 1969, a.positjon paper Dreoared by thp agency stressed th.t €v€n lf rt.<br />

oigs were- rntroduced to p.ot€ct front-se.t occup.nts, ,'both laD .nd strould€r<br />

oerts wrrr D€ requrred in re6r seat positiohs for thc foresee.ble future.,<br />

Proposed rulemakinq of the period reflected th€ saFre intpntron_ -V"r,<br />

t"i.ur" or<br />

hnnu{acturer resistance, dgencJ indiffe.pnce, or a corbinntro. or tie tno, t}re<br />

"yle vis never put<br />

lliql<br />

into pl6ce. The resistance offered by the industr.y ts<br />

difficult- to understand rn-lt9hf nf certajn jnternal dDcuments l{hjch prov€ tnat<br />

rne manuracturers xere ie aware of tie need for 3 point belt 9yst.ng. As<br />

Attachrpnt 'g'<br />

rgveals. as e6rly as 1967. Ford ilotor Conpanv's top enqineers<br />

reconnended properly desion?d 3 Point se.t belt s.vstetlrs to replic. l.D betis.<br />

ln 1968, the ldtional Srcdish Rodd s.fety Board.nnouncad saf€ty belt requtdfions<br />

tftich reqIired the insta]lat'ion nf 3 point bett3 rn ati poiitloni e-it-"ot ,e<br />

Eiddle seit position. fAn exanple of the Ford t{oto. Company,s conrptianii xrtn<br />

this requlation, alona Nith the regulation itself is aopenied-as Attachnent.D".l<br />

Aherican ndnufacturers have told M{TSA thit in the future they wi]] voluntarily<br />

pr.vide standard-equiFne.t re.r lap-shouldpr belts in .n inire.stnq sh.re of<br />

their ney-car productiDn. and son€ .tready have begun to ao io in i tei "".r.<br />

1€t the the.gency, .gency, despite rs0ite decades decddes of nf research resear(h sho'lino shoring the ierar.ir hBzards nf of l.n-n.iv lao_onty h.rr belt<br />

systerns s.ysrerns 6nd despite desprre te the rhe t.he deriofistra,<br />

denofistratpd.bilitv denofistrated abititv of the conoanies<br />

conpanies to to lnit.ll-thn-<br />

install then,<br />

still h.s not proceeded<br />

proceeoeo to ro set a Fed€ral red€rat Hotor Fotrjr vehtcle vehicle Sifety s6fety Standard standard ,equirtni ,equirlnq<br />

r?ar-ieat l-.p--shoulder belt systens. Its only rnove in thai direction tral oeen<br />

noncoflnittal r.dyance notic€ oi proposed rulenittng. issue.a ,no.e if,ai i yeii<br />

(Attachment'E')<br />

ugo.<br />

!l<br />

I


Until ftHTSA puts a st.ndard ln Dlace, of cou.se, ADericans rlll hav! to rcly<br />

rolely on tho good f.ith of the cdr cdnpanies for.dequrt€ r€dr-5Pat rP!tr.lnt<br />

protpction in crishes. lf the conpanies declde to discontinue pl.n5 for puttlng<br />

re.r-s€.t lap-rhoulder belts jn ney cars tornor.ov tDrning, thev iill be entirely<br />

t.ee to do 5o -- just as Gen€ral fiotors.nd Fard discontjnued thPir proni9€d i1r<br />

bao oronrihs in rhe 1970's becausp NHTSA h.d nor. put .<br />

"oassr!o<br />

restrrlnt'<br />

st.nd.rd ln place.<br />

Thus th€ i.dustr), not the regulato.y .gency, has €ffectively talca conlrol of<br />

providing or den)in9 idequate c.ash Drotection to rerr-saat occupants. Thls<br />

defies th€ lntert of !he ildtional Trafflc.nd flotor Y€hitlt Safety Act of 1966<br />

srncp in €ftect it t.urhs thc requlatary relns over to the nanufactur?r.<br />

The orly recourle available to people injured in cra5hes due to haa.rdous<br />

rear-seat la9-only b€lts is cofinon-lar.ction .q.inst th€ derellct fiafiofdcture.<br />

8ut, heie too, the manufacturers have n.d€ l€9al |nanuevers to thn6rt these clains<br />

on the basis that their anlv obligation is to meet thP ninimun st.ndard s€t by<br />

IHTSA -- in thls instanc€, th€ re;r-se.t ]!p-belt-only li;n-d;d. rhis lgnores<br />

the Act.'s cryst.l-clear injunction thrt c(mpli.nce yiith a mininum stand.rd does<br />

not protect a nanufacturer from co''rnon-lit actiDn rhen the nanufactu.er could<br />

have prevented or lessened the 5everitv of a crash injury by providing a better<br />

allernative safety 5ystein. In fact, a central Purpose of the Act and the<br />

st.ndards is to encouraq. m.nufactur€rs to Pxcepd the minimums rith improYed<br />

technologies nhenever po!sible. (see Attachment 'F" for a full discussion 6f<br />

this issue.)<br />

There is no €rcus€ for l(ttTSA's continued failure to 9et a Federal ltotor Y?hlc'1.<br />

Safety St.nderd requiring th.t at a nlninun. re.t_s€it outboard occupint5 of<br />

future new cais be given tap-lho0lder belt systeils to protect them in cri3hcs.<br />

Anything less nakes; nockery of the Actts intentions and llHTsA's ftission<br />

The IiHTSA<br />

should issup requlations regdrdinq thP nanu{scture.nd s.le o{ retrcfit<br />

3 Point re.r seat belt syslens, and_the iistallatron of factorY_built, 3 Polnt<br />

belt systefls in all neH vehiclee.<br />

-3-


3/20/ 88<br />

8<br />

INarr?urE rota INJtrRy REDUcrroN<br />

.-,,-;,.<br />

9uEsTlolrs At{D NSI|ERS ABOtrr<br />

.fHE<br />

INSTITUTE FOR INJVRY REOUCTION<br />

The Institure for lnjury ReductioD eas estabtrshed<br />

in arch,. 1988 to carry our and supporr rese.rch and<br />

educatior)al proqrans dealins wi!h producr-relared injuries.<br />

Its underlyinq p.enj.se is that if Anericans are berrer<br />

iDforned about the nature of deaths and inJuries j.nvolvlns<br />

product hazards, they Hill be bette! abtc to make judgnenrs<br />

and decisions that Iead Eo reducinq or elininatlnq those<br />

The folloerng qlesaioDs and ans{crs' .bour IIR ale<br />

to assrst prospective herbers and supporters in unde!srandina<br />

the or9aDrzation s purposes, proqrans and stluctur€.<br />

trDr Is lli t{e.d.al?<br />

Accidents involvinq products .ccount lor the vast<br />

najority of deaths and seri.ously di.sabling injuries ro<br />

Ahe!r.caDs fron btrth to retirenent aqe. The desiqn,<br />

naDufacture and use oI products play a pervasive role in<br />

qener.tinq sev€re aDd fatal danlge to human heaM - a rote<br />

larser th.n illnesses for host age groups.<br />

Yet the public is laroely uneduc6ted about rh.t role,<br />

alld unarare thaE product-r.lated r!auna rould be nuch less<br />

frequent aDd huch l.ss severc if producr desion and<br />

nanufactu!inq defects sere r.duced and adequare instrucrions<br />

and sarntngs Fere provided to product users-<br />

IIR s mission is t.o deslsn and carry out Drosrans ot<br />

infortnation, education. r€search and noti!icati.on that Filf<br />

i{piov€ society s kDoxledge ot producr-injury !.reracrions<br />

and councelneasures. Its qoal is ro help reduce productrelated<br />

t!auna rn Ane!ica; rts prenise is rha! better, nore<br />

qj.dely available rntornatton about such inju!ies and tbeir<br />

causes kilt coDt!ibute to achieviDg thar qoa1.<br />

lren't other croups Doipd This Alre.aty?<br />

No. A nunber ot orqanizations in qovelnnent anal the<br />

private secto! a!e involved in aEpects qf injury !eduction,<br />

but non€ works to carry out or supporr Froqlahs of educarion<br />

aDd research specifical.ly involvj,Dg produc!-related inju!ies.<br />

;


3t20tEA<br />

8<br />

INa'rtaurE FoR IriJlrRy REDUcrIow<br />

,sr orrror lot tt<br />

OUESTIONS AND ANSTERS AEO('T<br />

THE INSTITU}E FOR IN,'URY REDUCTION<br />

?he Institure tor Iniury ieclr,ctioD e.s esrabljsh€d<br />

ln Itarch,,1988 to carly our and supporr res€arch .nat<br />

ealucationaL prograns dealinq rith product-!elared injuries.<br />

Its underlying prenise is tha! if Aneric6ns are better<br />

inaorhed about the natule of dearhs and injuties invotvinq<br />

product hazards, they rifl be better able to nake judqnents<br />

and decisions cha! Iead to reducing or ellntn.!inq those<br />

The tollot|iDs<br />

"quesrions<br />

and ansr'€r3" abour IIR rre<br />

to assist prospective henbers and supporrers in und.rstandi'Ig<br />

the orqaniza!ion's purposes, prograrns .nd stEuciure.<br />

Acciderts involvins ploducrs account !or rhe vrst<br />

n6jority of deaths and serj.ously disabtinq injuries to<br />

Ahericans fron birth to !erirenent age. The desiqn,<br />

nan\r!acture and use of producrs play a pervasive role in<br />

qenelating severe and falaI danaqe ro hunan healrh - a role<br />

larger than itlhesses for: nost aqe sroups.<br />

Yet the public is Iargely uneducared about rhlt role,<br />

and unaeare lhat product-reLaeed rrauna eourd be nuch less<br />

frequent anil nuch less severe if DroducE desion and<br />

nanufacturing detecrs were reduced and adequaEe instlucrions<br />

and varniDqs rere provided to producr users.<br />

IIR s ntsston !s to design and carry oui pr:ograns of<br />

inforhation. education, research and notificatioD thac ritl<br />

inPlove society s knorledge ot product-injury rnreracrions<br />

and coudterneasules. Its qoal is to help re


IIR ttil1 tnake the results of its Drosrrtns av'il'ble to<br />

!11 !gencies !nd groups whose sctivitr's lnvolve 1nJ\rrv<br />

;;;"";'"" and cohtrol, aDd 1s prepsred to collaborate eith<br />

ir.i-.i"""i"".i*s on speciflc projects lhere apPloprlate<br />

!!s startcd l!!t-?,<br />

IIR has been torh.d b? a qroup ot lc!


All nerbers receive IIR's qu.rte!ly netrl€tter<br />

runnsrizine its dcti!ities and res€a!ih results. ln addition.<br />

founding. sustliDrnq ard orqanizati.onal nenbers receive<br />

copies of a1I !eports, 5tudies .nd lilhs published<br />

by IIR rtthoui separatc charoe.<br />

ToT Is I IR RUn?<br />

IIR s DolicynaLinq body is its Boald of Directors. Board<br />

rerbels sre elected annually by nenbers wiih voting !ights,<br />

shich iDclude all FouDdina. sustaiDlng and P.egular neDbers,<br />

on an 6nnuBl basis. currenr board charrnan rs La.ry E.<br />

Coben. Othe! hesbers iDclude $ayne Fisber, Be!!!ah H.<br />

Coldster.n, John R, Overchlck and David L, Perry.<br />

l<br />

The day-to-day managenent ot IIR is carlied out undcr the<br />

direcrion o! its presid€n!, A- Senjanin KelIey. a 1€adids<br />

authority on horor vehicte-related injury causation and<br />

prevenrlon- Ur- *elIey, folherIy senicr vjce p!esident of the<br />

lnsurance Institute for High,ay safety and.n official of the<br />

U.5. Dep.rtmenr or 1!dnsportation, has t'een active rn the<br />

inlury control field to! hore than t{o decades.<br />

D€scri.be IIR's Proor.,n.<br />

In qeneral,, lIR s concern extcDds to products in<br />

the autohotive, aviaiion, nedical, occupatronal, tar'I. hohe<br />

and all olher categories in which produ.t-rsJu.y<br />

!elationships a!€ tound. Its de!eloprns eFphasis in each ot<br />

these is j-n the follosinq areas of uoll:<br />

--CoIlectinE, anatyzinq and dis!!ibutinq data concelnins<br />

the narure, seve!ity, and t!equen.y.f p!oduct !el-Led<br />

j,njuries, rnd relating thcrn !o design, nanutdcture and use<br />

sources for such inforhation ri11 incl.ude research<br />

publisheil by governh€nt, private-secto! and acadenic groups;<br />

conpleted product-injury litr.gationj !egulatory aDd<br />

]egislative proce.dings concerned rith product injury issues.<br />

and specj.al res€arch and tacl-itndinq projecls unale!taxen or<br />

sPonsoled by IIR.<br />

l0<br />

--Providinq no!ice ro nanufactrr€rs, the rnedical<br />

corn[unity, goverDhent regulatory igencies ahd the general<br />

Fublic of product hazard 6nd injury-causatiob :.rtoihation.


--Conductinq o! sponsorins special resc!!cb, t€stinq<br />

denon.tration and anaryLical projects to ex^hrn! sp!c1t rr<br />

!ypes and Pattelns'ol inju!v qenerated bv !he deslgn,<br />

hanut.l.turr and use cf Products.<br />

--SuPPo!tinq out5ide research to incr€'se knoeledq' oI<br />

product Dazard lnJurv re) Jt -onshiDs<br />

!!9--sE!9!!t!4g5-&9-Dj!I9s!i9!-g-ll!-!gEqalsL?<br />

A TechDic.I Advisory Connittee, appolnted bv the<br />

aoard ot Directors, evaluates and approves Fropos!15 lor III<br />

rcsea!ch, testing and dara analvsis. Henbe!5 tuust be<br />

accrediied expertt in sci.entific or engioeerinq tieldi<br />

relared to inJury causa!ion and contro]'<br />

Boe can r AdvancE rfEj:_!_9!!-?<br />

Ey applyinq for benbership or cortribing nos!<br />

If you are able, applv to becone a Foundr.nq,<br />

Organizailonal or sustaininq nenb€r. Your dues 'ilI 90 l'!<br />

to;a!d helpinq IlR to brinq about inportant i,nprovehenls in<br />

th€ public s of producl-related lnjurles as eeIl<br />

as in the breadth and qualitv of research, ahalvsrs and<br />

nocilication concerned Hith proalucl baz.rds that result in<br />

or, you nay lish to hake a substantial one_line<br />

contributj.on losa!d lrR's start-uP eff€rt lhi1e jointnq at '<br />

loser dues level.<br />

lrheiher you a!e inte!ested in Folndinq. orqaDizational<br />

Sustaining, Requla! ar Associate nenbership' uith or tr'hout<br />

a seD.rate contribution, it takes onlv a honenc to aPplv<br />

usinq ttre attached forn o! a letrer or card lo: IIR' P'o_ Dox<br />

3?5, Dunkirk. xd- You 1l receive a prompi respoDse aDd be<br />

bitled for your ilrst-yea! dues at that trne.<br />

(the Inslltute fo! Injury Reduction is a non-profit<br />

oie""rz.tion r".orp"riteb 1n the sta"e or Halvland to neet lhe<br />

"uj"..ir"" describ;d above rlR i5 in thc process of apPlvinE<br />

fo! an advance aleterrnination ot its cotrpliance {!th<br />

plovisions of the tnte!ha1 Reven!e code and regulatlons that<br />

;e!nic .ha.itable" tax deduc!1ons ior nehbership dues aDd<br />

;onl!ibutions to the orsanization. That de!erninalion, i!<br />

favo!able, till applv to all neFbership dues ancl<br />

cont!ibutions !eceived trom th€ tillle of lhe otganization s<br />

?


incorpor!lion- Horev€r, uDtil j.t is rec€ived, Drospective<br />

herhb.r6 3nd conlributors are c.u!ioned rhat no 9u5.rnree risy<br />

be ntde .s to the deducribility of dues and conrriburions<br />

recel ved 6t this rille.I<br />

tO: In3tttute to! InJury Reduction<br />

Post. office Box l?5<br />

Dunkirk, Harrland 20754<br />

5<br />

l2<br />

l. this is hrlour applicarion to becore . iFoundi.!9)<br />

lOrganizatj.onal) isustat.ning) lRegutart {lssocia!el heriber<br />

of the Insritute for lnjury Reduction_ please no!ify he o!<br />

appro!al ot this applicaEron and bitl ne ror Fy firs!-year<br />

?. r {ish<br />

{ 3isnEture )<br />

co rake a conrribution to IIR'6 s tart -up et!orr<br />

{ Aj'll. ne. please. )


l1tffi<br />

Natr'nil lran6port;tron s'lc(! Bo're r'crlortn'ct<br />

., l.r' t'.lr' rr.'(' I'ontnl Cr'61!'t Julv ll'r l9a6<br />

REPSRENCES<br />

l. ^],ff'.!. Dl.ter. seal DeB18n -- A slanlrtc6t! Faclor for salctJ B€]l<br />

'<br />

H.i#ill;;.Tits"e;1"*!m.fl<br />

''<br />

'' ffi ^ii,"*i;!:<br />

lt:t<br />

.:ln::l1l"r;r::::ru *":1"*i':"i';:;r-il *"<br />

'<br />

m:ili.ft"*.x ;L'efrru::ir h1';''' "-'*<br />

13<br />

'<br />

'<br />

4*l: : HiJl""l;-HlP*i:r,""H:i:'[]:l"l"y-"$fil:::tr".<br />

*gd"ilL'il"::Y.i:';i:<br />

li:l:n::1ry;i-l:ii:ul::; il:'i*''*<br />

'<br />

**;**, ryffi :::ffi ffi hfi iffi " r.IilF#;iil' " "'<br />

,r dH::i"^+!:" "ff I'i,F',"*T:ir*r<br />

l "$ : *rue; i!l;i'?;^ii3''<br />

," #:1lkl'3r,:1, *fifl'ff;"J*"T ti""^il1,i""i%Tl,]in";""<br />

,, {#l}ffii:dHh,H{Hiiffi ;'ii lr,;il:"** ***<br />

ll ll xil;"I:;;i;. +;.*;.**i'"3]"h*i lio,.,. ""' p€'ro'atlon'<br />

t". #;iit;'i]'"i 3"lii"i"" Anarwls or ?8'ooo AccldPnt c€ses vrtlt<br />

'"-n*ru**:":u"l:; j**'^:x;"m**"'n'ly*::"':'t:"-<br />

" ";n*';'*s"f "'fl<br />

#+" U:Yil:l??:"fi ';"':'[ffio<br />

f#::l*'f il$;'t;r;;;;; Y8 """!ii1i;<br />

,6. ;fri"iil";l<br />

lllll,'<br />

*#Hi'-'j':+::iF'*,<br />

( 1967),<br />

*,v::r*":"*"*ll:i"":;"''<br />

2:801<br />

''dHi'-*"*,Hll"h'il;"#"1il-1":Hr""#1"?"'*T::"rtl""<br />

ii-r"cro."t a'o riarrt " I9* 9'"1:::l''.""marlonar srEpo-.lun dl<br />

1a- c€nob€lI. B.J. S€at !eIl Efrectlv'<br />

'<br />

s"itt g€tts, lblryo (19791'<br />

!h lnJury r€!e6!ch proaraE of Corr.U<br />

to. -**ar*'1.1i"1"ff 'Ii."ft ie;l tgi",.<br />

d,<br />

it<br />

r'<br />

I


]I ETERENCES<br />

14<br />

?1. ...ll:: lqlub€rs!<br />

l!<br />

Ja..rro X. sclr Bclt Elr.c!1v.re6! t'l trE<br />

srruat ron. p'.oceed'.r|8!, 7rh srap! c";<br />

m;fl:""c-,r,-c_,r"*"."<br />

;;. C€ltpbell, H.E,- Folr ot thp 6a1eLy belL 1n nlnercen !u!o c.MDes.<br />

--<br />

gll.iI.!4ll'-;*!6. 'r0: r55 (1955).<br />


l5<br />

-at- REFljRENCES<br />

'Dre<br />

!r ct al. F"latlomhlP Brtreen Belt F1t atd lbdc' I|al<br />

'- -Fnilei-<br />

L; npar s?at o"cupants. Proceed lnss, lth q"*ly.<br />

ltil irdllclplltlrJ HlShvav Sa-f etv Conf er€nce' r'lofl tFeal t I vc' )<br />

LL. .t ai. Ll"tttteo.<br />

"PEprlnt" for Io85 SAt cd'rel4T'<br />

x5. [4trFai]]". ard Brsunsleln, P.x. lne seat be.r lyndrrn i ]gll'<br />

2:220 ( 1962).<br />

,,e. ci-r", c. irr oren rn InJurv lzv€I Accldcnts. Proc€edrnas ' 20lh aAM<br />

conference, Ailanla ( 1976).<br />

lr.0"..rt".n, F. et aI. tlNlual .bdqdj|!.r 4urtcs due to 'cat bel!3' J'<br />

lq!9tr Einst"rn qrd. ftr. r!:63 (1966).<br />

{8. c;;iG.-!. and Hobb5, J.A. Sote Patlems and cau3es or hJurv !r car<br />

-<br />

cr".t.*t". Pro.P^drrus, 5th Intematlonsl l\ecMlcsl Conlercnc' ol<br />

Ef,ueitr,'enlal saJetv lchlcles ( 197!)<br />

rq. c*!r. i.N, ;l al. rnvesr-lsatlon or lt{urJ rlechsnlsns tusoclated *lth<br />

-<br />

tutlr Restralned Psssctu'er vchtcle ftcupants ln london ' ('llarro'<br />

PFo.;ed1n6s, :lst $r,^1 conJP.mce rlo"7l-<br />

50- G.1de. C. lnfolflrlon on InJurles Obt_atned tr'n Reports ol Accldents<br />

'-'<br />

i;c". occupanls vearli€ s6Jetv B€lls Proceedltlgs ' confenence^on<br />

Boad sarerr. Foundatlon I o: -,.<br />

Hili,"i""i?x,.i;,:r;:';"::;::l'.,<br />

5I. -- Haddad, G.H. and Zlclel, 8'E Int<br />

l;;;; vertebra causd bv lap-t).P seat be1t. !:!: Eglg {' !S!'<br />

67:930 (1967).<br />

5r. H;;;;;;, F. and rarrrere,-c. rbs to Flrther loprove tne Prorectron<br />

'<br />

df OccuDants liearh8 Seal E€lB. Pfoce€dlngs ' l9th AAAV confenence<br />

( 1975).<br />

sr. n.n6"iion, J.lt. ard FleFdlwr' X'<br />

'he<br />

llftect or llandstorv seat Eell tbe<br />

'-- "t;-N;;<br />

sou.n ttut"", Auslralla. Proc'edlt6s, l?lh AAAI conter€nce'<br />

Okls}lctna cttY - ' (1973).<br />

ilr<br />

"i tt. ?ertoMce or Chlld R'straln:s ln Crsshes snd<br />

' -G-66.-atorv 'Ibsis. ProceedMas, s€at B€ll sertnar' llelboum€<br />

(1976)<br />

s<<br />

et al. the Efrec! of s€at B€lt Deslp and anchora8e<br />

"' -G6;Eii!=;-r'uurJ<br />

Patlerr,s. ?ioceedlnss, 6!h Inremartonsl<br />

ConJerence of iMt4, Melbourne r19?7).<br />

56. N€rberr. D.c. Inlury reduc:Ion t'y dlaSonal 5nd otber veDlcle sarely<br />

.,. *t'"' !u9'* *i:*;ul."331]; "."r"*t-, ror cnlrdEn A.er.T,.lr<br />

- -fii-1rn<br />

Blrthday. Dept. of llolor Ti'al]sport ' lJee south 'bres-t rero''<br />

*. niui!, i.i.--6" occuPant hJurv iattems Md nechsls4s Proceed ln6s '<br />

'-' 'sir'-i.ii*rtion"r<br />

re;hrcal conf€'sce on ErFE.lnental safetJ<br />

Vehlcles. volfsbu.g (1980).<br />

-.i-.i "<br />

59. 15"1-""il"r . "'. n,i"',t rractu!'es or the lurbar sPl:)e' J^l1A<br />

I93:21r0 ( 1965).<br />

6'<br />

*r$t":: L.-H{:il iiff "",;i"n:iH:'%"#$H 1n aeduclrs s€'1ou!<br />

Iie;lrarn!, '*-' --'-'.--3iudv Ibronto (Alax' l9EI) '<br />

of 13i Accrdents ltNolvlna l?? FstalltleE' HlShrev<br />

er.<br />

u,. @T*il"Tilftf;"H.ii"*i"!'lt#il f*lilj -'u ^"'."""<br />

-Tr.as-A;-GAr<br />

?7ol rr3 ).<br />

61 lh€ Rear S€aL autd6bue hssenS'r 1t lYontal cmsh€s '<br />

----ffiAEs,<br />

22d MArl conreEnce (1978)'<br />

.''--__-=<br />

eq.<br />

it'a cnetnlnd' ! A c


l6<br />

Rf,FEREITCES 42- .t<br />

I<br />

55. -IF6ceFdfru:, ct al. Injury Clulatldr ln nollover Accrdert3.<br />

iTth A A)1 confe.€nce, ct{l!}'(ru clty 09?l).<br />

66. _ 6nd Lav6on, t|.rlas E. IJ|Jurle! to near-Sea! p.lscngcrs -T6-nEtrfitsrptrve<br />

c.a!hes, th€ HsRi Researcb nefley, vol.9,-rb.<br />

(1978).<br />

tn<br />

I<br />

6l- -S;E-Flii*C-lE-76637d:--ffi-Iu!d'p!tve<br />

ErpGltton, Detrclt ( r9?5),<br />

LHcr Tb.so hJurlc! arld AutcnDblle<br />

En€,lneertrs corur€ss and<br />

68. -G-Fr.o'rtai-e.arhes<br />

.<br />

. th€ near Seat Aulc.mblle Passem..<br />

-E;Af,rss<br />

(vol. r), 22d ^ ^x confcrsrce (lt?E).<br />

69. HurYLtt, E.S. &r|l1 SlLver, C.E. S€at belt hemla: a ven!.sl hemla<br />

folloytra ar autc€blle cr.ih. JAIaA l9rr:829 (1965).<br />

70. Johsiiessen, H. GeorSc- ttl.storlc;f-hcrlsp€ct1ee on S.at EeLt Festrslnt<br />

Slstens (SA-E 8rr0l9?). ln, Advances ln Eelt. Resrmlrt Svsietns I D"sI':n.<br />

!qrl!E9l9!-!!9,!!!gi,<br />

LErforr. (.r9b.rl.<br />

7r. -F6itC!,'d-fSAFTIdfgz 6rd Plllr8kl, neai.! Y. Fear Seat occupant<br />

).<br />

72.<br />

tmd Vos, thc.ras H.<br />

'Ihe<br />

-Fr?TG;ffi -fSAFTto?e5<br />

Cttar'Gll,E .$isp€ ot S€at<br />

).<br />

73. fia,rDre, Chlrles. RaDarks at. !|eetl-n8 sponsor€d bJ ll.S. DeparEDert ot<br />

Itsnspo.tatlon ard OECD, the Ellectlveness of Safety BeIt Us€ brs: A<br />

Iultl-Natlonal Ersrnlratlon, H6shln6ton, D. C. ( 1985 ).<br />

?{. f\fiIber8, J.X. Efflcacy of Seat Beltr 1n lr{ury lrd }rm-IrJurt C.llhca<br />

1r nural Ut6h. Seport. VJ-2721-n3, Calspon Conloratlon, Buftalo<br />

( 1969).<br />

75. Xroop, J.C. et aL. SlatlstlcaL Ehluatlon of th€ Erfectlvenes! of<br />

Ol1]d nestralnts (Do1'-tls-805-660), Septefl ber 1980.<br />

76, Xulorskl, J. and Fos!, W.B. Intra-abddnLnaL blury froi s6l€ly bclt tn<br />

aulo accldent: .€port ot a caEe, Arch. $r-6. 73:970 (1956).<br />

7?. l,arle, J.X, eL aI. Evaluatlon or the-198l:8-near I€B! B€]t Csrpalan.<br />

Rosd Safety !lt|d l}.afflc Authorlty (nOSIA) Beport fk,. I, Vlctorla<br />

( r983).<br />

78. "lap seat b€Lt useful but c€n hJure chltd.en,n Jr0l,ll 2{5:228r (1981).<br />

S€e also, "L-mbar 1r!ur1es se€n as posslble r€sli-t of auto seai belt<br />

use," glIg!99!9 !9gI r:1 (198r).<br />

79. larlEon, J.J. aff CElnotas, D.J. Ar rasciatEnt of the Potcntlll<br />

Cos!-Effectlveness of a ReAulatlon Requlrln8 hree-Polr! Rear Seat<br />

B€]is 1n PEsser€er C€-rl, Pmceedlr8s, 3d C€iadlan llultldlaclp]lnrrJ<br />

lltSnaay Satetl ConfeFence, Lrdon, qrt&lo (l98ll).<br />

80. t€U1re et aI. Intra-abd€.ilnal l'lJurles couscd bJ lut rDblle leat<br />

belts. JA A 20r:lo9 (1967).<br />

8f. burl6, f.t-. et sl. Surmarlnlia InJurtes of hre-Polnt Belted<br />

occuFtnt8 1n ltoDtal CoUlllons - Descrlptloi, Neat)lnlrE, l'rd<br />

Protectl,on.<br />

(r9E2).<br />

Pr€c€edlnSs, 25th Stlpp Csr Crsah ConfcFeoce, Arfl A.r'bor<br />

82. lav1ne, Drnald N. and C€rrpb€Il, B.J, Effecllvencss ol l4.p S€a! Eelts<br />

dr*t the DEr8/-Absorblra steerha systd 1'l th€ F€ductlco of ll)Jur{.ra.<br />

HlgIr.J Sdfely nesearch C€nt€r, Un1verc1ly of )brtn CaroUns (19?1).<br />

E3. Lhott(a, Dctuld C. rbtor Vehlcle Occupart Protectlcn - A Hlrlorlcal<br />

Plrrpectlve. ProceedlnAs, 19th ALAI! cc'rf eFence ( 1975).<br />

8I. lfirdgren, S. 6J1d Ha.g, E. S€lt be]t8 .r$ accldent pr.eventlqr.<br />

Practl,tloner I88: {67 (1962).<br />

85. Iili6F;-F-.f. lnd l,u1son, a.x car leat belts; sn a''alysls of tbe<br />

lllJurle! lustalned bJ car occupanta. hlctltLoner, 191:332 (1963).


t7<br />

NEFERENCES<br />

86. touton, J.C. a,rd Fusier, T.x. neltralnt Syste€, De!1EIl and<br />

Pe.folrsce Par&:€ie.s. PrcceedlnSs,<br />

E7.<br />

88,<br />

qtc auiaDtlvc Safety Ssnlrl|r<br />

( r968).<br />

lorne, R. et a]. the Effect of the IJx S€lt Bctt lESlsta!1on on<br />

Rest.alnt Usage bJ Chlldru. It' ldv$ces !n geli 8esL.a1nt Svlta|!:<br />

Deslri. Desl!.n, PerforriaDcF &1d a'd Usa4e, Usa8e, Detrctt Det.ort (196&). (r98r).<br />

bndirr,- E:;t-?f--Fdit-Eifo&anc. of 6 n ar. Sca! B€1! svit6' rltj,<br />

Opttilzcd Seat cushlo. tEsl8n (SAE 810796). SAE P85leIaer cs. xe€tLn6<br />

(r981).<br />

8g. [ackay, G.lt. Eelted Occupants tn llontal C.6sh!6. ProcecdtnS6, 5t'h<br />

Intemsiloru] conference of the tiAlt't, Belbourlle (1977)'<br />

90. S€at Bells ln ErrrolE -- lbelr lbe and PerforiEnce ln<br />

-GTII6lffi.<br />

Inremsllonal SJqloslu! on occupant Resiraln!' Toronto<br />

(aMl!, 19Br).<br />

91. Tvo lears' Ext€rLence l.lth th€ Seat Belt lai' ln Brltaln<br />

--lsAE-T5IB'r).<br />

92- et al. Serlous thauna to Car ftcuP6.nls vearUl8 Se6t Be]ts'<br />

-s{lntemallonal<br />

lutonotlve balneerln€ consress' DPtrolt t197ll'<br />

(AIso Fresenied aL tRmBl confecence, eln!\tt€tl€s' EnAI8nl' I9?5')<br />

93. l'lackod, J.H. ard Nlchol6on, D.fi. Seat bel! ltatrI of tbe abdsoen.<br />

c€rad, J, slirE. 12:202 {1959).<br />

gt. _ tlirsir, .lo"eFtr-t. et al lnlury Patt€ms bv Reltrdlrt lllrge in 1973 ltxl<br />

197! Paisenser Csrs. Proceedlr€s, l9!h Stapp Crr Crrlh Confcllr|ce'<br />

ssn Dleso ( 1975).<br />

95, rbherso;, D- atd ove.sby, H. Iwestlaatlom of l')l,urv-fi€danll|ttl ln<br />

!!lly Restralned Vehlcle Occupants. Proc.€dltas, 6th Lt.firatlonal<br />

conference of lhe IMTH, ltelboume (197?).<br />

96. cnoberis, J.R. S€at b€It lruurres lnd te8al Epecls. Itdulirlal lbd '<br />

s!rr.3l:865 ( 1965),<br />

gf. ltEll6.1rla, c. e! al. the hdlpltaL etDe.!€flce of .cat -b€I!-lcSll]atlon<br />

U tn" iounry or skarabors, $eden. l4lII 12(6):506 {1961).<br />

98. rulls, ?,J. ano lrcbb3, c.A. ?|e Probatr-).r-E of hlurv to c.r occupatts<br />

ln Fr.onial and Slde Inpacis (SAE 8/11552)' ProccedlnSs ' l6th st{pp ca'<br />

crash Confer€nce ( 1985).<br />

99. t.tllne. Peter l{. I:lliria atd \iearlna of s€at Eelts ln-Australla: lhc<br />

tllstorJ of a $lccessful Cowtern€alur'. Ault.ellan uep!' oI<br />

Transport, offlce of Fo€d $tety (1979).<br />

IOO lbffat;, Ciarl"s A, et al. DlaAnosls of S€at Belt lJ3aA€ ln Accldcnt!<br />

(sAE 640396). In, adBces tr Eelt Fe6tralnt svstsrB: Deskn'<br />

rol h*-;J;e---T:;68-EIr, x.x. seet b€]! 1durv.9ur1,! ryTl.TT:Ig.<br />

fLth ruptur€ of d1acf3aD, llcflLch lrld splcen. ranoel z:lu{{ \rv/o/'<br />

102 NaJJar, lbnlel ' Reslr.lnt thsSe ltd Elfec t Lver|ess<br />

t€a!<br />

-lo. .near --<br />

occupants. In,<br />

of<br />

r03<br />

t0ll<br />

105Nleder€r,<br />

-r.!u""i !. et al. Adverse Effccts of Seat E€tt5 .t|d Causes of Bel!<br />

i" Seve.e Cai Acclarcnts rl'l Srl,rzerllnd (SAE ?70916).<br />

p"*!"arng", 2lst stapp C.. Cruh confercDce, l€H Yo'k (f9??).<br />

).<br />

J


REfERENCES 4+<br />

l8<br />

106 Nortn, lrrr! aru lnderuson, Br1tt . Src Mult Belt-A lb4rd b tne<br />

Chlld? Pr.oc.redlrAs, 6th Interirtldral b.oclatlon for ArtdDtlvc rDd<br />

'D_sfftc ttdlcln (IM'Ii1) IntcrdtloBl Conr.r€nce, lbrbome (1977).<br />

l0? et al, Chlldr€n 1-r) Cq.: - (Ir.t..nal 6urvey !€.fo!vEd by<br />

-SFvo; no Oate, but not latcr tt[n 1979).<br />

to8 €t ai. c ld neltralnt8 1n ca.s -- l'l Approoch to S..re<br />

-ElFrlFiruportatr.on<br />

(sAE ?90320).<br />

I09 -EFreeTIn, et 6I. S4a! BFII lhag. 1n Sred€n ard 1!t IaJurJ Feductia<br />

lrt\.arces 1n B.lt Re6tralnt sysl€ne: De!la'r, Perrotu ncc<br />

ana usace, De?6-ifTi98[t:-<br />

Ilo orF;Jd€s r.r|d xsphn, Rlchrrd, F trl InJurles !o Restmlned<br />

PBsserae. Car OccuDant€. [lc ]SRI R€earch B.v1ex, Vol. 9, rb. t,<br />

thlv€;lw or }lrchlsln (l97$t.lll<br />

o'lleLll, Brl,sn. h.clcntatlon, sAx Panel on the Pol1tlcrl 6rd lbchnlcd<br />

conslderatlons of Lflstable R€straln!!, Detroli (1981),<br />

ll2 Patrtck, L.11. et al, IiDact DT r6hlcs of LhreBtralned, Iap Eelted snd<br />

l,ap 6rd Dlaaona] Ch€st 8e]!€d Vehlcle occupsnis (SAx 660?88),<br />

Proceedlnas, lolh slapp car crAah confcreDce (1966).<br />

113 l}ly8lclaru for aut{rno!1ve S6,fety. Srculder belts 1Jl l.ear 6cats. Pt"s<br />

D.r.s (sllrler,&ll 1981).<br />

llA PoE., S.E. ard Green, E.ll. Seat belt lnJurles, 1E!. !tE' 96 : 2rr2<br />

(1968).<br />

U5 Pr€ntlce, H,A.J. Sieat B€lt Effectlv€rEls: Posslb1e B€neflb and<br />

rdvcrrl!!|8. Inlerrla!1oos.] StaopollrD on S€e! B€lts, Tolryo (r9?9).<br />

116 li€ston, Pred. A Cd4arllctr of Cortacts lor lhEsiralned 6nd lap<br />

Eelted occupants ln Autd.oblle Accldents. P.oceedl.ngs, l?tb AAll'l<br />

conference, Odsldra CltJ ( 1973).<br />

117 Ar1r[}, F.n., Jr. Ar.6cet belts enougb? !S". Prej!. 26:10r (1962).<br />

lt8 ftaite;burt, S.J. et al. th€ B1d!€chs;1cal-Bdii-T s€rt Eelt<br />

Prctec!1on, Proc€edfig,!, 23d M,tIl corfcrsrcc (1979).<br />

119 Ref-nfuFt, D,l{. et eI. l Stlt1ltlcrl lnalysls ol Seat belt<br />

Effcctlven.ss tn 1973-75 lbdel cars Involvcd 1n lbvaxal cr.sh€6.<br />

NstloDAl Hlgh.ay Fafflc S.fcty ltuitrlltrstlon, 0.s' FI (1976).<br />

l2O Rltchle, Y.P.. Jr. €t a]. C


l9<br />

128 SevEry. D.li. ct sl' P!!!.laer PFotcctlon tt.('l ProDt-hd I'|tPac!6'<br />

REF ERENCES<br />

"" *r"iiittiiJ'*i-eria*tr'.<br />

d!t'*..r',e cona'tss ' Dctrolt (1969)'<br />

129 $arL,, J.f,. et al. Analvsl! of Lp $ould'r B'lt E r?ctl!t.n'!r ur<br />

'-';;i;.;i;: -<br />

proceeot''ss, gth stapp cor cralh conr''rr-' rqrc)'<br />

''<br />

T*:',p;# l; J'f"::"H%::"H:?""f ;" *:"ilI:T lli.'"',,.<br />

i."ia.'*. i"*i"ottss. lTth AA-AI4 confcRnce, o(ltlcrM cltv ocTl)'<br />

'' Tii;,I;l; #,-'li'i;"i'""itll"T #.Tf$# ;l^l:li'i,tii:'*<br />

132 sryde., n.c. srrver ct Aurc'iorlv.<br />

K:::fltP:ff1*"1"il"1il-?i:lT*<br />

Ie,ve Becn, l{hele ve Are, ano Lur<br />

rrt et aI. I np, Pallem of splnP lr.Jurle€ arsoclst'l rlth ltp<br />

-- -EF;Eat<br />

belb. !. Sr! 84: qtr' J' 3l (Har-Ju''e ' r9b7)<br />

trtr e! aI. - PaiEolog), of ii;h; Btt.lbuLcd !o ftslralnt Gvrtctrs<br />

,.. -*"s: f##ft H;"i:;"'j, !i}3l: "''* *'..,<br />

--- -T;;;;F;fr-instllu!e,<br />

lhlversltv or rucnEan (196?)'<br />

rCS S;oo. C"r. JohD P. an.l Dfleld, lleu! D'L Ev3lu8tlon of the<br />

"- -iil:iv*-l"i-"t1<br />

I e &Jety Belt rlth Bef.rnce Lo hru Tolerorrce'<br />

ti..iii "i llr s'""r lbe!1n6, Atlsntlc clrv (1958)'<br />

rv si"i.".-J.D. "i ir. l'" }ledlcat AsP'cts or Drl\'!r Protecilon svrtEll<br />

"' -fi-D.'-r;;<br />

itveioxo nrousn AutdrDblle nacrrre (saE 700660)'<br />

:38 Sleckler, B.l'1. €i 41. S€at belt t'Alm to the lrmttar sDlne: an tmuauar<br />

-<br />

rnadres;tlon of lhe !e6! belt svtd.rn€' J' TraE! 9:508 (1959)'<br />

"' {ff *zu'll;-,rnii":':f; :'*i::i"r:mT1-il1 Hi::""&fl"!;,<br />

tro .SiltliltS];. cuest passenser lnJurles' Jlll 13?:3!8 (re37)'trtt<br />

srb€,,1. er al. seai b€Il trallla to the abddfn' i4sl'1'!!$'<br />

*. *lli3ll,'l?l1t'*-"ar ror a Pror€ctton crrlerlon as Feaarns<br />

- -<br />

;;;i.;1 r''t"''or' o.g"* ' R'oceedlnts, ITth lrAll conteFence'<br />

o{lahdna cltv (1973).<br />

lr3 rii;].;:i: i!-.!r- s""t.*it f.aclu.e! of th€ cerYlcsl splne' !'<br />

ruo '-- *H"a-.*f*]"'#: -#ii;<br />

"-il-t*i'.<br />

;iil'A'"." or ru6k nrrerences ro' a€st.l'€d<br />

aestrarned F.ont Ps!.enaer -1n tt-'d -?11111311 :<br />

f-i""Ort€",<br />

qth lntematltr|al TFclhlcsl Conference on Lrp€rllrenral<br />

,ur r$ii"'l lHtn'#:3r'ii"fi du. to !h€ 'ea! b€rt' r' Eess t:3e?<br />

( 196lr).<br />

lff il#"ft#,: T5:'JTJ:E ll't]; *'" rbase. Inle-atlona'<br />

'u" "dt- - s'"" H:'*il{iHL$?l?L'"" or 0""'pu''t Restraln! or<br />

' - -ffitEiiTiEE<br />

.Ge and rhole vbo T!€.t l}ls! Itl'rirtlctril svdrroglrm<br />

-' o""i,p."t i.srralnt ' lbrorto<br />

ll*#rli'll'*,, *- ror Rrodrd.ng<br />

flg U.S. bFrutErt of Trstlsportatlor<br />

({9 F.R. r52q1' ^pr1r ro, rro{/<br />

tr<br />

bcr'et r'ro' ?{-rrri fbtrce 1? (rttl<br />

;,;,-;;;r;;-,;*r.,rr--r"-'<br />

-<br />

' bcket No' ?!-rrr<br />

;; ;,-;;;;,<br />

(rrt P'n' 2060'<br />

.l<br />

I


REF EREI{CF.s<br />

F,n. U580, Aprlt rz, l9!5).<br />

l5rl<br />

F.R. lq5u9, Aprll u, l9d)).<br />

ttt-to-.*tur,-o--ar.r-t--l<br />

155<br />

!'.n. 20b4, J6nurry U, l9dl).<br />

AuAust 23, 1965).<br />

m<br />

bck.t lb. ?t-lt; tbtlcc 19 ({6<br />

Docke! lib. 7{-l{; }rctlce 37 (50<br />

b|ck€t c. ?q-l{; tbtlce 38 (50<br />

bc|rct ib. ?{-14; lbtlce 39 (50<br />

bcket rb. 7{-1! (50 F.n. 3!r5?,<br />

bcket lb. 74-l(; lbtlce {2 (50<br />

F.R. 116056, lbvenber 6, I9o5l.<br />

t58 Flnal Re6llatory Inpact An6l.ysl!<br />

-ah-;-€r,enffi -to-TWS?68-:<br />

of<br />

P.-lsenser car Piont sea! occupan!<br />

Prolectlon, July 11, 198{.<br />

159 Vella., I.D. er ai. Buptut\e o! the bo,e1 due io Foad traw: the<br />

erF.sence o!" the sea! b€lt s}{d.tne. !ql. J. lust. r:69rr (1976).<br />

teo Vor"o"cr" corDoratlon atxl stedlsh noad F.tt dilae. InJurv-Reduclia<br />

Efrect of seatbelts on Rear Selt Pas€en8ers (1979).<br />

16l laaenaar, Aler. n€larks at neetlng sporBored Dv U.5. t€T ltd the OECD,<br />

il|e Effecilven€ss of Satetv Belt lbe Lvs: A liiltl-l{atlorul<br />

Eis'llnattdr. vsshlr8ton, D.c, ( 1985),<br />

16? yalpole, &v!n. lbtor vehlcle .ccld.nt - mrltlD]e trauDa. AultFAl$t|<br />

Fsnlly Fryslclrn, Vot. 13, No. r, (198{)'<br />

163 HAr? Jell.ii:-;i aI . severely a,1d Iratruv rnJured Rear seat car<br />

Passen6ers (OAIS )/= 2) ln SYltzerllIld Orrlng 19?6. Proceedrna6, 22d<br />

MIX confetence ( l97E).<br />

f61r tlar')er, Cbarles Y. EeIt OccuD6nt Rellmlnt Effectlvlnels.<br />

Pioceedr8s, Uth MAx corfer€nce, Odlbtua Cltv (tglf).<br />

f65 Xcxler, L. srd Sllven-E , J. lidlDatlc ruptuE of t.he -1ry|€.nltale<br />

aFtery - a seri b€It ldurv. I. ES. J.<br />

I"d. 2l:1186-(1970).<br />

166 t1ld, B.R. et aI. Effect oI seal belts on ltuurles lo rrcn! lnd rear<br />

seat Dsrs€nRerri. Br. I'Ed. J. 290:1621 (1985).<br />

167 v1]11sr!6. A]]sn F. and 60r; Psul. InJu'les to chlldFen ln<br />

autdbbl]es 1r l.elatlotr to s.atlrlS loclt1on and Festrdnt u!e.<br />

AccL.len! AnalvEls lrd Ffealntlon, Vol. 9, Br. I (1977)'<br />

- .---e-t<br />

168 - a].:--EEiFt PFotectlon ln Interlor lrpacts: ln<br />

-ffiFas<br />

o-i-TVSs tb. 201. h"oce€d1nss,23d ll,'{'Lu1lvtUc (1979)-<br />

159 - H111,1&[s. Je.! S. 6rd XlrkP.trlck, Jol'l R. thr nlture of !.a! belt<br />

lnru.les. J, lisua lI:207 (19?l). (ll!o rubllshed<br />

!! s E ?00896 ltl<br />

Pr;ceedlrss; ltr-lh stspp c{r c.s!h corf?rttce, Detrnlt (1970)i auo<br />

Drcsented-at 28th Atvrual Conventlotl of th€ ,scrlcrn Alloclatlon for<br />

bJ].eery of fraur6, Eontreal (19?l).<br />

1?O et d. l'le autdlD!1ve sdety b€lt: ln 3av1r8 s IUe<br />

-6i-iEcE:EiEFa..aroddru]<br />

l^tuite3. J. trll'a 6:303 (1956).<br />

ur rGt", c.i. tleaenterv ard borei lrlJurv fr


-2to-<br />

2l<br />

sEr.Ecito cesrs rnou MEDTcAL LITERAToRE<br />

ON LAP A'LT INDUC€D INJURIE.S<br />

Atkcn, D,v. (1963). r-ap b.lt-lnduc.d JeJurut p.rroEt lon or th€ Eldl<br />

Gii?i'inC :_IFfie ted fo- 6 dsvs !-ct.r cruh. lnJuu Prob.Dlv c!B'd bv<br />

luddcn colpElston b€treen Deli bucld. rtd .P1roI colrEr- qi}v €rtcma]<br />

lrd1cltlon of brlt 1nJu.t ra! velt act'o!! Ior.. abddEn, b€lor urblllcr.E.<br />

Problbl€ corrcc! bell use, no 6uttrarltltta.<br />

E6clr1nr?l, X.D. (1968). n pofl! ? c&cs. Ca.? l: l6l-vcar!'('!an ln Fcrr<br />

tl6-i€D be-ii: -lrcntrT-1npac I, folloted bv r13it iai.ral. &rt brul!rnd<br />

!cr.o!s abdanen 6een blthl1J, lcco.[P6'|lcd by cdlplrln!! of rudnlnal palt'<br />

bu! condltlon iedled stable unrll nert t6m1tl8, rhcn lcv.rc paln d'v'1opcd<br />

.nd rdlan r.nt lnto shock- A! laparotcrv, a tcar 1n !h. E€scnlerv of th'<br />

aiall b6rel ras fo\rrd ' {!th about: 12n of Erngf.no'$<br />

barel. ocrFr'l:zed<br />

crttonltl! tDl pFlent and the rtlran dlcd on thc opcmutl8 tlDle' C'!c 2:<br />

I tg-v."" *" tn "dan !p.cd" frontal hlt, rllrltB ltp b.lt 1n rtgj"'t I Font,<br />

6eat. Drlvef aJeci;, frdctured r)o!€' LP b€lt rtaf"r had 'rilnslve<br />

nultlD]e lace.allon ot scalp, upFer/loH€r ]lps, rcqulrlna de'8encJ<br />

!ur8.ncJ,<br />

20" r 20' a|.ea of aD.aslon at|d ecchrnEsls corE6ForEltrS to !'a!<br />

Uefi Ollnnsrons acl.oss lorer rbddnen, rtght acFoss lcf! Md '8h! 1114c<br />

-.es!s (l'|dlcates correct belt glacatlent). Fracturc of thlrd lurbar<br />

verrebra, Abdoilna: dlstenllon, no blood at lr-q!6drMt t.ap, lt<br />

l6oat.sto!.]l, rDner, 750 cc of old blood routd. aronS rlib p'rro'atlon of<br />

ifiu'', tr'rne kar 1t o€lenlerv of loall Do'eI. qhlch ?ttettd?d doHn to<br />

i"r".io" #".nt""t" veln. AIso' I'cc'npl.!. t'ar or lleocollc art?rJ - A<br />

i:-c'n t"nstn of sknord colon Yas "coopl.t€lv ltrlpped ol 1!s "riera|3l co't<br />

of lcrcsa, t scularls pr€prla, sutr cosa' and EuscuLarl! wcosae "<br />

Dlhenb.r^, r.w. ()967). Relorts ?0 c!!es of<br />

"<br />

lnirs{bddn1nal vlsctra} at$<br />

iG:;;;Fic t.-;C-EG-!o trte sea! b€l! svndlvlcn 1n the 11tcttluFe ai !l|A!<br />

itne' neporls a nev case: 25-year lap tlcltcd |Dan ltvolved ln an<br />

aoo"o"tnot" 35 Dph lateral skld blo PoIe. ntcelv€


l'lJury;El- th<br />

P€po.ir 3 c!!.! of I.p b€It-lrxluc.d<br />

.h!|d-or!n coftliam!, c.!. 1: r'-y.a. b.n. h"rcturrd<br />

&'lxle, llultlple laclal a'd h.ad lnjurrill- *er 6bddllal c.ntu!1on6,<br />

abraslons, and €cchJiDs.5.<br />

abdcrien. AbdoDlru.l btcedrns<br />

I|our!. lapd!.oi..qy wdertd.n<br />

Audlble tr.1st l..1!, no r.bo!ryj t?dem.!3 of<br />

not d afte. clt}li.r |lad b.€n !n pr.ce for I<br />

12 hour6 al*l€r.ccldet!. bw|d<br />

"1.r8.<br />

De!.nterlc lac?rltlon ben..!h a l5-lnch .cSrErt of lrt&.clcd ,.l.u!.i c..!.<br />

2: 2o-y.ar Da, austaln.d cdnpr.llr1on fraclur.. of 4th ]urr|a. vcrt bra,<br />

;ulrlple faclal traclures .nd lac.ratlons. lbddllt|al t p ta! t.8at1ve, no<br />

botcl 6oad!. l,aparatllJ urd..t kcn r0 da),6 att l. !ccld.t:t, bwa 2<br />

pe.foratlom<br />

lE6prrltohlu!.<br />

ol cec\r rlth 6urrourdlng dbrc.ue8.<br />

V1ct1r rcquL.ld 6<br />

lb.cnt rlc t rr! atd<br />

nvc.J prclonA.d coBl:tc.chcc.i cdlc 3:<br />

23-Jear r(|D.J| sultaln.d laclal tracturls .rvl hc?ratlcn.!, fEct'rFd .l8ht<br />

ankl. ard fracturc of tne flrth llEblt. v!ftebr!. l|rltlDl€ tbdctnfEl<br />

contuslons and abraslons, "6.ver€ r.cat belt !lAn.'n lb .bddrtral !p.-3h or<br />

rrbound t rdcm€6s. hr1rt h1.. !,frEcr. Itft f@r!I prl3c dcrllclJ<br />

dlE1r13H. ,rbdod-ral t'aF nc8atlvc trlcc. 8.8!n dctrrtorrttia on dal 2.<br />

At BufS?ry, fol'md,,bo!h rctus rEulcl.s, ficlud1n8 thelr 6h.r!hs, a! rell .3<br />

!hel. adJaccnt obllque riusculaturc, {e.? cqrFllt!]J tr'6r.cct d.tr<br />

Pe.lto.rlw iom, o.|e contlnuous !.bsc.53 cavlty frf! p..lloral rpace !n!o<br />

tne nuscles ard Bubculaneous i1!!ues on cach llde ]o,er abddlen. SiaII<br />

borel alnost cc.npl€tely iransectad. l\.o larae ftsentcrlc lacerallons and<br />

tra\marlc thrFibosls ot letr 1l1ac art ry *!th d1lsectlon ot 1ntlra.<br />

IMcnl dled one r€ck later oI iovllrh€lrdng !eP613.i<br />

tuBols, E.F. {1952). neFrts 23 c3..3 or ht.!-abddnlnal lnlurles<br />

6ustllned b! ]ap belr€d alrc.af! occupanls, aforS xllh 32 c&es oI<br />

contrrllon! aLorg the belt lln€,<br />

Ftsh, J. ard vrtht, n,F. (1965). PF"s.nts ! c6lc! of llp belt-ltducd<br />

IfulFi?f-Tffi-;r;-?FEi:--case t: A.rrved hospltal ln shock. 8.tr1ses<br />

acr.oss lorer lbddEn lrd FiiTs tocan t rDe, i€td.r. PaFtccnt!!16 tn 3<br />

q\ra.lers B6s ne8arlve. f6und ?-foo! lcEr€nt of llclm avlrlled frs! lt!<br />

,Des€nterJ; stlall !e!.o!u!cular lear 4ldrorllo.l ol the lnt Biljle. Avulscd<br />

end of r!€sentel.Lc !l-t Fy acllvcly b1c€dlt€. rbatdla ln lcft lt.lnsvel.lc<br />

Desocoton; sple€d h6d c5fau1a. Ler r|!ar hfcrlor 9o1e. C..€e 2: 's]ortlJ<br />

att n cl!!h, Do!.d paLn 1n rlaDt n.tlk rtd lorc. |bd@n.--E6batlon<br />

fol'd lover abddnLnal t.dl .rE rlght flaik contu!1on corrllporalnt to<br />

aFess of patn. Parac.nlells ln I quldllnts al1 Eglt1v€ ' In bosPliaL,<br />

cqlpla1Jled of abd@1ia.l d!!cq!tor!' ltc llltle, !6d lor A.de revlr to th.<br />

l3ih post-lnluiy dal, Fj(ploratory oFrttlon tound prorlr!6L llctft PartlallJ<br />

tl. rDrct€d, adJlccnt bor.ll DAr'k iLIJ cq$u&i; thc ,Jrlurcd bor.I rcr<br />

6dheFent !o lhe 1eft !ldr. C€lc 3: -Dda rlrr<br />

n<br />

i.xtEctcd lll|lsclf vlthout<br />

dlfflcu]ty fr.o ttre rrcckrge]--6ly c@DlaLnl at bo!p1te1 rr! lot!.<br />

abdcalial, lr|.t fllnk taln cort.ert


tr.r.h.r F.D. and B.oadon. B.C. (196?). 2)-ve.r dr1v"r or "mt]l ' foiclSn<br />

iiffi"TreaFZf!=TGaIEF".t 6 h:.&h ratc ot .p..d." :b.<br />

;fi.i.4-i"ut.ry over Lh. !.6! b?11 ltn ttruck b"r rrc".q'ltBt rh?<br />

d;;;;.;;.; [Ittpt. n-ot


-213-<br />

Ltt1r4, J,n. ei. .l (1467 . IiPports 2 care! ' Case l: ?6-vcar r(fu r!<br />

Flffffi---*.;E-l-p"ct.<br />

tap uctt !a1d-65.<br />

"16!r" and "hun."<br />

q|ly srgn ot jttra-slddltnal l^)urv ra! nccch,Dll! rt$ ccnbDloh or lorlr'<br />

D6.t of abddlial rarl cor.estotrltrg io !1te or !c!t b.1!.' Elv. nEntns<br />

b.t-.*n, vlctlD r.


25<br />

EIi-!U a 's"ts" lap belt. concu.lon, rD6. rtlclure, lac..6tloD t ctt .k<br />

lDd lcit elboi. ldrt.rous coniullc.ls tttd f.1ntly v1.1blc E!tk! rrot bett on<br />

lorrr abd€.Dej .nd $!.rlo. superlor 111!c lpltte!. 12 botrF! l't'r. 'url'rv<br />

forrd t ar of JcJt!'rrtt about I lncbc! bclor ]l8drn! or lYtllr, rhlch rEirlv<br />

!"vcred tn. bo!.e]. Case 2: 6l-Jcrr rsEn It rlSht frsrL' 'Earlr€ a 'ntrA<br />

IrD belt." ln frontsT=;-n !t'lbout 30 |tPh.! cdprlstlon fracturc to tlqlv<br />

of r1.!t thbar ve.t.bra. Cltc. to nFrldd cdt!tr1c!tl.'t1" Y1l]r lbhlfD and<br />

S1ca.l, ttdlotlr|g U nuElr $rd"r. n.C, ct al (1967). n Dort! 2 c!!cs '1tjr corrcct lrp b.lt u!c.<br />

-TE;-Iffire paslenaer 1, w !t!!ck bv onccnlr'8 car.<br />

hpublllhed lttiv of ov.t'150 accld.nts tn tt|.<br />

L.A. ar€a," mre t!|.n 30 c.!.r or !!a! b€MnJal.s.<br />

Ibllrs, S.H- (196!). n ports on Ddn 1n rkDt r.ont ''!dr1n8 Itp b?ll rh€n<br />

cd-Ei-'tre"- D.t"-er ard rhFe rcar ..st p.!s.n6.rs unF.straln.c. }l.y<br />

*e.e all url-r\lurid. l,ap b.lted passenaer 6Lrtt.ted !?ver€ dldabdrD]Jul rr)l<br />

conrullon lnd perfor.tlon of upp€r Jelt'|dn. r.tnltt d to hospllal ?b rbur!<br />

fost-1nJuiy, not opcrat4d on rmtll r1!h rolt_lnJurv dlJ.<br />

v,ralB)le. EryM tl98lr). !5-year rdtB adiltt d t hodpltll a.rt r cruh.<br />

iE;dI=lg)s;T=st bei! conluslon on .bdc'rrn. srtll:'a' aenrraltzcd<br />

t€ndemess, Darked Suardln6 6id reboutrd tendern.ls. BoYel 6ouD0s audlble.<br />

,,tl(irenely pale, very confused snd 8s.sp1n8 for atr but respondlt€ to<br />

cuElsnds, tuI6e 1!0, blood pre.lur€ 90/50, resPrratlon lt5lBltute<br />

(!hal.lor)." l-ral formd l.f! gtuttd dlaphFaE i, pr.otlrl!1on ol dtddEltlal<br />

conients lnlo lerl ctust. A! dlerSc'lcy llp6rotary' n Ptur+d lPlcFn<br />

r€rved, teft I?!h rlb exclted; dtsphr!€m6tlc deflcll repalr?d; !ev'r!1<br />

aegnenls tom 3u:I bovel .rd ocs"r|t ry r@ovcd; .rd-to


-22n-<br />

26<br />

PAR1AAL CBROl|OlIrcY<br />

OP SEAT BSLT R!'LATED EVEI.TS<br />

tht! chFonolo8r of evenrs related !o th€ devcloFErt ltLl ur. of Ebto'<br />

v€h1cle leat belts nal p"ovldF sdllF PersPectlv. for lhc|s€ unfMlllar Y:t\<br />

-<br />

tl*sc toplcs. The Eoari ea: uablc !o locale 6 !li8re, cdnprele nrEtory or<br />

sear Oells anO thelr use, the ro])olrlng hss be€n plcced !o8!ther frc.l a<br />

nun*r or sourc"s (lL, 33, 52, 69' 7t' 78, 82' 89' lI0' 131' lnd<br />

correoponaence of tKrnas ]!rbel1, Chlcf Blgllechanlcs ne3€archer, Sr€dllh<br />

no"a aio ft.ffl" Besearch lnstllute, ta SsJetv Eoard ' october 11, 1985)'<br />

1930,5<br />

S€veral U.S. Physlclens equtp lhelr ol'| cars wtth 16P belts 6td b€gln<br />

urElns rjanufsalurers to prEvlde lhen 1n all ner c'ia<br />

1953<br />

Colorado State l'ledlcal Soclety publlshes Pollcy 5uplortltg lnslallallon of<br />

lap belts 1n a]l auldioltbl€s<br />

-t?51<br />

$orts<br />

Car C)ub of lrer1ca r€qulres cd@etLng 'lrlv'ts to redr lap belts<br />

a,n:r1can lleit.al. Assoclallo, Eouse of Delegales voies !o suDDorl<br />

lnstal]atlon of lap belts ln all aDtoDbllc6<br />

Callforr a Vehlcle Coate l5 ,nErded to requlre State approvd of t€dt bells<br />

b€lore th€Lr sale or use<br />

lbllottat Sa-fety Councl], lnerlcat CoIIege of Surgeons ' lnlematlonal<br />

-<br />

jr"io"rrtro" or Chlefs oi Pbllce vote to support lnstal latlon of lap b'tti<br />

ln all auidtobll es<br />

Soclely or Autdmtlv! D8lneers (SAE) epFlnts lblor vehlcle Sest B'}t<br />

Ccrrnltlee<br />

1956<br />

volvo rnarkels ?-polnt cfoss.cheat dlrgor8l belt at rcccssory<br />

nord etd Chrysler ofler lap bells 1n fi'ont es optlon on 6or€ liodcls<br />

Ford begllls 2-:traF aC cdDstg;1 base3 cn srf€ly, locGtng heav:'lJ on b'lts<br />

j<br />

l<br />

I


95?<br />

n<br />

lrolvo provtdcs .trclbr6 for z-potnt dftssd. b!lt! ln Itqrt<br />

$cc1al Sibcc.-riltlee on lYff1c S€fetv, u.S. Houle of EepEren!5tlvc!,<br />

oi,c* f,..rfrU" on €flecllvcn€ss or !€at belts !n 6utcdb1le!<br />

)958<br />

volvo pFvldcB .mhors for ?-pold dilaonal belts h r'ar<br />

t959<br />

Volvo Lnttodues 3-po1nt bctt It ft'oot 6! !t!'66'd' tn $'!d'n<br />

l,"r Yo.k conslalers lrd reJ.cts bll] to t.Gqulrc !cs! bclta ln tEr c'r! lold<br />

1n St5te.<br />

r960<br />

Ner Yo* !8rl,t cd|rt(hl! lrld !€gl,l l'.Jlct! t'at belt btU<br />

r95l<br />

SAE lssu.s staiataFl for U.S. !€at bcltr (J!)<br />

ller Iork requlrls seat belt anchors st frdlt outboad !e!t Fsltidls<br />

(lffcctlve JanuarJ l, 1962)<br />

l.bcd|lln r€qulres !ea! b€lts ln ft'.nt outboard scat posMotl5<br />

Stlrdrds Assoclation of Aus!811a tlsu€s 6t$dsrd for ilafEtJ belts '|tl<br />

hamcas !3ssDbllcs"<br />

r962<br />

-226-<br />

bsocle!1on for lld to CrtEDIcd Chudrcn rrd Corureer€ llrl'n lponso'<br />

i;ffi;-;;;;;;; - "r"ii"tts.. car D!l18n 6D6 ltlalnry s'rc!t' Yltn<br />

occupBnt proiactlon the 6ole tlEr€<br />

Str U.S. Statcs ttqulrc fwlt airtbo'rrl lcit bclt lncl|o's<br />

U.S. dtnrfactuJlrt DroYlda !a!t batt lllclFrr 1Jr t rtrlt outbo'd l! lt"d'!d


1953<br />

28<br />

Yolvo lnt.oduc.s 3-!olni bclt ln fFont r! ltrtnrld, ln tAl<br />

Sdie U.S. r,Bnufacturirs Drovldc 1rD b.lts ln fron! qltbo!.d Dosltld|! (23<br />

Sldles Dav! I.i! to requlre b€lts IJ] ft'dl!, @!i eff.ctlv. l/6lr)<br />

SIE lsruc! rrvllcd rt$da.d (J{!)<br />

U.S. Consress p8ses P.L, 88-20t t ellox Ccnrlll"cc DrparEpnt to l!!u?<br />

nrndalorJ sqndarts for sca! belts sold lJ) lntaEtetc cctu rce<br />

1951r<br />

tbout bslf !tl! U,S. Sldtes r€qulE lcrt bllt.ttclFrlges 6! l.ont outbo8ri<br />

llcst U.S. Danufrctuier! Diurldc lap belt! !t fwlt qltbocrd 8.at porltldrs<br />

Vlcto.16 ard Sorlt}l lustralla r€qulre aea! bclt anclroieS€s at fFonl outboarn<br />

FsMons 1n n€r c!.s (eltber ?- or 3-tornt P.nnltl.d)<br />

r955<br />

t.S. Ccrtt rc. bDt. lslucs flFst !c!t b.lt stltnrtd (rdopta6 3lg !!.ta!rn)<br />

SiAI lssu€s revlBed silrdard (J!c)<br />

A1l, U.S. Darufaclur€rs Drovldln6 lap bells Ln troni outboal€ porltlons DJ<br />

lhls !1!!<br />

Sdlie t.S, runufsctuR.s provtde aulonat:.c lockfrt rctracto.s (ALR5 ) 1n<br />

lront leal belts<br />

1966<br />

S/edlsh regulatldr! DFhlbtt z-pottt cro6!'clEat ditlCEnat balt tt .artE<br />

n!t! to ! doo., ird f-typ. of 3-pol'nt b.lt dtagcttlt<br />

U.S. Ccotlerce DeD!. lsslcs .evllcd 6e.t b.lt !t tdard (SlE Jqc)<br />

U.S. conar(ss p!!!cs P.L. 89-593, establlshltg lbtlor|al fira/'irqv S.tetv<br />

b,relu (noY IEISA)<br />

Slorts Cal. CIub of lE€rlc! dqulres ccqtur|8 drlvcB to tGAr a lhatrlaLr<br />

ha!r.r! !! rcll 6! a ]aD b.lt (plrhrF f96?, rccotd.ttr8 to rtf. 131)<br />

'|<br />

t<br />

i<br />

.<br />

:


!9gI<br />

U.5. F6nuflctuErs Prcvlde IaP belt3 at rler outbo6'd posluons (l{Y 196?)<br />

NltsB l!!u.s 1n1tlal tldcrtl lbtol_ v.ilcle Saf"ly St'6tdards 208' 209',<br />

o.tttru, st-d"nl" ror ]!p rtd lhoulder D€)t5 ln front oulboan1 .posMor|l t<br />

i:;-;1,; -i";ii-"ih.tF"iii""<br />

(!o ""x. .rrect \/t/68 $d 3/67'<br />

rr'tt ctl\'a)Y)<br />

volvo lntroduc.s 3-poln! belt ln fcar !3 !t!'ld'Fd, c"rtllt tEa'k'ts<br />

n<br />

0rr.t Bt.lt3ln requlres 3-po1n!6 1n fFont outboatd poslllctra<br />

Aurlrlltln !!!tld!rd for b€It .rclo.!g?s t6sucd<br />

:buth Au3tralla r€qu1res scat bells (lap belis OX) 't fl'(n! outboaid<br />

r$!<br />

volvo lt'ovtd.s d"r!€ttcy locr!€ F.lrrciors (En5) t! ltdard tJ| f!'oot' ln<br />

0r.6t B.lta:n requlres retrolli of 3-poltt b€Its !n front lt l'lY 55 .'ld<br />

rbtu U'S. c!.s tbls XY provlde AIA! '<br />

ull<br />

Stldcn rcqutt€s 3_polnt bells oi approved lyP€ ln fro'lt<br />

volvo Provld€s 3_Foltt belt 1n "er B !t$dard' all E*cls<br />

fFrccd.!-BcrE adds 3-po1nt b€lt 1n tlar outboaln lerts !s rtltdard' eU i<br />

J.p!,r r.qulres 6ca! belts, front al)d r'a'<br />

Au!!.al1a r€qDlres 3_Irolnt b€I!s, fr'oni outbdrd !ea!s' al1 crfs rrglrtcr'd<br />

.lrc? 1965<br />

lgo<br />

3t!d.n rcqul.es belt! II| rllr (dlladttl 6nd ltrtlc dlotrd; latr


1971<br />

-220-<br />

30<br />

Volvo prsvldca ELR! !s rtlrdaril ln Ea., ell E rt!t!<br />

NlrsA o:)ends n{vss 208 to rcqu1re p63Bj.vc t.eltrlt t! 1n ft art, !o Dc<br />

.ff.ctlve 1973<br />

Lr South rale! rcqull..! use of slat b€lt!<br />

1912<br />

volvo lntrnduccs adJuslabl? B-po6! ancho. potnt (not ltlrdaFd) !o D.tult<br />

b€!!er fllllnE of shouldcr portlon ot tFor!! Iap/lbouldcr b.lts<br />

last lult.auan !t6te lay .equrrbA b.I! u!c,. frfr|t lrd r.e6.., go€! lnto<br />

.ffcct l/1<br />

lbv Zealard requlrcs belt use, fron! ard |.ce!<br />

ll. Ccmany r€qulres 3-polnt brltr. fwlt and r.car<br />

IOIISA r€qulres ancho.ages for (dctechabtc) lhoutd.r !!.rp! for tt..<br />

outboa.d (Fn\-sS 210 )<br />

VY dl.plaJs 3-poLnt belt !y!t.o vlth rlbbtng prr-tcnlldFr (lllruFrt ?2,<br />

t{r3hlngton, D.C. )<br />

19?3<br />

I'lercedes-Benz p|ovldes Eli on 3-potnt bclt! tn latlg. ("S. cLr!) crm<br />

l:13<br />

,lcFc.des-8€nz pFovld€s ER oD 3-0o1ft b€:.ts ln Eldltr. (300 Scrtc!) clrs<br />

S€den rrqult.e! ELn on balt! ln tt dl! rcat!<br />

NIIISA requj..es 3-Dobt bel!3 (1.e., non-


1979<br />

hlnc€ haDdatc! laat bclts ln rcari clthcr 3 LrP bcltt or :|+lnt! !t-<br />

.<br />

o'rGro poslttons and lap belt a! ccnte. (tus! DMufactuftrs chdse llttct<br />

oplton )<br />

l||.r Zed..tld t.cqul.cs 3-Po1n! belB, ft'ort 6trd r.a. outboat{ tEsllla|!<br />

r980<br />

lbr"ceilc!-Banz Drovltc! drlvcr !1dc alrboa ara lqtr irolltar' ri<br />

pF?-tensloner on a1l 3-Polnt bel!3<br />

r98t<br />

}[|TSA Rsclrxls rrqulf-ttt! tot cvaitrrl lnllallatldl of p6!!1ve rlslr!1nl<br />

l9!l<br />

lbx Brrlrlvlck ltd Oltarlo DrI! b€lt ula EndalorJ' fasl! !J|d rtrr' (f'(.|t<br />

;!! ulc n tdltory !n Ort rlo lltcr l/76)<br />

s.ab htroduces 3-Pol'nt 1n rear 1n all nbd€)s sotd 1n U'S' (h'd grovlded<br />

"for yerts" 1n Scatdlnavla and Dlrope )<br />

1991<br />

Austrla !l!k.s belt use bandatorJ ln alar for car's )'lth vehlck aP9rova1<br />

afier l/8rr (f.ont .ea! u!. Drtxbtory .rncc 1/76)<br />

tl, cj€rlllrny roakes r..a. !cs! Delt uB. E&datory ll1 c-aFs Dll]utectultd llncc<br />

5/79 (E ndalorJ u:e 1n fmnt !1llce 1n6)<br />

Seven ol c.$lta'! lo PFvltces bv tnls th? tr'qulFc dcuF nts or Fr4T g<br />

vaUctca to rl'. r.ttatever !e!t bal! ayllqn l! rvrl.llb]c !o tDa<br />

.199J<br />

3l<br />

lbvr Scotla dl(c! bcli u!€ utdrtou' frcnt "il Fcl!<br />

lbtrrv DI!! r'.!f !ca! b.1! ulc ntdlt ry l' Yllrlcl'r F8tltctld tft" f/ll<br />

(frdi !..t ut. Eardllory .rnc. 9n5)<br />

lla' tork d]('s b']t ulc Ddd'tot''' fl.llt altl icer (1,r t.c6t for P'rr'ru 10<br />

JG!r! or oldlcr)<br />

tbFc€d..-D.nt rttrduces drlve! !1d€ 'lt b'a rltr EE t'btcr (ln dditldr<br />

io Drt-i.tltoEd 3-Fo1n! bcIE) l, u's' nr't!!<br />

'v<br />

i


32<br />

Exc.rpt.d Frm' Ev.ns, L.. OccuDlnt iror.ctioh D.vi.e Eff..!rv.n.s6 ,f,<br />

Pr.venci.S F.L.ltti.6, c.n.ral Moror! Re.carch L.bor.rort€s, April I,1,, l9Er.<br />

f.bt. 9. Enp;. ;.. 1 1! d.a.r^;^.d<br />

d., t..s In.tt cts.s<br />

rhi.h ,outd occlt il .<br />

ao ch.ng. .a unir.rt.t<br />

o^a sL.ad.fd E.ror.<br />

Crr<br />

.ff.cCit.^.ss of ahr.. occut.na D.oa..tio^<br />

./l.cLir.^.ss artns ah. ..ducCion in lza.t;a;.s<br />

papu r 2t iaa ^oL ust^9 thr<br />

ut.. Th. unc.ratt^at ;.d;c.a.d it ptu' c. d'nss<br />

Eff.ctiY.n.r. in<br />

pr.r.nt in9 t.t. I iti..<br />

(12 . .)r 'l<br />

I ({r . 1}r<br />

p9. aJr )<br />

f.bl. !O. S@.ry of th..ff.ct;En.ss ol ah. thrr. d.ric.s in p..'.oa/n9<br />

o.cop.nt rot.ction d.Yic.<br />

L.t/.hou ld.r b.ltr in ostborrd -<br />

;;;;;.:;;.; .:;.---<br />

L.p onlr b.lt. in outbor.d -<br />

;:.;-;:.; "f;;;<br />

lT*::;<br />

| (.,. {)i<br />

| (18. e)l<br />

(le . ro)<br />

(r7. elI<br />

(l! . !)t<br />

(25 . e)t I| (21 . j)I<br />

(2e . e\, )<br />

I.to.crcl. h.l!.t. I (27 . 9)I<br />

J<br />

I<br />

-l<br />

.l


33<br />

tocar loErrr:t rEDlc& tqnirL tol'd 6l ' !c' !' ArFit lt..<br />

Drr tt l|ia ctr.rqt 60-".' r:,os 3, ,lL l'-"<br />

p:ddnr oa !!!h.:F. lh. ilt Jr \{li.! Dnl<br />

l Oi sl,i\ |n! holnir, 'rt' l's<br />

tc,i.t $rr!.Jit?tr.*4 n ::.t..<br />

o. hl.i . .rc.F lq d b$.d<br />

ot d'li's'r<br />

Fc''i'r<br />

r'tu<br />

c.d u€8 oa rdd bidi.t bddJ bt t'iLi.l<br />

t, Arcsrr. l9tr<br />

Thirty-thrce Iatal crashes rvith seat bells<br />

U. br: s! )€! in $hi.h !r lLri on. FFr<br />

r'! Tdirt . (c L:lL At d. du! ir .rall<br />

l. !d.6ro!d lh.l thd qdv de1 Mt rGnrF o<br />

rrtEi6 th< pto.|


t ( !r


e r.t4dirn E .rt oa dr &{.'Eii<br />

t diri6 oa dr .i.4.6 b6Er .d o! I -t:r<br />

:|5<br />

@.r tiw €Dt t .rd d<br />

{<br />

:tt<br />

iJ


36<br />

Aa/Qa:rranaanp tncDrEa.Ixc sulr<br />

Intra-Company Com m unication<br />

N!. Jobr V.rr.c.<br />

P. C. B.!t.L.'o<br />

a. G. SE d.!<br />

Subl.c'.: P!o!.c!1o! oft.!!d br Should.r g.lt (3-PoLE! Sr!t@)<br />

19 S.p!eb.! 196?<br />

I! !!3pour. !o th. ftqtr.lt !o! aoll c@pl.t. doc!!.dtrtl@ p.!l.ld-!g to<br />

t!. prot.ctl.co, !n! ..ad .ou, og.ftd t'y !b. 3-FtDt lbool,.dcr r!t..:-o!<br />

syt:@ prpot.it ao! 19@, ih. toUdrrlg cLlul.c.d, .!tl cF.rb.utd it^r.<br />

shodd b. ccobLrd \.ltb IEp..! Ot.dcst fi-ld.lrgr foi caDlld.Fai1d. ft.!.<br />

rt ..r.atLr!.t coEt b.d !a ry Dao of 29 lugur! to H.. !r1ggr, ,r. !!vc<br />

l'ot d .I publltb.d d!!^, .!d rd. olpubL1lh.al dat , bov| !o ut !.t^r1r6<br />

!o ctlDl'c.l c ..! loqDd to d.l! b.lrt@otlt. .cc!lor!. !b1! l! t!!t<br />

cPrE. to dat. .!d ccltrb'It bc@e].u3j.v.. I! r.r! lJlpoltoi to !6i.<br />

tlri Edir.!! of tb. BlG.ciudcr D.pqrtDos lr!r. Frt1clp.t.d tjr t!. oDlt<br />

.rf.d&!t L stt!l1.. vlt! !lyL!s $bJ.c!! @..rlCL!b.d !o .Lrt. vlrb .! oL<br />

J.c'.lt. or ts!.!!bs LrJljr.t pot.rtl.I qbrc! !!t b. rttrlt !.


3?<br />

19 s.ptab.. 195?<br />

- 2 -<br />

?oL!i. t! c!rr6! !t.i.Jl.!to.! .!. fl.r d' !ot...6! of !h. .6.t'<br />

c@bj..o!.t sl,th r dd. !Da. oa ocdP&t' lodt t1..5, 1!ct.4.! !!.<br />

UL,.!tbo.d o! lEprsp.t Po.!t1odig.<br />

.) It !h.<br />

!.rt.d<br />

1d d<br />

upD.! Ec!o!ig.<br />

o::rDE!, t\!<br />

rb. ;dljj-dr!.<br />

ls too !^r lorrrd<br />

b.l,t ot!. s!11 t<br />

.!d t!1! ..n .lloe<br />

r.lrtlt. to th.<br />

!!dr tiri li !! i6<br />

tb. Lld.ltldtt4l !o!<br />

od.t !o Ad<br />

dlt rot t.d<br />

or.t 1t<br />

ddrlEd<br />

.!d !L!P ou!, l t E<br />

dutl,rg !tr. .l.c.1.nttc6,<br />

b. iorquld lotv.rd<br />

!il'c.h couL


38<br />

l. a1.i{.a! Strdr-! .r tnr}ii! t. {!tob6tlv. O.-,n.nt. ltrJ\r:.d<br />

!o ih. i-?o1.! 8.1t<br />

,' cdp!tir.!:j.'. r.dry or !b. Frbllsb.d .!d !:!tuf !b.d c!.dc.l<br />

flladlls! !.1^!l.!B to ..tt b.Lt 1!JrEI.! 1! p.srld.d b r.t.!oc.-8.<br />

rbt!. qt b. .lr!'|!g.d r' lollov! i<br />

slDc. t!. 3-polD! !.!t!r5i c@t1gur:tJ6 ha, lot Ft b.c [|.d ct !!1r.1',<br />

b.ras of!.!.d c6Lr.! optle! l-! 1967 r.h1cL!t rc!Ld.s! .:EFd@c. 1! ,!l-tt<br />

ll-slt.d ed j.!l!ri.! ri!r1r !.d to tLLr rtrte b!r. b.cD t55.qu.rtJ.t r.-<br />

pdlt.d to d!t.. n!!b.r :.! 1965 d.!crl!.d r!. ftlri 6s. o! r ! .r1c :rprl:t<br />

frld us. o! r 3-pobr coEbiatl.co lAp.!d dl'lg.o.I !.1i. Iloale.Utr th.<br />

. IrlFci f o!c.. ,!voLv.d e.!. rEuluall'y !4U, r Voll.q8.a strlhbs r B.uuI!<br />

tElqdsld! .i 5-10 Bph fr@ . nd-! srop. Sogb t!. \A-r.udd e@s dnv.-<br />

.!d tb. 6?-t..'


.<br />

of .t!rt .! 6s hcr ltlt 31d', rd nrFtE..d !'! 'PL"E dt:l t^t!tt' btt'-<br />

r!d.oi,a!l hecE!h!8.. ?o!!_r'89'c!' 'a out.IlD' '! lbt b'It (5 tcch'Eo!'!)<br />

n! rlsltil. !n DdL!8 trd dglt sbodd" to ltlt th18h' lbt f'tu s!<br />

rdllboro \8 ho63 Poli-LtBFc!'<br />

39<br />

b.t h.!d !!d b..! rlos 1!Pact$8 ![' F!'l' :j'r:l'!<br />

h..d ot . PFglrrci<br />

r!! 'Ll'goEAl t'1! 'Lld not FFr'li botb<br />

'.o !b' 'h"t Ed<br />

e@4! d5o ocaE!'d b t ltcold c4'' occar5S !!c'r<br />

.LEolt 1d.!ttcd' .6dl't1os; !dc!cr' tb' outc@t or trtrt! to t!' !6tg<br />

t! !!G! !abo6'<br />

lr )<br />

svdrlh studt's !At' ttPor!'d !'s q'Ertliu' to ibl! svli'o '!c<br />

A - 2<br />

ddkr st!d-16! bAv. b"D @d' !n agLr_d"' rnd r.ul!! L!.'-' Ls ' Dirt'!<br />

ltudt't!t.. t1$t at 4!t cb'!i o.' Itg bluift!'E!! loltld !6! dLtgood'<br />

.!d 3-pobi u!c!t .! !d ].ap brt uscrs'(2) (I! u' rDtl'e 3-Pob! tttt@'<br />

lqlL.td! or tb. dl.iSoad' lDd laP !'1t dt !tt|!btd' vbLlt l_D ih' EuroPto<br />

3-F.d,!! 5t3t@, tb.!. .F @lt tbt'6 PolEt!' 6' '!d o! tb' LP b']t !srr6U!8<br />

uD to !ot! !h! co!tl$.3r d1!go!d' ait&r!ta!' ) ODtot'tlsi'lt' tb's' EuroP'E<br />

ltn li.! do lot tldtLd. T.c{lc lDll!|7 br"}ddE' Tlt Dllot 'd!6!'g' of<br />

th6 3-!o1!! !t!i@ oe.r .1t!" rb' !i!gL dlaSolll ot t!' LrP b'It It tl^!<br />

It ot!.r! .ddlt.lo!61' Prt.ctloD<br />

bt Fdtot5E<br />

'L'!'0! o:';!' qpF! !o!!o'<br />

Dlr.dad!.gt! tF!..r to t ibai L! Elt l1t tbt ocdF!! colt'ctlt t' !'<br />

.tt.ctLv.' €!.u !.l!.t i.h. occcP!!! !o *!P out b !1dt trFct f LlPActtd oD<br />

th. !.!. tld. !t ib. !houl'd'! h']'!'!t' Tb'!' oat dro !t 'o' PoltlblUt7<br />

d c.rY!c..l 5lt:7 ilrou8h !!PlDg!@ai or tho b'1! rf !5Fct'd fro| t5'<br />

0t!.' !1d., n.'.r't!.1.!" r nP.lrz;1.]3d6!<br />

3rr.!.! ptot cttoD tb!! tb. LP b'1t'(9'<br />

10)<br />

!!'i!'b! ry!!'! o('rt<br />

I<br />

j


9.<br />

40<br />

NT'IPsICIS CITED<br />

ErcrsBct, --t.i.i-.i-t" C.! 1963 Arrffrc l4ll:fr.t 1! Soui! S!"d'! vlt! Sr'ctd<br />

t{'.dtco-t rt1 ^u!oP!1.! of cat occuP6!! Ed !'Ls<br />

It i"J r.rr". c$rgll1e-!sbd&!r1st, sqepf. :o8.<br />

ErsrtuxsE. J. c. Ed l. l. Scticuol: 1955 Strtls tlcd stldt.<br />

arr..tl,i-..t (of) S..! B.l'i!. irPPort. ul-!|o, ID!i!tN! vocr<br />

Vcgt arporutldd.]-d. !.tb!rl&d:-<br />

UXRErt. J. E.: 19&<br />

's.-f.cv B.L!s fo! <strong>Motor</strong> v'l{cl!5 b vlctoFlai<br />

UdJ-.J-JrtlrE]le r:5?<br />

EaBE!IS, J.: 19& iscat 8.rts Dd C.trl cal SP'o&fotl!' :=si3tq.r:<br />

188:8c4.<br />

r - j<br />

X!sB. P.: 1965 'I4E!t J"J]!.s!sll!!4].u!d:el&!<br />

!:!de.d b' s.at B'Iis:<br />

?:2x+]2'<br />

R'Pott o! 2 C'.'e!r<br />

FTCICER. 8. !. 6!!t B. c. &r.@o[: 196? is4!<br />

ua sieru. JDo 2oo(2):m-1?8, L0 rpdL<br />

B'li !t!c!u!'! o! thc sC.!.<br />

lJsln, B. D. .!d B. u. MIIlal: 1963 rc!! --ib;'fi;."<br />

s"! 8'l'!!: l! laltllt of<br />

s*i"t.a t7 cr: oicupors" !E!t!Us!r 191:39-3A0<br />

s[nEB, R. C., u. U. CBOgr, C. C. 9lo!l, J. lJ. rcInC P. Erl{Sol;<br />

196? is..! B.1r l!ls'.l.! ll1 IrF.!" (3 p!.!rl b$-!!E&a!-ll!<br />

i;d.ntrcn .! Fl.b4e rllllF stuFltlE. !b. UdY6!!i'tt of !|lc!it!'D<br />

l{odlcal scjrool. (P!!!t"tDl rti.ch.c'.<br />

:Ou!IG, J. !].: 1967 "A hlctl o!!l' cosP.rtlcd o! B's1c R'5t!tLr!<br />

St;.!5" Olr R.Po!: (1! p!.5!) f.d.!.L ltlrt1oD ld4t! stt'!!6'


li.'rc.rt.! Stodl.r .i q.rtarrt t:6ttctld vlth th' r_Pollt<br />

{l<br />

E18h! t tts bw! b..E corduli'd !1!L b'booD tubl'ci! u!l-U!j'!g<br />

!h. EoIL@'! tt! Dat3y D.c.L!rto!' ?b!" e"6 LsP'c!'d b tb'<br />

f6!er!d-f.cLrB body orl.Et il.oD' leo r"r!"!il f^cf'ba' d' 'i too<br />

dd. !acr-Dg, .!d t@ d! 9oo 31'!t ttcils' to 6E bt'l'dg!' ll'!' rt_<br />

F.r.!i tb. ody .rP.rieDtd. ttudt ot t!| L4!F gr6!'itto! !'P!'!'Etttd<br />

bt th. 3-Pobi E!tr!$i tF!6. I!! r'!ul't! o! t!t!6 lltt ltc<br />

r@arl!.d j.! tb. attac!.d T!b16. C@pI't' datcu!3toE t!]d ccrcblloo'<br />

..r. fouad lu !cf.!! c. 1.<br />

I! luo fo!e!!d-r.c1!g 1tF !s 't 20 & 2A' Do tdult 6! folld<br />

b oac ctir Ed dtgbi Lalltt (I'ss"tLc Pot'cEd'<br />

bcloF h!6" adt'!!l'<br />

Frfctpsd.ar bEo?rD!86, ut'!u! bro'd lfgE !l b@!@) b tlE ot!'r'<br />

A ttold t.r! t 3cc (2oo !..'- !1!c!, ?.2 fvs'c r']ocrtv, 30oo 8/!'c oq!'i<br />

nt. to! 0.095 !.ct iiuttiloa) 'I!6 t'ltrltld t'a ol_!4 !!rl4 (!'1'- c@iu!1@! '<br />

dpld co!gr3'loE) @:'7. 1!! lPP.tt t6 offlr an'D b'l!!! !t$\E7 lri'ctlob'<br />

rot .t!sD]', to tb. !!s !.v.1 o! !P!ct t!!! sith ' ItP b'Il odt !h1ch<br />

.pp.s! !o of!e! b!tgL!aL tu:Ttrtblutt tt 30C'<br />

tuo tu.F{acbg !.!tt s.r rs !! lbj!! c'o:118!t!!1o!' li 20C' !6<br />

bll'tt vss !oEd. It \cc, 5JE vs uo! sst'!' (t'tdrEd' baoFb!8"<br />

.llb..F3u.b! ld,&.y b6!ro:Tb!g!' .!d F!"!1d h!so:tt'S" ), '!d ollv !E<br />

)d.dr.7 $d ri> P.t.c.rl.!:' lttolrllg.t .ttrlEr!'d !o tb' b'1! (r! !'!olEA) '<br />

l{t.! oac 5Oo 1.!i' 5td. i!P!.! t! 22G !'d'!'!' btr'_dlltrL<br />

h.sor!!g. vrr lou.sd u?oq grost a&brtloD' |!d 4oc!rd&L lv@rhch<br />

upoE El.cFscoplc \.j.3io1ogicd. ttudt'<br />

fer 9Oo !1d.vr!t-r&&8 tsPrcts .l 22 |.!d 30C v'!t trrD' l! !b'<br />

Irv.! f.v6], !6a.F. duld &d u!j.D-r7 bladdo! b@or:bAg. occur:cd, !D<br />

stltld c6ir!!t t'o !b. 22C loflit"d !rl! vb.t. !o t!$E! 6! fo!!d. lt 3OC


tri.B !r.. flttcllt ftttj', dr. pd-E r!l, t rtl'd,6.tta of tt occ(Ft t t_<br />

12<br />

lulltold lobi .! !h. E.ck r-drSld upo! tb. d1|{rrt b.It.<br />

r.<br />

RSEEISqE<br />

ID_E*l_c.,.g;_c. "'+iEHir;[i',ffi"<br />

suolr, J, v. :!rruc, v. t{. cos[ .!d<br />

Jcr.El' Lqnd:'e6. oD rdatl@ FrrholoFT, o!!.r-. u scpterc:.'<br />

:j<br />

I<br />

,!


E<br />

I<br />

I lltF<br />

lrl ltl<br />

l:[-[l<br />

l; lt il;1<br />

l:l!U<br />

la Flrl<br />

lir<br />

I 1 p'<br />

I t:F t<br />

:l l.ur<br />

;l I Xl<br />

it tF<br />

il lE.<br />

1n--<br />

i1<br />

!l I r<br />

:-l | |<br />

i|!<br />

ri<br />

,l<br />

:l<br />

I<br />

!<br />

! t<br />

ii<br />

il<br />

1<br />

t-<br />

I!<br />

I<br />

I<br />

1<br />

tl<br />

iti al<br />

it t:<br />

itr: li<br />

!Jll ri<br />

!!lr<br />

43<br />

I<br />

I L<br />

I<br />

33-r<br />

o:3.<br />

\z2a<br />

: :;:<br />

--.:.'<br />

! i<br />

iiiiiiI<br />

ll i;<br />

I<br />

: i!;<br />

I<br />

liri iJ:,1i r ii<br />

.t5:: I<br />

-.e i a .e-<br />

!dit:<br />

iii,lii<br />

tf<br />

il iliii ilniti rliiir'liili<br />

:liii<br />

li<br />

itii!<br />

ll<br />

i litl<br />

tl<br />

i<br />

:!:<br />

:F<br />

iF<br />

:::


Tr(E r{ llofirl, s-JElI5il lr0.l! sirf,?M,txD<br />

(stntcn. irrliks[k€rhctsv.rk)<br />

21.r.1968<br />

REcULrtIol{S Ia sttrEIY tF;LtS (TlanststtoE fro! th. Srodllh 01161: l)<br />

2.2<br />

2.'<br />

2.1<br />

2.'<br />

,,<br />

1.I<br />

4,1.2<br />

lpnl.icntioh<br />

44<br />

Thcsc reguLtions apply 10 paE6€r6er co!!.<br />

Dcfi ni t{on.<br />

F I 196A<br />

ilafct/ belt" nccns s dcv.ice consl6ttna of strnps rrth<br />

fastcr:n6 cnd .djuslablc llcklca, attBcbDcnt flttiD4:s and,<br />

occolionally . !etr^ctor dcvice, rhic\, flrEly !ec!!ed to<br />

the structure of a cat, is dcsl6^cd to reducc ihc .Iok<br />

of injury to t.bc rcarar by liDlting hj.6 Eobillty 1n th. lvlnt<br />

oI colliiioh or othc! violctri !etsrd?tlotr or ihe rehlcl€.<br />

ntblcc<br />

Foint bcLt,,i! o 6afcty belt nith a diagonll otrsp<br />

nnd o lnp sLtaD aDd rlt)! oic ul'Dar snd tro Lorcr ancholag.<br />

t'T'ro poiDi bel.ti IB tr lnf.ty b.lt tlth a ilia8onsl sttap riih<br />

onc upFc!. and onc lo.cr dncholaBs point.<br />

"lit) belt' ls A .ufcty blIL niih a hI etlsp vith tro lorcr<br />

enchoregc Foints,<br />

I,Arch.''ace polrtl Do6r! D })oi'lt rhare a sarety bclt Io<br />

conrectcd to 1!e ca! body o! equiyalcnt ?rrt o.f tha constructio<br />

gco)9.<br />

vith thc srceDtlor. !1dtcd in poini ,.:, a c.Icty te:t shl,l<br />

bc instell.d tn odch.cat po.ttlon.<br />

lhe rcouirchcnt of poiDt ,,I docs Doi 6FpLy to lld!-fRctng<br />

oc.t5, tcldini iuxiliary j!ftp seats lnd !aor-Ia.j.lrt 6orlto.<br />

tor t\. !:c.of rlitfa!.Dt typci of .nfcty tolto thc follosln-<br />

.hrll .p;'Iy ;<br />

t'lrri4 r'oirt bclL. Lry 1,.. r:i.iC lo! all ic^t Io.itions.<br />

'lrr lr:rl. L'cIl! htl3t nol 1,.: u$!d for th'j jrit<br />

Ire::li:jon l:/ tl.+<br />

'<br />

-il<br />

.!<br />

11,<br />

i


t6<br />

i',<br />

- ttoo<br />

r.1'1 3":::::::'11'"':"""J:*".-t"t':*::::::<br />

a2 tti't"lffix:;;;1;ffi*r<br />

4.) ::::.,il."1::*:r,,..'""-*:rr:i=t*:igi<br />

:11 .ll"'J"'-;;;nchors'e5<br />

,.4.I ::1il:::'*:'J;.:.n{<br />

5h'rr<br />

.- .-nli


6,2<br />

46<br />

t.<br />

. r9_r959<br />

Ihc racI]atlorE of polnt 4.5 lre heont io bo rc}laced<br />

by tole dctallcd onc6 rh.n preB€nt sork on iDtcr'natlonnl<br />

re€llrtion! ha. bccb cDhll c !cd.<br />

;<br />

I


I I<br />

o t<br />

r o \<br />

il! I -<br />

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:<br />

i<br />

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,l NSTRACT<br />

48<br />

Ar r.chenr f<br />

870483<br />

A Three-Point Belt in the Rear Center Seating<br />

Position as Accessories<br />

fhrs paper desc!bes softe oflhe ensin.errnq<br />

srtuahons cn.ounLcr.a during the<br />

'i"velopmenl of a lhree pornt bcl! for Lhe<br />

rrar cenler seaLins posilroD rn a sedan cai.<br />

Tne b.lt $ rll be soid as an accessory for the<br />

The reinforcemenl of the parcel shelf<br />

r. achreve a sutficienlly strong anchoraE.<br />

. ). the rebacto. and the s€ometrical loca-<br />

Lions ofthe bell. anchorases are presetrted.<br />

The coDflict between lhe g€omerrical<br />

requrremenls. the deesn and thc visibilny<br />

rvill be tocuss€d. Thc n.ed for updatcd<br />

rcquirehents lor bel! hstallaLioDs in Lh.<br />

r€ar center seahng posr\ion will be pornted<br />

Data iroh lhe pertormed LesLs shos<br />

lha! all demaods froh resulatjors and "inho!.tse<br />

' requirenenls are fulfilled.<br />

BACKGROUND<br />

THE lST OF JULY, 1986, S*eden introduced<br />

a compulsory belt lar for the reat<br />

seat in pass€ngpr cars. Countries as Wesl-<br />

G€.lnany, Norway, Ne$ Zeeland and<br />

Auslralia have already entorced similar<br />

laws-This willinclease the useolseat belts<br />

in the rear a.d also ,ncrcase the dcmand oD<br />

comfort of seat bell rDstaliations.<br />

Lell |(rtbnnk and Hu9o Mdrandx<br />

Today host Europ€an car manuf.cturers<br />

have tbree point b€lLs on the rear<br />

oulborrd posit,ons snd a iap bclt in the<br />

c€nte. as st.rdard equrPmerl<br />

ll is. even for lhc iron! sc.! occupanL.<br />

rmporLant Lhal rearseatocrupants use th€f<br />

saf.ty belLs (1)'. ln ihe ccn!cr scalrng<br />

posilion loday w. have a very lo* usaBe<br />

rate. mainl! because il is unconfortsble<br />

and difficull lD pu! on.nd<br />

Children nay pref.r lD srt tn Lhe tear<br />

.erter pos'tion whcre thrr" c.n have a clear<br />

vi€e oDl on Lh,! roid. finlhes s,lh lhr€e<br />

children may *. ht to havr all lhcrr children<br />

use !he 6sm. U pc ot thrt( po,tr! b.lt.<br />

Takrng Bll rhrs Into rccounL il was<br />

de.ided lo d€velop s thrr. l,oint bclt for this<br />

scaling posihon as rn scccasorr. 'l h. main<br />

sdvrrtag$ of ! three pornt bclt in lhe r€ar<br />

cenLcr posrUon arc:<br />

- lliEher s.felv le!el 'n fronLalimptcts<br />

- Incrc6sed comfort 3nd conv.n'enc€<br />

- Bette. desrAn, compsrcd Lo a nonrctraclor<br />

lap betl<br />

. Childrcn pt€ter lhis plscc<br />

r-T'ri-E*_iiT*"rEe*"ae-ii?;;Erfercncrs<br />

al €nd of D6D.r


ENCINEERINC<br />

Thr rcquirem.n!5 r:o!crn,nr: iht<br />

dev.lopmenL of thir bcll iy.L.m ctrm( from<br />

''in-housc rcqu!reheD!s ond koh rcsuln.<br />

r,ons The r.Fulal'ons $eft.trlrc ltreni!h<br />

teslrnE ol' b.l..nciorage. 6@rdrn( lo r'iClt<br />

Itli and ADR 58, btll sy6lrin L€Ftrnt .t! rrl<br />

FMvSS end seohelr,c.l locElions ot<br />

Thc rn-hous. .oqurrc6cnLs wcr(<br />

f.onL.l barricr.r.sh lesl.s in 30.nd 35 hph.<br />

desrgn !nd comfort r.quiremcDts, such aF<br />

easy handl'ng, rninimi ng of the wcbbitf<br />

pressurc on the shoulder rnd easy tnslnlls.<br />

tlon in lhe car oILhe accessory belL<br />

Durjns the dcvelopFent phssc it<br />

became cl€ar thal lhe pa'cclshclfhad to bc<br />

reinforced. Special p.rls had to b. enSine€ted<br />

to make thc psrcel sh€lf aDchorage<br />

meel the exisling slrength requirencnts.<br />

h the engrneenng ofLhe special parts<br />

ise€ fiFures I nnd 2) lhe follopits porDr.<br />

had to be consideredl<br />

Aslo* weightaspossible<br />

Low manufactu{ns cost<br />

No intert€rence with the luggege<br />

No lnterterence with eristing parts<br />

like loudspeake.s, *indow shade<br />

aDd head !estrainLs<br />

At. t. id.toE.mnt Sdct.rt .spEli.d<br />

Inlh.&c..Ed lli<br />

49<br />

Ut9o 6ouEtin9 .l ..tEcaot on<br />

l. A brs.Let holding aDd keeprn8 lhe<br />

retra.tor ol lhc decided posilron<br />

2. I'rofil.distributi.stheload<br />

3-.1. Ilrofrle! lrevenlrnE rhe ltpPrng oi the<br />

rctr!c!oidu€ to lh€ bendrns lnoment<br />

i Parcel shclftrim<br />

8. I'ar.cLEh.lfshe€t.m.1..1<br />

lL was slso a problem to trnd t rctractor<br />

that ess cspable ot *ilhstanding 6<br />

load of l5 kN drrectly 'nlo l-he reel. In this<br />

bell.syslem lher. is no D'rrn8 and th. Ioad<br />

comes from a drfterEn! anelc than iD a<br />

no.mal load'ng case. as 1n a l}.post 'nslalla.<br />

FIS 3. Olal.enc.In lordlng di..ctaon.<br />

lot lh. cl..ctor<br />

t,


Du. tothe r€Fubtiont of geohetrical<br />

rones rhe relr8clor had !o b€ pls.ed nbout<br />

lo0 hm .bDvc lhc psrcel !helf lrio, which<br />

meanr that thc retracror hsd ro b. cove.cd<br />

w'th a plaslrc covct (see figure 4).<br />

Fi9,4. vaewthrosgh rearran.low<br />

showin9thG insra .iion<br />

The i tallation ofth. nc* rhr€e point<br />

be)t.lso pe.hits the lap bclt to remain in<br />

the rar and be !sed for securins lone<br />

luggase or restraining certsin child- sesri<br />

Fagr 5. Low.r an.ho.as.! ol ..:? ...t.?<br />

50<br />

Slli.lULATloNs<br />

MBl.hensli.sl simulalioni pere done<br />

to detelmtn€ {h€ .ff.ct ot o losercd uppet<br />

anchoras€ poinl. ln lhe ?60 sedan car Lhere<br />

are three differ€nl b.1t F.omelries I sec<br />

[8ure 6) and lh. qles|on w.s what effect<br />

th€ lowered upler rnchoraFe had on<br />

compr€3sron ol Lhe sprn.<br />

tlg,6, a.ng.oftrn.r r.7rh. dln.Enr<br />

A lwo-dimcnsional lumped mass computerproAram<br />

deveioped b! !ollo (2) was<br />

used Lo sludy thrs srluauoo<br />

Accordins to lhe stmulaLions [he compressron<br />

lorce In the spire is trealer wrLh a<br />

lower upper anchorage poinl bul slill at an<br />

acceptable level compared wiLh lhe outboard<br />

hisher poinL (3). The simulation<br />

show€d 2.8 kN in .ompression ol lh€ lower<br />

sprne rn r 30 mph crrsh. This value sas also<br />

laae. confi.med ir sledrests as desribe.l<br />

.:<br />

i<br />

.


TlisTlNc<br />

All rctulBtion t€.ts. ihe Errcnalh<br />

aeslins or bclt ancto.ages rnd lh€ b.l(<br />

sy.!1m lestina. were conducled wilh satisfoclory<br />

rcsults The rn.house demands of Lh.<br />

syslcn nrlud.d dlnam ic crosh tests<br />

lrontsl bnrn.. Lesrs aL 35 mph Bnd Hy-Ge<br />

s).drcsts rl 30 fttl| }sv. bceh partorm.d<br />

SLED TESTS-The sled tests werc<br />

conduclcd sith a Hy-Ce crash simulator<br />

lbat simllrr.d I ;]0 nph lrash Th€ dunr<br />

hies used vere a P5?2 dumnr nnd child<br />

dumm,cs: TNO P3, Us3year. US6yer..<br />

TNO PIO<br />

'l hc 50 perc dummy Pas elso<br />

equippcd wilh a special arial force kans.<br />

ducc. 'n lhe lower spine Lo measure the<br />

compressron load in the splne. (Sec fLgure<br />

it.<br />

Fi$ ?. Fotltion ot rFGGial .ri.l torc!<br />

it ndu..t in th. P572.1!6nr'<br />

5l<br />

An adyanlss€ *ith this hee bell8.o.<br />

tnarry .omp6red wilh th. outboard Fco.<br />

meuy war. s reduced forwsrd di6plac.hcnt<br />

.fth. h.!d snd lower lllC- !slues.<br />

The t€6L( conductcd $.irh chitd du6,<br />

mie8 w.ra don€ with Volvo 6 child cuihion.<br />

Thcrc wss ro siFnif'cEnt difTerpnce ol child<br />

dummy re€poDEe reslraiDed with lhree<br />

pornl belt on center place compar.d lo<br />

The dummy responscs in average from<br />

30 hph 6ledtasts were as follovs:<br />

HIC Chest Upp€r<br />

tesullznl, aDchorsrob.r!<br />

crc forc€. kN<br />

50p€rc. ?70 4l<br />

3 yeaB 560<br />

6 years ,130<br />

l0 yesrs ,150<br />

46<br />

48<br />

5l<br />

The loads rrom the load cell in th€<br />

loeer spin€ showed 2-4 kN. This is<br />

$me*hat hisher cohpar€d with the outboard<br />

places and.onfirmed the results from<br />

!he simularion. The outboard places sho*ed<br />

1.5 - 3.0 kN.<br />

FRONTAL EARRIER TESr - The<br />

froDtal bar.iertesl w€r€ run at J5 hph wilh<br />

a 760 6eda, car. The rear cenler posilion<br />

was equ'pped wilh a ih.ee pornt bell and<br />

occupied by ! P5?2-dumny<br />

Thedummy responses w€re:<br />

HIC<br />

= ?80<br />

Ch6t r€sultsnt, Cr =4lG<br />

Femure forces<br />

7<br />

= 2-5 kN<br />

Tltc rDarimuo io.ce rn lhe diagoDal b.lt<br />

lfar 6.4 !N-<br />

GEOMETRICAL BELT ANCHORAGE<br />

ZONES<br />

Three different reEllations of beh<br />

archorag€ rnnes apply to this belt lyst m.<br />

The US I FMVSS ?r0). Australian (ADR 5B)<br />

rnd the Eu'opean (EG ?6/rI5,82/319,<br />

Rl4/02) zoD€s.lSee igrre 8).


52<br />

Fb!4. Upp.r b.||..GhoEg. ror. r,<br />

dttt Fni r.sotaiton,<br />

Today the Europcan rcgularrons srat.<br />

tor rhree poinr belrs ancho.<br />

rages rn the outboard ppsilions and zones<br />

for a lap bel! in the cenrer posirion. Th.<br />

uon€s ld the upper anchoraSe poinr also<br />

appry ror the center posirron, if equroDed<br />

wii.}| a three po,nL bciL<br />

ln order not to,nterferr wir]1 the sishr<br />

out thrcush lhe rear wiDdow the reka.ior<br />

was put close Lo l.he lower limits of the<br />

European and AusrralraD zones. An<br />

addiLionaL Eu.opean r€quriemenr is lhar<br />

eveD atter. stalic pull tesr ot l3.S kN rhe<br />

retr.cror has to be inside rhe zoD€. lsee<br />

figure 9)-<br />

Th,s pror€cr hos shosn !har !h€<br />

rns!'3llahon oI a rhrec pornr belr rn th€<br />

cent€r posrtron would beneirr from no!<br />

riavrng Lhe same geomerrical zones as for<br />

rhe ouLboard ptoces. Due ro lack of hreh<br />

body sLrurru.e, desr8n and conflicts wih<br />

resr s'Bhr, rh-e middt€ pLace oughr Lo have s<br />

roser.zone rt equipped wrlh a Lhree Dornt<br />

D€rt Nok rl.Iat Lhe US-zore already .I;wss<br />

DuflDg rhe development phas€ of this<br />

proJecl. Lhe differ€n.e5 ot rhe narronal<br />

regrrarrons became very obvious. A ha.mG.<br />

nratron belween the difTcrenl rcsularrons<br />

would be benetrcirl. The geomerr,crl zon€s<br />

and Lhe. slatic skengrh LestrnS rre ar€6s<br />

wnere rhere are possibrtilres ro have r.he<br />

same regulations. Sinc? Loday 3 reeulahons<br />

are not inLended tor r.hc rear c.nrc; posrrron.<br />

specrtLc regutar'ons for i,hr3 pDsrtrDn oushL<br />

l,o be lou nde.l<br />

r<br />

:l<br />

I


Fla. a. lclt.idr. atsuE ot dq{lDd<br />

Eu@''... rtdic PUll l"l Itth'<br />

n.t ...( i. .qult9.d ihll thE.<br />

thF.<br />

CONCLUSIONS<br />

potnl b.lt..<br />

53<br />

This Proj.ct h,as !ho*D that it is<br />

Dos.ibl€ to Dslsll a three poinL tetractor<br />

L€tt for the rea' cenlre seatins posriron rn a<br />

*dan car.<br />

Thrs D.D€r d.scribes the developmenl<br />

ot .n a"cesi.ry b€lt whcre effort has- been<br />

spent on reinfDrcirE dre p.rcel shell wrrn<br />

bolr-on brack.ls to Mhieve s-ullrct€nt<br />

strensth of !h€ upper mbunttng lL rs.lerrrJ<br />

er.y to eD8:ine.r tbe bodv struclure. dunng<br />

the desigD of a new car' e tbal lh'se sPecrsr<br />

Darrs would b. ibt€3r.ated in rhe bodv.<br />

'<br />

. .<br />

The vurictv ol r.sulations appttcsbl€<br />

to belt systeo. b..obsrncted the work and<br />

it has to be stt"ssed thst aoendmeDl b e' r_<br />

3tDs resulstions rn EuroPe and Austraxa-'s<br />

ne€ded io co'€r th€ sPecific probleb ol lhe<br />

three po,nt bel! InsLall.tion in non'<br />

oulbo8rd Places<br />

Th€;e rsdeiinrLelv a treed lor barmon'zatron<br />

oI regllshons and Elso Po3s'brltttes<br />

to cerhiy restraint svEierns bv Perlormrn8<br />

dynamrc syslem tests<br />

REFgRENCAS<br />

l ll Norin, A Nil.lon-Ehle E Sr'€tol' C<br />

TLnq!rll<br />

''1";urv.E.ducrn! ElTect ot SeE! bel|! otr<br />

'.i'. *". *-p""t. _8th ESv Cont '<br />

()rt ber 2l ?a, l98O<br />

"Co.mPutc.r<br />

2- J.rn.rrom.<br />

C I1983r<br />

!rhulsLton ol e motor vehrcl' cr'lo<br />

dummv und !3. of srmuialion In th'<br />

d.$8tu3n61Y.r5 Process<br />

ln! J. of V.hrcle D$tgn vol 4 Doz rr'<br />

. .l'f Jl'"" -**** " A,r Force re''-urch<br />

on brodvnamrcs of col)rsion rnjurv I'rc'<br />

of lolh SE9P Cqt Cont Novedb€r u'e'<br />

o ll8tn",,.n.0.. schnerder' c K X'o"lL<br />

F.D. tGulch R.sponee ol belt reltlal[cd<br />

i,"'#:';;i ;: t#t i :'6i""ll6fiil"; ".<br />

, it;tt'11,*t o.cupsnt dvnam'cs as.'<br />

functron of rmPact ungl€ and<br />

^bcl.(<br />

r.rtte,nt Proc of 24Lh sl'sPp ua' uonr'<br />

Octlber l5 li 1980<br />

6 B Lundell, Ll M€llsnder' I t-arlslon<br />

"Sat<br />

ty pertorhance ol a rear ceat.b'lt<br />

sy.tem with oPlimrzed sear cusnld<br />

d€.isn Psss car meetrng June o'rz'<br />

198r'


APPENDIX<br />

Ol.9r.d l. Sl.d rc..l.r.lio. 9urs. 3o mph<br />

l!rmrl.tio. .t . a.ont.l b5-'.. l..tl<br />

Ol.tnn 2. Foid !.Fi* tc.r.cc.t.r.id<br />

o!t..35Fph<br />

u


i, /22/ 82<br />

55<br />

A NOTE ABOUT THE PREEIPTION TSSUE<br />

6asrc lssue AutonobilL nanufacrurers hav( arou€d in a<br />

"-u"o"r oi iu'."i!s !r.:t .lains aearnst it,nanuiac!urcr tcr<br />

r:llurres resul!1;rg frct" l11. tanuiactu!€! s fa:iur' ro provioc<br />

ao€guatE saie:y a:€ F!e€npEei fro: triai Hh€n Eh€ lnvolved<br />

autcmobil: cr sys!en ne€ts a nlnif,r'::: Federai Ilotor<br />

v' nrci. Satety . tanoard TFMVS5<br />

sectlon 103 (d :be prEer'Ftron subseclicn ci !h€ lct (15 USc<br />

:392\d) ), co:llains nc la.quaqe, ieqisLaEiv€ i_istorv or rntent<br />

precludinq ccr! ac!icns (her€ a F}lvs: has !eEr n€r ' i! 1!<br />

atrrectei solely at Freer:!rliq a sLat€ .r po: iL:ca:<br />

suDdi?rs:or." f:cn. aicFtr.t: totcr vehicie sa!€rl- s!andards<br />

'r.r!<br />

rd.n(tc-: t. r.r'- Federa' s:ar'carc!<br />

i.'o!i i::rp3rran: against ianui:.lurers ior safetv<br />

c€i€crr. vjnelhe! .: r.:t !i1€t involv€ coirpcnen!s lnat conplv<br />

with::.rnrnur' Ft{VS stanoat:! a!e specii:ca:-; prorLcLEo bv<br />

10s (c) "conpir'ance<br />

as !o11olts:<br />

lti!h anv tederal not.or v€hic1e<br />

safetr stancard lssued und€: thi s La$ oo€s nc' €:{elnp! anv<br />

pelson fron any I].abili!y undet connon iar'<br />

F;oo1 oebaEe D€arinp cn tO9(cl ccnfirms cong:ess's clea!<br />

:nter.L crE to F:€€itrFt io!! aclion:<br />

lltous€ Debale o:1 passag€ c: lhe National Traf:ic and MoEor<br />

vei.licle salety Acl. conq: Rec. Aug. :7, f965, ;' 19653): r|r'<br />

Ding€:.1, tor ri.e .ili an.. aqains! an arendn€ni (defeated)<br />

cftered by Er. l'Neri: o; llessacbus€!ts !.::i:Fos€ c:1r:rnar<br />

p€nai ! i es for ncn_ccnpl:atlc::<br />

secorli, $: have preserved every singi€ corntnon-i!l|<br />

r:etnedy tia! €>:ists agains! a nanuiacEur€! io! th€<br />

benefit ot a:ioEor v€hi.L€ pulcilas€r' Th:.s neans<br />

ll.}a! ali ci tire Fa:ranties and ail of the<br />

other devi.es a: cohtncn iar Fh:ch are atforded lo<br />

the purchaser' rer,ain in the buyer, aid th€l' can<br />

be exerc:sed agarns'- tre manutactu!e: '<br />

In Ehe Senate's floo! conside!a!1on o: the Ccnte!€nc€<br />

Connitcee repor!, on August 31, 1955, al F. :148-r' sen'<br />

Magnuson, ChaitnLan ot tile Senat€ Cotirnerce Costiittee' €xp1a1ned<br />

tn! s.rlute'. acceptanc€ oi rhe :iouse-criqiiated lanquase of<br />

108 (ci as folloEs:<br />

The senare conlerees accePred the House Provisior'<br />

that colnpli.ence t|iEh Federal standards {ioes not<br />

exernF! any Person fron cct!rnon iaH 1ia'i1itv- This


56<br />

prcvisroi nal(es €xFIicit i:: th€ bii.l '<br />

F!1n.iFie o€v€ioP€d ir- !ie senatt repor! Thr!<br />

D!ovrsio6 doe. no: pr€vent anv person :!on<br />

ir.!rocucln; in. ia$su!r evid€nc. of co:iplranct<br />

.r nonconFliancr !r1!h Federai s_.anoard3 lio cour:<br />

rules ot evldence a!€ intendeo :o be alrer€d bi<br />

[his p:o\'1s1on,<br />

Ti. rr:r..ip;: aeviloped :n rhe sEna!€ rePort" - Repor 1<br />

'l('<br />

icccipa::y :. -100:, Jun€ ::, i966<br />

- r.as as tollovrs:<br />

. . . !h€ Fede!ai .--:ni:r'u: safeiv staidar


57<br />

Mr. Kr-nczxl. Which gentleman prefers t'o go next? Mr<br />

,Kelley'<br />

Mr. Knu'tv- Mr. Chairman. I'm going to submrt my lull 6tare'<br />

-;;i f;th"';ita. L'ti i would lile to summarize it and .underscore<br />

for you the researcn rnar we have conducted that emphasizes<br />

;#;;;.id;lih" p.tut"- and the failure of manufacturers so far<br />

t" -ti'f t"k" it"io- tong'needed st€ps-to solve it'<br />

r"""tIitti"lJt'lni"ii ne'auction has completed twu research<br />

"r;i""L;'i;;;ili on iii.' i.uu" and we're PrgsellinF<br />

t hem the<br />

.for<br />

il;iG;;t this <strong>hearing</strong> They're described.in f-ull in attachments<br />

i;;;';;it"";y --fifrt.<br />

and I wIIl sunimarize them brieflv now<br />

*" coiducted a series of frontal impact -tests to comPare<br />

rriiiin ,.a-iiplihoulJer belts in t€rrns of their differences in pra<br />

i",iii-"1'J["iiJf""-:utltu" forces to the abdorninal, lower spinal<br />

;;;;"r:;il';;J ut*'* or i"u. seat occupants At Lhe conclusion of<br />

;;;iil;""t, l-*iti itto* vou a brief videotape of one of these<br />

t€sts. *"Gorra,<br />

we underlook a survey of 30 new car dealers across the<br />

countrv to determine the extent to whlch the manulacturers are<br />

;;;;ii" ;tktil-ut"itaut* retrofit rear seat .lap/shoulder belt sysirrns<br />

t6 car owners who want to purchase them' somethrng many<br />

Flii""i iiirriiiir-t"* *v tt "v are'doing todav The survev's results<br />

;;.ii;;;;;;;;;'th;;Ei ;"f large' minufaiturers and their deal-<br />

;;;';; f;ilil; -ut * itu"tt retr6frt rear seat prot€ction available<br />

to *i!'r?y,';" car owners<br />

questioned 30 dealerships in urban areas across the<br />

countrv dtvrded equally Derween Chrysler, Ford' General <strong>Motor</strong>s'<br />

ilH;;1 #di;ollllrot io""a that n6t one of these-dealers had a<br />

;;"#; ;;;-t lJJiilpltt'otta"i b"lt sv"t'n in stock we found that<br />

ii;f il;5-0 au"r".i rtua no iuch svitems available and said thev<br />

could ""6iri not be ordered.<br />

"i"it-i*" oi ttt"- GIvt dealers and three Toyota dealers-<br />

*id'iTti^?it; ";il;; ;;;ld ue-o'de'"d Prices per cai for. rear lap/<br />

"t""fa"i U.jt",'ittut is for both outboard rear seat -positions' both<br />

;ii;-f"{"i'ff ti1;-}iont, run between $99 1nd $400 for the various<br />

6i\{ "'Th-"t-i;'il1;;i;;i';-;i<br />

;;d;;ttJ*"." $156 for each of the Tovou.dealers .<br />

iabor rates and iristallatioa rates which<br />

-i;'hi"i;,'il i;iiili.tai"rt"a, as much as $180 to- $200 per car' The<br />

ili;iil;;' ii i"escapable fiom these findings that ,m9puractgryry<br />

hu"L fuit"a to unde-rtake vigorous production,. marketrng' pncrng<br />

irla- i"ii"li"tio" ptogta-s ai-ed al substantially increasing the<br />

;;#iiitt;i;;tioitT i"u. seat lap/shoulder belts to American car<br />

owners, "'tirl""",r.""n<br />

indicates that General <strong>Motor</strong>s has done better than<br />

t}tJ""irt"-*. i"i'"i!n G"t!i.t <strong>Motor</strong>s.has-placed pricing and deliv-<br />

I'i ii^" "oitaitions on the belts which fiusti'ie rather- t'han encoirrage<br />

their purchase by GM car -owners Nor does uM or any<br />

other manutacturer appear to- be informing car owners of haz-<br />

.the<br />

iiii'"l-J*i"t"a *ith idar lapbeltonly use or aggressively promot'<br />

ine ..'"fUJ"*itif" sales of the lap/shoulder belt alLernative'<br />

il"'autt, incluJing General <strong>Motor</strong>s'own data' which<br />

t";;TfiAl;'il.:-c.b;;; G"tT*gnv as an attachment' make it<br />

;;;ih;i th; titk oi death and injury in crashes for rear aeat mG<br />

iift.ts.ii"gT;;ifi''J"""a- "'n"" kip/ihoulder belts instead of lap<br />

onlv belts,-are made available.<br />

;:<br />

,<br />

1<br />

I


58<br />

Unless the car conrpanies and NHTSA undertake a national<br />

effort to get both warning information and retrofit rear belt systems<br />

to the motoring public, rear seat occupants will c


59<br />

Notice hereitfi.'f""."*o.<br />

On the video, there is no front 8€at Now' possibly<br />

-.ftifa<br />

fri'tfr" ""a dehnitely for an adult, what is the effect of the<br />

oersorr hitting the back of the front seat l<br />

*i\i;.<br />

K;";-" It would probably bt to aggruvatt .<br />

the excursion<br />

*i."" "rt *"tfa now have'the heid impacting somelhing Best that<br />

iir" iJ"J i-E"t nothing. Nonetheless, vou siill have., ir a forward<br />

;;;"il, i;";;;$ts forwird movement of the seat and the people in<br />

iir" fio"t so that excursion continues and we know from- real life<br />

"*""' tftuf-l"jt.ies to the lower abdominal area and the. lower<br />

.p"rril "ir.i ^i'" .o-ini out ofjust this kind ol performance in real<br />

crasnes. "';;;-.<br />

we see this tremendous amount of force on the waist and<br />

the - dummv is flung lbrward all the way<br />

i\4;. c;;;;. io in.*". a little bit more specificallv' in terms of<br />

ttt"^ir""J injury issue, the presence of lhose seat backs would undoubtedly<br />

ca,r"e "tt increase risk of head injury- if .the<br />

child or<br />

iIi*" #".* to "trike the rear seat back, because they're not really<br />

i't$T1i"rtt".<br />

Here we're seeing the counterpart child wearing the<br />

fr"irfr""la"i belt and you ""e het" that the forces are distributed<br />

;;id;;tG;; iiirom the side in a moment, the fo-rces are distributiJ-u"tv<br />

"u""tv across the upper torso -and the lo-wer part of the<br />

iia" "i J * i' ."v. t hu u"t..t.l' tn"usured pounds of loading on the<br />

l"n6elt *ete reduced by 60 percent if you want to put rt that way<br />

irrthis * crash for the child.<br />

s. ift!: *i. "i i":ury would have been substantially rq-d.uq€d This<br />

*iiin"'in" i*] "i6* itt"t I will show vou and tben we'll.show the<br />

'ih;<br />

;;;r;;.<br />

tup* irn" longer, but-l m going to cut it.off here<br />

ili"r"i.'i tiii[ *6 -rtt"" -"ai our point Again, the shoulder belt<br />

;;;; ;;;;l"g ui"t , rt"'. been niielv restrained across his bodv-'<br />

iil"il";;ii';;;-v ii'' ttt" rear-all- right-vou .can . cut it off'<br />

rf"r*. i-*.tt to shtw you now' in concluiion. a brief piece of tape<br />

irom Government footage' a test series' an extenslve test senes run<br />

il;it; ii;i;;;f Hien;iv Traffic Safeti Administration in Novem-<br />

;:. ili.;lt;i omFluttv'."t"*ed In this test the Government has<br />

looked '-ih? at lai and lap/shoulder belt comParisons.'<br />

clt"i"-""ttJ report has not been issued' but. we.have been<br />

a*" . a.tfi of the reirort. Ttte Government should submit it for<br />

?fr""i"J".J "i trt"t" h"uiit g". As our tests showed, these te,sts show<br />

;;;;il;"lv i;.in^J tiuai"g' on averase {or. the<br />

.lapbelt-onlv<br />

i,i-*-i"" i" inl; ubao.inut arei compared 6 the lap/shoulder belt<br />

dummies.<br />

Mr. Kuczx.e.. W}lo authored the repon?<br />

iii.. iit ;e". rnii l" u Nutio"ut Hilhwav Traffic- Safetv Administ.ui."<br />

i"pott but it has not been pu6tlsned ye! w-q ha5 a, draft of<br />

iil';;;;.i;;;-;" [.'" u""n siven a topv oi-the fi]m- Notice here'<br />

;';; ;;;;Gi";"ia "*"ut iJ", which hits the lapbelt sc violentlv<br />

;ili d;'i;"b-;n-t."ut". it breaks after measuring .an average load'<br />

il;';'ih;'b"ia of-more than 2,200 -pounds,.which<br />

is as much as<br />

thiee times that measured on a lap/shoulder belt oummy


60<br />

Here is a very good close shot of all of that force at the waiat,<br />

which is finally'so Sleat that it breake the lapbelt. That's enough'<br />

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our direct presentation<br />

[The prepared stat€ment of Mr. Kelley followsJ


6l<br />

STITEI1EI:T OF iLBERT BENJiI''IIi XELIJE'i<br />

PRESIDEII''., ]NSTITUTE FOR IIIJUT: REDUC?]OII<br />

SESoRE n HEARINC c'F THE<br />

GOVER}IHE]IT ;CT]I]iTIE5 iIID TFNI]SFCFT.\TIO]'J sLIBCOMI'I]TTEE,<br />

I]CU S E COVERN}'E}IT OPERi'TIOII9 CO!1I1ITTEL<br />

INT',<br />

'SE;T<br />

SELT SAFETi-': IIIITS; OVERS]GIiT'<br />

JUIIX :: 198t<br />

t1.dsi Chair$ona::. dehb€rs :<br />

; €m Albe!! aenjahin r:etlet, president of the Ins!i!u!€ for<br />

i"l"ty n"a".ttoi. {i!h ne todav is Lalrv E coben ItR s.-<br />

Iniui"'., ano Haloid sakavan, a foundinq nenbei of IIL- re are<br />

app.arr.r-q in resPcns. lo th. Subcomnit!e€ s !equesl ro'<br />

r€srinony bea!inq on the subjec! c' thes' hea!1ngs-<br />

:t has been known and 9lideiy publicized for oecades tha( seat<br />

..tl" "." preven! deaths and injuries<br />

.nis xncFre


62<br />

H€anNnii( af(,er crash, chi ldr€n 6nd a


The su!vey ques!ronei thr:ty d€alerships iD urban areas acr03s<br />

tne coun!r)'. lsee A'.tach:nen! c for the cohpleie survey<br />

i"o.t..; ri'"v tert divided equallv belueen chrvsler ' Ford'<br />

i.l.t"r u"t"i-' N:ssaD and rovor6- Elch sas asked rhelher<br />

;;;;;;:.. '."'-."at lap-shourde! b€1ts ser€ availabl€ io! both<br />

.-igei ."e.1 car ana an early l9to5-nod€1 car and if so' on<br />

trhac price and de!averv tern's fi19h1i9h!s cl !he survev s<br />

f rndinqs were as folloEs:<br />

6il<br />

--Ncr one of tn€ deaLers batt a ret!ofit rear-sea! lap-shou1der<br />

o€1r sys !€n :n slocr(.<br />

--Tw€nty_one d€alers said that no such svstens ee!e availabte'<br />

crtir.telt.<br />

- i1v. Cii deal€rs ar'


--Disselninate dara,'crash aeEr resulEs and othe! inlornati6n<br />

d1r €ct€d a! €duc6!rnq ioEorists as !o rhe need fcr and<br />

oerlrabiltty oi rear-sea! iap-shouide! belt sysrens. and<br />

sarr]'ng them oi th€ dansers associated t.ith lap-belr-only<br />

--Oevelop produc!ion pians for effective, eidety availabte<br />

retr:ofii kirs rc replace €r.i.sring Iap-only betts with laFsnould€r<br />

DeIrs rn tne rear sea!s of tens of nrtrions ot cals,<br />

--Undertake viqorous prograns ro aoverrise and narler rh€<br />

retrofl! ki!s and ro assure !ha! lhey ale in deal.er slocks a!<br />

a1: t ines .<br />

--p!ic. !he !er:oi:! j{i!s ar bale-bones. no-proiit leve:s sa<br />

as t3 enccurag: :a!h€: rhan irus!rate rireir sai€, an{i Frovide<br />

cnr-trne tr€. or ver't iow-cosr insraliatici servic€.<br />

?hes€ actirns wouid r€p!esenr an j,nporrant s!ep toward<br />

red!cinq the likeiihooa rhar as nore and rno!e rear-sear<br />

occupanis Hear !hErr safery belts, more and no!e of rh€m ri11<br />

be needlessiy kiiied or nurt in crasbes because rhe be]!s are<br />

l ap-only ani' no! lap-s:louide!-<br />

Today, tine bu:den is on rl'Ie car or.ner ro fiDd orit Fhether a<br />

r€ar-sear iaF-should€r belE is availabt€ tor his or her nod€l<br />

- i._- fac!. even General l1o!ors, with a berre: recorri rilan the<br />

o!i1€.s, rarns cusrore:s rhat th€y nay have !o.be<br />

'"ri<br />

Fersis!€nt<br />

t.1 you! deaie:' rDen tryj.n? !. frnd such a beIE to: lheir<br />

ca!. {See he:rc :n nrtacbnent D.) I,lt:TSi appears !o hav€<br />

Jrsir:bu!eC onii one piece o: pubt:c inlcrhacion abour<br />

acqu:::ir-? r€:rofrr lear bslrs. :! :s a one,parasraph<br />

Essurance, in a ..nsuhe. iniorna!1o::" Danbiri€: !na! uroes<br />

3€:.- use. rnat Cnr!s:€:, Forc. cH, ilonoa irirs"orsf.r anC<br />

Toyo!a "have r€trc::r ;,-i!s avaj.iabl.<br />

'<br />

tor sone noceis.'<br />

The panpiri"r urg€s raders tc<br />

"Buckte<br />

Up In The Back S€ar..<br />

rll' € pamphl€E dlrec!s consuners !.<br />

,'check<br />

lrith your deaier ior<br />

d€!ails cn irheEher: :/our parEicular vebicl€ can be rerrof:!t€d<br />

ei!i. should€r bei(s. Bur the !act j.s rhat becaus€ NHTS;<br />

!€qurres rea! snculdei belt anchorases, qi! vehj.cies can be<br />

r€!:cficced ric; th: belrs. ?he reat issue is rhether a<br />

parcicular nanuiacru!:: cirooses ro Frovi.qe rire bet!s - an<br />

1ss.r€ which tlHTSl has fa:1ed ro ad


65<br />

Th€ burder.:s in the erong p]!ce It is titne for the car<br />

cohpani€s and NNTS; to acceP! thar turden _ "b€<br />

!c Persistent"<br />

i;--;.;;i;s ho!oris!s oi tne ha'6ros ci reer-5ea! rap-ontv<br />

belts and Frov)'din! them sith a b€tt': aIt€rnativ' The<br />

alternative is !n€ iap_sho!r1


66<br />

-0"r"^"tn" S./"ty 1"*"x, -9",. PfiOOUCT<br />

t|^at[t.rrstrN6 ca.rif rc^lcln<br />

--<br />

rEST REPOIT<br />

ACCEL'RATOR SLID iESTS:<br />

colrPlttsoNs of tap, lrl-sltoul-DEt tELttD<br />

Rfrti sE l auTofioatlE oacup,r,yl L4lDtNcs<br />

Autoetiw€ S.f.ty l.stlng, ln(<br />

Itrstttut. for Inlury R.ductio"<br />

TRC of ohio, Elst Lib€tty. oH<br />

j ,ec o, oHro Brdo f2o<br />

.d ,s7 e s, 3l<br />

l,r Lb! oib .t3r9<br />

PlE, t5r3r 656.6rSi<br />

,d t3r3r d66-6066<br />

L<br />

:s


Autolotive s!tetv i.!ttDs, Inc , 9'rtorn'd<br />

sirulated cr!3h Dod'r!t' 6pGeds usiDo tn' 24-<br />

inch Hyq€ a.ce1€r6tct sled.t th' Tt!nspattt!ion R€searcr c!nt€r<br />

E.sc Libelly, ohio. on tl!!ch lt 'nd lpr11 1n' 1988<br />

fhe te!ts te!€ peltorh.d lor th€ lnstr!uie to! I'jut:<br />

Reoucrlon. the purpose of th. tesis e'6 !o det€!n1n€ tn{<br />

d:ifElences<br />

jr anv. ib IlP belt lo'drno! 'nd Htc rtte'c lnrurt<br />

c!iteria) te5ults txp€rienced<br />

j.D id€ni1'a1 crEshes bv roeirrca:<br />

.e.r-duMy occupants tealing llp bel.s only .nd, in coipa:rson<br />

ee!!ins 1!P_sbou1de. belts<br />

TEST DESIGN. PREPiRATION<br />

i1l tesls rele peltorned usinq a63enbiv !!on r'<br />

l98r_ loDda accolil LX tour-door sedan Floo! to teat dis!'nc€'<br />

3€!! cushion.nd s€6! bact anqles leplica(.d those o: a !ear-<br />

{o!ld velstot ot this nodeL' E6ch lett se.ting positiot sa5<br />

fitied {ith a nes .oncinuous-eebbinq lap-shoulder s'fetv belt<br />

systen - ttte s!.nil.rd !ti! provided b, ttonda as oliqinal<br />

equipnent tor !hj.s iodel . The letractor r{s installed tt tbe 3'!'<br />

lDole .s lound fo! a re.1-xo!1d version ot tbis lodel'<br />

The riqht seatiDq position,!s litted eit.h ' n€' naru'llv<br />

.dju3rable LaF be1! - the slaodald belt Plovided bv ltoD'ia for<br />

the rea! 5eat cen!e! posllion in this ood€l.<br />

I


t-<br />

68<br />

fh. !ir.d lnchor polD!! lor borh b.tt.,.rG inrt.lt.d !. tn<br />

. r..l-rorld v.!3ioD ot rhiB bocl.l. fbc b.1ts ,.!. adjusred<br />

rnusl' .iouDd th€ lor.! .bdon.n of e.ch duey ud rhe .houtd.r<br />

bclt DortroD ot rhe l.D-.houtder unlr r.r aulty r.trrct.d.<br />

l..ving no rllck !n thc b.tt.<br />

Fo!..ch !.!t, ,.r !.r. of b.l!r r.r. inrt.llld rn borh<br />

The lap b.lt of elch itruhy,.! !ir!.d pith one o! eorE s€lt<br />

b.Ir load celts- The !boulde! belts o! the I.p_shoulder belt<br />

all|bj,e3 .16o r.r€ titr.d rirh Lo.d c€Ils. Tb... c.lls plovrd.


69<br />

'EST PARA!'ETERS, IESULTS<br />

l<br />

t.rt !.3ults to! lhe conpl.te s.ri.t !r..horn 1n th. i.bl.<br />

Iest No. 1: Tro sit-y.ar-old child t€3t duM1.6 rcre<br />

6cce1.!ated to an inplct speed ot 32 7 ni1€s per hour th€ I6p_<br />

should€r b6lt.hild duhFv expelienced a pe6i LoaitinE ot 'o8 l<br />

pounris on tbe oulboard eebbinq of tDe ).!p b.l!. tbe l.P-belt-onlv<br />

child dllMy expe!leDcec a pe.k nelsured ouiboard-tebbrns loldtnq<br />

of 658.5 pouods on the 13P be1t.<br />

In othe! rolds, Ilp-belt 1oliliDca r.re 61 D€rcent higber<br />

!o! the laF-be1t-oDly dunny thaD to! che lap-sboulder belt<br />

t{tc re.dlng tor !h. Ilp_shouliter belt itqlhv r!3 5?2.1. Fol<br />

rhe iep-belq-oDly dlMy it sas 599.:. or about :O pelcett hiCh.!.<br />

Test No, :r aro 50th pelc€nEii€ .dult harc tHvbrid II)<br />

iluMles rere a.c€]e!!ted to aD iDpaci 3pe€d o! 25.8 nile8<br />

pc! hou!. the l.p-3houlder belt dumv exD.rieB.eal D.!k 1o.ilhgr<br />

of 537.1 Dounds on tbe outboald Febbing and 9?7 9 poubds on tbe<br />

irlboald *ebbiDg, colp.red eith peBk loadiDqs o! 2l5O pourds on<br />

tbe outboald pebbinE and 1195 2 FouDds on the inboard sebbing<br />

er(perier.ed by the llp-belt_only duhhv.<br />

!!


?0<br />

ln otber rord3, outbolrd lDd iDbo.rd l.p-b€It lo.di,nt3<br />

,.r. 138 p.!c€ni .D


71<br />

t<br />

coNcLuslors<br />

The !.3t !.6!Its contilneal th.l iD hod.r!t'-sp'ed hotor<br />

vehicle cllthcs, !e.r-se.t oc.uD.nt3 te'rins onlv 1'p belts are<br />

eiposed to substanciallv grc.tet iBpact totc€s in the abdohln!1<br />

.Dd lore! spinal colunn area Lhan occupan(s ee6rina lap-shoullter<br />

beIEs. Thls qr€atly rnctc..€s th€r! rist ol sustatnlno sevele<br />

rDjuri.s<br />

_ rncludins drssblinq or f.t.r injuri€5 tc th€ 5p1n'l<br />

.orC ind abdoFin.l oro.ns - iD !!ch c!!!hc6.<br />

Th€ results also shoted substan!ial over'tl incr'lses in<br />

heid !nlu!y exposuie for !ea!-se.L occuDants teariDq oni! laD<br />

belts in such crashes Hhen cohpare


ll: 12,? tPfi -<br />

,l: 26.8 HPH -<br />

50th tri1. ti.l€<br />

50th rtile lt.le<br />

72<br />

SUIIIMAiY OF iESUITS<br />

LAP AELT LOAD IIBS )<br />

Outbo!!d Ipbo.rd<br />

408,1<br />

556.5<br />

61<br />

2f5o<br />

438<br />

718.7<br />

190?<br />

la5<br />

SIIOULDEA BELT LOAD (LEs)<br />

977.9 tat2.8<br />

5!O<br />

989.8<br />

2360.2<br />

t58<br />

1775.5<br />

!.I.E<br />

312.3<br />

20<br />

215I<br />

27 tl<br />

28t5.6<br />

1a9


el<br />

BI<br />

EI<br />

EI<br />

et -l<br />

Et -t<br />

El ?l<br />

9t .l<br />

HI HI<br />

EI FI<br />

EI EI<br />

Cl ;l<br />

et ll<br />

5l 3l<br />

H .'l<br />

st El<br />

5l El<br />

6l El<br />

El al<br />

ht xl<br />

=t Et<br />

xl<br />

EI<br />

?3<br />

flli=!;rir:E=i1<br />

H!. *,i<br />

fl:E"t s d.qii<br />

il ii; ig:i i i::t :i:;<br />

:i<br />

giFgEig;;!;iiEiE<br />

:"1<br />

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et :a<br />

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*'!;<br />

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i e I I<br />

! i s i i<br />

il ,il3<br />

El :E is=<br />

F<br />

3 1 t<br />

3 . li or<br />

;"58 Eg;€Es<br />

iiiiiE; ;eii<br />

, S H !! 3i 311."<br />

t;;EEiA;Esi<br />

'l<br />

cl<br />

:ts<br />

g3 3t-<br />

!, !. ! 3'3<br />

E E f E EE<br />

I


:<br />

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R E F E<br />

E r 6 r E 5<br />

= t<br />

t t i f 4 t<br />

EC<br />

74<br />

a F, a ; Fi<br />

? e 1 e e : -T<br />

E p i € e E e;<br />

t E ; ' ' E E x<br />

I r a I € s as I<br />

6g -o 2".<br />

B<br />

d *.<br />

g:'"<br />

l; .g t! i tE i :; s EigI.[<br />

$- !; 't ;; ;? i P; I le !. ge;A1<br />

;* ;i ?; P? ;d i : sJ t 3:- ; F;:tg<br />

i;F i;;; ;;Es: :;1otiiE, iE:$i<br />

ic';;5i 13pe ts 3;il:i{i; ;33j1<br />

fe E ro EIs 3r l2 5 3 ; 3: I l:: : jr-_.<br />

€i I bi ?2" bP br i : ?; i'rgt E Et-€=3<br />

;5 - .F .e-- .: .! c I I ;b ; ;l€ E ;e9qE<br />

5.r'I E{ SEi ;; ;E i a a;B; ara 6 aSgEE<br />

E ! . E a<br />

d =<br />

i i<br />

i .-<br />

E 5<br />

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; 9;<br />

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4i<br />

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tt<br />

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: 6<br />

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og^<br />

i3; Eo-<br />

=eE<br />

Bu3 Ea" "el ,'gr<br />

+ E +I -<br />

5 .e :5:<br />

3 E - ? - d 5 E . - - p € t<br />

E?!i;it ! E gl:tEi E! t Ei:<br />

ii:ilir .E i iiElr:;; ! 5EE<br />

s iE,ia s ili<br />

i - + € i ;:.' s ? t r


IN'fTTTryE rcN I NJIJRY IlEUCT'OT{<br />

I SURVIY OF NEI CAF DEILERS TO DETETHIITE<br />

TVAILABILIT! OI NETROFlT LAP.SHOULDEP EELT!<br />

FOR iEAR SEiT iOSITIONs OF III.USE CARS<br />

!y ;. 3- Xe11ey and Jon s. verni.L<br />

lb3rlact: To deterqihe th€ .v!ilability ot r€irolii r€ar-slat<br />

I.p-lhoulder bclt kits, .!0 n.g-c!r d..l.rs in r1x !!jor citi.6<br />

r.!e contacted betreen Junc 16nd Jun. 5, 198a. E.ch ras !6t.d<br />

obour th€.vailabilitl oI 3uch r€trotit berts both tor.193t<br />

Dodel aDd.n older rodet to! a tot6l ol lto r!Ie-!odel-ye!!<br />

coebinations. The de.lers lepiesentcd chry3ler, Fo!6, cene!al<br />

rrotors, Nissan and aoyota six dc.lers tor eacb oanufa.tulet.<br />

Of rhe 30 d€al€rs contact.d, non€ h.d r.rlofit r.ar-seat laD-<br />

Ehoulder belt sy3teos in stocl


lo<br />

Ai DreBen< tbe v!5r hrjority of th. esri!.led 1l{ rillioi<br />

cdrs on Anerrc! s ro.ds rre equrpped oniy eith I6F b€l!3 lor<br />

re!r-s.!( ourbolr


77<br />

.:<br />

F.d.r.i resul!tioDs gov.rtinq ih. brDinun 9'rfo!m6n'e lnd<br />

ih.t!i!!tion oa s.!nda!d-€q!iDn€nt belts 1n n'e clrs lFed!!'l<br />

||oto! v.hic-€ s.i.cv sr.odarc 2Os, 209 !nd 2101 h!v' been in<br />

.tf.ct !ot 3ori. tr.ntv v"ot"-! rt tbe ourtet the s(tndtrds<br />

cnvisioned th.t n.ouflcture!s initi6llv 'ouId 5eli 'nd in3tall<br />

op!ion.l ret.!ofrt rear-se!! rhoulder b'lts to buve!s tho<br />

Irnrec rher, tnd tb!t bv the riat-19-los che nlnuftctuler! rdlil<br />

be p!ovldrns !ear-3eat iap-shoutde! beirs on all ne' ca!s:s<br />

r !anda!o eq(l'Pier!<br />

i 3tronq indication oi th€ 1.tenr tc €ncoulrge<br />

.v.llabilr!y 6t reElofit relr-se.' sh'ulde! be1Es "5 t'he<br />

r.qDireieni, tiich tooi effect rD r972 in FllvSS 210' th!t<br />

r.r.ufactulE!s de5igna.e ancnorase polnts" lor shoulder belts<br />

in the rear o!tbos!6 seatinq positioDs of ati net cars 5 ttrese<br />

points !ei!e nc othe: PurDose tha5 to "'ohodat€ shoulder<br />

belts thlt n.nuilctulers rould plotid€ to ntr o: uscd_ca!<br />

tsan: Lo reduc: tile iih€llnood 'i cr'sb iDJr::| tc<br />

rea!_seBt cutbc.rd_posr--roD occuprnts'<br />

v.! unti-- lecentlv !he!e has be€n :ilEle if '!v<br />

in


?8<br />

a<br />

FclloetDg i3ru.nc. o: rb€ NtS! report iD 1966, rob.<br />

h.nu!acturere indicat.d r chaDqe in.rtit!d€ ror.id rea!-se.L<br />

1.p-shoulder b€l.s ..d vorced a ,i:Iingn.Es ro plovid€ suct<br />

systehs tc: both lee cars rnd .a!s already in u.€, For<br />

j.dt!6nc€, as oa the eDd of Apiii 198'?, !de tolloxing aajor<br />

h6nutacrurers had leporr€d to NTSa thar rhey yEie o! soo!<br />

qould be nakinr ret!olir r€ar-seat l,lp-shoulde. beir kj,!s oi<br />

ti1.rr o1c-: no


?9<br />

rr th. rule.y. conduc!.d B.y 25_26, 1988 . t.leghon.<br />

int.r!lerer po.cd .t th. otn€r ot .eo tp.citic popui6r h.i._<br />

rod€ls o! 6uto!o!il.6.nuractur.d bv rht cohp.nv r€pres€nteo<br />

by that d..l.r. on. ert.1987 nod.l. ThG otb€r rls.n e'rlv<br />

l980 s hod€i. lDqu1!i.s lnvolv.d . .ot.l ol a0 haLe-hodei-v..r<br />

cobbinsrion.. lsee ADpendir B lor . Ii.t of delltr! .nd n!k.-<br />

roiiels involvcd 1n the surv.Y.) Qu.5iioD3 about the<br />

.vail,ability ot the r€trotir sv.teh *er€ directed .! lhr<br />

deaie! s FA!!s deplrtben!, tblle que3tion6.bout itsrallation<br />

s.r€ dile.r€d a( .he 3etvi.e depa!tn€n". lsee appendix C tor<br />

a s.r"ple of tile gu.stionDArlE loln uled.) Lhen lnitiai<br />

q!€srroninq €1i.'!ed a neqative response, the lntervre,e! '.5<br />

te:sisleni ii asFii-! ihar the derre: ebDlovee 'hecl: agzin to<br />

ile!€:iine *bettret the 3y5Ee, r!5 .vai13b1e-<br />

i!!.cll€<br />

Th€ inquiric6 alirlc!.ii st tb. thirtv d.tI.r! prodoc'd rh'<br />

loil.sins :esuits:<br />

--Ion. h.d. !.tt.!i,t rc.!-s..! lrP-3houlder b.lt tit in rEock'<br />

-Te.nry-one sliat tblt Do luch kit3 rere avrilable. onlv €i9h!<br />

d€flni_-ely rele able to older such a *it. of the3e, lile<br />

se!. Gr4 de!l,e!s lnd thlee re!. Totota d€.1ers. otc Fotd d6'I'r<br />

lDatrcaled he'nisnt" be abl€ !o orde! a !ear_..rt !e!ro!il<br />

3houlde: bel!. the Gt{ lnd tovota de6lels sere ce!tBin tbe<br />

oriler rould be lj,l,l€'i; tbe Fotd de.Ic! rB, not. No Chrvsl.! o!<br />

tli6san dealer r.. lbie lo otde! a !etlotit belt kit.<br />

I<br />

li


80<br />

--E.ci de!ie: th.t xouid.cc.pr an o!.j.! tor rerrofi! Lelr:<br />

to! tL€ 19S7-rod€1 ..r also eoul


8l<br />

--hiting peliod3 tot !et!:otit IitE th.t could t,e ord€r€c<br />

v!!ied ejd.ly .e ,eii. O! th€ live CN d.!ler3 tro €stinat€d<br />

. e.icrn9 period tthe oa 10 day6, lso la d.vs, .nd one<br />

21 d.ys, Elch ot lbe thre€ Toyoi! de.leis eEcrh!ted<br />

dillelent eairinC p€liods -:, ? lrd 1il d.vs The Folq deaiet<br />

s.ve a period of 60 days "PIus<br />

--Al: p!!c.s quot.s sppe.led to be !o! re.!_sc.t three-point<br />

r€!r.cro!-hounted iaF-shoulde! belt .vsiei5 ehicn,ould<br />

!epIac€ lbe exlstrns rap be1r, !ache! !han arid-on shoulder<br />

i<br />

bel,ts rhich Hould cobpieneni it. Horeee! tbe Ford deaier s.G<br />

uncle.r abolt the


82<br />

€<br />

the situ.lioh lor G€nelal Hotols.nd Toyor! d..l.rr rd:<br />

bett€r, sith nort ol the Getre!€1 l,otors de.le!s .nd hll{ o:<br />

ih€ Toyota d€.i€:s stariDe they could provrd€ ttie belts -<br />

auyeis sbould nor rxpecr to F.1L into ! de!1e! .Dd purchasr<br />

rhe belr., hoe.vc!, 5iDc€ th€ de6l€rs dc noi stoct !hes€ anrt:<br />

and thei! plo|li3ed deliv.ry datcs Dly run.! hiqh.s thre€<br />

r..l(s flotr d.y of o!d.!.<br />

car opners rno.:E able to titrd d.rlers th.t c.n provide<br />

th. belts :ay n. sDocLed by the pri.es they rre ask.d td pai'.<br />

In !ts receir l


83<br />

9<br />

.i.k o! injury iD c!r.h.5 _ . rish thtt 'o!ld bc sul'5(onti'11v<br />

reduc.d il h.nDt.ciu.e!6 tould und'rr'It vlqorou"nC<br />

lustarncd eflo!ts to 6upplv, pric. 'nd h"l't !'6!-s'nr<br />

!etrot:t sbould€! belt sv3tetE 5o " to tt!D!lltt r'th'r thtn<br />

llu6tr6te their tu!ch.!e bY<br />

.s<br />

:


1. t{.tron.1 Tr!n!gort.tion S!f.ty Do.rd, P.rlo!h.ncc o! L6Db.lL5<br />

in 2€ fron!61 crtsh.5, July 25, 198€.<br />

:. F.deral Brqorly idr,rni6tration, ollic? ot liqhEy lnlo!!.tion<br />

t.nrqenent, Sighray 5t.3tistic5 , 1986.<br />

3, s.e €.9-, Blskin, L. .Dil Pe.rce, f,. lor IJLI-Tv,<br />

b€i ti , B!t l1_11, 1984.<br />

a. a9 cFR 57!.<br />

5. rc.<br />

i, 5t tR ::81€.<br />

8{<br />

"lrtrtaaety<br />

:i<br />

li,<br />

I


85<br />

ID9.nd1:( a: Lttt ot D.'I'r! rnd C" Hod'18 S'Iected<br />

DlItiEo!. lt.t!o Ar..:<br />

1- Jerry 6 ch.vrol.r ' B!ltrlorG tt'l '<br />

r931 Ch€vroI.t C.lebritY<br />

1982 Ch.v!o!.t Ch.v€ttc<br />

2, Torson Dodqe P.rkville ld<br />

198t Dodge L.nc.r<br />

1982 Dodge ooni<br />

1. Sheriood Ford D.ltltore. Itd<br />

19Bt aold F€6ttv'<br />

193 2 Fold Eocot t<br />

{. Ritchie Nisslr, cleh BlrDi!, ttd<br />

19t? Iltsa!n HaalF!<br />

1932 lllssan sentrs<br />

5. lill (rdd s Trtncnluh lovot' Elllitore' lid<br />

198 7 foYot6 Co!.113<br />

!982 ToYola Ter ce t<br />

Clic.so Het.o lr..:<br />

1. serp ch€violet chrc'go I1'<br />

193? Chevrol.r C.Price<br />

1992 chevrote! cit!tion<br />

:. t1.tc.ri s o.L L.Fn chlvsIe!_Plvtouth' O't Llrb'<br />

193? ChlYsIet Fifth avenue<br />

1982 Chrysle! Ne{ Yolke!<br />

L Ltnch ior


1.<br />

l.<br />

a.<br />

5.<br />

2.<br />

l.<br />

5-<br />

lDse1.3 !?rro lt..:<br />

86<br />

Irv lJnrre luick, Los Anq.Ic6, Ca.<br />

193? Bu1.k CentD!l<br />

1982 Buicl SkYh6rk<br />

PaEadena Chrysler-PlyhouEh, l!!.d€n6, ca.<br />

l9 8? Plyrouth Sund.Dce<br />

r982 chlysrer Ner Yorker<br />

Cr!y Fo!


Philldelphr! rr.lro a!e! l<br />

8?<br />

1. south.!n xotors ch!tslc!-Pl,yhoutb. thil!d.1Dhi.,<br />

1981 Chrysl.i ee Yor ker<br />

l9EJ ch!yiJer LeErroi<br />

2. ?..:l ico Foro. Phrl!delDh1a, P!<br />

198? rord T!.c.r<br />

l9€2 Ford Escort<br />

3, CarDuE rli!J!n. Phrl.deipbr€, P6.<br />

l9 87 Nis3.n Pu13.r It(<br />

l9g2 Nir!.n sE.sz.<br />

4. Pltcairr old6nobile, l,.nthorhe, p!.<br />

.1987 old.Dobiie CDtIa3s Ci!r.<br />

193a ol


P.r!on Spot.n to:<br />

car rroal.l:<br />

1) Do you h.vc . (rtr!Dut.ctu!.! n at.t<br />

a. cost fo! pa!t? 6<br />

2 ) i,tll<br />

th! d..l€! inrt!ll tt?<br />

for lnstall.tton? 3<br />

88<br />

s[rvay RcPo!t Forh<br />

1on9 to in3rall? _ it.y3<br />

r..t rnould.! b.lt in stoct?<br />

a. c.n you o!d.r onc?<br />

yc3?_ no?<br />

b. shcn? _<br />

dlF<br />

Yho slll tnltall tt?


89<br />

lrto.utlon lro G.rrrrl ioto!3<br />

D..t.!-rt.t.lI.d R.rt 6..t LPlgbourdcr 6.a.tv a.ltr<br />

Rcvi!.d<br />

rhould.r<br />

d..I.!-intt.Il,.d<br />

6.l.ty b€ltB<br />

optio l ootbo.rd re.r<br />

tr. .e.Il.bl. for th.<br />

!.rt I!P<br />

follorin9<br />

P.Iang.r crr..<br />

1976-1987 T<br />

1977-1986 E,D,C ( RlrD)<br />

1979-1985 E<br />

1980-1965 X<br />

1995 E,r(<br />

r98o-1985 x<br />

1982-1986 A<br />

t9g2-r986 J<br />

1965-1986 C,l<br />

1985-19S5 N<br />

i t97E-198r F<br />

1982-1985 r<br />

r t9?8-1986 G,A<br />

(Rt|D)<br />

. 1978-1980 r I RrD)<br />

r AII currlnt nodals<br />

r r Avrihbllity<br />

d.l!<br />

ch.erol"t ch.ectt!, Po.tr.c T-I000<br />

Chcvlolct lDp.l.. .nd c.Prlc.,<br />

Pontl.c P.r lrl.nn., €u1ck Lcsrbr.<br />

lnd Et.ctr!, old!ftobiI" D.lt. aB<br />

.nd 98, c.dl rr.c FlG.teood.nd<br />

D! vl,l.l !<br />

Buick Rivi.r., OId6Fobll. Toron.do,<br />

C.dilI!c EIdor.do<br />

crdiII.c s.v i 11.<br />

Aulck Rivr.r.. Oldgaobil. Toronsdo,<br />

Crdlllac Eldolldo ,,rd scvi 1I.<br />

Chlvrol.t cr t.t ion, Ponti.c Phocni.r.<br />

Bulct Skyl! rk, oldsnobil. o$.9.<br />

Ch.ero1.t cel.br i ty, Pontiac 6000.<br />

Euicr century. oldEftobil e cutlass<br />

G||<br />

Ch.vrol.t C.vali.!, Pont t.c J2000//<br />

Sunbitd. auicl Sryh.rk ' olds.dobi).<br />

lircnta, c.diIlac CiDarron<br />

Eulck Elcctr! and l.slbrc.<br />

old6hoblle 98 .nd Deltr 88. cadlllac<br />

o. vi 11e<br />

Pontiac ct.Dd ah, Bulck SkyI.rl .nd<br />

Sonc!lct, Oldsnobt 1e ca].is<br />

Chev.oJ.€t c.rna.o, lontiac Fir€bird<br />

Ch.vrol€t C.naro, Pontiac rirebird<br />

chevrol.t lt.libu and uonte carlo'<br />

Pooti.c Bonn.vilI€.nd Gland Prrx,<br />

Bulct R.ga!. OId50obi Ie C!lIass<br />

Chlvrolet lonta, Pont i.c Sunbird,<br />

Eu rc( skyh.!{, OldthobiI€ siar!j...<br />

to bc dlt€riin"d t€rcept ? _ t.c rbov!)<br />

!c ac.6i!!cnt ttth you! d..I!! if lt aPPc..s h. iB not t.nilir!<br />

ytth- th. .cc!3.ory .v.il.biIity. You My su99.Et ih. d.rIr! c.ll<br />

rh. Iocal 2on. P.rts Distilbu!ion Ccnter lor furth.l iDlorn!!ion.<br />

D!!ler-instaII€l te.! IaP/shbulder sa(ety b.ll acc.ssotv P.ctlgcs<br />

eIIl b! nade .eailabl€ lor liqht trucks ard th€<br />

.v.ilrbility d.t€ !cnain! to b! d.t.rnin.d.<br />

r2-5-t6<br />

.ic


90<br />

Mr. Kt,tczxe. OK, Mr. Kelley, how long have the major auto<br />

manufacturers been aware of the safety features of the rear lap<br />

b€lt?<br />

Mr. Km,r,rv. Well, as Mr. Coben said in his statement and as is<br />

supported by attachments to his statement and mine, that would<br />

be at least 20 years. The knowledge has been available lrom the<br />

medical and engineering professions. l-et me show you, if I rrray, we<br />

have another tape which I brought with me, a piect of film pre<br />

oared bv Chrvsler C)orp., we don't know when but we bclr.v' it wss<br />

in the lite seventies ut d this *as submitted to a docket of the National<br />

Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 1'his is Ohrysler's<br />

hlm statement about lap and lap/shoulder belts You nrty find it of<br />

int€rest.<br />

fAnother videotape shown.]<br />

Mr. Knu.rv. Ironically, Mr. Chairman, Chrysler wu"s one of the<br />

dealer systems in our survey which was tntally unabltr to provide<br />

any kind of retrofit shoulder belt in response to our requesls-<br />

Mr. Kuczxr. OK, but this film didn't indicate any study or documentation<br />

on the rear lap--<br />

Mr. Kru.rv. No, this was directed at the front seat system, but<br />

as the statement was made and it's absolutely true, for every position<br />

in the car, Iaplshoulder belLs provide a higher margin of<br />

safety, substantially.<br />

Mi. Kr,nczxe. In'the questioning, after we hear from all the witnesses,<br />

we can also posjibly talk ;bout the airbags' I see Chrysler<br />

ads all over the newipapers on teaching an old dog a new trick, or<br />

something? Mr. Saka;ian, I believe you're next sir?<br />

STATEIT1ENT OF HAROLD A. SAI(AYAN, ESQ., INSTITUTE FOR<br />

INJURY REDIIVTION<br />

Mr. Slxlrnrq. Yes, thank you.<br />

I happen to have unfortunately a number of real life.examples to<br />

give v6i todav. The firtt one covers every base that we've seen and<br />

lalk about-this morning. It's an accident that happened right<br />

down here in Anne Arundel C,ounty a couple of years ago.<br />

Four youngsters were in a 1985 American-made Ford Escort. TVo<br />

sirls ud in ihe front, one was wearing a shoulder/lap belt, the<br />

6ther uias wearing notbing. T$o kids in the back seat, 11 years old<br />

and 14 years old, iach pufon their lapbelt. The car was inv-olved in<br />

a headon collision with a tractor -trailer<br />

truck at rather low<br />

speeds. -<br />

Each of the vehicles were going about 22,25 mlles an hour which<br />

is about what you'd be having on a city street in a t]?ical accident<br />

in town. W}en the dust settled, the girls up liont' one wearing a<br />

shouider/lap, one with nothing at all,. had broken legs. The client<br />

that I had, iimmv Garrett, 1l vears old, ended up being paralyzed<br />

from the ivaist dbwn for life. His best friend seatcd next to him<br />

died 6 hours later because he bled tn death.<br />

When thev pulled the bovs out of that Escort, the only mark that<br />

either of thei had on rheir body was a purple welt that went<br />

across their abdomen around their belly button made by the seatbelt.<br />

There was not another mark of injury or contact anJ.where<br />

except the belt.<br />

s<br />

ii


91<br />

Both bovs werc done in by their soatbelt Ncit}r'r- of them would<br />

f,ri!""rir,J."a ^rythi"g ;o.'" tha n tr.m grra r i lr d isrr hl i r r g i nj,uries if<br />

i;;;;;J;;a ltt6 gooi'sense not to pui anything r-rn,thut dav'.Be<br />

cause they buckled up, one's under th( Fround, llt(' ol lr('r ut)e a ln a<br />

wheelchair "'li;;:'if'";; for life.<br />

ihinl ttt.t'" sort of :r freak occu-rrt'nct" think about<br />

thil. i;; i".x". itt" Escort in America and in Eurt.rlx" ln America'<br />

;ffi;;"; iuoGi*."ty -nu'ope"an in the back seat We went ovtrr.to. Germany<br />

;ff 6;;;h;;<br />

Escort back here and lo and beh-old' thev<br />

;;;" "h;';i;";/t"p lt lt" i.t the back seat of the car that thev<br />

oroduce ''ih;;;;; in Europe.<br />

prcssed about ihal. Whv do vou produce il one wav in<br />

America and another way in Europei Ultimately th(' rt'sponae was<br />

we do it this way in America because we re not requlred to do anyi'niti"<br />

rn"ii,. W"'-uk" it b"tt". in Europe becaus. t hey -make us'<br />

nndihat was their answer and if there is an)'lhlnF lhal lve come<br />

u"a:oat in"t -i'""'i "nd"ttaores the need for some sort of action more than<br />

irtlri.'r knJ* *rt"t it is because the same company making<br />

;i;;-U-;;"; *lln t*o different configurations and not making it<br />

better here because they're not required to -'l hat was thelr, anawer'<br />

To sive vou a few other horror stories whtch are currenf,ly rn our<br />

office'"o*l Ali of these incidentally have come into- beinq in just<br />

'6<br />

;il"6; -o"itt". Cto"" by here-, coming .home.<br />

from Bethany<br />

fr;;"ft *;k A;, 2 *eeks ago' four persons in their mid 60's drivi;";ir<br />

h;;;t;d io u" u poii produit but it was.a l98S.LTD-as<br />

ii'?" ;;;-.;i-6;;.s"b*;, bE, ih" -un dozed in the middle of the<br />

;Tid;ffi:;; t"i"ptt"tib p.i"' The front seat passengers walked<br />

;;;'i;;;L;i"ia5"t.<br />

t" irt" back seat ther-e were two ladi€s' 65<br />

il;*;ft':'one-.i tt'"tit'n"a on her tapbelt, ihe other one had on<br />

'"i,iirl"i.-btt-"-t"dy<br />

*no naa on nothing ended up with a broken<br />

ii'iiT. i'r-,,j t'"-a"-;io had on the lapbelt Aied ? houis later in l'ewes<br />

ii"iriir.iii HJJpiGi-biA i. death from the injuries caused internally<br />

by her seatbelt.<br />

This was a low-speed accident. The only serious ,<br />

injury-hap<br />

*irla to * i futuliiv-to"" to the person wearing a lapbelt lt'E a<br />

i;*;t"r"1;; b.;u,l.. iigttt next io her was the same aged adult<br />

iiiti't -T;;;;# ".i-til"e on. She ended up with a broken^wrist ^<br />

e-"""i-ota "ruta.'WeII, down in South -Carolina in Jan'<br />

"".i- f gEi,-tft6 - "Sh; -otftet *us driving her 1.98?- Mercury station<br />

;;;"r. rtuJ it"i tov""t-old daughter in the front seat with her<br />

;A h;6;;;;ia io" itiappea in ;ith his lapbelt in the len rear<br />

"-'ri"y<br />

,un cff the road and. hit- a. parked tractor truck'<br />

-trailer<br />

rieht front corner to the back of thi truck The -mother<br />

walked<br />

;"il uJiil;;ii;i;s.-Th; aa"gt't€' sittins in the front. had some<br />

i*iir "11*. iil;;;fi"s b.v;itting in ihe bick sea.t with that lapbelt<br />

;;;;i"d;p-;lt"h a b?ainlrcm.inlu'v lf v9y li":lt-YI^1: v.ou saw on<br />

the taDe- when the accroenr ha-ppens *;ith the- lapbelt'.your body<br />

i;k;Ii;.';;;;, vo".-h""J ""t""ii all the wav down' which is what<br />

'#;;;;il<br />

t"."1 H" -ua" contact either witli the floor pan or the<br />

iiliiiiir'iif i,"i-;";;;;d h; ended sn with a brain injury which<br />

ffi-i"li hit" prelty mucl a,vegetable for life . ,. r :4 rr"<br />

Those examples couro .r".?ii have been avoided if there had<br />

u"i#T"tr'J"ii!'.lrii""iiiui""ii"n in place of the lapbelt-onlv' None<br />

j


92<br />

ol those persons had any other mark of injury on them except that<br />

related directlv to the seatbelt-the lapbelt.<br />

The reason ;hy the lapbelt is such a dangerous device and ought<br />

to be removed irnmediately or else augmented by the shoulder<br />

strap is there doesn't seem to be any minor injuries when you're<br />

involved with a lapbelt in an accident. lt's almost all or nothing.<br />

The typical seatbelt injuries that result from lapbelts alone involve<br />

spinal fractures, spinal cord injuries, abdominal musculature<br />

tearing, abdominal intestinal injuries, all of which are severe and<br />

the one that has proved to be fatal is a rupture or t€ar ol the me6enteric<br />

artery and vein which is the blood supply for the bowels<br />

and it happens to be located at tbat level just around or above the<br />

navel which is where these belts tend to ride up and pull in on you.<br />

I have other illustrations I can give you. I think in my stat€ment<br />

I've set them all forward. Everyone of those cases have these features<br />

in common. The person who was injured was weari'ng a lap<br />

belt-only. The person who was injured became far more seriously<br />

injured than anyone else in the car even those who were complete<br />

Iy - unrestrained'or those wearing the shoulder/lap belt.<br />

Everyone of the injuries thai I've detailed in these seven cases<br />

could ipecifically have been avoided had the automobile been<br />

equipped with a shoulder/lap belt in lieu of the_ lapbelt-only. The<br />

saddlit part of all of this is that since 1962 there has been a continuous<br />

strbam of literature that has spewed forth from the automotive,<br />

the medical, the engineering, and the safety community. I b€lieve<br />

the number is ovei 1,000 published articles that speak about<br />

the dangers associated with lapbelts.<br />

Thai'J a 26-year-run. That iras been well-known by the- auto industry<br />

who has contributed to it. There's nothing rew alout this<br />

and yet nothing has been done even though we've had 26 years of<br />

recoid in history. With your mandatory use laws, these cases are<br />

occurring much'more frequently because as mommy and daddy gct<br />

in the frlnt seat and buikle up, kids who most often ride in the<br />

back seat are being told to buckle up too.<br />

The problem is-that mommy ani daddy don't ^know that what<br />

they're-telling their children to buckle up into is far less safe than<br />

what they're provided up front. Thank you.<br />

Mrs. ColuNs lpresidingl. Thank you.<br />

[The prepared itatemeil of Mr. Sakayan followsl


93<br />

TlstIiloNl OF llARoLo e. saKAvAN, Esq.<br />

BEFORE A fiEARINC OI' TIII:<br />

GOVEFNM'NT ACTT V I TI ES ANO TRANS PORI'A'IoN SUTTCOMXI'I"TI]I,,<br />

HOLISt COVEItNI'ENT OPCkAI ION5 aCtf'lMllllI<br />

INTO<br />

'SEAT 8EL't SAFET!: NHTSA OVERSIGfla'<br />

JUNE 2i, r9e8<br />

Madan cha i.ronan, ellbers:<br />

I aF 8arold a. sakayan, of the Iae firh of Hargolrs.<br />

sakayan r 8oltr,!th offices in the oisLrtct oI co!umbia<br />

aod ite stare of Maryland. He are currenllv rePres€nring<br />

a numbe! of persons tho have sus!ained serious or faral<br />

iDluries from rear seat IaP bells and at your invrtairoo<br />

,ill address that rssue.<br />

You have hea.d irom M!, Kelley and Hr. Coben on Elle<br />

oeDe!al nature of the problen and noe I vould Iiie !o<br />

;ake iL a lrttle mor€ pe!sooal by 9!vrnq vou some real<br />

ro!1d exanples of r(a9rc aod u..ecessarv rnlu!ies aod<br />

deaths that are lesultrqg f!om an unsusPeciiog public<br />

heeding the adhonition lo Buckle Up<br />

First, ny Pelcep!ion is lhat NHTSA has failed to provide<br />

leadership in the area of autonotive safetv and the niniFum<br />

perlor!.ance sraDdalds kno*n as the Federal l'1oLo!<br />

vehicie safety slandalds (Fl'wss) have becone the maximun<br />

which the indus!ry tiLL deliver beca\rse there rs noone<br />

thaL is demanding Fole of themr eveD lhen Llley kDo'<br />

The nissioD of NHTSA should be le-defined in cLea! and<br />

un€quivocat !€rhs so that lhey, lhe industly and the<br />

DubIic ailI undelstand that NllTsA bas aD rmPortant<br />

ieadership role and is expecled to be oDt front on<br />

safety rss'res.<br />

The issue of rear s€at belts is a c.lassic illustralton<br />

of everything that is {roDg with the Presenl svslen and<br />

how i! could be easity changed.<br />

The seat belt syslem for the-!ea. oulboald seatinq<br />

oosi!iods ,as detited in l'968. Ihe nanufacture!s 'ete<br />

;iveD a choice ot using ejthe! a lap belt onlv or a<br />

;houlder/1ap combiDa!ion' Every U.S. sanufaclurer chose<br />

rh€ lap belt onrY.<br />

In 1972 NIITSA directed thal anchorage points !o! rear<br />

shautCe!,/L:a bel,t systers he ircr;ll-d i. all dohestic<br />

cars presuniury because lh€v felt lhe iDduslry tould<br />

volunta!i IY make th€ change.<br />

:<br />

..1 ,:<br />

,<br />

:l


June 22, 1988<br />

lrarold A. s.k.y6n<br />

94<br />

lie have b€€n raitiog siateen yeals..at stitl no aur(<br />

nanufaclurer has attached a shoulde! ba.oess ro rhr.<br />

anchorage poi.L thar they nus! insralt in the re.rr cr<br />

e!er) ca! lhey m"rnutactuie,<br />

NflTsA, instead of enacting a rule requ!ria9 this huch<br />

I<br />

oeeded improveheoL, has tssueo dn advance notlce or<br />

Proposed rule 'r'akin9 ard the iDdustry has responded by<br />

say!n9 Lhat if yo! don,! require us Ec iosrall Ln!<br />

stroul.der lap belt in the re wtll do ir on our<br />

own Hhen_"e 9et d!ouno to rr proDdbly Dy Ln- rrd l9c0's<br />

No provrsron Los made ror rh, mo!e rhan 100 mrtt.on<br />

auLohoorles arready on tbe street riLb Iap bel!s only in<br />

the rear seats,<br />

The Eulopeatr experience as relt as rhe overehelmino<br />

weight of the enginee!in9, safery, hedical and auro_<br />

motive Iiterature h,as clear L! dehonstraced rhar rh(<br />

shoulder/,Ep DFIL offers Frorecrron to,,<br />

oei,ted occupant-than the ldp oe.L onIy, parrrcutart).<br />

rn a fronral col.Irsron. This same eiperrence ano liter_<br />

atule also denonsr!aies tha! certain injury patrerns<br />

.!e the resu]L of the lap belt and c.n bp avorot.d b)<br />

the shou lde!/ Iap beIr.<br />

Lap belt injuri€s unfortunately are se!i.ous ones.<br />

splnal cord injuries,hich !esuIr in pa!alysis; sproal<br />

col.unn f!actures; abdosinaL eall rears; devascura;ira!ron<br />

of the bowels; internal bemor!a9brn9; Lears in<br />

the snal] o! 1ar9e inrestines, etc.<br />

AI1 of these cao be avoided by the add.ltj,on of a sDaII<br />

prece of clotn tba! crosses the body diagonatly and<br />

keeps rhe uppe! rolso reslrained againsc the back of rhe<br />

seat. It ca. be done for approrinalety Sl2 to S2O per<br />

ca!. the entire cost is absolbed by the conssne!.<br />

In Eulope shoulder/lap betrs in the rea! outboard<br />

seating posittons have been comon for ove! ren ye.!r<br />

Do'. VoIvo irscalled thenl volunta!ity atmost re;nty<br />

Handatory use laws hav€ sigDificaDtl.y increas€d the<br />

ovelatl usage of sear betts in the U.S. anat alrhouqb<br />

j<br />

.!,<br />

l.


St.tenenr ol lta!oId A, sakayan<br />

June 22, 1988<br />

95<br />

thele l.vs perlain gen€.a]lv to the fron! seat occuPants<br />

iE seems that the rear seat passenqers are 'rso maxrn9<br />

\rse of !he belts. unlortunatElv, morc ot the renr seat<br />

'rhe<br />

rend to b. childten<br />

use hai proaoced a correspondiDg increase in sea! belt<br />

Let's Look aL some exaFples of Lhe Prrce ADericans are<br />

odvrda becaJsP NHTSA rs uneLtlrnJ Eo ]edd on the rssde<br />

Lr'."i"rot'"" sale!y and out mdnr:acture!s refuse to act<br />

un!j.1. tbey are cohpelted io, claihing cha! cohPliaDce<br />

rith FMvsi rs the mos! that can be exPected of lhen:<br />

Auqlrst 29, 1985r<br />

JiMv carrelt, II y€ars old, got in the back seat of '<br />

lgs5 Ford Escort. tlis best friend 3nd next door neighbor<br />

Chlis Gaboury, 14, sat next !o hin. Jimy buckled uP<br />

aDd lold his friend that he should also. chris did'<br />

A sholt *hile la!e! they rere involved in a loe speed<br />

head-on collision ei!b a t!actor l!ailer lruck' ahe<br />

tro qirls uo front suffeled a broken leg' one had on<br />

lhe ;houldel/rap b€rt, the othe! did no!'<br />

cbris dieal six hours at!er the accident haviDg bled<br />

rntetnal.lv f!oF hrs Iap beli tnjurres. Ou! clrenl,<br />

JrMv Garielt, was paralvzed lroF lbe earsr doun Frth a<br />

fraciule of his L3,/L4 veltebra aod spinal cold dahage'<br />

Ite also hacl his insides lorD aPart aad lost most of his<br />

s(aII iDLesrrne and a Parr ot h)s largp rntestine'<br />

Ee haooeDs !o be ib tbe hosPrLaI !r'qhl noH under9oiD9<br />

his f;;trh or fiflh op€!atioo since the accidenL He<br />

stiI lades hjnself fo! Cbris dvrng because be Eas lhe<br />

one rho insisLed they should buckle ;P.<br />

Cause of Injury: JiDoY's lap belt<br />

solution: thould€r/LaP in rear seat<br />

Novehber 1.5 / 1985.<br />

Son-i e^od. 24 ycars old and t Proni3ing sinqer, buckl.d<br />

herserl up rn tn€ lear of a Fold Prnto. Th€ car was<br />

in. heaal'on collisjon' Sonja suffered a fractute oI


5!!len€nt of Htrold A' sak.Y!|n<br />

June 2?, 1988<br />

96<br />

LllL4 vertebra€ aDd iE palalvzed fron tt|e rarst oovn<br />

iil'"iri".- irre arso naa-a iearins ot her abdonrnar salr'<br />

CausF ot IniurY: sonla's laP bell<br />

i"i"i'.., 6n.l'ta"!/Lap berr rn rea! serL'<br />

Julv 25 , 19 86 :<br />

lracv StancIu, 2O vears old' buckled herself up in the<br />

;::;'":;; ;;"; iisi ro'a Escort' 'he car eas involved<br />

i^ ".orri.i"t a! ao in!ersectron The drtver sulferei<br />

;; ;";;;;;;. rhe 'ronL ".1. p9'::13::<br />

3i'iil'"",i"T""'<br />

tacrai cut. TracY suffered a tr<br />

ve!tebra atrd abdosinaL inlu!res'<br />

Cause of rnlurY: T!acY's IaP belt<br />

iolution, !n",rta"!/LaP belt in rcar seat '<br />

ranuarv 3, 1987:<br />

Auorey Bergoan, 30 vears-old'<br />

'as ridrnq rn tne rear<br />

li-u-igsl Buick cenru!v 'l!rven bv he! b!other ' tler<br />

;;';.; ;"' r,d!nq in rhe front p!sseneer:'i:..<br />

-li:.-<br />

.Ii-""r i"""r'"a-in a hea'l on collisioo at low speeos'<br />

f i.:-li;:i;ii;:::i.t'.i??llii";'l::.l::":; ;::';;*<br />

Cause of Injlrry; AudreY's- lap belt<br />

;oluLron: aho;Ider/Lap belr rn rPar se'!'<br />

""<br />

:::t:-::' ::::' "?'l,l'ii?,'!]i; lii,oilili?""8.!l'1i"<br />

Januarv 16 , I98 7:<br />

;l:;;;'il";-;;.-;";-<br />

ni c a crucr,earred on tne shoulder'^<br />

iil.-*"ii"." i'd he: 19,I:i:-ot"":'"::":::r::::': ;:.::'<br />

f!onl suffe!ed $rno! -i;it lnlurles '<br />

:iA'.;;i;";;;<br />

sroed tremrpleqia' ahone other<br />

irlrnq=.na is seve!eLY dtsabled '<br />

cause oi InlurY: David's LaP Eelt<br />

i"i'ii"n, sn"nto.!/Lap BeIt iD r€ar 6€ar'<br />

I<br />

:,<br />

I<br />

:l<br />

I


statem€nt of li.rold A. s6klyan<br />

June 22, 1988<br />

April 27, 1987,<br />

n<br />

B€verly Dirterd)oa, .9e 4?. !nd three frrends had jt'st<br />

finrsh;d a round or 9o1f nenr Palm springs, callfornia<br />

and !€re re!urning l; therr hol€1. tseverly sas buckled<br />

up in rh€ rigb! rear ol ! l98t oldsfrobite Nrnetv-Er9ht'<br />

rit..u. ".. involved rn a he.d on coliision on tbe left<br />

!ron! colner. The drrv€r dred. the .ighi tronL p3ss-<br />

€nger survrved snd nas essentrallv re'oveted rrof her<br />

inlurres. gevtrly sulfe!ed a lraciure of Ll vertebra<br />

ani spioal cord drmasd, sh€ !s no! pa!alvzed t!om the<br />

uaisL doen fo! trfe.<br />

Cause of Inlury: Beve!lY'5 1aP belt<br />

solution: shoulde!/LaP B€lt in rea! s'at'<br />

June I, I988:<br />

Priscj.IIa Rtce, 65, her hDsband and anolher couple re!"<br />

driving hone from Bethany beach in the ntddte of the<br />

aftern;on in a I983 Ford LTo- P!iscill'a *as buckled t'p<br />

in tbe light rear seat. Th€ ca! struck a telePhone pole<br />

at relati;eIy Ioe sP€ed. The Iadv seated nett Lo !1!s'<br />

Rice in the ;ea! drd not Put on her sea! belt. she<br />

suffered a broken *rist and olber sinor rnlulres.<br />

Prrscrlla died on Lhe oPerati,rg table about srx hours<br />

after the accident flor internal bleeding.<br />

Cause of Inlury: PrisciIIa's taP b€It<br />

solu!ion: shourde!,/Lap Beli in lea' seai'<br />

These cases ale clrawD flon mattels peDding in our offic€<br />

anil ale lepresentalive of a nuch larg€! volune. of cases<br />

that ar€ n;, surfacing aII ove! lhe countlv' They ale<br />

aatters on rhich te have been consulled lust eilhltr lhe<br />

past fes 6onths, The comon feaiules ,hicb tbey sha'e<br />

l. Each rear sest Passeng€r sas using a 1ap be]t.<br />

2. the passenger using lhe lear sert IaP belt suffercd<br />

se! icus or falal iniuries.<br />

3. The iniuries ljer€ caused by the lap belt'<br />

a. Th€ injuries could bave sPecificallv been avoi'led<br />

i'ith a shoulde!/IaP belr.<br />

1<br />

1<br />

l


sracemenL ot flarold a. sakayan<br />

June ?2, I988<br />

98<br />

5. Esch ot lhe injured persons eould have suffe.ed<br />

Iesser i,nturies if lhey bad nor used a seat betr<br />

at llt.<br />

6. The iront eeaL passenge!s b€lleat or unbelred,<br />

{ith one erception, suffered huch less serio,rs<br />

injuries even !hou9b alnosr eve!y collision was<br />

a frodcal rype crash placidq rhe rear seat passenger<br />

turrhesr aqay fron Ehe iopact.<br />

7. NIITSA during this enLire riFe and for at ]east<br />

t!fteen years befo.e Ehe first of this se!ies oi<br />

accidenLs knee that Lhrs Lyge of injury coutd be<br />

caused by a iap belt.<br />

6. Eve!y autoftobil€ manufactule! iDvotv€at kn€r for at<br />

Ieast Lbe sane peliod of tine that these ryp€s of<br />

serious or faral iojuries colld be caused by a lap<br />

9. NtlTsA and every dornestrc auroDobite nanufacrurer<br />

kner for ar ieast trenty years rhar rbe shoulder/<br />

lap beIL eorLd avoid tne rnjurres desc!,bed rn<br />

these cases.<br />

10, NtSE in its 1985 sluaty of 26 accideDts, iDcLuding<br />

the Garrett case, developed the sain€ infolhatj.on<br />

as the sludy of our case files has disclosed.<br />

1I. NflasA inst€ad oi acting on lhe NTSB<br />

da! rons tha( snoulder/Iap belrs be insralled rn<br />

aIi rea! sea!s, bas done nothing ro acknorledge<br />

the problen o! reoedy the sirualton.<br />

RECOITI.,ENDAT]ONS :<br />

A. That CoDgless enact tegislation lequiring<br />

shoulde!/lap belts for lhe rear seats cf all new<br />

cars beqinoiDg liris yea! if NltTsA doesn't lake<br />

action on tbis issue within the next 50 davs.<br />

I<br />

l


statement of ttarold A. Sakayan<br />

June 22, 1988<br />

99<br />

E. Thar NITSA issue a delail€d uarnrng rega!clrng<br />

injuries caused by lap b€tis and codpel aLl manutaitu'ers<br />

to offer ca! oeners .etrofit kits<br />

w!Lhin a !2 monlh Pe!iod at do cost to Ehe car<br />

C. TbaL NBTSA be required lo take inco coosrd€ration<br />

safecy standards froo all over the rorld<br />

and adopt ihar which Provides rbe glea!esl wblcn<br />

provide the measuie of Proteciion.<br />

O. That NHTSA be directed to lequile dYnanic testrnq<br />

of all occupanL resLrarrt systems, Passrve or<br />

aci\ve, by rndependent laoo!dtorte: and Lhe resurts<br />

publ ished -<br />

Respeclf ully strblittcd.<br />

tJY^


Mrr Cou-rNs Mr. Dewey.<br />

100<br />

sTA'l'HMENT Ol'IrOltH,RT 1,. t)EWEY, Vl: tCt,E SAI.'ETY STAI'F,<br />

cDNTt.)rr ]'oR AtiTo SA]'ETY<br />

Mr. Drwty- Madam Chairman and members of the subcommittee.<br />

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on automobile rear<br />

seat shoulder and lapbelt safety. The C;enter for Auto Safety [CAF]<br />

is a nonprofit organization founded by C,onsumer's Union and<br />

Ralph Nader in l9?0, CAS hus been independent since 1972.<br />

The subcommittee's oversight into the National Highway Traffic<br />

Safety Administration's INHTSA's] inadequate efforts to encourage<br />

rear seat shoulder/lap belts is especially needed at this time. A<br />

1986 report by the National Transportation Safety Board INTSB]<br />

focused national attention on a real and all too common irony.<br />

seatbelts, which have so much potential and are relied upon to pro<br />

vide life-saving protection, can in some accidents themselves be the<br />

primary cause of death and serious injury. This is because in<br />

higher speed frontal collisions, which account for a substantial percentage<br />

of all crashes, wearing a lapbelt only concentrates the re<br />

straint effect in the lower abdominal region.<br />

In these crashes, occupants restrained by lapbelts can suffer abdominal<br />

trauma and internal injuries which sometimes cause<br />

death. The NTSB report was and is important because of the<br />

timing of its release and the substance of its recommendations to<br />

NHTSA. While there have long been reports of lapbelt injuries, low<br />

belt usage rates have kept the number of such cases small. This allowed<br />

the problem to go uncorrected by NHTSA and virtually unnoticed<br />

by the American public. Today however, more Americans<br />

than evei before are wearing seatbelts-including rear seat lap<br />

belts.<br />

The NTSB report not only identified a growing safety problem, it<br />

contained two 'simple buf crucial recoirmendlations tb NH'ISA<br />

about actions that would reduce the number of lapbelt- induced in-<br />

- iuries and make safetv belts safer.<br />

First, NTSB recommended NHTSA immediately initiate rulemakine<br />

to require automakers to provide shoulder/lap belts instead<br />

oJ lap-only belts in all new cars. The Board also recommended<br />

NHTSA encourage automakers to offer retrofit kits and enable<br />

consumers to convert lapbelts converted into the shoulder/lap<br />

desien. lt is NHTSA's response to these recommendations that I<br />

wisli to discuss jn the remainder of my testimony.<br />

Todav. nearlv 2 vears after NTSB's recommendations, NHTSA<br />

has stifi not foimaliy proposed let alone adopted a rear seat shoulder/lap<br />

belt mandate. Further, NHTSA has done little to encouraee<br />

-Followine t hi availabilitv of retrofits.<br />

NTSB's report, NHTSA delayed nearly 10 months<br />

before issuing.a prelimiirary<br />

.notice of proposed rulemaking Even<br />

worse. the notice ex pressed skepticism about the need for a shoulder/lap<br />

belt requirement. lnst{iad of concentrating on the safety<br />

benefiis, NHTSA's notice emphasized the cost of a shoulder/lap<br />

belt requirement. CAS believes NHTSA's application of cost-benef-rt<br />

analysii is of limited value in this instance and as applied, is fun'<br />

damlntally flawed. NHTSA's analysis fails to even mention that<br />

i !"<br />

{


l0l<br />

children are cspecially victimized by lapbelt-induced injuries. Not<br />

only are children much more likely to buckle-up than adults,<br />

NHTSA's surveys indicate children at up to age 20 account lbr (wothirds<br />

of all rear seat occupants.<br />

Our concern for the disproportionatc impact of lapbelts on children<br />

is not just statistical. The majority of lapbeJt-induced injury<br />

reports we receive concern iniuries to children. Since more and<br />

more States are passing mandator.y seatbe)l use laws that apply lo<br />

rear seats and are amending child restraint laws to apply to older<br />

children in all seating positions, an increasing number of children<br />

are wearing rear seatbelk.<br />

At least five States now reouire that all rear seat occuDants<br />

buckle.up. Eight other States require older children to buckie up<br />

wherever they srt. It is especially tragic that NHTSA has been<br />

averse to requiring shoulder/lap belts even though these State laws<br />

will in certain accjdents, sentence rear seat occupants including<br />

many children to a greater risk of death and serious injury than<br />

occupants wearing shoulder/lap belts or occupants wearing no<br />

belts at all.<br />

This tragedy is compounded by the fact that there is today a familiar<br />

cheap and simple solution that would effectively eliminate<br />

lapbelt-induced injuries-a combination shoulder/lap belt. NHTSA<br />

not only fails to factor into its analysis the effect of lapbelts on<br />

children, the agency also places too great an emphasis on the minuscule<br />

cost of requiring shoulder/lap belts in the rear outboard<br />

seating positions of new passenger cars, a cost NHTSA estimates to<br />

be about $12.<br />

Further, NHTSA appears to substantially underestimate the<br />

numher of lives that would be saved by a shou)der/lap belt requirement.<br />

The notice emphasizes a NHTSA requirement may not be<br />

needed since many manufacturers have announced tentative plans<br />

to voluntarily initall shoulder/lap belts in coming model years.<br />

CAS disagreris. First, some manuiacturers may mike rear shoulder/lap<br />

belts an option rather than standard equipment. Further,<br />

there is no Iuarant€e that rear shoulder/lap belts may not somedav<br />

be removed for competitive reasons.<br />

Shoulderrlap belts are simply too important to be left to future<br />

marketing and competitive c'oit considbrations of individual auto<br />

maKers,<br />

Mrs. Cor.r,rNs. Mr. Dewey, on that not€ Iet me remind you that<br />

your 5 minutes have expired. Your entire testimony will be made a<br />

part of the record and any further statement that you might want<br />

to make will come out in the quesrion and answer session.<br />

Mr. Drwry. Let me just conclude by talking briefly about seatbelts<br />

retrofits. Besides failing to require rear seat shoulder/lap<br />

belts on new cars, NHTSA has not followed through to asisure consumers<br />

can have cars they now own retrofitted with shoulder/lap<br />

belts. NHTSA's retrofit recommendation is especially important<br />

since yirtually all of the approximately 80 million cars now on the<br />

road have only lapbelts in the rear seats.<br />

The reports we receive from vehicle owners attempting to obtain<br />

shoulder/lap belts show that retrofrtting is still not a viable alternative<br />

for the vast majority of consumers.<br />

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dewey follows:]


02<br />

STTTEIEIT OF NOBEIT L. DETET<br />

VEHICLE sTFETI STIFF, CEIITEI FOR TUIO STFETI<br />

B.for. th.<br />

GOVERNNEIIT ACTIVITIES IIiD TIINS?ONTITIOI SUBCOXNTTTTE<br />

of the<br />

IIOUSE COIiIITTEE OII GOVERINEIIT OPERITIOIIS<br />

lJashlnSton, D.c., Jun€ 21, 1988<br />

ll.da Chalreo|lan and ne|lber! of the Subcorfiltt.€. !hanrl you for<br />

!he oppor!unity lo test!fy on a\itodob!le.€ar-3eaL shoulo.r and Lap<br />

belt. safery. The Center tor Auio Safety 1s € non-proflt or'.nlzatlon<br />

found€d by Con5uners Unlon aDd Ralph tlad.r 1n 1970 btrt 13 nos<br />

tndependeaL of bol.h. Th€ cenler rork3 !o lnprove !.hlc).e and hlShray<br />

saf€ty. I have !orked on seai beM55ues for the Center tince 1984.<br />

IUE NATTONA! $ANSPONTII.IQII 5AFETY !!I.B-D .EIEOEI<br />

The Subcommr!iee's overslgh! In!o th€ riationsl Hlsheay Trafflc<br />

Safety Addlni5tratlon's (litlTSA's) iDad.quate €fforts to encoura8€ rca.<br />

sea! shoulde./1..p b€I!s is especlally ne€ded at thi! trde. A 1986<br />

r.po.t by th€ [atlonat Transporta!1on Safcly Board (XTSB) focused<br />

natloBal attentlon on e real and all !oo combon lrony: !eat b€1!3,<br />

shlch have so much polehtial and ar€ relied upon lo provide Ilfe-<br />

savlng protection, can 1n so e sccldents th.m:elrr! ie the prloary<br />

cause of dealh and set"lous injury. Thls l5 because ln hrEher sp.ed<br />

froDtal collistons, Hhlcb account for e substaoiial percen!.8. of 3II<br />

crashes, eearinS a seat belt conslstlng of a lap belt-o.1y<br />

concentrates the rest13irt eff€c! 1n the lor€r abdo lnal re81on. In<br />

these cra3hesr occupants re!traln.d by 1ap b.1ts can sulf.r abdoo!naI<br />

trauGa and 1nt.rn.l, lrjurles rhlch loo€!ires causc dcath.


103<br />

The findin4s of the IITSB terc not n'ts !o autonoLr 1" :ir":1<br />

erp€rts. In!ernal analtse5 ov sDtona!ers includint Ford ;n'j 6ener:1<br />

ltorors, sore dating back ro the 1960's' noted Lhe infer!or performanc'<br />

or a lap-onlv seat belt as conpared to a 3hould€r/I3p combinatlon'1<br />

A !986 cM sludv found IaP belts '€re only ?_181 eff€cllvc tn Preventrne<br />

fatallties<br />

as comPared to q11 ror shouldet/lap belts<br />

The Cent'er ha:<br />

been receivinS rePorts of lap bel t-induc€d lDJuries since our roundlnS'<br />

If,deed, ihe C€nter Petltloned IIHTSA to requir' rear se3! shoulde''/Irp<br />

bel ts 1n 197 r1'<br />

The NTSB report Yas and:s lnpor!ant because of the lift1nB ot tts<br />

re1€a3€ and the substance of lts reco|1lnend'iions to NHTSA' {hiIe<br />

ihere bave lotiS been reports ot laP belt lDj$ries' loe bel! useEc<br />

raies kePL !h€ number of such cas€s small This:tlored the probleb<br />

!o 80 uncorrected bv NHTSI and vlrtDallv unnolic€d bv the Adertcan<br />

pubIlc. Th€ !ituatlon began lo chanBe' hosever' in lhe mid-1980's'<br />

Through advertising camPaigns and pressure on stat' Sovernltl'n!s' NHTSA<br />

began aggresslve €tforts !o encouraSe lhe pubtic to buckle_up ranv<br />

state3 passed Dandalory seat belt use Iavs and/or srLend€d child<br />

re!!rain! Iaqs !o require older chlldren to buckle-up' Todav' dor'<br />

lEErl.ansthanev.rbeforeareuearlng!€atbeLt's'includlnBrea's'at<br />

I.p beI t s.<br />

Thc llts8 rlport not onlv ld'nt1fl'd ' gror'lng safely probletr' ll<br />

con!a1ned lto sioFte but crucial recodEendations<br />

to NHTSA aboul<br />

ec!lons lhat l.ould reduce lne nunber of Ia! be!i-jnduced tnjurl'3<br />

rOff€red bv Sbould'r BeIt'i Intra-<br />

1 See. for eraoPle, rProtectiotr<br />

' " " '"""';.-'i;;d oior co" sePrenDer 19'<br />

'1<br />

o'rrill-t"iii,"i""iion,' nG snvoer' rorc i co., septero.. 19' 1967'<br />

";i<br />

:::':!.::'E:li"i:'"'i:.'. j,:;';;ii":r-",i" "':::"::";;i;"""i i'i;;;l,i;';<br />

lil,;:::; :i',',:."i"i*eiliTi.""'.;'i;:;.i".r;;;;i;;J;"ii';;;;"""'""t<br />

i.il.." t.iy, Deceulb.r 1967'<br />

ano<br />

r


104<br />

dake sarety b.!ts !afer. Fr.:r, ITSB reconnend€d {8TSl imriediah€1,<br />

rnitiate rulemaking to r.quire a!tod:k€rs io provld€ shou.ider/Iap<br />

b€Its. inst€ad or I3p-onIy betts, in:Il nee cars. The eoard elso<br />

.ecoomended NHTSA encouraEe autooakers to offer reLrofit kiL5 !c<br />

enable consuoers lo have their Iap bells conv€rled to Lhe shoulder/lap<br />

d.s1an. It is NIITSA's respon3e to lhese .ecodn.ndatlons th.l I !ish<br />

to discuss in the reoarnder ot ny tes!1Dony,<br />

.6 tu9uLqEE4tS lrLI ffqu-Brlr-Nr E-O-8 Xft vr!rcLfs<br />

Today, nearly tro years after NTSS's recsohendallons, llH:St still.<br />

has not iormally proposed,<br />

let aloDe adopted, a rear s€ai should€r/1ap<br />

beLt nend6te. Furiher, IHTSA hEs done lirlle to encourage<br />

!o obtain o. manufEcturers to offer retroflCs- Folloeing NTSE's<br />

repo|.t, IHTSA delayed !en nonths b!fore 1s!u1ng a !!llj-oin:rv<br />

notj.ce<br />

of proposed rulemakinB. Even rorse, the notlce expressed sceptictsD<br />

abouc the need fo. a shoulder/1ap belt requlr€6ent-<br />

Instead of<br />

concent.etlng on tbe sefeiy b€neflts, llHTSArs notice emPhasized thc<br />

costs of . shoulder/Iap beli required.nt;'The ag€ncy 1s co.cern€d<br />

that such costs are eriremely disproporti.onate to th€ posslble safety<br />

benef 1t s. i<br />

Th€ c.nt.r b.l1.ves IHTSI,s eppllcatlon of co!t/beheflt en.1tsl3<br />

1r of Iidlted valu. ln lhls i.slance and, as appli.ed, 1s fundao.ntally<br />

f!ared. NHTSA's analysis falIs !o even Dentlon that chlldren are<br />

especially victlmized by lap b€1t-induced lnJurles. No! o.Iy a.e<br />

children nuch more likeIy to buckt€-up than adults, IHTSA surveys<br />

indlcate children at up to a8e 20 account fo.2/3 of all rear se.!<br />

occupanis- Our conc€rn ior ihc disprop'Jrtion6i.€ iilpaci of lap !elts<br />

on ch1Id.€r 1s not .Just stet1st1c.I, thc dajorlty of lap b.1t-induced<br />

j<br />

)


105<br />

injury repo.ts concern inlu'l€! to chlldren'<br />

ln sddition to the case ot Jinmv 0arrtll' thtch etl I l'' 'r:cu55'd<br />

today by another lJitness' th. Center has rec'iv'd oth'r lrrtlc r'Poits<br />

descrtbing lap belt-rnduced injurles !o chldren' La3t luqutl'' for<br />

exampl€, Dr' Salvalore OrI.ndo, a Plttsburgh Pedlatrlclan e'ot' to<br />

descrlbe the severe laP bett injurles susialn'd bv hls !1t!e'n-v'ar_<br />

old daurbLer, vlckl. The accldent occu'red rh!Ie Vickr and !htee<br />

friends e€re retu.n!ng f.om a s!1D neet'<br />

al l forir occupanLs' tvo tn<br />

the fron! sea!s and tt'ro ln the back seaLs, re'e eearinE seat belt3<br />

vhen thelr vehicle, a 198{ Cadill ac Eldorado srru'k a tree 3t 25 m9h'<br />

Accordlng !o the Pedlatrlcian,<br />

occupants rdid not receive anv serlous<br />

th€ tto 3houl derll3p belted fron! s'at<br />

jnjuries'i In contrast' th€<br />

Iap bel!-restrain€d glrl' sltting nert !o Vlckl' 'recelved ouItlpIc<br />

fr:c!ure5 lo her spine nec€3si!at!ng surgerv !o fuse her louet 3p1t''tr<br />

Vlckl Orlando sufl€red n3€vere lnjurtes to h€r abdominal ea]1' 5pln€'<br />

and lntestines'<br />

n€cess1!aLlng r€sec!lon of, several se8menls of her<br />

soall intestlne anO Isrg€ bov.l, and a co!o!!66v.I<br />

Since mo.e and 'nol"e t!a!es are passing nandatory see! belt use<br />

lars !ba! applv !o rear seats end are aorendin8 ch1ld reslraint lass<br />

to apply to oId€r chltdren ln e:.1 searlng<br />

poslilons' an lncr'asrns<br />

Dumber of chlldren are eearlDg rear s'e! bel!s' lt leas! flv' ltaies'<br />

lncludlng callfornia, \{iscodsln, !l:shlngton' HontanE and llevada' nos<br />

.equire that all rea. seat occupants bucl'(Ie-uP eiSht other states'<br />

lncIud1n8 NeH Iork, lassacbusett5' Haln'' OreSon' lhode lsland' Xe!t<br />

vir81nia, Nee llexlco, and llinnesota' r'qulre older childreD (rangin'<br />

f.oo uP t.r;ges 3-li)<br />

'-3 5u'kle_up riei:v:r<br />

t!ev 31i'<br />

Y.t lt t! esp.clally traEtc that Ntllsa has bcltr evcrs' lo


106<br />

r.qulrlng !houlder./lrp b.l13.v.n !hou8h thcs! 5taLe laes rill, 1n<br />

cerLaln accident5, 5enten.e rcar seat occ,ipanls. lncludlnq rany<br />

chlldren, !o a greater r13k of d.ath rnd !erlou! than occupants<br />

rearlnB should€r/lap belti or occupanls Hearlng no belts at alL Thls<br />

trag€dy 1s compoubded by th€ fact !hat th.r. 1s todEy a farl11er,<br />

cheap and slrhpl€ solutlon thel pouId.ff.ctLveIy .llntnat. lap b.lt-<br />

lndu.ed lnJurles: a conblnatlo. shoulder/Iap belt.<br />

Unfortunately, NtlTSl not only falls !o factor lnlo 1!s analysls<br />

the eff€ct of lap belt! on chlldren, the ag€ncy a13o plac€s loo Erca!<br />

tn emphasls on tbe Elnuscule cost of rcqulrtnE shoulder/Iap b€Ils 1n<br />

!he rear outboard seat.ing posltlons or ner passeDger cars -- a cost<br />

ilHTSA est.16lales to be about i12, Incldently, cene.al HoLorsr (CH)<br />

rulenaking comment polnted out tba! thls i12 flgur€ la! loo hlgh slnce<br />

1t I.ef€rr€d only to ih! flrst year cosl! of tl,eetlng a net{ requlr.Dent<br />

for current vehicles. Cl's.omrent steled: nCurrent costs day not<br />

rcfl,.c!.fficlencle! that olEbt be posslbl. lf vchlcles re.. lD1t1a1ly<br />

d!r18nc


h.<br />

l0?<br />

The notlc€ al50 empbasizcs a IJHTSI r.quir.nent may not D' ne?od<br />

stnce nany nanufacturers have arnounc.d !€nistlve plans to volunterlly<br />

lnst:11, or ttlake avall.bIr as tn option, shouldc./lap bcl!5 tn comlnB<br />

nodel years. The CenLer disaBrees. F1rsl. 3ome danuractu'e'e mav<br />

r.ke .ear shoulder/lap bclLs an optton rsth.r than standard 'qulPn'nt_<br />

lurth€r, there 13 no Suarantec that rear shouLder/lap belis oav not<br />

5omeday be renoved to. conpe!i!ive reasons. Iovota, tot ex:nPle'<br />

lnslall.ed shoulder/Iap b€lts !n rear seatlng Po5lt1ons of 1981-82<br />

Cressldas but subsequentlv r€v€rted to 1aP b€lts rn 1983'<br />

Shoulder/lap b€]ts are slmPIy too loPortant to be I€fl to thc fulurc<br />

oarketlng and conPetitive cost coh3ideratlons of indlvldual<br />

automak€rs. A !ederal regulation eould a3sute that bv a certaln d:t'<br />

a1l, oodel.s aae €qujPped lljth shoulder/lap b€1!! and provld€ IHTSA tllh<br />

sn enforcemerrt fi.chab1sE to assur€ conpllanc€.<br />

s.u.o!!LE-84ff !!LI RErRoFrrS Elj vEHrcLii cuinENTLr a! lXE -Eq,O<br />

SeDa.ate froft falIlng to require rear 3eat shoulder/Iap belts on<br />

n.r cars, NfltSA has no!. follot €d throu8h to assure consumers can h'v'<br />

the cars !hey nos oHn r€trofltied r1!h should€r/lap beI!s' llTSBr3<br />

retroflt recomh€ndatloo is especiatlv loportan! 5lnce v1rluallv a1l of<br />

the approrlnatelv 80 ojltlon passenger cars holj on the road ha!e only<br />

lae belts Ln !h. rcar seats. The..ports ee recelve froD vehlcl'<br />

oeners a!!e ptln8 to obtaln 3hould.r/1ap bel!s to r'place th! la!<br />

bel.r nol. in their rear seats shou th.t r€t-tofiitinC 15 3tlIL not '<br />

vlabl€ a1lerna!1ve tor the vast daiort!y of consurDers'<br />

1€veIs.<br />

Subsianti3l g.obIeEs erist both a! ih' manufactu"r 3nd d'aI'r<br />

Sepor!s ee nave recelved ov consuhers ano revieH oi !€rvice<br />

lnforna!1on danufactu.ers have issu€d to deale's, lndlcates ihtl<br />

5<br />

i?<br />

t<br />

I<br />

.<br />

l<br />

il


108<br />

r€t.rof1t krt..re stoply not off.r.d by some autom.l(ers' lnclLrdrnF<br />

Ford, VoI ksl]ageo end Ni!54.. In other cas.s. ..trofits are no!<br />

avallable for all nakes and nod.ls' Ev.n Cen.r.I Hotors' chrch<br />

appear5 !o hav€ reLroflt krts avallable for n.nv dlfterent dodeIs'<br />

does not nat(. retroflts .valIabl. for anv of l!5 Japanes. lnport5'<br />

Ev.n wh€n r.lroflt klts are DEdc .vallabl., l|'ost nahufacturers<br />

5re do1n8 lltt]e to lnforo consumers or d.alcrs about thelr<br />

rvallabillty.<br />

su.v.y3 conducted the Cent€r fo|. lu!o Safetv and oihers<br />

shor lidesprcsd ).bck of d€aI€r knoel.dae about r.troflts'<br />

of !hether or not the oanutactur.r off.r5 a r€troflt k1t tor 3<br />

Resardl 'ss<br />

Darricular model, deal€rs may not even kno! thev etlst a'd ei11 oftcn<br />

tell consude.s that they are unavallable. 0ne of th. onlv nanufscturers<br />

encouraSlng consum€rs !o 1nst31l r.troflt! 1s Chrvsl"' thlch lttt<br />

fall lnforo.d oen€rs'ctlrvsler loror! hlghlv r.codi'nds th'se<br />

Unforlunat.lv, .v€n Chrysler do.! tot ipP€ar !o !'ke retrofl!s<br />

!vr11.ble for atI v.h1c1c5. Le!t Septcob.., ZlIl.h Dtvls of El roy'<br />

tllscons!ni d1.d ln an autodoblle acctdent Ln rhlcb rh' uas e€a'lng a<br />

rea. seat 1sp bel!. fier hu!b3o.l, Loul! Dtv13' rec.ntlv tr!'d to 8!t<br />

shoulder/1ap b.lt3 eddcd to h1s Je.p Chlrokc. but eas iold !h'v rcrc<br />

nor offered by ch ry sl er-<br />

It ls crltrcal that {HTSA lncou.age !o ask fo'<br />

reCroflts 3nd p.e3s Ea.ufacturer3 to offer tb'o and lnforll de:ler! of<br />

tbelr avallabMly. Sooe after arket 6utomobllc Parls sup9llc's do<br />

offer 8ene.ic..trof1! klts and manutacturers hav€ b€en required !o<br />

provlde anchorages for rear should.r bcl!s slnce 197? Horev€r'<br />

.eport that ind.P.ndcnt rcpalr !boPs and 'ven dtal'rshlp!


109<br />

ar€ un!1Ilin8 to lnslaII e shoulder/l.ap b.Il ret.oflt klt.ot is!ued<br />

Dy the nanufactur€r. lf consuDer! cannot ob!a1n retrorit shoulder/laF<br />

b€1ts nade by thelr v.hlclet. m.nuiactu.er, it l! likely that th.y<br />

vlLl not b€ ablc !o retrofit thelr car at all.<br />

Fo11or1n8 the IITSB r€port, l\ltlTst told t.he Senate Comderce<br />

confilt!e€ lhat a final ruIe, eh1.h beca'Dc eff.ctlve septenber 1, 198?,<br />

eould b. helpiul 1n retrofltti.B shoulder/1ap belts- The regulation<br />

do€s noL, hor€v.r' €nab1. consuners lo 8!t relrofli beI!s, 1l only<br />

.€qulres manufaciurer5 grovlde info.na!1on ln th€1r oener's ranu.Is<br />

about lhe availabllii] of shoulder/lap bel.l anchor3ges.<br />

The Cent€r und€rstands NHTST lacks ih€ authorily to requlre<br />

.fte.Farket equlpD€nt, tncl.uding ret.oflt b€lts, for vehlcl€5 1n use.<br />

lle do, ho{ever, bellev€ the agency should do ttuch tlore than 1E has<br />

b.€n !o encourage should€r/lep belt r€lrof1ts.<br />

The neag:n<br />

ldnlristratlon has egressively encou.:8ed Ad.ricans io buckl€-uP<br />

through educa!1on3I actlvl.ties.nd proooti.on of ltandacory 3eat belt<br />

us. leus. R.dlrectlrS Ju!t e soall p.rc.ntagc of lhesc funds to a<br />

relroflt educalion caopeign eould be coDsl!i.nt viLb these effor!s and<br />

ls the Ioglcal n€rt .t.p. Ftn.lly, llHTsA should cor€ agresslv€Iy<br />

press au!onak.rs to oakc r.troflts avail.bI€ and inforl| deal €rs lhat<br />

I<br />

€<br />

il<br />

1<br />

:1<br />

!{<br />

ri


110<br />

Mrs. Colr.rNs. Wh;- is retrofitting not acceptable to tht, vast<br />

number of car owneri'/<br />

Mr..Dtwrr..Substrntiirl problr.ms exist, both al Ihe ntilnufacturer<br />

and dealer levels. At tlrc nr nuiircturer level, sonte auto rnakers<br />

don't even nrake shrruldt.r/lal' bclt retrofits available. We know for<br />

t'xirnrple that lurd, Volksrrirgerr and Nissan don't currentlv offer<br />

th(,m to consun)ers. At tlr(' dt'alership level, dealerships arrl reluctant<br />

to put in belLs that are rrot offered bv the manufacturer such<br />

as belts madc by alter market ruti' parts supplicrs.'l'hat's a reat<br />

problem for the consumer as well,<br />

_ Mr.s. Cor"r-rNs. Than} you. Mr. Sakayan, I was very interested in<br />

l,he rllustratrons you have given us about how lupbr,lt-only caused<br />

major injuries. Now, l'm sorry- | was not here for the opening part<br />

of your testimony and had to leave because we were hivins a vote<br />

in the Fnergy and Commerce Subcommittee that I needed io go to,<br />

but did you by any chance mention the fact that you have inade<br />

NHTSA aware of all of these thinss?<br />

Mr. Snr.ly,c.r,r. Well, what we did, Madam Chairwoman. is we<br />

filed ^a<br />

petition.asking for a recall on the Escort because of a specific<br />

defect in th.eir seatbelt system. The l20day period by which'they<br />

were supposed to make the decision exoired on-Mav Il.<br />

.. As of yesterday, they have still not made a decision nor will they<br />

discuss the matter with us when we call them and ask what's haipened<br />

to our petition. All I can say is that based on our experience<br />

up until now, not much has happLned. They were prompt in sending<br />

someone out who did an initial investieation ind rie thoueht<br />

was impressed with what we had to offer but evel since it wEnt<br />

beyond the hrst level, it's sort of sittins there in limbo at the<br />

moment.<br />

Yes, we have tried to make them aware with our specifrc cases<br />

about these problems and whatever we can do to try a;d get some<br />

relief weve attcmpred, but I can say. without succesi, this iar.<br />

Mrs. C,ou-nrs. Well, ran anyone'tell me why NHTSA would req-ulre<br />

companres t-o make anchor points for shoulder straps but not<br />

the straps themselves?<br />

Mr. Knu,ry. Well, Mrs. Collins, it was the clear intention of<br />

NHTSA when it set the anchorage requirement that two things<br />

would happen. One, that the agency itself within a year or so<br />

would require new cars to have reai seat lap/shouldei belts and<br />

second that it expected the car companies t6 begin - in good - faith<br />

providing those retrofit kits for cars on the roads.<br />

Neirher one of those things has happened and we are now close<br />

to 20 years later. The agencv s exp&-tations were clearly spelled<br />

out rn rts pollcy documents at the time. In fact, I was in the Department<br />

of Transportation when some of those policy documenls<br />

were prepared and somervhere along the way the'ball'has been totally<br />

dropped and the car companies have failed to live up to that<br />

exDectaf,lon.<br />

Mrs. Cor,r,rNs. Mr. Dewey, do you think there's an institutional<br />

bias against the back seat shoulder straps by NHTSA?<br />

Mr. Dowry. I think ihe requirement is long overdue. The re.<br />

quirement should have been promulgated in 1t)72 when shoulder<br />

belts were required for front seats. I think the problem has onlv<br />

become more acute in recent years as more peopie have worn reai<br />

:<br />

ir!<br />

a<br />

{<br />

il<br />

t1


I<br />

lapbelts and people have h:


112<br />

Mr- S,cx./\yaN. We'rc talking about lapbelLq in the rear seat of a<br />

car because--<br />

Mr. Ntuusox. Yes.<br />

Mr. Sex,,rvrrq. OX.<br />

Mr. Nrtr^sor'r. You gave us a picture that the lapbells in the back<br />

seat in several instances caused deaths and serious irrjuries. llow<br />

many serious injuries and deaths have been caused by not wearing<br />

seatbelts at all in the back seatt<br />

Mr- SlxlylN. I honestly don't know a statistic to give you there<br />

because I just don't. I have seen a symposium recently that was<br />

done last year on rear seat restraints, I believe it was the SAE in<br />

which the whole need for added protection was questioned because<br />

of the safer environment senerally but I don't-I can't tell you how<br />

many people have gone oiit the riat window of a car because they<br />

weren't wearing any restraint at all.<br />

Mr. NrursoN. You gave the impression-I'm not sure you intended<br />

to-but you gave the impression that it was better not to wear a<br />

seatbelt at all than to wear a lapbelt-only. Did you intend that imnression?<br />

-<br />

Mr. Sex.cy.AN. Under certain circumstances, yes. If the lap.<br />

belt--<br />

Mr. NrusoN. But we don't know the circumstance, when vou<br />

buckle uo in the back seat--<br />

Mr. SaxayaN. l,et me explain that if I can--<br />

Mr. NrsrsoN- When I decide whether to buckle up or not, what<br />

are my odds?<br />

Mr. Saxavln. OK. The predicament is this. A lapbelt is designed<br />

to provide pelvic restraint and it functions best for that kind of a<br />

system when it comes at approximately a 45Jegree angle to a<br />

person who is seated upright and it falls below the iliac crest, that<br />

Lop part of your hip bone iomewhere around the area of what they<br />

call the an{erior/superior iliac spine. It's a little hook out in front<br />

of the pelvis.<br />

If the belt comes across there, then whatever protection it's capable<br />

of providing will fall on the largest bone mass you have in your<br />

body, the pelvi-, and it is better able to absorb the forces that come<br />

out in an accident and also the pel.ric bowl has the bladder and the<br />

lower part of your intestines in front of it but because of the way it<br />

is shaied, theie is less likelihood that those are going to suffer serious<br />

injury.<br />

As soon as it rides up--<br />

Mr. NrrrsoN. But ydu still haven't anewered my question. Is it<br />

better to wear a lapbelt in the back if that's all that's there? Obviouslv.<br />

if the shoulder harness is there. that's frne, but if there's<br />

only a lapbelt. should you or should you not wear it?<br />

Mr. SlxeveN. I'm answering it--<br />

Mr. NreLsoN. No, you're not.<br />

Mr. S.nrevaN. Oh, I'm sorry. l,et me try it this way.<br />

Mr. NIrrcor. Try just yes or no.<br />

Mr. SlxeveN. Yes or no depends on whether it comes acro68<br />

vour pelvis or rides up higher. lf the lapbelt when you strap it on<br />

iides hieh above the belrris so that it comes across your abdomen<br />

around lour navel foi example, based on the cases I've had and<br />

this is n6t that many, but it's more than I think most other people


113<br />

have had so far, I would say you're better off without it than with<br />

rt.<br />

If it rides down on lhe pelvis where it's supposed to be, then l<br />

*outJ.ov ust il as opposed to nothrng und the r"irson I say that is<br />

ii-ii.. frilfr. in", s when it cuts jn and does the danrage that all of<br />

these ---tvt.. L-3, L-4 liactures I've cited to you (rccur.<br />

tltitt*olt. Of all the carses you've handled, how many have<br />

been the result of wearing the lapbelt-only versu-s hovv many you<br />

have had which were due to wearing nothing at all..' .<br />

Mr. SlxevlN. Well, I haven't taken a case where a person<br />

wasn't wearing an1'thing at all, I mean these are only--<br />

Mr- Ntnsor. Mr. Coben.<br />

Mi. Cou"". Yes, sir, if I may speak i! that' I think there is an<br />

obuio.r" er""ti. answer which i thlnk we ought to make and that is<br />

i[i..-iiiE oUtiou. that in low speed crashes whether you are in the<br />

ir,j"t ii'" car or in the back of'a car, you should be restrained You<br />

should wear the available seatbelt syste-m and that-rncludes wearine<br />

the lapbelt if that s all that's available to you we are not recorimendine<br />

-- that people abandon the available salety s-vstems<br />

Wttut *"'u." siyirig is that in higher speed crash environments,<br />

and when I mean higher crash' we re talklng about- anlfthrng m<br />

"*"""" of 30 miles an hour, there is an increased risk of harm to<br />

;t;-;;;" who is wearing that lapbelt-onlv That doesn't mean<br />

iiilt'ft. ooo"tt have somi benefit'from it, but it's an increased<br />

risk. - ^-tfii.<br />

Nt"t"o*. I have about 15 questions and if each question<br />

t"ii". tlui lo"e to answer, I won't g'ei through very-many of them'<br />

ilii r"i*i *-li ttiis questibn. If I w-ere to ta[e Mr' Sakavan's testi-<br />

;-";;;;;l;it" ;.td-rolio- it, I could arge settins rid of seatbelt<br />

laws -blp".irtiy' in every State in this country'<br />

*ittt young childrei, - vou'll hurt them Most of the<br />

oeopie baci< there'are young children and they are.more apt to<br />

[;;'k]; ;p. Neb.uska to-ok oit the seatbelt law largelv- because ol'<br />

it i" ou.ti.rtn. argument, and frankly. I think you re flirting with<br />

;;;*;;. U-rtil y;u-get the other in hind, I certainlv wouldn't want<br />

t a?, r.o"ttl"d oi 5av anvthing that would discourage people from<br />

wearinq - seatbelts because I'm convinced lapbelts do help mone<br />

than liarm and that's the point I was trytng to ^get--acrosa'<br />

i'i-1 ."-*"'ii going to hat e another round are we not? oK, other'<br />

$'ise-- "frr.<br />

Km-uv. Mav I just address a brief comme-nt to.that,. Mr'<br />

Ni"i'"l"ii1TI'tl* -i1" liue"av of this situation is that it's a "pick<br />

;;#;;i";";;';i;;ii;" f;; tti" p"i.o" l" it'u u"'t. seat rhe fa6t of<br />

iiJ'"i"tL.-i" lii t"me crashes you ure *otse off and more, r'ulnera'<br />

;i; ;;-;;;ih ;;d lnjurv with ihe lapbelt than.without' In others<br />

uou u." not. I thinli our position is emphatically that we wart to<br />

iiii'i'rit"'iii"i ;;;i;; "; iapidlv as posdible and'one. component of<br />

;ii;;;;ii";;"i choice is educiting -people as to the better alternative<br />

-- and seiing that it's Provided<br />

I-iion't knoi another way to do it than to have the- Government<br />

""afirl-*i .o-panies get out there and gei those shoulder belts<br />

out and explain to people why that is sup€nor protectlon-<br />

Mrs. ColuNs. Mr. Kleczka.<br />

I<br />

.,<br />

:<br />

l


114<br />

Mr. Kt,r:r'zxa. Quesliorr. Mr. Sakayan You madr'nttrtlir'tr itr vour<br />

testimony of a pelition that was filed with NHTSA' tlrc t r.ltiration<br />

date has come and gone and -You've received no reply'l Wlrat was<br />

the case in point? What was the petition actually-- - - ..<br />

Mr. Saxr.vlr.r. The petition had to do with a recall of all Ford<br />

Escorts liom 1984 on which have a particular modification to their<br />

rear lapbelt system that prevents them from providing pelvic restraint<br />

as it's defined in the law because it has a tendency to pull<br />

the belt up above the peJvis and what we sought lr'as a correction<br />

of that particular delect wbich could be done just by taking a pair<br />

of scissors and sniPPing--<br />

Mr. Kr,eczxe. Oli, Uut ttte petition didn't address the issue that<br />

we're talking about today and that's the--<br />

Mr. S,c.xlieN. No, sir, it went to a specific defect in a particular<br />

model of car. It happened to have involved lapbelts, but not the<br />

larser ouestion.<br />

M.. Kuczxo. OK, so as I understand it, aII American made auto<br />

mobiles today do have the anchors in place, I'm assuming somewhere<br />

under the seat<br />

Mr. Keurv. That's correct.<br />

Mr. Kmczxe. And ihis was a requirement?<br />

Mr. Krlmv. Yes, it was. It was a requirement that was adopted<br />

bv the asencv in anticipation of two things. One, that the car comoinies<br />

w"ould offer optibnal rear shoulder belts to their car buyers<br />

ind two, that the Government itself would soon be requiring mandatorv<br />

rear lap/shoulder seatbelt systems for all new cars<br />

Mr- Kr-nczxi. And neither scenarios have plal ed out?<br />

Mr. KELT,EY. Neither scenario has played out which has been a<br />

disappointment and a tragedy l :night, by the way.<br />

fe.t vou know<br />

that-anchorage is not under the Government rule and its interPre<br />

tation. the a"nchorage is not a device or a system' It is simply a<br />

olace.'a point, on thi inner body of the car that is strong enough to<br />

iarrv thi shoulder belt under ihe Government regulations. Manuiactirers<br />

must designate that point and inform the -consumer<br />

when<br />

lh" "otr.u.tt"t wish'es to put in a shoulder belt if there's a belt<br />

available. which usuallv there isn't.<br />

Mr. Xlrczx-a.. So whlt's the resolve to the problem? A mandate<br />

coming out of NHTSA that all automobiles sold after a certain date<br />

have tl-rese devices installed, is that--<br />

Mr. Keu,nv. C,ertainly for future new cars, NHTSA should be<br />

,.i"g itt Iong existing iegula-tory authority. to require,that those<br />

ca.""ha.re reir seat Ep/slouldei belts in the outboard positions.<br />

Foi "i.. existing on ihe high*ays today and being driven by<br />

o"opt", it should issue a *artti-ttg to those people and an urging and<br />

i wbrkins with the car companies to be sure that retrolrt rear seat<br />

ihoulder "belts are available at reasonable prices, meaning barebones<br />

costs, which should be perhaps $10.<br />

Mr. Kr,rczxe. Thank you, Madam Chair.<br />

Mis. Cor,uxs. I getthe impression from thc <strong>hearing</strong> thus far that<br />

manJ aubmobile -makers and dealers have been lax in advertising<br />

lhe ivailability of shoulder-strap addon kits for older cars' Would<br />

anvbodv --ftr. have a reason for this?<br />

keu"r. I think, Mrs Collins, you'll have to ask the motor<br />

vehicle manufacturer's association and the industry representa-<br />

:


5<br />

tives whv, but the fact of the matter is that no car marufacturer<br />

;nj-;'a; ;;;1; is advertising the availabilitv of those belts'<br />

None. '''lii.<br />

Dtt*t". I would add to that, even lor manufacturers who do<br />

.ff*';t;;iia b"l*, dealers just don't seem to know about their<br />

r""if^frliiw- entthe. p.oblem is that some manulacturers- do offer<br />

;h;;;;a ion;i ittro."j dealers of that fact so as a lrsctical matt€r'<br />

ii';;;;n- ;; ;;J ask for retrofits even if thev're available'<br />

"U;;"';;; id" a""r.t won't know about thenr and consequently<br />

he'll "-lvi;. tell vou thev're 'A;e not available.<br />

t6;r;;. ih'.e shoulder harnesses in the back seats of<br />

th; C;.;"I"t ;i"l 'ra.ts, do yo,l know that have been sold each y,ear?<br />

*'M;.<br />

ii;;t;. -C"lt ih"." u." s-houlder harnesses in the rear seat of one<br />

mJ*" ""^, i believe it is called the Vista That model is made'<br />

iiiii""", l" u'it"uUi"itl ro. Chrvsler and it happens to have shoul'<br />

;;r';;i; if t'r," i".i ieat, probablv because thev are put there for<br />

i"*.1 "$;;;;;"%i'i"noi"<br />

^"a"1" going to other deitinations that require shoulder<br />

;;i;<br />

u." Iuckv enough to set a rear seat shoulder<br />

--i4.". betr but"ir appears to be totally by accident'<br />

Co""i"s. And is that the only miniva-n that we're^driving<br />

around -'Ui. in America today that has those shoulder harnessesi<br />

ktt."t". ^C";;-;i".. To the best of my knowledge, Mrs Collins'<br />

iti;. -;";t;;ii b; you think if the." *itt to be active testing of<br />

il;-k ;y;teirs bv manufacturers that it would perhaps<br />

;;;; iit;l;-;;.iier introduction if we aren't able to- get legislation<br />

i.as*a-'i"i ,-o."-."u"ott? .Would that cause manufacturers to be<br />

more "'"M;.-C"Jil.-i self-policing and begin to put them in?<br />

;'rn t"ti v"o" from experience in past insta.nces that<br />

tt " u"tornoiit" i.tdrrstry has lbr the iast 20 years been- actively test'<br />

i;; ;h;b"i;;;"aerns iti theit vehicles. The automobile industry is<br />

*iif-'"i'r* "i'tt* pertor-rnce in crashes of existing restraint systems<br />

^ in those vehicles.<br />

li't;:'i;;;t: F;i ihe recotd, let me ask q question l see a lot of<br />

th;; ;;;" ;.; tl"r go o" the back seat of cars and most of them<br />

;;;"il;.t J';y ihe "seatbelt that goes beneath the seat in some<br />

tina oi *uv. How safe do you think those are?<br />

Mr. CogxN. l)o you mean in conjunction with specific seatbelt<br />

svst€m? "'ii"".<br />

Cor,t"".. Yes In a crash, you krow you.ttave this big thing'<br />

*'taii. ;;T;;" have a babv in'it, and it s all.sort of put in the<br />

#.ftLJ';JJ;d1."k ;; t;" little-or some kind of device and<br />

fi;';;;;;.1;';tp. between those and that's supposed.to -lock<br />

the<br />

-i'.it ri, J"i!. u'""n impact, it's suppos€d to keep the baby from get'<br />

ffi; ii;i;;: b,ii h"; A; it becarise it's onlv-supporrcd at the back<br />

ffiroi il;;;cis'una vou have the weight 6f the child' perhaps 15'<br />

20 *Ni;. pounds. How safe is this device?<br />

ffi;;: ilu J"ui.". vary obviouslv in their safetv' 4lp"n.ailg<br />

"p"t it""*'t"rt"i'l* d;;ig;;d Thut" ut" divices that are built-childrestralnt<br />

devlces to accommodate and deal with u. three-point<br />

:;il;;;;;;';;;';f ver'iciei *r'icr' mak€ them supt'rior to sim-plv<br />

;'";ftft;;;he iapbeltontv svstem So the varialions in safetv<br />

ilil;;;";il;-a".rs" i well-as'the restraint svstem<br />

*


6<br />

Mrs. CoLltNs. Ilut tbr the most f)itrt, when lhere is an accident<br />

and there's rtn inlant in the back seat, then the infant usually isis<br />

it sale to say th('inlant is usually not harmed upon the impact?<br />

Mr. Dr:wlv.'Cletrri,v, child restraint systems add salety lbr that<br />

child, clearly.<br />

Mrs. CoI.r,lNs. I have no further questions Mr' Nielson?<br />

Mr. NIrusoN. Who lbrnred the Institute for Injury Reduction and<br />

with whom are you afli!ialed'1<br />

Mr. Knu-nv. 'Well, that's explained in detail, Mr. Nielson, in the<br />

first attachment to Mr. Cobcn's testimony, but in brief, the founders<br />

were plaintiffs'attorneys who have worked in injury cases and<br />

have become concerned :rbout the kinds of injuries they've seen<br />

and the lack of their necessity. Our membership is open to anyone<br />

who believes in the mission of injury reduction.<br />

Mr. Nrruso^-. Mr. Sakayan said he concentrates on lapbelt-only<br />

iniuries. -Mr. .ls that the only thing you focus on?<br />

KsLLev- Oh, no, not at all, Mr. Chairman.<br />

Mr. Nrersor.r. What other products or product-related injuries do<br />

vou-- '<br />

Mt. Kn,-"u". Well, we're a new organization. We have been lookins<br />

at among other issue areas, the rollover propensities of vehiclis.<br />

We are looking at motor boat propeller injuries. We re go-ing<br />

to be working far a-field in this product-injury area l believe Mr'<br />

Sakavan waJreferring to restrai;t syst€m cases. I believe he also<br />

does -other product cases, but I'm not really--<br />

Mr. Nln*oN. When a customer buys a vehicle, he accepts a certain<br />

amount of risk. He buys insurance for that risk. 14 your view'<br />

how much risk is acceptable in society and how mucb should we<br />

regulate - -"lvti. to make sure that accidents don't happen.<br />

Ku""t". Well. I agree with the mission of the Traffic and<br />

<strong>Motor</strong> <strong>Vehicle</strong>s Safeiy Ait of 1966 written and passed by- this Cone."i"<br />

.s .-".tded, ani that mission is to take feasible technological<br />

lteos within economic reality to reduce motor vehicle crashes--<br />

Mr. NIersor.r. Would you repeat that? Within--<br />

Mr. Knr,rv. I'm not using the exact words of the act--<br />

Mr. Nrnsor':. wjthin economic reality--<br />

Mr. Kru-ev. I believe, in fact, I don't even think the act saJrs economic,<br />

I believe it says feasible.<br />

Mr. NrnrsoN. Should we consider cost-to-risk ratios as a measure<br />

of how much we can require?<br />

Mr. Krr,r-rY. I don't know ',vhat cost risk ratio you'd be referring<br />

to, Mr. Nielson. I think that the mission of the act is to do the best<br />

work possible to encourage the marketplace and the regulatory<br />

mechanism to do a\ a) wiih needless deaths and injuries in car<br />

crashes, the leading cause of death from birth !o u!"ut age 60 in<br />

ifrir "ori"tty, far aid away beyond all other health hqzards includine<br />

illnessei. I ihink that mission is well spellec out in the act, m<br />

li"e ieeisiative history, and I believe everl'thing we're saying here<br />

is -- four--square within that intention.<br />

Mr. NinrsoN, No, it's rather well-known that most accidents<br />

iniure occupants in'the front seat. Do YQt kno.w what the breakdo'*n<br />

mighi be between the accidents and iqiuries to front seat occupants<br />

versus back seat passengers?<br />

:<br />

J


177<br />

Mr. Knlt,rv. I don't know the data offhand, but certainly those<br />

are available and l'd be happy to provide thenr to the subc()mmitte€.<br />

Mr- Ntriuson- Would you do that?<br />

Mr. Knrlrv. C,ertainly.<br />

[The inlbrmatiun follows:]


f n 19E6. 60,19? drir.B q.r(<br />

| 'nrol'cd in far.l..cid.nc<br />

ITrblc?tp,orid*rh.<br />

dir(ribrtion of dri!.6 h) \.hrl(<br />

typ., rccid.nt 1Y9., and a8.'<br />

s,our TIG tatS.sr t tc.nraSc oI<br />

th.rc driv.ts for l0 !.at a8<<br />

8toups ras for th. 8ro!t bcl<br />

s..n t5 and 24 ].ars of a8c<br />

This sa1 rollor'<br />

{12.5 D.rc.nr).<br />

cd b) lh.8roup b.Ie..n 2t and<br />

34 r.ac of as. (26.8 t rc.nt)-<br />

So. alnost 60 pcrc.tr or lbe<br />

dri\'.r iDfol!.d in taral .r.th.s<br />

in l9E6 ut'c uDd.r rh. asc or<br />

3t T!bl.'t I also shoes thal a5<br />

dri!.r ar. inct.a!.s, lh. Ptopor<br />

rion of rh.n fatal aash.! rhar<br />

ar. nDl(i'\.hiclr also rrcrcascs<br />

l18<br />

k.n.,allt, rh. dnv.r'r 5..1) rh.tr<br />

iD ary orh.r lo5nioD. todt{D<br />

t rc.d of rh. (clDrnti of thit<br />

rrat who r.r. in na\t.n8ct carr<br />

in\olv.d in t.ral accid.nts dnd<br />

Thc Io$.!l nroto,lion ol d.atl't<br />

fo' all or rh. pollibl. s.aoD8<br />

po.n,ons, fton' and bact, wal<br />

amor! Gcupanl3 sitlin8 in thc<br />

niddl. rcar 5ca'. Ot 1.46J G<br />

cutanrs of thi5 posnion, onlt<br />

246 q.r. taraliri.s (16.6 Ft,


u-c.. rt<br />

119<br />

2 a,922 - tATAlm€S<br />

62.90r . OCCT P NTS<br />

.0,74r , occuPANTs oF VEHICIaS ltl WX|CH ^ fAlAurY occuRR€o<br />

Pass€nge, Ca' Occupanl and<br />

Faraliry Se€linq Posilrons<br />

lable 7-2<br />

Number and Percenr ol Dr r ers Involved in Falal Accidenls by<br />

Age-GroLi .nd Da! ol Week<br />

60,297)<br />

1tt 10.0<br />

rrl .t<br />

.. rz,t


12()<br />

Mr. NIrt-soN. NIITSA has been concentrating on the liont seal<br />

because, with their lin)ited resources, they can reduce injuries and<br />

dr:aths nt


lzl<br />

which they have in lbct designed and provided to all consumers a<br />

r,,a."liu"O t it lbr a shoulder harness system in the center position'<br />

the ""in"t'ii rear seats, of their automobiles.<br />

i,l.- provided in a number of other European vehicles'<br />

W. think that trrgineering knowledg| ts therc so thar safety can<br />

also be provided iherc lt's a r;;uestir:n of strtistics cl)d wtere you<br />

besin- the desigrr ol safety and where the prrorltles ll(. 1ney ceriri.i"<br />

fi" *llt'the outboird seating posltions bul ullimately' a's<br />

V;i;; has Jon", th"." ought to be sh"ouider harnesst's !ur all people<br />

seated -"tli.. in the vehicle.<br />

Xi,t"r*o. You're saying the technology is already developed?<br />

Mr. CoRf,N- Oh, Yes, sir.<br />

Mr. Kr-nczxn. We're not remaking the wheel here'<br />

Mr, CoseN. Yes, sir.<br />

iii;. ;i;";il.-iliing the testimonv this mortting',vou indicated<br />

ttrai ine auro manufacfurers on a voluntary basis will bc putting rn<br />

i'n"-*.r t"" and shoulder belts. Is this in fact accurate and how<br />

-"r"" -u"tifJ"rers are going to move ahead with that progrqm?<br />

"'i4i.<br />

K;;;;;. -flgt well, the inanifacturers have so st'ated to the Natlo"ui<br />

*ty Traffic Safety Administration' Again' the control--<br />

Mr. Kmczxl. Effective when?<br />

ii.i;. i;;;"" Well, effective thev sav, and d.on t hold me to this'<br />

*-"ti-i ty'i9gZ,-i fuli"u", thev sav ihev will be in all. cars l'm<br />

sure that the industry representative will be able to grve you a<br />

il"* i.?"i"li ni,;i". ri'e piobt"- is that he who giveth mav taketh<br />

il;; ih;; ";? the same car companies who.began,to provide air-<br />

;;; ";;-;i;;; ptot "iiot in the midseventies and said if vou'll<br />

iff;;" "|";;-f?o-m a regulatory standpoint, we'll do this voluntarilYTh"u<br />

s"u"th for awhile and then they tooketh away for every<br />

t";; fi"il;i't;; u"tit uuout 2 years ago or 1 vear ago and we still<br />

iil.^i h;;; "l;b"c" in ttto.t """t". lt is-the lob of regulation and it is<br />

;h"';;;;.* of th"e act Lo see that what tire companies can do and<br />

;il il;ii"";;;'i;'-u"i"-"i -alned in the resplitorv process and<br />

that ""iirl hasn't haPPened here.<br />

xi"tr*ii cive me an update on the airbag situation' Is that<br />

rirUrl-i"iis" only to protect and provide additional safety for the<br />

;;tff ;ff; ih"! "o.i,"tto* positibned in the dashboard for other<br />

occuDants<br />

""i;i.-i;;. in the front seat?<br />

th; eiisiing product on the market todav' with tbe<br />

".i,iiliiii- "i p"it aps one" automobile manufacturer' is providing<br />

oniv'protection for the drirer sith a-n airbag' One manulacturer'<br />

;ili ir'il;h;, ii pro"iding its vehicles at an option with the passenger<br />

side modem as well', .<br />

Thpre are manv automoorle manufacturers that have suggested<br />

t" iii;. i"l;;"-;l;""t"s *iU be that same protection for the front<br />

#";'il;;;;t i i"-ifa ttt committee thit starting.in 19?3' the<br />

manufacturers that Put arroags in vehicles at that- time had sys-<br />

;;;i;;6li f;";tal irotection, both passenger and driver' two sep<br />

arate -'il|-i. operations.<br />

fto"r*o. ln your estimation, is the.airbag critical since all<br />

cars are now equrPpeo *ttrr itt" iai and shouldir front seatbelts?


t22<br />

Mr. Cogan. We believe it is. We believe that the airbag provides<br />

supplemental and additional protection which is highly supt'rior to<br />

seatbelt svst€ms alone.<br />

Mr. KLiczxl. Would you also prefer to see i,hat a mandatory regulation<br />

l<br />

Mr. Ckraer.r. We would nrost defrnitely. What is happening.here is<br />

that the industry is being provided with options ol chorce l hey are<br />

rlectins- in the t'assive restraint options-1hey are eleclrng Lo go<br />

with what they bt'lieve is feusible, practical, and less costly to them<br />

and to the cortiun,"t. What is happening, thougtr' is we see that the<br />

industry is being lbrced because of consumer demand to go to arrbags.<br />

ilo-.n"., we're talking about a very slow introduction into the<br />

nrarketplace and in t he meantime, people are -d-ying ^,<br />

Mr. Iileczxe. I have no further questions' Madam Chair. Thank<br />

you " all.<br />

Mrs. Cou-txs. Thank you' Just for m-v own curiosity, I wonder if<br />

I can get an answer to-this. Why.is the diagonal halter<br />

.shoulder<br />

more beneficial than perhaps a double shoulder nallerj<br />

Mr. Kru-tv. It is not necessarily more beneficial, Mrs' Collins,<br />

and some of the attachments to our testimony sugg€st knowledge<br />

and engineering work within the industry showing tlat the double<br />

harnesJ is even more effective than the shoulder belt However,<br />

ihe.e has been the feeling within the industry and possibly the<br />

Goro"r.r.trettt that many people would not use that system- since it<br />

reouires a eood deal nioie aition in order to get it on and keep it<br />

on-and - it may be regarded as more restrictive.<br />

Cectt"i".tti, that'is a better system even than the diagonal<br />

shoulder/lap - combination.<br />

Ui". Cot-it*s. Thank you l have no further questions We thank<br />

uou fo. "ou, t€stimony ihis morning. You certainly helped to give<br />

irs1o-*" ia"u of the siverity of thJ problem Our next witness is<br />

s"lne t b" M.. Tho** H. Hanna-who is the-president of the<br />

'Moto".<br />

V"hi"l" Manufacturer's Association. Would you come for-<br />

ward please?<br />

STATEMENT OF THOMAS H. HANNA' PRESIDENT' MOTOR<br />

VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION<br />

Mrs. Cor-Ltrss. Mr. Hanna, you may begin your testimony at this<br />

time, ---t"ti.'H"""". nlease.<br />

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman l am Tom Hanna<br />

atrd l;- ptesid"t t of tie <strong>Motor</strong> <strong>Vehicle</strong> Manufacturers Association<br />

.oa -MVMA I nui" a brief statement to make to the committee'<br />

is a trade association whose members produce -more than<br />

96 peicent -l;; of the motor vehicles manufactured in the United<br />

biuGi here today to tell you about the domestic. manufactur-<br />

;;t;f";; to install lipishouldir belts in the outboard rear seating<br />

ob.itlo"i-of p*""ng"t.u.s, light trucks and multipurpose passeneer<br />

vehicles ind to offer accessory kits for ins-ervlce vehlc'es<br />

'-MVMA<br />

members are commitied to install those- restraint sy&<br />

t";: il f"a;;""y ot tft" 1988 models already incllde theT: 9v<br />

i-Sliii. "i*"uliv euery car produced in the United Siates will be<br />

A;iir# ;ifr lap/ihoulddr belLs in outboard rear seating posi-<br />

q<br />

,<br />

'.


123<br />

tioDs. By 1992, practically ull light trucks and multipurpose passenpcr<br />

vchicles also will be includcd in this cflbrt '<br />

*Of<br />

fou."". [hose i,ct luns apply r'rnly to new nrotor vehicles To<br />

extend the availability ol these systtns to v( hrcles.'rlrtady In servi"*,-<br />

irlvMn mlmberi have designed i,c('essorJ k iL\ cnd notified<br />

iir"it a"ul". service nelworks r-rl the availabilily ol oulboard rear<br />

*rii"g-p"iiti* kits for most models manufactured in the last 10<br />

- Years. -Manulacturers<br />

have included information on accessory kit.s in<br />

"tii.".i p.i"r "avertising. lt's contained in the owner's manuals<br />

unJitt" piUti.irud regularly in speeches and in corporate communi-<br />

;;;i";.6" ih. n,unuIo"tu.ittg companies. In uddition, the.manufaci;;;;;;;;;".i.ate<br />

directlvlo deilers about their availabilitv and<br />

i;;-e;^;" '--lutu"ulu"t"t".. haue becn madi repeatedlv avare of-their availabilitv'<br />

have also cooperatsd with the National Highway<br />

Traflic Safety Administration in its efforts to produce consumer lni"r-rii""<br />

ob'out .c.e""o.y kits Domestic manufacturers have indi-<br />

;;t"J to NHTSA in response to the advance notice of ploposed<br />

."i.^^xi"*, itt^i ihev tiouta not oppose amendments to Federal<br />

<strong>Motor</strong> Veiicle Safety Standard No.208, to require the systems<br />

they "'itr"i" are already voluntarily providing.<br />

"." h6*euer, additi'onal issues raised in the notice that<br />

"ouiJli ou..u"a lo tlre level of regulatory requirements' disrupt<br />

'schedules<br />

ilu"ufu"iui"t<br />

for introduction of these s.vslems For example,<br />

the agency has solicited comments on dynamrc testrng or<br />

belis and on ihe need for comfort and convenience requirements to<br />

r.t-"t"-ttt"ii t"". The multitude of issues that would need to be<br />

iesolved for such requirements could seriously delay some manufacturers'<br />

'- schedules for introduction.<br />

e-sr"it"; it""nilv" tot rear seat lap/shoulder belt use would be<br />

r""i"t"*- Si"*-belt u"" laws that require both..front-and rear<br />

;;;l'-;;ir;; to buckle up Neither the availabilitv of the belt<br />

i".t"t" "o. its effectivenesi will produce results unless the belts<br />

l'.!" ,iLa.- nJ. ttti" l"*o", lvrvltit car companv joined<br />

Irembers<br />

ilift-"ttr"i pii"ut" """tot interests to create Trafhc Safety Now'<br />

lnc. "'iri" tTSNl, 4 vears ago<br />

*tt -"issio.t if TSN is to encourage the widest possible use<br />

of safety belts through educational programs and enactment and<br />

""foi""ir"nt of effect'ive use laws in'all-fifty States To date' TSN<br />

i* l.i""i"a ""Li $54 -illio" on this elTort which has directly coni'.I6u-i"-J<br />

m i["iuit thut lz States and the District of Columbia now<br />

have '-fto*"u".. belt use Iaws in effect.<br />

'*f',i.n-ii-ii onlv eight of those laws cover rear seat passengers' two<br />

"the"rear<br />

"f<br />

belt use requirement to- children As the<br />

iif"-*"i"S and injury prevention benehts of safety belt use laws<br />

become even more apparent than they are today'.we're hoPsful<br />

fi;;^;;.;';;";;- t"."bi"t of a passenger motor vehicle in all 50<br />

States will be r'equired to use safety belk<br />

This is a goal to which we remain committ€d Madrrrtr L:harrwomu",<br />

l.}iaf"otipi"t t my-prepared st€tement and I tharrk vou lbr the<br />

opportunity ' to aPpear here lodaY.<br />

iTh" pre-pared-dutement of Mr. Hanna follows:l


t24<br />

l,| A ItS I lr'1UfuY<br />

IJTIURL II]L<br />

GUVIIiNIIIN] ALIIVIIILS ANIJ IIiANSPURIAI IUI'/ SUIJLOI'II']I I ILI<br />

UI' IHL<br />

t.ulllllllLt uN 6(lvtRNllLNl 0PtRAi luN:<br />

UF ] HI<br />

UTIITLJ SIAILS HUUSt UI. RLPRLSLI{IAIIVLI<br />

JUriL lJ, TqJJH<br />

l'ly raHE ls lHotas H, flANNA. Ill<br />

pntstotttt oF THL ll0loR<br />

VEBtcLE IIaNUFAcTURERs Ass0clATIo oF rHE lJllrED SrATEs, lic', A<br />

TRAD€ ASSOCIATION iIHOSE II'HBER5 PRODUC€ ITORE TNAN 9b PERCL'{T OF<br />

THE HoToR vEHtcLEs TIaNUFAcTURERED lN THE IJNITED STATES' I al<br />

HERE TODAY TO TELL YOU ABOUI DOIlESTIC fiANUFACTURERS, PLANS ]O<br />

lnsraLL LAplsHouLDER EELTs Itt rHE ourSoARD REAR sEArlx6 PoslTloNs<br />

OF PASS€N6ER CARS, LIGHT TRUCKS AND I'UL-TIPURPOSE PASSEI'IGER<br />

VEHICLES AND ]O OFFER ACCESSORY KITS FOF III'SERVIC€ VEHICL€S'<br />

flVl'lA HEHBERS aRE cot{llrTED To lNsrALL THos€ RESTRAINT<br />

sysrE s. lN FAcT, nANY or rH€ 1988 ttoDELs ALR€ADY lrlcLUDE THEtI'<br />

By 1990, vtRTUALLY EvERY caR PRoDUcED lfl rHE ll. 5. v?lLL BE<br />

€ou:ppEo NlrH LAp/sHouL0€R EELTs Ili ourBoaRD R€AR SEATING<br />

poslrloNs, lro av 1992, PRAcTtcALLY aLL LI6HT TRUcKS Ati0<br />

IIULTIPURPOSE PASSENGER VEHICLES ALSO WILL BE ]NCLUDED IN IHIS<br />

EFFORT.<br />

IJF coURsE, TfloSE ACTTOIIS APPLY OIITY IO IIEU ttOTOR VEHICL€S.<br />

To Exr€flD THE avAILABILITY oF THEsE SYslEHs ro v€HlcLEs ALREADY<br />

li{ sERvtcE, l'1V11A MEHBERS rlavE DESIcNED accEssoRY xlrs alt0<br />

ItiOTIFiED THEIR DEALER SERVICE I{ETIiORKS OF ThE AVAILABILITY OF<br />

OUT!OARD REAR SEATING POS]TION '


25<br />

- !'<br />

liA(!fA(lttrlp' HAvt lilcL(10t0 INF(tRl'iA'I toil oN ruL A('i:{ssnkt xlT':<br />

[t ltAIloN/\t ll'lr]l ADvfRIlslNG aNIl lN 0|lNIRS HANllAl!i ulr<br />

PUiLICIZID<br />

II]TIII AVAILAITILITY It'I SPELCHES AND CORPOIiATT<br />

coffiuNttArtolrs. ltr,0tillloN, MANUFAcTURERS c {r 11 l'1 u N I c A r t lJ DIREcTLY<br />

TO D€ALTRS ABOIIT IHEIR AVATIA!ILITY, AIID COOP€RAIED ylITIi TtIE<br />

l{artoNA! HtGHwAY lrrrrtc Seretv AD INIsTRATIoN It! lts EFFoRTS ro<br />

FRODUC€ CONSUtlIK INFOfII'lAIION ABOUT ACCESSOFY K]TS'<br />

UonEsTtc rANUFAcIuRttis HAvt INDIcATED ro HISA__lN R€sPoNsE<br />

to THE ADvaricE llottct or PnoPostD RuLEnaKttG-_THAT TH€Y lrouLD Nor<br />

opposE AHENDT.TENTs ro IEDtFAL I'l0ToN VEHIcLE SAFETY STANDARD<br />

(II'tVSS) I.IO.2O8 IO sEGUIRE TNE SY5]EI"IS THEY ARE ALREADY<br />

voLur,rraFtLy pRovtDtr{6. IHERE aRt, Hor€vER/ ADolrtoNAL Issu€s<br />

RAtsED tN THE NUISA NorlcE rHAT couLD, IF PIJRSUED To rHE LEvEL oF<br />

REGuLAtoRy REoutREraENTS, DlsRuPT H A N u F A c r u n e n s ' s c s t o u L t s ron<br />

tN-rR0DUcrtoN oF THEsE sYsrEtls. loR EXAtIPLE, THE AGENcY HAs<br />

SOLICITED COIIXEN-IS ON DYtlAHIC TESTTNG OF THE BELTS AND OI{ IHE<br />

t€ED fOR COr'1FORr AllD COt{VENI€liC€ REOUtSEn€NTS TO PROtIOTE THEIR<br />

ust,<br />

lle lruLTlruDE oF IssuEs rHAl rouLD NEED To BE R€soLvED FoR<br />

sucH REOUtRET,lENTS COuLD SERT0USLY DELAY SOnE rllHUraCrUnens'<br />

SCEEDULES FOR I IIIROOUCT ] OII '<br />

A GFEATER lNc€flrl vE FoR REAR stAr LAPlsHoulDER B€LT usE xouLD<br />

BE 5'TATE hANDATORY BELT USE LA\{S'IHAT 8€A!IRE EOJH f RON-I AND REAR<br />

sEAT occupANTs ro BucKLE uP. l{ElrflER THE avalLABlLllY 0F ltlE<br />

BEL'I SYSTEIl ItOR ITS EFFECTIVEIlESS WILL PRODUCE ANY RESULTS UITLESS<br />

IH€ BELTS AR€ USED.<br />

Fon rnts vtnv REAso,llVl'lA cAR coflPANY rlEr'18€Rs JoINED rlrH<br />

orrlER pRl!arE s€croR lltrEREsrs ro cREATE TRArFlc SAFETY ilou (TSil)


t26<br />

Foun ytARs rcn lrE so!E ntsstoH or IS ts t(J t cot,t4r,r rIl<br />

-t-<br />

I'llDESI POSSIILt l,St Of SAFETY BEITS IHROUGN tDUCATIoNAt l'fi{rnRAnS<br />

4ND EtAClr.rENr A n E f0RCtnENT OF EFFECTtVt US€ !Ats tn ^t I 5(l<br />

srATEs. lo tj^tr, ISN HAs txfiENDt0 ovtn t5lj rrrr-tor r,r rrrr.<br />

EFFoRT yrHrcH HAs DtRtcrLy coNTRIBUTED To tHE FAcT tHAl j/ : r^rrs<br />

aND TrE UrslRlcr or coLu BtA Nori HAvE BELT usE LA\{s Ifl fr | | ( I .<br />

tlol{EvER, or{LY EIGHT 0F TH0SE LAHS COvER REAR S€Ar pASSEX6!ris--Tl{O<br />

OF I{HICH LIIlIT THE REAR BELI USE REOUIREtl!ItT TO CHTIDRE'r,<br />

AS THE LIFE-SAVIIIG AND IIiJURY PR€VENTION 8E!EFITS OF SAFETY<br />

BELT I'SE LArlS BECOHE EVEN }IORE APPASENT ]HAN THEY ARE TODAf, TE<br />

AR€ HOPEFUL THAT SOOII EVERY OCCUPAXT OF A PASSEIIG€R IIOTOR VEIIICLE<br />

tN ALL 50 srar€s l{tLL Bt REoUtRED To usE sAFEry geuts. Trts ls I<br />

6oAL To nHIcfr TSN AND 11VllA RETAIN conHITT6D-<br />

/ APPREcIA]€ THI oPPoRTUIiITY To APPEAR 8€FoRE You ToDAY.<br />

.'<br />

a<br />

{<br />

I<br />

I<br />

i


121<br />

r,Y#;,3j;i'ri,?;*',:T;1 :if' #',J::i.? JH"iii"f Xill"l'""nil,ii:;<br />

belts in the back seat^s'/<br />

I$;tt il,.m J*Ti ","Ji'1"i"""':1.1<br />

6;;:":1J:';,:titi'$:t*i<br />

r:r*;[i:{i}:*ir;'"",""3iTiili"o,'"}1fil:Tli}'i:'*',?<br />

.rrt"ai "'itlr.. li "t were in the blck seats of cars<br />

co"ti". tsut is that a reason why the manulacturers should<br />

^ti15{lt*1+:il["JiH::$"flJn'J"'1,'-lii:;:ff<br />

li'1,*,'<br />

llii"l-nlit*;P:nfi ,::l';1"1-*i--:s'":*1;$!1""i,'iii<br />

il;,;,t;;;;;; to'u"", tni' less ljkclv people are 1o.use it if<br />

-And<br />

lilT,Yt: .1''f #1"T3""ii"''"t"f"1",'il"T",'f i$;l'i:Ti]li'"?'T;<br />

;l+$J""*i*i;1"t1:*t 11" tr::"+'i"''*"T"x'.i,i"sti-o.,y tr.,is<br />

-irt" relative eflectiveness of the lapbelt and the<br />

-i."'iit"g tnr"i<br />

*nitfyJJ*:*;ln*i''**;",i?"Jlilo:1":;i:ft :'-::iJiTf; l;<br />

;il;';ffi ttt"-'rnu.t"futt"ters are now voluntarily introducing<br />

ir,i"'. rl'i,: p"i"t is it's-not "i<br />

:i;""i ?ru"'T;:t;i:t f:,tJl:T"i:I:<br />

::it'i:i{:rfr ]l:{*rlliii:":T:in',"'x"trjti,,,w:*1,,ru<br />

it that manufacturers haven I<br />

Hll'#Ui:i:i'f<br />

"f<br />

'lon*.tl'rut*s;H'""is"l'H:"lHl**.:"fn:l<br />

iii'. rri,.ia now, the costs run $15 to $20' ls that,the case'/<br />

Mr. HaNrv.r. I wouldn't^dispure that number' lt s--<br />

,^lii:';'1"J^'ff .';";liiill;it?i,t'1""',..i'3i"i'i}Ef *Hf fl *Jli<br />

'"fiiUf,l;'$:ff1"i''Jffi<br />

!'T"Yiin:T,T;manu-ract,rer'sde-<br />

cision whether or not tne..pedple *ill use them l believe it's the<br />

-"u"rtu"iri".'. responsibi-lity to make sure they mal


128<br />

not. taking<br />

_eare of [he safety of the American consumer. you,re<br />

telllnA us all lhe tlme lo buv American.<br />

Mr. IlanNe. There's an entirely diflerent set of circumsLances in<br />

Europe due 1o t.hc lirtl that they havc national seatbelt uie laws<br />

and,usage rate there are typically in the g0-percent plus iange.<br />

I nat n r (:,r ns--<br />

( 'or-r,r<br />

. ,Mrs.<br />

r'rs.<br />

. Your point is if it's required by law. vou do it. If<br />

lts, nol, requtred. by litw, vou..dont thjnk its necesjirr! t,, lry t_o<br />

make thc rrder ol an uutt mobile in America sali..<br />

Mr. HlrqNe- No. My point- is you will do it if you have some as_<br />

surance that you.will actually improve the aggrigate salety of car<br />

pas engers as evidencr'd bv their willingness to use thc svsltim<br />

Mrs- Colr-rNs. OIr. rhat's baloney. 1'hat b me is not a lrlausible<br />

response- It seems lo me that automobile manufaclurers have a<br />

duty. and a. responsiLrility to make the automobile as sale as humanly<br />

possible. Mr. Kleczka, mv tjme is expirins.<br />

Mr. Xleczxe. Thank..rou. Madam Chairiryomin. ln your testimo<br />

ny, lvlr. rlanna. you Indrcalp lhat some ol the lgEg models already<br />

are including<br />

_the^lap/shoulder rear seatbelts. Could you indicate to<br />

me which models?<br />

Mr. HexNa. I have a summa-ry he_r-e, a ver"v good sumrnary,<br />

thar's. been nlblished b.v the.N-ational Highwa.v iriinc Sateiy al_<br />

mlnrstratlon. Uould I submlt rt lor the record:)<br />

Mr. Knczx,q. Are there too many models to mention here?<br />

Maybe just give me a flavor for whicir manufactu.e." ".u .r


129<br />

manulbcturers until l!|l)2 to Put thesc devices in the cars? What's<br />

the ""i4;.U;;;; lag time therc:/<br />

lor autonrobiles, virtua)ly everv automobile wil) be<br />

*mpi"f ed bl lllll(r.'l lrrrl'ts th('next 2 modt') yer'rs<br />

Mr. Kr.ct'zxe.0X.<br />

itit. uiii^ii.'t'tt" l1)$2 datt' relers to the vans and multipurpose<br />

vehicles-- "itii. -ii.',""r*o.<br />

I'm talkiug all vehicles lf the technology is with<br />

""'i iary,'iiny'it.ii'sottte a years bclorc the nranulacturers actually<br />

install "'*L"i'Hn**o the device<br />

lt doesrr t hlve to du \^-tth th(' tecl)nology of.the belt<br />

.""#- io"ii,'it- itas io do *ith the curr{'nt cunstruction of the vehi-<br />

;i;. J;"i;: ii';;;lndicated belbrc, vou have to provide an anchort*f;n?l*;;*^.<br />

Are tbose anchors alreadv in automobiles produced<br />

today?<br />

Mr. HnNua. ln automoblles' yes' slr'<br />

Mr. Kleczxe. But not trucks?<br />

M;. il;"". But not necessarily in all vans and multipurpoee ve<br />

hicles, "'i"fl no, sir.<br />

(iuii*o. So, then as early as 1989' we could have all passenger<br />

automobiles equiPped wlth Ihese devlces'<br />

"'i4;. -ii;;.<br />

S6m'e' mattufacturers will Some have indicated<br />

tfreie *rit be a few models that will go hto the next year'<br />

Mr. Klsczre. -il;.rli. What's their rationale lor the delay'<br />

iil. 'Ji'"tgi"""ii ii'eo". ; the construction of i'he car and the<br />

"riiii"i<br />

ni tt'at will have to be do;re to get them in<br />

in"i". i .""{ t?tt you ireciselv model bv model-- "'i4;. ., -<br />

X;;;;;^. fto, vou lusi said the-anchors are there Ttre an-<br />

chors are already there,-so I don't think any more englneenng<br />

;;;ld h;;; d b;"done. Mavbe drill a hole, put a plate in there so<br />

vou can attach the belt<br />

'"t4;: H;;";. ihe point is that ihev are doing--this across their<br />

-#;i ii;;;il. iij" i.-if z -"a"t,vedrs' thev.will !,"-9<br />

".?lpl"d<br />

ile entire iob. Bevond that, I don'i have specific information as to<br />

i^iili'itiiiif* tt"ir"rn ttt"t" -igt't t'" with a particular car model'<br />

"'t\il."ft;;t<br />

"going<br />

i. oii;'"; v;i''; to advis6 vour n1er.r!.ers that<br />

tnei tetter have a little bettcr oulreach on the retrotrt l(rts' s)nce<br />

;;;"l"it what we heard about this morning didn't really prove<br />

this *'itli. stafument to be verY accurate<br />

Hlin"o. If the availabiity isn't being made known to the<br />

.rfi;;fii;;; ir" 6i-"*i liii. tt'd dealership,-not a.good enough.job<br />

il.;;;; done to eet that message through l wouldn't cont€st that'<br />

toi4tjl'*""."*o.<br />

How about- the affordable.cost o-f t}e re,trofitting?<br />

tsiir;;;;;hit;-ihut "u,t be-aone auout that? We'r-e t-alking $200<br />

irU"i""J ii" ki"ts being around $200 1 think very. few consumets<br />

ii i'i.tlit- $ioo for a d]evice, knowing or not, it's better for their<br />

oTff:fiTi"".<br />

The numbers published bv the manufaciurers that I<br />

h"* ;A;;';; uii l..t lttu"'that Thei're in the range of $66 to<br />

about --Mt. $99 for the kit itsell ,<br />

itr,tcz*r. lncluding labor?<br />

i,ii. iii"tii. t$, ;ir. Fri'r the kit itself, plus labor'<br />

i<br />

i


t30<br />

Mr. Xl.nr--zxrr. And labor, averaqe, would<br />

'<br />

be what?<br />

..Mr.<br />

Ilnr'lNe. Oh, il -vou figured g25 an hour and it took a couple<br />

of hours to..do it, nuybe another $50, but please, Llrat s lust l rougrr<br />

esl,inrllt' oll tht,toJr ol ny head. It's going to var-y delx,rdirrg orr tne<br />

vohiclc and tlre deuler's service charge and so on.<br />

Mr. lir,r:r:zxrr.<br />

'l'irirrrk<br />

lou, Madunr Olrair. You indicalc orr page i3<br />

ol -!our t(,$trnlonl thtrl 1-ou rt:lily don't have any opposition or ol><br />

jection to a mrrndatt'bv NIITSA to mukc thesc devices rrrandarorv.<br />

ls I ltttl ar'curirttj.<br />

Mr. llexxr,. Yes, sir.<br />

Mr. Kr,rr;zxe- So then, if this committ€e should reconrnrend that<br />

to the entire C,ongress, you would not oppose that?<br />

Mr. Hlnra. That's corrccr, sir.<br />

Mr. Kr,rczxe- OK, but you have a caveat to that endorsement<br />

a_nd.that is the ?gency is soliciting comments on d-ynamic testing of<br />

the belts. Explain that to the comrnittee.<br />

Mr. HeNNa. That would require that a whole test protocol be established<br />

so that you would do the testing of these vehjcles model<br />

by model. You would have to work that out 1-rrst and establish a<br />

test procedure. Our concern is that if that is undertaken, it's going<br />

to delay the process and the manulacturers alreadv have scheiulei<br />

to put these into vehicles or car--<br />

Mr. Klrczxa. Aren't these tests already being conducted or<br />

haven't they been conducted?<br />

Mr. HANNA. There are tests of a kind that test the quality and<br />

strength of the belt materials. There are observations ihat eo on<br />

regularly during rhe teii process. Sled tesrs of dummy kinem"atics,<br />

observations of this. I really don't think it's--<br />

Mr. Kr,nczxr.. So it's reaily no additional burden if in fact,<br />

NHTSA would ask for these lab tests.<br />

Mr. Hewxl. If the tests were of a character that are being done<br />

now for the front seats, no.<br />

Mr. Kr.rczre- But it's your understanding that the tests that<br />

they are asking for are different.<br />

Mr. HervN.c.. No, sir. It was an advance notice. They just raised<br />

the.questiorr of whether there should be. We're saying that we<br />

don't think it's necessary so that we can get on with'the job ol installing<br />

these systems.<br />

Mr. Kr-rczxr,. That's all the questions I have.<br />

Mrs. C;or,r,rNs. I have no further questions. Thank you for your<br />

testimony, Mr. Hanna.<br />

Mrs. Coluns. Our next witness will be Jeffrey R. Miller, who,s<br />

Deputy Administr-a.tg1 for the National Highway Traffrc Safety Administration.<br />

Mr. Miller.<br />

Mr. MIr.r.nn. That's a long title.<br />

Mrs. Cor.r,rNs. Yes. Easier for us to say NHTSA. Will you tell ue<br />

for the record, who's accompanying you, please?<br />

Mr. Mrr,r.nn. Yes, ma'am. To my left is Mr. Barry Felrice, who,s<br />

our Associate Administrator for Rulemaking in NHTSA. To my<br />

right is Mrs. Erika Jones. She's chief counsel of the agency and i<br />

am Jeffrey Miller, Deputy Administrator.<br />

,\-<br />

t


131<br />

StrAT.EUEM OF JEFFBEY R MILLER. DEPIITY ADMINISIRAM&<br />

NATIONAL HIGITIYAY TRAFFIC ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPA.<br />

NIED BY BARRY FELBICE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRTOR FOR<br />

RULES, AND ERIKA JONES, CHIEF COUNSEL<br />

Mr. Mrr,r.nn. Madam Chairwoman, members of the subcommittee.<br />

We appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss<br />

thl matter of reii seat sdfety beit safety, both with regard to<br />

lapbelk and laplshoulder belk.<br />

Ste'll also be discussing the NHTSA rulemaking on this issue,<br />

our followup to certain iecommendations made by the National<br />

Transportation Safety Board in 1986. Before discussing some specifics,<br />

I'd like to provid'e just a little background. I will be summarizing<br />

my testimony here but I would asklhat the fuIl text be inserted<br />

into the record.<br />

Mrs. CorrNs. Without objection. It will be.<br />

Mr. Mrr.r,tn. Ttrank vou. Higtoricallv, safetv belt uee in the rear<br />

seats has been lower lhan safety beli use ii the front seats, and<br />

even that usage waa very low until just recently. In the eaily eighties<br />

for example, when front seatbelt use was only around 12 percent,<br />

usage in the rear seat was almoet too low to measure. Our<br />

survevs indicated onlv around 2 percent.<br />

Now wittr the incieasing pubiicity about the benefrk of safety<br />

belt use and the advent of ealetv beli use Iaws in States around the<br />

United States, belt use in the fiont s€€ts has increased substantiallv.<br />

Belt uee in the rear seat has also incr€ased, but it's still far less<br />

than in the front seat. Our latest national survey indicates that<br />

usage rat€s in the rear seat are oaly about 16 percent.<br />

We also believe it's important to keep in mind that orer 90 percent<br />

of all the passenger vehicle deaths -and injuries in ,this country<br />

occur in the fiont seit of passenser vehicles Since that was the<br />

area of greatest risk and fieatesl ha.m, it was also the area of<br />

greatest .- opportunity to save lives and prevent injuries. -<br />

We theitifore believe it was entirelv appropriate for the Federal<br />

Government and for State governmenG drid for motor vehicle manufacturers<br />

to place their top priority on improving occupant prot€ction<br />

syst€ms and usage ratee in the front seak of passenger vehicles.<br />

Those campaisns are now well underway We believe they are responsible<br />

for savlng literally thousands of lives. Now the number of<br />

r-esr se:t passengeis is far-lower, and that s€ating environment is<br />

also Iess risty tlian the front seat. Nonetheless the safety of rear<br />

seat passengers is just as important as the safety of front seat passengers.<br />

WLile the total opportunity for saving lives and reducilg injuries<br />

in the rear seats is-s;aller because the numbers are smaller, there<br />

sti.ll are some opportunities to impmve occupant protection in the<br />

rear. So we now have a second campaign underway, and again, it<br />

involves the Federal Government, State governments and the auto<br />

makers, to improve safety for rear seat passengers<br />

We nbw have 32 State safety belt use laws in the U--nited States.<br />

Si-x of those require safetv beli use in the rear Eeats We don't have<br />

extensive data -so far on iust how effective tho6e usage lalls are in<br />

improving actual usage rates in the rear seat, but we believe they


L82<br />

will be effec,tiva, at least based on the experience we,ve had with<br />

front seat usaqe laws.<br />

- We've seen-about a 20-percent increase in usage rates in the<br />

lront aeat due-to usage laws, and we are opti:nistiC that rear seat<br />

usage rat€a wrll continue to rise as well. The total benefrte of anv<br />

safety system, whether it's front or rear s€at, is e;ins to ai*"a-#<br />

how many<br />

.people aciually use and take advan-tagd of thA€e ffe_<br />

Bayljrg anq rnJury-reduc tng syst€ms.<br />

, we ve- stated on many occasions, and I know this subiect ha8<br />

been agdre8sed earlier before the subcommittee today, that-the sys_<br />

tems<br />

lhal<br />

are currently in place- in the rear seats of i,isseng€r cars;<br />

na-mely, lap safety belts, are in fact effective in reducing ani reduci'tg<br />

substantially the risk of death and injury. We also -believe that<br />

rear Beat lap/shoulder belts will be even more effective.<br />

At the current estimated usag€ rat€ of 16 percent in the rear<br />

seat, we believe that lap/shouldei belts, if they were lrrstattea in ati<br />

'lhatI<br />

gtssengers cars in use today, might prevent another 25 deetlu.<br />

above and.beyond the 100- deaths that we believe are pre.<br />

rTtrqally<br />

I9:td<br />

due to currenj levels of lapbelt usage. As usage<br />

rat€8,go hrgher, benef-rts of either system, either laponly or la[/<br />

snorucer Dert€, could b€ exDect€d to increa8e.<br />

- Because we believe that-lap/shoulder belts will be even more eflectwe.<br />

than.lapbel$, yg've been encouraging vehicle manufacturer€<br />

to rnatall.lap/shoulder belts voluntarily. In part as a result of<br />

Enes€ ducuSslons ln recent years, marty manufacturerE who had<br />

Dot prevrouay done ao are now installi.g those systems in ttreir<br />

ne-w- models. I'hey're doing so on a rapid basis.<br />

- w9 qee that many 1988 models already have rear Beat Laplshoul_<br />

der belts, even in similar models that did not have those -belt6 in<br />

recent years, As you heard from Mr. Hanna, moet manufacturers<br />

plan to have them in all of their passenger car lines \yithin the<br />

next year. oT-tyo..lrl. fact. by_ 1990, virtually every passenger car<br />

alq oygj nau ot alt lrght trucks and multipurpose passenger vehicres<br />

wrll come equlpp€d with rear seat lap/shoulder belts as standaro<br />

equrpmeDt.<br />

_ Eariiei this year, we canvas.sd all of the automakers, and in<br />

lebruary we released a consumer information bulletin which<br />

showed that 24 out of 29 manufacturers already have iear seat<br />

l?.p/shoulder beJ!4 !a at least some of their car ioodels this year.<br />

We think that NHTSA bulletin, a copy of which I have ".itfl me<br />

and I would like to leave for the comnii-ttee, will help consumers in<br />

making plrchase decisions. We also believe that 6ur diision to<br />

prepare this bulletin did in itself help to accelerate the plans ^ of<br />

manufacturers to install rear seat laDl;houlder belt^s-<br />

I'd.be lrappy to submit that for thd committ€e. I'd also be pleased<br />

to-l ve heard the bell so I will keep my further surnma& even<br />

p,ngfer;w3 have responded -to the recom-mendations made ty the<br />

Natlonll<br />

'lYansportation<br />

Safety Board in 1986 when it exa;ined<br />

the, subject of rear. seat lapbelts. We were concern-ed quite frankly<br />

that so-me_peq)le drew some improper inferences fion that repor[.<br />

The Irl'ffiB itself studied only-a very small number of csses'and<br />

they did not draw any conclujions oi make .try i-o--ii-dltion,<br />

one-wqy or the other on uaage of lapbelts. They strongly encouraged<br />

ttte movement tn lap/shoulder belt systems. We ri'ere con-


133<br />

cerned that that report weakened public confidence-in the safety of<br />

lapbelts and indeed in safety belts ge-nerally. 4" Y..Y" stated many<br />

times, we believe the record is very clear that -lapbelts are effective'<br />

ianlshoulder belts are even morL effective, but that does not di'<br />

minish the safety of the syst€ms that are currently-ln P!ac:'<br />

We hate also -made pr6oisions to assist in providing information<br />

to conEumers on retrofit kits. Most manufacturers now have retro'<br />

frt kits available for those models where they believe it is appropriate,<br />

and indeed we believe it's appropriate to look- to manufacturert<br />

ioi'itt"i. expertise in determiriing -which models car and which<br />

cannot be suitably equipped with retrofrt kits.<br />

The effectiveness oT a ietrofrt kjt is going to depend in large part<br />

on the specifics of the vehicle-the seat stiffness, seat height, floor<br />

oan design, thinm of that nature. Ttrerefore, it's very important to<br />

iook to tle manifaciurer for guidance as to whether a specific retrofit<br />

kit can be adapted to a vehicle and also on installation instructions.<br />

We have information available through our toll-free<br />

consumer hotline to assist consumert in finding retrofrt kits if they<br />

encounter - dilfrculty through the manufacturers.<br />

wt are ako p.odeedingiwe issued an a4vance notice of proposed<br />

rulemaking in 198?-0; the question of whether rear seat lap/<br />

ihoulder bilts should be made mandatory in the United States'<br />

itt"." u." many ancillary issues to consider such as comfort and<br />

convenience standarils, dynamic crash t€sting.<br />

We expect to announce a decision very soon on the issue of mandatorv<br />

$stauation. But as a practical matt€r, the commitments<br />

have -all been made and cemented by the manufacturers now to<br />

huoe.u.t seat lap/shoulder belts installed as standard equipment<br />

in virtually "u"ry'"u. to be sold in the country in the near-future'<br />

That concludei the summary of ny prepared rem-arks' My collea.gues<br />

and I would be very happy to try to resPond to any questions<br />

vou or members of the subcommitt€e might have'<br />

Thank vou.<br />

[The pripared stat€ment of Mr. Miller follows:]


134<br />

STATEX€IIT OF JTFfRTY R. IILLER<br />

oEPt w ^0 uslnAToR, tiATtoilAt- HIG|{IAY TMFFTC SAFtTy AIXtrtSn TIfl<br />

EEFORE IHE<br />

mvtni ENr AcTMTIES Aio TMltSpoRTATIoat SUS6fiIITEE<br />

0t lrt NoJst cor,trTEt 0N covtRt,|tt|t optr IIotS<br />

JUXE 23, 1988<br />

Irdu Ch.trro n rnd H.nb.rs ot tha Subcfiltt!!,<br />

I tppracl.te thls opportunlty to dlscuii tha rittar of rarr-lalt ihoulthr<br />

|nd l.p b.lt i.fety, the ltr on.l Htghrry Trrfft. S.flty ad tntrtrldon,r<br />

(llllTSA) ruleniklng on thts !s5ue, .nd tiXtSA's fol tor-up to th. l9t6<br />

tttlonal lri.sportatlon Sifaty Eoard raport rParformlna!<br />

of Lrp Balts In<br />

25 Frontal Crathe5." t{lth ne rt tha ritaa!r tablo ira garry felrla!,<br />

Assoclatr Adnlnistrrtor for nulemiklog. rnd trtka Jones. Cht€f Counsel.<br />

Lfort I rddrall tha lDlcl?lci ol our rultiaklng, t rolld flrrt ltlr to<br />

provlde soo€ gen€ral inforoetlon rs a background for our dlscusston.<br />

illttorlcally. lrflty brlt ure In the r.ar sltts ha! b.en tor.r than b€lt<br />

lla ln th€ front larts. In 198l-1982, for aruple . rhen tfia front-rrat<br />

balt lsa rate ris around<br />

I2 per cent, rear-rtat ualge ra! alFjt too lof<br />

to.r€asur€ -- trosnal 2 ger c!nt. *ltft tha Incrs.jlng publlclty about<br />

3tflty belts ind tha anactoent<br />

of lafaty belt uie tara, b?lt usa to tha<br />

raar seat hit lncr€alad to ibout l6 per cant ln 1987 bot it reoalns tt!ll<br />

3lgnlflarntly lorer thin belt us€ 1n tha front !ait. $lch hi! rli€n.to<br />

ln e!tlmated 42 per c?nt nrtlonrtde-<br />

::<br />

t6<br />

,-q<br />

t<br />

{<br />

$ s<br />

f r<br />

:.{


35<br />

Ooe lhould rlro krip ln $lnd o{ir 90 9tt ctnt of lll pelsenqer v?hlcl!<br />

otclpalt dertlri rnd 103srles occ(r ln the front sctt<br />

Tirt Yai 'ne erea<br />

of grtrttlt rlsk, lftl the grert'5t ogportunlty to ilve llv€t; 5o lt r'5<br />

tDgroorlrt€ for the Fadaral gov'rntent' st'te !ov'ro[Ent! and tptor<br />

ttilcla rnufactlr.rs to glace toD prtorlty on Inprovlng oc'up'nt<br />

prot?ctlo. systent ind utlEe r'tes 1n the front s"t<br />

rall u.ldar vay! rnd lt t5 !'vlng tho0lrndt of llv'i'<br />

lhst 'rtpilgn l9<br />

R€ir-seit Putangers are fir feYer ln n0.|b'r' lnd th't l'itlng<br />

anvlronmgnt ts le3s rlrky thin th€ front' But the trf€ty of thos'<br />

gr3rangert l9 lutt !! toport'nt '5 thelr fronl-5eet coonterprrts 'nd<br />

thara rr? opportunltl!s to prtrent denths 'nd lnJutle! In tlre re'r l'at<br />

through tnproved occupant protectlon so re nor have ' second ciopil9n<br />

In progress, 19.tf Involvlng the tederal end St'te !ov'rnnen!5<br />

autodlakarS, to upgrade 5afetJ for reir-se3t Da'sengert<br />

Durlng the last folr yearJ' 3t Stttcs rnd tnl Olstrlct of Colsdblr lr't'<br />

adopted lifety balt u!'e lars for froni-3r't sist'$gers' but only sir of<br />

thrse lir! alrrently rtqu\re lafety belt us' tn th' r€'r seats Ne<br />

cr$not yct dris an! flrn conclusloni '! to ho|. eff'ctlv€ those l'vs rlll<br />

be 1n eniouraglng ln


186<br />

In tht rtr. tl|t rlll contlnua to lncr?a!! to rooe ertant, avln rhera oot<br />

raqulrad by liH, at the habtt or Influence of buckltng up ln th€ front<br />

saat alrrlai ovla to thola rtdlng In tn€ raar.<br />

Ihe tot.l bao.ftts of rny t.trty boll 5p16 ylll naturatly drgrnd od ft6.<br />

aany leopla yetr thasa ltfa_javlng .nd lnjury-reductn! iylt€nr. As re<br />

nava ltttad on |||iny occtston!, ye are convtncad that raar_raat llp nfatJ<br />

baltt are effectlve ln reduClng th€ rlrk of d€tth rnd InJ!ry. ta rlso<br />

0el1ev6 1s61-raa1 1.p/shoulder safety belts hay ba av!0 rbre effacflva,<br />

At tie estlmated belt ose r.te of l5 prr caot ln tha ra.r seit, te<br />

Itt hate that lrp/shoulder beltl Instillad rt.raar outboard seattng<br />

porj:lons voutd prevent.n iddltjonil 25 fattll as and 547<br />

'ltsO?rata-to-crltical<br />

lnJuri{s innuil ly. a5 conparad tO lap-onl} baltr.<br />

If usage r.ta! rere hjgh?r. thr added beneftts of tha lap/rhoutdar Syit[<br />

ro!ld be larglr, too. t€ are exaninlng the!a aff€cti In the contert of<br />

our rul€oaklng on rear-seat lap/rhoulder belti.<br />

I rlll raturn to tha rubject of our rutenrklng tn a Foant, but flrit !<br />

Lnt to giv€ you a report on davelopmentr In tha iptor yahlcl€ Induttry.<br />

Btcalle of agalcy as lnltes that ]rp/shoutder belti tn tha rerr iaat<br />

rould be 3onerhat rdore eff€cttve than lip betts In raduclng fatrllfl!s,<br />

ve hav€ bean €naouragtng thQ vehtat€ lBnuficturart to lnstall<br />

lap/shoulder belt3 vol0nt.rlly tn tha re!r seatJ of pts!.n9€r aari. tn<br />

pirt aJ a rtsult of the5e dlscurjloDs, ,iany &tnufacturers ,ho hid<br />

previorJsly not dona !o ara nor ripldly instal1lng tiere systams In thetr<br />

n€Y rrbde I s ,<br />

3


1$7<br />

t.nJ lgEE rcdel! rlre.dy have r!'r-!'at 1rp/shouldlr b€lt! r! !t'nd'rd<br />

aqulpm€nt, aid iblt olnufacturet! pl'n to Dh'!e then in to th' remilndg'<br />

gf th€tr passenger crr oodel3 rlthln ' ylrr' By 1990' ttrtu'llJ 'll<br />

ctrs. and lpproxlmatety 50 p€r cant of 'll ltght trucks 'nd n!ltlpurpd3e<br />

vahlcl€r, rlll cooe aqulpped vtth ther€ dtvlces 15 stind'rd e{ulptilnt'<br />

trrly thls y.rr, Y. Ganviiled !L! of the !utdt'k!r!' lnd !n F'brurrt r'<br />

rllltsad a consuflEr lnformrtlon bullltln rhtch lhorcd thtt 2' of 2.9<br />

oanufacturer! hr!e rear_3aat lip/shoulder belts 1n sc'De or 'll gf thtlr<br />

cl. nodeli thl! nodel yerr. Anong the do0Estlc r'nufactur'r!' Gl{ !'ld<br />

all of tts 1989 dooestic flodels,ill hav€ r"r-!'at l'p/should'r b'lt5'<br />

rhlte Ford srld 40-45 per cent of itJ c.rs rlll be Jo equlpped by 1989<br />

.nd all ncdels, €rcfpt for aeitiln coov'rtlbl'i' by 1990' Chryil'r 'l!o<br />

plrn! to h.ve ill of lt! tDdals rquipp'd rlth th'5e lystens by 1990'<br />

crcept for c€rtaln aonvertlbles Thjs llllTSA b0lletln' tog€ther Ylth<br />

oth€r consum€t lnfornatloo mitrrlal5 r' h'v' prep'r'd' vill h'l9<br />

consumer5 ln ftaklng th€lr purchaslng d'cl5lon9' te b!ll!ve th!t our<br />

dtclsiori to prag.re thls bulletin n'y tn ttself nave 'ncour'ged the<br />

Ba|luficturer! to tc(elar.te thelr p]an3 for prgvldlng l'p/!hould€r b'lts<br />

ln the r€ir a€rta.<br />

At Jour raqueit, I Ylll dtlcuss ilHTSA'! folior-up to th' il'tlon'l<br />

lrrnspo.tation S.fety 8o.rd's rlport of Augult 1986 that called Into<br />

que!tion the safery of reir-sa!t l'p b'lts<br />

Th't r'Dort not'd vrrlo{'!<br />

lap-belt-lnduced lnJurle3 at|ong re'r-s!'t occupanti In 26 frontal<br />

cralhes, ! nunber tha Board admltted vas fEt too tmall for 'ny<br />

!trtl !ttcal vrl l dl tY<br />

4


188<br />

lfirn thr rl9ort rrs r!lf.!!d, iflls lttongly dlrrgtard vltti th.<br />

jmplicitJon<br />

that people lght be better off !9!<br />

urlng l.p b€lts th.n<br />

rldl[E In tha r!.r 9€tt. x€ etpr€lsed our d!!9 conaarn that thE 8oa.d<br />

based ltJ rnrlyil! on tlte v!.y loll l nudar of cralhat conttlned ln lt3<br />

ilport, tnd that tht ragort dld not axaftlnt cllts rhtre rtlr-lilt<br />

laD-bllt |'!r had prarlntld llrlous lnlltla5. lh! Soard'r concllslons<br />

contrrdlct the flndlngs of n0narous studl?i by a lld€ rrnga of<br />

prof€sslonal r!s€archor! lnvolving far ||rcre cilia! thit cla!rly shoY tha<br />

llf€-srvlng p€.fornance of rrir-se!t lrp beltt. Br5ed on oirr inaly!l! of<br />

I number of crish data flies. re.r-5eat lrp balts ar€ abo0t 32 par (ant<br />

affectlve in preventlng fatalttles.nd.boot 36 par c€nt affactiva In<br />

radualng lnJury. In l98r alooe, re estinrt€ that raar-reat lap belt!<br />

!avad rbout l0O llvet and prlvented over 1500 trrlou5 InJurl9l. And<br />

these flgorer rould have been huch larger lf uiage rrte3 had bean hl9htl,<br />

lr tre concernad that th€ publtctty icconganylng th€ Soard'! r!0ort<br />

confulad the 0ub1lc and desgenad anth$3lish for !lf€t) belt u3e ltr<br />

gan€rll. lhls publlclty hrt been tlted'by t{rbrriki Stlte offlclals i3 |<br />

'partlculirly dr .9ln9 €!ant" ln tha referlnalur rhlch r.peil6d l{€bretka'!<br />

ilfaty belt use lly ln tlovrnbar 19E6. fe crn onty hopa that our futura<br />

alforts and thosa of others ln the lafaty cotfiunlty rlll ovarcoDP any<br />

lgig-tetu neg.tlva rffect3 th.t tha publtclty surroundlnq th. Soird'!<br />

ra9ort iBy have hnd.<br />

^! a result of lts stldy. th€ Board nade four r€co|||nendatlonti<br />

thlt<br />

IHTSA ihoLrld enaoura0e nranufacturers to provlde after.har|(et lap rnd<br />

:<br />

1<br />

a ,1


139<br />

!ho0lder balts for consun€rs to ln3tall ln th' r'ir 3€att; thit NHTSA<br />

should lnltirte rul€ttiklng to reQUlre such belts ln the futur'; thrt th'<br />

agencJ, iho!ld €ncourige fiin0facturers to lnattll !uch b'lt! Yolunt'rlly<br />

ti rn Intarlm naasur€: and thrt ve rhould arahlne th€ fe'5lblltty of<br />

tnrtalltng 3-polnt belts ln other !eatlng 9osltlonl'<br />

The agency hi! carefully revlared th€se r€coih€nd'tioni' tk l9r" thlt<br />

Droperly deslgnad lrp alld shoulder belts hrv€ th' pot'ntl'] to offtr tttn<br />

graat€r rra!h protectlon than lap belt5 alon€' lhlle both systen! ire<br />

aff€ctlve ln pr€vantlng tJ€ctlon (r alor ciu!€ of lerloui Inlury or<br />

darth). l!0/shoulder belts provide the added b€neftt of prot€ctlng th'<br />

haid lnd uDDer torso as rell as th€ lor€r body liorev€r' re fiu5t dg"n<br />

stresr th.t our vjeYs rbgut tha tdd€d protectlon off'r'd by li9/lhould'r<br />

balir do not tn any ray altet out conclu5lon thrt retr_t'lt l'p bllts lrt<br />

thanselves lffactlve ln r€duclng the r1!k of terlou! lnJury or d'rth'<br />

llth r€gard to tha loard'5 r.cofilr€ndatlon for tht rettofJttl,'g of lap 'nd<br />

rho!lder belt! tnto aars aqulppad rlth re'r-5'!t l'p-only b!ltt' r' h've<br />

baen cautlou3 ln our ddvice to coniuner!' Th're ire soil€ lliportint<br />

r€rsoos for thti approach. Flrgt' In vltr ol the genertl 'ffectlveness<br />

of ltp-only baltl ln tha rlar !aat, ra b'll!v' lt !! €rtr'!'lJ lhport'nt<br />

ttat re !9! uadeflDine publJa conftdence or deter ulrge of the s'f'ty<br />

!r!ten! that lta rlraady avillrble In nllllons of crrs on th' ro'd'<br />

Sicond, the effectlv.ness of a retroflttld lap/lhotlld'r 5'f'ty bllt<br />

system fiay rell depend on lts design coogitablllty vlth the v'hlcl' 'nd<br />

the lnrtallatlon, slnce they rere not enqlneered and bullt In at th€<br />

faatory. A vahtala'3 floot 9rn deslgn, r€it ttlff;es3, rnd s'at deslgn


F<br />

-<br />

(as lt relate, to oc(uDtnt posture, €an affect tha p955,bl)tty<br />

of<br />

occlrpart',<br />

a,<br />

suboartnlng in a crarl sl'lt'blllty of r prrttcurar<br />

yahrcr€ for rltrofrtang ,, ,nar,' ' co'Dl'r q!''ttoi.<br />

In our vtar,<br />

tne Jud$rrrt !s to .,refhfr " .a*.tott l'plsiouid'r 6.rt Jystar should<br />

lnrt.r.d<br />

d!<br />

rn. rehrcre rs 0",,,"1t" ot tnt vahtcr€ hrnufrct,r.r, yhtch<br />

&it fa.rr.r<br />

r5<br />

rrth tb? drta,r.d,f" "rd itr{'ctur'r dtsrgn<br />

ptrfo<br />

and crarh<br />

..nca of the car. ,n,"0, a,ttt Jnsumrt tholld bc 'rtr'<br />

purchasa<br />

thrt th.<br />

and prop€r lnstirit,on )f ' ratrofrt rear-saat ilp/strorldar<br />

Dert krt.rr rntaJI consrderabre<br />

ttth th€re cauaonr rn nrnd,<br />

noy€var. re have actlvery aought t<br />

ptovt.ren<br />

ro the<br />

or r€tro*t 6.rt! ," ,",:::;t:t:;::'.cooe'r'tron<br />

l{a nrve aontact.d €aci of the rEjor vthlal. lanufraturari to asctrtaln<br />

thttr pt.ns for offlrtn9 tip/rhoutd b'lt r'trofJt kJts for r.rr<br />

of yohJ.,!! i..t!<br />

orrrrnary €qutppad rrt<br />

rlr..dy orfertns ruch kr ts to,,,. r:r;:: ::jt:"r'::":::<br />

:::r::<br />

Chryiler<br />

..r,<br />

haj jgsued<br />

r,arvic€ brrllal to ttt d"rars that descrrbrs<br />

ratrofrt<br />

th.<br />

krt3 thnt are irrrr.br€ ro,."n lt! r.d'li' Ford r3 d.veroprr)9<br />

r.troflt krts fo-rrst ol rts l9?9 a iat€r ad'l-t"r crri aod vl'<br />

orovrd€ th€le ktts to rtr dairers th Atlgust othlr r'nuflctlrars rr.<br />

rrio offarrng ktts or hryr rrrd,r!tld tltct 'r! rtvl*rng tia rtsual<br />

irve<br />

but<br />

not yet n de flnar dacrsto.s.<br />

L both gublta and Frtvata raa ng!. IFTSA hat anco0rrgtd atnufacturart<br />

to off?r yett-destgned<br />

retroftt kjts tot tnorr 'onsufterr rho d€srra<br />

lrrd<br />

thafi.<br />

," .re ad'tin,rng our efforts ,n t"ttto le rlgo a'e tryln9<br />

!d!cita<br />

to<br />

consuner!, through pubrrc ,nr,tn" )matlon l|ateri al,, lbout trle


14t<br />

beneflts rnd (osts of theg€ belt rystatti !o that th€y aan oak€ an<br />

lnforned cholce. He provid€ tha nrne, addrgs! rnd t!iaphone nuflb€r gt<br />

InJ, tntarested consuit€r lho contrcts tha agaocy to I tanufacturer'i<br />

raDreslntatlva rho ln tlrn arrang€t to hrve e ftctory rapreientrttva<br />

advlse th€ consuher about th. ratrof!t optlon.<br />

I Fold alio ]lke to aall loor attantion to a rllatad flnal rola ra<br />

tttlad tn t985, nonth! bafor? tha iTSB raport vrs ralaatad' to rslllt<br />

consum€ri rho rlsh to hrve r.troflt lap/!houlder belt5 !nsttllad. That<br />

r0la raqulres, for any vahlcle not aqulgpad rlth r€ar-t€.t lrp/ihouldar<br />

bll:s i! itandard rqulpment. thrt tha mrnufrcturer n!!t provlde I dlrgra.<br />

In th€ orn!r'3 anutl !hortng tha locatlon of the rarr_t!rt rltoolder balt<br />

anchorages, rhlch are crltlcal tn proper ln!tallatlon. IHTSA hai<br />

raqulrad thase inchorage po1nt3 ln all pa3sang.r cars !lnca 1968. lhls<br />

ornlr'3 ornual lnformatlon requlraient, rhiah rant lnto effert on<br />

Saptanber l, 1987, 3ho!ld ilart consumers that th!lr v!hlcles clo ba<br />

raulDped rlth iuch b€ltl and lt rhould conplement.anufecturars'lffortt<br />

In thl r r.gard.<br />

Tha ilTSB tlro oade r.aofi[ndatloos r€qlrdlng po!3lblt rulafirkfng to<br />

rtqutre reir-se!t li9/rhooldar beltl to nlr ibtor {ahlalei. ln thll<br />

rtgard, the igency granted I g.tltton fll.d by th€ Los AnEeles Arei Chlld<br />

Paii€nger Safety Asroalatlon rlqua!tlng th€ ag€nc, to raqulra the<br />

initillatlon of re.r-!eat l.p/shoutder beltl as orlglnal ' 5t.ndird<br />

aqulDment. Tro ner factors 1!d the igency to grant this petltion.<br />

Flrst, nany states had adopted !ifqty belt u:e laYs, rhlch led to an<br />

Incraale ln belt use in the rear i€at. Sacond, i nlnber of ahlld


lltrrl nt lylterl hrd b..n<br />

ncre ?a5lly ba usad ln rear<br />

provl dad.<br />

712<br />

d€!lgn.d for uie rlth lhoulder b.lts ahd could<br />

seatlng poslttons lf ihould€r belt5 yere<br />

l3so.dlngly, ltt Juna lgt? rr pu0ll3iad m ldvrnctd iotlca of prooo3.d<br />

rultn|.king (ANPRl,4) reeklng coooent5 on th! neld to rlqulr! lap/shouldar<br />

baltr ln the r.rr s.!tln9 posttton! of priilnllar carr, nultipuiport<br />

prtsangar vahlclas, su(h a! vans and utlllty vahlalas, rnd sm!ll buttt.<br />

Thl c€nter s€ating posltloni rere to be ronsldaaad, as yell r! the<br />

outboard porlttonr, fhe a.,ltrP-hts tr resDorg€ to th€ AnpRil h.ve provlilld<br />

ur,lth conaldarabla Inforirtjon on thls sublert.<br />

ln connactlon tlth our ra?xanlnitlon of the lrru. of reqolrlng<br />

lrD/3houlde. beltE ln re.r !e.ti. tha AilPRI also dlsco!s€d the rat!ltt ol<br />

tha agencJ'! prallnlnary revl€r of the co5t5 and rrfaty beneflts of<br />

ratr-i€rt lap/lhoulder balts rnd req!€sted coiment! on thot! rasults.<br />

lh! prallnlnary rlvl€r lhowd thtt raar-saat lrD balts hava bean<br />

.ff..tlv€ !n reduclng deaths and r€rlous tnlurl.i. At th!t tlr€, !e<br />

tttllated th.t the beneflts of i.vlng r.ar-laat lap/sioulder beltJ lr.ll<br />

pa3rantar vahlcler rould ba io.ddltlonal rnnual rrductloo of about l0<br />

fatalltl€r ind 400 lartou! lnjurlas, rt tha 1985 u5a9e rata of rbout l0<br />

pa. clnt for rear-iaat oacupints. Th€ pr!llrlniry ravlar al!o ritlrtad<br />

that the Ennual cort of a req!lrerEnt for lrp/rhouldar b6lts at th€ retr<br />

outboird !eatlog po!ltion5 rorild be tl39 rllllon for pt!i€nge. car!, t2l<br />

nllllon for llght truck!.nd multlpurgose p.rr€n9er vehl(las. ind<br />

1100,000 for smal I buses.<br />

9


l,l8<br />

Glwn tll. currant ?rtlitrt€d o€lt utaga rat€ of 16 9ar caat In raar j€att,<br />

aa cofipared to the 1985 usage rate of 10 per cent, th€ ben€flts<br />

alsoclited rlth raqulrlng lap/shouldar beltt In the raar sa!ts rguld ba<br />

grlltar than ra astlmated<br />

ln the AliPRI. le ara nor coDla ng our rcrk<br />

to detarnlne nbre er.ctly the rott3 of tha rulaaaklns and r! banafltt<br />

for dlffarent proJected usage rat€s.<br />

lh? rul!m!ktn9 proceis eotatls caraful aongldarrtloo Of tha comant!<br />

received in response to tha ANpRH, ei rell r! tha thorough.n.ly5ts of<br />

th€ manufactur€rt' Dlanr to ln!till lap/!houldar b!lti voluntarlly In tha<br />

raar saats of thelr veilcles, the contlnutog trend of Strtes to anact<br />

itfety belt use lars, rnd JnCreaSlng belt o!age rata!. la are tn the<br />

ftnal 5ta9r of forfiulating our response to alt thl! inforiE oo and rc<br />

arpart to ba able to plblt!h the r€gulti of thli Droceir In the ne.r<br />

Ilth r.lrrd to ITSB,! r.cc-.nlt.tlon tl||t tlSA rholtd anco{rr9c thr<br />

[.nufacturers to provjd€ r€ar-teat lrp/!hou]6er bettr on a voluntary<br />

0rrli, re rould ag.ln nota thrt ye hava been dcrng io for ieyeral t!!r!.<br />

In part as a r€sult of tilJ lncourigefient. v{ arc aaalnE th€ r?toltJ t<br />

dlsc!ssed aarller concernlng th€ manuficturar!, plan! to lnrttll thar!<br />

tyttans In th€lr nar mderr. Thui, r! bellGva ra hava cdeltad rtth thlr<br />

rccoolnendatlon<br />

as re l1 ,<br />

Iadam Chalrroflan. thii conclodes ny prep.red remarks. l,ty cotl€a9ues .nd<br />

I rould be h.ppy to trj, to ansrar any quertions you may hrve.<br />

t0


^,yfii?*Til*"Ti:o"J<br />

114<br />

:ff rffi,ffif "ftr$T'*ffi }$:-ffid[]tl'"ff 'v"'l<br />

#ll"-*ffiHg'##.ffi -**##;f $"rri?:*<br />

gdi$#'*:i1";ff fu{ffi t:r;'s.j**;HxT"Tn}<br />

'"'#:tffiltr{f5;iff:-<br />

not have been done simurtaneousrv'<br />

ffixffi$*ffiffi<br />

'V*.#**tm#*mHroiiY'Jl;:s'"*o'**<br />

tri.*eTJ#lJ*:T#s'srffi'?',:#"ii$ISST?,hfl<br />

i<br />

nl,jffil*:n,'*u,;gffi*<br />

nffidi*ii:{t"#*#*tt},trs Ttr 4,;T$r ff ir<br />

r*nrffi ;m:#*.*,*ffiTffiffi HH$H:f


t16<br />

meut That's why we and the manufacturare are rn{}vjDg tmard a<br />

etandard installation of rear seat lap/shoulder belts. In-deed, they<br />

are now standard in many of the new model cars in the showrcoms<br />

this year.<br />

Mns. Cor,rws. Mr. Nielson asked a question of t,le previous wit<br />

ness of how many livee have been saved by the rear seitbelts. Have<br />

you got any information on that?<br />

Mr. Mrlr.xn. Yes. We have some estimates of savings by lapbelts.<br />

At current rates of lapbelt uaage, we believe they aie respdnsible<br />

for saving about 100 lives per year and that's with an eslimated<br />

uaage rate rate. of 16 pe: percent. If usage _was higher, we could expect<br />

higher savings. _Indeed,<br />

i! we had 100 percent usage of those systema<br />

currently in cars today, we believe we could sive another 600<br />

lives per _y_ear. The savings if we had lap/shoulder belts in the rear<br />

geat would be slightly higher. Our estimat€s of effectiveness of the<br />

sys!€ms when used in the rear s€at is about 32 percent for lapbelts<br />

and about 4l percent for laplshoulder belts. So-there's a slight incrrease<br />

but we believe evidence is very clear that lapbelt€-themaelves<br />

are-and we've looked at numeroua data sources involving<br />

lite"atly lhorrotrds of cases-srafe and that usage should be encouraged.<br />

Mrs. CoulNs. Mr, Felrice, now that the car companies have said<br />

the manufacturers say that they're going to have ihe lap/shoulder<br />

belts in the cars by f990, ian't your regulation or rulemaking a<br />

little bit late?<br />

Mr. FEr,trcE. Well, not necessarily, because our proposed rulemaking<br />

-addressed more than p.rs,s€nger cars. It addrissdd all lightduty-<br />

vehicles and it includes vans, utility vehicles and pic"kup<br />

trucks, many of which also have other than a front seat.<br />

We don't see the same kind of voluntary efforts for these other<br />

vehicles, or at least the efforts for those vehicles are later in time.<br />

O_ur_ rulemaking is more comprehensive thsn the voluntary actions<br />

of the companies so far. For paa€enger cars, yes, we could not re.<br />

quire them to put in lap/shoulder belts faster than they're doing<br />

by themselves. But for other vehicles, it's a potentially differeni<br />

question.<br />

Mr. Mu.r.nn. May I also add, Madam Chairwoman, as we've seen<br />

in recent years that there are a large number of new entrants into<br />

the U.S. auto market. While the commitments and our survevs<br />

have looked at all of the maaufacturers that are currently selling<br />

in the Ulited States, there are from time to ti.rne, ner" auti companies<br />

coming into the United Stat€s. A Federal reouirement on our<br />

part w.ould help to guarantee that those new entrants made similar<br />

commrtments,<br />

Mrs. Coluxs. Mr. Nieison.<br />

Mr. NrBrsoN. Yes, I'm sorry I didn't hesr all of your statement,<br />

Mr. Miller. On pagte 3, you say, and I quote, "Fir€t I must give you<br />

a report on developments of the motor vehicle industry. Becaus€<br />

the agency estimates the lap/shoulder belts in the rear seat would<br />

be somewhat more effective than lapbelts in reducing fatalitiee, we<br />

\"t" !*tt encouraging- the vehicle manufacturers to install lap/<br />

shoulder belts voluntarilv in the rear seat."


146<br />

If ttre lapbelt-only in the back seat ie worth one unit, hw much<br />

is the lapplus-shoulder belt on that scale? Is it three times as effective?<br />

Twice as effective-1.5?<br />

Mr. Mrr,r.nn. I'd defer to Mr. Felrice, but I'll double check my<br />

math. I believe about 1.2.<br />

Mr. FsLRrcn. 1.29 is our estimat€.<br />

Mr. Nrxrsor. In other words, 30 percent more effective having<br />

the other?<br />

Mr, Fnrnrcu. Yee,<br />

Mr. Mu,r,nn. That incidentally, is only an estimate. We do not<br />

have extengive hard data on the effectiveneas of the lap/shoulder<br />

gvst€ms<br />

- in the rear seats as vet.<br />

Mr. NrErsoN. We had wiinesses earlier who indicated that the<br />

lapbelt only really was of questionable value. In some cases, you're<br />

better off not even wearing it. I)o you concur with Mr. Sakayan<br />

when he made that kind of a generalization?<br />

Mr. Mu.rrn. I was not here to hear the exact language that Mr.<br />

Sakayan used, but I would not coneur with that general statement.<br />

lVe believe the evidence is very clear that on balance, the usage of<br />

lapbelts in the r€ar seat i.s considerably efrective in reducing the<br />

- risk of death or urjury.<br />

It is not necessarily effective in every case, and indeed, the sam€<br />

thing could be said of lap/shoulder belt€. There are gome crashes<br />

that simply cannot be survived.<br />

Mr. Nrcrsox. I may be misinterpreting what I heard earlier, but<br />

I gpt the impression that the lapbelt plus-shoulder belt was many<br />

times better than the lapbeltonly-not<br />

just 30 percent better.<br />

Mr. Mru,rn. Our frgures are estimates; they are aggregates. Even<br />

in tJre front seat, which is a more dangeroue seating environment,<br />

there were demongtrated benefits of lapbelts before the tine in<br />

which lsp/shoulder beltr were introduced in the front seat.<br />

The pr-incipal benefrt, or at least one primary benefit of any belt<br />

eystem-whether it's lap or lap/shoulder-is to hold the occupant<br />

in place and to prevent ejection. In other worcls, to prevent the occupant<br />

from being thrown outeide the vehicle. That's 11t" single<br />

biggest cause of death and serious iqiury. iapbelts do that job very<br />

well.<br />

The one advantage of a shoulder strap is it provides additional<br />

suDnort for the upper torso.<br />

Mr. Nrursox. Iti older than some of you and I can remember the<br />

time when they emphasized: Be sure that you have seatbelk, particularly<br />

in the right hand passenger side in the front seat. I asked<br />

the question, is that the most dangerous place? They said, no, the<br />

driver seat is the most dangerous place. That's where you're put<br />

tine the airbass.<br />

Why don't you have airbags or recommend them for the right<br />

eeat passenger, where it seems you have nothing to grab onto and<br />

therefore would be more vulnerable than ttrre driver?<br />

Mr. Mu..wn. We do recommend airbagr in both eeating positions<br />

in the front. In fact, Ford <strong>Motor</strong> Co. just yeeterday unveiled a new<br />

model that they'll be selling this next model yeer; the frret domestically<br />

produced car to offer airbags at the right passenger seating<br />

poeition as well as for the driver.


tM<br />

Oru automatic prot€ctioD requirement that I referencetl earlier,<br />

which was issued in 1984 b,y former Secretary Dole, requiree automatic<br />

protection syst€ms f6r both the drivei and the righLfront<br />

passenger. That requirement is phasing in. 'lli8<br />

i8 the second year<br />

6f a a-year phaseiri progr"m. 14'e have permittod driver+ideonly<br />

airbage as a means to encourage the airbag technology.<br />

At the end of the phasein, whatever technology the manufacturer<br />

chooses must be available at both seating pcitions'<br />

Mr. Nrnrrox. You also mentioned the fact that if you hsve automatic<br />

seatbelt, aa Eome care do, that wes very effective. Why don't<br />

you recornmend that for aII cars. In Bome cars novr' when you open<br />

ihe door and get in, the sestbelt automatically cloeea over you.<br />

Whv don't vou recommend that?<br />

Iir. tvttl-r-rn. We've done more than recommend it. We've, in fact,<br />

required either that or airbegs. Our automatic protection standard<br />

that wag iesued in 1984, will require--<br />

Mr. Nrursox. Effective when?<br />

Mr. Mnr-nn. We're in a phasein period. It becomee fully effective<br />

in September 1989- We're in the middle of a phasein right now.<br />

Mr. Nrmsox. The 1990 model year will have them though?<br />

Mr. Mnmn. Thads correct. Every new car sold in the Uniteil<br />

States in model year 1990, will be required to have automatic protection<br />

systema in the front seat. It'e the manufacturer's option as<br />

to whether to do that through airbags or through automatic ssfety<br />

belts or if they come up with some new technology, they're free to<br />

try that as well.<br />

-Mr. NtEsoN. The Institute for lnjury Reduction said they are<br />

trvinq to set a car recalled becaue€ ist has a defective s€stbelt<br />

grite6. Wf,at is vour recall authoritv and what are ite limitations?<br />

- Mr. MIr.r.tn. Under the National Tiaffic and <strong>Motor</strong> <strong>Vehicle</strong><br />

Safetv Act. which is our authorizing statut€, we are authorized and<br />

also -motoi vehicle manufacturers are required to recall and<br />

remedy any vehicle which is determined to have a safety-related<br />

defect. firat term is Ieft very broad so that it can encompaaa any<br />

syst€m. It doesn't matter whetJrer it's specifrcally covercd by our<br />

regulations or not.<br />

Mr. Nrmsorc. It cen include a s€atbelt syst€m?<br />

Mr. lfrr,r.nn. It certainly would include a safety belt system. It<br />

must Dr€Bent a safety defirt, which means an unreasonable safety<br />

risk 6 motor vehicle travel. We have, in fact, had a number of<br />

cases in which safety beit systerns have been the subject of recalls'<br />

Mr. NrnrcoN. So you have recalled a vehicle due to a faulty aeat<br />

belt syst€m?<br />

Mr. Mru.un. Yea, sir, we have-more properly, the manufactur-<br />

ers have. Thoee have been to address a number of probleme euch ag<br />

faulty retractore or inadequate webbing. Safety belts are-and I<br />

don't want to leave the impression impr€ssion that in general geneial they're bad' bad, be bg<br />

cauee they're not. They're very good. They're y're very effective, but<br />

like anv syst€m system in a motor vehicle, vehicl' ther€ may be eome occasional<br />

orobleris problems durins during manufacture and becsua€ becauae thoee relate directly to<br />

0he safety of ocdupants, E8, they're lhey Te covered covereo by Dy orrr our recall recau authority. aurnonly.<br />

Whenever we frnd a defect defeit in a safetv safety belt syst€m, we do require<br />

a recell,


148<br />

Ms. JoNEs. I would like to add that under the statute. if a safetvrelated<br />

defect is determined to exist in a car, whether ordered 5y<br />

our agency or determined by the motor vehicle manufacturer, the<br />

consumer who owns that car is notified and the remedv is provided<br />

free of charge under the law.<br />

Mr. Ntursorq. I have more oueetions which lll submit later<br />

unless there's another round.<br />

Mrs. Colr.rxs. Mr. Kleczka.<br />

Mr. Krrczrce. Thank you, Madan Chairwoman. Mr. Miller, for<br />

the auto manufacturers installing the rear shoulder/lap belts in<br />

the 1988 models; is that being done as standard equipment in the<br />

cat?<br />

Mr. Mrr.r.nx- Yes, sir. T?rere may be one or two models-there are<br />

ao many models, it's difficult to keep track of them all-where it is<br />

still optional, but our focus hag been on installation as standard<br />

equipment. That is the commitment that the manufacturers have<br />

made, that by model year 1990, virtually every new passenger car<br />

sold in this country will have rear seat lap/shoulder belts as standard<br />

equipment.<br />

Our congurnner information nieee-<br />

Mr. Klrca


1tl9<br />

Mr. Krrczse. Do you have any gugsstimate es to what year this<br />

might be required to be put into care?<br />

Mr. MIr.r "n. It would-depend to some extent on the number of<br />

@mments we received on the rulemaking and the length of time it<br />

took to resolve any issues that surfaced before we issued the final<br />

rule.<br />

Under the law, we must provide some leadtime, and that-would<br />

also be one of thb issues to be discussed during a formal rulemakine<br />

nroce€dine as to iust what amount of lead time wa6 neceasary.<br />

W; 'misht haie stasiered lead times-one year for passenger cars<br />

and an-other vear fofthe larger vehicles eince they-since, the passenser<br />

cars dlready have the anchorage rroints. Some of the larger<br />

veh'icles may not. But it would be within the next few years -<br />

Mr. Kr,nc'zxn. The speaker from the Auto Association indicatBs<br />

that there misht be other provisions of the rule which could pro<br />

vide a hardsf,ip for the manufacturers. Do you know what he<br />

misht be referring to?<br />

ffi.. 1141r r rn. Ye-s, I believe I do, Mr. Kleczka. We raised some of<br />

thoee i8gueg in our advance notice, in an effort to try to stimulate<br />

some diecussion at an early stage so we could perhape expedite<br />

later stages of the rulemaking. One of the issues would be whether<br />

to reouire dvnamic testing of the belis in the rear 8eat.<br />

Oviurnic testing is our-way of describing a full'scale crash t€et<br />

witli instrumented crash t€6t dummies. T?rat's an extremely complex<br />

means of proceedins with a re$rlation. Our front seat autoinatic<br />

protectioir requireirent is governed by dynamic tealing gnd<br />

that t&k-there wire other iss[es involveil there, too-but that<br />

took almost 20 vears to resolve.<br />

Mr. Kr,rczx,.-. OK, but it seems to me that that testing has aIready<br />

been done. In Tact, we just saw a video here in which the institu-te<br />

did tests on lhe rear shoulder/lap belts.<br />

Mr. Mrr.r.en. We do those sorts of test and I'm sure the manufacturers<br />

do those sorts of test as well fo1 purposes of development.<br />

But when thoee te$s are conducted foi purposes of com^pliance<br />

with a iezulation. there are an almost couirtless number of highly<br />

technical -details. These include issues euch as placement of the<br />

dunmy. If you have a dummy in the rear seat, should-you simultaneousl-v<br />

have a dummv in the front s€at; the angle of imPactl the<br />

speed 6f imp-act; the c6nditioning and pretesting of a dummy prior<br />

to '-If ugase rn the tegt.<br />

w1- were to determine that that was necessary' that would<br />

bolh, I think, delay the rulemaking and also require a longer leadtime.<br />

Mr. Kmczxe. The Institute indicated that they s€nt your agency<br />

u oeiitio" some time aso and the time for response has since lapsed<br />

an'd that was Mav of ihis vear, I believe. That was relative to an<br />

unsa6 eeatbelt il the Esiort. Whai s the status of that petition<br />

filed with your agency?<br />

tvIr. Mtri.rn. TEat ri,as a petition for a defects investigation. That<br />

is cJrrently pending beforti the agency. We expect to,make a decision<br />

on whether or not to open an investigatlon m that car€ very<br />

shortlv-within the next few weeks. As a matier ol general agency<br />

-it"] as with anv law enforcement agency, we do not discuss<br />

pending enforcement matt€rs at length in public forums'


150<br />

Mr. Kr.nca


15r<br />

At that time, baged on the most recent usagp rate *u !4d'<br />

which at that point were 1985 usage rates, the benefits appeared to<br />

be low. Our m6re recent information i8 that usage rates are higher'<br />

They've gone from an eetimated 10 percent in the rear seat to l'6<br />

pencen[. '<br />

That increases the level of benefrte that one could expect with<br />

rear shoulder belts. We also have eligh v incre-ased our mtimatee<br />

of the effectiveneee of tho€e systeme when us€d. B€cause uesge<br />

rates are continuing to rise in the front seat, we are more oPtimistic<br />

now I believe, tf,an we were previously, 88 to the <strong>Project</strong>ionl for<br />

future uaase in the rear seat. The moFe usage you have, the mor€<br />

benefrts vo:u will have.<br />

Mrs. eoluxs. So then you 'to don't feel today that coots are extr€me.ly<br />

disproportiotrate the possible eafety benetits on the<br />

shoulder/ lap belts, right?<br />

Mr. Mrr-r.in. We-have more r€@nt thinking on the subject.<br />

Mr. Frr,nrce. If I could just add, Madam Chairman, one of the<br />

rea'ons that stat€ment was in the rulgrnnt ing notice was, in the<br />

oagt, the agency has been able to issue safety re4ulations which'<br />

ilttr6ueh w-e doir't put a dolar figure on a human life or an iqiury'<br />

we flrgired wou)d iost the publiC about $300,000 for every fatality<br />

that our resulatione avoided.<br />

For this -resulation, that number would heve been cloeer to 515<br />

million for eierv fatalitv avoided. So it was about 50 times mor€<br />

exrengive than -the tvpical rezuIation we b^ave is8ued. It ki'd of<br />

raised our eyebrows and that's why we aaked the public for comment<br />

on that point.<br />

Mr. Mu,mn. Aeain, we're uot focusing eo much on the dollars as<br />

we are the usage-the best, use of linited r,e8ource3. We have resources<br />

within -our agency; the .na'ufacturers have limited resources<br />

and we want-to foake sure tlut when we are dirccting<br />

Bomebody throwh regulation to do eomething' that we're going to<br />

eet - a eood safetv -w'e Davoff for that irrvettmeut.<br />

If rie're not, ilmbably ought t try to channel it- into some<br />

other oart of th" "dhiclu w-herJwe couid get a good Eafety payofr.<br />

Mrs. CourNs. I believe in respon€€ to a queetion from Mr. Klecz.<br />

U tttaCtou mentioned that vou at first had str advan@ notice of<br />

;frem"Ling and you were nori in*q a secogd phase..My queetion i8'<br />

when are you ever gorng to get to the tlPa'l rulemakln-gt<br />

Mr. Mrirn. The-issu-ancds of a final rule would depend on the<br />

extent and complexity of the comments that are rEceived in a<br />

"oii". of piopo"d.t ruEmaking, but I would envision t'hat c'ould be<br />

completed- by early or middle of next ye9r.<br />

Mrs. Colllr.rs. I8 that your tsrgEt dat€?<br />

M;. Mrrr.EB" That would be oir target date now, but again' that<br />

will be dependen! in large part, on the typ€ of comments that we<br />

"""eire. ttfe're rtquired inder our statuti-and under the APA to<br />

fullv ---lit". address and ionsider all comments received<br />

Cor.r"*". If it should be tlnt you reach a t€rget which is<br />

peihtp" *m" time in the middle of nert year-another y€ar from<br />

iow:i o* lo"g will it have taken you to let that ruIe into a fi:ral<br />

rulemakine poeition?<br />

Mr. MIrlrB. WeIl, it would be-<br />

Mrs. CoLLrxs. When did you start?<br />

$<br />

E


752<br />

Mr, Mrr,Lsn. I guess it depends a little on what you consider<br />

the- Mrs. Couxs. Well, when did you start? You know when you<br />

started the process. When did you start it? What year?<br />

Mr. Mnr.in. Well, the frrst notice we published on the issue was<br />

our advance notice for pmposed ruleinakinS, published in the<br />

gummer of 1987. So that would have been approximately z year8.<br />

That is, for our rulemaking process, probably about the norm'<br />

Mrs. Cor.r,rNs. OK, thank you. Mr. Nielson.<br />

Mr. Nrnrsox. Yes, Mr. Miller, in terms of safety, how do you<br />

comparre the relative safety of the bach seat environment with the<br />

front seat environment?<br />

Mr. Mrr,r,rn. The back seat of a vehicle tenile to be a much safer<br />

place.<br />

- Mr. Nrnr-soN. How much eafer?<br />

Mr. Mu,r,nr. I'll defer to my exp€rt.<br />

Mr. NnrsoN. If the risk in the back seat-<br />

Mr. Mrr.r.nn. I can describe why it's safer.<br />

Mr. NrErsoN. No, I don't want that. If the risk of the back eeat's<br />

a "one." what's the rigk in the front seat?<br />

Mr. Frr-nrcr. I don't know. We could supply that for you. Essentiallv<br />

vour askins, given that a seat is occupied, what's the risk of<br />

Ueini iniured or Ell-ed in that seat?<br />

14i. 1i[1nr-sqN. Well, I know that there's the probability of it's<br />

beins occupied. but leave that factor out.<br />

Mi. FnuiIcn. I'm saving, given that a seat is occupied, what's the<br />

probability of injury 6r deattr and I'd have to go back and check<br />

our crash data,<br />

Data from the agency's crssh data frles indicate that the rear<br />

seat provides a safei environment than the front seat for passenger<br />

car &cupants. If the likelihood of iqiury to a rear seat occupant ia<br />

1.0, the likelihood of injury to a front seat occupant is approximat+<br />

lv 1.4 or 40 D€r€ent great€r.<br />

- Mr. Mu.lin. I think it would be somewhere between one and two'<br />

Mr. NrprsoN. Obviouslv, we need a bett€r range. Our frrst<br />

panel-you weren't here,- some of you. I think Erika was here'<br />

they advocated more effort by the Government to Pressure the indusfrv<br />

to nrovide retrofit kiG so that consumers can equip their<br />

o*rr iars, iheir existing cars, $'ith lap/shoulder belts in the rear<br />

seats. if thev so choose.<br />

Is ihig a dood idea?<br />

M.. Mr"ii*. We believe it can be a good idea, although -it's not<br />

necessarily a good idea fo-r 4l vehic-les. That's wFy .we<br />

rely -very<br />

heavilv oi thelxpertise of the manufacturers to identify which ve<br />

ttia"J'c"" properlv be retrolitted with kits and also identify the ap<br />

^ propriate liit fbr the appropriate vehicle'<br />

Mr. Nrnrsox. There ire-some vehicles for which it would not be<br />

a eood -Mr. idea?<br />

Mu,lrn. That's what we are informed by the manufacturers,<br />

and thev have the detailed model-by-model information'<br />

Mi. tirersox. Would the burden'of proof of saying it would be or<br />

would not be a good idea be on them or on yo.Y? - .. . -<br />

Mr. Ml,r-rn. bn the manufacturer-for all of this information,<br />

ru" iely otr the vehicle manufacturers. Particulariy for a manufac-


l5:l<br />

turer that ofrers largp numbers of models, such as Ford or General<br />

MoLors; they have done some pretty extensive analyrir ae to just<br />

which models can and which csn not be properly outftttad with retrofrt<br />

kits.<br />

Mr. Nrrrsox. It was also asserted by the firrt panel that in rome<br />

cases, laponly safety belk may actually contribute t, or ovon caure<br />

injury during an accident. In your experience, is it unurual to hcar<br />

of problems with safety features like that? In other wordr, h it<br />

rather unusual for someone to be downgrading it€ms that you've<br />

found to be safe?<br />

Mr. Mu,r,nn. Well, we try not to downgrade safety systemr, brrt<br />

it's not unusual that a system which ordinarily works well and contributes<br />

to safety, may in some instances, either not provide safety,<br />

or in a rare instance, provide some detriment.<br />

One analogy we frequently use is in the medical community to<br />

vaccines. Vaccines do a wonderful job of insulating us against dieease,<br />

but there are some rare case where vaccines may actually<br />

injure a person. On balance, they are very effective. We feel the<br />

same way about safety belts.<br />

Mr. NmIsoN. It seerns to me like you're treading a very frne line<br />

there, because if you tell people about the danger of using lapbelts<br />

only and the superiority of the shoulder/lap combination, that you<br />

would need to be careful that you don't encourge them to stop<br />

using the lapbelte entirely.<br />

I'm afraid, unless I misread the first panel-I hope they'll forgive<br />

me, but I felt the impression was: "If you haven't got a lap/shoulder<br />

combination, don-t bother." That was the basis on which Ne<br />

braska changed their law, basically.<br />

Mr. Mn lfr. That was dne of th6 factors cited by State officiale in<br />

Nebraska.<br />

Mr. NtnrsoN. Plus the fact that the people thought you shouldn't<br />

try to Iegislate good trehavior.<br />

Mr. Mir,r,rn. That's another issue that surfaces from time to time<br />

as well. I think your analysis there is correct. We do -try to walk<br />

that line carefully so that bven when we tout the added benefrts of<br />

new systems, we do not in any way denieFat€ the demonstrable<br />

benefits of existinq 6vstem6.<br />

We frnd a similir iituation in the front seats. We are very excit'<br />

ed about the added benefits that could be supplied with airbags'<br />

but that does not in any way cause us to weaken our recommendations<br />

for usage of the safety belts that are currently in the front<br />

geats of passenger cars.<br />

Mr. Ftr.ntcr.-Mr. Nielson, if I can just add for a second. A lot of<br />

the potential problems that were mentioned by the earlier panel,<br />

were related lo the misuse of the syst€m. We've been trying as<br />

hard as we can to urge everyone we speak to, to use the syEt€rrg<br />

properly. -<br />

In teims of a lapbelt, wear it on the pelvis. Any safety system'<br />

whether it's a lap6elt, a lap/shoulder belt, an airb-ag; they all, in<br />

some rare circurnstances, can cause injury that would not have otherwise<br />

occurred,<br />

Mr. Nrrrsox. I think you're being unfair to the first panel. They<br />

did say, it's better to have it lower. It secures it bett€r, but if you


154<br />

have it around your stomach, it's liable to cause harm. I think they<br />

emphasized that as well.<br />

Eut let me ask this question: I)o you have enough data to accurately<br />

measure the beneFrts of a &point belt in the rear seat?<br />

Mi. Mrr.lun. We don't presently have defrnitive data on the sub<br />

ject,<br />

-werb for the simple -small reason that up until the last year or two, ther€<br />

rebtively numbers bf vehicles in t'he United States<br />

eouipped with rear seat lap/ehoulder belts.<br />

ttti. NmrsoN. What about other countries?<br />

Mr. Ml-r,rn. Other countries have had those systems longer, but<br />

they tend not tn have as good record keeping systems as we do, and<br />

occirpancy rates in the rear seats tend to be pretty low We believe<br />

there is an added benefrt, based on our experience with front seat<br />

shoulder belts.<br />

Mr. Nrnr.soN. If you don't have enough data yet, at what time do<br />

you - think you'll gLt enough data to make a definitive judgment?<br />

Mr. Mrlirn. Well, we're currently proceeding in the rulemaking.<br />

The data collection to docurnent effectively-to move from estimates<br />

into after-the-fact analysis-will probably take another 2 to<br />

3 -Mr. vears. It will depend in large part upon usage.<br />

NruIsoN. Iiow did you determine that they would be suffrcientiy<br />

effective in reducing fatalities to justify your making a rule<br />

to require them-if you dou't have enough data?<br />

Mr. Mrr,r-nn. We have some anecdotal data, and we do have the<br />

experience in the front geats where there is demonstrable improve<br />

ment. Also the crash t€sts we conduct show that in mat cases, although<br />

not necessarily every caae, but with a welldesiSxred lap/<br />

shoulder belt system ii: the rear, it will provide added protection as<br />

compared to a welldeaiened lapbelt.<br />

Mi. Nrnrson. i could-ask thi seme series of questions about the<br />

automatic harness in the front seat. Do you have data indicating<br />

that that's better than the voluntary syst€m, other than the fact<br />

that in the voluntarv. onlv 42 percent uae them, whereas with an<br />

automatic svst€m. th-ev'd dl have to? Is that the only basis?<br />

Mr. Mn lin. That's ihe only benefit to automatic eafety belts in<br />

the fmnt seats, to increase uiage rather than to increase the level<br />

of protection that's provided. airbags in the front- seat will provide<br />

added protection, piovided the occupant remembers to wear the<br />

safety belt in the first place.<br />

Mi. NrrIsoN. I have a number of other questions. I'd like to<br />

submit them in writing and I'd appreciate your ansvers L€t me<br />

ask one that I asked th6 previous p-anel. You've mentioned yourteU<br />

that you have to look at cost and benefrt analysis'<br />

Were you justified having concentrated so much on the front<br />

sest. sinie 90- percent of th; injuries occur there? Did you sort of<br />

ignore the bacli sest for all those years? Were you justified in doing<br />

so?<br />

Mr. Mnlsn I wouldn't say that we have entirely igrrored the<br />

rear 6eat, but we did focus mct of our efforts on the front seat,<br />

becauee the front eeat is where the overwhelmiag mqiority of the<br />

occupanta and the deaths and the injuries are. The other reason<br />

whv-the focus on the rear seat has been slower in coming, is be<br />

cause usage rates have been so low in the rear seats.<br />

il<br />

* 4q<br />

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ia<br />

il<br />

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t


Da<br />

wrtErr<br />

Illi Ttl-y!.q<br />

y9y Jtrq have nave a reasonable<br />

reruorabl.g pros prqpect of obtaining good<br />

f;i.,."1 j1g3 T ;ll"^^.:ii :l_*, thar it ;;j[t ;i;ft; 6'oj". "r,.<br />

proYlce rmproved types of syst€q<br />

#[d,;."Tf<br />

"o.9€tts-r :i"*tml{:iiqe;ll-'il;#iri,fi Jn"iliJJrlT,H<br />

than an unused lalbelt.<br />

y-our lf.":)jm^l-.Ari!tl;:co,;fiued atr<br />

statistics.<br />

a ttfle bit<br />

on the_one<br />

dubious<br />

hr"g,Jiu;y<br />

about<br />

"hil;."i'".;'JiilH<br />

g"?1#:<br />

rt"r<br />

:4.!F.".191tt" are;,chiliren-mo""<br />

u(elv<br />

oft n''ta" iii"ii" ur" bacL<br />

f.*-l!Tl a-dults; how "o-uih;,ii'inrv i,i"iifri Duckung buckling 9; "fiii;.6i:<br />

up in the back seat nr aB in rh-'r-^*+ ihth;;;;-;ii ^^-+c rt t. ,ilHtt?""l';<br />

-t^l--!'-<br />

aenae,<br />

Mr. Mlr.LEn. First, Id *T!.91-t that<br />

children<br />

we<br />

who<br />

exclude.-the<br />

are in<br />

very<br />

chilil r<br />

srn4.ll<br />

$;_;,y;'j;il"r.ti:i"d?fJTiJJX*"T;j"',"Hr*1ff ^'i:*:<br />

rt€ar seat<br />

Tcup+n$ are not alwayi children,<br />

have,<br />

and ftn<br />

data<br />

ioi<br />

that indicates<br />

uu""<br />

that<br />

*"<br />

agi group<br />

buckle<br />

neiessarily<br />

up<br />

a-J"<br />

nore<br />

t"na<br />

than adults_<br />

to<br />

Mr.. NrersoN. The first Sroup saiq so. My experienee<br />

case; that<br />

is<br />

it's rhe_<br />

that,s<br />

childreriwho<br />

the<br />

remind adrilts. .<br />

-_-lur. rurrltn. we re hopeful that that will<br />

we<br />

happen<br />

have not,<br />

in the future.<br />

:<br />

seen thad dennrtrvety In our survey data so far.<br />

and :flf$t!ifiryFji*i,t?r,ff;,"4*r'l#1i:$it,lln""*<br />

logic. would tell us that's ttre caee, but i d-;nT<br />

tbe dat€<br />

*jI""""<br />

to prove *"<br />

it yet.<br />

r,.r"<br />

Mr. Mrr.un- We'rL certainly, gearing many of our education oro-<br />

gi11" *ifh rhar soal in mind_to tfr to rtactr'ctriilre-ri;troft;<br />

:JTtf, thiouch. t)'pee of proglams<br />

crash<br />

thaf<br />

tesl<br />

aJieil<br />

dumbies,<br />

to-"1ilj.rr,_*o.r"<br />

Vince and Larrv.<br />

lhere s a muppet program<br />

ronttns i,hd giro aroundf,ouring<br />

satety<br />

the<br />

bett uee<br />

country<br />

and other<br />

\rye<br />

iypes<br />

want<br />

;a ;lrfii;-sa};ii'p'rogru_u.<br />

to _reach thar grou-p, bot-li t ;t-go f,it"t i#"'ro" tiru<br />

lylu"e ,rng also so.they'li- influence rheir paients.. ilui-<br />

;s<br />

togfarg to judge the results<br />

a titue<br />

of that camoaign.<br />

rur. -r_ELa,lcE. Mr. Nielson, if I could -juJt<br />

. add one more quick<br />

ffil:l{:f, "'."',Pi,,fr ifr I;,',:Ti"or**n.1",:'*i11"'#f<br />

!l!,n_tflp.,,rner9 q1e tw-o pe4ineng."criteri.<br />

deAl mlrr the<br />

Ti ;h;;iL.,J<br />

selection<br />

*r,ict<br />

of aativities that we will under*ike.<br />

--<br />

__y,r. o rne ma€tltude ol the eafety problem. In this case, rear<br />

f:,: 11y,lg"r car occupank,. althoirgh<br />

tsn<br />

in<br />

f, a 8malr problem,<br />

a" a-Ueol;d;umbe",<br />

relative to the<br />

rt<br />

dtal highway<br />

did rank<br />

;;l;at<br />

fairly low on the list.<br />

fi;iil;:<br />

lh€ sec€_nd .criterion we use is<br />

problem.<br />

our ability to ameliorate<br />

Here'e that<br />

_where usage comes *. Si"ce"*" coii i r,'"r?ry n"O<br />

:l{:Jrf _we*dnc belts in the tacl, it jusia-iOi,t ;;;r;hi[";;<br />

L.t]"i:91<br />

ot, our scare-?esources to a-problem that we<br />

solve<br />

A-dii,i<br />

by mandating<br />

tt irif.<br />

a more effective<br />

tr#:<br />

aevice ttra? wLuU "ot<br />

...TTjg gh"neu .g,n{. ttgt s ryhy ye've. reexamined rhe situauon,<br />

{15l_.T-I9 are wirh light truck ierety. e Ior of ouiitanOal& smr_<br />

LT,I -ipJry<br />

to passenger cars and. n6w that<br />

used<br />

light<br />

dlnerentrucks<br />

y,<br />

ari beini<br />

the environmert is differeni<br />

m,g. o.ur<br />

ula we<br />

regulations<br />

are ,-ee-*amln_<br />

to. see which ones we<br />

wnrch<br />

should "dlitiiigii -"o#-'ju"r<br />

are often<br />

t.u"t"<br />

used as passenger "". "ul"ti1u*<br />

*<br />

jr<br />

i1<br />

t"<br />

x<br />

f<br />

f


156<br />

usage increases in the rear seat, \'e are now in the midst of reexamining<br />

the reculation for rear seat shoulder belts.<br />

Mr. NreisoNl I thank you for testifying. I return the balance of<br />

mv -Mrs. time.<br />

Cor.r.rNs. I thank the gentleman. Thst concludes our witness<br />

panels for today. We thank you for testifying before us today.<br />

Mr. Mru.rn. Thank You.<br />

Mrs. CoLr.rxs. If there are any questions submitted to you in<br />

writing, would you please see to it that the answers are returned to<br />

ue within two weeks.<br />

Mr. MIr.r.rn. We would be happy to do so<br />

Mrs. CoLUxs. Ttrank you very much. Hearing is adjourned.<br />

lWhereupon. at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned' to reconve'ne<br />

subjeit to the call of the Chalr'1


APPENDIX<br />

Meronrar, SusMrtrEo rcn rnn Hnlnrr.rc Rrcono<br />

lhe Bonor.ble C..di36 coll ins<br />

Subconnitt.e on Covernre.t Activi Li€6<br />

and transportaiion<br />

co.mi tt€e on coverntrenL oper.tions<br />

8350A Rayburn Horse Offic€ Building<br />

rea6hinston, D. c, 20515<br />

tr1.5. ?tm!r of Rqftrmrtroet<br />

Sl|(!dni. ,n On .ri$ d ,i!l,t{ai.Il<br />

trc<br />

Cn'tttlradgdCIlr<br />

edfi$m, EC r"<br />

'Jl'ii .i<br />

June 3, 1988<br />

I under.t.nil through dl.c!..lon. ,lth our .!rf!6 that yolr<br />

SubcotroiEtee is planntnq.n inve6tigatlon r.ga.ding seat b€lls in<br />

th. rear of existinq and new noLor v€hlcles and Lhei. use, includln9<br />

the avail.bility dnd cost of rnstalling shoulder belts in Lh€<br />

re.! of eristinq vehicl€s.<br />

?he use of s€at belts by all pelsons ehiLe d!ivin9 i$ lhe<br />

Unit.d Stntes has b.en of con.id€!.ble conce.o of this subcotrrittee,<br />

as shovn by lhe.trcl.s.d Coriitte€ on Ene.9y a.d Corn..ce<br />

report on 11.R. t1 (p.9e5 I0-r21. !y lette. of Aprjl 29, r988 to the<br />

National Highray rraffic sat€ty Adolnistration (NHrsA) and Lhe<br />

General Account!19 offic€'s<br />

(GAol r€porr for the subconnittee on<br />

th€s€ ndtters. I call your particular attention to a letL€r of<br />

April 1r, l93a rron lhe chairnan of th. N.tioul Transportation<br />

Safety Boa.d, lrr, Jin aurnett, ,ho stat.s:<br />

rhe GAo vds (o(recr in irs frndrnq<br />

that th€ controve.6y prowoled by the Boardrs lap belt<br />

report.ro6e fron our conclusions.bout the valjdity of<br />

eatirat€6 on rear seat Iap b€lts, rore part!cula(Iy o!r<br />

finding that none of the a!alrab),e daLabases (i.cIuding<br />

ou! ovnl iE.deqvate for this purpose.<br />

Ironicatly, this uhote controv€rsial<br />

because. dian.y€d by vhat eo ,ere Iearnirq about the<br />

serious n!zdrds of laF bel!6, ,e rere enge! to be ibte<br />

to include in the reporL rhat, oe€i.rl,<br />

lnp b.rts pro!ide posrtrve b.netits. r'hur, ao6Ld staff<br />

spenl a substantial portion !f its rjr€ and effoft<br />

erattnrn9 studi€s on s.at belt eff..tiv.n€ss, r6viFr)n9<br />

the nature of th€ v.rious databases used in th.se<br />

05?)<br />

I<br />

:.<br />

a<br />

1;<br />

.{!<br />

;<br />

.t:'<br />

t<br />

1:<br />

ll<br />

f ..<br />

!<br />

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fil<br />

i 't<br />

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f


Th. flonor.bl. C.rdii6 Collln.<br />

168<br />

rtudt.., .nd con.td.ring lh. at..n9th6 .nd v..lt.....<br />

ol th.! fo( th. purpos! of..tl.!ttng r..r 3.rt llp<br />

belt eff.ctiveness. e. y.r. r.ll .,.r. thlt<br />

"no d.t.b.6e<br />

is p..f.ct,' .s th. cAo.€port not.6, and th!t th.<br />

"po66Ibte in.ccuracie6 or lirit.tlonE tn th€ data" !ust<br />

ib€<br />

evrluated to d.t.(rin€ hoe Iit.ly it Is th.t theY<br />

yould 6igriticantly rff.ct" conclusions.bout re.r Ee!t<br />

t.D b.)t ef(ectrv€n€66. It '.s indeed<br />

o! this Lh!l t.d us to con.lude, reqre<br />

?6irFiEFI6dThiictfu-r;:T*-.codclustonth.aoard<br />

contilru.s to hold -- hive been 5et fo.th. a5 you tno,,<br />

ln th. l.p b.!t report itself. th. Borrd'6 reEponde to<br />

B,J. C..pb.ll,3 p.Per, 6nd the 3.v.r.1 pIec.s of correlpond.nc.<br />

b.tve.o you(self atrd th. Borrd.<br />

vr€.re ple.sed ihat the GAo repo!t has dravn<br />

tu!ther atteotlon to the fact thrt there ar. ve.y teal<br />

.bortcotrIngs in the najor accident d.t.b.EeE, and it iE<br />

good that ih. N.tional Higheay T.nffic 5.fety Adnini6tr.!ion<br />

(NHTsa) is trying to irprove the.ccuracy ol<br />

.ccidenl drr. r.porttbg, lany t...!rche.5 h.v.,.!ned<br />

th.t th€ !c.urlcy ot b€lt u6...portlog ir lIl.ly to be<br />

rorEening a6 .n unfortunat. 61d. .tf.ct of D.nd.tory<br />

belt us€ IrH6. tien caopbell'5 !t.t.r.ntE iD the GAo<br />

r.port, p.9er a1-a2 refer to tht! ph.no..non, for<br />

we.re also Dleased, .s you.r., rrLh Lhe<br />

ft;d;;'id;r i-(ft. ror ei-ipfel--Fni? frator cotrp;;t st.rt<br />

a;EfiEfr-ET;7;d Bo.,d 6t.rf on the Etrtus of plan6 aor<br />

providing ie.. 6ert lap,/shollde( b.lt! (both ner and<br />

r.trofits), Nce p.o.otlonal e.r.!I.Ir tro! G.n.r.l<br />

rotors give prolincDt cove(a9e to thc oeu.vailabillty<br />

of th€6e .y6teos in that coeprny'. v.hlcIcs. ch(yslcr<br />

r.cently rail.d to its o{ners of r.cDrd a d.EcriPtion<br />

of rts re.r E.rt shoulder belt !etrofit progrrh and<br />

"hlqhlv<br />

recouended" that its oroers h.ve the<br />

inEi.r'ied. Be a(. sLiIl hooe!ul hdl th. NRTsa<br />

ce(t.inly, you. strong suppo(t fo. the pas6aqe of<br />

Et.te 5eat b.lt u3e lavs h.6 plly€d an ilpott.nt rol€<br />

in the 6ucc.!6 thus far of th!t effort. rndesd. one of<br />

che..!6ons th€ Bo.rd i5.ued itE lrp belt report e.rly<br />

o. r!s to encour.ge a p.olpl lr.n6iLion froR lap belts<br />

to Irpl.houlder belts, Eince peop!e are inc!easin91y<br />

bucklirg up. !erhap6 our d€.p.st frustration has been<br />

th.t luch of th. highray safety<br />

".orunity,'<br />

includlng<br />

\<br />

tl<br />

ft<br />

:<br />

.:'<br />

f i<br />

t 1.<br />

I .,<br />

f*<br />

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*<br />

I


Th€ notro.rbl. c!rdi38 coLlIn.<br />

159<br />

the lttlsA, failed to d..l vith th. rain thru.t of th€<br />

.eport -- th€ ne€d to trove to I.P/6houtder b.1ts --.nd<br />

focused .ltrost er Lirely on rls dis.9reeFent urth our<br />

d.tab.se conctusron.<br />

As vou an see our rnvesLigation into theE.<br />

belt-rel;t€d issues rs f.r irotr ove.. althoLgh, given Ehe co.t<br />

to th€ consuner, I .n nor .onvrnced !hat ndny irII tnstalt<br />

tetrofit kits, particularl! on olde( vehicres, Neve.there3E. t<br />

vlnted tou to be aware of the eatensive.fforts of thi6 subcoinitt.e<br />

in this area. At the saEe time, I vant to ca!tron vou<br />

th.t public asareness and acceptance or seat belts ts stiII not<br />

9!.rt: Tbere continues to b€ fea!! and hisu.derst.ndin9s about<br />

Ihe6e be]ts !nat are.xplorted by sone dho are opposed to slrte<br />

ttandatorv -beIi.ve seal se)t use Lavs uhrch I supDo.t. l{.ny, rncruort9<br />

oy6.lf,<br />

thdt unrntentronly the Bot.d's 1986 lap belr<br />

r;Dort conLribut.d to tlassachusetas,.t lea5t, voting to rescind<br />

1t; seat belt !se lav. I urse your subcoi!ittee to b€ caretul<br />

lh!t vour €l(orts not.Iso un:nt.ntronallv rekindle oppositlon in<br />

othe(-6t.te6 l6uch.s New Yort and Ohrol there effarts lo res


|:'<br />

The sonorable c.rdi.3 coll i..<br />

r00<br />

E.c!u.. ot thlG ..rlou. .l.ction ittu' tlo..' lhc suDcorrrttc!-ii!-iccn<br />

v€ry c.utrous ;bout ovcr-Ptavt'e-tf: p:::1lr'<br />

t"i'iv t."' tap bel!6 th!t r. a p.oPer conc'(n or the ao'ro'<br />

iiiiii'"i-ii.i.i,t h..d injurv loi ei!!Pr.. rioD eiection bec'ur"<br />

b.It6.r€ trot used is at 1..3t as 9.'at<br />

wlth beEt tt.he6 '<br />

JOHN D' DINGELI<br />

chai rtran<br />

Subcolmi ttee on<br />

ov.rsight and Investigation'<br />

cc: The r|ono.!ble rhoots J. BlIleY, Jr', RlotlnE llnorlty i"b'r<br />

srbcoDitt€! oo Ov.r.ight lnd Inv.sti9atio^s ,$<br />

j'<br />

..<br />

:s<br />

6<br />

$<br />

F<br />

i<br />

1


100rH CoNcnrss<br />

2d Sessvon<br />

l6l<br />

I RnYr' 100-158<br />

I souso or REPREsENTATIVES 1 Part2<br />

INDEPENDENT SAFETY BOARD ACT AMENDMENTS OF<br />

MARCH 28, 1e88.-{oEruittcdroo;T,?"ff.:f;*";,XH"<br />

+-<br />

House on the stlte of<br />

Mr. Drwarr.r, from the Committee on Energ7 and Comnerce'<br />

submitted the following<br />

REPORT<br />

flo accompany H R 11 shich on JanrlBrv 6 1981' was eferred jointly to the Commitree<br />

on public worke ab6 ,."""jlli;" ;o'il"'c"--ltio on Energv and<br />

Comnrercel<br />

Uncluding cost eslrmare of the ConSEa6ional Budget Oficel<br />

!h&?,r,fi Fifi<br />

"{ j=*""f";**T**"rHJfr<br />

':::.:::-thl-*^me. #,qi-l.#i<br />

19?4 to authorize apProprratrons l:'-<br />

report<br />

u;ni<br />

l::3""iTt;T:,:H%hm::im:l'"?,T?i"?1f-111"'1T<br />

as amended do Pass'<br />

CONTENlS<br />

8"?lliiii; c";;l;;liq;:, .'."" """" "'-----'-'-- ........::...::.:::....::.::......<br />

H**illfi*;*F"g-#$ffii;;;:::::: ::: :: :: : :: :': :::<br />

6m-itt e ott Govemment<br />

Committee Cct E;timate<br />

6iiil*r.".t ilag"t ofhce Estimaa<br />

Irfl;tioo6rv lhpact stat€ment - - "<br />

lnflatioo6ry llnpacl Jrat€nrer! -<br />

Section.bYSecion Analyall ano<br />

I'lxe amendments are- as follows:<br />

sii-i6 i^ii Jr aft€r the enacting clause andinsert<br />

in lieu thereof<br />

the following:<br />

83-63{<br />

2 3361,|<br />

l4


162<br />

2<br />

SECA|oN I. SHOXIT TTfLE<br />

This Act may be citcd as the "lndependent Safety Board Act Amendments of<br />

198?"<br />

SEC. 2, AUTHORIZATIOII OF APPROPRIATIONS.<br />

(a) GENERAL AurHontz.|rroN.-Sectiolt 309 of the lndeDendent Safetv Board Act of<br />

19?4 (49 U.S.C. App. 190?) is amended by adding at th; end the follbwing: "Ihere<br />

are authorized to be appropriated for the purpo€es of this Act not to exce€d<br />

$25.400.000 for the fiecai yedr ending Septem'bei 30, 1988 and g2?,000,000 for the<br />

liscal year ending September 30, 1989, such suma to remain availsble until expend-<br />

lb) Egr BusHMENr oF EMERGENCy Fuxo.-Section 309 of such Act is further<br />

amended by inserting "(d" after "309." and by adding at the end the following new<br />

suDsectlon:<br />

"(b)<br />

An emergency fund of $1,000,000 is authoriz€d for expenditule by the Board<br />

to be available for necessary exlt€nses, not otherwise provided for, of the Board for<br />

accident investigations. There is authorired to be appropriated such surns as may be<br />

necessary to establi8h the emergency fund under the preceding sentence and to re<br />

plenish the fund annually- Such sums are authoaiz€d to remain available until expended.".<br />

SEC. 3. f, LIMINATION 01' CEEIAIN N0TICE REQUIREME]\"TS.<br />

(a) REpoRrs.-Section 304(aX2) of the Independent Safety Board Act of 19?4 (49<br />

U.S.C. App. l9031art2r) is amended by striking "and to cauge notice of the issuance<br />

and availability ofsuch rcIrorts t,o be publbhed in the Federal Regist€r"<br />

(b) SerT rv RrcoxxsNottloxs.-The la6t sentenc€ of aection 30?(a) of the Inde<br />

pendent Safety Boad Act of 1974 (49 U.S.C. App. 1906(s)) is amended to read as<br />

follows: "The Board ehall make copies of each such recornmendation and responae<br />

thereto available to the public at reasonable cct.".<br />

gDc. 4. TRATNTNG SCI|OOI^S.<br />

Section J04(bJ of the Independent Safety Board Act of 19?4 (49 U.S.C. App.<br />

1903fbl) iE amended by redesigiating paragr;ph (10) ar paragraph (11) end by insert<br />

ing alter paragraph (9) the following new paragraph:<br />

''110)<br />

The Board may at any time utilize on a reimbursable basjs the Eervices of<br />

the TlansfortatioD Safety Institut€ of t}le Department of Transportatiob (e€tablished<br />

for ih€ purpoee of developing courtes ani c,onducting trainiirg in safety ard<br />

€ecurity for all modes of transportation) or any aucressor organization. Tlre Seqre<br />

tary shall continue to make available such Institut€ or succes€or organization (A) to<br />

the Board for safety training of employee of the Board in the performsnce of all of<br />

their authorized function8 and (Bl to such other safetv pereonnel of Federal, interstate,<br />

State, local, and foreim qovemments and non-ebv_ernmental organizations as<br />

the Board may frorn time to ti;e de€i€naE in consullation with the *cret3ry. Utilization<br />

of such training st the lnstitute or any succe€aor organizalion by any designated<br />

non-Federal eafetv Dersonnel shsll be at a rea.sonable fee to b€ e6tablished De<br />

riodicslly by the Board- in consultation with the Secretary. Such fee shall be p;d<br />

directly to the Secretary for the credit of the prope! appropriation, subject tD the.<br />

requirement€ of an), annual appropristion, and ehall be an offBet against any<br />

annual reimburaement agleement edtared into between the Board and the Secre<br />

lary to cover all reosona5le direct and indirect c6ts incurred for sll such trainlog<br />

by the Secretary in the adminGtration and operation of the lnstitut€ or any su@ea.<br />

6()r orgadzation. The Board shall maintain an annual record of all euch offsetr. tr<br />

providing such a traioing to Feieral employeee, the Board shall be subject to chal><br />

ter 4l of title 5. Unitrd Stat€s Code trelating to training of employe€a). .<br />

EEC.5. PAYMENT FOR GOODS AND SERVICES<br />

Section 304(bI6) of the Independent Safety Bosrd Act of 19?4 (49 U.S.C. App.<br />

1903(bX6) iE amended bv striki;s and" befo;e'lGI and bv ntrikine the Deriod-it<br />

the end and inserting t$e followrng: "; and tHl require payirent or 6rher appropriate<br />

consideration from Federal agencies, aDd State, local, and for€i8n governmeDtS<br />

for the r€asonable co€t of goods and sericee supplied by the Board and to apply tlre<br />

tunds received to lhe Board s appropriatione.".<br />

SEC.6. REPOFTTNC OF ACCIDENIII AND INCIDEIV-I€ IIIVOLVINo CENTAIN PUBLIC AIRCR.AFI.<br />

S€ction 304(aI6) of th€ Independent Safety Board Act ol l9?4 (49 U.S.C. App,<br />

1903(aX6,<br />

"(6)<br />

is amended to read a; followb.<br />

establish by regllation requirements binding on peEons reportidg (A) ac.<br />

cidents and aviation incidents subject to the Board's inve€tigatory jurisdiction<br />

fl<br />

i<br />

n<br />

),.<br />

.ti<br />

r<br />

1:<br />

.:j<br />

'v<br />

aa ;<br />

fE<br />

ii<br />

{<br />

;i<br />

-t<br />

* ,6<br />

s<br />

!<br />

i


68<br />

o<br />

uDder this aubsection; and (B) accidents and aviation incldente involving public<br />

aircraft other than aircraft of the Armed Forcesi'.<br />

Amend the title to read as follows:<br />

A bill to amend the Independent Safety Board Act of 19?4 to authorize appropris'<br />

tions for fiscsl years 1988 and 1989, and for other purposes<br />

PunPosu eNo SuIulr.nnY<br />

The purpose of H R 11, the "Independent Safety Board Act<br />

Amendments of 198?" is to reauthorize the activities of the Nation-<br />

J Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). As amended !v the Corn-<br />

-itte", Ii.n. 11 would authorize $25.4 million fol -fiqcal<br />

year 1988'<br />

and S2? million for fiscal year 1989. The bill would also amend certain<br />

provisions of the lndependent Safety Board Act of 1974'<br />

Foilowing are the mqior provisions of the bill:<br />

i. irr" U'iti authoriz& funding as follows: for frscal year 1988'<br />

S25.4 ' million; and for fiscal year 1989, $27 million.<br />

2. The NTSB's emergency fund is reauthorized in the amount of<br />

$1 million for use in jeari where there is an unusual number of<br />

accidents and regular -funding authority would not be adequate to<br />

cover exp€ns€s.<br />

3- Certain Federal Register publication requirements believed to<br />

be - unnecessarY are eliminated.<br />

a. f"itio" flnds collected from non-NTSB employees attending<br />

NTSB accident investigation training courses a-re- redirected to<br />

NTSB's appropriations in order to offset the cost or the courses'<br />

S. ffre NfSb is permitted to collect payment, which would be appti"a<br />

io tttu NTS'B's appropriations. 'from Federal agencies, and<br />

State, tocat, and foreign-gbvirnments which request assistance with<br />

accident investigations'<br />

6. The NTSF is authorized to require repork from persons rnvolved<br />

in accidents involving publiC aircraft, other than military<br />

aircraft.<br />

B.Lcrcnoulo l.rn Nrro ron TIIE LTcELATIoN<br />

The NTSB is an independent Federal agency charged with inves'<br />

tigating transPortation accidents. The agCncy is respo-nsible for in-<br />

""?iguii"g. ditermining the cause of. reporling the. facts and cir-<br />

*-"iu""""J of, and ma[ing recommendations on, all civil aviation<br />

acciJe"ts; all railroad accidents in which there is a fatality or sub-<br />

"tr"iiul ptop.*v damage. or which involve a passenger trainr all<br />

oioeline accidents in which there is a fatality or substantlal properiy<br />

damage; highway accidents. including railroad grade


164<br />

4<br />

The last enacted authorization bill for the NNIB was Public Law<br />

99-37, which authorized funding for fiscal years 1984 through 1986.<br />

That authorization expired on September 30, 1986.<br />

In the 99th Consress. the NISB submitted in June 1986 an authorization<br />

proposil similar to H.R. 11. It was enacted by Congress,<br />

but it was vetoed by the President. ln his veto statement of November<br />

4, 1986, the President indicated objections to the budget authorization<br />

levels and to provisions relative aviation matters not within<br />

the jurisdiction of this Committee. The Committee believes that<br />

H.R. 11 lacks these problems.<br />

The Committee is concerned, however, about the adequacy of the<br />

NTSB's staffrng, including the impact of cutbacks, and about the<br />

allocation of resources bvlhe Boara. We believe that there must be<br />

adequate funding and the Board must turn its attention to activities<br />

beyond aviation. Both matters are addressed in an exchange of<br />

letters between the C,ommittee and the Board. In an April ?, 1987<br />

letter, the Board discussed the budget and the impact of staff cuts<br />

as follows:<br />

Below are the dollars and staff requested in our authorrzation<br />

request, H.R. 11. Unfortunately, the dollar estimatcs<br />

in H.R. 11 do not take iirto consideration the recent<br />

ly enacted changes to the new Federal Employee Retire<br />

ment System and the additional costs for the general pay<br />

raise. Therefore, our revised estimates for the next three<br />

years is provided below. These are the same estimates contained<br />

in the Senate C,ommerce, Science and Transportation<br />

Committee version.<br />

f!l|{m€ 4iyrknb fTtl<br />

H.R, II<br />

lll d a t6ie--Ht-tl<br />

t9E7 1983 l9A<br />

198 19& rm<br />

t21,000<br />

317 t25,100 127.000 t26.200 t27,500 l2t,t00<br />

317 30 311 317 317<br />

Question 2(a). In a December 10, 1986 letter to the Director<br />

of the Office of Management and Bu&et (OMB), the<br />

Board appealed OMB's funding allowance tor Fiscal Year<br />

1988. What was the result of that appeal? Was i;he 347<br />

FIE level restored? If not, why not, and what was the<br />

l-rnal level established by OMB? How will that level be assigned<br />

within the Board?<br />

Response. As a result of the Board's appeal, the OMB increased<br />

the Board's allowance from E22.t4 million and 300<br />

FTE to $23.56 million and 310 FTE, which is gtill considerably<br />

lower than the Board's request of 34? FIE. The OMB<br />

did not provide the Board with a written reaponse to our<br />

appeal and therefore it is not clear why the OMB only increased<br />

the Board's fundins to the 310 FTE level. Below is<br />

the distribution of the 310-FTE as reflect€d in the Board's<br />

Congressional budget requeat.<br />

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Policy and direction ...<br />

Accident investigation<br />

TechnoloS- -.......-....<br />

Saf€ty programs<br />

Ad]!inistration..<br />

Administrative law judgee<br />

165<br />

146<br />

64<br />

24<br />

30 5<br />

Total.....................<br />

310<br />

Question Aft). The C,ommittee is concerned about the<br />

"sharo<br />

reduction" in the Board's staff level since Fiscal<br />

Year -1982 and requests an explanation of t}re impact o-!<br />

the cutbacks on th-e professional and nonprofessio-nal staff<br />

and on the Board's important functions Please also show<br />

the FTE attritions annually since that year.<br />

Resoonse. We share the Committ€e's concern. Enclosed<br />

(encloiure 5t is a graphic description of the fluctuation<br />

that the Board's staffing level has experienced in rece-nt<br />

-Board's vears. This fluctuation has been very disruptive to the<br />

nroductivitv and to emplovee morale. In the first<br />

wave of ieductions bccurring in-1981, the Board made significant<br />

reductions in its administrative and support staff.<br />

However, reductions continued into 1982,. forcing- the<br />

Board to implement a rather large reduction !.n force.<br />

Overall, appioximately 60. percent of the Board's losses<br />

have been from the professional ranks<br />

The unrelenting pressure on key staff c-aused by increased<br />

workload- dlmands, couplea with these reduced<br />

etaffine levels, has resulted in a continuing loss ol easential<br />

t€;hnical staff. The Board's stalT ie compo6ed for the<br />

most part of highly trained technical specialists in3l! the<br />

various transpi'rtdtion modes. Reductions in staff have<br />

forced the Boird to eliminate the depth in most technical<br />

specialtv areas to the point where, in some areas, there<br />

alre onli one or two speiialists. Therefore, it is common for<br />

investilators to be oir call 24 hours a day' seven days a<br />

week. This is one of the reasons whv industry and other<br />

government agencies recently have been very succeasful in<br />

hiring the Board's technical staff.<br />

An! additional reductions would furthe,r com-pound our<br />

probl-em of maintaining experienced staff, and -seriouely<br />

- ieopardize our abilitv to fulfill our statutory mandate'<br />

In general, the siope of the Board's aciident inv€stigation<br />

ictivity and the comprehensiveness of its aviation accident<br />

dati base have bee-n sigrrificantly and adversely imoacted.<br />

The resultins scope, detail and number ot our<br />

iafetv recommendatio=ns hds been less than what could be<br />

achidved. Also, our ability to assure the effective imple<br />

mentation of the recommendations through aggressive,<br />

persistent ' follow-up has been limited.<br />

To put this in pirspective, it should be noted that-after<br />

the slbstantial dutbi'cks in fiscal year 1982 ihe Saf,ety<br />

Board was forced to reevaluate all of its programs. At that<br />

time, we determined that we needed at least 34? FIE to<br />

fulfiil our Congressional mandate Consequently we have<br />

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builset requests for the past' six vears to<br />

ffiffi?lt{ff$:<br />

our nation's *I"ly :^T:j11ilhf,ru;"s,H ^J.;H iillf;<br />

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Budget to recogniz€ thls conc'<br />

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th, Bot"d'" allocation of reaourcee' the t:Y "11?<br />

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whiih the Board is.req$re(<br />

transportation accldenrs' rr<br />

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eated onlY aviation- accroe<br />

Bureau of SsfetY withm tr<br />

reaourcea in other moc€a r<br />

with resPoneibilitiea to tnvt<br />

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modes which Provrde .tne,<br />

lieve that our current anlr ai''*"'gfrlt'1"":rtl*<br />

the other modes deserve at<br />

those accident inveatlg.atr<br />

various forme of transpo<br />

given the svailable resources'<br />

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Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and International Affairs'<br />

U.S. Department of Transportation.<br />

Courrrrrrru CoNsronnattox<br />

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On January 6, 198?, the bill, H.R. 11, was introduced by Mr.<br />

Mineta. The bill was referred jointly to the Committee on Energy<br />

and Commerce and to the Committee on Public Works and ?rans'<br />

portation. -<br />

On December 15, 198?, the Committ€e on Energy and Commerce<br />

met in mark-up session adopted an amendment in the nature of a<br />

substitute offeied by Mr. Luken, and ordered the biil reported to<br />

the House as amended by unanimous vote with a quorum present.<br />

C,ourvrrrrrn Ovnnsrcnr Ftt.tnrr.rcs<br />

Pureuant to clause 2(IX3XA) of rule XI of the Rules of the House<br />

of Representatives, the Committee has made oversight frndings and<br />

recommendations as s€t forth in this report.<br />

The Committee, as part of its oversight responsibilities, inquired<br />

into the Board's efforts to have the DOT better address the poiential<br />

hazards to public safety in the transportation of hazardous materials.<br />

The Committee n6ted that in December 1984 the Board<br />

wrote to the DOT about the "inadequacv of the DOI's system for<br />

hazard identifrcation and claesifrcation.'t The Board said the need<br />

for redesigning the system stemmed back to the Board's recommendations<br />

isiued-to ihe DOT on December 13, f972' The Board, in its<br />

April 7, 1987 letter to the Committee, said:<br />

In 1981, the Safety Board reviewed the DOT's hazardous<br />

materials regulatory progtaE to identify corrective actions<br />

taken and analy"e ftri r&ults of such aitions. The frndings<br />

of this review are reported in our "Safety Report: Status of<br />

Department of Transportation's <strong>Hazard</strong>ous Materials Regulatory<br />

Program" which was issued Septemb€r 29, 1981.<br />

Even ihough called for by the Safety Board. the ileneral<br />

Accounting Offrce, various Congressibnal committ€e€, and<br />

even by so-me of DOT's own repotts, there was no evidence<br />

of any'systematic efforts by the DOT to improve its hazsrd<br />

identifrcation and classifi cation syst€m.<br />

As you will note in our December 19, 1984 letter, the<br />

present hazard identifrcation and classifrcation -syst€m is<br />

in outgro*'th of an industrydeveloped system based. primarily<br />

on accident experience to make judgmenk about<br />

the hizard posed by a hsterial and abouf the adequacy of<br />

packaging irethods' to minimize the potential for releases<br />

iturind tiinsportation. Additionally, ihis system is further<br />

limit& in that it was developed with consideration only<br />

for acute threats to life for persons at the scene of the acci<br />

dent and upon the assumplon that all accidents would- be<br />

accornpanied by frre. Such limitations prevent con-srderation<br />

of long-term hazards tn health and safety and pre'<br />

vent conside;ations about hazards posed to persons- nearby<br />

an accident scene involving the release of mat€rials when<br />

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168<br />

8<br />

frre is not present. Or said more specifrcally, conditione<br />

similar to those which existed at Bophal, India.<br />

In response to the Safety Board's December 19, 1984<br />

letter, the DOT issued, on February 4, 1985, a Notice of<br />

Proposed Rulemaking. On March 27, 1985 the Safety<br />

Board commented on this rulemaking proposal, and enclosed<br />

is a copy of that correspondence (enclosure 8). On<br />

October 3, 1985, the DOI issued a frnal rule for regulating<br />

toxic liquids. Safety Board staff reviewed this final rule in<br />

light of the Safety Board's original letter and our response<br />

to the rulemaking proposal. The review found that:<br />

1. The hazards of many hazardoug materials have not<br />

lSeen addressed because the rulemaking excludes consideration<br />

of solids and gases.<br />

2. Materials for which specific container requirements<br />

presently are listed in the regulations will have no change<br />

made in the container specifications. What if any changes<br />

will be made to these container specifications will have to<br />

await the result of final action on Docket HM-181: a rule<br />

making activity which @an in 1982. Under this rulemaking<br />

action, the DOT propo€€s to address container requirements<br />

in performance lansuase. At the time of this<br />

review. we itere advised thatHM-l8l would be made final<br />

by the spring of 1986. While we yet are awaiting frnal<br />

action of the rulemaking, it is reported that final action is<br />

expected in the near future.<br />

3. The toxic hazard identification requirement wae not<br />

integrated into tJre existing hazard idenlification and clas<br />

sifrcation system, rather it has been applied more as a<br />

bandaid to an already identified deficient syetem.<br />

4. No action was- taken to interrelate - the hazards of<br />

Poison A and Poison B materiale. However, the final rule<br />

reported that the entire hazard classification scheme will<br />

be reconsidered in the DOT rulemaking actions within<br />

Docket HM-181: This again deferred corrective action<br />

until this 1982 rulemaking activity was completed.<br />

5. No action was taken -bv the DOT for reconsidering the<br />

scientifrc basis for the staniards established for identifying<br />

materials which posed substantial toxic hazarde. It is unclear<br />

whether or not this also waa being deferred until<br />

final action on Docket HM-f8f.<br />

The Committee is pleased that the DOT has begun to act on<br />

these matt€r€. but we are concerned that recommendations of the<br />

Board are apparently ignored or shelved for long periods by the<br />

DOT before action takeg place. When asked about this, the then<br />

DOT Secretary, in a May i3, 198? letter to Chairman Dingell, said<br />

that the Board "makes important contributions by identifying<br />

problem areas, and keeping iafety issum before the public eye."<br />

Their ideas are ofttn a part of the solutions crafted by the modal<br />

agencies, and are always considered in the crafting of those solutions."<br />

Nevertheless. Nevertheless, the DOT has concerns about Board recom-<br />

mendations in that the Board does not assess coets or prioritize<br />

their recommendations. The DOI Secretary said;<br />

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At the same time, there are eeveral factors which often<br />

make NTSB recommendations less usable and effective<br />

than they otherwise might be. NTSB makes no effort to<br />

aseesg the costs of its recommendations, or gauge their cost<br />

benefrt. This can put the Board in a position of offering<br />

recommendations which provide the public with a negative<br />

cost benefit, or which ari simply not feasible for technical<br />

or economic reasons. The Boiri could increase the functional<br />

value of its recommendations by exploring implementation<br />

issues, making a preliminary cosi benefrt estimate,<br />

and providing this-info'rmation ai part of their recommendation<br />

package.<br />

Moreover, the Board issues a large numtrer of reconmendations-106<br />

in the railroad areia over the last elht<br />

years-without making any effort to prioritize among<br />

them. Each recommendation .is treated in isolation, both<br />

from a cost and an implementing perspective. All are accorded<br />

equal priority. The problem with this approach is<br />

that, as much as we might like it to be otherwise, resources<br />

are finite, tre they in the public or private sector.<br />

Rezulatory agencies have enorrrous inlluence on how privaie<br />

parties;llocate those safety dollars. The key challenge-before<br />

any safety regulatory agency is the challenge<br />

to Drioritize. to pursue the option that will steer available<br />

doliars to their irost effectivri use from a public safety perspective.<br />

To the extent that regulatory agencies utilize<br />

tireir authority to steer limited iesourc& td ttre 8th, gth,<br />

or 10th most productive area, they have a less than oPtimum<br />

impact on safety because of opportunities lbregone.<br />

Determining which safety initiatives have the greatest<br />

impact on public safety, and can offer the public the greatest<br />

cost beirefrt, is a cirallenge that lies at the heart of effective<br />

regulation. And NTSB's recommendations, ir' their<br />

current format, offer little guidance in rnaking this type of<br />

judgment.<br />

The modal administrations. on the other hand, must<br />

make safety policy decisions tliat are in fact resource alle<br />

cation decisions, and must make them in a real world environment.<br />

They must consider not only the merit of a<br />

safety-enhancing measure, but also its t6chnical, financial,<br />

and operational feasibility.<br />

The Board responds that it has "very limited resources and i8<br />

unable to make a cost/benefrt analysis with respect to the recommendations<br />

we issue." The Board. howene., con-tends that it does<br />

analyze "the expected impact" of its recommendations and ''only<br />

issue those which pass a test of 'reasonableness'." The Board says<br />

that the "cost of implementing a recommendation is a factor fre<br />

quently considered iir this test'' and the "highet priority is given<br />

to rec6mmendations which are 'reasonable' and which will yield<br />

the highest safety benefits." The Board adds:<br />

Also, after we issde recommendations to the modal agencies<br />

we are freque;itly drawn into cost benefit discussions.<br />

If the modal agency presenk a convincing case that imple-<br />

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mentation of our recommendation is not cost effective or<br />

practical, we reconsider our position. While the cost may<br />

at times seem high, the benefits over a long period of time<br />

may far exceed the initial cost.<br />

Clearly, costs should not be ignored. However, the first priority<br />

should be safety. Co6ts can be used as an excuse, not a sound<br />

reason for failing to act. Even costs can be lessened through phasing<br />

and other methods. Recommendations that improve safety significantlv<br />

should be civen the hishest priority. The Committee's<br />

concern is that Board- recommenditions -tend to "sit on the shelf'<br />

for far too long at the DOT, although to be fair, the Committee's<br />

examination s6ows that DOT mak-es the required statutory re<br />

sponse, but the Board is not always pleased with the response. In<br />

its reply, the Board said of 2,271 nonaviation recommendations<br />

issued since 1980, there were 146 in an "Open Unacceptable<br />

Action" category. Tltese are cases where the "addressee responds<br />

by expressing disagreement with the need outlined in the recommendation<br />

and when the Board has some further evidence to substantiat€<br />

the need defined."<br />

While this is not a huge number, the Committee believes a<br />

system is needed to ensure that all recommendations are addressed<br />

in a quicker and fuller fashion and where the responses are not<br />

satisfactory to the Board, to resolve differences. There may be<br />

sound reasons not to adopt them in whole or in part, but they can<br />

only be deternined after consideration.<br />

We expect both agencies to examine this problem and report to<br />

the Committee before the end of hscal vear 1988. The report should<br />

identify all outstanding recommendations of the Board -relating to<br />

nonaviation safety matters that are more than two years old that<br />

have not been ieviewed and implemented. It should indicate<br />

whether they are still sound from a safety standpoint and whether<br />

implementaiion is still needed. If not i.-mplemdnted, reasons for<br />

such non-implementation should be provided.<br />

Finally, the Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations<br />

with the help of the General Accounting Offrce has been<br />

examining in great detail the efforts of the Federal Government to<br />

encourage the use of seat belts in the operation of motor vehicles.<br />

Of nartiiular concern to the Subcommiltee has been the slowness<br />

and-, in some cases, the resistance of Federal agencies to require<br />

seat belt use by all pnrsons when operating on Federal areas. To its<br />

great credit, the Efense Department (with encouragement from<br />

the Subcommittee and the GAO) has taken an aggressive atance in<br />

requiring such use. On the other hand, the National Park Service<br />

recently abandoned a proposed rule requiring such use after receiving<br />

complaints from its employees. This investigation is continuing<br />

with the help of the GAO.<br />

During thi <strong>hearing</strong>, Chairman Dingell expressed concern about<br />

the Boafu's 1986 report on the use of riar seat belts. In exchange of<br />

letters between the Oversight and Investigatione Subcommitt€e<br />

and the Board, there was concern about the idequacy of the report<br />

and about its adverse irnpacts on efforts to have all 50 States adopt<br />

mandatory seat belt use laws. In a November 13, 1987 report by<br />

the GAO about the Board's studv. the GAO said:<br />

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We do not believe that NTSB's concerns about the data<br />

provide a sufficient basis for dismissing either the results<br />

bf other research in this area cr the databases themselves'<br />

No daiabase is perfect. The question an agency lnal lntends<br />

to use data must address is whether the data are. sul'<br />

i.i""tlv "".tttt" to vield valid findings about the.thing<br />

beine analyzed. Possible inaccuracies or limitations rn tne<br />

data-shoulil be evaluated to determine how likely rt $ that<br />

thev would significantly affect any conclusions bas€d on<br />

the-dara. NTITSA investigated the flaws in the data l! uses<br />

6-;;;"; i".[ u.tt effeitivenegs and concluded that the<br />

"ioUi""i" *"t" not sufficient to invalidate the data for re-<br />

5.uiitr. nrss did no analysis of its own to -demonstrate<br />

the NHTSA's frndings about the usability of Lhe data v'/ere<br />

rncorrecl. "'ifr"t"ii.",<br />

we find that while NTSB has highlighted<br />

*-"-i-pori*t limitations in widely used accident data'<br />

bases. it- has not shown thai these databases cannot be<br />

ua"a i".tto* that lap belts, on balance' protect r-ear seat<br />

Dassengers in automobile crashes. The presence ol lnaccuiacies<br />

in the data is not a sufficient reason lor dsmrssrng<br />

i["-ii"dine. of all the research that has us€d that data'<br />

Finallv, NTSB's criticiems of the principal da!"bases re-<br />

*;;;h;; used to analyze the performan-ce. of diflerent<br />

;;;';'a ;f"tv iv"l"-i rtau" nbt beett fullv answered'<br />

While *e believe that NTSB has not shown the data to De<br />

u"Lt-& fo. anal-ysis, there are. nonetheless, short'comings<br />

in the quality of databases that rely on police accldent reoorts-<br />

NfffS,{ is working on several programs that mrght<br />

imorove the accuracy rf police reporting and Proude more<br />

cuirent information on the relationship between potrce re'<br />

ports and investigator analysis of accidents.<br />

AIso of particular concern to the Subcommittee is the fact that<br />

-iiii".il"it" Itii"i"a in -otoi vehicle accidents are ejected ln a<br />

i,ir;'ri.-i5ii ieit"i i.ttt" Committee. the Board resPonded to this<br />

coniern by saying:<br />

To put this in some p€rspectivi', the statement in our Octoue't'20,<br />

10b6 l.t;"; ,irit iejection is not at all a probable<br />

outcome for most crash-involved car occupants, even. un-<br />

["t-iii".ti"i"-ii- uasid on data contained in the--1984<br />

iiffiBl Nutio"al Accident Sampling Svsten - tJ!$ps)<br />

;;;;: Th;t;;p'; indicates that d6,00i0 or- th,e.15,43?'000<br />

o6ole involved in reported traffic crashes had been. ejectia.<br />

Tnat is about 0.2 percent About 0 6 percent ol all occu'<br />

oants involved in reported crashes were ejected and rei;ita;i<br />

i;;a;;deilie injuries. Even for towawav ^crashes.<br />

the NASS report indicates that only 1 0 percent ot occu'<br />

Pants '-ift" are eJecteo.<br />

S"f"w Board agrees completely that seat belts. of<br />

any type, iricluding lap belts, are effectiv,e in preventlng<br />

eiectiiri. ttre Board's report did address the lssue -ol eJec'<br />

;i;;;;d ihe role of lap'belts in preventing it I.n fact'.an<br />

entire section (pp. 23-24) on the role of lap belts rn eJectron<br />

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prevention was included in the Board's safety study on lap<br />

belts.<br />

It is the Committee's understanding that not all of the 15 million<br />

people reported to be in traffic cras-hes were injured. Nevertheless,<br />

the Committee believes that 36,000 ejections is large, particularly<br />

when one realizes that many result in death, head injuries, or<br />

other s€vere injuries with lasting effects.<br />

Despite this controversial issue, the Committee shares the<br />

Board's view that the best solution is the installation of the threepoint<br />

belt in the outboard positions of the rear seats. Most, if not<br />

all, the auto companies are quickly moving to install these belts in<br />

all models. We applaud that effort.<br />

CoMMrrrEE oN GovERNMEf,{T Oppnrrroxs<br />

Pursuant to clause ZOXBXD) of rule XI of the Rules of the House<br />

of Representatives, no oversight findings have been submitted to<br />

the Committee by the Committee on Government Operations.<br />

Conrnrrr:rnn Cosr EsrIue.rr<br />

In compliance with clause ?(a) of Rule XIII of the Rulea of the<br />

House of Representatives, the Committee notes that the bill would<br />

establish an authorization level of $25.4 million for the hscal year<br />

ending September 30, 1988, and $2? million for the fiscal year<br />

ending September 30, 1989, for the activities of the NTSB. In addition,<br />

the bill would authorize $1 million for an emergency fund for<br />

NTSB investigations.<br />

' U.S. CoNcnpss,<br />

Coxcnrssroxlr- Buocrr Orrrcn,<br />

Washington, DC, January 27, 1988.<br />

Hon. JonN D. Drr'rcnu,.<br />

Chairman, Committze on Encrgy and, Comrnerce, House of Representatiues,<br />

Woshington, DC<br />

Dnln Mn. CnA.rnrr,r,c.N: The Congressional Budget Olfrce has pre<br />

pared the attached cost estimate for H.R. 11, the Independent<br />

Safety Board Aet Amendments of 1987.<br />

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to<br />

provide them.<br />

Sincerely,<br />

Jlurs L. Bluu.<br />

Acting Dirccton<br />

Coucnrssrox.r,r, Buocnr Onnrcn-{osr Esrrurrp<br />

1. Bill number: H.R. 11.<br />

2. Bill title: Independent Safety Board Act Amendments of 1987.<br />

3. BiIl status: As ordered reported by the House Committ€€ on<br />

Energy and Commerce, December 15, 198?.<br />

4. Bill purpose: This bill would authorize the appropriation of<br />

$25.4 million and $2?.0 million for fiscal years 1988 and 1989, re<br />

spectively, for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).<br />

In addition it would authorize an emergency fund of $l million to<br />

be available for necessary expenses of the NTSB, not otherwise pro-<br />

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vided for, for accident investigations. Ttre bill would authorize the<br />

appropriation of such sums as may be necessary to establish and.<br />

replenish the fund annually.<br />

Other provisions in this bill would (1) provide that tuition collected<br />

from non-federal employees attending Department of Transportation<br />

training courses will be credited to the department's appropriation,<br />

(2) require paJrment from federal agencies and state, local<br />

and foreigri governments for the reasonable cost of goods and services<br />

provided by NTSB, with.these payments applied to the board's<br />

appropriation, (3) eliminate certain Federal Register notice requirements,<br />

and (4) allow the MISB to obtain information about accidents<br />

and aviation incidents involving public aircraft other than<br />

aircraft. of the armed forces.<br />

5. Estimated cost to the Federal Governnent:<br />

lrJfllorirrlioo lcirl:<br />

IITSB authsit lin<br />

nsdeniinenl ol emqsEt<br />

25.a<br />

ol<br />

27.0<br />

Total €ltin ted 25.8<br />

24.0 2t.0<br />

Lr3r Erbti[8 4ra.iation<br />

[h aditional eotlE iratiors 1.8 2?.0<br />

tdim.ld<br />

I.3 21.1<br />

lq H F... r hili|6 ol ddhlll i<br />

i?,<br />

1988 l9l9 t990 I99l 1992 1993<br />

The costs of this bill fall within bu&et function 400.<br />

Basis of estimate: It is assumed thal the full amounk authorized<br />

would be appropriated. The outlay estimate is based on the historical<br />

spending rates.<br />

In frscal year 1983, an appropriation of $1 million was provided<br />

for the emergency fund authorized by this bill. Since then, ffi5f,000<br />

has been obligated from the fund. This estimat€ assumes that<br />

$351,000 would be appropriated for fiscal year 1988 to bring the<br />

fund balance back to the full authorized amount of $l million. No<br />

outla;rs are .-eflected from this appropriation because CBO is<br />

unable to predict when conditions will arise requiring use of these<br />

funds.<br />

The Continuing Resolution for fiscal year 1988 appropriated<br />

$24.0 million for the NISB, while this bill authorizes $25.4 rnillion.<br />

This estimate reflects the net additional fundine authorized.<br />

Other provisions of the bill are not expected [o have a sigrrificant<br />

budgetary impact.<br />

6. Financing mechanism: This legislation authorizes funding to<br />

be provided in subsequent appropriation bills. This cost estimat€<br />

shows the amount of bufuet authority that would be authorized to<br />

be appropriated. The estimated outlays, with the exception noted<br />

above, are those that would be generated if the Congress chooses to<br />

fully fund the authorized amounts.<br />

?. Estimated co€t to stst€ and local sovernments: As stated<br />

above, this bill would require state and locil governments to reimburse<br />

NTSB for goods and services supplied to them. This is not exp€ct€d<br />

to result in a signifrcant cost for these governments.<br />

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8. Estimate comparison: None.<br />

9. Previous CBO estimate: On March 13. 1987. CBO transmitted a<br />

cost estimate to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and<br />

Transportation for S. 623, the Independent Safety Board Act<br />

Amendments of 198?, On June 9. 198?. CBO transmitted a cost estimat€<br />

to the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation<br />

for H.R. 11, as ordered reported by that committee. These bills<br />

differ as to the years funded and the amounts authorized, and<br />

CBO's cost estimates reflect these differences.<br />

9. Estimate prepared by: Marjorie Miller.<br />

10. Estimate approved by: C.G. Nuckols, (for James L. Blum, Assistant<br />

Director for Budget Analysis).<br />

Ixrr,nrroNanv lup.e.gr Srlrnnrrxt<br />

Pursuant to clause 2(lX4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House of<br />

R€presentatives, the Committee makes the foliowing statement<br />

with regard to the inflationary impact of the reported bill:<br />

The NTSB makes recommendations on how to improve the safety<br />

of all transportation modes. lilany of these recommendations, if implemented,<br />

would result in fewer accidents and would thus reduce<br />

costs from personal injury and property damage. Therefore, by reauthorizing<br />

the NTSB, this bill should have an anti-inflationary<br />

rmpact.<br />

Srcrrox-nySnqrroN ANALysrs AND Drscussron<br />

Section 1. Short title<br />

This section provides that the short title of the bill is the "Ind+<br />

pendent Safety Board Act Amendments of 1987".-<br />

Section 2. Authorization of appropriations<br />

The first subsection, subsection (a), authorizee funding for the<br />

National Transportation Safety Board for fiscal years 1988 and<br />

1989. The level of appropriations are lixed as follows:<br />

$25,400,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988;<br />

$2?,000,000 for ihe hscal year ending September 30, 1989.<br />

Funding of the NTSB at this level should provide for 347 fulltime<br />

staff positions.<br />

The second subsection, subsection (b), authorizes an "Emergenry<br />

Fund" of $1,000.000. Ttre purpose of this fund is to provide the<br />

NTSB with an account from which funds may be obtained in order<br />

to pay necessary expetrs€s incurred in accident investigations. According.to<br />

the Board, it is needed "to cover extraordinary circumstances.<br />

The ernergency fund was created in fiscal year 1982, and since<br />

ther has been used only once (to assist in recovery of the Air India<br />

Boeing 74? that crashed off of the coast of lreland in 1985). The<br />

fund is intended to ensure that the lftsB has adequate resources<br />

available to it in years when there is an unusually high number of<br />

accidents, and general appropriations are not sufficient to cover<br />

the cost of investigations. The fund is to be replenished annually.<br />

In its April 7, 1987 letter, the Board discussed the fund as follows:<br />

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This emergency fund assures that there always will be<br />

suffrcient funds available to conduct thorough accident investigations<br />

and to identify and recommend needed safety<br />

improvements, particularly in years in which there are a<br />

large number of catastrophic accidents. However, the<br />

Safety Board will use this fund only when it determines<br />

that an accident investigation is required in the interest of<br />

public safety and there are no other funds available to perform<br />

the work.<br />

The Committee appreciat€s the Board's aasurances.<br />

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&ction J. Elimination of certoin notite rcquirements<br />

This section, in subsection (a), eliminates the requirement that<br />

the NTSB publish notice in the Federal Register of the availability<br />

of accident investigation reports.<br />

Subsection O) eliminates the requirement that the NTSB publish<br />

notice in the l'ederal Register of the issuance and availability of<br />

safety recomrnendations, and responses thereto.<br />

The Board assures the Committee that elimination of these notices<br />

will not result in an appreciable loss of information to the<br />

public. Many other, more effeiiive means of information dissemination<br />

are being employed by the NTSB. On two prior occasions since<br />

19?4, the NTSB has curtailed the scope of its notice publication,<br />

and no public comments or objections were received. The NTSB has<br />

estimated that this will result in savings of approximately $25,000<br />

per year. In its letter, the Board explained why this provision<br />

would appear tn be sensible. The Board said:<br />

Escalating coets and the absence of evidence of any signifrcant<br />

use or value derived by the public from publication<br />

of these notices in the Federal Resister twice has<br />

caused the Board t reduce the scope of s:ucb notices over<br />

the years. Originally, the notice consisted of short summaries<br />

of accident report facts and findings and of recommendations<br />

and recommendation resDonse contents. Several<br />

years later, the notices were reduced to publishing the<br />

titles of the accident reDork. the verbatim recommendations<br />

only and a one sentetrce characterization of the responses<br />

received. More recently, the recommendation and<br />

response notice has been reduced to chart form with key<br />

words used to identify the content of the recommendation<br />

and responses.<br />

No public comments or objections have been received following<br />

each reduction. Further, Board staff receives relatively<br />

few inquiries or requests for further information<br />

about accident re1rcrts, recommendations or recommendation<br />

responses identified as having been prompted by Federal<br />

Register notices, although the Board receives a total<br />

of over 16,000 such inquiries each year. In summary, the<br />

Board believes that publication of this information in the<br />

Federal Register is one of the least effective techniques it<br />

uses to inform the public of iis activities and of significant<br />

transportation safety issues.<br />

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Among the techniques which the Board believes are successfully<br />

fulfilling the public notification purpose intended<br />

by the mandated Federal Register publication requirement<br />

are the following:<br />

1. Press releases are issued on all major accident reports<br />

and related safety recommendations.<br />

2. Paid subscriptions for receipt of all accident reports<br />

and safety recommendations are available through the National<br />

Technical Information Service.<br />

3. A free subscription to a quarLerly summary of significant<br />

Safety Board publications is available.<br />

4. Copies of individual safety recommendations iseued by<br />

the Boird and recommendaiion responses received are<br />

available on request from the Board's Public Inquiries Sectlon.<br />

The Board is now using these techniques ald would continue<br />

to relv on them instead of publication in the Federal<br />

Registcr. In addition, we would piace a notice in the Federal<br />

Reg:ister several times a year describing the availability<br />

of these methods for keeping informed of the issuance of<br />

Safety Board publications and how to ue€ them.<br />

&ction 4. Training schools<br />

Section 4 of the bill has been the subject of coneiderable discu+<br />

sion b€tween the Board and the Committee. That exchange has<br />

helped to provide a better understsnding of the Board's purpose in<br />

seeking the provision which, as introduced, the Committee believed<br />

to be overly broad and in the nature cf a "blank check."<br />

In essence, the exchanqe showed that the Board was not i.ntending<br />

to establish multiplJschools throughout the U.S. Instead, the<br />

Board intended to continue to provide its formal technical training<br />

program at the Tranoportation Safety Institute in Oklahoma that<br />

is operated by the Department of Tlansportation. In a June 22,<br />

198? letter to the Committee, the Board explained the purpose. The<br />

letter follows:<br />

NltroNar, Tn c.xsponrlrroN Serrrv Bolno,<br />

Washington, DC, June 22, 1987.<br />

Hon. Joxl D. DrNcnr,r.<br />

Hon. THoMes A. Luxnx,<br />

Committee on Energy and Commerce,<br />

House of Represeniitioes, Washington, DC.<br />

Dnen Cnlrnuen Drrcnr,r, lNo LuxrN: The National Tranaportation<br />

Saiety Board (MISB) is in receipt of a copy of your June 5,<br />

198? letter to Secretary Dole resardinq regarding Section 5 of H.R. 11 which<br />

deals with the Board's accident investieation school. scl<br />

The Safety Board has conducted a fdrmal technicel training prosram<br />

gTam in ln accident investisation investigation technioues techniques and methodology for its<br />

own employees and Ld others since the establishment of the NISB in<br />

196? (and a similar school was conducted bv the Civil Aeronautics<br />

Board which performed the aviation acciderit investisation activity<br />

prior to NTSB's establishmentl. The only period dur'ing which thi<br />

Bafety Board did not have a formal technical training program was<br />

from 1982 to 198,1. It was rieceasary to discontinue the program<br />

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durine this period for lack of funtls following the massive budget<br />

cut sustained by the Board in FY 1982 during which employment<br />

fell below 300 aird a major reduction-in-force was required.<br />

Similarlv, the Board ionducted its school in cooperation with the<br />

FAA at Olilahoma City in the 1960s and 19?0. In 19?1 it estab-<br />

Iished its own small tiaining facility in conjunction with a field<br />

office it maintained at Dulles International Airport, in order to<br />

better integrate on-thejob investigative training with its classroom<br />

training aid to clearly separate NTSB's non-iegulatory qpproach<br />

to investigative training fiom the DOI's enforcement and regulatory<br />

train-ing perspectiie. Upon reestablishing its school in 1984,<br />

while maintiiriingits sepa.aG curriculum, the Board decided to re<br />

locat€ the schoolln Oklahoma City in order to take advantage of<br />

the already existing excellent training facilities and support services<br />

of the -DOT's Tiansportation Safety Institute (TSI).<br />

It should also be pointed out that the Safety Board's "sc!ool" has<br />

never consisted of more than one full-time training specialist (with<br />

Dart-time administrative supDort). kcturers are drawn fmm the<br />

iloard's own technical speciiiist staff and from industry technical<br />

oersonnel - on an as-needed basis.<br />

Althoush this prosram is signifrcantly more advanced than the<br />

courses o-ffered bi the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) pro<br />

gram, cost savingl sre realized by both agencies through sharing<br />

instructorr and educational facilities. TSI'g safety programs in<br />

other transportation modea offer further opportunities for shared<br />

reaourcea.<br />

Beyond the basic vocabulary of aircraft accident investigation,<br />

thed iB little commonality in ihe content of the NISB aviation accident<br />

investigation couree and the FAA courge in accident investigation.<br />

As in a comparison of the rolee played by each.pare-nt<br />

6gency, the program lhares a common puipose in enhancing the<br />

safety of the fiylng public, but achieves thal purpose through dif'<br />

ferent and codple-m-entarv means. The fundamental basis of the<br />

FAA course iB rkuhtory;- the students are taught to Iind answer€<br />

to the queetions oT adeqriacy in the creation, enforcement and comoliance-with<br />

Federal Aviation Regulations. The fundamental basis<br />

itf the NTSB progxam is to deter;ine all causal and contributory<br />

factors in an icciident, and to make recommendations to regulatory<br />

authorities, manufacturers and op€rators to rectify problems discovered.<br />

T?re I'I'ISB has prirnacy in the investigation of an aircraft<br />

accident and may draw upon tlhe resources of- any or all-of these<br />

entities. In the sime manrier, the NISB school begins with the aseistance<br />

of the FAA and goes on to teach leaderthip and manage<br />

ment of the inveetigation, requiring a broader and deeper under'<br />

standing of the are-as of lxp*irtise,-capabilitiee and limitations of<br />

each Dartv to the NISB invegtieation.<br />

Th6 cor.irses taught by the NTSS at TSI go beyond aviation acc!<br />

dents to include virtually all modes of transportation. Current<br />

courses include highway and rail accident investigation, cros+<br />

modal trainine in human p€rformance snd cross-modal training in<br />

hres and expl6sions. With the latitude permittcd in H.R ll-and S.<br />

623, additio;al cost savings and enhanc-ed training will result from<br />

sharing TSI's capabilities in hazardous materials, -piE:fine safety,<br />

urban "mass traniit and security. For example' the NTSB could not<br />

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justify maintenance of a bomb range to demonstrate the effects of<br />

various types of hazardous materials on aircraft, truck or marine<br />

structures; TSI has access to two explosive ranges. Dedicated displays<br />

of wreckage sit€s that provide valuable hands-on training experience<br />

have been made possible at TSI through the combined efforts<br />

of several agencies. Within the year, these wreckage layouts<br />

will be housed in a large metal building, providing even great€r<br />

training opportunities. This is made possible by effectively pooling<br />

the training nesources of federal agencies.<br />

Tasking other agencies with the requirement to train NTSB personnel<br />

would overburden their training programs, requiring them<br />

to hire additional personnel and acquire expertise in fields outside<br />

their responsibilities. No single program at TSI could fulfill our<br />

needs, and the management of a piecemeal training program would<br />

be inefficient. By establishing a viable NTSB program at TSI, both<br />

agencies benefit, at no additional co6t to the student and minimal<br />

co6t to the government.<br />

If you have additional questions, please do not hesitate to contact<br />

ua.<br />

Respectfully yours,<br />

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Jnr Bunnrtr, Cheirman<br />

The Board operates under a reimbursable agreement with the<br />

Federal Aviation Administration. However, in an October 22, 1986<br />

memorandum an FAA lawyer raised some questions about this<br />

agreement. He said:<br />

Crediting of NTSB Appropri.ation-The second area of<br />

concern is the language in paragraph V.b. which authorizes<br />

the FAA to credit to the NTSB operations appropriation<br />

thoee tuitions collected by TSI for training conducted<br />

by NTE|B. Ttre crediting of tuitions is apparently conditioned<br />

on the exist€nce of specific Iegislative authority permitting<br />

NTSB to credit its appropriation in this manner.<br />

Based on the information that I have received from your<br />

office, it appears that such enabling legislation hag not<br />

been signed into law. In the abeence of the specific legislative<br />

authority, it appears that the frnal Agreerrent should<br />

not contain the language of paragraph V.b. The FAA<br />

should not agree to crediting NTSB's appropriation in the<br />

absence of epecifrc legal authority to do so. I should point<br />

out that the FAA credits its appropriation under the authority<br />

of Section 313(d) of the Federal Aviation Act of<br />

1958 (49 U.S.C. Section 1354(d)), which explicitly permita<br />

such crediting. Crediting NTSB's appropriation is not le<br />

gally supportable without similar legislative authority.<br />

The Committee amendment clarifies section 4 of ILR. 11 and provides<br />

the authority needed by the Board to address this problem. It<br />

authorizes the Board to continue to use the DOI's. training school<br />

in Oklahoma on a reimbursable basis. It directs the Secretary of<br />

DOT to make the school available to the Board and to other safety<br />

entities that are governmental or nongovernmental. However, such<br />

use by non-Federal personnel must be covered by a fee suffrcient to<br />

cover applicable costs. The fee would go directly to the DOT and it<br />

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shall be treated as an offset against the annual training ag"reement<br />

entered into b€tween the Board and the DOT. The fee will be reviewed<br />

and adjusted periodically. Use of the fee is subject to<br />

annual appropriation requirements.<br />

The Committee believes this revised section will meet the needs<br />

of the Board fully, while eliminating features that we considered<br />

objectionable. The Committee emphasizes, however, that we expect<br />

the Board and the DOT to provide training in all safety fielde, not<br />

JUr|t avratron.<br />

Allowing the Board to directly recover part of the costs of conducting<br />

classes will enable the Board to hold classes more frequently,<br />

to better serve its own needs, since the costs of operating the<br />

program will be divided among a larger, paying student base. The<br />

Chairman of the NTSB testified that the tuition fees would total<br />

approximately $75,000 annually, which would be about onethird of<br />

the direct costs necesaarv to run the school.<br />

&ction 5. Payment for ioods and seruices<br />

The Board is authorized to recover the reasonable coetg of eoods<br />

and services furnished to State, locol, and foreign govennients,<br />

with such recovery to be credited to the Board's appropriation.<br />

On many prior occasions, the Board has provided its accident investigation<br />

expertrse to other governments, both in the United<br />

States, and abioad. The moet co;mon example of this is the wid+<br />

epread use of the NtSB's laboratory to examine data from cockpit<br />

voice recorders, and flight data recorders. In commenting on this<br />

provision, the Board eaid:<br />

The Board always has been willing to furnish those services<br />

without charge to the foreign government, but we do<br />

incur cost6 in providing such aasistance. Since the net<br />

effect of providine thes€ servic€s is a diminution of the<br />

Board's regources.- the Board believes that it should have<br />

the authority to recoup these co€ts at least in those cases<br />

where the organizations offer to pay for these senrices.<br />

Each yearlhe Board voluntarili investigates a number<br />

of accidents involving aircraft that are owned or used exclusively<br />

by federal, stat€ or local governments (public uee<br />

aircrafti. IJnlike accidents concern-ing civil aircr-aft which<br />

the Board must investigate, the Board is not required to<br />

investigate accidents involving public use aircraft. However,<br />

upon request the Board will assist if at all possible. The .<br />

benefits of our participation are high quality investigations<br />

by an objective organization with unique ekills for identifying<br />

problems and recommending corrective action.<br />

Further, in many inetancea the public use aircraft involved<br />

in tirese accidents have ciyilian counterparts which<br />

may be susceptible to the same failures. Thus, an emerging<br />

safety problem for civil sector aircraft may be more<br />

readily identified through the Board's participation in<br />

such investigations.<br />

In view of continued tightening of the Board's resources,<br />

we may have to abandon these types of activities. The authority<br />

to provide such serviees at a reasonable cost and<br />

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the ability to apply the funils received to current apprc<br />

priations would enable the Board, minimally, to continue<br />

to offer these valuable services.<br />

This section provides the NTSB with the abilitv to recover the<br />

exp€nses which it incurs in conducting accident iirvestigations on<br />

behalf of these entities.<br />

The Committee exp€cts the Board to keep the Committees, including<br />

the Committee on Appropriations, aware of the extent of<br />

such revenues and their uses each year.<br />

Section 6. Reporting of accidents and, irrci.dents inuoluing certain<br />

public aircraft<br />

This section allows the Board to establish requirements for the<br />

reporting of accidents and incidents involving pubiic aircraft, excluding<br />

aircraft of the armed forces. Since many types of aircraft<br />

are owned and operated in both the public and private sector, valuable<br />

information regarding public aircraft safety may be acquired<br />

from establishing performance histories for public aircraft.<br />

CHANGBs rN Exrsnxc Llw Mlnr sv rHn Brr,r- ls Rnponrno<br />

In compliance with claus€ 3 of rule XIII of the Rules of the<br />

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill,<br />

as reported, are shown as followB (existing law proposed to be omit<br />

ted is enclo€ed in black brackets, ne\r. matter is printed in italic,<br />

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):<br />

IrnepnxluNr SAFETy BoAnD Acr oF 1974<br />

GENERAL PROVIAIONg<br />

Src. 804. (a) Durrne or Bolno.-The Board ehall-<br />

(2) report in writing on the facts, conditione, and circumstances<br />

of each accident investigated pursuant to paragraph (1)<br />

of this subsection and csus€ suCh reports to be made available<br />

to the public at reasonable cost fan-d to cause notice of the is<br />

euance and availability of such reports to be published in the<br />

Federal Registerl;<br />

f(6) establish by regulation requirements binding on persons<br />

reporting accidents aud aviation incidents subject to the<br />

Board's investigatory jurisdiction under this subsection;I<br />

(0 establish bv rceulation reouircments bind.inz on Deraons rcprting<br />

(A) "cit*i* and aiiation incidcnts -subjict to the<br />

Bmrd.'s inuestigalory jurbd.ittion under this subection; and (B)<br />

accidents and aviation incidents inuoluing public aircmft other<br />

than aircmft of the Armed, Forces;<br />

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(6) The Board is authorized to (A) use, on a reimburtable basis or<br />

otherwise, when appropriate, available services, equipment, personnel,<br />

and facilities of the Department of Transportation and of other<br />

civilian or military agencies and instrumentalities of the Federal<br />

Government; (B) confer with employees and use available services,<br />

records, and facilities of State, municipal, or local governments and<br />

agencies; (C) employ experts and consultants in accordance with<br />

section 3109 of title 5, United States Code; (D) appoint one or more<br />

advisory committtes composd of qualified private citizens or offrcials<br />

of Federal, State or local governments as it deems ne@saary<br />

or appropriate, in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee<br />

Act (5 U.S.C. App, I); (E) accept voluntary and uncompensated services<br />

notwithstanding any other provision of law; (F) accept gifts or<br />

donations of money or property (real, personal, mixed, tangible, or<br />

intangible; [andJ (G) enter into contracts with public or private<br />

nonprofrt entities for the conduct of studies related to any of its<br />

functionsf .!,' and (H) require payment or other appropriate corcidemtion<br />

from Federal agencies, and State, local, and forcign gouernmznts<br />

for the reasonable cost of goods and seruices supplicd by the<br />

Boord and to apply the funds received to tlv Board's appropriataons.<br />

(10) The Board may at any time utilize on a reimbursablz bosis<br />

the seruices of the Tlansportation Safet, Inatitute of the Department<br />

of Trarxportation kstablbhed for the purpose of deueloping cources<br />

and conducting training in safety and. security for all mod.es of<br />

transprtationl or an! su.ccessor organization, The Secretary shall<br />

continue to mahe auailable such Itutitutc or succe.ssor organization<br />

(A) to the Brnrd for safet, t aininq of employees of the Boord in the<br />

prformance of all of their authorized functiora and (B) to such<br />

other safety personnel of Fedcral, Interstste, State, Iocal, and foreign<br />

governnunts and non-gotnrnmental orgonizations as the B


22<br />

NEEPONSE TO BOAND RE@MMN{ITATTONII<br />

Spc. 30?. (a) Whenever the Board submits a recommendation re'<br />

sardins transportation safetv to the Secretary, he shall respond to<br />

6ach sich recbmmendation iormally and in *riting not later than<br />

90 days after receipt thereoi The response to the Bbard by the Secretarv<br />

- shall include this intention to-<br />

(1) initiate and conduct procedures for adopting such recommendation<br />

in full, pursua:rt to a proposed timetable, a copy of<br />

which shall be included;<br />

(2) initiate and conduct procedures for adopting such recommendation<br />

in part, pursuant to a proposed timetable, q co-py 9f<br />

whish shall be- inchjded. Such response shall set forth in detail<br />

the reasons for the refusal to proceed as to the remainder of<br />

such recommendation; or<br />

(3) refuse to intiate or conduct procedures for adopting such<br />

recommendation. Such response ihall set forth in detail the<br />

reasons for such refusal.<br />

fThe Board shall cause notice of the issuance of each such recomfrendation<br />

and of each receipt of a response thereto to be published<br />

in the Federal Register, and shall make copies thereof available tp<br />

the public at reasonable cost.I<br />

The' Board shall make copies-of each such recommendation and re'<br />

sponse thereto auailable to the public at reasonoble cost.<br />

UTHORIZATION OF APPROPNIATIONS<br />

Snc. 309. 1o) There are authorized to be appropriated for the purposes<br />

of this Act not to exceed $12,000,000 for the fiscal year<br />

inding June 30, 19?5; and $12,000,000 for the fiscal year ending<br />

June "30, 19?6, such sums to remain available until expended'<br />

There are authorized to be appropriated for the purpos-e of this Act<br />

not to exceed $3,800,000 for the transition quarter endrng lieptember<br />

30, 19?6, $15,200,000 for the fiscal yeai ending September 30,<br />

19??, and $16,400,000.for the frscal year -ending September 30' 1978,<br />

such sums to remain available uniil expended. There are authorized<br />

to he appropriated for the purposes of this Act not t-o-exceed<br />

$16,420,000 fi,r ihe fiscal year-e.tding September 30, 19?,9, and<br />

$1?;650;000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, such<br />

sums to remain available intil expeniied. There are authorized to<br />

be applopriated for the purposes of this Act not to exceed<br />

$18,540,00b for the fiscai year ending September 30' 1981'<br />

$19,925,000 for the fiscal yeir ending September 30, 1982, and<br />

$22;100;000 for the fiscal lear ending Seftember 30. 1-983, such<br />

sums to remain available rintil expended. There are authorized to<br />

be appropriated for the purposes of this Act not t-o- exceed<br />

$22,600,00b for the fiscaf y-ear ending September 30, 1984'<br />

$24;500,000 for the fiscal year ending Slptember 30, 19-85, and<br />

$26;100;000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1986. such<br />

sums to remain available until expended. There are a,uthot'tzed to<br />

be approprioted for the purposis af th$ Act not to- exceed,<br />

$J5,1bb,000 for the l'iscal'year ending September J0 1983 and<br />

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$27,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1989, such sums<br />

to remain auailable until ernended..<br />

- lbt An emergency fund of'$1,000,000 is uuthorized for expenditure<br />

b1 the Board to be auqilable for net essary "rperues, not'olherwise<br />

prouided, for, of the Board for accident iiuestisatiorx. There rc authorized,<br />

to be appropriated such sums as may be nercssary to establish<br />

the emergency fund under the preceding sentence and tct replenish<br />

the funds annualllt. Such sums are authorized to remain auailable<br />

until expended.<br />

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Th! Horor.ble Di.n. x. st.cd<br />

P.qe 2<br />

186<br />

b.lt., .rd th. !ctlo.. b.ing t.k.. by th. .uto!.k.!. .nd NBISA<br />

!or.rd co.t.ctlon, lf n..d.d.<br />

Fln.lly, r ,ust .rpresE disday .bout the lrct of any rlal<br />

ti.et,br. f;r.ctron r.a.(din9 the propo6!I of. ruI€ conc.r.lng<br />

re.r 6e.t bctt6- a 9r€!t dG.1 6f tiDe h.E P.ca.d sinc€ Lht3 ia.u.<br />

uas IrrsL !.i66d.nd lovelent.t NHTsA.ppe.rE, aL l.ast, Lo b. 1n<br />

"turLl.-lrke"<br />

l..hion. I requesL d Labl. in chronoloqjcal o.d€r or<br />

aIL actions re9.rdtn9 Lhrs issv. srnce r.nu.ry l9a7.nd a date<br />

cerL.ln for r ricclsron by NHTSA on vhether. .ul. viII be ProPosGd<br />

.nd 1f propo..d, a date vh.o thlt f,llt oc.ur. I.rnnot t!!gin.<br />

th.t tt vtl1 tat€ nuch 60r€ tlD. to .n.lyz. th.<br />

"coe.nta<br />

r al.o not. you! co.!.nt that'21 Dl 27 laDufacturers elll<br />

provtd. thos. .ys!... in virtullly.lI ot th.lr v.hlcl€3 by rod.l<br />

t€.! 1990,' P1.r!e td.ntify the th.ee fi(oB that vill not 16et<br />

ihat date.nd.xpl.in rhen they 'ilI do 6o. P1..3. also id.ntlay<br />

th. flrrs of lh. oth.( 24 rhat urll not Provld. tho.. ayal.tE in<br />

all nodel6 by thrl drLE rnd indrcat. vh.n lh.y vrll provld. then<br />

for all nodeI6, Ftn!Ily, pl..3..rPIrin th..rt.nL to whrcn Lh.r.<br />

sy6t.rs for alI 2? vlll be unlforr fron fir! to firn and indicit.<br />

rh.t, if nny, vllue o(.dv.ntag.. .ute tould h.!. ov.r tnls<br />

volunt6ry .ftorc. to ry l.oel.d9., th. dot..tlc firms, at 1..6t,<br />

have not.rpressed oppolition to. .Dle, .ltholgh they tay be<br />

conc€rn€d.bout Ie.d t1... I do nol ravor rules for the sar. of<br />

.u1e6, p.rticularly if volunt.ty conpliance reallY torks, but t.!<br />

oot, in thi6 c.se, convinced th!t a voluntary Pro9.a6, althoush<br />

Iaudable, viII b. satis!actory- rf you think it vill surfice, you<br />

ne€d to expl.ln in great detail hor.nd thy it vill suafi.e. r .!<br />

Eoclo.u!..<br />

r requ.Et 6 r.!Iy ri<br />

cha i rnan<br />

SubconDi ttee on<br />

Ovttrl9ht and rnvestig.lior3<br />

cc: Th. nonollbl. rhorr. J. B!11.y, tllllng rlnority rl.d.r<br />

slbcoultt.. on ov.r.ight .nd rnv..tlg.tion6<br />

Th. ono(abI. Tholas A. LDten, Chair!.n<br />

Subconfri tt.e on Transport.tion, lou.isi?<br />

.nd saz.rdous lrite rial s<br />

The sono.able Bob whittaker, R.nling ltinority reib.(<br />

subcotrni ttee on Transportrtion, Tou.istr,<br />

aod <strong>Hazard</strong>ous nrt€ rial s<br />

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It rddltton, the ttudy fo0id that corilctly rorn l.p/shoolder t€'t b'lt!<br />

-<br />

oto"ioe-ooii iriticiron ii bDth. prlgn.nt roril rnd her unborn cnlld 'nd should<br />

il;;;i";il 5iii-,i"'"t i pornt rip-inlv belt. Th. l.p/thoulder b€lt dlffuses<br />

i""il forcii over r trrser arpa of the mther's bodv.nd.inimires the possibilitJ<br />

of nrternal or feiai inJurY.<br />

A caaeful ex. in.tion of the c.se veilcle ta3 carried out in €rch crrlh<br />

l*"iti""ii"".-J"c-""1rnq lts 'vrt.l strtlttlcs' .nd colle.tlng lnfor tlon rbout<br />

the r.3i.ilnt svstelt.v.ii.ble to e.ch occuDant. lh..Yants of th' r'cld€nl Y€r€<br />

cerefullv recon;tru.ted .nd the necess.ry reasu.e.ents tada to €sttaata the<br />

collision :everity. The aqe, rergnt. helght, rnd saattng locatlon or arcn<br />

occlpant ,as detpitnin.d. Th. cr.sh inY€s!lgation.lso det€nnlnad rllathar tne<br />

avallable 5elt b.lt rar used, rhether i! vrs used correctlv. tn€ proD.Di€ sourcc<br />

of each injury, ind the s.v.rity for €ach injury sust.jned.<br />

The investlortions reve.led ctses of lr9/shoulder b€lt nlsuse rhlch


.<br />

189<br />

- 3 -<br />

Ita Safaty 8o$\d arld lt t!9!aita tha pr,3.g. of stata n.nd.tort l4/ttoulder<br />

b.lt us. l.rs. Thlrty-ona 3tatas.nd th€ olttrlct of Colu*j. h.v€ €ntct€d toie<br />

tlp. of..nd.tor, c.ri b.lt lrc l.|. Llv€3 h.va bren i.Y.d r,. direct result of<br />

tii: leglrlrtton, ilnce os. rrt.s h.va r€port.dly tncr.a3ad subst.ntjrlly ln<br />

ravaral rtrtes Ylth 1av3,<br />

A! | result of this Saflty Study, the NTSB nide four r.cocndrtlons to tlHlSA:<br />

--rrvlre puhltcatlons to Glinin.te su99a5t1lns to drjYars .nd 9a.€ntstrrn3po.tlig;hlldrrn<br />

th.t th€, nlsrout. r chlld'3 l.p/should€r b€lt or rllor<br />

chlldnn to rhrm I s..t belt:<br />

--r.qulr. th.t rjndorihrd€-equiPp.d l.r/.hould.r b€lts b! telt.d rltl tha .<br />

.rrl.a5t iFunt of sl.ck thrt crn be lntroducGd, or h.v€ lh€3. b.lt3.q||lpFd xlth<br />

I Dr.-tlnsionlr.i p.rt of the b€lt syst€n, to €nsur€ thrt sl.ck Prastnt in the<br />

.hoold.r portion of tha b.lt rlll bc t.t€n up durlng the cr.!n;<br />

--ltrtt the.ngl. of lncllnrtlon.llor.ble 1n r.cllnlng r..ts in p.ssenger<br />

v.hicl.s to no gr.ater thin the r.xirrt 9l! thrt c.n t.falJ .nd-.ff.ctivelv be<br />

usrd, rhile th. v€hicle i! rn ilotion, Ytth I lrplshoulder s.rt D€lti<br />

--.xplore the potslbllity of requlrlng .n rdJust.bl€ up9€r rnchorag€ polnt for<br />

th. rhould.r portlon of lrp,/shoulder belts in nerl' ..nufrcturad .uto.lobi1e5.<br />

Tha Srf.tJ 8o.rd's conpl.t. prlnted rpport rlll bc rvrllrbl. in .pprorlmtely<br />

on. mnth. CoDiei of thl3 reDort, nhich should b. id.ntlfl.d .s P8_88_917002, nay<br />

bc purci.s.d by nail fron th. llrtion.l Technic.l lnformation servlc€, 5285 Port<br />

Royrl Rord, Springfi.ld, Yirginl. Z2l6l-<br />

Pr..r Cont.ct: Al.n Pol lock<br />

(202) 382-6606<br />

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Honor.ble John 0. Dlna.ll<br />

Ch.lmen, Subco-ttta; o|| Oral!lgit<br />

.nd Investlg.ttons<br />

Comitt€e on Enargy Ind Coanrca<br />

lioure of n6pre3entrtlvas<br />

Yashi.gton, 0.C. 20515<br />

oerr llr Ch.1nr.n:<br />

r90<br />

llrtlonal Trrntgoiiltlon S.taiy Eoard<br />

w-nhrbn, o.C, 2i,iaa<br />

Atltl 12, 1988<br />

APR ll.t$ff 1:<br />

Thrnk you for your letter of Deceib€r 21, 1987, trinsmit m a cooy of<br />

tha G€n.r.l Accountrng 0fflc€ {cAo) report, 'A R€vter of th€ ilTs-g Repori on<br />

Re.r Se.t L.p Belt Iff.ctivenesr,' .nd inviting the 8o.rd,s co-€nt.<br />

In oor vier, the GAo r.s corr€ct in its finding thrt th. cont.overly<br />

pr.ovol.d by tl|. Eorrd'r lep belt report !ro3e fror ou; conclustors .bout tb€<br />

vrlldltJ of estl||t€r on r€ar sert lap belts, trora o.rttcqlarly our findlna<br />

th.t non. of th. rv.1l.ble d.t.b.ses (includjng our om) 1s .deq_urte for thja<br />

turDose,<br />

Ironlcrlly, thl3 irhola controvarilrl lattar .rose becausa, dltrryad by<br />

rrt re rene learning about th€ sEriou5 tlrzfda of l.D belts. |r rcr€ aiqar to<br />

!e.bla to lnclude In tie report re.ssur.n... Urrt, oier.ll. trp bett5 9;ovtde<br />

porltlva ban flt3. Thu!, Borrd st.ff sp.nt.3u!,trn .l portion of jts tj||a<br />

ad .ffort .r.rl n I n9 3trdles on se.t beit €ff€cHv.ness. rivlerrno the n.ture<br />

of the v.rlous datrbrset uted ir these studt.s. rnd con!tderino tie rtrenqths<br />

and l|eaknesses of ther for tia purposa of es aatina aear _seat lat 5!lt<br />

.ffectiveness. te rer! r.ll .r.re !h.t 'no drt.b.se ii oerfEct.' rs the cAo<br />

report notes, and th.t the'Dos!ible in.ccur.cie5 or limit..tjons in the d.t..<br />

nust 'be evaluated to deter loe hor likely it ts that the/ would significantlJ<br />

rffect' concluslons rbout rerr s€.t l.p balt €ff€ctrvenesl. lt ris-ind€ed oui<br />

evalu.tion of this thrt led us lo conclude, reqr€tfJ ly, !h.! rhe d.t.bare!,<br />

9ossible inaacurrcies or ll|rltations rere sufficienttJ 9re.t to render tha!<br />

In.pproprl.ti for the purpo!e of shoring rhat rear sert tap belts .r.,<br />

overall, eff.ctlv. (or lneffecti!€). 0ur detailed re.sons for rerching th.t<br />

concluslon -- a conilusion the 8o.;d conttouas to hold -- have b€€n set iorth,<br />

.s you knd, ln th. lap belt report lt5€lf, the Sorrd's r.soonse to B.J.<br />

C.rpbell'i p.p.r,.nd th! sev€r.l pl.c.r of corre3pond.nce botre€n yorrself<br />

.nd the 8orrd.<br />

le .re pl€.sed th.t the GAo reDort hes dir|'r further .tt.ntion to ti.<br />

frct thrt there .re very rerl shortaorings in the maJor .ccjd€nt d.ttb.s€s,<br />

and it ls good th.t the li.tlon.l Highr.y Tr.ffic S.f€ty Adolnistr.tio. (I{HTSA)<br />

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Honorable John 0. Di no.l I<br />

Page 2<br />

l9l<br />

is trJlng to i$rove thc accuracy of .ccjd€nt d.t. r.port{ng. li.ny<br />

ras.irclrer! hrv€ r.rned that th. acc[racy of belt use reporting is lilaly to<br />

b. rorsening.s .n unfortunate side eff.ct of nandatory belt use 1rri. (Ken<br />

Ca6pbell't stateipnts rn th€ G.Ao .eport, pages ll aZ refer to this phenomnon,<br />

le are also ple.sed, .s you.r€, rith the gr.tlfying rcsponse of the<br />

industry itself to our re(omandatlons. For exaipl€, ford llotor Conprny staff<br />

recently brlefed 8o.rd staff on th€ st.tus of pl.o! for Drovidinq re.r s€at<br />

l.p/shoulder b€lts (both rer and retrofits), Ner grcFtion.l materi.ls frofi<br />

6eneral llotors give proninent cover.g€ to the ner .v.ll.biljt] of th€se<br />

systems in th.t conp.ny's vehicles. Chrysler recently ftiled to its o €rs of<br />

r€cord a descrlption of its rear se.t should€r belt retroflt progran<br />

'ilghly<br />

and<br />

recc'drended'!h.t its o*ners have ther inst.lled. f€ a;e still<br />

hopeful thrt tb€ IIHTSA ultin.t€ly rill move forr.ri to provjde a unjfoar<br />

standari for reir seat laolshould€r belt lnstallrtions.<br />

Cert.1nly, yorr strong support for the p.ss.ge of st.te s..t b.lt use<br />

l.rs h.s pl.y€d an inoort.ht rol€ In the success thus frr of th.t.ffort.<br />

Ind€ed, one of tie raasons the Soard i3iued its lap belt report earlt on ras<br />

to encour.ge r pronpt tr.nsitjon fro. lrp b€lts to l.p/shoulder b€lts, slnc.<br />

people .re lncre.singly buckling up. Perh.ps orr deepest frurtr.tton h.s be.n<br />

th.t mch of tne highr.y safety 'coinrnity,'<br />

tncludtng th. titiISA, f.lted to<br />

derl ilti the nain th.ust of th€ report -- tha need ta Fv. to laDlshoulder<br />

belts -.- .nd focur€d.l ost entirely on its dlsagreeiret|t<br />

rith our drt.b.s!<br />

lh. 8!.rd contjnues to endors€ thc i portrnce of nend.tory belt us! t.r3,<br />

and loots fofirrd to ev.n greatea loss reductlons as nor! vehlcles ara<br />

equlPpad rith the superlor lrplshoulder belt th.oiighoot.<br />

le rppteci.te the contln!ing int.rest you h.v€ shol{n ii ttese rmportant<br />

stf€ty irsu€s, and look fo rrd to rorling closel) drth )ou and others ro<br />

llDrove transportation s.fety in rany arces.<br />

Respectful<br />

rM<br />

ly yours,<br />

cc: Gen€rrl lccouotlng offlc!<br />

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. 8onor.bl. Don.ld P, nod.l<br />

s.c..t.ry of th. Ior.rror<br />

loth.nd c str..r., N. r{.<br />

r..rhtdglon, D. c. 20240<br />

D..( nt. s.c r.l..y:<br />

l92<br />

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Eraffi.€i.n$drrrlffa<br />

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aprll 29, 1980<br />

t .r rrth.< .Etolnd.d b' your r.ply of Aprtl 6, 198! to ry<br />

1.tt.r of r.bru.ry 12, r988 aon.!rn,ni irr. 'nirrar t.nd publlc-<br />

..l.ty b!..dt propor.l to ..quire p..sons drrvrnq eithin th.<br />

N.llon.l P..t sy.r.! to u!. ..!r b.Irs, I r..IIi r.il ro... hor<br />

thc D.p.rrr..t crn d.a.nd thr N.tio..I p.rr servic.,. .lao.t. vhlch<br />

.i!l.d th. publlc to b.II.vrn9 th.t.Irrin.rron of thl...f.ty<br />

p(ov16ron s6s b...d on ov..vh.l!rn9'public":o .nLs. c!.r.ly, it<br />

I lully.qr.. th.t ir l5'.nr1..ty rpproprr.t. ao!.9...y<br />

Pollcyi.k... to roliclt.nd con.id.. th. iie,s" o! Ir...p]oy....<br />

I Prr.ur. that er. dor. b.for. th. NpS proposed rh..ntlr.<br />

r.gut.tio!, .or during t6;.E61ic proccls. rnaecd, r rcquest<br />

lPur.u.nt to Rul.. x !n


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rtlh b.rt Y1.h...<br />

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lllt'S'*."."*'!-*,#i{l*ll"i'.*''i*":i:ttr,i:t:<br />

t r,qu"t ' ('Pl)' to !h' 'bov' i'tt'tt 'lthin !0 drl''<br />

sub'otrl!t"<br />

on<br />

ov'!'t9-h; rtrd rnv"tI9rtloD'<br />

"i,'";*r,,t*Bii?.i+?'lti"i"li!til3.l:l:"" "'-'<br />

th. rono..br.'h:r::-l:.lll'ill."lilliil<br />

iiii.ii.t.tt'o, rou'i"'<br />

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:$":::j.l'.".'.'.i'1,::ili?tlii'li"iil?'lllorttv'i'rD"<br />

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194<br />

th. tonor.bl. Don.ld t. ro


It<br />

?Sio dilg|rE<br />

ti'filc a.lrt<br />

Adr*tlrllEl<br />

The llonorable Uillie Letnan<br />

Cht{nnan, Sukodnittee on the<br />

oepartmnt of Ti.nsPortati on<br />

.nd Rel ated ^ge|Etet<br />

Comittee on Appropri.tions<br />

House of Repr€sentatl Yes<br />

I.shi mton, D.C. 20515-09t 7<br />

oear l1r. Chai rran:<br />

,<br />

r96<br />

APR<br />

13 |sB<br />

The Confererre Regort to accd+lrv H.J. nrt. 395 (H.R. neP. -lq:!98)<br />

directs the Nrtional Hiqlury Tr.fflc Srfety Adrln{strltlon {lllll5a, to<br />

conduct a cdrDrehen3ive evrlualion of tha effectiYeness of stlt' otol --<br />

;ehicle intDeition Droqr.ms ln (l ) rtducing higlllJ.J accldett3 that ne ll<br />

ln iniurles and deaths, and l2) limiting the nunber of dafectlve 0r unslre<br />

iotor-yeh{cle9 on the hign/rys. tn .ddltion' th€ House Report rcqrested<br />

thrt !€ 9.?pafe a itudy plan describing study Ethodology lnd ip€cllylng<br />

a detailed studJ tinet.5le. [nclosed is a copy of'he stuqy pl'n on--!ne<br />

affectlven€ss of Strte periodic nrotor vehicle inspection pFogr'|||s lPnrr''<br />

lt|. eyaluation t|i]l b€ conducted by. tark force of senlor level llHTSl<br />

i;;tist. "na engineers, all of vhoi h.ve extenslve fdmi]l"lty flth tir'<br />

blclgiound issues surrounding P'|WI.<br />

To assur€ the Sroadest inpu!, rr rill publish a Federal Elgl$SI notlce lo<br />

30licit lnfonnation fron State, local, public ind priYate agencles'<br />

affectea irdustries and consuqer organiratlon!, the auto obile lngurlnce<br />

lndustry. and erpertS in the fields of hlghvay 5afetv ''ese'.rch' Yenlcle<br />

rrfetv Derfonnance, lnspeclion equipmnt and tecnnlques' Pmrr<br />

;drinisiration,.nd enfortemnt. The notice,.ill also provl0e for puDrrc<br />

harr'lngs for the solicit.tlon of infodnati0n.<br />

For addltlonal input, the tlik forte rill conduct a serie3 of iite Yl9lt3<br />

tg revler on-goinb progr.ns, .nd xill pr€Prre the fin'l r€port' 0ut3ide<br />

ilopo"t *ttt 6e pfovraia bv . consult.nt ior d.t' analysls, 'i requirtd'<br />

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th. Eport is schedul.d for cql.tlon by Blrch 1989. I b.lJ.Y. orrt<br />

rtudy progr.m is both r€aio||.bla ad prrctlcal, rnd that lt 3hould<br />

grt.tly lTrov. o|rr knorledlE ln thls flcld.<br />

lc htyc alto proyldad Chal an Stennli r copy of our study Plan.<br />

E|r I gttrta<br />

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U, S. Olprrtint of Tr.nigort tlon<br />

latlonll Hg ry lr.fflc Satrty ,ll'l trl str.tl on<br />

Tltlc: A Plrn for ttr Studv of ttl ElfcctttetE!3 of Strt. lotor V.ltlclt<br />

ln3pectlon Prograts<br />

SUl|{aRY: In r.3ponse to dirlction provl dld by Cong|".!! ln tlt Cor|fa|.a|ra<br />

I-.Dort to rccdp.ny n,J. R.3' 395 itl.R. R.p 100-498, ttt lrtlon.l Hlglrly<br />

triffic S.fety Adlinlttrrtion ()lflTSA) Yill .or|d|et rn cv.lu.tlon of tlE<br />

atf.ctl venei5 of Stat! notor veHcle iafaty lnlp€ctlon progrrls ln:<br />

lred|ri ng hi ghray craslts tlrt rriult I n l nt url aS ald<br />

daaths, and<br />

lifiitin9 tlr nunbar of ungafe.otor vrhlclet on tlt<br />

ti g lrry s.<br />

ItE ev.luation rlll b€ condtrcted by a ilHTS t.!k force. Tltii t.3l forcc<br />

riII rtyier.lI rElev.nt 'llterrture, study arliting Pci1odlc ltotor<br />

Y.nicle lnspection (PilVl) Progr|'i, analyre IXTSA'5 crrih datl bttet for<br />

avi dence of.ff.c!lveness of tllie progttis,.nd saal publlc<br />

D.rticioltion thrcuqh DUblic ltarlnqs.nd. F.deral Regl3tar llotlca.<br />

ittTsa *ill .rt€cirliy incourrgc p.rtict p.ti oFE-3i.iE-dfToc.l rotor<br />

v!hicl€.9enciar, other public at$ pri v.t. o|.gttrl zatloni, !ftacted<br />

induitrier tnd consuner organization3, tlE autonobi le In3urunc€ ! ndultry'<br />

and expe.ts io iuch fields.5 high.ay 3aflty niearch, valdcla iaf.ty<br />

Darfonnanae, i nrD.ctlon equip*nt and tachqlas, tqyl Drlgrr<br />

iitil nJ 3trati on, ail tiions 1ns9actlo||i, atld anfoftenent. TIE trtt forca<br />

rlll alio coid(t a 3aries of rlte vltlt3 to surYey on_going PIIYI<br />

9lo9rr S.<br />

Tha evalultlofl *lll b€ cmplated and ttE rcport tregared by l'Lrc h 1989.<br />

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198<br />

U(leto 0: C|tr"€ttly, trftV orlcntGd twt groorr| |r. coid|Gt d It tl<br />

S6f.;ina th! Dlttrlct ot Colur6l.. Th.s. progr..! rff.ct $qn 68 rll!lon,<br />

o. roughly 381, of al'l r€9l3tar.d vehlcla3 ln dll! counttt ar ot DccarSar 31,<br />

1985. 0f tba non-ln3prctloo St ta3, s6r (b Drovlda tor<br />

'3Dot'<br />

lnaDactlon,<br />

or othar rrrlatlons ot lnspectlon afflatlng caitaln c'lr!3!i of vlhlcla3, ruch<br />

aa lchool b{tat.<br />

Thlre arc rlgnlflcrnt dlff.rencas aabnE tha Strtlt that do havr t|l|VI. lh6a<br />

dlfff.ncas lnclude $lch vehlcla cdDonants ar! lnrDcct d. tha lnttectlon<br />

procrdurri tltrt rrc arip'l oyed, tha supa|'yfrlon of t5a procatt, and thc<br />

anfoFc?tEnt rctivltlas, So|E Strtas hrve boti tlfat)' IflVt progr|li |'ld<br />

a?l!3lon ir3p€ctlon progrrFs. 0thar Stata3 hlva Jort ona of ttrc progrt.<br />

In those Stltes rlth PWI, rtl cl.s5e! of v.hlcl.r reqlst.r.d ln tJ|. Strt!<br />

are 3ubJect to lnspectlon. Hoyever. undar tha llotor Carrl.r gfaty lct of<br />

1984, FltfA ir'ln th! process of deve]otlng ! rula for D.rlodlc Ftor yrhlclc<br />

lnrFtctlon for coirercial rctor vel.iclai. 8.G!uj. thts rtll cianlr tt!<br />

ttatu3 of truck lnspactions, |re ylll focli only on thosa vthlclar rltli a eYyP<br />

of l.5r thln'10,000 I bs,<br />

Sfnc€ the e.tly 1970'!, ieveral att pts hava bacn F.(h to datadlna the<br />

aftactlvanat! .nd coit-banatltt of Pl{ prograB. ln tddltlo||, lttaipts hava<br />

haan l|ad€ to develop lrprovad rrthods for {n3tactln! vahlcl! tub3ystaia a3<br />

prrt of the Pl,Jl proc€is. lha r.s!lts of th!!a affort3 daionstrrt. rlxad<br />

3UCCa!3.<br />

Flrst, lt har blan shot{n th.t lt 13 artrsr.ljr dlfflcult to rllatt thr artent<br />

to rilch P|fyl ratults ln a brttar ',l.lntrlnad vahlcla flaat. Thl! k 30<br />

baceuse such an asle3lrEnt fiJ3t b€ [Ed€ ln(hpcndlnt of tha PlryI Droclss, 3uch<br />

a9 !n ert.nslva randoo vehlcla lnap.ctlon prcgratt|. Ercaur. of aaapla sl'e<br />

considerrtlons, and th€ir attandlnt co3t .ll!p'llcatlon!, stndl!s addr.3alng<br />

ttls lssuc bavr not bee. dona for sevcral J,aars. For that. rtrt rcaton3. lt<br />

ulll not b. poillble to.ddr.i3 thli l!3u!.rpcrlmntt'lly ln thla rtudy<br />

althcr. Hor.y!r, all prevlous rorl rill ba revlded lnd lt rlll forr th!<br />

ba3l3 for the dlicus3loni ln thli !rea,<br />

The 3rfaty bcn€fit5 resulting fron! PllYl progr.Fs hrve baen dlff.lcult to<br />

astrbllsh because of thc llnlt.d.rbunt of lnfom.tion.v.ll.ble conclinlnE<br />

the role that vehfcla defecti play in h{ghr.y cr.shp9. Ndever, d!t! s.t9<br />

have lfiprov€d lnd nore lnforratlon rlght non b€ obt.inahla than xa! poislhl!<br />

In .arlier efforts.<br />

Flnally, tha irsuas Involyad In {nsDactlng vchlcl. syltrB r.ith tha goal ot<br />

prcdlctlng railcla raf€ty iystril frllures ara Oult€ rall-undarstood and tha<br />

lFpllcatlont that thasa lisue! havc on tna Plryl proclt!.r. docuftnttd. lha<br />

problat l! thlt axlst{ng lnrpectlon tlchnleua3 do not provl& Irtplctorr rlt}<br />

the ablllty to rale naanlngful pred.jctlont of sygteF frllurcs. Ilsrlrg thc<br />

couB. of tha 3t!dy, thasa li9ua9 rill ba Rex.Flned, and nli drtt rlll bc<br />

obtalncd rtrara 3uah data tre .v.ll.blr.<br />

ln rddltlon t! th..ff!ctlv.n€3! .nd cBt-b.n.flts ir3u.3 cltld rborc, the<br />

po3llbllltJ ot cotblnlng Pi|lI vlth .itlttlons Inrp.ctlons rlll rlto b.<br />

corrldarart. lnforo.tlon ralaylnt to tili lr!0. rlll b. tollcltad durlog tli!<br />

Dubllc haarlnqr. ln the Fedcral Lqlrtar lotlcc. .nd durlna tha !lt! vltlt!.<br />

ir. rtll .t30 ;.auast th.-!T-E-orE-E'1.<br />

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L rlll rlto tollclt tlt vl!r3 of appro0.l rtc Sntc rd lcrl' F|bllc ad<br />

Ddwta tc|rltt. tffcctad I ndustrlai and contDa. orglr{lltlontr aid l'.<br />

iotor vctriclt lo3utaEa liduitty. Lterl al obtaltEd dut'l it PuDtlc<br />

hrrtnot. ftu ttt.trrants of csrEnt P YI 9rcgrt5, fr! tlt llta urt'<br />

frs c;a3h dtta analJ3as, aid ft'o. v.rloo3 otltr tourclt rlll fort tb<br />

b.313 for tlt dlrcut3iona and conclutloni ln th llnal report'<br />

It 13 tlt oUtectlve of thls 3tudy to ardt|. tlt Yarious li3u.3<br />

corEaiil ng tlt rff.ctl v?ie3t of Sttte.otor valtlcla tafaty lnipcctlon<br />

prpq"ros in ll tllng ttE nunbcr of d.factlva or unlafa rotor Y.hlcle3 ot<br />

tb hgtrlys and rtduclng hlglr.y craaltt tl|t E$rlt ln ldury.nd<br />

d.aths.<br />

YORK PLM:<br />

To...t ttt obJ.ctlyri of tlt Cor|gtltslon l raq||ait, [lTS vlll coPltt.<br />

ttE t.3ts d.tcrlbld b.lor. Tb rott dll b. .ccaDll3tld bJ . t 3l tottc<br />

nad! up of 5a|riot lav€l NHTSA a ltit3 atld aigl naait. all ot rho. hlva<br />

extangl rr ldflltrity yith motor tahlcl! safaty lod otltr ll5ua9<br />

iurrluidi n9 PtlYI. As such, llP t.il foftr FlPn!3aitt a.o3t hlghly _ _<br />

qu.lified 3ouica of tachnical axpa.tlta to acatpllth thlS effort Tlrl3<br />

i.3k force rill b€ supported by ll t.d (und.r 110,000) outrldc<br />

consultlnt tuDgort.<br />

E!I---Lll!!l!re-E9!l!<br />

Ora. ttE p.st tro dacades a si gnl f'l crit uount of lffort tri golt l|no<br />

tlr aisliir€nt of tlt affectlY.nG33 and coat/benefl !3 of nltl. l|.ny<br />

repo.ts dealing rlth F'liyl have been Publl3ltd by Y.rlout tr.sa.rt h<br />

oroanlz.tloni 3uah a5 tlE Tr.n3gort.tion Rata..ch lnitlt!t!, unl versl ty<br />

of-lil cli grn, Slata3 aid otlrrs. llrc h of thls to.l Y.t ipontor€d by<br />

l|lTSAi th/s, it li E.dlly .Y.{ lrbl! for r.viet by tlt t.ll forc.'<br />

Spaclrl enptrii3rlll be 9l*ed on Eports rag.rdlng tll affactivtiess of<br />

PIiVI ln ll itlng tlE nunbcr of dafactl Ya or unsafa vlhlclai on tlE<br />

ro.dr.ys.rd itl-rlduclng ni glray crailEi..tulting ln ldur'y and daath3.<br />

lJa rllt aggcciallJ tark out raportt of State erperia|E. tlrlch docl'| nt<br />

tlFir reasoni for axpaidlng or rld|Elng tltir PIIYI s.flty progrua3. le_<br />

rill rlSo 3e€k Eports reg.rdi ng tfE lff.cti vencsi of Pl'lYl inipactlons tn<br />

d€tecting cooponents th.t rrc |iccianlcally unsafe.<br />

Sldlrr ruvlari by ttr Stata3 of t.r Jarsry, .nd Vlrglna, tlt Coptroller<br />

6?i!r.t of t|! lrd t.d Strt.3, .nd lilTS h|Ye bcrn cotd€trd ln ttE 9lit<br />

rnd t|lrr lri not bcan a tlgntficant anount of nrt srk contil butad lllEc<br />

tlr la3t l..vl art t!.e dott, It lt, lbravar, iTort nt to ravl tl t ttt<br />

'litaratur!<br />

to attuft oursalva3 that r! lrt tr llrr tlth tlt lott cllrl..nt<br />

affo.ti and to thn lse that dlta rr tlt golnt of dr9lrtut.t for tb otltr<br />

taaks ln t|l study.<br />

TA9( 21 0.t. ln.lysl t<br />

l{TS h.i nulEr.oua crarh data rltt tht rlll ba ui€d !n t l 3tudy to<br />

davalog a batter udlalrtaniti ng of tlE 9olrlbla rc'lrllonltip babaan PiVl<br />

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progr.rn3 and higirry crlsher irara yc.ilcla dafacts nay hava plttld I xJor<br />

rola, Th! io3t notrbla set ls tha FARS s.t nhich has b..n u3ad ln aanJ<br />

slnilrr analy3es ln tbe p.st. Yhll€ this set l3 exccl'!rnt bacau3c lt<br />

includ.s all fatll crashes, lt lg llnited becaur! lt ls qulta laall - about<br />

4C,0m crarha! .ach ye.r.<br />

Another lource of lrfomntlon tirt hri rec.ntly bacoiE rvr'l'labl! to ti€<br />

ag.ncy ls State crash d.t! flles. lh€s. fllei contaln..ny tinps tha nurocr<br />

of crrihe3 .s does FARS !nd, ts s!ch, offer the pot€ntlrl to p€rforfi an.ly3a3<br />

th.t rere prevlous]y not possfble. l€ currently hava drt! sets for the pa3t<br />

ten year3 for'18 Strte3, l€ ylll rati6. thes€ sets to dctlm,lre rhlcl' .rc<br />

the.ost rpprcprl.t. for thls typ€ gf anllysis lnd thln proceld to try to<br />

e5t!b'llsh llnts betreen th€ existanca of Plfvl progrtG and tie fraquency of<br />

crtshes involyin! malfunctloning brales, rorn olt t{ras, drfactly€ st sprnilon<br />

ot 3teering systeDit or broken glass.<br />

TASX 3: A5se3spent of Current PIIYI Progra s<br />

Prior to the tubllc herrlngi, flHTSA technlall staff rlll ..t! a rrrllt of<br />

slte yisits to Ptryl St,tes to deterrin€ tha act!!'l pr.ctlc.r ln th!<br />

inrp€ction f.cilities, to docuflrnt the hl3tory of lnspection results, to<br />

revlay rirt enforcercnt pr.ctfces lre follo|.d to enslre th.t defective<br />

velricles.re.epaired, to review the crlterla for tralnlng rnd ccrtlfic.tiot<br />

of lnspectQrs.nd c€rtific.tion of Iripection strtloni, to.tla an Inltial<br />

issesrtnent of the flaalblllty of cortblnjng s.fety and ail3slon ln3pection<br />

proq.ns, anC to erFlore the fersltllity of us! by Strtes of grlvtt€<br />

organ{zttlons to conduct rotor vehlcle tafaty lnspection progrlFs. A! patt<br />

of tiele assessrEnts, re rlll visit sever!'l Strtas drich efipl oy r.ndofi spot<br />

inspections to batt?r understnnd the.dvrntloes,nd disrdv.nt.qes lnh6p;1 16<br />

thri forr or insleatlof sJster,s iell. In iacit'on to Drovicino valurble<br />

lnfom.tion rbout rctu!l Strte pr.ctices, these site vlslts rill also provlde<br />

ertrenElJ valulble bactground ii'forll€tion for tle public he.ring!.<br />

TASI( 4: Federrl Reqlster lot{ce<br />

A Fcdcral negister lotlce rill be pul'lished rn.ouncing the Publlc Xe.rlnos<br />

and raquasting corFents on the s.nr lssues raised in T.sLs 1,2,3.nd 5, Tha<br />

FeCer.l negister Notice xill frovide.rother rEans for getting the bro.dest<br />

posSIDle 9articipntio".ron the public and privtte sectors.<br />

TASK 5: Publ lc He.rinqs<br />

Trc publlc haar'lngs vlll be lield t soliclt Info'itrtlon froc Statt3r Dubllc<br />

saf.ty, ttd rotor v€iicle agencies, other puhlic .nd prlv.te orglnfz.tlon!,<br />

affected lndustrles and consun'er organiurtions, the autorbblle lnsurance<br />

fndu'try, and erperts in such fields.s highrly gafety iese.rch, vehlcl€<br />

gafety p€rforrunce, lnsDcction eqlig|Ent .nd technique5, PFJI progrtn<br />

adnlnlrtration, j3slons lnspection, and anforceFi€rt. The Inforr.tlon<br />

901lcltrd drring these herrings rlll covar th€ full r.nge of tlptca tncludlng<br />

cvl(hnca of PItVI effectivenes3<br />

'ln llfiitlng the nunber of unrafa vahlcles on<br />

the rnadrlys, evldence cf effectlvaness {n reducing (hfact relatad crushc!,<br />

aith.tai of th. felilbility of corbinlng srfrty enC en'lsslons lnir€ctlon!,<br />

anforcaEnt lssu€s, and trai'llng rnd cartiffcatJon l3sue3,<br />

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TlSx 6: Fl nal Re9oit<br />

201<br />

iii'.iiiiii'.t I t3-€r'o.ts, -o'' I Tii"Bl:::: lilffill"ll,"ll'.**''<br />

UDon c@letl on of tlr .!ov. t.slt-||?Sl rl It Dt!D|r' ' dr'ft-r9ort ot<br />

co|Ecfni ng P{Vl. This drlft r"Porc r<br />

iioi it.t io s.el puDlic cdn€nt. Tlt Eport Yil'l cont'in:<br />

--lL..rat<br />

"" surn!.y ittluding liport.nt findlngs of t|t tn'lvses'<br />

iurveys, puDllc reetl n9! rnd conclullons'<br />

! statemnt of tlE obJectlve3 r'd ttvl er of b'ctground "terl'l'<br />

a Drief iulrlry of tlt litarrture rtvie!'<br />

a discuislon of tL rarolti obtained fr$ th' dtt' '['lttlt'<br />

! dlrcusrion ot tha.aterirls obtai n€d frqll tlE slte villtil<br />

a lnrn.ry of tlt lnfoiiation gtined fio tt' Dublic t'rr{ tEs 'iit fro<br />

t,E F.dertl &gllfgl loti ce'<br />

a oresentttion of .11 datr deri Yed duti ng t|t rtudy tlrt b'!r on tlt<br />

Ptil issues undet consideratjon, 'nd<br />

a dis.ussion of tlE finding3 and comluslons, tlong Yith tlu<br />

rpproprl ate r€comendrti ons.<br />

l final r€port vill ll€n be 9rcprr€d.<br />

SCHE0ULE: A tent.tlvc lclrdula for t|t rtudy t'ils ii s lb'r 's FiguE l'<br />

I988<br />

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(dr.ft reeott publiettd in tlt 4!3Ig-<br />

Rrgi ster for gubl i c cFentl<br />

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GAO F#ffiur-<br />

nauc$ CoDEDtty,.!d<br />

Botuutc D"Elor|6i Dtrldoi<br />

LzA?35<br />

Nov.mber lS, 1087<br />

Th€ Honorable John Un$n<br />

Chellru. Sub,{nn I r on qv.niSht sd lnv.lti8.tloM<br />

Cdmitte on En€rS/ md Comer€<br />

flo@ of R€prentltiv6<br />

De.r Mr. Chril1Ml<br />

w2 .a<br />

Thb Epolt it in 6DoR to y@ au6Et 27, 10(16, requat that re review the stody of Eu<br />

at l3p beL eff.ctirlr..s isued by the N.tior.l Tnrtslo.tltion Safety BGd (mB} This<br />

!.Dott o..rtrh€ rtE nEthodolog/ u*d by the B@rd sd Dsys paroculd atte.tion to tne<br />

Bo3rd ! criticbB of odE ted.h tn.t shoes l.D b.lb b be eff€tiae prctetjon for r{<br />

A! iEsued with you oftle, ud6s you publicly al]t|oue it3 @ntenB dlier, w€ pl.. io<br />

turtlcr


kecutiveSummary<br />

203<br />

Purpose taD b€lrs for lw rat Dtdmbile D.s..n8ie€ hv. ldE b..!t Dromd€d<br />

ar ar effedjre lifsvina .l€vie, tlotwer, e Jdy 1986 ldrdy by the<br />

Natronat TrqB@rr4tid Satety BoaRl (rt-rs) c}.lLnt d thi! wid€ty h.ld<br />

beliet The *udy, P€rfom&c€ of t3p BelB in 26 Fronrlt C@he,<br />

un@veled a nunber of cag in which D.*n8eB werc ir\iurcd bdu.€<br />

they *or l.p belts. Given LhB ryjd€ne ard the Boqd ! b€liet ihat<br />

€xisting


nl<br />

€vidqe of pcible h€rn it obssved ir trwy of rhe ecidenLs ir irv6tj.<br />

8$ed and tlE pDbl€rc with the avaiLbl€ rlat3, it rs udble !o ey<br />

wrplher or .ot pai€r8e6 h the F& $at shdld be adv&d to wee lap<br />

b.ltr. The Board lKmehded ttur sll new c6 tE equipp.d with l.p/<br />

lhoulde. belt! ed thlr older cs be Efined with th€m.<br />

The cnd6 of tlE B.sd'e srudy ctaim rha! |]N l6ked only at very<br />

ever aeid€nt3 in shich nrlr inr syst ru @ nuch t6! eff€cttve, srd<br />

did not l(r@ d cas in which lap b€ltr m8ht Drcvide prctArtoh. WIrh<br />

or€ €xepnon, |im qmirEd only frontal dide.rl, but lrcnarr of all<br />

tat l didentl @ notrfrcnt€b A nore Epllgtltive gsDle, lhey<br />

believ€, euld have show tnlt Lhe net eatet of rr s.t l.p bettl is to<br />

sve lir6sd edua tle nmbcrdd *v.ntyoi rr{urie.<br />

R€sults in Brief c^o dc not dtpute llm s audhS thsa lsp belB, in $ne rets€, ce<br />

cdse deuth o. *rjru i4iury io rcir !.ar coral3 wsu8 th€fr. as<br />

tlp Bdrd not€, thb infomlttd hs b.d ldDm ro rhe eciden!<br />

@..ch @mMity fo. I|uy y€a, c^o.8rg wirh llN thar theE<br />

mry b€ i@or.ci6 in rL darr lE&heF have u*d to aaty2 .es<br />

.€.t rsD b€lt €ffective€$, bu! a^o belkve that befoe .qErting all of<br />

Principal Findings<br />

th..e snalysB &d rh€ widaly h€ld b€lief thar laD bel6 p.or€ct rcrr se.t<br />

Dqlsei{4i h'IsB mut do a|ort tn n limply poinr to che exilten t of linitrti@<br />

in the dat b8s.<br />

TIE Boed hs rcr shdn |h.t rh€ vdios dat'be3 e e flawed tley<br />

oMot be uled to .nillu t@ *at l.p b€h efetivhB. ,{ number of<br />

'@nt studie €mploting diff*nt methodologie sd different dar!.<br />

bErs, while fhdina that Fd *at llp belt3 e bss effR'lile in rh€<br />

tlTe. of cidmt3 inv€ngated by \"rsB, @no h fhding that red e.t<br />

lap belts prote.t w@6 more oft h lha they hsft rh€h.<br />

The Board's Report llp 20 cls Nr'8 €ret|.d abmndlate thar a FrfdD&a DroDkrn<br />

aist3 vith reu *.t bD belcs in *vere ftun4l as5he.. r.rs b€lieva<br />

that .he conventiotul $ isdom thaL hol& t!.t rca e.t lap bettr are<br />

eff61rve in .educing deaft ed trUurj *verity is bs!€d on highly D[eb,<br />

rltL &ra. M6l hi8hway sfery re&ch us data ongna[ing in poiice<br />

&cidat eDo.tJ wlrich, .@rding to \NB @ ridd€d *jch ina..ur&ies.<br />

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205<br />

The aodd .0(6 thlt da!.be thlt do not rcly d polie .4{i&it<br />

Eports also @ i.sdequaB be{ae they @ntain clstively fd cg in<br />

whrh lap b€lt d dcup.rtJ wee inlolv€d N"rsB d€ nol claim to hav€<br />

shown that laD bel6 @, on bd&e, ineff(tive, but tnat inen overdl<br />

eff{bvenG cMot be subtdtiated by dal}zing the existing<br />

Criticism of the R€port Alhough teeh.rs do not dtptrt€ the vrsB indillg thet l.p b.ltl<br />

$utit@ cfi due de.th or *ri@s ulury, c.iti6 of the Fpq! clrh<br />

thr! thc Boe.l dmir€d a biasd gmple of &cidentr, which naaL lrp<br />

belB app€s t4 be 16 effective tltu lhey vould hlve boen hld it stu&<br />

ied a mre r!?idl oll€clion of Eldenr3. S€verd relt dud!6 employing<br />

diffeEnr darabss ud diffemi daltt|car techntqud dl @rclude<br />

rhat )aD belts r€due rh€ rilk or d€rd sd *riN !\iury to re& st<br />

(cuDdts The sludi€r.le sugadr !h.t the prctq'tton gJforded by<br />

Ed $at lap b€lb B 8I!!t r i. nonfrorrrl .(ident3 sd.t iowr inpact<br />

sFeds. This is @B6tdt wiih |N s ihdinS that hp b.lB d la<br />

ed.ctiv€ m frcnr.l, huh imDat didenrJ.<br />

GAO'S Anal!€is<br />

N"rsB<br />

hs identilied a number of posible limitatioG in tlt dar. E d by<br />

t..ffi. sJety resdcleB to FsIy4 *3l belt eft


Becommendations<br />

206<br />

Sm.e d€ purre o( cm r r€view wd t $rli'. snd cemenr d h"rsB i<br />

repon. c^o E ruldra no recomendarim.<br />

Agenqr Colunents c^o briefed NIla 3l3ff on rhe Bults of the rtviry dd t&k inro s.fuL<br />

ihei. omrnents and s886cioru wh€E apprcpnat€. Horcver, c o did<br />

not obt4tn offBial E8ency @M€nt3 on rhis repo.r.<br />

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Contents<br />

wl<br />

Drecutive SurrLrnaxy '.<br />

Chapter I<br />

Introduction<br />

Chapt€r 2<br />

The NISB Study of<br />

the Performance of<br />

Lap Belts<br />

Chapter 3<br />

Reactions to the NTSB<br />

Report<br />

Chapter 4<br />

NTSB Response to the<br />

Critics<br />

Chapt€r 5<br />

GAO Observations and<br />

Conclusions<br />

NftlB ad lt3 M!6ion<br />

C,ene.i. of the NtsB Ilp Eelt Study<br />

The Role of the NaLional ttiglrty lYaftic Ssf€ty<br />

Ob.ie


Figures<br />

N<br />

Tabl. 3 ?: Eff€riven6 of rrp !d trp/ Shoulder Bells<br />

in ReducinS Se.iou l.juti..<br />

FS'P InvesriSanor R€port3<br />

A@rdlu t PoUe dd<br />

Table 3 3, Fatslity Reducooh llmlth EinpLo}T€nt ol<br />

Rte Se3! L€p Belts-Double Ptir c.mpeisn<br />

Trble 3.4: Effetivens E6tin ts of n€& Seat lip Belts<br />

Usrn8 Double Pdr Companon of 1982+6<br />

P.Nylv@a A..id€nr D.ta<br />

T.ble 3.5 1985 MichiSu Aeid.nts-Ra seai<br />

Oeupmts lnjury Seventy by B€lt U*<br />

Tlble 3.6: Oberyed B€tt Us oa Red Seat OccuFnt6 by<br />

/\8e ir Mrchrgo-s€l(ied Monihs<br />

Ttble 3.7: PolieR€ponad R€d Seat Occupdt B.lt Ud€ ltr<br />

l9E6 Michuu A€i&nts by A6e dd Quart€.<br />

Tsble .1. l: B.lt gffetiv.ie.s in RSEP<br />

Ftgure l.2r bp/Sr'oukb Belt!<br />

!'iE!E 3.I : vehicle Oefodtltlon (TAD) R.ttutF in Norih<br />

Cmlim C.ah6 sd 26 NTSB C.ahB<br />

FiSiure 3 ?: IbJurr Conpe]s@ ot 6.069 Ndth<br />

csolini@ ad r39 OcflF.ts in the 26 NISB<br />

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209<br />

rls Abbrcviaied l.j{ry S.rle<br />

Depanme.r ol TltBponriion<br />

Failurc An.4.is As*rar6<br />

Fatar Accideri Repo.iLng Syst€m<br />

mss Federal <strong>Motor</strong> vehicle sJcry stdd.ds<br />

Cerral Amuntil8Ollie<br />

Itr€hway Satety R*d.h C€nter ar lhe UniwBiiy of Nonh<br />

x lco sdle oflnjund (I( = tilled; A,a,c = lev€l of it\ju.iq 0 -<br />

un,qju.€d)<br />

National Aaidqt Sopli!8 Systen<br />

Na.ional Center tor Si.ti3iicd AnalysE<br />

Na.ional Crah S€v€.ity Study<br />

nrrs^ Naoonal H{hway T.arric Safely Adnmjstr.tlon<br />

Natrond ftanspo.t4trDn Satety Aodd<br />

R6trunr Stsiens Elaluation ProSr.m<br />

T.aJli. A.cid€nl DmaSe kale<br />

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Introduction<br />

NTSB and Its Mission<br />

211<br />

In July 1986 the Niridd Tjlaponadd Safety B@rd (r,.rJB) Eleed a<br />

r€pon, Th€ Perfoma€ of tap Belt5 in 26 Frontal Crdh6, shich q!*<br />

doned lheoverall eil€criven* oa rear *ai lat bek-s tn penger c6<br />

{d vG Lap bel6 a.c sinele straps thal e€ broughl erc rhe pellis<br />

aid c usuarly fDund n rhc rcar *at of p6


Fhw !,r uc/eErdr B.ht<br />

2t2<br />

mB Spne rrlr j-' dH not un


Genesis of the NTSB<br />

r.qp Belt ftudy<br />

213<br />

ed t th. vehicl€ within . fer deys b€foE lhe ryidqe is dbturb€d by<br />

N8hway Mintt@e cIEs o. notor vehicle Epo. snoF6. The hi8hway<br />

accident invFijgator nal6 a naber ol mesurmdts to .dculate the<br />

force ud dretron oi rmpad od the evenis th,r o.tuned i$jde th€<br />

vehr.le In additon tu exmninA the phrsrc.l evidenc at lhe *ne, the<br />

invGtigator intewiews qi!1es6, vehicle @oputi Doh€, ud emer-<br />

8e.cy medical persnrel. The inv6tuato. also nvi.*s medi.al infomation<br />

on th@ i4iurcd when ir i3 sv.iiable u3in8 all tlE infomat'on<br />

avatlabte, th. inv6ti6ao. adnDr5 b t8Ntruct ihe dident ed<br />

detefrine why ihe Kjd€nr durEd dd ho* rhe GcupdLs rere<br />

h the taU of 1984, rh€ Bqrd 6ppmved a plrn to invsd$t€ the ftan<br />

perfort]ae of *.r- belB in . sple of apprcFoately 200 qFridenri,<br />

lnitiaUy. the Board wE inie.6t4d in evsluetin8 the perfofrae of 3ll<br />

tttaof s.t bel|s dd did not int ndt oent..t on lapt€lt3. Ti€<br />

Board vat€d inlomation on the Erl woild Frfo'lr$c€ of *ar b.lr3<br />

becaur€ it ss conched thit rean. chen86 in allonobile d€i8., sch<br />

a do*BizinS, miSht b. empomiiinS st bel! efie.iiven*. In .dditio,<br />

tlE Board qa qerned 3!o!r the l&l or dynuic t4.un8 or sear<br />

b"lt systds. The B@rd believed Uat nol.nougn 9E rnoen .bout how<br />

o!@t belt systec perfomed in .eal *trld sccidentr.<br />

After about a quarter of tne app.oxinately 200 investiSatjom hrd<br />

begun, ias3 invstigatoE notrced that n *veral tronial ae'cl€nts, E&<br />

*at, lap-belted ecupets we.e erio6ly rlued, ud that lhe it\jun6 to<br />

the abdohinal .e8ron sustBined by th@ $ean^8 the lap belts we.e<br />

caDed by Lhe b€lts then*1v6. Aft€. leming about ths unexD€.ied<br />

phenDrunon. N"r$ de.ided b rcfos its efrori dd cDnentnte on th€<br />

perfolmn€ ot lap belts. in Lhe lrp belt rcp.n, NTrR @ndud€d not only<br />

rMt cDnditio$ could exisr ude. which lap belts suld b€ hamful bDt<br />

de r.hat the dar. ued bt lhe National HrShway Tratric saf€t,! Admjnie<br />

tralion (l\'l'tr!i{) ud othe. re@he6 are mt suafrciendy reiiable t!<br />

show thar lap belts e etfHtiv€ Tne Bdrd 'emcnded that r.'8R<br />

inidat! a Dlemaki.8 lmediately b.€quire lap lshoulder bells in .he<br />

rcu dtbodd (side) Mts of penSer vehicld (S& ch 2 )<br />

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The Role of the<br />

National Highway<br />

Ttaffic Safety<br />

Administration<br />

2rr<br />

NmsA is q aaehcy widrn the u s. rte!.rtnen. of Tt?roponelid i!o.l<br />

GpoEible for mprcvjng the safety p€.fomee of mbr v.hi.l6<br />

hrdcGe. .8€nci6 crcated tn 1966 *tre tt?Ef..red in 196? 14 Lhe<br />

N*ly ceaied Depar|meni of TrNpottation The FedeEl_Aid HiShway<br />

A(t of 19?O 6tablished NHrs^ as a FDst€ sdmiri3ltatid wrthin mr'<br />

To carry o!! its GDoEibilitis, NHT s.r promulgabs &d en-fors regula_<br />

oons, inclu


Objectives. Scope. and<br />

Methodology<br />

215<br />

In AuSu$ l9a6 the Chaims of rhe sub.omide on oveBighr dd<br />

Inv6liSatroE, {ow CoMilte on Elergy dd Come@. requBt d<br />

thar c^o damine rhe b6is for the Board s 6n laioB dd .smmendatiore<br />

reSarding l4 belt dd the bais for lhe qiticisms of th€ reF.n<br />

by other leoche6 we met with the chane s rcprenlairve dd<br />

ageed to fro our sludy on ho* h'IsE *teted accidents for its smpl€<br />

8hd i hethe. it had demorot.ated ch3t NBR ud orhe. a.crdenl dat3b.s<br />

cdnor br used to €valuat tbe benefits of lap belts in reducint che<br />

rbk of dearh ud *rios iqjury in moto. vehicle aadents. we ale<br />

qrled it rculd not be f4ibi€ for E to uMena]{e e independdl analysis<br />

ol l8D belt effetivere. Ictead, we d8reed t exmine the N1S3<br />

study dd the salys€s perfomed b! orhe6. In addition, k a8red ro<br />

Evi€w the available lileralure ad to inteNiew i-IsB persnnel, in.lndi.g<br />

steff who wo.ked on rhe lap belt rcDorr.<br />

ln addir)m ro |{N staJf , ft ntenised hi6h{a! safety red.h$s al<br />

[rrrs^. includng th@ at N{rs{ we inlarvia€d we.a] memb€B or lh€<br />

hjgh{ay safery re*e.h .omuniiy who hav€ erked in the arca or<br />

m!.aint syscm effeciivenes, including B.J Cmpb€ll ol th€ Highwat<br />

S.feLy fte*dch C€nter at the Lnive6ity of Nonh Carclina in ChaPel<br />

Hill: Fmk Contey ot the liew York Stale [Fpanm€nt Df <strong>Motor</strong> vehicld<br />

in A)bmy, New Yo.kt ad I{en Campbell of ihe Tr4port4tjon Re*a.ch<br />

IEiuute at the Universty of MichUe. we also inteflie*€d individrals<br />

frcm PhysiciMs fo. Automodve $feiy, ihe O€nt r for Aulo Sarery the<br />

AFerico A$@iation fo. AutoFoove Medicine, a d tepreentati!4 Df<br />

boih rDrei8n dd


2L6<br />

* *lo--"0 rt'" ."."" ," d', mddc. with thetall) acptFd 8orh'<br />

wpd.{us*d rL rul6 or rur revPq qth<br />

*,[-a,u"e.,-a".d.<br />

'"1-J,rr'"'ir<br />

-a,r.,."w5 de u@rpoBr6 e apprcpnaF In<br />

ffijane srt' rt'p r"q*st of theChetu&sotrF *.didnolobtar<br />

offi.ial rg4Y coMents on ine rePon'<br />

ctrDt"r 2 pre*^is ihe d€lals ol thP s3 rpon 'h'pLat 3 mnare<br />

;;d.nt'qu6 or the NrsB rcr'n- dd *verat renr nFmpa b<br />

L"i"Lole r.t. *t*ou"*$ or lap beltt chap@t 4 | epons NlsB s<br />

L-n*r' tlo" **nt "ttorl.e (napFr 6 s(|rmMF 'u<br />

oi c"n"tu,oroo<br />

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277<br />

Chaptlr 2<br />

The I{IISB Study of the Performance of<br />

Lap Belts<br />

NTSB Study<br />

Methodolos/<br />

In lh€ @R of N study of the Frf.hqe ol both r.rx' lsp .rd t.D/<br />

ltbulder *at belLs, NrsB inv6tuato6 enduts€d sverar .Eyr rrl<br />

wNch a p€Mn sering a Lp belt 96 eriously iruured by rln ddxr<br />

The Bodd rut@used its study to conqiEr4 oh the lap beu i$ue and<br />

ftud rhat n lronal aeid€nts liD belts @uld b€ deftimenral insread ot<br />

b.neficial. When rhe Bo.!d sght to d€t€mrne whethe.lap belrs w€rc<br />

b.neticial in oth€r t'-p€ of did€nts, dd thus beneficial ove.all, rt on-<br />

.lud.d that th€ availible dat e iMdequate to nake such a d€t€minadon<br />

n'Tsa dcided that it @uld not advi* Fople to eed lap belG when<br />

ndinS ir ttE ree *ats of pasnger caE. od it romend€d that ree<br />

*a! (xnputs n ve the s.re prot€.tion as fmnr s€3t Gup{ts-lap/<br />

'the NlsB eion sisis ol r*o !drs. The fiBr ts the Eoed's u8lylis ot<br />

26acidenls in ehi.h ar lesr one vehrlc @opdi w6 *€dnn8 r llp<br />

belt. Oth€r Gcup&ts may have ben mbelr€d o. wemne a lap/shoulder<br />

belt. The sond parl ades on tj]e &rard s cntique of rh. lar8e &ciden!<br />

dat b'g ttur oiher rear.heN have u$d to support Lhe Dcitio<br />

thlt l.p b€ltl proiide Fenable piotalon t rca. ear p6*n8€B who<br />

wilh rc8dd io th€ @ll


S''nthe6is of the zti<br />

Cases NTSB Exanined<br />

218<br />

6trmile.adiE ftum the reSional offid.. How€ver, b€arE€ sofie reootl3<br />

h.d diflioltrG obtaininS ca*, the Sro8raDhic limiB were e&8ndcd<br />

h .ddtlon to tlE side saltsi! brcl.lFoud tn l MIs inv6tigrtoE<br />

u$dly brinB to . 3tudy, the hiShsry ..d.brt ihv.stiSab6 who w€rc<br />

t. b. irvolved ir th€ set b€lt study .tra.bd a l-wek tBiNrS @uL ao<br />

le@ now to detdmie whe Fr o. not peopte lnvrfiad in rmtD. vehicl€<br />

s..idenls were etu..lly *mn8 ea! belts To v€nfy bell u!€, ch. inE<br />

rigabE s€.e t.ained t i@k lor evid€@ such a lddjnS md*s d the<br />

rin8, holding r}le be)ts or on the belt! th€lelve that would 'ndjcn<br />

rlrtlp. they ha


tfila.E.ro.i.H6I."d<br />

219<br />

aptoyed belts RF @,in8 . pmblem Ttrdrv_sir lePb€lted (Kr'<br />

pst3 sultliled *ireu3 to fat l idai6 in oNh€s where othe. €a!_<br />

pdt3. jhcludin8 the in 1l|€ mote tlhtt8ble frtnt sat. Pet l*<br />

*riNly r4juRd or not ir\iured 3t au.<br />

hd ;aM 'r.k'l-.d rs r.ddr. s..i",. s.s cdd.rl r.tr'ul F.r.l<br />

S s - 5 7 . ? ' 1 1 ? 2 ( 4 )<br />

I<br />

U \ '<br />

Lrp/.tus htr<br />

The iiu.tes sultrin d s s Eult of th€ lsp belts eere oft4n .!MB th.<br />

h6t dmgdN typ€ or i^jun6: the t th€ head, spire, ed abdome.<br />

The dstribut$n of rhe L1ims 3ustained in ine 26 cr.6h€ is shown in<br />

tsbl€ 2 r. Of th€ 60 rENm w€aring l8p belk in the o8h6, onlt L<br />

w6 uNdu.e


Limitations of Er.isting<br />

Databases<br />

Omitt€d and Misclassified<br />

Data in Police Accident<br />

Reports<br />

m<br />

Tie 26 cs* !h.t i'rsc €rumed led ir to qu€stion ahethe. l.p belb e<br />

ar eIa€tive ount tufluE against d€arh o. rljury. €leci.lly in f|s<br />

t3t collbions l+cau* the 26 ces examined w€rc not a statisticany llP<br />

re.ent tive sople of all &cidenls in which E& $.t laP belis nrghl<br />

Fsle a ditre.€ne the Bsrd luned to pnor ealy*s of ihe natmnal<br />

sdidenl daiab.g to dswer rhe qu6tDn of th€ ove.all effe.tilene$ of<br />

e& *a! l.D b.lt5 Aft€r i! reviryed a numb€r of goteme.r .eports<br />

.nd srudi6 by hiSh*3y slery r*uch€6. rhe ao&d @ncluded th.t<br />

very few studie had specifically addressd lh. €fiedvetrs of laP<br />

b.lrs, dd whar studr6 h.d b€en d6e een bed on hiSNv unreliibL<br />

NrIs^ od otheF had p@iously 6timlt d tlBt lap belts we.€ $ nuch<br />

.i 60 pe.€nt eafe.live m preventing d.e$ ot *rious iNury for weeF<br />

ol ree *at tap b€lts.' sns,{ beLiev6 that this p€rentag€ wa stet in.<br />

sse fD lap/should€r b€lts. NB be)iev6 that $e €stimat6 @<br />

Iteatly exaS€rer.ted Pohtin8 out liat the rc...rch cldminS Lh.t rcd<br />

*st lap b.lts de very efletive 6 bs.d on irfomatid otinanv<br />

rE@rded in polie accident Epo.rs, Nma belie!6 thal lhe reports<br />

oft n omn or ll@tNify impondl infomation, @ntah npRrF<br />

rE6urs or aalden! ed it\iury ev€ntv, and sufier from other draw_<br />

backs rhar limi! *ve.ely their efulne$ in evaluati!8 rear *ar lap iElt<br />

.ffRitveres Nrsu E Ep€oally cntic.l oa lh. lege nanonal dabbas.s<br />

\Tss Doinl! on! in its srudy lhat rh€ Drinatv 3ouc of dident infomidon<br />

usd by xllrs od othcG ir ihe rlFrt! frll€d @t by the polce a!<br />

tt ei


lnprecise Measures of<br />

Crash S€verity<br />

z2r<br />

Hfr*-o-..*-<br />

f,lpther or.ot belr! *re rcm. We exmined lh€ @iddc r?F).t fo@<br />

lBed by lhe individusl sttts Md fosd that etu do not 4en mclude.<br />

Dla4€ to rord belt.e. Ih tlte css b€lt-e inforalron apFs in<br />

@mpute.iu d dtta fil.s only if tne olfier included it in de nealive of<br />

th€ accident. ln addton, aeid€nt rcFrtirS tom differ fron sttte to<br />

$!r. .4mon8 stats s!


lftplecise Measurcs of<br />

Idury Seventy<br />

E2<br />

invesugsto. crn cdcllate delta v TnB is . mo.e renn€d €.trnste of dt€<br />

deijdsnes6 of . fiash thd tnst made by the lolie .t tlE !ft<br />

Itrss nois Lh.t a eftlad,on exil|3 b€trq Etrairt us€ ud Gid4t<br />

serity rhat Rds to be Mllolled fo. in ualyzinS Glrdnt st*en<br />

effe[ivens. Rert evidene su88Bt3 tha! Btnir€d .lrivers .re 16!<br />

Itl€ly to be involved in colbsim, 6peci..[y ..rLorr! on€ ]t hc b€n<br />

6tina!€d that mt.ained drive6 har€ 3 6? Frwt gMte. lil@Uhood<br />

ol bein8 involved in @Ui5io6 of sufficient leverity t ldl] th.h the do<br />

Brnined dnve6. E3timies of eat bel! eff.


Limitations of NHTSA<br />

Databases<br />

NTSB's Conclusrons<br />

ftrmh.'drr.'.ir-.<br />

m<br />

Mss i5 hill ycitiol of the datsbsg us€d by Nffi dt19?_79<br />

Nation i C..!h S.venty Siudy (Ncss) itr su(j]:g., rhe Nation l aei_<br />

dent SepLinS Syst€n (H.{-ss)i a.d ihe Fa$l Acciddr RePrtinS Sy3t m<br />

iE{s) Acording to mB the d.t! @ntlir€d in Ncss de &t€d ed<br />

lehDlete. F-hile the data in :.'s d htSely iftlevet 3nd include t@<br />

lry


zlA<br />

ftffii-",--,..--,<br />

4. Det.rmift tll€ f€Bibrlitv ol ihFpoint l4/.lurlder belrs for every<br />

$atirA pcicron (i.€., indudnS front dd Rlr c.ntzr sts) dd if f4i'<br />

bl€, rcqtriE llBuf.4turcE to illtdl ihem in dl 'w v€hicl6.<br />

GAO Observ ations ite do not dlsDute the ifiB ntdhS lh.t, in a (aber of diddt!' oc.updt3<br />

reeing lap belrs @re sridlly or fst ly injuftd bv the d€vicl6<br />

that vere suplo*d to pnn4cl ttee liot !.t, this Frobld, a the<br />

Bo3rd iBelf poinrs our, h6 been ldom for muv vem. The Bosrd did<br />

not ned Lhe evidene ol th€ 26 accidents it studie


ftNE3d'rt-ifu.....<br />

ru<br />

4. D€rermine the fdlibiliiy of thrGpoinr lap/shoulde. D.lt€ fo .v€ry<br />

eadnS p@itjon ( '.e., includha font ed red ent2r ed.) rnd, if f4g!ble.<br />

muire meuf.4rurs3 to l$td t}len in all new vehicl!'.<br />

GAO Observations we do nor dbput! ttE lrEa fldint th!r, in a number of 0.ci&nBr eo-<br />

D{rt! rclrilU bp b.lt3 ftn erioaly or frt3lly i{iured by ltte devis<br />

thlr s€t€ erpp6.d to potet thetn. However, this probhm, a5 the<br />

Edrd it €lt pointt dq ha teen knom fd many yec. The Board did<br />

nc{ rE€d ttp did€E ol r}. 26 e.$d€ils it ltudied t4 m*. dE l:e<br />

t}{t lap b.l6 off.r les protettd th{ Lp/shouLter belb ,nd ih8t h<br />

s(re ttpps oa r.d.lenB lsp b.l6 ar kl|l @ eriNly i\iulE tle peer.<br />

l{rsB eys m jts study that th. 26 s.q


':h.oF r<br />

225<br />

Reactiors to the NTSB RePort<br />

0r'erall Concerns of<br />

the Critics<br />

iiii"'.t ^.r ,r'. r"st'.av $tetv res h oMudrv cnbri2rd ih'<br />

;;'epon on tap uetr peaome* ThFt belrPvP th' ^-r$ *3a8€Et4d<br />

,i* "ir'"-'""e. - ,h" a"."bs nscd n s@ristical ddvs ot *ar<br />

r*h.l{{teI)6. whne sekst 5N' rcllBdolo8a3l em6 t 16 (ls<br />

i"rrv.i" r" too*., ,r,.v tt"Ie;e dd a Pubhc!'iq rls fndis" rhe<br />

nmrO nav nare uOemnca the Dublic s rcnjrdene in *al b'll ev*ro<br />

"tt,er'*ay<br />

keralty<br />

seterv lffite^ rrentlv @mphtFd *veralsrud'<br />

[ii,. i*-i",i''"i t'r'" qi,*r,on or r.p bert €fr


$ffiffi*<br />

.$?,<br />

r-.dc. b r|rr*rlri.r<br />

i%<br />

ffi<br />

*i?;'"#:Tm<br />

Highway Safe;i<br />

fi€searchem<br />

ffi<br />

ffi$tl*-f-t**iffi*i,":ffi<br />

q.o/r.cee',L'*t!fttjb


Critique of the NTSB 26<br />

C&s€s<br />

b.6.berdilFt<br />

2n<br />

campbell not6 tha! rlthoulh M{!B tdElte! lsp/3ndtd.f b.txt l' .n<br />

improvement @er l.t bell., i! bag it3 .eotmendatjm d hu.h of .he<br />

;e evidence n disisd wh€n the stme 4jderc. ws sppli€d to lap<br />

beltr. Camp&ll arXrrd ihst lJ exiliing deta md r6drch e adequt€ to<br />

deNGtrst4 the effetiv€nB! of lap/shoulde. belts' th€v N .dequate<br />

for lar b€lts s weu. CmptEU b€ltev€ ihat th€rc b ample evidence in<br />

de liid.ture to


ft5 !-r: r.l,.r. D.t mr-..r Oro)<br />

ir*{. h|!nc.it c.r.lDra2a<br />

m<br />

ksdNB&Fr i j<br />

Clmtt U mperes the fftqu€n f dj.rlibution ofr.dd.nt s.riay i.<br />

tn 26 n"r$ cBn6 with that ot tE North C&irlinr (':.dE rEtirS dl.<br />

mB c@ *letion qitena He fh& rhsr tJre Nasa eil4i! .n Ery<br />

3lw.d loFael the hjgh end of tlp ..iidelri eleriiy dj"itittim. A s3,<br />

tirticrl tat shows ttui tlE od& .E rlore ftd 10,000 b r .g.itrs dDwin8<br />

! dmple with such an erddr€ distributjd of Gi(bhc ..rstv.<br />

Thb &gt€33 th4 &e l\r!a !mDl4 i! Lnu.D@r.dve ol tlE dtltribE<br />

ti6 of 4ident *veriiy aomd in dE popul.don of @idst! nRritrt<br />

tlE aosld s ltated s€ledion qiterta (!€. fu- 3.r )<br />

'*[hl<br />

-b"cde*.d.r<br />

In*,-dq<br />

&rE rJ c5F... tL Eetu d.-€-r L+€a! h c'.ar riry rdEb, 16<br />

c.npD.I .lso @npa6 il* i4u.r diltribuiid in tn. 26 M$ i,g ?ith<br />

the Noftn Cmlin. erle.ire Th€ kal6 enpLoyed to 8!u8€ ulury<br />

senry 8le differ l\'rs u!.s the Abbreqated laju.y ScsL of i4jury<br />

senty in which . nurneriol ra1r8 of I 6rcu8h 6 is ssligrEd to euh<br />

iAju.y @rved b.s€d on ils ihreat 10 $€ ncdn s Uf€ Thus, d rls 1<br />

i\jurt vould in.lude supern.Lal abrNrcs, while & ^a 6 r'ould nvoll€<br />

j<br />

i<br />

;j<br />

l<br />

':l<br />

.<br />

t<br />

I<br />

t-!<br />

'l<br />

1<br />

1<br />

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i ;


Evidence of LaP Belt<br />

Effectiveness From North<br />

Carolina Data<br />

r...d-..&Ml|r....<br />

m<br />

souBl rc.d rruui6, se@rd or tlud


tE@ 3.2: r.i!t cdF.rLd ol Lca<br />

l|.r$ c$ri.r.n. .'n 139 ocar'l. h<br />

bfuot|.|fl.rFr<br />

230<br />

(rr 7), the.e .ppee b be no siSdtcor diff*@ betwen {-eari.8<br />

l.p beltl dd wedinS rc b€lt at all<br />

- .Fl<br />

,tHt<br />

ffi-.-,"*<br />

11rc6.@o@q<br />

-*"""*-,<br />

Crhpbell b.liev6 that Lh@ who rcloned acodenrs to |he NB sludy<br />

prob.blt ch@ t rcporr ornt very seriN aeidst5 *here be)t d D€.eG<br />

eete rnju.ed He b{liev6 that c&s where lap belts e€re b€n€fu8l<br />

reE inadlenendy $ened out, ed 6 a resulr. lhe Board wG lef!<br />

wilh ihe inprsjon tnat lap b€lrJ *€re oi quebonabl€ b€neril Bu!.<br />

&o.ding t4 Cdpbell, eve! !h@ wemnS lap/shoulder b€lts fa.€d little<br />

b€tt€r thM ch@ wedin8 no belt at all in $€ 26 a.cidents exahin€d by<br />

^1sB For exMplej .bout 16 pere.t of lap/shoulder-belted ftcupats<br />

reivcd idun6 nted ^s 44, phile only I pe.enc ol unetroned<br />

@cupels .@ived such erioE irturi6. simildly, rcu8hly the rme<br />

plolonron of lar/shoulder-b€lt€d lnd un6trained oNpdts Fere<br />

uinju.€d o. .e.ery€d @ly ninor (ars I I ir!uri6. A more .eDrs?ntative<br />

ffipl€, CMpb.ll b€lieva, would have sho*n tha! both lap ed l.p/<br />

shoulder.belled p.snSeB fared b€tt€r, md that alrhough lsp belts<br />

e.ar'E-DL!BElrtu<br />

T<br />

,i 311:<br />

ii<br />

j<br />

i<br />

3<br />

I<br />

_ i<br />

{ I<br />

-{ ,|<br />

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!<br />

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Ij


8l<br />

ercrim6 cN!!€ inhry, t!€y mo.€ often h€19 rcduce i{urv nd it{urv<br />

Cmpbell abo !.inB out that tie ^'rsB report fm*s on ca% wh.re a<br />

liFbelted Dem. fared woM thd d unbelLd Gupdt in the sMe<br />

vehicte A8u uu|g Non! Celina d.ta, CamDb€ll |n€s to democtnt<br />

tha. su.h wrcng wet oulc$m6 u€ tD b€ expected €ven w'th lap/<br />

stroulder b.l!s but thdthey& no! prcdommst€ Th. No.lh Carolina<br />

data shos that €.upMtl weding lap or lap/sh@lder belrs de idued<br />

m@ *nouly the unbelid ons in .he sme whicl€ I t t 14 percent<br />

of ih€ uhe Bur ir\iurt6 14 belled (mpuis ,.e tes *vere in d ev€n<br />

SEater proportid of dF d*. Fo. 3 14 a.cidents In wNch on€ t4@n<br />

in lhe re& *at of . vehicle 9s wean^8 a lap b€lt ad the other sa<br />

sb€lted, he fin{rs that in I r 5 pe.cnl of lhe cas, ihe laFbelt€{t pemn<br />

ws mor eriNly iniured, but in r 9 De.ceni of .h€ cag. the laPbelted<br />

Fls farFd betttr' lh.ddrtron .n alera€. 'n Lne lss *heF lap<br />

b.l!4d o


...fu.*lvr.1...<br />

a2<br />

Failure Analysis Ar €ndh..rin8 coNultjnS fm, Feilure Aldysb A!dod!4s (rdl, .lso<br />

revierrd lh€ ||rsB study ad issu€d a EDon ciaiol of th. Bo&d s d.ta<br />

@l€did ploc€du6 sd the way the data @E prt .nt d." rd intervisped<br />

nr$ fi€ld staff &d wahin8ron officiab, udert@l a detailed<br />

airtysi! of the full tu.d of the a.cidents in \E3 s s4ple dd con<br />

tlat d *rs8 s dala with orher d.rabas. FA beli€ve tnat liN s c4<br />

s.ridst3 _e a sioEly bi&s.d lel6tion which is 6Fp.€*nt3ti!e of<br />

dy poDubdon of mot r vehicl€ ..iidents in th€ Unikd StaFs F4<br />

furd! tllat Mrs, violated its oh !€l€ciion citeae in cil4ins cas for<br />

invBtigation, .*ived a b'aed d[tlibution of cas w)th $m€ .egnB<br />

reporimg only very *ve.€ rcdents, ed *lfttiwely iSnor€d peltinent<br />

jnfomalion.n the.ccidents ir inl6tie8ted that *a readily available.<br />

D.tabe en$i6 o$ $e addent3 in ihe \"rsu smlie r$rradid !h€<br />

Bo6rd's aenton that pouce mi..slortirS ma!6 it impcsbl€ lo delernnrE<br />

belt eifectvffi tnrdrgh *tthdcd dslysis of ldge accident<br />

F.] not6 thar }.Tsa ,naltzed inforutjon frcm 30 c€e vehrcl€. In 30<br />

a.ldents (rhe 26 with hlbelted ocap&t3 ud 4 orhs rh" 8.ed lrler<br />

sdded for ompeatfue purF36), but omit8 Eults lrom 26 other [nmce)<br />

vehiclA involv€d in th€!. &aidents beoe they railed t met<br />

one or more ot th€ *lection 6iteria. But, .drdnS to Pd^. N"rsB dtd rcl<br />

oNsr4ntly adhere to itr el.r-tion c.tttria. For exmple, a r 96? Pontia.<br />

E included $ a ce lehicle ddpite the wrsB s stated crit€rion .hat<br />

vehi.l6 wer€ supD6€d t be FxalST4 models.In ddiuon, althouSh<br />

N'rsB claimed rhar irs inr€rr3.tion tEf,.n i! ihe fall ol 1984, *vsd ci.e<br />

.ccidents €srred ir the lat€ sp.ing &d s|jrMe. ot 1984.<br />

Fd fMd Lh.t the dbtriburion ol edenr reporrl,rg by the l"tsB<br />

regional ofi|rr w$ highly skryed wilh adveE oruequdB ror the<br />

replentrrivens of tlE NISD sanple ThE regioN Epo.t€d only fsLl<br />

ui(ienB whne the otl6 epo.ted lrc y nonla(lr oE. A sttlbti.d<br />

rst showed lhrt the od& of Lhis distribucoh o@niru by ch8re &e<br />

l* rhu I m 200. TIE impli€tion il thtt diff€Ma ,i.ld offis interpreiel<br />

the et€:tion cri(4!s difterentF .(d gre reP)ned o y Ni<br />

.tents wherc emdft wa bUed. rd rci6 that fEld olfi€ eporting<br />

only ral3r a.idenLr Mtrlbutcd . dilpDFrliMt sh@ of laPb.lt4d<br />

hrIAr{q.cr onadI Ifutu N|h@ dft NEI!!5E44<br />

"rrrd b. Frr@ d la b. s ttffE'EFry-(P&<br />

E<br />

1<br />

I<br />

i<br />

I.I<br />

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..rl<br />

,-l<br />

il<br />

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'I I<br />

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.


...r'-.b&NBLFr<br />

AB<br />

r.^ i! sls cttic.l of tlE itty l.rs us€d the dtt! it olledld For .nF<br />

Dl", rr^^ ,tuty.b of tlE fuu l&rd of the 30 m denb rereeled Od 30<br />

sefteRtof tlE sbelt€d o.apstr r @lr,..$ venrla *.F tolled This<br />

i'rpenencr, F.i,r ob!erv€6, rcprenB dE rcBt rNrd of ev 8Mp of<br />

@Dartr u ttle $tnpte rciddt!, lnsB dc noc wen reporr ul|' sev€re<br />

outc;m€ in rhe M.4 v€hicl€s srd tocu... iBttd on low porlv laF<br />

beli€d @cuper! far€d in ce v€hicl€<br />

Finany, €Itho4h n"rsB b€li€E thrt Fuce hi*poriihg of b€lt e .id<br />

idury *venty enouly lihir tlt @fuhs of lidstjcsl aalvli! of<br />

l&{e datsb* r. meere belt effetivens. rt never exelnd ae<br />

datab@ siri6 of its a.aideft 'sple t test it5 hlloth6rs Fd (m_<br />

rsred ss mv6ligator r€porB of belt ur€ with b.lt @ repon d for<br />

ih* 30 acident3 in rhe F E dat b@. Ao$ tDtie od NrsB irvetga_<br />

to6 @rded reiirlnt u5. try 132 mDrnts rd ddv'js of th. c'ord<br />

relealed tlst in only 6 cas (3 8 Dere.r) *a tr'ere dbagem€nt<br />

ber,wen the polie ud Mrs inv6liSstor coding of belt us Momve'<br />

r* noler th.t lhe diffefenB @ bddced 6 to Lhe diJetron o' the<br />

odrnc e.ror Md rruury l€vel e th{ rc tt$ M b. infened $ iln rea.rd<br />

ro qj,.y r"porune. pol,o , d i'l!s inverr8tio6 .o


Dr. l€onard Evans,<br />

General lllotors Res€arch<br />

l,abs<br />

Nationsl Hi8hway Treffic<br />

Safety Administration<br />

E.{baf,rsrFr<br />

234<br />

Dr. ten.rd Evs, Srenior Staff R*arc} Scientist Caeral Mot B<br />

Rearch LaboBlones. @tly evaluared .6ilut sysr.m 8€n€raxy,<br />

and .€& *aa l.r belb in paftiold I Ue led a st tistical pMedure he<br />

reentl) develored called th€ d@ble rair onp8rison meihod (This prc<br />

c€dure is dscnbed in app. I.) BecN* it exdhs or y ratahes md<br />

nonfarainres jn the saN vehicle, Ev@ app.o&h redx€ rhe problen<br />

ca!*d by th€ .elatioNhip b€t{en b€lr ue dd accidenr eventy<br />

EvrE ws Frns data ior 197S4 to sss€5s rear sat beh effetivene$<br />

on reducinS lai.liti6. B€cau* the infom.rion contained in sAlrs des<br />

not dEiinguish by t]T€ of.6r.aint sysrem employ€d, Evm must<br />

L


i-.d. 3r, FEUdt El.fi"!o" or<br />

Evidence From the<br />

Restraint SYstems<br />

Evaluation Program<br />

sf.*".o**.<br />

,<br />

a5<br />

lffi;::i";;#;;;;;y<br />

ar"v (se tlbre 3 r)<br />

llH:":#ji+$"4<br />

#t<br />

:ffi #{ffindtr":ii#3l'tr1rffi<br />

ffi<br />

ePllD*lt L,r'r ttrt.jd


La|. aa ltt ctn@.. ot !.r rd bpt<br />

&dld.r 4.ft. b n.d{rinl s.d!r<br />

r.ir.. ^*dniq b Por6 .id Rs€P<br />

h6.blllBr'r<br />

m<br />

r6craj.t us, including exdining ihe belt !y!t4t fo! .vidence of lo.dirui<br />

interyie*in8 polift, witn€s6, ard ocruprnt!; .hd studying d@p.nt<br />

iiury pattec uke n.rs8 inv6ti8ar..st tlre t6Df lhvgriSaton<br />

mede a @ful dete@narion of b.l! use.<br />

The nsEp dat! were exmjred by rsc teNheB. Aft r Mtlouing t6<br />

@ntomding f&toB such $ d4h ev€.ity, * siz, impa.t te.tion,<br />

sd qsD4t a8e, sslts d€t R.ircd r\$ bo{h la$ sd lap,rshoulde!<br />

belrs were €ff


Evidence From the<br />

National Crash Severity<br />

Study and the National<br />

Accident Sampling System<br />

rrlbbeNs&F..<br />

AI<br />

over ihe pst dftsde S€co(d, Ble ineesiiSatid orlt fruls. pasq,<br />

geE, !o the lapbelted pash{eN in tne d.ra were in the frcnt !€.t<br />

.atle. thu the ed rar wirh .pgad to rh€ exr€nt ot *ar b.lt E mje<br />

reDonin8 by rhe rElie. r8rs,^ b€liev6 rhar tlw timitarioc nilht<br />

rllcr lhesraof rh..ftd.v bur no, whp.hp l i\ Mi-<br />

Following nsp, Mns^ D€ga the N.ridrrl Clsh Se!€!fty S\rdy, whlcl<br />

exmined l2,OO0 io@w.t accidents be.wen l97? lnd 1979. Alchdgh<br />

rr ws not tixu*d on rEstrajnr system effetiverE6, Ncss .Nit€d belr<br />

u* lrom thr $u.ci tolice a.cidenr repor6, ocop6nr interuiens,<br />

dd mvet'gator deteminaoon. Analysi5 oa rhe datr sho*ed rhar frcnr<br />

s€at bett effRtivens Admar6 were sNisient wi$ !$p nhdiM<br />

Thap were rew red*d laFbeth cas6 m l,he \(:s nre. bur one;xm.<br />

Mtion of the data found that tap belts were equ.rly effdjve, betw!<br />

60 hd 60 percent, for fm.r .rd !w e mulslJ.<br />

The Ndtionat Aciddr Sepling Sysren $@eded Ncss in t 979. Thi. b<br />

a broarl $mple or Flie accidenr epor$ d€rgn€d ro p.odue a 3rsti!Ucally<br />

r€pr@ntative $mtle ol $e nalion s rccid"nLs. Whil€ boih Ncs<br />

ad f;a\\ u*d rnvstrgaror derenination of beli w, neither emptoyed<br />

the prcr@ls of 6Ep od borh relied @.e heelily on rhe poti.e amid€nt<br />

.epo.t! Sn ll sdple sta fo. slsific @pularion sub8hlr6, su.h a<br />

rr\JuEd re& sar rtupanls €aring lap belts, also linir the applicrtDn<br />

of statisti.al d.lysis ro Nc$ ed NAs6 dsra to erinEre ef(


Dr. Ch4rles Kahane's<br />

Analysis of Fatal Accident<br />

Reporting Syslem and<br />

Pennsylvania State<br />

Accident Data<br />

r";bo*|{ti.r.Fr<br />

N<br />

Dr. Chsl6 K&h.ft of Nl|B @ntly e.timst4d the fat3lilv_8nd ir{ury_<br />

reducinS erfstiveffi ol lap b.ltr aot Elr *at pasngeB I'n8 data<br />

rmn ih€ r975J6 Fatal Accid€nt &etoni.g svstem dd 1982_86 lthh<br />

s\tv.n a rjuL, dGdcn6 bkc Evm, hahoP U*d rhP double Dair sm_<br />

Dd$n ndhod F raly- tnp d.t! (s r'pp I XcnMesatulvsisof the<br />

res d.!a differed trom Elds in rhar I(rnae ucd only dnveF 6 a<br />

mnrrol Stuup l(ahd€ s malysb als ditfered f6m Evc in ihal he<br />

included rS86 rAns cas, children bet*€en th€ 396 of 6 ud I6 mcup{ts<br />

in ihe @rier rcar *at, ud pasnges in v@ ud lid! trucks<br />

Fdrs coniaitu nedly 500 reconls of falallv i.Jured rcd eat, lstrbelt€d<br />

o


ld. r.a t.!.nt R.d.|o. rrq4h<br />

l!9|o'[ rn or e.r ad r.p &rb-<br />

.&.6t|.tll|rr,...<br />

a9<br />

F4funldrd!t&..bi9'o6Ftaoc'slg7<br />

A64lif,n{$d.|*h'oBJ..tnoc.J<br />

t *"*-*. -.""* ** ,,*, *". *!e6, both r.6rren


Lhr. 3.a: llrctv.d.. E.rbn t ol<br />

t..r 5..r L.D E r! u.rt tlolta P.,<br />

CmD.ite ol lglll5 thr.yltt|n.<br />

Evidence Flom Canadian<br />

Erp€rience<br />

r..br*Ifl8.rryr<br />

240<br />

A,-k s5 5€ 8<br />

Kdft de llnrt thrt hp tdts e t|r@ elfEtive in reducing \jurv in<br />

tu.trfit5l $rn ,roiit t cruh.4 *ept d th€ miror hju.v level<br />

Kah4 belFB tlts lsD b.lt! e nad d efi€cite in t' i:l 'rrch6<br />

b@e evd u@st sjtEd E|! sr eopets have a lower i4iur' ck<br />

thq EtEined dnveF. lloFw6, ch€ b..t *at offe6 no such advdt!8e<br />

in nonfrontd $6hB Th6. e the rj'''p6 ol s.oddts n whch<br />

ta est lap lplt3 may do th€ n$st !pod, {d th€s€ t]?€ of ecidnl4<br />

wNch a@ut td onehalf of ,I flt3l aid€nts were not irclude


Evidenc€ Ftom New York<br />

Sta[e<br />

ul<br />

$mpL. They are s!€cidly *rsitlve !o the prcbl€n ol bb! d|te lo<br />

@lie rnisreponinS of belL u* Thev pertomed a ersilrvitv &dy3i3<br />

;rt ihowed thal ii Fbe overeDon rdtraini u* bv suniv6 by l0<br />

D..enr. a 20 pe.ent diff€Mft in the €afebven$ BtimaL @ld<br />

6ult They be[ev€ that su.h e level of ruE oning is entirelv pdsible'<br />

Dahola\ Md Xzlrw\l.r LFhev.lhat the \tsstudv rq trm.lv ud rhd<br />

red *ar c rupdt DmtFt.on foradulc ha d-n la'8Plt otPrhFcd<br />

The\ balie\e lhat theC{rdr$dara rrPt ednsed 'lP&ll rnd'ra@ otl<br />

tno "-'ne the *e-"8..e of rcd lap b.lB Y rll€!x in 'unnPr Fduc'<br />

inp the n;frber of ()@Pdts Lilled or irluftd @uallv in moior veNcl€<br />

cr6h6 However, they el3o believe tlut the ^'r$ (8 studns 3how tnat<br />

l$Jr\s ihDrovMts in the d€sign ol ree slt oalget 9rotection Nre<br />

Fruk Conley ot tlE New York Depanmen. of Moro' veh'cl6 examitud<br />

New lort St4t€ s polic*.eportert ac.ident dti? | He mad€ a stnitlhtfo'_<br />

wud conpsisn ;f th€ iiurt md lat litv ex!€.ienc6 of bel&d ud<br />

unbeltld ()ND6nts, whi.b rev€aLd thar popl€ fued bett€' if thev<br />

wer€ dlraind. sin.e t982 Ne* Iork S!a!. hs r€quir€d that childrcn<br />

und€r 5 yec be proleied bv e €t.aint, ud ha rcquired other ()m-<br />

Ddts exepl tor Ed *at Eopots r0 veaF dd older' to bu'he ut<br />

;he 198.4. The shre ais. rcquiE !h.l all l(ldent5 involving noE<br />

rh<br />

$600 In dMcce be reporred !o rh. Dtr Eron of Moiot v'hrfl6<br />

Ths trtu\ isioE r;ult rn a lertf d.r!b4 *rth a f.irlv latlP number of<br />

(rc in which Htrsined indivjduats @ rr\ju.ed.<br />

How€lcr lherc # sne oblpue prcbleN wrlh rhP d.6 ForexMple<br />

tlP polrcFreton-ed Gt.ainl us€8e b 8o.r Deran! dd this peGnt'lF is<br />

^uirr nO"iU,- ttt"r t""otded bv beh e oteNe6 u* bv *tting<br />

pGirion;ais eve nore qu6lioB .bou! !tu doracv of Flic tep{rts'<br />

In New ]o.k alnct lO pere ol td *3t ps*ngeF w're rmrc& a<br />

edinS lap/snoude. b.ht, s wR 22 Ftaat or pasnaeF tidtg in<br />

th€ middl. front *at Tlr.re Ftert g€ ato nor @n6!ond al all wth<br />

rhe av.ilabilit! oa such syr!4 for lhe &a(rn! plfiiioc ThGe num_<br />

beE, reprRniing lhd;fib ot €!.t, 3u886a thal problems of ntr<br />

Do.ting dd miB&ding 4 cotMdplr4 Tt6e probl€ru r&* qu..@c<br />

'trdfu.PEsvdR^J@D<br />

;T;ii..:-n;;ft;;d;- bsidhFAl'fu so{'dtut'dtEF i<br />

m/!D*l.L'ka6|e<br />

I<br />

a<br />

4 I<br />

i<br />

:<br />

t<br />

'.i<br />

N ,.,<br />

:<br />

j<br />

'!<br />

I<br />

:d'1<br />

j<br />

,|<br />

i<br />

=i<br />

ii


IdOb&NEr.Fr<br />

|uz<br />

a!qr! tlE a4.u.&y of the d.t3 4d, by implicsdon, che validitv ol &alv-<br />

Evidence Ftom ltichtSan Xen CepbelL of th€ TrrruDonrtion nltesrch lrstjtltt of th€ UdveFitv<br />

of Michigs anelyad policreport4d cidenl dat! lmn th€ stab or<br />

Michigd to detsnine the elretilele$ of lap b€lis tor P:r €at du_<br />

Durs. Mich4e h6 iad a nudalorv w l.w sinLt 1985 Th.<br />

u&alyrd


T.d.3,t:..a+i.t .idrs a.r<br />

Ocat |( ,.n ux h r*t rgrg,<br />

..dd.db'^..d,rr|!i|'<br />

GAO Observations<br />

r-fub*lEr.Fr<br />

2/,3l<br />

110a rr3* 43 rt<br />

$5 r B4 r 065 r.136<br />

Xen Capb€ll@rcludes thal Do6tn nd.lory ue las dat ftm roli€<br />

@tddl rc@rt! c,mot b€ ued t! d€tamire *at belt efiNtiveness<br />

wirhout takug . tire erie 3pprorch, i..., .rMiNnS lhe chdge in<br />

i\jury etpenere over trre aJ&r smoothing for orhe. t.ends. He rold u<br />

th8, he hG ch6en nor to do thn, but iBt4d he plar$ ro go back dd<br />

ex2rnihe expenene Drior b tne psaA€ of the medato.y u* law Thls<br />

eDrk L! still in progls<br />

FiruIy, (s CmDbell tbld us that he is moE snaident in polie &cideni<br />

eport dara rhd i5 rhe $. He believB rha! if ni


dNEl.F.<br />

244<br />

Nc,nh CsolrE s. BaclsiltitrS Cmrb€$'! Nrrr! C|ldD .g tLt<br />

mer the Nrs !.rortrn8 rit€na into f.t [i!6 rd td|fat liti6 stil<br />

raelds r dilaribotion ligufL@rlv dilielcnt arorn !{r{a t<br />

The eiiddre tr!fr ..versl studi6, €mpLoyin8 ditf.E t m€lhodl lnd<br />

data, indtc.r4s tlEt llp b.lB @ les, .ff.(tiv€ ln fmnkr, hilh_inD..t<br />

c.ahFrhe tyF of dslh thd h'Is hv.d$t d-but e .ff


The Board's Defense<br />

of Its Methodology<br />

NTSB Views of Other<br />

Dat bas€s<br />

216<br />

iGB oaticids h.ve Eponded ro .he .ntic of the lap belt study. Th€y<br />

hav€ defen&d their app@ch ro rh€ querion sd hav€ reject d the<br />

hotio. that.ney exmined ody very s€.ious didenls N"r$ staff have<br />

reite.ated th€ir .onceru abour the qualiry and ueaulne$ of lolie aei,<br />

dent repo.t baed data od b.li4e thar rhe l@nr srudies suffe r frcn<br />

m6t of rhe s.N probl€G s earlie. uatys. Fina]ly, rhey b€lieve that<br />

lh€y had 3 horal obli8arion ro publish rheir {indinEs ud dNbt rhar<br />

thei. study played ey pan in de outcone of r.h€ *a! tptt r€Deal .efe.-<br />

Boord officiars naint in, t! !.td d6rly in *rrb n?oii, $a ul. n!v.r<br />

rntanded r.o ud, :n l&t, did mr perfom . stalbtically .eurbte.n lysis<br />

of rh€ eff(tiven* of re& e.r lap b€li5 od fxnhe., ths! d|ey t cluded<br />

lh€ appropnah caveats in rheir s.udy. Th€y Ekrowledle rhtt st3ri*r<br />

c,l reliability *ould hav€ .equir€d a nuch IdB€. trd @.€ fuuy repF<br />

ent tive sanpl€. [osev.r. Board rENm€t r Wahingion sd i! .he<br />

field ruJect thenotion rhat rh.y e\aminedonl! lery *no6 am@n6.<br />

They glhi oui &ai chc areraer detia V m rhe snrdied.ccdenl3 qs 2?<br />

mph, b€low the Mrr$ c.Eh resr srddard for stety belt efferilen* of<br />

30 mth They point out thar NtsR crssh t.3rs e, in tad, perfomed s,<br />

Th€ Doard s sraff atlo rE€t ru^ s sleli.rbn that cit ria oahs th|n<br />

tn@ stared qer€ ued fo. reFnin8 ,ccid€n6. Wnib !"r$ did no! Eti!.<br />

Pd s srEciric qiticbtu oI its gaple, the Bo&d cl.iN thar norhjrU tr<br />

'ts notrfi.ation cnr€na rsk.d rh@ reponjnS &cidenrr to r€pon dv<br />

rh@ in tr hi.h r\jurics ecured or in which a beltard peMn ws trUur€


xls.+cb&db<br />

?A6<br />

sar ltelt o* .aqratlly They beliele it is $lfsi


Problems With Federal<br />

Databases<br />

NTSB Response co<br />

Analyses Using State Dala<br />

m.r4'Nu|e(te<br />

2t7<br />

found (asin shich lhr lapbclt@uscd $rious ituury, bur found m<br />

cus of lrplshoulder brlt.rnduced inJuries<br />

Th€ B.ard s srata b€liev€ that fte F |.j dar1, u*d br borh Evhs ud<br />

Xahue, are uueprable fo. Btinating ear *at lap b€lt era{dvenG<br />

. The outconrs of @pants m fatal cr6h6 csrcr predid ourcone ih<br />

. Tht rca. *a1 Gcupani numbeB sre erlremelr smau<br />

. tiks data are h€.€ly tDlrcjeponed a€d€nt data and arc nor rciiable<br />

in a numberof cru.ial FsD


The Belt Use Reporting<br />

Issue<br />

The Board's Justification<br />

for Publishing the Report<br />

2r8<br />

['rsu officjals rrin! to rhe srudi6 using sta|e accident rtat3 bv FEnk<br />

Co.ley ed Ken Cmptsll s fu.ther prmf oa Lhe futil v oa Lrving lo<br />

work wilh Dlie.eDon€d a.(id.nt data Thev clain tn. obvious nFrepomng<br />

of the lype oasyst€m employ€d rhar app€a.ed h the New York<br />

sd MrchiSan da!. malr6 it imF.sslble topla.e d,r onfiden.€ n analv'<br />

sislsingsuch poli.e acciden( r.pon b&td dala \Ats starral$.rt€ pno.<br />

leech, inclutinS that p€.fom€d by B.J. Cdpb€ll&


GAO Observations<br />

Nr8ar4buc6<br />

A9<br />

With resp


lv'',bbc&&oi.r.<br />

zffi<br />

ffi#lffiLlfiHffiffiffi#l*,n<br />

$ffi<br />

#jfr l'i,#',,,lr#li,,'trfi itr*#[*:li:<br />

ffi#^ffitlfliF.#f#it#'<br />

'" _ "<br />

@irc mbe<br />

poirrng qDurd redu.p hceffFrrr<br />

rF r'@h<br />

;;,il,11#,.#Hq,,i"x:,:.*:;:dil_yil<br />

fi<br />

%--"<br />

ffii,rJl*:Hffi##Fffi"H,?:ii'[[ixTi].s&<br />

.'/|.1D..[r4r*Erdr-.


26r<br />

ChapFr 6<br />

GAO Observatiors and Conclusions<br />

On lh€ b8sb of @r revi4 of the ^15B Epon, otlcr srudis dd .!rlys,<br />

sd intdie* with individuals expen jn kaffic safery rcedh. w€<br />

have developed obsewatioN and on lu$oc on the Lwo o6!c ouesnoN<br />

Do*d to us by the Chaimd: how NmB develoFd rhe d.t! on rhe 26<br />

ces m its smple dd whetner its rejection of the databrc unde.ly'r8<br />

statislical aalys of red *at lap belt efletiven* ws justiai€d<br />

GAO Observations on<br />

t}Ie 26 Cases<br />

The IlsB smple or 26 accidents s a nor a reprentarive sample of<br />

GAO Obsersations on<br />

the Usability of the<br />

Databases<br />

hiShvBy accidenE, but a siatsircally .ep@htalive smpte 6 nor nec6<br />

sry L show that a p.oblem exisb. Nrsu usually rales a (e sru


252 ,$ Y,.<br />

r e do not b.lise thai Ftss's con4€rc lbout tlE drts provide 3 sufr!<br />

ciat bsis for dimjsing .ith?r th. Eults of otlE reach in thls atlr<br />

or the dat bas thel@lvF No dstsbe is perfed Th€ qu6don s<br />

aq.ncy Lhar In@nds !o e drk m@l add.b b *he!ne- rhP dak de<br />

{,fficFntlv a@rale !o neld vrrd tndrngt aSourth" th'nJ b"in8 da'<br />

lvad P;ible jnecureiE or limita.io$ in lhe data should b€ e!3]u'<br />

;2d b deEmne ho{ li}.ly i. is |hat iheY w$ld li8nif'cotLv ,fect<br />

dv co..lusions ba*d on th€ dab NHls^ inv6tig.a4d th€ flaws tn ltE<br />

data n !* to md'% eat b.li effdivens tnd Mcluded that the<br />

pDbl€re were .ot suffri€nt !o rnvaltdai. tlre data for IR$'h' NnB<br />

dirl no ealwis of it3 oM !o denoNrrst that r\HTs{ s rindmgs ahut lne<br />

eb ity or &€ data weE ino]€t<br />

Therefore. * ind lnat while M5! hs hiAlilht d ere impon ft lnit3ctore<br />

in eldely u*d @idenr daubss, i! h$ rct shown tha! the<br />

dal3bes .a ot be Dkd to shos lhat lap belts' on balece prct€t rc'i<br />

*at lEsgcels rn aulomobrleaatha The pre*to Fof inaaracE ur<br />

,r'" aro r" n_nt " "urr'"'"nr *a!on fot drmsrng rhP frndhgs o, all th€<br />

learch thal h4 Ed that d.t<br />

firally, Nrss s otronn! ot th. p.in.iD6l databM r*mh"E uled to<br />

mal% the r.fol'r|.m ot dtfterenr tvT.s ut


289<br />

Dessiption of the Double Pairs<br />

C,omparison Procedure<br />

The merhod fdlls on too l)spels, a sDbirr" i)@pst and d<br />

''othe.<br />

@cupsnL The p.obablliti6 of a fatality to lhe subiect ltnp6rl<br />

bder two cddirio$ for exmple, r€stEin€d and unrdtrarn€d-aE<br />

ompared. The orher' o.tupant esntalll seNes a no.malizinS. o.<br />

ex!.6ure estinali!8, role The pr€du.e us !*oscls of iaLal..ahet<br />

Th. fi*t *r scists ol cr€h6 involvinS (aG contairi.nS a subjel du'<br />

pu! of rnte.6r (such {s r.est.un€d nSht res penSer) and an<br />

"oth€r"<br />

d@pol (such s3 u unresrrained dnver), al iest on€ of whom<br />

is kill€d F.on Lhe nmb€6 ol subje.t {d othe. @cupant rat3lio6. a<br />

$bjecvothe. fatality ratlo is calcrl.€d (such d rhe 6t.dned nSht<br />

red palsnger to Nestraned d.ive. fatlritv .atb). r'rcn a *cond *t<br />

of crss}G involving cm where the subjer EcupMl dd the other ftcu-<br />

Fur elrmsl.ained, uolJls latarrty .ato is.alolat d lslch 6 tfe<br />

m.est.aired rl8h! Ed t4 umt.ained dnve. .atiol. DYrding the fiFr<br />

f.talhy ratjo by the s@nd ).el(ls Lhe p.obabilitv $at a Eddned nght<br />

E& p4enSer is lilled conpared with rhe corespondi4 probabiliit<br />

lhai & un6rr*i.ed not rcaryer6en8e. L. killed This.atD rs the<br />

efletivenes of the 6tr$nt systm defined 6 lhe feciion (or p€..en0<br />

reduction in farabtie that woutd drue to a @re^tly unEt.aned<br />

Dopulation if the population r€rc to chsge io miversal ar.ant u5€,<br />

dl other I&ioF .enaini!8 unche8ed<br />

f<br />

$l<br />

4<br />

$<br />

!<br />

,!<br />

I<br />

i<br />

I !!<br />

4<br />

:<br />

:<br />

.;,<br />

i<br />

i ]


M4jor Contributors to This Report<br />

Resources,<br />

Community, and<br />

Economic<br />

Development Division<br />

He.b€n R Mclure. AsyEiate Oirecror<br />

JayEtt2 Hrke., Group Di.eror<br />

F.dcis P. Mulvey, Evaluro.ln{h.X.<br />

Pah.ia lech. Ayalu.lo.<br />

Mrch&l K.lse, Sp€cirl Asistat !o the Conprroler C€i€rd<br />

I I'<br />

,4<br />

i<br />

i<br />

t<br />

'l


th! nonor.bl. c.rdl3. corlins<br />

255<br />

f,.F. fuw d Rqrtrch.!<br />

.futrn@!dr.!|rB.l|r't<br />

{fr<br />

f:rcr!!IdCnar.<br />

TtuqaoL DiS ,r,t<br />

JUr I ., ftn<br />

Subcoa!ttee on Gove rDoent AcCivitl..<br />

lnd TransPortrtlon<br />

U. S. Eouae of represerlrtive.<br />

r.3hin9ton, D. c. 20 515<br />

tot. ?, 1988<br />

Sinee rritlng to yo! a f€v dtyi r9o.bout your ProPoB.d 6..t<br />

b.lt iDvestio.tloo. our Subcondltt.e rG..ived the €n.lo5.d l.tter<br />

trod the staIe of .bra6I!,s Departrert or |{otor vehicles, the<br />

lette. helps to confir! the c!utions r.rPressed to you in hy rirst<br />

l.tter. The Nebraska letter states:<br />

rt uas -Ev-ThE--n6tere-<br />

unfortunate ihat our s.f€tv belt la{ ras<br />

rescrnde<br />

in th. NoL e ns;l , -F66-!-en-a<br />

l<br />

TIiTm-, rr vds decided br only 1,133 vot.s. 1!3<br />

lo' oDDosLLion involved the frePdon of<br />

;Fal:; antil-?. !, JurT-- qh r sar qlent3-.--ThETi6M<br />

retropolltaffipF itid 5ET-t usc, vhlle the rlrar<br />

populntio. rended to support the opposttton posrtion.<br />

A 5tudv


he Honorable clrdl!B colltt.<br />

?.ffi<br />

t.lso ob6e.ve that th. June 6, t98? edition or l$!39!jJ9 -<br />

iter. indlct!e6 rpage 581 that the Iota SuPrene court has _69teeo to<br />

cffi-ider ! consLitutionai chlllenge to Lhe st.re'6<br />

irr" iiii"t. ind,cates rhat Lhe challenger uho 'has been convicced<br />

of two' s€aL bel_ vLoI6r,ons heads a statewide drivE to overturn<br />

ir,. ra.,' rt'" c!ganiz.tion is "Freedon First in loYa " This<br />

articl€ ,llus-rdles once .9ain shy r af, 'xtretrFly concprn€d from<br />

the sLandooinr c! DUDLIc s.f.tv thr( rhp !eaL<br />

is"'" u. i"" .atatlsr tt'at h€l;s th.s. !esci


TATE<br />

257<br />

OF<br />

DEPAIIIIENr OF MOTON VEIfICLDS<br />

J6. 2, t9tt<br />

th. Hncable tohn D. DjnE.ll<br />

U5. Hoos. oi R.pr*errariv.t<br />

slb


..-a -<br />

P.F 2<br />

Thc Hono.abl. John D, Dint ll<br />

?.8<br />

On. !... ol caution ilFuld b. ctBi.br.d. TIE t t ty b.lr E. hv3 v;c<br />

p.ohot.d and adopt.d $in8 ihe arEum.ntt ot th.lil.svjng b.n.fii how.ver, usi.8<br />

'!at. vallic tatality couts a a m.ar. o, !cc.$ d tlilue of salety beit use<br />

l.er ir m..ainal at be51. In fact, Nebrek!'3 t.atlic fat.lity co61 increated during<br />

lhr Frlod the lav {6 in efl€ct whiL. ar rh. 3am. rine th. injuy rare in passnger<br />

v.hicl.t d.clied dramaticallt. Too much .mphasis is pl.@d on th. lit.€vinE<br />

i5rE and not enough on the iniury..drclion. Unril usag. raict...ch 7096 or more<br />

ir i5 .s!ma!.d that siSnilicanr r.ductio$ in l.hrid.r in pa.$nt r v.hjcler will<br />

Ercl6.d to ynu infdm.tion sd rcvi.e, is a @ll.ction oI EsPaF.<br />

.rdcl.e rea6rdira th. salcty b.lt law rep.al .ttort- lI you h.!. uy l(th.r<br />


EBli'*'l:;<br />

tEB 2 ? r98b<br />

259<br />

UNTVERSAL FIdCLF'N. BT*<br />

\<br />

Poll shows support \<br />

of seat belt law up<br />

61 0z6 would keeo it i{ vote held today<br />

N.larlr'r on1m6n l s.|l t n<br />

Lr E ,r|niiS $J9Fr! .c$nli,rt lo a<br />

Ii.! .orr||lcld r*.noy Iq trr 5l|l<br />

ll dDr.d ar Frlr<br />

ol N.h.r*.,B<br />

@.r!d rodd wt. ro t .r U. bw 'I .<br />

rlndw lcn.dd.d l' liorttr$..<br />

QF hlr lod.! tlElt tb Fcd n !<br />

lnt rould vot rtrb3|rltLr,<br />

Trr FlI wh.tr intlad aal ti.|r&<br />

lrE lon Fd r+rl, G .dkrdt Dt<br />

n.rarEi ^go.r.i ol Ltncolr. lt Lt r<br />

.6lxLN krll ol 6 Fa4 e.q<br />

0||r t ih r.U r.E n!..Lrl 16 Urn+d<br />

rll rallls rouL rr0 r{Lr nE !.l!l<br />

..iur.! rut F urxa T|l.


zffi<br />

Mogt Nebrashtfr: S"rtAnF 62/o A,ryrovd<br />

App*,;rns"iEiitni-' g"lkl"Flo<br />

qr?|r,-ftr.rld6<br />

otrEc ,or.dh.r rE lf'< m/E.ts.<br />

-ffi|<br />

*xkdffi.mmmmmmmG fr*1,3#:r,irnu<br />

1ffiru ffis{,gasrt'sil<br />

H:r.$ffiffiH ffiil il+-utr:":r;i:uffi<br />

sl*x'*;,H#.ffiF EffitrffiEIrl li:Fffilq::=.:'.r;:<br />

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fif*ffiHEfld ffii l[."fiir"i;C='"*<br />

r*e."4::rr<br />

w*rlt',:irlli,l=;:<br />

ffiffiffiffil r'#lffi'#tr<br />

ffiffiffi$ffi41 ffi'*':''iffi<br />

F#ffis:= ml if#.s;'"'ulnsrr<br />

*F#fiJ,f.ffinf; ffii J"r#.ihs;nrr;r,u<br />

car, $.n sffi. 3 FG6r. $d $.j<br />

En r bc. . t! trrE A (b|F .rn ffitr#.rru:ffififfi,."<br />

FrqF orn b. ctuF rrl. *<br />

Ih|.t t!. Lr. .n dnrB .,n lMt.<br />

n t-n.'t b Doi6 vdrilE brilr<br />

Effi daoar, !d.c, El- tt *d.<br />

r!.1 .'t b nrr !61 3.d Dy. tdlc<br />

Fo. rhc ht6r poll. (h. ficbGr.tu<br />

q#':;ffi;;<br />

ffiil #f,#r''m,sr<br />

Tb ortrru E de to !h. q{drh<br />

ctlrtst . Ditr ol dror ol tlE or<br />

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ShoulilStasBuchledUp<br />

Do tou |.vo"<br />

o. oDDoto tha<br />

...t balt l.w ?<br />

,L#<br />

r..$d.,, r.! s.Er*.<br />

N.h€lrr't st-t l. Li tdlrl b.<br />

Erudl * rl?akd. n $c vd .I 6r<br />

ft alB ol dr Fll En ffi'r<br />

durd L! r.rt b acn ol ',\. r'o<br />

pflM $r1,.t4 lr|tnly ftr tu .<br />

Lilrd or tE q".tEr.d rurcd b u.<br />

ot tt 6 Grrrltta 8.8 qu6<br />

E d 5.r 'n, ar Ft6 r. eY<br />

rd.d ro tce dr Lr tq!B! rlE<br />

! ii. l@ st to ndJ. uD..,n i<br />

e.r6r rra oEy nnra ro RFr r.<br />

TrrR FlEn.rid thy li Dem<br />

rvdlar rb fttt l!a!a b.E<br />

!n .!0.!. a.|c al GE-.{ rl*<br />

t@ urnr. nld '.n ol tn. or.<br />

|* d lttrrri o! * -r{.u<br />

F.ffi.rn ddrnr irc E d!.<br />

dy 4q{.!ldrl or.a!.t h 'n(h<br />

firn @dl r!. t'd|rrnr dr tJeir<br />

\qtd $E h.rd F4.l6rBl Mli<br />

|' dr !. c63erl D.m, {<br />

Seat-Belt law<br />

Backed bv61%<br />

dtd e. ti.t<br />

rrr. r.f ht o t.l!d.4!.i, lrd 6<br />

Lr. o![r.dnfir.{ !'! Ddnd<br />

mrt.rory !.1!t r@ nd.d 'l a Fr<br />

Dd rrM,.d rr Th. wdr6H*<br />

d6 trdl !' slr tard atu, . E<br />

lrlE y .t !.LrE| tq'd lR. .l<br />

rq! rtd !L d' !.h r.. .l.r<br />

..r- i .rib..t lr lfl - r.<br />

Fa6 t !* c*Jd- r. E sr<br />

rdB!rad-do*ttri.L<br />

if Fb-.r*d-l;r<br />

rr, r r.{ t- L I lE 4L.5.<br />

fi- r|r rrqar wlrrd.<br />

xrt, I p.t6 d th. .lsEid<br />

ra rllr rall b dh m rt .na<br />

t 'ld 116<br />

EEn l.i.lll6ld Hl, O ffi6r<br />

r]. &t gr.d tr Er{ar L'<br />

.r!!.FCa*tGt<br />

lrtst&r.rE!!*rdql<br />

tb dilil r rc 16 i.r rtu<br />

rlry .Gt tar. rt a Fe .p<br />

,Ftqt t .rl a t.dr ruia F<br />

Ih ldr aEr- . CE r hla M<br />

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639o favom retaining'<br />

statets eeat-belt law<br />

!rru xnF<br />

or.Jq*Ar.lc.<br />

It ib .6 rr'r bi ria.!, 3 D6.<br />

..rr ol tr.ir*.E ra! st !o r.rt<br />

b ,ljii. [ddt ..t b.:l ).a rn<br />

tj.drdrc ro a.t nd ol f,<br />

qbtFr.r rtlL[4<br />

'Dc&&ldrCrtol.r<br />

i.rad t6 1I lr..t Jcd V r.<br />

r! i Ard.!- C L6l|i 'A<br />

lt F0 .l L Fd. b r ...rtt<br />

rq. ol *r-EbLtrl.l<br />

Dq ba .a l-!! l-.lt!.<br />

* O. r!.& r''- L !-t I lt<br />

l.{l ol rtcr b lb br. L nFl<br />

.l it|l ro !. ll ral.d ... *<br />

.obb0lrlld.<br />

rrt l.cr, n Fdt., Fd.<br />

D.!.a d rLt frl FL L Lt ll<br />

tr, rnD l| Fli<br />

td &.t E!<br />

r. D t Lut tl Fqra. U<br />

*r|.lFtrdltEdo.lt<br />

LlrFr{rl*th.td<br />

-q.rlbbtlrrdi-t*<br />

il-t[ rdn . Ei. l<br />

rb o Ftd t! g-a d,<br />

Etrtlblfr.r4ffi<br />

irtio|t'{tlrtdtt.fa<br />

I Lidr rr.rrH!bt(['|!*rstlrr.Etr.lcFlarotF-<br />

lFht||rr.b--t<br />

qr-d-tErLO!tDllE<br />

sa.tlbll-Liraa<br />

Fdblt r.L tl I E!ld,<br />

r4aEt-kllrrFrr!tFld<br />

!.'lit{F!.iJ<br />

I ..ril rrl rrrn t|t aA t<br />

Frd.gdqFrdaF<br />

I'lmoh torrnd<br />

EEITT<br />

Irrd.b.t<br />

.-l balt<br />

F6.blrtliLraqrir L<br />

tFd.rLdsrnirrt<br />

It Lr[lGb-Glb<br />

-E.ll!.brrt.t-<br />

6r.bd,!!dbril|<br />

b.rr.rb!Lbirll|.<br />

Frrl r.l D.r.d, rE rb d<br />

ll ll.,a ro |lr! n a F(- !<br />

!Frrtr'E.h.l.ll!6€<br />

@&a q- $dd rb br !<br />

Frrro lFr.l<br />

Hbr Ftt !- Felt t<br />

dt ErLrtF.Frt-!,<br />

!.!.ta E krt har.r-l<br />

b r Fr-. Dd6ra l tda l<br />

at r.r dFaFr-lrolFd.<br />

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263<br />

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El#*,'*<br />

ocT 2 7 1985<br />

265<br />

UNIVERSAL P.EcriFq sue<br />

Safety vs. free choice<br />

focus of seat belt issue<br />

It i.icy Hido t<br />

.trLtr.td''St I<br />

l{.ialo hL.r! q! hrq r cnrc. Not. a ro I<br />

6Ni.|. tt N.!.art rrdd rsrb |3 y.Nrdd I<br />

r drlqy sr b.lL hr. I<br />

Gllrr t llol ur ts* E L!.td a.It't!d'|| I<br />

lcl. lL r! dt Sndt..rn I ot tatli|tig. 8u r<br />

1i,.3.8.r.d<br />

!' r!. ot! LSd 4 ol D. lr!! _ iltGr b pohls on ljl. $t 06<br />

:l.lg:9 I f qr-*-l.qr Fryc' or nnd-arbtu.B.urxl'r.ha!.r.i<br />

:1:-:i1!!9111 gry -trEd r'r ts n!' tt Fttd to !.1.;" t Fed !o{F'<br />

rna.t d. rDrd whr.l..Fr.Ld<br />

-<br />

d I ttr! lrf, dd rn; t! L* ror.fi..r<br />

1fl:"J<br />

j,,'*.1L'1-.1 r{.!.rslr r. u,.!r . clefuFr h.r r ryhr ro rre Fd. ro.cr<br />

erdy 0.[ r rli$roi-<br />

,.accr, r.L b!;rDdr.6 rilr;d rL s<br />

l ht! -tn"<br />

et! nt tn tJt *rt b.I t!. l ofta S0|!!6r 'tw! tn.l Frs k rtn.UL<br />

vor. 'rg.!Ei" q[ Fp.d n t u.n ol O.! hjql{ ]d liF r|lfon th.<br />

'|.^iE sEr^mRi +erond ri. o,-.t-<br />

t'Tf.Iffffn",lffiu<br />

,n -,n<br />

=tri<br />

bt! da!'8. ft rs. krddrv.<br />

=* er.iii*.r,a -,*h * tiqu rc di..rr!i<br />

T* nx.sr!. rt n t. r.n d tbt s.t ib. i,! o|! r.i.@n r.d,.;.e.FE.rn bi!<br />

!qwj. d''l.f3 !n !d r.t FEF| Ir b;rlrE o.r|<br />

ffiffi*ffi'.#F.;ftrffi;I<br />

t dr.r-ilii.oor',ro rm u arr- m*llrlr @ Ebt !' '?'d r! rr'<br />

H#'#ffffidffi$fs3flH<br />

ffiffiffi'ffi<br />

fiE EtUDI It ldty rnd.: ||ldt l'r qF..r& dn t !.w uBt ny d rtd.r!<br />

t!.&oC&... .r! lr.ntt.llf bw r.6)&d tn. lrxiry<br />

Ceo.. rd.. br F66d tlEr |t tr! . ul bFt! lr rE nrnt r6y sr b.n rr*<br />

r.tblrib.l'&rl ol &trl bt rF!.r irg.t rab I luls rdur Disrkr of @<br />

r-|>rrCbF !, r F!.n, ..!!lba !o dtrd<br />

zE d. rhfrrr tr !t tb Ii tr.F rriir ot trs..i.!o! br rn n<br />

kdrr Omc..r aints.ldt. r! t{l !t nq|nfir.i rix turEr .E b.<br />

Arn ffdidt .Lty !.I Lrr rqt Zrc. Sd r||! .t !.tt U rrarhnlr oa rtr ,rrs<br />

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8El ,lilr<br />

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Fasten Yor.r Seat Belt\\:T1:I-<br />

TalyTuns Cliffiunger<br />

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Fasten Seat Belts:TalyTms Cliffiranger


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NOJ r r lll5<br />

UNIVERSA!<br />

P'dcnd!'oBu'&<br />

- Editorial<br />

268<br />

'Ottinion<br />

---<br />

Seat-belt law<br />

defeated, not<br />

seat-belt use<br />

Ot| E issue of vhethrr Nebraske should ke.D 3 man-<br />

Ostory sercb€ll las. 267.136 voted a8alnlt and 255,94 vole<br />

for Thrt is pr.lly close lo an even split<br />

w.'d lil. tllil. It *ould m€an mor. r€.d.rs l'|d fctrt'<br />

obituri.s L.e or m l.v, buckling up stiu mek.s !.ff..<br />

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.!


269<br />

Elcction regulb cerdflod D4.8t, 1on*."o1<br />

State seat-belt law<br />

officially repealed<br />

rsl.dllllw|tlL.ltlrrlb.<br />

L.itlt r.l blr b.|D . oda Rdr d iI .!enr rbftl $.1<br />

c F$d .d.. d t0:t..!. Idry Ctr rd 5 ltll|! l|1.bl ol solr}<br />

|l !b .rr!t a6d of CrftG .rr+ tldr E tb tt .!dci.l.kre !t<br />

!.d tb rr.!t ol & xoe, a tsd tllld.. 1Dttscd tr,!|5 Er...<br />

(!q.{ r|l Lll b D.n r ic<br />

voLrr Rt .b l! rrrt l Ddl 6&r l.Lr Ecr rn E ne<br />

lrt atB ||r !t . lEtb ol Lul lba dr.! Lr- c,.r. DdE lrobt .<br />

i(,t.' cE idror l|[y 0r? |s tw- Board nsnbo'!<br />

|r!(r |dl rEaLa I r.!.ol diltit c(a-<br />

-lltdd ld br!c. ||l,<br />

t! ..!r* i..td k .n|hd !t<br />

tL olGd .r!v|r tnoid ttrla<br />

cd. lob f,-tt, L! orbr n|!l!!.'l at<br />

i.l,rlr3 ..1. rdr. tlrD r Fol of 8GrD. Cr (|' art Etrr,nt). A.<br />

L.t|! ntE '.d d.r! - | Ed oi r.@t cd'd nobrt s9!r rd srd!<br />

lFtr!!<br />

Aldtr Ery ]|C. Job.<br />

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t.i tlDrt b ErI c.ilat rBr<br />

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lribllr<br />

s|rw caldt l$ r n$d tlrnd 1or<br />

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rhe Honorlbl. c.ldi.6 coltln.<br />

Subcorni ttee on Gov€r.!.nt<br />

Activi lies and fransport.tion<br />

u.s- House of RepreEentat!veE<br />

na6hi.9ton, D- c. 20 515<br />

Dear C a rdt s6:<br />

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tl.s. Am!! of n4rurmsrib.!<br />

t*!dt'rt or €ttt*k tL ,lDlrfistl,<br />

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Jun! 2?, 198!<br />

r appreci.t. gr..tly y@r Jonc 0, l9a6 r.ply to Dv t'tl"s in<br />

thich vol indi.ate_a "uiu;lrtY'of<br />

"intet.st6 r'l'tive to 6ett<br />

beIL s;i.ry, rncludlnq the neea tor state i.nd.torv seat b'lt u"<br />

l!r5." r;rso.ppl.uA your asreenent that iL is<br />

iitPort.nt not to<br />

dl6courage person; fro!_usin9 rear seat safetY belts that do tot<br />

Include Ehoulder belts.'<br />

at the saie tire r vas dtstu!bed to learn frotr the enclosed<br />

.rLicle .bouL you. subco!!lttee he.rrnqs that on. of the urrnesse6<br />

ras a lasv€r r;Dr€s€nt.tive or an Instltu(. iounded ontv rh!s vear<br />

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oUESTION 1: Pl€aa€ alescribe in deiall !h. p€tirion proc€ss and what lo]e<br />

lf any the prlv.t. sector playa.in the proc$s.<br />

llI9BB: Th€ defec! petition plocess is de8cribed 1n detatl tn the<br />

€nctosed coPy of'Control Plan for the Processing of Def€cr petittons..<br />

Since our publication of the controt plan, re have made a few minor<br />

changes in tbe Hay re process p€tirions. Th€ plan is curr€ntly being<br />

levised !o reflect these ninor changes in lhe process. rh€ regula!ions<br />

for carrying out the pelition process are sp€cified under 49 cFR Parls<br />

552 and 557 and in NITSA ord€r 800-2,<br />

'Proc€dures<br />

for Processing<br />

Pe!itions,' dated Novenber 20, 1978,<br />

In summary, lh€ defecl petition proc€5s involves tbe fotloring:<br />

1. liben a petj.tion is received, it is revtered and assigned to a<br />

staff engineer o! analyst ro g.ther and analyze inforMtion fror<br />

!11 possible source3, this u3ually includes an inforEeion<br />

re9ue6 t to the manufactur€r.<br />

2. UPon asEignn€nt of a petition, tb€ p.lition aDalyst:<br />

o Reriees the p€tiLion for content. In sone clse6, the<br />

p€titicfiet nust be conEacted for clarificatlon of the requested<br />

investlg!tlon, for nore infornation on the inciden!s ci!ed in<br />

the pelition, o! for clarification of technical points llEde in<br />

lbe pelition. Freguently. thos€ cited in the petition as<br />

having €xperienced the conseguenc€s of th€ alleged defect nust<br />

b€ contacted for nole information.<br />

o lccesses the co'nputerized dat. base for sinilar conplaints, dnd<br />

fot an!'service bulletins o! !ecall notificatlons pertatnlng to<br />

the subJ€ct veb i cl e.<br />

o tnalyzes the naterhl leceiv.d frorn the data b!se. thia<br />

lnc1ude6 revi€r of all corpl.lnlE, rhich fleqoently lnvolv€s<br />

contacling lhe coEplainant, and analysis of th€ felevanc! ro<br />

lhe all.eg€d tlefect of service bultetins issued by the<br />

manufaclurer and the prec€denc€ of p!ior r€caLls.<br />

o If nece€aary, conducts an analysis of .epofts of the atra<br />

probleo in sirailar, peer vehiclea.<br />

o Pr.p!r.s an lnfolnation request (IR) to tn. Bubrect v.*tlcl.<br />

rnrnufaclure!. The nanuf.cEure! is t€que6ted to provide !<br />

resporue eithin 30 working d.ys of receipt of lhe lR but<br />

fr€guentl,y exten€ions are requested due to Cranslation problaia<br />

and the nagnitud€ and/or ccnplexi!y of rhe infornEtion de6ired.<br />

o If testing ot vehicleE or cotrponenrs is necessary, pr€pares<br />

taEt r€guirements and objecttves, prepare6 ckrcunent8 nec€Ea.ry<br />

to inpl€l|ent lhe ees!s, ronilors lhe t€Bts, and analyc$ tbe<br />

rcsul tlng da ta,<br />

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Eecelvea and analyzs tlre manulaclurer ra response !o the IR<br />

and, if necessary, nakes furLher inquiry to the nanufaclure.,<br />

Fr€gu€ntly, those identified by the manufacturer as baving<br />

experienced th€ consequences of th€ atteged defect are<br />

contacted fo. nore inforn'ation.<br />

Fo! p€titions based on atleged acaident overlnvolviicnt ln<br />

which fe'r, if any, complainLs have been leceived by the rqency<br />

or the nanufacturer, statistical data on crash involve'nent, .ndl<br />

that oi p€er vehicles, erill be requested fron the agency's da!!<br />

center and analyzed.<br />

o occasionally, the perl !iode. rill s.rbnit additionar<br />

inforrE!ion, This is normally r€viered and i.ncluded in lhe<br />

anaLysis, unless it is received at the v€ry end of the<br />

process, Ever ther, i.! is revi€eed Lo see if rhe P€tition<br />

procEasing should be delayed to consider the nee informalion,<br />

o A.alyzes all infornEtion received and d€v€loped. Prepares a<br />

report aDd !ecomnenalati ons.<br />

o Preparea a response to lhe p€Litioner.<br />

If a petition is granred, an investigarion ls lnltlat€d. It a<br />

petition is d€nied, a Pederal Ftegister notice of $e denial is<br />

ahe agency normally nak$ a delernination and nolifies the<br />

petitiqler within 120 daya o! receiving the petiiion. llo{everr<br />

this i€ not alEys possible if testing is ne€ded or if there ar€<br />

delays in th€ rece!pr of infornElion froft the manufac!'rrer.<br />

Ihlays are also encounteled if coiprainants rnust be contacred o!<br />

if exlensive analysis of crash statistics is necessary.<br />

5. The T€chnicat Rete!€nce Division of the agency nakes available and<br />

supplies ro mettt,ers ot the public upon request alI publicly<br />

available documents conc€rninq lh€ D.tition,<br />

the privaLe sector nay participate in the proces6 by providing substanlive<br />

infornation conce!ning the stb ject of a p€titim and can reviee the<br />

publicly available inforratlon during the agency considera!ion of a<br />

petition, If rhe information is plovided eithin the first 60.lays aft.r<br />

the aqency bas received a petition, the agency rill nornally conside! lt,<br />

Tb€ agency does not release any business confi.l€ntial information or lny<br />

of its own tesL !€sults and analyses, if testing vas conducted, to the<br />

private seclor durj,ng the proc€€s, The agencl, considers Lhe p€cition<br />

processing as lh€ first step in a lae enforcement accion. coEistent nith<br />

the connoD practic€ for lar eoiorcan€nt rctions, tb€ aqency iloes not<br />

!evea1 the .esutts of its investigarion rhile j.n progress. Afcer<br />

conFleeion of Che petiCion, any test results p€ltainiDq !o the p€tition<br />

are avail&Ic Eo the g.neral publrc.<br />

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@EltIotl 2: Slnce th€ relaase of the rltldral lransportatlqt Sbfety<br />

Board's 1986 report, ho!' many ocher Stales have foltoued or may soon<br />

folrow Neb!aska.s €xampLe in rescinding alI or part of rheir mandatory<br />

sear bel h laws ?<br />

aNsvlER: w€ believc tha(e $ra a noticelble loss of nonen brrn for llfaty<br />

belt use and belt lass follo\ding the lelease of tbe NTSB report on<br />

lear-seat lap bel!s in August 1986. Belt lars in both Massachusetts and<br />

Neb!aska \re.e repealed by voter referenda in Novenber 1986, tihile no<br />

other slate has since repealed 1!s safety law, we note that r€peal bills<br />

have been intlodrc€d in haDy states, ritb varying deg.ees of action. In<br />

llisconsin, for exanple, lhe legislalure approved a proposal to accelerate<br />

the schedu]€d<br />

'sunset'of<br />

the safety belt las; that provision was<br />

llne-i!€rn vetoed by Lbe @vernor. In additlon, teo Stales eill hold<br />

voter referenda on the issue this Novedbe!: !4ontana, on whether to<br />

a€p€a] the belt 1ar already in effect, aDd Oreqon, on pbether lhe belt<br />

lax ahould be allored to 90 into effect. It should aLso be nored that<br />

safety belt bi]ls ril.l conlinire to be considered in nany of the 18 states<br />

currently lacking such lawsr and that nany of the other 32 Stares 'rill<br />

continLre to considet various proposals to an€nd, sLrengthen or weak€n<br />

their safeLy belt Iaws.<br />

Those ongaing Iegislativ€ and public reviers rnay r€ll be influ€nc?d by<br />

publ.iclty abou! lhe p€rformance of safety belt syst€nls, including<br />

rear-seat lap belts. In thal regard, ere are conc€rned that stories such<br />

as the recent ABC-TV '20l/20r<br />

leport on rear-seat lap bel.ts (July 22,<br />

1988) lllay raise pubtic dor.rbls about the effectiveness of safety belts<br />

generally, and Lhus as to the value of safety belt usage and of safeLr<br />

belt use laes. The content ot the'2A/20'proslam appeared to be based<br />

largely on the NTSB's 1985 report, and focused on cas€s rtere lap belts<br />

had induced injury, rather on the overrhelminq najor!cy of cases where<br />

Lap bel!s prevented or reduced injuries. althouqh<br />

'?0/20'<br />

did counsel<br />

vis{€rs to eear lap belts? it nonetheless suggesled Lhat they are<br />

inferior to rap/shoulder belts; and the reporL's !itle ('cutting colne.s,<br />

costing lives') may have left viewe!s rith an unfavorable inplession of<br />

aafeLy bel ts generally.<br />

oUESTION 3: las NlltsA rfrre of the concern about lrp-only !e!r aeat<br />

belts prlor !o lhe r€cent publicily 8ltrroundlng lhe Garret! case?<br />

a!$l|ER: The agency has alr€ys been asare that safely countelri€asurer,<br />

unde! certaiD crash conditions, can occasionally cause occupanc injury,<br />

but lhat fact does 19! negaLe Ehe overall effecti!$ess of thcse safety<br />

features.. I. lhis regard, NHISA has 1on9 re@gnized that Iap belts can<br />

induce injury in sone clashes. of course, this is even true of<br />

lap-shourder belts, But focusing solely on belt-ind'rced injuries<br />

susiained by res!!ained occupaDts j.s hiqhly nisteading; those sane<br />

occupants, if unrestrained, nighl relt have beeo injured or ktlted (thru<br />

ejectlon, for exanple). So eeen rhere a belted passenger is injured, one<br />

3hou1d not auConatically assume that belt Dse tJas necessatily<br />

dellir.enCal. Itor€ove!, the evidence is clear that. on balance, 1ap-b€lt<br />

usage prevenLs or nitigates fa! more inju!ies than it causes.<br />

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the lssue of tho c!a3h protection plovided by reer-eeat Iag belts nas<br />

highlighted in Ngu6t 1986 l{hen the National Transportarion Safety Board<br />

reteased its repolt. that report questioned rhether rear-seaL tap beLts<br />

{ere effecliv€. In lesponse to the reporc and the discussion it<br />

stinulaled, NHISA and other safety researchers revtered nunerous analyses<br />

oo the erfectiveness of lap betts, erhich confirmed the value of rhose<br />

aysteN. In Febflrary I98?, $e Society of Aulonstive hgineers sponsored<br />

a stmlposiufr on rear-seat occupan! crash protecti,rn, The findinss of th€<br />

reEearchers chat parcicipated in the sympcsium overwhelmingly supporLed<br />

tbe coDclusion that, over tire spectrun of crashes, rear-seaC tap belts<br />

.t€ eEfectrve in redcing the risk of occupst inlury or deaLh,<br />

QUESTIoN {: Of the rear selt passenge! fatalitieE rhat have occurr€d<br />

over th€ la.st s€veral years, hor many have been atlribuled !o lap-on]y<br />

safety belts and hor nany to the passenger erearing no restraint devic??<br />

ANSTWER: notor vehicle crash experi€nce indicates lhat a rear seat<br />

occupant eho vrears a lap belt has a significantly snatler risk of dealh<br />

or injury than an occlpaDt Lho is unlestrained. rn iLs srudy of lap belt<br />

effecliveness, NHlsa has found that rear seat Lap beIcs, rhen worn, are<br />

approxlmaLely 32 per cant €ffective in reducing Lh€ risk of fatality.<br />

tithout a deLailed invesligarim of each fatality, it i6 no! possibl€ to<br />

&cermin€ the exact cause of death for pelsons sho !ea! Iap belrs ani<br />

thcse sbo do not, sa.ever, *e believe the diff€rence in farality<br />

experience speals for itself: a lap-belted occupanL is safer than an<br />

unrestrained occutEDt,<br />

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