KASSERINE PASS BATTLES Readings - US Army Center Of Military ...
KASSERINE PASS BATTLES Readings - US Army Center Of Military ...
KASSERINE PASS BATTLES Readings - US Army Center Of Military ...
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<strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong><br />
<strong>BATTLES</strong><br />
<strong>Readings</strong><br />
Volume I, Part 2<br />
U.S . ARMY<br />
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
Contents<br />
18 . 1 st Armored Division, Report of Operations, Bahiret Foussana Valley,<br />
Tunisia, 19-25 February 1943<br />
19 . Combat Command B, 1 st Armored Division, Operations Report,<br />
Bahiret Foussana Valley, 20-25 February 1943<br />
20 . A Factual Summary of the Combat Operations of the 1 st Infantry<br />
Division in North Africa and Sicily During World War lI (Extract)<br />
21 . 1 st Infantry Division, Summary of Activities, January-March 1943,<br />
and Division Commander's Notes<br />
22 . 16th Infantry, 1 st Infantry Division, Operations Report, 19-26 Febru-<br />
ary 1943<br />
23 . 10th Panzer Division, War Diary (Extract), 14-22 February 1943<br />
24 . 21st Panzer Division, War Diary (Extract), 14-23 February 1943<br />
25 . Fifth Panzer <strong>Army</strong>, War Diary (Extract), 18-23 February 1943<br />
26 . Deutsches Afrika Korps, War Diary (Extract), 19-24 February 1943<br />
27 . Il Corps, Report of Operations, 1 January-15 March 1943<br />
28 . Panzer Armee Afrika (Rommel), War Diary (Extracts), 17-22 Febru-<br />
ary 1943
18<br />
1 st Armored Division, Report of Operations,<br />
Bahiret Foussana Valley, Tunisia, 19-25 February<br />
1943
2 .<br />
DIV xii (liol<br />
CU, 81 :ion, Uo:udg '<br />
81 acn Bn (-d Co)<br />
4 L~alis, 41+3 C A .<br />
4180 - J~eets 28,3V - 6clle " 1,1200,000 .<br />
Gi, GS 4227 - z1heets 10,13 - ;scale= 1/200,000 .<br />
a . hrlemy is concentrated in strength in the vicinity of Fi:altii44 and<br />
1h : L-'TE with v~:at is estijoated to be riot less th4ri one amnred division,<br />
(toe 21st) understrength ill tang, (about 75 estil;atei) . _trong patrol<br />
activity was reported during the ni,~it of 18-19 February at ;-5842,<br />
-6450, 5--7370 and ;~-78)2 . Une battalion of tanks- was reported at 5-7048<br />
.<br />
and alao*er battalion (10th ranzer iiivision) was reported<br />
i;ZByRINE and j-9573 . t eavy two-way traffic on the ,6U ;<br />
b . Uur troops are holding the passes as shown<br />
r:+.. -:a L, ZIUD (:-4460)<br />
Lt . i;ol . Bo wen, C oladg<br />
3d !in 26 Inf<br />
Det 443 C A<br />
13 Go, 13 AR<br />
C Co, 106 C *i<br />
The `1st Armd Div will act- defensively to protect the town of T'! ESSA :and<br />
supply installations thereat against attack from the south and south-" . .:, ,<br />
west, being prepared laeanvhile to counterattack to the southeast. t o restore<br />
- the .D'rdidAI .L position in the event that position is-penetrated'by<br />
hostile attack .<br />
i aG10iu<br />
G G, l: i . .1 C o ladg<br />
6 Ilif (-2d 8: 3d inn)<br />
1st 'tin, 13 ai3. (-i~ Go)<br />
3d iin, 13 iit (-I moo)<br />
91 F,. Ln (-i)' U o)<br />
68 F.i bn (,% .l.o)<br />
701 '1"L-I) 1) n<br />
a l;0 1u !hgr<br />
lo,<br />
Halls, 443 v n<br />
tj ::iiiii,ag (6-7356)<br />
Gen vVelvert, Co:adg<br />
1st bri, 168 Inf<br />
1 Ranger Bn<br />
175 FA bn<br />
i3 Go , 19 - En gr<br />
1 Qo, 692 C .~<br />
.; Co, 105 Ca<br />
.i :CC o, 213Ct<br />
36 F .; nn (-Det)<br />
3 sins, French Inf<br />
enclosure 1~1<br />
1 st .,rid ~)iv<br />
in TY :e Field<br />
.?300 firs, 19 Feb x)43<br />
below :<br />
UC B (it LII LPT)<br />
:;G, CC L, Comdg<br />
13 .~;, (-1st & 3d isn)<br />
2d on, 6 Inf<br />
27 F.; b n '<br />
-601 `1!i) (~; Uo)<br />
;) ;;o, 16 algr<br />
16 bans, 443<br />
b etvreen<br />
-- F;LU .`,I4A Road .<br />
WJo 5-9574<br />
i~ol . Stark<br />
19!:ngr(-1Co)<br />
1st rir., 26 Inf<br />
33 FA L :1 (-1 ;try)<br />
1 Co, JJ AR<br />
805 TD ( C C o)<br />
Det 4143 C A<br />
D Co, 105 CA -<br />
1 Lt (-lstc2<br />
.1 vtry 68 Fa<br />
16 Engr (=A,O '~_ .<br />
u D Cp)<br />
lids, 443 CA -
auard -a Via 0"ifivin no!" :_ __aid Q that<br />
11culaalgaaacy to the ;ass at '~ 'UWF QW142) .<br />
of jud Fir<br />
.<br />
._ _L~ LA 0 - 1 Wisio" Dre,<br />
~111 2 ~!d all"! in L~VWMWK 1rals .<br />
'2 :2z' ab-<br />
U ." ' S rl" voill "not and rqml wil aiepyr uttaca fru . the ';',St throug<br />
ho valley between DJ WU WA-LAL W n4ovx eL ~iu - 'd I'll e<br />
ene_-q forces %,iill be first oaZw~cd and defeated jr delayed in the vici<br />
nity of the eastorn eKK5 of Vie valley . lnfantrT deAnnive positions<br />
will be reconnoitered but not occupied ; a proportion of anti-tank and tani<br />
b,,~ locate,i, d'.1 j ift<br />
'.'( :1d<br />
tc) eff?c . s'..;rprise fla . -l.C`_ng<br />
fire al en attuc .SAI husUle furce, it is cuntaLolated Wat if Qu "Ali<br />
is furced bwci : L. ,, ene, .Z~ strength, it will be ordered tc<br />
retire, 7h!le executin ; to toe vicinity of Lill 1172<br />
(6-3 064) . 03n, it will eiie ., _er ; ru_,_,resF, :,it d prepare to execute a<br />
;incer CounteraLtsen, in cunjoiction sith 6, W, upon an cneay penetration<br />
horth ef"111 1172 .<br />
Lu W MI. also ke grepared to p,xtlcipate :vdth other ele.nentg t- 'f<br />
the Divisicn in an e-,o .iy attac--c in sectors other than its<br />
art :*,11ery to 11ace jf'ire in frcc. .i vile --ainefields<br />
behig 14id at \ :, T' near) 6-106u, j-1559 and at a-052 .<br />
"AN will establisn iuards ozi the idiiefields at 0-1559 and at<br />
0-05 2 .<br />
CC "B" from the general vicinity of its present position will be p rier c~3<br />
!~i' 0<br />
pared to execute on Livision order the following alternate missions : 41<br />
(1) Counterattacn, or reinforcenni of the U hi W ARM podtiona'04.'Grl<br />
.0 case of threatened ene;W penetration .<br />
Wovenant to position covered fronu grcund observation in vicinity .a m<br />
of Faint B-4072 as Division Reserve in case of ene~ry attack from the We "I rm N<br />
"From that p osit ion- OU "a" will be prepar ed to exec ut e a pincer counter<br />
I<br />
attack (in conjunction with CL; against all eneqr penetration froill - ,5VIC<br />
the ast through the valley .,' zeanwhile placing 4 force Ju include Tank 01 r-<br />
Destroyer gunsl to block enuLy pasEage Jorth through the pass at S 030755<br />
(3) GounterattacK to restore the ij&tN:i!A position in the case of<br />
genet ration .<br />
CC " mill in the Weanwhile eivlace an appropriate nwaber of tanks<br />
to support the position of the 26 lnf in the passes_ South of EL IS EL<br />
'blud .<br />
qk<br />
, . ( 1) Arab traffic into our lines (except throucJa minefields) d-11 be<br />
perinitted . ' .~`ab traffic toward the ene7qV will' not be pernitted .<br />
(2) nny passes (in additi-xi to those at iiiich minefields are now being<br />
emplaced) through the mountain3 Wich form our defensive line, vill also<br />
be i!diied and covered by artillery fire . Reconnaissance to locate such<br />
passes will be effected by coi.,bat co. ,,L.oands as Tollows :<br />
U R.; "A" ;<br />
6V "B" :<br />
West of the - EL w % zb tii16L) ftoad .<br />
Last of the '}.'W:_ :5 ., - r;L EL ~,j!OD ao<br />
T!~- I -
, . i TIj !~ ~.;Ji Y :<br />
4 . -'ee .,d;aiaistrat ive girder<br />
5 .<br />
Lid ii,, :<br />
61 caav :<br />
--4474 .<br />
,-4463 .<br />
:o be rep ortec .<br />
-4665 .<br />
_b . Iristructions regarding use of a thrust line and ;i new set of referanc<br />
e points will be issued separately .<br />
`:1i7r;114 L . I'U~Sr Ll,, ult . ,<br />
i~a jo r, G ." .C . ,<br />
-,r-s It . .1 . C . of 6 ., G-3 .<br />
'vltL~il~ .Jlr iatti.i<br />
Cor,rj:,andin-
OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTION )<br />
s<br />
NUMBER . . . . . . . . 6 )<br />
2 .<br />
SEADWARTERS IST ARMORED DI' iSIOR<br />
A.P .O. 251 c/o Postmaster<br />
New York City, N .Y .<br />
1 . CC "A" will be prepared to carry out the Division mission in the valley<br />
between DJ BOU DJELLbI and BABET EL SID - DJ ANOUAL, that is, to act defensively<br />
to proteot the town of TFBESSA ad supply installations thereat against attack<br />
from the South and Southwest, being prepared meanwhile to oounter-attack to the<br />
Southeast to restore the DERNAIA position in the event that position is penetrate(<br />
"by hostile attack . If suddenly attacked or if communications fail, appropriate<br />
action will be taken at once . `<br />
The execution of the above mission requires the following.<br />
a. Minefields in the mountain passes to be guarded and backed-up by<br />
artillery firs .<br />
b. Disposition for the oounter-attack, or reinforcemont of the EL ML BL<br />
ABIOD position in vase of threatened enemy penetration.<br />
;- A<br />
c . Close liaison with thertroops holding the DERNAIA position to ditm4<br />
mine 'The routes of approaoh and most profitable direction of oouater-a<br />
d. The preparation of plans Per the attack on any enemy forces rorol:>w<br />
entrance into the valley by the Eastern exits . - ' -. t<br />
e . Prepare plans for blocking the passes through this mountain range~,;D<br />
just youth of TEBESSA by the use of mines and defensive nation . -.- :~<br />
NOTES . Cross fire from` tanks hidden - in Arab homes, hay stsoks, eto . or "uiA-?<br />
or behind other .cover : and the clever use of supporting fires,-mine fields ;<br />
=Hhidden adl-tank guns will be used to trap at a disadvantage any enemy. :, . . _'<br />
tanks"entering the valley .<br />
a/i~GCOLIt~~~<br />
.~JJ t . O 1 .. .<br />
IrIclusu r e " .* :1 .<br />
ORLANDO WARD<br />
Major General, U. S. <strong>Army</strong><br />
Commanding .<br />
20 February 1943 .
FIELD ORDER )<br />
:<br />
NO : . . . 7 }<br />
MAPS :<br />
2 .<br />
' ,TDIV RCN , .. _<br />
;~co~ Rcn,,.Comdo,<br />
~ : 81 Rcn'Bn'(-A Co)<br />
GS,GS 41£30 - Sheets 18,28,39 - Scale : 1200,000 .<br />
GS,GS 4227 + Sheets 10,11,13,14 - Scale ; 1/200,000.<br />
a . See Intelligence Summary.<br />
b . (1) Forces of the British 6th Armd Div and the 34th Inf Div held<br />
a position at SBIBA, and the passes at 0-1905 and at T-1590 ; the pas<br />
Northwest of <strong>KASSERINE</strong> is the only one available to the enemy.<br />
(2) Forces of the 1st Inf Div and French troops under General Welwart<br />
hold the DERMA position and the pass South of EL MA EL ABIOD; part of<br />
the 1st Inf Div made a successful attack East from a point near S-7574 in<br />
the afternoon of February 22 .<br />
The lst Armd Div (less detachments) with attached troops will hold the<br />
enemy South*of the general line DJ HAINRA - THALA, covering the left<br />
'`-flank of .the II Corps and preventing aGerman move to the West .<br />
TROOPS<br />
C B (ROBINETT<br />
AR -. s . Bn &<br />
2d'<br />
Bn, 6 Inf<br />
27 FA Bn ,<br />
68 FA Bn<br />
894 ::TD - -<br />
601 TD ,(-i,': Co)<br />
D Co, .16 mgr<br />
2d Bn, 16 Inf<br />
3d Bn, 39 Inf .<br />
16 Guns, 443 AA<br />
Hq 8 I .' Co, 3d Bn)<br />
Liclosllrt 140 .<br />
Hq 1st Armd Div<br />
In the Field<br />
4300 hrs, 23 Feb 1J43<br />
.<br />
CC A - (DIV . RES) (McQUILLIN) . DIV RES<br />
6 Inf - , 26 & 3 Bn~-<br />
Inf (-2d & 3d Bns )<br />
I Bin, . :13 AR 3d 4n, 6th Inf<br />
3d Bn, .13th AR<br />
91 FA J-B Btry}<br />
A Co, 6th Engr<br />
701 TD'<br />
16 Guns, 443 $<br />
16th Engr (-A,C, & D Cos)<br />
prov . Bn<br />
,<br />
1 AR<br />
26TH ARUD BRIG, : .(REI<br />
ICHO ON<br />
26th >prrnd Iir gade ;;' .<br />
1 - 0,-:s6tn cam ;<br />
1 - Co ; . .86th Chemical Mox<br />
B & D . . Cos, 1~J5th -pg. . 'r3<br />
34th U .- Bu .<br />
60th FA .,Bn<br />
84th-FA Bn<br />
NOTE : The dispositions indicated above will be checked for accuracy, and<br />
of error made to Division Headquarters .<br />
3 . a . The 81 Rcn Bn will operate initially in tile gap between DJ BOU EL HA?EEHE .~ >;<br />
and DJ EL ATRO<strong>US</strong> to cover the left flanL of the Division, and Trill rriconnoiter: ~<br />
through the pass East of DJ EL ATRC<strong>US</strong> to establish contact with the anemy .--The
81 Rcn Bn will shift its main forces into the latter pass, on Division<br />
order, if that pass'is reported clear .<br />
b . CC 3 will execute the Division mission within the zone :<br />
West Boundary : REKKARIA (inel) - ridge top of DJ ES SIE to point 1116<br />
road- .rai . junc ion at S-8379 (incl)<br />
East Boundary : DJ EZ ZABA (N-3912,) - DJ DiUL^:S (T-050-6) .<br />
c. The 26th Armd Brig (rein) will execute the Division mission yii.thin<br />
t~e zone :<br />
West Boundary : Railroad line (actual) RAIDRA - XASSERINE (incl)<br />
East BOu_n7FYy: DJ EZ ZABA (N-9914) - DJ DOLTLEB (T-0588) .<br />
d . CC . .A will remain in Division Reserve in general area East of HAIDRA .<br />
Tt will institute route reconnaissance to enable it to reinforce the<br />
positions either o£ CC B or the 26th Arrad Hrigade, if that action be<br />
ordered . It will maintain all elements of the command in positions<br />
permitting them to be moved. ..East or JVest . It will anticipate and<br />
formulate plans for a counterattack through the THALA or DJ HAINRA<br />
position .<br />
e . The 16th Engr Bn (-det) will continue necessary maintenance on the<br />
road EAIDRA - DJ HAINRA, and will conduct route reconnaissance within<br />
the zone= DJ HAINRA - THALA - TADJEROUINE - KALAAT ES SENAN - EL bOIDJ<br />
- .MORSOTT - TEBESSA.<br />
-=Other elements of the Division Reserve will remain in present areas<br />
astz . :or HAIDRA,%reorganizing and awaiting orders .<br />
:enamy,<br />
'''( 1 ) All elements of the Division will fully inform personnel o the<br />
existing situation, to permit intelligent action by all ranks . Action<br />
will, be ten,aaious,°and harassing . Through aggressive action, night and<br />
day, .the armor .and personnel will be waylaid, . or approached by<br />
stealth, and destroyed . Great emphasis will be placed on the use of<br />
sticky, bombs and "Molotov Cocktails" to inflict the maximum losses upon .- ,<br />
z<br />
><br />
the energy . :, Our armor, must be so utilized as to inflict damaging losses<br />
et mtii.tain itself at effective fig!itin , " stren?th . ?t :m!st be given<br />
y o o g<br />
adequate artillery support .<br />
. - o<br />
.z<br />
>=-<br />
A .strong counter offensive (on Division order) 'to destroy the<br />
enemy North of the bottleneck of the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> pass must be kept in mind . .`
OFSRATIONAL INSTRUCTION )<br />
s<br />
NUMBER . . . . . . . . 6 )<br />
2 . PLAN "A" s<br />
3 . PLAN "B"s<br />
. .uw. Jo :" , J . L; .<br />
r -<br />
a . V . . .1 i<br />
HEADQUARTERS IST ARMORHD DIVISION<br />
A.P .O . 251 0% Postmaster<br />
New York City, N.Y .<br />
1 . CC "A" will be prepared to execute with a striking foroe, consisting<br />
of purely combat elements of Hq CC "A", 3d Bn, 13 AR (-2 Cos), 1st Bn, 13 AR,<br />
701 TD Bn, lot Bn, 6 Inf and 91 FA Bn, each of the following missione upon<br />
receipt of the message "Execute Plan A" or "Execute Plan B" .<br />
A counterattack by CC "A" to supplement the efforts of the 26th Armd<br />
Brig at THALA. Approach should be made rapidly via the quickest route, and<br />
(according to a hasty reconnaissance) must bottleneck through THALA. Further<br />
reconnaissance and liaison with the 26 Armd Brig will be made to determine bast .<br />
route and direction. Brig Nicholson will take over command of bath forces inthe<br />
_<br />
event of such commitment of CC "A"<br />
A counterattack by CC "A" to supplement the efforts of CC "Bu in the :'._,';'<br />
vicinity of DJ HAINRA . The approach should be made rapidly via the quickest . . . ; ><br />
route: Reconnaissance and liaison with CG, CC "B"- will be made to determine-'b l<br />
route and direction of attack . This action, if ordered, will by coordinated-by,m ,<br />
91<br />
Ct, l AD . _ . . Zs<br />
' 4.enmy Th eeituationty s mieve<br />
ro?tare that a reezufar oemont of a defnsi ;<br />
line .(plaoing tanks in hull domn firing positions) be effected, rather than ._ : : .<br />
a counterattack . Such action will be additionally contemplated by aommandsrs_-~`¬<br />
concerned . - - --<br />
WARD<br />
Major General, U.S . <strong>Army</strong><br />
Commanding,<br />
23 February 1943 .<br />
m<br />
N
Field Order : Dictated . by General Harmon, 1640 hrs ., February 24, 1943 .<br />
Howze Plan will be executed 0630 hrs ., tomorrovi, 25 February,<br />
1943 . The limit of artillery fire to the left for the 1st Armored<br />
Division and to the right for the 6th Armored Division will be the<br />
wadi that goes through Kasserine Pass . Artillery fire to the left of<br />
the wadi only on call from the 6th Armored Division .<br />
The 1st Armored<br />
Division will send an artillery liaison officer with radio to THALA<br />
AT once to report to the Commanding General, 6th Armored Division .<br />
Attack must be made on time . High ground over-looking the Pass tidll<br />
be the objective of both Divisions . Corps artillery will flzrr_ish .<br />
supporting fires to be coordinated by Force Commander and artillery<br />
officer, II Corps . Air support will be furnished by Corps . When<br />
position is captured the high ground over-looking the Pass will be<br />
organized for defense by the combat team from the 1st Infantry<br />
Division making the attack . The attack will be made primarily by<br />
infantry and supporting artillery. The artillery of the 9th Division<br />
under Gen . Irwin is attached to the 6th Armored Division for the attack .<br />
These battalions will be in the British sector under their control but<br />
supporting fire for the American force may be called for through the<br />
artillery liaison officer with the 6th Armored Division .<br />
Reeonnaissanoe<br />
after the Pass is captured and the mines cleared will be pushed by the<br />
1st Armored Division to Kasserine then south to Feriana . Recoxnaissanoe<br />
.from 6th Armored Division will be pushed' through Kasserine north to
Finj uAiLt,<br />
05 V . , AM<br />
W OO G72 estizate .<br />
b . See boundary .<br />
See overlay .<br />
a . 9th Div .<br />
i) oaf old sector F,; . -.. Es,<br />
(botri inc:Lusive j .<br />
b - lst Arrad Div . .<br />
25 February 1943 .<br />
(2) meteve elehants ist jiv . except loth AT), Constantine<br />
GT and 1st Ranger .)n .<br />
(3) Relieve lott A& upon arrival 3d Stir Div.<br />
(1) '.,'!hen aASS!;KlnZ F ASS is captured and secured, asse .-d)le north<br />
Ll . ~ A AMOD in Corps Reserve .<br />
(2) zAaintain contact Derby Yebmanry and 9th Div .<br />
(3) Release ele ;aents 3cAh In f . to 9th Div . in -"<strong>Of</strong> CE"Ebl : . ; dZEA .,<br />
34th Div .<br />
(1) Defend sector indicated on overlay .<br />
(2) Relieve 18th CT upon arrival 168th UT .<br />
W Aintain contact Corps .<br />
d . 168th RCT .<br />
j;ssei,ble and reorganize vicinity i,L!J-A as rU-ieved-<br />
I . 1st Derby Yeomanry . See overlay .<br />
1st I J Uroup . U"I-LL' s as 10l-LOWS :<br />
rP<br />
N<br />
At ..7j 110001<br />
W5tli T ' i ;"XI--hill : :, jz' For reorgani?, .-AiOrl .<br />
bUist = nn-nesurve .<br />
?013t 2j ist )iv .<br />
751st A 3".4 1 mi swival, 751st ii ; ai to be att.-icheo 3jttil I)iv .<br />
InviOre V)
19<br />
Combat Command B, 1 st Armored Division, Operations<br />
Report, Bahiret Foussana Valley, 20-25<br />
February 1943
tIDQUAHl.'BtW 4UAWA1 UUMN6M) "b"<br />
APO 251-- II: S . .<strong>Army</strong><br />
OPERATIONS -REPORT<br />
BAHIBET FO<strong>US</strong>SANA Q=TY<br />
In the "Field<br />
1 March 19.43<br />
20 February 1943 to 25 February 1943<br />
A kJ3S0<br />
1 . 20 .Februa 19431 At about 1030 hre the Commanding General received<br />
from the 1st Armored Division orders that he was to move his command without"delay<br />
to TEALA by way of TEBESSA - HAIDRA, where he could assume commandlof<br />
all troops defending the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> Pass. At this time many officers of all<br />
units and of the C/C "B" staff were reconnoitering terrain to be traversed<br />
case the command were to act in -accordance .with plans issued by the -CG,' ;l<br />
The command moved at 1300, proceeded by the CG party .<br />
At about 1600 hrs the CG met Gen Fredend11 about 4 miles south of THAIA<br />
on the TIE-AU - KASSERIIE road . $e was there informed that the enemy had broken<br />
through the KASSERI-n Pass and was pushing. t o the north on TFxLIA, west toward<br />
TEi?ESSA . Our forces were in retreat up both avenues . CA B ws}s ordered to -<br />
move southeast from HAIDRA, secure the passes of Dj al HAINRA, assume eomme~ndof<br />
all U .S . troops southwest of OUED EL FATAB in the FO<strong>US</strong>WTA Valley, stop -=advance<br />
of the enemy into that sector,<br />
our position in the EASSEREM pass .<br />
drive him out of the valley and restore<br />
That part of the command -which had passed EAIDRA counter-marched and went<br />
into assembly areas about l .mile southeast ` of HAIDRA . Unit C .O.'s were called .r<br />
to the Cp which had been established at 1725 hrs just south of HAIDR4, advised<br />
of the new situation and ordered into assembly positions shown on overlay&l .<br />
unit . closed in those areas by 2400'k -r-0 _ . 1 heavy section of the 601st TD 'A"<br />
was attached to the 27th FA "Bn. The Reconnaissance Co, and the remaining ;heavy<br />
guns of the 601st TD Bn were attached to the 2nd Bn, 13th AR . p<br />
The C .O ., 601st TD Bn, was charged with establishing a straggler line along\<br />
the norlhh - south road just east of Dj al HAINRA Arid all available staff officers<br />
of the command were ordered out to contact, assemble and help reorganise<br />
units 'retreating from the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> Pass .<br />
At .2300 hrs, CG and S-3 left the CP to meet Brig Nicholson, British 6th<br />
..<br />
h All. d Div under whose couJnand C IC B was: tq operate .<br />
2 . 21 February 1943 . The CG and the S-3 mat Brig 1~cNabb, the BGS . of 1st<br />
<strong>Army</strong>, and the CG, 26th Armd Brip in the THALA Post <strong>Of</strong>fice at 0200 hrs . In the<br />
absence of the coirur~ander, Brig icholson, it was agreed bga arties to the conference<br />
that 26th.Armd Brig, moving south .from TBAIA and C/ B, moving southeast<br />
from vicinity . Dj al HAINRA, would advance toward the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> Pass if<br />
possible with infantry elements, but would not commit the armor in either sector .<br />
Brig '..-bNabb stated that II Corps would be informed that it must coordinate the<br />
action . The conference was concluded and the CG departed for the CP just south<br />
of HAIDRA .<br />
By 0600 hrs, the 601st TD Bn, less detachments, had commenced feeding regrouped<br />
stragglers just west of the Pass at S-7088 . Units which were being -<br />
reassembled at. this time included the 3rd Bn, 39th Inf, the .1st Bn, 26 CT, the<br />
894t)i . TD Bn (almost entirely intact), very small groups of the 19th Engrs"Bn,<br />
and the 33rd FA Bn . Personnel 9~~5th TD Bn, supposedly in the area,<br />
were never contacted .<br />
At 1500 hrs, the C .O . eI94th , with the 3rd Bn, 39th Inf, Co ' /f.<br />
D 16th Engrs attached, ar ' d se of the passes at S-6784,<br />
QE- ,~ ~~~<br />
S ~ Fc E
S-7088 and S-7384 . These passes were completely organised for defense`='by :<br />
hrs, except that the northern-most pass had not been mined due to a .shortage of<br />
mines and wire, then on order.<br />
At 1530, the 2nd Bn, 13th AR (plus detachments) which had then picked .' -<br />
up the remainder of "I" Company, 13th AR, was attacked by approximately 4-0 .<br />
enemy tanks, followed by lorried infantry . This attack was repulsed with s<br />
loss to the enemy of 10 tanks and 10 other vehicles and an unknown number--of<br />
infantry . We had no losses . The 27th FA " Bn, which wqs supporting the stank<br />
battalion, was dive-bombed at 1630 hrs by 10 Stukaa and suffered .4 casualties ;<br />
1 u/T destroyed . The enemy retired at. about 1800 hrs .<br />
At about 1600 hrs 68th Armd FA arrived in the area just west of the pass<br />
at S-7088 to operate under this command .<br />
sometime during the afternoon, the CG was informed by II Corpshrat the lend<br />
Bn of the 16th Inf, then in the area S-7274, was under his command. It was<br />
then learned that the 33rd and the 7th FA Bns were near that Bn and in support<br />
of it, but it was never clear under whose Bommand these FA Bns would operate .<br />
At about 1400 hrs, the 2nd Bn, 6th Inf, was ordered to work its way south<br />
along the eastern slopes of Dj al ?-:Albs& to the vicinity of the pass at S-7475<br />
with the view to later covering the right flank of the 2nd Bn, 13th AR ~in subsequent<br />
advances down the valley . At 1800 hrs the '2nd Bn, 16th Inf was, ordered<br />
to displace to the SE to cover the passes at S-7473 and a-8070 and to patrol .<br />
to the east toward the pass . At 2400 hrs the comli;and was disposed as shown<br />
on overlay #2 . Co G, 13th AR, joined the co:ncand late in the afternoon.<br />
3 . 22 February 1943 . 2-nd Bn 13th AR reported anemy burning vehicles and<br />
apparantly planning to withdraw 0050 hrs . Th5 2nd Bn, 6th Inf and 2nd Bn, 16th<br />
i n-f " -rmre ordered to patrol actively to their front . No contact was gained with<br />
enemy. 0655<br />
" " attacked bNr supported<br />
: / . " " " i . of tanks and 1<br />
attacked by fire only . 1 Etry of the 33rd FA Bn was captured, penetration was<br />
Vh3n the CG sent Co "G", 13th AR, to support the .:<br />
" employed<br />
" 1200 en .(, seemed " e slowed down<br />
arably and by 1400 hrs it had been so stopped that the 2nd Bn, 6th Inf, was able<br />
of the 33rd FA Dn .<br />
Coi.ri-nc ing at 0700 hr-11.,<br />
.<br />
the 2nd Bn, l3th AR, was taken under fire by -a oon-<br />
" " " " . " : . " capture eno my<br />
infantry which ivere driven toward its position . Over 200 prisoners were taken .<br />
" day, although " " " " " 2nd<br />
6th IrLf . fired ov5r 2000 rounds on targets of opportunity vhilch presented themdue<br />
to the<br />
" " . " f the enemy ivas in great part<br />
accuracy and quan'-.~.-gogg~ - ine 'delivered b- the 27th FA .<br />
At about 0930 hrs mes s<br />
" " I T:<br />
unit was ta:fling charge<br />
that its CP was moving<br />
?e- a4bn<br />
SEC AR~t<br />
OROER<br />
fX52<br />
C R E T<br />
7- 1<br />
a~"~Wt S possible . Its right boundary was<br />
n<br />
m
(Par 3, 22 FEB 43 contd)<br />
riven as an East - West line through DJ EL SIP to cross-roads li4fM<br />
mid-afternoon, the 1st 3n ., of the 16th CT without our knowledge moved into<br />
at S--6"884 and S-7088 with orders from CG, 1st Inf. Div. to defend them . Accordingly<br />
3rd Bn ., 39th Inf . was ordered to move to defend the passes at S-7393 and S-?695 .<br />
Occupation of the pauses was completed by . both Bns by 2400 hrs . Co "D" 16th Engrs,<br />
completed mining of pass at S-7393 at 1800 hrs . Dispositions of troops are as<br />
shown on overlay #3 . -<br />
4 . 23 February 1943 . 2nd hn, 13th kR moved at daybreak to occupy positions<br />
in wadi at S-7582 . At 1100 hrs one Co of tanks bade a reconnaissance in force<br />
t.o the vicinity of S-7880 . No enemy encountered. At 1700 hrs the Bn completed<br />
an ordered move to a position in the vicinity of S-8378 . The 27th and 68th Armd<br />
FA bns moved up behind it . i"o ene -ty -:et encountered . Rcn Co reconnoitered as<br />
far earl. as v-rtical 85 - no ener .y contact . ,,<br />
At 0935 the 2nd Bn, 6th lnf, assembled in the vicinity of S-7180 . The~ 16th<br />
CT was advised to fill the cap thus cfeated on its front . At this point no satisfactory<br />
communication had as yet been established with the 2nd Bn, 16th CT, which<br />
was under our co-rurand in the sector of the 1st Inf Div . just after d rk, the 2nd<br />
En of the 13th AR dropped back Qhout 1 mile to bivouac for the night .<br />
During this night the RAF bombed FASSERIYE intermittentl1r .<br />
1'115 16th CT came under our command at 2200 hrs .<br />
At about 1100 the 894th TD Bn was ordered to assemble in rear of the -ra ss<br />
at S-7088 and to send light patrols to the north to the area south and west<br />
of TIALA . The balance of the Bn when assembled was to move to the right flank .<br />
of the 2nd En, 13th AR and push rcn toward th- KASSERI?iE Pass along the northern<br />
slopes of Dj CFX.MI . .<br />
R9ports had been received statting before dawn that the enemy occupied"<br />
T1;AU or that t': - -e 6 A .D . vm._° defending along a nc.rbhsast - southwest line<br />
about four miles south of TFALA, thereby encountering our left flank .<br />
ror dispositions of the cora :and as of 2900 hrs, see overlay #4 .<br />
the results of oi;r operations this date= .Tone .<br />
.<br />
- 5 . At about 0300 hrs, CG, 1st AD, arrived at our CP and informdd the CG<br />
that the command had the -, ission of driving the enemy from the valley, destroying<br />
as much of h-_-n as possible -and re-capturing the KASSEPd E Pass . The attack<br />
was tc be coorinated with the 26th Armd Drib;, moving south from ThAiA by i+"~j<br />
Gin harmon, Deputy Commander of the II Corps . The encury :gad apparantly withdrawn<br />
from before ThAiA, anti olar left seemed secure . -<br />
The CG, C/C B, submitted a plan for the dapture of the Pass which- was later<br />
adopted by the Deputy Cori;ander . The plan provided for infantry to work onto both<br />
shoulders of the Pas . ; from the north and west, the infantry to be closely followed<br />
by a tank - artillery team -- C/C B moving from the west, 6 AD from the north .<br />
The 2nd Bn, 13th hR, with dne"C6mpanp of Infantry attached, closely supported<br />
by the 27th and 68th FA Bns moved forward towards the XX;MSSE=:I1;B Pens at daylight .<br />
`-he 601st TD Bn (less Co "C") with C 1-the 13th AR attached, moved to the<br />
north S-1de of OUED EL iATAB Just<br />
ht and frum the vicinity of S-<br />
8078 :,loved forward at dawn, prot<br />
ank of the 2nd Bn, 13th Ar<br />
and sendi-g reconnaissance t<br />
The 894th TD Bn was on the<br />
right flank of the 2nd Bn, 13t<br />
,t 1000 hrs, the Rcn Co of<br />
the 894th TD Br_ iiid of the 13t<br />
contact at a point one<br />
1~<br />
p!
: ._i-lc west cf the KASS y1?~ Pass . at 1400 hrs 2::d j'n, 13th AR, received artillery<br />
fire in the vicinity of S-8776 . All. that tire, orders w9re issued Tor<br />
unj.ts to advance to positions as shoo-n on overlay $5 . The 2nd hn, 6th Armd<br />
lnf was to secure a line of departure for the 16th C :' as shovti-n on tha* over<br />
lay . Co,-menci :, ai dark, the 16th CT be _an mjvA_:,ent to position as gown on<br />
t__at overlay, and b;- 2400 :ors, all ttroops were in position as shown on overlay<br />
#5 .<br />
During the late afternoon, Frov-isional Inf, detachments orjanized from the<br />
894th TD b;; by its C .0 ., had worked its way S'N of Dj Eh ACAB tcwards Dj CEA;6l,<br />
yi:iera it cane under mortar and machine gun fire . It -_ s bal_eve :: that the fire<br />
:- s detachment returned had driven t',e rear elo=aents of the ene-:y off the<br />
6W shoulder of the YASSE .-':I ; .. Fass, by . 2000 hrs . This -.,,as not t:nown until the<br />
followinC '..ay, because of lack of Co:--=unacat' on w3_'Ih that detachment .<br />
6 . 25 Februa l, 19 , 3 . r'ollol~ri -'` a 18 - --i -sites artillery Fre-Daration,<br />
t__e 16t CT attacked at 0630 to seize an"- _-_, c -are t .' P Vi' shoulder of~ t' -~e i :fi.S-<br />
S . .i : . : . Fass . "1-o _-ne :-r; was contacted . 1030 hrs the 2_.d 13th AR`, reached<br />
_oath of the Pass and Co "D", 16th En-rs, .- oved forward to ;, e =in rwLcvi_-c<br />
mires at t:-:at tine . I .-ines in th_ pass -were removed by 1400 and t'. -_ "_ road-cleared<br />
to -o ; r ::l800 . Rc~_ Cc, 1'th AR, reached t:ASSE=-I_' :`E at 1800 . . the 894th<br />
TD ^r!, with th° 2nd bn, 6th IrS attached, outposted t" , ! 16th CT rite: s-'call<br />
eleTnerts of each arm in the VicinfLty of KASSEERI?."E .<br />
=<br />
:<br />
a 16th CT con . Anced Re n<br />
of the I?E shoulder of the pass at about 1700 hrs i n order to bemin relicving<br />
the Guards' Brigade, fro=q their positions at daylight of the 26th February .<br />
7 . In conclusion, it is felt that the attac l : ( which was eventually launched<br />
in the air) could have met the enerw successfully had more infantry been assisned<br />
to C/C 3 sooner and had ii .s left flank been s cured by more vigorous<br />
action by the 6 AD south of T' :-ALA. '.arir:s and artillery with little infantry<br />
cannot naintain contact ; : close terrain, espedially at night .<br />
0 :- .-: 1C 1.AL .<br />
DIU1+ A . r SSaLL, jr<br />
L- . CO1,C, Cav.,<br />
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iio 76 , 1, C+.,tbt " i7 " .<br />
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M~
20<br />
A Factual Summary of the Combat Operations of<br />
the lst Infantry Division in North Africa and Sicily<br />
During World War 11 (Extract)
6 . Lessons learned from the ORAN Operation<br />
Immediately following the French surrender at ORAN, intensive efforts were made, by the Division,<br />
to correct the deficiencies noted in that operation . _<br />
The use of night maneuver and night combat . A severe setback had been suffered by the 18th<br />
Infantry Regiment, during its initial attack against ST . CLOUD, on 8-9 Nov . Their initial attacks had<br />
bogged down, and considerable casualties had been incurred This impasse was due to a lack of accurate<br />
preliminary reconnaissance and a lack of maneuverability by the assault battalions . However, this grave<br />
deficiency was corrected by the 18th Infantry Regiment, on the battle-field, on the night of 9-10 Nov . ,<br />
'42, by the following measures ;<br />
The 1st Battalion was held to contain the enemy forces at ST . CLOUD .<br />
The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were withdrawn to bypass ST . CLOUD under _cover of darkness; and<br />
by night maneuver were directed on to their assigned locations, for the assault on ORAN, early on 10<br />
November .<br />
After seeing the results of :his particular night maneuver, the 1st Infantry Division had become<br />
completely sold on the results that might be attained, by the skillful use of night maneuver and night<br />
attacks .<br />
This night maneuver at ORAN was the fore-runner of many boldly executed night attacks launched<br />
later, during the hard fought campaigns against the Germans in TUNISIA and later in SICILY . The<br />
German Panzer Divisions learned to fear the dreaded night attacks of the 1st Infantry Division, which<br />
invariably resulted in maximum damage to the enemy, and quick tactical success for the 1st Division .<br />
II . THE INITIAL. COMBAT OPERATIONS IN TUNISIA<br />
1 . Detachment of 1st Division Units to TUNISIA .<br />
Hardly had the 1st Division regrouped and reorganized, after the surrender of the French forces at<br />
CP,AN, on 10 Nov . . '42, when varlor_s units of the Division were }rastll} detached into UNLMA . This<br />
was done, as an emergency measure, on orders of the Allied High Command, to bolster the Allied<br />
defenses against the rapid German build-up on the Eastern front . These early troop movements were as<br />
follows :<br />
The 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry , Lt . Col . John W . Bow-a . Comdg., left by transport planes<br />
and gliders, on 15 Nov , '42, to outpost the southern approaches to the ATLAS Mountains, in the GAFSA<br />
area In Southern TUNISIA .<br />
The 18th Infantry Regimen t , Col . Frank Greet, Comdg ., the 32nd Field Artillery Battalion ,<br />
and the 5th Field Artillery Battalion left later in November '42, to reinforce the British V Corps, then<br />
fighting against heavy odds In Northern TUNISIA .<br />
The 26th Infantry Regiment , Col . Alec . Stark, Comdg ., (less the 3rd Battalion - already<br />
detached) together with the 33rd Field Artillery Battalion, left early in Jan. '43, to join the American<br />
11 Corps, in Southern TUNISIA .<br />
The detachment of these 1st Division Units, to various Allied Task Forces, then operating under<br />
American, British and French command, !n Eastern TUNISIA, was a matter of grave concern to 1st Division
Headquarters, still located back in ORAN . It was reported that the Division Commander of the 1st infantry<br />
Division had inquieed at the Allied Force General Headquarters, at ALGIERS, as to -Whether or not this<br />
was a private War? Or, could any Son-of-a-gun get into It? -<br />
Finally on 18 Jan .<br />
'43, the remainder of the 1st Infantry Division, together with Division Headquarters,<br />
was ordered into general reserve in Central TUNISIA . Later on 27 Jan . '43, the 1st Infantry Division (less<br />
its detached elements) took over a combined American-French Sector, in the O<strong>US</strong>ELLTIA VALLEY_, In<br />
Central TUNISIA .<br />
III . THE ROLE OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION IN THE DEFENSE AGAINST THE GERMAN<br />
BREAK-THROUGH AT THE <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong> (See Battle Map #2)<br />
To visualize the role of the 1st Infantry Division, In is operations against the German break-through,<br />
at the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong>, will require a brief explanation of these Items, In connection therewith .<br />
The distribution of Allied Forces in Eastern TUNISIA .<br />
The location of units of the 1st Infantry Division (on all fronts) .<br />
The defensive set-up of the American II Corps, in Southern TUNISIA .<br />
The German recapture of the FAID <strong>PASS</strong>, early in Feb ., '43 .<br />
The German break-through at FAID <strong>PASS</strong>, 14 Feb . . '43 .<br />
The German break-through at the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong>, 21 Feb ., '43 .<br />
The later Allied counter-attack .<br />
1 . The Distribution of Allied Troops In Eastern TUNISIA, as of 1 Feb ., '43 .<br />
The Northern Tunisian Sector was basically a British Sector, under the British V Corps (Gen .<br />
Allfrey, Comdg .) . It had been reinforced, in Nov . and Dec . of '42, by detached units from the American<br />
1st Infantry Division and the American 1st Armored Division .<br />
The C-ntzal Tunisian Scct3r was caslcgly a Freach Eec.tx . Cadet the :ranch )G, Cnips (Gent .<br />
Koeltz, Comdg .) . V This Sector had been reinforced from time to time, by American Units from the 1st<br />
Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Division and from the 34th Infantry Division . -<br />
On 27 Jan . '43 . elements of the 1st Infantry Division (under 1st Division command) took over the<br />
critical O<strong>US</strong>ELLTIA VALLEY Sector, under the French XIX Corps, In Central TUNISIA . The 1st Infantry<br />
Division was then temporaril reinforced by a French Groupment (including 6 French infantry battalions) .<br />
The Southern Tunisian Sector was basically an American Sector, under the American II Corps<br />
(Gen . Fredenall, Comdg ) . The troops, in this sector, had been gradually guilt up Into a heterogeneous<br />
group of Special Task Forces, as listed below :<br />
American Units<br />
26th Infantry Regiment (less the 2nd Battalion), of the 1st Infantry Division .<br />
33rd Field Artillery Battalion , of the 1st Infantry Division .<br />
168th Infantry Regiment , of the 34th Infantry Division-<br />
9
The 1st Ranger Battalion (a specially trained unit of high combat value) .<br />
Combat Commands "A" and "C", of the lit Armored Division .<br />
The 19th Combat Engineer Battalion (a newly organised engineer unit) .<br />
Various Corps Artillery units .<br />
French Units<br />
The French Constantine Division (Gem . Welvert, Comdg .) Made up of brave, willing soldiers,<br />
but under strength and ill equipped .<br />
British Units<br />
The Derb e Yeomanry Reconnaissance Squadron (a well trained reconnaissance squadron -<br />
Detached from the British 8th Armored Division) .<br />
NOTE Other American and British Units attached later .<br />
2 . The Location of all Units of the ist Infantry Division .<br />
Although the units of the 1st Infantry Division were deployed on a wide front (tinder British, French<br />
and American command - in Northern . Central and Southern TUNISIA) at the time of the German<br />
break-through, at FAID <strong>PASS</strong>, it will be noted that eventually all units of the lit Infantry Division were<br />
later committed in Southern TUNISIA, against the German break-through forces . The actual location<br />
of these lit Division units, at the time of the German break-through, at FAIR, on 14 Feb . . '"i3, was as<br />
follows :<br />
1st Infantry Division Units in Northern TUNISIA . (then attached to the British V Corps)<br />
18th Infantry Regiment<br />
32nd Field Artillery Battalion<br />
1st Infantry Division Units in Central TUNISIA . (then attached to the trench XM Corpa)<br />
lit Infantry Division Headquarters<br />
1st Infantry Division Special Troops<br />
18th Infantry Regiment<br />
2nd Battalion only (of 28th Infantry Regiment)<br />
32nd Field Artillery Battalion<br />
5th Field Artillery Battalion (released from British V Corps - 7 Feb . . '43 .<br />
1st Combat Engineer Battalion<br />
lit Infantry Division Units in Southern TUNISIA (then attached to the American II Corps)<br />
10
26th Infantry Regiment (leas the 2nd Battalion)<br />
33rd Field Artillery Battalion<br />
3. Defensive Set-up_of the American II Corps, in Southern TUNISIA.<br />
Importance of the FAIR <strong>PASS</strong><br />
The Southern Tunisian Sector, assigned to the American II Corps, included a stretch of wild desert<br />
country, covering a frontage of 200 miles . It was interspersed with a series of precipitous mountain ridges,<br />
extending from Northeast to Southwest. The PAID <strong>PASS</strong> (located in the north central portion of Southern<br />
TUNISIA) provided the most practicable route of approach, through the south end of the GRAND DORSAL<br />
Mountain Range. Control of this Pass was vitally important .<br />
For the Allies , their control of the Pas: would deny the movement of Gemun mechanized<br />
forces into the western areas, of Southern TUNISIA .<br />
For the Germans , their control of the Pass would provide the most feasible, direct route of .<br />
approach for their mechanized forces, in their future plans for offensive action, which were based on<br />
securing more maneuver space to the west . Additional maneuver space would be needed later by tU<br />
German Africa Corps, then withdrawing in the East, towards TUNISIA, before the advancing British 8th<br />
<strong>Army</strong> .<br />
Early Operations in the FAIR <strong>PASS</strong><br />
_Task<br />
The tactical importance of the FAIR <strong>PASS</strong> had been apparent, since Dec. . '42, to the commanders<br />
of the allied<br />
included;<br />
Forces, who first operat ed in Southern TUNISIA. These early Task Force units<br />
The 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment , of the 1st Infantry Division, (Lt . Col. John Bowers,<br />
Comdg .) . This battalion was then based on GAFSA, with instructions to outpost the GAFSA-SENED<br />
area, and to reconnoiter east and northeast thereof .<br />
Elements of the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment (Lt . Col . Edson D . Raff,<br />
Comdg .) .<br />
One Company of Tank Destroyer (commanded by Capt . Gilbert Ellma n) .<br />
Detached Infantry - Artillery elements from the French Coastantiae Division, (Gen . Welvert ;<br />
Comdg .) .<br />
The strategic value of the FAID <strong>PASS</strong> seemed obvious to Raff and Bowers . So, while acting on their<br />
own initiative In that area, they decided to take the place, for self-protection . With a makeshift Task<br />
Force, made up from these units noted above, they took the Pass in a surprise !~&Irt attack , arty in<br />
Dec . '42 .<br />
Lt . Col . Raff then arranged with Gen. Welvert to garrison the Pass with elements of the French<br />
Constantine Division ; as it was necessary for Lt . Col. Bowers to return with his Battalion to the GAFSA-<br />
FERIANA area .<br />
Had the Allied High Command seen fit, _at that time , to organize a s~ defending force for the<br />
for the FAIR <strong>PASS</strong>, with adequate artillery andanti-tank support, a great dal of their liter difficulties,
at the time of the German break-through, might have been avoided .<br />
4 . Readjustment of American Forces, in Southern TUNISIA , prior to 14 Feb . . '43 .<br />
Commencing in Jan .<br />
'43, the American units were gradually reinforced in Southern TUNISIA .<br />
The remainder of the 26th Infantry Regimental Combat Team (less the 2nd Battalion, then in<br />
Central TUNISIA), and with the 33rd Field Artillery Battalion attached, arrived in that area late in Jan .<br />
'43 . It was placed initially in a reserve position near SBEETLA (about 32 miles west of FAIR <strong>PASS</strong>) . At<br />
this time, the 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, was still in GAFSA .<br />
Combat Command "A", of the 1st Armored Division, came into the area and occupied a<br />
position in the SIDI BOU ZED area, west of the FAID <strong>PASS</strong>, in Jan . '43 .<br />
During this period, the 168th Infantry Regiment, of the 34th Infantry Division, was in position<br />
on the high ground, northwest of the FAIR <strong>PASS</strong> .<br />
b . Corps Status of the Southern Tunisian Sector .<br />
Major General Fredenall arrived about 10 Jan ., '43, established the American II Corps CP at<br />
TEBESSA, and assumed command of the II Corps Sector, in Southern TUNISIA .<br />
During this interval, the G-2, of the American II Corps, predicted an all-out German attack against<br />
the FAIR <strong>PASS</strong> . And, Gen . Fredenall requested reinforcements and an opportunity to regroup the American<br />
forces, in this sector, under better cohesion and control .<br />
But the British 1st <strong>Army</strong> Headquarters (under which the American II Corps operated) insisted that the<br />
expected German main attack would be launched farther north, in the PICHON area, where it had come<br />
before . Meanwhile, the actual garrison, of the FAIR <strong>PASS</strong>, still consisted only of the same elements of<br />
the French Constantine Division, which had taken over the defense of the Pass, early in December, '42,<br />
after the Pass had first been captured by the American Task Force . These French Troops were _ill equipped<br />
to stop a determined German mechanized attack .<br />
6 . Recapture of the FAIR <strong>PASS</strong> . by the Germans, early in Feb . '43 .<br />
Following their recent feints further North, the German Pauzers rook a nia :p c.ac< at the AILled<br />
south flank, in an all-out attack against the FAID <strong>PASS</strong>, early in Feb . '43 . This was in exact accordance<br />
with the G-2 Intelligence Estimate, previously submitted by the G-2, of the American II Corps .<br />
Smashing Into the Pass with infantry, artillery and tanks . and a few 88's . the Germans were finally<br />
able to snatch the Pass from the French garrison (elements of the French Constantine Division) . But this<br />
was not accomplished until at least half of the gallant but ill-equipped French troops were either killed<br />
or wounded .<br />
An American counter-attack was launched early the next morning, following the German capture of<br />
the Pass, by the 26th Infantry Regimental Combat Team (less two battalions) and Combat Command - A - ,<br />
of the 1st Armored Division . But the counter-attack was not successful . The Germans, having been<br />
reinforced, were able to hold on, and retained complete control of the FAIR <strong>PASS</strong> .<br />
7. The German Break-ThrouEh Attack, at FAIR <strong>PASS</strong>- - 14 Feb ., - '43 .<br />
12
The Initial German Attack<br />
The German break-through forces had apparently been strongly reinforced, following their capture<br />
of the FAID <strong>PASS</strong>, early in Feb . '43 . And, on 14 Feb . . the German Panzers came boiling out of the<br />
west end of the Pass, with a whip lash of tanks, guns and men, that set the American forces reeling<br />
back behind the mountain passes at SBEITLA and <strong>KASSERINE</strong> (40 miles west of the FAIR <strong>PASS</strong>) .<br />
Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "C" (of the American 1st Armored Division), then<br />
located in the SIDI BOU ZED area (10 miles west of the FAIR <strong>PASS</strong>), caught the brunt of the German<br />
break-through attack . Out-maneuvered, out-numbered and out-gunned, by the German Panzer Divi<br />
sions, they were badly mauled, and lost 54 tanks in this engagement . A side swipe, by these on-rushing<br />
German Panzers, also over-ran the 168th Infantry Regiment, of the American 34th Infantry Division,<br />
then located north of SIDI BOU ZED .<br />
Following their quick success at SIDI BOU ZED, the German Panzers were then well on their way to<br />
SBEITLA and <strong>KASSERINE</strong>, just 30 miles further to the west . It then became necessary for the American<br />
II Corps to take immediate steps to protect the mountain passes, through SBIITLA and <strong>KASSERINE</strong>, and<br />
the passes west thereof, leading north to TEBESSA .<br />
8 . American Reinforcements from the North<br />
When it was finally realized that the tremendous American supply base at TEBESSA was in grave<br />
danger of being captured; and that the Germans very possibly could smash north through THALA, clear<br />
to LE KEF, and thus threaten the right rear flank of the entire British 1st <strong>Army</strong>; then, finally, the<br />
Headquarters of the British 1st <strong>Army</strong> saw fit to release additional reinforcements from the north, to<br />
assist the hard pressed American H Corps . These initial reinforcements included Combat Command "B"<br />
(of the American 1st Armored Division), and the 18th Infantry Regimental Combat Team (of the 1st<br />
Infantry Division .<br />
Combat Command "B" (of the 1st Armored Division) (Col . Robinette, Comdg .) - on release<br />
from the British V Corps, boiled down south, and by 16-17 Feb . was in position, north of SBIITLA, to<br />
cover the American withdrawal therefrom . It was later ordered further northwest, to help protect the<br />
THALA area and the passes leading into TEBESSA, from the east .<br />
The 18th Infantry Regimental Combat Team (of the 1st Infantry Division - Wiih the<br />
Field Artillery Battalion arached) , Col . Greer . Comdg ., on relcaae from the British it Corps, ura.z<br />
down from the north, on 17 Feb ., to occupy a defensive position, just southwest of SBIBA, (24 miles,<br />
north of SBIITLA) . On 19 Feb . '43, it repulsed several enemy armored-infantry attacks, in this area,<br />
after inflicting heavy losses on the enemy; and thus secured the left flank of the hard pressed American<br />
II Corps .<br />
9 . The German Break-through at the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong>,<br />
The <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong> provided the most favorable corridor of approach for the German Panzer<br />
Units, in their advance north towards the critical area near THALA (at the head of the <strong>KASSERINE</strong><br />
VALLEY) . The <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong> had been occupied initially by the 19th Combat Engineer Regiment<br />
(a regiment of Corps troops, which was new to combat) . These defending troops were reinforced, and<br />
the Pass was hastily organized for defense on 19 Feb . , under command of the Headquarters, of the 26th<br />
Infantry Regimental Combat Team (Col . Alec Stark, Comdg .) . In this hasty defensive organization ,<br />
the 19th Engineer Rogiment occupied the west side of the Pass ; and the 26th Infantry Regiment ( less the<br />
2nd and 3rd Battalions) occupied the _east side of the Pass . The 33rd Field Artillery Battalion (Lt Col .<br />
Verdi Barnes . Comdg .) was in general support .<br />
13<br />
-Z1<br />
Feb ., '43 .
The organization of this defensive position has hardly beep stated . on 19 Feb . , '43, when the<br />
Germans launched a probing attack . They, later launched their main attack . against the pass . early<br />
on 20 Feb . , and gained possession of the dominating heights ou the _west flank . After bringing up their<br />
88mm guns and mortars, the Germans then pi reed the right 4nk o the west sector (held by the 19th<br />
Engineer giment) . and ve o thro h . . ,ZG _ ( 2<br />
During the ni ht 20-21 Feb . .Jthe Germans over-ran both positions . cleared the ripe fields, and<br />
g<br />
their tanks then started rolling up the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> VALLEY . early on 21 Feb . In the rAeanUme . after<br />
having incurred heavy losses, the surviving American defenders had been forced to withdraw to the<br />
north, under strong enemy pressure .<br />
10 . Additional Allied Reinforcements (British)<br />
Two additional tank regiments . of a British Armored Brigade, had been rushed down from the north,<br />
on 19-20 Feb ., to reinforce Combat Command B (of the 1st Armored Division), in the area near THALA .<br />
This combined British-American Task Force was later driven back further north, behind THALA (the<br />
northern exit of the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> VALLEY) . by the heavier German tanks . and were being hard pressed .<br />
However, at that time . the Division Artillery . of the American 9th Infantry Division, had just arrived<br />
after a forced march of 750 miles, from SPANISH-MOROCCO . Their added artillery support saved the<br />
day for these Allied units, then holding the critical northern exit of the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> VALLEY (south of<br />
THALA) .<br />
11 . Movement to Southern TUNISIA, by remainder of the 1st Infantry Division .<br />
When the German offensive in Southern TUNISIA first started, the 1st Infantry Division (less units<br />
detached elsewhere) had been holding a sector in the O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA VALLEY . in Central TUNISIA, under<br />
the French XDC Gorps . The units . under 1st Division command, in this sector , then included the<br />
following :<br />
1st Infantry Division Units<br />
1st Infantry Division Headquarters<br />
Division Special Troops<br />
16th infantry Regiment (Col . Fechet, Comdg .)<br />
2nd Battr_liou, 26th Infantry Regiment (Lt Col . Beck, Ccrndg .)<br />
1st Engineer Battalion (Lt Col . H . C . Rowland, Comdg .)<br />
1st Division Artillery, to include<br />
5th Field Artillery Battalion (Lt Col . Tyson, Comdg . )<br />
7th Field Artillery Battalion (Lt Col . Geo . Gibb, Comdg .)<br />
French Units temporarily attached to 1st Infantry Div .<br />
French Groupment, to include :<br />
6 Infantry Battalions<br />
1 Field Artillery Battalion<br />
Signal Company<br />
At this time, the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters had close working relations with Gen . Koeltz,<br />
the Commanding General . of the French III Corps . On 18 Feb . . '43 . the following radio telegraph<br />
message was received, by the Comdg . General,/ of the 1st Infantry Division . at his O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA VALLEY<br />
CP - Quote:<br />
14
~', G.<br />
Feb . 18, '43 . Koeltz to Allen; "This is a warning, General Anderson^ s just issued a directive<br />
to Colonel Fechets' Regiment (the 16th Infantry Regiment) to go to Fredenall as soon as possible ."<br />
(Referring to Gen . Fredenall . C .O . o f American II Coups) .<br />
It was then urgently requested by Gen . Allen that this reinforcement to the II Corps, be provided<br />
on a divisional basis . Instead of sending the 16th Infantry Regiment down (merely as another Task Force<br />
component) .<br />
Gen . Koeltz was requested by Gen . Allen to arrange for the movement of_ all available combat _elements<br />
, of the 1st Infantry Division, to go as a unit , under 1st Division Command, to support the Ameri-<br />
can II Corps, in Southern TUNISIA . Shortly thereafter, it happened that all available combat units of<br />
the 1st Infantry Division were ordered to move without delay, (under _1st Division control , to support the<br />
American II Corps . The 2nd Battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment and the 5th Field Artillery Batta-<br />
lion were left behind as a nucleus for the incoming French units, detailed to take over the O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA<br />
VALLEY Sector, which was to be vacated by the 1st Infantry Division . The O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA VALLEY sector<br />
was 80 miles NW of THALA .<br />
An advance detail from the 1st Infantry Division, to include the Division Commander, the Division<br />
G-2 (Lt . Col . R . W . Porter), the Assistant Division G-4 (Major Donald Curbs), and Assistant DivLzfon<br />
G-3, and several liaison officers, left the O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA VALLEY at dusk, on 18 Feb . , to contact the<br />
Headquarters of the II Corps, in the HAIDRA-TEBESSA area, in Southern TUNISIA .<br />
While enroute by motor to TEBESSA, early on 19 Feb ., '43, the Advance Command Group, of the<br />
1st Division, met Gen . Fredenall (C .G . of the American II Corps) with his aides, on the road in motors,<br />
near HAIDRA (24 miles northeast of TEBESSA) . Gen . Fredenall was cheerful and optimistic . He out<br />
lined the latest developments at the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong> ; and stated that the 1st Division must be prepared<br />
to counter-attack where needed . He directed that the 1st Division make early contacts with Gen . Welvert<br />
(C .G . of the French Constantine Division, then located south of TEBESSA), and have him coordinate<br />
his efforts with the 1st Division .<br />
The 1st Division Artillery Commander, Gen . Clift Andrus . completed the turn-over of the 1st<br />
Division Sector, in the O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA VALLEY, to the incoming French units, on 19 Feb . ; and then<br />
followed immediately thereafter with the designated combat units of the Division, to an assembly area,<br />
southeast of TEBESSA, in Southern TUNISIA .<br />
12 . Combat preparations initiated by the 1st Infantry Division .<br />
Assembly areas were indicated for the incoming 1st Division Units, near BOU CHEBKA, west of the<br />
<strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong> VALLEY .<br />
That evening, on 19 Feb ., the C .G . of the 1st Infantry Division contacted the rear CP of the 33rd<br />
Field Artillery Battalion, then In direct support of the American units, defending the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong> .<br />
This CP was operated by Capt . Theodore Crocker . S-3 of the 33rd Field Artillery Battalion . Crocker<br />
was not particularly worried, now that the remaining 1st Division units were on the way . He was a<br />
unique type of combat soldier, and quite a "rustler' . He even produced Gen . Welvert (C .G . of the<br />
French Constantine Division), at 22-00 AM, on the morning of 20 Feb .<br />
Gen Welvert was a gallant old soldier . But, having had 10-15 years service, as a Major General,<br />
in the French <strong>Army</strong>, he was very jealous of his prerogatives . He was not too sure but that he might be<br />
"Having his leg pulled" . But he finally offered to have the French Constantine Division cooperate "full<br />
out", with the 1st Division .<br />
15
During the night of 19-20 Feb . , the remaining elements of the 1st Infantry Division (including the<br />
Division Special Troops, the 16th Infantry Regiment the 7th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 1st Fngi-<br />
neer Battalion) rolled into their assembly areas near BOU CHEBKA, west of the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong> VALLEY .<br />
13 . Counter-Attack-Orders, issued by the 1st Infantry Division .<br />
Lage on 20 Feb ., warning orders were received, by the lit Division, from the 11 Corps, to be pre-<br />
pared, at daylight, on 21 Feb . . to block the north exit of the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong> VALLEY, and to counter-<br />
attack, from positions west of the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong> VALLEY, against any German forces advancing<br />
north up the Valley . Orders were then issued by the lit Division, as follows :<br />
To have the 16th Infantry Regiment (Col . Fechet, Comdg .) place one battalion, with anti-<br />
tank weapons attached . In position on the DJEBEL HAMRA (north of BOU CHEBKA), prepare d to block<br />
any continued German armored advance, up the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> VALLEY to the northwest, towards HAIDRA,<br />
or through the Pass, in that area, leading directly west into TEBESSA .<br />
To have the 16th Infantry Regiment counter -attack with its two remaining battalions, from the<br />
west, against the left (west) flank of any German infantry forces, that may advance up the <strong>KASSERINE</strong><br />
VALLEY, to the north .<br />
To have the 7th Field Artillery Battalion operate in general support .<br />
To have the 1st Engineer Battalion alerted in Division reserve .<br />
14 . Limit of the German break-through up the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> VALLEY .<br />
After the Germans had finally over-run both flanks of the KASSERENE <strong>PASS</strong> defensive position (on<br />
the night of 20-21 Feb .), the German heavy tanks then started rolling north, up the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> VALLEY,<br />
early on 21 Feb . . followed by the German infantry units . In the meantime, the surviving American<br />
defenders had withdrawn to the north, towards THALA, under heavy enemy pressure .<br />
The British had rushed in their lighter tanks (from the THALA area) very early on 21 Feb . , to support<br />
the hard pressed American units, In the Pass . But these British tanks were little match for the heavier<br />
German 'Tiger' Tanks . Driven back close to THALA, (near the northern exit of the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> VALLEY),<br />
:he 3dtfih urla wayc fLixlly able to hold in thst area, undo: the close support of the nev-ly an1ved<br />
American artillery units, and Combat Command "B" of the <strong>US</strong> 1st Armored Division .<br />
At this time, early on 21 _Feb . , '43, the German Panzers had reached the furthest northern limits,<br />
of their hard fought drive fiom the south . After their initial success at FAID, SIDI BOU ZID, and<br />
SBEITLA . and finally in their break-through at the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong>, the Germans were now over-extended ,<br />
and were "Riding for a fall ." The Allied final line of defense, protecting the northern exits of the<br />
KAESERWE VALLEY, had to be held, at all cost .<br />
Both sides were "wobbly and punch drunk ." But, the Allies still had one "Ace left in the hole ."<br />
The last remaining elements of the 1st Infantry Division, bad come down from the north, unde r Division<br />
control, and were all set to counter-attack .<br />
16 . Launching of the lst Division Counter-A ttack .<br />
This was the picture, when the newly arrived lit Division units came in at daylight, 21 Feb . '43,<br />
to counter-attack .<br />
16
The 3rd Battalion, of the 16th Infantry Regiment, Lt . Col . Mathews . Comdg ., with special<br />
anti-tank weapons attached, was located on the DJEBEL HAMRA (10 miles south of HALDRA), prepared<br />
to block the northwest exit of the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> VALLEY, and to protect the mountain pass, leading west<br />
to TEBFSSA .<br />
The lst and 2nd Battalions (Lt . Col . Cunningham and Lt . Col . Crawford . Comdd .), of the<br />
16th Infantry Regiment , from positions west of the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> VALLEY, had gained early contact with<br />
the German follow-up infantry units, and attacked aggressively, at daylight, on 21 Feb . After considera-<br />
ble close-in hard fighting, the German infantry units attempted to with-draw to the north , under close<br />
pressure from the west, by the 16th Infantry assault battalions . But these German units incurred heavy<br />
casualties when they found escape in that direction cut-off by the British and American tanks (with<br />
close-in artillery support - located south of THALA) .<br />
The 7th Field Artillery , Lt . Col . George Gibb, Comdg ., of the 1st Division Artillery , was<br />
in close support of the 16th Infantry units, during this operation .<br />
Allied Air Support was tremendously helpful at this time . American and British bombers<br />
Joined in aseries of highly effective sorties, on the afternoon-of 21 Feb . . against the German tanks and<br />
guns, which ,were then jammed-up "bumper to bumper" . In their hurry to escape being bottled up to<br />
the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> VALLEY .<br />
16 . The German Withdrawal .<br />
Once the German withdrawal to the south had started, their evacuation of the KASSERIN£ VALLEY<br />
was conducted with remarkable celerity . The lack of any pre-planning for an organized direct pursuit,<br />
had delayed the regrouping of any mobile II Corps troops, for a quick , direct pursuit .<br />
Thus, contact with the retreating German forces was lost, ani their withdrawal to the south was<br />
effected without serious hindrance . A few days later, close contact was regained with the German units,<br />
further south, at the same old stands, at GAFSA, MAKNASSY, FAID and PICHON .<br />
The German High Command had "Shot the Works", 1n an all-out effort to setae the initiative . But,<br />
from that time on, the end in TUNISIA . was Inevitable ; although the fighting became even more severe,<br />
before the Allies had won the final victory in TUNISIA, on 13 May, 1943 .<br />
To present a clear picture of the entire <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong> Operation, there is included herein a<br />
terrain analysis of that general area, and a chronological listing of the combat operations connected<br />
therewith .<br />
7 . Z, -,urxaAt1yn of the Cornhat np err- ticnt (Lead?ng up to and follov'!ng the ".SSERINE 7AF a'<br />
Break-through)<br />
Terrain Analysis (See Battle Map $2)<br />
The Southern Tunisian Sector included a wild desert area, covering a frontage of 200 miles . interspersed<br />
with a series of precipitous mountain ridges . The FAIR <strong>PASS</strong> (located fn the north central part<br />
of that area) provided the only feasible route, through the south end of the GRAND DORSAL Mountain<br />
Range . Control of this Pass was vitally important, both to the Germans and to the Allies_<br />
From FAIR (near the west exit of the Pass), it was 10 miles due west, to SIDI BOU ZID; and thence<br />
32 miles northwest . to SBEITLA . From SBIITLA it was 26 miles north (through the SBIITLA Pass) to SBIBA .<br />
17
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The road junction at SBIBA controlled the main eastern highway leading 44 miles further north to LE<br />
KFF ; it also controlled the road leading 20 miles west to THALA .<br />
The cross-road center, at THALA, controlled the western highway, leading 46 miles north to LE<br />
AJEF, and a road leading 32 miles west (through HAIDRA) to TEBESSA (the location of the huge American<br />
supply dumps) .<br />
The pass at <strong>KASSERINE</strong> (16 miles west of SBEITLA) provided direct access, up the <strong>KASSERINE</strong><br />
Valley, to THALA (30 miles north of the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong>) . A continued break-through, by the Germans .<br />
to the north, through THALA, would seriously endanger LE KEF (46 miles further north) . The German<br />
seizure of the road center at LE KEF, would disrupt the main Allied supply route, and would endanger<br />
the right rear flank of the entire 1st British <strong>Army</strong>, in Eastern TUNISIA .<br />
about 10 jam . '43.<br />
Chronological WE of the Combat Operations in Southern TUNISIA (previously explained) :<br />
to again recapture the Pass .<br />
Capture of FAIR <strong>PASS</strong>, by American Tank Forces in Southern TUNISIA, about 4 Dec .., '42 .<br />
Establishment of the American II Corps, in Southern TUNISIA (Gem . Fredendall, Camdg,)<br />
Recapture of FAIR <strong>PASS</strong> by the Germans, about 3 Feb . '43 - followed by American attempt<br />
German break-through, at FAIR <strong>PASS</strong>, 14 Feb . '43 .<br />
German defeat of Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "C" (of the American<br />
1st Armored Division) and of the 168th Infantry Regiment (of the American 34th Infantry Division),<br />
near SIDI BOU ZED, 15 Feb . '43 .<br />
area, 16 Feb . '43 .<br />
Allied Reinforcements sent down from the North:<br />
Combat Command "B" (of the American 1st Armored Division) to the SBIBA-THALA<br />
18th Infxrtry Regimental Combat Team, wish the 37ad Field Artillery Battalion (of<br />
the American 1st Infantry Division) to the SBIBA area, for a critical defensive role, 17 Feb . . '43 .<br />
Remainder of the American 1st Infantry Division (to include the 16th Infantry Regi-<br />
ment, the 7th Field Artillery Eattallon, the lit Combat FmgIneer Battalion, and the Division Special<br />
Troops) r.are south, from the O<strong>US</strong>SFt.TIA Valley, to counter-attack, from the area west of <strong>KASSERINE</strong><br />
Valley, on 19-29 Feb . . '43 .<br />
Two British tank regiments came down to reinforce Combat Command "B", of the<br />
American 1st Armored Division, at THALA, 19 Feb ., '43 .<br />
The Division Artillery, of the American 9th Infantry Division, arrived from Spanish<br />
MOROCCO, 19 Feb . . '43, to reinforce the Allied units in the THALA area .<br />
The German attack and break-through at the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> Pass, 19-21 Feb . . '43 .<br />
The American defending force, then holding the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong>, included only the 26th Infantry<br />
18
Regimental Combat Team (of the 1st Infantry Division), less two battalions ; and with the 19th Engineer<br />
Regiment attached to the 28th Infantry Regiment .<br />
Counter-attack by elements of the American 1st infantry Division, from the area west of<br />
<strong>KASSERINE</strong> Valley, 21 Feb . . '43 .<br />
Counter-attack by Combat Command B (of the American 1st Armored Division) and by British<br />
tank regiments, in the THALA area, 21 Feb ., '43 .<br />
Allied Air Support, in the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> VALLEY, 21 Feb ., '43 .<br />
The German Withdrawal, to the south, 21-23 Feb . . '43 .<br />
18 . Conclusions to be drawn from the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong> _op eratio n .<br />
When Gen . Fredendall took command of the Allied Forces !n Southern TUNISIA (under the American<br />
II Corps).abour 10 Jan . '43, he found that sector sparsely occupied by a heterogeneous group of Allied<br />
Tank Forces . It was reported that Gen . Fredendall had endeavored to bring these scattered units, under<br />
cohesion and control ; that he had asked to bring the American 1st Infantry Division under unified d1vfaion<br />
control , in one section of the line; and, that he had tried to bring the widely separated components of<br />
the American 1st Armored Division together, in a central location, under proper division control . But,<br />
he was not able to attain these objectives, for the unification of his command_<br />
The G-2, of the American II Corps, had predicted that the Germans would break through in force,<br />
at FAIR <strong>PASS</strong>; and Gen . Fredendall had repeatedly requested reinforcements for that critical area . But,<br />
the British 1st A4my Headquarters (in overall field command) was far more worried about a. German<br />
break-through, further north, at PICHON, in Central TUNISIA; and made their plans accordingly .<br />
After the German break-through at FAIR (as predicted by the American II Corps), followed by their .<br />
victory at SIDI BOU ZID, reinforcements were then finally rushed down, from the north, to assist the<br />
hard-pressed American Il Corps . Only a few Allied units (moved barely in time to "plug" the critical<br />
holes) had finally succeeded in preventing an all-out German victory .<br />
There was never. any indication of panic at the Command Post of the American II Corps, in spite of<br />
the difficulties incurred, at that time . There seemed to be a feeling of certainty, that eventually the<br />
fide would tam It, their favor .<br />
The Advance Command Group (of the First Infantry Division), while enronte from the O<strong>US</strong>SEULLA -<br />
VALLEY to TEBESSA, happened to meet Gen . Fredendall, on the road, by motor, at about daylight, _<br />
on 19 Feb . . '43, near KALATT JERDA . northeast of TEBESSA, The verbal instructions, then received<br />
by the Division Commander . from Gen . Fredendall. (as to the immediate mission of the incoming In<br />
Infantry Division units) were positive and clear cut . Detailed instructions (regarding the counter-attacking<br />
mission, for the 1st Division) were received shortly thereafter .<br />
A final analysis of the results attained, in the German break-through drive in Southern TUNISIA,<br />
would indicate that the entire operation finally terminated in a stale-mate, with heavy losses in personnel<br />
and equipment, both to the Germans and to the Allies . Actually, the Germans had failed in their primary<br />
objective for this offensive - to gain more maneuver space to the west, for their German Afrika Kurps,<br />
then withdrawing from the East, before the advancing British 8th <strong>Army</strong> .<br />
1 9
For the American forces, the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong> Operation had resulted in a bitter lesson . stressing<br />
the need for cohesion and control , in the battle leadership of the major American combat units . It had<br />
_aot been possible for Gen . Fredendall to exercise the proper cohesion and control of his tna jot units,<br />
because of the conditions involved in Southern TUNISIA, during his period of command of the American<br />
11 Corps . He war greatly handicapped . In this respect .<br />
However, it happened that, early in March, '43, the American 11 Corps was_ then designated as a<br />
separate autonomous command, responsible thereafter 2!qy to the new field commander, General Sir<br />
Harold Alexander, of the British <strong>Army</strong>, who had been designated as field commander of the entire<br />
Allied Forces in TUNISIA . This assurance of control of his major units, in the II Corps, had never<br />
been available to Gen . Fredend4l, as it was later for his successors (Gen Patton and Gen Bradley) .<br />
IV .<br />
REASSEMMY OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION .<br />
Rest Period at MORSOTT<br />
Following the German retreat from the KASS~INE <strong>PASS</strong> area, on 21-23 Feb . . '43, the new German<br />
defensive line was later re-established along the general line (GAFSA-SENED-MAKNASSY-FAIR-PICHON) .<br />
After the German withdrawal to the south, the 1st Division was pulled back and regrouped, -on 1<br />
Mar . . '43, near MORSOTT, northwest of TEBESSA . Here all units of the Division were reassembled,<br />
rested and filled with replacements, preparatory to ftuther combat operations . A quick reorganization<br />
was needed, as there had been considerable battle casualties, particularly in the Infantry units, some<br />
of which had been almost continually in combat, since the landing at ORAN, on 8 Nov . . '42 . But,<br />
with the 1st Division again reunited, there was a general feeling, throughout the Division, .w_genewed<br />
confidence and combat esprit .<br />
The 1st Division Battle School for Replacements<br />
A Battle School, for incoming Replacements, assigned to the 1st Infantry Division, was established<br />
at this time near MORSOTT; and ft continued in effect during the remainder of the campaign in N .<br />
AFRLCA . This brief special course of instruction, for replacements, was conducted by a small selected<br />
group of wattle wise officers and NCO'S, operating on e rotathtg basis , from the front line units . The<br />
instruction included an orientation on the background and traditioru of the at D"vislon - a program of<br />
intensive physical conditioning - special instruction in infantry weapons - scouting and patrolling -<br />
night combat - and platoon combat exercises . -<br />
As a result of this proc6dure in special Replacement training, the number of battle casualties was<br />
greatly reduced, and the combat efficiency of all units was maintained at a higher level .<br />
V. THE RECAPTURE OF GAFSA (16-17 Mar . . 1943<br />
Strategic Value of GAFSA<br />
GAFSA, a former French garrison town, was located on the edge of the desert, 60 miles south of<br />
<strong>KASSERINE</strong> . It was then occupied by a garrison of German-Italian troops, having been evacuated by<br />
the American 11 Corps, when the Germans broke through at FAID . on 14 February, 1943 . GAFSA had<br />
strategical assets, as a road center and a railroad junction . Its re-capture was needed in order to providt<br />
a railroad supply point for the British Eighth <strong>Army</strong>, then advancing from the south, through the caastal<br />
area to the East .<br />
20
21<br />
1 st Infantry Division, Summary of Activities,<br />
January-March 1943, and Division Commander's<br />
Notes
*W-571 `~<br />
Ybl- l_ Yn<br />
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION<br />
A. P. 0 . #1, U. S . <strong>Army</strong><br />
8 ?larch 1943<br />
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES OF 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION<br />
After the initial successful landing operations at ORAN, the Division underwent<br />
intensive training in a large area south of ORAN . Emphasis was placed on<br />
rapidity of maneuver and quick use of supporting fires . It was also necessary<br />
to guard TAFARAOUI and IA SE11IA airdromes, and air field -at NOUVION, and to<br />
furnish a battalion to maintain order in ORAN .<br />
On November 20, the 5th FA Battalion started east from ORAN to join the<br />
British 5th Corps . By November 25, they were in action Sf of TUNIS. They<br />
have operated continuously on the Tunisian front since then and have been at<br />
BEJA, TABOURBA, MOM EL BAG, GAFSA, SBEITLA, O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA, and KESSERA. They re-<br />
Joined the Division on March 4th.<br />
On November 20, -the third battalion, 26th Infantry, tree flown by air transport<br />
from ORAN to YOUKS-LES-GAINS airpdrt and attached to the remaining elements<br />
of Col. Raff's parachute battalion. They took part in the initial action at<br />
FAID and then operated from FERIANA-GAM as part of the RAFF FORCE. They conducted<br />
numerous raids on SEVED and MACKNASSY and together pith the Rangers,<br />
covered the withdrawal of II Corps elements from GAFSA and FERIANA . The battalion<br />
came back under Division control on February 21 .<br />
On November 19, Btry "C", 33d FA Battalion and the Anti-tank Company, 26th<br />
Infantry, were ordered to MARTINPREY DU KISS from ORAN to reinforce the French<br />
units of the TLEMCEN sub-division . They were returned to the Regiment . on -December<br />
27.<br />
Combat Team 18 was ordered east on December 8, and attached to British 5th<br />
Corps . They went into the lines at MEDJEZ EL BAB on December 23. The first<br />
battalion was given the mission of relieving the Coldstream (lizards, after the<br />
Guards had taken LONGSTOP BILL which is northeast of M©JEZ EL GAB. In a twoday<br />
action, the first battalion suffered casualties of 44-gfficers and men.<br />
Drafts were taken from the other battalions of the Regiment to re-man this<br />
battalion .<br />
The 18th CT operated in the MEDJEZ area until February 15, when they were<br />
relievad and sent south to the gDC French Corps . While in the MEDJEZ area the<br />
18th Combat Team took part in many raids and were very active in their patroll<br />
ing. They were well spoken of by all elements of the 5th Corps, and our 32nd<br />
Field Artillery battalion was taken as a model for artillery of this British<br />
Corps .<br />
Upon passing to the command of the XIX French Corps, the 18th Combat Team<br />
was placed in the line at SBIBA between the British Guards Brigade and the American<br />
;4th Division . In this sector on February 19-20 the 18th Infantry distinguis2w,rd<br />
itself by completely stopping every German tank and infantry attack .<br />
They are expected to rejoin the Division within the newt few days .<br />
-<br />
1 -, I -- ,.i, -~ 0201611,<br />
.
On January 10, CT,26, less third cattalicn, wit; the 1st Reconnaissance<br />
Tx"oop attached, ryas ordered east and attached to II Ccrps for operation in<br />
Southern TUNISIA . They were split up into Task Fcr ces by II Corps and operated<br />
with armored elements in the GAFSA-SEBEITLA-FAIR area until the German breakthx"ough<br />
southwest of PONT DU FANS, They were then ordered into the O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA<br />
VALLEY with Combat Command "B", 1st Armored Division, and assisted in restoring<br />
the situation in that area .<br />
Combat Team 26, less the second and third battalions and the lst'Reconnaissance<br />
Troop, was then ordered to SEBEITLA, and took part in operations<br />
around FAIR with Combat Command "A", 1st Armored Division .<br />
They were then withdrawn to the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong> where they took part in<br />
the heavy fighting which proceeded and followed the German break-through in<br />
that area . They came back under Division control February 26th .<br />
By January 20, the Division, less 26th and 18th Combat Teams: and certain<br />
divisional- units, were at GUELMA which is 75 miles east of CONSTANTINE.<br />
On January 18, the Division, less detachments, was ordered to join the<br />
French %I% Corps. A sector was assigned the Division in the O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA VALLEY<br />
extending from PICHON N about thi~ miles . Six French infantry battalions<br />
and two Tabors (Moroccan Irregulars) together with British, French, and American<br />
artillery and tank units, were attached to the Division for the defense of this<br />
sector . The thirty-mi.le sector was organized for a vigorous defense . It was<br />
sub--divided into two sub-sectors with the various French Moroccan and British<br />
units in the PICHON (right sector) with General Roosevelt in command. The left_<br />
sub-sector was composed of First Division units under Colonel Fechet:who'd :<br />
sands CT 16. The work of General Roosevelt in organizing his conglomerate<br />
units was 6utstanding.<br />
Activity in this sector was largely restricted to continual active patrol-_<br />
ling and to artillery fire . Minor enemy attacks were quickly broken dorm .<br />
Enomy air vas very active . The Or<strong>US</strong>SErTIA VALLE'f is very flat and open . Day<br />
light movement of combat vehicles in the VALLEY brought almost immediate straffi.ng.<br />
Two German planes, particularly, nick-named "Ike and Mike" by the soldiers<br />
were very annoying in their straffing and diving tactic . Even a lone jeep was<br />
a fair target for "Ike and Mike" .<br />
The French High Command discussed the advisability of the Division captor- _<br />
ing DJEBEL BOU DABO<strong>US</strong>S which was a commanding hill mass north o£ the HALFA <strong>PASS</strong> .<br />
It dominated our left sub-sector . With the continued reverses in southern`<br />
TUNISIA, an early withdrawal from positions east of the O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA VALLEY teemed<br />
inevitable . Consequently, it seemed futile to waste lives and materiel in capturing<br />
this position . In football parlance taking this hill mass would have<br />
been "battering our brains out to gain a yard and a half in the middle of the<br />
field" . Accordingly, plans to capture this hill _was abandoned. This turned<br />
out to be a wise decision, since the High Command later ordered us to withdraw<br />
west across the O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA VALLEY .
The withdrawal order was issued on February 15th . The Division was ordered<br />
to occupy And defend the mountain range along the west side of the O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA<br />
VALLEY . Ammunition and heavy supplies were moved across the Valley-the night<br />
proceeding the withdrawal eif infantry and artillery elements .- All units were<br />
withdrawn the night of February 17-18 without casualties, confusion, or the loss<br />
of materiel . The new position was occupied and organized by February 19th .<br />
On February 19, the Division, less detachments (CT 18, CT 26, and 5th FA Bn)<br />
was ordered to move with a].1 possible speed to vicinity of BOU CHEBKA, northwest.<br />
of <strong>KASSERINE</strong> to reinforce that sector . The Germans, attacking in force, had<br />
taken the KASSF~t.INE <strong>PASS</strong> . This gave them a close approach to our supply base,<br />
TEBESSA . Further advances by the Germans would cut Allied communications,<br />
threaten CONSTUTINE, and might necessitate a general .withdrawal of Allied forces<br />
in '.TDNISIA .<br />
On arriving at higher headquarters en route . I was informed of the dangerous<br />
German break-through in the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> <strong>PASS</strong>, that our units were withdrawing toward<br />
THALA and that the situation was critical . I was directed to assume commmnd<br />
of the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> sector, including the French Constantine Division and various<br />
.separate American units . At that time, the German continued advance up the<br />
<strong>KASSERINE</strong> VALLEY seemed inevitable.<br />
A division command post was set up at 11:00 P.M., February 20, hear BOLT<br />
CHEBKA, where c awtact was hastily established with the French Constantine Division9<br />
attached American units,'and elements of the First Division . The situa-'<br />
tion at this time was precarious . The second battalion, 16th Infantry, vas - attached<br />
to Combat Command OB" at daylight, February 21, and remained in position<br />
, on the high ground south of DJ HAMRA during the day. At midnight on the night<br />
of February 21-22, it was decided to .block the HAMM <strong>PASS</strong>ES at the head of the.<br />
<strong>KASSERINE</strong>.VALLEY with one battalion of the 16th Infantry, heavily reinforced<br />
with artillery and accompanying weapons, and to be prepared to counter-attack<br />
from tie commanding ground south of HAMA position, held by . our 16th Infantry<br />
and two French Senegalese Battalions .<br />
;' The German attackwas resumed on tight of February 21-22 . There was<br />
considerable confusion, since the leading elements of the German Infantry attacked<br />
in American and French uniforms . They overran and captured one battery of<br />
the 33rd Field Artillery, then supporting Combat Command "B", 1st Armored Division.<br />
; t It was "touch and . go" for a short time . In f act, warning orders had already been ,<br />
``issued by higher headquarters to prepare for a general withdrawal,<br />
The German Infantry was followed by German tanks . Local counter-,attacks<br />
were directed for all available infantry units with the close assistance of the<br />
artillery . The 33rd Field Artillery Battalion, now under Divisional control,<br />
and the 7th Field Artillery Battalion participated in the counter-attack . firing<br />
at close ranges at German Infantry and Tank's . General Andrus (Divisional<br />
Artillery Commander) was very active in directing these counter-attackq . A coordinated<br />
counter-attack was launched by the 16th Infantry at 3:30 P.M., February<br />
22nd . As the lines of our infantry reached their positions, the Germans broke<br />
and ran . Some 400 surrendered to a group of 13th Armored Regiment tanks on<br />
reaching the valley . Our attack was followed by a 'counter-attack by Combat Command<br />
"B" of the 1st Armored Division fr an 1he northeast side o£ the valley .
These counter--attacks apparently caused a complete German withdrawal from<br />
the <strong>KASSERINE</strong> VALLEY . They were made on the flank of the thrust toward THALA<br />
and threatened to cut off elements engaged there . I have been told that this<br />
incident seemed to be a turning point and that a general withdrawal was then<br />
started of all the German forces in contact with the Allied Forces .<br />
On February 27 .,<br />
re-equipment .<br />
the Division was withdrawn to a rest area for re-supply and<br />
All combat operations of the Division in TUNISIA, including the minor operations<br />
of separated battalions were as successful as might have been expected .'<br />
considering the handicaps and difficulties of control, Marked success attended<br />
the efforts of the Division when it was possible to operate under Divisional control<br />
and take advantage of the teamwork and morale so thoroughly instilled during<br />
training periods . Losses have been suffered, which are part of the-cost of belonging<br />
to the "Fighting First", but in no case was there any disorganisation,<br />
and the Boche was made to pay in kind . Casualties in the officer personnel have<br />
been particularly heavy and indicated the active leadership of the junior officers .<br />
One incident occurred in the O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA VALLEY about the 31st of January,<br />
which seemed typical of this spirit, Lt, Colonel Davis, 7th Field Artillery,<br />
Battaliai, and his S-3, Major Levin, were killed while reconnoitering for a new<br />
forward position. Both were buried in rear of their artillery positions . When<br />
their bodies were lowered into their graves, the entire 7th Field -Artillery<br />
Battalimx fired three concerted salvos at located enemy targets, This incident<br />
indicated the spirit*in which the Division is making the Germanspay for the<br />
losses received .<br />
4<br />
/s/ TERRY ALLEN<br />
TERRY ALLEN,<br />
Major General, U, S . Armor,<br />
Commanding .
C 0 P Y-''Y-r~<br />
- lien . McNarney JTM<br />
~. -~^-,- J` - _ ----- Gen . Handy . (H)<br />
Gen . McNair<br />
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION return<br />
" . . " APO #l, NEW YORK, N . Y. " - GCM<br />
General George C .<br />
War Department,<br />
Marshall,<br />
Washington ; D . C ;--<br />
Dear General Marshall :<br />
March 10, 1943<br />
mowing your interest in the First Division, wYiich-we appreciate<br />
very greatly, I .am sending you a. brief summary .of the operations' of units -<br />
of the Division on the Eastern Front . - .<br />
Higher tactical considerations have necessitated the dispersion of<br />
many elements of the Division during a great part of this period . Considering<br />
the difficulties of control and leadership that were thus involved, all<br />
units did exceptionally well in some cases, and very well in others .<br />
Elements of the Division did particularly well when half the Division<br />
was assembled on February 21 End 22 at the time of the German breakt'Zrough<br />
in the Kasserine Valley . At that time, the French Constantine<br />
Division and various separa: ;,e units were attached to the First Division<br />
for the final defense in thLs sector a.nc, the followin ;, counter-attack . If '<br />
I ao say so, the counter-attack launched by the First Division was most<br />
successful snd I hove been told' that it res responsible for the initiation`<br />
of the, general German withdr&vra.l .<br />
&m, happy to sLy that the Division is now being reassembled for<br />
use E .s a: complete unit in a very imglrcbnt impending operation. Many of the,<br />
units have been separated for some time, but their morale and esprit is<br />
still excellent and i am sure they will give a good -.ccount of themselves .<br />
I have enclosed a cita=tion given the Division by General Koeltz,<br />
comana.nding the French 19th Corps, under whom we temporarily served, and ::by<br />
General Eisenhower, following the counter-attack on February 22 . I have<br />
also enclosed two memorandums recently issued the Division .<br />
Assuring you of our serious .intentions of living up to the confidence<br />
tht.t hans been reposed in the Division, I aim<br />
Very sincerely,<br />
/s/ Terry Allen<br />
T RRY ALLEN
R E S T R I C T E D<br />
HEADQUARTERS 1st INFANTRY DIVISION<br />
A . P. 0. No. 1, U. S . <strong>Army</strong><br />
ME~:oRANDU2d: March 4, 1943 .<br />
SUBJECT Message of Commendation .<br />
TO Unit Commanders, 1st Infantry Division .<br />
The following message of commendation from the Commander-in-Chief,'<br />
Allied Force, is published for the information of all .personnel of 'this command<br />
:<br />
"As an American, I am proud of the tray in which American Troops . in<br />
the recent battling, recovered from initial shocks and speedily demonstrated<br />
a readiness to slug it out with the enaW . Our troops are rapidly becoming<br />
battlewise and their future operations are certain to bring discouragement<br />
to the ranks of our enemies . Front line units now have the urgent<br />
task of replacement, rehabilitation and training, and I assure you that I<br />
am straining every nerve to bring your magnificent organization up to<br />
strength as quickly as it is humanly possible .<br />
"Lot us make sure thQt the new men coning up quickly absorb the lessons<br />
that the front line units have learned, so that every pound of ammunition<br />
and equipment that is brought to you, may be most effectively employed<br />
in the destruction of the forces opposing us .<br />
"I,hope that every man in your covmard realizes that I have corpl6te<br />
confidence in his readiness and ability to do -~his full part alongside our<br />
gallant allies in driving our enemies out of Africa . Please accept my<br />
personal thanks and congratulations on your fine record of leadership . _<br />
DISTRIBUTION :<br />
"A" & "CCtt<br />
By command of Majcr General ALLEN :<br />
/s/ EISENHMER"<br />
R E S T R I C T E D<br />
Is` LEONIDAS GAVAIAS<br />
Lt . Col ., A .G .D .<br />
Adjutant General<br />
n,)n1 2 ,f
19 Armp Carps<br />
Staff G-1<br />
At the moment when the 1st American Division is leaving the<br />
sector of the C .A .F . J. General Koeltz, commanding the 19th <strong>Army</strong> Corps,<br />
is particularly happy to express to its commander, General Allen, as<br />
well as to his assistants, General . Roosevelt and General Andrus, all<br />
the satisfaction that he felt in having under his orders such valorous<br />
troops .<br />
Arriving in the Ousseltia Valley at the moment when a powerful<br />
German attack had just been launched on the flank of the 19th <strong>Army</strong> Corps,<br />
they came at once with resolution to the aid of their French comrades<br />
and threw back the enemy into the mountains .<br />
Animated by the finest military spirit, they thus showed the<br />
highest battle comradeship.<br />
Side by side with the battalions of the Division of Algiers, they<br />
then fought to hold the reconquered heights in Ejebels Rihana and lahrich<br />
and the Byzantine Ruins,<br />
General Koeltz asks General .Men to be so kind as to transmit<br />
his sincere thanks and his very best wishes to the officers, non-commissioned<br />
officers and men of the let Infantry Division .<br />
Directed to General Allen<br />
GENERAL ORDERS NO . 65<br />
Headquarters, 21 February 1943<br />
Lt . General Koeltz,<br />
Commanding 19th <strong>Army</strong> Corps<br />
True Copy<br />
/sl Terry Allen<br />
Maj . Gen.
MEMORANDUM)<br />
z All units in the lst Infantry Division .<br />
DISTRIBUTION<br />
"Alt and tqc"<br />
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION<br />
APO #1, U . S . <strong>Army</strong><br />
My sincere thanks to all units for your efficient execution of<br />
missionz assigned you during recent operations . Your cheerful execution<br />
of difficult missions has been favorably commented upon . Preparation<br />
for our comhing tasks will require the most intensive efforts . The following<br />
items are of utmost importances<br />
Discipline<br />
Physical toughness<br />
Combat efficiency<br />
Intensive belief in your units .<br />
a<br />
Your discipline must be<br />
exemplified by the promt execution of orders, by military bearing and the<br />
proper wearing of the uniform, by careful attention to saluting discipline<br />
and by the general -demeanor - of all individuals .<br />
Physical toughness is a vital requisite to success in combat . It<br />
must be attained by intensive physical conditioning . All of us must be<br />
mentally, morally, and physically tough and well able to "Take it and dish<br />
it out ."<br />
Combat training must be stressed to acquire the battle -nisdcm necessary<br />
to inflict the maximum losses upon the enemy, with the minimum losses<br />
to ourselves . Maximum proficiency must be attained in the use of all<br />
weapons;, in mine laying, mine detection and the detection and removal of<br />
booby traps, in all types of night operations, and particularly in the<br />
skillfg use of FIRE and MANEUVER . Reconnaissance, security, patrolling,<br />
the use of cover and the lessons learned in recent combat operations must<br />
all be stressed .<br />
An abiding belief in your units is a pre-requisite to success in<br />
combat . All individuals must be actuated by the need for maintaining the<br />
traditions of our Division . "Nothing in hell must delay or stop the<br />
FIRST DIVISION ."<br />
/Sl TERRY ALLEN,<br />
TERRY ALLEN<br />
Major General, U . S . .<strong>Army</strong>,<br />
Commanding<br />
n~) ni c~ /i
DIST3IBUTION :<br />
"A" & "Cit<br />
R E S T R I C T E D<br />
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION<br />
APO #l, U . S . ARMY<br />
MEMORANDUM)<br />
s All Units, 1st Infantry Division .<br />
TO )<br />
Recently, the units of the Division, of necessity, have been<br />
widely separated on detached combat missions, involving great difficul-<br />
ties of leadership and control . We have not been able heretofore to<br />
fight as a complete division . The First Division is now reassembling .<br />
We do not know what our next mission may be or haw soon it must<br />
be executed, but in arty case, "WE WILL FIGHT AS A UNIT."<br />
Every individual must be prepared to give everything he has got<br />
for the honor of our Division . Every objective must be taken per schedule<br />
with the maximum damage to the enemy. Every oblgctiye seized must be<br />
held .<br />
"Nothing in hell must delay or stop the First Division ."<br />
R E S T R I C T E .D<br />
March 9, 1943 .<br />
Is/ TERRY ALLEN,<br />
TERRY ALLEN,<br />
Major General, U. S . <strong>Army</strong>,<br />
Comnanding.
22<br />
16th Infantry, I st Infantry Division, Operations<br />
Report, 19-26 February 1943
HASSEKYE CA?.TAIGN<br />
F~;RH,t~~RV 19, 1943 " CT moves from Ousseltia Valley, having turned sector over<br />
to French Forces for defense . CT moved to new location at 6253, Sheet 13, to<br />
open . Kassarine "hase, beginning movement at 1350 hours, 19 February 19¢3 and<br />
arriving in bivouac area at 0550 hours 20 February 1943 "<br />
_F-BRi1 Rv 20, 1943 ; CT in bivouac in Kasserine sector . Preparation made and orders<br />
issued for movement into lines .<br />
FEBRUELRY 21, .`196-3:<br />
lst Platoon Company A, 1st Engineers Battalion relieved from<br />
attached to CT16 and reverts to control of Commanding General, lst U .,:s . Infantry<br />
Division . The 2nd Battalion is moved forward into the lines and the remainder of .<br />
the CT is alerted for movement . However, no movement is made . At 2200 -'.hours .1st .<br />
and 3rd Battalion with attachments from Special- Units are moved forward,bdt-are,<br />
not committed .<br />
FEBRUARY 22, 19x3 ; Regimental CP moved forward to 6967, sheet 13 . Orders receiv=<br />
ed from Commanding General, Combat Command B that CT `16 will hav,: neission of protecting<br />
7th ., and 33rd Field Artillery Battalions . At 1045 hours K am .M Companies'-<br />
16th Infantry come in contact with enemy . 1st Battalion is sent ort mission to -<br />
protect flanks . Corrunanding <strong>Of</strong>ficer issues'plan to make local attacks in cooord- .<br />
ination with Combat Co :+mand g, At 3443 orders issued for 2nd and 3rd-Battalions<br />
to make their local attacks as planned at 1500 hours ., preceded by small' .artillery<br />
barrage . Battalions jump off on ti :;e . Company C, lst Ranger . BattbLlion 'attached<br />
to CT at 16113 hours . Local attacks made by battalions . were successful in~that,<br />
dominating ground was taken and some field artillery guns captured by enemy were<br />
retaken . The Commanding usneral, II Corps and . the Commanding General- lst U.S .<br />
Infantry Division, each sent the following message to"the Commanding . <strong>Of</strong>ficer<br />
CT 16 ; Miany thanks for the splendid work of your .CT today. .<br />
FEBRUARY 233 1943 : Orders received from Commanding "Ueneral, lst U . S . ;'Infantry .<br />
Division that very active patrolling must keep up as .it ' i.b believed -that., en<br />
is making a general withdrawal . Orders passed to Battalions.wriich are out of<br />
contact following attacks of yesterday . 39th Infantry takes over sector . occupied-'<br />
by 3rd Battalion, 16th Infantry . 3rd Battalion moves to new ,defensive positia %<br />
FEBRUARY 24, 1943 ;<br />
Extensive plans made to move forward thru pass .- Plans ::made<br />
in detail and although no resistance is expected, every detail is-planned' to-take-care<br />
of it . C? moved to 8477 after meeting of all unit commanders .<br />
F_EBRUARY25, 191,-3 : At 0700 all battalions move forward as - _planned . _. At _O$?0 hours<br />
the lst Battalion had reached the base of the hill which is its first_ objective ;.<br />
without resistance . At 1000 hours the 1st :Battalion had a,dsed ts"first objec= r;<br />
tive and reached its 2nd one . The 3rd Battalion moved fortyard without reslstanc<br />
and took objective on schedule . Kasserine pass wascleared of enemy,,<br />
to be mined and booby trapped extremely . All units moved forward without'Rrdsis<br />
tance to Thelpte and Feriana . There, lines were stopped,' and°defensive posn*SL<br />
_<br />
organized .<br />
---"<br />
FEB~jJJARY 26, 1943 : Defensive postions organized and a period of reorganization'.<br />
Not in contact with enemy . At 1155 hours new Cp opened at 390742, 1/50;000 .<br />
lst ?reconnaissance Troops attached to CT to reinforce motorized reconnaissance .<br />
for a short >>eriod . '
23<br />
10th Panzer Division, War Diary (Extract), 14-22<br />
February 1943
10:PZ,DIV 1 Ak3TL4rC ' T~tigkaitoberiaht 29.11.42-15,111.43 .A.frika<br />
9 February, 1943<br />
w<br />
Intelligence Report of Aotivitiea<br />
Transfer of Div, Hqs: to Dou Thadi (south of gairouan).<br />
3,3 February . 19113<br />
14 February 1943<br />
Transfer of Div. C,P. to the region mast of raid .<br />
Attaok of the divicion on Sidi non Zid .<br />
At 0600 hr the advanood elements of the 86th NtGren. reach the<br />
area 8 km roost of the FUid pass without aomin; 3n aontaot with the anamy .<br />
. . , . . , Fhid<br />
Attar clearing the mines at the/pAoe Our tankGiAQW4- Fraroeping a round to<br />
the right pact, the north 'edga of Dj . Lescouda, advance, on the road to Sbeitla.<br />
At 065-0 hr our tanks are `engaged with aneuW tanks just southeast of DJ .<br />
Lvasouda. The mountain itself is ortouplad by ensmy infantry . At 0700 hr<br />
that right P ank of the `86th fz,tTon.Rgt .<br />
enemy tacks attaoaat of DJ .Lessouda (north of the road to Sbaitla) . `She<br />
attack is ropulsod. At 0730 hr the enenV artillery was still firinG on<br />
tb* defile just vast of Fuide At 0735 hr the anoW raoiatance on the road<br />
to 8beitla (about 8 lan northeast of Sidi bon Zid) was broken. At 0330 hr<br />
after our tanks had reaohed the road fork about 14 In evet--northwest or<br />
to the northwest<br />
Faid $ !the onszV withdrawyq c - cIMP?H? mac4, %# sew TAiila Cit the oars<br />
time_ he attgqktd with tanks . ;from, Sidi bon Zid ; , on the road to tho northeast .<br />
At 0900-hr onwy low level attack on the 7th Ps .Rgt, At OJ30 our tnnlm<br />
advanoad southward on Sidi bon Zid. At 0'300 hr come anaur tminks zethdrarl<br />
rrpp the road caning down from Sidi bon Zid and moved toward the wart . Tlia<br />
f~~.Elc<br />
-A"a~~of the enan7 tnnka was eucoesfYilly attacked by dive bombers north or<br />
Sidi bon Zid botwoon 1015 and 1055 hre. At 1100 hr our air e.nd groiuzcl re-<br />
oonaaissauoes acaartainod that the onew . east of Sidi bon
:wae,ratr"ting through . Sidi bou Zid .to the vast and the northwest,<br />
and that there va.s heavy tank and artillery traffic . At the rams tires<br />
25 anaW tanks wore ~i8d driving from Sidi bou Zid to the %wat .<br />
Behind the lines .vehioles movomontm also from Sidi bou Zid to ttw aoi.th-<br />
W'ogt. :, At x,23 hr the 7th Pz.Rgt . reported a near aneuoy tank attack o- l0-<br />
15 tanks from the .iWat-on Sidi bou Zidj it vane ripulsod . Durirz~; the engage-<br />
rQnts the 66th f.0ran.,~the 7th Pz .FtGt took 71 priaonora Incslueilrig F, orfloors .<br />
.o<br />
In addition the . follwing natdriel van oapturod or dustroyode<br />
.4o,.tanko<br />
. .7 amored personnel oarriero<br />
, . . .. . . . _ :a5 S motor oarriages<br />
, ., . .~~: . .> . . 1 antItnwk gun<br />
15 i?etraary .1943<br />
prlw mover : truck-<br />
XA;addltion . 1Q vahloles, am* of them arwred were captured oi' Ovstroyod,<br />
oas au=V; .plane . . shot dam and an onorgy reoonmisoanoe plum chattered<br />
en the. gruuad . &everal ammunition daaps were aat on firs .<br />
w tanks wore zostYy . or tho8horman type . -<br />
------------<br />
~:>. . Thainight passed without spaotal oaourranoe . At 11110 hr the re-<br />
ooanaiasanoa"dmtaohamba of the 06th Pz . Grem . roportod heavy ancW Movemonts<br />
from the north on. the Maid.-Sbeitla road, 15 lax vi-eat of DJ .LocvoAa . At 1150<br />
hr 86th Pz . . .Gr,an, ,.. roportpdenemy motorized column with tanks acivanoirw vat on<br />
the Sbaitla -l road . . , . lhon strong enn~y oonaQntratioaa vmro oboarvad ir the<br />
oroa vioct:of 84aguia. . At .1525,hr the euomy attaolmd with 110 tanks (GQn .<br />
":harraantl} , fY'oue the area = of SadvZuia on Sidi bou Zid and the road 6 Lm
w<br />
aouthsmst, thereofy the attack vas excouted with artillery oup2o.rt. An<br />
immediate oounterattaok with tanks brought the enaW attaok to a atandatill .<br />
About 30 ones tanks were shot` down `ey our tames during the repulao of<br />
the autW . tank attack from the area 10 ka northfst of Sidi bout Zid to<br />
the east and . southeast . Three additional snarW tanks which had broken tararough<br />
in the area b ka southeast o£ Sidi bou Zid were shot dowa . A total of 81<br />
prisoners has been brought in .<br />
Prisoners statenanta disclosed the follovrinr units in lines 3d On .,<br />
1st , 8r:uored,, ,Rgt.$ 91st Field hrtVRgt. (10.5 am guns on gun oarria,cs)j 17th<br />
field Arty,,Rgt, ,(X5.5 am guns) " 165th In£: j 70lat Antitank Bn . ('j..5 ors oh<br />
oarriages) q ,<br />
Captured papers disclosed that thane unite and the 0lcwaonts<br />
they have In line here belong to Combbt Komando b, and that 1tvctqz the ;<br />
lattarx had its .$ . Iigo kxsl n Sidi bou Zid until a £ansr days o.Lo .<br />
Combat Commando C vu connitted notth thereof aooordlug, to oaptiu*ed papers .<br />
The -'following alaments bolo nged to its 2 battalions of vie 6trt Inf.Rgt .<br />
( rad7 ), a battery or the 68th n2ld Arty., c: Co .,13th Pz.Rut ., B coo s<br />
701st Antitu* Bn., lot Co., i6th F;ngineoxu, 2 platoons of ~43 Flak Arty . 5n.<br />
In the course of the tank fight on the a£tarnoon of 15 Fob. there arose<br />
the imprequion that the enopy kt1 intended to put into 'Line the :1oatilo olv<br />
nta; located : an . Djebol Carat liadid and cant thvropE, In the e;;anin o£<br />
15 .l'ab, ancu , e1R onta ware still holding out on the hoighto of Dj. Tar aaouda .<br />
On that day trvX .1n£liotad considerable locsos on tae enaW . On 15 Fob,<br />
the . followirG- mtt&riel vas captured or dostroycds<br />
: . . 39 tunka<br />
'' I7'armored .ant personnel carriers<br />
.<br />
1 .4<br />
it=k guns ,<br />
- 'gun motor' e"riagas<br />
. ~3 .~aohlne Sip<br />
-` 1 `10.5cms mountain howitzer<br />
1 _ 15 cm sun<br />
100 '~vehioloa (approximately)<br />
Durlng'tha~ 2 days `of £ightlng the total of matiriel oaptared or
doetroyed followas '9 tanks, 30 armored personnel carriers, 16 gun rztor<br />
-, x<br />
carriages, 5 antitank gums, *2 arty gzuse, 17 coaching (;uns, about 100 vehi-<br />
ales, .2 planes ; 125 prisoners word talcoa .<br />
16 February 1943<br />
onciroled<br />
During the night the eneW attomptod to got amy fro,nii/DJ .Loosouda.<br />
Three offioore and 53 men ware taken prisoners . Rezrairdrzg on-amy elorn'ante<br />
ara proe=ablW otill on D, . Lessouda .<br />
. , The I encircled enezrr on Dj . Garot F3adid was rooonnoit-trod and attaoked .<br />
cross r<br />
In the foramoon end tanks advanced north of thofroad (17 icy northvmat of<br />
Sidi bou'Zid) toward the east .The eno:ay was oleo roportod as advanc$n~; w1th<br />
tcuxks 'over this z=abc2mxk in~erasotiou on both sides of the road to tl :o<br />
as tar .as the area 4<br />
east end' ecutheast fi km crest of Sadaguia . It is supposed<br />
that thin 'zovomant was for the purpose of ooverin& the enegt withdram;f<br />
Oar roconriaissan 'e) to 'tho west in the direction of Sbeitla. Toward 17 hr<br />
an=W. : fianka<br />
ntreated to the - north and carat from our tantrrc thrusts . In the afternoon<br />
the'road to Sbeitla east of the intorsootion 17 Ica northwest of Sidi bou<br />
Zid lay Dander `eneztr artillery fire . Enaqr batteri ,as on gun earriagas timers<br />
aaoortsined nort west of the intersection .<br />
On the semi of lb Fob, the onsr held cut on. 11i11 5W of Dj .<br />
Itsaira with at least . l ooapaW in well improved povitione with antitank<br />
guns apinst - our attaok from the northrmst, and on the northeast spurs<br />
of Dj. Garid 'Dadid I against our attack from the southeast. "Ziero too Azm<br />
It was assumed that the 'enaaEpr strength was approximately 1 oompany.<br />
The enoW encircled on Dj . Lossouda was still holdiu; out . .<br />
Captured papery *d1soloce easy rninefiolds on roads hotxoon Dj .<br />
Rsaira and DJ .Roohaioh, and on road 2 km east o£ Rill %1 . Ilia C,?th<br />
Pz.Groa,RSt, was warned of the fact by radio .<br />
. . . . An eotimats of the anvuyy situation as depioted by the division
(Vap . pp, 1j ;Fwarig MY tanks the mithdrwwal on the<br />
seat roads in the diroation of Sbeitla) leads to tho Minion for Mack<br />
and for the destruction of enemy tanS ausumad tp be thorn,<br />
17 Abruary 1943<br />
At 093,5 our tr?opc ; .reaoh Hadjob al Aioun without contact with<br />
the enwV . Our raoannalsoanoo In tho area 12 km north-northwest of Eadjob<br />
al Aioun obvervod at 1235 hr motorized enemy forces w1thdrazing .to the<br />
northwast0rhe oaony had mined and blaotod the tountain pass at 04 el Almar .<br />
At 15 hr our spearhead established liaison with our troopal at<br />
Pondouk, Natives stataments disolojahkwk the enemy as having KIM<br />
back to the apt during the night .<br />
SAW forces in still unkaavn strum,th on Q.0suouda, Tank<br />
apvarhyad was hold up Q Puapy mina obatoolos in the aria 6 km northeast<br />
of Qdjeb . el - Ajoun and 10 km south-oouthivost of Fondouk. Tho approach<br />
roud .to Fondoiuk lay _candor onamy artillery fire from a northern direction.<br />
through : '<br />
jor .Qitiopaj information on the onapy Q.priconers statements ooe<br />
Portfolio Frisonaro atatoments,<br />
14 Februm<br />
-<br />
Quiet might . .4. rm more priagara were brought in ; they-balonged<br />
survounded<br />
to tho,ramalsim/onany0orooo (168th American IUf.Rgt) on DjAaasouda . In<br />
the early yorp5mg our troops ocoupiad QLoasouda and the last rarnatle<br />
of the eawW wara oapturod . Q My unak enemy foroas avro atill ocoupyinz<br />
Plohon in the roranom As our troopa approached the anary withdrew to<br />
the most so that the town Brae taken iAthout fighting . Arab atatow,3nts Ilahis<br />
close that the enoqr has withdrava the bulk of .1U= forcea about 30 W.<br />
19 Fabruax7 -1943<br />
The divisional C.P. Is shiftod to El Alem, north of Viroinn.<br />
Die Intalligenee officer sots out for the advanead C . P, of
fx .A.Q.X.Afrioaj, under whose co ::trol tho d'viaion has bQon plaoad on<br />
10 February'43,, to'got'oriented on the anamy situation,<br />
At &biba the 2j.Pz.D1v . has c=o upon I3ritiah troope . The intol11-<br />
Genoa officer- of Pz.A,0,r, suspeotta that they belong to the British 6th<br />
.Pz.DIV' . _ . It is aaoearxtd that thia division has boon 13xt; in line for the<br />
supiwrt oi"'tho right 'Frmoh flank which,,, after then fighting; for Side, bou<br />
Zid and the subotquont .eLthdra%=1 of the Amorioana;:' also fallinG back.<br />
Desida these Britichors ozil.y/I-cnoh are to be uxpooted nit ",biba . aaauaver<br />
it is not ulto;;ethcr izpoaaiblc that slc~i:a"atc of an Amarioar,, oo -.bat . om-uar.do<br />
ma1~c cm apgoaranoo thane. In other rocpooto the A:nar; oars hiwe_ g;ono book<br />
to Taboo= with Cozbat Commando 1:. :;high 7m 1m.r. Lad few camxalties and<br />
itth the rcus=ts o£ Co=at - Co=nndoO A alxd C.<br />
Awrionxi priwonor4 ware taken in lbrianaf they belonged to the<br />
infantry. Amordine to statements or c+rlconars the unit =s idantifiod<br />
44'thc - Lut Amaioan lnf.Aiv . fhe British in line at Sbiba :c-we i=adiataly<br />
Aned"mod w1red' thOir position and w offorlIg stubborn roziytanoo . For<br />
thia reason the German attack me not oontirruod on the cvcxrinr, of 19 M.<br />
and was to' ba . resumed in the morning of 20 February .<br />
At Toboaca also the .aawV hzca mirxd and vrlrcd his ho3itionu,<br />
Qaoordini to ,'reparta ` on hand mt Pz .A.O.K. In the ovon1w of In February<br />
thure , is ~ stili no report on '.;ha Kampfgruppo of Fz .A.O. K. Africa which has<br />
been ooamiaittcd ~r= Kassarim to mho nortlamost in the direction of Male ;<br />
thera£oro . pt .A.O.r4 is unable to girt out a detulled oatimto G^ the uncmY<br />
actuation . F1awever aw oneW forooz axe not exrootud in Chic aoator . It<br />
in trm that the Amorionna ha-.3 still about: 3 divisions in Africa( the 2d<br />
Pz .Div .,` 3d . and_ 9th Inf.Diva .~ but they arc cold to be -W=- back is L~rooco<br />
_ . -, . kAand<br />
perhape haldA ~n readinoaa thorn for speoial anploym.ent"<br />
1" . 1
20 Fobs 1943<br />
7<br />
An Goon as the dofae behind Kassarino"has boon fought tr "3e of<br />
the onmoW. tho division has tho mission to pursue him iaw:9iately through<br />
that d3flle in a northarn direction. The Karayfbruppo of P-A.0 .':.Africa.,<br />
r<br />
aomaittad from Zasoorina on tho defile ras only vicai: infuntr~r olert:inte but<br />
i.s vory strong in art4llery (9 bat'l erias and xrojootors ) . I"cording, 4o<br />
prisoners' atatom®nts tho defile 10 defended by aler_c+uts of uno :Yirst<br />
Ameriona Arwred Division. Enat7 ntr*nath In catimatad at about 1500 mon ;<br />
a few oonorate pill bdxos have boon identiflod . AoooriinZ to infor;;ation<br />
raoaivad the en=r has avaotuatod all they air fiolda, including Tobesoa.<br />
Div. C.P Kassorina railroad station.<br />
' Weathor: dull, foamy, rain At tai Cj;t.<br />
Dataohzant [?] 10 vAiiah at firm had been oo itted at th® defile<br />
north of_lasserina had talooa Dill 974 at 1414 hr and was attaokizw, on 11!11<br />
1191, vrith ones foross betrean the two points . At 7.430 a report is re-<br />
.caived . fro= Dat.10 that the anoW is still noroat of IM11 1191 . It is<br />
from<br />
aloe raportod that the onemV is briuSing formrd reinforow.:enta z= tho<br />
north inoluding Y tanks and artillory on gun carriages .<br />
A prisoner was 'brought in, a atraEZIer who had bccona s4paratod<br />
from his unit days before (158th Inf . )<br />
21 Februpry 1943 '<br />
At 0109 hr, 2 too south' of still X3-6 (road 'to Thala) ~:=W Infantry<br />
men and nohiolos . 86th Fz .Ccr n. at-tacking to tho north. At 0113 report<br />
received that the enemy is vithdre-dng nortlnvard . At 0233 hr the defile at<br />
846 is taken; . the onangr hag retreated ; only coatterod onamy machine Cun<br />
fire (2 am) . At 0730 hr the . 86th Pz.Graa. reports that 2kin south of Thala<br />
ruuorod corm<br />
and 2 .ka,wost :of the road 1$ enezW arc feeling forward. At 031 hr<br />
20 armored -oars aro oboarved approaching covora4~ tp t:ho oarly morning fog.<br />
1
At'.0832, hr-.the.:,~! in attacking from the north with tanks, . and artillery<br />
fire from 2..batteriep NampEgruppo 36 antronohas . At 0935 the xax cnew<br />
stops hia attack, Kaapfgruppo lies under artillery firs . :th advanoo at<br />
firat waa delayed by strong mine obstacles. At 1230 hr liwapfgruppo reports<br />
that strong en=t infantry forsws have not coon obssrvad herotoforo . At 1235<br />
hr air roconnaisaunoos North of Mll 992 7 unerj tanks ~_nd 20<br />
mfor vehiclass light motor vehicles traffic on the road norta thoredf in<br />
a northern direction. In the meantizio our tanks have paauod through the<br />
to the<br />
&fgruppo . .and are attacking/right of t.1-to road in t_'o dirco tion of Th,ela .<br />
T.he road of advanoo vsspooially in the area try Hill 992 lies under enemy<br />
:artillery firaj* we are assumlng that there are 2 anew-y batteries thurc .<br />
At 1710 hr then 7th Pe,Egt. reports that: the snowy is tvitl,dravire<br />
.<br />
under oovor of thA haws.<br />
worn<br />
Dhila pursuing the aneutiy 15<br />
anav tanks~ .ostroyed xpxi+acx 'metx<br />
en~ .<br />
zm%jx and as the advance eon-<br />
tiuumd , additionaVtanka were 1zooked out. At 1930 hr our tarLka sad advanced<br />
1,haouoh<br />
elaments have roaohed the area` 2 k= couthtofThaa.~gad l ~athcsr strod; ©nozv<br />
forces oil both aides of the road of advanoe3 our armored infantry had to<br />
fight - °ua7 still<br />
them out of their foxholes . At 2035 hr/on both aides of the rotid<br />
south o£ Thala, ta ko, infantry and ant-1t=7_- uT1, In tiiz courso of the<br />
fighting to south of Thala 1463 prisonera, Ltcluding 11 offioors,-~srara taken<br />
up to 24 hr 21 February 1943, Irisauerst atatamaixts diselosbei the follotivin;<br />
ftmxc ' identification of troopas '<br />
BriAlbh olomentas<br />
. .1,7-2 Iaszaara (firth . RrrRix A=lorod Div. )<br />
. :. 2*T Laioeatara (46th inf.Aiv.) .<br />
86 it Chemical Wurfara Co . `loyal =agineora, ind,3 ~,endent co ::parw<br />
vdth 12 zortars 4 inches axiYj r oalibar<br />
4~, Qoapozitlon aooording to dapturod papora<br />
~th Xuf. erigeda .<br />
2x1 Bn ., Ught Fuziliers<br />
lot aa., East Surroya<br />
e
2d Bu., . L?tmpshira (light Garde brigade)<br />
24 Ba:,' faraohute &<br />
6tii f . Ccuaaanda<br />
Womatero' (46th In:-Die . )<br />
86th Chomical tffarc indonandont Co .<br />
29 &mcri2aR elcmontss<br />
16th Co.,fnoinaar Fan. (I.st Armored Div .<br />
i69th Inf.P.rt . ( " th L~W.D2v .<br />
26th Inf.a4t . lot Inf . Div .<br />
39th Ynr .F:gt.. (9th Inf.Div . )<br />
Ic)th lheer Wit .<br />
Captured or doatroyods<br />
22 February 1943<br />
32 tan1w<br />
12 antitank guna<br />
13 heavy mortarc<br />
6 rotor vehiclau<br />
3 gun carrinca<br />
2 motor oyales .<br />
At 05145 a reconnaiunanoo disclosed thaAt the area on 'Moth sides of<br />
the road at Thala and mouth thevaof vitLs strongly occupied b y the encRr .<br />
She onoW attack®d out oi` Thala v-tWn1xj t 3 th tanks and a f elq o f them<br />
broke through our cocurity line . After 5 of hto tanks hed bamu do strolod<br />
trhe enemy withdrca northward . A new reoonnaiss=os at 0555 hr disclosed<br />
oaatapied<br />
that the hills about 1.5 lm south of Thala wore strmiGlyAy the en®uy,<br />
alto with antitank runs and tanks . During the day the enanV<br />
has rammed rather quiet . Looording to Arabs, atatoments and<br />
Mx= fresh vehicles marks u it was aasurmd that the enemy had brought<br />
roinforoamenta from. an ecuetorn dirvotion .<br />
tato in the afternoon the encW felt forvmrd wit], 7 tanks west of the<br />
road on the left flank of our saourity line$ later he withdr(AYj<br />
In, front of Gruppc Romml the enemy rma Lotting rolnforccmantr. .<br />
For ancRr oiphe .^ soar division order of 22 Fabruru-y .<br />
i3y tearing up the onozy front and dentroying strong one :: aler:iontC<br />
In the (loop onezy flank the division han oarriod slat its micnion to its<br />
w<br />
r
" 10 ."<br />
extent . During the night of 22/23 February it dicongagos itsolf<br />
from the eneW and roachao the pass position 15 L-a2aorthwoot o£ 7716<br />
to defend the lati;or with theD.A .K. For particulars couoorning the,<br />
onsnV eve the prisoners# stutemani3 film .
24<br />
21st Panzer Division, War Diary (Extract), 14-23<br />
February 1943
Kriegstagebuoh 21 Panzer Division Afrika<br />
1 . Jan . 1 43 . - 31 March " 43 33 135<br />
The night-passed quietly.<br />
Until break of day combat groups pushed forward to the trail 7226--<br />
7221.}. At 9535 hours Kampfgruppe ScOtte reports the crossing of the swamp area .<br />
'At 0610 hours the advanced elements of the March group have crossed the mine<br />
field . At 0615 hours and 0630 the Rec.Bn.580 and the Pz .Rgt . respectively<br />
have crossed/with--all their elementsZthe mine belt . The sandy areas of the<br />
trails mentioned present a considerable obstacle, progress being hindered by<br />
the frequent sinking of vehicles .<br />
Labor detachments of the 220th armored Eng .<br />
.<br />
:are,employed so'that - the vehicles are made mobile as soon as possible .<br />
At 0630 Kampggruppe Schiltte has occupied the prescribed position at<br />
7223 rind reconnoiters' to - the north.<br />
The enemy, intercepting some of our radio messages, knows of our<br />
;;advance, bub' remains quiet .<br />
The 609 Flak Bn . receives the order to occupy positions on both<br />
;-sides of the road south of the mine belt and to remain in contact with the<br />
' enerW,<br />
:ty .iy<br />
At 0755 a report'could be made to 5th .Panzer A.O.K. that the movements<br />
had been carried out systematic Kly,-but up to now no reports of xxxmy contact<br />
: :with the enemy are at hand .`<br />
The divisional C .P . was located on the south slope of Djobel Zobbak<br />
:-at 7229 and had a good view into the terrain of the advance . At 0730 hours<br />
Roconnaissanco Bn . 580 crossed point 7231 and in addition covered the ri &ht<br />
'flank at 7223 without corning in contact with the eneV .<br />
At 0820 hours Armored Bn . Rohr is pulled out o£ . area 7223 and brought<br />
r . .<br />
: . to' the 5th Panzer Rgt . At 081+0 the 220th Armored Eng.Bn . report that the co lur:in<br />
,,! :- :i :: t;<br />
is rolling since 0800 hours . The d slowing up and tomporarity stoppage cf the
speedway were . caused by 2 tanks which had chain trouble . At 5N 0900 hours the<br />
division commander decided to go forward to tha advanced tank elements as the<br />
Kampfgruppe had apparently halted . A radio message received by an armored re-<br />
giment was ambiguous' and armored regiment was standing still on purpooe .<br />
a ", "1 . . . . _ . ,<br />
'tee -dlvision - oommander 'took 'stock of the situation and ordered the march to be<br />
,-J, . l ..<br />
. . .resumed ; . _ _. .<br />
At 0920 hours the 104 Armored x Grenadier Rgt. was marching through<br />
the mine belt and passed through without enemy interference . Low flying enemy<br />
planes attacked the march groups several times without success . At 1000 hours<br />
the 220 Armored Eng . Bn . reported that the 104th A Armored Gren .Rgt . had con-<br />
eluded its trkaxx through march . The 2d Bn.,104th Rgt . reported at 1010 h .<br />
eS 7<br />
that`enemy artillery was , movxing from 7210 in the direction of Sidi bou Zid . At<br />
1015 hours the reconnaissance A. had reached the prescribed area at 7257 and<br />
_ through<br />
gone into position . The last vehicle _of Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer passed/the<br />
mine- belt at 1020 . '<br />
In the south sector the forenoon was quiet . At 1030 h . the command<br />
echelon of the division starts marching through the mine belt to reach the<br />
north slope of the Djebel Zebbak.<br />
A few 3nemy armored scout cars were engaged by Rec.Bn. 580 north of<br />
Djebel Quergha and forced to retreat leaving mxx 1 scout car behind .<br />
At 1055 h. the 5th Armored Rgt. had reached the area 3 km south of 519.<br />
The 2d Bn . reports kxiUix Vehicle traffic on the road to Bir el Hafey. The hoad<br />
of the . column . continues its march in the direction of the road Sidi bou Ai Zid-<br />
Gafsa . The terrain is not heavily mined but the mud swampsmake the going diffi-<br />
cult .' The reconnaissance of the 580th ROC.Bn. discloses only few enemy iehicles<br />
in the region southeast of Bir el Hafey. The enemy is falling back with his<br />
Stenkhoff<br />
Kampfgruppen to the southwest. Toward 1220 h . Kampfgruppe/reaches the road<br />
Sidi bou Zid - Gafsa at Point 518 . Tile 4th Bn ., 104th B retains contact with
, ,the, enemy group at 7221 . At 1316 h. the 609th Flak Bn .<br />
`mine-.belt and;advanees .in the direction of 563 -537 to 533 "<br />
passes through the<br />
In the area of<br />
518 the 5th Panzer .Rgt . .has assombled and at 1345 h . advances again on<br />
Sidi bou:Zid . The 2d Bn . already destroyed R enemy tanks northeast of 518 .<br />
At 1346 h.-a report+is received that elements<br />
tared Si .bou Zid. Pursuit to the southwest is initxited . Grenadier Bn .P,lajor<br />
Kn8sel carries out a thrust against the enemy at Djbol Ksaira .<br />
r<br />
It has the<br />
mission to suround it from the north in a southeastern direction and take it .<br />
.. The advance of the 5th Pz .Rgt . is going smoothiyg forward and at<br />
1445th . ,the area 2 Ion wxrt east of 388 is reached. Our artillery fire is in-<br />
ore.ased on the . Fekka . slopes . At 1450 h. x a change of C .P . for div .<br />
Hgs.takes place .in ..the area 3 l :m southeast of 531.4 ; the final divisional C .P .<br />
is reached . at 1540h . 3 km northwest of Nasseur .<br />
of the 1Oth . Pz . Div. have capk-<br />
Kampfgruppe Stenkhoff continuew to drive in the direction of Sidi<br />
bou,Zid in constant contact with the energy . At 1705 h. west of Sidi boa Zid<br />
contact<br />
asmDaxxiasctiax is established with th.e 10th Pz .Div . The enemy continues to<br />
as he shows intentions to fall back to the south<br />
hold . Hill 7209, and at 1800 h ./the 5th Pz ._A.O.K.orders pursuit . The IO.Pz .<br />
Div.%.presses from the north on 7209 . The ld4th B Pz .Gren ..Rgt . receives the<br />
_enemy<br />
.<br />
mission to push- forward against 7209 anti& it comes in contact with the xn=-X .<br />
-For. :the 15th of Feb . 7210-7220 is ordered as objective to force a junction<br />
with Battalion Kn8sels . :The Kmapfgruppen receive the order to get into posi-<br />
,tion;for all-around defense in the areas they have reached, refuel, re-ammuni-<br />
tion ahd organize so as to march on Gafsa as soon as possible .<br />
. . Flak Bn.609 is committed in the area of 7256 with the mission to<br />
at 7210, 20 and 21<br />
cover to the northeast/against the encircled enemy.<br />
Sidi bou Zid is securely in our hands . The energy has withdrawn in<br />
the direction of Sboitla.<br />
it is reported to<br />
At 2015 h./5th Panz . A .I.K . that the divisions expects to be in a<br />
position to march on Gafsa at 1200 h . 15 Feb . Gren Rgt. 104 B hasbeon ordered
to .~block the terrain-at' 512 in a northeastern direction and to tid down<br />
the enemy . at 357 . At dawn 1 battalion will be launched to destroy the oneiV<br />
in a coup de main . .<br />
Gruppe Sdd .had the mission to continue on 15 Fob . on the defensive<br />
and to carry out offensive reconnaissance against 9015 .<br />
In areas 358 ., .357, 356 a reconnaissance discloses energy forces with<br />
many motor vehicles . Thereupon 5th Pz .Rgt . reo&ives at 2100 h. the order to<br />
reconnoiter immediately in these areas with instructions to the<br />
to advance on the enemy groups from the south and southeast on the morning of<br />
15 Feb .<br />
Gran.Rgt .104 B<br />
In all Kmmpfgruppen ie night, passed quietly .<br />
The 5th Panz .Rgt .<br />
CA4.4,zd1<br />
received the mission to reconnoiter from 7237 to the<br />
southeast as far as the area 7222 qnd 72__09 I ;w establish contact v-ith the Gren .<br />
r<br />
Rgt.-104 B . The 4th - Bn ., i# 104th Rgt. i s engaged with the enezV since 0730 h. ;<br />
- '<br />
the enemy is still occupying the hills at 7221 .<br />
in .Sidi bou . Zid ; that of the 5th Pz .Rgt . i s 5 km southwest of Sidi bou Zid,<br />
south of the road to Gafsa.<br />
encircled southeast of . Sidi bou Zid, the fighting is concluded .<br />
south',of 7288 to facilitate the planned operation on Gafsa .<br />
until the enemy blockaded southeast of Sidi bou Zid is exterminated . In addition<br />
it . will prepare the march , to the south. All supplies will be adjusted to the<br />
undertaking .<br />
The C . P. of Gren.Rgt . 104 B is<br />
The general,impression is that_wxcept afor the small enemy group<br />
The Rec . Bn . 580 receives the order to keep open the defile 8 km<br />
5th Pz .Rgt . receives the basic order to hold the positions reached<br />
Toward J~b3 0930 h . the division commander with Lt .Col .Steakho=f and<br />
Capt.Voss discuss the operation Gafsa at point 7260 Crom where they have a view<br />
into the terrain . For the conference ordered by 5th Pz . A .O.K . the~rrn1M
.accompanied-by the 44 go to the advanced C .P . of 5th Pz . A .O .K . at<br />
at 0700 h . is<br />
La Fauconnerie/ .The Gafsa operation w" discunsed thoroughly and planned .<br />
Toward 1030 a report is received here from the lo.Pz.Div . that enemy columns<br />
with tanks and iflfantry have been kndix identified in the region of<br />
direction indicates_ that Sidi .bou Zid is their objective .<br />
, At 1300 h. ..the-QpwwvMIM leaves the C .P . of the advanced Pz .A .b .K . and at 1500<br />
" 104th A<br />
h., arrives arrives at the/regimantal C.P. (in Sidi bou Zid) . Shor tly<br />
thereafter an, observer reports that the enemy already identified is now be-<br />
tween P50 and . .7251. After a short consultation between._&3~~r<br />
Col . Gerhard_. (7th Pz.Rgt.) and Major Pfeiffer the following elements are put<br />
in line for the destruction of the enemy :<br />
south-north direction .<br />
7. 250. Their<br />
companies of the 5th PZ .Rgt . attack the enemy in the flank in a<br />
113 company . of the 104th Pz .Gren.Rgt . follows the tanks . A company<br />
of the 7th Pz .Rgt .%-is put, in line northwest of Sidi bou Zid enveloping toward<br />
the-west. committed artillery (3 heavy and 2 light guns) is effectively<br />
at a<br />
engaging :..the,,.enemy __ brisk rate . The- counterattack of our Panzers gains<br />
ground . . The, enemy fails to raach his objective, Sidi bou Zid, and kkE Vmxim<br />
he cannot reach the group which is surrounded . At 1630 h . a Stuka attack<br />
takes, place on enemy tanks . During the entire engagement the enemy artillery<br />
tries to"find the- range on our batteries, but without success . The tank action,<br />
1ca<br />
so successful for us, continues until nightfall . At 1830 h . the 6 e4&sas<br />
4 br arrives at the divisional C .P . and reports to the division commander .<br />
45 ;,enemy tanks were shot down ; we did not lose any . The loss of time caused<br />
by ,<br />
this engagement necessitated a 24 hours delay in the Gafsa operation .<br />
At 1730 h. the Reeonn .Bn. 580 reported Gafsa free of enemy ; thereby<br />
the . entire operation falls through. As it is provided for that the D .A . K. is<br />
to ' oecupy Gafsa coming from the south, the division commander decides to send
",:. . .;<br />
the following telephone message. to D,A.K. : :<br />
,i .:; X1,.3 .<br />
for other pupposeR :<br />
. . . ~~ . .C' _ . .<br />
The undertaking of Pz .Gren.Rgt .104 B against the enemy group in<br />
,l .1 f<br />
area 7222 was not successful, a s the enemy, i.r the strength of a battalion,<br />
had well established himself in impmxx improved za2d positions<br />
recognize . At 1920 h the Recon.Bn.550 is given the mission<br />
and to reconnoiter<br />
rest areas in the evening .<br />
'Sf:iv2<br />
,t :<br />
"Request elements of the Africa Corps to Gafsa ;<br />
Elements<br />
in the areas 9020, 25 and 9043 .<br />
which participated in the tank engagement<br />
---------------------------------<br />
`16'February 1943<br />
The Ught : passed without special occurrence .<br />
At 0215 h . a radio message -vas received from the advanced 5th Pz .A.O.K .<br />
giving the l0 ..Pz .Div . . .the mission . to move very early on Sbeitla with a strong<br />
reconnaissance force to pursue the evading enemy at Sidi bou Zid . For that pur-<br />
pose the 21.Pz .Div . will hold an armored battalion in readiness .<br />
At 0610 P. . the D .A .K . reports the occupation of Gafsa and the rzrtDnticn<br />
of Recon.Bii.580 is now unnecessary . At 0630 h . Bn.Plessing engaged anew the<br />
enemy positions at 7221 . The O .B . orders<br />
need Recon .Bn.580<br />
ifficult to<br />
to occupy Gafsa<br />
returned to their<br />
a conference at 1200 h . at X88 7212 .<br />
In oompliance with an order of 5th Pz . A .O.K . the Recon . 13n.580 is brought forward<br />
''to .7288 . At 1100 h . Rgt . 104B reports that the attack against 7221 advances<br />
only slowly . The enemy is falling back step by step toward the nor thviest .<br />
Pz . Gren.Rgt . 104 A receives the order to initiate<br />
connaissance out of Sidi bou Zid . At 1435 h . Recon .Bn .580 is<br />
area~'7263 . The<br />
immediately a re-<br />
ordered to reach<br />
reconnaissance launched toward the northtivcst is to stop ; a re-<br />
counaissance patrol will remain in the defile 8 Ion southwest of 7288 . ~arIng
the conference at-7212 Gen .Ziegler gives the' division conumuander and the com-<br />
rnander -of,-the' 10;Pz .Div . instructions for the attack on Sbeitla . KumpfGruppe<br />
Pfeiffer :oomes'~ :under .the control-of the 10 .Pz .Div . effective at once and re-<br />
ceives the mission to march in the direction of Sbeitla toward 17 00 Pt, with<br />
a grenadier-battalion, an'armored - battalion and 2 light batteries . The mass<br />
of the 21 .Pz.Div . will fo-Irlow as soon as possible . Tvrrard 1600 h . the divi-<br />
sional'C .P.`is transferred to 7253 .<br />
In the- south , the enemy apparently holds with comparatively -weak re-<br />
donnaissaace'forces'the : line 9222, 93, 24 as rearguard . Paced by rather strong<br />
reconnaissance= forces'-he withdraws at 9024 toward the northwest almost «ithout<br />
fighting . ` . - . .<br />
with antitank guns is covering .0 km - east o£ 7275 . The Kampfgruppe is attacking .<br />
At 2214 h . 4 enemy tanks are reported ; 1 antitank gun is destroyed . The attack<br />
is gaining further ground .<br />
On°'16 :Feb~ Rgt . 104 B continues his attack on 7221 and Djebol Ksaira .<br />
At_2345 :=.h.-Fjak~Bn.609 : receives the following mission : it will cover the ad-<br />
vance of ahe'division with the-combat detachments under its control at 7211.0 -<br />
72149' ,and on the road 7269 -`1 249 by occupying a position in the valleys be-<br />
DJ- Ne~.,.r.n b 1cn.ASWard~j k4~<br />
tween :-7272 .and 7270 .- At the same time the battalion will assume air protection<br />
' for that . area . - When - this takk is accomplished the<br />
.!e( battalion .' At 23 .5'h . the<br />
At 2145 h . Kampfgruppe'Pfeiffer reports that at 2130 h . eneW infantry<br />
division will recall the<br />
supplements bhe order issued,<br />
and goes over It once more . The battalion will fall in at 0100 h . and between<br />
0400 and 0500 will reach the area between 7272 and 7271 with front toward the<br />
northwest, west and north<br />
The .2d Bn., 25th Flak will t ake the protection of the cross raads at<br />
7249 with l~ light and 1 heavy battery . They will be ready to fire at 0400 h .<br />
At 0045 h . the 1st Bn .,104th Rgt . receives the order to nmovs in such
'a'way that its advanced elements will stand at 7249 on 17 Feb . at 0900 h . It<br />
will leave the present area at 0500 h. The left flank will be covered from<br />
v ., t<br />
the region. 7272 -7271 by Flak Bn .609 . The irarch route will lead through 7268,<br />
C Xiz4q<br />
0M to 724.9 . The 1st Co .,220th Eng . i s ordered to the Sbeitla area early on<br />
X*18 Feb . - anc~ theewill be at the disposal o£ the divisioriy A labor detachment<br />
will occupy Wadi Meheri until 104.B has passed through and will then complete<br />
the mine belt .<br />
' ' At 0110 h. the 2d Bn ., Flak 25 receives the mission to set to march<br />
a'"flak combat detachment to the 1st Bn.,104th at 7232 .<br />
During the night Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer meets strong enemy resistance<br />
of<br />
at 7275, and upon order/the division commander remains stationary until, dawn .<br />
Toward 0100 h. Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer passes out of the control of the l0 .Pz .Div .<br />
-----------------------------------------------------<br />
17 February 1943<br />
During the , night and morning the movements of the division are taking<br />
'place as'planned . At 0530 the division commander with the assistant iz Ia go<br />
. . . . Nw'~3f1<br />
to the` C.P. in area 7274. ' In the morning hours the elements which had remained<br />
'in the former divisional resting area identify enemy forces south of the road<br />
'Sidi'bou Zid - Bir~el Bafey. In a vigorous action about 800 prisoners mere<br />
ro . ughin . They belonged to that enemy unit which had occupged a positio<br />
;7221 and was now attempting to fight its way through to the north west . On its<br />
RS S6.~? .,:.<br />
march from 72 3 to 7268 the 1st Bn.,104th also came upon the enemy falling<br />
back'to the northwest ; he hxcl was well camouflaged in cactus fields . After a<br />
short exehunge of fire about 600 prisoners were taken, including Col .brake,<br />
., ,<br />
commander of the position in area 7221,<br />
The enemy has organized for defense in the favorable terrain around<br />
Sbait6tl and the attack is set for 1200 h . Reconnaissance d1scloses that he is
-9-<br />
. ,. . . with ~_<br />
I,,q;thdrawingAis , train :elements to the northwest in the direction of Sbiba-<br />
7.282 . and. . 7291 .<br />
smoke shells .<br />
The Reoon .Bn .580 has the mission to reconnoiter and screen the line<br />
. . ,Kampfgruppe Stenk4off attacks, south o£ Sbeit&a, the enemy tanks<br />
Hostile<br />
which, wall camouflaged, in the olives groves, accept the fight . Armored forces<br />
n<br />
are adosialso it the. .spurs of the Djebe ls el Rheradok . The tanks were partly<br />
buried . and interspersed with antitank guns . 1~'neny artillery . had a good range<br />
on our.attacking .tanks, observation for the artillery was conducted by single-<br />
engine fighter, planes . . .The , Panzer Regiment had toadvance k through the diffi-<br />
cult terrain on a .width .of 10 kn . A violent tank fight developed and onecould<br />
see that ., it, ,was . a case of a systematicadd<br />
getting,,,out .of.Meitla everything possible . The<br />
prepared defense with the objective<br />
enenV's expenditure was 501'o<br />
During . the attack our Luftwaffe was very activy and attacked the<br />
enpmy .positions and columns with bombs and in low flying raids .<br />
The 3d Bn.,104th attaoked Sbeitla frontally and made good progress<br />
along the Wadi southeast of Sbeitla, - Toward 1700 h . it reached Sboitla and the<br />
same evening pushed a company to the northwest through the locality and there<br />
moved into defensive . uositions . The,tank engagement taking place south +)f Sbeitla<br />
was very stubborn and last until 1830h . Despite everythinb on this day 27 tanks<br />
were put out of commission vrithout/a complete loss e<br />
During the evening -The 5th Pz .Rgt . assembles in the area 2 ran east of<br />
Sbeitla . The Grenadiers ha-de the mission to defend Sbeitla . The artillery<br />
at once<br />
supports the Grenadiers and is ready to beat down/arty eventual enemy attack .<br />
n<br />
The division . intends to undertake in the moring of 18 Feb . a vigorous reconnaissance<br />
to Kasserine . The mission of Co1 .Lan&, the defense o£ the high ridge (Dj .;bel<br />
Lessouda) with reconnaissance up to the line 7217 - Y216 - 7220 remains in force<br />
as there might still be some remaining enemy forces to reckon tirith .
!'"Supplement to 17 February .<br />
- 10 -<br />
At 0715 h . Major Pfeiffer reports to the division commander : "Ad-<br />
vance f'rqXmx elements are still holding firm in front of a superior enemy ."<br />
!The .. division commander decides to put off the attack until 1200 h . At 0915 h .<br />
;the, attack is discussed with the commanders .<br />
After a short,vigorous artillery<br />
,preparation the tanks advance on Sbeitla in an enveloping movement to the right,<br />
while the infantry.carry out a frontal attack . At 0800 h . JU 2 light enemy<br />
batteries find their range and at the same time the first enemy low-flying<br />
raids take place .,_ A reconnaissance discloses that on the right attack flank<br />
tH~~<br />
,there ixists a tank obstacle and on the slope behind itl about 15 enemy tanks<br />
have concentrated Thereupon at 1015 h . in the presence of the commanders<br />
the, .division commander decides to. -laanch the panzer attack enveloping on the<br />
left ., Flak combat detachments ._assume the protection of the right flank. An<br />
antiaircraft battery 8,8 moves forward in the area 7274 and takes over air<br />
raid defense and at the same time ground commitment .<br />
At .2140 h. Kampfgruppe Kuhn receives the order to return to Rgt.<br />
;04,A. _ Report at 0645 . 18- Feb . by Major Pfeiffer .<br />
Recapitulation<br />
The enemy resistance at Sbeitla Proved considerably stronger than<br />
' Opposing the division was<br />
expected . An organized, tactically well planned defensive position in which<br />
a strong,mobile armor belt took a hand (about 50 enemy tanks) T"ne 7 hours<br />
very<br />
tank fight was/hard . Sbeitla is firmly in our hand .<br />
Akin body of tanks east of 7279 ; 5 batteries northeast of 7279 ;<br />
7280 . K ~<br />
104th A Sbeitla . Flak 60?,<br />
The reinforced 1st Bn ., 104th moving to n3sembly position<br />
in the area north of 7269 destroyed the remnants of the 168th in hard close<br />
combat . Plans for 18 Feb . : Defense of Sbeitla, cleaning up of the resion<br />
7237 - 7263 .<br />
Spa,<br />
Reconnaissance with point of main effort 5372 and 7716 .
The night passed. . .quietly.<br />
The divisional C.P . is located 6 km crest-northwest of 7249 . the Pz .<br />
Gren.Rgt . 101} B .i s .again placed under the control of the division with - its 2<br />
battalions and-attached elements mission to o-earvr with Bn . ::n8sels<br />
exea<br />
area. .7230 and : with ;Bn .Plessing arid 3--1-ight-b y,72_63 [Dr . Howe : the same<br />
words are crossed out . .in .the text]<br />
.The intermediate terrain retains some enoW remnants which mast be<br />
cleaned up . for the .missions of the various units for 18 Feb . see division<br />
order no .4 in .the annex ., . .<br />
direction of .Kasserine and .twice encounters an armored ene r reconnaissance<br />
which, after .a short exchange of fire, withdraws to the north .<br />
contact with the . DAK-.in Kasserine .<br />
- 1 1 -<br />
18 February 1943<br />
At 1300 h. Gren .Rgt . 104. A launches a reconnaissance platoon in the<br />
,In the course of the afternoon this reconnaissance platoon made<br />
The . division -receives .the order to push immediately a fresh security<br />
of<br />
detachment toKasserine ;, as . this is not possible the division requests/DAK the<br />
permission l ur, keep the. detachment until 1000 h . 19 Fob, It is provided that<br />
fgruppe under the conmiand of Capt . Kuhn/the dutjrx at 1000h .19 Feb .<br />
The closing report of the day to the 5th Pz . AOR is as 21=<br />
follows : The enemy rtes retains weak reconnaissance forces in the area<br />
'r-611A ll+61,<br />
5378 . and on the road 7279-7716 . Occupation of 1 5347 is established . No enemy<br />
air activity . Our reconnaissance forces in 7716 ; contact made with elements<br />
of . DAK.-Combing through the area 209 - 63 - 79 results in taking 2 officers<br />
and 150 men prisoners . 2 tanks, 4 personnel transportation wagons destroyed .<br />
Numerous motor vehicles captured, mostly disabled . From 14 fob .-17 Fob . the<br />
5th .Pz .Rgt . has destroyed 103 . tanks without corcpletely losing one .<br />
Tank . situation: 55/111, 1VIV-<br />
!Plans for tomorrow : Kampfgruppe to 7216 .
- 12 -<br />
19 February 1943<br />
The night passed quietly in the Sbeitla secdsor . At 0445 h . the following<br />
radio message was sent from the advanced 5th Pz . AOK : "Get ready to march<br />
immediately . Probable time of departure 0800 h . under Rommel in direction<br />
of 5372 . Order for starting follows" . At 0634 h . the division received the<br />
following order:"The 21st Pz .Div . comes under the orders of Rommel effective<br />
at once . The division will leave area 7279 at 0800 h-19 Feb . along the main<br />
road lending .to the north and will reach the road junction<br />
11.567 ."<br />
1"or division<br />
starting order see- annex. At 0615 h. units were acquainted separately with<br />
the new order by telephone or radio . The battery with Gren .Rgt . 101 B and with<br />
Kampfgruppe Ddvrer also follows to the Sbeitla area .<br />
The Reconn.Bn.580 will join the line of march i4 the first possible<br />
gap that occurs, if possible between Panzer Gron . and artillery. A move forward<br />
is intended later . Capt ./immediately in front to the division commander who<br />
drives<br />
mxxxx behind the armored spearhead . :<br />
IPoward 1100 h . the armored spearhead encountered a mine field 1 km<br />
south of 5374; it was cleaned up without incident and crossed^ , A few enemy<br />
scout cars withdraw to the north . Aftax Beyond this rather ineffectual mine<br />
field there was a second . much better se:re ;ructecla Behind it about ?0 tanks,<br />
batteries and well placed infantry are ascertained . The division commander<br />
decided to attack after moving into position . The road as well as the area<br />
are obviously under artillery observation fire . While the engineers are occu-<br />
pied cleaning up the second mine field an armored battaidon, encircling about<br />
7 km from the east is committed .<br />
A light field Haubitzer battery is ready to<br />
fire 30 minutes after the tanks came upon the mine field ; 4 additional batteries<br />
are put in line during the afternoon to fight the enemy batteries whic4 are<br />
giving our tanks plenty to do . At 1500 h . Major Pfeiffer receives fran tho<br />
division commander the order to bring forward the 104 A Rgt . and place it for<br />
the time bUhng behind the nearest rearward hill . It is intended that the
even today perhaps<br />
tkxkxkkx regiment be committed to the attack/on the infantry positions along<br />
-the hills . For the present a reconnaissance is to be carried out in both<br />
fkanks . At 1620 h . the Fll4 arrives at the C .P . to get oriented on the course<br />
o£ the operations . The Fa4 advocates the view that every means must be employed<br />
to throw the enemy . At 1710 h . Lt .Col . Stenkhoff reports the following to the<br />
division commander at the divisional C .P . : "Our tank attack is at a stand still<br />
as a result of barbed wire obstacles, mines and antitank guns, and also because<br />
of enenV artillery ; ten breakdowns up to now" . The division commander decides<br />
to call off the attack and orders to take back the tanks at dusk, to assemble,<br />
and .<br />
refuel/ re-anmunition .<br />
~2 .<br />
A battalion of 104 A Rgt . i s committed am for the defense of the<br />
A<br />
ridge east of the road . The second battalion moves to the hollow as reserve .<br />
, Reconn.Bn.580 assume the protection of the . right flank and reconnoiters<br />
toward the east . Flak Bn.609 covers the left flank and occupies a position<br />
to<br />
on the ridge with connection mx the road . Recormaissance as far as the enemy<br />
will begin immediately - when the moon shines .<br />
The division commander takes the following decision : vrith the first<br />
rays bf light on 20 Feb . the attack will be launched anew . Tho entire infantry<br />
and the 5th Pz .Rgt . will carry the attack forward under good artillery support.<br />
force<br />
Bn . Kurzei, widely pulled apart, will attack frontally by bounds . The main xfcaxt<br />
concentrated<br />
will be 3 on the right flank. An engineer platoon and 2 flak combat detach-<br />
ments, Bn.Kuhn and the 5th Pz .Rgt . will be on the right flank. The attack of<br />
the right flank will be carried forward in such a way that from point 5354<br />
either point 5371 will be reached and thereby Draa bou Rouino,skirtirg Sbiba,<br />
or that the attack from 5354 - advance to the north so as to swing west on<br />
Sbiba at the proper moment . -<br />
To Flak Bn .609 devolves the mission to tie down the enemy and especially<br />
to simulate an attack on the left flank.
3t-. auk : will begin at 0630 h .<br />
- 14-<br />
At 2200 h. a conderence took plaice among the conunandors concerning<br />
the Sbiba undertaking. Since Bn .Kuhn was a little late in reaching his assem-<br />
bly area the attack was ordered for 0830 h.<br />
The artillery will be committed as follows :<br />
3 light Field howitzer batteries will occupy positions on the right<br />
flank<br />
3 heavy field howitzer and 1 gun battery have gone into position<br />
in the hollow in front of the mine field .<br />
Two flak combat detachments haste been attached to Gren .Brl.Kurzei .<br />
----------------------------------------------<br />
20 February 1943<br />
The night passed quietly . Heavy'ground fog cut off the view in the morning hours .<br />
enenly<br />
At 0827 Stukas,are requested from Pz .A01E Africa to fight/artillery positions<br />
at 5372 . At 0830 h . the attack progresses as planned . the RecQn .Bn . covers<br />
the right flank and reports that the area at 5354 is free of enemy .<br />
The enemy , with considerable artillery, betins adjustment fire on<br />
the advance march movements of the division .<br />
At 1130 h . Kampfgruppe .Stenkhoff rexports that the advance 4 km<br />
southeast of 57/71 makes only slow progress as the terrain is cut through by<br />
deep Wadis . . Until now the march was accomplished without resistance . The 3d<br />
Ba.,104th . Rgt. .advances only slowly yet heavy artillery and mortar fire . The 1st<br />
.,104th Rgt . which fell into line at 0940 h . 2 km southeast of 55521<br />
reached the hills of 620 toward 1140 h .<br />
The Panzer Regt, reports that the terrain bobweon 5571 and dill 620LS-~~S37,<br />
is impassable ; a scout patrol sent ahead in advance bocanA bog;od . Toward<br />
1200 h . the 3d Bn ., 104 reached Hill 643 with its right flank. On the basis of<br />
the report of 5th Pz .Rgt . the division couunander at 1230 h, decides as follows :<br />
the thrust of the Pz .Rgt . with 1 battery . will tal:o place over ~~'jl - 6$ - b6<br />
I
to 5367 to-a-Qize the ene4 in Bbiba from the northwest . The let Bu,104th<br />
continue to<br />
will mnxmzxxz attack along the wadi in a western direction . The 3d Bn .,104<br />
closes, to the right and follows . flak Bn,609 exptends its position a- f(-,-,v<br />
observation<br />
100 meters to the east . The artillery increases its of the area<br />
west of the road .<br />
At 1400 h. a liaison officer arrives from 3d Bn .104th and reports<br />
that the attack is at a stand still as a result of the strongest onomy artillery<br />
and , mortar fire . Up ,to now 3 . nen killed and 10 wounded . The enemy artillery<br />
fires more and more acurately on our batteries and especially on the divisional<br />
C .P . There is strong evidence that ehemy observers are<br />
west of the road and .kxxmx that our entire installations a-e exposed to their<br />
view .<br />
- 1 5 -<br />
At , 1415 h. , there is a call from Ia Pz . AOK Afrika with the report<br />
that FM Kesselring .has promised the strongest air commitment for the attack<br />
on Sbiba . The, weather becoming worse and worse the project is not carried out.<br />
At 1700 h . the division commander decides to stop the attack and<br />
orders the various Kampfgruppen Jckm: to disengage from the enemy at night fall .<br />
At 2200 h . a commanders conference takes place . Its basis is the<br />
division order for the defense of the terrain south of Sbiba. :or~ the -order<br />
see the annex. In the course of the day the reconnaissance Bn .<br />
rr,G_] La,<br />
mission,to reconnoiter over<br />
w&..<br />
was giueo. the<br />
. 3%-<br />
53 47,46, 55, 56 . Result : no enemy observation .<br />
The battalion receives the order to block the defile at 534, 7 toward the north<br />
with ikzxmxsaxn9xitxxJmm s its main body . The reconnais aace Will ho carried<br />
r"( m3 . Sr K ~<br />
out . as far as 5 45, 55 . 56, 70 and 67` [^'''sd-41<br />
Upon order o£ Pz .AOK Afrika, Recon .Bn.560 comes under the control<br />
of Pz .AOK Afrika, effective at once .<br />
The march takes place over 5353 to 7716 .<br />
cated on the hills
21 February 1943<br />
------------<br />
The weather became worse during the night ;<br />
the rain softened roads<br />
and terrain. -'--Enemy harassing fire lay on the division positions during the<br />
night.<br />
At'0310 AOK issues the following order:<br />
"Pass position south of Sbiba resting on the enemy mine field to<br />
be defended . Reconn .Bn .5E30 to march immediately by the shortest road as arimj<br />
reserve to the area around Kasserine" .<br />
Toward 0500 strong artillery fire begins again. Probably the enemy<br />
expects us to be moving into position of readiness . During the night we succeeded<br />
in disengaging from the enemy and to organize the defense .<br />
During the night a nuisance force under the command of Lt .Col .von<br />
Katzler was ordered to block with mines the road net 5 Ion east of 5616 . The<br />
force is equipped with radio and has the mission to reconnoiter to the west .<br />
According,to Arabs' statements from 1t0 to 50 enemy tanks are moving there .<br />
south of 5376 .<br />
At 1200,h . enemy artillery fire lays on the divisional C .P . and<br />
the division commander decides for an immediate transger of the C .P . 4 km<br />
At ±4 :141, .0 h . it was possible to report to Pz .AOK that the divi-<br />
sion after ka regrouping on the line 534£3, 5353, 5373, had passed to<br />
active defense . Toward 1600 h.Cpt . IIissmann reports that about 500: men coming<br />
from the north . are moving in the mountain in front of the position of Flak Bn .<br />
609, and that according to a reconnaissance th-r-m already about 300 men are<br />
there . Thereupon an armored company is set to march and occupy the position<br />
behind Flak Bn . 609 .<br />
Toyrard 1610 h. it looks as if the enei%r,400-500 men strong, has trio<br />
of st:,~cLir the position of the bE:ttii~)on. At lr,: ,30 h . «n order ~,.ocs<br />
to Major Pfeiffer :"The enemy will be observed and kept off by a recornais-ance" .
- 17 -<br />
strong<br />
Toward 1730 h . knxzy artillery fire of heavy caliber with smoke<br />
is,, upon the 3d .Bn., 104th Rgt. The enemy attack which is shaping up is at once<br />
taken under effective fire by<br />
enemy tanks attack frontally .<br />
the 2d and 3d Bn, 155th Arty .Rgt . At 1745 h .<br />
x rxa I %~ ABOUT 6-10<br />
Violent smoke-shell firing lies on Flak Bn .609<br />
which moreover is reached by enemy infantry fire . It 1745 the Pz .ggt eras<br />
alerted ; on order of the division commander kka one battalion cleans an the<br />
penetration while the other remains in readiness . A tank broke through in<br />
the. 3d Bn .,10,5th and 3 others in Flak Bn .609 . All weapons turn at onao to<br />
active defense and 5 tanks are disabled ; not one of ours is a total loss .<br />
An inquiry of Ia to Flak Bn .,609 as to whether the infantry is following the<br />
tanks is answered in the negative by Capt.Hissmann.<br />
22 February 1943<br />
With the approval of Sth AOK the 104 B Rgt. i s bounght forward to<br />
S E~b,<br />
.7270 . The order follows at 0325 by radio . At 0130 the following telephone<br />
'call was made to AOK:<br />
"7 batteries in the area around Sbiba including 1-2 heavy ones ;<br />
20 tanks ascertained east of Sbiba . Infantry elements in position north of<br />
'74 on both sides of the road . No retrograde movement . At 616 $ enemgl groups<br />
in company strength with antitank guns and personnel transportation wagons ;<br />
feast thereof for the protection of our flank 1 lieutenant and 10 men with 1<br />
battery. Withdrawal of the enemy improbable ."<br />
-PAS,-41<br />
The security detachment ordered to Pass 534.7 establishes that ap(;a-<br />
1L-t.0 .<br />
rently there exists a former American path of retreat as many vehicles hors<br />
de combat are lying along the trail. The committed reconnaissance patrols<br />
returned in toto without coming in contact with the enemy . The reconniissance<br />
patrols in line in the pass position at 5616 also spent a quiet night . The
- 18 -<br />
laying of mines in the position before Sbiba makes good progress . At 1000h .<br />
the enemy fires well placed harassing fire on our advanced positions, ospe-<br />
eially on icknd~c the 3d Bn., 104th Rgt . Our observation is very much hindered<br />
N-IdWe~.,! It/ e~ DJ .<br />
by the weather . At 1100 h . the reoorinaissanco detachment at 5616 roports -`4--<br />
that contrary to map findings there is a goo~ ss entrance1+at Mashei and<br />
Abdullah . 5616 is occupied by an' enemy zxxz. nX company . Toward 1300 h . again<br />
violent smoke firing on the left flank of Flak Bn . 609 . It can be assumed<br />
that the enemy is undertaking an attack to get relief from pressure . At 1330 h .<br />
20 tanks, 1 battery and a few motor vehicles are observed 4 km . east of Sbiba .<br />
As visibility has become extrerrsly good it is assumed that these motor vehicles<br />
are Jduy sFx = xKxxirkmw nothing new but rsimplyIwere there in the previous days-<br />
ould not be identified because of the weather .<br />
Toward 1500 h . enemy artillery fire lies on a line with the flak<br />
switnh line . Westward toward 643 an enemy battery is identified . Our artillery<br />
fires on identified objectives . The numerous scouting operations launched<br />
by the division during the day disclose that the forward terrain is mostly<br />
free of enemy . Toward evening Kxxx the enemy's artillery fire slackens notice-<br />
ably and wma. altogether quiet after 1630 h . At 1730 h . for the first time<br />
m<br />
12 enemy fighder planes flew over the divisiorCal area . A "Lighting" was-<br />
brought down .<br />
The following commanders were ordered to appear at the [division]<br />
commander : Co1 .Bruer<br />
Lt .Col . Stenkhoff<br />
" " Werdelmann<br />
" " Pfeiffer<br />
Captain Hissmann<br />
" Richter<br />
" Streitz<br />
At 1830 h . the 3d Bn.,l04th RU-t . observed vehicles before the front .<br />
They were probbbly employed to lay mines . Our artillery engages til e,-., at once .<br />
At 1850 h . Col . Bayerlein informs Ia : "1 0 . Pz . Div . ;YL DAK re~rouood and reached
"!""the pass positions at 7760,-7745 . The 21 .Pz .Div . remains before Sbiba for<br />
the defense . Again several artillery fire concentrations or. the sector of<br />
the 3d Bn, 105th Rgt since 1915 h . At 20 h . a radio from X O .B . reaches<br />
the division.Contents : [Figures illegible] defense of the present position .<br />
10 .Pz .Div . and DAR will withdraw to the pass position 7776, 5655 vitnich will<br />
be held . Prepare the mining of the road to Sbeitla" .<br />
The enemy behaved as on the previous day, but did not attack .<br />
Artillery activity is some~qhat less . 5616 is occupied by an enemy company .<br />
Our 6 km east of 5616 .<br />
WSAX flank protection by artillery is weak/ First enemy air reconnaissance<br />
over the positions of the division . One "Lighting" sho.Edown . Plans for 23<br />
February : Defense ; reconnaissance .<br />
Tank situation: 33/III,6/LV<br />
-------------------------------------------------------------<br />
23 February 1943<br />
------------<br />
The night passed without special occurence . The reconnaissance com-<br />
firmed Arabs statements that the enemy has evacuated the positions south of<br />
Sbiba and the locality itself . Enemy artillery fires on Sbiba and north of<br />
throughout the<br />
Sbiba tkRx$x:tzxj& day.<br />
of the position .<br />
At_1220 h . FM Rommel issued the order to continue the occupation<br />
Bn .Major Kn8sels with the addition of a company from-Major Plessing<br />
occupies the position just northwest of Sbeitla. Flak Bn.609 furnishes a re-<br />
inforced platoon and amt starts it to march to 5 km east of 5616 for security<br />
purposes and to rellmve Lt .Col .von Katzler . The platoon is placed under the<br />
control of Capt .R8mer, corrmnander of the position . The entiro position is un-<br />
der the direct control of the division . Toward 1550 h . an armored enemy co-<br />
luzn coming fro- the north approaches Sbiba arsd in front of ~ . . . northern
-20-<br />
°'"exit turns again to the north. At 1630 h . an enemy infantry coLipany is<br />
advancing from the north on Sbiba on both sides of the road . Committed<br />
fresh reconnaissance patrols roconnoitor south of Sbiba and at fk 7_644 re-<br />
port the area south of Sbiba free of enemy . At the southern exit the patrol<br />
10<br />
was fired upon by tanks from the northern direction. Two tanks and 1-12<br />
motor vhhicles were ascertained without a'doubt . At 1720 h.our artillery<br />
moving into<br />
observers ascertain that the enemy is VXjuKg his old position though on-<br />
ly with weak elements at first. Toward 1730 h. the Pz,Gren.Rgt . 104A re-<br />
ceives the order to bring to the region east of Faid all the non-motorized<br />
elements that are not needed . At 1,140 h . The la goes to the OB to be apprized<br />
of the situation.<br />
At 1940 F.M.Ronunel spoke with the division commander and informed<br />
him that when the JO.Pz.Div . and DAK pass through Sbeitla the 21 .Pz .Div . will<br />
cover the march into the positions northwest of Sboitla. At 20?,0 h. the divi-<br />
sion commander instructs all the commanders and orders a cormmanders conference<br />
for 24 Feb .<br />
The plans for 21.x. Feb .is defense as on 23 Feb .<br />
After a temporary withdrawal the enemy again felt forward . The enemy<br />
artillery fired on its own troops . Vigorous enemy aii reconnaissance with<br />
law level and high altitude bombing . Division position at 5353 to 5373 . Divi-<br />
1_<br />
sion flank protection with 1 company at 5317, and with 1 company and artillery<br />
at 5616 .
25<br />
Fifth Panzer <strong>Army</strong>, War Diary (Extract), 18-23<br />
February 1943
the entire north and center front of the 5.Pz .Aaunee .<br />
On the basis of these considerations the army has decided to-withdraw<br />
to the area north of Gab es e LwoJg.Brig.I as well as elements of the heavy<br />
army artillery and flak artillery s army reserve for possible employment<br />
at the lbxeth front. These elements were held as reserve at noon already<br />
by D.A.K. upon orders of the army . The transfer will begin in the evening.<br />
Ineddition the Div. Centauro is ordered to commit its forces reinforced by<br />
the 7.Bers.Rgt . in the Gafsa area for defense with front to the north and<br />
the west, and to leave the im-mobile elements of the division as support<br />
in the former positions east and southeast of el Guettar. 'Annex 1097)<br />
The combat group of the D.A.K. -receives the order to hold on 18<br />
Feb. - with the remaining forces<br />
(Pz.Gran.Rgt:Afr ., 1 artillery - bkttalion,<br />
A.A.33, 1 Posed battalion, 1 engineer company, 1 antitank company,<br />
1 Italian ar battalion, 1 Italian artillery battalion) the bridgehead<br />
positions gained just north of Thelepte and to launch strong reconnaissances<br />
against Kasserine and in the direction of Tebessa . Withdrawal in the direction<br />
of Gafsa will be effected only in case of strong, superior enemy attack .<br />
(Attack 1098)<br />
2. Morning and noon report to O.K.H. (Annex In)<br />
Sequence of events .<br />
a . Southeast front :<br />
------------------------------<br />
18 February 1943<br />
The enemy continues vigorous reconnaissance activities in front of<br />
the reconnaissance group afid of the 15 .Pz .')iv ., but without advancing with<br />
stronger forces . All assaults of enenV armored scout cars are repulsed by<br />
our artillery fire . No largo scale operation is carried out withor in. the<br />
Foum Tatahouine area or against the rearguard position west of Kedenine .<br />
(t:nex 1100)
a<br />
reaches<br />
remains<br />
- 114 -<br />
control<br />
The Iw.Jg.Brig .l -under the immediate/of the army sinoe 18 Feb .-<br />
at dawn the assembly area Ma~ .lsiw, (north-northwest of Gabes) and<br />
at the Mareth front . (Annex 1101)<br />
b . West fronts<br />
alerted there at the disposal of the arnV for eventual commitment<br />
Our reconnaissance forces throw enemy rearguards north o£ Thelepte<br />
and at the Tunisian-Algerian border near Oum Ali back to the mountain passes<br />
leading to Tebessa, where the enemy occupies defensive positions reinforced<br />
by artillery. Kasserine is captured and xJsn a platoon kzxw-x of 60rdau<br />
arriving from the east is taken prisoner . Annex llogl)<br />
The weak security detachments of the D.A.K. committed in the lbtlauoi -<br />
.<br />
Tozeur line reconnoiter over Mouleres in the direction of Tamerza on the<br />
No enemy is observed in Moulares .<br />
Tunisian-,Algerian border. A quantity. of . valuable_ railroad and mining material<br />
is secured . Reconnaissance in the direction of the border cannot be continued<br />
because of a violent sander storm.<br />
is still occupied by the enemy. (Annex 11033)<br />
Reconnaissance forces of<br />
the 21 .Pz.Div . establishom contact at Kasserine with the D.A .X. and<br />
clean up and secure the area gained . (Annex 1104)<br />
Air situations<br />
(Situation map and reports see Annex 1105)<br />
Limited commitment on both sides on<br />
fron . -~-'<br />
According to Arab statements Tamerza<br />
account of unfavorable weather.<br />
Air reconnaissance discloses no important change in the enemy picture<br />
before the southeast front. One must suppose that the enemy will attack the<br />
rearguard positions at present just west of Modenine only after a concentration<br />
and readiness of comparatively strong forces . At the same time we must exaect<br />
a continued strong pressure of enemy reconnaissance forces against the south<br />
flank .<br />
east<br />
There is no change in the plans of the army au the south front .<br />
J
.<br />
West fronts<br />
The air - reconnaissance disclosed in the forenoon movemeh is to the<br />
rear from the area northwest of Kasserine and from the area around Bou<br />
Chebka ; this and the general impression gained from the enemy picture<br />
for<br />
gave the army ground tz the interpretation that the enemy is falling back<br />
with its main body to Tebassa leaving strong rear guards at the mountain<br />
exits southeast and east o£ Tebessa. On the basis of this enemy situation<br />
the O.B . is of the opinion that through an immediate thrust of comparatively<br />
to the<br />
strong forces from the southwest on Tebessa and the area/north a unique<br />
opportunity is offered to change the situation derisively in Tunisia. This<br />
thrust, which would be carried out by the 3 Panzer divisions, would penetrate<br />
i A<br />
in the deep flank and rear of the British forces facing the north Tunisian front<br />
sand would=-likely-cause the entire' eiiety north . front to"collapse. prerequisite -'<br />
for the execution of this operation is the assurance of plentiful supply<br />
through drawing on the reserves of the 5.Pz.Armee .<br />
Inquiries are made to the :15. Pz .A.O.K-5 as to plans for the continua-<br />
tion of operations . The answer is that th6 intention is to fall back to the<br />
positions of departure -some of which are far forward- . The 21 .Pz .Div . will<br />
at first cover the occupation of the new positions from the Sbeitla area<br />
and then withdraw from enemy pressure behind the main line of resistance .<br />
The withdrawal of the mobile units of both armies from the SbeitQt-Thelepte-<br />
:eriana area will be carried out by mutual agreement . (Annex 1106)<br />
The 5.Pz .Armee is therefore of ark Qnposite opinion concerning the<br />
transmits<br />
further conduct of operations . Nevertheless, at 111.20 hours the O.B . txTaxma<br />
by radio his su es tion to Comando Supremo for an immediate enveloping<br />
thrust from the southwest on Tebessa and north thereof, provided supplies are<br />
assured, and requests for that purpose that the 10.and 21 .Pz .Divs . be put<br />
under his control and be moved as soon as possible to the Thelepto-Feriana<br />
area_ (Annex 1107)
In a telephone conversation of the O. B . wi th Gen.von Armin the<br />
latter expresses his concern with regard to the plans of the O.B . The 5.<br />
Pz .Arme+ntended in the next few days an attaok operation in the area west<br />
of Tunis and would need a panzer division for that purpose . The arnV therefore<br />
had already withdrawn the l0.Pz .Div .~of the present operations and trans-<br />
(erred it to Kairouan .<br />
Nevertheless the O.B . upholds his intention as he sees in it the only<br />
possibility bring eeklong relief to the entire Tunisian front and free<br />
strong forces to resist the British Eighth <strong>Army</strong> or to attack the enemy advance<br />
before the Mareth position, and thereby change the entire complexion of the<br />
North African theater of war .<br />
Toward evening F.M. Kesselring agrees with the O.B . T s point of view<br />
_. . : - - _- -_ - z -<br />
toix that effect<br />
and announces that he will that same evening have a talk/with Comando Supremo<br />
and the Duoe . ( Annex 1108)<br />
When at midnight there was still no answer from Comando Supremo a<br />
radio message was sent pointing to the fact that the proposed operation had<br />
a chance for s,roess only if the attack ,we- launched ;r1thott delay .<br />
(Annex 1109) -<br />
2. Morning and noon report to O.K.H. Annex 1110<br />
1 . Sequence of events .<br />
------------------------------------<br />
Attack Operations in Central Tunisia<br />
from 19 Feb . - 23 Feb . 1943<br />
----<br />
19 February 1943<br />
a . Southeast front : The enemy continues his reeonnobtering with tanks and<br />
armored scout cars from the east and southeast against our rearguard positions<br />
just west of h5edenine . All his assaults are repulsed by our artillery fire .
eyond<br />
The energy does not succeed in feeling forward xxxx Medenine to the west .<br />
The Vown itself ist still free of the energy in the evening . It is occupied<br />
by our . weak security detachments. Annex 1111)<br />
The pressure of superior energy forces continues in the sou&h flank<br />
against the raconnaissanoe group. Faced by an enemy infantry attack with<br />
artillery support it has to withdraw its right flank from Ksar Mguebla to<br />
about 12 km to the northwest on Ksar et Turki to avoid being cut off from<br />
some of its elements . (Annex 1142)<br />
b . Front of the attack group north:<br />
ed<br />
Ths approval of Comando Supremo for the operation suggastt= is<br />
received at 0130 hours .<br />
(Annex lll~)<br />
Comando Supremo orders that ;Um a thrust be carried out against<br />
deep flank and rear of ' the enemy forces opposite the north Tunisian front,<br />
making full use of uux previous success, cut them off if possible, but at<br />
least force the enemy to a withdrawal .<br />
first on Le Kef<br />
F.M.Rormnel will execute this drive with all available troops of the<br />
D.I .Parserarmee and thoss of the newly subordinated l0.and 21.Pz,Divs . 3 1 11<br />
under close concentration of forces and strong screening of the west flank<br />
on the general line Sbeitla - Thelepte - Maktar - Tadjerouine . Moreover the<br />
5,Pz .Armee will hold itself in readiness to fall in to an attack upon special<br />
orders between the coast and Pont du Fahs on a 3rd broad front . The enemy<br />
effective now,<br />
facing it will be/kept tied dxnx dawn and on the alert by frequent assaults .<br />
Deviating from the suggestion of O .B, Comando Supremo has ordered<br />
the thrust made on La Kef. The O.B . had proposed Tebessa as this is farther<br />
Ply<br />
crest of the northern Tunisian front and therefore would not lead so easily<br />
to<br />
the eneny reserves in readiness there .<br />
The army issues immediately the following order to the subordinate
- 118 -<br />
units (extracts given out c by tale e )<br />
aa . The combat group of D.A.K . (lees Bers .Bn . and artillery bn . of the Div .<br />
Centauro which will remkin at first in the Feriana area to protect and<br />
reconnoiter to the north and northwest), starting at once, will reach<br />
Kasserine, and there will get ready to attack shortly and will *ken gain<br />
immediately first the mountain pass northwest of Kasserine . Further<br />
action from there will be by special order of the army according to the<br />
development o£ the situation.<br />
The following units will be immediately brought forward for the reinfor-<br />
cement of the D.A.K . :<br />
1 mortar battery, 1 smoke battery and 1 Eng .battery .<br />
The Bers .B n. and the Italian artillery bn . agai+ill be brought forward<br />
-:to . the- : combat group._,as soon as. . the newly- ; subordinated :7. BerA .Rgt .. :and the<br />
reinforced co . , ,Lw.Jg.Brig .l have arrived in the Feriana and have been<br />
committed to the north and the northwest for the defense of the left flank<br />
of the Rommel attack group.<br />
The 7.Bers.2gt . Will be brought forward in the forenoon by Div.Centauro<br />
and the reinforced Lw . Co . by the Lw.Jg.Brig . 1.<br />
bb, The 21 .Pz.Div . will start from the Sbeitla area at 0800 hours 19 Feb .<br />
(the order will be transmitted by A.0-K-5) along the high road leading<br />
north and will gain the toe road junction about 75 km north-northwest<br />
of SbeitleL(Ksour)<br />
cc . The 10.Pz .Div . will leave the present area around Pichon immediately<br />
SbeitU<br />
and reach/by the shortest road at the disposal of the Romael attack group .<br />
It will hold itself in readiness there, and according to the situation<br />
Trill, on special order, be committed either behind the 21 .Pz .Div . in<br />
the direction of Le ifa3 Kef or over Kasserine in a general northwesterly<br />
direction.<br />
without delay<br />
dd . Div . Centauro will boing forward/to the Gafsa area all the ar±k elements
heretofore committed southeast or south of Gafsa and will put them in<br />
line for defense there . The 7 .Bers .Rgt . will be detached immediately<br />
from the positions in front of Gafsa and will march to Feriana . There<br />
the regiment will be placed under the control of D.A.K.<br />
ee . The Lw.Jg.Brig.l will set to march as soon as possible 1 co.,reinforoed<br />
by a platoon of light flak and a platoon of heavy flak, to Feriana at the<br />
disposal of D.A .K . ( Annex 1114)<br />
The O.B . decides to start at dawn to the D.A.K . Hgs .with an operations<br />
staff and the necessary communication equipment and, according to -where the<br />
to<br />
main effort of the attack unfolds,/conduct the operaLtions directly with the<br />
following . .<br />
advanced C .P./behind the D.A.K. or the 21 .Pz.Div . The main body of the Pz .<br />
the Mareth front.<br />
the command of the let officer of the General Staff at<br />
The order of Comando Supremo provides for F.XRommel's retention of<br />
the responsibility for the Mareth position . Nevertheless, the argy requests<br />
Gen.Messe to take over the high command over the Mareth front as a represent<br />
ative du-ring the absence of the O.B . from the southeast front. GGn,Messe<br />
declines . Thereupon the O.B . informs Comando Supremo that it is not possible<br />
for him to command at the Mareth front and lead the western operations at the<br />
same time, as means o£ communication are lacking for x the exercise of direct<br />
command . The O.B . therefore requests that Gen.Messe take over the command<br />
of the Mareth front as his representative . (Annex 1115)<br />
While in the morning hours D.K.K . is getting into a position of readiness<br />
in the Kasserine area for attack, the A .A .33 is thrown forward to ppen the pass<br />
worthwest of the locality in a coup de main. This is foiled however by the<br />
stuUborn resistance of the enoW in line on the heights on both sides of the<br />
pass . At 1100 hours the Pz .Gren .Rgt .Afrika moves to the attack . It succeeds<br />
at 1315 hours to- capturif "Hill 914 with the right flank, while in the left
- 120 -<br />
the attack comes to a standstill .<br />
strong<br />
The tank attack launched in the afternoon<br />
is stopped by the/mine bmd blocks at the pass . However at 1600 hours fM1<br />
712 is taken and in the evening hours stubborn fighting forces the violently<br />
resisting eneny to gall back to the north, though it is not possible to break<br />
through the well fortified defensive positions. ( Annex 111 6)<br />
The 7.Bers.Rgt. coming from the Gafsa area arrives toward noon in<br />
Feriana, and with the reinforced company of the lw.Jg.Brig .l which has also<br />
arrived there, will be committed for the defense of the left flank west and<br />
northwest of Thelepte on the road leading in the direction of Tabessa . There-<br />
by the Bers .Bn and the artillery battalion of the Div. Centauro are freed<br />
to be committed by D.A.K . Im compliance with orders they arrive in the after-<br />
noon _ in the . Kasserine, area . The army Eng.Bn.Afrika and 1 mortar battery and<br />
l smoke battery also arrive there for the reinforcement of the combat group<br />
of the D.).K . and are_ placed under the control of the combat group . ( Annex 1117)<br />
At 0830 hours the 21.Pz.Div.,starts from SbeitR& to the north . (teak<br />
energy forces -probably combat outposts- in the region 8 ~:m south of Sbiba<br />
are pushed back at 1100 hours . At 1230 hours, 1} k m south of Sbiba the division<br />
a<br />
runs against/comparatively strong enery in impanved positions with several<br />
mine fields extending in front of them. After moving into position o£ readiness<br />
and clearing paths free of mines the Pz.Rgt.resumes the attack at 1600 hours .<br />
Because of stronger resistance, new mine lines and rain making the terrain<br />
almost impassable tit is impossible to break through the enemy lines . The<br />
attack comes to a stand still . The division passes to the defensive for re-<br />
grouping . ( Annex 1118)<br />
The l0.Pz .Div . coming from the Kairouan - Pichon area reaches Sbeitla<br />
with his advanced elements only toward the afternoon because of road diffi-<br />
culties . The division which has only half of its cesbat strength because a<br />
considerable part of its elements tkre committed and iTwiobilized on the north
- 121 -<br />
front of the 5.Pz .Armee, will have reached with the mass of its units the<br />
the assembly area of Sbeitla by dawn of next day. (Annex 1119)<br />
There is no contact with the enemy in the Gafsa - Lbtlauoi -_Tozeur<br />
area and west thereof.<br />
The immobile forces of the Div .Centauro which had remained in the<br />
former positions at el Guettar are brought forward and put in line at the<br />
north front of Gafsa .<br />
Air situation :<br />
Situation map and reports see Annex 1119) f?]<br />
Sand storms and strong fog formations in the mountains make the<br />
of the air force almost impossible on both sides .<br />
Estimate of the situation and intentions :<br />
a. Southeast front :<br />
Because of the weather situation air reconnaissance discloses only<br />
au imcomplete picture before the front .<br />
The army intends to hold the rearguard positions just west of<br />
Yedenine on 20 Feb . also .<br />
b. front of the attack soup north :<br />
On the north front the energy opposed stubborn resistance to our<br />
attaok . The attack came to a standstill in the two &#sack groups (21 .Pz .<br />
Div . and combat group D.A . K.) because of strong enemy resistance in well<br />
on the heights<br />
improved positions/reinforced by numerous mine blocks . The enemy has apparent<br />
ly brought reserves forward . British troops were identified opposite the<br />
21 .Pz .Div . It is to be assumed that the enemy has brought forward the 6th<br />
British Panzer Bivision located heretofore behind the north sector as re-<br />
serve and has thrown ih into the fight . S5mxxx13r Txxkxxer A combat value<br />
considerably higher than that of the American troops can be attributed to<br />
these British troops . Therefore the army expects a further stiffening of<br />
the resistance on 20 Feb . ( Annex 1120 )<br />
use
The army intends to continue the attack on 20 Feb . with the main<br />
effort in the D .A .K.<br />
The following orders are issued in that intention (in the evdning<br />
2 . Morning and noon report to O.K.H. ( Annex 1122)<br />
1 . Sequence of events<br />
- 122 -<br />
the O.B . instructs the individual division commanders<br />
by<br />
aa . The combat group of the D .A . K.will gain ica a coup de main during the<br />
night if possible the pass positions still held by the enemy, and at<br />
dawn will debouch from the pass in the direction of el Hamra and of the<br />
pass 5 km to the southwest, open the passes and will pass to the defensive<br />
with icix its front to the west . In connection with this operation a<br />
combat group will be employe to open the Dernaia pass<br />
direction . connect with Div.Centaurots attack from the aooc<br />
direotion _ of :, Thelepte .<br />
bb . Until dawn the lo.Pz.Div . will bring its units forward to the Kasserine<br />
area and west thereof and will attack, following behind the D .A.K., in<br />
the direction of Kalaa Djerda, and at the same time will protect the<br />
right flank of the D.A.K. from a possibly enengy drive from the Thala<br />
direction.<br />
cc . The 21 .Pz.Div . will continue the attack through Sbiba on Ksour .<br />
---------------------------------<br />
20 February 1943<br />
from a northern<br />
dd . Div. Centauro, while retaining its former mission -recohnoitering and<br />
in - the afternoon<br />
covering in a western and northeM direction- will opan/the Dernaia ~<br />
(northxst - northwest of Thelepte) with a combat group. (Annex 1121)<br />
The order of Comando Supremo for Gen.lbsse<br />
(First Ital.ArnV) to take over the OOLUmnd at the Viireth iron& is received<br />
during the night . The First Ital .Awgy and the attack group north Trill ea
_ 123 _<br />
join the Ronzuel group andplaced under the joint command of F.M.Rommal who,<br />
at the same time, will retain the direot command o£ attack group north.<br />
(Annex 1123)<br />
a. First Ital . Ar yx<br />
At 0600 Gen.Lbsse has taken over the high command of the Mareth<br />
front. All the German and ital . troops heretofore under the high command of<br />
the D.I .Panzerarmee will at that time come under the awnkxxI high command of<br />
the First Ital .<strong>Army</strong> inasmuch as they are in line at the Mareth front. Gen.<br />
Messe will be given a German liaison staff for the command of the German<br />
units. (Annex ll )<br />
To watch over German interests F.M.Rommel orders that Gen.Ziegler<br />
be entrusted with the command of D.A.K. until the arrival of the commanding<br />
general. ---All=the<br />
'German-troops - employed -at -the l%areth- front are -placed' under -<br />
the control of D.A .K. Only the 90.le.Afr.Div . wil l receive operational<br />
orders from the XX.A.K. (Annex 1125<br />
Under the cover o£ strong dust clouds loosened in the forenoon by a<br />
sand storm strong enemy armored units have advanced with their point of main<br />
effort north of the left flank of the rearguard position of the 15.Pz.Div .<br />
and in the early forenoon stand in the deep northern flank of the divi-sion.<br />
The division had to fight stubbornly and call out all its forces to resist<br />
the crushing superiority of the enenW panzers)C, and despite the enemy attempt<br />
to encircle the southern flank also, it kept open the withdrawal road bfedenine -<br />
Toujane . The one armored battalion at the disposal of the division (with<br />
about 20 tanks) repeatedly brings to a standstill through counterattacks<br />
an enemy almost five times as strong . Severe fighting continues until dusk .<br />
The division has mastered the situation so far that it can disengage itself<br />
from the enemy systematically and withdraw along the Laedenine - Toujane<br />
behind the advanced position . (Annex 1126 )<br />
Herewith the last German units have been withdrawn behind the advanced
position and the defense of the Mareth position is beginning . The First<br />
Ital .<strong>Army</strong> has already ordered readiness for defense of all the positions<br />
in the morning . (Annex 1127)<br />
The enemy continues vigorous reconnaissance aotitities on the south<br />
flank of the position in the area about - 25 km northwest of Foum Tatahouine .<br />
( Annex 1127) [?]<br />
b, Front of the attack group north:<br />
during the night<br />
After regrouping had been carried out/the 21.Pz .Div . attacks again<br />
at dawn and strikes at a reinforced enemy in imqmraoc improved, heavily mined<br />
positions and vid.th ntmerous artillery pieces (9 batteries ascertained), tanks<br />
and antitank guns . Our attack makes only slow progress because of extremely<br />
violent resistance and at noon is bnaught to a standstill . After further re-<br />
grouping a renewed attack equally fails iiT-gain g ground . The'division'stops<br />
sses to the defensive<br />
the attack and at the edge of the enemy mine field . ( Annex 1128<br />
The combat group of D.A.K. does not succeed in taking the rest of<br />
the enemy positions at Kasserine Pass .<br />
The enemy,who has brought reinforce-<br />
ments forward, even ax launches counterattacks which it is possible, however,<br />
to repulse entirely .<br />
- 124-<br />
At dawn the combat group of D.A.K . renews his attack after strong<br />
artillery preparation, The attaok comes to a stand still in t he violent de-<br />
fensive wxsa=7 fire of the enemy stubbornly fighting in overhanging' mountain<br />
positions . Thereupon the advanced elements of the IO.Pz.Div . which have<br />
arrived in the area northwest of Kasserine are put in line on the right of<br />
the combat group of D.A.K . After hadd and fluctuating fighting lasting un-<br />
til late afternoon the enemy is thrown out of his mo~uitain positions . Enemy<br />
reinforcements launohin an envelo n movement over_ the_ mountain are ca ht~<br />
by _a counterattack, surrounded and for the most part destroyed. The panzer<br />
battalion of D.A.K. xXppaxkc wgxlr~[~~ ~~ which supported the attack and forced<br />
the breakthrough on the pass road, shot dorm 10 enemy tanks and captured
about 30 American armored personnel oarriers mounted with 7.5 om guns .<br />
(Annex 1 129 )<br />
After a brew<br />
rough the pass position had been forced) elements of<br />
the D .A.K . and of the IO.Pz .Div . were immediately put in line, a the direction<br />
of Djebel el Hamra or Thala ~or , pursuitl<br />
For the first time on the African theatre o£ war rocket launchers were<br />
used in the fighting for the I3asserine pass position . One of the batteries<br />
at the disposal of the D .I .Panzerarmee supports effectively tha attack of<br />
our infantry. The O.B . requests therefore the immediate bringing forward<br />
of additional rocket projector equipment and submits this request also to<br />
F.XKssselring at his C .P. in the afternoon . (Annex 11,'LO }<br />
The Div.Centauro holds its positions at Feriana . An attack executed<br />
with only weak available forces against the' . pass 'north~of The, epte effects<br />
no penetration because of strong artillery resistance . (Annex 1131 )<br />
There is no contaot with the eneny before the west front in the Gafsa<br />
- P6etlauoi - Tozeur area .<br />
in the afternoon<br />
Upon order of Comando Supremo the 5 PZ .Armee/with Kampfgruppe Buhss<br />
(reinforced Gren,Regt.47) fell in to the attac<br />
to the west in the direotion of bfaktar . The Kampfgruppe by evening reaches<br />
the region 6 km south of Ousseltia without meeting strong enemy resistance .<br />
Continuing the advance its foremost elements come upon strong enemy forces<br />
had taken a foothold in favorable positions at the passes west of Ousseltia .<br />
Annex 1132)<br />
O.B .SlId F.M.Kesselring arrives toward noon at the C .P . of Grmuppe<br />
Roranel northwest of Kasserine and the O .B . orients him concerning the si-<br />
tuation .<br />
Air situati on :<br />
Situation map and reports see Annex 11 3-39<br />
rom the area north of Kairouan
- 126 -<br />
Strong dust clouds and sand storms oantinue to limi11 the air activity on<br />
both sides . Annex 1131.})<br />
Estimate of the situation and intentions<br />
a. First Ital.Arwi:<br />
It is supposed that today t s attack of strong energy armored force s<br />
bring<br />
against the 15.Pz .Div, was carried out to/reliefs~/the American units engaged<br />
in heavy fighting . It is apparently the enemy's intention to induce our<br />
them<br />
command to pull out forces from the attack gropp and transfer/to the Mareth<br />
front . Therefor additional strong enemy attacks must be expected on 21 Feb.<br />
also . An air reconnaissance confirms this assumption, as the enemy group<br />
_W%.<br />
between Madenine and Ben Gardane has been rsitnrced by 2 500 motor vehicles .<br />
(Annex 1127)<br />
(the troops fully &Ierted?)<br />
The First Italian Array has ordered full defense readiness_ at the<br />
P6areth front .<br />
b . Attack- group- north :<br />
Using all his available forces the enemy attempted to hold his new<br />
switch position on the ridge northwest of Sbeit9d - Kasserine - Thelepte .<br />
He continued to send reinforcements for tf is purpose to Sbilba, northwest of<br />
Kasserine", as well as north of lhelepte . According to today's impressionmade<br />
by the enemy the army must expect enemy counterattacks on all of the three<br />
sectors, as the enemy will be anxious to restore the line that was partly<br />
lost .<br />
On the basis of this situation the arny decides to remain on the de-<br />
fensive on 21 Feb . at Sbiba and Feriana, to prepare for defense at Kasserine<br />
pass with comparatively weak forces and to be ready with a strong assault<br />
group to fall in, according to the develoomaht of the situation, either to<br />
an assault or to a counterattack to the north or to the west .<br />
In this connection the following is ordered :<br />
aa . The 21 .°z.Div . will defend its positions south o_° Sbiba to the odge of
o£ the enemy mine field . TheA.580plaoed under the control of the division/<br />
will be set to march inomediately to Kasserine as army reserve,<br />
bb . The D.A . K . will defend the pass positions west of the Kasserine - Thala<br />
roadrxwA and will send a kampfgruppe to reconnoiter in the direotion of<br />
D3ebel el Hamra . The relief of the IO .Pz .Div . east of the road will<br />
lore par e d .<br />
co . The 10.Pz .Div . will defenthe pass positions east of the Kasserine -<br />
Thala road and will &r4ve with a kampfgruppe (without tanks) in the direction<br />
of Thala . Tanks and the mass of the division will be held in readiness for a<br />
_ thrust to the north or possiblt a counterattack to the west .<br />
dd . The Div . Oentauro will defendthe Feriana - Thelepte area and brings for-<br />
ward for that puspose additional artillery from the Gafsa area . (Annex 1135)<br />
2 . Morning and noon report to O.K.H. ( Annex 1136 )<br />
Sequence of events<br />
a . First Ital.Armee<br />
- 127-<br />
21 February 1943<br />
Dtiring/the 15.Pz .Div . occupied systematically the ordered . area in the<br />
sector of the Div . Spezia . Though the division has been engaged the whole of<br />
yesterday in hard defensive fighting against enemy forces many times superior<br />
losses and breakdowns remained comparatively small . (Annex 1137)<br />
Today the enemy did not continue his attack but limited himself to<br />
vigorous reconnaissance against the advanced positions of the Wreth line .<br />
( Annex 11j8 )<br />
In the Rhoumerassen area (northwest of Foum Tatahoiime) the pressure<br />
of strong enemy reconnaissance forces continues against our reconnaissance<br />
group in line on the south flank of the position . (Annex . 1138)<br />
b . Front of the attack group north :<br />
'rhile the l0 .Pz.Div . and comoat grouo of D .A .K. aro preparing for
- 128-<br />
defense in the conquered pass positions, advanced pursuit elements drive<br />
during the night farther west and north.<br />
The reinforced A.A.33 (combat group D .A .K.) strikes against -a<br />
strong enemy fighting delaying action along the road in the direction of<br />
MmQua back<br />
Hamra pass . . It throws/to the northwest an enemy<br />
ing it<br />
armored attack at 0815 hours and followx1up iac reaches the area<br />
about 12 km east-southeast of el Hamra pass . (Annex 1139)<br />
The combat group of the JO.Pz .Div . throws the enemy rear guards<br />
back to the area 20 ]on south of Thala during the night . A counterattack by<br />
enemy tanks is suaosdsfully repulsed and several. tanks are shot down . Other<br />
from<br />
elements of the 10.PA:.Div. clean up/the high ground north of the Kasserine<br />
pass the rest of enemy forces still established there . Annex 111}0)<br />
The 21 .Pz .Div . has organized for defense in the area it reached<br />
yesterday afternoon.<br />
The night passes quietly in Div. Centauro . Since it is feardd that<br />
the one - r wi ll attack on the south flank with strong forces to drive into<br />
the left £lank of the attack~ro , the A.A.580 -army reserve since midnight<br />
receives the order to move immediately to the Feriana area . (Annex 1111)<br />
At dawn Gruppe Buhse o£ the 5.Pz .Arigee 2sx resumes its thrust in the<br />
direction of Maktar . In compliance with an order of Comando Supremo received<br />
during the night Gruppe Rommel will take over the command, effective at once,<br />
over the elements of the 5.Pz .Armee which except for the 10 . and 21 .Pz .Divs .<br />
a<br />
are incorporated into the attack movement or will be incorporated . (Annex 1112)<br />
On the basis of the orx impression created by the enemy this<br />
forenoon (his heavy losses during the fighting yesterday and early today,<br />
the vrithdrasral during the night, no counterattack to regain the lost pass<br />
positions, his passive attitude also in the Feriana area) the army comes to<br />
the realization that the enemy had been beaten so hard that for the jrcsent
d,a~iS<br />
he d*d not have the strength to recapture in a counterattack the pass posi-<br />
tions at Kassarine that are so important for him. Therefore the O .B . decides<br />
at 1200 hours to exploit the situation and continue the attack with the JO .Pz .<br />
Div. and the combat group of the D .A.K . and drive immediately on Kalaa Djerda<br />
or in the direction of Dj . el Hamra.<br />
In this connection orders are issued as follows : (verbal ly by the O.B . V/<br />
to the commander of the l0.Pz .Div., the commander of combat group D.A .K. and<br />
the commander o£ 4r A .A .580)<br />
aa, The 21 .Pz.Div . will hold its former positions .<br />
bb . The !O .Pz.Div . (less motor cycle Bn .10,which will at first occupy and<br />
hold the Kasserine pass) will drive through Thala on KaUa Djerda .<br />
cc. Comhat group ]W.A .K. will fall in immediately and open at first the<br />
pass at Slougi and then at Zitoun.An additional thrust in the KKU<br />
direction of Haidra is planned.<br />
dd. A.A.580 will not reach Feriana but will move to Kasserine by the short-<br />
est road and will open the pass north of 1helepte from the north by<br />
driv~w-eztmard through tae Kasserine pass .<br />
~e. Div. Centauro will hold the former positions at Ferian',"'and Thelepte .<br />
(Annex 11143)<br />
To prevent the enemy frcm draw-ing additional reserves from the north<br />
Tunisian front the 5:Pz.Armee is instructed to carry out limited offensive<br />
action in front of its western front to harass the energy and keep him as busy<br />
as possible. (Annex 11I4)<br />
At 1400 hours the JO .Pz .Div . and combat group D.A.K. launch an attack<br />
to the north and nortinvest .<br />
The l0 .Pz.Div . in a bold advance drives enemy security detachments<br />
back and about 15 km south Thala comes upon a comparatively strong enemy in<br />
a well developped hill oosition . In an energetic stroke the division succeeds
in throwing the enemy back end k in inflicting heavy losses to the British<br />
armored unit which had coarse forward to support the Americans in a countera<br />
attack . In a rpid follow up thrust Panzer and Panzergrenadiers drive into<br />
Thala toward 1900 hours, roll up a battalion and capture it (About 700 men)<br />
However the enemy holds the heights on both sides of the town with strong<br />
forces, so that the division has to withdraw a few kilometers to the south<br />
at dusk because of a threat to its flanks and rear . About 5 kin south of<br />
Thala the division passes to the defensive . (A nnex 1145) .<br />
The combat group of D.A .K., after good initial progress in the attack<br />
can only ms.ke slow headway in the &fternoon on account of extremely strong<br />
partly flanking defensi:vdix fire . The attack comes finally to a stand still<br />
on the plain opposite the energy occupying overhanging mountain positions.<br />
At dusk the combat group has its adxvanced elements 8 Ion east of Dj .el Hamra<br />
and has organized for defense there ., Its losses are considerable . (Annex 1146)<br />
Opposite the 21 .Pz .Div . the enemy during the day gets<br />
reinforcements especially of artillery (a total of 11 energy batteries are now<br />
ascertained) . At 1?00 hours tho enemy supported by n'vcercus tanks launches<br />
a counter-<br />
//X-X"a attack which can be brought to a stand still after 6 enemy tanks are- shot<br />
down . (Annex 11147)<br />
- 130 -<br />
A renewed attempt of Div. Centauro to open the Dernaia pass north of<br />
Thelepte fails because of extremely violent and well placed enemy artillery<br />
defensive fire . ( Annex 1148)<br />
Gruope Buhse has been unable to throw-the enemy out of his hill posi-<br />
tions wext of Ousseltia and therefore attempts to continue the thrust on<br />
Maktar driving from the north and the south.<br />
(Situation map and reports see Annex 11491<br />
Air situation:<br />
Limited air activity on both sides on account of bad weather .
- 131 -<br />
Estimate o£ the situation and intentions :<br />
a. First_ Italian <strong>Army</strong> :<br />
Today's air reconnaissance discloses that enemy forces in the area<br />
between Medenine and Ben Gardane are not as strong as was to be xxxxmmd<br />
assumed on the basis of yesterday's air reconnaissance . Today there were<br />
only 1200 motor vehicles ascertained in that area .<br />
As a result of his ai= ground reconnaissance of today the enemy must<br />
have observed that he has come against a well developed position . It must then<br />
11 E it be assumed that enemy, according to his former custom, will make<br />
thorough and lengthy preparations for attack . The arc army therefore does<br />
not expect that he will advance on the Mareth position in the next few days .<br />
The plans of the First Ital .<strong>Army</strong> are unchanged.<br />
b . Front of the attack group north:<br />
After the loss of the doming ass position northwest of Kasserine<br />
the enemy attempted today to hold the ridge line el Hamrt (11+ km southeast<br />
of Thala) - Dj .el Hamra. For the purpose he k-nrk brought forward additional<br />
American forces out cf the area around and southeast of Tabessa and also e.ddi-<br />
tional elements of the 6,British Fz .Div . The army expects that on 22 Feb .<br />
the enemy in a counterattack will attempt to regain the line of resistance<br />
he has lost in parts and that he will oppose stubborn resistance to a conti-<br />
nuation of our attacks . (Annex 11_50)<br />
The army intends therefore to continue the attack for a limited obat<br />
first<br />
jective/with D.A.K. and l0.Pz.Div . and to hold the former positions with the<br />
21 .Pz.Div . and Div . Cen*auro .<br />
To that effect the following orders are issued :<br />
aa . The 21 .Pz .Div . will assume the defensive in the former main line of re-<br />
sistanoe . If the enemy withdraws through Sbiba, the division will follow<br />
up with some elements, the main body being held in readiness for a new
%<br />
assignment . The O.B . combat echelon will drive from Thala on RoAia in the<br />
rear of the enemy from Sbiba .<br />
the re<br />
bb . The IO .Pz.Div . will reach the Thala - Kalaa Djerda area and/pass to<br />
of its<br />
defensive with its main body . The division will push some/elements on<br />
'Padjerouine and Le Kef.<br />
cc, Combat group D.A.K.lcontinuejf the attack for the capture of the el<br />
Hamra passes .<br />
the night of 2122 Feb .<br />
north and will hold them .<br />
The passes will be encircled far to the south during<br />
dd. A .A . 5S0 will open the passes north of Thelepte by a thrust from the<br />
Se . Div . Centauro will withdraw from action south of the passes, will reach<br />
during the night the old area around Feriana - Thelepte and will pass to<br />
the defensive there . The division~will `hold reserves in readiness .for<br />
mobile employment . (Annex 1151)<br />
Results o£ today's air reconnaissance, incomplete because of the<br />
adverse weather, but suplemented by ground reconnaissance and listening posts<br />
establish that the enemy continues to draw strong reserves from the northern<br />
Tunisian front and brings them forward to the Le Kef area . The 5.Pz .Armee<br />
is<br />
therefore/requested again to harass the enemy through xaasiac local thrusts<br />
on the entire front and tie him down . (Annex 11_52)<br />
2 . Morning and noon report to O.K.H. ( Annex 1153)
Events of the day :<br />
a . First Italian Armor<br />
- 133 -<br />
22 Februaty 1943<br />
The enemy continues his reconnaissance activities in advance of the<br />
B4areth position and also on the south flank in the region of Rhoumerassen . The<br />
day passed without any action on any considerable scale. (Annex 1154 )<br />
b. Front of attack group north<br />
The attack of the IO .Pz.Div . planned for 1300 hours against the enemy<br />
is not carried out as &round reconnaissance in the forenoon disclosed that the<br />
enemy has brought up strong reinforcements from the direction of galas D3erda ,<br />
receive<br />
and is apparently preparing to counterattack. The didivion plans to the<br />
enemy attack in its present favorable positions in order to take Thala in a<br />
thrust -to be . delivered -immediately ,following the enemy's move. ., However, the<br />
anticipated strong counterattack of the enemy was not made . Only minor hostw<br />
probings to the front are made bylhim and are beaten off with losses to him. As<br />
the enemy continues to move up reinforcements, the arm, taking into account<br />
the poor state of the terrain as a result of the rain, orders the division not<br />
to execute the attack that had been prepared but to pass to the defensive .<br />
(Annex 1155)<br />
The attempt made during the night by Kam9gruppe D.A.K.<br />
to seize the<br />
pass by a swift stroke fails. The Kampfgruppe reorganizes and at dawn advances<br />
again to the attack . As a consequence of the enemy's powerful artillery action<br />
and because of flanking fire on three sides coming from dominating positions<br />
in the hills, the attack meets with no success. The Kampfgruppe is forced to<br />
pass to the defensive toward noon and to meet several violent counterattacks<br />
executed by the enemy, some of them with tanks, until evening . In the course<br />
of this action our left flank is<br />
until nightfall . In :this counterattacks<br />
pressed back eastward, The fighting lasts<br />
the enemy has the advantage of possessing
134<br />
on thc+ surrounding heights excellent observation posts domfimnding the entire<br />
battlefield . (Annex 1156)<br />
The attack of the A .A.580 to open the passes north of Thelepte from the<br />
north is also unable to push through to its objective because of strong hostile<br />
interference and the swampy condition of the roads . Consequently the attack is<br />
broken off towatd noon on orders of the armor. (Annex 115?)<br />
Hostile artillery activity is stepped up on the front of the<br />
and Div. Centauro . However the enemy does not advance to the attack .<br />
The advance made by Buhse Group is scarcely able to move forward over the<br />
difficult terrain which has become almost impassable from the rain. The enew<br />
defiles<br />
continues as before to hold the basses west of Ousseltda in . heavy forces .<br />
]1Urther reconnaissance conducted on our part along the north Tunisian<br />
front establishes the fact that there has been no weakening of the advanced<br />
forces occupying the positions site the northern half of the -.10L 5.Pz .<br />
Armes's sector. Moreover local reserves still seem to be there (Annex 1158 )<br />
(Situation map and reports see Annex 1159 )<br />
Air situation:<br />
Our LuftnPffe is giving effective support to our fighting despite very<br />
difficult weather conditions . _<br />
Throughout the day enemy Tabo and attack planes were attacking in - the<br />
region of DJ .el Hams and wouth of Thala . In this fighting 5 enemy planes were<br />
shot down by ground fire .<br />
Estimate of the situation and plans :<br />
a . First Italian Amy :<br />
21 .Pz.Biv .<br />
Bedause of poor weather conditions, air reconnaissance is able to disclose<br />
only an incomplete picture of the enemy dispositions on the front . The impression<br />
gained of the enemy today confirms the viewpoint of the army, that the enemy<br />
qill not move to the attack against the advanced Mareth position until he has<br />
brought up stronger forces and has completed his preparations .
- 135 -<br />
The plan of the First Italian <strong>Army</strong> is unchanged .<br />
b . Front of attack group north :<br />
Air reconnaissance during the day disclosed new enemy forces moving<br />
toward the front along the ilne road Le Kef - Kalaa Djerda to Thala, and also<br />
east-northeast from Tebessa .<br />
Furthermore, according to reliable sources,<br />
orders have been issued all organizations forbidding any withdrawal from the<br />
positions now occupied oi?any,,to leave his without extpress order . The enemy<br />
in any case will defend the present line : Sbiba - Thala - Dj . el Hamra, and<br />
will probably aabauuc= start his counterattack from this line too, to recap-<br />
tzars the imrortsnt Kasserine Pass in particular . The energy counterattacks<br />
made this afternoon on the front of the l0 .Pz .Div . and Kampfgruppe D .A .K .<br />
support this interpretation . (Annex 1160 )<br />
The~O .B . orients F.M.Kesselring, o arrives at the C .P.northwest of Kasse-<br />
rine in the afternoon, on the situation and concludes that it appears futile<br />
to continue the attack,<br />
forces, the unfavorable<br />
in-view of the constant reinforcing of the hostile<br />
weather which renders the terrain<br />
impassable off the hard roads, and because of the increasing problems caused<br />
by the mountain terrain which is so unsuited to the employment of armored<br />
units, all this added to the low strength of our organizations . The O .B .<br />
th$refore recommends stopping the attack and withdrawing the attack group<br />
once heavy losses have been inflicted 4k the enemy and his development in<br />
-the Cafsa - Sbeit& area has been cut up . In favor of this decision is the<br />
furtjjer fact that the situation on the Mareth front necessitates a speedy<br />
shift of the mobile troops of both armies there, in order to strike a sudden<br />
blow at the enemy while he is regrouping and before he is ready to attack .<br />
By this means it would be possible to gain a delay in his attack .<br />
F.M.Kesselring, who approves of the idea of O .B., is requested to ad-<br />
vise Ccanando Sunremo of the situation in the attack group in this senae .<br />
In a#reement twhtth O .B .Sild she O .B . plans to effect an initiam with-
drawal to the position in the pass north of Kasserine in the dight 22/23<br />
Feb . by the l0.Pz .Div . and the D.A.K ., mining the roads and trails . This is<br />
to be fdfllowed by later bounds by all elements, including the 21 .Pz.Div . and<br />
Div.Centauro, back to the original departure positions of the operation. Con-<br />
sidering the weakness of our forces and the necessity of concentrating all<br />
mobile units for an operation from the Mareth Vmdzbmc position, the afore-<br />
mentioned position is viewed as the most favorable .<br />
Detailed orders were issuedf-as follows :<br />
aa . 21.Pz .Div . will defend on 23 February the present position and will<br />
prepare to mine the Sbiba - Sbeitla road .<br />
bb . The l0.Pz .Div . and Kampfgruppe D.A .K . will fall back at dusk to the old<br />
pass positions northwest of Kasserine, mining roads and trails .<br />
A cc . ` .A .580 at dusk will withdraw to . t}ie region north of Kasserine and will<br />
refrain there for the time being in army reserve .<br />
dd . Div . Centauro will hold its present positions on 23 Feb. Annex 1161<br />
by F.M.Kesselring<br />
On the basis of the estimate of the situation, at 2310 hours Comando<br />
Supremo issues the order for breaking off the a%ttack in Central Tunisia and<br />
for falling back with the mobile troops to the positions of departure (Annex<br />
7162 ) .<br />
2 . Morning and noon report to O .K.H . (Annex 1163)<br />
1 .<br />
Seauence o£ events :<br />
---------------------------------<br />
23 February 1943<br />
a . On the front of the First Italian Array the day passed without fighting of<br />
any consequence other than reconnaissance by both sides . (Annex 1164)<br />
In the regrouping of the left flank, the reconnaissance group (A.A .3 and<br />
A.A .Nizza) is moved to the Bir Sultane area . The mission of the VXcup is to<br />
secure the deep south flank of the Maxeth front by extended reconnaissance
- 137 -<br />
south and southeast . A rather small detachment of A.A.3 remains initially<br />
in the region north of Rhoumerassen . (Annex 1164)<br />
After Gen . Masse had stated that he could not agree to the order direct-<br />
ing that all ikerman Units in his mcx~c army be placed under a German commander,<br />
the commanding general of the J",, D.A .K., O .B .Stid, by direction of Comando<br />
Supremo, orders Gen.Ziegler as deputy commander of the D .A .K. to look after<br />
1<br />
the ante ests of the German troot)s in the First Italian <strong>Army</strong>, untiaq the<br />
N<br />
arrival of the "German commander at headquarters of the First Italian <strong>Army</strong> .<br />
(Annex 1165)<br />
5 . Front cf the attack t-oun north :<br />
The withdrawal of the l0 .Pz .Div . and Kampfgruppe D.A.K. in the night of<br />
22/23 Feb . took place free from enenrj pressure of any consequence and, .despite<br />
considerable difficulty on account of the roads - tt went off accoxrding -to ~-<br />
plan . In the late forenoon the last units are taken back behind the pass<br />
position, all roads and trails being heavily mined . The 10.Pz.Div . and the<br />
Kampfgruppe D.A .K. stand in the positions ordered, ready for action(Annea 1166)<br />
The night passed quietly in the 2lxPz .Div . and Div . Centauro.( Annex 1167)<br />
Toward noon the army orders Kampfgruppe D .A .K . relieved by elements of<br />
the l0 .Pz .Div . end to reach the region Feriana - Thelepte by evening, where<br />
it would take over positions held there by the Div . Centauro . (S[4 Given orally<br />
by O .B. to the co.-rander of Kampfgruppe D.A.K . )<br />
Apparently held up seriously by the mines, the enewW follows hesitantly<br />
only . He limits his activity to reconnaissance and artillery action. The day<br />
passes without fighting of any consequence.<br />
Toward evening the situation is as follows :<br />
21 .Pz .Div . is defending its former positions just south of 5biba,<br />
l0 .Pz .Div . i s holding the Kasserine pass positions .<br />
",lost of the organizations of Kampfgrupe D .A.K . have arrived in the<br />
Feriana - Thelepte region ahx have begun the relief of Div . Centauro .
A.A.580 is army reserve in region west of Sbeitla .<br />
Air situation :<br />
(Situation map)<br />
Since evUly afternoon the enemy has kept up a constant attack with bombers<br />
a<br />
of all types and pursuit aviation against the region/round Kasserine and `<br />
Feriana in a force heretofore unparallelled . (In a quarter of an hour 104 planes<br />
are counted over the Kasserine area) .<br />
Our Luftwaffe carries out successful attacks in the region around Thala<br />
and el Hams..<br />
Est&mate of the situation and plans :<br />
a . First Italian <strong>Army</strong> :<br />
- 138 -<br />
Situation and plan on the 14Sareth front unchanged .<br />
b. Front oftthe attack pxoup north :<br />
In compliance with orders from Comando Supremo to move the attack units<br />
back by echelon in delaying action, it is ordered for the 24 Feb. that :<br />
aa . The 21 .Pz.Div . will hold its present positions .<br />
bb . The l0.Pz .Div . will. defend Kasserine Pass . In case of strong enemy pressure<br />
it will be taken back to the region west of Sbeitla, to cover the with-<br />
drawal of the 21 .Pz .Div .<br />
cc . Ksmpfaruppe D .A .K . will defend the Feriana region and will fall back un-<br />
der heavy enemy pressure only after mining the roads and destroying the<br />
railway line running to Gefsa . Elements of Div. Centauro attached to the<br />
KampfRruppe will be released to the division .<br />
dd . Div . Centauro with mobile elements, including attached German Lw .Co . will<br />
occupy the north and n ,Drthwest front of Gafsa following its relief<br />
foot?<br />
by the D.A.K . There the im-mobile troops will be relieved and put in<br />
line in the former positions east of Guettar and south of DJ .Bu Jerra .<br />
Elements previously attached to Kamnfgruppe D .A .K . will accompany it .<br />
ee . A .A .580 will secure the right flank of the 21 .P- .Div . i n the region north-
east of Sbeitla . ( Annex 11681<br />
- 139 -<br />
At 1730 hours the order is received from Comando Supremo covering the<br />
formation of the Arm Groun Africa under the command of F."".Rommel. To the<br />
<strong>Army</strong> Group Africa are attached the 5.Pz.<strong>Army</strong> and the First Italian <strong>Army</strong>, and .<br />
are placed under its direct control as a mobile Kampfgruppe.<br />
the<br />
1O .Pz.Div ., 21 .Pz .Div . and the Kampfgruppe D .A .K./(Annex 1169)<br />
F.M.Rommel reports to Comando Supremo and RZ O .K.WA.F .St. I that he<br />
has taken command of Armor Group Africa at 1800 hours . (Annex 1170)<br />
On the basis of the new organization of the command it is directed that :<br />
aa. The 5.Pz.AruV will occupy the former main battle position, its right on the<br />
coast, its left at Sened and will organize it immediately for defazse. The<br />
work of mining the front is to be carried out quickly.<br />
bb . The First Italian <strong>Army</strong> takes command of the entire front of the former<br />
PZ .Arnly including the Gafsa area . For this purpose .Div .<br />
Centauro is attached to it . (Annex 1171)<br />
Toward 2100 hours a second order arrives from Comando Supremo<br />
containing instructions for subsequent action of the <strong>Army</strong> Group. It pre-<br />
scribes the operation on the A~reth front proposai by F.M.Rolmn-el, It directs<br />
that : -<br />
"The <strong>Army</strong> Group will move the mobile organizations by echelon in delaying<br />
lb<br />
action to rear of the former main battle position, so that they will complete<br />
their reorganization and rest, and be completely ready to reenter the line at<br />
the beginning of March. The following will be assembled as indicated, at the<br />
disposal of the <strong>Army</strong> Group: IO .Pz .Div . in the region of Sfax, the bulk of the<br />
other for ed organizations in the area of GaV'es .<br />
The new mission of the <strong>Army</strong> Group is to destroy the advanced combat ele-<br />
ments of the British Eighth <strong>Army</strong> . The objectives of this operation will be announ-<br />
ced as soon as possible" . (Annex 1172)<br />
On the basis of this order Gen.h4esse is requested to submit to the O.B .<br />
not later than 26 Feb . :
aa .<br />
1140<br />
Recommendations for an attack of mobile forces in the strength of 2-3<br />
Pz .divs . to destroy the hostile forces standing on the Mareth front.<br />
bb . Recommendations for an attack by 2-3 Pz .divs . against hostile forces<br />
opetating against the southern front of the Mareth position, with the<br />
object of destroying them . UAnnex 1173)<br />
2 . Morning and noon report to O .K.H. (Annex 1174)
a6<br />
Deutsches Afrika Korps, War Diary (Extract), 19-<br />
24 February 1943
DNU=AMM t A13T*X 'IR.2a12s3 0.0c8 v.24,1V'.45<br />
19 pebr44ty 1943<br />
. , . - QUIG~t ar'txt,<br />
Cmbgt eolm],an 4.}l, hut blm up the ral3.road twxnol<br />
vok&cast of moulstroo (A I -* 4# t3 I) .<br />
12 hr Arzyr or4or (*ta talephoned) througli Op.Sactlon .Q.O.K. via Nrsoaul<br />
&djut=t to 0,3, (GaCda) to : operation liootiont -rapfrruppo A..~ . Y~. will<br />
attook on 19 Fein . over the Tlwlapta road, the Nasaerluo Pats uorUrrroot o!'<br />
ordered<br />
serina end talon it (taXt Ar V Order A 5) All troops gill bo/roady to<br />
=rah imadiat*ly. Comandera at dorpo 0,P, 'The intention or f-ho Corps<br />
. .-attempt to, .<br />
is to/tom ttmt patio xzorthwast of Saanaring in a aurprioa raid try the<br />
Raaonnaiareanoo Bn. mommas maidng una o£ the first =cmmii lil;ht . In<br />
*arse the battalion mete strong raaiateawa the Pz .Gran.PCt.Afr1oa will attaol:<br />
1atdr after mvinC i pog1tion and aftrar the vAvanoa of utis artill),ry .<br />
Azmarsd Ba .6totten u.ll move forward- at first only as far as tazn area vast<br />
oR tho road fork north of Theleptxa ao au to be available for amplo mant in<br />
the dirootion of the pains and also to the freCt: ice 5th 3araa,-Uari tan. will<br />
ewer tho. e*otor harai ofora defouded by D.A.R. until the arrival of the rc-<br />
inforood 7th Hvrsarlieri ast. fr= Co.fea. The: Arvorod of tt~ Die. Cwi-<br />
taut wIll by 'placed for they Control of tlut battalion to ropultle a poasiblo<br />
e oow attank tram tha direotion of the Tobeeo4 road . Pe: r< orders 0.1 l.<br />
orally<br />
be iesuod i diately by tblaphono and later tb U,%c.<br />
tlto 33d heo.Vn. is advanoiai; in the diraotjon of zusasrlno .<br />
vie h rozaininz; olazanta of t4o Alag"'lpfc"rupie £all in . ""'Ith Poor viai-<br />
bIMy the 3'xt Rao.Bn. appronolias the papa taxed .£a mart b;; 1:? .¢ :iro of ar{A-<br />
track gun* and of a light battery . (Annex (;-3) he enez,V in doLO ::wllrt,~. Uxr<br />
rte with the point of rain effort to the want. It to n .t I:oasible to taker<br />
Q withdrc-~rs<br />
the paue with the £*mat of the battalion. `Rivreforo tl-c, bc.ttlioa
from the eatr=as of .the pass to the aouttvre$t .(An.9 )<br />
In the meantime the Pz .Oren.IIgt .Africa has reached the assembly area<br />
Wouth of the paaa . Behind the regiment the artillery and the flak btry .<br />
xkxXIDab9~ are going rapidly into position .<br />
. ' .,h . the regiment starts in the dimotion of the pass entranou (Chadbi) .<br />
"The Corpo C,p, ' has " already been moved to the region 1 Len nortfrvoat ofthe<br />
.<br />
ro4id fork .west of KLseerino (B 2 ) . With the support of the artillery the<br />
regimnta2 attack makes good progress at firstj there la a ¢1.iFht fog .<br />
The 2d "hn . attaoldng on the right throtiva envy esourity dotaohnisnts baak<br />
into , the pass road and, toward noon, tdkes Hill 974 east of the pass . -O 3)<br />
Then flaztking firs from the via .ty of hill 712 and from the north stopa<br />
thei attack,<br />
.<br />
"The lot Ano (left),whioh had atsuted shortly after the 2d'Bn .,<br />
atteAks over Wadi Zobboua in ti he dirootion of dill 712. Zho battalion sustains<br />
strong fire . from" antitank guns, xh maohiiw guns and artillery N7Uoh on'wiot<br />
be alittinatedby our artillery baoauo* of poor visibility . 'His aumv sears<br />
to be strongly entrenched in the left " peotor . At some plaoos 7.5 era motor<br />
gun oarriAgax are identified. As the region possoacou the only croesing.<br />
to Bill 712 exoopt for Wadi Zabbous, and has no terrain obstaolea, the com-<br />
manding genera, deoidos to oo=it the armored battalion for the support of the Im<br />
battalion employed on the left and engaged in hard fighting, and for tha re-<br />
11oving the presauro on the right battalion. The armored battalion mo":es<br />
~, out of<br />
at 1215 hr fewaxtho area west of the road fork west of Kaaaeriiw .<br />
at the C .P. Hs is oriented by the oammanding general on the<br />
dOwelopmontof . . the situation. The Corps intends to oapturo today the .xta<br />
stubbornly defended pass . The O.D . gives informtion oonocrni : ; the intFIution<br />
to Carry out a main thrust with tIio 10th and 21st fz .Diva . over Sbuitlo.,<br />
Sbiba to the north. After the Rasserine pnaa is opcnod an adranao toward<br />
the we at against Tabea$a is intandod to deceive the eneW . After the pass<br />
is taken the Corps will take measuroo for leaving soouritl dataeilnonto at the
pace . end,<br />
West<br />
fo., movi th the bulk pf , its troops over Sbeitla, Sbiba Do to<br />
.<br />
fho qot t, ooverizzg _fcroe.letpr * 0 13 * giivas furthor information on Vie oi "-<br />
. the division,<br />
tu%tloa An the ,2jet,Ps,Div,j ,, 1 3 11 ij advancing oter, 5baltla, has atone to about<br />
12 lea o£ Suiba, .has boon sstoppod thorn by . a double mina bolt end stronuly<br />
ocoupied ==trim ,positions, .and io getting ready to .renew its attack.<br />
hr the,.K=p£gruppc roaumos the ' attack on the loft flan1c . Tho amorod<br />
battalion attaol over .W41 gubbous on Hill 712. About 30 onamy heavy arrraorod<br />
.r , , , . . . . . . . : .<br />
to the noru:wout<br />
ooout , Class, so=, of thaw equipped with 7 .5ara ru4s, withdraw/from do W;t:aok .<br />
The lot Dn*,Fz .Gron .Rgt . Anioa follows the attack of ithe Armored B:rt ,.alion .<br />
As, fair as vi..aibllity pa=its the attack io auupoxtoQ, by t1 :o oouoesnttttrfAd Sirs<br />
of, the artillery and heavy flak. Ths anomy offers stubborn resistanoe . The<br />
area betvmon Pills 712 Atsd 812, froze which he oonduots his defenae, turns out-<br />
to . be rug;,od hill country with parry ravinaa . At 1 .[9.11 712 tlhn attack 431 the<br />
armored battalion .1a stopped b1 a ziino field (Anr lo . B 4, FIZ5) . The let: Bn .,<br />
moves<br />
Dr,,, Gren*Agt.Afrioa t up to tlia line of tnnks, and at nightfall moves<br />
h.~rond then in the direction of Hill .812. Several timas the enemy is obsorvod<br />
moving back to the northwast. Bhgineers arc Omployad to olear the minas in<br />
front of tlw arrored battalion. However, the approaching dar}a:wss riakou a<br />
further asaault: of the t=ka '.'raossible ..<br />
A`ooaa?ar3y of the Ps*Grate*Rg *Africa (mountain infantry) had boon aozi3itted<br />
in the , direction of hill $12 onoiroling frcua the south. No message is rooeived<br />
from ,ths . .oorpany . The sound . .of £lghting is heard from a direction south of<br />
Hill 812. Aaoording to prisonaral a -tntvmanta the corcrpany 3,s surrounded,<br />
in the 2d Bn., Pz.Gren.R9t.AfrIoa oommittod on the right the attack did<br />
:. : : : . . . : . .<br />
anew<br />
net go beyond Hill 974 because of stronr_/flankiug fire from a arrest-rly direction .<br />
From the road leading from the nort1i to tho pans and from the mountainoua<br />
tcrrpln north of Hill 974 th,o ta=7 laun:ahos saveral attacks uZai.wat the<br />
battalions they are all repulsed . .
: Por- tha=ni&VU ; is ordered that - tho Pz . Gren.Rgr. Afrioa will ,pace to<br />
tie~defdnacin-iha`lint"it has reaohed and will kcop oloso oontaot with "ckio<br />
oonsV . throvgh~vorbat reoonaiaswloe . If a vridhdraval of the enenv - is ob-<br />
eerved "-pursuit vd.ll be`- lauaohed imadiataly. The armored battalion troves<br />
back to the area south"st of Chombi . The 5th 13arsaftliori<br />
relieved durl reg the day by the 7th B cr aagl ion R t .<br />
inite Tholepte "aaotor sand the Armored Battalion of Div . Contauro move durilC<br />
irho night to - the area northrrent 'o£ the T{asnerino road fork . I~oo .li%1 .33 ru_<br />
oeivas the order to move to the arse 3 km ar_at o£ CYuunbl and to nest us covaring<br />
i<br />
Toro® ;jointly with the 24 Ha *# Pat Grvn,Rgt.Afrioa. Booausa the terrain is isi<br />
pamble - the mission aannot'bo carried out. The battalion thareforo remains<br />
in. the area southwaat of Cheznbi . '<br />
20w ; fir The Corps C,? is transtarrad to the east exit o£ Za3aerino (B G)<br />
Evening report A 11 ." 13 .- B 7i B 6<br />
, . . ." ` 14 tlia '"$reef of Hill 712 over x.00 prisoners warn taken .<br />
Atrioa repozta that acoording'to pri:abna~rsl mtataicento the, pass is dcforded<br />
by 1500 Amrict4 . (A 19)<br />
Supplies, n .A,X.`,begins during the day to ,ova the supply depot Oorvoxd<br />
to the'area Fari=a, - Thelepto 13 9) .<br />
~'APter' nightfall the- 2d _ Ds., Pz :Or=*Rgt .Afrioa suoo aeds 9.n takii4c; the<br />
domi=t hoighti - .X191 =st oP the pasa and in advancing along the road to<br />
the torth as'£or au the region of points 700 . The $nay attaoUr4; durin(;<br />
the night the do battalions o£ P& grcn.Rgr .Afriea io t;rrne :ally repulo :+d . :ie<br />
auooaada howavor in recapturing point 700 in a counterthruet . Contrary to<br />
late<br />
the iaipz'assxorl exi.ating during the/aft" rnoon that th© vna y is ret.:"t7ating to<br />
the'narthw4ct, the Corps gain the improsaion that the creamy intends to ao:ilanum<br />
holding the western and northern oxits o£ tile? pans on 20 February .<br />
2'00 hr the r1rv order for 20 February is rooivad . 20 j`QJruc:ry the Corpo
ind'advenoo to' tha northnvoct, in the dircotion o£<br />
'Di,el . Hamra# open the passes there and pass to the defense with front to<br />
e<br />
the v®at (A 20).- Driating from the intention annouaoed this mornin Xby<br />
the .00 . - the' <strong>Army</strong> intoruia, after the pass hats been opened, to draw the 10th<br />
f_s*niv. through it in the diraotion of Thala, Kalaa D3orda .<br />
., . Thereupon the Corps orders for 20 Feliruaryr Ps . Cren .Rgt .Afrioa west,<br />
with`: to . support-of this entire artillery and heavy flak to whtoh a lhaezl tzar<br />
1~attary ;and a jx rookat projeotor buttery arrived during 19 Fab. have boon<br />
attached, will -,continue the attack and take Knoserino pose, Attack will be<br />
lauitohed . at 0700 hr. - Arbor opening the peas road irmediate oo:axlt3innt of<br />
the .<br />
'raconzaiasanas battalion and the haw armored battalions to the nort}nost<br />
is intended,, These two units will ready to rrar, oh at 0800 hr . (pertinent<br />
orders - isausd 20 . Feb rusty.0105 hr w-id 0110 hr, , B 10, 11).<br />
. . 0m 20 February l light flak battery o£ the 135th Flak Rgt. will ba<br />
brought up to Fz* Oren ..Rgt ..Afrioa aid re aorw+a for grourui operation. (J 12)<br />
; _ . . . , 20 February 19143<br />
During the' eight the enemy attempted at varioun<br />
places to<br />
throwlthe attaoking advanood elements or the Pz.Cron.Rgt .Africa back by a<br />
oountarthru4t. Tho attaok~s vmre repulaud (A .1 . )<br />
In the crorning hours the loading olements of the loth Pz . Div. arrive<br />
in .tha Xasaorino area . Towoid a concentration of. foroas the division is<br />
requested try romin east or Kaaaorino (p.2)<br />
;. . . The attack which had bass dooidod for 0'100 hr is postponed 1 )tour aril<br />
fire<br />
30 beoauso or poor visibility and the/un*zcvtrottdinose of the entire urtillory .<br />
At 3 the atta0k interrupted the pr*viouo dray is rosmod . In the &~opl-<br />
mat of point 77,2 the let Hn:,Pz .Oron.Rrt .Afr1oa uakas only slow ns:d<br />
rawlnoa
tromi the worth .<br />
Y :wiP A i°<br />
. - (r<br />
.v<br />
.<br />
dAwiA44' jThti '2d'"Pz,oren.Rgr Afrioa I oannot ` fall in to the attaok<br />
a ic''as''tho' euy'is'advaw{nZ *against M11 1191 9.n battalion atrengtii, w<br />
k `the `Oeourity detaohrzonte planed thorn o1ui L~attapk~4 a~a 2d 8 ;1,<br />
p,B,` . : at. .Oorpo C,P, at Kaaaerino . 110 disousses tyro altuution with<br />
the comLmanding general . As a result an ordar is iwsuod to the 5th BoraaCII. ,=ri<br />
Bn to - attaok into the gap bartwoon 'the lot and 2d lies ., fz . urez~ . .Ut.~fri~;a ovor<br />
Point 712 in . the' dirootion of Ogriue . T'LO O .B . "moves to U10 cll':vanocjd Corps<br />
G 'P*~~and issues tha " order for the iwrsodiate oor :rrd"tnent of ;;ho Gronadlor Cod .<br />
of the 0,B, oor:bat ooholon* and of the Groxundior, Co . oil the 33d Rooou . an .<br />
on:lthe left flank of the lot Bn . Pz.Grun.?2gt.Afr1ca . From the advanood Corps<br />
0 ; P the 0. . goes with the we=nding general . to the C .P . of the lot Bn .<br />
Pz.Gron,Rgt.Afrioa in the area Tmat of point 712 . fho regtmont oonumnder<br />
reports on the'e*of the ¬attaok . The lot Bn .~ la advanoing slowly and with<br />
great pains in'the diffloult mountainous terrain by Hill (312 whore the ti :-em'<br />
In well -- ooasol1datod .xmubda= and domimnt wountain positions is roaistirZ,<br />
atubboraly.' The possibilities of artillery support taro limited by this<br />
terrain' diffioulties sad espevially b-y the fog . Tho onOW $coma to bo of ., oring<br />
strotizast rusiatance in the line Ogrino-point £312 . For the reiaforoomont of<br />
the attaak the ' 0, A, orders the ooasml.tmr3nt of a battalion of the 10th Pz . Div .<br />
vhi4 had adwicod out of the Sboitla during the night,<br />
.<br />
later the order S.a<br />
puppleiaentdd to the extent that at 1,630 ht' the loth Pz . Div . and Xampfgruppe<br />
6-<br />
D .A4,r* together (the loth Ps .Div. with all elements arrived now)<br />
-rill attack the pass positions (B 3.4) . The 10th Pz,Div . will atdaat: with 2<br />
. battalions over Hill 974, to the north and later turn zreatzrard in the dirootion<br />
of Ogrixu3 .<br />
V7111 .;. attack<br />
712 to . .'tho nortlmest (A.2, 3) .<br />
The 2d Bn . Pz.Gron .Rgr .Africa mid Bn .5 B©raagliari<br />
' 'the 5th Bn.Ikruagliori is adti"anoliT, ainao 1025 hr frog: Hill
.. 7 -<br />
XU the noun }rpurS the 5th Bn.Bersaglieri and the let Bn Pz,, CGron.Rgt,<br />
Africa are advancing slowly in the direction O~rino - 812. The artlllory<br />
is active on both sides.<br />
Araored Inf. I<br />
At 163''.1 hr alanentz of the 10th Pz .Div .( 4/Battalions, 2 Artll ry Day) end<br />
Xampfgruppe D.A.1, again launoh tho att.;aak on the entire front. 1hoy galzn<br />
ground rapidly thanks to well plaoad fire of a-tillvry and z:ortarrn In U;'e:<br />
left aeotor the lot Big,, fz. Grvn.Rgt ., offootivoly supportad on Its right<br />
,lank by the 5th bareagliarl Bn., driven tho crteny out of the peas to the<br />
northwest, The enemy is still, holding out at the north exit of 1ko pass<br />
with strong forces and also tanks. The commanding general therfiforo dooidoa<br />
1to launch the Armored Bn,Btotton against th&a eneW, In atronuous 1Yghtlng<br />
the battalion suconads in annihilating 12 'many tanks and 51 armored porconnol<br />
`oarricars ., fha+ s,tt k is effeativoly supported by ole=ntu of ttio loth PZ,<br />
`Die, advanoizig over paint 974"<br />
At ?,Eil5 hr the onosnpr is north of point 700 (An-4) . The tuattalion<br />
anatainues ~1.ts grctsr3wra end rvaohan the north exit ofthe pass 7 km nort}i of<br />
Chansbl (hzi.5), Lvsz1 before this uhdmy movexir3nts to the rear had bean observed<br />
end engaged by our artillery fire . Uiv,Cmntaurota sneered battalion, in roedi--<br />
naes for pursuit, rocsiv+nd the order to fall in before drarlaxnaa to ttrcr north-<br />
west ate reach Hir Bzikst (9 keen northwest of C3uaa:vi ) . 1 he battalion advances<br />
to liir Brika and - puithss 3 krn beyond without: rorjing ire contact with tlao onamy .<br />
In compliance with the O.B. w a instructions the orders for the-night and<br />
for 21 Fob . are issued, after nightfall, The 10th Yz .D3.v. -,,All tra o over the<br />
defense of the eastern part of the pass (eciet: of Wadi Hatab) and soma of its<br />
elomon'..s will attack during the night beyond this point to the north . The<br />
X321 be<br />
a®otor south of pledi Flatotr is protected by iiampfgrru:,po D.A .K . for that pur-<br />
pose the rein.E'orved 5th I3oreagltmri TSn . and the reinforced 1st Bn., Y£ .! :ra2; .<br />
Rgt: . Africa will be put in the advanced line . For the defense 1;11a jth Barsa-
,. 8u~,.~w ah<br />
r<br />
_ . ,.<br />
was killed at<br />
Fought valiantly today . (its , 'oamnnder :Ddl An the front; - )<br />
'~.vill bo - placed wilder thocontrol or P% . Vraa .j'1gt.Afrioa .<br />
`Armored Ba,Stottan will vithdraw to the area soath of Chanbi for avail-<br />
ability, while the 33d Recon.Su . relarorood by an Arm, Eng .gn., 1 11rlxt £Sold<br />
horitaor .battery and armored olement-a of Div. Coatauro reocivas tats order to<br />
short to march at midnight alone the road to the northraat an advan^o acs far<br />
as the passes at Dj, al Hamra a:,A take nosseasion of tha lain pac9 '0y, rur:>rlso<br />
1f possible . (p .6-11)<br />
Wanix~, raporU An .6 - 12 n.12<br />
Progress roport ,p:Y3<br />
Wed -air 9Rtivity 'on both sides becauso of poor visibility . Out of h<br />
attaa1cing onmw plmwa'3 were shot down .<br />
:AYW., order for' . the now sot up of the ahalA of co-,=ed . Moordingly the<br />
Arse Ib, .un Panaorarray has taken over the counnnd in the aotth e rotor. All<br />
tea elements of they First Italian `lirmy and oftie nfttz G%- .Ian ?rmy veacia<br />
are at `present engaged 3.n attao' f inomeal Tunisia avill be pleoad under<br />
the control of F,U.RozanaI at: Group Rorsw11 until . farther orders the3 1Yrst<br />
Italian <strong>Army</strong> 3.s also under hits arders (An.13, l4) .<br />
21 February 1,943<br />
Bsoause of obstruction of the pass road the r&luforcexl 33d Raoon.5n. vma<br />
waablo 'to launah its Counterthrust at 4000 hr ; It &1d so at 0200 hr (An. l ) .<br />
' 3,ixtean kilometers north of the pass the battalion cane upon an unsupr group<br />
of 20 vohialos whioll, upon attack o£ then battalion, withdrew to the nortfruest .<br />
An.2,3) . . The battalion'aoutIrwas to edvanoo, doetroyri I arlaorod r~-coruxalscanoo<br />
oar :.and 1 antitank gun and attempts to encircle cue:w roarg-uard (an .W. At<br />
thv battalion<br />
firrt the enory vithdraws, but at 0500 lxr attacks/with ~-0 vchicles irioludirZ<br />
tanks (tin . 5) and at Qur 0o hr wlthdraws arain to the north,roct . (Azzi .6 ) .
iT7"<br />
Ixt the pass position the night passed quiatly .<br />
An order frcz X1.0.1-: .<br />
. .. ., : .<br />
croup 11tmal) is roooivod for 21 ~Ilbruury . It conour .- wit?, tlzo<br />
Instruotioaa isaund oruily ra-Ld by tolophonos to hold tho pass poC{Lion,<br />
and, sand stronc recoznAisuruicmn in tlar dirootian <strong>Of</strong> Dj, 101 , i 11S3 10th<br />
will uttaok with a oorsb~t rrnup In t~zo d3.1act-lon o .'.' 1'.:r.?a . The ro»<br />
1S.eP of the . -<br />
=tor ayolo battalion of V -.0 1Mh 1z .Dj-z . in the oast p-rt of ::1_a pa-c by<br />
,f&ruppp D,A. Z. will by prgpurad, Thci road uc:oawr"r.c - Tti; ?,^_ -s111 ba tho<br />
boaadary battvrocr& the 10th a<br />
tulle witch the 30La P%*Div . tiia old bouv:ary Yladi iiatob la X-7-stIM retainod,<br />
a xoport boing moat to A.O,XC. (Fuz.?. An .3) : At c1Cyur3ak t
10 -<br />
.tbora unttil the arrival 4f K=p£gruppe D.A.K. wtdoh will come for rd out<br />
balk of the<br />
of the pass ` etV .06 hr . "The/10th 1-z .Div. will move at the sate tim an<br />
1hola (p,2-8) .' . 'The raid of the 33d Reo.Bn. failodj the battalion rlont in-<br />
t6--positron north ofthe' trail loading to the main paoe at point 732 at<br />
tadi Hatob' (An.W.<br />
At 1400 hr the bulk - of'thd Karnpfgruppe moves in in the order namods 1<br />
battalion o£ Pz'.Qrun,Rgr . Afrioa,artillery, 1 battalion Pz.Crf:n.Rgt . Africa,<br />
tank8,`-5th Dn.F Bersaglieri .' The foremost battalion joins the loft iAnnk<br />
of ,.the'3.3d Reo.Ba.at 1530 hr and prepares on both aides of the :%aasoa for<br />
an attach to the' mrthwast .<br />
--' W0 hr the battalion reinforced by tanks of the Div.Centauro (An-15)<br />
. . . , south of P,732 strong<br />
launoheo . the' attack (p"9) trhioh is ohooked/by inoreasingly/arty fire (p .10,11) .<br />
Our artillery, ready to fire in a vrry short time can only engago onemy vot2iclos<br />
and adveuaaad onenV positions. The positions of the enemy artillery (4. btrios)<br />
am, not been spotted .<br />
t; `~ . F-sti=ta of the situation at night falls<br />
The mission assigned at noon for the opening of one of the two pausas<br />
tO'`Tebessa could not We oxcouted, as the foroos brought forward Mtil tho<br />
afternoon wero too strongly hindered by the of foot of one artillery :ire .<br />
--The<br />
attitude of the enemy leads to the oonoluuion that he no lon or in-<br />
tends to hold bridgeheads west of itie paseas . It can be assumed, however,<br />
that'he will defend the passof proper on 22 Peb. also . ''<br />
The terrain between the positions we have r;!achod and the north pass<br />
51<br />
(Kranguat ae 8loughi) 1s very level, offers hardly any oovor and can bo v:ewdd<br />
exoeptioually Troll from than - do-Atant iaountain positions on both aides of the<br />
pees . - 'The strength'of our %ampfgruppe, especially of our infantry, indicates<br />
that a froatal attack, as mall me one from the riorticaDt would bo hopoloss .<br />
An attack from the south along the east ridge of D j . firms is rc joot .:d booauso
of constant flanking threat. For a night xkJaL surprise raid against<br />
the north pass the oneW forces aean too strong oo:arAarod to the ones rra<br />
can oozudt and the varied ooaforrmtions of the terrain in the rivrth pass<br />
too difficult.<br />
A systexatioally planned attack against the south pass is alrro v cry<br />
difficult Considering the comparatively wsak oorbat strength of t)t3 Kumpf-<br />
Gr", since strong flauUng socurit,,r detachments must bca detached . H=-<br />
ever, the terrain conditions thare are more favorable, as Dj . ol Adira atrot
During the night and also by dAy aezroral<br />
Bersaglied Bn, (roinforcod by 2 Italian batteries 6.5om and a Gorsrfan heavy<br />
antitatxx oompazq) ooouples positions in the proscribed area . Against the<br />
order of the Corps t1lo motor vahioles are taken into the positione and loft<br />
there ., The Pz .Gron*Rrt. Afrioa and the artillery of the KumpLgruppo are ro-r<br />
grouping, Booauao of terrain difficulties they naroh of t1lo fz . Gron.Rgr . Africa<br />
long'<br />
isldelaysd . Tho regiment happens upon the anogy by surpriaa (p.1) call takes<br />
Ei . guns and about 30 . motor. vohiolvs, bub during the dqy it loom t1lem<br />
again. ,.dt day brook it is fouzA - that durln the night the r"jgi=nt has Bona -<br />
out of its and is now at Hill 812, 9 )=.ooath" aouthoaat of the ordorod<br />
an<br />
objsotivo. WOWS the -regiment is opposed by onorV ivi about<br />
the strvrp-th of a. regimcmt ln=dxmtb~g dafonding the pass road lending Trope<br />
the north an Aino bau Q?rioa . to lat -, Bn.,Pz .C-ron .Il1;t .Ai'rioa<br />
the morns<br />
22 February l')43<br />
auoooods iti<br />
alll 812 a6oupiod by the snow, but the ro(;imcut,<br />
supported . by part o£ our artillery only and taoinG in an open terrain a<br />
is not possible to carry out the mission.<br />
pours . fllo 9th<br />
superior enarq, remains in a dangerous situations, as the left flank in<br />
which the 580th Reo.Bn. was to be is ".mprafvoted. In such a aituation 1.t<br />
*b In the right flank the situation develops as fellwo during the<br />
infantry<br />
morningi 'The erneW diaangngad tsuYf, He asam.a to have somv~saoursty<br />
detaotments opposite the 5th baraegliori Bn. ' In addition, before who front<br />
of the battalion several enaetf tanks and zdxt salt propollad mounts are hold-<br />
ing then positions under ethift fire (An.5). lho dofensive foroo of the b&tta-<br />
lion is poor ., broovar, oonsidorizg the Italian uentality, it ie dot>bt£ull<br />
whether the battalion is equal to further heavy dutioa . A~;oordingly then<br />
armored group (Da.8tottun, Armored Dn . and assault guza of Div.Coatauro)
13 ..<br />
reoeive the order that the envzV in front of R the 5th Dn.Dorsagliori is<br />
to - be'throym bask to the 'pass ciatranoo,<br />
At 0x930 -the 33d Roo,Ur6 raporta 25 enemy tanka a=in from tlio great,<br />
advanoing 4" lqu' north <strong>Of</strong>- our ponitiaxt (point 732 (An-6) . On the basis of thin .<br />
report 'on the new onegr group Ps. aron #Rgt,Afrii4a rooeivoo the order to with-<br />
draw 1 , bnttaiion and - put it in line north of the trail on a line fIth bhe<br />
Corps diP." . l1eaionr-protection of the deep north flank (P ,2),<br />
' The`rogimnt reports by telephone that it is under very atrong<br />
artillery fire, that to detach one battalion,is pocaible only at the risk<br />
fQ.a.t"<br />
Qr he4v.VIlosnae,' ",the line. rowhed oannot be dxtendecl held -with one batter.<br />
lion only . Thereupart the order to repealynd . The artillery regroups according<br />
VO l the * ohanGed situation* .<br />
v-K-<br />
.`; . :' In . the moefiios pressure S . the front of the 5th Bn,Barsaglieri has bean<br />
eased . by * .a tank attack of our'om, (Anw7, $) , Armorcsd Bn.Stotten roponto that<br />
x" ont (3.5 ku in . front of the 5th Bn.Beraagliari)) tanks and<br />
Ifatitry are in poeiti " ~; battalion in under strong artillo~y fire ; it'<br />
is impoeslblo to advanoo farther (Anr9. 10),<br />
Therefore at 1245 hr it reoelvos the order xdc to vrithdraw to the position<br />
,of the 9tsh Dn.Borgagliari (p.3) and to raaain in position there as rosorvn<br />
of the battalion,<br />
Rae.Da. - ropartd that the . onmq group north of point<br />
has been by<br />
7"Mpid'Y 'reinforood Matt 100 motor vihiolea, including 40 tanks<br />
(An.II;' An q 12 p.4 )* RaV~er the enfW group docrz not advance a ainat the<br />
. .4.k!<br />
D,*A,;% in the ecftarnoon (An.13,45),<br />
vohiolea drive from Aou<br />
Rhanen to the northeast in the direction of the advance route of the 10th Pa .<br />
Die, j the division is informed of the foot (A . O. K. also) P.5, P .6)<br />
During the noon hours the Pz.tlren.Rgt.A£rica'IA"-aC,.ain under heavy
Y<br />
4rtUleky-tfira:t ThA ; mortar batte :in position with the regimnt loses<br />
I ~ of ;its . . gu .,, ~~nsmdr : oouratere~ttsoks are repulsed .<br />
At - 1415 hr, on the basis of the devalopwnt of ttv altuation the oorr-<br />
Anding Coneral deoid*A to order a . withdrawal on Kassorino pass for tonight .<br />
A.a .T,* is inteteuotod (P.7r' P.8) .<br />
The Q.S,offioor in oluirga of Supplies and AdrAnistration, prosoat at<br />
the O.P. in oa=issioned '..o report orally at A,c,K. on t.-he dcvolopmontl of<br />
the situation; Arur-approves of the corps' intention and ordara tho ocou ,-<br />
patioa-of ,ths - bid I=ra position attar the withdrawal . (An.15, 17) .<br />
a<br />
1505' hr . The orders-for the vrlthdraval are issued (p .9 - 13).<br />
1600 hr ., The Corpa - shittts its O .P. The oomfutndina ganorv1 =off remains un-<br />
t1l dark at the old O.P.<br />
. . . ` Durin& -the . forsnoon- there vas oray voa~ air aotivity, but in the after-<br />
. $nor<br />
noon .the%ntt~gkad - several times of th bombora and £ightera in low-level flying .<br />
4 maohines sera shot down.<br />
At 1720 hr the PsOran.Rgt,Afrioa sports an attack on the advanood (Ist)<br />
battalion from'the eouthwast (An.19), wid lacers oritioal situation<br />
them : ("19) .<br />
F3 '-Rgt~ -135 and- the artillery commander are ihstructed to rolieve tna<br />
preasure on the - ragimnt *jr- odWvntratod fire . Shortly before dark onomV<br />
tanks panotrate into the positions of the battalion. the b u3k of the battalion<br />
1<br />
Vithdrawu in -disorder at first, -h%*MW' r, but raly, later* The 5th Bn. Bcrrsa-<br />
glieri is also attackod just before dark by sove isolated tanks and abandon<br />
its positions leaving vAW motor . vehicles and a11 4 hoa :y vcapana behold .<br />
At : 1900 hr near corps c,P. at Hill 735 volt of Cha:,bi .<br />
The withdrawal - is made difficult by the rriddy condition of the trails .<br />
At cons places only oross-country motor vohicloa oe+n manage the qur-r, ::1re<br />
°+ t G~ C.<br />
wwthout help ., As Pt,Gren.Rgt.Africa is unable to =mss oavoriz,-, pooition
at ,14* Au1ad DIC :in tire; : the Corps ordars the 33d Ree,un . and Armorad 13n.<br />
Stottan to cover .tho withdrawal . Col .1'solz, oonms4er of the 135th Flak<br />
has the .raiaaion to rcgulste the withdrawal n4rah on ti -4 j:ain ;r3t:h-<br />
dravval trail, .and the co=oWer of the N.Corps Signal Dn . is entruobcd<br />
with the traffic regulations at the narrow pawn road o£ Kassorine pass<br />
At the brad plaoea on the road to the roar torodn!r parties<br />
trill. keep the traffic going . For tlia prot&otion of the west o,rtranoo of<br />
the pace until, the arrival of Pz . Crren .11 t. Africa the oozriandArC general<br />
is putting the 3d Co . 7 (10 Pz.Div,) and D.A.K, artillery trainln sLaff<br />
in - line . The 10th . P .Div, *111 be inetruated .<br />
.<br />
At 2130 tl~e33d Reojn. and Arrnorvd Dn.Stotten report that the 5th Pn.Ur-<br />
'QALAIvrl~ is coattered. fhe . batted6nne tire the last elorwnts to brork can-<br />
taot with the eat (Art+20, 21). At 2.300 hr a report is roooivod froa ."P e<br />
0ren.R.gt.Afrioa aaoording to ahioh the regimnt after the taithdrnwal at<br />
roar guards: has broken =a contact with the onenV. (An.22) .<br />
At 2330 hr thu 33d Rea.t. wh9.ah is h=bL+m* aotinC, an raar guard in<br />
the Hir.0uled Sif region repents that at no point Is the oueW fol1 ovwin;<br />
Evening reports "2L~-26, p.20<br />
The attmPtt0 <strong>Of</strong> -KaPpfgruPPO A.A.K. to vpeu the passes neat of Toba:ssa<br />
prity<br />
on 21 end 22 February fti-saarried as a result of the suparioriA=C~M of the<br />
enmtq vho had. broom forvard now forass . Tho oonduet of oporaticaa vma<br />
made more diMoult through the a+coidontal splitting of forces vrhioh oocurrod<br />
on 22 February .- - .TbO 21st PX .Div . (Sld.ba) and the loth Pz,Div . (zwith of<br />
Thala') were fighting . hard dofanaivn action on 22 Rebruary G;ainst newly<br />
Seat brought up ( -British) forces . In the,evening the 10th fc .D,y,;r . in also<br />
boginaing to withdraw on Kassarine pass . On 23 February the Corps cxpoots<br />
that the enaV -*111 - attempt to raoapture Kaseerlno pass . The do£, uuive power
It.<br />
of D.A.S. is deemed adequate-if all alemants are in posit~'-on on time .<br />
Therefore moasures'arill be takon to aasuro the vrithdraival of thj antiro<br />
Kampfgruppe during the night.<br />
The now Chief of Staff, Lt.Col . tdoltv, r.S, arrives at the C .P . in the<br />
evening o£ 22 February .<br />
23 February 1943<br />
. During the. : daY . weather olear and oloudy by turns ; no tog . The Smpf<br />
gmgpe withdraw to Hasserine pass durirp the night . After the initial name<br />
went<br />
_ .thts :zno anrsat on ovelly though slowly . Almoat all the guru and vahioles<br />
-which hod stuok in the =d could be ealvaged, The 33d Rco . Un. vhjoh Me<br />
se a<br />
reportW several . . times that the oneW is mt in pursuit, leaves at 0300 hr<br />
~the area Mr Oiled Slf, the last unit to withdraw (an .1-3 ).<br />
.At damn the last 6l=onta are moving into the pass position (An-4-9.<br />
At;.074 ,he oommanding general. arrives at mho advanood C .P. There T.o<br />
-reocive _the prdere .tor the intended movements :<br />
. -~x.e . .. .The . attack in Central Tunisia is fimml2y broken off . Gruppo<br />
._ . , R l will withdraw. The aalaments will otart to mroh to tho<br />
. . :- . . bhreth position as rapidly as possibld .<br />
_: 2, . Aftor being relieved in the pane position by the 101ch Pz.Div .<br />
D,A.S, will withdraw to the area Thelepto, Feriana. Idasiou :<br />
to relieve Div.Centauro which will move to the Gafna circus, and<br />
to oo7er the fhvlepte area until ooraplation of the de»olitions<br />
. ., . . : , of road and stationsMelepto and Gafaa.<br />
T°day the . following troops in the l axa ..h positiank .<br />
regt.8gs. aW 2~ A;DtV J$t . Std'°;L tz 7a1c, °<br />
<strong>Of</strong> Aiv,Centauro<br />
"° t n
of the . let $try., *Oth Arty rdll be released.<br />
4<br />
` Further withdrawal from Tholepte on Gasa only upon order .<br />
Demolitions and mine layirig tiill be mod<br />
on railroad, roads and airfields all along the rmy to the rear .<br />
G . P. the<br />
Chief of Staff regulates the arraii;araent'of the KOMPfgru ;>po in the pass po-<br />
sition.<br />
While the oo=aanding general is still at the advanood A<br />
After the aomnanding general and the chief of ataf£ !off returned to<br />
the Corps" C:F, - the orders for the mrah ware issued . Kanpfgruppo will ~v--<br />
part at 1300 hr-in small groups at long intervals. The relief of the rEi--<br />
in£oraed rz.Oren,Rgt.Afrioa by the lot Bn.,10th Px . .Uiv, will be arranrfld<br />
trith the . 10th Pz. Div. (p.2-9). .<br />
1300 hr' : .OrB . ,. to the E attacked . nding General (telvi Div.Contauro is being<br />
the eno And is under strong enmny fire . Transfer to Th&lep~o to be' - aeool-<br />
'crated, elements to be seat there lmadiaVly.<br />
The 33d' Reo,B11. and the 1st Ba., 4th ArmorodRgt . receive the order to<br />
move i=ediately on Tha lepte (B 10-12, An.10 ).<br />
In the forenoon the eneW fait forvaird with tanks and snout ours against<br />
'the'rpositions. r`rom 1100 hr the harassing fire of heavy, long-distance artillery<br />
lies on the`Chanbi . regioa. EhoW units of combat planes, twin engines fUnos<br />
and Pighter'bombers attack the march movements several times in tree afternoon.<br />
1.345 hr . The Qo=aandinr General leaves for lhelepte .<br />
.500'-hr ' The Coraaanding OonQral arrives in Thelopto . Thorn the situation<br />
is altogether calm (P-13)<br />
1520 hr Conference at the C .P. of D1v.Contauro. Pr:sent: Corr=ding Generals<br />
3.at Ord .4fficer, Coanaandor 334 Rea .'t=n.,Com :z:andor and Oper.offinor ofDiv.<br />
Centauro.<br />
1. Situation before the (rants oalnj watt©rod - artillory harassing fire<br />
w<br />
R,
an advawod soourity detaohmnta .. The division was not attacked .<br />
2. , Roliaf : In Tholepto and in Gouboul lass t%a ol0onts of the division<br />
tote.+,<br />
in position thero ragy depart 4~2 2z.Gron.Rgt.Africa or 3jd Reo .I3n . arc<br />
ready for defense (presumably at 2100 hr). zlomonts which have pushed<br />
to Oglet Dou Iiaya can depart at 2L~00 hr (ooiaplotion of th.3 movownto<br />
on the Basaorine-lbolopte road) .<br />
After arrival in the Thelepto arcs the lz-t Bn.,IIth Pz ..Rgt . will main<br />
at first at, the northeast edge of Thelepte .<br />
1555. hr The Ccmnanding General to O.B. by telephone: tlic Comr-mndi,,r&Gon;--,-al<br />
. the<br />
reports on the situmtioa and the. progress . oflrolief.<br />
At 1715 hr report of Italian units are received through various chonnols ;<br />
they rontion 25 vehicles, tun}ra<br />
tions at Oglot Bou £rya . (An.11, 12, p.~711.) A reoonnaissanoe by the tat -Un.<br />
8th Pz.Rgt. disolosos that they arc our ozva troops, driven a- - by the fire<br />
of .Italian . artillery. .<br />
The march of the Corps Is disrupted several times by bou .S at'cmokz .<br />
At :t 2015 hr the Pz.Grcn.ggt.Africa has moved in the new positions north of<br />
Thelepte (An:13-15).<br />
7ho relief of Div, Centauro goes on systematically .<br />
Evening reports Au, , .p"15<br />
them, waieh are approaoU :4; the poci-<br />
At PjPO hr the <strong>Army</strong> Fng.En, begizms mining the %asserino - Tholopto{(An.22,<br />
23, p.lb, i7), .<br />
21i February 1943<br />
During the night eneW guns which have boon brought foramrd lay harassing<br />
. by<br />
fire on the Feriana-Thelspto road. Two attempts v& oneLV rcconnaisonncfl<br />
patrolu to penetrate in the ' Goubeul pass terra repulsed . Tho mining of the<br />
EassQrinee-Tholopte road is continued (An.l, 2, n .l, 2).<br />
. w
Gruppe Roanrol announces that F.ILRo=ol haz taken . the high comaand o1,<br />
"Asareagruppa 'ACriku" D.A.X~ is plaocd under tho direct control of the<br />
Iisereagruppo (An.j), In modification o£ the inatruations iasuod on the<br />
previous day the Arry Group Givaa the order far the def ensa of the Fu'riaza<br />
area and for withdruval on Gafra only 3f hard proceed by t:ic anew (An.1.).<br />
the the beois of this order +JYo Commanding General requests the retention of<br />
the 1st Bn.,r3th Pz.Rgt and 1SL Bu.,19Oth Arty in 4,-he FSriona area (n.3) .<br />
T3zo request is donicd . (A.5) iho Ist Bn.,Cth Pz.P.zt. and lot Bn.,190Eh Arty.<br />
(loss 1 battery) receive thQ order to vrithdraw vin Gafaa Into the :wroth<br />
area (-P,4, 5)e. D.A.K. reports the da£easo cannot be carried out with tho<br />
forces available (p.6).
27<br />
11 Corps, Report of Operations, 1 January-15<br />
March 1943
4 1<br />
SUBJECTS Report of Opo rati ~~ -<br />
TO s The Adjutant General, U . S . <strong>Army</strong>, lYashintton, D.C .<br />
SECTION I - TM SATIN TASK FORCE<br />
SECTION II - O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA VALLEY - SEt1ED DIVERSION<br />
SECTION III - SIDI BOU ZID - GAFSA<br />
SECTIOM IV - KASSERIM. VALLEY TiM<strong>US</strong>T<br />
SECTION V - ADIMIISTRATIVE<br />
Supporting troops eonsistod of the: French Constantine Division.<br />
lt . D-Day for the _x,cution of tho SATIPT OPERATION arts<br />
10i<br />
tentatively set<br />
for 22 January 1943 . Prior to D-Day, th. ; unomy rushed reinforcements a ~r<br />
UNutA~;SCi ILG<br />
:By Authority of<br />
:CG, II Corps . s<br />
: initials<br />
.Date : 2 IWOay . :<br />
2 may 194 .<br />
-_ Report of operations II Corps from 1 Januar;" 1943 to 15 march 1943 is<br />
horoby-submitted in compliance irith paragraph 10, AR 345-105:<br />
SECTION I - THE SATT11 TASK FORCE<br />
II Corps, under verbal authority AFHQ, was selected to pun"and"<br />
oxooute operation SATIN. The initial studies for operation SATIN prior-to<br />
1 January 19113 were prepared by Fifth <strong>Army</strong> under the direction of AFHQ .<br />
2, The II Corps staff assembled for the planning - of Operation SATIN is<br />
of 2400 hours, 31 December 1942 at the Alexander Hotel, City of Algiers .<br />
'_'_3on its arrival at Algiers, the staff was given tha mission of preparing<br />
-.hrce phi "A", "a", and "C" . Final choice as to Which of tha three plans : ;I<br />
"A", "B"4 or "C", to bc: put into effect was to be made by the C-in-C, AFHQ .<br />
Plans "p", "B", ad "C" all required an initial concentration of the SATPT<br />
TASK POWE in the TEBZSSA - MSSisRS1z area. In Plan "A", the SATIN TASK FORCE<br />
- :;c.s to sieze and hold the Port of SFAX, pr.;pared.to operate northwest is the 'r.<br />
"direction of SO<strong>US</strong>SE . In Plan "B", the SATIN TASK FORCE was to'sieze and hold .~<br />
prepared to operate: north tm-Tard SFAX . In Plan "C" the SATIN T..SK<br />
FORCE Ms to advance on and capture Kl'.IRGUI.h . After securing KAIROU121, the;<br />
force : was to advance on and capture SO<strong>US</strong>SG, being prepared to destroyethc<br />
port, bridges, utilities, Ltc ., if forced to withdraw .<br />
3 . The $dTIN T,'-SK rORCZ vras directly under the command of *LrIQ as of<br />
1 January 1943 . For this operation, thQ force consisted of the following<br />
major units :<br />
Headquarters II Corps .<br />
1st hrnorud Division_ plus 701st TD Bn .<br />
41.,3rd CA Bn . (-1 Plat. Dtry I.) and 2nd Bn ., 16th Tied . Regt .<br />
attached .<br />
26th RCT plus 5th F.A . Bn. and 501st TD Bn . attached<br />
XII Air Support Command.<br />
f" 'f
Report of D eration: ;I -)z - s, ' Vay hi1,3 cnt=<br />
supplies to ilinisia aria :YJ-LS, &-id reinforce-<br />
Lezts were arriviiii, at t : :e rate ~: aPoroxinately 800 per day, pri-ci-a11;<br />
by air . Supplies were s:iipped by sea and so:ae sun:ilies were<br />
fron SFAX - and SO<strong>US</strong>Si to Tr_IPCLI for the use of RO=1- ], :L I S M-15 which<br />
--was hard--pressed by the British Lightly Axmrr. The eneryl s rtcniion at<br />
this time was to ::eep tie eastern coast plains fron i%3 ; ;IS to TRIPOLI open<br />
- for a joining of the T1:iiS1:Ui forces and the :.FPIKA COaPS . k north and<br />
south range of no..zatains, knrnri as the PJ_ST1:k: ; DORSAIS, overlooks this<br />
coastal corridor . Prior to D-Day the enenWls defensc'of the .AST:;%'. ; DOPL.~jz<br />
in the proposed SIL-,Ill TASK :OrC% zone of action was based Senerally on the<br />
occunatioa of a series of detached positions coruian,:in- the four rlain apprcac'. :<br />
es at f(M)0U1 ;, .DJFDa ~AMMSSY, and EL GUZTTAR. Behind these outposts,<br />
as of 10 Janauary, at BOv TRADI and at LA :CUC^:MERIE, were approximately<br />
two battalions of mixad German and Italian troops . These battalions<br />
were capable of reinforcing the outposts within 12 hours . Enamor reinforcenents<br />
continued to arrive at the rate of approximately 800 per day .<br />
On 5 January 1943, the SATI*1 Staff moved from ALGII-RS to C06!STA !T-<br />
LIE to continue plans of the SATE' Operation . ahile the plans were being<br />
drawn from 1 January to 17 January, troops under the SATII1 TASK -CRCE were<br />
moved to initial concentration areas behind the British First Arry . Thos`.:<br />
areas were as follows ; 1st Armored Division in t1w areas T:. OGSOUK and<br />
,CUM SECUINT; 26 the areas GGEI;A and AIL' 11I LIIA ; and service troops<br />
In the areas- COMA2ITINE and .SSA . These concentrations were preparatory<br />
to concentration in the i'a.SSA - KASSERIItir, area . A secondary mission of<br />
girding the lines of coucnnications for the British First ArT was assi.ncd<br />
to the-SATI21 FO "' troops in these areas . A small infantry and paratroop<br />
force" under Col<br />
_oAR area .<br />
l Raff was at t_iis time operating in the - GAFSA - EL GfLT-<br />
lbila : the above concentrations were g oirn~; on, a reserve of 10 days'<br />
-supplies of-all classes ivas built up in the TEBESSA - KAS5 M area pric:<br />
to .Day. .Supplies were drawn from the British First Ar%V and from the<br />
OW _and' ALOJMs areas . The SPLTI?1- TASK p=E assumed the responsibility<br />
for ad d ni.atration east of the line TEBFSSA - 110RSOTT .<br />
. ~, ., ~ .Aa ;.engineor .depot was ostablishc.A in the vicinity of TEBESSA prior<br />
to D-Day. Water supply was the responsibility of cmiranders concerned;<br />
with information as to available water supply points being; furnished by'<br />
the _Engineer <strong>Of</strong>ficer . . Water distributing points were established after D-<br />
Day by the Water Supply Company.<br />
8 . Initially, an ;vacuation hospital and medical supply depot were<br />
established in the vicinity of CO:ZTAIITI]IE . One medical battalion was astablishod<br />
under Corps control in Vic vicinity of TII3i,SSA and a second medical<br />
battalion was attached to the lst Armored Division .<br />
' 9. . The,-wIN TASK FORCZ ansanition supply point was established at<br />
~ TBE;A and maintained a stock of four units of fire . Forward amruuiition<br />
.' supply points wore established close behind combat troops throughout opera-<br />
Lions and a .one-unit-of-fire, level maintained . The Provisional Ordnance<br />
Qroup provided 1iahencod ordnance :maintenance service to all units . Ton<br />
~W.sss,I and Class III supplies were assembled in TEBI~-SSA and a signal<br />
;QepRt established p4ooo'DrDa~y.<br />
JUN CU-, :61F ;_j
SLCR--T<br />
Report of Operationsi Uq. II Corps e _2 2,'.ay 19113 (CoLitimed),<br />
10 . Zffective dark, 17 January, SATIJJ FOPCE troops bogan movomont<br />
from- GOI:STANT.1N~ - ,GUEWA are* *_to .TMMSA -'ASS-MM - SMITLA areai 3z+d<br />
Bn .,' 26th .Inf.,, ruiaforced, eras in GAM aroa and 2nd Bn ., 26th Inf . at - . ~-<br />
KASSI'Mr .<br />
11 . End ground forces during 17 January to 21 January in the~-Seotor<br />
of the line- FG1JDOUK to Gk= (inclusive) were estimated to be equivalent<br />
to, one strong division composed of Italian Infantry and armored -elimontB<br />
reinforced b;* minor ulemants of Gorman infantry and armored forwe . The<br />
scale of enemy rei.iforcemonts remained constant at about 800 per dmq. Armored<br />
strength in this area %7as about 100 to 115 light and medium tanks<br />
e:elusive of the tank strength of the 10th Panzer Division wl"Ich was'ivrth<br />
of KfiIROUlLN . On 21 January, incidentally, one day prior to SATIN D-Day s,<br />
the enemy successfully disrupted the French front, secxwed p0NT DIT F!M<br />
and penetrated down the POI4T DU FLIH5 - RO&U VALLEY . AFT;Q iaaodiate],y- or<br />
dered a postponement of the execution o£ SATIN Operation. Due to 'the above,<br />
G(-;zcral Bard, commanding the 1st Armored Division, initiated a rocaesnaissa.mce<br />
by direction of General Fredendall and rocoamnended that the SATIN<br />
Plan lx-- carried out as of the 22 January as planned .-dth minor alterstioro<br />
to meet the changed situation:' .<br />
SECTION II - O<strong>US</strong>Sr`U.TIA VI,LLE'Y - SMIED DIVISION<br />
1. A directive issued 1200 hours, 21 January, by AFpq, signed by<br />
General Truscott was received . A suLzaary of this directive was as follows :<br />
iq ollowing measures will be inplcaa-nted imaediately to chuck German offen<br />
sive . El~.ments First Iay under British command tirill operate southeast<br />
and souti: in direction ROB.rA and OJED M KEBIR northeast of RO&,1 to cut<br />
off and block encmr advance, General Robinett's Force (CC' 1B", 1st Armd .<br />
Div.) is placed under command General Juin for o-perations cast or west of<br />
CrL .a`.tiD~ DOrSi.LE as situation requires . This force will ba cr.ployed as con-plete<br />
unit under General Robinett and not split into detachments . Goneral<br />
Juin Trill notify all conceni.~d as early as possible of mission assigned to<br />
this force . General Frodendall tiTill reconstitute reserve including armored<br />
units and artillery in area SB.-ITU, to be employed under ads corraand in su" -~port<br />
of French sectors M:DOUK and PICKON . Operations are being coordinated<br />
,:ith General Juin . "'<br />
2 . To meet tiffs threat from the north, CC'B" was dispatched to the<br />
CT :-:.S;LTL1 VyC,Lc:7 . 2nd Bn ., 26th Infantry (plus 33rd F1 Bn .) marched to<br />
il'jKT.,R. night 21-22 January. General Ward reconstituted a force from the<br />
1st Armored Division at SB::ITL, similar to CC'B", night 21-22 January, preparud<br />
to attack F0?:DOUK 23 January and observing FOMOUK, P=<strong>US</strong>SY and<br />
approaches to G:tFSA from WBES . With the dissolution of the S:.TIti FORCZS,<br />
the junction of time ~FRIKiL CORPS and the enemy forces in Tunisia became<br />
inevitable .<br />
3 . Colonel Fechet, couw.andin- infantry troops in O<strong>US</strong>SELTLk VaLLZY<br />
area, assembled his ~orcd in the vicinity of :LXKT1.R . The 2nd Bn., 26th<br />
Infantry and 33rd Fh Bn . reachad EL,KT;dR by daylight, 22 January. The 1st<br />
Bn., 16th Inf ., marched frog CU.& :A to r l,TAR night 22-23 January. Combat<br />
Corn:and ":;'I had assc:rabled in the vicinity of SB.:ITL'L by daylight, 22 January.
Report- of Operations, Iiq II Corps, 2 May 19113 (Continued ) .<br />
4 . In compliance with letter, :.FIIQ Advanced Cor.-iand Post, dated 211 January<br />
1f1t3, the II Corps (S:,TIll FOrCL) was attached to the Dritish First ArvW<br />
and the Coi ,~zanding General, British First Array, conoral Anderson, made responsible<br />
for L:u oriploynont of American troops in accordance with "cneral policies<br />
:.:ado known by the C-in-C . In accordance with lst GrnV Instruction No . 11, Comrmndi:zg<br />
Ganural, II Corps, assumed coruiand of ,;round troops of all_ throw nationalities<br />
operating south of t: : : --,n ,:ral line all exclusive MORSOTT - TKNLP. -<br />
S3=1 all inclusive DJ TROZZi. - F011DOUK - SIDI 2'M iL 1u~L:ItI thence exclusive<br />
)of SOCTSS,~ and north of the -oneral line exclusive the line of the CHOTTS to<br />
The nissicn of II Corps . as d --fined by :.fIIQ was the protection of the<br />
right flank of the Allied Forces in Tunisia .<br />
In addition to the 1n,.:ric n Infantry and Armored Forc :;s in the O<strong>US</strong>Si:L-<br />
TLN V,- :LL=, there were a-dproxinately two 13ns . of French Infantry in position<br />
on DJM%L B.IRCOU . These troops vr;sre also placed under the coin :and of Colonel<br />
Fce:ict . - Gcnc;ral Robinett was in conmand of the armored units .<br />
6 . on 26 January, the 26th CT attacked K.IIROULN <strong>PASS</strong> in the O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA<br />
~:;hLI;y and took 400 Italian Prisoners . 16th RCT less lst and 2nd Bns . and 7th<br />
F;, D-t. bivouaced east of 1L-',KT;.R . CC"B" was in contact with the enemy and hold<br />
ing along the 1UdROU:uj-O<strong>US</strong>Sj;LTL-, road . Patrols to IL.<strong>US</strong>OLLLh and IL,Re:CIi;:U1j - contacted<br />
the British at 1-,<strong>US</strong>OLLr~r. .<br />
7 . During those operations in the O<strong>US</strong>SELTIA VULEY, the enemy clearly controllc:d<br />
t::e skies . tic: usually made raids over our positions at 0800 hrs . , 1200<br />
as ., and 1500 :nrs . In one raid alone, six of our trucks ti-rcre lost .<br />
8 . On the 28th of January, 26th CT vicinity of O<strong>US</strong>S3LTI:. engaged oncrly<br />
forces cast of the pass through the :;.STEM? DORS:,LE 4:nd took 70 Italian prisoners .<br />
9 . On 30 January by 10000 hours, the O<strong>US</strong>SELTI . :. V_'.LLEY lead been cleared of<br />
cneriy troops to the O<strong>US</strong>S:.LTI.. - 1WROU..:: road and the castorn slope of BEK<br />
Z-':IO<strong>US</strong> . .ncW positions acre r-ported on the north slope of DJEBEL TOUIL.', .<br />
The cnerL" left man- scatt~red and unmarked .-.line: fi,:lds behind hi : .i indic^ting<br />
that :lc :iad no intention of rcsuminf; iris push throuEh the PONT-D(J-F~'.HS, ROD',;.<br />
end O<strong>US</strong>S ;LTI :. V:.LLL1' . The .;ne.~.tv, fearing .:n allied counterthrust up the O<strong>US</strong>-<br />
S-L'fl:, V. .LLF;Y dug dcf.:nsiva positions cow;ring tl: .; northern ::xit from -the valley<br />
.<br />
10 . :.mile tile: forces under Colonel Fechct and Gcn~ral Robinett ::ere<br />
assembling in the ROB.'.:. - O<strong>US</strong>S : LTI- . area, patrols fror, the Italian garrison at<br />
: .,,:::L:.SSY became : active in the SF.N3D ST:_TIO:I area .<br />
11 . On 24 January, the lst ..mored Division less detaclunants made a recoiL-.aissaace<br />
in force fro., G.:FS:. toward This fore ; : advanced halfway<br />
b,vucon S`::ZD and 1 : .1C_i:.SSY, mad,- contact with th . : :ncmy and captured 'three trucks,<br />
20 Cerrk.n Ph's -rid 130 Italian P'vil s . Tae 1st :,r-iored Division lost two medix:.<br />
tanks, two wcrc l:il?_,.;d and trroe -:owided . By the 28th of January, th .:rc; was<br />
increased cn-r .rl activity in the EL M,'ETT. .f, area . Th, : French outpost them ;:ad<br />
b:.;--n attacked b,",- c sa2ll G.2rman notorcyclc patrol .<br />
12 . ;,s t :-.e Ct":.S~LTI :. I'-LIZ- had 5- .: .^. cle red of t::c cncrrj, CC"B" bras withcra.Irn<br />
:nd rlovcd to f07: C: .1:31:: . during th- night 23-29 January and the Stack
eport of Operations, Hc- _A Corps, 2 Lay 19<br />
Continued,<br />
Farce (CC"C") consisting of one battalion of ucdiun tanks, one battalion infantry,<br />
and one battalion field artillery, moved to GAFSA to reinforce the 3rd<br />
Bn., 26th Infantry, which was still f;arrisoning GAFS ;, . The 26th RCT (-2 bns .)<br />
novod to SB~ITLA .<br />
13 . On the 30th of January, the Ger_aans initiated an at,ack aL ainst the<br />
French positions at PAID . (;C"A" under General i :cQuillan, and the 26th RCT<br />
(-2 bats .) ,marched from SBEITTJ: to reinforce the hard-pressed French -arrison<br />
at rUD . T::e XII ASC bombed and strafed uneW columns attackinZ FAID continunusly<br />
. As of 1700 hrs ., 30 January, the small French force garrisoned at F'1ID<br />
were- reported to be still holding F1ID, but t' -.e jneay had infiltrated units<br />
to the south and rear of the French positions . By daylight, 31 January, W"A"<br />
reached its forward assembly areas :lest of FAID and launched an attack against<br />
t- he e:Lemy positions at FIND . At last light on the 31st, the north prong of<br />
CC"A"'s attack had reached the eneiV positions which :ere duZ in t:ie foothills<br />
worth of F*LID . The souV : prong of CC".I"'s attack had advanced north from<br />
?,x', 110;1 along the cast side of DJEBEL BOU DZLR and had reached the village of<br />
F:,ID. Throughout the 1st and 2nd o£ February, CC":1" and the 26th RCT attacked<br />
to restore the FAID positions . Little progress was made . The ahem," remained<br />
in possession of the high ground co1 :L andinG F:,ID P.:S5 . CC":." had sane forces<br />
to t:ie south of this pass while tha, French also still retained a rotit positions -<br />
outh of tae pass . On the 3rd there was a lull in tire fighting in the vicin~_t ;;<br />
of FAID and General ..cQuillan regrouped his troops for another assault on r,^,-D .<br />
Tais assault failed to restore the FAID positions . Active caitact :ith the<br />
anei ;" eras uaintained . The 26th aCT (-2 Bns .) ryas withdraym from this position<br />
oz 9 Fcbruary and on the 10th the responsibility for the defense of t_ze FAID<br />
u:-3nroach v:as assigned to General lard, comianding the 1st ;iryaored Division .<br />
14 . The defense of t:ie F.-.ID approach by General Ward will be treated<br />
s .,parately under Section III of this report . In the meantime, as this battle<br />
of F.1ID eras in progress, the forces stationed at GAFS; began an attack against<br />
15 . Due to the increased activity in the vicinity of EL GUETTAR on the<br />
28th of January, W"C" under - Colonel Stack moved iron BOLT CIEBKA to G:,FSA .<br />
i4Len CC";." marched on the 30th of January, to relieve the hard-pressed French<br />
at F:SD, CC"C" also marched toward FAID frog} GAFSA to reinforce the French<br />
garrison . 115 W"C" was marching, however, orders :rere received from 1st .:rry<br />
to attack and seize IMIr:SSY . CC"GO , therefore was turned south at SIDI BOU<br />
ZID along the road to 1jU1Q1XSSY and the 1st Armored Division less MIA", CC"B",<br />
and the Stack Force but reinforced by the 1st Bn., 168th Infantry, moved fron<br />
F<strong>Of</strong> . C1iM14. to G;,FS:;, closing there at daylight .31 January. Fro;,i G:IMI W"D",<br />
comgndod by Colonol laraist, and consistinG of a battalion of medium tanks,<br />
a battalion of the 168th Inf:uLtry, and a battalion of armored field artiller,- ,<br />
advanced on :LVU'..:SSY . Reconnaissance ule:.k:nts of this force passed ST:.TION<br />
L :IiiOUCfi at 07115 hours, 31 January without coatacting the encr.y . As of 1700<br />
hours, W"D" was attacking cnunV Positions at S~_!lr:D . This position had bQea<br />
reinforced by 18 truckloads of enmW infantry during the afternoon . By dark,<br />
reconnaissance elements had reached within 8 miles _ of : :r;KH;.SSY . The XII :.SC,<br />
meanmd4le, bombed onomar concentrations at BOU T1i jDI and at ;:SIQI:,SSY, reporting<br />
many anogr vohiclos dama-Cod . During the niGht 31-1 February, the 2nd Bn ., 163th<br />
Infantry and the 175th Fl. Bn . ruiriforced W"D" for a coordinated attack on SEZD<br />
at daylight . By 0916 hours, W"C" had arrived at the DJ : ::,IZIL:. <strong>PASS</strong> and tivZ.c<br />
hundinG south to join W"D" . W"D" attacked ST.,TIOi1 SITED at 17.00 hours and<br />
had captured ST:.TIOi1 SMIED by 1405 :Lours . Patrols from CC"C" and<br />
h1ul:~;:: ;,~!=iED
Con-)L, 2 1-~L3<br />
CC"D" ri..t ~.n ti , _- DJ as o_° 111:.:0 is^ors . -? :- aarv, CC"Dlt had captured<br />
;;:, 1') and the 168th 12T !-ad orb,:nizcd t ..- .._gh Cr^iind two :.d1cs cast of STATIGi :<br />
SL_:LD for uofc~ns ;: . Over 100 F;"s wkcn is ti _ vi~'_nit, ;,f S -' :1-) . T'.:roug:out<br />
the .:a;," , cn`rr,, dive-bo . .ibers ~ttaclccJ o,, -.r troops _-etacen<br />
and<br />
16 . .,lthou-;}: tl'L i:nur-W had d,~finlttJy 1ve11 up a`1_; idea o-' a:Ctc :.ipting to<br />
core throuL;h the 0"SSZLT1_ . W,LLZ -air after :0 s c_L ost di=iastrmrs defeat by<br />
CC"B", air roco :a:i:issancc rcpor'~od .-no;_:" ccncc : -_trations _,ast -f t:_c<br />
t SS_:L,L-. pass and in:.xpcrionccu troops woo vrcrQ undul: . - Saar::::~ b;; their prox-<br />
1 :-:lty to t:? :. enor7 r,'rc:tl,' .. ::ar~ .:ratcd reports of ,rollrd a!l__ .:1r acti-"it :; .<br />
ascd on th~s_ reports, thcrci or.:, a ncssaL o fro:.: 1st British ..rrw f cc,:ived<br />
at 1 .119 !:ours, 1 Fc`aruary, diri;ct,~d that ::nCo.,:n_nts at S' -= and :'L'.h :L-,SSY areas<br />
k:iscontinucd as soon as possible, tnat an effort b.; ;-mdc to cl .~ar up eno<br />
- tositio_ns in tll- FAID area, and that tae a:axinun possible fore :: be conc ::ntrated<br />
in a :iobil, : r~s.:rvo position in the ar,;a o~ 11:.DJ~3 ~L '10 In- con -)liancc<br />
:-rith this order, C-11311 moved fron BOU C::to 1l:.DJ:.t3 LL :.IOtr" irnodiatu1y,<br />
later froze K;_DJZn LL :.IOTT' to 1L.1CTi.R during then night 2-3 February . (1st<br />
_r.morod Div-ision ).,~ss CC"..", CC"B", CC"C", and CC"D" moved to SB:]ITL:, night<br />
2-3 Fcbrt"ar,; .) Xring the night 3-!t February, all forces .:xc; pt a r,inforced<br />
inf
Report of Operations,'-_.i . II Corps, 2 , -:ay 1943, (Contir._ .d) .<br />
the direction of 1:U1-1<strong>US</strong>SY approached to within four or five miles of W.FSI. and<br />
heavy motor movements were observed on the GULi TREE RO:.D . Four or five Italian<br />
armbred cars and one motorcycle approached HDILL,'. and drove the french back<br />
slightly to the north.<br />
2~. To investigate the ene:Vts intentions in the vicinity of G.WSA and<br />
,ID, active reconnaissance was initiated by our forces . I light mobile force<br />
supported by air was dispatched from G~.FSE,_ to, investigate t`ie str:.ngtli of the<br />
enemy in t:.e vicinity of Zi. F:OUC .i . This force moved as far east as STATION<br />
S : . D without contact with the: an;m7. A small mobile force sent fra.1 G:,FSA<br />
easily restored the situation at :DILLA . The enerv met our patrols in the<br />
vicinity of F:SD with a withering fire . Elcnents of the ;;frika Corps were<br />
idenV.fied in this area .<br />
3 . . *,s stated in Section II of this report, on ]1 February the responsioility<br />
for the defense of tire FLID position eras asjigned to General Ward,<br />
Commnding the 1st Armored Division . The scheme of defense was to hold the<br />
two key terrain features, DJ . YS,lIIU on the south end DJ . ISESOUD:. on-the north<br />
of or anizin; infantry islands of resistance on these two positions . These<br />
positions wore not mutually supporting for antitank and small arms fires. :i<br />
mobile reserve was hold in a position of readiness in the- vicinity of SIDI :30U<br />
ZID; During the night 11-12 February, the 701st TD Bn. (:. and B Cos .) arrived<br />
.^.t SBEITLir and came . under the command of the 1st ~rmored Division for the de-<br />
_ense `of- the F.:ID psitions . During the afternoon of 13 February the C-in-C<br />
visited the FIJD positions and had a conference with General Anderson, British<br />
First '.' Comiander.<br />
4: t"daylight on the 14th of February, the enemy attacked our positions<br />
in front of FY.ID. The positions on DJ . LtSSOUD:. were attacked by artillery<br />
fito ihfantry, and approximately thirty unegy tanks . The FOPIDOUK and t:.FS.l<br />
areas were `quiet . i.s of 0920. hrs . the 3rd Battalion, 1st ;armored Re&dmcnt<br />
'rith two batteries, 91st F.. Bn., launched a counterattack and became heavily<br />
engaged with enemy tanks betireen SIDI BOU ZID and DJ . LE SOUD:. . By 1300 hours,<br />
the 31d Battalion, 1st .rmored Regiment, had suffered 50A tank casualties .<br />
BZ" .1700 hours -.no-my tanks 'tied overrun "B" Battery, 91st F.1 Bn ., nortlnrest of<br />
the "W.' IE. SCUD:aI . positicd . ;- Enemy infantry moved Boat F:ID to SIDI BOU ZID in<br />
trucks=~and,Ahe position`ori DJ . L9S OUn:: was completely, surrounded by the -enorw.<br />
~fhe-3r'd"Battnlion 1st :armoiiad Regiment was,-pushed back southwest of SIDI BOU<br />
"ZIDNith-b6tlf :flanks threatowoA .from the north and the south. The XII :.3.r<br />
U8re?l5orV-Comviand successf1x11y attacked onerq tank and track columns throughout<br />
the-day sT"a result of those ;operations, and after repuated requests, the<br />
: 'Com antlor ordorod the 2nd Battalion, let "rmored Regimont from CC'B" at<br />
iy.R'L:R : to - the Idt - Armorod Division at FAID.<br />
- ' .5. -:Due to the critical situation at F.IID, the force of ;,morican and<br />
: .French"_'troops at (3utjS.: was aithdrmm to- positions in the vicinity of FFRI:.1L:a<br />
g-t~ . night of I4=15- February.- :at- daylight on the 15th, the lot Armored<br />
4-Divijiea ` &Zwd a'VO&hterattack`betweenDH. JQtitL, and .<br />
"6 460th - ry`'bt1U ~WA the -hoighta. . of DJ=- MXL , r<br />
: . .~..,s... . ..3 .*...._ ...._+.<br />
draL. ri'hrmmred Division., was directed to offeat the witlh-<br />
Y:. defending . the lussmxa piss. By 1535;x . .<br />
the 2nd Battalion, let i3fmbredRagiamt had-reached the outsjoXts of SID-T,,WU<br />
ZID attempting to take the town and effect. the roliof of the 168th Infantry .<br />
'-,~<br />
5~-hSSIFirf
;report of Operations, jiq: II Corps, 2 Lay 19113 (Continu_<br />
150 i_ien froia the 2nd Battalion, 16uth Infantry, on DJLELL ' : - SSOLTD:, ._ianaged to<br />
rit!.draw to DJZBEL i- .:,,;. . The 3rd Battalion, 168th Infantry, still held D,f_'B;,L<br />
: ::S:,IR, . Contact 1- .as lost Both the 168t1: Infantry and the 2nd Bn ., 1st<br />
:.r._,orod ?Zc, ;i.aent, which was near SIDI BOU ZID. Patrols were unable to Cet<br />
t!xou; h from these forces or to that . The eno-q or-;"nizcd a strong def .- ;nsave<br />
position north and south through SIDI BOU ZID . EnenV tanks crest of SIDI ,OU<br />
'ID withdrew towards SIDI BOU ZID . :s of 1220 hours or. the 16th, aaout 50<br />
c:ne:.Tf tarp=s attacked in the vicinity of DjIMEL iL.I Ti .'. . Our armored . forces lost<br />
a_r-)rox1matcl .-" 86 niadiwi tanks in their att opt to relieve t :ie infantry 1_olding<br />
DJ=-' :L L_~~SOUL4". and DJZBUT KS..IR'. .<br />
u . :1. directive from the Co:"_.ia ding General, 1st British Ar :T;, dated 15<br />
February 19Zt3, directed that forces holding t=ic : high Z-round west of .F:JD be<br />
i:itadrav:n azd the pass at KASS_1nIIJa organized .-for defense . :, force consisting<br />
of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantx--, and the 19th Combat Engine=er Re;~iuaent orr<br />
aanizod a naw defensive position four miles east of K;,SS:,RI?E, . After repeated<br />
rvgncsts, CC"B" was released bar 1st British to ;I Corps as of 1800 hours,<br />
15 February, with permission to move CC"B" from 1_,KTAR to SBLI :I:. .<br />
7. From the 17th to the 19th of February, II Corps coMleted its with-_<br />
dr :wal to the &;moral line DJ BOU DJ=:L - DJ BOIL G:XEf. - DJ CI"2BRI - DJ<br />
- SPIB;.. Thu XII ILir Support Command ~;vacuatcd both airfields in the<br />
%ricipity of TIihI= . Vine 1st Arriored Division withdrew from SBEITL:1 to an<br />
area southeast of TEB%SS.. . The 894th TD Bn . arrived and tsunt into bivouac in<br />
the vicinity of BEIO~-.r~I ,. The 26th Arsaored Brigade (less 1 Regt . Group) (British)<br />
car. under control of II Corps in. the vicinity of T11:1.1 as of 0500 hours,<br />
~_° February, with t ie provision that they wore not to be COELAtted to action<br />
--:ithout the authority of the Con>`anding Gesusral, First British ixmy . Other<br />
new arrivals in the II Corps ware the 58th C .-Vi . ; :ortar Co . (British), AT and<br />
"Lu Co ., 39th Infantry, and the 56th Ron . Sqdn (British), all of which were<br />
in.-a-diately dispatched to rcsinforce the troops holding the K:1SSM.INE <strong>PASS</strong><br />
"positions .<br />
SECTION IV - Iti.SSERI :" VALLEY TIM<strong>US</strong>T<br />
1 . The TIESTERi1 DORS..LE, a range of mountains 20 miles west and parallel<br />
to the E:,STI:R:1 DORS ..LE rform-d a cross cora>>artment through which the . onemy<br />
would have to pass in an operation against the ; Allie=d right flank. MSSMINE<br />
WM" SBI3:. P:SS, the DrR:11:. <strong>PASS</strong> above TIMEPTE, consisting of three approaches<br />
across DJ. B=M :, and the EL MOD P..SS were the four ra=in approaches across<br />
t_~e ijBSTEI-I DORS:.LE in the II Corps zone of action . In a clockwise direction<br />
from Y,ASSMII4E P.M, DJ C:-dMI, south of the pass, DJ IdOGULZ:. and BOU DRIES<br />
south and west of the pass, DJ :"'T-U, about 20 miles west of the pass, DJ EL<br />
;D and DJ 3IitE : "., north and crest of the pass, and DJ forri the sides<br />
of a bowl around the corridor cut by the OUM ILTED . Two main roads, separated<br />
by the OUED IL~TEB, cut through this bowl and meet in the pass . Ono road loads<br />
northwest to TI ::.L: and the other approximately west to TEBhSS :. . Since there<br />
had boon several days , rain prior to tho 20th of February, the OUED 1LTEB was<br />
unfordablu and cosyaunication batsme=n they TIL:LA road and the T:;BBSS:i road was<br />
impracticable at any point other than at the fort: of these two roads within<br />
the pass . Since then rain had filled the K;'.SSER-NE bowl with spud, only fulltracked<br />
vehicles tirerc sable to operate across country.
of OMationa,,I&S2Ms~x~.1943 , Cout~) :,<br />
. pipt$j6ox ,~ elnfoxGodsforganized defensive positions<br />
~% bri' tlio north Iid of iC.',SSDitItTE <strong>PASS</strong> across the: road 7.eaQing to THALI wtd.le the<br />
± . 19 R'4A4ti.1 fQVeftdrrprganizod poeltisns" . on tlio south side of<br />
LY#ao~ea,,~st Ldoaxho fAad , loading -xo-TET SSi.. Tha first :,rmorod Division fro~a<br />
" 1WPb8MAxp isouthwast pf-.TMM. covered the ~' . ABIOD position . American and<br />
"Fr~ratt.~i~h bad-,boon,withdrawn from G.',F",,A organised defensive positions<br />
do *AftAA=oerapproachos, "across DJ Mlltth . 'The 6th Armorad Division<br />
(laa imor Brigado)(Bt .tish) aitl: the 18th, Infantry attached, organized<br />
' posfLMW1XXA0toA0 .,tdx, SDIM. :approach. " .<br />
araiol Airing . thcr ; night V-20~.Fobruary, onorV -infantry infiltrated to po-<br />
$ ,M : cbigh ground nordi :and south of K:.SSMLTM <strong>PASS</strong> . "From those posit<br />
,^chgovod the ;defensive positions in the pass, the one-,W brought<br />
-- S,.and;~mgrtar fira~directly on our defensive positions . a daylight<br />
} o z tb 4,,'engpW, infantry supported by artillery : attacked tlu: defensive<br />
. .<br />
~co, ~,1The e , s 6th . ..rrao=_ od 'Infantry, was ordered from TW.L1 to reinforce<br />
the tom, in K IHE ; P:.88. ".Tho 894th-TD B1%. ; likewise, moved up to rein-<br />
. fore6j0j~jQneL ,S k" s -forces .in V,SS=IE P:.SS. The 26th 1rmorod Brigade<br />
(Bri'ti0h3 move to a position along the TiL,U. - iG15S' 1Tt1E road" preparatory to<br />
suppwrt4ng . forcoW,holding K:',SSI:RIIM P:,SS .<br />
-5.~_Auo to small arms and mortar fire from the high ground overlooking<br />
thg;26th IQfantry .positions, tho 26th Infantry withdrevr up tlv: road towards<br />
Ai:~c: This ; withdrawal wcposod the north flank of the 19th Engineer Regiment<br />
' Troich . Vas disposed astride the road loading to TEBESS:, .<br />
~6 .-, The . enoaW appeared to be directing his main effort up the :1U', Road .<br />
On theMM :- ;=-,,Road lie appeared to bo making z soccndary effort using Italian.<br />
encouraged by supporting German Battalions behind tlit;n .<br />
7. CC'IB" roved up to DJ and prepared to counterattack to restore<br />
the situation on the south side of t21c pass . Th:: situation at the pass, howcvc:r,..had<br />
dotorloratod to such an ::Ytc:nt that G:~ :1c.ral Robinett, commandinb<br />
CC°B", : { had to .-irmediatoly set about to establish coordination and control of<br />
th'A.Aroops f nC back frord the pass on tae TEB:_ S:, Road . :,t daybreak on the<br />
21st, _ CC"!B" ;-.4d a 4,006 yard front astxi& the TEBES, Road about eight miles<br />
east-:of DJ=.Iu:&,. The; 16th Infantry h_ld positions on BOLT DRIES . Due to<br />
tip:: outstanding leadership of General Robinett, rrho assumed coal^.and of .111<br />
tr->ops along the TEBMS:, Road, he had the situation vell under control by<br />
d:,'break of' the 22nd .<br />
" 8 . :mile C,s::cral Robinott was .;n,-aged south of the OUED :L.TE3, BrigadiV ,R T<br />
Dumphie not the zaain Gorman attack zrith his 26th .rmored Brigade (British)<br />
of the OUED !:;MM. The 26th lrmorad Brigade (-1 an.,ored rol;iwental group) as<br />
stated above, arrived at TLIIA during tke night 18-19 February . Brigadior<br />
Dumphio roportod to jjq IT Corps at Ol0U hours on thu 19th . ..ftcr learning the<br />
situation, hu visited Colonel Stark who was in con iand of all the forces in<br />
the pass . lie arrived at Colonel Stark's CP at 1630 hours and 1_arned that the<br />
battle had bo-en in progress since daybreak . :1lthough Colonel Stark's CP was<br />
under direct srall arms fire at this tizk;, Colonel Stark claiued that the<br />
situation was w-11 in hand ztnd that all of his troops were in position . Ho<br />
r-
Report of Oporationsp Hq II Corps, 2 blay 1943 (Continued ) .<br />
did admit, however, that he ryas having slit difficulties with communications .<br />
.<br />
9 . .,$rigudior Dumphio ir mdiatcly ruturn(A £o TITI,If, vrhere ho reported to<br />
$pitish Krst army that the situation ,vas very poor at the pass and roquostod<br />
permission to employ his force to restore the situation . 1st Jar granted him<br />
permission to employ not more than one motorized company, 1 armored squadron,<br />
o:ao troop of :1T gurus, and one troop of artillory . This force moved to a -position<br />
astride the TI'!,L:i road along a ridge about two railos northwest of the<br />
pass during thr: night 19-20 February . This -Lorco was A'urthor r,jinforced in<br />
this position by the 3rd Dn., 6th Armored Infantry . ;,ftor the 26th Infantry<br />
loft their positions is the pass, this composite *merican and British force<br />
held this eov ring position along fw ridE;u astride the Tl_',L:. )toad until dark,<br />
20 February . The armored squadron lost all of its tanks . The 3rd Bn:, 6th<br />
;rrrorod, suffered very heavy casualties . During the afternoon of the 20th,<br />
the: renain&;r of the 26th Armored Brigade novud up to a covering position<br />
about 18 milers south west of TI- .LL :,. General Fredbndall paid a personal visit<br />
to this position at this tirho and placed Brigadier Dumphic in,command of all<br />
troops British and :,norican in this area . Airing the night 20-21, Brigadier_<br />
aicholson arrived to coordinate the action of CCuB't and the 26th armored<br />
Brigade . :; meeting of General Robinott, Brigadier Dumphio, and Brigadier<br />
dicholson at TI::,I;r was arranged . In order to got back to his troops prior to<br />
daylight, General Robinutt had to loava buforu Brigadior Nicholson arrived .<br />
Bribadi.ir Dumphic and Gonural Robinett, hrnrovor, had agreed to a plan of<br />
action before General Robinutt left TM.L:, . Brigadier Nicholson arrived in<br />
T1'.L.i at 0245 hours and approved the plans alruady made by Brigadier Dunphie<br />
and General Robinutt . .,ccording to this plan, General Robinett was to restore<br />
the situation south of the OUED Ij ;.TEB while the 2nd Bn ., of the 5th Loicesters,<br />
tirho had arrived early that night, prepared defunsivc positions astride the<br />
road thr,;o miles southvrest of Tiil.L:. . Thu 26th ;,Mored Brigade errs to delay<br />
the unomy and pr%:vcjnt hire from reaching the Lricesters position before 1800<br />
hours, 21st of February . Colonel Stark was to form a straggler point at T?_.L,<br />
for all An,:rican troops and send them up from this point to rAnforco the<br />
Luicosturs' position .<br />
10 . ;,bout 0730 hours on the 21st of February, a German force of all<br />
arms could be seen fron the: 26th Brigade's positions forming astride the: TlL:L :.<br />
Road proparud to attack north. Tic approxinatu str,;ngtli of this unomy force<br />
was as follows ; 30 tanks, . about 20 SP ups, 35 ztrack infantry v,:hiclcs,<br />
and 2 corrpanius of infantry in trucks who disuountod and advanced try foot .<br />
This unar:7 cencontration was sh-lle-ci by the: artill,:ry of the 26th ;amored<br />
Brigade . Tare ,;ncm; SP guns .;ngagod the forward tanks of the Brigade and<br />
? .:locked out four . :,t 1500 hours, the i:nurW attacked straight up the road .<br />
The tanks of 'the 26th Armored Brigade fought a dulayinC action buck to T: ::.I~,<br />
had lost 20 tarlcs knocking out only a snall nui:ib,,r of Gurnan tanks . The 26th<br />
:.rr.ored Brigade, however, t.iana;.ud to maintain the required delay . The last<br />
t.^.nk passed tzrough the Luicestirs , position at 1930 hours . Five TD guns of<br />
the (305th TD 3n . under Lt . Col. Forv.^lan wuru the only 'alerican troops tirho<br />
fought in this delaying action and in the duf,nsv of the L.:icesters " positions .<br />
:,!though most of th .: 805th TD Bn . had burn lost in previous fighting, Colonel<br />
Foronan by leis superior lvadurship, managed to keep these rcm^inin;~ guns togcthi;r<br />
and they have an uxc-!lent account of thcnselvos throughout the ren^.indur<br />
of the battle . The 26th _,ruorud Dri;;~dc rallied behind th;; LAcesters t<br />
position . By 19!45 hours, nichine -in fire insid.; the Luicestcrs , positions<br />
-10-
Report of 02!ati 1 II CwrpsZ 2 Nor 1943 (Contlnuoa , .<br />
indioated that tho .en=W had broken throudi thoao positions . Tho artillery<br />
of 9th Division, however, by marching continuously for four days and nights<br />
in the last stages of thoir march from CASLBL'd4M, arrived in the THaLA area<br />
and had ease into supporting positions of the 26th Anaored Brigade by_daylight.<br />
Orders from Brigadier Nichoison wore received to hold the positions<br />
of thO 26th . Arraorod Brigade at all costs .<br />
11..'-To relieve the situation confronting CC"B" and the 26th lmored<br />
'Brigade, the 16th Infantry launched a counterattack in the vicinity of BOU<br />
DRIBS and eloarod BOU_ DRIES of the onemy . This counterattack and the sudden<br />
incrciaso in artillery fire caused by the arrival. of the 9th Division Artillery,<br />
can0ud the ar10W to pull back bofofo his line of rotruat through the pass was<br />
cut behind him, At 1915 hours on the 22nd, the unomy began a gonoral withdraual'tcwards<br />
the pass . artillary concentrations harassed his movement<br />
through the pass by" interdiction fire throughout the night,<br />
l2 . CC"An moved from BOU CI3EBKI, to MIIDR.1 during the night 22-23 . From<br />
the 23rd of February to the 25th -of February, the unumy continued his withdrawal<br />
from tho L1SSBRIHE bowlp leaving many mines and booby traps . Patrols<br />
wore pushod out to maintain contact . By daylight on the 24th howovar, CC"B"<br />
had' lost contact with the uncmy. Fires wuru obsurvod in K;.SSMINE and FMIM1<br />
during ths night 24-25 February . By the 25th, CC"B" and the 26th :.rawred<br />
Brigade had regained control of the high ground north and south of the pass<br />
and by 13u8 hours the Roconnaiasanco Comparw of the 13th Armored Regiment<br />
entorod the pass. The advance of the forward ularwnts ryas greatly hanged<br />
by rAnes .<br />
13 . During the period 26 February to 16 11areh in complianeu with First<br />
IMI Operations Instruction Number 19, dated 24 Fub:uary 1943, II Corps roorgan-<br />
-izod and consolidated its positions alonf the 1t1MTCRIl DOM.LE with the 34th<br />
Infantry Division on the north, the 9th nfantry Division on the south, and<br />
the let Lrmorod Division in a position of readiness on the south flank . The<br />
1st Infantry Division began its concentration in the BOU CHM A area .<br />
SECTION V - iLD1'ZMISTR'.TIVE<br />
1. Status of 'strength - .lppundix »:." .<br />
2, Casualties and prisonara - :appendix "B"<br />
3 .<br />
Ruplacemunts - :.ppcmdix "C" .<br />
4. Lvacuation - ;,ppundix "D" .<br />
For the Corauanding duneral:
S R-!`.-<br />
APPENDIX "A" TO REPORT ON OP"~MTIO3S,--HEADQUARTMS II CORPS, 2 MAY 1943 .<br />
Status of Strength of Cormnand by Division and Separate Units on 1 January<br />
oron date they came under II Corps control.<br />
Headquarters II Corps<br />
Headquarters Company, II Corps<br />
202d M.P. Co .<br />
1st Armd. Div . (-2 Bns .)<br />
xq & Hq Co., 1st Armd Div.<br />
81st Rcn Bn .<br />
Serv o Co., 1st Armd.<br />
141st Signal Co.<br />
Div.<br />
16th Armd . Engr. Bn.<br />
47th Armd. lied. Bn.<br />
lst Armd. Maint . Bn.<br />
1st Arad. Sup . Ba. (-CO B)<br />
Hq . 13th Armd. Rogt.<br />
Rcn . Co., lath Armd. Rogt .<br />
1st Bn., 13th Arnd. Refit.<br />
2d Bn., 13th Armd. Regt.<br />
Surv. Co., 13th Armd . Refit .<br />
Maint . Co., 13th Armd. Regt .<br />
2nd Bn., 1st Armd. Rogt .<br />
3d Bn., lat Armd. Ragt.<br />
Rcn. Co., 1st Armd. Rogt .<br />
Maint. Ca ., 1st Armd . Refit.<br />
Servo Co., 1st Anad . Refit.<br />
1st Bn., 6th Armd . Inf.<br />
2d Bn., 6th Acmd . Inf.<br />
3d Bn ., 6th Armd . Inf.<br />
Hq. Co ., 6th Armd. Inf .<br />
Servo Co., 6th Armd . Inf.<br />
.<br />
r 27th Annd. - F.A. Bn.<br />
91st sand. F .A . Bn .<br />
68th Ar~ad . F.A. Bn.<br />
t-Train . Hq do Hq Co . ,- l.at Armed. Div .<br />
Canpon Co., 39th InfantrY<br />
5th F.A . Bn. .<br />
601st T .D. Bn. (-1 Co .)<br />
703tst T.D. Bn . (-Coa . B do Dots)<br />
lat -Bn., 213th C.A .<br />
106th C .A. Bn.<br />
4434 C .A. Bn.<br />
26th inf. (--3d Bn.) .<br />
33,4 F.A. BYI~ ,<br />
Co. C, 1st $W. Bn. (1 Plat)<br />
CPAt'C, lot Hed .<br />
1st Rcn . Troop<br />
Bn.<br />
--- i<br />
<strong>Of</strong>f . WO ANC EM Total<br />
70 13 83<br />
7 2 420 429<br />
h 178 182<br />
65 10 - 206 281<br />
43 1 726 " 770<br />
7 1 244 ' 2.52<br />
6 2 167 175<br />
44 2 655' 701<br />
43 2 281 326<br />
38 12 864 914<br />
11 1 220 232<br />
8 170 178<br />
2 187 189<br />
27 2 393 422<br />
20 1 468 489<br />
6 1 159 166<br />
4 1 108 113<br />
27 2 590 619<br />
27 2 590 619<br />
9 193 202<br />
7 181 188<br />
2 184 191<br />
24 535 559<br />
23 1 627 651<br />
6 78 84<br />
16 2 125 153<br />
6 3 142 - 151<br />
34 1 629 664<br />
40 3 - 702 . 745<br />
37 3 696 736<br />
12 135 147<br />
5 117 " 122<br />
22 2 608 632<br />
30 509 539<br />
23 370 393<br />
37 - 683 720<br />
35 807 842<br />
35 807 842<br />
109 5 2047 2161<br />
25 2 480 507<br />
1 - 48 49<br />
3 '' 107 110<br />
9 ' 170 179<br />
LiI4r. 1-~<br />
.~
20A ; ig . Depot . Co .- _<br />
~' Repo °4t1''bperittloAS~ ; ' Hq4 -II ' Corps. 2-W 1943 (Continued)*<br />
- .. ..,._ .. .._ _.... ' ...<br />
t Coy H "7 - - T.D" 8Z1. ,<br />
BtrY C~ ;345th . CA .'~ .<br />
~ yc' - uFr<br />
81, VA:<br />
-DO<br />
128~~Sig,v ;Co"<br />
55t~~rr sect~-.writ.)<br />
.51st Mod.. Bu, . .<br />
lst~t4gu q, 2W,Uod . Sup. Dep.<br />
77th'tvac, Hoop.<br />
48t:b%bnrg; HOP.<br />
9ts EvacI Hobp.<br />
B. Tearitis;<br />
,opedio,Moam s<br />
1' 3iock Toami . .<br />
2d-1§6. 16th`-Yed. Rogt.<br />
Det: _ " .<br />
65th (X .Co.<br />
C0 : As ' .<br />
938 37 : .. " . . . . . 901 -<br />
..<br />
3227-<br />
231<br />
84 86<br />
41 1 946 988<br />
1 50 51<br />
3 83 86<br />
22 2<br />
s 28 . 1 - 472- 1501<br />
3 30 33<br />
"415<br />
47 ' " - 51 317 -<br />
.48 57 273 378<br />
47 " - 52` 307 406<br />
6 6 -' 12<br />
2 , 2 4<br />
1, 2 3<br />
32 . 516 548.<br />
. 4 . 148 152<br />
205tH-_CX Bn.<br />
3 124 127<br />
Co Ds 2144th-" QU Bn. .<br />
. 3 . 215 218<br />
lsti'Bn. 0 28t1i QH (-a & C)<br />
11 282 -293<br />
93d .-qU Co . (Rhd)<br />
4 -' 108 112<br />
Hq Ec Hq Dot. ,;-POO<br />
8 39 47<br />
Hq & -Hq Det.; 55th Ord Bn.<br />
8 30 38<br />
30th.Ord. Co . (tDt)<br />
213 220<br />
Co : 'D, 87th Ord. Bn.<br />
7 191 198<br />
78th Ord. Co :=-<br />
168 173<br />
66th'Ord. C6:<br />
Hq & Hq Det. # .- 42nd Ord. Bn.<br />
109th Ord. Co .<br />
. 8 1-'139<br />
1 ~ . 123-<br />
148<br />
1.29<br />
3485th Ord. Co .<br />
Dot. *- 450th Ew. Depot Co.<br />
518th Engr. - .VS Co.<br />
761st Engr.:m Co .<br />
19th magrz =(C)<br />
Det. p 62d Erigr. Topo Co.<br />
105th CA (Buys A & D)<br />
688th CA Bti~'.<br />
689th CA Btry<br />
69M CA Btry<br />
694th CA Btry<br />
Hq & Hq Det:, 188th Ord. Bn.<br />
3488th Ord: Co.<br />
53d Ord. Co .<br />
Det. s 162d Sig. Photo Co.<br />
Dat e 163d Sig. Photo Co .<br />
Dot s 175th Radio Repair<br />
Dot ., Co. B 829th Sig. Bn.<br />
1st Bn. s 16fith Inf .<br />
. 6<br />
. $<br />
54 . .<br />
1. .<br />
23--<br />
5<br />
5<br />
-<br />
4<br />
7<br />
-<br />
-2<br />
2<br />
-<br />
_<br />
.<br />
3.91<br />
188<br />
. 56<br />
1384<br />
5<br />
374<br />
73<br />
, . 73<br />
- 73<br />
. . 73 u<br />
.<br />
198<br />
194<br />
- 261<br />
1440<br />
6<br />
399<br />
78<br />
78<br />
78<br />
78 15<br />
-<br />
.<br />
5<br />
1<br />
1<br />
1<br />
30 . - .<br />
.<br />
183"<br />
' . ' 136<br />
3<br />
3<br />
10<br />
8<br />
910<br />
190<br />
141 .<br />
3<br />
4<br />
11<br />
9<br />
940<br />
_2<br />
.. LASS1rtt,
Appendix "A" to Report on Operations, Hq. II Corps, 2 Z(ay 1943 (Qoatinnod) .<br />
Total<br />
602<br />
2059<br />
Roplacaments unassigned 19 5477<br />
.<br />
91<br />
358 54<br />
507<br />
629<br />
180<br />
2d Plat ., Co. B, 95th CM BIa7<br />
1st Plat., Co . A, 301st QU Bn.<br />
1<br />
60<br />
58' 4<br />
61<br />
- 2d Plat,, Co . D, 60th Qh Ldry 1 .<br />
175th F-A . Bn.<br />
35 2 565<br />
168th Inf. (-1st Bn.)<br />
107 3 1949<br />
Co. C, 109th tied . Bn .<br />
Det ., Co . C, 109th Engr . Bn.<br />
Dot ., 805th T.D . .Bn.<br />
1st Ranger Bn.<br />
2d Bn ., 17th F.A .<br />
5th Rep1 Bn.<br />
5<br />
8<br />
31<br />
31<br />
19<br />
2<br />
86<br />
350 53<br />
476<br />
596<br />
161<br />
70 71<br />
1 Plat.p _47th QK ((3R4) 1 27 28<br />
1st T.D. Group Hq. 16 123<br />
2d ._Ba., 591st-,-Snngr. B. Rsgt- (-F) 20 1 423 144 4<br />
lot Bn., 36tih";F.A. Rsgt,<br />
Btu A 87d Det., DO -1st F.A. Obsu Bn.<br />
26<br />
4<br />
1<br />
1<br />
616 643 -<br />
84<br />
34th : Divisions,- .<br />
Hq-, 34th Division<br />
_~ Hq. Co., .34th Div .<br />
-:~'-11P<br />
Plat:<br />
,34th sig.-Co.<br />
. _, - 34th Cav. . Rcn. Troop<br />
_ ;;_ .233d Daf: Refit. (-2d Ba.)<br />
: .: ' .235th Int. Regt .<br />
48<br />
8<br />
3<br />
1<br />
8<br />
107<br />
140<br />
10 233<br />
2 126 .<br />
73<br />
1247 .`<br />
].86<br />
6 1M<br />
2850. .<br />
291<br />
736<br />
76<br />
258<br />
194<br />
2089<br />
.<br />
;404th Div: Artillerr<br />
125th F.A. Bu ._<br />
16<br />
30<br />
2<br />
2<br />
730<br />
524<br />
2~<br />
15?,R F.A. : .r<br />
F.A. eau::<br />
33<br />
34<br />
2<br />
3<br />
487, _<br />
557 : _ : - 594<br />
109,E Mad* B ~ _ 30 4 ~<br />
4TI_<br />
"'<br />
13 1 206 =<br />
; ..<br />
1 804th P B 4 4J`' 1 .<br />
.<br />
2<br />
" n .<br />
lfColl. Co'*<br />
- ,-!-~- .<br />
APU TV<br />
*Vision 1429<br />
_ ~~fon R<br />
hAr8a.. CoAL3st . miv .<br />
8<br />
air<br />
<strong>Of</strong>f .<br />
No<br />
24 1<br />
v<br />
1<br />
UNCUIS51Fit~-"<br />
ANC $Y<br />
1A .a, . ; .. ,<br />
~t4a, .s<br />
...~~ : 't-,- _Cl<br />
I~ 14 4<br />
l~'~~ 1<br />
1rL<br />
F +~ .~<br />
26<br />
` 3 . AvT 8<br />
1h75<br />
`<br />
drjo ,<br />
ob ~4te't~nt1l ~',t 2579 kIM
Appendix "All to RopQrt on Operations, Hq . II Corps, 2 May 1943 (Continued) .<br />
1st Infantry Division (Continued)s<br />
Div . Arty .<br />
7th F .A . Bn.<br />
32nd F .A . Bn.<br />
13th F .1. . Brigade ;<br />
Hq & Hq Co.<br />
1st FOIL . Obsn Bn (-S & F Section)<br />
17th F.A . Regt . (-2d Bn.)<br />
36th F.A . Regt. (-1st Bn.)<br />
178th F .k . Re9t .<br />
813th T .D . Bn.<br />
894th T .D . Bn.<br />
9th Infantry Division :<br />
Hq. s 9th Infantry Division<br />
Hq. Co ., 9th Infantry Division<br />
M.P . Plat.<br />
9th Signal Co .<br />
15th Engr. Bn.<br />
9th Mod. Bn.<br />
9th QU Bn.<br />
709th OFd . Co.<br />
47th Ia. Rogt .<br />
39th Inf., Rogt .<br />
60th inf . Refit.<br />
Division artillery<br />
26th F .A . Bn.<br />
34th F.A . Bn.<br />
60th-F . Bn. -.....~-<br />
84th F.A. Bn.<br />
9th Rcn. Troop* . '<br />
107th CA Bn: -<br />
62d Engr. Topo Co. (-Det)<br />
427th Eugr . Co. (DT) - .<br />
Co.-Bo 601at'Engr . Cam. Bn.<br />
1 pIAU O Co. B* 205th QU<br />
SectIM Shoo Repair# 218th QU Co.<br />
751st Tank Bn.<br />
2619th QU Prow . Trk . Ba.<br />
14th' Ord. Co;<br />
Bt_ B, ~3la~. CA Bn.<br />
><br />
Det'4 6th Chem. Co.<br />
1?5 IMP* :Rdgt " (met) .<br />
~' B & 0; }2.63d QU Bn<br />
C4,.. . 7M Iank Bn.<br />
T.D, BAS;<br />
:TON Bn~`-<br />
'? 15 Varoti; Oorpe 'Total<br />
<strong>Of</strong>f . ITO ANC EM Total<br />
14 2 146 162<br />
27 2 589 618<br />
33 2 588 623<br />
15 1 92 108<br />
16 330 346<br />
34 1 589 624<br />
31 2 709 742<br />
67 3 1295 1365<br />
37 849 886<br />
37 852 889<br />
42 8 98 148<br />
7 3 162 172<br />
3 86 89<br />
13 1 350 3611<br />
35 1 716 752<br />
38 473 511<br />
14 228 242<br />
10 146 156<br />
169 5 3450 3624<br />
129 3 3252 3384<br />
152 2 3088 3242<br />
24 210 234<br />
28 2 597 627<br />
31 2 611 644<br />
34 1 568 603<br />
34 2 547 583<br />
6 211 217<br />
39 2 752 793<br />
4 115 119<br />
4 105 109<br />
5 77 82<br />
1 51 52<br />
1 33 34<br />
36 2 730 768<br />
2 5 1 ' 1.40<br />
116<br />
6 28 1117 153<br />
25 25<br />
3<br />
6<br />
6<br />
3<br />
617<br />
418 1<br />
105<br />
652<br />
55<br />
111,<br />
38 851 889<br />
38 895 933<br />
4410 228 157 83492 88287<br />
iJ15~`l L aCyLJ~`v<br />
.,<br />
i
APPFMIX "$" TO_ REPORT_ ON OPERATIONS H&'1DQUiRTERS II CAPS, 2 wa 1943 .<br />
1. Prisoners captured by II Corps units during period 1 January to 17<br />
March, 1943.<br />
German<br />
Italian<br />
<strong>Of</strong>f. EM <strong>Of</strong>f. EN<br />
2 71 5 548<br />
2 . Casualties of II Corps during period 1 January to 17 March, .1943 :<br />
<strong>Of</strong>ficers<br />
Enlisted Hen<br />
K IT 11 C K W ' ?d 0<br />
.. .. - oft<br />
22 72 '199 3 170 7452 220<br />
29
APPEN= "C" TO REPORT ON OPFUTIORI3 WADQUARTERs II CORPS, 2 NU 1943 .<br />
Replacemente by branch received by II Corps units during the period 1<br />
January - 15 March, 1943s<br />
OFF.<br />
Infantry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 4074<br />
Field Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . 34 789<br />
Medical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 193<br />
Dental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2<br />
T.D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1_15<br />
Engineer . . .6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . .<br />
Q.M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br />
5 231<br />
199<br />
C .A .- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 52<br />
Ordnance * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .* . . . .<br />
EM<br />
107<br />
Armored Force , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 858<br />
Cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . .r . . . . . . . . . 12 69<br />
Liilitary Police , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31<br />
B Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5<br />
23<br />
Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .<br />
TOTAL 290 6746
1PP_: '.DI :: "D" TO R~,PORT v : OPMATIOIIS, Ifc.ADQUARTZRS II C0 .-Z5 .<br />
medical Activities During Period 1 January to 17 .larch, Inclusive .<br />
1 . DurinC the period 1 January to 21 January, corps medical units were<br />
concentrated in the Constantine area . These units were the 9th Evacuation<br />
Hospital, 77th Evacuation Hospital, 118th Surgical Hospital, 51st Medical<br />
Battalion, 2nd Battalion, 16th i.iedical Regiment, and the lst Advance Section,<br />
2nd = :edical Supply Depot . iluring this period, only Brit13h'hospital facilities<br />
were available and all hospitalization was in British hospitals .<br />
2 . Upon arrival in the Tebessa area, the 9th Evacuation Hospital was<br />
established 12 rules south of Tebessa . The 118th Surgical Hospital establishod<br />
one hospitalization section at Feriana, the other section moving to vicinity<br />
of Thala . The 77th Evacuation Hospital was held in r:~serve until 111 February,<br />
rraen it established lightly 12 wiles south of Tebessa . The 1st Advance Section,<br />
2nd '-edical Supply Depot,, was established 10 miles south of Tebessa .<br />
3 .. During; the period 16 February to 20 February, all medical installations<br />
were ti:ithdrwtin to vicinity of Ainc Boida . DurinL this withdrawal it liras neces-<br />
sary to move approxinately 700 patients with the hospitals because of lack of<br />
evacuation facilities to the rear .<br />
11 . Supply . The initial medical supplies vrere adequate and there was no<br />
difficultyy n int~ainin an adequate supply of class one supplies, that is,<br />
t' % so supplies contained in :.icdical maintenance units . It became necessary<br />
.:=ray in the op .:ration to :Later the naintenancc unit in order that a pore<br />
nearly balaaced stock would be available in the depot . The greatest difficulty<br />
in s-pDly was encountered in replacing itcns of organizational equipment for<br />
hospitals and field units . It rras necessary to augment the T/B.l equipment of<br />
hospitals materially, in order that they night . function c:ificiuntly at ne?r<br />
full capacity .<br />
. ospitalization . The t'.---o 750-bed evacuation hospitals and the h00-<br />
b :d surgicl Lospi a rrc:rc adequate for the troops initially involved . The<br />
two 750-bed evacuation hospitals were placed on a 15-day policy in order that<br />
as :many patients as possible might b,: r,,turncu to duty in th:: forward ar_e :1 .<br />
This policy was abandoned towards t : :e end of the period rrhcn troops in the<br />
arcs were incr,;asc:d . The 118th Surgical Hospital rec-ived the ciljority of<br />
casualties and r ::n&red tli.: initial operating trcntm~nt . This unit. was on no<br />
fixed policy . Clearing platoons of Corps 1~~edical Batt^lions linen: utilized<br />
extensively in the forward ar .:as rrith surgical tcons ati.aclwd . These units<br />
performed exc ::11,:ntly and filled the gap bctwecn division units and t.hc more<br />
fixed :iospit-nls in the rLar .<br />
6. Evacuation . Evacuation fro:: : f-orward units was acconplishec b,; the:<br />
51st .edicalBattalion and the 2a6i Battalion ., 16th I edical RC incnt . T` :is<br />
latter unit was placed _ntir .~ly L: sup,rort of the lst U .S . Armored Division,<br />
w:_ilc th_ 51st :.:edical Battalion covered L:vacuation from cl, :rin .; platoons to<br />
hospitals . Evacuation to the CovLFa -iication Zen ._ 'Was ,:ntir_.ly b:. - -,ir until 16<br />
' :;bruary, when ::ir evacuation conpletcly f:iil~:d due: to unfavorable flying; con-<br />
ditions . The Brltisa =First :Xnr t :L,:n furnish-,d . . f,:ctlon of t : :, 6th i_otor<br />
!1~~ulancc Corps for evacuation by road to th :. 61st Station : :ospit -il -L ;. Cl C.itcrrah<br />
. T"is unit ri,_-rained rrith the Corps during the r,.:m ::indcr of this period,<br />
and covered all r,.an:ard .:vacu-.tigp ~oad~<br />
khi;u" . 5 [r~~ :
as<br />
Panzer Armee Afrika (Rommel), War Diary (Extracts),<br />
17-22 February 1943
From t4ae 21st Pz. Division to<br />
Pz. A.O.K. 235- h. 17 Irrebruury 1943<br />
by me$sair,er<br />
%e fight for Sboltla is lmrder than e=poctcd . . Defonse well<br />
organized;. about 50 enatay tanks. Se, :on-h.ocw tank fight . Sbeitla fir,,07 in<br />
our hand . Bulk of talks r= cd. 7"4'79 (Sbaitlst) 1-lasult : number of Prisoners<br />
imroaaed to 54 oMoars, 1660 man; 12 tom, ae"ral acIr-propelled no=--ts,<br />
6 personnel transportation wagons, 2 gums dratroyed. Intention: defense of<br />
Sbaltla, nonning up in 723^f/7263 (zed 81 bou Zid to 30 kn southwest) . Point<br />
of main efl`ort of rocu~.u~i.ssanco 59?2 ( SUi , 35 km rorti of Sbeitle.) and<br />
7716 -(Zasserine) .<br />
Sources<br />
lituatiom 63 ready for cation.<br />
AnlaViiaexYd 9 tum aobladhtbericht d-,r Pz.Anrv-<br />
.,vAfrikm Ia .<br />
12.2.43 - 23.2.43<br />
34 37VU
To Comando Suppemio<br />
to PE .A.O.B.5 for information<br />
On the basis of the enemy situation as of today, and pro,--upposinG<br />
that the supply situation of the Fifth Pz .Aru;y is adequate, I subggst an<br />
immediate enveloping thrust of strong forces from the southwest on Teb'3ssa<br />
and the area north o£ it . I also recommend, if nococsury for the purpose,<br />
the attaohment and rapid move forward of the 10th and 21st Pz .DJ.vs . to the<br />
Thelepte»Feriana area . _<br />
Source :<br />
German-Italian Pz .Aflty C.P .<br />
18 February 1943<br />
Rommel<br />
- Analagenband* 9 zum Sohlachtboriohtdor Pz .Armee Mr .<br />
12.2.43 - 23.2.43<br />
Ia<br />
34 37 5/11<br />
.
Field ?11arshal<br />
General<br />
CONFERENCE on 19 February 1 1.0 - at 091;5 hrs .<br />
Kesselring<br />
v, Arnim<br />
Major General Ziegler<br />
Brigadier General<br />
Gause<br />
Lt, General Gandin<br />
Colonel<br />
Aide<br />
v, Quast<br />
O .B .S .<br />
The general describes briefly the tactical and supply situation<br />
and states his view on the order from Commando Supremo concerning the<br />
Gruppe Rommel attack, The commander-in-chief emphasizes that the main<br />
objective must be Bone . To this end, the first attack. objective_ is<br />
Le Kef (see written plan) . If the attack ordered is to succeed it should<br />
be executed promptly ; as a matter of fact, it should have been launched<br />
2 days ago already . The objective ordered by Co=ando Supremo - the ponotra-<br />
tion between Le Kef and Tebessa - promises little success ; the attach. will<br />
also get farther away from the supply base . The attack, accompanied by a<br />
covering action, should move with all force toTrard the north, a direction<br />
not expected by the enemy, and in a manner that would steadily shorten the<br />
routes o£ supply . Hence, copnitment of the 21st Pz . Div . Prom Sbeitla<br />
toward Le Kef, of the 10th Pz . Div . from Pichon toward Lo Kof. The main<br />
effort should not be laid on Tebessa, not even in the direction of Tebossa .<br />
Although Field 11arshal Kesselring dons not side in wii:h the plans<br />
proposed with all peremptoriness, ho concedes that this operation has very<br />
m.any advantages and a prospect of success .<br />
The question of adjustment in the chain of corz :iand, the frontier, or<br />
the boundary botwoon Gruppo Rornel and 5th Pz, Armoe is not clearly solved
CONFERENCE on 19 Feb, 191.3 - at 0915 hrs . (cont .)<br />
by Field Marshal Kesselring . The project of Field Marshal KesselrinG<br />
got the<br />
that Regt . Buhse should be commanded by Rormtol did not XKKK consent<br />
from the other officers,<br />
The amount of supply and motor vehicles, considered absolutely necessary<br />
if the operation is to be executed at all and requested by the commander-<br />
in-chief,appear high to the Field Martihal ; however, an increase in the<br />
bringing up of supply and motor vehicles is promised .<br />
Source : KRIEGS TAGEBU CiI 1V<br />
Pz. A.O .K . 5, Ia<br />
from 1,2 - 26, 2, 43<br />
29 777/7
Telephone lbataoe to<br />
A.0.K.JS ldvanood C.P.<br />
Lt.Col.Pomptog<br />
1 . The roroas under the eo=uaad of Fiold i`arWial ::owl oz, n-mly p:Laaod<br />
umder his order (10t}Y Pz . Okv, 21st T1z .DJ. :d'., 1xajnfCru ),~e D.~~. Y.. ), axploiting<br />
i3= former suco"s, x.11. Inviadiately ptcah forva.rd ovor the Conoral lin 7279<br />
512"7 nortIvrard in . the noon rlar& and r :ar of the Bri -tish L'orcos str3.nding in<br />
front of tho north fusislun from:.<br />
2. To that offoot tho follorninS is orderods<br />
3*<br />
Order' for Operation "Stumflutn<br />
a. zxte 21st zr5,7.1 lczrva tiiA aria of 72"t> a<br />
coed along, tho high road leading nort: wrard and will reach the rcun j<br />
sumt-lou abotit 75 Ion north-rorthvoat of 7L/1-9 .<br />
t11rcotion.<br />
Ro .:,~0 1<br />
Souroez<br />
Anlagcnband 9 zum Sohlachtbario}nt der Pz .Arrvo Afr. Za<br />
12.2.4.3 - 23.2 .43<br />
34 375/11<br />
Gorron-Italian Panzer Arn C .p.<br />
19 February 1943<br />
0 h. 1S" Fub. rro-<br />
The 10th fz.Dvv. r after reoeivir;; portinnt orders, vill i- ;-:Ldiately<br />
leave the Fichon area. and reach by the shortest; route the St)e t3a area<br />
1at trio diapo- of Fiald zs"s?"uxl rio:1;s31 . At ::ill re:>ain L ~ :ro In r ::adi-<br />
neca and upon order or Flold 1Lirsha?. :llonnel and av^cordinlv to the develop--<br />
:aunt: of the situation will by co-mittod oitlier behind the 21st Pz .fliv.<br />
in the direct(' of T.e .aP or ovcr Fsaorine su n on.ral nort7r .:bat< rly<br />
l'.old ? u"u_~iu1 Roumal'G C.P. will ho tranfozrad at noon 19 Feb . to<br />
ibriarn- auut . Radio ommunication with t:ho 10 .}~ fz.Div . :rill bo asourod .
Operations Seotion Geruml Italian Ponnor Ariw C.R<br />
19 Februsuy '43 d4i:5 h .<br />
Div. Dentauro<br />
Bow situation. Tho 7th Bers .RSt. will start to naroh to ForIona irrx<br />
madiately . Upon arrival thero,will pass under tho oontrol of D.A.K. The ro-<br />
timntal oom=nder will proooed in advanoo to tho C.P. of the D.A.R. at, ae-<br />
riana, south. Thero Ew -All receive furVier orders .<br />
Operations Soction German Italian Panzor Aray C .P.<br />
1: r`ai3rtaa.ry °1 ; 01_ 5.1 h .<br />
. to<br />
Div,, Cantauro<br />
All- tha ajar-onta ofDiv. Contauro heretofore oozmfttod southoact -QG o-11-<br />
south o£ Carm ce.lI move as rapidly as pocsible to the Cafe rca. 'Dnwro ;.troy<br />
rd1l organize Por dei'easo.<br />
Source :<br />
AnUgon:oand .9 zusr Sohlaahtberioht dnr Pz .Armc;e Afr . la<br />
12.2.43 - 23.2.:4<br />
34 375/n . .
Germ= Italian Panzer Lire % .P .<br />
19 Fobr-=ry 1943<br />
{Order for German African Corps ( by t8l®phone to Lt.Col.Stolboalc)<br />
1. Now cituation. Me foreoz under ho=wl's cor.,.nd or :e---&o w1ll bo<br />
shortly under Ror=olfs cosanand UM 1,Z.Div ., 2lat Pz.Div ., Ktvt_nfs 'u-_~he D.A.K. ).<br />
oxiloiting tho advantage gained up to now, will. attack as rapidly ac lzosoibla<br />
flank<br />
over the r,cnoral line 7279 - 5127 norttmard 3.n Vto deep Zia-xkd and roar of :;ho<br />
British forces a'=ding opposite the northern Tuntaian J.'z-ant .<br />
2, To that effoot the 22= following, is ordered:<br />
a. At 0800 h. 19 i4bb. the 21u- Pz.Div, grill move out of t-, : area 7279.<br />
follow the high road to who north and Cain the June -Lion about '75 }a<br />
. north.-north=st of 7279 .<br />
b. Tho 10th Pz.D.rlv. atarting, 'L`=cdiately froz the :ichaa nrca, at firr -',,.<br />
at the disposal of RoY=3, wi11 roach area '279. Furthcr ooMa3t . Crt<br />
from thoro is reservcd .<br />
c. pfgruppe D.A.14 (leas the Brreaglieri Bn said the arb 11Gry bat - .alion<br />
of the Div.. Contauro) will start L:zndiatcly and rfi,r,oh rxoa 7716, Trill<br />
move into position of roadiuace shortly and Y,-,Ill then gain without delay<br />
the mountain oass nort2:vest o£ 771,6. lku"thsr comitmen4 from thcro<br />
ing to the devolopnont of who situation ,~. . ..c ooial . -ord''r .o.^ who fix<br />
3. Ow Uersagliori battalion and the ic tillery Ba. o£ Dav. Contauro will<br />
at first rozuin in who area 774.1 for seotwity and recornuiusanco to t4io north<br />
and the nortlraest . Relief d,xini, 19_. Feb . through tzo 7th 3 . ra: .r,L,t . arrivin<br />
froze Cafra<br />
s provided .for. Upon arrival in horiana south the 7t :: ?3crr .Pit ;"<br />
x-411 bo placed under tno control of D.A . n. After ro14 of ,1irou[;h t!lo 7th 3orc .<br />
D.A.X. will issuo the necoaeary orders for who =oven.cnt o£<br />
xgt./,by Bers .Bn. and Arty.Bn.of Div. Centaurs rte.<br />
After romvi:!g the £order goiat o.i' Aiain effort o£ roaox.aloua :-ioo t4o<br />
Rooon.Bn.33 is placed oonpletoly at the raisposal o£ D.A.S. for t-.',-if new rzicf^.ion .
4o Howitzer Stzy, 2d Bn.,A.A.2 1 and let Co Rookot projaator Lxgt.71<br />
-dIl movo during 19 Feb . toD.A .Z. at 17113 south and gill be nlacod candor<br />
its. orders at arrival.<br />
- Hasta A.O.F,. vrII1. be detaolzod izrmacliately from D.A.K. amd is a,ai ;a<br />
plaood direot3,y under the control of the Arty,<br />
souroet<br />
:B= At On 3,9 Ibb . noon, Rom-,alla C .P. nt 77h.1 ao&h .<br />
Ablaganband 9 xuus f aohthoricht dor 1'E.1x=a Af'r.Ta<br />
12.2.43 - 23.2.43<br />
- 34 '3W11
IntoIS.igonc~- CArmaTl-Italian P$ .AsvTy C .P.<br />
20 February 143<br />
Radio Lbssage to<br />
O.K .E. ,try G.S., Section Fremde Heere West III*<br />
Gorman General in Robe<br />
North Front:<br />
?'ho eneuy opposed vi&lent res1stan-,a to our attacks at Sbiba and at<br />
the pae3s-northwest Kasserina .<br />
At Sbiba, the eneW nho roooived constant roinforoononts especially in<br />
artillery, vies able to put: a stop to the attack o£ the 21st Pz .Div, from his<br />
improved, dcsainant positions ; the division had gained little ground and was<br />
forocd to pass to the defensive,<br />
Intolligonco Evening Report<br />
Opposite Yampfgruppe D.a ..L the onezy succeeded at first, xrith the support<br />
of new toroos brought from the north, in holdinE; his very advarita£;oous pass<br />
positions northwest of Rasseriao . Put after the coaultmcnt of elwaents of the<br />
3Oth Pz.Div, he -ma throm back in heavy fighting and had to give up the pass .<br />
Hs lost several hundred prisoners, xaW weapons and mt4riel.<br />
Northwest o£ Thalepte the ©neW s able to repulse with retreat; artiLlozy<br />
are attack launched by wens: forces of the Div. Centauro .<br />
Very weak air activity because of poor visibility . Out of 4 onamy planes<br />
attacking Ptom the north=st of KasseeLno 3 ware shot do=.<br />
2. Impression made by the enomX:<br />
Cormittinng all his available forces<br />
/the encinV is endeavoring to hold his new switch position in the hills<br />
northwest of Sbeitla---Kassarino---Thelepte . Ho keeps on bringing roinfor-<br />
cements at Sbiba and northwest of lfassorine . Ene' counterattacks are axpocted<br />
on 21 Fob. at Sbiba, northwest of hanzorine and northuout of Tholoptc .<br />
Branch of _*<br />
the ~Intelligence Service, dealing Frith aostorn Allies .
.: Souroct<br />
Aseording to stataents of the British Intelligence Soruioo, alarent<br />
o£ the lot British Garde-Brigade ray be assumed to be at Sbiba . Since British<br />
tankw "-brk VI acre also ascertained there the oo=3.tment of elements of tlho<br />
British 6th Panzer Div. in this area can be rooroned arlth.<br />
Prisonora o£- the 9th Itr., 9th American Inf.Div, wore tit Hortnvost<br />
o£ Kasaerine .<br />
Aooording to reliable information the rest of the Combat Co=ando of the<br />
1st American Panzer Div. 1Ac boon ascertained ancra in the area southeast of<br />
Tobe sca. .<br />
' . Anlageaband 9 mum Sehlaahtbericht der Pm.Arm_e Arr . la<br />
23.2.43<br />
"34 3rr,/zl
OperAtiona Section<br />
21st P$.Div .<br />
Gc=mn Italian Prn.ATzny C .P.<br />
21 Feb . 143 221(:N1.<br />
Defenso in the present main line of rosistance .<br />
r0adY In onao the ensues withdraws over Sbiba, pursuo with elements ; bulk/for now<br />
assiguaMnt .<br />
Basta O.B, will attack from Thala on Rhodi.a in the rear of the enorV at<br />
Sbiba.<br />
To the l0 -th Pz,Div.<br />
Defense in the area 1hala-Kalaa Djorda . Local assault on Jad,jerouino around<br />
To = D.A. K.<br />
Conif xc~~ thrust to capture Pass el IImra,<br />
the night o£ 2122 if necessary.,<br />
To 530th Arty.Bn.<br />
Attauk over 7?q0 on 77E32 and 7762, lbld the passoa .<br />
To Div . Centauro<br />
...._ ....__... . .... ..----------------<br />
Wide south envelogpont during<br />
Withdraw fromoetction south of t :ie passia . During the night the old<br />
area around Feriana---Tolepte will bo ;aimed and dofondod, road fork Oglet<br />
w<br />
bu li-tya will be ninod . Ros "trve will 'Do held in readiness for mobile : co;mraia.'ront .<br />
To Ccmanding General, Air Force Corps Tunis<br />
Today 0 s rooonnaiasanoo results received attar 1600 h. only . Gontinuod<br />
reco~inaisaanoe in the anti" Tunisian ar :-a and ti " cl report°-are of decisive<br />
ininortanoe for further dociaiona . Ro,-xzfll.
Radio lbasage from Garman-Italian Panzer A1*V C .P.<br />
Intulligenoe Section 21 Feb . 191*3<br />
to<br />
O.K.H. <strong>Army</strong> Gent. Staff, Fromde Roera F:o st III<br />
German General in Rome<br />
O.B.SUd<br />
1.. North fronts<br />
Evening Report, Intelligence<br />
At Shiba the enMy continued to pt reinforcements . A total of 11 batteries<br />
was identified . A tank thrust from the west in the afternoon was repulsed and<br />
6 enewy tanks were destroyed .<br />
In the forenoon northvmst of Kassorino pass an attack of enemy armored<br />
forces ms repulsed ia the area of . The onony opposed violent resistance<br />
to our noon attack in a northern and northwestern direction. Ira brought forward<br />
the 26th pz.Brigade of the British 6th Pz.Div. against our 10th Pz .Div . in line<br />
toward the north. In hard fighting this brigade tma thro:vn back in the direc-<br />
tion o£ Thala and lost almost 4.0 tanks. The enezV Rae auoceasful in bringing<br />
to a stop the attack of Kav:Pfgruppe D.A.K. against the pasa 31.E cast of Tobossaj `<br />
he waa in strong positions on the surrounding hills and his artillery fire<br />
chenkad the attack b kra neat of Ll Harare . Be conteatcd his Positious sucoass-<br />
fully against an assault of freak -forces of Div. Centauro on heights 20 lea<br />
norttwest of Thelente .<br />
2. Earl intentions<br />
the encry attempted today to hold the line of heights El Hmat (31, Ia southeast<br />
of ThQla)---Dj .fi lima (32'm wost of Tobes--a) ., ._.-Dii .Flohuozci-(779)3- nor ti`3<br />
purpose ho brought forward additional Amorioan forces from U:o area of Tobessa<br />
and trouthoast thereof and also the 26 British Pz .13r1gado .<br />
According to reliable information Combat Co=_-ando B of the let A-auriean
Pz.Div, was tratasferrod from the area southeast of Tobos.;a to the rcr,ioti of<br />
IIaldra ( ~4 laa northeast of TBbessa) .<br />
I~. Capti rad papers indicated t:-mt armV forces at Sasserine paes rsc as follows :<br />
SotXCss<br />
1 bn. of the 26th Inf. (1st Agr.Inf. Div. )<br />
1 bn. o£ the 1C$th Inf.(34th<br />
I bn. of The Rangers<br />
1 frenah bn. of tho Div. Constantine<br />
2 cos.,13th Pz.Rgt. (lst Amr.Pz.Div. )<br />
Aut Co ., Derbyshire Yoorany (6th Britiah Pz .Div. )<br />
33d Arty,Bn. (1st A!sr.Inf.Div . )<br />
58th Pz.Arty.Bn.(lst<br />
175th Arty.Bn.<br />
1bth Pz. .Bn. (1st lurmr. fz .DlJ . )<br />
1 bin. 228th Royal Eh&tneers<br />
3. oo. 19th Amar.Eag,Rgt. :<br />
1 co.. 805th Antitank Bn.<br />
6 flak batteries<br />
Anla&anband 9 a= Sohlaohtberioht der fhnzar Amiae Afr. Ia<br />
.<br />
12,2,43 - 23.2.43<br />
34 375/U<br />
ti
Operations Section German Italina Panzer <strong>Army</strong> C .P .<br />
22 February t43 0030 h .<br />
to<br />
German rzonoral in Boma<br />
'O.B .S. Xflbrungsabtlg u.Arbeitsstab<br />
0.K.W.Af..F.St.<br />
0.K H. <strong>Army</strong> G. S .<br />
Day report 22 kbbruary_ '43<br />
I, General<br />
A continuation of the attack appears to be pointless on account of the<br />
continuous reinforcements o£ enemy forces during 22 Mo., -the adverse weather<br />
vdzioh rendors the terrain impassable outside of the hard surface roads, and<br />
the inareasing difficulties of co=itting mobile troops in the unfaiorable<br />
mountain region= also because of the poor combat value of the troops.<br />
breaking<br />
Tharotore the AruW, after causing the ©ne7 heavy losses and<br />
up his conoentration, in agreement vrith O.S.Md ordered in tlia afternoon a<br />
ocaaation of the attack and a withdravial of the attacking troops .<br />
Additional groun3 for the decision was the fact that the situation a .-<br />
the ?:xreth front mmkes a rapid shift of Ue mobile troops of both armies ns-<br />
cossary to give the envW:who is not yet ready for the attack, a swift blow<br />
in his assembled forces aria thereVy force hits to dalay it. During the night<br />
vatt.druar<br />
of 22/23 fob. the <strong>Army</strong> vi 11 xM the 10th Pz . Div. and Kampfgru,LPe D.A.K.<br />
the roads and the trail first to the pass position north of Easserins,<br />
I-. ...._...._. . . .,_._.<br />
and then iu additional bounds Trill have all units including the 21st Pz .Div .<br />
and Div. Centauro roach the point of, departure of the operation.<br />
. In view of the weak forces and the necessity of concentrating all =bile<br />
elements for an op-ration, out of the fhreth position, this position is held<br />
to be the most favorable .<br />
Partimilarn<br />
The 2lat Pz.Div.held its position south of Sbiba. %nom ap.arently<br />
furthar reinforced ; howovor no onamy attack .
10th Pz.Div .<br />
The armored battalion which in the evening hours of 21 Feb . had<br />
brokon .through at Thala, was caught in the back by strong eneW forces and<br />
was forced to evacuate the village . Strong onomy forces (elements o£ tire<br />
6th British Pz .Div. and of the 46th British In°.Div.) :lore occupying the do-<br />
ninant ridges on both aides of Thala. The pro pared attack on the Shale hills<br />
mess not carried out on account of the continuous roinforooments in oneny infantry<br />
si~xs and artilleryx from a western and northorn direction. Several<br />
enemy attempts at attacks ware repulsed with losses for him.At night fall the<br />
Idisengaged itself fran the chemy and reached Kasserine :ass after mining the<br />
road .,<br />
KampfFruppe D.A. in the zooming hours had launched an attack on the pass<br />
position of D3 . ol Han a. As a result of strong artillery effect of the onmW<br />
and thfl flanking on 3 sides from dominant mountain Positions the attack did<br />
not. suecedd. The Kampfgruppe had-to pass to the defensive and ropulned several<br />
violent anamy counterattacks which were otill in progress at night fall. The<br />
withdrawal and reaching the positions in the Kasserine Pass ware oarried out<br />
during the night.<br />
Mo attack of the krti<br />
open the passes north of Thelepte<br />
:3unchad from a'northernd rerat ~could not bsx= go formrd on account o£<br />
strong aneny action and marshy roads, and had to be broken off.<br />
Div. Gentauro v'.ithout important engagement in defensive positions in the<br />
Thelepte-lbriana area .<br />
Air situation During the entire day constant Jabo and low-level attacks in<br />
the area Dj . al. Hamra and bouth of '17iala. Five onarv planes tiers downod by<br />
antiaircraft fire . Despite advarso weather conditions our Luftraffe supported<br />
the operations offootively.<br />
Results of 19-22 Feb. angagemonta a:cording to reports as yet inoomplatc :
destroyed.<br />
Souroes<br />
845 prisoners (mostly British)<br />
66 tanks<br />
74 motor gun carriages and scout cars<br />
hS antitank gnus .<br />
10 guns<br />
3<br />
numerous motor trucks, heavy and light infantry weapons captured or<br />
8 planes domed by anti aircraft firo .<br />
Anlagenband 9 sum Sehlaohtbericht der Panzer Armco Afr. la<br />
32.2,43 - 23.2.43<br />
34 .375/11
Radio Message from<br />
Intelligence Section German-Italian Pananr Arnyrt.P.<br />
22 February 191}3<br />
to<br />
Q,K.ii. <strong>Army</strong> G.S., Sectinn Fremde 11Jaro 1+'oat III<br />
G,~raan General in Rome<br />
O.B .3fid<br />
l, North rent<br />
Rveniar, 3capcr t, Intelliganoo Ser uico<br />
ilaere is no change in the picture p:esonted by the onoMl at Sbiba.<br />
Toward noon strong cnany forces with tanks were assembled in readiness<br />
ror a oo=erattaok on our positions 5 LT. southeast o£ Thala, but- the attack<br />
was not launahed.<br />
Tho eumW initiated several strong thrusts with tank support6Gainst oar<br />
Xampfgruuppe southeast of Dj . al IIa:,ra but uns repulsod for the most part. Ho<br />
really succeeded only pushing bank t1ae laft flank of this Kam, fgruppa tox:ard<br />
the eastl. The enemy attacks in this area were supported by stro ::g artillery<br />
which had at its disposal outstanding oboorvation positions on the surrounding<br />
hills .<br />
Lo important lotion northwest of Thalepte.<br />
Our air reoonnaissanoe, spotty because of bad weather, disclosed that<br />
na:r onany forces :yarn bro:a.Sat fon7a.:d on the Le itof-.--Kalaa D3erda road try<br />
Thula, and from. Tebesna to the east-northeast .<br />
2, Picture RL<br />
The enemy continued to brie forward reinforcements to stop our advunoe<br />
over the Kasserino pass to the north and northwest or to launch a counter-<br />
attack to reaa2ture Kasserino pass .<br />
Reliable information, prisoners stateiLents,oaptured papers and grmind<br />
raoozuialza=ca disclose the follovring picture of the enter distribution of<br />
forces is before our attack front at the present time :<br />
a . At Sbiba olev;ents of the lst British Guard Brigado, and olment~; of
. At Thala 26th Pz.Brigade of the 6 British Pz .Div ., ly)th Inf.Brigade<br />
Amerioan Inf.Divs.<br />
Djebel<br />
e. In the el Hamm scoter IIonbat Commando H of the lot Amarioan<br />
d,<br />
the 6th British Pz.Div., at least 14 battalion strong, 1 armored battalion<br />
and 11 batteries.<br />
o£ the 46th British InfDDiv., as wall as elements of the lst and 9th<br />
Pz.Div. AS E: L AS elements of the 1st and 9th Am%,rioan Inf.Divs.<br />
In the area southeast of Tobessa Combat Conwando A of the lot Amr.<br />
Armored Div.<br />
According to reliable information on 21 Feb . all units of the First<br />
British Arxr were given the order that there will be no fallinGi book out bf<br />
the present position and that no man may leave his post witaout an express<br />
order.<br />
3.<br />
During the fighting of 19/22 Feb . on the north front of the wrm.-Ital .<br />
Pr..Arry, reports as yet imoompletd announced the following success :<br />
Prisoners: 815<br />
Captured or destroyed: 66 tanks<br />
74 gun motor oarriagas and armored personnel carrions<br />
4S antitank guns<br />
10 guns<br />
and numerous motor true", heavy and light infantry weapons. In addition 8<br />
planes were shot dam .<br />
Sources Aulagenband 9 zum Sohlachtberioht der Panzer Armee Afr. Ia.<br />
12.2.143 - 23.2.43<br />
34 375/11