KASSERINE PASS BATTLES Readings - US Army Center Of Military ...

KASSERINE PASS 

BATTLES 

Readings 

Volume I, Part 2 

U.S . ARMY 

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

Contents 

18 . 1 st Armored Division, Report of Operations, Bahiret Foussana Valley, 

Tunisia, 19-25 February 1943 

19 . Combat Command B, 1 st Armored Division, Operations Report, 

Bahiret Foussana Valley, 20-25 February 1943 

20 . A Factual Summary of the Combat Operations of the 1 st Infantry 

Division in North Africa and Sicily During World War lI (Extract) 

21 . 1 st Infantry Division, Summary of Activities, January-March 1943, 

and Division Commander's Notes 

22 . 16th Infantry, 1 st Infantry Division, Operations Report, 19-26 Febru- 

ary 1943 

23 . 10th Panzer Division, War Diary (Extract), 14-22 February 1943 

24 . 21st Panzer Division, War Diary (Extract), 14-23 February 1943 

25 . Fifth Panzer Army, War Diary (Extract), 18-23 February 1943 

26 . Deutsches Afrika Korps, War Diary (Extract), 19-24 February 1943 

27 . Il Corps, Report of Operations, 1 January-15 March 1943 

28 . Panzer Armee Afrika (Rommel), War Diary (Extracts), 17-22 Febru- 

ary 1943

18 

1 st Armored Division, Report of Operations, 

Bahiret Foussana Valley, Tunisia, 19-25 February 

1943

2 . 

DIV xii (liol 

CU, 81 :ion, Uo:udg ' 

81 acn Bn (-d Co) 

4 L~alis, 41+3 C A . 

4180 - J~eets 28,3V - 6clle " 1,1200,000 . 

Gi, GS 4227 - z1heets 10,13 - ;scale= 1/200,000 . 

a . hrlemy is concentrated in strength in the vicinity of Fi:altii44 and 

1h : L-'TE with v~:at is estijoated to be riot less th4ri one amnred division, 

(toe 21st) understrength ill tang, (about 75 estil;atei) . _trong patrol 

activity was reported during the ni,~it of 18-19 February at ;-5842, 

-6450, 5--7370 and ;~-78)2 . Une battalion of tanks- was reported at 5-7048 

. 

and alao*er battalion (10th ranzer iiivision) was reported 

i;ZByRINE and j-9573 . t eavy two-way traffic on the ,6U ; 

b . Uur troops are holding the passes as shown 

r:+.. -:a L, ZIUD (:-4460) 

Lt . i;ol . Bo wen, C oladg 

3d !in 26 Inf 

Det 443 C A 

13 Go, 13 AR 

C Co, 106 C *i 

The `1st Armd Div will act- defensively to protect the town of T'! ESSA :and 

supply installations thereat against attack from the south and south-" . .:, , 

west, being prepared laeanvhile to counterattack to the southeast. t o restore 

- the .D'rdidAI .L position in the event that position is-penetrated'by 

hostile attack . 

i aG10iu 

G G, l: i . .1 C o ladg 

6 Ilif (-2d 8: 3d inn) 

1st 'tin, 13 ai3. (-i~ Go) 

3d iin, 13 iit (-I moo) 

91 F,. Ln (-i)' U o) 

68 F.i bn (,% .l.o) 

701 '1"L-I) 1) n 

a l;0 1u !hgr 

lo, 

Halls, 443 v n 

tj ::iiiii,ag (6-7356) 

Gen vVelvert, Co:adg 

1st bri, 168 Inf 

1 Ranger Bn 

175 FA bn 

i3 Go , 19 - En gr 

1 Qo, 692 C .~ 

.; Co, 105 Ca 

.i :CC o, 213Ct 

36 F .; nn (-Det) 

3 sins, French Inf 

enclosure 1~1 

1 st .,rid ~)iv 

in TY :e Field 

.?300 firs, 19 Feb x)43 

below : 

UC B (it LII LPT) 

:;G, CC L, Comdg 

13 .~;, (-1st & 3d isn) 

2d on, 6 Inf 

27 F.; b n ' 

-601 `1!i) (~; Uo) 

;) ;;o, 16 algr 

16 bans, 443 

b etvreen 

-- F;LU .`,I4A Road . 

WJo 5-9574 

i~ol . Stark 

19!:ngr(-1Co) 

1st rir., 26 Inf 

33 FA L :1 (-1 ;try) 

1 Co, JJ AR 

805 TD ( C C o) 

Det 4143 C A 

D Co, 105 CA - 

1 Lt (-lstc2 

.1 vtry 68 Fa 

16 Engr (=A,O '~_ . 

u D Cp) 

lids, 443 CA -

auard -a Via 0"ifivin no!" :_ __aid Q that 

11culaalgaaacy to the ;ass at '~ 'UWF QW142) . 

of jud Fir 

. 

._ _L~ LA 0 - 1 Wisio" Dre, 

~111 2 ~!d all"! in L~VWMWK 1rals . 

'2 :2z' ab- 

U ." ' S rl" voill "not and rqml wil aiepyr uttaca fru . the ';',St throug 

ho valley between DJ WU WA-LAL W n4ovx eL ~iu - 'd I'll e 

ene_-q forces %,iill be first oaZw~cd and defeated jr delayed in the vici 

nity of the eastorn eKK5 of Vie valley . lnfantrT deAnnive positions 

will be reconnoitered but not occupied ; a proportion of anti-tank and tani 

b,,~ locate,i, d'.1 j ift 

'.'( :1d 

tc) eff?c . s'..;rprise fla . -l.C`_ng 

fire al en attuc .SAI husUle furce, it is cuntaLolated Wat if Qu "Ali 

is furced bwci : L. ,, ene, .Z~ strength, it will be ordered tc 

retire, 7h!le executin ; to toe vicinity of Lill 1172 

(6-3 064) . 03n, it will eiie ., _er ; ru_,_,resF, :,it d prepare to execute a 

;incer CounteraLtsen, in cunjoiction sith 6, W, upon an cneay penetration 

horth ef"111 1172 . 

Lu W MI. also ke grepared to p,xtlcipate :vdth other ele.nentg t- 'f 

the Divisicn in an e-,o .iy attac--c in sectors other than its 

art :*,11ery to 11ace jf'ire in frcc. .i vile --ainefields 

behig 14id at \ :, T' near) 6-106u, j-1559 and at a-052 . 

"AN will establisn iuards ozi the idiiefields at 0-1559 and at 

0-05 2 . 

CC "B" from the general vicinity of its present position will be p rier c~3 

!~i' 0 

pared to execute on Livision order the following alternate missions : 41 

(1) Counterattacn, or reinforcenni of the U hi W ARM podtiona'04.'Grl 

.0 case of threatened ene;W penetration . 

Wovenant to position covered fronu grcund observation in vicinity .a m 

of Faint B-4072 as Division Reserve in case of ene~ry attack from the We "I rm N 

"From that p osit ion- OU "a" will be prepar ed to exec ut e a pincer counter 

I 

attack (in conjunction with CL; against all eneqr penetration froill - ,5VIC 

the ast through the valley .,' zeanwhile placing 4 force Ju include Tank 01 r- 

Destroyer gunsl to block enuLy pasEage Jorth through the pass at S 030755 

(3) GounterattacK to restore the ij&tN:i!A position in the case of 

genet ration . 

CC " mill in the Weanwhile eivlace an appropriate nwaber of tanks 

to support the position of the 26 lnf in the passes_ South of EL IS EL 

'blud . 

qk 

, . ( 1) Arab traffic into our lines (except throucJa minefields) d-11 be 

perinitted . ' .~àb traffic toward the ene7qV will' not be pernitted . 

(2) nny passes (in additi-xi to those at iiiich minefields are now being 

emplaced) through the mountain3 Wich form our defensive line, vill also 

be i!diied and covered by artillery fire . Reconnaissance to locate such 

passes will be effected by coi.,bat co. ,,L.oands as Tollows : 

U R.; "A" ; 

6V "B" : 

West of the - EL w % zb tii16L) ftoad . 

Last of the '}.'W:_ :5 ., - r;L EL ~,j!OD ao 

T!~- I -

, . i TIj !~ ~.;Ji Y : 

4 . -'ee .,d;aiaistrat ive girder 

5 . 

Lid ii,, : 

61 caav : 

--4474 . 

,-4463 . 

:o be rep ortec . 

-4665 . 

_b . Iristructions regarding use of a thrust line and ;i new set of referanc 

e points will be issued separately . 

`:1i7r;114 L . I'U~Sr Ll,, ult . , 

i~a jo r, G ." .C . , 

-,r-s It . .1 . C . of 6 ., G-3 . 

'vltL~il~ .Jlr iatti.i 

Cor,rj:,andin-

OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTION ) 

s 

NUMBER . . . . . . . . 6 ) 

2 . 

SEADWARTERS IST ARMORED DI' iSIOR 

A.P .O. 251 c/o Postmaster 

New York City, N .Y . 

1 . CC "A" will be prepared to carry out the Division mission in the valley 

between DJ BOU DJELLbI and BABET EL SID - DJ ANOUAL, that is, to act defensively 

to proteot the town of TFBESSA ad supply installations thereat against attack 

from the South and Southwest, being prepared meanwhile to oounter-attack to the 

Southeast to restore the DERNAIA position in the event that position is penetrate( 

"by hostile attack . If suddenly attacked or if communications fail, appropriate 

action will be taken at once . ` 

The execution of the above mission requires the following. 

a. Minefields in the mountain passes to be guarded and backed-up by 

artillery firs . 

b. Disposition for the oounter-attack, or reinforcemont of the EL ML BL 

ABIOD position in vase of threatened enemy penetration. 

;- A 

c . Close liaison with thertroops holding the DERNAIA position to ditm4 

mine 'The routes of approaoh and most profitable direction of oouater-a 

d. The preparation of plans Per the attack on any enemy forces rorol:>w 

entrance into the valley by the Eastern exits . - ' -. t 

e . Prepare plans for blocking the passes through this mountain range~,;D 

just youth of TEBESSA by the use of mines and defensive nation . -.- :~ 

NOTES . Cross fire from` tanks hidden - in Arab homes, hay stsoks, eto . or "uiA-? 

or behind other .cover : and the clever use of supporting fires,-mine fields ; 

=Hhidden adl-tank guns will be used to trap at a disadvantage any enemy. :, . . _' 

tanks"entering the valley . 

a/i~GCOLIt~~~ 

.~JJ t . O 1 .. . 

IrIclusu r e " .* :1 . 

ORLANDO WARD 

Major General, U. S. Army 

Commanding . 

20 February 1943 .

FIELD ORDER ) 

: 

NO : . . . 7 } 

MAPS : 

2 . 

' ,TDIV RCN , .. _ 

;~co~ Rcn,,.Comdo, 

~ : 81 Rcn'Bn'(-A Co) 

GS,GS 41£30 - Sheets 18,28,39 - Scale : 1200,000 . 

GS,GS 4227 + Sheets 10,11,13,14 - Scale ; 1/200,000. 

a . See Intelligence Summary. 

b . (1) Forces of the British 6th Armd Div and the 34th Inf Div held 

a position at SBIBA, and the passes at 0-1905 and at T-1590 ; the pas 

Northwest of KASSERINE is the only one available to the enemy. 

(2) Forces of the 1st Inf Div and French troops under General Welwart 

hold the DERMA position and the pass South of EL MA EL ABIOD; part of 

the 1st Inf Div made a successful attack East from a point near S-7574 in 

the afternoon of February 22 . 

The lst Armd Div (less detachments) with attached troops will hold the 

enemy South*of the general line DJ HAINRA - THALA, covering the left 

'`-flank of .the II Corps and preventing aGerman move to the West . 

TROOPS 

C B (ROBINETT 

AR -. s . Bn & 

2d' 

Bn, 6 Inf 

27 FA Bn , 

68 FA Bn 

894 ::TD - - 

601 TD ,(-i,': Co) 

D Co, .16 mgr 

2d Bn, 16 Inf 

3d Bn, 39 Inf . 

16 Guns, 443 AA 

Hq 8 I .' Co, 3d Bn) 

Liclosllrt 140 . 

Hq 1st Armd Div 

In the Field 

4300 hrs, 23 Feb 1J43 

. 

CC A - (DIV . RES) (McQUILLIN) . DIV RES 

6 Inf - , 26 & 3 Bn~- 

Inf (-2d & 3d Bns ) 

I Bin, . :13 AR 3d 4n, 6th Inf 

3d Bn, .13th AR 

91 FA J-B Btry} 

A Co, 6th Engr 

701 TD' 

16 Guns, 443 $ 

16th Engr (-A,C, & D Cos) 

prov . Bn 

, 

1 AR 

26TH ARUD BRIG, : .(REI 

ICHO ON 

26th >prrnd Iir gade ;;' . 

1 - 0,-:s6tn cam ; 

1 - Co ; . .86th Chemical Mox 

B & D . . Cos, 1~J5th -pg. . 'r3 

34th U .- Bu . 

60th FA .,Bn 

84th-FA Bn 

NOTE : The dispositions indicated above will be checked for accuracy, and 

of error made to Division Headquarters . 

3 . a . The 81 Rcn Bn will operate initially in tile gap between DJ BOU EL HA?EEHE .~ >; 

and DJ EL ATROUS to cover the left flanL of the Division, and Trill rriconnoiter: ~ 

through the pass East of DJ EL ATRCUS to establish contact with the anemy .--The

81 Rcn Bn will shift its main forces into the latter pass, on Division 

order, if that pass'is reported clear . 

b . CC 3 will execute the Division mission within the zone : 

West Boundary : REKKARIA (inel) - ridge top of DJ ES SIE to point 1116 

road- .rai . junc ion at S-8379 (incl) 

East Boundary : DJ EZ ZABA (N-3912,) - DJ DiUL^:S (T-050-6) . 

c. The 26th Armd Brig (rein) will execute the Division mission yii.thin 

t~e zone : 

West Boundary : Railroad line (actual) RAIDRA - XASSERINE (incl) 

East BOu_n7FYy: DJ EZ ZABA (N-9914) - DJ DOLTLEB (T-0588) . 

d . CC . .A will remain in Division Reserve in general area East of HAIDRA . 

Tt will institute route reconnaissance to enable it to reinforce the 

positions either o£ CC B or the 26th Arrad Hrigade, if that action be 

ordered . It will maintain all elements of the command in positions 

permitting them to be moved. ..East or JVest . It will anticipate and 

formulate plans for a counterattack through the THALA or DJ HAINRA 

position . 

e . The 16th Engr Bn (-det) will continue necessary maintenance on the 

road EAIDRA - DJ HAINRA, and will conduct route reconnaissance within 

the zone= DJ HAINRA - THALA - TADJEROUINE - KALAAT ES SENAN - EL bOIDJ 

- .MORSOTT - TEBESSA. 

-=Other elements of the Division Reserve will remain in present areas 

astz . :or HAIDRA,%reorganizing and awaiting orders . 

:enamy, 

'''( 1 ) All elements of the Division will fully inform personnel o the 

existing situation, to permit intelligent action by all ranks . Action 

will, be ten,aaious,°and harassing . Through aggressive action, night and 

day, .the armor .and personnel will be waylaid, . or approached by 

stealth, and destroyed . Great emphasis will be placed on the use of 

sticky, bombs and "Molotov Cocktails" to inflict the maximum losses upon .- , 

z 

> 

the energy . :, Our armor, must be so utilized as to inflict damaging losses 

et mtii.tain itself at effective fig!itin , " stren?th . ?t :m!st be given 

y o o g 

adequate artillery support . 

. - o 

.z 

>=- 

A .strong counter offensive (on Division order) 'to destroy the 

enemy North of the bottleneck of the KASSERINE pass must be kept in mind . .`

OFSRATIONAL INSTRUCTION ) 

s 

NUMBER . . . . . . . . 6 ) 

2 . PLAN "A" s 

3 . PLAN "B"s 

. .uw. Jo :" , J . L; . 

r - 

a . V . . .1 i 

HEADQUARTERS IST ARMORHD DIVISION 

A.P .O . 251 0% Postmaster 

New York City, N.Y . 

1 . CC "A" will be prepared to execute with a striking foroe, consisting 

of purely combat elements of Hq CC "A", 3d Bn, 13 AR (-2 Cos), 1st Bn, 13 AR, 

701 TD Bn, lot Bn, 6 Inf and 91 FA Bn, each of the following missione upon 

receipt of the message "Execute Plan A" or "Execute Plan B" . 

A counterattack by CC "A" to supplement the efforts of the 26th Armd 

Brig at THALA. Approach should be made rapidly via the quickest route, and 

(according to a hasty reconnaissance) must bottleneck through THALA. Further 

reconnaissance and liaison with the 26 Armd Brig will be made to determine bast . 

route and direction. Brig Nicholson will take over command of bath forces inthe 

_ 

event of such commitment of CC "A" 

A counterattack by CC "A" to supplement the efforts of CC "Bu in the :'._,';' 

vicinity of DJ HAINRA . The approach should be made rapidly via the quickest . . . ; > 

route: Reconnaissance and liaison with CG, CC "B"- will be made to determine-'b l 

route and direction of attack . This action, if ordered, will by coordinated-by,m , 

91 

Ct, l AD . _ . . Zs 

' 4.enmy Th eeituationty s mieve 

ro?tare that a reezufar oemont of a defnsi ; 

line .(plaoing tanks in hull domn firing positions) be effected, rather than ._ : : . 

a counterattack . Such action will be additionally contemplated by aommandsrs_-~`¬ 

concerned . - - -- 

WARD 

Major General, U.S . Army 

Commanding, 

23 February 1943 . 

m 

N

Field Order : Dictated . by General Harmon, 1640 hrs ., February 24, 1943 . 

Howze Plan will be executed 0630 hrs ., tomorrovi, 25 February, 

1943 . The limit of artillery fire to the left for the 1st Armored 

Division and to the right for the 6th Armored Division will be the 

wadi that goes through Kasserine Pass . Artillery fire to the left of 

the wadi only on call from the 6th Armored Division . 

The 1st Armored 

Division will send an artillery liaison officer with radio to THALA 

AT once to report to the Commanding General, 6th Armored Division . 

Attack must be made on time . High ground over-looking the Pass tidll 

be the objective of both Divisions . Corps artillery will flzrr_ish . 

supporting fires to be coordinated by Force Commander and artillery 

officer, II Corps . Air support will be furnished by Corps . When 

position is captured the high ground over-looking the Pass will be 

organized for defense by the combat team from the 1st Infantry 

Division making the attack . The attack will be made primarily by 

infantry and supporting artillery. The artillery of the 9th Division 

under Gen . Irwin is attached to the 6th Armored Division for the attack . 

These battalions will be in the British sector under their control but 

supporting fire for the American force may be called for through the 

artillery liaison officer with the 6th Armored Division . 

Reeonnaissanoe 

after the Pass is captured and the mines cleared will be pushed by the 

1st Armored Division to Kasserine then south to Feriana . Recoxnaissanoe 

.from 6th Armored Division will be pushed' through Kasserine north to

Finj uAiLt, 

05 V . , AM 

W OO G72 estizate . 

b . See boundary . 

See overlay . 

a . 9th Div . 

i) oaf old sector F,; . -.. Es, 

(botri inc:Lusive j . 

b - lst Arrad Div . . 

25 February 1943 . 

(2) meteve elehants ist jiv . except loth AT), Constantine 

GT and 1st Ranger .)n . 

(3) Relieve lott A& upon arrival 3d Stir Div. 

(1) '.,'!hen aASS!;KlnZ F ASS is captured and secured, asse .-d)le north 

Ll . ~ A AMOD in Corps Reserve . 

(2) zAaintain contact Derby Yebmanry and 9th Div . 

(3) Release ele ;aents 3cAh In f . to 9th Div . in -"Of CE"Ebl : . ; dZEA ., 

34th Div . 

(1) Defend sector indicated on overlay . 

(2) Relieve 18th CT upon arrival 168th UT . 

W Aintain contact Corps . 

d . 168th RCT . 

j;ssei,ble and reorganize vicinity i,L!J-A as rU-ieved- 

I . 1st Derby Yeomanry . See overlay . 

1st I J Uroup . U"I-LL' s as 10l-LOWS : 

rP 

N 

At ..7j 110001 

W5tli T ' i ;"XI--hill : :, jz' For reorgani?, .-AiOrl . 

bUist = nn-nesurve . 

?013t 2j ist )iv . 

751st A 3".4 1 mi swival, 751st ii ; ai to be att.-icheo 3jttil I)iv . 

InviOre V)

19 

Combat Command B, 1 st Armored Division, Operations 

Report, Bahiret Foussana Valley, 20-25 

February 1943

tIDQUAHl.'BtW 4UAWA1 UUMN6M) "b" 

APO 251-- II: S . .Army 

OPERATIONS -REPORT 

BAHIBET FOUSSANA Q=TY 

In the "Field 

1 March 19.43 

20 February 1943 to 25 February 1943 

A kJ3S0 

1 . 20 .Februa 19431 At about 1030 hre the Commanding General received 

from the 1st Armored Division orders that he was to move his command without"delay 

to TEALA by way of TEBESSA - HAIDRA, where he could assume commandlof 

all troops defending the KASSERINE Pass. At this time many officers of all 

units and of the C/C "B" staff were reconnoitering terrain to be traversed 

case the command were to act in -accordance .with plans issued by the -CG,' ;l 

The command moved at 1300, proceeded by the CG party . 

At about 1600 hrs the CG met Gen Fredend11 about 4 miles south of THAIA 

on the TIE-AU - KASSERIIE road . $e was there informed that the enemy had broken 

through the KASSERI-n Pass and was pushing. t o the north on TFxLIA, west toward 

TEi?ESSA . Our forces were in retreat up both avenues . CA B ws}s ordered to - 

move southeast from HAIDRA, secure the passes of Dj al HAINRA, assume eomme~ndof 

all U .S . troops southwest of OUED EL FATAB in the FOUSWTA Valley, stop -=advance 

of the enemy into that sector, 

our position in the EASSEREM pass . 

drive him out of the valley and restore 

That part of the command -which had passed EAIDRA counter-marched and went 

into assembly areas about l .mile southeast ` of HAIDRA . Unit C .O.'s were called .r 

to the Cp which had been established at 1725 hrs just south of HAIDR4, advised 

of the new situation and ordered into assembly positions shown on overlay&l . 

unit . closed in those areas by 2400'k -r-0 _ . 1 heavy section of the 601st TD 'A" 

was attached to the 27th FA "Bn. The Reconnaissance Co, and the remaining ;heavy 

guns of the 601st TD Bn were attached to the 2nd Bn, 13th AR . p 

The C .O ., 601st TD Bn, was charged with establishing a straggler line along\ 

the norlhh - south road just east of Dj al HAINRA Arid all available staff officers 

of the command were ordered out to contact, assemble and help reorganise 

units 'retreating from the KASSERINE Pass . 

At .2300 hrs, CG and S-3 left the CP to meet Brig Nicholson, British 6th 

.. 

h All. d Div under whose couJnand C IC B was: tq operate . 

2 . 21 February 1943 . The CG and the S-3 mat Brig 1~cNabb, the BGS . of 1st 

Army, and the CG, 26th Armd Brip in the THALA Post Office at 0200 hrs . In the 

absence of the coirur~ander, Brig icholson, it was agreed bga arties to the conference 

that 26th.Armd Brig, moving south .from TBAIA and C/ B, moving southeast 

from vicinity . Dj al HAINRA, would advance toward the KASSERINE Pass if 

possible with infantry elements, but would not commit the armor in either sector . 

Brig '..-bNabb stated that II Corps would be informed that it must coordinate the 

action . The conference was concluded and the CG departed for the CP just south 

of HAIDRA . 

By 0600 hrs, the 601st TD Bn, less detachments, had commenced feeding regrouped 

stragglers just west of the Pass at S-7088 . Units which were being - 

reassembled at. this time included the 3rd Bn, 39th Inf, the .1st Bn, 26 CT, the 

894t)i . TD Bn (almost entirely intact), very small groups of the 19th Engrs"Bn, 

and the 33rd FA Bn . Personnel 9~~5th TD Bn, supposedly in the area, 

were never contacted . 

At 1500 hrs, the C .O . eI94th , with the 3rd Bn, 39th Inf, Co ' /f. 

D 16th Engrs attached, ar ' d se of the passes at S-6784, 

QE- ,~ ~~~ 

S ~ Fc E

S-7088 and S-7384 . These passes were completely organised for defense`='by : 

hrs, except that the northern-most pass had not been mined due to a .shortage of 

mines and wire, then on order. 

At 1530, the 2nd Bn, 13th AR (plus detachments) which had then picked .' - 

up the remainder of "I" Company, 13th AR, was attacked by approximately 4-0 . 

enemy tanks, followed by lorried infantry . This attack was repulsed with s 

loss to the enemy of 10 tanks and 10 other vehicles and an unknown number--of 

infantry . We had no losses . The 27th FA " Bn, which wqs supporting the stank 

battalion, was dive-bombed at 1630 hrs by 10 Stukaa and suffered .4 casualties ; 

1 u/T destroyed . The enemy retired at. about 1800 hrs . 

At about 1600 hrs 68th Armd FA arrived in the area just west of the pass 

at S-7088 to operate under this command . 

sometime during the afternoon, the CG was informed by II Corpshrat the lend 

Bn of the 16th Inf, then in the area S-7274, was under his command. It was 

then learned that the 33rd and the 7th FA Bns were near that Bn and in support 

of it, but it was never clear under whose Bommand these FA Bns would operate . 

At about 1400 hrs, the 2nd Bn, 6th Inf, was ordered to work its way south 

along the eastern slopes of Dj al ?-:Albs& to the vicinity of the pass at S-7475 

with the view to later covering the right flank of the 2nd Bn, 13th AR ~in subsequent 

advances down the valley . At 1800 hrs the '2nd Bn, 16th Inf was, ordered 

to displace to the SE to cover the passes at S-7473 and a-8070 and to patrol . 

to the east toward the pass . At 2400 hrs the comli;and was disposed as shown 

on overlay #2 . Co G, 13th AR, joined the co:ncand late in the afternoon. 

3 . 22 February 1943 . 2-nd Bn 13th AR reported anemy burning vehicles and 

apparantly planning to withdraw 0050 hrs . Th5 2nd Bn, 6th Inf and 2nd Bn, 16th 

i n-f " -rmre ordered to patrol actively to their front . No contact was gained with 

enemy. 0655 

" " attacked bNr supported 

: / . " " " i . of tanks and 1 

attacked by fire only . 1 Etry of the 33rd FA Bn was captured, penetration was 

Vh3n the CG sent Co "G", 13th AR, to support the .: 

" employed 

" 1200 en .(, seemed " e slowed down 

arably and by 1400 hrs it had been so stopped that the 2nd Bn, 6th Inf, was able 

of the 33rd FA Dn . 

Coi.ri-nc ing at 0700 hr-11., 

. 

the 2nd Bn, l3th AR, was taken under fire by -a oon- 

" " " " . " : . " capture eno my 

infantry which ivere driven toward its position . Over 200 prisoners were taken . 

" day, although " " " " " 2nd 

6th IrLf . fired ov5r 2000 rounds on targets of opportunity vhilch presented themdue 

to the 

" " . " f the enemy ivas in great part 

accuracy and quan'-.~.-gogg~ - ine 'delivered b- the 27th FA . 

At about 0930 hrs mes s 

" " I T: 

unit was ta:fling charge 

that its CP was moving 

?e- a4bn 

SEC AR~t 

OROER 

fX52 

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a~"~Wt S possible . Its right boundary was 

n 

m

(Par 3, 22 FEB 43 contd) 

riven as an East - West line through DJ EL SIP to cross-roads li4fM 

mid-afternoon, the 1st 3n ., of the 16th CT without our knowledge moved into 

at S--6"884 and S-7088 with orders from CG, 1st Inf. Div. to defend them . Accordingly 

3rd Bn ., 39th Inf . was ordered to move to defend the passes at S-7393 and S-?695 . 

Occupation of the pauses was completed by . both Bns by 2400 hrs . Co "D" 16th Engrs, 

completed mining of pass at S-7393 at 1800 hrs . Dispositions of troops are as 

shown on overlay #3 . - 

4 . 23 February 1943 . 2nd hn, 13th kR moved at daybreak to occupy positions 

in wadi at S-7582 . At 1100 hrs one Co of tanks bade a reconnaissance in force 

t.o the vicinity of S-7880 . No enemy encountered. At 1700 hrs the Bn completed 

an ordered move to a position in the vicinity of S-8378 . The 27th and 68th Armd 

FA bns moved up behind it . i"o ene -ty -:et encountered . Rcn Co reconnoitered as 

far earl. as v-rtical 85 - no ener .y contact . ,, 

At 0935 the 2nd Bn, 6th lnf, assembled in the vicinity of S-7180 . The~ 16th 

CT was advised to fill the cap thus cfeated on its front . At this point no satisfactory 

communication had as yet been established with the 2nd Bn, 16th CT, which 

was under our co-rurand in the sector of the 1st Inf Div . just after d rk, the 2nd 

En of the 13th AR dropped back Qhout 1 mile to bivouac for the night . 

During this night the RAF bombed FASSERIYE intermittentl1r . 

1'115 16th CT came under our command at 2200 hrs . 

At about 1100 the 894th TD Bn was ordered to assemble in rear of the -ra ss 

at S-7088 and to send light patrols to the north to the area south and west 

of TIALA . The balance of the Bn when assembled was to move to the right flank . 

of the 2nd En, 13th AR and push rcn toward th- KASSERI?iE Pass along the northern 

slopes of Dj CFX.MI . . 

R9ports had been received statting before dawn that the enemy occupied" 

T1;AU or that t': - -e 6 A .D . vm._° defending along a nc.rbhsast - southwest line 

about four miles south of TFALA, thereby encountering our left flank . 

ror dispositions of the cora :and as of 2900 hrs, see overlay #4 . 

the results of oi;r operations this date= .Tone . 

. 

- 5 . At about 0300 hrs, CG, 1st AD, arrived at our CP and informdd the CG 

that the command had the -, ission of driving the enemy from the valley, destroying 

as much of h-_-n as possible -and re-capturing the KASSEPd E Pass . The attack 

was tc be coorinated with the 26th Armd Drib;, moving south from ThAiA by i+"~j 

Gin harmon, Deputy Commander of the II Corps . The encury :gad apparantly withdrawn 

from before ThAiA, anti olar left seemed secure . - 

The CG, C/C B, submitted a plan for the dapture of the Pass which- was later 

adopted by the Deputy Cori;ander . The plan provided for infantry to work onto both 

shoulders of the Pas . ; from the north and west, the infantry to be closely followed 

by a tank - artillery team -- C/C B moving from the west, 6 AD from the north . 

The 2nd Bn, 13th hR, with dne"C6mpanp of Infantry attached, closely supported 

by the 27th and 68th FA Bns moved forward towards the XX;MSSE=:I1;B Pens at daylight . 

`-he 601st TD Bn (less Co "C") with C 1-the 13th AR attached, moved to the 

north S-1de of OUED EL iATAB Just 

ht and frum the vicinity of S- 

8078 :,loved forward at dawn, prot 

ank of the 2nd Bn, 13th Ar 

and sendi-g reconnaissance t 

The 894th TD Bn was on the 

right flank of the 2nd Bn, 13t 

,t 1000 hrs, the Rcn Co of 

the 894th TD Br_ iiid of the 13t 

contact at a point one 

1~ 

p!

: ._i-lc west cf the KASS y1?~ Pass . at 1400 hrs 2::d j'n, 13th AR, received artillery 

fire in the vicinity of S-8776 . All. that tire, orders w9re issued Tor 

unj.ts to advance to positions as shoo-n on overlay $5 . The 2nd hn, 6th Armd 

lnf was to secure a line of departure for the 16th C :' as shovti-n on tha* over 

lay . Co,-menci :, ai dark, the 16th CT be _an mjvA_:,ent to position as gown on 

t__at overlay, and b;- 2400 :ors, all ttroops were in position as shown on overlay 

#5 . 

During the late afternoon, Frov-isional Inf, detachments orjanized from the 

894th TD b;; by its C .0 ., had worked its way S'N of Dj Eh ACAB tcwards Dj CEA;6l, 

yi:iera it cane under mortar and machine gun fire . It -_ s bal_eve :: that the fire 

:- s detachment returned had driven t',e rear elo=aents of the ene-:y off the 

6W shoulder of the YASSE .-':I ; .. Fass, by . 2000 hrs . This -.,,as not t:nown until the 

followinC '..ay, because of lack of Co:--=unacat' on w3_'Ih that detachment . 

6 . 25 Februa l, 19 , 3 . r'ollol~ri -'` a 18 - --i -sites artillery Fre-Daration, 

t__e 16t CT attacked at 0630 to seize an"- _-_, c -are t .' P Vi' shoulder of~ t' -~e i :fi.S- 

S . .i : . : . Fass . "1-o _-ne :-r; was contacted . 1030 hrs the 2_.d 13th AR`, reached 

_oath of the Pass and Co "D", 16th En-rs, .- oved forward to ;, e =in rwLcvi_-c 

mires at t:-:at tine . I .-ines in th_ pass -were removed by 1400 and t'. -_ "_ road-cleared 

to -o ; r ::l800 . Rc~_ Cc, 1'th AR, reached t:ASSE=-I_' :È at 1800 . . the 894th 

TD ^r!, with th° 2nd bn, 6th IrS attached, outposted t" , ! 16th CT rite: s-'call 

eleTnerts of each arm in the VicinfLty of KASSEERI?."E . 

= 

: 

a 16th CT con . Anced Re n 

of the I?E shoulder of the pass at about 1700 hrs i n order to bemin relicving 

the Guards' Brigade, fro=q their positions at daylight of the 26th February . 

7 . In conclusion, it is felt that the attac l : ( which was eventually launched 

in the air) could have met the enerw successfully had more infantry been assisned 

to C/C 3 sooner and had ii .s left flank been s cured by more vigorous 

action by the 6 AD south of T' :-ALA. '.arir:s and artillery with little infantry 

cannot naintain contact ; : close terrain, espedially at night . 

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20 

A Factual Summary of the Combat Operations of 

the lst Infantry Division in North Africa and Sicily 

During World War 11 (Extract)

6 . Lessons learned from the ORAN Operation 

Immediately following the French surrender at ORAN, intensive efforts were made, by the Division, 

to correct the deficiencies noted in that operation . _ 

The use of night maneuver and night combat . A severe setback had been suffered by the 18th 

Infantry Regiment, during its initial attack against ST . CLOUD, on 8-9 Nov . Their initial attacks had 

bogged down, and considerable casualties had been incurred This impasse was due to a lack of accurate 

preliminary reconnaissance and a lack of maneuverability by the assault battalions . However, this grave 

deficiency was corrected by the 18th Infantry Regiment, on the battle-field, on the night of 9-10 Nov . , 

'42, by the following measures ; 

The 1st Battalion was held to contain the enemy forces at ST . CLOUD . 

The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were withdrawn to bypass ST . CLOUD under _cover of darkness; and 

by night maneuver were directed on to their assigned locations, for the assault on ORAN, early on 10 

November . 

After seeing the results of :his particular night maneuver, the 1st Infantry Division had become 

completely sold on the results that might be attained, by the skillful use of night maneuver and night 

attacks . 

This night maneuver at ORAN was the fore-runner of many boldly executed night attacks launched 

later, during the hard fought campaigns against the Germans in TUNISIA and later in SICILY . The 

German Panzer Divisions learned to fear the dreaded night attacks of the 1st Infantry Division, which 

invariably resulted in maximum damage to the enemy, and quick tactical success for the 1st Division . 

II . THE INITIAL. COMBAT OPERATIONS IN TUNISIA 

1 . Detachment of 1st Division Units to TUNISIA . 

Hardly had the 1st Division regrouped and reorganized, after the surrender of the French forces at 

CP,AN, on 10 Nov . . '42, when varlor_s units of the Division were }rastll} detached into UNLMA . This 

was done, as an emergency measure, on orders of the Allied High Command, to bolster the Allied 

defenses against the rapid German build-up on the Eastern front . These early troop movements were as 

follows : 

The 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry , Lt . Col . John W . Bow-a . Comdg., left by transport planes 

and gliders, on 15 Nov , '42, to outpost the southern approaches to the ATLAS Mountains, in the GAFSA 

area In Southern TUNISIA . 

The 18th Infantry Regimen t , Col . Frank Greet, Comdg ., the 32nd Field Artillery Battalion , 

and the 5th Field Artillery Battalion left later in November '42, to reinforce the British V Corps, then 

fighting against heavy odds In Northern TUNISIA . 

The 26th Infantry Regiment , Col . Alec . Stark, Comdg ., (less the 3rd Battalion - already 

detached) together with the 33rd Field Artillery Battalion, left early in Jan. '43, to join the American 

11 Corps, in Southern TUNISIA . 

The detachment of these 1st Division Units, to various Allied Task Forces, then operating under 

American, British and French command, !n Eastern TUNISIA, was a matter of grave concern to 1st Division

Headquarters, still located back in ORAN . It was reported that the Division Commander of the 1st infantry 

Division had inquieed at the Allied Force General Headquarters, at ALGIERS, as to -Whether or not this 

was a private War? Or, could any Son-of-a-gun get into It? - 

Finally on 18 Jan . 

'43, the remainder of the 1st Infantry Division, together with Division Headquarters, 

was ordered into general reserve in Central TUNISIA . Later on 27 Jan . '43, the 1st Infantry Division (less 

its detached elements) took over a combined American-French Sector, in the OUSELLTIA VALLEY_, In 

Central TUNISIA . 

III . THE ROLE OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION IN THE DEFENSE AGAINST THE GERMAN 

BREAK-THROUGH AT THE KASSERINE PASS (See Battle Map #2) 

To visualize the role of the 1st Infantry Division, In is operations against the German break-through, 

at the KASSERINE PASS, will require a brief explanation of these Items, In connection therewith . 

The distribution of Allied Forces in Eastern TUNISIA . 

The location of units of the 1st Infantry Division (on all fronts) . 

The defensive set-up of the American II Corps, in Southern TUNISIA . 

The German recapture of the FAID PASS, early in Feb ., '43 . 

The German break-through at FAID PASS, 14 Feb . . '43 . 

The German break-through at the KASSERINE PASS, 21 Feb ., '43 . 

The later Allied counter-attack . 

1 . The Distribution of Allied Troops In Eastern TUNISIA, as of 1 Feb ., '43 . 

The Northern Tunisian Sector was basically a British Sector, under the British V Corps (Gen . 

Allfrey, Comdg .) . It had been reinforced, in Nov . and Dec . of '42, by detached units from the American 

1st Infantry Division and the American 1st Armored Division . 

The C-ntzal Tunisian Scct3r was caslcgly a Freach Eec.tx . Cadet the :ranch )G, Cnips (Gent . 

Koeltz, Comdg .) . V This Sector had been reinforced from time to time, by American Units from the 1st 

Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Division and from the 34th Infantry Division . - 

On 27 Jan . '43 . elements of the 1st Infantry Division (under 1st Division command) took over the 

critical OUSELLTIA VALLEY Sector, under the French XIX Corps, In Central TUNISIA . The 1st Infantry 

Division was then temporaril reinforced by a French Groupment (including 6 French infantry battalions) . 

The Southern Tunisian Sector was basically an American Sector, under the American II Corps 

(Gen . Fredenall, Comdg ) . The troops, in this sector, had been gradually guilt up Into a heterogeneous 

group of Special Task Forces, as listed below : 

American Units 

26th Infantry Regiment (less the 2nd Battalion), of the 1st Infantry Division . 

33rd Field Artillery Battalion , of the 1st Infantry Division . 

168th Infantry Regiment , of the 34th Infantry Division- 

9

The 1st Ranger Battalion (a specially trained unit of high combat value) . 

Combat Commands "A" and "C", of the lit Armored Division . 

The 19th Combat Engineer Battalion (a newly organised engineer unit) . 

Various Corps Artillery units . 

French Units 

The French Constantine Division (Gem . Welvert, Comdg .) Made up of brave, willing soldiers, 

but under strength and ill equipped . 

British Units 

The Derb e Yeomanry Reconnaissance Squadron (a well trained reconnaissance squadron - 

Detached from the British 8th Armored Division) . 

NOTE Other American and British Units attached later . 

2 . The Location of all Units of the ist Infantry Division . 

Although the units of the 1st Infantry Division were deployed on a wide front (tinder British, French 

and American command - in Northern . Central and Southern TUNISIA) at the time of the German 

break-through, at FAID PASS, it will be noted that eventually all units of the lit Infantry Division were 

later committed in Southern TUNISIA, against the German break-through forces . The actual location 

of these lit Division units, at the time of the German break-through, at FAIR, on 14 Feb . . '"i3, was as 

follows : 

1st Infantry Division Units in Northern TUNISIA . (then attached to the British V Corps) 

18th Infantry Regiment 

32nd Field Artillery Battalion 

1st Infantry Division Units in Central TUNISIA . (then attached to the trench XM Corpa) 

lit Infantry Division Headquarters 

1st Infantry Division Special Troops 

18th Infantry Regiment 

2nd Battalion only (of 28th Infantry Regiment) 

32nd Field Artillery Battalion 

5th Field Artillery Battalion (released from British V Corps - 7 Feb . . '43 . 

1st Combat Engineer Battalion 

lit Infantry Division Units in Southern TUNISIA (then attached to the American II Corps) 

10

26th Infantry Regiment (leas the 2nd Battalion) 

33rd Field Artillery Battalion 

3. Defensive Set-up_of the American II Corps, in Southern TUNISIA. 

Importance of the FAIR PASS 

The Southern Tunisian Sector, assigned to the American II Corps, included a stretch of wild desert 

country, covering a frontage of 200 miles . It was interspersed with a series of precipitous mountain ridges, 

extending from Northeast to Southwest. The PAID PASS (located in the north central portion of Southern 

TUNISIA) provided the most practicable route of approach, through the south end of the GRAND DORSAL 

Mountain Range. Control of this Pass was vitally important . 

For the Allies , their control of the Pas: would deny the movement of Gemun mechanized 

forces into the western areas, of Southern TUNISIA . 

For the Germans , their control of the Pass would provide the most feasible, direct route of . 

approach for their mechanized forces, in their future plans for offensive action, which were based on 

securing more maneuver space to the west . Additional maneuver space would be needed later by tU 

German Africa Corps, then withdrawing in the East, towards TUNISIA, before the advancing British 8th 

Army . 

Early Operations in the FAIR PASS 

_Task 

The tactical importance of the FAIR PASS had been apparent, since Dec. . '42, to the commanders 

of the allied 

included; 

Forces, who first operat ed in Southern TUNISIA. These early Task Force units 

The 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment , of the 1st Infantry Division, (Lt . Col. John Bowers, 

Comdg .) . This battalion was then based on GAFSA, with instructions to outpost the GAFSA-SENED 

area, and to reconnoiter east and northeast thereof . 

Elements of the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment (Lt . Col . Edson D . Raff, 

Comdg .) . 

One Company of Tank Destroyer (commanded by Capt . Gilbert Ellma n) . 

Detached Infantry - Artillery elements from the French Coastantiae Division, (Gen . Welvert ; 

Comdg .) . 

The strategic value of the FAID PASS seemed obvious to Raff and Bowers . So, while acting on their 

own initiative In that area, they decided to take the place, for self-protection . With a makeshift Task 

Force, made up from these units noted above, they took the Pass in a surprise !~&Irt attack , arty in 

Dec . '42 . 

Lt . Col . Raff then arranged with Gen. Welvert to garrison the Pass with elements of the French 

Constantine Division ; as it was necessary for Lt . Col. Bowers to return with his Battalion to the GAFSA- 

FERIANA area . 

Had the Allied High Command seen fit, _at that time , to organize a s~ defending force for the 

for the FAIR PASS, with adequate artillery andanti-tank support, a great dal of their liter difficulties,

at the time of the German break-through, might have been avoided . 

4 . Readjustment of American Forces, in Southern TUNISIA , prior to 14 Feb . . '43 . 

Commencing in Jan . 

'43, the American units were gradually reinforced in Southern TUNISIA . 

The remainder of the 26th Infantry Regimental Combat Team (less the 2nd Battalion, then in 

Central TUNISIA), and with the 33rd Field Artillery Battalion attached, arrived in that area late in Jan . 

'43 . It was placed initially in a reserve position near SBEETLA (about 32 miles west of FAIR PASS) . At 

this time, the 3rd Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, was still in GAFSA . 

Combat Command "A", of the 1st Armored Division, came into the area and occupied a 

position in the SIDI BOU ZED area, west of the FAID PASS, in Jan . '43 . 

During this period, the 168th Infantry Regiment, of the 34th Infantry Division, was in position 

on the high ground, northwest of the FAIR PASS . 

b . Corps Status of the Southern Tunisian Sector . 

Major General Fredenall arrived about 10 Jan ., '43, established the American II Corps CP at 

TEBESSA, and assumed command of the II Corps Sector, in Southern TUNISIA . 

During this interval, the G-2, of the American II Corps, predicted an all-out German attack against 

the FAIR PASS . And, Gen . Fredenall requested reinforcements and an opportunity to regroup the American 

forces, in this sector, under better cohesion and control . 

But the British 1st Army Headquarters (under which the American II Corps operated) insisted that the 

expected German main attack would be launched farther north, in the PICHON area, where it had come 

before . Meanwhile, the actual garrison, of the FAIR PASS, still consisted only of the same elements of 

the French Constantine Division, which had taken over the defense of the Pass, early in December, '42, 

after the Pass had first been captured by the American Task Force . These French Troops were _ill equipped 

to stop a determined German mechanized attack . 

6 . Recapture of the FAIR PASS . by the Germans, early in Feb . '43 . 

Following their recent feints further North, the German Pauzers rook a nia :p c.ac< at the AILled 

south flank, in an all-out attack against the FAID PASS, early in Feb . '43 . This was in exact accordance 

with the G-2 Intelligence Estimate, previously submitted by the G-2, of the American II Corps . 

Smashing Into the Pass with infantry, artillery and tanks . and a few 88's . the Germans were finally 

able to snatch the Pass from the French garrison (elements of the French Constantine Division) . But this 

was not accomplished until at least half of the gallant but ill-equipped French troops were either killed 

or wounded . 

An American counter-attack was launched early the next morning, following the German capture of 

the Pass, by the 26th Infantry Regimental Combat Team (less two battalions) and Combat Command - A - , 

of the 1st Armored Division . But the counter-attack was not successful . The Germans, having been 

reinforced, were able to hold on, and retained complete control of the FAIR PASS . 

7. The German Break-ThrouEh Attack, at FAIR PASS- - 14 Feb ., - '43 . 

12

The Initial German Attack 

The German break-through forces had apparently been strongly reinforced, following their capture 

of the FAID PASS, early in Feb . '43 . And, on 14 Feb . . the German Panzers came boiling out of the 

west end of the Pass, with a whip lash of tanks, guns and men, that set the American forces reeling 

back behind the mountain passes at SBEITLA and KASSERINE (40 miles west of the FAIR PASS) . 

Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "C" (of the American 1st Armored Division), then 

located in the SIDI BOU ZED area (10 miles west of the FAIR PASS), caught the brunt of the German 

break-through attack . Out-maneuvered, out-numbered and out-gunned, by the German Panzer Divi 

sions, they were badly mauled, and lost 54 tanks in this engagement . A side swipe, by these on-rushing 

German Panzers, also over-ran the 168th Infantry Regiment, of the American 34th Infantry Division, 

then located north of SIDI BOU ZED . 

Following their quick success at SIDI BOU ZED, the German Panzers were then well on their way to 

SBEITLA and KASSERINE, just 30 miles further to the west . It then became necessary for the American 

II Corps to take immediate steps to protect the mountain passes, through SBIITLA and KASSERINE, and 

the passes west thereof, leading north to TEBESSA . 

8 . American Reinforcements from the North 

When it was finally realized that the tremendous American supply base at TEBESSA was in grave 

danger of being captured; and that the Germans very possibly could smash north through THALA, clear 

to LE KEF, and thus threaten the right rear flank of the entire British 1st Army; then, finally, the 

Headquarters of the British 1st Army saw fit to release additional reinforcements from the north, to 

assist the hard pressed American H Corps . These initial reinforcements included Combat Command "B" 

(of the American 1st Armored Division), and the 18th Infantry Regimental Combat Team (of the 1st 

Infantry Division . 

Combat Command "B" (of the 1st Armored Division) (Col . Robinette, Comdg .) - on release 

from the British V Corps, boiled down south, and by 16-17 Feb . was in position, north of SBIITLA, to 

cover the American withdrawal therefrom . It was later ordered further northwest, to help protect the 

THALA area and the passes leading into TEBESSA, from the east . 

The 18th Infantry Regimental Combat Team (of the 1st Infantry Division - Wiih the 

Field Artillery Battalion arached) , Col . Greer . Comdg ., on relcaae from the British it Corps, ura.z 

down from the north, on 17 Feb ., to occupy a defensive position, just southwest of SBIBA, (24 miles, 

north of SBIITLA) . On 19 Feb . '43, it repulsed several enemy armored-infantry attacks, in this area, 

after inflicting heavy losses on the enemy; and thus secured the left flank of the hard pressed American 

II Corps . 

9 . The German Break-through at the KASSERINE PASS, 

The KASSERINE PASS provided the most favorable corridor of approach for the German Panzer 

Units, in their advance north towards the critical area near THALA (at the head of the KASSERINE 

VALLEY) . The KASSERINE PASS had been occupied initially by the 19th Combat Engineer Regiment 

(a regiment of Corps troops, which was new to combat) . These defending troops were reinforced, and 

the Pass was hastily organized for defense on 19 Feb . , under command of the Headquarters, of the 26th 

Infantry Regimental Combat Team (Col . Alec Stark, Comdg .) . In this hasty defensive organization , 

the 19th Engineer Rogiment occupied the west side of the Pass ; and the 26th Infantry Regiment ( less the 

2nd and 3rd Battalions) occupied the _east side of the Pass . The 33rd Field Artillery Battalion (Lt Col . 

Verdi Barnes . Comdg .) was in general support . 

13 

-Z1 

Feb ., '43 .

The organization of this defensive position has hardly beep stated . on 19 Feb . , '43, when the 

Germans launched a probing attack . They, later launched their main attack . against the pass . early 

on 20 Feb . , and gained possession of the dominating heights ou the _west flank . After bringing up their 

88mm guns and mortars, the Germans then pi reed the right 4nk o the west sector (held by the 19th 

Engineer giment) . and ve o thro h . . ,ZG _ ( 2 

During the ni ht 20-21 Feb . .Jthe Germans over-ran both positions . cleared the ripe fields, and 

g 

their tanks then started rolling up the KASSERINE VALLEY . early on 21 Feb . In the rAeanUme . after 

having incurred heavy losses, the surviving American defenders had been forced to withdraw to the 

north, under strong enemy pressure . 

10 . Additional Allied Reinforcements (British) 

Two additional tank regiments . of a British Armored Brigade, had been rushed down from the north, 

on 19-20 Feb ., to reinforce Combat Command B (of the 1st Armored Division), in the area near THALA . 

This combined British-American Task Force was later driven back further north, behind THALA (the 

northern exit of the KASSERINE VALLEY) . by the heavier German tanks . and were being hard pressed . 

However, at that time . the Division Artillery . of the American 9th Infantry Division, had just arrived 

after a forced march of 750 miles, from SPANISH-MOROCCO . Their added artillery support saved the 

day for these Allied units, then holding the critical northern exit of the KASSERINE VALLEY (south of 

THALA) . 

11 . Movement to Southern TUNISIA, by remainder of the 1st Infantry Division . 

When the German offensive in Southern TUNISIA first started, the 1st Infantry Division (less units 

detached elsewhere) had been holding a sector in the OUSSELTIA VALLEY . in Central TUNISIA, under 

the French XDC Gorps . The units . under 1st Division command, in this sector , then included the 

following : 

1st Infantry Division Units 

1st Infantry Division Headquarters 

Division Special Troops 

16th infantry Regiment (Col . Fechet, Comdg .) 

2nd Battr_liou, 26th Infantry Regiment (Lt Col . Beck, Ccrndg .) 

1st Engineer Battalion (Lt Col . H . C . Rowland, Comdg .) 

1st Division Artillery, to include 

5th Field Artillery Battalion (Lt Col . Tyson, Comdg . ) 

7th Field Artillery Battalion (Lt Col . Geo . Gibb, Comdg .) 

French Units temporarily attached to 1st Infantry Div . 

French Groupment, to include : 

6 Infantry Battalions 

1 Field Artillery Battalion 

Signal Company 

At this time, the 1st Infantry Division Headquarters had close working relations with Gen . Koeltz, 

the Commanding General . of the French III Corps . On 18 Feb . . '43 . the following radio telegraph 

message was received, by the Comdg . General,/ of the 1st Infantry Division . at his OUSSELTIA VALLEY 

CP - Quote: 

14

~', G. 

Feb . 18, '43 . Koeltz to Allen; "This is a warning, General Anderson^ s just issued a directive 

to Colonel Fechets' Regiment (the 16th Infantry Regiment) to go to Fredenall as soon as possible ." 

(Referring to Gen . Fredenall . C .O . o f American II Coups) . 

It was then urgently requested by Gen . Allen that this reinforcement to the II Corps, be provided 

on a divisional basis . Instead of sending the 16th Infantry Regiment down (merely as another Task Force 

component) . 

Gen . Koeltz was requested by Gen . Allen to arrange for the movement of_ all available combat _elements 

, of the 1st Infantry Division, to go as a unit , under 1st Division Command, to support the Ameri- 

can II Corps, in Southern TUNISIA . Shortly thereafter, it happened that all available combat units of 

the 1st Infantry Division were ordered to move without delay, (under _1st Division control , to support the 

American II Corps . The 2nd Battalion of the 26th Infantry Regiment and the 5th Field Artillery Batta- 

lion were left behind as a nucleus for the incoming French units, detailed to take over the OUSSELTIA 

VALLEY Sector, which was to be vacated by the 1st Infantry Division . The OUSSELTIA VALLEY sector 

was 80 miles NW of THALA . 

An advance detail from the 1st Infantry Division, to include the Division Commander, the Division 

G-2 (Lt . Col . R . W . Porter), the Assistant Division G-4 (Major Donald Curbs), and Assistant DivLzfon 

G-3, and several liaison officers, left the OUSSELTIA VALLEY at dusk, on 18 Feb . , to contact the 

Headquarters of the II Corps, in the HAIDRA-TEBESSA area, in Southern TUNISIA . 

While enroute by motor to TEBESSA, early on 19 Feb ., '43, the Advance Command Group, of the 

1st Division, met Gen . Fredenall (C .G . of the American II Corps) with his aides, on the road in motors, 

near HAIDRA (24 miles northeast of TEBESSA) . Gen . Fredenall was cheerful and optimistic . He out 

lined the latest developments at the KASSERINE PASS ; and stated that the 1st Division must be prepared 

to counter-attack where needed . He directed that the 1st Division make early contacts with Gen . Welvert 

(C .G . of the French Constantine Division, then located south of TEBESSA), and have him coordinate 

his efforts with the 1st Division . 

The 1st Division Artillery Commander, Gen . Clift Andrus . completed the turn-over of the 1st 

Division Sector, in the OUSSELTIA VALLEY, to the incoming French units, on 19 Feb . ; and then 

followed immediately thereafter with the designated combat units of the Division, to an assembly area, 

southeast of TEBESSA, in Southern TUNISIA . 

12 . Combat preparations initiated by the 1st Infantry Division . 

Assembly areas were indicated for the incoming 1st Division Units, near BOU CHEBKA, west of the 

KASSERINE PASS VALLEY . 

That evening, on 19 Feb ., the C .G . of the 1st Infantry Division contacted the rear CP of the 33rd 

Field Artillery Battalion, then In direct support of the American units, defending the KASSERINE PASS . 

This CP was operated by Capt . Theodore Crocker . S-3 of the 33rd Field Artillery Battalion . Crocker 

was not particularly worried, now that the remaining 1st Division units were on the way . He was a 

unique type of combat soldier, and quite a "rustler' . He even produced Gen . Welvert (C .G . of the 

French Constantine Division), at 22-00 AM, on the morning of 20 Feb . 

Gen Welvert was a gallant old soldier . But, having had 10-15 years service, as a Major General, 

in the French Army, he was very jealous of his prerogatives . He was not too sure but that he might be 

"Having his leg pulled" . But he finally offered to have the French Constantine Division cooperate "full 

out", with the 1st Division . 

15

During the night of 19-20 Feb . , the remaining elements of the 1st Infantry Division (including the 

Division Special Troops, the 16th Infantry Regiment the 7th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 1st Fngi- 

neer Battalion) rolled into their assembly areas near BOU CHEBKA, west of the KASSERINE PASS VALLEY . 

13 . Counter-Attack-Orders, issued by the 1st Infantry Division . 

Lage on 20 Feb ., warning orders were received, by the lit Division, from the 11 Corps, to be pre- 

pared, at daylight, on 21 Feb . . to block the north exit of the KASSERINE PASS VALLEY, and to counter- 

attack, from positions west of the KASSERINE PASS VALLEY, against any German forces advancing 

north up the Valley . Orders were then issued by the lit Division, as follows : 

To have the 16th Infantry Regiment (Col . Fechet, Comdg .) place one battalion, with anti- 

tank weapons attached . In position on the DJEBEL HAMRA (north of BOU CHEBKA), prepare d to block 

any continued German armored advance, up the KASSERINE VALLEY to the northwest, towards HAIDRA, 

or through the Pass, in that area, leading directly west into TEBESSA . 

To have the 16th Infantry Regiment counter -attack with its two remaining battalions, from the 

west, against the left (west) flank of any German infantry forces, that may advance up the KASSERINE 

VALLEY, to the north . 

To have the 7th Field Artillery Battalion operate in general support . 

To have the 1st Engineer Battalion alerted in Division reserve . 

14 . Limit of the German break-through up the KASSERINE VALLEY . 

After the Germans had finally over-run both flanks of the KASSERENE PASS defensive position (on 

the night of 20-21 Feb .), the German heavy tanks then started rolling north, up the KASSERINE VALLEY, 

early on 21 Feb . . followed by the German infantry units . In the meantime, the surviving American 

defenders had withdrawn to the north, towards THALA, under heavy enemy pressure . 

The British had rushed in their lighter tanks (from the THALA area) very early on 21 Feb . , to support 

the hard pressed American units, In the Pass . But these British tanks were little match for the heavier 

German 'Tiger' Tanks . Driven back close to THALA, (near the northern exit of the KASSERINE VALLEY), 

:he 3dtfih urla wayc fLixlly able to hold in thst area, undo: the close support of the nev-ly an1ved 

American artillery units, and Combat Command "B" of the US 1st Armored Division . 

At this time, early on 21 _Feb . , '43, the German Panzers had reached the furthest northern limits, 

of their hard fought drive fiom the south . After their initial success at FAID, SIDI BOU ZID, and 

SBEITLA . and finally in their break-through at the KASSERINE PASS, the Germans were now over-extended , 

and were "Riding for a fall ." The Allied final line of defense, protecting the northern exits of the 

KAESERWE VALLEY, had to be held, at all cost . 

Both sides were "wobbly and punch drunk ." But, the Allies still had one "Ace left in the hole ." 

The last remaining elements of the 1st Infantry Division, bad come down from the north, unde r Division 

control, and were all set to counter-attack . 

16 . Launching of the lst Division Counter-A ttack . 

This was the picture, when the newly arrived lit Division units came in at daylight, 21 Feb . '43, 

to counter-attack . 

16

The 3rd Battalion, of the 16th Infantry Regiment, Lt . Col . Mathews . Comdg ., with special 

anti-tank weapons attached, was located on the DJEBEL HAMRA (10 miles south of HALDRA), prepared 

to block the northwest exit of the KASSERINE VALLEY, and to protect the mountain pass, leading west 

to TEBFSSA . 

The lst and 2nd Battalions (Lt . Col . Cunningham and Lt . Col . Crawford . Comdd .), of the 

16th Infantry Regiment , from positions west of the KASSERINE VALLEY, had gained early contact with 

the German follow-up infantry units, and attacked aggressively, at daylight, on 21 Feb . After considera- 

ble close-in hard fighting, the German infantry units attempted to with-draw to the north , under close 

pressure from the west, by the 16th Infantry assault battalions . But these German units incurred heavy 

casualties when they found escape in that direction cut-off by the British and American tanks (with 

close-in artillery support - located south of THALA) . 

The 7th Field Artillery , Lt . Col . George Gibb, Comdg ., of the 1st Division Artillery , was 

in close support of the 16th Infantry units, during this operation . 

Allied Air Support was tremendously helpful at this time . American and British bombers 

Joined in aseries of highly effective sorties, on the afternoon-of 21 Feb . . against the German tanks and 

guns, which ,were then jammed-up "bumper to bumper" . In their hurry to escape being bottled up to 

the KASSERINE VALLEY . 

16 . The German Withdrawal . 

Once the German withdrawal to the south had started, their evacuation of the KASSERIN£ VALLEY 

was conducted with remarkable celerity . The lack of any pre-planning for an organized direct pursuit, 

had delayed the regrouping of any mobile II Corps troops, for a quick , direct pursuit . 

Thus, contact with the retreating German forces was lost, ani their withdrawal to the south was 

effected without serious hindrance . A few days later, close contact was regained with the German units, 

further south, at the same old stands, at GAFSA, MAKNASSY, FAID and PICHON . 

The German High Command had "Shot the Works", 1n an all-out effort to setae the initiative . But, 

from that time on, the end in TUNISIA . was Inevitable ; although the fighting became even more severe, 

before the Allies had won the final victory in TUNISIA, on 13 May, 1943 . 

To present a clear picture of the entire KASSERINE PASS Operation, there is included herein a 

terrain analysis of that general area, and a chronological listing of the combat operations connected 

therewith . 

7 . Z, -,urxaAt1yn of the Cornhat np err- ticnt (Lead?ng up to and follov'!ng the ".SSERINE 7AF a' 

Break-through) 

Terrain Analysis (See Battle Map $2) 

The Southern Tunisian Sector included a wild desert area, covering a frontage of 200 miles . interspersed 

with a series of precipitous mountain ridges . The FAIR PASS (located fn the north central part 

of that area) provided the only feasible route, through the south end of the GRAND DORSAL Mountain 

Range . Control of this Pass was vitally important, both to the Germans and to the Allies_ 

From FAIR (near the west exit of the Pass), it was 10 miles due west, to SIDI BOU ZID; and thence 

32 miles northwest . to SBEITLA . From SBIITLA it was 26 miles north (through the SBIITLA Pass) to SBIBA . 

17

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The road junction at SBIBA controlled the main eastern highway leading 44 miles further north to LE 

KFF ; it also controlled the road leading 20 miles west to THALA . 

The cross-road center, at THALA, controlled the western highway, leading 46 miles north to LE 

AJEF, and a road leading 32 miles west (through HAIDRA) to TEBESSA (the location of the huge American 

supply dumps) . 

The pass at KASSERINE (16 miles west of SBEITLA) provided direct access, up the KASSERINE 

Valley, to THALA (30 miles north of the KASSERINE PASS) . A continued break-through, by the Germans . 

to the north, through THALA, would seriously endanger LE KEF (46 miles further north) . The German 

seizure of the road center at LE KEF, would disrupt the main Allied supply route, and would endanger 

the right rear flank of the entire 1st British Army, in Eastern TUNISIA . 

about 10 jam . '43. 

Chronological WE of the Combat Operations in Southern TUNISIA (previously explained) : 

to again recapture the Pass . 

Capture of FAIR PASS, by American Tank Forces in Southern TUNISIA, about 4 Dec .., '42 . 

Establishment of the American II Corps, in Southern TUNISIA (Gem . Fredendall, Camdg,) 

Recapture of FAIR PASS by the Germans, about 3 Feb . '43 - followed by American attempt 

German break-through, at FAIR PASS, 14 Feb . '43 . 

German defeat of Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "C" (of the American 

1st Armored Division) and of the 168th Infantry Regiment (of the American 34th Infantry Division), 

near SIDI BOU ZED, 15 Feb . '43 . 

area, 16 Feb . '43 . 

Allied Reinforcements sent down from the North: 

Combat Command "B" (of the American 1st Armored Division) to the SBIBA-THALA 

18th Infxrtry Regimental Combat Team, wish the 37ad Field Artillery Battalion (of 

the American 1st Infantry Division) to the SBIBA area, for a critical defensive role, 17 Feb . . '43 . 

Remainder of the American 1st Infantry Division (to include the 16th Infantry Regi- 

ment, the 7th Field Artillery Eattallon, the lit Combat FmgIneer Battalion, and the Division Special 

Troops) r.are south, from the OUSSFt.TIA Valley, to counter-attack, from the area west of KASSERINE 

Valley, on 19-29 Feb . . '43 . 

Two British tank regiments came down to reinforce Combat Command "B", of the 

American 1st Armored Division, at THALA, 19 Feb ., '43 . 

The Division Artillery, of the American 9th Infantry Division, arrived from Spanish 

MOROCCO, 19 Feb . . '43, to reinforce the Allied units in the THALA area . 

The German attack and break-through at the KASSERINE Pass, 19-21 Feb . . '43 . 

The American defending force, then holding the KASSERINE PASS, included only the 26th Infantry 

18

Regimental Combat Team (of the 1st Infantry Division), less two battalions ; and with the 19th Engineer 

Regiment attached to the 28th Infantry Regiment . 

Counter-attack by elements of the American 1st infantry Division, from the area west of 

KASSERINE Valley, 21 Feb . . '43 . 

Counter-attack by Combat Command B (of the American 1st Armored Division) and by British 

tank regiments, in the THALA area, 21 Feb ., '43 . 

Allied Air Support, in the KASSERINE VALLEY, 21 Feb ., '43 . 

The German Withdrawal, to the south, 21-23 Feb . . '43 . 

18 . Conclusions to be drawn from the KASSERINE PASS _op eratio n . 

When Gen . Fredendall took command of the Allied Forces !n Southern TUNISIA (under the American 

II Corps).abour 10 Jan . '43, he found that sector sparsely occupied by a heterogeneous group of Allied 

Tank Forces . It was reported that Gen . Fredendall had endeavored to bring these scattered units, under 

cohesion and control ; that he had asked to bring the American 1st Infantry Division under unified d1vfaion 

control , in one section of the line; and, that he had tried to bring the widely separated components of 

the American 1st Armored Division together, in a central location, under proper division control . But, 

he was not able to attain these objectives, for the unification of his command_ 

The G-2, of the American II Corps, had predicted that the Germans would break through in force, 

at FAIR PASS; and Gen . Fredendall had repeatedly requested reinforcements for that critical area . But, 

the British 1st A4my Headquarters (in overall field command) was far more worried about a. German 

break-through, further north, at PICHON, in Central TUNISIA; and made their plans accordingly . 

After the German break-through at FAIR (as predicted by the American II Corps), followed by their . 

victory at SIDI BOU ZID, reinforcements were then finally rushed down, from the north, to assist the 

hard-pressed American Il Corps . Only a few Allied units (moved barely in time to "plug" the critical 

holes) had finally succeeded in preventing an all-out German victory . 

There was never. any indication of panic at the Command Post of the American II Corps, in spite of 

the difficulties incurred, at that time . There seemed to be a feeling of certainty, that eventually the 

fide would tam It, their favor . 

The Advance Command Group (of the First Infantry Division), while enronte from the OUSSEULLA - 

VALLEY to TEBESSA, happened to meet Gen . Fredendall, on the road, by motor, at about daylight, _ 

on 19 Feb . . '43, near KALATT JERDA . northeast of TEBESSA, The verbal instructions, then received 

by the Division Commander . from Gen . Fredendall. (as to the immediate mission of the incoming In 

Infantry Division units) were positive and clear cut . Detailed instructions (regarding the counter-attacking 

mission, for the 1st Division) were received shortly thereafter . 

A final analysis of the results attained, in the German break-through drive in Southern TUNISIA, 

would indicate that the entire operation finally terminated in a stale-mate, with heavy losses in personnel 

and equipment, both to the Germans and to the Allies . Actually, the Germans had failed in their primary 

objective for this offensive - to gain more maneuver space to the west, for their German Afrika Kurps, 

then withdrawing from the East, before the advancing British 8th Army . 

1 9

For the American forces, the KASSERINE PASS Operation had resulted in a bitter lesson . stressing 

the need for cohesion and control , in the battle leadership of the major American combat units . It had 

_aot been possible for Gen . Fredendall to exercise the proper cohesion and control of his tna jot units, 

because of the conditions involved in Southern TUNISIA, during his period of command of the American 

11 Corps . He war greatly handicapped . In this respect . 

However, it happened that, early in March, '43, the American 11 Corps was_ then designated as a 

separate autonomous command, responsible thereafter 2!qy to the new field commander, General Sir 

Harold Alexander, of the British Army, who had been designated as field commander of the entire 

Allied Forces in TUNISIA . This assurance of control of his major units, in the II Corps, had never 

been available to Gen . Fredend4l, as it was later for his successors (Gen Patton and Gen Bradley) . 

IV . 

REASSEMMY OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION . 

Rest Period at MORSOTT 

Following the German retreat from the KASS~INE PASS area, on 21-23 Feb . . '43, the new German 

defensive line was later re-established along the general line (GAFSA-SENED-MAKNASSY-FAIR-PICHON) . 

After the German withdrawal to the south, the 1st Division was pulled back and regrouped, -on 1 

Mar . . '43, near MORSOTT, northwest of TEBESSA . Here all units of the Division were reassembled, 

rested and filled with replacements, preparatory to ftuther combat operations . A quick reorganization 

was needed, as there had been considerable battle casualties, particularly in the Infantry units, some 

of which had been almost continually in combat, since the landing at ORAN, on 8 Nov . . '42 . But, 

with the 1st Division again reunited, there was a general feeling, throughout the Division, .w_genewed 

confidence and combat esprit . 

The 1st Division Battle School for Replacements 

A Battle School, for incoming Replacements, assigned to the 1st Infantry Division, was established 

at this time near MORSOTT; and ft continued in effect during the remainder of the campaign in N . 

AFRLCA . This brief special course of instruction, for replacements, was conducted by a small selected 

group of wattle wise officers and NCO'S, operating on e rotathtg basis , from the front line units . The 

instruction included an orientation on the background and traditioru of the at D"vislon - a program of 

intensive physical conditioning - special instruction in infantry weapons - scouting and patrolling - 

night combat - and platoon combat exercises . - 

As a result of this proc6dure in special Replacement training, the number of battle casualties was 

greatly reduced, and the combat efficiency of all units was maintained at a higher level . 

V. THE RECAPTURE OF GAFSA (16-17 Mar . . 1943 

Strategic Value of GAFSA 

GAFSA, a former French garrison town, was located on the edge of the desert, 60 miles south of 

KASSERINE . It was then occupied by a garrison of German-Italian troops, having been evacuated by 

the American 11 Corps, when the Germans broke through at FAID . on 14 February, 1943 . GAFSA had 

strategical assets, as a road center and a railroad junction . Its re-capture was needed in order to providt 

a railroad supply point for the British Eighth Army, then advancing from the south, through the caastal 

area to the East . 

20

21 

1 st Infantry Division, Summary of Activities, 

January-March 1943, and Division Commander's 

Notes

*W-571 `~ 

Ybl- l_ Yn 

HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION 

A. P. 0 . #1, U. S . Army 

8 ?larch 1943 

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES OF 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION 

After the initial successful landing operations at ORAN, the Division underwent 

intensive training in a large area south of ORAN . Emphasis was placed on 

rapidity of maneuver and quick use of supporting fires . It was also necessary 

to guard TAFARAOUI and IA SE11IA airdromes, and air field -at NOUVION, and to 

furnish a battalion to maintain order in ORAN . 

On November 20, the 5th FA Battalion started east from ORAN to join the 

British 5th Corps . By November 25, they were in action Sf of TUNIS. They 

have operated continuously on the Tunisian front since then and have been at 

BEJA, TABOURBA, MOM EL BAG, GAFSA, SBEITLA, OUSSELTIA, and KESSERA. They re- 

Joined the Division on March 4th. 

On November 20, -the third battalion, 26th Infantry, tree flown by air transport 

from ORAN to YOUKS-LES-GAINS airpdrt and attached to the remaining elements 

of Col. Raff's parachute battalion. They took part in the initial action at 

FAID and then operated from FERIANA-GAM as part of the RAFF FORCE. They conducted 

numerous raids on SEVED and MACKNASSY and together pith the Rangers, 

covered the withdrawal of II Corps elements from GAFSA and FERIANA . The battalion 

came back under Division control on February 21 . 

On November 19, Btry "C", 33d FA Battalion and the Anti-tank Company, 26th 

Infantry, were ordered to MARTINPREY DU KISS from ORAN to reinforce the French 

units of the TLEMCEN sub-division . They were returned to the Regiment . on -December 

27. 

Combat Team 18 was ordered east on December 8, and attached to British 5th 

Corps . They went into the lines at MEDJEZ EL BAB on December 23. The first 

battalion was given the mission of relieving the Coldstream (lizards, after the 

Guards had taken LONGSTOP BILL which is northeast of M©JEZ EL GAB. In a twoday 

action, the first battalion suffered casualties of 44-gfficers and men. 

Drafts were taken from the other battalions of the Regiment to re-man this 

battalion . 

The 18th CT operated in the MEDJEZ area until February 15, when they were 

relievad and sent south to the gDC French Corps . While in the MEDJEZ area the 

18th Combat Team took part in many raids and were very active in their patroll 

ing. They were well spoken of by all elements of the 5th Corps, and our 32nd 

Field Artillery battalion was taken as a model for artillery of this British 

Corps . 

Upon passing to the command of the XIX French Corps, the 18th Combat Team 

was placed in the line at SBIBA between the British Guards Brigade and the American 

;4th Division . In this sector on February 19-20 the 18th Infantry distinguis2w,rd 

itself by completely stopping every German tank and infantry attack . 

They are expected to rejoin the Division within the newt few days . 

- 

1 -, I -- ,.i, -~ 0201611, 

.

On January 10, CT,26, less third cattalicn, wit; the 1st Reconnaissance 

Tx"oop attached, ryas ordered east and attached to II Ccrps for operation in 

Southern TUNISIA . They were split up into Task Fcr ces by II Corps and operated 

with armored elements in the GAFSA-SEBEITLA-FAIR area until the German breakthx"ough 

southwest of PONT DU FANS, They were then ordered into the OUSSELTIA 

VALLEY with Combat Command "B", 1st Armored Division, and assisted in restoring 

the situation in that area . 

Combat Team 26, less the second and third battalions and the lst'Reconnaissance 

Troop, was then ordered to SEBEITLA, and took part in operations 

around FAIR with Combat Command "A", 1st Armored Division . 

They were then withdrawn to the KASSERINE PASS where they took part in 

the heavy fighting which proceeded and followed the German break-through in 

that area . They came back under Division control February 26th . 

By January 20, the Division, less 26th and 18th Combat Teams: and certain 

divisional- units, were at GUELMA which is 75 miles east of CONSTANTINE. 

On January 18, the Division, less detachments, was ordered to join the 

French %I% Corps. A sector was assigned the Division in the OUSSELTIA VALLEY 

extending from PICHON N about thi~ miles . Six French infantry battalions 

and two Tabors (Moroccan Irregulars) together with British, French, and American 

artillery and tank units, were attached to the Division for the defense of this 

sector . The thirty-mi.le sector was organized for a vigorous defense . It was 

sub--divided into two sub-sectors with the various French Moroccan and British 

units in the PICHON (right sector) with General Roosevelt in command. The left_ 

sub-sector was composed of First Division units under Colonel Fechet:who'd : 

sands CT 16. The work of General Roosevelt in organizing his conglomerate 

units was 6utstanding. 

Activity in this sector was largely restricted to continual active patrol-_ 

ling and to artillery fire . Minor enemy attacks were quickly broken dorm . 

Enomy air vas very active . The OrUSSErTIA VALLE'f is very flat and open . Day 

light movement of combat vehicles in the VALLEY brought almost immediate straffi.ng. 

Two German planes, particularly, nick-named "Ike and Mike" by the soldiers 

were very annoying in their straffing and diving tactic . Even a lone jeep was 

a fair target for "Ike and Mike" . 

The French High Command discussed the advisability of the Division captor- _ 

ing DJEBEL BOU DABOUSS which was a commanding hill mass north o£ the HALFA PASS . 

It dominated our left sub-sector . With the continued reverses in southern` 

TUNISIA, an early withdrawal from positions east of the OUSSELTIA VALLEY teemed 

inevitable . Consequently, it seemed futile to waste lives and materiel in capturing 

this position . In football parlance taking this hill mass would have 

been "battering our brains out to gain a yard and a half in the middle of the 

field" . Accordingly, plans to capture this hill _was abandoned. This turned 

out to be a wise decision, since the High Command later ordered us to withdraw 

west across the OUSSELTIA VALLEY .

The withdrawal order was issued on February 15th . The Division was ordered 

to occupy And defend the mountain range along the west side of the OUSSELTIA 

VALLEY . Ammunition and heavy supplies were moved across the Valley-the night 

proceeding the withdrawal eif infantry and artillery elements .- All units were 

withdrawn the night of February 17-18 without casualties, confusion, or the loss 

of materiel . The new position was occupied and organized by February 19th . 

On February 19, the Division, less detachments (CT 18, CT 26, and 5th FA Bn) 

was ordered to move with a].1 possible speed to vicinity of BOU CHEBKA, northwest. 

of KASSERINE to reinforce that sector . The Germans, attacking in force, had 

taken the KASSF~t.INE PASS . This gave them a close approach to our supply base, 

TEBESSA . Further advances by the Germans would cut Allied communications, 

threaten CONSTUTINE, and might necessitate a general .withdrawal of Allied forces 

in '.TDNISIA . 

On arriving at higher headquarters en route . I was informed of the dangerous 

German break-through in the KASSERINE PASS, that our units were withdrawing toward 

THALA and that the situation was critical . I was directed to assume commmnd 

of the KASSERINE sector, including the French Constantine Division and various 

.separate American units . At that time, the German continued advance up the 

KASSERINE VALLEY seemed inevitable. 

A division command post was set up at 11:00 P.M., February 20, hear BOLT 

CHEBKA, where c awtact was hastily established with the French Constantine Division9 

attached American units,'and elements of the First Division . The situa-' 

tion at this time was precarious . The second battalion, 16th Infantry, vas - attached 

to Combat Command OB" at daylight, February 21, and remained in position 

, on the high ground south of DJ HAMRA during the day. At midnight on the night 

of February 21-22, it was decided to .block the HAMM PASSES at the head of the. 

KASSERINE.VALLEY with one battalion of the 16th Infantry, heavily reinforced 

with artillery and accompanying weapons, and to be prepared to counter-attack 

from tie commanding ground south of HAMA position, held by . our 16th Infantry 

and two French Senegalese Battalions . 

;' The German attackwas resumed on tight of February 21-22 . There was 

considerable confusion, since the leading elements of the German Infantry attacked 

in American and French uniforms . They overran and captured one battery of 

the 33rd Field Artillery, then supporting Combat Command "B", 1st Armored Division. 

; t It was "touch and . go" for a short time . In f act, warning orders had already been , 

`ìssued by higher headquarters to prepare for a general withdrawal, 

The German Infantry was followed by German tanks . Local counter-,attacks 

were directed for all available infantry units with the close assistance of the 

artillery . The 33rd Field Artillery Battalion, now under Divisional control, 

and the 7th Field Artillery Battalion participated in the counter-attack . firing 

at close ranges at German Infantry and Tank's . General Andrus (Divisional 

Artillery Commander) was very active in directing these counter-attackq . A coordinated 

counter-attack was launched by the 16th Infantry at 3:30 P.M., February 

22nd . As the lines of our infantry reached their positions, the Germans broke 

and ran . Some 400 surrendered to a group of 13th Armored Regiment tanks on 

reaching the valley . Our attack was followed by a 'counter-attack by Combat Command 

"B" of the 1st Armored Division fr an 1he northeast side o£ the valley .

These counter--attacks apparently caused a complete German withdrawal from 

the KASSERINE VALLEY . They were made on the flank of the thrust toward THALA 

and threatened to cut off elements engaged there . I have been told that this 

incident seemed to be a turning point and that a general withdrawal was then 

started of all the German forces in contact with the Allied Forces . 

On February 27 ., 

re-equipment . 

the Division was withdrawn to a rest area for re-supply and 

All combat operations of the Division in TUNISIA, including the minor operations 

of separated battalions were as successful as might have been expected .' 

considering the handicaps and difficulties of control, Marked success attended 

the efforts of the Division when it was possible to operate under Divisional control 

and take advantage of the teamwork and morale so thoroughly instilled during 

training periods . Losses have been suffered, which are part of the-cost of belonging 

to the "Fighting First", but in no case was there any disorganisation, 

and the Boche was made to pay in kind . Casualties in the officer personnel have 

been particularly heavy and indicated the active leadership of the junior officers . 

One incident occurred in the OUSSELTIA VALLEY about the 31st of January, 

which seemed typical of this spirit, Lt, Colonel Davis, 7th Field Artillery, 

Battaliai, and his S-3, Major Levin, were killed while reconnoitering for a new 

forward position. Both were buried in rear of their artillery positions . When 

their bodies were lowered into their graves, the entire 7th Field -Artillery 

Battalimx fired three concerted salvos at located enemy targets, This incident 

indicated the spirit*in which the Division is making the Germanspay for the 

losses received . 

4 

/s/ TERRY ALLEN 

TERRY ALLEN, 

Major General, U, S . Armor, 

Commanding .

C 0 P Y-''Y-r~ 

- lien . McNarney JTM 

~. -~^-,- J` - _ ----- Gen . Handy . (H) 

Gen . McNair 

HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION return 

" . . " APO #l, NEW YORK, N . Y. " - GCM 

General George C . 

War Department, 

Marshall, 

Washington ; D . C ;-- 

Dear General Marshall : 

March 10, 1943 

mowing your interest in the First Division, wYiich-we appreciate 

very greatly, I .am sending you a. brief summary .of the operations' of units - 

of the Division on the Eastern Front . - . 

Higher tactical considerations have necessitated the dispersion of 

many elements of the Division during a great part of this period . Considering 

the difficulties of control and leadership that were thus involved, all 

units did exceptionally well in some cases, and very well in others . 

Elements of the Division did particularly well when half the Division 

was assembled on February 21 End 22 at the time of the German breakt'Zrough 

in the Kasserine Valley . At that time, the French Constantine 

Division and various separa: ;,e units were attached to the First Division 

for the final defense in thLs sector a.nc, the followin ;, counter-attack . If ' 

I ao say so, the counter-attack launched by the First Division was most 

successful snd I hove been told' that it res responsible for the initiation` 

of the, general German withdr&vra.l . 

&m, happy to sLy that the Division is now being reassembled for 

use E .s a: complete unit in a very imglrcbnt impending operation. Many of the, 

units have been separated for some time, but their morale and esprit is 

still excellent and i am sure they will give a good -.ccount of themselves . 

I have enclosed a cita=tion given the Division by General Koeltz, 

comana.nding the French 19th Corps, under whom we temporarily served, and ::by 

General Eisenhower, following the counter-attack on February 22 . I have 

also enclosed two memorandums recently issued the Division . 

Assuring you of our serious .intentions of living up to the confidence 

tht.t hans been reposed in the Division, I aim 

Very sincerely, 

/s/ Terry Allen 

T RRY ALLEN

R E S T R I C T E D 

HEADQUARTERS 1st INFANTRY DIVISION 

A . P. 0. No. 1, U. S . Army 

ME~:oRANDU2d: March 4, 1943 . 

SUBJECT Message of Commendation . 

TO Unit Commanders, 1st Infantry Division . 

The following message of commendation from the Commander-in-Chief,' 

Allied Force, is published for the information of all .personnel of 'this command 

: 

"As an American, I am proud of the tray in which American Troops . in 

the recent battling, recovered from initial shocks and speedily demonstrated 

a readiness to slug it out with the enaW . Our troops are rapidly becoming 

battlewise and their future operations are certain to bring discouragement 

to the ranks of our enemies . Front line units now have the urgent 

task of replacement, rehabilitation and training, and I assure you that I 

am straining every nerve to bring your magnificent organization up to 

strength as quickly as it is humanly possible . 

"Lot us make sure thQt the new men coning up quickly absorb the lessons 

that the front line units have learned, so that every pound of ammunition 

and equipment that is brought to you, may be most effectively employed 

in the destruction of the forces opposing us . 

"I,hope that every man in your covmard realizes that I have corpl6te 

confidence in his readiness and ability to do -~his full part alongside our 

gallant allies in driving our enemies out of Africa . Please accept my 

personal thanks and congratulations on your fine record of leadership . _ 

DISTRIBUTION : 

"A" & "CCtt 

By command of Majcr General ALLEN : 

/s/ EISENHMER" 


Is` LEONIDAS GAVAIAS 

Lt . Col ., A .G .D . 

Adjutant General 

n,)n1 2 ,f

19 Armp Carps 

Staff G-1 

At the moment when the 1st American Division is leaving the 

sector of the C .A .F . J. General Koeltz, commanding the 19th Army Corps, 

is particularly happy to express to its commander, General Allen, as 

well as to his assistants, General . Roosevelt and General Andrus, all 

the satisfaction that he felt in having under his orders such valorous 

troops . 

Arriving in the Ousseltia Valley at the moment when a powerful 

German attack had just been launched on the flank of the 19th Army Corps, 

they came at once with resolution to the aid of their French comrades 

and threw back the enemy into the mountains . 

Animated by the finest military spirit, they thus showed the 

highest battle comradeship. 

Side by side with the battalions of the Division of Algiers, they 

then fought to hold the reconquered heights in Ejebels Rihana and lahrich 

and the Byzantine Ruins, 

General Koeltz asks General .Men to be so kind as to transmit 

his sincere thanks and his very best wishes to the officers, non-commissioned 

officers and men of the let Infantry Division . 

Directed to General Allen 

GENERAL ORDERS NO . 65 

Headquarters, 21 February 1943 

Lt . General Koeltz, 

Commanding 19th Army Corps 

True Copy 

/sl Terry Allen 

Maj . Gen.

MEMORANDUM) 

z All units in the lst Infantry Division . 

DISTRIBUTION 

"Alt and tqc" 


APO #1, U . S . Army 

My sincere thanks to all units for your efficient execution of 

missionz assigned you during recent operations . Your cheerful execution 

of difficult missions has been favorably commented upon . Preparation 

for our comhing tasks will require the most intensive efforts . The following 

items are of utmost importances 

Discipline 

Physical toughness 

Combat efficiency 

Intensive belief in your units . 

a 

Your discipline must be 

exemplified by the promt execution of orders, by military bearing and the 

proper wearing of the uniform, by careful attention to saluting discipline 

and by the general -demeanor - of all individuals . 

Physical toughness is a vital requisite to success in combat . It 

must be attained by intensive physical conditioning . All of us must be 

mentally, morally, and physically tough and well able to "Take it and dish 

it out ." 

Combat training must be stressed to acquire the battle -nisdcm necessary 

to inflict the maximum losses upon the enemy, with the minimum losses 

to ourselves . Maximum proficiency must be attained in the use of all 

weapons;, in mine laying, mine detection and the detection and removal of 

booby traps, in all types of night operations, and particularly in the 

skillfg use of FIRE and MANEUVER . Reconnaissance, security, patrolling, 

the use of cover and the lessons learned in recent combat operations must 

all be stressed . 

An abiding belief in your units is a pre-requisite to success in 

combat . All individuals must be actuated by the need for maintaining the 

traditions of our Division . "Nothing in hell must delay or stop the 

FIRST DIVISION ." 

/Sl TERRY ALLEN, 

TERRY ALLEN 

Major General, U . S . .Army, 

Commanding 

n~) ni c~ /i

DIST3IBUTION : 

"A" & "Cit 



APO #l, U . S . ARMY 

MEMORANDUM) 

s All Units, 1st Infantry Division . 

TO ) 

Recently, the units of the Division, of necessity, have been 

widely separated on detached combat missions, involving great difficul- 

ties of leadership and control . We have not been able heretofore to 

fight as a complete division . The First Division is now reassembling . 

We do not know what our next mission may be or haw soon it must 

be executed, but in arty case, "WE WILL FIGHT AS A UNIT." 

Every individual must be prepared to give everything he has got 

for the honor of our Division . Every objective must be taken per schedule 

with the maximum damage to the enemy. Every oblgctiye seized must be 

held . 

"Nothing in hell must delay or stop the First Division ." 

R E S T R I C T E .D 

March 9, 1943 . 

Is/ TERRY ALLEN, 

TERRY ALLEN, 

Major General, U. S . Army, 

Comnanding.

22 

16th Infantry, I st Infantry Division, Operations 

Report, 19-26 February 1943

HASSEKYE CA?.TAIGN 

F~;RH,t~~RV 19, 1943 " CT moves from Ousseltia Valley, having turned sector over 

to French Forces for defense . CT moved to new location at 6253, Sheet 13, to 

open . Kassarine "hase, beginning movement at 1350 hours, 19 February 19¢3 and 

arriving in bivouac area at 0550 hours 20 February 1943 " 

_F-BRi1 Rv 20, 1943 ; CT in bivouac in Kasserine sector . Preparation made and orders 

issued for movement into lines . 

FEBRUELRY 21, .`196-3: 

lst Platoon Company A, 1st Engineers Battalion relieved from 

attached to CT16 and reverts to control of Commanding General, lst U .,:s . Infantry 

Division . The 2nd Battalion is moved forward into the lines and the remainder of . 

the CT is alerted for movement . However, no movement is made . At 2200 -'.hours .1st . 

and 3rd Battalion with attachments from Special- Units are moved forward,bdt-are, 

not committed . 

FEBRUARY 22, 19x3 ; Regimental CP moved forward to 6967, sheet 13 . Orders receiv= 

ed from Commanding General, Combat Command B that CT `16 will hav,: neission of protecting 

7th ., and 33rd Field Artillery Battalions . At 1045 hours K am .M Companies'- 

16th Infantry come in contact with enemy . 1st Battalion is sent ort mission to - 

protect flanks . Corrunanding Officer issues'plan to make local attacks in cooord- . 

ination with Combat Co :+mand g, At 3443 orders issued for 2nd and 3rd-Battalions 

to make their local attacks as planned at 1500 hours ., preceded by small' .artillery 

barrage . Battalions jump off on ti :;e . Company C, lst Ranger . BattbLlion 'attached 

to CT at 16113 hours . Local attacks made by battalions . were successful in~that, 

dominating ground was taken and some field artillery guns captured by enemy were 

retaken . The Commanding usneral, II Corps and . the Commanding General- lst U.S . 

Infantry Division, each sent the following message to"the Commanding . Officer 

CT 16 ; Miany thanks for the splendid work of your .CT today. . 

FEBRUARY 233 1943 : Orders received from Commanding "Ueneral, lst U . S . ;'Infantry . 

Division that very active patrolling must keep up as .it ' i.b believed -that., en 

is making a general withdrawal . Orders passed to Battalions.wriich are out of 

contact following attacks of yesterday . 39th Infantry takes over sector . occupied-' 

by 3rd Battalion, 16th Infantry . 3rd Battalion moves to new ,defensive positia % 

FEBRUARY 24, 1943 ; 

Extensive plans made to move forward thru pass .- Plans ::made 

in detail and although no resistance is expected, every detail is-planned' to-take-care 

of it . C? moved to 8477 after meeting of all unit commanders . 

F_EBRUARY25, 191,-3 : At 0700 all battalions move forward as - _planned . _. At _O$?0 hours 

the lst Battalion had reached the base of the hill which is its first_ objective ;. 

without resistance . At 1000 hours the 1st :Battalion had a,dsed ts"first objec= r; 

tive and reached its 2nd one . The 3rd Battalion moved fortyard without reslstanc 

and took objective on schedule . Kasserine pass wascleared of enemy,, 

to be mined and booby trapped extremely . All units moved forward without'Rrdsis 

tance to Thelpte and Feriana . There, lines were stopped,' and°defensive posn*SL 

_ 

organized . 

---" 

FEB~jJJARY 26, 1943 : Defensive postions organized and a period of reorganization'. 

Not in contact with enemy . At 1155 hours new Cp opened at 390742, 1/50;000 . 

lst ?reconnaissance Troops attached to CT to reinforce motorized reconnaissance . 

for a short >>eriod . '

23 

10th Panzer Division, War Diary (Extract), 14-22 

February 1943

10:PZ,DIV 1 Ak3TL4rC ' T~tigkaitoberiaht 29.11.42-15,111.43 .A.frika 

9 February, 1943 

w 

Intelligence Report of Aotivitiea 

Transfer of Div, Hqs: to Dou Thadi (south of gairouan). 

3,3 February . 19113 

14 February 1943 

Transfer of Div. C,P. to the region mast of raid . 

Attaok of the divicion on Sidi non Zid . 

At 0600 hr the advanood elements of the 86th NtGren. reach the 

area 8 km roost of the FUid pass without aomin; 3n aontaot with the anamy . 

. . , . . , Fhid 

Attar clearing the mines at the/pAoe Our tankGiAQW4- Fraroeping a round to 

the right pact, the north 'edga of Dj . Lescouda, advance, on the road to Sbeitla. 

At 065-0 hr our tanks are èngaged with aneuW tanks just southeast of DJ . 

Lvasouda. The mountain itself is ortouplad by ensmy infantry . At 0700 hr 

that right P ank of the `86th fz,tTon.Rgt . 

enemy tacks attaoaat of DJ .Lessouda (north of the road to Sbaitla) . `She 

attack is ropulsod. At 0730 hr the enenV artillery was still firinG on 

tb* defile just vast of Fuide At 0735 hr the anoW raoiatance on the road 

to 8beitla (about 8 lan northeast of Sidi bon Zid) was broken. At 0330 hr 

after our tanks had reaohed the road fork about 14 In evet--northwest or 

to the northwest 

Faid $ !the onszV withdrawyq c - cIMP?H? mac4, %# sew TAiila Cit the oars 

time_ he attgqktd with tanks . ;from, Sidi bon Zid ; , on the road to tho northeast . 

At 0900-hr onwy low level attack on the 7th Ps .Rgt, At OJ30 our tnnlm 

advanoad southward on Sidi bon Zid. At 0'300 hr come anaur tminks zethdrarl 

rrpp the road caning down from Sidi bon Zid and moved toward the wart . Tlia 

f~~.Elc 

-A"a~~of the enan7 tnnka was eucoesfYilly attacked by dive bombers north or 

Sidi bon Zid botwoon 1015 and 1055 hre. At 1100 hr our air e.nd groiuzcl re- 

oonaaissauoes acaartainod that the onew . east of Sidi bon

:wae,ratr"ting through . Sidi bou Zid .to the vast and the northwest, 

and that there va.s heavy tank and artillery traffic . At the rams tires 

25 anaW tanks wore ~i8d driving from Sidi bou Zid to the %wat . 

Behind the lines .vehioles movomontm also from Sidi bou Zid to ttw aoi.th- 

W'ogt. :, At x,23 hr the 7th Pz.Rgt . reported a near aneuoy tank attack o- l0- 

15 tanks from the .iWat-on Sidi bou Zidj it vane ripulsod . Durirz~; the engage- 

rQnts the 66th f.0ran.,~the 7th Pz .FtGt took 71 priaonora Incslueilrig F, orfloors . 

.o 

In addition the . follwing natdriel van oapturod or dustroyode 

.4o,.tanko 

. .7 amored personnel oarriero 

, . . .. . . . _ :a5 S motor oarriages 

, ., . .~~: . .> . . 1 antItnwk gun 

15 i?etraary .1943 

prlw mover : truck- 

XA;addltion . 1Q vahloles, am* of them arwred were captured oi' Ovstroyod, 

oas au=V; .plane . . shot dam and an onorgy reoonmisoanoe plum chattered 

en the. gruuad . &everal ammunition daaps were aat on firs . 

w tanks wore zostYy . or tho8horman type . - 

------------ 

~:>. . Thainight passed without spaotal oaourranoe . At 11110 hr the re- 

ooanaiasanoa"dmtaohamba of the 06th Pz . Grem . roportod heavy ancW Movemonts 

from the north on. the Maid.-Sbeitla road, 15 lax vi-eat of DJ .LocvoAa . At 1150 

hr 86th Pz . . .Gr,an, ,.. roportpdenemy motorized column with tanks acivanoirw vat on 

the Sbaitla -l road . . , . lhon strong enn~y oonaQntratioaa vmro oboarvad ir the 

oroa vioct:of 84aguia. . At .1525,hr the euomy attaolmd with 110 tanks (GQn . 

":harraantl} , fY'oue the area = of SadvZuia on Sidi bou Zid and the road 6 Lm

w 

aouthsmst, thereofy the attack vas excouted with artillery oup2o.rt. An 

immediate oounterattaok with tanks brought the enaW attaok to a atandatill . 

About 30 ones tanks were shot` down èy our tames during the repulao of 

the autW . tank attack from the area 10 ka northfst of Sidi bout Zid to 

the east and . southeast . Three additional snarW tanks which had broken tararough 

in the area b ka southeast o£ Sidi bou Zid were shot dowa . A total of 81 

prisoners has been brought in . 

Prisoners statenanta disclosed the follovrinr units in lines 3d On ., 

1st , 8r:uored,, ,Rgt.$ 91st Field hrtVRgt. (10.5 am guns on gun oarria,cs)j 17th 

field Arty,,Rgt, ,(X5.5 am guns) " 165th In£: j 70lat Antitank Bn . ('j..5 ors oh 

oarriages) q , 

Captured papers disclosed that thane unite and the 0lcwaonts 

they have In line here belong to Combbt Komando b, and that 1tvctqz the ; 

lattarx had its .$ . Iigo kxsl n Sidi bou Zid until a £ansr days o.Lo . 

Combat Commando C vu connitted notth thereof aooordlug, to oaptiu*ed papers . 

The -'following alaments bolo nged to its 2 battalions of vie 6trt Inf.Rgt . 

( rad7 ), a battery or the 68th n2ld Arty., c: Co .,13th Pz.Rut ., B coo s 

701st Antitu* Bn., lot Co., i6th F;ngineoxu, 2 platoons of ~43 Flak Arty . 5n. 

In the course of the tank fight on the a£tarnoon of 15 Fob. there arose 

the imprequion that the enopy kt1 intended to put into 'Line the :1oatilo olv 

nta; located : an . Djebol Carat liadid and cant thvropE, In the e;;anin o£ 

15 .l'ab, ancu , e1R onta ware still holding out on the hoighto of Dj. Tar aaouda . 

On that day trvX .1n£liotad considerable locsos on tae enaW . On 15 Fob, 

the . followirG- mtt&riel vas captured or dostroycds 

: . . 39 tunka 

'' I7'armored .ant personnel carriers 

. 

1 .4 

it=k guns , 

- 'gun motor' e"riagas 

. ~3 .~aohlne Sip 

-` 1 `10.5cms mountain howitzer 

1 _ 15 cm sun 

100 '~vehioloa (approximately) 

Durlng'tha~ 2 days òf £ightlng the total of matiriel oaptared or

doetroyed followas '9 tanks, 30 armored personnel carriers, 16 gun rztor 

-, x 

carriages, 5 antitank gums, *2 arty gzuse, 17 coaching (;uns, about 100 vehi- 

ales, .2 planes ; 125 prisoners word talcoa . 


onciroled 

During the night the eneW attomptod to got amy fro,nii/DJ .Loosouda. 

Three offioore and 53 men ware taken prisoners . Rezrairdrzg on-amy elorn'ante 

ara proe=ablW otill on D, . Lessouda . 

. , The I encircled enezrr on Dj . Garot F3adid was rooonnoit-trod and attaoked . 

cross r 

In the foramoon end tanks advanced north of thofroad (17 icy northvmat of 

Sidi bou'Zid) toward the east .The eno:ay was oleo roportod as advanc$n~; w1th 

tcuxks 'over this z=abc2mxk in~erasotiou on both sides of the road to tl :o 

as tar .as the area 4 

east end' ecutheast fi km crest of Sadaguia . It is supposed 

that thin 'zovomant was for the purpose of ooverin& the enegt withdram;f 

Oar roconriaissan 'e) to 'tho west in the direction of Sbeitla. Toward 17 hr 

an=W. : fianka 

ntreated to the - north and carat from our tantrrc thrusts . In the afternoon 

the'road to Sbeitla east of the intorsootion 17 Ica northwest of Sidi bou 

Zid lay Dander èneztr artillery fire . Enaqr batteri ,as on gun earriagas timers 

aaoortsined nort west of the intersection . 

On the semi of lb Fob, the onsr held cut on. 11i11 5W of Dj . 

Itsaira with at least . l ooapaW in well improved povitione with antitank 

guns apinst - our attaok from the northrmst, and on the northeast spurs 

of Dj. Garid 'Dadid I against our attack from the southeast. "Ziero too Azm 

It was assumed that the 'enaaEpr strength was approximately 1 oompany. 

The enoW encircled on Dj . Lossouda was still holdiu; out . . 

Captured papery *d1soloce easy rninefiolds on roads hotxoon Dj . 

Rsaira and DJ .Roohaioh, and on road 2 km east o£ Rill %1 . Ilia C,?th 

Pz.Groa,RSt, was warned of the fact by radio . 

. . . . An eotimats of the anvuyy situation as depioted by the division

(Vap . pp, 1j ;Fwarig MY tanks the mithdrwwal on the 

seat roads in the diroation of Sbeitla) leads to tho Minion for Mack 

and for the destruction of enemy tanS ausumad tp be thorn, 

17 Abruary 1943 

At 093,5 our tr?opc ; .reaoh Hadjob al Aioun without contact with 

the enwV . Our raoannalsoanoo In tho area 12 km north-northwest of Eadjob 

al Aioun obvervod at 1235 hr motorized enemy forces w1thdrazing .to the 

northwast0rhe oaony had mined and blaotod the tountain pass at 04 el Almar . 

At 15 hr our spearhead established liaison with our troopal at 

Pondouk, Natives stataments disolojahkwk the enemy as having KIM 

back to the apt during the night . 

SAW forces in still unkaavn strum,th on Q.0suouda, Tank 

apvarhyad was hold up Q Puapy mina obatoolos in the aria 6 km northeast 

of Qdjeb . el - Ajoun and 10 km south-oouthivost of Fondouk. Tho approach 

roud .to Fondoiuk lay _candor onamy artillery fire from a northern direction. 

through : ' 

jor .Qitiopaj information on the onapy Q.priconers statements ooe 

Portfolio Frisonaro atatoments, 

14 Februm 

- 

Quiet might . .4. rm more priagara were brought in ; they-balonged 

survounded 

to tho,ramalsim/onany0orooo (168th American IUf.Rgt) on DjAaasouda . In 

the early yorp5mg our troops ocoupiad QLoasouda and the last rarnatle 

of the eawW wara oapturod . Q My unak enemy foroas avro atill ocoupyinz 

Plohon in the roranom As our troopa approached the anary withdrew to 

the most so that the town Brae taken iAthout fighting . Arab atatow,3nts Ilahis 

close that the enoqr has withdrava the bulk of .1U= forcea about 30 W. 

19 Fabruax7 -1943 

The divisional C.P. Is shiftod to El Alem, north of Viroinn. 

Die Intalligenee officer sots out for the advanead C . P, of

fx .A.Q.X.Afrioaj, under whose co ::trol tho d'viaion has bQon plaoad on 

10 February'43,, to'got'oriented on the anamy situation, 

At &biba the 2j.Pz.D1v . has c=o upon I3ritiah troope . The intol11- 

Genoa officer- of Pz.A,0,r, suspeotta that they belong to the British 6th 

.Pz.DIV' . _ . It is aaoearxtd that thia division has boon 13xt; in line for the 

supiwrt oi"'tho right 'Frmoh flank which,,, after then fighting; for Side, bou 

Zid and the subotquont .eLthdra%=1 of the Amorioana;:' also fallinG back. 

Desida these Britichors ozil.y/I-cnoh are to be uxpooted nit ",biba . aaauaver 

it is not ulto;;ethcr izpoaaiblc that slc~i:a"atc of an Amarioar,, oo -.bat . om-uar.do 

ma1~c cm apgoaranoo thane. In other rocpooto the A:nar; oars hiwe_ g;ono book 

to Taboo= with Cozbat Commando 1:. :;high 7m 1m.r. Lad few camxalties and 

itth the rcus=ts o£ Co=at - Co=nndoO A alxd C. 

Awrionxi priwonor4 ware taken in lbrianaf they belonged to the 

infantry. Amordine to statements or c+rlconars the unit =s idantifiod 

44'thc - Lut Amaioan lnf.Aiv . fhe British in line at Sbiba :c-we i=adiataly 

Aned"mod w1red' thOir position and w offorlIg stubborn roziytanoo . For 

thia reason the German attack me not oontirruod on the cvcxrinr, of 19 M. 

and was to' ba . resumed in the morning of 20 February . 

At Toboaca also the .aawV hzca mirxd and vrlrcd his ho3itionu, 

Qaoordini to ,'reparta ` on hand mt Pz .A.O.K. In the ovon1w of In February 

thure , is ~ stili no report on '.;ha Kampfgruppo of Fz .A.O. K. Africa which has 

been ooamiaittcd ~r= Kassarim to mho nortlamost in the direction of Male ; 

thera£oro . pt .A.O.r4 is unable to girt out a detulled oatimto G^ the uncmY 

actuation . F1awever aw oneW forooz axe not exrootud in Chic aoator . It 

in trm that the Amorionna ha-.3 still about: 3 divisions in Africa( the 2d 

Pz .Div .,` 3d . and_ 9th Inf.Diva .~ but they arc cold to be -W=- back is L~rooco 

_ . -, . kAand 

perhape haldA ~n readinoaa thorn for speoial anploym.ent" 

1" . 1

20 Fobs 1943 

7 

An Goon as the dofae behind Kassarino"has boon fought tr "3e of 

the onmoW. tho division has tho mission to pursue him iaw:9iately through 

that d3flle in a northarn direction. The Karayfbruppo of P-A.0 .':.Africa., 

r 

aomaittad from Zasoorina on tho defile ras only vicai: infuntr~r olert:inte but 

i.s vory strong in art4llery (9 bat'l erias and xrojootors ) . I"cording, 4o 

prisoners' atatom®nts tho defile 10 defended by aler_c+uts of uno :Yirst 

Ameriona Arwred Division. Enat7 ntr*nath In catimatad at about 1500 mon ; 

a few oonorate pill bdxos have boon identiflod . AoooriinZ to infor;;ation 

raoaivad the en=r has avaotuatod all they air fiolda, including Tobesoa. 

Div. C.P Kassorina railroad station. 

' Weathor: dull, foamy, rain At tai Cj;t. 

Dataohzant [?] 10 vAiiah at firm had been oo itted at th® defile 

north of_lasserina had talooa Dill 974 at 1414 hr and was attaokizw, on 11!11 

1191, vrith ones foross betrean the two points . At 7.430 a report is re- 

.caived . fro= Dat.10 that the anoW is still noroat of IM11 1191 . It is 

from 

aloe raportod that the onemV is briuSing formrd reinforow.:enta z= tho 

north inoluding Y tanks and artillory on gun carriages . 

A prisoner was 'brought in, a atraEZIer who had bccona s4paratod 

from his unit days before (158th Inf . ) 

21 Februpry 1943 ' 

At 0109 hr, 2 too south' of still X3-6 (road 'to Thala) ~:=W Infantry 

men and nohiolos . 86th Fz .Ccr n. at-tacking to tho north. At 0113 report 

received that the enemy is vithdre-dng nortlnvard . At 0233 hr the defile at 

846 is taken; . the onangr hag retreated ; only coatterod onamy machine Cun 

fire (2 am) . At 0730 hr the . 86th Pz.Graa. reports that 2kin south of Thala 

ruuorod corm 

and 2 .ka,wost :of the road 1$ enezW arc feeling forward. At 031 hr 

20 armored -oars aro oboarved approaching covora4~ tp t:ho oarly morning fog. 

1

At'.0832, hr-.the.:,~! in attacking from the north with tanks, . and artillery 

fire from 2..batteriep NampEgruppo 36 antronohas . At 0935 the xax cnew 

stops hia attack, Kaapfgruppo lies under artillery firs . :th advanoo at 

firat waa delayed by strong mine obstacles. At 1230 hr liwapfgruppo reports 

that strong en=t infantry forsws have not coon obssrvad herotoforo . At 1235 

hr air roconnaisaunoos North of Mll 992 7 unerj tanks ~_nd 20 

mfor vehiclass light motor vehicles traffic on the road norta thoredf in 

a northern direction. In the meantizio our tanks have paauod through the 

to the 

&ampfgruppo . .and are attacking/right of t.1-to road in t_'o dirco tion of Th,ela . 

T.he road of advanoo vsspooially in the area try Hill 992 lies under enemy 

:artillery firaj* we are assumlng that there are 2 anew-y batteries thurc . 

At 1710 hr then 7th Pe,Egt. reports that: the snowy is tvitl,dravire 

. 

under oovor of thA haws. 

worn 

Dhila pursuing the aneutiy 15 

anav tanks~ .ostroyed xpxi+acx 'metx 

en~ . 

zm%jx and as the advance eon- 

tiuumd , additionaVtanka were 1zooked out. At 1930 hr our tarLka sad advanced 

1,haouoh 

elaments have roaohed the area` 2 k= couthtofThaa.~gad l ~athcsr strod; ©nozv 

forces oil both aides of the road of advanoe3 our armored infantry had to 

fight - °ua7 still 

them out of their foxholes . At 2035 hr/on both aides of the rotid 

south o£ Thala, ta ko, infantry and ant-1t=7_- uT1, In tiiz courso of the 

fighting to south of Thala 1463 prisonera, Ltcluding 11 offioors,-~srara taken 

up to 24 hr 21 February 1943, Irisauerst atatamaixts diselosbei the follotivin; 

ftmxc ' identification of troopas ' 

BriAlbh olomentas 

. .1,7-2 Iaszaara (firth . RrrRix A=lorod Div. ) 

. :. 2*T Laioeatara (46th inf.Aiv.) . 

86 it Chemical Wurfara Co . `loyal =agineora, ind,3 ~,endent co ::parw 

vdth 12 zortars 4 inches axiYj r oalibar 

4~, Qoapozitlon aooording to dapturod papora 

~th Xuf. erigeda . 

2x1 Bn ., Ught Fuziliers 

lot aa., East Surroya 

e

2d Bu., . L?tmpshira (light Garde brigade) 

24 Ba:,' faraohute & 

6tii f . Ccuaaanda 

Womatero' (46th In:-Die . ) 

86th Chomical tffarc indonandont Co . 

29 &mcri2aR elcmontss 

16th Co.,fnoinaar Fan. (I.st Armored Div . 

i69th Inf.P.rt . ( " th L~W.D2v . 

26th Inf.a4t . lot Inf . Div . 

39th Ynr .F:gt.. (9th Inf.Div . ) 

Ic)th lheer Wit . 

Captured or doatroyods 


32 tan1w 

12 antitank guna 

13 heavy mortarc 

6 rotor vehiclau 

3 gun carrinca 

2 motor oyales . 

At 05145 a reconnaiunanoo disclosed thaAt the area on 'Moth sides of 

the road at Thala and mouth thevaof vitLs strongly occupied b y the encRr . 

She onoW attack®d out oi` Thala v-tWn1xj t 3 th tanks and a f elq o f them 

broke through our cocurity line . After 5 of hto tanks hed bamu do strolod 

trhe enemy withdrca northward . A new reoonnaiss=os at 0555 hr disclosed 

oaatapied 

that the hills about 1.5 lm south of Thala wore strmiGlyAy the en®uy, 

alto with antitank runs and tanks . During the day the enanV 

has rammed rather quiet . Looording to Arabs, atatoments and 

Mx= fresh vehicles marks u it was aasurmd that the enemy had brought 

roinforoamenta from. an ecuetorn dirvotion . 

tato in the afternoon the encW felt forvmrd wit], 7 tanks west of the 

road on the left flank of our saourity line$ later he withdr(AYj 

In, front of Gruppc Romml the enemy rma Lotting rolnforccmantr. . 

For ancRr oiphe .^ soar division order of 22 Fabruru-y . 

i3y tearing up the onozy front and dentroying strong one :: aler:iontC 

In the (loop onezy flank the division han oarriod slat its micnion to its 

w 

r

" 10 ." 

extent . During the night of 22/23 February it dicongagos itsolf 

from the eneW and roachao the pass position 15 L-a2aorthwoot o£ 7716 

to defend the lati;or with theD.A .K. For particulars couoorning the, 

onsnV eve the prisoners# stutemani3 film .

24 

21st Panzer Division, War Diary (Extract), 14-23 

February 1943

Kriegstagebuoh 21 Panzer Division Afrika 

1 . Jan . 1 43 . - 31 March " 43 33 135 

The night-passed quietly. 

Until break of day combat groups pushed forward to the trail 7226-- 

7221.}. At 9535 hours Kampfgruppe ScOtte reports the crossing of the swamp area . 

'At 0610 hours the advanced elements of the March group have crossed the mine 

field . At 0615 hours and 0630 the Rec.Bn.580 and the Pz .Rgt . respectively 

have crossed/with--all their elementsZthe mine belt . The sandy areas of the 

trails mentioned present a considerable obstacle, progress being hindered by 

the frequent sinking of vehicles . 

Labor detachments of the 220th armored Eng . 

. 

:are,employed so'that - the vehicles are made mobile as soon as possible . 

At 0630 Kampggruppe Schiltte has occupied the prescribed position at 

7223 rind reconnoiters' to - the north. 

The enemy, intercepting some of our radio messages, knows of our 

;;advance, bub' remains quiet . 

The 609 Flak Bn . receives the order to occupy positions on both 

;-sides of the road south of the mine belt and to remain in contact with the 

' enerW, 

:ty .iy 

At 0755 a report'could be made to 5th .Panzer A.O.K. that the movements 

had been carried out systematic Kly,-but up to now no reports of xxxmy contact 

: :with the enemy are at hand .` 

The divisional C .P . was located on the south slope of Djobel Zobbak 

:-at 7229 and had a good view into the terrain of the advance . At 0730 hours 

Roconnaissanco Bn . 580 crossed point 7231 and in addition covered the ri &ht 

'flank at 7223 without corning in contact with the eneV . 

At 0820 hours Armored Bn . Rohr is pulled out o£ . area 7223 and brought 

r . . 

: . to' the 5th Panzer Rgt . At 081+0 the 220th Armored Eng.Bn . report that the co lur:in 

,,! :- :i :: t; 

is rolling since 0800 hours . The d slowing up and tomporarity stoppage cf the

speedway were . caused by 2 tanks which had chain trouble . At 5N 0900 hours the 

division commander decided to go forward to tha advanced tank elements as the 

Kampfgruppe had apparently halted . A radio message received by an armored re- 

giment was ambiguous' and armored regiment was standing still on purpooe . 

a ", "1 . . . . _ . , 

'tee -dlvision - oommander 'took 'stock of the situation and ordered the march to be 

,-J, . l .. 

. . .resumed ; . _ _. . 

At 0920 hours the 104 Armored x Grenadier Rgt. was marching through 

the mine belt and passed through without enemy interference . Low flying enemy 

planes attacked the march groups several times without success . At 1000 hours 

the 220 Armored Eng . Bn . reported that the 104th A Armored Gren .Rgt . had con- 

eluded its trkaxx through march . The 2d Bn.,104th Rgt . reported at 1010 h . 

eS 7 

thatènemy artillery was , movxing from 7210 in the direction of Sidi bou Zid . At 

1015 hours the reconnaissance A. had reached the prescribed area at 7257 and 

_ through 

gone into position . The last vehicle _of Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer passed/the 

mine- belt at 1020 . ' 

In the south sector the forenoon was quiet . At 1030 h . the command 

echelon of the division starts marching through the mine belt to reach the 

north slope of the Djebel Zebbak. 

A few 3nemy armored scout cars were engaged by Rec.Bn. 580 north of 

Djebel Quergha and forced to retreat leaving mxx 1 scout car behind . 

At 1055 h. the 5th Armored Rgt. had reached the area 3 km south of 519. 

The 2d Bn . reports kxiUix Vehicle traffic on the road to Bir el Hafey. The hoad 

of the . column . continues its march in the direction of the road Sidi bou Ai Zid- 

Gafsa . The terrain is not heavily mined but the mud swampsmake the going diffi- 

cult .' The reconnaissance of the 580th ROC.Bn. discloses only few enemy iehicles 

in the region southeast of Bir el Hafey. The enemy is falling back with his 

Stenkhoff 

Kampfgruppen to the southwest. Toward 1220 h . Kampfgruppe/reaches the road 

Sidi bou Zid - Gafsa at Point 518 . Tile 4th Bn ., 104th B retains contact with

, ,the, enemy group at 7221 . At 1316 h. the 609th Flak Bn . 

`mine-.belt and;advanees .in the direction of 563 -537 to 533 " 

passes through the 

In the area of 

518 the 5th Panzer .Rgt . .has assombled and at 1345 h . advances again on 

Sidi bou:Zid . The 2d Bn . already destroyed R enemy tanks northeast of 518 . 

At 1346 h.-a report+is received that elements 

tared Si .bou Zid. Pursuit to the southwest is initxited . Grenadier Bn .P,lajor 

Kn8sel carries out a thrust against the enemy at Djbol Ksaira . 

r 

It has the 

mission to suround it from the north in a southeastern direction and take it . 

.. The advance of the 5th Pz .Rgt . is going smoothiyg forward and at 

1445th . ,the area 2 Ion wxrt east of 388 is reached. Our artillery fire is in- 

ore.ased on the . Fekka . slopes . At 1450 h. x a change of C .P . for div . 

Hgs.takes place .in ..the area 3 l :m southeast of 531.4 ; the final divisional C .P . 

is reached . at 1540h . 3 km northwest of Nasseur . 

of the 1Oth . Pz . Div. have capk- 

Kampfgruppe Stenkhoff continuew to drive in the direction of Sidi 

bou,Zid in constant contact with the energy . At 1705 h. west of Sidi boa Zid 

contact 

asmDaxxiasctiax is established with th.e 10th Pz .Div . The enemy continues to 

as he shows intentions to fall back to the south 

hold . Hill 7209, and at 1800 h ./the 5th Pz ._A.O.K.orders pursuit . The IO.Pz . 

Div.%.presses from the north on 7209 . The ld4th B Pz .Gren ..Rgt . receives the 

_enemy 

. 

mission to push- forward against 7209 anti& it comes in contact with the xn=-X . 

-For. :the 15th of Feb . 7210-7220 is ordered as objective to force a junction 

with Battalion Kn8sels . :The Kmapfgruppen receive the order to get into posi- 

,tion;for all-around defense in the areas they have reached, refuel, re-ammuni- 

tion ahd organize so as to march on Gafsa as soon as possible . 

. . Flak Bn.609 is committed in the area of 7256 with the mission to 

at 7210, 20 and 21 

cover to the northeast/against the encircled enemy. 

Sidi bou Zid is securely in our hands . The energy has withdrawn in 

the direction of Sboitla. 

it is reported to 

At 2015 h./5th Panz . A .I.K . that the divisions expects to be in a 

position to march on Gafsa at 1200 h . 15 Feb . Gren Rgt. 104 B hasbeon ordered

to .~block the terrain-at' 512 in a northeastern direction and to tid down 

the enemy . at 357 . At dawn 1 battalion will be launched to destroy the oneiV 

in a coup de main . . 

Gruppe Sdd .had the mission to continue on 15 Fob . on the defensive 

and to carry out offensive reconnaissance against 9015 . 

In areas 358 ., .357, 356 a reconnaissance discloses energy forces with 

many motor vehicles . Thereupon 5th Pz .Rgt . reo&ives at 2100 h. the order to 

reconnoiter immediately in these areas with instructions to the 

to advance on the enemy groups from the south and southeast on the morning of 

15 Feb . 

Gran.Rgt .104 B 

In all Kmmpfgruppen ie night, passed quietly . 

The 5th Panz .Rgt . 

CA4.4,zd1 

received the mission to reconnoiter from 7237 to the 

southeast as far as the area 7222 qnd 72__09 I ;w establish contact v-ith the Gren . 

r 

Rgt.-104 B . The 4th - Bn ., i# 104th Rgt. i s engaged with the enezV since 0730 h. ; 

- ' 

the enemy is still occupying the hills at 7221 . 

in .Sidi bou . Zid ; that of the 5th Pz .Rgt . i s 5 km southwest of Sidi bou Zid, 

south of the road to Gafsa. 

encircled southeast of . Sidi bou Zid, the fighting is concluded . 

south',of 7288 to facilitate the planned operation on Gafsa . 

until the enemy blockaded southeast of Sidi bou Zid is exterminated . In addition 

it . will prepare the march , to the south. All supplies will be adjusted to the 

undertaking . 

The C . P. of Gren.Rgt . 104 B is 

The general,impression is that_wxcept afor the small enemy group 

The Rec . Bn . 580 receives the order to keep open the defile 8 km 

5th Pz .Rgt . receives the basic order to hold the positions reached 

Toward J~b3 0930 h . the division commander with Lt .Col .Steakho=f and 

Capt.Voss discuss the operation Gafsa at point 7260 Crom where they have a view 

into the terrain . For the conference ordered by 5th Pz . A .O.K . the~rrn1M

.accompanied-by the 44 go to the advanced C .P . of 5th Pz . A .O .K . at 

at 0700 h . is 

La Fauconnerie/ .The Gafsa operation w" discunsed thoroughly and planned . 

Toward 1030 a report is received here from the lo.Pz.Div . that enemy columns 

with tanks and iflfantry have been kndix identified in the region of 

direction indicates_ that Sidi .bou Zid is their objective . 

, At 1300 h. ..the-QpwwvMIM leaves the C .P . of the advanced Pz .A .b .K . and at 1500 

" 104th A 

h., arrives arrives at the/regimantal C.P. (in Sidi bou Zid) . Shor tly 

thereafter an, observer reports that the enemy already identified is now be- 

tween P50 and . .7251. After a short consultation between._&3~~r 

Col . Gerhard_. (7th Pz.Rgt.) and Major Pfeiffer the following elements are put 

in line for the destruction of the enemy : 

south-north direction . 

7. 250. Their 

companies of the 5th PZ .Rgt . attack the enemy in the flank in a 

113 company . of the 104th Pz .Gren.Rgt . follows the tanks . A company 

of the 7th Pz .Rgt .%-is put, in line northwest of Sidi bou Zid enveloping toward 

the-west. committed artillery (3 heavy and 2 light guns) is effectively 

at a 

engaging :..the,,.enemy __ brisk rate . The- counterattack of our Panzers gains 

ground . . The, enemy fails to raach his objective, Sidi bou Zid, and kkE Vmxim 

he cannot reach the group which is surrounded . At 1630 h . a Stuka attack 

takes, place on enemy tanks . During the entire engagement the enemy artillery 

tries to"find the- range on our batteries, but without success . The tank action, 

1ca 

so successful for us, continues until nightfall . At 1830 h . the 6 e4&sas 

4 br arrives at the divisional C .P . and reports to the division commander . 

45 ;,enemy tanks were shot down ; we did not lose any . The loss of time caused 

by , 

this engagement necessitated a 24 hours delay in the Gafsa operation . 

At 1730 h. the Reeonn .Bn. 580 reported Gafsa free of enemy ; thereby 

the . entire operation falls through. As it is provided for that the D .A . K. is 

to ' oecupy Gafsa coming from the south, the division commander decides to send

",:. . .; 

the following telephone message. to D,A.K. : : 

,i .:; X1,.3 . 

for other pupposeR : 

. . . ~~ . .C' _ . . 

The undertaking of Pz .Gren.Rgt .104 B against the enemy group in 

,l .1 f 

area 7222 was not successful, a s the enemy, i.r the strength of a battalion, 

had well established himself in impmxx improved za2d positions 

recognize . At 1920 h the Recon.Bn.550 is given the mission 

and to reconnoiter 

rest areas in the evening . 

'Sf:iv2 

,t : 

"Request elements of the Africa Corps to Gafsa ; 

Elements 

in the areas 9020, 25 and 9043 . 

which participated in the tank engagement 

--------------------------------- 

`16'February 1943 

The Ught : passed without special occurrence . 

At 0215 h . a radio message -vas received from the advanced 5th Pz .A.O.K . 

giving the l0 ..Pz .Div . . .the mission . to move very early on Sbeitla with a strong 

reconnaissance force to pursue the evading enemy at Sidi bou Zid . For that pur- 

pose the 21.Pz .Div . will hold an armored battalion in readiness . 

At 0610 P. . the D .A .K . reports the occupation of Gafsa and the rzrtDnticn 

of Recon.Bii.580 is now unnecessary . At 0630 h . Bn.Plessing engaged anew the 

enemy positions at 7221 . The O .B . orders 

need Recon .Bn.580 

ifficult to 

to occupy Gafsa 

returned to their 

a conference at 1200 h . at X88 7212 . 

In oompliance with an order of 5th Pz . A .O.K . the Recon . 13n.580 is brought forward 

''to .7288 . At 1100 h . Rgt . 104B reports that the attack against 7221 advances 

only slowly . The enemy is falling back step by step toward the nor thviest . 

Pz . Gren.Rgt . 104 A receives the order to initiate 

connaissance out of Sidi bou Zid . At 1435 h . Recon .Bn .580 is 

area~'7263 . The 

immediately a re- 

ordered to reach 

reconnaissance launched toward the northtivcst is to stop ; a re- 

counaissance patrol will remain in the defile 8 Ion southwest of 7288 . ~arIng

the conference at-7212 Gen .Ziegler gives the' division conumuander and the com- 

rnander -of,-the' 10;Pz .Div . instructions for the attack on Sbeitla . KumpfGruppe 

Pfeiffer :oomes'~ :under .the control-of the 10 .Pz .Div . effective at once and re- 

ceives the mission to march in the direction of Sbeitla toward 17 00 Pt, with 

a grenadier-battalion, an'armored - battalion and 2 light batteries . The mass 

of the 21 .Pz.Div . will fo-Irlow as soon as possible . Tvrrard 1600 h . the divi- 

sional'C .P.ìs transferred to 7253 . 

In the- south , the enemy apparently holds with comparatively -weak re- 

donnaissaace'forces'the : line 9222, 93, 24 as rearguard . Paced by rather strong 

reconnaissance= forces'-he withdraws at 9024 toward the northwest almost «ithout 

fighting . ` . - . . 

with antitank guns is covering .0 km - east o£ 7275 . The Kampfgruppe is attacking . 

At 2214 h . 4 enemy tanks are reported ; 1 antitank gun is destroyed . The attack 

is gaining further ground . 

On°'16 :Feb~ Rgt . 104 B continues his attack on 7221 and Djebol Ksaira . 

At_2345 :=.h.-Fjak~Bn.609 : receives the following mission : it will cover the ad- 

vance of ahe'division with the-combat detachments under its control at 7211.0 - 

72149' ,and on the road 7269 -`1 249 by occupying a position in the valleys be- 

DJ- Ne~.,.r.n b 1cn.ASWard~j k4~ 

tween :-7272 .and 7270 .- At the same time the battalion will assume air protection 

' for that . area . - When - this takk is accomplished the 

.!e( battalion .' At 23 .5'h . the 

At 2145 h . Kampfgruppe'Pfeiffer reports that at 2130 h . eneW infantry 

division will recall the 

supplements bhe order issued, 

and goes over It once more . The battalion will fall in at 0100 h . and between 

0400 and 0500 will reach the area between 7272 and 7271 with front toward the 

northwest, west and north 

The .2d Bn., 25th Flak will t ake the protection of the cross raads at 

7249 with l~ light and 1 heavy battery . They will be ready to fire at 0400 h . 

At 0045 h . the 1st Bn .,104th Rgt . receives the order to nmovs in such

'a'way that its advanced elements will stand at 7249 on 17 Feb . at 0900 h . It 

will leave the present area at 0500 h. The left flank will be covered from 

v ., t 

the region. 7272 -7271 by Flak Bn .609 . The irarch route will lead through 7268, 

C Xiz4q 

0M to 724.9 . The 1st Co .,220th Eng . i s ordered to the Sbeitla area early on 

X*18 Feb . - anc~ theewill be at the disposal o£ the divisioriy A labor detachment 

will occupy Wadi Meheri until 104.B has passed through and will then complete 

the mine belt . 

' ' At 0110 h. the 2d Bn ., Flak 25 receives the mission to set to march 

a'"flak combat detachment to the 1st Bn.,104th at 7232 . 

During the night Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer meets strong enemy resistance 

of 

at 7275, and upon order/the division commander remains stationary until, dawn . 

Toward 0100 h. Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer passes out of the control of the l0 .Pz .Div . 

----------------------------------------------------- 


During the , night and morning the movements of the division are taking 

'place as'planned . At 0530 the division commander with the assistant iz Ia go 

. . . . Nw'~3f1 

to the` C.P. in area 7274. ' In the morning hours the elements which had remained 

'in the former divisional resting area identify enemy forces south of the road 

'Sidi'bou Zid - Bir~el Bafey. In a vigorous action about 800 prisoners mere 

ro . ughin . They belonged to that enemy unit which had occupged a positio 

;7221 and was now attempting to fight its way through to the north west . On its 

RS S6.~? .,:. 

march from 72 3 to 7268 the 1st Bn.,104th also came upon the enemy falling 

back'to the northwest ; he hxcl was well camouflaged in cactus fields . After a 

short exehunge of fire about 600 prisoners were taken, including Col .brake, 

., , 

commander of the position in area 7221, 

The enemy has organized for defense in the favorable terrain around 

Sbait6tl and the attack is set for 1200 h . Reconnaissance d1scloses that he is

-9- 

. ,. . . with ~_ 

I,,q;thdrawingAis , train :elements to the northwest in the direction of Sbiba- 

7.282 . and. . 7291 . 

smoke shells . 

The Reoon .Bn .580 has the mission to reconnoiter and screen the line 

. . ,Kampfgruppe Stenk4off attacks, south o£ Sbeit&a, the enemy tanks 

Hostile 

which, wall camouflaged, in the olives groves, accept the fight . Armored forces 

n 

are adosialso it the. .spurs of the Djebe ls el Rheradok . The tanks were partly 

buried . and interspersed with antitank guns . 1~'neny artillery . had a good range 

on our.attacking .tanks, observation for the artillery was conducted by single- 

engine fighter, planes . . .The , Panzer Regiment had toadvance k through the diffi- 

cult terrain on a .width .of 10 kn . A violent tank fight developed and onecould 

see that ., it, ,was . a case of a systematicadd 

getting,,,out .of.Meitla everything possible . The 

prepared defense with the objective 

enenV's expenditure was 501'o 

During . the attack our Luftwaffe was very activy and attacked the 

enpmy .positions and columns with bombs and in low flying raids . 

The 3d Bn.,104th attaoked Sbeitla frontally and made good progress 

along the Wadi southeast of Sbeitla, - Toward 1700 h . it reached Sboitla and the 

same evening pushed a company to the northwest through the locality and there 

moved into defensive . uositions . The,tank engagement taking place south +)f Sbeitla 

was very stubborn and last until 1830h . Despite everythinb on this day 27 tanks 

were put out of commission vrithout/a complete loss e 

During the evening -The 5th Pz .Rgt . assembles in the area 2 ran east of 

Sbeitla . The Grenadiers ha-de the mission to defend Sbeitla . The artillery 

at once 

supports the Grenadiers and is ready to beat down/arty eventual enemy attack . 

n 

The division . intends to undertake in the moring of 18 Feb . a vigorous reconnaissance 

to Kasserine . The mission of Co1 .Lan&, the defense o£ the high ridge (Dj .;bel 

Lessouda) with reconnaissance up to the line 7217 - Y216 - 7220 remains in force 

as there might still be some remaining enemy forces to reckon tirith .

!'"Supplement to 17 February . 

- 10 - 

At 0715 h . Major Pfeiffer reports to the division commander : "Ad- 

vance f'rqXmx elements are still holding firm in front of a superior enemy ." 

!The .. division commander decides to put off the attack until 1200 h . At 0915 h . 

;the, attack is discussed with the commanders . 

After a short,vigorous artillery 

,preparation the tanks advance on Sbeitla in an enveloping movement to the right, 

while the infantry.carry out a frontal attack . At 0800 h . JU 2 light enemy 

batteries find their range and at the same time the first enemy low-flying 

raids take place .,_ A reconnaissance discloses that on the right attack flank 

tH~~ 

,there ixists a tank obstacle and on the slope behind itl about 15 enemy tanks 

have concentrated Thereupon at 1015 h . in the presence of the commanders 

the, .division commander decides to. -laanch the panzer attack enveloping on the 

left ., Flak combat detachments ._assume the protection of the right flank. An 

antiaircraft battery 8,8 moves forward in the area 7274 and takes over air 

raid defense and at the same time ground commitment . 

At .2140 h. Kampfgruppe Kuhn receives the order to return to Rgt. 

;04,A. _ Report at 0645 . 18- Feb . by Major Pfeiffer . 

Recapitulation 

The enemy resistance at Sbeitla Proved considerably stronger than 

' Opposing the division was 

expected . An organized, tactically well planned defensive position in which 

a strong,mobile armor belt took a hand (about 50 enemy tanks) T"ne 7 hours 

very 

tank fight was/hard . Sbeitla is firmly in our hand . 

Akin body of tanks east of 7279 ; 5 batteries northeast of 7279 ; 

7280 . K ~ 

104th A Sbeitla . Flak 60?, 

The reinforced 1st Bn ., 104th moving to n3sembly position 

in the area north of 7269 destroyed the remnants of the 168th in hard close 

combat . Plans for 18 Feb . : Defense of Sbeitla, cleaning up of the resion 

7237 - 7263 . 

Spa, 

Reconnaissance with point of main effort 5372 and 7716 .

The night passed. . .quietly. 

The divisional C.P . is located 6 km crest-northwest of 7249 . the Pz . 

Gren.Rgt . 101} B .i s .again placed under the control of the division with - its 2 

battalions and-attached elements mission to o-earvr with Bn . ::n8sels 

exea 

area. .7230 and : with ;Bn .Plessing arid 3--1-ight-b y,72_63 [Dr . Howe : the same 

words are crossed out . .in .the text] 

.The intermediate terrain retains some enoW remnants which mast be 

cleaned up . for the .missions of the various units for 18 Feb . see division 

order no .4 in .the annex ., . . 

direction of .Kasserine and .twice encounters an armored ene r reconnaissance 

which, after .a short exchange of fire, withdraws to the north . 

contact with the . DAK-.in Kasserine . 

- 1 1 - 


At 1300 h. Gren .Rgt . 104. A launches a reconnaissance platoon in the 

,In the course of the afternoon this reconnaissance platoon made 

The . division -receives .the order to push immediately a fresh security 

of 

detachment toKasserine ;, as . this is not possible the division requests/DAK the 

permission l ur, keep the. detachment until 1000 h . 19 Fob, It is provided that 

fgruppe under the conmiand of Capt . Kuhn/the dutjrx at 1000h .19 Feb . 

The closing report of the day to the 5th Pz . AOR is as 21= 

follows : The enemy rtes retains weak reconnaissance forces in the area 

'r-611A ll+61, 

5378 . and on the road 7279-7716 . Occupation of 1 5347 is established . No enemy 

air activity . Our reconnaissance forces in 7716 ; contact made with elements 

of . DAK.-Combing through the area 209 - 63 - 79 results in taking 2 officers 

and 150 men prisoners . 2 tanks, 4 personnel transportation wagons destroyed . 

Numerous motor vehicles captured, mostly disabled . From 14 fob .-17 Fob . the 

5th .Pz .Rgt . has destroyed 103 . tanks without corcpletely losing one . 

Tank . situation: 55/111, 1VIV- 

!Plans for tomorrow : Kampfgruppe to 7216 .

- 12 - 


The night passed quietly in the Sbeitla secdsor . At 0445 h . the following 

radio message was sent from the advanced 5th Pz . AOK : "Get ready to march 

immediately . Probable time of departure 0800 h . under Rommel in direction 

of 5372 . Order for starting follows" . At 0634 h . the division received the 

following order:"The 21st Pz .Div . comes under the orders of Rommel effective 

at once . The division will leave area 7279 at 0800 h-19 Feb . along the main 

road lending .to the north and will reach the road junction 

11.567 ." 

1"or division 

starting order see- annex. At 0615 h. units were acquainted separately with 

the new order by telephone or radio . The battery with Gren .Rgt . 101 B and with 

Kampfgruppe Ddvrer also follows to the Sbeitla area . 

The Reconn.Bn.580 will join the line of march i4 the first possible 

gap that occurs, if possible between Panzer Gron . and artillery. A move forward 

is intended later . Capt ./immediately in front to the division commander who 

drives 

mxxxx behind the armored spearhead . : 

IPoward 1100 h . the armored spearhead encountered a mine field 1 km 

south of 5374; it was cleaned up without incident and crossed^ , A few enemy 

scout cars withdraw to the north . Aftax Beyond this rather ineffectual mine 

field there was a second . much better se:re ;ructecla Behind it about ?0 tanks, 

batteries and well placed infantry are ascertained . The division commander 

decided to attack after moving into position . The road as well as the area 

are obviously under artillery observation fire . While the engineers are occu- 

pied cleaning up the second mine field an armored battaidon, encircling about 

7 km from the east is committed . 

A light field Haubitzer battery is ready to 

fire 30 minutes after the tanks came upon the mine field ; 4 additional batteries 

are put in line during the afternoon to fight the enemy batteries whic4 are 

giving our tanks plenty to do . At 1500 h . Major Pfeiffer receives fran tho 

division commander the order to bring forward the 104 A Rgt . and place it for 

the time bUhng behind the nearest rearward hill . It is intended that the

even today perhaps 

tkxkxkkx regiment be committed to the attack/on the infantry positions along 

-the hills . For the present a reconnaissance is to be carried out in both 

fkanks . At 1620 h . the Fll4 arrives at the C .P . to get oriented on the course 

o£ the operations . The Fa4 advocates the view that every means must be employed 

to throw the enemy . At 1710 h . Lt .Col . Stenkhoff reports the following to the 

division commander at the divisional C .P . : "Our tank attack is at a stand still 

as a result of barbed wire obstacles, mines and antitank guns, and also because 

of enenV artillery ; ten breakdowns up to now" . The division commander decides 

to call off the attack and orders to take back the tanks at dusk, to assemble, 

and . 

refuel/ re-anmunition . 

~2 . 

A battalion of 104 A Rgt . i s committed am for the defense of the 

A 

ridge east of the road . The second battalion moves to the hollow as reserve . 

, Reconn.Bn.580 assume the protection of the . right flank and reconnoiters 

toward the east . Flak Bn.609 covers the left flank and occupies a position 

to 

on the ridge with connection mx the road . Recormaissance as far as the enemy 

will begin immediately - when the moon shines . 

The division commander takes the following decision : vrith the first 

rays bf light on 20 Feb . the attack will be launched anew . Tho entire infantry 

and the 5th Pz .Rgt . will carry the attack forward under good artillery support. 

force 

Bn . Kurzei, widely pulled apart, will attack frontally by bounds . The main xfcaxt 

concentrated 

will be 3 on the right flank. An engineer platoon and 2 flak combat detach- 

ments, Bn.Kuhn and the 5th Pz .Rgt . will be on the right flank. The attack of 

the right flank will be carried forward in such a way that from point 5354 

either point 5371 will be reached and thereby Draa bou Rouino,skirtirg Sbiba, 

or that the attack from 5354 - advance to the north so as to swing west on 

Sbiba at the proper moment . - 

To Flak Bn .609 devolves the mission to tie down the enemy and especially 

to simulate an attack on the left flank.

3t-. auk : will begin at 0630 h . 

- 14- 

At 2200 h. a conderence took plaice among the conunandors concerning 

the Sbiba undertaking. Since Bn .Kuhn was a little late in reaching his assem- 

bly area the attack was ordered for 0830 h. 

The artillery will be committed as follows : 

3 light Field howitzer batteries will occupy positions on the right 

flank 

3 heavy field howitzer and 1 gun battery have gone into position 

in the hollow in front of the mine field . 

Two flak combat detachments haste been attached to Gren .Brl.Kurzei . 

---------------------------------------------- 


The night passed quietly . Heavy'ground fog cut off the view in the morning hours . 

enenly 

At 0827 Stukas,are requested from Pz .A01E Africa to fight/artillery positions 

at 5372 . At 0830 h . the attack progresses as planned . the RecQn .Bn . covers 

the right flank and reports that the area at 5354 is free of enemy . 

The enemy , with considerable artillery, betins adjustment fire on 

the advance march movements of the division . 

At 1130 h . Kampfgruppe .Stenkhoff rexports that the advance 4 km 

southeast of 57/71 makes only slow progress as the terrain is cut through by 

deep Wadis . . Until now the march was accomplished without resistance . The 3d 

Ba.,104th . Rgt. .advances only slowly yet heavy artillery and mortar fire . The 1st 

.,104th Rgt . which fell into line at 0940 h . 2 km southeast of 55521 

reached the hills of 620 toward 1140 h . 

The Panzer Regt, reports that the terrain bobweon 5571 and dill 620LS-~~S37, 

is impassable ; a scout patrol sent ahead in advance bocanA bog;od . Toward 

1200 h . the 3d Bn ., 104 reached Hill 643 with its right flank. On the basis of 

the report of 5th Pz .Rgt . the division couunander at 1230 h, decides as follows : 

the thrust of the Pz .Rgt . with 1 battery . will tal:o place over ~~'jl - 6$ - b6 

I

to 5367 to-a-Qize the ene4 in Bbiba from the northwest . The let Bu,104th 

continue to 

will mnxmzxxz attack along the wadi in a western direction . The 3d Bn .,104 

closes, to the right and follows . flak Bn,609 exptends its position a- f(-,-,v 

observation 

100 meters to the east . The artillery increases its of the area 

west of the road . 

At 1400 h. a liaison officer arrives from 3d Bn .104th and reports 

that the attack is at a stand still as a result of the strongest onomy artillery 

and , mortar fire . Up ,to now 3 . nen killed and 10 wounded . The enemy artillery 

fires more and more acurately on our batteries and especially on the divisional 

C .P . There is strong evidence that ehemy observers are 

west of the road and .kxxmx that our entire installations a-e exposed to their 

view . 

- 1 5 - 

At , 1415 h. , there is a call from Ia Pz . AOK Afrika with the report 

that FM Kesselring .has promised the strongest air commitment for the attack 

on Sbiba . The, weather becoming worse and worse the project is not carried out. 

At 1700 h . the division commander decides to stop the attack and 

orders the various Kampfgruppen Jckm: to disengage from the enemy at night fall . 

At 2200 h . a commanders conference takes place . Its basis is the 

division order for the defense of the terrain south of Sbiba. :or~ the -order 

see the annex. In the course of the day the reconnaissance Bn . 

rr,G_] La, 

mission,to reconnoiter over 

w&.. 

was giueo. the 

. 3%- 

53 47,46, 55, 56 . Result : no enemy observation . 

The battalion receives the order to block the defile at 534, 7 toward the north 

with ikzxmxsaxn9xitxxJmm s its main body . The reconnais aace Will ho carried 

r"( m3 . Sr K ~ 

out . as far as 5 45, 55 . 56, 70 and 67` [^'''sd-41 

Upon order o£ Pz .AOK Afrika, Recon .Bn.560 comes under the control 

of Pz .AOK Afrika, effective at once . 

The march takes place over 5353 to 7716 . 

cated on the hills


------------ 

The weather became worse during the night ; 

the rain softened roads 

and terrain. -'--Enemy harassing fire lay on the division positions during the 

night. 

At'0310 AOK issues the following order: 

"Pass position south of Sbiba resting on the enemy mine field to 

be defended . Reconn .Bn .5E30 to march immediately by the shortest road as arimj 

reserve to the area around Kasserine" . 

Toward 0500 strong artillery fire begins again. Probably the enemy 

expects us to be moving into position of readiness . During the night we succeeded 

in disengaging from the enemy and to organize the defense . 

During the night a nuisance force under the command of Lt .Col .von 

Katzler was ordered to block with mines the road net 5 Ion east of 5616 . The 

force is equipped with radio and has the mission to reconnoiter to the west . 

According,to Arabs' statements from 1t0 to 50 enemy tanks are moving there . 

south of 5376 . 

At 1200,h . enemy artillery fire lays on the divisional C .P . and 

the division commander decides for an immediate transger of the C .P . 4 km 

At ±4 :141, .0 h . it was possible to report to Pz .AOK that the divi- 

sion after ka regrouping on the line 534£3, 5353, 5373, had passed to 

active defense . Toward 1600 h.Cpt . IIissmann reports that about 500: men coming 

from the north . are moving in the mountain in front of the position of Flak Bn . 

609, and that according to a reconnaissance th-r-m already about 300 men are 

there . Thereupon an armored company is set to march and occupy the position 

behind Flak Bn . 609 . 

Toyrard 1610 h. it looks as if the enei%r,400-500 men strong, has trio 

of st:,~cLir the position of the bE:ttii~)on. At lr,: ,30 h . «n order ~,.ocs 

to Major Pfeiffer :"The enemy will be observed and kept off by a recornais-ance" .

- 17 - 

strong 

Toward 1730 h . knxzy artillery fire of heavy caliber with smoke 

is,, upon the 3d .Bn., 104th Rgt. The enemy attack which is shaping up is at once 

taken under effective fire by 

enemy tanks attack frontally . 

the 2d and 3d Bn, 155th Arty .Rgt . At 1745 h . 

x rxa I %~ ABOUT 6-10 

Violent smoke-shell firing lies on Flak Bn .609 

which moreover is reached by enemy infantry fire . It 1745 the Pz .ggt eras 

alerted ; on order of the division commander kka one battalion cleans an the 

penetration while the other remains in readiness . A tank broke through in 

the. 3d Bn .,10,5th and 3 others in Flak Bn .609 . All weapons turn at onao to 

active defense and 5 tanks are disabled ; not one of ours is a total loss . 

An inquiry of Ia to Flak Bn .,609 as to whether the infantry is following the 

tanks is answered in the negative by Capt.Hissmann. 


With the approval of Sth AOK the 104 B Rgt. i s bounght forward to 

S E~b, 

.7270 . The order follows at 0325 by radio . At 0130 the following telephone 

'call was made to AOK: 

"7 batteries in the area around Sbiba including 1-2 heavy ones ; 

20 tanks ascertained east of Sbiba . Infantry elements in position north of 

'74 on both sides of the road . No retrograde movement . At 616 $ enemgl groups 

in company strength with antitank guns and personnel transportation wagons ; 

feast thereof for the protection of our flank 1 lieutenant and 10 men with 1 

battery. Withdrawal of the enemy improbable ." 

-PAS,-41 

The security detachment ordered to Pass 534.7 establishes that ap(;a- 

1L-t.0 . 

rently there exists a former American path of retreat as many vehicles hors 

de combat are lying along the trail. The committed reconnaissance patrols 

returned in toto without coming in contact with the enemy . The reconniissance 

patrols in line in the pass position at 5616 also spent a quiet night . The

- 18 - 

laying of mines in the position before Sbiba makes good progress . At 1000h . 

the enemy fires well placed harassing fire on our advanced positions, ospe- 

eially on icknd~c the 3d Bn., 104th Rgt . Our observation is very much hindered 

N-IdWe~.,! It/ e~ DJ . 

by the weather . At 1100 h . the reoorinaissanco detachment at 5616 roports -`4-- 

that contrary to map findings there is a goo~ ss entrance1+at Mashei and 

Abdullah . 5616 is occupied by an' enemy zxxz. nX company . Toward 1300 h . again 

violent smoke firing on the left flank of Flak Bn . 609 . It can be assumed 

that the enemy is undertaking an attack to get relief from pressure . At 1330 h . 

20 tanks, 1 battery and a few motor vehicles are observed 4 km . east of Sbiba . 

As visibility has become extrerrsly good it is assumed that these motor vehicles 

are Jduy sFx = xKxxirkmw nothing new but rsimplyIwere there in the previous days- 

ould not be identified because of the weather . 

Toward 1500 h . enemy artillery fire lies on a line with the flak 

switnh line . Westward toward 643 an enemy battery is identified . Our artillery 

fires on identified objectives . The numerous scouting operations launched 

by the division during the day disclose that the forward terrain is mostly 

free of enemy . Toward evening Kxxx the enemy's artillery fire slackens notice- 

ably and wma. altogether quiet after 1630 h . At 1730 h . for the first time 

m 

12 enemy fighder planes flew over the divisiorCal area . A "Lighting" was- 

brought down . 

The following commanders were ordered to appear at the [division] 

commander : Co1 .Bruer 

Lt .Col . Stenkhoff 

" " Werdelmann 

" " Pfeiffer 

Captain Hissmann 

" Richter 

" Streitz 

At 1830 h . the 3d Bn.,l04th RU-t . observed vehicles before the front . 

They were probbbly employed to lay mines . Our artillery engages til e,-., at once . 

At 1850 h . Col . Bayerlein informs Ia : "1 0 . Pz . Div . ;YL DAK re~rouood and reached

"!""the pass positions at 7760,-7745 . The 21 .Pz .Div . remains before Sbiba for 

the defense . Again several artillery fire concentrations or. the sector of 

the 3d Bn, 105th Rgt since 1915 h . At 20 h . a radio from X O .B . reaches 

the division.Contents : [Figures illegible] defense of the present position . 

10 .Pz .Div . and DAR will withdraw to the pass position 7776, 5655 vitnich will 

be held . Prepare the mining of the road to Sbeitla" . 

The enemy behaved as on the previous day, but did not attack . 

Artillery activity is some~qhat less . 5616 is occupied by an enemy company . 

Our 6 km east of 5616 . 

WSAX flank protection by artillery is weak/ First enemy air reconnaissance 

over the positions of the division . One "Lighting" sho.Edown . Plans for 23 

February : Defense ; reconnaissance . 

Tank situation: 33/III,6/LV 

------------------------------------------------------------- 


------------ 

The night passed without special occurence . The reconnaissance com- 

firmed Arabs statements that the enemy has evacuated the positions south of 

Sbiba and the locality itself . Enemy artillery fires on Sbiba and north of 

throughout the 

Sbiba tkRx$x:tzxj& day. 

of the position . 

At_1220 h . FM Rommel issued the order to continue the occupation 

Bn .Major Kn8sels with the addition of a company from-Major Plessing 

occupies the position just northwest of Sbeitla. Flak Bn.609 furnishes a re- 

inforced platoon and amt starts it to march to 5 km east of 5616 for security 

purposes and to rellmve Lt .Col .von Katzler . The platoon is placed under the 

control of Capt .R8mer, corrmnander of the position . The entiro position is un- 

der the direct control of the division . Toward 1550 h . an armored enemy co- 

luzn coming fro- the north approaches Sbiba arsd in front of ~ . . . northern

-20- 

°'"exit turns again to the north. At 1630 h . an enemy infantry coLipany is 

advancing from the north on Sbiba on both sides of the road . Committed 

fresh reconnaissance patrols roconnoitor south of Sbiba and at fk 7_644 re- 

port the area south of Sbiba free of enemy . At the southern exit the patrol 

10 

was fired upon by tanks from the northern direction. Two tanks and 1-12 

motor vhhicles were ascertained without a'doubt . At 1720 h.our artillery 

moving into 

observers ascertain that the enemy is VXjuKg his old position though on- 

ly with weak elements at first. Toward 1730 h. the Pz,Gren.Rgt . 104A re- 

ceives the order to bring to the region east of Faid all the non-motorized 

elements that are not needed . At 1,140 h . The la goes to the OB to be apprized 

of the situation. 

At 1940 F.M.Ronunel spoke with the division commander and informed 

him that when the JO.Pz.Div . and DAK pass through Sbeitla the 21 .Pz .Div . will 

cover the march into the positions northwest of Sboitla. At 20?,0 h. the divi- 

sion commander instructs all the commanders and orders a cormmanders conference 

for 24 Feb . 

The plans for 21.x. Feb .is defense as on 23 Feb . 

After a temporary withdrawal the enemy again felt forward . The enemy 

artillery fired on its own troops . Vigorous enemy aii reconnaissance with 

law level and high altitude bombing . Division position at 5353 to 5373 . Divi- 

1_ 

sion flank protection with 1 company at 5317, and with 1 company and artillery 

at 5616 .

25 

Fifth Panzer Army, War Diary (Extract), 18-23 

February 1943

the entire north and center front of the 5.Pz .Aaunee . 

On the basis of these considerations the army has decided to-withdraw 

to the area north of Gab es e LwoJg.Brig.I as well as elements of the heavy 

army artillery and flak artillery s army reserve for possible employment 

at the lbxeth front. These elements were held as reserve at noon already 

by D.A.K. upon orders of the army . The transfer will begin in the evening. 

Ineddition the Div. Centauro is ordered to commit its forces reinforced by 

the 7.Bers.Rgt . in the Gafsa area for defense with front to the north and 

the west, and to leave the im-mobile elements of the division as support 

in the former positions east and southeast of el Guettar. 'Annex 1097) 

The combat group of the D.A.K. -receives the order to hold on 18 

Feb. - with the remaining forces 

(Pz.Gran.Rgt:Afr ., 1 artillery - bkttalion, 

A.A.33, 1 Posed battalion, 1 engineer company, 1 antitank company, 

1 Italian ar battalion, 1 Italian artillery battalion) the bridgehead 

positions gained just north of Thelepte and to launch strong reconnaissances 

against Kasserine and in the direction of Tebessa . Withdrawal in the direction 

of Gafsa will be effected only in case of strong, superior enemy attack . 

(Attack 1098) 

2. Morning and noon report to O.K.H. (Annex In) 

Sequence of events . 

a . Southeast front : 

------------------------------ 


The enemy continues vigorous reconnaissance activities in front of 

the reconnaissance group afid of the 15 .Pz .')iv ., but without advancing with 

stronger forces . All assaults of enenV armored scout cars are repulsed by 

our artillery fire . No largo scale operation is carried out withor in. the 

Foum Tatahouine area or against the rearguard position west of Kedenine . 

(t:nex 1100)

a 

reaches 

remains 

- 114 - 

control 

The Iw.Jg.Brig .l -under the immediate/of the army sinoe 18 Feb .- 

at dawn the assembly area Ma~ .lsiw, (north-northwest of Gabes) and 

at the Mareth front . (Annex 1101) 

b . West fronts 

alerted there at the disposal of the arnV for eventual commitment 

Our reconnaissance forces throw enemy rearguards north o£ Thelepte 

and at the Tunisian-Algerian border near Oum Ali back to the mountain passes 

leading to Tebessa, where the enemy occupies defensive positions reinforced 

by artillery. Kasserine is captured and xJsn a platoon kzxw-x of 60rdau 

arriving from the east is taken prisoner . Annex llogl) 

The weak security detachments of the D.A.K. committed in the lbtlauoi - 

. 

Tozeur line reconnoiter over Mouleres in the direction of Tamerza on the 

No enemy is observed in Moulares . 

Tunisian-,Algerian border. A quantity. of . valuable_ railroad and mining material 

is secured . Reconnaissance in the direction of the border cannot be continued 

because of a violent sander storm. 

is still occupied by the enemy. (Annex 11033) 

Reconnaissance forces of 

the 21 .Pz.Div . establishom contact at Kasserine with the D.A .X. and 

clean up and secure the area gained . (Annex 1104) 

Air situations 

(Situation map and reports see Annex 1105) 

Limited commitment on both sides on 

fron . -~-' 

According to Arab statements Tamerza 

account of unfavorable weather. 

Air reconnaissance discloses no important change in the enemy picture 

before the southeast front. One must suppose that the enemy will attack the 

rearguard positions at present just west of Modenine only after a concentration 

and readiness of comparatively strong forces . At the same time we must exaect 

a continued strong pressure of enemy reconnaissance forces against the south 

flank . 

east 

There is no change in the plans of the army au the south front . 

J

. 

West fronts 

The air - reconnaissance disclosed in the forenoon movemeh is to the 

rear from the area northwest of Kasserine and from the area around Bou 

Chebka ; this and the general impression gained from the enemy picture 

for 

gave the army ground tz the interpretation that the enemy is falling back 

with its main body to Tebassa leaving strong rear guards at the mountain 

exits southeast and east o£ Tebessa. On the basis of this enemy situation 

the O.B . is of the opinion that through an immediate thrust of comparatively 

to the 

strong forces from the southwest on Tebessa and the area/north a unique 

opportunity is offered to change the situation derisively in Tunisia. This 

thrust, which would be carried out by the 3 Panzer divisions, would penetrate 

i A 

in the deep flank and rear of the British forces facing the north Tunisian front 

sand would=-likely-cause the entire' eiiety north . front to"collapse. prerequisite -' 

for the execution of this operation is the assurance of plentiful supply 

through drawing on the reserves of the 5.Pz.Armee . 

Inquiries are made to the :15. Pz .A.O.K-5 as to plans for the continua- 

tion of operations . The answer is that th6 intention is to fall back to the 

positions of departure -some of which are far forward- . The 21 .Pz .Div . will 

at first cover the occupation of the new positions from the Sbeitla area 

and then withdraw from enemy pressure behind the main line of resistance . 

The withdrawal of the mobile units of both armies from the SbeitQt-Thelepte- 

:eriana area will be carried out by mutual agreement . (Annex 1106) 

The 5.Pz .Armee is therefore of ark Qnposite opinion concerning the 

transmits 

further conduct of operations . Nevertheless, at 111.20 hours the O.B . txTaxma 

by radio his su es tion to Comando Supremo for an immediate enveloping 

thrust from the southwest on Tebessa and north thereof, provided supplies are 

assured, and requests for that purpose that the 10.and 21 .Pz .Divs . be put 

under his control and be moved as soon as possible to the Thelepto-Feriana 

area_ (Annex 1107)

In a telephone conversation of the O. B . wi th Gen.von Armin the 

latter expresses his concern with regard to the plans of the O.B . The 5. 

Pz .Arme+ntended in the next few days an attaok operation in the area west 

of Tunis and would need a panzer division for that purpose . The arnV therefore 

had already withdrawn the l0.Pz .Div .~of the present operations and trans- 

(erred it to Kairouan . 

Nevertheless the O.B . upholds his intention as he sees in it the only 

possibility bring eeklong relief to the entire Tunisian front and free 

strong forces to resist the British Eighth Army or to attack the enemy advance 

before the Mareth position, and thereby change the entire complexion of the 

North African theater of war . 

Toward evening F.M. Kesselring agrees with the O.B . T s point of view 

_. . : - - _- -_ - z - 

toix that effect 

and announces that he will that same evening have a talk/with Comando Supremo 

and the Duoe . ( Annex 1108) 

When at midnight there was still no answer from Comando Supremo a 

radio message was sent pointing to the fact that the proposed operation had 

a chance for s,roess only if the attack ,we- launched ;r1thott delay . 

(Annex 1109) - 

2. Morning and noon report to O.K.H. Annex 1110 

1 . Sequence of events . 

------------------------------------ 

Attack Operations in Central Tunisia 

from 19 Feb . - 23 Feb . 1943 

---- 


a . Southeast front : The enemy continues his reeonnobtering with tanks and 

armored scout cars from the east and southeast against our rearguard positions 

just west of h5edenine . All his assaults are repulsed by our artillery fire .

eyond 

The energy does not succeed in feeling forward xxxx Medenine to the west . 

The Vown itself ist still free of the energy in the evening . It is occupied 

by our . weak security detachments. Annex 1111) 

The pressure of superior energy forces continues in the sou&h flank 

against the raconnaissanoe group. Faced by an enemy infantry attack with 

artillery support it has to withdraw its right flank from Ksar Mguebla to 

about 12 km to the northwest on Ksar et Turki to avoid being cut off from 

some of its elements . (Annex 1142) 

b . Front of the attack group north: 

ed 

Ths approval of Comando Supremo for the operation suggastt= is 

received at 0130 hours . 

(Annex lll~) 

Comando Supremo orders that ;Um a thrust be carried out against 

deep flank and rear of ' the enemy forces opposite the north Tunisian front, 

making full use of uux previous success, cut them off if possible, but at 

least force the enemy to a withdrawal . 

first on Le Kef 

F.M.Rormnel will execute this drive with all available troops of the 

D.I .Parserarmee and thoss of the newly subordinated l0.and 21.Pz,Divs . 3 1 11 

under close concentration of forces and strong screening of the west flank 

on the general line Sbeitla - Thelepte - Maktar - Tadjerouine . Moreover the 

5,Pz .Armee will hold itself in readiness to fall in to an attack upon special 

orders between the coast and Pont du Fahs on a 3rd broad front . The enemy 

effective now, 

facing it will be/kept tied dxnx dawn and on the alert by frequent assaults . 

Deviating from the suggestion of O .B, Comando Supremo has ordered 

the thrust made on La Kef. The O.B . had proposed Tebessa as this is farther 

Ply 

crest of the northern Tunisian front and therefore would not lead so easily 

to 

the eneny reserves in readiness there . 

The army issues immediately the following order to the subordinate

- 118 - 

units (extracts given out c by tale e ) 

aa . The combat group of D.A.K . (lees Bers .Bn . and artillery bn . of the Div . 

Centauro which will remkin at first in the Feriana area to protect and 

reconnoiter to the north and northwest), starting at once, will reach 

Kasserine, and there will get ready to attack shortly and will *ken gain 

immediately first the mountain pass northwest of Kasserine . Further 

action from there will be by special order of the army according to the 

development o£ the situation. 

The following units will be immediately brought forward for the reinfor- 

cement of the D.A.K . : 

1 mortar battery, 1 smoke battery and 1 Eng .battery . 

The Bers .B n. and the Italian artillery bn . agai+ill be brought forward 

-:to . the- : combat group._,as soon as. . the newly- ; subordinated :7. BerA .Rgt .. :and the 

reinforced co . , ,Lw.Jg.Brig .l have arrived in the Feriana and have been 

committed to the north and the northwest for the defense of the left flank 

of the Rommel attack group. 

The 7.Bers.2gt . Will be brought forward in the forenoon by Div.Centauro 

and the reinforced Lw . Co . by the Lw.Jg.Brig . 1. 

bb, The 21 .Pz.Div . will start from the Sbeitla area at 0800 hours 19 Feb . 

(the order will be transmitted by A.0-K-5) along the high road leading 

north and will gain the toe road junction about 75 km north-northwest 

of SbeitleL(Ksour) 

cc . The 10.Pz .Div . will leave the present area around Pichon immediately 

SbeitU 

and reach/by the shortest road at the disposal of the Romael attack group . 

It will hold itself in readiness there, and according to the situation 

Trill, on special order, be committed either behind the 21 .Pz .Div . in 

the direction of Le ifa3 Kef or over Kasserine in a general northwesterly 

direction. 

without delay 

dd . Div . Centauro will boing forward/to the Gafsa area all the ar±k elements

heretofore committed southeast or south of Gafsa and will put them in 

line for defense there . The 7 .Bers .Rgt . will be detached immediately 

from the positions in front of Gafsa and will march to Feriana . There 

the regiment will be placed under the control of D.A.K. 

ee . The Lw.Jg.Brig.l will set to march as soon as possible 1 co.,reinforoed 

by a platoon of light flak and a platoon of heavy flak, to Feriana at the 

disposal of D.A .K . ( Annex 1114) 

The O.B . decides to start at dawn to the D.A.K . Hgs .with an operations 

staff and the necessary communication equipment and, according to -where the 

to 

main effort of the attack unfolds,/conduct the operaLtions directly with the 

following . . 

advanced C .P./behind the D.A.K. or the 21 .Pz.Div . The main body of the Pz . 

the Mareth front. 

the command of the let officer of the General Staff at 

The order of Comando Supremo provides for F.XRommel's retention of 

the responsibility for the Mareth position . Nevertheless, the argy requests 

Gen.Messe to take over the high command over the Mareth front as a represent 

ative du-ring the absence of the O.B . from the southeast front. GGn,Messe 

declines . Thereupon the O.B . informs Comando Supremo that it is not possible 

for him to command at the Mareth front and lead the western operations at the 

same time, as means o£ communication are lacking for x the exercise of direct 

command . The O.B . therefore requests that Gen.Messe take over the command 

of the Mareth front as his representative . (Annex 1115) 

While in the morning hours D.K.K . is getting into a position of readiness 

in the Kasserine area for attack, the A .A .33 is thrown forward to ppen the pass 

worthwest of the locality in a coup de main. This is foiled however by the 

stuUborn resistance of the enoW in line on the heights on both sides of the 

pass . At 1100 hours the Pz .Gren .Rgt .Afrika moves to the attack . It succeeds 

at 1315 hours to- capturif "Hill 914 with the right flank, while in the left

- 120 - 

the attack comes to a standstill . 

strong 

The tank attack launched in the afternoon 

is stopped by the/mine bmd blocks at the pass . However at 1600 hours fM1 

712 is taken and in the evening hours stubborn fighting forces the violently 

resisting eneny to gall back to the north, though it is not possible to break 

through the well fortified defensive positions. ( Annex 111 6) 

The 7.Bers.Rgt. coming from the Gafsa area arrives toward noon in 

Feriana, and with the reinforced company of the lw.Jg.Brig .l which has also 

arrived there, will be committed for the defense of the left flank west and 

northwest of Thelepte on the road leading in the direction of Tabessa . There- 

by the Bers .Bn and the artillery battalion of the Div. Centauro are freed 

to be committed by D.A.K . Im compliance with orders they arrive in the after- 

noon _ in the . Kasserine, area . The army Eng.Bn.Afrika and 1 mortar battery and 

l smoke battery also arrive there for the reinforcement of the combat group 

of the D.).K . and are_ placed under the control of the combat group . ( Annex 1117) 

At 0830 hours the 21.Pz.Div.,starts from SbeitR& to the north . (teak 

energy forces -probably combat outposts- in the region 8 ~:m south of Sbiba 

are pushed back at 1100 hours . At 1230 hours, 1} k m south of Sbiba the division 

a 

runs against/comparatively strong enery in impanved positions with several 

mine fields extending in front of them. After moving into position o£ readiness 

and clearing paths free of mines the Pz.Rgt.resumes the attack at 1600 hours . 

Because of stronger resistance, new mine lines and rain making the terrain 

almost impassable tit is impossible to break through the enemy lines . The 

attack comes to a stand still . The division passes to the defensive for re- 

grouping . ( Annex 1118) 

The l0.Pz .Div . coming from the Kairouan - Pichon area reaches Sbeitla 

with his advanced elements only toward the afternoon because of road diffi- 

culties . The division which has only half of its cesbat strength because a 

considerable part of its elements tkre committed and iTwiobilized on the north

- 121 - 

front of the 5.Pz .Armee, will have reached with the mass of its units the 

the assembly area of Sbeitla by dawn of next day. (Annex 1119) 

There is no contact with the enemy in the Gafsa - Lbtlauoi -_Tozeur 

area and west thereof. 

The immobile forces of the Div .Centauro which had remained in the 

former positions at el Guettar are brought forward and put in line at the 

north front of Gafsa . 

Air situation : 

Situation map and reports see Annex 1119) f?] 

Sand storms and strong fog formations in the mountains make the 

of the air force almost impossible on both sides . 

Estimate of the situation and intentions : 

a. Southeast front : 

Because of the weather situation air reconnaissance discloses only 

au imcomplete picture before the front . 

The army intends to hold the rearguard positions just west of 

Yedenine on 20 Feb . also . 

b. front of the attack soup north : 

On the north front the energy opposed stubborn resistance to our 

attaok . The attack came to a standstill in the two &#sack groups (21 .Pz . 

Div . and combat group D.A . K.) because of strong enemy resistance in well 

on the heights 

improved positions/reinforced by numerous mine blocks . The enemy has apparent 

ly brought reserves forward . British troops were identified opposite the 

21 .Pz .Div . It is to be assumed that the enemy has brought forward the 6th 

British Panzer Bivision located heretofore behind the north sector as re- 

serve and has thrown ih into the fight . S5mxxx13r Txxkxxer A combat value 

considerably higher than that of the American troops can be attributed to 

these British troops . Therefore the army expects a further stiffening of 

the resistance on 20 Feb . ( Annex 1120 ) 

use

The army intends to continue the attack on 20 Feb . with the main 

effort in the D .A .K. 

The following orders are issued in that intention (in the evdning 

2 . Morning and noon report to O.K.H. ( Annex 1122) 

1 . Sequence of events 

- 122 - 

the O.B . instructs the individual division commanders 

by 

aa . The combat group of the D .A . K.will gain ica a coup de main during the 

night if possible the pass positions still held by the enemy, and at 

dawn will debouch from the pass in the direction of el Hamra and of the 

pass 5 km to the southwest, open the passes and will pass to the defensive 

with icix its front to the west . In connection with this operation a 

combat group will be employe to open the Dernaia pass 

direction . connect with Div.Centaurots attack from the aooc 

direotion _ of :, Thelepte . 

bb . Until dawn the lo.Pz.Div . will bring its units forward to the Kasserine 

area and west thereof and will attack, following behind the D .A.K., in 

the direction of Kalaa Djerda, and at the same time will protect the 

right flank of the D.A.K. from a possibly enengy drive from the Thala 

direction. 

cc . The 21 .Pz.Div . will continue the attack through Sbiba on Ksour . 

--------------------------------- 


from a northern 

dd . Div. Centauro, while retaining its former mission -recohnoitering and 

in - the afternoon 

covering in a western and northeM direction- will opan/the Dernaia ~ 

(northxst - northwest of Thelepte) with a combat group. (Annex 1121) 

The order of Comando Supremo for Gen.lbsse 

(First Ital.ArnV) to take over the OOLUmnd at the Viireth iron& is received 

during the night . The First Ital .Awgy and the attack group north Trill ea

_ 123 _ 

join the Ronzuel group andplaced under the joint command of F.M.Rommal who, 

at the same time, will retain the direot command o£ attack group north. 

(Annex 1123) 

a. First Ital . Ar yx 

At 0600 Gen.Lbsse has taken over the high command of the Mareth 

front. All the German and ital . troops heretofore under the high command of 

the D.I .Panzerarmee will at that time come under the awnkxxI high command of 

the First Ital .Army inasmuch as they are in line at the Mareth front. Gen. 

Messe will be given a German liaison staff for the command of the German 

units. (Annex ll ) 

To watch over German interests F.M.Rommel orders that Gen.Ziegler 

be entrusted with the command of D.A.K. until the arrival of the commanding 

general. ---All=the 

'German-troops - employed -at -the l%areth- front are -placed' under - 

the control of D.A .K. Only the 90.le.Afr.Div . wil l receive operational 

orders from the XX.A.K. (Annex 1125 

Under the cover o£ strong dust clouds loosened in the forenoon by a 

sand storm strong enemy armored units have advanced with their point of main 

effort north of the left flank of the rearguard position of the 15.Pz.Div . 

and in the early forenoon stand in the deep northern flank of the divi-sion. 

The division had to fight stubbornly and call out all its forces to resist 

the crushing superiority of the enenW panzers)C, and despite the enemy attempt 

to encircle the southern flank also, it kept open the withdrawal road bfedenine - 

Toujane . The one armored battalion at the disposal of the division (with 

about 20 tanks) repeatedly brings to a standstill through counterattacks 

an enemy almost five times as strong . Severe fighting continues until dusk . 

The division has mastered the situation so far that it can disengage itself 

from the enemy systematically and withdraw along the Laedenine - Toujane 

behind the advanced position . (Annex 1126 ) 

Herewith the last German units have been withdrawn behind the advanced

position and the defense of the Mareth position is beginning . The First 

Ital .Army has already ordered readiness for defense of all the positions 

in the morning . (Annex 1127) 

The enemy continues vigorous reconnaissance aotitities on the south 

flank of the position in the area about - 25 km northwest of Foum Tatahouine . 

( Annex 1127) [?] 

b, Front of the attack group north: 

during the night 

After regrouping had been carried out/the 21.Pz .Div . attacks again 

at dawn and strikes at a reinforced enemy in imqmraoc improved, heavily mined 

positions and vid.th ntmerous artillery pieces (9 batteries ascertained), tanks 

and antitank guns . Our attack makes only slow progress because of extremely 

violent resistance and at noon is bnaught to a standstill . After further re- 

grouping a renewed attack equally fails iiT-gain g ground . The'division'stops 

sses to the defensive 

the attack and at the edge of the enemy mine field . ( Annex 1128 

The combat group of D.A.K. does not succeed in taking the rest of 

the enemy positions at Kasserine Pass . 

The enemy,who has brought reinforce- 

ments forward, even ax launches counterattacks which it is possible, however, 

to repulse entirely . 

- 124- 

At dawn the combat group of D.A.K . renews his attack after strong 

artillery preparation, The attaok comes to a stand still in t he violent de- 

fensive wxsa=7 fire of the enemy stubbornly fighting in overhanging' mountain 

positions . Thereupon the advanced elements of the IO.Pz.Div . which have 

arrived in the area northwest of Kasserine are put in line on the right of 

the combat group of D.A.K . After hadd and fluctuating fighting lasting un- 

til late afternoon the enemy is thrown out of his mo~uitain positions . Enemy 

reinforcements launohin an envelo n movement over_ the_ mountain are ca ht~ 

by _a counterattack, surrounded and for the most part destroyed. The panzer 

battalion of D.A.K. xXppaxkc wgxlr~[~~ ~~ which supported the attack and forced 

the breakthrough on the pass road, shot dorm 10 enemy tanks and captured

about 30 American armored personnel oarriers mounted with 7.5 om guns . 

(Annex 1 129 ) 

After a brew 

rough the pass position had been forced) elements of 

the D .A.K . and of the IO.Pz .Div . were immediately put in line, a the direction 

of Djebel el Hamra or Thala ~or , pursuitl 

For the first time on the African theatre o£ war rocket launchers were 

used in the fighting for the I3asserine pass position . One of the batteries 

at the disposal of the D .I .Panzerarmee supports effectively tha attack of 

our infantry. The O.B . requests therefore the immediate bringing forward 

of additional rocket projector equipment and submits this request also to 

F.XKssselring at his C .P. in the afternoon . (Annex 11,'LO } 

The Div.Centauro holds its positions at Feriana . An attack executed 

with only weak available forces against the' . pass 'north~of The, epte effects 

no penetration because of strong artillery resistance . (Annex 1131 ) 

There is no contaot with the eneny before the west front in the Gafsa 

- P6etlauoi - Tozeur area . 

in the afternoon 

Upon order of Comando Supremo the 5 PZ .Armee/with Kampfgruppe Buhss 

(reinforced Gren,Regt.47) fell in to the attac 

to the west in the direotion of bfaktar . The Kampfgruppe by evening reaches 

the region 6 km south of Ousseltia without meeting strong enemy resistance . 

Continuing the advance its foremost elements come upon strong enemy forces 

had taken a foothold in favorable positions at the passes west of Ousseltia . 

Annex 1132) 

O.B .SlId F.M.Kesselring arrives toward noon at the C .P . of Grmuppe 

Roranel northwest of Kasserine and the O .B . orients him concerning the si- 

tuation . 

Air situati on : 

Situation map and reports see Annex 11 3-39 

rom the area north of Kairouan

- 126 - 

Strong dust clouds and sand storms oantinue to limi11 the air activity on 

both sides . Annex 1131.}) 

Estimate of the situation and intentions 

a. First Ital.Arwi: 

It is supposed that today t s attack of strong energy armored force s 

bring 

against the 15.Pz .Div, was carried out to/reliefs~/the American units engaged 

in heavy fighting . It is apparently the enemy's intention to induce our 

them 

command to pull out forces from the attack gropp and transfer/to the Mareth 

front . Therefor additional strong enemy attacks must be expected on 21 Feb. 

also . An air reconnaissance confirms this assumption, as the enemy group 

_W%. 

between Madenine and Ben Gardane has been rsitnrced by 2 500 motor vehicles . 

(Annex 1127) 

(the troops fully &Ierted?) 

The First Italian Array has ordered full defense readiness_ at the 

P6areth front . 

b . Attack- group- north : 

Using all his available forces the enemy attempted to hold his new 

switch position on the ridge northwest of Sbeit9d - Kasserine - Thelepte . 

He continued to send reinforcements for tf is purpose to Sbilba, northwest of 

Kasserine", as well as north of lhelepte . According to today's impressionmade 

by the enemy the army must expect enemy counterattacks on all of the three 

sectors, as the enemy will be anxious to restore the line that was partly 

lost . 

On the basis of this situation the arny decides to remain on the de- 

fensive on 21 Feb . at Sbiba and Feriana, to prepare for defense at Kasserine 

pass with comparatively weak forces and to be ready with a strong assault 

group to fall in, according to the develoomaht of the situation, either to 

an assault or to a counterattack to the north or to the west . 

In this connection the following is ordered : 

aa . The 21 .°z.Div . will defend its positions south o_° Sbiba to the odge of

o£ the enemy mine field . TheA.580plaoed under the control of the division/ 

will be set to march inomediately to Kasserine as army reserve, 

bb . The D.A . K . will defend the pass positions west of the Kasserine - Thala 

roadrxwA and will send a kampfgruppe to reconnoiter in the direotion of 

D3ebel el Hamra . The relief of the IO .Pz .Div . east of the road will 

lore par e d . 

co . The 10.Pz .Div . will defenthe pass positions east of the Kasserine - 

Thala road and will &r4ve with a kampfgruppe (without tanks) in the direction 

of Thala . Tanks and the mass of the division will be held in readiness for a 

_ thrust to the north or possiblt a counterattack to the west . 

dd . The Div . Oentauro will defendthe Feriana - Thelepte area and brings for- 

ward for that puspose additional artillery from the Gafsa area . (Annex 1135) 

2 . Morning and noon report to O.K.H. ( Annex 1136 ) 

Sequence of events 

a . First Ital.Armee 

- 127- 


Dtiring/the 15.Pz .Div . occupied systematically the ordered . area in the 

sector of the Div . Spezia . Though the division has been engaged the whole of 

yesterday in hard defensive fighting against enemy forces many times superior 

losses and breakdowns remained comparatively small . (Annex 1137) 

Today the enemy did not continue his attack but limited himself to 

vigorous reconnaissance against the advanced positions of the Wreth line . 

( Annex 11j8 ) 

In the Rhoumerassen area (northwest of Foum Tatahoiime) the pressure 

of strong enemy reconnaissance forces continues against our reconnaissance 

group in line on the south flank of the position . (Annex . 1138) 

b . Front of the attack group north : 

'rhile the l0 .Pz.Div . and comoat grouo of D .A .K. aro preparing for

- 128- 

defense in the conquered pass positions, advanced pursuit elements drive 

during the night farther west and north. 

The reinforced A.A.33 (combat group D .A .K.) strikes against -a 

strong enemy fighting delaying action along the road in the direction of 

MmQua back 

Hamra pass . . It throws/to the northwest an enemy 

ing it 

armored attack at 0815 hours and followx1up iac reaches the area 

about 12 km east-southeast of el Hamra pass . (Annex 1139) 

The combat group of the JO.Pz .Div . throws the enemy rear guards 

back to the area 20 ]on south of Thala during the night . A counterattack by 

enemy tanks is suaosdsfully repulsed and several. tanks are shot down . Other 

from 

elements of the 10.PA:.Div. clean up/the high ground north of the Kasserine 

pass the rest of enemy forces still established there . Annex 111}0) 

The 21 .Pz .Div . has organized for defense in the area it reached 

yesterday afternoon. 

The night passes quietly in Div. Centauro . Since it is feardd that 

the one - r wi ll attack on the south flank with strong forces to drive into 

the left £lank of the attack~ro , the A.A.580 -army reserve since midnight 

receives the order to move immediately to the Feriana area . (Annex 1111) 

At dawn Gruppe Buhse o£ the 5.Pz .Arigee 2sx resumes its thrust in the 

direction of Maktar . In compliance with an order of Comando Supremo received 

during the night Gruppe Rommel will take over the command, effective at once, 

over the elements of the 5.Pz .Armee which except for the 10 . and 21 .Pz .Divs . 

a 

are incorporated into the attack movement or will be incorporated . (Annex 1112) 

On the basis of the orx impression created by the enemy this 

forenoon (his heavy losses during the fighting yesterday and early today, 

the vrithdrasral during the night, no counterattack to regain the lost pass 

positions, his passive attitude also in the Feriana area) the army comes to 

the realization that the enemy had been beaten so hard that for the jrcsent

d,a~iS 

he d*d not have the strength to recapture in a counterattack the pass posi- 

tions at Kassarine that are so important for him. Therefore the O .B . decides 

at 1200 hours to exploit the situation and continue the attack with the JO .Pz . 

Div. and the combat group of the D .A.K . and drive immediately on Kalaa Djerda 

or in the direction of Dj . el Hamra. 

In this connection orders are issued as follows : (verbal ly by the O.B . V/ 

to the commander of the l0.Pz .Div., the commander of combat group D.A .K. and 

the commander o£ 4r A .A .580) 

aa, The 21 .Pz.Div . will hold its former positions . 

bb . The !O .Pz.Div . (less motor cycle Bn .10,which will at first occupy and 

hold the Kasserine pass) will drive through Thala on KaUa Djerda . 

cc. Comhat group ]W.A .K. will fall in immediately and open at first the 

pass at Slougi and then at Zitoun.An additional thrust in the KKU 

direction of Haidra is planned. 

dd. A.A.580 will not reach Feriana but will move to Kasserine by the short- 

est road and will open the pass north of 1helepte from the north by 

driv~w-eztmard through tae Kasserine pass . 

~e. Div. Centauro will hold the former positions at Ferian',"'and Thelepte . 

(Annex 11143) 

To prevent the enemy frcm draw-ing additional reserves from the north 

Tunisian front the 5:Pz.Armee is instructed to carry out limited offensive 

action in front of its western front to harass the energy and keep him as busy 

as possible. (Annex 11I4) 

At 1400 hours the JO .Pz .Div . and combat group D.A.K. launch an attack 

to the north and nortinvest . 

The l0 .Pz.Div . in a bold advance drives enemy security detachments 

back and about 15 km south Thala comes upon a comparatively strong enemy in 

a well developped hill oosition . In an energetic stroke the division succeeds

in throwing the enemy back end k in inflicting heavy losses to the British 

armored unit which had coarse forward to support the Americans in a countera 

attack . In a rpid follow up thrust Panzer and Panzergrenadiers drive into 

Thala toward 1900 hours, roll up a battalion and capture it (About 700 men) 

However the enemy holds the heights on both sides of the town with strong 

forces, so that the division has to withdraw a few kilometers to the south 

at dusk because of a threat to its flanks and rear . About 5 kin south of 

Thala the division passes to the defensive . (A nnex 1145) . 

The combat group of D.A .K., after good initial progress in the attack 

can only ms.ke slow headway in the &fternoon on account of extremely strong 

partly flanking defensi:vdix fire . The attack comes finally to a stand still 

on the plain opposite the energy occupying overhanging mountain positions. 

At dusk the combat group has its adxvanced elements 8 Ion east of Dj .el Hamra 

and has organized for defense there ., Its losses are considerable . (Annex 1146) 

Opposite the 21 .Pz .Div . the enemy during the day gets 

reinforcements especially of artillery (a total of 11 energy batteries are now 

ascertained) . At 1?00 hours tho enemy supported by n'vcercus tanks launches 

a counter- 

//X-X"a attack which can be brought to a stand still after 6 enemy tanks are- shot 

down . (Annex 11147) 

- 130 - 

A renewed attempt of Div. Centauro to open the Dernaia pass north of 

Thelepte fails because of extremely violent and well placed enemy artillery 

defensive fire . ( Annex 1148) 

Gruope Buhse has been unable to throw-the enemy out of his hill posi- 

tions wext of Ousseltia and therefore attempts to continue the thrust on 

Maktar driving from the north and the south. 

(Situation map and reports see Annex 11491 

Air situation: 

Limited air activity on both sides on account of bad weather .

- 131 - 

Estimate o£ the situation and intentions : 

a. First_ Italian Army : 

Today's air reconnaissance discloses that enemy forces in the area 

between Medenine and Ben Gardane are not as strong as was to be xxxxmmd 

assumed on the basis of yesterday's air reconnaissance . Today there were 

only 1200 motor vehicles ascertained in that area . 

As a result of his ai= ground reconnaissance of today the enemy must 

have observed that he has come against a well developed position . It must then 

11 E it be assumed that enemy, according to his former custom, will make 

thorough and lengthy preparations for attack . The arc army therefore does 

not expect that he will advance on the Mareth position in the next few days . 

The plans of the First Ital .Army are unchanged. 

b . Front of the attack group north: 

After the loss of the doming ass position northwest of Kasserine 

the enemy attempted today to hold the ridge line el Hamrt (11+ km southeast 

of Thala) - Dj .el Hamra. For the purpose he k-nrk brought forward additional 

American forces out cf the area around and southeast of Tabessa and also e.ddi- 

tional elements of the 6,British Fz .Div . The army expects that on 22 Feb . 

the enemy in a counterattack will attempt to regain the line of resistance 

he has lost in parts and that he will oppose stubborn resistance to a conti- 

nuation of our attacks . (Annex 11_50) 

The army intends therefore to continue the attack for a limited obat 

first 

jective/with D.A.K. and l0.Pz.Div . and to hold the former positions with the 

21 .Pz.Div . and Div . Cen*auro . 

To that effect the following orders are issued : 

aa . The 21 .Pz .Div . will assume the defensive in the former main line of re- 

sistanoe . If the enemy withdraws through Sbiba, the division will follow 

up with some elements, the main body being held in readiness for a new

% 

assignment . The O.B . combat echelon will drive from Thala on RoAia in the 

rear of the enemy from Sbiba . 

the re 

bb . The IO .Pz.Div . will reach the Thala - Kalaa Djerda area and/pass to 

of its 

defensive with its main body . The division will push some/elements on 

'Padjerouine and Le Kef. 

cc, Combat group D.A.K.lcontinuejf the attack for the capture of the el 

Hamra passes . 

the night of 2122 Feb . 

north and will hold them . 

The passes will be encircled far to the south during 

dd. A .A . 5S0 will open the passes north of Thelepte by a thrust from the 

Se . Div . Centauro will withdraw from action south of the passes, will reach 

during the night the old area around Feriana - Thelepte and will pass to 

the defensive there . The division~will `hold reserves in readiness .for 

mobile employment . (Annex 1151) 

Results o£ today's air reconnaissance, incomplete because of the 

adverse weather, but suplemented by ground reconnaissance and listening posts 

establish that the enemy continues to draw strong reserves from the northern 

Tunisian front and brings them forward to the Le Kef area . The 5.Pz .Armee 

is 

therefore/requested again to harass the enemy through xaasiac local thrusts 

on the entire front and tie him down . (Annex 11_52) 

2 . Morning and noon report to O.K.H. ( Annex 1153)

Events of the day : 

a . First Italian Armor 

- 133 - 

22 Februaty 1943 

The enemy continues his reconnaissance activities in advance of the 

B4areth position and also on the south flank in the region of Rhoumerassen . The 

day passed without any action on any considerable scale. (Annex 1154 ) 

b. Front of attack group north 

The attack of the IO .Pz.Div . planned for 1300 hours against the enemy 

is not carried out as &round reconnaissance in the forenoon disclosed that the 

enemy has brought up strong reinforcements from the direction of galas D3erda , 

receive 

and is apparently preparing to counterattack. The didivion plans to the 

enemy attack in its present favorable positions in order to take Thala in a 

thrust -to be . delivered -immediately ,following the enemy's move. ., However, the 

anticipated strong counterattack of the enemy was not made . Only minor hostw 

probings to the front are made bylhim and are beaten off with losses to him. As 

the enemy continues to move up reinforcements, the arm, taking into account 

the poor state of the terrain as a result of the rain, orders the division not 

to execute the attack that had been prepared but to pass to the defensive . 

(Annex 1155) 

The attempt made during the night by Kam9gruppe D.A.K. 

to seize the 

pass by a swift stroke fails. The Kampfgruppe reorganizes and at dawn advances 

again to the attack . As a consequence of the enemy's powerful artillery action 

and because of flanking fire on three sides coming from dominating positions 

in the hills, the attack meets with no success. The Kampfgruppe is forced to 

pass to the defensive toward noon and to meet several violent counterattacks 

executed by the enemy, some of them with tanks, until evening . In the course 

of this action our left flank is 

until nightfall . In :this counterattacks 

pressed back eastward, The fighting lasts 

the enemy has the advantage of possessing

134 

on thc+ surrounding heights excellent observation posts domfimnding the entire 

battlefield . (Annex 1156) 

The attack of the A .A.580 to open the passes north of Thelepte from the 

north is also unable to push through to its objective because of strong hostile 

interference and the swampy condition of the roads . Consequently the attack is 

broken off towatd noon on orders of the armor. (Annex 115?) 

Hostile artillery activity is stepped up on the front of the 

and Div. Centauro . However the enemy does not advance to the attack . 

The advance made by Buhse Group is scarcely able to move forward over the 

difficult terrain which has become almost impassable from the rain. The enew 

defiles 

continues as before to hold the basses west of Ousseltda in . heavy forces . 

]1Urther reconnaissance conducted on our part along the north Tunisian 

front establishes the fact that there has been no weakening of the advanced 

forces occupying the positions site the northern half of the -.10L 5.Pz . 

Armes's sector. Moreover local reserves still seem to be there (Annex 1158 ) 

(Situation map and reports see Annex 1159 ) 

Air situation: 

Our LuftnPffe is giving effective support to our fighting despite very 

difficult weather conditions . _ 

Throughout the day enemy Tabo and attack planes were attacking in - the 

region of DJ .el Hams and wouth of Thala . In this fighting 5 enemy planes were 

shot down by ground fire . 

Estimate of the situation and plans : 

a . First Italian Amy : 

21 .Pz.Biv . 

Bedause of poor weather conditions, air reconnaissance is able to disclose 

only an incomplete picture of the enemy dispositions on the front . The impression 

gained of the enemy today confirms the viewpoint of the army, that the enemy 

qill not move to the attack against the advanced Mareth position until he has 

brought up stronger forces and has completed his preparations .

- 135 - 

The plan of the First Italian Army is unchanged . 

b . Front of attack group north : 

Air reconnaissance during the day disclosed new enemy forces moving 

toward the front along the ilne road Le Kef - Kalaa Djerda to Thala, and also 

east-northeast from Tebessa . 

Furthermore, according to reliable sources, 

orders have been issued all organizations forbidding any withdrawal from the 

positions now occupied oi?any,,to leave his without extpress order . The enemy 

in any case will defend the present line : Sbiba - Thala - Dj . el Hamra, and 

will probably aabauuc= start his counterattack from this line too, to recap- 

tzars the imrortsnt Kasserine Pass in particular . The energy counterattacks 

made this afternoon on the front of the l0 .Pz .Div . and Kampfgruppe D .A .K . 

support this interpretation . (Annex 1160 ) 

The~O .B . orients F.M.Kesselring, o arrives at the C .P.northwest of Kasse- 

rine in the afternoon, on the situation and concludes that it appears futile 

to continue the attack, 

forces, the unfavorable 

in-view of the constant reinforcing of the hostile 

weather which renders the terrain 

impassable off the hard roads, and because of the increasing problems caused 

by the mountain terrain which is so unsuited to the employment of armored 

units, all this added to the low strength of our organizations . The O .B . 

th$refore recommends stopping the attack and withdrawing the attack group 

once heavy losses have been inflicted 4k the enemy and his development in 

-the Cafsa - Sbeit& area has been cut up . In favor of this decision is the 

furtjjer fact that the situation on the Mareth front necessitates a speedy 

shift of the mobile troops of both armies there, in order to strike a sudden 

blow at the enemy while he is regrouping and before he is ready to attack . 

By this means it would be possible to gain a delay in his attack . 

F.M.Kesselring, who approves of the idea of O .B., is requested to ad- 

vise Ccanando Sunremo of the situation in the attack group in this senae . 

In a#reement twhtth O .B .Sild she O .B . plans to effect an initiam with-

drawal to the position in the pass north of Kasserine in the dight 22/23 

Feb . by the l0.Pz .Div . and the D.A.K ., mining the roads and trails . This is 

to be fdfllowed by later bounds by all elements, including the 21 .Pz.Div . and 

Div.Centauro, back to the original departure positions of the operation. Con- 

sidering the weakness of our forces and the necessity of concentrating all 

mobile units for an operation from the Mareth Vmdzbmc position, the afore- 

mentioned position is viewed as the most favorable . 

Detailed orders were issuedf-as follows : 

aa . 21.Pz .Div . will defend on 23 February the present position and will 

prepare to mine the Sbiba - Sbeitla road . 

bb . The l0.Pz .Div . and Kampfgruppe D.A .K . will fall back at dusk to the old 

pass positions northwest of Kasserine, mining roads and trails . 

A cc . ` .A .580 at dusk will withdraw to . t}ie region north of Kasserine and will 

refrain there for the time being in army reserve . 

dd . Div . Centauro will hold its present positions on 23 Feb. Annex 1161 

by F.M.Kesselring 

On the basis of the estimate of the situation, at 2310 hours Comando 

Supremo issues the order for breaking off the a%ttack in Central Tunisia and 

for falling back with the mobile troops to the positions of departure (Annex 

7162 ) . 

2 . Morning and noon report to O .K.H . (Annex 1163) 

1 . 

Seauence o£ events : 

--------------------------------- 


a . On the front of the First Italian Array the day passed without fighting of 

any consequence other than reconnaissance by both sides . (Annex 1164) 

In the regrouping of the left flank, the reconnaissance group (A.A .3 and 

A.A .Nizza) is moved to the Bir Sultane area . The mission of the VXcup is to 

secure the deep south flank of the Maxeth front by extended reconnaissance

- 137 - 

south and southeast . A rather small detachment of A.A.3 remains initially 

in the region north of Rhoumerassen . (Annex 1164) 

After Gen . Masse had stated that he could not agree to the order direct- 

ing that all ikerman Units in his mcx~c army be placed under a German commander, 

the commanding general of the J",, D.A .K., O .B .Stid, by direction of Comando 

Supremo, orders Gen.Ziegler as deputy commander of the D .A .K. to look after 

1 

the ante ests of the German troot)s in the First Italian Army, untiaq the 

N 

arrival of the "German commander at headquarters of the First Italian Army . 

(Annex 1165) 

5 . Front cf the attack t-oun north : 

The withdrawal of the l0 .Pz .Div . and Kampfgruppe D.A.K. in the night of 

22/23 Feb . took place free from enenrj pressure of any consequence and, .despite 

considerable difficulty on account of the roads - tt went off accoxrding -to ~- 

plan . In the late forenoon the last units are taken back behind the pass 

position, all roads and trails being heavily mined . The 10.Pz.Div . and the 

Kampfgruppe D.A .K. stand in the positions ordered, ready for action(Annea 1166) 

The night passed quietly in the 2lxPz .Div . and Div . Centauro.( Annex 1167) 

Toward noon the army orders Kampfgruppe D .A .K . relieved by elements of 

the l0 .Pz .Div . end to reach the region Feriana - Thelepte by evening, where 

it would take over positions held there by the Div . Centauro . (S[4 Given orally 

by O .B. to the co.-rander of Kampfgruppe D.A.K . ) 

Apparently held up seriously by the mines, the enewW follows hesitantly 

only . He limits his activity to reconnaissance and artillery action. The day 

passes without fighting of any consequence. 

Toward evening the situation is as follows : 

21 .Pz .Div . is defending its former positions just south of 5biba, 

l0 .Pz .Div . i s holding the Kasserine pass positions . 

",lost of the organizations of Kampfgrupe D .A.K . have arrived in the 

Feriana - Thelepte region ahx have begun the relief of Div . Centauro .

A.A.580 is army reserve in region west of Sbeitla . 

Air situation : 

(Situation map) 

Since evUly afternoon the enemy has kept up a constant attack with bombers 

a 

of all types and pursuit aviation against the region/round Kasserine and ` 

Feriana in a force heretofore unparallelled . (In a quarter of an hour 104 planes 

are counted over the Kasserine area) . 

Our Luftwaffe carries out successful attacks in the region around Thala 

and el Hams.. 

Est&mate of the situation and plans : 

a . First Italian Army : 

- 138 - 

Situation and plan on the 14Sareth front unchanged . 

b. Front oftthe attack pxoup north : 

In compliance with orders from Comando Supremo to move the attack units 

back by echelon in delaying action, it is ordered for the 24 Feb. that : 

aa . The 21 .Pz.Div . will hold its present positions . 

bb . The l0.Pz .Div . will. defend Kasserine Pass . In case of strong enemy pressure 

it will be taken back to the region west of Sbeitla, to cover the with- 

drawal of the 21 .Pz .Div . 

cc . Ksmpfaruppe D .A .K . will defend the Feriana region and will fall back un- 

der heavy enemy pressure only after mining the roads and destroying the 

railway line running to Gefsa . Elements of Div. Centauro attached to the 

KampfRruppe will be released to the division . 

dd . Div . Centauro with mobile elements, including attached German Lw .Co . will 

occupy the north and n ,Drthwest front of Gafsa following its relief 

foot? 

by the D.A.K . There the im-mobile troops will be relieved and put in 

line in the former positions east of Guettar and south of DJ .Bu Jerra . 

Elements previously attached to Kamnfgruppe D .A .K . will accompany it . 

ee . A .A .580 will secure the right flank of the 21 .P- .Div . i n the region north-

east of Sbeitla . ( Annex 11681 

- 139 - 

At 1730 hours the order is received from Comando Supremo covering the 

formation of the Arm Groun Africa under the command of F."".Rommel. To the 

Army Group Africa are attached the 5.Pz.Army and the First Italian Army, and . 

are placed under its direct control as a mobile Kampfgruppe. 

the 

1O .Pz.Div ., 21 .Pz .Div . and the Kampfgruppe D .A .K./(Annex 1169) 

F.M.Rommel reports to Comando Supremo and RZ O .K.WA.F .St. I that he 

has taken command of Armor Group Africa at 1800 hours . (Annex 1170) 

On the basis of the new organization of the command it is directed that : 

aa. The 5.Pz.AruV will occupy the former main battle position, its right on the 

coast, its left at Sened and will organize it immediately for defazse. The 

work of mining the front is to be carried out quickly. 

bb . The First Italian Army takes command of the entire front of the former 

PZ .Arnly including the Gafsa area . For this purpose .Div . 

Centauro is attached to it . (Annex 1171) 

Toward 2100 hours a second order arrives from Comando Supremo 

containing instructions for subsequent action of the Army Group. It pre- 

scribes the operation on the A~reth front proposai by F.M.Rolmn-el, It directs 

that : - 

"The Army Group will move the mobile organizations by echelon in delaying 

lb 

action to rear of the former main battle position, so that they will complete 

their reorganization and rest, and be completely ready to reenter the line at 

the beginning of March. The following will be assembled as indicated, at the 

disposal of the Army Group: IO .Pz .Div . in the region of Sfax, the bulk of the 

other for ed organizations in the area of GaV'es . 

The new mission of the Army Group is to destroy the advanced combat ele- 

ments of the British Eighth Army . The objectives of this operation will be announ- 

ced as soon as possible" . (Annex 1172) 

On the basis of this order Gen.h4esse is requested to submit to the O.B . 

not later than 26 Feb . :

aa . 

1140 

Recommendations for an attack of mobile forces in the strength of 2-3 

Pz .divs . to destroy the hostile forces standing on the Mareth front. 

bb . Recommendations for an attack by 2-3 Pz .divs . against hostile forces 

opetating against the southern front of the Mareth position, with the 

object of destroying them . UAnnex 1173) 

2 . Morning and noon report to O .K.H. (Annex 1174)

a6 

Deutsches Afrika Korps, War Diary (Extract), 19- 

24 February 1943

DNU=AMM t A13T*X 'IR.2a12s3 0.0c8 v.24,1V'.45 

19 pebr44ty 1943 

. , . - QUIG~t ar'txt, 

Cmbgt eolm],an 4.}l, hut blm up the ral3.road twxnol 

vok&cast of moulstroo (A I -* 4# t3 I) . 

12 hr Arzyr or4or (*ta talephoned) througli Op.Sactlon .Q.O.K. via Nrsoaul 

&djut=t to 0,3, (GaCda) to : operation liootiont -rapfrruppo A..~ . Y~. will 

attook on 19 Fein . over the Tlwlapta road, the Nasaerluo Pats uorUrrroot o!' 

ordered 

serina end talon it (taXt Ar V Order A 5) All troops gill bo/roady to 

=rah imadiat*ly. Comandera at dorpo 0,P, 'The intention or f-ho Corps 

. .-attempt to, . 

is to/tom ttmt patio xzorthwast of Saanaring in a aurprioa raid try the 

Raaonnaiareanoo Bn. mommas maidng una o£ the first =cmmii lil;ht . In 

*arse the battalion mete strong raaiateawa the Pz .Gran.PCt.Afr1oa will attaol: 

1atdr after mvinC i pog1tion and aftrar the vAvanoa of utis artill),ry . 

Azmarsd Ba .6totten u.ll move forward- at first only as far as tazn area vast 

oR tho road fork north of Theleptxa ao au to be available for amplo mant in 

the dirootion of the pains and also to the freCt: ice 5th 3araa,-Uari tan. will 

ewer tho. e*otor harai ofora defouded by D.A.R. until the arrival of the rc- 

inforood 7th Hvrsarlieri ast. fr= Co.fea. The: Arvorod of tt~ Die. Cwi- 

taut wIll by 'placed for they Control of tlut battalion to ropultle a poasiblo 

e oow attank tram tha direotion of the Tobeeo4 road . Pe: r< orders 0.1 l. 

orally 

be iesuod i diately by tblaphono and later tb U,%c. 

tlto 33d heo.Vn. is advanoiai; in the diraotjon of zusasrlno . 

vie h rozaininz; olazanta of t4o Alag"'lpfc"rupie £all in . ""'Ith Poor viai- 

bIMy the 3'xt Rao.Bn. appronolias the papa taxed .£a mart b;; 1:? .¢ :iro of ar{A- 

track gun* and of a light battery . (Annex (;-3) he enez,V in doLO ::wllrt,~. Uxr 

rte with the point of rain effort to the want. It to n .t I:oasible to taker 

Q withdrc-~rs 

the paue with the £*mat of the battalion. `Rivreforo tl-c, bc.ttlioa

from the eatr=as of .the pass to the aouttvre$t .(An.9 ) 

In the meantime the Pz .Oren.IIgt .Africa has reached the assembly area 

Wouth of the paaa . Behind the regiment the artillery and the flak btry . 

xkxXIDab9~ are going rapidly into position . 

. ' .,h . the regiment starts in the dimotion of the pass entranou (Chadbi) . 

"The Corpo C,p, ' has " already been moved to the region 1 Len nortfrvoat ofthe 

. 

ro4id fork .west of KLseerino (B 2 ) . With the support of the artillery the 

regimnta2 attack makes good progress at firstj there la a ¢1.iFht fog . 

The 2d "hn . attaoldng on the right throtiva envy esourity dotaohnisnts baak 

into , the pass road and, toward noon, tdkes Hill 974 east of the pass . -O 3) 

Then flaztking firs from the via .ty of hill 712 and from the north stopa 

thei attack, 

. 

"The lot Ano (left),whioh had atsuted shortly after the 2d'Bn ., 

atteAks over Wadi Zobboua in ti he dirootion of dill 712. Zho battalion sustains 

strong fire . from" antitank guns, xh maohiiw guns and artillery N7Uoh on'wiot 

be alittinatedby our artillery baoauo* of poor visibility . 'His aumv sears 

to be strongly entrenched in the left " peotor . At some plaoos 7.5 era motor 

gun oarriAgax are identified. As the region possoacou the only croesing. 

to Bill 712 exoopt for Wadi Zabbous, and has no terrain obstaolea, the com- 

manding genera, deoidos to oo=it the armored battalion for the support of the Im 

battalion employed on the left and engaged in hard fighting, and for tha re- 

11oving the presauro on the right battalion. The armored battalion mo":es 

~, out of 

at 1215 hr fewaxtho area west of the road fork west of Kaaaeriiw . 

at the C .P. Hs is oriented by the oammanding general on the 

dOwelopmontof . . the situation. The Corps intends to oapturo today the .xta 

stubbornly defended pass . The O.D . gives informtion oonocrni : ; the intFIution 

to Carry out a main thrust with tIio 10th and 21st fz .Diva . over Sbuitlo., 

Sbiba to the north. After the Rasserine pnaa is opcnod an adranao toward 

the we at against Tabea$a is intandod to deceive the eneW . After the pass 

is taken the Corps will take measuroo for leaving soouritl dataeilnonto at the

pace . end, 

West 

fo., movi th the bulk pf , its troops over Sbeitla, Sbiba Do to 

. 

fho qot t, ooverizzg _fcroe.letpr * 0 13 * giivas furthor information on Vie oi "- 

. the division, 

tu%tloa An the ,2jet,Ps,Div,j ,, 1 3 11 ij advancing oter, 5baltla, has atone to about 

12 lea o£ Suiba, .has boon sstoppod thorn by . a double mina bolt end stronuly 

ocoupied ==trim ,positions, .and io getting ready to .renew its attack. 

hr the,.K=p£gruppc roaumos the ' attack on the loft flan1c . Tho amorod 

battalion attaol over .W41 gubbous on Hill 712. About 30 onamy heavy arrraorod 

.r , , , . . . . . . . : . 

to the noru:wout 

ooout , Class, so=, of thaw equipped with 7 .5ara ru4s, withdraw/from do W;t:aok . 

The lot Dn*,Fz .Gron .Rgt . Anioa follows the attack of ithe Armored B:rt ,.alion . 

As, fair as vi..aibllity pa=its the attack io auupoxtoQ, by t1 :o oouoesnttttrfAd Sirs 

of, the artillery and heavy flak. Ths anomy offers stubborn resistanoe . The 

area betvmon Pills 712 Atsd 812, froze which he oonduots his defenae, turns out- 

to . be rug;,od hill country with parry ravinaa . At 1 .[9.11 712 tlhn attack 431 the 

armored battalion .1a stopped b1 a ziino field (Anr lo . B 4, FIZ5) . The let: Bn ., 

moves 

Dr,,, Gren*Agt.Afrioa t up to tlia line of tnnks, and at nightfall moves 

h.~rond then in the direction of Hill .812. Several timas the enemy is obsorvod 

moving back to the northwast. Bhgineers arc Omployad to olear the minas in 

front of tlw arrored battalion. However, the approaching dar}a:wss riakou a 

further asaault: of the t=ka '.'raossible .. 

Aòoaa?ar3y of the Ps*Grate*Rg *Africa (mountain infantry) had boon aozi3itted 

in the , direction of hill $12 onoiroling frcua the south. No message is rooeived 

from ,ths . .oorpany . The sound . .of £lghting is heard from a direction south of 

Hill 812. Aaoording to prisonaral a -tntvmanta the corcrpany 3,s surrounded, 

in the 2d Bn., Pz.Gren.R9t.AfrIoa oommittod on the right the attack did 

:. : : : . . . : . . 

anew 

net go beyond Hill 974 because of stronr_/flankiug fire from a arrest-rly direction . 

From the road leading from the nort1i to tho pans and from the mountainoua 

tcrrpln north of Hill 974 th,o ta=7 laun:ahos saveral attacks uZai.wat the 

battalions they are all repulsed . .

: Por- tha=ni&VU ; is ordered that - tho Pz . Gren.Rgr. Afrioa will ,pace to 

tie~defdnacin-iha`lint"it has reaohed and will kcop oloso oontaot with "ckio 

oonsV . throvgh~vorbat reoonaiaswloe . If a vridhdraval of the enenv - is ob- 

eerved "-pursuit vd.ll be`- lauaohed imadiataly. The armored battalion troves 

back to the area south"st of Chombi . The 5th 13arsaftliori 

relieved durl reg the day by the 7th B cr aagl ion R t . 

inite Tholepte "aaotor sand the Armored Battalion of Div . Contauro move durilC 

irho night to - the area northrrent 'o£ the T{asnerino road fork . I~oo .li%1 .33 ru_ 

oeivas the order to move to the arse 3 km ar_at o£ CYuunbl and to nest us covaring 

i 

Toro® ;jointly with the 24 Ha *# Pat Grvn,Rgt.Afrioa. Booausa the terrain is isi 

pamble - the mission aannot'bo carried out. The battalion thareforo remains 

in. the area southwaat of Cheznbi . ' 

20w ; fir The Corps C,? is transtarrad to the east exit o£ Za3aerino (B G) 

Evening report A 11 ." 13 .- B 7i B 6 

, . . ." ` 14 tlia '"$reef of Hill 712 over x.00 prisoners warn taken . 

Atrioa repozta that acoording'to pri:abna~rsl mtataicento the, pass is dcforded 

by 1500 Amrict4 . (A 19) 

Supplies, n .A,X.`,begins during the day to ,ova the supply depot Oorvoxd 

to the'area Fari=a, - Thelepto 13 9) . 

~'APter' nightfall the- 2d _ Ds., Pz :Or=*Rgt .Afrioa suoo aeds 9.n takii4c; the 

domi=t hoighti - .X191 =st oP the pasa and in advancing along the road to 

the torth as'£or au the region of points 700 . The $nay attaoUr4; durin(; 

the night the do battalions o£ P& grcn.Rgr .Afriea io t;rrne :ally repulo :+d . :ie 

auooaada howavor in recapturing point 700 in a counterthruet . Contrary to 

late 

the iaipz'assxorl exi.ating during the/aft" rnoon that th© vna y is ret.:"t7ating to 

the'narthw4ct, the Corps gain the improsaion that the creamy intends to ao:ilanum 

holding the western and northern oxits o£ tile? pans on 20 February . 

2'00 hr the r1rv order for 20 February is rooivad . 20 j`QJruc:ry the Corpo

ind'advenoo to' tha northnvoct, in the dircotion o£ 

'Di,el . Hamra# open the passes there and pass to the defense with front to 

e 

the v®at (A 20).- Driating from the intention annouaoed this mornin Xby 

the .00 . - the' Army intoruia, after the pass hats been opened, to draw the 10th 

f_s*niv. through it in the diraotion of Thala, Kalaa D3orda . 

., . Thereupon the Corps orders for 20 Feliruaryr Ps . Cren .Rgt .Afrioa west, 

with`: to . support-of this entire artillery and heavy flak to whtoh a lhaezl tzar 

1~attary ;and a jx rookat projeotor buttery arrived during 19 Fab. have boon 

attached, will -,continue the attack and take Knoserino pose, Attack will be 

lauitohed . at 0700 hr. - Arbor opening the peas road irmediate oo:axlt3innt of 

the . 

'raconzaiasanas battalion and the haw armored battalions to the nort}nost 

is intended,, These two units will ready to rrar, oh at 0800 hr . (pertinent 

orders - isausd 20 . Feb rusty.0105 hr w-id 0110 hr, , B 10, 11). 

. . 0m 20 February l light flak battery o£ the 135th Flak Rgt. will ba 

brought up to Fz* Oren ..Rgt ..Afrioa aid re aorw+a for grourui operation. (J 12) 

; _ . . . , 20 February 19143 

During the' eight the enemy attempted at varioun 

places to 

throwlthe attaoking advanood elements or the Pz.Cron.Rgt .Africa back by a 

oountarthru4t. Tho attaok~s vmre repulaud (A .1 . ) 

In the crorning hours the loading olements of the loth Pz . Div. arrive 

in .tha Xasaorino area . Towoid a concentration of. foroas the division is 

requested try romin east or Kaaaorino (p.2) 

;. . . The attack which had bass dooidod for 0'100 hr is postponed 1 )tour aril 

fire 

30 beoauso or poor visibility and the/un*zcvtrottdinose of the entire urtillory . 

At 3 the atta0k interrupted the pr*viouo dray is rosmod . In the &~opl- 

mat of point 77,2 the let Hn:,Pz .Oron.Rrt .Afr1oa uakas only slow ns:d 

rawlnoa

tromi the worth . 

Y :wiP A i° 

. - (r 

.v 

. 

dAwiA44' jThti '2d'"Pz,oren.Rgr Afrioa I oannot ` fall in to the attaok 

a ic''as''tho' euy'is'advaw{nZ *against M11 1191 9.n battalion atrengtii, w 

k `the Òeourity detaohrzonte planed thorn o1ui L~attapk~4 a~a 2d 8 ;1, 

p,B,` . : at. .Oorpo C,P, at Kaaaerino . 110 disousses tyro altuution with 

the comLmanding general . As a result an ordar is iwsuod to the 5th BoraaCII. ,=ri 

Bn to - attaok into the gap bartwoon 'the lot and 2d lies ., fz . urez~ . .Ut.~fri~;a ovor 

Point 712 in . the' dirootion of Ogriue . T'LO O .B . "moves to U10 cll':vanocjd Corps 

G 'P*~~and issues tha " order for the iwrsodiate oor :rrd"tnent of ;;ho Gronadlor Cod . 

of the 0,B, oor:bat ooholon* and of the Groxundior, Co . oil the 33d Rooou . an . 

on:lthe left flank of the lot Bn . Pz.Grun.?2gt.Afr1ca . From the advanood Corps 

0 ; P the 0. . goes with the we=nding general . to the C .P . of the lot Bn . 

Pz.Gron,Rgt.Afrioa in the area Tmat of point 712 . fho regtmont oonumnder 

reports on the'e*of the ¬attaok . The lot Bn .~ la advanoing slowly and with 

great pains in'the diffloult mountainous terrain by Hill (312 whore the ti :-em' 

In well -- ooasol1datod .xmubda= and domimnt wountain positions is roaistirZ, 

atubboraly.' The possibilities of artillery support taro limited by this 

terrain' diffioulties sad espevially b-y the fog . Tho onOW $coma to bo of ., oring 

strotizast rusiatance in the line Ogrino-point £312 . For the reiaforoomont of 

the attaak the ' 0, A, orders the ooasml.tmr3nt of a battalion of the 10th Pz . Div . 

vhi4 had adwicod out of the Sboitla during the night, 

. 

later the order S.a 

puppleiaentdd to the extent that at 1,630 ht' the loth Pz . Div . and Xampfgruppe 

6- 

D .A4,r* together (the loth Ps .Div. with all elements arrived now) 

-rill attack the pass positions (B 3.4) . The 10th Pz,Div . will atdaat: with 2 

. battalions over Hill 974, to the north and later turn zreatzrard in the dirootion 

of Ogrixu3 . 

V7111 .;. attack 

712 to . .'tho nortlmest (A.2, 3) . 

The 2d Bn . Pz.Gron .Rgr .Africa mid Bn .5 B©raagliari 

' 'the 5th Bn.Ikruagliori is adti"anoliT, ainao 1025 hr frog: Hill

.. 7 - 

XU the noun }rpurS the 5th Bn.Bersaglieri and the let Bn Pz,, CGron.Rgt, 

Africa are advancing slowly in the direction O~rino - 812. The artlllory 

is active on both sides. 

Araored Inf. I 

At 163''.1 hr alanentz of the 10th Pz .Div .( 4/Battalions, 2 Artll ry Day) end 

Xampfgruppe D.A.1, again launoh tho att.;aak on the entire front. 1hoy galzn 

ground rapidly thanks to well plaoad fire of a-tillvry and z:ortarrn In U;'e: 

left aeotor the lot Big,, fz. Grvn.Rgt ., offootivoly supportad on Its right 

,lank by the 5th bareagliarl Bn., driven tho crteny out of the peas to the 

northwest, The enemy is still, holding out at the north exit of 1ko pass 

with strong forces and also tanks. The commanding general therfiforo dooidoa 

1to launch the Armored Bn,Btotton against th&a eneW, In atronuous 1Yghtlng 

the battalion suconads in annihilating 12 'many tanks and 51 armored porconnol 

òarricars ., fha+ s,tt k is effeativoly supported by ole=ntu of ttio loth PZ, 

`Die, advanoizig over paint 974" 

At ?,Eil5 hr the onosnpr is north of point 700 (An-4) . The tuattalion 

anatainues ~1.ts grctsr3wra end rvaohan the north exit ofthe pass 7 km nort}i of 

Chansbl (hzi.5), Lvsz1 before this uhdmy movexir3nts to the rear had bean observed 

end engaged by our artillery fire . Uiv,Cmntaurota sneered battalion, in roedi-- 

naes for pursuit, rocsiv+nd the order to fall in before drarlaxnaa to ttrcr north- 

west ate reach Hir Bzikst (9 keen northwest of C3uaa:vi ) . 1 he battalion advances 

to liir Brika and - puithss 3 krn beyond without: rorjing ire contact with tlao onamy . 

In compliance with the O.B. w a instructions the orders for the-night and 

for 21 Fob . are issued, after nightfall, The 10th Yz .D3.v. -,,All tra o over the 

defense of the eastern part of the pass (eciet: of Wadi Hatab) and soma of its 

elomon'..s will attack during the night beyond this point to the north . The 

X321 be 

a®otor south of pledi Flatotr is protected by iiampfgrru:,po D.A .K . for that pur- 

pose the rein.E'orved 5th I3oreagltmri TSn . and the reinforced 1st Bn., Y£ .! :ra2; . 

Rgt: . Africa will be put in the advanced line . For the defense 1;11a jth Barsa-

,. 8u~,.~w ah 

r 

_ . ,. 

was killed at 

Fought valiantly today . (its , 'oamnnder :Ddl An the front; - ) 

'~.vill bo - placed wilder thocontrol or P% . Vraa .j'1gt.Afrioa . 

Àrmored Ba,Stottan will vithdraw to the area soath of Chanbi for avail- 

ability, while the 33d Recon.Su . relarorood by an Arm, Eng .gn., 1 11rlxt £Sold 

horitaor .battery and armored olement-a of Div. Coatauro reocivas tats order to 

short to march at midnight alone the road to the northraat an advanô acs far 

as the passes at Dj, al Hamra a:,A take nosseasion of tha lain pac9 '0y, rur:>rlso 

1f possible . (p .6-11) 

Wanix~, raporU An .6 - 12 n.12 

Progress roport ,p:Y3 

Wed -air 9Rtivity 'on both sides becauso of poor visibility . Out of h 

attaa1cing onmw plmwa'3 were shot down . 

:AYW., order for' . the now sot up of the ahalA of co-,=ed . Moordingly the 

Arse Ib, .un Panaorarray has taken over the counnnd in the aotth e rotor. All 

tea elements of they First Italian `lirmy and oftie nfttz G%- .Ian ?rmy veacia 

are at `present engaged 3.n attao' f inomeal Tunisia avill be pleoad under 

the control of F,U.RozanaI at: Group Rorsw11 until . farther orders the3 1Yrst 

Italian Army 3.s also under hits arders (An.13, l4) . 

21 February 1,943 

Bsoause of obstruction of the pass road the r&luforcexl 33d Raoon.5n. vma 

waablo 'to launah its Counterthrust at 4000 hr ; It &1d so at 0200 hr (An. l ) . 

' 3,ixtean kilometers north of the pass the battalion cane upon an unsupr group 

of 20 vohialos whioll, upon attack o£ then battalion, withdrew to the nortfruest . 

An.2,3) . . The battalion'aoutIrwas to edvanoo, doetroyri I arlaorod r~-coruxalscanoo 

oar :.and 1 antitank gun and attempts to encircle cue:w roarg-uard (an .W. At 

thv battalion 

firrt the enory vithdraws, but at 0500 lxr attacks/with ~-0 vchicles irioludirZ 

tanks (tin . 5) and at Qur 0o hr wlthdraws arain to the north,roct . (Azzi .6 ) .

iT7" 

Ixt the pass position the night passed quiatly . 

An order frcz X1.0.1-: . 

. .. ., : . 

croup 11tmal) is roooivod for 21 ~Ilbruury . It conour .- wit?, tlzo 

Instruotioaa isaund oruily ra-Ld by tolophonos to hold tho pass poC{Lion, 

and, sand stronc recoznAisuruicmn in tlar dirootian Of Dj, 101 , i 11S3 10th 

will uttaok with a oorsb~t rrnup In t~zo d3.1act-lon o .'.' 1'.:r.?a . The ro» 

1S.eP of the . - 

=tor ayolo battalion of V -.0 1Mh 1z .Dj-z . in the oast p-rt of ::1_a pa-c by 

,f&ruppp D,A. Z. will by prgpurad, Thci road uc:oawr"r.c - Tti; ?,^_ -s111 ba tho 

boaadary battvrocr& the 10th a 

tulle witch the 30La P%*Div . tiia old bouv:ary Yladi iiatob la X-7-stIM retainod, 

a xoport boing moat to A.O,XC. (Fuz.?. An .3) : At c1Cyur3ak t

10 - 

.tbora unttil the arrival 4f K=p£gruppe D.A.K. wtdoh will come for rd out 

balk of the 

of the pass ` etV .06 hr . "The/10th 1-z .Div. will move at the sate tim an 

1hola (p,2-8) .' . 'The raid of the 33d Reo.Bn. failodj the battalion rlont in- 

t6--positron north ofthe' trail loading to the main paoe at point 732 at 

tadi Hatob' (An.W. 

At 1400 hr the bulk - of'thd Karnpfgruppe moves in in the order namods 1 

battalion o£ Pz'.Qrun,Rgr . Afrioa,artillery, 1 battalion Pz.Crf:n.Rgt . Africa, 

tank8,`-5th Dn.F Bersaglieri .' The foremost battalion joins the loft iAnnk 

of ,.the'3.3d Reo.Ba.at 1530 hr and prepares on both aides of the :%aasoa for 

an attach to the' mrthwast . 

--' W0 hr the battalion reinforced by tanks of the Div.Centauro (An-15) 

. . . , south of P,732 strong 

launoheo . the' attack (p"9) trhioh is ohooked/by inoreasingly/arty fire (p .10,11) . 

Our artillery, ready to fire in a vrry short time can only engago onemy vot2iclos 

and adveuaaad onenV positions. The positions of the enemy artillery (4. btrios) 

am, not been spotted . 

t; `~ . F-sti=ta of the situation at night falls 

The mission assigned at noon for the opening of one of the two pausas 

tO'`Tebessa could not We oxcouted, as the foroos brought forward Mtil tho 

afternoon wero too strongly hindered by the of foot of one artillery :ire . 

--The 

attitude of the enemy leads to the oonoluuion that he no lon or in- 

tends to hold bridgeheads west of itie paseas . It can be assumed, however, 

that'he will defend the passof proper on 22 Peb. also . '' 

The terrain between the positions we have r;!achod and the north pass 

51 

(Kranguat ae 8loughi) 1s very level, offers hardly any oovor and can bo v:ewdd 

exoeptioually Troll from than - do-Atant iaountain positions on both aides of the 

pees . - 'The strength'of our %ampfgruppe, especially of our infantry, indicates 

that a froatal attack, as mall me one from the riorticaDt would bo hopoloss . 

An attack from the south along the east ridge of D j . firms is rc joot .:d booauso

of constant flanking threat. For a night xkJaL surprise raid against 

the north pass the oneW forces aean too strong oo:arAarod to the ones rra 

can oozudt and the varied ooaforrmtions of the terrain in the rivrth pass 

too difficult. 

A systexatioally planned attack against the south pass is alrro v cry 

difficult Considering the comparatively wsak oorbat strength of t)t3 Kumpf- 

Gr", since strong flauUng socurit,,r detachments must bca detached . H=- 

ever, the terrain conditions thare are more favorable, as Dj . ol Adira atrot

During the night and also by dAy aezroral 

Bersaglied Bn, (roinforcod by 2 Italian batteries 6.5om and a Gorsrfan heavy 

antitatxx oompazq) ooouples positions in the proscribed area . Against the 

order of the Corps t1lo motor vahioles are taken into the positione and loft 

there ., The Pz .Gron*Rrt. Afrioa and the artillery of the KumpLgruppo are ro-r 

grouping, Booauao of terrain difficulties they naroh of t1lo fz . Gron.Rgr . Africa 

long' 

isldelaysd . Tho regiment happens upon the anogy by surpriaa (p.1) call takes 

Ei . guns and about 30 . motor. vohiolvs, bub during the dqy it loom t1lem 

again. ,.dt day brook it is fouzA - that durln the night the r"jgi=nt has Bona - 

out of its and is now at Hill 812, 9 )=.ooath" aouthoaat of the ordorod 

an 

objsotivo. WOWS the -regiment is opposed by onorV ivi about 

the strvrp-th of a. regimcmt ln=dxmtb~g dafonding the pass road lending Trope 

the north an Aino bau Q?rioa . to lat -, Bn.,Pz .C-ron .Il1;t .Ai'rioa 

the morns 

22 February l')43 

auoooods iti 

alll 812 a6oupiod by the snow, but the ro(;imcut, 

supported . by part o£ our artillery only and taoinG in an open terrain a 

is not possible to carry out the mission. 

pours . fllo 9th 

superior enarq, remains in a dangerous situations, as the left flank in 

which the 580th Reo.Bn. was to be is ".mprafvoted. In such a aituation 1.t 

*b In the right flank the situation develops as fellwo during the 

infantry 

morningi 'The erneW diaangngad tsuYf, He asam.a to have somv~saoursty 

detaotments opposite the 5th baraegliori Bn. ' In addition, before who front 

of the battalion several enaetf tanks and zdxt salt propollad mounts are hold- 

ing then positions under ethift fire (An.5). lho dofensive foroo of the b&tta- 

lion is poor ., broovar, oonsidorizg the Italian uentality, it ie dot>bt£ull 

whether the battalion is equal to further heavy dutioa . A~;oordingly then 

armored group (Da.8tottun, Armored Dn . and assault guza of Div.Coatauro)

13 .. 

reoeive the order that the envzV in front of R the 5th Dn.Dorsagliori is 

to - be'throym bask to the 'pass ciatranoo, 

At 0x930 -the 33d Roo,Ur6 raporta 25 enemy tanka a=in from tlio great, 

advanoing 4" lqu' north Of- our ponitiaxt (point 732 (An-6) . On the basis of thin . 

report 'on the new onegr group Ps. aron #Rgt,Afrii4a rooeivoo the order to with- 

draw 1 , bnttaiion and - put it in line north of the trail on a line fIth bhe 

Corps diP." . l1eaionr-protection of the deep north flank (P ,2), 

' The`rogimnt reports by telephone that it is under very atrong 

artillery fire, that to detach one battalion,is pocaible only at the risk 

fQ.a.t" 

Qr he4v.VIlosnae,' ",the line. rowhed oannot be dxtendecl held -with one batter. 

lion only . Thereupart the order to repealynd . The artillery regroups according 

VO l the * ohanGed situation* . 

v-K- 

.`; . :' In . the moefiios pressure S . the front of the 5th Bn,Barsaglieri has bean 

eased . by * .a tank attack of our'om, (Anw7, $) , Armorcsd Bn.Stotten roponto that 

x" ont (3.5 ku in . front of the 5th Bn.Beraagliari)) tanks and 

Ifatitry are in poeiti " ~; battalion in under strong artillo~y fire ; it' 

is impoeslblo to advanoo farther (Anr9. 10), 

Therefore at 1245 hr it reoelvos the order xdc to vrithdraw to the position 

,of the 9tsh Dn.Borgagliari (p.3) and to raaain in position there as rosorvn 

of the battalion, 

Rae.Da. - ropartd that the . onmq group north of point 

has been by 

7"Mpid'Y 'reinforood Matt 100 motor vihiolea, including 40 tanks 

(An.II;' An q 12 p.4 )* RaV~er the enfW group docrz not advance a ainat the 

. .4.k! 

D,*A,;% in the ecftarnoon (An.13,45), 

vohiolea drive from Aou 

Rhanen to the northeast in the direction of the advance route of the 10th Pa . 

Die, j the division is informed of the foot (A . O. K. also) P.5, P .6) 

During the noon hours the Pz.tlren.Rgt.A£rica'IA"-aC,.ain under heavy

Y 

4rtUleky-tfira:t ThA ; mortar batte :in position with the regimnt loses 

I ~ of ;its . . gu .,, ~~nsmdr : oouratere~ttsoks are repulsed . 

At - 1415 hr, on the basis of the devalopwnt of ttv altuation the oorr- 

Anding Coneral deoid*A to order a . withdrawal on Kassorino pass for tonight . 

A.a .T,* is inteteuotod (P.7r' P.8) . 

The Q.S,offioor in oluirga of Supplies and AdrAnistration, prosoat at 

the O.P. in oa=issioned '..o report orally at A,c,K. on t.-he dcvolopmontl of 

the situation; Arur-approves of the corps' intention and ordara tho ocou ,- 

patioa-of ,ths - bid I=ra position attar the withdrawal . (An.15, 17) . 

a 

1505' hr . The orders-for the vrlthdraval are issued (p .9 - 13). 

1600 hr ., The Corpa - shittts its O .P. The oomfutndina ganorv1 =off remains un- 

t1l dark at the old O.P. 

. . . ` Durin& -the . forsnoon- there vas oray voa~ air aotivity, but in the after- 

. $nor 

noon .the%ntt~gkad - several times of th bombora and £ightera in low-level flying . 

4 maohines sera shot down. 

At 1720 hr the PsOran.Rgt,Afrioa sports an attack on the advanood (Ist) 

battalion from'the eouthwast (An.19), wid lacers oritioal situation 

them : ("19) . 

F3 '-Rgt~ -135 and- the artillery commander are ihstructed to rolieve tna 

preasure on the - ragimnt *jr- odWvntratod fire . Shortly before dark onomV 

tanks panotrate into the positions of the battalion. the b u3k of the battalion 

1 

Vithdrawu in -disorder at first, -h%*MW' r, but raly, later* The 5th Bn. Bcrrsa- 

glieri is also attackod just before dark by sove isolated tanks and abandon 

its positions leaving vAW motor . vehicles and a11 4 hoa :y vcapana behold . 

At : 1900 hr near corps c,P. at Hill 735 volt of Cha:,bi . 

The withdrawal - is made difficult by the rriddy condition of the trails . 

At cons places only oross-country motor vohicloa oe+n manage the qur-r, ::1re 

°+ t G~ C. 

wwthout help ., As Pt,Gren.Rgt.Africa is unable to =mss oavoriz,-, pooition

at ,14* Au1ad DIC :in tire; : the Corps ordars the 33d Ree,un . and Armorad 13n. 

Stottan to cover .tho withdrawal . Col .1'solz, oonms4er of the 135th Flak 

has the .raiaaion to rcgulste the withdrawal n4rah on ti -4 j:ain ;r3t:h- 

dravval trail, .and the co=oWer of the N.Corps Signal Dn . is entruobcd 

with the traffic regulations at the narrow pawn road o£ Kassorine pass 

At the brad plaoea on the road to the roar torodn!r parties 

trill. keep the traffic going . For tlia prot&otion of the west o,rtranoo of 

the pace until, the arrival of Pz . Crren .11 t. Africa the oozriandArC general 

is putting the 3d Co . 7 (10 Pz.Div,) and D.A.K, artillery trainln sLaff 

in - line . The 10th . P .Div, *111 be inetruated . 

. 

At 2130 tl~e33d Reojn. and Arrnorvd Dn.Stotten report that the 5th Pn.Ur- 

'QALAIvrl~ is coattered. fhe . batted6nne tire the last elorwnts to brork can- 

taot with the eat (Art+20, 21). At 2.300 hr a report is roooivod froa ."P e 

0ren.R.gt.Afrioa aaoording to ahioh the regimnt after the taithdrnwal at 

roar guards: has broken =a contact with the onenV. (An.22) . 

At 2330 hr thu 33d Rea.t. wh9.ah is h=bL+m* aotinC, an raar guard in 

the Hir.0uled Sif region repents that at no point Is the oueW fol1 ovwin; 

Evening reports "2L~-26, p.20 

The attmPtt0 Of -KaPpfgruPPO A.A.K. to vpeu the passes neat of Toba:ssa 

prity 

on 21 end 22 February fti-saarried as a result of the suparioriA=C~M of the 

enmtq vho had. broom forvard now forass . Tho oonduet of oporaticaa vma 

made more diMoult through the a+coidontal splitting of forces vrhioh oocurrod 

on 22 February .- - .TbO 21st PX .Div . (Sld.ba) and the loth Pz,Div . (zwith of 

Thala') were fighting . hard dofanaivn action on 22 Rebruary G;ainst newly 

Seat brought up ( -British) forces . In the,evening the 10th fc .D,y,;r . in also 

boginaing to withdraw on Kassarine pass . On 23 February the Corps cxpoots 

that the enaV -*111 - attempt to raoapture Kaseerlno pass . The do£, uuive power

It. 

of D.A.S. is deemed adequate-if all alemants are in posit~'-on on time . 

Therefore moasures'arill be takon to aasuro the vrithdraival of thj antiro 

Kampfgruppe during the night. 

The now Chief of Staff, Lt.Col . tdoltv, r.S, arrives at the C .P . in the 

evening o£ 22 February . 


. During the. : daY . weather olear and oloudy by turns ; no tog . The Smpf 

gmgpe withdraw to Hasserine pass durirp the night . After the initial name 

went 

_ .thts :zno anrsat on ovelly though slowly . Almoat all the guru and vahioles 

-which hod stuok in the =d could be ealvaged, The 33d Rco . Un. vhjoh Me 

se a 

reportW several . . times that the oneW is mt in pursuit, leaves at 0300 hr 

~the area Mr Oiled Slf, the last unit to withdraw (an .1-3 ). 

.At damn the last 6l=onta are moving into the pass position (An-4-9. 

At;.074 ,he oommanding general. arrives at mho advanood C .P. There T.o 

-reocive _the prdere .tor the intended movements : 

. -~x.e . .. .The . attack in Central Tunisia is fimml2y broken off . Gruppo 

._ . , R l will withdraw. The aalaments will otart to mroh to tho 

. . :- . . bhreth position as rapidly as possibld . 

_: 2, . Aftor being relieved in the pane position by the 101ch Pz.Div . 

D,A.S, will withdraw to the area Thelepto, Feriana. Idasiou : 

to relieve Div.Centauro which will move to the Gafna circus, and 

to oo7er the fhvlepte area until ooraplation of the de»olitions 

. ., . . : , of road and stationsMelepto and Gafaa. 

T°day the . following troops in the l axa ..h positiank . 

regt.8gs. aW 2~ A;DtV J$t . Std'°;L tz 7a1c, ° 

Of Aiv,Centauro 

"° t n

of the . let $try., *Oth Arty rdll be released. 

4 

` Further withdrawal from Tholepte on Gasa only upon order . 

Demolitions and mine layirig tiill be mod 

on railroad, roads and airfields all along the rmy to the rear . 

G . P. the 

Chief of Staff regulates the arraii;araent'of the KOMPfgru ;>po in the pass po- 

sition. 

While the oo=aanding general is still at the advanood A 

After the aomnanding general and the chief of ataf£ !off returned to 

the Corps" C:F, - the orders for the mrah ware issued . Kanpfgruppo will ~v-- 

part at 1300 hr-in small groups at long intervals. The relief of the rEi-- 

in£oraed rz.Oren,Rgt.Afrioa by the lot Bn.,10th Px . .Uiv, will be arranrfld 

trith the . 10th Pz. Div. (p.2-9). . 

1300 hr' : .OrB . ,. to the E attacked . nding General (telvi Div.Contauro is being 

the eno And is under strong enmny fire . Transfer to Th&lep~o to be' - aeool- 

'crated, elements to be seat there lmadiaVly. 

The 33d' Reo,B11. and the 1st Ba., 4th ArmorodRgt . receive the order to 

move i=ediately on Tha lepte (B 10-12, An.10 ). 

In the forenoon the eneW fait forvaird with tanks and snout ours against 

'the'rpositions. r`rom 1100 hr the harassing fire of heavy, long-distance artillery 

lies on the`Chanbi . regioa. EhoW units of combat planes, twin engines fUnos 

and Pighter'bombers attack the march movements several times in tree afternoon. 

1.345 hr . The Qo=aandinr General leaves for lhelepte . 

.500'-hr ' The Coraaanding OonQral arrives in Thelopto . Thorn the situation 

is altogether calm (P-13) 

1520 hr Conference at the C .P. of D1v.Contauro. Pr:sent: Corr=ding Generals 

3.at Ord .4fficer, Coanaandor 334 Rea .'t=n.,Com :z:andor and Oper.offinor ofDiv. 

Centauro. 

1. Situation before the (rants oalnj watt©rod - artillory harassing fire 

w 

R,

an advawod soourity detaohmnta .. The division was not attacked . 

2. , Roliaf : In Tholepto and in Gouboul lass t%a ol0onts of the division 

tote.+, 

in position thero ragy depart 4~2 2z.Gron.Rgt.Africa or 3jd Reo .I3n . arc 

ready for defense (presumably at 2100 hr). zlomonts which have pushed 

to Oglet Dou Iiaya can depart at 2L~00 hr (ooiaplotion of th.3 movownto 

on the Basaorine-lbolopte road) . 

After arrival in the Thelepto arcs the lz-t Bn.,IIth Pz ..Rgt . will main 

at first at, the northeast edge of Thelepte . 

1555. hr The Ccmnanding General to O.B. by telephone: tlic Comr-mndi,,r&Gon;--,-al 

. the 

reports on the situmtioa and the. progress . oflrolief. 

At 1715 hr report of Italian units are received through various chonnols ; 

they rontion 25 vehicles, tun}ra 

tions at Oglot Bou £rya . (An.11, 12, p.~711.) A reoonnaissanoe by the tat -Un. 

8th Pz.Rgt. disolosos that they arc our ozva troops, driven a- - by the fire 

of .Italian . artillery. . 

The march of the Corps Is disrupted several times by bou .S at'cmokz . 

At :t 2015 hr the Pz.Grcn.ggt.Africa has moved in the new positions north of 

Thelepte (An:13-15). 

7ho relief of Div, Centauro goes on systematically . 

Evening reports Au, , .p"15 

them, waieh are approaoU :4; the poci- 

At PjPO hr the Army Fng.En, begizms mining the %asserino - Tholopto{(An.22, 

23, p.lb, i7), . 

21i February 1943 

During the night eneW guns which have boon brought foramrd lay harassing 

. by 

fire on the Feriana-Thelspto road. Two attempts v& oneLV rcconnaisonncfl 

patrolu to penetrate in the ' Goubeul pass terra repulsed . Tho mining of the 

EassQrinee-Tholopte road is continued (An.l, 2, n .l, 2). 

. w

Gruppe Roanrol announces that F.ILRo=ol haz taken . the high comaand o1, 

"Asareagruppa 'ACriku" D.A.X~ is plaocd under tho direct control of the 

Iisereagruppo (An.j), In modification o£ the inatruations iasuod on the 

previous day the Arry Group Givaa the order far the def ensa of the Fu'riaza 

area and for withdruval on Gafra only 3f hard proceed by t:ic anew (An.1.). 

the the beois of this order +JYo Commanding General requests the retention of 

the 1st Bn.,r3th Pz.Rgt and 1SL Bu.,19Oth Arty in 4,-he FSriona area (n.3) . 

T3zo request is donicd . (A.5) iho Ist Bn.,Cth Pz.P.zt. and lot Bn.,190Eh Arty. 

(loss 1 battery) receive thQ order to vrithdraw vin Gafaa Into the :wroth 

area (-P,4, 5)e. D.A.K. reports the da£easo cannot be carried out with tho 

forces available (p.6).

27 

11 Corps, Report of Operations, 1 January-15 

March 1943

4 1 

SUBJECTS Report of Opo rati ~~ - 

TO s The Adjutant General, U . S . Army, lYashintton, D.C . 

SECTION I - TM SATIN TASK FORCE 

SECTION II - OUSSELTIA VALLEY - SEt1ED DIVERSION 

SECTION III - SIDI BOU ZID - GAFSA 

SECTIOM IV - KASSERIM. VALLEY TiMUST 

SECTION V - ADIMIISTRATIVE 

Supporting troops eonsistod of the: French Constantine Division. 

lt . D-Day for the _x,cution of tho SATIPT OPERATION arts 

10i 

tentatively set 

for 22 January 1943 . Prior to D-Day, th. ; unomy rushed reinforcements a ~r 

UNutA~;SCi ILG 

:By Authority of 

:CG, II Corps . s 

: initials 

.Date : 2 IWOay . : 

2 may 194 . 

-_ Report of operations II Corps from 1 Januar;" 1943 to 15 march 1943 is 

horoby-submitted in compliance irith paragraph 10, AR 345-105: 

SECTION I - THE SATT11 TASK FORCE 

II Corps, under verbal authority AFHQ, was selected to pun"and" 

oxooute operation SATIN. The initial studies for operation SATIN prior-to 

1 January 19113 were prepared by Fifth Army under the direction of AFHQ . 

2, The II Corps staff assembled for the planning - of Operation SATIN is 

of 2400 hours, 31 December 1942 at the Alexander Hotel, City of Algiers . 

'_'_3on its arrival at Algiers, the staff was given tha mission of preparing 

-.hrce phi "A", "a", and "C" . Final choice as to Which of tha three plans : ;I 

"A", "B"4 or "C", to bc: put into effect was to be made by the C-in-C, AFHQ . 

Plans "p", "B", ad "C" all required an initial concentration of the SATPT 

TASK POWE in the TEBZSSA - MSSisRS1z area. In Plan "A", the SATIN TASK FORCE 

- :;c.s to sieze and hold the Port of SFAX, pr.;pared.to operate northwest is the 'r. 

"direction of SOUSSE . In Plan "B", the SATIN TASK FORCE was to'sieze and hold .~ 

prepared to operate: north tm-Tard SFAX . In Plan "C" the SATIN T..SK 

FORCE Ms to advance on and capture Kl'.IRGUI.h . After securing KAIROU121, the; 

force : was to advance on and capture SOUSSG, being prepared to destroyethc 

port, bridges, utilities, Ltc ., if forced to withdraw . 

3 . The $dTIN T,'-SK rORCZ vras directly under the command of *LrIQ as of 

1 January 1943 . For this operation, thQ force consisted of the following 

major units : 

Headquarters II Corps . 

1st hrnorud Division_ plus 701st TD Bn . 

41.,3rd CA Bn . (-1 Plat. Dtry I.) and 2nd Bn ., 16th Tied . Regt . 

attached . 

26th RCT plus 5th F.A . Bn. and 501st TD Bn . attached 

XII Air Support Command. 

f" 'f

Report of D eration: ;I -)z - s, ' Vay hi1,3 cnt= 

supplies to ilinisia aria :YJ-LS, &-id reinforce- 

Lezts were arriviiii, at t : :e rate ~: aPoroxinately 800 per day, pri-ci-a11; 

by air . Supplies were s:iipped by sea and so:ae sun:ilies were 

fron SFAX - and SOUSSi to Tr_IPCLI for the use of RO=1- ], :L I S M-15 which 

--was hard--pressed by the British Lightly Axmrr. The eneryl s rtcniion at 

this time was to ::eep tie eastern coast plains fron i%3 ; ;IS to TRIPOLI open 

- for a joining of the T1:iiS1:Ui forces and the :.FPIKA COaPS . k north and 

south range of no..zatains, knrnri as the PJ_ST1:k: ; DORSAIS, overlooks this 

coastal corridor . Prior to D-Day the enenWls defensc'of the .AST:;%'. ; DOPL.~jz 

in the proposed SIL-,Ill TASK :OrC% zone of action was based Senerally on the 

occunatioa of a series of detached positions coruian,:in- the four rlain apprcac'. : 

es at f(M)0U1 ;, .DJFDa ~AMMSSY, and EL GUZTTAR. Behind these outposts, 

as of 10 Janauary, at BOv TRADI and at LA :CUC^:MERIE, were approximately 

two battalions of mixad German and Italian troops . These battalions 

were capable of reinforcing the outposts within 12 hours . Enamor reinforcenents 

continued to arrive at the rate of approximately 800 per day . 

On 5 January 1943, the SATI*1 Staff moved from ALGII-RS to C06!STA !T- 

LIE to continue plans of the SATE' Operation . ahile the plans were being 

drawn from 1 January to 17 January, troops under the SATII1 TASK -CRCE were 

moved to initial concentration areas behind the British First Arry . Thos`.: 

areas were as follows ; 1st Armored Division in t1w areas T:. OGSOUK and 

,CUM SECUINT; 26 the areas GGEI;A and AIL' 11I LIIA ; and service troops 

In the areas- COMA2ITINE and .SSA . These concentrations were preparatory 

to concentration in the i'a.SSA - KASSERIItir, area . A secondary mission of 

girding the lines of coucnnications for the British First ArT was assi.ncd 

to the-SATI21 FO "' troops in these areas . A small infantry and paratroop 

force" under Col 

_oAR area . 

l Raff was at t_iis time operating in the - GAFSA - EL GfLT- 

lbila : the above concentrations were g oirn~; on, a reserve of 10 days' 

-supplies of-all classes ivas built up in the TEBESSA - KAS5 M area pric: 

to .Day. .Supplies were drawn from the British First Ar%V and from the 

OW _and' ALOJMs areas . The SPLTI?1- TASK p=E assumed the responsibility 

for ad d ni.atration east of the line TEBFSSA - 110RSOTT . 

. ~, ., ~ .Aa ;.engineor .depot was ostablishc.A in the vicinity of TEBESSA prior 

to D-Day. Water supply was the responsibility of cmiranders concerned; 

with information as to available water supply points being; furnished by' 

the _Engineer Officer . . Water distributing points were established after D- 

Day by the Water Supply Company. 

8 . Initially, an ;vacuation hospital and medical supply depot were 

established in the vicinity of CO:ZTAIITI]IE . One medical battalion was astablishod 

under Corps control in Vic vicinity of TII3i,SSA and a second medical 

battalion was attached to the lst Armored Division . 

' 9. . The,-wIN TASK FORCZ ansanition supply point was established at 

~ TBE;A and maintained a stock of four units of fire . Forward amruuiition 

.' supply points wore established close behind combat troops throughout opera- 

Lions and a .one-unit-of-fire, level maintained . The Provisional Ordnance 

Qroup provided 1iahencod ordnance :maintenance service to all units . Ton 

~W.sss,I and Class III supplies were assembled in TEBI~-SSA and a signal 

;QepRt established p4ooo'DrDa~y. 

JUN CU-, :61F ;_j

SLCR--T 

Report of Operationsi Uq. II Corps e _2 2,'.ay 19113 (CoLitimed), 

10 . Zffective dark, 17 January, SATIJJ FOPCE troops bogan movomont 

from- GOI:STANT.1N~ - ,GUEWA are* *_to .TMMSA -'ASS-MM - SMITLA areai 3z+d 

Bn .,' 26th .Inf.,, ruiaforced, eras in GAM aroa and 2nd Bn ., 26th Inf . at - . ~- 

KASSI'Mr . 

11 . End ground forces during 17 January to 21 January in the~-Seotor 

of the line- FG1JDOUK to Gk= (inclusive) were estimated to be equivalent 

to, one strong division composed of Italian Infantry and armored -elimontB 

reinforced b;* minor ulemants of Gorman infantry and armored forwe . The 

scale of enemy rei.iforcemonts remained constant at about 800 per dmq. Armored 

strength in this area %7as about 100 to 115 light and medium tanks 

e:elusive of the tank strength of the 10th Panzer Division wl"Ich was'ivrth 

of KfiIROUlLN . On 21 January, incidentally, one day prior to SATIN D-Day s, 

the enemy successfully disrupted the French front, secxwed p0NT DIT F!M 

and penetrated down the POI4T DU FLIH5 - RO&U VALLEY . AFT;Q iaaodiate],y- or 

dered a postponement of the execution o£ SATIN Operation. Due to 'the above, 

G(-;zcral Bard, commanding the 1st Armored Division, initiated a rocaesnaissa.mce 

by direction of General Fredendall and rocoamnended that the SATIN 

Plan lx-- carried out as of the 22 January as planned .-dth minor alterstioro 

to meet the changed situation:' . 

SECTION II - OUSSrÙ.TIA VI,LLE'Y - SMIED DIVISION 

1. A directive issued 1200 hours, 21 January, by AFpq, signed by 

General Truscott was received . A suLzaary of this directive was as follows : 

iq ollowing measures will be inplcaa-nted imaediately to chuck German offen 

sive . El~.ments First Iay under British command tirill operate southeast 

and souti: in direction ROB.rA and OJED M KEBIR northeast of RO&,1 to cut 

off and block encmr advance, General Robinett's Force (CC' 1B", 1st Armd . 

Div.) is placed under command General Juin for o-perations cast or west of 

CrL .a`.tiD~ DOrSi.LE as situation requires . This force will ba cr.ployed as con-plete 

unit under General Robinett and not split into detachments . Goneral 

Juin Trill notify all conceni.~d as early as possible of mission assigned to 

this force . General Frodendall tiTill reconstitute reserve including armored 

units and artillery in area SB.-ITU, to be employed under ads corraand in su" -~port 

of French sectors M:DOUK and PICKON . Operations are being coordinated 

,:ith General Juin . "' 

2 . To meet tiffs threat from the north, CC'B" was dispatched to the 

CT :-:.S;LTL1 VyC,Lc:7 . 2nd Bn ., 26th Infantry (plus 33rd F1 Bn .) marched to 

il'jKT.,R. night 21-22 January. General Ward reconstituted a force from the 

1st Armored Division at SB::ITL, similar to CC'B", night 21-22 January, preparud 

to attack F0?:DOUK 23 January and observing FOMOUK, P=USSY and 

approaches to G:tFSA from WBES . With the dissolution of the S:.TIti FORCZS, 

the junction of time ~FRIKiL CORPS and the enemy forces in Tunisia became 

inevitable . 

3 . Colonel Fechet, couw.andin- infantry troops in OUSSELTLk VaLLZY 

area, assembled his ~orcd in the vicinity of :LXKT1.R . The 2nd Bn., 26th 

Infantry and 33rd Fh Bn . reachad EL,KT;dR by daylight, 22 January. The 1st 

Bn., 16th Inf ., marched frog CU.& :A to r l,TAR night 22-23 January. Combat 

Corn:and ":;'I had assc:rabled in the vicinity of SB.:ITL'L by daylight, 22 January.

Report- of Operations, Iiq II Corps, 2 May 19113 (Continued ) . 

4 . In compliance with letter, :.FIIQ Advanced Cor.-iand Post, dated 211 January 

1f1t3, the II Corps (S:,TIll FOrCL) was attached to the Dritish First ArvW 

and the Coi ,~zanding General, British First Array, conoral Anderson, made responsible 

for L:u oriploynont of American troops in accordance with "cneral policies 

:.:ado known by the C-in-C . In accordance with lst GrnV Instruction No . 11, Comrmndi:zg 

Ganural, II Corps, assumed coruiand of ,;round troops of all_ throw nationalities 

operating south of t: : : --,n ,:ral line all exclusive MORSOTT - TKNLP. - 

S3=1 all inclusive DJ TROZZi. - F011DOUK - SIDI 2'M iL 1u~L:ItI thence exclusive 

)of SOCTSS,~ and north of the -oneral line exclusive the line of the CHOTTS to 

The nissicn of II Corps . as d --fined by :.fIIQ was the protection of the 

right flank of the Allied Forces in Tunisia . 

In addition to the 1n,.:ric n Infantry and Armored Forc :;s in the OUSSi:L- 

TLN V,- :LL=, there were a-dproxinately two 13ns . of French Infantry in position 

on DJM%L B.IRCOU . These troops vr;sre also placed under the coin :and of Colonel 

Fce:ict . - Gcnc;ral Robinett was in conmand of the armored units . 

6 . on 26 January, the 26th CT attacked K.IIROULN PASS in the OUSSELTIA 

~:;hLI;y and took 400 Italian Prisoners . 16th RCT less lst and 2nd Bns . and 7th 

F;, D-t. bivouaced east of 1L-',KT;.R . CC"B" was in contact with the enemy and hold 

ing along the 1UdROU:uj-OUSSj;LTL-, road . Patrols to IL.USOLLLh and IL,Re:CIi;:U1j - contacted 

the British at 1-,USOLLr~r. . 

7 . During those operations in the OUSSELTIA VULEY, the enemy clearly controllc:d 

t::e skies . tic: usually made raids over our positions at 0800 hrs . , 1200 

as ., and 1500 :nrs . In one raid alone, six of our trucks ti-rcre lost . 

8 . On the 28th of January, 26th CT vicinity of OUSS3LTI:. engaged oncrly 

forces cast of the pass through the :;.STEM? DORS:,LE 4:nd took 70 Italian prisoners . 

9 . On 30 January by 10000 hours, the OUSSELTI . :. V_'.LLEY lead been cleared of 

cneriy troops to the OUSS:.LTI.. - 1WROU..:: road and the castorn slope of BEK 

Z-':IOUS . .ncW positions acre r-ported on the north slope of DJEBEL TOUIL.', . 

The cnerL" left man- scatt~red and unmarked .-.line: fi,:lds behind hi : .i indic^ting 

that :lc :iad no intention of rcsuminf; iris push throuEh the PONT-D(J-F~'.HS, ROD',;. 

end OUSS ;LTI :. V:.LLL1' . The .;ne.~.tv, fearing .:n allied counterthrust up the OUS- 

S-L'fl:, V. .LLF;Y dug dcf.:nsiva positions cow;ring tl: .; northern ::xit from -the valley 

. 

10 . :.mile tile: forces under Colonel Fechct and Gcn~ral Robinett ::ere 

assembling in the ROB.'.:. - OUSS : LTI- . area, patrols fror, the Italian garrison at 

: .,,:::L:.SSY became : active in the SF.N3D ST:_TIO:I area . 

11 . On 24 January, the lst ..mored Division less detaclunants made a recoiL-.aissaace 

in force fro., G.:FS:. toward This fore ; : advanced halfway 

b,vucon S`::ZD and 1 : .1C_i:.SSY, mad,- contact with th . : :ncmy and captured 'three trucks, 

20 Cerrk.n Ph's -rid 130 Italian P'vil s . Tae 1st :,r-iored Division lost two medix:. 

tanks, two wcrc l:il?_,.;d and trroe -:owided . By the 28th of January, th .:rc; was 

increased cn-r .rl activity in the EL M,'ETT. .f, area . Th, : French outpost them ;:ad 

b:.;--n attacked b,",- c sa2ll G.2rman notorcyclc patrol . 

12 . ;,s t :-.e Ct":.S~LTI :. I'-LIZ- had 5- .: .^. cle red of t::c cncrrj, CC"B" bras withcra.Irn 

:nd rlovcd to f07: C: .1:31:: . during th- night 23-29 January and the Stack

eport of Operations, Hc- _A Corps, 2 Lay 19 

Continued, 

Farce (CC"C") consisting of one battalion of ucdiun tanks, one battalion infantry, 

and one battalion field artillery, moved to GAFSA to reinforce the 3rd 

Bn., 26th Infantry, which was still f;arrisoning GAFS ;, . The 26th RCT (-2 bns .) 

novod to SB~ITLA . 

13 . On the 30th of January, the Ger_aans initiated an at,ack aL ainst the 

French positions at PAID . (;C"A" under General i :cQuillan, and the 26th RCT 

(-2 bats .) ,marched from SBEITTJ: to reinforce the hard-pressed French -arrison 

at rUD . T::e XII ASC bombed and strafed uneW columns attackinZ FAID continunusly 

. As of 1700 hrs ., 30 January, the small French force garrisoned at F'1ID 

were- reported to be still holding F1ID, but t' -.e jneay had infiltrated units 

to the south and rear of the French positions . By daylight, 31 January, W"A" 

reached its forward assembly areas :lest of FAID and launched an attack against 

t- he e:Lemy positions at FIND . At last light on the 31st, the north prong of 

CC"A"'s attack had reached the eneiV positions which :ere duZ in t:ie foothills 

worth of F*LID . The souV : prong of CC".I"'s attack had advanced north from 

?,x', 110;1 along the cast side of DJEBEL BOU DZLR and had reached the village of 

F:,ID. Throughout the 1st and 2nd o£ February, CC":1" and the 26th RCT attacked 

to restore the FAID positions . Little progress was made . The ahem," remained 

in possession of the high ground co1 :L andinG F:,ID P.:S5 . CC":." had sane forces 

to t:ie south of this pass while tha, French also still retained a rotit positions - 

outh of tae pass . On the 3rd there was a lull in tire fighting in the vicin~_t ;; 

of FAID and General ..cQuillan regrouped his troops for another assault on r,^,-D . 

Tais assault failed to restore the FAID positions . Active caitact :ith the 

anei ;" eras uaintained . The 26th aCT (-2 Bns .) ryas withdraym from this position 

oz 9 Fcbruary and on the 10th the responsibility for the defense of t_ze FAID 

u:-3nroach v:as assigned to General lard, comianding the 1st ;iryaored Division . 

14 . The defense of t:ie F.-.ID approach by General Ward will be treated 

s .,parately under Section III of this report . In the meantime, as this battle 

of F.1ID eras in progress, the forces stationed at GAFS; began an attack against 

15 . Due to the increased activity in the vicinity of EL GUETTAR on the 

28th of January, W"C" under - Colonel Stack moved iron BOLT CIEBKA to G:,FSA . 

i4Len CC";." marched on the 30th of January, to relieve the hard-pressed French 

at F:SD, CC"C" also marched toward FAID frog} GAFSA to reinforce the French 

garrison . 115 W"C" was marching, however, orders :rere received from 1st .:rry 

to attack and seize IMIr:SSY . CC"GO , therefore was turned south at SIDI BOU 

ZID along the road to 1jU1Q1XSSY and the 1st Armored Division less MIA", CC"B", 

and the Stack Force but reinforced by the 1st Bn., 168th Infantry, moved fron 

FOf . C1iM14. to G;,FS:;, closing there at daylight .31 January. Fro;,i G:IMI W"D", 

comgndod by Colonol laraist, and consistinG of a battalion of medium tanks, 

a battalion of the 168th Inf:uLtry, and a battalion of armored field artiller,- , 

advanced on :LVU'..:SSY . Reconnaissance ule:.k:nts of this force passed ST:.TION 

L :IiiOUCfi at 07115 hours, 31 January without coatacting the encr.y . As of 1700 

hours, W"D" was attacking cnunV Positions at S~_!lr:D . This position had bQea 

reinforced by 18 truckloads of enmW infantry during the afternoon . By dark, 

reconnaissance elements had reached within 8 miles _ of : :r;KH;.SSY . The XII :.SC, 

meanmd4le, bombed onomar concentrations at BOU T1i jDI and at ;:SIQI:,SSY, reporting 

many anogr vohiclos dama-Cod . During the niGht 31-1 February, the 2nd Bn ., 163th 

Infantry and the 175th Fl. Bn . ruiriforced W"D" for a coordinated attack on SEZD 

at daylight . By 0916 hours, W"C" had arrived at the DJ : ::,IZIL:. PASS and tivZ.c 

hundinG south to join W"D" . W"D" attacked ST.,TIOi1 SITED at 17.00 hours and 

had captured ST:.TIOi1 SMIED by 1405 :Lours . Patrols from CC"C" and 

h1ul:~;:: ;,~!=iED

Con-)L, 2 1-~L3 

CC"D" ri..t ~.n ti , _- DJ as o_° 111:.:0 isôrs . -? :- aarv, CC"Dlt had captured 

;;:, 1') and the 168th 12T !-ad orb,:nizcd t ..- .._gh Crîind two :.d1cs cast of STATIGi : 

SL_:LD for uofc~ns ;: . Over 100 F;"s wkcn is ti _ vi~'_nit, ;,f S -' :1-) . T'.:roug:out 

the .:a;," , cn`rr,, dive-bo . .ibers ~ttaclccJ o,, -.r troops _-etacen 

and 

16 . .,lthou-;}: tl'L i:nur-W had d,~finlttJy 1ve11 up a`1_; idea o-' a:Ctc :.ipting to 

core throuL;h the 0"SSZLT1_ . W,LLZ -air after :0 s c_L ost di=iastrmrs defeat by 

CC"B", air roco :a:i:issancc rcpor'~od .-no;_:" ccncc : -_trations _,ast -f t:_c 

t SS_:L,L-. pass and in:.xpcrionccu troops woo vrcrQ undul: . - Saar::::~ b;; their prox- 

1 :-:lty to t:? :. enor7 r,'rc:tl,' .. ::ar~ .:ratcd reports of ,rollrd a!l__ .:1r acti-"it :; . 

ascd on th~s_ reports, thcrci or.:, a ncssaL o fro:.: 1st British ..rrw f cc,:ived 

at 1 .119 !:ours, 1 Fcàruary, diri;ct,~d that ::nCo.,:n_nts at S' -= and :'L'.h :L-,SSY areas 

k:iscontinucd as soon as possible, tnat an effort b.; ;-mdc to cl .~ar up eno 

- tositio_ns in tll- FAID area, and that tae a:axinun possible fore :: be conc ::ntrated 

in a :iobil, : r~s.:rvo position in the ar,;a o~ 11:.DJ~3 ~L '10 In- con -)liancc 

:-rith this order, C-11311 moved fron BOU C::to 1l:.DJ:.t3 LL :.IOtr" irnodiatu1y, 

later froze K;_DJZn LL :.IOTT' to 1L.1CTi.R during then night 2-3 February . (1st 

_r.morod Div-ision ).,~ss CC"..", CC"B", CC"C", and CC"D" moved to SB:]ITL:, night 

2-3 Fcbrt"ar,; .) Xring the night 3-!t February, all forces .:xc; pt a r,inforced 

inf

Report of Operations,'-_.i . II Corps, 2 , -:ay 1943, (Contir._ .d) . 

the direction of 1:U1-1USSY approached to within four or five miles of W.FSI. and 

heavy motor movements were observed on the GULi TREE RO:.D . Four or five Italian 

armbred cars and one motorcycle approached HDILL,'. and drove the french back 

slightly to the north. 

2~. To investigate the ene:Vts intentions in the vicinity of G.WSA and 

,ID, active reconnaissance was initiated by our forces . I light mobile force 

supported by air was dispatched from G~.FSE,_ to, investigate tìe str:.ngtli of the 

enemy in t:.e vicinity of Zi. F:OUC .i . This force moved as far east as STATION 

S : . D without contact with the: an;m7. A small mobile force sent fra.1 G:,FSA 

easily restored the situation at :DILLA . The enerv met our patrols in the 

vicinity of F:SD with a withering fire . Elcnents of the ;;frika Corps were 

idenV.fied in this area . 

3 . . *,s stated in Section II of this report, on ]1 February the responsioility 

for the defense of tire FLID position eras asjigned to General Ward, 

Commnding the 1st Armored Division . The scheme of defense was to hold the 

two key terrain features, DJ . YS,lIIU on the south end DJ . ISESOUD:. on-the north 

of or anizin; infantry islands of resistance on these two positions . These 

positions wore not mutually supporting for antitank and small arms fires. :i 

mobile reserve was hold in a position of readiness in the- vicinity of SIDI :30U 

ZID; During the night 11-12 February, the 701st TD Bn. (:. and B Cos .) arrived 

.^.t SBEITLir and came . under the command of the 1st ~rmored Division for the de- 

_ense òf- the F.:ID psitions . During the afternoon of 13 February the C-in-C 

visited the FIJD positions and had a conference with General Anderson, British 

First '.' Comiander. 

4: t"daylight on the 14th of February, the enemy attacked our positions 

in front of FY.ID. The positions on DJ . LtSSOUD:. were attacked by artillery 

fito ihfantry, and approximately thirty unegy tanks . The FOPIDOUK and t:.FS.l 

areas were `quiet . i.s of 0920. hrs . the 3rd Battalion, 1st ;armored Re&dmcnt 

'rith two batteries, 91st F.. Bn., launched a counterattack and became heavily 

engaged with enemy tanks betireen SIDI BOU ZID and DJ . LE SOUD:. . By 1300 hours, 

the 31d Battalion, 1st .rmored Regiment, had suffered 50A tank casualties . 

BZ" .1700 hours -.no-my tanks 'tied overrun "B" Battery, 91st F.1 Bn ., nortlnrest of 

the "W.' IE. SCUD:aI . positicd . ;- Enemy infantry moved Boat F:ID to SIDI BOU ZID in 

trucks=~and,Ahe positionòri DJ . L9S OUn:: was completely, surrounded by the -enorw. 

~fhe-3r'd"Battnlion 1st :armoiiad Regiment was,-pushed back southwest of SIDI BOU 

"ZIDNith-b6tlf :flanks threatowoA .from the north and the south. The XII :.3.r 

U8re?l5orV-Comviand successf1x11y attacked onerq tank and track columns throughout 

the-day sT"a result of those ;operations, and after repuated requests, the 

: 'Com antlor ordorod the 2nd Battalion, let "rmored Regimont from CC'B" at 

iy.R'L:R : to - the Idt - Armorod Division at FAID. 

- ' .5. -:Due to the critical situation at F.IID, the force of ;,morican and 

: .French"_'troops at (3utjS.: was aithdrmm to- positions in the vicinity of FFRI:.1L:a 

g-t~ . night of I4=15- February.- :at- daylight on the 15th, the lot Armored 

4-Divijiea ` &Zwd a'VO&hterattack`betweenDH. JQtitL, and . 

"6 460th - ry`'bt1U ~WA the -hoighta. . of DJ=- MXL , r 

: . .~..,s... . ..3 .*...._ ...._+. 

draL. ri'hrmmred Division., was directed to offeat the witlh- 

Y:. defending . the lussmxa piss. By 1535;x . . 

the 2nd Battalion, let i3fmbredRagiamt had-reached the outsjoXts of SID-T,,WU 

ZID attempting to take the town and effect. the roliof of the 168th Infantry . 

'-,~ 

5~-hSSIFirf

;report of Operations, jiq: II Corps, 2 Lay 19113 (Continu_ 

150 i_ien froia the 2nd Battalion, 16uth Infantry, on DJLELL ' : - SSOLTD:, ._ianaged to 

rit!.draw to DJZBEL i- .:,,;. . The 3rd Battalion, 168th Infantry, still held D,f_'B;,L 

: ::S:,IR, . Contact 1- .as lost Both the 168t1: Infantry and the 2nd Bn ., 1st 

:.r._,orod ?Zc, ;i.aent, which was near SIDI BOU ZID. Patrols were unable to Cet 

t!xou; h from these forces or to that . The eno-q or-;"nizcd a strong def .- ;nsave 

position north and south through SIDI BOU ZID . EnenV tanks crest of SIDI ,OU 

'ID withdrew towards SIDI BOU ZID . :s of 1220 hours or. the 16th, aaout 50 

c:ne:.Tf tarp=s attacked in the vicinity of DjIMEL iL.I Ti .'. . Our armored . forces lost 

a_r-)rox1matcl .-" 86 niadiwi tanks in their att opt to relieve t :ie infantry 1_olding 

DJ=-' :L L_~~SOUL4". and DJZBUT KS..IR'. . 

u . :1. directive from the Co:"_.ia ding General, 1st British Ar :T;, dated 15 

February 19Zt3, directed that forces holding t=ic : high Z-round west of .F:JD be 

i:itadrav:n azd the pass at KASS_1nIIJa organized .-for defense . :, force consisting 

of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantx--, and the 19th Combat Engine=er Re;~iuaent orr 

aanizod a naw defensive position four miles east of K;,SS:,RI?E, . After repeated 

rvgncsts, CC"B" was released bar 1st British to ;I Corps as of 1800 hours, 

15 February, with permission to move CC"B" from 1_,KTAR to SBLI :I:. . 

7. From the 17th to the 19th of February, II Corps coMleted its with-_ 

dr :wal to the &;moral line DJ BOU DJ=:L - DJ BOIL G:XEf. - DJ CI"2BRI - DJ 

- SPIB;.. Thu XII ILir Support Command ~;vacuatcd both airfields in the 

%ricipity of TIihI= . Vine 1st Arriored Division withdrew from SBEITL:1 to an 

area southeast of TEB%SS.. . The 894th TD Bn . arrived and tsunt into bivouac in 

the vicinity of BEIO~-.r~I ,. The 26th Arsaored Brigade (less 1 Regt . Group) (British) 

car. under control of II Corps in. the vicinity of T11:1.1 as of 0500 hours, 

~_° February, with t ie provision that they wore not to be COELAtted to action 

--:ithout the authority of the Con>ànding Gesusral, First British ixmy . Other 

new arrivals in the II Corps ware the 58th C .-Vi . ; :ortar Co . (British), AT and 

"Lu Co ., 39th Infantry, and the 56th Ron . Sqdn (British), all of which were 

in.-a-diately dispatched to rcsinforce the troops holding the K:1SSM.INE PASS 

"positions . 

SECTION IV - Iti.SSERI :" VALLEY TIMUST 

1 . The TIESTERi1 DORS..LE, a range of mountains 20 miles west and parallel 

to the E:,STI:R:1 DORS ..LE rform-d a cross cora>>artment through which the . onemy 

would have to pass in an operation against the ; Allie=d right flank. MSSMINE 

WM" SBI3:. P:SS, the DrR:11:. PASS above TIMEPTE, consisting of three approaches 

across DJ. B=M :, and the EL MOD P..SS were the four ra=in approaches across 

t_~e ijBSTEI-I DORS:.LE in the II Corps zone of action . In a clockwise direction 

from Y,ASSMII4E P.M, DJ C:-dMI, south of the pass, DJ IdOGULZ:. and BOU DRIES 

south and west of the pass, DJ :"'T-U, about 20 miles west of the pass, DJ EL 

;D and DJ 3IitE : "., north and crest of the pass, and DJ forri the sides 

of a bowl around the corridor cut by the OUM ILTED . Two main roads, separated 

by the OUED IL~TEB, cut through this bowl and meet in the pass . Ono road loads 

northwest to TI ::.L: and the other approximately west to TEBhSS :. . Since there 

had boon several days , rain prior to tho 20th of February, the OUED 1LTEB was 

unfordablu and cosyaunication batsme=n they TIL:LA road and the T:;BBSS:i road was 

impracticable at any point other than at the fort: of these two roads within 

the pass . Since then rain had filled the K;'.SSER-NE bowl with spud, only fulltracked 

vehicles tirerc sable to operate across country.

of OMationa,,I&S2Ms~x~.1943 , Cout~) :, 

. pipt$j6ox ,~ elnfoxGodsforganized defensive positions 

~% bri' tlio north Iid of iC.',SSDitItTE PASS across the: road 7.eaQing to THALI wtd.le the 

± . 19 R'4A4ti.1 fQVeftdrrprganizod poeltisns" . on tlio south side of 

LY#ao~ea,,~st Ldoaxho fAad , loading -xo-TET SSi.. Tha first :,rmorod Division fro~a 

" 1WPb8MAxp isouthwast pf-.TMM. covered the ~' . ABIOD position . American and 

"Fr~ratt.~i~h bad-,boon,withdrawn from G.',F",,A organised defensive positions 

do *AftAA=oerapproachos, "across DJ Mlltth . 'The 6th Armorad Division 

(laa imor Brigado)(Bt .tish) aitl: the 18th, Infantry attached, organized 

' posfLMW1XXA0toA0 .,tdx, SDIM. :approach. " . 

araiol Airing . thcr ; night V-20~.Fobruary, onorV -infantry infiltrated to po- 

$ ,M : cbigh ground nordi :and south of K:.SSMLTM PASS . "From those posit 

,^chgovod the ;defensive positions in the pass, the one-,W brought 

-- S,.and;~mgrtar fira~directly on our defensive positions . a daylight 

} o z tb 4,,'engpW, infantry supported by artillery : attacked tlu: defensive 

. . 

~co, ~,1The e , s 6th . ..rrao=_ od 'Infantry, was ordered from TW.L1 to reinforce 

the tom, in K IHE ; P:.88. ".Tho 894th-TD B1%. ; likewise, moved up to rein- 

. fore6j0j~jQneL ,S k" s -forces .in V,SS=IE P:.SS. The 26th 1rmorod Brigade 

(Bri'ti0h3 move to a position along the TiL,U. - iG15S' 1Tt1E road" preparatory to 

suppwrt4ng . forcoW,holding K:',SSI:RIIM P:,SS . 

-5.~_Auo to small arms and mortar fire from the high ground overlooking 

thg;26th IQfantry .positions, tho 26th Infantry withdrevr up tlv: road towards 

Ai:~c: This ; withdrawal wcposod the north flank of the 19th Engineer Regiment 

' Troich . Vas disposed astride the road loading to TEBESS:, . 

~6 .-, The . enoaW appeared to be directing his main effort up the :1U', Road . 

On theMM :- ;=-,,Road lie appeared to bo making z soccndary effort using Italian. 

encouraged by supporting German Battalions behind tlit;n . 

7. CC'IB" roved up to DJ and prepared to counterattack to restore 

the situation on the south side of t21c pass . Th:: situation at the pass, howcvc:r,..had 

dotorloratod to such an ::Ytc:nt that G:~ :1c.ral Robinett, commandinb 

CC°B", : { had to .-irmediatoly set about to establish coordination and control of 

th'A.Aroops f nC back frord the pass on tae TEB:_ S:, Road . :,t daybreak on the 

21st, _ CC"!B" ;-.4d a 4,006 yard front astxi& the TEBES, Road about eight miles 

east-:of DJ=.Iu:&,. The; 16th Infantry h_ld positions on BOLT DRIES . Due to 

tip:: outstanding leadership of General Robinett, rrho assumed coal^.and of .111 

tr->ops along the TEBMS:, Road, he had the situation vell under control by 

d:,'break of' the 22nd . 

" 8 . :mile C,s::cral Robinott was .;n,-aged south of the OUED :L.TE3, BrigadiV ,R T 

Dumphie not the zaain Gorman attack zrith his 26th .rmored Brigade (British) 

of the OUED !:;MM. The 26th lrmorad Brigade (-1 an.,ored rol;iwental group) as 

stated above, arrived at TLIIA during tke night 18-19 February . Brigadior 

Dumphio roportod to jjq IT Corps at Ol0U hours on thu 19th . ..ftcr learning the 

situation, hu visited Colonel Stark who was in con iand of all the forces in 

the pass . lie arrived at Colonel Stark's CP at 1630 hours and 1_arned that the 

battle had bo-en in progress since daybreak . :1lthough Colonel Stark's CP was 

under direct srall arms fire at this tizk;, Colonel Stark claiued that the 

situation was w-11 in hand ztnd that all of his troops were in position . Ho 

r-

Report of Oporationsp Hq II Corps, 2 blay 1943 (Continued ) . 

did admit, however, that he ryas having slit difficulties with communications . 

. 

9 . .,$rigudior Dumphio ir mdiatcly ruturn(A £o TITI,If, vrhere ho reported to 

$pitish Krst army that the situation ,vas very poor at the pass and roquostod 

permission to employ his force to restore the situation . 1st Jar granted him 

permission to employ not more than one motorized company, 1 armored squadron, 

o:ao troop of :1T gurus, and one troop of artillory . This force moved to a -position 

astride the TI'!,L:i road along a ridge about two railos northwest of the 

pass during thr: night 19-20 February . This -Lorco was A'urthor r,jinforced in 

this position by the 3rd Dn., 6th Armored Infantry . ;,ftor the 26th Infantry 

loft their positions is the pass, this composite *merican and British force 

held this eov ring position along fw ridE;u astride the Tl_',L:. )toad until dark, 

20 February . The armored squadron lost all of its tanks . The 3rd Bn:, 6th 

;rrrorod, suffered very heavy casualties . During the afternoon of the 20th, 

the: renain&;r of the 26th Armored Brigade novud up to a covering position 

about 18 milers south west of TI- .LL :,. General Fredbndall paid a personal visit 

to this position at this tirho and placed Brigadier Dumphic in,command of all 

troops British and :,norican in this area . Airing the night 20-21, Brigadier_ 

aicholson arrived to coordinate the action of CCuB't and the 26th armored 

Brigade . :; meeting of General Robinott, Brigadier Dumphio, and Brigadier 

dicholson at TI::,I;r was arranged . In order to got back to his troops prior to 

daylight, General Robinutt had to loava buforu Brigadior Nicholson arrived . 

Bribadi.ir Dumphic and Gonural Robinett, hrnrovor, had agreed to a plan of 

action before General Robinutt left TM.L:, . Brigadier Nicholson arrived in 

T1'.L.i at 0245 hours and approved the plans alruady made by Brigadier Dunphie 

and General Robinutt . .,ccording to this plan, General Robinett was to restore 

the situation south of the OUED Ij ;.TEB while the 2nd Bn ., of the 5th Loicesters, 

tirho had arrived early that night, prepared defunsivc positions astride the 

road thr,;o miles southvrest of Tiil.L:. . Thu 26th ;,Mored Brigade errs to delay 

the unomy and pr%:vcjnt hire from reaching the Lricesters position before 1800 

hours, 21st of February . Colonel Stark was to form a straggler point at T?_.L, 

for all An,:rican troops and send them up from this point to rAnforco the 

Luicosturs' position . 

10 . ;,bout 0730 hours on the 21st of February, a German force of all 

arms could be seen fron the: 26th Brigade's positions forming astride the: TlL:L :. 

Road proparud to attack north. Tic approxinatu str,;ngtli of this unomy force 

was as follows ; 30 tanks, . about 20 SP ups, 35 ztrack infantry v,:hiclcs, 

and 2 corrpanius of infantry in trucks who disuountod and advanced try foot . 

This unar:7 cencontration was sh-lle-ci by the: artill,:ry of the 26th ;amored 

Brigade . Tare ,;ncm; SP guns .;ngagod the forward tanks of the Brigade and 

? .:locked out four . :,t 1500 hours, the i:nurW attacked straight up the road . 

The tanks of 'the 26th Armored Brigade fought a dulayinC action buck to T: ::.I~, 

had lost 20 tarlcs knocking out only a snall nui:ib,,r of Gurnan tanks . The 26th 

:.rr.ored Brigade, however, t.iana;.ud to maintain the required delay . The last 

t.^.nk passed tzrough the Luicestirs , position at 1930 hours . Five TD guns of 

the (305th TD 3n . under Lt . Col. Forv.^lan wuru the only 'alerican troops tirho 

fought in this delaying action and in the duf,nsv of the L.:icesters " positions . 

:,!though most of th .: 805th TD Bn . had burn lost in previous fighting, Colonel 

Foronan by leis superior lvadurship, managed to keep these rcmînin;~ guns togcthi;r 

and they have an uxc-!lent account of thcnselvos throughout the ren^.indur 

of the battle . The 26th _,ruorud Dri;;~dc rallied behind th;; LAcesters t 

position . By 19!45 hours, nichine -in fire insid.; the Luicestcrs , positions 

-10-

Report of 02!ati 1 II CwrpsZ 2 Nor 1943 (Contlnuoa , . 

indioated that tho .en=W had broken throudi thoao positions . Tho artillery 

of 9th Division, however, by marching continuously for four days and nights 

in the last stages of thoir march from CASLBL'd4M, arrived in the THaLA area 

and had ease into supporting positions of the 26th Anaored Brigade by_daylight. 

Orders from Brigadier Nichoison wore received to hold the positions 

of thO 26th . Arraorod Brigade at all costs . 

11..'-To relieve the situation confronting CC"B" and the 26th lmored 

'Brigade, the 16th Infantry launched a counterattack in the vicinity of BOU 

DRIBS and eloarod BOU_ DRIES of the onemy . This counterattack and the sudden 

incrciaso in artillery fire caused by the arrival. of the 9th Division Artillery, 

can0ud the ar10W to pull back bofofo his line of rotruat through the pass was 

cut behind him, At 1915 hours on the 22nd, the unomy began a gonoral withdraual'tcwards 

the pass . artillary concentrations harassed his movement 

through the pass by" interdiction fire throughout the night, 

l2 . CC"An moved from BOU CI3EBKI, to MIIDR.1 during the night 22-23 . From 

the 23rd of February to the 25th -of February, the unumy continued his withdrawal 

from tho L1SSBRIHE bowlp leaving many mines and booby traps . Patrols 

wore pushod out to maintain contact . By daylight on the 24th howovar, CC"B" 

had' lost contact with the uncmy. Fires wuru obsurvod in K;.SSMINE and FMIM1 

during ths night 24-25 February . By the 25th, CC"B" and the 26th :.rawred 

Brigade had regained control of the high ground north and south of the pass 

and by 13u8 hours the Roconnaiasanco Comparw of the 13th Armored Regiment 

entorod the pass. The advance of the forward ularwnts ryas greatly hanged 

by rAnes . 

13 . During the period 26 February to 16 11areh in complianeu with First 

IMI Operations Instruction Number 19, dated 24 Fub:uary 1943, II Corps roorgan- 

-izod and consolidated its positions alonf the 1t1MTCRIl DOM.LE with the 34th 

Infantry Division on the north, the 9th nfantry Division on the south, and 

the let Lrmorod Division in a position of readiness on the south flank . The 

1st Infantry Division began its concentration in the BOU CHM A area . 

SECTION V - iLD1'ZMISTR'.TIVE 

1. Status of 'strength - .lppundix »:." . 

2, Casualties and prisonara - :appendix "B" 

3 . 

Ruplacemunts - :.ppcmdix "C" . 

4. Lvacuation - ;,ppundix "D" . 

For the Corauanding duneral:

S R-!`.- 

APPENDIX "A" TO REPORT ON OP"~MTIO3S,--HEADQUARTMS II CORPS, 2 MAY 1943 . 

Status of Strength of Cormnand by Division and Separate Units on 1 January 

oron date they came under II Corps control. 

Headquarters II Corps 

Headquarters Company, II Corps 

202d M.P. Co . 

1st Armd. Div . (-2 Bns .) 

xq & Hq Co., 1st Armd Div. 

81st Rcn Bn . 

Serv o Co., 1st Armd. 

141st Signal Co. 

Div. 

16th Armd . Engr. Bn. 

47th Armd. lied. Bn. 

lst Armd. Maint . Bn. 

1st Arad. Sup . Ba. (-CO B) 

Hq . 13th Armd. Rogt. 

Rcn . Co., lath Armd. Rogt . 

1st Bn., 13th Arnd. Refit. 

2d Bn., 13th Armd. Regt. 

Surv. Co., 13th Armd . Refit . 

Maint . Co., 13th Armd. Regt . 

2nd Bn., 1st Armd. Rogt . 

3d Bn., lat Armd. Ragt. 

Rcn. Co., 1st Armd. Rogt . 

Maint. Ca ., 1st Armd . Refit. 

Servo Co., 1st Anad . Refit. 

1st Bn., 6th Armd . Inf. 

2d Bn., 6th Acmd . Inf. 

3d Bn ., 6th Armd . Inf. 

Hq. Co ., 6th Armd. Inf . 

Servo Co., 6th Armd . Inf. 

. 

r 27th Annd. - F.A. Bn. 

91st sand. F .A . Bn . 

68th Ar~ad . F.A. Bn. 

t-Train . Hq do Hq Co . ,- l.at Armed. Div . 

Canpon Co., 39th InfantrY 

5th F.A . Bn. . 

601st T .D. Bn. (-1 Co .) 

703tst T.D. Bn . (-Coa . B do Dots) 

lat -Bn., 213th C.A . 

106th C .A. Bn. 

4434 C .A. Bn. 

26th inf. (--3d Bn.) . 

33,4 F.A. BYI~ , 

Co. C, 1st $W. Bn. (1 Plat) 

CPAt'C, lot Hed . 

1st Rcn . Troop 

Bn. 

--- i 

Off . WO ANC EM Total 

70 13 83 

7 2 420 429 

h 178 182 

65 10 - 206 281 

43 1 726 " 770 

7 1 244 ' 2.52 

6 2 167 175 

44 2 655' 701 

43 2 281 326 

38 12 864 914 

11 1 220 232 

8 170 178 

2 187 189 

27 2 393 422 

20 1 468 489 

6 1 159 166 

4 1 108 113 

27 2 590 619 

27 2 590 619 

9 193 202 

7 181 188 

2 184 191 

24 535 559 

23 1 627 651 

6 78 84 

16 2 125 153 

6 3 142 - 151 

34 1 629 664 

40 3 - 702 . 745 

37 3 696 736 

12 135 147 

5 117 " 122 

22 2 608 632 

30 509 539 

23 370 393 

37 - 683 720 

35 807 842 

35 807 842 

109 5 2047 2161 

25 2 480 507 

1 - 48 49 

3 '' 107 110 

9 ' 170 179 

LiI4r. 1-~ 

.~

20A ; ig . Depot . Co .- _ 

~' Repo °4t1''bperittloAS~ ; ' Hq4 -II ' Corps. 2-W 1943 (Continued)* 

- .. ..,._ .. .._ _.... ' ... 

t Coy H "7 - - T.D" 8Z1. , 

BtrY C~ ;345th . CA .'~ . 

~ yc' - uFr 

81, VA: 

-DO 

128~~Sig,v ;Co" 

55t~~rr sect~-.writ.) 

.51st Mod.. Bu, . . 

lst~t4gu q, 2W,Uod . Sup. Dep. 

77th'tvac, Hoop. 

48t:b%bnrg; HOP. 

9ts EvacI Hobp. 

B. Tearitis; 

,opedio,Moam s 

1' 3iock Toami . . 

2d-1§6. 16th`-Yed. Rogt. 

Det: _ " . 

65th (X .Co. 

C0 : As ' . 

938 37 : .. " . . . . . 901 - 

.. 

3227- 

231 

84 86 

41 1 946 988 

1 50 51 

3 83 86 

22 2 

s 28 . 1 - 472- 1501 

3 30 33 

"415 

47 ' " - 51 317 - 

.48 57 273 378 

47 " - 52` 307 406 

6 6 -' 12 

2 , 2 4 

1, 2 3 

32 . 516 548. 

. 4 . 148 152 

205tH-_CX Bn. 

3 124 127 

Co Ds 2144th-" QU Bn. . 

. 3 . 215 218 

lsti'Bn. 0 28t1i QH (-a & C) 

11 282 -293 

93d .-qU Co . (Rhd) 

4 -' 108 112 

Hq Ec Hq Dot. ,;-POO 

8 39 47 

Hq & -Hq Det.; 55th Ord Bn. 

8 30 38 

30th.Ord. Co . (tDt) 

213 220 

Co : 'D, 87th Ord. Bn. 

7 191 198 

78th Ord. Co :=- 

168 173 

66th'Ord. C6: 

Hq & Hq Det. # .- 42nd Ord. Bn. 

109th Ord. Co . 

. 8 1-'139 

1 ~ . 123- 

148 

1.29 

3485th Ord. Co . 

Dot. *- 450th Ew. Depot Co. 

518th Engr. - .VS Co. 

761st Engr.:m Co . 

19th magrz =(C) 

Det. p 62d Erigr. Topo Co. 

105th CA (Buys A & D) 

688th CA Bti~'. 

689th CA Btry 

69M CA Btry 

694th CA Btry 

Hq & Hq Det:, 188th Ord. Bn. 

3488th Ord: Co. 

53d Ord. Co . 

Det. s 162d Sig. Photo Co. 

Dat e 163d Sig. Photo Co . 

Dot s 175th Radio Repair 

Dot ., Co. B 829th Sig. Bn. 

1st Bn. s 16fith Inf . 

. 6 

. $ 

54 . . 

1. . 

23-- 

5 

5 

- 

4 

7 

- 

-2 

2 

- 

_ 

. 

3.91 

188 

. 56 

1384 

5 

374 

73 

, . 73 

- 73 

. . 73 u 

. 

198 

194 

- 261 

1440 

6 

399 

78 

78 

78 

78 15 

- 

. 

5 

1 

1 

1 

30 . - . 

. 

183" 

' . ' 136 

3 

3 

10 

8 

910 

190 

141 . 

3 

4 

11 

9 

940 

_2 

.. LASS1rtt,

Appendix "A" to Report on Operations, Hq. II Corps, 2 Z(ay 1943 (Qoatinnod) . 

Total 

602 

2059 

Roplacaments unassigned 19 5477 

. 

91 

358 54 

507 

629 

180 

2d Plat ., Co. B, 95th CM BIa7 

1st Plat., Co . A, 301st QU Bn. 

1 

60 

58' 4 

61 

- 2d Plat,, Co . D, 60th Qh Ldry 1 . 

175th F-A . Bn. 

35 2 565 

168th Inf. (-1st Bn.) 

107 3 1949 

Co. C, 109th tied . Bn . 

Det ., Co . C, 109th Engr . Bn. 

Dot ., 805th T.D . .Bn. 

1st Ranger Bn. 

2d Bn ., 17th F.A . 

5th Rep1 Bn. 

5 

8 

31 

31 

19 

2 

86 

350 53 

476 

596 

161 

70 71 

1 Plat.p _47th QK ((3R4) 1 27 28 

1st T.D. Group Hq. 16 123 

2d ._Ba., 591st-,-Snngr. B. Rsgt- (-F) 20 1 423 144 4 

lot Bn., 36tih";F.A. Rsgt, 

Btu A 87d Det., DO -1st F.A. Obsu Bn. 

26 

4 

1 

1 

616 643 - 

84 

34th : Divisions,- . 

Hq-, 34th Division 

_~ Hq. Co., .34th Div . 

-:~'-11P 

Plat: 

,34th sig.-Co. 

. _, - 34th Cav. . Rcn. Troop 

_ ;;_ .233d Daf: Refit. (-2d Ba.) 

: .: ' .235th Int. Regt . 

48 

8 

3 

1 

8 

107 

140 

10 233 

2 126 . 

73 

1247 .` 

].86 

6 1M 

2850. . 

291 

736 

76 

258 

194 

2089 

. 

;404th Div: Artillerr 

125th F.A. Bu ._ 

16 

30 

2 

2 

730 

524 

2~ 

15?,R F.A. : .r 

F.A. eau:: 

33 

34 

2 

3 

487, _ 

557 : _ : - 594 

109,E Mad* B ~ _ 30 4 ~ 

4TI_ 

"' 

13 1 206 = 

; .. 

1 804th P B 4 4J`' 1 . 

. 

2 

" n . 

lfColl. Co'* 

- ,-!-~- . 

APU TV 

*Vision 1429 

_ ~~fon R 

hAr8a.. CoAL3st . miv . 

8 

air 

Off . 

No 

24 1 

v 

1 

UNCUIS51Fit~-" 

ANC $Y 

1A .a, . ; .. , 

~t4a, .s 

...~~ : 't-,- _Cl 

I~ 14 4 

l~'~~ 1 

1rL 

F +~ .~ 

26 

` 3 . AvT 8 

1h75 

` 

drjo , 

ob ~4te't~nt1l ~',t 2579 kIM

Appendix "All to RopQrt on Operations, Hq . II Corps, 2 May 1943 (Continued) . 

1st Infantry Division (Continued)s 

Div . Arty . 

7th F .A . Bn. 

32nd F .A . Bn. 

13th F .1. . Brigade ; 

Hq & Hq Co. 

1st FOIL . Obsn Bn (-S & F Section) 

17th F.A . Regt . (-2d Bn.) 

36th F.A . Regt. (-1st Bn.) 

178th F .k . Re9t . 

813th T .D . Bn. 

894th T .D . Bn. 

9th Infantry Division : 

Hq. s 9th Infantry Division 

Hq. Co ., 9th Infantry Division 

M.P . Plat. 

9th Signal Co . 

15th Engr. Bn. 

9th Mod. Bn. 

9th QU Bn. 

709th OFd . Co. 

47th Ia. Rogt . 

39th Inf., Rogt . 

60th inf . Refit. 

Division artillery 

26th F .A . Bn. 

34th F.A . Bn. 

60th-F . Bn. -.....~- 

84th F.A. Bn. 

9th Rcn. Troop* . ' 

107th CA Bn: - 

62d Engr. Topo Co. (-Det) 

427th Eugr . Co. (DT) - . 

Co.-Bo 601at'Engr . Cam. Bn. 

1 pIAU O Co. B* 205th QU 

SectIM Shoo Repair# 218th QU Co. 

751st Tank Bn. 

2619th QU Prow . Trk . Ba. 

14th' Ord. Co; 

Bt_ B, ~3la~. CA Bn. 

> 

Det'4 6th Chem. Co. 

1?5 IMP* :Rdgt " (met) . 

~' B & 0; }2.63d QU Bn 

C4,.. . 7M Iank Bn. 

T.D, BAS; 

:TON Bn~`- 

'? 15 Varoti; Oorpe 'Total 

Off . ITO ANC EM Total 

14 2 146 162 

27 2 589 618 

33 2 588 623 

15 1 92 108 

16 330 346 

34 1 589 624 

31 2 709 742 

67 3 1295 1365 

37 849 886 

37 852 889 

42 8 98 148 

7 3 162 172 

3 86 89 

13 1 350 3611 

35 1 716 752 

38 473 511 

14 228 242 

10 146 156 

169 5 3450 3624 

129 3 3252 3384 

152 2 3088 3242 

24 210 234 

28 2 597 627 

31 2 611 644 

34 1 568 603 

34 2 547 583 

6 211 217 

39 2 752 793 

4 115 119 

4 105 109 

5 77 82 

1 51 52 

1 33 34 

36 2 730 768 

2 5 1 ' 1.40 

116 

6 28 1117 153 

25 25 

3 

6 

6 

3 

617 

418 1 

105 

652 

55 

111, 

38 851 889 

38 895 933 

4410 228 157 83492 88287 

iJ15~`l L aCyLJ~`v 

., 

i

APPFMIX "$" TO_ REPORT_ ON OPERATIONS H&'1DQUiRTERS II CAPS, 2 wa 1943 . 

1. Prisoners captured by II Corps units during period 1 January to 17 

March, 1943. 

German 

Italian 

Off. EM Off. EN 

2 71 5 548 

2 . Casualties of II Corps during period 1 January to 17 March, .1943 : 

Officers 

Enlisted Hen 

K IT 11 C K W ' ?d 0 

.. .. - oft 

22 72 '199 3 170 7452 220 

29

APPEN= "C" TO REPORT ON OPFUTIORI3 WADQUARTERs II CORPS, 2 NU 1943 . 

Replacemente by branch received by II Corps units during the period 1 

January - 15 March, 1943s 

OFF. 

Infantry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 4074 

Field Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . 34 789 

Medical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 193 

Dental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 

T.D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1_15 

Engineer . . .6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . 

Q.M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5 231 

199 

C .A .- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 52 

Ordnance * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .* . . . . 

EM 

107 

Armored Force , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 858 

Cavalry . . . . . . . . . . . . . .r . . . . . . . . . 12 69 

Liilitary Police , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 

B Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 5 

23 

Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

TOTAL 290 6746

1PP_: '.DI :: "D" TO R~,PORT v : OPMATIOIIS, Ifc.ADQUARTZRS II C0 .-Z5 . 

medical Activities During Period 1 January to 17 .larch, Inclusive . 

1 . DurinC the period 1 January to 21 January, corps medical units were 

concentrated in the Constantine area . These units were the 9th Evacuation 

Hospital, 77th Evacuation Hospital, 118th Surgical Hospital, 51st Medical 

Battalion, 2nd Battalion, 16th i.iedical Regiment, and the lst Advance Section, 

2nd = :edical Supply Depot . iluring this period, only Brit13h'hospital facilities 

were available and all hospitalization was in British hospitals . 

2 . Upon arrival in the Tebessa area, the 9th Evacuation Hospital was 

established 12 rules south of Tebessa . The 118th Surgical Hospital establishod 

one hospitalization section at Feriana, the other section moving to vicinity 

of Thala . The 77th Evacuation Hospital was held in r:~serve until 111 February, 

rraen it established lightly 12 wiles south of Tebessa . The 1st Advance Section, 

2nd '-edical Supply Depot,, was established 10 miles south of Tebessa . 

3 .. During; the period 16 February to 20 February, all medical installations 

were ti:ithdrwtin to vicinity of Ainc Boida . DurinL this withdrawal it liras neces- 

sary to move approxinately 700 patients with the hospitals because of lack of 

evacuation facilities to the rear . 

11 . Supply . The initial medical supplies vrere adequate and there was no 

difficultyy n int~ainin an adequate supply of class one supplies, that is, 

t' % so supplies contained in :.icdical maintenance units . It became necessary 

.:=ray in the op .:ration to :Later the naintenancc unit in order that a pore 

nearly balaaced stock would be available in the depot . The greatest difficulty 

in s-pDly was encountered in replacing itcns of organizational equipment for 

hospitals and field units . It rras necessary to augment the T/B.l equipment of 

hospitals materially, in order that they night . function c:ificiuntly at ne?r 

full capacity . 

. ospitalization . The t'.---o 750-bed evacuation hospitals and the h00- 

b :d surgicl Lospi a rrc:rc adequate for the troops initially involved . The 

two 750-bed evacuation hospitals were placed on a 15-day policy in order that 

as :many patients as possible might b,: r,,turncu to duty in th:: forward ar_e :1 . 

This policy was abandoned towards t : :e end of the period rrhcn troops in the 

arcs were incr,;asc:d . The 118th Surgical Hospital rec-ived the ciljority of 

casualties and r ::n&red tli.: initial operating trcntm~nt . This unit. was on no 

fixed policy . Clearing platoons of Corps 1~~edical Batt^lions linen: utilized 

extensively in the forward ar .:as rrith surgical tcons ati.aclwd . These units 

performed exc ::11,:ntly and filled the gap bctwecn division units and t.hc more 

fixed :iospit-nls in the rLar . 

6. Evacuation . Evacuation fro:: : f-orward units was acconplishec b,; the: 

51st .edicalBattalion and the 2a6i Battalion ., 16th I edical RC incnt . T` :is 

latter unit was placed _ntir .~ly L: sup,rort of the lst U .S . Armored Division, 

w:_ilc th_ 51st :.:edical Battalion covered L:vacuation from cl, :rin .; platoons to 

hospitals . Evacuation to the CovLFa -iication Zen ._ 'Was ,:ntir_.ly b:. - -,ir until 16 

' :;bruary, when ::ir evacuation conpletcly f:iil~:d due: to unfavorable flying; con- 

ditions . The Brltisa =First :Xnr t :L,:n furnish-,d . . f,:ctlon of t : :, 6th i_otor 

!1~~ulancc Corps for evacuation by road to th :. 61st Station : :ospit -il -L ;. Cl C.itcrrah 

. T"is unit ri,_-rained rrith the Corps during the r,.:m ::indcr of this period, 

and covered all r,.an:ard .:vacu-.tigp ~oad~ 

khi;u" . 5 [r~~ :

as 

Panzer Armee Afrika (Rommel), War Diary (Extracts), 

17-22 February 1943

From t4ae 21st Pz. Division to 

Pz. A.O.K. 235- h. 17 Irrebruury 1943 

by me$sair,er 

%e fight for Sboltla is lmrder than e=poctcd . . Defonse well 

organized;. about 50 enatay tanks. Se, :on-h.ocw tank fight . Sbeitla fir,,07 in 

our hand . Bulk of talks r= cd. 7"4'79 (Sbaitlst) 1-lasult : number of Prisoners 

imroaaed to 54 oMoars, 1660 man; 12 tom, ae"ral acIr-propelled no=--ts, 

6 personnel transportation wagons, 2 gums dratroyed. Intention: defense of 

Sbaltla, nonning up in 723^f/7263 (zed 81 bou Zid to 30 kn southwest) . Point 

of main eflòrt of rocu~.u~i.ssanco 59?2 ( SUi , 35 km rorti of Sbeitle.) and 

7716 -(Zasserine) . 

Sources 

lituatiom 63 ready for cation. 

AnlaViiaexYd 9 tum aobladhtbericht d-,r Pz.Anrv- 

.,vAfrikm Ia . 

12.2.43 - 23.2.43 

34 37VU

To Comando Suppemio 

to PE .A.O.B.5 for information 

On the basis of the enemy situation as of today, and pro,--upposinG 

that the supply situation of the Fifth Pz .Aru;y is adequate, I subggst an 

immediate enveloping thrust of strong forces from the southwest on Teb'3ssa 

and the area north o£ it . I also recommend, if nococsury for the purpose, 

the attaohment and rapid move forward of the 10th and 21st Pz .DJ.vs . to the 

Thelepte»Feriana area . _ 

Source : 

German-Italian Pz .Aflty C.P . 


Rommel 

- Analagenband* 9 zum Sohlachtboriohtdor Pz .Armee Mr . 

12.2.43 - 23.2.43 

Ia 

34 37 5/11 

.

Field ?11arshal 

General 

CONFERENCE on 19 February 1 1.0 - at 091;5 hrs . 

Kesselring 

v, Arnim 

Major General Ziegler 

Brigadier General 

Gause 

Lt, General Gandin 

Colonel 

Aide 

v, Quast 

O .B .S . 

The general describes briefly the tactical and supply situation 

and states his view on the order from Commando Supremo concerning the 

Gruppe Rommel attack, The commander-in-chief emphasizes that the main 

objective must be Bone . To this end, the first attack. objective_ is 

Le Kef (see written plan) . If the attack ordered is to succeed it should 

be executed promptly ; as a matter of fact, it should have been launched 

2 days ago already . The objective ordered by Co=ando Supremo - the ponotra- 

tion between Le Kef and Tebessa - promises little success ; the attach. will 

also get farther away from the supply base . The attack, accompanied by a 

covering action, should move with all force toTrard the north, a direction 

not expected by the enemy, and in a manner that would steadily shorten the 

routes o£ supply . Hence, copnitment of the 21st Pz . Div . Prom Sbeitla 

toward Le Kef, of the 10th Pz . Div . from Pichon toward Lo Kof. The main 

effort should not be laid on Tebessa, not even in the direction of Tebossa . 

Although Field 11arshal Kesselring dons not side in wii:h the plans 

proposed with all peremptoriness, ho concedes that this operation has very 

m.any advantages and a prospect of success . 

The question of adjustment in the chain of corz :iand, the frontier, or 

the boundary botwoon Gruppo Rornel and 5th Pz, Armoe is not clearly solved

CONFERENCE on 19 Feb, 191.3 - at 0915 hrs . (cont .) 

by Field Marshal Kesselring . The project of Field Marshal KesselrinG 

got the 

that Regt . Buhse should be commanded by Rormtol did not XKKK consent 

from the other officers, 

The amount of supply and motor vehicles, considered absolutely necessary 

if the operation is to be executed at all and requested by the commander- 

in-chief,appear high to the Field Martihal ; however, an increase in the 

bringing up of supply and motor vehicles is promised . 

Source : KRIEGS TAGEBU CiI 1V 

Pz. A.O .K . 5, Ia 

from 1,2 - 26, 2, 43 

29 777/7

Telephone lbataoe to 

A.0.K.JS ldvanood C.P. 

Lt.Col.Pomptog 

1 . The roroas under the eo=uaad of Fiold iàrWial ::owl oz, n-mly p:Laaod 

umder his order (10t}Y Pz . Okv, 21st T1z .DJ. :d'., 1xajnfCru ),~e D.~~. Y.. ), axploiting 

i3= former suco"s, x.11. Inviadiately ptcah forva.rd ovor the Conoral lin 7279 

512"7 nortIvrard in . the noon rlar& and r :ar of the Bri -tish L'orcos str3.nding in 

front of tho north fusislun from:. 

2. To that offoot tho follorninS is orderods 

3* 

Order' for Operation "Stumflutn 

a. zxte 21st zr5,7.1 lczrva tiiA aria of 72"t> a 

coed along, tho high road leading nort: wrard and will reach the rcun j 

sumt-lou abotit 75 Ion north-rorthvoat of 7L/1-9 . 

t11rcotion. 

Ro .:,~0 1 

Souroez 

Anlagcnband 9 zum Sohlachtbario}nt der Pz .Arrvo Afr. Za 

12.2.4.3 - 23.2 .43 

34 375/11 

Gorron-Italian Panzer Arn C .p. 


0 h. 1S" Fub. rro- 

The 10th fz.Dvv. r after reoeivir;; portinnt orders, vill i- ;-:Ldiately 

leave the Fichon area. and reach by the shortest; route the St)e t3a area 

1at trio diapo- of Fiald zs"s?"uxl rio:1;s31 . At ::ill re:>ain L ~ :ro In r ::adi- 

neca and upon order or Flold 1Lirsha?. :llonnel and av^cordinlv to the develop-- 

:aunt: of the situation will by co-mittod oitlier behind the 21st Pz .fliv. 

in the direct(' of T.e .aP or ovcr Fsaorine su n on.ral nort7r .:bat< rly 

l'.old ? u"u_~iu1 Roumal'G C.P. will ho tranfozrad at noon 19 Feb . to 

ibriarn- auut . Radio ommunication with t:ho 10 .}~ fz.Div . :rill bo asourod .

Operations Seotion Geruml Italian Ponnor Ariw C.R 

19 Februsuy '43 d4i:5 h . 

Div. Dentauro 

Bow situation. Tho 7th Bers .RSt. will start to naroh to ForIona irrx 

madiately . Upon arrival thero,will pass under tho oontrol of D.A.K. The ro- 

timntal oom=nder will proooed in advanoo to tho C.P. of the D.A.R. at, ae- 

riana, south. Thero Ew -All receive furVier orders . 

Operations Soction German Italian Panzor Aray C .P. 

1: rài3rtaa.ry °1 ; 01_ 5.1 h . 

. to 

Div,, Cantauro 

All- tha ajar-onta ofDiv. Contauro heretofore oozmfttod southoact -QG o-11- 

south o£ Carm ce.lI move as rapidly as pocsible to the Cafe rca. 'Dnwro ;.troy 

rd1l organize Por dei'easo. 

Source : 

AnUgon:oand .9 zusr Sohlaahtberioht dnr Pz .Armc;e Afr . la 

12.2.43 - 23.2.:4 

34 375/n . .

Germ= Italian Panzer Lire % .P . 

19 Fobr-=ry 1943 

{Order for German African Corps ( by t8l®phone to Lt.Col.Stolboalc) 

1. Now cituation. Me foreoz under ho=wl's cor.,.nd or :e---&o w1ll bo 

shortly under Ror=olfs cosanand UM 1,Z.Div ., 2lat Pz.Div ., Ktvt_nfs 'u-_~he D.A.K. ). 

oxiloiting tho advantage gained up to now, will. attack as rapidly ac lzosoibla 

flank 

over the r,cnoral line 7279 - 5127 norttmard 3.n Vto deep Zia-xkd and roar of :;ho 

British forces a'=ding opposite the northern Tuntaian J.'z-ant . 

2, To that effoot the 22= following, is ordered: 

a. At 0800 h. 19 i4bb. the 21u- Pz.Div, grill move out of t-, : area 7279. 

follow the high road to who north and Cain the June -Lion about '75 }a 

. north.-north=st of 7279 . 

b. Tho 10th Pz.D.rlv. atarting, 'L`=cdiately froz the :ichaa nrca, at firr -',,. 

at the disposal of RoY=3, wi11 roach area '279. Furthcr ooMa3t . Crt 

from thoro is reservcd . 

c. pfgruppe D.A.14 (leas the Brreaglieri Bn said the arb 11Gry bat - .alion 

of the Div.. Contauro) will start L:zndiatcly and rfi,r,oh rxoa 7716, Trill 

move into position of roadiuace shortly and Y,-,Ill then gain without delay 

the mountain oass nort2:vest o£ 771,6. lku"thsr comitmen4 from thcro 

ing to the devolopnont of who situation ,~. . ..c ooial . -ord''r .o.^ who fix 

3. Ow Uersagliori battalion and the ic tillery Ba. o£ Dav. Contauro will 

at first rozuin in who area 774.1 for seotwity and recornuiusanco to t4io north 

and the nortlraest . Relief d,xini, 19_. Feb . through tzo 7th 3 . ra: .r,L,t . arrivin 

froze Cafra 

s provided .for. Upon arrival in horiana south the 7t :: ?3crr .Pit ;" 

x-411 bo placed under tno control of D.A . n. After ro14 of ,1irou[;h t!lo 7th 3orc . 

D.A.X. will issuo the necoaeary orders for who =oven.cnt o£ 

xgt./,by Bers .Bn. and Arty.Bn.of Div. Centaurs rte. 

After romvi:!g the £order goiat o.i' Aiain effort o£ roaox.aloua :-ioo t4o 

Rooon.Bn.33 is placed oonpletoly at the raisposal o£ D.A.S. for t-.',-if new rzicf^.ion .

4o Howitzer Stzy, 2d Bn.,A.A.2 1 and let Co Rookot projaator Lxgt.71 

-dIl movo during 19 Feb . toD.A .Z. at 17113 south and gill be nlacod candor 

its. orders at arrival. 

- Hasta A.O.F,. vrII1. be detaolzod izrmacliately from D.A.K. amd is a,ai ;a 

plaood direot3,y under the control of the Arty, 

souroet 

:B= At On 3,9 Ibb . noon, Rom-,alla C .P. nt 77h.1 ao&h . 

Ablaganband 9 xuus f aohthoricht dor 1'E.1x=a Af'r.Ta 

12.2.43 - 23.2.43 

- 34 '3W11

IntoIS.igonc~- CArmaTl-Italian P$ .AsvTy C .P. 


Radio Lbssage to 

O.K .E. ,try G.S., Section Fremde Heere West III* 

Gorman General in Robe 

North Front: 

?'ho eneuy opposed vi&lent res1stan-,a to our attacks at Sbiba and at 

the pae3s-northwest Kasserina . 

At Sbiba, the eneW nho roooived constant roinforoononts especially in 

artillery, vies able to put: a stop to the attack o£ the 21st Pz .Div, from his 

improved, dcsainant positions ; the division had gained little ground and was 

forocd to pass to the defensive, 

Intolligonco Evening Report 

Opposite Yampfgruppe D.a ..L the onezy succeeded at first, xrith the support 

of new toroos brought from the north, in holdinE; his very advarita£;oous pass 

positions northwest of Rasseriao . Put after the coaultmcnt of elwaents of the 

3Oth Pz.Div, he -ma throm back in heavy fighting and had to give up the pass . 

Hs lost several hundred prisoners, xaW weapons and mt4riel. 

Northwest o£ Thalepte the ©neW s able to repulse with retreat; artiLlozy 

are attack launched by wens: forces of the Div. Centauro . 

Very weak air activity because of poor visibility . Out of 4 onamy planes 

attacking Ptom the north=st of KasseeLno 3 ware shot do=. 

2. Impression made by the enomX: 

Cormittinng all his available forces 

/the encinV is endeavoring to hold his new switch position in the hills 

northwest of Sbeitla---Kassarino---Thelepte . Ho keeps on bringing roinfor- 

cements at Sbiba and northwest of lfassorine . Ene' counterattacks are axpocted 

on 21 Fob. at Sbiba, northwest of hanzorine and northuout of Tholoptc . 

Branch of _* 

the ~Intelligence Service, dealing Frith aostorn Allies .

.: Souroct 

Aseording to stataents of the British Intelligence Soruioo, alarent 

o£ the lot British Garde-Brigade ray be assumed to be at Sbiba . Since British 

tankw "-brk VI acre also ascertained there the oo=3.tment of elements of tlho 

British 6th Panzer Div. in this area can be rooroned arlth. 

Prisonora o£- the 9th Itr., 9th American Inf.Div, wore tit Hortnvost 

o£ Kasaerine . 

Aooording to reliable information the rest of the Combat Co=ando of the 

1st American Panzer Div. 1Ac boon ascertained ancra in the area southeast of 

Tobe sca. . 

' . Anlageaband 9 mum Sehlaahtbericht der Pm.Arm_e Arr . la 

23.2.43 

"34 3rr,/zl

OperAtiona Section 

21st P$.Div . 

Gc=mn Italian Prn.ATzny C .P. 

21 Feb . 143 221(:N1. 

Defenso in the present main line of rosistance . 

r0adY In onao the ensues withdraws over Sbiba, pursuo with elements ; bulk/for now 

assiguaMnt . 

Basta O.B, will attack from Thala on Rhodi.a in the rear of the enorV at 

Sbiba. 

To the l0 -th Pz,Div. 

Defense in the area 1hala-Kalaa Djorda . Local assault on Jad,jerouino around 

To = D.A. K. 

Conif xc~~ thrust to capture Pass el IImra, 

the night o£ 2122 if necessary., 

To 530th Arty.Bn. 

Attauk over 7?q0 on 77E32 and 7762, lbld the passoa . 

To Div . Centauro 

...._ ....__... . .... ..---------------- 

Wide south envelogpont during 

Withdraw fromoetction south of t :ie passia . During the night the old 

area around Feriana---Tolepte will bo ;aimed and dofondod, road fork Oglet 

w 

bu li-tya will be ninod . Ros "trve will 'Do held in readiness for mobile : co;mraia.'ront . 

To Ccmanding General, Air Force Corps Tunis 

Today 0 s rooonnaiasanoo results received attar 1600 h. only . Gontinuod 

reco~inaisaanoe in the anti" Tunisian ar :-a and ti " cl report°-are of decisive 

ininortanoe for further dociaiona . Ro,-xzfll.

Radio lbasage from Garman-Italian Panzer A1*V C .P. 

Intulligenoe Section 21 Feb . 191*3 

to 

O.K.H. Army Gent. Staff, Fromde Roera F:o st III 

German General in Rome 

O.B.SUd 

1.. North fronts 

Evening Report, Intelligence 

At Shiba the enMy continued to pt reinforcements . A total of 11 batteries 

was identified . A tank thrust from the west in the afternoon was repulsed and 

6 enewy tanks were destroyed . 

In the forenoon northvmst of Kassorino pass an attack of enemy armored 

forces ms repulsed ia the area of . The onony opposed violent resistance 

to our noon attack in a northern and northwestern direction. Ira brought forward 

the 26th pz.Brigade of the British 6th Pz.Div. against our 10th Pz .Div . in line 

toward the north. In hard fighting this brigade tma thro:vn back in the direc- 

tion o£ Thala and lost almost 4.0 tanks. The enezV Rae auoceasful in bringing 

to a stop the attack of Kav:Pfgruppe D.A.K. against the pasa 31.E cast of Tobossaj ` 

he waa in strong positions on the surrounding hills and his artillery fire 

chenkad the attack b kra neat of Ll Harare . Be conteatcd his Positious sucoass- 

fully against an assault of freak -forces of Div. Centauro on heights 20 lea 

norttwest of Thelente . 

2. Earl intentions 

the encry attempted today to hold the line of heights El Hmat (31, Ia southeast 

of ThQla)---Dj .fi lima (32'm wost of Tobes--a) ., ._.-Dii .Flohuozci-(779)3- nor ti`3 

purpose ho brought forward additional Amorioan forces from U:o area of Tobessa 

and trouthoast thereof and also the 26 British Pz .13r1gado . 

According to reliable information Combat Co=_-ando B of the let A-auriean

Pz.Div, was tratasferrod from the area southeast of Tobos.;a to the rcr,ioti of 

IIaldra ( ~4 laa northeast of TBbessa) . 

I~. Capti rad papers indicated t:-mt armV forces at Sasserine paes rsc as follows : 

SotXCss 

1 bn. of the 26th Inf. (1st Agr.Inf. Div. ) 

1 bn. o£ the 1C$th Inf.(34th 

I bn. of The Rangers 

1 frenah bn. of tho Div. Constantine 

2 cos.,13th Pz.Rgt. (lst Amr.Pz.Div. ) 

Aut Co ., Derbyshire Yoorany (6th Britiah Pz .Div. ) 

33d Arty,Bn. (1st A!sr.Inf.Div . ) 

58th Pz.Arty.Bn.(lst 

175th Arty.Bn. 

1bth Pz. .Bn. (1st lurmr. fz .DlJ . ) 

1 bin. 228th Royal Eh&tneers 

3. oo. 19th Amar.Eag,Rgt. : 

1 co.. 805th Antitank Bn. 

6 flak batteries 

Anla&anband 9 a= Sohlaohtberioht der fhnzar Amiae Afr. Ia 

. 

12,2,43 - 23.2.43 

34 375/U 

ti

Operations Section German Italina Panzer Army C .P . 

22 February t43 0030 h . 

to 

German rzonoral in Boma 

'O.B .S. Xflbrungsabtlg u.Arbeitsstab 

0.K.W.Af..F.St. 

0.K H. Army G. S . 

Day report 22 kbbruary_ '43 

I, General 

A continuation of the attack appears to be pointless on account of the 

continuous reinforcements o£ enemy forces during 22 Mo., -the adverse weather 

vdzioh rendors the terrain impassable outside of the hard surface roads, and 

the inareasing difficulties of co=itting mobile troops in the unfaiorable 

mountain region= also because of the poor combat value of the troops. 

breaking 

Tharotore the AruW, after causing the ©ne7 heavy losses and 

up his conoentration, in agreement vrith O.S.Md ordered in tlia afternoon a 

ocaaation of the attack and a withdravial of the attacking troops . 

Additional groun3 for the decision was the fact that the situation a .- 

the ?:xreth front mmkes a rapid shift of Ue mobile troops of both armies ns- 

cossary to give the envW:who is not yet ready for the attack, a swift blow 

in his assembled forces aria thereVy force hits to dalay it. During the night 

vatt.druar 

of 22/23 fob. the Army vi 11 xM the 10th Pz . Div. and Kampfgru,LPe D.A.K. 

the roads and the trail first to the pass position north of Easserins, 

I-. ...._...._. . . .,_._. 

and then iu additional bounds Trill have all units including the 21st Pz .Div . 

and Div. Centauro roach the point of, departure of the operation. 

. In view of the weak forces and the necessity of concentrating all =bile 

elements for an op-ration, out of the fhreth position, this position is held 

to be the most favorable . 

Partimilarn 

The 2lat Pz.Div.held its position south of Sbiba. %nom ap.arently 

furthar reinforced ; howovor no onamy attack .

10th Pz.Div . 

The armored battalion which in the evening hours of 21 Feb . had 

brokon .through at Thala, was caught in the back by strong eneW forces and 

was forced to evacuate the village . Strong onomy forces (elements o£ tire 

6th British Pz .Div. and of the 46th British In°.Div.) :lore occupying the do- 

ninant ridges on both aides of Thala. The pro pared attack on the Shale hills 

mess not carried out on account of the continuous roinforooments in oneny infantry 

si~xs and artilleryx from a western and northorn direction. Several 

enemy attempts at attacks ware repulsed with losses for him.At night fall the 

Idisengaged itself fran the chemy and reached Kasserine :ass after mining the 

road ., 

KampfFruppe D.A. in the zooming hours had launched an attack on the pass 

position of D3 . ol Han a. As a result of strong artillery effect of the onmW 

and thfl flanking on 3 sides from dominant mountain Positions the attack did 

not. suecedd. The Kampfgruppe had-to pass to the defensive and ropulned several 

violent anamy counterattacks which were otill in progress at night fall. The 

withdrawal and reaching the positions in the Kasserine Pass ware oarried out 

during the night. 

Mo attack of the krti 

open the passes north of Thelepte 

:3unchad from a'northernd rerat ~could not bsx= go formrd on account o£ 

strong aneny action and marshy roads, and had to be broken off. 

Div. Gentauro v'.ithout important engagement in defensive positions in the 

Thelepte-lbriana area . 

Air situation During the entire day constant Jabo and low-level attacks in 

the area Dj . al. Hamra and bouth of '17iala. Five onarv planes tiers downod by 

antiaircraft fire . Despite advarso weather conditions our Luftraffe supported 

the operations offootively. 

Results of 19-22 Feb. angagemonta a:cording to reports as yet inoomplatc :

destroyed. 

Souroes 

845 prisoners (mostly British) 

66 tanks 

74 motor gun carriages and scout cars 

hS antitank gnus . 

10 guns 

3 

numerous motor trucks, heavy and light infantry weapons captured or 

8 planes domed by anti aircraft firo . 

Anlagenband 9 sum Sehlaohtbericht der Panzer Armco Afr. la 

32.2,43 - 23.2.43 

34 .375/11

Radio Message from 

Intelligence Section German-Italian Pananr Arnyrt.P. 

22 February 191}3 

to 

Q,K.ii. Army G.S., Sectinn Fremde 11Jaro 1+'oat III 

G,~raan General in Rome 

O.B .3fid 

l, North rent 

Rveniar, 3capcr t, Intelliganoo Ser uico 

ilaere is no change in the picture p:esonted by the onoMl at Sbiba. 

Toward noon strong cnany forces with tanks were assembled in readiness 

ror a oo=erattaok on our positions 5 LT. southeast o£ Thala, but- the attack 

was not launahed. 

Tho eumW initiated several strong thrusts with tank support6Gainst oar 

Xampfgruuppe southeast of Dj . al IIa:,ra but uns repulsod for the most part. Ho 

really succeeded only pushing bank t1ae laft flank of this Kam, fgruppa tox:ard 

the eastl. The enemy attacks in this area were supported by stro ::g artillery 

which had at its disposal outstanding oboorvation positions on the surrounding 

hills . 

Lo important lotion northwest of Thalepte. 

Our air reoonnaissanoe, spotty because of bad weather, disclosed that 

na:r onany forces :yarn bro:a.Sat fon7a.:d on the Le itof-.--Kalaa D3erda road try 

Thula, and from. Tebesna to the east-northeast . 

2, Picture RL 

The enemy continued to brie forward reinforcements to stop our advunoe 

over the Kasserino pass to the north and northwest or to launch a counter- 

attack to reaa2ture Kasserino pass . 

Reliable information, prisoners stateiLents,oaptured papers and grmind 

raoozuialza=ca disclose the follovring picture of the enter distribution of 

forces is before our attack front at the present time : 

a . At Sbiba olev;ents of the lst British Guard Brigado, and olment~; of

. At Thala 26th Pz.Brigade of the 6 British Pz .Div ., ly)th Inf.Brigade 

Amerioan Inf.Divs. 

Djebel 

e. In the el Hamm scoter IIonbat Commando H of the lot Amarioan 

d, 

the 6th British Pz.Div., at least 14 battalion strong, 1 armored battalion 

and 11 batteries. 

o£ the 46th British InfDDiv., as wall as elements of the lst and 9th 

Pz.Div. AS E: L AS elements of the 1st and 9th Am%,rioan Inf.Divs. 

In the area southeast of Tobessa Combat Conwando A of the lot Amr. 

Armored Div. 

According to reliable information on 21 Feb . all units of the First 

British Arxr were given the order that there will be no fallinGi book out bf 

the present position and that no man may leave his post witaout an express 

order. 

3. 

During the fighting of 19/22 Feb . on the north front of the wrm.-Ital . 

Pr..Arry, reports as yet imoompletd announced the following success : 

Prisoners: 815 

Captured or destroyed: 66 tanks 

74 gun motor oarriagas and armored personnel carrions 

4S antitank guns 

10 guns 

and numerous motor true", heavy and light infantry weapons. In addition 8 

planes were shot dam . 

Sources Aulagenband 9 zum Sohlachtberioht der Panzer Armee Afr. Ia. 

12.2.143 - 23.2.43 

34 375/11

KASSERINE PASS BATTLES Readings - US Army Center Of Military ...

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