Nov - High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Nov - High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Nov - High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
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3 All] Smt. K<strong>at</strong>ori Devi V. Nawab Singh and others 973<br />
APPELLATE JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.10.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE ARUN TANDON, J.<br />
Second Appeal No. 802 <strong>of</strong> 2008<br />
Smt. K<strong>at</strong>ori Devi …Defendant/Appellant<br />
Versus<br />
Nawab Singh and others …Respondent<br />
Counsel for the Appellant:<br />
Sri Jai Shanker Prasad Singh<br />
Counsel for the Opposite Parties:<br />
Sri Madhav Jain<br />
Code <strong>of</strong> Civil Procedure-Order XXXI Rule-<br />
3, 4 and 4-A-Appointment <strong>of</strong> legal<br />
Guardian-during pendency <strong>of</strong> suit<br />
mother <strong>of</strong> appellant died-Substitution <strong>of</strong><br />
appellant being grandson through his<br />
sister- filed through the sister <strong>of</strong> minordismissed-<br />
even on record appeal stage<br />
same objection raised-held-hyper<br />
technical-finding recorded to the effect<br />
the sister had right to appear through<br />
minor- finding became final- if no<br />
challenge <strong>of</strong> the appointment <strong>of</strong> n<strong>at</strong>ural<br />
guardian-court not oblige to appoint<br />
legal guardian.<br />
Held: Para 14 & 18<br />
In the facts <strong>of</strong> the present case the <strong>Court</strong><br />
records th<strong>at</strong> the real sister had right to<br />
act as the guardian <strong>of</strong> the minor brother<br />
in view <strong>of</strong> Order XXXII Rule 4A <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Code <strong>of</strong> Civil Procedure and therefore it<br />
is in this background th<strong>at</strong> appropri<strong>at</strong>e<br />
orders were not passed on the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion being paper no. 98A, as the<br />
real sister responded after substitution<br />
to represent the interest <strong>of</strong> minor<br />
brother, Shanker. It is legally to be<br />
presumed th<strong>at</strong> she was authorised by<br />
the <strong>Court</strong> to act as such. In the opinion<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong>, objection now raised by codefendant<br />
is hyper technical in n<strong>at</strong>ure<br />
and the courts below are legally justified<br />
in rejecting the same.<br />
It is settled law th<strong>at</strong> all <strong>Court</strong>s <strong>of</strong> law are<br />
established for furtherance <strong>of</strong> interest <strong>of</strong><br />
substantial justice and not to obstruct<br />
the same on technicalities. Reference--<br />
Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal vs. N<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
Building M<strong>at</strong>erial Supply; AIR 1969 SC<br />
1267, wherein it has been held th<strong>at</strong> if<br />
substantial justice and technicalities are<br />
pitted against each other, the cause <strong>of</strong><br />
substantial justice should not be<br />
defe<strong>at</strong>ed on technicalities. No procedure<br />
in a <strong>Court</strong> <strong>of</strong> law should be allowed to<br />
defe<strong>at</strong> the cause <strong>of</strong> substantial justice on<br />
some technicalities. Reference-<br />
Ghanshyam Dass & Ors. vs. Dominion <strong>of</strong><br />
India & Ors; (1984) 3 SCC 46.<br />
Case law discussed:<br />
AIR 1968 SC 954, W.P. No.45549 <strong>of</strong> 1993,<br />
decided on 20 th December, 1993, AIR 1992<br />
Punjab and Haryana 95. 1972 AIR(All) 513,<br />
AIR 1969 SC 1267, (1984)3 SCC 46.<br />
(Delivered by Hon’ble Arun Tandon, J.)<br />
1. Heard learned counsel for the<br />
appellant.<br />
2. This is defendant's second appeal.<br />
3. One Lochan Singh executed an<br />
agreement to sell in favour <strong>of</strong> respondentplaintiff<br />
Nawab Singh on 1st July, 1995.<br />
Before the sale-deed could be executed in<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> agreement to sell, Lochan Singh<br />
expired. For specific performance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
contract, Nawab Singh filed original Suit<br />
No. 141 <strong>of</strong> 1996, impleading the mother<br />
<strong>of</strong> Lochan Singh, namely, Ramshree, as<br />
the defendant being the legal heir <strong>of</strong><br />
Lochan Singh. In between, said Ramshree<br />
is st<strong>at</strong>ed to have executed a sale-deed in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> same property in favour <strong>of</strong><br />
K<strong>at</strong>ori Devi and Sushila Devi. During the<br />
pendency <strong>of</strong> the suit, said Ramshree also<br />
expired and in her place, an applic<strong>at</strong>ion
974 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
for substitution <strong>of</strong> grand-son <strong>of</strong> Ramshree<br />
namely, Shanker, who was minor <strong>at</strong> the<br />
relevant time, and was orphan, as his<br />
mother and f<strong>at</strong>her pre-deceased the grand<br />
mother, was filed through his sister,<br />
namely, Babali. On the substitution<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion, notices were issued. It<br />
appears th<strong>at</strong> n<strong>at</strong>ural guardian, Babali did<br />
not respond to the notice and therefore, an<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion was made by the plaintiff for<br />
appointment <strong>of</strong> an advoc<strong>at</strong>e as Guardian<br />
to Shanker under order <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong> with<br />
reference to the provisions <strong>of</strong> Order<br />
XXXII Rule 3 <strong>of</strong> the Code <strong>of</strong> Civil<br />
Procedure. Before formal orders could be<br />
passed on the applic<strong>at</strong>ion, Babali<br />
responded and appeared to protect the<br />
interest <strong>of</strong> her minor brother. She<br />
appeared before the trial court and filed<br />
her written submissions. She also<br />
contested the proceedings in the suit filed<br />
by Navab Singh. The suit was ultim<strong>at</strong>ely<br />
decreed under judgment and decree d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
31st January, 2007. Not being s<strong>at</strong>isfied,<br />
Shankar through his sister Babali as well<br />
as subsequent purchasers, namely, K<strong>at</strong>ori<br />
Devi and Sushila Devi filed Civil Appeal<br />
No. 13 <strong>of</strong> 2007. The appeal filed has also<br />
been dismissed by the first appell<strong>at</strong>e court<br />
vide judgement and order d<strong>at</strong>ed 31st May,<br />
2008. Hence the present second appeal.<br />
4. This present second appeal has<br />
been filed by subsequent purchaser <strong>of</strong> the<br />
property in question, namely, K<strong>at</strong>ori Devi<br />
only. Shanker through his guardian,<br />
Babali has been impleaded as pr<strong>of</strong>orma<br />
respondent no.2.<br />
5. On behalf <strong>of</strong> the appellant,<br />
judgment and orders <strong>of</strong> the courts below<br />
are being challenged on the ground th<strong>at</strong><br />
despite applic<strong>at</strong>ion having been made<br />
under Order XXXII Rule 4 (4) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Code <strong>of</strong> Civil Procedure, no orders on the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ions were passed by the court<br />
concerned appointing a guardian for the<br />
minor defendant, Shanker and Smt.<br />
Babali therefore, had no right to represent<br />
the interest <strong>of</strong> Shanker. The decree was<br />
passed against the minor in absence <strong>of</strong><br />
any guardian having been appointed<br />
under Order XXXII Rule 3 <strong>of</strong> the Code <strong>of</strong><br />
Civil Procedure and therefore be declared<br />
as null and void.<br />
6. I have considered the submissions<br />
made by the learned counsel for the<br />
appellant and have examined the records<br />
<strong>of</strong> the present second appeal.<br />
7. The trial court framed issue no.9<br />
for deciding as to whether the suit as filed<br />
by the plaintiff is hit by Order XXXII<br />
Rule 3 <strong>of</strong> the Code <strong>of</strong> Civil Procedure or<br />
not.<br />
8. This <strong>Court</strong> finds th<strong>at</strong> suit was<br />
instituted against Smt. Ramshree. After<br />
her de<strong>at</strong>h, Shanker, who was minor was<br />
substituted through her real sister. Notices<br />
were issued to the substituted legal heir<br />
through Babali. However, Smt. Babali did<br />
not respondent. Plaintiff therefore, made<br />
an applic<strong>at</strong>ion under Order XXXII Rule 4<br />
(4) read with Section 151 <strong>of</strong> the Code <strong>of</strong><br />
Civil Procedure for a guardian being<br />
appointed for Shanker. Before orders<br />
could be passed on the said applic<strong>at</strong>ion,<br />
Smt. Babali appeared as the Guardian <strong>of</strong><br />
Shanker and filed her written st<strong>at</strong>ement,<br />
she also contested the proceedings. At no<br />
point <strong>of</strong> time, any objection was raised by<br />
the appellant qua substitution <strong>of</strong> Shanker,<br />
who was minor through her real sister in<br />
whose custody, he was residing. The suit<br />
was decreed by the trial court vide<br />
judgment and decree d<strong>at</strong>ed 31st January,<br />
2007. Against the said decree, civil appeal<br />
no. 13 <strong>of</strong> 2007 was filed by Shanker
3 All] Smt. K<strong>at</strong>ori Devi V. Nawab Singh and others 975<br />
through her sister along with Smt. K<strong>at</strong>ori<br />
Devi and Smt. Sushila Devi and the<br />
plaintiff was impleaded as respondent in<br />
the appeal. The first appell<strong>at</strong>e court<br />
considered the objection with regard to<br />
the orders under Order XXXII Rule 4 (4)<br />
having not been passed on the applic<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
made by the plaintiff being paper no. 98-<br />
A and held th<strong>at</strong> present appeal itself has<br />
been filed by Shanker through her n<strong>at</strong>ural<br />
guardian as the sister and <strong>at</strong> no point <strong>of</strong><br />
time, any objection was raised, even when<br />
substitution was directed and amendments<br />
were made in the plaint itself before the<br />
trial court. The <strong>Court</strong>, therefore, held th<strong>at</strong><br />
in these circumstances, it cannot be said<br />
th<strong>at</strong> sister was not looking after the<br />
interest <strong>of</strong> her minor brother or th<strong>at</strong> she<br />
had any adverse interest in the property<br />
vis-a-vis minor brother Shanker. The first<br />
appell<strong>at</strong>e court therefore, held th<strong>at</strong><br />
objection in th<strong>at</strong> regard by the appellant<br />
was too technical in n<strong>at</strong>ure and cannot be<br />
used as a tool to defe<strong>at</strong> the lawful decree<br />
<strong>of</strong> the court below.<br />
9. Before this <strong>Court</strong> the same plea<br />
has been raised qua orders being not<br />
passed on applic<strong>at</strong>ion being paper no. 98-<br />
A made under Order XXXII Rule 3 & 4<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Code <strong>of</strong> Civil Procedure and<br />
therefore, the judgement and decree <strong>of</strong> the<br />
courts below be declared null and void.<br />
10. This <strong>Court</strong> may record th<strong>at</strong><br />
Shanker has not chosen to file any appeal<br />
against the judgement and decree <strong>of</strong> the<br />
first appell<strong>at</strong>e court and he has permitted<br />
the order become final.<br />
11. For appreci<strong>at</strong>ing the controversy,<br />
it would be worthwhile to reproduce<br />
Order XXXII Rule 3, 4 and 4A as<br />
substituted in the St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Uttar Pradesh,<br />
which reads as follows:<br />
"ORDER XXXII<br />
SUITS BY OR AGAINST MINORS<br />
AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND<br />
3. Guardian for the suit to be<br />
appointed by <strong>Court</strong> for minor<br />
defendant.--(1) Where the defendant is a<br />
minor the <strong>Court</strong>, on being s<strong>at</strong>isfied <strong>of</strong> the<br />
fact <strong>of</strong> his minority, shall appoint a proper<br />
person to be guardian for the suit for such<br />
minor.<br />
(2) An order for the appointment <strong>of</strong><br />
a guardian for the suit may be obtained<br />
upon applic<strong>at</strong>ion in the name and on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> the minor or by the plaintiff.<br />
(3) Such applic<strong>at</strong>ion shall be<br />
supported by an affidavit verifying the<br />
fact th<strong>at</strong> the proposed guardian has no<br />
interest in the m<strong>at</strong>ters in controversy in<br />
the suit adverse to th<strong>at</strong> <strong>of</strong> the minor and<br />
th<strong>at</strong> he is fit person to be so appointed.<br />
(4) No order shall be made on any<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion under this rule except upon<br />
notice to any guardian <strong>of</strong> the minor<br />
appointed or declared by an authority<br />
competent in th<strong>at</strong> behalf, or, where there<br />
is no such guardian, [upon notice to the<br />
f<strong>at</strong>her or where there is no f<strong>at</strong>her, to the<br />
mother, or where there is no f<strong>at</strong>her or<br />
mother, to other n<strong>at</strong>ural guardian] <strong>of</strong> the<br />
minor, or, where there is [no f<strong>at</strong>her,<br />
mother or other n<strong>at</strong>ural guardian], to the<br />
person in whose care the minor is, and<br />
after hearing any objection which may be<br />
urged on behalf <strong>of</strong> any person served with<br />
notice under this sub-rule.<br />
[(4A) The <strong>Court</strong> may, in any<br />
case, if it thinks fit, issue notice under<br />
sub-rule (4) to the minor also.]<br />
[(5.) A person appointed under<br />
sub-rule (1) to be guardian for the suit for<br />
a minor shall, unless his appointment is<br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ed by retirement or removal or<br />
de<strong>at</strong>h, continue as such throughout all
976 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
proceedings arising out <strong>of</strong> the suit<br />
including proceedings in any Appell<strong>at</strong>e or<br />
Revisional <strong>Court</strong> and any proceedings in<br />
the execution <strong>of</strong> a decree.]"<br />
4. Who may act as next friend or<br />
be appointed guardian for the suit. --(1)<br />
Any person who is <strong>of</strong> sound mind and has<br />
<strong>at</strong>tained majority may act as next friend <strong>of</strong><br />
a minor or as his guardian for the suit:<br />
HIGH COURT AMENDMENTS<br />
<strong>Allahabad</strong>.--(a) In Order XXXII, for<br />
rule 4, substitute the following rule,<br />
namely:---<br />
"4.(1) Where a minor has a guardian<br />
appointed or declared by competent<br />
authority no person other than such<br />
guardian shall act as next friend, except<br />
by leave <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong>.<br />
(2) Subject to the provisions <strong>of</strong> subrule<br />
(1) any person who is <strong>of</strong> sound mind<br />
and has <strong>at</strong>tained majority may act as next<br />
friend <strong>of</strong> a minor, unless the interest <strong>of</strong><br />
such person is adverse to th<strong>at</strong> <strong>of</strong> the<br />
minor, or he is a defendant, or the <strong>Court</strong><br />
for other reasons to be recorded considers<br />
him unfit to act.<br />
(3) Every next friend shall, except as<br />
otherwise provided by clause (5) <strong>of</strong> this<br />
rule, be entitled to be reimbursed from the<br />
est<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> the minor any expenses incurred<br />
by him while acting for the minor.<br />
(4) The <strong>Court</strong> may, in its discretion,<br />
for reasons to be recorded, award costs <strong>of</strong><br />
the suit, or compens<strong>at</strong>ion under Section<br />
35A or section 95 against the next friend<br />
personally as if he were a plaintiff.<br />
(5) Costs or compens<strong>at</strong>ion awarded<br />
under clause (4) shall not be recoverable<br />
by the guardian from the est<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> the<br />
minor, unless the decree expressly directs<br />
th<strong>at</strong> they shall be so recoverable."<br />
4A. (1) Where a minor has a<br />
guardian appointed by competent<br />
authority no person other than such<br />
guardian shall be appointed his guardian<br />
for the suit unless the <strong>Court</strong> considers, for<br />
reasons to be recorded, th<strong>at</strong> it is for the<br />
minor's welfare th<strong>at</strong> another person be<br />
appointed.<br />
(2) Where there is no such guardian<br />
or where the <strong>Court</strong> considers th<strong>at</strong> such<br />
guardian should not be appointed it shall<br />
appoint as guardian for the suit the<br />
n<strong>at</strong>ural guardian <strong>of</strong> the minor, if<br />
qualified, or where there is no such<br />
guardian the person in whose care the<br />
minor is, or any other suitable person<br />
who has notified the <strong>Court</strong> <strong>of</strong> his<br />
willingness to act or failing any such<br />
person, an <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong>.<br />
Explan<strong>at</strong>ion.---An <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Court</strong> shall for the purposes <strong>of</strong> this subrule<br />
include a legal practitioner on the roll<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong>."<br />
12. From conjoint reading <strong>of</strong> Order<br />
XXXII Rule 3, 4 and 4A as applicable in<br />
the St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Uttar Pradesh, it would be<br />
apparently clear th<strong>at</strong> if there is no<br />
guardian appointed by a competent<br />
authority and the <strong>Court</strong> considers th<strong>at</strong><br />
such guardian should not be appointed, or<br />
the <strong>Court</strong> feels th<strong>at</strong> such appointed<br />
guardian should not act as the guardian<br />
for the minor in the suit, the n<strong>at</strong>ural<br />
guardian <strong>of</strong> the minor, if qualified or<br />
where there is no guardian, person in<br />
whose care the minor is, or nay other<br />
suitable person, who has notified the<br />
<strong>Court</strong> <strong>of</strong> his willingness to act or failing<br />
any such person, an <strong>of</strong>ficer <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong><br />
can be appointed as the Guardian. Wh<strong>at</strong><br />
follows from the aforesaid is th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
<strong>Court</strong> is under legal oblig<strong>at</strong>ion to appoint<br />
the person declared to be the guardian <strong>of</strong><br />
the minor by a competent authority <strong>at</strong> the<br />
first instance and if no such appointed<br />
guardian is available or when the <strong>Court</strong>
3 All] Smt. K<strong>at</strong>ori Devi V. Nawab Singh and others 977<br />
finds th<strong>at</strong> such appointed guardian should<br />
not act, it has to appoint the n<strong>at</strong>ural<br />
guardian <strong>of</strong> the minor, if qualified, and<br />
where there is no such guardian the<br />
person in whose care the minor is as the<br />
guardian.<br />
13. In the facts <strong>of</strong> the present case, it<br />
is apparently clear th<strong>at</strong> the minor Shanker<br />
was in the care <strong>of</strong> his real sister as the<br />
f<strong>at</strong>her and mother had predeceased the<br />
grand parents. Further the minor was<br />
impleaded through is real sister and no<br />
objections were filed to such impleadment<br />
<strong>at</strong> any point <strong>of</strong> time by the respondentdefendants.<br />
Suit was contested all along<br />
and having lost before the trial court.<br />
Civil appeal was also preferred through<br />
the same guardian, namely, his real sister.<br />
The civil appeal has also been dismissed.<br />
The Subsequent purchaser, who has<br />
preferred the second appeal objects to the<br />
acting <strong>of</strong> the real sister as the guardian.<br />
14. In the facts <strong>of</strong> the present case<br />
the <strong>Court</strong> records th<strong>at</strong> the real sister had<br />
right to act as the guardian <strong>of</strong> the minor<br />
brother in view <strong>of</strong> Order XXXII Rule 4A<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Code <strong>of</strong> Civil Procedure and<br />
therefore it is in this background th<strong>at</strong><br />
appropri<strong>at</strong>e orders were not passed on the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion being paper no. 98A, as the<br />
real sister responded after substitution to<br />
represent the interest <strong>of</strong> minor brother,<br />
Shanker. It is legally to be presumed th<strong>at</strong><br />
she was authorised by the <strong>Court</strong> to act as<br />
such. In the opinion <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong>,<br />
objection now raised by co-defendant is<br />
hyper technical in n<strong>at</strong>ure and the courts<br />
below are legally justified in rejecting the<br />
same.<br />
15. On a simple reading <strong>of</strong> the<br />
aforesaid provision, this <strong>Court</strong> may record<br />
th<strong>at</strong> it is only an enabling provision,<br />
which permits the represent<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
minor in a suit, in case it is found th<strong>at</strong><br />
n<strong>at</strong>ural guardian is not representing the<br />
interest <strong>of</strong> minor to the best <strong>of</strong> his interest<br />
or they have interest themselves in the<br />
dispute in question. Such enabling<br />
provisions cannot be read so as to suggest<br />
th<strong>at</strong> if interest <strong>of</strong> minor is already<br />
represented by a n<strong>at</strong>ural guardian, even<br />
then an applic<strong>at</strong>ion under Order XXXII<br />
Rule 3 <strong>of</strong> the Code <strong>of</strong> Civil Procedure is<br />
required to be filed and any orders on<br />
such applic<strong>at</strong>ion are mand<strong>at</strong>ory. If the<br />
interest <strong>of</strong> minor is protected by a n<strong>at</strong>ural<br />
guardian and there is no challenge either<br />
by the minor or by the plaintiff to such<br />
represent<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the minor by the n<strong>at</strong>ural<br />
guardian, the provisions <strong>of</strong> Order XXXII<br />
Rule 3 <strong>of</strong> the Code <strong>of</strong> Civil Procedure will<br />
have no applic<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
Learned counsel for the appellant<br />
contends th<strong>at</strong> there has to be an order by<br />
the <strong>Court</strong>, permitting the n<strong>at</strong>ural guardian<br />
to represent the interest <strong>of</strong> the minor.<br />
16. I am <strong>of</strong> the considered opinion<br />
th<strong>at</strong> such orders are procedural in n<strong>at</strong>ural<br />
and cannot be permitted to be used to<br />
defe<strong>at</strong> the judgment and decree <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Court</strong> <strong>at</strong> the behest <strong>of</strong> a third person, who<br />
is neither the minor nor his guardian <strong>of</strong><br />
the minor, more so when there is nothing<br />
on record to establish th<strong>at</strong> the n<strong>at</strong>ural<br />
guardian was not acting in the best<br />
interest <strong>of</strong> the minor or th<strong>at</strong> she had some<br />
interest in the suit proceedings.<br />
Learned counsel for the appellant has<br />
placed reliance upon the following<br />
various judgements in support <strong>of</strong> the case:<br />
(1) Ram Chandra Arya vs. Man Singh &<br />
Anr. Reported in AIR 1968 SC 954,
978 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
(2) Sri Arjun Singh vs. IInd Addl. Civil<br />
Judge, Aligarh & Ors. passed in Civil<br />
Misc. Writ Petition No. 45549 <strong>of</strong> 1993,<br />
decided on 20th December, 1993,<br />
(3) Gurpreeet Singh vs. Ch<strong>at</strong>terbhuj<br />
Goel, reported in AIR 1992 Punjab and<br />
Haryana 95,<br />
(4) Bachcha vs. Lakhpali Devi & Ors.,<br />
reported in 1972 AIR (All) 513.<br />
17. The judgements relied upon by<br />
the learned counsel for the appellant are<br />
clearly distinguishable in the facts <strong>of</strong> the<br />
present case, wherein the intent and scope<br />
<strong>of</strong> Order XXXII Rule 4A <strong>of</strong> the Code <strong>of</strong><br />
Civil Procedure was neither under<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion nor has been examined.<br />
18. It is settled law th<strong>at</strong> all <strong>Court</strong>s <strong>of</strong><br />
law are established for furtherance <strong>of</strong><br />
interest <strong>of</strong> substantial justice and not to<br />
obstruct the same on technicalities.<br />
Reference-- Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal vs.<br />
N<strong>at</strong>ional Building M<strong>at</strong>erial Supply; AIR<br />
1969 SC 1267, wherein it has been held<br />
th<strong>at</strong> if substantial justice and technicalities<br />
are pitted against each other, the cause <strong>of</strong><br />
substantial justice should not be defe<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
on technicalities. No procedure in a <strong>Court</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong> law should be allowed to defe<strong>at</strong> the<br />
cause <strong>of</strong> substantial justice on some<br />
technicalities. Reference-Ghanshyam<br />
Dass & Ors. vs. Dominion <strong>of</strong> India & Ors;<br />
(1984) 3 SCC 46.<br />
19. This <strong>Court</strong> may record th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
findings recorded by the courts below in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> right <strong>of</strong> Babali to represent<br />
Shanker under the impugned judgment<br />
has become final between the plaintiff and<br />
defendant-Shanker, as he has not chosen<br />
to file any second appeal.<br />
20. No other point was pressed. No<br />
substantial questions <strong>of</strong> law arises. The<br />
second appeal is dismissed.<br />
---------<br />
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION<br />
CRIMINAL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.08.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE RAJESH CHANDRA, J.<br />
Criminal Revision No. 2971 <strong>of</strong> 2009<br />
Kailash Babu Gupta …Revisionist<br />
Versus<br />
S<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and another…Opposite Party<br />
Counsel for the Revisionist:<br />
Sri S<strong>at</strong>ish Trivedi<br />
Sri Ram Kishor Gupta<br />
Counsel for the Opposite Parties:<br />
A.G.A.<br />
Code <strong>of</strong> Criminal Procedure-Section 397-<br />
Criminal Revision <strong>of</strong>fened under Section<br />
302,307,504 IPC-after committe <strong>of</strong> case<br />
before session judge-Discharge<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion or ground-during<br />
investig<strong>at</strong>ion nowhere named the<br />
revisionist merely on suspicion no charge<br />
can be framed-held-court not bound with<br />
conclusion <strong>of</strong> investig<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong>ficer-even<br />
on suspicion-charges can be framed-No<br />
illegality committed by Trail <strong>Court</strong>-No<br />
interference called for<br />
Held: Para 13<br />
It is true th<strong>at</strong> the investig<strong>at</strong>ing <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
has concluded th<strong>at</strong> the involvement <strong>of</strong><br />
the revisionist Kailash Gupta has not<br />
been found in the murder <strong>of</strong> Gaurav but<br />
the court is not bound by the conclusions<br />
arrived <strong>at</strong> by the investig<strong>at</strong>ing <strong>of</strong>ficer.<br />
There is sufficient m<strong>at</strong>erial in the case<br />
diary showing th<strong>at</strong> the accused Kailash<br />
Gupta is also prima facie involved in the<br />
murder <strong>of</strong> Gaurav and the infliction <strong>of</strong><br />
injuries to Mangal Tiwari.
3 All] Kailash Babu Gupta V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and another 979<br />
Case law discussed:<br />
(2008) 10 SCC 681, C.B.I. (2007) 2 SCC (Cri)<br />
514.<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Chandra, J.)<br />
1. This revision has been filed for<br />
setting aside the order d<strong>at</strong>ed 7.7.2009<br />
passed by Sessions Judge Jalaun rejecting<br />
the prayer <strong>of</strong> the revisionist for his<br />
discharge in S.T. No. 200/2008.<br />
2. In brief the facts <strong>of</strong> the case are<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the first informant Dinesh Kumar<br />
Tiwari lodged a report <strong>at</strong> P.S. Kandaura,<br />
District Jalaun on 16.8.2008 <strong>at</strong> 5.40 p.m.<br />
alleging therein th<strong>at</strong> on 16.8.2008 <strong>at</strong> about<br />
12.30 p.m. accused Kapil Gupta and<br />
Kailash Gupta abused Mangal Tiwari and<br />
Gaurav. When Mangal Tiwari objected to<br />
this, accused Kailash Gupta exorted Kapil<br />
to kill Mangal and Gaurav. Kapil<br />
thereafter, opened fire upon Mangal<br />
Tiwari and Gaurav causing injuries to<br />
both <strong>of</strong> them. Subsequently, Gaurav was<br />
declared dead.<br />
3. After registr<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> case <strong>at</strong> crime<br />
no. 140 <strong>of</strong> 2008 for the <strong>of</strong>fences under<br />
Section 302, 307, 504 I.P.C., investig<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
ensued and culmin<strong>at</strong>ed in the filing <strong>of</strong> the<br />
charge sheet against Kapil Gupta and<br />
Kailash Gupta.<br />
4. The Magistr<strong>at</strong>e committed the<br />
case to the court <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> Sessions where the<br />
case was registered as S.T. No. 200 <strong>of</strong><br />
2008.<br />
5. The Revisionist Kailash Gupta<br />
moved an applic<strong>at</strong>ion in the court <strong>of</strong><br />
Sessions Judge alleging therein th<strong>at</strong> from<br />
the evidence collected during the<br />
investig<strong>at</strong>ion and the conclusions<br />
recorded by the investig<strong>at</strong>ing <strong>of</strong>ficer, it is<br />
confirmed th<strong>at</strong> the revisionist Kailash<br />
Gupta was not present <strong>at</strong> the spot and as<br />
such there is no evidence against him for<br />
framing charges. He requested for his<br />
discharge from the case.<br />
6. The learned Sessions Judge after<br />
hearing the prosecution as well as<br />
revisionist Kailash Gupta rejected the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion vide order d<strong>at</strong>ed 7.7.2009 and<br />
it is against this order th<strong>at</strong> the present<br />
revision has been filed.<br />
7. I have heard the learned counsel<br />
for the revisionist as well as learned AGA<br />
and perused the papers filed with the<br />
revision.<br />
8. The learned counsel for the<br />
revisionist argued th<strong>at</strong> during<br />
investig<strong>at</strong>ion the st<strong>at</strong>ements <strong>of</strong> the eye<br />
witnesses namely Ramesh Shiv Hare,<br />
Pappu @ Abdul Kalam, Vijay Gupta,<br />
Vikram Singh, and Anil Gupta were<br />
recorded in which they all st<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
revisionist Kailash was not present <strong>at</strong> the<br />
spot <strong>at</strong> the time <strong>of</strong> alleged incident. The<br />
contention <strong>of</strong> the revisionist is th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
learned Sessions Judge without<br />
appreci<strong>at</strong>ing the evidence collected during<br />
the investig<strong>at</strong>ion has passed the impugned<br />
order in arbitrary manner and th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
order is illegal. In fact there was no<br />
evidence against the revisionist to frame<br />
the charge hence the impugned order<br />
passed by the Sessions Judge is liable to<br />
be set-aside.<br />
9. I have considered over the<br />
argument and I feel th<strong>at</strong> it does not<br />
contain any w<strong>at</strong>er. It is an established<br />
principal <strong>of</strong> law th<strong>at</strong> the charge may be<br />
framed against accused even where there<br />
is a strong suspicion th<strong>at</strong> the accused has<br />
committed the <strong>of</strong>fence. In this connection
980 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
the judgement <strong>of</strong> Hon'ble Supreme <strong>Court</strong><br />
in Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Priv<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Ltd. Vs. Sanjay Chaudhari and others<br />
(2008) 10 SCC 681 may be referred in<br />
which it was held th<strong>at</strong><br />
10. "even if there is a strong<br />
suspicion about the commission <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
and the involvement <strong>of</strong> the accused, it is<br />
sufficient for the court to frame a charge.<br />
At th<strong>at</strong> stage, there is no necessity <strong>of</strong><br />
formul<strong>at</strong>ing the opinion about the<br />
prospect <strong>of</strong> conviction".<br />
11. Similarly Hon'ble Supreme<br />
<strong>Court</strong> in Soma Chakravarty Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
through C.B.I. (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 514<br />
held as under :<br />
"it may be mentioned th<strong>at</strong> the settled<br />
legal position, is th<strong>at</strong> if on the basis <strong>of</strong><br />
m<strong>at</strong>erial on record the court could form<br />
an opinion th<strong>at</strong> the accused might have<br />
committed <strong>of</strong>fence it can frame the<br />
charge, though for conviction the<br />
conclusion is required to be proved<br />
beyond reasonable doubt th<strong>at</strong> the accused<br />
has committed the <strong>of</strong>fence. At the time <strong>of</strong><br />
framing <strong>of</strong> the charges the prob<strong>at</strong>ive<br />
value <strong>of</strong> the m<strong>at</strong>erial on record cannot be<br />
gone into, and the m<strong>at</strong>erial brought on<br />
record by the prosecution has to be<br />
accepted as true <strong>at</strong> th<strong>at</strong> stage. Before<br />
framing a charge the court must apply its<br />
judicial mind on the m<strong>at</strong>erial placed on<br />
record and must be s<strong>at</strong>isfied th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
commitment <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fence by the accused was<br />
possible. Whether, in fact, the accused<br />
committed the <strong>of</strong>fence, can only be<br />
decided in the trial".<br />
committed the <strong>of</strong>fence, a charge can be<br />
framed against him.<br />
13. In the present case there is<br />
sufficient evidence to show the<br />
involvement <strong>of</strong> the accused in the<br />
commission <strong>of</strong> the Crime. There is<br />
evidence <strong>of</strong> Dinesh Kumar Tiwari as well<br />
as Mangal Tiwari th<strong>at</strong> it was the accused<br />
applicant Kailash Gupta who had exorted<br />
for opening fire and thereafter, Kapil<br />
Gupta had opened fire causing injuries to<br />
Gaurav and Mangal. Subsequently,<br />
Gaurav succumbed to the injuries. It is<br />
true th<strong>at</strong> the investig<strong>at</strong>ing <strong>of</strong>ficer has<br />
concluded th<strong>at</strong> the involvement <strong>of</strong> the<br />
revisionist Kailash Gupta has not been<br />
found in the murder <strong>of</strong> Gaurav but the<br />
court is not bound by the conclusions<br />
arrived <strong>at</strong> by the investig<strong>at</strong>ing <strong>of</strong>ficer.<br />
There is sufficient m<strong>at</strong>erial in the case<br />
diary showing th<strong>at</strong> the accused Kailash<br />
Gupta is also prima facie involved in the<br />
murder <strong>of</strong> Gaurav and the infliction <strong>of</strong><br />
injuries to Mangal Tiwari.<br />
14. The learned Sessions Judge has<br />
not committed any illegality in rejecting<br />
the discharge applic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the accused<br />
Kailash Gupta and I do not find any<br />
reason to interfere with the order <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Sessions Judge passed on 7.7.2009.<br />
15. The revision is therefore,<br />
dismissed.<br />
---------<br />
12. In view <strong>of</strong> the above rulings it is<br />
clear th<strong>at</strong> if there is sufficient m<strong>at</strong>erial on<br />
record th<strong>at</strong> the accused might have
3 All] Anil Kumar Vashisth V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 981<br />
APPELLATE JURISDICTION<br />
CRIMINAL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.10.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE VIJAY KUMAR VERMA, J.<br />
Criminal Misc. Applic<strong>at</strong>ion No. 19770 <strong>of</strong><br />
2009<br />
Anil Kumar Vashisth …Applicant<br />
Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. & others …Opposite Parties<br />
Counsel for the Applicant:<br />
Sri R.K. Kaushik<br />
Counsel for the Opposite Parties:<br />
A.G.A.<br />
Code <strong>of</strong> Criminal Procedure-482-<br />
Procedure after receiving final report on<br />
protest applic<strong>at</strong>ion an order accepting<br />
final report ignoring protest applic<strong>at</strong>ioneven<br />
without giving any notice to<br />
informant-illegal-procedure contained in<br />
Chapter XV should be followed tre<strong>at</strong>ing<br />
complaint to the protest applic<strong>at</strong>ionorder<br />
passed by <strong>Court</strong>s below set-asidem<strong>at</strong>ter<br />
remanded for fresh consider<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
Held: Para 14<br />
Consequently, both the applic<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are allowed.<br />
Setting aside the impugned orders, the<br />
courts below are directed to pass orders<br />
on the protest petitions filed by the<br />
applicants against final reports in both<br />
the cases, tre<strong>at</strong>ing the same as<br />
complaint and following the procedure<br />
laid down under section 200 and 202<br />
Cr.P.C.<br />
Case law discussed:<br />
2003 (46) ACC182.<br />
(Delivered by Hon’ble Vijay Kumar Verma, J.)<br />
1. “Whether the final report can be<br />
accepted without passing any order on the<br />
protest petition filed by the complainant<br />
in the case where prima facie <strong>of</strong>fences are<br />
disclosed from the averments made in the<br />
FIR,: is the main legal question th<strong>at</strong> falls<br />
for consider<strong>at</strong>ion in both these<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ions under section 482 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Code <strong>of</strong> Criminal Procedure (in short, ‘the<br />
Cr.P.C.’).<br />
2. By means <strong>of</strong> Criminal Misc.<br />
Applic<strong>at</strong>ion No. 19770 <strong>of</strong> 2009, order<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 21.03.2009 passed by the Special<br />
Judge, (D.A.A.), Jhansi in Criminal Misc.<br />
Case No. 690 <strong>of</strong> 2007 (Anil Kumar<br />
Vashisth Vs. Shiv Prakash and others)<br />
under section 395 IPC, P.S. Irach, District<br />
Jhansi is sought to be quashed, whereas in<br />
Criminal Misc. Applic<strong>at</strong>ion No. 19771 <strong>of</strong><br />
2009, prayer to quash the order d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
20.05.2009 passed by the judicial<br />
Magistr<strong>at</strong>e, Garotha in Criminal Misc.<br />
Case No. 52 <strong>of</strong> 2008 (Km. Bhanw<strong>at</strong>i Vs.<br />
Badri and others) under section<br />
379,352,504, 506 IPC P.S. Garotha,<br />
District Jhansi has been made.<br />
3. Although different orders have<br />
been challenged by means <strong>of</strong> these<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ions under section 482 Cr.P.C.,<br />
but since the common legal question is<br />
involved in both these applic<strong>at</strong>ions, hence<br />
for the sake <strong>of</strong> convenience, they are<br />
being decided by this common order.<br />
4. Shorn <strong>of</strong> unnecessary details, the<br />
facts emerging from the record leading to<br />
the filling <strong>of</strong> these applic<strong>at</strong>ions, in brief,<br />
are th<strong>at</strong> an FIR was lodged on 17.10.2007<br />
by Anil Kumar Vashisth (applicant in<br />
Applic<strong>at</strong>ion No. 19770 <strong>of</strong> 2009) <strong>at</strong> P.S.<br />
Irach (Jhansi), where a case under section<br />
395, 397 IPC <strong>at</strong> case crime No. 320 <strong>of</strong><br />
2007 was registered against Sri Prakash,<br />
Ashok Kumar, Sri Ram, Ram Kumar,<br />
Lakhan Lal, Mahadev (opposite parties
982 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
No. 2 to 7) and 30 unknown persons.<br />
After investig<strong>at</strong>ion, final report was<br />
submitted on next day i.e. 18.10.2007.<br />
Against th<strong>at</strong> final report, the applicant<br />
Anil Kumar Vashisth filed protest petition<br />
in the <strong>Court</strong> <strong>of</strong> Special Judge, (D.A.A.),<br />
Jhansi in Criminal Misc. Case No.690 <strong>of</strong><br />
2007. After hearing parties counsel, the<br />
learned Special Judge, (D.A.A.) Jhansi<br />
accepted the final report vide impugned<br />
order d<strong>at</strong>ed 21.03.2009, but did not pass<br />
any order on the protest petition. This<br />
order has been challenged in Applic<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
No.19770 <strong>of</strong> 2009. On the basis <strong>of</strong> the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C.<br />
moved by Km. Bhanw<strong>at</strong>i (applicant in<br />
Applic<strong>at</strong>ion No. 19771 <strong>of</strong> 2009), an FIR<br />
was registered in pursuance <strong>of</strong> the order<br />
passed on th<strong>at</strong> applic<strong>at</strong>ion on 20.07.2008<br />
<strong>at</strong> P.S. Garotha, where a case under<br />
section 379, 352, 504, 506 IPC was<br />
registered <strong>at</strong> case crime No. 378 <strong>of</strong> 2008<br />
against Badri, Phool Singh, Ajay, Indra<br />
Kumar and Hari (opposite parties No. 2 to<br />
6). After investig<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> this case also,<br />
final report was submitted by the<br />
investig<strong>at</strong>ing <strong>of</strong>ficer, against which the<br />
applicant Km. Bhanw<strong>at</strong>i filed protest<br />
petition on 14.12.2008 in Criminal Misc.<br />
Case No. 52 <strong>of</strong> 2008 in the <strong>Court</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
Judicial Magistr<strong>at</strong>e, Garotha, who vide<br />
impugned order d<strong>at</strong>ed 20.05.2009<br />
accepted the final report, without passing<br />
any order on the protest petition. This<br />
order has been challenged in Criminal<br />
Misc. Applic<strong>at</strong>ion No.19971 <strong>of</strong> 2009.<br />
5. I have heard arguments <strong>of</strong> Sri<br />
R.K. Kaushik, Advoc<strong>at</strong>e appearing for the<br />
applicants and AGA for the St<strong>at</strong>e. Since<br />
the accused/opposite parties had no right<br />
to particip<strong>at</strong>e in the proceedings, which<br />
have arisen due to submission <strong>of</strong> final<br />
report and filing protest petition by the<br />
complainants (applicants), hence notices<br />
have not been issued to the<br />
accused/opposite parties in both the cases.<br />
6. The first and foremost submission<br />
made by the learned counsel for the<br />
applicants was th<strong>at</strong> <strong>at</strong> the time <strong>of</strong> disposal<br />
<strong>of</strong> the final reports, the learn ed courts<br />
below were bound to tre<strong>at</strong> the protest<br />
petitions <strong>of</strong> the complainants as complaint<br />
and after adopting the procedure laid<br />
down in Chapter XV Cr.P.C., order under<br />
Section 203 or 204, as the case may be,<br />
ought to have been passed and since this<br />
procedure was not followed by the <strong>Court</strong>s<br />
below while deciding the final reports and<br />
protest petitions, hence, the impugned<br />
orders being wholly illegal should be setaside<br />
and the cases be sent back to the<br />
<strong>Court</strong>s below for passing fresh order on<br />
the protest petitions filed by the<br />
complainants against the final reports<br />
tre<strong>at</strong>ing the same as complaints and<br />
following the procedure under Section<br />
200 and 202 Cr.P.C.<br />
7. The learned A.G.A. on the other<br />
hand submitted th<strong>at</strong> the Magistr<strong>at</strong>e is not<br />
bound in each and every case to tre<strong>at</strong> the<br />
protest petition as complaint, and hence,<br />
there is no scope to make any interference<br />
by this <strong>Court</strong> in the impugned orders, as<br />
the said orders do not suffer from any<br />
legal infirmity.<br />
8. Having taken the submissions<br />
made by the parties’ counsel into<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion and after carefully going<br />
through the averments made in the first<br />
inform<strong>at</strong>ion reports in both the cases, I am<br />
<strong>of</strong> the opinion th<strong>at</strong> in present cases, the<br />
protest petitions filed by the applicants<br />
against final reports, ought to have been<br />
tre<strong>at</strong>ed as complaint and after following<br />
the procedure laid down under Chapter<br />
XV Cr.P.C., order under section 203 or
3 All] Anil Kumar Vashisth V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 983<br />
204 Cr.P.C., as the case may be, should<br />
have been passed.<br />
9. There is no provision in the Code<br />
<strong>of</strong> Criminal Procedure to file the protest<br />
petition the final report. However, the<br />
Hon’ble Apex <strong>Court</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Bhagwant Singh Vs. Commissioner <strong>of</strong><br />
Police (supra) hold th<strong>at</strong> when on<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the report made by the<br />
Officer Incharge <strong>of</strong> the Police St<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
under Sub-Section (2)(i) <strong>of</strong> Section 173<br />
Cr.P.C., the Magistr<strong>at</strong>e is not inclined to<br />
take cognizance <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence and issue<br />
process, the informant must be given an<br />
opportunity <strong>of</strong> being heard, so th<strong>at</strong> he can<br />
make his submission to persuade the<br />
Magistr<strong>at</strong>e to take the cognizance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence and issue process. Siminlar view<br />
has been expressed by the Hon’ble Apex<br />
<strong>Court</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong> Gangadhar<br />
Janardan Mh<strong>at</strong>re Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
Maharashtra (supra). It is further held in<br />
Gangadhar Janardan Mh<strong>at</strong>re case<br />
(supra) th<strong>at</strong> in a case where the<br />
Magistr<strong>at</strong>e, to whom a report is forwarded<br />
under sub-section (2) (i) <strong>of</strong> Section 173<br />
Cr.P.C., decides not to take cognizance <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>of</strong>fence and to drop the proceeding or<br />
takes the view th<strong>at</strong> there is no sufficient<br />
ground for proceeding against some <strong>of</strong> the<br />
persons mentioned in the first inform<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
report, the Magistr<strong>at</strong>e must give notice to<br />
the informant and provide him an<br />
opportunity to be heard <strong>at</strong> the time <strong>of</strong><br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the report. There is<br />
nothing in both the rulings th<strong>at</strong> in each<br />
and every case the Magistr<strong>at</strong>e is bound to<br />
adopt the procedure <strong>of</strong> complaint case on<br />
the protest petition. Only the opportunity<br />
<strong>of</strong> hearing is to be granted to the<br />
informant <strong>at</strong> the time <strong>of</strong> consider<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
the final report. If from the alleg<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
made in the first inform<strong>at</strong>ion report any<br />
criminal <strong>of</strong>fence is not primal facie<br />
disclosed, then the Magistr<strong>at</strong>e is not<br />
bound to tre<strong>at</strong> the protest petition as<br />
complaint and in such case after<br />
dismissing the protest petition, the final<br />
report may be accepted. However, if in<br />
any case, from the averments made in the<br />
First Inform<strong>at</strong>ion Report, prima facie<br />
criminal <strong>of</strong>fence is disclosed, but the<br />
m<strong>at</strong>erial in the case diary submitted with<br />
the final report is not sufficient to take<br />
cognizance and to issue process against<br />
the accused, then in such case, as held by<br />
this <strong>Court</strong> in the cases <strong>of</strong> Anil Kumar<br />
Chauhan Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and Mohd.<br />
Yusuf Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. (supra), the<br />
accused can not be summoned to face the<br />
trial merely on the basis <strong>of</strong> the protest<br />
petition and other m<strong>at</strong>erial including<br />
affidavits filed in support there<strong>of</strong> without<br />
following the procedure laid down under<br />
section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C.<br />
10. The Division Bench <strong>of</strong> this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong> Pakhandu Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.P.(supra) after making reference <strong>of</strong><br />
certain decisions <strong>of</strong> Hon’ble Apex <strong>Court</strong><br />
has held as under in para 14 <strong>of</strong> the report<br />
<strong>at</strong> page 2546:-<br />
“14. From the aforesaid decisions, it<br />
is thus clear th<strong>at</strong> where the Magistr<strong>at</strong>e<br />
receives final report, the following four<br />
courses are open to him and he may adopt<br />
any one <strong>of</strong> them as the facts and<br />
circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case may require:<br />
(i) he may agreeing with the<br />
conclusions arrived <strong>at</strong> by the police,<br />
accept the report and drop the<br />
proceedings. But before so doing, he shall<br />
give an opportunity <strong>of</strong> hearing to the<br />
complainant; or<br />
(ii) he may take cognizance under<br />
Section 190 (1)(b) and issue process<br />
straightway to the accused without being<br />
bound by the conclusions <strong>of</strong> the
984 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
investig<strong>at</strong>ing agency, where he is s<strong>at</strong>isfied<br />
th<strong>at</strong> upon the facts discovered or<br />
unearthed by the police, there is sufficient<br />
ground to proceed; or<br />
(iii) he may order further investig<strong>at</strong>ion, if<br />
he is s<strong>at</strong>isfied th<strong>at</strong> the investig<strong>at</strong>ion was<br />
made in a perfunctory manner; or<br />
(iv) he may, without issuing process or<br />
dropping the proceedings decide to take<br />
cognizance under Section 190 (1)(a),<br />
upon the original complaint or protest<br />
petition tre<strong>at</strong>ing the same as complaint,<br />
Cr.P.C. and thereafter decide whether<br />
complaint should be dismissed or process<br />
should be issued.<br />
11. From the afore-cited<br />
observ<strong>at</strong>ions <strong>of</strong> the Division Bench also,<br />
it is clear th<strong>at</strong> the Magistr<strong>at</strong>e is not bound<br />
to tre<strong>at</strong> the protest petition as complaint in<br />
each and every case and if the Magistr<strong>at</strong>e<br />
agreeing with the conclusions arrived <strong>at</strong><br />
by the police decides to accept the final<br />
report and to drop the proceedings, then<br />
opportunity <strong>of</strong> hearing has to be given to<br />
the complainant before passing order on<br />
the final report. According to the<br />
Pakhandu case (supra), the fourth course<br />
open to the Magistr<strong>at</strong>e is th<strong>at</strong> without<br />
issuing process or dropping the<br />
proceedings, he may decide to take<br />
cognizance under Section 190 (1)(a)<br />
Cr.P.C., upon the original complaint or<br />
protest petition tre<strong>at</strong>ing the same as<br />
complaint and proceed to act under<br />
Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. and<br />
thereafter to deicde whether the complaint<br />
may be dismissed or process should be<br />
issued. The procedure <strong>of</strong> fourth course <strong>of</strong><br />
Pakhandu case (supra) should be<br />
followed in the cases where prima facie<br />
<strong>of</strong>fences are disclosed from the averments<br />
made in the First Inform<strong>at</strong>ion Reports; but<br />
in the cases, where the first inform<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
report does not disclose any criminal<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence and final report is submitted by<br />
the investig<strong>at</strong>ing <strong>of</strong>ficer, then there is no<br />
justific<strong>at</strong>ion in such cases to compel the<br />
Magistr<strong>at</strong>e to tre<strong>at</strong> the protest petition<br />
against final report as complaint and to<br />
follow the procedure laid down in Chapter<br />
XV Cr.P.C.<br />
12. In view <strong>of</strong> the observ<strong>at</strong>ions made<br />
herein-above, let us now see whether in<br />
instant cases, the learned <strong>Court</strong>s below<br />
were justified in accepting the final report<br />
without passing any order on the protest<br />
petitions. Annexure 12 in Criminal Misc.<br />
Applic<strong>at</strong>ion No. 19770 <strong>of</strong> 2009 is the<br />
copy <strong>of</strong> the FIR <strong>of</strong> case crime No.<br />
320/2007 <strong>of</strong> P.S. Erach (Jhansi). On the<br />
basis <strong>of</strong> the averments made in the FIR,<br />
prima facie <strong>of</strong>fences are disclosed. In the<br />
like manner, from the averments made in<br />
the First Inform<strong>at</strong>ion Report (Annexure-1<br />
<strong>of</strong> Criminal Misc. Applic<strong>at</strong>ion No.19771<br />
<strong>of</strong> 2009) <strong>of</strong> case crime no. 378 <strong>of</strong> 2008 <strong>of</strong><br />
P.S. Garotha (Jhansi), prima facie<br />
<strong>of</strong>fences are disclosed. Therefore, if the<br />
m<strong>at</strong>erials in the case diary submitted with<br />
the final reports by the investig<strong>at</strong>ing<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer in both these cases were not<br />
sufficient to take cognizance against the<br />
accused persons, then having regard to the<br />
alleg<strong>at</strong>ions made in the first inform<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
reports, the protest petitions <strong>of</strong> the<br />
applicants ought to have been tre<strong>at</strong>ed as<br />
complaint and after following the<br />
procedure laid down in Chapter XV<br />
Cr.P.C., the courts below ought to have<br />
decided whether the complaint may be<br />
dismissed or process against the accused<br />
should be issued. In case the process is<br />
issued against the accused, then the final<br />
report has to be rejected.<br />
13. The Hon’ble Apex <strong>Court</strong> in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Mahesh Chand Vs. B. Janardhan<br />
Reddy and another 2003 (46) ACC182
3 All] Smt. Sadhana Singh V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 985<br />
has held th<strong>at</strong> even after accepting the final<br />
report, cognizance <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fence can be<br />
taken on the complaint/protest petition<br />
filed by the complainant on the same or<br />
similar alleg<strong>at</strong>ions. Therefore, having<br />
regard to the law laid down by the<br />
Hon’ble Apex <strong>Court</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Mahesh Chand Vs. B. Janardhan Reddy<br />
(supra) and the observ<strong>at</strong>ions made by the<br />
Division Bench <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> in the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Pakhando Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e (supra) if would<br />
be in the interest <strong>of</strong> justice to send the<br />
cases back to the court below for passing<br />
order on the protest petitions tre<strong>at</strong>ing the<br />
same as complaint and following the<br />
procedure laid down in Chapter XV<br />
Cr.P.C.<br />
14. Consequently, both the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ions under Section 482 Cr.P.C.<br />
are allowed. Setting aside the impugned<br />
orders, the courts below are directed to<br />
pass orders on the protest petitions filed<br />
by the applicants against final reports in<br />
both the cases, tre<strong>at</strong>ing the same as<br />
complaint and following the procedure<br />
laid down under section 200 and 202<br />
Cr.P.C.<br />
15. This order shall form part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
record <strong>of</strong> Criminal Misc. Applic<strong>at</strong>ion No.<br />
19770 <strong>of</strong> 2009 and copy there<strong>of</strong> will be<br />
kept on the record <strong>of</strong> Criminal Misc.<br />
Applic<strong>at</strong>ion No.19771 <strong>of</strong> 2009.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.11.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE ARUN TANDON, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.42640 <strong>of</strong> 2009<br />
Smt. Sadhana Singh …Petitioner<br />
Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others …Respondents<br />
Counsel for the Petitioner:<br />
Sri Sh<strong>at</strong>rughan Singh<br />
Counsel for the Respondent:<br />
C.S.C.<br />
Constitution <strong>of</strong> India-Article 14-<br />
discrimin<strong>at</strong>ion-exclusion from eligibility<br />
<strong>of</strong> B.Ed. degree holders from the St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
J. & K for Special B.T.C. Training Course<br />
2007-held-not discrimin<strong>at</strong>ory.<br />
Held: Para 21<br />
In these set <strong>of</strong> circumstances if the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
with reference to the letter <strong>of</strong> the NCTE<br />
has decided to entertain the applic<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
<strong>of</strong> the candid<strong>at</strong>es who have obtained a<br />
B.Ed. Degree from the institutions<br />
recognized by NCTE or who under the<br />
Full Bench judgment <strong>of</strong> the <strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong><br />
may become entitle to such<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion alone. Such decision<br />
cannot be termed as arbitrary in view <strong>of</strong><br />
the specific norms <strong>of</strong> teachers educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
provided under the NCTE Act which are<br />
not applicable to the institutions in<br />
Jammu & Kashmir. The candid<strong>at</strong>e with a<br />
Degree <strong>of</strong> B.Ed. from institutions in<br />
Jammu & Kashmir form a different class<br />
and if such class <strong>of</strong> candid<strong>at</strong>es have been<br />
excluded from consider<strong>at</strong>ion for<br />
admission to BTC Special Training<br />
Course, 2007 by the St<strong>at</strong>e Government<br />
purposely, it cannot be said to be<br />
viol<strong>at</strong>ive <strong>of</strong> Article 14 <strong>of</strong> the Constitution<br />
<strong>of</strong> India. Such action <strong>of</strong> the district<br />
authorities to exclude the candid<strong>at</strong>es like
986 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
the petitioner from the zone <strong>of</strong><br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion is in conformity with the<br />
terms and conditions laid down in the<br />
Government Order issued under the<br />
permission granted by the NCTE.<br />
Case law discussed:<br />
(2006) 9 SCC, 1.<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Tandon, J.)<br />
1. This bunch <strong>of</strong> writ petitions has<br />
been filed for a writ <strong>of</strong> mandamus<br />
commanding the Director, St<strong>at</strong>e Council<br />
for Educ<strong>at</strong>ional Research and Training,<br />
U.P. Nish<strong>at</strong>ganj, Lucknow as well as<br />
Principal <strong>of</strong> District Institute <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
and Training <strong>of</strong> various districts <strong>of</strong> St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> Uttar Pradesh to not to reject the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion made by the petitioners for<br />
admission to Special BTC Training<br />
Course, 2007 only on the ground th<strong>at</strong> they<br />
had obtained a Degree <strong>of</strong> B.Ed. from an<br />
institution/University situ<strong>at</strong>e in the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> Jammu & Kashmir.<br />
2. Facts giving rise to the present<br />
writ petition in short are as follows:<br />
On 14.11.2008 the St<strong>at</strong>e Government<br />
after obtaining permission from N<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
Council for Teachers Educ<strong>at</strong>ion (NCTE)<br />
decided to admit students to Special BTC<br />
Training Course <strong>of</strong> the year 2007.<br />
Accordingly an advertisement has been<br />
published. Besides other one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
essential conditions provided for being<br />
considered for admission to aforesaid<br />
Special BTC Course is th<strong>at</strong> the candid<strong>at</strong>e<br />
must have a Degree <strong>of</strong> B.Ed. From a<br />
Degree College established by the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government/Central Government/a<br />
recognized affili<strong>at</strong>ed Degree College,<br />
duly approved by the NCTE for the B.Ed.<br />
Course. Since the issue raised in the<br />
present writ petitions is confined to the<br />
aforesaid condition only, all other<br />
conditions mentioned in the Government<br />
Order are not being referred to.<br />
3. The petitioners before this <strong>Court</strong><br />
claim th<strong>at</strong> they have obtained a Degree <strong>of</strong><br />
B.Ed. from an educ<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
institute/University situ<strong>at</strong>e in the St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
Jammu & Kashmir. According to the<br />
petitioners as per Section 1 (2) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
NCTE Act, 1993, the area <strong>of</strong> oper<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
the aforesaid Act is the entire country <strong>of</strong><br />
India except the St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Jammu &<br />
Kashmir. It is contended th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
eligibility clause under the Government<br />
Order which requires a candid<strong>at</strong>e to be<br />
possessed <strong>of</strong> a Degree <strong>of</strong> B.Ed. from<br />
institute/University duly approved by<br />
NCTE (for grant <strong>of</strong> such<br />
Degree/Certific<strong>at</strong>e) cannot be applied qua<br />
the candid<strong>at</strong>es like the petitioners who<br />
have obtained the B.Ed. Degree from an<br />
institution within the St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Jammu &<br />
Kashmir. Therefore, it is prayed th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ions made by the petitioner be<br />
directed to be entertained by the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
respondents as petitioners have a Degree<br />
<strong>of</strong> B.Ed. from a University duly<br />
established.<br />
4. On behalf <strong>of</strong> the writ petitioners a<br />
large number <strong>of</strong> interim orders which<br />
have been granted in similar m<strong>at</strong>ters have<br />
been referred to.<br />
5. The contention raised on behalf <strong>of</strong><br />
the writ petitioners is opposed by the<br />
Standing Counsel and it is submitted th<strong>at</strong><br />
the St<strong>at</strong>e Government has the competence<br />
to lay down the norms and conditions for<br />
admission to Special BTC Training<br />
Course 2007 inasmuch as the purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
such Special BTC Training Course is to<br />
train the candid<strong>at</strong>es for appointment as<br />
Assistant Teacher in Parishadiya<br />
Vidyalayas, appointment where<strong>of</strong> is
3 All] Smt. Sadhana Singh V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 987<br />
regul<strong>at</strong>ed by the U.P. Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
Teachers Service Rules, 1981. He<br />
submits th<strong>at</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e Government in its<br />
wisdom had decided to permit admission<br />
to Special BTC Course to only those<br />
candid<strong>at</strong>es who have a Degree <strong>of</strong> B.Ed.<br />
from duly established Degree Colleges<br />
which have been approved for B.Ed.<br />
Course by the NCTE. It is clarified th<strong>at</strong><br />
NCTE Act, 1993 has been promulg<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
by the Parliament for regul<strong>at</strong>ing the<br />
standards <strong>of</strong> teachers training for<br />
appointment from the stage <strong>of</strong> Nursery<br />
schools to the stage <strong>of</strong> Secondary<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion throughout the country. If the<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e Government insists th<strong>at</strong> a candid<strong>at</strong>e<br />
for admission to BTC Special Course<br />
must have obtained his B.Ed. Degree<br />
from NCTE Recognized College, it<br />
cannot be said th<strong>at</strong> such condition is<br />
arbitrary. It is clarified th<strong>at</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e is<br />
presumed to know th<strong>at</strong> the NCTE Act is<br />
not applicable to the St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Jammu &<br />
Kashmir and, therefore, it has<br />
conscientiously decided to exclude the<br />
candid<strong>at</strong>es like the petitioners who have a<br />
Degree from institutions which cannot be<br />
granted recognition by NCTE.<br />
6. I have heard learned counsel for<br />
the parties and have gone through the<br />
records <strong>of</strong> the present writ petition.<br />
7. The St<strong>at</strong>e legisl<strong>at</strong>ure by means <strong>of</strong><br />
U.P. Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act, 1972 has<br />
constituted U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad<br />
which in turn has established Parishadiya<br />
Vidyalayas throughout the St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P.<br />
for imparting educ<strong>at</strong>ion from classes<br />
Nursery to Class VIII. The institutions<br />
have been c<strong>at</strong>egorized as Nursery<br />
Schools, Junior Basic Schools and Senior<br />
Basic Schools (herein after referred to as<br />
as Basic Schools). For appointment <strong>of</strong><br />
teachers in these Basic Schools a set <strong>of</strong><br />
st<strong>at</strong>utory Rules have been framed namely<br />
U.P. Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion (Teachers) Service<br />
Rules, 1981 (herein after referred to as<br />
Rules <strong>of</strong> 1981) in exercise <strong>of</strong> power under<br />
Section 9 <strong>of</strong> the U.P. Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
Act, 1972. Rule 8 <strong>of</strong> the Rules <strong>of</strong> 1981<br />
lays down the essential qualific<strong>at</strong>ion for<br />
appointment <strong>of</strong> Assistant Master and<br />
Assistant Mistress <strong>of</strong> Basic Schools.<br />
According to it a candid<strong>at</strong>e has to be<br />
possessed <strong>of</strong> Bachelor's Degree from a<br />
University established by law in India<br />
together with Teachers Training<br />
qualific<strong>at</strong>ion namely a Basic Teacher's<br />
Certific<strong>at</strong>e, HTC etc. or any other training<br />
qualific<strong>at</strong>ion recognized by the<br />
Government as equivalent thereto.<br />
8. Thousands <strong>of</strong> post <strong>of</strong> Assistant<br />
Teacher in Basic Schools are vacant due<br />
to non-availability <strong>of</strong> candid<strong>at</strong>es having<br />
Basic Teacher's Training Certific<strong>at</strong>e<br />
(BTC), HTC etc.<br />
9. The Basic Training Course is<br />
<strong>of</strong>fered by District Institute <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
and Training (herein after referred to as<br />
the DIET) established by the St<strong>at</strong>e in<br />
different districts. However, the intake <strong>of</strong><br />
the students for imparting training in<br />
respective DIET's is limited. The number<br />
<strong>of</strong> candid<strong>at</strong>es who have regular Basic<br />
Teachers Training is too meager to cope<br />
with the requirement <strong>of</strong> Assistant<br />
Teachers in Basic School. To meet the<br />
requirements <strong>of</strong> Assistant Teacher in<br />
basic schools, the St<strong>at</strong>e formul<strong>at</strong>ed a<br />
scheme for imparting Special Basic<br />
Training to the candid<strong>at</strong>es, who are<br />
already B.Ed., knows as Special Basic<br />
Training Course. The case in hand rel<strong>at</strong>es<br />
to Special Basic Training Course 2007.<br />
10. The Parliament has enacted the<br />
N<strong>at</strong>ional Council for Teacher Educ<strong>at</strong>ion
988 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
Act, 1993 (herein after referred to as the<br />
Act <strong>of</strong> 1993) with a view to achieve<br />
planned and coordin<strong>at</strong>ed development for<br />
teacher's educ<strong>at</strong>ion for the regul<strong>at</strong>ion and<br />
proper maintenance <strong>of</strong> norms and<br />
standards in the teacher's educ<strong>at</strong>ion and<br />
for m<strong>at</strong>ter connected therewith. Prior to<br />
enforcement <strong>of</strong> the Act <strong>of</strong> 1993, the<br />
N<strong>at</strong>ional Council for Teacher Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
was in existence since 1973 to guide the<br />
system <strong>of</strong> teacher educ<strong>at</strong>ion as an<br />
advisory body till it was declared as an<br />
st<strong>at</strong>utory body with the functions and<br />
object entrusted to it under the Act <strong>of</strong><br />
1993. The N<strong>at</strong>ional Council for Teacher<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act, 1993 has been enforced<br />
w.e.f. 1st July, 1995 by virtue <strong>of</strong><br />
notific<strong>at</strong>ion issued by the Central<br />
Government under Section 1 (3) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
1993 Act. The Act <strong>of</strong> 1993 has been<br />
enacted by Parliament in exercise <strong>of</strong><br />
power under Entry 66 <strong>of</strong> the Union List <strong>of</strong><br />
Seventh Schedule <strong>of</strong> the Constitution <strong>of</strong><br />
India.<br />
11. A Constitution Bench <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Apex <strong>Court</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong> St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
Maharashtra vs. Sant Dhyaneshwar<br />
Shiksha Shastra Mahavidyalaya and<br />
others reported in (2006) 9 SCC, 1 had<br />
the occasion to consider the provisions <strong>of</strong><br />
N<strong>at</strong>ional Council for Teacher Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
Act, 1993 in context <strong>of</strong> power <strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
regarding recognition <strong>of</strong> educ<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
institution to start B.Ed. course. The Apex<br />
<strong>Court</strong> in paragraph 62 and 63 has held as<br />
follows :<br />
“62. From the above decisions, in our<br />
judgment, the law appears to be very well<br />
settled. So far as coordin<strong>at</strong>ion and<br />
determin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> standards in institutions<br />
for higher educ<strong>at</strong>ion or research, scientific<br />
and technical institutions are concerned,<br />
the subject is exclusively covered by<br />
Entry 66 <strong>of</strong> List I <strong>of</strong> Schedule VII to the<br />
Constitution and the St<strong>at</strong>e has no power to<br />
encroach upon the legisl<strong>at</strong>ive power <strong>of</strong><br />
Parliament. It is only when the subject is<br />
covered by Entry 25 <strong>of</strong> List III <strong>of</strong><br />
Schedule VII to the Constitution th<strong>at</strong> there<br />
is a concurrent power <strong>of</strong> Parliament as<br />
well as the St<strong>at</strong>e Legisl<strong>at</strong>ures and<br />
appropri<strong>at</strong>e Act can be made by the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Legisl<strong>at</strong>ure subject to limit<strong>at</strong>ions and<br />
restrictions under the Constitution.<br />
63. In the instant case, admittedly,<br />
Parliament has enacted the 1993 Act,<br />
which is in force. The preamble <strong>of</strong> the Act<br />
provides for establishments N<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
Council for Teacher Educ<strong>at</strong>ion (NCTE)<br />
with a view to achieving planned and<br />
coordin<strong>at</strong>ed development <strong>of</strong> the teacher<br />
educ<strong>at</strong>ion system throughout the country,<br />
the regul<strong>at</strong>ion and proper maintenance <strong>of</strong><br />
norms and standards in the teacher<br />
educ<strong>at</strong>ion system and for m<strong>at</strong>ters<br />
connected therewith. With a view to<br />
achieving th<strong>at</strong> object, the N<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
Council for Teacher Educ<strong>at</strong>ion has been<br />
established <strong>at</strong> four places by the Central<br />
Government. It is thus clear th<strong>at</strong> the field<br />
is fully and completely occupied by an<br />
Act <strong>of</strong> Parliament and covered by Entry<br />
66 <strong>of</strong> List I <strong>of</strong> Schedule VII. It is,<br />
therefore, not open to the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Legisl<strong>at</strong>ure to encroach upon the said<br />
field. Parliament alone could have<br />
exercised the power by making<br />
appropri<strong>at</strong>e law. In the circumstances, it is<br />
not open to the St<strong>at</strong>e Government to<br />
refuse permission relying on a St<strong>at</strong>e Act<br />
or no policy consider<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
12. The permission to run the<br />
Special Basic Training Course 2007 has<br />
been granted by the Regional Committee<br />
under Section 15 <strong>of</strong> the Act <strong>of</strong> 1993. It is<br />
useful to quote the relevant portion <strong>of</strong>
3 All] Smt. Sadhana Singh V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 989<br />
order <strong>of</strong> the Regional Committee granting<br />
permission to run Special Basic Training<br />
Course vide its order d<strong>at</strong>ed 27th June,<br />
2007, which reads as follows :<br />
“Whereas, NRC in its 118th (1st<br />
sitting) meeting held on 16th - 18th June,<br />
2007 after thorough discussion and<br />
observ<strong>at</strong>ion rel<strong>at</strong>ed documents, noted the<br />
following:-<br />
As per proposal submitted by the<br />
Government, it has been informed th<strong>at</strong><br />
admission will be granted in this special<br />
programme <strong>of</strong> six months dur<strong>at</strong>ion only to<br />
those candid<strong>at</strong>es who are already B.Ed.<br />
The NRC appreci<strong>at</strong>ed the proposal <strong>of</strong><br />
U.P. Government decided to grant<br />
approval to conduct the special BTC<br />
programme bridge course as proposed by<br />
the st<strong>at</strong>e. It will be only one approval.<br />
Teachers are to be trained only in DIETs<br />
recognizes NRC-NCTE. The committee<br />
also observed th<strong>at</strong> as this programme will<br />
be conducted only in recognised DIETs,<br />
so there is not for any inspection.<br />
Now, therefore, in exercise <strong>of</strong> the<br />
powers vested Section 15(3)(b) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
NCTE Act, the Regional Commissioner<br />
hereby grants one time approval for<br />
training 60,000 candid<strong>at</strong>es primary<br />
teachers who are already B.Ed. subject to<br />
the fulfil <strong>of</strong> the following :<br />
a. The teachers are to be trained only in<br />
the list <strong>of</strong> recognised by NRC-NCTE.<br />
b. The SCERT to submit the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
commence <strong>of</strong> the course along with the<br />
list <strong>of</strong> the recognized where the proposal<br />
training is to be conducted.<br />
c. The quarterly progress report <strong>of</strong> the<br />
programme to be submitted to NRC-<br />
NCTE.<br />
d. The curriculum as finalized in the<br />
meeting between NCTE and the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government <strong>of</strong> U.P. followed for the<br />
programme.<br />
13. From the above quoted order <strong>of</strong><br />
the NCTE, it is clear th<strong>at</strong> NCTE granted<br />
permission to run the Special Basic<br />
Training Course for the candid<strong>at</strong>es, who<br />
are already B.Ed.<br />
14. The Full Bench <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> in<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> Bhupendra N<strong>at</strong>h Trip<strong>at</strong>hi and<br />
others vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others<br />
(Special Appeal No. 858 <strong>of</strong> 2008) had<br />
examined the following three issues:<br />
(I) Whether after the enforcement <strong>of</strong><br />
1993 Act the candid<strong>at</strong>es who obtained<br />
B.Ed. degree from an institution or a<br />
University during the period when the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the Institution or University<br />
for grant <strong>of</strong> recognition was pending are<br />
eligible for Special B.T.C. Course-2007<br />
as held by Division Bench judgement in<br />
Ekta Shukla's case<br />
Whether the candid<strong>at</strong>es who have<br />
obtained degree from an institution or<br />
University recognised by NCTE are only<br />
eligible for Special B.T.C. Course 2007 as<br />
held by Division Bench judgement in<br />
Sanjai Kumar and Sunita Upadhyay's<br />
case<br />
Or<br />
(II) Whether recognition, as referred to in<br />
the proviso to Section 14(1) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
N.C.T.E. Act 1993 Act can be tre<strong>at</strong>ed to<br />
be deemed recognition under the 1993<br />
Act <strong>of</strong> an institution or a University for<br />
the period applic<strong>at</strong>ion were pending
990 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
(III) Whether the exclusion <strong>of</strong> those<br />
candid<strong>at</strong>es from field <strong>of</strong> eligibility for<br />
Special B.T.C. Course 2007 who have<br />
obtained B.Ed. degree prior to<br />
enforcement <strong>of</strong> 1993 Act or after the<br />
enforcement <strong>of</strong> 1993 Act during the<br />
period when the applic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Institution or the University was pending<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion, is arbitrary and<br />
unreasonable viol<strong>at</strong>ive <strong>of</strong> Articles 14 and<br />
16 <strong>of</strong> the Constitution <strong>of</strong> India <br />
15. The Full Bench after referring to<br />
the words who are already B.Ed. has held<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the permission does not require th<strong>at</strong><br />
such B.Ed. Degree should have been<br />
obtained from a NCTE recognized<br />
institution alone and no such limited<br />
interpret<strong>at</strong>ion or scope is contempl<strong>at</strong>ed in<br />
the letter <strong>of</strong> the NCTE granting the<br />
permission.<br />
16. The aforesaid observ<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Full Bench in the case <strong>of</strong> Bhupendra N<strong>at</strong>h<br />
Tiwari have to be read with reference to<br />
the questions which were examined as<br />
quoted above inasmuch as the Full Bench<br />
even after making the aforesaid<br />
observ<strong>at</strong>ions in its answer to question no.<br />
1 has held as follows :<br />
17.. “The candid<strong>at</strong>es, who have<br />
B.Ed. degree obtained from an institution<br />
or University during the period when the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the institution or the<br />
University for grant <strong>of</strong> recognition under<br />
Section 14 <strong>of</strong> N<strong>at</strong>ional Council for<br />
Teacher Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act, 1993 was<br />
pending, are eligible for Special Basic<br />
Training Course 2007 as laid down by the<br />
Division Bench in Ekta Shukla’s case<br />
(supra).<br />
18. Similarly while answering<br />
question no. 2 it has been held as follows:<br />
“The proviso to Section 14(1)<br />
recognizes continuance <strong>of</strong> the course,<br />
which was being run immedi<strong>at</strong>ely before<br />
the appointed day provided applic<strong>at</strong>ion is<br />
submitted within the continuance <strong>of</strong> such<br />
course is deemed recognition <strong>of</strong> such<br />
course and degree awarded therein by<br />
express provisions <strong>of</strong> proviso to Section<br />
14(1) <strong>of</strong> N<strong>at</strong>ional Council for Teacher<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act, 1993.”<br />
Lastly while answering question no. 3 it<br />
has been held as follows:<br />
“The exclusion <strong>of</strong> the candid<strong>at</strong>es<br />
from the field <strong>of</strong> eligibility for Special<br />
Basic Training Course 2007, who have<br />
obtained B.Ed. degree prior to<br />
enforcement <strong>of</strong> N<strong>at</strong>ional Council for<br />
Teacher Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act, 1993 or after the<br />
enforcement <strong>of</strong> N<strong>at</strong>ional Council for<br />
Teacher Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act, 1993 during the<br />
period when the applic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
institution or the University was pending<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion is arbitrary, unreasonable<br />
and viol<strong>at</strong>ive <strong>of</strong> Articles 14 and 16 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Constitution <strong>of</strong> India. The above two<br />
c<strong>at</strong>egories <strong>of</strong> candid<strong>at</strong>es are also eligible<br />
to particip<strong>at</strong>e in Special Basic Training<br />
Course 2007.”<br />
It will thus be seen th<strong>at</strong> the Full<br />
Bench <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> has not held th<strong>at</strong> any<br />
candid<strong>at</strong>e who has obtained a Degree <strong>of</strong><br />
B.Ed. subsequent to the enforcement <strong>of</strong><br />
NCTE Act <strong>of</strong> 1993 from an institution<br />
whose applic<strong>at</strong>ion for approval was not<br />
pending consider<strong>at</strong>ion before the NCTE<br />
or was rejected to be qualified for the<br />
purposes <strong>of</strong> admission to BTC Course,<br />
2007. The Full Bench has recognized the<br />
B.Ed. Degree granted prior to<br />
enforcement <strong>of</strong> Act <strong>of</strong> 1993 or such B.Ed.<br />
Degrees granted by only those institutions<br />
which had made their applic<strong>at</strong>ions for
3 All] Smt. Sadhana Singh V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 991<br />
recognition to the NCTE after coming<br />
into the force <strong>of</strong> NCTE Act but their<br />
recognition applic<strong>at</strong>ions had not been<br />
finally decided.<br />
The students who had a degree <strong>of</strong><br />
B.Ed. from other two c<strong>at</strong>egories <strong>of</strong><br />
institutions i.e.:<br />
a. the institution which did not<br />
make any applic<strong>at</strong>ion for recognition after<br />
coming into the Act <strong>of</strong> 1993.<br />
b. The institutions which made the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ions but their applic<strong>at</strong>ions had<br />
been rejected by the NCTE on various<br />
grounds have not been held entitled for<br />
admission to Special BTC Course, 2007.<br />
This <strong>Court</strong> has been made aware <strong>of</strong><br />
the interim order passed by the Hon'ble<br />
Apex <strong>Court</strong> in the Special Leave to<br />
Appeal against the Full Bench judgment<br />
<strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> in the Case <strong>of</strong> Bhupendra<br />
N<strong>at</strong>h Trip<strong>at</strong>hi which in the opinion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
court does in any way help the petitioners.<br />
The issue before this <strong>Court</strong> is more<br />
or less similar to the c<strong>at</strong>egory <strong>of</strong><br />
institutions who had not made the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ions for recognition even after<br />
coming into force by NCTE Act <strong>of</strong> 1993.<br />
The only difference being th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
institutions in the St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Jammu &<br />
Kashmir can not make such applic<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
as the Act <strong>of</strong> 1993 had no territorial<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion in th<strong>at</strong> St<strong>at</strong>e.<br />
19. In the opinion <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong> the<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. in its wisdom has decided to<br />
entertain applic<strong>at</strong>ions <strong>of</strong> those candid<strong>at</strong>es<br />
only who have obtained a Degree <strong>of</strong><br />
B.Ed. from the institution recognized by<br />
NCTE. The words had a Degree <strong>of</strong> B.Ed.<br />
even if given the broader interpret<strong>at</strong>ion as<br />
per the answers given by the Full Bench<br />
in the case <strong>of</strong> Bhupendra N<strong>at</strong>h Trip<strong>at</strong>hi to<br />
question nos. 1, 2 and 3 will not cover an<br />
institution situ<strong>at</strong>e in the St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Jammu &<br />
Kashmir inasmuch as qua the St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
Jammu & Kashmir, the NCTE Act has no<br />
territorial oper<strong>at</strong>ion. Therefore, the issue<br />
<strong>of</strong> any approval being applied or being<br />
granted by the NCTE to such institutions<br />
<strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Jammu & Kashmir will not<br />
arise.<br />
20. The competence <strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government to lay down the conditions<br />
for entertaining the applic<strong>at</strong>ions for<br />
admission to BTC Course 2007 as well as<br />
those which flow from the letter <strong>of</strong> the<br />
NCTE while granting permission to start<br />
Special BTC Course 2007 are not under<br />
challenge.<br />
21. In these set <strong>of</strong> circumstances if<br />
the St<strong>at</strong>e with reference to the letter <strong>of</strong> the<br />
NCTE has decided to entertain the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ions <strong>of</strong> the candid<strong>at</strong>es who have<br />
obtained a B.Ed. Degree from the<br />
institutions recognized by NCTE or who<br />
under the Full Bench judgment <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong> may become entitle to such<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion alone. Such decision cannot<br />
be termed as arbitrary in view <strong>of</strong> the<br />
specific norms <strong>of</strong> teachers educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
provided under the NCTE Act which are<br />
not applicable to the institutions in Jammu<br />
& Kashmir. The candid<strong>at</strong>e with a Degree<br />
<strong>of</strong> B.Ed. from institutions in Jammu &<br />
Kashmir form a different class and if such<br />
class <strong>of</strong> candid<strong>at</strong>es have been excluded<br />
from consider<strong>at</strong>ion for admission to BTC<br />
Special Training Course, 2007 by the<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e Government purposely, it cannot be<br />
said to be viol<strong>at</strong>ive <strong>of</strong> Article 14 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Constitution <strong>of</strong> India. Such action <strong>of</strong> the<br />
district authorities to exclude the<br />
candid<strong>at</strong>es like the petitioner from the<br />
zone <strong>of</strong> consider<strong>at</strong>ion is in conformity
992 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
with the terms and conditions laid down<br />
in the Government Order issued under the<br />
permission granted by the NCTE.<br />
22. Writ petition is dismissed.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.10.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE A.P. SAHI, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 57354 <strong>of</strong> 2009<br />
C/M Lok Bharti Inter College & another<br />
…Petitioner<br />
Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others …Respondent<br />
Counsel for the Petitioner:<br />
Sri Chandra Shekhar Srivastav<br />
Sri Sudhanshu Srivastava<br />
Counsel for the Respondent:<br />
Sri P.K. Srivastava<br />
Sri N.S. Yadav<br />
Sri Ajay Kumar Yadav<br />
C.S.C.<br />
Constitution <strong>of</strong> India Art-226-N<strong>at</strong>ural<br />
justice-Dismissal order passed-in<br />
absence <strong>of</strong> reply filed by the petitionerinspite<br />
<strong>of</strong> repe<strong>at</strong>ed request to supply the<br />
copy <strong>of</strong> complaint for proper<br />
explan<strong>at</strong>ion-not given even <strong>of</strong> the<br />
direction <strong>of</strong> <strong>Court</strong>-held- non sustainablenon<br />
supply <strong>of</strong> copy cause gre<strong>at</strong> prejudice<br />
the petitioner-order impugned quashed.<br />
Held: Para 6<br />
In the opinion <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong> non-supply <strong>of</strong><br />
the said document to the petitioner<br />
inspite <strong>of</strong> repe<strong>at</strong>ed demands viol<strong>at</strong>es the<br />
principles <strong>of</strong> n<strong>at</strong>ural justice and the<br />
<strong>Court</strong> is supported in its opinion by the<br />
Division Bench in the case Rayeen Fruits<br />
Co. and others Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and<br />
others reported in 2000 RD 440 and M/s<br />
Nagarjuna Constructions Co. Vs. Govt. <strong>of</strong><br />
A.P. and others reported in 2008(12) JT<br />
371 Paragraph 30. On account <strong>of</strong> nonsupply<br />
<strong>of</strong> the objection filed by the<br />
respondent no.4 the cause <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner has been prejudiced and<br />
therefore, the order impugned d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
13.10.2009 is un-sustainable.<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble A.P. Sahi, J.)<br />
1. Heard Sri Sudhanshu Srivastava<br />
learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri<br />
P.K.Srivastava for the respondent no.4<br />
and the learned standing counsel for the<br />
respondent nos. 1,2 and 3. In view <strong>of</strong> the<br />
consent <strong>of</strong> the learned counsels the<br />
petition is being disposed <strong>of</strong> finally <strong>at</strong> this<br />
stage without awaiting any further<br />
affidavits.<br />
2. The prime issue raised by the<br />
petitioner in this petition is th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
impugned order d<strong>at</strong>ed 13.10.2009 is in<br />
viol<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> principles <strong>of</strong> n<strong>at</strong>ural justice<br />
inasmuch as the directions <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> in<br />
the judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed 3.8.2009 have not<br />
been complied with in right earnest and<br />
the petitioner's claim has been non-suited<br />
without letting the petitioner know about<br />
the objection raised by the respondent<br />
no.4. Learned counsel for the petitioner<br />
contends th<strong>at</strong> on account <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid<br />
twin errors committed by the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools the impugned order<br />
is liable to be set aside as it is in gross<br />
viol<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> principles <strong>of</strong> n<strong>at</strong>ural justice.<br />
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner<br />
contends th<strong>at</strong> there is no indic<strong>at</strong>ion or<br />
mention <strong>of</strong> the demand made by the<br />
petitioner for supplying a copy <strong>of</strong> the<br />
reply submitted by the respondent no.4 on<br />
29.9.2009.
3 All] C/M, Lok Bharti Inter College and another V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 993<br />
4. Sri Srivastava contends th<strong>at</strong> after<br />
having received the contention on behalf<br />
<strong>of</strong> the petitioner the District inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools vide order d<strong>at</strong>ed 2.9.2009 called<br />
upon the respondent no.4 to submit his<br />
reply which was submitted and which has<br />
been considered in detail while passing<br />
the impugned order. The error committed<br />
by the District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools is th<strong>at</strong><br />
inspite <strong>of</strong> a written request made, the said<br />
reply <strong>of</strong> the respondent no.4 had never<br />
been made available to the petitioner and<br />
in the absence <strong>of</strong> any knowledge <strong>of</strong> the<br />
contents <strong>of</strong> such objection, the petitioner<br />
had absolutely no occasion to submit a<br />
reply to the same.<br />
5. Having heard learned counsel for<br />
the parties, this <strong>Court</strong> does not find any<br />
recital in the order d<strong>at</strong>ed 13.10.2009 th<strong>at</strong><br />
the petitioner was ever made aware about<br />
the reply submitted by the respondent<br />
no.4 and the objections taken therein. This<br />
was necessary as the reply submitted by<br />
the respondent no.4 has been accepted by<br />
the District inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools and has<br />
also been made the basis <strong>of</strong> passing <strong>of</strong> the<br />
impugned order. Learned counsel for the<br />
respondents have also not been able to<br />
point out any such m<strong>at</strong>erial or recital to<br />
th<strong>at</strong> effect.<br />
6. In the opinion <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong> nonsupply<br />
<strong>of</strong> the said document to the<br />
petitioner inspite <strong>of</strong> repe<strong>at</strong>ed demands<br />
viol<strong>at</strong>es the principles <strong>of</strong> n<strong>at</strong>ural justice<br />
and the <strong>Court</strong> is supported in its opinion<br />
by the Division Bench in the case Rayeen<br />
Fruits Co. and others Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P.<br />
and others reported in 2000 RD 440 and<br />
M/s Nagarjuna Constructions Co. Vs.<br />
Govt. <strong>of</strong> A.P. and others reported in<br />
2008(12) JT 371 Paragraph 30. On<br />
account <strong>of</strong> non-supply <strong>of</strong> the objection<br />
filed by the respondent no.4 the cause <strong>of</strong><br />
the petitioner has been prejudiced and<br />
therefore, the order impugned d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
13.10.2009 is un-sustainable.<br />
7. For the reasons st<strong>at</strong>ed herein<br />
above the order d<strong>at</strong>ed 13.10.2009 is set<br />
aside and a direction is issued to the<br />
respondent no.3 to proceed to pass a fresh<br />
order after giving opportunity <strong>of</strong> hearing<br />
to the petitioner committee <strong>of</strong><br />
management to rebut the response<br />
submitted by the respondent no.4 as<br />
expeditiously as possibly preferably<br />
within a period <strong>of</strong> four weeks from the<br />
d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> production <strong>of</strong> a certified copy <strong>of</strong><br />
this order before him.<br />
The writ petition is allowed. No<br />
order as to costs.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED ALLAHABAD: 19:08:2009.<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE A.P. SAHI J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3268 <strong>of</strong> 2006<br />
Sanskrit Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd.<br />
…Petitioner<br />
Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others …Respondents<br />
Counsel for the Petitioner:<br />
Sri S. Niranjan,<br />
Sri. Dharam Pal Singh<br />
Sri Vinod Kumar Singh<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
Sri Ramesh Upadhyaya<br />
Sri Ajit Kumar Singh<br />
Sri M.C. Trip<strong>at</strong>hi<br />
S.C.<br />
Constitution <strong>of</strong> India Art.-226-<br />
Expungtion <strong>of</strong> long term entry in favour<br />
<strong>of</strong> petitioner-without notice opportunity-
994 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
held-order passed utter viol<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
principle <strong>of</strong> N<strong>at</strong>ural Justice-not<br />
sustainable.<br />
Held: Para 8<br />
Having heard learned counsel for the<br />
parties and the submissions raised on<br />
their behalf , the petitioners have a<br />
remedy <strong>of</strong> getting their rights declared<br />
by filing a regular suit. Nonetheless,<br />
keeping in view the law laid down in the<br />
judgment referred to herein above, the<br />
order expunging the entries th<strong>at</strong> have<br />
continued for decades together ought<br />
not to have been passed without putting<br />
the petitioner to notice.<br />
Case law discussed<br />
Ch<strong>at</strong>urgun and others Versus St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and<br />
others reported in 2005 ALJ 756.<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble A.P. Sahi, J.)<br />
1. Heard Sri M.N.Singh learned<br />
counsel for the petitioner and the learned<br />
standing counsel for the respondent nos.<br />
1,2 and 3 and Sri Ajit Singh for the<br />
respondent no.4.<br />
2. The challenge is to the order<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 10.4.95 as upheld by the learned<br />
Commissioner in revision vide order<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 23.11.05 whereby the entries<br />
allegedly in favour <strong>of</strong> the petitioner have<br />
been expunged.<br />
3. The contention advanced on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> the petitioner is th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
petitioner society is in possession <strong>of</strong> plot<br />
nos. 268M, 270M and 281M total area <strong>of</strong><br />
20 Bighas and 3 Biswas situ<strong>at</strong>e in Mauja<br />
Bingawan Pargana/Tahsil Kanpur ,<br />
district Kanpur Nagar. It is submitted th<strong>at</strong><br />
the land in question was recorded in the<br />
name <strong>of</strong> the tenure holder since 1359 F<br />
and the said tenure holder executed a sale<br />
deed in favour <strong>of</strong> one Umesh Chandra<br />
Bharadwaj. The said Umesh Chandra<br />
Bharadwaj had executed a registered sale<br />
deed in favour <strong>of</strong> the petitioner society in<br />
1966 where after the petitioner society is<br />
in continuous possession <strong>of</strong> the land in<br />
dispute.<br />
4. It is alleged th<strong>at</strong> an ex-parte report<br />
had been submitted by the revenue<br />
authority behind the back <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner, and the S.D.M. vide order<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 10.4.95 directed the name <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner society to be expunged from the<br />
revenue record. It is further alleged th<strong>at</strong><br />
the petitioner had no knowledge about the<br />
same and after obtaining a copy <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Kh<strong>at</strong>auni they preferred a revision under<br />
section 219 <strong>of</strong> the U.P.Z.A. & L. R. Act<br />
which has been dismissed.<br />
5. The main contention raised on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> the petitioner is th<strong>at</strong> even if the<br />
proceeding had been under taken for<br />
expunging the name <strong>of</strong> the petitioner<br />
society then the same ought to have been<br />
done after giving an opportunity <strong>of</strong><br />
hearing, and having not done so, the<br />
impugned orders are in viol<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
principles <strong>of</strong> n<strong>at</strong>ural justice.<br />
6. The submission advanced is th<strong>at</strong><br />
long standing entries should not be<br />
ordinarily expunged summarily and <strong>at</strong><br />
least an opportunity should be given<br />
before passing such an order. In support<br />
<strong>of</strong> his submissions learned counsel for the<br />
petitioner has relied upon a decision in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Ch<strong>at</strong>urgun and others Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others reported in 2005<br />
ALJ 756.<br />
7. Learned standing counsel and Sri<br />
Ajit Singh learned counsel for respondent<br />
no.4 contend th<strong>at</strong> the entries in favour <strong>of</strong><br />
the petitioner society are fictitious and<br />
manipul<strong>at</strong>ed inasmuch as they are not in
3 All] Krishan Kumar V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 995<br />
possession <strong>of</strong> any valid title over the land<br />
and th<strong>at</strong> the entries have been<br />
manipul<strong>at</strong>ed which were rightly expunged<br />
by the S.D.M. They further contend th<strong>at</strong><br />
there is no requirement for interference by<br />
this <strong>Court</strong> under Article 226 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Constitution. It is further submitted th<strong>at</strong><br />
the n<strong>at</strong>ure <strong>of</strong> the proceeding being<br />
summary in n<strong>at</strong>ure, the petition should not<br />
be entertained against such an order.<br />
8. Having heard learned counsel for<br />
the parties and the submissions raised on<br />
their behalf , the petitioners have a<br />
remedy <strong>of</strong> getting their rights declared by<br />
filing a regular suit. Nonetheless, keeping<br />
in view the law laid down in the judgment<br />
referred to herein above, the order<br />
expunging the entries th<strong>at</strong> have continued<br />
for decades together ought not to have<br />
been passed without putting the petitioner<br />
to notice.<br />
9. In view <strong>of</strong> this no useful purpose<br />
would be served by keeping the writ<br />
petition pending before this <strong>Court</strong>. The<br />
impugned order d<strong>at</strong>ed 10.4.95 as well as<br />
the order <strong>of</strong> the learned Commissioner<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 23.11.2005 are hereby set aside.<br />
The S.D.M respondent no.3 shall be <strong>at</strong><br />
liberty to pass a fresh order in accordance<br />
with law after giving an opportunity <strong>of</strong><br />
hearing to the petitioner.<br />
10. The writ petition is allowed. No<br />
order as to costs. Learned counsel for the<br />
petitioner prays th<strong>at</strong> the S.D.M. be<br />
directed to dispose <strong>of</strong> the m<strong>at</strong>ter<br />
expeditiously. The S.D.M., Kanpur Nagar<br />
shall proceed to conclude the proceedings<br />
as expeditiously as possible but not l<strong>at</strong>er<br />
than six months.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.11.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE R.K AGARWAL, J.<br />
THE HON’BLE JAYASHREE TIWARI, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 64223 <strong>of</strong> 2009<br />
Krishan Kumar<br />
Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others<br />
Counsel for the Petitioner:<br />
Sri Ashok Khare<br />
Sri Durga Tiwari<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
Sri Ghanshyam Maurya<br />
Sri Sunil Kumar Singh<br />
Sri Sanjiv Singh<br />
C.S.C.<br />
…Petitioner<br />
…Respondents<br />
Constitution <strong>of</strong> India-Article 226-N<strong>at</strong>ural<br />
Justice-Cancell<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> Residence<br />
certific<strong>at</strong>e-before cancell<strong>at</strong>ion No Notice<br />
or opportunity <strong>of</strong> hearing given-heldorder<br />
not sustainable.<br />
Held: Para 5<br />
From a perusal <strong>of</strong> the order and the<br />
averments made in paragraph 16 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
writ petition, we are <strong>of</strong> the considered<br />
opinion th<strong>at</strong> neither any show cause<br />
notice nor any opportunity <strong>of</strong> hearing<br />
was afforded to the petitioner stands<br />
established and the impugned order has<br />
been pased in gross viol<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> principle<br />
<strong>of</strong> equity, fair play and n<strong>at</strong>ural justice.<br />
The same cannot be sustained which is<br />
hereby set aside. The respondent no.3<br />
may proceed in accordance with law.<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble R.K. Agrawal, J.)<br />
1. By means <strong>of</strong> the present writ<br />
petition the petitioner sought a writ , order
996 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
or direction in the n<strong>at</strong>ure <strong>of</strong> certiorari<br />
calling for the record <strong>of</strong> the case and<br />
quashing the order d<strong>at</strong>ed 11th <strong>Nov</strong>ember,<br />
2009 passed by the the Sub Divisional<br />
Magistr<strong>at</strong>e Sadar, district Deoriarespondent<br />
no.3, filed as Annexure 7 to<br />
the writ petition by which the residence<br />
certific<strong>at</strong>e issued to the petitioner on 23rd<br />
July, 2009 has been cancelled on the basis<br />
<strong>of</strong> the complaint made on 9th <strong>Nov</strong>ember,<br />
2009 by one Sanjay Tiwari, respondent<br />
no.6.<br />
2. According to the petitioner the<br />
complaint was made on 9th <strong>Nov</strong>ember,<br />
2009 and without affording any<br />
opportunity to show cause or hearing the<br />
order has been passed in haste on 11th<br />
<strong>Nov</strong>ember, 2009. The entire exercise has<br />
been done within a short span <strong>of</strong> two days<br />
which according to the petitioner itself<br />
speaks about the motive. The averment<br />
regarding neither issuing any show cause<br />
notice nor affording any opportunity <strong>of</strong><br />
hearing to the petitioner has been made in<br />
paragraph 16 <strong>of</strong> the writ petition.<br />
3. We have heard Sri Ashok Khare,<br />
learned Senior Advoc<strong>at</strong>e assisted by Ms.<br />
Durga Tiwari, learned standing counsel<br />
appearing for respondent nos. 1 to 4, Sri<br />
Sunil Kumar Singh, learned counsel<br />
appearing for respondent no.6 and Sri<br />
Sanjiv Singh has filed his appearance on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> respondent no.5.<br />
4. With the consent <strong>of</strong> the learned<br />
counsel for the parties, the writ petition is<br />
being disposed <strong>of</strong> <strong>at</strong> the admission stage<br />
without calling for counter affidavit. From<br />
a perusal <strong>of</strong> the impugned order d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
11th <strong>Nov</strong>ember, 2009, we find th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
Sub Divisional Magistr<strong>at</strong>e has mentioned<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the complaint was filed by Sri Sanjay<br />
Tiwari on 9th <strong>Nov</strong>ember, 2009, an<br />
enquiry was conducted on 10th<br />
<strong>Nov</strong>ember, 2009 and the impugned order<br />
has been passed on 11th <strong>Nov</strong>ember, 2009<br />
whereby the petitioner's residence<br />
certific<strong>at</strong>e has been cancelled. It does not<br />
mention th<strong>at</strong> any showcause notice or<br />
opportunity <strong>of</strong> hearing was given to the<br />
petitioner before passing the impugned<br />
order.<br />
5. From a perusal <strong>of</strong> the order and<br />
the averments made in paragraph 16 <strong>of</strong><br />
the writ petition, we are <strong>of</strong> the considered<br />
opinion th<strong>at</strong> neither any show cause<br />
notice nor any opportunity <strong>of</strong> hearing was<br />
afforded to the petitioner stands<br />
established and the impugned order has<br />
been pased in gross viol<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> principle<br />
<strong>of</strong> equity, fair play and n<strong>at</strong>ural justice.<br />
The same cannot be sustained which is<br />
hereby set aside. The respondent no.3<br />
may proceed in accordance with law.<br />
6. The writ petition succeeds and is<br />
allowed.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.08.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE RAKESH TIWARI, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4006 <strong>of</strong> 2005<br />
Smt. Raman Pandey & others …Petitioners<br />
Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others …Respondent<br />
Counsel for the Petitioners:<br />
Sri A.C. Tiwari<br />
Sri Akhilesh Kuamr Pandey<br />
Sri D.K. Jaiswal<br />
Sri Pawan Kumar Tiwari<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
Sri H.M.B. Sinha (S.C.)
3 All] Smt. Raman Pandey and others V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 997<br />
C.S.C.<br />
Constitution <strong>of</strong> India-Art-226- Post<br />
retirel benefits-claim by second wife on<br />
basis <strong>of</strong> nomin<strong>at</strong>ion made by deceased<br />
employee even the marriage <strong>of</strong> second<br />
wife declared void- in view <strong>of</strong> law laid<br />
down by apex court children <strong>of</strong> the<br />
second wife entitled equally half share<br />
with first wife.<br />
Held: Para 5<br />
In the present case, daughter <strong>of</strong><br />
petitioner Priyanka Pandey ( Petitioner<br />
no. 1/1), who had filed impleadment<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion, has also <strong>at</strong>tained majority.<br />
But Deepak Pandey ( petitioner no. 1/2 )<br />
son <strong>of</strong> the deceased with the petitioner-<br />
Smt. Raman Pandey is still a minor being<br />
13 years <strong>of</strong> age, therefore, he is entitled<br />
to retirement benefits <strong>of</strong> the deceased<br />
employee particularly in the backdrop<br />
th<strong>at</strong> Smt. Raman Pandey had been<br />
nomin<strong>at</strong>ed as wife by the deceased in<br />
the service records for receiving his<br />
benefits.<br />
Case law discussed:<br />
[200(1) E.S.C. Page 577 (SC)<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.)<br />
1. Heard counsel for the parties.<br />
This petition has been filed by Smt.<br />
Raman Pandey claiming herself to be wife<br />
<strong>of</strong> deceased employee Jayanti Prasad<br />
Pandey.<br />
Son <strong>of</strong> Smt. Savitri Devi claimed<br />
appointment on compassion<strong>at</strong>e ground on<br />
the basis th<strong>at</strong> Smt. Raman Pandey, the<br />
second living wife <strong>of</strong> the deceased is not<br />
entitled to the benefits on compassion<strong>at</strong>e<br />
ground under Dying in Harness Rules as<br />
she is not within the definition <strong>of</strong> family<br />
therein. In th<strong>at</strong> context, the <strong>Court</strong> in Writ<br />
Petition No. 18397 <strong>of</strong> 2002, wherein<br />
present petitioner- Smt. Raman Pandey<br />
was a party as respondent no. 4 and had<br />
also filed counter affidavit, held as<br />
follows :<br />
"In my opinion, If Smt. Raman<br />
Pandey is not legally wedded wife and the<br />
marriage <strong>of</strong> Smt. Raman Pandey is void.<br />
According to Hindu Marriage Act, she<br />
can not claim the benefits to claim and<br />
appointment under Dying in Harness<br />
because she does not come under the<br />
definition <strong>of</strong> family. The judgment relied<br />
upon by the counsel for the petitioner<br />
fully supports the contention <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner."<br />
2. Now by means <strong>of</strong> this petition,<br />
Smt. Raman Pandey claims for a writ in<br />
the n<strong>at</strong>ure <strong>of</strong> mandamus commanding<br />
opposite party no. 1 to 3 to appoint the<br />
petitioner on compassion<strong>at</strong>e ground<br />
according to eligibility on any suitable<br />
post. This prayer has not been pressed by<br />
the counsel for petitioner in the backdrop<br />
th<strong>at</strong> Rajesh Kumar Pandey, elder son <strong>of</strong><br />
the deceased employee has been provided<br />
appointment under Dying in Harness<br />
Rules pursuant to order passed by the<br />
<strong>Court</strong> in the aforesaid writ petition No.<br />
18397 <strong>of</strong> 2002.<br />
Counsel for the petitioner has<br />
confined his arguments only in respect <strong>of</strong><br />
prayer no. 2 which is for a writ <strong>of</strong><br />
mandamus "commanding the opposite<br />
parties to make payment <strong>of</strong> G.P.F., Group<br />
insurance and other dues in favour <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner and family pension month to<br />
month towards the services rendered by<br />
her husband l<strong>at</strong>e Jayanti Prasad Pandey on<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the fact th<strong>at</strong> she is only<br />
nominee <strong>of</strong> her husband in the service<br />
records."
998 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
Notices were issued vide order d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
4.5.2007 to respondent no. 4 to 6. His<br />
Lordship Hon. Mr. Justice Sabhajeet<br />
Yadav vide order d<strong>at</strong>ed 10.4.08 directed<br />
the <strong>of</strong>fice to submit report about service<br />
upon aforesaid respondents and they were<br />
directed to file counter affidavit within<br />
four weeks.<br />
From the service report submitted by<br />
the <strong>of</strong>fice, it appears th<strong>at</strong> neither<br />
acknowledge nor registered cover has<br />
been received back, therefore, in view <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong> Rules, service is deemd to<br />
be sufficient upon respondent no. 4 to 6<br />
who have not put in appearance in the<br />
m<strong>at</strong>ter.<br />
Counsel for the petitioner has also<br />
submitted th<strong>at</strong> respondent no. 6- Smt.<br />
Savitri is now living with one Ramfer<br />
Yadav, resident <strong>of</strong> Pura Meharban Ka<br />
Purva, village Panchay<strong>at</strong> Gobari, Tehsil<br />
Sadar, Pr<strong>at</strong>apgarh after de<strong>at</strong>h <strong>of</strong> her<br />
husband and has now six issues from him.<br />
3. In support <strong>of</strong> his second prayer,<br />
the counsel for the petitioner has placed<br />
reliance upon the judgment <strong>of</strong> the Apex<br />
<strong>Court</strong> in Rameshwari Devi Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
Bihar,( 2000 (1) E.S.C. page 577 (S.C.)<br />
wherein it was held th<strong>at</strong> where a Govt.<br />
servant being a Hindu having two living<br />
wives, died while in service, then his<br />
second marriage was void under the<br />
Hindu law and as regards the st<strong>at</strong>us <strong>of</strong><br />
second wife and children from second<br />
marriage is concerned, considering the<br />
question whether they were entitled to any<br />
share in the family pension and de<strong>at</strong>h cum<br />
retirement gr<strong>at</strong>uity etc, , the Apex <strong>Court</strong><br />
ruled th<strong>at</strong> second wife having no st<strong>at</strong>us <strong>of</strong><br />
widow is not entitled for anything.<br />
However, children from the second wife<br />
would equally share the benefits <strong>of</strong> de<strong>at</strong>h<br />
cum retirement gr<strong>at</strong>uity and family<br />
pension till they <strong>at</strong>tain their majority.<br />
In the present case, it appears th<strong>at</strong><br />
first wife <strong>of</strong> deceased employee is now<br />
living with another person.Both her sons<br />
have <strong>at</strong>tained majority. One <strong>of</strong> the sons<br />
has also been given appointment by the<br />
department on compassion<strong>at</strong>e ground.<br />
While the present petitioner- Smt. Raman<br />
Pandey, who is said to be the second wife,<br />
is nomin<strong>at</strong>ed in the service records by the<br />
deceased whereas first wife Savitri Devi<br />
is not so nomin<strong>at</strong>ed.<br />
4. The standing counsel on the basis<br />
<strong>of</strong> paragraph no. 4 <strong>of</strong> the counter affidavit<br />
submitted th<strong>at</strong> marriage <strong>of</strong> Smt. Raman<br />
Pandey-second wife, is void as has also<br />
been held in Writ Petition No. 18397 <strong>of</strong><br />
2002 referred to above, therefore, she is<br />
not entitled to any claim on retiral dues <strong>of</strong><br />
the deceased govt. employee. The<br />
argument is fallacious and incorrect. The<br />
<strong>Court</strong> had not decided the st<strong>at</strong>us <strong>of</strong> Smt.<br />
Raman Pandey, the petitioner in th<strong>at</strong> case<br />
as second wife nor had declared the<br />
marriage as void. The <strong>Court</strong> has laid<br />
emphasis th<strong>at</strong> if Raman Pandey is second<br />
wife, even her marriage is void. Until and<br />
unless it is so declared, it cannot be said<br />
tobe a void marriage unless it is so<br />
declared by a court <strong>of</strong> cmpetent<br />
jurisdiction . The claim in her petition was<br />
for compasson<strong>at</strong>e appointment and not for<br />
any declar<strong>at</strong>ion or adjudic<strong>at</strong>ion th<strong>at</strong> Smt.<br />
Raman Pandey is not the wife <strong>of</strong> the<br />
deceased. However, even if the petitioner<br />
can be said to be the second wife, in th<strong>at</strong><br />
case also she may not have any st<strong>at</strong>us <strong>of</strong><br />
widow and will be entitled to anything but<br />
progenies <strong>of</strong> the deceased govt. employee<br />
through her, would equally share the<br />
benefits <strong>of</strong> de<strong>at</strong>h cum retirement gr<strong>at</strong>uity<br />
and family pension till they <strong>at</strong>tain
3 All] Smt. Shailendra Rai V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 999<br />
majority in accordance with r<strong>at</strong>io laid<br />
down in Rameshwari Devi's case (supra),.<br />
4. In the present case, daughter <strong>of</strong><br />
petitioner Priyanka Pandey (Petitioner no.<br />
1/1), who had filed impleadment<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion, has also <strong>at</strong>tained majority.<br />
But Deepak Pandey (petitioner no. 1/2)<br />
son <strong>of</strong> the deceased with the petitioner-<br />
Smt. Raman Pandey is still a minor being<br />
13 years <strong>of</strong> age, therefore, he is entitled to<br />
retirement benefits <strong>of</strong> the deceased<br />
employee particularly in the backdrop th<strong>at</strong><br />
Smt. Raman Pandey had been nomin<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
as wife by the deceased in the service<br />
records for receiving his benefits.<br />
5. For all the reasons st<strong>at</strong>ed above,<br />
this petition is allowed. The respondents<br />
are directed to release retiral dues in<br />
favour <strong>of</strong> minor son Deepak Pandey in the<br />
form <strong>of</strong> Fixed Deposit in a n<strong>at</strong>ionalised<br />
bank earning maximum interest payable<br />
to him on his <strong>at</strong>taining majority i.e. 18<br />
years <strong>of</strong> age. The F.D. shall be made in<br />
the name <strong>of</strong> the minor Deepak Pandey,<br />
expeditiously within a period <strong>of</strong> two<br />
months from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> present<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> a<br />
certified copy <strong>of</strong> this order and the<br />
petitioner who is n<strong>at</strong>ural guardian <strong>of</strong> the<br />
minor <strong>at</strong> present, will be entitled to draw<br />
interest half yearly on the deposit so made<br />
to meet expenses <strong>of</strong> educ<strong>at</strong>ion etc. <strong>of</strong> the<br />
children. No order as to costs.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.10.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 43643 <strong>of</strong> 2006<br />
Smt. Shailendra Rai<br />
Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others<br />
Counsel for the Petitioner:<br />
Sri Markandey Rai<br />
Sri D.S.P. Trip<strong>at</strong>hi<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
Sri R.P. Dubey<br />
Sri C.K. Rai<br />
Sri Vipul Trip<strong>at</strong>hi<br />
Sri Neeraj Trip<strong>at</strong>hi<br />
Sri Prabh<strong>at</strong> Rai<br />
C.S.C.<br />
…Petitioner<br />
…Respondents<br />
Constitution <strong>of</strong> India, Art.-226-Salary<br />
Art.21, 300-A- Salary <strong>of</strong> petitioner<br />
withheld since March 2005-inspite <strong>of</strong><br />
repe<strong>at</strong>ed direction R-5 neither filed<br />
counter non appeared-only after issuing<br />
warrant- although payment made<br />
through cheque- but the fact remain<br />
regarding fixing liability- R.5 and R3<br />
both equally responsible direction for<br />
release <strong>of</strong> arrears <strong>of</strong> salary with 8%<br />
interest given- considering conduct <strong>of</strong><br />
authorities exumplory cost imposed <strong>of</strong><br />
Rs.2 lacs, out <strong>of</strong> which Rs.1,5000/ shall<br />
be recover from the personal benefit <strong>of</strong><br />
R.5 an remaining 50,000/- from R3 in<br />
case <strong>of</strong> default to recover the same as<br />
arrears <strong>of</strong> land Revenue.<br />
Held: Para 22 and 25<br />
In this case, as already discussed above,<br />
the act <strong>of</strong> respondent no. 5 in non<br />
payment <strong>of</strong> salary to the petitioner is<br />
wholly unjustified and illegal.<br />
Simultaneously, this <strong>Court</strong> cannot leave
1000 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
the respondent no. 3 as wholly innocent<br />
in the m<strong>at</strong>ter for the reason th<strong>at</strong> he,<br />
being a superior and higher <strong>of</strong>ficer, if<br />
found th<strong>at</strong> someone in his <strong>of</strong>fice is not<br />
acting properly and is causing a glaring<br />
injustice and illegality, it was incumbent<br />
upon him to apprise the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government <strong>of</strong> such act <strong>of</strong> the<br />
respondent no. 5 recommending a<br />
suitable disciplinary action against him,<br />
but the respondent no. 3 also kept<br />
silence in this m<strong>at</strong>ter and it is only when<br />
he was personally summoned, took steps<br />
which he could have taken earlier for<br />
paying the salary to the petitioner. To<br />
this extent, the respondent no. 3 is also<br />
guilty and is to be held responsible.<br />
In view <strong>of</strong> the above discussion, this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> is s<strong>at</strong>isfied th<strong>at</strong> here is a case<br />
where the conduct <strong>of</strong> the respondents<br />
makes them liable for an exemplary cost<br />
which I quantify to Rs. two lacs. This<br />
would also be compens<strong>at</strong>ory to the<br />
petitioner. The liability is distributed to<br />
the extent <strong>of</strong> Rs. 1.5 lacs against<br />
respondent no. 5 and fifty thousands<br />
against respondent no. 3. The above cost<br />
shall be paid by them within six months<br />
failing which it would be open to the<br />
Registrar General <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> to take<br />
steps to realize the same amount as<br />
arrears <strong>of</strong> land revenue. After realizing<br />
the amount <strong>of</strong> cost, the same may be<br />
released in favour <strong>of</strong> the petitioner.<br />
Case law discussed:<br />
AIR 1979, SC 49, JT 2009 (13) SC 643, 2009<br />
(2) SCC 592, JT 2007(3) SC 112, AIR 1979 SC<br />
429, AIR 2006 SC 182, AIR 2006 SC 898,<br />
(2007)9 SCC 497; (2009) 6 SCALE 17; (2009)7<br />
SCALE 622, JT(2009) 12 SC 198, 1972 AC<br />
1027, 1964 AC 1129, JT 1993 (6) SC 307, JT<br />
2004 (5) SC 17, (1996) 6 SCC 558, AIR 1996<br />
SC 715.<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.)<br />
1. Heard Sri Markandey Rai for the<br />
petitioner, Learned Chief Standing<br />
Counsel assisted by Standing Counsel<br />
representing respondents no. 1, 3, 4 and 5<br />
and Sri C.K. Rai, Advoc<strong>at</strong>e, for<br />
respondent no. 2.<br />
2. As agreed by learned counsels for<br />
the parties, since the pleadings are<br />
complete, the writ petition is being heard<br />
and decided finally under the Rules <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Court</strong> <strong>at</strong> this stage.<br />
3. Though the controversy, which<br />
has engaged the <strong>at</strong>tention <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> by<br />
means <strong>of</strong> the present writ petition is very<br />
short but shows the ways and means<br />
adopted by the respondents for harassing<br />
their employees to the extent <strong>of</strong> not only<br />
putting him/her to gre<strong>at</strong> inconvenience<br />
but making the entire family to suffer to<br />
the extent <strong>of</strong> starv<strong>at</strong>ion without there<br />
being any illegality or irregularity on the<br />
part <strong>of</strong> such an employee.<br />
4. The petitioner, Smt. Shailendra<br />
Rai, an Assistant Teacher in a Junior <strong>High</strong><br />
School has approached this <strong>Court</strong> on<br />
account <strong>of</strong> non payment <strong>of</strong> her salary by<br />
the respondents since March' 2005<br />
without there being any fault on her part.<br />
A writ <strong>of</strong> mandamus has been prayed<br />
directing the respondents to pay salary to<br />
the petitioner since March' 1985.<br />
5. To start with, this <strong>Court</strong> directed<br />
the respondents to file counter affidavit<br />
informing the <strong>Court</strong> as to why salary has<br />
not been paid to the petitioner. On<br />
21.8.2006, the following order was passed<br />
by this <strong>Court</strong>:<br />
"Sri C.K. Rai Advoc<strong>at</strong>e has accepted<br />
notice on behalf <strong>of</strong> respondent nos. 2 and<br />
3, Standing Counsel accepts notice on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> respondent nos. 1, 4 and 5.<br />
Respondents may seek instruction as<br />
to why payment <strong>of</strong> salary is not being<br />
effected in favour <strong>of</strong> the petitioner. The
3 All] Smt. Shailendra Rai V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1001<br />
District Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Officer,<br />
Sonebhadra may also file his affidavit<br />
along with the objection <strong>of</strong> the Finance<br />
and Audit Officer in his <strong>of</strong>fice, referred to<br />
in the letter d<strong>at</strong>ed 27.4.2006 List on 31st<br />
August, 2006."<br />
6. When the m<strong>at</strong>ter again came up<br />
on 27.10.2006, a vague and incomplete<br />
reply was filed which was noticed by this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> in its order d<strong>at</strong>ed 27.10.2006 as<br />
under :<br />
"Learned counsel for the petitioner<br />
st<strong>at</strong>es th<strong>at</strong> he has not been served with<br />
counter affidavit filed by the District<br />
Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Officer, Sonebhadra.<br />
Moreover, the affidavit filed is not<br />
accompanied with the objection <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Finance and Audit Officer referred to in<br />
the letter <strong>of</strong> the District Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
Officer d<strong>at</strong>ed 27th April, 2006, as was<br />
directed under order <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
21st August, 2006.<br />
Let Sri C.K. Rai, learned counsel for<br />
respondent nos. 2 and 3 file a better<br />
affidavit in strict compliance <strong>of</strong> the order<br />
<strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> d<strong>at</strong>ed 21st August, 2006, by<br />
20th <strong>Nov</strong>ember, 2006.<br />
Put up on 20th <strong>Nov</strong>ember, 2006."<br />
7. Noticing th<strong>at</strong> there was no fault<br />
shown on the part <strong>of</strong> the petitioner for non<br />
payment <strong>of</strong> salary, but inter alia shifting<br />
<strong>of</strong> responsibility sought to be indulged by<br />
the respondents, this <strong>Court</strong> on 11.11.2007<br />
passed the following order :<br />
"In the present case short counter<br />
affidavit has been filed and the same is<br />
only on behalf <strong>of</strong> respondent no. 3. In pith<br />
and substance the said short counter<br />
affidavit supports the version <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner and entire burden has been<br />
fastened upon Finance and Accounts<br />
Officer, based <strong>at</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> District<br />
Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Officer, Sonebhadra for<br />
ensuring payment <strong>of</strong> salary to petitioner.<br />
Backdrop <strong>of</strong> the case reflects th<strong>at</strong> some<br />
adjustment has been made and the reason<br />
why Finance and Accounts Officer is not<br />
ensuring payment <strong>of</strong> salary to petitioner is<br />
not all before this <strong>Court</strong>, as such it would<br />
be expedient th<strong>at</strong> the version <strong>of</strong> Finance<br />
and Accounts Officer should come before<br />
this <strong>Court</strong>.<br />
In these circumstances and in this<br />
background, Finance and Accounts<br />
Officer, Office <strong>of</strong> District Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
Officer indic<strong>at</strong>ing as to why salary is not<br />
being ensured to petitioner. While<br />
preparing counter affidavit details<br />
furnished in short counter affidavit filed<br />
on behalf <strong>of</strong> respondents no. 3 shall also<br />
be explained. For this purpose, learned<br />
counsel for petitioner is directed to serve<br />
a copy <strong>of</strong> this short counter affidavit upon<br />
Finance and Accounts Officer, Basic<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion, Sonebhadra within three<br />
weeks from today. In the event <strong>of</strong> service<br />
<strong>of</strong> short counter affidavit alongwith a<br />
copy <strong>of</strong> this order in all eventuality<br />
counter affidavit has to be filed by<br />
Finance and Accounts Officer within next<br />
three weeks.<br />
List after one month."<br />
8. Thereafter, on 13.8.2009,<br />
5.10.2009 and 9.10.2009 having found<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the respondents were neither able to<br />
give any justific<strong>at</strong>ion for non payment <strong>of</strong><br />
salary to the petitioner nor had made any<br />
effort to pay her salary, the following<br />
orders were passed :<br />
"The only grievance <strong>of</strong> the petitioner<br />
is th<strong>at</strong> he is not being given salary since<br />
March 2005, though she is a regularly<br />
appointed teacher in a Junior <strong>High</strong><br />
School maintained by the Basic Shiksha
1002 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
Parishad. Though counter affidavit has<br />
been filed on behalf <strong>of</strong> respondent no. 3<br />
though his counsel but he learned counsel<br />
is not present. Sri Prabh<strong>at</strong> Rai, holding<br />
brief <strong>of</strong> Sri Neeraj Trip<strong>at</strong>hi, learned<br />
counsel for the respondent no. 5 is present<br />
but he is not able to tell as to why the<br />
salary has not been paid to the petitioner<br />
till d<strong>at</strong>e. Since the <strong>Court</strong> is not getting any<br />
assistance from them so it is directed th<strong>at</strong><br />
respondents no. 3 and 5 are shall be<br />
present in <strong>Court</strong> and explain as to why the<br />
salary <strong>of</strong> the petitioner has not been paid<br />
so far.<br />
List this m<strong>at</strong>ter on 30th September<br />
on which d<strong>at</strong>e appropri<strong>at</strong>e orders will be<br />
passed in this m<strong>at</strong>ter. Sri Prabh<strong>at</strong> Rai,<br />
holding brief for Sri Neeraj Trip<strong>at</strong>hi, who<br />
has filed his Vakal<strong>at</strong>nama on behalf <strong>of</strong><br />
respondent no. 5 and the learned standing<br />
counsel for respondents 3 & 5 are<br />
directed to make compliance <strong>of</strong> this order.<br />
The <strong>of</strong>fice is directed to furnish a copy <strong>of</strong><br />
this order by Monday, i.e 17.08.2009.<br />
13.08.2009"<br />
"Vide order d<strong>at</strong>ed 13.08.2009 the<br />
respondents no. 3 and 5 both were<br />
required to appear before this <strong>Court</strong> on<br />
30.09.2009 in person to explain as to why<br />
the petitioner has not been paid salary so<br />
far but since 30.09.2009 was declared as<br />
holiday, Sri C.K. Rai, learned counsel<br />
appearing for respondent no. 3 st<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong><br />
the respondent no. 3 is not present. Sri<br />
Vipul Trip<strong>at</strong>hi, holding brief on behalf <strong>of</strong><br />
Sri Neeraj Trip<strong>at</strong>hi st<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong> he has filed<br />
his Vakal<strong>at</strong>nama on behalf <strong>of</strong> respondent<br />
no. 5 but it appears th<strong>at</strong> the respondent<br />
no. 5 has engaged some other counsel. It<br />
is not concerned with the <strong>Court</strong> as to how<br />
many counsels were engaged in a m<strong>at</strong>ter<br />
but once notice has been issued to the<br />
party concerned and he is aware with the<br />
case, it is his oblig<strong>at</strong>ion to keep w<strong>at</strong>ch <strong>of</strong><br />
the case.<br />
In the facts and circumstances <strong>of</strong> the<br />
case, respondents no. 3 and 5 both are<br />
directed to be present in person before<br />
this <strong>Court</strong> on 09.10.2009. Sri Rai and Sri<br />
Trip<strong>at</strong>hi shall communic<strong>at</strong>e this order to<br />
respondents no. 3 and 5 respectively as<br />
the same has been passed in their<br />
presence.<br />
05.10.2009"<br />
"On 13.08.2009 this <strong>Court</strong> passed<br />
order directing the respondents no. 3 and<br />
5 both to be present in person before this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> to explain as to why the salary <strong>of</strong><br />
petitioner has not been paid though he is<br />
a regularly appointed teacher in Junior<br />
<strong>High</strong> School maintained by Basic Shiksha<br />
Parishad.<br />
The respondent no. 3, Sri Rajesh<br />
Kumar is present but the respondent no. 5<br />
is not present.<br />
Sri Vipul Trip<strong>at</strong>hi holding brief on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> Sri Neeraj Trip<strong>at</strong>hi st<strong>at</strong>es th<strong>at</strong> he<br />
has communic<strong>at</strong>ed the direction <strong>of</strong> this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> to respondent no. 5 but he has not<br />
responded.<br />
Let non-bailable warrant be issued<br />
to respondent no. 5 to ensure his presence<br />
before this <strong>Court</strong> on 21.10.2009. The<br />
<strong>of</strong>fice shall take appropri<strong>at</strong>e steps for<br />
compliance <strong>of</strong> this order. The respondent<br />
no. 3 shall also remain present on the<br />
next d<strong>at</strong>e.<br />
List this m<strong>at</strong>ter on 21.10.2009.<br />
09.10.2009"<br />
9. The reluctant <strong>at</strong>titude shown by<br />
the respondent no. 5 compelled this <strong>Court</strong><br />
in issuing non-bailable warrant on<br />
9.10.2009 as already noted above.<br />
However, this time, the Registry <strong>of</strong> this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> came to rescue <strong>of</strong> the respondents<br />
by not taking steps for issuing non<br />
bailable warrant as directed and on<br />
21.10.2009 a report was submitted th<strong>at</strong><br />
due to rush <strong>of</strong> work, no further action
3 All] Smt. Shailendra Rai V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1003<br />
could be taken by them and, therefore,<br />
they may be granted some further time to<br />
comply with the <strong>Court</strong>'s order d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
9.10.2009.<br />
10. In the meantime, an applic<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
no. 274455 <strong>of</strong> 2009 was filed on behalf <strong>of</strong><br />
respondent no. 5 st<strong>at</strong>ing th<strong>at</strong> firstly due to<br />
mistake <strong>of</strong> Sri Neeraj Trip<strong>at</strong>hi, Advoc<strong>at</strong>e,<br />
he did not get any inform<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
order d<strong>at</strong>ed 17.8.2009 and, therefore,<br />
could not appear on 5.10.2009 and<br />
secondly th<strong>at</strong> on 6.10.2009 when he<br />
received the inform<strong>at</strong>ion by th<strong>at</strong> time he<br />
suffered viral fever and hence could not<br />
appear on 9.10.2009. The above st<strong>at</strong>ement<br />
is sought to be supported by a medical<br />
certific<strong>at</strong>e issued by the Medical Officer,<br />
District Hospital, Sonebhadra d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
12.10.2009 certifying th<strong>at</strong> the respondent<br />
no. 5 Rajesh Kumar was in his tre<strong>at</strong>ment<br />
as an outdoor p<strong>at</strong>ient since 8.10.2009 to<br />
10.10.2009 and fitness certific<strong>at</strong>e is being<br />
issued from 12.10.2009.<br />
11. It is to be noted th<strong>at</strong> though<br />
respondent no. 5 is impleaded by his<br />
<strong>of</strong>fice and, therefore, he ought to be<br />
represented by learned Standing Counsel<br />
appointed by the St<strong>at</strong>e Government but in<br />
this case, the applic<strong>at</strong>ion has been filed<br />
through Sri Neeraj Trip<strong>at</strong>hi, Advoc<strong>at</strong>e,<br />
who has also filed counter affidavit on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> respondent no. 5 earlier. The<br />
respondent no. 5 thus has engaged this<br />
priv<strong>at</strong>e counsel but whether for the said<br />
purpose he obtained permission from the<br />
Government or not is not clear from the<br />
record.<br />
12. On the request <strong>of</strong> learned<br />
counsels for the parties, this m<strong>at</strong>ter was<br />
taken up on 28.10.2009 on which d<strong>at</strong>e Sri<br />
Manohar Prasad, Basic Shiksha Adhikari,<br />
Sonebhadra and Sri Rajesh Kumar,<br />
Finance and Accounts Officer in the<br />
<strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> Basic Shiksha Adhikari,<br />
Sonebhadra, both were present. A<br />
supplementary counter affidavit sworn on<br />
27.10.2009 <strong>at</strong> 3.10. P.M. by the<br />
respondent 3 was also filed st<strong>at</strong>ing th<strong>at</strong> by<br />
cheque d<strong>at</strong>ed 15.10.2009, salary <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner for the period <strong>of</strong> March' 2005 to<br />
October' 2009 has been paid and a<br />
photocopy <strong>of</strong> Treasury Cheque d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
26.10.2009 was annexed. In para 4 and 5<br />
<strong>of</strong> the supplementary counter affidavit, it<br />
is said th<strong>at</strong> due to some confusion and<br />
misconception, some delay has occurred<br />
in making payment <strong>of</strong> salary to the<br />
petitioner, which is regretted and it is said<br />
th<strong>at</strong> since the petitioner's salary has been<br />
paid, therefore, no further cause <strong>of</strong> action<br />
survives and, the writ petition may be<br />
dismissed as infructuous. The deponent <strong>of</strong><br />
the affidavit has also tendered his<br />
unconditional apology.<br />
13. Normally, when the relief sought<br />
in the writ petition is met in the hands <strong>of</strong><br />
the respondents and this <strong>Court</strong> finds th<strong>at</strong><br />
no further cause <strong>of</strong> actions survives, as a<br />
normal practice, the writ petitions are<br />
dismissed having become infructuous but<br />
here is a case where the petitioner's salary<br />
was detained by the respondents illegally<br />
and without any lawful justific<strong>at</strong>ion, as is<br />
evident from the above facts, and when<br />
she made this complaint to this <strong>Court</strong> in<br />
August 2006, even then the respondents<br />
did not look into the m<strong>at</strong>ter as a model<br />
and law abiding employer having some<br />
sense <strong>of</strong> symp<strong>at</strong>hy and justice for their<br />
employees, but here in a casual fashion<br />
they filed incomplete and vague affidavits<br />
shifting blame from one and another. No<br />
<strong>at</strong>tempt shown to be made to remedy the<br />
grievance <strong>of</strong> the petitioner and th<strong>at</strong> is how<br />
she was compelled to suffer not only<br />
herself but the entire family for a further
1004 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
period <strong>of</strong> three years and more. Not only<br />
this, the respondents shown the audacity<br />
and courage <strong>of</strong> even not <strong>at</strong>tending this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> flouting its order to the maximum<br />
possible level and it is only when they<br />
found no other option, the salary is paid to<br />
the petitioner. This <strong>Court</strong> is thus clearly<br />
s<strong>at</strong>isfied th<strong>at</strong> their action by means <strong>of</strong> the<br />
supplementary counter affidavit is not<br />
bona fide but just to bury a just and valid<br />
grievance <strong>of</strong> harassment <strong>of</strong> the petitioner<br />
by their extraordinary, not only bel<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
but also illegal and arbitrary act, and they<br />
are trying to get the m<strong>at</strong>ter consigned so<br />
as to wriggle out <strong>of</strong> the clutches <strong>of</strong> law in<br />
respect to affixing <strong>of</strong> responsibility and<br />
liability upon the <strong>of</strong>ficer concerned for<br />
not only illegal detention <strong>of</strong> salary <strong>of</strong> a<br />
person for almost four years but also by<br />
harassing and victimizing her for no fault<br />
on her part.<br />
14. In my view, here is a case which<br />
cannot be allowed to shut in such a<br />
manner by simply confining the m<strong>at</strong>ter to<br />
record without considering as to whether<br />
the respondents are in fact guilty <strong>of</strong> an<br />
illegal and arbitrary act, and, if so, how<br />
they must be made<br />
accountable/responsible for the same.<br />
15. An equity <strong>Court</strong> exercising<br />
jurisdiction under Article 226 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Constitution <strong>of</strong> India is not only entitled<br />
to look into valid grievances <strong>of</strong> the citizen<br />
but also to pass appropri<strong>at</strong>e orders against<br />
the St<strong>at</strong>e or its <strong>of</strong>ficers and<br />
instrumentality as the case may be where<br />
they are found to have acted in a wholly<br />
illegal and arbitrary manner. From the<br />
own admission <strong>of</strong> the respondents in the<br />
counter affidavit where they have not<br />
shown any fault on the part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner as a reason for non payment <strong>of</strong><br />
salary to her since March' 2005, the denial<br />
<strong>of</strong> salary to the petitioner is evidently<br />
arbitrary and also infringes her<br />
constitutional right under Articles 21 and<br />
300A which provides th<strong>at</strong> no person shall<br />
be deprived <strong>of</strong> her property except in<br />
accordance with the procedure prescribed<br />
in law. In the case in hand, the petitioner<br />
has been deprived <strong>of</strong> her lawful salary and<br />
wages, which she has earned after<br />
rendering service, in a manner which is<br />
not prescribed in law.<br />
16. Now, I may give in brief the<br />
explan<strong>at</strong>ion given by the respondents for<br />
non payment <strong>of</strong> salary to the petitioner.<br />
The petitioner was initially working as<br />
Assistant Teacher in a Primary School,<br />
Billi Obra and was promoted as Assistant<br />
Teacher (C.T. Grade) on 7.2.2004. It<br />
appears th<strong>at</strong> a Government Order was<br />
issued on 9.6.2004 th<strong>at</strong> the Teachers in<br />
the Primary Schools be allowed to be<br />
adjusted/accommod<strong>at</strong>ed according to the<br />
strength <strong>of</strong> the students in the schools and<br />
may be shifted to other schools where<br />
there is deficiency. The Board <strong>of</strong> Basic<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion issued certain directions on<br />
24.7.2004 th<strong>at</strong> the Teachers who are<br />
posted/appointed after July 2003 if are<br />
found in excess may be<br />
transferred/adjusted and those who have<br />
the longest period <strong>of</strong> posting should first<br />
be adjusted. It appears th<strong>at</strong> the Secretary,<br />
Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion, <strong>Allahabad</strong> passed an<br />
order on 11.2.2005 st<strong>at</strong>ing th<strong>at</strong> in the<br />
Junior <strong>High</strong> School, Billi, 8 teachers<br />
working and five <strong>of</strong> such Teachers were<br />
to be adjusted by the District Basic<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Officer but since Sri Shailendra<br />
Rai and Rajani Rajvanshi were two<br />
teachers who were posted after July, 2003<br />
therefore first <strong>of</strong> all the said two teachers<br />
be adjusted and thereafter adjustment <strong>of</strong><br />
rest <strong>of</strong> three teaches should be made.<br />
Pursuant to the said order <strong>of</strong> Secretary,
3 All] Smt. Shailendra Rai V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1005<br />
Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion, <strong>Allahabad</strong>, the<br />
respondent no. 3 passed an order on<br />
2.3.2005 cancelling adjustment <strong>of</strong> Smt.<br />
Nirmala Devi-II, another teacher working<br />
in the Junior School, Billi, Sonebhadra.<br />
He also directed for compliance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Secretary, Board <strong>of</strong> Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion's<br />
letter d<strong>at</strong>ed 11.2.2005. It is also said th<strong>at</strong><br />
in view <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid orders, no further<br />
teacher was required to be adjusted from<br />
aforesaid Junior <strong>High</strong> School since the<br />
strength <strong>of</strong> teachers was as per the<br />
requirement and standard fixed, therefore,<br />
the petitioner continued to work in the<br />
said institution and it was in the interest <strong>of</strong><br />
the students <strong>at</strong> large. It is also said th<strong>at</strong> in<br />
June 2006, the strength <strong>of</strong> Junior School<br />
reduced to three due to promotion and<br />
transfer <strong>of</strong> Sri Munni Lal, a senior<br />
Teacher <strong>of</strong> Junior <strong>High</strong> School, Billi,<br />
Chopan as Head Master to Junior <strong>High</strong><br />
School, Obradeeh, Vikas Kshetra Chopan,<br />
Sonebhadra. It is further said th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
petitioner's functioning in the institution<br />
concerned was justified in all these<br />
circumstances and, therefore, when the<br />
salary bills <strong>of</strong> the petitioner were received<br />
in the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> respondent no. 3, the same<br />
were countersigned by respondent no. 3,<br />
in particular Sri Vinod Sharma holding<br />
<strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> respondent no. 3, and, the file<br />
sent to the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> respondent no. 5 for<br />
payment <strong>of</strong> salary but it is he (respondent<br />
no. 5) who is not making payment to the<br />
petitioner. Para 10 and 11 <strong>of</strong> the counter<br />
affidavit <strong>of</strong> respondents no. 3 are<br />
reproduced as under:<br />
"10. Th<strong>at</strong> is is most respectfully<br />
submitted th<strong>at</strong> since there was no<br />
requirement and occasion for adjustment<br />
<strong>of</strong> the petitioner for the reasons st<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
above and as such she remained posted in<br />
the institution in question and was<br />
discharging her duties and accordingly,<br />
her <strong>at</strong>tendance was also certified by the<br />
Regional Asstt. Basic Shiksha Adhikari,<br />
Chopan, Sonebhadra and her salary bill<br />
was submitted in the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
deponent upon which the same was<br />
counter-signed by the deponent and was<br />
sent <strong>of</strong> the the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> Finance and<br />
Accounts Officer <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> B.S.A.<br />
Sonebhadra for payment <strong>of</strong> her salary.<br />
11. Th<strong>at</strong> it is relevant to mention here<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the Finance and Accounts Officer <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the deponent without there<br />
being any order <strong>of</strong> the competent<br />
authority, deleted the salary <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner and made payment <strong>of</strong> salary to<br />
the rest <strong>of</strong> the teachers working in Vikas<br />
Kshetra Chopan and their salary were<br />
transmitted in the Bank accounts<br />
concerned."<br />
17. It is said th<strong>at</strong> on the<br />
represent<strong>at</strong>ion made by the petitioner to<br />
respondent no. 3, repe<strong>at</strong>ed directions were<br />
issued to respondent no. 5 but he did not<br />
take steps for payment <strong>of</strong> salary to the<br />
petitioner. When the m<strong>at</strong>ter was brought<br />
to the notice <strong>of</strong> District Magistr<strong>at</strong>e,<br />
Sonebhadra, he also passed an order on<br />
6.1.2006 for disbursement <strong>of</strong> salary to the<br />
petitioner but even thereafter the<br />
respondent no. 5, adopting an adamant<br />
<strong>at</strong>titude, did not pay salary to the<br />
petitioner. The stand taken by respondent<br />
no. 3 in para 14, 15 and 16 <strong>of</strong> his counter<br />
affidavit is reproduced as under:<br />
"14. Th<strong>at</strong> it is relevant to mention here<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the abovenoted direction issued by<br />
the District Magistr<strong>at</strong>e was also apprised<br />
to the Finance and Accounts Officer vide<br />
Letter d<strong>at</strong>ed 18.1.2006 issued by the <strong>of</strong>fice<br />
<strong>of</strong> the deponent but despite <strong>of</strong> the same,<br />
he has not paid the salary to the<br />
petitioner.
1006 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
15. Th<strong>at</strong> it is also pertinent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
mention here th<strong>at</strong> <strong>at</strong> present in the<br />
institution in question in view <strong>of</strong> strength<br />
<strong>of</strong> students, <strong>at</strong> least five teachers are<br />
required but against the same, only 3<br />
teachers are working and as such no<br />
occasion has arisen for adjustment <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner, accordingly she continued to<br />
work in the said institution and has<br />
performed teaching work but despite <strong>of</strong><br />
repe<strong>at</strong>ed directions issued by the higher<br />
authorities concerned as well as<br />
deponent, the Finance and Accounts<br />
Officer <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the deponent, is not<br />
making payment <strong>of</strong> salary to the petitioner<br />
for the reason best known to him.<br />
16. Th<strong>at</strong> it is pertinent <strong>of</strong> the mention<br />
here th<strong>at</strong> in pursuance to the order passed<br />
by this Hon'ble <strong>Court</strong> d<strong>at</strong>ed 21.8.2006,<br />
the deponent has written a letter to the<br />
Finance & Accounts Officer asking him<br />
about the non-payment <strong>of</strong> salary to the<br />
petitioner. Copy <strong>of</strong> the said letter d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
25.8.2006 is filed herewith as Annexure<br />
CA-5 to this affidavit."<br />
18. In the Counter affidavit filed on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> respondent no. 5, it is evident<br />
th<strong>at</strong> he has levelled serious alleg<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
against the respondent no. 3 st<strong>at</strong>ing th<strong>at</strong> in<br />
his (respondent no. 3) affidavit he has<br />
concealed several facts. In fact in view <strong>of</strong><br />
the Secretary, Board <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion's letter<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 24.7.2004, the petitioner ought to<br />
have been adjusted in some other<br />
institution but the same having not been<br />
done, her non payment <strong>of</strong> salary by<br />
respondent no. 5 is absolutely just and<br />
valid. From the documents appended to<br />
the affidavit filed by respondent no. 5, it<br />
is evident th<strong>at</strong> the justific<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> a<br />
Teacher in a particular school and<br />
necessity <strong>of</strong> adjustment, if any, was to be<br />
considered firstly by the Board <strong>of</strong> Basic<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion and, thereafter, by the District<br />
Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Officer <strong>of</strong> the concerned<br />
District. No other authority or <strong>of</strong>ficer was<br />
entitled or empowered by any order either<br />
by the St<strong>at</strong>e Government or the Board <strong>of</strong><br />
Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion authorizing him/her to<br />
flout either the orders passed by the<br />
District Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Officer or to take<br />
a decision <strong>of</strong> his/her own so as to disobey<br />
or not to comply the order passed by the<br />
District Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Officer.<br />
19. The respondent no. 5, Sri Rajesh<br />
Kumar, who was present in the <strong>Court</strong><br />
when enquired as to how he was<br />
authorized and empowered to ignore the<br />
direction/order issued by District Basic<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Officer, and, whether the<br />
respondent no. 3 is not an <strong>of</strong>ficer higher<br />
in rank than him in the hierarchy, he<br />
could not give any justific<strong>at</strong>ion for his<br />
action. He also could not explain as to<br />
how he could disobey the order <strong>of</strong> the<br />
District Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Officer<br />
(respondent no. 3). In fact, even from the<br />
documents filed as enclosures to his<br />
counter affidavit in support <strong>of</strong> his<br />
averments made in the counter affidavit,<br />
he failed to show as to which part <strong>of</strong> those<br />
orders either <strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e Government or<br />
th<strong>at</strong> <strong>of</strong> Board <strong>of</strong> Board <strong>of</strong> Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
authorises him to take a decision as to<br />
whether a particular teacher would be<br />
entitled for payment <strong>of</strong> salary when the<br />
District Basic Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Officer in his<br />
own discretion has not found any reason<br />
for shifting or transfer a teacher and has<br />
cleared the salary bill <strong>of</strong> such teacher.<br />
20. With regard to non compliance<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong>s order regarding his<br />
presence, I find th<strong>at</strong> on the one hand he<br />
claim to have fallen ill on 6.10.2009 but<br />
the medical certific<strong>at</strong>e is for the period <strong>of</strong><br />
8.10.2009 to 10.10.2009, it appears th<strong>at</strong><br />
only to cover up the d<strong>at</strong>e on which he was
3 All] Smt. Shailendra Rai V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1007<br />
supposed to appear before this <strong>Court</strong>, i.e<br />
9.10.2009. Moreover, swearing <strong>of</strong> para 5<br />
<strong>of</strong> the affidavit accompanying the recall<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion wherein he has said th<strong>at</strong> he<br />
did not receive any inform<strong>at</strong>ion due to<br />
mistake on the part <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> Sri<br />
Neeraj Trip<strong>at</strong>hi, Advoc<strong>at</strong>e, is on the basis<br />
<strong>of</strong> the inform<strong>at</strong>ion received and regarding<br />
sickness and medical certific<strong>at</strong>e, the<br />
averments contained in para 6 <strong>of</strong> the said<br />
affidavit have been partly sworn on the<br />
basis <strong>of</strong> personal knowledge and partly on<br />
the basis <strong>of</strong> record. This itself makes the<br />
aforesaid averments unreliable and<br />
incredible.<br />
21. Having found myself s<strong>at</strong>isfied<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the respondent no. 5 has no valid and<br />
lawful justific<strong>at</strong>ion for detaining salary <strong>of</strong><br />
the petitioner, I am also s<strong>at</strong>isfied th<strong>at</strong> his<br />
act was not only illegal and arbitrary but<br />
travels in the realm <strong>of</strong> malice in law,<br />
therefore, it deserves to be dealt with<br />
severely by this <strong>Court</strong> so th<strong>at</strong> no<br />
Government <strong>of</strong>ficer in future may have<br />
the audacity <strong>of</strong> harassing a helpless poor<br />
employee, firstly, by torturing him/her by<br />
detaining his/her lawful dues and<br />
thereafter to escape from any liability so<br />
as to boast th<strong>at</strong> nobody can touch him<br />
even if he commits an ex facie illegal or<br />
unjust act. Every Government <strong>of</strong>ficer,<br />
howsoever high, must always keep in<br />
mind th<strong>at</strong> nobody is above law. The hands<br />
<strong>of</strong> justice are meant not to only c<strong>at</strong>ch out<br />
such person but it is also the<br />
constitutional duty <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Court</strong> <strong>of</strong> law to<br />
pass suitable order in such a m<strong>at</strong>ter so th<strong>at</strong><br />
such an illegal act may not be repe<strong>at</strong>ed,<br />
not only by him/her but others also. This<br />
should be a lesson to everyone<br />
committing an act which is ex facie unjust<br />
and having not been done for any just or<br />
lawful reason. Prima facie it must be<br />
tre<strong>at</strong>ed to have been done for coll<strong>at</strong>eral<br />
purposes and covered by the term ''malice<br />
in law'.<br />
22. The Apex <strong>Court</strong> has<br />
summarised "malice in law " in (Smt.)<br />
S.R.Venk<strong>at</strong>raman Vs. Union <strong>of</strong> India<br />
and another, AIR 1979, SC 49 as under :<br />
"It is equally true th<strong>at</strong> there will be<br />
an error <strong>of</strong> fact when a public body is<br />
prompted by a mistaken belief in the<br />
existence <strong>of</strong> a non-existing fact or<br />
circumstance. This is so clearly<br />
unreasonable th<strong>at</strong> wh<strong>at</strong> is done under<br />
such a mistaken belief might almost be<br />
said to have been done in bad faith; and<br />
in actual experience, and as things go,<br />
these may well be said to run into one<br />
another." (Para 8)<br />
12. The Apex <strong>Court</strong> further in para 9<br />
<strong>of</strong> the judgment in S.R.Venk<strong>at</strong>raman<br />
(supra) observed:<br />
" 9. The influence <strong>of</strong> extraneous<br />
m<strong>at</strong>ters will be undoubted where the<br />
authority making the order has admitted<br />
their influence. It will therefore be a gross<br />
abuse <strong>of</strong> legal power to punish a person<br />
or destroy her service career in a manner<br />
not warranted by law by putting a rule<br />
which makes a useful provision for the<br />
prem<strong>at</strong>ure retirement <strong>of</strong> Government<br />
servants only in the ''public interest', to a<br />
purpose wholly unwarranted by it, and to<br />
arrive <strong>at</strong> quite a contradictory result. An<br />
administr<strong>at</strong>ive order which is based on<br />
reasons <strong>of</strong> fact which do not exist must,<br />
therefore, be held to be infected with an<br />
abuse <strong>of</strong> power."<br />
13. In Mukesh Kumar Agrawal<br />
Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others JT 2009<br />
(13) SC 643 the Apex <strong>Court</strong> said :
1008 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
"We also intend to emphasize th<strong>at</strong><br />
the distinction between a malice <strong>of</strong> fact<br />
and malice in law must be borne out from<br />
records; whereas in a case involving<br />
malice in law which if established may<br />
lead to an inference th<strong>at</strong> the st<strong>at</strong>utory<br />
authorities had acted without jurisdiction<br />
while exercising its jurisdiction, malice <strong>of</strong><br />
fact must be pleaded and proved."<br />
14. In Somesh Tiwari Vs. Union <strong>of</strong><br />
India and others 2009 (2) SCC 592<br />
dealing with the question <strong>of</strong> validity <strong>of</strong> an<br />
order <strong>of</strong> transfer on the ground <strong>of</strong> malice<br />
in law , the Apex <strong>Court</strong> in para 16 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
judgment observed as under:<br />
"16. .... Mala fide is <strong>of</strong> two kinds--<br />
one malice in fact and the second malice<br />
in law. The order in question would<br />
<strong>at</strong>tract the principle <strong>of</strong> malice in law as it<br />
was not based on any factor germane for<br />
passing an order <strong>of</strong> transfer and based on<br />
an irrelevant ground i.e on the alleg<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
made against the appellant in the<br />
anonymous complaint. It is one thing to<br />
say th<strong>at</strong> the employer is entitled to pass<br />
an order <strong>of</strong> transfer in administr<strong>at</strong>ive<br />
exigencies but it is another thing to say<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the order <strong>of</strong> transfer is passed by way<br />
<strong>of</strong> or in lieu <strong>of</strong> punishment. When an<br />
order <strong>of</strong> transfer is passed in lieu <strong>of</strong><br />
punishment, the same is liable to be set<br />
aside being wholly illegal."<br />
15. In HMT Ltd. and another Vs.<br />
Mudappa and others JT 2007(3) SC<br />
112 the Apex <strong>Court</strong> in paras 18 and 19<br />
defined malice in law by referring to<br />
"Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 3rd<br />
Edn., London Butterworths, 1989" as<br />
under:<br />
"The legal meaning <strong>of</strong> malice is "illwill<br />
or spite towards a party and any<br />
indirect or improper motive in taking an<br />
action". This is sometimes described as<br />
"malice in fact". "Legal malice" or<br />
"malice in law" means ''something done<br />
without lawful excuse'. In other words, ''it<br />
is an act done wrongfully and wilfully<br />
without reasonable or probable cause,<br />
and not necessarily an act done from ill<br />
feeling and spite'. It is a deliber<strong>at</strong>e act in<br />
disregard <strong>of</strong> the rights <strong>of</strong> others."<br />
"19. It was observed th<strong>at</strong> where<br />
malice was <strong>at</strong>tributed to the St<strong>at</strong>e, it could<br />
not be a case <strong>of</strong> malice in fact, or<br />
personal ill-will or spite on the part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e. It could only be malice in law, i.e<br />
legal mala fide. The St<strong>at</strong>e, if it wishes to<br />
acquire land, could exercise its power<br />
bona fide for st<strong>at</strong>utory purpose and for<br />
none other. It was observed th<strong>at</strong> it was<br />
only because <strong>of</strong> the decree passed in<br />
favour <strong>of</strong> the owner th<strong>at</strong> the proceedings<br />
for acquisition were necessary and hence,<br />
notific<strong>at</strong>ion was issued. Such an action<br />
could not be held mala fide."<br />
16. In brief malice in law can be said<br />
when a power is exercised for an<br />
unauthorized purpose or on a fact which<br />
is claimed to exist but in fact, is non-est or<br />
for the purpose for which it is not meant<br />
though apparently it is shown th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
same is being exercised for the purpose<br />
the power is supposed to be exercised.<br />
(See Manager Govt. Branch Press and<br />
another Vs. D.B.Belliappa AIR 1979 SC<br />
429; Punjab Electricity Board Vs. Zora<br />
Singh and others AIR 2006 SC 182;<br />
K.K.Bhalla Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others<br />
AIR 2006 SC 898; P. Mohanan Pillai<br />
Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Kerala and others (2007) 9<br />
SCC 497; M.P.St<strong>at</strong>e Corpor<strong>at</strong>ion Diary<br />
Feder<strong>at</strong>ion Ltd. and another Vs.<br />
Rajneesh Kumar Zamindar and others<br />
(2009) 6 SCALE 17; Swarn Singh
3 All] Smt. Shailendra Rai V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1009<br />
Chand Vs. Punjab St<strong>at</strong>e Electricity<br />
Board and others (2009) 7 SCALE 622<br />
and Sri Yemeni Raja Ram Chandar Vs.<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Andhra Pradesh and others JT<br />
(2009) 12 SC 198.<br />
17. Regarding harassment <strong>of</strong> a<br />
Government employee referring to<br />
observ<strong>at</strong>ions <strong>of</strong> Lord Hailsham in Cassell<br />
& Co. Ltd. Vs. Broome, 1972 AC 1027<br />
and Lord Devlin in Rooks Vs. Barnard<br />
and others 1964 AC 1129, the Apex<br />
<strong>Court</strong> in Lucknow Development<br />
Authority Vs. M.K. Gupta JT 1993 (6)<br />
SC 307 held as under;<br />
"An Ordinary citizen or a common<br />
man is hardly equipped to m<strong>at</strong>ch the<br />
might <strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e or its instrumentalities.<br />
Th<strong>at</strong> is provided by the rule <strong>of</strong> law....... A<br />
public functionary if he acts maliciously<br />
or oppressively and the exercise <strong>of</strong> power<br />
results in harassment and agony then it is<br />
not an exercise <strong>of</strong> power but its abuse. No<br />
law provides protection against it. He<br />
who is responsible for it must suffer<br />
it...........Harassment <strong>of</strong> a common man by<br />
public authorities is socially abhorring<br />
and legally impermissible. It may harm<br />
him personally but the injury to society is<br />
far more grievous." (para 10)<br />
18. The above observ<strong>at</strong>ion as such<br />
has been reiter<strong>at</strong>ed in Ghaziabad<br />
Development Authorities Vs. Balbir<br />
Singh JT 2004 (5) SC 17.<br />
19. In the case <strong>of</strong> Registered<br />
Society Vs. Union <strong>of</strong> India and Others<br />
(1996) 6 SCC 530 the Apex court said as<br />
under:<br />
"No public servant can say "you may<br />
set aside an order on the ground <strong>of</strong> mala<br />
fide but you can not hold me personally<br />
liable" No public servant can arrog<strong>at</strong>e in<br />
himself the power to act in a manner<br />
which is arbitrary".<br />
20. In the case <strong>of</strong> Shivsagar Tiwari<br />
Vs. Union <strong>of</strong> India (1996) 6 SCC 558 the<br />
Apex <strong>Court</strong> has held as follows:<br />
"An arbitrary system indeed must<br />
always be a corrupt one. There never was<br />
a man who thought he had no law but his<br />
own will who did not soon find th<strong>at</strong> he<br />
had no end but his own pr<strong>of</strong>it."<br />
21. In the case <strong>of</strong> Delhi<br />
Development Authority Vs. Skipper<br />
Construction and Another AIR 1996<br />
SC 715 has held as follows:<br />
"A democr<strong>at</strong>ic Government does not<br />
mean a lax Government. The rules <strong>of</strong><br />
procedure and/or principles <strong>of</strong> n<strong>at</strong>ural<br />
justice are not mean to enable the guilty<br />
to delay and defe<strong>at</strong> the just retribution.<br />
The wheel <strong>of</strong> justice may appear to grind<br />
slowly but it is duty <strong>of</strong> all <strong>of</strong> us to ensure<br />
th<strong>at</strong> they do grind steadily and grind well<br />
and truly. The justice system cannot be<br />
allowed to become s<strong>of</strong>t, supine and<br />
spineless."<br />
22. In this case, as already discussed<br />
above, the act <strong>of</strong> respondent no. 5 in non<br />
payment <strong>of</strong> salary to the petitioner is<br />
wholly unjustified and illegal.<br />
Simultaneously, this <strong>Court</strong> cannot leave<br />
the respondent no. 3 as wholly innocent in<br />
the m<strong>at</strong>ter for the reason th<strong>at</strong> he, being a<br />
superior and higher <strong>of</strong>ficer, if found th<strong>at</strong><br />
someone in his <strong>of</strong>fice is not acting<br />
properly and is causing a glaring injustice<br />
and illegality, it was incumbent upon him<br />
to apprise the St<strong>at</strong>e Government <strong>of</strong> such<br />
act <strong>of</strong> the respondent no. 5 recommending<br />
a suitable disciplinary action against him,
1010 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
but the respondent no. 3 also kept silence<br />
in this m<strong>at</strong>ter and it is only when he was<br />
personally summoned, took steps which<br />
he could have taken earlier for paying the<br />
salary to the petitioner. To this extent, the<br />
respondent no. 3 is also guilty and is to be<br />
held responsible.<br />
23. In the circumstances, the writ<br />
petition is allowed with the direction to<br />
the respondents to pay simple interest on<br />
the delayed payment <strong>of</strong> salary to the<br />
petitioner <strong>at</strong> the r<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> 8% p.a. from the<br />
d<strong>at</strong>e the same became due till actual<br />
payment.<br />
24. Liberty is given to respondent<br />
no. 1 to realize the amount <strong>of</strong> interest paid<br />
to the petitioner under this order from the<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficials concerned who, it may found<br />
responsible after holding an appropri<strong>at</strong>e<br />
departmental enquiry in this m<strong>at</strong>ter.<br />
25. In view <strong>of</strong> the above discussion,<br />
this <strong>Court</strong> is s<strong>at</strong>isfied th<strong>at</strong> here is a case<br />
where the conduct <strong>of</strong> the respondents<br />
makes them liable for an exemplary cost<br />
which I quantify to Rs. two lacs. This<br />
would also be compens<strong>at</strong>ory to the<br />
petitioner. The liability is distributed to<br />
the extent <strong>of</strong> Rs. 1.5 lacs against<br />
respondent no. 5 and fifty thousands<br />
against respondent no. 3. The above cost<br />
shall be paid by them within six months<br />
failing which it would be open to the<br />
Registrar General <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> to take<br />
steps to realize the same amount as<br />
arrears <strong>of</strong> land revenue. After realizing<br />
the amount <strong>of</strong> cost, the same may be<br />
released in favour <strong>of</strong> the petitioner.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.11.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.51528 <strong>of</strong> 2009<br />
Rishi Pal Singh<br />
Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others<br />
Counsel for the Petitioner:<br />
Sri Vijay Gautam<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
C.S.C.<br />
…Petitioner<br />
…Respondents<br />
Constitution <strong>of</strong> India-Article 226-<br />
Transfer <strong>of</strong> Sub-Inspector-who remained<br />
in adjoining District for 24 yearsinvolved<br />
in Criminal Case <strong>of</strong>fence under<br />
379 IPC-on ground <strong>of</strong> challenge made<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the approving authority-‘Police<br />
Establishment Board’ not properly<br />
constituted-G.O. d<strong>at</strong>ed 12.08.09<br />
providing the approval <strong>of</strong> the decision <strong>of</strong><br />
Board by D.G.P.-which put further check<br />
on exercise <strong>of</strong> power <strong>of</strong> Transfer-helddirection<br />
<strong>of</strong> Supreme <strong>Court</strong> in Prakash<br />
Singh Case fully complied with-No scope<br />
for technical plea-Transfer order can not<br />
be interfered.<br />
Held: Para 16 & 17<br />
In the aforesaid facts and circumstances,<br />
in so far as the police Establishment<br />
Board th<strong>at</strong> has granted approval to the<br />
transfer <strong>of</strong> the petitioner is concerned<br />
has subserved the object with which the<br />
guidelines were laid down by the<br />
Supreme <strong>Court</strong>, the approval so granted<br />
would not stand viti<strong>at</strong>ed only for the<br />
reason th<strong>at</strong> the Director General <strong>of</strong><br />
Police has not been included as one <strong>of</strong> its<br />
members specially when the approval<br />
granted by the Police Establishment<br />
Board is further required to be approved<br />
by the Director General <strong>of</strong> Police.
3 All] Rishi Pal Singh V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1011<br />
Thus, in effect the guidelines issued by<br />
the Supreme <strong>Court</strong> with regard to the<br />
cre<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the Police Establishment<br />
Board have been followed and<br />
implemented by the St<strong>at</strong>e Government in<br />
pith and substance according to the true<br />
spirit. Any technical infraction in the<br />
implement<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the said guidelines<br />
cannot be a subject <strong>of</strong> consider<strong>at</strong>ion by<br />
this <strong>Court</strong>.<br />
Case law discussed:<br />
(2006) 8 SCC 1, Writ Petition No.1525 <strong>of</strong> 2009<br />
decided on 4.9.2009, 2003(1) UPLBEC 636.<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal, J.)<br />
1. Petitioner who is a Sub-Inspector<br />
(Special C<strong>at</strong>egory) in U.P. Police has<br />
challenged the order d<strong>at</strong>ed 16.9.2009<br />
passed by the Deputy Inspector General<br />
(Establishment), U.P. Police<br />
Headquarters, <strong>Allahabad</strong> transferring him<br />
from district Gautam Budh Nagar to Mau<br />
in public interest with the approval <strong>of</strong><br />
Police Establishment Board.<br />
2. On behalf <strong>of</strong> the petitioner a<br />
supplementary affidavit and then a second<br />
supplementary affidavit has been filed.<br />
Learned Standing Counsel was earlier<br />
allowed time to obtain instructions and to<br />
file counter affidavit. A counter affidavit<br />
as well as a supplementary counter<br />
affidavit has been filed by the learned<br />
Standing Counsel on behalf <strong>of</strong><br />
respondents no.1 to 5 and respondent no.7<br />
to which even rejoinder affidavit has been<br />
filed. The counsel for the parties as such<br />
agree for final disposal <strong>of</strong> the writ petition<br />
<strong>at</strong> the admission stage itself. Accordingly,<br />
having heard Sri Vijay Gautam, learned<br />
counsel for the petitioner and the learned<br />
Standing Counsel for the respondents<strong>at</strong><br />
length, I proceed to decide the m<strong>at</strong>ter<br />
finally.<br />
3. Before addressing various points<br />
which have been canvassed by the learned<br />
counsel for the petitioner in order to assail<br />
the impugned order, it is tiride to mention<br />
th<strong>at</strong> under the service jurisprudence<br />
transfer <strong>of</strong> an employee who holds a<br />
transferable post is a normal fe<strong>at</strong>ure and<br />
has been recognised throughout as an<br />
incident <strong>of</strong> service. In the m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong> the<br />
transfer, the Government/employer has a<br />
wide discretion and it is the employer<br />
who is the best judge to utilise the service<br />
<strong>of</strong> its employee and to place and post him<br />
<strong>at</strong> its discretion accordingly. The<br />
employee has no legal say in the m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong><br />
his posting except to bring to the notice <strong>of</strong><br />
the authority concerned his personal<br />
difficulty or any hardship. The employee<br />
as such, as no vested right either to insist<br />
for a particular post or to be posted <strong>at</strong> a<br />
particular place or to stick to a particular<br />
one. In fact, transfer has been considered<br />
necessary in public interest and to<br />
maintain efficiency in public<br />
administr<strong>at</strong>ion. Therefore, it has been<br />
settled by a c<strong>at</strong>ena <strong>of</strong> authorities th<strong>at</strong><br />
ordinarily transfer orders are not to be<br />
interfered with on the judicial side until<br />
and unless it is shown th<strong>at</strong> the order <strong>of</strong><br />
transfer passed is without jurisdiction; is<br />
in breach <strong>of</strong> any st<strong>at</strong>utory rule or it has<br />
been motiv<strong>at</strong>ed by malice <strong>of</strong> fact or law or<br />
is proved to be punitive, vindictive or<br />
stigm<strong>at</strong>ic in n<strong>at</strong>ure.<br />
4. It is in the above settled legal<br />
background th<strong>at</strong> I have to examine the<br />
validity <strong>of</strong> the impugned order.<br />
5. The first submission <strong>of</strong> the<br />
learned counsel for the petitioner is th<strong>at</strong><br />
the Police Establishment Board<br />
(hereinafter referred to as "the Board")<br />
which had granted approval to the transfer<br />
is not properly constituted as per the
1012 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
directions <strong>of</strong> the Apex court in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Prakash Singh and others Vs. Union <strong>of</strong><br />
India and others (2006) 8 SCC 1 and, as<br />
such, there is no approval by the Board<br />
and the order <strong>of</strong> transfer stands viti<strong>at</strong>ed.<br />
The only defect pointed out in the<br />
constitution <strong>of</strong> the Board is th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
Director General <strong>of</strong> Police is not the<br />
Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Board as it is headed by<br />
the Inspector General <strong>of</strong> Police<br />
(Establishment).<br />
6. In reply to this argument, learned<br />
Standing Counsel has submitted th<strong>at</strong> in<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> Prakash Singh (supra) the<br />
Apex <strong>Court</strong> has merely issued guidelines<br />
for the better administr<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the Police<br />
Force and one <strong>of</strong> the guidelines provides<br />
for establishment <strong>of</strong> a Police<br />
Establishment Board in each St<strong>at</strong>e for the<br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> transfer, posting and<br />
promotion and other m<strong>at</strong>ters rel<strong>at</strong>ing to<br />
the services <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> the Police<br />
Force. In pursuance <strong>of</strong> the guidelines so<br />
issued by the Supreme <strong>Court</strong>, the<br />
Principal Secretary, U.P. Government<br />
vide letter d<strong>at</strong>ed 12.3.2008 notified six<br />
different Boards for supervising transfer,<br />
posting, promotion and other service<br />
rel<strong>at</strong>ed m<strong>at</strong>ters <strong>of</strong> the police department<br />
depending upon the c<strong>at</strong>egory <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers.<br />
The Board in respect to the <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Police Force <strong>of</strong> the rank <strong>of</strong> Sub-Inspector<br />
and below comprises <strong>of</strong> Inspector General<br />
<strong>of</strong> Police (Establishment), Deputy<br />
Inspector General <strong>of</strong> Police<br />
(Establishment), Superintendent <strong>of</strong> Police<br />
(Karmik) and Additional Superintendent<br />
<strong>of</strong> Police (Karmik) and Deputy<br />
Superintendent <strong>of</strong> Police (Karmik). The<br />
transfer <strong>of</strong> the petitioner has been<br />
approved by the aforesaid Board and, as<br />
such, there is no illegality.<br />
7. No doubt, the directions/guidelines<br />
issued by the Supreme <strong>Court</strong> in the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Prakash Singh (supra) are mand<strong>at</strong>ory<br />
in n<strong>at</strong>ure, being one issued in exercise <strong>of</strong><br />
power under Article 142 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Constitution <strong>of</strong> India, but to find out the<br />
true mand<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> the said guidelines it is<br />
imper<strong>at</strong>ive to underline the object behind<br />
issuing the same.<br />
8. Police force is a disciplined force<br />
which comprises <strong>of</strong> persons who are not<br />
only specialised and skilled but are<br />
charged with the preserv<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> public<br />
order and tranquillity; promotion <strong>of</strong><br />
public he<strong>at</strong>h and safety; and with<br />
prevention, detection and investig<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
crime. Such persons in uniform are<br />
distinguishable from common man so th<strong>at</strong><br />
a person in need may recognise and<br />
approach them easily for necessary<br />
assistance. Therefore, the duty <strong>of</strong> the<br />
police personnel is basically to serve the<br />
public and to maintain the rule <strong>of</strong> law.<br />
Their approach has to be service oriented.<br />
The commitment, devotion and<br />
responsibility <strong>of</strong> the police personnel has<br />
to be to the rule <strong>of</strong> law so th<strong>at</strong> they serve<br />
the people impartially, irrespective <strong>of</strong><br />
their st<strong>at</strong>us and position. The police force<br />
therefore, has to maintain pr<strong>of</strong>essional<br />
independence free <strong>of</strong> interference and<br />
influence <strong>of</strong> the Government.<br />
9. Realising the importance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
police force in a democr<strong>at</strong>ic set up, the<br />
Government <strong>of</strong> India appointed a N<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
Police Commission to comprehensively<br />
review the police administr<strong>at</strong>ive system<br />
so as to secure its pr<strong>of</strong>essional<br />
independence and to provide a<br />
supervisory mechanism which may<br />
dispense with unhealthy interference,<br />
influences and pressure in the m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong><br />
frequent and indiscrimin<strong>at</strong>e transfer <strong>of</strong>
3 All] Rishi Pal Singh V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1013<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> the police force on political<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ions. The Commission so<br />
appointed submitted various reports in<br />
phases and the ultim<strong>at</strong>e recommend<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
was to the effect th<strong>at</strong> the police force be<br />
granted pr<strong>of</strong>essional independence to<br />
enable it to work impartially as an agent<br />
<strong>of</strong> law so th<strong>at</strong> the rule <strong>of</strong> law does not<br />
become a causality and the <strong>of</strong>fenders are<br />
brought to book without any outside<br />
pressure or influence. It was with this<br />
object; to frame a new Act for the police<br />
force as recommended by the N<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
Police Commission; and to constitute<br />
various boards for the purposes <strong>of</strong><br />
ensuring th<strong>at</strong> the police performs their<br />
duties and functions free from any<br />
pressure with the aim to serve the law <strong>of</strong><br />
the land and the people th<strong>at</strong> guidelines<br />
were issued by the Supreme <strong>Court</strong> in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Prakash Singh (supra) till<br />
appropri<strong>at</strong>e legisl<strong>at</strong>ion in terms <strong>of</strong> the<br />
guidelines so issued is framed. One <strong>of</strong> the<br />
guidelines so issued provided for the<br />
cre<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the Police Establishment<br />
Board in each St<strong>at</strong>e comprising <strong>of</strong><br />
Director General <strong>of</strong> Police and four other<br />
senior <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> the department to decide<br />
about the transfer, promotion and posting<br />
and other service rel<strong>at</strong>ed m<strong>at</strong>ters police<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers up to a particular rank. Thus, in<br />
pith and substance the idea behind the<br />
cre<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> Police Establishment Board is<br />
to avoid frequent and indiscrimin<strong>at</strong>e<br />
transfers <strong>of</strong> the police <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>at</strong> the<br />
behest <strong>of</strong> the Government. The guidelines<br />
issued by the Apex <strong>Court</strong> though<br />
mand<strong>at</strong>ory but cannot be interpreted like a<br />
st<strong>at</strong>ute and in case the guidelines are<br />
principally followed and implemented in<br />
the true tenor as per the r<strong>at</strong>io decendi <strong>of</strong><br />
the Prakash Singh case (supra) there<br />
would be no error in the constitution <strong>of</strong><br />
the Board.<br />
10. In view <strong>of</strong> the object behind<br />
issuing the guidelines in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Prakash Singh (supra) it is obvious th<strong>at</strong><br />
the purpose is to streamline the police<br />
administr<strong>at</strong>ion and to make the police<br />
force more efficient, free from all outside<br />
pressure, particularly from the<br />
Government side. Thus, the constitution<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Board which includes senior<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> the Police Department having<br />
specialised knowledge <strong>of</strong> the police<br />
administr<strong>at</strong>ion is sufficient compliance <strong>of</strong><br />
the guidelines so issued by the Apex<br />
<strong>Court</strong>. The non-inclusion <strong>of</strong> the Director<br />
General <strong>of</strong> Police as its Chairman by itself<br />
would not make the constitution <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Board illegal as it is otherwise able to<br />
serve the purpose for which it has been<br />
established.<br />
11. Reliance has been placed upon a<br />
decision <strong>of</strong> a learned Single Judge <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Lucknow Bench <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> in Civil<br />
Misc. Writ Petition No.1525 <strong>of</strong> 2009<br />
Sunder Singh Solanki Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P.<br />
and others decided on 4.9.2009 to the<br />
effect th<strong>at</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e or its instrumentality<br />
have not no right to avoid the directions<br />
issued by the Hon'ble Supreme <strong>Court</strong>.<br />
12. The aforesaid decision, in no<br />
way helps the petitioner, inasmuch as the<br />
guidelines/directions so issued by the<br />
Apex <strong>Court</strong> have not been flouted and<br />
r<strong>at</strong>her have been carried out in its true<br />
character and n<strong>at</strong>ure.<br />
13. The Secretary, Government <strong>of</strong><br />
Uttar Pradesh vide letter d<strong>at</strong>ed 12.8.2009<br />
has further provided th<strong>at</strong> the decisions<br />
taken by the Board so established are<br />
ultim<strong>at</strong>ely to be further approved by the<br />
Director General <strong>of</strong> Police before passing<br />
<strong>of</strong> any order by the superior<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer/authority concerned. This is to put
1014 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
a further check on the exercise <strong>of</strong> any<br />
power in the m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong> transfer, promotion<br />
and posting <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> the police<br />
force.<br />
14. In view <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid direction<br />
so issued providing for further approval <strong>of</strong><br />
the Director General <strong>of</strong> Police the<br />
irregularity, if any, in the constitution <strong>of</strong><br />
the Board stands cured and the transfer<br />
would not stand viti<strong>at</strong>ed on account <strong>of</strong><br />
non constitution <strong>of</strong> the Board strictly in<br />
accordance with the guidelines <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Supreme <strong>Court</strong>. It is not the case <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner th<strong>at</strong> the approval <strong>of</strong> the Director<br />
General <strong>of</strong> Police was not taken before<br />
affecting the transfer. In my opinion,<br />
therefore, there is no substance in the<br />
above argument.<br />
15. Besides the above, in the counter<br />
affidavit in paragraph 12 it has been<br />
st<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong> the Supreme <strong>Court</strong> itself has<br />
subsequently appointed a Committee<br />
under the Chairmanship <strong>of</strong> Hon'ble Mr.<br />
Justice K.T. Thomas, retired Justice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Supreme <strong>Court</strong> to supervise the<br />
implement<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the guidelines laid<br />
down in the case <strong>of</strong> Prakash Singh<br />
(supra). The said Committee has not<br />
pointed out any defect in the<br />
implement<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the guidelines by the<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. or in the constitution <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Police Establishment Boards in U.P.<br />
Thus, when the Apex <strong>Court</strong> itself is<br />
monitoring the implement<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
aforesaid guidelines through a Committee<br />
appointed for the purpose, the petitioner is<br />
no one to complain th<strong>at</strong> the Board is not<br />
properly constituted by means <strong>of</strong> this<br />
petition and the proper forum, if any, for<br />
the petitioner to raise the issue either<br />
before the said Committee or to approach<br />
the Supreme <strong>Court</strong> itself.<br />
16. In the aforesaid facts and<br />
circumstances, in so far as the police<br />
Establishment Board th<strong>at</strong> has granted<br />
approval to the transfer <strong>of</strong> the petitioner is<br />
concerned has subserved the object with<br />
which the guidelines were laid down by<br />
the Supreme <strong>Court</strong>, the approval so<br />
granted would not stand viti<strong>at</strong>ed only for<br />
the reason th<strong>at</strong> the Director General <strong>of</strong><br />
Police has not been included as one <strong>of</strong> its<br />
members specially when the approval<br />
granted by the Police Establishment<br />
Board is further required to be approved<br />
by the Director General <strong>of</strong> Police.<br />
17. Thus, in effect the guidelines<br />
issued by the Supreme <strong>Court</strong> with regard<br />
to the cre<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the Police Establishment<br />
Board have been followed and<br />
implemented by the St<strong>at</strong>e Government in<br />
pith and substance according to the true<br />
spirit. Any technical infraction in the<br />
implement<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the said guidelines<br />
cannot be a subject <strong>of</strong> consider<strong>at</strong>ion by<br />
this <strong>Court</strong>.<br />
18. The second argument from the<br />
side <strong>of</strong> the petitioner is th<strong>at</strong> the transfer <strong>of</strong><br />
the petitioner is in viol<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Government Policy d<strong>at</strong>ed 6.6.2009 as<br />
there is no approval <strong>of</strong> the Chief Minister.<br />
19. Learned Standing Counsel, to<br />
counter the said argument, has submitted<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the transfer policy is not binding in<br />
n<strong>at</strong>ure and otherwise also the aforesaid<br />
transfer policy is not applicable to the<br />
Police Department. In this connection he<br />
has placed reliance upon Annexure CA -<br />
3 to the counter affidavit which is a<br />
Government Order issued by the Special<br />
Secretary, U.P. Government on<br />
15.10.2009 clarifying th<strong>at</strong> the Police<br />
Department is free from the transfer
3 All] Rishi Pal Singh V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1015<br />
policy d<strong>at</strong>ed 6.6.2009 right from the<br />
inception <strong>of</strong> the policy.<br />
20. In one <strong>of</strong> the writ petition i.e.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.51317 <strong>of</strong><br />
2009 (Narendra Sharma Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P.<br />
and others) involving the <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> the<br />
police department I had earlier referred<br />
the m<strong>at</strong>ter with regard to the binding<br />
n<strong>at</strong>ure and enforceability <strong>of</strong> the said<br />
transfer police to a larger Bench vide<br />
order d<strong>at</strong>ed 12.10.2009 but as to whether<br />
the said transfer policy is applicable to the<br />
police department or not is another<br />
question which I am called upon to<br />
examine herein.<br />
21. The service conditions <strong>of</strong> the<br />
police <strong>of</strong>ficers, both gazetted and non<br />
gazetted are covered by the Police Act,<br />
1961 and the U.P. Police Regul<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
which are said to have been framed under<br />
the said Act. The aforesaid Act and the<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions provide a complete<br />
mechanism for the transfer <strong>of</strong> the police<br />
personnel. Further, the said mechanism<br />
has been strengthen by the guidelines<br />
issued by the Supreme <strong>Court</strong> in the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Prakash Singh (supra). The said<br />
guidelines read with the provisions <strong>of</strong> the<br />
aforesaid Act and Regul<strong>at</strong>ions completely<br />
occupy the field leaving no scope for the<br />
Government to supplement them by any<br />
Government Order, Circular or any policy<br />
decision. Therefore, any policy decision<br />
governing the m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong> police<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers would not override the st<strong>at</strong>utory<br />
provisions and the guidelines <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Supreme <strong>Court</strong> which are quasi legisl<strong>at</strong>ive<br />
and <strong>of</strong> mand<strong>at</strong>ory n<strong>at</strong>ure. The said policy,<br />
as such is ex facie <strong>of</strong> a general n<strong>at</strong>ure and<br />
is applicable only to those departments<br />
where there are no service rules and the<br />
field is not occupied. If it is allowed to<br />
run parallel it would be in direct conflict<br />
with the Regul<strong>at</strong>ions and guidelines <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Supreme <strong>Court</strong>. Accordingly, the said<br />
policy which is <strong>of</strong> general n<strong>at</strong>ure cannot<br />
be applied to the police department.<br />
22. The above view taken by me<br />
also finds support by a decision <strong>of</strong> another<br />
Single Judge <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
15.10.2009 passed in Civil Misc. Writ<br />
Petition No.51998 <strong>of</strong> 2009 Constable 289<br />
CP Tahsildar Singh and others Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.P. and others where dealing with a<br />
similar controversy in rel<strong>at</strong>ion to transfers<br />
involving <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> U.P. Police it was<br />
observed th<strong>at</strong> the transfer <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong><br />
the police force are governed by the U.P.<br />
Police Regul<strong>at</strong>ions framed under the<br />
Police Act <strong>of</strong> 1961 and it is well settled<br />
th<strong>at</strong> executive instruction or order cannot<br />
prevail over the st<strong>at</strong>utory provision and<br />
therefore, the Government Order d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
6.6.2009 would be inoper<strong>at</strong>ive and<br />
inconsistent to the said Regul<strong>at</strong>ions.<br />
23. It is for this reason th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
Government issued a clarific<strong>at</strong>ion on<br />
15.10.2009 vide Annexure - 3 to the<br />
counter affidavit th<strong>at</strong> the police<br />
department is not outside the preview <strong>of</strong><br />
the transfer policy d<strong>at</strong>ed 6.6.2009.<br />
24. Next submission <strong>of</strong> the learned<br />
counsel for the petitioner is th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
transfer <strong>of</strong> the petitioner is a colourable<br />
exercise <strong>of</strong> power, inasmuch the same has<br />
been made on caste basis. He has<br />
submitted th<strong>at</strong> from the western districts<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.P., namely, Gautam Budh Nagar,<br />
Ghaziabad, Baghp<strong>at</strong>, Meerut, Muzaffar<br />
Nagar, Saharanpur only Constables<br />
belonging to J<strong>at</strong> and Gurjar community<br />
alone have been picked up and transferred<br />
to other districts.
1016 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
25. As far as the petitioner is<br />
concerned, he has been transferred from<br />
Gautam Budh Nagar to Mau. It has come<br />
on record th<strong>at</strong> from the district Gautam<br />
Budh Nagar only six transfers have been<br />
made out <strong>of</strong> more than 2000 police<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> sub-ordin<strong>at</strong>e rank posted in the<br />
district. Thus, the number <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers<br />
transferred out <strong>of</strong> the district is negligible<br />
and on its basis it cannot be even<br />
imagined th<strong>at</strong> any discrimin<strong>at</strong>ion in the<br />
m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong> transfer has been practised on<br />
the basis <strong>of</strong> caste.<br />
26. In the first supplementary<br />
affidavit a completely vague averment has<br />
been made th<strong>at</strong> from the Meerut Zone<br />
about 400 Police Officers have been<br />
transferred in September, 2009 and<br />
approxim<strong>at</strong>ely all <strong>of</strong> them belong to a<br />
particular community. In the second<br />
supplementary affidavit, it has been st<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
th<strong>at</strong> approxim<strong>at</strong>ely 250 Police Officers <strong>of</strong><br />
a particular community are transferred<br />
from Meerut Zone in September, 2009.<br />
These two averments are contradictory to<br />
each other and cannot be reconciled.<br />
Further, as per the averments made in the<br />
second supplementary affidavit, the total<br />
number <strong>of</strong> police <strong>of</strong>ficers posted in a<br />
particular district and the number <strong>of</strong><br />
police <strong>of</strong>ficers transferred is as under:<br />
District<br />
Total number<br />
<strong>of</strong> Police<br />
Officers<br />
Number <strong>of</strong><br />
Police Officers<br />
<strong>of</strong> a particular<br />
community<br />
Number <strong>of</strong><br />
transferred<br />
Police Officers<br />
<strong>of</strong> particular<br />
community<br />
Meerut 1500 22% i.e. 330 65<br />
Saharanpur 1275 20% i.e. 255 60<br />
Baghpt 360 32% i.e. 115 24<br />
27. The number <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficers so<br />
transferred appears to be quite<br />
insignificant looking to the number <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers posted in each district.<br />
28. The learned Standing Counsel in<br />
this regard rightly submits th<strong>at</strong> the process<br />
<strong>of</strong> transfer is not complete and the<br />
possibility <strong>of</strong> transfer <strong>of</strong> others <strong>of</strong>ficers<br />
which may include those <strong>of</strong> other<br />
community cannot be ruled out. In such a<br />
situ<strong>at</strong>ion, in the absence <strong>of</strong> a clear cut<br />
averment as to why the department, r<strong>at</strong>her<br />
the high level committee i.e. Police<br />
Establishment Board, would choose and<br />
transfer the police personnels <strong>of</strong> a<br />
particular community alone, the<br />
contention th<strong>at</strong> the transfers are in<br />
colourable exercise <strong>of</strong> power is general in<br />
n<strong>at</strong>ure and too remote to be accepted.<br />
29. Apart from the above, Police<br />
Force is a disciplined force established for<br />
the purpose <strong>of</strong> maintaining law and order<br />
and for investig<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> crimes. Therefore,<br />
in order to maintain strict discipline,<br />
sometimes whole sole transfers are<br />
necessary in administr<strong>at</strong>ive exigencies. It<br />
is a common phenomena th<strong>at</strong> in such<br />
circumstances a whole B<strong>at</strong>talion or a<br />
Brigade or a Regiment is transferred,<br />
which may include generally<br />
Constables/Sepoys <strong>of</strong> a particular caste. In<br />
Army particularly there are specific<br />
Regiments for J<strong>at</strong>s, Gorakhas and Sikhs<br />
etc. Thus, where the Regiment as a whole<br />
is transferred it would result in the<br />
transfer <strong>of</strong> persons <strong>of</strong> particular<br />
community alone but such a transfer<br />
cannot be faulted on account <strong>of</strong><br />
arbitrariness or discrimin<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
Muzaffar<br />
Nagar<br />
1250 25% i.e. 312 59<br />
30. Sri Vijay Gautam, learned<br />
counsel for the petitioner has placed<br />
reliance upon a decision reported in
3 All] Naik R.K. Mahap<strong>at</strong>ra V. Chief <strong>of</strong> Army Staff and others 1017<br />
2003(1) UPLBEC 636 Bishan Pal Malik<br />
and others Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others<br />
in support <strong>of</strong> the contention th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
transfer on caste basis is a colourable<br />
exercise <strong>of</strong> power. In the aforesaid case,<br />
though the transfers were said to have<br />
been made in administr<strong>at</strong>ive exigencies,<br />
the <strong>Court</strong> found th<strong>at</strong> the purpose was<br />
actually to flush out the <strong>of</strong>ficers belong to<br />
a particular caste due to out come <strong>of</strong> an<br />
action which involved the f<strong>at</strong>her <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Chief Minister. However, in the present<br />
case no such incident has been placed on<br />
record on the basis <strong>of</strong> which it can be<br />
imagined th<strong>at</strong> the transfer <strong>of</strong> the police<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers <strong>of</strong> a particular community is<br />
tainted with ulterior motive.<br />
31. In the last, a faint submission has<br />
been made th<strong>at</strong> the impugned order <strong>of</strong><br />
transfer <strong>of</strong> the petitioner is punitive in<br />
n<strong>at</strong>ure as is apparent from paragraph 5 <strong>of</strong><br />
the counter affidavit.<br />
32. A perusal <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid<br />
paragraph reveals th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner had<br />
remained posted for 25 years in the<br />
adjoining districts <strong>of</strong> Bulandshahr and<br />
Ghaziabad. He was involved in case<br />
crime no.983 <strong>of</strong> 2008 u/s 379 IPC<br />
pertaining to demand <strong>of</strong> illegal<br />
gr<strong>at</strong>ific<strong>at</strong>ion in respect where<strong>of</strong> an<br />
enquiry was conducted and a censure<br />
entry was awarded to the petitioner. It is<br />
in view <strong>of</strong> above circumstances and the<br />
conduct <strong>of</strong> the petitioner th<strong>at</strong> a<br />
recommend<strong>at</strong>ion for his transfer was<br />
made, which on being approved by the<br />
Board has been implemented. Neither the<br />
impugned order <strong>of</strong> transfer nor the above<br />
paragraph 5 <strong>of</strong> the counter affidavit is<br />
stigm<strong>at</strong>ic or punitive in n<strong>at</strong>ure. It only<br />
narr<strong>at</strong>es the basis <strong>of</strong> award <strong>of</strong> censure<br />
entry to the petitioner which may have<br />
formed one <strong>of</strong> the grounds for his transfer.<br />
Obviously, transfers have to be made on<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> certain aspects and the<br />
past record <strong>of</strong> the petitioner as such<br />
becomes an essential aspect within the<br />
domain <strong>of</strong> administr<strong>at</strong>ive exigency.<br />
Therefore, even if such an entry has<br />
formed a part <strong>of</strong> decision making process<br />
it can not be said to be objectionable. It is<br />
a well recognised principle <strong>of</strong> law th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
legality <strong>of</strong> the order has to be judged<br />
independently only on the basis <strong>of</strong> the<br />
reasons mentioned in the order itself and<br />
more reasons can not be supplemented by<br />
m<strong>at</strong>erial other than the order itself.<br />
33. In view <strong>of</strong> the above discussion,<br />
I am not inclined to exercise my extra<br />
ordinary discretionary jurisdiction under<br />
Article 226 <strong>of</strong> the Constitution so as to<br />
interfere with the impugned order <strong>of</strong><br />
transfer. There is no merit in the petition<br />
and it is accordingly dismissed with no<br />
order as to costs. Petitioner is permitted to<br />
join <strong>at</strong> the transferred place within a<br />
week.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.10.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE SHISHIR KUMAR, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 60367 <strong>of</strong> 2005<br />
No.63829833 Naik R.K. Mahap<strong>at</strong>ra<br />
…Petitioner<br />
Versus<br />
Chief <strong>of</strong> Army Staff and others<br />
…Respondents<br />
Counsel for the Petitioner:<br />
Sri Colonel Ashok Kumar<br />
Sri Rohit Kumar<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
Sri K.C. Sinha, A.S.G.I.
1018 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
S.S.C.<br />
December,1999. Various other facts<br />
st<strong>at</strong>ed in the writ petition are not<br />
Defence Service Regul<strong>at</strong>ion (Regul<strong>at</strong>ion necessary to be mentioned herein. It has<br />
for Army) 1987-Para 164-Discharge from been st<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong> during leave period,<br />
Service-on charges <strong>of</strong> overstaying on<br />
petitioner was called back and due to<br />
leave-held-valid can not be interfered by<br />
Writ <strong>Court</strong>.<br />
aforesaid fact, annual leave <strong>of</strong> petitioner<br />
for the year 1999 has been elapsed. A<br />
Held: Para 11 & 12<br />
show cause notice was issued to petitioner<br />
submitting reply and subsequently a show<br />
The Apex <strong>Court</strong> has further held th<strong>at</strong> in cause notice was also issued directing<br />
the said circumstances discharge from<br />
petitioner to submit reply to said show<br />
service cannot be said to be by way <strong>of</strong><br />
punishment. In Sugreev Singh's case cause notice. Petitioner has submitted<br />
(Supra), the Division Bench has also reply and an order <strong>of</strong> discharge from<br />
taken the same view.<br />
service was passed on the ground th<strong>at</strong><br />
petitioner was awarded four red ink<br />
After considering all facts and entries during his 13 years <strong>of</strong> service and<br />
circumstances <strong>of</strong> the present case and<br />
petitioner was send on leave for 64 days<br />
decisions <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> as well as the<br />
Apex <strong>Court</strong>, I am <strong>of</strong> view th<strong>at</strong> discharge but without any permission for extension<br />
<strong>of</strong> petitioner from service cannot be said <strong>of</strong> leave, he has overstayed, which is an<br />
to be illegal or disproportion<strong>at</strong>e.<br />
<strong>of</strong>fence under the Army Act but<br />
Case law discussed:<br />
respondent without adopting any<br />
W.P. No. 10816 <strong>of</strong> 2000, W.P.No. 3201 <strong>of</strong> procedure as provided under the Act, an<br />
1994 decided on 2.2.2005, 1990 ACJ, 597,<br />
administr<strong>at</strong>ive action has been taken<br />
2002 (2) ESC (<strong>Allahabad</strong>), 207, 2008 (2)<br />
Supreme <strong>Court</strong>, 302, 2005 (2) ESC, 892.<br />
under the Army Rule 13(3)(4) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Army Rules. The ground taken in the<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble Shishir Kumar, J.)<br />
discharge certific<strong>at</strong>e was th<strong>at</strong> as petitioner<br />
has earlier been punished under Sections<br />
1. This writ petition has been filed<br />
40, 39, 63 <strong>of</strong> the Army Act, for various<br />
for quashing the order <strong>of</strong> discharge d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
<strong>of</strong>fences, therefore, he is being discharge<br />
25th May, 2000 (Annexure 10 to the writ<br />
from service being undesirable as<br />
petition) as well as the order d<strong>at</strong>ed 31st<br />
inefficient solider. Petitioner filed a<br />
May, 2005 (Annexure 17 to writ petition).<br />
complaint as provided under the Act th<strong>at</strong><br />
Further prayer in the n<strong>at</strong>ure <strong>of</strong> mandamus<br />
too has been dismissed. Hence, the<br />
commanding the respondent No.1 to tre<strong>at</strong><br />
present writ petition.<br />
petitioner to have continued in Colour<br />
Service till he would have completed<br />
3. Counter and rejoinder affidavits<br />
requisite service laid down in Para 164 <strong>of</strong><br />
have already been exchanged, therefore,<br />
Defence Service Regul<strong>at</strong>ion (Regul<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
with the consent <strong>of</strong> parties, present writ<br />
for Army), 1987 with all consequential<br />
petition is being disposed <strong>of</strong> on the<br />
benefits.<br />
admission stage.<br />
2. The facts st<strong>at</strong>ed in the writ<br />
4. Learned counsel for petitioner<br />
petition are th<strong>at</strong> petitioner who was<br />
submits th<strong>at</strong> the ground taken by<br />
recruited in army was granted annual<br />
respondents while discharging petitioner<br />
leave from 12 th September, 1999 upto 28 th from service cannot be sustained in view
3 All] Naik R.K. Mahap<strong>at</strong>ra V. Chief <strong>of</strong> Army Staff and others 1019<br />
<strong>of</strong> the fact th<strong>at</strong> if petitioner has committed<br />
some <strong>of</strong>fence, he is liable for trial by the<br />
<strong>Court</strong> Martial. <strong>Court</strong> Martial being a<br />
procedure for punishment under the Act is<br />
to be adopted. Under Section 108 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Army Act, there are four types <strong>of</strong> <strong>Court</strong><br />
Martial by which petitioner can be tried.<br />
In case in the opinion <strong>of</strong> respondents,<br />
petitioner has committed any <strong>of</strong>fence or<br />
overstayed on leave without sanction <strong>of</strong><br />
the same, unless and until an opportunity<br />
to th<strong>at</strong> effect is given, petitioner cannot be<br />
discharged from service. Under the Army<br />
Act and Rules, there is a procedure th<strong>at</strong>,<br />
in case, some <strong>of</strong>fence is committed by a<br />
person subject to the Army Act, a court <strong>of</strong><br />
enquiry as provided under Rule 177 has to<br />
be ordered by the competent authority and<br />
in case it is found th<strong>at</strong> prima-facie case is<br />
made out, then the commanding <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
will pass an order for holding a <strong>Court</strong><br />
Martial either summary, general or<br />
district. But taking action under Rule 13,<br />
without affording an opportunity to<br />
petitioner is not sustainable in law and is<br />
liable to be quashed.<br />
5. Assuming without admitting this<br />
fact, if petitioner was punished earlier on<br />
some <strong>of</strong>fence th<strong>at</strong> cannot be a ground for<br />
discharge <strong>of</strong> petitioner from army service.<br />
Petitioner has placed reliance upon a<br />
judgement <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> in C.M.W.P. No.<br />
10816 <strong>of</strong> 2000 No.5042301A, L.B.Thapa<br />
Vs. Chief <strong>of</strong> Army Staff and others.<br />
Another judgement has been relied upon<br />
by petitioner in C.M.W.P.No. 3201 <strong>of</strong><br />
1994 Shambu Gurung Vs. Union <strong>of</strong><br />
India and others decided on 2.2.2005.<br />
Further reliance has been placed upon<br />
1990 ACJ, 597, Chaukas Ram Vs. Sub<br />
Area Commander and Another. Taking<br />
support <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid judgements,<br />
learned counsel for petitioner submits<br />
th<strong>at</strong>, in case, no notice against<br />
contempl<strong>at</strong>ed discharge having been<br />
given to petitioner, it will be tre<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong><br />
order impugned <strong>of</strong> discharge has been<br />
passed in viol<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the procedure laid<br />
down by Rule 13 and also against the<br />
principle <strong>of</strong> n<strong>at</strong>ural justice. Further<br />
argument has been raised th<strong>at</strong> unless and<br />
until submission is recorded th<strong>at</strong> trial <strong>of</strong><br />
petitioner by <strong>Court</strong> Martial is inexpedient<br />
or impracticable against Rule 13, cannot<br />
be taken. In such situ<strong>at</strong>ion, learned<br />
counsel for petitioner submits th<strong>at</strong><br />
discharge order passed by respondents is<br />
liable to be set aside.<br />
6. On the other hand, learned<br />
counsel for respondents submits th<strong>at</strong><br />
petitioner was NCO Incharge, Kerbside<br />
Petrol Pump and was posted to 45<br />
Company ASC (Supply) Type-B on<br />
3.9.1998. Petitioner had four red-ink<br />
entries from his previous units under<br />
various sections <strong>of</strong> the Army Act,<br />
awarded by different Commanding<br />
Officer under whom he was working.<br />
Petitioner requested for annual leave for<br />
the year 1999 in the month <strong>of</strong> December,<br />
1999. His leave was sanctioned and he<br />
was issued a railway warrant for both<br />
ways in advance as per the existing rules.<br />
Petitioner before proceeding on leave has<br />
to handover the charge but petitioner<br />
became absent without leave with effect<br />
from 29.12.1999 without handing over the<br />
charge <strong>of</strong> the petrol pump. An<br />
apprehension roll was issued as he left the<br />
unit without any proper order and<br />
permission. Petitioner reported on<br />
4.1.2000. Thereafter petitioner was sent<br />
on 34 days part <strong>of</strong> annual leave for the<br />
year 2000 on compassion<strong>at</strong>e ground. His<br />
leave was extended by 30 days till 12th<br />
March, 2000. After re-joining on leave,<br />
petitioner was awarded "Severe<br />
Reprimand" for being absent without
1020 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
leave with effect from 29.12.1999 to<br />
3.1.2000. This was his 5th red ink entry.<br />
Then a show cause notice was issued to<br />
petitioner on 17.1.2000 to discharge on<br />
account <strong>of</strong> four red ink entries being an<br />
undesirable/ inefficient person. Petitioner<br />
submitted a reply and same was<br />
considered and st<strong>at</strong>utory complaint filed<br />
by petitioner has also been dismissed.<br />
7. It has further been submitted on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> respondents th<strong>at</strong> army<br />
authorities in view <strong>of</strong> provisions had an<br />
option to try a person either by a <strong>Court</strong><br />
Martial or to take an administr<strong>at</strong>ive action<br />
as provided under Rule 13 <strong>of</strong> the Army<br />
Rules. Further Section 20 <strong>of</strong> the Act gives<br />
power to Army authority to dismiss or<br />
remove any person subject to the act other<br />
than <strong>of</strong>ficer. The procedure has been<br />
prescribed th<strong>at</strong> he can be dismissed from<br />
service on the basis <strong>of</strong> show cause notice<br />
and then he will have a remedy under<br />
Section 26 <strong>of</strong> the Army Act. The<br />
procedure for discharge has been<br />
provided under Rule 13 <strong>of</strong> the Rules.<br />
Reliance has been placed upon a<br />
judgement <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> reported in 2002<br />
(2) ESC (<strong>Allahabad</strong>), 207 Sugreev Singh<br />
Desuriya Vs. The Central Government<br />
(H.C.). Placing reliance upon aforesaid<br />
judgement, learned counsel for<br />
respondent submits th<strong>at</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> while<br />
considering similar provision which is<br />
under the Air Force Act and Rules has<br />
held th<strong>at</strong> if a non-commissioned <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
was discharged from service on the<br />
ground <strong>of</strong> service no longer required and<br />
unsuitable retention for Air Force on the<br />
ground <strong>of</strong> red and black ink entries in his<br />
conduct book, this <strong>Court</strong> has held th<strong>at</strong>, in<br />
such circumstances, it cannot be said th<strong>at</strong><br />
procedure prescribed and adopted by<br />
respondents is faulted. The <strong>Court</strong> has<br />
further held th<strong>at</strong> respondents have<br />
followed the procedure <strong>of</strong> giving warning<br />
and also issuing a show cause notice after<br />
he again incorpor<strong>at</strong>ed red-ink entry in the<br />
conduct book and after considering the<br />
explan<strong>at</strong>ion has discharged him from<br />
service, it cannot be said to be contrary to<br />
the policy <strong>of</strong> discharge <strong>of</strong> habitual<br />
<strong>of</strong>fender. The submission <strong>of</strong> petitioner<br />
regarding policy as ultra-virus was also<br />
not accepted. Further reliance has been<br />
placed on a Apex <strong>Court</strong> judgement<br />
reported in Judgement Today, 2008 (2)<br />
Supreme <strong>Court</strong>, 302 Union <strong>of</strong> India and<br />
others Vs. Rajesh Vyas. Relevant para<br />
10 is being reproduced below:-<br />
"10. As noted above, policy for<br />
discharge <strong>of</strong> habitual <strong>of</strong>fender was<br />
considered by this <strong>Court</strong> in A.K.Bakshi's<br />
case (supra).After analyzing the policy, it<br />
was observed th<strong>at</strong> the whole idea<br />
underlying the policy was to weed out the<br />
indisciplined personnel from the force. It<br />
was further observed th<strong>at</strong> it was a<br />
discharge simplicitor and as such it<br />
cannot be held as termin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> service<br />
by way <strong>of</strong> punishment for misconduct."<br />
8. Learned counsel for respondents<br />
has also placed reliance upon a judgement<br />
<strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> reported in 2005 (2) ESC,<br />
892 Ali Jabed Vs. Union <strong>of</strong> India and<br />
others. Placing reliance upon aforesaid<br />
judgement, learned counsel for<br />
respondents submits th<strong>at</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> in<br />
similar circumstances taking into<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion the previous four red entries<br />
has held th<strong>at</strong> discharge <strong>of</strong> a person cannot<br />
be said to be by way <strong>of</strong> punishment and<br />
has held th<strong>at</strong> policy <strong>of</strong> discharging <strong>of</strong><br />
habitual <strong>of</strong>fender cannot be said to be<br />
ultra-virus and if a person has been<br />
awarded red-ink entries, punishment<br />
cannot be said to be illegal. Further it has<br />
been held by this <strong>Court</strong> th<strong>at</strong> the person
3 All] Naik R.K. Mahap<strong>at</strong>ra V. Chief <strong>of</strong> Army Staff and others 1021<br />
concerned has given adequ<strong>at</strong>e opportunity<br />
<strong>of</strong> placing his defence in accordance with<br />
rules and procedure provided, therefore, it<br />
cannot be held th<strong>at</strong> punishment awarded<br />
is not correct and proper.<br />
9. I have considered the submissions<br />
made on behalf <strong>of</strong> parties. From the<br />
record, it is clear th<strong>at</strong> earlier petitioner has<br />
been awarded four red ink entries under<br />
various sections <strong>of</strong> the Army Act and he<br />
was punished for the same and it was<br />
incorpor<strong>at</strong>ed in his service record.<br />
(a) Army Act Section 40 (C) on 16 Oct<br />
8914 days RI, by Lt.Col N.C.Dutta<br />
(b) Army Act Section 39 (d) on 30 Mar<br />
96- severe Reprimand by Lt.Col Surjit<br />
Singh.<br />
(c) Army Act Section 63 on 16 Sep 96-<br />
Severe Reprimand by Col Kamal Mohey.<br />
(d) Army Act Section 63 on 02 Apr 96-<br />
Severe Reprimand by Col JS Dhillon.<br />
(e) Army Act Section 30 (a) on 18 Mar<br />
2000- Severe Reprimand by Major J.S.<br />
Shekhaw<strong>at</strong>.<br />
10. Lastly, petitioner was awarded<br />
Severe Reprimand under Section 39(A)<br />
on 18th March, 2000. The argument<br />
raised on behalf <strong>of</strong> petitioner to this effect<br />
th<strong>at</strong> if some punishment is to be awarded<br />
to petitioner, there was no occasion for<br />
initi<strong>at</strong>ing an administr<strong>at</strong>ive action against<br />
petitioner Under Rule 13 (3)(iv) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Army Rules. It was incumbent on the part<br />
<strong>of</strong> respondents to have an enquiry to hold<br />
a trial for the purposes <strong>of</strong> initi<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
action against petitioner. Rule 13 gives<br />
the power to the Sub Area Commander<br />
ordering discharge in the circumstances <strong>of</strong><br />
the case permit to give the person whose<br />
discharge is contempl<strong>at</strong>ed, an opportunity<br />
to show cause against the contempl<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
discharge is to be given. From the perusal<br />
<strong>of</strong> aforesaid rule, it is clear th<strong>at</strong> power has<br />
been conferred to army authorities to take<br />
administr<strong>at</strong>ive action against a person<br />
who is serving in the army. From the<br />
record it is clear th<strong>at</strong> petitioner was<br />
habitual <strong>of</strong>fender and earlier he was<br />
punished four times under various section<br />
<strong>of</strong> the army. The contention regarding th<strong>at</strong><br />
no administr<strong>at</strong>ive action should have been<br />
taken against petitioner as no <strong>Court</strong><br />
Martial has been held, therefore,<br />
punishment is bad in law and cannot be<br />
accepted in view <strong>of</strong> provision <strong>of</strong> Section<br />
125 <strong>of</strong> the Act. It is the army authority to<br />
choose the forum. Under the Army Act,<br />
there are two modes <strong>of</strong> punishment which<br />
can be awarded to a army person, one by<br />
a <strong>Court</strong> Martial and another is<br />
administr<strong>at</strong>ive action provided under<br />
Army Act and procedure provided under<br />
Rule 13 <strong>of</strong> the Rules. The decision citied<br />
by learned counsel for petitioner is not<br />
applicable to the present case as in<br />
Chaukas Ram's Case (Supra), it was not a<br />
case <strong>of</strong> red-ink entry. In the aforesaid<br />
case, petitioner was involved in a crime<br />
and has concealed the said fact. The other<br />
two cases relied upon by learned counsel<br />
for petitioners rel<strong>at</strong>es to the decision <strong>of</strong><br />
the st<strong>at</strong>utory complaint. This <strong>Court</strong> in th<strong>at</strong><br />
circumstances has directed the army<br />
authorities to pass appropri<strong>at</strong>e orders to<br />
decide the st<strong>at</strong>utory complaint. The<br />
submission <strong>of</strong> the learned counsel for<br />
petitioner to this effect th<strong>at</strong> punishment<br />
awarded to petitioner is very harsh. In my<br />
opinion, case in hand is a case <strong>of</strong> military<br />
personnel and discipline in the military<br />
service has to be maintained for the<br />
purposes and security <strong>of</strong> the country. In<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> Vidya Prakash Vs. Union <strong>of</strong><br />
India reported in AIR 1988 Supreme<br />
<strong>Court</strong>, 705, question raised before the<br />
Apex <strong>Court</strong> was in order to withdrawing<br />
red-ink entries and if a person is absent
1022 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
without leave, whether the punishment <strong>of</strong><br />
dismissal is disproportion<strong>at</strong>e or not. The<br />
Apex <strong>Court</strong> has held th<strong>at</strong> if a person is<br />
punished for an <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> absent from<br />
duty on four occasions and red ink entry<br />
has been awarded, punishment awarded<br />
by the <strong>Court</strong> Martial for dismissal from<br />
service cannot be said to be<br />
disproportion<strong>at</strong>e to the charges levelled<br />
against the person concerned. In AIR<br />
1996 Supreme <strong>Court</strong>, 1368, Union <strong>of</strong><br />
India and others Vs. A.K.Bakshi, while<br />
considering similar provision <strong>of</strong> Air<br />
Force, which is in the Army Act, it has<br />
been held by the Apex <strong>Court</strong> th<strong>at</strong> policy<br />
<strong>of</strong> discharge <strong>of</strong> habitual <strong>of</strong>fender as<br />
prescribed in the policy discharging a<br />
person in accordance with law with the<br />
procedure laid down does not amount to<br />
removal by way <strong>of</strong> punishment. It is a<br />
discharge under the Rules. Similar policy<br />
for removal for undesirable and<br />
inefficient solders have been framed by<br />
the Army Authorities d<strong>at</strong>ed 28th<br />
December, 1988. The relevant part is<br />
being quoted below:-<br />
"JCOs, Wos and OR who have<br />
proved inefficient:<br />
3.(a) Before recommending or<br />
sanctioning discharge, the following<br />
points must be considered-<br />
(i) if lack <strong>of</strong> training is the cause <strong>of</strong> his<br />
inefficiency, arrangements will be<br />
made for his further training,<br />
(ii) if an individual has become<br />
unsuitable in his arm/service through<br />
no fault <strong>of</strong> his own, he will be<br />
recommended for suitable extraregimental<br />
employment.<br />
(b) Should it be decided to transfer a<br />
JCO, he may be transferred in his<br />
acting/substantive rank according to the<br />
merits <strong>of</strong> the case and will not be<br />
recommended for further promotion and /<br />
or increment <strong>of</strong> pay until he proves his<br />
fitness for promotion and / or increment<br />
<strong>of</strong> pay in his new unit.<br />
(c) Prior to transfer, if such a course is<br />
warranted on the merits <strong>of</strong> the case, a WO<br />
or an NCO may be reduced to one rank<br />
lower than his substantive rank under<br />
Army Act Section 20(4).<br />
Procedure for Dismissal/ Discharge <strong>of</strong><br />
undesirable JCOs/WOs/OR<br />
4. AR 13 and 17 provide th<strong>at</strong> a<br />
JCO/WO/OR whose dismissal or<br />
discharge is contempl<strong>at</strong>ed will be given a<br />
show cause notice. As an exception to<br />
this, services <strong>of</strong> such a person may be<br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ed without giving him a show<br />
cause notice provided the competent<br />
authority is s<strong>at</strong>isfied th<strong>at</strong> it is not<br />
expedient or reasonable practice to serve<br />
such a notice. Such cases should be rare,<br />
e.g., where the interests <strong>of</strong> the security <strong>of</strong><br />
the St<strong>at</strong>e so require. Where the serving <strong>of</strong><br />
a show cause notice is dispensed with, the<br />
reason for doing so are required to be<br />
recorded. See provision to AR 17.<br />
5. Subject to the foregoing, the procedure<br />
to be followed for dismissal or discharge<br />
<strong>of</strong> a person under AR 13 or AR17, as the<br />
case may be, is set out below-<br />
(a) Preliminary Enquiry.<br />
Before recommending discharge or<br />
dismissal <strong>of</strong> an individual the authority<br />
concerned will ensure-<br />
(i) th<strong>at</strong> an impartial enquiry (not<br />
necessarily a <strong>Court</strong> <strong>of</strong> Inquiry) has been<br />
made into the alleg<strong>at</strong>ions against him and<br />
th<strong>at</strong> he has adequ<strong>at</strong>e opportunity <strong>of</strong>
3 All] Naik R.K. Mahap<strong>at</strong>ra V. Chief <strong>of</strong> Army Staff and others 1023<br />
putting up his defence or explan<strong>at</strong>ion and<br />
<strong>of</strong> adducing evidence in his defence.<br />
(ii) th<strong>at</strong> the alleg<strong>at</strong>ions have been<br />
substanti<strong>at</strong>ed and th<strong>at</strong> the extreme step <strong>of</strong><br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the individual's service is<br />
warranted on the merits <strong>of</strong> the case.<br />
(b) Forwarding <strong>of</strong> Recommend<strong>at</strong>ions.<br />
The recommend<strong>at</strong>ion for dismissal or<br />
discharge will be forwarded through<br />
normal channels, to the authority<br />
competent to authorise the dismissal or<br />
discharge, as the case may be, along with<br />
a copy <strong>of</strong> the proceedings <strong>of</strong> the enquiry<br />
referred to in (a) above.<br />
(c) Action by Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Authorities.<br />
Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e authorities through<br />
whom the recommend<strong>at</strong>ions pass will<br />
consider the case in the light <strong>of</strong> wh<strong>at</strong> is<br />
st<strong>at</strong>ed in (a) above and make their own<br />
recommend<strong>at</strong>ions as to the disposal <strong>of</strong> the<br />
case.<br />
(d) Action by Competent Authority.<br />
The authority competent to authorise<br />
the dismissal or discharge <strong>of</strong> the<br />
individual will consider the case in the<br />
light <strong>of</strong> wh<strong>at</strong> is st<strong>at</strong>ed in (a) above. If he is<br />
s<strong>at</strong>isfied th<strong>at</strong> the termin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
individual's service is wait ranted he<br />
should direct th<strong>at</strong> show cause notice be<br />
issued to the individual in accordance<br />
with AR 13 or AR 17 as the case may be.<br />
No lower authority will direct the issue <strong>of</strong><br />
a show cause notice. The show cause<br />
notice should cover the full particulars <strong>of</strong><br />
the cause <strong>of</strong> action against the individual.<br />
The alleg<strong>at</strong>ions must be specific and<br />
supported by sufficient details to enable<br />
the individual to clearly understand and<br />
reply to them. A copy <strong>of</strong> the proceedings<br />
or the enquiry held in the case will also<br />
be supplied to the individual and he will<br />
be afforded reasonable time to st<strong>at</strong>e in<br />
writing any reasons he may have to urge<br />
against the proposed dismissal or<br />
discharge.<br />
(e) Action on receipt <strong>of</strong> the reply to the<br />
show cause notice.<br />
The individual's reply to the show<br />
cause notice will be forwarded through<br />
normal channels to the authority<br />
competent to authorise his<br />
dismissal/discharge together with a copy<br />
<strong>of</strong> each <strong>of</strong> the show cause notice and the<br />
proceedings <strong>of</strong> the enquiry held in the<br />
case and recommend<strong>at</strong>ions <strong>of</strong> each<br />
forwarding authority as to the disposal <strong>of</strong><br />
the case.<br />
(f) Final Orders by the Competent<br />
Authority.<br />
The authority competent to sanction<br />
the dismissal/discharge <strong>of</strong> the individual<br />
will before passing orders reconsider the<br />
case in the light <strong>of</strong> the individual's reply<br />
to the show cause notice. A person who<br />
has been served with a show cause notice<br />
for proposed dismissal may be ordered to<br />
be discharged if it is considered th<strong>at</strong><br />
discharge would meet the requirements <strong>of</strong><br />
the case. If the competent authority<br />
considers th<strong>at</strong> termin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
individuals service is not warranted but<br />
any <strong>of</strong> the actions referred to in (b) to (j)<br />
<strong>of</strong> para 2 above would meet the<br />
requirements <strong>of</strong> the case, he may pass<br />
orders accordingly. On the other hand, if<br />
the competent authority accepts the reply<br />
<strong>of</strong> the individual to the show cause notices<br />
entirely s<strong>at</strong>isfactory, he will pass orders<br />
accordingly."
1024 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
11. The Apex <strong>Court</strong> has further held<br />
th<strong>at</strong> in the said circumstances discharge<br />
from service cannot be said to be by way<br />
<strong>of</strong> punishment. In Sugreev Singh's case<br />
(Supra), the Division Bench has also<br />
taken the same view.<br />
12. After considering all facts and<br />
circumstances <strong>of</strong> the present case and<br />
decisions <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> as well as the<br />
Apex <strong>Court</strong>, I am <strong>of</strong> view th<strong>at</strong> discharge<br />
<strong>of</strong> petitioner from service cannot be said<br />
to be illegal or disproportion<strong>at</strong>e.<br />
13. In view <strong>of</strong> aforesaid fact, the<br />
writ petition is devoid <strong>of</strong> merits and is<br />
hereby dismissed.<br />
No order is passed as to costs.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.10.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE A.P. SAHI, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 57675 <strong>of</strong> 2007<br />
Jafar Khan<br />
Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others<br />
Counsel for the Petitioner:<br />
Sri Rohit Upadhyay<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
Sri K.K. Chand<br />
Sri Rajesh Kumar Yadav<br />
C.S.C.<br />
…Petitioner<br />
…Respondents<br />
Group-D Employees Service-Rule-1985-<br />
Cancell<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> appointment <strong>of</strong> class 4 th<br />
employee- working government Girls<br />
Inter College- Principle is the only<br />
competent authority <strong>of</strong> order impugned<br />
passed by Secretary- without Notice<br />
opportunity without applic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> mind<br />
held illegal principle <strong>of</strong> N<strong>at</strong>ural justice<br />
viol<strong>at</strong>ed cannot sustain.<br />
Held: Para 12 & 13<br />
In view <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid and the<br />
undisputed position with regard to<br />
applicability <strong>of</strong> the rules, the competent<br />
authority being the Principal, the order<br />
<strong>of</strong> cancell<strong>at</strong>ion, termin<strong>at</strong>ion or otherwise<br />
could have only been passed by the<br />
Principal <strong>of</strong> the institution. The St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government does not have any power<br />
either defined under the aforesaid Rules,<br />
1985 or even as a residuary power to<br />
determine st<strong>at</strong>us <strong>of</strong> employment <strong>of</strong> a<br />
Class-IV employee <strong>of</strong> a Government Girls<br />
Degree College.<br />
In view <strong>of</strong> this, the directions issued by<br />
the St<strong>at</strong>e Government and the direction<br />
issued by the Director <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>at</strong><br />
the best can be administr<strong>at</strong>ive<br />
recommend<strong>at</strong>ions. The proceedings are<br />
to be initi<strong>at</strong>ed by the Competent<br />
Authority. Keeping in view Rule 31<br />
referred to herein above if the<br />
appointment <strong>of</strong> the petitioner was illegal<br />
or invalid, the cancell<strong>at</strong>ion has to be<br />
initi<strong>at</strong>ed by the Principal <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Institution and it is the Principal who has<br />
to issue a notice to the petitioner and to<br />
cancel his appointment. It is admitted in<br />
the counter affidavit th<strong>at</strong> the impugned<br />
orders have eman<strong>at</strong>ed without there<br />
being any notice or opportunity to the<br />
petitioner and the Principal has, as a<br />
m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong> fact surrendered his<br />
jurisdiction in favour <strong>of</strong> St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government as well as Director <strong>of</strong><br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion. This in the opinion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Court</strong> is impermissible under law.<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble A.P. Sahi, J.)<br />
1. Heard Sri Bheem Singh, learned<br />
counsel for the petitioner, learned<br />
standing counsel and Sri K.K. Chand,<br />
learned counsel for respondents No. 1, 2<br />
and 3 and perused the counter affidavit<br />
filed on behalf <strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e.
3 All] Jafar Khan V. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1025<br />
2. Sri R.K. Yadav, Advoc<strong>at</strong>e for<br />
cave<strong>at</strong>or has also been heard under<br />
Chapter 22, Rule 5(A) <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Allahabad</strong><br />
<strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong>, Rules.<br />
3. The petitioner has come up<br />
against the order d<strong>at</strong>ed 27th September,<br />
2007 and 19th October, 2007 whereby the<br />
appointment <strong>of</strong> the petitioner as Class IV<br />
employee in a Government Girls Degree<br />
College has been cancelled on the ground<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the selections held were invalid.<br />
4. The impugned order also recites<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner had not filed his<br />
certific<strong>at</strong>e with regard to low-vision<br />
before the Competent Authority and in<br />
spite <strong>of</strong> th<strong>at</strong> he was selected.<br />
5. The contention raised on behalf <strong>of</strong><br />
the petitioner is th<strong>at</strong> the impugned order<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 27th September, 2007 has been<br />
passed by the Principal Secretary<br />
Government <strong>of</strong> U.P. who is not the<br />
Competent Authority to pass any such<br />
order and further the Director <strong>of</strong><br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion had no authority to issue an<br />
order to the Principal <strong>of</strong> the Institution to<br />
cancel the appointment <strong>of</strong> the petitioner.<br />
It is urged th<strong>at</strong> the said orders are without<br />
jurisdiction and consequently both the<br />
orders have been passed without giving<br />
any notice or opportunity to the petitioner<br />
and, therefore, it is in viol<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
principles <strong>of</strong> n<strong>at</strong>ural justice. The<br />
averments to th<strong>at</strong> effect have been made<br />
in paragraph 19 and 26 <strong>of</strong> the writ<br />
petition. The petitioner has also tried to<br />
justify the certific<strong>at</strong>e issued to him by a<br />
medical practitioner and has urged th<strong>at</strong>,<br />
had the petitioner been given an<br />
opportunity, he would have been<br />
demonstr<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong> he was fully qualified<br />
and eligible.<br />
6. Lastly, it has been submitted by<br />
Sri Bheem Singh, th<strong>at</strong> the impugned order<br />
has been passed <strong>at</strong> the behest <strong>of</strong> a member<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Legisl<strong>at</strong>ive Assembly and,<br />
therefore, the impugned orders are<br />
viti<strong>at</strong>ed on the ground <strong>of</strong> malice as well.<br />
7. A counter affidavit has been filed<br />
on behalf <strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e as well as also on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> the Cave<strong>at</strong>or who is seeking<br />
impleadment. From the perusal <strong>of</strong> the<br />
counter affidavit filed on behalf <strong>of</strong> the<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e indic<strong>at</strong>es th<strong>at</strong> the stand taken is th<strong>at</strong><br />
since the St<strong>at</strong>e Government controls all<br />
Government Institutions, therefore, the<br />
Principal <strong>of</strong> a Degree College is also<br />
under the control <strong>of</strong> Government and<br />
there is no illegality in the issuance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
directions either by the Principal<br />
Secretary or by the Director <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
8. So far as opportunity is<br />
concerned, it has been st<strong>at</strong>ed in paragraph<br />
16 <strong>of</strong> the counter affidavit th<strong>at</strong> since the<br />
selections were invalid and illegal,<br />
therefore, there was no necessity <strong>of</strong> giving<br />
opportunity <strong>of</strong> hearing to the petitioner.<br />
9. A rejoinder affidavit has also been<br />
filed to the said counter affidavit denying<br />
the aforesaid alleg<strong>at</strong>ions.<br />
10. Learned counsel for the<br />
proposed respondent has also adopted the<br />
same argument and urged th<strong>at</strong> petitioner<br />
has obtained the appointment illegally and<br />
since his appointment is illegal the<br />
direction issued by the St<strong>at</strong>e to cancel the<br />
appointment <strong>of</strong> the petitioner does not<br />
suffer from any infirmity.<br />
11. It remains undisputed between<br />
the parties th<strong>at</strong> the appointment <strong>of</strong> a<br />
Class-IV employee <strong>of</strong> a Government Girls<br />
Degree College has to be made by the
1026 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
Principal <strong>of</strong> the Institution. The<br />
Competent Appointing Authority has<br />
been defined in Group-D Employees<br />
Service Rules, 1985 and thereafter the<br />
said rules for other m<strong>at</strong>ters, makes<br />
provision under Rules 31, th<strong>at</strong> for such<br />
m<strong>at</strong>ters which are not specifically covered<br />
under the rules, the rules pertaining to<br />
government servants shall apply.<br />
12. In view <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid and the<br />
undisputed position with regard to<br />
applicability <strong>of</strong> the rules, the competent<br />
authority being the Principal, the order <strong>of</strong><br />
cancell<strong>at</strong>ion, termin<strong>at</strong>ion or otherwise<br />
could have only been passed by the<br />
Principal <strong>of</strong> the institution. The St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government does not have any power<br />
either defined under the aforesaid Rules,<br />
1985 or even as a residuary power to<br />
determine st<strong>at</strong>us <strong>of</strong> employment <strong>of</strong> a<br />
Class-IV employee <strong>of</strong> a Government Girls<br />
Degree College.<br />
13. In view <strong>of</strong> this, the directions<br />
issued by the St<strong>at</strong>e Government and the<br />
direction issued by the Director <strong>of</strong><br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>at</strong> the best can be<br />
administr<strong>at</strong>ive recommend<strong>at</strong>ions. The<br />
proceedings are to be initi<strong>at</strong>ed by the<br />
Competent Authority. Keeping in view<br />
Rule 31 referred to herein above if the<br />
appointment <strong>of</strong> the petitioner was illegal<br />
or invalid, the cancell<strong>at</strong>ion has to be<br />
initi<strong>at</strong>ed by the Principal <strong>of</strong> the Institution<br />
and it is the Principal who has to issue a<br />
notice to the petitioner and to cancel his<br />
appointment. It is admitted in the counter<br />
affidavit th<strong>at</strong> the impugned orders have<br />
eman<strong>at</strong>ed without there being any notice<br />
or opportunity to the petitioner and the<br />
Principal has, as a m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong> fact<br />
surrendered his jurisdiction in favour <strong>of</strong><br />
St<strong>at</strong>e Government as well as Director <strong>of</strong><br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion. This in the opinion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Court</strong> is impermissible under law.<br />
14. Accordingly, the orders<br />
impugned are unsustainable and the same<br />
are quashed. The impugned orders d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
27th September, 2007 and 19th October,<br />
2007 are set aside with the direction to the<br />
respondent No. 3 to <strong>of</strong>fer an opportunity<br />
to the petitioner and thereafter proceed to<br />
pass an appropri<strong>at</strong>e order in accordance<br />
with law as expeditiously as possible<br />
preferably within a period <strong>of</strong> three months<br />
from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> production <strong>of</strong> certified<br />
copy <strong>of</strong> this order before him.<br />
15. It is made clear th<strong>at</strong> the payment<br />
<strong>of</strong> salary shall be subject to any order<br />
being passed by the Principal.<br />
16. With the aforesaid direction, the<br />
writ petition stands allowed.<br />
No order is passed as to costs.<br />
---------<br />
APPELLATE JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.10.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE SATYA POOT MEHROTRA, J.<br />
THE HON’BLE RAJESH CHANDRA, J.<br />
First Appeal From Order No. 2935 <strong>of</strong> 2009<br />
New India Assurance Company Ltd.<br />
…Defendant/Appellant<br />
Versus<br />
Mohd. Yameen & another …Respondents<br />
Counsel for the Appellant:<br />
Sri Dhananjay Awasthi<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988-Section 149-<br />
Third party insurance-duty <strong>of</strong> insever to<br />
s<strong>at</strong>isfy the award-Tribunal directed the
3 All] New India Assurance Co. Ltd. V. Mohd. Yameen and others 1027<br />
insurance Company to pay the entire<br />
amount <strong>of</strong> award-recover the same from<br />
vehicle owner-held perfectly justifiedappeal<br />
by insurance company dismissed.<br />
Held: Para 19<br />
In view <strong>of</strong> the above, it is evident th<strong>at</strong><br />
the Tribunal did not commit any illegality<br />
in directing the Insurance Company/<br />
Appellant to make deposit <strong>of</strong> the amount<br />
<strong>of</strong> compens<strong>at</strong>ion and recover the same<br />
from the insured person i.e. the owner <strong>of</strong><br />
the vehicle in question - respondent no.3<br />
herein.<br />
Case law discussed:<br />
AIR 1998 SC 588, 2004(3) SCC 297 : 2004 (1)<br />
T.A.C. 321 : AIR 2004 SC 1531, 2008(1) T.A.C.<br />
803 (S.C.), (2007) 3 S.C.C. 700 : 2007 (2)<br />
T.A.C. 398, (2007) 5 S.C.C. 428: 2007 (2)<br />
T.A.C. 417.<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble S<strong>at</strong>ya Poot Mehrotra, J.)<br />
1. The present Appeal has been filed<br />
by the Insurance Company under Section<br />
173 <strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988<br />
against the award d<strong>at</strong>ed 22.5.2009<br />
whereby Rs. 1,69,940/- with interest @<br />
6% per annum has been awarded as<br />
compens<strong>at</strong>ion to the claimantsrespondents<br />
on account <strong>of</strong> the de<strong>at</strong>h <strong>of</strong><br />
Wasim in an accident which took place on<br />
23.4.2005 <strong>at</strong> around 4.00 a.m. in the<br />
morning wherein Canter No. UP23B-<br />
2043 collided with a Truck.<br />
2. The Motor Vehicles Accident<br />
Claims Tribunal framed five issues.<br />
3. Issue No.1 was in regard to the<br />
factum <strong>of</strong> accident having taken place on<br />
account <strong>of</strong> rash and negligent driving by<br />
the driver <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid vehicle,<br />
namely, Canter No. UP23B-2043. The<br />
Tribunal decided the said Issue in the<br />
affirm<strong>at</strong>ive.<br />
4. Issue No.2 was as to whether the<br />
vehicle in question was insured with the<br />
Insurance Company/ Appellant and as to<br />
whether the driver <strong>of</strong> the vehicle was<br />
having a valid and effective Driving<br />
License on the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> accident. The<br />
Tribunal held th<strong>at</strong> the vehicle in question<br />
was insured with the Insurance Company/<br />
Appellant on the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> the accident.<br />
However, it was held th<strong>at</strong> the driver <strong>of</strong> the<br />
vehicle in question was not having valid<br />
and effective Driving License on the d<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> accident.<br />
5. Issue No. 3 was as to whether the<br />
Claim Petition was bad for non-joinder <strong>of</strong><br />
necessary parties. The said Issue was<br />
decided against the opposite parties in the<br />
Claim Petition.<br />
6. Issue No.4 was as to whether the<br />
deceased was travelling in the vehicle in<br />
question as gr<strong>at</strong>ituous passenger in an<br />
unauthorized manner which was viol<strong>at</strong>ive<br />
<strong>of</strong> the terms and conditions <strong>of</strong> the<br />
insurance policy. The Tribunal decided<br />
the said Issue in the affirm<strong>at</strong>ive in favour<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Insurance Company/ Appellant. It<br />
was held th<strong>at</strong> the vehicle in question was<br />
being used for commercial purposes, and<br />
the same was against the terms and<br />
conditions <strong>of</strong> the insurance policy.<br />
7. Issue No.5 was as to whether the<br />
claimants-respondents were entitled to get<br />
compens<strong>at</strong>ion as against the opposite<br />
parties in the Claim Petition jointly or<br />
separ<strong>at</strong>ely. It was held by the Tribunal<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the claimants/ respondents were<br />
entitled for compens<strong>at</strong>ion amounting to<br />
Rs.1,69,940/- with interest @ 6%.<br />
However, the compens<strong>at</strong>ion was not<br />
payable by the Insurance Company/<br />
Appellant but was payable by Mahmood<br />
Hasan, owner <strong>of</strong> the vehicle in questionrespondent<br />
no.3 herein.
1028 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
8. The Insurance Company/<br />
Appellant has filed the present Appeal<br />
impugning the aforesaid award.<br />
9. We have heard Shri Dhananjay<br />
Awasthi, learned counsel appearing for<br />
the Insurance Company/ Appellant, and<br />
perused the record.<br />
10. The impugned award has,<br />
interalia, directed th<strong>at</strong> even though the<br />
amount <strong>of</strong> compens<strong>at</strong>ion is not payable by<br />
the Insurance Company/ Appellant, the<br />
Insurance Company/Appellant would<br />
deposit the amount within 60 days <strong>of</strong> the<br />
award, and the Insurance Company/<br />
Appellant would be entitled to recover the<br />
same from the owner <strong>of</strong> the vehicle in<br />
question, i.e., respondent no.3 herein.<br />
11. It is submitted by Shri<br />
Dhananjay Awasthi, learned counsel<br />
appearing for the Insurance<br />
Company/Appellant th<strong>at</strong> having decided<br />
Issue Nos. 2 and 4 in favour <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Insurance Company/ Appellant, the<br />
Tribunal erred in directing the Insurance<br />
Company/ Appellant to deposit the<br />
amount <strong>of</strong> compens<strong>at</strong>ion and recover the<br />
same from the owner <strong>of</strong> the vehicle in<br />
question, i.e., respondent no.3 herein.<br />
We have considered the submissions<br />
made by Shri Dhananjay Awasthi, and we<br />
find ourselves unable to accept the same.<br />
Sub-section (5) <strong>of</strong> Section 147 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 lays down as<br />
under:<br />
"147. Requirements <strong>of</strong> policies and<br />
limits <strong>of</strong> liability .- (1) to (4).................<br />
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in<br />
any law for the time being in force, an<br />
insurer issuing a policy <strong>of</strong> insurance<br />
under this section shall be liable to<br />
indemnify the person or classes <strong>of</strong> persons<br />
specified in the policy in respect <strong>of</strong> any<br />
liability which the policy purports to<br />
cover in the case <strong>of</strong> th<strong>at</strong> person or those<br />
classes <strong>of</strong> persons."<br />
The above provision, thus, provides<br />
th<strong>at</strong> an insurer issuing a policy <strong>of</strong><br />
insurance under Section 147 <strong>of</strong> the Motor<br />
Vehicles Act, 1988 shall be liable to<br />
indemnify the person or classes <strong>of</strong> persons<br />
specified in the policy in respect <strong>of</strong> any<br />
liability which the policy purports to<br />
cover in the case <strong>of</strong> th<strong>at</strong> person or those<br />
classes <strong>of</strong> persons.<br />
Section 149 <strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles<br />
Act, 1988, in so far as is relevant,<br />
provides as follows:<br />
"149. Duty <strong>of</strong> insurers to s<strong>at</strong>isfy<br />
judgments and awards against persons<br />
insured in respect <strong>of</strong> third party risks.-(1)<br />
If, after a certific<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> insurance has<br />
been issued under sub-section (3) <strong>of</strong><br />
Section 147 in favour <strong>of</strong> the person by<br />
whom a policy has been effected,<br />
judgment or award in respect <strong>of</strong> any such<br />
liability as is required to be covered by a<br />
policy under clause (b) <strong>of</strong> sub-section (1)<br />
<strong>of</strong> Section 147 (being a liability covered<br />
by the terms <strong>of</strong> the policy) [or under the<br />
provisions <strong>of</strong> Section 163-A] is obtained<br />
against any person insured by the policy,<br />
then, notwithstanding th<strong>at</strong> the insurer may<br />
be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have<br />
avoided or cancelled the policy, the<br />
insurer shall, subject to the provisions <strong>of</strong><br />
this section, pay to the person entitled to<br />
the benefit <strong>of</strong> the decree any sum not<br />
exceeding the sum assured payable<br />
thereunder, as if he were the judgmentdebtor,<br />
in respect <strong>of</strong> the liability, together<br />
with any amount payable in respect <strong>of</strong>
3 All] New India Assurance Co. Ltd. V. Mohd. Yameen and others 1029<br />
costs and any sum payable in respect <strong>of</strong><br />
interest on th<strong>at</strong> sum by virtue <strong>of</strong> any<br />
enactment rel<strong>at</strong>ing to interest on<br />
judgments.<br />
(2) to (7)................."<br />
The above-quoted provision shows<br />
th<strong>at</strong> in case any judgment or award in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> the liability as is required to be<br />
covered by a policy under clause (b) <strong>of</strong><br />
sub-section (1) <strong>of</strong> Section 147 (being a<br />
liability covered by the terms <strong>of</strong> the<br />
policy) or under the provisions <strong>of</strong> Section<br />
163-A is obtained against any person<br />
insured by the policy, then the insurer<br />
shall pay to the person entitled to the<br />
benefit <strong>of</strong> the decree any sum not<br />
exceeding the sum assured payable<br />
thereunder, as if he were the judgmentdebtor,<br />
in respect <strong>of</strong> the liability, together<br />
with the amount <strong>of</strong> costs and interest. This<br />
will be so even though the insurer may be<br />
entitled to avoid or cancel or may have<br />
avoided or cancelled the policy.<br />
In view <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid provisions,<br />
we are <strong>of</strong> the view th<strong>at</strong> the direction given<br />
by the Tribunal directing the Insurance<br />
Company/ Appellant to make deposit <strong>of</strong><br />
the amount <strong>of</strong> compens<strong>at</strong>ion and recover<br />
the same from the insured person i.e. the<br />
owner <strong>of</strong> the vehicle in question -<br />
respondent no.3 herein, does not suffer<br />
from any infirmity.<br />
13. The above conclusion is<br />
supported by the decisions <strong>of</strong> the Apex<br />
<strong>Court</strong>:<br />
In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v.<br />
Inderjit Kaur and others, AIR 1998 SC<br />
588, their Lordships <strong>of</strong> the Supreme <strong>Court</strong><br />
opined as under (paragraph 7 <strong>of</strong> the said<br />
AIR):<br />
"7. We have, therefore, this position.<br />
Despite the bar cre<strong>at</strong>ed by S. 64-VB <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Insurance Act, the appellant, an<br />
authorised insurer, issued a policy <strong>of</strong><br />
insurance to cover the bus without<br />
receiving the premium therefor. By reason<br />
<strong>of</strong> the provisions <strong>of</strong> Ss. 147(5) and 149(1)<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles Act, the appellant<br />
became liable to indemnify third parties<br />
in respect <strong>of</strong> the liability which th<strong>at</strong> policy<br />
covered and to s<strong>at</strong>isfy awards <strong>of</strong><br />
compens<strong>at</strong>ion in respect there<strong>of</strong><br />
notwithstanding its entitlement (upon<br />
which we do not express any opinion) to<br />
avoid or cancel the policy for the reason<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the cheque issued in payment <strong>of</strong> the<br />
premium thereon had not been<br />
honoured."<br />
(Emphasis supplied)<br />
14. This decision thus supports the<br />
conclusion mentioned above on the basis<br />
<strong>of</strong> Sections 147(5) and 149(1) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.<br />
15. In N<strong>at</strong>ional Insurance Co. Ltd..<br />
v. Swaran Singh, 2004(3) SCC 297 :<br />
2004 (1) T.A.C. 321 : AIR 2004 SC 1531,<br />
their Lordships <strong>of</strong> the Supreme <strong>Court</strong> held<br />
as follows (paragraph 105 <strong>of</strong> the said<br />
AIR):<br />
"105. The summary <strong>of</strong> our findings to<br />
the various issues as raised in these<br />
petitions is as follows :<br />
(i) Chapter XI <strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles Act,<br />
1988 providing compulsory insurance <strong>of</strong><br />
vehicles against third-party risks is a<br />
social welfare legisl<strong>at</strong>ion to extend relief<br />
by compens<strong>at</strong>ion to victims <strong>of</strong> accidents<br />
caused by use <strong>of</strong> motor vehicles. The<br />
provisions <strong>of</strong> compulsory insurance<br />
coverage <strong>of</strong> all vehicles are with this<br />
paramount object and the provisions <strong>of</strong>
1030 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
the Act have to be so interpreted as to<br />
effectu<strong>at</strong>e the said object.<br />
(ii) An insurer is entitled to raise a<br />
defence in a claim petition filed under<br />
Section 163-A or Section 166 <strong>of</strong> the Motor<br />
Vehicles Act, 1988, inter alia, in terms <strong>of</strong><br />
Section 149(2)(a)(ii) <strong>of</strong> the said Act.<br />
(iii) The breach <strong>of</strong> policy condition e.g.,<br />
disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the driver or invalid<br />
driving licence <strong>of</strong> the driver, as contained<br />
in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) <strong>of</strong> Section 149,<br />
has to be proved to have been committed<br />
by the insured for avoiding liability by the<br />
insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid<br />
driving licence or disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
driver for driving <strong>at</strong> the relevant time, are<br />
not in themselves defences available to<br />
the insurer against either the insured or<br />
the third parties. To avoid its liability<br />
towards the insured, the insurer has to<br />
prove th<strong>at</strong> the insured was guilty <strong>of</strong><br />
negligence and failed to exercise<br />
reasonable care in the m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong> fulfilling<br />
the condition <strong>of</strong> the policy regarding use<br />
<strong>of</strong> vehicles by a duly licensed driver or<br />
one who was not disqualified to drive <strong>at</strong><br />
the relevant time.<br />
(iv) Insurance Companies, however, with<br />
a view to avoid their liability must not<br />
only establish the available defence(s)<br />
raised in the said proceedings but must<br />
also establish 'breach' on the part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
owner <strong>of</strong> the vehicle; the burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong><br />
wherefor would be on them.<br />
(v) The <strong>Court</strong> cannot lay down any<br />
criteria as to how the said burden would<br />
be discharged, inasmuch as the same<br />
would depend upon the facts and<br />
circumstances <strong>of</strong> each case.<br />
(vi) Even where the insurer is able to<br />
prove breach on the part <strong>of</strong> the insured<br />
concerning the policy condition regarding<br />
holding <strong>of</strong> a valid licence by the driver or<br />
his qualific<strong>at</strong>ion to drive during the<br />
relevant period, the insurer would not be<br />
allowed to avoid its liability towards the<br />
insured unless the said breach or<br />
breaches on the condition <strong>of</strong> driving<br />
licence is/are so fundamental as are found<br />
to have contributed to the cause <strong>of</strong> the<br />
accident. The Tribunals in interpreting<br />
the policy conditions would apply "the<br />
rule <strong>of</strong> main purpose" and the concept <strong>of</strong><br />
"fundamental breach" to allow defences<br />
available to the insurer under Section<br />
149(2) <strong>of</strong> the Act.<br />
(vii) The question, as to whether the<br />
owner has taken reasonable care to find<br />
out as to whether the driving licence<br />
produced by the driver, (a fake one or<br />
otherwise), does not fulfil the<br />
requirements <strong>of</strong> law or not will have to be<br />
determined in each case.<br />
(viii) If a vehicle <strong>at</strong> the time <strong>of</strong> accident<br />
was driven by a person having a learner's<br />
licence, the insurance Companies would<br />
be liable to s<strong>at</strong>isfy the decree.<br />
(ix) The claims tribunal constituted under<br />
Section 165 read with Section 168 is<br />
empowered to adjudic<strong>at</strong>e all claims in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> the accidents involving de<strong>at</strong>h or<br />
<strong>of</strong> bodily injury or damage to property <strong>of</strong><br />
third party arising in use <strong>of</strong> motor vehicle.<br />
The said power <strong>of</strong> the tribunal is not<br />
restricted to decide the claims inter se<br />
between claimant or claimants on one<br />
side and insured, insurer and driver on<br />
the other. In the course <strong>of</strong> adjudic<strong>at</strong>ing<br />
the claim for compens<strong>at</strong>ion and to decide<br />
the availability <strong>of</strong> defence or defences to<br />
the insurer, the Tribunal has necessarily<br />
the power and jurisdiction to decide<br />
disputes inter se between the insurer and<br />
the insured. The decision rendered on the<br />
claims and disputes inter se between the<br />
insurer and insured in the course <strong>of</strong><br />
adjudic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> claim for compens<strong>at</strong>ion by<br />
the claimants and the award made<br />
thereon is enforceable and executable in
3 All] New India Assurance Co. Ltd. V. Mohd. Yameen and others 1031<br />
the same manner as provided in Section<br />
174 <strong>of</strong> the Act for enforcement and<br />
execution <strong>of</strong> the award in favour <strong>of</strong> the<br />
claimants.<br />
(x) Where on adjudic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the claim<br />
under the Act the tribunal arrives <strong>at</strong> a<br />
conclusion th<strong>at</strong> the insurer has<br />
s<strong>at</strong>isfactorily proved its defence in<br />
accordance with the provisions <strong>of</strong><br />
Sections 149(2) read with sub-section (7),<br />
as interpreted by this <strong>Court</strong> above, the<br />
Tribunal can direct th<strong>at</strong> the insurer is<br />
liable to be reimbursed by the insured for<br />
the compens<strong>at</strong>ion and other amounts<br />
which it has been compelled to pay to the<br />
third party under the award <strong>of</strong> the<br />
tribunal. Such determin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> claim by<br />
the Tribunal will be enforceable and the<br />
money found due to the insurer from the<br />
insured will be recoverable on a<br />
certific<strong>at</strong>e issued by the tribunal to the<br />
Collector in the same manner under<br />
Section 174 <strong>of</strong> the Act as arrears as land<br />
revenue. The certific<strong>at</strong>e will be issued for<br />
the recovery as arrears <strong>of</strong> land revenue<br />
only if, as required by sub-section (3) <strong>of</strong><br />
Section 168 <strong>of</strong> the Act the insured fails to<br />
deposit the amount awarded in favour <strong>of</strong><br />
the insurer within thirty days from the<br />
d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> announcement <strong>of</strong> the award by the<br />
tribunal.<br />
(xi)The provisions contained in subsection<br />
(4) with the proviso thereunder<br />
and sub-section (5) which are intended to<br />
cover specified contingencies mentioned<br />
therein to enable the insurer to recover<br />
amount paid under the contract <strong>of</strong><br />
insurance on behalf <strong>of</strong> the insured can be<br />
taken recourse to by the Tribunal and be<br />
extended to claims and defences <strong>of</strong> the<br />
insurer against the insured by releg<strong>at</strong>ing<br />
them to the remedy before regular court<br />
in cases where on given facts and<br />
circumstances adjudic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> their<br />
claims inter se might delay the<br />
adjudic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the claims <strong>of</strong> the victims."<br />
(Emphasis supplied)<br />
16. Proposition nos. (vi) and (x),<br />
reproduced above support the conclusion<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the direction given by the Tribunal in<br />
the award impugned in the present case is<br />
in accordance with law.<br />
In N<strong>at</strong>ional Insurance Co. Ltd. v.<br />
Laxmi Narain Dhut, 2007 (2) T.A.C. 398<br />
(S.C.), their Lordships <strong>of</strong> the Supreme<br />
<strong>Court</strong> considered the decision in N<strong>at</strong>ional<br />
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh<br />
(supra) and held as under (paragraph 35<br />
<strong>of</strong> the said TAC):<br />
"35. As noted above, the conceptual<br />
difference between third party right and<br />
own damage cases has to be kept in view.<br />
Initially, the burden is on the insurer to<br />
prove th<strong>at</strong> the license was a fake one.<br />
Once it is established the n<strong>at</strong>ural<br />
consequences have to flow.<br />
In view <strong>of</strong> the above analysis the<br />
following situ<strong>at</strong>ions emerge:<br />
(1) The decision in Swaran Singh's case<br />
(supra) has no applic<strong>at</strong>ion to cases other<br />
than third party risks.<br />
(2) Where originally the license was fake<br />
one, renewal cannot cure the inherent<br />
f<strong>at</strong>ality.<br />
(3) In case <strong>of</strong> third party risks the insurer<br />
has to indemnify the amount and if so<br />
advised to recover the same from the<br />
insured.<br />
(4) The concept <strong>of</strong> purposive<br />
interpret<strong>at</strong>ion has no applic<strong>at</strong>ion to cases<br />
rel<strong>at</strong>able to Section 149 <strong>of</strong> the Act.<br />
The <strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong>s/Commissions shall now<br />
consider the m<strong>at</strong>ter afresh in the light <strong>of</strong><br />
the position in law as deline<strong>at</strong>ed above.<br />
The appeals are allowed as aforesaid with<br />
no order as to costs."<br />
(Emphasis supplied)
1032 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
17. In view <strong>of</strong> the above decision, it<br />
is evident th<strong>at</strong> in case <strong>of</strong> third party risks,<br />
the decision in N<strong>at</strong>ional Insurance Co.<br />
Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and others (supra)<br />
would apply, and the insurer has to<br />
indemnify the amount to the third party<br />
and thereafter may recover the same form<br />
the insured.<br />
18. In Prem Kumari and others Vs.<br />
Prahlad Dev and others, 2008(1) T.A.C.<br />
803 (S.C.), their Lordships <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Supreme <strong>Court</strong> have reiter<strong>at</strong>ed the view<br />
expressed in N<strong>at</strong>ional Insurance Company<br />
Limited Vs. Laxmi Narain Dhut case<br />
(supra) explaining the decision in<br />
N<strong>at</strong>ional Insurance Company Limited Vs.<br />
Swarn Singh and others (supra), and held<br />
as under (paragraphs 8 and 9 <strong>of</strong> the said<br />
TAC):<br />
"8. The effect and implic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
principles laid down in Swarn Singh's<br />
case (supra) has been considered and<br />
explained by one <strong>of</strong> us (Dr. Justice Arijit<br />
Pasay<strong>at</strong>) in N<strong>at</strong>ional Insurance Co.<br />
Ltd.v. Laxmi Narain Dhut, (2007) 3<br />
S.C.C. 700 : 2007 (2) T.A.C. 398. The<br />
following conclusion in para 38 are<br />
relevant:<br />
"38. In view <strong>of</strong> the above analysis the<br />
following situ<strong>at</strong>ions emerge:<br />
(1) The decision in Swaran Singh's case<br />
(supra) has no applic<strong>at</strong>ion to cases other<br />
than third party risks.<br />
(2) Where originally the license was a<br />
fake one, renewal cannot cure the inherent<br />
f<strong>at</strong>ality.<br />
(3) In case <strong>of</strong> third-party risks the insurer<br />
has to indemnify the amount, and if so<br />
advised, to recover the same from the<br />
insured.<br />
(4) The concept <strong>of</strong> purposive<br />
interpret<strong>at</strong>ion has no applic<strong>at</strong>ion to cases<br />
rel<strong>at</strong>able to Section 149 <strong>of</strong> the Act.<br />
9. In the subsequent decision<br />
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena<br />
Variyal and Others, (2007) 5 S.C.C. 428:<br />
2007 (2) T.A.C. 417, which is also a two<br />
Judge Bench while considering the r<strong>at</strong>io<br />
laid down in Swaran Singh's case (supra)<br />
concluded th<strong>at</strong> in a case where a person is<br />
not a third party within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Act, the Insurance Company cannot be<br />
made autom<strong>at</strong>ically liable merely by<br />
resorting to Swaran Sing's case (supra).<br />
While arriving <strong>at</strong> such a conclusion the<br />
<strong>Court</strong> extracted the analysis as mentioned<br />
in para 38 <strong>of</strong> Laxmi Narain Dhut (supra)<br />
and agreed with the same. In view <strong>of</strong><br />
consistency, we reiter<strong>at</strong>e the very same<br />
principle enunci<strong>at</strong>ed in Laxmi Narain<br />
Dhut (supra) with regard to interpret<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
and applicability <strong>of</strong> Swaran Singh's case<br />
(supra)."<br />
(Emphasis supplied)<br />
19. In view <strong>of</strong> the above, it is<br />
evident th<strong>at</strong> the Tribunal did not commit<br />
any illegality in directing the Insurance<br />
Company/ Appellant to make deposit <strong>of</strong><br />
the amount <strong>of</strong> compens<strong>at</strong>ion and recover<br />
the same from the insured person i.e. the<br />
owner <strong>of</strong> the vehicle in question -<br />
respondent no.3 herein.<br />
20. After making the deposit <strong>of</strong> the<br />
amount, as directed by the impugned<br />
award, it will be open to the Insurance<br />
Company/ Appellant to recover the same<br />
from the insured person i.e. the owner <strong>of</strong><br />
the vehicle in question - respondent no.3<br />
herein by moving appropri<strong>at</strong>e applic<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
before the Tribunal in this regard.<br />
21. It is made clear th<strong>at</strong> in case the<br />
claimants-respondents or the owner <strong>of</strong> the<br />
vehicle in question/ respondent no.3<br />
herein files an Appeal against the<br />
impugned award, it will be open to the
3 All] N<strong>at</strong>ional Insurance Co.Ltd. V. Smt. Guddi Devi and others 1033<br />
Insurance Company/ Appellant to contest<br />
the same on the grounds legally open to it.<br />
22. The amount <strong>of</strong> 25,000/-<br />
deposited in this <strong>Court</strong> while filing the<br />
present Appeal will be remitted to the<br />
Tribunal for being adjusted towards the<br />
amount to be deposited by the Insurance<br />
Company/ Appellant, as per the directions<br />
given in the impugned award.<br />
23. Subject to the aforesaid<br />
observ<strong>at</strong>ions, the Appeal filed by the<br />
Insurance Company/Appellant is<br />
dismissed. However, on the facts and in<br />
the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case, there will<br />
be no order as to costs.<br />
---------<br />
APPELLATE JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 14.10.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE S.P. MEHROTRA, J.<br />
THE HON’BLE RAJESH CHANDRA, J.<br />
First Appeal From Order No. 3049 <strong>of</strong> 2009<br />
N<strong>at</strong>ional Insurance Company Ltd.<br />
…Petitioner<br />
Versus<br />
Smt. Guddi Devi & others …Respondent<br />
Counsel for the Petitioner:<br />
Sri Saral Srivastava<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988-Section-170,<br />
readwith 149-Appeal by insurance<br />
Company-Challenging the quantum <strong>of</strong><br />
award-applic<strong>at</strong>ion by insurance<br />
Company already rejected by claim<br />
tribunal-held-quantum <strong>of</strong> compens<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
can not be questioned by insurance<br />
company.<br />
Held: Para 15<br />
In our opinion, as the applic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Appellant-Insurance Company under<br />
Section 170 <strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles<br />
Act,1988 was rejected by the Tribunal, it<br />
is not open to the Appellant-Insurance<br />
Company to raise the question <strong>of</strong><br />
quantum <strong>of</strong> compens<strong>at</strong>ion, awarded by<br />
the Tribunal in the impugned award. The<br />
pleas raised in this regard by Sri Saral<br />
Srivastava, learned counsel for the<br />
Appellant-Insurance Company cannot,<br />
therefore be considered.<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble S.P. Mehrotra, J.)<br />
1. The present appeal has been filed<br />
against the judgment and order /award<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 25.7.2009 passed by the Motor<br />
Accidents Claims Tribunal, Mainpuri in<br />
Claim Petition No. 318 <strong>of</strong> 2006, filed by<br />
the claimant-respondent nos. 1 to 7 under<br />
Section 166 <strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles Act,<br />
1988 on account <strong>of</strong> the de<strong>at</strong>h <strong>of</strong> Ram<br />
Prakash in an accident which took place<br />
<strong>at</strong> about 5.45 PM on 14.5.2006.<br />
2. It was, inter-alia, averred in the<br />
Claim Petition th<strong>at</strong> on 14.5.2006 <strong>at</strong> about<br />
5.45 PM, the deceased Ram Prakash with<br />
his wife Smt. Guddi Devi, Balister Singh,<br />
Prem Chandra, Raj Kishore and others<br />
while returning after <strong>at</strong>tending a marriage<br />
ceremony in village Dalelpur <strong>at</strong> the place<br />
<strong>of</strong> the sister <strong>of</strong> the deceased,was waiting<br />
for vehicle on the road -side on GT Road,<br />
Kurawali-Etah Marg, a Mini Truck T<strong>at</strong>a<br />
407 DL-1LG 391,which was coming from<br />
the direction <strong>of</strong> Etah and was being driven<br />
by the Driver rashly and negligently, hit<br />
the said Ram Prakash, resulting in his<br />
de<strong>at</strong>h on the spot. The Driver ran away<br />
with the said Mini Truck, i.e., the vehicle<br />
in question from the spot. The accident<br />
was witnessed by Smt.Guddi Devi and<br />
others. The First Inform<strong>at</strong>ion Report was<br />
lodged in regard to the accident, which<br />
was registered as Case Crime No. 174 <strong>of</strong>
1034 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
2006 under Sections 279, 304A, Indian<br />
Penal Code in Police St<strong>at</strong>ion Kurawali,<br />
District Mainpuri. The deceased was aged<br />
34 years <strong>at</strong> the time <strong>of</strong> his de<strong>at</strong>h and was a<br />
healthy person. The deceased was an<br />
agriculturist and was carrying on the<br />
business <strong>of</strong> sale and purchase <strong>of</strong><br />
buffaloes, and his monthly income was<br />
not less than 7,000/- rupees. An amount<br />
<strong>of</strong> Rs.24,25,000/- with interest @ 12 %<br />
per annum was claimed as compens<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
in the Claim Petition.<br />
3. Joint Written St<strong>at</strong>ement was filed<br />
by respondent nos. 8 and 10. The<br />
Appellant- Insurance Company also filed<br />
its Written St<strong>at</strong>ement.<br />
The Tribunal framed four issues.<br />
Issue no.1 was as to whether the<br />
Driver <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid vehicle in question<br />
while driving the same in rash and<br />
negligent manner, hit the said Ram<br />
Prakash resulting in the de<strong>at</strong>h <strong>of</strong> the said<br />
Ram Prakash. The Tribunal decided the<br />
said issue in the affirm<strong>at</strong>ive in favour <strong>of</strong><br />
the claimant-respondent nos. 1 to 7.<br />
Issue no.2 was as to whether the<br />
vehicle in question was insured with the<br />
Appellant-Insurance Company <strong>at</strong> the time<br />
<strong>of</strong> the accident. The Tribunal held th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
vehicle in question was insured with the<br />
Appellant-Insurance Company <strong>at</strong> the time<br />
<strong>of</strong> the accident, and decided Issue no.2<br />
accordingly.<br />
Issue no. 3 was as to whether the<br />
Driver <strong>of</strong> the vehicle in question was<br />
having a valid and effective licence <strong>at</strong> the<br />
time <strong>of</strong> the accident. The Tribunal held<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the Driver <strong>of</strong> the vehicle in question<br />
was having a valid and effective licence <strong>at</strong><br />
the time <strong>of</strong> the accident, and decided Issue<br />
no.3 accordingly.<br />
Issue no.4 was regarding the relief, if<br />
any, to which the claimant-respondent<br />
nos.1 to 7 were entitled. The Tribunal<br />
held th<strong>at</strong> the claimant-respondent nos. 1<br />
to 7 were entitled to compens<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
amounting to Rs.4,89,500/- with interest<br />
@ 6% per annum.<br />
4. The Appellant- Insurance<br />
Company has filed the present appeal<br />
against the said award.<br />
5. We have heard Sri Saral<br />
Srivastava, learned counsel for the<br />
appellant and perused the record filed<br />
with the appeal.<br />
6. From the perusal <strong>of</strong> the record, it<br />
is evident th<strong>at</strong> an applic<strong>at</strong>ion under<br />
Section 170 <strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles Act,<br />
1988 was filed on behalf <strong>of</strong> the Appellant-<br />
Insurance Company before the Tribunal.<br />
However, by the order d<strong>at</strong>ed 7.3.2009, the<br />
Tribunal rejected the said applic<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
7. Section 170 <strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles<br />
Act, 1988 lays down as under:-<br />
"170 Impleading insurer in certain<br />
cases- Where in the course <strong>of</strong> any inquiry,<br />
the Claims Tribunal is s<strong>at</strong>isfied th<strong>at</strong> –<br />
(a) there is collusion between the<br />
person making the claim and the person<br />
against whom the claim is made, or<br />
(b) the person against whom the<br />
claim is made has failed to contest the<br />
claim,<br />
it may, for reasons to be recorded in<br />
writing, direct th<strong>at</strong> the insurer who may<br />
be liable in respect <strong>of</strong> such claim, shall be<br />
impleaded as a party to the proceeding
3 All] N<strong>at</strong>ional Insurance Co.Ltd. V. Smt. Guddi Devi and others 1035<br />
and the insurer so impleaded shall<br />
thereupon have, without prejudice to the<br />
provisions contained in sub-section (2) <strong>of</strong><br />
Section 149, the right to contest the claim<br />
on all or any <strong>of</strong> the grounds th<strong>at</strong> are<br />
available to the person against whom the<br />
claim has been made."<br />
Sub-section (2) <strong>of</strong> Section 149 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 referred to in<br />
Section 170 <strong>of</strong> the said Act is reproduced<br />
below:-<br />
"<br />
(1)...............................................................<br />
.......................<br />
(2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer<br />
under sub-section (1) in respect <strong>of</strong> any<br />
judgment or award unless, before the<br />
commencement <strong>of</strong> the proceedings in<br />
which the judgment or award is given the<br />
insurer had notice through the <strong>Court</strong> or,<br />
as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal<br />
<strong>of</strong> the bringing <strong>of</strong> the proceedings, or in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> such judgment or award so<br />
long as execution is stayed thereon<br />
pending an appeal; and an insurer to<br />
whom notice <strong>of</strong> the bringing <strong>of</strong> any such<br />
proceedings is so given shall be entitled<br />
to be made a party thereto and to defend<br />
the action on any <strong>of</strong> the following<br />
grounds, namely:-<br />
(a) th<strong>at</strong> there has been a breach <strong>of</strong> a<br />
specified condition <strong>of</strong> the policy, being<br />
one <strong>of</strong> the following conditions, namely:--<br />
i.a condition excluding the use <strong>of</strong> the<br />
vehicle-<br />
(a) for hire or reward, where the<br />
vehicle is on the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> the contract<br />
insurance a vehicle not covered by a<br />
permit to ply for hire or reward,<br />
or<br />
(b) for organised racing and speed<br />
testing, or<br />
(c) for a purpose not allowed by the<br />
permit under which the vehicle is used,<br />
where the vehicle is a transport vehicle,<br />
or<br />
d. without side-car being <strong>at</strong>tached<br />
where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or<br />
(ii) a condition excluding driving by a<br />
named person or persons or by any<br />
person who is not duly licensed, or by any<br />
person who has been disqualified for<br />
holding or obtaining a driving licence<br />
during the period <strong>of</strong> disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion; or<br />
(iii) a condition excluding liability for<br />
injury caused or contributed to by<br />
conditions <strong>of</strong> war, civil war, riot or civil<br />
commotion; or<br />
(b) th<strong>at</strong> the policy is void on the ground<br />
th<strong>at</strong> it was obtained by the non disclosure<br />
<strong>of</strong> a m<strong>at</strong>erial fact or by a represent<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
<strong>of</strong> fact which was false in some m<strong>at</strong>erial<br />
particular.<br />
(3) to (7.....................................".<br />
8. Reading Sections 170 and 149(2)<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 together,<br />
it is evident th<strong>at</strong> in case the Tribunal<br />
grants permission to the insurer under<br />
Section 170, the insurer will get right to<br />
contest the Claim Petition on all or any <strong>of</strong><br />
the grounds th<strong>at</strong> are available to the<br />
person against whom the claim has been<br />
made. However, if such permission is not<br />
granted by the Tribunal, then the insurer<br />
will be entitled to contest the Claim<br />
Petition on the limited grounds mentioned<br />
in sub-section (2) <strong>of</strong> Section 149 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.<br />
9. It follows, therefore, th<strong>at</strong> in case<br />
an appeal is filed by the insurer against an<br />
award in a case where its applic<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
under Section 170 <strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles<br />
Act, 1988 was rejected by the Tribunal, it<br />
(insurer) will be able to challenge the<br />
award only on the limited grounds<br />
mentioned in sub-section (2) <strong>of</strong> Section<br />
149 <strong>of</strong> the said Act.
1036 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
10. As noted above, in the present<br />
case, the Tribunal rejected the applic<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Insurance Company for permission<br />
under Section 170 <strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles<br />
Act, 1988.<br />
11. In view <strong>of</strong> the rejection <strong>of</strong> the<br />
said applic<strong>at</strong>ion under Section 170 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
aforesaid Act, it is evident th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
Appellant-Insurance Company can<br />
challenge the impugned award only on the<br />
grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) <strong>of</strong><br />
Section 149 <strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles Act,<br />
1988. Such grounds are evidently in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> Issue Nos.2 and 3.<br />
12. As noted above, in regard to<br />
Issue Nos. 2 and 3, the Tribunal has<br />
recorded findings <strong>of</strong> fact th<strong>at</strong> on the d<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> the accident, the vehicle in question<br />
was insured with the Appellant-Insurance<br />
Company, and the Driver <strong>of</strong> the vehicle in<br />
question was having a valid and effective<br />
licence.<br />
13. Sri Saral Srivastava, learned<br />
counsel for the Appellant-Insurance<br />
Company has not been able to point out<br />
any error in the said findings recorded by<br />
the Tribunal. The Appellant-Insurance<br />
Company has failed to establish any<br />
infirmity or illegality in the impugned<br />
award on the grounds open to the<br />
Appellant-Insurance Company to raise in<br />
view <strong>of</strong> the provisions <strong>of</strong> sub-section (2)<br />
<strong>of</strong> Section 149 <strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles Act,<br />
1988.<br />
14. Sri Saral Srivastava, learned<br />
counsel for the Appellant-Insurance<br />
Company submits th<strong>at</strong> the quantum <strong>of</strong><br />
compens<strong>at</strong>ion as determined by the<br />
Tribunal is not correct as the Tribunal has<br />
erred in applying multiplier <strong>of</strong> 15 and has<br />
wrongly taken the monthly income <strong>of</strong> the<br />
deceased as Rs.4,000/-.<br />
15. In our opinion, as the applic<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Appellant-Insurance Company<br />
under Section 170 <strong>of</strong> the Motor Vehicles<br />
Act,1988 was rejected by the Tribunal, it<br />
is not open to the Appellant-Insurance<br />
Company to raise the question <strong>of</strong> quantum<br />
<strong>of</strong> compens<strong>at</strong>ion, awarded by the Tribunal<br />
in the impugned award. The pleas raised<br />
in this regard by Sri Saral Srivastava,<br />
learned counsel for the Appellant-<br />
Insurance Company cannot, therefore be<br />
considered.<br />
16. In view <strong>of</strong> the above, we are <strong>of</strong><br />
the opinion th<strong>at</strong> the appeal filed by the<br />
Appellant-Insurance Company lacks<br />
merits, and the same is liable to be<br />
dismissed.<br />
17. The appeal is, accordingly,<br />
dismissed. However, on the facts and in<br />
the circumstances <strong>of</strong> the case, there will<br />
be no order as to costs.<br />
18. The amount <strong>of</strong> Rs.25,000/-<br />
deposited by the Appellant-Insurance<br />
Company while filing the present appeal,<br />
will be remitted to the Tribunal for being<br />
adjusted towards the amount payable<br />
under the impugned award.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.08.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 63052 <strong>of</strong> 2007<br />
Vinay Kumar Upadhyay …Petitioner<br />
Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others …Respondents
3 All] Vinay Kumar Upadhyay V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1037<br />
Counsel for the Petitioner:<br />
Sri Ashok Trip<strong>at</strong>hi<br />
Sri N.L. Srivastava<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
Sri D.K. Trip<strong>at</strong>hi<br />
Sri P.C. Shukla<br />
S.C.<br />
U.P. Collection Peon Service Rule-2004-<br />
Rle-5-Substantive appointmentpetitioner<br />
was denied as not achieved<br />
70% target <strong>of</strong> collection during four<br />
fasli-fasli means an year e.g. Ravi and<br />
Kharif-while petitioner has been<br />
awarded s<strong>at</strong>isfactory collection in four<br />
fasal-moreover for lessure collection<br />
peon can not be held directly<br />
responsible-order quashed-direction for<br />
reconsider<strong>at</strong>ion issued.<br />
Held pare 13<br />
Besides, the rule also required<br />
"s<strong>at</strong>isfactory service" in the "last four<br />
Fasals" and not "Fasali". The distinction<br />
between a "Fasali" and "Fasal" has been<br />
considered by this <strong>Court</strong> in Mithlesh<br />
Kumar and another Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and<br />
others, 2008 (2) ESC 1332 and this <strong>Court</strong><br />
held as under:<br />
"This <strong>Court</strong> finds th<strong>at</strong> though in the<br />
Rules one has to show his average<br />
recovery <strong>of</strong> <strong>at</strong> least 70% in the last four<br />
Fasals but the chart was submitted by<br />
Tahsildars not based on the Fasals but<br />
Fasalis i.e. the year which includes both<br />
the Fasals namely, Ravi and Kharif. The<br />
Selection Committee was also aware <strong>of</strong><br />
this fact th<strong>at</strong> it has to consider recovery<br />
performance <strong>of</strong> last four Fasals but<br />
thereafter it has clearly erred by not<br />
confining to consider performance with<br />
respect to recovery in last four Fasals but<br />
has taken the aforesaid chart to be<br />
correct without noticing the fact th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
chart (Annexure-CA-2) was prepared on<br />
the basis <strong>of</strong> last four Fasalis and not on<br />
the basis <strong>of</strong> last four Fasals. One Fasali<br />
year has more than one Fasal. It is not<br />
the entire Fasali year but last four Fasals<br />
performance ought to have been<br />
considered by the Selection Committee.<br />
It has considered performance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
candid<strong>at</strong>es beyond the period for which<br />
it is provided under Rule 5(1) <strong>of</strong> 1974<br />
Rules."<br />
Case law discussed-<br />
2008(2)ESC 1332, Special Appeal No. 294 <strong>of</strong><br />
2008, Manbodh Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others<br />
connected with Special Appeal No. 398 <strong>of</strong><br />
2008.<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.)<br />
1. Heard Sri N.L. Srivastava, learned<br />
counsel for the petitioner and learned<br />
Standing Counsel appearing for<br />
respondents no. 1 to 3. The respondent no.<br />
4 was issued notice by registered post<br />
pursuant to this <strong>Court</strong>'s order d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
13.10.2008. As per the <strong>of</strong>fice report the<br />
notice through registered post/AD sent on<br />
17.10.2008 and the <strong>of</strong>fice report d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
13.07.2009 shows th<strong>at</strong> notice has been<br />
received unserved with post <strong>of</strong>fice report<br />
"refused". In the circumstances the<br />
service <strong>of</strong> notice is deemed sufficient.<br />
Neither any counter affidavit has been<br />
filed on behalf <strong>of</strong> respondent no. 4 nor<br />
any one has put in appearance on his<br />
behalf. Respondents no. 1 to 3 have filed<br />
counter affidavit and supplementary<br />
counter affidavit. Petitioner has also filed<br />
rejoinder affidavit and, therefore, as<br />
requested and agreed by learned counsels<br />
for the parties, this writ petition has been<br />
heard and is being decided finally <strong>at</strong> this<br />
stage under the Rules <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong>.<br />
2. By means <strong>of</strong> the present writ<br />
petition the order d<strong>at</strong>ed 03.10.2007 passed<br />
by the District Magistr<strong>at</strong>e, Sant Ravidas<br />
Nagar (Bhadohi) has been assailed<br />
whereby the represent<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> petitioner<br />
against his supersession/non selection for<br />
substantive appointment on the post <strong>of</strong>
1038 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
Collection Peon has been rejected<br />
confirming selection and appointment <strong>of</strong><br />
respondent no. 4 for such appointment.<br />
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner<br />
submitted th<strong>at</strong> he has not been selected<br />
for substantive appointment on the post <strong>of</strong><br />
Collection Peon on the ground th<strong>at</strong> in the<br />
Fasali years 1410, 1411, 1412 and 1413<br />
the percentage <strong>of</strong> recovery was 15.5, 75,<br />
16.9 and 23.4 respectively resulting in<br />
average recovery <strong>of</strong> 32.7 though as per<br />
U.P. Collection Peon Service Rules, 2004<br />
(hereinafter referred to as the "Rules,<br />
2004") the average recovery ought to have<br />
been <strong>at</strong> least 70%. The respondent no. 4<br />
who was admittedly junior to the<br />
petitioner but his recovery having been<br />
noticed above 70% in the said Fasali<br />
years, was selected and given<br />
appointment to the post <strong>of</strong> Collection<br />
Peon. It is submitted th<strong>at</strong> under Rule 5 <strong>of</strong><br />
Rules, 2004 the criteria for selection for<br />
regular appointment to the post <strong>of</strong><br />
Collection Peon in respect to Seasonal<br />
Collection Peon is s<strong>at</strong>isfactory service in<br />
the last <strong>at</strong> least four "Fasals". The<br />
explan<strong>at</strong>ion there<strong>of</strong> further provides th<strong>at</strong><br />
s<strong>at</strong>isfactory service means good conduct<br />
shown from beginning and in the last<br />
"four Fasals" he has cooper<strong>at</strong>ed for<br />
making recovery <strong>at</strong> least to the extend <strong>of</strong><br />
70% as prescribed by the Government. He<br />
contended th<strong>at</strong> the respondents no. 1 to 3<br />
have erred in considering the record <strong>of</strong><br />
preceding four Fasali years instead <strong>of</strong> four<br />
Fasals. Further th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner has not<br />
been found guilty or lacking coordin<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
or cooper<strong>at</strong>ion in making recovery to the<br />
extent <strong>of</strong> 70% but since the recovery as a<br />
m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong> fact was less than 70% for th<strong>at</strong><br />
purpose the petitioner has been<br />
superseded. He pointed th<strong>at</strong> Rule 5 <strong>of</strong><br />
Rule, 2004 required only cooper<strong>at</strong>ion on<br />
the part <strong>of</strong> the petitioner since the<br />
recovery as a m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong> fact is the primary<br />
duty <strong>of</strong> the Collection Amin to whom a<br />
Collection Peon assist and, therefore, the<br />
relevant consider<strong>at</strong>ions as contempl<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
and provided in the Rules, 2004 have not<br />
been taken into account.<br />
4. Learned Standing Counsel relying<br />
on his counter affidavit, however,<br />
supported the selection <strong>of</strong> respondent no.<br />
4 as well as the impugned order passed by<br />
the District Magistr<strong>at</strong>e, Sant Ravidas<br />
Nagar (Bhadohi) and said th<strong>at</strong> the same<br />
has been passed in accordance with law.<br />
5. Having considered the rival<br />
submissions as well as the record I find<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the only issue up for consider<strong>at</strong>ion in<br />
this case is whether the petitioner has<br />
been considered and rejected for the post<br />
<strong>of</strong> Collection Peon on relevant<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ions as provided under Rule 5<br />
or not.<br />
6. Rule 5 <strong>of</strong> Rules, 2004 reads as under:<br />
^^5- lsok esa f<strong>of</strong>HkUu Jsf.k;ksa ds inksa ij HkrhZ fuEufyf[kr<br />
lzksrksa ls dh tk;sxh%&<br />
¼,d½ ipkl izfr'kr p;u lfefr ds ek/;e ls lh/kh HkrhZ<br />
}kjk]<br />
¼nks½ ipkl izfr'kr in ,sls lkef;d laxzg vuqlsodksa esa ls<br />
ftUgksaus de ls de pkj Qlyha rd larks"ktud dk;Z fd;k<br />
gks vkSj ftudh vk;q ml o"kZ dh igyh tqykbZ dks ftlesa<br />
p;u fd;k tk; 45 o"kZ ls vf/kd u gks] p;u lfefr ds<br />
ek/;e ls Hkjs tk;sxsaA<br />
ijUrq ;fn mi;qZDr vH;FkhZ miyC/k u gks rks [k.M<br />
¼,d ½ ds v/khu 'ks"k fjfDr;ka lh/kh HkrhZ }kjk Hkjh tk;sxhaA<br />
Li"Vhdj.k%& larks"ktud dk;Z dk rkRi;Z gksxk 'kq: ls vUr<br />
rd vPNs vkpj.k dks lfEefyr djrs gq, vfUre pkj<br />
Qlyksa ds nkSjku ljdkj }kjk fu;r f<strong>of</strong>gr Lrj ds vuqlkj<br />
de ls de lRrj izfr'kr olwyh esa iw.kZ lg;ksx iznku<br />
djukA**<br />
7. A perusal <strong>of</strong> Rules shows th<strong>at</strong> a<br />
Seasonal Collection Peon if has
3 All] Vinay Kumar Upadhyay V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1039<br />
s<strong>at</strong>isfactorily worked for <strong>at</strong> least "four<br />
Fasals" and is not above 45 years <strong>of</strong> age<br />
would have to be considered and if he<br />
fulfils the above criteria, is entitled to be<br />
selected for the post <strong>of</strong> Collection Peon.<br />
8. The term "s<strong>at</strong>isfactory service"<br />
has been explained and it provides th<strong>at</strong><br />
the Seasonal Collection Peon shall extend<br />
"full cooper<strong>at</strong>ion for recovery in the last<br />
four Fasals" according to the standard<br />
prescribed by the St<strong>at</strong>e Government i.e. <strong>at</strong><br />
least 70% recovery. It nowhere provides<br />
the Seasonal Collection Peon himself<br />
would make recovery to the extent <strong>of</strong><br />
70% or <strong>at</strong> any other level.<br />
9. In taking the aforesaid view I am<br />
also supported by a Single Judge decision<br />
<strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> in Civil Misc. Writ Petition<br />
No. 2421 <strong>of</strong> 2006, Ishwar Chandra Vs.<br />
District Magistr<strong>at</strong>e, Khalilabad, Sant<br />
Kabir Nagar and others decided on<br />
22.08.2008. Though th<strong>at</strong> was a case <strong>of</strong><br />
compulsory retirement but in respect to<br />
duties <strong>of</strong> Collection Peon this <strong>Court</strong> held<br />
th<strong>at</strong> a Collection Peon is only required to<br />
assist the Collection Amin and is not<br />
responsible for the collection <strong>of</strong> dues<br />
itself which is the primary duty <strong>of</strong><br />
Collection Amin.<br />
10. The respondents in the counter<br />
affidavit have nowhere pleaded or shown<br />
as to how a Seasonal Collection Peon can<br />
be held directly responsible for lesser<br />
recovery. On the contrary, the U.P.<br />
Collection Manual, Chapter IX para 61<br />
provides for duties <strong>of</strong> the Collection Peon<br />
and reads as under:<br />
^^61- drZO;& ljdkjh cdk;ksa ds laxzg lEcU/kh vkns'kksa es<br />
vehu ds vkns'kksa dk vuqikyu djuk pijklh dk ije~<br />
drZO; gSA tc vehu ljdkjh /ku ysdj ;k=k dj jgk gks<br />
;k vius {ks= esa :dk jgs] rc og pijklh mlds lkFk<br />
jgsxkA f<strong>of</strong>HkUu izdkj dh dzwj dkydze vknsf'kdkvksa ds<br />
fu"iknu ds fy, Hkh pijkfl;ksa dh lsokvksa dk mi;ksx fd;k<br />
tk ldsxkA ,sls ekeyksa esa og Lo;a dksbZ laxzg ugha djsxkA<br />
rglhynkj rFkk vU; <strong>of</strong>j"b vf/kdkfj;ksa ds vkns'kksa ds<br />
v/khu] ,dhd`r laxzg vehuksa ds v/khu] laxzg pijkfl;ksa dks<br />
vU; drZO; lkSais tk;saxsA**<br />
11. It shows th<strong>at</strong> the Collection Peon<br />
has to obey the orders given by the<br />
Collection Amin and when the Amin is<br />
travelling alone with Government revenue<br />
or is staying in his area <strong>of</strong> jurisdiction, the<br />
Collection Peon will always stay with him<br />
so th<strong>at</strong> his services may be utilised by the<br />
Collection Amin. Para 61 Chapter IX<br />
further provides very clearly th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
Collection Peon himself will not make<br />
any recovery <strong>at</strong> all.<br />
12. Th<strong>at</strong> being so, and in the light <strong>of</strong><br />
the st<strong>at</strong>utory provisions contained in Rule<br />
5, it is evident th<strong>at</strong> the Collection Peon<br />
himself is not <strong>at</strong> all responsible for any<br />
recovery wh<strong>at</strong>soever. Hence the<br />
assumption on the part <strong>of</strong> the District<br />
Magistr<strong>at</strong>e, respondent no. 2 th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
petitioner having failed to make recovery<br />
to the extent <strong>of</strong> 70% in the preceding four<br />
Fasali years cannot be said to have failed<br />
to s<strong>at</strong>isfy the criteria <strong>of</strong> "s<strong>at</strong>isfactory<br />
service" is p<strong>at</strong>ently illegal and in the teeth<br />
<strong>of</strong> the st<strong>at</strong>ute.<br />
13. Besides, the rule also required<br />
"s<strong>at</strong>isfactory service" in the "last four<br />
Fasals" and not "Fasali". The distinction<br />
between a "Fasali" and "Fasal" has been<br />
considered by this <strong>Court</strong> in Mithlesh<br />
Kumar and another Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and<br />
others, 2008 (2) ESC 1332 and this <strong>Court</strong><br />
held as under:<br />
"This <strong>Court</strong> finds th<strong>at</strong> though in the<br />
Rules one has to show his average<br />
recovery <strong>of</strong> <strong>at</strong> least 70% in the last four
1040 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
Fasals but the chart was submitted by<br />
Tahsildars not based on the Fasals but<br />
Fasalis i.e. the year which includes both<br />
the Fasals namely, Ravi and Kharif. The<br />
Selection Committee was also aware <strong>of</strong><br />
this fact th<strong>at</strong> it has to consider recovery<br />
performance <strong>of</strong> last four Fasals but<br />
thereafter it has clearly erred by not<br />
confining to consider performance with<br />
respect to recovery in last four Fasals but<br />
has taken the aforesaid chart to be<br />
correct without noticing the fact th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
chart (Annexure-CA-2) was prepared on<br />
the basis <strong>of</strong> last four Fasalis and not on<br />
the basis <strong>of</strong> last four Fasals. One Fasali<br />
year has more than one Fasal. It is not the<br />
entire Fasali year but last four Fasals<br />
performance ought to have been<br />
considered by the Selection Committee. It<br />
has considered performance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
candid<strong>at</strong>es beyond the period for which it<br />
is provided under Rule 5(1) <strong>of</strong> 1974<br />
Rules."<br />
14. The above judgement was taken<br />
in Special Appeal No. 294 <strong>of</strong> 2008,<br />
Manbodh Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others<br />
connected with Special Appeal No. 398 <strong>of</strong><br />
2008, Dev Kumar Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and<br />
others, decided on 17.07.2009 and the<br />
Hon'ble Division Bench while dismissing<br />
both the above appeals and confirming the<br />
judgment under appeal held as under:<br />
"In our considered opinion, the<br />
learned Judge was perfectly justified in<br />
arriving <strong>at</strong> the findings on the basis <strong>of</strong><br />
m<strong>at</strong>erial available on record and<br />
thereafter concluding th<strong>at</strong> the selections<br />
had been made contrary to the provisions<br />
contained in Rule 5 (1) read with Rule 17<br />
(A) <strong>of</strong> the Rules. In support <strong>of</strong> the<br />
conclusion drawn, the learned Judge has<br />
very succinctly and appropri<strong>at</strong>ely drawn<br />
the distinction between the words "Fasal"<br />
and "Fasali". The meaning <strong>of</strong> the said<br />
words are defined in the Law Lexicon<br />
1997 Edition <strong>at</strong> page 713, which read as<br />
follows:-<br />
"Fasl. (A.) Harvest; fasli-jyasti, faslkami.<br />
(M.) Addition or reduction in the<br />
revenue on account <strong>of</strong> double crops, or<br />
the loss <strong>of</strong> one. (Bad. Pow. iii. 99)<br />
Fasli. Of or belonging to a harvest;<br />
the Mahommadan <strong>of</strong>ficial era. (Bad. Pow.<br />
II. 13, 14)<br />
Agricultural lease in which the word<br />
'Fasli' is used unless there are indic<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the intention <strong>of</strong> the parties was to use<br />
the word in its strict sense, should be held<br />
to be for the agricultural year. (LR 2 A.<br />
139 (Rev.)<br />
Fasli or Fusli. Wh<strong>at</strong> rel<strong>at</strong>es to the<br />
seasons; the harvest year. (Mac. Mhn.<br />
Law.) The name <strong>of</strong> an era instituted by<br />
Akbar, who made the samw<strong>at</strong> year agree<br />
with th<strong>at</strong> <strong>of</strong> the hijra by arbitrarily cutting<br />
649 years <strong>of</strong>f from the former. This was<br />
done in the year 963 <strong>of</strong> the hijra which<br />
year was therefore also 963 fasli; but fasli<br />
or harvest year was necessarily counted<br />
according to the seasons while th<strong>at</strong> <strong>of</strong> the<br />
hijra is the lunar year <strong>of</strong> only 354 days.<br />
Thus a difference <strong>of</strong> several years has<br />
arisen between the hijra year and the fasli<br />
year. (See also 1896 AWN 123).<br />
Fasli-jasti (Tel.) An extra crop, one<br />
more than usual; an extra cess imposed<br />
on land bearing more than one annual<br />
crop."<br />
The aforesaid definitions would,<br />
therefore, reflect th<strong>at</strong> the word Fasal<br />
means crop whereas the word Fasali is<br />
rel<strong>at</strong>ed to the revenue year, which<br />
ordinarily in the St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Uttar Pradesh<br />
comprises <strong>of</strong> two harvest seasons - the<br />
Kharif and the Rabi. Learned counsel for<br />
the appellants could not point out any<br />
m<strong>at</strong>erial to the contrary to persuade us to<br />
opine otherwise.
3 All] Aligarh Muslim University and another V.Industrial Tribunal and another 1041<br />
We find no good reason to differ<br />
from the view taken by the learned<br />
Judge."<br />
15. In the result, the writ petition is<br />
allowed. The impugned order d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
03.10.2007 as well as the selection and<br />
appointment <strong>of</strong> respondent no. 4 is hereby<br />
quashed. The respondent no. 2 is directed<br />
to reconsider the m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong> appointment<br />
on the post <strong>of</strong> Collection Peon <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner and the respondent no. 4 in<br />
accordance with law and in the light <strong>of</strong><br />
the observ<strong>at</strong>ions made hereabove,<br />
expeditiously, preferably within a period<br />
<strong>of</strong> two months from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
production <strong>of</strong> a certified copy <strong>of</strong> this<br />
order. There shall be no order as to costs.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.10.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE RAN VIJAI SINGH, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 34240 <strong>of</strong> 1997<br />
Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh and<br />
another<br />
…Petitioner<br />
Versus<br />
Industrial Tribunal(4), Agra and another<br />
…Respondent<br />
Counsel for the Petitioners:<br />
Ms. Sunita Agrawal<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
S.C.<br />
Sri J.J. Munir<br />
U.P. Industrial Dispute Act-Section 6-A-<br />
Restor<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> Ex Party award published<br />
on 20.04.95-public<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> Notice Board<br />
on 22.05.95-applic<strong>at</strong>ion for recall <strong>of</strong><br />
award moved on 25.10.96- allowed on<br />
03.05.97 nowhere in restor<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion on d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> knowledge<br />
disclosed- in spite <strong>of</strong> registered notices<br />
workman did not response- after expiry<br />
<strong>of</strong> 30 days from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> public<strong>at</strong>iontribunal<br />
become “functus <strong>of</strong>ficio” <strong>at</strong> last<br />
its jurisdiction to entertain any<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion- restor<strong>at</strong>ion order set-a-side.<br />
Held: Para 15<br />
Under these facts and circumstances,<br />
since the applic<strong>at</strong>ion for setting aside the<br />
exparte award was filed after the expiry<br />
<strong>of</strong> 30 days <strong>of</strong> its public<strong>at</strong>ion, therefore it<br />
could not be entertained as the Tribunal<br />
had become functus <strong>of</strong>ficio and lost its<br />
jurisdiction to entertain any applic<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
Case law discussed:<br />
AIR 1981 S.C. 606 14, (2005) 9 S.C.C. 331. 6<br />
and 8, A.I.R. 1985 Supreme <strong>Court</strong> 294,<br />
2005(2) U.P. L.B.E.C. 1751And 2 008(118)<br />
F.L.R. 922.<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.)<br />
1. This writ petition has been filed<br />
for issuing a writ <strong>of</strong> certiorari quashing<br />
the orders d<strong>at</strong>ed 3rd May, 1997 and 22nd<br />
August, 1997 passed by Industrial<br />
Tribunal (4), Agra (respondent No. 1).<br />
Vide order d<strong>at</strong>ed 3rd May 1997, the<br />
Tribunal had allowed the restor<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion for setting aside an exparte<br />
award d<strong>at</strong>ed 10th February, 1995 rendered<br />
in Adjudic<strong>at</strong>ion Case No. 204 <strong>of</strong> 1994,<br />
whereas by the subsequent order d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
22nd August, 1997, the Tribunal had<br />
rejected the petitioners' applic<strong>at</strong>ion to<br />
recall the order d<strong>at</strong>ed 3rd May, 1997.<br />
2. The facts giving rise to this case<br />
are th<strong>at</strong> the respondent no 2. claiming<br />
himself to be a workman has raised an<br />
industrial dispute. The dispute was<br />
referred under Section 4-K <strong>of</strong> the U.P.<br />
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter<br />
referred to as Act <strong>of</strong> 1947) The reference<br />
was registered as Adjudic<strong>at</strong>ion Case No.<br />
204 <strong>of</strong> 1994 before the Industrial Tribunal<br />
(4) Agra. The dispute referred was
1042 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
'whether the employers were justified in<br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ing the services <strong>of</strong> the workman<br />
from 16th April, 1993 and if not then to<br />
wh<strong>at</strong> relief the workman was entitled to.'<br />
3. The petitioners-employers<br />
appeared before the Tribunal and filed<br />
their written st<strong>at</strong>ement st<strong>at</strong>ing therein th<strong>at</strong><br />
the St<strong>at</strong>e had no jurisdiction to refer the<br />
dispute under Section 4-K <strong>of</strong> the Act <strong>of</strong><br />
1947. It was also contented th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
respondent no. 2 is not workman as his<br />
engagement was only for a fixed period<br />
and th<strong>at</strong> had come to an end after expiry<br />
<strong>of</strong> the aforesaid period.<br />
4. The notices were issued to the<br />
parties through registered post but it<br />
appears the workman did not appear<br />
before the Tribunal and on 10th February,<br />
1995, the Tribunal has passed an exparte<br />
award deciding the reference against the<br />
workman.<br />
5. The aforesaid award was<br />
published on 20th April,1995 under<br />
Section 6 (3) <strong>of</strong> the Act <strong>of</strong> 1947 and it<br />
was also published on the notice board on<br />
22nd May, 1995.<br />
6. It appears thereafter the<br />
respondent no. 2 filed an applic<strong>at</strong>ion on<br />
25th October, 1996 before the Tribunal<br />
for setting aside the exparte award d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
10th February, 1995 with a prayer to<br />
restore the Adjudic<strong>at</strong>ion Case No. 204 <strong>of</strong><br />
1994 to its original number. The<br />
petitioners-employers have filed a<br />
detailed reply to the restor<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion supported with an affidavit<br />
st<strong>at</strong>ing therein th<strong>at</strong> the applic<strong>at</strong>ion itself<br />
was not maintainable as it was filed<br />
beyond the period <strong>of</strong> limit<strong>at</strong>ion as<br />
prescribed under Rule 16 <strong>of</strong> the rules<br />
framed under the Act. It was also st<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the Tribunal had sent registered<br />
letters to both the parties on 24th<br />
December, 1994 fixing 9th February,<br />
1995 but the workman did not appear. It<br />
was also st<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong> the workman had not<br />
st<strong>at</strong>ed in his applic<strong>at</strong>ion as to on which<br />
d<strong>at</strong>e he had acquired knowledge <strong>of</strong> the<br />
exparte award. It was also contended th<strong>at</strong><br />
the award <strong>at</strong>tained finality under Section 6<br />
(5) <strong>of</strong> the Act on its public<strong>at</strong>ion under<br />
Section 6(3) <strong>of</strong> the act and Under Section<br />
6 (A) <strong>of</strong> the Act <strong>of</strong> 1972, the award<br />
became enforceable after the expiry <strong>of</strong> 30<br />
days from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> its public<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
7. The Tribunal after hearing both<br />
the parties had allowed the restor<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion by the impugned order d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
3rd May, 1997. While allowing the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion, the Tribunal has observed<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the limit<strong>at</strong>ion shall start from the d<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> the knowledge <strong>of</strong> the award and not<br />
from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> its public<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
8. Thereafter the petitionersemployers<br />
have filed an applic<strong>at</strong>ion on<br />
21st June, 1997 for recalling the order<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 3rd May, 1997 on the ground th<strong>at</strong><br />
the workman had not disputed the address<br />
indic<strong>at</strong>ed in the summons sent by the<br />
Tribunal through registered cover which<br />
had not returned back after service. The<br />
presumption goes th<strong>at</strong> there was sufficient<br />
service on the workman. The Tribunal<br />
thereafter hearing the parties had rejected<br />
the applic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the petitioners vide<br />
order d<strong>at</strong>ed 22nd August 1997. Hence this<br />
writ petition.<br />
9. Ms. Sunita Agarwal learned<br />
counsel appearing for the petitioners has<br />
assailed the impugned orders on<br />
following grounds:
3 All] Aligarh Muslim University and another V.Industrial Tribunal and another 1043<br />
1. Because the exparte award d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
10th February, 1995 was published in<br />
accordance with Section 6 (3) <strong>of</strong> the U.P.<br />
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on 20th<br />
April 1995 and was also put on the notice<br />
board on 22nd May, 1995, therefore, it<br />
became enforceable after 30 days from its<br />
public<strong>at</strong>ion as per provision contained<br />
under Section 6-A <strong>of</strong> the Act <strong>of</strong> 1947.<br />
2. Because the Tribunal had become<br />
functus <strong>of</strong>ficio after 30 days from the d<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> public<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> award and it had no<br />
jurisdiction to proceed any further.<br />
In support <strong>of</strong> her submissions she has<br />
placed reliance upon the few judgments <strong>of</strong><br />
the Apex court namely A.I.R. 1981 S.C.<br />
606 14 Grindlays Bank Vs. Central<br />
Government Industrial Tribunal and<br />
(2005) 9 S.C.C. 331. 6 and 8 Sangham<br />
Tape Co. Vs. Hansraj (Grindlays Bank<br />
Ltd.)<br />
3 Because under Rule 16 (2) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
U.P. Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 an<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion to set-aside an exparte award<br />
could be filed within ten days from the<br />
d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> the exparte award and even if it be<br />
assumed th<strong>at</strong> the said applic<strong>at</strong>ion could be<br />
made within 30 days from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
public<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the exparte award even<br />
then the restor<strong>at</strong>ion applic<strong>at</strong>ion filed on<br />
25th October, 1996 was barred by time.<br />
In the submissions <strong>of</strong> learned counsel<br />
for the petitioners, the language used in<br />
Section 6 (A) <strong>of</strong> the U.P. Industrial<br />
Dispute Act is identical to Section 17-A<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Industrial dispute Act, 1947 ( Act<br />
No. 14 <strong>of</strong> 1947), (Central Act)<br />
(hereinafter referred to as Act No. 14 <strong>of</strong><br />
1947) and in the cases referred above, it<br />
has been held th<strong>at</strong> the award becomes<br />
enforceable after expiry <strong>of</strong> 30 days from<br />
the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> its public<strong>at</strong>ion and the<br />
Tribunal/labour court retain their<br />
jurisdiction within thirty days from the<br />
public<strong>at</strong>ion and thereafter the<br />
Tribunal/labour court becomes functus<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficio. In her submissions, although<br />
cases referred above are rel<strong>at</strong>ed to under<br />
Section 17-A <strong>of</strong> the Act No.14 <strong>of</strong> 1947<br />
but it will be fully applicable with respect<br />
to Section 6-A <strong>of</strong> the U.P. Industrial<br />
Dispute Act, 1947.<br />
Refuting the submissions <strong>of</strong> learned<br />
counsel for the petitioners, Sri J.J.Munir<br />
learned counsel appearing for the<br />
respondent no. 2 submitted th<strong>at</strong> an<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion for setting aside an exparte<br />
award can be entertained by the Tribunal<br />
and Tribunal does not become functus<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficio as argued by learned counsel for<br />
the petitioner. In support <strong>of</strong> his<br />
submissions, he has placed reliance upon<br />
the judgment <strong>of</strong> the Apex <strong>Court</strong> reported<br />
in A.I.R. 1985 Supreme <strong>Court</strong> 294<br />
S<strong>at</strong>nam Verma Vs. Union <strong>of</strong> India.<br />
10. I have heard learned counsel for<br />
the parties and perused the record.<br />
11. It has not been disputed by the<br />
learned counsel for the parties th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
m<strong>at</strong>ter was referred by the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government under Section 4-K <strong>of</strong> the Act<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1972 for adjudic<strong>at</strong>ing the reference as<br />
mentioned above and the said reference<br />
was registered as Adjudic<strong>at</strong>ion Case No.<br />
204 <strong>of</strong> 1994 before the Industrial Tribunal<br />
(4) Agra. The notices were issued to the<br />
parties through registered post but the<br />
respondent no. 2 did not appear and the<br />
Tribunal has passed an exparte award on<br />
10th February, 1995 deciding the<br />
reference against the workman. The<br />
aforesaid award was published on 20th<br />
April, 1995 under Section 6 (3) <strong>of</strong> U.P.<br />
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. The
1044 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
respondent no. 2 has filed an applic<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
for setting aside the exparte award and<br />
th<strong>at</strong> was allowed vide order d<strong>at</strong>ed 3rd<br />
May, 1997 and the applic<strong>at</strong>ion to recall<br />
the order d<strong>at</strong>ed 3rd May, 1997 was<br />
rejected by the Tribunal vide order d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
22nd August, 1997.<br />
12. Rule 16 (2) provides th<strong>at</strong> an<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion to set aside the exparte award<br />
can be filed within 10 days <strong>of</strong> such award.<br />
From the pleadings <strong>of</strong> the parties, it<br />
transpires th<strong>at</strong> the factum <strong>of</strong> sending <strong>of</strong><br />
notices through registered post has not<br />
been denied and it has also not been st<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
th<strong>at</strong> on which d<strong>at</strong>e the respondent no. 2<br />
acquired knowledge <strong>of</strong> the exparte award.<br />
Further the applic<strong>at</strong>ion for setting aside<br />
exparte award was filed after 30 days <strong>of</strong><br />
its public<strong>at</strong>ion. In these circumstances, it<br />
cannot be said th<strong>at</strong> the applic<strong>at</strong>ion filed by<br />
the respondent no. 2 to set aside the<br />
exparte award was within time or there<br />
was a reasonable reason to not apply for<br />
the same.<br />
13. The Apex <strong>Court</strong>, in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Grindlays Bank (supra) has held th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
Tribunal/court retained its jurisdiction to<br />
set aside an exparte award provided the<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion has been filed within 30 days<br />
<strong>of</strong> its public<strong>at</strong>ion. In the case <strong>of</strong> Sangham<br />
Tape Co. (supra), the Apex court has held<br />
th<strong>at</strong> once the award becomes enforceable,<br />
the Industrial Tribunal or labour court<br />
becomes functus <strong>of</strong>ficio.<br />
14. Here in the present case, as has<br />
been mentioned above, the award was<br />
given on 10th February,1995 and it was<br />
published on 20th April, 1995 and it was<br />
also published on the notice board on<br />
22nd May, 1995, whereas the respondent<br />
no. 2 has filed the applic<strong>at</strong>ion for setting<br />
aside the exparte award on 25th October,<br />
1996 apparently this was beyond 30 days<br />
from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> its public<strong>at</strong>ion i.e. 20th<br />
April 1995 or 22nd May, 1995. Section 6-<br />
A <strong>of</strong> the U.P. Industrial Dispute Act<br />
provides th<strong>at</strong> the award becomes<br />
enforceable after 30 days <strong>of</strong> its<br />
public<strong>at</strong>ion. The language used in Section<br />
6-A <strong>of</strong> the U.P. Industrial Dispute Act is<br />
identical to the language used in Section<br />
17-A <strong>of</strong> the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.<br />
In the cases <strong>of</strong> Grindlays Bank (supra)<br />
and Sangham Tape Co. (supra), the Apex<br />
<strong>Court</strong> has held th<strong>at</strong> once the award<br />
becomes enforceable, the Industrial<br />
Tribunal or labour court become functus<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficio. Although in the case <strong>of</strong> S<strong>at</strong>nam<br />
Verma, (the case cited by respondent's<br />
counsel) the Apex <strong>Court</strong> has held th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
labour court has jurisdiction to entertain<br />
the applic<strong>at</strong>ion for setting aside the<br />
exparte award but the facts <strong>of</strong> this case are<br />
totally different as in the case <strong>of</strong> S<strong>at</strong>nam<br />
Verma the applic<strong>at</strong>ion was filed prior to<br />
the public<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the award and was well<br />
within time, therefore, the case cited by<br />
the respondent's counsel is distinguishable<br />
on facts.<br />
15. Under these facts and<br />
circumstances, since the applic<strong>at</strong>ion for<br />
setting aside the exparte award was filed<br />
after the expiry <strong>of</strong> 30 days <strong>of</strong> its<br />
public<strong>at</strong>ion, therefore it could not be<br />
entertained as the Tribunal had become<br />
functus <strong>of</strong>ficio and lost its jurisdiction to<br />
entertain any applic<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
16. This <strong>Court</strong> has also taken the<br />
same view in the cases <strong>of</strong> St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P Vs.<br />
the Presiding Officer Labour <strong>Court</strong> (II)<br />
U.P. Meerut and another 2005 (2) U.P.<br />
L.B.E.C. 1751 and 2 008 (118) F.L.R.<br />
922 District Panchay<strong>at</strong> (Zila Parishad)<br />
Kanpur Deh<strong>at</strong> Vs. Presiding Officer,
3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1045<br />
Labour <strong>Court</strong> (IV) Kanpur Nagar and<br />
another.<br />
17. In view <strong>of</strong> th<strong>at</strong>, the impugned<br />
order passed by the Tribunal cannot be<br />
sustained. The writ petition succeeds and<br />
is allowed. The impugned orders d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
3rd May, 1997 and 22nd August, 1997<br />
passed by Industrial Tribunal (4) Agra<br />
(respondent no. 1) are hereby quashed.<br />
There shall be no order as to costs.<br />
However dismissal <strong>of</strong> this writ petition<br />
will not preclude the respondents to<br />
approach the appropri<strong>at</strong>e forum if any<br />
available under law against the exparte<br />
award.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.10.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE C.K. PRASAD, C.J.<br />
THE HON’BLE DILIP GUPTA, J.<br />
THE HON’BLE A.P. SAHI, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.19101 <strong>of</strong> 1999<br />
With<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.21965 <strong>of</strong> 2003.<br />
Rishikesh Lal Srivastava …Petitioner<br />
Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. & others …Opposite Parties<br />
Counsel for the Petitioners:<br />
Sri Harish Chandra Singh<br />
Sri R.K. Ojha<br />
Sri O.P. Pandey<br />
Sri A.P. Singh<br />
Sri S.C. Singh<br />
Counsel for the Opposite Parties:<br />
Sri R.C. Dwivedi,<br />
Sri N.K. Pandey,<br />
Sri R.C. Singh<br />
Sri Dinesh Dwivedi<br />
Sri M.C. Ch<strong>at</strong>urvedi, C.S.C.<br />
assisted by Dr. Y.K. Srivastava,<br />
Standing Counsel.<br />
U.P. Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act-1921-<br />
Chapter III Reg.-31- prior approval <strong>of</strong><br />
dismissal-whether prior approval for<br />
awarding punishment <strong>of</strong> dismissal to a<br />
Class 4 th employee is must as<br />
contempl<strong>at</strong>ed in Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 held<br />
“No” various reasons discussed<br />
Practice and Procedure-Law Conflicting<br />
view <strong>of</strong> different D.B. Judgment-the<br />
judgment reported in 2006 (3) ESC 1765,<br />
2006(65) ALR 767 and 2000 (1) UPLBEC<br />
707 approved hold correct law.<br />
Held: Para -73<br />
Our answer to the questions referred to<br />
us are as under:<br />
(i) For awarding a punishment as<br />
enumer<strong>at</strong>ed under Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31<br />
Chapter III <strong>of</strong> the U.P. Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act, 1921 to a Class-IV<br />
employee <strong>of</strong> a institution recognized<br />
under the aforesaid Act, no prior<br />
approval or sanction from the Inspector<br />
<strong>of</strong> Schools is required.<br />
(ii) The Division Bench judgments in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Ali Ahmad Ansari Vs. District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools, Kushinagar<br />
[2006(3) ESC 1765 (All)] and Pujari<br />
Yadav Vs. Ram Briksh Yadav [2006(65)<br />
ALR 767] lay down the correct law in<br />
contradistinction to the Division Bench<br />
judgment <strong>of</strong> Principal, Rashtriya Inter<br />
College, Bali Nichlaul, District<br />
Maharajganj And Others [(2000) 1<br />
UPLBEC 707] and the other judgments to<br />
th<strong>at</strong> effect.<br />
Case law discussed:<br />
[1991 (1) UPLBEC 467], [1998(2) UPLBEC<br />
1101], [2000(1) UPLBEC 707],[2000 (3) E.S.C.<br />
1880 (All.), [2001(1) UPLBEC 487], [2002 (4)<br />
ESC 201], [2006(3) ESC 1765 (All) (DB)],<br />
(1998)2 UPLBEC 1101, [2000(3) E.S.C. 1880<br />
(All), 1998 Lab IC 1252, (2007) 1 AWC 253,<br />
1981 U.P.L.B.E.C. 135, 1988 U.P.L.B.E.C 123,<br />
1998(3) A.W.C.1940(L.B.), [AIR 2002 SCC<br />
1334], [(1951) 2 All E.R. 839], [AIR 1953 SCC
1046 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
394], [(2003) 2 SCC 577], [(2005) 5 SCC 561],<br />
[2002 (3) ESC 108]<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble C.K. Prasad, C.J.)<br />
1. The learned Single Judge while<br />
hearing this petition on 21.3.2007 and<br />
finding conflicting views between the two<br />
Division Bench judgments <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> in<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> 2000(1) UPLBEC 707 and<br />
2006(3) ESC 1765 (All), referred, under<br />
Rule 6 Chapter VIII <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Allahabad</strong><br />
<strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong> Rules, the following questions<br />
for determin<strong>at</strong>ion by a larger Bench:<br />
(i) Whether prior approval for awarding<br />
punishment <strong>of</strong> dismissal to a Class-<br />
IV employee is contempl<strong>at</strong>ed and<br />
required under Chapter-III,<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 <strong>of</strong> U.P. Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act, 1921 <br />
(ii) Which <strong>of</strong> the Division Bench<br />
judgments, as noticed above, lays<br />
down the correct law <br />
2. In the light there<strong>of</strong>, the case was<br />
posted for consider<strong>at</strong>ion before a Division<br />
Bench on 12.08.2009 which, finding<br />
conflict between the judgments rendered<br />
by the two Division Benches as referred<br />
in the order <strong>of</strong> the learned Single Judge,<br />
directed the m<strong>at</strong>ter to be heard by a larger<br />
Bench and accordingly the m<strong>at</strong>ter has<br />
come up before us for consider<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
3. The facts lie in a narrow compass.<br />
Petitioner - Rishikesh Lal Srivastava is a<br />
class IV employee working in<br />
Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e College, Vedupar in the<br />
district <strong>of</strong> Kushi Nagar (hereinafter<br />
referred to as ''the College'). While he was<br />
in service, the Principal <strong>of</strong> the College by<br />
order d<strong>at</strong>ed 5th <strong>of</strong> July 1994 dismissed<br />
him from service and aggrieved by the<br />
same, he filed Writ Petition No. 473 <strong>of</strong><br />
1996 (Rishikesh Lal Srivastava vs. St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.P. & others) before this <strong>Court</strong> inter<br />
alia praying for a direction to the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools to pay salary. This<br />
<strong>Court</strong> directed the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools to examine his case and in the<br />
light there<strong>of</strong>, the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools passed order d<strong>at</strong>ed 21 st <strong>of</strong> April<br />
1998 for payment <strong>of</strong> his salary. The<br />
Committee <strong>of</strong> Management <strong>of</strong> the College<br />
challenged the said order <strong>of</strong> the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools by filing another writ<br />
petition and the same was disposed <strong>of</strong>f<br />
with a direction to the District Inspector<br />
<strong>of</strong> Schools to record reasons as to whether<br />
the service <strong>of</strong> the said employee was<br />
legally termin<strong>at</strong>ed, whether approval <strong>of</strong><br />
the District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools was<br />
required for such termin<strong>at</strong>ion and whether<br />
in fact approval was granted or not. In the<br />
light <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid direction, the<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools passed order<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 28th <strong>of</strong> July 1998 and upheld the<br />
order <strong>of</strong> removal <strong>of</strong> the petitioner from<br />
service. It is this order <strong>of</strong> the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools, which has been<br />
challenged in Civil Misc. Writ Petition<br />
No. 19101 <strong>of</strong> 1999 (Rishikesh Lal<br />
Srivastava vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. & others).<br />
4. Chandra Bali, a class IV<br />
employee <strong>of</strong> Seth Ganga Ram Jaiswal<br />
Inter College, Baraut, <strong>Allahabad</strong>,<br />
aggrieved by the order <strong>of</strong> termin<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
passed by the Principal <strong>of</strong> the College,<br />
represented before the District Inspector<br />
<strong>of</strong> Schools, <strong>Allahabad</strong> who disapproved<br />
his dismissal by order d<strong>at</strong>ed 12th <strong>of</strong> May<br />
2003 inter alia observing th<strong>at</strong> before<br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ing his service, prior approval<br />
under Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 <strong>of</strong> Chapter III framed<br />
under the U.P. Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
Act, 1921 was not obtained. The Principal<br />
<strong>of</strong> the College aggrieved by the same has
3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1047<br />
preferred Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.<br />
21965 <strong>of</strong> 2003 (The Principal, Seth Ganga<br />
Ram Jaisawal Inter College, Baraut,<br />
<strong>Allahabad</strong> vs. The District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools, <strong>Allahabad</strong> and others).<br />
5. It is not in dispute th<strong>at</strong> both the<br />
Colleges are duly recognized by the U.P.<br />
Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act 1921 (U.P.<br />
Act 2 <strong>of</strong> 1921) [hereinafter referred to as<br />
the ''Act'] and the Regul<strong>at</strong>ions framed<br />
thereunder. It is also an admitted position<br />
th<strong>at</strong> both the Colleges receive grant-in-aid<br />
from the St<strong>at</strong>e Government and<br />
disbursement <strong>of</strong> salary <strong>of</strong> the employees<br />
is governed by the U.P. <strong>High</strong> School and<br />
Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Colleges (Payment <strong>of</strong><br />
Salaries <strong>of</strong> Teachers and other<br />
Employees) Act, 1971 (U.P. Act No. 24<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1971).<br />
6. We have heard Sri Harish<br />
Chandra Singh, learned counsel for the<br />
petitioner in writ petition no.19101 <strong>of</strong><br />
1999, Sri R.C. Dwivedi, learned counsel<br />
for respondent Nos. 3 and 4 and Sri N.K.<br />
Pandey, learned counsel for respondent<br />
no.5. We have also heard Sri R.K. Ojha,<br />
learned counsel for the Principal <strong>of</strong> the<br />
College - petitioner in writ petition<br />
no.21965 <strong>of</strong> 2003 and Sri R.C. Singh,<br />
learned counsel on behalf <strong>of</strong> the<br />
respondent no.4 - employee therein and<br />
Sri M.C. Ch<strong>at</strong>urvedi, learned Chief<br />
Standing Counsel on behalf <strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e in<br />
both the petitions.<br />
7. Before we enter into merit <strong>of</strong> the<br />
case, it is apt to go into the legisl<strong>at</strong>ive<br />
history. The legisl<strong>at</strong>ure enacted the U.P.<br />
Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act, 1921 (U.P.<br />
Act No 2 <strong>of</strong> 1921) for regul<strong>at</strong>ing and<br />
supervising the system <strong>of</strong> the <strong>High</strong> School<br />
and Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Educ<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
8. Sections 16-A to 16-I were<br />
inserted in the Act by Section 7 <strong>of</strong><br />
Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Educ<strong>at</strong>ion (Amendment)<br />
Act, 1958 (U.P. Act No. 35 <strong>of</strong> 1958).<br />
Section 16-G <strong>of</strong> the Act as inserted by the<br />
U.P. Act No. 35 <strong>of</strong> 1958 reads as<br />
follows:-<br />
"16-G. Conditions <strong>of</strong> service <strong>of</strong><br />
teachers -(1) Every person employed in a<br />
recognized institution shall be governed<br />
by such conditions <strong>of</strong> service as may be<br />
prescribed by Regul<strong>at</strong>ions and any<br />
agreement between the management and<br />
such employee ins<strong>of</strong>ar as it is inconsistent<br />
with the provisions <strong>of</strong> this Act or with the<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions shall be void.<br />
(2) Without prejudice to the generality<br />
<strong>of</strong> the powers conferred by subsection<br />
(1), the Regul<strong>at</strong>ions may<br />
provide for--<br />
(a) the period <strong>of</strong> prob<strong>at</strong>ion, the<br />
conditions <strong>of</strong> confirm<strong>at</strong>ion and the<br />
procedure and conditions for<br />
promotion and punishment, including<br />
suspension pending inquiry and the<br />
emoluments for the period <strong>of</strong><br />
suspension and termin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
service with notice;<br />
(b) the scales <strong>of</strong> pay, and payment <strong>of</strong><br />
salaries ;<br />
(c) transfer <strong>of</strong> service from one<br />
recognized institution to another ;<br />
(d) grant <strong>of</strong> leave and Provident Fund<br />
and other benefits ; and<br />
(e) maintenance <strong>of</strong> record <strong>of</strong> work and<br />
service.<br />
(3)(a). No Principal, Headmaster or<br />
teacher may be discharged or<br />
removed or dismissed from service<br />
or reduced in rank or subjected to<br />
any diminution in emoluments, or
1048 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
served with notice <strong>of</strong> termin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
service except with the prior<br />
approval in writing <strong>of</strong> the Inspector.<br />
The decision <strong>of</strong> the Inspector shall be<br />
communic<strong>at</strong>ed within the period to<br />
be prescribed by regul<strong>at</strong>ions.<br />
(b). The Inspector may approve or<br />
disapprove or reduce or enhance the<br />
punishment or approve or disapprove<br />
<strong>of</strong> the notice for termin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
service proposed by the<br />
management:<br />
Provided th<strong>at</strong> in the cases <strong>of</strong><br />
punishment, before passing orders, the<br />
Inspector shall give an opportunity to the<br />
Principal, the Headmaster or the teacher<br />
to show cause within a fortnight <strong>of</strong> the<br />
receipt <strong>of</strong> the notice why the proposed<br />
punishment should not be inflicted.<br />
(c) An appeal against the order <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Inspector under clause (b), may be<br />
made to the Regional Appell<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Committee constituted under clause<br />
(d) within one month from the d<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> such order being communic<strong>at</strong>ed to<br />
the parties concerned and the<br />
Regional Appell<strong>at</strong>e Committee may,<br />
after such enquiry as it considers<br />
necessary, confirm the order or set<br />
aside or modify it, and the order<br />
passed by the Regional Appell<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Committee shall be final.<br />
(d) The Regional Appell<strong>at</strong>e Committee<br />
in each region shall consist <strong>of</strong>--<br />
(i) the Regional Deputy Director,<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion who will be President <strong>of</strong><br />
the Committee,<br />
(ii) a member <strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e Maneger's<br />
Associ<strong>at</strong>ion nomin<strong>at</strong>ed by th<strong>at</strong><br />
Associ<strong>at</strong>ion, and<br />
(iii) a member <strong>of</strong> the U.P. Madhyamik<br />
Shiksha Sangh nomin<strong>at</strong>ed by th<strong>at</strong><br />
Sangh.<br />
(4) An order made or decision given by<br />
the competent authority under subsection<br />
(3) shall not be questioned in<br />
any court and the parties concerned<br />
shall be bound to execute the<br />
directions contained in the order or<br />
decision within the period th<strong>at</strong> may<br />
be specified therein.<br />
(5) In this section and section 16-F the<br />
powers conferred on or the duties<br />
assigned to the Inspector and the<br />
Regional Deputy Director, Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
shall, in the case <strong>of</strong> an institution for<br />
girls, be respectively exercised or<br />
discharged by the Regional<br />
Inspectress <strong>of</strong> Girl's Schools and the<br />
Deputy Director <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
(Women).<br />
9. Section 2 <strong>of</strong> the U.P. Act No. 7 <strong>of</strong><br />
1966 amended Section 16-G <strong>of</strong> the Act<br />
and substituted Section 16 G (3) (c).<br />
Section 2(i) <strong>of</strong> U.P. Act 7 <strong>of</strong> 1966 reads<br />
as follows:<br />
"2. Amendment <strong>of</strong> Section 16-G <strong>of</strong><br />
U.P. Act II <strong>of</strong> 1921.--In Sub-section (3)<br />
<strong>of</strong> Section 16-G <strong>of</strong> the Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act, 1921, hereinafter referred<br />
to as the principal Act,--<br />
(i) For clause (c) the following shall be<br />
substituted, namely -<br />
"(c) Any party may prefer an appeal to<br />
the Regional Deputy Director,<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion, against an order <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Inspector under clause (b), whether<br />
passed before or after the<br />
commencement <strong>of</strong> the Uttar Pradesh<br />
Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
(Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1966,<br />
within one month from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
communic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the order to th<strong>at</strong><br />
party, and the Regional Deputy<br />
Director may after such further<br />
enquiry, if any, as he considers<br />
necessary, confirm, set aside or<br />
modify the order, and the order
3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1049<br />
passed by the Regional Deputy<br />
Director shall be final. In case the<br />
order under appeal was passed by the<br />
very person holding the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong><br />
Regional Deputy Director while<br />
acting as Inspector, the appeal shall<br />
be transferred by order <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Director to some other Regional<br />
Deputy Director for decision, and the<br />
provisions <strong>of</strong> this clause shall apply<br />
in rel<strong>at</strong>ion to decision by th<strong>at</strong> other<br />
Regional Deputy Director as if the<br />
appeal had been preferred to<br />
himself."<br />
Further Section 15 <strong>of</strong> the U.P.<br />
Secondary Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Laws (Amendment)<br />
Act, 1975 (Act No. 26 <strong>of</strong> 1975) amended<br />
Section 16 G <strong>of</strong> the Act. Same reads as<br />
follows:<br />
15. Amendment <strong>of</strong> Section 16 G.-- In<br />
Section 16 G <strong>of</strong> the principal Act -<br />
(i) in the marginal heading for the words<br />
"conditions <strong>of</strong> service <strong>of</strong> teachers"<br />
the words "conditions <strong>of</strong> service <strong>of</strong><br />
Head <strong>of</strong> Institutions, teachers and<br />
other employees" shall be<br />
substituted;<br />
(ii) in sub-section (2), in clause (a), for<br />
the words "including suspension<br />
pending enquiry", the words and<br />
brackets "(including suspension<br />
pending or in contempl<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
enquiry or during the pendency <strong>of</strong><br />
investig<strong>at</strong>ion, enquiry or trial in<br />
criminal case for an <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
involving moral turpitude)" shall be<br />
substituted;<br />
(iii) for sub-section (5), the following<br />
sub-sections and Explan<strong>at</strong>ion shall be<br />
substituted, namely:-<br />
"(5) No Head <strong>of</strong> Institution or teacher<br />
shall be suspended by the<br />
Management, unless in the opinion<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Management-<br />
(a) the charges against him are serious<br />
enough to merit his dismissal,<br />
removal or reduction in rank; or<br />
(b) his continuance in <strong>of</strong>fice is likely to<br />
hamper or prejudice the conduct <strong>of</strong><br />
disciplinary proceedings against him;<br />
or<br />
(c) any criminal case for an <strong>of</strong>fence<br />
involving moral turpitude against<br />
him is under investig<strong>at</strong>ion, enquiry or<br />
trial.<br />
(6) Where any Head <strong>of</strong> Institution or<br />
teacher is suspended by the<br />
Committee <strong>of</strong> Management, it shall<br />
be reported to the Instructor within<br />
thirty days from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> the<br />
commencement <strong>of</strong> the Uttar Pradesh<br />
Secondary Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Laws<br />
(Amendment) Act, 1975, in case the<br />
order <strong>of</strong> suspension was passed<br />
before such commencement, and<br />
within seven days from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
the order <strong>of</strong> suspension in any other<br />
case, and the report shall contain<br />
such particular as may be prescribed<br />
and be accompanied by all relevant<br />
documents.<br />
(7) No such order <strong>of</strong> suspension shall,<br />
unless approved in writing by the<br />
Inspector, remain in force for more<br />
than sixty days from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
commencement <strong>of</strong> the Uttar Pradesh<br />
Secondary Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Laws<br />
(Amendment) Act, 1975 or as the<br />
case may be from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> such<br />
order and the order <strong>of</strong> the Inspector<br />
shall be final and shall not be<br />
questioned in any <strong>Court</strong>.<br />
(8) If, <strong>at</strong> any time, the Inspector is<br />
s<strong>at</strong>isfied th<strong>at</strong> disciplinary<br />
proceedings against the Head <strong>of</strong><br />
Institution or teacher or being
1050 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
delayed, for no fault <strong>of</strong> the Head <strong>of</strong><br />
Institution or the teacher, the<br />
Inspector may after affording<br />
opportunity to the Management to<br />
make represent<strong>at</strong>ion revoke an order<br />
<strong>of</strong> suspension passed under this<br />
section.<br />
(9) All appeals pending before the<br />
Deputy Director <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
(Women) immedi<strong>at</strong>ely before the<br />
commencement <strong>of</strong> this sub-section<br />
shall be transferred to the Joint<br />
Director <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion (Women) for<br />
disposal:<br />
Provided th<strong>at</strong> where the Deputy<br />
Director <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion (Women) has<br />
already commenced the hearing <strong>of</strong> any<br />
such appeal before the commencement <strong>of</strong><br />
this sub- section, the appeal shall be<br />
disposed <strong>of</strong> by the Deputy Director <strong>of</strong><br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion (Women) herself.<br />
Explan<strong>at</strong>ion. - For the purposes <strong>of</strong><br />
this section, the expression ''Regional<br />
Deputy Director, Educ<strong>at</strong>ion shall, in<br />
rel<strong>at</strong>ion to a girls' institution mean the<br />
Joint Director <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion (Women)."<br />
10. In exercise <strong>of</strong> power conferred<br />
under Section 16-G <strong>of</strong> the Act,<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions have been framed and<br />
Chapter 3 there<strong>of</strong> pertains to Conditions<br />
<strong>of</strong> Service. Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31, which is<br />
relevant for the purpose, reads as<br />
follows:-<br />
"31. Punishment to employees for<br />
which prior sanction from Inspector or<br />
Regional Inspectress would be essential<br />
may be any one <strong>of</strong> the following:<br />
(1) Discharge,<br />
(2) Removal or Termin<strong>at</strong>ion,<br />
(3) Demotion in grade,<br />
(4) Reduction in emoluments.<br />
Principal or Headmaster would be<br />
competent to give above punishment to<br />
Fourth-class employees. In case <strong>of</strong><br />
punishment awarded by competent<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer, the Fourth-class employee may<br />
appeal to Management Committee. This<br />
appeal must be preferred within one<br />
month <strong>of</strong> the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> intim<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
punishment and Management Committee<br />
on receipt <strong>of</strong> appeal will decide the m<strong>at</strong>ter<br />
within six weeks. On consider<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> all<br />
necessary records and after giving an<br />
opportunity <strong>of</strong> hearing to the employee, if<br />
he wants to appear before the<br />
Management Committee, it will give its<br />
decision.<br />
Fourth-class employee would also have a<br />
right to represent against the decision <strong>of</strong><br />
the Management Committee on his appeal<br />
to the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools/Regional Inspectress <strong>of</strong> Girls<br />
Schools within one month <strong>of</strong> the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
intim<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the decision:<br />
11. By this juncture, it would be<br />
appropri<strong>at</strong>e to quote Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 100 <strong>of</strong><br />
Chapter 3, which reads as follows:-<br />
"100. In respect <strong>of</strong> clerks, which includes<br />
Librarian also, the Management<br />
Committee and in respect <strong>of</strong> Fourth<br />
class employees, the<br />
Principal/Headmaster shall be the<br />
appointing authority. Regarding<br />
appointment, prob<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> clerk, which<br />
includes Librarian also, and Fourth class<br />
employees, the period for which is one<br />
year, confirm<strong>at</strong>ion and other service<br />
conditions, etc. rel<strong>at</strong>ing to it, provisions<br />
with necessary changes described in<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 1, 4 to 8, 10, 11, 15, 24 to 26,<br />
30, 32 to 34, 36 to 38, 40 to 43, 45 to 52,<br />
54, 66, 67, 70 to 73 and 76 to 82 shall<br />
apply. But in respect <strong>of</strong> Fourth class
3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1051<br />
employees Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 77 to 82 would<br />
apply only when necessary directions in<br />
this regard are issued by the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government. Provisions in Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 9,<br />
12, 13, 14, 16 to 20, 27, 28, 54, 55 to 65<br />
and 97 would not apply in respect <strong>of</strong> such<br />
employees."<br />
12. From a plain reading <strong>of</strong> the<br />
aforesaid Regul<strong>at</strong>ion, it would be evident<br />
th<strong>at</strong> various Regul<strong>at</strong>ions would be<br />
applicable in the case <strong>of</strong> Class IV<br />
employees for the purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
confirm<strong>at</strong>ion and other service conditions,<br />
but Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 has not been made<br />
applicable in the case <strong>of</strong> Class IV<br />
employees. It is, <strong>at</strong> this stage, to apt to<br />
quote Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37, which reads as<br />
follows:-<br />
"37. Soon after the report <strong>of</strong> the<br />
proceedings and recommend<strong>at</strong>ion from<br />
the inquiring authority are received, the<br />
Committee <strong>of</strong> Management shall after<br />
notice to employee, meet to consider the<br />
report <strong>of</strong> the proceeding and<br />
recommend<strong>at</strong>ion made and take decision<br />
on the case. The employee shall be<br />
allowed, if he so desires, to appear before<br />
the Committee in person to st<strong>at</strong>e his case<br />
and answer any question th<strong>at</strong> may be put<br />
to him by any member present <strong>at</strong> the<br />
meeting. The Committee shall then send a<br />
complete report together with all<br />
connected papers to the Inspector or<br />
Regional Inspectress as the case may be,<br />
for approval <strong>of</strong> action proposed by it.<br />
But, regarding fourth-class<br />
employees, no report shall be sent to<br />
the Inspector or Inspectress for<br />
approval. Abovesaid all proceedings in<br />
this regard shall be done by appointing<br />
authority."<br />
13. It has been contended on behalf<br />
<strong>of</strong> Class IV employees th<strong>at</strong> prior approval<br />
from the District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools is<br />
sine qua non for dismissing Class IV<br />
employee and in support <strong>of</strong> the<br />
submission, reliance has been placed on<br />
the following judgments <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> :-<br />
Shankar Saran Vs. Vesli Inter College,<br />
[1991 (1) UPLBEC 467], Daya Shankar<br />
Tewari Vs. Principal, R.D.B.M.<br />
Uchch<strong>at</strong>ar Madhyamik Vidyalaya,<br />
Neogaon, Mirzapur and others, [1998 (2)<br />
UPLBEC 1101], Principal, Rastriya Inter<br />
College, Bali Nichlaul, District<br />
Maharajganj and another Vs. District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools, Mahrajganj and<br />
others, [2000 (1) UPLBEC 707], Sita<br />
Ram Vs. District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools,<br />
<strong>Allahabad</strong> and others, [2000 (3) E.S.C.<br />
1880 (All.)], Committee <strong>of</strong> Management,<br />
St. Charles Inter College, Sardhana and<br />
others Vs. District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools,<br />
Meerut and others, [2001 (1) UPLBEC<br />
487], Ram Khelawan Maurya Vs. District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools, Jaunpur and others,<br />
[2002 (4) ESC 201].<br />
14. However, counsel representing<br />
the Committee <strong>of</strong> Management and the<br />
Principal, contend th<strong>at</strong> prior approval <strong>of</strong><br />
the District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools is not<br />
necessary before termin<strong>at</strong>ing the services<br />
<strong>of</strong> Class IV employees and in support<br />
there<strong>of</strong>, reliance has been placed on the<br />
following judgments <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong>:<br />
Principal, Shitladin Inter College,<br />
Bagbana, District <strong>Allahabad</strong> Vs. District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools, <strong>Allahabad</strong> and<br />
another, [1994 (3) ESC 112 (All)], Swami<br />
Vivekanand Uchch<strong>at</strong>ar Madhyamik<br />
Vidyalaya, Unnao and another Vs.<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools, Unnao and<br />
another, [1998 (3) A.W.C. 1940 (L.B.)],<br />
Ali Ahmad Ansari Vs. District Inspector
1052 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
<strong>of</strong> Schools, Kushinagar and others,<br />
Reported in [2006 (3) ESC 1765<br />
(All)(DB)].<br />
15. In the case <strong>of</strong> Shankar Saran<br />
(Supra), a Division Bench <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong><br />
has held th<strong>at</strong> an order <strong>of</strong> dismissal passed<br />
against a class IV employee without prior<br />
approval <strong>of</strong> the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools, is illegal. Relevant portion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
judgment <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> in the aforesaid<br />
case reads as follows:<br />
"13- blds vfrfjDr vf/kfu;e ds vUrxZr cuk;s fu;eksa<br />
ds v/;k;&3 ds f<strong>of</strong>u;e 31 ds vk/kkj ij ;kph dh lsok;sa<br />
fcuk ftyk fo|ky; fujh{kd dh iwoZ vuqefr ds lekIr fd;k<br />
tkuk Hkh iw.kZr;k voS/kkfud FkkA iwjs rF;ksa ls ;g Hkh Li"V<br />
gS fd izcU/k lfefr vkSj iz/kkukpk;Z us kksj :i ls vuqfpr<br />
n`f"Vdks.k ;kph ds lEcU/k esa viuk;k vkSj ftyk fo|ky;<br />
fujh{kd vkSj iz/kkukpk;Z us ;kph dks voS/kkfud :i ls ckgj<br />
j[kkA"<br />
16. A more detailed and exhaustive<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion is found in the case <strong>of</strong> Daya<br />
Shankar Tewari (supra), wherein the<br />
learned Single Judge concluded as<br />
follows:<br />
"8. While considering the aforesaid<br />
contention, I find th<strong>at</strong> sub-section (3) <strong>of</strong><br />
Section 16-G <strong>of</strong> U.P. Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act, 1921 clearly provides for<br />
approval <strong>of</strong> Inspector in case <strong>of</strong> discharge,<br />
removal, dismissal from service,<br />
reduction in rank diminution in<br />
emoluments and termin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> service<br />
but this provision only makes reference <strong>of</strong><br />
Principal, Headmaster and teachers and<br />
no c<strong>at</strong>egorical reference <strong>of</strong> Class-IV<br />
employee has been made therein. But subsection<br />
(1) <strong>of</strong> Section 16-G provides th<strong>at</strong><br />
the condition <strong>of</strong> service <strong>of</strong> every person<br />
employed in a recognized institution shall<br />
be governed by Regul<strong>at</strong>ions. Therefore,<br />
St<strong>at</strong>ute permits framing <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
providing conditions <strong>of</strong> service every<br />
person employed and therefore, this<br />
includes Class-IV employees also.<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 <strong>of</strong> Chapter-III <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions so framed under the U.P.<br />
Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act, 1921,<br />
provides for prior approval in case <strong>of</strong><br />
certain punishments including<br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ion. Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 100 <strong>of</strong> the said<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions though does not c<strong>at</strong>egorically<br />
make Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 applicable in case <strong>of</strong><br />
Class-IV employees but it also does not<br />
c<strong>at</strong>egorically exclude Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 from<br />
its applicability to Class-IV employees.<br />
Therefore, the only provisions <strong>of</strong><br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 indic<strong>at</strong>es its scope <strong>of</strong><br />
applicability. It is true th<strong>at</strong> first paragraph<br />
<strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 while providing for prior<br />
approval in case <strong>of</strong> some punishment,<br />
does not refer to Class-IV employees<br />
specially but the said first paragraph<br />
providing for prior approval refers to all<br />
employees and there is no reason to<br />
presume exclusion <strong>of</strong> Class-IV employees<br />
from the applicability <strong>of</strong> the said<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion. The subsequent paragraphs in<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 clearly refer to Class-IV<br />
employees."<br />
17. A perusal <strong>of</strong> the said decision<br />
indic<strong>at</strong>es th<strong>at</strong> the <strong>Court</strong> came to the<br />
conclusion th<strong>at</strong> even though Regul<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
100 does not c<strong>at</strong>egorically apply<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31, yet it also does not exclude<br />
the same. Further, the learned Single<br />
Judge in paragraph 11 found th<strong>at</strong><br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37, which provides for<br />
sending <strong>of</strong> a report, limits the same in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> Class-IV employees to be sent<br />
to the appointing authority instead <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Inspector and nothing more, which is<br />
quoted below:<br />
"11. A perusal <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 36 and<br />
37 <strong>of</strong> the said Regul<strong>at</strong>ions indic<strong>at</strong>e th<strong>at</strong><br />
they provide for procedure in respect <strong>of</strong>
3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1053<br />
disciplinary proceeding. Proviso to<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37 only excludes Class-IV<br />
employees to the extent the said<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37 requires sending <strong>of</strong> the<br />
report and the recommend<strong>at</strong>ion to the<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools for approval<br />
making it clear th<strong>at</strong> the said entire<br />
proceedings rel<strong>at</strong>ing to Class-IV<br />
employees are to be performed by the<br />
appointing authority. This has been done<br />
as in respect <strong>of</strong> Class-IV employees the<br />
appointing authority is the Principal<br />
whereas in respect <strong>of</strong> teachers the<br />
appointing authority is committee <strong>of</strong><br />
management and Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37 provides<br />
for sending <strong>of</strong> report and recommend<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Enquiry Officer to committee <strong>of</strong><br />
management which was to consider the<br />
same and take a decision and then to send<br />
the entire record to the Inspector for his<br />
approval. Therefore, proviso to<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37 was required making it<br />
clear th<strong>at</strong> for Class-IV employees ending<br />
<strong>of</strong> papers to the Inspector was to be made<br />
by the Principal, being the appointing<br />
authority and in this case papers were not<br />
to be sent by the committee <strong>of</strong><br />
management which is not the appointing<br />
authority."<br />
18. For ready reference, <strong>at</strong> this<br />
juncture, we may record th<strong>at</strong> even though<br />
there was a decision to the contrary in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Principal, Shitladin Inter College<br />
(supra), the same appears to have not been<br />
noticed in the judgment <strong>of</strong> Daya Shankar<br />
Tewari (supra), which was rendered <strong>at</strong><br />
l<strong>at</strong>er point <strong>of</strong> time.<br />
19. The decision in the case <strong>of</strong> Daya<br />
Shankar Tewari (supra) came to be<br />
considered by a Division Bench in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Principal, Rastriya Inter College,<br />
(supra) and the Division Bench affirmed<br />
the decision <strong>of</strong> Daya Shankar Tewari's<br />
(supra) case, with an approval in<br />
paragraph 4 and 5, which is as follows:-<br />
"4. A learned Single Judge <strong>of</strong> this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> (Hon'ble Aloke Chakrabarti, J.) in<br />
Daya Shankar Tewari Vs. Principal and<br />
others, (1998) 2 UPLBEC 1101, has held<br />
th<strong>at</strong> such prior approval is necessary. The<br />
learned Single Judge has gone into the<br />
m<strong>at</strong>ter in gre<strong>at</strong> detail and has examined<br />
the relevant provisions in the U.P.<br />
Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act as well as<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 31 and 100 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions made under the aforesaid<br />
Act.<br />
5. We are in respectful agreement with<br />
the aforesaid decision <strong>of</strong> the learned<br />
Single Judge in Daya Shankar Tewari's<br />
case. The decision <strong>of</strong> the Full Bench <strong>of</strong><br />
this <strong>Court</strong> in Magadh Ram Yadav v. Dy.<br />
Director <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion and others, 1979<br />
ALJ 1351, which is relied upon by the<br />
learned Counsel for the appellant is in our<br />
opinion not applicable as it has not<br />
considered Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 31 and 100 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
U.P. Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Regul<strong>at</strong>ion."<br />
20. A learned Single Judge <strong>of</strong> this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> followed the case <strong>of</strong> Daya Shankar<br />
Tewari (supra) in the decision <strong>of</strong> Sita<br />
Ram Vs. District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools,<br />
<strong>Allahabad</strong> and others, [2000 (3) E.S.C.<br />
1880 (All.)] and held as follows :<br />
"6. Now there is no escape from the in<br />
holding th<strong>at</strong> prior approval <strong>of</strong> the DIOS is<br />
essential in awarding punishment <strong>of</strong><br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ion, dismissal etc. <strong>of</strong> Class-IV<br />
employee. The contention <strong>of</strong> the learned<br />
Counsel for the respondent is th<strong>at</strong><br />
approval was not required because<br />
petitioner was a Class-IV employee, is not<br />
acceptable. It is not disputed by the<br />
respondents th<strong>at</strong> no approval <strong>of</strong> the DIOS<br />
prior to his termin<strong>at</strong>ion by the Principal
1054 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
was obtained. The petition, therefore,<br />
deserves to be allowed and the impugned<br />
order <strong>of</strong> termin<strong>at</strong>ion be quashed on this<br />
ground alone. Since the impugned order is<br />
liable to be quashed on the ground th<strong>at</strong> no<br />
approval <strong>of</strong> the DIOS was obtained in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> the petitioner, prior to termin<strong>at</strong>ing<br />
him from service, the other grounds<br />
sought to challenge the propriety <strong>of</strong> the<br />
impugned order is not considered."<br />
21. It may again be pointed out th<strong>at</strong><br />
none <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid decisions took<br />
notice <strong>of</strong> the decision in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Principal, Shitladin Inter College,<br />
(supra). The same position was reiter<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
in the case <strong>of</strong> Committee <strong>of</strong><br />
Management, St. Charles Inter College,<br />
Sardhana (supra) by a learned Single<br />
Judge <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong>, as contained in<br />
paragraph 12, which reads as follows:-<br />
"12. The next question is whether<br />
the management could dismiss a class IV<br />
employee without obtaining prior<br />
approval <strong>of</strong> the DIOS as provided in<br />
Chapter III, Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31. Counsel for<br />
the petitioners argued th<strong>at</strong> no prior<br />
approval <strong>of</strong> DIOS was required for<br />
dismissing a class IV employee. On the<br />
other hand Counsel for the respondent<br />
No. 2 urged th<strong>at</strong> prior approval <strong>of</strong> DIOS<br />
was necessary. In the altern<strong>at</strong>ive the<br />
learned Counsel urged th<strong>at</strong> in cases where<br />
prior approval <strong>of</strong> DIOS has not been<br />
obtained the class IV employee could<br />
prefer appeal before the management and<br />
represent<strong>at</strong>ion before the DIOS. The<br />
argument is supported by a Single Judge<br />
decision <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong> in Daya Shanker<br />
Tiwari v. Principal, R.D.B.M. Uchch<strong>at</strong>ar<br />
Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Neogaon,<br />
Mirzapur and others, 1998 (1) ESC 403<br />
(All). The learned Single Judge held th<strong>at</strong><br />
the provisions <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 read with<br />
Section 16-G (1) were applicable before<br />
dismissing a class IV employee. And<br />
prior approval <strong>of</strong> Inspector or Regional<br />
Inspectress was required to be obtained by<br />
the management. This decision was<br />
approved by a Division Bench <strong>of</strong> this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> in Principal, Rastriya Inter<br />
College, Bali Nichlaul, District<br />
Maharajganj and others v. District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools, Maharajganj and<br />
others, (2000) 1 UPLBEC 707. Therefore,<br />
since prior approval <strong>of</strong> DIOS was not<br />
obtained by the petitioners before<br />
dismissing the respondent No. 2, the<br />
DIOS rightly set aside the dismissal<br />
order."<br />
Another learned Single Judge in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Ram Khelawan Maurya Vs.<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools (supra)<br />
arrived <strong>at</strong> the same conclusion by holding<br />
as follows:-<br />
"7. It is settled law th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
punishment can be awarded after prior<br />
approval <strong>of</strong> the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools or the Regional Inspectress <strong>of</strong><br />
Girls School. Since approval <strong>of</strong> the<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools was not been<br />
obtained, the decision <strong>of</strong> the Committee<br />
<strong>of</strong> Management is bad in law.<br />
It is submitted on behalf <strong>of</strong><br />
respondents th<strong>at</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 <strong>of</strong> the U.P.<br />
Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Regul<strong>at</strong>ions while<br />
providing for prior approval in case <strong>of</strong><br />
Class IV employees the said paragraph<br />
refers to all employees and there is no<br />
reason to exclude Class IV employees<br />
from the applicability <strong>of</strong> the said<br />
regul<strong>at</strong>ion. Subsequent paragraph <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 also refers to Class IV<br />
employee.<br />
This <strong>Court</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong> Principal,<br />
Rashtriya Inter College (supra) has held<br />
th<strong>at</strong> prior approval in case <strong>of</strong> dismissal <strong>of</strong>
3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1055<br />
non-teaching staff is necessary and if such<br />
prior approval is not taken before<br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the services, the<br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ion is illegal.<br />
The learned Single Judge in Daya<br />
Shankar Tiwari v. Principal, Smt.<br />
Ramw<strong>at</strong>i Devi Beni Madho Uchch<strong>at</strong>ar<br />
Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Mirzapur and<br />
others, 1998 Lab IC 1252, has held th<strong>at</strong><br />
the provision <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 read with<br />
Section 16-G (1) <strong>of</strong> the Act make it clear<br />
th<strong>at</strong> in case <strong>of</strong> Class IV employees prior<br />
approval <strong>of</strong> Inspector or Regional<br />
Inspectress is necessary. This case has<br />
been approved by the Division Bench <strong>of</strong><br />
this <strong>Court</strong>."<br />
22. There is yet another decision <strong>of</strong><br />
a learned Single Judge to the same effect<br />
in the case <strong>of</strong> Principal, P.N.V. Inter<br />
College, Chilli Hamirpur & another Vs.<br />
D.I.O.S. Hamirpur & another, (2007) 1<br />
AWC 253.<br />
Thus, it can be seen th<strong>at</strong> the decision<br />
in the case <strong>of</strong> Shankar Saran Vs. Vesli<br />
Inter College (supra), which was<br />
delivered on 3rd March, 1991, there was<br />
no detailed discussion on the various<br />
provisions <strong>of</strong> the Act and a conclusion<br />
was drawn on the strength <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
31 only to the effect th<strong>at</strong> prior approval<br />
was required. The l<strong>at</strong>ter decisions from<br />
Daya Shankar Tewari's case (supra)<br />
onwards, upon a discussion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
relevant provisions, came to the<br />
conclusion th<strong>at</strong> prior approval was<br />
required, but as pointed out hereinabove,<br />
none <strong>of</strong> the said decisions took notice <strong>of</strong><br />
the decision in the case <strong>of</strong> Principal,<br />
Shitladin Inter College, (supra).<br />
23. The decisions, which hold th<strong>at</strong><br />
no such prior approval is required begin<br />
with the case <strong>of</strong> Principal, Shitladin Inter<br />
College (supra), wherein a learned Single<br />
Judge drew the following conclusion:<br />
"9. Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 35 to 44-A provide the<br />
manner in which enquiry is to be<br />
conducted. In case the enquiry is not<br />
conducted against the delinquent<br />
employee, any order awarding<br />
punishment will be illegal. In case all the<br />
procedures were followed, the order <strong>of</strong><br />
punishment imposed by the authority<br />
concerned cannot be set aside. The<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools has not<br />
recorded any finding th<strong>at</strong> the enquiry<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer or the Principal did not follow the<br />
procedure prescribed for holding enquiry<br />
and in giving opportunity <strong>of</strong> hearing<br />
before awarding punishment.<br />
The disciplinary proceedings against<br />
a Class IV employee <strong>of</strong> the institution is<br />
in the n<strong>at</strong>ure <strong>of</strong> domestic enquiry. If the<br />
disciplinary authority, after holding the<br />
enquiry, in a fair manner, comes to the<br />
conclusion on the basis <strong>of</strong> appreci<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
evidence on record th<strong>at</strong> the charges<br />
against the delinquent employee is<br />
proved, the Committee <strong>of</strong> Management on<br />
appeal being filed can re-appraise the<br />
evidence and can come to different<br />
conclusion. The aggrieved employee is<br />
given right <strong>of</strong> making represent<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
against the decision <strong>of</strong> the Committee <strong>of</strong><br />
Management given in appeal. The power<br />
given to the District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools<br />
is in the n<strong>at</strong>ure <strong>of</strong> supervisory jurisdiction.<br />
He can set aside the findings recorded by<br />
the disciplinary authority <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Committee <strong>of</strong> Management when it is<br />
either perverse or based on no m<strong>at</strong>erial<br />
evidence or certain m<strong>at</strong>erial evidence has<br />
been ignored. He has further to examine<br />
whether procedure prescribed for holding<br />
the enquiry was followed and it was fair<br />
and impartial enquiry. He has, however,
1056 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
no jurisdiction to re-appraise the evidence<br />
on record.<br />
Learned counsel for the respondent<br />
urged th<strong>at</strong> the order <strong>of</strong> dismissal from<br />
service was otherwise illegal as before<br />
passing the order <strong>of</strong> dismissal no prior<br />
approval <strong>of</strong> the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools was taken as provided under<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 <strong>of</strong> Chapter III <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions framed under the Act<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 <strong>of</strong> Chapter III <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion framed under the Act had been<br />
amended by Notific<strong>at</strong>ion No. 7/562/5-8<br />
(Board, September 1974) <strong>Allahabad</strong> d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
10th March, 1975 issued in pursuance to<br />
the approval <strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e Government<br />
contained in G.O. No. 789(1)-15/(7) 75<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed March 1, 1975 and by the<br />
amendment so brought specific provisions<br />
have been made pertaining to<br />
appointment, disciplinary proceedings,<br />
appeal etc. in so far as Class IV<br />
employees are concerned. Amendment to<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 lays down power to<br />
appoint, punish and further provides for<br />
the appell<strong>at</strong>e authority to hear appeals<br />
against punishment imposed and<br />
procedure for disposal <strong>of</strong> appeal and<br />
against the said appeal a further<br />
represent<strong>at</strong>ion has been provided to the<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools, Regional<br />
Inspectress <strong>of</strong> Girls Schools concerned.<br />
The said Regul<strong>at</strong>ion is extracted<br />
hereunder.<br />
"31& deZpkfj;ksa dks izk;% n.M] ftlds fy, fujh{kd vFkok<br />
e.Myh; fujhf{kdk dh iwoZ Lohd`fr vko';d gksxh]<br />
fuEufyf[kr esa ls fdlh ,d :i ls gks ldrh gS%&<br />
¼d½ i`FkDdj.k vFkok izeqfDrA<br />
¼[k½ Js.kh esa voufrA<br />
¼x½ ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa dehA<br />
prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkfj;ksa dks mijksDr dksbZ n.M nsus gsrq<br />
iz/kkukpk;Z vFkok iz/kkuk/;fidk l{ke gksxkA l{ke vf/kdkjh<br />
}kjk n.M fn;s tkus dh n'kk esa prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkfj;ksa }kjk<br />
izca/k lfefr dks vihy dh tk ldsxhA ;g vihy n.M<br />
lwfpr fd;s tkus dh frfFk ls ,d ekg ds vUnj izLrqr gks<br />
tkuh pkfg, vkSj ml ij izca/k&lfefr }kjk fu.kZ; dj<br />
vihy dh izkfIr frfFk ls vf/kdre N% ekg ds Hkhrj ns fn;k<br />
tk;sxkA leLr vko';d vfHkys[kksa ij fopkj djus ,oa<br />
deZpkjh dks] ;fn og izca/k lfefr ds le{k Lo;a mifLFkr<br />
gksuk pkgs] lquokbZ ds i'pkr izca/k&lfefr vihy ij fu.kZ;<br />
nsxhA<br />
prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh dks ;g Hkh vf/kdkj gksxk fd<br />
mldh vihy ij fd;s x;s izca/k lfefr ds fu.kZ; ds fo:)<br />
og ftyk fon~;ky; fujh{kd e.Myh; ckfydk fon~;ky;<br />
fujhf{kdk dks] fu.kZ; lwfpr fd;s tkus dh frfFk ls ,d ekg<br />
ds vUnj lE;kosnu dj ldsxkA<br />
fdUrq izfrcU/k ;g gksxk fd ;fn izca/k lfefr mi;qZDr<br />
fu/kkZfjr N% lIrkg dh v<strong>of</strong>/k ds Hkhrj viuk fu.kZ; mijksDr<br />
vihy ij u ns rks lEcaf/kr deZpkjh viuk vH;kosnu lh/ks<br />
ftyk fon~;ky; fujh{kd e.Myh; ckfydk fon~;ky; fujhf{kdk<br />
dks mijksDr N% lIrkg dh v<strong>of</strong>/k chr tkus ij ns ldrk gSA<br />
ftyk fon~;ky; fujh{kd e.Myh; ckfydk fon~;ky; fujhf{kdk<br />
}kjk mijksDr vH;kosnu ij vH;kosnu dh izkfIr dh frfFk ls<br />
vf/kdre rhu ekg ds Hkhrj fu.kZ; ns fn;k tk;sxk vkSj ;g<br />
fu.kZ; vfUre gksxkA<br />
vH;kosnu ds izLrqrhdj.k] fopkj ,oa fu.kZ; ds laca/k esa<br />
vko';d ifjorZu ds lkFk bl v/;k; ds f<strong>of</strong>u;e 86 ls<br />
92 ykxw gksxsA"<br />
24. Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 100 <strong>of</strong> Chapter III<br />
inserted by the said Notific<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 1, 4 to 8, 10, 11, 15, 24 to 26,<br />
30, 32 to 34, 36 to 38, 40 to 43, 45 to 52,<br />
66, 67, 70 to 73 and 76 to 82 with<br />
necessary modific<strong>at</strong>ions have been made<br />
applicable in the case <strong>of</strong> Class IV<br />
employee. Unamended Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 has<br />
not been applicable.<br />
25. From a reading <strong>of</strong> amended<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 it is clear th<strong>at</strong> as far as<br />
employees who are employed by<br />
Committee <strong>of</strong> Management a different<br />
procedure has been prescribed but as<br />
regards Class IV employees, different<br />
procedure has been prescribed before<br />
passing an order <strong>of</strong> punishment. In case <strong>of</strong><br />
an employee other than Class IV<br />
employee it is Committee <strong>of</strong> Management<br />
who has to impose punishment and such<br />
punishment cannot be made without prior
3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1057<br />
approval <strong>of</strong> the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools/Regional Inspectress <strong>of</strong> Girls<br />
Schools concerned. But in a case <strong>of</strong> Class<br />
IV employee the imposition <strong>of</strong><br />
punishment is made by the Principal or<br />
the Headmaster <strong>of</strong> the institution<br />
concerned and against the said order an<br />
appeal is maintainable before the<br />
Committee <strong>of</strong> Management <strong>of</strong> the<br />
institution within a prescribed time and<br />
after the dismissal <strong>of</strong> appeal by the<br />
management a right to make further<br />
represent<strong>at</strong>ion has been given within a<br />
prescribed time. The procedure for<br />
disposal <strong>of</strong> represent<strong>at</strong>ion by the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools is to be made in<br />
accordance with Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 86 and 98 <strong>of</strong><br />
the Regul<strong>at</strong>ions framed under the Act.<br />
26. This provision clearly makes<br />
distinction in the manner <strong>of</strong> imposition <strong>of</strong><br />
punishment. In case <strong>of</strong> Class IV<br />
employees no prior approval <strong>of</strong> the<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools is required.<br />
In case, the intention <strong>of</strong> the Legisl<strong>at</strong>ure<br />
had been to obtain prior approval <strong>of</strong> the<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools before<br />
imposition <strong>of</strong> penalty, the right <strong>of</strong> appeal<br />
could have not been given to the<br />
Management and thereafter a further right<br />
to make represent<strong>at</strong>ion to the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools.<br />
27. Learned counsel for respondent<br />
No. 2 has placed reliance upon the<br />
Committee <strong>of</strong> Management, Janta Inter<br />
College, Karni, Faizabad vs. District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools, Faizabad and<br />
others, 1981 U.P.L.B.E.C. 135, wherein it<br />
was held th<strong>at</strong> prior approval <strong>of</strong> the<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools is to be<br />
obtained to the decision <strong>of</strong> the Committee<br />
<strong>of</strong> Management to award punishment. It<br />
was a case <strong>of</strong> Class III employee and is<br />
not applicable to the facts <strong>of</strong> the present<br />
case.<br />
In Brij Raj Singh vs. District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools and other, 1988<br />
UPLBEC 123, it was held th<strong>at</strong> if the order<br />
<strong>of</strong> termin<strong>at</strong>ion is passed in viol<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 35 and 36 in termin<strong>at</strong>ing the<br />
services <strong>of</strong> a Class IV employee the same<br />
cannot be upheld. The court did not hold<br />
th<strong>at</strong> prior approval was necessary even in<br />
Class IV employees' services.<br />
In Shankar Sharan vs. Waslee Inter<br />
College, 1991(2) ALR 1, it was held th<strong>at</strong><br />
if the services <strong>of</strong> Class IV employee is<br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ed without giving opportunity <strong>of</strong><br />
hearing it is liable to be quashed. The<br />
decision was mainly based on the facts <strong>of</strong><br />
the case."<br />
28. The other decision, which has<br />
been cited <strong>at</strong> the Bar in support <strong>of</strong> the said<br />
proposition is th<strong>at</strong> <strong>of</strong> Swami Vivekanand<br />
Uchch<strong>at</strong>ar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Unnao<br />
and another Vs. District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools, Unnao and another, 1998 (3)<br />
A.W.C. 1940 (L.B.). We are not referring<br />
to any paragraph <strong>of</strong> the said judgment, as<br />
in our opinion, the same is not a case<br />
directly for the proposition as advanced<br />
before us as we shall explain it l<strong>at</strong>er on.<br />
29. The Division Bench decision, on<br />
the basis where<strong>of</strong> the conflict has been<br />
referred to be resolved by us, is the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Ali Ahmad Ansari Vs. District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools, Kushinagar and<br />
others (supra), where the Division Bench<br />
after having traced the various provisions<br />
held as follows:<br />
"8. Although the opening words <strong>of</strong><br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 provides th<strong>at</strong> punishment<br />
to employee requires prior sanction from<br />
the District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools or
1058 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
Regional Inspectress <strong>of</strong> Girls Schools but<br />
the l<strong>at</strong>er part <strong>of</strong> the said regul<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
provides th<strong>at</strong> Principal or the Headmaster<br />
would be competent to give the above<br />
punishment to Class-IV employee. The<br />
first part <strong>of</strong> the said regul<strong>at</strong>ion specifically<br />
provide th<strong>at</strong> prior sanction from Inspector<br />
for awarding punishment to employee is<br />
necessary whereas in the next part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
said regul<strong>at</strong>ion it is said th<strong>at</strong> for Class-IV<br />
employee the Principal or Headmaster<br />
would be competent to give punishment.<br />
Further with regard to punishment<br />
awarded to a Class-IV employee, right <strong>of</strong><br />
appeal has been given to the employee<br />
before the Management Committee within<br />
one month. The Class-IV employee has<br />
also been given right <strong>of</strong> represent<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
against the decision <strong>of</strong> the Management<br />
Committee on his appeal to the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools. The proviso to the<br />
said regul<strong>at</strong>ion further provides th<strong>at</strong> if the<br />
Management Committee does not give a<br />
decision on the appeal <strong>of</strong> the employee<br />
within six weeks, the employee has right<br />
to represent the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools directly. Had the prior approval<br />
for awarding the punishment to the Class<br />
IV employee was also required, there was<br />
no object and purpose for giving the right<br />
<strong>of</strong> represent<strong>at</strong>ion to the same authority.<br />
The provisions <strong>of</strong> seeking prior approval<br />
for awarding punishment from the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools and the provisions<br />
for right <strong>of</strong> represent<strong>at</strong>ion to the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools cannot go together.<br />
The above intend is further clear from the<br />
subsequent regul<strong>at</strong>ions <strong>of</strong> Chapter-III, i.e.,<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 44 and 44-A. Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 44<br />
clearly mentions th<strong>at</strong> the Inspector or<br />
Regional Inspectress shall for the purpose<br />
<strong>of</strong> proceedings as envisaged in subsection<br />
3(a) <strong>of</strong> Section 16(G) <strong>of</strong> the Act or<br />
for adjudic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> proposed punishment<br />
against any employee <strong>of</strong> clerical cadre<br />
within six weeks <strong>of</strong> receipt <strong>of</strong> complete<br />
proposal inform the Management about<br />
his decision. Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 44-A further<br />
provides th<strong>at</strong> Inspector or Regional<br />
Inspectress may accept or reject the<br />
punishment proposed in respect <strong>of</strong><br />
employee <strong>of</strong> clerical cadre. Had the prior<br />
approval <strong>of</strong> Inspector was also<br />
contempl<strong>at</strong>ed for Class-IV employees<br />
under Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31, the mention <strong>of</strong> only<br />
Class-III employee in Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 44 and<br />
44-A would not have been there.<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 44 and 44-A are extracted<br />
below:<br />
"44. The Inspector or Regional<br />
Inspectress shall for the purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
proceedings as envisaged in sub-section<br />
3(a) <strong>of</strong> Section 16(g) <strong>of</strong> the Act or for<br />
adjudic<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> proposed punishment<br />
against any employee <strong>of</strong> clerical cadre<br />
within six weeks <strong>of</strong> receipt <strong>of</strong> complete<br />
proposal inform the Management about<br />
his/her decision. If incomplete proposal is<br />
received from the Management, the<br />
sanctioning authority shall ask to resubmit<br />
the complete proposal and period<br />
<strong>of</strong> six weeks as proposed in this<br />
regul<strong>at</strong>ion would be counted from the d<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> receipt <strong>of</strong> complete papers to the<br />
sanctioning authority. These papers may<br />
be sent either by registered post or by<br />
special bearer.<br />
44-A. (1) The Inspector or<br />
Inspectress may accept or reject the<br />
punishment proposed in respect <strong>of</strong><br />
employees <strong>of</strong> clerical cadre. He may<br />
either extend or reduce it :<br />
Provided th<strong>at</strong> Inspector or Inspectress<br />
would give a notice to the concerned<br />
employee before issuing an order in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> punishment to show cause<br />
within fifteen days <strong>of</strong> service <strong>of</strong> the notice<br />
as to why he should not be punished as<br />
proposed.
3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1059<br />
Either party within a period <strong>of</strong> one<br />
month from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> receipt <strong>of</strong><br />
inform<strong>at</strong>ion may appeal to the Regional<br />
Deputy Director <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion against an<br />
order <strong>of</strong> Inspector or Inspectress and<br />
Regional Deputy Director <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion,<br />
after any such additional enquiry, if any,<br />
which he may deem fit, can affirm or<br />
cancel or modify the order, which will be<br />
final. On appeal <strong>of</strong> an employee, decision<br />
<strong>of</strong> Regional Deputy Director <strong>of</strong> Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
would be given within a period <strong>of</strong> three<br />
months."<br />
30. The scheme <strong>of</strong> the Regul<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
31 to 45 <strong>of</strong> Chapter-III, thus, do not<br />
provide th<strong>at</strong> prior approval is required for<br />
awarding punishment <strong>of</strong> removal or<br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> a Class-IV employee from<br />
the District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools."<br />
31. Learned counsel, appearing for<br />
the employees, namely Sri Harish<br />
Chandra Singh and Sri R.C. Singh, have<br />
urged th<strong>at</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31, clearly<br />
stipul<strong>at</strong>es th<strong>at</strong> the Conditions <strong>of</strong> Service<br />
<strong>of</strong> all Employees <strong>of</strong> an Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e<br />
College including Class-IV employees are<br />
to be governed by the same and,<br />
therefore, the decision by the Division<br />
Bench in the case <strong>of</strong> Ali Ahmad Ansari<br />
Vs. District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools,<br />
Kushinagar And Others (supra) does not<br />
lay down the law correctly.<br />
32. Sri R.C. Singh vehemently urged<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the opening part <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31<br />
leaves no room for doubt th<strong>at</strong> prior<br />
approval is required for all class <strong>of</strong><br />
punishments referred to therein in respect<br />
<strong>of</strong> all employees and th<strong>at</strong> such prior<br />
approval cannot be excluded. He contends<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the l<strong>at</strong>ter part <strong>of</strong> the procedure, which<br />
makes provision for appeal from the<br />
decision <strong>of</strong> the Head <strong>of</strong> the Institution to<br />
the Committee <strong>of</strong> Management and<br />
further represent<strong>at</strong>ion to the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools does not take away<br />
the power <strong>of</strong> granting prior approval.<br />
33. He further submits th<strong>at</strong><br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37, which carves out a proviso<br />
in respect <strong>of</strong> Class-IV employees, not<br />
obliging the disciplinary authority to<br />
forward papers for approval, does not<br />
curtail the powers <strong>of</strong> District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools to grant prior approval. He<br />
contends th<strong>at</strong> if such an interpret<strong>at</strong>ion is<br />
given, then Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 would become<br />
redundant and, therefore, the principle <strong>of</strong><br />
harmonious construction should be<br />
applied for which, he drew support from<br />
the conclusion drawn by the learned<br />
Single Judge in the case <strong>of</strong> Daya Shankar<br />
Tewari (supra). He further contends th<strong>at</strong><br />
Class-IV employees are clearly covered<br />
by Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31, and if the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure<br />
has omitted the use <strong>of</strong> specific words,<br />
then the said gap or omission, being an<br />
accidental omission, should be filled in by<br />
this <strong>Court</strong> by applying the tools <strong>of</strong><br />
purposive interpret<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
34. Shri R.C. Singh in his written<br />
submissions has also invited the <strong>at</strong>tention<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong> to the general principles<br />
rel<strong>at</strong>ing to addition <strong>of</strong> words when<br />
permissible and the duty <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong> to<br />
avoid anomalies and ambiguity including<br />
inconsistencies and repugnancies. The<br />
rules <strong>of</strong> interpret<strong>at</strong>ion, as enunci<strong>at</strong>ed in<br />
Chapter II <strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>utory Rules <strong>of</strong><br />
Interpret<strong>at</strong>ion by Justice G.P. Singh, have<br />
been pressed into service. He contends<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the <strong>Court</strong> should avoid a construction<br />
th<strong>at</strong> was never intended by the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure<br />
and the provisions made for the protection<br />
<strong>of</strong> an employee should be construed in a<br />
manner th<strong>at</strong> it provides for a complete<br />
umbrella under the law to an employee,
1060 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
designed for protection <strong>of</strong> his interest<br />
against any arbitrary action by the<br />
disciplinary authority.<br />
35. The submission is th<strong>at</strong> the level<br />
<strong>of</strong> s<strong>at</strong>isfaction <strong>at</strong> the time <strong>of</strong> grant <strong>of</strong> prior<br />
approval by the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools would be different and would be<br />
<strong>of</strong> a far lesser intensity, as <strong>at</strong> th<strong>at</strong> point <strong>of</strong><br />
time, he has to simply accord his approval<br />
and not enter into the validity or<br />
otherwise <strong>of</strong> the merits <strong>of</strong> the charges for<br />
punishment. He contends th<strong>at</strong> if the<br />
provision is read in this way, then there<br />
would be no embarrassment to the<br />
Committee <strong>of</strong> Management to hear an<br />
appeal against an order <strong>of</strong> dismissal even<br />
if there is a prior approval and the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools would not be<br />
deprived <strong>of</strong> his authority to decide a<br />
represent<strong>at</strong>ion on merits, which he can do<br />
uninfluenced by the prior approval<br />
granted by him. It is urged th<strong>at</strong> when an<br />
appeal or represent<strong>at</strong>ion is filed, then the<br />
level <strong>of</strong> investig<strong>at</strong>ion and the scope <strong>of</strong><br />
power exercised would be entirely<br />
different from th<strong>at</strong> <strong>at</strong> the stage <strong>of</strong> prior<br />
approval being granted <strong>at</strong> the time <strong>of</strong><br />
dismissal. He, therefore, submits th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
omission by the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure and keeping in<br />
view the provisions <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31, 37<br />
and 100, this <strong>Court</strong> should interpret the<br />
provisions so as to resolve the conflict by<br />
pressing into service the recital in the title<br />
heading <strong>of</strong> Section 16-G, which has<br />
neither been considered or interpreted<br />
from this angle in any <strong>of</strong> the decisions<br />
which have been cited by the Bar.<br />
36. Sri Harish Chandra Singh has<br />
supported the same contentions and<br />
submitted th<strong>at</strong> the view expressed by this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> in Daya Ram Tewari's (supra) case,<br />
as upheld by the Division Bench l<strong>at</strong>er on<br />
should be approved as laying down the<br />
correct law.<br />
37. Sri R.K. Ojha, Sri R.C. Dwivedi<br />
and Sri Yadav, for the employers, namely<br />
the Principal <strong>of</strong> the Institution have relied<br />
their submissions in spite <strong>of</strong> only a couple<br />
<strong>of</strong> decisions in their favour, to urge th<strong>at</strong><br />
the entire Scheme <strong>of</strong> the Act is clear<br />
enough to hold th<strong>at</strong> prior approval <strong>of</strong> the<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools is not<br />
contempl<strong>at</strong>ed and any such interpret<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
would be a viol<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the provisions<br />
resulting in absurdity. They contend th<strong>at</strong><br />
this situ<strong>at</strong>ion has arisen on account <strong>of</strong> the<br />
decision in Principal, Shitladin Inter<br />
College, (supra) having not been noticed<br />
either in Daya Shankar Tewari's (supra)<br />
case or any <strong>of</strong> the l<strong>at</strong>ter decisions. On the<br />
strength <strong>of</strong> his written submissions, he<br />
also invited the <strong>at</strong>tention <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong> to<br />
the fact th<strong>at</strong> the Division Bench decision<br />
in the case <strong>of</strong> Principal, Rashtriya Inter<br />
College (supra) holding th<strong>at</strong> prior<br />
approval was necessary and approving the<br />
decision <strong>of</strong> Daya Shankar Tewari's<br />
(supra) case was put in jeopardy before<br />
the Apex <strong>Court</strong> in Special Leave Petition<br />
No.2337 <strong>of</strong> 2001, wherein initially the<br />
judgment <strong>of</strong> the Division Bench was<br />
stayed by the Apex <strong>Court</strong> in the following<br />
terms:<br />
"The Hon'ble Supreme <strong>Court</strong> by<br />
filing Special Leave petition, numbered as<br />
Appeal (Civil) no.2337 <strong>of</strong> 2001 and<br />
Hon'ble Apex <strong>Court</strong> in its interim order<br />
was pleased to pass following orders:<br />
"LA 1 is allowed.<br />
It is contended th<strong>at</strong> the action under<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion in question does not require<br />
prior approval <strong>of</strong> the Inspector in the Case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Class IV employee and further more
3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1061<br />
the action in question was taken on the<br />
basis <strong>of</strong> the complaint and order <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Inspector himself.<br />
Issue notice.<br />
Stay in the meanwhile.<br />
Sd/ B.N. Kirpal J.<br />
Sd/ Ruma Pal, J."<br />
38. It has been st<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong> the said<br />
appeal was even though dismissed on<br />
02.11.2001, yet the question <strong>of</strong> law raised<br />
therein was left open to be decided. The<br />
said order <strong>of</strong> the Apex <strong>Court</strong> is quoted<br />
below :<br />
"Leaving the question <strong>of</strong> law open,<br />
the Special Leave petition is dismissed."<br />
39. Relying on the decision <strong>of</strong> Shri<br />
Shitladin Inter College (supra) case and<br />
the l<strong>at</strong>ter Division Bench judgment in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Ali Ahmad Ansari (supra), Sri<br />
Ojha contends th<strong>at</strong> the words <strong>of</strong><br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 read with Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37,<br />
are unambiguous and clear enough, which<br />
do not require any purposive<br />
interpret<strong>at</strong>ion as suggested by the other<br />
side and further, the history <strong>of</strong> various<br />
amendments brought about in Section 16-<br />
G and the Regul<strong>at</strong>ions framed would<br />
clearly demonstr<strong>at</strong>e th<strong>at</strong> had the<br />
legisl<strong>at</strong>ure intended to bring about any<br />
such provision seeking prior approval,<br />
then the same would have been expressly<br />
included, and the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure or the<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion making authority having not<br />
done so, there is no occasion for this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> to read into the provisions, the<br />
requirement <strong>of</strong> a prior approval in respect<br />
<strong>of</strong> a punishment to be awarded to a Class-<br />
IV employee. He further submits th<strong>at</strong> if<br />
th<strong>at</strong> is done, then it would be encroaching<br />
upon the function <strong>of</strong> the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure or the<br />
rule making authority, which our <strong>Court</strong>s<br />
have held to be outside their jurisdiction<br />
and even otherwise, there is no necessity<br />
<strong>of</strong> doing so, as there is an ample<br />
protection in the Act making room for<br />
reconsider<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>at</strong> the stage<br />
<strong>of</strong> appeal before the Committee <strong>of</strong><br />
Management and by way <strong>of</strong> a<br />
represent<strong>at</strong>ion even thereafter to the<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools himself.<br />
40. Mr. Ojha further submits th<strong>at</strong><br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37 clarifies the position, where<br />
the sending <strong>of</strong> reports for the purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
approval has been clearly excluded, and<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 stands specifically<br />
excluded in the m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong> Class-IV<br />
employees by way <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 100. He<br />
submits th<strong>at</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31, therefore,<br />
cannot be read beyond for which it has<br />
been intended, and he further submits th<strong>at</strong><br />
if such a provision was necessary, then<br />
the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure could have done it, as was<br />
done in the case <strong>of</strong> Class-III employees<br />
by introducing Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 44 and 44-A <strong>of</strong><br />
the Regul<strong>at</strong>ions under Chapter III<br />
aforesaid, which have been already<br />
quoted and reproduced hereinbefore while<br />
referring to Ali Ahmad Ansari's case.<br />
41. He submits th<strong>at</strong> if the<br />
interpret<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> having a prior approval is<br />
accepted, then it would be an anomalous<br />
situ<strong>at</strong>ion where the Committee <strong>of</strong><br />
Management would hear an appeal in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> a decision taken after approval<br />
by a higher authority, namely the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools. This incongruity<br />
would further stand multiplied, if the<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools is called<br />
upon to hear a represent<strong>at</strong>ion in respect <strong>of</strong><br />
the same m<strong>at</strong>ter, for which he has granted<br />
prior approval.<br />
42. He further submits th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
words 'prior approval' in respect <strong>of</strong> the<br />
punishments referred to in Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31
1062 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
also envisage the examin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
m<strong>at</strong>ter by the District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools<br />
on merits, and it is for this reason th<strong>at</strong> all<br />
documents are required to be sent to the<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools, as per<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37. However for Class-IV<br />
employees, such documents would not be<br />
required to be sent to the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools and the entire<br />
procedure has to be followed by the<br />
disciplinary authority, i.e., the Head <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Institution in the instant case. Sri Ojha,<br />
therefore, submits th<strong>at</strong> this provision itself<br />
specifically excludes the exercise <strong>of</strong><br />
power by the District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools<br />
to grant prior approval, as he cannot enter<br />
into the merits <strong>of</strong> the charges nor the<br />
papers in respect there<strong>of</strong> are required to<br />
be sent to the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools. He submits th<strong>at</strong>, fortified with<br />
the decisions in the case <strong>of</strong> Ali Ahmad<br />
Ansari (supra) and Principal, Shitladin<br />
Inter College (supra), his submissions<br />
should be accepted and the r<strong>at</strong>io in the<br />
aforesaid two decisions should be<br />
approved as laying down the correct law.<br />
43. Sri M.C. Ch<strong>at</strong>urvedi, learned<br />
Chief Standing Counsel for the St<strong>at</strong>e with<br />
the aid <strong>of</strong> his written submissions and the<br />
decisions cited <strong>at</strong> the Bar, raised the same<br />
submissions, and urged th<strong>at</strong> the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools is under no legal<br />
oblig<strong>at</strong>ion to grant prior approval in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> the proposal <strong>of</strong> punishment<br />
against a Class - IV employee. He submits<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the word 'employees' occurring in the<br />
opening part <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 would<br />
stand restricted to such employees about<br />
whom reference has been made in the<br />
l<strong>at</strong>ter Regul<strong>at</strong>ions and a Class-IV<br />
employee would stand excluded by virtue<br />
<strong>of</strong> the specific provision contained in<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 100. He contends th<strong>at</strong> the r<strong>at</strong>io<br />
<strong>of</strong> the decision in the case <strong>of</strong> Daya<br />
Shankar Tewari's (supra) does not lay<br />
down the correct position <strong>of</strong> law<br />
inasmuch as the <strong>Court</strong> could not have<br />
read into a provision by employing any<br />
tool <strong>of</strong> interpret<strong>at</strong>ion, so as to include<br />
something, which has been specifically<br />
excluded. He contends th<strong>at</strong> the wisdom <strong>of</strong><br />
the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure cannot be doubted as the<br />
legisl<strong>at</strong>ure will be presumed to be<br />
conscious <strong>of</strong> the existence <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
31, while framing Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 100, and<br />
when there is a conscious departure by<br />
excluding the applicability <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
31, then in th<strong>at</strong> event, it would be<br />
inappropri<strong>at</strong>e for this <strong>Court</strong> to read into a<br />
provision, which has not been made<br />
applicable. He submits th<strong>at</strong> in the event<br />
the interpret<strong>at</strong>ion as contended by the<br />
other side is accepted, the same would<br />
result in incongruity and would not be in<br />
accordance with the Scheme <strong>of</strong> the Act<br />
and Regul<strong>at</strong>ions referred to hereinabove.<br />
44. Having heard learned counsel<br />
for the parties, it would be appropri<strong>at</strong>e for<br />
us to declare the law on the basis <strong>of</strong> first<br />
principles underlying the interpret<strong>at</strong>ion on<br />
the basis where<strong>of</strong> the dispute has to be<br />
resolved. This is necessary in view <strong>of</strong> the<br />
conflict <strong>of</strong> the two Division Bench<br />
decisions, as pointed out in the referring<br />
order.<br />
45. Before proceeding to do so, we<br />
may, <strong>at</strong> the very outset, record th<strong>at</strong><br />
another Division Bench decision rel<strong>at</strong>ing<br />
to the same subject, which arose out <strong>of</strong> a<br />
reference in a second appeal and which<br />
was not cited <strong>at</strong> the Bar, has come to our<br />
notice and which, in our opinion,<br />
substantially answers the issues referred<br />
before us. The same is reported in 2006<br />
(65) ALR Page 767 Pujari Yadav Vs. Ram<br />
Briksh Yadav decided on 09.10.2006. The<br />
said decision has distinguished the r<strong>at</strong>io <strong>of</strong>
3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1063<br />
the decisions in the case <strong>of</strong> Daya Shankar<br />
Tewari (supra) as approved in Principal<br />
Rashtriya Inter College (supra), by<br />
tracing the legisl<strong>at</strong>ive history <strong>of</strong> Section<br />
16-G <strong>of</strong> the Act and Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31, and<br />
has proceeded to approve and follow the<br />
view taken by the Division Bench in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Ali Ahmad Ansari (supra),<br />
thereby holding th<strong>at</strong> it is not necessary to<br />
seek prior approval <strong>of</strong> the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools before termin<strong>at</strong>ing<br />
the services <strong>of</strong> a Class-IV employee. Our<br />
task therefore, has been rendered more<br />
convenient and our burden is lessened.<br />
46. The Scheme <strong>of</strong> the provisions as<br />
contained in Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 clearly<br />
demonstr<strong>at</strong>es th<strong>at</strong> the said Regul<strong>at</strong>ion uses<br />
the word 'employees' in the opening<br />
sentence, where the recital is th<strong>at</strong> prior<br />
sanction from the Inspector would be<br />
essential for awarding any <strong>of</strong> the<br />
punishments as enumer<strong>at</strong>ed from Sl. No.<br />
1 to 4 therein. The word 'employees' has<br />
not been defined under the U.P.<br />
Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Educ<strong>at</strong>ion Act, 1921.<br />
However, the said word employee has<br />
been defined under Section 2 (f) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Uttar Pradesh <strong>High</strong> Schools and<br />
Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Colleges (Payment <strong>of</strong><br />
Salaries <strong>of</strong> Teachers and other<br />
Employees) Act, 1971 as follows :<br />
"2. Definitions .- ''employee' <strong>of</strong> an<br />
institution means a non-teaching<br />
employee in respect <strong>of</strong> whose<br />
employment maintenance grant is paid by<br />
the St<strong>at</strong>e Government to the institution ;"<br />
47. In our opinion, the word<br />
'employees' occurring in the opening<br />
words <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 does not include<br />
Class - IV employees, as it is clearly<br />
distinct in its oper<strong>at</strong>ion as compared to the<br />
definition <strong>of</strong> the word 'employees'<br />
occurring in Section 2(f) <strong>of</strong> U.P. Act No.<br />
24 <strong>of</strong> 1971. The reason is not far to see. In<br />
the Regul<strong>at</strong>ions framed under Chapter III,<br />
a specific procedure has been carved out<br />
for taking disciplinary action against<br />
Class-IV employees, whereas in U.P. Act<br />
No.24 <strong>of</strong> 1971, the purpose is distinct,<br />
namely the payment <strong>of</strong> salary to all the<br />
employees who receive the same, as a<br />
result <strong>of</strong> extension <strong>of</strong> benefit <strong>of</strong> grant-inaid<br />
given by the government. Thus, the<br />
purpose for which the said words have<br />
been used in the two enactments are<br />
clearly different and, therefore, the word<br />
''employee' as understood in U.P. Act<br />
No.24 <strong>of</strong> 1971 is altogether in a different<br />
context. It is well settled th<strong>at</strong> the same<br />
words used in separ<strong>at</strong>e st<strong>at</strong>utes may not<br />
connote the same meaning as they oper<strong>at</strong>e<br />
in different fields.<br />
48. Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 was amended<br />
twice, firstly by notific<strong>at</strong>ion d<strong>at</strong>ed 1st<br />
March, 1975 and subsequently vide<br />
notific<strong>at</strong>ion d<strong>at</strong>ed 27th February, 1978.<br />
The Division Bench judgment in the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Pujari Yadav Vs. Ram Briksh Yadav<br />
(supra) clarified and interpreted the<br />
aforesaid amendments in Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31<br />
and the impact there<strong>of</strong> was discussed in<br />
paragraph 21 to 23 <strong>of</strong> the said decision<br />
which is as follows :<br />
"21. The Board has framed regul<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
under section 15 <strong>of</strong> the Act. Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31<br />
<strong>of</strong> Chapter - III <strong>of</strong> the Regul<strong>at</strong>ion (see<br />
Appendix-II <strong>of</strong> the judgment) provides<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the prior approval <strong>of</strong> the Inspector<br />
will be necessary for the punishments<br />
enumer<strong>at</strong>ed therein. This includes<br />
dismissal also which is the case in<br />
present. Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 unlike section 16-<br />
G(3) <strong>of</strong> the Act is not confined to the<br />
teachers and Head <strong>of</strong> Institutions but<br />
refers to the 'employees' which prima
1064 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
facie include non-teaching staff as well as<br />
Class-IV employees also.<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 has been amended twice:<br />
By the Notific<strong>at</strong>ion No.789 (1)/15 (7)-75<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 1st March 1975 published vide No.<br />
Board-7/562-V-8 (Board September,<br />
1974) <strong>Allahabad</strong> d<strong>at</strong>ed 10th March 1975<br />
(the 1975 Notific<strong>at</strong>ion). By this<br />
notific<strong>at</strong>ion two clauses were added in<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31.<br />
By Notific<strong>at</strong>ion No.8372/15 (7)-<br />
12(103)/77 Lucknow: d<strong>at</strong>ed 27th<br />
February 1978 (the 1978 Notific<strong>at</strong>ion). By<br />
this Notific<strong>at</strong>ion the two clause added by<br />
the 1975 Notific<strong>at</strong>ions were modified.<br />
The effect <strong>of</strong> the first clause added by the<br />
1975 Notific<strong>at</strong>ion was to empower the<br />
principal to award any punishment to<br />
Class-IV employees and his order is<br />
subject to appeal before the Committee <strong>of</strong><br />
Management. The second clause provides<br />
further appeal to the D.I.O.S./Regional<br />
Inspector. These clauses are further<br />
amended by the 1978 Notific<strong>at</strong>ion,<br />
however substantially they remain the<br />
same."<br />
49. Thereafter, the <strong>Court</strong> came to the<br />
conclusion th<strong>at</strong> in view <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid<br />
amendments as noted above and the<br />
addition <strong>of</strong> the two clauses in Regul<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
31, the Principal or Headmaster <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Institution became competent to termin<strong>at</strong>e<br />
the services <strong>of</strong> a Class-IV employee with<br />
further provision <strong>of</strong> an appeal and a<br />
represent<strong>at</strong>ion to the Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools<br />
thereafter. The Division Bench carefully<br />
examined the impact <strong>of</strong> the said<br />
amendments and came to the conclusion<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the purpose <strong>of</strong> including the two<br />
clauses as brought by way <strong>of</strong> amendments<br />
in 1975 and 1978, clearly establish th<strong>at</strong><br />
the Principal is empowered to termin<strong>at</strong>e<br />
the services <strong>of</strong> a Class-IV employee<br />
without taking prior approval <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Inspector. Such a decision by the<br />
Principal or Headmaster was to be final,<br />
subject to an appeal before the Committee<br />
<strong>of</strong> Management and then a further appeal<br />
to the Inspector. The relevant paragraphs<br />
<strong>of</strong> the said judgment namely paragraphs<br />
24 to 26 are quoted below :<br />
"24. The services in the present case<br />
were termin<strong>at</strong>ed on 12.6.1977 and as such<br />
the Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 as amended by the<br />
1975 notific<strong>at</strong>ion was applicable. The<br />
question is, whether Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 as<br />
amended by the 1975 Notific<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
requires prior approval <strong>of</strong> the Inspector<br />
before termin<strong>at</strong>ing the services a Class-IV<br />
employee or not.<br />
It is correct th<strong>at</strong> the cases (mentioned<br />
in paragraph 19 <strong>of</strong> this judgment) do<br />
support the submission <strong>of</strong> the plaintiffappellant.<br />
However, these cases have not<br />
taken into account the amendment made<br />
in Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 by the 1975 or 1978<br />
Notific<strong>at</strong>ion. They have taken into<br />
account Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 as it was originally<br />
framed. These cases have not considered<br />
the Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31as amended from time<br />
to time and cannot be pressed to show th<strong>at</strong><br />
prior approval was necessary before<br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ing services <strong>of</strong> Class-IV<br />
employees. This question has to be<br />
decided in the light <strong>of</strong> the Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31<br />
<strong>of</strong> Chapter-III as amended.<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 as it was originally<br />
framed required prior approval <strong>of</strong> the<br />
D.I.O.S. before termin<strong>at</strong>ing service <strong>of</strong> an<br />
employee. However, after addition <strong>of</strong> two<br />
clauses in Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 in 1975 it clearly<br />
empowered the principal to termin<strong>at</strong>e the<br />
services <strong>of</strong> Class-IV employee. It further<br />
provided an appeal to the Committee <strong>of</strong><br />
Management and thereafter to the<br />
Inspector itself. In case prior approval <strong>of</strong>
3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1065<br />
Inspector was necessary before<br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ing services <strong>of</strong> Class-IV<br />
employee then wh<strong>at</strong> was the point in<br />
providing appeal first to the Committee <strong>of</strong><br />
Management and then to the Inspector. In<br />
case the Inspector has already granted<br />
approval for termin<strong>at</strong>ing the service then<br />
can he change his decision in the appeal.<br />
In our opinion the purpose <strong>of</strong> including<br />
two clauses by 1975 notific<strong>at</strong>ion, which<br />
continued with some modific<strong>at</strong>ion by<br />
1978 notific<strong>at</strong>ion, clearly show th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
principal is empowered to termin<strong>at</strong>e the<br />
services <strong>of</strong> the Class-IV employee<br />
without taking any prior approval <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Inspector and his decision is final; it is<br />
subject to an appeal before the Committee<br />
<strong>of</strong> Management then to the appeal before<br />
the Inspector."<br />
50. We have given our thoughtful<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion to the aforesaid reasoning<br />
given in the decision <strong>of</strong> Pujari Yadav<br />
(supra) and we find th<strong>at</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31<br />
stands qualified by making an express and<br />
separ<strong>at</strong>e provision for the procedure to be<br />
followed in the case <strong>of</strong> Class-IV<br />
employees and, therefore, the word<br />
'employees' occurring in the opening<br />
sentence <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 does not<br />
include within its fold, a Class-IV<br />
employee. It is for this reason th<strong>at</strong><br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 to th<strong>at</strong> extent stood<br />
excluded in its applicability to Class-IV<br />
employees. To our mind, the Regul<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
making Authority was conscious <strong>of</strong> the<br />
amendments brought about in Regul<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
31 in 1975 and 1978, and it is for the said<br />
reason th<strong>at</strong> the applicability <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
31 to th<strong>at</strong> extent has not been included in<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 100. The reasoning given in<br />
Pujari Yadav's case (supra) has our firm<br />
approval as we find th<strong>at</strong> the amendments<br />
bring about a sea-change <strong>of</strong> procedure in<br />
rel<strong>at</strong>ion to Class-IV employees with an<br />
exclusive dominant role assigned to the<br />
Head <strong>of</strong> the institution for taking<br />
disciplinary action. These amendments,<br />
which were introduced stepwise, in our<br />
opinion, exclude the role <strong>of</strong> the Inspector<br />
<strong>of</strong> Schools <strong>at</strong> the stage <strong>of</strong> taking action by<br />
the disciplinary authority. The<br />
amendments clearly and unambiguously,<br />
which have been quoted in detail in<br />
Appendix A to the judgment in Pujari<br />
Yadav's case (supra), exhibit the intention<br />
<strong>of</strong> the rule making authority to clothe the<br />
Head <strong>of</strong> the institution with exclusive<br />
powers <strong>of</strong> initial disciplinary control<br />
unfettered by any prior sanction from any<br />
other authority.<br />
51. With pr<strong>of</strong>ound respect, we find<br />
fallacy in the reasoning <strong>of</strong> learned Single<br />
Judge, in the case <strong>of</strong> Daya Shankar<br />
Tewari (supra) as upheld by the Division<br />
Bench in the case <strong>of</strong> Principal, Rashtriya<br />
Inter College (supra) and quoted<br />
hereinabove. The learned Single Judge in<br />
Daya Shankar Tewari's case proceeded on<br />
a consider<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> Section 16-G (3) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Act, and held th<strong>at</strong> the said provision<br />
provides for Conditions <strong>of</strong> Service <strong>of</strong> all<br />
employees including Class-IV employees<br />
as well. According to the learned Single<br />
Judge, Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 <strong>of</strong> Chapter III, so<br />
framed would, therefore, apply to a Class-<br />
IV employee and in order to explain the<br />
impact <strong>of</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 100, held th<strong>at</strong> even<br />
if, Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 had not been made<br />
specifically applicable, yet the same was<br />
not c<strong>at</strong>egorically excluded.<br />
52. Apart from the reasons given by<br />
the Division Bench in the case <strong>of</strong> Pujari<br />
Yadav (supra) hereinabove, we may<br />
further add th<strong>at</strong> there is a legal principle<br />
engrained in the maxim "expressum facit<br />
cessare tacitum". The said maxim means<br />
when there is express mention <strong>of</strong> certain
1066 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
things, then anything not mentioned is<br />
excluded. The aforesaid well-known<br />
maxim was described as a principle <strong>of</strong><br />
logic and commonsense and not merely a<br />
technical rule <strong>of</strong> construction. Reference<br />
may be had to the decision in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
B. Shankara Rao Badami Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
Mysore, [1969 (1) SCC 9] and followed<br />
in Union <strong>of</strong> India Vs. Tulsiram P<strong>at</strong>el<br />
[(1985) 3 SCC 398] [paragraph 70].<br />
53. In our opinion, the aforesaid<br />
principle squarely applies in the present<br />
context and for the reasons given<br />
hereinabove and hereinafter, we would<br />
interpret Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 read with<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 100 to mean th<strong>at</strong> the sanction<br />
<strong>of</strong> prior approval in respect <strong>of</strong> the<br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> a Class-IV employee<br />
would stand excluded. The reasoning<br />
given by the learned Single Judge in Daya<br />
Shanakar Tiwari (supra) to th<strong>at</strong> extent<br />
does not lay down the law correctly and,<br />
therefore, its approval by the Division<br />
Bench in the case <strong>of</strong> Principal Rashtriya<br />
Inter College, (supra) also cannot be said<br />
to be laying correct law.<br />
54. There is yet another reason to<br />
come to this conclusion, which has also<br />
been taken note <strong>of</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong> Pujari<br />
Yadav (supra). The provision <strong>of</strong> appeal<br />
against an order <strong>of</strong> termin<strong>at</strong>ion passed by<br />
the Head <strong>of</strong> the Institution lies to the<br />
Committee <strong>of</strong> Management. The order <strong>of</strong><br />
the Committee <strong>of</strong> Management can be put<br />
in jeopardy in a further appeal before the<br />
District Inspector Schools. The hierarchy<br />
so provided, therefore, clearly amplifies<br />
the intention <strong>of</strong> the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure th<strong>at</strong> a<br />
Class-IV employee would have the<br />
benefit <strong>of</strong> appeals to the higher authorities<br />
<strong>at</strong> two stages. If a prior approval or<br />
sanction was intended before the<br />
punishment to be awarded, then the<br />
District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools would be<br />
supposed to go into the merits <strong>of</strong> such a<br />
punishment. Th<strong>at</strong> is the purpose for a<br />
prior approval or sanction, which requires<br />
the sanctioning authority to examine an<br />
order <strong>of</strong> punishment in depth before<br />
proceeding to grant sanction. It is for this<br />
reason th<strong>at</strong> Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37 quoted<br />
hereinabove, makes it imper<strong>at</strong>ive for the<br />
punishing authority to send all documents<br />
including reports to the Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools for approval.<br />
55. There is yet another reason to<br />
come to the same conclusion. Regul<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
37 specifically excludes for sending <strong>of</strong><br />
any such report to the Inspector in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Class-IV employees and all<br />
proceedings in rel<strong>at</strong>ion to Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37<br />
have to be undertaken by the appointing<br />
authority. The aforesaid st<strong>at</strong>utory<br />
provision, therefore, does not allow the<br />
sending <strong>of</strong> any such documents to the<br />
Inspector in the case <strong>of</strong> Class-IV<br />
employees. It injuncts the sending <strong>of</strong> any<br />
such papers to the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools for examin<strong>at</strong>ion. In our opinion,<br />
the intention <strong>of</strong> the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure is clear<br />
enough th<strong>at</strong> the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools is not required to examine the<br />
m<strong>at</strong>erial on the basis where<strong>of</strong> any<br />
punishment has been awarded to a Class-<br />
IV employee. To our mind, there is no<br />
purpose to seek prior approval or sanction<br />
when the Inspector cannot examine the<br />
documents, which are necessary for<br />
granting such sanction. To interpret it<br />
otherwise, would be to do viol<strong>at</strong>ion to the<br />
procedure, which specifically st<strong>at</strong>es th<strong>at</strong><br />
all proceedings in this regard have to be<br />
performed by the appointing authority,<br />
namely the Head <strong>of</strong> the Institution. If we<br />
interpret the provisions making it<br />
compulsory to obtain a sanction, then the<br />
aforesaid procedure as engrained in
3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1067<br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 37 would be rendered<br />
inoper<strong>at</strong>ive. There being no requirement<br />
<strong>of</strong> sending the papers to the Inspector, the<br />
intention appears to be clear th<strong>at</strong> the role<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Inspector stands excluded <strong>at</strong> th<strong>at</strong><br />
stage. The question <strong>of</strong> granting prior<br />
sanction without any purpose would be a<br />
meaningless exercise, and therefore, we<br />
would refrain from rendering an<br />
interpret<strong>at</strong>ion th<strong>at</strong> leads to futility.<br />
56. While applying the rules <strong>of</strong><br />
harmonious construction, the <strong>Court</strong> has to<br />
be cautious in interpreting the provisions,<br />
which may lead to anomalous results. We<br />
find it apt to record th<strong>at</strong> the rules <strong>of</strong><br />
harmonious construction, while<br />
interpreting such st<strong>at</strong>utes, immedi<strong>at</strong>ely<br />
come into play in a situ<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
present kind and reference in this<br />
connection can be made from<br />
Interpret<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> St<strong>at</strong>ues by Justice<br />
Markandey K<strong>at</strong>ju in which it has been<br />
st<strong>at</strong>ed as follow:<br />
"Where different interpret<strong>at</strong>ions <strong>of</strong> a<br />
st<strong>at</strong>ute are possible, the court can adopt<br />
th<strong>at</strong> which is just, reasonable and sensible<br />
as it can be presumed th<strong>at</strong> the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure<br />
would have used the words in the sense<br />
which least <strong>of</strong>fends our sense <strong>of</strong> justice.<br />
Similarly, if the harmonical construction<br />
leads to some absurd or repugnant result<br />
or inconsistency with the rest <strong>of</strong> the<br />
instrument, it may be departed from so as<br />
to avoid th<strong>at</strong> absurdity and inconsistency.<br />
There may be cases where there appears<br />
to be inconsistency or repugnancy in a<br />
st<strong>at</strong>ute and in such cases the principle <strong>of</strong><br />
harmonious construction is applied. This<br />
is, however, subject to the principle th<strong>at</strong><br />
the special rule will override the general<br />
rule. Similarly, it is ordinarily not open to<br />
the court to add words to a st<strong>at</strong>ute on the<br />
grounds th<strong>at</strong> there is an omission in the<br />
words used in the st<strong>at</strong>ute."<br />
(Interpret<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> St<strong>at</strong>utes, by Justice<br />
Markandey K<strong>at</strong>ju, Judge Supreme <strong>Court</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong> India.)<br />
57. In the case <strong>of</strong> Padmasundara<br />
Rao and others Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Tamil Nadu<br />
and others, [AIR 2002 SCC 1334], a<br />
Constitution Bench <strong>of</strong> the Supreme <strong>Court</strong><br />
ruled th<strong>at</strong> the principle <strong>of</strong> casus omissus<br />
can be permitted to be pressed into<br />
service in case <strong>of</strong> a clear necessity and<br />
when reason for it is found in the four<br />
corners <strong>of</strong> the st<strong>at</strong>ute itself but <strong>at</strong> the same<br />
time a casus omissus should not be<br />
readily inferred.<br />
58. In the case <strong>of</strong> Magor and St.<br />
Mellons Rural District Council Vs.<br />
Newport Corpor<strong>at</strong>ion, [(1951) 2 All E.R.<br />
839], the remarks <strong>of</strong> Lord Denning in the<br />
<strong>Court</strong> <strong>of</strong> Appeals has been quoted, which<br />
read as follows :<br />
"We sit here to find out the intention<br />
<strong>of</strong> Parliament and Ministers and carry it<br />
out, and we do this better by filling in the<br />
gaps and making sense <strong>of</strong> the enactment<br />
than by opening it up to destructive<br />
analysis."<br />
59. It has also been held by the<br />
Supreme <strong>Court</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong> Rao Shiv<br />
Bahadur Singh and another Vs. The St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> Vindhya Pradesh [AIR 1953 SCC 394]<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the <strong>Court</strong> has to avoid a construction,<br />
which may render devoid any part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
st<strong>at</strong>ute. It has been held by the Supreme<br />
<strong>Court</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong> Nasiruddin and<br />
others Vs. Sita Ram Agarwal [(2003) 2<br />
SCC 577] in paragraph 37 th<strong>at</strong> the use <strong>of</strong><br />
neg<strong>at</strong>ive words are mand<strong>at</strong>ory in<br />
character and the <strong>Court</strong> has to proceed<br />
accordingly. Sounding a caution to the<br />
<strong>Court</strong>s while interpreting a Rule, the
1068 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
Supreme <strong>Court</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong> St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
Kerala and Another Vs. P.V. Neelakandan<br />
Nair and others [(2005) 5 SCC 561] in<br />
paragraphs 8 to 16 held th<strong>at</strong> while<br />
interpreting a Rule, <strong>at</strong>tention should be<br />
paid not only to wh<strong>at</strong> has been said, but<br />
also to wh<strong>at</strong> has not been said. The Rule<br />
has to be interpreted not like a Euclid's<br />
theorem, but with some imagin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
the purposes, which lie behind the Rule.<br />
A Full Bench <strong>of</strong> the Andhra Pradesh <strong>High</strong><br />
<strong>Court</strong> in B. Prabhav<strong>at</strong>hi Vs. Govt. <strong>of</strong><br />
Andhra Pradesh, [2002 (3) ESC 108] in<br />
paragraph 44 ruled th<strong>at</strong> Rules framed<br />
under the Act should be harmoniously<br />
interpreted as they form part <strong>of</strong> the Act.<br />
60. Having considered the principles<br />
enunci<strong>at</strong>ed and referred to hereinabove<br />
and applying them to the present<br />
controversy, it is clear to us th<strong>at</strong> nothing<br />
has been omitted by the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure, which<br />
may require filling up by the <strong>Court</strong> as<br />
suggested by Sri R.C. Singh. As<br />
explained hereinabove in Pujari Yadav<br />
(supra), the rule making authority itself<br />
proceeded to fill in the gaps by making<br />
express recitals in Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 31, 37, 100<br />
and the other provisions rel<strong>at</strong>ing thereto.<br />
The amendments in Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 lead to<br />
a heavy full stop to the role <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Inspector and is not a silent comma<br />
expressing doubt. The same brings about<br />
a clarity which has an almost window<br />
pave effect and removes the cloud <strong>of</strong><br />
doubt th<strong>at</strong> has been raised to be resolved<br />
by us.<br />
61. There is yet another principle,<br />
which deserves to be taken notice <strong>of</strong>. If<br />
the sanction is required prior to giving<br />
effect to a punishment in respect <strong>of</strong> a<br />
Class-IV employee, then the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools would hear an appeal<br />
against his own approval. This, to our<br />
mind, would bring about an anomaly,<br />
which may extend to an absurdity. The<br />
same authority cannot be presumed to<br />
have been conferred with a power to hear<br />
an appeal against its own approval. This<br />
would be rendering nug<strong>at</strong>ory the<br />
hierarchy provided for in Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31<br />
itself, where an appeal is provided to the<br />
Committee <strong>of</strong> Management against the<br />
order <strong>of</strong> disciplinary authority and a<br />
further appeal to the Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools.<br />
The purpose, therefore, is clear enough<br />
and it does not suffer from any ambiguity<br />
which may require us to render an<br />
interpret<strong>at</strong>ion, which otherwise would<br />
bring about an incongruous result. As<br />
observed above, the Rules <strong>of</strong><br />
Interpret<strong>at</strong>ion as enunci<strong>at</strong>ed by the Apex<br />
<strong>Court</strong> do not permit us to give an<br />
interpret<strong>at</strong>ion, which would obviously<br />
result in a clear anomaly as pointed out<br />
hereinabove. This we adopt, as the law<br />
permits us to apply 'the intention seeking'<br />
Rule <strong>of</strong> Interpret<strong>at</strong>ion to illustr<strong>at</strong>e the<br />
anomaly th<strong>at</strong> may result in the event we<br />
accept the proposition th<strong>at</strong> a prior<br />
sanction is required.<br />
62. A feeble submission raised by<br />
Sri R.C. Singh was th<strong>at</strong> the District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools has to merely grant<br />
prior approval and not to make an indepth<br />
examin<strong>at</strong>ion, as <strong>at</strong> th<strong>at</strong> stage, he<br />
would be proceeding as if to perform a<br />
routine work. Such an action would not,<br />
therefore, prevent him from hearing an<br />
appeal when the m<strong>at</strong>ter may arise out <strong>of</strong><br />
an appeal before the Committee <strong>of</strong><br />
Management.<br />
63. We are not inclined to accept the<br />
aforesaid submission for the simple<br />
reason th<strong>at</strong> the District Inspector <strong>of</strong><br />
Schools, in our opinion, does not perform<br />
a mere ministerial act while granting
3 All] Rishikesh Lal Srivastava V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1069<br />
sanction. We agree with the submission <strong>of</strong><br />
Sri Ojha th<strong>at</strong> a combined reading <strong>of</strong><br />
Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 31 and 37 makes it amply<br />
clear th<strong>at</strong> the District Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools<br />
is not required to undertake any such<br />
exercise, which is to be done only by the<br />
Head <strong>of</strong> the Institution in the case <strong>of</strong> Class<br />
- IV employees. The submission is,<br />
therefore, devoid <strong>of</strong> substance and has<br />
been noted only to be rejected.<br />
64. We have also perused the notes<br />
submitted by Sri R.C. Singh annexing<br />
therewith the General Principles <strong>of</strong><br />
Interpret<strong>at</strong>ion as contained in Chapter II<br />
<strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>utory Rules <strong>of</strong> Interpret<strong>at</strong>ion,<br />
by Justice G.P. Singh. Having given our<br />
anxious consider<strong>at</strong>ion to the said Rules, as<br />
contained therein and as pointed out by<br />
Sri R.C. Singh, we find th<strong>at</strong> said Rules on<br />
the contrary milit<strong>at</strong>e against the<br />
submissions as advanced on behalf <strong>of</strong> the<br />
employees pointed out hereinabove. The<br />
aforesaid principles have been considered<br />
in a large number <strong>of</strong> authorities and the<br />
conclusion drawn is th<strong>at</strong> the intent and<br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> the provisions in the light <strong>of</strong><br />
the enactment made, has to be considered<br />
in order to avoid any absurdity. We have<br />
already pointed out th<strong>at</strong> by a reading <strong>of</strong><br />
the Regul<strong>at</strong>ions, it is more than clear th<strong>at</strong><br />
the Rule making authority clearly<br />
intended to exclude the applicability <strong>of</strong><br />
prior sanction as contained in Regul<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
31 in respect <strong>of</strong> Class-IV employees. To<br />
add further, would be repe<strong>at</strong>ing wh<strong>at</strong> has<br />
already been observed hereinabove.<br />
65. Another aspect <strong>of</strong> the m<strong>at</strong>ter,<br />
which clarifies the intention <strong>of</strong> the Rule<br />
making authority as pointed out by Sri<br />
R.K. Ojha is th<strong>at</strong> in respect <strong>of</strong> Class-III<br />
employees, Regul<strong>at</strong>ions 44 and 44-A were<br />
expressly included under Chapter III,<br />
which envisage a separ<strong>at</strong>e procedure in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> disciplinary action for the<br />
clerical cadre <strong>of</strong> employees. This<br />
however, illustr<strong>at</strong>es th<strong>at</strong> the Rule making<br />
authority did not apply any other<br />
provision to Class-IV employees and<br />
specifically empowered the Head <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Institution, namely the Principal or the<br />
Headmaster to take action <strong>at</strong> his end in<br />
respect <strong>of</strong> a disciplinary proceeding<br />
against a Class-IV employee. The<br />
aforesaid illustr<strong>at</strong>ion further removes the<br />
cloud and expresses clarity on a<br />
comparison <strong>of</strong> the provisions th<strong>at</strong> had<br />
been referred to hereinabove.<br />
66. Responding to the submissions<br />
th<strong>at</strong> were raised, Sri M.C. Ch<strong>at</strong>urvedi,<br />
learned Chief Standing Counsel appears<br />
to be right in his submissions th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
Rule making authority clearly intended to<br />
restrict the meaning <strong>of</strong> the word<br />
'employees' occurring in Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 in<br />
accordance with Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 100 to mean<br />
th<strong>at</strong> a prior sanction would not be<br />
required in the case <strong>of</strong> a Class-IV<br />
employee. We accept his submission th<strong>at</strong><br />
the wisdom <strong>of</strong> the legisl<strong>at</strong>ure should not<br />
be doubted and the Rule making authority<br />
will be presumed to be conscious <strong>of</strong> the<br />
departure th<strong>at</strong> was deliber<strong>at</strong>ely made for<br />
the procedure to be adopted in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Class-IV employees.<br />
67. Having laid threadbare the first<br />
principles on which we have interpreted<br />
the provisions, we have no hesit<strong>at</strong>ion in<br />
coming to the conclusion th<strong>at</strong> there is no<br />
requirement under the Regul<strong>at</strong>ions for a<br />
prior sanction or approval <strong>of</strong> the Inspector<br />
<strong>of</strong> Schools in respect <strong>of</strong> order <strong>of</strong><br />
termin<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> Class-IV employees.<br />
68. Coming to the decisions th<strong>at</strong><br />
have been cited <strong>at</strong> the Bar, we may point<br />
out th<strong>at</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong> Shankar Saran Vs.
1070 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
Vesli Inter College (supra), the learned<br />
Single Judge has merely recorded<br />
conclusions without discussing the impact<br />
<strong>of</strong> the provisions, and it appears th<strong>at</strong> no<br />
such issues were raised therein to<br />
contradict the opinion <strong>of</strong> the requirement<br />
<strong>of</strong> a prior sanction. The decision in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Daya Shankar Tewari (supra),<br />
which was rendered in the year 1998,<br />
unfortun<strong>at</strong>ely did not take notice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
decision in the case <strong>of</strong> Principal,<br />
Shitladin Inter College (supra), which had<br />
been rendered way back in 1994 itself.<br />
The decision in the case <strong>of</strong> Principal<br />
Shitladin Inter College (supra), in our<br />
opinion, has correctly construed the<br />
provisions and we accordingly, approve<br />
the same.<br />
69. Unfortun<strong>at</strong>ely, the Division<br />
Bench judgment in the case <strong>of</strong> Principal<br />
Rashtriya Inter College (supra), which<br />
approved the decision in the case <strong>of</strong> Daya<br />
Shankar Tewari (supra) also did not<br />
notice the reasoning given by the learned<br />
Single Judge in the case <strong>of</strong> Principal,<br />
Shitladin Inter College (supra). The same<br />
was religiously followed in the<br />
subsequent decisions in the case <strong>of</strong> Sita<br />
Ram (supra) as well as in the decision <strong>of</strong><br />
Ram Khelawan Maurya Vs. District<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools (supra).<br />
70. On the other hand, the Division<br />
Bench decision in the case <strong>of</strong> Ali Ahmad<br />
Ansari (supra) also did not take notice <strong>of</strong><br />
the earlier Division Bench decision in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Rashtriya Inter College (supra)<br />
and while holding th<strong>at</strong> no prior<br />
approval/sanction is required, the said<br />
Division Bench also appears to have not<br />
been apprised <strong>of</strong> the decision in the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Principal Shitladin Inter College<br />
(supra). The other decision in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Swami Vivekanand Uchch<strong>at</strong>ar<br />
Madhyamik Vidyalaya (supra), in our<br />
opinion, does not dwell upon the<br />
controversy presently involved and does<br />
not contain any discussion on the issue<br />
raised in the present m<strong>at</strong>ter, as such a<br />
reference to the said decision by the<br />
learned counsel is <strong>of</strong> no assistance in<br />
resolving the present dispute. As noticed<br />
above, the <strong>Court</strong> has come across the<br />
Division Bench decision in Pujari Yadav<br />
(supra), which has substantially answered<br />
the question referred before us and having<br />
taken notice <strong>of</strong> the same, we fully approve<br />
the view taken therein.<br />
71. In view <strong>of</strong> the conclusions, as<br />
drawn hereinabove, we are respectfully<br />
unable to agree with the view expressed<br />
in Daya Shankar Tiwari's case as upheld<br />
by the Division Bench in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Principal Rastriya Inter College (supra)<br />
and followed l<strong>at</strong>er on in the decisions <strong>of</strong><br />
learned Single Judges referred to<br />
hereinabove.<br />
72. We approve the view taken in<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> Principal, Shitladin Inter<br />
College (supra), the Division Bench<br />
judgment in the case <strong>of</strong> Ali Ahmad Ansari<br />
(supra) and the decision in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Pujari Yadav (supra) as laying down the<br />
correct law.<br />
73. Our answer to the questions<br />
referred to us are as under :<br />
(i) For awarding a punishment as<br />
enumer<strong>at</strong>ed under Regul<strong>at</strong>ion 31 Chapter<br />
III <strong>of</strong> the U.P. Intermedi<strong>at</strong>e Educ<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
Act, 1921 to a Class-IV employee <strong>of</strong> a<br />
institution recognized under the aforesaid<br />
Act, no prior approval or sanction from<br />
the Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools is required.<br />
(ii) The Division Bench judgments in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Ali Ahmad Ansari Vs. District
3 All] M<strong>at</strong>loob Gaur V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and another 1071<br />
Inspector <strong>of</strong> Schools, Kushinagar<br />
[2006(3) ESC 1765 (All)] and Pujari<br />
Yadav Vs. Ram Briksh Yadav [2006(65)<br />
ALR 767] lay down the correct law in<br />
contradistinction to the Division Bench<br />
judgment <strong>of</strong> Principal, Rashtriya Inter<br />
College, Bali Nichlaul, District<br />
Maharajganj And Others [(2000) 1<br />
UPLBEC 707] and the other judgments to<br />
th<strong>at</strong> effect.<br />
The reference is answered accordingly.<br />
74. Let the papers be placed before<br />
the learned Single Judges before whom<br />
the writ petitions are pending to proceed<br />
with the m<strong>at</strong>ter in the light <strong>of</strong> the answers<br />
given by us in the present reference.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.10.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE SUNIL AMBWANI, J.<br />
THE HON’BLE RAN VIJAY SINGH, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.7751 <strong>of</strong> 2009<br />
M<strong>at</strong>loob Gaur<br />
…Petitioner<br />
Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and another …Respondents<br />
Counsel for the Petitioner:<br />
Sri Kesari N<strong>at</strong>h Trip<strong>at</strong>hi<br />
Sri Suneet Kumar<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
Sri Devendra Kumar<br />
S.C.<br />
U.P. Nagar Palika Adhiniyam 1916-<br />
Section 48 (2) (b) Removal <strong>of</strong> chairman<br />
<strong>of</strong> Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong> burden <strong>of</strong> Pro<strong>of</strong><br />
wrongly shifted upon petitionersalleg<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
not fall within the meaning <strong>of</strong><br />
misconduct- No concern with the duty<br />
discharged by petitioner-held- order <strong>of</strong><br />
removal- illegal<br />
Held: Para 19<br />
On the aforesaid discussion we find th<strong>at</strong><br />
the St<strong>at</strong>e Government not only wrongly<br />
placed the burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> the<br />
charges on the petitioner to be disproved<br />
by him, but also failed to discuss the<br />
evidence led by the petitioner. The<br />
charge No.1 had no concern with the<br />
misconduct and did not fall in any <strong>of</strong> the<br />
grounds given in Section 48 (2) (b) and<br />
th<strong>at</strong> charge No.2 was wholly vague and<br />
was not rel<strong>at</strong>ed to the duties performed<br />
by the petitioner. The third and fourth<br />
charge, were also not proved against the<br />
petitioner.<br />
Case law discussed:<br />
2005(3) AWC 2818, 2000(3) ESC 1611(All),<br />
2005(4) AWC 3563.<br />
(Delivered by Hon’ble Sunil Ambwani, J.)<br />
1. Heard Shri Kesari N<strong>at</strong>h Trip<strong>at</strong>hi,<br />
Senior Advoc<strong>at</strong>e assisted by Shri Suneet<br />
Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner.<br />
Learned Standing Counsel appears for the<br />
respondents. Shri Devendra Kumar has<br />
entered cave<strong>at</strong> for the Administr<strong>at</strong>or and<br />
Executive Officer <strong>of</strong> the Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong>,<br />
Kithore, Distt. Meerut.<br />
2. Shri M<strong>at</strong>loob Gaur, the petitioner<br />
was elected as Chairman <strong>of</strong> Nagar<br />
Panchay<strong>at</strong>, Kithore, Distt. Meerut in<br />
<strong>Nov</strong>ember, 2006. A notice d<strong>at</strong>ed 5.2.2008<br />
was issued to him by the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government on 5th February, 2008 and<br />
was served upon him by the District<br />
Magistr<strong>at</strong>e, Meerut by his letter d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
8.2.2008 to show cause as to why he<br />
should not be remove from the post <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong> under<br />
Section 4 (2) (b) (ii), (iv), (ix), (x), (xi),<br />
(xii) and (xvii) <strong>of</strong> the U.P. Municipalities<br />
Act, 1916. The notice also contained an
1072 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
order by which the petitioner's financial<br />
and administr<strong>at</strong>ive powers under the<br />
proviso to Section 48 (2) <strong>of</strong> the U.P.<br />
Nagar Palika Adhiniyam, 1916 were<br />
ceased, and were directed to be exercised<br />
by the District Magistr<strong>at</strong>e, or an <strong>of</strong>ficer<br />
nomin<strong>at</strong>ed by the District Magistr<strong>at</strong>e, who<br />
shall not be Sub Divisional Magistr<strong>at</strong>e to<br />
exercise such powers until the petitioner<br />
is exoner<strong>at</strong>ed <strong>of</strong> the charge. The District<br />
Magistr<strong>at</strong>e by his communic<strong>at</strong>ion letter<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 8.2.2008 directed the Sub<br />
Divisional Officer, Mawana to exercise<br />
the financial and administr<strong>at</strong>ive powers,<br />
until the conclusion <strong>of</strong> the proceedings.<br />
3. The show cause notice contained<br />
four charges namely; (1) th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
petitioner had st<strong>at</strong>ed in his affidavit filed<br />
along with nomin<strong>at</strong>ion paper on<br />
5.10.2006 th<strong>at</strong> there was no case pending<br />
against him in any <strong>Court</strong>. He did not<br />
disclose the cases, which are pending<br />
against him and thus concealed the facts;<br />
(2) the log book d<strong>at</strong>ed 2.8.2007 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
consumption <strong>of</strong> diesel was only with<br />
regard to tractor. The tractor driver st<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the diesel is filled directly <strong>at</strong> the<br />
petrol pump and is not consumed<br />
separ<strong>at</strong>ely. No log book was maintained<br />
for the period prior to the period 2.8.2007,<br />
causing doubt over the consumption <strong>of</strong><br />
diesel; (3) the contract for parking place<br />
for the year 2007-08 <strong>of</strong> Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong><br />
Kithore, was settled by the petitioner in<br />
favour <strong>of</strong> his brother Shri Maro<strong>of</strong> Ahmad.<br />
Three persons namely Shri Maro<strong>of</strong><br />
Ahmad, Dilshad and Sher Mohammed<br />
particip<strong>at</strong>ed in the auction held on<br />
30.5.2007, whereas the amended bylaws<br />
were published in the gazette on<br />
14.7.2007. The petitioner viol<strong>at</strong>ed the<br />
conditions <strong>of</strong> Section 18 (b) (ii), which<br />
prohibits the Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Nagar<br />
Palika to give benefits to his family<br />
members either directly or indirectly; and<br />
(4) the plot No.908, 903, 935 are<br />
registered as a pond and is not in the<br />
possession <strong>of</strong> the Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Nagar<br />
Panchay<strong>at</strong>, but plot No.702, which is<br />
entered as 'kh<strong>at</strong>a kuria' (manure pits) has<br />
been used to construct a house for which a<br />
suit is pending in the civil court and th<strong>at</strong><br />
<strong>Court</strong> directed the parties to maintain<br />
st<strong>at</strong>us quo. In preliminary enquiry the<br />
charge was found fully proved against the<br />
Chairman.<br />
4. The petitioner in his reply d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
20.2.2009 after referring to the documents<br />
in his support denied the alleg<strong>at</strong>ions and<br />
submitted th<strong>at</strong> no enquiry was made from<br />
him nor any facts were placed before him.<br />
He has not misused the property and<br />
money <strong>of</strong> Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong> in any<br />
manner. With regard to alleg<strong>at</strong>ions in<br />
charge No.1 rel<strong>at</strong>ing to concealment <strong>of</strong><br />
the cases <strong>at</strong> the time <strong>of</strong> filing nomin<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
does not come within the purview <strong>of</strong><br />
Section 48 <strong>of</strong> the Nagar Palika<br />
Adhiniyam, 1916. He has not been<br />
convicted in any <strong>of</strong>fence, and th<strong>at</strong> in all<br />
the cases in which the decisions were<br />
made, the petitioner was either discharged<br />
or acquitted. Regarding Charge No.2 the<br />
petitioner st<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong> the consumption <strong>of</strong><br />
diesel rel<strong>at</strong>es to the tractor <strong>of</strong> Nagar<br />
Panchay<strong>at</strong>. The log book <strong>of</strong> the period<br />
prior to 2.8.2007 is available in the <strong>of</strong>fice<br />
<strong>of</strong> Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong> in which entreis have<br />
been made by the tractor driver. The<br />
petitioner has not used the diesel in any<br />
other vehicle or for any other purpose.<br />
The driver had st<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong> he directly fills<br />
the diesel in the tractor. The petitioner is<br />
not responsible for maintenance <strong>of</strong> the log<br />
book <strong>of</strong> the tractor. On charge No.3 the<br />
petitioner alleged th<strong>at</strong> Shri Maro<strong>of</strong><br />
Ahmad is a contractor <strong>of</strong> collecting<br />
parking fees from 1.4.2006, much before
3 All] M<strong>at</strong>loob Gaur V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and another 1073<br />
the petitioner was elected as Chairman. At<br />
th<strong>at</strong> time Shri Shams Parvez was the<br />
Chairman. There are no dues pending on<br />
Shri Maro<strong>of</strong> and th<strong>at</strong> Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong> has<br />
not sufferred any loss. The petitioner's<br />
brother Maro<strong>of</strong> Ahamd is living<br />
separ<strong>at</strong>ely from the petitioner and has<br />
r<strong>at</strong>ion card in his own name. The<br />
petitioner has no concern with his<br />
business. The contract <strong>of</strong> parking fees has<br />
been given in accordance with the rules<br />
and th<strong>at</strong> the contract settled after due<br />
execution vide public<strong>at</strong>ion in Amar Ujala<br />
and Punjab Kesari newspapers on<br />
17.5.2007, 23.5.2007 and 29.5.2007 was<br />
approved by the Board. The Munadi was<br />
also made in Nagar Kithore area on<br />
16.5.2007 and 21.5.2007 before auction<br />
was held on 30.5.2007. Shri Maro<strong>of</strong> was<br />
the highest bidder and as old contractor<br />
with no complaint against him, his highest<br />
bid was accepted and approved by the<br />
Board.<br />
5. On the last charge the petitioner<br />
st<strong>at</strong>ed in his reply th<strong>at</strong> Khasra No.702 is<br />
situ<strong>at</strong>ed in Mohalla Mausam Khani,<br />
Nagar Panchayt Kithore, whereas the<br />
petitioner's house is situ<strong>at</strong>e in Mohalla<br />
Badbaliyan Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong> Kithore.<br />
There is no dispute or suit pending in any<br />
<strong>Court</strong> rel<strong>at</strong>ing to Plot No.702 and th<strong>at</strong><br />
charge is entirely false and baseless. He<br />
further submitted th<strong>at</strong> the enquiry report<br />
has been prepared on the pressure<br />
exercised by Shri Munkad Ali, member <strong>of</strong><br />
Rajya Sabha/ leader <strong>of</strong> Bahujan Samaj<br />
Party. Shri Munkad Ali has illegally<br />
occupied Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong> land. The<br />
petitioner has initi<strong>at</strong>ed proceedings for his<br />
eviction from Khasra No.632 Kabristan<br />
and 633 Rasta belonging to Nagar<br />
Panchay<strong>at</strong> and had also made complaint<br />
to the Sub Divisional Magistr<strong>at</strong>e, Mawana<br />
on 24.9.2007 and 26.9.2007. A writ<br />
petition No.42015 <strong>of</strong> 2007 filed by the<br />
petitioner impleading Shri Munkad Ali as<br />
respondent is pending. The petitioner had<br />
defe<strong>at</strong>ed Shri Majid Ali, the brother <strong>of</strong><br />
Munkad Ali in the elections giving rise to<br />
the complaint against him. Khasra No.702<br />
is old abadi on which house <strong>of</strong> Farooq,<br />
Mashroor, Hazi Aarif, Shahid Manzoor<br />
and Shamshad have been constructed.<br />
6. It is alleged th<strong>at</strong> the Principal<br />
Secretary, Nagar Vikas Anubhag No.1<br />
fixed 27.8.2008 for hearing. The<br />
intim<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the d<strong>at</strong>e was received by the<br />
petitioner on 23.8.2008. On the d<strong>at</strong>e fixed<br />
no document was shown to the petitioner.<br />
The petitioner was required to submit his<br />
reply either orally or in writing. Since no<br />
further documents were relied upon, the<br />
petitioner st<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong> he has already given<br />
his reply in writing. The petitioner,<br />
thereafter, waited for a decision to be<br />
taken by the St<strong>at</strong>e Government. By an<br />
order d<strong>at</strong>ed 14.11.2008 giving rise to this<br />
writ petition the petitioner has been<br />
removed from the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the Chairman<br />
<strong>of</strong> Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong>, Kithore giving rise to<br />
this writ petition.<br />
7. Shri Keshari N<strong>at</strong>h Trip<strong>at</strong>hi,<br />
learned counsel for the petitioner submits<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the powers under Section 48 to<br />
remove the elected Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Nagar<br />
Panchay<strong>at</strong> should be sparingly exercised<br />
by the St<strong>at</strong>e Government. These powers<br />
cannot be compared with the powers <strong>of</strong><br />
misconduct <strong>of</strong> a government servant. An<br />
elected Chairman can be removed on the<br />
grounds given in Section 48 (2) (b) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 but th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
charge should be serious enough to<br />
initi<strong>at</strong>e the action and to exercise the<br />
powers <strong>of</strong> removal. In the present case the<br />
first charge rel<strong>at</strong>ing to the cases pending<br />
against the petitioner <strong>at</strong> the time <strong>of</strong> filing
1074 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
<strong>of</strong> the nomin<strong>at</strong>ion and the failure to<br />
disclose the pendency <strong>of</strong> the case can not<br />
be a ground <strong>of</strong> removal as the<br />
disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion under Section 12 (D) and<br />
Section 43 (AA) <strong>of</strong> the Act, may be<br />
incurred after the petitioner is elected.<br />
The St<strong>at</strong>e Government did not disclose<br />
the pendency <strong>of</strong> any case against the<br />
petitioner by giving the details and th<strong>at</strong><br />
the impugned order also does not give<br />
reference to the pendency <strong>of</strong> any case<br />
against the petitioner on the day, when he<br />
contested the election. The charge is not<br />
only vague but is also non existing and<br />
does not fall in any <strong>of</strong> the conditions <strong>of</strong><br />
exercise <strong>of</strong> powers under Section 48 (1)<br />
(b) <strong>of</strong> the Act.<br />
8. With regard to second charge<br />
rel<strong>at</strong>ing to the consumption <strong>of</strong> diesel, it is<br />
submitted th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner as Chairman<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong> was not directly<br />
concerned with the consumption <strong>of</strong> diesel<br />
and the supervision <strong>of</strong> the log book. The<br />
charge does not give the details <strong>of</strong> the<br />
consumption <strong>of</strong> the diesel and the alleged<br />
discrepancy in the log book. The<br />
alleg<strong>at</strong>ion th<strong>at</strong> the log book d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
2.8.2007 only rel<strong>at</strong>es to the diesel<br />
consumed by the tractor, and th<strong>at</strong> log<br />
book prior to 2.8.2007 was not maintained<br />
was entirely vague and did not allege or<br />
establish any misconduct against the<br />
petitioner. The petitioner had clearly<br />
st<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong> the maintenance <strong>of</strong> log book is<br />
a m<strong>at</strong>ter to be looked after by the<br />
Executive Officer and th<strong>at</strong> log book <strong>of</strong> the<br />
period prior to 2.8.2007 is available. The<br />
Executive Officer, incharge for<br />
maintaining log book may not have<br />
produced the same before the enquiry<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer but th<strong>at</strong> by itself could not be a<br />
ground to make an enquiry unless it was<br />
shown th<strong>at</strong> the diesel was misused.<br />
9. On the third charge the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government has illegally and arbitrarily<br />
accepted the report <strong>of</strong> the District<br />
Magistr<strong>at</strong>e th<strong>at</strong> the proceedings <strong>of</strong> auction<br />
held on 30.5.2007 should have awaited<br />
the selection <strong>of</strong> the parking place in<br />
accordance with the amended bylaws<br />
published on 14.7.2007, and th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
petitioner has not given any reply or<br />
evidence to disprove the fact. The<br />
Chairman has given direct benefit <strong>of</strong><br />
contract to his brother in viol<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
Section 48 (b) (2) <strong>of</strong> the Act and has thus<br />
committed an act, which makes him liable<br />
to be removed from the <strong>of</strong>fice. It is<br />
submitted by Shri K.N. Trip<strong>at</strong>hi th<strong>at</strong><br />
Section 48 (2) (b) (ii) rel<strong>at</strong>es to knowingly<br />
acquire or continued to have, directly or<br />
indirectly or by a partner, any share or<br />
interest, whether pecuniary or <strong>of</strong> any<br />
other n<strong>at</strong>ure, in any contract or<br />
employment with by or on behalf <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Municipality or (iii) knowingly acted as<br />
President or as a member in a m<strong>at</strong>ter other<br />
than a m<strong>at</strong>ter referred to in clauses (a) to<br />
(g) <strong>of</strong> sub-section (2) <strong>of</strong> Section 32, in<br />
which he has, directly or indirectly, or by<br />
a partner, any share or interest whether<br />
pecuniary or <strong>of</strong> any other n<strong>at</strong>ure, or in<br />
which he was pr<strong>of</strong>essionally interested on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> a client, principal or other<br />
person. There are no alleg<strong>at</strong>ion th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
petitioner has any pecuniary interest in the<br />
contract awarded to his brother, who was<br />
working as a contractor <strong>of</strong> the Nagar<br />
Panchay<strong>at</strong> from before the election <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner as Chairman. The alleg<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner had approved the<br />
contract before the m<strong>at</strong>ter could be<br />
considered by the Board is entirely<br />
incorrect as the petitioner as Chairman <strong>of</strong><br />
the Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong> did not approve the<br />
contract. The proceeding <strong>of</strong> the auction<br />
and the highest bid was approved by the
3 All] M<strong>at</strong>loob Gaur V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and another 1075<br />
Executive Officer and was approved by<br />
the Board.<br />
10. With regard to findings on the<br />
last alleg<strong>at</strong>ions Shri Kesari N<strong>at</strong>h Trip<strong>at</strong>hi<br />
submits th<strong>at</strong> the report <strong>of</strong> the District<br />
Magistr<strong>at</strong>e accepted by the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government was entirely vague and did<br />
not give the details either <strong>of</strong> the<br />
construction <strong>of</strong> the house or the pendency<br />
<strong>of</strong> the case. The petitioner had clearly<br />
st<strong>at</strong>ed in his reply th<strong>at</strong> his house was not<br />
constructed <strong>at</strong> Plot No.702 Mohalla Khani<br />
but was situ<strong>at</strong>ed in Mohalla Badbalian<br />
and th<strong>at</strong> infact the house <strong>of</strong> Farooq,<br />
Mashroor and others were constructed on<br />
the Khasra No.702 recorded as purani<br />
abadi. The St<strong>at</strong>e Government without<br />
considering the petitioner's reply has<br />
mechanically believed the report <strong>of</strong> the<br />
District Magistr<strong>at</strong>e in exercising the<br />
extreme powers <strong>of</strong> removal <strong>of</strong> elected<br />
Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong>.<br />
11. Shri Kesari N<strong>at</strong>h Trip<strong>at</strong>hi has<br />
relied upon the judgments in Munna Lal<br />
Gupta Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. & Ors., 2005<br />
(3) AWC 2818; Nasimuddin Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.P. & Ors., 2000 (3) ESC 1611 (All.)<br />
and Smt. Kesari Devi Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P.<br />
& Ors., 2005 (4) AWC 3563 in support<br />
<strong>of</strong> his submission th<strong>at</strong> the burden <strong>of</strong><br />
proving <strong>of</strong> charges is upon the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government. It cannot be shifted on the<br />
petitioner. An elected Chairman <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong> cannot be removed only<br />
on the ground th<strong>at</strong> he could not defend<br />
himself <strong>of</strong> the charges, which were<br />
entirely vague and were not supported by<br />
any m<strong>at</strong>erial in pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> the alleg<strong>at</strong>ions by<br />
the District Magistr<strong>at</strong>e. In Nasimuddin<br />
Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. (Supra) the <strong>Court</strong> relied<br />
upon Isr<strong>at</strong> Ali Khan Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. in<br />
finding th<strong>at</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e Government did not<br />
hold enqiry in a quasi judicial manner and<br />
found the charges to be proved without<br />
discussing the evidence on its merits. In<br />
Smt. Kesari Devi (Supra) this <strong>Court</strong> held<br />
th<strong>at</strong> in removing the elected<br />
represent<strong>at</strong>ive the St<strong>at</strong>e Government must<br />
record specific finding <strong>of</strong> misconduct on<br />
the charges after considering the m<strong>at</strong>erial<br />
placed by such elected represent<strong>at</strong>ive.<br />
12. Learned Standing Counsel on<br />
the other hand submits th<strong>at</strong> the charges<br />
were fully proved. The petitioner had<br />
misused his <strong>of</strong>fice. He was facing several<br />
criminal cases <strong>at</strong> the time, when he<br />
contested the elections and th<strong>at</strong> charge <strong>of</strong><br />
misuse <strong>of</strong> diesel in failing to maintain the<br />
log book properly and allowing his<br />
brother to be awarded the contract for<br />
parking place was sufficient to remove the<br />
petitioner. Further the petitioner had<br />
occupied public utility land in Khasra<br />
No.702 for constructing his house. The<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e Government considered the<br />
preliminary enqiry report and the reply<br />
submitted by the petitioner in taking<br />
action against him. The Writ Petition<br />
No.8761 <strong>of</strong> 2008, M<strong>at</strong>loob Gaur Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.P. against notice d<strong>at</strong>ed 5.2.2008 was<br />
dismissed by the <strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong> on 7.5.2008.<br />
He was given full and adequ<strong>at</strong>e<br />
opportunity to defend himself both by<br />
filing a reply in writing and to appear and<br />
making oral submissions. The preliminary<br />
enquiry report was found established<br />
against the petitioner. The complaint<br />
made by Hazi Rais Ahmad and Smt.<br />
Naeem, Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong> Kithore were<br />
supported by the affidavits verified by<br />
them and th<strong>at</strong> Regional Naib Tehsildar<br />
had caused an enquiry and found the<br />
alleg<strong>at</strong>ions to be proved. There is no<br />
illegality in the order <strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government to cause interference in the<br />
m<strong>at</strong>ter.
1076 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
13. A Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong> under<br />
Art.243 (Q) <strong>of</strong> the Constitution <strong>of</strong> India is<br />
a local body <strong>of</strong> a transitional area, in<br />
transition from a rural area to an urban<br />
area to which the elections are held in<br />
accordance with the procedure prescribed<br />
in the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. The<br />
Chairman is elected directly and th<strong>at</strong> his<br />
term is coterminous with the term <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Nagar Panchayt. He may resign in writing<br />
to the St<strong>at</strong>e Government and can be<br />
removed, under Section 48, where the<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e Government has <strong>at</strong> any time reason<br />
to believe th<strong>at</strong> (a) there has been a failure<br />
on the part <strong>of</strong> the President in performing<br />
his duties or th<strong>at</strong> he is under clause (b)<br />
incurred any <strong>of</strong> the disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion or<br />
conducted himself in a manner provided<br />
in the fifteen clauses <strong>of</strong> Clause (b) <strong>of</strong> subsection<br />
(2) <strong>of</strong> Section 48. The proceedings<br />
for removal must serve the principle <strong>of</strong><br />
n<strong>at</strong>ure justice and th<strong>at</strong> decision must show<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the authority had applied its mind to<br />
the alleg<strong>at</strong>ions made, the explan<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
furnished and the m<strong>at</strong>erial produced by<br />
the elected represent<strong>at</strong>ive.<br />
14. The elected public represent<strong>at</strong>ive<br />
<strong>of</strong> local body is accountable to his<br />
elector<strong>at</strong>e. His removal by the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government has serious consequence as<br />
the people, who had elected him, loose<br />
their voice to be represented by him. The<br />
power <strong>of</strong> judicial review, in such m<strong>at</strong>ters<br />
is limited but has to be exercised with<br />
caution. An elected represent<strong>at</strong>ive should<br />
ordinarily be allowed to complete his term<br />
for which he is elected. If the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government wants to curtail the term on<br />
any <strong>of</strong> the ground given in Section 48 (2)<br />
(b) <strong>of</strong> the Act, there must be a complaint<br />
on which a preliminary enquiry is made,<br />
and th<strong>at</strong> m<strong>at</strong>erial collected during the<br />
enquiry must be put to the elected<br />
represent<strong>at</strong>ive in the form <strong>of</strong> specific<br />
charge. The burden <strong>of</strong> proving such<br />
charges is upon the complainant. The<br />
charges must be specific and must contain<br />
all the details to submit effective reply.<br />
The findings must not only be based on<br />
m<strong>at</strong>erial but should also rel<strong>at</strong>e to the<br />
grounds given in detail in Section 48 (2)<br />
(b) <strong>of</strong> the Act. The St<strong>at</strong>e Government<br />
must consider and after enquiries serving<br />
the principles <strong>of</strong> n<strong>at</strong>ural justice find with<br />
reasons to be recorded in writing th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
alleg<strong>at</strong>ions are sufficiently serious to<br />
remove him from the elected <strong>of</strong>fice. The<br />
proviso to sub-section (2) (A) provides<br />
th<strong>at</strong> where the St<strong>at</strong>e Government has<br />
issued notice in respect <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> the<br />
grounds in clause (a) or sub-clause (ii),<br />
(iii), (iv), (vi), (vii) and (viii) <strong>of</strong> Clause<br />
(b) and sub-section (2), it may instead <strong>of</strong><br />
removing him, given him a warning.<br />
15. In the present case the charge<br />
No.1 against the petitioner did not fall in<br />
any <strong>of</strong> the clauses for removing the<br />
Chairman under Section 48 (2) <strong>of</strong> the Act.<br />
The disclosure <strong>of</strong> the pendency <strong>of</strong> the<br />
case, <strong>at</strong> the time <strong>of</strong> contesting the<br />
elections is a m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong> incurring<br />
disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion for contesting the<br />
elections with an object to inform the<br />
elector<strong>at</strong>e as well as to verify whether the<br />
person is qualified to contest the election<br />
<strong>of</strong> the President. Such a charge will not<br />
fall within the meaning <strong>of</strong> the ground in<br />
Section 48 (2) (b) (i), which provides for<br />
incurring any disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion mentioned<br />
in Section 12-D and 43 (aa) <strong>of</strong> the Act.<br />
Section 12-D <strong>of</strong> the Act provides for<br />
disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion for registr<strong>at</strong>ion in an<br />
electoral roll, such as the person is not a<br />
citizen <strong>of</strong> India or is <strong>of</strong> unsound mind,<br />
and so declared by the competent court or<br />
is for the time being disqualified from<br />
voting under the provisions <strong>of</strong> any law<br />
rel<strong>at</strong>ing to corrupt practice and other
3 All] M<strong>at</strong>loob Gaur V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and another 1077<br />
<strong>of</strong>fences in connection with elections. In<br />
such case his name has to be struck <strong>of</strong> the<br />
electoral roll. Section 43 AA provides for<br />
disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion for a Presidentship and<br />
which includes the disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion such<br />
as the person is not the elector for any<br />
ward or has not <strong>at</strong>tained the age <strong>of</strong> 30<br />
years on the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> his nomin<strong>at</strong>ion. A<br />
person is also disqualified under subsection<br />
(2) for being chosen and for being<br />
President <strong>of</strong> the municipality, if he is or<br />
has become subject to any disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) and for (i)<br />
to (k) <strong>of</strong> Section 13D. The failure to<br />
disclose the pendency <strong>of</strong> case is not a<br />
ground <strong>of</strong> disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion unless such<br />
case has resulted into the disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
for contesting the elections such as<br />
conviction for any <strong>of</strong>fence punishable<br />
with imprisonment under Section 171 (E)<br />
or under Section 17 (F) <strong>of</strong> the IPC, 1860<br />
in Section 13D (h) (ii) or sentence to<br />
imprisonment for contravention <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong><br />
the order under the Essential<br />
Commodities Act etc. or for an <strong>of</strong>fence,<br />
which is declared by the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government to involve such moral<br />
turpitude as to render him unfit to be a<br />
member etc. given in Section 13-D (h) (j)<br />
provided th<strong>at</strong> in case <strong>of</strong> (j) the<br />
disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion shall cease on the expiry<br />
<strong>of</strong> five years.<br />
16. The disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> a person<br />
to be elected as a member under Section<br />
12-D and the disqualific<strong>at</strong>ion to contest as<br />
a President under Section 43-AA can be a<br />
ground to file and declare the election <strong>of</strong><br />
the President to be invalid but th<strong>at</strong> these<br />
grounds cannot be the subject m<strong>at</strong>ter <strong>of</strong><br />
complaint and enquiry by the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government in removing a President<br />
under Section 48 <strong>of</strong> the Act.<br />
17. The second charge rel<strong>at</strong>ed to the<br />
negligence in maintaining the log book <strong>of</strong><br />
the use <strong>of</strong> diesel in the tractor <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong>. The charge only rel<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
to the maintenance <strong>of</strong> log book, which is<br />
the job <strong>of</strong> the driver and has to be<br />
supervised under Section 60 <strong>of</strong> the Act by<br />
the Executive Officer. The Act does not<br />
provide for supervision <strong>of</strong> maintenance <strong>of</strong><br />
log book and consumption <strong>of</strong> diesel to be<br />
made by the Chairman <strong>of</strong> the Nagar<br />
Panchay<strong>at</strong>. The St<strong>at</strong>e Government neither<br />
charged nor alleged any misuse <strong>of</strong> the<br />
diesel, purchased by the Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong>,<br />
by the petitioner. The charge, therefore,<br />
did not rel<strong>at</strong>e to the petitioner and any<br />
case did not prove any misuse <strong>of</strong> the<br />
property and assets <strong>of</strong> the Nagar<br />
Panchay<strong>at</strong>. In respect <strong>of</strong> third charge the<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e Government has found substance in<br />
the report <strong>of</strong> the District Magistr<strong>at</strong>e th<strong>at</strong><br />
the auction took place on 30.5.2007,<br />
whereas the amended bylaws for<br />
identifying the parking place were<br />
published on 14.7.2007 and th<strong>at</strong><br />
Chairman has not given any reply or<br />
evidence in this regard. The Chairman is<br />
not permitted to give any contract either<br />
directly or indirectly and th<strong>at</strong> he had<br />
approved the contract before it was placed<br />
before the Board. The St<strong>at</strong>e Government<br />
did not consider the petitioner's reply th<strong>at</strong><br />
the brother <strong>of</strong> the petitioner was already<br />
working as a contractor <strong>of</strong> the Nagar<br />
Panchay<strong>at</strong> prior to his election. He was<br />
living separ<strong>at</strong>ely and th<strong>at</strong> notific<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
the bylaws, was subsequent to the auction<br />
held after giving due publicity in which<br />
three persons had particip<strong>at</strong>ed. There was<br />
no finding th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner had obtained<br />
any financial gain or th<strong>at</strong> he had given<br />
any favour to his brother. The burden <strong>of</strong><br />
proving was also wrongly shifted upon<br />
the petitioner. No one had challenged<br />
settlement <strong>of</strong> the contract or th<strong>at</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fer
1078 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
was inadequ<strong>at</strong>e. There was no alleg<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
<strong>of</strong> any direct or indirect benefit accrued to<br />
the petitioner in respect <strong>of</strong> award <strong>of</strong> the<br />
contract to his brother. There are no<br />
findings on the reply given by the<br />
petitioner th<strong>at</strong> his brother is living<br />
separ<strong>at</strong>ely and has a separ<strong>at</strong>e r<strong>at</strong>ion card<br />
in his name and th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner had no<br />
concern with him.<br />
18. With regard to the last charge,<br />
once again the St<strong>at</strong>e Government wrongly<br />
placed the burden on the petitioner. There<br />
is no finding th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner's house is<br />
constructed on the Khasra No.702. On the<br />
contrary the finding is th<strong>at</strong> the Chairman<br />
could not prove by any evidence in his<br />
reply th<strong>at</strong> his house is not constructed <strong>at</strong><br />
Khasra No.702 and th<strong>at</strong> no case is<br />
pending in respect <strong>of</strong> his house on Khasra<br />
No.702 in any civil court or any revenue<br />
court filed either by the petitioner or his<br />
f<strong>at</strong>her. The St<strong>at</strong>e Government has not<br />
given clear finding with regard to<br />
construction <strong>of</strong> the house <strong>of</strong> the petitioner<br />
on public utility land and has not<br />
considered the petitioner's reply th<strong>at</strong> his<br />
house is not constructed on Khasra<br />
NO.702 but is actually constructed in<br />
Mohalla Badbaliyan. Further there was no<br />
finding on the reply given by the<br />
petitioner th<strong>at</strong> the house <strong>of</strong> Farooq,<br />
Mashroor and others are constructed on<br />
Khasra No.702.<br />
19. On the aforesaid discussion we<br />
find th<strong>at</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e Government not only<br />
wrongly placed the burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> the<br />
charges on the petitioner to be disproved<br />
by him, but also failed to discuss the<br />
evidence led by the petitioner. The charge<br />
No.1 had no concern with the misconduct<br />
and did not fall in any <strong>of</strong> the grounds<br />
given in Section 48 (2) (b) and th<strong>at</strong> charge<br />
No.2 was wholly vague and was not<br />
rel<strong>at</strong>ed to the duties performed by the<br />
petitioner. The third and fourth charge,<br />
were also not proved against the<br />
petitioner.<br />
20. Since we have found th<strong>at</strong> four<br />
charges levelled against the petitioner<br />
were not proved, we are not going into<br />
alleg<strong>at</strong>ions <strong>of</strong> malafide. We may,<br />
however, observe th<strong>at</strong> in order to remove<br />
an elected Chairman <strong>of</strong> Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong>,<br />
the St<strong>at</strong>e Government must have a good<br />
case, falling within the grounds given in<br />
Section 48 <strong>of</strong> the Act and on which the<br />
explan<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the person is not sufficient.<br />
The charges, even if proved, may not<br />
always result in a decision <strong>of</strong> removing<br />
him from the <strong>of</strong>fice. The St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government may exceed unless the<br />
charges are very serious giving him a<br />
warning in as much as a President<br />
removed under sub-section (2-A) shall<br />
also cease to be a member <strong>of</strong> the Nagar<br />
Panchay<strong>at</strong> and in case <strong>of</strong> his removal <strong>of</strong><br />
any <strong>of</strong> the ground mentioned in Clause (a)<br />
or sub-clauses (vi), (vii) or (viii) <strong>of</strong> clause<br />
(b) <strong>of</strong> sub-section (2) is not eligible under<br />
sub-section (4) for reelection as President<br />
or member for a period <strong>of</strong> five years from<br />
the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> his removal. This penalty<br />
clause put the St<strong>at</strong>e Government under a<br />
duty to remove a President only if the<br />
charges are serious and th<strong>at</strong> in the opinion<br />
<strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e Government the person does<br />
not deserve to continue in the <strong>of</strong>fice as the<br />
Chairman <strong>of</strong> Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong>. Each case,<br />
however, will depend upon its own facts.<br />
21. The writ petition is allowed. The<br />
order <strong>of</strong> the St<strong>at</strong>e Government d<strong>at</strong>ed 14th<br />
<strong>Nov</strong>ember, 2008 removing the petitioner<br />
from the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the Chairman <strong>of</strong> Nagar<br />
Panchay<strong>at</strong>, Kithore, Distt. Meerut is set<br />
aside. The petitioner shall be allowed to<br />
resume the charge, if the charge <strong>of</strong> the
3 All] Ashutosh Kumar Trip<strong>at</strong>hi V.St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others 1079<br />
Chairman, Nagar Panchay<strong>at</strong> has been<br />
taken away from him.<br />
----------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.08.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE AMITAVA LALA, J.<br />
THE HON’BLE SHISHIR KUMAR, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 40476 <strong>of</strong> 2009<br />
Ashutosh Kumar Trip<strong>at</strong>hi …Petitioner<br />
Versus<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others …Respondents<br />
Counsel for the Petitioner:<br />
Sri Bhanu Prakash Singh<br />
Sri Avinash Chandra Srivastava<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
Sri Amit Sthalekar<br />
S.C.<br />
U.P. Services (Reserv<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> Physically<br />
Handicapped, Dependent <strong>of</strong> Freedom<br />
fighter and Ex-Serviceman, Amendment<br />
Act-1997-Claim <strong>of</strong> 2% reserv<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
1556 post- can be done only by the st<strong>at</strong>e<br />
govt. with consult<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> <strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong>-<br />
Question <strong>of</strong> reserv<strong>at</strong>ion not approved by<br />
full bench- no such direction can be<br />
issued-petition dismissed.<br />
Held: Para 3<br />
We have also gone through the Full<br />
Bench judgement <strong>of</strong> our <strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong><br />
reported in 2005 (4) ESC 2378 (All)<br />
Sarika Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others where<br />
also it has been held th<strong>at</strong> the reserv<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
will be made, if required, for the judicial<br />
service by the St<strong>at</strong>e Government, then it<br />
should be made in consult<strong>at</strong>ion with the<br />
<strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong>. Therefore, when such Full<br />
<strong>Court</strong> <strong>of</strong> this <strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong> did not approve<br />
any such proposal for reserv<strong>at</strong>ion, we<br />
are <strong>of</strong> view th<strong>at</strong> the prayer <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner cannot be considered and as<br />
such writ petition is liable to be<br />
dismissed and is accordingly dismissed,<br />
however, without imposing any cost.<br />
Case law discussed<br />
2000 (IV) SCC 640, 2005 (4) ESC 2378 (All).<br />
(Delivered by Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.)<br />
1. This writ petition has been made<br />
to obtain an appropri<strong>at</strong>e direction upon<br />
the Registrar General <strong>of</strong> this <strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong><br />
to keep 2% <strong>of</strong> the posts in direct<br />
recruitment to U.P.H.J.S.- 09 reserved for<br />
the candid<strong>at</strong>es <strong>of</strong> dependent <strong>of</strong> freedom<br />
fighters. The learned counsel has relied<br />
upon U.P. Public Services (Reserv<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
Physically Handicapped, Dependence <strong>of</strong><br />
Freedom Fighters and Ex-servicemen)<br />
(Amendment) Act 1997. He said th<strong>at</strong> by<br />
way <strong>of</strong> amendment in Section 3 (1) there<br />
shall be reserv<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>at</strong> the stage <strong>of</strong> direct<br />
recruitment in public services i.e. two per<br />
cent <strong>of</strong> vacancies for dependents <strong>of</strong><br />
freedom fighters and one per cent <strong>of</strong><br />
vacancies for ex-servicemen.<br />
2. However, we have considered the<br />
Constitution Bench judgement <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Supreme <strong>Court</strong> reported in 2000 (IV)<br />
SCC 640 St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Bihar and another Vs.<br />
Bal Mukund Sah and others which<br />
speaks as follows:-<br />
"Any scheme <strong>of</strong> reserv<strong>at</strong>ion foisted<br />
on the <strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong> without consult<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
with it directly results in trunc<strong>at</strong>ing the<br />
<strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong>'s power <strong>of</strong> playing a vital role<br />
in the recruitment <strong>of</strong> eligible candid<strong>at</strong>es<br />
to fill up these vacancies and hence such<br />
appointments on reserved posts would<br />
remain totally ultra vires the scheme <strong>of</strong><br />
the Constitution enacted for th<strong>at</strong> purpose<br />
by the Founding F<strong>at</strong>hers."
1080 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
3. We have also gone through the<br />
Full Bench judgement <strong>of</strong> our <strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong><br />
reported in 2005 (4) ESC 2378 (All)<br />
Sarika Vs. St<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> U.P. and others<br />
where also it has been held th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
reserv<strong>at</strong>ion will be made, if required, for<br />
the judicial service by the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government, then it should be made in<br />
consult<strong>at</strong>ion with the <strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong>.<br />
Therefore, when such Full <strong>Court</strong> <strong>of</strong> this<br />
<strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong> did not approve any such<br />
proposal for reserv<strong>at</strong>ion, we are <strong>of</strong> view<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the prayer <strong>of</strong> the petitioner cannot be<br />
considered and as such writ petition is<br />
liable to be dismissed and is accordingly<br />
dismissed, however, without imposing<br />
any cost.<br />
---------<br />
APPELLATE JURISDITION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED ALLAHABAD:04.08.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE C.K. PRASAD, C.J.<br />
THE HON’BLE A.P. SAHI, J.<br />
Special Appeal (D) No. 318 <strong>of</strong> 2006<br />
With<br />
Special Appeal (D) No. 615 <strong>of</strong> 2009<br />
Superintending Engineer, Jhansi Lalitpur<br />
Circile, P.W.D. Jhansi and others<br />
…Appellants/Respondents<br />
Versus<br />
Anoop Kumar R<strong>at</strong>hore<br />
…Respondent/Petitioner<br />
Counsel for the Appellants:<br />
Sri K.S. Kushwaha, S.C.<br />
Sri M.S. Pipersenia, Addl. CSC<br />
Counsel for the Respondent:<br />
Sri Indra Raj Singh<br />
U.P. Subordin<strong>at</strong>e Offices Ministerial Staff<br />
(Direct Recruitment) Rules 1985- Rule<br />
23-Rule provides mode <strong>of</strong> selectionwritten<br />
test and Hindi typing test-only<br />
these candid<strong>at</strong>e after qualifying in both<br />
test on basis <strong>of</strong> merit shall be called for<br />
interview-advertisement provides<br />
preference <strong>of</strong> Hindi Type knowing<br />
Candid<strong>at</strong>es- petitioner respondent<br />
qualify in written test but remain<br />
unsucess in type test-nor called for<br />
interview-held-on conflict <strong>of</strong> rules as<br />
well as in advertisement-rule shall<br />
prerail as per law developed by apex<br />
<strong>Court</strong>-held-petitioner/ respondent can<br />
not be selected- order passed by Single<br />
Judge-set a side.<br />
Held: Para-27<br />
In view <strong>of</strong> the judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
09.09.2005 having been set aside by us,<br />
we have no hesit<strong>at</strong>ion in further<br />
expressing the same opinion in respect<br />
<strong>of</strong> the judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed 12.01.2009<br />
passed in Writ Petition No.51691 <strong>of</strong><br />
2006, inasmuch as the said judgment<br />
proceeds on the same presumption and<br />
findings th<strong>at</strong> were drawn in favour <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner in Writ Petition No.7660 <strong>of</strong><br />
1999. Therefore, the judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
12.01.2009 passed in Writ Petition<br />
No.51691 <strong>of</strong> 2006 is also set aside.<br />
Case law discussed<br />
JT 2007(3) SC 352.<br />
(Delivered by Hon'ble C.K. Prasad, C.J.)<br />
1. These two special appeals arise,<br />
though against separ<strong>at</strong>e judgments d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
09.09.2005 and 12.01.2009 respectively,<br />
out <strong>of</strong> common questions <strong>of</strong> law and fact<br />
pertaining to the same process <strong>of</strong> selection<br />
on the post <strong>of</strong> Junior Clerk in the Public<br />
Works Department, against an<br />
advertisement d<strong>at</strong>ed 10.08.1998 published<br />
by the Chief Engineer, Public Works<br />
Department, Jhansi Region, Jhansi, where<br />
the respondent-petitioner Anoop Kumar<br />
R<strong>at</strong>hore (hereinafter referred to as the<br />
''petitioner') claimed appointment on the<br />
basis <strong>of</strong> the said selection.
3 All] Superintending Engineer and others V.Anoop Kumar R<strong>at</strong>hore 1081<br />
2. The dispute raised by the<br />
petitioner is th<strong>at</strong> knowledge <strong>of</strong> Hindi<br />
typewriting was only a preferential<br />
qualific<strong>at</strong>ion, and not essential, as per the<br />
advertisement itself, and therefore, the<br />
appellants - employer could not have<br />
disqualified the candid<strong>at</strong>ure <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner on th<strong>at</strong> count. The stand <strong>of</strong> the<br />
appellants in response is th<strong>at</strong> the word<br />
preference in the advertisement was a<br />
mistake, and th<strong>at</strong> the Rules provide for<br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> Hindi typewriting as an<br />
essential qualific<strong>at</strong>ion for the post in<br />
question, which would prevail as against<br />
an error in the advertisement. The learned<br />
Single Judges while allowing the writ<br />
petitions have found favour with the plea<br />
<strong>of</strong> the petitioner, hence these appeals<br />
under Rule 5 Chapter VIII <strong>of</strong> the<br />
<strong>Allahabad</strong> <strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong> Rules, 1952.<br />
3. Short facts giving rise to the<br />
present appeals are th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner<br />
applied for the post <strong>of</strong> Junior Clerk in the<br />
Public Works Department in the Jhansi<br />
Region against the advertisement issued<br />
by the Chief Engineer <strong>of</strong> the said region<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 10.08.1998. He appeared in the<br />
written examin<strong>at</strong>ion, which was<br />
conducted on 13th December 1998 and by<br />
a subsequent letter d<strong>at</strong>ed 5th February<br />
1999, he was called upon to appear in the<br />
typing test scheduled on 13.02.1999. The<br />
petitioner appears to have made himself<br />
available for the typing test, but could not<br />
qualify the same. The result <strong>of</strong> the written<br />
test was declared and a merit list was<br />
prepared, which was sent to the St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government. The petitioner was,<br />
however, not interviewed, as only those<br />
candid<strong>at</strong>es were called for interview who<br />
qualified in the Hindi typing test with a<br />
speed <strong>of</strong> 25 words per minute.<br />
4. At this stage, the petitioner filed<br />
Writ Petition No. 7660 <strong>of</strong> 1999 praying<br />
for a writ <strong>of</strong> mandamus commanding the<br />
respondent authorities (appellants herein)<br />
to give him an opportunity to appear in<br />
the interview for the post <strong>of</strong> Junior Clerk<br />
and thereafter declare his result. This<br />
<strong>Court</strong> entertained the writ petition and<br />
thereafter vide order d<strong>at</strong>ed 26.02.1999<br />
stayed the declar<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the result <strong>of</strong> the<br />
said selections. Out <strong>of</strong> the selected<br />
candid<strong>at</strong>es, one Santosh Kumar Yadav<br />
filed Writ Petition No. 7903 <strong>of</strong> 2000 and<br />
the said writ petition was heard along<br />
with Writ Petition No. 7660 <strong>of</strong> 1999,<br />
where after by an order d<strong>at</strong>ed 20.04.2001,<br />
the interim order d<strong>at</strong>ed 26.02.1999 was<br />
modified directing the respondents therein<br />
to declare the results, which were made<br />
subject to the final decision <strong>of</strong> the writ<br />
petition. These facts are mentioned in the<br />
order d<strong>at</strong>ed 26.08.2006 passed by the<br />
Chief Engineer, Public Works<br />
Department, Jhansi Region, Jhansi.<br />
5. The writ petition filed by the<br />
petitioner, i.e. Writ Petition No. 7660 <strong>of</strong><br />
1999 was finally decided on 9th<br />
September 2005 after exchange <strong>of</strong><br />
affidavits, and the learned Judge held th<strong>at</strong><br />
the qualific<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> possessing pr<strong>of</strong>iciency<br />
in Hindi typewriting was only a<br />
preferential qualific<strong>at</strong>ion as per the<br />
advertisement for the post in question,<br />
and since it was not an essential<br />
qualific<strong>at</strong>ion, the Department had erred in<br />
excluding the petitioner from the<br />
interview. Accordingly, a direction was<br />
issued to interview the petitioner<br />
separ<strong>at</strong>ely and to convey the result <strong>of</strong> the<br />
said interview to the Board for final<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion. The Department preferred<br />
Special Appeal (Defective) No. 318 <strong>of</strong><br />
2006 assailing the said judgment, which<br />
was presented before the <strong>Court</strong> on
1082 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
08.05.2006 and an order was passed on<br />
11.05.2006 to list the appeal after the<br />
delay condon<strong>at</strong>ion applic<strong>at</strong>ion was<br />
disposed <strong>of</strong>f.<br />
6. The Department interviewed the<br />
petitioner on 24.07.2006 in compliance <strong>of</strong><br />
the directions <strong>of</strong> this <strong>Court</strong>. The petitioner<br />
also filed Contempt Petition No. 2092 <strong>of</strong><br />
2006 alleging disobedience <strong>of</strong> the order<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 09.09.2005, in which an order was<br />
passed on 27th July, 2006 directing the<br />
Chief Engineer to decide the claim <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner within a period <strong>of</strong> six weeks.<br />
Accordingly, the Chief Engineer<br />
proceeded to consider the claim <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner and rejected the same by order<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 26.08.2006.<br />
7. The aforesaid order d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
26.08.2006 gave rise to Writ Petition No.<br />
51691 <strong>of</strong> 2006 preferred by the petitioner<br />
assailing the said order on the ground, th<strong>at</strong><br />
once this <strong>Court</strong> had already held th<strong>at</strong><br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> Hindi typewriting by a<br />
candid<strong>at</strong>e was a preferential qualific<strong>at</strong>ion,<br />
then the same could not have been made a<br />
ground to reject the candid<strong>at</strong>ure <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner. The said writ petition was<br />
finally allowed on 12.01.2009 by this<br />
<strong>Court</strong>, which has given rise to Special<br />
Appeal (Defective) No. 615 <strong>of</strong> 2009. It is<br />
in the aforesaid backdrop th<strong>at</strong> both the<br />
appeals have been heard and are being<br />
disposed <strong>of</strong>f together.<br />
8. Shri M.S. Pipersenia, learned<br />
Additional Chief Standing Counsel,<br />
appearing on behalf <strong>of</strong> the appellants,<br />
addressed the <strong>Court</strong> in both the appeals<br />
and Shri Indra Raj Singh has been heard<br />
in response thereto on behalf <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner - Anoop Kumar R<strong>at</strong>hore.<br />
9. Shri Pipersenia, while advancing<br />
his submissions in Special Appeal<br />
(Defective) No. 318 <strong>of</strong> 2006 against the<br />
judgment <strong>of</strong> the learned Judge d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
09.09.2005, urged th<strong>at</strong> the said judgment<br />
proceeds on an erroneous assumption <strong>of</strong><br />
fact as well as in law, inasmuch as the<br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> typewriting in Hindi, as<br />
reflected in the advertisement d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
10.08.1998 as a preferential qualific<strong>at</strong>ion,<br />
was a mistake and which had been<br />
pointed out through the averments<br />
contained in the counter affidavit and<br />
further, even otherwise the Rules<br />
applicable to the controversy clearly<br />
provide the knowledge <strong>of</strong> Hindi<br />
typewriting as an essential qualific<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
and not as a preferential qualific<strong>at</strong>ion. He<br />
contends th<strong>at</strong> in view <strong>of</strong> the above, the<br />
finding recorded by the learned Judge in<br />
the judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed 09.09.2005 tre<strong>at</strong>ing<br />
the knowledge <strong>of</strong> Hindi typewriting as a<br />
preferential qualific<strong>at</strong>ion is erroneous and,<br />
therefore, the same deserves to be set<br />
aside. For this, he has invited the <strong>at</strong>tention<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong> to the contents <strong>of</strong> the<br />
advertisement, the averments contained in<br />
the counter affidavit filed on behalf <strong>of</strong> the<br />
St<strong>at</strong>e in the writ petition as well as the<br />
provisions contained in the Public Works<br />
Department Ministerial Establishment<br />
Rules 1965, the Subordin<strong>at</strong>e Offices<br />
Ministerial Staff (Direct Recruitment)<br />
Rules 1975, the U.P. Subordin<strong>at</strong>e Offices<br />
Ministerial Staff (Direct Recruitment)<br />
Rules, 1985 and the Uttar Pradesh<br />
Procedure for Direct Recruitment for<br />
Group "C" Posts (Outside the Purview <strong>of</strong><br />
the Uttar Pradesh Public Service<br />
Commission) Rules, 1998. On the<br />
strength <strong>of</strong> the relevant Rules prescribed<br />
therein, Shri Pipersenia contends th<strong>at</strong><br />
since the Rules provide for knowledge <strong>of</strong><br />
Hindi typewriting as an essential<br />
qualific<strong>at</strong>ion, therefore, the learned Judge
3 All] Superintending Engineer and others V.Anoop Kumar R<strong>at</strong>hore 1083<br />
committed an error in accepting the<br />
contention on behalf <strong>of</strong> the petitioner th<strong>at</strong><br />
the said qualific<strong>at</strong>ion was preferential.<br />
10. Shri Indra Raj Singh, on the<br />
other hand, urged th<strong>at</strong> the advertisement<br />
clearly indic<strong>at</strong>es th<strong>at</strong> the knowledge <strong>of</strong><br />
typing in Hindi was a preferential<br />
qualific<strong>at</strong>ion and the Rules 1998, which<br />
have an overriding effect read with the<br />
subsequent amendments, ruled out the<br />
possibility <strong>of</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> the knowledge<br />
<strong>of</strong> typewriting in Hindi as an essential<br />
qualific<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
11. Shri Indra Raj Singh further<br />
contends th<strong>at</strong> since the order passed by<br />
the Chief Engineer on 26.08.2006<br />
suffered from the same infirmity, and<br />
since the learned Judge in the judgment<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 09.09.2005 had already held th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
qualific<strong>at</strong>ion was only a preferential<br />
qualific<strong>at</strong>ion, therefore, the subsequent<br />
writ petition filed by the petitioner, i.e.<br />
Writ Petition No. 51691 <strong>of</strong> 2006 was<br />
rightly allowed and, as such, the judgment<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 12.01.2009 also does not require<br />
any interference <strong>at</strong> the instance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
appellants.<br />
12. Shri Pipersenia, in rejoinder, has<br />
urged th<strong>at</strong> the judgment <strong>of</strong> the learned<br />
Judge d<strong>at</strong>ed 12.01.2009 in Writ Petition<br />
No. 51691 <strong>of</strong> 2006, giving rise to Special<br />
Appeal No. 615 (Defective) No. 2009, is<br />
founded on an earlier decision <strong>of</strong> this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> d<strong>at</strong>ed 09.09.2005. Therefore, in the<br />
event the judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed 09.09.2005 is<br />
set aside, then the judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
12.01.2009 in the subsequent writ petition<br />
has also to fall through. He contends th<strong>at</strong><br />
the order <strong>of</strong> the Chief Engineer d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
26.08.2006 is valid and in accordance<br />
with the Rules and, therefore, the same<br />
was unjustifiably interfered with by the<br />
learned Judge.<br />
13. Having heard the learned<br />
counsel for the parties, it would be<br />
appropri<strong>at</strong>e to refer to the relevant Rules,<br />
which have been relied upon by the<br />
contesting parties. From the record, it<br />
appears th<strong>at</strong> for the purposes <strong>of</strong><br />
recruitment to the post <strong>of</strong> ministerial staff,<br />
the St<strong>at</strong>e Government framed "Rules for<br />
the Recruitment <strong>of</strong> Ministerial Staff to the<br />
Subordin<strong>at</strong>e Offices", which were<br />
promulg<strong>at</strong>ed on 11.07.1950 and published<br />
in the gazette on 16.07.1950. Rule 6 <strong>of</strong><br />
the said Rules provided as follows:-<br />
"6. Subjects <strong>of</strong> the test. - (1) The<br />
competitive tests shall comprise a written<br />
test as well as an oral test.<br />
(2) The subjects <strong>of</strong> the tests and<br />
maximum marks on each subject shall be<br />
as follows:-<br />
Subjects<br />
Marks<br />
Oral<br />
1. Personality ... ... ... ... 25<br />
2. General knowledge and suitability for<br />
the particular post. 25<br />
Written<br />
1. Simple drafting (in Hindi) ... ... 50<br />
2. Essay and Precis writing 50<br />
(in Hindi)<br />
3. Simple drafting and Precis<br />
writing (in English) 50<br />
Optional<br />
1. Typewriting in English<br />
and Hindi ... 50<br />
2. Shorthand in Hindi<br />
and English ... 50<br />
__________________________________<br />
NOTE- Candid<strong>at</strong>es must take one <strong>of</strong><br />
the optional subjects but may take both if<br />
they so choose."
1084 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
14. The aforesaid Rule along with<br />
the other provisions in the said Rules was<br />
incorpor<strong>at</strong>ed as Appendix ''B' in "the<br />
Public Works Department Ministerial<br />
Establishment Rules, 1965". The relevant<br />
Rule 5 (2) is quoted below:-<br />
"5. Sources <strong>of</strong> recruitment –<br />
(1) ... ... ...<br />
(2). Direct recruitment to the post <strong>of</strong><br />
Junior Noters and Drafters, Record<br />
Keepers, Routine Clerks and the Lower<br />
Grade Clerks in all the <strong>of</strong>fices shall be<br />
made on the results <strong>of</strong> a competitive<br />
examin<strong>at</strong>ion prescribed in the ''Rules for<br />
the Recruitment <strong>of</strong> Ministerial Staff to the<br />
Subordin<strong>at</strong>e Offices' published under<br />
Government notific<strong>at</strong>ion no.0-1119/II-<br />
B/50, d<strong>at</strong>ed July 11, 1950, as amended<br />
from time to time.<br />
NOTE- A copy <strong>of</strong> the Rules referred<br />
to above in force <strong>at</strong> the time <strong>of</strong><br />
commencement <strong>of</strong> these rules in given in<br />
Appendix ''B' to these rules."<br />
15. These Rules continued to be in<br />
vogue till the new Rules were framed by<br />
the St<strong>at</strong>e Government notified on 29 th<br />
July, 1975 known as "the Subordin<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Offices Ministerial Staff (Direct<br />
Recruitment) Rules, 1975". The aforesaid<br />
Rules were made applicable to all the<br />
departments as per Rule 2 <strong>of</strong> the said<br />
Rules. Simultaneously, the said Rules<br />
were given an overriding effect ins<strong>of</strong>ar as<br />
the pre-existing Rules were inconsistent<br />
with the said Rules. This provision was<br />
contained in Rule 3 there<strong>of</strong>. The St<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Government, however, through a specific<br />
Rule 20 <strong>of</strong> the said Rules further<br />
rescinded the Rules for the Recruitment <strong>of</strong><br />
Ministerial Staff to the Subordin<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Offices, which had been promulg<strong>at</strong>ed on<br />
11.07.1950 and published in the gazette<br />
on 16.07.1950, referred to hereinabove.<br />
Thus, the Rules 1975 thereafter held the<br />
field. The St<strong>at</strong>e Government promulg<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
another set <strong>of</strong> new Rules known as "the<br />
U.P. Subordin<strong>at</strong>e Offices Ministerial Staff<br />
(Direct Recruitment) Rules, 1985", which<br />
also has an overriding effect ins<strong>of</strong>ar as the<br />
previous Rules are inconsistent in this<br />
regard. Rule 35 <strong>of</strong> the said Rules provided<br />
for regul<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> other m<strong>at</strong>ters, if they<br />
were not specifically covered by the said<br />
Rules. Sri Pipersenia, during the course <strong>of</strong><br />
his submission, specifically invited the<br />
<strong>at</strong>tention <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong> to sub-rule (5) <strong>of</strong><br />
Rule 23, which makes a provision for the<br />
procedure <strong>of</strong> selection on the post <strong>of</strong><br />
Clerk/Typist. The same is quoted below:-<br />
"23. Procedure <strong>of</strong> Selection.-(1). ...<br />
... ...<br />
(2) .... ... ... ...<br />
(3) .... ... ... ...<br />
(4) .... ... ... ...<br />
(5) In the case <strong>of</strong> candid<strong>at</strong>e to be<br />
selected for the post <strong>of</strong> clerk/typist as also<br />
for any other post for which typing has<br />
also been prescribed as an essential<br />
qualific<strong>at</strong>ion only those candid<strong>at</strong>es who<br />
know typewriting will be considered<br />
and final assessment <strong>of</strong> merit shall be<br />
made only after adding the marks<br />
obtained in Hindi typewriting. The<br />
candid<strong>at</strong>es shall be required to appear <strong>at</strong> a<br />
competitive test for Hindi typing. Marks<br />
shall be allowed for Hindi typing out <strong>of</strong><br />
the maximum marks <strong>of</strong> 50. The marks<br />
obtained in Hindi typing shall be added to<br />
the marks already obtained under sub-rule<br />
(4) and the final merit list shall in such<br />
case be prepared on the basis <strong>of</strong> aggreg<strong>at</strong>e<br />
marks." (Emphasis supplied).<br />
16. The aforesaid Rule, therefore,<br />
clarifies th<strong>at</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong> a candid<strong>at</strong>e to<br />
be selected for the post <strong>of</strong> a Clerk or<br />
Typist, only those candid<strong>at</strong>es who know
3 All] Superintending Engineer and others V.Anoop Kumar R<strong>at</strong>hore 1085<br />
Hindi typewriting would be considered<br />
and the final assessment <strong>of</strong> merit shall be<br />
made only after adding the marks<br />
obtained in the Hindi typewriting.<br />
17. Sri Indra Raj Singh, questioning<br />
the applicability <strong>of</strong> the said Rule, urged<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the said Rule would apply only to the<br />
post <strong>of</strong> Clerk-cum-Typist and, therefore,<br />
the said Rule would not be applicable in<br />
the present case.<br />
18. Having given our anxious<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion to the aforesaid aspect <strong>of</strong><br />
the m<strong>at</strong>ter, we are unable to subscribe to<br />
the suggestion made by the learned<br />
counsel for the petitioner th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
aforesaid Rule would apply in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
a candid<strong>at</strong>e applying for Clerk-cum-<br />
Typist. The words Clerk and Typist are<br />
clearly segreg<strong>at</strong>ed by an oblique stroke,<br />
which clearly means the said words do<br />
not, in any way, suggest a single post <strong>of</strong><br />
Clerk-cum-Typist, r<strong>at</strong>her the placement <strong>of</strong><br />
the words are clearly narr<strong>at</strong>ed in the<br />
altern<strong>at</strong>ive and separ<strong>at</strong>e. The words<br />
cannot be construed to mean a post, which<br />
has both the connot<strong>at</strong>ions.<br />
19. Nonetheless, taking any view <strong>of</strong><br />
the m<strong>at</strong>ter, whether the post is <strong>of</strong> a Clerk<br />
or a Typist or a Clerk-cum-Typist, the<br />
position remains the same, namely th<strong>at</strong><br />
the candid<strong>at</strong>e for any <strong>of</strong> such posts has to<br />
qualify a Hindi typewriting test for being<br />
selected.<br />
The advertisement also clearly<br />
indic<strong>at</strong>es the post <strong>of</strong> a Junior Clerk and,<br />
therefore, the essential qualific<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong><br />
typing as prescribed in the said Rule is<br />
clearly rel<strong>at</strong>able to both the posts<br />
separ<strong>at</strong>ely. A candid<strong>at</strong>e applying for the<br />
post <strong>of</strong> a Clerk shall only be considered<br />
provided such a candid<strong>at</strong>e knows typing<br />
as well. It is a well-known Rule <strong>of</strong><br />
Interpret<strong>at</strong>ion th<strong>at</strong> the Legisl<strong>at</strong>ure or the<br />
Rule-making Authority cannot be<br />
presumed to have used surplusage and the<br />
literal meaning has to be given its true<br />
sense. Viewed from any angle, it is more<br />
than clear th<strong>at</strong> the Rule provides th<strong>at</strong> for<br />
both the posts, i.e. posts <strong>of</strong> Clerk as well<br />
as Typist, a candid<strong>at</strong>e should know<br />
typewriting in order to enable him to<br />
qualify for appointment on such a post.<br />
The prepar<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the final merit has to<br />
be made after assessment <strong>of</strong> the<br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> tying as indic<strong>at</strong>ed in the<br />
aforesaid Rule. We are, therefore, <strong>of</strong> the<br />
firm view th<strong>at</strong> the post <strong>of</strong> Junior Clerk,<br />
which was advertised by the Department,<br />
was clearly governed by the qualific<strong>at</strong>ions<br />
prescribed and referred to herein above<br />
under the 1985 Rules.<br />
20. It is further clear th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
Department itself realized its mistake and<br />
error in the advertisement and took up a<br />
clear stand before the learned Judge in<br />
Writ Petition No.7660 <strong>of</strong> 1999 th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
advertisement suffered from an error to<br />
the effect th<strong>at</strong> the knowledge <strong>of</strong> typing<br />
was a preferential qualific<strong>at</strong>ion. The said<br />
position has been reiter<strong>at</strong>ed before us by<br />
the learned counsel for the appellants th<strong>at</strong><br />
the word "preferential" occurring against<br />
the column <strong>of</strong> "knowledge <strong>of</strong> typing" was<br />
a clear mistake and de hors the Rule<br />
aforesaid. The order d<strong>at</strong>ed 26.08.2006,<br />
which was impugned in Writ Petition<br />
No.51691 <strong>of</strong> 2006, also narr<strong>at</strong>es the same<br />
position. We do not find any error in the<br />
stand taken by the appellants and,<br />
therefore, we hold th<strong>at</strong> the knowledge in<br />
typing in Hindi was an essential<br />
qualific<strong>at</strong>ion as per the Rule aforesaid and<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the advertisement suffered from an<br />
error to th<strong>at</strong> extent. In view <strong>of</strong> this, the<br />
conclusion drawn by the learned Judge in
1086 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
the judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed 09.09.2005 does not<br />
appear to be in conformity with law.<br />
21. At this juncture, it would be apt<br />
to record th<strong>at</strong> whenever there is a conflict<br />
between the Rules and the advertisement,<br />
it is settled law th<strong>at</strong> the Rules would<br />
prevail. Reference may be had to the<br />
decision <strong>of</strong> the Supreme <strong>Court</strong> in the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Malik Mazhar Sultan & Anr. Vs. U.P.<br />
Public Service Commission & Ors., JT<br />
2007 (3) SC 352.<br />
22. This is not a case where any<br />
change <strong>of</strong> qualific<strong>at</strong>ion has been brought<br />
about after the advertisement was made.<br />
This is a clear case where the incorrect<br />
qualific<strong>at</strong>ion was reflected in the<br />
advertisement. A qualific<strong>at</strong>ion, which was<br />
essential under the Rules, was wrongly<br />
referred to as a preferential qualific<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
In our opinion, an incorrect advertisement<br />
referring to a wrong Rule would neither<br />
cre<strong>at</strong>e or confer a right on a candid<strong>at</strong>e to<br />
claim selection nor would it give rise to<br />
any legitim<strong>at</strong>e expect<strong>at</strong>ion to a candid<strong>at</strong>e,<br />
in law. The Rule on the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
advertisement, which has been pointed<br />
out on behalf <strong>of</strong> the appellants, was very<br />
much in existence and was applicable.<br />
Learned counsel for the petitioner could<br />
not successfully dispute the applicability<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Rules 1985.<br />
23. Sri Indra Raj Singh altern<strong>at</strong>ively<br />
urged th<strong>at</strong> the Rules 1998 have an<br />
overriding effect. We have perused the<br />
same and the said argument is st<strong>at</strong>ed only<br />
to be rejected, inasmuch as the Rules<br />
1998 are the Rules <strong>of</strong> procedure and they,<br />
in no way, take away the impact <strong>of</strong> the<br />
substantive Rules, which held the field on<br />
the d<strong>at</strong>e when the advertisement was<br />
issued. Even otherwise, the Rules 1998, in<br />
no way, contradict the Rules 1985 and<br />
r<strong>at</strong>her they supplement the same, as<br />
would be evident from a perusal <strong>of</strong> Rules<br />
5 and 6 <strong>of</strong> the Rules 1998.<br />
24. We may hasten to add th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
Rules have been subsequently modified in<br />
the year 2001 and even thereafter, but<br />
such modific<strong>at</strong>ions are not <strong>at</strong> all relevant<br />
to be discussed herein, as this m<strong>at</strong>ter<br />
specifically concerns the 1985 Rules th<strong>at</strong><br />
were applicable on the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
advertisement, i.e. 10.08.1998. No other<br />
Rule apart from the Rules 1985 was<br />
applicable in respect <strong>of</strong> the selections in<br />
question in the year 1998 and the learned<br />
counsel for the petitioner could not show<br />
anything to the contrary.<br />
25. In view <strong>of</strong> the findings aforesaid,<br />
we are <strong>of</strong> the view th<strong>at</strong> the learned Single<br />
Judge committed an error in allowing<br />
Writ Petition No.7660 <strong>of</strong> 1999 and<br />
permitting the petitioner to be<br />
interviewed. We, accordingly, set aside<br />
the judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed 09.09.2005 passed in<br />
Writ Petition No.7660 <strong>of</strong> 1999.<br />
26. The judgment in Writ Petition<br />
No. 51691 <strong>of</strong> 2006 d<strong>at</strong>ed 12.01.2009<br />
appears to have been delivered under the<br />
impression th<strong>at</strong> the said judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
09.09.2005 had become final and had not<br />
been challenged. We may record th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed 09.09.2005 had already<br />
been assailed through Special Appeal<br />
(Defective) No.318 <strong>of</strong> 2006, which fact<br />
appears to have escaped the notice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
learned Judge, while rendering the<br />
judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed 12.01.2009. In view <strong>of</strong><br />
the fact th<strong>at</strong> Writ Petition No.7660 <strong>of</strong><br />
1999 stands dismissed upon the judgment<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 09.09.2005 having been set aside,<br />
the very found<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
12.01.2009 is taken away. Accordingly,<br />
the petitioner would, therefore, not be
3 All] Dr. R.C. Agrawal and another V. Bhar<strong>at</strong> Press and others 1087<br />
entitled to any benefit under the judgment<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 09.09.2005 and, therefore, he would<br />
not be entitled for being considered<br />
against the post <strong>of</strong> Junior Clerk in<br />
question.<br />
27. In view <strong>of</strong> the judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed<br />
09.09.2005 having been set aside by us,<br />
we have no hesit<strong>at</strong>ion in further<br />
expressing the same opinion in respect <strong>of</strong><br />
the judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed 12.01.2009 passed in<br />
Writ Petition No.51691 <strong>of</strong> 2006,<br />
inasmuch as the said judgment proceeds<br />
on the same presumption and findings th<strong>at</strong><br />
were drawn in favour <strong>of</strong> the petitioner in<br />
Writ Petition No.7660 <strong>of</strong> 1999. Therefore,<br />
the judgment d<strong>at</strong>ed 12.01.2009 passed in<br />
Writ Petition No.51691 <strong>of</strong> 2006 is also set<br />
aside.<br />
28. Accordingly, both the special<br />
appeals are allowed and the writ petitions<br />
filed by the petitioner, i.e. Writ Petition<br />
No.7660 <strong>of</strong> 1999 and Writ Petition<br />
No.51691 <strong>of</strong> 2006 are dismissed.<br />
29. In the facts and circumstances <strong>of</strong><br />
the case, there shall be no order as to<br />
costs.<br />
---------<br />
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION<br />
CIVIL SIDE<br />
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.10.2009<br />
BEFORE<br />
THE HON’BLE MRS. POONAM SRIVASTAVA, J.<br />
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 37549 <strong>of</strong> 2009<br />
Dr. Ram Chandra Agrawal and another<br />
…Petitioners<br />
Versus<br />
Bhar<strong>at</strong> Press and others<br />
…Defendant-Respondents<br />
Counsel for the Petitioner:<br />
Sri Manish Trivedi<br />
Sri A.K. Bajpai<br />
Counsel for the Respondents:<br />
Sri M.K. Gupta<br />
Sri Nikhil Kumar<br />
Sri Shikha Singh<br />
U.P. Urban Building (Control <strong>of</strong> Rent<br />
and Eviction) Act 1972 Sec-21(i) (a)-<br />
Bona-fide need-Land lord -very old<br />
man-suffering from massive heart<br />
<strong>at</strong>tack-strictly restrained from using<br />
stairs-his son being Doctor-wants to<br />
open a clinic-rejection by the<br />
authorities below- held-not proper if<br />
the case remanded-very purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
eviction frustr<strong>at</strong>ed.<br />
Held: Para 27<br />
I am conscious <strong>of</strong> the fact th<strong>at</strong> this<br />
<strong>Court</strong> cannot reevalu<strong>at</strong>e the evidence<br />
and substitute its own findings<br />
because two views are possible. A bare<br />
perusal <strong>of</strong> the release applic<strong>at</strong>ion,<br />
objections filed by tenants and the<br />
various affidavits it is abundantly clear<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the landlords (psetitioners) who<br />
are owners, require the shops for their<br />
personal need. They are the first and<br />
the rightful claimant to use their own<br />
property as they want it. This is a<br />
situ<strong>at</strong>ion where f<strong>at</strong>her and son with<br />
their spouses are facing a number <strong>of</strong><br />
problems and therefore the release <strong>of</strong><br />
the shops cannot be refused. The very<br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> the Act stands frustr<strong>at</strong>ed if<br />
the two judgments <strong>of</strong> the courts are<br />
left to stand.<br />
Case law discussed<br />
AIR 1999 Supreme <strong>Court</strong>, 100, 2009(1) ARC,<br />
829, 2008(3) ARC 532.(2000)1 SCC, 679,<br />
2000 SCF BRC,24, (1996) 5 SCC, 353,<br />
(2002) 5 SCC, 397:2002 SCFBRC 388, AIR<br />
1965 AP 435, (1979)1 SCC 273: 1986<br />
SCFBRC 346, JT 2002(10) SC 203:2003<br />
SCFBRC 137, JT 2004(Suppl.1) SC 538: 2004<br />
SCFBRC 338, 1977 ARC 46, 2007 (68)<br />
ALR,555, 2007(68) ALR, 603, 2008(71) ALR,<br />
857, 2009(2) ARC,715, 2003(1) ARC, 256,<br />
(1993) 3 SCC, 483, AIR 2002 Supreme<br />
<strong>Court</strong>,200, 2004 All. C.J., 304 (S.C.).
1088 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
(Delivered by Hon’ble Ms. Poonam Srivastav, J.)<br />
1. Heard Sri Manish Trivedi and<br />
Sri A.K. Bajpai, learned counsels for the<br />
petitioners, Ms. Shikha Singh Advoc<strong>at</strong>e<br />
for the respondent no. 1, Sri Nikhil<br />
Kumar Advoc<strong>at</strong>e for the respondent no.<br />
2 and Sri M. K. Gupta Advoc<strong>at</strong>e for the<br />
respondent no. 3.<br />
2. Counter and rejoinder affidavits<br />
have been exchanged and as agreed<br />
between the counsels for the parties,<br />
writ petition is heard finally.<br />
3. Notices were accepted by Sri<br />
M.K. Gupta Advoc<strong>at</strong>e on behalf <strong>of</strong><br />
respondent no. 3 Yogesh Kishan Dhall,<br />
son <strong>of</strong> L<strong>at</strong>e Kishan Chand Dhall, Sri<br />
Nikhil Kumar Advoc<strong>at</strong>e on behalf <strong>of</strong><br />
respondent no. 2 Sohan Agrawal and<br />
Ms. Shikha Singh Advoc<strong>at</strong>e on behalf <strong>of</strong><br />
respondent no. 1 Bhar<strong>at</strong> Press. Counter<br />
affidavit has been filed on behalf<br />
respondent nos. 1 and 2. Sri M.K. Gupta<br />
Advoc<strong>at</strong>e filed an applic<strong>at</strong>ion on<br />
3.9.2009 bringing on record a<br />
compromise applic<strong>at</strong>ion on behalf <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioners and respondent no. 3. Joint<br />
affidavits have been filed by Anoop<br />
Chandra Agrawal and Sri Neeraj Dhall<br />
where the parties have entered into an<br />
agreement on account <strong>of</strong> the reason th<strong>at</strong><br />
f<strong>at</strong>her <strong>of</strong> the respondent no. 3 who is a<br />
very old man and was admitted in Apolo<br />
Hospital, New Delhi and therefore he<br />
requested for some symp<strong>at</strong>hetic<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion. Finally they entered into<br />
an agreement after institution <strong>of</strong> the writ<br />
petition th<strong>at</strong> the respondent no. 3 will<br />
continue as tenant <strong>of</strong> the disputed shop<br />
on the ground floor for a period <strong>of</strong> 5<br />
years <strong>at</strong> the government rental value <strong>of</strong><br />
Rs. 3,000/- per month from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
order <strong>of</strong> the court and parties have<br />
agreed th<strong>at</strong> for a period <strong>of</strong> 5 years, the<br />
petitioners will not seek eviction <strong>of</strong> the<br />
respondent no. 3 alone and the<br />
respondent no. 3 has further agreed to<br />
vac<strong>at</strong>e the disputed shop in recognition<br />
<strong>of</strong> the fact th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner no. 1 Dr.<br />
Ram Chandra Agrawal will require the<br />
shop for his proposed registered clinic<br />
for his priv<strong>at</strong>e practice only.<br />
Accordingly the writ petition was<br />
decided in terms <strong>of</strong> compromise viz.-aviz<br />
between the petitioners and<br />
respondent no. 3 on 11.9.2009.<br />
4. The dispute rel<strong>at</strong>es to a shop<br />
situ<strong>at</strong>ed on the ground floor <strong>of</strong><br />
accommod<strong>at</strong>ion No. 106/93, K.P.<br />
Kakkar Road, <strong>Allahabad</strong>. The<br />
respondents are three different tenants<br />
occupying entire ground floor. The<br />
respondent no. 1 is a tenant <strong>at</strong> the r<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
Rs. 100/- per month and respondent nos.<br />
2 and 3 are paying Rs. 200/- per month<br />
as rent. The petitioner no. 1 retired as<br />
eye surgeon from Sitapur Eye Hospital<br />
Trust and was living with his family in<br />
his ancestral house. The petitioner no. 2<br />
is his only son who has now shifted<br />
from Sultanpur to <strong>Allahabad</strong> with his<br />
entire family in the year 1995 and is<br />
living in the residential accommod<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
situ<strong>at</strong>ed above the shop. Petitioner no. 1<br />
and his wife have also shifted to<br />
<strong>Allahabad</strong> and are living on the second<br />
floor with his son petitioner no. 2.<br />
5. A release applic<strong>at</strong>ion was filed<br />
by the petitioners under Section 21(1)(a)<br />
<strong>of</strong> U.P. Act No. 13 <strong>of</strong> 1972 (hereinafter<br />
referred to as the Act) for release <strong>of</strong><br />
three shops on the ground floor. The<br />
need and requirement pleaded in the<br />
release applic<strong>at</strong>ion is th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner<br />
no. 2 was previously enrolled as an<br />
Advoc<strong>at</strong>e but did not practice and
3 All] Dr. R.C. Agrawal and another V. Bhar<strong>at</strong> Press and others 1089<br />
finally surrendered his registr<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
certific<strong>at</strong>e to the Bar Council <strong>of</strong> U.P. on<br />
25.5.1995. He started printing business<br />
in partnership <strong>of</strong> one Sanjeev Misra in<br />
the name and style <strong>of</strong> M/s Printrite<br />
which was run from the house <strong>of</strong> Mr.<br />
Sanjeev Misra, 523/450, Badshahi<br />
Mandi, <strong>Allahabad</strong>. The partnership was<br />
dissolved in the year 2001 and the<br />
petitioner no. 2 having no other option<br />
was compelled to take away the printing<br />
machines, computer, furniture etc.<br />
which are now kept on the second floor<br />
<strong>of</strong> the disputed shop. Since then the<br />
petitioner no. 2 is idle without any work<br />
and unemployed, therefore, he required<br />
the shops in dispute for his personal use<br />
to set up his printing business. The need<br />
<strong>of</strong> the petitioner no. 1 was also set up<br />
for the ground floor accommod<strong>at</strong>ion i.e.<br />
the disputed shop as petitioner no. 1 had<br />
suffered massive heart <strong>at</strong>tack on<br />
15.9.2002 and was admitted in Nazareth<br />
Hospital, <strong>Allahabad</strong>. He was referred to<br />
Escort Hospital, New Delhi and is also a<br />
p<strong>at</strong>ient <strong>of</strong> diabetes and high blood<br />
pressure and doctor has strictly advised<br />
him not to use stairs but having no other<br />
option but to ascend and descend the<br />
staircase on the second floor number <strong>of</strong><br />
times during the day. The petitioner no.<br />
1 also required job as he wanted to open<br />
a small clinic on the ground floor after<br />
shifting so th<strong>at</strong> he may be engaged and<br />
also put his skill to good use. Thus the<br />
bonafide need set up in the release<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion was on the aforesaid two<br />
grounds. On perusal <strong>of</strong> the release<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion, it transpires th<strong>at</strong> it was<br />
urgently required for both the<br />
petitioners. Request to the respondents<br />
to vac<strong>at</strong>e the ground floor failed to yield<br />
any result.<br />
6. The respondents-tenant filed<br />
their objection denying their bonafide<br />
need <strong>of</strong> the petitioners pleading<br />
compar<strong>at</strong>ive hardship in their favour.<br />
Specific objection was th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
petitioner no. 1 and his wife did not<br />
reside in <strong>Allahabad</strong> and they are<br />
permanently residing <strong>at</strong> Sultanpur and<br />
they have two big houses <strong>at</strong> Sultanpur.<br />
He is rerunning his medical clinic <strong>at</strong><br />
Sultanpur and claim by the petitioner<br />
th<strong>at</strong> he had a massive heart p<strong>at</strong>ient and<br />
diabetes is concocted and not worth<br />
reliance. The ground for release <strong>of</strong> the<br />
disputed shop was also denied. Sales tax<br />
registr<strong>at</strong>ion, partnership deed and<br />
dissolution deed were also denied. The<br />
petitioner had also filed affidavit <strong>of</strong><br />
Sanjeev Misra, erstwhile partner <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner no. 2 which is numbered as<br />
Paper No. 48B supporting the<br />
contention <strong>of</strong> the petitioner no. 2<br />
regarding partnership business <strong>of</strong><br />
printing press for the period from 1995<br />
to 2001. Subsequently when Sanjeev<br />
Misra was got employed after de<strong>at</strong>h <strong>of</strong><br />
his f<strong>at</strong>her in <strong>Allahabad</strong> University on<br />
compassion<strong>at</strong>e ground, the partnership<br />
firm was dissolved. Neeraj Dhall, son <strong>of</strong><br />
respondent no. 3 had given his affidavit<br />
on 1.7.2008 expressing willingness to<br />
vac<strong>at</strong>e the back portion hall <strong>of</strong> the first<br />
floor <strong>of</strong> the disputed house. The<br />
petitioners had also <strong>of</strong>fered an<br />
altern<strong>at</strong>ive accommod<strong>at</strong>ion to<br />
respondent nos. 2 and 3 to shift their<br />
business to the first floor from the<br />
ground floor <strong>of</strong> the same building but<br />
they refused to agree and instead<br />
preferred to contest the release<br />
applic<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
7. The trial court dismissed the<br />
release applic<strong>at</strong>ion vide its judgment<br />
d<strong>at</strong>ed 11.8.2008. The petitioners
1090 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
preferred an appeal under Section 22 <strong>of</strong><br />
the Act challenging the judgment passed<br />
by the Prescribed Authority which was<br />
numbered as Rent Appeal No. 119 <strong>of</strong><br />
2008.<br />
8. During pendency <strong>of</strong> the appeal,<br />
additional documentary evidence was<br />
also brought on record on behalf <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner. A request was made by the<br />
landlord th<strong>at</strong> documents brought on<br />
record <strong>at</strong> the stage <strong>of</strong> appeal were old<br />
documents and were misplaced and<br />
mixed up with the old unused papers<br />
and not traceable and, therefore, it could<br />
not be brought on record while the<br />
proceedings were pending before the<br />
Prescribed Authority. The said<br />
documents were refused by the appell<strong>at</strong>e<br />
court primarily on the ground th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
petitioners failed to file the partnership<br />
deed which was very essential and,<br />
therefore, document rel<strong>at</strong>ing to<br />
partnership with Sanjeev Misra was not<br />
acceptable and thus the contention <strong>of</strong><br />
learned counsel for the petitioners is<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the same were refused illegally.<br />
Another applic<strong>at</strong>ion was moved on<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> the petitioners under Section<br />
34 read with Rule 22(f) <strong>of</strong> the Rules<br />
framed under the Act bringing to the<br />
notice <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Court</strong> th<strong>at</strong> the partnership<br />
deed was also on record <strong>of</strong> the trial<br />
court and, therefore, the court has<br />
wrongly rejected the applic<strong>at</strong>ion for<br />
taking the documents on record.<br />
However, this applic<strong>at</strong>ion was once<br />
again rejected by the appell<strong>at</strong>e court on<br />
17.3.2009. However, the appell<strong>at</strong>e court<br />
required both the contesting parties to<br />
submit their written submissions and<br />
thereafter dismissed the appeal vide<br />
judgment and order d<strong>at</strong>ed 28.5.2009.<br />
Both the judgments are impugned in the<br />
instant writ petition.<br />
9. The submission <strong>of</strong> learned<br />
counsels appearing for the landlordpetitioners<br />
is th<strong>at</strong> both the courts below<br />
have erred in law and also principles<br />
laid down by the Apex <strong>Court</strong> as well as<br />
this <strong>Court</strong> in its various decisions taking<br />
lop sided view in favour <strong>of</strong> the tenants<br />
on wholly irrelevant consider<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
Besides refusal to accept documents<br />
rel<strong>at</strong>ing to partnership with Sanjeev<br />
Mishra on one hand and taking an<br />
adverse view for want <strong>of</strong> those very<br />
documents are evidently erroneous.<br />
10. The respondent nos. 1 and 2<br />
have contested the release applic<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
Counter and rejoinder affidavits as well<br />
as written submissions have been filed<br />
by respective counsels. Two judgments<br />
<strong>of</strong> the courts below have been supported<br />
by Ms. Shikha Singh and Nikhil Kumar<br />
Advoc<strong>at</strong>es. It is submitted on behalf <strong>of</strong><br />
the tenants th<strong>at</strong> both the courts below<br />
have come to conclusion th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
landlord does not require the<br />
accommod<strong>at</strong>ion in question and need is<br />
not bonafide therefore the writ petition<br />
is liable to be dismissed.<br />
11. Learned counsels on behalf <strong>of</strong><br />
the petitioners have challenged each and<br />
every findings <strong>of</strong> the two courts and<br />
have laid emphasis th<strong>at</strong> once the<br />
Prescribed Authority had taken into<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion and given findings on the<br />
partnership deed, the appell<strong>at</strong>e court<br />
could not have refused documents who<br />
is the last court <strong>of</strong> fact. However,<br />
affidavit <strong>of</strong> partner Sanjeev Misra was<br />
already on record and th<strong>at</strong> was sufficient<br />
to substanti<strong>at</strong>e th<strong>at</strong> some printing<br />
business was carried out in the<br />
partnership <strong>of</strong> Sanjeev Misra and<br />
petitioner no. 2. Besides the claim <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner no. 1 th<strong>at</strong> on every day he has
3 All] Dr. R.C. Agrawal and another V. Bhar<strong>at</strong> Press and others 1091<br />
to climb 50 steps on second floor and<br />
the courts were completely misled while<br />
rejecting the release applic<strong>at</strong>ion.<br />
12. I have heard the respective<br />
counsels <strong>at</strong> length and also examined<br />
two judgments in detail as well as<br />
various documents filed in support <strong>of</strong><br />
the respective submissions. On a close<br />
scrutiny <strong>of</strong> the judgments and arguments<br />
advanced by the learned counsels<br />
appearing on behalf <strong>of</strong> the petitioners<br />
and respondents, it is apparent th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
judgments are not legally balanced.<br />
Both the courts while holding th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
petitioner no. 1 is having two big houses<br />
<strong>at</strong> Sultanpur as well as taking into<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion the fact th<strong>at</strong> he is a retired<br />
eye surgeon <strong>at</strong> Sultanpur has completely<br />
lost sight <strong>of</strong> the fact th<strong>at</strong> now the same<br />
retired man is living <strong>at</strong> <strong>Allahabad</strong> with<br />
his son on the second floor and he<br />
cannot be compelled to live in<br />
Sultanpur. He may have a number <strong>of</strong><br />
houses in different cities but it is<br />
absolutely imm<strong>at</strong>erial. It is not for the<br />
court to direct the landlord to choose the<br />
place where he should reside, specially<br />
in the instant case where the courts<br />
below have completely given a goodbye<br />
to the consider<strong>at</strong>ion th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner<br />
no. 1 is an old ailing man having heart<br />
problem and if he wants to live with his<br />
son and his family, it ought to have been<br />
respected. The courts cannot compel the<br />
petitioner to live and run business in a<br />
particular city or in a particular<br />
building, specially the courts were liable<br />
to take into consider<strong>at</strong>ion th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
petitioner no. 2 is the only son <strong>of</strong> the<br />
petitioner no. 1 and if he has preferred<br />
to live with him despite the misery <strong>of</strong><br />
scaling steep stairs every day, the<br />
findings cannot be said to be justiciable,<br />
specially when both the courts have<br />
accepted the fact th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner no.<br />
1 is a heart p<strong>at</strong>ient but declined to<br />
release on the basis <strong>of</strong> an assumption<br />
th<strong>at</strong> he is living in Sultanpur. Some<br />
stray prescriptions have been relied<br />
upon to come to this conclusion whereas<br />
it is amply explained th<strong>at</strong> he had gone to<br />
Sultanpur for a few days and some <strong>of</strong><br />
his old acquaintances approached him<br />
and he had written out the said<br />
prescriptions. The ground <strong>of</strong> bonafide<br />
need has not been accepted only on<br />
account <strong>of</strong> the finding th<strong>at</strong> he has two<br />
houses <strong>at</strong> Sultanpur but the courts<br />
completely overlooked the fact th<strong>at</strong> it is<br />
situ<strong>at</strong>ed outside the municipal limit <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Allahabad</strong> where the landlord has<br />
preferred to reside in his old age with<br />
his only son. The appell<strong>at</strong>e court has<br />
also gone to the extent <strong>of</strong> taking into<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion some family settlement<br />
which cannot be taken into<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion and it is something<br />
between the landlords interse. Both the<br />
courts have completely failed to<br />
appreci<strong>at</strong>e the grounds as well as<br />
evidence on record and also the fact th<strong>at</strong><br />
all the printing machineries and<br />
appliances are kept <strong>at</strong> the residence <strong>of</strong><br />
petitioner no. 2 on the second floor. In<br />
fact while declining to accept the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> the landlord, the courts have relied<br />
upon seal <strong>of</strong> the treasury on the back<br />
side <strong>of</strong> the stamp <strong>of</strong> first page <strong>of</strong><br />
dissolution deed which mentions<br />
19.5.1998. It is absolutely insignificant<br />
as this was not a case or objection set up<br />
by the tenant. It is not unusual, old<br />
stamps are in possession and there is no<br />
limit<strong>at</strong>ion for using them. No inference<br />
can be drawn on its basis. While coming<br />
to conclusion against the landlord the<br />
courts below have taken into<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion th<strong>at</strong> first floor portion was<br />
vac<strong>at</strong>ed by some tenant and was given
1092 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
to Neeraj Dhall. This has specifically<br />
been replied by the landlord on affidavit<br />
th<strong>at</strong> he had agreed to vac<strong>at</strong>e the ground<br />
floor portion and, therefore, the first<br />
floor was <strong>of</strong>fered to him as an<br />
altern<strong>at</strong>ive accommod<strong>at</strong>ion but<br />
subsequently he declined from his own<br />
assurance. It is also st<strong>at</strong>ed on affidavit<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the petitioner no. 2 is doing job<br />
work by getting orders from different<br />
Universities and is getting printing work<br />
from the market which is hardly<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>itable and he gets only nominal<br />
commission. Thus he is suffering in day<br />
to day business.<br />
13. In fact after going through the<br />
judgment, I realize th<strong>at</strong> the courts have<br />
taken small and extraneous m<strong>at</strong>ter into<br />
consider<strong>at</strong>ion and not considered<br />
broadly the principles laid down for<br />
coming to definite conclusion whether<br />
the accommod<strong>at</strong>ion is required<br />
bonafidely or not and also regarding the<br />
compar<strong>at</strong>ive hardship. I have also<br />
noticed th<strong>at</strong> the appell<strong>at</strong>e court though<br />
has halfheartedly come to a conclusion<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the landlords are suffering hardship<br />
but since the finding on the bonafide<br />
need was recorded against the landlord,<br />
the appeal has also been dismissed. The<br />
courts have strenuously tried to neg<strong>at</strong>e<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> the landlord ignoring<br />
specific assertions on affidavit. The<br />
court has also disbelieved the assertion<br />
th<strong>at</strong> partnership stands dissolved for<br />
want <strong>of</strong> the partnership deed on one<br />
hand while they have refused to accept<br />
the document in evidence.<br />
14. The Apex <strong>Court</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India<br />
Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1999 Supreme<br />
<strong>Court</strong>, 100 has held th<strong>at</strong> to deprive a<br />
landlord <strong>of</strong> the benefit <strong>of</strong> release on<br />
account <strong>of</strong> availability <strong>of</strong> altern<strong>at</strong>ive<br />
residential accommod<strong>at</strong>ion in another<br />
city is not a ground to disentitle the<br />
landlord from recovery <strong>of</strong> possession <strong>of</strong><br />
tenanted accommod<strong>at</strong>ion. The Apex<br />
<strong>Court</strong> has c<strong>at</strong>egorically come to a<br />
conclusion th<strong>at</strong> it is unnecessary to<br />
make endeavour as to how the landlords<br />
have adjusted in another<br />
accommod<strong>at</strong>ion. This is wh<strong>at</strong> exactly<br />
the courts below have done in the<br />
instant case. They have tried to<br />
somehow advise the landlord and also<br />
grant heavy consider<strong>at</strong>ion to the tenant<br />
only because they have set up a<br />
goodwill since last 40-50 years or<br />
because they do not have any other<br />
place to go. The courts below were<br />
liable to take into consider<strong>at</strong>ion th<strong>at</strong> it is<br />
the landlord himself who is the best<br />
judge <strong>of</strong> his requirement. The courts<br />
cannot dict<strong>at</strong>e how and where he should<br />
live. Same view was expressed in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Nanak Chand (since deceased)<br />
and others Vs. Jai Bhagwan, 2009 (1)<br />
ARC, 829. In the said case the landlord<br />
had sought release on the ground th<strong>at</strong> he<br />
is retired and wants to live in his<br />
hometown and also to do the research<br />
work and write articles and papers on<br />
the subject <strong>of</strong> science and also teach<br />
some students free <strong>of</strong> charge. This court<br />
was <strong>of</strong> the view th<strong>at</strong> it is a very valid<br />
ground and held th<strong>at</strong> the landlord was<br />
entitled for his accommod<strong>at</strong>ion. Similar<br />
view was expressed in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak<br />
Raj Bajaj (d) by L. Rs. and others,<br />
2008 (3) ARC 532. Extract <strong>of</strong> relevant<br />
paragraph is quoted below:-<br />
"The Counsel is also right in<br />
submitting th<strong>at</strong> admittedly, M<strong>at</strong>loob<br />
Ahmad had retired from service. Even if<br />
the tenant was right in submitting th<strong>at</strong>
3 All] Dr. R.C. Agrawal and another V. Bhar<strong>at</strong> Press and others 1093<br />
the landlord belonged to a higher str<strong>at</strong>a<br />
<strong>of</strong> society, it did not mean th<strong>at</strong> all<br />
throughout his life after retirement,<br />
M<strong>at</strong>loob Ahmad, husband <strong>of</strong> applicant<br />
No. 6 should not do any work. If he<br />
wanted to get himself engaged in doing<br />
some business. It could not be held th<strong>at</strong><br />
he would not be entitled to possession <strong>of</strong><br />
property for doing business since he<br />
was rich and even without doing any<br />
business, he could maintain himself. A<br />
finding as to bonafide requirement for<br />
doing ready made business by M<strong>at</strong>loob<br />
Ahmad has been expressly recorded by<br />
the Appell<strong>at</strong>e Authority. The said<br />
finding was a finding <strong>of</strong> fact. Neither it<br />
could have been interfered with, nor it<br />
has been set aside by the writ <strong>Court</strong>. In<br />
view <strong>of</strong> the above position, the <strong>High</strong><br />
<strong>Court</strong> was wrong in allowing the writ<br />
petition."<br />
15. Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm<br />
Prem Machinery and Company, (2000)<br />
1 SCC, 679, 2000 SCFBRC, 24, is<br />
another authority for the proposition<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the landlord is the best judge <strong>of</strong> his<br />
own requirement for residential or<br />
commercial purpose and has complete<br />
freedom in the m<strong>at</strong>ter. In this authority<br />
the Apex <strong>Court</strong> has relied upon its<br />
earlier judgment in Pr<strong>at</strong>iva Devi Vs.<br />
T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC, 353.<br />
16. In Joginder Pal Vs. Naval<br />
Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC, 397 :<br />
2002 SCFBRC 388, the Apex <strong>Court</strong><br />
with a reference to the provisions <strong>of</strong><br />
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,<br />
on the question <strong>of</strong> bonafide need, after<br />
surveying its earlier pronouncements,<br />
has held th<strong>at</strong> the requirement <strong>of</strong> a major<br />
son and a coparcener in a joint Hindu<br />
family intending to start a business is<br />
the requirement <strong>of</strong> the landlord himself<br />
as was held in B. Balaiah Vs. Chandoor<br />
Lachaiah, AIR 1965 AP 435. The<br />
words "for his own use" must receive a<br />
wide, liberal and useful meaning r<strong>at</strong>her<br />
than a strict or narrow construction. It<br />
has been further held th<strong>at</strong> while casting<br />
its judicial verdict, the <strong>Court</strong> shall adopt<br />
a practical and meaningful approach<br />
guided by the realities <strong>of</strong> life.<br />
17. In Mst. Bega Begum and<br />
others Vs. Abdul Ahad Khan and<br />
others, (1979) 1 SCC 273: 1986<br />
SCFBRC 346, it has been held th<strong>at</strong> rent<br />
control laws must be construed<br />
reasonably. They should be interpreted<br />
in such a way as to achieve the object <strong>of</strong><br />
enabling landlord to evict tenant where<br />
the st<strong>at</strong>ute grants such right in favour <strong>of</strong><br />
landlord.<br />
18. It has been held by the Apex<br />
<strong>Court</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong> Akhileshwar<br />
Kumar and others Vs. Mustaqim and<br />
others, JT 2002 (10) SC 203 : 2003<br />
SCFBRC 137, th<strong>at</strong> landlord has the<br />
right <strong>of</strong> choosing the accommod<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
which would be reasonable to s<strong>at</strong>isfy his<br />
requirements. In Sarla Ahuja Vs.<br />
United India Insurance Co. Ltd.<br />
(supra) it has been held by the Apex<br />
<strong>Court</strong> th<strong>at</strong> the fact th<strong>at</strong> landlady was in<br />
possession <strong>of</strong> another fl<strong>at</strong> in another city<br />
is not a ground to disentitle her to seek<br />
recovery <strong>of</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> tenanted<br />
premises.<br />
19. The Apex <strong>Court</strong> in Shakuntala<br />
Bai and others Vs. Narayan Das and<br />
others, JT 2004 (Suppl. 1) SC 538 :<br />
2004 SCFBRC 338, has held th<strong>at</strong> there<br />
is no warrant for interpreting a Rent<br />
Control legisl<strong>at</strong>ion in such a manner.<br />
The basic object <strong>of</strong> which is to save<br />
harassment <strong>of</strong> tenants from
1094 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
unscrupulous landlords. The object is<br />
not to deprive the owners <strong>of</strong> their<br />
properties for all time to come.<br />
20. Smt. Sharda Devi Vs. Colonel<br />
Dinesh Chandra and others, 1977 ARC<br />
46, is an authority for the proposition<br />
th<strong>at</strong> if a landlord owns house <strong>at</strong> several<br />
places and needs one <strong>of</strong> several other<br />
houses to settle after retirement, need is<br />
genuine and landlord can settle <strong>at</strong> any<br />
place <strong>of</strong> his liking. Tenant cannot<br />
superimpose his wishes on landlord.<br />
21. In the case <strong>of</strong> Raj Kumar Vs.<br />
IIIrd Additional District Judge, Meerut<br />
and others, 2007 (68) ALR, 555, the<br />
<strong>Court</strong> was <strong>of</strong> the view th<strong>at</strong> it is settled<br />
position <strong>of</strong> law th<strong>at</strong> the landlord is the<br />
best judge <strong>of</strong> his requirement for<br />
residential or business purpose.<br />
22. In the case <strong>of</strong> Mohd. Ayyub<br />
Vs. District Judge, Lucknow and<br />
another, 2007 (68) ALR, 603, it was<br />
held th<strong>at</strong> bonafide need and requirement<br />
<strong>of</strong> a premises for business purposes and<br />
augment<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> income for oneself and<br />
for the family cannot be neg<strong>at</strong>iv<strong>at</strong>ed in<br />
any circumstances. The intention to<br />
establish son in his career and the<br />
requirement <strong>of</strong> the premises for the<br />
same purpose cannot be termed as<br />
malafide. Need <strong>of</strong> landlord to settle his<br />
son in independent business cannot be<br />
defe<strong>at</strong>ed on mere fact th<strong>at</strong> the son was<br />
working in a tailoring shop. Every<br />
individual has a right to settle himself<br />
independently in business.<br />
23. This <strong>Court</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Harish Bh<strong>at</strong>ia Vs. Smt. Johra Begum,<br />
2008 (71) ALR, 857, has held th<strong>at</strong> to<br />
establish her son in business the<br />
landlady could establish the business <strong>of</strong><br />
her son from the room available on the<br />
second floor and it is not for the tenant<br />
to dict<strong>at</strong>e to the landlord how he should<br />
adjust without getting possession <strong>of</strong> the<br />
tenanted premises.<br />
24. In the case <strong>of</strong> Mohabbey Ali<br />
Vs. Tej Bahadur and others, 2009 (2)<br />
ARC, 715 the <strong>Court</strong> declined to look<br />
and examine compar<strong>at</strong>ive hardship <strong>of</strong><br />
the tenant. An identical situ<strong>at</strong>ion appear<br />
in the instant case, the tenant has<br />
nowhere st<strong>at</strong>ed th<strong>at</strong> he has tried to look<br />
an altern<strong>at</strong>ive accommod<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
wh<strong>at</strong>soever, after initi<strong>at</strong>ion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
proceedings before the Prescribed<br />
Authority. In such a circumstance, I am<br />
<strong>of</strong> the view th<strong>at</strong> the tenant is not entitled<br />
for comparison <strong>of</strong> his hardship while<br />
recording a finding on the question. In<br />
the case <strong>of</strong> Sushila Vs. IInd Additional<br />
District Judge, 2003 (1) ARC, 256<br />
similar view was adopted. Also in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Gulab Bai Vs. Nalin<br />
Narsimonia, (1993) 3 SCC, 483 the<br />
Apex <strong>Court</strong> held th<strong>at</strong> the tenant should<br />
make an effort to search for an<br />
altern<strong>at</strong>ive accommod<strong>at</strong>ion and a<br />
specific assertion is essential to<br />
establish his 'hardship'.<br />
25. The Apex <strong>Court</strong> held th<strong>at</strong> the<br />
word 'reasonable requirement'<br />
undoubtedly postul<strong>at</strong>e th<strong>at</strong> there must be<br />
an element <strong>of</strong> need to a mere desire or<br />
wish. The view taken by the Apex <strong>Court</strong><br />
was th<strong>at</strong> the distinction between desire<br />
and need should doubtless be kept in<br />
mind but it should not be extended so<br />
far as to make even a genuine need as a<br />
desire. Perusal <strong>of</strong> two judgments<br />
apparently has stretched its arms too<br />
long while declining to accept the need<br />
<strong>of</strong> the landlords as 'bonafide'. Stray<br />
circumstances have been given tall
3 All] Dr. R.C. Agrawal and another V. Bhar<strong>at</strong> Press and others 1095<br />
meaning only to discard the evidence<br />
and the contention <strong>of</strong> the landlord. It is<br />
eloquent on the face <strong>of</strong> the two<br />
judgments <strong>of</strong> the courts below th<strong>at</strong><br />
conscious and deliber<strong>at</strong>e effort has been<br />
made to neg<strong>at</strong>e the valid contention <strong>of</strong><br />
the petitioners.<br />
26. In view <strong>of</strong> the aforesaid<br />
discussions, it is a foregone conclusion<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the need <strong>of</strong> the landlord is genuine,<br />
bonafide and the landlords are<br />
defenitely suffering gre<strong>at</strong>er hardship and<br />
they are entitled for release <strong>of</strong> the two<br />
shops in possession <strong>of</strong> respondent nos. 1<br />
and 2. Both the f<strong>at</strong>her and son have<br />
conclusively pleaded and affirmed their<br />
independent need for a vacant<br />
accommod<strong>at</strong>ion and therefore, both the<br />
shops are liable to be released in their<br />
favour. I am not inclined to remand the<br />
m<strong>at</strong>ter for afresh decision. Admittedly,<br />
f<strong>at</strong>her is a very old man and remand <strong>of</strong><br />
the case might render the entire purpose<br />
<strong>of</strong> institution <strong>of</strong> the release applic<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
fruitless. The Apex <strong>Court</strong> in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
G. C. Kapoor Vs. Nand Kumar Bhasin<br />
and others, AIR 2002 Supreme <strong>Court</strong>,<br />
200 allowed the release applic<strong>at</strong>ion<br />
straightaway setting aside the findings<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Prescribed Authority, Appell<strong>at</strong>e<br />
Authority and the <strong>High</strong> <strong>Court</strong> on the<br />
question <strong>of</strong> bonafide need and<br />
compar<strong>at</strong>ive hardship. The Apex <strong>Court</strong><br />
was <strong>of</strong> the view th<strong>at</strong> no fruitful purpose<br />
will be solved in remanding the m<strong>at</strong>ter<br />
and thereby opening another g<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
fresh series <strong>of</strong> litig<strong>at</strong>ion. Similar view<br />
was adopted by the Apex <strong>Court</strong> in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> R.V.E. Venk<strong>at</strong>achala Gounder<br />
Vs. Viswesaraswami V.P. Temple and<br />
another, 2004 All. C.J., 304 (S.C.).<br />
27. I am conscious <strong>of</strong> the fact th<strong>at</strong><br />
this <strong>Court</strong> cannot reevalu<strong>at</strong>e the<br />
evidence and substitute its own findings<br />
because two views are possible. A bare<br />
perusal <strong>of</strong> the release applic<strong>at</strong>ion,<br />
objections filed by tenants and the<br />
various affidavits it is abundantly clear<br />
th<strong>at</strong> the landlords (petitioners) who are<br />
owners, require the shops for their<br />
personal need. They are the first and the<br />
rightful claimant to use their own<br />
property as they want it. This is a<br />
situ<strong>at</strong>ion where f<strong>at</strong>her and son with their<br />
spouses are facing a number <strong>of</strong><br />
problems and therefore the release <strong>of</strong><br />
the shops cannot be refused. The very<br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> the Act stands frustr<strong>at</strong>ed if<br />
the two judgments <strong>of</strong> the courts are left<br />
to stand.<br />
28. In the circumstances and for<br />
the reasons detailed herein above the<br />
writ petition is allowed. The judgment<br />
and order d<strong>at</strong>ed 11.8.2008 passed by the<br />
Small Causes <strong>Court</strong>, <strong>Allahabad</strong> in P.A.<br />
Case No. 13 <strong>of</strong> 2005 and judgment and<br />
order d<strong>at</strong>ed 28.5.2009 passed by the<br />
Additional District and Session Judge,<br />
<strong>Court</strong> No. 12, <strong>Allahabad</strong> in Rent<br />
Control Appeal No. 119 <strong>of</strong> 2008 are<br />
quashed.<br />
29. In the end, learned counsels for<br />
the tenants have made a request for<br />
granting some time to the tenants to<br />
vac<strong>at</strong>e the shops in question. However,<br />
the request <strong>of</strong> the learned counsels for<br />
the tenants th<strong>at</strong> some time may be<br />
allowed to vac<strong>at</strong>e the shops in question<br />
appears to be reasonable and justified.<br />
30. The tenants are permitted six<br />
months' time from today to vac<strong>at</strong>e the<br />
shops in question and handover vacant<br />
possession to the landlord till 25.4.2010<br />
provided they file an undertaking within<br />
a period <strong>of</strong> four weeks before the
1096 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2009<br />
Prescribed Authority th<strong>at</strong> they will<br />
continue to pay rent <strong>at</strong> the r<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong> Rs.<br />
3000/- per month from the d<strong>at</strong>e <strong>of</strong><br />
judgment till they hand over vacant<br />
possession and also they will not sublet<br />
or handover possession to any third<br />
person but for the landlords. In the<br />
event the tenants fail to file an<br />
undertaking in the shape <strong>of</strong> an affidavit<br />
within the aforesaid period, this liberty<br />
<strong>of</strong> six months shall autom<strong>at</strong>ically come<br />
to an end.<br />
---------