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EDMC#: 0060246 

SECTION: 2 OF 2 

DOCUMENT #: 03-WMD-0244 

TITLE: Transmittal of Final FS for Canyon 

Disposition Initiative 221-U 

Facility DOE/RL-2001-11, Rev 1 

Draft B and Proposed Plan 

DOE/RL-2001-29, Rev 0 Draft D

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Proposed Plan for the 

Canyon Disposition 

Initiative (221-U Facility) 

United States 

Department of Energy 

For Externai Review 

DOE/RL-2001-29 

Draft D 

Redline/Strikeout

(^N 

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Proposed Plan for the 

Canyon Disposition Initiative 

(221-U Facility) 

June 2003 

United States Department of Energy 

^• t P.O. Box 650. RkMand, Washington 99352 

For External Review 

DoEJRL-2001-29 

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DOEiRL-2001-29 

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PROPOSED PLAN FOR THE CANYON DISPOSITION INITIATIVE (221-U FACILITY) 

INTERIM REMEDIAL ACTION 

EPA, ECOLOGY, AND DOE ANNOUNCE 

PROPOSED PLAN 

This Proposed PLnI identifies the preferred 

alternative for action at the 221-U 

Process Canyon Building (221-U Facility) located in 

the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site. In addition. 

the plan Includes summaries of other alternatives 

analyzed. fiistorically, the 221-U Facility was used to 

recover uranium and to decontaminate and reclaim 

radiologically contaminated equipment. Because of 

these activities. hazardous substances remain within 

the 221-U Facility that present a potential threat to 

human health and the environment. The preferred 

alternative for rernediation of these hazardous 

substances is to partially demolish the structure and 

dispose in place the resulting debris and e-limited 

heûve 

inside and adjacentto 

the remaining structure tmdcr an environmental cap. 

This Proposed Plan is issued by the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 

Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology), 

and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). These 

three agencies are referred to as the Tri-Panies. The 

EPA and Ecology are- the joint lead regulatory 

agencies for the 221-U Facility. The role of the lead 

regulatory agencies Is to oversee the activities at a 

remedial action site to ensure that all applicable 

requirements are met. The DOE is responsible for 

performing the selected remedial action. 

The Harrford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent 

Order, known as the Tri-Party Agreement, governs 

cleanup of the Hanford Site. The Tri-Party Agreement 

identifies the 221-U Facility as a remediation site to be 

evaluated under Section 120 of the Comprehenrive 

Environmental Response. Compensation, and llabiltry 

Act of 1980 (CERCLA). This evaluation was 

completed in the Final Feasibility Srudy for the 

Canyon Di.rposirion Initiative (221-U Facility) 

(DOIJRI.2001-I1. Rev. 1) ( final feasibility study). 

t TaMial Was Ia bold are defisdd in We dos+ty at the end of 

dna doeument. 

s The tenn'72t-U Fututy" Inctudes arc 22t-U BulWing.lhe 27t-U 

Support Snvim DuiMling. and the 276-U Solvent Flandbng Fadaty. 

Hanford Site, Rkhland, Washington 

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This Proposed Plan presents a summary of the key 

results of this evaluation and proposes a preferred 

alternative for remediation of the 22t-U Facility based 

on the evaluation. 

MARK YOUR CALENDAR 

This Proposed Plan Is being Issued by the Tri-Panies, 

and you are encouraged to comment during the public 

comment period on the preferred altermtive for the 

221-U Fadlity interitwtemedial action and other 

altematives described in this Proposed Plan. Based on 

new information or public eomments, the Tri-Parties 

may modify the preferred alternadve presented in this 

Proposed Plan. 

A 30-day public eommem period for this Proposed Plan 

will be from sx to xx. A public meeting on this 

Proposed Plan is geheduled to be held on ai in ax. 

To request a public meeting in your area or to send 

written comments, eontact: 

Craig Cameron 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

712 Swill Boulevard, Suite 5 

Riehland,Washington 99357 

Or 

Matt Mills 

W asbington State Department of Ecology 

1315 West Founh 

Kennewick,Washington 99336-6018 

Comments may also be nmde via e-mail to 

finterxn,Creig@F.pA.r+nv-or camemn.eraiZlaena.er,v 

or mm4W6lQs .wa.rov , or by ealling the Hanford 

Cleanup Toll-Frze Line in 14O1L321-2008. 

The Canyon Disposition Initiative (CDI) is the result 

of a 1996 Agreement in Principle among the 

Tri-Parties to define the path forward for determining 

the final disposition of the five major canyon 

buildings in the 200 Areas of the Hanford Site. The 

purpose of the CDI is to investigate the potential for 

using the canyon buildings as disposal sites (or 

Hanford Site remediation waste. rather than 

demolishing the structures and transferring the 

resulting waste to another disposal facility.

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The 22I-U Facility is the fint canyon building to be 

addressed under the CDI. The dispositioning process 

for the 221-U Facility is considered to be a pilot 

project for the remaining four canyon buildings. 

However, because of varying amounts, types, and 

locations of radiological contamination within the five 

eanyon, buildings, the complexity and costs for 

impkmentation could vary significantly for each 

building. Therefore, remedial alternatives and the 

interint-seiected remedy for the 221-U Facility may not 

be the same as those to be determined for the other 

canyon buildings. 

The Phase I Feasibility Study for the Canyon 

Dirposition Initiative (221-U Facility) (DOFlR697-11, 

Rev. 1) was completed to assess and scrcen an initial, 

wide range of alternatives for remediation of the 

221-U Facility. The Phase I study concluded with a 

set of potential alternatives that were feasible for 

221-U Facility remediation. These alternatives were 

then analyzed in detail In the Final Feasibility Snrdv 

for the Canyon Dimositlan Initiative (221-U FacJfitv). 

DOFIRL.2001-11. Rev. 1. {uwiêasibiiily Nudy. 

The interim-remedial action alternatives summarized 

in this Proposed Plan Include complete removal of the 

structure and its associated contamination and three 

containment alternatives that would leave existing 

contamination in place and, for two of the alternatives. 

would reuse varying portions of the facility's interna) 

and external area for the disposal of other Hanford 

Site remediation waste. Details on each of the 

alternatives for 221-U Facility runediation can be 

found in the final feasibility study and in other 

documents contained in the Administrative Record 

for the 200 West Area. The public Is encouraged to 

review the final feasibility study to gain a better 

understanding of the 221-U Facility and the 

environmental issues presented. 

After reviewing all public comments, the Tri-Panies 

may select the preferred alternative or another 

alternative or combination of alternatives presented in 

this Proposed Plan. Written comments on this 

Proposed Plan should be submitted by xx (see box on 

page 1). Responses to comments will be presented in a 

responsiveness summary that will be part of the 221-U 

Facility Record of Decision (ROD). 

47 SITE 

48 The llanford Site 

DOFJRL-2001-29 

Draft RD RedlinelStrikeout 

52 the primary mission of the Hanford Site was the 

53 production of nuclear materials for national defense. 

54 In July 1989, the Hanford Site was placed on the 

55 National Priorl0es Ust (NPL) pursuant to CERCLA. 

56 The Hanford Site currently Includes three NPL sites 

57 consisting of the 100, 200, and 300 Areas? 

58 The Hanford Site lies within a semi-arid climate 

59 (average annual precipitation of 16 cm 16.3 in.)) with 

60 high evapotrampiration rates and periodic high winds. 

61 200 West Area 

62 The 200 West Area is a DOE-controlled area of 

63 approximately 8.3 kms (32 mi3) near the middle of the 

64 fianford Site (Figure 1). The 200 West Area Is about 

65 8 iun (5 mi) from the Columbia River and 11 kin 

66 (6.8 mi) from the nearest Hanford Site boundary. The 

67 200 West Area contains waste management facilities 

68 and'uradiated-fuel reprocessing facilities. Because the 

69 200 West Area is located on an elevated, flat area, 

70 often referrcd to as the 200 Area P)atwu, the 

71 underlying vadose zone is relatively thick, ranging 

72 from less than 50 in (165 fl) to more than 100 in 

73 (328 f) to groundwater. 

74 The 221-U Faci6ty 

75 The 221-U Facility (Figures I and 2) Is located in the 

76 200 West Area of the Hanford Site. The 221-U 

77 Facility was one of three nearly identical Hanford Site 

78 chemical separations plants constructed from 1944 

79 through 1945 to support World War It plutonium 

80 production. The 221-U Facility was built to extract 

81 plutonium from fuel rods irradiated in the Hanford Site 

82 production reactors. However, the 221-U Facility was 

83 never used for this purpose because eariier serarraeted 

84 canyon buildings construmet the Hanford 

85 Site's production goals. The 221-U Facility instead 

86 was used to train B and T Plant operators until 1952. 

97 At that time, it was converted into it uranium recovery 

98 process for waste from other canyon facilities. A cross 

89 section of the 221-U Facility Is shown In Figure 3. 

90 SITECHARACTERISTICS 

91 The depth to groundwater new the 221-U Facility 

92 measures approximately 79 in (260 ft) and the flow Is 

93 to the south-southeast. The surface or the water table 

94 beneath the 200 West Area is currently declining at a 

95 rate of iess than 0.5 m/yr (1.6 fNyr). Groundwater in 

49 The Hanford Site (Figure 1) is a 1.517-kms (586-mis) 'Mw 40D ad 600AreasaR odw Hanr«d Site uw wt.ene not 

50 federal facility located in southeastern Washington 

Idemi6ed.seeparemNPLsius. ^nrwasufius.i^hnuncâs 

we ahnared wder oat or aie oUrcr NPL sites. The 11001Vea ws 

51 State along the Columbia River. From 1943 to 1990, êdtromu,eNPt,tn 19v6,

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DOF/R1^2001 •29 

^ Draft D Redline/Strikenu rti 

! FIgure 1. Ilanford Site I.oeation Map. 

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400 

West Area 

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Draft D Red(inelStrikeout II 

Figure 2. 221-U Facility (Aerial Vkw). 

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DOEIRf.2001-29 

Draft D RedlinelStfikenut B 

Figure 3. Cross Section of the 221-U Facility. 

3 the 200 Areas is currently contaminated and is not 27 

4 withdrawn for beneficial uses. The f/an/'osC 28 

5 Land-Use Plan Environmental lmpact 29 

6 Statement (FICP EIS) and associated ROD, issued in 30 

1999. and The Future for flanford Usrr and Qeanup, 31 

the Final Report of the Nanfond Future site Uses 32 

Wo&ng Group (Docember 1992) have Identified the area 33 

10 encompasud by the 221-U Facility on an indusrtial land 34 

11 use area. In the HCP EIS, this area Is designated 35 

12 'tindustrialsxelusive" and is defined as "land areas 36 

13 suitable and desitable for aestment, stotage, and disposal 37 

5 of harardous. dangerars. rrdioactive, nonradieactive 338 9 

wattes, and related seaivities." 

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The 221-U Facility and surrounding areas have been 

disturbed by Industrial activities and have little 

vegetative cover. Public access to the 221-U Facility 

is prohibited at the present time. 

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Potential contaminants that must be eansidered in the 44 

alternative evalua6on of On 221-U Facility include 45 

substances currently present within the canyon building 46 

and those associated with wastes to be received under the 47 

eontainmem alterwtives. The predominant 

eontandnrnls of concern are radionuclides. 

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49 

Radionuclides etctcntiy within the 22 1-U Facility that ate 50 

aow 

.al.s46waas. 

psfs1aaonp 

asry.wwe 

U.sasm 

pattaq 

tManawstea-PYq 

w+.^^ • 

considered to be of eoncern are americium-441; eesium- 

137; cobalt-60; jiptunium-237;_ plutonium-2391240; 

atrontium-90; and isotopes of europium, thorium, and 

manium. Cternical contaminants of concern currently 

within the facility are amimonv. araenic, )Z,itislhL 

cadmium, chromimn, k.ad, tnactvy, pbdulates, and 

polychlorinated biphenyls. seleniVM. silver. and y^:tnium . 

Based on analyses of materials disposed at the 

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF), the 

following radionuclides and nonndionuctides would also 

be contaminants of concern for alternatives that would 

usc the 221-U Facility as a disposal facility: carbon-14, 

technetiunt-99, ttidutn, antimenyberylliutn, petroleum 

hydrocarbons, and polyaromatic hydrocarbons. 

41 SCOPE AND ROLE OF ACTION 

This Proposed Plan presents the interirn•-remedial 

action for contaminated atructures, soil, and debris at 

the 221-U Facility. The scope of the i+werini-remedial 

action includes only the 221-U Facility (which 

includes the 271-U Support Services Building and the 

276-U Solvent Handling Facility). -ldjaeent-streetutes 

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thai. PMs+ea t-+n 

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the steHitFths+amedielaetion. 

11 The role of the proposed imerim rcmedial action Is to 

18 reduce potenGal future threats to human hn)th and the 

19 environmem associated with hazardous substances in the 

20 facility and the underlying soils. Existing contaminated 

21 grourdwater underlying the 221-U Facility is being 

22 addressed under a separate CERt'i.A action associated 

23 with the 200-UP-1 Operable Unit. Cleanup levels 

24 Identified as a result of this Proposed Plan will be 

25 protective of grotadwater and the Columbia River. 

DOE!RG2001-29 

Draft D RedlinelS trikeout i3 

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26 SUMMARY OF S1TE RISK 

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The Tri-Parties believe that the preferred altereative, or 

one of the other active measures presented in this 

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Proposed Plan, is necessary to protect human health or 

welfare and the environment from actual or threatened 

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31 releases of hazardous substances into the environment. 83 

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Such a release, or threat of release, may present an 

imminent and substantial endangerment to public 

health, welfare, or the environment. 

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35 Human Health Risk 

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36 In the Superfund ptocess, potential risks to human 90 

37 health and the environment are evaluated to determine 91 

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If signi8cant risks exist due to site contaminants. 

Excess cancer risks are expressed exponentially as 

1 x 10'4, 1 x IT. and I x 10+ (i.e., one in ten 

92 

93 

94 

41 thousand, one in one hundred thousand, one in a 

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43 

million, respectively). This means that for a I x 10' 

risk. If 10,000 people were exposed to a contaminant 

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96 

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of concern for some period of time, one additional 

person may be diagnosed with cancer In his/her 

lifetime. Remedial actions generally are not required 

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47A 

at risk levels between 1 x 10' and ) x IOs unless there 100 

are other considerations such as adverse environmental 101 

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impacts, the potential for future migration, ori02 

uncertainty regarding future land use. 

103 

Contamination existing at the 221-U Facility poses the 

potential for increased human health risk to future site 

users. The level of potential health risk posed by 

contaminants currently present at the facility differs 

depending on the future site use. Two reasonable 

maximum exposure scenarios were evaluated for 

the221-U Facility: an industrial scenario and an 

Inadvertent intruder scenario. In both scenarios, future 

users could be exposed to contaminants in the facility 

through external exposure to radiation and ingestion or 

inhalation of particulate released from the facility. 

Air, biota. and groundwater would be secondary media 

of concern because the likelihood of these media 

becoming contaminated Is less andlor the magnitude of 

their potential comamination Is small. 

In general, the assessment of risk is based on a limited 

data aet. Uncertainties exist with both the contaminants 

Identified for the 221-U Facility and the concentrations 

of the contaminantss. The results of sampling of existing 

areas of contamination may not be representative of 

specific conditions throughout the facility. '1Uerefore, 

the evaluations of risks that are presented could be 

either underestimated or overestimated. 

Industrial Scenario. Based on risk assessment results 

for contaminants and concentrations evaluated in the 

final feasibility study, the contaminants at the 221-U 

Facility providing the highest contribution to potential 

increased human health risks include various 

radionuclides ( americium-241, eesium-137, cobalt-60, 

europium-154, nemunium -^37. plutonium-2391240, 

and-atronlium-90 . and utanium iconmesl and heavy 

metals ( lead, mercury, and uranium). The total 

Incremental cancer risk (ICR) of the radionuclides at 

eoncentrations measured at the 221-U Facility is 

greater than 10. 

Concentrations and risk ranges are presented In Table 1. 

Environmental media and waste material contaminated 

by these constituents inciude concrete, metallic waste, 

eontaincriud materials, soil, and miscellaneous debris 

currently contained within the structure of the 221-U 

Facility. iGN!e-f " : 1 

iwteJ--lâutl -iat 

pi sed sheps. 

Inadvertent Intruder Scenario. The inadvertent 

intruder scenario assumes that unacceptable hazards to 

an intruder could occur from exposure to contents of 

the 221-U Facility after the loss of Institutional 

controls ( e.g.. access restrictions). In this scenario. 

institutional control Is conservatively assumed to be 

lost aqrr-100 years after cbsure of dispocal faciliti^w 

containina radinactivc waac . Consistent with U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations. the

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DOE1R1.-2001-29 

Draft l) Rcdlinc/StrikeowE 

prcmise for the Inadvertent intmder scenario was to 

ensure that the dose from a single acute exposure 

would not exceed 500 nuem. The 221-U Facility 

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9 

dose to an inadvertcnt inlruder in the presence of these 

types of contaminants is predicted to be above 

contains various levels of ndiologically contaminated 

equipment. fission products, contaminated building 

materials, and/or miscellaneous debris from the fuels 

10 

11 

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500 mrem for a single acute exposure for at least 500 

years. 

manufacturing process. The potential radiological 

Table 1. Representative Risks of 221-U Facility Contaminants. 

Contaminant 

Represenfatlvt-95S LiCL of 

' 

Human i:lealsh Risk b 

Nonndionuclides 

Contaminant Concenlrations (Industrial Scenarlo) 

Antimon 2.96+1-0.14 me/ke )J1=0.07+1-0.02 

Arie ni 50.3a/-23.3mJke NI=2+/-1:1CR-7.6xI7`+/.9.Sx10't 

jl&pRID 

Cadmium 

397 19 f1 ID:t.6g 

3.54+/.0.13 M:U 

111= 0.07 +/- 0.01 

III=0.33+/.001:1CRs1.7x 104 4-3.5 x 10's 

W' i 

l ead 

Mercury 

Sclcniurn 

SiLE 

Uranium 

2.100+/-349 ^/LS 

1.140+/-12S 3tSLp mc/ka 

1.190+/- 1173ri20 mclka 

0.2''_S+/.0.o5.y mg/Rg 

4 + mvJkg 

JjW_±L-J,4Q mgAcg 

HI=0A18+1-0.003 

Not Applicable; PRO = 353 mg/kg 

HI =50±/-S ;2^ 

HI=O.oOrxt+/-o.0lx/i 

}u = 0.062 +/. 0.ais 

1. 4+/- 

HO=87+1-12 

TotallCRs2.Sx10++/-0.7x 04 

Radionuclides 

Americium-241 

Cesium-137 

6.4 x 10's+1- 3.1 x IO^S.32C,+7 pCi/g 

^ d^+ - 0.4 x pCVg 

ICR => 10'i+I•^ 

ICR => 10' +/- 

Cobalt^fi 9.4 x 10' +/. 1.4 x l0'^ 437,000 pCi/g ICR s> 10' = +/- 0'- 

Europium-154 3.3 x 10''+/- 0.9 x 10' a3,6C-r6 

pCi/g ICR => 10' a +l- > 0'- 

Ncntunium-237 7.1 vi1 Q"+ l.4.6 x 10~ pCVg ICR => 10'=+/-> 10'- 

Plutonium-238 s a x I0'-+/- 0.9 x 10•'Z,qgg pCi/g It'R s 3.1- OeS x 10's3.3-a-iA'a 

Plutonium-239 J.4 x 10' +l-0.^3^3,;85+5 pCi/g ICR=> 1D+l-^jQ- 

Plutonium-240 3.3x 10"+/-0.6x_t0'!d,H3E+3 pCi/g ICR=>10+.> 

Strontium-90 

Thorium-230 

2.3 +^ x lb îA3T+9 

pCi/g 

].1x 10'+l- 0.2 x 10't pCi/g 

ICR=> 10' 

LCM = 4 

+a> 

0+- • 

Uranium-234 6. t x 10° 2^ +/- 2 x 10'I>i(rAOD pCJg ICR = - 6.I-a-iA's 

Uranium435 -':i,2G0 3 ^Vg ICR = 1.9 x 10' +/-1.1 x 10 s;a.{ a-i8^ 

Uranium-238 4.0 x 10` +/- 1.1 x 10' 8B ^'Jg ICR= ItY^+/-O.R 2.8 x 

10^9.g w i9+ 

TotallCR=>10's+- lo't 

'957 UCL vnluesBwe for individual contaminants were used to iweaninrI 

final feasibility study. 

sks as described in Appendix P-A-of the 

RJumerical values are not reported for risks greater than lo't because the linear equation for risk estimation Is only valid for 

eontaminant Intakes resulting in calculated risks below 104. 

iU =hazanlindrx 

liQ - haiani maxiem . aum of haârd^ndices 

ICR ainctementalearberrisk 

PRtI a pteiinilnary remediation goal 

I1Ci.= upper confidence limit 

13 Eeologleal Risk 

14 The 221-U Facility is within the industrial exclusive 

15 area Identified in the Ht:P E1S (DOFJEIS-0222-F). 

16 The area Immediately surrounding the 221-U Facility 

17 is highly disturbed and thus provides reduced-quality 

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habitat for ecological communities and the 

establishment of food webs with a hierarchy of 

tcrrestrial receptors. In addition, there is little 

likelihood of ecological exposure to 221-U Facility 

contaminants via intrusion or releases at the present 

time. However, if remedial alternatives are not

o"N 

DOF/RIr2001-29 

Draft D Redline/Strikeout li 

I implemented, the possibility of exposure will increase 32 

2 over time. 53 

54 

3 The level of safety required for the protection of all 55 

4 human individuals is believed to be adequate to protect 56 

5 other species, although not neces 

6 members of those species. Etolo 

200 Areas, including the 221-U Facil 

be--further considered in The t 

35 

36 

37 

Individual 

risk In the 

wabe5ev-F. 

feesilkw+4eel" I 

° ie^-pwjxr 

Idam _ R 

t 

renxdiei•-eetien-aittrnatwe-ahusenîsr-Nw •22-{-U 

rweiliiv.- The placement of an environmental cap 

under containment alternatives would be designed to 

sever all exposure pathways, thus greatly reducing the 

probability and degree of impacts to human and 

ecological receptors. 

38 REMEDIAL ACTION OBJECTIVFS 

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The remedial action obJectives (RAOs) for the 221-U 

Facility are as follows: 

RAO 3: Prevent the migration of contaminants through 

the vadose zone to groundwater and the Columbia River 

such that concentrations reaching groundwater and the 

river do not exceed ARARs or risk-based criteria and 

will result in no ftuther degradation. 

57 RAO 4: Minimiu physical, ecobgicat, or cultural 

58 impacts caused by remediation of the 221-U Facility or 

59 by use of ahe 221-U Facility as a disposal facility. 

60 PRELIMINARY REMEDIATION GOALS 

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90 

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Preliminary rcrnediation goals (PRGs) have been 

developed for determining the extent of resnediation 

required under Altemative5 1 and 6 . Hecause there ere 

no low-level waste streams at this time with 

aeceotence criteria end risk assessment narsmeters. 

These data would be submitted to the reeufatnrv 

agencies and DOE for jechnico l review and 

cotKurrence. 

PROs for Alterna 'ttvei I nd 6 are eentaieed iarnesent 

in Tables 2 and 3. These values are based on acceptable 

levels of human health and ecological risk. Typically. 

PROs are Identified for individual hazardous substances. 

If multiple contaminants are pnesent at n site. the 

suitability of using Individual PRds as final cleanup 

values protective of human health and the environment 

is evaluated based on site-specific information and the 

potential for contaminant Interaction. Specific PROa 

applicable to achieving one or more of the 221-U 

Facilitya RAOs are based on the following guidance 

and ARARs. Final PROs will be specified in the 

interi*-autio*ROD for the 221-U Facility. 

RAO 1: Prevent or mitigate health and occupational 91 

92 Fardirectexposurr. 

risks to workers and the environment from physical, 

chemical, and radiological haxards posed by the 93 • For radionuclides, the EPA CERCLA risk range of 

221-U Facility. 94 104 to 10+ increased cancer risks 

RAO 2: Prevent or mitigate risk to human health. 

ecological recepton, or natural resources associated 

with external exposure to, ingestion of, inhalation of, 

and dermal contact with 221-UFacility contents at 

kvels that exceed applicable or relevant and 

appropriate requirements (ARARs) or risk-based 

criteria. 

•1M Td•Panin tuve ehaea 15 meMyr above backpwod far 

t.aDa qean afln naal temediadm fur a maxiwur tapwed 

i.dividul to addiev ads PRO. CoeVaance with this PRO 0.e.10 

to 104) will be dennnstrated for tadioloairaf and nwtadiolopnl 

eoeurNmnn of eoocem apan site ved6ntian and darout.

(O"N 

27 

^ 29 

29 

1 

ll 

1 

13 

DOF/RI.-2001-29 

Draft 1) Redline/Strikeout 6 

wndards caicuialedLusi_nz he State of 14 

Washington's 15 

elexmtpreguletn>tw--( Washington Admin(strarive 16 

Code (WACI 173-340-745 t iii B) a i ns 17 

for nonradioanive contaminants. 

• Ambient water quality criteria developed under the 

Federal Clean Water Act (40 CFR 131) atd/or 

turfaee water quality standards promulgated by the 

State of Washington (WAC 173-201A) 

18 • The State of Washington's #FAA-Lj1j-(+g,gyj 

For groundwater/Cofumbia River protection, the most 19 siandardv fiw adcutatina eroundwater and surface 

stringent of the following: 20 water slandarde uleanxp-sfandnrd%{WAC 173-340- 

21 720_)). 

• Maximum contaminant levels (MCfs) as 

promulgated under the Federal Safe Drinking 22 • The State of 1Vashingtetn's rick-based standardc fix 

WaterAct (40 Code ajFederal Regulations (CFRJ 23 dcrivine util concentratinnc for vroundwatcr and 

141) (for most radionuclides. MC(s correspond to 24 surface water onxcction (WAC 173-340.747141). 

4 Inretnlyr) andJor the State of Washington's 

drinking water standards (WAC 246-290) 25 

26 

Table 2. Summary of Radionuclide Preliminary Remtd'latlon Coals for All Pathways. 

Constittunt 1S-raeemfyr 

Dose 

Direct Eipowsn' (pCYt) Groundwater and Overall Clmnup 

608-mrem/yr 

Dasea 

RiverProteetioo' 

Witt) 

Levde 

(lcvt) 

Amedeium-241 335 112,000 NA' 335 

Carbon-14 33.100 1,100.000 322 322 

Cesium-137 23.4 ' 780 NA' 23.4 

Cobalt-0 4.90 • 164 NA' 4.90 

Emopimo-152 11A 386 NA' 11A 

Eusopium-1S4 '. 103 345 NA' 103 

Palropium-155 426 14.200 NA' 426 

Neptunium-117 5U LZ N1L .52,^. 

Plutonium-239RA0 425 14,2W NA' 425 

Stronriunf90 2,4t0 80,300 NA' 2.410 

Teohnettum-99 412,000 13.700.000 181 181 

7lmriunr228 7.73 258 NA• 7.73 

7horium-232 4.90 160 NA' 4.80 

7tiGum ( 11-3) 66.900 2,230.000 6.000 6.000 

(hanium ( total) 608 20,800 NA' 608 

NOTE: Shaded aeeas tepreseot the pathway Niver fa the oveon eloeup level. 

'lAmet apomwe vsWes tepnseet aeavi6n for IedivWual radionuclides tlw would mra the RAO fa eumulative risa 

(I4.10' m 10' sisk stnder an lodwuial seesulo) from exposure to ooeuminated so0ds. Values win be lower for muhipk 

esdioevetides b acaieve the same risk endpdet. tbted nlues are eatsvloted by ibCRPSRAD axek:tand applparCa.ed m;re,us4Lthe 

top 4b as (15 O)r(,Ot

(^N 

i0,"% 

/ ' 

DOF/RL-2001-29 

Draft D Redline/Strikenut l3 

Table J. Summnn• of Nnnradinnutlide Trrliminnn• Remediation Cmlc for All Palhwnrs. 

I 

li r t d Cil 

1 

/:ruundwater and rh 

un < r c 

i rrc l 

l 

Comtiturnl Rxkemund 

•n a" Columhia Rivrr idn^ 

N'i 

Ovrrnll PIt(7 ` 

1'rntMion ` dM i mt a m < 1 

Im¢!ke) lnr!lcel 

n •' 

IntrJlt} 

Am1.fmRY NSLS ^ " ^ •nn 1.4 

A[Stmf :^ B11 4SlLZ 2Q :9 

acau lklm Lu 1m • 'M, T4LS filz 

sI.qN1A00' ^^fl1l • j^ • jjS 

[hmmfumtyh ^+ 10.S0(1 m • NOW 2.1 

Slodik EM m 'it •' N990 16 

idw 1Q3 1Ql0 m 22-0 :24 

Llcmltz 4^d3 1.4^4 4423 2 4,33 

359,44q ^4 '

^ 

^ 

I Meeting these ARARs and, by extension, achieving 

2 RAOs, can be accomplished by reducing concentrations 

3 (or activities) of contaminants to remediation goal 

4 levels or by eliminating potential exposure pathways. 

5 Contaminant-specific, numeric soil PROs for direct 

6 exposure and protection of groundwater and the 

7 Columbia River are typically presented as 

8 concentration (mg/kg) or activities (pCi/g). 

9 SUMMARY OF REMEDIAL ALTERNATIVES 

10 The 221-U Facility final feasibility study addressed 

llI five alternatives for interim-remedial action. The 

12 Phase I feasibility study Identified two other 

13 alternatives that were not recommended for further 

14 study. These were Alternatives 2 (Decontaminate and 

15 Leave in Place) and S(Close in Place - Standing 

16 Structure). Only Alteraatives 0 (as a baseline), 1. 3.4. 

1^ and 6 were carried forward into the final feasibility 

1 study and this Proposed Plan. 

19 These alternatives are as follows: 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

3 

3 

3 

4 

41 

4 

4 

4 

4 

48 

49 

• Alternative 0: No Action 

• Alternative 1: Full Removal and Disposal 

• Alternalive 3; Entombment with Internal Waste 

Disposal 

• Alternative 4: Entombment with InternaVExternal 

Waste Disposal 

• Alternative 6: Close in Place - Collapsed Structure. 

With the exception of the No Action baseline 

(Alternative 0), the remaining active alternatives 

consist of common elements to achieve the 221-U 

Facility RAOs. The common elements include 

components within the response action, in.aitutional 

rnntrols. and, for Alternatives 3, 4, and 6, a u a 

barrier nost-elosure monitoring. These are 

summarized in Table 4. The foomrint of the surface 

Alternative 0: No Action Alternalive 

DOFJRl.2001-29 

Draft D RedlindStrikeout D 

50 The "National Oil and Nazardous Subsunees103 

SI Contingency Plan" (NCP) (40 CFR 300) requires that 

52 a No Action alternative be evaluated as a baseline for 

53 comparison with other remedial alternatives. 

54 Alternative 0 represents a situation where no legal 

SS restricbons, access controls, or active remedial 

56 measures are applied to the site. No Action implies 

57 "walking away" from the 221-U Facility and allowing 

S8 the wastes to remain in their current configuration, 

59 affected otily by natural processes and without benefit 

60 of surveillance or maintenance acdvities. Selecting 

61 Ahernative 0 as the preferred alternative would require 

62 that the 221-U Facility poses no unacceptable threat to 

63 human health or the environment. 

64 Alternatlve 1: Full Removal and Disposal 

65 In this alternative, the 221-U Facility structure and 

66 contents would be decontaminated and demolished. 

67 Demolition of the structure would involve cutting it 

68 into large blocks. Structural material, facility contents. 

69 and associated soil above tieaoW>-leve{R-yj,l^y3gQ 

70 st,indards would be disposed at the ERDF. An 

71 estimated 78,OOD ms (102,000 yd) of debris and soil 

72 would be disposed to the ERDF. Most wastes would 

73 be expected to meet the criteria established for ERDF 

74 waste acceptance. If the ERDF waste acceptance 

75 criteria cannot be achieved, waste treatment or 

76 disposal at an offsite disposal facility would be 

77 required. Material to be disposed of would be 

78 segregated, evaluated for reuse or recycle, and 

79 packaged and shipped to the disposal facility. The 

80 demolition excavation would then be backfilled to 

81 surrounding grade, and the disturbed area would be 

82 reseeded or otherwise resurfaced consistent with future 

83 land-use decisions. Institutional controls to mainuin 

84 industrial land use would be required if unrestricted 

85 cleanup levels are not achieved by this alternative. 

86 Alternative 3: Entombment with Internal 

87 Waste Disposal 

88 This alternative would involve decontimination of the 

89 221-U Facility in preparation for intemal placement of 

90 wastes from other CERCLA actions on the Flanford 

91 Site. Approximately 3A00 ms (4A00 yds) of exi.sting 

92 contaminated equipment from the canyon eperating 

93 dcck would be reduced in size and volume and then 

94 disposed to process cells of the facility. Approximately 

95 10.100 ms (13.200 yds) of waste from other CERCLA 

96 actions would also be disposed in available remaining 

97 spaces within the 221-U Facility, resulting in a total 

98 waste disposal volume of 13500 tns (17.600 yd'). 

99 These wastes would be grouted to minimize the 

100 potential for void spaces. A eross section of the 

101 interior waste fill plan under Alternative 3 is shown in 

102 Figure 4. 

11

fO'^, 

^ 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

l 

1 

17 

18 

19 

20 

Ii' 

Element 

DOF/RI..2001-29 

Draft D RedlinelStrikeoam B 

Tabk 4. Common Elements of the Active Remedial Alternatives for the 221•U Facility. 

Desertp0oa 

Respaue The response action is the pdwry elemem of the remedial action alternstive. Response actions determined to be appmpriaWe 

Action for the 221-U Facility include removd of eontanrinams ( Alletnmive 1), containment of eontanunants In The existing swcture 

with Internal waste disposal ( Ahernative 3). eantainmeat of contaminants In the existing suueave with Internal and external 

wane disposal (Alternative q, and containmem of emnaminaus in a panially demolished strocturo (Aherna6ve 6). All 

alternatives will require eommon steps to stabilize the facility. Key eonunoa steps include instaltmian of a new toof rover; 

gtouting of concretesocased tik sewer pipe and ventilatwo Wnnel; siu reduction and dismantiing of equipment currently 

Yeingitxedon the canyon ep«eNepdock; fuing eonuminanon on the canyon walls, tlaor. roof. aells, hot pipe trenck. and 

equipmeon D&D of The outer 22.9 m (7! 0) of the railroad tunnel and wing wal Iss and disposition of the 276U Solvent 

Recovery Facility, the 271-U lHfn:e Bu)iding, and front and «ar stairs of the 221-U Facility. 

AMaadve I involves complete sowce tenavat, tceument as necessary, and disposal at an onshe eaginmed facility such as the 

tRDF. 'Re cootaimrcm rnponse aetiem inchde elomae of drc unit with an enginared muni-layered sudace eaviroomentaf eap. 

tustnu6unal lastinaioml mnools sre sn imegnl pon of aU tespame saimc 71lese comok would be tequirod dutiog and after oomplcte aeute 

Cantrak nanovd (Aiumnive p nemwe Itut twre land use n^milm ansWem widt dte lodumial sceoatio. Fvomaa)mne^ altnnatives, 

more robust Innawiooal controls would be required to emuro that environmrnul caps are poperty maimaiaed Methods of 

ptecluding uointeotioml acspassing and eonuoning access to waste sites eould Include sigm, enuyeooud. exeavation pnndu, 

anificW at nmtmal barriets, and active naveiUaece. legd testriiaions on the inc of land and groundwater would be (nqoscd (ey 

hdption,we0a88ag)7irkgnlrestdcdomwouidbeet@ c t i veifeonaulofasheistruufaredffanDOEloanogrrpnty. 

Monitoring ThismmedialaclioneovpoaentisaeommoodementforAhaeatives3,d,and6. 0pg,y

^ 

r 

^ 

I 

2 

3 

4 

5 6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

a.u:. 

Erosion ProNeOon 

DoFJR1.-2001-29 

Draft D Rediine/Strikeout8 

Figure 4. Alternatives 3 and 4 - Cross Section or the 

221-U Facility Interior Waste Fill Plan. 

%^••'^^^ 

^ ' . 

KNAW/ 

. % ; ;^ •^ 

•w^qu}i ^ a,a • ^ 

• i . 

-461 

. ^.a.. 

Figure S. 221-U Facility Environmental Cap Components. 

(Course iGprop. Oravel and Sand) 

. ^ rc^sbv!(nm•1 

• V^n j "^ti^Y^,l 

Enpineend Fill 

(Unoontaminabd Compaetad Soil) 

Envkonm.ntd Cap 

13 

Enplnuand 9arrNr 

(ModiBed RCRA Sutdhb C Surface BaMer) 

,^.^1Ì',^4/ 

221-U 

(Concrete Stnxtura with Waste Flq

I 

f^ 

^ 

DOE!RL-2001-29 

Ikaft D RedlinelStriketwt B 

Figure 6. Alternative 4- Cross Section of the Environmental Cap and Exterior Waste F'ilL 

Enplnwnd OartMr 

(dedUMd RCRA &bn0e C Sudxe Banier) 

^ ^'&oq tOm 

^'. 

... . . 

am 

^ìc=l;^f^::'7`•.î^J^,:' 

7 

. .E. .. t' ..:i:: 1 

. ^'7Ext..wrw..ur:tn L 

2214 "^^^^DuN unerlNow weste Flll 

(Oaw,Na Ntuelun 

wlNwaNena) 

IsarrMr i^ ^^-Enplnsandfill^ 

i^.s. 

C_k. . 

provide containment to both interior and exterior waste 

Gll (Figure 6). The disposal unit's exterior waste fill 

area will include as part of its design a RCRArnaapliant 

double Finer and leachate collection 

21 system to account for the potential to receive 

9 hazardous waste from CERCLA or RCRA past- 

10 practice aleanups at ffanford In this portion of the 

11 facility. With the addition of the external disposal 

12 area, approxhmtely 63,600 ms (82,700 yds) of waste 

13 could be disposed at the 221-U Facility under 

14 Alternative 4. Like Alternative 3, approximately 

IS 1.4 million m' (1.8 million yd') of borrow materials 

16 would be required to construct the environmental cap. 

17 The facility after placement of the environmental cap 

18 would be approximately 461 m(1312 h) in length by 

19 234 m(768 fl) in width by 24 in (80 ft) high at existing 

20 grade. 

21 Alterodive 6: Close In Place - Collapsed Strueture 

2 

2 

2 

2f{ 

21 

2 

29 

31 

31 

32 

33 

34 

5 

31 3 

3 

3 

This allernaQve would require dispn.êi-of-F000-tnr 

rki:ar,-î approxinutely 3,400 m' (4,400 yd) of existing 

contaminated equipment from the canyon eperatingdock 

weadd-be size reduced and disposed to the pracess cells 

and erotncd (Figiae 7). The upper part of the 221-U 

Faeility would then be demolished to approximately the 

level of the canyon eperadng-dock. Demolition would 

involve cutting the upper part of the structtuo into large 

blocks. The eot>Retc debris from building demolition 

would be placed on the canyon deck and on the ground 

adjacent to the building, Cementitious grout would be 

placed around waste to minimize the potential for void 

spaces Unlike Aitem^vl^ves 3 and 4. Alternative 6 would 

ruy include dispnsal of impnned llanfttrd Site 

mmediatinn waaes de cr unmd the outcide of the 

Ermbn Probeaon 

' ` 

39 2^1-U Facititv. -A kxa 

40 m ., 

41 FxiiityandeN4kernntive{r. 

NaloscaVe 

ae,aw ,as 

42 The oaniallv demolished_ building and concrete debris 

43 would be covered with a modified RCRA Subtitle C. 

44 compliant environmental cap; however, the 

45 environmental cap would be smaller in dimension than 

46 In Alternatives 3 and 4 as a result of the decreased 

47 height of the structure. Approximately 460,000 ms 

48 (602.000 yd)) of borrow materials would be required 

49 under this alternative for environmental cap materials. 

50 The facility after placement of the environmental cap 

SI would be approximately 370 m(1,214 R) In length by 

52 159 m(522 ft) in width by 12 m(39 It) high. 

53 Post-closure cara, Institutional controls, and 

54 monitoring required as pan of this alternative would be 

55 similar to Alternatives 3 and 4. 

56 EVALUATION OF REMEDIAL 

37 ALTERNATIVES 

58 The following evaluation of remedial alternatives 

59 summarizes each alternative in rolation to the aine 

60 CERCLA criteria (see box - Explanation of CERCLA 

61 Evaluation Criteria). A comprehensive analysis of 

62 each alternative is contained In the 221-U Facility final 

63 feasibility study. 

64 The first two criteria. overall protection and 

65 compliance with ARARs. are defined under CERCLA 

66 as'tihreshold criteria." Threshold criteria ttwst be met 

67 by an alternative to be eligible for selection. The next 

68 five criteria are defined as "primary balancing 

69 criteria." These criteria are used to weigh major 

70 tradaoffs among alternatives. The Wst two criteria, 

71 stale and community acceptance, are defined as 

14

(^N 

{ 

01 

f^ 

DOE0r2001•29 

Draft D RedlinelStrikeom II 

1 ^ Figure 7. Alternatlve 6- Cross Section of the 221-U Facility Interior WaslrFlil Plan. 

2 

3 

fi^PM.M,^wn.. 

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, • • 

_ t/bl'IMYETtlMCa a 

lLFCYnK'.W 

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. 

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. • • eIK1CiS1L^lLwn11 • ' • 1 

•' NMTwsnluTtn ÔUnTIU. ^ • . . . ' ^ ^ : 

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3 

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b73, pUIN NFAbEa 

EkISTNaeQtl(1tF.YC Glld.'TNII. Lf(NCry 

7YKlC1L'aP. rVUlrfnfT 

aenma 

EXPLANATION OF CERCLA EVALUATION CRITERIA 

Overall Protection of Ifuman fleabh and the 

Environmene Is the primay objective of the remedial 

action and addresses whether a remedial action provides 

adequate overall protection of human health and the 

environmem. 71ds eritedon must be met for a remedial 

alternative to be eligible for consideration. 

Compliance with Applicable or Relevant and 

Appropriate Requirements addresses whether a remedial 

action will sneet an of the applicable or relevant and 

appropriate requirements and odler kderat and wme 

environmental stuutcs, or provides grounds for Invoking 

a waiver of the sequircments. This criterion must be met 

for a remedial attesnative to be eligible for consideration. 

fong.Tenn Ef/eeiveness and Pennanenee refers to she 

magnitude of residual risk and the ability of a remedial 

action to maintain iong-krm, reliable protection of 

human health and the envisonmeat after rcmedial goals 

have been mel. 

Reduction of Toskiry, Mobtliry, or Volume 75rough 

Treatment refers to an evaluation of the anticipated 

pesfomuusce of the treatment technologies that may be 

employed in a mmedy. Reduction of toxidty, mobility. 

and/or volutne contribute s toward overall psotecsive ness. 

15 

5. Shon-Tenn Ffjeetiveness refers to evaluation of the 

speed with which the remedy achieves protection. It 

also refers to any potential adverse dfects on human 

health and she environment during the eonstnsction and 

imp[ementuion phases of a remedial action. 

G brrpleolentabiliry refers to the technieal and 

administrative feasibility of a remedial aMion, 

fncluding the availability of materials and services 

needed to Implement the selected solution. 

7. Cost refers to an evaluation of the capital, operation and 

maintenanoe, and monitoring costs for each alternative. 

S. State Aeeeptam Indicates whether the state concurs 

with, opposes, or has no comment an the preferred 

imetim-alternative based on review of the final 

feasibility study and the Proposed Plan. 

9. Community Acceptance assesses the genesnl public 

response to the Proposed Plan, following a review of 

the public comments received during the public 

comment period and open community meetings. The 

rcmedial action is selected only after consideration of 

this criterion.

^ 

^ 

^ 

1 

1 

119 

12 

13 

14 

15 

19 

17 

1 

I 

2 

21 

2 

2 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

3^ 

33 

34 

3 

3 

38 

31 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

45 

46 

4 

4ypal71 y 

4 

50 

51 

52 

tinodifying criteria.^ These criteria may be considered 

to the extent that Information is available during the 

final feasibility study, but cannot be fully considered 

until after public comment is received on the Proposed 

Plan. In the final comparison of alternatives to select a 

remedy, modifying criteria are of equal importance to 

the balancing eriteria. 

Overall Protection. The No Action alternative would 

fail to meet this threshold criterion and, therefore, is 

not discussed further In this evaluation. All remaining 

alternatives would meet this threshold criterion. 

Alternative I would protect human health and the 

environment by removing contaminants from the 

221-U Facility. Alternatives 3, 4, and 6 would protect 

human health and the environment by eliminating or 

reducing exposure pathways. 

Compliana with Applicable or Rekvanl and 

Appropriate Requiremenes. AH-eWive alternatiws 

aNeptaHvea, Alternative 0 dnes not comnlv with 

ARARs. Alternative I would nrovide full eomn iance 

with ARAR - while Alternatives 3 and 4 would reauire 

certain waivers rtaining to landfill repuiremems. 

Similar waivers could also be neoded for Alternative 6. 

DOFJRL2001-29 

Draft D Redlinc/Strikecwt 8 

Long-Term Effectiveness and Permanence. All of 79 

the alternatives would provide a similar degree of 

long-term effectiveness and permanence. 80 

Alternative 1 would transfer contaminants from the gI 

221-U Facility to the ERDF. Containment 82 

alternatives 3. 4, and 6 would leave contaminants In 83 

place within the 221-U Facility's structure. The 94 

environmental cap systems for the containment 85 

alternatives and for ERDF under Alternative I are 86 

similarly designed. iMwever, the F.RDF can under 87 

Altetnative 1 and fl.S_Alternative 6 environmental aps gg 

ere- av a slightly more reliable design for long•term 89 

performanee than the environmental eap designa of 90 

Alternatives 3 and 4. Th ie is bccam th e extreme 91 

height required for construction of the environmental 92 

caps in Alternatives 3 and 4 would result in a greater 93 

inherent risk of failure under seismic loading 94 

conditions than would the standard environmental cap 95 

design used at i]tDF under Alternative 1, which 96 

would be of similar height to that used for 97 

Alternative 6. On the other hand, should yg 

environmental caps fail, the grouted waste form 99 

contained In Alternatives 3Lgnd 41 and ttrcwted leaacv loo 

y+astE in Altemative 6 would be more protective In OtelOl 

long term than untreated waste. Long-term use102 

restrictions, monitoring, and environmental eap103 

maintenance would be similar for both ERDF underl1N 

53 Alternative I and the environmental caps for 

54 Alternatives 3, 4, and 6. 

55 

56 

57 

58 

59 

60 

61 

62 

63 

64 

65 

66 

67 

68 

69 

70 

71 

72 

73 

74 

75 

76 

77 

78 

16 

Reduction of Toxkity, Mobility, or Volume 

Through Treatttxnt. Under Alternatives 3, 4, and 6, 

the filling of void space with grout would effectively 

treat by encapsulation certain contaminants remaining 

In the 221-U Facility and wastes received into the 

facility from Alternatives 3 and 4 . Upon filling the 

facility, there would be a relatively solid cementitious 

matrix formed that would aid in preventing the 

mobilization of contaminants from the facility. 

Ahhough the encapsulation of contaminants may not 

be entirely verifiable in portions of the facility, in 

general this action would immobilize a large portion of 

radiological and inorganic wastes. Alternatives 3 and 

4 would provide the greatest degree of treatment 

relative to Alternative 6 because these alternatives 

wouhf fill the greatest volume of internal void space. 

Alternative 1 would provide the least seduction of 

toxicity. mobility, or volume through aeaunent. 

Short-Term F.Rectlvenesr. All of the alternatives 

would be expected to be effective in protecting human 

health and the environment in the short term. 

Alternatives 3, 4, and 6 would be more effective In the 

short term than Alternative 1. due predominantly to a 

significantly lower risk to workers from radiological 

exposure and industrial accidents. Alternative I would 

cause nearly six times more worker dose as a result of 

exposure to radionuclides than would Alternatives 3 

and 4, and nearly eight times more than Alternative 6, 

which would have the lowest worker dose expected of 

the alternatives. This is because Alternative 1 would 

require the breaching of a larger number of 

radioactively contaminated systems and structures that 

may present unknown hazards to workers. Industrial 

accidents would be more likely for a large-scale 

decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) action 

such as would occur mainly under Alternative 1 and, 

to a lesser extent. Alternative 6. Waste receipt 

activities under Alternatives 3,-ir and 64 would occur 

undcr controlled circumstances and would not be 

expected to pose significant worker safety issues. 

Because Altemative 4 would include placement of 

waste both inside and outside of the structure, it would 

perform less effectively In the short term than would

^ 

f^ 

^ 

1 Alternative 3 because of the added waste handling 

2 activities. 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

to 

11 

12 

13 

14 

IS 

16 

17 

18 

19 

211 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

435 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

45 

46 

47 

48 

49 

50 

51 

52 

Short-term Impacts to vegetation, wildlife, and cultural 

resources are not considered significant indicators of 

short-term effectiveness for any alternative at the 

221-U Facility because the site and adjacent had area 

have been previously disturbed. However, 

Alterttatives 1. 3. 4, and 6 could impact natural and 

cultural rcsotuces at borrow sites. The quantity of 

geologic tnatcrials required would be significantly 

kss for Alternative l; thus, the impacts to these 

resources would be less. Approximately 86.900 ms 

(113,600 yds) of material would be required to backfill 

and recontour the site for Alternative 1. The total 

volume of geologic materials would be almost 

1.500.000 ms ^1y00,000 yd) in Alternatives 3 and 4 

and 460,000 m(602,000 yd^ in Alternative 6. 

DOEIRI.2001-29 

Draft D Redli ndStrikeout 6 

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 

38 

59 

60 

61 

62 

63 

64 

65 

66 

67 

68 

69 

70 

All alternatives would take approximately the same it 

amount of time (9 to 10 years) to achieve RAOs. 72 

73 

Implettseatabi8ty. All of the alternatives am 74 

considered to be itnplementable. Alternative I and, 75 

lesser extem. Alternative 6 would involve 76 

technical difOcutties and safety requ'vements 77 

associated with large-scale radiological D&D actions. 

However, these elements use standard, proven 78 

technologies and are considered implemeatable. Size 79 

reduction, transponation, and disposal of large 

volumes of radioactively contaminated sauctures, 80 

piping systems, equipment, wastes, and soils would 81 

add complexity to Alternative I relative to the other 82 

alternatives. 

Internal waste placement under Alternatives 3, 4rand-4 

(^woutd be impktnentable. Technologies for waste 

receipt and placement using shielded containers and 

container lift equipment are proven and reliable. 

External waste placement under Alternative 4 would 

require that a bottom liner system be placed on a steep 

slope and attached to a vertical exterior wall. This 

would complicate the implementation of this 

alternative. 

and 4, these performance issues are less pronounced. 

Alternative 4 would be the most complex 

environmental cap to construct because of technical 

issues in the construction of the external liner 

installation and the exterior wall of the 221-U Facility. 

and with construction of the steeply lined area for 

external waste fill. In addition, the steep slope for the 

external fill area in Alternatives 3 and 4 would need to 

be built in stages to aecommodate the need for equal 

loading of outside and inside wall of the 221-U 

Facility during waste plaeement. t'xotechnicat 

specialists would be required for design of the 

environmental cap. 

Because of the technical difficulties that may result In 

the design and construction of the environmental cap. 

Alternatives 3 and 4 are considered slightly less 

(mplcmentable than Alternatives I and 6, with 

Alteroative 4 being the most difficult to (mplement. 

Costs. Table S summartxes the capital, operation and 

maintenance. and total present-worth costs for each 

alternative. The present-worth costs for Alternatives 6 

and 1 are 570-¢7_million and $84 million, respectively. 

making these the least costly alternatives. The presentworth 

costs for Alternatives 3 and 4 are $111 million 

and $113 million, respectively. 

State Acceptanca The State of Washington supports 

the preferred alternative. 

Community Acceptance. Community acceptance 

will be considered after all public comments on this 

Proposed Plan have been received. 

83 SUMMARY OF THE PREFERRED 

84 ALTERNATIVE 

85 

86 

87 

88 

89 

90 

91 

92 

Construction of an engineered environmentat cap for 93 

the containment alternatives would require innovative 94 

and unproven design applications. Alternatives 3 and 95 

4 have the greatest inherent environmental cap design 

uncertainty due to height. Inherent uncertainties 96 

would exist in the asstcances of engineered barrier 

Integrity during certain seismic conditions. The 97 

environmental cap for Alternative 6 also includes some 98 

performance Issucs under certain seismic loading 99 

conditions. However, because the cap for Alternative100 

6 would not be as high as the caps for Alternatives 3 

17 

Based on the available information and the analysis of 

the CERCLA evaluation criteria, the Tri-Parties are 

proposing Alternative 6, Close In Place - Collapsed 

Strueture, as the prefened alternative for the 221-U 

Facility. Alternative 6 meets the threshold criteria and 

provides the best balance of tradeoffs among the other 

alternatives with respect to the balancing and 

modifying criteria. The Tri-Panies expect the 

preferred alternative to satisfy the following statutory 

requirements of CFRCLA;121(b): 

• Be protective of human health and the environment 

• Comply with ARARa (orjustify a waiver) 

• Becosteffective 

• Use permanent solutions and alternative treatment 

technologies or resource recpvery technologies to 

the maximum extent practicable

! ' 

t^ 

Project 

Prepare the existing eomptes 

DOF1RG2001-29 

Draft D Redlirte/StrikeoutB 

Table 5. CDI Total Project Cost Summary. 

Dollar Amounts 

Altenutivel Alternalive3 Attesmttve4 Ahernative6 

Capital Cost Summary 

Assessnent aehvi0es 700.000 700,000 700,000 700.000 

Design aetivides 7,900.000 8,800,000 9,000,000 4,800^11,000 

Removal ofslud8e and liquids fromequipment 1.300A00 1300,000 1.300,000 1,300.000 

Establish infrastmeture I.600.000 2,480Q04.000 2,200Z44,000 1.600,000 

Modify 221-U Facility 15,400,000 16,900,000 16,900,000 16,900M,000 

Modify external araa 

D'upositlonof extenu11e8ary structures 

Sa00,000 32,100;,^_00,00 

I 1 

0 

27,{^,00 

0 

20,900,000 

Disposition of waste sites within footprint 2A00A00 0 0 0 

Operate exlsttnt complex 

Building demolition, semoval, and disposal 59,000,000 1,300,000 1J00.000 10,700,000 

Fill galleries with wute(&Qyl materials 0 8.SOOS^Q.000 8,SO0M000 71MJ ".000 

Fill opera0n8 daet area with waste anterlal 0 16,400.000 16,l00.000 0 

Construct engineered clean BIl 0 30.200,000 28,800.000 7,400,000 

Construa external leaehate collection system 0 0 1,600.000 0 

Place external contaminated soil fill 0 0 1,900,000 0 

Clase complex 

Backfill221-Uexeava6onvoid 1,300,000 0 0 0 

Construct environmrntal eap 0 4,700.000 4.700.000 4,100,000 

Construct erosion protection on sideslopes 0 7,800,000 7,800,000 3.100.1100 

Revegetate 30,000 50.000 50,001) 50.000 

Closeout activities 200.000 200.000 200,000 200,000 

Demobiliration 50.000 60,000 60,000 50,000 

Establish yoondwater or vadose wne monitoring 0 300,000 900,000 300,000 

Totaleapitalerots 94^00,000 43Ir4N120.900 , 

000 

O&M Cost Summary 

12J,900M,000 ?6,0007^'M,00 

0 

Monitmin8 and Inspections 500.000 49,300,000 49,300.000 49A00,000 

Engineecd barrier seplarement (year 500) 500,000 4,700.000 4.700,000 4,100,000 

ToW O&M Cast 1,000A00 54,000,000 34,000,000 53,100,000 

Overalt Casl Sunusury 

Project That Costs (Undiscounted) 95,ti00,000 i38r100 174.900 , 

000 

177;o0aM,000 i29,300 21 5.900 , 

000 

Net Ptesent Worth iotals 84400.000 111,200,000 113,100,000 70,300LT,y0q 00 

0 

NOTB: All saa rqimYes have an aearacy of -W* b+l076. Raent•woM caa one based on a 7.3% =1 diseeunt rate (OMB l]reular 

Na. A-94, Appardix C) and a 1,6W-year period of pafarmamce. Tool uod'acouoted costs are 2001 dollass far a IA00-year period or analysis. 

AU oosa have been wundcd. 

O&bt . O9eratioes and Maintenance 

l6

f^ 

i^ 

lrl-^11 

1• Satisfy the preference for treatment as a principal 

2 element. 

3 

4 

5 

19 

10 

ll 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

11 

1 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

2s 

26 

27 

24 

29 

30 

31 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

41 

42 

43 

44 

45 

4f,JJl 

4 

48 

49 

50 

51 

All of the alternatives other than Alternative 0 meet the 

threshold criteria for protection of human health and 

the environment and compliance with ARARs. thus 

satisfying the statutory requirements of ¢$C(.A 

eriteria ( 1) and (2) (see inset table on n. XX__for 

criteria. Alternative 6 is also the least costly 

alternative, is similarly or more effective than the other 

alternatives for the long term and short tenn, and Is 

considered implementable, thus satisfying the statutory 

requirement to be cost effective ( 3). Alternative 6 

provides a similar degree of permanence compared to 

the other alternatives because all alternatives involve 

hazardous substance disposal on the Hanford Site. The 

use of grout to fill void spaces will act as a treatment 

to immobiline contaminants in the building's structure 

although not to the degree of 

Alternatives 3 and 4. Orouting will serve to help 

satisfy the statutory requirements in (4) and (5), 

although none of the alternatives Include treatment as a 

principal element. 

Changes to the preferred altemative presented in this 

Proposed Plan or changes to another alternative may 

be made if public comments andlor additional data 

Indicate that such a change would result In a tnore 

appropriate ckanup solution. The final decision 

regarding the selected interitmremedies for the 221-U 

Facility will be documented in a ROD after review and 

consideration of all comments on this Proposed Plan. 

DOE/RG2001-29 

Draft D Redline/StrikeoutB 

52 

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 

$9 

$9 

60 

61 

62 

63 

64 

65 

66 

67 

68 

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70 

71 

72 

73 

74 

75 

76 

77 

78 

79 

80 

81 

82 

83 

84 

85 

86 

87 

88 

89 

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 90 

91 

Several of the evaluation criteria specified by 92 

CERCLA Involve consideration of environmenul 93 

resources, but the emphasis is often directed at 94 

potential adverse effects of contaminants on living 95 

organisms. The National Enrironmenaof PoGcy Act 96 

of 1969 (NEPA) process is Intended to help federal 97 

agencies make decisions based on an understanding of 98 

environmental consequences and to take appropriate 99 

actions that protect, restore, and enhance the 1oo 

environment. DOE 0 451.113 requires incorporation 101 

19 

of NEPA values into CERCLA documents, such as the 

221-U Final Feasibility Study and this Proposed Plan, 

to the extent practicable in lieu of separate 

documentation. 

The NEPA-related resources and values that have been 

considered for the 221-U Facility support the 

CERCLA docision-making process and are 

summarized in the following text. The No Action 

alternative has no impact on NEPA values and is not 

included in the discussion. 

Transportation Impacts. None of the proposed 

remedial alternatives would be expected to create any 

long-term transportation impacts. If adverse impacts 

to transportation were to be detected. remedial 

activities would be modified or halted until the impact 

is mitigated. 

Air Qtsality. Potential a'tr quality impaeu are 

associated with all of the alternatives. These impacts 

have not been quantified but in the near term would be 

expected to be minor. For Alternatives 1, 3. 4, and 6, 

impacts would be mitigated through appropriate 

engineering controls. 

Natural, Cultural, and Historical Resources. Some 

short-tcrm adverse impacts to natural or cultural 

resources could occur during Implememation of 

Alternatives 1, 3, 4, and 6. The area immediately 

around the 221-U Facility is heavily developed with 

little wildlife or useable habitat, so few Impacts to 

biological or cultural resources are anticipated at the 

facility. 

Potential impacts to these resources would be a greater 

concern at borrow sites because they are located in 

otherwise undisturbed areas. Hotrow material would 

be obtained on or near the Central Plateau, an area 

that contains important iHg--largg_sagebrush 

communities. In any alternative, it would be critical to 

avoid disturbing sagebrush communities and any other 

high-quality habitat. Alternative 1 would require the 

least amount of borrow material and therefore would 

have the fewest potential impacts at borrow sites. 

Alternatives 3 and 4 would require 17 times more 

borrow material than Alternative 1 and would have the 

greatest potential Impacts at borrow sites. 

Allernative6 would require about five times more 

borrow material than Alternative 1. In Alternative 1, 

there is also the potential for adverse impaets at the 

ERDF. which Is located in an area of high-quality 

shrub-steppe habitat. Alternative I would require 

about a 12% expansion of an ERDF cell for waste 

disposal.

f ' 

^ 

rN 

100 

I Noise, Visual, and Aesthetic Effects. Alternatives 1, 

2 3.4. and 6 would increase noise levels, but the impacts 

3 would be or shurt-term duration during remedial 

4 actions and would not affect offsite noise kvels. 

5 Alternative 1 would have a positive impact on visual 

6 and aesthetic effects. Conversely. Alternatives 3 and 4 

7 and, to a lesser extent. Alternative 6 would have a 

8 negative long-term visual and aesthetic impact due to 

9 the visibility of the disposal facility from a distance. 

10 Under Alternatives 3 and 4, the facility would be 

11 approximately 24 m(80 ft) in height, and under 

12 Alternative 6, would be approximately 12 m (39 ft) in 

13 height. 

14 Socioeconosnie Impacts The 221-U Facility itself is 

15 not a factor In the socioecotwmics of the region. The 

16 number of workers involved in remedial actions under 

17 any of the alternatives would be small; therefore. 

18 impacts would be negligible. 

19 1Envlromanental Justice. Offsite impacts to any of the 

20 local communities would be minimal for all of the 

21 alternatives, so environmental justice iuues (i.e.. high 

22 and disproportionate adverse health and 

23 socioeconomie impacts on minority or low-income 

24 populations) would not be a concern. 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29( 

3p^1 

31 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

3 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

Irrevessibk and Irretrievabk Commitrnent or 

Resources. Depending on the alternative selected. 

remedial action at the 221-U Facility could require an 

irreversible or Irretrievable commitment or resoiuces. 

particularly land use and geologic materials. 

All of the alternatives would result in land-tue loss to 

some extent. Alternatives 3, 4, and 6 would have 

the greatest impact because they would leave all or 

part of the 221-U Facility in place. This would make 

the site unlikely to be usable for other purposes. 

including industrial uses, for the foreseeable future. 

Alternative I would also limit site use, but to a lesser 

extent because contamination could remain below 

industrial cleanup standards but above unrestricted use 

standards to a depth or at least 4.6 m(IS A). 

Contamination above industrial cleanup standards 

might remain at greater depths. Alternative I would 

also result in IaM-use loss for ERDF disposal, because 

the ERDF would need to be expanded by about 12% of 

one cell to accommodate 221-U Facility waste. 

45 Alternatives 1. 3. 4, and 6 also would require an 

46 irretrievable and irreversible commitment of resources 

47 in the form of geologic materials. The quantity 

DOFIRL-2001-29 

Draft D Redline/Strikeout B 

48 

49 

50 

51 

52 

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 

58 

59 

60 

61 

62 

63 

64 

65 

66 

67 

68 

69 

70 

71 

72 

73 

74 

75 

76 

77 

78 

79 

80 

81 

82 

83 

84 

85 

86 

87 

88 

89 

90 

91 

92 

93 

94 

95 

96 

97 

20 

required would be significantly less for Alternative 1. 

This material would be obtained from onsite borrow 

pits. In addition, there would be a small increase in the 

amount of material required for the closure 

environmental cap at ERDF. Alternatives l, 3, 4, and 

6 also would require an irretrievable and irreversible 

commitment of resources in the form of petroleum 

products (e.g., diesel fuel and gasoline). 

Cumulative Effects. The proposed remedial action 

alternatives could have impacts when considered 

together with impacts from past and foreseeable future 

actions at and near the Hanford Site. Authorized 

current and future activities in the 200 Arws that 

might be ongoing during remedial action Include soil 

and groundwater remediation; operation and closure of 

underground waste tanks; construction and operation 

of tank waste vitrification facilities; storage of spent 

nuclear fuel; and surveillance, maintenance, and D&D 

of reprocessing facilities. Other activities on the 

Hanford Site Include D&D of a variety of facilities, 

soil and groundwater remediation, removal of spent 

nuclear fuel from the K Basins, and operation of the 

Energy Northwest commercial reactor. Activities near 

the Hanford Site include a privately owned radioactive 

and mixed waste treatment facility, a commercial fuel 

manufaaurer, and a titanium reprocessing plant 

There is some potential for impacts to natural 

resources at onsite borrow sites, although impacts can 

be minimized by appropriate planning. A DOE NEPA 

environmental assessment aurrenilyiuteviewthat 

evaluated Impacts to borrow sites from ether-Hanford 

Site projects including remediation did dees not 

identify significant Impacts associated with continued 

use of existing onsite borrow pits. TheretaFvaiunusef 

remediet' ferr^yl 

Under Alternatives 3. 4, and 6, the 221-U Facility 

would become a permanent above-grade structure In 

the 200 West Area. With Alternatives 3 and 4, the 

structure would be about 24.4 m(80 ft) high and 

visible from a distance. Depending on other 

remediation activities in the 200 Areas (particularly the 

disposition or other canyon facilities), she facility 

could either be one of several such structures or could 

become a singular man-made element in an otherwise 

seeniclandscape.

^ 

^ 

^ 

DOEIRL-2001-29 

Draft D RedlinetStrikrnut l; 

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 

The public Is encouraged to read the following 

documents to gain a better understanding of the 

221-U Facility: 

Final FeoribilityStudyjorthe Canyon Disposition 

Initiative (221-U Facility), DOE!RL2001-11, 

Rev.10, U.S. Department of Energy. Richland 

Operations Office, Richland. Washington. 

aVasAingten. 

Phase! Feasibility Study jor the Canyon Disposition 

Initiative (221-UFaciliry), DOEIRL.97-11, Rev. 1, 

U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations 

Offa:e, Riehland, Wuhington. 

Fotused Feasibilitv Study for the U Plant Clesare 

Area a.rre Sites. DOElRG2003-23. Rev. O rDraft Al. 

U.S. Denartment of Enerev. Richland Ooeratiens 

Office. Richland. Washineton. 

21 

The Administrative Record can be reviewed at the 

following locations: 

Lnckheed Martin Services, Inc. 

Administrative Record 

2440 Stevens Center Place, Room 1101 

Itichland, W sshington 99352 

509/376-2530 

ATJUp86: Debbi Isom 

Washington State Dept. of Ecology 

Nuclear Waste Program 

300 Desmond Drive SE 

PO Box 47600 

Olympia, Washington 98504-7600 

360J407-7105 

AjjffRAG: Donna Ealdonada 

Armstrong Data Services 

00 US Environmental Protection Agency 

1200 6th Avenue EC1.076 

Seattle, Washington 98101 

206/553-6983 

ATTN 1169: JennirerJoki

^ POINTS OF CONTA CP 

^ 

U.S. Drnartment of Enerev Renresentative 

AFlef19t ^vinl.earv 

Project Manager 

5091-V,V= 

373 9G3+ 

U.S. Environrnental Protection Aeencv 

Reoregntative 1Region 10) 

Craig Cameron 

Project Manager 

5091376-8665 

Washinaton State Denanment ofEcoln¢v 

Reoresentative 

Man Mills 

Unit Manager 

309l1365721 

DOElRL-2001-29 

Draft D Rediine/Strikeout B 

22 

INFORMATION 

This Proposed Plan is avaiiable for viewing at the 

following public information repositories: 

University of Washington 

Suuallo Libnry Government Publications 

Box 3529000 

Seattle, Washington 98193 

206/543-1937 

g)^1R9G: Eleanor Chase 

Gomaga University, Foley Center 

Tri-Party Information Repository 

East $02 Boone 

Spokane, Washington 99258 

509/323-3839 

A37EROC: Connie Scarpelli 

Portland State University 

Branford Price Millar Library 

Science and Engineering Floor 

Tri-Patry Inforrnation Repository 

934 SW Harrison 

Portland, Oregon 97207-1151 

503/725-3690 

ATS,LpoG: Michael Bowman 

U.S. BDeoartment n6LED= Richland Public 

Reading Room 

Washington State University 

Consolidated Information Center, Room 101L 

2770 University Drive 

Richland, Washington 99352 

309/3727443 

$7311F66: Terri Traub

1 

DOEIR62001-29 

^ Draft D Redlinc/StrikeoutB 

^ CLOSSARY 

/\ 

I 

2 

3 The first usage of technical terms and other specialized text in this Proposed Plan Is shown in bold In the document 

4 and the terms are defined below. 

5 Adadnistrative Record - The files containina all the documrnta used to selec(a tesnonx action at a CERCLA 

6 remedial action sile f ecations where the Administrative Record for Ihe }hnford Sit e is maintai ned were oreviou Iv 

7 provided In this document. 

8 Applicable or rekvant and appropriate requirements (ARARs) - Cleanup standards, standards of control, and 

9 other env'uonmental protection requirements based on federal or state laws that address a hazardous substance, 

10 pollutant, eontaminant, remedial action, location, or other circumstance at a CERCLA site, or that address problems 

11 or situations sufficiently similar to those encountered at the (ERCLA site that their use is well-suited to the 

12 particulars7te. 

13 Canyon buildings - Hanford Site chemical separations plants, called canyon buildings or canyon facilities. were 

14 constructed from 1944 through 1945 by the DuPont de Nemours Company for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 

13 support of World War It plutonium ptoduction. These facilities were termed "canyon" buildings because of their 

16 monolithic size and the canyon-like appearance of their interiors. 

17 Containment A remedial alternative that relies on nlacement or a ohvsical barrier over a waste s it e to preve,,, 

18 Intrusion by humans andlor biota• may also bqQesianed to limit infiltration of preeinitation to provide nrotertion of 

19 groundwater by Iimiting mobilizati n orcontaminants in the vadose s oils . 

20 Contamisunts of conimm fCOCI - A focaced list of radioactive and cheTtcat Mn

f^ 

n 

DOF/RL-2001-29 

Draft D Redlinc/Strikeout 6 

1^ Remedial aetion obieetives (RAOs) - Oeneral deacrintionc of what the remedial action will accomolitih (e e 

2 restoration of mroundwater). 

9 

10 

RCRA-compliant double liner and leachale collection system - A RCRA-compliant double liner and Icachate 

collection system for a landfill meets the requirements of Section 3004(o) and 3015 of the Hazardous and Solid 

Waste Amendments of RCRA. It consists of a top liner and a bottom liner with two Icachate collection and removal 

systems, one placed between the liners and one placed under the bottom liner. 

Record of Decision - The formal document in which a regulatory agency sets forth the selected remedial measure 

and the reasons for Its selection. 

24

f ' 

("] APPENDIX C 

2 

3 RISK MODELING OF AN ENGINEERED SURFACE 

4 BARRIER FOR THE 221-U FACILITY 

r*N 


Rev. {1 1 lhaTt fl 

Rrdlinc/StrikMU 

Final Feasibility Study/or the Canyon Disposition 7nitiative (221-U Facility) 

Junc 200 C-i

noFIRL-2001-11 

Rev. p 1 1)raft P 

^ ReJlinclSlrikawt 

f 

Final Feasibility Srudy fur the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221 •U Facility) 

J une 2 00 3 C-li

^ 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

^1 9 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

f^ 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

DOFJR1.2001-11 

Rev. e-LPrsft j_3 

Rcdlinc/Stril^crnrt 

C RISK MODELING OF AN ENGINEERED SURFACE BARRIER FOR 

THE 221-U FACIIITY ................................................................................................... C-1 

FIGURE 

C.1 MODELING APPROACH, INPUTS, AND RESULTS ....................................C-1 

C.1.1 Similarityof Waste Disposal at the 221-U Facility to the 

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility ..........................................C-1 

C.1.2 Specific Results of Modeling Fate and Transport to Groundwater 

at the 221-U Facility or ERDF ............. :........................... _.............. ....... C-2 

C.1.3 Results of Modeling a Disposal Facility with Clay Admix Liner.... ....... C-3 

C.2 REFERFNCES .................................................. ................................................... C-3 

C-1. Runoff Coefficient Graph ................................................................................................C-6 

TABLES 

C-1. RESRAD Input Parameters for Modeling Groundwater Protection at the 

221-U Facility and ERDF ...............................................................................................C-7 

C-2. Carbon-14 and Technetium-99 Breakthrough to Groundwater at Different 

Precipitation Rates ................................................................................. _........................ C-8 

Final Fea.ribiliry S+udy jor die Canyon Disposition lnfHarive (221•t/ Faciliry) 

June2003 C-iii

^ 

^ 

1 

2 


Rev.A 1 Dra(t g 

Rcdlinr/Striktcwt 

Final Ftasibtlity StuAy for she Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

unc ÎX) C-iv

f0'^' 

APPENDIX C 

DOFIRI.2001-1 l 

Rev. y l Draft j,t 

Rcdlinc/Strikeout 

3 RISK MODELING OFAN ENGINEERED SURFACE 

4 BARRIER FOR THE 221-U FACILITY 

5 

6 

7 C.1 MODELING APPROACH, INPUTS, AND RESULTS 

8 

9 Groundwater in the vicinity of the 221-U Facility is contaminated as a result of past operations, 

10 disposal practices. and unplanned releases. No use of groundwater is predicted to be allowed to 

11 occur as long as the mission of the 200 Areas remains management of existing waste and waste 

12 disposal facilities and institutional controls remain in place. However, further degradation of 

13 groundwater will be prevented. 

14 

15 The groundwater cleanup objective for the 200 Areas is restoration of the contaminated aquifer 

16 to drinking water standards. For mobilc contaminants in the 200 Areas, cleanup levels protective 

17 of groundwater and the Columbia River are based on the 

Is W „ ., 

19 #4ethed-,4EWashington Administrative Code (WAC)173-340-7453 ( Ecolog,v 2001) . Drinking 

20 water standards are used as the basis for detem»ning whether soil cleanup levels will be 

(--N21 protective of groundwater quality because the aquifer is considered to be a potential drinking 

22 ^ water source even though PATC-A AC 173-340-745j is being used as the basis for 

23 direct contact cleanup levels for chemicals under the industrial land-use scenario and 

24 groundwater consumption is not part of the reasonable maximum exposure scenario. 

25 

26 C.1.1 Similarity or Waste Disposal at the 221-U Facility to the 

27 Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility 

28 

29 Use of the 221-U Facility for purposes of waste disposal, as described in this final feasibility 

30 study report for Alternatives 3, 4, and 6, would be modeled after the Environmental Restoration 

31 Disposal Facility (ERDF). The ERDF is a large radioactive and mixed waste landfill authorized 

32 under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act oj1980 

33 (CERCLA) and established to receive waste, including both soil and debris from reactor-related 

34 remediation activities on the Hanford Site. Constructed to Resource Conservation and Recovery 

35 Act of 1976 (RCRA) Subtitle C criteria, it has a double liner/leachate collection system. As 

36 mandated by the ERDF Record of Decision (EPA 1995), the disposal facility will be capped by a 

37 RCRA Subtitle C-type cover modified to be 5 m(16.4 tt) thick for intrusion control. The cover 

38 will incorporate two infiltration barriers. The first is a vegetative barrier that removes moisture 

39 by evaporation/transpiration. The second is a composite flexible membrane/clay admix liner 

40 60 cm (2 ft) thick overlain by a drainage layer. The drainage layer is planned to be a 30-cm 

41 (1-ft)-thick layer of gravel on a 2% slope (or equivalent). Waste is compacted in the ERDF to 

42 provide a stable foundation for the cover. 

(--'43 

Final Ftasibitiry Study jor the Canyon Disposition fnitiative (221-U Facility) 

Jum 200.1 C-1

. . .,.. 

Appendix C - Risk Modeling of an Engineered DOFIRlr2001•I I 

Surface Barrier for the 221•U Facility Rev. m Draft E 

Rcdiinc/Strikeout 

I The radionuclides carbon-14, tcchnetium-99, tritium ( 1-I-3), and most uranium isotopes are highly 

2 mobile when contacted by water in soil. These radionuclides pose a potential threat to 

3 groundwater when disposed in a facility and must be evaluated by appropriate mathematical 

4 modeling. The potential impacts of carbon-14 and other radionuclides on the groundwater 

5 beneath the 221-U Facility or ERDF were modeled using the RESidual RADioactivity 

6 (RESRAD) model developed for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by Argonne National 

7 Laboratory (ANL). The results of the modeling concluded that no radionuclides, including 

8 carbon-14, technetium-99, tritium (11-3), and uranium isotopes, will reach groundwater within 

9 1,000 years. 

10 

I I The RESRAD model was developed forDOE (ANL 1993) to implement guidelines under 

12 DOE Order 5400.5 for allowable residual radioactive material in soil. The RESRAD model is a 

13 well-developed and mature code. It incorporates a dynamic, one-dimensional, nondispersion 

14 analytical model to evaluate contaminant mobility from a source in the vadose zone to 

15 groundwater. The RESRAD model has been validated and veritied independently as described 

16 in reports available from ANL The model was identified for use by the U.S. Environmental 

17 Protection Agency (EPA) in performing dose assessments to support the EPA guidance limit for 

1 B radiation dose from contaminated sites to 15 mrem/yr above background (EPA 1997). 

19 

20 Benchmarking of RESRAD, MEPAS, and MMSOIIS was performed in a study by the DOE and 

^2I EPA (DOE 1995) that concluded that RESRAD would predict a shorter travel time and higher 

22 groundwater concentration of potential contaminants than the other two models. That is, 

23 RESRAD provides a more conservative evaluation than models that consider more elaborate 

24 fate-and-transport algorithms. In addition. the RESRAD modeling described is conservative 

25 because only the cover admix layer and overlying drainage layer, and not the other eover 

26 components or liner system, were considered for its contribution of runoff and moisture 

27 retardation in the evaluation of groundwater protection. 

28 

29 C.1.2 Specific Results of Modeling Fate and Transport 

30 to Groundwater at the 221-U Facility or ERDF 

31 

32 To determine if radionuclides arc predicted to reach groundwater within 1,000 years, modeling 

33 was performed as described in Appendix B. Section B.6.3. Multiple runs using several 

34 radionuclide concentrations showed that the results of the evaluation of groundwater protection 

35 are insensitive to radionuclide concentration variation. With the exception of the field capacity 

36 and cover characteristics, all of the RESRAD input parameters are reprzsentative of the 

37 200 Areas as modeled in the 200-CW-I Operable Unit Remedial Investigation Report 

38 (DOE-RL 2000) and presented in Appendix B. Tables B-9 and B-10 of this final feasibility study 

39 report. The RESRAD guidance (ANL 2001) defines the field capacity as the total porosity 

40 minus the effective porosity. The field capacity is used as the lower bound for the moisture 

41 content of the specified soil layer. Under field conditions the field capacity may be expected to 

42 be lower than the total porosity minus the effectivc porosity, but not higher. Values of porosity 

('43 and field capacity used in these calculations were based on levels of waste compaction normally 

44 achieved at ERDF and expected at the 221-U Facility. These values are presented in Table C-1. 

Firtaf Fearibrliry Strrdy jar the Cart)on Disposition In&iative (221-U Facility) 

LLne 2001 C-2

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

^20 

.r ..1 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

("^13 

44 

Appendix C - Risk Modeling of an Engineered DoFARlr2001-11 

Surface Barrier for the 221-U Facility Rev. ol raft Q 

Redlinc/Strikcout 

Cover-rclated inputs to RESRAD are predicated upon use of a Modified RCRA Subtitle C-type 

cover for the 221-U Facility or ERDF final cover, as mandated by the ERDF Record of Decision 

(EPA 1995). The Modified RCRA Subtitle C-typc cover includes a 0.6-m (2-ft)-thick 

compacted soil/bentonite admix with a geosynthetic membrane, a drainage layer, a vegetation 

layer, and a total thickness of 5 m(16.4 ft). The effect of the geosynthetic membrane to retard 

moisture penetration was ignored in the RESRAD evaluation. Two important cover modeling 

parameters are admix soil density and runoff coefficient. Runoff coefficient is related to 

drainage layer transmissivity, admix transmissivity, and annual inflow (precipitation). Values 

from the ERDF design analysis (Casbon 1995) for admixed soil density and the transmissivity 

(1 cmis) for 0.3 m(1 ft) of clean drainage gravel were used to model the cover. Drainage layer 

transmissivity is converted to a runoff coefficient value for different inflows as shown in 

Fi gure C- thc .-qhrrunoff coefficient increases as the transmissivity increases and as the 

precipitation increases. 

i u C- 1 shows coefficientc for 20.3 cm/yr and 127 cm/vr ( 8 in./vr and 50 in./yr1. The 

26 cm/vr and 53.3 cm/yr (' 

linearrelationship. Because 

transmissivitv of 10'° cm/vr was assumed. Runoff coefficients approach 100% as liner 

transmissivity decreases to the transmissivity value of a clay liner of 10'8 cm/yr. Therefore, a 

single runoff coefficient of 0.98 was used for all precipitation levels. 

C.1.3 Results of Modeling a Disposal Facility with Clay Admix Liner 

The RESRAD runs for determination of preliminary remediation goals did not model the effects 

of the cover and predicted that only radionuclides with a distribution coefficient of less than one 

(carbon-14, technetium-99, and tritium (H-3]) had the potential to reach groundwater within 

( 1,000 years. Uranium has a distribution coefficient.eRikreeereater than zem and was predicted 

not to reach groundwater within 1,000 years. 

With the clay admix cover included in the evaluation, RESRAD predicts that no radionuclides 

from the 221-U Facility or ERDF will reach groundwater within 1,000 years. Âs shown in 

Table C-2. this would hold true for current, double, and triple precipitation rates for the 

Hanford Site. 

C.2 REFERENCES 

40 CFR 141, "National Primary Drinking Water Regulations;' Code of Federal Regulations, 

as amended. 

Final Feasibility Study for the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

June 100 

C-3

n 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

r'%21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

Appendix C - Risk Modeling of an Engineered DOFJRL-2001-11 

Surface Barrier for the 221-U Facility Rev. p t nn,ft L 

Redlinc/Strikcnut 

ANL,1993, Manual forlmplementing Residual Radioactive Material Guidelines Using 

RESRAD, Version 5.0, ANL/EAD/LD-2, September 1993, Environmental Assessment 

Division, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois. 

ANL, 2001, RESRADfor Windows, Version 6.1. Environmental Assessment Division, Argonne 

National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois. 

BHI, 2001, ERDFCroundwater Modeling White Paper (CCN 088246 to A. R. Michael, Bechtel 

Hanford, Inc.. from Michael Casbon, April 4, 2001), Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, 

Washington. 

Casbon, M. A., 1995, Design Analysis, Construction of W-296 Environmental Restoration 

Disposal Facility, BHI-00355, Rev. 00, Vol. 1, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, 

Washington. 

DOE, 1995, Benchmarking Analysis of Three Multimedia Models: RESRAD, MMSOILS, and 

MEPAS, DOE(ORO-2033, October 1995, U.S. Department of Energy and 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 

DOE O 5400.5. Radiation Protection ofthe Public and the Environment, U.S. Department of 

Energy. Washington, D.C. 

DOE-R4 1992, Remedial Investigation Feasibility Study for tGe 1 t70-BC-1 Operable Unit, 

DOE/RLr90-07, Rev. 0, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, 

Richland, Washington. 

DOE-Rf., 2000, 200-CW-I Operable Unit Remedial Investigation Report, DOElRL2000-35, 

Rev. 0, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, Richland, Washington. 

Ecolo!rv. 2001. Model Toxios Control Act Clemrup Rerrdatinn. Chamer 173-340 WAC. 

Publication 94406. Amended Februar,yl2. 2001. Washinrton State Department of 

Ecolow. Ofvmpia. Washington. 

EPA.1995, Record of Decision: U.S. DOE Hanford Environmental Restoration Disposal 

Facility, flanford Site, Benton County, Washington, U.S, Environmental Protection 

Agency, Region 10, Seattle, Washington. 

EPA, 1997, Establishment of Cleanup Levels for CERCLA with Radioactive Contamination, 

OSWER No. 9200.4•18, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 

Pe yt on, R. L. and P. R. Schrocder. 1990. 

F,ttvironmetntd Enrineering, Vol. 

"Journal a 

Final Feasibility Study for the Canyon Disposition tnitiative (221-U Facility) 

J une 200'i C-4

l . . 

Appendix C - Risk Modeling of an Engineered DoFnur.2ool-1 t 

Surface Barrier for the 221-U Facility Rev. e l Draft p 

^ Rcdlino/Strilxou 

^ 

(0^\ 

1 PNNL,1999, Hanford Site Climatological Data Summary 1998 with Historical Data, 

2 PNNL-12087, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington. 

3 

4 " nt+e+l,hc^--Eleunty : le^ 

5 es-ttme+xleel 

6 

7 WDOH,1997, Hanford Guidance for Radiological Cleanup, WDOF1320-015, Rev. 1, Division 

8 of Radiation Protection, Washington Department of Health, Olympia, Washington. 

9 

Final Feasibility Studyfor Nie Canyon Disposition fiiitiative (22/dJ Facility) 

lune :441 C-5

t^ 

Appendix C - Risk Modeling of an Engineered noFlRt.-2001-1t 

I Surface Barrier for the 221-U Facility Rev. W 1 nr,ft g 

1 I Fle ttre C-1 . Run o ff Cne(ficient Graph (Pevtnn and Schroeder 1990). 

2 

3 

loo 0 

: p w \ \ 

C `, 

OD •` ^^ `,` ^ 

^ JO 

•^ O \ 

`. 

10 

20 

Redline/Slrikeout 

O^ 

^ 

`70 C 

tu 00 --__- KO - 1 ca/t `,^•. 

^\ '° 40 

r w --- KO - 0.1 c^/a 

K0- 0.01eah ^^ 

•. ^ \ 

60 

o 

o 40 W KO - 0.001 oe/n 00 ¢ 

Cr 

^ ^ '• ,,, ^ b 70 C-4 

0 60 In./yr Intlor ^ .^ ^ ^ 

¢ m o 6 In./Or 66 Inflor 

4 

^ 10 Do 

0 Itt-6 10_r t0-0 t0_6 

KP (crt/s) 

Final Feasibi7iry Stadyfor the Canyon DisposUlon Initiative (221 d/ FaeAiry) 

une 2 00 1 • C-6 

100

1 ' 

^ 

Appendix C - Risk Modeling of an Engineered DoEIRI-2ool-1I 

Surface Barrier for the 221-U Eacility Rev. 0 1.Dr.t3 11 


Exposure Pathways 

Table C-1. RESRAD Input Parameters for Modeling Groundwater Protection 

at the 221-U Facility and ERDF- 

Category(Parametcr Units User Input Rationale and Cltation' 

Drinking Used for evaluation of groundwater protection. 

water athway See Table B-9 

ROt I- Contaminated Zone CZ) 

Area of CZ m2 1.9 x l0s Avera e areal extent of dispo sal facilit y 

Thickness of CZ m 23.9 Avera ge thickness of disposed waste 

Length Parallel to Aquifer Flow in 521.2 Based on areal extent of di. sal facilit y 

Radiation Dose I.imit mrenJyr 4 40 CFR 141 

Elapsed Time Since Waste Placement yr 0 RESRAD default for determination of lookup values 

R013 -Cover and CL Hydrolo ical Data 

Cover Depth m 0.61(2 fU Clay admix layer in RCRA Subtitle C cover 

Cover Material Density glems 2.2 Average density of admix layer 

Cover Erosion Rate m/yr 0 Erosion of 15-m cover will not affect admix la yer 

Density of CZ g/cros 2.1 From direct measurement 

CZ Erosion Rate m! 0 CZ will be covered and not affected by erosion 

CZTotalPotosit 0.34 DOE-RL2000andBHI2001 

CZ Effective Porosity 0.25 DOE-RI.2000 and Bill 2001 

CZFieldC.apacit 0.09 =Totalporosity -effectiveporosity 

CZ Hydraulic Conductivity m/yr 300 DOE-RL 2000 and BHI 2001 

CZ b Parameter 4.05 DOE-RI. 2000 and BH12001 

Humidity in Air cros 8 RESRAD default 

Eva an. iration Coefficient 0.91 WDOII 1997 

Wind Speed ndsec 3.4 PNNL 1999 

Precipitation nVyr 0.16 16em(6.3in.)avg.annualrainfall.DOL-RL1992 

Irrigation Rate m/ r 0 Industrial scenario 

Irrigation Mode Overhead RESRAD default 

Runoff Coefficient 0.98 Based on cover density and 2% slopc 

Watershed Area for Nearby Stream or Pond m= 1.000,000 RESRAD default 

Accuracy for Water/Soil Computations 0.001 RESRAD default 

R014 - Saturated Zone (SZ) flydrolo ical Data See Table B-B 

R015 - Uncontaminated and Unsaturated Strata 

Hydrological Data 

Sce TaDle B 8 

R016 -Distribution Coefficients (Kd) See Table B-8 

R017 - Inhalation and External Gamma See Table B-B 

R018 - IngeAion Pathway Data. Dietary 

Parametcrs 

See Table B-8 

R019 - Ingestion Pathwa y Data, Nondietary See Table B-B 

R021-Radon 

'See Section C2 for complete references. 

Not used Radon is not a contaminant of potential concern 

2 

Final Feasibility Srudy/or fba Canyon Dirpotrtion httNaliva (22/-U Facility) 

1 

'100 C-7

(_^% 

^ 

^ 

11 

Appendix C - Risk Modeling of an Engineered DoF1xt-2001-11 

I Surface Barrier for the 221-U Facility Rev.p1 nraf @ 

2 Table C-2. Carbon-14 and TechnetiumA9 Breakthrough to 

3 

Groundwaterat Different Precipitation Rates. 

4 

Preciuitition tFSRAn Fxtimated 

Runoff Cornicirnt 

m/vr ((nJvrl 

Wars for Breakthr2 ch 

Q,LkSOJI 4.4$ 14.430 

q•36 (U4 Q.4$ Z.^.$ 

¢L){21 LU ^^^ 

Rcdlinc)Strikeout 

Finaf fsaslbifity Studyforthe Canyon Disposition )nitrat)vt (22)-U Facility) 

Iune?00:1 C-$

^ 

^ 

APPENDIX D 

2 

3 SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS FOR 

4 ENVIRONMENTAL CAP 

Final Feasibility Smdy jor rhe Canyon DiJporiiion Initiative (221• f/ Facility) 

me,0 1 


Rev. N 1 Draft Li 

$edlinc/Stri kennt 

D-i

(0"% 

t^ 

DOFJRL-2001-1 l 

Rev. N 1 Draft P 

Rcdline/Strikecwt 

Fina1 Feasibifity Srady jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

June 100.1 D-il

DOFlRL-2001-11 

Rev. 0 1 nri fi f,i 


2 

3 

4 

5 

D SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CAP ................ ........D-1 

6 D.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... ........D-1 

7 

8 D.2 DESIGN CRITERIA ................................................................................... ........D-2 

9 

10 D.2.1 Design Life ..................................................................................... ........ D-2 

11 D.2.2 Engineered Fill, Waste, and Subgrade Properties ...................................D-2 

12 . D.2.3 Engineered Banier Function and Components .......................................D-2 

13 

14 

D.2.4 

D.2.5 

Bottom Liner Function and Components ...................................... .. ........ D-3 

Erosion Protection ...................................................................................D-4 

15 D.2.6 Seismic Design ................................................................................ ........D4 

16 

17 

D.2.7 Acceptabfe Factors of Safety ........................................................... ........D-5 

18 

19 

D3 METHODS OF ANALYSIS ................................................... .................... ........D-5 

20 D3.1 StabifityAnalyses .................... ........................................................ ........ D-5 

(--`,21 

22 

D3.2 Seismic Defotmation Analyses ........ ................................... ................... D-6 

23 

24 

D.4 SUMMARY OF STABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS .....................................D-6 

25 

26 

27 

D.4.1 

D.4.2 

Results forAltemative 3 .......................................................................... D-6 

Results for Alternative 4 ..........................................................................D-7 

28 D.5 CONSIDERATIONS DURING DESIGN DEVELOPMENf............................D-8 

29 

30 

31 

32 

D.6 REFERENCFS ................ »................................ ................... ».............................D-9 

^ 

Final Feasibiiiry Studyjor qte Canyon D'upoaitian leitiative (221-U Facility) 

1une !D03 D-iii

1 ' 

^ 

^ 

DOEJRL-2001-1 t 

Rev.H1 nraf{$ 

RcdlinclSlrikenut 

I FIGURES 

2 

3 D-1. 221-U Environmental Cap Components .......................... . ......................... ....................D-11 

4 D-2. Alternative 3: Cross Section of Environmental Cap ....................................................D-12 

5 D-3. Alternative 4: Cross Section of Environmental Cap ................................ ....................D-13 

6 Dj{. Engineered Barrier Cross Scction for Alternatives 3, 4, and 6. ........„ ...... ....................D-14 

7 D-5. Cross Section for Bottom Layer (Alternative 4 Only) .............................. ....................D-15 

8 D-6. Cross Section: Erosion Protection Layer .................................................. ....................D-16 

9 

10 

11 TABLES 

12 

13 D-1. Assumed Engineered Fill, Waste, and Subgrade Properties .................................... ....D-17 

14 D-2. Assumed Geotechnical Engineering Properties for Engineered 

15 Barrier Components ....... ............................................... .................... ........ .................... D-17 

16 D-3. Summary of Alternative 3 Stability Analysis ................ ........ _.......... _...... .................... D-18 

17 D-4. Summary of Alternative 4 Stability Analyses for Exterior Bottom Liner . ...... .............D-18 

18 

19 

Final Feasibility Stadyjor the Canyon Disposition lnitiativo (221-U Facility) 

June 2003 D-iv

DOF1Rlr2001-11 

Rev. ALP-rqfj },.i 

ReJlinc/Strit.cout 

1 APPENDIX D 

2 

3 SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS FOR 

4 ENVIRONMENTAL CAP 

5 

6 

7 D.1 INTRODUCTION 

8 

9 This appendix describes the slope stability analyses and results used to develop recommended 

10 cross sections for an environmental cap in support of two alternative layouu for disposing of 

11 contaminated material in and around the 221-U Facility. The environmental cap consists of three 

12 components: engineered fill (uncontaminated compacted soil), an engineered barrier (a modified 

13 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act oj1976 [RCRA) Subtitle C surface barrier), and 

14 erosion protection (coarse riprap, gravel, and sand). The arrangement of these components 

15 within the environmental cap is presented in Figure D-1. 

16 

17 The alternative development is in support of pre

Appendix D- Slope Stability Analysis for DOFJR1-2001-1 i 

Environmental Cap Rev.A l Dreft lt 

I 

Redlinc/Strikeout 

I final design may also consider additional configurations (e.g., during construction). 

2 The recommendations are pre-cronceptual in nature and should be reevaluated if the design is 

3 finalized and specific slope geometry, material availability, material properties, and construction 

4 requirements are known. The engineered barrier and exterior bottom liner sections (for 

5 Alternative 4 only) analyzed and described in this appendix were developed by others; their 

6 suitability for limiting infiltration and supporting vegetation were not assessed as part of this 

7 final feasibility study. Such evaluations should be performed during a final design effort. 

8 

9 

10 D.2 DESIGN CRITERIA 

11 

12 Design criteria and assumptions that were used in the slope stability analyses are discussed in the 

13 following subsections. 

14 

15 D.2.1 Design Life 

16 

17 The performance period for the 221-U Facility under Alternatives 3 and 4 is 1,000 years. The 

18 RCRA Subtitle C barrier design life, however, is 500 years (DOE-Ri. 1996). It is assumed that 

19 the engineered barrier would be replaced in kind after 500 years so that the 1,000-year 

20 pcrformance period would be achieved. It is understood that construction and initial 

^21 maintenance would proceed for several years following closure of the facility, but after a period 

22 of roughly 50 years, the facility is to be self-maintaining. 

23 

24 D.2.2 Engineered Fill, Waste, and Subgrade Properties 

25 

26 The assumed properties for the engineered fill, exterior waste ftll (Alternative 4 only), and 

27 subgrade are listed in Table D-1. These subgrade design strengths were taken from the 

28 . calculations prepared by Baxter (2000) for structural evaluation of the building and are judged to 

29 be reasonable based on the logs of existing subgradc conditions and the primarily granular nature 

30 of waste and fill materials in the area. 

31 

32 D.2.3 Engineered Barrier Function and Components 

33 

34 The engineered barrier is patterned after the Modified RCRA Subtitle C design (DOE-RL 1996), 

35 which has a minimum surface slope of 2% for drainage, uses evapotranspiration in an upper zone 

36 combined with a capillary break as a primary hydraulic barrier to infiltration, and has an 

37 additional layer of low-permeability material to act as a secondary hydraulic barrier. The general 

38 engineered barrier cross section is shown in Fgure D-4. The height of seepage above any of the 

39 layers is assumed to be zero. This cross section is similar to that used for capping similar waete 

40 inatetialswaste on the Hanford Site, except that a 0.9-m (3-ft)-thick clay admixture was used 

41 instead of an asphaltic layer for the secondary barrier. Because of the potential, although judged 

42 to be very low, for differential settlement of the environmental cap around the 221-U Facility, it 

io^'43 is believed that secondary settlement of the clay-admixture secondary would accommodate 

44 settlement, if any, more satisfactorily than a comparatively thin asphalt layer. This is a 

Final FtasibifiryStady jor dit Canyon Disposition Giltiativt (221-U Facility) 

lune 300:1 D-2

Appendix D-- Slope Stability Analysis for poFJrtt.-2001-1 l. 

I Environmental Cap Rev. e cd1 n 

Rodlinc/Strikcout 

1 conservative approach, because most settlcmcnt of the engineered fill would have occurred 

2 during the approximately 2-year construction period for the barrier, thus minimizing the potential 

3 for additional settlement during the post-closure period. 

4 

5 Gcosynthetics were not used for the engineered surface barrier in the recommended cross 

6 sections because the long-term (500-year) performance of geosynthetics cannot be extrapolated 

7 from existing data. Layout requires that the engineered barrier must extend to at least a 1 H:1 V 

8 projection upward and outward from the bottom comcrs of the 221-U Building. 

9 

10 The assumed geotechnical properties of the engineered barrier components are listed in 

11 Table D-2. The basis for estimating each property is also included in the table. 

12 

13 D.2.4 Bottom Liner Function and Components 

14 

15 The exterior bottom liner would be placed only for Alternative 4 to function as bottom 

16 containment for waste that is disposed outside of the concrete structure. A waterproof coating or 

17 liner would be applied to the exterior wall of the 221-U Facility where it would be in contact 

18 with the exterior waste fill. The liner system is intended only as a temporary filtrate collection 

19 and barrier system while the exterior waste fill, engineered fil1, and engineered barrier are being 

20 placed. After the engineered barrier is in place and excess pore water ( if any) within the exterior 

(^N21 waste fill has dissipated, it is assumed that only very small amounts of additional infiltration 

22 would reach the bottom liner. After facility closure, the bottom liner would no longer be relied 

23 upon for long-term protection of human health and the environment or for leachate collection. 

24 

25 The general bottom liner cross section is shown in F'igure D-5. The height of seepage in the 

26 drain gravel layers is assumed to be less than 15 cm (6 in.) for short-term conditions during 

27 waste-filling operations (a conservative assumption because no specific analyses were performed 

28 to determine the estimated seepage height for this pre-conceptual feasibility study) and zero for 

29 long-term conditions. The cross section shown is Identical to the dual liner that has been used at 

30 the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) on the Hanford Site (Casbon 1995). 

31 Throughout the geotechnical profession, it is generally agreed that geosynthetics can be 

32 considered to have a useful life of at least 100 years. Because the liner must maintain drainage 

33 and low-permeability functions for only a few years (until the engineered barrier is in place and 

34 minimizes infiltration), geosynthefics are used in the external bottom liner cross section. 

35 

36 The clay admixture and drainagc material properties for the external bottom liner are assumed to 

37 be similar to those listed in Tablc D-1 for the engineered surface barrier materials. The unit 

38 weight of the 0.9-m (3-R)-thick native soil protective layer was conservatively estimated to 

39 weigh 1,031 kglm3 ( 1101b/fO) and have an angle of internal friction of 26 degrees with no 

40 cohesion. 

41 

42 For stability analyses, the textured high-density polyethylene (FIDPE)lnonwoven geocomposite 

("43 interface is the weakest of all the materials and interfaces within the external bottom liner cross 

44 section. Residual strengths are commonly used for assessing the stability of sloping liner or cap 

Fiaal Feasibility Study jor dte Canyon Disposition laiuiat(ve(221-U Facility) 

un '1 00Z D-3

Appendix D - Slope Stability Analysis for DOE/Rt..-2001-1I 

I Environmental Cap Rev. 0 1 Draft n 

RedlinelStrikcnut 

I systems (Stark and Pocppel 1994). The residual friction for the critical HDPFJgeocomposite 

2 interface was assumed to be 24 degrees with no cohesion, based on recent interface friction 

3 testing performed on similar materials (CH2M HILL 2001). The actual value of interface 

4 friction should be confirmed with testing during final design. 

6 D.2.5 Erosion Protection 

7 

8 The finished environmental cap is roughly 24 in (80 ft) high. Although a specific hydraulic 

9 analysis was not performed for this pre-conceptual design stage, it is judged that a slope this high 

10 would need rock armor for erosion protection if the slopes were steeper than about 8%. 

11 Vegetated slopes steeper than 8% are commonly used in landGlls, but they usually have 

12 intermediate drainage collection ditches so that slope lengths are limited to around 30 m(100 ft). 

13 Mid-slope drainage ditches are not considered feasible for the 221-U environmental cap because 

14 they would require maintenance and some kind of surface protection from concentrated flows 

15 that would n:nder the evapotranspirational properties of the silt ineffective. An embankment 

16 grade of 3H:I V or 4H:1 V would create a slope roughly 90 to 122 in (300 to 400 ft) long, which 

17 is judged to have unacceptable rilling and sheet erosion without rock armor. 

18 

19 For the purposes of pre-conceptual design stability analyses, the erosion protection layer is 

20 assumed to have the cross section shown in Figure D-6. The composition and thickness of the 

^21 riprap and graded filters must be specified during final design based on hydraulic information, 

22 constructability considerations, and filter criteria for the undcrlying clean fill. For stability 

23 analyses, the combined 1.8-m (6-ft) depth of riprapr and filters were assumed to have a friction 

24 angle of 43 degrees and unit weight of 1,265 kg/m (1351b/ft3). 

25 

26 D.2.6 Seismic Design 

27 

28 Seismic design criteria were taken from Skriba (1997), which provides general design criteria for 

29 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities at the Hanford Site. Skriba (1997) is based on 

30 DOE Order 6430.IA, General Design Criteria, DOE Order 5480.28, Natural Phenomenon 

31 Hazards Mitigation, and DOE STD-1020, Natural Phenomenon Hazards Design and Evaluation 

32 Criteria jor Department ojEnergy Facilities (DOE 1996). Design criteria in Skriba (1997) are 

33 presented by "Performance Category' (PC), with PCO corresponding to the lowest facility hazard 

34 ranking (e.g., a nonessential facility with no occupants) and PC4 being the highest hazard 

35 ranking (e.g., an operating nuclear reactor). 

36 

37 For stability analyses, response spectra in Skriba (1997, Table 6) for PC3 that were developed 

38 for the 100 and 200 Areas of the Hanford Site were used to determine peak horizontal ground 

39 accelerations within the environmental cap. The performance goal for a PC3 facility is 

40 continued function of the facility following a seismic event, including confinement of hazardous 

41 materials and occupant safety, and is believed to be appropriate for the 221-U Facility under 

42 Alternatives 3 and 4. The PC3 base acceleration used in stability analyses is 0.26 S. Based on a 

(^43 probabilistic seismic hazard analysis performed for the 200 West Area of the Hanford Site 

44 (WHC 1996), a mean peak horizontal acceleration of 0.26 g corresponds to a seismic event with 

Final Feasibility Stady jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221•U Faciliry) 

'1 001 D-4

Appendix D - Slope Stability Analysis for poEIRL-2001-11 

I Environmental Cap Rev. 0 1 Draft a 

^ Redline/Slrikeout 

I a return period of approximately 2.000 years. The design earthquake magnitude is estimated at 

2 6.5, based on site-specific deaggregation information from the U.S. Geological Survey seismic 

3 hazards web site (httn://@eohazards.cr.usgs. fov/eq) . 

4 

5 D.2.7 Acceptable Factors of Safety 

6 

7 For long-term static slope stability, the desired factor of safety is 1.5 or higher. For short-term 

8 construction loading when no waste is in place, the desired minimum static factor of safety is 

9 1.3. These minimum factors of safety are consistent with standard geotechnical engineering 

10 practice. The performance goal under long-term seismic loading is to maintain the integrity of 

12 the engineered barrier over any waste and to keep the post-earthquake static factor of safety at 

12 1.5 or higher. 

13 

14 Because the amplification of the base acceleration is very high for the environmental cap under 

15 Alternatives 3 and 4 ( and particularly for the engineered surface barrier), it is judged that there 

16 would likely be some amount of movement ( i.e., the factor of safety under seismic loading is less 

17 than 1.0) for any reasonable environmental cap configuration. Such movement is acceptable as 

18 long as the goals listed above are met. It was judged that 2.5 or 5.0 cm (1 or 2 in.) of 

19 deformation that is primarily horizontal within the silt barrier layers and does not penetrate the 

20 bottom of the layer is acceptable. Deformations of several centimeters occurring outside of the 

^21 boundaries of the engineered barsier, within engineered fill, would commonly be considered 

22 acceptable in design of engineered barriers. For example, in a summary of current practice for 

23 seismic design of liner and cover systems for waste fills, Seed and Bonaparte ( 1992) note that 

24 seismic deformations less than 15 cm (6 in.) are viewed by designers as being acceptable levels 

25 of seismic displacement. Studies conducted on seismic stability of surface barriers for waste 

26 disposal sites in the 200 East Area of the Hanford Site have also concluded that seismically 

27 induced deformations less than 15 cm (6 in.) are considered to be acceptable levels of 

28 displacement ( Saleh and Daniel 1994). For the purposes of this pre-conceptual design for 

29 Alternatives 3 and 4, the maximum allowable deformation for the environmental cap was 

30 conservatively set at that 2.5 or 5.0 cm ( I to 2 in.). This judgement is consistent with current 

31 engineering practice. 

32 

33 

34 D3 METHODS OF ANALYSIS 

35 

36 D3.1 Stability Analyses 

37 

38 Slope stability was evaluated by one of two methods. The stabilitX of the cap layers under 

39 drained conditions (no cohesion) was evaluated using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet employing 

40 the method of Druschel and Underwood ( 1993). This two-dimensional method employs a fixed 

41 failure surface along a predetermined interface, which extends over the entire length of the slope. 

^42 Buttressing effects from the cover soils are considered. 

° Miaosoft Is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, Washington. 

Final Feasibility Study for the Canyon Disposition Initiative ( 221•U Facility) 

it•+ D-5

(^N 

Appendix D- Slope Stability Analysis for poFlRL-2001-11 

I Environmental Cap Rev.At riftA 

Rcdfinc/Strikcout 

1 

2 Stability of the cover veneer under undrained conditions and the entire embankment under all 

3 loading conditions was evaluated in a two-dimensional analysis by the method of slices using the 

4 computer program STABLSM, initially developed by Purdue University and the Federal 

5 Highways Administration. The modified Bishop and Janbu methods were used to evaluate the 

6 factor of safety. Multiple runs of the model were performed for both circular failure surfaces and 

7 random failure surfaces radiating from straight lines between user-defined blocks, and the 

8 computer model was allowed to search for the failure surface with the minimum factor of safety. 

9 

10 D3.2 Seismic Deformation Analyses 

11 

12 The peak ground acceleration at the crest of the embankment was estimated from the site- 

13 specific response spectra using the method of Makdisi and Seed (1979). Based on engineering 

14 judgment, an estimation of the maximum shear wave velocity of 340 rn/sec (1,110 ft/sec) was 

15 assumed. A peak horizontal acceleration of 1.3 g at the top of the environmental cap was 

16 determined using the Makdisi and Seed (1979) method. 

17 

18 Permanent deformation was estimated by a method outlined by Makdisi and Seed (1978). First, 

19 stability analyses for the portion of environmental cap or slopes in question were performed to 

20 determine the yield acceleration, or horizontal acceleration at which the factor of safety is 1.0. 

'^21 The location of the failure surface relative to the top of the environmental cap was then used to 

22 determine the average acceleration throughout the location of the failure surface (accelerations 

23 decrease with depth below the crest of the environmental cap). The ratio of the yield 

24 acceleration to this average acceleration is then used to estimate deformation based on the 

25 Makdisi and Seed (1978) empirical charts that consider the magnitude of shaking and the first 

26 natural period of ground motion. The Makdisi and Seed (1978) method is generally considered 

27 to conservatively predict deformations, but can only predict them to within a few inches. 

28 

29 

30 D.4 SUMMARY OF STABILITY ANALYSIS RESULTS 

31 

32 D.4.1 Results for Alternative 3 

33 

34 Based on the results of the stability analyses, the layout for Alternative 3 (as well as 

35 Alternative 4) involves a relatively flat upper slope for the engineered barrier and a steeper slope 

36 for the erosion protection layer. Thus, based on results of stability analyses, the finished 

37 environmental cap configurations were based on two modes of slope movement: 

38 

39 • Slippage within the engineered surface barrier layers 

40 

41 • A more deep-seated failure into the engineered fill and roughly parallel with the erosion 

42 protection layer. 

t0"1143 

44 

Final Fcaribility Stvdyfor the Canyon Dl rpoatiioar Intthtive (221-U Facility) 

June z003 D-6

Appendix D - Slope Stability Analysis for poFJRt,-2001-1 t 

Environmental Cap Rev. o Draft ts 

I To remain within acceptable displacements, a slope of 2% was selected for the engineered 

2 barrier. The weakest portion of the engineered barrier would be the two upper silt layers. At a 

3 2% slope, the yield acceleration for the engineered barrier is approximately 0.8 g. The average 

4 design acceleration for the critical displacement plane is approximately 1.3 g. There is a higher 

5 acceleration for the barrier than for the lower portions of the environmental cap because the 

6 barrier is at the crest, which has a higher seismic amplification factor. The resulting deformation 

7 for the 2% barrier slope is approximately 2.5 cm ( 1 in.). The deformation during a seismic event 

8 is most likely to occur along a shallow sliding surface within the silt that is parallel to the 

9 finished 2% slope of the engineered barrier. The sliding surface is unlikely to extend completely 

10 through the uppermost silt layers. The static factor of safety is well above 1.5. 

11 

12 A slope of 3H:IV was selected for the portion of the environmental cap below the engineered 

13 barrier. The average yield acceleration for the rock-armored embankment sloped at 3H:1 V, as 

14 shown in Figure D-2, is 0.4 S. The average design acceleration along the critical displacement 

15 plane is approximately 0.8 g. Therefore, the predicted deformation of the 3H:1 V-sfopc is about 

16 2.5 to 5.0 em (t to 2 in.). The static factor of safety for the 311:1 V embankment is well above 

17 1.5. A 2H:1 V slope would have an average yield acceleration of 0.3 g and only experience a few 

18 more inches of deformation. The more conservative 3H:1 V slope was selected to limit 

19 movement, decrease long-term erosion concerns, and ensure that construction could be 

20 performed adequately and safely. 

21 

22 The head scarp for the critical failure surface for the entire embankment is approximately 6 in 

23 (20 ft) back from the top of the 31-1:1V slope, as shown in Figure D-2. The deformation at the 

24 head scarp is predicted to be nearly vertical. Although the deformation at the head scarp may not 

25 result in an open crack, it was conservatively determined that the engineered barrier should not 

26 extend across the potential head scarp. Therefore, the embankment should extend at least 6 in 

27 (20 ft) horizontally past the required limits of the engineered barrier before being sloped at 

28 3H:1 V. 

29 

30 A summary of the stability analysis results for the recommended configurations for Alternative 3 

31 is provided in Table D-3. Results for Alternative 3 are considered to be applicable to the 

32 environmental cap for Alternative 6: Close in Place - Collapsed Structure, which is also 

33 addressed in this final feasibility study. Alternative 6 involves disposal of waste in the lower 

34 part of the concrete structure, demolition of the upper part of the structure, and containment with 

35 an environmental cap that is lower in height and has an overall footprint that i s smaller than the 

36 environmental cap for Alternative 3. Therefore, slope stability analyses for Alternative 3 are 

37 considered to be useful in developing the Alternative 6 environmental cap design and layout. 

38 

39 D.4.2 Results for Alternative 4 

40 

41 The layout and engineering basis for the environmental cap for Alternative 4 is identical to 

42 Alternative 3. However, unlike Alternative 3, Alternative 4 includes a bottom liner and waste fill 

(^ 43 around the exterior perimeter of the 221-U Facility. The external bottom liner and small amount 

44 of exterior waste fill would not adversely impact the slope or stability of the finished 

Final Featibiliy Study jor the Canyon Disporition Initiative (221-U Faeiliry) 

une 2001 D-7

Appendix D - Slope Stability Analysis for DOF/R1.2001-11 

Environmental Cap Rev. e ra p 

RedlinelStrikcout 

I environmental cap. The stability of the external bottom liner during construction is the most 

2 critical condition and determines the bottom slope of the waste fill. This construction condition 

3 is considered to be short-term, so the minimum factor of safety is 1.3. Seismic loading was not 

4 considered for this short-term condition and may need to be assessed during final design. 

5 

6 A Caterpillar D6H-LPG dozer or equivalent is assumed for spreading the 0.9-m (3-ft)-thick 

7 operating soil layer over the external bottom liner during construction. The most critical 

8 condition would be with the dozer pushing on the operating laycr over the geomembrane/ 

9 geocomposite interface for the exterior bottom liner. The static factor of safety for this 

10 equipment loading condition is 1.3 for a 3H:1V slope with no seepage (this assumes that the 

1 I specifications would be implemented so that the operating layer should not be spread during or 

12 shortly after rain storms). The static factor of safety for the same slope without the equipment 

13 loading is 1.45. With no equipment loading and a seepage height of 0.15 m (0.5 ft), the factor of 

14 safety is 1.3. All the factors of safety reported above are for the condition where no load is 

15 transferred to the geomembrane or geocomposite used in the bottom. Higher factors of safety 

16 could be achieved by transferring some load through the geomembrane and geocomposite to the 

17 anchor trench. A summary of the stability results for the recommended configuration of the 

IS exterior bottom liner is presented in Table D-4. 

19 

^20 In order for the assumptions in the analysis to remain valid, the equipment used to spread native 

21 cover material must have loading equivalent to or smaller than a Caterpillar D6H-LPG 

22 (20,593 kg [45,4001b] over a total track width of 3.14 m[10 ft]) and operate on a eninimum of 

23 0.9 m (3 ft) of soil cover (operating layer) over the geocomposite/geomembranc interface. In 

24 addition, the waste soil must be compacted in horizontal lifts starting at the bottom of the lined 

25 exterior space and working upward. 

26 

27 

28 DS CONSIDERATIONS DURING DESIGN DEVELOPMENT 

29 

30 The assumptions about soil material and critical barrier component interface strengths and 

31 seepage heights should be verified during final design. For example, there should be analyses to 

32 refine the final design for specific site, construction, and initial maintenance conditions. The 

33 following items are suggested as a partial list of additional design details that must be addressed 

34 during final design: 

35 

36 1. The potential for differential settlement between locations above the rigid structure and the 

37 surrounding engineered fill should be evaluated. Required steps to mitigate the impact of 

38 settlement on the engineered barrier integrity should be identified. 

39 

40 2. Details for attaching the Alternative 4 bottom liner to the exterior of the concrete structure of 

41 the 221-U Facility must be developed. 

42 

(0-^'43 3. Seismic design criteria for use in final stability analyses should be verified based on possible 

44 updates to seismic hazard analyses for the Hanford Site and DOE design requirements for 

45 natural phenomenon. 

Final Feasibility Study for the Canyon Disposition Initlarive (221-U Faeiliry) 

Junc')00 D-8

Appendix D-- Slope Stability Analysis for DOEtRt,-2001-11 

Environmental Cap Rev.p t Drafi g 

Redlinc/Strikcou 

1 

2 

3 

4. The effects of soil-structure interaction for the building and adjacent fill materials should be 

consideted Analyses should be performed to evaluate the effects of potential differential 

4 

5 

6 

response to seismic ground motions between the fairly rigid 221-U Facility concrete structure 

and the comparatively flexible filI materials placed around the exterior of the facility. 

7 5. Final design should also pursue the technological challenge of attempting to design a barrier 

8 that will providc containment to the 221-U Facility and to adjacent waste sites while 

9 

10 

11 

maintaining the barrier footprint developed in this FS for Alternatives 3, 4, and 6. 

12 

13 

D.6 REFERENCES 

14 Baxter,l. T., 2000, 221-U Conceptual Structural Study (CSS)forthe Canyon Disposition 

15 

16 

lnitiative (CDI), HNF-6325, Rev. 0, Fluor Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 

17 Casbon, M. A.,1995, Design Analysis, Construction ofW296 Environmental Restoration 

18 Disposal Facility, BHI-00355, Rev. 00, Vol. 1, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, 

19 

^20 

Washington. 

( ?1 CH2M HILJ., 2001, Engineering Design File, Draft Slope Stability Assessments, INEEL, 

22 

23 

EDF-ER-268, CH2M HILL, Idaho Falls, Idaho. 

24 DOE 0 5480.28, Natural Phenomenon llazards Mitigation, U.S. Department of Energy, 

25 

26 

Washington, D.C. 

27 

28 

DOE 0 6430.IA, General Design Criteria, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 

29 DOE, 1996, Natural Phenomena Hatards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of 

30 

31 

32 

Energy Facilities, DOE-STD-1020-94, Rev. 1, U.S. Department of Energy, 

Washington, D.C. 

33 

34 

35 

36 

DOE-RL,1996, Focused Feasibility Study ofEngineered Barriers for Waste Management Units 

in the 200 Areas, DOEIRL-93-33, Rev. 1, U.S. Department of Energy. Richland 

Operations Office, Richland, Washington. 

37 DOE-RL, 1998. Phase I Feasibility Study for the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility), 

38 

39 

40 

DOE//Rllr97-11, Rev.1, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, 

Richland, Washington. 

41 Druschel, S. J. and E. R. Underwood, 1993, "Design of Irning and Cover System Sideslopes:' 

42 accepted for publication and presentation, Geosyntlietics '93 Conference, Industrial 

('43 

44 

Fabrics Association International, Vancouver, B.C. 

Final Feasibility Surdyfor the Canyon DisposiNon laitiative (221-U Faciliry) 

'1 003 D-9

Appendix D - Slope Stability Analysis for DOFJRL-2001-11 

Environmental Cap Rev. AI Dref D 

r„% I Redline/Strikeout 

1 Makdisi, F. A. and H. B. Seed, 1978, "Simplified Procedure for Estimating Dam and 

2 Embankment Parthquake-Induced Deformations," American Society of Civil Engineers, 

3 Journal of the Geotechnical Engineering Division, July, pp. 849-867. 

4 

5 Makdisi, F. A. and H. B. Seed, 1979, "Simplified Procedure for Evaluating Embankmcnt 

6 Response," American Society of Civil Engineers, Journal of the Geotechnical 

7 Engineering Division, December, pp. 1427-1434. 

8 

9 Saleh, A. A. and D. E. Daniel, 1994, Preliminary Stability Analyses for Prototype Surface 

10 Barrier- 200 East Area, prepared for Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Contract MJF-SCV-298796, 

11 by the University of Texas, Department of Civil Engineering, Austin, Texas. 

12 

13 Seed, R. H. and It. Bonaparte, 1992, "Seismic Analysis and Design of Lined Waste Fills: 

14 Current Practice," Stability and Performance ofSlopes and Embankments I1, American 

15 Society of Civil Engineers, Vol. 2, pp. 1521-1545. 

16 

17 Skriba, M. C., 1997, "Engineering Design Evaluation," Project Hanford Policy and Procedure 

18 System. HNFRPRO-97, p. 41, Fluor Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 

19 

20 Skelly, W. A., C. J. Chou, J. W. Lindberg, and D. J. Hoff, 1994, Material Properties Data and 

r 21 Volume Estimate of Silt Loam Soil at the NRDWL Reserve, McGee Ranch, 

22 WHC-SD-ENTI-218, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington. 

23 

24 Stark, T. D. and A. It. Poeppe1,1994, "Landitll liner Interface Strengths, Torsional Ring Shear 

25 Strength."JournalofGeotechnicalEng(neering,ASCE,Vol.120,No.3. 

26 

27 WHC, 1996, Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis, DOE Hanford Site, Washington, 

28 WHC-SD-W236A-TI-002, Rev. IA, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, 

29 Washington. 

30 

Final Feasibility Study for tlhe Canyon Disposition inirfatire (221-U Facility) 

June 20Q1 D-10

Appendix D - Slope Stability Analysis for poEIRL-2ooi-11 

I Environmental Cap Rev. A l nr„ft p 

r Rcdlinc/Strikcout 

f 

1 ^ 

2 

Figure D-1. 221-U Environmental Cap Components. 

W 

4 

O 

E 

G 

0 

C 

W 

V 

m 

^ 

U 

0 

^ CO 

H 

IC 

m 

20 

d^ 

e 

W^ 

I O 

N 

9 

..1 

A 

n 

.' } 

'^'• 

.1 

f\i( NCD 

.9%• g, 

^.. . 

., 

. ^\f:% N v 

Final Ftailbility Stadyfor the Canyon Dirpotition JnJttative (221-11 Faciliry) 

un 1 00.1 D-11 

W 

8 

m 

tmi 

N

Appendix D - Slope Stability Analysis for poFJRCr2ooi-i t 

Environmental Cap Rev. a l DrAft P 

n Redline/Slrikenut 

^ 

(0-N 

t 

2 

3 

Fgure D-2. Alternative 3: Cross Section of Irnvironmental Cap. 

î 

m 

^ 

OGi 

W 

jr 

Q 

^rY 

I 

^`414 \\ 

.v^';1^. ♦ 

j.^• ,`11.r \ 

1 ^ 

Finaf Feasibility Study jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221d/ Fatifiry) 

un 1003 , D-12 

i 

^ 

$ 

8 

^ 

I 

^ AI 

x W

(^N • 

1 

r 

1 

2 

3 

Appendix D - Slope Stability Analysis for poFmt,-2001-11 

Environmental Cap 2ev. 0 DraR li 

I 

Redli nelSlri kcnut 

Figure D-3. Alternative 4: Cross Section or Environmental Cap. 

^ 

^ 

î 

iCy 

^g 

d^. 

n 

^ 

E V6 

A w^ 

'ys ; • 

• 

, MI 

I 

^\ \ 

î a 

:•CSy ` ^ ^ • ^ Z ^ 

Final Ftasibilfry Stwdy jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

LUM-2 D-13 

! 

/. 

ll 

v^ 

^ 

M 

^c W 

\. 

-

• 

Appendix D-Slope Stability Analysis ror poFntl,-2o01-11 

Environmental Cap Rev. o l nrvrt L3 

RediinclStrikcnut 

1 Figure D4. Engineered Barrier Cross Section for Altcrnatives 3, 4, and 6. 

2 

2.35m 

(7.7 It) 

(8.7ft^ 

2% SloPOO 

-• .-r 

-•-^r•- 

-_-. 

.-' ^ 

.- •-, ^ 

''•^`^ 

^• 

4 

Not to Sca7e 

s=_-^ 

Layer 1: (50 cm; 20 In.) Siit loam topsoil 

with pea gravel admixture 

Layer 2: (50 cm; 20 In.) LJghtly 

compacted native sandy slit 

Layer 3: (15 cm; 6 In.) Filter sand 

Layer 4: (15 cm; 6 In.) Filter gravel 

tayer 5: (15 cm; 6 In.) Drain gravel 

Layer 6: (90 cm; 36 In.) Low 

permeability compacted 

soll with clay admixture 

Engineered flll (variable thickness) 

°, v ^",:. .4,: y'• a" ; 221-U Concrete structure with waste till 

A total depth of 5 m(16.4 ft) Is required above 

any waste placed on the exterior of 221-U 

(Altemative 4 only) 

co1atu-ts 

Final Feasibility Srady jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

mo "001 D-14

1 

2 

3 

Appendix D - Slope Stability Analysis for poFJR[.-2001-11 

I Environmental Cap Rev. oLVruR p 

Rcd1inclStrikcout 

,'^.'•w: 

,.- • ._-:-.^ 

I, : a. ..'^ 

.^^'• . 

^. ^.• e^L u'^ i 

° ^v;'`"3 m (1 

( ^`..a•OV.^ _ 

.:_'Jr 

^.fl •^,'. 

:4. w_i^ • 

(-"N 

Figure D-5. Cross Section for Bottom Layer (Alternative 4 Only) 

Waste 

placed 

,•-•,1•: above this 

^'',-; : r -•.,•. . level 

^.;:..: 

:k •i.._; ::': ':;^ 

" w,:d':= :'..^•:. 

.Opeyting 

R)',1^^^1taMî,il • 

-:•"^. 

L•`,`. 

..Y 

. 

Geoteutlle 

,•'i • . 

raln Gnvel•, : 1.-Geotextlle 

l-Geomembmne 

I rGeotextite 

^^.nL. ._r. : : . . .,,V . . . 

:Dniin ^ravsl•

^• 

r^, 

r^ 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

Appendix D- Slope Stability Analysis for DpE/RL Z00)-t ) 

Environmental Cap Rev.N l Draft fi 

I 

RcdlinalStrikeout 

1 FIgure D-6. Cross Section: Erosion Protection Layer. 

Rfprap 

Gr^'atleQrFlzr^ ^ 

Not to Scale 

1: Vertical 

... ^ 

^q^lire COdrse Îa. 122m (a n) 

r.Ftne ^G.raVe' 

^n9ln^,orep^/^^V 

e^sa^ /) 

0.3t1 ft} 

Eo1Ut1

f 

^ 

i0, 

2 

3 

4 5 

Appendix D- Slope Stability Analysis for 

Environmental Cap 

Table D-1. Assumed Engineered Fiil,1'Vaste, and Subgrade Properties. 

DOFJR1^2001-11 

Rev.A l f)rart j_i 


Moist Unit Drained Drained Angle of Undrained 

Material Weight, Cohesion, Internal Friction Cohesion, kg/mI 

Qg/m'(ib/ft') hglm'(Ib/ft') (degrees) t7bKt=) 

Engineered fill (uncontaminated. 1.220 (130) 0 40 0 

compacted) 

Compacted exterior waste fill 1,125 (130) 0 37 0 

(Alternative 4 only) 

Subgrade 1.060(113) 0 37 0 

Material 

Table D-2. Assumed Ceotechnicai Engineering Properties for 

Engineered Barrier Components 

Moist Unit 

kt: i ht, 

Drained 

Strength 

eD 

Undralned 

Strength 

^ 

c 

(IhNt) (deg.) kg/ms 

(bJrl s) 

(deg.) kg/m3 

(Ib/ft ') 

Basis for Estimate 

Pea graveVsilt 985 30 0 30 0 Material gradation is 85% sandy silt.1596 pea 

mix (105) gravel by weight. Moisture-density relationships 

on McCrce Ranch material is basis for unit 

weight (S(celly et aa. 1994). No site-specific data 

for strength parameters are available. so estimate 

is based on material descriptions and 

professional judgement. 

Silt 985 30 0 30 0 Same material as above, but no pea gravel and 

(105) slightly greater compaction. 

Composite of 1,144 (122) 37 0 37 0 Values are typical for these types of materials. 

sand and 

gravel f Iters 

and drains 

Compacted 1.172 (125) 36 0 0 72 Native silty sand and gravel mixed with 

clay admixture (1700) bentonite. Unit weight and drained properties 

from Casbon (1995). Undrained from estimate 

for similar materials. 

Final Feasibility Study jortlu Canyon DUposltion lnitiative (221-U Facility) 

J une 100 ^ D-17

^ 

Appendix D-- Slope Stability Analysis for poEIRL-2001-11 

Environmental Cap Rev. e l Drrfl R 

RediindStrikeout 

Table D-3. Summary of Alternative 3 Stability Analysis. 

Slope Seismic 

Condition Soil Properties Percent Slope Itelght, m Coefficient Foctorof 

sarety 

(ft) 

tg) 

Approximate 

Derormation, 

em 

(ln.) 

Silt: Static:0 >10 0 

Veneer stability 

(engineered 

barrier stability) 

Q 

c 

Y 

. 30 degrees 

s 0 

s 

. 995 ( 1051b11t ) 

296 0.92 (3) Dynamic: 

0 . 78 

1.0 

23 (1) (parallel 

to layer, at top 

of silQ' 

Engineered fill': Static: 0 >2.0 0 

Overall stability 

of engineered 

fdl and erosion 

protection 

^ s 

c s 

Y s 

40 degrees 

0 

1,220 kg/ms 

(1301b1fti) 

2% uPPef N. 

311:1 V lower 

parl (see 

Figure D-2) 

24 (90) Dynamic: 

0.4 

1.0 

25 5 . 0 (1-2) 

(along surface 

shown In 

Figure D-2f D-2) 

'Derormation for aven8e design acceleratiun for critical displacemcnt plane. 

"Presence of engineered batrier ignored. Erosion protection modeled as a 1.8-m ( 6-ft)-dtick layer with unit weight of 

1,266 kg/ms ( 1351b/lts) and hiction angle ( #) of 43 degrees. 

•Defonaation for average design acceleration for failure surface of 0.8 g. 

2 

3 

4 Table D4. Summary of Atternative 4 Stability Analyses for Exterior Bottom Liner. 

Sbpe Sap>,gc 

Equipment 

^^^ Factor 

Condition Soil Properties Slope Height, as 

(n) 

Height, in 

(e) 

of 

O^ k 

Safety 

^ e 24degrees 0 0 1A5 

c s 0 for textured 0.15 0 1.3 

Veneer lmpg/gcocompositelnterface 

stability 4, 26 

311:1V 9.2(30) 

(bottom liner 

stability) Y s (0.5) 609(4A00) 1.3 

(3 ft) operating layer during 

wrstntction 

NOTE: Stability of oventl embankment and final engineered barrier for Alternative 4 we identical to those results for 

Alternative 3 shown In Table D-3 and are not repeated In this table. 

Final Feasibility Stnndy fors8e Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-17 Facility) 

)one 2003 D-18

DOF/RLr2001-11 

Rev. ft 

^ RodlinclStrikeoutO 

^ 

l APPENDIX E 

2 

3 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE 1: 

4 FULL REMOVAL AND DISPOSAL 

F1naf Feâaibifity Study jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

Iune 20():4 E-i

^ 

(00h^' 

^ 

2 

DOFIRI^2001-I I 

Rev. JQrafj3 

Redline/Strikeoat B 

Final FeasibilitySrudy jorthe Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

Jsee-242? E-ii

^ 


DOEtRL-2001-11 

Rev. I D raft 13 

E DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE 1: FULL REMOVAL 

AND DISPOSAL ........ .... _. .. ........ .»».. ......»»..». ...» . ._. ._.»........ E-I 

13.1 PREPARE EXISTING COMPLEX .................................................................... E-3 

7 E.1.1 Control Hazards ....................................................................................... E-3 

8 E.1.2 Establish Infrastructurc ......... ....................... ........................................... E-5 

9 E.1.3 Modify Facility ..................................................................................... .. E-6 

10 E.1.4 ModifyExternalArea ............................................................................ E-10 

11 E.1.5 Manage Hazardous Materials ................................................................ E-11 

12 

13 E.2 OPERATE'fHE COMPLEX ............................................................................ E-12 

14 E.2.1 D&D 221-U Building ........... ................................................................ E-12 

15 

16 E.3 CLOSE TIIE COMPLEX ..................:.............................................................. E-15 

17 E.3.1 Backfi1122I-UExcavation ............................. ....................................... E-15 

("'.18 E.3.2 Revegetate Site.............................................. ....................................... E-15 

19 E.3.3 Cleanup Complex .................................................................................. E-15 

20 E.3.4 Sustain Post-Closure .......... ................................................................. E-15 

21 

22 E.4 REFERENCES........... _ ..................................................................................... 1: 17 

f^ 

23 

24 

25 AITACIiMEIVT 

26 

27 El FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY ..................................................................................... E-19 

28 

29 

Final Feasibility Study jor the Canyon Disposition fnitiative (221-U Facility) 

uno 100 .1 E-iii

t^` 

^ 

^ 

1 

2 


Rev. JDr-ALi 

Redline/StrikeoutA 

Final Frasibiliry Srady jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

J un e 2 1 E-iv

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('21 

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APPENDIX E 

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OFALTERNATIVE 1: 

FULL REMOVAL AND DISPOSAL 


Rev. I Draft Il 

Redline/StrikeoutA 

This appendix presents a description of details for the Alternative 1 dispositioning of the 

221-U Facility. This alternative requires the complete disassembly/demolition of the building 

and its ancillary structures, removal of contaminated equipment stered on the canyon eperatieg 

deck and inside the process cells, and disposal of the resulting contaminated debris in the 

Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF). 

Alternative I would be implemented in coordination with cleanup of the U-Plant Closure Area. 

The following key assumptions have been made in the development of this alternative: 

This alternative is a brownfield option, as the site cleanup is limited to building decontamination, 

demolition, and removal with limited cleanup of waste sites within the building demolition 

perimeter, including the layback slope of excavations and working access around the 

construction site. Demolition and removal would extend to 0.9 m ( 3 ft) below the bottom of 

the structure. Waste sites within this perimeter would be remediated as part of Alternative 1. 

Any contamination located outside of the demolition perimeter would be remediated by future 

projects. For cost-estimating purposes, it is assumed that there are no contaminant plumes 

above Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 173-340 industrial limits. During actual 

demolition work, if soil contaminalion above WAC 173-340 industrial limits is identified 

below this depth, then the Tti-Patties would need to evaluate the situation and decide whether 

to remove the contamination. Contaminated equipment and piping from building demolition 

would be disposed at the ERDF. Equipment would be decontaminated, as necessary, to levels 

that meet ERDF acceptance criteria. 

2. For removal and hauling to ERDF, demolished building sections would be limited to 

approximately 90 metric tons ( 100 tons) or less. In accordance with ERDF waste acceptance 

criteria (131-1I 1998, 2001b)ry compliance with size and weight requireme nts would be 

coordinated with ERDF operations staff during final design if this alternative is selected. 

Decontaminated equipment, equipment with fixed contamination, and building debris from 

the demolition activities would be taken to ERDF for disposal. 

42 3. Some concrete surface contamination exists and would need removal to meet disposal criteria 

t'43 at ERDF. The surface decontamination effort was assumed equivalent to the area of five 

Final Feasibility Studyjur the Canyon Disposition btlriaNve (22)-U Faciliry) 

un '2 l Ir-1

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DOIJRL-200I-I1 

I Full Removal and Disposal Rev. e t Dr^ft 11 

^ Redline/Strikeout 

1 process cells. Following decontamination, all concrete surfaces would receive an application 

2 of paint fixative to minimize the potential for contamination spread during demolition. 

3 

4 4. Facilities to be dispositioned in support of implementation of Alternative I are the 

5 221-U Facility, the 211-U and 211-UA Tank Farms, the 271-U Office Building ( including 

6 the 296-U-10 Stack), and the 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility. Wastes sites to be 

7 remediated as part of Alternative I include the following: the 216-U-7 French Drain; the 

8 241-UX-154 Diversion Box; the 241-UX-302 Catch Tank; the 2607-W-7 Septic Tank and 

9 Drain Field; unplanned releases (UPRs) UPR-200-W-101, UPR 200-W-1 18, 

10 UPR 200-W-138, and UPR 200-W-162; and portions of process lines associated with 

11 200-W-42, 200-W-84, and UPR-600-20. 

12 

13 5. Equipment removal, decontamination, and demolition operations would be performed using 

14 conventional, proven technologies. 

15 

16 6. The existing crane in the 221-U Facility is assumed to be functional based on recently 

17 completed upgrades. Crane use would be limited to moving of equipment from the process 

18 cells and the hot pipe trench to the canyon epeFatittg-clcck where it would be reduced in size 

19 and volume as necessary and loaded into modular containers. The main crane would be used 

20 to move the equipment from the canyon deck during size-reduction and container-loading 

(_^121 activities. It would also be used for cover block movement. The containers would be moved 

22 to the rail tunnel where they would be loaded onto trucks. Container contents would be 

23 double wrapped in plastic. Micro-encapsulation, if needed, would be used to reduce 

24 radiation dose. 

25 

26 7. All underground piping systems within 23 m of the 221-U Facility would be removed. 

27 

28 ^ 8. The 221-U Canyon eperatittg-deck elevation is estimated at 221.5 m(726.5 ft). 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

r',43 

44 

29 

30 9. 

31 

32 

Other than the canyon area (including the process cells, trench, and associated vent tunnel) 

and the rail tunnel interior, all other 221-U and 271-U Building surfaces are considered to be 

uncontaminated. 

10. The 221-U Facility is located within the exclusive land-use boundary identified in the Final 

Ilanford Comprehensive Land-Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1999) and 

the associated "Hanford Comprehensive Land-Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement 

(HCP EIS), Hanford Site, Richland, Washington; Record of Decision (ROD)" (65 Federal 

Register 61615). This implies that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) would remain in 

control of the 200 Areas and industrial-exclusive land use would be limited to waste 

management activities. 

11. Decontamination limits for loose surface and fixed contamination are based on preliminary 

remediation goals. 

Final FeasibillryStudyforthe Canyon Disposition Initiatlve(221-UFacility) 

)une 100.1 E-2

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DoE/RI.-2oo1-1 t 

Full Removal and Disposal Rev. O l Drailo 


1 12. Remediation of waste sites outside of the Alternative I demolition perimeter would be 

2 addressed by future projects using the remedial action alternative selected for the appropriate 

3 200 Area operable unit. 

E.1 PREPARE EXISTING COMPLEX 

8 This function provides for the necessary programs, administrative and physical controls, 

9 safeguards, and infrastructure that would sustain the activities associated with operating and 

10 closing the complex. The purpose of these activities is to establish a complex-wide 

11 configuration designed to support the requirements for waste processing, decontamination, 

12 demolition, and closure. 

13 

14 E.1.1 Control Hazards 

15 

16 E.1.1.1 Establish Hazards Protection. The potential personnel and environmental hazards 

17 associated with this alternative are a combination of high hazards normally encountered during 

18 routine operations, and those hazards involving the nonroutine activities of large-scale 

19 demolition operations. Specifically, they are industrial and radiological in nature. Hazard 

20 mitigation would involve the implementation of engineering and administrative controls that 

('-",21 address both personnel and environmental protection. 

22 

23 E.1.1.1.1 Control Health and Safety Hazards. Personnel would encounter industrial hazards 

24 during site preparation, facility operation, and site closure. These hazards would be similar to 

25 those that are encountered on any large-scale construction and demolition project, including 

26 unique hazards associated with demolition operations that include crane operation, concrete 

27 sawing, and excavator operation. Typical hazards would include such things as moving 

28 machinery, falling, tripping, cutting, sound exposure, and dust inhalation. The risk of injury due 

29 to these hazards is addressed in national Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 

30 and Washington Industrial Safety and Health Administration safety regulations, as well as the 

31 Hanford Site-specific procedures that implement the codes. Compliance with the applicable 

32 safety codes, regulations, and procedures would mitigate the risk posed by industrial hazards. 

33 

34 Physical and administrative controls would be implemented to control industrial hazards. 

35 Personnel access control to the complex would be established by installing a perimeter exclusion 

36 fence. Access to the local work site would be controlled and maintained with barriers and signs 

37 warning personnel of the specific work site hazards. Heavy equipment would use audible 

38 warning signals when backing up. Personnel would wear hard hats, safety glasses, and safety 

39 shoes, as a minimum, and any additional safety equipment as required by job-specifc 

40 requirements. Administrative controls would include the implementation of programmatic plans, 

41 procedures, job safety analyses, and applicable work permits to operate hazardous equipment and 

42 enter hazardous areas. 

(--,43 , 

44 High radiation areas and very high radiation areas would be encountered and would be a concern 

45 primarily during equipment removal and waste packaging operations. For example, 

Final Feasibifity Srudy jor the Canyon Disposirian lnftfarive (221-U Facility) 

J une 1 00 3 E-3

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DoEIRt..-2001-11 

Full Removal and Disposal Rev.Ot Draf 


1 approximately 25% of the cells contain equipment and materials that have high radiation levels 

2 that exceed 1,000 mremJhr. The maximum gamma dose rate in cell 30 was 190,000 tnrem/hr 

3 (13HI 2001a). Also, one of the most significant radiological hazards anticipated during 

4 operational activities would be the generation of airborne contamination. Mitigation of airborne 

5 contamination would be accomplished with local exhaust ventilation of the decontamination 

6 equipment, persona! protective equipment, existing facility exhaust system, and administrative 

7 controls and physical controls. Decontamination or fixing of loose or smearable contamination 

8 would be performed prior to any removal)dcmolition activities. Radiological limits for worker 

9 protection are provided in 10 Code ojFederal Regulations (CFR) 835. 

10 

11 Nonroutine activities would require special procedures and equipment to ensure that the risk of 

12 exposure is properly mitigated. Safety criteria would be determined on a case-by-case basis; 

13 however, criteria would require that exposures be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). 

14 

15 Administrative controls include radiation work permits, exposure limits, and escort requirements. 

16 Physical controls include barriers, postings, and personnel surveys. In accordance with site 

17 procedures, administrative and physical controls applicable to this project would be defined in 

18 job-specific work plans and procedures. Compliance with the job-specific work practices and 

19 procedures would ensure that personnel exposures do not exceed allowable limits. 

20 

^1 Access to the work site would be controlled by installing a perimeter fence and implementing a 

22 site{ntry procedure. The procedure would require either training or escorts for site visitors. 

23 Additionally, operating methods that depend primarily on equipment would be used and the 

24 number of operating personnel would be minimized to the extent practicable. 

25 

26 E.1.1.1.2 Control Envitronmental Hazards. The potential dispersion/migration of dangerous 

27 and/or radioactive waste is an inherent risk of Alternative 1. Wind is the principal cause of 

28 dispersion, and water is the main transport mechanism for migration. Dangerous/radioactive 

29 contaminants could also migrate through the inadvertent contamination of vehicles and personnel 

30 leaving the project site. Radiological limits for exposure to the public are provided by DOE 

31 Order 5400.5. Radiation Protection ojthe Public and the Environment. 

32 

33 Wind dispcrsion of contaminants would be mitigated by implementing a combination of 

34 procedural and physical controls. Procedural controls typically consist of wind-spced restrictions 

35 on work activities. Also, demolition techniques (such as diamond wire sawing) would be 

36 selected, due in part to their ability to minimize contamination dispersion. Physical controls 

37 would include spray fixatives ( i.e., water sprays and chemical coagulants), minimizing the size 

38 of the work area, pressurized application of concrete slurries through a hose and nozzle 

39 (gttniting), clean fill, and)or containerization. Radiation air monitoring would be performed on 

40 the work site perimeter to confirm the effectiveness of airborne contamination control. 

41 

42 The potential for water migration would also be mitigated by implementing a combination of 

rN3 procedural and physical controls. Procedural controls would consist of work restrictions during 

44 precipitation events if the potential for contaminant migration exists. Physical controls would 

45 include a combination of temporary shelters and)or sealing products. Shelters would be used to 

Final Feaaibility Study fard+e Canyon Disposttian Inlriativr (221-U Facility) 

^ a 200 1 E-4

(^N 

Appendix E- Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DoFntir2001.1 t 

Full Removal and Disposal Rev. e rafi 

Redline/Strikeout 

I shield waste from precipitation. Demolition activities would be scheduled to occur after the 

2 equipment removal is complete and the fixative sealer has been applied to surfaces with 

3 smearablc or loose contamination. Scalers would be used to prevent dangerous/radioactive 

4 contaminants from seeping/Ieaching out of the waste containment. 

5 

6 Personnel and equipment leaving the site would present a risk of contaminant migration. This 

7 risk would be mitigated by procedural and physical measures. Work procedures would require 

8 that equipment used on the site and exposed to dangerous/radioactive wastes be decontaminated 

9 before the equipment is released. Personnel working the site would wear proper protective 

10 clothing. Protective clothing exposed to dangerous/tadioactive wastes would be controlled in 

11 accordance with Hanford Site procedures. Personnel ]taving radiologically contaminated areas 

12 would require an exit survey before leaving. 

13 

14 Hazardous materials are expected to present minimal hazard to personnel or the environment. 

15 All waste m 4e&lswaSte would be sampled, tested, and designated as required by applicable or 

16 relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs) and applicable waste acceptance criteria. 

17 

18 E.1.2 Establish Infrastructure 

19 

20 Implementation of Alternative 1 remediation activities would rely heavily upon the existing 

^ 21 221-U Facility complex infrastructure. Some modification of the existing building and utilities 

22 would be necessary to support this alternative. 

23 

24 E.1.2.1 Modify Existing Infrastructure. Where possible, the existing utilities would be used 

25 to support Alternative 1 activities. The basic approach to establishing the infrastructure for this 

26 alternative would be to use the existing road network within the complex and relocate water and 

27 electrical service terminals outside the perimeter fence. The existing road network surrounding 

28 the 221-U Facility would adequately accommodate heavy equipment during demolition 

29 operations, as well as waste hauling traffic to ERDF. Additional spurs off paved roadways for 

30 heavy equipment access and waste loading activities would be constructed, as required. The 

31 existing main crane would be recertified, and the heating/air conditioning systems in the crane 

32 cab would be replaced. 

33 

34 Water mains and sewer pipelines inside the exclusion fence would be terminated and relocated 

35 outside the fence. Temporary water lines would be installed, as required, for sanitary 

36 requirements, ftre-suppression systems, decontamination operations, and dust control as needed. 

37 Main transformers for electric power to the 221-U Facility would be relocated outside of the 

38 exclusion fence. Temporary 480-volt electrical lines and panels would be installed in the 

39 building as required for lighting, ventilation, and equipment operations. 

40 

41 E.12.2 Establish Support Facilities. Alternative 1 would also require administrative offices, 

42 change rooms, tool rooms, lunchroom, restrooms, and storage rooms. During the initial 

^43 equipment removal stage, this support could be provided from the 271-U Building. Its use 

44 would only be practical during the initial stages of 221-U modifications. The 271-U Building 

45 would be removed to allow access to the 221-U Facility for demolition. 

Final Feasibility Study jor the Canyon Diryotirion lnitiarive (221-U Facility) 

um 2003 E-5

Appendix E- Detaiied Description of Alternative 1: DOEIR1,2001-11 

I Full Removal and Disposal Rev. 0 1 ft B 

^ Redl inc/Strikeout 

1 

2 Mobile office units would be brought to the site to provide support office space at that point. 

3 These facilities would be located outside the perimeter fence that would have been installed to 

4 control access into and out of the work zone. A main change room for nonradioactive work 

5 would be located outside the exclusion fence. Existing telephone and electrical lines would be 

6 used to support office and clerical requirements. Existing Hanford Site fire protection and 

7 ambulance services would be adequate for emergency response. 

8 

9 E.1.2.3 Establish Staging Areas. Personnel staging areas would be included in the space 

10 requirement for the support facilities. This would include change rooms, meeting facilities, and 

11 other construction activity support areas. Equipment storage, waste queues, decontamination 

12 an:as, frisking tents, container storage, and other staging requirements would be included in the 

13 layout of support requirements for Alternative 1 activities. 

14 

15 To facilitate the movement of waste containers out of and equipment and supplies into the 

16 221-U Facility, anew truck door would be installed. Vehicle access would involve construction 

17 of a road approximately 100 in long from the railroad tunnel connection to 221-U (location of the 

18 new truck door) to a tie-in point on the existing 221-U Facility site road network. The road 

19 would be designed and constructed to accommodate heavily loaded trucks. 

20 

("*N 21 E.13 Modify Facility 

22 

23 In preparation for the operational phase of this alternative, the 221-U Facility would require 

24 modifications. The first step would be to prepare the facility by evaluating it for the intended use 

25 and making modifications, as necessary. The existing equipment on the canyon epereting-deck 

26 would be removed from the canyon epeFating-dcck and the process cells, reduced in size and 

27 volume, and loaded into containers for shipment to ERDF for final disposal. The railroad tunnel 

28 would be demolished to improve access to the 221-U Facility. Surface contamination found 

29 would be either removed or a fixative applied to prepare the canyon for the start of demolition 

30 activities. 

31 

32 E.1.3.1 Prepare Facility for Use. The 221-U structure must resist loads with safety factors that 

33 meet building codes (i.e., American Concrete Institute, American Institute of Steel Construction) 

34 for standard occupancy, but containment or serviceability requirements would be minimal. No 

35 public access would be permitted; therefore, structural concerns would be for worker safety only. 

36 

37 The building must be put in a safe condition for work activities. This would require radiological 

38 surveys, fixing or removing contamination, building inspcction for industrial safety concerns, 

39 and equipment repairs or upgrades to support the operation phase. It is assumed that the 

40 271-U Office Building would be needed for support of the preparation phase. Therefore, it must 

41 be maintained in a safe condition, as well. 

42 - 

r"`43 E.1.3.1.1 Inspect 271-U. The 271-U Building would be inspected to determine the condition of 

44 the building and its equipment. Information for this inspection would help finalize planning for 

45 the operational phase of this alternative. The functional requirements of the various activities 

Final Feasiblliry Stadyjor the Canyon Dispotition )nitiatfve (221-U Facilrry) 

un 2n07 E-6

l^ 

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DOEIRI.r2001-11 

I Full Removal and Disposal Rev. e t Dran B 

RedlinclStrikeout 

I involved in operating the facility and the building modifications and upgrades necessary to safely 

2 accomplish the activities would be identified. Modifications identified would be designed. The 

3 services and/or new equipment needcd would be procured. 

4 

5 No known building repairs or upgrades are needed. Also, it is assumed for this alternative that 

6 minimal equipment repairs and upgrades would be necessary. 

7 

8 E.1.3.1.2 221-U Facility Modifications. l.imited modifications to the 221-U Facility are 

9 necessary to accomplish equipment removal and decontamination operations. First, the roof 

10 covering (versus the roof structure) of the 221-U Facility would be replaced. Other facility 

11 modifications would primarily involve disconnecting and blanking utility and electrical lines 

12 where they are no longer required, and installing temporary utilities that would be required to 

13 support planned operations. The change room at the northeast end of the operating gallery would 

14 be renovated and established as the main access and egress point for canyon operations. Water 

15 and drain lines for the change room facility could be tied into the active systems in the 

16 271-U Office Building. 

17 

18 Additional 480-volt electrical service requirements would be installed, as necessary, to support 

19 portable ventilation requirements and selected decontamination equipment, such as air 

20 compressors for pneumatic tools and temporary greenhouse structures. In addition, 480-volt 

(""21 electrical service would be installed to support waste processing and decontamination/ 

22 disassembly operations within specially designed enclosures erected in section 1 of the 

23 221-U Facility. 

24 

25 Facility modification would also involve removing and disposing of interfering structures, 

26 equipment, and material. During this phase of the work scope, equipment and material removal 

27 would be limited to "clean" areas of the 271-U Office Building, the 221-U Facility galleries, and 

28 associated storage spaces. This activity would include the removal of the following: 

29 

30 • Installed and fixed equipment 

31 • All unattached equipment and components 

32 • Abandoned supplies 

33 • Materials 

34 • Debris. 

35 

36 These items would be sorted for reuse, recycle, or disposal. 

37 

38 E.1.3.2 Decontamination and DecommissioninR (D&D) or Railroad Tunnel. Before 

39 excavating the northwest side of the canyon, the railway tunnel would be removed. The tunnel 

40 extends 46 m(150 ft) eastward from the east side of the canyon building and allowed train 

41 access into the third cell of the canyon. The tunnel is a reinforced concrcte structure with a soil 

42 cover about 1.5 m (5 ft) deep. There are unreinforced wing-wall retaining structures at the ends 

(0,^143 of the tunnel. The tunnel is assumed to have light surface contamination that could be fixed in 

44 place with fixative application. It is assumed that a backhoc with a processor would be used for 

Final Feasibility Studyjor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

iat>s 100 E-7

t^' 

Appendix E -Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DoE/RI,-2001-11 

Full Removal and Disposal Rev. eLUMft 13 

Redline/StrikeMt 

1 demolition. Demolition debris would be sized for load, haul, and acceptance criteria for ERDF. 

2 Demolition of the railroad tunnel would improve access to the building through cell 3. As a last 

3 step in railroad tunnel work, a truck door would be constructed at the tunnel's connection to 

4 221-U (cell 3). This door would allow access to the building without disrupting proper 

5 ventilation of the canyon. 

6 

7 E.1.33 Removal of Equipment in the Building. For evaluating this step in Alternative 1, 

B photographs of the canyon eperating-dcck and of a majority of the process cells were reviewed. 

9 Based on this review, it is estimated that there are anoroximatelv 5.400 ms (7.000 vds) of 

10 contaminated eauinment andcorrmonents ( ¢ross loose volume before size reduction) currentlv 

11 stered-on the canyQn eck. process cells. and hot pipgtrench. Afterjizc reduction. it is 

12 estimated that this volume will be reduced to t#terettre approximately 4,100 m(5,300 yd) of 

13 equipment and components (gross loose volume) on the canyon epeFatingdeck, process cells, 

14 galleries, andleF hot pipe trench. It is assumed that the size-reduced volume of al}+sueh 

15 equipment would be placed in containers and hauled to ERDF for disposal, and none would be 

16 salvaged for reuse or recycle. 

17 

1 B All of the equipment and materials stered in the canyon must be removed. Work would start 

19 with the equipment on the canyon eperatingdeck followed by equipment removal from the 

20 process cells and the hot pipe trench. Due to the large size of the equipment, it would require 

^11 some level of size reduction for disposal. After all of the equipment is removed from the 

22 canyon, equipment in the galleries would be addressed. 

23 

24 ^ The canyon eperating-deck must be cleared of equipment steped-on top of the process cells prior 

25 to opening the cells. Early removal of equipment from the deck may be necessary to reduce the 

26 radiation dose. Additionally, early removal of this equipment would provide space for other 

27 work activities. The canyon would be used as a packaging facility, to prepare material for 

28 transportation. 

29 

30 ^ Equipment from the k-sanyon deck would be reduced in size and volume as 

31 necessary for it to fit into modular (sea-land type) containers. This would require a disposition 

32 plan for each equipment item. If breaking or cutting activities are necessary for disposing of the 

33 equipment, the canyon would be the best place to do these activities because it is a closed facility 

34 for controlling contamination spread. During final design, size-reduction technologies and other 

35 newer technologies would be evaluated for use. For this final feasibility study report, the use of 

36 conventional size-reduction technologies is assumed. 

37 

38 Equipment would be double wrapped as packaging ready for loading into the container. The 

39 container loading would occur inside the canyon. The equipment currently on the sanyon 

40 operetingdeekcanyon deck would be removed through the railway tunnel using a truck that 

41 would access the tunnel through a new truck door. The truck door would be installed after the 

42 railroad tunnel was completely removed. 

('t3 

44 An equipment disassembly and decontamination enclosure, if necessary, would be installed on 

45 the canyon dcek at the northeast end of the 221-U Facility. The enclosure 

Final Feasibiliry Sradyjor the Can)hau Dirpotirlou lafrlatlve (221 •U Facility) 

Junc'7003 E-8

(^N 

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DOF/R1.-2001-1I 

I Full Removal and Disposal Rev. o raft t; 

Redlinelstrikeout 

1 would be designed for equipment disassembly, dccontamination, and packaging of large items in 

2 a controlled environment. Disassembly activities would include mechanical and flame cutting, 

3 hydraulic shearing, and manual methods. Additional technologies that could be applied are 

4 described in Appendix 1. Equipment and materials would be transferred into and out of the 

5 enclosure with the main overhead crane. 

6 

7 The most significant contribution to worker exposure under Alternative I would be the size 

8 reduction and packaging of the contaminated legacy equipment that is currently within the 

9 221-U Facility. Estimated worker dose for these activities alone is nearly 200 pcrson-rem (BFA 

10 2001a). If all of the legacy equipment is volume reduced for shipment, significant worker time 

11 and resulting higherexposures would occur. This activity, even with latest technologies 

12 available, would be performed in personal protective equipment-required work areas (i.e., 

13 contaminated areas and airborne areas). Significant engineering controls would be required to 

14 reduce worker exposure from external and internal exposure sources. Worker turnover could 

15 increase due to harsher working conditions. The preliminary ALARA estimate (BHI 2001 a) 

16 considered technology currently available. 

17 

18 E.19.4 Hot Pipe Trench. After the anvon deck can support work 

19 activities, equipment currently stered in the process cells could be prepared for removal. The 

20 equipment would require the same level of planning and disposition approach as the eanyon 

^21 deck equipment. Based on review of available historical photographs, the 

22 hot pipe trench contains small-diameter piping. Piping could be removed by cutting a section 

23 free, ensuring it is empty, then crushing the cut ends. It would be removed, size reduced as 

24 necessary, wrapped, and placed into the modular containers ready for hauling and disposal at 

25 ERDF. 

26 

27 E.13S Remove Surface Contamination. To safely enter the building during its operational 

28 phase in this alternative, contamination survey results would be used to identify where 

29 decontamination activities are needed. Contamination would either be removed or fixed to the 

30 canyon surface to reduce the dose rate and contamination risk to the lowest possible level. It is 

31 assumed that water jet, water blasting, or water flushing are practical on the canyon's interior 

32 because the waste water could be collected in cell 10 and disposed of in the 200 Area's Liquid 

33 Effluent Remediation Facility. Scarifying may be required on some areas. 

34 

35 After the building has been surveyed and the contamination removal planned, the work would 

36 require scaffolding and wastewater collection systems to be installed and maintained, and 

37 disposal of wastewater during and after decontamination. 

38 

39 E.1.3.6 F'ix Contamination on 221-U Interior Surfaces. It is assumed that surface 

40 contamination on the canyon walls, Aeercanyon deck s, and ceiling could be addressed with 

41 application of a fxative. Fixative would also be applied to all of the interior surfaces of the pipe 

42 trench, process cells, craneway, and vent tunnel. 

>'\43 

Final Feasibility Siady for rite Canyon Disposirion Initiative (221 •U Faeiliry) 

J une 2 00-1 E-9

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DOE/lu.2001-1 l 

I Full Removal and Disposal Rev. e Lpsaft n 

^ Redlinc/SUikeout 

1 E.1.4 Modify External Area 

2 

3 The following modifications would be performed to support full removal and disposal of the 

4 221-U Facility. Before demolition and removal of 221-U can begin, the legacy structures that 

5 surround the exterior of 221-U must first be removed. Demolition of 221-U would involve a 

6 large excavation to remove the foundation slab and the cell drain. Waste sites would be removed 

7 that are within the limits of this excavation. 

8 

9 The Alternative 1 approach conservatively assumes that all concrete demolition debris would be 

10 disposed at ERDF. During final design this assumption could be revisited to determine if 

11 decontaminating and recycling steps could be economically included to support DOE waste 

12 minimization goals. 

13 

14 E.I.A.I. Disposition of External Legacy Structures and Systems. These structures include 

15 276-U. 271-U, 211-U, 211-UA, and the access stairs into 221-U. 

16 

17 E.1.4.1.1 Demolition of the 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility. The 276-U Solvent Recovery 

18 Facility, attached to the southwest end of the 221-U Facility, is composed of walkways, tanks, 

19 and associated piping set in an open-concrete basin. Decommissioning would involve removing 

20 the tanks, walkways, and all aboveground piping. The concrete basin and underground piping 

i^'21 would be removed. Concrete surfaces would be decontaminated using selected off-the-shelf 

22 technologies. 

23 

24 Tanks, steel framing, and concrete walls and floors could be removed concurrently with the 

25 canyon cleanout activities. The concrete could be left in place until the canyon is demolished, 

26 because considerable excavation is required for complete removal and it may be more cost 

27 effective to do all concrete removal and excavation at the same time. if left in place, the concrete 

28 walls should be fenced for worker safety. Demolition debris would be taken to ERDF for final 

29 disposal. 

30 

31 E.1.4.1.2 Demolition of the 271-U Office Building. The northwest side of the building must 

32 be leveled to allow access for a very large mobile crane for canyon demolition. This activity 

33 would begin with demolition of the 271-U Office Building. The building is a concrete framed 

34 structure built against the northwest face of the 221-U Canyon. 

35 

36 The 271-U Office Building consists of a basement, three floors, and a reinforced concrete slab 

37 roof. There Is a concrete masonry perimeter wall supported on a basement wall, with interior 

38 masonry walls within the building. The roof is a reinforced concrete slab similar to the floors. 

39 The third floor is a chemical makeup area with floor slabs up to 0.3 m thick that support 

40 chemical tanks. Additional building features included in the demolition are a stack on the roof 

41 (296-U-10), an elevator, a second floor vault, and mechanical equipment in the basement. 

42 Demolition would use typical building demolition techniques. Building 271-U demolition debris 

(O'N43 would be stockpiled and used for backfill of the 221-U excavation. After demolition of 271-U, 

44 the building footprint would be leveled and compacted as necessary for crane access across this 

45 area. 

Final Feasi6iiiry Study jor die Canyon Disposition Initiative (221 •U Facifity) 

me200 3 E-10

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DoEIR1,-2001-i t 

Full Removal and Disposal Rev. e1 DMft 1; 

^ RsSilindStrikeout 

2 E.1.4.1.3 D&D of 221-U and 221-UA Tank Farms. These tank farms are within the 

3 operational area needed for demolition access to 221-U and the railroad tunnel. The tank, piping, 

4 and equipment would be size reduced, wrapped, and placed in containers for hauling to ERDF. 

5 

6 E.1.4.1.4 D&D Stairways on 221-U Building. Eight stairwells on the northwest side of 

7 221-U are light construction and would be dcmolished using typical building demolition 

8 techniques. Ten stairwells on the southeast side of 221-U are thick wall, lightly reinforced 

9 concrete construction. The heavier construction of these stairwells would be factored into the 

10 demolition costs. Any contamination found in the stairwells on the canyon's southeast side 

11 would be fixed in place prior to demolition. All stairwell demolition waste would be disposed at 

12 ERDF. 

13 

14 E.1A.2 Remedlate Waste Sites Within the Footprint of 221-U Excavation. Extensive 

15 earthwork and excavation is required to prepare for crane and other demolition equipment access 

16 to 221-U. Waste sites that are identified as part of Assumption 4 at the beginning of this 

17 appendix that are located within the footprint of these excavation areas would be removed as part 

18 of the demolition activities. All remediation wastes would be disposed at ERDF. 

19 

20 E.1.4.3 Excavations to Prepare Working Area Adjacent to 221-U. The northwest side 

r`21 (271-U and rail tunnel) of the building would be leveled and compacted to allow removal of the 

22 canyon roof with a large mobile crane. This leveled area would allow the crane to travel the 

23 length of the building and provide sufficient area to lay down roof panels. This excavation 

24 would be in addition to that done during demolition of the rail tunnel. 

25 

26 Fill material would be removed from the southeast face of the canyon to leave a 6-m-wide work 

27 area at the level of the canyon foundation mat. This working area would be needed for crane and 

28 demolition equipment access. 

29 

30 E-1S Manage Hazardous Materials 

31 

32 Dangerous waste, asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls, and other hazardous materials would be 

33 removed from all areas of the complex and managed in accordance with ARARs. All waste 

34 ataterialswaste would be sampled, tested, designated as required by ARARs, and treated prior to 

35 disposal. Products consisting of orcontaining hazardous materials would be used and managed 

36 in accordance with their respective Material Safety Data Sheets. WestefnetefielsWaste would be 

37 treated as required. 

38 

39 A temporary waste accumulation laydown area would be established to facilitate shipment and 

40 disposal activities. This area would conform to established requirements for the maintenance, 

41 accountability, inventory, labeling, and transportation of waste to approved disposal facilities. 

42 

to-N43 

Final Feasibility Study jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221•U Facility) 

une'0 7 E-11

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DoEtu..-2oo1-11 

I Full Removal and Disposal Rev. e 1 DtaR fi 

^ RedlindStrikeout 

I E.2 OPERATE THE COMPLEX 

2 

3 Operation of the complex for Alternative I refers specifically to demolition and waste disposal 

4 operations associated with complete removal of the 221-U Building. In previous steps, the area 

5 surrounding 221-U would have been prepared to support building demolition, all equipment 

6 within the building would have been removed, and exposed surfaces inside the canyon would 

7 have been decontaminated or a fixative applied. The steps to operate the complex are discussed 

8 in the following subsections. 

9 

10 E.2.1 D&D 221-U Building 

11 

12 Conventional methods and technologies, such as wrecking balls and shears, are not suited for 

13 demolishing this concrete structure and are not effective when wall or floor thickness exceeds 

14 0.9 m. The 221 -U Facility contains structural components that typically exceed 1.5 m (5 ft) in 

15 thickness. The recommended demolition method is to cut the building apart using diamond wire 

16 saws. Most pieces would be cut to meet the ERDF size restrictions (assume 90 metric tons 

17 [100 tons]) and would be set directly on a transporter and moved to the disposal site. Large 

18 elevated pieces that would be hazardous to demolish due to their elevation and/or support 

19 function in the building (e.g., roof panels) would be removed intact and set on the ground for 

20 further size reduction. 

t^21 

22 The canyon facility can be characterized as mass concrete, and other demolition methods suitable 

23 to thick, lightly reinforced concrete were considered. Controlled blasting was considered to be 

24 impractical because it would cause considerable dust and debris, which could be difficult to 

25 control and could spread radioactive contamination. Additionally, it would probably disturb 

26 fixative coatings from adjacent areas. Stitch drilling would take longer and is more labor 

27 intensive, but could be used for small areas that are difficult to access with the diamond wire 

28 saw. Core drilling holes that are filled with expansive slurry (e.g., "Bristae' demolition 

29 compound) could also be used for splitting the foundation mat. 

30 

31 The diamond wire cutting technique uses a small quantity of water to cool and lubricate the wire. 

32 The waste water could be channeled into building's drain system, where it could be collected for 

33 later removal. Using this approach to demolition would make use of the segmented construction 

34 of the canyon structure. The canyon consists of 20 independent segments, each about 12 m 

35 (40 ft) long. Adjacent roof panels are keyed with a stair-step joint similar to the cover block 

36 edges, which would make it feasible to cut the canyon into pieces that are about 12 m(40 ft) 

37 long. 

38 

39 E.2.1.1 Mobilize and Erect Cranes. Cranes necessary for removal of roof panels would be 

40 brought to the site and erected. These cranes would be used to remove building sections as they 

41 are cut by the diamond wire saws. 

42 

(`,43 E.2.1.2 Remove Roof Sections. Removal would start with the end wall at the building's north 

44 end. The end walls are unreinforced, apparently to make future additions easier. The northeast 

45 end wall should be removed first because the roof removal would begin at that end of 221-U. 

Final Feasibility Study jor the Canyon pispos(tionln8iative(221-U Facitity) 

iwc :.00-1 E-12

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: Do&R[.-2001-11 

I Full Removal and Disposal Rev. 61 Draft 


I Removing the roof panel above the end wall, with the end wall in place, could damage the plain 

2 concrete, with the risk of collapsing it. The southwest end wall would be dealt with similarly, 

3 anytime prior to removal of the adjacent roof panel. 

4 

5 Wire saws would be used to cut the roof panels from their connection to the walls. The roof 

6 panels would be removed from the building as a full (12-m [40-ftl) section. Wire saws would be 

7 used on the panel once on the ground to size reduce the panel to an acceptable size for hauling to 

8 ERDF. 

9 

10 Demolition activities would make extensive use of large-capacity cranes for building section 

11 removal as each section is cut free by the diamond wire sawing process. Scaffolding would be 

12 needed on both sides of each building segment to support the cable-cutting machines. 

13 

14 Steel beams would be attached lengthwise, on each side of the building, inward from the roof 

15 edge, to distribute the lifting forces for the roof slab removal. Bearing plates would probably be 

16 required on the bottom of the roof, inside of the canyon, to distribute the lifting forces to the 

17 concrete slab. As the cut progresses, wedges or clamps must be placed in the cut to provide 

18 vertical support and lateral stability for all concrete sections as cutting continues. 

19 

20 1 E.2.73 Remove Canyon Walls to Canvon deck Level. Wire saws 

.I would be used to cut the wall sections into blocks and the cranes would remove these blocks. A 

22 step-by-step approach was evaluated for this removal. The following list provides the 

23 approximate order of removal for concrete sections in each building segment: 

24 

25 • Roof panel as a single section for size reduction on the ground 

26 • Bridge cranes 

27 • Upper gallery (crane) wall 

28 • Upper crane shield wall 

29 • Crane gallery floor 

30 • Rear (southwest) outside wall (pipe trench side) 

31 • Crane gallery floor 

32 • Operating gallery outer wall 

33 • Operating gallery shield wall 

34 • Operating gallery floor 

35 • Pipe gallery floor 

36 • Outer wall for pipe and electrical gallcries 

37 . Cell cover blocks 

38 • Cell end walls 

39 • Celi dividing walls 

40 • Lower gallery shield wall 

41 • Pipe trench floor 

^42 • Inner pipe trench wall 

43 • Exterior pipe trench wall 

Flnal Fearlbillty Slady for die Canyon Pirpmirion Iniiiarive (221-U Facility) 

June 1003 E-13

f,^N 

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DoFJRL-2001-11 

I Full Removal and Disposal Rev. o t DtaU 

Redlinc rikeout 

1 • Foundation mat 

2 • Cell drain header. 

3 

4 The demolition steps would be even more extensive adjacent to the rail tunnel, adjacent to 

5 cell 10, and at each end of the building. 

6 

7 E.2.1.4 Excavate Outside Building to Foundation Level. After demolition would have 

8 reached the anyon dcck , the area on each side of 221-U would be 

9 excavated to the foundation level. This would allow continuation of demolition of the building. 

10 Clean material removed during this excavation would be stockpiled for later use as site backfill. 

S 1 Contaminated soil, if encountered, would be taken to ERDF for disposal. 

12 

13 E.11.5 Demolish 221-U from Canyon to Foundation Level. Building segments above the 

14 foundation mat could be dismantled from both ends, meeting at cells 9 and 10, which would be 

15 demolished last. This would Icave the process cells covered to minimize water intrusion and 

16 leave the cell drain header collection tank in cell 10 functional for as long as possible. 

17 

18 The foundation mat varies in thickness from 1.8 to 2.4 m (6 to 8 ft). It would be left in place 

19 until the walls of the canyon were completely removed to provide a firm working surface, and to 

20 avoid disturbing the cell drain header. The foundation slab would be cracked using expansive 

^21 grout. Wire saws would be used to cut slab reinforcement prior to demolition. 

22 

23 After removal of the foundation mat, the only remaining structure would be the bottom of 

24 cell 10, the termination of the cell drain header. The cell walls extend approximately 6 m(20 ft) 

25 below the bottom of the foundation. The walls would be exposed, cut, and removed. The cell 

26 floor slab would be removed similar to the foundation mat. 

27 

28 E.2.1.6 Excavate Soil Below 221-U. As part of the demolition of 221-U, the first 0.9 m (3 ft) of 

29 soil below the foundation slab would be removed. This removal step would include demolition 

30 of the cell drain header. This 0.6-m (2-ft)-diameter clay pipeline is encased in concrete. The 

31 pipe would be grouted solid to contain contamination and then removed in blocks for disposal at 

32 ERDF. 

33 

34 E.2.1.7 Demolition of External ['iping Around 221-U. Piping not already addressed in the 

35 preparation of the complex step would be removed as part of the demolition steps for 221-U. In 

36 addition to the miscellaneous piping to be removed, a portion of the exhaust air tunnel would be 

37 removed. This tunnel is a reinforced structure connecting the canyon's air ventilation tunnel to 

38 the stack and filter. The tunnel is approximately 60 m(200 ft) long and runs from the end of the 

39 air tunnel in building section 3 to the fans. Approximately 23 m(75 ft) of the tunnel would be 

40 demolished and removed as part of Alternative 1. 

41 

42 The ventilation stack is about 60 m (200 ft) from the back wall of the canyon and would not be 

(0^'43 demolished in this option. 

44 

45 

Final Feasibility Sradyjor the Canyon DkpoXtion Initiative (221 •U Facility) 

^ ltmc:^ E-14

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DoE1R1,2001-11 

Full Removal and Disposal Rev. e i DMft n 

^ Rcdlinc/Strikeout 

E3 CLOSE THE 

This function consists of restoring the excavated and disturbed sites (including laydown and 

equipment staging areas) to a grade consistent with the natural surface topography. A closeout 

report would be prepared for regulatory agency approval. 

E3.1 Dack611221-U Excavation 

9 The excavations from demolition activities would be backfilled with compacted clean soil and 

10 clean concrete rubble. Fill contours would match adjacent natural contours. Material for backfill 

11 would come from both stockpiled material and an unidentified borrow source. The borrow 

12 source is assumed to be within the Hanford Site. 

13 

14 E3.2 Revegetate Site 

15 

16 All areas disturbed by demolition activities would be prepared for surface restoration. If 

17 required under the industrial land use for the 200 Areas, the majority of restoration would be 

18 application of an approved native grass seed mixture. Alternative 1 assumes revegetation for the 

19 surface restoration of the site. The actual restoration method would depend on the future land- 

20 use decisions. Existing roads damaged by the demolition would be returned to their pre-project 

^21 condition. 

22 

23 Post-closure care would consist of periodic inspections and maintenance to ensure success of the 

24 revegetation effort. 

25 

26 E33 Cleanup Complex 

27 

28 Before leaving the complex, the demolition contractor would clear the site of all equipment and 

29 materials. 

30 

31 E3.4 Sustain Post-Closure 

32 

33 This alternative would require relatively little closure activity once demolition is complete. 

34 No active post-closure monitoring systems would be installed at the former site of the 

35 221-U Facility. However, capital costs would be incurred for construction of cells at ERDF to 

36 receive wastes generated under Alternative I and for placement of a final cover over those cells 

37 at ERDF. These costs would be incurred by ERDF and are included in waste disposal rates 

38 incurred from disposal of wastes generated under Alternative 1. Waste sites near the demolition 

39 site would be addressed and monitored as part of the overall operable unit remediation. 

40 

41 E3A.1 Institutional Control Component of Alternative 1. After removal of all contaminated 

42 material, institutional controls on use of the area would be required if contaminants remained at 

('43 the site above unrestricted cleanup levels. Institutional controls could consist of both physical 

44 and legal barriers to prevent access to contaminants. In addition, certain activities would need to 

Final Feasibility Study Jor die Canyon Disposition Intriotive (221-U Facility) 

J unc + E-15

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DoFnt1.-2oo1-11 

Full Removal and Disposal Rev. A raft B 

r I Redline/Strikeout 

1 be prohibited to ensure that the groundwater and Columbia River water quality are protected. 

2 Specific institutional controls associated with this alternative would be developed as part of the 

3 remediation activities specified in the 221-U Facility Record of Decision. Generally, these 

4 activities would include physical and legal methods of controlling land use. Physical methods of 

5 controlling access include signs, entry control, artificial or natural barriers, and active 

6 surveillance. The DOE, or subsequent land managers, could enforce land-use restrictions as long 

7 as risks were above unrestdcted land-usc levels. The DOE would continue to use fencing, 

8 excavation permits, and the badging program to control access to the area for as long as it 

9 maintains control over the land. Signs would be maintained prohibiting public access. In 

10 addition, maintenance of vegetative or man-made covers for reduction of infiltration would be 

11 required. 

12 

13 Legal restrictions would include both administrative and reat-property actions intended to reduce 

14 or prevent future human exposure to contaminants remaining on site by restricting the use of the 

15 land, including groundwater use for drinking water or irrigation. Land-use restrictions and 

16 controls on real-property development are effective in providing a degree of human health 

17 protection by minimizing the potential for contact with contaminated media. Land-use 

18 restrictions will be put in place, as necessary, until such time as the federal government ceases 

19 ownership of the property. The DOE, or subsequent land managers, would enforce land-use 

20 restrictions as long as risks were above acceptable levels. 

+O'N.21 

22 Restrictions on the removal of remaining soil or debris above unrestricted-use cleanup levels 

23 would also be required. Removal of soil or debris would be controlled at both the surface and at 

24 depth ( i.e., below 4.6 m(15 ft]). Any soil removed from the 221-U Facility area would be sent 

25 to a disposal facility approved in advance by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 

26 

27 Groundwater-use restrictions would be required to ensure that groundwater is not used as a 

28 drinking water source as long as contaminant concentrations aro above federal and state drinking 

29 ^ water standards and WAC 173-340 #4TCA-B groundwater protection standards. Irrigation 

30 would also need to be restricted if it is demonstrated that remaining contaminants could impact 

31 groundwater or river water quality under an irdgation scenario. Well drilling, except for the 

32 purposes of monitoring, research, or other uses authorized by the Tri-Parties, would be 

33 prohibited until groundwater cleanup levels comply with these drinking water standards. As 

34 further protection of groundwater, infiltration controls (e.g., revegetation, asphalt, concrete) may 

35 need to be maintained depending on the contaminant concentrations left at the site and their 

36 potential for mobilization to groundwater. 

37 

38 E3.4.2 Groundwater Monitoring Component of Alternative 1. A groundwater monitoring 

39 system for ERDF would be implemented. The purpose would be to monitor groundwater at 

40 ERDF for contaminants from the 221-U Facility waste that Is disposed there. A monitoring 

41 system for ERDF that adequately covers the underlying groundwater area and includes all 

42 contaminants of concern associated with the facility would be developed. The specific 

('43 monitoring system design and its requirements would be established as part of the operations and 

44 maintenance plan for ERDF. 

45 

Final Feasibility Siadyfor the Canyon Disposition /nlriative (221-U FacHiry) 

^ in e 1^^ E-16

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: Dopntl,-2001-11 

Full Removal and Disposal Rev. e i Draft n 


1 

2 E.4 REFERENCES 

3 

4 10 CFR 835, "Occupational Radiation Protcction;' Code ojFederal Regulations, as amended. 

5 

6 64 FR 61615,1999, "Hanford Comprehensive Land-Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement 

7 (HCP EIS), Hanford Site, Richland, Washington; Record of Decision (ROD)," Federal 

8 Register, Vol. 64, No. 218, pg. 61615 (November 12). 

9 

10 BHI,1998, Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility Waste Acceptance Criteria, 

11 BHI-00139, Rev. 3, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 

12 

13 BHI, 2001a, Canyon Disposition Initiative: PreliminaryAUIRA Evaluation jorFinal Feasibility 

14 Study Alternatives 1, 3.4. and 6 (CCN 089828 to G. M. MacFarlan, Bechtel Hanford, 

15 Inc., from J. C. Wiles and R. C. Free, Jr.. May 31), Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, 


17 

18 BHf, 2001b, Supplemental Waste Acceptance Criteria jor Bulk Shipments to the Environmental 

19 Restoration Disposal Facility, 0000X-DC-W0001, Rev. 2, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., 

20 Richland, Washington. 

(...'21 

22 DOE, 1999, Final llanjord Comprehensive Land Use Plan Environmentallmpact Statement, 

23 DOEIEIS-0222-F, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 

24 

25 DOE O 5400.5, Radiation Protection ojthe Public and the Environment, U.S. Department of 

26 Energy, Washington, D.C. 

27 

28 DOE-RL.2 3.FocNsed Fea.ribilitvSntdyjorthe UPlantClosureAreaWa.ste Sites.DOE/R 

29 2003-23. Rev. 0 A. U.S. Denartment of Energy. Richland 

30 Opcratiotls Office, Richland, Washington. 

31 

32 WAC 173-303, "Dangerous Waste Regulations;' Washington Administrative Code, as amended. 

33 

34 WAC 173-340, "Model Toxics Control Act - Cleanup," Washington Administrative Code, 

35 as amended. 

^ 

Final Feasibility Study for the Canyon pispositJon initiative (221-U Facility) 

Lunc ^43 E-17

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: floEIRl.-2001-11 

I Full Removal and Disposal Rev.e l Drae B 

^ RedlindStrikeout 

^ 

^ 

Final Feasibility Stndy jor die Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

J une 200 1 E-18

(O'N 

APPENDIX E 

3 ATTACHMENT El -FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 

4 

5 

6 E.1 PREPARE EXISTING COMPLEX 

7 E.1.1 Control hazards 

DOEIRL-2001-1 l 

Rev. 0 1 Draft D 

&dlinc/Strikenut 

8 E.1.1.1 Establish hazards protection 

9 E.1.1.t.1 Control heaith and safety hazards 

10 E.1.1.1.2 Control environmental hazards 

11 E.1.1.2 Manage hazardous materials 

12 E.1.1.2.1 Characterize hazardous materials 

13 E.1.1.2.2 Dccontaminate areas and systems 

14 E.1.1.2.3 Prepare hazardous materials for processing and disposition 

15 E.1.2 Establish inftastruMure 

16 E.1.2.1 Modify existing infrastruture 

17 E.1.2.1.1 Water 

18 E.1.2.1.2 Sewer 

(--N19 E.1.2.1.3 Electrical 

20 E.1.2.1.4 HVAC 

21 E.1.2.1.5 Lighting 

22 E.1.2.1.6 Recertify main bridge crane 

23 E.1.2.1.7 Install new roof system 

24 E.1.2.2 Establish support facilities 

25 E.1.2.2.1 Modifications to the existing building 

26 E.1.2.2.2 Install mobile office units 

27 E.1.2.3 Establish staging areas 

28 E.1.2.3.1 Establish personnel staging areas (change rooms, operations, 

29 lunchroom, first aid, emergency, offices...) 

30 E.1.2.3.2 Establish equipment staging areas (maintenance, repair, 

31 decontamination, packaging, waste shipping, haul vehicle 

32 frisking, parking,...) 

33 E.1.2.3.3 Add ramp and truck door to 221-U 

34 E.1.3 Modify Facility 

35 111.3.1 Prepare facility for use 

36 E.1.3.1.1 Inspect 271-U for its role during preparing the complex 

37 E.1.3.1.2 Identify 221-U building modifications, if any, required for its 

38 support during first phase of Altetnative 1 

/^39 

E.1.3.2 D&D Railroad Tunnel 

f 40 E.1.3.2.1 Remove soil cover 

41 E.1.3.2.2 Fix contamination on tunnel interior 

Final Feasibility Smdy/or the Canyon DLrpwUiai Initiative (271-U Facility) 

mc'+001 E-19

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DoFnt1:2001-1 t 

Full Removal and Disposal Rev.AI Drrf j-3 

RedlinelStrikeout 

ATTACHl11ENT El - FUNCTIOYAI. HIERARCIIY 

1 E.1.3.23 Demolition 

2 E.1.3.2.4 Load/liaul 

3 E.1.3.25 Disposal 

4 E.1.3.2.6 Construct Truck Door 

5 E.1.3.3 Equipment in building: 

6 E.1.3.3.1 Remove equipment from canyon floor 

7 E.13.3.2 Remove cell cover blocks 

8 E.1.3.33 Size reduceldismantIe (D& D workers, torches) 

9 E.1.3.3.4 Remove equipment and pipe from galleries 

10 E.1.3.35 Package for disposal (double wrap) 

11 E.1.3.3.6 Load into ERDF containers 

12 E.1.3.3.7 Haul/Remove from building to Queue 

13 E.1.33.8 Transportation and disposal at ERDF 

14 E.1.3.4 Hot Pipc Trench 

15 E.1.3.4.1 Remove Cover blocks 

16 E.1.3.4.2 Remove piping (Pipe fitters, D& D workers, torches) 

17 E.1.3.43 Package (double wrap &Jor fix in place) 

f'118 E.1.3.4.4 Load into ERDF containers (crane) 

19 E.1.3.4.5 Transportation and disposal at ERDF 

20 E.1.3.5 Remove Surface Contamination 

21 E.1.3.5.1 Scabbie surface 

22 E.1.3.6 Fix contamination on 221-U interior surfaces 

23 E.1.3.6.1 Building interior (canyon walls, floor, roof, cells, pipe trench & 

24 venttunnel) 

25 E.1A Modify external area - remove external physical obstructions 

26 E.1.4.1 Disposition extemal legacy structures and systems 

27 

28 

29 

E.1.4.1.1 

E.1.4.1.2 

E.1.4.13 

Disposition 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility 

Disposition 271-U office building 

211-U Tank Farm and 21 l-UA Tank Farm 

30 E.I.4.1.4 Disposition Front and Rear Stairs for 221-U 

31 E.1.4.2 Remediatc waste sites within footprint of building excavation 

32 

33 

34 

E.I.4.2.1 

E.1.4.2.2 

E.1.4.2.3 

216-U-7 French Drain 

241-UX-154 Diversion Box 

241-UX-302A Catch Tank 

35 

36 

E.1.4.2.4 

E.1.4.2.5 

2607-W-7 Septic Tank and Drain Field 

UPR 200-W.101 

37 E.1.4.2.6 UPR 200-W-138 

^38 

E.1.4.2.7 UPR 200-W-162 

4 39 

E . 1 . 4 . 3 Excavat i ons to prepare working area adjacent to 221-U 

40 E.1.4.3.1 Prepanc area along northwest side 

Final Feasibility Siadyjor 1he Canyon DisparJtian laitiaNve (22l -U FaNliry) 

June 'tooj E-20

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DOF/Ri.-2001-1 i 

Full Removal and Disposal Rev. o i Dran p 

Redlinc/Strikcout 

ATTACHMENT El - FUNCTIONAL IIIERARCHY 

1 E.1.4.3.2 Prepare area along southeast side 

2 E.IS Manage Hazardous Wastes 

3 E.1.5.1 Identify waste generated 

4 E.1.5.2 Prepare inventory of waste shipments to ERDF and elsewhere 

7 E.2 OPERATE EXISTING COMPLEX 

8 E.2.1 D&D 221-U Building 

9 E.2.1.1 Mobilize and erect cranes 

10 E.2.1.2 Remove roof sections 

11 E.2.1.2.1 Wire saw panels 

12 E.2.1.2.2 Remove and place at ground level 

13 E.2.1.2.3 Size reduce panels with wire saw on ground 

14 E.2.1.2.4 Load & haul to ERDF 

15 E.2.1.2.5 ERDF unload & disposal 

^l6 E.2.1.3 Remove canyon walls down to canyon deck level 

17 E.2.1.3.1 Wire saw into bloeks (approx 90 metric tons). Will be done one 

18 building segment at a time. 

19 E.2.1.3.2 Use crane for block removal 

20 E.2.1.3.3 Load & haul to ERDF 

21 E.2.1.3.4 ERDF unload & disposal 

22 E.2.1.4 Excavate outside building for 221-U foundation demolition 

23 E.2.1.4.1 Excavate 

24 E.2.1.4.2 Haul material to stockpile area 

25 E.2.1.4.3 Dust control 

26 E.2.1.5 Demolish 221-U from canyon level to bottom of foundation 

27 E.2.1.5.1 Remove cell & trench covers 

28 E.2.1.5.2 Wire saw and remove concrete wall/slab segments down to 

29 foundation slab (approx 90 metric ton sections) 

30 

31 

E.2.1.5.3 

E.2.1.5.4 

Foundation slab will be split using Bristar. 

Excavate around and demolish Cell 10 lower section 

32 E.2.1.5.5 Load concrete into containers 

33 E.2.1.5.6 Haul containers to queue 

34 E.2.1.5.7 Transportation and disposal at ERDF 

35 E.2.1.6 Excavate soil 3 feet below foundation level 

36 E.2.1.6.1 Excavate for soil removal 

37 

E.2.1.6.2 Demolish cell drain header (24" pipe) 

^38 

39 

E.2.1.6.3 

E.2.1.6.4 

Load concrete debris onto site haul trucks 

Haul debris to ERDF for disposal 

Final Feasibifity Stady jor the Canyon Disposition lniNative (22!•t/ Facifiry) 

junc 2003 E-21

(0^s 

1,^N 

Appendix E - Detailed Description of Alternative 1: DOElRL.200t-11 

I Full Removal and Disposal Rev. A ra P 

Redlinc/Slrikenut 

ATTACHMENT El - FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 

1 E.2.1.7 D&D External buried piping around 221-U within 23 meters of building 

2 E.2.1.7.1 Remove air tunnel outside 221-U 

3 E.2.1.7.2 Remove, cut and plug misc yard piping 

4 E.2.1.7.3 Disposal at ERDF 

5 

6 

7 E.3 CLOSE THE COMPLEX 

8 E3.1 Backfill 221-U excavation 

9 E.3. 1.1 Place clean concrete rubble in excavation 

10 E.3.1.2 Load/haul backfill from stockpile area and from borrow source 

11 E.3.13 Spread and compact backfill 

12 . E.3.2 Revegetate site 

13 E.3.2.1 Prepare all disturbed areas for surface restoration 

14 E.3.2.2 Apply approved seed mix and soil fixative 

15 E33 Pick up and clean the complex 

16 E3.3.1 Remove excess equipment and materials 

17 E.33.2 Conduct final walkdown 

18 E3A Sustain Post Closure 

19 E.3.4.1 Establish institutional controls 

20 E.3.4.1.1 Establish access restrictions 

21 E.3.4.1.2 Establish deed restrictions 

22 E.3.4.1.3 Establish restrictions on use of the complex 

Final Feasi6ifiry Study jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

June 200; E-22

^ 

r-,1 APPENDIX F 

2 


4 ENTOMBMENT WITH INTERNAL 

5 WASTE DISPOSAL 

^ 

DOF/RL-2001-11 

Rev. AJ„DGfLH 

cdline/,4trikcont 

FbmJ Fearibility Stady jur the Canyon Disposition htitiative (22!•U Facility) 

J une F-i

i^ 

r^'. 

^ 

1 

2 


Rev. 8jPmftjR 

2LedlinclStrikernrt 

Fina! Feasibility Stadyfor(he Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

June 2001 F-li

^ 


DOFJRL-2001-1 t 

Rev. N I nraft li 

Rcdlinc/Stritxout 

F DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE 3: ENTOMBMENT WITH 

IA"TERNAL WASTE DISPOSAL ....................................................... ......................... F-1 

6 F.1 PREPARE EXISTING COMPLEX .................................... _.............................. F-4 

7 F.1.1 Control Hazards .................................... »................................................ F-5 

8 R1.2 Establish lnfrasttucturo ............................................................................ F7 

9 F.13 ModifyFacility ........................................................................................F-8 

10 RI.4 Modify External Area ............................................................................ F-13 

11 F.1.5 Manage Hazardous Materials ................................................................ F-15 

12 

13 F.2 OPERATE THE COMPLEX ............................................................................ F-15 

14 F.2.1 Emplace Waste in 221-U Galleries ....................................................... F-16 

15 F.2.2 Accept Waste for Placement Within Canyon ........................................ F-18 

16 

17 F.3 CLOSE THE COMPLEX ....... .......................................................................... F-20 

("",18 F.3.1 Construct Environmental Cap...... ........................................................ F-20 

19 F.3.2 Revegetate Site ............................. .................. ........................ »............. F-22 

20 F.33 Cleanup Complex ......................... _........................................ _............. F-22 

21 F.3.4 Sustain Post-Closure ..... ................................................. ....... _............. F-22 

22 

23 F.4 REFERENCES .................................................................................................. F-24 

^ 

24 

25 

26 FIGURES 

27 

28 F-1. Alternative 3: Plan View of Environmental Cap .......................................................... F-26 

29 F-2. Alternative 3: Cross Section of Environmental Cap .................................................... F-27 

30 

31 

32 ATTAQiMENT 

33 

34 FI FUNCTIONAL IiIERARCHY ......................................................................................F-29 

Final FcasibilitySrady jorthe Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-t1 Facility) 

)une'!003 F-iii

^ 

^ 

t^ 

2 


Rev. H Ihafi ti 

RcJlinc/Stril.ecxiit 

Final Fearibiliry S1ady jor Nie Canyon Dispotilion Initiative (121-U Faciliry) 

June :002 F-iv

^ 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

(^\43 

44 

APPENDIX F 

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE 3: 

ENTOMBMENT WITH INTERNAL 

WASTE DISPOSAL 

DOFJRI r2001-11 

Rev. 0 1 f)raft R 

Recll inclStrilronut 

This appendix presents a detailed description of the Alternative 3 dispositioning of the 

221-U Facility. Alternative 3 involves disposing of wastes into available spaces within the 

interior of the 221-U Facility. When complete, Alternative 3 transforms the existing 

221-U Facility and its surroundings into a permanent near-surface burial complex for Hanford 

Site generated low-level wastes. 

Altemative 3 would be implemented in coordination with cleanup of the U-Plant Closure Area , 

completed before or concurrent with final imRlementation of Altcmative 3 

For this alternative, legacy equipment currently stered on the canyon eperating-Reerdeck and in 

the process cells would be reduced in size and volume and then placed into the process cells and 

grouted. The ec and its three galleries would be prepared for 

acceptance as a disposal site for low-level Class C or lower wastes. Waste would be 

containerized by others prior to receipt at 221-U. After placement, the containers would be filled 

with grout. Building voids not filled with waste would be grouted. The intent of the grouting is 

to minimize the potential for 221-U slab or wall movement. The grout also would provide 

uniform support for waste and/or soil placed above the cells and gallery slabs. 

The building and disposed waste would be protected from water infiltration by an engineered 

barrier. The engineered barrier would be placed on top of engineered fill and would cover the 

entire footprint of the building. The side slopes of the engineered fill would be constructed with 

an erosion protection layer. Together, these three elements make up the environmental cap. 

Adjacent facilities and wastes sites that are located within the footprint of the environmental cap 

must be remediated to support implementation of Alternative 3. The adjacent aboveground 

facilities would be dispositioned as part of Alternative 3 activities. However, remediation of the 

wastes sites is not included as part of Alternative 3. 

The following key assumptions have been made In the development of this alternative: 

1. This alternative does not account for the remediation of waste sites within the perimeter of 

the environmental cap. It is assumed that these sites would be addressed by other projects in 

time to implement Alternative 3. Remediation of waste sites beyond the Alternative 3 

environmental cap footprint are also outside the Alternative 3 scope and would be addressed 

Final Feasibility Studyjortha Canyon Disposition 1nit1at1ve(221•t/ Facility) 

1 003 F-1

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DoE/RI 2o01-11 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. A Drafi 

r. ^ Redline/Strikenut 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

("^21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

(04^143 

44 

by future projects using the remedial action altcrnativc selected for the appropriate 200 Area 

operable unit. For cost-estimating purposes, it is assumed that there are no contamination 

plumes above Wa.rhingron Admini.rtrative Cade /fWAC1173-340 

(iWTC-A) industrial limits associated with the Alternative 3 activities. During Alternative 3 

activities (such as buried pipe and exterior air tunnel removal), if soil contamination above 

WAC 173-340 N4TGA industrial limits is identified, then the Tri-Parties would need to 

evaluate the situation and address the contamination. Contaminated equipment and piping 

from demolition activities would be disposed at the Environmental Restoration Disposal 

Facility (ERDF). 

2. Facilities to be decontaminated and decommissioned in support of implementation of 

Alternative 3 are the 221-U Facility stairwells, the 271-U Office Building, the 276-U Solvent 

Recovery Facility, and the railroad tunnel. Aboveground facilities that are within the 

footprint of the Alternative 3 environmental cap would be removed as a pan of Alternative 3 

activities. These facilities include the 211-U and 211-UA Tank Farms, the 241-WR Vault 

Thorium Storage, the 271-U Office Building, the 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility. 

2714-U Warehouse, 275-UR Chemical Storage Warehouse, 200-W-44 Sand Filter, 

291-U Process Unit Plant, 291-U-1 Stack, 296-U-10 Stack, 222-U Office Lab, 224-U 

Concentration Facility, 224-UA Calcination Facility, 272-U Maintenance Shop, 2715-UA 

Maintenance Shop, and 292-U Stack Monitoring Station. The remediation of these facilities 

the cost estimates in Sections 5.0 and 6.0 and in Ap,pcndix K of this final feasibility study 

LFM 

3. Waste sites that are within the footprint of the environmental cap and must be remediated by 

other projects in time to support Alternative 3 include the 216-U-4 Reverse Well; 

216-U-4A French Drain; 216-U13B French Drain; 216-U-S Trench; 216-U-6 Trench; 

216-U-7 French Drain; 216-U-15 Trench; 224-U-HWSA; 224-U CNT; 241-UX-154 

Diversion Box; 241-UX-302A Catch Tank; 2607-W-7 Septic Tank and Drain Field; 

270-W Tank; unplanned releases (UPRs) UPR 200-W-33, UPR 200-W-39, UPR 200-W-55, 

UPR 200-W-60, UPR 200-W-78, UPR 200-W-101, UPR 200-W-117, UPR 200-W-I 18, 

UPR 200-W-125, UPR 200-W-138, and UPR 200-W-162; and portions of process lines 

associated with 200-W-42, 200-W-84, and UPR-600-20. Three wells are located within the 

footprint of the environmental cap: wells 299-W 19-8. 299-W19-55, and 299-W19-98. It is 

assumed that these wells would be decommissioned in time to support Alternative 3. This 

work scone is not included In the cost estimate. 

4. Unless otherwise noted in this appendix, wastes from legacy structure removal and removal 

of the operating gallery equipment and piping would be disposed at ERDF. This would 

maintain the canyon and gallery volume for disposal of Class C wastes from other waste sites 

on the Hanford Site. For removal and hauling to ERDF remediation waste would be in 

accordance with ERDF waste acceptance criteria (B1II 1997, 2001b), and compliance with 

Final Feasibiiity Study jor the Canyon Disposition initiative (22I-U Facility) 

n 2 9 

F-2

Appendix F- Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOVrtl.2001a 1 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. QLP_rjfLfl 

RediinelStrikeout 

1 size and weight reauirements would be coordinated with ERDF operations during final 

2 design if this alternative is selected. 

3 

4 5. No surface contamination removal from the interior surfaces of 221-U is included in 

5 Altemative 3. All concrete surfaces would receive applications or fixatives. 

6 

7 6. Removal, decontamination, and demolition operations for contaminated equipment beieg 

8 stored-insidc of 221-U would be performed using conventional, proven technologies. 

9 

10 7. Following mechanical modifications and recertification, the existing main crane in the 

1 I 221-U Facility would be functional and ready for use in Alternative 3 activities. Crane use 

12 would be limited to moving of equipment from the process cells to the eanyon eperming 

13 deekcanvon deck where the equipment would be reduced in size and volume, as necessary, 

14 and then placed back into the process cells. The main crane would also be used to move the 

15 equipment from the canyon deck during size and volume reduction and to place the 

16 equipment into the process cells. Cover block movement would be completed using the 

17 crane during these activities. 

18 

19 8. All underground piping systems located beneath the environmental cap footprint for 

0 Alternative 3 would be grouted in olace or removed as patt of the altemative , depending on 

^1 L outcome of risk assessment work . 4his-]f removed. waste would be disposed at ERDF. 

22 

23 1 9. The 221-U 6anyen eperetingieek canyon deck elevation is estimated at 221.5 m(726.5 ft). 

24 

25 10. The canyon interior (including the process cells, trench, and associated ventilation tunnel) 

26 and the rail tunnel interior are considered to be contaminated. The galleries are considered to 

27 be uncontaminated except for some areas of the southeast wall that would require fixative 

28 application. 

29 

30 11. The 221-U Facility is located within the exclusive land-use boundary identified in the Final 

31 Hanford Comprehensive Land-Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1999) and 

32 the associated "Hanford Comprehensive Land-Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement 

33 (HCP EIS), Hanford Site, Richland. Washington: Record of Decision (ROD)" (64 Federal 

34 Regtrfer61615). This implies that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) would remain in 

35 control of the 200 Areas and industrial-exclusive land use would be limited to waste 

36 management activities. 

37 

38 12. Only remediation waste generated at the Hanford Site would be disposed in the facility. 

39 Immobilized low-activity waste was considered but is not included in waste inventory for 

40 disposal at 221-U. 

41 

42 13. Waste containers would be open-top cargo containers. The containers would have the 

approximate dimensions of 5 in long by 2.4 in wide by 2.6 in high ( 16 ft by 8 ft by 8.5 ft). 

44 This size would allow container placement two abreast on the eanyen-eperatiflgtiec-kcanvon 

Final Feaaibitity Srudy for the Canyon Disposition lnitiative (221-U Facility) 

June 2007 F-3

Appendix F -Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOFJRL-2001-11 

IEntombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. e,-df 

n Redline/Strikenut 

1 ^ 92;1. Containers would be placed using special shielded forklifts designed to limit operator 

2 exposure during container handling. 

3 

4 14. Waste received for placement would arrive at the site containerized in the cargo containers 

5 complete with an application of fixative to the container interior. Costs associated with 

6 placing waste into the containers and application of the fixative would be incurred by the 

7 waste generators and are not included in this altemative. 

8 

9 15. Backfill around exterior of the 221-U and waste inside the canyon would be placed evenly as 

10 the building is gradually filled with waste to prevent a large differential load on the canyon 

1 I wall. Waste would be placed in lifts along the full length of 221-U to eliminate the potential 

12 of a large load difference between adjacent sections of the building. 

13 

14 16. Due to the uncettainties associated with both the volume of contaminated equipment 

15 ^ currently located on the eanyon o deelicinyan deck and inside of the process cells 

16 and the degree of equipment volume reduction that is achievable, it is assumed that only this 

17 contaminated equipment would be disposed in the 221-U process cells. It is further assumed 

18 that there is not sufficient space to accept additional waste from other sites for placement 

19 inside the process cells. The exception is cell 3, which is expcxted to have room for 

20 ^ placement of waste in addition to that from the eanyeneper ' 

22 17. The existing 0.6•m{tiameter cell drain header located beneath 221-U would be grouted solid 

23 to immobilize contamination in this pipe. 

24 

25 18. A new ventilation system with replaceable high-efficiency particulate air (IIEPA) filter banks 

26 would be installed on the northeast end of the 221-U roof. It would replace the existing 

27 ventilation tunnel and stack ventilation system. The new ventilation system would stay in 

28 operation until the canyon is filled with waste and grouted. 

29 

30 19. Internal void spaces associated with wastes disposed inside of 221-U would be filled with 

31 grout and pressure grouted. Where large voids are grouted (such as around the cargo 

32 containers and inside the cells), a low-cement-content grout would be used. This grout 

33 would have a limited potential for heat buildup due to a low heat of hydration, yet would 

34 provide sufficient compressive strength for the intended service. 

35 

36 20. While sources for some materials required for construction of an environmental cap have not 

37 yet been identified, it is assumed that sufficient quantities of materials necessary for the clean 

38 fill and construction of the environmental cap are available locally. 

39 

40 21. A modified Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) Subtitle C engineered 

41 barrier would be constructed to protect the 221-U Facility and its contents from infiltration 

42 and intrusion. 

^ 43 

44 

Final Feasibility Study for the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

J une 200 

F-4

^ 

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOEfRL-2001-1t 

I Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. eJ_P_raft n 

Rcdlinc/Strikcout 

1 F.1 PREPARE EXISTING COMPLEX 

2 

3 This function provides for the necessary physical modifications to the existing 221-U complex, 

4 including related programs, administrative and physical controls, safeguards, and infrastructure 

5 to prepare the complex for the subsequent operating and closing functions. The purpose of these 

6 activities would be to establish a complex-wide configuration designed to support waste 

7 processing, decontamination, demolition, and closure. 

8 

9 F.1.1 Control Hazards 

10 

I,1 Preparing for Alternative 3 would include controlling hazards at the site. This control would 

12 begin with preparation of a decommissioning plan. The plan would include, but not be limited 

13 to, such things as readiness evaluations, hazard classifications, waste designation, a waste 

14 profile. a health and safety plan, and site-specific waste management instructions. This planning 

15 would be followed by hazardous material and radioactivity surveys. 

16 

17 F.1.1.1 Establish Hazards Protection. The potential personnel and environmental hazards 


19 routine operations and those hazards involving the nonroutine activities of large-scale demolition 

20 operations. SpeciBcally, they are industrial and radiological in nature. Hazard mitigation would 

(0^'21 involve the implementation of engineering and adminisuative controls that address both 

22 personnel and environmental protection. 

23 

24 F.l.1.1.1 Control Health and Safety Hazards. Personnel would encounter industrial hazards 










34 






40 shoes, as a minimum, and any additional safety equipment as required by job-specifc 



("%43 enter hazardous areas. 

44 

Final Feasibitiry Stady for the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

ivnc :2o: F-5

Appendix T- Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOEIRI^2001-1 t 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. al nrafi n 

r., R dline)Strikeout 

I High radiation arcas and very high radiation areas would be encountered and would primarily be 

2 a concern during equipment removal. For example, approximately 25% of the cells have 

3 equipment and materials that have high radiation levels that exceed 1,000 mremJhr. The 

4 maximum gamma dose rate in cell 30 was 190,000 mrem/hr (BHI 2001a). Also, the most 

5 significant radiological hazard anticipated during operational activities would be the generation 

6 of airborne contamination. Mitigation of airborne contamination would be accomplished with 

7 local exhaust ventilation of the decontamination equipment, personal protective equipment, 

8 existing facility exhaust system, and administrative controls and physical controls. 

9 Decontamination or fixing of loose or stnearable contamination would be performed prior to any 

10 removal/demolition activities. Radiological limits for worker protection are provided in 10 Code 

I1 of Federal Regulations (CFR) 835. 

12 

13 Nonroutine activities would require special procedures and equipment so that the risk of 



16 


18 Physical controls include barriers, postings, and personnel surveys. In accordance with site 


e,,20 job-specific work plans and procedures. Compliance with the job-specific work practices and 

>_I procedures would ensure that personnel exposures do not exceed allowable limits. 

22 

23 Installing a perimeter fence and implementing a site-entry procedure would control access to the 

24 work site. The procedure would require either training or escorts for site visitors. Additionally, 

25 operating methods that depend primarily on equipment would be used, and the number of 

26 operating personnel would be minimized to the extent practicable. 

27 

28 F1.1.1.2 Control Envtronmental Hazards. The potential dispersion/migration of dangerous 

29 and)or radioactive waste would be an inherent risk of Alternative 3. Wind is the principal cause 

30 of dispersion, and water is the main transport mechanism for migration. Dangerous/radioactive 


32 leaving the project site. Radiological limits for exposure to the public are provided by 

33 DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection ofthe Public and the Environment. 

34 

35 Implementing a combination of procedural and physical controls would mitigate wind dispersion 

36 of contaminants. Procedural controls typically consist of wind-speed restrictions on work 

37 activities. Physical controls include spray fixatives ( i.e., water sprays and chemical coagulants). 

38 minimizing the size of the work area, pressurized application of concrete slurries through a hose 

39 and nozzle (guniting), clean fill, and/or containerization. Radiation air monitoring would be 

40 performed on the work site perimeter to confirm the effectiveness of airborne contamination 

41 control. 

42 

1'43 The potential for water migration would also be mitigated by implementing a combination of 

44 procedural and physical controls. Procedural controls would consist of work restrictions during 


Final Feasibility Studyfor the Canyon Disparftion initiative (221•U FacRity) 

nc 1 00 1 F-6

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DoFntl.-2001-11 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. A 1 Drr11 ti 

n 

I 


1 include a combination of temporary shclters and/or sealing products. Shelters would be used to 

2 shield waste from precipitation. A fixative sealer would be applied to surfaces with smearable or 

3 loose contamination. Sealers are used to prevent dangerous/radioactive contaminants from 

4 seepingAeaching out of the waste containment. 

5 

6 Personnel and equipment leaving the site present a risk of contaminant migration. This risk 

7 would be mitigated by procedural and physical measures. Work procedures would require 

8 equipment used on the site and exposed to dangerous/radioactive wastes to be decontaminated 

9 before the equipment is released. Personnel working at the site would wear proper protective 

10 clothing. Protective clothing exposed to dangerous/radioactive wastes would be controlled in 

11 accordance with Hanford Site procedures. Personnel leaving radiologically contaminated areas 


13 


15 All waete tnatetielswa. would be sampled, tested, and designated as required by applicable or 


17 

18 F.1.2 Establish Infrastructure 

19 


('21 221-U Facility complex infrastructure. Some modification of the existing building and utilities 

22 would be necessary to support this alternative. These and other mobilization such as preparation 

23 of staging areas would be necessary to prepare the complex to support Alternative 3 activities. 

24 

25 F.1.2.1 Modify Existing Infrastructure. The existing utilities where possible would be used to 

26 support Alternative 3 activities. The basic approach to establishing the infrastructure for this 

27 altemative would be to use the existing road network within the complex and relocate water and 

28 electrical service terminals outside the footprint of the Alternative 3 environmental cap. The 

29 environmental cap for this alternative is larger than that of Alternative 6. 

30 

31 The existing road network surrounding the 221-U Facility would adequately accommodate 

32 equipment during waste delivery operations, waste-hauling traffc, and traffic associated with 

33 construction of the environmental cap. Additional spurs off paved roadways for heavy 

34 equipment access and waste movement activities would be constructed, as required. 

35 

36 Immediately before demolition of 271-U, water mains and sewer pipelines located within the 

37 environmental cap footprint would be sealed at the outer edge of the environmental cap. 

38 Temporary water lines would be installed, as required, for sanitary requirements, fire- 

39 suppression systems, decontamination operations, and dust control. Main transformers for 

40 electric power to the 221-U Facility would be relocated outside of the perimeter of the 

41 environmental cap. Temporary 480-volt electrical lines and panels would be installed in the 

42 building, as required, for lighting, ventilation, and equipment operations. The electrical service 

1,00N43 would need to include power supply to a new air-handling unit on the roof of 221-U. 

44 

Final Feasibility Study jor she Canyon Dirpo.rition Initiative (221•U Facility) 

J une"' 001 F-7

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DoEIRtr2oot-1 I 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. e raft 

RedlinclStrikeout 

1 The existing bridge crane would be recertified for use during equipment handling within the 

2 canyon. At the same time, minor modifications and repairs would be made to the crane, 

3 including repair of the heating and air conditioning systems. 

4 

5 The final step modifying the 221-U Facility for this alternative is replacement of its roof 

6 covering (versus the roof structure). To prevent precipitation from entering the building during 

7 waste handling activities within the canyon, a new roof covering would be installed. 

8 

9 F.1.2.2 Establish Support Facilities. Alternative 3 would also require administrative offices, 

10 change rooms, tool rooms, lunchroom, restrooms, and storage rooms. During the initial activities 

11 such as equipment sizing, equipment placement in the process cells, and demolition of attached 

12 structures, this support could be provided from the 271-U Building. The use would be practical 

13 only during the initial stages of 221-U modifications.. Although there would be no need for close 

14 crane access to 221-U, 271-U Building demolition would still occurearly in this alternative. 

15 Removal of this building would allow preparation of the electrical gallery for waste placement 

16 and access for backlilling. The backfill would start on the northwest side of the 221-U Facility 

17 as the galleries are filled with waste. 

18 


0 These facilities would be located outside the construction area for the environmental cap. 

^1 A construction perimeter fence would be installed to control access into and out of the work 

22 zone. A main change room for nonradioactive work would be located outside the exclusion 

23 fence. Existing telephone and electrical lines would be used to support office and clerical 

24 requirements. Existing Hanford Site fire protection and ambulance services would be adequate 

25 for emergency response. 

26 

27 F.1.2.3 Establish Staging Areas. Personnel staging areas would be included in the space 


29 other construction activity support areas. Equipment storage, waste qucucs, decontamination 

30 areas, survey tents, container storage, and other staging requirements would be included in the 

31 layout of support requirements for Alternative 3. 

32 

33 F.1.3 Modify Facility 

34 



37 and making modifications as necessary. A major part of this step would be preparing a new 

38 building ventilation system and blocking the existing system. The existing equipment on the 

39 ^ an would be placed into the process cells, and both the cells and 

40 pipe trench would be grouted. The railroad tunnel would be demolished to improve access to the 

41 221-U Facility. The final modification step would be to address surface contamination with a 

42 fixative application to prepare the canyon for the start of waste emplacement activities. 

('O'*;t3 

Finat Feastbiliry Srady jor the Canyon Disposition lnUiative (221-U Facifiry) 

unc 1 00 1 

F-8

(^N 

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOFJIU:2001-1I 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. 0 1 Draft I3 

Rcdline/Strikcout 

1 F.1.3.1 Prepare Facility for Use. The 221-U structure must resist loads with safety factors that 

2 meet building codes (i.e., American Concrete Institute, American Institute of Steel Construction) 


4 

5 

public access would be permitted; therefore, structural concerns are for worker safety only. 

6 The building must be put in a safe condition for operational activities. This would require 

7 radiological surveys, fixing or removing contamination, a building inspection for industrial 

8 safety concerns, and equipment repairs or upgrades to support the operation phase. It is assumed 

9 that the 271-U Office Building would be needed for support of the preparation phase. Therefore, 

10 

11 

it must be maintained in a safe condition as well. 

12 F.13.1.1 Inspect 271-U. The building would be inspected to determine the condition of the 

13 building and its equipment. Information for this inspection would help finalize planning for the 

14 operational phase of this alternative. The functional requirements of the various activities 

15 

16 

involved in operating the facility and the building modifications and upgrades necessary to safely 

accomplish the activities would be identified. Modifications identified would be designed. The 

17 

18 

services and/or new equipment needed would be procured. 

19 

(00^120 21 

No known building repairs or upgrades would be needed. Also, it is assumed for this alternative 

that minimal equipment repairs and upgrades would be necessary. 

22 F.1.3.1.2 221-U Facility Modifications. Limited modifications to the 221-U Facility are 

23 

24 

necessary to accomplish equipment removal and decontamination operations. Facility 

modifications would primarily involve disconnecting and blanking utility and electrical lines 

25 where they are no longer required and installing temporary utilities that would be required to 

26 support planned operations. The change room at the northeast end of the operating gallery would 


28 

29 

30 

and drain lines for the change room facility could be tied into the active systems in the 

271-U Office Building. 


32 

33 

portable ventilation requirements and selected decontamination equipment, such as air 

compressors for pneumatic tools and temporary greenhouse structures. In addition, 480-volt 

34 electrical service would be installed to support waste processing and 

35 

36 

decontamination/disassembly operations. 

37 F.13.13 Add New Air Handler. Installation of a new air-handling unit on the roof of 221-U 

38 would be a major modification that may ormay not be required based an further analysis of tasks 

39 

40 

41 

42 

and seauencine of events that will be done during design. If needcd.wed}d eceof. -;The unit 

would be located on the northeast end of the building and require penetrations through the roof 

for air duct connections. 

(^'43 F.13.1.4 Grout Cell Drain Header and Vent Tunnel. The cell drain headcr would be filled 

44 with cement grout during the building preparation phase once the new air handler was installed 

45 and operational. Grouting would fill the 0.6-m (24-in.)-diameter void space and encapsulate any 

Final Feasibiliy Studyjor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

Luns1-M? F-9

Appendix F -Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOEAR1,2001-11 

I Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. p l Draft 0 

Rcdlinc/Slrikcout 

I contamination present in the pipe. After the connecting pipes to cell 10 are sealed, grout would be 

2 pumped in from both ends of the cell drain header. Because the cell drain header flows 

3 downward from the building ends toward cell 10, a liquid-consistency grout would flow through 

4 the header and require very little pumping pressure. Drainage openings in each process cell 

5 would act as air vents, and the pressure would be regulated so that the grout would be visible in 

6 the process cell drains, but would not rise in the cells. After this operation, any liquid within the 

7 canyon would not automatically flow to cell 10. 

9 Waste placement is not planned for the ventilation tunnel due to limited accessibility of this area. 

10 Therefore, the ventilation tunnel would be grouted to eliminate voids in the building structure. 

I 1 Holes would be angle drilled through to canyon's exterior wall to allow access to the ventilation 

12 tunnel for grouting. Free-flowing grout would be pumped through these holes to 6ll the 

13 ventilation tunnel. The grouting would be completed in lifts to allow time for heat dissipation 

14 during grout curing. The tunnel is planned to be filled with grout to the maximum extent 

15 possible. It is estimated that the ventilation tunnel would require approximately 2,300 m3 

16 (3,000 ydP) of grout. During final design, the decision to fill the tunnel should be revisited. 

17 Preliminary structural calculations (Smyth 2001) show that the exterior wall of the tunnel may 

18 have sufficient strength to withstand later external pressures from fill heights associated with 

19 burying the canyon building and, therefore, not require grouting. 

20 

('_^'21 Facility modification would also involve removing and disposing of interfering structures, 

22 equipment, and material. During this phase of the work scopc, equipment and material removal 



25 

26 • Installed and fixed equipment 





31 

32 These Items would be sorted for reusc, recycle, or disposal. 

33 

34 F.13.2 Disposal or Contaminated Equipment In 221-U. It is estimated that there+sare 

35 approximately 5,400 m3 (7,000 yd3) of contaminated equipment and components (gross loose 

36 volume before size reduction) currently steredon the canyon deck and in the process cells. For 

37 Alternative 3, those process cells with legacy equipment having dose rates >100 mrem/hr would 

38 be opened only to place size-reduced legacy equipment from the operating deck and erout into 

39 them. All of the equipment would be reduced in size and volume and then disposed into the 

40 process cells meeting the dose rate criteria (except for cell 3, which would be left unfilled for 

41 later equipment or waste placement). Size and volume reduction would be necessary so that all 

/-^42 of the contaminated equipment would fit into the process cells. Minimizing the amount of size 

1 43 and volume reduction to just the effort required to allow the contaminated equipment to fit into 

44 the process cells would be desirable because it would limit worker exposure. After size - 

F(nal^Feas(6tfity 

Study jor the Canyon Ditposition hdtiatlve (22l •U Facifity) 

Ju n e 

F-10

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOE/Rfr2001-11 

Entombment with Interttal Waste Disposal Rev. A I nraft B 

RedlinclSerikeout 

1 I reduction, the estimated volume of equipment from the eanyen-eperating-deek canvon deck and 

2 

3 

in the process cells is 3,400 m^ (4,400 yd). 

4 Size and volume reduction would require a disposition plan for each equipment item. If breaking 

5 

6 

or cutting activities are necessary for disposing of the equipment, the 221-U Canyon Building 

would be the best location to do these activities because it is a closed facility for controlling 

7 contamination spread. The most significant contribution to worker exposure under Alternative 3 

8 ^ would be the size reduction of the contaminated legacy equipment that is currently ster+ed on the 

9 operating deck. Estimated worker dose for these activities alone is nearly 36 pcrson-rem (BHI 

10 

11 

2001a). If all of the legacy equipment on the operating deck is substantially reduced in size and 

volume for placement into the process cells, significant worker time and resulting higher 

12 exposures would occur. This activity, even with latest technologies available, would be 

13 performed in personal protective equipment-required work areas (i.e., contaminated areas and 

14 airbome areas). Significant engineeting controls would be required to reduce worker exposure 

15 from external and internal exposure sources. Worker turnover could increase due to harsher 

16 

17 

working conditions. 

18 During final dcsign, it is anticipated that emerging size and volume reduction technologies would 

19 

r^0 

1 

be evaluated for use. For this final FS, use of conventional size and volume reduction 

technologies is assumed. Disassembly activities would include mechanical cutting, hydraulic 

shearing, and manual methods. Additional technologies that could be applied are described in 

22 

23 

Appendix I. 

24 After the equipment is placed into the process cells, each cell would be coated with a fixative for 

25 control of loose surface contamination. Cement grout would be placed in lifts into each cell to 

26 fill voids. Each lift would be allowed to cure before placing additional lifts. As each process 

27 cell is filled, the cover blocks would be placed back into position. The volume of void space to 

28 

29 

30 

be filled within the process cells is conservatively estimated as 50% of total cell volume. 

Therefore, the grout volume needed to fill the process cells Is 3,400 m3 (4,400 yd1). 

31 

32 

33 

34 

After the process cell cover blocks are in place, holes would be drilled through the covers and 

any voids under and around the edges of the blocks would be filled by pressure grouting. The 

cover lifting bails would be removed after pressure grouting is complete. 

35 All equipment and materials inside the operating gallery must be removed to support placement 

36 of containerized waste into this gallery. There is a substantial amount of piping in this gallery 

37 that requires removal. Conversely, very little equipment and piping would need to be removed 

38 

39 

to pteparc the pipe and electrical galleries ready for waste container placement. 

40 Some removed equipment could be identificd as reusable. Unneeded material from the gallery 

41 

42 

would be size reduced and placed in ERDF boxes for disposal at ERDF. It could be desirable to 

containerize some of this material for placement in the electrical gallery. This approach could be 

(0-^13 used as a test run of the procedure for placing waste in these galleries. However, for the cost 

44 

45 

estimate, all waste from the gallery is assumed to be disposed at ERDF. 

Final Ftasibiliry Srndyjor the Canyon Disposition fnifiarive (221-t/ Faciliry) 

n7uc_^ Qo^ F-il

(O^N 

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DoFaRS.-2001-11 

I Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. Ni prr 

Redlinc/Sirikeout 

1 F.1.33 Demolition of Railroad Tunnel. To leave the tunnel in place would mean an 

2 unnecessary increase in the size of the environmcntal cap. This alternative includes removal of 

3 the railroad tunnel. The contaminated concrete would be disposed at ERDF. 

4 

5 The tunnel, which allowed train access into cell 3, extends 46 m(150 ft) westward from the 

6 northwest side of the canyon building. The tunnel is a reinforced concrete structure with a soil 

7 cover about 1.5 m(5 ft) thick. There are unreinforced wing-wall retaining structures at the end 

8 of the tunnel. The tunnel is assumed to have light surface contamination that can be fixed in 

9 place with fixative application. It is assumed that a backhoc with a processor would be used for 

10 demolition. 

11 

12 Demolition of the railroad tunnel would allow truck access to cell 3 without safety hazards 

13 associated with backing down the long, narrow railroad tunnel. Also, part of the railroad tunnel 

14 work would be construction of a truck door at the tunnel's connection to 221-U (cel) 3). This 

15 door would allow access to the building without disrupting ventilation of the canyon. 

16 

17 The new access door to cell 3 at the tunnel would allow placement of containerized and possibly 

18 long-length waste. After cell 3 is full of waste, it would be filled with cement grout and the 

19 cover blocks would be permanently replaced. I.ike the other process cells, the cover blocks 

20 would be drilled and pressure grouted in place, and the baits would be removed. 

i^21 

22 F.13A Hot Pipe Trench. The hot pipe trench is assumed to be contaminated. A review of 

23 historical photographs of the trench indicates that the trench contains intertwined, small-diameter 

24 piping. Waste placement is not planned for the hot pipe trench due to limited available space. 

25 Instead, the trench will be filled with grout to eliminate voids in the building structure. The 

26 initial preparation step for grouting the trench would be coating the interior surfaces with a 

27 fixative to contain surface contamination. After the coating is cured, the hot pipe trench would 

28 be grouted. Due to the maze of piping, it is assumed that no contaminated equipment or waste 

29 would be disposed to the hot pipe trench. The interior volume of the pipes encased by the grout 

30 is very small and, therefore, assumcd to have no effect on the stability of 221-U. The volume of 

31 grout needed to fili the trench, 800 m3 ( 1,100 yd3), is estimated as 75% of its overall volume. 

32 The trench cover blocks would then be permanently replaced. The cover blocks would be 

33 pressure grouted as described for the process cell cover blocks. After grouting, the bails would 

34 be removed from the hot pipe trench cover blocks. 

35 

36 F.13.5 Remove Surface Contamination. To safely enter the building during its operational 

37 phase in this alternative, contamination survey results would be used to identify where 


39 canyon surface to reduce the dose rate and contamination risk to the lowest possible level. Water 

40 jet, water blasting, or water-flushing activities would be more difficult if completed after the 

41 process cell drain header and cells are grouted because all water would need to be collected and 

42 taken to the 200 Area's laquid Effluent Remediation Facility for trwtment. If any surface 

("^43 removal work is identified, carbon dioxide blasting or scarifying would be the preferred method 

44 for its removal instead of water blasting or flushing. 

Fina1 Ftasibitiry Srudyjor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

,,,e+ ^ F-12

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOEIRl-2001-11 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. e l nraft B 

I 

Redlinc/Strikcoul 

1 

2 F.13.6 Fix Contamination on 221-U Interior Surfaces. After the cover blocks are placed and 

3 grouted on the process cells and hot pipe trench, the existing main bridge crane is no longer 

4 needed. Use of the crane for movement of the containerized waste would be a potential source 

5 of contamination. Therefore, both crancs would be parked at the north end of 221-U, their oil 

6 would be drained, and the power source disconnected. 

7 

8 It is assumed that surface contamination on the canyon walls, floors, and ceiling can be 

9 addressed with application of a fixative. This fixative would be applied after all equipment 

10 removal (including the bridge crane) and grouting in the canyon is complete. It would provide 

11 containment for loosc surface contamination during containerized waste placement within the 

12 ^ canyon. Prior to beginning container placement on the Willing anyon deck , the 

13 fixative application would be inspected. 

14 

15 F.1.4 Modify External Area 

16 

17 The following modifications would be performed to support placement of waste inside 221-U. 

18 Before waste placement begins within 221-U, the aboveground structures that are physically 

19 attached to 221-U and those that are located within the footprint of the environmental cap must 

20 be removed. In addition, prior remediation (by others) of waste sites within the footprint of the 

(0'**21 environmental cap would be verified. 

22 

23 The Alternative 3 approach conservatively assumes that all demolition debris from the legacy 

24 structures would be disposed at ERDF. During final design this assumption could be revisited to 

25 determine if decontaminating and recycling steps can be economically included to support DOE 

26 waste minimization goals. 

27 

28 F.1.4.1 Disposition of Aboveground Structures. The aboveground structures identified in 

29 Assumption 2 at the beginning of this appendix would be demolished as part of Alternative 3. 

30 

31 F.1A.1.1 Demolition of the 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility. The 276-U Solvent Recovery 

32 Facility, attached to the southwest end of the 221-U Facility, Is composed of walkways, tanks, 


34 the tanks, walkways, and all aboveground piping. All pipe penetrations associated with this 

35 structure would be cut, sealed, and capped. Drains would be sealed with concrete. Concrete 

36 surfaces would be decontaminated, if required, using selected off-the-shelf technologies. 

37 

38 The concrete slabs and wall would be demolished with conventional demolition equipment. 

39 Demolition debris would be taken to ERDF for final disposal. An option during final design 

40 would be to place some of the equipment either in cell 3 or into containers placed into the 

41 galleries. 

42 

r^43 F.lA.1.2 Demolition of the 271-U Office Building. The 271-U Office Building would be 

44 demolished in Alternative 3. The 271-U Office Building has a basement, three floors, and a 

Final Feasibiliry Study for Hie Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Faciliry) 

june :00 F-13

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOFJ[u.2001-11 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. A t Draft B 


1 reinforced concrete slab roof. There is a concrete masonry perimeter wall supported on a 

2 basement wall, with interior masonry walls within the building. The roof is a reinforced concrete 

3 slab similar to tbe floors. The third floor is a chemical makeup area with floor slabs up to 0.3 m 

4 (1 ft) thick that support chemical tanks. 

5 

6 Additional building features included in the demoiition are a stack on the roof (296-U-10). an 

7 elevator, a second floor vault, and mechanical equipment in the basement. Demolition would 

8 use typical building demolition techniques. The resulting rubble would be left in place alongside 

9 221-U and the area filled and compacted as pan of the clean fill around the canyon. 

10 

11 F.lA.1.3 Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) Stairways on 221-U Building. 

12 Eight stairwells on the northwest side of 221-U are light construction and would be demolished 

13 using typical building demolition techniques. Ten stairwells on the southeast side of 221-U are 

14 thick wall, lightly reinforced concrete construction. The heavier construction of these stairwells 

15 would be factored into the demolition costs. Any contamination found in the stairwells on the 

16 canyon's southeast side would be fixed in place prior to demolition. All stairwell demolition 

17 waste would be disposed adjacent to 221-U where it would be protected from infiltration by the 

18 environmental barrier. 

19 

20 F.lA.1.4 D&D Other Aboveground Structures. All other aboveground structures identified 

^21 in Assumption 2 at the beginning of this appendix that are within the footprint of the 221-U 

22 environmental cap would be decommissioned as part of Alternative 3 activities. 

23 

24 F.lA.2 D&D of Buried Piping. Buried piping not already addressed in the preparation of the 

25 complex function would be arouted in place or removed prior to the placement of engineered fill 

26 around 221-U,pased on the outcome of risk assessment work . In addition to the miscellaneous 

27 piping to be removed, the exhaust ventilation tunnel would be removed. This tunnel is a 

28 reinforced tunnel connecting the canyon air ventilation tunnel to the stack and filter. The tunnel 

29 is approximately 60 in long and runs from the end of the air tunnel in Section 3 to the fans. 

30 

31 F.1A.3 Confirm Remediated Waste Sites Within Environmental Cap Footprint. 

32 Alternative 3 includes covering 221-U with an environmental cap. It Is assumed that the waste 

33 sites located within the environmental cap, as identified in Assumption 3 at the beginning of this 

34 appendix, would be remediated by other projects prior to the start of Alternative 3 and 

35 construction of the environmental cap. All remediation wastes would be disposed at ERDF. 

36 

37 F.1.4.4 Confirm Well Decommissioning. Three wells are located within the footprint of the 

38 environmental cap. It is assumed that these wells would be decommissioned by other projects 

39 prior to the start of Alternative 3. The wells are 299-W 19-8, 299-W 19-55, and 299-W19-98. 

40 Their prior removal would be confirmed as part of Alternative 3. 

41 

t^` 

Fieaf Feasibility Studyfar the Canyon Disposition Initictive (2I )-U Facility) 

, 2 00 1 F-14

Appendix F-Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOFJRL-2001-I I 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. e rafi B 

^,, Rcdlinc/5trikeout 

I 

2 

3 

4 

F.1.4.S Earthwork to Prepare Working Area Adjacent to 221-U. Following removal of 

aboveground structures and associated buried piping, the area surrounding 221-U would be 

leveled and compacted in preparation for placement of the engineered fill. The subgradc 

compaction and fill placement are the first steps for construction of the environmental cap. 

5 

6 R1.5 Manage Hazardous Materials 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 ^ 

Dangerous waste, asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls, and other hazardous materials would be 

removed from all areas of the complex and managed in accordance with ARARs. AII waste 

faeterraiswaste would be sampled, tested, and designated as required by ARARs. and treated 

prior to disposal. Products consisting of or containing hazardous materials would be used and 

managed in accordance with their respective Material Safety Data Sheets. WssiefngetielsWaste 

13 

14 

would be treated as required. 



17 

18 

accountability, inventory, labeling, and transportation of waste to approved disposal facilities. 

19 

20 F.2 OPERATE THE COMPLEX 

^Zl 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

Operation of the complex for Alternative 3 refers specifically to waste acceptance and placement 

inside the three galleries and on the eanyon , deekggny2n deck of 221-U. Engineered 

fill would be installed around the exterior of 221-U as waste is placed inside it. 

In the preceding function, the area surrounding 221-U would have been prepared to support 

construction of the environmental cap, all equipment that would interfere with placement of 

containerized waste would have been placed in the process cells or removed, and exposed 

surfaces inside the canyon would have been decontaminated or a fixative applied. The roofing 

on 221-U would also be replaced to minimize the potential for precipitation entering the building 

during the operational phase of this alternative. The steps to operate the complex are discussed 

below. 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

The volume of waste placed inside the 221-U Building in Alternative 3 is estimated as 13.500 m3 

(17,500 yd3). This includes 3,400 m3 (4,400 yd) of legacy equipment placed inside theprocess 

ceils,1,500 m3 (2,000 yd) of waste inside containers in the three galleries, and 8,600 m 

(11,200 yd3) of waste placed on the operating deck and craneway. An estimated 51.200 m3 

(67,000Aof grout would be used in this alternative to surround the waste and fill voids in the 

process cells, hot pipe trench, galleries, canyon deck/craneway, and the building's ventilation 

tunnel. 

41 

42 

(0,N3 

44 

In the Phase I FS, consideration had been given to reserving the process cells only for disposal of 

Class C wastes at 221-U because of the high degree of isolation and shielding provided by the 

process cells. However, i n this final FS, there is a need to clear the operating deck to support 

Final Feasibility Studyfor the Cwqon Disposition lnitiative (221 •U Facility) 

)ine200 

F-15

Appendix E- Detailed Description of Alternative 3: Do1JR1:2o0t-t 1 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. e1_pmrL 


I building demolition. The removal and disposal of legacy equipment to the process cells would 

2 be the most efficient means of achieving this objective. Moreover, while the process cells would 

3 

4 

provide a significant amount of isolation in 221-U as it is currently configured, after closure 

activities for Alternative 3, all parts of the 221-U Facility containing waste fill, regardless of the 

5 

6 

7 

class of waste within, would be equally protected (contained) by an engineered barrier. 

Therefore, from the standpoint of long-term protectiveness, there is no advantage in reserving the 

process cells exclusively for Class C waste. However, cell 3 could have room for placement of 

8 

9 

waste-meterialswaste in addition to legacy waste from the canyon fleor ec c. 

10 

11 

F.11 Emplace Waste In 221-U Galleries 

12 Waste placement would start with container placement in the galleries. The waste would be in 

13 open-top cargo containers that would be placed on an individual steel frame with casters. Small 

14 rails would be installed on the gallery walls to guide the containers on a one-way trip into the 

15 galleries. Equipment and piping in the galleries that prevents container placement would be 

16 removed. After the waste containers are in place, each gallery would be grouted to provide 

17 support for the wastes and the environmental cap. 

1s 

19 Waste would be placed first in the lowest (electrical) gallery. In preparation, the south end wall 

-0 

.r \ 1 

22 

23 

24 

25 

of the gallery, located in the 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility, must be exposed. The concrete 

slab adjacent to the end wall would be cleared to allow vehicle access to the lowest gallery. 

A temporary structure would be erected so that containers could be prepared outside of the 

galleries. The concrete masonry unit block end wall must be removed and enlarged for waste 

container access. A new rollup door would be installed on this opening. The doorways from the 

271-U Office into the galleries could be left open to provide emergency egness, but would 

26 eventually be filled. A ventilation system for the galleries must remain functional during waste 

27 

28 

placement and grouting. 

29 F.2.1.1 F311 Electrical Gallery with Containerized Waste. Waste would arsive at the south 

30 end of the canyon by truck in cargo containers (see assumptions for description) and would be 

31 lifted onto dollies staged at the open gallery end. They would be pushed as far as possible into 

32 

33 

34 

35 

the gallery with an electric forklift and then secured in place to prevent movement during 

grouting. The total length of the electrical gallery is separated by the railroad tunnel in two 

segments. The main segment of the electrical gallery on the south side of the railroad tunnel is 

225 m (740 ft) in length. This gallery segment could hold approximately 37 containers. 

36 A spacing of 6 m (20 fi) on center for the 5-m ( 16-ft) containers was assumed to allow for dolly 

37 length and container placement. 

38 

39 

40 

41 

There is a short segment of the electrical gallery on the north side of the rail tunnel. This gallery 

segment is about 12 m(40 ft) long and could store, at most, one container. The best use of this 

space would be to place loose material that is too long or tall to be placed in a container. 

42 A possible use for this space would be disposal of material from demolition of the 276-U Solvent 

('13 Storage Facility. After waste placement, this short segment would be closed off with forms and 

44 grouted from the pipe gallery level. 

Final Feasibility Srwty for the Cartyvrr Disposlrioa lniriative (221 •U Faclfiry) 

lone'!0oJ F-16

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DoFIRI.-2o01-11 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev.a l nraft n 

^ I 


1 

2 F.2.1.2 Grout Electrical Gallery. To encase the waste and provide support for waste 

3 containers to be placed in the pipe gallery above, the electrical gallery would be grouted. 

4 Cement grout would be placed into the containers through a hole in the slab above and centered 

5 on the container. The flowable grout to surround the containers would be placed after the 

6 containers are partially filled with grout. Flowable cement grout could be obtained with a 

7 strength of 14 kg/cmZ (2001b/in2). This could be pumped under low pressure, just sufficient to 

8 positively fill voids and prevent shrinkage, and would provide the necessary support to the 

9 second floor. Grout amendments, such as fly ash or zeolite clays, would be considered for all 

10 grouting activities to reduce potential for leaching of radioactive isotopes. Grouting each 

11 container as the galleries are filled would have the advantage of providing radiological shielding 

12 for subsequent container placement. 

13 

14 Grouting around the containers would be alternated with grout placement inside the containers. 

15 Grouting would be done in lifts to maintain loading on the gallery walls to an acceptable level. 

16 Additional benefits of grouting in lifts are that the cargo containers would not float and the heat 

17 of hydration would occur over a longer time. By limiting the grout lifts to half the gallery wall 

18 height and waiting for the grout to reach adequate strength, the grouting could occur without 

19 backfill in place on the wall's exterior. Grout placed around the containers would be delivered 

20 into the gallery through existing rectangular openings at the edge of the floor slabs. As the grout 

r'21 reaches its required design strength, the engineered fill would be placed against the gallery wall 

22 on the exterior of 221-U. This approach would be typical for all three galleries. 

23 

24 F.2.1.3 Filt Pipe Gallery with Containerized Waste. The second gallery level to be filled with 

25 waste would be the pipe gallery. It is also divided into two segments by the railroad tunnel. The 

26 main segment is approximately 225 m (740 ft) long. An estimated 37 waste containers would be 

27 placed in this gallery in the same manner as described for the electrical gallery. An earth-fill 

28 access ramp would be constructed and the end wall of the gallery would be removed. The 

29 temporary cover and rollup door used for the lower level gallery would be relocated. 

30 

31 F.2.1.4 Grout Pipe Gallery. The pipe gallery would be grouted in the same manner as the 

32 electrical gallery. Grout would be placed in the containers and around the containers in lifts. 

33 The grout would be placed from the operating gallery level. 

34 

35 F.2.IS Fill Operating Gallery. The uppermost gallery, the operating gallery, has more room 

36 available for container placement than the electrical or pipe galleries because its length is not 

37 affected by the railroad tunnel. It is estimated that 40 containers would be placed in the 

38 operating gallery. To access this gallery, backfill and an access ramp would have to be enlarged 

39 at the south end of the gallery. 

40 

(^N 

Final Feasibility Study jor Nie Canyon Disposition lnitiasive (221-U Facility) 

n •l 1 F-17

..^•. , 

Appendix F- Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DoE/itt.2001-1 t 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. e a nr•aft B 

iicdlinc/Strikcout 

1 F.2.1.6 Grout the Operating Gallery. The concrete slab above this gallery is much thicker 

2 than the slab on top of the other two galleries, and a different method for grout placement would 

3 be used. Like the ventilation tunnel grouting, angled holes would be drilled through the gallery 

4 wall to grout the operating gallery. These holes would be sized and located to allow grouting 

5 both inside and around the waste-filled containers. 

7 F.2.2 Accept Waste for Placement Within Canyon 

8 

9 At the same time that the galleries are filling, waste placement would begin on the eenyee 

10 epertaEingdeek canyon deck . The waste would be placed on the deck in four separate layers. 

I 1 Each layer would be grouted as it is placed, and the waste placement would be completed for the 

12 entire canyon length by layer prior to starting the next waste layer. Layers of waste would be 

13 separated from each other by an approximately 0.75-m (2.5dt)-thick lift of grout. The grout 

14 layer provides important shielding to limit operation staff exposure to radiation from the wastes 

15 in the layers below. Grout amendments, such as fly ash or zeolite clays, would be considered for 

16 the grout to reduce potential for leaching of radioactive isotopes. A summary of steps involved 

17 for this part of Alternative 3 follows. 

18 

19 F.2.2.1 Modify Canyon End Walls. In preparation for waste placement in the canyon, the end 

20 walls of the building must be modified. A gridwork of steel beams would be installed on both 

(0**'21 the northeast and southwest end walls. This grid would be designed to resist seismic forces and 

22 loads applied during the complex's operation period. For the southwest end wall, the 

23 modification would include saw cutting an opening in the concrete wall. This opening would be 

24 sized to accept the waste containers moved by a forklift. The opening would be covered with a 

25 rollup door. The wall's steel beam gridwork would be designed to allow the rollup door to be 

26 moved upwards level by level as the waste is placed within the canyon. The gridwork would be 

27 anchored to the roof slab and surrounding reinforced walls. Through-bolting would connect the 

28 gridwork to the unreinforced concrete end wall. 

29 

30 F.2.2.2 Fill Ganyon Canvon deck and Craneway with Waste. The eanyex 

31 an n deck would be filled with a total of four layers of waste containers. The 

32 first three layers would hold a estimated 160 cargo containers each, for a total of 480 containers. 

33 The container placement would start at the northeast end of the canyon and advance towards the 

34 southwest end. Each layer would be completed prior to placement beginning on the next layer 

35 up. This approach would ensure that there would not be a large differential in loading of 

36 adjacent building sections. 

37 

38 Containers would be grouted both inside the container and around their exterior. It is envisioned 

39 that grouting would occur roughly every 12 m (40 ft) of building length. Containers would be 

40 placed using a forklift with adequate shielding to limit operator exposure to an acceptable level. 

41 The containers would be placed two abreast across the canyon deck width. In this manner, the 

42 forklift could place the containers without making a 90-degree turn, which would be difficult in 

i^43 the limited width of the canyon deck. 

44 

Final Feasibility Studyjor the Canyon Dispoiition lnitiqfive (221-U Facility) 

un ?003 F-18

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DoEIRt.2001-11 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. et ra 

Redline/Strileout 

I As part of the grouting effort, a 0.75-m (2.5-ft)-thick layer of grout would be placed on top of the 

2 filled containers. This layer would act as both shielding and a working surface for the next layer 

3 of containers. Grout amendments, such as fly ash or zeolite clays, would be considered for the 

4 grout to reduce potential for leaching of radioactive isotopes. In the final design, a reinforced 

5 concrete stab could be installed as the top section of the grout layer. The concrete slab would 

6 provide a smoother surface for operation of the forklifts during waste placement of the next 

7 layer. The grout, or possibly reinforced concrete slab, would be designed for the wheel loads of 

8 the forklift. 

10 The next waste placement would be inside the craneway. An opening in the southwest end wall 

11 would be cut to provide access to the craneway. Guide rails would be installed and cargo 

12 containers delivered into the craneway similar to waste placement in the galleries. 

13 Approximately 39 containers could be placed in the craneway. The containers would be grouted 

14 inside and out as was done in the galleries. 

15 

16 After placing, grouting, and pouring the topping grout or concrete layer on the third layer of 

17 cargo containers, the height from the grout layer to the underside of the canyon roof would be 

18 approximately 2 in. This would be too short to allow placement of cargo containers. Rather than 

19 fill this large void with grout, placement of waste-filled burial boxes (1.2 m by 1.2 m by 2.4 m 

r,20 long [4 ft by 4 ft by 8 ft]) would be performed. For this final FS, it is assumed that 960 boxes of 

(.> 1 this size could be placed into a fourth and final layer of waste within the canyon. With tighter 

22 packing, the number of boxes placed could be increased to 1,500. Void spaces on the interior of 

23 the boxes would be filled with grout prior to placement. As a final step in placement of waste 

24 inside the canyon, holes would be drilled through the canyon roof. Flowable grout would be 

25 delivered into the canyon through these holes to fill around the boxes. Pressure grouting would 

26 be used to fill voids not reached by previous grouting. 

27 

28 Upon completion of waste placement within 221-U, available space within the facility would be 

29 filled with waste and/or grout. The containment provided by the grouting the waste inside 

30 openings in the canyon would eliminate a111arge voids. These steps would stabilize 221-U and 

31 ready it for placement of the environmental cap. 

32 

33 F.2.2.3 Install Engineered Fill. As the canyon is filled with waste, engineered fill would be 

34 compacted in lifts around the exterior of 221-U. The engineered fill elevation would be 

35 maintained within a few meters of the same level as the grouted wastes within 221-U. This 

36 would prevent an excessive load across the canyon walls, including the end walls. The 

37 engineered fill would also provide an access ramp to the south end of 221-U for container 

38 delivery. 

39 

40 The engineered fill would be clean, compacted granular material, which would be placed in lifts. 

41 Its source is assumed to be a Hanford Site borrow pit within 24 km (15 mi) of the 221-U Facility. 

42 The actual source location has not been identified. The volume of engineered fill for 

^33 Alternative 3 is approximately 1,169,700 m3 (1,529,869 yd'). The extent of the engineered fill 

44 and environmental cap is shown in Figure F-1. 

45 

Final Feasibility Stndy/6rthe Canyon Di.ryrosltion Inftrative (221 •U Facility) 

n,e 200-1 

F- 19

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOFAt1.20o1-1 t 

I Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev.A ran 

^ Rcdline/Sirikenut 

1 The fill would be compacted to a density in the range of 95% to 98% relative compaction where 

2 relative compaction is determined by standard proctor (ASTM D698). Final design of the 

3 engineered fill would determine the compaction requirements and the material specifications. 

4 

5 

6 F3 CLOSE THE COMPLEX 

7 

8 This function consists of completing construction of the environmental cap over 221-U and 

9 demolition debris that was placed immediately adjacent to it. It would also involve restoring the 

10 disturbed sites (access roads and equipment staging areas) to a grade consistent with the natural 

11 surface topography. Closure of the complex for Alternative 3 would also require institutional 

12 controls and maintenance of a monitoring system. Institutional controls could consist of both 

13 physical and legal barriers to prevent access to contaminants. A closeout report would be 

14 prepared for regulatory agency approval. 

15 

16 F3.1 Construct Environmental Cap 

17 

18 The environmental cap for Alternative 3 consists of three parts: engineered fill, engineered 

19 barrier, and erosion protection (see Figure F-2). As discussed above, the engineered fill would 

20 be placed during the operational function concurrent with waste placement inside of 221-U. 

^21 When operational activities are complete, the engineered barrier and the erosion protection layer 

22 would be constructed. This section discusses the completion of the environmental cap and 

23 provides the results of analyses performed on stability of environmental cap. 1'he footprint of the 

24 environmental can may be slightly modified to mnvidc containment for nearby CERCLA 

25 remediation sites. The specific l a3mut wifl be nrovided in the rcmcdial desien document. 

26 

27 F3.1.1 Construct Engineered Barrier. The engineered barrier would be designed to prevent 

28 unintentional human and biotic intrusion, minimize potential human and biotic exposures, and 

29 control potential contaminant migration by preventing water infiltration into the waste 

30 fnaterielswaste (221-U and demolition debris). The barrier thickness would be 5 m minimum. 

31 which meets the requirement for protection against inadvertent intruders. 

32 

33 The barrier would be a modified RCRA Subtitle C-compliant barrier design to providc protection 

34 against water infiltration and biotic intrusion for 500 years. The barrier would be vegetated to 

35 control soil erosion and promote moisture evapotranspiration . A moisture measurine system or a 

36 detection method to monitor for contaminalion movement 

37 mav be installed- ui d in the barrier to monitor soil moisture and 

38 verify that water is not infiltrating through the barrier into the waste. For the purposes of this 

39 final FS, it is assumed that the engineered barrier would be replaced one time at the end of its 

40 500-year design life. The result is that 221-U would have containment for at least 1,000 years. 

41 

42 The barrier consists of a loosely placed silt/pea gravel layer, which is a storage medium for soil 

/0^'43 moisture. It supports evapotranspiration and vegetation growth. This layer is underlain by a 

44 compacted layer of silt. The compacted silt greatly reduces hydraulic conductivity and therefore 

Final Feasibility Studyfoi Nrt Canyon DisposUion lnh/ative (22/-U Facility) 

unc I l F-20

^ 

Appendix F- Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DoFJRt,-2001-11 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. p^fp 

Redlinc/S trik cou 

1 retards vertical moisture movement. At the bottom of the compacted silt, sand and gravel layers 

2 provide a capillary break in the barrier cross section. The capillary break causes moisture to be 

3 retained in the overlying compacted silt layer. The sand and gravel layers are sloped to the 

4 outside edge of the barrier to carry any water that migrates vertically through the silt horizontally 

5 to the outside edge of the barrier. The drain gravels/sand are placed on a 1-m (3.3-ft)-thick clay 

6 admixture layer. This layer provides a second bartier of low hydraulic conductivity. Below the ' 

7 admixture layer is compacted clean fill of adequate thickness to provide a total barrier depth of 

8 5 m(16 ft) over the waste, as required for an intruder barrier. 

9 

10 The total volume of material for the engineered barrier for Alternative 3 is estimated as 

11 135,000 mi (176,567 yd'). 

12 ^ 

13 

14 While not expected to be a significant concern, during final design of the engineered barrier, the 

15 potential for differential settlement at the interface between the fill directly on top of the waste- 

16 filled facility (221-U) and the fill adjacent to it should be evaluated fully. It is estimated that 

17 filling the canyon with waste could take several years. This extended period of engineered fill 

18 placement ( fill level must match the waste placement fill inside) around the 221-U Facility and 

19 the fact that the engineered fill would be constructed of locally available coarse granular material 

20 should allow for the majority of settlement of the fill prior to construction of the engineered 

(0'%1 barrier. Therefore, differential settlement at this interface is expected to be minimal. 

22 

23 F.3.1.2 Place Erosion Protection. The top of the engineered barrier would have a 2% slope. 

24 the top layer would be vegetated, and it would contain pea gravel. Therefore, after vegetation is 

25 established, concerns for erosion from precipitation and wind would be minimized. To reduce 

26 the volume of the engineered fill while prnviding stability during a seismic event, a 3:horizontal 

27 to l:vertical (H:V) side slope was selected for the engineered fill. This slope would also require 

28 placement of a basalt riprap-type layer for erosion protection. The erosion protection layer 

29 would include gravel and sand filter layers to carry the runoff safely to the outer toe of the 

30 environmental cap. The erosion protection slope would not be vegetated. The volume of the 

31 erosion protection is estimated as 140,700 m^ (184,003 yd^). 

32 

33 F3.13 Stability Analysis of Environmental Cap. A two-dimensional stability analysis 

34 (Appendix D) was completed for the environmental cap. The layout of the environmental cap at 

35 221-U is a unique application because of the height of the engineered barrier, which is nearly 

36 24 m(80 ft) above the surrounding grade. The controlling factor for the stability analysis was 

37 selection of a cap layout that would remain functional after enduring a design seismic event. 

38 Results from this analysis were key in determining the physical layout of the components of the 

39 cap for Alternative 3. 

40 

41 The analysis found that the engineered barrier slope must be as flat as possible to minimize the 

42 potential for earthquake-induced cap deformations from reaching the portion of the engineered 

(0-143 barrier that functions as a capillary break. Therefore, the engineered barrier is sloped at 2% and 

44 does not extend down the sides of the environmental cap. In addition, the barrier must extend 

45 out far enough from 221-U that a potential earthquake-induced crack (estimated to be 5 cm 

Final Feasibility Study jorthc Canyon Aispasition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

' 007 F-21

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DoEIRI.,2oo1-1 t 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. e Dr•e 

^ f Rcdlinc/Strikcout 

1 (2 in.] or less) resulting from movement in the 3:11 to I:V side slope of the environmental cap 

2 would be outside the waste area requiring infiltration protection from the engineered barrier. 

3 With Ihese layout parameters addressed, the environmental cap could provide the required 

4 containment during a 500-ycar life. During final design of the environmental cap, a finite 

5 element analysis method should be used to define the final cap layout dimensions and confirm 

6 that the engineered barrier components are propcrty sized for the design seismic event. 

7 Additional discussion of the barrier is provided in Section 4.0 of this final FS report. 

8 

9 F.3.2 Revegetate Site 

10 

11 The excavations from demolition activities would be backf lled with compacted clean soil and 

12 clean concrete rubble. Fill contours would match adjacent contours. Material for backfill would 

13 come from both stockpiled material and the borrow source. The borrow source is assumed to be 

14 within the Hanford Site, but has not yet been idcntified. 

15 



18 application of an approved native grass seed mixture. Existing roads damaged by the demolition 

19 would be roturned to their pre-project condition. 

20 

^31 F33 Cleanup Complex 

22 


24 materials. 

25 

26 1F3.4 Sustain Post-Closure 

27 

28 This alternative would require institutional controls and maintenance of a monitoring system. 

29 Institutional controls could consist of both physical and legal batriers to prevent access to 

30 contaminants. In addition, certain activities would need to be prohibited to verify protection of 

31 the groundwater and the Columbia River. Post-closun: care would consist of periodic 

32 inspections and maintenance to verify the success of the revegetation effort. 

33 

34 F3A.1 Establish Institutional Controls. Specific institutional controls associated with this 

35 alternative would be developed as the remedy is further dcfined in the remedial design report and 

36 implemented through an update to the Sitewide fRrtirutional Controls PlanjorHanjord CERCIA 

37 Response Actions (DOE-RL 2002). Generally, these activities would include physical and legal 

38 methods of controlling land use. Physical methods of controlling access to waste sites are signs, 

39 entry control, excavation permits, artificial or natural barriers, and active surveillance. Physical 

40 access controls would be designed to preclude unintentional trespassing and minimize wildlife 

41 access. Physical restrictions are effective in protecting human health by reducing the potential 

42 for contact with contaminated media and avoiding adverse environmental, worker safety, and 

(O'N33 community safety impacts that arise from the potential release of contaminants. They require 

44 ongoing monitoring and maintenance. Public notices and community relation efforts would 

Final Feeslbiliry Study for the Canyon DitpnrNion Inidmive (221-U Facility) 

ino :oo. F.u

:,. 

Appendix F -Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DoFnu^2001-I I 

I Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. A raft 1 ; 


1 supplement site surveillance efforts. The DOE, or subsequent land managets, could enforce 

2 land-use restrictions as long as risks were above unrestricted land-use levels. The DOE would 

3 continue to use fencing, eacavation permits, and the badging program to control access to the 

4 area for as long as it maintains control over the land. Signs would be maintained prohibiting 

5 public access. 

6 

7 Legal restrictions would include both administrative and real-property actions intended to reduce 


9 land, including groundwater use for drinking water or irrigation. Land-use restrictions and 

10 controls on real-property development are effective in providing a degree of human health 

11 protection by minimizing the potential for contact with contaminated media. Land-use 

12 restrictions will be put in place, as necessary, until such time as the federal government ceases 

13 ownership of the property. The DOE, or subsequent land managers, would enforce land-use 


15 

16 After cleanup, site land-use controls would be established through easements and covenants to 

17 prevent development. The DOE, or subsequent land managers, would enforce land-use 


19 

20 Groundwater-use restrictions would be required so that groundwater is not used as a drinking 

water source as long as contaminant concentrations are above federal and state drinking water • 

22 ( standards and WAC 173-340 IAFV^B groundwater protection standards. Irrigation would also 

23 need to be restricted on the footprint of the environmental cap. Well drilling, except for the 


25 prohibited until groundwatercleanup kvels comply with these drinking water standards. 

26 

27 F.3A.2 Maintain Monitoring System. A moisture measuring system or a detection method to 

28 monitor for contamination movement may be reauired to determine if the barrier is nerformine 

29 aa desiened The final desien of the environmental can will provide the specific details on 

30 engineered features to accomplish any perfomtance monitoring, 

31 

32 ' tI+ 

33 

34 d (e.g ., 

35 

36 

37 Long-term site-specific monitoring requirements for Alternative 3 would not be determined until 

38 post-ROD activities (e.g., during final design in preparation of the remedial design 

39 report/remedial action work plan). It is expected that long-term monitoring would occur over the 

40 1,000-year performance period and consist of either groundwater monitoring or vadose zone 

41 monitoring, but it is not expected that both monitoring efforts would be required at the 

42 221-U Facility. The specific monitoring system design and its requirements would be 

/~t3 established as part of the operations and maintenance plan for the 200 Area-widc groundwater 

44 operable unit remcdiation activities associated with the 200-UP-I Operable Unit. 

45 

Final Fnatibility Stardy farrhe Canya+ Disposition 6Jrialive (22I-U FaciJity/ 

J un e '100 

F-23

(^, 

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DO>JRL-2001-11 

I Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. el oraf 

Rcdiine/Strikcout 

1 Post-closure care would comply with the following functions as defined in Washington 

2 Administrative Code 173-303-665(6). The functions were selected as being representative of the 

3 

4 

post-closure requirements of other applicable regulations: 

5 

6 

• Limit access to the environmental cap 

7 • Maintain the integrity and effectiveness of the final cover (engineered barrier), including 

8 making repairs to the barrier, as necessary, to correct the effects of settling, subsidence, 

9 

10 

erosion, or other events 

11 • Maintain and monitor the groundwater monitoring systems 

12 

13 • Prevent runon and runoff from eroding or otherwise damaging the final cover (engineered 

14 

15 

barrier) 

16 • Protect and maintain surveyed benchmarks. 

17 

18 

19 

Post-closure care would consist mainly of periodic inspections to identify erosion or settling. 

Either of these items could lead to infiltration of the barrier. If settling is Identified, the resultant 

^.20 depressions would be filled and reseeded. The post-closure cost estimate includes a one-time 

/ 21 replacement of the engineered barrier after 500 years. 

22 

23 Monitoring of the barrier and the vadose zone or groundwater would be perfotmed over the 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1,000-year petformance period to verify the effectiveness of the waste placement activities and 

containment provided by the engineered barrier. Periodic sampling of monitoring stations would 

be performed followed by comprehensive laboratory analyses. 

29 FA REFERENCES 

30 

31 10 CFR 835, "Occupational Radiation Protection," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended. 

32 

33 

34 

64 FR 61615. 1999, "Hanford Comprehensive Land-Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement 

(HCP EIS), Hanford Site, Richland, Washington; Record of Decision (ROD)," Federal 

35 

Register, Vol. 64, No. 218, pg. 61615 (November 12). 

36 

37 BHI.1998, Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility Waste Acceptance Criteria, 

38 

39 

BI-11-00139, Rev. 3, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 

40 BHI, 2001a, Canyon Disposition Initiative: Preliminary AL11RA Bvaluation for Final Feasibility 

41 

42 

Study Alternatives 1. 3, 4, and 6 (CCN 089828 to G. M. MacFarlan, Bechtel Hanford, 

Inc., from J. C. Wiles and R. C. Free, Jr„ May 31), Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, 

('33 Washington. 

Final Feasibility Sardyjor the Canyon Dirposhion lnitiative (221 •U Faciliry) 

hinc 1003 

F-24

Appendix F-Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOErFtL-2001-11 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. o raf n 

^ RedlinelStrikcout 

1 

2 BHI, 2001b, Supplemental Waste Acceptance Criteria jor Bulk Shipments to the Environmental 

3 Restoration Disposal Facility, 0000X-DC-W0001, Rev. 2, Bcchtel Hanford, Inc., 


5 

6 DOE, 1999, Final Ilanjord Comprehensive Land Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement, 

7 DOElEIS-0222-F, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 

8 

9 DOE 0 5400.5, Radiation Protection ojthe Public and the Environment, U.S. Department of 

10 Energy. Washington, D.C. 

11 

12 DOE-RL, 2002, Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan jor Ilanjord CERCUI Response Actions, 

13 DOE/RLr2001-41, Rev. 0. Draft, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations 

14 Office, Richland, Washington. 

15 

16 DOE-RL. 2003. Focused Feasibility Study for the U Plant Closure Area Waste Sites. DOE/RL, 

17 2003-23. Rev, 0 Draft A. U.S. Department of Enerey. Richland Onerations Offlce. 

18 Richland. Washinston. 

19 

20 Resource Conservation and RecoveryAct oj1976, 42 U.S.C. 6901, et seq. 

(---N21 

22 Smyth, W. W., 2001, Structural Calculations Supporting the Final Feasibility Study jor the 

23 Canyon Disposition Initiative, 221-U Facility, HNF-8379, Fluor Hanford, Inc., Richland, 


25 

26 WAC 173-303, "Dangerous Waste Regulations," Washington Administrative Code, as amended. 

27 

28 WAC 173-340, "Model Toxics Control Act - Cleanup," Washington Adminisrrative Code, 


^ 

Final Feasibility Srudy jor the Canyon Disposition biiiiative (221-U Facility) 

rune2003 

F-25

(^N 

f ` 

Appendix F - Detailed Description or Alternative 3: floFIR1,2oo1-11 

I Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. P I DMft Is 


I Figure F-Z. Alternative 3: Plan View or Environmental Cap. 

2S4m 

86m 

ENGINEERED 

• . BARRIER 

_^ • 

. . 

•^ i. . 

E E a •. 

€ ENGINEERED 

FILL 

00,0 

•' ^ 

^. 

EROSION 

+ PROTECTION 

70 

40 

• . • 

i S :1 AO PE 

.. 

r(P . 

1 

• , • 

221-U BLDG. 

U.S DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CANYON DISPOSAL INITIATIVE 

DOE f1ElD Oii10E. RICNtAND FlNAL FFASIBtLITY STUDY 

NM60RD ENNRDNMElRAL RESiDRATIDN PROCRAM ALT. 3 - PLAN 

ALT-3J1CI.DM'0 

Fina! Ftasibility Study jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221d! Fatility) 

isne "3 F-2G

^ 

^ 

I 

Appendix F- Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOFJR[^2001-11 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. AI tt B 

Rcdlinc/Strikcnut 

1 Figure F-2. Alternative 3: Cross Section of Environmental Cap. 

^ v 

0 

e 

0 

tX 

E 

^ K 

V ?^ z O 

CO 

7 

WyZ 

Om^ 

in 

W fKV • a C 

E 

40 

°a: 

W 

^ 

^ O 

WsZ 

V 

Finaf Feasibility Studyjor the Canyon Disposition h0riarive (221-U Facility) 

m 1 003 F-27 

° 

t2 

Cn 

< 

3Q3 

I 

5 F

Appendix F-Detailerl Description of Alternative 3: DOFIu.-2001-11 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. a r f 

n Redline/strikeout 

t0,^\ 

(0,^N 

Final Feasibility Study jorthe Canyon Disposltion Initiative (221-U Facility) 

June 200 ; F-28

t 

'. 

APPENDIX F 

2 

3 

4 

5 

ATTACHMENT F1- FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 

6 F.1 PREPARE EXISTING COMPLEX 

7 F.1.1 Control hazards 


Rev. 0 1 Draft I3 

edlinr/Stril.cnut 

8 F.1.1.1 Establish hazards protection 

9 F.1.1.1.1 Control health and safety hazards 

10 R1.1.1.2 Control environmental hazards 

11 F.1.1.2 Manage hazardous materials 

12 F.I.1.2.1 Characterize hazardous materials 

13 R2.1.2.2 Decontaminate areas and systems 

14 F.1.1.2.3 Prepare hazardous materials for processing and disposition 

15 F.1.2 Establish Infrastructure 

16 F. 1.2.1 Modify existing infrastruture 

17 F.1.2.1.1 Water 

18 F.1.2.1.2 Sewer 

("'^19 F.12.13 Electrical 

20 17.1.2.1.4 HVAC 

21 F.1.2.1.5 Lighting 

22 F.1.2.1.6 Recertify bridge crane 

23 F.1.2.1.7 Install new roof system 

24 F.1.2.2 Establish support facilities 

25 F.1.2.2.1 Modifications to the existing building 

26 F.1.2.2.2 Install mobile office units 

27 F.1.2.3 Establish staging areas 

28 A1.2.3.1 Establish personnel staging areas (change rooms, operations, 


30 F.1.2.3.2 Establish equipment staging areas ( maintenance, repair, 

31 decontamination, packaging, waste receiving, haul vehicle 


33 F.1.3 Modify Facility 

34 F.13.1 Prepare facility for use 

35 R13.1.1 Inspect 271-U for its role during preparing the complex 

36 F.i.3.1.2 Identify 221-U building modifications, if any, required for its 

37 support during first phase of Alternative 3 

38 F.1.3.1.3 Add new air handier (roof mounted) with replaceable HEPA 

39 filters on 221-U to replace the ventilation tunnel 

(^N40 F.I.3.1.4 Grout cell drain header and ventilation tunnel 

41 F.13.2 Disposal of Contaminated Equipment in 221-U 

Final Feasibility Study for tlu Canyon Disposition Initiative (221 •U Facitity) 

J unc ^ j F-29

^`} 

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: noFIRL-2001-I1 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. A 1 Drafi ti 

I 


ATTACHMENT Fl - FUNCTIONAL HIERARCIIY 

1 F.1.3.2.1 Size and dismantle equipment from canyon floor 

2 F. 1.3.2.2 Place canyon eqmt into cells 

3 F.1.3.2.3 Fog cell/eqmt with fixative 

4 F.1.3.2.4 Grout cells and replace cover blocks 

5 F.132.5 Pressure grout cells once cover blocks in place 

6 F.1.3.2.6 Remove pipe from Operating Gallery to allow container 

7 placement. 

8 F.1.3.2.7 Remove the bails from the cc1l cover blocks 

9 F.1.3.3 D&D Railroad Tunnel 

10 F.I.3.3.1 Remove soil cover from rail tunnel 

1I F. 1.3.3.2 Fix contamination on tunnel interior 

12 F.1.3.3.3 Demolish rail tunnel. Clear demolition debris to allow truck 

13 access to Cell 3. 

14 F.13.3.4 Place containerized and other wastes into Cell 3 (rail tunnel) 

15 F.1.3.35 Construct concrete wall to close rail tunnel opening in canyon 

16 F.1.3.3.6 Grout Cell 3 solid with covers in place 

17 F.1.3.3.7 Place demolition debris into tunnel section (inner half) 

18 F.1.3.3.8 Fill voids if found in demolition debris w/ flowable grout 

19 F.1.3.4 Hot Pipe Trench 

20 F.1.3.4.1 Remove Cover blocks 

21 F.1.3.4.2 Fog trench/piping with fixative 

22 R1..3.4.3 Grout pipe trench full with pipes in place and replace cover 

23 blocks 

24 F.1.3.4.4 Pressure grout trench once cover blocks in place 

25 F.1.3.4.5 Remove the bails from the hot pipe trench cover blocks 

26 F.1.3.5 Remove Surface Contamination 

27 R.1.3.6 Fix contamination on 22I-U interior surfaces 

28 F.1.3.6.1 Building interior (canyon walls, floor & roof) 

29 F.I.3.6.2 Inspect and verify 

30 F.1.4 Modify external area 

31 F.1.4.1 Disposition external aboveground legacy structures and systems within 

32 the environmental cap footprint 

33 F.1.4.1.1 Disposition 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility 

34 F.1.4.1.2 Disposition 271-U office building 

35 F.1.4.1.3 Disposition Front and Rear Stairs for 221-U 

36 F.1.4.1.4 211-U Tank Fann and 211-UA Tank Farm 

37 F.1.4.1.5 Disposition 241-WR Vault'I7torium Storage 

38 F.1.4.1.6 Disposition 2714-U Warehouse 

r"^\39 F.1.4.1.7 Disposition 275-UR Chemical Storage Warehouse 

40 R1.4.1.8 Disposition 200-W-44 Sand Filter 

41 F.1.4.1.9 Disposition 291-U Process Unit Plant 

Final Feasibillry Study jor thc Canyon Disposition Initlative (221-U Fatility) 

J une 2 3 F-30

Appendix F - Detailed Descriptioqof Alternative 3: DOFIR1,2001-11 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. a aR 

Redlinc/Slrikeoul 

ATTACI3111ENT Fl -FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 

I F.1.4.1.10 Disposition 291-U Stack 

2 F.1.4.1.11 Disposition 222-U Office Lab 

3 F.1.4.1.12 Disposition 224-U Concentration Facility, U03 Plant 

4 F.1.4.1.13 Disposition 224-UA Calcination Facility 

5 F.1.4.1.14 Disposition 272-U Maintenance Shop 

6 F.1.4.1.15 Disposition 292-U Stack Monitoring Station 

7 F.1.4.1.16 Disposition 2715-UA Maintenance Shop 

8 F.1.42 Disposition buried piping which are located bcneath the proposed 

9 environmental cap 

10 F.1.4.2.1 Remove air tunnel outside 221-U 

11 F.1.4.2.2 Remove misc yard piping and encasements 

12 F.1.43 Confirm remediation of waste sites within environmental cap footprint 

13 F.1.4.3.1 216-U-4 Reverse Well 

14 F.1.4.3.2 216-U- 4A French Drain 

15 F.1.43.3 216-Ur4B French Drain 

16 F.1.4.3.4 216-U-5 Trench 

17 F.1.4.3.5 216-U-6 Trench 

('118 F.1.4.3.6 216-U-7 French Drain 

19 F.1.4.3.7 216-U-iSTrench 

20 F.1.4.3.8 224-U-HWSA 

21 F.1.4.3.9 241-UX-154 Diversion Box 

22 F.1.4.3.10 241-UX-302A Catch Tank 

23 F.1.4.3.11 2607-W-7 Septic Tank and Drain Field 

24 F.1.43.12 UPR 200-W-33 

25 F.l .4.3.13 UPR200-W-39 

26 F.1.4.3.14 UPR 200-W-55 

27 F.1.4.3.15 UPR 200-W-60 

28 F.1.43.16 UPR 200-W-78 

29 F.1.43.17 UPR200-W-101 

30 F.1.4.3.18 UPR 200-W-118 

31 F.1.4.3.19 UPR200-W-125 

32 F.1.4.3.20 UPR 200-W-138 

33 F.1.4.3.21 UPR 200-W-162 

34 F.1.4.4 Confirm that wells located within environmental cap have been 

35 decommissioned 

36 F.1.4.4.1 299-W 19-8 

37 F.1.4.4.2 299-W19-55 

38 F.1.4.4.3 299-W 19-98 

39 F.1.4.5 Earthwork to prepare working area adjacent to 221-U 

40 F. 1.4.5.1 Prepare area along northwest side 

41 F.1.4.5.2 Prepare area along southeast side 

Final Feasibility Stndyjor the Canyon Disparirron /nitiative (221 •U Facilrty} 

une ^ F-31

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DOFIItL-200t-11 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. o r^,,n B 

Redlinc/Strikenut 

1 F.1.5 "Manage Hazardous Wastes 

ATTACHMENT F1- FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 

2 F.1.5.1 Identify waste generated 

3 F. 1.5.2 Prepare inventory of waste shipped to ERDF and elsewhere 

4 

5 F.2 OPERATE EXISTING COMPLEX 

6 F.2.1 Emplace Waste in 221-U Galleries 

7 F.2.1.1 Fill Electrical Gallery with containerized waste and grout solid as waste is 

8 placed 

9 F.2.1.2 Grout Electrical Gallery through Pipe Gallery floor 

10 F.2.1.3 Fill Pipe Gallery with containerized waste and grout solid as waste is 

11 pladed. 

12 F.2.1.4 Grout Pipe Gallery through Operating Gallery floor 

13 F.2.13 Fill Operating Gallery with containerized waste and grout solid as waste 

14 is placed 

n15 F.2.1.6 Grout Operating Gallery through holes angle drilled through exterior wall 

16 F.2.2 Accept Waste for Placement within Canyon 

17 R.2.2.1 Modify Canyon End Walls 

18 A2.2.1.1 Reinforce end walls with installation of steel bcam grid 

19 F.2.2.1.2 Install moveable rollup door for access on southwest end wall 

20 F.2.2.2 Fill Canyon Operating Deck and Crane Way With Waste 

21 F.2.2.2.1 Place cargo containerized waste using forklift 

22 P.2.2.2.2 Grout insidc and on exterior of containers 

23 F.2.2.2.3 After layer of containers placed and grouted, pour topping slab 

24 of grout (shielding) and concrete slab (working surface) 

25 F.2.2.2.4 Begin placement of next layer of cargo containers (place 3 

26 layers total). Move rollup door in end wall up with each layer. 

27 F.2.2.2.5 Place waste containers in craneway 

28 F.2.2.2.6 Place waste in burial boxes for fourth and final layer 

29 F.2.2.2.7 Grout burial boxes inside and out similar to cargo boxes 

30 F.2.2.2.8 Drill access holes through roof for grouting last lift beneath 

31 roof slab. Drill additional holes for pressure grouting under the 

32 roof slab. 

33 P.2.2.3 Install Engineered Fill 

34 P.2.2.3.1 Compacted granular fill against 221-U exterior walls to closely 

35 follow elevation of waste placement inside canyon. 

r136 F.2.2.3.2 Complete engineered fill to dimensions ready for placement of 

37 engineered batrier and erosion protection. 

38 

Final Feasibility Stady jar the Canyon Di.rpo.rltlon Initlative (2I1-U Facility) 

J u nc 2 003 F-32

t^' 

Appendix F - Detailed Description of Alternative 3: DoEIRL-2001-11 

Entombment with Internal Waste Disposal Rev. pi Diuft 


ATTACHMENT Fl - FUNCTIONAL HIERARCIIY 

1 

2 F3 CLOSE THE COMPLEX 

3 F3.1 Construct Environmental Cap 

4 F.3.1.1 Construct engineered barrier 

5 F.3.1.2 Place erosion protection layer on 3:1 fill slopes 

6 P.3.1.3 Stability Analysis of Environmental Cap 

7 F3.2 Revegelate site 

8 P.3.2.1 Prepare all disturbed areas and engineered barrier for seeding 

9 P.3.2.2 Apply approved seed mix and soil fixative 

10 F33 Pick up and elean the complex 

11 P.3.3.1 Remove excess equipment and materials 

12 F.33.2 Conduct final walkdown 

13 F3A Sustain Post Closure 

14 K3.4.1 Establish institutional controls 

15 F3.4.1.1 Establish access restrictions 

16 F.3.4.1.2 Establish deed restrictions 

17 R3.4.1.3 Establish restrictions on use of the complex 

18 F.3.4.2 Maintain monitoring system 

19 F.3.4.2.1 Monitorgroundwater 

20 F.3.4.2.2 Monitor neutron probes below engineered barrier 

21 F.3.4.2.3 Periodically inspect barrier for erosion & settlement 

22 

Final Fearibiliry Smdyjor the Canyon Ditpotiulan Iniliarive (ZYI-U Facility) 

J unc +0(ri F-33

^ 

(10^' 

(^N 

DOF/RL-2001-11 

Rev. AjDjj ^ 3 

Rcdline/SUiKcout 

Final Feasibility Sradyjor fic Canyon Dfsposition Initiative (221•U Facility) 

]anc2003 F-34

^ 

DOFJRL-2001-I1 

^ Rev. I Draft I3 


rN 1 APPENDIX G 

2 


ENTOMBMENT WITH INTERNAL AND 

5 EXTERNAL WASTE DISPOSAL 

n 

Flnal Feaslbiltry Studyfor!he Canyon D'uparUion lnlllarlve (121 •U Facility) 

unc 1 3 G-i

^N 

r^ 1 

n 

DOF/RLr2061-1 l 

' Rev. I Drafl i3 


Final Feasibility Study for the Canyon Disposiiion Initiative (221-U Facility) 

me I(1()1 

Ci-il

1 

2 

3 

4 G 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

ni8 

(0,^,' 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

FIGURES 



Rev. I Draft.L 


DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE 4: ENTOMBMENT WITH 

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL WASTE DISPOSAL .................................:............G-1 

G.I PREPARE EXISTING COMPLEX ....................................................................G-4 

0.1.1 Control Hazards .................................................... _................................. G-5 

G.1.2 Establish Infrastructure ............................................................................G-7 

G.1.3 Modify Facility ..............................................................................._.......G-8 

G.1.4 Modify External Area ......... ........ .......................................................... G-13 

G.1.5 Manage Hazardous Materials ........................................ ................. ...... G-15 

G.2 OPERATE THE COMPIJEX ............................................................................G-15 

G.2.1 Emplace Waste in 221-U Galieries .......................................................G-16 

G.2.2 Emplace Waste in 221-U Canyon ................................................. _...... G-17 

G.2.3 Placement of External Waste at 221-U ....... ......................................... G-19 

G.3 CLOSE THE COMPLEX ...................... ........................................................... G-20 

G.3.1 Construct Environmental Cap..» ...........................................................G-20 

G.3.2 Revegetate Site ......................................................................................G-23 

G.3.3 Cleanup Complex ....................... _......................................................... G-23 

G.3.4 Sustain Post-Closure .............................................................................G-23 

G.4 REFERENCES ....................................... ........................................................... G-25 

G-1. Aitemative 4: Plan View of Environmental Cap ............................................... ...........G-27 

G-2. Altemative 4: Cross Section of Environmental Cap ................................. ...................G-28 

AITACHMENT 

G l FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY ..................................................................................... G-29 

Final Feasibility Study jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

J un c 1 7 

G-iii

1 ^ 

(^N 

^ 

DoFJRL-M-t t 

^ Rev. I Dnft_p 


Final Feasibility Study jor the Canyon Disposhioa Liitiative (221•U Facility) 

7une2003 G-iv

n 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

I8 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

APPENDIX G 

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OFALTERNATIVE 4: 

ENTOMBMENT WITH INTERNALAND 

EXTERNAL WASTE DISPOSAL 

DOE/RL-2001-1 t 

Rev. I Draft I3 



221-U Facility. Alternative 4 involves disposal of wastes into available spaces within the 

interior of the 221-U Facility and placement of waste in a waste disposal area located within the 

engineered fill around the building. When complete. Alternative 4 transforms the existing 

221-U Facility and its surroundings into a permanent near-surface burial complex for Hanford 

Site generated low-level wastes. 

For this alternative, legacy equipment currently stered on the anvon deck 

and in the process cells would be reduced in size and volume and then placed into the process 

cells and grouted. The een5+en-ePerating deekcanvon deck and its three galleries would be 

prepared for acceptance as a disposal site for low-level Class C or lower wastes. Waste would be 

containerized by others prior to receipt at 221 U. After placement, the containers would be filled 

with grout. Building voids not filled with waste would be grouted. The building and disposed 

waste would be protected from water infiltration by an engineered barrier. The engineered 

barrier would be placed on top of engineered fill and would cover the entire footprint of the 

building. The side slopes of the engineered fill would be constructed with an erosion protection 

layer. Together, these three elements make up the environmental cap. Adjacent facilities and 

wastes sites that are located within the footprint of the environmental cap must be remediated to 

support implementation of Alternative 4. The adjacent aboveground facilities would be 

dispositioned as part of Alternative 4 activities. However, remediation of the wastes sites is not 

included as part of Alternative 4. 


This alternative does not account for the remediation of waste sites within the perimeter of 

the environmental cap. It is assumed that these sites would be addressed by other projects in 

time to implement Alternative 4. Remediation of waste sites beyond the Alternative 4 

environmental cap footprint are also outside the Alternative 4 scope and would be addressed 

by future projects using the remedial action alternative selected for the appropriate 200 Area 

operable unit. For cost-estimating purposes, it is assumed that there are no contamination 

Final Feasibility Stadyjor the Canyon Disposirion fnitialive (221-U Facility) 

]une;lb3 G-1

Appendix G -Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DOF1R1,-200i-11 

^ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. I Draft B 


l plumes above 1Vashirtgton Admrn)arrarive Code (WAC) 173-340 .', Genfowl.Ae 

2 (14F6A}industrial limits associated with the Alternative 4 activities. During Alternative 4 

3 activities (such as buried pipe and exterior ventilation tunnel removal), if soil contamination 

4 above 1- 0 industrial limits is identified, then the Tri-Parties would need 

5 to evaluate the situation and make the decision whether to remove the contamination. 

6 Contaminated equipment and piping from demolition activities would be disposed at the 

7 Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF). 

8 

9 2. Facilities to be decontaminated and decommissioned in support of implementation of 

10 Alternative 4 are the 221-U Facility stairwells, the railroad tunnel, the 271-U Office 

I l Building, and the 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility. Aboveground facilities that are within 

12 the footprint of the Alternative 4 environmental cap would be removed as part of 

13 Alternative 4 activities. These facilities include the 21 I-U and 21 I-UA Tank Farms, 

14 241-WR Vault'Iitorium Storage, 271-U Office Building, 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility, 

15 2714-U Warehouse, 275-UR Chemical Storage Warehouse, 200-W-44 Sand Filter, 291-U 

16 Process Unit Plant, 291-U-1 Stack, 296-U-10 Stack, 222-U Office Lab, 224-U Concentration 

17 Facility, 224-UA Calcination Facility, 272-U Maintenance Shop, 2715-UA Maintenance 

18 Shop, and 292-U Stack Monitoring Station. The rcmediation of these facilities is to be 

19 performed by others and. therefore, such rem diation work is not accounted for in the 

20 Alternative 4 cost estimate. However. disposition and removal of the same facilities after 

t^21 they have been remediat de are corsidcred part of the Alternative 4 scopc and are includcd in 

22 the cost estimates in Sections 5 .0 and 6 .0 and in Appendix K of this final feasibility study 

23 (FS), 

24 

25 3. Waste sites that are within the footprint of the environmental cap and must be remediated by 

26 other projects in time to support Alternative 4 include the 216-U-4 Reverse Well; 216-U-4A 

27 French Drain; 216-U-4B French Drain; 216-U-5 Trench; 216-U-6 Trench; 216-U-7 French 

28 Drain; 216-U-15 Trench; 224-U-FIWSA; 224-U CNT; 241-UX-154 Diversion Box; 

29 241-IJX-302A Catch Tank; 2607-W-7 Septic Tank and Drain Field; 270-W Tank; unplanned 

30 releases (UPRs) UPR 200W-33, UPR 200-W-39, UPR 200-W-55, UPR 200W-60, 

31 UPR 200-W-78, UPR 200-W-101, UPR-200-W-117, UPR 200-W-1 18, UPR 200-W-125, 

32 UPR 200-W-138, and UPR 200-W-162; and portions of process lines associated with 

33 200-W42, 200-W-84, and UPR-600-20. Three wells are located within the footprint of the 

34 environmental cap: wells 299-W 19-8, 299-W 19-55, and 299-W 19-98. It is assumed that 

35 these wells would be decommissioned in time to support Alternative 4. This work scope is 

36 not included in the cost estimatc 

37 

38 4. Unless otherwise noted In this appendix, wastes from legacy structure removal and removal 

39 of the operating gallery equipment and piping would be disposed at ERDF. This maintains 

40 the canyon and gallery volume for disposal of Class C wastes from other waste sites on the 

41 Hanford Site. For removal and hauling to ERDF, remediation waste would be in accordance 

42 with ERDF waste acceptance criteria (BHI 1997, 200Ib), and compliancc with size and 

43 weight reguirementj would be coordinated with ERDF operations during final design if this 

44 alternative is selected. 

45 

Final Feastbility Stady for the Canyon DisposFlton teltlative (?21•U FadAky) 

June '1oo G-2

f~' 

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DOFiRI.-2001-11 

^ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. l Draft_a 

RedlineJStrikeout 

1 

2 

5. No surface contamination removal from interior surfaces of 221-U is included in 

Alternative 4. All concrete surfaces would receive applications of fixatives. 

3 

4 

5 

6. Removal, decontamination, and demolition operations for contaminated equipment being 

atereci inside of 221-U would be performed using conventional, proven technologies. 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

7. Following minor mechanical modifications and recertification, the existing main crane in the 

221-U Facility would be functional and ready for use in Alternative 4 activities. Crane use 

would be limited to moving of equipment from the process cells to the eanyeneperet9rtg 

deEltc:ln,von dcck where the equipment would be reduced in size and volume, as necessary, 

and then placed back into the process cells. The main crane would also be used to move the 

equipment from the canyon deck during size and volume reduction and to place the 

equipment into the process cells. As part of these activities, the crane would be used for 

cover block movement. 

15 

16 

17 

18 

S. All underground piping systems located beneath the environmental cap footprint for 

Alternative 4 would be gmuted in place or removed as part of the alternative . based on the 

outcome of ris assessment work . 9his moved waste would be disposed at ERDF. 

19 

20 ^ 9. The 221-U Canvon eck elevation is estimated at 221.5 m (726.5 ft). 

r21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

10. The canyon interior (including the process cells, hot pipe trench, and associated ventilation 

tunnel) and the rail tunnel interior are considered to be contaminated. The galleries are 

considered to be uncontaminated except for some areas of the southeast wall that would 

require fixative application. 

27 

28 

29 

11. The 221-U Facility is located within the exclusive land-use boundary identified in the Final 

Hanford Comprehensive land-Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1999) and 

the associated "Hanford Comprehensive I.and-Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement 

30 (HCP EIS), Hanford Site, Richland, Washington: Record of Decision (RODy' (64 Federal 

31 Register 61615). This implies that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) would remain in 


33 management activities. 

34 

35 12. Only remediation waste generated at the Hanford Site would be disposed in the facility. 

36 Immobilized low-activity waste was considered but Is not included in the waste inventory for 

37 disposal at 22 1 -U. 

38 

39 

40 

41 

13. Waste containers would be open-top cargo containers. The containers would have the 

approximate dimensions of 5 in long by 2.4 m wide by 2.6 in high ( 16 ft long by 8 ft wide by 

8.5 ft high). This size would allow container placement two abreast on the eanyen epefatieg 

42 deekcanyon deck . Containers would be placed using special shielded forklifts designed to 

(0^143 

44 

limit operator exposure during container handling. 

Final Feasibility Study jor the Canyon Disposition bJtiative (221-U FaeiJiry) 

7unc 20()3 

0-3

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: noFJRI.-2oo1-1I 

Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. I DraftJ3_ 


1 14. Waste received for placement would arrive at the site containerized in the cargo containers 

2 complete with an application of fixative to the container interior. Costs associated with 

3 placing waste into the containers and application of the fixative would be incurred by the 

4 waste generators and are not includcd in this alternative. 

5 

6 15. Backfill around the exterior of 221-U and waste inside the canyon would be placed evenly as 

7 the building is gradually filled with waste to prevent a large differential load on the canyon 

$ wall. Waste would be placed in lifts along the full length of 221-U to eliminate the potential 

9 of a large load difference between adjacent sections of the building. 

10 

11 16. Due to the uncertainties associated with both the volume of contaminated equipment 

12 currently located on the eenyettepeFatingdeekcanyon deck and inside of the process cells 

13 and the degree of equipment volume reduction that is achievable, it is assumed that only this 

14 contaminated equipment would be disposed in the 221-U process cells. It is further assumed 

15 that there is not sufficient space to accept additional waste from other sites for placement 

16 inside the process cells. The exception is cell 3, which is expected to have room for 

17 placement of waste in addition to that from the anvon dcck . 

18 

19 17. The existing 0.6-m (24-in.)-diameter cell drain header located beneath 221-U would be 

20 grouted to immobilize contamination in this pipe. 

("21 

22 18. A new ventilation system with replaceable high-efficiency particulate air (IEPA) filter banks 

23 would be installed on the northeast end of the 221-U roof. It would replace the existing 

24 ventilation tunnel and stack ventilation system. The new ventilation system would remain in 

25 operation until the canyon is filled with waste and grouted. 

26 

27 19. Internal void spaces associated with wastes disposed inside of 221-U would be filled with 

28 grout and pressure grouted. Where large voids are grouted (such as around the cargo 

29 containers and inside the cells), a low-cement-content grout would be used. This grout has a 

30 limited potential for heat buildup due to a low heat of hydration, yet would provide sufficient 

31 compressive strength for the intended service. 

32 

33 20. While sources for some materials required for construction of an environmental cap have not 

34 yet been identified, it is assumed that sufficient quantities of materials necessary for the clean 

35 fill and construction of the environmental cap are available locally. 

36 

37 21. A modified Resource Conservation and Recovery Act oj1976 (RCRA) Subtitle C engineered 

38 barrier would be constructed to protect the 221-U Facility and its contents from infiltration 

39 and intrusion. 

40 

41 

42 G.1 PREPARE EXISTING COMPLEX 

(^\43 

44 This function provides for the necessary physical modifications to the existing 221-U complex, 

45 including related programs, administrative and physical controls, safeguards, and infrastructure 

Final Feasi6ifiry Study jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U FaeiGty) 

ne1 

G-4

^ 

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DOF/Rr..2001-11 

^ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. I Draft Q 


I to prepare the complex for the subscquent operating and closing functions. The purpose of these 

2 activities is to establish a complex-wide configuration designed to support waste processing, 

3 decontamination, demolition, and closure. 

4 

5 G.1.1 Control Hazards 

6 

7 Preparing for Alternative 4 would include controlling hazards at the site. This control would 

8 begin with preparation of a decommissioning plan. The plan would include, but not be limited 

9 to, such things as readiness evaluations, hazard classifications, waste designation, a waste 

10 profile, a health and safety plan, and sitc-specific waste management instructions. This planning 


12 

13 G.1.1.1 Establish Hazards Protection. The potential personnel and environmental hazards 

14 associated with this alternative would be a combination of high hazards normally encountered 

15 during routine operations and those hazards involving the nonroutine activities of large-scale 

16 demolition operations. Specifically, they would be industrial and radiological in naturc. Hazard 

17 mitigation would involve the implementation of engineering and administrative controls that 

18 address both personnel and environmental protection. 

19 

20 G.1.1.1.1 Control Health and Safety Hazards. Personnel would encounter industrial hazards 

n 21 during site preparation, facility operation, and site closure. These hazards would be similar to 









30 






36 shoes, as a minimum, and any additional safety equipment as required by job-specific 


38 procedures, job safety analyses, and applicable work pcrmits to operate hazardous equipment and 


40 

41 High radiation areas and very high radiation areas would be encountered and would be a concern 

42 primarily during equipment removal. For example, approximately 25% of the cells contain 

^ 43 equipment and materials that have high radiation levels that exceed 1,000 mrem/hr. The 

44 maximum gamma dose rate in cell 30 was 190,000 mrem/hr (B1112001a). Also, the most 



Lsne2493 

G-5

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DOEIR1.r2oo1-I1 

+ Entombtnent with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. I DraftJ3 



2 local exhaust ventilation of the decontamination equipment, personal protective equipment, the 

3 existing facility exhaust system, and administrative and physical controls. Decontamination or 

4 fixing of loose or smcarable contamination would be performcd prior to any removal/demolition 

5 activities. Radiological limits for worker protection are provided in 10 Code of Federal 

6 Regulations (CFR) 835. 

7 




11 


13 Physical controls includc barriers, postings, and personnel surveys. In accordance with site 


15 job-specific work plans and procedures. Compliance with the job-specific work practices and 

16 procedures would ensure that personnel exposures do not exceed allowable limits- 




t^20 operating personnel would be minimized to the extent practicable. 

21 

22 G.1.1.1.2 Control Environmental Hazards. The potential dispersion/migration of dangerous 

23 and/or radioactive waste is an inherent risk of Alternative 4. Wind is the principal cause of 

24 dispersion, and water is the main transport mechanism for migration. Dangerous/radioactive 



27 DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment. 

28 

•29 Implementing a combination of procedural and physical controls would mitigate wind dispersion 

30 of contaminants. Procedural controls would typically consist or wind-speed restrictions on work 

31 activities. Physical controls would include spray fixatives (i.e., water sprays and chemical 

32 coagulants), minimizing the size of the work area, pressurized application of concrete slurries 

33 through a hose and nozzle (guniting), clean fill, and/or containcrization. Radiation air 

34 monitoring would be performed on the work site perimeter to confirm the effectiveness of 

35 airborne contamination control. 

36 


38 proccdural and physical controls. Procedural controls would consist of work restrictions during 


40 include a combination of temporary shelters andlor sealing products. Shelters would be used to 

41 shield waste from precipitation. A fixative sealer would be applied to surfaces with smearable or 

("w"N42 loose contamination. Scalers would be used to prevent dangerouslradioactive contaminants from 

43 seeping/leaching out of the waste containment. 

44 

Final Feasibility Study for the Canyon DlsposUion Initiative (221-U Facility) 

June 1003 

G-6

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DoEIRIr2001-11 

{ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. I Draft [1 

RedlindStrikeout 



3 equipment used on the site and exposed to dangerous/radioactive wastes to be decontaminated 

4 before the equipment is released. Personnel working at the site would wear proper protective 




8 


10 ^ All avestefnatetie4swostc would be sampled, tested, and designated as required by applicable or 


12 

13 G.1.2 Establish Infrastructurc 

14 


16 221-U Facility complex infrastructure. Some modification of the existing building and utilities 



19 G.1.2.1 Modify Existing Infrastructure. The existing utilities where possible would be used 

(0^\20 to support Alternative 4 activities. The basic approach to establishing the infrastructure for this 



23 environmental cap for this alternative is larger than that of Alternative 6 and equal in size to the 

24 Alternative 3 cap. 

25 

26 The existing road network surrounding the 221-U Facility would adequately accommodate 

27 equipment during waste delivery operations, waste-hauling traffic, and traffic associated with 

28 construction of the environmental cap. Additional spurs off paved roadways for heavy 

29 equipment access and waste movement activities would be constructed, as required. 

30 

31 Immediately before demolition of 27I-U, water mains and sewer pipelines located within the 

32 environmental cap footprint would be sealed at the outer edge of the environmental cap. 





37 building, as required, for lighting, ventilation, and equipment operations. The electrical service 

38 would need to include power supply to a new air-handling unit on the roof of 221-U. 

39 

40 The existing main bridge crane would be recertified for use during equipment handling within 

41 the canyon. At the same time, minor modifications and repairs would be made to the main crane, 

n 42 including repair of the heating and air conditioning systems. 

43 

Fina! Fea.tibility Siudyjoi the t:anyon Disposition Giitlativc (22l-U Facility) 

J L]n C ') Of) ^ 0-7

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DoE(lu,-2001-11 

^ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. I Drafi13 


1 The final step modifying the 221-U Facility for this alternative would be replacement of its roof 

2 covering (versus roof structure). To prevent precipitation from entering the building during 

3 waste handling activities within the canyon, a new roof covering would be installed. 

4 

5 G.1.2.2 Establish Support Facilities. Alternative 4 would also require administrative offices, 



8 structures, this support could be provided from the 271-U Building. The use would be practical 

9 only during the initial stages of 221-U modifications. Although there is no need for close crane 

10 access to 221-U, 271-U Building demolition would still occur early in this alternative. Removal 

11 of this building would allow preparation of the electrical gallery for waste placement and access 

12 for backfilling. The backfill would start on the northwest side of the 221 •U Facility as the 

13 galleries are filled with waste. 

14 



17 A construction perimeter fence would be installed to control access into and out of the work 





22 G.1.2.3 Establish Staging Areas. Personnel staging areas would be included in the space 


24 other construction activity support areas. Equipment storage, waste queues, decontamination 



27 

28 G.1.3 Modify Facility 

29 





34 ^ eaeyen-eper ' an n deck would be placed into the process cells, and both the cells and 



37 fixative application to prepare the canyon for the start of waste emplacement activities. 

38 

39 G.1.3.1 Prepare Facility for Use. The 221-U structure must resist loads with safety factors that 

40 meet building codes (i.e.. American Concrete Institute, American Institute of Steel Construction) 


(--)42 public access would be permitted; therefore, structural concerns would be for worker safety only. 

43 

Final Feasibility S1udy jor the Canyon Disposilion lniriarive (221-V Facility) 

J une 200l G-8

(0"^' 

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: 

^ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal 

DOEJRL-2001-1 l 

Rev. 1 DraftJ_ 






5 it must be maintained in a safe condition as well. 

6 

7 G.13.1.1 Inspect 271-U. The building would be inspected to determine the condition of the 

8 building and its equipment. ]nfotmation for this inspection would help finalize planning for the 


10 involved in opcrnting the facility and the building modifications and upgrades necessary to safely 

1I accomplish the activities would be identified. Modifications identified would be designed. The 

12 services and/or new equipment needed would be procured. 

13 

14 No known building repairs or upgrades would be needed. Also, it is assumed for this alternative 

15 that minimal equipment repairs and upgrades would be necessary. 

16 

17 G.13.1.2 221-U Facility Modifications. Limited modifications to the 221-U Facility would be 

18 necessary to accomplish equipment removal and decontamination operations. Facility 

19 modifications would primarily involve disconnecting and blanking utility and electrical lines 

20 where they are no longer required and installing temporary utilities that would be required to 

n 21 support planned operations. The change room at the northeast end of the operating gallery would 


23 and drain lines for the change room facility could be tied into the active systems in the 

24 271-U Office Building. 

25 Additiona1480-volt electrical service requirements would be installed, as necessary, to support 


27 compressors for pneumatic toots and temporary greenhouse structures. In addition, 480-volt 

28 electrical service would be installed to support waste processing and 

29 decontamination/disassembly operations. 

30 

31 G.1.3.1.3 Add New Air Handler. Installation of a new air-handling unit on the roof of 221-U 

32 is a major modification that may or may not be required based on further analysis of tasks and 

33 seauencinp of events that will be done durin g design If needed weuld-eeeuF-tThe unit would 

34 be located on the northeast end of the building and require penetrations through the roof for air 

35 duct connections. 

36 

37 G.1.3.1A Grout Cell Drain Header and Vent Tunnel. The cell drain header would be filled 

38 with cement grout during the building preparation phase once the new air handler is installed and 

39 operational. Grouting would fill the 0.6-m (24-in.)-diameter void space and encapsulate any 

40 contamination present in the pipe. After the connecting pipes to cell 10 are sealed, grout would 

41 be pumped in from both ends of the cell drain header. Because the cell drain header flows 



44 would act as air vents, and the pressure would be regulated so that the grout is visible in the 

Final Feasibility StadyJor site Canyon Disposition lnitiativc (221-U Faci(iry) 

^ n , } G-9

Appendix G- Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DoEIR1.200I-I t 

^ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. I Draft tl 

Redline)Stsikeout 

1 process cell drains, but does not rise in the cells. After this operation, any liquid within the 


3 

4 Waste placement is not planned for the ventilation tunnel due to limited accessibility of this area. 

5 Therefore, the ventilation tunnel would be grouted to eliminate voids in the building structure. 

6 Holes would be angle drilled through to canyon's exterior wall to allow access to the ventilation 

7 tunnel for grouting. Frec-flowing grout would be pumped through these holes to fill the 

8 ventilation tunnel. The grouting would be completed in lifts to allow time for heat dissipation 

9 during grout curing. The tunnel is planned to be filled with grout to the maximum extent 

10 possible. It is estimated that the ventilation tunnel would require approximately 2,300 m^ 

11 (3,000 ydP) of grout. During final design, the decision to fill the tunnel should be revisited. 

12 Preliminary structural calculations (Smyth 2001) show that the exterior wall of the tunnel may 

13 have sufficient strength to withstand later external pressures from fill heights associated with 

14 burying the canyon building and, therefore, not require grouting. 

15 




19 associated storage spaces. 'lltis activity would include the removal of the following: 

20 

^21 • Installed and fixed equipment 





26 

27 These items would be sorted for reuse, recycle, or disposal. 

28 G.13.2 Disposal of Contaminated Equipment In 221-U. It is estimated that there isare 

29 approximately 5,400 mj (7,000 y&) of contaminated equipment and components (gross loose 

30 ^ volume before sizc reduction) currently stoped-on the canyon deck and in the process cells. For 

31 Alternative 4, those process cells with legacy equipment having dose rates >100 tntem/hr would 

32 be opened only to place size-reduced legacy equipment from the operating deck and emut into 

33 them. All of the equipment would be reduced in size and volume and then disposed into the 

34 process cells meeting the dose rate criteria (except for cell 3, which would be left unfilled for 

35 later equipment or waste placement). Size and volume reduction is necessary so that all of the 

36 contaminated equipment would fit into the process cells. Minimizing the amount of size and 

37 volume reduction to just the amount of effort required to allow the contaminated equipment to fit 

38 into the process cells is desirable because it would limit worker exposure. After size reduction, 

39 the estimated volume of equipment from the • an n deck and in the 

40 process cells is 3,400 0 (4,400 yd^. 

41 

(O^N42 Size and volumc reduction would require a disposition plan for each equipment item. If breaking 

43 or cutting activities are necessary for disposing of the equipment, the 221-U Canyon Building 

Final Feasibility Srudy foe the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221 •U Facility) 

1 C-lo 

200

Appendix G- Detailed Description of Altemative 4: DoE(Rlr20o1-t 1 

^ Entombment with Internal and Extei•nal Waste Disposal Rev. I t>mtt s 


1 would be the best location to do these activities because it is a closed facility for controlling 


3 would be the size reduction of the contaminated legacy equipment that is currently slered-on the 

4 operating deck. Estimated worker dose for these activities alone is nearly 36 person-tem (I3111 

5 2001a). If all of the legacy equipment on the operating deck is substantially reduced in size and 

6 volume for placement into the process cells, significant worker time and resulting higher 

7 exposures would occur. This activity, even with latest technologies available, would be 

8 performed in personal protective equipment-required work areas ( i.e., contaminated areas and 

9 airborne areas). Significant engineering controls would be required to reduce worker exposure 

10 from external and internal exposure sources. Worker turnover could increase due to harsher 

11 working conditions. 

12 

13 During final design, it is anticipated that emerging size and volume reduction technologies would 

14 be evaluated for use. For this final FS, use of conventional size- and volume-reduction 

15 technologies is assumed. Disassembly activities would include mechanical cutting, hydraulic 

16 shearing, and manual methods. Additional technologies that could be applied are described in 

17 Appendix I. 

18 

19 After the equipment is placed into the process cells, each cell would be coated with a fixative for 

20 control of loose surface contamination. Cement grout would be placed in lifts into each process 

(0^'21 cell to fill voids. Each lift would be allowed to cura before placing additional lifts. As each 

22 process cell is filled, the cover blocks would be placed back int6 position. The volume of void 

23 space to be filled within the process cells is conservatively estimated as 50% of total cell volume. 

24 Therefore, the grout volume needed to fill the process cells is 3,400 m3 (4,400 yd3). After the 

25 process cell cover blocks are in place, holes would be drilled through the covers and any voids 

26 under and around the edges of the blocks would be filled by pressure grouting. The cover lifting 

27 bails would be removed after pressure grouting is complete. 

28 

29 In the Phase I FS, consideration had been given to reserving the process cells only for disposal of 

30 Class C wastes at 22I-U because of the high degree of isolation and shielding provided by the 

31 process cells. However, in this final FS, there is a need to clear the sanyen epereting 

32 deekcanvon deck to support building demolition. The removal and disposal of legacy equipment 

33 to the process cells would be the most efficient means of achieving this objective. Moreover, 

34 while the process cells provide a significant amount of isolation in 221-U as it is currently 

35 configumd, after closure activities for Alternative 4, all parts of the 221-U Facility containing 

36 waste fill, regardless of the class of waste within, would be equally protected (contained) by an 

37 engineered barrier. Therefore, from the standpoint of long-term protectiveness, there is no 

38 advantage in reserving the process cells exclusively for Class C waste. However, cell 3, may 

39 have room for placement of avaste n+etefiais waste in addition to legacy waste from the canyon 

40 #leerdcck. 

41 

42 All equipment and materials inside the operating gallery must be removed to support placement 

("\43 of containerized waste into this gallery. There is a substantial amount of piping in this gallery 

44 that requires removal. Conversely, very little equipment and piping would need to be removed 

45 to prepare the pipe and electrical galleries ready for waste container placement. 

Final Feasibifity StnCy jor llre Canyon Disporition lniriarive (22!•U Faeiirry) 

1 00l G-11

... ,. 

Appendix G - Detailed DescrIptioti tif Alternative 4: DoEIR1.2001-11 

' Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. I Draftli 


t ' 

1 

2 Some removed equipment may be identified as reusable. Unneeded material from the gallery 

3 would be size reduced and placed in ERDF boxes for disposal at ERDF. It may be desirable to 

4 containerize some of this material for placement in the electrical gallery. This approach could be 

5 used as a test run of the procedure for placing waste in these galleries. However, for the cost 

6 estimate, all waste from the gallery is assumed to be disposed at ERDF. 

7 

8 G.1.3.3 Demolition or Railroad Tunnel. To leave the tunnel in place would mean an 

9 unnecessary increase in the size of the environmental cap. This alternative includes removal of 

10 the railroad tunnel. The contaminated concrete would be disposed at ERDF. 

11 

12 The tunnel, which allowed train access into cell 3, extends 46 m(150 ft) westward from the 

13 northwest side of the canyon building. The tunnel is a reinforced concrete structure with a soil 

14 cover about 1.5 in (5 ft) thick. There are unreinforced wing-wall retaining structures at the end 

15 of the tunnel. The tunnel is assumed to have light surface contamination that could be fixed in 

16 place with fixative application. It is assumed that a backhoe with a processor would be used for 

17 demolition. 

18 

19 Demolition of the railroad tunnel would allow truck access to cell 3 without safety hazards 

20 associated with backing down the long, narrow railroad tunnel. Also, part of the railroad tunnel 

("4\21 work is construction of a truck door at the tunnel's connection to 221-U (cell 3). This door 

22 would allow access to the building without disrupting ventilation of the canyon. 

23 

24 The new access door to cell 3 at the tunnel would allow placement of containerized and possibly 

25 long-length waste. After cell 3 is full of waste, it would be filled with cement grout and the. 

26 cover blocks would be permanently replaced. l.ike the other process cells, the cover blocks 

27 would be drilled and pressure grouted in place and the bails would be removed. 

28 

29 G.1.3A Hot Pipe Trench. The hot pipe trench is assumed to be contaminated. A review of 

30 historical photographs of the trench indicates that the trench contains intertwined, small-diameter 

31 piping. Waste placement is not planned for the hot pipe trench due to limited available space. 

32 Instead, the trench would be filled with grout to eliminate voids in the building structure. The 

33 initial preparation step for grouting the trench would be coating the interior surfaces with a 

34 fixative to contain surface contamination. After the coating is cured, the hot pipe trench would 

35 be grouted. Due to the maze of piping, it is assumed that no contaminated equipment or waste 

36 would be disposed to the hot pipe trench. The interior volume of the pipes encased by the grout 

37 would be very small and therefore assumed to have no effect on the stability of 221-U. The 

38 volume of grout needed to fill the trench, 800 tns (1,100 yds), is estimated as 75% of its overall 

39 volume. The trench cover blocks would then be permanently replaced. The cover blocks would 

40 be pressure grouted as described for the process cell cover blocks. After grouting, the bails 

41 would be removed from the hot pipe trench cover blocks. 

42 

n43 G.13.5 Remove Surface Contamination. To safely enter the building during its operational 

44 phase in this aitemative, contamination survey results would be used to identify where 


Final Feasibility Study jor the Canyon D'uposlrion lnitiative (211-U Facility) 

Luas:.401 G-12

Appendix G -Detailed Description ofAlternative 4: DoFJRtr2oo1-1 i 

Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev.1 Draft n 


1 canyon surface to reduce the dose rate and contamination risk to the lowest possible level. Water 

2 jet, water blasting, or water-flushing activities would be more difficult if completed after the 

3 process cell drain header and cells are grouted because all water would need to be collected and 

4 taken to the 200 Area's Liquid Effluent Remediation Facility for treatment. If any surface 

5 removal work is identified, carbon dioxide blasting or scarifying would be the preferred method 

6 for its removal instead of water blasting or flushing. 

7 

8 G.13.6 Fix Contamination on 221-U Interior Surfaces. After the cover blocks are placed and 

9 grouted on the process cells and hot pipe trench, the existing bridge eFanesg= would no longer 

10 be needed. Use of the eFe-es= ranc for movement of the containerized waste would be a potential 

11 source of contamination. 'Therefore, they would be parked at the north end of 221- U, their oil 

12 would be drained, and the power source disconnected. 

13 

14 + It is assumed that surface contamination on the canyon walls, 4aesrcAq3on deck s, and ceiling can 

15 be addressed with application of a fixative. This fixative would be applied after all equipment 

16 removal (including the bridge crane) and grouting in the canyon is complete. It would provide 

17 containment for loose surface contamination during containerized waste placement within the 

18 ^ canyon. Prior to beginning container placement on the n on de k, the 

19 fixative application would be inspected. 

20 

^21 G.IA Modify External Area 

22 

23 The following modifications would be performed to support placement of waste inside 221-U. 

24 Before waste placement begins within 221-U, the aboveground structures that are physically 

25 attached to 221-U and those that are located within the footprint of the environmental cap must 

26 be removed. In addition, prior remediation (by others) of waste sites within the footprint of the 

27 environmental cap would be verified. 

28 



31 determine if decontaminating and recycling steps could be economically included to support 

32 DOE waste minimization goals. 

33 

34 G.1.4.1 Disposition or Aboveground Structures. The aboveground structures identified in 

35 Assumption 2 at the beginning of this appendix would be demolished as part of Alternative 4. 

36 

37 G.1.4.1.1 Demolition or the 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility. The 276-U Solvent Recovery 



40 the tanks, walkways. and all aboveground piping. All pipe penetrations associated with this 

41 structure would be cut, sealed, and capped. Drains would be sealed with concrete. Concrete 

42 surfaces would be decontaminated,ifrequired,using selected off-the-shelfteehnologies. 

(ON3 

44 The concrete slabs and wall would be demolished with conventional dcmolition equipment. 

45 Demolition debris would be taken to ERDF for final disposal. An option during final design 

Finat Feasibility Sludy firr the Canyon Dispo.tilion lniriarive (21I-U Facility) 

Arne 1003 G-13

o"^, 

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Altt:rnative 4: DOFJRL-2001-11 

^ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev.1 Draft li 


1 would be to place some of the equipment either in cell 3 or into containers placed into the 

2 galleries. 

3 

4 G.lA.1.2 Demolition of the 271-U O[fice Bullding. The 271-U Oftice Building would be 

5 demolished in Alternative 4. The 271-U Office Building has a basement, three floors, and a 

6 reinforced concrete slab roof. There is a concrete masonry perimeter wall supported on a 

7 basement wall, with interior masonry walls within the building. The roof is a reinforced concrete 

8 slab similar to the floors. The third floor is a chemical makeup area with floor slabs up to 03 m 

9 (1 ft) thick that support chemical tanks. 

10 

11 Additional building features included in the demolition are a stack on the roof (296-U-10), an 



14 221-U and the area filled and compacted as part of the clean fill around the canyon. 

15 

16 G.1.4.1.3 Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) of Stairways on 221-U Building. 

17 Eight stairwells on the northwest side of 221-U are light construction and would be demolished 


19 thick wall, lightly reinforced concrete construction. The heavy construction of these stairwells 

20 would be factored into the demolition costs. Any contamination found in the stairwells on the 

(0-'\ 21 canyon's southeast side would be fixed in place prior to demolition. All stairwell demolition 

22 waste would be disposed adjacent to 221-U where it would be protected from infiltration by the 

23 environmental barrier. 

24 

25 C.1.4.1A D&D Other Aboveground Structures. All other aboveground structures identified 

26 in Assumption 2 at the beginning of this appendix that are within the footprint of the 221-U 

27 environmental cap would be decommissioned as part of Alternative 4 activities. 

28 

29 G.1A.2 D&D of Buried Piping. Buried piping not already addressed in the preparation of the 

30 complex function would be ttrouted in place or removed prior to the placement of engineered Cill 

31 around 221-U . based on the outcome of risk assessment work . In addition to the miscellaneous 

32 piping to be removed, the exhaust ventilation tunnel would be removed. This tunnel is a 

33 reinforced tunnel connecting the canyon air ventilation tunnel to the stack and filter. The tunnel 

34 is approximately 60 m long and runs from the end of the ventilation tunnel in section 3 to the 

35 fans. 

36 

37 G.1.4.3 Confirm Remediated Waste Sites Within Environmental Cap Footprint- 

38 Altemative 4 includes covering 221-U with an environmental cap. It is assumed that the waste 

39 sites located within the environmental cap, as identified in Assumption 4 at the beginning of this 

40 appendix, would be remediated by other projects prior to the start of Alternative 4 and 

41 construction of the environmental cap. All remediation wastes would be disposed at ERDF. 

42 

43 G.1AA Confirm Well Decommissioning. Three wells are located within the footprint of the 

44 environmental cap. It Is assumed that these wells would be decommissioned by other projects 

Final Feasibility Studyfor the Canyon Disposition lnitietive (221-U Facility) 

)uno?003 G-14

. .r• ^ .. ' 

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DOEIRI.2001-11 

^ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. t Draft_8 


1 prior to the start of Alternative 4. The wells are 299-W 19-8, 299-W 19-55, and 299-W 19-98. 

2 Their prior removal would be confirmed as part of Alternative 4. 

3 

4 G.1.4S Earthwork to Prepare Working Area Adjacent to 221-U. Following removal of 

5 aboveground structures and associated buried piping, the area surrounding 221-U would be 

6 leveled and compacted in preparation for placement of the engineered fill. The subgrade 

7 compaction and fill placement are the first steps for construction of the environmental cap. 

9 G.1.5 Manage Hazardous Materials 

10 

11 Dangerous waste, asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls, and other hazardous materials would be 

12 removed from all areas of the complex and managed in accordance with ARARs. All avaete 

13 materialsw s would be sampled, tested, and designated as required by ARARs, and treated 

14 prior to disposal. Products consisting of or containing hazardous materials would be used and 

15 ^ managed in accordance with their respective Material Safety Data Sheets. Waste meterie{sWa.cte 

16 would be treated as required. 

17 



20 accountability, inventory, labeling, and transportation of waste to approved disposal facilities. 

^21 

22 

23 C.2 OPERATE THE COMPLEX 

24 

25 Operation of the complex for Alternative 4 refets spccifically to waste placement and entombment 

26 in the 221-U Facility. Waste would be emplaced in the three galleries and on the main fanyen 

27 epeming n on d k. Engineered fill would be installed around the exterior of 221-U as 

28 waste is placed inside it. As a final step of the operation function, waste would be placed around the 

29 exterior of 221-U. 

30 

31 In the preceding functions, the area surrounding 221-U has been prepared to support construction 

32 of the environmental cap, all equipment that would interfere with placement of containerized 

33 waste has been placed in the process cells or removed, and exposed surfaces inside the canyon 

34 have been decontaminated or a fixative applied. The roofing system on 221-U has also been 

35 replaced to minimize the potential for precipitation entering the building during the operational 

36 phase of this alternative. The steps to operate the complex are discussed below. 

37 

38 The total volume of waste placed inside and outside of the 221-U Building in Alternative 4 is 

39 estimated as 63,600 ms (83,063 yd). The waste volume inside 221-U (13,500 ms [17,600 Ids]) 

40 Includes 3,400 m3 (4,400 yd^) of legacy equipment placed inside the process cells,1,5tx1 m 

41 (2,000 yd3) of waste inside containers in the three galleries, and 8,600 m3 (11,200 yd) of waste 

42 ^ placed on the n k and craneway. An estimated 51,200 tnO 

^ 43 (67,000 yd) of grout would be used inside 221-U in this alternative to surround the waste and 

44 fill voids in the process cells, hot pipe trench, galleries, canyon deckicraneway, and the 

Final Feaiibifiry Srudyjor the Canyon Disposition lnitiarive (221-U Facility) 

June 2003 G-15

- •s. t .W ;. . 

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DOF^RIr2001-11 

^ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. I Draft [i 


I building's ventilation tunnel. An estimated 50,100 m' (65,463 yd) (uncompacted volume) of 

2 soil remediation-type waste would be placed outside of 221-U in Alternative 4. 

3 G.2.1 Emplace Waste In 221-U Galleries 

4 

5 Waste placement would start with container placement in the galleries. The waste would be in 

6 open-top cargo containers that would be placed on an individual steel frame with casters. Small 

7 rails would be installed on the gallery walls to guide the containers on a one-way trip into the 

8 galleries. Equipment and piping in the galleries that prevents container placement would be 

9 removed. After the waste containers are in place, each gallery would be grouted to provide 

10 support for the wastes and the environmental cap. 

11 

12 Waste would be placed first in the lowest (electrical) gallery. In preparation, the south end wall 

13 of the gallery, located in the 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility, must be exposed. The concrete 

14 slab adjacent to the end wall would be cleared to allow vehicle access to the lowest gallery. 

15 A temporary structure would be erected so that containers could be prepared outside of the 

16 galleries. The concrete masonry unit block end wall must be removed and enlarged for waste 

17 container access. A new rollup door would be installed on this opening. The doorways from the 

18 271-U Office into the galleries could be left open to provide emergency egress, but would 

19 eventually be filled. A ventilation system for the galleries must remain functional during waste 

(^%0 placement and grouting. 

21 

22 G.2.1.I F511 Electrical Gallery with Contalnerized Waste. Waste would arrive at the south 

23 end of the canyon by truck in cargo containers ( see assumptions for description) and would be 

24 lifted onto dollies staged at the opcn gallery end. They would be pushed as far as possible into 

25 the gallery with an electric forklift and then secured in place to prevent movement during 

26 grouting. The total length of the electrical gallery is separated by the railroad tunnel in two 

27 segments. The main segment of the electrical gallery on the south side of the railroad runnel is 

28 225 m in length. This gallery segment could hold approximately 37 containers. A spacing of 

29 6 m (20 ft) on center for the 5-m ( 16-ft) containers was assumed to allow for dolly length and 

30 container placement. 

31 

32 There is a short segment of the electrical gallery on the north side of the rail tunnel. This gallery 

33 segment is about 12 m(40 ft) long and could store, at most, one container. The best use of this 

34 space would be to place loose material that is too long or tall to be placed in a containcr. 

35 A possible use for this space is disposal of material from dcmolition of the 276-U Solvent 

36 Storage Facility. After waste placement, this short segment would be closed off with forms and 

37 grouted from the pipe gallery level. 

38 

39 G.2-1.2 Grout Electrical Gallery. To encase the waste and provide support for waste 

40 containers to be placed in the pipe gallery above, the electrical gallery would be grouted. 

41 Cement grout would be placed into the containers through a hole in the slab above and centered 

("%42 on the container. The flowable grout to surround the containers would be placed after the 

43 containers are partially filled with grout. Flowable cement grout could be obtained with a 

44 strength of 14 kg/cm2 (2001b1in=). This could be pumped under low pressure, just sufficient to 

Final Feasibiliry Studyjor the Canyon Disposition lnitiotive (2I1-U Faciliryl 

un " 1 0-16

^ 

I . . . 

Appendix G-- Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DoEIRI:2001-11 

^ Entombment with Internal and Externai Waste Disposal Rev. I Dratt 1 


l positively fill voids and prevent shrinkage, and would provide the necessary support to the 

2 second floor. Grout amendments, such as fly ash or zeolite clays, would be considered for all 

3 grouting activities to reduce potential for leaching of radioactive isotopes. Grouting each 

4 container as the galleries are filled has the advantage of providing radiological shielding for 

5 subsequent container placement. 

6 

7 Grouting around the containers would be alternated with grout placement inside the containers. 

8 Grouting would be done in lifts to maintain loading on the gallery walls to an acceptable level. 

9 Additional benefits of grouting in lifts are that the cargo containers would not float and the heat 

10 of hydration would occur over a longer time. By limiting the grout lifts to half the gallery wall 

11 height and waiting for the grout to reach adequate strength, the grouting could occur without 

12 backfill in place on the wall's exterior. Grout placed around the containers would be delivered 

13 into the gallery through existing rectangular openings at the edge of the floor slabs. As the grout 

14 reaches its required design strength, the engineered fill would be placed against the gallery wall 

15 on the exterior of 221-U. This approach would be typical for all three galleries. 

16 

17 G.2.13 Fill Pipe Gallery with Containerized Waste. The second gallery level to be filled 

18 with waste would be the pipe gallery. It is also divided into two segments by the railroad tunnel. 

19 The main segment is approximately 225 in long. An estimated 37 waste containers would be 

20 placed in this gallery in the same manner as described for the electrical gallery. An earth-Hll 

21 access ramp would be constructed and the end wall of the gallery would be removed. The 

22 temporary cover and rollup door used for the lower level gallery would be relocated. 

23 

24 G.2.1A Grout Pipe Gallery. The pipe gallery would be grouted in the same manner as the 

25 electrical gallery. Grout would be placed in the containers and around the containers in lifts. 

26 The grout would be placed from the operating gallery level. 

27 

28 G.2.1.5 F111 Operating Gallery with Contalnerized Waste. The uppermost gallery, the 

29 operating gallery, has more room available for container placement than the electrical or pipe 

30 galleries because its length is not affected by the railroad tunnel. It is estimated that 

31 40 containers would be placed in the operating gallery. To access this gallery, backfill and an 

32 access ramp would have to be enlarged at the south end of the gallery. 

33 

34 G.2.1.6 Grout the Operating Gallery. The concrete slab above this gallery is much thicker 

35 than the slab on top of the other two galleries, and a different method for grout placement would 

36 be used. Like the ventilation tunnel grouting, angled holes would be drilled through the gallery 

37 wall to grout the operating gallery. These holes would be sized and located to allow grouting 

38 both inside and around the waste-filled containers. 

39 

40 G.2.2 Emplace Waste In 221-U Canyon 

41 

42 At the same time that the galleries are being filled, waste placement would begin on the eanyen 

143 eperating an on deck. The waste would be placed on the dcek in four separate layers. 

44 Each layer would be grouted as it is placed, and the waste placement would be completed for the 

45 entire canyon length by layer prior to starting the next waste layer. Layers of waste would be 

Fiaa( FeasibUiq S7adyfw the Canyon Ditposidoa Initiative (221-1/FacNiry) 

)une?0()3 G-17

.. . .,. .. . 

Appendix G- Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DoEIRt.-2003-11 

Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. l DraftJ 

RedlinrlStrikeout 

I separated from each other by an approximately 0.75-m (2.5-ft)-thick lift of grout. The grout 

2 layer provides important shielding to limit operation staff exposure to radiation from the wastes 

3 in the layers below. Grout amendments, such as fly ash or zeolite clays, would be considered for 

4 the grout to reduce potential for leaching of radioactive isotopes. A summary of steps involved 

S for this part of Alternative 4 follows. 

6 

7 G.2.2.I Modify Canyon End Walls. In preparation for waste placement in the canyon, the end 

8 walls of the building must be modified. A gridwork of steel bcams would be installed on both 

9 the northeast and southwest end walls. This grid would be dcsigned to resist seismic forces and 

10 loads applied during the complex's operation pcriod. For the southwest end wall, the 

11 modification would include saw cutting an opening in the concrete wall. This opening would be 

12 sized to accept the waste containers moved by a forklift. The opening would be covered with a 

13 rollup door. The wall's steel beam gridwork would be designed to allow the rollup door to be 

14 moved upwards level by level as the waste is placed within the canyon. The gridwork would be 

15 anchored to the roof siab and surrounding reinforced walls. 71rough-bolting would connect the 

16 gridwork to the unreinforced concrete end wall. 

17 

18 G.2.2.2 Fill Ganyan Canvon deck and Craneway with Waste. The eaxyen 

19 canvon deck would be filled with a total of four layers of waste containers. The 

20 first three layers would hold a estimated 160 cargo containers each, for a total of 480 containers. 

21 The container placement would start at the northeast end of the canyon and advance towards the 

22 southwest end. Each layer would be completed prior to placement beginning on the next layer 

23 up. This approach would ensure that them is not a large differential in loading of adjacent 

24 building sections. 

25 

26 Containers would be grouted both inside the container and around their exterior. It is envisioned 

27 that grouting would occur roughly every 12 m (40 ft) of building length. Containers would be 

28 placed using a forklift with adequate shielding to limit operator exposure to an acceptable level. 

29 The containers would be placed two abreast across the canyon deck width. In this manner, the 

30 forklift could place the containers without making a 90-degree turn, which would be difficult in 

31 the limited width of the canyon deck. 

32 

33 As part of the grouting effort, a 0.75-m (2.5-ft)-thick layer of grout would be placed on top of the 

34 filled containers. This layer would act as both shielding and a working surface for the next layer 

35 of containers. Grout amendments, such as fly ash or zeolite clays, would be considered for the 

36 grout to reduce potential for leaching of radioactive isotopes. In the final design, a reinforced 

37 concrete slab may be installed as the top section of the grout layer. The concrete slab provides a 

38 smoother surface for operation of the forklifts during waste placement of the next layer. The 

39 grout, or possibly reinforced concrete slab, would be designed for the whccl loads of the forklift. 

40 

41 The next waste placement would be inside the craneway. An opening in the southwest end wall 

42 would be cut to provide access to the cranaway. Guide rails would be installed and cargo 

(-,\43 containers delivered into the craneway similar to waste placement in the galleries. 

44 Approximately 39 containers could be placed in the craneway. The containers would be grouted 

45 inside and out as was done in the galleries. 

Final Feasibility Study jor Jhe Canyon Disposition )nitiativt (22 )-U Facility) 

^ Ivte 1!tL^ G-18

^ 

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: Do>mt-2001-1I 

^ Entombment with Internal and Eicternal Waste Disposal Rev. i Draft-B 


1 

2 After placing, grouting, and pouring the topping grout or concrete layer on the third layer of 

3 cargo containers, the height from the grout layer to the underside of the canyon roof would be 

4 approximately 2 an. This would be too short to allow placement of cargo containers. Rather than 

5 fill this large void with grout, placement of waste-filled burial boxes (1.2 an by 1.2 an by 2.4 an 

6 long [4 ft by 4 ft by 8 ftj) would be performed. For this final FS report, it is assumed that 

7 960 boxes of this size could be placed into a fourth and final layer of waste within the canyon. 

8 With tighter packing, the number of boxes placed could be increased to 1,500. Void spaces on 

9 the interior of the boxes would be filled with grout prior to placement. As a 6na1 step in 

10 placement of waste inside the canyon, holes would be drilled through the canyon roof. Flowable 

11 grout would be delivered into the canyon through these holes to fill around the boxes. Pressure 

12 grouting would be used to ensure that voids not reached by the flowable grout are filled. 

13 

14 Upon completion of waste placement within 221-U, available space within the facility would be 

15 filled with waste and/or grout. The containment provided by grouting the waste inside openings 

16 in the canyon would eliminate all large voids. These steps would stabilize 221-U and ready it for 

17 placement of the environmental cap. 

18 

19 G.2.23 Install Engineered Fill. As the canyon is filled with waste, engineered fill would be 

20 compacted in lifts around the exterior of 221-U. The engineered fill elevation would be 

21 maintained within a few mcters of the same level as the grouted wastes within 221-U. This 

22 would prevent an excessive load across the canyon walls, including the end walls. The 

23 engineered fill would also provide an access ramp to the south end of 221-U for container 

24 delivery. 

25 

26 The engineered fill would be clean, compacted granular material, which would be placed in lifts. 

27 Its source is assumed to be a Hanford Site borrow pit within 24 km of 221-U. The actual source 

28 location has not been identiGed. The volume of engineered Gll for Alternative 4 is approximately 

29 1,115,400 m3 (1,458,850 yd3). The extent of the engineered fill and environmental cap is shown 

30 in Figure G-1. 

31 

32 The fill would be compacted to a density in the range of 95% to 98% relative compaction where 



35 

36 G.2.3 Placement of External Waste at 22I-U 

37 

38 Alternative 4 would include an external waste disposal area within the engineered fill that 

39 surrounds 221-U. The overall size of the environmental cap for Alternative 4 is assumed to be 

40 the same size for Alternative 3 to allow for an equitable comparison of these two alternatives. 

41 The waste disposal area is limited to that area of the engineered fill cross section that is protected 

42 by the environmental barrier. Further, the size of the disposal area is restricted by constructability. 

43 The disposal area would have a dual-liner leachate collection system. For Alternative 4, this 

44 liner system Is assumed to have a 3 horizontal to I vertical slope. The cross section shown for 

45 the bottom liner (see Figure D-5 in Appendix D) is identical to the dual liner that has been used 

Final Feasibility Snidy for the Canyon Disposition lniriarive (22i-U Facility) 

1ine 100.1 

G-19

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DoFJRI.-20oI-1t 

^ Entombment with Internal and Eirte'rnal Waste Disposal Rev. I Draft n 


1 at the ERDF (Casbon 1995). The 3 horizontal to I vertical (horizontal:vertical) slope for the 

2 liner system is anticipated to pose construction challenges because it would need to be built in 

3 stages as engineered fill is placed around the facility. The liner starts from the intersection of a 

4 45-degree line projected from the bottom slab of 221-U and the bottom of the engineered barrier 

5 (see Figure G-2). The liner extends downward toward 221-U and transitions into a flat section 

6 prior to intersecting the building's exterior face. An impermeable barrier would also be required 

7 along the building face above the liner, and a method for transitioning from the wall to the liner 

8 would be defined during final design. To serve the operational period, the building face barrier 

9 could use a waterproof-type paint system. 

10 

l I The area of liner system is estimated as 15,100 mz (162,476 ftz), which includes the 3,800 mz 

12 (40,100 ftz) of painted wall area. The total volume available for placement in this external waste 

13 disposal area is 50,100 0 (65,463 yd). 

14 

15 The waste envisioned for placement within this disposal area is soil remediation-type waste. It 

16 would be delivered and placed in compacted lifts, from a 0.6-m (2-ft)-thick clean working 

17 surface, similar to the ERDF operations. Due to the location of the disposal area, lining and 

18 placing waste would be difficult. Irke ERDF, the open working area would be limited to reduce 

19 the potential for release of contaminants. Upon completion of waste placement, an interim cap 

20 would be placed on the waste. Its purpose would be to limit the potential for infiltration during 

^ 21 waste placement activities until the engineered barrier could be constructed during closure 

22 activities. 

23 

24 Construction of the liner system for Alternative 4 would be challenging because it must address 

25 scheduling requirements to maintain near-equal levels between internal and external waste 

26 placement and the technical issues associated with the liner installation. I.iner installation 

27 scheduling could present a delay to the placement of waste internally while the liner system was 

28 completed. Technical design issues include selection of an appropriate paint system for the 

29 canyon exterior, the connection of the liner to the wall, and a liner system that could be installed 

30 satisfactorily in "lifts" over an extended period of time. 

31 

32 

33 G3 CLOSE THE COMPLEX 

34 

35 This function consists of completing construction of the environmental cap over 221-U, 

36 demolition debris, and external waste disposal area that was placed immediately adjacent to it. It 

37 would also involve restoring the disturbed sites (access roads and equipment staging areas) to a 

38 grade consistent with the natural surface topography. Closure of the complex for Alternative 4 

39 would also require institutional controls and maintenance of a monitoring system. Institutional 

40 controls could consist of both physical and legal barriers to prevent access to contaminants. 

41 A closeout report would be prepared for regulatory agency approval. 

42 

^ 43 G3.1 Construct Environmental Cap 

44 

Final Feasibility Stady jor rlu Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

„ • 100 G-20

Appendix G- Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DoplR1.-2001-11 

^ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. I DrrftM 



2 barrier, and erosion protection (see Figure G•2). As discussed above, the engineered fill would 

3 be placed during the operational function concurrent with waste placement inside of 221-U and 

4 in a waste disposal area located at the top of the engineered fill. When operational activities are 

5 complete, the engineered barrier and the erosion protection layer would be constructed. This 

6 

7 

8 

9 

section discusses the completion of the environmental cap and provides the results of analyses 

performed on stability of the environmental cap. The footprint of the environmental can may bc 

§liehtlv modified to pr vide containment for nearby CERQLA remediation sites. The saccitic 

layout will be nrovided in the remedial desitm document. 

10 

11 C3.1.1 Incorporate Interim Cap. Upon completion of waste placement and the engineered 

12 fill around 221-U for Alternative 4, construction would begin on the engineered barrier. It is 

13 assumed that the interim cap and the grading fill that makes up the lower portion of the 

14 engineered barrier would be the same material. Therefore, the interim cap would be incorporated 

15 into the compacted grading fÎl. No removal cost is assumed for the interim cap due to this 

16 approach. 

17 

18 G3.1.2 Construct Engineered Barrier. The engineered barrier would be designed to prevent 


20 control potential contaminant migration by preventing water infiltration into the waste 

^21 inater3alsFLste (221-U and demolition debris). The barrier thickness would be 5 in (16 ft) 

22 

23 

24 

minimum, which meets the requirement for protection against inadvertent intruders. 

25 The bartier would be a modified RCRA Subtitle C-compliant barrier design to provide protection 

26 against water infiltration and biotic intrusion for 500 years. The barrier would be vegetated to 

27 control soil erosion and promote moisture evapotranspiration A moisture measuring system or a 

28 detection method to monitor for cpqtamination movement may be reauired r llraeutfen preHe 

29 in the barrier to monitor soil moisture and verify 

30 that water is not infiltrating through the barrier into the waste. For the purposes of the final FS 

31 report, it is assumed that the engineered barrier would be replaced one time at the end of its 

32 500-year design life. The result is that 221-U would have containment for at least 1,000 years. 

33 

34 The barrier consists of a loosely placed silt/pea gravel layer, which Is a storage medium for soil 

35 moisture. It supports evapotranspiration and vegetation growth. This layer is underlain by a 

36 compacted layerof silt. The compacted silt greatly reduces hydraulic conductivity and therefore 

37 retards vertical moisture movement. At the bottom of the compacted silt, sand and gravel layers 

38 provide a capillary break in the barrier cross section. The capillary break causes moisture to be 

39 

40 

41 

42 

retained in the overlying compacted silt layer. The sand and gravel layers are sloped to the 

outside edge of the barrier to carry any water that migrates vertically through the silt horizontally 

to the outside edge of the barrier. The drain gravels/sand are placed on a 1-m (3.2-ft).thick clay 

admixture layer. This layer provides a second barrier of low hydraulic conductivity. Below the 

(^N-43 

admixture layer is compacted clean G1l of adequate thickness to provide a total barrier depth of 

44 5 m ( 16.4 ft) over the waste, as required for an intruder barrier. 

45 

Final Feasibility Sradyfor the Canyon Disposition hrBlarivc (221-U Facility) 

Iune2003 0-21

Appendix G -Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DoFJRI.-2oo1-1i 

^ Entombment with Internal and Extertial Waste Disposal Rev. l Draft,Lt 


I The interim barrier material would become incorporated into the bottom layer of the engineered 

2 barrier. Therefore, no additional fill material is estimated for construction of the interim barrier. 

3 The total volume of material for the engineered barrier for Alternative 4 is estimated as 

4 1 135,000 m3 (176,567 ydt). 

5 

6 While not expected to be a significant concern, during final design of the engineered barrier, the 

7 potential for differential settlement at the interface between the fill directly on top of the waste- 

8 filled facility (221-U) and the fill adjacent to it should be evaluated fully. It is estimated that 

9 filling the canyon with waste could take several years. This extended period of engineered fill 

10 placement ( fill level must closely match the waste placement fill inside) around 221-U and the 

I 1 fact that the engineered fill would be constructed of locally available coarse granular material 

12 should allow for the majority of settlement of the fill prior to construction of the engineered 

13 barrier. Therefore, differential settlement at this interface is expected to be minimal. 

14 

15 G.3.13 Placc Erosion Protection. The top of the engineered barrier would have a 2% slope; 

16 the top layer would be vegetated and would contain pea gravel. Therefore, after vegetation is 

17 established, concerns for erosion from precipitation and wind would be minimized. To reduce 

18 the volume of the engineered fill while providing stability during a seismic event, a 3:H IN side 

19 slope was selected for the engineered fill. This slope would require placement of a basalt riprap- 

20 type layer for erosion protection. The erosion protection layer would also include gravel and 

^ 21 sand filter layers to carry the runoff safely to the outer toe of the environmental cap. The erosion 

22 protection slope would not be vegetated. The volume of the erosion protection is estimated as 

23 140,700 0 (184,003 yd'). 

24 

25 G.3.1A Stability Analysis of Environmental Cap. A two-dimensional stability analysis 

26 (Appendix D) was completed for the environmental cap. The layout of the environmental cap at 

27 221-U is a unique application because of the height of the engineered banier, which is nearly 

28 24 m ( 80 ft) above the surrounding grade. The controlling factor for the stability analysis was 

29 selection of a cap layout that would remain functional after enduring a design seismic event. 

30 Results from this analysis were key in determining the physical layout of the components of the 

31 cap for Alternative 4. 

32 

33 The analysis found that the engineered barrier slope must be as flat as possible to minimize the 

34 potential for eatthquake-induced cap deformations from reaching the portion of the engineered 

35 barrier that functions as a capillary break. Therefore, the engineered barrier is sloped at 2% and 

36 does not extend down the sides of the environmental cap. In addition, the barrier must extend 

37 out far enough from 221-U that a potential earthquake-induccd crack (estimated to be 5 cm 

38 [2 in.] or less) resulting from movement in the 3:I1 to IN side slope of the environmental cap 

39 would be outside the waste area requiring infiltration protection from the engineered barrier. 

40 With these layout parameters addressed, the environmental cap can provide the required 

41 containment during a 500-year life. 

42 

43 The environmental cap layout is affected most by the need for a minimal slope on the engineered 

^44 barrier to remain functional and not by the waste type (such as soil remcdiation or containerized 

45 waste) covered or the dual-liner system beneath the external waste unit. During final design of 

Final Femsibility Srudyfnr the Cenyoar Diiposiifon lnitiative (221-U Facility) 

Jura 1^ 0-22

^ 

I . .. 

Appendix G- Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DoFJltt.-zoo1-11 

Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. l Drrflll 

RediinclStrikeout 

1 the environmental cap, a finite element analysis method should be used to define the final cap 

2 layout dimensions and confirm that the engineered barrier components are properly sized for the 

3 design seismic event. Additional discussion of the barrier is provided in Section 4.2 of this final 

4 FS report. 

6 G.3.2 Revegetate Site 

7 

8 The excavations from demolition activities would be backi-elled with compacted clean soil and 

9 clean concrete rubble. Fill contours would match adjacent contours. Material for backfill would 

10 come from both stockpiled material and the borrow source. The borrow source is assumed to be 

11 within the Hanford Site, but has not yet been identified. 

12 



15 application of an approved native grass seed mixture. Existing roads damaged by the demolition 

16 would be returned to their pre-project condition. 

17 

18 G3.3 Cleanup Complex 

19 


(^',21 materials. 

22 

23 G3A Sustain Post-Closure 

24 


26 Institutional controls could consist of both physical and legal barriers to prevent access to 

27 contaminants. In addition, certain activities would need to be prohibited so that the groundwater 

28 and Columbia River water quality are protected. Post-closure care would consist of periodic 

29 inspections and maintenance to verify the success of the revegetation effort. 

30 

31 G.3.4.1 Establish Institutional Controls. Specific institutional controls associated with this 

32 alternative would be developed as the remedy is further defined in the remedial design report and 

33 implemented through an update to the Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan forflanford CERCLA 


35 methods of controlling land use. Physical methods of controlling access to waste sites are signs, 

36 entry control, excavation permits, artificial or natural batriers, and active surveillance. Physical 

37 access controls would be designed to preclude unintentional trespassing and minimize wildlife 

38 access. Physical restrictions are effective in protecting human health by reducing the potential 

39 for contact with contaminated media and avoiding adverse environmental, worker safety, and 

40 community safety impacts that arise from the potential release of contaminants. They require 

41 ongoing monitoring and maintenance. Public notices and community relation efforts would 

42 supplement site surveillance efforts. The DOE, or subsequent land managers, could enforce 

(O^N43 land-use restrictions as long as risks were above unrestricted land-use levels. The DOE would 

44 continue to use fencing, excavation permits, and the badging program to control access to the 

F(nal Feasibility SardyJor tlie Canyon Dispofitian Initiative (?Il •U Facility) 

)une 30Oi G-23

i^ 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

(Om*^21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

('^'43 

44 

45 


Entombment with Internal and Exte'rnal Waste Disposal 

DOFIRI,2001-11 

Rev. 1 Draft.j,i 


area for as long as it maintains control over the land. Signs would be maintained prohibiting 

public access. 

Legal restrictions would include both administrative and real-property actions intended to reduce 

or prevent future human exposure to contaminants remaining on site by restricting the use of the 

including groundwater use for drinking water or irrigation. land-usc restrictions and 

controls on reat-property development are effective in providing a degree of human health 

protection by minimizing the potential for contact with contaminated media. Land-use 

restrictions will be put in place, as necessary, until such time as the federal government ceases 

ownership of the property. The DOE, or subsequent land managers, would enforce land-use 

restrictions as long as risks were above acceptable levels. 

After cleanup, site land-use controls would be established through easements and covenants to 

prevent development. The DOE, or subsequent land managers, would enforce land-use 


Groundwater-use restrictions would be required so that groundwater is not used as a drinking 

water source as long as contaminant concentrations are above federal and state drinking water 

standards and WAG 173-340 - VFFC4 B groundwater protection standards. Irrigation would also 

need to be restricted on the footprint of the environmental cap. Well drilling, except for the 

purposes of monitoring, research, or other uses authorized by the Tri-Parties, would be 

prohibited until groundwater cleanup levels comply with these drinking water standards. 

G.3A.2 Maintain Monitoring System. A moisture measuring system or a detection method to 

monitor for contamination movement may be Mquired to determine if the barrier is orming 

(e.g., 

Long-term site-specific monitoring requirements for Alternative 4 would not be determined until 

post-ROD activities (e.g., during final design in preparation of the remedial design 

report/remedial action work plan). It is expected that long-term monitoring would occur over the 

1,000-year performance period and consist of either groundwater monitoring or vadose zone 

monitoring, but it is not expected that both monitoring efforts would be required at the 

221-U Facility. The specific monitoring system design and its requirements would be 

established as part of the operations and maintenance plan for the 200 Area-wide groundwater 

operable unit remediation activities associated with the 200-UP-1 Operable Unit. 

Post-closure care would comply with the following functions as defined in Washington 

Administrative Code 173-303-665(6). The functions were selected as being representative of the 



ne 1003 G-24

Appendix G- Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DOEIRI.-2001-1l 

^ Entombment with Internal and Extertial Waste Disposal Rev. I Drrft B 

RedlindStrikeout 

2 • Limit access to the environmental cap 

3 

4 • Maintain the integrity and effectiveness of the final cover (engineered barrier), including 

5 making repairs to the barrier, as necessary, to correct the effects of settling, subsidence, 

6 erosion, or other events 

8 • Maintain and monitor the groundwater monitoring systems 

9 

10 • Prevent runon and runoff from eroding or otherwise damaging the final cover (engineered 

11 barrier) 

12 

13 • Protect and maintain surveyed benchmarks. 

14 

15 Post-closure care would consist mainly of periodic inspections to identify erosion or settling. 

16 Either of these items could lead to infiltration of the barrier. If settling is identified, the resultant 

17 depressions would be filled and reseeded. The post-closure cost estimate includes replacement 

18 of the engineered barrier after 500 years. 

19 

20 Monitoring of the barrier and the vadose zone or groundwater would be performed over the 

^21 1,000-year performance period to verify the effectiveness of the waste placement activities and 

22 containment provided by the engineered batrier. Periodic sampling of monitoring stations would 

23 be performed followed by comprehensive laboratory analyses. 

24 

25 

26 GA REFERENCES 

27 

28 10 CFR 835, "Occupational Radiation Protection," Code ojFederal Regulations, as amended. 

29 

30 64 FR 61615, 1999, "Hanford Comprehensive Land-Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement 

31 (HCP EIS), Hanford Site, Richland, Washington; Record of Decision (ROD)," Federal 


33 

34 BIB, 1998, Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility Waste Acceptance Criteria, 


36 

37 BHI, 2001a, Canyon Disposition Initiative: Preliminary AIARA Evaluation for Final Feasibility 

38 Study Alternatives 1, 3, 4, and 6 (CCN 089828 to G. M. MacFarlan, Bechtel Hanford, 

39 Inc. from J. C. Wiles and It. C. Free, Jr., May 31), Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, 


41 

42 BHI, 2001b, Supplemental Waste Acceptance Criteria for Bulk Shipments to the Environmental 

("*N43 Restoration Disposal Facility, 000oX-DC-W0001, Rev. 2, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., 


Final Feasibility Smdy jor the Canyon Disposition initiatPve (221-U Facility) 

J une IOn^ 

G-25

^ 

. , , ,... 

Appendix G - Detailed Description or Alternative 4 : DOFJRL-2001-1 I 

^ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. I Dranl.l 


1 

2 Casbon, M. A., 1995, Design Analysis. Construction of W-296 Environmental Restoration 

3 Disposal Facility, BHI-00355, Rev. 00, Vol. 1, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, 

4 Washington. 

5 

6 DOE,1999, Final flanford Comprehensive Land Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement, 

7 DOE/EIS-0222-F, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 

8 

9 DOE 0 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, U.S. Department of 

10 ^ Energy, Washington, D.C. 

11 

12 DOE-RL, 2002, Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan for CERCLA Response Actions, 

13 DOE/RIr2001-41, Rev. 0. Draft, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations 

14 Office, Rich)and, Washington. 

15 

16 DOE-RI.. 2003,EQnesedFeasibilitv Study for the UPjant Closure Area Wa.ste Sites. DOElRL- 

17 2003-23. Rev.0^Draft A. U.S. Department of Energy. Richland 

18 Opcrations Office. Richland. Washineton. 

19 

20 Resource Conservation and RecoveryAct of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 6901, et seq. 

t^21 

22 Smyth, W. W., 2001, Structural Calculations Supporting the Final Feasibility Studyfor the 

23 Canyon Disposition Initiative. 221-U Facility, HNF-8379, Fluor Hanford, Inc., 


25 

26 WAC 173-303, "Dangerous Waste Regulations," Washington Administrative Code, as amended. 

27 

28 WAC 173-340,'•Model Toxics Control Act - Clcanup," Washington Administrative Code, 


30 

(^N 

Ffnal Feasibiliry Strrdy forU+e Canyon Disposition IniNatire (221-V Faelliry) 

un 1 003 G-26

n 

( ' 

. , . 

Appendix G- Detailed Description of Alternative 4: 

^ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal 

1 Figure G-1. Alternative 4: Plan View of Cnvironmental Cap. 

2 

^X 

E 

„^ 

^.' 

WASTE UNER 

. 

L^ 

234m_ 

86m^ 

rVA 

s .. 

^^•^' EROSION 

PROTECTION 

^• 

t 

7 :1 SLOPE 

TW. 

K 

221-U BLCG. 

DOF/RL-2001-11 

Rev. 1 Dratt I3 


WASTE FILL 

U.S DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

CANYON DISPOSAL INRIAT{VE 

DOE ÊLO omcE. R^cNUNO FINAL FEASIBILITY STUDY 

NANIORD ENNRONYENTAL RESTGRATION PROCRAM ALT. 4 - PLAN 

I 

ALT-4JM1.pWG 

Final Feasitriliry Studyjor the Canyon Dispatftion lnitiative (221-V Fatility) 

)une 2003 G-27

^• 

f 

f 

2 

3 

Appendix G- Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DoERl-2001-11 

^ Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev.1 Draa n 


Fii;ure C-2. Aiternative 4: Cross Section of Environmental Cap. 

E E 

10 

^ 

'N 

1 

2 

3 

APPENDIX G 

ATTACHMENT G1-FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 

4 

5 

6 G.1 PREPARE EXISTING COMPLEX 

7 G.1.1 Control hazards 

DOFJRI.-2001-1 t 

Rev.O Drafi 

H£dl!inc/SlLik4t!it 

8 G.1.1.1 Establish hazards protection 

9 G.1.1.1.1 Control health and safety hazards 

10 G.1.1.1.2 Control environmental hazards 

11 G.1.1.2 Manage hazardous materials 

12 0.1.1.2.1 Characterize hazardous materials 

13 G.1.1.2.2 Decontaminate areas and systems 

14 G.1.1.2.3 Prepare hazardous materials for processing and disposition 

15 G.1.2 Establish Infrastructure 

16 0.1.2.1 Modify existing infrastruture 

17 G.1.2.1.1 Water 

18 G.1.2.1.2 Sewer 

19 G.1.2.1.3 Electrical 

20 G.1.2.1.4 1NAC 

21 G.1.2.1.5 Lighting 

22 G.1.2.1.6 Recenify bridge crane 

23 G.1.2.1.7 Install new roof system 

24 G.1.2.2 Establish support facilities 

25 G.1.2.2.1 Modifications to the existing building 

26 G.1.2.2.2 Install mobile office units 

27 G.1.2.3 Establish staging areas 

28 G.1.23.1 Establish personnel staging areas (change rooms, operations, 


30 G.1.2.3.2 Establish equipment staging areas (maintenance, repair, 


32 frisking, parking....) 

33 G.1.3 Modify Facility 

34 G.1.3.1 Prepare facility for use 

35 G.13.1.1 Inspect 271-U for its role during preparing the complex 

36 0.13.1.2 Identify 221-U building modifications, if any, required for its 


38 G.13.1.3 Add new air handler (roof mounted) with replaceable HEPA 

39 filters on 221-U to replace the ventilation tunnel 

("N 40 G.1.3.1.4 Grout cell drain header and ventilation tunnel 

Final Feasibility Studyjor the Canyon Disposition initiative (221-U Facility) 

June zOn3 G-29

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DOEIRI.-20o1-1 t 

Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. A nrrfi 

R edtin St 'kcnW 

AITACHNII~NT Cl - FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 

I G.13.2 Disposal of Contaminated Equipment in 221-U 

2 0.1.3.2.1 Size and dismantle equipment from canyon floor 

3 G.1.3.2.2 Place canyon eqmt into cells 

4 G.1.3.2.3 Fog cell/cqmt with fixative 

5 G.1.3.2.4 Grout cells and replace cover blocks 

6 G.1.3.2.5 Pressure grout cells once cover blocks in place 

7 G.1.3.2.6 Remove pipe from Operating Gallery to allow container 

g placement. 

9 ' G.1.3.2.7 Remove the bails from the cell cover blocks 

10 G.1.33 D&D Railroad Tunnel 

11 0.133.1 Remove soil cover from rail tunnel 

12 G.1.3.3.2 Fix contamination on tunnel interior 

13 G.13.3.3 Demolish rail tunnel. Clear demolition debris to allow truck 

14 access to Ce113. Place containcrized and other wastes into 

15 Ce113 (rail tunnel) 

16 G.133.4 Construct concrete wall to close rail tunnel opening in canyon 

17 0.1.3.3.5 Grout Cel13 solid with covers in place 

(^'18 G.1.3.3.6 Place demolition debris into tunnel section (inner half) 

19 G.1.3.3.7 Fill voids if found in demolition debris w/ flowable grout 

20 G.1.3.4 Not Pipe Trench 

21 G.1.3.4.1 Remove Cover blocks 

22 G.1.3.4.2 Fog trcncblpiping with fixative 

23 G.13.4.3 Grout pipe trench full with pipes in place and replace cover 

24 blocks 

25 G.13.4.4 Pressure grout trench once cover blocks in place 

26 0.1.3.4.5 Remove the bails from the hot pipe trench cover blocks 

27 0.1.3.5 Remove Surface Contamination 

28 0.1.3.5.1 Assume forAlternative 4 no surface contamination removal is 

29 needed. 

30 G.1.3.6 F'tx contamination on 221-U interior surfaces 

31 G.1.3.6.1 Building interior (canyon walls, floor & roof) 

32 G.13.6.2 Inspect and verify 

33 C.1.4 Modify external area 

34 G.1.4.1 Disposition external aboveground legacy structures and systems within 


36 G.1.4.1.1 Disposition 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility 

37 G.1.4.1.2 Disposition 271-U office building 

38 G.1.4.1.3 Disposition Front and Rear Stairs for 221-U 

n39 G.1.4.1.4 211-U Tank Farm and 211-UA Tank Farm 

40 G.1.4.1.5 Disposition 241-WR Vault Thorium Storage 

41 G.1.4.1.6 Disposition 2714-U Warehouse 

Final Feasibility Study for the Canyon Disposition Inilintive (221-U Facility) 

June 2(N13 0-30

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DoEIRI.-2001-11 

I Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev.AL ,aft n 

n $ed1iuLSS[.ibcstul 

ATTACHMENT Gl - FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 

1 G.1.4.1.7 Disposition 275-UR Chemical Storage Warehouse 

2 G.1.4.1.8 Disposition 200-W-44 Sand Filter 

3 G.1.4.1.9 Disposition 291-U Process Unit Plant 

4 G.I.4.1.10 Disposition 291-U Stack 

5 G.1.4.1.11 Disposition 222-U Office Lab 

6 G.1.4.1.12 Disposition 224-U Concentration Facility, U03 Plant 

7 G.1.4.1.13 Disposition 224-UA Calcination Facility 

8 G.1.4.1.14 Disposition 272-U Maintenance Shop 

9 G.1.4.1.15 Disposition 292-U Stack Monitoring Station 

10 G.1 A.1.16 Disposition 2715-UA Maintenance Shop 

11 G.1.4.2 Disposition all buried piping which are located beneath the proposed 

12 environmental cap 

13 G.1.4.2.1 Remove air tunnel outside 221-U 

14 G.1.4.2.2 Remove misc yard piping and encasements 

15 G.1.4.3 Confirm remediation of waste sites within environmental cap footprint 

16 G.1.4.3.1 216-U-4 Reverse Well 

17 G.1.4.3.2 216-U- 4A French Drain 

n 18 G.1.4.3.3 216-U-413 French Drain 

19 G.1.43.4 216-U-STrench 

20 G.1.4.3.5 216-U-6 Trench 

21 G.1.43.6 216-U-7 French Drain 

22 G.1..4.3.7 224-U-HWSA 

23 G.1.43.8 241-UX-154 Diversion Box 

24 G.1.43.9 241-UX-302A Catch Tank 

25 G.1.4.3.10 2607-W-7 Septic Tank and Drain Field 

26 G.1.4.3.11 UPR 200-W33 

27 G.1.4.3.12 UPR 200-W-39 

28 G.1.43.13 UPR 200-W-46 

29 G.1.43.14 UPR 200-W-55 

30 G.1A3.15 UPR 200-W-60 

31 G.1.4.3.16 UPR 200-W-78 

32 G.1.4.3.17 UPR 200-W-101 

33 0.1.4.3.18 UPR200-W-118 

34 G.1.43.19 UPR 200-W-138 

35 0.1.43.20 UPR 200-W-162 

36 G.1.4.4 Confirm that wells located within environmental cap have been 

37 decommissioned 

38 G.1.4.4.1 299-W 19-8 

39 0.1.4.4.2 299-W19-55 

,---,40 G. i.4.4.3 299-W19-98 

Final Feasibility Study jor the Canyon Dirposirion Initlafive (221-U Facility) 

G-31

Appendix G- Detailed Description of Alternative 4: DOEI[ur2001-11 

Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. e l DrafW 

^ R^l^t^t^^ctpt 

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("'_^36 

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ATTACIiMENT GI -FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 

G.1.43 Earthwork to prepare working area adjacent to 221-U 

G.1.4.5.1 Prepare area along northwest side 

G.1.4.5.2 Prepare area along southeast side 

G.1.5 Manage Hazardous Wastes 

G.1.5.1 Identify waste generated 

0.1.5.2 Prepare inventory of waste shipments to ERDF and elsewhere 

G.2 OPERATE EXISTING COMPLEX 

G.2.1 Emplace Waste In 221-U Galleries 

G.2.1.1 Fill Electrical Gallery with containerized waste 

G.2.1.2 Grout Electrical Gallery through Pipe Gallery floor 

G.2.13 Fill Pipe Gallery with containcrized waste 

0.2.1.4 Grout Pipe Gallery through Operating Gallery floor 

G.2.1.5 Fill Operating Gallery with containerized waste 

0.2.1.6 Grout Operating Gallery 

G.2.2 Emplace Waste In 221-U 

G.2.2.1 Modify Canyon End Walls 

G.2.2.1.1 Reinforce end walls with installation of steel beam grid 

G.2.2.1.2 Install moveable rollup door for access on southwest end wall 

G.2.2.2 Fill Canyon Operating Deck and Crane Way With Waste 

G.2.2.2.1 Place cargo containerized waste using forklift 

G.2.2.2.2 Grout inside and on exterior of containers 

G.2.2.2.3 After layer of containers placed and grouted, pour topping 

slab of grout (shielding) and concrete slab (working surface) 

G.2.2.2.4 Begin placement of next layer of cargo containers (place 3 

layers total). Move rollup door in end wall up with each 

layer. 

G.2.2.2.5 Place waste containers in craneway 

G.2.2.2.6 Place waste in burial boxes for fourth and final layer 

0.2.2.2.7 Grout burial boxes inside and out similar to cargo boxes 

G.2.2.2.8 Drill access holes through roof for grouting last lift beneath 

roof slab. Drill additional holes for pressure grouting under 

the roof slab. 

C.23 Install Engineered Fill 

0.2.3.1 Compacted granular fill against 221-U extcrior walls to closely follow 

elevation of waste placetnentinside canyon. 

Finaf FeasibilirySrady jor the Canyon DispoaUion lniriative (221•11 Faeifiry) 

mc 200 3 G-32

t^ 

^ 

Appendix G - Detailed Description of Alternative 4: noFJRL-2ool-1i. 

Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal Rev. p Dra 

^diine/Strikcout 

ATTACHMENT Gl - FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 

1 G.23.2 Complete engineered fiil to dimensions ready for placement of 

2 engineered barrier and erosion protection. 

3 G.2.4 Place External Waste at 221-U 

4 G.2.4.1 Install double liner/leachate collection system 

5 G.2.4.2 Prepare infiltration barrier for exterior wall surface of 221-U which is 

6 above double liner 

7 0.2.4.3 Place external waste (soil remediation type waste) and compact in lifts 

8 G.2.4.4 Place interim cap over waste 

9 

10 

1 l G3 CLOSE THE COMPLEX 

12 G3.1 Construct Environmental Cap 

13 0.3.1.1 Incorporate interim cap material into engineered barrier 

14 G.3.1.2 Construct engineered barrier 

15 G.3.13 Place erosion protection layer on 3:1 fill slopes 

16 G.3.1.4 Stability Analysis of Environmental Cap 

17 G3.2 Revegetate site 

18 09.2.1 Prepare all disturbed areas and engineered barrier for seeding 

19 G.3.2.2 Apply approved seed mix and soil fixative 

20 G33 Pick up and clean the complex 

21 G.3.3.1 Remove excess equipment and materials 

22 G.3.3.2 Conduct final walkdown 

23 G3.4 Sustain Post Closure 

24 G.3.4.1 Establish institutional controls 

25 0.3.4.1.1 Establish access restrictions 

26 G.3.4.1.2 Establish deed restrictions 

27 G.3.4.1.3 Establish restrictions on use of the complex 

28 0.3.4.2 Maintain monitoring system 

29 0.3.4.2.1 Monitorgroundwatcr 

30 G.3.4.2.2 Monitor neutron probes below engineered barrier 

31 G.3.4.2.3 Periodically inspect barrier for erosion & settlement 

32 

Final Ftasibility StudyJor the Canyon Disposiliai iniriatlve (221-U Facility) 

^ itme 2003 G-33

^• 

^ 


Entombment with Internal and External Waste Disposal 

Final FeasibiliryStadyfar the Canyon DispotJtion !n(tiattor (221 •U Facility) 

J une I 


Rev. A I Dr(^ 

Rxs!lin.cLS 'tnkeosn 

G-34

^ 

^ 

1 

APPENDIX H 

2 


4 CLOSE IN PLACE - COLLAPSED STRUCTURE 

Final £easibiliry Srady jor the Canyon pisyosftion lnitiatnk (221-U FaciGry) 

June 100 

DOE/RL-2001-11 

Rev. 9LDzJi 13 

^,'^pÊriS c 

•o u 

H-i

^ 

^ 

t"'^N 

1 

2 

DOElRL-2001-I1 

Rev. 9Lpraft 3 

Redline/Strikcout 

Final Feasibility Smdyjor t/u Canyon Disposition lnftiative (221-U Facility) 

J une 1001 H-il

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Rev.61 Dr,U 

Re IinclStril.cout 

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 

2 

3 

4 H DETAILED DESCRfPTION OF ALTERNATIVE 6: CLOSE IN PLACE- 

5 COLLAPSED STRUCTURE ....................................................................................... H-1 

i1.1 

H.2 

H.3 

H.4 

FIGURES 

H-1. Alternative 6: Cross Section of Environmental Cap ............................................. ...... H-25 

H-2. Alternative 6: Plan View of Environmental Cap ..........................................................H-26 

ATTACHMENT 

PREPARE EXISTING COMPLEX ....................................................................H-4 

H.1.1 Control Hazards....... ...............................................................................H-4 

H.1.2 Establish Infnastructtue ...................................................................._......H-7 

H.1.3 Modify Facility........._ ....................................................................._......H-8 

H.1.4 Modify External Area .......................................... .................................. H-13 

H.1.5 Manage Hazardous Materials ................................................................H-15 

OPERATE THE COMPLEX ............................................................................H-15 

H.2.1 Emplace Waste in 221-U Galleries .......................................................H-15 

H.2.2 Demolition of 221-U Building ......... _ ..................................................H-17 

CLOSE THE COMPLEX . .................... ....... .................................................... H-18 

H.3.1 Consttuct Environmental Cap ............................................... ................ H-19 

H.3.2 Revegetate Site ................. _................................................... ................ H-20 

H.33 Cleanup Complex ............. _............................... ................... _.............. H-20 

H.3.4 Sustain Post-Closure ........ ................................. _............................ .....H-21 

RF.FERENCES ............................................................... .................................. H-23 

HI FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY ..................................................................................... H-27 

Finaf Feasibi[iry Study for the Canyon Disposition Atitiative (221-U Facility) 

u • 2tbl 

H-iii

t^N 

(M"N 

Final Feasibifity Stady jar the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

DOFJRL-2001-1 I 

Rev. A-LDrrfc B 

cdlinc/Strikoout 

June 1009 H-[V

t^ 

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('\43 

44 

APPENDIX H 

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVE 6: 

CLOSE IN PLACE - COLLAPSED STRUCTURE 


Rev. 19 nraU 

Redline/Sarikcout 


221-U Facility. This alternative involves the disassembly and demolition of the 221-U Facility 

to approximately its canyor„deck elevation. Building demolition debris would be 

placed adjacent to and within the 221-U footprint. Available space within the ^taining 

SIFUNM aan y2n process ce ll s would be used for disposal of 

and process cells . After waste-equipment placement, remaining voids in tanks. around the 

ggainment. and in the remaining 221 -U structure would be filled with grout. The intent of the 

grouting is to minimize the potential for 221-U slab or wall movement. The grout also would 

provide uniform support for waste and/or soil placed above the cells and gallery slabs. The 

building and demolition debris would be protected from water infiltration by an engineered 

barrier. The engineered barrier would be placed on top of engineered fill that would cover the 

building and debris. The side slopes of the engineered fill would be constructed with an erosion 

protection layer. Together, these three elements make up the environmental cap. Structures 

attached to 221-U and adjacent structures located within the footprint of the environmental cap 

would be demolished as part of this alternative. Waste sites located within the cap footprint 

would be remediated by others prior to the stan of Alternative 6 activities. 

Alternative 6 would be implemented in coordination with cleanup of the U-Planr ClasureArea. 

The U Plant Closure Area remediation approach is described in a focused feasibility xtudy 

fDOE-RL 2003) and includes-thc remediation of waste sites: removal actions for associated 


1. This alternative does not include remediation of waste sites within the perimeter of the 

environmental cap. It is assumed that these sites would be addressed by other projects in 

time to implemcnt Alternative 6. Rcmediation of waste sites beyond the Alternative 6 

environmental cap footprint are outside the Alternative 6 scope and would be addressed by 

future projects using the remedial action alternative selected for the appropriate 200 Area 

operable unit. For cost-estimating putposes, it is assumed that there are no contamination 

plumes above Washington ,9dmiqistrative Cade fWACI 173-34 

{-kFFC.A) industriallintits associated with the Alternative 6 activities. During Alternative 6 

activities (such as buried pipe and exterior air tunnel removal), i f soil contamination above 

NMA WAC 173-340 industrial limits is identified, then the Tti-Parties would need to 

evaluate the situation and decide whether to remove the contamination. Contaminated 

Final Fearibility Study jor the Canyon OrJposirlon lniriaNve (221-U Facility) 

1 00.1 H-1

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r"`%43 

44 

Appendix Ii - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoEIR1.-2o01-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. jA ra 

RedlinclStrikegut 

equipment and piping from demolition activities would be disposed at the Environmental 

Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF). 

2. For removal and hauling to ERDF, remediation waste would be in accordance with ERDF 

waste acceptance criteria (BF1I 1997, 2001b), and comnliance with size and weight 

reouirements would be coordinated with ERDF operations staff during final design if this 

alternative is selected. Unless otherwise noted in this appendix, wastes from legacy structure 

removal and removal of the operating gallery equipment and piping would be disposed at 

ERDF. 

3. No surface contamination removal is necessary for Alternative 6. All concrete surfaces 

would receive applications of fixative. 

4. Attached facilities to be decontaminated and decommissioned in support of implementation 

of Alternative 6 are the 221-U Facility (partial demolition including the railroad tunnel), 

271-U Office Building, and 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility. In addition, aboveground 

facilities that are within the footprint of the Alternative 6 environmental cap would be 

removed as part of the Alternative 6 activities. These facilities are the 211-U and 211-UA 

Tank Farms, 241-WR Vault Thorium Storage. 2714-U Warehouse, 275-UR Chcmical 

Storage Warehouse, 200-W-44 Sand Filter, 291-U Process Unit Plant, 291-U-1 Stack, 

292-U Stack Monitoring Station, 296-U-10 Stack, 222-U Office Lab, 224-U Concentration 

Facility, and 224-UA Calcination Facility. The remediation or these facilitiec Is to be 

nerfotmed by others and, therefore, such remediation work Is not accounted for In the 

Alternative 6 cost estimate. Ilowever, disonsition and removal of the same racllities 

5. Waste sites that are within the footprint of the Alternative 6 environmental cap and must be 

remediated by other projects in time to support Alternative 6 include the 216-U-4 Reverse 

Well; 216-U-4A French Drain; 216-U-7 French Drain; 216-U-15 Trench; 224-U-HWSA; 

224-U CNT; 241-UX-154 Diversion Box; 241-UX-302A Catch Tank; 2607-W-7 Septic Tank 

and Drain Field; unplanned releases (UPRs) UPR 200-W-39, UPR 200-W-55, 

UPR 200-W-60, UPR 200-W-78, UPR 200-W-101, UPR 200-W-1 17, UPR 200-W-118, 

UPR 200-W-125, UPR 200-W-138, and UPR 200-W-162; and portions of process lines 

associated with 200-W-42, 200-W-84, and UPR-600-20. Three wells are located within the 

footprint of the environmental cap: wells 299-W 19-8, 299-W 19-55, and 299-W19-98. It is 

assumed that these wells would be decommissioned prior to the start of Alternative 6. This 

work acppejs not included in the cost estimate. 

6. Removal, decontamination, and demolition operations for contaminated equipment being 

stered-insidc of 221-U would be performed using conventional, proven technologies. 

Final Feasibitiry Srudyjor the Canyon Disposition lniriative (221-U Facility) 

J un e 2003 H-2

^ 

..'. / 

Appendix H- Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DOE(R1.-2001-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure 1tev.1A rA(t 

$edline/Strikcou{ 

7. Following minor mechanical modification and recertification, the existing main crane in the 

221-U Facility would be functional and ready for use in Alternative 6 activities. Crane use 

would be limited to moving of equipment from the process cells to the canyon fieer4 c c 

where the equipment would be size reduced as necessary and placed back into the cells. The 

main crane would also be used to move the equipment from the canyon deck during size and 

volume reduction and placement into the process cells. The crane would be used for cover 

block movement, as well. 

3^ 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 8. All underground piping systems located beneath the environmental cap footprint for 

10 Alternative 6 would be ¢routed in place or removed based on the outcome of risk as 

11 work. -This-J(:removed. the waste would be disposed at ERDF. 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

9. The 221-U Canyon Aeerdc k elevation is estimated at 221.5 m (726.5 ft). 

20 11. The 221-U Facility is located within the exclusive land•use boundary identified in the Final 

^21 Hanford Comprehensive Land-Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1999) and 

22 the associated "Hanford Comprehensive land-Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement 

23 (HCP EIS), Hanford Site, Richland, Washington: Record of Decision (ROD)" (64 Federal 

24 Register 61615). This implies that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) would remain in 


26 

27 

management activities. 

28 12. Decontamination limits for loose surface and fixed contamination would be based on 

29 preliminary remediation goals. 

30 

31 

nteFy fer 

32 dispesel et921U. 

33 44:1LOnly Aemedietien-lcgacv eauinment from 221-U 

34 Rrocess cells and tmeratiagAocxt:anyon deck would be disposed in the facility. No new 

35 waste from outside 221 -ILwould be placed in the process cells or galleries or around the 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

exterior of the buildinp- 

44 

45 

46:J4. Because of the uncertainties associated with the volume of contaminated equipment 

currently located on the canyon fleerie and inside of the process cells of 221-U and with 

10. The canyon interior (including the process cells, hot pipe trench, and associated ventilation 

tunnel) and the rail tunnel interior are considered contaminated. The galleries are considered 

to be uncontaminated except for some areas of the southeast wall that would require fixative 

application. 

Final Feasibility Studyjorthe Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

)uno 2003 11-3

(00^1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

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41 

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^43 

44 

Appendix H- Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoEIRI.-2oo1-11 

I Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. 10.rafso 

Red litt S t 'kenu! 

the degree of equipment volume reduction that is achievable, it is assumed that only this 

contaminated equipment would be disposed in the 221-U cells. It is further assumed that 

there may be equipment placement in cel13. which connect.c to the rail tunnel. 

(-1-^j.L`The existing 0.6-m (24-in.)-diamcter cell drain header located beneath 221-U would be 

grouted to immobilize contamination in this pipe. 

^48:J^LA new ventilation system with replaceable high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter 

banks would be installed on the northeast end of the 221-U roof. It would replace the 

existing ventilation tunnel and stack ventilation system. 

49:I7Intemal void spaces essceiat . inside of 221-U would be filled with 

grout and pressure grouted. Where large voids are grouted (such as oFeund the vaige 

eentainers in the allgeries and inside the cells), a low-cement-content grout would be used. 

This grout has a limited potential for heat buildup due to a low heat of hydration yet would 

provide sufficient compressive strength for the intended service. 

^20:J$.While sources for some materials required for construction of an environmental cap have 

not yet been identified, it is assumed that sufficient quantities of materials necessary for the 

clean fill and construction of the environmental cap are available locally. 

24-.12.A modified Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) Subtitle C 

engineered barrier would be placed over the 221-U Building and wherever demolished 

building sections are placed outside of the footprint of 221-U. No liner would be placed 

under the building wastes placed to the northwest of 221-U. The building sections (roof and 

canyon wall sections) are not considered RCRA-type wastes and would be located under the 

engineered barrier. 

H.1 PREPARE EXISTING COMPLEX 

This function provides for.the necessary programs, administrative and physical controls, 

safeguards, and infrastructure to prepare the complex for subsequent operating and closing the 

complex functions. The purpose of these activities is to establish a complex-wide configuration 

designed to support wastepreeessing;decontamination, demolition, and closure. 

11.1.1 Control Hazards 

Preparing for Alternative 6 would include controlling hazards at the site. This control would 

begin with preparation of a decommissioning plan. The plan would include, but not be limited 

to, such things as readiness evaluations, hazard classifications, waste designation, a waste 

Final Feasibility Srudyfor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221•I! Facility) 

]u x 2tlnl H-4

... 

Appendix H- Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoEI[tL-2001-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. jaJJ3fB 

^ tLedlinc/Strikeout 

1 profile, a health and safety plan, and site-specific waste management instnictions. This planning 


3 

4 11.1.1.1 Establish Hazards Protection. The potential personnel and environmental hazards 


6 routine operations and those hazards involving the nonroutine activities of large-scale demolition 

7 operations. Specifically, they are industrial and radiological in nature. Hazard mitigation would 

8 involve the implementation of engineering and administrative controls that address both 

9 personnel and environmental protection. 

10 

i l H.1.1.1.1 Control Health and Safety Hazards. Personnel would encounter industrial hazards 


13 those that are encountered on any large-scale construction and demolition project. including 

14 unique hazards associated with demolition opcrations that include crane operation, concreta 







^. 21 






27 shoes as a minimum and any additional safety equipment as required by job-specific 




31 

32 High radiation areas and very high radiation areas would be encountered and would primarily be 

33 a concern during equipment removal. For example, approximately 25% of the cells have 

34 equipment and materials that have high radiation levels that exceed 1,000 mrem/hr. The 

35 maximum gamma dose rate in cell 30 was 190.000 mrom/hr (BHI 2001a). Also, the most 



38 local exhaust ventilation of the decontamination equipment, personal protective equipment, the 

39 existing facility exhaust system, and administrative controls and physical controls. 

40 Decontamination or fixing of loose or smearable contamination would be performed prior to any 

41 removal/demolition activities. Radiological limits for worker protection are provided in 10 Code 

42 of Federal Regulations (CFR) 835. 

r143 



Final Feasibility Study jor the Canyon DiWsition lnitiative ( 221•U Facility) 

1 J un e ^ 3 lI-5

,.r.. . 

Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoUiu,-2oo1-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structtire Rev. je Dran n 

ReJlinc/, tr k out 

I however, criteria would require that exposures be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). 

2 Administrative controls would include radiation work permits, exposure limits, and escort 

3 requirements. Physical controls would include batriers, postings, and personnel surveys. In 

4 accordance with site procedures, administrative and physical controls applicable to this project 

5 would be defined in job-specific work plans and procedures. Compliance with the job-specific 

6 work practices and procedures would ensure that personnel exposures do not exceed allowable 

7 limits. 

8 




12 operating personnel would be minimized to the extent practicable. 

13 

14 11.1.1.1.2 Control Environmental Hazards. The potential dispetsion/migration of dangerous 

15 and/or radioactive waste would be an inherent risk of Alternative 6. Wind is the principal cause 

16 of dispersion, and water is the main transport mechanism for migration. Dangerous/radioactive 



19 DOE Order 5400.5, Radiation Protection ofthe Public and the Environment. 

20 

r 21 Implementing a combination of procedural and physical controls would mitigate wind dispersion 

22 of contaminants. Procedural controls would typically consist of wind-speed restrictions on work 

23 activities. Also, demolition techniques (such as diamond wire sawing) would be selected due in 

24 part to their ability to minimize contamination dispersion. Physical controls would include spray 

25 fixatives ( i.e., water sprays and chemical coagulants), minimizing the size of the work area, 

26 pressurized application of concrete slurries through a hose and nozzle (guniting), clean fill, 

27 and/or containerization. Radiation air monitoring would be performed on the work site perimeter 

28 to confirm the effectiveness of airborne contamination control. 

29 


31 procedural and physical controls. Procedural controls would consist of work restrictions during 


33 include a combination of temporary shelters and/or sealing products. ShelieFswouldbetased! 

34 sAield-wASte^rem-pceFiPitatien-Dcmolition activities would be scheduled to occur after the 

35 equipment removal is complete and the fixative sealer has been applied to surfaces with 

36 smearable or loose contamination. o 

37 eentemine inntenF. 

38 



41 equipment used an the site and exposed to dangerous/radioactive wastes to be decontaminated 

42 before the equipment is released. Personnel working the site would wear proper protective 




Final Feasibility Study for the Canyon Diapositian lnitiative (221-U Faciliy) 

J unc' 003 H-6

(.., 

Appendix H- Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoEItu.2ool-1 i 

Close In Place - Collapsed Structure itev.l0 Drari 

tj_edlinelStrikecxn 

2 Hazardous materials are expected to present minimal hazard to pcrsonnel or the environment. 

3 âterials weuld be sampkd aested^nddcîowted as tYquired by epplieaHie or 

4 and upplieable waste aeEepte riee efi:e:;a: 

5 

6 H.1.2 Establish Infrastructure 

7 


9 221-U Facility complex infrastructure. Some modification of the existing building and utilities 



12 

13 H.1.2.1 Modify Existing Infrastructure. The existing utilities where possible would be used 

J4 to support Alternative 6 activities. The basic approach to establishing the infrastructure for this 



17 existing road network surrounding the 221-U Facility would adequately accommodate heavy 

18 equipment during demolition operations, as well as waste-hauling traffic to ERDF. Additional 

19 spurs off paved roadways for heavy equipment access would be 

20 constructed, as required. 

(^)21 

22 Immediately before demolition of 271-U, water mains and sewer pipelines located within the 

23 environmental cap footprint would be seaied at the outer edge of the environmental cap. 





28 building, as required. for lighting, ventilation, and equipment operations. The electrical service 

29 would need to include power supply to a new air-handling unit on the roof of 221-U. 

30 

31 The existing main bridge crane would be recertified for use during equipment handling within 

32 the canyon. At the same time, minor modifications and repairs would be made to the crane, 

33 including repair of heating and air conditioning systems. 

34 

35 The final step modifying the 221-U Facility for this alternative would be replacement of its roof 

36 covering (versus roof structure). To prevent precipitation from entering the building{lasing 

37 , a new roof covering would be installed. 

38 

39 11.1.2.2 F.stablish Support Facilities. Alternative 6 would also require administrative offices, 



42 structures, this support could be provided from 271-U. The use would be practical only during 

43 the initial stages of 221-U modifications. The 271-U Building would be removed to allow access 

44 to 221-U for demolition. 

45 

Final Feasibility Srudy for the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221 •U Facility) 

2 00 

H-7

(^\ 

Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoE/al..-2001-1t 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. j0.prrft rt 

Bsd iM irissil 

I Mobile office units would be brought to the site to provide support office space at that point. 


3 A construction perimeter fence would be installed to control access into and out of the work 





8 

9 11.1.2.3 Establish Staging Areas. Personnel staging areas would be included in the space 


11 other construction activity support areas. Equipment storage, waste-qHeue"econtamination 



14 

15 H.13 Modify Facility 

16 





('2I nvon deck would be placed into the process cells, and both the cells and 



24 ^ fixative application to prepare the canyon for the start of demolition activities. 

25 

26 H.13.1 Prepare Facility for Use. The 221-U structure must resist loads with safety factors that 

27 meet building codes ( i.e., American Concrete Institute, American Institute of Steel Construction) 


29 public access would be permitted; therefore, structural concerns would be for worker safety only. 

30 





35 it must be maintained in a safe condition as well. 

36 

37 H.13.1.1 Inspect 271-U. The building would be inspected to determine the condition of the 

38 building and its equipment. Information for this inspection would help finalize planning for the 


40 involved in operating the facility and the building modifications and upgrades necessary to safely 

41 accomplish the activities would be identified. Modifications idcntified would be designed. The 

42 services and/or new equipment needed would be procured. 

3 

44 No known building repairs or upgrades would be needed. Also, it is assumed for this alternative 

45 that minimal equipment repairs and upgrades would be necessary. 

Final Feasibility Srudy jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

1 lunc:00-1 H-8

Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoEI[tL-2oo1-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure 1tev.18 Draft II 

Redline/5trikeout 

1 

2 11.13.1.2 221-U Facility Modifications. Limited modifications to the 221-U Facility are 

3 necessary to accomplish equipment removal and decontamination operations. Facility modifications 

4 primarily involve disconnecting and blanking utility and electrical lines where they are no longer 

5 required and installing temporary utilities that would be required to support planned operations. 

6 The change room at the northeast end of the operating gallery would be renovated and 

7 established as the main access and egress point for canyon operations. Water and drain lines for 

8 the change room facility could tied into the active systems in the 271-U Office Building. 

9 



12 compressors for pneumatic tools and temporary greenhouse structures. In addition, 480-volt 

13 ^ electrical service would be installed to support w erte ,.-Messi..o and 

14 decontamination/disassembly operations. 

15 

16 H.13.13 Add New Air Handler. Installation of a new air-handling unit on the roof of 221-U 

17 is a major modification that would oeeurmav or may not be rrnuired based on further analvsis of 

18 tasks and seauencine of events that will be done during design . If needed. .:Ahe unit would be 

19 located on the northeast end of the building and require penetrations through the roof for air duct 

20 connections. 

r121 

22 H.1.3.1.4 Grout Cell Drain Header and Vent Tunnel. The cell drain header would be filled 

23 with cement grout during the building preparation phase once the new air handler is installed and 

24 operational. Grouting would fill the 0.6-m (24-in.)-diameter void space and encapsulate any 

25 contamination present in the pipe. After the connecting pipes to cell 10 are sealed, grout would 

26 be pumped in from both ends of the cell drain header. Because the cell drain header flows 



29 would act as air vents, and the pressure would be regulated so that the grout would be visible in 

30 the process cell drains, but would not rise in the cells. After this operation, any liquid within the 


32 

33 *Vestei.e¢acy equipment placement is not planned for the ventilation tunnel due to limited 

34 accessibility of this area. Therefore, the ventilation tunnel would be grouted to eliminate voids 

35 in the building structure. Holcs would be angle drilled through to canyon's exterior wall to allow 

36 access to the ventilation tunnel for gt+outing. Free-flowing grout would be pumped through these 

37 holes to fill the ventilation tunnel. The grouting would be completed in lifts to allow time for 

38 heat dissipation during grout curing. The tunnel is planned to be filled with grout to the 

39 maximum extent possible. It is estimated that the ventilation tunnel would require approximately 

40 2,300 m3 (3,000 yd3) of grout. During final design, the decision to fill the tunnel should be 

41 revisited. Preliminary structural calculations (Smyth 2001) show that the exteriorwall of the 

42 tunnel may have sufficient strength to withstand later external pressures from fili heights 

43 associated with burying the canyon building and, therefore, not require grouting. 

44 

Final Feasibility Study/or she Canyon Disposition Initiative (221•tJ Facility) 

J une 1oo^ H-9

Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DOFJItI.-2001-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structu're itev..Ita DraU 

Rcd1ins1S1rikssxn 





.5 6 • Installed and fixed equipment 




10 

11 

• Debris. 

12 

13 

These items would be sorted for reuse, recycle, or disposal. 

14 H.1.3.2 Removal of Contaminated Equipment in 221-LJ it is estimated that there isgrc 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

(^-120 

21 

22 

23 

approximately 5,400 m3 (7,000 yd) of contaminated equipment and components (gross loose 

volume before size reduction currently 6toFed-on the canyon deck and in the process cells. For 

Alternative 6, those process cells with legacy equipment having dose rates >100 mrcm/hr would 

be opened only to place size-reduced legacy equipment from the operating deck and prour into 

them. All of the equipment would be reduced in size and volume and then disposed into the 

process cells meeting the dose rate criteria (except for cel13, which would be left unfilled for 

later equipment or-waste-placement). Size and volume reduction would be necessary so that all 

of the contaminated equipment would fit into the process cells. Minimizing the amount of size 

and volume reduction to just the amount of effort required to allow the contaminated equipment 

24 

25 

to fit into the process cells would be desirable because it would limit worker exposure. 

26 Ia t he-preeess-eelis-enFy 

27 

nd+kietding 

28 

,' 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

0 0 

39 

40 

Size and volume reduction would require a disposition plan for each equipment item. If breaking 

or cutting activities are necessary for disposing of the equipment, the 221-U Canyon Building 

41 would be the best location to do these activities because it is a closed facility for controlling 


" 43 1 would be the size reduction of the contaminated legacy equipment that is currently •tered-on the 

44 operating deck. Estimated worker dose for thcse activities alone is nearly 36 person-rem (BHI 

Final Feasibility Stady jor the Canyon Disposition lnhiative (221-U Facility) 

Iunc ?OOl H-10

Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoEIRI..-2001-11 

( Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. 1e rift 13 

M Iim/Strikceut 

1 I 2001 a.131{12002 ). 1f all of the legacy equipment on the operating deck is substantially reduced 

2 in size and volume for placement into the process cells, significant worker time and resulting 

3 higher exposures would occur. This activity, even with latest technologies available, would be 

4 performed in personal protective equipmcnt-required work areas ( i.e., contaminated areas and 

5 airborne areas). SigniGcant engineering controls would be required to reduce worker exposure 

6 from external and intemal exposure sources. Worker turnover could increase due to harsher 

7 working conditions. 

8 

9 During final design, it is anticipated that emerging size and volume reduction technologies would 

10 be evaluated for use. For this final FS, use of conventional size and volume reduction 

11 technologies is assumed. Disassembly activities would include mechanical cutting, hydraulic 

12 shearing, and manual methods. Additional technologies that could be applied are dcscribcd in 

13 Appendix I. 

14 

15 After the equipment is in the process cells, each cell would be coated with a fixative for control 

16 of loose surface contamination. Cement grout would be placed in lifts into each cell to fdl voids. 

17 Each lift would be allowed to cure before placing additional lifts. As each process cell is filled, 

18 the cover blocks would be placed back into position. The volume of void space to be filled 

19 within the process cells is conservatively estimated as 50% of total cell volume. Therefore, the 

20 grout volume needed to till the process cells is 3,400 m3 (4,400 yd). 

^21 

22 After the process cell cover blocks are in place, holes would be drilled through the covers, and 

23 any voids under and around the edges of the blocks would be filled by pressure grouting. The 

24 cover lifting bails would be removed after pressure grouting is complete. 

25 

26 All equipment and materials inside the operating gallery must be removed to support demolition 

27 of this portion of 221-U. There is a substantial amount of piping in this gallery. Some items 

28 could be Identified as reusable. Unneeded material from the gallery would be size reduced and 

29 placed in ERDF boxes for disposal at ERDF. 

30 materia 

31 

32 

33 

34 H.1.3.3 Demolition of ]tailtrosd Tunnel. After the railway tunnel is no longer needed, and 

35 before excavating the northwest side of the canyon to allow crane access for roof removal, 

36 demolition activities would begin on the railway tunnel. 

37 

38 The tunnel, which allowed train access into cell 3, extends approximately 46 m(150 ft) 

39 westward from the northwest side of the canyon building. The tunnel is a reinforced concrete 

40 structure with a soil cover about 1.5 m(5 ft) thick. 'lliere are unrcinforced wing-wall retaining 

41 structures at the end of the tunnel. The tunnel is assumed to have light surface contamination 

42 that can be fixed in place with fixative application. It is assumed that a backhoe with a processor 

r'"143 would be used for demolition. 

44 

Final Feasibility Stady for the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221•U Facility) 

)une20n3 FI-I1

Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoEIiu.-2oo1-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structurc Rev. 1e r^ 3 

^ Redlinc/Sirikggu{ 

1 Demolition of the railroad tunnel would allow truck access to cell 3 without backing down the 

2 long, narrow railroad tunnel. Also, part of the railroad tunnel work would be construction of a 

3 truck door at the tunnel's connection to 221-U (cell 3). This door would allow access to the 

4 building without disrupting ventilation of the canyon. 

5 

6 - 

er+xed-end.pessiHly 

7 

8 

9 

10 

leng-3ength•waAfter cell 3 is FulFeFavaste filled with legacy equipment , it would be filled 

with cement grout and the cover blocks replaced. Like the other process cells, the cover blocks 

would be drilled and pressure grouted in place and the bails would be removed. 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

r'121 

22 

23 

24 

H.1.3.4 Hot Pipe Trench. The hot pipe trench is assumed to be contaminated. A review of 

historical photographs of the trench indicates that the trench contains intertwined, small-diameter 

piping. *;esto-Le&acv equinment placement is not planned for the hot pipe trench due to limited 

available space. Instead, the trench would be filled with grout to eliminate voids in the building 

structure. The initial preparation step for grouting the trench would be coating its interior 

surfaces with a fixative to contain surface contamination. After the coating is cured, the hot pipe 

trench would be grouted. Due !9 +he maze _r ^:_: _ t • , , , 

. The interior volume of the pipes 

encased by the grout is very small and therefore assumed to have no effect on the stability of 

221-U. The volume of grout needed to fill the trench, 800 m3 ( 1,100 yd'), is estimated as 75% of 

it overall volume. The trench cover blocks would then be replaced. The cover blocks would be 

pressure grouted as described for the process cell cover blocks. After grouting, the bails would 

be removed from the hot pipe trench cover blocks. 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

H.13S Remove Surface Contamination. To safely enter the building during its operational 

phase in this alternative, contamination survey results would be used to identify where 

decontamination activities are needed. Contamination would either be removed or fixed to the 

canyon surface to reduce the dose rate and contamination risk to the lowest possible level. Water 

jet, water blasting, or water-flushing activities would be more difficult if completed after the 

process cell drain header and cells are grouted because all water would need to be collected and 

taken to the 200 Area's l:.iquid Effluent Remediation Facility for treatment. If any surface 

removal work is identified, carbon dioxide blasting or scarifying would be the preferred mcthod 

for its removal instead of water blasting or flushing. 

35 

36 

37 

38 

After the building has bcen'surveyed and the contamination removal planned, the work would 

require scaffolding and wastewater collection systems to be installed and maintained, and 

disposal of wastewater during and after decontanmination. 

39 

40 

41 

42 

r "*-, 43 

44 

H.13.6 Fix Contamination on 221-U Interior Surfaces. It is assumed that surface 

contamination on the canyon walls, #ieercanyon deck s, and ceiling can be addressed with 

application of a fixative. This fixative would be applied after all equipment removal and 

grouting in the canyon is complete. It would address loose surface contamination during the 

demolition of the upper half of 221-U. 

Final Feasrbiliry Studyjorthe Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

Ju ne 2001 H-12

, .., 

Appendix II - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoFJRl4001-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structu're Rev. jA^ft_L1 

n RC4Jis•L.S:;^kcrn,t 

1 Ii.1.4 Modify External Area 

2 

3 The following modifications would be performed to support partial demolition of 221-U,-and 

4 . Before demolition activities 

5 on 221-U can begin, the legacy structures that are physically attached to 221-U and those which 

6 are located within the environmental cop footprint must first be removed. In addition, prior 

7 remediation (by other projects) of waste sites within the footprint of the environmental cap 

8 would be verified. 

9 



12 determine if decontaminating and recycling steps could be economically included to support 

13 DOE waste minimization goals. 

14 

15 H.1A.1 Disposition of Aboveground Legacy Structures. The aboveground structures 

16 identified in Assumption 4 at the beginning of this appendix would be demolished as part of 

17 Alternative 6. 

18 

19 H.1A.1.1 Demolition or the 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility. The 276-U Solvent Recovery 


('\21 and associated piping set in an opentoncrete basin. Decommissioning would involve removing 

22 the tanks, walkways, and all aboveground piping. The concrete basin and underground piping 

23 would be left in place. All pipe penetrations associated with this structure would be cut, sealed, 

24 and capped. Drains would be sealed with concrete. Concrete surfaces would be decontaminated 

25 using selected off-the-shelf technologies. 

26 

27 Tanks, steel framing, and concrete walls and Aeercanyon deck s could be removed concurrently 

28 with the canyon cleanout activities. The concrete could be left in place until the canyon is 

29 demolished, because considerable excavation would be required for complete removal and it 

30 may be more cost effective to do all concrete removal and excavation at the same time. If left in 

31 place, the concrete walls should be fenced for worker safety. Demolition debris would be taken 

32 to ERDF for final disposal. An option during final design would be to place some of the 

33 equipment eithetin cell 

34 

35 H.1.4.1.2 Demolition of the 271-U Office Building. The northwest side of the building must 

36 be leveled to allow access for a very large mobile crane for removal of the canyon roof slab and 

37 upper walls. This preparation would begin with demolition of the 271-U Office Building. This 

38 building is a concrete framed structure built against the northwest face of the 221-U Canyon. 

39 

40 There is a basement, three floors, and a reinfotced concrete slab roof. There is a concrete 

41 masonry perimeter wall supported on a basement wall, with interior masonry wa11s within the 

42 building. The roof is a reinforced concrete slab similar to the floors. The third floor is a 

('N 43 chemical makeup area with floor slabs up to 0.3 m(1 ft) thick that support chemical tanks. 

Final Feasibility Sludyjor the Canyon Disposition lniriotive (221-U Facility) 

June '100 H-13

Appendix N- Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoEIiu:200 t-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structare Rev. to oraft D 

BeMqVlSqL^9sii 

1 Additional building features included in the demolition are a stack on the roof (296-U-10), an 



4 

5 

221-U and the area filled and compacted for crane access to the canyon. 

6 II.1A.1.3 Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) of Stairways on 221-U Building. 

7 Eight stairwells on the northwest side of 221-U arc light construction and would be demolished 


9 thick wall, lightly reinforced concrete construction. The heavy construction of these stairwells is 

10 factored into the demolition costs. Any contamination found in the stairwells on the canyon's 

1 I southeast side would be fixed in place prior to demolition. All stairwell demolition waste would 

12 be disposed at ERDF. 

13 

14 

15 

H.IA.lA Disposition of Aboveground Structures. All other aboveground structures identified 

in Assumption 4 at the beginning of this appendix that are within the footprint of the 221-U 

16 

17 

environmental cap would be decommissioned as part of Alternative 6 activities. 

18 11.1.4.2 Demolition of External Piping Around 221-13. Piping not already addressed in the 

19 preparation of the complex step would be rrouted in place or removed prior to the placement of 

20 

("^\21 

22 

23 

engineered till around 221-U, denendine on the outcome of risk assessment work . In addition to 

the miscellaneous piping to be removed, the exhaust ventilation tunnel would be removed. This 

tunnel is a reinforced tunnel connecting the canyon's ventilation tunnel to the stack and filter. 

The tunnel is approximately 60 m long and tuns from the end of the air tunnel in section 3 to the 

24 

25 

fans. 

26 H.1A.3 Confirm Removal of Waste Sites Within 221-U Environmental Cap Footprint. 

27 Extensive earthwork and excavation would be required to prepare for crane and other demolition 

28 equipment access to 221-U. In addition, Alternative 6 includes covering 221-U and associated 

29 demolition debris with an environmental cap. It is assumed that the waste sites, as identified in 

30 Assumption S at the beginning of this appendix, would be remediated by other projects prior to 

31 

32 

the start of Alternative 6 and construction of the environmental cap. 

33 H.IAA Confirm Well Decommissioning. Three wells are located within the footprint of the 

34 environmental cap. These wells would be decommissioned as part of Alternative 6. The wells 

35 are 299-W 19-8, 299-W 19-55, and 299-W19-98. Their prior removal would be confirmed as part 

36 of Alternative 6. 

37 

38 H.IAS Excavations to Prepare Working Area Adjacent to 221-U. The northwest side 

39 

40 

(271-U and rail tunnel) of the building would be excavated, shaped, and compacted to prepare 

for removal of the canyon roof panels with a large mobile crane during operations. The 

41 excavated area would allow the crane to travel the length of the building and allow sufficient 

42 area to lay down roof panels. The ground surface in the laydown area would be shaped to fit the 

43 

44 

underside of the roof panels to minimize voids. 

Final Feasibility Sradyjor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (121-U Facility) 

un 3 H-14

(^N 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

r,.NZO 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

^43 

44 

45 

Appendix H- Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DOE/RI.-2001-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. jp_PrjLU 

RIdUns&S.trikmm 

F'ill material on the southeast side of the canyon would be graded and compacted to provide a 

firm working area for scaffolding and other construction equipment access. 

HAS Manage Hazardous Materials 

Dangerous waste, asbestos, polychlorinated biphenyls, and other hazardous materials would be 

removed from all areas of the complex and managed in accordance with ARARs. All waste 

materiaie waste would be sampled. tested, and designated as required by ARARs, and treated 

prior to disposal. Products consisting of or containing hazardous materials would be used and 

managed in accordance with their respective Material Safety Data Sheets. Waste ma:eri°msWaste 

would be treated as required. 

A temporary waste accumulation laydown area would be established to facilitate shipment and 

disposal activities. This area would conform to established requirements for the maintenance, 

accountability, inventory, labeling, and transportation of waste to approved disposal facilities. 

H.2 OPERATE THE COMPLEX 

Operation of the complex for Alternative 6 refers specifically to 

tasideg)puting the two renneining er aileries at 221-U and demolition of the roof and upper 

wa11s of the building. In previous steps, the area surrounding 221-U has been prepan:d to 

support building demolition, all equipment within the building has been removed, and exposed 

surfaces inside the canyon have been decontaminated or a fixative applied. The roof would 

remain in place over 221-U during gal^ groutin and ivaste-placement of legacy equipment 

operetieus-into the process cells to minimize the potential for precipitation entering the building 

during this activity. The steps to operate the complex are discussed below. 

The volume of e ac waste placed inside the collapsed structure in Alternative 6 is estimated as 

4j4003.4t)D in3. This ineludes3,d90-m°-ef volume is the legacy equipment placed inside the 

process cellsend1:690-m° . An estimated 

43,3903.300 ms (17,6904.100 yd3) of grout would be used in this alternative to surround the 

cgac waste and fill voids in the process cells,t An estimated 11.300 me (14.800 y(z) of Prout 

wi ll s hot pipc trench, galleries, and the building's ventilation tunnel. 

( H.2.1 Emploee WasteGroutine of ie-221•U Galleries 

For this alternative, po waste weuld^placed-inplacement is planned_for the two lower galleries. 

, nstead, each gallery 

would be totally filled with ¢routed to provide support for the wastes ernvironmental cap 

placed above. tieM#e 

Final Feasibility Study jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221 •U Facility) 

un 1 l 11-15

1 

2 

3 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

n 21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

34 

35 

36 

37 

38 

39 

40 

41 

42 

(----,43 

44 

45 

Appendix H- Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoE/2t.-2oo1-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. 10 nraft R 

R d^ linc/Strikc%tt 

plaeement end-greuting 

H4.1.$-1.}2.1.1 Grout Electrical Gallery. 

Cement grout would be placed I 

on !he eeRt-.:---.starting with the electrical ¢allery. Grout will be delivered into the gallerv 

t hrou gh an existine rectangular ooeninr in the floor slab above. 

Flowable 

cement grout could be obtained with a strength of 14 kg/cm2 (200 Ibrn). This could be pumped 

under low pressure, just sufficient to positively t'ilI voids and prevent shrinkage, and would 

provide the necessary support to the second floor so it can be filled and grouted. 6reutingtaeh 

Grouting would be done in lifts to maintain loading on the gallery walls to an acceptable level. 

An additional benefits ere js the heat of hydration would 

occur over a longer time. By limiting the grout lifts to half the gallery wall height and waiting 

for the grout to reach adequate strength, the grouting could occur without backfill in place on the 

wall's exterior. Grout amendments, such as fly ash or zeolite clays, would be considered for all 

gouting activities to reduce potential for leaching of radioactive isotopes. GrouEPleeed aFeund 

edgeef(he4leeFaiebs: 

Final Feaxibiliry Study Jor the Canyon pitparition Initiative (221•U Facility) 

J une 200 3 H-16

Appendix 11 - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: Do>:JRL-2001-1t 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev.1e ntatt B 

R îcilin •4/Sirj{,ctxit 

1 

2 

3 gallefy-wtwld-be-re,-. o..-•l:-;e-4 emparat^ eeveF-end-rellup^leer used foF the lewerlevel gallery 

4 would be Feleealed. 

5 

6 H.2.1.2 Grout Pipe Gallery. The pipe gallery would be grouted in the same manner as the 

7 1 electrical gallery. Greut•wetdd-be-pleeed-inside-the-eentainers-e.44hey-er 

9 

10 

11 H.2.2 Demolition of 221-U Building 

12 

13 Conventional methods and technologies, such as wrecking balls and shears, are not suited for 

14 demolishing this concrete structure and are not effective when wall or floor thickness exceeds 

15 0.9 m ( 1 ft). The 221-U Facility contains structural components that typically exceed 1.5 m in 

16 thickness. The recommended demolition method would be to cut the building into sections using 

17 diamond wire saws. Large elevated pieces (such as roof panels) that would be hazardous to 

18 demolish in place due to their elevation would be removed intact and set on the ground. 

19 Elevated wall pieces would be cut into large sections that would be placed either on top of the 

20 1 roof slabs or on the canvon deck . The end walls of the canyon would be 

i^'.1 demolished by wire sawing It into blocks. 

22 

23 The diamond wire cutting technique uses a small quantity of water to cool and lubricate the wire. 

24 The wastewater would be captured and, if needed, removed from the site for treatment. Adjacent 

25 roof panels are keyed with a stair-step joint similar to the cover block edges, making it feasible to 

26 cut the canyon into pieces that are about 12 m(40 ft) long. 

27 

28 13.2.2.1 Mobilize and Erect Cranes. Cranes necessary for removal of roof panels would be 

29 brought to the site and erected. These cranes would be used to remove building sections as they 

30 are cut by the diamond wire saws. 

31 

32 H.2.2.2 Retnove End Walls and Roof Sections. Removal would start with the end wall at the 

33 building's north end. The end walls are unreinforced. The northeast end wall should be 

34 removed first because the roof removal would begin at that end of 221-U. Removing the roof 

35 panel above the end wall, with the end wall in place, could damage this unreinforced concrete, 

36 with the risk of collapsing it. The end walls would be wire sawed into blocks and lifted to the 

37 ground level. Wall demolition debris would be placed with other building sections. The end 

38 walls would not be required for the structural stability of the canyon during the Alternative 6 

39 activities. The end wall at the southwest end of 221-U would be dealt with similarly, any time 

40 prior to removal of the adjacent roof panel. 

41 

42 Wire saws would be used to cut the roof panels from their connection to the walls. The roof 

(ON3 panels would be removed from the building as a full (12-m [40-ft]) section. lrfting the roof 

44 panel in one piece would be safer than supporting the roof and walls and breaking the elevated 

45 slab into pieces. The ground must be shaped to fit the underside of the roof to eliminate voids 

Final FeasibiUry Study for drc Canyon Dispoittion biltiative (221-U Faciliry) 

^ lune2003 1-1-17

Appendix It - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DOFJRL-2001-I1 

Close in Place - Collapsed Sttucltire Rev. jA-Drafi [3 

^ gîi,e)^ttl^Ftln 

1 when the stab is lowered. No further demolition would be done on the roof panels after they are 

2 placed on the ground. 

3 

4 Demolition activities would make extensive use of large-capacity cranes for building section 

5 removal as each section is cut free by the diamond wire sawing process. Scaffolding would be 

6 needed on both sides of each building segmcnt to support the cable-cutting machines. 

7 Steel beams would be attached lengthwise, on each side of the building, inward from the roof 

8 edge, to distribute the lifting forces for the roof slab removal. Bearing plates would probably be 

9 required on the bottom of the roof, inside of the canyon, to distribute the lifting forces to the 

10 concrete slab. As the cut progresses, wedges or clamps would need to be placed in the cut to 

11 provide vertical support and lateral stability for all concrete sections as cutting continues. 

12 

13 H.2.23 Remove Canyon Walls to Canyon Canvon deck Level. Wire saws 

14 would be used to cut the wall sections into blocks, and the cranes would remove these blocks. 

15 The wall on the south side of the canyon would be removed down to the canyon operating level. 

16 Wall sections would be placed on the canyon deck. On the north side of the building, the 

17 craneway and majority of the operating gallery would be removed. Approximately half the 

18 shield wall height would be left in place to reduce demolition costs. This section of the wall 

19 would be approximately the same height as wall sections placed on the canyon fieer dgji and 

20 therefore would not increase the height of the environmental cap. Prior to demolition of the 

21 operating gallery, all piping (including any hazardous materials such as asbestos insulation) 

22 inside the gallery would be removed and disposed at ERDF. 

23 

24 As part of this demolition, the canyon bridge cranes would be demolished. They would be 

25 drained of oil and could either be placed on the canyon deck or size reduced and placed in cell 3. 

26 

27 

28 H3 CLOSE THE COMPLEX 

29 

30 This function would consist of constructing the environmental cap over the building and 

31 demolition debris. It would also involve restoring the excavated and disturbed sites (including 

32 laydown and equipment staging areas) to a grade consistent with the natural surface topography. 

33 Closure of the complex for Alternative 6 would also require institutional controls and 

34 maintenance of a monitoring system. Institutional controls could consist of both physical and 

35 legal barriers to prevent access to contaminants. A closeout report would be prepared for 

36 regulatory agency approval. 

37 

Final FeasibiliryStudyJbr the Canyon Disposition lnitiative (221-U Facility) 

uo ') 1 H-18

Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoFnu.-2001-1 t 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. 1e nn,fi E3 

^ Rcd inc/Strikcout 

1 1I3.1 Construct Environmental Cup 

2 


4 barrier, and erosion protection (see Figure 11-1). This application of an engineered barrier is 

5 unique in that the top of the barrier is nearly 13 m(40 ft) above the surrounding grade. This 

6 affects the seismic event factors used for barrier design and consequently the barrier layout as 

7 described below. 

8 

9 A preliminary two-dimensional stability analysis (Appendix D) was completed for the 

10 environmental cap for Alternative 3. Results for Alternative 3 are considered to be applicable to 

11 the environmental cap for Alternative 6. The controlling factor for this analysis was to select a 

12 cap layout that could remain functional after enduring a design seismic event. This analysis was 

13 key in determining the physical layout of the environmental cap geometry. Briefly, the analysis 

14 finding was that the engineered barrier must be as flat as possible to prevent potential 

15 deformations from reaching the drain gravels that are the barrier's capillary break. Therefore, 

16 the barrier Is sloped at 2%. In addition, the batrier must extend out far enough from 221-U that a 

17 potential crack (estimated to be 5 cm [2 in.] or Iess), due to movement in the 3H:1 V side slope, 

18 would be outside the waste-area requiring infiltration protection from the barrier. With these 

19 layout steps addressed, the environmental cap can provide the required containment during a 

20 500-year life. During final design of the environmental cap, a finite element analysis method 

21 should be used to define the final cap layout dimensions and confirm that the engineered barrier 

22 is properly sized for the design seismic event. Additional discussion of the barrier is provided in 

23 Section 4.2. 

24 

25 H.3.1.1 Place Engineered FJL The engineered fill would be clean compacted granular 

26 material, which would be placed in lifts. Its source is assumed to be a Hanford Site borrow pit 

27 within 24 km of 221-U. The actual source location has not been identified. The fill level along 

28 the galleries walls would be maintained within a few meters of the grout elevation inside the 

29 galleries. The volume of enginecred fill needed for Alternative 6 is 287,800 m3 (376,300 yd3 

30 The extent of the engineered fill and environmental cap is shown in >:rgure 4.2. 

31 

32 The Gll would be compacted to a density in the range of 95% to 98% relative compaction where 



35 

36 H3.1.2 Construct Engineered Barrier. The engineered barrier would be designed to prevent 


38 control potential contaminant migration by preventing water Infiltration inte-the-waste-materiale 

39 (221-U and demolition debris). The barrier thickness would be 5 m(16 ft) minimum, which 

40 would meet the requirement for protection against inadvertent intruders. 

41 

42 The barrier would be a modified RCRA Subtitle C-compliant barrier design to provide protection 

r`^ 43 against water infiltration and biotic intrusion for 500 years. For purposes of this final FS, it is 

44 assumed that the engineered barrier would be replaced one time at the end of its 500-year design 

45 life. The result is that 221-U would have containment for at least 1,000 years. The barrier would 

Final Feasibiliry Study jor the Canyon Disposition lnitiative (221-U Facility) 

Ju ne '0 • H-19

(^N 

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Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoE/ttt.-2001-11 

I Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. 10 Urarn 

r tin sSlri -Lcmt 

be vegetated to control soil erosion and promote moisture evapotranspiration. A moisture 

The barrier consists of it loosely placed silt/pea gravel layer, which is a storage medium for soil 

moisture. It supports evapotranspiration and vegetation growth. This layer is underlain by a 

compacted layer of silt. The compacted silt greatly reduces hydraulic conductivity and therefore 

retards vertical moisture movement. At the bottom of the compacted silt, sand and gravel layers 

provide a capillary break in the barrier cross section. The capillary break causes moisture to be 

retained in the overlying compacted silt layer. The sand and gravel layers are sloped to the 

outside edge of the bartier to carry any water that migrates vertically through the silt horizontally 

to the outside edge of the barrier. The drain gravels/sand are placed on a 1-m (3.2-ft)-thick layer 

clay admixture layer. This layer providcs a second barrier of low hydraulic conductivity. Below 

the admixture layer is compacted clean fill of adequate thickness to provide a total batrier depth 

of 5 m (16 ft) over the legacy equipment waste, as required for an intruder barrier. 

The total volume of material for the engineered barrier for Alternative 6 is estimated as 

116,000 ms (151,700 yd'). 

H3.13 Place Erosion Protection. The top of the engineered barrier has a 2% slope; the top 

layer would be vegetated and would contain pea gravel. Therefore, once vegetation is 

established, erosion from precipitation would not be a concern. To reduce the volume of the 

engineered fill while providing stability during a seismic event, a 3 horizontal to 1 vertical (H:V) 

side slope was selected for the engineered fill. This slope would require placement of a basalt 

riprap-type layer for erosion protection. This layer would be 1.2 m thick. The erosion protection 

layer would also include gravel and sand filter layers (0.3 m[ 1 ft] thick each) to carry the runoff 

safely to the outer toe of the environmental cap. The erosion protection slope would not be 

vegetated. The total volume of the erosion protection is estimated as 56,300 m? (73,700 yd'). 

H3.2 Revegetate Site 

The excavations from demolition activities would be backfillcd with compacted clean soil and 

clean concrete rubble. Fill contours would match adjacent contours. Material for backfill would 

come from both stockpiled matcrial and the borrow source. The borrow source is assumed to be 

within the Hanford Site, but has not yet been identified. 

All areas disturbed by demolition activities would be prepared for surface restoration. If 

required under the industrial land use for the 200 Areas, the majority of restoration would be 

application of an approved native grass seed mixture. Existing roads damaged by the demolition 

would be returned to their pre-project condition. 

1133 Cleanup Complex 

Final Feasibitiry Stady for the Canyon Dirposition Initiative (221-U Faciliry) 

J un C 1 003 H-20

Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DOEIltl:2001-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. le Draft e 

tLedlinelStri •eout 


2 

3 

materials. 

4 111.3,4 Sustain Post-Closure 

5 


7 

8 

Institutional controls could consist of both physical and legal barriers to prevent access to 

contaminants. In addition, certain activities would need to be prohibited so that the groundwater 

9 and Columbia River water quality are protected. Post-closure care would consist of periodic 

10 

11 

inspections and maintenance to verify the success of the revegetation effort. 

12 113.4.1 Establish Institutional Controls. Specific institutional controls associated with this 

13 alternative would be developed as the remedy is further defined in the remedial design report and 

14 implemented through an update to the Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan for Hanford CERCIlI 


16 methods of controlling land use. Physical methods of controlling access to waste sites would 

17 include signs, entry control, excavation permits, artificial or natural barriers, and active 

18 surveillance. Physical access controls would be designed to preclude unintentional trespassing 

19 and minimize wildlife access. Physical restrictions would be effective in protecting human 

20 health by reducing the potential for contact with contaminated media and avoiding adverse 

(0*^121 environmental, worker safety, and community safety impacts that arise from the potential release 

22 of contaminants. They would require ongoing monitoring and maintenance. Public notices and 

23 community relation efforts would supplement site surveillance efforts. The DOE, or subsequent 

24 land managers, could enforce land-use restrictions as long as risks were above unrestricted land- 

25 use levels. The DOE would continue to use fencing, excavation permits, and the badging 

26 program to control access to the area for as long as it maintains control over the land. Signs 

27 

28 

would be maintained prohibiting public access. 

29 Legal restrictions would include both administrative and real-property actions intended to reduce 


31 

32 

33 

34 

land, including groundwater use for drinking water or irrigation. Land-use restrictions and 

controls on real-property development are effective in providing a degree of human health 

protection by minimizing the potential for contact with contaminated media. Land-use 

restrictions will be put in place, as necessary, until such time as the federal government ceases 

35 

36 

37 

ownership of the property. The DOE, or subsequent land managers, would enforce land-use 


38 Groundwater-use restrictions would be required so that groundwater is not used as a drinking 

39 water source as long as contaminant concentrations are above federal and state drinking water 

40 

41 

^ standards and WAC 173-340 #4T6,4 B groundwater protection standards. Irrigation would also 

need to be restricted on the footprint of the environmental cap. Well drilling, except for the 


(00N•43 

44 

prohibited untii groundwater cleanup levels comply with these drinking water standards. 

Final Feasibility Study for the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221 •U Facility) 

„ 100 .1 11-21

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('^43 

Appendix H-- Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DOEIRL-2001-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. 1o nratl B 

8s'dt IIIaLSiulp-cw 

H3.4.2 Maintaln Monitoring System. Alooisture measuring system or a detection method to 

Long-term site-specific monitoring requirements for Alternative 6 would not be determined until 

post-ROD activities (e.g., during final design in preparation of the remedial design 

report/remedial action work plan). It is expected that long-term monitoring would occur over the 

1,000-year performance period and consist of either groundwater monitoring or vadose zone 

monitoring, but it is not expected that both monitoring efforts would be required at the 

221-U Facility. The specific monitoring system design and its requirements would be 

established as part of the operations and maintenance plan for the 200 Area-wide groundwater 

operable unit remediation activities associated with the 200-UP-I Operable Unit. 

Post-closure care would comply with the following functions as defined in Washington 

Adminisrrative Code 173-303-665(6). The functions were selected as being representative of the 


• Limit access to the environmental cap 

• Maintain the integrity and effectiveness of the final cover (engineered batrier), including 

making repairs to the barrier, as necessary, to correct the effects of settling, subsidence, 

erosion, or other events 

• Maintain and monitor the groundwater monitoring systems 

• Prevent nmon and runoff from eroding or otherwise damaging the final cover (engineered 

barrier) 

• Protect and maintain surveyed benchmarks. 

Post-closure care would consist mainly of periodic inspections to idontify erosion or settling. 

Either of these items could lead to infiltration of the barrier. If settling Is identified, the resultant 

depressions would be filled and reseeded. The post-closure cost estimate includes replacement 

of the engineered barrier after 500 years. 

Monitoring of the barrier and the vadose zone or groundwater would be performed over the 

1,000-year performance period to verify the effectiveness of the 

Final Feasibifiry Study jor the Canyon Disposition lnidative (221•U FacUiry) 

iues =00 11-22

1^ 

Appendix H - Detailed Description or Alternative 6: DOEIRI,-2001-11 

I Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev.le rar 

]l0linejSttAkeut 

t containment provided by the engineered barrier. Periodic sampling of monitoring stations would 

2 be performed followed by comprehensive laboratory analyses. 

3 

4 

5 HA REFERENCES 

6 

7 10 CFR 835, "Occupational Radiation Protection," Code of Federal Regulations, as amended. 

8 

9 64 FR 61615,1999, "Hanford Comprehensive Land-Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement 

10 (HCP EIS), Hanford Site, Richland, Washington; Record of Decision (ROD);' Federal 


12 

13 BHI, 1998, Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility Waste Acceptance Criteria. 


15 

16 BHI, 2001a, Canyon Disposition Initiative: Preliminary AIARA Evaluation for Final Feasibility 

17 StudyAlternatives 1. 3, 4, and 6(CCN 089828 to G. M. MacFarlan, Bechtel Hanford, 

18 Inc. from J. C. Wiles and R. C. Free, Jt., May 31), Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, 


20 

r 21 BHI, 2001b, Supplemental Waste Acceptance Criteria far Bulk Shipments to the Environmental 

22 Restoration Disposal Facility, 0000X-DC-W0001, Rev. 2. Bechtel Hanford, Inc., 

23 Richlanil, Washington. 

24 

25 BNI. 2002. Canyon Initiative: Updated PreliminorvAli1R F.vahearinn for Final 

26 Feasibility Stady. Revision 1. Alternative 6 (CCN 098589 to G. M. MacFarlan. Bechtel 

27 Hanford. Inc. from J. C. Wiles. July 24)-Bec tel Hanford. Inc.. Richland. Washineton. 

28 

29 DOE, 1999, Final Ilanford Comprehensive Land Use Plan Environmental Impact Statement, 

30 DOE/EISA222-F, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 

31 DOE O 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, U.S. Department of 

32 Energy. Washington, D.C. 

33 

34 DOE-RI„ 2002, Sitewide Institutional Controls Plan for Hanford CERCLA Response Actions, 

35 DOE/RLr2001-41, Rev. 0. Draft, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations 

36 Office, Richland, Washington. 

37 

38 DOE-R L. 2003. Focused Feasibilftv Sradv for the U Plmy Clo.cure Area Waste Sites. DOE/RI 

39 2003-23 Rev , 0 Draft A. U S Department of Energy. Richland Onerationc Office 

40 R ichland.Washineton. 

41 

n 42 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 6901, et seq. 

43 

Final FeasibilityStudy for the Canyon Disposition lnitiative (221-U Facitiry) 

June ^ H-23

^N 

i ' 

(0-1% 

C Appendix H- Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoE/ttl..-2001-1 t 

Close In Place - Collapsed Structtii•c Rev.1ta r„f 

Red fi • StLjrot it 

Smyth, W. W., 2001, Structural Calculations Supporting the Final Feasibility Studyfor the 

Canyon Disposition Initiative. 221-U Facility, HNF-8379, Fluor Hanford, Inc., Richland, 

Washington. 

WAC 173-303, "Dangerous Waste Regulations," Washington Administrarive Code, as amended. 

WAC 173-340, "Model Toxics Control Act - Cleanup, Washington Administrative Code, 

as amendcd. 

Final Feasibifery Study jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Faciliry) 

June ?^ H-24

Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DOFJRtrzoot-l t 

I Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. 1e ry n B 

^ &d in •lStrikmqt 

I 

^ 

1 Figure H•1. Alternative 6: Cross Section of Environmental Cap. 

2 

E 

ow 

. ^NOz 

°amin 

Ti ,c 

S u a 

E + ^ g i g 

Y 

E I 

zz 

g 

wZl 

Final Feasibility StndyJorfhe Canyon Disposition Giitiative (221•U Facility) 

J une 

N 

V! h^ 

S ^ 

pqg 3 ^ ^ 

^d 

H-25

^ 

(' 

^ 

Appendix H- Detailed Description of Alternative 6: boFIu -200 l-t l 

Close In Place - Collapsed Structure Rev.le Drurt 

$olinclStrikcout 

Figure 11-2. Alternative 6: Plan View orCnvironmental Cap. 

U.S DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CANYON DISPOSAL INRIATIVE 

DOE REtD DmCE. WMAUD FINAL FEASIBILITY STUDY 

Wu+rORD WNRONYEMK RESTOfUTION PROf:WM ALT. 6 - PLAN 

AlT-t-C.owa 

^159m^ 

Final Feasibility Study jor the Canyon Disposirion Initiative {221-U Facility) 

J une 2007 H-26

^ 

1 APPENDIX H 

2 

3 ATTACHMENT H1- FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 

4 

5 

6 H.1 PREPARE EXISTING COMPLEX 

7 11.1.1 Control bazards 

DOFJRL-2001-1I 

Rev. 9 1 Draft fl 

Redlinctrikcout 

8 H.1.1.1 Establish hazards protection 

9 H.1.1.1.1 Control health and safety hazards 

10 H.1.1.1.2 Control environmental hazards 

11 H.1.1.2 Manage hazardous materials 

12 H.1.1.2.1 Characterize hazardous materials 

13 H.1.1.2.2 Decontaminate areas and systems 

14 H.1.1.2.3 Prepare hazardous materials for processing and disposition 

15 H.1.2 Establish Infrastructure 

16 H.1.2.1 Modify existing infrastruture 

17 11.1.2.1.1 Water 

18 H.1.2.1.2 Sewer 

19 H.1.2.13 Electrical 

20 11.1.2.1.4 IIVAC 

21 H.1.2.1.5 Lighting 

22 H.1.2.1.6 Recertify bridge crane 

23 H.1.2.1.7 Install new roof system 

24 H.1.2.2 Establish support facilities 

25 H.1.2.2.1 Modifications to the existing building 

26 H.1.2.2.2 Install mobile office units 

27 H.1.2.3 Establish staging areas 

28 H.1.2.3.1 Establish personnel staging areas (change rooms, operations, 


30 H.1.2.3.2 Establish equipment staging areas (maintenance, repair, 



33 H.1.3 Modify Facility 

34 H.1.3.1 Prepare facility for use 

35 H.1.3.1.1 Inspect 271-U for its role during preparing the complex 

36 H.1.3.1.2 Identify 221-U building modifications, if any, required for its 


38 11.1.3.1.3 Add new air handler (roof mounted) with replaceable HEPA 

39 filters on 221-U to replace the air tunnel 

n40 H.1.3.1.4 Grout cell drain header and ventilation tunnel 

Final Feasibifiry Study for rke Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

J une '000i II-27

Appendix H - Detailed Description of Altcrnative 6: DoEIRL-2001-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. A 1 Draft n 

n I Redline/Strikeout 

ATfACHAtENT H1- FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 

1 H.1.3.1.5 Angle drill approx 15 meters OC through 221-U exterior wall 

2 and grout vent tunnel with flowable grout. 

3 H.13.2 Disposal of Contaminated Equipment in 221-U 

4 H.1.3.2.1 Size and dismantle equipment from canyon floor 

5 H.1.3.2.2 Place canyon eqmt into cell 

6 H.1.3.2.3 Fog celVaqmt with fixative paint 

7 H.1.3.2.4 Grout cells and replace cover blocks 

8 H.1.3.2.5 Pressure grout cells once cover blocks in place 

9 H.1.3.2.6 Remove equipment from Operating Gallery. Centainerize it 

10 

i l H.1.3.2.7 Remove the bails from the cell cover blocks 

12 •H.1.3.3 D&D Railroad Tunnel 

13 H.1.3.3.1 Remove soil cover from rail tunnel 

14 H.1.3.3.2 Fix contamination on tunnel interior 

15 H.1.3.33 Demolish railroad tunnel and clear demolition debris to allow 

16 truck access into the rail tunnel. 

17 H.1.3.3.4 Place containerized and et#wFlone-len¢th lecacv wastes into 

18 gGcl13 (rail tunnel) 

19 H.1.3.35 Construct concrete wall to close rail tunnel opening in canyon 

20 H.1.3.3.6 Grout Ccll 3 solid with covers in place 

21 H.1.3.3.7 Place demolition debris into tunnel section ( inner half) 

22 H.1.3.3.8 Fill voids where found in demolition debris w/ flowable grout 

23 H.13.4 Hot Pipe Trench 

24 ^ 1-1.1.3.4.1 Remove 6evepo_vSLblocks 

25 • 111.3.4.2 Fog trench/piping with fixative paint 

26 H.1.3.43 Grout pipe trench full with pipes in place and replace cover 

27 blocks 

28 H.1.3.4.4 Pressure grout trench once cover blocks in place 

29 H.1.3.4.5 Remove the bails from the hot pipe trench cover blocks 

30 H.1.3.5 Remove Surface Contamination 

31 H.1.3.5.1 Assume for Alternative 6 no surface contamination removal is 

32 needed. 

33 H.1.3.6 Fix contamination on 221-U interior surfaces 

34 H.1.3.6.1 Building interior (canyon walls, floor & roof) 

35 H.lA Modify external area _ 

36 H.1.4.1 Disposition external aboveground legacy structures and systems within 


38 H.1.4.1.1 Disposition 276-U Solvent Recovery Facility 

39 H.1.4.12 Disposition 271-U office building 

40 H.1.4.1.3 Disposition Front and Rear Stairs for 221-U 

Final Feasibifiry Study jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221 -U Facility) 

JIM 100 , H-28

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^40 

Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoE/R1.2001-11 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. e 1 DtaU 


ATTACHMENT H1-F'UNGTIONAL HIERARCHY 

H.1.4.1.4 211-U Tank Fatm and 211-UA Tank Farm 

H.1.4.1.5 Disposition 241-WR Vault Thorium Storage 

H.1.4.1.6 Disposition 2714-U Warehouse 

H.1.4.1.7 Disposition 275-UR Chemical Storage Warehouse 

H.1.4.1.8 Disposition 200-W-44 Sand F•tlter 

H.1.4.1.9 Disposition 291-U Process Unit Plant 

H.1.4.1.10 Disposition 291-U Stack 

H.1.4.1.11 Disposition 222-U Office Lab 

H.1.4.1.12 Disposition 224-U Concentration Facility, U03 Plant 

H.1.4.1.13 Disposition 224-UA Calcination Facility 

H.1.4.1.14 Disposition 292-U Stack Monitoring Station 

H.1.4.2 Disposition buried piping which are located beneath the proposed 

environmental cap 

H.1.4.2.1 Remove air tunnel outside 221-U 

H.1.4.2.2 Remove misc yard piping and encascments 

H.1.43 Confirm remediation of waste sites within the environmental cap 

footprint 

H.1.43.1 216-U-4 Reverse Well 

H.l A3.2 216-U- 4A French Drain 

H.1.433 216-U-7 French Drain 

H.1.43.4 216-U-15 Trench 

H.1.43.5 224-U-HWSA 

H.1.4.3.6 241-UX-154 Diversion Box 

H.1.43.7 241-UX-302 Catch Tank 

H.1.43.8 2607-W-7 Septic Tank and Drain Field 

H.1.43.9 UPR 200-W-33 

1I.1.4.3.10 UPR 200-W-39 

H.1.43.11 UPR 200-W-55 

H.1.43.12 UPR 200-W-60 

H.1.4.3.13 UPR 200-W-78 

H.1.4.3.14 UPR 200-W-101 

H.1.43.15 UPR 200-W-118 

H.1.4.3.16 UPR 200-W-125 

H.1.43.17 UPR 200-W-138 

I-1.1.43.18 UPR 200-W-162 

H.1.4.4 Confirm that wells located within environmental cap footprint have been 

decommissioned 

H.1.4.4.1 299-W 19-8 

H.1.4.4.2 299-W 19-55 

11.1.4.43 299-W 19-98 

Final FeasfblHry Study jor the Canyon Disposition lnJtiat(ve (221-U Facility) 

7uae 100 3 

H-29

Appendix H-Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DOtrnrnlr2oo1-it 

I Close in Place - Collapsed Structarc Rev. e l nr^rt p 

^ 1Ledline/Slrikeout 

A'I'I'ACHMENT Hl -FUNCPIONAL HIERARCHY 

1 H.1.4.5 Excavations to prepare working area adjacent to 221-U 

2 1i.1.4.5.1 Prepare area along northwest side 

3 11.1.4.5.2 Prepare area along southeast side 

4 H.1.5 Manage Hazardous Wastes 

5 H.1.5.1 Identify waste generated 

6 H.1.5.2 Prepare inventory of waste shipped to ERDF and elsewhere 

7 

8 

9 H.2 OPERATE EXISTING COMPLEX 

10 H.2.1 Empleee i{teske inCroutine of 221-U Galleries 

11 rrc' ^. s 'rrair;ll-^leettieal-6a1 

12 11.2.1.2 H.2.1.1 Grout Electrical Gallery through Pipe Gallery floor 

13 , 

14 H:2-1-4-.H 2. i.2 Grout Pipe Gallery through Operating Gallery floor 

15 H.2.2 DdcD 221•U Building 

16 H.2.2.1 Mobilize and erect cranes 

17 H.2.2.2 Remove end walls and roof sections 

18 H.2.2.2.1 Remove end walls using wire sawing. 

19 H.2.2.2.2 Wire saw wall panels 

20 H.2.2.2.3 Remove and place roof panels at ground level on northwest 

21 side of 221-U 

22 H.2.2.3 Remove canyon walls down to canyon deck level 

23 H.2.23.1 Wire saw wall sections into blocks 

24 H.22.3.2 Place sections on top of roof slab sections. Use same crane as 

25 roof slab removal work 

26 H.2.2.3.3 Demolish craneway floor slab and shield wall. Place sections 

27 on canyon floor and adjacent to southeast side of 221-U 

28 ^ H.2.2.3.4 Remove bridge cranes. Place either in GeACell 3 before 

29 grouting or on canyon floor 

30 

31 

32 H3 CLOSE THE COMPLEX 

33 H3.1 Construct Environmental Cap 

34 H.3.1.1 Place engineered fill evenly around and over 221-U. Where necessary, 

35 use flowable grout to fill voids 

^ 36 H3.1.2 Construct engineered barrier 

37 11.3.1.3 Place erosion protection layer on 3:1 fill slopes 

Final Feasibipry Srady jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

Ju ne '001 H-30

^ 

Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: DoEIRI.-2001-1t 

Close in Place - Collapsed Structure Rev. o i ljrafi n 

RedlincLStrikeoul 

1 11.3.2 Revegetatesite 

ATTACHMENT Hl -FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY 

2 H.3.2.1 Prepare all disturbed areas and engineered barrier for seeding 

3 11.3.2.2 Apply approved seed mix and soil fixative 

4 H.3.3 Pick up and clean the complex 

5 H3.3.1 Remove excess equipment and materials 

6 H3.3.2 Conduct final walkdown 

7 113A Sustain Post Closure 

8 H.3.4.1 Establish institutional controls 

9 H.3.4.1.1 Establish access restrictions 

10 H.3.4.1.2 Establish deed restrictions 

11 H.3.4.1.3 Establish restrictions on use of the complex 

12 H.3.4.2 Maintain monitoring system 

13 H.3.4.2.1 Monitor groundwater 

14 H.3.4.2.2 Monitor neutron probes below engineered baaier 

15 H3.4.2.3 Periodically inspect barrier for erosion & settlement 

16 

Final Ftasibility StndyjordreCanyon Disposition fnhiative (221-U Facility) 

m ?tXl H-31

Appendix H - Detailed Description of Alternative 6: noFJw-.20ot-1 t 

^ Close in Place - Collapsed Structui•e Rev. e 1 DrMft A 

^ Redline/Strikeont 

I ' 

^ 

Final Feasibility Study jar the Canyon Disposition Liii(alfve (221-U Facility) 

Ju ne 100 ^ H-32

^ 

n 1 APPENDIX I 

2 

TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS 

^ 


Rev.9 aft 

Rcdlinc/Stril,eoat 

Final Feasibility Study for the Canyon Disposition initiatine (221•U Facility) 

nc 00v I-i

f^ 

^ 

DOFJRL-2001-I I 

Rev. N raft 

Rcdf inc/Stri I,eout 

Final FraslbifJry Srady jor ghc Canyon Disposition lniNative (221-U Facility) 

ne ^ I-ie

^ 

DOE/R1^2001-I 1 

Rev. N Draft 

Rcdlinc/Slrikonut 

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 

2 

3 

4 I DECOMMISSIONING TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS ........... ......................... I-1 

5 1.1 DECONTAMINATION ...................... _............................................................... 1-1 

1.1.1 Chemical Decontamination Techniques ...................................................I-1 

1.1.2 Mechanical Decontamination Techniques ...............................................I-2 

1.2 EQUIPMENT REMOVAL AND SIZE REDUCTION .......................................1-6 

10 1.2.1 Mechanical Cutting Teehniques ............................................................... I-6 

11 1.2.2 Thermal CuttingTechniques.... ».... _ ........................................................I-8 

12 1.23 Other Techniques ................... .................................................................. 1-9 

13 

14 1.3 DEMOLTTION ................................................................................................... I-10 

15 1.3.1 Controlled Blasting ......... .......................................... ........ _................... I-10 

16 1.3.2 Wrecking Ball or Slab.... _ ...................................................................... I-10 

17 1.3.3 Backhoe-Mounted Rams ........................................................................ I-11 

I'` 18 1.3.4 Rock Splitter....... ........... ....................................................................... I-11 

19 I.3S Bristar Demolition Compound ............................................................... I-11 

20 1.3.6 Paving Breakers and Chipping Hammers ........................ ..................... I-12 

21 

22 1.4 REFERENCE ..................................................................................................... I-12 

23 

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2 

APPENDIX[ 

3 

4 

DECOMMISSIONING TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

This appendix identifies industry standard technologies for decontaminating and 

decommissioning (D&D) nuclear facilities. The information in this appendix represents a 

synopsis of information contained in the U S. Department ojEnergy Decommissioning 

Handbook (DOE 1994). The technologies have been broadly classified as technologies 

associated with the following: 

12 • Decontamination 

13 • Equipment removal and size reduction 

14 

15 

16 

• Demolition. 

17 

18 

1.1 DECONTAMINATION 

19 Decontamination is regularly used to reduce occupational exposure, reduce the potential for the 

20 

21 

release and uptake of radioactive material, permit reuse of a component, and facilitate waste 

management. The decision to decontaminate should be weighed against the total dose and cost. 

22 

23 Decontamination techniques are primarily categorized as chemical or mechanical. Selection of 

24 the appropriate technology or technologies for a particular decontamination activity should 

25 

26 

consider the following: 

27 

28 

• Cost 

29 

30 

• Surface layer thickness to be removed 

31 

32 

• Final end state of the material surface 

33 • Decontamination aim (the purpose to reduce exposure to personnel or release for 

34 

35 

unrestricted use) 

36 

37 

• Allowed dosage level to personnel 

38 

39 

• Amount of secondary waste generation and treatment required. 

40 

41 

1.1.1 Chemical Decontamination Techniques 

42 Chemical decontamination techniques use concentrated or dilute solvents in contact with 

^ 43 

44 

contaminated surface. The advantages of chemical dccontamination include the following: 

45 • Can be used for inaccessible surfaces 

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1 • Requires fewer work hours 

2 • Can decontaminate process equipment and piping in place 

3 • Can usually be performed remotely 

4 • Produces few airborne hazards 

5 • Uses chemical agents that are readily available 

6 • Produces wastes that can be handled remotely 

7 • Generally allows the recycling of the wash liquors after further processing. 

8 

9 The disadvantages of chemical dccontamination include the following: 

10 

11 • Not usually effective on porous surfaces 

12 • Can produce large volumes of waste 

13 • May generate mixed wastes 

14 • Can result in corrosion and safety problems when misapplied 

15 • Requires different reagents for different surfaces 

16 • Requires drainage control 

17 • For large jobs, generally requires construction of chemical storage and collecting equipment 

18 • Requires addressing criticality concerns, where applicable. 

19 

("',20 Common reagents used for chemical decontamination include water/steam, strong mineral acids, 

21 acid salts, weak acids, alkaline salts, completing agents, oxidizing and reducing agents, 

22 detergents and surfactants, and organic solvents. 

23 

24 1.1.2 Mechanical Decontamination Techniques 

25 

26 Mechanical decontamination techniques are physical techniques that can generally be considered 

27 as surface cleaning or surface removing. Mechanical decontamination can be used in lieu of or 

28 in conjunction with chemical decontamination and can be used on any surface (which typically 

29 achieves superior results). Mechanical decontamination processes require the work piece surface 

30 to be accessible. Crevices and corners are difficult to decontaminate using mechanical 

31 techniques. Many mechanical techniques also tend to create airborne dusts. 

32 

33 Industry-standard mechanical decontamination techniques are briefly described in the following 

34 sections. 

35 

36 1.1.2.1 Flushtng with Water. This technique involves flooding a surface with hot water. The 

37 hot water dissolves the contaminants, and the resulting wastewater is pushed to a central 

38 collection area. This method is usually performed after scrubbing, especially on floors. The 

39 volume of the wastewater can also be reduced by using a water treatment system to recycle the 

40 flush water. 

41 

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n 1 1.1.2.2 Dusting, Vacuuming, Wiping, and Scrubbing. This technique refers to physical 

2 removal of dust and particles from building and equipment surfaces by using common cleaning 

3 techniques. 

4 

5 1.1.2.3 Fxative/Stabilizer Coatings. Various agents can be used as coatings on contaminated 

6 residues to fix or stabilize the contaminant in place and dccrease or eliminate exposure hazards. 

7 No removal of contaminants is achieved. 

9 1.1.2.4 Turbulator. A turbulator is a large tank with propellers that direct the flow of a cleaning 

10 solution across a component. 

I1 

12 1.1.2.5 Metal-Based Paint Removal. Metals such as lead, cadmium, chromium, and mercury 

13 have been used as ingredients in paints used to coat the interior surfaces of buildings. In some 

14 instances, these paints (especially lead) may still be used to coat piping and other metallic 

15 structures or components. If decontamination of any such surface is required, use of paint- 

16 removal techniques could be used. 

17 

18 1.1.2.6 Strippable. The use of a strippable coating involves the application of a polymer 

19 mixture to a contaminated surface. As the polymer reacts, the contaminants are stabilized, 

20 becoming entrained in the polymer. In general, the contaminated layer is pulled off, 

("""^21 containerized,and disposed. 

22 

23 1.1.2.7 Steam Cleaning. Steam cleaning physically extracts contaminants from buildings and 

24 equipment surfaces. The steam is applied using hand-held wands or automated systems, and 

25 condensate is collected for treatment. 

26 

27 I.1.2.8 Sponge Blasting. This technique was originally developed for the painting industry as a 

28 surface-preparation activity. This technique cleans by blasting surfaces with various grades of 

29 foam-cleaning media ( i.e., sponges). The sponges are made of a water-based urethane. During 

30 surface contact, the sponges expand and contract, creating a scrubbing effect. Most of the energy 

31 of the sponges is transferred onto the surface being cleaned. 

32 

33 1.1.2.9 CO2 Blasting. This method is a variation of grit blasting in which CO2 pellets are used 

34 as the cleaning medium. Small dry-ice pellets are accelerated through a nozzle using 

35 compressed air at 4 to 8 kg/cm2 (50 to 250lblini). The pellets shatter when they impact the 

36 surface, and the resulting kinetic energy causes them to penetrate the base material and shatter it, 

37 blasting fragments laterally and releasing the contaminant from the base material. 

38 

39 1.1.2.10 Wet-Ice Blasting. This technique is similar to other decontamination technologies that 

40 direct a high-velocity stream of fine particles such as steel pellets, plastic pellets, or glass beads 

41 onto a surface to remove contamination. This system employs low-pressure air and wet ice for 

42 cleaning and surface preparation. Because this system uses water in the form of ice as its 

r"N 43 medium, no other consumables are required. 

44 

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1 1.1.2.11 Hydrobiasting. In this technology, a high-pressure 70 kg/cm2 (>10P ]bfin2) water jet is 

2 used to remove contaminated debris from surfaces. The debris and water are then collected, 

3 treated, and disposed. 

5 1.1.2.12 Ultra-High-Pressure Water. In this technique, water is pressurized up to 379,225 kPa 

6 (55,000 psi) by an ultra-high-pressun; intensifier pump. The water is then forced through a 

7 small-diameter nozzle that generates a high-velocity water jet at speeds of up to 914 m/s 

8 (3,000 ft/s). 

9 

10 1.1.2.13 Shot Blasting. Shot blasting is an airless method that strips, cleans, and etches the 

11 surface simultaneously. The technique is virtually dust free, so the potential for airbome 

12 contamination is very low. Portable shotblasting units move along the surface that is being 

13 treated as the abrasive is fed into the center of a completely enclosed centrifugal blast whecl. As 

14 the whecl spins, the abrasives are hurled from the blades, blasting the surface. The abrasive and 

15 removed debris are bounced back to a separation system that recycles the abrasive and sends the 

16 contaminant to a dust collector. Larger shot removes more concrete, and the etch depth can be 

17 controlled by varying the speed of the unit. Units are available that can remove a surface up to 

18 0.63 cm (0.25 in.) thick in a single pass. 

19 

20 1.1.2.14 Wet Abrasive Cleaning. A wet abrasive cleaning system is a closed-loop, liquid 

(--^'21 abrasive (wet grit blasting) decontamination technique. The system uses a combination of water, 

22 abrasive media, and compressed air and is applied in a self-contained, leaktight, stainless steel 

23 enclosure. The system uses a high

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RallinelSlrikeout 

1 1.1.2.18 Milling. There are two milling techniques: one for shaving metals and another for 

2 shaving concrete. Concrete milling is similar to concrete scabbling or scarifying, except that it 

3 may be applied to a much larger surface area. Large paving-type equipment is generally used to 

4 shave the concrete surface. Approximately 63 to 25.4 cm (2.5 to 10 in.) can be removed in this 

5 manner. 

6 

7 1.1.2.19 Dril1-and-Spall. The drill-and-spall technique was developed to remove contaminated 

8 concrete surfaces without demolishing the entire structure. The technique involves drilling 

9 2.54- to 3.81-cm ( 1- to 1.5-in.)-diameter holes approximately 7.6 cm (3 in.) deep into which a 

10 hydraulically operated spalling tool is inserted. The spalling tool bit is an expandable tube of the 

I I same diameter as the hole. A tapered mandrel is hydraulically forced into the hole to spread the 

12 fingers and spall off the concrete. 

13 

14 1.1.2.20 Paving Breaker and Chipping Hammer. Although paving breakers and chipping 

15 hammers are primarily used in demolition activities, they can be used to remove surface 

16 contamination up to 15.2 cm (6 in.) thick. 

17 

18 1.1.2.21 Electropolishing. Electropolishing is an anodic-dissolution technique. A small, 

19 controlled amount of material (conductive metal) is stripped from the surface of the object being 

20 cleaned. This method is reverse electrolysis. 

r^'121 

22 1.1.2.22 Ultrasonic Cleaning. Thistachniquo uses a generator to produce an ultrasonic 

23 frequency. A transducer then converts this high-frequency energy into low-amplitude 

24 mechanical energy (vibrations) of the same frequency. A vigorous scrubbing action is produced 

25 by a cleaning solution and imparted into the object being cleaned. 

26 

27 1.1.2.23 Vibratory Finishing. Objects are placed in a basket filled with abrasive media that is 

28 vibrated at a high frequency in a cleaning solution. The vibrating media produce a scouring 

29 action that removes contamination, including tape, paint, and corrosion products from most 

30 items. 

31 

32 1.1.2.24 Light Ablation. This technique uses the absorption of light energy and its conversion 

33 to heat to selectively remove surface coating or contaminants. For a given frequency of light, 

34 some surfaces reflect the beam, some transmit the beam, and others absorb the light energy and 

35 convert it to heat. If the light intensity is high enough, the surface film can be heated to 1,000EF 

36 to 2,000EF in microseconds. 

37 

38 1.1.2.25 Microwave Scabbiing. This technique directs microwave energy at contaminated 

39 concrete surfaces and heats the moisture present in the concrete matrix. Continued heating 

40 produces steam pressure-induced internal mechanical stresses and thermal stresses. When 

41 combined, these two stresses burst the surface layer of the concrete into small chips. 

42 

43 1.1.2.26 Flaming. This technique uses controlled high-temperature 1lames applied to 

44 noncombustible surfaces to thermally degrade organic contaminants. 

45 

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^ 

1 1.1.2.27 Flame Scarifying. This technique is similar to flaming. The top layer of concrete is 

2 heated to cause differential expansion and spalling. Pieces of up to several centimeters in 

3 diameter erupt from the surface. 

4 

5 1.1.2.28 Plasma Torch. Potential uses in decontamination of materials include breaking down 

6 oils and polychlorinated biphenyls into less harmful or harmless substances, achieving the rapid 

7 spalling of concrete, and dclaminating contaminants from underlying substrates. 

9 1.1.2.29 Electrical Resistance. This technique is a spalling technique that involves heating the 

10 steel re-enforcing rods using electrical resistance or induction heating. This heating causes the 

11 bars to expand, which in turn induces the concrete to spail from the bars. 

12 

13 

14 1.2 EQUIPMENT REMOVAL AND SIZE REDUCTION 

15 

16 Equipment removal and size reduction refers to the physical dismantling and segmenting of 

17 equipment such as piping, pumps, tanks, hot cells, and laboratories. Equipment dismantling and 

18 segmenting techniques can be generally grouped into the three categories of mechanical, thermal, 

19 and other. The removal methods should be chosen based on the following major factors: 

20 

("^'21 • Radiological criteria 

22 • Availability or adaptability of suitable equipment 

23 •, Knowledge of problems to be tackled 

24 • Time available 

25 • Cost effectiveness of proposed solutions. 

26 

27 In general, the equipment chosen should be easy to use, familiar, reliable, well constructed, and 

28 proven. It should be capable of being used manually and adaptable for remote use. 

29 

30 1.2.1 Mechanical Cutting Techniques 

31 

32 The following techniques use mechanical forces and/or motions to cut or break a component. 

33 

34 1.2.1.1 Power Nibblers and Shears. A nibbler is a punch and die-cutting tool that normally 

35 operates at a rapid reciprocation rate of the punch against the die, "nibbling" a small amount of 

36 sheet metal work piece with each stroke. This process is ideal for cutting intricate shapes and 

37 turning comers. 

38 

39 A shear is a two-blade or two-cutter tool that operates on the same principle as a conventional 

40 pair of scissors. A blade shear primarily is used for in-line cutting of sheet metal, and a rotary 

41 shear is capable of producing irregular or circular cuts. In addition to the cutting of thin sheets, 

42 the power shear is also applicable to the cutting of small-bore piping and tubing and, in some 

(00^\43 instances, can be used to segment tanks. The large mobile shears are capable of cutting 0.63-cm 

44 (0.25-in.)-thick steel and can be used on structural steel, largc-diameter piping, and above- and 

45 belowgradc tanks. 

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I 

2 11.1.2 Conventional Mechanical Saws. Hacksaws, guillotine saws, and reciprocating-action 

3 saws are relatively common industrial tools used for cutting all metals with a reciprocating- 

4 action, hardened-steel saw blade. These saws are frequently selected for cutting piping systems 

5 because of their low operating cost, high cutting speed, and ease of contamination control. These 

6 saws can be applied in either portable (hand-held or remote) or stationary models. 

7 

8 I.2.13 Circular Cutters. A circular cutting machine is a self-propelled unit that cuts as it 

9 moves around the outside circumference of a pipe on a track. The machine may be powered 

10 either pneumatically, hydraulically, or electrically and is held to the outside of the pipe or 

11 component by a guide chain that is sized to fit the outside diameter. 

12 

13 1.2.1A Abrasive Cutters. An abrasive cutter is an electrically, hydraulically, or pneumatically 

14 powered wheel formed of resin-bonded particles of aluminum oxide or silicon carbide. The 

15 wheels, usually reinforced with fiberglass matting for strength, cuts through the work piece by 

16 grinding the metal away. The cutting technique generates a continuous stream of sparks, making 

17 it unsuitable for use near combustible materials. Because the particles are removed in very small 

18 pieces, contamination control is a significant problem. 

19 

20 I.2.1S Wall and Floor Sawing. Wall and floor sawing Is used when disturbance of the 

to^'21 surrounding material must be kept to a minimum. A diamond or carbide wheel is used to 

22 abrasively cut through the concrete. The blades can be used to cut through reinforcing rods. 

23 Floor saws, also called slab saws and flat saws, feature a blade that is mounted on a walk-behind 

24 machine requiring only one operator. Wall saws, also called track saws, employ a blade on a 

25 track-mounted machine. The track mounted on a wall or incline will not permit the use of a floor 

26 saw. The operator manually advances the blade into the work. The dust produced by the 

27 abrasive cutting is controlled using a water spray. 

28 

29 1.2.1.6 Diamond Wire Cutting. Diamond wire cutting involves a series of guide pulleys that 

30 draw a continuous loop of multi-strand wire strung with a series of diamond beads and spacers 

31 through a cut. Contact tension, in combination with the spinning wire, cuts a path through 

32 concrete and reinforcing rods. If an internal cut is required (e.g., doorway), core drilling is 

33 necessary, and the wire is fed through the holes. Almost any thickness can be cut with this 

34 technique. The wire saw can cut unusual configurations and allows easy and safe cutting in 

35 difficult areas. Water is used for cooling and lubricating. Potential concerns associated with 

36 wire saws include physical hazards caused by mechanical failure or contaminant transport. 

37 

38 1.2.1.7 Explosive Cutting. Explosive cutting is a method of segmenting materials using an 

39 explosive that is formed in a geometric shape specially designed and sized to produce the desired 

40 separation of the work piece. The cutter Is shaped like a chevron, and the apex is pointed away 

41 from the material to be cut. When detonated, the explosive core generates a shock wave that 

42 fractures the casing inside the chevron and propels the casing into the material to be cut. This is 

(----,43 a potentially dangerous process, and the application should be left to expcrts who specialize in 

44 that field. 

45 

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1 1.2.1.8 Core Drilling and Stitch Drilling. The core drilling technique makes use of a diamond- 

2 or carbide-tipped drill bit in an electric- or fluid-driven rotary drill. Precise, circular cuts of 

3 almost any diameter up to 152 cm (60 in.) can be drilled. The stitch drilling process, an 

4 extension of the core drilling process, involves the boring of a series of overlapping holes. Stitch 

5 drilling can also be performed by boring close-pitched holes with the centerline of the holes 

6 located along the desired breaking plane in the concrete. 

7 

8 Core drilling produces no hazes or smoke, thereby facilitating contamination control. The dust 

9 produced by the drilling is controlled by a water spray that is also used to cool the drill bit. 

10 Stitch drilling is used where surrounding material must not be disturbed or where accessibility is 

11 limited. However, the slab to be removed must be amenable to the method used to shear the 

12 concrete (bar, slab, or wrecking ball) if overlapping holes are not drilled. The method of drilling 

13 close-pitched holes is not recommended for reinforced concrete because the remaining 

14 reinforcing rod inhibits shearing. 

15 

16 The process is very slow and costly for large volumes of massive concrete removal. 

17 

18 1.2.2 Thermal Cutting Techniques 

19 

20 Thermal cutters consist of flame producers and arc producers; both types of cutters are desesibed 

n 21 in the following sections. 

22 

23 1.2.2.1 Plasma Arc Cutting. The plasma arc cutting technique is based on the establishment of 

24 a direct current arc between a tungsten electrode and any conducting metal. The arc is 

25 established in a gas, or gas mixture, that flows through a constricting orifice in the torch nozzle 

26 to the work piece. The stream or plasma consists of positively charged ions and free electrons. 

27 The plasma is ejected from the torch nozzle at a very high velocity and, in combination with the 

28 arc, melts the contacted work piece metal and literally blows the molten metal away. 

29 

30 An automatic plasma arc cutting system would include torch-positioning equipment; torch travel 

31 system; air, starting gas, and plasma gas supply systems; pilot are high-frequency power supply; 

32 plasma arc power supply; and associated gas flow, arc, and mechanical travel controls. Portable, 

33 , hand-held automatic plasma cutting systems are available from various manufacturers as 

34 off-the-shelf items. 

35 

36 1.2.2.2 Oxygen Burning. Oxygen burning, sometimes referred to as oxyacetylene cutting, 

37 consists of a flowing mixture of a fuel gas and oxygen ignited at the orifice of a torch. In 

38 general, a hand-held torch is used in this process and is readily adaptable to automated 

39 positioning and travel. 

40 

41 The principal application of oxygen burning in equipment removal work would be for the 

42 general disassembly of structural carbon-steel members (e.g., beams, columns, and supports). 

n43 Because the process is so widely known, skilled workers who can handle the equipment are 

44 readily available. Moreover, the equipment is inexpensive to obtain and maintain and is quickly 

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1 and easily set up. In hazardous environments, the torch can be mounted on a remotely opcrated 

2 positioner to reduce the potential for exposures to workers. 

3 

4 An oxygen-buming torch is ordinarily unable to cut aluminum and other nonferrous or 

5 ferrous/high-pcrcent alloy metals, such as stainless steel. 

6 

7 1.2.2.3 Flame Cutting. Flame cutting, a technique used to cut concrete, involves a thermite 

8 reaction in which a powdered mixture of iron and aluminum oxidizes in a pure oxygen jet. As 

9 the high temperature of the jet (as high as 16,000°F) causes the concrete to decompose, the mass 

10 flow rate through the flame-cutting nozzle acts to clear the debris from the work piece area. Any 

l 1 reinforcing rods in the concrete add iron to the reaction, sustaining the flame and assisting the 

12 reaction. 

13 

14 Heat and smoke that result from the process can be removed with a blower and directed through 

15 a flexible duct that houses a water logger to hold down smoke particulates. The high operating 

16 temperatures preclude the use of HEPA filters for contamination control, making the flame- 

17 cutting technique poor for use in contaminated environments. 

18 

19 I.2.2.4 Thermite Reaction ILance. The thetmite reaction lance is an iron pipe packed with a 

20 combination of steel, aluminum, and magnesium wires through which a flow of oxygen gas is 

("",21 maintained. The lance cuts are achieved by a themtite reaction at the tip of the pipe in which all 

22 constituents are completely consumed. Temperatures at the tip range from 4,000°F to 10,000°F 

23 depending on the environment (air or underwater) and the ambient condidons of that 

24 environment. The lance is ignited in air by a high-temperature source such as an oxygen-burning 

25 torch or an electric arc. Typical lances are 3.2 m ( 10.5 ft) in length and have outside diameters 

26 of 0.38 in., 0.5 in., 0.63 in., or 0.69 in. Use of the lance is practical only in a hand-held mode. 

27 The lance operator must also be provided with complete fireproof protective clothing and face 

28 shield. 

29 

30 1.2.2.5 Arc Saw Cutting. The atC saw is an extension of nonconsumable melting electrode 

31 technology. It is a circular, toothless saw blade that cuts any conducting metal without physical 

32 contact with the work piece. The cutting action is achieved by maintaining a high-current 

33 electric arc between the blade and the material being cut. The blade can be made of any 

34 electrically conductive material (e.g.. tool steel, mild steel, or copper) with equal success. The 

35 depth of cut is limited by blade diameter, and a maximum cut of 0.9 m (3 ft) is considered 

36 achievable. 

37 

38 1.23 Other Techniques 

39 

40 Abrasive water-jet cutting is a technique that is neither mechanical nor thermal. In this 

41 technique, the material is eroded away by an abrasive. The abrasive water-jet cutting technique 

42 involves the use of highly pressurized water (as high as 379,225 kPa [55,000 psi]). The water is 

("^N43 pressurized by a hydraulically driven intensifier pump. The water tiows through a chamber 

44 where it is mixed with an abrasive, the most common being crushed garnet. This mixture of 

45 water and abrasive is then forced through a wear-resistant nozzle with a small orifice, which 

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1 focuses the abrasive jet stream at the component being cut. The pressurized jet stream exits the 

2 

3 

4 

orifice at extremely high velocities, producing erosion that yields a clean cut. If this process is 

applied to contaminated surfaces, the resulting slurry, consisting of cut particles of material (i.e., 

concrete and reinforcing bar), abrasive, and water, may require collection and treatment. 

5 

6 

7 

Abrasive water-jet cutting generates large quantities of water and used grit. It is possible to 

recycle the water, but such a recycling effort requires an ultra-pure filtration system with 

8 sufficient capacity to support operations. Without an ultra-pure filter, the cylinders of the 

9 intensifier pump will become scored more quickly, making the generation of the necessary high 

10 pressure virtually impossible. Moreover, the abrasives may also wear away the recycling system 

11 

12 

13 

14 

piping components, which could lead to leakage of contaminants. The cost of the filtration 

system adds to the high cost of the intensifier, making the overall process fairly expensive. 

15 

16 

1.3 DEMOLITION 

17 Demolition techniques also can be generally divided into mechanical and thermal categories. 

18 Several of the techniques describcd under decontamination and equipment removal can also be 

19 applied to concrete demolition activities. Techniques not previously discussed are described in 

20 

r2l 

the following sections. • 

22 

23 

I3.1 Controlled Blasting 

24 Controlled blasting is ideally suited for demolition of massive or heavily reinforced, thick 

25 concrete sections. The process consists of drilling holes in the concrete, loading them with 

26 explosives, and detonating using a delayed firing technique. The delayed firing increases 

27 fragmentation and controls the direction of material movement. Each borehole fractures radially 

28 during the detonation. The radial fractures in adjacent boreholes form a fracture plane. The 

29 detonation wave separates the fractured surfaces and moves the material toward the structure's 

30 free face. Controlled blasting is the concrete demolition method recommended for all concrete 

31 greater than 0.6 m (2 ft) thick, provided that noise and shock in adjacent occupied areas are not 

32 limiting. The process is well suited to heavily reinforced concrete demolition because a high 

33 degree of fragmentation may be achieved with proper selection of the blast parameters. The 

34 

35 

exposed reinforcing bar may then be cut with an oxyacetylene torch or bolt cutter. 

36 

37 

1.3.2 WreckingBall Bailor 

38 The wrecking ball is typically used for demolition of nonreinforced or lightly reinforced concrete 

39 structures less than 0.9 m(3 ft) in thickness. The equipment consists of a 2- to 5-ton ball or flat 

40 

41 

slab suspended from a crane boom. The ball may be used in either of two techniques to 

demolish structures. The preferred method is to drop the ball from a height of 3 to 6 m (10 to 

42 20 ft) above the structure. The maximum height of the structure is limited to about 30 m 

(*-'143 ( 100 ft). This method develops good fragmentation of the structure with maximum control of the 

44 ball after impact. The second method is to swing the ball into the structure using a suck line for 

45 recovery after impact. The structure height is limited to about 15.2 m (50 ft) because of the 

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Appendix I - Decommissioning Technology Applications [tev.0 D raft I; 

RcdlinclStrikcout 

n 1 crane instability during the swing and after impact. The latter method is not recommended 

2 because the target area is more difficult to hit and the ball may ricochet off the target and damage 

3 adjacent structures while putting side leads on the crane boom. The flat slab may only be used in 

4 the vertical drop mode, but offers the advantage of being able to shear through steel-neinforcing 

5 rods as well as concrete. 

6 

7 The wrecking ball or slab is recommended for nottradioactive concrete structures less than 0.9 in 

8 (3 ft) in thickness. It would be virtually impossible to control the release of radioactive dust 

9 during demolition due to the access needed for the crane to drop or swing the ball. For 

10 nonradioactive structures, the wrecking ball Is an effective method and provides good 

11 fragmentation to expose reinforcing rods. 

12 

13 1.3.3 Backhoe-Mounted Rams 

14 

15 Backhoe-mounted rams are used for concrete structures less than 0.6 m(2 ft) thick with light 

16 n:inforcement. The method is ideally suited for low-noise, low-vibration demolition. and for 

17 interior demolition in confined areas. The equipment consists of an air- or hydraulic-operated 

18 impact ram with a moil or chisel point mounted on a backhoe arm. With the ram head mounted 

19 on a backhoe, the operator has approximately a 6- to 7.6-m (20- to 25-ft) reach and the ability to 

20 position the ram in limited access structures. The ram is recommended for applications with 

('-121 limited access for heavy equipment, such as a wrecking ball, and where blasting is not pcrtnitted. 

22 

23 I.3.4 Rock Splitter 

24 

25 The rock splitter is a method for fracturing concrete by hydraulically expanding a wedge into a 

26 pre-drilled hole until tensile stresses are large enough to cause fracture. The tool consists of a 

27 hydraulic cylinder that drives a wedge-shaped plug between two expandable guides (called 

28 feathers) inserted in the pre-drilled hole. Concrete may be separated at the fracture line using a 

29 backhoe-mounted air ram or similar equipment. The reinforcing rod in reinforced concrete must 

30 be cut before separation is possible. The splitter is ideally suited for fracturing concrete in 

31 limited access areas where large air rams cannot operate. Reinforced concrete sections up to 

32 2.4 m (8 ft) thick may be cut with a single large unit. Reinforced concrete sections 3 m (10 ft) 

33 thick will require two or more large units to operate simultaneously. 

34 

35 I33 Bristar Demolition Compound 

36 

37 Bristar concrete demolition compound is a chemically expanding compound that is poured into 

38 pre-drilled holes and causes tensile fractures in the concrete upon hardening. Bristar is a 

39 proprietary compound of limestone, siliceous material, gypsum, and slag. Cracks will form and 

40 propagate along the fracture line. The crack width will range between 0.63 cm (0.25 in.) after 

41 10 hours to almost 5 cm (2 in.) after 15 hours. The fractured burden may then be removed with a 

42 paving breaker, backhoe, or bucket loader. If a reinforcing rod is encountered, it must be cut 

43 separately. The compound is not classified as a hazardous substance and can be readily stored 

44 and handled. Bristar is suited for use on massive nonreinforced concrete structures where noise, 

Final Feasibility Study jor the Canyon Disposition fnitiative (221-U Facility) 

^ luas 2,003 I-11

^ 

n 

^ 

DOF1RG2001-11 

Appendix I - Decommissioning Techno{ogy Applications Rev. AI raft 

edtine%Strikcout 

1 vibration, flyrock. dust, or gas must be avoided. It is not recommended for slabs of concrete less 

2 than 30 cm (12 in.) in thickness. 

3 

4 1.3.6 Paving Breakers and Chipping Hammers 

6 Paving breakers and chipping hammers remove concrete (and asphalt) by mechanicalty 

7 fracturing localized sections of the surface. Fracturing is caused by the impact of a hardened tool 

8 steel bit of either a compressed air or hydraulic fluid pressure source. Paving breakers are 

9 recommended for use on floors to remove small areas that are inaccessible for heavy equipment. 

10 They may also be used to expose reinforcing rods after controlled blasting to permit cutting of 

11 the rods. 

12 

13 

14 IA REFERENCE 

15 

16 DOE, 1994, U.S. Department ojEhergy Decommissioning llandbook, DOE/EM-0142P, 

17 U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 

18 

Final Feasibifiry Stwdy jor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (221-U Facility) 

^ 1Jin£ 200 1-12

^ 

r APPENDIX J 

f^ 

APPLICABLE OR RELEVANT AND 

APPROPRIATE REQUIREMENTS 

DOFJRLr2001-11 

Rev.4 1. DraR BA 

Redtinc/StriGeont 

Final fiarlerriy srudyfor the Canyon Disposition Initiative (?Il-u Pacrrfy) ^ 

September^^Fâ^9^ I-i

^ 

("` 

^ 

DOFJRI.2001-11 

Rev. G I. Drafl BA 

FlnalFear1b1f1ryStadyjor the Canyon DfspasltlonlnUfotPoe (221-UFac!liry) 

Scptember 2002$#rkv*-v-3Atu J-ii

ao"N 

^ 

n 


DOEIRII-2001-11 

Rev. 0 1. Dra ft 8A 

Redlinc/Strikmut 

APPLICABLE OR RELEVANT AND APPROPRIATE REQUIREMENTS ......... J-1 

J.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... J-1 

J.2 STANDARDS FOR SOIL CLEANUP AND GROUNDWATER AND 

RIVER PROTECTION..._ ................................................................................... J-2 

J.2.1 Full Removal and Disposal Alternative (Alternative 1) .......................... J-3 

J.2.2 Containment Alternatives (Alternatives 3,4, and 6) .... .......................... J-3 

J.3 WASTE MANAGEMENT STANDARDS ......................................................... J-3 

J.3.1 Full Removal and Disposal Alternative (Alternative 1) ............... _......... J-4 

J.3.2 Containment Alternatives (Alternatives 3,4, and 6) ............................... J-4 

J.4 WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT STANDARDS ........................................... J-6 


3.4.2 Containment Alternatives (Alternatives 3, 4, and 6) ............................... J-6 

J.5 STANDARDS FOR PROTECTION OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER FROM 

DIRECT DIS CHARGES ..................................................................................... J-6 

J.6 AIR EMISSION STANDARDS ............................................................... _......... J-7 


J.6.2 Containment Alternatives (Alternatives 3, 4, and 6) ......................J-83&L7 

J.7 STANDARDS FOR THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL AND 

ECOLOGICAL RESOURCES .................... ......................... ........ ........ ........... .. 1-8 

J.7.1 Full Removal and Disposal Alternative (Alternative 1) 

J.7.2 Containment Alternatives (Alternatives 3,4, and 6) .». 

J.8 RADIATION PROTECTION STANDARDS .................................................... J-9 

J.8.1 Full Removal and Disposal Alternative (Alternative 1) ........................ J-10 

J.8.2 Containment Alternatives (Alternatives 3,4, and 6) ............................. J-10 

3.9 REFERENCES ...... ............................................:............................................... J-10 

• 

Flnal fearlbfliry Studyjor the Canyon Disposition InUtatlve (I?!-U Faeiliry) 

goflawb^F AUFSeptembers ln3 J-iii I . 

J-9 

J-9

^ 

r^, 

TABLES 

DOFJRIr2001-11 • 

Rev.8 1. Drntt B,4 

Redline/Stri{.crtn ^ • 

J-1. Identification of Potential Federal ARARs and TBCs for the 221-U Facility 

Canyon Disposition Initiative Remedial Alternatives ................................................... J-17 

J-2. Identification of Potential State ARARs and TBCs for the 221-U Facility 

Canyon Disposition Initiative Remedial Alternatives ...................................... J-27J-2Fi4:i 

FAmlFearlbtfityS7adyjorthe Cmryon Diaposftlon/nlrlaHve (221-UFoc7fity) 

S@ft "UhM 1001 September^s!N)s J-iv I

^ 

J.1 INTRODUCTION 

APPENDIX J 

APPLICABLE OR RELEVANT AND 

APPROPRIATE REQUIREMENTS 

DOE/RI.2001-11 

Rev. Cl Draft T3A 

Section 121 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and IdablllryAct of 

1980 (CERCLA), as amended, establishes cleanup standards for remedial actions at National " 

Priorities List sites. Section 121 requires, in part, that any applicable or relevant and appropriate 

standard, requirement, criteria, or limitation under any Federal environmental law, or any more 

stringent state requirement promulgated pursuant to a state environmental statute, be met (or a 

waiver justified) for any hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant that will remain on site 

after completion of remedial action. In addition, 40 Code ojFederal Regulations (CFR) 

300.435(b) requires that all applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARs) be met 

(or waived) during the course of the remedial action. 

When requirements are identi6ed, a determination must be made as to whether those 

requirements are applicable or relevant and appropriate. A requirement is applicable if the 

specific terms (orjurisdictional prerequisites) of the law or regulations directly address the 

circumstances at a site. If not applicable, a requirement may nevertheless be relevant and 

appropriate if (l) circumstances at the site are, based on best professional judgment, sufficiently 

similar to the problems or situations regulated by the requirement; and (2) the use of the 

requirement is well suited to the site. 

To-be-considered (TBC) information is nonpromulgated advisories or guidance issued by 

Federal or state governments that are not legally binding and do not have the status of potential 

ARARs. In some circumstances, TBCs will be considered along with ARARs to determine the 

remedial action necessary for protection ofhuman health and the environment. The TBCs 

complement ARARs in determining what is protective at a site or how certain actions should be 

implemented. 

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has developed a two-volume guidance 

document for preparing ARARs, titled CERCLA Compliance with Other Laws Manual, Interim 

Final (EPA 1988,1989). This guidance document defines three categories of ARARslfBCs: 

• Chemical-specific requirements are usually health- or risk-based numerical values or 

methodologies that, when applied to site-specific conditions, result in the establishment of 

numerical values. These values establish the acceptable amount or concentration of a 

contaminant that may be found In, or discharged to, the ambient environment. 

^ • Action-specific requirements are usually technology- or activity-based requirements or 

limitations triggered by the remedial actions performed at the site. 

Final Feasibility Sn+dyjor the t:arryon Dtrposlr(on lnitiatlve (211-U Facility) 

Septnnber^^l J-1 I

^ 

Appendix J- Applicable or Relevant and •• • DoFlRIr20o 1-1 t•` •••' 

Appropriate Requirements ... Rev.A I nralt 6A • 


;•..Location-specific requirements are restrictions placed on the concentration of dangcrous :substances 

or the conduct of activities solely because they occur in special geographic areas. 

The information presented In this appendix contains asumman• discussion of how each remedial 

alternative evaluated for the 221-U Facility will comply with key ARARs/TBCs. I)etailed Mists 

of potential federal and state ARARs/TBCs are presented in Tables J-1 and J-2, respectively. 

Because the No Action alternative does not 

no associated ARARs or TBCs-+efawaatiet 

natbeen provided for this alternative . 

J.2 STANDARDS FOR SOIL CLEANUP AND GROUNDWATER 

AND RIVER PROTECTION 

The 

Nashingrox Admixislratfve Code (WAC) 173-340 e+xl-establishes cleanup standards (including 

cleanup levels and points of compliance) for nonradioactive contaminants in soil and 

groundwater. In setting standards, AtTVA-WAC 173-340 prescribes a methodology for 

calculating cleanup levels based on potential land use and exposure assumptions. In addition, 

?.t FF,L WAC 173-340 specifies that soil and groundwater cleanup must be accomplished so that 

other interconnected media, such as adjacent surface waters, are protected. For a containment 

alternative, AIT4'-A WAC 173-340 acknowledges that numeric cleanup levels uill not be 

attainedaMAGI be-- mo but that reliance on controls (e.g., barriers, groundwater monitoring, and 

institutional controls) will be used to preclude contact above the numeric cleanup levels and 

minimize the migration of hazardous substances. 

'It is assumed that all waste 

management facilities will be closed after a period of 50 ycars arid the 200 Areas will be 

restricted to public entry for an additiona1100 years by enforcement of effective institutional 

controls. After that time, although institutional controls would still exist, it is presumed that an 

intruder could obtain access to the area and establish a residence, although the presence of 

effective barriers would prevent access to contaminated materials. 

It is assumed that Aafter the cessation of waste management operations, remediation goals for 

radioactive wastes and radioactively contaminated soils for human receptors «•illaFo eensidei-ei 

to be based on the EPA radionuclide soil cleanup guidance. The EPA has not promulgated 

regulations on radioactive soil contamination. However, it has been stated in a directive (EPA 

1999) that at CERCLA sites, a 10 to 10'6 incremental cancer risk range must be achieved for 

radionuclides to be considered protective of human health and the environment in lieu of less 

stringent standards promulgated by the NRC at 10 CFR 20 Subpart E. At 

1 lanford. a 15 mrem/yr dose above background (generally representing a risk level of 

Final Fearibiliry Srrrdyfor the Canyon Dfspoairion InlrlarHe (221-UFaeNiry) 

94ptOR11urNO I September_ZM2 J-2

.• Appendix J- Applicable or Relevant and• ^•••' DOSlRlr2oaI-t t' 

Appropriate Requirements Rev.4 1 Man BA 

Redline/S(ri{.eout 

r_^' 

approxitnately 3 x 10'+risk)' g leatiup level is applied during remedial 

actions aetiv+ties to achieve the CERCLA risk range. Standards for maximum contaminant levels 

for certain radionuclides, based on an annual dose limit, are provided in 40 CFR 141. 

The following information provides an analysis ofhow each alternative is anticipated to comply 

with the ARARs and TBCs for soil cleanup and protection of groundwater and the Columbia 

River. 


Removal and subsequent treatment and disposal of the 221-U Facility and underlying 

contaminated soils will provide compliance with all soil and groundwater/river cleanup standards 

associated with an industrial land use at the 221-U Facility. 

J.2.2 Containment Alternatives (Alternatives 3,4, and 6) 

Containment will provide compliance with all soil and groundwater/river cleanup standards for 

both nonradioactive and radioactive constituents by preventing exposure to centaminated 

wastecontaminants and ensuring that funher mobilization of contaminants to groundwater and to 

the river is prevented. 

J.3 WASTE MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 

The Resource Conservation and RecoveryAct of1976 (RCRA) regulates the generation, 

transportation, storage, treatment, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste. Authority to 

implement much of RCRA has been delegated to the state and is implemented via WAC 173-303 

(for dangerous waste) and WAC 173-304 ( for solid nondangerous waste). Authority for land 

disposal restrictions (LDRs) has been delegated to the state of R'ashin¢ton. which administers all 

federal LDRs thfo%&hbv reference to a 0 CFR 26g. in 

addition.Washinaton ndministcrc,-atitzr-tltaa state-only LDRs throueh WAC 173-303-140 . The 

Atomic EnergyAct oj1954 (AEA) establishes standards for the management of radioactive 

wastes. Regulations pertaining to the management and land disposal of low-level radioactive 

waste at NRC-licensed facilities are contained in 10 CFR 61. These regulations include barrier 

design requirements that include protection of humans from inadvertent contact with waste 

above acceptable levels at any time after the loss of active institutional controls. 

The Toxic Substances Control Act of1976 (fSCA) and its implementing regulations (40 CFR 

761) govern the storage, treatment, and disposal of extwiais-eeatainint polychlorinated 

biphenyls (PCBs) ^,•aste . The 1002 amenchu 

remediation wastes=Oiat ,Lchich does not depend on the current concentration of PCBs in the 

^-, waste for it4-spilis that occurred (1) after Apri11978 and the original source contained PCBs at 

500 ppm or greater, or, (2) after July 1979 and the original source contained PCBs at 50 ppm or 

greater. Risk-based determinations can be made for PCB rcmediation waste under th s- 

FGwl Fearlb!lity Studyfor the Canyon Disposition !nltWtive (SZI-U Faelliry) 

girl awt.%0 340 !September 2002 • J-3

t^ 

^ 

Appendix J-Applicable or Relevant and,- • DoFJRL2001t 1' ^ 

•Appropriate 

Requirements Rev.4 1 Draft Ba. ^ =•, 


Alternatives that involve facility demolition or the removal of waste or contaminated media or 

ex situ treatment may generate solid, dangerous, or radioactive waste. The RCRA requirements 

are applicable to those alternatives that margenerate, treat, store, or dispose of solid or 

dangerous waste. The substantive requirements of 10 CFR 61 are potentiall^• relevant and 

appropriate to those alternatives that g0liffater}reat-Pr-dispose of radioactive waste in situ .-,44 

Waste would be disposed to the Environmental Restoration 

Disposal Facility (ERDF), which is designed to meet the requirements of RCRA. TSCA, and 

8>zlow-Ievel radioactive waste standards. For alternatives that involve leaving solid or 

dangerous waste in place, RCRA performance standards for landfill covers are relevant and 

appropriate and will be incorporated into the design. Cover performance standards contained in 

10 CFR 61 are potentiallv relevant and appropriate to the in-place disposal of radioactive waste. 

The following information provides an analysis of how each alternative is anticipated to comply 

with the ARARs and TBCs for waste management. 

J3.1 Full Removal and Disposal Alternative (Alternative 1) 

Large quantities of soil and debris (e.g., piping, structures, and cleanup materials) will be 

generated under this alternative. Some of these wastes may require treatment or a waiver from 

LDRs i+:oi•.kr-to be disposed at the ERDF or offsite waste disposal facility. It is anticipated that 

compliance with waste management standards will be achievable for the types of waste and 

contaminants that may Ae-required to he treatmented andtor disposed. Due to the potential for 

much greater quantities of waste to be generated from this alternative, waste management 

ARAR/1BC compliance will be more complex for this alternative rslati+e te than for the disposal 

alternatives. Treatment actions may generate treatment residuals that potentially could require 

treatment prior to disposal at the ERDF or another disposal unit to comply with applicable 

requirements . 

J3.2 Containment Alternatives (Alternatives 3,4, and 6) 

collection m•stems willwakt be souehlrrwsired hecauso the huttom containment scstem (the floor 

Flrtal Feasibility Studyfor the Canyon Disposition In(t(atfve (111-U PacUtry) 

9 ipl iaAos '100 FSeptember ^0" _ .14

f^ 

^ 

(^N 

Appendix J= Applicable or Relevant and ' ,•. ^• DOFJRLr2oo1-11 ,•- ' 

Appropriate Requirements Rev. o l rnafi pA ^ 

Redtine/Strikeout 

, 

AlIeFna6va q , . . . 

^^ . 

.^ . ;^.^ 

, , , 

" ,. a ll 

...: . u.._... ....e...._,,_nrn. . . ................t ..,,..,t....,...o.n: 

Small quantities of waste may be generated from the placement of a barrier such as contaminated 

soils and cleanup debris generated during site preparation and construction. Wastes may also be 

generated during maintenance of the barrier. These wastes may or may not require treatment 

nrioria-^ to bz-disposaled at the ERDF. It is anticipated, however, that treatment to meet 

disoosal 

standards will be achievable. 

Wastes that will be left in place- unJer all comiinmcnt alternatices include residuals remaining in the 

61-cm (24-in.) concrete-encased tile sewer pipe drains located 13.7 m (45 ft) below grade. 

Limited characterization information (two "opportrmistic" samples of residual material on the skids 

of the robotic crawler, see Section 2.6) has shown that these residuals may contain quantities of 

transuranic (alpha-emitting transuranic isotopes with half-lives greater than 20 years)• 

radionuclides in concentrations greater than 100 nanocuries per gram of waste. Wastes 

exceeding these eoncentrations-.ea3led arc classified as TRU waste, and must be disposed to the 

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant deep geologic repository. However, under all of the disposal 

alternatives, the drain lines will be filled with grout to ensure that a preferential pathway for 

liquids is not left in place. The resulting solidified residuals would no longer meet the definition 

ofTRU waste and could be left in place. This assessment complies with various guidance' for 

concentration averaging of solidified waste matrices. Concentration averaging allows solidified 

waste to be based on the solidified nuclide activity divided by the volume or weight of the 

'For example, M.R.1Cnapp, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Commission Licensees. "Issuance orFinat 

Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Eneapsulation, Revision in Part to Waste Ctassifcalion 

Technical Position," dated January 17,1995. 

Final FearibilirySrudyjor the Canyon Dispos!lion Initiative (221-U Faeiliry) 

fi,y4tttt"49(31SeptemtxrZLOl J-S 1 

,

^ 

Appendia J- Applicable or Relevant and • ' DoE/ltt,100l-1 t 

Appropriate Requirements .. - Rev, e t orArt s,a 


solidified mass. _In addition, under all of the disposal alternatives, TRU waste in sludge and 

17nu:.i :w #wnb in enA C_6 wnnl.l h. ....nv..l a..d di,,.,..n-.i 

.,. 

J.4 WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 

The federal Clean iVaterAct oj1977 (CWA) cefltrels re ^tttlatas discharges of pollutants to 

surface waters. The ' 

173-216 establishes requirements for discharges to waters of the state through the soil column to 

ensure that applicable surface water quality standards are met and that beneficial uses of 

groundwater are preserved. WAC 173-218 establishes requirements for injection of fluids to the 

ground through wells. 


Wastewater management standards may apply to contaminated wastewaters generated as a result 

of decontamination activities under the full removal and disposal alternative. Potentially 

contaminated may be discharged to the ground or may 

need to be collected and taken to the 200 Area's Liquid Effluent Retention Facility for treatment 

at the Effluent Treatment Facility. If any surface contamination removal work is identified for 

structures or waste, carbon dioxide blasting or scarifying will be used for its removal instead of 

water. No wastewater would be discharged to an injection well under this alternative. 

J.4.2 Containment Alternatives (Alternatives 3, 4, and 6) 

Decontamination wastewaters will be managed as described for Alternative 1. Stormwater 

runoff may require collection in some type of percolation/evaporation basin during operation, 

closure, and post-closure of the 221-U Facility under any of these alternatives if contaminated. 

Uncontaminated stormwater will not be rcouire collection and will he discharged to the ground 

The percolation/evaporation basin would be expected to meet standards for waste discharges 

from stormwater runoff. All known available and reasonable technologies will be implemented 

in the form of stormwater runon/runotl'management controls. For example, the barrier final 

design needs to address limiting runoff erosion of the barrier and capture of the runoff in some 

type of percolation/evaporation basin. No wastewater would be discharged to an injection well 

under this alternative. 

J-5 STANDARDS FOR PROTECTION OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER 

FROM DIRECT DISCHARGES 

The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) authority, codified in 40 CFR 

122, addresses technology-based limitations and standards, control of toxic pollutants, and 

monitoring for direct discharges to waters of the United States, including stormwater. Public 

Final Fearlbiliry Stvr*for the Canyon Disposition lnftfatlve (111-UFacl/ity) 

Fa1taxil>ar31W tSeptember 2002 1-6 

.^

t^ 

^ 

AppendixJ-ApplicabteorRelevantand • DOFJlur2001-1l"- 

Appropriate Requirements •,. •• Rev. o l Drart Et+ 


,Law 100-605, Banjord Reach Comprehensive River Protection Study and Interim Protection, 

requires new activities near the Columbia River to minimize direct and adverse effects on the 

values for which the Columbia River is under study. 

No direct wastewater discharges to the Columbia River are planned under any of the alternatives. 

All remediation work will occur several miles from the river, sd there is no potential for 

stormwater runoff to the river. 

J.6 AIR EMISSION STANDARDS 

The Clean Air Act oj1977 establishes standards for the control of air emissions. Authority has 

partially been delegated to Washington State. Under 40 CFR 61 (Subpart H) and WAC 246-247, 

radionuclide airborne emissions from all combined operations at the Hanford Site may not 

exceed 10 mrem/yr effective dose equivalent to the hypothetical offsite maximally exposed 

individual. These regulations require verification of compliance through monitoring. 

"t3eneral Regulations for Air Pollution Sources" (WAC 173-400) and "Controls for New 

Sources of Toxic Air Pollutants" (WAC 173-460) establish air emission requirements for new or 

modified sources of air pollutants. These regulations establish new source review requirements, 

general emissions standards (e.g., control of fugitive dust), and technology requirements. 

The radionuclide emission limits would apply to all fugitive, diffuse, and point-source air 

emissions of radionuclides generated by any of the removal or ex situ alternatives. If there is the 

potential for any non-zero radioactive emissions, best available radionuclide control technology 

(BARCT) wille,AA be required. If the alternative willettd generate an increase of toxic air 

pollutants to the atmosphere above the small quantity emission rates, implementation of BARCT 

willeNkt be required.-_01.4-and th - U.'ash' 

The following information provides an analysis of how each alternative is anticipated to comply 

with the ARARs and •i'BCs for air standards. 

J.6.1 Full Removal and DiVosal Alternative (Alternative 1) 

Final Feasibility Studylor the Canyon D6pa*klon lntriative (??f-UFaclliry) 

F4j'WH!h0F 200 +Septemtxr1001 • J-7 ^

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