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Description of document: Closing documents for twenty nine (29) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General (OIG) Investigations, 2011-2014

Requested date: 31-October-2014

Released date: 08-October-2015

Posted date: 30-November-2015

Source of document: FOIA Request
FOIA Public Liaison
DHS-OIG Counsel
STOP 0305
245 Murray Lane, SW
Washington, D.C. 20528-0305
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

October 8, 2015

Subject: Freedom of Information Act Request No. 2015-035
Final Response

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG), dated October 31, 2014, seeking the closing documents for specified investigation numbers. DHS-OIG received your request on November 12, 2014.

In response to your request, searches of the DHS-OIG investigative database were conducted. That search revealed 22 reports of investigation (ROIs) responsive to your request, two of which are also publicly available on DHS-OIG's website (I12-USSS-OSI-00800 and I12-USSS-OSI-00876). For your convenience, I am including with this response copies of those two publicly available reports.

Our search also revealed that case number 11-USSS-HQ-00308 was not investigated by DHS-OIG, thus no report of investigation (ROI) was located for that case number. We are instead providing you with a copy of the case summary report which shows that DHS-OIG deferred handling of that case to the U.S. Secret Service (USSS). Additionally, no ROI was completed for case number 13-USSS-WFO-00629. As such, we are providing you with the one existing memorandum of activity associated with that case.

Further, case numbers I11-USSS-HQ-00415, I11-USSS-PHL-00441, I13-USSS-DVR-00146, I13-USSS-MIA-00364, I14-USSS-DAL-10736, and I14-USSS-SID-01281 were administratively closed by DHS-OIG. As such, we are providing you with the documentation showing the administrative closure (case summary reports or closing memos). Please be advised, however, that case number I13-USSS-DVR-00146 was administratively closed then merged with another investigation (I12-USSS-WFO-01016). As a matter of discretion, we conducted a search for a copy of the I12-USSS-WFO-01016 ROI; however, that investigation is still ongoing. Thus, I am invoking exemption (b)(7)(A) of the FOIA for any

records concerning I13-USSS-DVR-00146 and I12-USSS-WFO-01016. Additional information regarding this withholding can be found below.

Finally, there were no investigations or complaints within DHS-OIG’s investigative database with the numbers I13-USSS-WFO-00986 or I14-USSS-AIG-00637. As such, there are no records for those two portions of your request.

Enclosed are 200 pages of records responsive to your request. We reviewed the responsive records under the FOIA to determine whether they may be accessed under the FOIA's provisions. Based on that review, this office is providing the following:

- 38 page(s) are released in full (RIF);
- 162 page(s) are released in part (RIP);
- 9 page(s) are withheld in full (WIF);
- 0 page(s) were referred to another entity.

The exemptions cited for withholding records or portions of records are marked below.

| Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 | | | Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a |
|---|--|--|-------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(1) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(5) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(7)(C) | <input type="checkbox"/> 552a(j)(2) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(2) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(6) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(7)(D) | <input type="checkbox"/> 552a(k)(2) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(3) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(7)(A) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(7)(E) | <input type="checkbox"/> 552a(k)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(4) | <input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(7)(B) | <input type="checkbox"/> 552(b)(7)(F) | <input type="checkbox"/> Other: |

OIG redacted from the enclosed documents, names and identifying information of third parties to protect the identities of these individuals. Absent a Privacy Act waiver, the release of such information concerning the third parties named in these records would result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy in violation of the Privacy Act. Information is also protected from disclosure pursuant to Exemptions 5, 6, 7(A), 7(C), 7(D), and 7(E) of the FOIA further discussed below.

Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)

Exemption 5 of the FOIA protects “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). DHS-OIG is invoking the attorney work product privilege of Exemption 5 to protect the reason the Assistant U.S. Attorney declined to prosecute.

Exemption 6, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

Exemption 6 allows withholding of “personnel and medical files and *similar files* the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)(emphasis added). DHS-OIG is invoking Exemption 6 to protect the names of third parties and any information that could reasonably be expected to identify such individuals.

Exemption 7(A), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A)

Exemption 7(A) authorizes the withholding of “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . to the extent that production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). DHS-OIG is invoking Exemption 7(A) to protect information pertaining to investigation numbers I13-USSS-DVR-00246 and I12-USSS-WFO-01016. DHS-OIG also asserts Exemptions 6 and 7(C) for this information.

Exemption 7(C), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)

Exemption 7(C) protects from public disclosure “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes . . . [if disclosure] could reasonably be expected to cause an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). DHS-OIG is invoking Exemption 7(C) to protect the names of third parties, and any information contained in these investigative records that could reasonably be expected to identify those individuals.

Exemption 7(D), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D)

Exemption 7(D) protects records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which could reasonably be expected to disclose the identities of confidential sources. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). DHS-OIG is invoking Exemption 7(D) to protect any information provided by and/or could reasonably be expected to identify confidential sources.

Exemption 7(E), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E)

Exemption 7(E) protects all law enforcement information that “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigation or prosecution, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecution if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). DHS-

OIG is withholding from disclosure specific information which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.

Appeal

You have the right to appeal this response.¹ Your appeal must be in writing and received within 60 days of the date of this response. Please address any appeal to:

FOIA/PA Appeals Unit
DHS-OIG Office of Counsel
Stop 0305
245 Murray Lane, SW
Washington, DC 20528-0305

Both the envelope and letter of appeal must be clearly marked, "Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act Appeal." Your appeal letter must also clearly identify the DHS-OIG's response. Additional information on submitting an appeal is set forth in the DHS regulations at 6 C.F.R. § 5.9. If you have any questions about this response, please contact me at 202-254-4001 or stephanie.kuehn@oig.dhs.gov.

Sincerely,



Stephanie L. Kuehn
Supervisory FOIA/PA Disclosure Specialist

Enclosures

¹ For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. *See* 5 U.S.C. 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

Case Summary Report

111-USSS-HQ-00308

Title: [REDACTED] - BOX 2 SSA [REDACTED]

Date Rcd: 1/7/2011 Date Assigned: 1/7/2011 Date Opened: 1/7/2011 Date Closed: 7/14/2011
Rcd Method: Email Agent: [REDACTED]
Affected Agency: U.S. Secret Service (DHS) PrimaryOffice: Headquarters
Ref Agency: U.S. Secret Service (DHS)
Alleg Type: Miscellaneous \ Criminal Misconduct \ False Statements
Special: No Privacy: No Confidential: No Dollar Loss: \$0.00
Joint Agency:

Ref Cases: 190-805-0000488

Comments: On [REDACTED], 2010, the Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division (PID) notified the Inspection Division that [REDACTED] provided false statements to [REDACTED] supervisors when questioned regarding [REDACTED] actions during a recent temporary duty (TDY) assignment. [REDACTED] Top Secret security clearance was suspended pending investigation. Inspectors subsequently interviewed USSS personnel who had direct interaction and supervision of [REDACTED] during the TDY assignment and [REDACTED] initially provided false statements in a signed sworn statement to inspectors, but later admitted [REDACTED] had lied to [REDACTED] supervisors and inspectors. An administrative review is pending.

BOX 2 SSA [REDACTED]

People - Subjects

| | | |
|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|
| [REDACTED] | Home | [REDACTED] |
| Aka: | SSN: [REDACTED] | EOD: [REDACTED] |
| POB City: | POB State: | |
| DOB: [REDACTED] | Alien Number: | |
| Address: | Company Name: | |
| | City: [REDACTED] | State: [REDACTED] Zip: [REDACTED] |
| DHS Emp: YES | DHS Exec: No | |
| Phone: | | |
| Email: | | |

| | | |
|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|
| [REDACTED] | Work | [REDACTED] |
| Aka: | SSN: [REDACTED] | EOD: [REDACTED] |
| POB City: | POB State: | |
| DOB: [REDACTED] | Alien Number: | |
| Address: | Company Name: | |
| | City: WASHINGTON | State: DC Zip: |
| DHS Emp: YES | DHS Exec: No | |
| Phone: | | |
| Email: | | |

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Case Summary Report

I11-USSS-HQ-00308

People - Complainants

People - Witness

People - Victims

Violations

Case Dates:

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|----|
| Received: | 1/7/2011 | Assigned: | 1/7/2011 | Reassigned: | |
| Prb Referral: | | Retention: | | Acknowledged: | |
| Incident Start: | | Incident End: | | Approx: | No |
| Police Report: | | Police Rpt #: | | Referred: | |
| Notified: | | Reesponse: | 7/14/2011 | | |
| Investigation Comp: | | Closed: | 7/14/2011 | | |
| Prb Decision: | | Reopened: | | | |

Location

| | | |
|--------------------|---------------|------|
| Airport: | Location: | |
| City: | State: | Zip: |
| Facility: | FFDO Airline: | |
| Investigation Loc: | Region: | |
| Transport | | |

Technical

Disposition - Criminal

Dispositions - Civil

Dispositions - Admin

MA

ROI / Referral

| | | | | | | | |
|------------|----------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|----------------|----------|--------------|-----------|
| Case Type: | Investigation | Referral Date: | 3/9/2011 | Response Date: | 3/9/2011 | Closed Date: | 7/14/2011 |
| Action: | Referred - Reply Requested | Agency Referred: | U.S. Secret Service (DHS) | | | | |

Collaterals

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All redactions in this document are made pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C).

Case Summary Report

I11-USSS-HQ-00308

Uploaded Documents

Date Prepared: 1/7/2011

Grand Jury: No

Doc Type: Box 2 Request and Notification with report

Description: Information Report

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I12-USSS-ATL-00985



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| Case Number: | I12-USSS-ATL-00985 |
| Case Title: | [REDACTED] [REDACTED] U.S. Secret Service [REDACTED] |
| Report Status: | Final |
| Alleged Violation(s): | Administrative Policy |

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), investigative inquiry was initiated based on a referral from the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Inspections Division (ID), on [REDACTED] 2012, alleging that [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] allegedly purchased and sold USSS memorabilia on line for profit.

Our preliminary investigation failed to develop any credible evidence to substantiate the allegation. Therefore, this investigation is closed.

Copies of the initial referral and the relevant DHS OIG memoranda of activity are appended.

| | | | |
|--|------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Atlanta Field Office | Original |
| Title: Assistant Special Agent in Charge | Date: 3/11/13 | Headquarters | cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) | cc |
| Name: James E. Ward | Signature: [Signature] | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 3/11/13 | | |

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

I13-USSS-ORL-00025



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| Case Number: | I13-USSS-ORL-00025 |
| Case Title: | [REDACTED] [REDACTED] U.S. Secret Service Washington, D.C. |
| Report Status: | Final |
| Alleged Violation(s): | Administrative Misconduct - Destruction of Records |

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

On [REDACTED], 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received information from a confidential source (CS) indicating that in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (then a [REDACTED]), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), denied a request from [REDACTED], Special Agent (SA), USSS, regarding additional manpower and magnetometers for the protection mission of President George Bush in [REDACTED]. The CS alleged that [REDACTED] ordered the destruction of all documents pertaining to the request because it would be embarrassing to the USSS. (Exhibit 1)

On August 2, 2012, the DHS OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, partially regarding the allegation that [REDACTED] destroyed records regarding a request for manpower. [REDACTED] stated that the USSS devotes more assets on foreign trips, and it is routine to receive requests for additional manpower from subordinate USSS supervisors. [REDACTED] stated that budgetary concerns are factored into the decision when making a consideration to approve or deny a manpower request. Reference this specific mission, [REDACTED] could not remember what was requested or denied. Additionally, [REDACTED] stated that the USSS counts on its foreign counterparts for protection assistance, and [REDACTED] opined that the foreign counterparts failed the USSS in regards to this specific instance. [REDACTED] denied any knowledge or receipt of any orders to destroy records regarding incidents or activities related to the [REDACTED] Presidential Visit. (Exhibit 2)

| | | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-------------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: | [REDACTED] | Signature: | [REDACTED] |
| Title: | Senior Special Agent | Date: | 3/11/13 |
| Approving Official | | | |
| Name: | David C. Nieland | Signature: | [Signature] |
| Title: | Special Agent in Charge | Date: | 3/11/13 |
| | | Miami Field Office | Original |
| | | Headquarters | 1 cc |
| | | Component(s) USSS | 1 cc |
| | | Other | cc |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

On August 22, 2012, the DHS OIG requested [REDACTED], USSS, Office of Chief Counsel, provide all documents relating to the request of additional manpower and equipment for President Bush's visit to [REDACTED], in [REDACTED] (Exhibit 3)

On September 10, 2012, the DHS OIG received documents provided by [REDACTED], regarding the aforementioned request for information. The provided documents included a memorandum from SA [REDACTED] who was [REDACTED] agent for the USSS reference President Bush's visit to [REDACTED]. In summary, [REDACTED] requested an additional 28 special agents to supplement the 35 special agents who were assigned to this detail. [REDACTED] explained and justified this request for additional agents indicating the individual mission and location where each additional agent would be assigned. (Exhibit 4)

The USSS provided the DHS OIG with the record of [REDACTED] request for more manpower, which showed that it had not been destroyed as alleged, thereby confirming that the allegation was unfounded.

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| NUMBER | DESCRIPTION |
|--------|--|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity, Predicate Summary, dated October 10, 2012. |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, Record Review, [REDACTED] interview, dated November 15, 2012. |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, Record Review, Letter to [REDACTED] dated November 15, 2012 |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, Record Review, [REDACTED] memorandum, dated November 15, 2012. |

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I13-USSS-OSI-00035



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| Case Number: | I13-USSS-OSI-00035 |
| Case Title: | [REDACTED] [REDACTED] United States Secret Service [REDACTED] NY |
| Report Status: | Final |
| Alleged Violation(s): | Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Subpart G - Misuse of Position); Executive Order 12731, Principles of Ethical Conduct for Government Officers and Employees; and USSS Manual (PER-05). |

SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated following the receipt of an allegation that [REDACTED] United States Secret Service (USSS), Uniformed Division (UD), brought [REDACTED] onto the White House (WH) grounds while [REDACTED] was working a security shift at the WH, and received no form of punishment for [REDACTED] actions. Subsequently, it was determined that an employee of the same name, [REDACTED], was [REDACTED] for the USSS. [REDACTED] NY.

The investigation determined that [REDACTED] was never assigned to the USSS UD and there were no findings to indicate that [REDACTED] brought [REDACTED] onto the WH grounds without the proper authorization and clearance. However, the investigation did reveal that [REDACTED] reportedly assisted [REDACTED] with a tour of the WH and failed to follow the appropriate USSS procedures for coordinating tours of the WH for friends and/or family members. [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED] was verbally counseled by [REDACTED] first-line supervisor for [REDACTED] actions.

| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Headquarters | Original |
| Title: Senior Special Agent | Date: April 2, 2013 | | |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) | cc |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Other | cc |
| Title: Acting Special Agent in Charge | Date: April 2, 2013 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DETAILS

On August 8, 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Washington, DC, received an anonymous complaint concerning allegations of misconduct involving ██████████ United States Secret Service (USSS), Uniformed Division (UD). The complaint alleged that ██████████ brought ██████████ onto the White House (WH) grounds while ██████████ was working a security shift at the WH. It was further alleged that ██████████ “bumped into” the President, who was reportedly outside of his room and walking the dog at the time. ██████████ was allegedly counseled by ██████████ Supervisor, USSS, but was never reprimanded for ██████████ actions. (Exhibit 1)

Allegation #1: ██████████ presumably without authorization, brought ██████████ onto the WH grounds while ██████████ was working a security shift at the WH and received no form of punishment for ██████████ actions.

At the request of the DHS-OIG, ██████████, USSS, Office of the Chief Counsel (OCC), reported that a search of USSS records for material responsive to the allegation against ██████████ produced negative results. ██████████ further advised that ██████████ was employed with the USSS as a Special Agent and that ██████████ career history did not indicate an assignment as a UD officer. A review of ██████████ Employee Performance File for any indication of counseling concerning the alleged incident was also negative. (Exhibits 2 & 3)

The DHS-OIG interviewed ██████████, USSS, ██████████ NY, who asserted that ██████████ had never been assigned to the UD or brought ██████████ onto the WH grounds while performing ██████████ official duties. However, ██████████ explained that while ██████████ was assigned to ██████████ had an authorized personal guest accompany ██████████ to two events at the WH and, on an earlier occasion, assisted ██████████ with a tour of the WH, which resulted in a verbal counseling by ██████████ first-line supervisor.

According to ██████████ brought a person, whom ██████████ at the time, to a USSS WH ██████████ and the individual, who ██████████ later identified as ██████████, were guests at the party. ██████████ indicated that ██████████ was authorized to bring ██████████ to the party and did not work in an official capacity during the event. In ██████████ brought ██████████ onto the WH grounds a second time to attend ██████████ and affirmed that neither the President nor any members of the First Family were seen while in attendance at this event. ██████████ also advised that in 2004, while also assigned to ██████████ assisted ██████████ with a tour of the WH. At the time of the incident, ██████████ was unaware of an existing USSS procedure regarding WH tours that applied specifically to agency personnel. ██████████ believed that ██████████ had followed proper procedures when ██████████ coordinated the tour through a WH usher, but was later told that ██████████ had not and that ██████████ should

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

have coordinated the tour through the USSS. Shortly after the incident, [REDACTED] was verbally counseled regarding the incident by [REDACTED] immediate supervisor at the time. (Exhibits 4 & 5)

The DHS-OIG interviewed [REDACTED] USSS, Washington, DC. [REDACTED] was not aware of an incident involving [REDACTED] bringing [REDACTED] onto the WH grounds or [REDACTED] bumping into the President. [REDACTED] asserted that [REDACTED] would have remembered a significant incident such as this, if it had occurred. [REDACTED] also did not recall having ever counseled [REDACTED] on the alleged incident or for violating USSS procedures. [REDACTED] was not aware of any other USSS supervisors having counseled [REDACTED] on the aforementioned matter and affirmed that if [REDACTED] had been counseled, it would have been done by [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] first-line supervisor. (Exhibit 6)

The DHS-OIG interviewed [REDACTED], DHS, USSS, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] affirmed that [REDACTED] had never counseled [REDACTED] regarding the above allegation. [REDACTED] further clarified that [REDACTED] would have never counseled [REDACTED] who was then a [REDACTED], being that [REDACTED] was at the [REDACTED] level at the time of the alleged incident. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] did not believe that [REDACTED] would have bumped into the President as per the allegation. (Exhibit 7)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|---|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity, Other – Predication, dated October 18, 2012. |
| 2 | Letter from [REDACTED] Acting Deputy Assistant Inspector General (DAIG), DHS, OIG, Washington, DC to [REDACTED] United States Secret Service (USSS), Office of the Chief Counsel (OCC). |
| 3 | Letter from [REDACTED], USSS, OCC to [REDACTED], A/DAIG, DHS, OIG, Washington, DC. |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED], dated November 5, 2012. |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, Amended Sworn Statement of [REDACTED], dated November 21, 2012. |
| 6 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED], dated November 21, 2012. |
| 7 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED], dated March 27, 2013. |

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I13-USSS-SID-00036



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | I13-USSS-SID-00036 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | [REDACTED] [REDACTED] United States Secret Service [REDACTED] Washington, DC |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | 18 USC § 1001, Statements or entries generally; 5 CFR § 731 - Suitability; Management Directive #11043: Sensitive Compartmented Information Program Management; Management Directive #: 11052: Internal Security Program; Conduct prejudicial to the Government; and Misuse of Position. |

SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated based on an anonymous complaint received by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, indicating that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] United States Secret Service (USSS), [REDACTED], engaged in inappropriate conduct with [REDACTED] officials during a Presidential advance trip to [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] and alleging that [REDACTED] failed to report foreign contact and activities with the [REDACTED] officials. A subsequent anonymous complaint alleged that [REDACTED] had an ongoing inappropriate relationship with [REDACTED], a [REDACTED] national, whom [REDACTED] had been seeing and driving in [REDACTED] government vehicle. It was further alleged that [REDACTED] was helping [REDACTED] national named [REDACTED] to obtain a travel visa.

The investigation found no conclusive evidence to support the allegation that [REDACTED] engaged in inappropriate conduct with [REDACTED] officials during a Presidential advance trip to [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] or that [REDACTED] failed to report foreign contact or activities with [REDACTED] officials.

The investigation revealed that [REDACTED] (whose first and last names were reversed in the anonymous complaint) was a naturalized U.S. citizen, employee of [REDACTED], and

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Special Investigations | Original |
| Title: Senior Special Agent | Date: 6/3/14 | Component | cc |
| Approving Official | | | |
| Name: Karen Cottrell | Signature: <i>Karen Cottrell</i> | | |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 6/3/14 | | |

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personal associate of [REDACTED] however, the full history or extent of their relationship was not disclosed. [REDACTED] was determined to be a [REDACTED] citizen and [REDACTED], who resided in [REDACTED] held a [REDACTED] visa, and had applied for employment authorization to work in the United States. The investigation did not identify any definitive evidence to substantiate the allegation that [REDACTED] helped [REDACTED] to obtain a travel visa or other immigration benefit.

The investigation revealed evidence that [REDACTED] failed to report contact with a foreign national, [REDACTED] with whom [REDACTED] had close, continuing personal association, to the USSS within 72 hours, as required by the Management Directive #:11043, Sensitive Compartmented Information Program Management, and/or during [REDACTED] periodic background investigation. Additionally, it was determined that [REDACTED] reported foreign contacts, including with [REDACTED] to the USSS Personnel Security Division only after the DHS-OIG had initiated its investigation and interviewed [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] association with [REDACTED]. Additional findings indicated that [REDACTED] fostered what appeared to be close, continuing contact with the late-reported, and possibly unreported, foreign contacts utilizing [REDACTED] USSS email account.

The United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia declined criminal prosecution.

The details of the investigation concerning the allegation that [REDACTED] misused [REDACTED] assigned government owned vehicle were addressed in an interim Report of Investigation, dated July 15, 2013.

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DETAILS

On May 31, 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received an anonymous complaint indicating that [REDACTED], United States Secret Service (USSS), [REDACTED] engaged in inappropriate conduct with [REDACTED] officials during a Presidential advance trip to [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] and alleging that [REDACTED] failed to report foreign contact and activities with the [REDACTED] officials. A subsequent anonymous complaint alleged that [REDACTED] had an ongoing inappropriate relationship with [REDACTED], a [REDACTED] national, whom [REDACTED] had been seeing and driving in [REDACTED] government vehicle. It was further alleged that [REDACTED] was helping [REDACTED] national named [REDACTED] to obtain a travel visa. (Exhibit 1 and 2)

During the course of the investigation, it was learned that [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] last name (the first and last names were reversed in the original allegation), and [REDACTED] was identified as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] who was later determined to be [REDACTED].

Allegation#1: [REDACTED] engaged in inappropriate conduct with [REDACTED] officials during a Presidential advance trip to [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] and failed to report foreign contact and activities with the [REDACTED] officials.

The DHS-OIG interviewed [REDACTED] USSS, Security Clearance Division (SCD), Washington, DC. [REDACTED] stated that in October 2009, the USSS-SCD, under the guideline of manual section SCD -02(01), implemented the Special Security Clearance Reporting Responsibilities, which required USSS employees to report among other issues, foreign contacts. Prior to October 2009, only those employees holding Top Secret (TS) - Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) access were required to report foreign contact(s), as it was a requirement mandated by the Director of Central Intelligence (Intelligence Community). When the manual section SCD -02(01) was revised in April 2012, SCD created a Foreign Contact Form (SSF 4315) to be used by all USSS employees to report foreign contacts, independent of one's clearance level, whether TS or TS-SCI.

[REDACTED] review of [REDACTED] personnel security file and the SCD's foreign contact automated system revealed that as of January 22, 2013, there were no records concerning the reporting of foreign contacts by [REDACTED]. Additionally, no derogatory and/or questionable information was included in [REDACTED] file reflecting the [REDACTED] timeframe. During the interview, [REDACTED] was unable to state with certainty whether or not [REDACTED] held a TS-SCI clearance/access in [REDACTED] but subsequently followed up via e-mail, advised that [REDACTED] was initially briefed into SCI programs on [REDACTED] and had retained SCI access since that date. During the [REDACTED] timeframe, [REDACTED] was not required to report foreign contacts under the USSS policy governing foreign contact(s) reporting, as there was not a policy in place; however, [REDACTED] would have been required to report all close and continuing contacts with foreign nationals under the indoctrination procedure. (Exhibit 3)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

The DHS-OIG interviewed [REDACTED] who stated that [REDACTED] has held a TS-SCI clearance/access either since [REDACTED] began [REDACTED] employment with the USSS or [REDACTED] obtained it when [REDACTED] was assigned to the Presidential detail. [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] has maintained the TS-SCI clearance/access since [REDACTED] obtained it. According to [REDACTED] no "unofficial socializing" ever took place with foreign nationals before, during, or after the President's visit when [REDACTED] was in [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not report any foreign contact upon [REDACTED] return to the United States, as it was an official trip and [REDACTED] was not required to do so. All foreign contacts on that trip were for official business. (Exhibit 4)

Allegation #2: [REDACTED] had an ongoing inappropriate relationship with [REDACTED] (later identified as [REDACTED]), a [REDACTED] national, and a reported association with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] national named [REDACTED] (later identified as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]).

When interviewed by the DHS-OIG, [REDACTED] refused to discuss certain matters related to [REDACTED] to include the nature and the length of their relationship. However, [REDACTED] willfully shared with the SID agents that [REDACTED] was a U.S. citizen (USC) and worked for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] further stated that [REDACTED] was a friend of [REDACTED] and advised that was as much as [REDACTED] wanted to talk about [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] confirmed knowing [REDACTED] and explained that [REDACTED] first met [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] and with [REDACTED] (in or about [REDACTED]). Initially, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] and they kept in touch and/or saw each other "periodically." Later in the interview, [REDACTED] revised [REDACTED] previous account by describing [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] friend to [REDACTED] and advising that they "sporadically" saw each other. When asked about the frequency of [REDACTED] contact and communication with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated they saw each other in-person on two occasions "last year", in [REDACTED] 2013 and [REDACTED] 2012, and sporadically kept in touch. [REDACTED] last met [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] 2013 at the [REDACTED].

When [REDACTED] was asked if [REDACTED] knew of [REDACTED] immigration status, [REDACTED] responded by stating that [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] came to the United States legally and [REDACTED] was able to find a job in [REDACTED] after graduating. When asked if it was reasonable to assume that [REDACTED] was a foreign national, [REDACTED] responded, "Yes". (Exhibit 4)

The DHS-OIG identified and reviewed [REDACTED] immigration records, which revealed that [REDACTED] became a USC on [REDACTED] held a [REDACTED] visa in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. (Exhibit 5)

In conjunction with the DHS-OIG investigation, the U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service interviewed [REDACTED] who indicated that [REDACTED] first met [REDACTED] on [REDACTED], when [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was originally from [REDACTED] and entered into the

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United States on a B1/B2 Visa (Tourist visa) in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was granted Lawful Permanent Residence (Green Card) status, and subsequently became a USC in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] didn't feel comfortable discussing the nature of [REDACTED] relationship with [REDACTED] other than that [REDACTED] was a close personal friend of [REDACTED] and was [REDACTED] descent. At the end of the interview, [REDACTED] stated, "... I do not feel like I should disclose my sexual and intimate relationship," possibly acknowledging a closer personal association than [REDACTED] had previously described.

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] first met [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] [REDACTED] In [REDACTED] [REDACTED] returned to the United States, traveling on a B1/B2 visa and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] From [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] lived with [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] During that time, [REDACTED] interacted with [REDACTED] at least once a week, possibly more; [REDACTED] had less interaction with [REDACTED] than [REDACTED] (Exhibit 6)

The DHS-OIG identified and reviewed [REDACTED] immigration records. The review revealed that [REDACTED] was a citizen of [REDACTED] held a [REDACTED] Visa, resided in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also listed [REDACTED] as one of [REDACTED] associates, and email addresses of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (Exhibit 7)

The DHS-OIG reviewed the DHS Management Directive (MD) number 11043, issued September 17, 2004. The review revealed that "Persons with SCI access have a continuing responsibility to report, within 72 hours, to their immediate supervisor or local SSO/SSR (Special Security Officer/ Special Security Representative) all contacts: (1) That are of a close, continuing personal association, characterized by ties of kinship, affection, or obligation with foreign nationals. Casual contacts and associations arising from living in a community normally need not be reported." (Exhibit 8)

On January 22, 2013, when contacted by the DHS-OIG, [REDACTED] (USSS-SCD) reported that [REDACTED] review of [REDACTED] personnel security file and SCD's foreign contact automated system revealed that there were no records regarding any reporting of foreign contacts by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] subsequently provided [REDACTED] Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF-86) reports. A review of [REDACTED] SF-86 submitted in 2010 yielded the following question within the Foreign Contacts section: Do you have or have you had close and/or continuing contact with foreign nationals within the last 7 years with whom you, your spouse, or your cohabitant are bound by affection, influence, and/or obligation? Include associates as well as relatives, not already listed in Question 18 [Relatives]. [REDACTED] replied, "No." (Exhibit 3)

At the request of the DHS-OIG, the DHS, Office of the Chief Security Officer, Technical Service Branch (TSB), Washington, DC, conducted surveillance of [REDACTED] on March 27, 2013. The TSB observed [REDACTED] assigned government owned vehicle parked by [REDACTED]

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in [REDACTED] as well as a [REDACTED], which was determined to be registered to [REDACTED] was observed meeting and greeting [REDACTED] with a hug. (Exhibit 9)

On April 9, 2013, the DHS-OIG interviewed [REDACTED] who stated [REDACTED] was a good person and kept in touch with [REDACTED] periodically. [REDACTED] met [REDACTED] through [REDACTED] and regarded [REDACTED]. At the time of the interview, [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] last met [REDACTED] "two weeks" ago for a dinner at [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] near [REDACTED] where [REDACTED] currently works; before that, they last met during Christmastime. According to [REDACTED] they usually have met for dinner at the Outback restaurant. (Exhibit 10)

On May 2, 2013, at the request of the DHS-OIG, [REDACTED] provided an update on [REDACTED] reporting of foreign contacts and [REDACTED] conveyed that [REDACTED] had "recently" reported four foreign contacts. [REDACTED] submitted Foreign Contact Forms (SSF 4315) for [REDACTED] all dated April 11, 2013, which was two days after the DHS-OIG's interview of [REDACTED]. At the same time, [REDACTED] also provided a copy of the mass email message, concerning the required reporting of foreign contact(s), that was sent by the SCD to all USSS personnel on May 14, 2012, approximately 11 months prior to [REDACTED] reporting of foreign contacts with [REDACTED] and the other three individuals.

The DHS-OIG reviewed [REDACTED] SSF 4315s, including the one for [REDACTED]. Although the SSF 4315 for [REDACTED] was intended to report [REDACTED] contact with [REDACTED] noted on the form that [REDACTED] was a USC and [REDACTED] wrote that [REDACTED] kept in contact with [REDACTED] approximately every six months and that [REDACTED] met [REDACTED] briefly on March 27, 2013, for dinner. It was also noted that [REDACTED] has known [REDACTED] "since approximately [REDACTED]". The SSF 4315 for [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] and their contact began in [REDACTED]. The SSF 4315 for [REDACTED] noted that on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was in DC for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] met [REDACTED] briefly in the lobby of [REDACTED] hotel and their contact began in approximately [REDACTED]. The SSF 4315 for [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] usually sent an email message to [REDACTED] around Christmas and their contact began in [REDACTED]. (Exhibit 11)

The DHS-OIG reviewed, in substance, [REDACTED] external email communications using [REDACTED] official USSS e-mail account ([REDACTED]@uss.s.dhs.gov). The review revealed that [REDACTED] exchanged email with [REDACTED] on numerous occasions, dating back to August 26, 2012, using [REDACTED] e-mail addresses of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. In addition, there were several email communications between [REDACTED] and individuals who were later identified as foreign nationals, some of which appeared to depict a close and/or continuous relationship. The identified email correspondence was with the following individuals who were reported as foreign contacts by [REDACTED] on April 11, 2013: [REDACTED] (contact during January 2013), [REDACTED] contact during July and September 2012), and [REDACTED] (contact during September 2012). (Exhibit 12)

The DIIS-OIG presented the case to the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of [REDACTED] which declined the case for criminal prosecution. (Exhibit 13)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Allegation #3: ██████ helped ██████ (later identified as ██████) to obtain a travel visa.

The complaint to the DIIS-OIG included (what appeared to be) a copy of email correspondence between ██████ and ██████ dated July 12, 2012, in which ██████ described ██████ efforts to expedite ██████ application for employment authorization (I-765) which was pending with USCIS [United States Citizenship and Immigration Services], and inquired if ██████ “could still contact ██████ [unidentified] friend and see what ██████ says”. The provided correspondence indicated ██████ wrote, in response, “I’ll check and see what I can do.” (Exhibit 2)

The DHS-OIG’s review of ██████ external USSS email communications yielded email communication from ██████ to ██████ dated August 11, 2012, in which ██████ forwarded correspondence ██████ received from USCIS regarding ██████ pending application/petition and thanked ██████ for ██████ help. Further review of ██████ e-mail revealed e-mail communication between ██████ and ██████ dated September 10 and 11, 2012, in which ██████ wrote, “Thank you for helping ██████ to expedite ██████ work permit,” and conveyed ██████ appreciation. In response, ██████ wrote that ██████ was “glad ██████ could help ██████” (Exhibit 12)

When interviewed by the DHS-OIG, ██████ was asked if ██████ had ever requested assistance from ██████ or ██████ to obtain ██████ EAD (Form I-766); ██████ categorically denied ever doing so. ██████ further stated that ██████ never asked anyone to help with her an EAD and/or a visa. When asked whether ██████ ever offered ██████ assistance with ██████ EAD application (Form I-765), ██████ again replied “no.” ██████ proceeded to inquire if the interviewing agents meant, “Like expedite?” (similar to the terminology used by ██████ in ██████ email to ██████. In response, the SID agents positively retorted, and ██████ continued to reply with a “no.” ██████ further added that ██████ never asked anyone for help, not even to check the status of ██████ application. (Exhibit 10)

When interviewed by the DIIS-OIG, ██████ was asked if ██████ had ever asked ██████ for help with ██████ immigration paperwork or if ██████ had ever offered to help ██████ with ██████ immigration paperwork; ██████ replied “no” to both questions. ██████ advised that during a phone conversation, ██████ possibly told ██████ that ██████ was having some problems with ██████ immigration paperwork and that a petition to adjust ██████ immigration status with USCIS was needed in order for ██████ to accept a job offer with ██████.

██████ further stated that ██████ asked ██████, USSS-██████ if ██████ could look into ██████ immigration paperwork hold up, and whether ██████ knew someone from USCIS. According to ██████’ first attempted to reach out to someone within the USSS who was assigned as a liaison with CIS; then ██████ looked into ██████ situation ██████ by accessing a public USCIS Website. ██████ stated that neither ██████ nor ██████ interfered with the immigration

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process. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was not in the position to call for any special favors or do anything inappropriate. Apparently, [REDACTED] was able to find out [REDACTED] immigration paperwork status online without contacting anyone from USCIS. (Exhibit 4)

The DHS-OIG telephonically interviewed [REDACTED] Immigration Service Officer, DHS-USCIS, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] adjudicated and approved [REDACTED] Form I-765. [REDACTED] did not recall being contacted about [REDACTED] file by anyone, to include [REDACTED] supervisors. [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] did not notice any issues and/or discrepancies with [REDACTED] EAD application. (Exhibit 14)

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EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|---|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity, Other - Predication, dated May 31, 2012. |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, Other - Receipt of Additional Allegations, dated November 14, 2012. |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview of [REDACTED], dated January 22, 2013. |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview of [REDACTED], dated April 24, 2013. |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, Other – Request, Receipt, and Review of [REDACTED] Immigration Record(s), dated April 18, 2013. |
| 6 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview of [REDACTED], dated May 17, 2013. |
| 7 | Memorandum of Activity, Other - Request, Receipt and Review of IRB Report on [REDACTED], dated April 3, 2013. |
| 8 | Memorandum of Activity, Other – Review of the DIIS MD 11043 (SCI Program), dated July 30, 2013. |
| 9 | Memorandum of Activity, Other - Surveillance on [REDACTED] by TSB, dated March 27, 2013. |
| 10 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview of [REDACTED], dated April 9, 2013. |
| 11 | Memorandum of Activity, Other – Request, Receipt and Review of [REDACTED] Updated Foreign Contacts Info, dated May 2, 2013. |
| 12 | Memorandum of Activity, Other - Request, Receipt and Review of [REDACTED] External Emails (Non-GOV), dated April 24, 2013. |
| 13 | Memorandum of Activity, Other – Declination of criminal prosecution, dated April 22, 2014. |

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14

Memorandum of Activity, Telephone Contact -- Interview of [REDACTED],
dated May 22, 2013.

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I11-USSS-DVR-01313



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | 111-USSS-DVR-01313 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | [REDACTED] Non-DHS Employee |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | Other - Rape and Extortion |

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated an investigation based on a complaint filed by [REDACTED], who alleged that U.S. Secret Service (USSS) Agent [REDACTED], Colorado Springs, Colorado, allegedly raped [REDACTED] 18 and 16-year-old sons and extorted \$5,000 from her in 2005. (Exhibit 1)

In contact with the Inspection Division within the USSS (USSS-ID), on September 21, 2011, DHS-OIG was informed that their records did not list a "[REDACTED]." Yet, their records listed a "[REDACTED]" with a post of duty in Denver, Colorado. Furthermore, USSS-ID reported that they did not have any contact with [REDACTED] (Exhibits 2 and 3)

DHS-OIG conducted a review of [REDACTED] history through the use of a commercial database, known as "CLEAR," and was unable to identify any children related to [REDACTED]. However, several addresses were identified which were associated with [REDACTED]. A couple of these addresses were identified as the Colorado Mental Health Institute of Pueblo, Colorado, and Community Alternative-El Paso (Rehabilitation Center), Colorado Springs, Colorado. (Exhibit 4)

On September 22, 2011, DHS-OIG conducted a review of a law enforcement database for [REDACTED] name and the research yielded a current Colorado Identification Card (CO-ID) for [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] CO-ID listed an address of 2120 N. 10th Street, Canon City, Colorado. This address returned to the Valley View Health Care Center in Canon City, Colorado. (Exhibit 5)

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | El Paso Field Office | Original |
| Title: Special Agent | Date: 05/21-2012 | Headquarters | cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) | cc |
| Name: James E. Smith | Signature: [REDACTED] | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent In Charge | Date: 6/27/12 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

On September 23, 2011, DHS-OIG conducted a review of [REDACTED] criminal history and discovered numerous arrests/convictions/custody matters, to include fraud, making false reports and false statements. These incidents occurred from 1996 through 2005. During that same period, [REDACTED] was placed in the Colorado Mental Health Institute, Pueblo, Colorado and Denver Reception and Diagnostic Center, which is part of Colorado Department of Corrections. (Exhibit 5)

On September 26, 2011, DHS-OIG interviewed [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] temporary residence, Mountain View Care Center in Colorado Springs, Colorado, where [REDACTED] was interned for a mental medical condition. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] was taking medication related to [REDACTED] psychotropic condition. [REDACTED] confirmed [REDACTED] contacted the DHS-Hotline about the above referenced complaint against USSS Agent [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] elaborated on the complaint and claimed [REDACTED] obtained this information through a "telepathic sign" emitted by [REDACTED] son. [REDACTED] claimed that while [REDACTED] was interned at the state mental hospital in Pueblo, Colorado, [REDACTED] had been contacted by the local USSS, as a result of [REDACTED] making threats against then President (George W.) Bush. [REDACTED] also claimed [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] local U.S. Senator, Michael F. Bennet, to report the similar allegation against USSS back in October 2010, but the senator informed [REDACTED] that the allegation was out of his jurisdiction. (Exhibit 6)

Immediately after the interview of [REDACTED] DHS-OIG spoke with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] at the center where [REDACTED] was currently interned. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] has a mental medical condition and [REDACTED] is taking medication for that. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] is delusional, paranoid, and makes allegations about people trying to cause [REDACTED] harm. (Exhibit 6)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|---|
| 1. | Memorandum of Activity, dated September 23, 2011, Case Initiation. |
| 2. | Memorandum of Activity, dated September 23, 2011, Contact with U.S. Secret Service, Inspection Division. |
| 3. | Memorandum of Activity, dated November 17, 2011, Follow-up Contact with U.S. Secret Service, Inspection Division. |
| 4. | Memorandum of Activity, dated September 23, 2011, Review of [REDACTED] Contact Information. |
| 5. | Memorandum of Activity, dated September 23, 2011, Law Enforcement Database Examination for [REDACTED]. |
| 6. | Memorandum of Activity, dated September 27, 2011, Interview of [REDACTED] 09/26/2011. |

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Case Summary Report

I11-USSS-HQ-00415

Title: Box 2, [REDACTED] USSS Dallas Field Office

Date Rcd: 2/4/2011 Date Assigned: 2/4/2011 Date Opened: 2/4/2011 Date Closed: 10/17/2011
Rcd Method: Email Agent: [REDACTED]
Affected Agency: U.S. Secret Service (DHS) PrimaryOffice: Headquarters
Ref Agency:
Alleg Type: Miscellaneous \ Non-Criminal Misconduct \ Prohibited Personnel Practices
Special: No Privacy: No Confidential: No Dollar Loss: \$0.00
Joint Agency:
Ref Cases:
Comments: Complainant alleged that [REDACTED], USSS, Dallas Field Office, violated hiring laws with the SAC of ICE Dallas field office through an agreement between them stating that ICE Dallas would not hire any SAs from USSS Dallas and USSS Dallas would not hire any SAs from ICE Dallas.

People - Subjects

[REDACTED] **Home** Male
Aka: SSN: [REDACTED] EOD: [REDACTED]
POB City: POB State:
DOB: [REDACTED] Alien Number:
Address: Company Name:
City: [REDACTED] State: TX Zip: [REDACTED]
DHS Emp: NO DHS Exec: No
Phone:
Email:

[REDACTED] **Work** Male
Aka: SSN: [REDACTED] EOD: [REDACTED]
POB City: POB State:
DOB: [REDACTED] Alien Number:
Address: Company Name:
City: IRVING State: TX Zip:
DHS Emp: NO DHS Exec: No
Phone:
Email:

People - Complainants

People - Witness

People - Victims

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Case Summary Report

I11-USSS-HQ-00415

Violations

Name: [REDACTED]
Violation: Other Violation
Allegation Type: Allegation Status: Unfounded
Primary Allegation: False Ethical Conduct: None
Factual Detail:

Case Dates:

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|----------|---------------|------------|---------------|----|
| Received: | 2/4/2011 | Assigned: | 2/4/2011 | Reassigned: | |
| Prb Referral: | | Retention: | | Acknowledged: | |
| Incident Start: | | Incident End: | | Approx: | No |
| Police Report: | | Police Rpt #: | | | |
| Notified: | | Reesponse: | | Referred: | |
| Investigation Comp: | | Closed: | 10/17/2011 | | |
| Prb Decision: | | Reopened: | | | |

Location

| | | |
|--------------------|---------------|------|
| Airport: | Location: | |
| City: | State: | Zip: |
| Facility: | FFDO Airline: | |
| Investigation Loc: | Region: | |
| Transport | | |

Technical

Disposition - Criminal

Dispositions - Civil

Dispositions - Admin

MA

ROI / Referral

| | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Case Type: Investigation | Referral Date: 3/9/2011 | Response Date: 3/9/2011 | Closed Date: 10/17/2011 |
| Action: Admin Closure | Agency Referred: | | |

Collaterals

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Case Summary Report

I11-USSS-HQ-00415

Uploaded Documents

Date Prepared: 2/4/2011 Grand Jury: No

Doc Type: Complaint

Description: Other Document(s)

Date Prepared: 2/4/2011 Grand Jury: No

Doc Type: Notification

Description: Other Document(s)

Date Prepared: 10/17/2011 Grand Jury: No

Doc Type: Email from USSS addressing complaint

Description: Other

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I11-USSS-LAX-01153



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | I11-USSS-LAX-01153 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | ██████████ Secret Service Agent, GS-13 Los Angeles, CA |
| | ██████████ Secret Service Agent, GS-13 Los Angeles, CA |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | 18 USC §1014: False Statement to Financial Institution |

SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated based upon a complaint received from a confidential source (CS) alleging that ██████████, Special Agent (SA), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Los Angeles, CA, and ██████████ SA, USSS, Los Angeles, CA, structured financial transactions to evade bank reporting requirements. The CS specifically alleged that on two occasions, in October 2010 and in February 2011, ██████ wrote checks to ██████ totaling \$9,999, just beneath the Currency Transaction Reporting (CTR) requirements.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG) interviewed ██████ and ██████ who both admitted to structuring bank transactions to avoid reporting requirements. ██████ also admitted that he knowingly provided false information and documents in a mortgage loan application.

██████████ was charged by Information with one count of 18 USC §1014, False Statement to Financial Institution and was sentenced to 24 months supervised probation and a \$100 fine.

██████████ was not charged in this investigation in exchange for agreeing to resign from the USSS.

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: ██████████ | Signature: ██████████ | Los Angeles Field Office | Original |
| Title: Special Agent | Date: 6/12/13 | Headquarters | 1 cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) | 1 cc |
| Name: Roger T. Merchant | Signature: <i>R.T. Merchant</i> | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent-in-Charge | Date: 6/12/13 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DETAILS

This investigation was initiated based upon a complaint received from a confidential source (CS) alleging that [REDACTED] Special Agent (SA), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Los Angeles, CA, and [REDACTED], SA, USSS, Los Angeles, CA, structured financial transactions to evade bank reporting requirements. The CS specifically alleged that on two occasions, in October 2010 and in February 2011, [REDACTED] wrote checks to [REDACTED] totaling \$9,999, just beneath the Currency Transaction Reporting (CTR) requirements. (Exhibit 1)

Allegation: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Structured Financial Transactions to Evade Reporting Requirements.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), the USSS, Inspection Division (ID), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Criminal Investigation (CI) interviewed [REDACTED]. Before any questioning began, [REDACTED] was given a Garrity warning which he stated that he understood and agreed to be interviewed. [REDACTED] stated that in 2009, [REDACTED], CA, and [REDACTED] stated that in an effort to hide a portion of the money during his subsequent divorce proceedings, on two occasions, he wrote checks to [REDACTED] totaling \$9,999. [REDACTED] said that he purposely structured the transactions to be under \$10,000 in order to avoid "bank suspicion." [REDACTED] also admitted that he knowingly provided false information and documents in a mortgage loan application. (Exhibit 2)

The DHS OIG, USSS ID, and IRS CI interviewed [REDACTED]. Before any questioning began, [REDACTED] was given a Garrity warning which he stated that he understood and agreed to be interviewed. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] gave him \$50,000 that he knew were funds intended for [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that he also received three checks from [REDACTED] totaling \$9,999, deposited the checks in separate accounts to avoid the filing of a Currency Transaction Report, and sent three checks payable to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] then transferred the money to [REDACTED] who declared in a mortgage loan application that the money was a gift from [REDACTED]. (Exhibit 3)

On October 10, 2012, in the Central District of California, Santa Ana, CA, an Information was filed charging [REDACTED] with one count of 18 USC §1014, False Statement to Financial Institution. (Exhibit 4)

The DHS OIG reviewed [REDACTED] Standard Form (SF) 50, Notice of Personnel Action, and determined that [REDACTED] resigned from the USSS on October 30, 2012. (Exhibit 5)

On December 27, 2012, in the Central District of California, Santa Ana, CA, [REDACTED] pleaded guilty to one count of 18 USC §1014, False Statement to Financial Institution. (Exhibit 6)

The DHS OIG reviewed a written agreement between [REDACTED] and the United States Attorney's Office, Central District of California, Santa Ana, CA, in which in exchange for resigning from the USSS, the USAO agreed not to prosecute [REDACTED]. (Exhibit 7)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Central District of California, Santa Ana, CA, in which in exchange for resigning from the USSS, the USAO agreed not to prosecute [REDACTED] (Exhibit 7)

The DHS OIG reviewed [REDACTED] SF-50, Notice of Personnel Action, and determined that [REDACTED] resigned from the USSS on January 30, 2013. (Exhibit 8)

On May 20, 2013, [REDACTED] appeared in U.S. District Court, Santa Ana, CA, and was sentenced to 24 months of supervised probation. (Exhibit 9)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|---|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity, Receipt of Complaint, dated August 17, 2011. |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated January 10, 2012. |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED] dated January 11, 2012. |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, Receipt of Information, dated October 10, 2012. |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, Records Review, dated January 24, 2013. |
| 6 | Memorandum of Activity, Records Review, dated March 22, 2013 |
| 7 | Memorandum of Activity, Records Review, dated February 4, 2013. |
| 8 | Memorandum of Activity, Records Review, dated February 20, 2013. |
| 9 | Memorandum of Activity, Records Review, dated May 20, 2013. |

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I11-USSS-OSI-00405



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | I11-USSS-OSI-00405 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | [REDACTED], et. al. [REDACTED] U.S. Secret Service Washington, DC |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | 18 USC 208 Acts affecting a personal financial interest |

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

On February 2, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) received an anonymous complaint purportedly from an employee within the Procurement Division of the U.S. Secret Service (USSS). The complainant alleged that [REDACTED] USSS, awarded an unjustified multi-million dollar sole source contract to [REDACTED], former director of USSS, through Command Consulting Group (CCG), Washington, DC. According to the complaint, the procurement staff brought to the attention of senior USSS management discrepancies in the contract and was warned by them "not to interfere." (Exhibit 1)

The investigation developed no evidence or information to support the allegation. The OIG determined the USSS has no current or past contracts with CCG or with former USSS Director [REDACTED], who is [REDACTED]. The OIG also verified that CCG is not a current subcontractor of any existing USSS contracts.

On February 15, 2011, the OIG interviewed [REDACTED], Deputy Chief of the Procurement Division, USSS, Washington, DC, regarding a contract awarded by USSS to either CCG or to [REDACTED] had never heard of CCG prior to being interviewed. [REDACTED] checked the unified procurement system used by USSS for any contracts awarded to CCG or to [REDACTED] and found none for either. (Exhibit 2)

| | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Special Investigations Div | Original |
| Title: Senior Special Agent | Date: 5/12/2011 | Headquarters | 1 cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) | 1 cc |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Other | cc |
| Title: Acting Special Agent in Charge | Date: 5-12-2011 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

█████ also provided a list of 35 contracts awarded to 28 contractors that were more than \$1 million, and awarded from February 4, 2010 to February 7, 2011. None of the contracts were awarded to CCG or to any companies known to be associated with ██████ ██████ advised that, except for four (4) contracts, none of the other contracts listed CCG or ██████ as a subcontractor. ██████ provided no subcontractor information for the four (4) contracts: Kadix; Specialty Vehicle Solutions, LLC; Batelle Memorial Institute; and Transformational Security, LLC. (Exhibit 3 and 4)

On March 11, 2011, ██████, ██████ of CCG, provided a signed and notarized statement denying CCG ever bid on or received a Request for Proposal, or a contract with USSS from which CCG expected or anticipated any work. Further, ██████ wrote that CCG had never received any compensation from any client or former client that was awarded a contract by the USSS.

█████ stated that CCG contracted with Transformational Security, LLC as a vendor to install security systems for a private individual client of CCG. However, according to ██████ CCG never worked with Transformational Security, LLC on any USSS or DHS contracts, or pursued any USSS or DHS contracts with it. (Exhibit 5)

On April 12, 2011, ██████, Transformational Security, LLC, Hanover, Maryland was interviewed. ██████ said his company did have a contract with USSS to supply electronic equipment. ██████ worked with CCG as a vendor to create and install a surveillance system for houses and yachts belonging to a high net-worth individual client of CCG. Further, ██████ denied ever working with ██████ (Exhibit 6)

On April 13, 2011, ██████, Security Specialist, Security Clearance Division, Clearance Access Branch, USSS, Washington, DC, was interviewed. ██████ oversaw certain USSS contracts. Of the four (4) contracts for which ██████ had no subcontractor information, ██████ found files for only three (3): Kadix; Batelle Memorial Institute; and Transformational Security, LLC. ██████ checked his files and said all three (3) contracts did not have subcontractors. ██████ could not find any contracts under his supervision with Specialty Vehicle Solutions, LLC. (Exhibit 7)

On April 18, 2011, ██████ Specialty Vehicle Solutions, LLC, Trenton, NJ, was interviewed. ██████ has a contract with USSS to deliver covert specialty vehicles. ██████ said his company does not have subcontractors for the USSS contract, and has never heard of Command Consulting Group or ██████. (Exhibit 8)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|--|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity, Case Predication, anonymous complaint received February 1, 2011. |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED], dated February 15, 2011. |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, Spreadsheet – USSS contracts over \$1 million awarded February 4, 2010 to February 7, 2011. |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, Email Contact - [REDACTED], dated April 18, 2011 stating the subcontractor for EMW Inc. is CA Inc. |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, Document Received – Notarized statement from [REDACTED], dated March 14, 2011. |
| 6 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal interview – [REDACTED] dated April 12, 2011. |
| 7 | Memorandum of Activity, Telephone Interview – [REDACTED], April 13, 2011. |
| 8 | Memorandum of Activity, Telephone Interview – [REDACTED], dated April 18, 2011. |

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All redactions in this document are pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C).

**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I11-USSS-OSI-01134



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | I11-USSS-OSI-01134 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | USSS Inspection Division [REDACTED] [REDACTED] U.S. Secret Service Washington, DC [REDACTED] Inspector, GS-15 U.S. Secret Service Washington, DC |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | 18 USC § 1001. False Statements |

SYNOPSIS

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation based on an allegation that U.S. Secret Service (USSS) agents misconstrued and/or misinterpreted several statements attributed to [REDACTED] City of Poquoson, VA, from a May 2010 interview related to an inquiry of USSS Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] Vice Presidential Protective Division (VPD).

The investigation developed no evidence that USSS agents intentionally falsified, misconstrued or misinterpreted statements attributed to [REDACTED]. The investigation confirmed that USSS Inspectors [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], USSS Inspection Division (ID), interviewed [REDACTED] on or about May 24, 2010, in connection with a USSS Fact-Finder Inquiry of [REDACTED] and both took notes during the interview. The investigation determined that their notes corroborated statements attributed to [REDACTED] in a USSS Fact-Finder report. The investigation further determined that while [REDACTED] believes that some of his statements were taken out of context, he does not believe it was intentional.

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Special Investigations | Original |
| Title: Senior Special Agent | Date: 11/8/11 | Headquarters | cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) | cc |
| Name: James Izzard, Jr. | Signature: [Handwritten Signature] | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 11/8/11 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DETAILS

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation based on a referral that originated from ██████████ City of Poquoson, VA, alleging that U.S. Secret Service (USSS) agents misconstrued and/or misinterpreted several statements attributed to ██████████ from a May 2010 interview related to an inquiry of USSS Special Agent (SA) ██████████ Vice Presidential Protective Division (VPD). (Exhibit 1)

[Agent's Note: USSS Inspection Division (ID) conducted a "Fact-Finder" Inquiry which determined that ██████████ interfered in a police investigation involving his brother-in-law and revealed evidence that ██████████ sought professional courtesy in connection with that investigation and used unprofessional language during several telephone calls to officers of the Poquoson Police Department (PD). USSS Inspectors interviewed ██████████ as part of the Fact-Finder Inquiry. At the time, ██████████ was assigned as an Inspector in the USSS ID. ██████████ was subsequently assigned as ██████████ USSS Uniformed Division, Foreign Missions Branch, Washington, DC.]

Allegation: U.S. Secret Service (USSS) agents misconstrued and/or misinterpreted statements attributed to ██████████ City of Poquoson, VA, in a USSS Fact Finder memorandum.

DHS OIG reviewed documents related to the USSS Fact-Finder Inquiry, File: 190-872-10-004, related to ██████████. The review revealed that ██████████ was interviewed by USSS Inspectors on or about May 24, 2010, and provided information which was summarized in bullets in a USSS ID memorandum, dated June 16, 2010. The sixth bullet of the section pertaining to ██████████ interview states, "SA ██████████ wanted to be given [']professional courtesy['] concerning the investigation of ██████████." The ninth bullet states, "He did not feel that SA ██████████ actions were a [']good representation of the USSS.[']" The tenth bullet in this section states, "He felt that SA ██████████ pushed the boundaries of their friendship and [']crossed the line.[']" (Exhibit 2)

DHS OIG reviewed a letter, dated March 2, 2011, from ██████████ to ██████████, Special Agent in Charge (SAIC), USSS VPD, Washington, DC. In that letter, ██████████ stated that in response to the USSS interview in May 2010, he was "truly disappointed with regard to at least three of the bullets" that were attributed to him, and that he "cannot imagine how they could have been so misunderstood." ██████████ specifically contested the sixth, ninth and tenth bullets, denying that he made each of those statements. Regarding the sixth bullet, ██████████ stated, "This is simply not true. I categorically deny that I ever made such a statement. Not only did Agent ██████████ not ask me for professional courtesy, but I never made such an admission to anyone. I am troubled that my words could be so misinterpreted." Regarding the ninth bullet, ██████████ stated, "Again, I categorically deny that I made that statement to anyone. Actually until now I have had the highest respect for the Secret Service. It is beyond my understanding how my statement could be so misconstrued." Regarding the tenth bullet, ██████████ stated, "Again I vehemently deny the statement that has been attributed to me. Simply put, I never said Special Agent ██████████ was

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

pushing the boundaries of our friendship nor did I say he crossed the line. My response was direct with respect to the question. I did, however, make a call to my son. His reply was [redacted]no[redacted] and so was mine.” (Exhibit 3)

DHS OIG obtained a copy of [redacted] handwritten notes, dated May 24, 2010, from the apparent interview of [redacted]. These notes appeared to include the following statements: “wanted professional courtesy” and “all about sister”; “not good representation of USSS”; and “access to me but pushed” and “line crossed”. (Exhibit 4)

DHS OIG interviewed [redacted] who acknowledged sending the March 2, 2011 letter to [redacted]. He also confirmed one in-person interview that he had with two USSS agents regarding [redacted]. [redacted] stated that he sent the letter because [redacted] asked him to and that he received the USSS memorandum of his interview [containing the bullet points] from [redacted]. [redacted] also noted that [redacted] asked him to specifically address the sixth, ninth and a tenth bullet, which was what precipitated his March 2, 2011 letter. [redacted] still agreed with the statements he made in that letter and thought that some of the bullets in the USSS memorandum, which he addressed in his letter, were taken out of context, but stated that he did not believe that anyone in the USSS intentionally falsified statements pertaining to his interview.

[redacted] contended he did not say that [redacted] wanted to be given professional courtesy by him; rather, [redacted] thought that [redacted] had asked [redacted], Poquoson PD, for professional courtesy and talked to [redacted] about wanting professional courtesy from [redacted]. It was [redacted] recollection that he may have said that he was confident that the USSS was not happy about the situation involving [redacted] but not that [redacted] actions were not a good representation of the USSS. Further, [redacted] added that he referred to his friendship with [redacted] many times during the interview, but he did not say that he felt that [redacted] pushed the boundaries of their friendship and crossed the line. [redacted] advised that his statements could have been misconstrued due to the way he “runs on and on,” referencing how he answered questions during the interview. (Exhibit 5)

DHS OIG interviewed [redacted] who noted that he was the lead Inspector on the Fact-Finder Inquiry of [redacted]. [redacted] reviewed the following statements from his handwritten notes taken during the interview of [redacted]: “wanted professional courtesy” and “all about sister”; “not good representation of USSS”; and “pushed access to me” and “line crossed”. [redacted] noted that it was clear from the interview of [redacted] that [redacted] was seeking professional courtesy related to his [redacted] sister, and that [redacted] had indicated that he [redacted] felt that the access that [redacted] had to him may have crossed the line. [redacted] was confident that he recapped with [redacted] the information contained in the sixth and tenth bullets of the section of the memorandum pertaining to that interview, and noted that this may have been the point at which [redacted] made the statement regarding the information noted in the ninth bullet. [redacted] noted that [redacted] did not want to provide a signed, sworn statement due to concerns about possible litigation involving [redacted]. [redacted] also noted that [redacted] is friends with [redacted] family and that [redacted] said that [redacted] is “like a son to him.” [redacted] thought that [redacted] could have regretted some of the statements that he had made during his interview. (Exhibit 6)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DHS OIG interviewed ██████ who stated that he was a co-Inspector on the Fact-Finder Inquiry of ██████ ██████ recalled the in-person interview that he and ██████ had with ██████ and remembered ██████ making the statements noted in the sixth, ninth and tenth bullets in the section of the Fact-Finder memorandum pertaining to that interview. ██████ also noted that ██████ said that he ██████ felt uncomfortable about ██████ talking to him ██████ Further, ██████ noted that ██████ told him and ██████ that he was upset that the city [Poquoson] was going to incur expenses from a potential lawsuit from ██████ ██████ agreed with the accuracy of the section of the Fact-Finder memorandum pertaining to the interview of ██████ (Exhibit 7)

DHS OIG reviewed ██████ handwritten notes of the interview, dated May 24, 2010. ██████ notes reflected the following statements: "used profanity, but not directed at him"; "used the term prof. courtesy"; "he didn't ask ██████ for favor but looking for some relief for sister."; "█████ filing a law suit against City & PD."; "█████ was agitated, intense; swearing but not at him."; "█████ would think differently of ██████ now after what ██████ did."; "█████ retained Decker Law Firm."; "going to Channel 10 – Mother on Fri."; and "not good representation". (Exhibit 8)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|--|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity, dated August 22, 2011, Case Predication. |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, dated August 22, 2011, Records Review, Fact-Finder Inquiry Memorandum. |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, dated August 22, 2011, Records Review, Letter from [REDACTED] |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, dated September 21, 2011, Records Review, Handwritten Notes. |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, dated October 14, 2011, Personal Interview, [REDACTED] |
| 6 | Memorandum of Activity, dated September 23, 2011, Personal Interview, [REDACTED]. |
| 7 | Memorandum of Activity, dated September 23, 2011, Personal Interview, [REDACTED]. |
| 8 | Memorandum of Activity, dated October 6, 2011, Records Review, [REDACTED] Notes. |

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Case Summary Report

I11-USSS-PHL-00441

Title: [REDACTED], et al.

Date Rcd: 2/10/2011 Date Assigned: 2/10/2011 Date Opened: 2/10/2011 Date Closed: 4/20/2011

Rcd Method: Email

Agent: [REDACTED]

Affected Agency: U.S. Secret Service (DHS)

PrimaryOffice: Philadelphia, PA

Ref Agency:

Alleg Type: Program Fraud / Financial Crimes \ False Personating of a DHS Employee

Special: No Privacy: No Confidential: No Dollar Loss: \$0.00

Joint Agency:

Ref Cases: OSI-FY2011-187

Comments: [REDACTED], currently is incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution Satellite Camp, Fort Dix, New Jersey. Last year, prior to his acceptance of a plea agreement, he and his wife were swindled by a neighbor couple, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] displayed false credentials, claimed to be an FBI agent, claimed that an associate named [REDACTED] a Secret Service agent in the Philadelphia office, had proof of investigative and prosecutor misconduct in my [REDACTED] case, and that a sitting federal judge, [REDACTED] had approved a quiet deal where he could pay a substantial fine and serve a year of house arrest. As a result, [REDACTED] and his wife paid [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] \$200,000.

*This case was Admin. Closed on April 20, 2011. [REDACTED]

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Case Summary Report

I11-USSS-PHL-00441

People - Subjects

| | | | |
|-------------------|---------------|--------|------|
| [REDACTED] | Home | | |
| Aka: | SSN: | EOD: | |
| POB City: | POB State: | | |
| DOB: | Alien Number: | | |
| Address: | Company Name: | | |
| | City: | State: | Zip: |
| DHS Emp: NO | DHS Exec: No | | |
| Phone: | | | |
| Email: | | | |

| | | | |
|-------------------|---------------|--------|------|
| [REDACTED] | Work | | |
| Aka: | SSN: | EOD: | |
| POB City: | POB State: | | |
| DOB: | Alien Number: | | |
| Address: | Company Name: | | |
| | City: | State: | Zip: |
| DHS Emp: NO | DHS Exec: No | | |
| Phone: | | | |
| Email: | | | |

| | | | |
|-------------------|---------------|--------|------|
| [REDACTED] | Home | | |
| Aka: | SSN: | EOD: | |
| POB City: | POB State: | | |
| DOB: | Alien Number: | | |
| Address: | Company Name: | | |
| | City: | State: | Zip: |
| DHS Emp: NO | DHS Exec: No | | |
| Phone: | | | |
| Email: | | | |

| | | | |
|-------------------|---------------|--------|------|
| [REDACTED] | Work | | |
| Aka: | SSN: | EOD: | |
| POB City: | POB State: | | |
| DOB: | Alien Number: | | |
| Address: | Company Name: | | |
| | City: | State: | Zip: |
| DHS Emp: NO | DHS Exec: No | | |
| Phone: | | | |
| Email: | | | |

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Case Summary Report

I11-USSS-PHL-00441

People - Complainants

| | | | | |
|-------------|---------------|--|--------|------|
| [REDACTED] | Home | | | |
| Aka: | SSN: | | EOD: | |
| POB City: | POB State: | | | |
| DOB: | Alien Number: | | | |
| Address: | Company Name: | | | |
| | City: | | State: | Zip: |
| DHS Emp: No | DHS Exec: No | | | |
| Phone: | | | | |
| Email: | | | | |

| | | | | |
|-------------|---------------|--|--------|------|
| [REDACTED] | Work | | | |
| Aka: | SSN: | | EOD: | |
| POB City: | POB State: | | | |
| DOB: | Alien Number: | | | |
| Address: | Company Name: | | | |
| | City: | | State: | Zip: |
| DHS Emp: No | DHS Exec: No | | | |
| Phone: | | | | |
| Email: | | | | |

People - Witness

People - Victims

Violations

Case Dates:

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|--------------|----|
| Received: | 2/10/2011 | Assigned: | 2/10/2011 | Reassigned: | |
| Prb Referral: | | Retention: | | Acknowledged | |
| | | | | : | |
| Incident Start: | | Incident End: | | Approx: | No |
| Police Report: | | Police Rpt #: | | | |
| Notified: | 2/17/2011 | Reesponse: | | Referred: | |
| Investigation Comp: | | Closed: | 4/20/2011 | | |
| Prb Decision: | | Reopened: | | | |

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Case Summary Report

I11-USSS-PHL-00441

Location

| | | |
|--------------------|---------------|------|
| Airport: | Location: | |
| City: | State: | Zip: |
| Facility: | FFDO Airline: | |
| Investigation Loc: | Region: | |
| Transport | | |

Technical

Disposition - Criminal

Dispositions - Civil

Dispositions - Admin

MA

ROI / Referral

Collaterals

Uploaded Documents

Date Prepared: 2/10/2011 Grand Jury: No

Doc Type: Complaint / Notification

Description: Other Document(s)

Date Prepared: 3/2/2011 Grand Jury: No

Doc Type: MOA#1 - Personal Interview

Description: Memorandum of Activity

Date Prepared: 3/16/2011 Grand Jury: No

Doc Type: MOA #2

Description: Memorandum of Activity

Date Prepared: 4/19/2011 Grand Jury: No

Doc Type: Additional Information

Description: Information Report


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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I11-USSS-WFO-00624



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | I11-USSS-WFO-00624 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | [REDACTED] Investigative Support Assistant (GS-8) United States Secret Service Washington, DC |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | 18 USC 641 – Theft/Conversion of U.S. Government Property |

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

In March 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Washington Field Office (WFO) received an allegation that [REDACTED], Investigative Support Assistant, United States Secret Service (USSS), Washington Field Office (WFO), stole genuine currency suspected to be counterfeit, which had been submitted to the USSS WFO for processing. As part of the scheme, [REDACTED] initially deposited approximately \$1,400 of the stolen currency into [REDACTED] Partnership Federal Credit Union (PFCU) account. (Exhibit 1)

The USSS is responsible for maintaining the integrity of the global financial system by investigating counterfeiting of U.S. currency. Financial institutions and bulk cash processing entities use USSS Counterfeit Note Reports (SSF 1604) to report and submit suspected counterfeit currency to the USSS for identification and processing. As part of [REDACTED] duties at the USSS WFO, [REDACTED] was responsible for logging and classifying received suspected counterfeit currency into the USSS counterfeit tracking database. Our investigation determined [REDACTED] intercepted and stole at least \$5,000 in genuine U.S. currency (suspected counterfeit) submitted to the USSS WFO, destroyed or attempted to destroy the attached SSF 1604's, and deposited the stolen currency directly into [REDACTED] personal PFCU account. [REDACTED] plead guilty to one misdemeanor count of theft and was terminated by the USSS. Also, based on evidence obtained during this investigation, the USSS strengthened their procedures for processing suspected counterfeit currency at WFO.

On March 30, 2011, [REDACTED] was interviewed by DHS OIG and USSS Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). [REDACTED] initially confessed to stealing \$1,100 in genuine currency from the USSS WFO counterfeit vault, and then depositing the funds into [REDACTED] PFCU account via an automated teller

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Headquarters | Original |
| Title: Special Agent | Date: 09/20/12 | Washington | 1 cc |
| Approving Official | | Component | 1 cc |
| Name: Michael Dawson | Signature: | | |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 09/20/12 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

machine in the USSS Headquarters lobby. However, upon further questioning ██████████ confessed to stealing an additional \$1,000 and consented to a search of her purse and vehicle. During the searches, DHS OIG and USSS OPR discovered an additional \$1,600 in stolen currency and stolen SSF 1604's. (Exhibit 2)

On April 1, 2011, ██████████ consented to an interview and polygraph examination at USSS Headquarters. ██████████ confessed to stealing an additional \$2,000 in currency in January 2011 and reportedly deposited the stolen currency into ██████████ PFCU account. (Exhibit 3)

On December 5, 2011, ██████████ plead guilty to a one-count federal Information charging ██████████ with a misdemeanor violation of Theft of Government Property (18 USC 641) and a criminal forfeiture judgment for \$2,100 for unrecovered funds. ██████████ was processed and arrested. (Exhibit 4)

On March 9, 2012, ██████████ was sentenced to thirty-six (36) months probation, \$2,100 restitution to the USSS, \$25 fine, and 100 hours of community service. (Exhibit 5)

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EXHIBITS

NUMBER

DESCRIPTION

1. Memorandum of Activity, detailing the March 29, 2011 Origin of Allegation.
2. Memorandum of Activity, detailing the March 30, 2011 Interview and Consent to Search [REDACTED] Vehicle and Purse.
3. Memorandum of Activity, detailing the April 1, 2011 Interview and Polygraph Examination of [REDACTED].
4. Memorandum of Activity, detailing the December 5, 2011 Federal Plea and Arrest Processing of [REDACTED].
5. Memorandum of Activity, detailing the March 9, 2012 Federal Sentencing of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I12-USSS-ATL-00054



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | I12-USSS-ATL-00054 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | [REDACTED] Physical Security Specialist, GS-13 United States Secret Service Washington, DC |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | Alabama State Code, 13A-11-8; Threatening/Harassing Communications |

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

On October 18, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), was advised by the United States Secret Service (USSS) of a complaint received from [REDACTED] alleging harassment by [REDACTED] Physical Security Specialist (PSS), Technical Security Division (TSD), USSS, Arlington, VA. [REDACTED] filed the complaint with [REDACTED] Police Department, [REDACTED] who advised they were not pursuing the matter. DHS OIG and USSS, Inspections Division agreed to work the case jointly. (Exhibit 1)

The OIG/USSS investigation determined that [REDACTED] harassed [REDACTED] and violated several USSS policies. The violations included misuse of a government vehicle, falsifying time and attendance worksheets, and unauthorized fleet credit card use. [REDACTED] resigned from the USSS, effective December 30, 2011.

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Atlanta Field Office | Original |
| Title: Special Agent | Date: 3/1/12 | Headquarters | cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) | cc |
| Name: James. E. Ward | Signature: [Signature] | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 3/1/12 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

On October 24, 2011, OIG made contact with [REDACTED], Special Agent (SA), Inspections Division, United States Secret Service (USSS), Washington, DC, who provided initial documents pertaining to allegations of harassment against Physical Security Specialist (PSS), [REDACTED]. SA [REDACTED] advised that he spoke with Detective [REDACTED] Police Department [REDACTED], [REDACTED] who took the initial police report from [REDACTED] regarding the harassment by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised that due to PSS [REDACTED] living out of state and the crime being a misdemeanor it was requested that USSS pursue the matter. SA [REDACTED] advised that he interviewed [REDACTED] who informed him that after [REDACTED] he became threatening, verbally, and in e-mail and posted sexually oriented pictures of [REDACTED] on the internet. (Exhibit 2)

On November 14, 2011, OIG was advised of the results of a fact finding investigation by USSS. SA [REDACTED] stated that upon reviewing PSS [REDACTED] employee records, agency credit cards and cell phone records it was determined that during the period of September 8-12, 2011, PSS [REDACTED] harassed [REDACTED], through telephone calls, e-mails and text messages. The investigation also determined that PSS [REDACTED] violated USSS policy. The investigation revealed that PSS [REDACTED] allegedly abandoned his post in Cincinnati, Ohio, during a Technical Services Division (TSD) advance for the Presidential Protective Division (PPD). SA [REDACTED] advised this matter was being converted to a special investigation. (Exhibit 3)

On November 14, 2011, OIG and USSS conducted an interview of PSS [REDACTED]. PSS [REDACTED] admitted to excessively calling and e-mailing [REDACTED] and admitted to being capable of making the types of threats [REDACTED] alleged. PSS [REDACTED] admitted to driving from Cincinnati, OH to [REDACTED] on September 3, 2011, when his protection assignment was in Cincinnati, OH. PSS [REDACTED] admitted using a USSS rental car, falsifying his time and attendance record and falsely over claiming overtime. It was estimated that PSS [REDACTED] was absent from his USSS assignment for approximately 21 hours. PSS [REDACTED] completed a sworn statement but denied creating spoof e-mails or hacking into [REDACTED] e-mail account as alleged. PSS [REDACTED] consented to a polygraph examination administered by the USSS Forensic Services Division (FSD) on November 15, 2011. FSD evaluated PSS [REDACTED] as "Deception Indicated." (Exhibit 4)

On December 30, 2011, OIG was advised by SA [REDACTED] that PSS [REDACTED] submitted his resignation letter to USSS effective December 30, 2011. (Exhibit 5)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|---|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity, Case Initiation, dated September 19, 2011 |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, Preliminary Investigation Records, dated October 24, 2011 |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, USSS Report of Results, dated November 14, 2011 |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], November 14, 2011 |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, Resignation of [REDACTED] dated December 30, 2011 |


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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I12-USSS-ATL-00815



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | I12-USSS-ATL-00815 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | [REDACTED] Special Agent, GS-13 U.S. Secret Service Charlotte, North Carolina |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | Title 21 USC 848, Continuing Criminal Enterprise |

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), investigative inquiry was initiated based on a referral from the Joint Intake Center (JIC), on May 30, 2012, alleging that [REDACTED], U.S. Secret Service (USSS) Special Agent (SA), and [REDACTED] is involved in international organized crime group/drug cartel organization that involves identity theft and public corruption.

Our preliminary investigation failed to develop any credible evidence to substantiate the allegation(s). Therefore, this investigation is closed.

Copies of the initial referral and the relevant DHS OIG memoranda of activity are appended.


| | | | |
|--|------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Atlanta Field Office | Original |
| Title: Assistant Special Agent in Charge | Date: 10/5/2012 | Headquarters | cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) | cc |
| Name: James E. Ward | Signature: [Signature] | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 10/29/12 | | |

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I12-USSS-ATL-00832



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**Homeland
Security**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | I12-USSS-ATL-00832 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | [REDACTED] |
| | Special Agent, GS-13 U.S. Secret Service Charlotte, North Carolina |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | Improper Use of Emergency Lights |

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), initiated an investigation based on a YouTube video that was broadcast on a local news report of an apparent road rage incident which occurred in Charlotte, NC involving a government owned vehicle (GOV) assigned to the USSS Charlotte Field Office. The actual incident occurred on Sunday, May 20, 2012, and was recorded by a private citizen. The U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Inspections Division (ID), contacted the OIG to notify that the vehicle is assigned to Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED]. The OIG agreed to work a jointly with the USSS ID. (Exhibit 1)

During the course of the investigation, the OIG and USSS OPR determined that Special Agent [REDACTED] was the driver of the GOV. It was also determined through witness interviews that road rage did not occur during the incident.

| | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Atlanta Field Office | Original |
| Title: Asst. Special Agent in Charge | Date: 10/22/12 | Headquarters | cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) | cc |
| Name: James E. Ward | Signature: [REDACTED] | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 10/23/12 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

On June 21, 2012, DHS OIG, along with Inspector ██████████, U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Inspection Division (ID), interviewed ██████████, who advised that on May 20, 2012, he was traveling south on I-77. ██████████ was travelling in the far left lane when he saw a black, dark tinted, Dodge Charger coming up behind him in high rate of speed. At first, ██████████ thought it was a local police officer in pursuit so he moved his vehicle over to the right, in the second lane. ██████████ began to videotape the Charger. ██████████ stated that he observed the Charger drive up alongside of a black SUV that was in front of him, in the lane he moved over to. The Charger moved his vehicle behind the SUV, and then moved in front of the SUV. ██████████ said that he noticed the Charger's rear emergency lights on. The Charger double tapped his rear brakes. According to ██████████ the SUV attempted to change lanes to avoid the Charger.

The Charger stayed in front of the SUV and then suddenly sped off. ██████████ advised that the Charger had his emergency lights on when he sped away. Suddenly, the Charger returned and pulled behind the SUV once again. The Charger's emergency lights were still activated. The SUV began to change lanes in the attempts of pulling over to the off ramp exit medium. The Charger stayed behind the SUV and both vehicles slowed down. ██████████ advised that he continued videotaping the incident. The Charger pulled the SUV over but not to a complete stop. ██████████ advised that he stayed behind because he thought the Charger was abusing his authority.

██████████ advised that the Charger suddenly drove off the exit, in a high rate of speed, leaving the SUV sitting in the middle of the off ramp. ██████████ stated that he could not believe what he saw so he continued to follow the Charger. According to ██████████ the Charger was driving recklessly through the traffic. ██████████ said that he did not want the Charger to think that he was following so he decided to abandon the chase. ██████████ provided the investigating agents with an unedited copy of the video that he took of the incident. ██████████ advised that he was sorry for putting the video on the internet because he did not know that the driver of the Charger was a USSS agent. (Exhibit 2)

On June 21, 2012, DHS OIG and USSS IA interviewed ██████████, who advised that on Sunday, May 20, 2012, during the morning hours, ██████████ was traveling south on I-77 in a white, Volkswagen Jetta. (Agent note: ██████████ identified himself as the white, Volkswagen Jetta in the YouTube video that was later aired on a local news report) ██████████ advised that during the hours of the incident, there was not much traffic on the road. ██████████ advised that he was travelling in the second from the right lane when he saw a black, dark tinted, Dodge Charger coming up behind him in high rate of speed in the far left lane. According to ██████████ the Charger had his emergency lights activated. ██████████ advised that the Charger pulled alongside of him and a black SUV then pulled ahead of the SUV. The Charger changed lanes and pulled in front of the SUV. ██████████ stated that the Charger's rear emergency lights were also activated. Suddenly, the Charger double tapped his brakes then pulled into another lane and dropped behind the SUV and began to pull the SUV over. ██████████ observed the Charger pull the SUV over into an off ramp medium and then took off. (Exhibit 3)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

On June 22, 2012, the DHS OIG and USSS IA interviewed [REDACTED], Special Agent (SA), USSS. [REDACTED] stated that on May 20, 2012, he was on his way home from working the Vice President (VP) detail that arrived in Charlotte, NC. [REDACTED] was assigned as the VP Airport Counterpart. [REDACTED] advised that he was travelling in either the left or middle lane heading south on I-77, when he saw an object the size of a cinder block coming at his vehicle. [REDACTED] advised that the object was thrown from a black sports utility vehicle (SUV) in front of him. [REDACTED] was driving a black colored Dodge Charger, equipped with emergency response lights in the grill, rear lights and right passenger visor. [REDACTED] said that he slowed down to assess the damages and to observe if the vehicle was fully functional. [REDACTED] advised that he took his attention away from the SUV while he assessed the vehicle operations. [REDACTED] decided to catch up with the vehicle that threw out the object. According to [REDACTED] he reached into his glove compartment and pulled out a napkin to write the tag number down. [REDACTED] attempted to speed up to the SUV in order to stop it. [REDACTED] advised that he remembered seeing an arm hanging out of the passenger window of the SUV prior to the object hitting his vehicle. [REDACTED] stated that he saw a black SUV a tenth of a mile ahead of him.

[REDACTED] advised that while he was attempting to catch up to the SUV, he became fearful of what his Special Agent in Charge (SAC) was going to say regarding the damages to his government owned vehicle (GOV). [REDACTED] stated that he has the second best vehicle in the office, next to SAC so he knew that he would be facing some disciplinary actions. [REDACTED] informed the investigating agents that the SAC gets upset when any of the vehicles are dirty; much less damaged. [REDACTED] stated that he had a similar incident happen to him when he was working in New York. [REDACTED] advised that he was not to blame when his GOV was damaged but still was reprimanded.

[REDACTED] stated that he sped up to the vehicle with his emergency lights activated. [REDACTED] drove in front of the SUV because it was the only black SUV on the road and figured that was the vehicle. [REDACTED] advised that he looked through his rear view mirror so he could see the driver. [REDACTED] told the interviewing agents that he doubted that he caught up to the correct vehicle so he [REDACTED] accelerated and drove off to find the correct SUV. [REDACTED] noticed that the vehicles that were ahead did not match the description of the vehicle that threw the object out. [REDACTED] began to think that he may have had the correct vehicle from the beginning. [REDACTED] slowed his vehicle down so that the original black SUV could catch up to him. [REDACTED] caught up with the original SUV and turned his lights and siren on so he could pull the vehicle over. [REDACTED] did not want to get penalized for not going after the vehicle because he is a law enforcement officer. In the process of pulling the SUV over, [REDACTED] saw that the SUV contained only one passenger. [REDACTED] recalled again that the subject SUV had a passenger inside. When the SUV pulled in the medium of the off ramp, [REDACTED] decided not to pull the vehicle over. [REDACTED] instead, decided to see if the subject SUV could have taken the same off ramp that the vehicle he was pulling over had taken. [REDACTED] advised that he accelerated off the exit with hopes of finding the SUV. [REDACTED] remembered that the exit he got off was the I-495 exit.

[REDACTED] admitted that he realized that he would not find the vehicle and became upset after he thought

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

about the calls he will have to make to his supervisor and the SAC. [REDACTED] also stated that he was upset that he was placed in a situation that clearly was not his fault and feared disciplinary action from management from a previous minor traffic incident that damaged his vehicle according to [REDACTED] was clearly not his fault. [REDACTED] stated that the Charlotte Office Management counseled him because he has one of the best vehicles.

When [REDACTED] arrived home, he inspected his vehicle and saw no damages were sustained from the object that hit his vehicle.

[REDACTED] advised that in 2002/2003, was the only other time that he activated his emergency lights. The incident involved some teenagers throwing eggs at his vehicle. [REDACTED] advised that he pulled the car over and escorted the vehicle to the police station. [REDACTED] stated that he contacted his supervisors after the incident. [REDACTED] was forthcoming with all of the information provided and expressed regret for the embarrassment he caused to the USSS. [REDACTED] provided the interviewing agents with a sworn statement. (Exhibit 4)

On July 12, 2012, the DHS OIG and USSS IA interviewed [REDACTED], the driver of the Black SUV. [REDACTED] advised that he travelling south on I-77. [REDACTED] advised that he was travelling alone. [REDACTED] looked in his left side mirror and noticed a black Dodge Charger coming up fast behind him. The Charger was traveling in the far left lane and [REDACTED] was in the middle lane. [REDACTED] advised that he noticed the vehicle near the Remount Road exit. [REDACTED] stated that he thought the vehicle was either an undercover state or local police vehicle.

When [REDACTED] saw the Charger coming up, he decided to move to change lanes to the right. According to [REDACTED] the Charger did not have any emergency lights activated when the vehicle was approaching from behind. [REDACTED] advised that between the Clinton Road and Woodlawn exit, the Charger began to slow down in the far left lane. The Charger continued to slow down and came behind [REDACTED] black, sports utility vehicle (SUV) and then pulled to the right of his vehicle. Suddenly, the Charger pulled in front of [REDACTED] and "slammed on his (Charger) brakes." [REDACTED] advised that he had a bottle of juice in his hand when the Charger slammed the brakes, which caused [REDACTED] to slam his brakes causing him to spill the juice on his pants.

[REDACTED] advised that he moved his vehicle over to the middle lane to avoid the Charger's erratic driving. [REDACTED] advised that the Charger activated his emergency lights when the Charger pulled in front of him. [REDACTED] noticed that the Charger moved behind him with his emergency lights on in the grill and right visor. [REDACTED] stated that he did not understand what he had done wrong to be pulled over. [REDACTED] advised that he slowed his vehicle down and began to pull over into an off ramp medium. [REDACTED] said that the Charger slowed down to a "slow trot" and then suddenly took off. [REDACTED] was perplexed to why he was pulled over and why the Charger suddenly took off. [REDACTED] advised that all of his windows were up at the time of the vehicle stop. [REDACTED] was asked

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

if he had seen any other vehicle that matched his vehicle prior to the encounter with the Charger.

██████████ advised that he did not remember seeing any vehicle that looked similar to his but could not be sure.

██████████ stated that he did not know that the vehicle that was shown on the news footage and YouTube was his vehicle until someone told him that the vehicle resembled his vehicle. (Exhibit 5)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| NUMBER | DESCRIPTION |
|--------|---|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity, dated June 21, 2012, Case initiation. |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, dated June 21, 2012, Interview of [REDACTED]. |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, dated June 21, 2012, Interview of [REDACTED]. |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, dated June 22, 2012, Interview of [REDACTED]. |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, dated July 12, 2012, Interview of [REDACTED]. |

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I12-USSS-DAL-00690



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | I12-USSS-DAL-00690 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | ██████████, Special Agent, GS-1811-12 United States Secret Service New Orleans, Louisiana |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | Title 18, USC 1509, Obstruction of Court Orders |

SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated based upon an allegation received from the United States Secret Service (USSS), Inspection Division, that ██████████, Special Agent (SA), USSS, New Orleans Field Office, New Orleans, Louisiana, warned a defendant about USSS operational plans to conduct an arrest.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), conducted witness and subject interviews and gathered documentary evidence during the course of investigation. The investigation resulted in ██████████ admitting to warning a criminal defendant about a pending arrest during a USSS operation.

The United States Attorney's Office and the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office declined to prosecute ██████████ ██████████ resigned his position with the USSS because of the investigation.

| <i>Reporting Agent</i> | | <i>Distribution:</i> | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Name: ██████████ | Signature: ██████████ | Dallas Field Office | Original |
| Title: Senior Special Agent | Date: 12-3-13 | Headquarters | cc |
| <i>Approving Official</i> | | Component(s) | cc |
| Name: Charles D. Haas | Signature: <i>Charles Haas</i> | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 12-4-13 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

The DHS OIG interviewed [REDACTED] who stated that he graduated from USSS training academy in March 2009. Prior to that, he was employed as a Deputy Sheriff for the [REDACTED] County Sheriff's Office, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] confirmed that he participated in a search warrant operation in July 2009 at the address of [REDACTED] Louisiana and [REDACTED] was a co-worker and the case agent. [REDACTED] was assigned to maintain security of the outer perimeter of the residence and to watch the suspects of the investigation, while search teams conducted a search of the residence. [REDACTED] identified the suspects as [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said that he disagreed with the entry used on the residence and that he was sympathizing with [REDACTED] and his family and established a good rapport with them. [REDACTED] said that he did not know nor had met [REDACTED] or his family prior to the execution of the search warrant.

Following the search warrant at [REDACTED] residence, [REDACTED] said he returned to the residence to check on [REDACTED] and his family. [REDACTED] did not notify the case agent or a supervisor of his actions. [REDACTED] said that he met with [REDACTED] multiple times after the search warrant in July 2009 and admitted that he developed a personal relationship with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that he would call [REDACTED] on his cellular telephone to arrange meetings. [REDACTED] said that he contacted [REDACTED] and asked him to fix his [REDACTED] personal computer. [REDACTED] agreed to work on [REDACTED] computer at no charge. When [REDACTED] picked up the computer, he and [REDACTED] went to downtown New Orleans, to the French Quarter for lunch in his black, Chrysler 300, issued government vehicle.

[REDACTED] admitted to paying for lunch and cigars. [REDACTED] admitted that [REDACTED] disclosed that he had made counterfeit money. [REDACTED] said that he did not disclose this admission or his lunch to the case agent or any supervisor. [REDACTED] said that he felt bad for [REDACTED] and his family.

[REDACTED] said that subsequent to the search warrant in July 2009, he learned that [REDACTED] had an outstanding arrest warrant for possession of counterfeit identifications. [REDACTED] said that the probable cause for the arrest was obtained through the search of the [REDACTED] residence. [REDACTED] admitted to contacting [REDACTED] on the telephone and disclosing that [REDACTED] had an outstanding arrest warrant and that the Louisiana State Police and the USSS were going to execute the arrest. [REDACTED] said that he could have possibly notified [REDACTED] a second time regarding a pending arrest of [REDACTED], but was not sure.

[REDACTED] recalled attending an operational briefing at the USSS Field Office, New Orleans, Louisiana, where discussions occurred of using an undercover agent to gain [REDACTED] trust. The operational plan was to use SA [REDACTED] USSS, New Orleans Field Office, for the operation. [REDACTED] admitted that he spoke to [REDACTED] and identified SA [REDACTED] as a [REDACTED] male and in his [REDACTED]s who would be working undercover. [REDACTED] provided DHS OIG a sworn written affidavit. (Exhibit 4)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

The DHS OIG received telephone records from USSS Inspection Division that revealed that [REDACTED] had used his government cellular telephone and had contacted [REDACTED] on 20 different occasions. (Exhibit 5)

The DHS OIG received information from USSS, Inspection Division that [REDACTED] resigned from employment with the USSS. (Exhibit 6)

The DHS OIG presented a case report and received a declination to prosecute from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA's), Southern District of Alabama, Mobile, Alabama. AUSA [REDACTED] said that the investigation did not merit federal prosecution. (Exhibit 7)

The DHS OIG presented a case report to the Louisiana Attorney General's Office. The Attorney General's Office presented a case report to Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office for prosecutorial consideration. DHS OIG received a declination to prosecute. (Exhibit 8)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|--|
| 1. | Memorandum of Activity, dated April 13, 2012, Case Opening. |
| 2. | Memorandum of Activity, dated April 23, 2012, Email correspondence SA [REDACTED] |
| 3. | Memorandum of Activity, dated May 7, 2012, Personal Interview [REDACTED]. |
| 4. | Memorandum of Activity, dated May 7, 2012, Personal Interview [REDACTED]. |
| 5. | Memorandum of Activity, dated June 22, 2012, Receipt of personnel file and Government telephone records. |
| 6. | Memorandum of Activity, dated January 24, 2013, Receipt of SF-50. |
| 7. | Memorandum of Activity, dated March 25, 2013, Declination to Prosecute. |
| 8. | Memorandum of Activity, dated October 21, 2013, Declination to Prosecute. |

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I12-USSS-DET-00987



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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|---|--|
| <p><i>Case Number:</i> I12-USSS-DET-00987</p> <p><i>Case Title:</i> [REDACTED]</p> <p><i>Report Status:</i> Final</p> <p><i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> Title 18 USC 205, Conflict of Interest: Activities of Officers and Employees in Claims Against and Other Matters Affecting the Government</p> | <p>United States United Secret Service (USSS) Washington, DC</p> |
|---|--|

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

This U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigative inquiry was initiated based on an August 9, 2012, referral from DHS OIG, Office of Special Investigation (OSI), case number I12-USSS-OSI-00800, which resulted in lead #324. Lead #324 alleged that [REDACTED], USSS, Washington DC, was “sexting” with SA [REDACTED], USSS.

Our preliminary investigation failed to develop any credible evidence to substantiate the allegation. Therefore, this investigation is closed.

Copies of the initial referral and the relevant DHS OIG memoranda of activity are appended.

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Detroit Field Office | Original |
| Title: Special Agent | Date: 2-13-13 | Headquarters | cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) | cc |
| Name: John Tiano | Signature: [Signature] | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 2-15-13 | | |

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

I12-US88-MIA-01019



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | I12-USSS-MIA-01019 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | [REDACTED] Special Agent, GS-13 U.S. Secret Service Washington, DC |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | Improper Conduct, Inappropriate Associations |

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

On September 11, 2012, the U.S Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), initiated this investigation based on information that [REDACTED] Special Agent (SA), U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Washington DC, interfered with a local criminal investigation, misused his position, and had inappropriate associations while he was assigned to the USSS Ft. Myers, FL office between 2006 and 2010. (Exhibit 1)

The DHS OIG interviewed [REDACTED], Special Agent In Charge (SAIC), DHS, USSS, Tampa, FL regarding [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that in 2006, the USSS received information from the Collier County, FL Code Enforcement Bureau (CEB) that [REDACTED] confronted a CEB investigator on official business and used his position as a USSS SA to influence his investigation. [REDACTED] also stated that in 2006 he met with Collier County Sheriff's Office (CCSO) officials on multiple occasions who advised him that [REDACTED] was observed by CCSO investigators socializing with subjects believed to be involved with organized criminal groups, frequenting, and possibly working at night clubs owned and operated by Eastern European suspects. [REDACTED] advised that he was informed by CCSO officials that [REDACTED] was determined to have a close relationship with a CCSO deputy who was under investigation, and was subsequently removed from the CCSO. CCSO investigators also believed that [REDACTED] may have identified undercover investigators to night club staff. [REDACTED] stated that he confronted [REDACTED] with these allegations in 2007 and found [REDACTED] explanations to be credible. [REDACTED] stated that he prepared a report detailing these events and forwarded it to USSS Headquarters for further action. [REDACTED] said he never received any response to the report. (Exhibit 2)

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Miami Field Office | Original |
| Title: Special Agent | Date: 2/26/2013 | Headquarters | 1 cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) USSS | 1 cc |
| Name: David C. Nieland | Signature: [Signature] | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 3/20/13 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

The DHS OIG interviewed ██████ Resident Agent In Charge (RAIC), DHS, USSS, Ft. Myers, FL regarding ██████ ██████ stated that he arrived in the Ft. Myers office after ██████ was transferred to Washington, DC. ██████ stated that in January 2011 he met with, and received additional information from CCSO regarding ██████ which he detailed in a report and forwarded to SAIC ██████ According to CCSO, in May 2010, investigators unsuccessfully attempted to serve an arrest warrant on a suspect who investigators believe was an associate of ██████ who was involved with an Albanian organized criminal group. This suspect fled the U.S. days after this arrest attempt. Investigators later learned that ██████ had numerous telephone contacts with the suspect within hours after the arrest attempt, prior to the suspect's departure from the U.S. ██████ also had telephone contact with other suspects and CCSO deputies during this time. (Exhibit 3)

The DHS OIG met with officials from the CCSO who provided an overview, including reports, surveillance video, and transcripts of consensually monitored non-telephonic conversations, of the information that was previously reported by SAIC ██████ and RAIC ██████ These items are maintained in the case file. (Exhibit 4)

On February 12, 2013, prior to interviewing ██████ the DHS OIG decided to return/refer this investigative matter back to the USSS Inspection Division (ISP) for further investigation. (Exhibit5)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|---|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity, Opening Document, dated September 11, 2012. |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 13, 2012. |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview of [REDACTED] dated November 14, 2012. |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, Meeting with CCSO, dated November 15, 2012. |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, Other – Investigative Referral/Return to USSS, dated February 12, 2013. |

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


OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

September 26, 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Janet Napolitano
Secretary

FROM: Charles Edwards
Acting Inspector General 

SUBJECT: United States Secret Service Cartagena Review-Phase One
United States Secret Service
Washington, DC

CASE NUMBER: I12-USSS-OSI-00800

Attached is our Report of Investigation (ROI) on the above subject.

The ROI is furnished for whatever action you consider appropriate and no reply is necessary. However, should you take any action in response to our ROI, please inform this office so that we can update our records. Please destroy the ROI upon disposition of this matter.

Should you have any questions regarding the contents of the ROI or need additional information, you may contact me at (202) 254-, or my Assistant Inspector General for Investigations (AIGI), John E. Dupuy at (202) 254-.

Attachment

**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I12-USSS-OSI-00800

USSS Cartagena Review



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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

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Executive Summary

Independent Review of the Cartagena, Colombia Incident Involving United States Secret Service Employees

Synopsis

In response to a joint request by Senators Lieberman and Collins to conduct an independent inquiry into alleged misconduct of United States Secret Service (USSS) employees around the time of the President's April 2012 trip to Cartagena, Colombia, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Investigations, initiated an investigation. The President travelled to Cartagena to attend the Summit of the Americas.

The objectives of our investigation were (1) to determine the details of the incident in Cartagena, and (2) to assess USSS' cooperation with our investigation. This report contains the results of our investigation into the details of the incident in Cartagena.

As part of our investigation of misconduct reported prior to the President's April 2012 visit to Cartagena, we interviewed or attempted to interview 251 USSS personnel. Based on our interviews and review of records, we identified 13 USSS employees who had personal encounters with female Colombian nationals consistent with the misconduct reported. We determined that one of the female Colombian nationals involved in the incident was known to the Intelligence Community. However, we found no evidence that the actions of USSS personnel had compromised any sensitive information.

While the scope of the investigation was limited to the conduct of DHS personnel in Cartagena, we did obtain hotel records that suggested female foreign nationals signed in as guests to rooms registered to one White House Communications Agency employee (an officer with the Department of Defense) and one reported member of the White House staff and/or advance team. We did not interview the two non-DHS employees.

During our investigation, we attempted but were not able to interview the female Colombian nationals involved in the incident. Nor were we able to obtain records for 14 of the 15 hotels used by official U.S. Government personnel to determine whether similar misconduct occurred during the time USSS personnel were in Cartagena, between April 1st and April 17, 2012. We made an official Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request from the Department of Justice so we could interview the female Colombian nationals and secure other investigative records.

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However, the Department of Justice declined our request because the information was sought for a Congressional proceeding rather than a U.S. criminal matter.

Details

Methodology

Upon initiating our investigation, we independently identified USSS personnel who directly supported the Cartagena visit and other potential witnesses who may have had information regarding the Cartagena trip. We identified the personnel directly involved in the incident, as well as the potential witnesses, through documentary sources including official travel records, hotel registries, country clearance cables, personnel assignments, and USSS and U.S. Embassy records.

Of the 251 USSS employees we interviewed or attempted to interview, 32 employees declined to answer our questions. Of these 32 employees, 10 were senior level managers or senior executives; and 22 were special agents or inspectors. Before conducting an interview, we informed employees that our investigation was separate and distinct from the investigation conducted by the USSS Office of Professional Responsibility.¹ In addition, depending on the USSS employee interviewed, we generally asked them to read and sign an Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity) form, stating that participation in the interview was voluntary, or Advice of Rights (Kalkines) form, stating that participation in the interview was non-voluntary. In addition, we asked employees to sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement. Twenty-two of the 219 USSS employees who were interviewed did not sign an Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity or Kalkines) form and/or Non-Disclosure Agreement, but still agreed to be voluntarily interviewed.

We also attempted to interview eight additional current and former employees regarding issues related to the USSS personnel in Cartagena, but were unable to contact them.

Results of Interviews and Review of Records

Based on our interviews and review of records, we identified 13 USSS employees who had personal encounters with female Colombian nationals consistent with the misconduct reported

¹ On May 30, 2012, OIG consulted with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) after preliminary reports indicated that the USSS Office of Professional Responsibility did not provide any employee rights advisements during interviews conducted as part of its investigation of this incident. By not providing such advisements, the office may have potentially "tainted" information obtained during, or as a result of, these interviews. After consulting with DOJ, we decided to conduct new interviews to ensure that our information was obtained voluntarily, and therefore, would be usable in any potential criminal or administrative proceeding.

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Department of Homeland Security

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in April 2012, around the time of advance activities for the President's visit to Cartagena. These encounters took place at the Hotel Caribe, the Hilton Cartagena Hotel and at a private residence.

Our investigation determined that 12 of the 13 USSS employees met 13 female Colombian nationals at bars or clubs and returned with them to their rooms at the Hotel Caribe or the Hilton Cartagena Hotel. In addition, one USSS employee met a female Colombian national at a private residence; we attempted to interview this employee but he refused. We interviewed the remaining 12 USSS employees who had personal encounters with the 13 female Colombian nationals. Through our interviews, we learned that following their encounters, 3 females left the rooms without asking for money, 5 females asked for money and were paid, and 4 females asked for money but were not paid. In addition, one female, who asked to be paid but was not, brought a Colombian police officer to the door of the USSS employee's room; the employee did not answer the door. As a result, she was paid by another USSS employee and left.

During our investigation, USSS personnel alleged that a White House Communications Agency employee (an officer with the Department of Defense) and one reported member of the White House staff and/or advance team had personal encounters with female Colombian nationals. We reviewed the registry from the Hilton Cartagena Hotel for this time period, which showed names of two people who we identified as the non-DHS employees associated with the White House, registered in two separate rooms. The names of three females were listed as visitors to these two rooms during the advance activities for the President's visit. We did not interview the two non-DHS employees.

We also reviewed travel vouchers from Cartagena submitted by 7 of the 13 USSS employees who had personal encounters with female Colombian nationals consistent with the misconduct reported. We found no evidence of any claims for reimbursement for overnight guest fees, a fee charged by the hotels for the female Colombian nationals who visited the 12 USSS employees. The remaining 6 USSS employees did not submit travel vouchers.

During our interviews, we asked USSS employees whether they were aware of incidents similar to those that occurred in Cartagena and whether they thought this incident was indicative of larger organizational or cultural issues within the USSS. One hundred twenty-three interviewees believed the incident was an anomaly, 5 said the underlying organizational culture played a role, and 11 relayed knowledge of similar misconduct occurring on other occasions.

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Department of Homeland Security

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National Security

As part of our investigation, we identified 16 female Colombian nationals involved in the incident; we could not identify the name of the female Colombian national involved in the incident at a private residence. We queried the Intelligence Community to determine whether these 16 females were connected to criminal or terrorist organizations. Two of the females' names had associated derogatory information, which is classified; however, just one could be supported. The other was vetted and found not to be the foreign national in question.

During our interviews, no USSS personnel reported any potential loss or disclosure of national security information or any specified threat to the President directly related to the Cartagena incident. More specifically, we found no evidence that the actions of USSS personnel had potentially compromised any sensitive information.

Reporting of Contact with Foreign Nationals

As part of our investigation, we reviewed USSS reports of contact with foreign nationals dated between December 16, 2008 and June 15, 2012, to determine whether contact with foreign nationals had been reported and documented as required² and to identify any contacts with foreign nationals similar to that in Cartagena. We found that 105 reports of contact with foreign nationals had been filed by USSS personnel before the Cartagena incident. Following the Cartagena incident and a subsequent reported change in USSS policy, 423 new reports of contact with foreign nationals were filed for contacts dating back to 1976. Of the 423, one report was filed for the Cartagena trip.

² Director of Central Intelligence Directive, *DCI Directive No. 6/4, Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)* dated July 2, 1998 and *Security Awareness and Reporting of Foreign Contacts Presidential Decision Directive PDD/NSC-12*, dated August 5, 1993 contain requirements for reporting contact with foreign nationals.

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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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|------------------------------|--|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | II2-USSS-OSI-00800 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | USSS Cartagena Review United States Secret Service (USSS) Washington, D.C. |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final- Phase One |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | Independent Review of Cartagena, Colombia Incident |

SYNOPSIS

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation on May 23, 2012, based upon a Congressional request that OIG conduct an independent inquiry into the alleged misconduct of United States Secret Service (USSS) employees associated with the President's trip to Cartagena, Colombia in April 2012. During the inquiry, OIG also received reports that USSS employees had engaged in similar misconduct on other occasions and reports of broader organizational issues within the USSS.

OIG interviewed or attempted to interview 251 USSS personnel associated with the President's trip to Cartagena, totaling 283 interviews. Before questioning these employees, OIG advised them that our investigation was completely separate from the investigation previously conducted by the USSS, Office of Professional Responsibility. In addition, depending on the USSS employee interviewed, we generally asked them to read and sign an Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity) form, stating that participation in the interview was voluntary, or Advice of Rights (Kalkines) form, stating that participation in the interview was non-voluntary. Of the 251 personnel, 32 employees declined to participate in a voluntary interview and to answer our questions. Of these 32 employees, 10 were senior level managers or senior executives; and 22 were special agents or inspectors. Twenty-two of the 219 USSS employees who participated did not sign an Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity or Kalkines) form and/or Non-Disclosure Agreement, but still agreed to be voluntarily interviewed.

Based on interviews and review of records, OIG identified 13 USSS employees who had personal encounters with female Colombian nationals consistent with the misconduct reported. A 14th USSS

| <i>Reporting Agent</i> | | <i>Distribution:</i> | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | OSI | Original |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge- Miami | Date: [REDACTED] 09/26/2012 | Headquarters | cc |
| <i>Approving Official</i> | | Component(s) | cc |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge- OSI | Date: [REDACTED] 09/26/2012 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

employee who was initially identified by the USSS as involved in misconduct was subsequently determined by USSS and OIG to have been misidentified.

While the scope of the investigation was limited to the conduct of DHS personnel in Cartagena, OIG did obtain hotel records that suggested female foreign nationals signed in as guests to rooms registered to one White House Communications Agency employee (an officer with the Department of Defense) and one reported member of the White House staff and/or advance team. We did not interview the two non-DHS employees.

OIG identified 16 female Colombian nationals involved in the incident; OIG could not identify the name of the female Colombian national involved in the incident at a private residence. OIG queried the IC as to whether these 16 females were connected to criminal or terrorist organizations. Two of the females' names had associated derogatory information, which is classified; however, just one could be supported, the other was vetted and found not to be the foreign national in question.

OIG made an official Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request from the Department of Justice so we could interview the female Colombian nationals and secure other investigative records. However, the Department of Justice declined our request because the information was sought for a Congressional proceeding rather than a U.S. criminal matter.

Our investigation developed no evidence to suggest that the actions of USSS personnel in Cartagena had potentially comprised the safety and security of the President or any sensitive information during this trip.

Other Allegations Reported:

Evidence obtained during this investigation suggested USSS officials reportedly knew of the IC interest in one female foreign national (FFN), but apparently never reported this information to the OIG or to the Congress until after OIG became aware of this issue during our investigation. The OIG has initiated another investigation, which will be conducted and reported separately.

Certain USSS employees interviewed also reported organizational issues and specific misconduct allegations that have been either referred to OIG Inspections Division or are under OIG review as independent investigative matters. OIG confirmed incidents of prostitution solicitation during official visits in two other foreign countries, El Salvador and Panama.

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DETAILS

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation on May 23, 2012, based upon a Congressional request that OIG conduct an independent inquiry into the alleged misconduct of United States Secret Service (USSS) employees associated with the President's trip to Cartagena, Colombia, in April 2012. Specifically, OIG was asked to determine whether USSS employees had engaged in similar misconduct on other occasions and whether this incident was indicative of broader organizational issues within the USSS.¹ The OIG Office of Investigations (INV) was tasked with the initial phase which included the re-investigation of the Cartagena incident.

On May 30, 2012, the OIG consulted with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) after USSS employees reported that the USSS Office of Professional Responsibility (RES) did not provide USSS personnel with any employee rights advisements during the interviews conducted as part of their investigation of this incident. After consulting with the DOJ, OIG decided that the OIG would conduct an entirely new investigation to ensure that the information OIG obtained during our interviews was obtained voluntarily and therefore useable in any potential criminal or administrative proceeding.²

Allegation 1: U.S. Secret Service and other official personnel allegedly solicited prostitutes in Cartagena, Colombia, while on official government travel.

When OIG initiated our investigation, OIG independently identified both the USSS personnel who had supported the Cartagena visit and other potential witnesses in the position to have information or insight regarding the Cartagena trip. These individuals were identified through documentary sources, to include: official travel records, hotel registries, country clearance cables, foreign personnel assignments, USSS and U.S. Embassy records, etc.³

Based upon our review of these documentary sources, OIG identified and conducted 283 interviews of 251 related USSS personnel. Depending on the USSS employee interviewed, we generally asked them to read and sign an Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity) form, stating that participation in the interview was voluntary, or Advice of Rights (Kalkines) form, stating that participation in the interview was non-voluntary. OIG generally provided each interviewee with their Advice of Rights and a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA), and notified them that our investigation was completely

¹ (Exhibit # 1, 365, 366)

² (Exhibit # 3)

³ (Exhibits # 2, 5, 10, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 365)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

separate and distinct from the previous USSS RES investigation of the matter. Some personnel OIG interviewed declined to sign the Rights and NDA forms OIG presented to them, but still agreed to be voluntarily interviewed. Of the 251 personnel, 32 employees declined to participate in a voluntary interview and to answer our questions. Of these 32 employees, 10 were senior level managers or senior executives; and 22 were special agents or inspectors. Despite repeated efforts, OIG was unable to establish contact with eight USSS employees in request for voluntary interviews who OIG had identified as potentially having information relevant to our investigation.⁴

Based on our interviews and review of records, OIG identified 13 USSS employees who had personal encounters with female Colombian nationals consistent with the misconduct reported in April 2012, around the time of advance activities for the President's visit to Cartagena. These encounters took place at the Hotel Caribe, the Hilton Cartagena Hotel and in a private residence.⁵

Our investigation determined that 12 of the 13 USSS employees met 13 female Colombian nationals at bars or clubs and returned with them to their rooms at the Hotel Caribe, and the Hilton Cartagena Hotel. In addition, one USSS employee met a female Colombian national at a private residence; OIG attempted to interview this employee but he refused. OIG interviewed 12 USSS employees who had personal encounters with the 13 female Colombian nationals. The final USSS employee failed to appear for an interview despite being compelled to do so. Through our interviews, OIG learned that following their encounters, 3 females left the rooms without asking for money, 5 females asked for money and were paid, and 4 females asked for money but were not paid. In addition, one female, who asked to be paid but was not, brought a Colombian police officer to the door of the USSS employee's room; the employee did not answer the door. As a result, she was paid by another USSS employee and left. A 14th USSS employee who was initially identified by the USSS as involved in misconduct was subsequently determined by USSS and OIG to have been misidentified.

Employee #1- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, Washington, D.C. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised the interview was compelled, and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the "Warnings and Assurance to Employee Required to Provide Information" (Kalkines), which he signed. Additionally, prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

⁴ (Exhibits # 75, 83, 88, 92, 102, 104, 105, 109, 111, 113, 120, 144, 149, 153, 163, 171, 173, 176, 177, 181, 213, 218, 219, 258, 259, 260, 263, 270, 280, 282, 288, 301, 365)

⁵ (Exhibits # 365, 366)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

[REDACTED] was in Cartagena, Colombia as part of the advance team in preparation for the Presidential visit to Colombia. He [REDACTED] a cargo plane carrying approximately [REDACTED] 7E [REDACTED]. The cargo plane arrived in Cartagena at approximately 2:00 a.m. on [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012. There were a total of [REDACTED] cargo planes [REDACTED] was delayed due to mechanical problems and the SAs in the [REDACTED] cargo plane in Colombia were required to immediately report for duty [REDACTED] the SAs who had arrived in Colombia [REDACTED] at the Hotel Caribe so that they could pick up their diplomatic passports and credentials [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] spoke to [REDACTED], USSS, Washington, D.C, regarding what time they should meet for dinner, and they agreed to meet at [REDACTED] at the hotel lobby. When they met at the lobby there were approximately [REDACTED] USSS SAs who were going to join them for dinner. An unknown USSS SA in the group either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and he suggested a restaurant for dinner. They departed as a group to the unknown restaurant. After their meal, the group decided to go to a bar [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had approximately [REDACTED] drinks each, and [REDACTED] decided that they wanted to go " [REDACTED] " at [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] agreed that they would [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in an effort not to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] They [REDACTED] outside of the bar and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] told him that he was taking them to " [REDACTED] " was unable to verify the name of the club when they arrived.

When they arrived, the bouncer escorted them into the club and they sat at a table inside of the club. The club [REDACTED] [REDACTED] females introduced themselves to [REDACTED] individually. [REDACTED] of the females sat down at their table and asked if [REDACTED] could buy them drinks and they agreed. [REDACTED] he approached another female named [REDACTED] Last Name Unknown and started talking to her. It seemed to [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] " [REDACTED] ?" [REDACTED] stated that it would cost the equivalent of \$100 U.S. dollars. [REDACTED] tried negotiating with [REDACTED] for a better price; however she stated she had already given him a good price and that the price was not negotiable. [REDACTED] then stated to [REDACTED] that he would also need to pay a tax. [REDACTED] was having problems understanding her Spanish at that point and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that if he wanted to take her out of the club he would have to pay [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] of the tax and they both agreed to take the women back to their hotel. [REDACTED] paid approximately [REDACTED] the \$100 he negotiated with the female. The females [REDACTED] along with the [REDACTED] females departed the club [REDACTED] arrived at the Hotel Caribe. [REDACTED] he feared that the club could have had cameras and he would be vulnerable to blackmail if he were recorded having sex with her at the club.

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Once at the hotel, the females approached the hotel counter and signed a form. They gave the hotel employee their identification cards (IDs). [REDACTED] signed them in and [REDACTED] did not recall seeing a clause in the form stating that all guests had to depart the hotel by 6 a.m. the next day. [REDACTED] had to pay a \$20 fee to the hotel so that they would be able to take the females to their room. After they finished signing the females in, [REDACTED] departed ways and went to their respective rooms with their prostitutes. [REDACTED] stated that he and [REDACTED] had sex in his hotel room. She wanted to stay the night and [REDACTED] asked her whether she would charge an additional fee if she did. She stated no. At approximately [REDACTED] while they were sleeping, [REDACTED] escorted her to the lobby of the hotel and gave her money for a cab and she departed the hotel. [REDACTED] did not tell [REDACTED] why he was in Cartagena, nor did he tell her that he was a USSS SA. He did not release any classified or sensitive information to the prostitute. The only other USSS employee who solicited prostitutes that he knew of was [REDACTED]. He was not aware of any other U.S. government employees that were involved. When asked why there were so many USSS employees involved that were not aware of each other he stated that considering how much USSS SAs travel, they learn what is permissible and legal in certain locations overseas and what is not.

The USSS had an initial briefing [REDACTED] at approximately [REDACTED]. No mention of prostitutes was made during the briefing, but [REDACTED] remarked that [REDACTED] before the briefing and [REDACTED]. In retrospect, he believed that [REDACTED] may have already known about the prostitutes before the briefing and [REDACTED] due to the fact that they were [REDACTED].

At approximately [REDACTED] were emailed by [REDACTED], USSS, and told to report to [REDACTED]. They were not told the nature of the meeting. Before they arrived at the hotel for the meeting with [REDACTED] they made an agreement between themselves. If [REDACTED] asked them regarding their behavior the previous night they would respond that they met some women that night and took them home. [REDACTED] was concerned about answering [REDACTED] questions regarding the previous night due to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. When they arrived at the hotel they asked [REDACTED] what was going on and [REDACTED] stated that a "[REDACTED] guy had messed up." [REDACTED] then believed that they were being called [REDACTED] to discuss the "[REDACTED] guy."

[REDACTED] was interviewed by [REDACTED] regarding his involvement with prostitutes in Cartagena. [REDACTED] impression was that the interview was not voluntary, and he felt that if he did not answer [REDACTED] questions he would be found to be insubordinate by the USSS. [REDACTED] was not administered any rights during his interview with [REDACTED] also stated at the beginning of the interview something to the effect of "[REDACTED]." [REDACTED] stated he answered the questions truthfully and the interview was concluded.

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At approximately [REDACTED] received another email that they needed to report again to [REDACTED] reported to the hotel and [REDACTED], later identified by the OIG as a [REDACTED], came out of [REDACTED] and told them [REDACTED] told them they could return to their hotel. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] if he would be able to [REDACTED] not to take any prostitutes back to their hotels. [REDACTED] stated to [REDACTED] " [REDACTED] email and advised the USSS personnel [REDACTED] that they should not take prostitutes back to their hotel rooms.

[REDACTED] and the other USSS employees who solicited prostitutes were sent home, and he was notified by [REDACTED] that he needed to report to USSS Office of Professional Responsibility (RES) on [REDACTED] 2012 for an interview. [REDACTED] was also notified to report to the interview on the same day. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] if he needed to [REDACTED]. At that point, [REDACTED] believed that he was going to be removed from duty temporarily as punishment. [REDACTED] was interviewed by SA [REDACTED] and another unknown SA. [REDACTED] asked the SAs if he [REDACTED] brought out a form which stated he was being compelled to speak to the SAs. The form did not say Kalkines nor did it explicitly state that he was not going to be prosecuted criminally. [REDACTED] why the form did not state that, [REDACTED] since the form stated the interview was related to an administrative action criminal immunity was implied. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that if [REDACTED] tone and body language implied that [REDACTED] if he did not cooperate. [REDACTED] decided to cooperate [REDACTED] felt compelled and he felt like he was in a custodial interview. He felt that if he talked to the SAs he would not be criminally prosecuted by the USSS. The SAs did not address [REDACTED] during the interview. [REDACTED] stated he answered their questions truthfully and [REDACTED] told him that he could tell that [REDACTED] was telling the truth during the interview. They asked him if the female knew who [REDACTED] was and he stated she did not. They did not ask any questions regarding the release of sensitive information to the prostitute. They [REDACTED] also stated to the SAs that [REDACTED].

[Agent's Note: The OIG determined that the "Do Not Admit" list was a notice that is disseminated to all USSS personnel when USSS employees were placed on administrative leave for an issue. The notice advised USSS personnel not to admit an individual to USSS property and was a method of sharing information with all employees.]

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█████ stated that to his knowledge, none of the USSS personnel involved in the Cartagena incident had been put on a "Do Not Admit" list. █████ believed the reason they were not put on a "Do Not Admit" list was because the USSS did not consider them a security risk. He also believed that USSS personnel who were well-connected were not put on the list due to their connections. [Agent's Note: The OIG later determined some personnel involved in Cartagena had been placed on the "Do Not Admit list" and disseminated to all USSS employees.]

█████ was contacted to report to the USSS Headquarters on ██████████. ██████ reported to Headquarters and was taken to a room where ██████████ were seated. ██████ stated to ██████████ that they had ██████████ and that ██████████ "██████████". ██████ added, that they "██████████" the matter. ██████ picked up a piece of paper ██████████. ██████████ The paper was ██████████. ██████████ copies of newspaper articles detailing the press coverage of the incident. At that time, ██████████ asked ██████████ if he had given ██████████ the form yet. ██████ then stated, "██████████" went into the hallway and spoke to ██████████ with the door closed. ██████████ told them ██████████ they should go ahead with any action that they felt they needed to take ██████████. The USSS was ██████████. ██████████ to his knowledge; however, ██████████ was placed on administrative leave. He still had the form and would be able to provide it to DHS OIG ██████████. ██████████ advised ██████████ that he was still a USSS employee and that he needed to report to the USSS if they contacted him.

On or about ██████████ 2012, ██████████ was called to USSS headquarters. ██████████ gave ██████████ a ██████████ form for his signature. He asked ██████████ was voluntary and they stated it was. ██████████ stated to them, "██████████".

On ██████████ 2012, two notices were sent by USSS to ██████████, stating that the USSS was in the process of revoking ██████████ security clearance and that the USSS was ██████████ ██████████ pending the outcome of the USSS ██████████. ██████████ was told that some time in the future ██████████ ██████████ felt ██████████ was being used as punishment unfairly because there was no ██████████. Despite the fact that OIG was conducting an independent investigation, the USSS was still conducting personnel actions without knowledge of the outcome of the DHS OIG investigation. ██████████ stated that action was not done to the other USSS personnel involved with the Cartagena incident and ██████████ being used as scapegoats by the USSS. ██████████ also stated

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there were also criminal leaks within the USSS because [REDACTED]

Employee # 2- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] USSS, Washington, D.C. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised the interview was compelled and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the Advice of Rights (Kalkines), which he signed. Additionally, prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] stated he arrived in Cartagena, Colombia on April [REDACTED] 2012. Later in the day on April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] at the Caribe hotel in Cartagena, Colombia. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] told him that [REDACTED] prostitution was legal in Colombia.

[REDACTED] was [REDACTED]; however, [REDACTED] decided to accompany [REDACTED]. That evening [REDACTED] took a taxi to [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] could not remember the name of the establishment. [REDACTED] patronized exclusively by Caucasian males, who he believed to be mostly USSS and United States military personnel. [REDACTED] stated he did not know the other USSS personnel or if any White House staff was at [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] sat at a table [REDACTED] in order to [REDACTED] because [REDACTED]. At some point during their visit at the establishment, [REDACTED] each began conversations with females, purchased drinks for the females, and asked the females whether they were interested in going back to the hotel with them. The female [REDACTED] was talking to was named [REDACTED] Last Name Unknown (LNU).

[REDACTED] paid [REDACTED] of 150,000 pesos to the establishment; [REDACTED] paid a 200,000 pesos fee for his prostitute to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] paid a total of 400,000 pesos for his prostitute to [REDACTED], which allowed the females to leave the establishment with them. [REDACTED], and the [REDACTED] prostitutes then left the strip club [REDACTED] to the Hotel Caribe. When they walked into the hotel lobby the prostitutes gave the hotel clerk their identification and they signed a form. [REDACTED] believed the hotel charged a fee for extra occupants in the rooms and the form was so [REDACTED] could be charged the extra occupancy fee. [REDACTED] believed the hotel

⁶ (Exhibits # 123, 365, 366)

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was complicit in prostitution activities. Once the hotel forms had been signed [REDACTED] and his prostitute went to [REDACTED] room and [REDACTED] and his prostitute went to [REDACTED] room.

[REDACTED] and the prostitute engaged in sexual activities. [REDACTED] LNU spent the night with [REDACTED] and she left the next morning at approximately [REDACTED]. When she left, [REDACTED] gave her approximately 20,000 pesos so she could catch a taxi.

On April [REDACTED], 2012, at approximately [REDACTED] he attended a briefing. Right before the briefing began, [REDACTED], USSS, Miami, FL, whom [REDACTED] noticed [REDACTED] did not understand [REDACTED] behavior at that time.

After the briefing [REDACTED] were paged and it was at that point [REDACTED] knew something was amiss. [REDACTED] was interviewed by [REDACTED] in Cartagena, Colombia, after the briefing. [REDACTED] was not administered any rights during that interview. [REDACTED] impression was that the interview was compelled, and that failure to submit to the interview would result in his probable termination.

[REDACTED] began the interview with [REDACTED] stating there had been speculation that USSS agents had solicited prostitutes and that her team was in the process of reviewing hotel video recordings. She added that she was going to brief the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia about the incident.

[REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that she was going to conduct his interview because of [REDACTED] as a [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was asked to recount the events of April [REDACTED], 2012.

[REDACTED] stated he was asked whether he had secured sensitive or classified documents while he was with the Colombian prostitute on April [REDACTED], 2012. [REDACTED] was not asked whether he had disclosed classified information to the prostitute or whether he knew if she had a criminal background; however, [REDACTED] told USSS investigators he had secured all sensitive or classified documents [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated he was interviewed again on [REDACTED] 2012, in Washington, D.C, by [REDACTED] USSS, Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] was read an administrative warning during that interview.

[REDACTED] stated he was told during that interview there would be no "criminal effect" to the interview and he understood that to mean it was administrative in nature. [REDACTED] impression was that the interview was not voluntary, that it was compelled, and that failure to submit to the interview would result in adverse action against him.

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[REDACTED] stated that prior to the [REDACTED] interview on [REDACTED], 2012, [REDACTED] received a telephone call from [REDACTED], USSS, Washington, D.C, in which [REDACTED]. Also prior to the interview, [REDACTED] briefly spoke to [REDACTED], who stated to [REDACTED] that [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] stated he had been completely forthcoming during [REDACTED] and after [REDACTED] interview, nothing was promised to [REDACTED] concerning punishment. At some point after [REDACTED] interview, [REDACTED] spoke to [REDACTED], USSS, Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED], and that [REDACTED] had heard from many people that [REDACTED] had been very honest about the Cartagena incident, and that [REDACTED] punishment for his participation in the Cartagena incident.

[REDACTED] stated that he later asked [REDACTED], another USSS agent who had worked in [REDACTED], why [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] stated he was instructed to meet with [REDACTED] USSS, Washington, D.C, on [REDACTED], 2012. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] he had been [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] had been truthful and honest. [REDACTED] handed [REDACTED] a prepared statement which contained language that [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] "[REDACTED]" [REDACTED] then told [REDACTED] "[REDACTED]" [REDACTED], which was within 48 hours of returning from Cartagena, Colombia.

On [REDACTED], 2012, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] received a telephone call from [REDACTED] USSS, Washington, D.C, during which [REDACTED] instructed [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] was to appear at USSS Headquarters for an administrative interview. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] stated he presented himself for [REDACTED] interview on [REDACTED] 2012, at USSS Headquarters and that [REDACTED] conducted the interview. Upon arriving at the interview [REDACTED] was read his Garrity Warnings and was told the interview was voluntary. At that point, he realized the interview was not administrative as they had told [REDACTED].

During that interview [REDACTED] was asked whether he would be willing to submit to a polygraph examination [REDACTED] the statements he made during that interview were memorialized in the form of a sworn statement. [REDACTED] stated that this interview focused on [REDACTED].

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[REDACTED] in which [REDACTED] alleged sexual encounters [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated he was allowed to [REDACTED] prior to [REDACTED] and that he felt coerced to sign [REDACTED] provided to him by [REDACTED] felt he was supposed to be given due process when [REDACTED] and that opportunity was not afforded to him since [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] suspected there was a leak within USSS top management because [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated he felt the focus of the investigation by USSS was to get the perpetrators to resign in order for the Director to save face, not to obtain the facts about what happened in Cartagena.

[REDACTED] also admitted to the OIG that [REDACTED]

Employee # 3- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] Field Office [REDACTED]. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which he signed and agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," [REDACTED] at the advice of his attorney. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] began working for the USSS on [REDACTED] and was assigned to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated he was assigned on the trip to Cartagena, Colombia in April of 2012. [REDACTED] was assigned to be [REDACTED]. Prior to leaving for Cartagena, Colombia, [REDACTED] stated he received emails from Protective Operations detailing the information for the trip and also sent and received emails from [REDACTED] talking about the trip. [REDACTED] a USSS SA assigned to Cartagena, Colombia. [REDACTED] stated he did not have the emails because he was placed on administrative leave on [REDACTED], 2012, and had to turn in all his government issued property so he no longer had access to his laptop or government email account.

[REDACTED] stated he arrived in Cartagena, Colombia on April [REDACTED] 2012, and stayed at the Hotel Caribe. After checking in, [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] all [REDACTED]. After [REDACTED] of them went [REDACTED]. Once

⁷ (Exhibits # 26, 365, 366)

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██████████, they returned to the Hotel Caribe ██████████ stated he ██████████ before ██████████.

██████████ stated ██████████ decided to eat at ██████████ restaurant and then head to a nightclub. ██████████ did not recall the name of the restaurant and nightclub. While at the nightclub, ██████████ began talking to ██████████ females that were standing around him. The ██████████ females spoke broken English. As the night progressed, ██████████ decided to leave the nightclub and go back to his hotel room. ██████████ along with ██████████ and the ██████████ females left the nightclub and went back to Hotel Caribe.

When ██████████ and the ██████████ females arrived at Hotel Caribe, ██████████ went their separate ways. ██████████ went his way with ██████████ females and ██████████ signed in ██████████ females who went with him to his room. ██████████ stated the front desk hotel attendant told him there was a fee for guests, so ██████████ paid the fee to the hotel attendant.

██████████ stated when they got to the room he put on some music and ██████████ continued socializing. The females began soliciting ██████████ for sexual services and ██████████ responded by telling the ladies he was not interested in that kind of service. ██████████ stated he then escorted ██████████ out of the hotel and went back to his room and fell asleep. ██████████ stated he did not know ██████████ were prostitutes but as soon as he realized it, he let ██████████ know he was not interested in doing business with them. ██████████ stated ██████████ were not disappointed with him, did not cause a scene or make any accusations against him to the local authorities. ██████████ stated he did not engage in sexual relations in exchange for money, nor was he involved in illicit behavior during the Cartagena, Colombia assignment.

On April ██████████ 2012, ██████████ received an email instructing him to report to the hotel where the President was staying for an interview at ██████████ arrived and met with ██████████ ██████████ was not given any type of warnings prior to this informal interview. ██████████ was advised that he was being interviewed because he had signed in ██████████ to his room. ██████████ explained what happened in his hotel room then left the interview. Fifteen minutes later, ██████████ was notified that he would be departing Colombia to go back to his Field Office.

On April ██████████ 2012, ██████████ arrived in ██████████ and was approached by the ██████████ ██████████ of the USSS ██████████ Field Office and was told he would be interviewed by USSS Inspectors the following day in Washington D.C.

On April ██████████ 2012, ██████████ met with USSS Inspectors and was interviewed. ██████████ did not recall if he was given any type of warnings prior to this interview. ██████████ provided a written statement. ██████████ stated he was willing ██████████ on that written statement. ██████████ was then told he was being placed on administrative leave. ██████████ took his badge and gun and told ██████████ that if

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also stated

On April 2012, met with and , USSS. advised he had two options, to resign or be removed from the agency. advised he was since he had so they would also advised that if SF-50 personnel action would reflect but told he may still lose his security clearance in the process. continued by stating that could and departed the field office.

Approximately later, called and asked to come in returned to the and met with who also wanted to was present and told that the two options he gave earlier was an "oversight" by as well. the met with and determined at that time and should

On April 2012, sent an email to USSS management stating so he . Later that day, was asked to come to the USSS . When he arrived, was asked by to submit to a drug screen. After passing the drug test, advised that he was willing . provided the OIG with a copy of this email.

On April 2012, was scheduled to take a polygraph test at was administered the Basic National Security Polygraph examination . The exam ended at approximately was told by the polygrapher, " .” Following this examination, the USSS Inspectors requested which was to focus on his original written statement provided by regarding payment for sex. agreed to which started at approximately and ended at . The inspectors advised that and there was nothing to hide.

On April 2012, met with told he had two options, resign or have his clearance revoked. realized by losing his clearance, he would not be able to work for the USSS because there was no position in that agency that would allow someone to be employed without a clearance. stated he gave in to the pressure and submitted his resignation effective has

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

█████ stated he had heard rumors of other USSS SAs engaging in activity with prostitutes in Cartagena, Colombia. Specifically ██████ heard USSS ██████ refused to pay a prostitute for services rendered and that a third USSS ██████ had attended ██████ where he paid for prostitution services ██████

Employee # 4- ██████

The OIG interviewed ██████, USSS, ██████. Prior to questioning, ██████ was advised the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. ██████ was also administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which he signed and agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, after questioning, ██████ was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. ██████ provided the following information in substance:

█████ started with USSS in ██████ and was assigned to ██████. He was assigned to ██████. Despite the fact that he is assigned to ██████, he estimated he spends approximately ██████ percent of his time working protection for the President, Vice President, and foreign dignitaries. ██████ traveled on ██████ traveled internationally for protection details ██████. He had never been disciplined until April ██████ 2012, when he was placed on administrated leave. ██████ stated he never solicited a prostitute or engaged in illegal activity while employed by USSS.

On ██████ 2012, ██████ was notified that he would be traveling to Cartagena and assigned ██████. On April ██████ 2012, ██████ flew to Cartagena and checked into the El Caribe Hotel. ██████ was assigned ██████, along with ██████, USSS ██████, Field Office, ██████, and other SA's whose names ██████ could not remember. ██████ team leaders were ██████ worked with a number of other USSS SAs that were assigned to other teams, who he recognized but did not know their names. He also worked with a few U.S. military members who were assigned as ██████, but he did not know their names either.

On April ██████ 2012, ██████, so he went to ██████ where ██████. About ██████ went to ██████ with ██████ individuals whose names he could not remember, where they had dinner. ██████ could not remember the name of the restaurant. ██████ stated he had ██████ drinks at dinner. During the dinner, ██████. After they paid, ██████

⁸ (Exhibits # 82, 365, 366)

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led them to a club [REDACTED] the restaurant. [REDACTED] could not remember the name of the club, but said they arrived about [REDACTED]

While at the club, the group danced with women and bought them drinks. All of the drinks [REDACTED], although [REDACTED] cover his portion of the tab. [REDACTED] did not have any receipts from the night as he used cash to pay for all his expenses. About [REDACTED] left the club with [REDACTED], presumably going back to the hotel. About [REDACTED] left with [REDACTED] women and [REDACTED] back to the hotel, which took approximately [REDACTED]. When they arrived at the hotel, he had to sign [REDACTED] into the hotel. The hotel required that he pay a fee of approximately \$20 USD to take [REDACTED] to his room, which [REDACTED] described as a "guest fee." [REDACTED] paid the fee for [REDACTED] paid the fee for [REDACTED], and then [REDACTED] went to his room with [REDACTED] leaving [REDACTED] in the lobby. [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED] had taken [REDACTED] to his room in the past, but declined to elaborate when asked about the circumstances.

[REDACTED] entered his hotel room and talked for approximately 15 minutes. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] sexual intercourse or any sexual acts at any point. [REDACTED] was in his room for a total of [REDACTED]. He did not believe anyone actually saw [REDACTED] enter or exit his room, although [REDACTED] knew he took [REDACTED] to his room.

[REDACTED] did not give his contact information to [REDACTED] nor did he obtain her contact information. [REDACTED] believed that she gave the hotel her contact information, but other than that would not know how to contact [REDACTED] if he returned to Cartagena. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that he was a tourist from the U.S., but did not tell her his occupation, nor did he ask her occupation. [REDACTED] did not ask any questions about the U.S. government, USSS, or anything about the U.S. other than the fact that she mentioned she would like to visit the U.S. at some point in her life. [REDACTED] did not have any classified information, any documentation regarding the Presidential visit to Cartagena, [REDACTED] in his room. [REDACTED] did have [REDACTED] his credentials locked in the safe in his room. [REDACTED] believed he may have had his personal travel documentation, such as plane tickets and receipts, in a bag in his room. [REDACTED] was carrying his USSS blackberry, but it was locked with a password.

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On April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED]. After [REDACTED], he attended [REDACTED] at which point [REDACTED]. Later in the day, he was told to be at the hotel at [REDACTED]. When he arrived at the hotel, he discovered that there had been some sort of altercation the prior night with [REDACTED] and a foreign national woman in the hotel hallway. He could not remember who told him this information.

[REDACTED] stated he was called to an interview with [REDACTED], USSS, Miami Field Office. [REDACTED] was not given any type of rights advisements or warnings, but stated he felt that it was a voluntary interview; however, [REDACTED] believed that if he did not cooperate with the interview, he would be sent back to the U.S. immediately and disciplined, but no one told him this specifically. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] the events of the night prior, explaining that when [REDACTED] and she left. [REDACTED] did not specifically state whether [REDACTED] or not, nor did [REDACTED] specifically ask him. [REDACTED] asked if [REDACTED] was willing to take a polygraph, which he agreed to do. After the interview was complete, [REDACTED] was told to check in with his supervisor for further instructions. [REDACTED] was then told he would be returning to the U.S. the next morning.

On April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] left Cartagena to fly to Miami at about [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was instructed to be at USSS headquarters at [REDACTED] on [REDACTED], 2012, to be interviewed. He then left Miami to fly to Washington, D.C., at about [REDACTED], and, after going to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] arrived home about [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated he did not sleep on the night of [REDACTED], 2012, because he was worried about the situation.

On [REDACTED], 2012, [REDACTED] arrived at USSS Headquarters at about [REDACTED] and interviewed with FNU [REDACTED] Inspector, USSS. [REDACTED] was given some sort of rights advisements or warnings, but could not remember what type of warning it was. [REDACTED] stated he believed that the interview was voluntary; however, he felt if he did not cooperate he would receive disciplinary action. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] the same information that he told [REDACTED] but specified that [REDACTED] provided a typed statement. [REDACTED] asked if [REDACTED] was willing to take a polygraph, which he agreed to do. [REDACTED] was then scheduled for a polygraph for [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] stated he did not sleep on the nights of [REDACTED], 2012 to [REDACTED], 2012, because he was worried about the situation.

On [REDACTED], 2012, [REDACTED] arrived at USSS headquarters at about [REDACTED] where he met with [REDACTED] Polygraphers, USSS, who conducted a national security polygraph of [REDACTED] and did not ask any guided questions about the Cartagena incident. However, [REDACTED] did address the incident when explaining his contact with foreign nationals. [REDACTED] was told [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] everything about his contact with foreign nationals. He believed that [REDACTED]

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which [REDACTED] question about contact with foreign nationals. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] a few times between approximately [REDACTED] [REDACTED], and was told [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] although he saw [REDACTED]. At about [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] and was told to return on [REDACTED] 2012 at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 2012, because he was worried about the situation.

On [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] arrived at USSS Headquarters at [REDACTED] and met with [REDACTED] again. He was administered the national security polygraph [REDACTED], and was told he [REDACTED]. It became clear that [REDACTED] and the polygraphers were [REDACTED]. About [REDACTED] walked [REDACTED] out, telling him that [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED]. The next step would be [REDACTED] indicated that it would be best if [REDACTED] resigned rather than be fired. [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] seek legal advice. [REDACTED] was placed on administrative leave and turned in his USSS issued equipment.

On [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] resigned [REDACTED] so that he could [REDACTED] consulting with legal counsel. [REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] placed on administrative leave as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] believed that those SAs who [REDACTED] were allowed to keep their jobs.

[REDACTED] stated he did not believe that he violated any regulations or laws. On [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] stated he had attended a counterintelligence briefing at [REDACTED] along with many other SAs, wherein they were told that "one night stands" with foreign nationals were acceptable and only needed to be reported if the relationship continued. [REDACTED] provided signed statements from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] USSS, [REDACTED] to corroborate this information.

[REDACTED] believed he was a scapegoat and was being pressured to resign due to the media scrutiny of the situation. He was concerned about the veracity of the information the USSS used to evaluate him. In particular, the USSS stated that he received an in country briefing and packet that noted that he could not have a foreign national in his room. [REDACTED] stated he never received this information. During the bus ride from the airport to the hotel, there was a USSS employee who gave them tourist type information about the area, but did not discuss any regulations. At no point did he receive a packet discussing country specific regulations.

[REDACTED] still has all of the official emails related to the Cartagena trip and did not delete any of them. [REDACTED] did delete some of the unofficial emails between him and other agents in order to clear up

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room on his blackberry. [REDACTED] deleted some of these before the night of April 11, 2012 and some after.

[REDACTED] stated he did not have any direct or second hand knowledge of any USSS employee paying for sexual intercourse or sexual acts in Cartagena. [REDACTED] stated he heard that [REDACTED] USSS, later identified by the OIG as [REDACTED], was being pressured to resign as a result of the Cartagena incident. [REDACTED] apparently [REDACTED] knowledge of several other incidents similar to the situation in Cartagena, [REDACTED] could not remember where he heard this information from, but believed that USSS "had files" on all of these incidents.⁹

Employee # 5- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] USSS, [REDACTED]. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised that the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which he signed and agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] began his career with USSS on [REDACTED], and had been [REDACTED] worked for USSS [REDACTED], for [REDACTED]; and with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] traveled to Cartagena to be a [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012. The official email notification was the only information he received concerning the trip. [REDACTED] had no Top Secret or classified information in his possession. [REDACTED] was interviewed by USSS RES and received the appropriate advisements during his interview which he believed was voluntary. [REDACTED] provided a detailed sworn statement to USSS RES and submitted to a polygraph exam concerning his statement and national security items.

In Cartagena, [REDACTED] direct supervisors were [REDACTED] traveled with USSS [REDACTED] spent time with them off duty. [REDACTED] visited a local restaurant and bar with [REDACTED] on the evening of Wednesday, April 11, 2012. The other SAs involved in the Cartagena incident were [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had no direct knowledge of the allegations concerning [REDACTED]. Later that evening, the [REDACTED] were at a typical, non-strip club establishment. [REDACTED] were talking and having a few beers. Eventually, [REDACTED] met a girl who was dancing and bought her some drinks.

⁹ (Exhibits # 86, 365, 366)

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██████████ and the woman left the club together in a cab and returned to the Caribe Hotel. ██████████ and the woman went to ██████████ room, where they had a few beers over 45 minutes. ██████████, when the woman said that if he wanted her to stay longer, it would be “more money”, which ██████████. ██████████ denied knowing she was a prostitute until she asked for money, ██████████

After the situation in Cartagena unfolded, ██████████ was interviewed locally by USSS management and sent back to the U.S., departing on ██████████, April ██████████ 2012. ██████████ was placed on paid administrative leave for ██████████ which was later lifted. ██████████ believed the egregious acts in Cartagena were swiftly addressed and taken care of. ██████████ declined to provide a signed statement, citing he had given one to USSS RES.¹⁰

Employee # 6- ██████████

The OIG interviewed ██████████, ██████████, USSS, ██████████ ██████████ employee of the USSS; therefore, he was not administered rights advisements prior to questioning. He submitted to a voluntary interview. ██████████ provided the following information in substance:

██████████ stated he was previously interviewed by ██████████, ██████████, USSS, RES, Washington, D.C., following the Cartagena incident. ██████████ was not provided any warnings prior to either of the two interviews. He did not believe either interview was voluntary because he was told by his SAC, ██████████, to participate in the interviews. He believed he would have received some type of discipline for failure to comply with the interviews.

██████████ stated he had ██████████ polygraph ██████████. ██████████ was hired by the USSS on ██████████, and spent ██████████ before he resigned from the USSS ██████████ under duress. ██████████ was assigned as ██████████

██████████ stated he was in Cartagena from April ██████████ 2012, through April ██████████ 2012. ██████████ went on the detail to Colombia. ██████████ was designated as ██████████ stayed at the Caribe Hotel while in Cartagena. ██████████ claimed that he arrived on the car plane early ██████████ morning at approximately 7:00 a.m. and then checked into the hotel ██████████, he stayed around the hotel until he went to dinner. At approximately ██████████ traveled to ██████████ for dinner and returned to the hotel.

¹⁰ (Exhibits # 124, 365, 366)

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any sexual encounter between the two of them. [REDACTED] stated that he did not go to that bar looking for prostitutes and that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] also stated that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that he would never pay for a prostitute.

The following day, [REDACTED] was in conference with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] asked him if he had hired a prostitute the previous evening. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advised him that he did not hire a prostitute and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to make arrangements to meet with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for an interview.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated he was interviewed by [REDACTED] [REDACTED], wherein he advised [REDACTED] [REDACTED] of what took place the previous night. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was confused because [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was asking him questions about other incidents with other USSS employees and U.S. Military Personnel which occurred the previous evening. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated he advised [REDACTED] [REDACTED] that he was with [REDACTED] [REDACTED], but ran into a few USSS employees from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was then advised he would be traveling back to the U.S. the following morning.

The [REDACTED] [REDACTED] following the incident, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was interviewed by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] USSS, RES, Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated he was not given any employee rights prior to the interview. The only thing [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was advised of was that the interview was an important matter and that he needed to be truthful in the interview. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated he was asked what happened and he provided a chronology of the incident. At the conclusion of the RES interview, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] provided a statement and was advised he would be contacted for further action.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that either Tuesday or Wednesday following the interview, he was called to RES to take a polygraph examination. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was with RES for approximately [REDACTED] [REDACTED] hours and took the polygraph then was sent home. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was then contacted by SAC [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] polygraph examination. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] claimed on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] polygraph examination, there were [REDACTED] [REDACTED] questions and he was advised that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was asked again if he knew she was a prostitute, and he again stated that he did not know that she was a prostitute.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that he was shown by USSS Inspectors a written statement about [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not know who the statement was from, but later discovered it was not the statement of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] because the USSS had not even interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] because they could not locate her. On Friday of that week, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] reported to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Office in Washington, D.C. whose name he could not remember. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] two options, either to resign or wait out the process of his termination. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advised him that the USSS would revoke his security clearance because of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] his actions in Colombia, and then he would be terminated.

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During the meeting with [REDACTED], a [REDACTED] by the name of [REDACTED] from Human Resources came into to the office and asked if [REDACTED] had any questions. According to [REDACTED] he signed the resignation papers under duress. [REDACTED] felt that he was singled out because [REDACTED] was lying about the incident and the USSS needed someone to blame. [REDACTED] believed this because [REDACTED] were never disciplined for their actions in Colombia, which were the same as his actions.¹¹

Employee # 7- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED]. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised that the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which he signed and agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] had been employed with the USSS since [REDACTED]. Prior to becoming a [REDACTED] stated he worked as [REDACTED]. In [REDACTED]. From April [REDACTED]-13, 2012, [REDACTED] was assigned to the USSS mission in Cartagena in support of the President. [REDACTED] was assigned to [REDACTED]. During his shift, [REDACTED] team leader was [REDACTED]. In total, the [REDACTED] consisted of [REDACTED]. Specifically, [REDACTED] recalled that [REDACTED] were assigned to [REDACTED].

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On April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] arrived in Cartagena [REDACTED]. After checking into his room at the Hotel Caribe, [REDACTED]. After [REDACTED] went to dinner with [REDACTED] that was located approximately [REDACTED] from the hotel. Following dinner, [REDACTED] went to [REDACTED] that may have included [REDACTED] in its name.

While at [REDACTED], and after conversing with [REDACTED] women sitting at a table, [REDACTED] motioned for [REDACTED] to come join him and the women. [REDACTED] felt the women were Colombian because they did not speak fluent English. Initially [REDACTED] did not talk much based on his limited ability to speak Spanish, the noise of the sports bar, and that he was watching television. At some point thereafter, [REDACTED] left the group and went to talk to another woman in [REDACTED].

¹¹ (Exhibits # 118A, 365, 366)

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On April [REDACTED] 2012, at approximately [REDACTED] departed [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] of the women and returned with them to the Hotel Caribe. [REDACTED], when the group left. [REDACTED] did not recall seeing any additional USSS personnel while at [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] did not recall the names of the women he and [REDACTED] departed with, but described them. At the Hotel Caribe, [REDACTED] had to register [REDACTED] women at the front desk in order for them to go to their rooms. Specifically, [REDACTED] females had to present their identification to a representative of the Colombian National Police (CNP) so that they could be logged into the hotel.

[REDACTED] stated that he and his female acquaintance went to [REDACTED] hotel room and engaged in consensual sexual relations. [REDACTED] denied that the sexual relations were done in exchange for money. Similarly, [REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] register his female acquaintance ([REDACTED]) into the Hotel Caribe and they proceeded to [REDACTED] hotel room, located [REDACTED] hotel room.

On April [REDACTED] 2012, at approximately [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] female acquaintance [REDACTED] the woman who was still with [REDACTED] female acquaintance [REDACTED] stated in English, "[REDACTED]." Subsequently, the female ([REDACTED]) entered [REDACTED] room and [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] and demanded \$250. At some point thereafter, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] went out into the hallway. Despite [REDACTED] sending numerous emails to [REDACTED] via his USSS-issued Blackberry device, [REDACTED] was not able to contact [REDACTED].

While in the hallway with the women, [REDACTED] requested [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED], but described him. In the hallway and in the presence of [REDACTED], [REDACTED] stated to [REDACTED] "[REDACTED]." [REDACTED] stated she never asked [REDACTED] for any money.

[REDACTED] someone should pay the female accompanying [REDACTED] to resolve the matter without causing further incident. Around the same time, [REDACTED] came upon the group [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] to watch his room [REDACTED].

Using his personal [REDACTED], [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. Subsequently, [REDACTED] returned to the vicinity of his room. [REDACTED] asked him to handle the complaint.

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] [REDACTED] women subsequently left the hallway and departed the hotel.

During the incident [REDACTED], [REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] was in his room based on the shadows from underneath [REDACTED] door. [REDACTED] did not have any contact with [REDACTED] until approximately [REDACTED] on April [REDACTED] 2012, when he [REDACTED] attended a briefing. When [REDACTED] met [REDACTED] before the briefing, [REDACTED] felt [REDACTED] reply to [REDACTED] was that [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was not concerned about the [REDACTED], but rather was very upset that [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did not further explain the situation to [REDACTED] which was the last substantive discussion between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] regarding the matter. Amongst [REDACTED] in Cartagena, numerous emails, via their USSS-issued Blackberry devices, were exchanged regarding the incident.

On April [REDACTED] 2012, at approximately [REDACTED] was interviewed at the Hilton Hotel by the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was not issued any warnings during the interview which lasted approximately twenty minutes. [REDACTED] understood that the interview was administrative, and related to his suitability of retaining his security clearance. [REDACTED] described the interview as "definitely voluntary," but would have "not ended up so well" if he did not participate in the interview. [REDACTED] further described his participation as "volun-told."

On April [REDACTED] 2012, at approximately [REDACTED] was notified via email that he was directed to return to the U.S. On April [REDACTED] 2012, at approximately [REDACTED] Hotel Caribe lobby to start their departure. In addition to [REDACTED], the following additional USSS personnel were identified by [REDACTED] as being sent home on April [REDACTED] 2012: [REDACTED] personnel. In total and including [REDACTED] he reported twelve personnel were sent home. By way of commercial air carriers, the group departed Cartagena and travelled [REDACTED] on their return to the U.S. While in [REDACTED]

Approximately [REDACTED] after his departure from Cartagena, [REDACTED] participated in a polygraph examination given by the USSS RES. [REDACTED] advised he took national security, integrity, and criminal-focused polygraph examinations. During these examinations, [REDACTED] was not issued any warnings. However, [REDACTED] did confer with his attorney prior to taking the examinations. [REDACTED] was subsequently reinstated.¹²

¹² (Exhibits # 119, 291, 365, 366)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Employee # 8- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED]. Prior to questioning, the OIG advised [REDACTED] that the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. Additionally, the OIG administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which [REDACTED] signed and agreed to be interviewed. [REDACTED] was verbally administered his "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he stated that he would take under advisement, but [REDACTED] did not sign the warnings form. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] made several verbal statements. [REDACTED] denied that he ever solicited a prostitute and stated that he engaged in a consensual sexual encounter with a woman he identified as [REDACTED] LNU, whom he believed was a Colombian National. He declined to provide a statement regarding the incident because he had already provided one to USSS RES. Additionally, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] contacted [REDACTED] LNU after he was contacted by RES and that [REDACTED] they engaged in sex for money. [REDACTED] provided the OIG with a copy of the statement that he provided to RES and the statement from [REDACTED] LNU.¹³

Employee # 9- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] who was [REDACTED]. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he signed. During the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED] stated he was interviewed as part of the Cartagena investigation on April [REDACTED] 2012, by USSS [REDACTED] was not given warnings and was under the impression he had to provide a statement. [REDACTED] did not believe the interview was voluntary and believed the USSS would "let go of me" had he not submitted to the interview. [REDACTED] in connection with the investigation.

[REDACTED] began with the USSS [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] was given [REDACTED] but was later [REDACTED] believed he was [REDACTED] assigned to the [REDACTED] where he [REDACTED] on or about [REDACTED].

¹³ (Exhibits # 120, 365, 366)

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In Cartagena, [REDACTED] was assigned the [REDACTED], but never got the [REDACTED]. His supervisor in Cartagena was [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] the Cartagena trip. [REDACTED] team members in Cartagena included [REDACTED] [REDACTED] arrived in Cartagena on [REDACTED], April [REDACTED], 2012, departed on the morning of [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012, and stayed at the Hotel Caribe.

While in Cartagena, [REDACTED] and his team members visited restaurants, bars and nightclubs, but he did not recall the names of the venues. [REDACTED] visited a bar for drinks [REDACTED] dinner was held on [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012, at [REDACTED] restaurant that [REDACTED]. Everyone from the team was in attendance. While at dinner, the team members shared approximately two bottles of wine. After dinner, [REDACTED] left the restaurant with the team members and walked around the city to different bars. He did not [REDACTED] members on the team, including [REDACTED]. The team went "bar-hopping" at two or three different bars. The crowd of people dispersed as the night went on and ended the night at a bar where they met girls. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] the majority of the night where they were met by [REDACTED] and two other U.S. government employees and engaged them in conversation.

After growing tired of the conversation with them, [REDACTED] joined [REDACTED] [REDACTED] were talking to several girls. The girls spoke in Spanish, which [REDACTED] could somewhat understand but could not speak. [REDACTED] no one was fluent. [REDACTED] talked about leaving the bar and going back to the hotel. [REDACTED] ended up leaving with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said they would be bringing the girls back to the hotel. There were [REDACTED] girls that went back to the hotel with them. The woman that was with [REDACTED] that was not with anyone in particular. When they arrived to the hotel, Colombian police checked their identification, but [REDACTED]. He was [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] checked the girls in at the front desk. [REDACTED] appeared to know the process of checking the girls into the hotel.

[REDACTED] said he had a lot to drink and was very tired. He said when he entered his room, he used the restroom while the female he was with was playing with her hair in the mirror. When he returned from the restroom, they sat on the bed and watched the television show, "Jersey Shore." He later told her that he was tired and asked her to leave. She began arguing with him in Spanish, but he could not understand what she was saying. He understood her references to time and money, [REDACTED]. She became upset and [REDACTED] spoke in Spanish. She then [REDACTED] translated what she said. [REDACTED] the female stated he

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owed her \$150 USD and if he did not pay she would call the police. Not wanting the female to call the police, [REDACTED] He gave her \$150 USD and she left the hotel. [REDACTED] said he did not have any sexual relations with the female and did not know her name. He said she did kiss him on the cheek.

[REDACTED] said he suspected the females were prostitutes when he initially met them at the nightclub. That was [REDACTED] time hanging out with [REDACTED] He knew them all to be [REDACTED] and knew they had a reputation of going to bars and picking up girls. [REDACTED] said he never would have taken the female to his room and believed he was [REDACTED].

On the afternoon of [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] at the Hilton Hotel. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had left with girls and the girl that came to his room threw a fit. [REDACTED] did not recall if he told [REDACTED] that he paid the girl to leave his room. [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] and some of the other team members [REDACTED] [REDACTED] received emails from upper level management regarding incidents that took place the night before. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] lay low and not to do anything stupid. [REDACTED] had not spoken to [REDACTED] about what had taken place in his hotel room the night before. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Later that afternoon around [REDACTED] [REDACTED] received an email [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] USSS. The email was related to conduct and contact with foreign nationals. After receiving that email, [REDACTED] got nervous, but did not think it was related to him. He did not think he had done anything to rise to that level. [REDACTED] wondered what happened and suspected someone had been arrested. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] involved in the incidents related to the emails. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] what occurred the night before. He did not seem nervous about it until [REDACTED] [REDACTED] met with them.

[REDACTED] did not know what occurred with [REDACTED] and the girls that they brought to their room. He did not know if [REDACTED] had sexual relations with them or if they paid them any money for their services or time. [REDACTED] said the "culture of the team" was that you do not want to know anybody's personal business. There was a "brotherhood" where you do not ask questions about personal business unless you are close friends. Prior to joining, [REDACTED] thought the team would consist of guys that were womanizers, but once on the team he realized that was not the case. [REDACTED] stated most were described as "good guys," but there were some "bad eggs" in the bunch such as [REDACTED], as he later learned.

Around [REDACTED] [REDACTED] received an email instructing him to report to a specific room at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] did not know who he would be meeting with. Upon arriving, [REDACTED]

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entered the room and immediately recognized [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] asked [REDACTED] to take [REDACTED] through the night and tell [REDACTED] what happened. [REDACTED] relayed the story and received no feedback. After the meeting, [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] they were continuing to look into the matter and to keep his telephone close. [REDACTED] also said they were considering sending people home.

[REDACTED] went out to eat and waited to hear back from [REDACTED]. Around [REDACTED] [REDACTED] received a logistical email stating he was to report for a flight [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]. On [REDACTED] [REDACTED] checked out of the hotel [REDACTED] to the airport with approximately 10 to 11 other people that consisted of [REDACTED] including [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] got word that he needed to contact a supervisor in Cartagena. He used [REDACTED] Blackberry to make the call [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] someone met with [REDACTED] and informed him [REDACTED] after it was learned [REDACTED] employee (name unknown) signed a girl into the hotel [REDACTED]. Upon a review of the video in the hotel, it was determined [REDACTED] was not involved and had not taken a girl to his room.

During the bus ride and flight, people said they thought the situation would "blow over" and there was not much talking on the bus ride; however, on the flight, [REDACTED] involved [REDACTED] incident with prostitutes, were upset and making comments like "[REDACTED]" [REDACTED] was the main person talking in this manner and was "the most pissed off." [REDACTED] had never met [REDACTED] and had never seen many of the other people on the bus/flight. [REDACTED] recognized [REDACTED] because [REDACTED], but he did not know him. [REDACTED] appeared very nervous. [REDACTED] knew [REDACTED] had more contact with management and had received a call from [REDACTED] who yelled at him about the incident after [REDACTED] heard rumors that a lot of prostitutes had been hired.

The flight consisted of two layovers in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. While on the layovers, everyone checked their emails during which emails were received ordering them to report to USSS Headquarters on [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012, to meet with USSS RES. [REDACTED] received an email from [REDACTED] instructing him to report at [REDACTED].

On [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] reported to USSS RES where he was interviewed and provided a written statement, [REDACTED] a polygraph examination. [REDACTED] was told he was being placed on administrative leave. His USSS property (i.e. credentials, uniforms, pins) was retrieved and he was instructed to go to his duty station and collect his personal property. Several days went by without hearing back from the USSS, so [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to speak with [REDACTED]. On his way to the [REDACTED] on April [REDACTED] 2012, [REDACTED] received a telephone call from a USSS Inspector instructing him to report to

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USSS Inspections as soon as possible. [REDACTED] informed the Inspector that [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. When [REDACTED] arrived [REDACTED], he was immediately passed off to USSS RES.

During this meeting with USSS RES, [REDACTED] He suspected this was a result of [REDACTED] in Cartagena. [REDACTED]

He was given a form to sign to choose which option he would take [REDACTED]. No one ever explained to him exactly why [REDACTED] and he did not know who made the decision or their basis. During that meeting [REDACTED] overheard people talking about him and stating "[REDACTED]..." [REDACTED] had approximately [REDACTED] of time with the USSS, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was also told, after making several telephone calls and being referred to the USSS Legal Division, that his security clearance was suspended. [REDACTED] reportedly received a print-out of why his clearance was being suspended [REDACTED], but [REDACTED] did not receive any documentation.

After [REDACTED] was told he would be leaving the USSS, he spoke with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] told him [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated he did not witness any other USSS employees with girls and/or prostitutes and had no knowledge of anyone paying prostitutes. [REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED] and/or [REDACTED] paid the girls they were with. [REDACTED] stated he heard stories of people getting prostitutes while on international trips and suspected it was common in countries where prostitution was prevalent, such as Indonesia, Japan, Korea and Brazil. [REDACTED] believed being with prostitutes was tolerated by USSS supervisors, as long as you did not get caught. He further stated that USSS supervisors also participate by getting prostitutes themselves. [REDACTED] could not provide specific examples, but said "Everybody doesn't know everything, but people know. Senior people know."

[REDACTED] had never reported allegations of misconduct or illegal activities to DHS OIG. He did not know what DHS OIG was or that he could report misconduct to them.¹⁴

Employee # 10- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] USSS, [REDACTED] Prior to the interview, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

¹⁴ (Exhibits # 87, 126, 365, 366)

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██████████ entered on duty (EOD) with the USSS on ██████████, as a ██████████ ██████████ was currently ██████████ the outcome of the investigation. Additionally, ██████████ security clearance had been suspended.

██████████ most recent assignment with the USSS was to ██████████ served as a member on one of the teams during his assignment in Cartagena in April 2012, where his chain of command for this assignment consisted of his team leader, ██████████, and ██████████ ██████████

Due to being prematurely sent home as a result of the incident in Cartagena, ██████████ never had an opportunity to work while the President of the United States was in Cartagena. While ██████████ was in Cartagena, he ██████████ ██████████ arrived in Cartagena on ██████████ and was flown back to the United States (U.S.) on ██████████ in advance of the visit. [Agent's Note: ██████████ could not recall the exact calendar dates of his trip to Cartagena.]

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██████████ stayed at the Hotel Caribe in Cartagena. Once ██████████ had returned to the U.S., he was interviewed by USSS RES in relation to the incident in Cartagena. Upon conclusion of RES' interview, ██████████ was placed on administrative leave and escorted out of the building. ██████████ had to return his access cards/keys and was placed on a "Do Not Admit" status. ██████████ did not have an opportunity to submit a travel voucher.

While in Cartagena, ██████████ went to several retail establishments that sold alcohol and/or food, including nightclubs, restaurants and bars. On ██████████ at approximately ██████████ and his other members began having drinks at a restaurant called ██████████, which was located ██████████ ██████████. Approximately an hour and a half later, ██████████ and maybe six or eight team members walked to a nearby ██████████ restaurant where they had dinner and wine. Afterwards, they left and met up with other members down the street, which some may have possibly been the same individuals that attended the first restaurant (██████████) earlier in the evening. Certain members of ██████████ group broke away at times, but reunited as the evening progressed. Subsequently, ██████████ attended several other bars with team members, to include ██████████ ██████████

██████████ met a female foreign national named ██████████ Last Name Unknown (LNU) at a nightclub called ██████████ [sic]. ██████████ was dressed conservatively and he did not believe she was a prostitute. The members of his (██████████) party were all present when he met ██████████ which at this point, he was considerably intoxicated. Throughout the entire evening, ██████████ ██████████. ██████████ asked ██████████ if she was "working" upon which she replied, "No." [Agent's Note: ██████████ meant prostitution when he asked ██████████ if she was "working".]

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_____ was _____ . After spending approximately _____ at _____ then left with _____ and proceeded to his hotel _____ where they arrived at approximately _____

_____ said that upon arrival at his hotel, he noticed _____, each accompanied by a female acquaintance, were also arriving to the hotel at the same time. Everyone was then escorted into the hotel by a security guard and guided to the front desk where they had to sign-in their female visitors and pay a fee. The females presented identification, and _____ advised the front desk to add his visitor's fee for _____ onto his bill. _____ told _____ and _____ that _____ then proceeded to _____ room while _____ and _____ accompanied by their visitors, went their separate ways. _____ and _____

Once the beer had been delivered, it was consumed in _____ room. _____ subsequently had to utilize the bathroom. Once he finished and exited the bathroom, _____ entered the bathroom where he believed she may have taken a shower because he heard the water running. Following _____ exiting the bathroom, _____ received a phone call from _____ what sounded to _____ as a female voice on the other end. Once _____ ended the call, she advised him that it was _____ and she had to leave. _____ asked _____ for money to pay for a cab. _____ pulled some pesos out of his pants pocket, which he believed to be equivalent to about \$10 to \$20 USD and gave it to _____ was familiar with the currency and gave some back to him after looking through it and removing a few bills. _____ claimed that the money she took would be enough for a cab. _____ was not sure exactly how much money _____ took, but he believed it could not have been much since he had already spent much of his money on food and drinks. _____ believed he may have been missing some money that he placed in a drawer underneath the television in his hotel room. _____ did not accuse anyone of taking the money, but it was possible that hotel staff or _____ may have done so. _____ did not exchange any contact information with _____ left the room by herself and presumably stopped by the front desk to check out on her way out, which was probably sometime either prior to or around _____ later walked down the street and got a bite to eat _____.

On _____ at around _____ _____ awoke after he was telephonically contacted by a friend who advised him that one member of _____ had been arrested for soliciting prostitution. _____ also received a phone call from _____ who advised him of the same issue and that he had heard about misconduct allegations concerning USSS employees. _____ was told by _____ that employees were allegedly partying too much, canines were sleeping on beds, things had been broken, and the rooms were being trashed. They told _____ that the U.S. Embassy had been contacted and the hotel staff was not content with the misconduct. _____ did not advise

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██████████ and ██████████ of his activities with ██████████ because he did not think she was a prostitute. ██████████ told both ██████████ and ██████████ that he would look into the issues.

██████████ then spoke on the phone with ██████████ who was also unaware of the alleged incidences. ██████████ decided to track down ██████████ since he observed them bringing women to the hotel the previous night. ██████████ told ██████████ that the female he brought back to the hotel had propositioned him for sex in exchange for money, which he refused and made her leave his room. Thereafter, ██████████ spoke to ██████████ who advised that he (██████████) and his female visitor had ██████████ arriving in his room. ██████████ said they were ██████████ female visitor departed his room upon being asked to leave. After speaking with ██████████ became concerned and notified ██████████ about the situations involving the girls they had brought back to the hotel.

██████████ subsequently received an e-mail instructing him to meet with ██████████ who was on scene. At approximately ██████████ met with ██████████ and provided an oral account of the events that occurred while in Cartagena. Also present during that meeting with ██████████ were ██████████. The meeting occurred at the Hilton Hotel in Cartagena. ██████████ not supposed to bring women back to the hotel. ██████████ first time he had ever heard of such directive. ██████████ had never been instructed to not bring females back to his hotel room while employed with the USSS. ██████████ advised that when ██████████ since working for the USSS both in the U.S. and abroad.

██████████ stated he was flown back to the U.S. ██████████ due to the incident. ██████████ submitted to ██████████ polygraph by USSS polygraphers, FNU ██████████ and FNU ██████████ believed this was unprecedented ██████████ was advised that ██████████.

██████████ stated he did not witness any USSS or government employees hire prostitutes during the Cartagena trip. ██████████ stated he had never paid for sexual favors while employed with the USSS or engaged in illegal activity; however, ██████████ provided the OIG with additional information pertaining to incidents similar to Cartagena.

██████████ stated the USSS Security Clearance Division held a meeting on ██████████, 2012, at WFO, and advised that you do not have to report a one night stand with a foreign national. It had never been an issue in the past and ██████████ believed it was only an OPSEC violation if you had a relationship that could subject a government employee to coercion or blackmail. A consensual relationship (sex with

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a female) had never been an issue prior to the Cartagena incident. [REDACTED] declined to provide DHS OIG with a written statement.¹⁵

Employee # 11- [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] USSS, [REDACTED]. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised the interview was voluntary and was being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which he signed and agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] with the USSS. As a result of an investigation by the USSS into the Cartagena incident, [REDACTED] resigned from the USSS effective [REDACTED] suspension of his top secret security clearance, which could have eventually led to his security clearance being revoked, or he could voluntarily resign. [REDACTED] felt he had no choice but to resign based on the way the USSS presented their findings against him.

Prior to the USSS, [REDACTED] started with the USSS [REDACTED]. After approximately [REDACTED] became a [REDACTED] which was under the USSS [REDACTED] stated that the [REDACTED] required [REDACTED]. The schedules were released on a daily basis and the number of required [REDACTED] was based on [REDACTED].

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[REDACTED] was assigned by the USSS to officially travel to Cartagena for the visit to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that he was scheduled by the USSS to arrive in Cartagena a few days early because the airport in Cartagena could only hold a certain number of airplanes at one time. [REDACTED] stated that there seemed to be a misperception in the media that several USSS employees arrived early for no particular reason. In most cases, [REDACTED] as the trip to Cartagena, but because of the logistical issues with the airport, equipment, and arriving dignitaries, he and [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] [REDACTED] would have been assigned to multiple locations; not one specific location. [REDACTED] supervisory chain of command in Cartagena was [REDACTED].

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¹⁵ (Exhibit # 125, 365, 366)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

██████████ arrived in Cartagena on April ██████████ 2012, around ██████████ and arrived at his hotel, the Hotel Caribe, around ██████████. On this same evening, ██████████ had dinner at a restaurant ██████████ with ██████████. He had no reportable contact with foreign nationals and returned to his hotel room alone.

While in Cartagena, ██████████ spent the majority of his off-duty time with ██████████ including ██████████. ██████████ did not socialize in Cartagena with any other USSS personnel outside of ██████████. ██████████ also did not socialize with any other DHS personnel, non-DHS employees or other U.S. government personnel.

Prior to discussing the events surrounding the allegations of prostitution in Cartagena, ██████████ wanted to clarify background information about the Hotel Caribe and information that was provided to him in the briefing packet he received. ██████████ admitted that he had ██████████ prior to this trip.

██████████ stated that to his knowledge, the Hotel Caribe had been completely rented out by U.S. personnel. In addition, he stated there were at least seventy-five to one-hundred police officers (non-U.S. citizens) that provided security around the Hotel Caribe. ██████████ stated that there were also at least twenty-five uniformed hotel security officers patrolling the hotel premises at one time. ██████████ also wanted to make clear that the Hotel Caribe did not have ██████████ the nearby 7E Hilton hotel where the President was going to stay while in Cartagena. The Hotel Caribe was a secure location, but he did not believe the hotel would have been considered secure by USSS standards.

██████████ heard the staff at the Hotel Caribe had issues with USSS personnel prior to the incident involving the prostitutes. ██████████ was not directly made aware of these complaints by hotel staff, but heard that the hotel staff had complaints about USSS employees throwing a football in and around the pool area, USSS employees bringing in their own coolers filled with beer instead of buying beer from the hotel bar, a USSS canine reportedly defecated on a bed, a USSS employee who damaged something in their room, and a USSS employee who vomited in a hallway. ██████████ saw people with their own coolers, but did not know the contents or if the people that had it were USSS employees. ██████████ did not know if these issues at the hotel were brought to the attention of USSS personnel or if USSS personnel were asked to stop any specific activities or actions that the hotel staff found offensive.

██████████ continued that on ██████████ April ██████████ 2012, ██████████ went to ██████████ to make sure ██████████ and ██████████. 7E
After ██████████ was briefed by ██████████ at the Hilton Hotel and was given welcome packets prepared by the Regional Security Officer (RSO) with the U.S. Embassy/Department of State. The USSS advance team (██████████) distributed the packets

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and mission assignments. [REDACTED] stated that no one from the U.S. Embassy spoke to them or briefed them about issues in Cartagena.

[REDACTED] further stated that he did not know that prostitution was legal in Cartagena and there was no information in the packet he received that warned or advised them about prostitution or criminal activity in the area. [REDACTED] stated that there was a bullet point on the individual protective measures form in the packet that stated to not give your hotel room number to strangers. [REDACTED] stated this was one of the items the USSS used against him administratively once he admitted that he had brought a female foreign national back to his hotel room. [Agent's Note: [REDACTED] provided a copy of the measures form.]

After the briefing, [REDACTED] and other [REDACTED] went back to [REDACTED] the Hotel Caribe. [REDACTED] and several team members [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] decided to meet around [REDACTED] at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not recall the name of this first location and further stated that no foreign national contacts were made other than wait staff. In addition, not all of the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] were present because [REDACTED]. This first group included [REDACTED]. They sat around for a while, had a few drinks (alcoholic beverages) and waited for other team members to arrive before departing for [REDACTED] located in [REDACTED]. The group ate dinner and, at approximately [REDACTED] they left the [REDACTED] and went to a third location.

At the third location, identified as [REDACTED] (name unknown), most [REDACTED] had arrived and joined the initial group, who included [REDACTED]. They left this location and proceeded to a fourth location, which was a bar (name unknown) in [REDACTED]. On the way to the bar, the group split up for a brief time but eventually met up with team members already inside of the bar. The group [REDACTED] was sitting at a table with females that appeared to be foreign nationals. [REDACTED] approached the female [REDACTED] and introduced himself, but not as a USSS employee. [REDACTED] did not recall the name of the female, but assumed she was a local resident/foreign national. [REDACTED] and the female sat together had a few drinks, talked and danced. The female inquired about leaving the bar with [REDACTED] and told him that he would need to pay [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] had exchanged money in the USSS control room prior to leaving that evening, so he was able to pay in pesos. [REDACTED] could not recall the exchange rate, but thought he paid [REDACTED] around three million pesos or approximately \$140 in U.S. currency for the girl to leave with him. [REDACTED] understood that he was paying for her to leave with him and eventually go back to his hotel room. There was no discussion at this time about sexual intercourse or any sexual services she would provide.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] left the fourth location and, as best he could recall, he ([REDACTED]) that had a female with him. [REDACTED] went to a fifth location, also a

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bar with female foreign nationals, had a few drinks and left. [REDACTED] stated at this point he was dancing and not paying much attention to what the other members in the group were doing.

When they left the fifth bar, [REDACTED] the female and a few others [REDACTED] back to the hotel. Prior to getting to the hotel, the group stopped at another bar, which would be location number six for [REDACTED]. Several members from the team had left as [REDACTED] stated they "lost several from the group." There were also several foreign national females at this location. [REDACTED] left this bar, which was [REDACTED] the Hotel Caribe, with the female he picked up.

[REDACTED] did not specifically recall any [REDACTED] [REDACTED] ask about his female companion during the evening or any of the details about payments for the female. [REDACTED] did not recall any [REDACTED] [REDACTED] identifying themselves to the female foreign nationals as USSS personnel and did not have any outward identification that would have identified them as USSS personnel. [REDACTED] stated that he did not tell his female companion anything about the USSS or that he was employed with the USSS.

When [REDACTED] arrived at the Hotel Caribe he was stopped by a person at the front desk and was told he needed to sign in any guests. [REDACTED] recalled signing a form, but was not sure what kind of form or what the form stated. [REDACTED] did not recall [REDACTED] at this time. [REDACTED] was also advised that he needed to pay for an additional guest. [REDACTED] showed OIG a receipt from the Hotel Caribe that had a charge for an additional guest for 95,000 pesos. This charge appeared as an incidental charge and [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that the charge for the extra guest was billed to him as an incidental charge [REDACTED] and he did not seek reimbursement from the USSS for this charge. [Agent's Note: OIG requested a copy of the hotel receipt, but [REDACTED] stated that it had [REDACTED] information on the receipt and did not want to provide a copy at this time.] [REDACTED] advised that he did not file a voucher for reimbursement of any incidental expenses he occurred in Cartagena.

After signing the hotel form and paying the fee to check the female into his room, [REDACTED] and his female companion went to his room. [REDACTED] estimated that he had at least [REDACTED] alcoholic beverages by this time and was drunk, but not incapacitated. When they got to his room [REDACTED] [REDACTED]; however, according to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that outside of Cartagena, he had never paid for sexual services while employed with the USSS.

The following morning, [REDACTED] April, 2012, [REDACTED] was awakened [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. When [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] said he was not aware of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] walked the female down to the lobby and she proceeded to the front desk. [REDACTED] did not walk to the front desk with her but assumed she needed to sign out and retrieve her identification. [REDACTED] provided the OIG with a copy of the Hotel Caribe policies that were located in his room that addressed visitors.

[REDACTED] checked his electronic mail messages (e-mail) on his government issued Blackberry cellular telephone and looked up and noticed the female was no longer at the front desk. A hotel security guard pointed towards where she exited and [REDACTED] went towards that direction and eventually met up with her at an entrance other than the main entrance. The female told [REDACTED] she needed more money. [REDACTED] paid her approximately three million pesos, or what he estimated to be \$140 – \$150 U.S. Dollars. [REDACTED] walked her to a taxi and attempted to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] estimated she left around [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] has had no further contact with her since that time.

[REDACTED] went back to his room to start getting ready for work. He met with [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED]. They walked together to [REDACTED] where they were scheduled to meet with [REDACTED]. At [REDACTED] they [REDACTED] and went to [REDACTED]. Shortly after meeting up with [REDACTED], they began to hear rumors that were spreading about a member of the USSS [REDACTED] that was involved in an incident with a prostitute in which local police were called. The information was disseminated to [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] heard that the [REDACTED] member in question was [REDACTED].

After [REDACTED] decided to [REDACTED]. While [REDACTED] and others started hearing that the U.S. Ambassador wanted to throw twenty-two U.S. personnel out of Colombia because of incidents involving prostitutes. [REDACTED] said the USSS wanted to “remove their own” instead of having the U.S. Ambassador remove them from the country. [REDACTED] understood that the twenty-two individuals involved included USSS personnel and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) personnel.

That afternoon, [REDACTED] received an email from [REDACTED] Miami Field Office, related to conduct in Cartagena. Later that afternoon, [REDACTED] received an e-mail from USSS logistics that he [REDACTED] needed to report to a hotel room [REDACTED] of the Hilton for a meeting. After ^{7E} appearing and waiting to be called in, he received e-mail containing travel plans for him to return to the U.S. on [REDACTED] prior to the arrival of the President. [REDACTED] were present and [REDACTED]. There were no discussions about the events of the previous night, but they were all wondering what the meetings were about.

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entered the room and was joined by an unknown and a supervisor who was also unknown. asked about the e-mail he received prior to the start of the meeting containing travel orders back to the U.S. said the did not believe was being truthful with him. admitted that he was not entirely truthful when questioned by and the others about his activities in Cartagena. He had admitted to having a guest in his room, but not to any payments or sexual intercourse. stated that after he received the e-mail about being sent home he figured the USSS had already made their decision and would not give him a chance.

After the meeting with returned to his hotel room and prepared to leave. He did not receive an email rescinding the travel order that said (according to On , and several others were flown back to the U.S. and arrived in Washington, D.C. or was instructed to report to USSS headquarters to meet with the USSS RES on at

At USSS headquarters, met with two SAs from the USSS RES and was instructed to type a statement in regards to his involvement in the incident in Cartagena. recalled some type of warnings being read to him prior to providing the statement, but he could not recall the exact type of warnings given. stated that it was on this date, April 2012, that he had to turn in property issued to him by the USSS. provided a copy of the memorandum placing him on administrative leave. The memorandum was dated April 2012, with an effective date of April 2012, and was signed by USSS.

stated that he was later called back to be administered polygraph was told the polygraph was going to be a "national security" polygraph and he would only be asked questions in regards to national security. voluntarily took the polygraph which he described as being about and was told that.

The polygraph examiners then asked . was advised that was also asked to because of an allegation that was involved during the incident. stated that he felt the media was controlling the USSS and what the USSS did to its employees in regard to the Cartagena incident. provided a copy of that he signed, which was dated 2012.

also provided a copy of a memorandum to that detailed the notice of suspension of top secret security clearance dated , 2012, and a copy of a USSS memorandum dated

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[REDACTED], 2012, with a subject of "Notice of Determination – [REDACTED]" addressed to [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] stated that this memorandum referenced the individual protective measure form provided in the welcome packet he received and specifically referenced foreign intelligence services and not giving your room number to strangers. [REDACTED] stated that not only did he have to sign in with her, but as he previously stated, the hotel had police officers and hotel security and he did not believe that what he did reached the levels as quoted from the warnings in the packet. In addition, [REDACTED] stated that the USSS took [REDACTED] out of context. [REDACTED] but stated that it was in regard to [REDACTED]. The e-mail stated in part, "[REDACTED]" and [REDACTED] stated that the USSS took it completely out of context [REDACTED] stated that USSS employees [REDACTED] and (First Name Unknown) [REDACTED] might have [REDACTED].

The memorandum also referenced [REDACTED] statement that was made to the USSS RES regarding his self-admitted alcohol consumption and taking the female foreign national to his hotel room. The polygraph was also noted in the memorandum and [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] provided a copy of a USSS memorandum dated [REDACTED] 2012, entitled Proposed [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] from USSS [REDACTED]. On [REDACTED], 2012, [REDACTED] was presented with an offer to resign from the USSS. [REDACTED] stated that he was going through a very stressful time [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had [REDACTED] he was [REDACTED] and was [REDACTED] stated that he was [REDACTED] all that was happening and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that it was presented to him that he could either resign or be placed on administrative leave pending an investigation in which he could lose his top secret clearance. [REDACTED] also stated that all of this could have been avoided if the pre-advance teams, advance teams, and Department of State had advised and made clear the propensity for prostitution in Cartagena.

[REDACTED] felt as if he had no choice but to resign in lieu of losing his top secret security clearance and provided DHS OIG with his letter of resignation dated [REDACTED], which would be effective [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] also provided a copy of a Standard Form 50 (SF 50) Request for Personnel Action that documented the resignation.

[REDACTED] stated that because of the media coverage and embarrassment to the agency, he was punished more severely than required based on his purported actions. [REDACTED] stated that there was a great deal of disparity and treatment within the USSS between [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that there were people within the USSS that committed actual crimes and were still employed by the USSS. [REDACTED] admitted he may have [REDACTED] but his actions in Cartagena were not a violation of law in Cartagena and he should not have lost his job as a result. Again he stated the whole situation could have been alleviated if the advance and pre-

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advance teams had done their jobs properly and made proper advisements about the area and prostitution in the area.

██████████ stated that the incident in Cartagena was not typical within the USSS; however he believed that if the local police and media were not involved, the USSS would have handled it in-house. ██████████ believes there is a level of acceptance balanced with a level of professionalism. He could not say that this type of behavior never happened, happened during every foreign trip, or if this was the only time this type of behavior occurred. ██████████ refused to provide a written statement.¹⁶

Employee # 12- ██████████

The OIG made attempts to conduct a voluntary interview with ██████████ ██████████ USSS, Washington, D.C. ██████████ was later personally contacted and his attorney was advised that the DOJ had approved Kalkines warnings and that ██████████ was compelled to appear for an interview with the OIG. ██████████ failed to comply and never appeared for an interview.¹⁷

Employee # 13- ██████████

The OIG interviewed ██████████, USSS, Washington, D.C. Prior to questioning, ██████████ was advised the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. Additionally, ██████████ was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [Agent's Note: ██████████ ██████████ administer Kalkines warnings to ██████████ in order to compel him to speak to the OIG. ██████████ provided copies of his resignation letter and SF-50 showing a resignation date effective on ██████████, therefore Kalkines would not be applicable. ██████████ agreed to proceed with the interview voluntarily.] ██████████ provided the following information in substance:

██████████ started with the USSS on ██████████, and was assigned to ██████████. He started with ██████████, and was assigned as ██████████ in Cartagena, Colombia, in preparation for the President's visit. ██████████ arrived in Cartagena, Colombia, on April ██████████ 2012, in order to ██████████. He was also tasked with ██████████. His supervisor in Cartagena was ██████████, USSS ██████████.

██████████ stated that he was in Cartagena approximately ██████████ for the Presidential visit and stayed at the Hilton hotel in Cartagena, Colombia. He did not have any classified paperwork in his hotel

¹⁶ (Exhibits # 122C, 365, 366)

¹⁷ (Exhibits # 177, 177A, 365, 366)

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room; all of the classified paperwork and his laptop were [REDACTED] 7E
[REDACTED] He spent his off-duty time with [REDACTED] (later identified by OIG as [REDACTED]), USSS, because they both worked similar shifts. Several days before the President's visit to Cartagena, Colombia, he went [REDACTED]. He was at the bar drinking and met a foreign national and "things got out of hand." [REDACTED] stated that he was at the bar drinking [REDACTED] and a female named "[REDACTED]" came up to him and they started talking and dancing. She asked him, "if he wanted to leave with her," and he agreed. [REDACTED] declined to answer what "leaving together" implied, but advised he did not pay a fee to leave with the female from the bar and stated that the females that were at the bar seemed like "regular girls."

They both returned to the Hilton Hotel and he signed her in at the hotel lobby and she provided her identification card at the hotel lobby. He had to pay a guest fee to the hotel but did not recall the exact figure. He gave her a fictitious name and told her he was there on vacation. When asked whether he paid the female any money, or the details of what occurred when they left the bar together, he declined to answer.

[REDACTED] stated that he tried to be discreet and never said anything to anybody for the remainder of the advance. He continued on with his duties for the trip and did not have additional contact with any other foreign nationals for the remainder of the trip. [REDACTED] stated that the first time he heard that USSS employees were involved in prostitution in Cartagena, Colombia, was when he heard that some of the Department of Defense (DOD) employees were causing a scene at the hotel with some girls. He was subsequently told that [REDACTED] members [REDACTED], were being sent home due their involvement with prostitutes. None of the employees spoke to him regarding their intentions to find prostitutes before the incident.

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] factor in the loss of the [REDACTED] members to accommodate the loss of [REDACTED] stated the USSS jeopardized the mission because they sent [REDACTED] members home before their mission was complete. He felt that the DOD response to the incident was more appropriate because they kept the employees in country to complete the mission and then dealt with the disciplinary action after the mission was completed.

[REDACTED] stated that there were subsequent meetings with the advance team regarding the prostitution incident in Cartagena and the advance team was told to report any information they knew regarding prostitution and USSS employees. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] returned to the U.S.

Once in the U.S., he received an email from SOD Support stating that he needed to report to the USSS RES for a witness interview where he was interviewed by RES on [REDACTED], 2012. He stated that he was not issued any warnings prior to the interview by RES and was under the

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impression that it was a witness interview. He did not feel that the interview was voluntary and felt that he would be subject to administrative action if he did not participate in the interview. He stated that during the interview, the inspectors implied that they had knowledge of wrongdoing by [REDACTED]. He then told them about the incident with the female foreign national at the bar. [REDACTED] believed that the USSS found out about the female through the log sheet that he signed when he returned to the hotel with the female [REDACTED]. During the interview, USSS RES asked him to voluntarily submit to a national security/counterintelligence polygraph examination and gave him a written request to which he agreed. The polygraph was administered on [REDACTED] April [REDACTED] 2012, and the polygraphers told him that [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] was then called in to USSS Headquarters on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 2012, and met [REDACTED] [REDACTED] could not recall his name) were present. [REDACTED] was given two options during the meeting, sign a typed letter of resignation or face termination proceedings and revocation of his security clearance due to his "unauthorized contact with a foreign national" [REDACTED] [REDACTED] signed the letter after his options were explained to him and his resignation was effective [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that he had approximately 15 minutes to decide whether he was going to resign or allow the USSS to take administrative action while his supervisors were staring at him.

[REDACTED] stated he did not feel that the USSS RES investigation was fair because of how quickly everything happened, he gave a statement on a [REDACTED] a polygraph on a [REDACTED] and signed a resignation letter on [REDACTED]. He also stated that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] are still working for the USSS. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] is a [REDACTED] and is currently [REDACTED], but [REDACTED] was unsure if this played a role in [REDACTED] employment status.

[REDACTED] stated he had witnessed the involvement on other foreign trips in [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. He stated that he witnessed SAs from PPD drinking excessively and "hooking up" with "working girls" and "non working girls." [REDACTED] stated he had direct knowledge because USSS SAs [REDACTED] because he [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. On another occasion, [REDACTED] returned to his assigned hotel from a club with a USSS supervisor in a taxi and the supervisor went to the front desk to advise them he (the supervisor) was expecting a young lady to come back to his room for the night.¹⁸

Employee # 14 – [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, Washington, D.C. Prior to questioning, [REDACTED] was advised the interview was voluntary and being conducted independent of any ongoing USSS internal investigation. [REDACTED] was also administered the Advice of Rights (Beckwith/Garrity), which

¹⁸ (Exhibits # 173C, 365, 366)

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he signed and agreed to be interviewed. Additionally, before questioning, [REDACTED] was administered the OIG "Warning to Not Disclose Investigative Information," which he also signed. [REDACTED] provided the following information in substance:

[REDACTED] stated that he entered on duty with [REDACTED] the USSS on [REDACTED] and was currently assigned to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that in April 2012 [REDACTED] the assignment to Cartagena, Columbia. [REDACTED] stated that he was previously interviewed [REDACTED] regarding the prostitution incident. [REDACTED] interviewed in Cartagena by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] USSS, Miami, Florida, and [REDACTED], [REDACTED], USSS, Bogota, Colombia. [REDACTED] stated that he was notified by e-mail to meet with [REDACTED] in Cartagena. [REDACTED] stated that he did not know what the interview was about and was not provided with any written or oral warnings (Garrity or Kalkines) prior to the interview. [REDACTED] stated that he did not believe the interview was voluntary and thought he would have suffered negative consequences if he refused to answer questions.

[REDACTED] stated that when he returned from Cartagena he was interviewed by investigators from the USSS Inspections Division in Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] stated that he was issued a Non-Disclosure warning and provided with his rights. [REDACTED] was not sure if he was advised of Garrity rights. [REDACTED] stated that he knew this interview was voluntary and did not think he would suffer negative consequences if he had declined to be interviewed. [REDACTED] stated that he was not asked to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that in Cartagena he was assigned to [REDACTED]. Before the trip, [REDACTED] spoke to [REDACTED] that were also going on the assignment. [REDACTED] stated that he did not e-mail anyone about the trip. [REDACTED] received e-mails containing logistical information such as travel dates, hotel reservations, etc. [REDACTED] stated that he did not receive or send any e-mails regarding after hours activities in Cartagena.

[REDACTED] stated that he was [REDACTED] staying at El Caribe Hotel in Cartagena and that he did not go to any night clubs. While off-duty they went to a restaurant [REDACTED] from El Caribe Hotel and to [REDACTED], both restaurants served alcohol. [REDACTED] stated that they also went to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that he interacted with the employees of the establishments but did not socialize with any females or other Colombian nationals.

[REDACTED] stated that on [REDACTED] 2012, he was interviewed by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and they asked if he knew what the interview was about. [REDACTED] said he did not and they informed him El Caribe complained about USSS personnel. They asked if [REDACTED] had anyone in his hotel room the night before and [REDACTED] said, "No." [REDACTED] stated that he was dismissed from the interview and not told anything else. The next day [REDACTED] received an e-mail addressed to him and eleven other USSS personnel informing them to check out of the hotel because they were being sent home.

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██████████ stated that they met in the hotel lobby and ██████████ knew ██████████, USSS, but did not know anyone else in the group. ██████████ did not know if the others were USSS officers or SAs. ██████████ stated that ██████████ was unable to ██████████.

██████████ stated that ██████████ a member of the USSS ██████████ could not remember his name. ██████████ stated that the ██████████ person stated that ██████████. He told ██████████ that ██████████ did it. ██████████ stated that he did not elaborate or describe the incident. ██████████ stated that he thinks someone must have ██████████ [Agent's Note: Based on ██████████ and others interviews, OIG and USSS determined that ██████████ he was not involved in the misconduct.]

██████████ stated that he has never hired a prostitute and that he did not witness or hear about any USSS personnel hiring prostitutes prior to the incident. ██████████ stated that while in Cartagena, he did not have access to any top secret or classified documents. ██████████ stated that he was provided with assignment sheets, but nothing that would specifically detail the President's locations or movements. ██████████ provided a sworn written statement.¹⁹

The OIG also identified others who potentially possessed information regarding prior encounters; however, individuals declined voluntary interviews.²⁰ OIG also reviewed travel vouchers from Cartagena submitted by 7 of the 13 USSS employees who had personal encounters with FFNs with the misconduct reported. OIG found no evidence of any claims for reimbursement for overnight guest fees, a fee charged by the hotels for the FFNs who visited the 12 USSS employees. The remaining 6 USSS employees did not submit travel vouchers for reimbursement.²¹

During our investigation, USSS personnel alleged that a White House Communications Agency employee (an officer with the Department of Defense) and one reported White House staff and/or advance member had personal encounters with female Colombian nationals. OIG reviewed the registry from the Hilton Cartagena Hotel for this time period, which showed two people who OIG identified as these individuals associated with the White House, registered in two separate rooms. Names of ██████████ females were listed as visitors to these two rooms during the advance activities for the

¹⁹ (Exhibits # 87, 126)

²⁰ (Exhibits # 2, 9, 10, 15, 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 37, 197, 203, 204, 208, 216, 220, 221, 223, 224, 227, 228, 265, 277A, 365)

²¹ (Exhibits # 329, 329A, 365)

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President's visit in April.²² OIG did not interview or investigate the activities of any individuals not employed by DHS, to include the WHCA employee and the reported White House staff and/or advance member.

OIG made an official Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request from the Department of Justice so we could interview the female Colombian nationals and secure other investigative records. However, the Department of Justice declined our request because the information was sought for a Congressional proceeding rather than a U.S. criminal matter. Therefore, OIG had to rely on the FFN statements previously obtained by the USSS.²³

During questioning, USSS employees reported they were aware of incidents similar to those that reportedly occurred in Cartagena and were asked whether they thought this incident was indicative of a broader organizational issue within the USSS. INV preliminarily identified reports that 123 believed it was an anomaly²⁴, 5 said that the broader organizational issues played a role²⁵, and 10 relayed knowledge of similar misconduct occurring on other occasions.²⁶ The remainder made no assertions of any opinion.

The reports of broader organizational issues within the USSS were referred to OIG Inspections Division for assessment in that these reports fell outside the scope of the INV investigation of the Cartagena incident.²⁷

Allegation 2: The DHS OIG received reports that the USSS RES did not provide any employee administrative warnings during the Cartagena interviews.

The OIG consulted with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) after USSS employees reported that the USSS Office of Professional Responsibility (RES) did not provide USSS personnel with any employee rights advisements during the interviews conducted as part of their investigation of this incident. After consulting with the DOJ, OIG decided that the OIG would conduct an entirely new investigation to ensure that the information OIG obtained during our interviews was obtained

²² (Exhibits # 20, 25, 123, 306, 314, 316, 317, 324, 340, 346, 352)

²³ (Exhibits # 3A, 315, 365)

²⁴ (Exhibits # 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 64, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 87, 91, 94, 95, 99, 100, 107, 110, 115, 119, 127, 129, 130, 131, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 147, 148, 150, 152, 155, 156, 161, 167, 169, 172, 174, 175, 178, 180, 182, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 195, 196, 197, 199, 202, 203, 207, 209, 211, 214, 215, 216, 217, 228, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 261, 262, 320)

²⁵ (Exhibits # 49, 50, 65, 126, 127, 145, 168, 234, 257, 268, 292, 294, 295, 306, 322, 324, 326, 338, 343, 345, 345A, 347, 351, 353, 354, 356)

²⁶ (Exhibits # 4, 26, 62, 80, 84, 86, 122, 125, 126, 127, 145, 168, 173C, 198, 212, 234, 252, 264, 291, 322, 353, 364, 365)

²⁷ (Exhibit # 366)

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voluntarily and therefore useable in any potential criminal or administrative proceedings. OIG found that of the employees initially interviewed by USSS RES, 38 said they were provided with an administrative rights advisement,²⁸ 72 advised that they were provided with no rights advisement²⁹ and 48 had no recollection of receiving any warnings whatsoever.³⁰

USSS employees OIG interviewed reported that they felt compelled to participate in the USSS RES interviews, citing concerns of punishment or reprimand if they failed to cooperate in the RES investigation.³¹

Two USSS RES Inspectors responsible for conducting the internal interviews also reported that administrative rights were not provided to employees.³²

The reports of USSS policy regarding the use of administrative warnings for USSS employees was referred to OIG Inspections Division for assessment in that these reports fell outside the scope of the INV investigation of the Cartagena incident.³³

Allegation 3: The DHS OIG received reports that U.S. Secret Service personnel failed to properly record foreign national contact reports.

As part of our investigation, OIG reviewed the completed USSS foreign national contact reports and conducted interviews to determine whether the USSS personnel had complied with the mandatory reporting provisions of DCID 6/4 and PDD 12, as authorized by Executive Order 9397, 6 USC 341, 44 USC 3101, PDD 12 and DCID 6/4. Specifically, the OIG requested all foreign contact reports on file with the USSS since January 2008, to determine whether foreign contacts had been properly reported and documented as required, and to identify instances with foreign nationals similar to those of the Cartagena incident. Our review of these documents found that in the four years prior to this incident, 105 total reports were filed. Our review revealed that following the Cartagena incident and a subsequent reported USSS policy change, 423 new reported foreign national contacts were filed,

²⁸ (Exhibits # 39, 41, 42, 55, 64, 71, 73, 85, 86, 87, 95, 97, 98, 100, 107, 112, 114, 122C, 123, 124, 128, 129, 133, 139, 145, 146, 151, 174, 178, 184, 190, 199, 212, 221, 223, 234, 238, 240, 249, 360E)

²⁹ (Exhibits # 18, 19, 20, 26, 44, 49, 51, 52, 57, 58, 62, 63, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 89, 91, 94, 96, 101, 103, 106, 108, 115, 116, 118A, 119, 123, 125, 126, 127, 136, 137, 138, 143, 150, 154, 172, 173C, 179, 182, 187, 188, 193, 195, 198, 203, 204, 205, 209, 214, 220, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 233, 235, 236, 239, 241, 243, 244, 246, 247, 251, 273, 297, 312, 360E)

³⁰ (Exhibits # 38, 43, 47, 53, 54, 59, 61, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 80, 82, 84, 99, 110, 130, 132, 134, 140, 141, 148, 168, 169, 175, 185, 189, 191, 192, 194, 196, 197, 200, 201, 206, 208, 215, 216, 217, 228, 230, 232, 237, 242, 244, 248, 250, 360E)

³¹ (Exhibit # 26, 65, 68, 74, 82, 85, 86, 94, 98, 107, 110, 112, 118A, 123, 126, 173C, 199, 220, 297, 312, 360E)

³² (Exhibits # 297, 312, 363)

³³ (Exhibit # 366)

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the majority of which were retroactively filed subsequent to this incident, dating back to 1976. Of the 423, one report was filed for the Cartagena trip.³⁴

The reports of prior USSS policy and new procedural changes regarding the reporting of foreign contacts were referred to OIG Inspections Division for assessment in that these reports fell outside the scope of the INV investigation of the Cartagena incident.³⁵

Allegation 4: The DHS OIG reviewed the Cartagena incident for any potential disclosure of national security information and/or related threat to the President of the United States.

During our interviews of USSS personnel, OIG received no reports of any potential loss or disclosure of national security information or any specified threat to the President directly related to the Cartagena prostitution incident. More specifically, our investigation developed no evidence to suggest that the actions of USSS personnel had potentially compromised the safety and security of the President or any sensitive information during this trip; however, OIG received reports of other alleged compromises of safety and security.³⁶ These additional allegations are currently under OIG review.

As part of our investigation, OIG identified 16 female Colombian nationals involved in the incident; OIG could not identify the name of the female Colombian national involved in the incident at a private residence. OIG queried the IC as to whether these 16 females were connected to criminal or terrorist organizations. Two of the females' names had associated derogatory information, which is classified; however, just one could be supported, the other was vetted and found not to be the foreign national in question.³⁷ Our interviews of USSS executive personnel and our review of relevant records confirmed that the USSS had knowledge that one FFN had derogatory information,³⁸ but were not aware of the second identified by the OIG.

[Agent's Note: Records from the Hilton Cartagena Hotel also showed names of two people OIG identified as the non-DHS employees associated with the White House, registered in two separate rooms. The names of the [REDACTED] females listed as visitors to these two rooms during the advance activities were queried through the IC, which did not reveal any derogatory information. OIG did not interview the two non-DHS employees or the FFN visitors regarding any disclosure issues.]

³⁴ (Exhibits # 122C, 152, 161A, 193, 261, 273, 279, 284, 285, 339, 360A, 360B, 365)

³⁵ (Exhibit # 366)

³⁶ (Exhibits # 257, 267, 285, 320A, 324, 348, 356, 365)

³⁷ (Exhibits # 335, 358, 358A, 365, 366)

³⁸ (Exhibits # 98A, 162, 277, 277A, 278, 278A, 283, 285, 289, 306, 310, 312, 313, 317, 323, 349, 350, 365, 366)

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The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] did not tell the prostitute why he was in Cartagena, nor did he tell her that he was a USSS SA. [REDACTED] stated did not release any classified or sensitive information to the prostitute and did not report any loss.³⁹

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] stated that he did not disclose any sensitive or classified information to [REDACTED] LNU. [REDACTED] told investigators he had secured all sensitive or classified documents in the car plane and in the safe of his hotel room.⁴⁰

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] pertained mainly to the [REDACTED] kept these documents in a safe in his hotel room when they were not in his possession. [REDACTED] disposed of these documents by placing them in a burn bag at the [REDACTED]. No unauthorized persons had access to [REDACTED] paperwork.⁴¹

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] stated that he told his female companion that he was a tourist from the U.S., but did not tell her his occupation, nor did he ask her occupation. [REDACTED] stated the female companion did not ask any questions about the U.S. government, USSS, or anything about the U.S. other than the fact that she mentioned she would like to visit the U.S. at some point in her life. [REDACTED] stated he did not possess any classified information, any documentation regarding the Presidential visit to Cartagena, or a weapon in his room. [REDACTED] stated he did have [REDACTED] and his credentials locked in the safe in his room. [REDACTED] believed he may have had his personal travel documentation, such as plane tickets and receipts, in a bag in his room. [REDACTED] stated he was carrying his USSS blackberry, but it was locked with a password. He did not report anything missing.⁴²

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] stated he had no Top Secret or classified information in his possession. He did not report anything missing.⁴³

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. [REDACTED] denied having any classified or sensitive information in his possession

³⁹ (Exhibits # 123, 365, 366)

⁴⁰ (Exhibits # 26, 365, 366)

⁴¹ (Exhibits # 82, 365, 366)

⁴² (Exhibits # 86, 365, 366)

⁴³ (Exhibits # 124, 365, 366)

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that the FFN may have had access to or whether she accessed any of information. [REDACTED] also denied her having any access to weapons or law enforcement tools.⁴⁴

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS, [REDACTED] Washington, D.C. While in Cartagena, [REDACTED] had no classified or sensitive paperwork. [REDACTED] stated he was not aware of any compromise of such material by anyone during the Cartagena operation. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any incident, to include Cartagena, in which the actions of USSS personnel compromised the safety and security of the President.⁴⁵

The OIG submitted an official Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) request so that OIG could proceed with re-interviews of the FFNs and secure additional records to identify any other outstanding investigative leads; however, that request was declined. Therefore, OIG had to rely on the FFN statements previously obtained by the USSS.⁴⁶

Other Allegations Reported:

[REDACTED]

During our investigation, OIG received allegations that the USSS learned on April 19, 2012, that one FFN had derogatory information within the IC;⁴⁷ [REDACTED]. It was also reported that USSS officials had previously advised Congress that no White House personnel were involved in the Cartagena incident despite knowledge of their potential misconduct.

Reportedly, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [A separate DHS OIG investigation has been initiated on this matter.]

⁴⁴ (Exhibits # 118A, 365, 366)

⁴⁵ (Exhibits # 119, 365, 366)

⁴⁶ (Exhibits # 3A, 315, 365)

⁴⁷ (Exhibits # 98A, 162, 277, 277A, 278, 278A, 283, 285, 289, 306, 310, 312, 313, 317, 323, 349, 349A, 350, 365)

⁴⁸ (Exhibits # 20, 25, 117A, 152, 306, 314, 316, 317, 324, 340, 346, 347, 352, 363, 365)

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The DHS OIG received allegations of interference by USSS personnel with transparency during the Cartagena investigation.

During our investigation of this matter, OIG received reports that USSS managers and executives advised their subordinates not to speak voluntarily with the OIG or proactively cooperate with the OIG investigation of this incident. Interviewees alleged that USSS legal counsel and others directed them not to participate in the interviews with the OIG.⁴⁹ Of the 32 employees who declined to participate in a voluntary interview and declined to answer our questions, 10 were senior level managers or senior executives, to include Deputy Assistant and Assistant Directors; and 22 were special agents or inspectors.⁵⁰

One individual interviewed reported threats of retaliation for cooperating with the OIG and consenting to be interviewed,⁵¹ and another reported that USSS information technology (IT) personnel had intercepted OIG email communications with USSS employees regarding their availability, or willingness, to be interviewed by the OIG.⁵²

Additionally, OIG received reports that USSS officials continued to proceed with their investigative activities into the Cartagena incident, despite having been advised by the OIG on several occasions to cease their investigative activities, in order to enable the OIG to conduct an independent investigation.⁵³ [A separate DHS OIG investigation has been initiated on this matter.]

All reported information of broader organizational issues within the USSS was referred to OIG Inspections Division for assessment in that these reports fell outside the scope of the INV investigation of the Cartagena incident.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ (Exhibits # 260, 267, 359, 365)

⁵⁰ (Exhibits # 104, 144, 153, 163, 177, 258, 259, 260, 263, 280, 282, 301, 365)

⁵¹ (Exhibit # 267)

⁵² (Exhibit # 299)

⁵³ (Exhibits # 123, 162, 278A)

⁵⁴ (Exhibit # 366)

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EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|---|
| 1 | Predicate Document – <u>Case Opening</u> , on May 23, 2012 |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Records Request (Dept of State, DSS)</u> , on May 30, 2012 |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – Meeting with DOJ Public Integrity</u> , on May 30, 2012 |
| 3A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – MLAT Request Rejection</u> , on July 27, 2012 |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – USSS Complaint Referrals</u> , on May 31, 2012 |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Subpoena Request - SATO Travel</u> , on June 1, 2012 |
| 6 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for USSS Records</u> , on June 3, 2012 |
| 7 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Hotline Complaint ([REDACTED])</u> , on June 3, 2012 |
| 8 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Hotline Complaint ([REDACTED])</u> , on June 3, 2012 |
| 9 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Contact – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 1, 2012 |
| 10 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – National Finance Records</u> , on June 3, 2012 |
| 11 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Hotline Complaint [REDACTED]</u> on June 6, 2012 |
| 12 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Contacts – Hotline Complaint [REDACTED]</u> , on June 6, 2012 |
| 13 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Contact – Hotline Complaint [REDACTED] (Attorney [REDACTED])</u> , on June 6, 2012 |
| 14 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 13, 2012 |
| 15 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012 |
| 16 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 13, 2012 |
| 17 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012 |
| 18 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 12, 2012 |
| 19 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 12, 2012 |
| 20 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 13, 2012 |
| 21 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012 |
| 22 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012 |
| 23 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 12, 2012 |
| 24 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Country Clearance Approvals</u> , on June 6, 2012 |

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|----|---|
| 25 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Hotel Hilton Cartagena Records</u> , on June 6, 2012 |
| 26 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on July 25, 2012 |
| 27 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – USSS Trip Emails for Assigned Visit Support Personnel</u> , on June 7, 2012 |
| 28 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – DOD JAG Records</u> , on June 7, 2012 |
| 29 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Records Request from DSS</u> , on June 12, 2012 |
| 30 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Record Review – USSS Names</u> , on June 21, 2012 |
| 31 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 12, 2012 |
| 32 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 28, 2012 |
| 33 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on July 23, 2012 |
| 34 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on July 23, 2012 |
| 35 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on July 23, 2012 |
| 36 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on July 23, 2012 |
| 37 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 18, 2012 |
| 38 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 19, 2012 |
| 39 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 19, 2012 |
| 40 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 18, 2012 |
| 41 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 19, 2012 |
| 42 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 19, 2012 |
| 43 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 20, 2012 |
| 44 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 20, 2012 |
| 45 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 20, 2012 |
| 46 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 26, 2012 |
| 47 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 26, 2012 |
| 48 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 27, 2012 |
| 49 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on July 2, 2012 |
| 50 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 19, 2012 |
| 51 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 19, 2012 |
| 52 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 19, 2012 |
| 53 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 19, 2012 |
| 54 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – ██████████</u> , on June 19, 2012 |

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|-----|---|
| 54A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Case File Review</u> , on June 25, 2012 |
| 55 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 56 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 57 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 58 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 59 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 60 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 60A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Emails from USSS Attorney</u> – ██████████ ██████████ on July 11, 2012 |
| 61 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 62 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 63 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 64 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 65 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 66 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 67 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 68 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 69 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 70 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 71 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 72 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 73 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 18, 2012 |
| 74 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 75 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 76 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 77 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 78 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 79 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 80 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 81 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 82 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 83 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 84 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 85 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 86 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------|---|
| 87 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 19, 2012 |
| 88 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 19, 2012 |
| 89 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 19, 2012 |
| 90 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Referral to [REDACTED] Field Office</u> – [REDACTED], on June 19, 2012 |
| 91 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 19, 2012 |
| 92 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 19, 2012 |
| 93 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Emails</u> , on June 23, 2012 |
| 94 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 95 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 96 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 97 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 98 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 98A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 12, 2012 |
| 99 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 100 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 101 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 102 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 103 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 104 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 104A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on July 11, 2012 |
| 105 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 106 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 107 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 108 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 109 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 110 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 111 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 112 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 113 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 114 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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|------|---|
| 115 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012 |
| 116 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012 |
| 117 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Record Request from Department of State</u> , on June 20, 2012 |
| 117A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review- Certified Official Passport Records</u> , on September 21, 2012. |
| 118 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 18, 2012 |
| 118A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 26, 2012 |
| 119 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 119A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Check (TECS)</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 120 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 121 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of ██████████ Lead</u> , on June 21, 2012 |
| 121A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Interview: ██████████</u> , on July 17, 2012 |
| 121B | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Information – United States Air Force</u> , on July 17, 2012 |
| 121C | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 25, 2012 |
| 121D | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Information – Forensic Threat Analysis Unit</u> , on July 26, 2012 |
| 121E | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Information – Photograph of ██████████</u> , on July 27, 2012 |
| 122 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012 |
| 122A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Attempted Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012 |
| 122B | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 122C | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012 |
| 123 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 25, 2012 |
| 124 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 125 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 126 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 127 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012 |
| 128 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 129 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 130 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 131 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, June 21, 2012 |
| 132 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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| 133 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 134 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 135 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 24, 2012 |
| 136 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 137 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 138 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 139 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 140 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 141 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 142 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 143 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 144 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 145 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 146 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 147 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 148 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 149 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 150 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 151 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, June 21, 2012 |
| 152 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on August 2, 2012 |
| 152A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 20, 2012 |
| 153 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012 |
| 153A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012 |
| 154 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 155 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 156 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012 |
| 157 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012 |
| 158 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 23, 2012 |
| 159 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 160 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 161 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012 |
| 161A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Information</u> – ██████████, on July 7, 2012 |

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| 162 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 13, 2012 |
| 163 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012 |
| 164 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012 |
| 165 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012 |
| 166 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 23, 2012 |
| 167 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 168 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012 |
| 169 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 170 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 23, 2012 |
| 171 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012 |
| 172 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 173 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 173A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Check (CLEAR/TECS)</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 173B | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Visit</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 173C | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on August 3, 2012 |
| 174 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012 |
| 175 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 176 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012 |
| 177 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Contact</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 177A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Surveillance of</u> ██████████ on June 26, 2012 |
| 178 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 179 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 29, 2012 |
| 180 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 181 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 182 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 183 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Cancelled Lead</u> , on July 20, 2012 |
| 184 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 185 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 186 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Lead Combined with #349</u> , on July 12, 2012 |
| 187 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012 |
| 188 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |

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| 189 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012 |
| 190 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012 |
| 191 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012 |
| 192 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012 |
| 193 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012 |
| 194 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012 |
| 195 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012 |
| 196 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 197 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 198 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 198A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Check (EDS/TECS)</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 199 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012 |
| 200 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 22, 2012 |
| 201 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 202 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 203 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 204 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 205 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████ on June 25, 2012 |
| 206 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 207 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 208 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 209 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 210 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 211 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████ on June 27, 2012 |
| 212 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 213 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 214 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 215 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 216 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 217 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 218 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 219 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 220 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, |

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| 221 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012 |
| 222 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012 |
| 223 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012 |
| 224 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012 |
| 225 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012 |
| 226 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012 |
| 227 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012 |
| 228 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012 |
| 229 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012 |
| 230 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012 |
| 231 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Cancelled Lead</u> , on July 20, 2012 |
| 232 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012 |
| 233 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 18, 2012 |
| 234 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012 |
| 235 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012 |
| 236 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012 |
| 237 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012 |
| 238 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012 |
| 239 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 20, 2012 |
| 240 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012 |
| 241 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 27, 2012 |
| 242 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012 |
| 243 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012 |
| 244 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012 |
| 245 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012 |
| 246 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 28, 2012 |
| 247 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 29, 2012 |
| 248 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 26, 2012 |
| 249 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 29, 2012 |
| 250 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 29, 2012 |
| 251 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – [REDACTED], on June 29, 2012 |

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| 252 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 19, 2012 |
| 253 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 23, 2012 |
| 254 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 23, 2012 |
| 255 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 23, 2012 |
| 256 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Request – DCA</u> , June 18, 2012 |
| 257 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 258 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 259 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 260 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012 |
| 261 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012 |
| 262 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 263 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012 |
| 264 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 265 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012 |
| 266 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Request - Collateral Request to FTA Unit</u> , on June 22, 2012 |
| 267 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 21, 2012 |
| 268 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012 |
| 269 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 22, 2012 |
| 270 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 29, 2012 |
| 271 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 23, 2012 |
| 272 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 24, 2012 |
| 273 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 274 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 24, 2012 |
| 275 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 24, 2012 |
| 276 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 24, 2012 |
| 277 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012 |
| 277A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 9, 2012 |
| 278 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 278A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 9, 2012 |
| 278B | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 16, 2012 |
| 279 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012 |
| 280 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012 |
| 281 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 25, 2012 |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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| 282 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012 |
| 283 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012 |
| 284 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 285 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 20, 2012 |
| 286 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Receipt of Trip Survey Packet for Trip #341-011-034-0163-12</u> , on June 22, 2012 |
| 287 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Summary/Closure – Lead 287</u> , on June 21, 2012 |
| 287A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt/Review of Information – Flying While Armed Logs</u> , on June 25, 2012 |
| 288 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 289 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 25, 2012 |
| 290 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 23, 2012 |
| 291 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 292 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 293 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 24, 2012 |
| 294 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 295 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 296 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 27, 2012 |
| 297 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012 |
| 297A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Check (EDS)</u> , on July 7, 2012 |
| 298 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012 |
| 299 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012 |
| 300 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012 |
| 301 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 9, 2012 |
| 302 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012 |
| 303 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012 |
| 304 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012 |
| 305 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 23, 2012 |
| 306 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012 |
| 307 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 26, 2012 |
| 308 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 27, 2012 |
| 309 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – FNU</u> ██████████, on June 27, 2012 |
| 310 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 26, 2012 |
| 311 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 9, 2012 |

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| 311A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Check (EDS) – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 9, 2012 |
| 312 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 11, 2012 |
| 313 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 11, 2012 |
| 314 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Summit of Americas Hotel List</u> , on June 14, 2012 |
| 315 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Colombian Female Foreign Nationals</u> , on June 26, 2012 |
| 316 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 12, 2012 |
| 317 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> on July 13, 2012 |
| 318 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 13, 2012 |
| 319 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on June 27, 2012 |
| 320 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 12, 2012 |
| 320A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012 |
| 321 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 9, 2012 |
| 322 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 28, 2012 |
| 323 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 28, 2012 |
| 324 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 28, 2012 |
| 325 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 28, 2012 |
| 326 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on June 28, 2012 |
| 327 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Cancelled Lead</u> , on July 23, 2012 |
| 328 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Receipt of Documents from DHS OIG, Office of Inspections</u> , on June 29, 2012 |
| 329 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Documents on July 12, 2012</u> , on July 12, 2012 |
| 329A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – USSS Travel Vouchers</u> , on July 18, 2012 |
| 330 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Request for Intelligence Report</u> , on July 3, 2012 |
| 331 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Subpoena Request (CITI bank)</u> , July 3, 2012 |
| 332 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Subpoena Request (Hilton)</u> , on July 3, 2012 |
| 333 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Cancelled Lead</u> , July 3, 2012 |
| 334 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Request - Request to USSS for Credit Card Records</u> , on July 6, 2012 |
| 335 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Request to [REDACTED] OIG</u> , on July 9, 2012 |
| 336 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 23, 2012 |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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| 337 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012 |
| 337A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012 |
| 338 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review</u> – ██████████ Letter, on July 5, 2012 |
| 339 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Information – Foreign Contact Reporting</u> , on June 20, 2012 |
| 340 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – White House Advance Staff Records from US Embassy, Bogota</u> , on July 6, 2012 |
| 341 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Hilton Subpoena Served</u> , on July 10, 2012 |
| 342 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 29, 2012 |
| 343 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other</u> – ██████████ on June 29, 2012 |
| 344 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012 |
| 345 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012 |
| 345A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Records – Documents Received by CS</u> , on July 13, 2012 |
| 346 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Contact</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012 |
| 347 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 11, 2012 |
| 348 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 9, 2012 |
| 349 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████ ██████████ on July 12, 2012 |
| 349A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Telephone Contact</u> – ██████████, on July 13, 2012 |
| 350 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of Information – Congressional Briefing Packet</u> , on July 12, 2012 |
| 351 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review</u> – ██████████, on July 10, 2012 |
| 352 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review</u> – ██████████ Emails Regarding Hilton Hotel Records, on July 12, 2012 |
| 353 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on July 12, 2012 |
| 354 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Employee Separations from U.S. Secret Service</u> , on July 18, 2012 |
| 355 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Receipt of</u> ██████████ Lead (Lead 90), on June 19, 2012 |
| 356 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview</u> – ██████████, on June 28, 2012 |
| 357 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Review of</u> ██████████ Statement, on July 19, 2012 |
| 358 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Intelligence Community (IC) Record</u> , on July 19, 2012 *** CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT *** |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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| 358A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Record Receipt – Intelligence Community (IC) Record</u> , on August 7, 2012 *** CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT *** |
| 359 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – [REDACTED]</u> , on July 24, 2012 |
| 360 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Receipt of USSS Documents</u> , on July 25, 2012 |
| 360A | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Record Review – USSS Training Documents</u> , on July 27, 2012 |
| 360B | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Record Review – Employee Reporting Responsibilities</u> , on July 26, 2012 |
| 360C | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Receipt of Records (USSS Documents)</u> , on July 30, 2012 |
| 360D | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – Receipt of Email Discs</u> , on August 21, 2012 |
| 360E | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – USSS Documents – RES</u> , on August 24, 2012 |
| 361 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Record Review – Hilton Worldwide</u> , on July 19, 2012 |
| 362 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on August 2, 2012 |
| 363 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Personal Interview – [REDACTED]</u> , on August 2, 2012 |
| 364 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Record Review – USSS Internal Allegations</u> , on August 21, 2012 |
| 365 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Records Review – Congressional Questionnaire to USSS</u> , on August 21, 2012 |
| 366 | Memorandum of Activity, <u>Other – INV Summary for Referral to DHS OIG Inspections</u> , dated September 5, 2012 |

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

March 1, 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Janet Napolitano
Secretary

FROM: Charles Edwards
Deputy Inspector General

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Charles K. Edwards".

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
United States Secret Service
Washington, DC

CASE NUMBER: I12-USSS-OSI-00876

Attached is our Report of Investigation (ROI) on the above subject.

The ROI is furnished for whatever action you consider appropriate and no reply is necessary. However, should you take any action in response to our ROI, please inform this office so that we may update our records. Please destroy the ROI upon disposition of this matter.

Should you have any questions regarding the ROI, you may call me at (202) 254-[REDACTED], or a member of your staff may call Karen Cottrell, Acting Special Agent in Charge, at (202) 632-[REDACTED]

Attachment

**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I12-USSS-OSI-00876



~~THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT MATERIAL. IT MAY NOT BE LOANED OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY AND, EXCEPT IN CONNECTION WITH OFFICIAL AGENCY ACTION, NO PORTION OF THE REPORT MAY BE COPIED OR DISTRIBUTED WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.~~



Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

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|------------------------------|---|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | 112-USSS-OSI-00876 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | [REDACTED] [REDACTED] United States Secret Service Washington, DC |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | 18 USC § 1001 Statements or Entries Generally; 18 USC § 1505 Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees; and Ethics/Standards of Conduct. |

SYNOPSIS

This investigation was initiated upon receipt of an allegation that [REDACTED] United States Secret Service (USSS), Washington, DC, [REDACTED] regarding the USSS' investigation into the alleged misconduct of USSS personnel in Cartagena, Colombia.

Specifically, it was alleged that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] In addition, it was alleged that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), investigation developed no evidence that [REDACTED] Furthermore the investigation, thus far, has not developed any evidence that [REDACTED]. However, the DHS-OIG investigation has revealed [REDACTED] which merits further investigation by the DHS-OIG and will be addressed in a subsequent Report of Investigation.

| | | | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Special Investigations | Original |
| Title: Senior Special Agent | Date: March 1, 2013 | Headquarters | cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) | cc |
| Name: Karen Cottrell | Signature: <i>Karen Cottrell</i> | Other | cc |
| Title: Acting Special Agent in Charge | Date: March 1, 2013 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

The DHS-OIG consulted with the U.S. Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section, regarding the investigative findings. The OIG was informed that the findings did not merit prosecution.

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DETAILS

In June 2012, during the course of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), investigation into the alleged misconduct by United States Secret Service (USSS) personnel in Cartagena, Colombia, the DHS-OIG received information alleging that [REDACTED] [REDACTED] USSS, Washington, DC, [REDACTED] the USSS' investigation into the alleged misconduct of USSS personnel in Cartagena, Colombia. Specifically, it was alleged that [REDACTED] concerning the Cartagena, Colombia, incident [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition, it was alleged that [REDACTED]

The OIG reviewed [REDACTED]

The following is an excerpt from [REDACTED]

Allegation #1: [REDACTED] concerning the Cartagena, Colombia, incident [REDACTED]

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], [REDACTED] USSS [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that the FFNs underwent a national security check in April 2012, which resulted in one match of the FFNs against a national security index. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any subsequent investigation or interpretation

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

conducted by the USSS regarding the response. [REDACTED] did not have any knowledge and/or fact that [REDACTED] (Exhibit 4)

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] personnel. In summary, the [REDACTED] personnel confirmed there was a database check conducted on the FFNs and it resulted in a response concerning one FFN, but they had no evidence that [REDACTED] (Exhibits 5-12)

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS [REDACTED] confirmed that a database check was conducted on the FFNs by [REDACTED], which resulted in what [REDACTED] determined to be a possible association. [REDACTED] took [the response] as a piece of information and characterized it as "not alarming," based upon [REDACTED] assessment. [REDACTED] assumed [REDACTED] did not have any knowledge and/or fact that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] believed that [REDACTED] (Exhibit 13)

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] USSS [REDACTED] stated that the intelligence information that came back on the FFN consisted of a partial name match, "nothing more." [REDACTED] briefed [REDACTED] chain of command that there was one possible association. [REDACTED] advised that after a review of the IC response, [REDACTED] explained why it was not a positive response; they all backed [REDACTED] and thought it was a good assessment. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] the IC response was accurate and [REDACTED] did not have knowledge or fact that [REDACTED] (Exhibit 14)

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] USSS [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] had knowledge that one FFN had a positive response for derogatory information based on the [IC] queries. [REDACTED] briefed [REDACTED] USSS [REDACTED], about the response. [REDACTED] felt that [REDACTED] was true and correct. (Exhibit 15)

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] indicated that the result from the IC check on the FFNs was not a positive response and referenced the age of the record and lack of an exact name match. [REDACTED] stated that prior to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] USSS [REDACTED], that there had been a response on one of the FFNs, but there had been no confirmation and they were in the process of verifying the information. [REDACTED] further stated that [REDACTED] it was probably not the same person as the FFN involved in the incident (referring to the alleged misconduct by USSS personnel in Cartagena, Colombia). [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] based on the information [REDACTED] (Exhibits 16-18)

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that the name checks were completed and all were negative, but then further clarified that they had a

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

response on one partial name. In reference to the response, [REDACTED] concluded and subsequently [REDACTED] "This is not our girl, no issues."

[REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] there was "nothing there." [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] provided the OIG with a [REDACTED] which revealed the following excerpt, amongst other things: [REDACTED] did not have any knowledge or belief that [REDACTED] (Exhibit 19)

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] none of the name checks contained information related to a "hit". [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] further told [REDACTED] one of the checks produced the same name as one of the FFNs, but [REDACTED] was not confident there was a match. [REDACTED] stated that the information was never verified so they were not comfortable saying it was a "match" or "hit" [REDACTED] why an innocent person was implicated. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] (Exhibit 20)

The OIG interview [REDACTED], USSS. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was aware there was a response, but did not know about the particulars. [REDACTED] did not communicate information on the response [REDACTED] outside of what was provided [REDACTED] by other directorates. [REDACTED], but did not address the response as it was not perceived as an issue at the time. [REDACTED] did not believe that [REDACTED] (Exhibit 21)

The OIG reviewed documents provided by the USSS. The review revealed a document with a cover page labeled [REDACTED]. The following is an excerpt from the document: [REDACTED] (Exhibit 22)

The OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS. [REDACTED] acknowledged that IC checks were conducted on all of the FFNs [REDACTED] there was no derogatory information reported. [REDACTED] reflected there was no derogatory information. [REDACTED] there was not a "hit." [REDACTED]

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

[REDACTED] one of the FFNs had a partial name "hit," but she (FFN) did not have the same name and date of birth as the person with the "hit" and it was not a name "hit." [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] informed [REDACTED] the interview of the FFN did not reveal any nexus to the "hit." [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] that there was not a "hit" [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] compiled [REDACTED] [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] stated there [REDACTED] (Exhibit 23)

Following the DHS OIG interview [REDACTED], provided the DHS-OIG with several documents, one of which was titled "Account of the U.S. Secret Service Incident on April 11-12, 2012, in Cartagena, Colombia," that contained the following excerpt, amongst other things: "None of the women were tied to terrorist, drug or human trafficking organizations." (Exhibit 24)

In November 2012, the DHS-OIG consulted with the U.S. Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section, regarding the investigative findings. The OIG was informed that the findings did not merit prosecution. (Exhibit 25)

Allegation #2: [REDACTED]

The OIG investigation has not developed any findings, to date, which indicate that [REDACTED] involved in an attempt to [REDACTED]. However, the DHS OIG investigation has revealed [REDACTED] which merits further investigation by the DHS OIG and will be addressed in a subsequent Report of Investigation.

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EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|--|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity, Predicate Document, dated June 28, 2012. |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, Other – Supplemental Case Predication, dated June 2012. |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, Other – Receipt and Review of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Related Documents, dated October 18, 2012. |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED], dated December 3, 2012. |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED], dated July 12, 2012. |
| 6 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED], dated June 27, 2012. |
| 7 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED], dated July 9, 2012. |
| 8 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview [REDACTED], dated June 28, 2012. |
| 9 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview [REDACTED], dated July 9, 2012. |
| 10 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview [REDACTED], dated July 16, 2012. |
| 11 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview [REDACTED], dated July 11, 2012. |
| 12 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview [REDACTED], dated December 4, 2012. |
| 13 | Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED], dated December 12, 2012. |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

- 14 Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED], dated February 8, 2013.
- 15 Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED] dated July 11, 2012.
- 16 Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED], dated July 12, 2012.
- 17 Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] dated July 12, 2012.
- 18 Memorandum of Activity, Telephone Contact – Telephone Interview of
[REDACTED], dated July 13, 2012.
- 19 Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview [REDACTED], dated
November 7, 2012.
- 20 Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED] dated
July 13, 2012.
- 21 Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED], dated July 11, 2012.
- 22 Memorandum of Activity, Other – review of USSS Documents, dated January 2013.
- 23 Memorandum of Activity, Personal Interview – [REDACTED], dated August 2, 2012.
- 24 Memorandum of Activity, Other – Receipt of Document (from [REDACTED]
dated August 13, 2012.
- 25 Memorandum of Activity, Telephone Contact – USDOJ Public Integrity, dated
November 20, 2012.

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I12-USSS-PHL-00439



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | I12-USSS-PHL-00439 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | Unknown Special Agents U.S. Secret Service Brooklyn, NY |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law, 18 U.S.C. 242 |

SYNOPSIS

The investigation was initiated upon receipt of an allegation that a Homeland Security Investigations' (HSI) confidential informant (CI) was physically and verbally assaulted by U.S. Secret Service (USSS) agents. Additionally, it was alleged the USSS agents held the CI for several hours and forced him to conduct a counterfeit currency operation. The CI reported the alleged assault to his HSI handler and sought hospital treatment for his injuries.

During interviews with the CI, he alleged [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The CI alleged [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
The CI claimed [REDACTED]

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All participants in the counterfeit operation were interviewed, to include [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. All participants provided voluntary sworn statements and denied causing and/or witnessing any abuse or mistreatment.

A review of government email messages and closed circuit television (CCTV) footage from the USSS office failed to identify any inappropriate actions. The CCTV footage provided a depiction of the CI that was contrary to the CI's allegations.

The Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Washington, DC, reviewed the investigative findings and declined action.

| <i>Reporting Agent</i> | | <i>Distribution:</i> | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|----------|
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Philadelphia Field Office | Original |
| Title: Asst. Special Agent in Charge | Date: 2/10/13 | Headquarters | 1 cc |
| <i>Approving Official</i> | | Component(s) | 1 cc |
| Name: Gregory K. Null | Signature: [REDACTED] | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 2/10/13 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DETAILS

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), initiated this investigation on February 7, 2012, upon receipt of information that a U.S. Customs and Border Protection confidential informant (CI) alleged he was physically and verbally assaulted by four U.S. Secret Service (USSS) agents assigned to the New York Field Office (NYFO), Brooklyn, NY. The CI alleged the USSS agents forced him to perform a counterfeit currency deal. The CI required hospitalization following the assault. It was determined the CI was assigned to Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and the complainant was the HSI agent who handled the CI. (Exhibit 1)

Allegation: USSS agents assaulted a confidential informant.

On February 15, 2012, DHS OIG interviewed the complainant, who was identified as confidential complainant (██████████ is the handler for a HSI CI who is assigned informant number ██████████

██████████ The CI was assisting HSI ██████████
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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (Exhibit 2)

On two occasions in February 2012, DHS OIG interviewed the CI who stated [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The CI recollected [REDACTED]

The CI [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [Agent's note: [REDACTED] was identified as [REDACTED] USSS, NYFO.]

The CI recalled [REDACTED]

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. (Exhibits 3 and 4)

During March 2012, DHS OIG conducted voluntary interviews with all USSS agents who had contact with the CI when [REDACTED] and/or participated in [REDACTED]. The following USSS agents were interviewed: [REDACTED]. Each agent provided a voluntary, sworn statement at the conclusion of the interview. Each agent stated they did not hear any struggle or cries from the CI. None witnessed any inappropriate physical or verbal actions by the agents who had direct contact with the CI. At no time did any of the above identified agents hear the CI ask to leave or request an attorney. (Exhibits 5-10)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

On March 23, 2012, DHS OIG conducted a voluntary interview of [REDACTED], SA, USSS, NYFO. [REDACTED] stated he, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were the main agents in the interview room on January 17, 2012, the day of the alleged assault. [REDACTED] stated he observed no physical or verbal altercation with the CI. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] took the CI to a different floor to conduct a consensually monitored telephone call. At no time did the CI complain or ask to leave. [REDACTED] described the CI's demeanor as normal. [REDACTED] stated the CI did not appear to be hurt, bruised or limping. At the conclusion of the interview, [REDACTED] provided a voluntary, sworn statement. (Exhibit 11)

On March 28, 2012, DHS OIG conducted a voluntary interview of [REDACTED], SA, USSS, NYFO. [REDACTED] stated he, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had the most contact with the CI on January 17, 2012. [REDACTED] recalled when the CI arrived at the USSS office he seemed to be pressed for time. The CI first claimed [REDACTED] but subsequently admitted [REDACTED]. That was the first time [REDACTED] was aware of another operation on the same day and he was concerned about the counterfeit targets being tied to the gun targets. [REDACTED] was concerned that the counterfeit meeting with the CI could be a "rip off." After discussion with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] a decision was made to go forward with the operation.

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At no time did the CI ever state he did not want to proceed with the operation. Gerbino stated "at no point did I see anyone touch him, hurt him, or throw anything." [REDACTED] acknowledged there was yelling, but he did not recall any swearing. [REDACTED] stated no one purposefully or accidentally pushed the table into the CI. [REDACTED] described his and the other agents' interactions with the CI as professional. [REDACTED] never heard the CS state he was hit or hurt. [REDACTED] never witnessed the CI slumped over, limping, wheezing or expressing any pain or discomfort. The CI never asked for medical assistance or to speak with an attorney. The CI never stated he was unwilling to participate in the operation. At the conclusion of the interview, [REDACTED] provided a voluntary, sworn statement. (Exhibit 12)

On May 1, 2012, DHS OIG conducted a voluntary interview of [REDACTED] SA, USSS, NYFO. [REDACTED] stated he served as the Counterfeit Squad's [REDACTED] and he was actively involved in the January 17, 2012, operation with the CI. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] was having difficulties getting information from the CI. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] sat down with the CI and questioned him about his participation in a gun deal later that day. [REDACTED] stated the CI was not being truthful and [REDACTED] yelled at the CI to tell the truth. [REDACTED] recalled at one point during the meeting with the CI, [REDACTED] stood across from the CI and [REDACTED] lifted up the table and dropped it down to get the CI's attention. [REDACTED] stated the CI was not hit or hurt by the table. [REDACTED] reiterated that he and [REDACTED] were loud and cursing while they tried to get the CI to realize the importance of telling the truth. [REDACTED] was concerned that agents could be hurt if another deal was scheduled to take place near their scheduled operation.

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

██████████ adamantly stated no one hit, pushed or hurt the CI. ██████████ did not hurt the CI in any way. ██████████ stated the CI never indicated he did not want to participate in the operation nor did he ask to speak to an attorney. ██████████ stated the CI never stated he was hurt or in pain. At the conclusion of the interview, ██████████ provided a voluntary, sworn statement. (Exhibit 13)

On May 1, 2012, DHS OIG conducted a voluntary interview of ██████████ USSS, NYFO. ██████████ stated ██████████ had a "hard time" working the CI and ██████████ instructed ██████████ to be involved in managing the CI. ██████████ recalled the CI was not happy about being searched with a hand magnetometer when he entered USSS space, but ██████████ stated that was standard procedure. ██████████ recalled the CI complained to ██████████ about being searched and the CI expected to be treated like a law enforcement agent. ██████████ first met the CI on January 17, 2012, prior to the operation. ██████████ described the CI as "hurried" and ██████████ wanted to get control of the CI prior to the operation. ██████████ stated he told the CI he was not needed for the operation since ██████████ already knew who the target was and the target vehicle. ██████████ exited the interview room, spoke in a loud voice, and directed two agents to the set location to possibly take down the target. ██████████ did this so the CI would realize ██████████ was serious about the operation.

When ██████████ returned to the interview room, the CI ignored him and kept talking to ██████████. At that point ██████████ picked up the table in the interview room, lifted it up and slammed it to the floor. ██████████ did that to get the CI's attention. ██████████ stated he "laid into him" by sitting on the table and invading the CI's personal space. ██████████ told the CI he worked for them and the CI had to be truthful and listen to the agents. After ██████████ confrontation, the CI began to respond truthfully to ██████████ and ██████████ decided to continue with the operation and the CI was provided with \$4,000 in U.S. currency and equipped with a recorder. The CI departed the USSS office in his own vehicle to the meet location.

██████████ stated he did not touch the CI. ██████████ stated he did point at the CI and ██████████ raised his voice to get the CI's attention. ██████████ stated the CI had no contact with the table when ██████████ lifted it and dropped the table to the floor. ██████████ described his interaction with the CI as an interrogation. At no point did the CI ever state he was hurt. The CI never stated he did not want to conduct the counterfeit deal. ██████████ stated the CI was not held against his will; however the CI was required to return to the USSS office after the operation since the CI had both counterfeit and authentic currency, and the recorder. ██████████ stated "that's the only time you could argue that procedurally he was restricted." ██████████ adamantly stated neither he nor any agent put their hands on the CI. At the conclusion of the interview, ██████████ provided a voluntary, sworn statement. (Exhibit 14)

DHS OIG reviewed closed circuit television (CCTV) recordings from the USSS, NYFO, processing and interview areas. According to the date and time stamps of the CCTV recordings, on January 17, 2012, the CI arrived at the USSS office at 12:54 p.m. The CCTV recording captured the CI and

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

agents departing the office at 3:39 p.m. [Agent's note: This time corresponds with the departure for the counterfeit buy-through operation.] At 5:18 p.m., the CI and USSS agents are captured on the CCTV recording as entering the processing and interview areas. [Agent's note: This time corresponds with the completion of the buy-through operation.] At 5:49 p.m., the CI is captured on the CCTV recording as departing the USSS processing and interview areas into the elevator area. The CCTV recordings captured images of the CI and USSS personnel at various times. At no time did the CI appear to be in pain or distress. Several images depict the CI smiling, laughing and speaking with USSS agents. (Exhibit 15)

DHS OIG reviewed the audio recordings and transcripts from the counterfeit operation that was captured from the CI's recorder prior to the operation, while he was en-route to the meet location, during the meeting, and on the CI's return to the USSS, NYFO. During the CI's ride to the meet location, several telephone conversations were recorded; however the audio was poor and the car radio interfered with the recording. During one telephone conversation, the CI is heard stating [REDACTED] [REDACTED] In a subsequent telephone conversation, the CI states [REDACTED] [REDACTED]."

During the CI's return to the NYFO, the recorder was turned off. During the audible portions of the recording, the CI's conversations seemed calm, relaxed and uneventful. The CI did not sound fearful, scared or upset and he did not mention being hurt or assaulted. (Exhibit 16)

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DHS OIG reviewed the Official Personnel Folders and relevant government emails for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. No pertinent information was identified. (Exhibit 17)

On March 15, 2013, the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Washington, DC, reviewed the investigative findings and determined the matter would be declined. (Exhibit 18)

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|--|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity, Case Initiation, dated February 6, 2012. |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of CC-1, dated February 15, 2012. |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of CI, dated February 15, 2012. |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of CI, dated February 17, 2012. |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated March 22, 2012. |
| 6 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated March 22, 2012. |
| 7 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated March 22, 2012. |
| 8 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated March 22, 2012. |
| 9 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated March 23, 2012. |
| 10 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated March 28, 2012. |
| 11 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated March 23, 2012. |
| 12 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated March 23, 2012. |
| 13 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated May 1, 2012. |
| 14 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated May 1, 2012. |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

- 15 Memorandum of Activity, Review of CCTV footage, dated January 7, 2013.
- 16 Memorandum of Activity, Review of consensual recordings, dated April 16, 2013.
- 17 Memorandum of Activity, Review of OPFs and emails, dated April 8, 2013
- 18 Memorandum of Activity, Declination notification, dated March 15, 2013.

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Case Summary Report

I13-USSS-MIA-00364

Title: [REDACTED]; USSS; [REDACTED] FL

Date Rcd: 4/11/2013 Date Assigned: 4/11/2013 Date Opened: 4/11/2013 Date Closed: 4/12/2013

Rcd Method: DHS Component

Agent: [REDACTED]

Affected Agency: U.S. Secret Service (DHS)

PrimaryOffice: Miami, FL

Ref Agency:

Alleg Type: Miscellaneous \ Non-Criminal Misconduct \ Ethics Violations - Non-Criminal

Special: No Privacy: No Confidential: No Dollar Loss: \$0.00

Joint Agency:

Ref Cases: C1308390

Comments: The purpose of this affidavit is to document the illegal and improper conduct committed by [REDACTED], [REDACTED] Field Office. These illegal and improper acts are described in this affidavit. These acts are described in detail. Some are known to me personally and others have been reported to me by men and women with great courage and unquestioned character. All of us are subordinates of [REDACTED] and have taken great risk to report this conduct upon fear of retaliation by [REDACTED] against us. This fear of retaliation is real and present. Although this may be the first time an illegal or improper act of his has been reported to Inspection, you will see that [REDACTED] has a long history of illegal and improper acts, both in the [REDACTED] Field Office and at least one event of falsifying paperwork outlined below in paragraph 9 while a junior agent in the [REDACTED] Field Office.

As an introduction to this affidavit, I feel it appropriate and necessary to document the most recent conduct committed by [REDACTED] that involves me. Upon conclusion, I will document other conduct which will be broken down by event and those that have knowledge of the event and conduct of [REDACTED].

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Case Summary Report

I13-USSS-MIA-00364

People - Subjects

| | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| [REDACTED] | Home | Male |
| Aka: [REDACTED] | SSN: [REDACTED] | EOD: [REDACTED] |
| POB City: [REDACTED] | POB State: [REDACTED] | |
| DOB: [REDACTED] | Alien Number: [REDACTED] | |
| Address: [REDACTED] | Company Name: [REDACTED] | |
| | City: [REDACTED] | State: [REDACTED] Zip: [REDACTED] |
| DHS Emp: YES | DHS Exec: No | |
| Phone: [REDACTED] | | |
| Email: [REDACTED] | | |

| | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| [REDACTED] | Work | Male |
| Aka: [REDACTED] | SSN: [REDACTED] | EOD: [REDACTED] |
| POB City: [REDACTED] | POB State: [REDACTED] | |
| DOB: [REDACTED] | Alien Number: [REDACTED] | |
| Address: [REDACTED] | Company Name: [REDACTED] | |
| | City: [REDACTED] | State: FL Zip: [REDACTED] |
| DHS Emp: YES | DHS Exec: No | |
| Phone: [REDACTED] | | |
| Email: [REDACTED] | | |

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Case Summary Report

I13-USSS-MIA-00364

People - Complainants

[REDACTED]

| | | |
|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Aka: | Home | Male |
| POB City: | SSN: [REDACTED] | EOD: [REDACTED] |
| DOB: [REDACTED] | POB State: | |
| Address: | Alien Number: | |
| | Company Name: | |
| DHS Emp: Yes | City: [REDACTED] | State: [REDACTED] Zip: [REDACTED] |
| Phone: | DHS Exec: No | |
| Email: | | |

[REDACTED]

| | | |
|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Aka: | Work | Male |
| POB City: | SSN: [REDACTED] | EOD: [REDACTED] |
| DOB: [REDACTED] | POB State: | |
| Address: | Alien Number: | |
| | Company Name: | |
| DHS Emp: Yes | City: WASHINGTON | State: DC Zip: |
| Phone: | DHS Exec: No | |
| Email: | | |

People - Witness

People - Victims

Violations

Name: [REDACTED]

Violation: 18 USC 1001 False Statements, Entries or Concealing or Covering Up a Material Fact

Allegation Type: Allegation Status: Information Only

Primary Allegation: True Ethical Conduct: None

Factual Detail:

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Case Summary Report

I13-USSS-MIA-00364

Case Dates:

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|----|
| Received: | 4/11/2013 | Assigned: | 4/11/2013 | Reassigned: | |
| Prb Referral: | | Retention: | | Acknowledged: | |
| Incident Start: | | Incident End: | | Approx: | No |
| Police Report: | | Police Rpt #: | | Referred: | |
| Notified: | | Reesponse: | | | |
| Investigation Comp: | | Closed: | 4/12/2013 | | |
| Prb Decision: | | Reopened: | | | |

Location

| | | | | | |
|--------------------|---------|---------------|----|------|--|
| Airport: | | Location: | | | |
| City: | Orlando | State: | FL | Zip: | |
| Facility: | | FFDO Airline: | | | |
| Investigation Loc: | | Region: | | | |
| Transport | | | | | |

Technical

Disposition - Criminal

| | | | | | |
|----------------------------|--------|--------------------|---------|--------------|--|
| Subject Violation: | | | | | |
| Prosecution Decision: | | | | | |
| Prosecutor Name: | | | | | |
| District Location: | | | | | |
| Sentence Reason: | | | | | |
| Recovery Date: | | | | | |
| Referral Date: | | | | | |
| Referral Decision | Other | | | | |
| Details: | | | | | |
| Indictment Date: | | Info Plea Date: | | | |
| Pretrial Diversion Date: | | Trial Date: | | Arrest Date: | |
| Acquitted Date: | | Fine Date: | | | |
| Restitution Date: | | Cost Saving Date: | | | |
| Confinement Mnths: | 0 | Suspended Mnths: | 0 | | |
| Probation Mnths: | 0 | Com Service Hrs: | 0 | | |
| Pre Trial Diversion Mnths: | 0 | Deported: | False | | |
| Restitution: | \$0.00 | Fine: | \$0.00 | | |
| Cost Savings: | \$0.00 | Asset Forfeiture: | \$0.00 | | |
| Conviction Date: | | Venue: | | | |
| Recovery Type: | | Jurisdiction Type: | Federal | | |
| Judicial Memo: | | | | | |

Dispositions - Civil

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Case Summary Report

I13-USSS-MIA-00364

Dispositions - Admin

MA

ROI / Referral

Collaterals

Uploaded Documents

Date Prepared: 4/11/2013 Grand Jury: No

Doc Type: Complaint Email

Description: Complaint Origination Document(s)

Date Prepared: 4/12/2013 Grand Jury: No

Doc Type: 1300364 DMV - [REDACTED]

Description: Public Database Reports (CLEAR, TLO, etc..)

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All redactions in this document are pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(6) and (b)(7)(C).



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Investigation # - 113
USSS-MIA-00364

Investigation Title - [Redacted]
[Redacted]; USSS: [Redacted]
FL

Status
Closed

Agent -
[Redacted]

[Initiation](#) [People](#) [Staff](#) [Violations](#) [Dates](#) [Location of Offense](#) [Notes](#)
[Technical Elements](#) [Disposition](#) [Significant Investigative Activity](#) [Upload Documents](#)
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Action

Action Admin Closure

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Chars left 4000

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Date Closed •

**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

I13-USSS-ORL-00001



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| <i>Case Number:</i> | I13-USSS-ORL-00001 |
| <i>Case Title:</i> | [REDACTED] Contractor (former), Paradigm Solutions U.S. Secret Service Washington, D.C. |
| <i>Report Status:</i> | Final |
| <i>Alleged Violation(s):</i> | Loss of Sensitive National Security Information |

SYNOPSIS

On June 26, 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received information from a source of information (SOI) alleging that a U.S. Secret Service (USSS) civilian employee lost network backup tapes that contained personal identifying information (PII) of USSS employees. This investigation revealed that on February 22, 2008, [REDACTED], a USSS contractor, was tasked with hand carrying two USSS backup network mainframe tapes from Washington D.C. to Olney, Maryland. While on public transit, [REDACTED] lost the tapes, which were never found, and ultimately he and [REDACTED], Branch Chief, USSS, were disciplined as a result. The USSS reported to the DHS OIG that the tapes were lost and contained PII and other information regarding USSS "protectees;" however, the tapes were encrypted and contained special proprietary software known only to one former USSS employee making the data inaccessible. The DHS OIG subsequently interviewed current and former USSS employees who stated that the tapes were not encrypted, were commercially made, and did not contain a specially made program for the USSS.

A forensic examination was conducted. However, tapes similar to the ones that were lost by [REDACTED] were not available to be analyzed. The exam did reveal that USSS tapes now contain encryption software that makes the stored data unreadable due to the post incident data encryption software uploaded onto them. However, tapes similar to the ones that were lost by [REDACTED] were not available to be analyzed. Hence, efforts to determine if the lost tapes did or did not contain encryption software were inconclusive. The SOI's allegation that the USSS did not report this incident was unsubstantiated since the incident was reported to the DHS Security Operations Center.

| <i>Reporting Agent</i> | | <i>Distribution:</i> | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Miami Field Office | Original |
| Title: Senior Special Agent | Date: 7/22/13 | Headquarters | 1 cc |
| <i>Approving Official</i> | | Component(s) USSS | 1 cc |
| Name: David C. Nieland | Signature: <i>David C. Nieland</i> | PRIV | 1 cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 7/22/13 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

DETAILS

On June 26, 2012, the DHS OIG received information reporting the loss of network backup tapes containing PII by a USSS contractor. In summary, a SOI indicated that on or around early 2008, an unnamed USSS contractor was given network backup tapes containing PII for the entire USSS, and he or she was tasked with carrying these tapes to a secure storage facility in Olney, MD. The contractor then travelled from Washington, D.C. to Olney, MD via the Washington D.C. public metro system and ultimately lost the tapes. Subsequently, the USSS reported this incident to the local police department; however, the SOI opined that it was not reported to the DHS OIG and/or the applicable employees whose PII was potentially disclosed. (Exhibit 1)

Allegation 1: A USSS contracted employee lost USSS network backup tapes that were not encrypted and contained Sensitive National Security Information and PII.

On August 22, 2012, the DHS OIG requested records from the USSS regarding the loss of the network backup tapes. (Exhibit 2)

On October 4, 2012, the DHS OIG reviewed USSS records that were provided by [REDACTED], Chief Counsel, USSS, Office of Chief Counsel, Washington, D.C., in response to a request made by the DHS OIG. In summary, the records indicated that on March 28, 2008, [REDACTED], Assistant Inspector, USSS, Inspections Division, completed an investigation involving the loss of the USSS network backup tapes.

This USSS investigation revealed that on February 22, 2008, [REDACTED], contractor, Paradigm Solutions, USSS, Information Resources Management Division (IRMD), hand carried two mainframe network backup tapes from the IRMD in Washington, D.C. to an offsite storage facility in Olney, Maryland. [REDACTED] travelled via the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Transit Authority and departed the train at the Shady Grove Station, 15903 Somerville Drive, Rockville, MD, and inadvertently left the tapes (two in total) on the train after he disembarked. After [REDACTED] realized that the tapes were missing, he returned to the Shady Grove Station and contacted [REDACTED], Station Manager, about the loss of the property. [REDACTED] then contacted several transit stations where the train would have traversed, but the tapes were not found. [REDACTED] contacted his manager at Paradigm Solutions, [REDACTED] who contacted his USSS supervisor, [REDACTED]. During a subsequent USSS interview of [REDACTED] on February 26, 2008, it was noted that [REDACTED] stated he did not know the "value and sensitivity of the information that was contained within the data tapes."

On February 25, 2008, [REDACTED], Assistant Director (AD), USSS, Office of Protective Research, notified [REDACTED], AD, USSS, Office of Professional Responsibility (RES), that on February 22, 2008, the aforementioned tapes were lost. AD [REDACTED] told AD [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] Special Agent in Charge (SAIC), USSS, IRMD, advised that the two tapes may have contained sensitive employee related information.

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

On February 25, 2008, [REDACTED], Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge (ATSAIC), USSS, IRMD, notified the DHS OneNet Security Operations Center (SOC) of the loss of the tapes, which were described as USSS Enterprise Mainframe System (EMS) information, which contained an unknown amount of PII information and was reported as protected with "Compression/Proprietary Software."

On February 25, 2008, [REDACTED], Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAIC), USSS, IRMD, forwarded a memorandum through SAIC [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], Deputy Assistant Director (DAD), USSS, "regarding the loss of two data storage tapes that contained a complete backup of all USSS Mainframe Data."

On February 26, 2008, the USSS RES interviewed SAIC [REDACTED], IRMD, regarding this incident. According to SAIC [REDACTED] he was first notified of the incident by [REDACTED], Assistant Division Chief (ADC), USSS, IRMD, on Monday, February 25, 2008. Through the assistance of SAIC [REDACTED], Washington Field Office (WFO), USSS, and [REDACTED], Acting Deputy Chief, Washington Metro Transit Police, SAIC [REDACTED] immediately dispatched USSS personnel from IRMD and the USSS WFO to the train station to look for the tapes. SAIC [REDACTED] subsequently briefed DAD [REDACTED] and AD [REDACTED]. Additionally, SAIC [REDACTED] researched the practice of using contractors to transport these tapes, which was later changed so that only U.S. Government personnel would transport these tapes in official vehicles.

On February 27, 2008, the USSS RES interviewed [REDACTED], Branch Chief (BC), USSS, IRMD, regarding why the USSS RES was not notified until three days after the loss of the tapes. According to BC [REDACTED] on February 25, 2008, at approximately 8 p.m., IT Specialist [REDACTED] advised him of the loss of the tapes. BC [REDACTED] then contacted ADC [REDACTED] leaving him a voicemail. BC [REDACTED] was then kept apprised of the situation by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. BC [REDACTED] stated that he was then under the impression that the information on the tapes was protected and could not be accessed without a related computer program and equipment. BC [REDACTED] further stated that ADC [REDACTED] did not return his call over the weekend, and he [REDACTED] did not make any notifications above ADC [REDACTED].

On March 3, 2008, the USSS RES interviewed ADC [REDACTED], USSS, IRMD, who stated that he worked the day after the incident, Saturday, February 23, 2008, and he was not made aware of the situation that occurred the day before. When (on February 25, 2008) ADC [REDACTED] learned of the incident via his voicemail, he notified (via voicemail) ATSAIC [REDACTED]. ADC [REDACTED] also briefed SAIC [REDACTED] and neither knew that the tapes were transported in this manner by contractors. ADC [REDACTED] also stated that there was "no encryption on the tapes. Previous request to encrypt denied."

On May 2, 2008, the DHS SOC records indicated that "the DHS Privacy Office gained information from the USSS IT management that the tapes were not encrypted, but the data was encrypted. Due to the age of the tape technology utilized with these backup tapes, it was determined that access to the data remained at a low risk."

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

The USSS concluded that the loss of the tapes (identified as #AL0177 and AL0178) was due to the negligence of [REDACTED], but without malicious intent. Additionally, BC [REDACTED] was found at fault for not making the proper notifications. Further, it was determined that the use of couriers to transport these tapes was required at the time of this incident because of the limitation of available data space on the existing cable; however, this practice of using non-sworn personnel for the transport was subsequently changed. (Exhibit 3)

On October 8, 2012, the DHS OIG was telephonically contacted by a SOI regarding the types of data typically stored on the USSS master mainframe, which would be on the lost tapes. The SOI stated that the USSS current mainframe stores similar data to that of the older system from 2008 and contains files regarding all of the PII for all USSS employees including: name, date of birth, social security numbers (SSN), all emergency contact information, home(s) addresses, telephone numbers for employees and their emergency contacts, entrance on duty (EOD) dates, and career posts of duty. Additionally all USSS electronic case files including: open and closed criminal investigations, information on confidential informants, internal administrative files, and applicant and budget information. Further, Protective intelligence information such as Presidential and other Dignitary protection files, site security surveys, and protection event information and related records also were reported to be on the lost tapes. (Exhibit 4)

On October 15, 2012, the DHS OIG requested information from the USSS regarding the lost tapes. Specifically, it was requested if the tapes contained PII, other types of data, and if the tapes contained encryption. (Exhibit 5)

On October 22, 2012, [REDACTED] provided a signed letter to the DHS OIG indicating that, "We have been advised that the mainframe at that time would likely have contained applications that could access databases that included PII for current and/or former USSS employees and/or others (such as applicants or contractors for whom a background check was opened, or the subject of an investigation). This information could have included names, dates of birth, social security numbers, home addresses, telephone numbers, and possibly other information such as height, weight, eye and hair color, and tattoos. It appears that EOD dates and current posts of duty for employees at that time would most likely have been accessible on the mainframe. It does not appear that routing and banking information for employees would have been found on the mainframe. We do not have further information regarding emergency contact information or noncurrent posts of duty."

"The data on the tapes was encrypted. Furthermore, in order to access the information on the tapes, one would need the appropriate hardware, the appropriate mainframe, proprietary software, and commercial software. One would also need a custom-made application (created by a former employee of the USSS) that was-is believed to have been known only to the USSS in order to make sense of the data on the tapes. Finally, one would need the key for the encryption." (Exhibit 6)

On October 24, 2012 the DHS OIG interviewed [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], regarding [REDACTED] response to the DHS OIG. In summary, [REDACTED] stated that he was

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

previously employed with the USSS IRMD, and he stated that he is very familiar with this incident since it occurred when he was with the IRMD. [REDACTED] stated that the tapes absolutely contained PII and confirmed that it contained all of the aforementioned information listed by the SOI in Exhibit 4.

[REDACTED] further stated that [REDACTED] comments are grossly inaccurate and incorrect regarding the data encryption. [REDACTED] juxtaposed that the USSS' tapes and related reader are commercial grade and can be purchased by anyone online. Furthermore, he stated that there was no unknown/mystery USSS employee that created a secret algorithm or software that only he or she knew to access the tapes. [REDACTED] clearly stated that the tapes can be [REDACTED]

7E

[REDACTED] If the data was encrypted, which he doubted, it would only be a matter of time before it could be correctly read. [REDACTED] then accessed the internet over his cell phone and quickly showed the DHS OIG the equipment needed to access the data on the tapes meaning it was not proprietary. The approximate price was under \$300. (Exhibit 7)

On October 25, 2012, the DHS OIG interviewed USSS IRMD IT Specialist [REDACTED] who stated that he is very familiar with this incident since it occurred during his employment at the IRMD. [REDACTED] stated that the tapes absolutely contained PII and confirmed that it contained all of the aforementioned information listed by the SOI in Exhibit 4.

[REDACTED] stated that the tapes were not encrypted, and the tapes and reader are commercial and can be purchased by the public. [REDACTED] also stated that he once asked his USSS supervisor, [REDACTED], about purchasing encryption for the backup tapes, and he [REDACTED] never heard a response to go forward with the encryption. [REDACTED] further stated that if the tapes were placed in a reader it would be difficult for the user to correctly read all of the data since they would not have the correct software needed. (Exhibit 8)

On October 26, 2012, the DHS OIG reviewed the Report of Investigation created by Inspector [REDACTED], USSS, RES, reference this investigation. Inspector [REDACTED] handwritten note, which is not cited in his report, stated the following, "No encryption on tapes, previous request was denied." (Exhibit 9)

On May 21, 2013, the DHS OIG and [REDACTED], Information Technology Specialist, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services, conducted an analysis of a sample tape provided by the USSS. The results of this analysis concluded that the data on the tapes was encrypted and unreadable.

Additionally, it was discovered that shortly after the tapes were lost, discussions were conducted with DHS, Office of Chief Information Officer and the USSS regarding a remedial action. It was concluded that the contents of the lost tapes were "constricted" by a unique mainframe process. Further, it was concluded that the only way to "de-encrypt" the data on the tapes would be to have the specific mainframe where the original tapes were created. If the original mainframe was not used,

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

the tapes could not be “de-encrypted” and the data would remain protected. Also, it was agreed upon by all parties that the USSS would acquire encryption software that was FIPS 140-2 compliant. (Exhibit 10)

[Agent’s note: Since all tapes were uploaded with data protection that was compliant with FIPS 140-2, the DHS OIG and the FBI were unable to conduct a forensic analysis on a tape that contained the similar level of protection as the ones that were lost. Due to the tested tapes having post incident data encryption software uploaded onto them, the DHS OIG was unable to validate [REDACTED]’ and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] assertion that the lost tapes were not encrypted.]

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|--|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity, Predicate Summary, dated June 26, 2012. |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, Case Coordination, dated August 22, 2012. |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, Record Review, USSS documents, dated October 4, 2012. |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, Telephone Contact, SOI, dated October 8, 2012. |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, Other, Request to USSS, dated October 15, 2012. |
| 6 | Memorandum of Activity, Other, [REDACTED] response, dated October 22, 2012. |
| 7 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], dated October 24, 2012. |
| 8 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated October 25, 2012. |
| 9 | Memorandum of Activity, Record Review, [REDACTED] notes, October 26, 2012 |
| 10 | Memorandum of Activity, Analysis of USSS Tape Backup using FIPS 140-2 FDRCRYPT software, dated May 21, 2013. |

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
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I13-USSS-ORL-00024



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| Case Number: | I13-USSS-ORL-00024 |
| Case Title: | [REDACTED] Counter Sniper, LE-01 U.S. Secret Service Washington, D.C. |
| Report Status: | Final |
| Alleged Violation(s): | Administrative Misconduct – Improper use of US Government equipment Administrative Misconduct -- Failure to file notification of contact with a foreign national |

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

On August 10, 2010, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Office of Professional Responsibility (RES), notified the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), that [REDACTED], U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Uniform Division (UD), Counter Sniper (CS), allegedly exchanged sexually explicit emails with a Russian female foreign national (FFN). This investigation was not opened at that time. However, on July 10, 2012, the DHS OIG interviewed [REDACTED], USSS (former), UD, CS, and [REDACTED] reiterated the aforementioned incident involving [REDACTED] and stated that [REDACTED] was still employed with the USSS. (Exhibit 1)

The DHS OIG requested records regarding this incident from [REDACTED], Chief Counsel, USSS, Office of Chief Counsel. (Exhibit 2)

The DHS OIG reviewed the records regarding [REDACTED] that were provided by the USSS. In summary, the records indicated that on July 2-5, 2010, the USSS discovered that [REDACTED] was using his U.S. Government email to communicate with a Russian FFN. A review of these emails found that they contained nude and partially nude photographs of [REDACTED] and women. On July 15, 2010, [REDACTED] was placed on administrative leave, and his top secret clearance was suspended. On July 20, 2010, it was confirmed through the USSS Security Clearance Division (SCD) that [REDACTED] had not filed any encounters with any foreign nationals. On July 21, 2010, a review of

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Miami Field Office | Original |
| Title: Senior Special Agent | Date: May 1, 2013 | Headquarters | 1 cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) USSS | 1 cc |
| Name: David C. Nieland | Signature: [Signature] | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: May 1, 2013 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

██████████ personnel file indicated that he signed the applicable related documents regarding Employee Responsibilities and Behavior and the Information Technology (IT) General Rules of Behavior.

On August 5, 2010, USSS RES interviewed ██████████ and discovered that he met a FFN while off duty on an official USSS mission in Russia. ██████████ also admitted to the USSS RES that he had another encounter with a FFN in Brazil, and that he exchanged sexually explicit communications with these and other women through his U.S. Government email. On September 30, 2010, the USSS conducted a polygraph examination of ██████████ which indicated no signs of deception. On November 22, 2010, the USSS reinstated ██████████ clearance. The allegations investigated by USSS RES were substantiated, and ██████████ was served with a 20 day suspension. Additionally, in 2010, management from the USSS UD addressed improper and excessive text messages with ██████████ in relation to his issued cellular telephone. As a result of this investigation, ██████████ paid \$24.68 to the USSS for reimbursement of the excess text messages. (Exhibits 3-6)

To determine if ██████████ continued to communicate with FFNs in this manner and misused his U.S. Government email account, the DHS OIG contacted the Office of Chief Counsel, USSS, requesting all of ██████████ U.S. Government emails from January 1, 2011, through December 31, 2011. (Exhibit 7)

The DHS OIG received a copy of ██████████ emails and did not discover emails similar to the aforementioned allegations. (Exhibits 8-9)

The DHS OIG did not interview ██████████ because no additional evidence was discovered that was not already investigated by USSS RES or USSS UD management. Additionally, the USSS investigated the Russian FFN through the Intelligence Community.

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| NUMBER | DESCRIPTION |
|--------|---|
| 1 | Predicate summary, dated October 5, 2012. |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, Other, Case Coordination, USSS, dated August 22, 2012. |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, Record Review, DHS OIG notification, dated October 18, 2012. |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, Record Review, USSS RES Reports, dated October 18, 2012. |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, Record Review, Polygraph Results, dated October 18, 2012. |
| 6 | Memorandum of Activity, Record Review, USSS Supplemental Appraisal, dated December 4, 2012. |
| 7 | Memorandum of Activity, Other, Case Coordination with USSS, dated October 18, 2012. |
| 8 | Memorandum of Activity, Other, Receipt of Records, dated November 16, 2012. |
| 9 | Memorandum of Activity, Record Review, [REDACTED] emails, dated December 4, 2012 |

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I13-USSS-ORL-00026



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Homeland Security

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| Case Number: | I13-USSS-ORL-00026 |
| Case Title: | [REDACTED], GS-14 U.S. Secret Service Washington, D.C. |
| Report Status: | Final |
| Alleged Violation(s): | Administrative Misconduct – Making false misrepresentation against fellow employee |

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

On June 27, 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), received information from a confidential source (CS) alleging that [REDACTED], [REDACTED] U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Washington, D.C., was involved in an affair with [REDACTED] USSS. According to the CS, [REDACTED] “did not get along” with [REDACTED], Deputy Division Chief, USSS, and because of this disdain, [REDACTED] removed [REDACTED] from the G20 Summit and had him transferred to the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC). Further, the CS stated that [REDACTED] was so upset over his transfer that he committed suicide. (Exhibit 1)

On August 22, 2012, the DHS OIG requested information related to this incident from [REDACTED], Chief Counsel, USSS, Office of Chief Counsel, Washington, D.C. (Exhibit 2)

On February 27, 2013, the DHS OIG reviewed records provided by [REDACTED], which indicated that Deputy Director [REDACTED] offered an assignment in the CFC to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] accepted the transfer to this new position. On August 1, 2011, [REDACTED] was scheduled to attend a briefing regarding his transfer to CFC; however, on or about this date he committed suicide by jumping off the Chesapeake Bay Bridge in Maryland. (Exhibits 3 & 4)

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] for | Miami Field Office | Original |
| Title: Senior Special Agent | Date: [REDACTED] 3/20/13 | Headquarters | 1 cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) USSS | 1 cc |
| Name: David C. Nieland | Signature: [Signature] | Other | cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 3/20/13 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

On February 27, 2013, the DHS OIG interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] USSS, Forensics Services Division, Office of Administration (OAD), who was a co-worker of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] became upset when he was notified of his transfer to the CFC program. [REDACTED] did not know or understand why [REDACTED] was transferred because their section was very busy at that particular period of time. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] never spoke to her about his family problems, but she heard rumors around the office that [REDACTED] had unspecified issues. [REDACTED] had also heard there were work related issues between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did not have specific information related to the suicide and was shocked by it. (Exhibit 5)

On February 27, 2013, the DHS OIG interviewed [REDACTED] Operations Support Coordinator, USSS, AOD, who was a co-worker of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] also worked in the AOD, and [REDACTED] opined that [REDACTED] was not nice to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] heard rumors that [REDACTED] was having an extra-marital affair with [REDACTED] and went to him for favors. In summary, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] would go to [REDACTED] with favors and they were granted. However, [REDACTED] could not list specific incidents. [REDACTED] did not have specific information related to the suicide and was shocked by it. (Exhibit 6)

On February 27, 2013, the DHS OIG interviewed [REDACTED], SAIC, USSS, AOD, who stated that [REDACTED] was his Deputy Division Chief in the AOD. SAIC [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was very upset due to the actions of [REDACTED]. According to SAIC [REDACTED] was arrested several times for various crimes (illicit drug related), and [REDACTED] often came to SAIC [REDACTED] requesting time off from work to bail [REDACTED] out of jail or attend a court appearance. SAIC [REDACTED] then stated that [REDACTED] became very stressed from the actions of [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] moved out of their house due to differing opinions on how to address the issues with [REDACTED]. SAIC [REDACTED] reiterated that the actions of [REDACTED] seemed to greatly stress [REDACTED]. On or around August 2011, Deputy Director [REDACTED] came to SAIC [REDACTED] to request a person needed for a temporary transfer to the main DHS Office (CFC). Sensing this would be a much less stressful job and would greatly help [REDACTED], SAIC [REDACTED] made the decision to assign [REDACTED] to this position. According to SAIC [REDACTED] agreed to go to this position. SAIC [REDACTED] stated that it was his decision and recommendation to Deputy Director [REDACTED] to assign [REDACTED] this position, and [REDACTED] never came to him or voiced her opinion on this matter. (Exhibit 7)

The allegation against [REDACTED] was unsubstantiated. Deputy Director [REDACTED] is retired and was not interviewed. The DHS OIG did not interview [REDACTED] since SAIC [REDACTED] stated that it was his decision (without influence from [REDACTED] to recommend [REDACTED] transfer to Deputy Director [REDACTED]

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| NUMBER | DESCRIPTION |
|--------|---|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity, Case opening, dated June 26, 2012. |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity, Other, case coordination with USSS, dated August 22, 2012. |
| 3 | Memorandum of Activity, Records Review, USSS documents, dated February 27, 2013. |
| 4 | Memorandum of Activity, Records Review, USSS documents, [REDACTED] emails, dated February 27, 2013. |
| 5 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated February 27, 2013. |
| 6 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated February 27, 2013. |
| 7 | Memorandum of Activity, Interview of [REDACTED], USSS, dated February 27, 2013. |

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**DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

I13-USSS-TUC-00029



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**Homeland
Security**

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

| | |
|------------------------------|---|
| Case Number: | I13-USSS-TUC-00029 |
| Case Title: | Unknown United States Secret Service Counter-Assault Team Members (CAT) |
| Report Status: | Final |
| Alleged Violation(s): | Non-Criminal Misconduct |

INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Inspector General (OIG), initiated this investigation on October 9, 2012, based on a field originated complaint stemming from DHS OIG investigation I12-USSS-OSI-00800, referred from LEAD #267.

It was reported that two incidents occurred on a trip to Turkey during March 2008 with Vice President Dick Cheney. Allegedly a United States Secret Service (USSS), Counter Assault Team (CAT) member had a two week relationship with a Turkish female. The confidential source (CS) did not believe the female was a prostitute. The Turkish female was observed waiting for the CAT member outside of USSS briefings. The other reported incident also occurred while in Turkey and involved a Turkish Intelligence Officer who allegedly attempted to stick a thumb-drive into a U.S. Government computer when an unknown USSS supervisor turned away to speak with someone. (Exhibit 1)

On December 11, 2012, DHS OIG reviewed a letter from [REDACTED], Chief Counsel, United States Secret Service (USSS), dated September 13, 2012, identifying USSS personnel assigned to the Counter Assault Team (CAT) in March 2008, in support of a Vice Presidential visit to Turkey.

According to the [REDACTED] letter, per OIG request, this list of USSS personnel was forwarded to the USSS Security Clearance Division (SCD), to determine if any of the named individuals had submitted a Foreign Contact Report for this reporting time period. A response from SCD advised that a search for Foreign Contact Reports by any of these individuals produced negative results.

| | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|----------|
| Reporting Agent | | Distribution: | |
| Name: [REDACTED] | Signature: [REDACTED] | Tucson Field Office | Original |
| Title: Special Agent | Date: [REDACTED] | Headquarters | 1 cc |
| Approving Official | | Component(s) | 1 cc |
| Name: Paul Leonard | Signature: [Handwritten Signature] | | cc |
| Title: Special Agent in Charge | Date: 4/19/13 | | |

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

The [REDACTED] letter advises of previously provided Foreign Contact Reports, received by DHS OIG after they were requested on June 20, 2012. Foreign Contact Reports are maintained in the DHS OIG database pursuant to I12-USSS-OSI-00800, Cartagena Review.

DHS OIG Tucson researched the provided Foreign Contact Reports previously provided by USSS and compared them with the list of names from the CAT team members during the Turkey Vice-Presidential site visit in March 2008. Two individuals from the list reported foreign contact in May 2012, but the reported contacts are unrelated to any visit to Turkey. (Exhibit 2)

It has been decided by DHS OIG management that no further investigation of this issue will be conducted and this matter is referred to the USSS Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) for whatever action they deem appropriate.

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS

| <u>NUMBER</u> | <u>DESCRIPTION</u> |
|---------------|--|
| 1 | Memorandum of Activity dated October 9, 2012, Other: Predicating Report |
| 2 | Memorandum of Activity dated December 11, 2012, Other: USSS reported foreign contact verification. |

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

www.oig.dhs.gov

MEMORANDUM FOR: File

FROM: Lori Hazenstab
Special Agent in Charge
Field Operations – Western Region

SUBJECT: [REDACTED], Special Agent, GS-13
United States Secret Service

CASE NUMBER: I14-USSS-DAL-10736

This case is unfounded and is administratively closed.

The anonymous allegation stated that “Agent is still involved in a relationship with a former [REDACTED] drug LT who was fired for cause. Agent has paid cash for multiple houses, cars. Agent and fired drug officer appear to still be involved in non ethical behavior.”

The DHS OIG Dallas field office was notified by the U.S. Secret Service, Inspection Division that [REDACTED] self-reported approximately 1 1/2 years ago that she was in a relationship with a [REDACTED] PD Lieutenant in the narcotics division and claimed to have terminated the relationship. [REDACTED] recently received a payout from a life insurance policy, due to the fact that her husband (active military) was killed in the war in Iraq. The former drug Lieutenant, [REDACTED] PD, received a large settlement from the [REDACTED] Police Department that resulted from a wrongful termination civil suit.



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

Washington DC / www.oig.dhs.gov

May 5, 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Special Agent in Charge – Inspection Division
United States Secret Service
Office of Professional Responsibility

FROM: Karen Cottrell *Karen Cottrell*
Special Agent in Charge
Special Investigations Division

SUBJECT: Transfer of Investigation I14-USSS-SID-01281

Pursuant to an agreement between Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General John Roth and United States Secret Service Director Julia A. Pierson, the enclosed I14-USSS-SID-01281 investigation is transferred to your office for whatever action you deem appropriate. As part of the enclosure you'll find all relevant investigative material produced and/or discovered during the course of this joint investigation.

My staff and I are committed to assisting you in any way possible. Please contact me or Gary Thorne at 202 254-[REDACTED] as necessary.

Enclosures: 1. Investigative Material for I14-USSS-SID-01281 Investigation



**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS**

INVESTIGATION SUMMARY AND TRANSFER DOCUMENT

Transferring Office: OIG - Special Investigations Division

File Number: I14-USSS-SID-01281

OIG Case Agent or Contact: [REDACTED]

Case Title: [REDACTED] et Al.

Receiving Office: United States Secret Service - Office of Professional Responsibility

Subject(s): [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Initial Allegation: It was alleged that two United States Secret Service (USSS) supervisory employees sent sexually suggestive e-mails to a female subordinate. The two supervisory employees were identified as [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], USSS, Presidential Protective Division, Washington, DC. It was alleged that [REDACTED], then Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Protective Intelligence Division, Washington, DC, [REDACTED], then Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge, Presidential Protective Division, Washington, DC and [REDACTED], then Special Agent, Presidential Protective Division, Washington, DC were involved in inappropriate relationships, which included the exchange of sexually suggestive e-mails, as well as sexually explicit e-mail/text messages and photos.

In Judicial Proceedings? No.

List Documents to be Transferred: Copy of signed MOAs and attachments, as well as other relevant investigative material.

In Judicial Proceedings? No.

Is There Evidence That Needs to Be Transferred? No.

Details of Evidence Transfer: N/A

Case Transfer Completion Date and SAC Signature: