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INTRODUCTION.

THE Protagoras of Plato is one of the few dialogues whose authenticity has never been called in question by any eminent scholar. None of the dialogues attributed to Plato is so full of fallacious reasoning; perhaps none contains an ethical theory so difficult to reconcile with ordinary Platonic teaching; but the extraordinary vivacity and power of the dramatic representation, as well as the charm of style, have furnished proofs of authenticity which even the most sceptical critics have been unable to resist.

§ 1. *Analysis.*

A brief analysis of the Protagoras will form a fitting introduction to the discussion of its scope and purpose.

Socrates narrates the dialogue to a friend (309 A—310 A).

Hippocrates had visited Socrates in great excitement at an early hour, in order to obtain from him a personal introduction to Protagoras, who had just arrived in Athens. In the interval before they set out, Socrates subjected his young friend to an interrogatory, which forced him to admit that he was

PREFACE.

THE present edition of the Protagoras is on the same lines as the Pitt Press editions of the Apology, Crito, and Euthyphro.

The Editors venture to hope that the study of this delightful dialogue, for which much has already been done in English by Mr Wayte and more recently by Mr Turner, may be still further encouraged by the publication of this edition.

Mr Neil, of Pembroke College, has kindly read through the proofs, and contributed various criticisms and suggestions.

CAMBRIDGE,

July 26, 1893.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

IN this edition a few errors and misprints have been corrected, but we have not thought it necessary or desirable to introduce any further changes.

INTRODUCTION.

about to entrust his soul to a sophist, without knowing what a sophist really is. Such a course of action Socrates declared to be perilous in the extreme (310 A—314 C). Socrates and Protagoras presently proceeded to the house of Callias, where Protagoras was staying, and having with some difficulty obtained admittance, found themselves spectators of an animated scene, in which Protagoras, Hippias, and Prodicus are the leading figures (314 C—316 A).

At this point the true business of the dialogue begins. After Hippocrates has been introduced to Protagoras, the latter delivers a speech claiming for his profession a high antiquity. Poets, religious teachers, musicians and others who were in reality 'Sophists', have vainly tried to disguise themselves by other names: Protagoras has found it both more prudent and more honest to profess himself openly that which he is, a Sophist and Educator of men. Prodicus and Hippias with their respective adherents assemble to hear Protagoras publicly explain the advantages of his teaching (316 A—317 E).

Aided by a little Socratic questioning, Protagoras explains that his art consists in making men good citizens. Socrates professes to have thought that civic virtue could not be communicated by teaching, and that on two grounds: first, because the Athenians do not think it can, since they allow any man to advise them in matters connected with the state without requiring from him evidence that he has been taught, whereas they will only listen to an expert when they are deliberating on matters connected with the arts: and second, because as a matter of fact, great statesmen have not succeeded in transmitting

their civic virtue to their sons and wards (317 E—320 C).

The reply of Protagoras is in the form of a *ῥῆσις* and falls into three sections.

In the first he endeavours to justify the Athenians for permitting any one to give counsel on politics, by relating a myth of pre-historic man, according to which no one is destitute of the foundations of civic virtue, Justice and Shame (320 C—323 A). That every man has part by nature in this virtue is, moreover, a universal belief, for he who publicly declares himself to be wicked is universally looked upon as mad (323 A—323 C).

Protagoras next endeavours to prove that the Athenians regard virtue as capable of being taught. In the first place, we hold men responsible for lacking that only which it was in their power to acquire, and we hold them responsible for their wrong-doing (323 C—324 A). Punishment, in the second place, is intended both by the Athenians and by all other men to be a means of teaching virtue (324 A—324 D).

Finally, Protagoras addresses himself to the question—why do not the sons of great statesmen possess the same virtue as their fathers? It is not from lack of teaching: for it would be absurd to suppose that statesmen teach their sons everything except the one thing needful for life as a citizen, and in point of fact, virtue is taught at every stage of human life—by parents, nurses, tutors, professional teachers for soul and body, and finally by the state herself, through the medium of the laws and the punishment which their violation entails. But children are often inferior to their parents in the capacity

for learning, and it is for this reason that they seem to fall short in civic virtue, although, compared with untutored savages, even the worst products of civilization might seem models of morality. Protagoras concludes by declaring himself a teacher of virtue and explaining his method of taking fees (324 D—328 D).

After thanking Hippocrates for bringing him to hear so fine a display, Socrates requests the Sophist to explain a matter which he had left obscure—Are the single virtues each of them parts of virtue, or only different names for one thing? They are parts of virtue, says Protagoras, in answer to the cross-examination of his rival, distinct from each other and the whole, as the parts of the face are different from the whole face and from one another. In number they are five—justice, temperance, holiness, courage, and wisdom, and wisdom is the greatest of them. We may possess one without possessing all the five. Each has its own peculiar efficacy and no one of them is like another (328 D—330 B).

Socrates endeavours in the first instance to make Protagoras admit that justice and holiness are identical, or nearly so. It is admitted that justice is just and holiness holy: but if justice and holiness do not resemble each other, justice will not be holy, but unholy, and holiness will not be just, but unjust—a conclusion which the Sophist rejects. Protagoras graciously concedes that there may be a considerable resemblance between justice and holiness, without however allowing that the two virtues are alike (330 B—332 A).

The next step in the argument seeks to establish the identity of temperance and wisdom. ἀφροσύνη,

Protagoras admits, is the opposite of σοφία, and nothing can have more than one thing which is opposed to it. ἀφροσύνη is however opposed to σωφροσύνη, as well as to σοφία; from which it follows that σοφία and σωφροσύνη are nothing but two names for one and the same thing (332 A—333 B).

If Socrates had also proved the identity of temperance and justice, four out of the five virtues would have been equated, but as he embarks upon his argument, Protagoras seizes the opportunity to plunge into a ῥῆσις on the relativity of the notion 'good' or 'beneficial' (333 B—334 C).

Here ensues an interlude, in which Socrates protests against his rival's lengthy speeches, and threatens to depart. At last, in deference to the entreaties of Callias, backed up by some remarks from Alcibiades, Critias, Prodicus, and Hippias, Socrates consents to stay, on condition that Protagoras shall first question him and afterwards submit to be questioned in his turn (334 C—338 E).

Protagoras proposes for criticism a poem of Simonides, remarking that the subject of the discussion will still be ἀρετή, though it is transferred from human conduct to the sphere of poetry. A good poem, Socrates admits, will not contradict itself: but Simonides, after asserting that it is hard to become good, proceeds in this poem to censure Prodicus for saying 'It is hard to be good'. That Simonides contradicts himself, Socrates denies, on the ground that 'to be good' is not the same as 'to become good': perhaps Simonides agreed with Hesiod in the view that it is hard to become, but easy to remain, good. Your cure is worse than the disease,

replies Protagoras: it would be the height of folly to call being good an easy thing. Socrates thereupon, with Prodicus' approval, at first suggests that 'hard' may mean not 'difficult', but 'evil', since the word 'hard'—so says Prodicus the Cean—means something evil in Ceos; but soon abandoning these sophistries he volunteers to give a continuous exposition of the poem (338 E—342 A).

Sparta and Crete are in reality the chief seats of philosophy in Greece, though they try to conceal the fact. The wise men of old knew this and in imitation of the Spartans compressed their wisdom into short and pithy sentences, one of which was the saying of Pittacus 'It is hard to be good'. Simonides wrote his poem to overthrow this maxim (342 A—343 C).

Socrates proceeds to support his theory of the poem by an exposition conceived (as will be afterwards shewn¹) in the most sophistical spirit, but he correctly apprehends the central idea, viz. that in a world where it is not hard, but impossible to be good, we should not expect too much in the way of moral excellence (343 C—347 A).

The exposition of the poem being finished Socrates expresses himself disparagingly on the value of poetical criticism as a means of arriving at the truth, and the original question is resumed with Socrates for interrogator, as before. Conceding all that Socrates has hitherto been trying to prove, viz. that justice, holiness, wisdom and temperance are of the same kind, Protagoras takes his stand upon the sole remaining virtue and denies that courage bears any resemblance to the other four. By way of reply,

¹ p. xxvii.

Socrates draws a distinction between *θάραρος* with knowledge, and *θάραρος* without knowledge, and endeavours to identify the former with courage. The proof which he offers is far from conclusive¹, as Protagoras points out: it is therefore dropped and a subtler train of reasoning now begins (347 A—351 B).

To the proposal of Socrates, that pleasure should be identified with good, and pain with evil, Protagoras is unwilling to assent. He allows however that knowledge and wisdom, whenever they are present in a man, control his impulses and determine his conduct. But how is this to be reconciled with the common belief that a man having knowledge of that which is better, does the worse, because he is overcome by pleasure? In what sense are pleasures thus called evil? It is shewn that pleasures are called evil when they are followed by pain, and pains good when they are followed by pleasure, but pleasure in itself is good and pain in itself is evil. To be overcome by pleasure is therefore to be overcome by good: but as the phrase implies a censure, it is evident that the good which overcomes is unworthy to overcome the evil. Unworthy the good can only be because there is less of it: from which we infer that 'to be overcome by pleasure' is to choose less in place of greater good. Such a choice can only be the result of ignorance, so that it is incorrect to say that we ever knowingly choose the worse, and pleasure may still be identified with good, pain with evil (351 B—357 E).

Socrates now makes use of this identification to prove that knowledge and courage are the same. If pleasure is good, so likewise is every action which

¹ See note on 349 B.

aims at pleasure: and as no one knowingly chooses evil rather than good, no one ever does that which he knows to be evil. Now fear is the expectation of evil, so that no one, neither the hero nor the coward, encounters that which he believes to be fearful. It follows that the coward who refuses to fight when he ought to fight, refuses by reason of his ignorance. In other words cowardice is ignorance, and therefore courage, its opposite, is knowledge (358 A—360 E).

It is pointed out in conclusion that whereas Protagoras had started by maintaining that virtue could be communicated by teaching, and Socrates by doubting whether it could, they have now changed places: since if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught, but otherwise not. Socrates expresses a desire to resume the subject after he has discovered what virtue is in itself (360 E—362 A).

It appears from the preceding analysis that the Protagoras falls naturally into these sections:

I. Introduction to the narration of the dialogue (309 A—310 A).

II. Introduction to the dialogue itself (310 A—317 E).

III. Protagoras' description of his profession, followed by the objections of Socrates (317 E—320 C).

IV. A *ῥῆσις* from Protagoras, containing both *μῦθος* and *λόγος* (320 C—328 D).

V. Cross-examination of Protagoras by Socrates, ending abruptly with a short *ῥῆσις* by Protagoras (328 D—334 C).

VI. Interlude (334 C—338 E).

VII. Cross-examination of Socrates by Protagoras, ending with a *ῥῆσις* by Socrates (338 E—347 A).

VIII. Conclusion of the cross-examination of Socrates by Protagoras, and final defeat of the Sophist (347 A—360 E).

IX. Epilogue (360 E—362 A).

§ 2. *The General Scope and Purpose of the Protagoras.*

In seeking to understand the scope and purpose of the Protagoras, we shall find it convenient, in the first instance, to view the form of the dialogue as far as possible apart from the matter.

Considered as to its form, the dialogue is an indictment primarily of Protagoras as an educator of young men. It is not however as an individual that Protagoras is attacked, but as the most distinguished representative of the Sophists¹: *ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστῆς εἶναι*, he says in 317 B, *καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους*; and before Protagoras appears on the scene, Plato is careful to instruct us as to the nature of that which was called 'Sophist'. Prodicus and Hippias, as well as Protagoras, receive their share of ridicule², and may be supposed to suffer with him in so far as the aim and method of their teaching agreed with his, although they are not directly associated with him in his fall³, which, as rivals⁴ in the profession, they doubtless viewed with something more than equa-

¹ 312 C ff., 316 D ff.

² 315 C ff., 337 A ff., 337 C ff., 347 A.

³ Socrates himself expressly separates them off in 359 A.

⁴ 318 E, 340 B ff., 341 A ff.

nimity¹. It is part of the irony of the situation when Prodicus and Hippias fail to see that whereas in the actual discussion it is only Protagoras who is worsted, the attack is in reality directed against the professional Sophist in general—the ἔμπορος τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται².

Pitted against Protagoras, as the representative of the Sophists, we find, as usual, Socrates. Whether in this case we are to regard Socrates as speaking for Plato or for himself, we shall presently inquire: in the meantime, it is well to notice one particular aspect in which the contrast presents itself. Protagoras represents the principle of μακρολογία, Socrates that of βραχυλογία: the former excels in continuous discourse, the latter in the method of investigation by question and answer. In the only section of the dialogue where Socrates deserts his usual method, in order to deliver a harangue upon the poem of Simonides, he expressly asserts that the method of Protagoras is futile³, and it must be admitted that he is himself, whether intentionally or not, altogether unsuccessful in applying it.

In its formal aspect, therefore, the Protagoras may be regarded as an attempt to shew the superiority of

¹ In 341 A ff. Prodicus furnishes Socrates with weapons against his rival: and in 358 A—359 A they lend their assent to the train of reasoning by which Protagoras is finally overthrown. Bonitz (Platonische Studien p. 260) is surely wrong in regarding their assent to Socrates' counter-reasoning as a proof that they too are refuted: what is refuted is the statement that courage is different from the other virtues—a statement to which they never assented.

² 313 C.

³ 347 E. Compare Bonitz l.c. pp. 260—262.

Socrates to Protagoras—of dialectic to continuous discourse. But the dialogue is not merely a “philosophical prize-fight”: the subject-matter of the dispute between the rival interlocutors is one of great importance for the theory of education. It is first expressly raised in 319A: Can virtue be communicated by teaching? If not, education, as it was understood by Socrates no less than by Protagoras, is impossible. The doubts expressed by Socrates upon the subject nowhere throughout the dialogue amount to a denial of what every self-respecting teacher must hold to be true: that the Athenians do not think virtue teachable proves nothing, as they may be mistaken: that Athenian statesmen do not teach it to their sons may prove only that it cannot be taught by Athenian statesmen¹. But the reasons adduced by Socrates against the view that virtue can be taught are judiciously chosen in order to drive Protagoras into a defence of his position. Protagoras was not only professionally a teacher of virtue, and therefore bound to hold that virtue could be taught, but as the representative of the Sophists, he was bound to maintain that the beliefs and practice of the Arch-Sophist of them all, the Athenian Demus², were in harmony with his own. Accordingly he meets Socrates with a flat denial—the Athenians do hold virtue to be teachable and teach it in a multitude of ways. It is possible to hold this view and still believe that the elements of virtue are present by nature in every man, as Protagoras also asserts: and such was no doubt in reality the belief of the Athenians, as it is perhaps of the ordinary practical man in all ages.

¹ 319A—320B.

² See Rep. VI 492A ff.

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§ 3. *On the myth of Protagoras.*

So much it was needful to say about the central theme of the dialogue, but there remain three episodes which call for special discussion, partly from their connexion with the subject of the whole, and partly on account of their substantive philosophic value.

The first of these is the myth of Protagoras. The place of this episode in the argument is to shew that the Athenians do right in permitting all and sundry to advise them on political questions. It is not unlikely that the introduction of the mythical form as a vehicle of exposition was due to Protagoras¹. There can at all events be no doubt that it was rapidly coming into favour in the literary circles of the day, and that it was sometimes employed not only by the so-called Sophists², but by the other Socratic schools³ as well as the Academy. It is therefore not unreasonable to suppose that the myth with which we are concerned was written by Protagoras himself. The style shows many marked peculiarities of the kind which we should suppose that Protagoras affected⁴, and although this might be set down to Plato's skill as an imitator, it is difficult to see why Plato should have taken such pains to imitate where he manifestly did

¹ Dümmler's *Akademika* p. 236.

² See note on ch. XI. ad init.

³ As for example the Cynics: see Dümmler *l.c.* p. 1 foll.

⁴ See on 320 E.

not intend to caricature¹. Zeller² has recently lent the weight of his authority to the view which we are advocating, and an Italian scholar³ has made it seem probable that the work from which this fable is taken had among other motives the polemical one of maintaining against the theories of Hippias and his followers the superiority of νόμος to φύσις. In the catalogue of Protagoras' works preserved by Diogenes Laertius⁴, two books are mentioned, in either of which the fable may have occurred, *περὶ πολιτείας* and *περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως*: most probably it formed part of the latter.

We have commented in detail in the notes upon the subject-matter of the myth: but its general bearings and literary connexions require to be noticed here.

We may say broadly that two views of early society were current in antiquity. On the one hand the *laudator temporis acti* loved to represent the past as a golden age, from whose glories we have fallen away:

¹ Grote (II p. 47) perhaps states the case too strongly when he says that the fable is "fully equal, in point of perspicuity as well as charm—in my judgment it is even superior—to any other fable in Plato": but hardly any one will now deny that the episode is one of the most valuable and interesting parts of the dialogue. It should be borne in mind that the fable differs in style from what Protagoras says in the rest of the dialogue (except at 334 A, where see note) as much as it differs from the myths of Plato. If Plato could insert in one of his works a speech by Lysias (Phaedrus 230 E foll.) I see no reason to suppose that he might not have made Protagoras deliver a speech of his own making.

² In the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* v 2 p. 175 ff.


³ Chiapelli *ibid.* III p. 15 and p. 256 foll.

⁴ IX 55.



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PLATONIS) PROTGORAS

WITH INTRODUCTION NOTES AND APPENDICES

BY

J. ADAM M.A.

FELLOW AND TUTOR OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE CAMBRIDGE

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while others again saw in the far-distant past little but savagery and woe, out of which humanity has by slow degrees climbed upward¹. Not a few—and this is perhaps the original view, whereof the others are fragments—maintained that the reigns of good and evil succeed each other in ever-recurrent cycles, as we find in the myth of the Politicus². The fable of Protagoras represents mankind as having risen. It is in effect a novel version of the story of Prometheus superinduced upon a cosmological theory. So far as concerns the creation of man out of the four elements, and the assumption of a period of time during which there were no men upon the earth, we can find

¹ See Dümmler's *Akademika* p. 216 ff. (*Die Anfänge des Menschengeschlechts*). There is an excellent and learned collection of passages bearing on the Golden Age by Graf in *Leipziger Studien* VIII pp. 1—80, and another by Eichhoff in *Fleckeisen's Jahrbücher* Vol. 120 (1879) pp. 581—601.

² 269 C foll. When Eichhoff (l.c. p. 596) asserts that there is no hint of a golden age awaiting mankind in the future in Greek profane writings, he ignores the evidence of Hesiod. In the *Works and Days* 174—175 we read: *μηκέτ' ἔπειτ' ὄφειλον ἐγὼ πέμπτοισι μετεῖναι ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ πρόσθε θανεῖν ἢ ἔπειτα γενέσθαι*, and *ibid.* 180—181 *Ζεὺς δ' ὀλέσει καὶ τοῦτο γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων, εὐτ' ἂν γεινόμενοι πολιοκρόταφοι τελέθωσιν*. It has been pointed out elsewhere (*The Nuptial Number of Plato*, p. 60) that the sign of the recommencement of the golden age is when children are born with grey hairs (cf. *Polit.* 273 E): an interesting parallel is afforded by the Testament cited by Mr James in his account of the Revelation of Peter p. 57, where it is stated that one of the signs of the end shall be "children whose appearance shall be as of those advanced in years: for they that are born shall be white-haired". There are traces of a similar tradition in Greek mythology: the three Graeae, for example, had grey hairs from their birth.

parallel views in Plato, and to a certain extent in Empedocles¹; but there seems to be nothing in contemporary or previous literature to account for the peculiarities of the Prometheus legend as it meets us here. According to Hesiod², mankind originally possessed fire, but lost it through the impious cunning of Prometheus. When Prometheus steals it back again for the use of man, both he and humanity are severely punished, he by the eagle preying on his vitals, humanity by the creation of woman. In Aeschylus, Prometheus appears in like manner as the befriender of man against the gods, but we hear nothing of Pandora, nor does it appear that man had ever possessed the use of fire till Prometheus came and stole it. On the other hand, Aeschylus greatly amplifies the services of Prometheus to mankind, assigning to him the invention of astronomy, number, writing, medicine, and divination, as well as the elements of material happiness and comfort³. Although it is not expressly stated by Aeschylus that we owe the political or social art to Prometheus, the poet can hardly have intended expressly to exclude it from the list of his benefactions⁴, since the arts which are attributed to Prometheus presuppose that man has already become in some measure a *πολιτικὸν ζῶον*. It was reserved for Protagoras to represent *πολιτική* as a later gift, not from Prometheus, but from Zeus himself, in direct and perhaps conscious antagonism to Hesiod, according to whom the age in which we are now living knows

¹ See the notes on 320 D foll.

² Theogony 521—616: Works and Days 47 ff.

³ Prom. 445—506.

⁴ Prom. 506 *πᾶσαι τέχναι βροτοῖσιν ἐκ Προμηθέως*.

neither Justice nor Shame¹. But the great and fruitful innovation introduced into the legend by Protagoras, whether on his own responsibility, or in accordance with his authorities, consists in making Prometheus and Epimetheus assist the gods in the making of mortal things. The work of the gods ended when they had moulded man and the lower animals: it was Prometheus and his brother who were charged to furnish them with such accidentals as size, strength, hoofs, hair and hide, not to speak of food and procreative power. Protagoras' version of the legend, in which Prometheus already takes part in the creation of man, proved the germ of the later representation of the hero as the artificer of mankind out of clay. In this form the story was transmitted by the poets of the New Comedy to Rome², and appears in quaint and interesting reliefs upon Roman Sarcophagi³.

§ 4. *On Socrates' criticism of Simonides' poem.*

The second episode which it is needful to discuss is the criticism given by Socrates of the poem of Simonides⁴.

As we have endeavoured to shew, the aim of the Protagoras is to prove that virtue cannot be communicated by teaching, unless knowledge and virtue are

¹ Works and Days 192 *δίκη δ' ἐν χερσὶ καὶ αἰδῶς οὐκ ἔσται.*

² Menander ap. Stob. Florileg. II 27 *Προμηθεύς, δὲ λέγουσ' ἡμᾶς πλάσαι καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ζῶα.* Compare Philemon in Lucian Am. 43 and Hor. Od. I 16. 13—16.

³ See Baumeister's *Denkmäler des klassischen Alterthums* p. 1413.

⁴ On the restoration of the poem see Appendix.

identical. Now Poetry, in the days of Plato, was regarded as perhaps the most powerful means of teaching virtue, and Protagoras had already maintained its educative value in his speech. It was therefore necessary to inquire whether the claims of the Muses were well founded. It became all the more necessary when the Sophists—or some of them—in this as in many other respects went with the stream, and developed the practice of poetical criticism into an art¹. Socrates' exposition of the poem is intended to shew by a practical demonstration that poetry does not teach virtue because in poetry there is no knowledge. There cannot be knowledge in the written words of poets οὐς οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι οἷόν τ' ἐστὶν περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν, ἐπαγόμενοι τε αὐτοὺς οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οἱ μὲν ταῦτά φασιν τὸν ποιητὴν νοεῖν, οἱ δ' ἕτερα, περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι δ' ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἐξελέγξαι (347 E): for knowledge implies the power to ask and answer questions—its method is, in short, dialectic. Browning and other societies would have received short shrift from Socrates, unless the members communicated with the poet to find out what he meant: and even then the poet would himself require to be cross-examined—an ordeal from which he would not be likely to emerge successfully, being in fact but a Sophist himself². Plato's objection to poetry in the Protagoras is not yet based upon ethical and metaphysical grounds as it was when he wrote the Republic, but rather reminds us of his condemnation in the Phaedrus³ of written books in general as a means of

¹ See note on 338 E.

² See 316 D and note in loc.

³ 275 D.

education. The poet is a *θεῖος ἀνὴρ*, who says what he does not know: even when alive he cannot explain his meaning: how much less shall another when he is dead! Socrates might have been content to prove his point without doing so much violence to Simonides' meaning. His exposition of the poem is admittedly sophistical. To begin with, there is nothing in the poem itself to indicate that Simonides' primary intention was to overthrow the maxim of Pittacus, as Socrates avers¹: Pittacus is censured for saying not what is untrue, but what is less than the whole truth. The real subject of the poem is the impossibility of continued perfection among mankind: the mention of Pittacus is but an episode, which might have been omitted without injuring the argument as a whole. But it is in the explanation of details that Socrates runs riot most. His comments upon *μέν*², upon *ἀληθῶς*³, upon *κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς*⁴, are obviously and intentionally absurd, while in dealing with *εὖ πράξας*⁵ and *ἐκῶν*⁶ he contrives by the most perverse sophistry to wrest the plain meaning of Simonides into his own favourite theories of the identity between knowledge and virtue and the impossibility of voluntary sin. But the exaggerated perversity of his exposition is doubtless intended as a satire on the epideictic displays in vogue among some of the Sophists: Plato would fain make it plain that he can beat a Sophist on his own ground.

¹ 342 A—343 C: 344 B et al. Schleiermacher's reference to the fragment of Simonides (in Schneidewin's *Delectus* fr. 2 of Simonides = Bergk⁴ fr. 57) proves nothing for this particular poem.

² 343 D.

³ 343 D.

⁴ 345 A.

⁵ 345 A.

⁶ 345 D.

At the outset, he borrows some features from the speech of Protagoras in 316 c: and the remark of Hippias, when the episode is ended, εὖ μὲν μοι δοκεῖς—περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος διεληλυθέναι may be taken as indicating that Hippias at least accepted the picture as a fair representation of his method¹. We have not sufficient data to say for certain whether the picture is a caricature or not: probably it is just as much and as little of a caricature as the representation of the Sophists in the Euthydemus. At all events, if the sketch is even approximately true to nature, no one will deny that the Sophists had better have “put the poets on their shelves²” if they desired to reach the truth of things.

If the view which we have taken is correct, it will be vain to look for reasoned ethical teaching in the episode. The opinion of Dümmler³, that Plato is here attacking Antisthenes for regarding virtue as ἀναπόβλητος⁴, receives no support from the dialogue, even if we allowed that the truly virtuous man could ever have seemed to Plato or even to Socrates capable of losing his virtue.

¹ From this point of view, the whole episode should be compared with the speech of Socrates in the Phaedrus 237 B—241 D.

² 348 A, where Socrates virtually confesses that his exposition is naught.

³ Akademia p. 50.

⁴ Diog. Laert. VI 105.

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The teaching of the Protagoras on the relation between Pleasure and Good, as is well known, differs *toto caelo* from that of nearly every other dialogue of Plato. Not to mention the Philebus¹, and the Republic², where the point is rather that Pleasure is not *the* i.e. the *Chief* Good, in the Gorgias³ and the Phaedo⁴ we have the most explicit assertion of the distinction between the two notions. Contrast the following passages:

οὐκ ἄρα τὸ χαίρειν ἐστὶν εὖ πράττειν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνιᾶσθαι κακῶς, ὥστε ἕτερον γίγνεται τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (Gorg. 497 A).

οὐ ταῦτὰ γίγνεται, ὦ φίλε, τὰ γὰρ τοῖς ἡδέσιν οὐδὲ τὰ κακὰ τοῖς ἀνιαιοῖς (Gorg. 497 D).

ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὐτὴ ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι καὶ μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα κτλ. (Phaedo 69 A).

λέγεις δὲ τινὰς, ἔφη, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς; Ἔφη. Ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀνθρώπος ἂν εὖ ζῆν, εἰ ἀνιώμενός τε καὶ ὀδυνώμενος ζῶν; Οὐκ ἔφη. Τί δ', εἰ ἡδέως βιοῦς τὸν βίον τελευτήσειεν, οὐκ εὖ ἂν σοι δοκεῖ οὕτως βεβιωκέναι; Ἐμοιγ', ἔφη. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀηδῶς κακόν (Prot. 351 B).

ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα ἰσότης, τὰ μείζω αἰεὶ καὶ πλείω ληπτέα· ἐὰν δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρὰ, τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ σμικρότερα· ἐὰν δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρὰ, ἐὰν μὲν τὰ ἀνιαιρὰ ὑπερβάλληται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, ἐὰν τε τὰ ἐγγύς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω ἐὰν τε τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν πρακτέον ἐν ἢ ἂν ταῦτ' ἐνῆ· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἡδέα ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνιαιρῶν, οὐ πρακτέα (Prot. 356 B).

¹ 53 C foll.

² VI 509 A οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ (i.e. τὸ ἀγαθόν) λέγεις. Εὐφήμει· ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

³ 495 A foll.

⁴ 64 D, 68 E foll.

Such passages, which might be multiplied at will, shew that, if there is any meaning in words, the antithesis is a real one. Nor does the contrast lurk merely in isolated passages, for the whole tone and argument of the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedo* are opposed to any communion between pleasure and good.

Various explanations of the difficulty have been offered.

Those who (like Grote) hold that the dialogues of Plato "are distinct compositions, written each with its own circumstances and purpose¹," find of course no difficulty to explain: the *Protagoras* is perhaps the strongest bulwark in their argument. The most thorough-going adherents of the opposite school deny that Plato is serious², Plato's object being merely to prove that whatever we take to be the Chief Good, virtue can only be identified with the knowledge thereof. Between these two extreme views comes the theory that the identification of Pleasure and Good is seriously meant, either as the view of Plato himself when he wrote the *Protagoras*, or as a faithful historical picture of the teaching of his master upon this subject. It seems clear to us that Plato is serious, but we do not find sufficient evidence to justify us in holding that the view which he advocates—whether he believed it formerly or not—was at this time held by the philosopher himself. To the opposite theory, it seems a fatal objection that in none of the minor dialogues which are universally admitted to be earlier

¹ Plato and the companions of Socrates II p. 89.

² Schleiermacher's Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato p. 95: Bonitz *Platonische Studien* p. 264: compare Grote II p. 87.

than the Protagoras does there seem to be any hint of hedonism. On the contrary, the analogues to the Measuring or Calculating art which meet us in the Charmides¹ and Laches² are concerned not with the weighing of *pleasure*, but with the determination of what is *good*³.

The most probable view is that which regards the episode in question as intended to represent the views of the historical Socrates. It is true that even in the Memorabilia Socrates never in so many words declares that Pleasure is Good⁴, but he frequently inculcates the practice of the virtues on account of the pleasures which they bring⁵. Moreover, if Socrates actually did sometimes call pleasure good, it is easier to understand how the Cyrenaics could have fathered their Hedonism upon him. It is of course quite possible that the formulating of the doctrine is due to Plato, and that the historical truth of the picture suffered by the introduction of greater brevity and precision: we may even suppose that Plato, for dramatic or other reasons, was not careful to represent his Master in all respects as he was. But to stigmatise the doctrine as "utterly un-Socratic," as Schleiermacher

¹ 174 A foll.

² 199 C.

³ The nearest approach to a unification of pleasure and good elsewhere in Plato seems to be in Laws II 663 A ff. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν μὴ χωρίζων λόγος ἡδύ τε καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν πιθανός γ', εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, πρὸς τὸ τινα ἐθέλειν ζῆν τὸν ὄσιον καὶ δίκαιον βίον κτλ.: where, however, Plato is merely insisting on the practical importance of the identification for the welfare of a state.

⁴ He identifies ὠφέλιμον with good in Mem. IV 6. 8 ff.

⁵ e g. II I. 19: IV 5. 9: see Zeller Philosophie der Griechen³ II I p. 126.

does¹, seems to involve a misconception of its moral worth. There is nothing degrading in the theory as it is worked out by Socrates, since it is not the balance of pleasure in each individual species of pleasure which we are recommended to choose, but the balance of pleasure generally and in the long run: it would be quite open to Socrates to maintain that the lower pleasures are never to be chosen, because they are always followed by more pain, or even that they are not even pleasant².

If we accept this explanation, the identification of pleasure and good will be in harmony with the general realistic tone of the dialogue, and we shall be justified in holding that in the *Protagoras* we see the ethical no less than the educational theories of Socrates and Protagoras brought face to face³.

§ 6. *Date of Composition.*

Of external evidence as to the date when the *Protagoras* was written, there is none.

The internal evidence, so far as it goes, is in favour of an early date. It rests upon indications furnished by (1) the language and style, (2) the doctrine, (3) references and allusions in the dialogue itself.

¹ Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato p. 95.

² Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. X 2. 1173^b 20 πρὸς δὲ τοὺς προφέροντας τὰς ἐπονείδιστους τῶν ἡδονῶν λέγουι τις ἂν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ταῦθ' ἡδέα. The historical Socrates would have stopped short of this assertion, if we may judge from such evidence as Xen. Mem. I 4. 12.

³ See Dr Jackson's article on the Sophists in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

On linguistic grounds, Ritter¹ holds that the dialogue was composed before 399 B.C. But the evidence upon which he relies is chiefly derived from the relative frequency of certain particles and formulæ throughout the dialogue, and (as usual with evidence of this kind) it is by no means clear that Plato's choice of particles and the like is not a result of the character of the composition rather than an index to its date. It is also unlikely on many grounds that any of Plato's dialogues are anterior to the death of Socrates. The proofs derived from the exuberant vivacity, the boisterous juvenility and dramatic fire of the dialogue are surer, if more intangible, and all point to a comparatively early date².

In two points of doctrine the Protagoras shews its affinity with the earlier and purely Socratic dialogues. Holiness, as in the Laches, is reckoned as a virtue and placed by the side of *δικαιοσύνη*, whereas in the Republic and Phaedo *δσιότης* is excluded, and it is only the four cardinal virtues that are recognised as such³. Too much stress ought not to be laid upon this argument, but at least, if we may trust Xenophon⁴, the recognition of *δσιότης* as a distinct virtue had the sanction of Socrates. The second point is of more importance. Although the subject of the dialogue might seem to have expressly invited mention of that

¹ Untersuchungen über Plato, p. 127.

² This subject is well handled by Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 70 foll.

³ Prot. 329 C et al., Lach. 199 D, Rep. IV. 428 A, Phaedo 69 C. The doctrine of the Meno and Gorgias resembles that of the Protagoras in this point: Meno 78 D, Gorg. 507 B.

⁴ Mem. IV 6. 4.

'demotic virtue'¹ of which Plato made so much, no allusion to it is made². It is perhaps a natural conclusion that Plato had not yet elaborated the distinction—unknown to Socrates—between scientific and unscientific virtue: but it should at the same time be remembered that Plato may have deliberately refrained from adverting to this subject in order to make his picture of Socrates more true to nature. However this may be, the distinction in question is only an ethical deduction from the metaphysical distinction between knowledge and true opinion: its absence from the Protagoras is therefore in harmony with the purely Socratic tone of the dialogue, where we look in vain for the metaphysical speculations or presuppositions of Plato's mature age.

¹ It is in the Meno that the difference between demotic and philosophic virtue is first clearly laid down. See on the whole subject Archer-Hind's Phaedo, Appendix I.

² The nearest approach to a recognition of two virtues, one scientific and the other unscientific, is in the speech of Protagoras 320 C foll. The elements of *πολιτικὴ ἀρετή* implanted in mankind at the beginning and transmitted by father to son are in their essence distinct from scientific virtue, and so far resemble the *δημοτικὴ ἀρετή* of Platonic teaching: but this part of Protagoras's speech is not taken up by Socrates, who will not even allow that the (so-called) virtue which the sophists and public opinion try to teach is virtue in *any* sense of the word, since it is not knowledge. Schöne (Über Platon's Protagoras, p. 51) thinks that the Platonic Socrates *does* recognise the distinction between true and demotic virtue when he expresses (319 A) a doubt whether virtue can be taught, since he afterwards proves himself that it can. No doubt Socrates' change of position in the course of the dialogue finds its justification in this distinction between true and spurious virtue (as it is found in the Meno), but so far as we can see, there is nothing in the Protagoras which shews that Plato had as yet made the distinction explicit to himself.

From the allusion in the dialogue to the art of the Peltasts¹, Teichmüller² has endeavoured to fix the date of composition more precisely. It is known that there were Peltasts in Thrace before the time of Iphicrates³, but there is no proof that they formed a regular corps of the Athenian army till the military reforms of 391, which are associated with his name. Teichmüller points out that Plato speaks of Peltasts in such a way as to imply that they are no longer unfamiliar or foreign to his readers⁴, and assigns the dialogue to 393 or 392 B.C., when Iphicrates probably began to organise the new arm.

On all these grounds we cannot go far astray in assigning the dialogue to the second half of the first decade of the fourth century B.C.

§ 7. *Date of the Action.*

The majority of critics are agreed in supposing the dialogue to be conceived as taking place before the war, in 433 or 432 B.C.

It is in harmony with this that Pericles and his sons are represented as still alive⁵, that Socrates is still young⁶, and that Alcibiades⁷ is but a youth and

¹ 350 A *τινες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες; οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μή; Οἱ πελταστικοί*: cf. Theaet. 165 D *πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ*.

² Literarische Fehden, p. 20.

³ Thucydides IV 111. 1: cf. (with Teichmüller) id. II 29. 4: Eurip. Alcest. 498 *Θρηκίας πέλτης ἀναξ* et al.

⁴ Contrast Xenophon Mem. III 9. 2, where peltasts are similarly cited in illustration, but called *Θρᾶκες ἐν πέλταις*.

⁵ 315 A et al. They died in 429.

⁶ 314 B et al. In 432 he would be 36.

⁷ 309 B. He was born in 451.

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11

ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ

[ἢ σοφισταί· ἐνδεικτικός]

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΤΑΙΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΙΠΠΟΚΡΑΤΗΣ,
ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑΣ, ΑΛΚΙΒΙΑΔΗΣ, ΚΑΛΛΙΑΣ,
ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ, ΠΡΟΔΙΚΟΣ, ΙΠΠΙΑΣ.

St. I
309

Ι. Πόθεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνει; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὥραν; καὶ μήν μοι καὶ πρόην ἰδόντι καλὸς μὲν ἐφαίνετο ἀνὴρ ἔτι, ἀνὴρ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρήσθαι, καὶ πώγωνος ἤδη ὑποπιμπλάμενος.

Socrates is asked by a friend to describe his interview with the newly-arrived Protagoras.

5

ΣΩ. Εἶτα τί τοῦτο; οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὀμήρου ἐπαινέτης εἶ, ὃς ἔφη χαριστάτην ἤβην εἶναι τοῦ ὑπηνήτου, ἣν νῦν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔχει;

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἢ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνει; καὶ πῶς πρὸς σὲ ὁ νεανίας διάκειται;

ΣΩ. Εὖ ἔμοιγε ἔδοξεν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ τῇ νῦν ἡμέρᾳ· καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἶπε, βοηθῶν

A. P.

I

έμοί. καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι. ἄτοπον
 15 μέντοι τί σοι ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν· παρόντος γὰρ ἐκείνου,
 οὔτε προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν, ἐπελανθανόμην τε αὐτοῦ
 θαμά.

ΕΤ. Καὶ τί ἂν γεγονὸς εἶη περὶ σὲ κακείνον C
 τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα; οὐ γὰρ δήπου τινὲ καλλίονι
 20 ἐνέτυχες ἄλλω ἔν γε τῆδε τῆ πόλει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ πολὺ γε.

ΕΤ. Τί φῆς; ἀστῶ ἢ ξένω;

ΣΩ. Ξένω.

ΕΤ. Ποδαπῶ;

25 ΣΩ. Ἄβδηρίτη.

ΕΤ. Καὶ οὕτω καλὸς τις ὁ ξένος ἔδοξέν σοι εἶναι,
 ὥστε τοῦ Κλεινίου υἱέος καλλίων σοι φανῆναι;

ΣΩ. Πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει, ὦ μακάριε, τὸ σοφώτατον
 κάλλιον φαίνεσθαι;

30 ΕΤ. Ἄλλ' ἢ σοφῶ τινι ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 ἐντυχῶν πάρει;

ΣΩ. Σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ D
 σοι δοκεῖ σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας.

ΕΤ. ὦ τί λέγεις; Πρωταγόρας ἐπίδεδήμηκεν;

35 ΣΩ. Τρίτην γε ἤδη ἡμέραν.

ΕΤ. Καὶ ἄρτι ἄρα ἐκείνω συγγεγονῶς ἦκεις;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ γε | πολλὰ καὶ εἰπὼν καὶ ἀκούσας. 31

ΕΤ. Τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω ἡμῖν τὴν ξυνουσίαν, εἰ
 μή σέ τι κωλύει, καθιζόμενος ἐνταυθί, ἐξαναστήσας
 40 τὸν παῖδα τουτονί;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ χάριν γε εἶσομαι, εἰ
 ἀκούητε.

ΕΤ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡμεῖς σοί, εἰ ἂν λέγῃς.

ΣΩ. Διπλῆ ἂν εἶη ἡ χάρις. ἄλλ' οὖν ἀκούετε.

II. Τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου, Ἰπποκράτης ὁ Ἀπολλοδώρου υἱός, Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός, τὴν θύραν
 B τῆ βακτηρία πάνυ σφόδρα ἔκρουε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ ἀνέωξέ τις, εὐθὺς εἴσω ἦει ἐπειγόμενος, καὶ τῆ φωνῇ μέγα λέγων ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγρήγορας ἢ καθεύδεις; καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν φωνὴν γνοὺς αὐτοῦ, Ἰπποκράτης, ἔφην, οὗτος. μή τι νεώτερον ἀγγέλλεις; Οὐδέν γ', ἢ δ' ὅς, εἰ μὴ ἀγαθὰ γε. Εὖ ἂν λέγοις, 10 ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἔστι δὲ τί, καὶ τοῦ ἔνεκα τῆνικάδε ἀφίκου; Πρωταγόρας, ἔφη, ἦκει, στὰς παρ' ἐμοί. Πρώην, ἔφην ἐγώ· σὺ δὲ ἄρτι πέπυσαι; Νῆ τοὺς θεούς, C ἔφη, ἐσπέρας γε. καὶ ἅμα ἐπιψηλαφήσας τοῦ σκίμποδος ἐκαθέζετο παρὰ τοὺς πόδας μου, καὶ 15 εἶπεν· Ἐσπέρας δῆτα, μάλα γε ὄψε ἀφικόμενος ἐξ Οἰνόης. ὁ γάρ τοι παῖς με ὁ Σάτυρος ἀπέδρα· καὶ δῆτα μέλλων σοι φράζειν, ὅτι διωξιόμεν αὐτόν, ὑπότινος ἄλλου ἐπελαθόμεν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦλθον καὶ δεδειπνηκότες ἡμεν καὶ ἐμέλλομεν ἀναπαύεσθαι, τότε 20 μοι ἀδελφὸς λέγει, ὅτι ἦκει Πρωταγόρας. καὶ ἔτι μὲν ἐνεχείρησα εὐθὺς παρὰ σὲ ἵεναι, ἔπειτά μοι λίαν D πόρρω ἔδοξε τῶν νυκτῶν εἶναι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τάχιστα με ἐκ τοῦ κόπου ὁ ὕπνος ἀνήκεν, εὐθὺς ἀναστὰς οὕτω δεῦρο ἐπορευόμεν. καὶ ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων αὐτοῦ τὴν 25 ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν πτοίησιν, Τί οὖν σοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο; μῶν τί σε ἀδικεῖ Πρωταγόρας; καὶ ὅς γελάσας, Νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι γε μόνος ἐστὶ σοφός, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐ ποιεῖ. Ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἂν αὐτῷ διδῶς ἀργύριον καὶ πείθης 30 ἐκεῖνον, ποιήσει καὶ σὲ σοφόν. Εἰ γάρ, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ,

Socrates relates how Hippocrates announced to him the arrival of Protagoras, and how Hippocrates and he determined to visit Protagoras at the house of Callias, to see if he would teach Hippocrates wisdom.

Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί, ἐν τούτῳ εἶη· ὡς οὐτ' ἂν τῶν ἐμῶν E
 ἐπιλίποισι οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν φίλων· ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα
 καὶ νῦν ἤκω παρὰ σέ, ἵνα ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ διαλεχθῆς αὐτῷ.
 35 ἐγὼ γὰρ ἅμα μὲν καὶ νεώτερός εἰμι, ἅμα δὲ οὐδὲ
 ἐώρακα Πρωταγόραν πώποτε οὐδ' ἀκήκοα οὐδέν· ἔτι
 γὰρ παῖς ἦ, ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησεν. ἀλλὰ γάρ,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες τὸν ἄνδρα ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ φασὶ
 σοφώτατον εἶναι λέγειν· ἀλλὰ τί οὐ βαδίζομεν παρ'
 40 αὐτόν, ἵνα ἔνδον | καταλάβωμεν; καταλύει δ', ὡς ἐγὼ 311
 ἤκουσα, παρὰ Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου· ἀλλ' ἴωμεν.
 καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Μήπω, ὦγαθέ, ἐκεῖσε ἴωμεν, πρῶ
 γὰρ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν,
 καὶ περιμόντες αὐτοῦ διατρίψωμεν, ἕως ἂν φῶς γένη-
 45 ται· εἶτα ἴωμεν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ Πρωταγόρας
 ἔνδον διατρίβει, ὥστε, θάρρει, καταληψόμεθα αὐτόν,
 ὡς τὸ εἶκός, ἔνδον.

III. Μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλήν
 περιῆμεν· καὶ ἐγὼ ἀποπειρώμενος τοῦ B
 Ἰπποκράτους τῆς ῥώμης διεσκόπουν
 αὐτόν καὶ ἠρώτων, Εἶπέ μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ,
 ὦ Ἰππόκρατες, παρὰ Πρωταγόραν νῦν
 ἐπιχειρεῖς ἵεναι, ἀργύριον τελῶν ἐκείνῳ
 μισθὸν ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ, ὡς παρὰ τίνα
 ἀφιζόμενος καὶ τίς γενησόμενος; ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐπε-
 νόεις παρὰ τὸν σεαυτοῦ ὁμώνυμον ἐλθὼν Ἰπποκράτη
 10 τὸν Κῶον, τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν, ἀργύριον τελεῖν
 ὑπὲρ σεαυτοῦ μισθὸν ἐκείνῳ, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο, Εἶπέ
 μοι, μέλλεις τελεῖν, ὦ Ἰππόκρατες, Ἰπποκράτει
 μισθὸν ὡς τίνι ὄντι; τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; Εἶπον ἂν, C
 ἔφη, ὅτι ὡς ἰατρῷ. Ὡς τίς γενησόμενος; Ὡς ἰατρός,
 15 ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ παρὰ Πολύκλειτον τὸν Ἀργεῖον ἢ

Before setting
 out Socrates eli-
 cits by question-
 ing that Hippo-
 crates wishes to
 obtain for money
 from Protagoras
 not a professional
 but a liberal edu-
 cation.

Φειδίαν τὸν Ἀθηναῖον ἐπενόεις ἀφικόμενος μισθὸν
 ὑπὲρ σαυτοῦ τελεῖν ἐκείνοις, εἴ τίς σε ἤρετο· τελεῖν
 τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον ὡς τίνι ὄντι ἐν νῶ ἔχεις Πολυ-
 κλείτῳ τε καὶ Φειδία; τί ἂν ἀπεκρίνω; Εἶπον ἂν
 ὡς ἀγαματοποιοῖς· Ὡς τίς δὲ γενησόμενος αὐτός; 20
 Δῆλον ὅτι ἀγαματοποιός. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· παρὰ
 D δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενοι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ
 ἀργύριον ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ἔτοιμοι ἐσόμεθα τελεῖν ὑπὲρ
 σοῦ, ἂν μὲν ἐξικνηῖται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ
 τούτοις πείθωμεν αὐτόν, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων 25
 προσαναλίσκοντες· εἰ οὖν τις ἡμᾶς περὶ ταῦτα οὕτω
 σφόδρα σπουδάζοντας ἔροιτο· εἶπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες
 τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατες, ὡς τίνι ὄντι τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐν
 νῶ ἔχετε χρήματα τελεῖν; τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναί-
 E μεθα; τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου 30
 ἀκούομεν; ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαματοποιὸν καὶ
 περὶ Ὀμήρου ποιητήν, τί τοιοῦτον περὶ Πρωταγόρου
 ἀκούομεν; Σοφιστήν δὴ τοι ὀνομάζουσί γε, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες, τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι, ἔφη. Ὡς σοφιστῇ ἄρα
 ἐρχόμεθα τελούντες τὰ χρήματα; Μάλιστα. Εἰ 35
 οὖν καὶ τοῦτό τίς σε προσέροιτο· αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ ὡς
 312 τίς γενησόμενος ἔρχει παρὰ | τὸν Πρωταγόραν; καὶ
 ὅς εἶπεν ἐρυθριάσας—ἤδη γὰρ ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας,
 ὥστε καταφανῆ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι—Εἰ μὲν τι τοῖς
 ἔμπροσθεν ἔοικεν, δῆλον ὅτι σοφιστῆς γενησόμενος. 40
 Σὺ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς
 τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστήν παρέχων; Νῆ τὸν
 Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἶπερ γε ἂ διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν.
 Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ὦ Ἰππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμ-
 βάνεις σου τὴν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι, 45
 B ἄλλ' οἷαπερ ἢ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ

κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου; τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἐκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει.
 50 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοιαύτη μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.

IV. Οἶσθα οὖν ὃ μέλλεις νῦν πράττειν, ἢ σε λανθάνει; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Τοῦ πέρι; "Οτι μέλλεις τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν σαυτοῦ παρα- C
 σχεῖν θεραπεῦσαι ἀνδρὶ, ὡς φῆς, σοφισ-
 τῇ· ὃ τι δέ ποτε ὁ σοφιστὴς ἐστίν, θαυ-
 μάζοιμ' ἂν εἰ οἶσθα. καίτοι εἰ τοῦτ' ἀγνοεῖς, οὐδὲ ὅτῳ παραδίδως τὴν ψυχὴν οἶσθα, οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθῶ οὔτ' εἰ κακῶ πράγματι. Οἶμαί γ', ἔφη, εἰδέναι. Λέγε δὴ, τί ἡγεῖ εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἦ δ'
 10 ὅς, ὡσπερ τοῦνομα λέγει, τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο μὲν ἔξεστι λέγειν καὶ περὶ ζωγράφων καὶ περὶ τεκτόνων, ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονες· ἀλλ' εἴ τις D
 ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσὶν οἱ ζωγράφοι ἐπιστή-
 15 μονες, εἴποιμεν ἂν πού αὐτῶ, ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τὴν τῶν εἰκόνων, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. εἰ δέ τις ἐκείνο ἔροιτο, ὃ δὲ σοφιστὴς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστίν, τί ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῶ; ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; Τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες;
 20 ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν; Ἴσως ἂν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ λέγοιμεν, οὐ μέντοι ἰκανῶς γέ· ἐρωτήσεως γὰρ ἔτι ἢ ἀπόκρισις ἡμῖν δεῖται, περὶ ὅτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν. ὡσπερ ὁ κιθα-
 ριστὴς δεινὸν δήπου ποιεῖ λέγειν περὶ οὐπὲρ καὶ E
 25 ἐπιστήμονα, περὶ κιθαρίσεως—ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Εἶεν· ὃ δὲ δὴ σοφιστὴς περὶ τίνος δεινὸν ποιεῖ λέγειν;

Socrates shews that Hippocrates, who calls Protagoras a sophist, does not know what is meant by the word "sophist."

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δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ ὅπως γε μή, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ἐ-
 σοφιστῆς ἐπαινῶν ἀ πωλεῖ ἔξαπατήσει ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ
 30 οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος τροφήν, ὁ ἔμπορός τε καὶ D
 κάπηλος. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοί που ὦν ἄγουσιν ἀγωγίμων
 οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἴσασιν ὅ τι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ
 σῶμα, ἐπαινοῦσιν δὲ πάντα πωλοῦντες, οὔτε οἱ ὠνού-
 μενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μή τις τύχη γυμναστικὸς ἢ
 35 ἰατρὸς ὦν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες
 κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ καπηλεύοντες τῷ
 ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἐπαινοῦσιν μὲν πάντα ἃ πωλοῦσιν,
 τάχα δ' ἂν τινες, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ τούτων ἀγνοοῖεν
 ὦν πωλοῦσιν ὅ τι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν πρὸς τὴν
 40 ψυχὴν. ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, E
 ἐὰν μή τις τύχη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν ἰατρικὸς ὦν.
 εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων τί χρη-
 στὸν καὶ πονηρὸν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὠνεῖσθαι μαθήματα
 καὶ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὄτουοῦν. εἰ
 45 δὲ μή, ὄρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις
 |κυβεύης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πολὺ 314
 μείζων κίνδυνος ἐν τῇ τῶν μαθημάτων ὠνῇ ἢ ἐν τῇ
 τῶν σιτίων. σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ ποτὰ πριάμενον
 παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμποροῦ ἔξεστιν ἐν ἄλλοις
 50 ἀγγείοις ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ
 σῶμα πιόντα ἢ φαγόντα, καταθέμενον οἴκαδε ἔξεστιν
 συμβουλεύσασθαι, παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαῖοντα, ὅ
 τι τε ἐδεστέον ἢ ποτέον καὶ ὅ τι μή, καὶ ὀπόσον καὶ
 ὀπότε. ὥστε ἐν τῇ ὠνῇ οὐ μέγας ὁ κίνδυνος. μαθή-
 55 ματα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγείῳ ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' B
 ἀνάγκη, καταθέντα τὴν τιμὴν, τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ
 ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα ἀπιέναι ἢ βεβλαμμένον
 ἢ ὠφελημένον. ταῦτα οὖν σκοπώμεθα καὶ μετὰ τῶν

πρεσβυτέρων ἡμῶν· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔτι νέοι ὥστε τοσοῦτον
 πρᾶγμα διελέσθαι. νῦν μέντοι, ὥσπερ ὠρμήσαμεν, 60
 ἴωμεν καὶ ἀκούσωμεν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἔπειτα ἀκούσαντες
 καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνακοινωσώμεθα· καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνος
 Πρωταγόρας αὐτόθι ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ
 C Ἡλείος· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Πρόδικον τὸν Κεῖον· καὶ
 ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ σοφοί. 65

VI. Δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἐπορευόμεθα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν
 τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιστάντες περὶ
 τινος λόγου διελεγόμεθα, ὃς ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν
 ὁδὸν ἐνέπεσεν· ἴν' οὖν μὴ ἀτελής γένοι-
 το, ἀλλὰ διαπερανάμενοι οὕτως ἐσίοιμεν,
 στάντες ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ διελεγόμεθα, ἕως συνωμολο-
 γήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι, ὁ θυρωρός, εὐνοῦχός
 D τις, κατήκουεν ἡμῶν. κινδυνεύει δὲ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος
 τῶν σοφιστῶν ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς φοιτῶσιν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν·
 ἐπειδὴ γοῦν ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν, ἀνοίξας καὶ ἰδὼν 10
 ἡμᾶς, Ἔα, ἔφη, σοφισταί τινες· οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ· καὶ
 ἅμα ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν τὴν θύραν πάνυ προθύμως
 ὡς οἶός τ' ἦν ἐπήραξε. καὶ ἡμεῖς πάλιν ἐκρούομεν,
 καὶ ὃς ἐγκεκλημένης τῆς θύρας ἀποκρινόμενος εἶπεν,
 ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀκηκόατε, ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ αὐτῷ; 15
 Ἄλλ' ὠγαθέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, οὔτε παρὰ Καλλίαν ἤκομεν
 E οὔτε σοφισταί ἐσμεν· ἀλλὰ θάρρει· Πρωταγόραν γάρ
 τοι δεόμενοι ἰδεῖν ἤλθομεν· εἰσάγγειλον οὖν. μόγις
 οὖν ποτὲ ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος ἀνέωξε τὴν θύραν· ἐπειδὴ
 δὲ εἰσῆλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν ἐν τῷ 20
 προστώῳ περιπατοῦντα, ἐξῆς δ' αὐτῷ συμπεριεπά-
 τουν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου
 315 καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ ὁμομήτριος, Πάραλος | ὁ
 Περικλέους, καὶ Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ

Socrates and
 Hippocrates pro-
 ceed to the house
 of Callias. The
 scene in the court
 is described.

25 ἐπὶ θάτερα ὁ ἕτερος τῶν Περικλέους Ξάνθιππος καὶ
 Φιλιππίδης ὁ Φιλομήλου καὶ Ἀντίμοιρος ὁ Μενδαῖος,
 ὅσπερ εὐδοκιμεῖ μάλιστα τῶν Πρωταγόρου μαθητῶν
 καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνη μαυθάνει, ὡς σοφιστῆς ἐσόμενος.
 τούτων δὲ οἱ ὄπισθεν ἠκολούθουν ἐπακούοντες τῶν
 30 λεγομένων, τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο, οὓς ἄγει
 ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι' ὧν
 διεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὡσπερ Ὀρφεύς, οἱ δὲ
 κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἔπονται κεκληλημένοι· ἦσαν δέ B
 τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ. τοῦτον τὸν
 35 χορὸν μάλιστα ἔγωγε ἰδὼν ἦσθην, ὡς καλῶς ηὐλα-
 βούντο μηδέποτε ἐμποδῶν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναι
 Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ἀναστρέφοι καὶ οἱ
 μετ' ἐκείνου, εὖ πως καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ περιεσχίζοντο
 οὗτοι οἱ ἐπήκοοι ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν, καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ
 40 περιμόντες αἰεὶ εἰς τὸ ὄπισθεν καθίσταντο κάλλιστα.

VII. Τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα, ἔφη Ὀμηρος, Ἴπ-
Further de-
 scription of the
 scene. πίαν τὸν Ἠλεῖον, καθήμενον ἐν τῷ κατ' C
 ἀντικρὺ προστώῳ ἐν θρόνῳ· περὶ αὐτὸν
 δ' ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ βάθρων Ἐρυξίμαχος τε ὁ Ἀκου-
 5 μενοῦ καὶ Φαῖδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος καὶ Ἄνδρων ὁ
 Ἄνδροτίωνος καὶ τῶν ξένων πολῖταιί τε αὐτοῦ καὶ
 ἄλλοι τινές. ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν
 μετεώρων ἀστρονομικὰ ἅττα διερωτᾶν τὸν Ἴππίαν,
 ὁ δ' ἐν θρόνῳ καθήμενος ἐκάστοις αὐτῶν διέκρινεν καὶ
 10 διεξήει τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ Τάυταλόν γε
 εἰσείδον· ἐπιδημεῖ γὰρ ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος. D
 ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκῆματί τινι, ᾧ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὡς ταμείῳ
 ἐχρήτο Ἴππόνικος, νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν κατα-
 λυόντων ὁ Καλλίας καὶ τοῦτο ἐκκενώσας ξένοις κατά-
 15 λυσιν πεποίηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο,

ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κωδίοις τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐφαίνετο· παρεκάθηντο δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίμαις Πausανίας τε ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων καὶ μετὰ Πausανίου νέον τι ἔτι μεϊράκιον, ὡς
 Ε μὲν ἐγῶμαι καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν φύσιν, τὴν δ' οὖν 20
 ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός. ἔδοξα ἀκούσαι ὄνομα αὐτῷ εἶναι Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ παιδικὰ Πausανίου τυγχάνει ὦν. τοῦτ' ἦν τὸ μεϊράκιον, καὶ τὸ Ἀδειμάντω ἀμφοτέρω, ὃ τε Κήπιδος καὶ ὁ Λευκολοφίδου, καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἐφαίνοντο· περὶ δὲ ὧν διελέ- 25
 γοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἐγωγε μαθεῖν ἔξωθεν, καίπερ λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδίκου· πάσσοφος γάρ 316
 μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος· | ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἰκήματι γιγνόμενος ἀσαφῆ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα. 30

VIII. Καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἄρτι εἰσεληλύθειμεν, κατόπιν δὲ ἡμῶν ἐπεισῆλθον Ἀλκιβιάδης τε ὁ καλός, ὡς φῆς σὺ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι, καὶ Κριτίας ὁ Καλλαίσχρου. ἡμεῖς οὖν ὡς εἰσῆλθομεν, ἔτι σμίγκρ' ἄττα διατρίψαντες καὶ ταῦτα διαθεασάμενοι, προσῆ-
 Β μεν πρὸς τὸν Πρωταγόραν, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον·
 ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πρὸς σέ τοι ἦλθομεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Ἴπποκράτης οὗτος. Πότερον, ἔφη, μόνω βουλόμενοι διαλεχθῆναι ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων; Ἡμῖν μὲν, ἦν 10
 δ' ἐγὼ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· ἀκούσας δὲ οὐ ἔνεκα ἦλθομεν αὐτὸς σκέψαι. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐστίν, ἔφη, οὐ ἔνεκα ἦκετε; Ἴπποκράτης ὃδε ἐστὶν μὲν τῶν ἐπιχωρίων, Ἀπολλοδώρου υἱός, οἰκίας μεγάλης τε καὶ εὐδαίμονος,
 C αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν φύσιν δοκεῖ ἐνάμιλλος εἶναι τοῖς ἡλι- 15
 κιώταις. ἐπιθυμεῖν δέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι

Socrates introduces Hippocrates to Protagoras. The latter justifies his profession, and the rival sophists assemble to hear him discourse. 5

ἐν τῇ πόλει, τοῦτο δὲ οἶεταί οἱ μάλιστ' ἂν γενέσθαι, εἰ
 σοὶ συγγένοιτο· ταῦτ' οὖν ἤδη σὺ σκόπει, πότερον
 περὶ αὐτῶν μόνος οἶει δεῖν διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς μόνους,
 20 ἢ μετ' ἄλλων. Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη, προμηθεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
 ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ. ξένον γὰρ ἄνδρα καὶ ἰόντα εἰς πόλεις
 μεγάλας, καὶ ἐν ταύταις πείθοντα τῶν νέων τοὺς
 βελτίστους ἀπολείποντας τὰς τῶν ἄλλων συνουσίας,
 καὶ οἰκείων καὶ ὀθνείων, καὶ πρεσβυτέρων καὶ νεω-
 25 τέρων, ἑαυτῷ συνεῖναι ὡς βελτίους ἐσομένους διὰ
 τὴν ἑαυτοῦ συνουσίαν, χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὸν ταῦτα D
 πράττοντα· οὐ γὰρ σμικροὶ περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε
 γίνονται καὶ ἄλλαι δυσμένεαιί τε καὶ ἐπιβουλαί.
 ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημί μὲν εἶναι πα-
 30 λαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν
 ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα
 ποιεῖσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι τοὺς μὲν ποιήσιν,
 οἷον Ὀμηρόν τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς
 δὲ αὖ τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμοδίας, τοὺς- ἀμφί τε
 35 Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον· ἐνίους δὲ τινὰς ἡσθημαὶ καὶ
 γυμναστικὴν, οἷον Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος καὶ ὁ νῦν
 ἔτι ὢν, οὐδενὸς ἦττων σοφιστής, Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμ- E
 βριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς· μουσικὴν δὲ
 Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος πρόσχημα ἐποιήσατο,
 40 μέγας ὢν σοφιστής, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος καὶ
 ἄλλοι πολλοί. οὗτοι πάντες, ὥσπερ λέγω, φοβη-
 θέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσ-
 μασιν ἐχρήσαντο· ἢ ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις ἅπασιν κατὰ τοῦτο 317
 εἶναι οὐ συμφέρομαι· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς οὐ τι
 45 διαπράξασθαι ὃ ἐβουλήθησαν· οὐ γὰρ λαθεῖν τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττειν,
 ὧν περ ἔνεκα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τὰ προσχήματα· ἐπεὶ οἷ γε

πολλοὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν αἰσθάνονται, ἀλλ' ἄττ' ἂν οὗτοι διαγγέλλωσι, ταῦτα ὑμνοῦσιν. τὸ οὖν ἀπο-
 διδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ κατα- 50
 Β φανῆ εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος,
 καὶ πολὺ δυσμενεστέρους παρέχεσθαι ἀνάγκη τοὺς
 ἀνθρώπους· ἠγοῦνται γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον πρὸς τοῖς
 ἄλλοις καὶ πανοῦργον εἶναι. ἐγὼ οὖν τούτων τὴν
 ἐναντίαν ἄπασαν ὁδὸν ἐλήλυθα, καὶ ὁμολογῶ τε 55
 σοφιστῆς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ εὐ-
 λάβειαν ταύτην οἶμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμο-
 λογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρνον εἶναι· καὶ ἄλλας πρὸς
 ταύτη ἔσκεμμαι, ὥστε, σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν δεινὸν
 C πάσχειν διὰ τὸ ὁμολογεῖν σοφιστῆς εἶναι. καίτοι 60
 πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμὶ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὰ
 ξύμπαντα πολλά μοί ἐστιν· οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ πάντων
 ἂν ὑμῶν καθ' ἡλικίαν πατὴρ εἴην· ὥστε πολὺ μοι
 ἠΐδιστόν ἐστιν, εἴ τι βούλεσθε περὶ τούτων, ἀπάντων
 ἐναντίον τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι. καὶ 65
 ἐγὼ—ὑπώπτεισα γὰρ βούλεσθαι αὐτὸν τῷ τε Προ-
 δίκῳ καὶ τῷ Ἰππία ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι
 ὅτι ἐρασταὶ αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἴμεν—Τί οὖν, ἔφην
 D ἐγὼ, οὐ καὶ Πρόδικον καὶ Ἰππίαν ἐκαλέσαμεν καὶ
 τοὺς μετ' αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἐπακούσωσιν ἡμῶν; Πάνυ μὲν 70
 οὖν ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Βούλεσθε οὖν ὁ Καλλίας
 ἔφη, συνέδριον κατασκευάσωμεν, ἵνα καθεζόμενοι δια-
 λέγησθε; Ἐδόκει χρῆναι· ἄσμενοι δὲ πάντες ἡμεῖς, - X
 ὡς ἀκουσόμενοι ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντιλα-
 βόμενοι τῶν βάθρων καὶ τῶν κλινῶν κατεσκευά- 75
 ζομεν παρὰ τῷ Ἰππία· ἐκεῖ γὰρ προὔπῆρχε τὰ
 E βάθρα· ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης
 ἠκέτην ἄγοντε τὸν Πρόδικον, ἀναστήσαντες ἐκ τῆς
 κλίνης, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τοῦ Προδίκου.

IX. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες συνεκαθεζόμεθα, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Νῦν δὴ ἄν, ἔφη, λέγοις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἶδε πάρειςιν, περὶ ὧν ὀλίγον πρότερον μνείαν ἐποιούῃ πρὸς ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ νεανίσκου. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι

5 Protagoras promises that Hippocrates shall improve daily, while taught by him. Socrates asks in what respect, and Protagoras replies: "In the art of politics: he will become a better citizen."

Ἡ αὐτὴ μοι ἀρχή | ἐστίν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, 318
ἢ ἔπερ ἄρτι, περὶ ὧν ἀφικόμην. Ἴπποκράτης γὰρ ὅδε τυγχάνει ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὧν τῆς σῆς συνουσίας· ὅ τι οὖν αὐτῷ ἀποβήσεται, εἰάν
10 σοι συνῆ, ἠδέως ἄν φησι πυθέσθαι. τοσοῦτος ὁ γε ἡμέτερος λόγος. ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπεν·
Ἦ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν σοι, εἰάν ἐμοὶ συνῆς, ἢ ἂν ἡμέρα ἐμοὶ συγγένη, ἀπιέναι οἴκαδε βελτίονι γεγυ-
νότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταῦτά ταῦτα· καὶ ἐκάστης
15 ἡμέρας αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι. καὶ ἐγὼ B
ἀκούσας εἶπον· Ἦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν λέγεις, ἀλλὰ εἰκός, ἐπεὶ κἂν σύ, καίπερ τηλικούτος ὧν καὶ οὕτω σοφός, εἴ τις σε διδάξειεν ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος, βελτίων ἂν γένοιο·
20 ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ αὐτίκα μάλα μεταβαλὼν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν Ἴπποκράτης ὅδε ἐπιθυμήσειεν τῆς συνουσίας τούτου τοῦ νεανίσκου τοῦ νῦν νεωστὶ ἐπιδημοῦντος, Ζευξίππου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου, καὶ ἀφικόμενος παρ' αὐτόν, ὥσπερ παρὰ σὲ νῦν,
25 ἀκούσειεν αὐτοῦ ταῦτά ταῦτα, ἕπερ σου, ὅτι ἐκάστης C
ἡμέρας ξυνὼν^ε αὐτῷ βελτίων ἔσται καὶ ἐπιδώσει· εἰ αὐτὸν ἐπανέροιτο· τί δὴ φῆς βελτίω ἔσεσθαι καὶ εἰς τί ἐπιδώσειν; εἶποι ἂν αὐτῷ ὁ Ζεύξιππος, ὅτι πρὸς γραφικὴν· κἂν εἰ Ὀρθαγόρα τῷ Θηβαίῳ συγ-
30 γενόμενος, ἀκούσας ἐκείνου ταῦτά ταῦτα, ἕπερ σου, ἐπανέροιτο αὐτὸν εἰς ὅ τι βελτίων καθ' ἡμέραν ἔσται συγγιγνόμενος ἐκείνῳ, εἶποι ἄν, ὅτι εἰς αὐλήσιν·

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καιός εἶμι εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀθηναίους, ὡσπερ καὶ
 οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες, φημὶ σοφοὺς εἶναι. ὁρῶ οὖν
 10 ὅταν συλλεγῶμεν εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπειδὰν μὲν
 περὶ οἰκοδομίας τι δέη πράξαι τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς οἰ-
 κοδόμους μεταπεμπομένους συμβούλους περὶ τῶν
 οἰκοδομημάτων, ὅταν δὲ περὶ ναυπηγίας, τοὺς ναυπη-
 γοὺς, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτως, ὅσα ἡγούνται μαθητά C
 15 τε καὶ διδακτὰ εἶναι· ἐὰν δέ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῇ
 αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύειν, ὃν ἐκεῖνοι μὴ οἴονται δημιουρ-
 γὸν εἶναι, κἂν πάνυ καλὸς ἦ καὶ πλούσιος καὶ τῶν
 γενναίων, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλὰ κατα-
 γελῶσι καὶ θορυβοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀποστῇ ὁ
 20 ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν καταθορυβηθεῖς, ἢ οἱ τοξόται αὐτὸν
 ἀφελκύσωσιν, ἢ ἐξαίρωνται κελευόντων τῶν πρυ-
 τάνεων. περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἴονται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω
 διαπράττονται· ἐπειδὰν δέ τι περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως D
 διοικήσεως δέη βουλευσασθαι, συμβουλεύει αὐτοῖς
 25 ἀνιστάμενος περὶ τούτων ὁμοίως μὲν τέκτων, ὁμοίως
 δὲ χαλκεύς, σκυτοτόμος, ἔμπορος, ναύκληρος, πλού-
 σιος, πένης, γενναῖος, ἀγεννής, καὶ τούτοις οὐδεὶς
 τοῦτο ἐπιπλήττει ὡσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδα-
 μόθεν μαθὼν οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ
 30 ἔπειτα συμβουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ
 ἡγούνται διδακτὸν εἶναι. μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ κοινὸν
 τῆς πόλεως οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ ἡμῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι E
 καὶ ἄριστοι τῶν πολιτῶν ταύτην τὴν ἀρετὴν ἣν
 ἔχουσιν οὐχ οἰοί τε ἄλλοις παραδίδόναι· ἐπεὶ Περι-
 35 κλῆς, ὁ τουτωνὶ τῶν νεανίσκων πατήρ, τούτους ἂ μὲν
 διδασκάλων εἶχετο καλῶς καὶ εὖ ἐπαίδευσεν, ἂ δὲ
 αὐτὸς σοφός ἐστιν, οὔτε αὐτὸς | παιδεύει οὔτε τῷ 320
 ἄλλῳ παραδίδωσιν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ περιόντες νέμονται

ὡσπερ ἄφετοι εἰάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ. εἰ δὲ βούλει, Κλεινίαν, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδου 40 τουτουῖ νεώτερον ἀδελφόν, ἐπιτροπεύων ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ Περικλῆς, δεδιὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ μὴ διαφθαρῆ δὴ ὑπὸ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τούτου, καταθέμενος ἐν Ἀρίφρονος ἐπαίδευε· καὶ πρὶν ἕξ μῆνας B γεγονέναι, ἀπέδωκε τούτῳ οὐκ ἔχων ὅ τι χρήσαιτο 45 αὐτῷ· καὶ ἄλλους σοι παμπόλλους ἔχω λέγειν, οἳ αὐτοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες οὐδένα πώποτε βελτίῳ ἐποίησαν οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων οὔτε τῶν ἀλλοτρίων. ἐγὼ οὖν ὦ Πρωταγόρα, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὐχ ἠγοῦμαι διδακτὸν εἶναι ἀρετὴν· ἐπειδὴ δέ σου ἀκούω ταῦτα 50 λέγοντος, κάμπτομαι καὶ οἶμαί τί σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ ἠγεῖσθαί σε πολλῶν μὲν ἔμπειρον γεγονέναι, πολλὰ δὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξηυρηκέναι. εἰ οὖν C ἔχεις ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπιδείξαι, ὡς διδακτὸν ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετῇ, μὴ φθονήσης, ἀλλ' ἐπίδειξον. Ἀλλ', ὦ 55 Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐ φθονήσω· ἀλλὰ ἴοτερον ὑμῖν, ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω ἢ λόγῳ διεξελθών; πολλοὶ οὖν αὐτῷ ὑπέλαβον τῶν παρακαθημένων, ὁποτέρως βούλοιτο, οὕτως διεξιέναι. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον ὑμῖν λέγειν. 60

XI. Ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε θεοὶ μὲν ἦσαν, D θνητὰ δὲ γένη οὐκ ἦν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ In reply to Socrates Protagoras relates a table of the creation of mankind, τούτοις χρόνος ἦλθεν εἰμαρμένος γενέσεως, τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον, ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρὸς μίξαντες καὶ τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ 5 κεράννυται. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἔμελλον, προσέταξαν Προμηθεὶ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεὶ κοσμησαί τε καὶ νεῖμαι δυνάμεις ἐκάστοις ὡς πρέπει. Προμηθεὶα δὲ παραιτεῖται Ἐπιμηθεὺς αὐτὸς νεῖμαι, νείμαντος δέ

10 μου, ἔφη, ἐπίσκεψαι· καὶ οὕτως πείσας νέμει. νέμων
 δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἰσχὺν ἄνευ τάχους προσῆπτεν, τὰ δ' E
 ἀσθενέστερα τάχει ἐκόσμει· τὰ δὲ ὤπλιζε, τοῖς δ'
 ἄοπλον διδοὺς φύσιν ἄλλην τιν' αὐτοῖς ἐμηχανᾶτο
 δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σμικρότητι
 15 ἤμπισχεν, πτηνὸν φυγὴν ἢ κατάγειον οἴκησιν ἔνεμεν·
 ἃ δὲ ἠῦξε μεγέθει, τῶδε | αὐτῷ αὐτὰ ἔσωζεν· καὶ τᾶλλα 321
 οὕτως ἐπανισῶν ἔνεμεν. ταῦτα δὲ ἐμηχανᾶτο εὐλά-
 βειαν ἔχων μή τι γένος ἀἰστωθείη· ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτοῖς
 ἀλληλοφθοριῶν διαφυγὰς ἐπήρκεσε, πρὸς τὰς ἐκ
 20 Διὸς ὥρας εὐμαρίαν ἐμηχανᾶτο ἀμφιεννὺς αὐτὰ
 πυκναῖς τε θριξίν καὶ στερεοῖς δέρμασιν, ἱκανοῖς μὲν
 ἀμῦναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα, καὶ ἐς
 εὐνάς ἰοῦσιν ὅπως ὑπάρχοι τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα στρωμνὴ
 οἰκεία τε καὶ αὐτοφυῆς ἐκάστω· καὶ ὑποδῶν τὰ
 25 μὲν ὅπλαῖς, τὰ δὲ δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀναίμοις. B
 τοῦντεῦθεν τροφὰς ἄλλοις ἄλλας ἐξεπόριζεν, τοῖς
 μὲν ἐκ γῆς βοτάνην, ἄλλοις δὲ δένδρων καρπούς,
 τοῖς δὲ ῥίζας· ἔστι δ' οἷς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφήν ζῶων
 ἄλλων βοράν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀλιγογονίαν προσῆψε,
 30 τοῖς δ' ἀναλισκομένοις ὑπὸ τούτων πολυγονίαν,
 σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων. ἢ ἄτε δὴ οὖν οὐ πάνυ τι
 σοφὸς ὢν ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἔλαθεν αὐτὸν καταναλώσας C
 τὰς δυνάμεις· λοιπὸν δὴ ἀκόσμητον ἔτι αὐτῷ ἦν τὸ
 ἀνθρώπων γένος, καὶ ἠπόρει ὅ τι χρήσαιτο. ἀπο-
 35 ροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος
 τὴν νομήν, καὶ ὄρα τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ζῶα ἐμμελῶς πάντων
 ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ
 ἀστρωτον καὶ ἄοπλον· ἤδη δὲ καὶ ἡ εἰμαρμένη ἡμέρα
 παρῆν, ἐν ἣ ἔδει καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐξιέναι ἐκ γῆς εἰς
 40 φῶς. ἀπορία οὖν ἐχόμενος ὁ Προμηθεύς, ἦντινα

σωτηρίαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εὖροι, κλέπτει Ἐφαιίστου
 D καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί—ἀμή-
 χανον γὰρ ἦν ἄνευ πυρὸς αὐτὴν κτητὴν τῷ ἢ
 χρησίμην γενέσθαι—καὶ οὕτω δὴ δωρεῖται ἀνθρώπῳ.
 τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν βίον σοφίαν ἄνθρωπος ταύτη 45
 ἔσχευ, τὴν δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχευ. ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ
 Δίῳ. τῷ δὲ Πρόμηθεϊ εἰς μὲν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν τὴν τοῦ
 Διὸς οἴκησιν οὐκέτι ἐνεχώρει εἰσελθεῖν. πρὸς δὲ καὶ
 E αἱ Διὸς φυλακαὶ φοβεραὶ ἦσαν. εἰς δὲ τὸ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς
 καὶ Ἐφαιίστου οἴκημα τὸ κοινόν, ἐν ᾧ ἐφιλοτεχνεῖτην, 50
 λαθῶν εἰσέρχεται, καὶ κλέψας τὴν τε ἔμπυρον τέχνην
 τὴν τοῦ Ἐφαιίστου καὶ τὴν ἄλλην τὴν τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς
 δίδωσιν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκ τούτου εὐπορία μὲν ἀν-
 322 θρώπῳ τοῦ βίου γίγνεται, Προμηθεῖα δὲ | δι' Ἐπιμηθεῖα
 ὕστερον, ἥπερ λέγεται, κλοπῆς δίκη μετῆλθεν. 55

XII. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας,
 πρῶτον μὲν† ζῶων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισεν, according to
 καὶ ἐπεχείρει βωμούς τε ἰδρύεσθαι καὶ which Shame and
 ἀγάλματα θεῶν. ἔπειτα φωνὴν καὶ ὀνό- Justice, which are
 ματα ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ, καὶ the foundation of
 οἰκήσεις καὶ ἐσθῆτας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ the art of poli-
 στρωμνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ἠὔρετο. tics, were given
 οὕτω δὲ παρεσκευασμένοι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἄν- in the beginning 5
 B θρωποὶ ᾧκουν σποράδην, πόλεις δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπώλ- to every human
 λυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων διὰ τὸ πανταχῇ αὐτῶν 10 creature. The
 ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι, καὶ ἡ δημιουργικὴ τέχνη αὐτοῖς man who openly
 πρὸς μὲν τροφήν ἱκανὴ βοηθὸς ἦν, πρὸς δὲ τὸν τῶν calls himself un-
 θηρίων πόλεμον ἐνδεής. πολιτικὴν γὰρ τέχνην οὐπω just is accounted
 εἶχον, ἧς μέρος πολεμική. ἐζήτουν δὲ ἀθροίζεσθαι mad.
 καὶ σώζεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις. ὅτ' οὖν ἀθροισθεῖεν, 15

† Post πρῶτον μὲν addunt codices διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν.

ἡδίκουν ἀλλήλους ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν
 τέχνην, ὥστε πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο. Ζεὺς
 οὖν δείσας περὶ τῷ γένει ἡμῶν, μὴ ἀπόλοιτο πᾶν, C
 Ἐρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καὶ
 20 δίκην, ἵν' εἶεν πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας
 συναγωγοί. ἐρωτᾷ οὖν Ἐρμῆς Δία τίνα οὖν τρόπον
 δοίη δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις· πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι
 νενέμηνται, οὕτω καὶ ταύτας νείμω; νενέμηνται δὲ
 ὧδε· εἷς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις, καὶ
 25 οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί· καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ οὕτω θῶ
 ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω; ἐπὶ πάντας, D
 ἔφη ὁ Ζεὺς, καὶ πάντες μετεχόντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο
 πόλεις, εἰ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν μετέχοιεν ὥσπερ ἄλλων
 τεχνῶν· καὶ νόμον γε θεὸς παρ' ἐμοῦ, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον
 30 αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως.

οὕτω δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἱ τε ἄλλοι
 καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ἢ
 λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις οἴονται
 μετεῖναι συμβουλής, καὶ εἴαν τις ἐκτὸς ὧν τῶν ὀλίγων
 35 συμβουλεύη, οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φῆς· εἰκότως, E
 ὡς ἐγὼ φημι· ὅταν δὲ εἰς συμβουλήν πολιτικῆς
 ἀρετῆς ἴωσιν, ἣν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης πᾶσαν ἵεναι 323
 καὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰκότως ἅπαντος ἀνδρὸς ἀνέχονται,
 ὡς παντὶ προσῆκον ταύτης γε μετέχειν τῆς ἀρετῆς,
 40 ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις. αὕτη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία.

ἵνα δὲ μὴ οἴη ἀπατᾶσθαι, ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται
 πάντες ἄνθρωποι πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν δικαιοσύ-
 νης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς τόδε αὖ
 λαβὲ τεκμήριον. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀρεταῖς, ὥσπερ
 45 σὺ λέγεις, εἴαν τις φῆ ἀγαθὸς ἀληθῆς εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλην
 ἡντινοῦν τέχνην, ἣν μή ἐστιν, ἢ καταγελωῶσιν ἢ B

καὶ
 αἰ
 πο
 ἐστ
 ἐστ
 παρ
 δεῖ
 μα
 C ἀνα
 αἰτ
 χοι
 βοῦ
 αἰτῆ
 φίσ
 μέτα
 λέει
 μετὰ
 D ἀλλ
 θυμο
 τοῖς
 ἐλεσ
 τίς ο
 ταῦτ
 τοῖς
 τούτ
 διδαχ
 E ταῦτ
 τούτ
 καὶ

χαλεπαίνουσι, καὶ οἱ οἰκείοι προσιόντες νουθετοῦσιν
 ὡς μαινόμενον· ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ
 πολιτικῇ ἀρετῇ, εἴαν τινα· καὶ εἰδῶσιν ὅτι ἄδικός
 ἐστίν, εἴαν οὗτος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτοῦ τάληθῇ λέγῃ 50
 ἐναντίον πολλῶν, ὃ ἐκεῖ σωφροσύνην ἠγοῦντο εἶναι,
 τάληθῇ λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μανίαν, καὶ φασιν πάντας
 δεῖν φάναι εἶναι δικαίους, εἴαν τε ᾧσιν εἴαν τε μή, ἢ
 μαίνεσθαι τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην, ὡς
 C ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα ὄντιν' οὐχὶ ἄμῶς γέ πως μετέχειν 55
 αὐτῆς, ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις.

XIII. "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πάντ' ἀνδρα εἰκότως ἀποδέ-
 χονται περὶ ταύτης τῆς ἀρετῆς σύμ-
 βουλον διὰ τὸ ἠγεῖσθαι παντὶ μετεῖναι
 αὐτῆς, ταῦτα λέγω· ὅτι δὲ αὐτὴν οὐ
 φύσει ἠγοῦνται εἶναι οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτο-
 μάτου, ἀλλὰ διδακτόν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμε-
 λείας παραγίγνεσθαι ᾧ ἂν παραγίγνηται, τοῦτό σοι
 μετὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι. ὅσα γὰρ ἠγοῦνται
 D ἀλλήλους κακὰ ἔχειν ἀνθρώποι φύσει ἢ τύχῃ, οὐδεὶς
 θυμοῦται οὐδὲ νουθετεῖ οὐδὲ διδάσκει οὐδὲ κολάζει 10
 τοὺς ταῦτα ἔχοντας, ἵνα μὴ τοιοῦτοι ᾧσιν, ἀλλ'
 ἐλεοῦσιν· οἷον τοὺς αἰσχροὺς ἢ σμικροὺς ἢ ἀσθενεῖς
 τίς οὕτως ἀνόητος ὥστε τι τούτων ἐπιχειρεῖν ποιεῖν;
 ταῦτα μὲν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἴσασιν ὅτι φύσει τε καὶ τύχῃ
 τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται, τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰναντία 15
 τούτοις· ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ
 διδαχῆς οἷονται γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώποις, εἴαν τις
 E ταῦτα μὴ ἔχῃ, ἀλλὰ τὰναντία τούτων κακὰ, ἐπὶ
 τούτοις που οἷ τε θυμοὶ γίγνονται καὶ αἱ κολάσεις
 καὶ αἱ νουθετήσεις. ὧν ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ 20
 324 ἀσέβεια καὶ συλλήβδην πᾶν τὸ | ἐναντίον τῆς πολι-

Moreover, the
 art of politics is
 capable of being
 taught, otherwise
 cities would not
 inflict punishments
 on those
 who violate it, 5

τικῆς ἀρετῆς· ἔνθα δὴ πᾶς παντὶ θυμοῦται καὶ
 νουθετεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ μαθήσεως
 κτητῆς οὔσης. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὸ κολάζειν,
 25 ὦ Σώκρατες, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας τί ποτε δύναται, αὐτό
 σε διδάξει, ὅτι οἷ γε ἄνθρωποι ἡγοῦνται παρασκευ-
 αστὸν εἶναι ἀρετῆν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἀδι-
 κοῦντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα, B
 ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὡσπερ θηρίου ἀλογίστως
 30 τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν
 οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται
 —οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν ἀγέννητον θείῃ—ἀλλὰ τοῦ
 μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὐθις ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς
 οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τούτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα· καὶ
 35 τοιαύτην διάνοιαν ἔχων διανοεῖται παιδευτῆν εἶναι
 ἀρετῆν· ἀποτροπῆς γοῦν ἕνεκα κολάζει· ταύτην οὖν
 τὴν δόξαν πάντες ἔχουσιν, ὅσοιπερ τιμωροῦνται καὶ C
 ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ· τιμωροῦνται δὲ καὶ κολάζονται οἷ
 τε ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οὓς ἂν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖν, καὶ οὐχ
 40 ἥκιστα Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ σοὶ πολῖται· ὥστε κατὰ τούτον
 τὸν λόγον καὶ Ἀθηναῖοί εἰσι τῶν ἡγουμένων παρα-
 σκευαστὸν εἶναι καὶ διδακτὸν ἀρετῆν. ὡς μὲν οὖν
 εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται οἱ σοὶ πολῖται καὶ χαλκέως καὶ
 σκυτοτόμου συμβουλεύοντος τὰ πολιτικά, καὶ ὅτι
 45 διδακτὸν καὶ παρασκευαστὸν ἡγοῦνται ἀρετῆν, ἀποδέ-
 δεικταί σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἱκανῶς, ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. D

XIV. Ἔτι δὴ λοιπὴ ἀπορία ἐστίν, ἣν ἀπορεῖς

and, in point
 of fact, virtue,
 which is the pro-
 duct of the poli-
 tical art, is taught
 to all,

5 περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τί δήποτε
 οἱ ἄνδρες οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοὺς
 αὐτῶν υἱεῖς διδάσκουσιν, ἀ διδασκάλων
 ἔχεται, καὶ σοφοὺς ποιοῦσιν, ἣν δὲ αὐτοὶ
 ἀρετῆν ἀγαθοί, οὐδενὸς βελτίους ποιοῦσιν. τούτου δὴ

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ἐπειδὴν θᾶπτον συνιῆ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφὸς
 καὶ μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ
 πατὴρ περὶ τούτου διαμάχονται, ὅπως D
 βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ' ἑκαστον
 καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι,
 ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τόδε μὲν καλόν,
 τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τόδε μὲν ὄσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον,
 10 καὶ τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποίει· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν ἐκὼν
 πείθεται· εἰ δὲ μή, ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ
 καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς. μετὰ
 δὲ ταῦτα εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες πολὺ μᾶλλον
 ἐντέλλονται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι εὐκοσμίας τῶν παιδῶν ἢ
 15 γραμμάτων τε καὶ κιθαρίσεως· οἱ δὲ διδάσκαλοι E
 τούτων τε ἐπιμελοῦνται, καὶ ἐπειδὴν αὐτὰ γράμματα
 μάθωσιν καὶ μέλλωσιν συνήσειν τὰ γεγραμμένα ὥσ-
 περ τότε τὴν φωνήν, παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν
 βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα
 20 καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλαὶ μὲν νου-
 θετήσεις | ἐνεῖσιν, πολλαὶ δὲ διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ 326
 ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν
 μιμῆται καὶ ὀρέγηται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι. οἷ τ' αὐτὸ
 κιθαρισταὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμελοῦν-
 25 ται καὶ ὅπως ἂν οἱ νέοι μηδὲν κακουργῶσιν· πρὸς δὲ
 τούτοις, ἐπειδὴν κιθαρίζειν μάθωσιν, ἄλλων αὐτῶν ποι-
 ητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα διδάσκουσι μελοποιῶν, εἰς B
 τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες, καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς τε καὶ
 τὰς ἀρμονίας ἀναγκάζουσιν οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς
 30 τῶν παιδῶν, ἵνα ἡμερώτεροί τε ᾧσιν, καὶ εὐρυθμότεροι
 καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι γιγνόμενοι χρήσιμοι ᾧσιν εἰς τὸ
 λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν· πᾶς γὰρ ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώ-
 που εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖται. ἔτι τοίνυν

πρὸς τούτοις εἰς παιδοτρίβου πέμπουσιν, ἵνα τὰ
 σώματα βελτίω ἔχοντες ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ 35
 C χρηστῇ οὔσῃ, καὶ μὴ ἀναγκάζονται ἀποδειλιᾶν διὰ
 τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις
 καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πράξεσιν· καὶ ταῦτα ποιούσιν
 μάλιστα οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι· μάλιστα δὲ δύνανται
 οἱ πλουσιώτατοι· καὶ οἱ τούτων υἱεῖς, πρωϊαίτατα εἰς 40
 διδασκάλων τῆς ἡλικίας ἀρξάμενοι φοιτᾶν, ὀψιαίτατα
 ἀπαλλάττονται. ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλα-
 γῶσιν, ἡ πόλις αὖ τούς τε νόμους ἀναγκάζει μαθάνειν
 D καὶ κατὰ τούτους ζῆν,† ἵνα μὴ αὐτοὶ ἐφ' αὐτῶν εἰκῆ
 πράττωσιν, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ γραμματισταὶ 45
 τοῖς μήπω δεινοῖς γράφειν τῶν παίδων ὑπογράψαντες
 γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι οὔτω τὸ γραμματεῖον διδόασιν καὶ
 ἀναγκάζουσι γράφειν κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τῶν γραμ-
 μῶν, ὡς δὲ καὶ ἡ πόλις νόμους ὑπογράψασα, ἀγαθῶν
 καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν εὐρήματα, κατὰ τούτους 50
 ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι· ὅς δ' ἂν ἐκτὸς
 βαίνῃ τούτων, κολάζει, καὶ ὄνομα τῇ κολάσει ταύτῃ
 E καὶ παρ' ὑμῖν καὶ ἄλλοθι πολλαχοῦ, ὡς εὐθυνούσης
 τῆς δίκης, εὐθῦναι. τοσαύτης οὖν τῆς ἐπιμελείας
 οὔσης περὶ ἀρετῆς ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, θαυμάζεις, ὧ 55
 Σώκρατες, καὶ ἀπορεῖς, εἰ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετή; ἀλλ'
 οὐ χρὴ θαυμάζειν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ διδακτόν.

XVI. Διὰ τί οὖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πατέρων πολλοὶ
 υἱεῖς φαῦλοι γίνονται; τοῦτο, αὖ μάθε·
 οὐδὲν γὰρ θαυμαστόν, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ ἐγὼ
 ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι τούτου
 τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μέλλει
 327 πόλις εἶναι, | οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν. εἰ
 γὰρ δὴ ὁ λέγων οὕτως ἔχει—ἔχει δὲ

If the children
 of good men are
 sometimes evil,
 this only shews
 that all have not
 the same natural
 aptitude for vir-
 tue. Conclusion
 of Protagoras'
 speech. 5

† Post ζῆν add. codd. κατὰ παράδειγμα.

μάλιστα πάντων οὕτως—ἐνθυμήθητι ἄλλο τῶν ἐπι-
 τηδευμάτων ὅτιοῦν καὶ μαθημάτων προελόμενος. εἰ
 10 μὴ οἶόν τ' ἦν πόλιν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πάντες αὐληταὶ
 ἦμεν, ὅποῖός τις ἐδύνατο ἕκαστος, καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδίᾳ
 καὶ δημοσίᾳ πᾶς πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε,
 τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθόνει τούτου,
 ὥσπερ νῦν τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς
 15 φθονεῖ οὐδ' ἀποκρύπτεται ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνη- B
 μάτων· λυσιτελεῖ γάρ, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἢ ἀλλήλων
 δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετή· διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς παντὶ προ-
 θύμως λέγει καὶ διδάσκει καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ
 νόμιμα· εἰ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἐν αὐλήσει πᾶσαν προθυ-
 20 μίαν καὶ ἀφθονίαν εἶχομεν ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν, οἶει
 ἂν τι, ἔφη, μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐλητῶν
 ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητὰς τοὺς υἱεῖς γίγνεσθαι ἢ τῶν φαύλων;
 οἶμαι μὲν οὐ, ἀλλὰ ὅτου ἔτυχεν ὁ υἱὸς εὐφυέστατος C
 γενόμενος εἰς αὐλησιν, οὗτος ἂν ἐλλόγιμος ἠϋξήθη,
 25 ὅτου δὲ ἀφυής, ἀκλεής· καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἀγαθοῦ
 αὐλητοῦ φαῦλος ἂν ἀπέβη, πολλάκις δ' ἂν φαύλου
 ἀγαθός· ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταί γ' ἂν πάντες ἦσαν ἱκανοὶ
 ὡς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ μηδὲν αὐλήσεως ἐπαῖοντα.
 οὕτως οἴου καὶ νῦν, ὅστις σοι ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται
 30 ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις τεθραμμένων,
 δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ δημιουργὸν τούτου τοῦ
 πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, D
 οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶν μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι
 μηδὲ ἀνάγκη μηδεμία διὰ παντὸς ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς
 35 ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἶεν ἄγριοί τινες, οἰοί περ οὓς
 πέρυσιν Φερεκράτης ὁ ποιητῆς ἐδίδαξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ.
 ἢ σφόδρα ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνθρώποις γενόμενος,
 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ μισάνθρωποι, ἀγαπήσαις
 ἂν, εἰ ἐντύχοις Εὐρυβάτῳ καὶ Φρυνώνδῃ, καὶ ἀνολο-

Ε φύραι' ἂν ποθῶν τὴν τῶν ἐνθάδε ἀνθρώπων πονηρίαν· 40
 νῦν δὲ τρυφᾶς, ὧ Σώκρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοί
 εἰσιν ἀρετῆς, καθ' ὅσον δύνανται ἕκαστος, καὶ οὐδείς
 σοι φαίνεται εἶναι· ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ζητοῖς τίς διδάσκαλος
 328 τοῦ ἐλληνίζειν, οὐδ' | ἂν εἰς φανείη, οὐδέ γ' ἂν, οἶμαι,
 εἰ ζητοῖς τίς ἂν ἡμῖν διδάξειεν τοὺς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν 45
 υἱεῖς αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν τέχνην, ἣν δὴ παρὰ τοῦ
 πατρὸς μεμαθήκασιν, καθ' ὅσον οἷός τ' ἦν ὁ πατήρ
 καὶ οἱ τοῦ πατρὸς φίλοι ὄντες ὁμότεχνοι, τούτους ἔτι
 τίς ἂν διδάξειεν,—οὐ ρᾶδιον οἶμαι εἶναι, ὧ Σώκρατες,
 τούτων διδάσκαλον φανῆναι, τῶν δὲ ἀπείρων παντά- 50
 πασι ρᾶδιον, οὕτω δὲ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων·
 ἀλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστιν τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν
 Β προβιβάσαι εἰς ἀρετὴν, ἀγαπητόν. ὦν δὴ ἐγὼ οἶμαι
 εἷς εἶναι, καὶ διαφερόντως ἂν τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων
 ὀνῆσαί τινα πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ 55
 ἀξίως τοῦ μισθοῦ ὃν πράττομαι, καὶ ἔτι πλείονος,
 ὥστε καὶ αὐτῷ δοκεῖν τῷ μαθόντι. διὰ ταῦτα καὶ
 τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πε-
 ποίημαι· ἐπειδὴν γάρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθη, ἐὰν μὲν
 βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν ὁ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον· 60
 C ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὁμόσας ὅσου ἂν φῆ ἄξια
 εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.

τοιοῦτόν σοι, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ καὶ μῦθον καὶ
 λόγον εἶρηκα, ὡς διδακτὸν ἀρετὴ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι οὕτως
 ἠγοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν 65
 πατέρων φαύλους υἱεῖς γίνεσθαι καὶ τῶν φαύλων
 ἀγαθούς, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ Πολυκλείτου υἱεῖς, Παράλου
 καὶ Ξανθίππου τοῦδε ἠλικιωῦνται, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν
 πατέρα εἰσίν, καὶ ἄλλοι ἄλλων δημιουργῶν· τῶνδε
 D δὲ οὐπω ἄξιον τοῦτο κατηγορεῖν· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς 70
 εἰσὶν ἐλπίδες· νέοι γάρ.

XVII. Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδειξάμενος ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου.

Socrates cross-examines the sophist. "Are the single virtues parts of virtue, or only different synonyms for it?"

καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον κεκηλη- μένος ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔβλεπον ὡς ἐροῦντά τι, ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούειν· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ ἤσθό- μην ὅτι τῷ ὄντι πεπαυμένος εἶη, μόγισ πως ἑμαυτὸν ὡσπερὶ συναγείρας εἶπον, βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Ἴπποκράτη· ὦ παῖ Ἀπολλοδώρου, ὡς χάριν σοι ἔχω ὅτι προὔτρεψάς με ὧδε ἀφικέσθαι·
 10 πολλοῦ γὰρ ποιοῦμαι ἀκηκοένας ἀ ἀκήκοα Πρωταγό- E
 ρου· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ἠγούμην οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται· νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι. πλὴν σμι- κρὸν τί μοι ἐμποδῶν, ὃ δῆλον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας
 15 ῥαδίως ἐπεκδιδάξει, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεδίδαξεν. καὶ γὰρ εἰ μὲν τις περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων |
 συγγένοιτο ὄτῳ τῶν δημηγόρων, τάχ' ἂν καὶ 329
 τοιούτους λόγους ἀκούσειεν ἢ Περικλέους ἢ ἄλλου
 τινὸς τῶν ἱκανῶν εἰπεῖν· εἰ δὲ ἐπανέροιτό τινά τι,
 20 ὡσπερ βιβλία οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε ἀποκρίνασθαι οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἐρέσθαι, ἀλλ' εἴαν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπερωτήσῃ τι τῶν ῥηθέντων, ὡσπερ τὰ χαλκία πληγέντα μακρὸν ἠχεῖ καὶ ἀποτείνει εἴαν μὴ ἐπιλά-
 βηταί τις, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὕτω σμικρὰ ἐρωτηθέντες
 25 δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. Πρωταγόρας δὲ B
 ὅδε ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροῦς λόγους καὶ καλοῦς εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἐρόμενος περιμεῖναί τε καὶ ἀποδέ-
 ξασθαι τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ἀ ὀλίγοις ἐστὶ παρεσκευασ-
 30 μένα. νῦν οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, σμικροῦ τινὸς ἐνδεής εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν, εἴ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε. ἡ τὴν ἀρετὴν φῆς διδακτὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπερ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀνθρώ-

C πων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι· ὁ δ' ἐθαύμασά σου λέγοντος, τοῦτό μοι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀποπλήρωσον. ἔλεγες γὰρ ὅτι ὁ Ζεὺς τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ 35 πέμψειεν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ αὐτὸς πολλαχοῦ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ὡς ἓν τι εἴη συλλήβδην, ἀρετή· ταῦτ' οὖν αὐτὰ διέλθέ μοι ἀκριβῶς τῷ λόγῳ, πότερον ἐν μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετή, μόρια δὲ αὐτῆς 40 ἐστὶν ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ὁσιότης, ἢ D ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον πάντα ὀνόματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος· τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἔτι ἐπιποθῶ.

XVIII. Ἀλλὰ ῥάδιον τοῦτό γ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι ἐνὸς ὄντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μόριά ἐστὶν ἢ ἐρωτᾶς. Πότερον, ἔφη, ὡς περ προσώπου τὰ μόρια μόριά ἐστὶν, στόμα τε καὶ ῥίς καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα, ἢ ὡς περ τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια, οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων, ἀλλήλων καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἀλλ' ἢ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρότητι; Ἐκείνως E μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς περ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ὅλον πρόσωπον. Πότερον οὖν, 10 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μεταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τούτων τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἄλλο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλο, ἢ ἀνάγκη, εἴαν περ τις ἐν λάβῃ, ἅπαντ' ἔχειν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ ἀνδρείοί εἰσιν, ἄδικοι δέ, καὶ δίκαιοι αὐτῶν, σοφοὶ δὲ οὐκ. Ἔστιν γὰρ οὖν καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τῆς 15 330 ἀρετῆς, ἔφη ἐγώ, | σοφία τε καὶ ἀνδρεία; Πάντων μάλιστα δήπου, ἔφη· καὶ μέγιστόν γε ἢ σοφία τῶν μορίων. Ἐκαστον δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο; Ναί. Ἡ καὶ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἰδίαν ἔχει; ὡς περ τὰ τοῦ προσώπου οὐκ ἐστὶν 20

P. "Virtue is one, and the single virtues are parts of virtue, distinct from each other like the parts of the face."

ὀφθαλμὸς οἶον τὰ ὠτα, οὐδ' ἢ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἢ
αὐτή· οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν ἐστιν οἶον τὸ ἕτερον
οὔτε κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα· ἄρ' οὖν
οὔτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια οὐκ ἐστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἶον.
25 τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτε ἢ δύναμις αὐτοῦ; ἢ δῆλα B
δὴ ὅτι οὔτως ἔχει, εἴπερ τῷ παραδείγματί γε ἔοικεν;
Ἄλλ' οὔτως, ἔφη, ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἰ καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον·
Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων ἄλλο οἶον ἐπι-
στήμη, οὐδ' οἶον δικαιοσύνη, οὐδ' οἶον ἀνδρεία, οὐδ'
30 οἶον σωφροσύνη, οὐδ' οἶον ὀσιότης. (Οὐκ ἔφη.) Φέρε
δὴ, ἔφην ἐγὼ, κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα ποῖόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν
ἕκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἢ δικαιοσύνη πράγμα C
τί ἐστὶν ἢ οὐδὲν πράγμα; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δὲ
σοι; Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; [εἴ τις ἔροιτο] ἐμέ τε
35 καὶ σέ· ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, εἶπετον δὴ
μοι, τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα, ὃ ὠνομάσατε ἄρτι, ἢ δικαιο-
σύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιόν ἐστὶν ἢ ἄδικον; ἐγὼ μὲν ἂν
αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμην ὅτι δίκαιον· σὺ δὲ τίν' ἂν ψῆφον
θεῖο; τὴν αὐτὴν ἐμοὶ ἢ ἄλλην; Τὴν αὐτὴν, ἔφη.
40 Ἔστιν ἄρα τοιοῦτον ἢ δικαιοσύνη οἶον δίκαιον εἶναι,
φαίην ἂν ἐγώ γε ἀποκρινόμενος τῷ ἐρωτῶντι· οὐκοῦν D
καὶ σύ; Ναί, ἔφη. Εἰ οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμᾶς ἔροιτο
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὀσιότητά τινά φατε εἶναι; φαίμεν ἂν, ὡς
ἐγῶμαι. Ναί, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν φατέ καὶ τοῦτο
45 πράγμα τι εἶναι; φαίμεν ἂν· ἢ οὔ; Καὶ τοῦτο
συνέφη. Πότερον δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα φατε
τοιοῦτον πεφυκέναι οἶον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἶον ὀσιον;
ἀγανακτήσαιμ' ἂν ἐγώ, ἔφην, τῷ ἐρωτήματι, καὶ
εἴποιμ' ἂν· εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε· σχολῆ μεντᾶν τι E
50 ἄλλο ὀσιον εἶη, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴ γε ἢ ὀσιότης ὀσιον ἔσται. τί
δὲ σύ; οὐχ οὔτως ἂν ἀποκρίναιο; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

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σύννη ὄσιον καὶ ὀσιότης δίκαιον. Μή μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ·
 οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ
 ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ· τὸ δ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ
 35 τοῦτο λέγω, οἰόμενος οὕτω τὸν λόγον βέλτιστ' ἀν
 ἐλέγχεσθαι, εἴ τις τὸ εἴ ἀφέλοι αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, D
 ἦ δ' ὅς, προσέοικέν τι δικαιοσύνη ὀσιότητι· καὶ γὰρ
 ὀτιοῦν ὀτωοῦν ἀμῆ γέ πη προσέοικεν. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν
 τῷ μέλανι ἔστιν ὅπη προσέοικεν, καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ
 40 μαλακῷ, καὶ τὰλλα ἃ δοκεῖ ἐναντιώτατα εἶναι ἀλλή-
 λους· καὶ ἃ τότε ἔφαμεν ἄλλην δύναμιν ἔχειν καὶ
 οὐκ εἶναι τὸ ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτερον, τὰ τοῦ προσώπου
 μόρια, ἀμῆ γέ πη προσέοικεν καὶ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἶον
 τὸ ἕτερον· ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ τρόπῳ κὰν ταῦτα
 45 ἐλέγχοις, εἰ βούλοιο, ὡς ἅπαντά ἐστιν ὅμοια· ἀλλή- E
 λους. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ ὅμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ὅμοια δίκαιον
 καλεῖν οὐδὲ τὰ ἀνόμοιόν τι ἔχοντα ἀνόμοια, κὰν
 πάνυ σμικρὸν ἔχη τὸ ὅμοιον. καὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας
 εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν, Ἦ γὰρ οὕτω σοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ
 50 τὸ ὄσιον πρὸς ἀλληλα ἔχει, ὥστε ὅμοιόν τι σμικρὸν
 ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, οὕτως, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ
 αὐτὸ | ὡς σύ μοι δοκεῖς οἶεσθαι. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφην ἐγώ, 332
 ἐπειδὴ δυσχερῶς δοκεῖς μοι ἔχειν πρὸς τοῦτο, τοῦτο
 μὲν εἰσώμεν, τόδε δὲ ἄλλο ὧν ἔλεγες ἐπισκεψώμεθα.

XX. Ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; Ἔφη. Τούτῳ τῷ

Socrates next
 argues that tem-
 perance and wis-
 dom are identical,
 and is about to
 prove the same of
 5 temperance and
 justice,

πράγματι οὐ πᾶν τούναντίον ἐστὶν ἢ
 σοφία; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Πότερον
 δὲ ὅταν πράττωσιν ἄνθρωποι ὀρθῶς τε
 καὶ ὠφελίμως, τότε σωφρονεῖν σοι δοκ-
 οῦσιν οὕτω πράττοντες†, ἢ τούναντίον;
 Σωφρονεῖν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν σωφροσύνη σωφρονοῦσιν; B

† ἢ εἰ τούναντίον ἔπραττον; codd.

Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν οἱ μὴ ὀρθῶς πράττοντες ἀφρόνως
 πράττουσι καὶ οὐ σωφρονούσιν οὕτω πράττον-
 τες; Συνδοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. Τούναντίον ἄρα ἐστὶν τὸ 10
 ἀφρόνως πράττειν τῷ σωφρόνως; Ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν
 τὰ μὲν ἀφρόνως πραττόμενα ἀφροσύνη πράττεται,
 τὰ δὲ σωφρόνως σωφροσύνη; Ὡμολόγει. Οὐκοῦν
 εἴ τι ἰσχύϊ πράττεται, ἰσχυρῶς πράττεται, καὶ εἴ
 τι ἀσθενείᾳ, ἀσθενῶς; Ἐδόκει. Καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ 15
 τάχους, ταχέως, καὶ εἴ τι μετὰ βραδυτήτος, βραδέως;
 Ἔφη. Καὶ εἴ τι δὴ ὡσαύτως πράττεται, ὑπὸ τοῦ
 αὐτοῦ πράττεται, καὶ εἴ τι ἐναντίως, ὑπὸ τοῦ
 ἐναντίου; Συνέφη. Φέρε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔστιν τι
 καλόν; Συνεχώρει. Τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν 20
 τὸ αἰσχρόν; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ἀγαθόν;
 Ἔστιν. Τούτῳ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον πλὴν τὸ κακόν;
 Οὐκ ἔστιν. Τί δέ; ἔστιν τι ὄξυ ἐν φωνῇ; Ἔφη.
 Τούτῳ μὴ ἔστιν τι ἐναντίον ἄλλο πλὴν τὸ βαρύν;
 Οὐκ ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ τῶν 25
 ἐναντίων ἐν μόνον ἐστὶν ἐναντίον καὶ οὐ πολλά;
 Συνωμολόγει. Ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναλογισώμεθα
 τὰ ὡμολογημένα ἡμῖν. ὡμολογήκαμεν ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον
 ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή; Ὡμολογήκαμεν. Τὸ
 δὲ ἐναντίως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ ἐναντίων πράττεσθαι; 30
 Ἔφη. Ὡμολογήκαμεν δὲ ἐναντίως πράττεσθαι ὃ
 ἂν ἀφρόνως πράττηται τῷ σωφρόνως πραττομένῳ;
 Ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ σωφρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφρο-
 σύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης;
 Συνεχώρει. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἐναντίως πράττεται, ὑπὸ 35
 ἐναντίου πράττοιτ' ἄν; Ναί. Πράττεται δὲ τὸ μὲν
 ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης; Ναί.
 Ἐναντίως; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ ἐναντίων ὄντων;

Ναί. Ἐναντίον ἄρ' ἐστὶν ἀφροσύνη σωφροσύνη;
 40 Φαίνεται. Μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν
 ὁμολόγηται ἡμῖν ἀφροσύνη σοφία ἐναντίον εἶναι;
 Συνωμολόγει. Ἐν δὲ ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι; Φημί.
 Πότερον οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λύσωμεν | τῶν λόγων; 333
 τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι, ἢ ἐκείνον ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγετο
 45 ἕτερον εἶναι σωφροσύνης σοφία, μόνιον δὲ ἑκάτερον
 ἀρετῆς, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἕτερον εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ
 αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ προσώ-
 που μόρια; πότερον οὖν δὴ λύσωμεν; οὗτοι γὰρ οἱ
 λόγοι ἀμφότεροι οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς λέγονται· οὐ γὰρ
 50 συνάδουσιν οὐδὲ συναρμόττουσιν ἀλλήλοις. πῶς γὰρ
 ἂν συνάδοιεν, εἴπερ γε ἀνάγκη ἐνὶ μὲν ἐν μόνον B
 ἐναντίον εἶναι, πλείω δὲ μή, τῇ δὲ ἀφροσύνη ἐνὶ
 ὄντι σοφία ἐναντία καὶ σωφροσύνη αὐ φαίνεται; ἢ
 γάρ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ ἄλλως πως; Ὁμο-
 55 λόγησεν καὶ μάλ' ἀκόντως. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἂν εἴη ἢ
 σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ σοφία; τὸ δὲ πρότερον αὐ ἐφάνη
 ἡμῖν ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἢ ὀσιότης σχεδόν τι ταῦτόν
 ὄν. ἴθι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ ἀποκάμω-
 μεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ διασκεψώμεθα. ἄρα τίς
 60 σοι δοκεῖ ἀδικῶν ἄνθρωπος σωφρονεῖν, ὅτι ἀδικεῖ;
 Αἰσχυνοίμην ἂν ἔγωγ', ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο C
 ὁμολογεῖν, ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ γέ φασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
 Πότερον οὖν πρὸς ἐκείνους τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι,
 ἔφην, ἢ πρὸς σέ; Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, πρὸς τοῦτον πρῶ-
 65 του τὸν λόγον διαλέχθητι, τὸν τῶν πολλῶν. Ἄλλ'
 οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει, εἰ μόνον σύ γε ἀποκρίνη, εἴτ'
 οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ταῦτα, εἴτε μή. τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε
 μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν
 ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι.

D XXI. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐκαλλωπίζετο ἡμῖν
 ὁ Πρωταγόρας· τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἤτιᾶτο
 δυσχερῆ εἶναι· ἔπειτα μέντοι συνεχώ- <sup>when Protago-
 ras launches out
 into a long and
 irrelevant ha-
 rangue.</sup>
 ρησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Ἴθι δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ,
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς μοι ἀπόκριναι. δοκοῦσί τινές
 σοι σωφρονεῖν ἀδικοῦντες; Ἔστω, ἔφη. Τὸ δὲ σω-
 φρονεῖν λέγεις εὖ φρονεῖν; Ἔφη. Τὸ δ' εὖ φρονεῖν
 εὖ βουλευέσθαι, ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν; Ἔστω, ἔφη. Πό-
 τερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες ἢ εἰ
 κακῶς; Εἰ εὖ. Λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθὰ ἅττα εἶναι; Λέγω. 10
 Ἄρ' οὖν ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, ἃ ἐστὶν
 ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις; Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη, καὶ
 E μὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὠφέλιμα ἦ, ἔγωγε καλῶ ἀγαθὰ.
 καί μοι ἐδόκει ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἤδη τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ
 ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι· 15
 ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐώρων αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, εὐλαβούμενος
 334 ἠρέμα ἠρόμην. Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις, ὦ | Πρω-
 ταγόρα, ἂ μὴδενὶ ἀνθρώπων ὠφέλιμά ἐστιν, ἢ ἂ μὴδὲ
 τὸ παράπαν ὠφέλιμα; καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα σὺ ἀγαθὰ
 καλεῖς; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη· ἀλλ' ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδ' ἂ 20
 ἀνθρώποις μὲν ἀνωφελῆ ἐστί, καὶ σιτία καὶ ποτὰ
 καὶ φάρμακα καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, τὰ δέ γε ὠφέλιμα· τὰ
 δὲ ἀνθρώποις μὲν οὐδέτερα, ἵπποις δέ· τὰ δὲ βουσίην
 μόνον, τὰ δὲ κυσίην· τὰ δέ γε τούτων μὲν οὐδενί,
 δένδροις δέ· τὰ δὲ τοῦ δένδρου ταῖς μὲν ρίζαις ἀγαθὰ, 25
 B ταῖς δὲ βλάσταις πονηρά, οἶον καὶ ἡ κόπρος, πάντων
 τῶν φυτῶν ταῖς μὲν ρίζαις ἀγαθὸν παραβαλλομένη,
 εἰ δ' ἐθέλοις ἐπὶ τοὺς πτόρθους καὶ τοὺς νέους κλῶνας
 ἐπιβάλλειν, πάντα ἀπόλλυσιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἔλαιον
 τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἅπασιν ἐστὶν πάγκακον καὶ ταῖς 30
 θριξίν πολεμιώτατον ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζώων πλὴν ταῖς

τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ταῖς δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρωγὸν καὶ τῷ
 ἄλλῳ σώματι. οὕτω δὲ ποικίλον τί ἐστὶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν
 καὶ παντοδαπὸν, ὥστε καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς μὲν ἔξωθεν
 35 τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῖς δ' ἐντὸς C
 ταῦτὸν τοῦτο κάκιστον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ ἰατροὶ
 πάντες ἀπαγορεύουσιν τοῖς ἀσθενούσι μὴ χρῆσθαι
 ἐλαίῳ, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅ τι σμικροτάτῳ ἐν τούτοις οἷς μέλλει
 ἔδεσθαι, ὅσον μόνον τὴν δυσχέρειαν κατασβέσαι τὴν
 40 ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς διὰ τῶν ῥινῶν γιγνομένην
 ἐν τοῖς σιτίοις τε καὶ ὄψοις.

XXII. Εἰπόντος οὖν ταῦτα αὐτοῦ οἱ παρόντες
 ἀνεθορύβησαν ὡς εὖ λέγοι· καὶ ἐγὼ
 εἶπον· ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἐγὼ τυγχάνω
 ἐπιλήσμων τις ὢν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ἐάν
 5 τίς μοι μακρὰ λέγη, ἐπιλανθάνομαι περὶ D
 οὗ ἂν ἢ ὁ λόγος. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ ἐτύγχα-
 νον ὑπόκωφος ὢν, ᾧ ἂν χρῆναι, εἶπερ
 ἔμελλές μοι διαλέξεσθαι, μείζον φθέγγε-
 σθαι ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, οὕτω καὶ νῦν, ἐπειδὴ
 10 ἐπιλήσμονι ἐνέτυχες, σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις
 καὶ βραχυτέρας ποίει, εἰ μέλλω σοι ἔπεσθαι. Πῶς
 οὖν κελεύεις με βραχέα ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ἢ βραχυτέρα
 σοι, ἔφη, ἀποκρίνωμαι ἢ δεῖ; Μηδαμῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.
 Ἄλλ' ὅσα δεῖ; ἔφη. Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Πότερα οὖν E
 15 ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, τοσαῦτά σοι ἀπο-
 κρίνωμαι, ἢ ὅσα σοί; Ἀκήκοα γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι
 σὺ οἶός τ' εἶ καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ ἄλλον διδάξαι περὶ τῶν
 αὐτῶν καὶ μακρὰ λέγειν, ἐὰν βούλη, οὕτως, ὥστε τὸν
 λόγον μηδέποτε ἐπιλιπεῖν, καὶ αὖ βραχέα οὕτως,
 20 ὥστε μηδένα σοῦ ἐν βραχυτέροις | εἰπεῖν· εἰ οὖν 335
 μέλλεις ἐμοὶ διαλέξεσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρῳ χρῶ τρόπῳ πρὸς

Socrates says
 he must depart
 on other business
 unless Protago-
 ras will consent
 to converse by
 5 means of short
 questions and
 answers. Callias
 entreats him to
 stay.

με, τῇ βραχυλογίᾳ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἐγὼ πολλοῖς
 ἤδη εἰς ἀγῶνα λόγων ἀφικόμην ἀνθρώποις, καὶ εἰ
 τοῦτο ἐποίουν ὃ σὺ κελεύεις, ὡς ὁ ἀντιλέγων ἐκέλευέν
 με διαλέγεσθαι οὕτω διελεγόμην, οὐδενὸς ἂν βελτίων 25
 ἐφαινόμην οὐδ' ἂν ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα ἐν
 τοῖς Ἑλλησιν. καὶ ἐγὼ—ἔγνω γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ ἤρεσεν
 αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεις ταῖς ἔμπροσθεν, καὶ ὅτι
 Β οὐκ ἐθελήσοι ἐκὼν εἶναι ἀποκρινόμενος διαλέγεσθαι
 —ἠγησάμενος οὐκέτι ἐμὸν ἔργον εἶναι παρεῖναι ἐν 30
 ταῖς συνουσίαις, Ἄλλὰ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,
 οὐδ' ἐγὼ λιπαρῶς ἔχω παρὰ τὰ σοὶ δοκοῦντα τὴν
 συνουσίαν ἡμῖν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν σὺ βούλη
 διαλέγεσθαι ὡς ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἔπεσθαι, τότε σοι δια-
 λέξομαι. σὺ μὲν γάρ, ὡς λέγεται περὶ σοῦ, φῆς δὲ 35
 καὶ αὐτός, καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχυλογίᾳ
 C οἷός τ' εἶ συνουσίας ποιεῖσθαι· σοφὸς γὰρ εἶ· ἐγὼ
 δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἷός
 τ' εἶναι. ἀλλὰ σὲ ἐχρῆν ἡμῖν συγχωρεῖν τὸν ἀμφό-
 τερα δυνάμενον, ἵνα συνουσία ἐγίγνετο· νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ 40
 οὐκ ἐθέλεις καὶ ἐμοί τις ἀσχολία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐκ ἂν
 οἷός τ' εἶην σοι παραμεῖναι ἀποτείνοντι μακροῦς
 λόγους—ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ποί με δεῖ—εἶμι· ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτ'
 ἂν ἴσως οὐκ ἀηδῶς σου ἤκουον. καὶ ἅμα ταῦτ' εἰπὼν
 ἀνιστάμην ὡς ἀπιών· καὶ μου ἀνισταμένου ἐπι- 45
 D λαμβάνεται ὁ Καλλίας τῆς χειρὸς τῇ δεξιᾷ, τῇ δ'
 ἀριστερᾷ ἀντελάβετο τοῦ τρίβωνος τουτουί, καὶ
 εἶπεν· Οὐκ ἀφήσομέν σε, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐὰν γὰρ σὺ
 ἐξέλθης, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἡμῖν ἔσονται οἱ διάλογοι. δέομαι
 οὖν σου παραμεῖναι ἡμῖν· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐδ' ἂν ἐνὸς ἡδίου 50
 ἀκούσαιμι ἢ σοῦ τε καὶ Πρωταγόρου διαλεγομένων·
 ἀλλὰ χάρισαι ἡμῖν πᾶσιν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον—ἤδη δὲ

ἀνειστήκη ὡς ἐξιῶν—ὦ παῖ Ἴππονίκου, αἰὲ μὲν
 ἔγωγέ σου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἄγαμαι, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν
 55 ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ, ὥστε βουλοίμην ἂν χαρίζεσθαί E
 σοι, εἴ μου δυνατὰ δέοιο· νῦν δ' ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ
 δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἴμεραίῳ δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι
 ἔπεσθαι, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων
 διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι, εἵπομι ἂν σοι ὅτι | πολὺ σοῦ 336
 60 μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐμαυτοῦ δέομαι θεουσιν τούτοις ἀκο-
 λουθεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι, ἀλλ' εἴ τι δέει θεά-
 σασθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐμέ τε καὶ Κρίσωνα θεόντας,
 τούτου δέου συγκαθεῖναι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι
 ταχὺ θεῖν, οὗτος δὲ δύναται βραδέως. εἰ οὖν ἐπι-
 65 θυμῆς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν, τούτου δέου,
 ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτόν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ
 αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι· εἰ
 δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γὰρ B
 ἔγωγ' ᾧμην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναι τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγο-
 70 μένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν. Ἄλλ' ὀρᾶς, ἔφη, ὦ
 Σώκρατες· δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν Πρωταγόρας ἀξιῶν
 αὐτῷ τε ἐξεῖναι διαλέγεσθαι ὅπως βούλεται καὶ σὺ
 ὅπως ἂν αὐ σὺ βούλη.

XXIII. Ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Οὐ

Alcibiades,
 Critias and Pro-
 dicus all give
 their vote for
 continuing the
 conversation.

5 καλῶς λέγεις, ἔφη, ὦ Καλλία· Σωκράτης
 μὲν γὰρ ὅδε ὁμολογεῖ μὴ μετεῖναι οἱ
 μακρολογίας καὶ παραχωρεῖ Πρωταγόρα,
 τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι οἷός τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐπί- C
 στασθαι λόγον τε δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι θαυμάζοιμ'
 ἂν εἴ τῷ ἀνθρώπων παραχωρεῖ. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ
 Πρωταγόρας ὁμολογεῖ φαυλότερος εἶναι Σωκράτους
 διαλεχθῆναι, ἐξαρκεῖ Σωκράτει· εἰ δὲ ἀντιποιεῖται,
 10 διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφ'

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δὲ ἐν λόγῳ πολλάκις παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων· ἡμεῖς
τ' αὖ οἱ ἀκούοντες μάλιστ' ἂν οὕτως εὐφραϊνοίμεθα, C
οὐχ ἠδοίμεθα· εὐφραίνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἔστι μανθά-
45 νοντά τι καὶ φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα αὐτῇ τῇ
διανοίᾳ, ἠδεσθαι δὲ ἐσθίουτά τι ἢ ἄλλο ἠδὺ πάσχοντα
αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι.

XXIV. Ταῦτα οὖν εἰπόντος τοῦ Προδίκου πολλοὶ
πάνυ τῶν παρόντων ἀπεδέξαντο· μετὰ
δὲ τὸν Πρόδικον Ἰππίας ὁ σοφὸς εἶπεν,
Ἦ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, οἱ παρόντες, ἠγοῦμαι
5 ἐγὼ ἡμᾶς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους καὶ πολίτας
ἅπαντας εἶναι φύσει, οὐ νόμῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὁμοῖον τῷ
ὁμοίῳ φύσει συγγενές ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος D
ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πολλὰ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν βιάζεται.
ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχροὺς τὴν μὲν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων
10 εἶδέναι, σοφωτάτους δὲ ὄντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ
κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο νῦν συνεληλυθότας τῆς τε Ἑλλάδος
εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς
πόλεως εἰς τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε,
μηδὲν τούτου τοῦ ἀξιώματος ἄξιον ἀποφήνασθαι,
15 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων δια- E
φέρεσθαι ἀλλήλοις. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν καὶ δέομαι καὶ
συμβουλεύω, ὧ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες, συμ-
βῆναι ὑμᾶς ὥσπερ ὑπὸ δαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβα-
ζόντων εἰς τὸ μέσον, | καὶ μήτε σὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο 338
20 εἶδος τῶν διαλόγων ζητεῖν τὸ κατὰ βραχὺ λῖαν, εἰ
μὴ ἠδὺ Πρωταγόρα, ἀλλ' ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς
ἡνίας τοῖς λόγοις, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπέστεροι καὶ εὐσχη-
μονέστεροι ἡμῖν φαίνωνται, μήτ' αὖ Πρωταγόραν
πάντα κάλων ἐκτείναντα, οὐρία ἐφέντα, φεύγειν εἰς
25 τὸ πέλαγος τῶν λόγων, ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, ἀλλὰ

Hippias begs
Protagoras and
Socrates to effect
a compromise.

XXIII
μέσοι
πεῖτε
B ἐλέστ
λόγω
X
ἐπι
ἀφί
εἶποι
ἐλέστ
ἔστα
τῶν
ὀρθῶ
C ἐκ π
αἰρή
ὑμῶ
σθαι
δέ, α
αἰετ
μοι
θυμ
εἰ μ
D ἐρω
αἰτ
ἀπι
ἀν
ἵπ
πρ
ὑμ
δι
E ἐπ
εἰ

μέσον τι ἀμφοτέρους τεμείν. ὡς οὖν ποιήσατε, καὶ πείθεσθέ μοι ῥαβδούχον καὶ ἐπιστάτην καὶ πρύτανιν
B ἐλέσθαι, ὃς ὑμῖν φυλάξει τὸ μέτριον μῆκος τῶν λόγων ἐκατέρου.

XXV. Ταῦτα ἤρесе τοῖς παροῦσι, καὶ πάντες ἐπήνεσαν, καὶ ἐμέ γε ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφήσειν καὶ ἐλέσθαι ἐδέοντο ἐπιστάτην. εἶπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν εἶη βραβευτὴν ἐλέσθαι τῶν λόγων. εἴτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται ἡμῶν ὁ αἰρεθείς, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὸν χείρω τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιστατεῖν, εἴτε ὁμοῖος, οὐδ' οὕτως ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ ὁμοῖος ἡμῖν ὁμοῖα καὶ ποιήσει, ὥστε
C ἐκ περιττοῦ ἡρήσεται. ἀλλὰ δὴ βελτίονα ἡμῶν αἰρήσεσθε. τῇ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀδύνατον 10 ὑμῖν, ὥστε Πρωταγόρου τοῦδε σοφώτερόν τινα ἐλέσθαι· εἰ δὲ αἰρήσεσθέ μὲν μηδὲν βελτίω, φήσετε δέ, αἰσχρὸν καὶ τοῦτο τῷδε γίγνεται, ὥσπερ φαύλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστάτην αἰρεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδέν μοι διαφέρει. ἀλλ' οὕτως ἐθέλω ποιῆσαι, ἵν' ὁ προ- 15 θυμείσθε συνουσία τε καὶ διάλογοι ἡμῖν γίγνωνται· εἰ μὴ βούλεται Πρωταγόρας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὗτος μὲν
D ἐρωτάτω, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινούμαι, καὶ ἅμα πειράσομαι αὐτῷ δεῖξαι, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι χρῆναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἐγὼ ἀποκρίνωμαι ὅπως 20 ἂν οὗτος βούληται ἐρωτᾶν, πάλιν οὗτος ἐμοὶ λόγον ὑποσχέτω ὁμοίως. εἰ οὖν μὴ δοκῇ πρόθυμος εἶναι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινῇ δεησόμεθα αὐτοῦ ἅπερ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ, μὴ διαφθείρειν τὴν συνουσίαν· καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τούτου 25
E ἕνεκα ἕνα ἐπιστάτην γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντες κοινῇ ἐπιστατήσετε. ἐδόκει πᾶσιν οὕτω ποιητέον εἶναι.

Socrates proposes that Protagoras shall question and he himself answer. This is agreed to.

5

καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν, ὅμως δὲ
 ἠναγκάσθη ὁμολογήσαι ἐρωτήσεων, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἰκα-
 30 νῶς ἐρωτήσῃ, πάλιν δώσειν λόγον κατὰ σμικρὸν
 ἀποκρινόμενος.

XXVI. Ἦρξατο οὖν ἐρωτᾶν οὕτως· Ἠγοῦ-

Protagoras pro-
 poses to examine
 Socrates upon a
 poem of Simoni-
 des. Socrate's
 maintains the
 consistency of the
 poet, which Pro-
 tagoras has called
 in question,

5

μαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας
 μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν
 εἶναι· ἔστιν | δὲ τοῦτο τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιη- 339
 τῶν λεγόμενα οἷόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε
 ὀρθῶς πεποιήται καὶ ἂ μή, καὶ ἐπί-
 στασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτώμενον
 λόγον δοῦναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔσται τὸ ἐρώτημα
 περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν, περὶ οὐπὲρ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νῦν
 10 διαλεγόμεθα, περὶ ἀρετῆς, μετενηνεγμένον δ' εἰς
 ποίησιν· τοσοῦτον μόνον διοίσει. λέγει γάρ· που
 Σιμωνίδης πρὸς Σκόπαν, τὸν Κρέοντος υἱὸν τοῦ
 Θετταλοῦ, ὅτι

ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι B

15

χαλεπόν,

χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετρά-
 γωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

τοῦτο ἐπίστασαι τὸ ἄσμα, ἢ πᾶν σοι διεξέλθω; καὶ
 ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Οὐδὲν δεῖ· ἐπίσταμαί τε γάρ, καὶ πάνυ
 20 μοι τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ἄσματος. Εὐ, ἔφη,
 λέγεις. πότερον οὖν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ πεποιήσθαι
 καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἢ οὐ; Πάνυ, ἔφην ἐγώ, καλῶς τε καὶ
 ὀρθῶς. Δοκεῖ δέ σοι καλῶς πεποιήσθαι, εἰ ἐναντία
 λέγει αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁ ποιητής; Οὐ καλῶς, ἦν δ'
 25 ἐγώ. Ὅρα δὴ, ἔφη, βέλτιον. Ἄλλ', ὠγαθέ, ἔσκεμμαι C
 ἰκανῶς. Οἴσθα οὖν, ἔφη, ὅτι προϊόντος τοῦ ἄσματος
 λέγει που

οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον νέμεται
καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον·
χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. 30

ἐννοεῖς ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος καὶ τάδε λέγει κακείνα τὰ
ἔμπροσθεν; Οἶδα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ἔφη,
ταῦτα ἐκείνοις ὁμολογεῖσθαι; Φαίνεται ἔμοιγε. καὶ
ἅμα μέντοι ἐφοβούμην μὴ τί λέγοι. Ἄτάρ, ἔφην
D ἐγώ, σοὶ οὐ φαίνεται; Πῶς γὰρ ἂν φαίνοιτο ὁμολο- 35
γεῖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὁ ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρω λέγων, ὅς γε
τὸ μὲν πρῶτον αὐτὸς ὑπέθετο χαλεπὸν εἶναι· ἄνδρα
ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἀληθείᾳ, ὀλίγον δὲ τοῦ ποιήματος
εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθὼν ἐπελάθετο, καὶ Πιπτακὸν
τὸν ταῦτὰ λέγοντα ἑαυτῷ, ὅτι χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν 40
ἔμμεναι, τοῦτον μέμφεται τε καὶ οὐ φησιν ἀποδέ-
χεσθαι αὐτοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ ἑαυτῷ λέγοντος. καίτοι ὅποτε
τὸν ταῦτὰ λέγοντα αὐτῷ μέμφεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
ἑαυτὸν μέμφεται, ὥστε ἦτοι τὸ πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον
οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγει. εἰπὼν οὖν ταῦτα πολλοῖς θόρυβον 45
E παρέσχευ καὶ ἔπαινον τῶν ἀκουόντων· καὶ ἐγὼ τὸ
μὲν πρῶτον, ὡσπερὶ ὑπὸ ἀγαθοῦ πύκτου πληγεῖς,
ἐσκοτώθην τε καὶ εἰλιγγίασα εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ταῦτα
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθορυβησάντων· ἔπειτα, ὡς γε
πρὸς σὲ εἰρησθαι τὰληθῆ, ἵνα μοι χρόνος ἐγγένηται 50
τῇ σκέψει τί λέγοι ὁ ποιητής, τρέπομαι πρὸς τὸν
Πρόδικον, καὶ καλέσας αὐτόν, ὦ Πρόδικε, ἔφην ἐγώ,
σὸς μέντοι Σιμωνίδης πολίτης· δίκαιος εἶ βοηθεῖν
340 τῷ ἀνδρί. | δοκῶ οὖν μοι ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ—ὡσπερ
ἔφη Ὀμηρος τὸν Σκάμανδρον πολιορκούμενον ὑπὸ 55
τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὸν Σιμόεντα παρακαλεῖν, εἰπόντα
φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφοτέροί περ
σχῶμεν,

ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σὲ παρακαλῶ, μὴ ἡμῖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας
 60 τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐκπέρσῃ. καὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ δεῖται τὸ
 ὑπὲρ Σιμωνίδου ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς σῆς μουσικῆς, ἢ τό
 τε βούλεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν διαιρεῖς ὡς οὐ ταῦτόν B
 ὄν, καὶ ἄ νῦν δὴ εἶπες πολλά τε καὶ καλά. καὶ νῦν
 σκόπει, εἴ σοι συνδοκεῖ ὅπερ ἐμοί. οὐ γὰρ φαίνεται
 65 ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ Σιμωνίδης. σὺ γάρ, ὦ
 Πρόδικε, προαπόφηναι τὴν σὴν γνώμην· ταῦτόν
 σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι, ἢ ἄλλο;
 "Ἄλλο νῆ Δί", ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος. Οὐκοῦν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐν
 μὲν τοῖς πρώτοις αὐτὸς ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώ-
 70 μην ἀπεφήνατο, ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν ἀληθείᾳ γενέσθαι
 χαλεπὸν εἶη; Ἄληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη ὁ Πρόδικος. Τὸν C
 δε γε Πιπτακόν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, μέμφεται, οὐχ, ὡς οἶεται
 Πρωταγόρας, τὸ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ λέγοντα, ἄλλ' ἄλλο.
 οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ὁ Πιπτακὸς ἔλεγεν, τὸ χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι
 75 ἐσθλόν, ὡσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔμμεναι· ἔστιν
 δὲ οὐ ταῦτόν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ὡς φησιν Πρόδικος
 ὅδε, τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν
 τὸ εἶναι τῷ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐναντία λέγει ὁ Σιμωνίδης
 αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. καὶ ἴσως ἂν φαίη Πρόδικος ὅδε καὶ
 80 ἄλλοι πολλοί, καθ' Ἡσίοδον, γενέσθαι μὲν ἀγαθὸν D
 χαλεπὸν εἶναι· τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς ἔμπροσθεν τοὺς
 θεοὺς ἰδρῶτα θεῖναι· ὅταν δέ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἄκρον
 ἵκηται, ῥηϊδίην δῆπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπήν περ
 εἰσοῦσαν, ἐκτῆσθαι.

ΧΧVII. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἀκούσας ταῦτα

and, after some
 playful sophistry,
 offers finally to
 give his own ex-
 plan^{at}i^on of the
 poem.

5

ἐπήνεσέν με· ὁ δὲ Πρωταγόρας, Τὸ ἐπαν-
 ὀρθωμά σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, μεῖζον
 ἀμάρτημα ἔχει ἢ ὁ ἐπανορθοῖς. καὶ ἐγὼ
 εἶπον, Κακὸν ἄρα μοι εἴργασται, ὡς

Ε ἔοικεν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός·
 ἰώμενος μείζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ. Ἄλλ' οὕτως ἔχει,
 ἔφη. Πῶς δὴ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Πολλὴ ἄν, ἔφη, ἀμαθία
 εἴη τοῦ ποιητοῦ, εἰ οὕτω φαῦλόν τί φησιν εἶναι τὴν
 ἀρετὴν ἐκτῆσθαι, ὃ ἐστὶν πάντων χαλεπώτατον, ὡς 10
 ἅπασιν δοκεῖ ἀνθρώποις. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, Νῆ τὸν Δία,
 εἰς καιρὸν γε παρατετύχηκεν ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
 Πρόδικος ὅδε. κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,
 341 ἢ Προδικου σοφία θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι, | ἦτοι ἀπὸ
 Σιμωνίδου ἀρξαμένη, ἢ καὶ ἔτι παλαιότερα. σὺ δὲ 15
 ἄλλων πολλῶν ἔμπειρος ὦν ταύτης ἄπειρος εἶναι
 φαίνει, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ἔμπειρος διὰ τὸ μαθητῆς
 εἶναι Προδίκου τουτουῖ· καὶ νῦν μοι δοκεῖς οὐ
 μαυθάνειν, ὅτι καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο ἴσως οὐχ οὕτως
 Σιμωνίδης ὑπελάμβανε, ὥσπερ σὺ ὑπολαμβάνεις, 20
 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ δεινοῦ Πρόδικός με οὕτωσιν
 νουθετεῖ ἐκάστοτε, ὅταν ἐπαινῶν ἐγὼ ἢ σὲ ἢ ἄλλον
 Β τινὰ λέγω ὅτι Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐστὶν
 ἀνὴρ, ἐρωτᾷ εἰ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι τὰ γαθὰ δεινὰ καλῶν—
 τὸ γὰρ δεινόν, φησὶν, κακόν ἐστιν· οὐδεὶς γοῦν λέγει 25
 ἐκάστοτε, δεινοῦ πλούτου οὐδὲ δεινῆς εἰρήνης οὐδὲ
 δεινῆς ὑγείας, ἀλλὰ δεινῆς νόσου καὶ δεινοῦ πολέμου
 καὶ δεινῆς πενίας, ὡς τοῦ δεινοῦ κακοῦ ὄντος—ἴσως
 οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν αὐτοῖς οἱ Κεῖοι καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης ἢ
 κακὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὃ σὺ οὐ μαυθάνεις. 30
 ἐρώμεθα οὖν Πρόδικον· δίκαιον γὰρ τὴν Σιμωνίδου
 φωνὴν τοῦτον ἐρωτᾶν· τί ἔλεγεν, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸ
 C χαλεπὸν Σιμωνίδης; Κακόν, ἔφη. Διὰ ταῦτ' ἄρα
 καὶ μέμφεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικε, τὸν Πιπτακὸν
 λέγοντα χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ 35
 ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι ἐστὶν κακὸν ἐσθλὸν

ἔμμεναι. Ἄλλὰ τί οἶει, ἔφη, λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Σιμωνίδην ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, καὶ ὀνειδίζειν τῷ Πιπτακῷ, ὅτι τὰ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἠπίστατο ὀρθῶς διαιρεῖν ἅτε
 40 Λέσβιος ὢν καὶ ἐν φωνῇ βαρβάρῳ τεθραμμένος;
 Ἄκούεις δὴ, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, Προδίκου τοῦδε. ἔχεις τι πρὸς ταῦτα λέγειν; καὶ ὁ Πρωτα- D
 γόρας, Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν, ὦ Πρόδικε· ἄλλ' ἐγὼ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ Σιμωνίδης τὸ χαλεπὸν
 45 ἔλεγεν ὅπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν μὴ ῥάδιον ἦ, ἀλλὰ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων γίγνηται. Ἄλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἔφην, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τοῦτο λέγειν Σιμωνίδην, καὶ Πρόδικόν γε τόνδε εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ παίζειν καὶ σοῦ δοκεῖν ἀποπειρᾶσθαι, εἰ οἴός τ'
 50 ἔσει τῷ σαυτοῦ λόγῳ βοηθεῖν· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε Σιμωνίδης οὐ λέγει τὸ χαλεπὸν κακόν, μέγα τεκμήριόν ἐστιν E
 εὐθὺς τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ῥῆμα· λέγει γὰρ ὅτι

θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας.

οὐ δήπου τοῦτό γε λέγων, κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, εἶτα
 55 τὸν θεόν φησιν μόνον τοῦτο ἂν ἔχειν καὶ τῷ θεῷ τοῦτο γέρας ἀπένειμε μόνῳ· ἀκόλαστον γὰρ ἂν τινα λέγοι Σιμωνίδην Πρόδικος καὶ οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον. ἀλλ' ἅ μοι δοκεῖ διανοεῖσθαι Σιμωνίδης ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ᾄσματι, ἐθέλω σοι εἰπεῖν, εἰ βούλει | λαβεῖν μου πείραν ὅπως 342
 60 ἔχω, ὃ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἐπῶν· εἰ δὲ βούλη, σοῦ ἀκούσομαι. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρωταγόρας ἀκούσας μου ταῦτα λέγοντος, Εἰ σὺ βούλει, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὁ δὲ Πρόδικός τε καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας ἐκελευέτην πάνυ, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι.

ΧΧVIII. Ἐγὼ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἅ γέ μοι δοκεῖ περὶ τοῦ ᾄσματος τούτου, πειράσομαι ὑμῖν διεξελεθεῖν. φιλοσοφία γὰρ ἐστιν παλαιότατη τε καὶ

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35 ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον παιδὸς μηδὲν
 βελτίω. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ καὶ τῶν νῦν εἰσὶν οἱ
 κατανενοήκασι καὶ τῶν πάλαι, ὅτι τὸ λακωνίζειν
 πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐστὶν φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ φιλογυμναστεῖν,
 εἰδότες ὅτι τοιαῦτα οἷόν τ' εἶναι ῥήματα φθέγγεσθαι
 40 τελέως πεπαιδευμένου ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου. | τούτων ἦν 343
 καὶ Θαλῆς ὁ Μιλήσιος καὶ Πιπτακὸς ὁ Μυτιληναῖος
 καὶ Βίας ὁ Πριηνεὺς καὶ Σόλων ὁ ἡμέτερος καὶ
 Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος καὶ Μύσων ὁ Χηνεὺς, καὶ ἔβ-
 δομος ἐν τούτοις ἐλέγετο Λακεδαιμόνιος Χίλων. οὗτοι
 45 πάντες ζηλωταὶ καὶ ἐρασταὶ καὶ μαθηταὶ ἦσαν τῆς
 Λακεδαιμονίων παιδείας· καὶ καταμάθοι ἄν τις αὐτῶν
 τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὔσαν, ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιο-
 μνημόνευτα ἐκάστῳ εἰρημένα· οὗτοι καὶ κοινῇ ξυνελ-
 θόντες ἀπαρχὴν τῆς σοφίας ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι B
 50 εἰς τὸν νεῶν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς, γράψαντες ταῦτα, ἃ δὴ
 πάντες ὑμνοῦσιν, γνῶθι σαυτόν καὶ μηδὲν ἄγαν.

τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος
 ἦν τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, βραχυλογία τις
 Λακωνική· καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ ἰδίᾳ περιεφέρετο
 55 τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν, τὸ
 χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. ὁ οὖν Σιμωνίδης, ἅτε C
 φιλότιμος ὢν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ἔγνω ὅτι, εἰ καθέλοι
 τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα ὥσπερ εὐδοκιμοῦντα ἀθλητὴν καὶ
 περιγένοιτο αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμήσει ἐν τοῖς τότε
 60 ἀνθρώποις· εἰς τοῦτο οὖν τὸ ῥῆμα καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα
 τούτῳ ἐπιβουλεύων κολουῦσαι αὐτὸ ἅπαν τὸ ἄσμα
 πεποίηκεν, ὡς μοι φαίνεται.

ΧΧΙΧ. Ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ ἅπαντες,
 εἰ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω. εὐθὺς γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ
 ἄσματος μανικὸν ἂν φανείη, εἰ βουλόμενος λέγειν, D

ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, ἔπειτα ἐνέβαλε
 τὸ μὲν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἓνα λόγον The poet says
that it is truly
hard to become
good,
 φαίνεται ἐμβεβληῆσθαι, εἰ μὴ τις ὑπο-
 λάβῃ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ ῥῆμα ὡσπερ
 ἐρίζοντα λέγειν τὸν Σιμωνίδην—λέγοντος τοῦ Πιπ-
 τακοῦ ὅτι Χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, ἀμφισβητοῦντα
 εἰπεῖν ὅτι Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν ἄνδρα 10
 ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ὧ Πιπτακέ, ὡς ἀληθῶς,—οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ
 E ἀγαθόν, οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λέγει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὡς ἄρα
 ὄντων τινῶν τῶν μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν, τῶν δὲ
 ἀγαθῶν μὲν, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθῶς· εὐηθες γὰρ τοῦτό
 γε φανείη ἂν καὶ οὐ Σιμωνίδου· ἀλλ' ὑπερβατὸν δεῖ 15
 θεῖναι ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι τὸ ἀλαθέως, οὕτωςί πως ὑπει-
 πόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ θεῖμεν αὐτὸν
 λέγοντα τὸν Πιπτακὸν καὶ Σιμωνίδην ἀποκρινόμενον,
 εἰπόντα Ὡ ἄνθρωποι, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι, τὸν
 344 δὲ ἀποκρινόμενον ὅτι Ὡ Πιπτακέ, | οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις· 20
 οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν ἐστιν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν
 χερσί τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου
 τετυγμένον, χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως. οὕτω φαίνεται πρὸς
 λόγον τὸ μὲν ἐμβεβλημένον καὶ τὸ ἀλαθέως ὀρθῶς
 ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ κείμενον· καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα πάντα τούτῳ 25
 μαρτυρεῖ, ὅτι οὕτως εἴρηται. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι
 καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν τῷ ᾄσματι εἰρημένων ἀπο-
 B δεῖξαι ὡς εὖ πεποιήται· πάνυ γὰρ χαριέντως καὶ
 μεμελημένως ἔχει· ἀλλὰ μακρὸν ἂν εἴη αὐτὸ οὕτω
 διελθεῖν· ἀλλὰ τὸν τύπον αὐτοῦ τὸν ὅλον διεξέλθωμεν 30
 καὶ τὴν βούλησιν, ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἔλεγχός ἐστιν
 τοῦ Πιπτακείου ῥήματος διὰ παντὸς τοῦ ᾄσματος.

XXX. Λέγει γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὀλίγα διελθών, ὡς
 ἂν εἰ λέγοι λόγον, ὅτι γενέσθαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν

χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως, οἷόν τε μέντοι ἐπὶ γε χρόνον τινά·

5 but to be good is not hard, but impossible; therefore Pittacus is wrong.

γενόμενον δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἔξει
καὶ εἶναι ἀνδρα ἀγαθόν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ C

Πιττακέ, ἀδύνατον καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον,

ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτο ἔχοι τὸ γέρας,

ἀνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,

ὄν ἂν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.

10 τίνα οὖν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθαιρεῖ ἐν πλοίου
ἀρχῇ; δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸν ἰδιώτην· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἰδιώτης

ἀεὶ καθήρηται· ὥσπερ οὖν οὐ τὸν κείμενόν τις ἂν

καταβάλοι, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἐστῶτά ποτε καταβάλοι

ἂν τις, ὥστε κείμενον ποιῆσαι, τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὐ

15 οὔτω καὶ τὸν εὐμήχανον ὄντα ποτὲ ἀμήχανος ἂν D

συμφορὰ καθέλοι, τὸν δὲ ἀεὶ ἀμήχανον ὄντα οὐ·

καὶ τὸν κυβερνήτην μέγας χειμῶν ἐπιπεσὼν ἀμή-

χανον ἂν ποιήσειεν, καὶ γεωργὸν χαλεπὴ ὥρα ἐπελ-

θοῦσα ἀμήχανον ἂν θείη, καὶ ἰατρὸν ταῦτά ταῦτά·

20 τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐσθλῷ ἐγχωρεῖ κακῷ γενέσθαι, ὥσπερ

καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ποιητοῦ μαρτυρεῖται τοῦ εἰπόντος

αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ποτὲ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ'

ἐσθλός·

τῷ δὲ κακῷ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ εἶναι E

25 ἀνάγκη· ὥστε τὸν μὲν εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ

ἀγαθὸν ἐπειδὰν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη, οὐκ ἔστι

μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι· σὺ δὲ φῆς, ὦ Πιττακέ, χαλεπὸν

ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι· τὸ δ' ἐστὶν γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν

(δυνατὸν δὲ) ἐσθλόν, ἔμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον·

30 πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,

κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς.

τίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα ἀγαθὴ πράξις ἐστίν, καὶ | τίς 345

ἀνδρα ἀγαθὸν ποιεῖ εἰς γράμματα; δῆλον ὅτι ἡ

τούτων μάθησις. τίς δὲ εὐπραγία ἀγαθὸν ἰατρὸν

ποιεῖ; δῆλον ὅτι ἢ τῶν καμνόντων τῆς θεραπείας 35
 μάθησις. κακὸς δὲ κακῶς· τίς οὖν ἂν κακὸς ἰατρὸς
 γένοιτο; δῆλον ὅτι ᾧ πρῶτον μὲν ὑπάρχει ἰατρῶ
 εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀγαθῶ ἰατρῶ· οὗτος γὰρ ἂν καὶ κακὸς
 γένοιτο· ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ ἰατρικῆς ἰδιῶται οὐκ ἂν ποτε
 γενοίμεθα κακῶς πράξαντες οὔτε ἰατροὶ οὔτε τέκτονες 40
 B οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅστις δὲ μὴ ἰατρὸς ἂν
 γένοιτο κακῶς πράξας, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ κακὸς ἰατρός.
 οὕτω καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε καὶ
 κακὸς ἢ ὑπὸ χρόνου ἢ ὑπὸ πόνου ἢ ὑπὸ νόσου ἢ ὑπὸ
 ἄλλου τινὸς περιπτώματος· αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστὶ κακὴ 45
 πράξις, ἐπιστήμης στερηθῆναι· ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ
 ἂν ποτε γένοιτο κακός· ἔστιν γὰρ αἰεὶ· ἀλλ' εἰ μέλλει
 κακὸς γενέσθαι, δεῖ αὐτὸν πρότερον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι.
 ὥστε καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ἄσματος πρὸς τοῦτο τείνει, ὅτι
 C εἶναι μὲν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν οὐχ οἶόν τε, διατελοῦντα 50
 ἀγαθόν, γενέσθαι δὲ ἀγαθὸν οἶόν τε, καὶ κακόν γε
 τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον· ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὲ καὶ ἄριστοί
 εἰσιν οὗς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

XXXI. Ταῦτά τε οὖν πάντα πρὸς τὸν Πιπτακὸν
 εἴρηται, καὶ τὰ ἐπιόντα γε τοῦ ἄσματος
 ἔτι μᾶλλον δηλοῖ. φησὶ γάρ·

τοῦνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ
 γενέσθαι δυνατὸν

διζήμενος κενεᾶν ἐς ἄπρακτον

ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,

πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι
 καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·

D ἐπί θ' ὑμῖν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω, 10

φησὶν· οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι' ὅλου τοῦ ἄσματος ἐπεξ-
 ἔρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ ῥήματι.

Simonides is
 content to praise
 a moderately
 good man: he
 seeks not for per-
 fect virtue." Con-
 clusion of Socra-
 tes' speech.

5

πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω
 ἐκῶν ὅστις ἔρδη
 15 μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μά-
 χονται.

καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἰρημένον. οὐ
 γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτος ἦν Σιμωνίδης, ὥστε τούτους
 φάναι ἐπαινεῖν, ὅς ἂν ἐκῶν μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῆ, ὡς
 20 ὄντων τινῶν οἱ ἐκόντες κακὰ ποιοῦσιν. ἐγὼ γὰρ
 σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν
 ἠγεῖται οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων ἐκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ
 αἰσχρά τε καὶ κακὰ ἐκόντα ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλ' εὖ E
 ἴσασιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντες
 25 ἄκοντες ποιοῦσιν· καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Σιμωνίδης οὐχ ὅς ἂν
 μὴ κακὰ ποιῆ ἐκῶν, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαινέτης εἶναι,
 ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λέγει τοῦτο τὸ ἐκῶν. ἠγεῖτο
 γὰρ ἄνδρα καλὸν καγαθὸν πολλάκις αὐτὸν ἐπαναγ-
 κάζειν φίλον τινὲ γίγνεσθαι καὶ | ἐπαινέτην†, οἶον 346
 30 ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις συμβῆναι μητέρα ἢ πατέρα ἀλλόκο-
 τον ἢ πατρίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. τοὺς μὲν
 οὖν πονηροὺς, ὅταν τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτοῖς συμβῆ, ὥσπερ
 ἀσμένους ὄραν καὶ ψέγοντας ἐπιδεικνύναι καὶ κατη-
 γορεῖν τὴν πονηρίαν τῶν γονέων ἢ πατρίδος, ἵνα
 35 αὐτοῖς ἀμελοῦσιν αὐτῶν μὴ ἐγκαλῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι
 μηδ' ὄνειδίζωσιν ὅτι ἀμελοῦσιν, ὥστε ἔτι μᾶλλον
 ψέγειν τε αὐτοὺς καὶ ἔχθρας ἐκουσίους πρὸς ταῖς B
 ἀναγκαίαις προστίθεσθαι· τοὺς δ' ἀγαθοὺς ἐπικρύπ-
 τεσθαί τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἀναγκάζεσθαι, καὶ ἂν τι
 40 ὀργισθῶσιν τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἢ πατρίδι ἀδικηθέντες,
 αὐτοὺς ἑαυτοὺς παραμυθεῖσθαι καὶ διαλλάττεσθαι
 προσαναγκάζοντας ἑαυτοὺς φιλεῖν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ

† Post ἐπαινέτην add. codd. φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν.

ἐπαινεῖν. πολλάκις δέ, οἶμαι, καὶ Σιμωνίδης ἠγή-
 σατο καὶ αὐτὸς ἢ τύραννον ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν τοι-
 ούτων ἐπαινέσαι καὶ ἐγκωμιάσαι οὐχ ἑκῶν, ἀλλ' 45
 C ἀναγκαζόμενος. ταῦτα δὴ καὶ τῷ Πιπτακῷ λέγει
 ὅτι ἐγώ, ὦ Πιπτακέ, οὐ διὰ ταῦτά σε ψέγω· ὅτι εἰμὶ
 φιλόψογος, ἐπεὶ ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ

ὅς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἢ μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος·
 εἰδώς γ' ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν 50
 ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ· οὐ μὲν ἐγὼ
 μωμήσομαι

(οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος)·

τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων

ἀπείρων γενέθλα· 55

ὥστ' εἴ τις χαίρει ψέγων, ἐμπλησθείη ἂν ἐκείνους
 μεμφόμενος.

πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέ-
 μικται.

D οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἔλεγε πάντα τοι λευκά, 60
 οἷς μέλανα μὴ μέμικται· γελοῖον γὰρ ἂν εἴη πολλαχῆ·
 ἀλλ' ὅτι αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέσα ἀποδέχεται ὥστε μὴ
 ψέγειν· καὶ οὐ ζητῶ, ἔφη, πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον,
 εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός, ἐπί
 θ' ὑμῖν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω· ὥστε τούτου γ' ἔνεκα 65
 οὐδένα ἐπαινέσομαι, ἀλλὰ μοι ἐξαρκεῖ, ἂν ἢ μέσος
 καὶ μηδὲν κακὸν ποιῆ, ὡς ἐγὼ πάντας φιλέω καὶ
 ἐπαίνημι—καὶ τῇ φωνῇ ἐνταῦθα κέχρηται τῇ τῶν
 E Μυτιληναίων, ὡς πρὸς Πιπτακὸν λέγων τὸ πάντας
 δὲ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω ἑκῶν (ἐνταῦθα δεῖ ἐν 70
 τῷ ἑκῶν διαλαβεῖν λέγοντα) ὅστις ἔρδη μηδὲν
 αἰσχρόν, ἄκων δ' ἔστιν οὗς ἐγὼ ἐπαινῶ καὶ φιλῶ.
 σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέσως ἔλεγες ἐπιεικῆ καὶ ἀληθῆ, ὦ
 347 Πιπτακέ, | οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἔψεγον. νῦν δὲ—σφόδρα γὰρ

75 καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδόμενος δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, διὰ ταῦτά σε ἐγὼ ψέγω.

XXXII. Ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Πρόδικε καὶ Πρωταγόρα, ἣν δ' ἐγὼ, Σιμωνίδης διανοούμενος πεποιηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ ἄσμα. καὶ ὁ Ἰππίας, Εὐ μὲν μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ σὺ περὶ τοῦ ἄσματος διεληλυθέναι· ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐμοὶ λόγος περὶ αὐτοῦ εὖ ἔχων, ὃν ὑμῖν ἐπι- B
δείξω, ἂν βούλησθε. καὶ ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, Ναί, ἔφη, ὦ Ἰππία, εἰσαῦθίς γε· νῦν δὲ δίκαιόν ἐστιν, ἂ ὠμο-
10 λογησάτην πρὸς ἀλλήλω Πρωταγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης, Πρωταγόρας μὲν εἰ ἔτι βούλεται ἐρωτᾶν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι Σωκράτη, εἰ δὲ δὴ βούλεται Σωκράτει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐρωτᾶν τὸν ἕτερον. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον Ἐπιτρέπω μὲν ἔγωγε Πρωταγόρα ὁπότερον αὐτῷ
15 ἥδιον· εἰ δὲ βούλεται, περὶ μὲν ἄσμάτων τε καὶ C
ἐπῶν ἐάσωμεν, περὶ δὲ ὧν τὸ πρῶτον ἐγὼ σε ἠρώτησα, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἠδέως ἂν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔλθοιμι μετὰ σοῦ σκοπούμενος. καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως διαλέγεσθαι ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τοῖς συμπο-
20 σίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀλλήλοις δι' ἑαυτῶν συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ πότῳ μηδὲ διὰ τῆς ἑαυτῶν φωνῆς καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν ἑαυτῶν ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας, τιμίας D
ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀυλητρίδας, πολλοῦ· μισθούμενοι ἄλλο-
25 τρία φωνὴν τῆν τῶν αὐλῶν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων φωνῆς ἀλλήλοις σύνεισιν· ὅπου δὲ καλοὶ καγαθοὶ συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσίν, οὐκ ἂν ἴδοις οὔτ' ἀυλητρίδας οὔτε ὀρχηστρίδας οὔτε ψαλτρίδας, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς ἱκανοὺς ὄντας συνεῖναι ἄνευ τῶν
30 λήρων τε καὶ παιδιῶν τούτων διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς,

Alcibiades now begs that the original question may be resumed. Protagoras appears reluctant, but at last is shamed into allowing himself to be questioned.

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ΧΧΧΙΙΙ. Εἶπον δὴ ἐγώ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, μὴ οἷου διαλέγεσθαι μέ σοι ἄλλο τι βουλό-

Socrates again formulates the question to be discussed. "Are wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, holiness, five names for one thing, or are they all parts of virtue, differing from one another?"

5

μενον ἢ ἂ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἐκάστοτε, ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι. ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ πάνυ λέγειν τι τὸν Ὀμηρον τὸ

σύν τε δὴ ἐρχομένω, καί τε πρὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνόησεν.

εὐπορώτεροι γάρ πως ἅπαντές ἐσμεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἅπαν ἔργον καὶ λόγον

10 καὶ διανόημα· μοῦνος δ' εἶπερ τε νοήσῃ, αὐτίκα περιῶν ζητεῖ ὅτῳ ἐπιδείξεται καὶ μεθ' ὅτου βεβαιώσεται, ἕως ἂν ἐντύχῃ. ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγὼ ἕνεκα τούτου

σοὶ ἡδέως διαλέγομαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί, ἡγούμενός σε βέλτιστ' ἂν ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων

15 περὶ ὧν εἰκὸς σκοπεῖσθαι τὸν ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐπερὶ ἀρετῆς. τίνα γὰρ ἄλλον ἢ σέ; ὅς γε οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς οἶει καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, ὥσπερ τινὲς ἄλλοι

αὐτοὶ μὲν ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσίν, ἄλλους δὲ οὐ δύνανται ποιεῖν· σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τ' εἶ

20 ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς. καὶ οὕτω πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ

ἴ' ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν | ὑποκήρυξάμενος εἰς πάντα 349

τοὺς Ἕλληνας, σοφιστὴν ἐπονομάσας, σεαυτὸν ἀπέφηνας παιδείσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος

25 τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνεσθαι. πῶς οὖν οὐ σε χρῆν παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν τούτων σκέψιν καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐ. καὶ νῦν δὴ

ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνα ἅπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἠρώτων περὶ τούτων, πάλιν ἐπιθυμῶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ μὲν ἀναμνησθῆναι παρὰ

30 σοῦ, τὰ δὲ συνδιασκέψασθαι. ἦν δέ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, B τὸ ἐρώτημα τόδε· σοφία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὀσιότης, πότερον ταῦτα, πέντε

ὄντα ὀνόματα, ἐπὶ ἐνὶ πράγματι ἐστίν, ἢ ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειται τις ἴδιος οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἕκαστον, οὐκ ὄν οἶον 35 τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν τὸ ἕτερον; ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἐνὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἕκαστον ἰδίῳ πράγματι
 C τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἐπικεῖσθαι, πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μόρια εἶναι ἀρετῆς, οὐχ ὡς τὰ τοῦ χρυσοῦ μόρια ὁμοιά ἐστίν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὄλῳ οὐ μόριά ἐστίν, 40 ἀλλ' ὡς τὰ τοῦ προσώπου μόρια καὶ τῷ ὄλῳ οὐ μόριά ἐστίν καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀνόμοια, ἰδίαν ἕκαστα δύναμιν ἔχοντα. ταῦτα εἰ μὲν σοι δοκεῖ ἔτι ὡσπερ τότε, φάθι· εἰ δὲ ἄλλως πως, τοῦτο διόρισαι, ὡς ἔγωγε οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι, ἐάν πη ἄλλη 45 νῦν φήσης· οὐ γὰρ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ τότε ἀποπειρώ-
 D μενός μου ταῦτα ἔλεγες.

ΧΧΧΙΥ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα μόρια μὲν ἐστίν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ ἀνδρεία πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρουν πάντων τούτων. ὦδε δὲ γνώσει ὅτι ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω· εὐρήσεις γὰρ πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀδικωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ ἀνοσιωτάτους καὶ ἀκολαστοτάτους καὶ ἀμαθεστάτους, ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως.

Protagoras replies that four of them are tolerably like each other, but that courage is of quite another kind. Socrates tries to shew that courage is identical with wisdom. Protagoras objects to his method of reasoning, and

wisdom

10

Ε Ἐχε δὴ, ἔφην ἐγὼ· ἄξιον γὰρ τοι ἐπισκέψασθαι ὃ λέγεις. πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλο τι; Καὶ ἴτας γ', ἔφη, ἐφ' ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ φοβοῦνται ἰέναι. Φέρε δὴ, τὴν ἀρετὴν καλόν τι φῆς εἶναι, καὶ ὡς καλοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ σὺ διδάσκαλον 15 σαυτὸν παρέχεις; Κάλλιστον μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ

μαίνομαί γε. Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν τι
 αὐτοῦ αἰσχρὸν, τὸ δέ τι καλόν, ἢ ὅλον καλόν; "Ολον
 που καλὸν ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα. Οἶσθα οὖν τίνες
 20 εἰς τὰ φρέατα | κολυμβῶσιν θαρραλέως; "Ἐγωγε, ὅτι 350
 οἱ κολυμβηταί. Πότερον διότι ἐπίστανται ἢ δι' ἄλλο
 τι; "Οτι ἐπίστανται. Τίνες δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων
 πολεμεῖν θαρραλέοι εἰσίν; πότερον οἱ ἵππικοὶ ἢ οἱ
 ἄφιπποι; Οἱ ἵππικοί. Τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες;
 25 οἱ πελταστικοὶ ἢ οἱ μή; Οἱ πελταστικοί. καὶ τὰ
 ἄλλα γε πάντα, εἰ τοῦτο ζητεῖς, ἔφη, οἱ ἐπιστήμονες
 τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ αὐτοὶ
 ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὴν μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν. "Ἦδη δέ Β
 τινὰς ἐώρακας, ἔφην, πάντων τούτων ἀνεπιστήμονας
 30 ὄντας, θαρροῦντας δὲ πρὸς ἕκαστα τούτων; "Ἐγωγε,
 ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ λίαν γε θαρροῦντας. Οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρ-
 ραλέοι οὗτοι καὶ ἀνδρείοι εἰσίν; Αἰσχρὸν μεντᾶν,
 ἔφη, εἶη ἢ ἀνδρεία· ἐπεὶ οὗτοί γε μαινόμενοι εἰσιν.
 Πῶς οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις τοὺς ἀνδρείους; οὐχὶ τοὺς
 35 θαρραλέους εἶναι; Καὶ νῦν γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν οὗτοι, C
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ οὕτω θαρραλέοι ὄντες οὐκ ἀνδρείοι ἀλλὰ
 μαινόμενοι φαίνονται; καὶ ἐκεῖ αὖ οἱ σοφώτατοι
 οὗτοι καὶ θαρραλεώτατοί εἰσιν, θαρραλεώτατοι δὲ
 ὄντες ἀνδρειότατοι; καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἢ
 40 σοφία ἂν ἀνδρεία εἶη; Οὐ καλῶς, ἔφη, μνημονεύεις,
 ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀ ἔλεγον τε καὶ ἀπεκρινόμην σοι. ἔγω-
 γε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ οἱ ἀνδρείοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν,
 ὠμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρείοι, οὐκ
 ἠρωτήθην· εἰ γὰρ με τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ
 45 πάντες· τοὺς δὲ ἀνδρείους ὡς οὐ θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, τὸ D
 ἐμὸν ὁμολόγημα, οὐδαμοῦ ἐπέδειξας ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς
 ὠμολόγησα. ἔπειτα τοὺς ἐπισταμένους αὐτοὺς ἑαυ-

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Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἡδέως ζῆν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀηδῶς κακόν.
 Εἶπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἔφη, ζῶν ἡδόμενος. Τί δὴ, C
 10 ὦ Πρωταγόρα; μὴ καὶ σύ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἡδέ'
 ἅττα καλεῖς κακὰ καὶ ἀνιαρὰ ἀγαθὰ; ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω,
 καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἄρα κατὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἀγαθὰ, μὴ
 εἴ τι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται ἄλλο; καὶ αὖθις αὖ
 τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὡσαύτως οὕτως οὐ καθ' ὅσον ἀνιαρὰ,
 15 κακὰ; Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ἀπλῶς οὕτως,
 ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ ἡδέα D
 τε ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶν ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακὰ· ἀλλὰ
 μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ
 ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς
 20 πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν; ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἀ
 τῶν ἡδέων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθὰ, ἔστι δ' αὖ καὶ ἀ τῶν
 ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἔστι κακὰ, ἔστι δ' ἀ ἔστιν, καὶ τρίτον
 ἀ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ' ἀγαθὰ. Ἡδέα δὲ καλεῖς,
 ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ τὰ ἡδονῆς μετέχοντα ἢ ποιοῦντα ἡδο-
 25 νήν; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Τοῦτο τοίνυν λέγω, καθ' ὅσον E
 ἡδέα ἐστίν, εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθὰ, τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτὴν ἐρωτῶν
 εἰ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστίν. Ὡσπερ σὺ λέγεις, ἔφη, ἐκάσ-
 τοτε, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκοπώμεθα αὐτό, καὶ εἰ μὲν πρὸς
 λόγον δοκῆ εἶναι τὸ σκέμμα καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται
 30 ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, συγχωρησόμεθα· εἰ δὲ μή, τότε
 ἡδη ἀμφισβητήσομεν. Πότερον οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σὺ
 βούλει ἡγεμονεύειν τῆς σκέψεως, ἢ ἐγὼ ἡγῶμαι;
 Δίκαιος, ἔφη, σὺ ἡγεῖσθαι· σὺ γὰρ καὶ κατάρχεις
 τοῦ λόγου. Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆδέ πη καταφανὲς |
 35 ἂν ἡμῖν γένοιτο; ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἄνθρωπον σκοπῶν 352
 ἐκ τοῦ εἶδους ἢ πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν
 τοῦ σώματος ἔργων, ἰδὼν τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς
 χεῖρας ἄκρας εἴποι· ἴθι δὴ μοι ἀποκαλύψας καὶ τὰ

στήθη καὶ τὸ μετάφρενον ἐπίδειξον, ἵνα ἐπισκέψωμαι
σαφέστερον· καὶ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτόν τι ποθῶ πρὸς τὴν 40
σκέψιν· θεασάμενος ὅτι οὕτως ἔχεις πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν
καὶ τὸ ἡδύ, ὡς φῆς, δέομαι τοιοῦτόν τι εἰπεῖν· ἴθι
δή μοι, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀπο-
B κάλυψον· πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ
τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ 45
ἄλλως; δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοι-
οῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδ' ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδ' ἀρχικὸν
εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται,
ἀλλ' ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν
ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν 50
θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ
ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς διανοούμενοι
C περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνδραπόδου, περιελ-
κομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. ἄρ' οὖν καὶ σοὶ
τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖ, ἢ καλόν τε εἶναι ἢ 55
ἐπιστήμη καὶ οἶον ἄρχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ἐάνπερ
γιγνώσκη τις τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά, μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι
ὑπὸ μηδενός, ὥστε ἄλλ' ἅττα πράττειν ἢ ἂ ἂν ἢ
ἐπιστήμη κελεύη, ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν
βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ; Καὶ δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥσπερ σὺ 60
λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἅμα, εἶπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ, αἰσχυρόν
D ἐστὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ σοφίαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην μὴ οὐχὶ πάντων
κράτιστον φάγει εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων.
Καλῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ, σὺ λέγων καὶ ἀληθῆ. οἴσθα
οὖν ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐμοί τε καὶ σοὶ 65
οὐ πείθονται, ἀλλὰ πολλοὺς φασὶ γινώσκοντας τὰ
βέλτιστα οὐκ ἐθέλειν πράττειν, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ
ἄλλα πράττειν· καὶ ὅσους δὴ ἐγὼ ἠρόμην ὅ τί ποτε
αἰτιόν ἐστι τούτου, ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς φασὶν ἠττωμένους

70 ἢ λύπης ἢ ὧν νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπὸ τινος τούτων E
κρατουμένους ταῦτα ποιεῖν τοὺς ποιούντας. Πολλὰ
γὰρ οἶμαι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄλλα οὐκ ὀρθῶς
λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι. Ἴθι δὴ μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐπιχείρη-
σον πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διδάσκειν ὃ ἐστίν
75 αὐτοῖς τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν | ἡδονῶν 353
ἠττᾶσθαι καὶ οὐ πράττειν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ βέλτιστα,
ἐπεὶ γιγνώσκειν γε αὐτά. Ἴσως γὰρ ἂν λεγόντων
ἡμῶν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγετε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλὰ
ψεύδεσθε, ἔροιντ' ἂν ἡμᾶς· ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ
80 Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἐστίν τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς
ἠττᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε
εἶναι; εἶπατον ἡμῖν. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, δεῖ ἡμᾶς
σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν ἀνθρώπων, οἷ ὅ
τι ἂν τύχωσι τοῦτο λέγουσιν; Οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, B
85 εἶναί τι ἡμῖν τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἐξευρεῖν περὶ ἀνδρείας,
πρὸς τᾶλλα μόρια τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πῶς ποτ' ἔχει.
εἰ οὖν σοι δοκεῖ ἐμμένειν οἷς ἄρτι ἔδοξεν ἡμῖν, ἐμὲ
ἠγήσασθαι, ἢ οἶμαι ἂν ἔγωγε κάλλιστα φανερόν
γενέσθαι, ἔπου· εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλει, εἴ σοι φίλον, ἐὼ
90 χαίρειν. Ἄλλ', ἔφη, ὀρθῶς λέγεις· καὶ πέραινε
ὥσπερ ἤρξω.

XXXVI. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, εἰ ἔροιντο

Pleasures are often called evil when pains follow them, and pains good when they are followed by pleasure, but at the time pleasure is good, and pain evil.

ἡμᾶς· τί οὖν φατέ τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἡμεῖς C
ἠττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλέγομεν; εἶποιμ'
ἂν ἔγωγε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὡδί· ἀκούετε δὴ·
πειρασόμεθα γὰρ ὑμῖν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρω-
ταγόρας φράσαι. ἄλλο τι γάρ, ὦ ἄν-
θρώποι, φατέ ὑμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι ἐν

τοῖσδε—οἶον πολλάκις ὑπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ
ἀφροδισίων κρατούμενοι ἡδέων ὄντων, γιγνώσκοντες

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καὶ εὐεξίαι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῶν πόλεων σωτηρία
καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχαὶ καὶ πλοῦτοι; φαῖεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι.
Συνεδόκει. Ταῦτα δὲ ἀγαθὰ ἐστὶ δι' ἄλλο τι, ἢ ὅτι
εἰς ἡδονὰς ἀποτελευτᾷ καὶ λυπῶν ἀπαλλαγὰς τε καὶ
45 ἀποτροπὰς; ἢ ἔχετε τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, εἰς ὃ
ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖτε, ἀλλ' ἢ ἡδονὰς C
τε καὶ λύπας; οὐκ ἂν φαῖεν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι. Οὐδ' ἐμοὶ
δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν
διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς
50 κακόν; Συνεδόκει. Τοῦτ' ἄρα ἡγείσθ' εἶναι κακόν,
τὴν λύπην, καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ
τὸ χαίρειν τότε λέγετε κακόν εἶναι, ὅταν μείζονων
ἡδονῶν ἀποστερῆ ἢ ὅσας αὐτὸ ἔχει, ἢ λύπας μείζους
παρασκευάζῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν· ἐπεὶ εἰ κατ' ἄλλο
55 τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακόν καλεῖτε καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι D
τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχοιτε ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν·
ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔξετε. Οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη ὁ Πρω-
ταγόρας. Ἄλλο τι οὖν πάλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ
λυπεῖσθαι ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; τότε καλεῖτε αὐτὸ τὸ
60 λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ὅταν ἢ μείζους λύπας τῶν ἐν
αὐτῷ οὐσῶν ἀπαλλάττῃ ἢ μείζους ἡδονὰς τῶν λυπῶν
παρασκευάζῃ; ἐπεὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέ-
πετε, ὅταν καλῆτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ἢ πρὸς E
ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔξετε.
65 Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Πρωταγόρας. Πάλιν τοίνυν,
ἔφην ἐγώ, εἴ με ἀνέροισθε, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, τίνος οὖν
δήποτε ἔνεκα πολλὰ περὶ τούτου λέγεις καὶ πολλαχῆ;
συγγιγνώσκετέ μοι, φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε. πρῶτον μὲν
γὰρ οὐ ρᾶδιον ἀποδείξαι, τί ἐστίν ποτε τοῦτο, ὃ ὑμεῖς
70 καλεῖτε τῶν ἡδονῶν ἥττω εἶναι· ἔπειτα ἐν τούτῳ εἰσὶν
πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις. ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἀναθέσθαι

355 ἔξεστιν, εἴ πη ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι | εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν
 ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν, ἢ
 ἀρκεῖ ὑμῖν τὸ ἡδέως καταβιῶναι τὸν βίον ἄνευ
 λυπῶν; εἰ δὲ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μὴ ἔχετε μηδὲν ἄλλο 75
 φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ὃ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾷ,
 τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούετε. φημὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν τούτου οὕτως
 ἔχοντος γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίνεσθαι, ὅταν λέγητε,
 ὅτι πολλάκις γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι
 κακά ἐστιν, ὅμως πράττει αὐτά, ἐξὸν μὴ πράττειν, 80
 B ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀγόμενος καὶ ἐκπληττόμενος· καὶ
 αὐθις αὖ λέγετε, ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὰγαθὰ
 πράττειν οὐκ ἐθέλει διὰ τὰς παραχρῆμα ἡδονάς, ὑπὸ
 τούτων ἡττώμενος.

ΧΧΧVII. Ὡς δὲ ταῦτα γελοῖά ἐστιν, κατάδηλον
 ἔσται, εἰ μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα
 ἅμα, ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῶ καὶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ
 κακῶ, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ δύο ἐφάνη ταῦτα, δυ-
 οῖν καὶ ὀνόμασιν προσαγορεύωμεν αὐτά,
 πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαθῶ καὶ κακῶ, ἔπειτα
 αὐθις ἡδεῖ τε καὶ ἀνιαρῶ. θέμενοι δὲ
 C οὕτω λέγωμεν ὅτι γιγνώσκων ὁ ἄνθρω-
 πος τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ ἐστιν, ὅμως αὐτὰ ποιεῖ. εἰ μὴ
 οὖν τις ἡμᾶς ἔρηται, διὰ τί, ἡττώμενος, φήσομεν· ὑπὸ 10
 τοῦ; ἐκεῖνος ἐρήσεται ἡμᾶς· ἡμῖν δὲ ὑπὸ μὲν ἡδονῆς
 οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν εἰπεῖν· ἄλλο γὰρ ὄνομα μετείληφεν
 ἀντὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἐκείνῳ δὲ ἀποκρινώμεθα
 καὶ λέγωμεν, ὅτι ἡττώμενος—ὑπὸ τίνος; φήσει· τοῦ
 ἀγαθοῦ, φήσομεν νὴ Δία. ἂν οὖν τύχη ὁ ἐρόμενος 15
 ἡμᾶς ὑβριστῆς ὢν, γελάσεται καὶ ἐρεῖ· ἢ γελοῖον
 D λέγετε πράγμα, εἰ πράττει τις κακά, γιγνώσκων ὅτι
 κακά ἐστιν, οὐ δέον αὐτὸν πράττειν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ

The phrase
 "To be overcome
 by pleasure" is
 an absurd way
 of expressing the
 fact that men
 often choose a
 less good in pre-
 ference to a
 greater. It is by
 reason of their
 ignorance that
 they do so.

τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ἄρα, φήσει, οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων νικᾶν ἐν
 20 ὑμῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ κακά, ἢ ἀξίων; φήσομεν δῆλον
 ὅτι ἀποκρινόμενοι, ὅτι οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων· οὐ γάρ ἂν
 ἐξημάρτανεν ὃν φαμεν ἥττω εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν. κατὰ
 τί δέ, φήσει ἴσως, ἀνάξιά ἐστιν τὰγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἢ τὰ
 κακὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν; ἢ κατ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅταν τὰ μὲν μείζω,
 25 τὰ δὲ σμικρότερα ἢ; ἢ πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ἢ; οὐχ E
 ἔξομεν εἰπεῖν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο. δῆλον ἄρα, φήσει, ὅτι τὸ
 ἡττᾶσθαι τοῦτο λέγετε, ἀντὶ ἐλαττόνων ἀγαθῶν μείζω
 κακὰ λαμβάνειν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὕτω. μεταλάβωμεν
 δὴ τὰ ὀνόματα πάλιν τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀνιαρὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς
 30 αὐτοῖς τούτοις, καὶ λέγωμεν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος πράττει,
 τότε μὲν ἐλέγομεν τὰ κακά, νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν τὰ ἀνιαρά,
 γιγνώσκων, ὅτι ἀνιαρά ἐστιν, ἡττώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν
 ἡδέων, δῆλον ὅτι | ἀναξίων ὄντων νικᾶν. καὶ τίς ἄλλη 356
 ἀναξία ἡδονῆ πρὸς λύπην ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπερβολὴ ἀλ-
 35 λήλων καὶ ἔλλειψις; ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μείζω τε καὶ σμι-
 κρότερα γιγνόμενα ἀλλήλων καὶ πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω καὶ
 μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. εἰ γάρ τις λέγοι ὅτι ἀλλὰ πολὺ
 διαφέρει, ὧ Σώκρατες, τὸ παραχρῆμα ἡδὺ τοῦ εἰς τὸν
 ὕστερον χρόνον καὶ ἡδέος καὶ λυπηροῦ, μῶν ἄλλω τῷ,
 40 φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε, ἢ ἡδονῆ καὶ λύπῃ; οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτῳ
 ἄλλῳ. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι ἄνθρωπος, συνθεῖς B
 τὰ ἡδέα καὶ συνθεῖς τὰ λυπηρά, καὶ τὸ ἐγγὺς καὶ τὸ
 πόρρω στήσας ἐν τῷ ζυγῷ, εἰπέ πότερα πλείω ἐστίν.
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα ἰστήσῃ, τὰ μείζω αἰεὶ καὶ
 45 πλείω ληπτέα· εἰ δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρά, τὰ ἐλάτ-
 τω καὶ σμικρότερα· εἰ δὲ ἡδέα πρὸς λυπηρά, εἰ μὲν
 τὰ ἀνιαρὰ ὑπερβάλληται ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδέων, εἰ μὲν τε
 τὰ ἐγγὺς ὑπὸ τῶν πόρρω εἰ μὲν τε τὰ πόρρω ὑπὸ τῶν
 ἐγγύς, ταύτην τὴν πράξιν πρακτέον ἐν ἢ ἂν ταῦτ' C

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ταγόρα ὁμολογεῖν. Εἶεν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ
 ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὀρθῇ τῇ αἵρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν
 ἢ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὔσα, τοῦ τε πλείονος καὶ ἐλάτ-
 τονος καὶ μείζονος καὶ μικροτέρου καὶ πορρωτέρω B
 85 καὶ ἐγγυτέρω, ἄρα πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται,
 ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὔσα καὶ ἰσότητος πρὸς
 ἀλλήλας σκέψις; Ἄλλ' ἀνάγκη. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητικὴ,
 ἀνάγκη δῆπου τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη. Συμφήσουσιν.
 Ἦτις μὲν τοίνυν τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν αὕτη,
 90 εἰσαῦθις σκεψόμεθα· ὅτι δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, τοσοῦτον
 ἐξαρκεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἣν ἐμὲ δεῖ καὶ Πρωτα-
 γόραν ἀποδείξαι περὶ ὧν ἤρεσθ' ἡμᾶς. ἤρεσθε δέ, εἰ C
 μέμνησθε, ἠνίκα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλοις ὠμολογοῦμεν ἐπι-
 στήμης μηδὲν εἶναι κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αἰεὶ κρατεῖν,
 95 ὅπου ἂν ἐνῆ, καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων·
 ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ ἔφατε τὴν ἡδονὴν πολλάκις κρατεῖν καὶ
 τοῦ εἰδότος ἀνθρώπου, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὑμῖν οὐχ ὠμολογοῦ-
 μεν, μετὰ τοῦτο ἤρεσθε ἡμᾶς· ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ
 Σώκρατες, εἰ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα ἡδονῆς ἡτ-
 100 τᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν καὶ τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε D
 εἶναι; εἶπατε ἡμῖν. εἰ μὲν οὖν τότε εὐθὺς ὑμῖν εἶ-
 πομεν ὅτι ἀμαθία, κατεγελάτε ἂν ἡμῶν· νῦν δὲ ἂν
 ἡμῶν καταγελάτε, καὶ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν καταγελάσεσθε.
 καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ὠμολογήκατε ἐπιστήμης ἐνδεία ἐξαμαρ-
 105 τάνειν περὶ τὴν τῶν ἡδονῶν αἵρεσιν καὶ λυπῶν τοὺς
 ἐξαμαρτάνοντας· ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ τε καὶ κακά·
 καὶ οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἥς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι
 ὠμολογήκατε ὅτι μετρητικῆς· ἢ δὲ ἐξαμαρτανομένη
 πρᾶξις ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης ἴστε που καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι ἀμα- E
 110 θία πράττεται. ὥστε τοῦτ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἡδονῆς ἡττω εἶναι,
 ἀμαθία ἢ μεγίστη· ἥς Πρωταγόρας ὅδε φησὶν ἰατρὸς

εἶναι καὶ Πρόδικος καὶ Ἰππίας· ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ οἶεσθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε τοὺς ὑμετέρους παῖδας παρὰ τοὺς τούτων διδασκάλους τούσδε τοὺς σοφιστὰς πέμπετε, ὡς οὐ διδακτοῦ 115 ὄντος, ἀλλὰ κηδόμενοι τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ οὐ διδόντες τούτοις κακῶς πράττετε καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

ΧΧΧVIII. Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀποκεκρι-
 358 μένοι | ἀνῆμεν· ὑμᾶς δὲ δὴ μετὰ Πρωτα-
 γόρου ἐρωτῶ, ὦ Ἰππία τε καὶ Πρόδικε—
 κοινὸς γὰρ δὴ ἔστω ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος—
 πότερον δοκῶ ὑμῖν ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἢ
 ψεύδεσθαι. Ὑπερφυῶς ἐδόκει ἅπασιν ἀληθῆ εἶναι
 τὰ εἰρημένα. Ὁμολογεῖτε ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ
 ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιαρὸν κακόν. τὴν δὲ Προδίκου
 τοῦδε διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων παραιτοῦμαι· εἴτε γὰρ
 B ἡδὺ εἴτε τερπνὸν λέγεις εἴτε χαρτόν, εἴτε ὀπόθεν καὶ 10
 ὅπως χαίρεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνομάζων, ὦ βέλτιστε Πρό-
 δικε, τοῦτό μοι πρὸς ὃ βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι. Γελάσας
 οὖν ὁ Πρόδικος συνωμολόγησε, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. Τί δὲ
 δὴ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ τοιόνδε; αἰ ἐπὶ τούτου
 πράξεις ἅπασαι, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύπως ζῆν καὶ ἡδέως, ἄρ' οὐ 15
 καλαί†; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον;
 Συνεδόκει. Εἰ ἄρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, τὸ ἡδὺ ἀγαθόν ἐστίν,
 οὐδεὶς οὔτε εἰδὼς οὔτε οἰόμενος ἄλλα βελτίω εἶναι, ἢ ἂ
 C ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατά, ἔπειτα ποιεῖ ταῦτα, ἐξὸν τὰ βελτίω·
 οὐδὲ τὸ ἥττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ ἄλλο τι τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἀμαθία, 20
 οὐδὲ κρείττω ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλο τι ἢ σοφία. Συνεδόκει
 πᾶσιν. Τί δὲ δὴ; ἀμαθίαν ἄρα τὸ τοιόνδε λέγετε, τὸ
 ψευδῆ ἔχειν δόξαν καὶ ἐψεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων
 τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων; Καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσι συνεδόκει. Ἄλλο

Now fear is expectation of evil; and as no one willingly enters on what he believes to be evil,

† Post καλαὶ add. codd. καὶ ὠφέλιμοι.

25 τι οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐπὶ γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἔρχεται
οὐδ' ἐπὶ ἃ οἶεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἔστι τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοι-
κεν, ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσει, ἐπὶ ἃ οἶεται κακὰ εἶναι D
ἐθέλειν ἰέναι ἀντὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὅταν τε ἀναγκασθῆ
δυοῖν κακοῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἰρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μεῖζον
30 αἰρήσεται ἔξον τὸ ἔλαττον. "Ἀπαντα ταῦτα συνεδό-
κει ἅπασιν ἡμῖν. Τί οὖν; ἔφην ἐγώ, καλεῖτέ τι δέος
καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἄρα ὅπερ ἐγώ; πρὸς σὲ λέγω, ὦ
Πρόδικε. προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε
φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. Ἐδόκει Πρωταγόρα μὲν
35 καὶ Ἰππία δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἶναι τοῦτο, Προδίκῳ δὲ E
δέος, φόβος δ' οὔ. Ἄλλ' οὐδέν, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Πρόδικε,
διαφέρει, ἀλλὰ τόδε. εἰ ἀληθῆ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν ἐστιν,
ἄρα τις ἀνθρώπων ἐθελήσει ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἰέναι ἢ δέδοικ-
κεν, ἔξον ἐπὶ ἃ μή; ἢ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν ὠμολογημένων;
40 ἢ γὰρ δέδοικεν, ὠμολόγηται ἠγεῖσθαι κακὰ εἶναι· ἢ
δὲ ἠγεῖται κακά, οὐδένα οὔτε ἰέναι ἐπὶ ταῦτα οὔτε
λαμβάνειν ἐκόντα. Ἐδόκει καὶ ταῦτα | πᾶσιν. 359

ΧΧΧΙΧ. Οὕτω δὴ τούτων ὑποκειμένων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

the coward
wrongly believ-
ing war to be
painful or evil, is
afraid to fight,
by reason of his
5 ignorance. Thus
cowardice is ig-
norance and
therefore bra-
very, its opposite,
is wisdom.

ὦ Πρόδικέ τε καὶ Ἰππία, ἀπολογείσθω
ἡμῖν Πρωταγόρας ὅδε, ἃ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπε-
κρίνατο, πῶς ὀρθῶς ἔχει, μὴ ἢ τὸ πρῶτον
παντάπασιν· τότε μὲν γὰρ δὴ πέντε ὄντων
μορίων τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδέν ἔφη εἶναι τὸ
ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτερον, ἰδίαν δὲ αὐτοῦ
ἕκαστον ἔχειν δύναμιν· ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα
λέγω, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ὕστερον εἶπεν. τὸ γὰρ ὕστερον ἔφη
10 τὰ μὲν τέτταρα ἐπιεικῶς παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις εἶναι,
τὸ δὲ ἐν πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρειν τῶν ἄλλων, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, B
γνώσεσθαι δὲ μ' ἔφη τεκμηρίῳ τῷδε· εὐρήσεις γάρ,
ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνθρώπους ἀνοσιωτάτους μὲν ὄντας καὶ

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45 Ὁρθῶς γε, ἔφην ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ | ποτέρους φῆς εἰς τὸν 360
 πόλεμον οὐκ ἐθέλειν ἰέναι, καλὸν ὄν καὶ ἀγαθόν;
 Τοὺς δειλοὺς, ἢ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶπερ
 καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡδύ; Ὁμολόγηται γοῦν, ἔφη.
 Ἄρ' οὖν γιγνώσκοντες οἱ δειλοὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἰέναι
 50 ἐπὶ τὸ κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἡδιον; Ἀλλὰ καὶ
 τοῦτο εἰς ὁμολογῶμεν, ἔφη, διαφθεροῦμεν τὰς ἔμ-
 προσθεν ὁμολογίας. Τί δ' ὁ ἀνδρείος; οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ
 κάλλιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον καὶ ἡδιον ἔρχεται; Ἀνάγκη,
 ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν. Οὐκοῦν ὅλως οἱ ἀνδρείοι οὐκ αἰσ- B
 55 χροὺς φόβους φοβοῦνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ
 θάρρη θαρροῦσιν; Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρὰ,
 ἄρ' οὐ καλά; Ὁμολόγει. Εἰ δὲ καλά, καὶ ἀγαθά;
 Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ θρασεῖς καὶ οἱ
 μαινόμενοι τούναντίον αἰσχροὺς τε φόβους φοβοῦνται
 60 καὶ αἰσχρὰ θάρρη θαρροῦσιν; Ὁμολόγει. Θαρροῦ-
 σιν δὲ τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ κακὰ δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν
 καὶ ἀμαθίαν; Οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη. Τί οὖν; τοῦτο δι' ὃ C
 δειλοὶ εἰσιν οἱ δειλοί, δειλίαν ἢ ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς;
 Δειλίαν ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Δειλοὶ δὲ οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν δεινῶν
 65 ἀμαθίαν ἐφάνησαν ὄντες; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Διὰ ταύτην
 ἄρα τὴν ἀμαθίαν δειλοὶ εἰσιν; Ὁμολόγει. Δι' ὃ δὲ
 δειλοὶ εἰσιν, δειλία ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ σοῦ; Συνέφη.
 Οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἂν
 εἶη; Ἐπένευσεν. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐναντίον
 70 ἀνδρεία δειλία. Ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ἢ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ D
 μὴ δεινῶν σοφία ἐναντία τῇ τούτων ἀμαθία ἐστίν;
 Καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἔτι ἐπένευσεν. Ἡ δὲ τούτων ἀμαθία
 δειλία; Πάνυ μόγις ἐνταῦθα ἐπένευσεν. Ἡ σοφία
 ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἐναντία
 75 οὔσα τῇ τούτων ἀμαθία; Οὐκέτι ἐνταῦθα οὔτ' ἐπι-

νεῦσαι ἠθέλησεν ἐσίγα τε· καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον· Τί δή, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, οὔτε σὺ φῆς ἢ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφης; Αὐτός, ἔφη, πέρανον. "Εν γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, μόνον ἐρόμενος ἔτι σέ, εἴ σοι ὡσπερ τὸ πρῶτον ἔτι δοκοῦσιν εἰαίτινες ἄνθρωποι ἀμαθέστατοι μὲν, ἀνδρειότατοι δέ. 80 Φιλονικεῖν μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· χαριοῦμαι οὖν σοι, καὶ λέγω ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογημένων ἀδύνατόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι.

XL. Οὔτοι ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄλλου ἔνεκα ἐρωτῶ πάντα ταῦτα, ἢ σκέψασθαι βουλόμενος, πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἢ ἀρετή. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τούτου 361 φανεροῦ | γενομένου μάλιστα ἂν κατάδηλον γένοιτο ἐκείνο, περὶ οὗ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ μακρὸν λόγον ἐκάτερος ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν λέγων ὡς οὐ διδακτὸν ἀρετή, σὺ δ' ὡς διδακτόν. καί μοι δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἢ ἄρτι ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων ὡσπερ ἄνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελάειν, καὶ εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι, 10 εἰπεῖν ἂν ὅτι ἄτοποί γ' ἐστέ, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Πρωταγόρα· σὺ μὲν λέγων ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, νῦν σεαυτῷ τὰναντία σπεύδεις, ἐπιχειρῶν ἀποδείξαι ὡς πάντα χρήματα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἢ 15 ἀνδρεία, ὦ τρόπῳ μάλιστα ἂν διδακτὸν φανείη ἢ ἀρετή· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀρετή, ὡσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, σαφῶς οὐκ ἂν ἦν διδακτόν· νῦν δὲ εἰ φανήσεται ἐπιστήμη ὅλον, ὡς σὺ σπεύδεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, θαυμάσιον ἔσται μὴ διδακτόν ὄν. Πρω- 20 ταγόρας δ' αὖ διδακτὸν τότε ὑποθέμενος νῦν τοῦναντίον C ἔοικεν σπεύδοντι, ὀλίγου πάντα μᾶλλον φανῆναι αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπιστήμην· καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤκιστα εἶη διδακτόν. ἐγὼ

Conclusion.
Socrates and Protagoras have both veered round to the opposite of that from which they started. 5

οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἄνω κάτω
 25 ταραπτόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἔχω καταφανῆ
 αὐτὰ γενέσθαι. καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελθόντας
 ἡμᾶς ἐξελθεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὃ τι ἔστι, καὶ πάλιν
 ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἴτε διδακτὸν εἴτε μὴ
 διδακτὸν, μὴ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐπιμηθεὺς ἐκεῖνος καὶ
 30 ἐν τῇ σκέψει σφήλη ἐξαπατήσας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ D
 διανομῇ ἡμέλησεν ἡμῶν, ὡς φῆς σύ. ἤρεσεν οὖν μοι
 καὶ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὁ Προμηθεὺς μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἐπιμηθέως·
 ὧ χρώμενος ἐγὼ καὶ προμηθούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου
 τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ παντὸς πάντα ταῦτα πραγματεύομαι, καὶ
 35 εἰ σὺ ἐθέλεις, ὅπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἔλεγον, μετὰ σοῦ
 ἂν ἡδιστα ταῦτα συνδιασκοποίην. καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας,
 Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπαινῶ σου τὴν προθυ-
 μίαν καὶ τὴν διέξοδον τῶν λόγων. καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τᾶλλα E
 οἶμαι κακὸς εἶναι ἄνθρωπος, φθονερός τε ἢ κιστ' ἀν-
 40 θρώπων, ἐπεὶ καὶ περὶ σοῦ πρὸς πολλοὺς δὴ εἶρηκα,
 ὅτι ὦν ἐντυγχάνω πολὺ μάλιστα ἀγαμαί σε, τῶν μὲν
 τηλικούτων καὶ πάνυ· καὶ λέγω γε ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυ-
 μάζοιμι, εἰ τῶν ἐλλογίμων γένοιτο ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ σοφία.
 καὶ περὶ τούτων δὲ εἰσαῦθις, ὅταν βούλη, διέξιμεν·
 45 νῦν δ' ὥρα ἤδη καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλο τι | τρέπεσθαι. Ἄλλ', ἦν 362
 δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ
 οἶπερ ἔφην ἰέναι πάλαι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ Καλλία τῷ καλῷ
 χαριζόμενος παρέμεινα.

ταῦτ' εἰπόντες καὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀπῆμεν.

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|| Alcibiade?" ἤ=Latin an? introduces a second question intended to forestall Socrates' answer to the first: compare Apol. 26 B πῶς με φῆς διαφθεῖρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κτλ.;

2. κυνηγεσίου—ὦραν. For the metaphor in κυνηγεσίου Sauppe quotes Soph. 222 D τῇ τῶν ἐρώντων θήρᾳ τὸν νοῦν, ὡς ζοικας, οὐπω προσέσχεσ and Xen. Mem. I 2. 24 Ἀλκιβιάδης—διὰ μὲν κάλλος—θηρώμενος κτλ. τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὦραν (=τὸν ὠραῖον Ἀλκιβιάδην, cf. βλή Ἡρακλεῖη for βίαιος Ἡρακλῆς) is a slight παρὰ προσδοκίαν as in the English: 'From hunting, no doubt—after the young and blooming Alcibiades'. It was part of Socrates' habitual irony to pretend to be in love with young men of ability (cf. the words of Alcibiades in Symp. 216 D Σωκράτης ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται τῶν καλῶν καὶ αἰεὶ περὶ τούτους ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκπέπληκται and 216 E: see also infra, note on 310 A line 38).

3. καὶ μὴν μοι καί. καὶ μὴν is merely 'well' as in Phaedo 84 D καὶ μὴν—τάληθῆ σοι ἐρῶ. The second καὶ goes with πρῶην: 'well, it was only the other day that I saw him etc.' In the next line καλὸς ἀνὴρ is in the predicate: the readings of Bekker (ἀνὴρ) and Athenaeus (ὁ ἀνὴρ) are less good. ἀνὴρ μέντοι is 'but yet a man')(παῖς. At the age of 18 an Athenian εἰς ἄνδρας ἐνεγράφετο.

5. ὡς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν—ὑποπιμπλάμενος. αὐτοῖς=μόνοις is emphatic as in the usual αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἐσμεν and therefore precedes ἡμῖν. ὡς γ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν εἰρήσθαι apologises for ἀνὴρ μέντοι: for this use of ὡς γε cf. Euthyd. 307 A ὡς γε πρὸς σὲ τάληθῆ εἰρήσθαι and infra 339 E: καὶ in καὶ πώγωνος is 'and' not 'even'. ὑπο- in ὑποπιμπλάμενος is diminutive, like sub- in Latin. So in 312 A ἤδη γὰρ ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας.

7. οὐ σὺ μέντοι. "In interrogationibus haec particula" (μέντοι) "ita cum οὐ negatione coniungitur, ut gravissima sententiae vox intercedat, quo modo aliquis eis quae ex altero quaerit summam veritatis ingerit speciem" (Hofer, de particulis Platonicis, p. 34). The idiom is very frequent in Plato, e.g. Rep. I 339 B, Crat. 439 A, Theaet. 163 E. Translate 'You don't mean to say that you disapprove of Homer'.

309 B 8. ὃς ἔφη χαριεστάτην ἦβην κτλ. Homer Il. XXIV 348 and Od. X 279 πρῶτον ὑπηνήτη τοῦπερ χαριεστάτη ἦβη. To insert τὴν (with Hirschig) before ἦβην would make the reference to Homer less precise. The line in Homer refers to Hermes, and Sauppe quotes Clement to shew that sculptors modelled their busts of Hermes after Alcibiades.

12. εὖ ἔμοιγε ἔδοξεν, sc. διακεῖσθαι. Socrates replies to his friend's second question (καὶ πῶς πρὸς σὲ ὁ νεανίας διάκειται;) first, and to his first question (ἢ παρ' ἐκείνου φαίνεται;) second, in the words καὶ οὖν καὶ ἄρτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἔρχομαι, where οὖν marks the regression to the earlier inquiry. Both B and T read ἄρχομαι by mistake for ἔρχομαι: ἔρχομαι is found in a Vienna codex (suppl. phil. gr. 7) which Kral and Wohlrab place along with B in the first class of MSS.

16. οὔτε προσεῖχον—ἐπελανθανόμην τε. τε following οὔτε throws emphasis on the second clause: e.g. Apol. 26 C παντάπασί με φῆς οὔτε ἀ^ντ^η νομίζειν θεοὺς τοὺς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν. The idiom is very common in Plato (e.g. infra 347 E, 360 D, 361 E) and corresponds to neque—que or (more frequently) neque—et in Latin. For the interchange of pronouns ἐκείνου—αὐτοῦ see on 310 D.

21. καὶ πολὺ γε, i.e. καλλίονι ἐνέτυχον.

309 C

25. Ἀβδηρίτη. Abdera, on the coast of Thrace, was the birthplace of Democritus and of Protagoras. The reputation of the city for heaviness and stupidity seems not to be earlier than the age of Demosthenes: see pseudo-Dem. περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον 23 ὥσπερ ἐν Ἀβδηρίταις ἢ Μαρωνεῖταις ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν Ἀθηναίοις πολιτευόμενοι and Cic. ad Atticum VII 7. 4.

27. υἱέος. Schanz writes υἱέος in conformity with the general usage of inscriptions about Plato's time, but MSS upon the whole favour υἱέος: see the Editor's note on Crito 45 C.

28. τὸ σοφώτατον. So the MSS: Schanz and others read σοφώτερον, apparently the reading of Ficinus, who translates the word by *sapientius*. Socrates however is thinking of Protagoras, who is not σοφός, but σοφώτατος (line 32): the effect of the neuter τὸ σοφώτατον is to generalise the statement into a kind of adage. σοφώτερον would introduce a somewhat frigid comparison between Alcibiades and Protagoras in respect of wisdom; and it should also be noted that the MSS reading σοφώτατον was more likely to be changed to σοφώτερον by mistake than vice versa. There may be an allusion to some proverbial form of speech resembling that in Theognis 255 κάλλιστον τὸ δικαίτατον· λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν κτλ.: cf. also the Scholium referred to in Gorg. 451 E. The sentiment is an interesting anticipation of the Stoic paradoxes as to the beauty of the wise man.

30. ἀλλ' ἢ expresses surprise and interest: 'What! have you just left etc.' So in Gorg. 447 A ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον κατόπιν

έορτῆς ἤκομεν; Presently μέν οὖν is as usual corrective: see on Apol. 26 B.

309 D 33. σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας. The interest is sustained by reserving the name of Protagoras to the end.

310 A 37. πάνυ γε πολλά καὶ εἰπών κτλ. Sauppe places a comma after πάνυ γε, but it suits the rapid movement of the dialogue better to take πάνυ with πολλά.

38. τί οὖν οὐ διηγῆσω. Literally 'why didn't you relate', i.e. 'tell us at once'. So in 317 D τί οὖν—οὐ καὶ Πρόδικον καὶ Ἴππιαν ἐκαλέσαμεν; This construction of τί οὐ and τί οὖν οὐ is common in animated conversational style, especially with the second person: e.g. Gorg. 503 B τί οὐχὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ αὐτὸν ἔφρασας τίς ἐστιν; = φράσον ὅτι τάχιστα—οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις φράζων as Thompson remarks.

τὴν ξυνουσίαν recalls συγγεγονώς in line 36. The continual use of the words συνεῖναι, συγγίγνεσθαι, πλησιάζειν, λέναι ἐπί, ἐρᾶν and the like to denote the relation between learner and teacher in Plato's dialogues depends upon the conception of the philosophical impulse as ἔρως: see Symp. 210.

39. ἐξαναστήσας τὸν παῖδα τουτονί. The slave was doubtless in attendance on the Friend.

42. ἀκούητε. From this, as well as from ἡμεῖς and ἀκούετε, it appears that the Friend was not the only listener.

44. διπλῆ ἂν εἶη ἡ χάρις. The expression is almost proverbial: cf. (with Schneidewin on Soph. Phil. 1370) Eur. Rhesus 162—163 παντὶ γὰρ προσκείμενον κέρδος πρὸς ἔργῳ τὴν χάριν τίκτει διπλῆν, and Eur. Suppl. 333—334 τῷδέ τ' εἶρηκας καλῶς κάμοι· διπλοῦν δὲ χάρμα γίγνεται τόδε.

CHAPTER II.

Socrates begins his story. Hippocrates called on him at an early hour and entreated him to apply to Protagoras on his behalf.

1. ἔτι βαθέος ὄρθρου. ὄρθρος βαθύς is the period just before daybreak: ὄρθρος is the morning twilight, and βαθύς implies that it was more dark than light: Crito 43 A. A similar use of βαθύς is seen in the expressions βαθεῖα νύξ and βαθεῖα ἑσπέρα.

2. Ἴπποκράτης—Φάσωνος δὲ ἀδελφός. Hippocrates is known only from this dialogue. δέ without preceding μέν is regular in such twofold descriptions of a person: Sauppe refers to Aesch. Pers. 151 μήτηρ βασιλέως, βασιλεία δ' ἐμή and Hdt. VII 10 πατρὶ τῷ σῷ,

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μὲν γάρ—ἔπειτα : Symp. 211 A πρῶτον μὲν αἰεὶ ὄν—ἔπειτα οὐ τῆ μὲν καλόν, τῆ δ' αἰσχρόν.

310 D 23. πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν. The plural is idiomatic: cf. Symp. 217 D διελεγόμεν αἰεὶ πόρρω τῶν νυκτῶν: Ar. Clouds 2 ὦ Ζεῦ βασιλεῦ τὸ χρῆμα τῶν νυκτῶν ὅσον. So μέσαι νύκτες for 'midnight'. "In quibus loquendi formulis" remarks Heindorf "νύκτες horas nocturnas denotant".

24. ὁ ὕπνος ἀνήκεν is modelled on Homer (e.g. Il. II 71 ἐμὲ δὲ γλυκὺς ὕπνος ἀνήκεν), but Plato gives a different turn to ἀνήκεν by adding ἐκ τοῦ κόπου, where ἐκ is 'from', not 'after' (as Stallbaum thinks). Note presently that οὕτω to introduce the apodosis after participles is especially common in Plato: cf. infra 314 C, 326 D.

26. ἀνδρείαν. ἀνδρείος occurs in much the same sense in Meno 81 D οὐδὲν κωλύει—τάλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, εἴαν τις ἀνδρείος ᾗ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνη ζητῶν. σοί is emphatic and should therefore be accented, like σέ in line 31.

27. ἀδικεῖ. ἀδικεῖν is often used of a past injury because the injury is regarded as continuing till atonement is made: see on Crito 50 C.

30. ἂν αὐτῷ διδῶς ἀργύριον καὶ πείθης ἐκείνον. For the variation of pronouns cf. Euthyphr. 14 D ἀλλά μοι λέξον τίς αὕτη ἡ ὑπηρεσία ἐστὶ τοῖς θεοῖς; αἰτεῖν τε φῆς αὐτοῦς καὶ διδόναι ἐκείνοις; supra 309 B and infra 318 C. The change is most frequent where the second pronoun is different in case from the first: compare Classen on Thuc. I 132. 5. Cobet ejects the words καὶ πείθης ἐκείνον, but they are supported by the parallel expression of 311 D ἂν μὲν ἐξικνηῖται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτοις πείθωμεν αὐτόν.

31. ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί: i.e. καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θεοί. The exclamation is common: see Blaydes on Ar. Plūtus 1.

32. ἐν τούτῳ εἴη. Cf. 354 E and 356 D εἰ οὖν ἐν τούτῳ ἡμῖν ᾗν τὸ εὖ πράττειν.

310 E 33. οὔτε τῶν φίλων. The English idiom would lead us to expect οὔτε τῶν τῶν φίλων: but in Greek the double article is avoided by substituting 'my friends' for 'my friends' property'. Analogous is the usage known as *comparatio compendiaría*, e.g. κῶμαι Χαρίτεσσιν ὁμοῖαι (Il. XVII 51), where 'the Graces' is put for 'the Graces' hair'.

ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα. See on Apol. 23 B. ταῦτα=διὰ ταῦτα is frequent in Plato and Aristophanes.

37. ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἐπεδήμησεν. Probably about 445 B.C., if

the date of action of the dialogue is 433—432. (See *Introd.* p. xxvi.) Protagoras went to Thurii in 443 B.C. being charged by Pericles to draw up a code of laws for the new colony.

41. **Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου.** Callias, son of Hipponicus, belonged to one of the richest families in Athens (*infra* 337 D *αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως—τὸν μέγιστον καὶ ὀλβιώτατον οἶκον τόνδε*). His devotion to the 'Sophists' in general is remarked upon in *Apol.* 20 A *ἀνδρὶ δὲ τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου* (cf. *Crat.* 391 B): but he seems to have been particularly attached to the doctrines of Protagoras: see *Theaet.* 164 E *οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου* (i.e. *Πρωταγόρου λέγων*) *ἐπίτροπος*. One of his two sons (*Apol.* 20 A), Protarchus, appears as an interlocutor in the *Philebus*. In 393—392 Callias was associated with Iphicrates in the command of the Athenian forces at Corinth, and as late as 371 we find him acting as ambassador to Sparta (*Xen. Hell.* vi 4). It appears that he spent all his money and died in actual want (*Athenaeus* XII 52).

42. **μήπω, ὦγαθέ.** The MSS have *μήπω ἀγαθέ*: probably the archetype had *μήπωγαθέ*, by a natural mistake. Cobet rejects *ἐκεῖσε ἴωμεν*, reading *μήπω γε*, on the ground that with *μήπω γε* the Greek idiom does not repeat the verb: but there is no proof that the verb could not be expressed with *μήπω* (without *γε*).

43. **δεῦρο ἐξαναστῶμεν εἰς τὴν αὐλήν.** Herwerden needlessly suggests that *ἐξαναστάντες* should be read, or *εἰς τὴν αὐλήν* rejected: *εἰς τὴν αὐλήν* goes with *ἐξαναστῶμεν*: cf. *ἐμὲ δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖν ἐξαναστῆναι* in *Theages* 129 B. *δεῦρο* we should translate by 'here': 'let us rise and go out into the court here'. Classic Greek does not admit of *τῆδε* in such a case: see Cobet's *Novae Lectiones* p. 91.

CHAPTER III.

Socrates cross-examines Hippocrates as to his purpose in putting himself under Protagoras, and elicits from him that his object is liberal education.

1. **ἀναστάντες εἰς τὴν αὐλήν.** For *ἀναστάντες* after *ἐξαναστῶμεν* cf. *infra* 314 C where *ἐπιστάντες* is followed by *στάντες*, 328 E *ἐπεκδιδάξει—ἐξεδίδαξεν*: 351 C *διεξεληθόντας—ἐξελεθεῖν*: *Phaedo* 104 D *ἐπὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον δὴ, φαμέν, ἢ ἐναντία ἰδέα ἐκείνη τῇ μορφῇ, ἢ ἂν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζηται, οὐδέποτ' ἂν ἔλθοι—εἰργάζετο δὲ γε ἢ περιττή;* *Euthyd.* 281 C *οὐκ ἐλάττω πράττων ἐλάττω ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι,*

ἐλάττω δὲ ἀμαρτάνων ἦττον ἂν κακῶς πράττοι and Rep. I 336 E: Phaedo 59 B: Crito 44 D: Crat. 399 A—B.

311 B 2. ἀποπειρώμενος—διεσκόπουν. ῥώμη of strength of will and resolution (cf. ἀνδρεία above 310 D) as in Polit. 259 C πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς σύνεσιν καὶ ῥώμην. γνώμη, the suggestion of Hoenebeek, would be much less forcible and exact.

8. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ κτλ. ἂν goes with ἀπεκρίνω in line 13. The application of the similes follows in D, and each illustration contains two subordinate protases, viz. (in B) (1) εἰ ἐπενδύεις—ἐκείνω, (2) εἰ τίς σε ἤρετο, and (in C) (1) εἰ δὲ—ἐκείνοισ, (2) εἰ τίς σε ἤρετο. With this multiplication of protases Heindorf compares Meno 74 B μανθάνεις γὰρ που ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει περὶ παντός· εἰ τίς σε ἀνέροιτο τοῦτο δὲ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τί ἐστὶ σχῆμα, ὦ Μένων; εἰ αὐτῷ εἶπες ὅτι στρογγυλότης, εἰ σοι εἶπεν ἄπερ ἐγὼ, πότερον σχῆμα ἢ στρογγυλότης ἐστὶν ἢ σχῆμά τι; εἶπες δὴ που ἂν ὅτι σχῆμά τι. The reasoning from analogy is quite in Socrates' style: see for example Gorg. 448 B foll.

9. Ἴπποκράτη—τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν. It is unnecessary (with Naber) to bracket Ἴπποκράτη. Hippocrates, the founder of medical science, born about 460 B.C. in Cos, was at the height of his renown about the year 400. He is referred to also in Phaedrus 270 C (εἰ μὲν οὖν Ἴπποκράτει γε τῷ τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν δεῖ τι πείθεσθαι) as holding the view that the human body could not be understood apart from ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις. The expression τὸν τῶν Ἀσκληπιαδῶν constituted a sort of medical degree, since it marked a man as one of the 'sons of Asclepius'—a recognised school of medicine in Cos and Cnidus. See Blümner Griechische Privatalterthümer p. 354.

311 C 15. Πολύκλειτον—Φειδίαν. As Hippocrates was the leading doctor, so Polyclitus and Phidias were the foremost sculptors of the fifth century B.C. in Greece. Polyclitus is not elsewhere mentioned in Plato (except infra 328 C): according to Pliny (Nat. Hist. xxxiv 55) he was born at Sicyon, but Argos was the centre of his school. Phidias is referred to in Meno 91 D οἶδα γὰρ ἄνδρα ἓνα Πρωταγόραν πλείω χρήματα κτησάμενον ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἢ Φειδίαν τε, δὲ οὕτω περιφανῶς καλὰ ἔργα εἰργάζετο, καὶ ἄλλους δέκα τῶν ἀνδριαντοποιῶν and in Hipp. Maior 290 A—D.

21. εἶεν—παρὰ δὲ δή. εἶεν is explained by Timaeus in his Lexicon Vocum Platoniarum as expressing συγκατάθεσις μὲν τῶν εἰρημένων, συναφὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα. According to the testimony of ancient grammarians the particle was pronounced εἶεν with inter-

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πάσιν ὀνομάζεις ταχυτήτα εἶναι. Cobet's suggestion to read εἶεν, ἔφη, ὡς for εἶναι, ἔφη. ὡς is ingenious but needless.

36. αὐτὸς δὲ δὴ—παρὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν, sc. τί ἂν ἀποκρίναιο;
 312 A 38. ὑπέφαινέν τι ἡμέρας. ὑποφαίνει ἡμέρα is used, as Heindorf says, *de die illucescente*. Here τι ἡμέρας = 'something of day', 'some daylight'.

39. εἰ μὲν τι—ἔοικεν. Heindorf remarks that Stephanus' conjecture τοῦτο ἔοικεν is needless, the vague indefinite subject being frequently omitted. Comp. Crat. 387 D εἶπερ τι τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν μέλλει ὁμολογούμενον εἶναι. Phaedo 99 E ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν.

41. εἰς τοὺς Ἑλληνας σαυτόν. εἰς τοὺς Ἑλληνας goes with παρέχων: cf. Symp. 179 B ἰκανὴν μαρτυρίαν παρέχεται—εἰς τοὺς Ἑλληνας. Young men of fashion were fond of looking to Greek, as opposed to Athenian, public opinion. The MSS have αὐτόν, but the use of the third personal reflexive pronoun for the first and second in the singular number does not seem to be certain in Plato: and it is simplest to suppose that σ fell out after Ἑλληνας: Scharz Vol. VII p. xii.

44. ἀλλ' ἄρα—μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην. οὐ goes closely with τοιαύτην, and μὴ is virtually 'perhaps' (originally 'lest' as in ὄρα μὴ Theaet. 145 B): 'but perhaps after all (ἄρα) this is not the kind of learning which etc.' Compare Euthyd. 290 E ἀλλ' ἄρα—μὴ ὁ Κτήσιππος ἦν ὁ ταῦτ' εἰπών and Apol. 25 A ἀλλ' ἄρα—μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους. Meno 89 C μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν. In all of these passages it is better to take μὴ in this way than as equivalent to Latin *nam*. From this use of μὴ grew up the use of μήποτε = 'perhaps', frequent in Aristotle and later, e.g. Eth. Nic. x 2 1173^a 22 μὴ ποτ' οὐ λέγουσιν τὸ αἴτιον.

312 B 46. οἷαπερ ἢ παρά is the reading of T: B has οἷα περὶ. The γραμματισταί of Athens were Schoolmasters, who besides teaching reading and writing (cf. infra 326 D) translated (ἐρμηνεύειν) Homer and interpreted his γλῶτται. They were distinct from the γραμματικοί or κριτικοί who pursued more scientific literary and grammatical studies. The κιθαριστής and γραμματιστής between them taught μουσική, and the παιδοτρίβης γυμναστική; and μουσική and γυμναστική were the two parts of παιδεία or liberal education: Rep. II 376 E.

48. ἐπὶ τέχνη—ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ: cf. 315 A ἐπὶ τέχνη μαθάνει, ὡς σοφιστῆς ἐσόμενος. The distinction between professional and liberal (ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει) education is fre-

quently emphasized by Plato (see especially *Laws* I 643 D): his word for the latter is always *παιδεία*, cf. *Gorg.* 485 A, *Rep.* VI 492 C. The 'arts' are throughout the *Republic* looked on as *βάνανσοι*, and unfit for men whose souls are free.

CHAPTER IV.

Socrates continues his cross-examination, and reduces Hippocrates to *ἀπορία*.

3. *παρασχεῖν θεραπεύσαι ἀνδρὶ σοφιστῆι*. The word *παρέχω* 312 C is often used of putting oneself in the hands of a doctor: compare *Gorg.* 456 B *φάρμακον πιεῖν ἢ τεμεῖν ἢ καῦσαι παρασχεῖν τῷ ἰατρῷ*. *ἀνὴρ* is regularly used (mostly in a complimentary sense, real or feigned) with words which denote one's profession, standing or the like, e.g. *ἀνὴρ μάντις*, *ἀνὴρ νομεύς*, *ἄνδρες δικασταί*; compare *Euthyphr.* 15 D. For *παρασχεῖν* Cobet reads *παρέχειν*, but if MSS can be trusted, Plato used the aorist infinitive with *μέλλω* tolerably often: see Schanz Preface to *Symposium* p. vii.

7. *οὔτ' εἰ ἀγαθῷ οὔτ' εἰ κακῷ πράγματι*. So in *Gorgias* 520 B *οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ τῷ πράγματι* (their pupils) *δ' αὐτοὶ παιδεύουσιν*. Here Socrates uses the most general form of expression because ex hypothesi nothing is yet known as to the sophist: cf. infra 330 C *ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμα τί ἐστὶν ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα*; Cases like *Crito* 53 D *οὐκ οἶε ἄσχημον ἂν φανείσθαι τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρᾶγμα*; are somewhat different and contain a slight admixture of contempt: see the Editor's note in loc.

8. *οἶμαί γ' εἰδέναι*. Hippocrates *οἶεται εἰδέναι μὴ εἰδώς*: he is thus, according to Socrates, in the worst of all states: compare *Apol.* ch. VI foll. Socrates now proceeds to convict him of ignorance.

10. *ὥσπερ τοῦνομα λέγει—τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα*. Hippocrates derives *σοφιστής* from *σοφός* and *(ἐπ)ίστ(αμαι)* "quasi sit ὁ τῶν σοφῶν ἴστης" (Heindorf, comparing the derivation of *Ἡφαιστος* in *Crat.* 407 C from *Φάεος ἴστωρ*). The correct derivation is perhaps given by *Suidas* s.v.: *σοφιστής καὶ ὁ διδάσκαλος ὡς σοφίζων* (cf. *σωφρονίζω* = make *σώφρων*), but *-ίζω* is very elastic in meaning, and *σοφίζω* may very well mean 'play the *σοφός*'.

14. *τῶν τί σοφῶν*. *τῶν πρὸς τί σοφῶν* would be more precise, 312 D but the accusative of reference is preferred for brevity. For the construction Kroschel compares *Theages* 125 C *τῶν τί σοφῶν*

συνουσία φῆς σοφούς εἶναι τοὺς τυράννους; where however σοφῶν is masculine. The neuter of σοφός is not here used ironically as in Theaet. 157 C παρατίθημι ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι.

17. ὁ δὲ σοφιστῆς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστίν. Heusde suggested ἐπιστήμων after ἐστίν, but the sense can be supplied out of the -ιστής of σοφιστής, according to the derivation of the word just given: the full sense is as it were ὁ δὲ σοφιστῆς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστίν (σοφ)ιστῆς.

18. τί ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῷ. There is no need to change the verb to ἀποκριναίμεθα, as was done by Bekker to suit ἔροιτο: compare infra 354 A εἰ ἐροίμεθα—φαῖεν ἂν and Phaedr. 259 A εἰ οὖν ἴδοιεν—δικαίως ἂν καταγελῶεν.

ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης. These words are not of course part of the imaginary questioner's interrogation, but are spoken by Socrates to help out Hippocrates' answer. Socrates suggests that Hippocrates should say that the sophist is ἐπιστάτης of some sort of ἐργασία, but in order that the answer should come from Hippocrates himself, he substitutes for the desired answer: '(The sophist is) ἐπιστάτης—of what kind of ἐργασία?' Hippocrates then replies by explaining the ἐργασία, viz. τὸ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν. The full grammatical construction would be ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης (ὅτι ἐστίν ἀποκριναίμεθα ἂν αὐτῷ); If we take this view, it is not necessary to insert ἐστίν after ἐπιστάτης (with Hirschig).

Note that ἐπιστάτης is substituted here for ἐπιστήμων: it is clear from Crito 47 B that Plato connected the two words—probably because both contain the syllable -ιστ- as in ἴστωρ: he frequently plays on the similarity of form between ἐπίσταμαι ἐπιστήμη and ἐπιστατεῖν: see the Editor's note on ἐπιστάτη καὶ ἐπαίοντι in the Crito l.c.

19. τί ἂν εἴποιμεν—ὦ Σώκρατες; Hippocrates is on the verge of ἀπορία, and merely throws out his suggestion ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν for what it is worth. The words ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν are strictly speaking a reply to the question of Socrates ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; for τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν answers ποίας ἐργασίας, and but for the intervening clause (τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι;) the word ἐπιστάτην would have been in the nominative.

Thus explained, the MSS reading need not be changed. The next best view is to read (with Schanz) τί ἂν <εἰ> εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεινὸν λέγειν;

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parallel from the Theaetetus (144 E): ἀτὰρ εἰ, νῶν ἐχόντων ἐκατέρου λύραν, ἔφη αὐτὰς ἠρμόσθαι ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθύς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθα ἂν (i.e. should have inquired *first*) εἰ μουσικὸς ὢν λέγοι;

9. τὴν ψυχὴν. Compare (with Heindorf) Rep. IX 583 E δ μεταξὺ ἄρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἔφαμεν εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτό ποτε ἀμφοτέρα ἔσται. ἐν ᾧ presently is like ἐν τούτῳ in 310 D where see note: Heindorf cites Eur. Iph. T. 1057 καὶ τᾶμ' ἂν ὑμῖν ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχειν ἢ μηδὲν εἶναι. For καὶ ἐν ᾧ we should at first sight expect καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ: for the Greek idiom is Relative + Anaphoric pronoun, not Relative + Relative when the two pronouns have the same antecedent and are connected by a conjunction: e.g. Gorg. 452 D τί ἐστὶ τοῦτο δ φῆς σὺ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι—καὶ σὲ δημιουργὸν εἶναι αὐτοῦ: see the Editor's note on Apol. 40 A. Here however the fact that the relative precedes its antecedent (δ δὲ περὶ πλείονος—περὶ δὲ τούτου) makes the rule inoperative; and there are other exceptions: e.g. Rep. II 374 B καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ ὡσαύτως ἐν ἀπεδίδομεν, πρὸς δ πεφύκει ἕκαστος καὶ ἐφ' ᾧ ἔμελλε τῶν ἄλλων σχολὴν ἄγων διὰ βίου αὐτὸ ἐργαζόμενος—καλῶς ἀπεργάζεσθαι, and Theaet. 192 B καὶ δ οἶδεν καὶ δ αἰσθάνεται (where however Bonitz rejects the second ὅ, perhaps rightly).

313 B 14. τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ ξένῳ. Heindorf's suggestion τῷ ἀφικομένῳ τούτῳ τῷ ξένῳ would convey a somewhat different meaning, viz. 'this arrival, the foreigner'. The presence of ἀφικομένῳ renders the article after τούτῳ unnecessary: cf. infra 337 E τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοῦτο εἶδος. There is some contempt in τούτῳ=isti (see note on Apol. 45 A), and much scorn in τὴν σὴν ψυχὴν, repeated slowly at the end of the clause.

15. ὄρθριος: the MSS have ὄρθριον by mistake. The adjectival construction of this word is found in Laws XII 961 B δεῖν δὲ ὄρθριον εἶναι τὸν σύλλογον.

20. γιγνώσκεις. The present is regularly used of being acquainted with a person: e.g. Phaedo 60 A Ξανθίππη, γιγνώσκεις γάρ: Theaet. 144 C ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν. γιγνώσκω. In Plato the perfect is generally used of knowing things: e.g. Apol. 23 B ὅστις—ἔγνωκεν ὅτι κτλ., Euthyphr. 2 C τοσοῦτον πρᾶγμα ἐγνώκειναι.

οὔτε διελέξαι οὐδεπᾶποτε, sc. αὐτῷ: cf. on 313 A line 9 above.

313 C 22. ᾧ μέλλεις σαυτὸν ἐπιτρέπειν is wrongly rejected by Cobet.

The words are to be taken closely with τὸν δὲ σοφιστὴν ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν φαίνει ἀγνοῦν: that Hippocrates should entrust himself to that of which he knows nothing is the climax of Socrates' rebuke.

23. **ἔοικεν**: sc. εἶναι, i. e. be true (not ἐμὲ ἀγνοεῖν, which is doubtful Greek for ἔοικα ἀγνοεῖν). The subject is simply 'it', as in Rep. I 333 C where ἔοικεν is similarly for ἔοικεν εἶναι.

25. **τυγχάνει ὦν—ψυχὴ τρέφεται**. τυγχάνει ὦν is virtually equivalent to 'really is': cf. Gorg. 468 D οἴομενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὄν κάκιον, and note on Euthyphr. 4 E. The ἔμπορος is a travelling merchant who trades on a larger scale than the retail dealer or κάπηλος: see Rep. II 371 D ἢ οὐ καπήλους καλοῦμεν τοὺς πρὸς ὠνήν τε καὶ πρᾶσιν διακονοῦντας ἰδρυμένους ἐν ἀγορᾷ, τοὺς δὲ πλανήτας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἔμπορους; The same account of the Sophist as ἔμπορός τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα (Soph. 231 E) is given in Soph. 223 C—224 E.

26. **φαίνεται γὰρ ἔμοιγε τοιοῦτός τις**. We follow Schleiermacher in giving these words to Socrates. Turner judiciously points out that γε in ἔμοιγε is only appropriate if Socrates speaks the words, and that Hippocrates could hardly assent till he knew what τροφή ψυχῆς meant.

28. **ὅπως γε μὴ—ἐπαινῶν ἃ πωλεῖ ἔξαπατήσει**. πωλεῖν is 'to have on sale': 'to sell' is ἀποδίδοσθαι. Cobet, *Novae Lectiones* p. 159. For ἔξαπατήσει the MSS have ἔξαπατήση, but the 1st aor. conj. is very doubtful in Plato after ὅπως μὴ (see on the whole question Rubner's *Griechische Grammatik* II p. 899), and final -η and -ει are frequently confused in the MSS.

30. **ὁ ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος**. ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος together 313 D plural, and according to strict logic would require a plural when ὁ is written by attraction instead of the grammatically won-gi. Compare Symp. 186 C ὁ διαγιγνώσκων—τὸν καλὸν public bu. ἔρωτα: infra 355 E τὰ ὀνόματα—τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ which were great stress ὀ. ἐπιστήμων. τυγχάνεις has sunk to a mere 313 E (ὀρθότης ὄνομα ἐπιστήμων. τυγχάνεις has sunk to a mere Charm. 163 D, necessary to insert ὦν after ἐπιστήμων, although only taught (we are that τυγχάνω (in this sense) occurs in Plato's Socrates had only expressed, viz. Phaedr. 263 C μέγιστον this subject (Crat. 384 γ. 502 B εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ἀηδὲς καὶ pupil of Prodicus, e.g. τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἀλλὰ Prodicus wrote eulogies of τυγχάνει τὸ γινῶναι ἑαυτὸν: ibid. substance, if not the actual In these cases (as here in the

Protagoras) it is easy to suppose that the participle has fallen out from 'lipography': but in Hipp. Maior (perhaps pseudo-Platonic) 300 A and in Laws XI 918 C and Timaeus 61 C the participle cannot be so easily supplied: and that the construction without the participle was used in every-day speech appears from Ar. Eccl. 1141 *καὶ τῶν θεατῶν εἴ τις εὖνους τυγχάνει*. See Rutherford's New Phrynichus p. 342.

45. *περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις*. τὰ φίλτατα is used here of the soul's health as in Gorg. 513 A *σὺν τοῖς φιλτάτοις ἡ αἵρεσις ἡμῶν ἔσται ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως τῆς ἐν τῇ πόλει*.

314 A 46. *κυβεύης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης*. Cobet rejects *τε καὶ κινδυνεύης*, but Plato often puts meta ph or and interpretation side by side. Compare infra 314 B *ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα* (where Deuschle wrongly rejected *καὶ μαθόντα*): 334 D *σύντεμνέ μοι τὰς ἀποκρίσεις καὶ βραχυτέρας ποιεῖ*. Euthyd. 297 C *πολὺ γάρ πού εἰμι φαυλότερος τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὃς οὐχ οἶός τε ἦν τῇ τε ὕδρα διαμάχεσθαι, σοφιστρία οὔση καὶ διὰ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνείση, εἰ μίαν κεφαλὴν ἀποτμηθεῖη τοῦ λόγου, πολλὰς ἀντὶ τῆς μιᾶς, καὶ καρκίνω τινὶ ἐτέρῳ σοφιστῇ...ὃς ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸν ἐλύπει οὕτως ἐκ τοῦ ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ λέγων καὶ δάκνων κτλ.*: Lach. 194 C *χειμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσιν*: Theaet. 174 C *εἰς φρέατά τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων*. See also note on *τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας* in Euthyphr. 3 A.

49. *παρὰ τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπορίου*: so B. The *κάπηλος* is put in the foreground as the most usual seller of *σιτία* and *ποτά*: the article is expressed only once, because the *κάπηλος* and *ἐμπορος* both belong to the same genus 'merchants': cf. Hdt. IV 71 *τὸν οἰνοχόον καὶ μάγειρον καὶ ἵπποκόμον καὶ διήκονον καὶ ἀγγελιστὴν κτλ.* There is no sufficient ground for bracketing the subjectival *τοῦ καπήλου καὶ ἐμπορίου* as is done by Schanz, nor for re de του (with T) and omitting *καπήλου καὶ ἐμπορίου*, as He

ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις: i.e. other than our own body of being ac- ti ὄνομα ἄλλο γέ λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούσιππην, γιγνώ- be implied that the body is itself an ἀγγεῖον ἔκ αὐτόν. γιγ- the notion is not unplatonian, and kindred ex of knowing things: later philosophy, e.g. Marcus Aurel. x 38. thyphr. 2 C τοσοῦτον καὶ τὰ ὄργανα ταῦτα τὰ περιπεπλασμένα '.

314 B 56. *ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα κ'*: cf. on 313 A line 9 *εἰς*) as in Rep. VII 517 A *εἴ πως ἐν τ'* 243 C *ταῦτόν τοῦτο πάθος εἰληφέν* is wrongly rejected by Cobet.

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the cross-roads is given by Xenophon Mem. II I. 21. A scholiast on Rep. x 600 c says the Athenians put him to death by hemlock for corrupting the youth, but there is no other authority for this unlikely story. Compare Zeller I⁴ p. 952 foll.

CHAPTER VI.

Socrates and Hippocrates proceed together to Callias' house.

1. **δόξαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα.** This idiom seems not to occur elsewhere in Plato. We can hardly supply *ποιεῖν*: rather *δόξαν ταῦτα* is like *δόξαντα ταῦτα*, an accusative absolute, the singular verb being kept as in *ἔδοξε ταῦτα*. See Goodwin's Moods and Tenses (new Edition) p. 339 § 854.

2. **προθύρω.** The rooms of a Greek house opened on the cloisters surrounding the *αὐλή* or court: from the *αὐλή* a passage (*θυρωρεῖον*, so called because the porter's lodge was situated in it) led into the *πρόθυρον* or space in front of the main door (*αὐλειος θύρα* or *αὐλεία* without *θύρα*). Blümner, Griechische Privatalterthümer p. 147 ff.

ἐπιστάντες διελεγόμεθα. The situation recalls Symp. 175 A foll., where Socrates, on his way to Agathon's house, is discovered standing wrapt in thought in front of a neighbouring house.

5. **οὕτως ἐσίοιμεν.** *οὕτως* with the apodosis after participles is extremely common in Plato: see above on 310 D.

6. **στάντες.** For the dropping of the preposition after *ἐπιστάντες* see on 311 A. The Bodleian has *ἐστάντες*, but T *στάντες*: Schanz reads *ἐπιστάντες*, Cobet *ἐστῶτες*. Tr. 'we came to a stand and conversed'.

7. **δοκεῖ οὖν μοι.** Compare Phaedo 108 D *ὁ βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμὸς—τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ*: the construction is fairly common in Plato: see on Crito 43 D. To have a eunuch for porter was rare, and a mark of wealth: they were supposed to be more trustworthy than others and fetched a higher price in the East (Hdt. VIII 105).

314D 8. **κινδυνεύει—ἄχθεσθαι.** Present, because the dialogue is narrated just after it took place (see 309 B), and as Protagoras is still with Callias, the stream of visitors probably continues. It is not quite clear why the number of the *sophists* should have made the porter annoyed *with the visitors*: unless the visitors themselves were sophists. Probably therefore *τοῖς φοιτῶσιν* means *τοῖς φοιτῶσιν*

σοφισταῖς: in the porter's judgment the house was already too full of sophists. φοιτᾶν implies frequent visitation: cf. Lach. 181 C χρῆν μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερόν σε φοιτᾶν αὐτὸν παρ' ἡμᾶς καὶ οἰκείους ἡγεῖσθαι.

10. ἐκρούσαμεν τὴν θύραν. There was a metal knocker (ρόπτρον, κόραξ, ἐπίσπαστρον) on the αὐλῆος θύρα. Blümner Gr. Privatalt. p. 149.

11. οὐ σχολή αὐτῷ. For αὐτῷ 'the master' cf. infra 315 B, Rep. I 327 B ἡρόμην ὅπου αὐτὸς εἶη, and the Pythagorean αὐτὸς εἶφα 'ipse dixit'.

12. ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χεροῖν. So B: T has ταῖν for τοῖν. Cobet has shewn that the dual feminine of the article is the same as the dual masculine: *Variae Lectiones* p. 70.

13. ἐκρούομεν, but ἐκρούσαμεν in line 10. Socrates pretends to be somewhat staggered by the rebuff.

14. ἐγκεκλημένης. So Bekker for ἐγκεκλειμένης of B: the Attic form is κλήω not κλείω: Cobet, *Var. Lect.* p. 159.

19. ἄνθρωπος. According to Ast, the Greeks sometimes used 314 E ἀνὴρ and ἄνθρωπος without the article of a definite person "sed ita ut vel contemptiōnem vel reprehensionem aliquam simul indicarent". But in the cases quoted in support of this usage where the word is in an oblique case, the meaning is quite general like the English 'a man', e.g. Rep. x 595 C δεινὸν τινὰ λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἄνδρα: Phaedo 98 B ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῶ οὐδὲν χρώμενον: Soph. Phil. 1228 ἀπάταισιν αἰσχροῖς ἄνδρα καὶ δόλοισ ἐλών: Theaet. 155 D ἐάν σοι ἀνδρὸς, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν—συνεξερευνήσωμαι: it is therefore safer to suppose (with Schanz and most Platonic scholars) that where ἀνὴρ and ἄνθρωπος of the MSS can only be translated by 'the man', the rough breathing should be restored: e.g. infra 315 E and Phaedr. 267 A, 268 C: Rep. I 331 E.

21. προστώφ. The αὐλή was surrounded by cloisters. This προστώφον is doubtless that on which the passage from the πρόθυρον opened.

23. Πάραλος—Ἀντίμοιρος. The mother of Xanthippus and 315 A Paralus had once been the wife of Hipponicus, to whom she bore Callias: Plut. Pericl. xxiv 9. In 320 A as well as in Meno 94 B Plato remarks that Pericles was unable to teach the art of statesmanship to either of his two sons: cf. Alc. I 118 E τῷ—Περικλέους υἱέε ἡλιθίω ἐγενέσθην. They both died of the plague. One of

the most interesting fragments of Protagoras describes the fortitude of Pericles when his sons died: see Appendix II. p. 203, Frag. 3. Charmides, son of the elder Glaucon, was Plato's maternal uncle: the dialogue Charmides is named after him. He was *φιλόσοφος τε καὶ πάνυ ποιητικός* (Charm. 155 A), and as remarkable for *σωφροσύνη* as for personal beauty (ibid. 157 D). He was afterwards one of the Ten, and fell along with Critias at the battle of Munychia in 404 B.C. (Xen. Hell. II 4. 19). Of Philippides and his father Philomelus and Antimoerus of Mende (on the west coast of the peninsula Pallene) nothing further is known.

29. *τούτων—ἐφαίνοντο*. B and T omit *οἷ*, which was inserted by Stephanus: Heindorf prefers to insert *ῶν* after *λεγομένων*. The MSS reading could only be defended if *ἐφαίνοντο* could be regarded as parenthetical = *ὡς ἐφαίνοντο*, like *δοκεῖ μοι = ὡς δοκεῖ μοι* (see on 314 C above), but there seems to be no authority for such a use of *φαίνομαι*. It is hardly to be supposed that in *ἐπακούοντες* and *ἐπήκοοι* (in B below) there is an allusion to an outer circle of Protagorean students, deemed unworthy of the subtlest teaching of the master, in spite of Theaet. 152 C, where Socrates is hardly serious.

31. *ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν πόλεων*. The plural is used as in Theaet. 157 C *παρατίθημι ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι* and Rep. x 601 A *χρώματ' ἅττα ἐκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν*.

315 B 34. *χορῶ*. The tragic chorus consisted of 15 *χορευταί*, arranged in 3 rows (*στοίχοι*) of 5 each, the leader (*κορυφαῖος*) being in the middle of the first. So here Protagoras occupies the middle of a row of 7. With the metaphor cf. Theaet. 173 B *τοὺς—τοῦ ἡμέτερου χοροῦ* and ibid. C *λέγωμεν δὴ—περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων*: Phaedr. 246 E foll.

35. *ἠύλαβοῦντο*. The MSS have *εὐλαβοῦντο*, but in the classic period *εὐ-* (and *εἰ-*) were always augmented in the past tenses, while after 300 B.C. *ἠύ-* does not appear on inscriptions. See Meisterhaus Gr. der Att. Inschr.² p. 136.

CHAPTER VII.

The scene in the house of Callias is further described.

1. *τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα, ἔφη "Ὅμηρος*. Homer Od. xi 601 *τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα βίην Ἑρακληίην*. The reference is not to be pressed beyond the words quoted: for there is no special likeness

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315 D 11. ἐπιδημεῖ γὰρ ἄρα. Heindorf's correction ἐπιδημεῖ for ἐπεδήμει seems to be necessary, as Prodicus is still in Athens. Just so the presential tenses are used in 314 D κινδυνεύει δὲ—ἄχθεσθαι and infra line 15 κατάλυσιν πεποίηκεν. If the clause is taken as a parenthetical clause of explanation, there is nothing harsh in the construction: ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκήματί τινι naturally enough follows on εἰσεῖδον. For γὰρ ἄρα (a somewhat rare combination) Heindorf quotes Rep. IV 438 A πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, Symp. 205 B ἀφελόντες γὰρ ἄρα (so T: B has only γάρ) τοῦ ἔρωτός τι εἶδος ὀνομάζομεν, Laws III 698 D συνάψαντες γὰρ ἄρα τὰς χεῖρας σαγηνεύσαιεν πᾶσαν τὴν Ἐρετρικὴν. γὰρ ἄρα always introduces something supposed to be known to the person addressed: see 314 B οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Πρύδικον τὸν Κεῖον.

18. Πausanias is known from the Symposium 180 c foll. The deme Κεραμῆς was in the tribe Acamantis. ὡς μὲν ἐγῶμαι is to be taken closely with καλὸν τε καὶ γαθὸν τὴν φύσιν.

315 E 20. τὴν δ' οὖν ιδέα ν πάνυ καλός. Compare Symp. 174 A ταῦτα δὲ ἐκαλλωπισάμην ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν (i.e. Ἀγάθωνα) ἴω. There is no ground for reading καλὸν for καλός with Stephanus: cf. Lach. 180 E τὰ γὰρ μεράκια τάδε—διαλεγόμενοι.

22. Ἀγάθωνα. It is at the poet Agathon's house that the scene of the Symposium is laid. From his speech in that dialogue 194 D foll. we should infer that he had studied under Prodicus to some purpose. Born about 447 B.C., Agathon was first successful on the tragic stage at an early age: cf. Symp. 175 E ἡ δὲ σὴ (sc. Ἀγάθωνος σοφία) λαμπρά τε καὶ πολλὴν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχουσα, ἢ γε παρὰ σοῦ νέου ὄντος οὕτω σφόδρα ἐξέλαμψε καὶ ἐκφανῆς ἐγένετο πρῶην ἐν μάρτυσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων πλέον ἢ τρισμυρίοις. He visited the court of Archelaus about 407 B.C. and died probably about 400. That he was held in esteem by the Athenians appears from Ar. Frogs 83 foll. Ἀγάθων δὲ ποῦ 'σθ'; ὅπου 'στ'; ἀπολιπὼν μ' οἴχεται ἀγαθὸς ποιητῆς καὶ ποθεινὸς τοῖς φίλοις. For παιδικὰ Πausανίου compare Symp. 193 B.

23. τοῦτ' ἦν τὸ μεράκιον. So BT: the idiom is like our 'There was this young man'. The nearest parallels seem to be Phaedo 59 B ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεύς and Rep. x 615 D ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιῶται τινες. τοῦτό τε δὴ (Ast), τοῦτό τ' οὖν (Heindorf), τοῦτ' ἔνδον ἦν (Schirlitz), have been suggested, while Kroschel rejects the words, but the text is probably sound.

τὸ Ἀδειμάντω. Adimantus son of Cepis is not elsewhere

named. The son of Leucolophidas was afterwards *στρατηγός* under Alcibiades, whose policy he supported (Xen. Hell. I 4. 21): he was taken prisoner at the battle of Aegospotami, but spared by the Spartans. He was afterwards put on his trial by Conon on the charge, not improbably a true one, of having betrayed the Athenian fleet at this battle: see Kock on Ar. Frogs 1512.

27. *πάσσοφος—άνήρ—καὶ θεῖος*. For *άνήρ* BT read *άνήρ*, but see on 314 E above. *πάσσοφος* is often ironical: e.g. Euthyd. 271 C *ὁ δὲ σὺ ἐρωτᾷς τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῖν, θαυμασία, ὦ Κρίτων· πάσσοφοι ἀτεχνῶς τῷ γε, οὐδ' ἤδη πρὸ τοῦ ὅ τι εἶεν οἱ παγκρατιασταί*. For the meaning of *θεῖος* cf. Meno 99 C *οὐκοῦν—ἀξιον τούτους θεῖους καλεῖν τοὺς ἄνδρας, ὅτινες νοῦν μὴ ἔχοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα κατορθοῦσιν ὧν πράττουσιν καὶ λέγουσι; θεῖος* (in the form *σεῖος*) was the favourite Spartan word of praise and was much affected by the Socratic circle in Athens.

CHAPTER VIII.

After Hippocrates has been introduced to Protagoras, the latter enlarges upon the antiquity of his profession. At the suggestion of Socrates a circle is formed to hear the Sophists discourse.

4. **Κριτίας** the foremost of the Thirty so-called tyrants was related to Plato on the mother's side: Perictione Plato's mother being granddaughter of the elder Critias, who was father of Callaeschrus. He is one of the *dramatis personae* in the Charmides and Timaeus, and the dialogue Critias is named after him. A Scholiast on the Timaeus 20 A (quoted by Stallbaum) describes him as *γενναίας καὶ ἀδρᾶς φύσεως, ἤπτετο δὲ καὶ φιλοσόφων συνουσιῶν, καὶ ἐκαλεῖτο ἰδιώτης μὲν ἐν φιλοσόφοις, φιλόσοφος δὲ ἐν ἰδιώταις*. For the fragments of his poems see Bergk's *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*⁴ II p. 279 foll.

5. *ἔτι σμίκρ' ἄττα—διαθεασάμενοι*. *σμίκρ' ἄττα* is the plural of *σμικρὸν τι*, and as *ἔτι σμικρὸν τι διατρίψαντες* would mean 'after a little further delay', so *ἔτι σμίκρ' ἄττα διατρίψαντες* means after 'some little further delays'. The reference in *ἔτι* is to 314 C. *ταῦτα* in *καὶ ταῦτα* refers to the causes of the delays, which were, as usual, some topics of discourse: its antecedent is involved in *διατρίψαντες*.

8. *πρὸς σέ τοι ἦλθομεν*. Here, as in 314 E, both B and T have *316 B* *τι* for *τοι*: but *τι* is impossible here, and this use of *τοι* is very frequent in address: Heindorf refers (inter alia) to Ar. Plut. 1100 *σέ τοι σέ τοι λέγω, Καρίων, ἀνάμεινον*. //

316 C 17. οἶεται οἱ μάλιστ' ἄν γενέσθαι. B and T read *μάλιστα* without *ἄν*: see on Crito 51 E. It is more likely that *ἄν* should have dropped out after *μάλιστα* here than that Plato's usage should have varied with *οἶμαι* and the aorist infinitive referring to the future: cf. infra 353 B ἢ οἶμαι ἄν ἔγωγε κάλλιστα φανερόν γενέσθαι, where *ἄν* is in all the MSS.

19. μόνος οἶει δεῖν—πρὸς μόνους. *οἶει δεῖν* is virtually like one verb, *ἀξιοῖς* or the like: it therefore takes the nom. (not the acc.) with inf.; cf. Demosth. Fals. Leg. 235 εὐθύς ἡγούμην ἐν τούτοις—αὐτὸς περιεῖναι δεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ μεγαλοψυχότερος φαίνεσθαι, quoted by Stallbaum on Crito 50 E. Note that Protagoras here uses the more precise *μόνος πρὸς μόνους*, but above only *μόνω* (316 B)—unless (with Cobet and Schanz) we there insert *μόνοι* before *μόνω*.

21. ξένον γὰρ ἄνδρα καὶ ἰόντα κτλ. For *καὶ ἰόντα* T reads in the margin *κατιόντα*: Liebhold suggests *καταλύοντα*. *ἰόντα* however is parallel to *ξένον* and to *πείθοντα* 'a man who is a stranger and goes—and tries to persuade etc.' The whole passage recalls Apol. 19 E—20 A τούτων (viz. Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias) γὰρ ἕκαστος—οἶός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ξυνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται—τούτους πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων ξυνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσι ξυνεῖναι χρήματα δίδοντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. Notice throughout the longwinded character of Protagoras' speeches: cf. Philostrat. Vit. Soph. I 494 (quoted by Kroschel on 320 C), γνοὺς δὲ τὸν Πρωταγόραν ὁ Πλάτων σεμνῶς μὲν ἐρμηνεύοντα, ὑπτιάζοντα δὲ τῇ σεμνότητι καὶ που καὶ μακρολογώτερον τοῦ συμμέτρου τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτοῦ μύθῳ μακρῶ ἔχαρακτήρισεν.

316 D 31. τὸ ἐπαχθὲς αὐτῆς. *ἐπαχθὲς* like *φορτικόν* means what hearers will resent (think a burden or ἄχθος) as in bad-taste because presumptuous: cf. Demosth. de Pace 4 τὸ λέγειν περὶ ὧν αὐτὸς εἶπέ τις καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ—οὕτως ἡγούμαι φορτικόν καὶ ἐπαχθὲς ὥστε κτλ.

32. τοὺς μὲν ποίησιν. *σοφός* and its derivatives are often used especially in early writers in connexion with poetry, e.g. Theognis 19—20 Κύρνε σοφιζομένῳ μὲν ἐμοὶ σφρηγὶς ἐπικείσθω τοῖσδ' ἔπεσιν, Pindar Isthm. 4. 29—30 μελέταν δὲ σοφισταῖς Διὸς ἕκατι πρόσβαλον σεβιζόμενοι.

34. τοὺς ἀμφὶ τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον = 'Orpheus and Musaeus and their schools'. The Editors quote Ar. Frogs 1032 foll. Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ' ἡμῶν κατέδειξε φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι, Μουσαῖος δ'

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—πρᾶον αὐ εἶναι διαφερόντως—ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' ἂν ῥόμην γενέσθαι κτλ. and Rep. I 331 B τὸ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄκοντά τινα ἐξαπατήσαι—μέγα μέρος εἰς τοῦτο ἢ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσις συμβάλλεται. Here καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος is a virtual repetition of ἀποδιδράσκοντα: cf. τὸν ταῦτα πράττοντα above in 316 C. The sentence reminds one of the practice observed in Spartan education—to punish the youths not for stealing but for failing to escape with their booty: Xen. Rep. Laced. 2. 8 εἶποι δ' ἂν οὖν τις· τί δῆτα, εἴπερ τὸ κλέπτειν ἀγαθὸν ἐνόμιζε, πολλὰς πληγὰς ἐπέβαλε τῷ ἀλισκομένῳ; ὅτι, φημί ἐγὼ καὶ τᾶλλα, ὅσα ἄνθρωποι διδάσκουσι, κολάζουσι τὸν μὴ καλῶς ὑπερετούντα: compare Rep. I 361 A τὸν ἀλισκόμενον δὲ φαῦλον ἠγητέον.

317 B 54. τούτων τὴν ἐναντίαν ἅπασαν ὁδόν. “h. e. τὴν ὁδὸν ἢ ἅπασά ἐστιν ἐναντία τούτων. pro τούτων eadem comparatione quae vocatur compendiaria dici potuit τούτοις. Andocid. or. I 4 ἐγὼ πολὺ τὴν ἐναντίαν τούτοις γνώμην ἔχω” (Kroschel). For ἅπασαν with an adjective compare (with Kroschel) Xen. Anab. I 5. 1 ἦν ἡ γῆ πέδιον ἅπαν ὁμαλὲς ὡσπερ θάλαττα and the common phrase πᾶν τοῦναντίον.

56. σοφιστῆς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους. The σοφιστῆς σοφίζει, i.e. παιδεύει: see note on 312 C above. Theaet. 167 C (where Socrates is speaking for Protagoras) ὁ σοφιστῆς τοὺς παιδευομένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφός τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθείσιν.

59. σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν. “Crebra modestiae formula, bene explicat Steph., quod ita dico, ut in eo orem divinam agnoscam”. Heindorf on Theaet. 151 B καὶ σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἰκανῶς τοπάζω οἷς ἂν συγγενόμενοι ὄναιτο.

317 C 61. πολλά γε ἔτη ἤδη εἰμι ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ. Meno 91 E οἶμαι γὰρ αὐτὸν (i.e. Πρωταγόραν) ἀποθανεῖν ἐγγὺς καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότα, τετταράκοντα δὲ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ὄντα. The phrases εἶναι ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ, ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ and the like are common.

62. οὐδενὸς ὄτου οὐ. For the asyndeton Heindorf compares Hom. Od. XIV 96 ἦ γὰρ οἱ ζῶη γ' ἦν ἄσπετος· οὐ τινι τόσση ἀνδρῶν ἠρώων. The nearest parallel to πάντων (which Cobet rejects) after οὐδενὸς ὄτου οὐ seems to be in Dem. Adv. Lept. § 3 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐφ' ὄτου τοῦτο οὐ πεπόνθατε τῶν πάντων (quoted by Heindorf).

64. ἀπάντων goes with τῶν ἐνδον ὄντων. It seems better to take περὶ τούτων with βούλεσθε than with τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι: otherwise it is hardly possible to separate τούτων from ἀπάντων.

67. ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι—ὅτι ἐρασταί. ὅτι depends rather on ἐνδείξασθαι than on καλλωπίσασθαι: compare infra 327 A ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, and *ibid.* B τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ οὐδ' ἀποκρύπτεται ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων, *Phaedo* 94 D τὰ μὲν ἀπειλοῦσα, τὰ δὲ νοουθετοῦσα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις. See also notes on 327 A and 335 E below.

68. εἶμεν. BT read εἴημεν, but in Plato's time the short form of the optative plural is regular: see on *Apol.* 22 E.

τί οὖν—οὐ—ἐκαλέσαμεν. See above on 310 A; and for ἐπακούσωσιν note on 315 A.

72. καθεζόμενοι. So T: B has καθιζόμενοι, but presently in 317 D 317 E both MSS read συνεκαθεζόμεθα.

74. καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντιλαβόμενοι. This passage is difficult and different views are possible as to the construction and meaning. The MSS read καὶ αὐτοὶ τε. If the MSS reading is retained, τε must be regarded as answering to δέ in ἐν δὲ τούτῳ (cf. *Euthyphr.* 3 E), and καὶ αὐτοὶ = *etiam ipsi*, i.e. even without waiting for servants—a harsh explanation both for καὶ and αὐτοί. If τε is left out (with most of the editors, following Heindorf), καὶ αὐτοὶ means 'ourselves also' as opposed to Callias and Alcibiades in ἐν δὲ τούτῳ Καλλίας τε καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης. There is still a slight difficulty in contrasting αὐτοὶ with these two, because they also would seem to be included in αὐτοὶ (πάντες ἡμεῖς—καὶ αὐτοί), but such slight inaccuracies of expression are common in actual dialogue, which Plato's style is intended to imitate.

77. Καλλίας. Hermann read Κριτίας in order to escape the 317 E slight difficulty remarked on in the preceding note: "sed hospitis erat Prodicum ut accederet invitare". Kroschel.

78. ἀναστήσαντες: but ἄγοντε just before. *Euthyd.* 273 B offers an exact parallel (if we follow the reading of the Bodleian MS) ἰδόντες δὲ αὐτὸν ὃ τε Διονυσόδωρος καὶ ὁ Εὐθύδημος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστάντε διελεγέσθην ἀλλήλοιον, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντες εἰς ἡμᾶς: cf. *ibid.* 273 A εἰσελθόντες—παριεπατείτην and D ἐγελασάτην γοῦν ἄμφω βλέψαντες εἰς ἀλλήλους. The dual in Plato as in Greek generally is apt to sink into the plural.

CHAPTER IX.

Protagoras explains his profession. It is to teach civil virtue and make men good citizens.

318 A 8. γάρ used like Latin *enim* to introduce a speech (introductory γάρ): see on Apol. 20 E.

9. ὅτι—ἀποβήσεται—πυθέσθαι. For the situation compare Gorg. 455 C—D where Socrates says ἴσως γὰρ καὶ τυγχάνει τις τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων μαθητῆς σου βουλόμενος γενέσθαι, ὡς ἐγώ τινὰς σχεδὸν καὶ συχνοὺς αἰσθάνομαι; οἱ ἴσως αἰσχύνονται ἂν σε ἀνερέσθαι· ὑπ' ἐμοῦ οὖν ἀνερωτώμενος νόμισον καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἀνερωτᾶσθαι· τί ἡμῖν, ὦ Γοργία, ἔσται, εἴαν σοὶ συνῶμεν; περὶ τίνων τῇ πόλει συμβουλεύειν οἱοί τε ἐσόμεθα;

14. ἐν τῇ ὑστεραῖα ταῦτά ταῦτα: sc. ἔσται σοι. ἐν (bracketed by Schanz after Hirschig) before τῇ ὑστεραῖα means 'during': cf. (with Kroschel) Thuc. I 44. I τῇ μὲν προτέρῃ οὐχ ἦσσαν—ἀπεδέξαντο τοὺς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραῖα μετέγνωσαν κτλ. and add infra 321 C ἡ εἰμαρμένη ἡμέρα παρήν, ἐν ᾗ ἔδει καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἐξιέναι ἐκ γῆς.

318 B 19. ὃ μὴ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστάμενος. τυγχάνοις (suggested by Bekker) would be the usual periodic structure: but the indicative is looser and more direct: Kroschel compares Gorg. 464 D εἰ δέοι—διαγωνίζεσθαι—πρότερος ἐπαίει. Notice the usual Socratic implication that virtue is knowledge.

20. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕτως. Cf. Meno 74 D ἀλλὰ μὴ μοι οὕτως and infra 331 C. So μὴ γάρ, μὴ σύ γε, μὴ τοι γε and the like are often used without a verb expressed. ὥσπερ ἂν belongs to εἶποι ἂν in lines 28 and 32: it is answered by οὕτω δὴ in line 33. αὐτίκα here does not mean 'for example' but goes with μάλα (which intensifies it): 'as if Hippocrates were to change his desire on the spot and conceive a desire (ἐπιθυμήσειεν) for etc.' αὐτίκα μάλα is idiomatic, cf. Gorg. 469 D αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, Crat. 384 B αὐτίκα μάλα εἰδέναι.

22. νῦν νεωστί: *nunc nuper* as in Meno 90 A. The more general word is followed by the more specific exactly as in Theaet. 161 C βατράχου γυρίνου where γυρίνος according to a Scholiast is τὸ ἐκ τοῦ βατράχου παιδίον.

23. Ζευξίππου. An obscure sculptor (not painter) of this name is mentioned in Corp. Inscr. Gr. No. 1229 (quoted by Overbeck, Die Antiken Schriftquellen-zur Geschichte der bildenden Künste

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Sauppe remarks, but there seems to be no precise parallel to such a use of the word.

47. εἰς τὸν Ἴππιαν ἀπέβλεψεν: see on 314 B.

49. εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκέων. The editors quote Meno 91 A οὗτος γὰρ—πάλαι λέγει πρὸς με ὅτι ἐπιθυμεῖ ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὐτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ξένους ὑποδέξασθαι τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι ἐπίστανται ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ: Euthyd. 273 D ἀρετὴν—ὦ Σώκρατες, οἴμεθα οἶω τ' εἶναι παραδοῦναι κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τάχιστα.

319 A 54. ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας forms a single expression: 'good citizens' are the ἔργον of πολιτικὴ τέχνη. So Ar. Knights 1304 ἄνδρα μοχθηρὸν πολίτην.

56. ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι. ἐπαγγέλλομαι and its derivatives are often used of sophistic 'professions'.

CHAPTER X.

Socrates professes to disbelieve that ἀρετή can be communicated by teaching. His arguments are twofold: (1) while in matters connected with the arts of building, ship-carpentry, and the like, the Athenians will listen only to the professional man, in politics they give ear to any and every one: (2) Athenian statesmen have not been able to communicate their political virtue to their sons.

2. εἴπερ κέκτησθαι. Cobet's rule (Mnemos. XI p. 168) "ubi praecedit vocalis, semper (Plato) κέκτημαι ponit, ubi consonans, promiscue κεκτῆσθαι et ἐκτῆσθαι" represents the usage of the best MSS, but Schanz now writes ἐκτῆσθαι universally after consonants. See also Mnem. VIII 336. ἐκτῆσθαι is in reality an old Ionic form: it is used by Aeschylus Prom. 795 κοινὸν ὄμμ' ἐκτῆμένοι.

319 B 5. οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως ἀπιστῶ. The MSS reading ὅπως ἂν ἀπιστῶ was corrected by Heindorf, ὅπως ἂν with the subjunctive being only used in final clauses. The subjunctive is deliberative: cf. Euthyphr. 11 B οὐκ ἔχω ἔγωγε ὅπως σοι εἶπω δ νοῶ.

6. οὐ διδακτὸν—μηδὲ. οὐ negatives διδακτὸν only, μηδέ the whole of its clause: a similar case is Eur. Andr. 586 δρᾶν εὖ, κακῶς δ' οὐ, μηδ' ἀποκτείνειν βία. μή after verbs of thinking and saying is tolerably common in Plato. See on Euthyphr. 6 B ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἰδέναι.

8. ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες, sc. φασί. Compare 337 D where Hippias calls Athens τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτὸ τὸ πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας: a somewhat less favourable judgment is given in *Laws* I 641 E τὴν πόλιν ἅπαντες ἡμῶν Ἕλληνες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ὡς φιλόλογός τε ἐστὶ καὶ πολύλογος, Λακεδαίμονα δὲ καὶ Κρήτην, τὴν μὲν βραχύλογον, τὴν δὲ πολύνοιαν μᾶλλον ἢ πολυλογίαν ἀσκοῦσαν.

12. μεταπεμπομένους is probably middle: Plato does not seem to use μεταπέμπειν in the sense of 'send for' (like Thucydides e.g. I 112. 3 Ἀμυρταίου μεταπέμποντος τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἔλεσι βασιλέως: VI 52. 1 et al.). The subject is τοὺς πολίτας to be supplied from τὴν πόλιν. Compare *Gorg.* 455 B foll. ὅταν περὶ ἰατρῶν αἰρέσεως ἢ τῇ πόλει σύλλογος ἢ περὶ ναυπηγῶν ἢ περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς δημιουργικοῦ ἔθνους, ἄλλο τι ἢ τότε ὁ ῥητορικὸς συμβουλεύσει; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐν ἐκάστη αἰρέσει τὸν τεχνικώτατον δεῖ αἰρεῖσθαι and *Alc.* I 107 A—C. Kroschel well remarks that the words περὶ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων (which Hirschig wrongly rejects) are added to shew that it is only about the actual buildings that the builders are consulted, "non de necessitate, utilitate, magnitudine", as to which the orators advise: compare *Gorg.* 455 D.

17. κἂν πάνυ καλὸς ἢ κτλ. Imitated in *Alc.* I 107 B and C: 319 C ἐάν τε γε σμικρὸς ἢ μέγας ἦ, ἐάν τε καλὸς ἢ αἰσχροὺς, ἔτι τε γενναῖος ἢ ἀγεννής, πῶς γὰρ οὐ;—ἀλλ' ἂν τε πένης ἂν τε πλούσιος ἢ ὁ παραινῶν, οὐδὲν διοίσει Ἀθηναίους, ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει βουλευῶνται, πῶς ἂν ὑγιαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ ζητοῦσιν ἰατρὸν εἶναι τὸν σύμβουλον.

20. οἱ τοξόται. The τοξόται (bowmen) or Σκύθαι (so called from their nationality) or Πευσίνιοι (from one Πευσίς who according to the *Schol.* on *Ar. Ach.* 54 had the chief hand in establishing them) were the police. ἔλκω was regularly used of removing an offending orator: e.g. *Ar. Knights* 665 κἄθ' εἰλκον αὐτὸν οἱ πρυτάνεις χοί τοξόται.

21. ἐξάιρωνται. So T (B has ἐξέρωνται): the present is perhaps due to tense-assimilation to κελεύοντων. The active αἶρειν is used in the same connexion by *Ar. Eccl.* 261 ἡμεῖς δὲ γ' ἦν αἶρωσ' (sc. οἱ τοξόται), ἐὰν κελεύσομεν, but no exact parallel for the use of the middle has yet been found—the nearest seems to be *Eur. I. T.* 1201 οὐ γὰρ ποτ' ἂν νιν ἠράμην βάθρων ἀπο: cf. *Ar. Ach.* 1140 τὴν ἀσπίδ' αἶρου καὶ βάδιζ' ὦ παῖ λαβῶν: *ibid.* 953.

23. περὶ τῶν τῆς πέλεως διοικήσεως. So B and T, but in both 319 D the copyist had doubts as to the text. It is usual to drop either τῶν

or διοικήσεως: Kroschel transposes τῶν and περί. Sauppe retains the MSS reading, making περί govern διοικήσεως—but this is very harsh. τὰ τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως is a periphrasis for ἡ πόλεως διοίκησις (for the omission of the article with πόλεως cf. Polit. 296 E τοῦτον δεῖ καὶ περί ταῦτα τὸν ὄρον εἶναι τὸν γε ἀληθινώτατον ὀρθῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως, δὲν ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ διοικήσει τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων): ‘the city’s administration’ being contrasted with τῶν ἐν τέχνῃ διοικήσεις. The whole phrase περί τῶν τῆς πόλεως διοικήσεως corresponds to 318 E καὶ περί τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.

25. ἀνιστάμενος. The audience sat in the assembly: cf. Rep. VI 492 B ὅταν, εἶπον, συγκαθεζόμενοι ἄθροοι πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίαν—ψέγωσι κτλ.

29. μαθῶν. Heindorf quotes many cases of the transition from plural to singular in Plato (e.g. infra 324 B): the change is justified here because in each case the reproach would be addressed to a single person.

31. μὴ τοίνυν ὅτι—ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ. See on Apol. 40 D οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα κτλ.

319 E 34. οὐχ οἰοί τε ἄλλοις παραδιδόναι. Plato comments on the inability of statesmen to teach their sons political sagacity in Meno 93 B foll., citing Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles and Thucydides as cases in point. Compare Alc. I 118 E foll.

35. ἃ μὲν διδασκάλων εἶχετο. The phrase is used by Plato in the other passages where he deals with this topic: cf. infra 324 D, Meno 93 D and 94 A.

320 A 38. νέμονται ὡς περ ἄφετοι. νέμεσθαι is properly ‘to graze’, and ἄφετος is said *de grege numini alicui consecrato* (Heindorf): cf. Critias 119 D ἀφέτων ὄντων ταύρων ἐν τῷ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος ἱερῷ. The same expression occurs in Rep. VI 498 C ὅταν δὲ λήγῃ μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατειῶν ἐκτὸς γίνονται, τότε ἤδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν. Here the object of νέμεσθαι is virtually the clause ἐάν που—τῇ ἀρετῇ ‘going to and fro by themselves they graze like creatures set apart upon whatever excellence etc.’: cf. (for the use of ἐάν) Rep. VII-528 A φθονοῖς μὴν οὐδ’ ἂν ἄλλω εἴ τις τι δύναίτο ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι.

39. ἐάν που αὐτόματοι περιτύχωσιν τῇ ἀρετῇ. αὐτομάτῳ (used as in Theaet. 180 C, Polit. 271 D δ δ’ ἤρου περί τοῦ πάντα αὐτόματα γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις) agreeing with ἀρετῇ would make the expression more pointed, and avoid the slight contradiction involved

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It is probable that this myth comes from Protagoras' treatise *περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως*, mentioned in Diog. Laert. IX 55. It does not resemble the other myths of Plato in point of style, and if not actually written by Protagoras, it is at least carefully modelled on his way of writing: compare the similar imitations of the style of Agathon in Symp. 194 D foll. and of Prodicus infra 337 A foll. See Introd. p. xxi. That the 'Sophists' taught by means of parables we can see from Prodicus' Apologue of Heracles in Xen. Mem. II 1. 21 foll. The other passages in Plato treating of the primitive constitution of man are Polit. 269 C foll., Tim. 42 E foll. and Symp. 189 C foll. In Rep. III 414 C foll. there are also some points of resemblance to the present story.

1. *ἦν γάρ ποτε χρόνος*. γάρ introduces the story: see on Apol. 20 E *Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε πού*. *ἦν χρόνος* was usual in beginning a tale: the editors quote Theocr. 8. 1 *ἦν χρόνος ἀνικ' ἐγών κτλ*.

320 D 2. *θνητὰ δὲ γένη οὐκ ἦν*. In the Timaeus 42 E foll. the creation of men takes place after that of gods. The lower animals in the Timaeus arise from the degeneration of the souls of men in later births, every soul being first born as man: cf. Tim. 41 E with 90 E foll. Here the lower animals are created simultaneously with man, for *θνητὰ γένη* is of course not limited to the human race.

3. *χρόνος ἦλθεν εἰμαρμένος γενέσεως*. The omission of the article, as well as the whole turn of expression (*ἦλθεν αὐτοῖς χρόνος*), is somewhat poetic.

4. *θεοὶ γῆς ἔνδον*: so in Tim. 42 E it is the created gods, not the *δημιουργοί*, who make men. There however it is not said that human creatures were made within the earth: but compare the *γενναῖον ψεύδος* of Rep. III. 414 C *ἦσαν δὲ* (i.e. the citizens of Plato's state) *τότε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὑπὸ γῆς ἐν τὸς πλαττόμενοι*. The wide-spread tradition of autochthonous races among the Greeks no doubt helped to produce such anthropological theories, with which compare Empedocles (ap. Ritter and Preller Hist. Philos.⁷ p. 143) *οὐλοφυεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον*: Symp. 191 C *ἐγέννων καὶ ἔτικτον* (sc. primitive men) *οὐκ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀλλ' εἰς γῆν ὥσπερ οἱ τέττιγες*: and Polit. 272 A *ἐκ γῆς γὰρ ἀνεβιώσκοντο πάντες*. It is to be noticed that Plato regularly uses ἐντός (not *ἐνδον*) as a preposition: *ἐνδον* (so used) is the more poetic word.

ἐκ γῆς—κεράννυται. Compare Tim. 42 E (of the creation of man) *μιμούμενοι* (i.e. the created gods) *τὸν σφέτερον δημιουργόν, πυρὸς καὶ γῆς ὕδατός τε καὶ αἴρος ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου δανειζόμενοι μόρια*

ὡς ἀποδοθησόμενα πάλιν εἰς ταῦτόν τὰ λαμβανόμενα ξυνεκόλλων. For 'air and water' is substituted here τῶν ὅσα πυρὶ καὶ γῆ κεράννυται. Fire is the rarest and earth the densest of the four elements: Protagoras' theory is that air and water are produced by mixing these in different proportions, for κεράννυται cannot mean merely that the elements interchange. Compare the theory attributed by Aristotle to Parmenides: Met. I 5. 986^b 33 δύο τὰς αἰτίας καὶ δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς πάλιν τίθησι, θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, οἶον πῦρ καὶ γῆν λέγων. It is noteworthy that Plato himself regards all four elements as differentiated, although imperfectly, before the creation of the κόσμος by the δημιουργός: compare Tim. 53 A foll. The chiasmus in γῆς καὶ πυρός followed by πυρὶ καὶ γῆ is part of Protagoras' art.

6. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἄγειν αὐτὰ πρὸς φῶς ἔμελλον. Cf. Rep. III 414 D ἐπειδὴ δὲ παντελῶς ἐξεργασμένοι ἦσαν καὶ ἡ γῆ αὐτοὺς μήτηρ οὖσα ἀνῆκε.

7. Προμηθεὶ καὶ Ἐπιμηθεὶ. In Gorg. 523 D Prometheus again appears as the servant of Zeus, commissioned to put a stop to man's foreknowledge of his day of death: in Polit. 274 C he is mentioned as the giver of fire to mortals. The Hesiodic and Aeschylean form of the legend, in which Prometheus *steals* the fire, does not appear in Plato, except at 321 D, nor is there any hint in his works of the story in Hesiod about the gift of Pandora—the source of human ills—to Epimetheus (Works and Days 50 foll.), though it is worth noting that Plato like Hesiod makes the creation of woman posterior to that of man (Tim. 42 B).

9. παραιτεῖται—αὐτὸς νεῖμαι. The object clause, as usual with verbs like παραιτεῖσθαι (deprecari) depends on the positive part of the verb (here αἰτεῖσθαι): see on Apol. 31 B. αὐτὸς is 'by himself', without Prometheus' aid. We follow Cron and Turner in retaining the MSS νείμαντος δέ μου as against Bekker's δ' ἐμοῦ: the antithesis, as Cron remarks, is between the actions—νείμαντος and ἐπισκέψαι. The point to be noticed is that Afterthought invites Forethought to exchange offices with him: it is Afterthought whose duty it is to inspect (ἐπισκέψασθαι: cf. Gorg. 526 C ὁ δὲ Μίνως ἐπισκοπῶν κἀθῆται).

11. τὰ δ' ἀσθενέστερα—τὰ δέ. B and T have τοὺς δ' ἀσθενε- 320 E στέρους—τοὺς δέ, a natural mistake, which can hardly be due to Plato.

13. ἐμηχανᾶτο δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν. Plato's own style rarely falls into verse: compare Rep. X 621 B εἰς τὴν γένεσιν ἄττοντας

ὡσπερ ἀστέρας. The whole passage is full of rare and often poetic rhythms, words, constructions, and turns of expression: e.g. ἄοπλον φύσιν, σμικρότητι ἤμπισχεν, πτήνην φύγην, τῷδε αὐτῷ (for αὐτῷ τούτῳ), ἀϊστωθείη, ἀλληλοφθοριῶν διαφυγὰς ἐπήρκεσε, εὐμαρίαν (as against εὐμάρειαν), and many more: note also the effort after balance and variety in *ικανοῖς μὲν ἀμῦναι χειμῶνα, δυνατοῖς δὲ καὶ καύματα* (321 A), *τοῖς μὲν ἐκ γῆς—ἄλλοις δέ—τοῖς δέ—ἔστι δ' οἷς*. "Summum opinor," says Heindorf, "in his imitantis philosophi appareret artificium, si quid de propria Protagorae dictione superesset". See Introd. p. xxi.

14. *σμικρότητι ἤμπισχεν*. The usual construction would require *σμικρότητα*: the change is perhaps due to the desire for balance with *ἃ δὲ ἠῦξε μεγέθει*, but the same construction occurs infra in line 21 with *ἀμφιεννύς*.

321 A 18. *μή τι γένος ἀϊστωθείη*. Aesch. Prom. 232 *ἀϊστώσας γένος*: ibid. 668 *κεραυνὸν δὲ πᾶν ἐξαϊστώσοι γένος*. Note the emphasis with which Protagoras asserts the permanence of the *genus*: cf. infra 321 B *σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει πορίζων*.

20. *εὐμαρίαν*. So Schanz with BT: the editors generally read *εὐμάρειαν*. The older form is intentionally used here: see above on line 13.

24. *ὑποδῶν* is Cobet's correction for *ὑπὸ ποδῶν* of B and T. See infra on 321 C *γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον κτλ*.

321 B 25. *τὰ δὲ δέρμασιν στερεοῖς καὶ ἀνάμοις*. After *τὰ δὲ* the MSS read *θριξίν καὶ*. The words seem to have been wrongly introduced from line 21. This (the suggestion of Ast, adopted by Schanz and others) seems better than to read for *θριξίν καὶ* the words *ὄνυξιν καὶ*. *ὄνυξιν καὶ* - *ὄνυξιν καὶ ἀνάμοις*.

31. *οὐ πάντι* = non satis: cf. note on Euthyphr. 2 B *οὐδ' αὐτὸς πάντι γινώσκω*. *οὐ πάντι* is the English 'not quite', sometimes equivalent to 'not at all' by *meiosis*: the addition of *τι* makes the phrase a little less emphatic. *πάντι οὐ* is quite a different phrase and means 'altogether not'.

321 C 32. *καταναλώσας τὰς δυνάμεις*. After *τὰς δυνάμεις*, the words *εἰς τὰ ἄλογα* are found in T, but not in B.

36. *ἐμμελῶς πάντων ἔχοντα*: like *ικανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα* in Theaet. 194 D and the genitive after *καλῶς ἔχειν* and the like.

37. *γυμνόν τε καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄοπλον*. Compare the description of Ἔρως in Symp. 203 C: *ἀνυπόδητος καὶ ἄοικος, χαμαιπετῆς αἰετῶν καὶ ἄστρωτος*. *ἀνυπόδητον* contrasts with

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the theft. Similarly in 346 D below Socrates reverts to a part of the poem which he has quoted some time before in 345 C.

51. ἔμπυρον τέχνην is τέχνη which works by πῦρ, as ἔντεχνος σοφία in line 42 is σοφία working by τέχνη.

322 A 54. τοῦ βίου—δι' Ἐπιμηθέα. βίου is 'means of living' as in line 45. The words δι' Ἐπιμηθέα mean 'thanks to Epimetheus': cf. Ar. Clouds 12—14 ἀλλ' οὐ δύναμαι δείλαιος εὔδειν δακνόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς δαπάνης καὶ τῆς φάτνης καὶ τῶν χρεῶν, διὰ τουτονὶ τὸν υἱόν, and in Rep. I 354 A οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστίημαι, δι' ἑμαυτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ. The words are rejected by Schanz (after Sauppe), but without reason: the jingle (Προ-μηθέα δὲ δι' Ἐπι-μηθέα) is quite in Protagoras' style.

55. ἦπερ λέγεται. Aeschylus relates the punishment but not the trial: cf. Prom. 7—9 τὸ σὸν γὰρ ἄνθος, παντέχνου πυρὸς σέλας, θνητοῖσι κλέψας ὤπασεν· τοιαῦδ' εἰ τοι ἁμαρτίας σφε δεῖ θεοῖς δοῦναι δίκην.

CHAPTER XII.

The myth is continued (322 A—322 D) and used to justify the Athenians for listening to promiscuous political advisers, since according to it all men are endowed with πολιτικὴ ἀρετή—as indeed all men believe, otherwise they would not (as they do) regard as insane the man who does not at least pretend to possess justice and πολιτικὴ ἀρετή generally.

1. θέλας μετέσχε μοῖρας: μοῖρα is 'dispensation', and refers to the ἔντεχνος σοφία, which is θέλα because derived from Hephaestus and Athena.

2. [διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ συγγένειαν]. These words are open to objection on two grounds. The singular τοῦ θεοῦ is inaccurate—no single god has been mentioned as akin to man: nor can τοῦ θεοῦ well be taken as God in the monotheistic sense, or as generic for τῶν θεῶν—both usages are alien to the whole tone of the myth. These difficulties might perhaps be got over by reading τοῦ θείου = τῶν θεῶν, but another difficulty remains. The reference in τὴν συγγένειαν can only be to 320 D τυποῦσιν αὐτὰ θεοί, the creatures being regarded as children of their creators as in Tim. 42 E νοήσαντες οἱ παῖδες (the created gods) τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς διάταξιν, but there it is not only man but all θνητὰ γένη that are in this sense 'akin to gods'—why then should not the lower animals also have built themselves fanes? As the phrase is at best a bad case of loose thinking

and inaccurate writing in an otherwise careful and elaborate piece of composition, I have followed Kral and Schanz in rejecting the whole phrase. The words were perhaps an (inaccurate) gloss on *θείας* in *θείας μοίρας*. For the sentiment which they express see the Editor's Introduction to the *Euthyphro* p. xvi.

μόνον: man alone *θείας μετέσχε μοίρας*: see note in loc. Cobet's *μόνος* would be more grammatical, but the attraction of *ζώων* is too strong.

3. **ἐπεχείρει βωμούς τε ἰδρύεσθαι κτλ.** Hom. Od. III 48 πάντες δὲ θεῶν χατέουσ' ἄνθρωποι.

4. **ἔπειτα.** *πρῶτον μὲν* and *ἔπειτα* refer to logical sequence rather than temporal: Protagoras follows the maxim *ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα*.

7. **ἠύρετο.** MSS *εὔρετο*, but see on 315 B above.

9. **ἀπώλλυντο οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων.** Compare Polit. 274 B 322 B τῆς γὰρ τοῦ κεκτημένου καὶ νέμοντος ἡμᾶς δαίμονος ἀπερημωθέντες ἐπιμελείας, τῶν πολλῶν αὐθιγῶν, ὅσα χαλεπὰ τὰς φύσεις ἦν, ἀπαγριωθέντων, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἀφύλακτοι γεγονότες διηρπάζοντο ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

14. **ἧς μέρος πολεμική.** *πολεμική* is recognised as a part of *πολιτική* in Rep. II 273 D foll.

15. **σφίξεσθαι κτίζοντες πόλεις.** The insufficiency of the individual for his own wants is assigned as the cause of city life in Rep. II 369 B γίνεται τοίνυν—πόλις, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής· ἢ τίν' οἶει ἀρχὴν ἄλλην πόλιν οἰκίσειν; οὐδεμίαν, ἢ δ' ὅς.

19. **αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην.** The editors cite Hesiod (*Works and Days* 192) *δίκη δ' ἐν χερσὶ καὶ αἰδῶς οὐκ ἔσται* (of the *γένος σιδήρεον*, where man is corrupt). *αἰδῶς* is a part of *δέος* (*Euthyphr.* 12 C): it keeps men together by making them fear the censure of their fellows (*Laws* I 647 A—B); compare Homer *Iliad* xv. 561 foll. ὦ φίλοι, ἄνδρες ἔστε, καὶ αἰδῶ θέσθ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ, ἀλλήλους τ' αἰδεῖσθε κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμῖνας. αἰδομένων δ' ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σβοὶ ἢ ἐπέφανται· φευγόντων δ' οὐτ' ἀρ κλέος ὄρνυται οὔτε τις ἀλκή. *δίκη* is here the abstract principle 'law' like Latin *ius*: for the original meaning of the word see Verrall on Eur. Med. 411.

20. **πόλεων κόσμοι—συναγωγόι.** The phraseology no less than the rhythm is highly poetical.

21. **τίνα οὖν τρόπον.** For *οὖν* retained in the indirect the editors cite Symp. 219 D ὥστε οὐθ' ὅπως οὖν ὀργιζομένην εἶχον οὐθ' ὅπη

προσαγαγοίμην αὐτὸν ἠὺπόρου. Cobet's δῶ for δολή is attractive but unnecessary.

22. **πότερον ὡς κτλ.** "Eleganter omissum ἔφη, ut obliqua oratio statim in rectam transeat" Heindorf, quoting (inter alia) Xen. Cyrop. I 4. 28 ἐνταῦθα δὴ τὸν Κῦρον γελάσαι τε ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν δακρύων καὶ εἰπεῖν αὐτῷ ἀπιόντα θαρρεῖν ὅτι παρέσται αὐθις ὀλίγου χρόνου· ὥστε ὀρᾶν σοι ἐξέσται κἂν βούλη ἀσκαρδαμυκτεῖ. Sauppe quotes an exact parallel in 338 B infra εἶπον οὖν ἐγὼ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν εἶη βραβευτὴν ἐλέσθαι τῶν λόγων. εἶτε γὰρ χείρων ἔσται κτλ.

24. **εἰς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν—ιδιώταις.** This division of labour takes place as soon as men begin to unite in cities: compare Rep. II 369 E foll.

322 D 30. **κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως.** κτείνειν is poetical for the ἀποκτείνειν of prose.

32. **Ἀθηναῖοι:** without the article as in 319 B and 324 C.

322 E 35. **οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φῆς:** 319 C οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀποδέχονται. The antithesis between οὐκ ἀνέχονται ὡς σὺ φῆς and εἰκότως ὡς ἐγὼ φημι is a poor one, since οὐκ ἀνέχονται has to be repeated with εἰκότως. We should expect some word like ἀλόγως before ὡς σὺ φῆς, or perhaps οὐκ εἰκότως has dropped out after φῆς.

323 A 37. **ἦν δεῖ διὰ δικαιοσύνης—ἰέναι.** The antecedent to ἦν is συμβουλήν not ἀρετῆς: cf. Laws I 632 C (quoted by Heindorf) κατιδῶν δὲ ὁ θεὸς τοὺς νόμους ἄπασιν τούτοις φύλακας ἐπιστήσει, τοὺς μὲν (sc. φύλακας) διὰ φρονήσεως, τοὺς δὲ δι' ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας. The phrase διὰ δικαιοσύνης ἰέναι is equivalent to δικαίαν εἶναι as διὰ φιλίας ἰέναι to φίλον εἶναι.

38. **ἅπαντος.** Schanz reads παντός on account of παντί following: but Plato frequently interchanges ἅπας and πᾶς; see on Euthyphr. 9 E. It is natural that the more emphatic form ἅπαντος should come first.

40. **ἢ μὴ εἶναι πόλεις.** ἢ = *alioquin* is regular with δεῖ, προσήκει, and the like, in the preceding clause: compare infra 323 C ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις and 325 A.

αὕτη—τούτου αἰτία: asyndeton as in 318 A τοσοῦτος ὁ γε ἡμέτερος λόγος.

41. **ὡς τῷ ὄντι ἡγοῦνται.** The presence of τῷ ὄντι, as Sauppe remarks, shews that ὡς depends on τεκμήριον in line 44: compare infra 324 C ὡς μὲν οὖν εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται—ἀποδέδεικται σοι.

323 B 54. **προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην:** elsewhere in Plato προσποιεῖσθαι takes the infinitive. Thuc. I 137. 7 has ἦν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο.

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324 A 24. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλεις—διδάξει. Cf. *infra* 342 D.

25. αὐτό σε διδάξει: 'fact will shew you': *Theaet.* 200 E ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος—ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό: the idiom is a frequent one.

27. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει κτλ. Plato's own theory of punishment so far agrees with this, but goes deeper: see *Gorgias* 525 A foll. προσήκει δὲ παντὶ τῷ ἐν τιμωρίᾳ ὄντι, ὑπ' ἄλλου ὀρθῶς τιμωρουμένῳ, ἢ βελτίονι γίνεσθαι καὶ ὀλίνασθαι ἢ παραδείγματι τοῖς ἄλλοις γίνεσθαι, ἵνα ἄλλοι ὀρώντες πάσχοντα ἃ ἂν πάσχη φοβούμενοι βελτίους γίνωνται. Vice (being ignorance) is disease of soul, as νόσος is of body: it is the business of the judge to cure the one as of the physician to cure the other: cf. *Rep.* IX 591 A—B and *Gorg.* 478 D σωφρονίζει γὰρ πού καὶ δικαιότερος ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἢ δίκης: hence (*ibid.* 480 B foll.) the sinner should go before the judge as readily as the patient to a doctor, and should even accuse his friends. In the ideal city the judges are to put to death incurable sinners just as the doctors will allow incurable patients to die: III 409 E foll. τῶν πολιτῶν σοι τοὺς μὲν εὐφυεῖς τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς θεραπεύουσι, τοὺς δὲ μή, ὅσοι μὲν κατὰ σῶμα τοιοῦτοι, ἀποθνήσκουσιν ἐάσουσι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφυεῖς καὶ ἀνιάτους αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν. The same holds good of punishment after death: for Ardiaeus and the others in *Rep.* X 616 A, whose punishment is everlasting (οὐχ ἤκει—οὐδ' ἂν ἤξει δεῦρο), are incurable—ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν ἄδου ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ, τοῖς αἰετῶν ἀδίκων ἀφικνουμένοις θεάματα καὶ νοουθητήματα—the majority are punished to purge them of the guilt contracted upon earth and teach them to choose more wisely their lot of life next time. The remedial view of punishment is embedded in the genius of the Greek language, as is shewn by the punitive sense of σωφρονίζειν, δικαιοῦν, εὐθύνειν. The older and sterner view (δράσαντι παθεῖν) appears more rarely in Plato's time.

324 B 29. ἠδίκησεν. See above on 319 D.

30. τιμωρεῖται. The editors quote *Aristotle Rhet.* I 10. 1369^b 12 διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἔνεκά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιούντος, ἵνα ἀποπληρωθῇ. The distinction is not invariably observed in Plato, although he generally uses τιμωρεῖσθαι in passages where the gravity of the sin is more insisted upon.

31. οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος—ἀγέννητον θείη. Turner (on 324 B) quotes *Laws* XI 934 A οὐχ ἔνεκα τοῦ κακουργῆσαι διδοὺς τὴν δίκην, οὐ

γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἀγένητον ἔσται ποτέ κτλ. The phrase οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θείη represents a common proverbial saying: cf. Simonides Frag. 69 τὸ γὰρ γεγεννημένον οὐκέτ' ἀρεκτον ἔσται (Sauppe) with Bergk's note, and the impressive application of the saying in Aesch. Ag. 1019—1021 τὸ δ' ἐπὶ γὰν ἅπαξ πεσὸν θανάσιμον προπάροισ' ἀνδρὸς μέλαν αἶμα τίς ἂν πάλιν ἀγκαλέσαιτ' ἐπαείδων;

38. **κολάζονται**: the middle (in the present) is rare: Heindorf 324 C quotes Ar. Wasps 405 νῦν ἐκεῖνο νῦν ἐκεῖνο τοῦξύθυμον ᾧ κολαζόμεσθα κέντρον ἐντέτατ' ὀξύ.

CHAPTER XIV.

Here begins the third part of Protagoras' reply: 324 E—328 D. In this chapter he begins to shew that virtue is in point of fact taught to all by shewing that it would be absurd to suppose that it is not.

1. **λοιπή ἀπορία**. For the omission of the article before a 324 D relative clause (Heindorf suggested the insertion of ἡ after λοιπή) Sauppe quotes Rep. III 413 E φύλαξ αὐτοῦ ὧν ἀγαθὸς καὶ μουσικῆς ἧς ἐμάνθανεν. The ἀπορία was raised by Socrates in 319 D foll.

4. **διδάσκουσιν**. Contrast infra 325 B τὰ μὲν ἄλλα διδάσκονται τοὺς υἱεῖς and ibid. τοὺς υἱεῖς διδάσκονται, said of the parents as διδάσκουσιν (in the usual sense of διδάσκονται) is said here and in Meno 94 B. Similarly in Prot. 320 A ἐπαίδευε is used where we should expect ἐπαιδεύετο: cf. ἐπαιδεύσατο in Meno 93 D.

ἀ διδασκάλων ἔχεται. See note on 319 E supra.

7. **οὐκέτι μῦθον ἀλλὰ λόγον**. Gorg. 523 A ὃν σὺ μὲν ἠγήσει μῦθον, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον· ὡς ἀληθῆ γὰρ ὄντα σοι λέξω ἃ μέλλω λέγειν.

13. **δικαιοσύνη—τὸ ὅσιον εἶναι**. Thus for the first time 325 A Protagoras definitely speaks of the virtues in language implying their unity: cf. 323 E.

15. **ἀνδρὸς ἀρετήν**: ἀνδρὸς is somewhat loftier and more impressive than ἀνθρώπου (cf. Rep. VIII 565 E βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανίζων). For the sentiment cf. Rep. VI 501 B ξυμμίγνύντες τε καὶ κεραυνύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ἀπ' ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, δ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδὲς τε καὶ θεοείκελον.

16. **μετὰ τούτου**: not μεθ' οὗ, see on 313 A καὶ ἐν ᾧ. For the use of μετὰ cf. Phaed. 69 A ff. (μὴ) ἢ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν,

ἀνθ' οὗ δεῖ ἅπαντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις, καὶ τούτου μὲν καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία κτλ.

19. καὶ παῖδα καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα: nearly equivalent to 'not only child but etc.': παῖδα is put first as the natural object of *κολάζειν*—"et nos ergo manum ferulae subduximus" (Juv. I 15).

21. ὑπακούη is more than obey: the word means 'to hear and answer' (cf. Crito 43 A): tr. 'respond', sc. by becoming better (as explained in line 20).

325 B 22. ὡς ἀνίατον ὄντα—ἀποκτείνειν: Rep. III 410 A τοὺς—κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν κακοφυεῖς καὶ ἀνιάτους αὐτοὶ ἀποκτενοῦσι. In the next line αὐτοῦ in αὐτοῦ πεφυκότος is still this 'one thing', viz. ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆ.

25. ὡς θαυμάσιοι γίνονται. The MSS have ὡς θαυμασίως γίνονται which could only mean 'in what a strange way are produced'—a meaning irrelevant here. The point is that it is *θαυμαστόν* if 'good men'—virtue having been proved to be teachable—teach their sons everything except virtue. *θαυμάσιοι* (with Kroschel and other editors) seems the simplest of the many emendations proposed: cf. Euthyd. 305 B *θαυμάσιοί εἰσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες*. The mistake may have arisen from the influence of the common *θαυμασίως ὡς*. Next best is Hirschig's *θαυμασίως γίνονται ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ* (cf. 328 E οὐκ εἶναι ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν ἢ ἀγαθοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται) or *θαυμασίως γίνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοί*: cf. Meno 89 B οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται and Heindorf's emendation on 326 C below. As to *γίνονται* "Saepius a Platone id quod argumentatione colligitur, *γίγνεσθαι* dicitur, ut p. 355 A φημι ὑμῖν τούτου οὕτως ἔχοντος γελοῖον τὸν λόγον γίγνεσθαι ὅταν λέγητε κτλ., Euthyd. p. 298 E οὐκοῦν ὁ κύων πατὴρ ὦν σὸς ἐστίν, ὥστε σὸς πατὴρ γίγνεται ὁ κύων". Kroschel. The same use of *γίγνεσθαι* is common in Aristotle.

28. τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἄρα. For the form of the sentence and for ἄρα here and in line 34 compare note on Crito 50 E ἢ πρὸς μὲν ἄρα.

29. διδάσκονται (but not of course ἄρα) is interrogative: so οὐ διδάσκονται in line 34.

30. ἐφ' ὧν. So BT: Heindorf's ἐφ' ᾧ is adopted by Kral. ἐφ' ὧν (i.e. ἐπὶ τούτων ᾧ) κτλ. is 'in the case of subjects which if they have not learnt' (μὴ μαθοῦσι), the latent ᾧ depending on μαθοῦσι: whereas ἐφ' οἷς—ἐπίστωνται in the previous line is ἐπὶ τούτοις οἷς (i.e. ἐφ' οἷς, according to the usual idiom)—ἐὰν μὴ ἐπίστωνται αὐτά. This use of ἐπὶ with the genitive is common in Plato, e.g. Rep. VII 524 E ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν. The variety of expression is not

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and Tenses (1889) p. 179. This idiom occurs more than once in Homer: it is perhaps a remnant of the days when the conditional particles introduced a main sentence: certainly the Greeks were not conscious of any such ellipse as εὖ ἔξει.

11. ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον. ξύλον is 'a piece of wood', not necessarily a dead log, as appears from Hdt. III 47 εἰρίοισι ἀπὸ ξύλου (of the cotton tree) and other exx. in L. and S. The growing child is compared to a tree growing up and becoming crooked (note the present διαστρεφόμενον—καρπτόμενον). Plato frequently applies the metaphors 'crooked', 'warped' and the like to victims of vice and vicious education: compare Gorg. 525 A πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους καὶ ἀλαζονείας. Theaet. 173 A μικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς.

12. εὐθύνουσιν—πληγαῖς. Cf. Arist. Ἀθην. πολιτ. Ch. 8 τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας ἠϋθυεν κυρία οὔσα τοῦ ζημιούν καὶ κολάζειν (of the Areopagitic council). For εὐθύνειν (here passing into the meaning of 'chastise') see note on 324 A οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει. To illustrate πληγαῖς Sauppe quotes the well-known line of Menander ὁ μὴ δαρεῖς ἄνθρωπος οὐ παιδεύεται.

13. εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες. It appears from 326 C that there was no regular age for going to school; the parents decided in each case. Plato ordains (Laws VII 809 E) that children shall learn γράμματα (i.e. reading and writing, ibid. 810 B) from 10 to 13, and the lyre from 13 to 16.

πολὺ μᾶλλον—εὐκοσμίας. Protagoras' description of the aim of Athenian education agrees with the account of the Δίκαιος λόγος in the Clouds 961 foll.

325 E 17. ὥσπερ τότε: supra 325 C ἐπειδὴν θᾶπτον συνιῆ τις τὰ λεγόμενα.

18. ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων: i.e. as they sit on the benches: cf. above 315 C. παρατιθέασιν represents the works of the poets as intellectual food: cf. Theaet. 157 C παρατίθημι ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπογεύσασθαι.

19. ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν: Homer especially, and also Hesiod, Theognis, Phocylides. Compare Laws VII 810 E, from which passage it also appears that extracts were frequently made for committing to memory (ἐκμανθάνειν).

20. ἀναγκάζουσιν: μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ μάθησις: Arist. Pol. VIII 1339^a 28 (quoted by Sauppe). So Niceratus in Xenophon Symp. III 5 says that his father ἠνάγκασέ με πάντα τὰ Ὀμήρου ἔπη μαθεῖν.

21. **διέοδοι** means finished narratives or descriptions (cf. *λόγῳ* 326 A *διεξεληθῶν* and *διεξιέναι* in 320 C). It is to be noted that so far we have not got beyond *ποίησις ψιλή* (i.e. unaccompanied by music): lyric poetry begins to be studied when the lyre has been learnt (line 26).

24. **ἕτερα τοιαῦτα**: for the phrase see on Apol. 26 A. The accusative (internal) depends on *ἐπιμελοῦνται* as in 325 C *ἐπιμελοῦνται πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν* and Laws VII 812 E *ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὁ παιδευτῆς ἐπιμελείσθω*: the whole phrase is equivalent to *ἑτέραν τοιαύτην σωφροσύνης τε ἐπιμέλειαν ποιοῦνται*. Verbs taking the external object in the genitive or dative are not precluded from taking the internal object in the accusative.

28. **εἰς τὰ κιθαρίσματα ἐντείνοντες**. *ἐντείνειν εἰς* is to stretch 326 B into, i.e. to 'put into': whence *ἐντείνειν ἐς κύκλον χωρίον τρίγωνον* 'to describe a triangle in a circle' (Meno 87 A); *περὶ γὰρ τοι τῶν ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους* of adapting to metre (Phaed. 60 D); and here of accompanying poems on the lyre: the boys learn the poems and tunes (made by the poet) together, while the Citharist plays the lyre. Plato in the Laws VII 812 D foll. requires the *κιθαρίσματα* to be identical with the tune to which the poem is sung: *δεῖ—τοῖς φθόγγοις τῆς λύρας προσχρῆσθαι—τόν τε κιθαριστήν καὶ τὸν παιδευόμενον, ἀποδιδόντας πρόσχορδα τὰ φθέγματα τοῖς φθέγμασι· τὴν δ' ἑτεροφωνίαν καὶ ποικιλίαν τῆς λύρας, ἅλλα μὲν μέλη τῶν χορδῶν ἰεισῶν, ἅλλα δὲ τοῦ τὴν μελωδίαν ξυνθέντος ποιητοῦ—πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ προσφέρειν κτλ.*

ῥυθμούς τε καὶ ἁρμονίας. *ῥυθμοί* times or rhythms (cf. Rep. III 399 E foll.), *ἁρμονίαι* scales (ibid. 398 D foll.). *ῥυθμός* and *ἁρμονία* between them make up *μουσική* in the narrower sense: see Symp. 187 A foll., where music is defined as *περὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἐρωτικῶν ἐπιστήμη—περὶ ἁρμονίαν* since it reconciles *ὀξύ* and *βαρύ*, *περὶ ῥυθμὸν* since it reconciles *ταχύ* and *βραδύ*.

29. **οἰκειοῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν παίδων**. Sauppe quotes Rep. III 401 D *κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἄπτεται αὐτῆς*.

30. **εὐρυθμότεροι καὶ εὐαρμοστότεροι**. See Rep. III 400 C foll., where, after it is shewn that *τὸ εὐρυθμον* and *τὸ εὐαρμοστον* imply *εὐλογία*, Plato continues (400 D) *εὐλογία ἄρα καὶ εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ εὐρυθμία εὐηθεία ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἦν ἀνοίαν οὔσαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἦθος κατεσκευασμένην διάνοιαν*.

34. εἰς παιδοτρίβου: Protagoras passes to γυμναστική, the second great division of Greek education: Rep. II 376 E.

35. ὑπηρετῶσι τῇ διανοίᾳ. Plato asserts that the true object of γυμναστική is not to cultivate the body, but to educate the soul to the proper mean between hardness and softness: Rep. III 410 C foll. On the soul as the mistress of the body see Phaedo ch. 43.

326 C 39. μάλιστα οἱ μάλιστα δυνάμενοι. The first μάλιστα is due to Heindorf: it is necessary to the meaning. Most of the editors insert the word μάλιστα not after ποιούσιν but after δυνάμενοι, explaining its loss by the presence of μάλιστα following: but it comes (we think) more naturally after ποιούσιν.

42. ἐκ διδασκάλων ἀπαλλαγῶσιν: ἐκ is rejected by Cobet (cf. Gorg. 514 C ἐπειδὴ τῶν διδασκάλων ἀπηλλάγημεν): but the phrase is just as stereotyped as εἰς διδασκάλων, to which (in line 40) it forms an appropriate contrast—in neither of the two cases were the Greeks (in all probability) conscious in common parlance of an ellipse. Sauppe quotes a fragment of Ar. Banqueters 42 οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀπεδίδρασκες ἐκ διδασκάλου, Plutus 84 ἐκ Πατροκλέους ἔρχομαι, and other parallels.

43. ἀναγκάζει μανθάνειν: hardly to be taken literally, but only in the sense that ignorance was no excuse for breaking the laws.

44. κατὰ τούτους ζῆν. After ζῆν occur in the MSS the words κατὰ παράδειγμα. “Facile succurrat cuius κατὰ τούτους ζῆν καθάπερ παράδειγμα—quamquam talia notanda potius quam statim corrigenda” says Heindorf. Most recent editors bracket or reject the words, which are open to objection on several grounds, that the laws are not an example but a *rule* of life, and Plato does not use παράδειγμα precisely in this way, as well as from the harsh omission of ὡς. The suggestion of Sauppe that the words are a gloss on κατὰ τούτους by a scribe referring to the illustration which follows—‘as for example’—has much probability.

326 D 45. γραμματιστάι: see on γραμματιστοῦ 312 B.

46. ὑπογράφαντες γραμμάς τῇ γραφίδι should be understood of tracing (by dots or otherwise) the outlines of the lines (γραμμαί) which form letters. These outlines would be filled up by the pupil: see Blümner, Griechische Privataltherthümer p. 315. The usual view (since Heindorf) has been to regard the γραμμαί as horizontal lines ruled for guidance; “ut pueri in schola directe s. ad lineam scribere iubentur, ita in vita quae agunt ad legis normam iis dirigenda sunt”, Kroschel. Such a view is however inconsistent with

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49. ὡς δὲ καί. ὡς for οὕτως is rare in Attic prose: Heindorf quotes (inter alia) Rep. VII 530 D κινδυνεύει ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὡς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὦτα παγήναι. For δέ see above on 318 C.

326 E 54. εὐθύναί regularly denotes the 'putting straight' or examination of a magistrate when his office expired. It is not clear whether Protagoras' philological zeal does not cause him to stretch a point in giving to the word a wider signification: but see on εὐθύνουσιν in 325 D.

CHAPTER XVI.

Protagoras at last comes to the difficulty raised by Socrates in 319 E. Virtue having been proved to be teachable, it is only from a lack of natural aptitude that good men's sons sometimes turn out badly: compared with men who have never been taught virtue, even they are good. Protagoras concludes with a manifest bid for pupils.

4. ἔμπροσθεν: viz. at 324 E.

327 A 6. οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν: equivalent to πάντας δεῖ εἶναι δημιουργούς: no one must be a layman in ἀρετή.

12. ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα. As ἐδίδασκε is the important word, ἐπέπληττε has no effect on the construction, but is in effect enclitic: see on 317 C ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι.

327 B 19. εἰ οὖν οὕτω. οὖν marks the reversion to the original protasis, viz. εἰ μὴ οἶόν τ' ἦν—καὶ τοῦτο κτλ., from λυσιτελεῖ to νόμιμα being parenthetical: it therefore seems better to print a colon rather than a full stop after νόμιμα.

327 C 24. ἐλλόγιμος ηὔξηθη. Proleptic adjectives with αὐξάνω are common: Heindorf cites (inter alia) Rep. VIII 565 C τοῦτον τρέφειν τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν.

27. ἀλλ' οὖν αὐληταί γ' ἄν: γ' ἄν for γοῦν was Shilleto's conjecture, which can hardly fail to be right. ἀλλ' οὖν—γε is an emphatic 'but at all events': cf. Gorg. 496 D μαθάνω· ἀλλ' οὖν τό γε πεινῆν αὐτὸ ἀνιαρόν.

29. οὕτως οἴου καὶ νῦν. Sauppe's ᾧου κἂν νῦν seems to be quite needless: the conclusion is naturally put as a command—'so in the present case, you are to think'.

30. τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις. So BT. ἀνθρώποις in this emphatic sense is a little awkward with ἀνθρώπους two lines below

and *ἀνθρώποις* said seven lines below of savages (though the word is qualified in both cases), but the text is probably right: cf. 323 C *ἀναγκαῖον οὐδένα ὄντιν' οὐχὶ ἀμῶς γέ πως μετέχειν αὐτῆς* (sc. *τῆς δικαιοσύνης*), *ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις*. Of the suggested emendations the most reasonable is perhaps Sauppe's *ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἐν νόμοις ἀνθρώποις*—which he has now given up in favour of the MSS reading.

31. *αὐτὸν* is not emphatic: to be *δίκαιος* is to be a *δημιουργὸς δικαιοσύνης*, cf. 326 E *τῆς ἀρετῆς—οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδιωτεύειν*.

33. *μήτε—μήτε—μήτε—μηδέ*. *μηδέ* introduces the climax: see 327 D note on *οὔτε—οὐδέ γε* in Apol. 19 D and Cope on Arist. Rhet. 14. 4. Presently *ἀλλ' εἰεν* is used rather than *ἀλλ' εἰσί* (in spite of *ἐστίν* in line 33) because the hypothetical nature of the case is becoming more prominent. For the passage of a relative clause into a main clause (*οἷ* is not to be repeated after *ἀλλά*) see on 313 A.

35. *ἀλλ' εἰεν ἄγριοί τινες*. It appears not only from Athenaeus (v 218 D), but from Suidas and others that the play in question was called *Ἄγριοι*. The few fragments of it which remain (see Kock's *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* I pp. 146—150) give us no indication of the plot or treatment. The probability is that the *Ἄγριοι* formed the chorus (compare the names *Νεφέλαι*, *Βάτραχοι* etc.), “ad quos”—as we should infer from the words of Plato—“Athenienses quidam, pauci sine dubio, vitae civilis in sua urbe pertaesi (*μισάνθρωποι*) sicut Pithetaerus et Euelpides, accedebant imprudenter sperantes se inter homines immanes meliorem iustioemque quam in civitate sua vitam inventuros esse” (Kock). Plato was perhaps thinking of the same play again in Rep. VI 496 D *ὡσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος ἐμπεσών, οὔτε ξυναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε ἰκανὸς ὦν εἰς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν*.

οἷοί περ οὖς πέρυσιν: so BT, and there is no sufficient reason for altering the text to *οἷους πέρυσιν* (with Sauppe, after Athenaeus v 218 D) or *οἷους περ πέρυσιν* with Schanz. Plato does not always avail himself of the liberty of attraction: a parallel is quoted from Crat. 432 E *ἵνα κομιδῆ ἢ τοιοῦτον οἷόν περ οὗ ὄνομά ἐστιν*.

36. *πέρυσιν*. Athenaeus v 218 D *ἐδιδάχθησαν δὲ οἱ Ἄγριοι ἐπ' Ἀριστίωνος ἄρχοντος*, i.e. Ol. 89 4=421/420 B.C. For the bearing of the date of the *Ἄγριοι* on the question when the dialogue of the Protagoras is assumed to have taken place see Introd. p. xxxvii.

Φερεκράτης. The fragments of Pherecrates—a poet of the old comedy who gained his first victory in 438 B.C.—are given in Kock's *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* I pp. 145—209.

ἔδιδαξεν ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ. The Λήναιον (also called Λίμναι and τέμενος τοῦ Διονύσου) was an enclosure sacred to Dionysus on the south-east slope of the Acropolis. Compare Photius s.v. Λήναιον· περίβολος μέγας Ἀθήνησιν, ἐν ᾧ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἤγον, πρὸ τοῦ τῷ θεάτρῳ οἰκοδομηθῆναι, ὀνομάζοντες ἐπὶ Ληναίῳ. The phrase 'at Lenaeum' seems to have survived even after all plays were given in the Dionysiac theatre, as by this time they were, and to have been understood as equivalent to 'at the Lenaeian festival' (cf. Ar. Ach. 504 οὐ πὶ Ληναίῳ τ' ἀγῶν), for which the expressions ἐν Ληναίοις and (ἐδιδάχθη) εἰς Λήναια are more usual in the *didascaliae* (see Müller's Bühnenalterthümer p. 316 note 3). The Lenaea took place in the month Gamelion.

38. ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χορῷ, sc. γενόμενοι. γίγνεσθαι ἐν is 'to come to be in or among', 'to fall among'. ἐν τῷ προθύρῳ ἐγενόμεθα of 314 C is the same idiom.

μισάνθρωποι. So the MSS. The various suggested emendations (ἡμιάνθρωποι Heinrich, μιξάνθρωποι Jacobs, μεσάνθρωποι Lehrs) proceed on the supposition that the word is an epithet of the ἄγριοι, which is most improbable: "alii sunt ἄγριοι, alii μισάνθρωποι, neque in illa sermonis iunctura" (sc. if we regard the ὥσπερ clause as explaining τοῖς τοιοῦτοις) "scribendum ὥσπερ sed οἰοί περ fuit" (Heindorf).

39. Εὐρυβάτῳ καὶ Φρυγῶνδᾳ. Two proverbial scoundrels of real life: see Suidas s. vv. Εὐρύβατος πονηρός, ἀπὸ τοῦ πεμφθέντος ὑπὸ Κροίσου ἐπὶ ξενολογίαν μετὰ χρημάτων, ὡς φησιν Ἐφορος, εἶτα μεταβαλομένου πρὸς Κῦρον· ἦν δὲ Ἐφέσιος κτλ. Φρυγῶνδας τῶν ἐπὶ πονηρίᾳ διαβεβοημένων, ὃς ξένος ὢν κατὰ τὰ Πελοποννησιακὰ διέτριβεν Ἀθήνησιν.—ἐκ τούτου τοὺς πονηροὺς Φρυγῶνδας καλοῦσι. They are frequently mentioned in Greek literature: see Blaydes on Ar. Thesm. 861. Blaydes remarks that -ώνδας is a Boeotian termination: cf. Ἐπαμεινώνδας, Χαρώνδας and the like.

327 E 42. οὐδεὶς σοὶ φαίνεται εἶναι. εἶναι is Heindorf's emendation for εἶθ' of the Bodleian. For the asyndeton with ὥσπερ see above on 311 E.

43. τίς διδάσκαλος τοῦ ἑλληνίζειν. The same illustration occurs in Alc. I 111 A.

328 A 48. τούτους ἔτι τίς ἂν διδάξειεν repeats τίς ἂν—διδάξειεν τοὺς τῶν χειροτεχνῶν υἱεῖς: and οὐ ῥάδιον οἶμαι εἶναι—τούτων διδάσκαλον φανῆναι is a variety on οὐδ' ἂν εἰς φανείη, which the οὐδέ γ' ἂν of line 44 might lead us to expect would be repeated—but the sentence is a

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CHAPTER XVII.

Here begins Socrates' criticism of Protagoras' speech. The question is first raised—Is Virtue one, or many? The connexion between this question and the speech of Protagoras is that if Virtue has a unity in knowledge, it is teachable, otherwise not: see *Introd.* p. xx.

328 D 2. **ἐπιδειξάμενος.** *ἐπιδείκνυσθαι* and *ἐπίδειξις* are regularly used of a Sophistic display: e.g. *Gorg.* 447 A *πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ καλὰ Γοργίας ἡμῖν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἐπέδειξατο*, *Crat.* 384 B *τὴν πεντηκοντάδραχμον ἐπίδειξιν. ἐπιδείκνυμι* is also sometimes used in the same way, e.g. *Euthyd.* 274 D and *infra* 347 B: in 320 C above *ἀλλ' ἐπίδειξον* is intended to suggest this meaning, which comes out more clearly in *ἐπιδείξω* two lines below.

3. **ἐπὶ μὲν πολὺν χρόνον** goes with *ἔβλεπον* and *ἔτι* with *κεκηλημένος*.

8. **ὦ παῖ Ἀπολλοδώρου:** with mock solemnity: so 335 D *ὦ παῖ Ἰππολίκου*, *Rep.* II 368 A *ὦ παῖδες ἐκείνου τάνδρος*.

9. **ὦδε** in the sense of *δεῦρο* is noted as a Platonic idiom by the lexicographers. The usage is found in tragedy, but no other example is quoted from Plato.

328 E 12. **ἀνθρωπίνην ἐπιμέλειαν:** cf. *Meno* 99 E *ἀρετὴ ἂν εἴη οὔτε φύσει οὔτε διδακτόν, ἀλλὰ θεῖα μοῖρα παραγιγνομένη ἄνευ νοῦ*.

15. **ἐπεκδιδάξει—ἐξεδίδαξεν:** see on 311 A.

329 A 17. **τάχ' ἂν καὶ τοιούτους λόγους:** *καὶ* goes with *τοιούτους*—'even such', 'just such': *τούτου* should not be inserted (with Sauppe, Schanz, Kral) before *τοιούτους*.

20. **ὥσπερ βιβλία.** Hermann wished to read *οὐχ ὥσπερ βιβλία*, since the orators do make a speech when spoken to: but the point is that like books they do not answer the questions asked, or put questions themselves, as the true dialectician does: cf. *Phaedr.* 275 D *δεινὸν γὰρ που—τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁμοιον ζωγραφία. καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἔστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρη τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾶ. ταῦτόν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι· δόξαις μὲν ἂν ὡς τι φρονούντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρη τῶν λεγομένων βουλόμενος μαθεῖν, ἐν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταῦτόν ἀεὶ: *infra* 347 E and *Hipp. Min.* 365 D *τὸν μὲν Ὀμηρον—ἑάσωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἐπανερέσθαι, τίποτε νοῶν ταῦτα ἐποίησε τὰ ἔπη*. A similar objection applies to laws: see *Polit.* 294 A (quoted above on 326 D).*

22. **ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκία.** The MSS have *χαλκεία*, but (as Kro-

schel points out) in Crat. 430 A εἴ τι χαλκίον κινήσειε κρούσας, χαλκεία would mean 'smithies'.

23. μακρὸν ἤχει καὶ ἀποτείνει: ἀποτείνει is used absolutely as in Gorg. 458 B καὶ νῦν ἴσως πόρρω ἀποτενοῦμεν. Compare Euthyd. 300 B ὅταν οὖν λίθους λέγῃς καὶ ξύλα καὶ σιδήρια, οὐ σιγῶντα λέγεις; οὐκ οὖν ἄ γε ἐγώ, ἔφη, παρέρχομαι ἐν τοῖς χαλκείοις (MSS. χαλκίοις), ἀλλὰ φθεγγόμενα καὶ βοῶντα μέγιστον τὰ σιδήρια λέγει.

25. δόλιχον κατατείνουσι τοῦ λόγου. δολιχὸν is the reading of B and T, but (1) the adjective δολιχός seems to be exclusively poetic, the word surviving in Plato's time only in the form δόλιχος for δολιχός δρόμος (cf. for the change of accent κάκη by κακή, Φαῖδρος by φαιδρός and the like): (2) δολιχός τοῦ λόγου would be a rare construction, though not without parallels, e.g. πολλήν τῆς χώρας in Xen. Cyrop. III 2. 2 and τῆς μαρίλης συχνήν in Ar. Ach. 350: ἀμήχανον τῆς εὐδαιμονίας of Apol. 41 C is different: (3) after the expressive simile which we have had, 'a long speech' sounds very weak. On the other hand δόλιχος τοῦ λόγου, the suggestion of Stephanus, is strongly supported by 335 E where Socrates compares Protagoras, because he plays the ῥήτωρ and not the dialectician, to a δολιχόδρομος: νῦν δ' ἐστὶν ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῷ Ἰμεραίῳ δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι ἔπεσθαι ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῷ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι, and the editors quote a number of parallels to the metaphor, such as Plut. Phoc. 23. 3 καλῶς ἔφη πρὸς τὸ στάδιον, τὸν δὲ δόλιχον τοῦ πολέμου φοβοῦμαι; Epicrates in Kock's Com. Att. Frag. Vol. II p. 283 ἐπεὶ δὲ δόλιχον τοῖς ἔτεσιν ἤδη τρέχει, Ar. Clouds 430 τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἶναι με λέγειν ἑκατὸν σταδίοισιν ἄριστον and Frogs 91 πλεῖν ἢ σταδίῳ λαλίστερα, Eurpolis (Kock l. c. I p. 281) (of Pericles) ὁπότε παρέλθοι δ' ὡσπερ ἀγαθοὶ δρομῆς ἐκ δέκα ποδῶν ἤρει λέγων τοὺς ῥήτορας. Dropping the sporting metaphor we may say 'spin out a league of verbiage against you'. The δόλιχος was 24 στάδια, the στάδιον being covered 12 times both ways: cf. Pind. Ol. III 33.

27. ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ. The MSS read αὐτά, which most recent 329 B editors change to αὐτό with Stephanus, regarding the idiom as analogous to that in 324 A αὐτό σε διδάξει, but in this idiomatic use of αὐτό the verb is generally, if not always, in the future. αὐτό που λέγει in Ar. Eq. 204 and the cases quoted by Blaydes in loc. are different, since in each case αὐτό has a definite antecedent expressed. ὡς αὐτὰ δηλοῖ is simply as 'things themselves' i.e. 'as facts shew': the reference is to the speech which Protagoras has just delivered.

Compare Arist. Pol. IV 12. 1331^a 21 δῆλον ὡς αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται κτλ. and (with Heindorf) Xen. Cyr. VI 1. 7 οὐκ οἶδα μὲν ἔγωγε, εἴ τι δεῖ λόγων, ὅπου αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα δείκνυσι τὸ κράτιστον.

31. εἴ μοι ἀποκρίναιο τόδε. The optative follows σμικροῦ τινὸς ἐνδεῆς εἰμι πάντ' ἔχειν as virtually equivalent to πάντ' ἂν ἔχοιμι (Heindorf).

32. εἴπερ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι. The fulness of expression is no doubt intentional: Socrates politely dwells upon his compliment. The objections to the syntax are twofold: (1) ἄν with the optative in protasis; (2) εἴπερ (in clauses of this kind) with its verb expressed. Cases of the potential optative in the protasis are given by Goodwin MT. p. 192 (e.g. Xen. Mem. I 5. 3 εἴ γε μηδὲ δοῦλον ἀκρατῆ δεξαίμεθ' ἄν, πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτόν γε φυλάξασθαι τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι); for εἴπερ with verb expressed Heindorf cites Meno 98 B ἀλλ' εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἰδέναι (ὀλίγα δ' ἂν φαίην) ἐν δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὦν οἶδα. Socrates' νῦν δὲ πέπεισμαι (hardly serious) in 328 E is not inconsistent with πειθοίμην ἄν, since he at once qualifies his assent by πλὴν σμικρόν τί μοι ἐμποδῶν: it is sufficiently represented here by καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι. We therefore agree with Heindorf, Wayte, and Turner in retaining the MSS reading: other editors mostly read either εἴπερ ἄλλω τῷ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν καὶ σοί, or drop πειθοίμην ἄν and retain καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι.

329 C 35. ἔλεγε γάρ: 322 C δικαιοσύνη and αἰδώς are looked on as two *distinct* virtues.

36. πολλαχοῦ: 324 E—325 A: cf. 323 A and E.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Socrates elicits from Protagoras (1) that while Virtue as a whole is one, the single virtues differ from each other and form the whole like the parts of the face: that it is possible to possess one virtue without possessing all: and that in all there are five virtues, justice, temperance, holiness, bravery, wisdom, of which the last is greatest (329 D—330 A): (2) that the virtues differ from each other not only in themselves, but in their δύναμις (330 A—330 B): (3) that justice is just, and holiness holy (330 B—330 E). The refutation of Protagoras does not begin till the next chapter.

329 D 4. προσώπου: προσώπου is treated as an abstract conception—'parts of face': cf. ψυχή in 313 C κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται: Rep. IV 435 C εἰς φαῦλόν γε αὐ—σκῶμμα ἐμπεπτώκαμεν περὶ

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330 B 27. ἀλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες. So T: B has only ἀλλ' οὕτως, ἔφη. The longer form of answer is more suited to Protagoras' style.

330 C 32. ἡ δικαιοσύνη πράγμα τί ἐστίν. Compare infra 332 A ἀφροσύνην τι καλεῖς; 332 C, 358 D. Plato frequently begins a train of reasoning in this way.

34. καὶ ἐμοί: so T: B has καὶ μοι. καὶ ἐμοί seems slightly better than κάμοι, as forming a more effective balance to ἐμοὶ μὲν in the last line.

35. ὦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες: but ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ as Greek usage requires. Protagoras is addressed first on the principle *seniores priores* and *honoris causa*; contrast 311 D, and compare 353 A (Kroschel).

εἶπετον: contrast 311 D εἶπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατες, where see note. The dual gives prominence to the notion in κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα (line 31). The connexion of this part of the argument with the rest is this: in 330 A—330 B it is said that no one part of virtue is οἷον τὸ ἕτερον, e.g. that δικαιοσύνη is not οἷον ὀσιότης (major premise): here it is said that δικαιοσύνη is δίκαιον, ὀσιότης ὄσιον (minor premise): from which the conclusion (in the next chapter) is drawn that δικαιοσύνη is not ὄσιον, nor ὀσιότης δίκαιον. This stage of the argument is therefore neither “tautological nor unmeaning” as Grote (quoted by Turner) asserts.

330 D 47. οἷον ἀνόσιον εἶναι ἢ οἷον ὄσιον. Notice the identification of the ‘not ὄσιον’ with ἀνόσιον: see below on 331 A.

330 E 49. εὐφήμει, ὦ ἄνθρωπε. ὦ ἄνθρωπε is somewhat brusque: so ὦ ἄνθρωποι in 314 D above. ἄνθρωπε without ὦ would border on rudeness: e.g. Gorg. 518 C ἴσως ἂν οὖν ἠγανάκτεις, εἰ σοι ἔλεγον, ἄνθρωπε, οὐδὲν ἐπαλεῖς περὶ γυμναστικῆς. εὐφήμει is frequent to express shocked surprise, real or feigned: e.g. Rep. I 329 C, Meno 91 B (Ἡράκλεις, εὐφήμει, ὦ Σώκρατες), Gorg. 469 A, Euthyd. 301 A.

CHAPTER XIX.

Socrates endeavours to refute Protagoras and to shew that Justice and Holiness are identical. If ὀσιότης is not οἷον δικαιοσύνη, nor δικαιοσύνη οἷον ὀσιότης, it will follow (says Socrates) that ὀσιότης is ἀδίκον and δικαιοσύνη ἀνόσιον. This is absurd, and therefore ὀσιότης is δίκαιον and δικαιοσύνη is ὄσιον. Protagoras will only admit that there is a certain likeness between the two virtues.

4. τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη. B and T omit the article, which can hardly be dispensed with—since the assertion was made not of parts of virtue, but of *the* i.e. all the parts: see 330 A ἀρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ ἕτερον οἶον τὸ ἕτερον—; ἢ δῆλα δὴ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει κτλ.;

οὕτως—ὡς. ὥστε for ὡς would be more usual: cf. Rep. II 365 D ἐξ ὧν τὰ μὲν πείσομεν, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦντες δίκην μὴ διδόναι. Perhaps the ὡς of Phaedo 108 E πέπεισμαι—ὡς πρῶτον μὲν—μηδὲν αὐτῇ δεῖν μήτε ἀέρος κτλ. is the same in kind: cf. the old English 'so as'. Here οὕτως—ὡς with the infinitive is natural in view of τοιοῦτον οἶον in the vicinity: 330 C and D.

11—12. σὺ—σός: notice the mock asperity: I expected better things of *you*. 331 A

16. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν: the interrogation begins here and ἄρα is illative.

17. ἀλλ' οἶον μὴ ὅσιον. So far we are entitled to go, but in τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον (line 18) the contrary and the contradictory are confused, as is frequently the case in Plato's dialogues: see note on Euthyphr. 7 A θεομισές, where are cited Alcib. II 138 D foll., Rep. IV 437 C: add Phileb. 48 B foll. where φθόνος is said to be joy at a friend's misfortune because envy of a friend's success implies joy at his ill-luck (cf. *ibid.* 50 A), and Euthyd. 276 B οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ σοφοί, ἀμαθεῖς; πάνυ γε. Plato was not unaware of the rules of logic in this matter (see Symp. 201 E—202 A), but the tendency of Greek thought and life was not to rest content with negations; whence words like ἀνωφελής, ἀφθονος acquired a positive significance, and Solon could enact ('Αθηναίων πολιτεία Ch. 8 ad fin.) ὅς ἂν στασιαζούσης τῆς πόλεως μὴ τιθῆται τὰ ὄπλα μηδὲ μεθ' ἐτέρων, ἄτιμον εἶναι καὶ τῆς πόλεως μὴ μετέχειν. Part of the argument in the next chapter suffers from the same flaw: see on 332 A line 3.

18. ἀλλ' ἄδικον ἄρα: Heindorf's emendation for ἀλλὰ δίκαιον ἄρα, the reading of the best MSS, which τὸ δὲ ἀνόσιον proves to be wrong and shews how to correct. Heindorf's correction was afterwards confirmed by a Paris MS. ἄρα is illative. For τὸ μὲν unexpressed (the words are equivalent to ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄδικον ἄρα) before τὸ δέ see on 330 A ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο.

22. ὅτι is 'because', not 'that': see note on line 24 below.

23. δικαιοσύνης ὁσιότητι. Socrates gives the words the same termination to suggest their closer likeness ('justness' to holiness): δικαιοσύνης is found also in Gorg. 508 A as a balance to κοσμιότητα.

331 B

Plato was fond of this suffix and coined by it the word ποιότης Theaet. 182 A.

24. καὶ μάλιστα πάντων—οἶον δικαιοσύνη. Kroschel objects to the emphasis, and inclines to doubt the genuineness of this clause. If ὅτι in line 22 is translated as 'because' and not as 'that', the difficulty disappears. ταῦτ' ἂν ταῦτα in line 22 thus means simply that δικαιοσύνη is ὄσιον and ὀσιότης δίκαιον (lines 20—21), which is the meaning also assigned to ταῦτ' ἂν ταῦτα by Protagoras in his reply (line 27 foll.). Socrates (for Protagoras) will reply that δικαιοσύνη is ὄσιον and ὀσιότης δίκαιον for two main reasons: (1) because δικαιοσύνη is the same as ὀσιότης—this he does not much insist ὅτι—or because δικαιοσύνη is ὅτι ὀσιότης—this he insists on more: (2) because δικαιοσύνη is οἶον ὀσιότης and ὀσιότης οἶον δικαιοσύνη—this he insists on most of all (μάλιστα πάντων), and with reason, because it expressly refutes Protagoras' assertion in 330 A—B. On the other hand if ὅτι is translated as 'that', Kroschel's objections can hardly be got over—viz. that ἦτοι ταῦτόν—δικαιοσύνη is not the same as Socrates' reply on his own behalf; that the words are ignored both by Protagoras in his reply and by Socrates himself in 333 B; and that the emphasis of μάλιστα πάντων is strained and unnatural.

331 C 28. ἀπλοῦν: opposed to ἀλλά τί μοι δοκεῖ ἐν αὐτῷ διάφορον εἶναι in 29. Plato uses ἀπλοῦν, as opposed to διπλοῦν, διάφορον, σύνθετον, πεπλεγμένον, ποικίλον and the like, of that which is uniform, simple, true without any difference or qualifications: Bonitz in Hermes II (1867) p. 307 foll.

32. μή μοι: see on μή οὕτως in 318 B.

33. τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο—ἐλέγχεσθαι, cf. infra 333 C τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔγωγε μάλιστα ἐξετάζω, συμβαίνει μέντοι ἴσως καὶ ἐμὲ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἐξετάζεσθαι. Here τό, as often, introduces a quotation.

34. τὸ δ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ τοῦτο λέγω: τοῦτο (cf. line 33) belongs to the τὸ δ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ and not to λέγω in the usual sense of τοῦτο λέγω 'I mean this'.

331 D 38. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι. Anaxagoras went so far as to say that snow was black. (because it is still water, though congealed): Ritter and Preller § 128 note b.

39. ὄπη: an old emendation for δ μή.

44. ταῦτα: the parts of the face.

331 E 47. καὶ πάνυ μικρὸν ἔχη τὸ ὅμοιον. This (the MSS reading) is successfully defended by Kroschel. The emphasis is on the first

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will be observed that Socrates already allows no middle position between *σωφρονεῖν* and its opposite: see above on line 3.

332 C 19. *φέρε δὴ*. From here to line 27 Socrates tries to prove that a thing can have but one *ἐναντίον*. This is true only if we confine *ἐναντίον* to the meaning of 'contradictorily opposite' throughout, e.g. if we are always content merely to assert that the *ἐναντίον* of *καλόν* is *μὴ καλόν*: as soon as we say that its *ἐναντίον* is *αἰσχρόν* we have given to the thing two opposites (one of them multiform)—since *μὴ καλόν* is not *αἰσχρόν* but may be anything in the whole world except *καλόν*. This part of the argument is therefore also vitiated by neglecting the difference between contrary and contradictory terms.

332 D 27. *ἀναλογισώμεθα*: of reckoning up and reflecting as in Rep. I 330 E, X 618 C.

33—34. *ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης—ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης*. This has not been admitted in so many words, but with *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀφροσύνη* for *ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης* and *ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης*: 332 B line 12: cf. C line 18.

332 E 40. *ἔμπροσθεν*: 332 A.

44. *τό* does not belong to *ἐν* but to the clause *ἐν ἐνὶ μόνον ἐναντίον εἶναι*: cf. *τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο* in 331 C. *ἐκεῖνον* refers to Chapter XVIII.

333 A 49. *οὐ πάνυ μουσικῶς—συναρμόττουσιν*. "In his *lenem agnosco Sophistae irrisionem, qui supra § 43*" (326 B) "*πάντα τὸν βίον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐρυθμίας τε καὶ εὐαρμοστίας δεῖσθαι dixisset*". Heindorf.

333 B 52. *πλείω δὲ μῆ*. B reads *πλείωσιν*, T *πλείωσι*: *πλείω* is a suggestion of Heindorf's, adopted by most editors. The nominatives *ἐν μόνον* in line 51 and *σοφία* and *σωφροσύνη* in 53 are strongly in favour of *πλείω*. If *πλείωσιν* is retained, it must be regarded as a blemish in Plato's style.

59. *τὰ λοιπά*. If *δικαιοσύνη* = *δσιότης* and *σωφροσύνη* = *σοφία* it remains to identify either *δικαιοσύνη* or *δσιότης* with either *σωφροσύνη* or *σοφία* in order to prove the identity of these four virtues. Socrates begins to prove that *δικαιοσύνη* = *σωφροσύνη*.

60. *ὅτι ἀδικεῖ*: *ὅτι* (cf. infra 333 D, and Parm. 155 E) is equivalent to *κατὰ τοῦτο ὅ*: cf. Rep. I 340 D *ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἰατρὸν καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ ἐξαμαρτάνει*; *ὅτι* the relative and *ὅτι* the conjunction shade into one another here. There is much to be said for Cron's view that the words should be written alike: see on Apology, Appendix II. p. 123.

333 C 62. *πολλοί γέ φασιν*. In Rep. I 348 B foll., Thrasymachus

asserts that *ἀδικία* is *εὐβουλία*, *ἀρετή*, *καλόν* and *ἰσχυρόν*: compare also Polus in *Gorg.* 469 B foll. Notice that Protagoras' *οἴω* opinion—that *ἀδικία* is not compatible with *σωφροσύνη*—makes for the identification of *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωφροσύνη*.

65. *τὸν τῶν πολλῶν*: on account of the *τῶν* here, Heindorf wished to insert *οἱ* before *πολλοί* in line 62, but such a view could hardly be said to be held by the majority: cf. *Rep.* I 348 E *εἰ γὰρ λυσιτελεῖν μὲν τὴν ἀδικίαν ἐτίθεσο, κακίαν μὲντοι ἢ αἰσχροὺν αὐτὸ ὡμολόγεις εἶναι ὥσπερ ἄλλοι τινές, εἴχομεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες κτλ.* As Sauppe points out, the article *τῶν* refers only to the above-mentioned *πολλοί*. With the situation compare *Rep.* VII 527 E foll. *σκόπει οὖν αὐτόθεν πρὸς ποτέρους διαλέγει, ἢ οὐ πρὸς οὐδετέρους ἀλλὰ σαυτοῦ ἕνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους, φθονοῖς μὴν οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλω εἴ τις τι δύναίτο ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι.*

66. *εἴτ' οὖν—εἴτε*: see on *Apol.* 34 E.

CHAPTER XXI.

Before Socrates has completed his proof that *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη* are identical, Protagoras takes occasion to deliver an irrelevant though carefully constructed harangue on *ἀγαθά*.

1. *ἐκαλλωπίζετο*. Cf. *Phaedr.* 236 D *παῦσαι πρὸς με καλλωπιζόμενος· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἔχω δ' εἰπὼν ἀναγκάσω σε λέγειν*: so also *τρυφᾶν*, cf. *Euthyphr.* II E *ἐπειδὴ δέ μοι δοκεῖς σὺ τρυφᾶν, αὐτός σοι ξυμπροθυμήσομαι*, where see note.

6. *ἔστω*. Protagoras has already disclaimed this view in 333 B.

8. *ὅτι ἀδικοῦσιν*: Hirschig suggested *δ' τι ἀδικοῦσιν*, but see on 333 B. Schanz rejects the words, but without sufficient reason.

9. *εὖ πράττουσιν ἀδικοῦντες*. *εὖ* is here primarily of success, and *κακῶς* of failure, but the collocation of *εὖ πράττειν* with *ἀδικεῖν* is intended to suggest that the view which Protagoras is defending is a paradox. Plato frequently makes use of the double sense (as we should call it: but see on *Euthyphr.* 3 A) of *εὖ πράττειν*, *εὖ ζῆν* and the like, to imply that the virtuous life is the happy one: e.g. *Alcib.* I 116 B foll.: *Rep.* I 353 E foll.: *Charm.* 172 A, 173 D: compare *Euthyd.* 281 c.

10. *λέγεις οὖν ἀγαθά*. Socrates proceeds to elucidate the definition of *εὖ* in *εὖ πράττειν*.

12. *ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*: *Xen. Mem.* IV 6. 8 *ἄλλο δ' ἂν τι φαίης ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον; οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. τὸ ἄρα ὠφέλιμον*

ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἂν ὠφέλιμον ᾖ; δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη. Plato Rep. II 379 B τί δέ; ὠφέλιμον τὸ ἀγαθόν; ναί.

333 E 15. ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι. The martial metaphor in the desiderative ἀγωνιᾶν is carried on by παρατετάχθαι, which is the MSS reading, and means literally 'to be set in array', cf. Thuc. IV 43. 3 οὔτοι γὰρ παρατεταγμένοι ἦσαν ἔσχατοι. For the metaphorical use cf. Rep. III 399 B ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις παρατεταγμένως καὶ καρτερούντως ἀμυνόμενου τὴν τύχην. The whole clause describes the outward demeanour of Protagoras, which causes Socrates to fear an imminent personal conflict. Kock's παρατετάσθαι, accepted by Schanz, does not suit, since παρατετάσθαι means 'to be tired, worn out', e.g. Euthyd. 303 B καὶ γελῶντε καὶ κροτοῦντε...ὀλίγου παρετάθησαν, cf. Ar. Clouds 213. It is noteworthy that συντεταγμένως and συντεταμένως are frequently found as variants in Platonic MSS.

334 A 20. οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. The argument is here broken off, and not (in its present form) again resumed. If Socrates had continued, Protagoras would doubtless have asserted that what is ὠφέλιμον for man is for him ἀγαθόν. The argument has therefore been: σωφρονεῖν, it is said, is ἀδικεῖν. But σωφρονεῖν = εὖ φρονεῖν = εὖ βουλευέσθαι if (but only if) εὖ πράττειν (i.e. ὠφέλιμα πράττειν) accompanies εὐβουλία. In other words ὠφέλιμα πράττειν = ἀδικεῖν is the stage which we have reached—a thesis which it is the object of the Republic and of a large part of the Gorgias to refute.

πολλὰ οἶδ' ἄ. The speech which follows may be from some work by Protagoras (so recently Zeller in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie V 2, p. 177), perhaps his περὶ ἀρετῶν, mentioned by Diog. Laert. IX 8. 55 (since ἀρετή is a general word for excellence). Zeller points out that just as the notion 'true' was conceived by Protagoras (in his πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος) as relative, so here the notion 'good' is represented as relative and varying with that to which it is relative.

21. ἀνθρώποις μὲν—ὠφέλιμα: ἀνθρώποις μὲν has no antithesis expressed: were the antitheses expressed in full, the sentence would be very cumbrous, running somewhat as follows: ἔγωγε πολλὰ οἶδ' ἄ ἀνθρώποις μὲν <τὰ μὲν> ἀνωφελῆ ἐστί, καὶ σίτια—μυρία, <τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς ὠφέλιμα>, τὰ δέ γε <ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις ἀνωφελῆ>. For μὲν without a balancing clause see on τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι in Euthyphr. 3 C, and on 330 A above for τὰ δέ without a preceding τὰ μὲν. ἀνωφελῆ is 'hurtful', as frequently: see above on οἶον μὴ ὄσιον in 331 A. With Protagoras' classification of ὠφέλιμα—

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of scents in banqueting: see Xen. Symp. II 2 foll. Kroschel thinks Plato is making fun of Protagoras by putting into his mouth the word 'ρίνω̄ν pro πικρῶν vel χυμῶν', but this view will hardly command assent.

CHAPTER XXII.

This and the next three chapters form a kind of interlude. In this chapter Socrates, protesting against Protagoras' long replies, remembers an engagement and is about to go, and Callias beseeches him to stay.

334 D 11. καὶ βραχυτέρας ποιεῖ. Hirschig would reject the words, but they explain the metaphor in σύντεμνε: see on 314 A κυβεύης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης.

334 E 15. ὅσα ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. Compare Gorg. 461 D τί δέ; οὐκ ἐξέσται μοι λέγειν ὅποσα ἂν βούλωμαι;

19. καὶ αὖ βραχέα. Sauppe cites Gorg. 449 C καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τοῦτο ἔν ἐστιν ὧν φημί, μηδένα ἂν ἐν βραχυτέροις ἐμοῦ τὰ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν. τούτου μὴν δεῖ, ὧ Γοργία· καὶ μοι ἐπίδειξιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ποιῆσαι, τῆς βραχυλογίας, μακρολογίας δὲ εἰσαῦθις: cf. also Gorg. 461 D and Phaedr. 267 B.

335 A 24. ὡς ὁ ἀντιλέγων—οὕτω διελεγόμεν. Asyndeton is frequent in such sentences: cf. Rep. II 359 B (cited by Heindorf) εἰ τοιόνδε ποιήσαιμεν τῇ διανοίᾳ, δόντες ἐξουσίαν—εἴτ' ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν κτλ. See on 311 E.

26. ἐγένετο Πρωταγόρου ὄνομα. With ἐγένετο ὄνομα (for which Kroschel reads ἐλέγετο ὄνομα) cf. Apol. 20 D τί ποτ' ἔστιν τοῦτο δ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν: γίγνεσθαι is the usual passive to ποιεῖν. With the sentence generally cf. Euthyphr. 4 E—5 A where Euthyphro says οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν μου ὄφελος εἴη, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐδέ τῳ ἂν διαφέρει Εὐθύφρων τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ μὴ κτλ.: see note in loc. for more parallels.

27. οὐκ ἤρεσεν—καὶ—οὐκ ἐθελήσοι. The combination of indicative and optative in the same sentence in indirect speech is fairly common: Goodwin MT. p. 261 § 670.

335 B 30. ἡγησάμενος. Heindorf conjectures ἡγησάμενος οὖν, but οὖν may be dispensed with after a short parenthesis.

335 C 38. τὰ μακρὰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατος. Meno 94 B ἵνα δὲ μὴ ὀλίγους οἶη καὶ τοὺς φαυλοτάτους Ἀθηναίων ἀδυνάτους γεγονέναι τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα: Rep. VI 478 A ἐφ' ἐτέρῳ ἄρα ἕτερόν τι δυναμένη ἑκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν.

40. *ἵνα συνουσία ἐγίγνετο*. For this construction see note on Crito 44 D *εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον—οἷοί τ' εἶναι—ἵνα οἷοί τ' ἦσαν*. A secondary tense of the indicative is found with *ἵνα* and *ὅπως* (without *ἄν*) in final clauses dependent on a wish which can no longer be fulfilled, or on the apodosis to an impossible protasis: Goodwin MT. p. 120 § 333. The idiom is frequent in Plato and sometimes corrupted by scribes e.g. Meno 89 B *ἡμεῖς ἄν παραλαβόντες—ἐφυλάττομεν—ἵνα μηδεὶς αὐτοὺς διέφθειρεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκοντο εἰς τὴν ἡλικίαν, χρήσιμοι γίγνοντο ταῖς πόλεσιν*—where perhaps we should read *ἀφίκοντο* and *ἐγίγνοντο*. See Cobet's *Variae Lectiones* pp. 102, 359.

47. *τρίβωνος*. The ordinary clothing of an Athenian consisted 335 D of a *χιτών*, or shirt, with a *ιμάτιον* or short mantle worn above it. The *τρίβων* was a short cloak of coarse material worn by the Spartans and sometimes by the Laconisers in other states to take the place of both *χιτών* and *ιμάτιον*. It was the ordinary garment of Socrates (Symp. 219 B), and was afterwards much affected by the more ascetic philosophers, such as the Cynics (Diog. Laert. VI 1. 13). Its use was supposed to be a mark of sturdy simplicity and austerity of manners.

50. *οὐδ' ἄν ἐνός*. The two parts of *οὐδεὶς* are sometimes separated by *ἄν* or a preposition, often with the effect (as here) of increasing the emphasis by making *οὐδέ* = *ne—quidem*, cf. infra on 343 D *οὐδὲ πρὸς ἓνα λόγον*.

53. *ὦ παῖ Ἰππονίκου*: see on 328 D above. With *ἀεὶ μὲν—ἀτὰρ* Sauppe compares Rep. II 367 E *καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἀεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἠγάμην, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἤσθην*.

54. *φιλοσοφίαν*. The original meaning of the word *φιλοσοφία* was 'love of knowledge for its own sake', no particular kind of knowledge being specified. The verb *φιλοσοφεῖν* is first found in Herod. I 30 *ὡς φιλοσοφῶν γῆν πολλὴν θεωρήσας εἵνεκεν ἐπελήλυθας*. In the present passage (as in Thuc. II 40 *φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας*) the word retains its original wider meaning, viz. 'love of knowledge' in general; but side by side with this in Plato it has the more restricted meaning of 'Philosophy', e.g. Rep. VI 496 A *πάνσμικρον δὴ τι...λείπεται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν ὁμιλούντων φιλοσοφία*. The wider meaning is also found in Aristotle, where he calls Theology the 'Highest Study' (*πρώτη φιλοσοφία*), and elsewhere.

57. *Κρίσωνι*. Criso of Himera, a famous *σταδιοδρόμος*, won 335 E

three times at Olympia, viz. Olymp. 83, 84, and 85 (448, 444, and 440 B.C.). His chastity during his prime as an athlete is mentioned in Laws VIII 840 A. *δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι* is rejected by some editors, but *δρομεῖ* should be taken with *Ἱμεραίῳ* and *ἀκμάζοντι* with *ἔπεσθαι*: 'to keep up with Criso, the runner of Himera, when he was in his prime'—presumably at the assumed date of this dialogue he was past his *ἀκμή*.

58. *δολιχοδρόμων*: *δολιχοδρόμοι εἰσὶν οἱ τὸν δόλιχον τρέχοντες*, says the scholiast: see on 329 A.

ἡμεροδρόμων. Heindorf quotes Livy XXXI 24. 4 "Hemerodromos vocant Graeci ingens die uno cursu emetientes spatium". Such was Phidippides; see Hdt. VI 105 *ἡμεροδρόμην τε καὶ τοῦτο μελετῶντα*.

59. *διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι*. *δια-* in compounds frequently denotes competition: for *διαθεῖν* cf. Theaet. 148 C *εἶτα διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἠττήθης*. As the emphasis is on *ἔπεσθαι* ('keep up with') *διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι* is equivalent to *διαθέοντα ἔπεσθαι*: cf. note on 317 C *ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι*, where *καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι* is (so to speak) enclitic as *διαθεῖν τε καὶ* is proclitic [cf. the English "Some—must be talked over by the hour before they could reach the humblest decision, which they only left the office *to return again* (ten minutes later) *and rescind*"].

336 A 63. *συγκαθεῖναι*: intransitive as in Rep. VIII 563 A *οἱ δὲ γέροντες ξυγκαθειέντες τοῖς νέοις*: so *παρέχω* for *παρέχω ἑμαυτὸν* infra 348 A *ἔτοιμός εἰμι σοι παρέχειν ἀποκρινόμενος*: cf. also *ἐκεῖνοι τε ἀπέκρυσαν* (sc. *ἑαυτούς*) Thuc. V 65. 5. The omission of the reflexive pronoun is a well-recognised way of making transitive verbs into intransitive.

336 B 68. *χωρίς*. Soph. O. C. 808 *χωρὶς τὸ τ' εἰπεῖν πολλὰ καὶ τὰ καίρια*. "In talibus locis *δίχα, χωρίς* etc. non ut vulgo, seiunctionem et separationem, sed diversitatem et oppositionem significant". Kroschel. The usage is frequent in Plato. *δημηγορεῖν* is *contionari*—platform oratory.

70. *ὄρᾳς*. Almost like our colloquial 'don't you know' (when used parenthetically and without interrogative force): the *ἀλλὰ* belongs in strict logic to *δίκαια δοκεῖ λέγειν*. Heindorf quotes parallels from Aristophanes e.g. Peace 330—331 *οὐκ ἂν ὀρχησαίμεθ', εἴπερ ὠφελήσαιμέν τί σε. ἀλλ' ὄρᾳτ', οὐπω πέπαυσθε*. Where *ὄρᾳς* or *ὄρᾳτε* stand in this way as the first word of a sentence, editors generally regard the usage as interrogative, e.g. Eur. Orest. 581 *ὄρᾳς; Ὀδυσσέως ἄλοχον οὐ κατέκτανε*.

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τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως εἶπες, Theaet. 157 B τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς—ἠναγκάσμεθα—χρησθαι αὐτῷ.

17. **χρῆ γάρ κτλ.**: said apologetically.

336 E 21. **φιλόνικος**. The MSS read *φιλόνεικος* and presently *συμφιλονεικεῖν*. It is however clear that the word comes from *φιλο-* and *νίκη*, not from *φιλο-* and *νεῖκος* (in which case the form would be *φιλονεικῆς*: compare *φιλοκερδῆς*, *φιλοκυδῆς*, but *φιλότιμος*, *φιλόδοξος*, *φιλόθηρος* and the like). Schanz has found only two traces of the original spelling with iota in Plato's MSS (A, B, T): viz. in Laws XI 935 B where Paris A has *ἀριστείων πέρι φιλονικῆση*, and Alcib. I 122 C where *φιλονικίαν* appears as a correction for *φιλονεικίαν* in T. We might in consequence be tempted to suppose that Plato himself wrote *φιλόνεικος* through the influence of a false etymology, were it not that the derivation from *νίκη* alone suits the meaning, and that in more than one passage he shews himself conscious of the connexion of the word with *νίκη*, notably in Rep. IX 586 C *τί δέ; περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐχ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ὅς ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττηται ἢ φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἢ βία διὰ φιλονικίαν (φιλονεικίαν A) ἢ θυμῷ διὰ δυσκολίαν, πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ διώκων ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ;* Compare also ib. 581 A-B. The orthography of this word is an old subject of dispute (see Stallbaum on Rep. VIII 545 A): Schanz (Preface to Vol. VI p. x) declares himself, after a full discussion, for *φιλόνικος*.

337 A 25. **ὁ Πρόδικος—ἔφη**. Prodicus contrives to make his remarks an *ἐπίδειξις* on *ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων*, which was his leading subject of instruction: see Euthyd. 277 E and cf. above on 314 C. The distinctions drawn by Prodicus are on the whole sound if somewhat wiredrawn and pedantic. The carefully balanced style of the speech finds a parallel in the story of Heracles in Xenophon Mem. II 1. 21 foll.: compare especially §§ 31—33.

28. **κοινὸς—ἄκροατᾶς—ἴσους**. *κοινός* and *ἴσος* are found as epithets of *ἄκροατῆς* in the orators: e.g. Dem. De Cor. 7 *τὰ τοῦ λέγοντος ὑστέρου δίκαια εὐνοϊκῶς προσδέξεται καὶ παρασχῶν ἑαυτὸν ἴσον καὶ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἄκροατῆν οὕτω τὴν διάγνωσιν ποιήσεται περὶ πάντων*, and Andoc. in Alcib. § 7 *δέομαι δ' ὑμῶν, τῶν λόγων ἴσους καὶ κοινούς ἡμῖν ἐπιστάτας γενέσθαι* (Heindorf).

31. **τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλέον κτλ.** In other words *ἰσότης γεωμετρική* and not *ἰσότης ἀριθμητική* should be observed by the audience (Gorg. 508 A): the regard paid to the speakers should be in proportion to their merit.

34. ἀμφισβητεῖν—ἐρίζειν. Cicero's translation of this sentence 337 B is preserved by Priscian (Nobbe's Cicero, p. 1313): "Nunc a vobis, a Protagora et Socrate (*leg.* o Protagora et Socrates), postulo, ut de isto concedatis alter alteri, et inter vos de huiusmodi rebus controversemini, non concertetis".

39. εὐδοκιμοῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐπαινοῖσθε. Heindorf suggests that ἀλλ' οὐκ should be written for καὶ οὐκ, or καὶ omitted: but καὶ is occasionally used in this way.

41. ἄνευ ἀπάτης is opposed to παρὰ δόξαν ψευδομένων: εὐδοκιμεῖν implies that he with whom one εὐδοκιμεῖ is sincere. ἐν λόγῳ as opposed to παρὰ ταῖς ψυχαῖς suggests Shakespeare's "Mouth-honour, breath, which the poor heart would fain deny, but dare not".

44. εὐφραίνεσθαι is connected by Prodicus with φρόνησις 337 C (φρονήσεως μεταλαμβάνοντα): for a fantastic derivation of the kindred εὐφροσύνη see Crat. 419 D παντὶ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν συμφέρεσθαι τοῦτο ἔλαβε τὸ ὄνομα, εὐφεροσύνην, τό γε δίκαιον· ὅμως δὲ αὐτὸ καλοῦμεν εὐφροσύνην. Compare Arist. Top. II 6, p. 112^b 22 Πρόδικος διηρεῖτο τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην. The Greek usage of this word hardly conformed to the rule laid down by Prodicus.

45. αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ: αὐτῇ is 'by itself', i.e. without the body, as αὐτῷ in αὐτῷ τῷ σώματι is without the mind. ἡδύ is introduced to give the derivation of ἡδεσθαι.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Hippias, anxious for a compromise, proposes the selection of an umpire in a speech marked by his characteristic doctrines and style.

If we may judge from this speech, Hippias must have been devoted to metaphor: e.g. τύραννος, πρυτανεῖον in D, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ δαιτητῶν in E, and in 338 A ἐφείναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας, κάλων ἐκτείναντα οὐρῖα ἐφέντα, πέλαγος λόγων, ἀποκρύψαντα γῆν, μέσον τι τεμεῖν, ῥαβδοῦχον and πρύτανιν. Zeller (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* v 2, p. 175) thinks that the opening part of the speech may have come from some book of which Hippias was himself the author.

2. ἀπεδέξαντο means simply 'assented': cf. Theaet. 162 E.

5. ἡμᾶς is Heindorf's correction for ὑμᾶς: "uti mox ἡμᾶς οὖν αἰσχροῦν etc., neque video cur se a ceteris h. l. segreget Hippias".

6. φύσει οὐ νόμῳ. The opposition between φύσις and νόμος frequently appears attributed to different sophists or their representatives in the Platonic dialogues: the historical Hippias was a leading champion of φύσις (see Introd. p. xxii.). Usually however νόμος is represented as a convention binding men together into friendship and φύσις (whose teaching is that might is right) as responsible for the enmity of man to man in the savage state: e.g. Rep. II 358 D foll., Gorg. 482 D foll. From the natural principle of 'Like to like' is here deduced something like the Stoic doctrine of the kinship between wise men.

τὸ γὰρ ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ: Gorg. 510 B φίλος μοι δοκεῖ ἕκαστος ἕκαστῳ εἶναι ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν, ὁ ὁμοῖος τῷ ὁμοίῳ: Laws IV 716 C. The proverb appears in the most various forms in Greek literature from Homer (Od. xvii 218 ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον) downwards. For more examples of its use in Plato see Stallbaum on Gorg. l. c.

337 D 7. τύραννος—βιάζεται. Hippias has in view the lines of Pindar quoted in Gorg. 484 B νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων—ἄγει δικαίων τὸ βιαιότατον ὑπερτάτῃ χειρὶ κτλ.

12. πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας. The prytaneum (like the temple of Vesta at Rome) was the religious centre of a Greek πόλις. It was sacred to Ἐστία, in whose honour fire was always kept burning, and contained what was called the 'Common Hearth' of the city: see Frazer in Journal of Philology, Vol. xiv pp. 145—172. The editors refer to Athenaeus v 187 D τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν, τὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος μουσεῖον, ἣν ὁ μὲν Πίνδαρος Ἑλλάδος ἔρεισμα ἔφη, Θουκυδίδης δ' ἐν τῷ εἰς Εὐριπίδην ἐπιγράμματι Ἑλλάδος Ἑλλάδα, ὁ δὲ Πύθιος ἔστIAN καὶ πρυτανεῖον τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

337 E 17. συμβῆναι—ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων. συμβάλω forms a passive to συμβιβάζω as πάσχειν to ποιεῖν, whence ὑπό: see note on Apol. 17 A. συμβιβάζω is regular in the sense of bringing together, effecting an arrangement between: compare (with Sauppe) Thuc. II 29. 8 ξυνεβίβασε δὲ καὶ τὸν Περδίκκαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. Note that ἡμῶν has no preposition with it—this is frequent (but not universal) in similes where ὥσπερ and a preposition precede the object compared, and the effect is almost to make the simile an identification: if on the other hand the object compared comes first, the preposition must be expressed twice. Compare

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form of ποιεῖν as here) ὡς οὖν χρή καὶ ἡμᾶς ποιοῦντας—παραινεῖν. For ποιήσατε the MSS read ποιήσετε, which is very harsh before πείθεσθε, and is probably a mistake for ποιήσατε, due to the influence of the common construction of ὅπως with 2nd person Fut. Ind. It is however possible that this use of the future as well as the use of ὡς for οὕτως was characteristic of Hippias' style.

27. **ράβδουχον—πρύτανιν.** *ράβδουχος, ἐπιστάτης* and *βραβευτής* are said of umpires or presidents at games: *ράβδούχους εἶπε τοὺς κριτὰς τοῦ ἀγῶνος*, says the schol. on Ar. Peace 733: for *ἐπιστάτης* cf. Laws XII 949 A *γυμνικῶν τε καὶ ἰππικῶν ἄθλων ἐπιστάτας καὶ βραβέας*. *πρύτανις* is an old word with lofty associations for ruler or prince. Cron thinks Hippias made this proposal with a view to be chosen President himself: he was probably still sitting on his *θρόνος*, cf. 315 B, 317 D.

338 B 28. **τὸ μέτριον μῆκος:** Phaedr. 267 B *αὐτὸς* (sc. ὁ Πρόδικος) *εὐρηκέναι ἔφη ὧν δεῖ λόγων τέχνην· δεῖν δὲ οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων, ἀλλὰ μετρίων.*

CHAPTER XXV.

Socrates protests against appointing an umpire, and in order that the conversation may go on is willing that Protagoras should become the interrogator. The others assent, Protagoras reluctantly.

2. **ἐμέ γε.** The MSS read *τε* not *γε*: *γε* is due to Heindorf. The position of *τε* is usually explained as due to displacement (see on 316 D), e.g. by Kroschel "nam haec dicit Socrates; omnes laudabant meque et Callias retinebat et (omnes) orabant ut praesidem deligerem": but *Καλλίας* can hardly be coupled in this way with an *unexpressed πάντες*. If *τε* is right it must be taken (with Turner) as coupling the whole clause *ἐμέ ὁ Καλλίας οὐκ ἔφη ἀφήσειν* with *καὶ ἐλέσθαι ἐδέοντο ἐπιστάτην*: this is possible, but strikes us as harsh.

338 C 9. **ἀλλὰ δὴ** like *at enim* introduces a possible objection: see on Crito 54 A. The fuller form of the comparative (*βελτιονα* and the like) is less common in Plato than the contracted.

11. **ὥστε.** Heindorf cites (inter alia) Phaedr. 269 D *τὸ μὲν δύνασθαι, ὧ Φαῖδρε, ὥστε ἀγωνιστὴν τέλεον γενέσθαι*. The insertion of *ὥστε* with the usual infinitive after *ἀδύνατον* increases the emphasis of *ἀδύνατον* by making it appear more than a mere auxiliary notion. Badham's conjecture *ἀδύνατον ὃν ὑμῖν ἴστε* deserves mention for its ingenuity. For *Πρωταγόρου* see above note on 318 D.

14. τό γ' ἐμόν οὐδέν διαφέρει. Gorg. 458 D τό γ' ἐμόν οὐδέν κωλύει. τό γ' ἐμόν is frequent in Plato for *quantum ad me attinet*.

17. εἰ μὴ βούλεται. For the asyndeton see above on 330 A.

28. πάνυ μὲν οὐκ ἤθελεν: οὐκ ἤθελεν is virtually one word: 338 E 'was very reluctant'. The phrase is quite different from οὐ πάνυ: see on οὐ πάνυ τι in 321 B above.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Here begins an episode (lasting down to the end of Chapter XXXII), in which Protagoras cross-examines Socrates upon a poem of Simonides. For the bearing of this episode on the general subject of the dialogue see Introduction p. xxv. foll.: and for the different restorations of the poem Appendix I.

3. περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι. ἐπῶν is 'verses'. As education in poetry formed part of the usual curriculum at Athens, it was natural for the Sophists to pose as poetical critics, and Sauppe gives a number of references to shew that they did so: it will suffice to quote Isocrates Panath. 18 ἀπαντήσαντες γὰρ τινές μοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔλεγον, ὡς ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ συγκαθεζόμενοι τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρες τῶν ἀγελαίων σοφιστῶν καὶ πάντα φασκόντων εἶδέναι—διαλέγοντο περὶ τε τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν καὶ τῆς Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῆς Ὀμήρου ποιήσεως κτλ.: compare infra 347 A, where Hippias says he has a speech ready on the poem, and Hipp. Minor 363 C foll. καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ἡμῖν ἐπιδέδεικται καὶ περὶ ποιητῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ περὶ Ὀμήρου. Protagoras appears as a critic of poetry in Arist. Poet. 19, p. 1456^b 15 ff. (where he censures Homer ὅτι εὐχεσθαι οἰόμενος ἐπιτάττει εἰπῶν 'μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά') and in Soph. El. 14, p. 173^b 19 ff. The popularity of such discussions as the present may be inferred from the well-known scene between Euripides and Aeschylus in the Frogs 1119 foll.

9. νῦν διαλεγόμεθα: so B and T: the editors mostly read νῦν δὴ 339 A (νυνδὴ) διελεγόμεθα. νῦν does not mean 'at this *present* moment', but simply 'now', 'on the present occasion', = ἐν τῇ νῦν συνουσίᾳ: translate 'about the same subject as you and I are now discussing', i.e. about the subject of our present discussion. A discussion which has never been finished (see on 334 A) and is to be resumed (cf. 338 E ἐπειδὴν ἰκανῶς ἐρωτήσῃ, πάλιν δώσειν λόγον, and 338 D) ought not to be spoken of as past. We have in fact in νῦν διαλεγόμεθα an indication that the subject of the dialogue is the same throughout: see

Introd. p. xix. foll. *νῦν* in *καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν* (line 8) is simply 'in the present case' and introduces the application of the general statement contained in *ἡγοῦμαι—λόγον δοῦναι*: cf. Apol. 17 D—18 A *ὥσπερ οὖν ἀν—καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν*.

10. *περὶ ἀρετῆς*. According to Diog. Laert. IX 8. 55, Protagoras wrote a book having the title *περὶ ἀρετῶν*.

12. *Σιμωνίδης*. It is a saying of Simonides of Ceos (circ. 556—468 B.C.) that forms the text on which the discussion in the first book of the Republic is based: see Rep. I 331 D foll. Plato seems also to allude to him in two other places, viz. Rep. II 365 C *ἐπειδὴ τὸ δοκεῖν, ὡς δηλοῦσί μοι οἱ σοφοί, καὶ τὰν ἀλάθειαν βιάται καὶ κύριον εὐδαιμονίας κτλ.* and Rep. VI 489 B *οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν—τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς πλουσίων θύρας ἵεναι ἀλλ' ὁ τοῦτο κομψευσάμενος ἐψεύσατο* (compare Arist. Rhet. II 16. 1391^a 8 ff. with Cope's note).

Σκόπαν. The Scopadae were a ruling family at Crannon and Pharsalus in Thessaly. Simonides seems to have frequently been their guest, and wrote poems in their honour: the most famous is that referred to by Cicero de Or. II § 352—353.

339 B 14. *ἀγαθόν* is here more than morally good: it includes bodily and external as well as internal well-being: whence *χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ* as well as *νόψ*: see also note on 344 B line 4 below. The notion of external well-being belonged to the word from very early times: see Grote Vol. III p. 45 note 3: 'good' and 'bad' are applied in Theognis and Solon "to wealth as contrasted with poverty—nobility with low birth—strength with weakness—conservative and oligarchical politics as opposed to innovation". This sense survived in classical times in the political meaning of *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός*, e.g. Xen. Hell. II 3. 12, Pl. Rep. VIII 569 A.

16. *τετράγωνον*. Simonides avails himself of a Pythagorean notion: among the Pythagoreans the number 4 was sacred, as being the first square number: see Ritter and Preller⁷ § 54. The expression *τετράγωνος ἀνὴρ* became afterwards almost proverbial for a perfect man: Sauppe refers to Arist. Rhet. III II. 1411^b 27 *οἶον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον· ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια*.

19. *καὶ πάνυ μοι—μεμεληκός*. From this and 347 A, where the same is implied of Hippias, it would seem that the poem was thought to be difficult.

22. *ἔφην ἐγὼ καλῶς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς*. This, Bergk's emendation, is generally accepted. B has *ἔφην ἐγὼ τε καὶ ὀρθῶς*: T *ἔφην ἔγωγε καὶ ὀρθῶς*.

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tr. 'therefore I think I will call you to my assistance'. *ἐγώ* and *σέ* are contrasted in view of the illustration which is about to follow.

ὥσπερ ἔφη κτλ.: *ὥσπερ* corresponds to *καὶ ἐγώ* in line 59: as, according to Homer, Scamander called on Simois, so look you, I call upon you. For *ὥσπερ* used in this way see above note on 330 A. The other editors take *δοκῶ οὖν ἐγὼ παρακαλεῖν σέ* with the *ὥσπερ* clause, and, regarding *παρακαλεῖν* as a present, print a full stop after *σχῶμεν* in the quotation: but (1) there is a certain awkwardness in the repetition 'I think I am summoning you' and 'so look you, I am summoning you'; (2) the quotation does not finish with *σχῶμεν*, but *ἐκπέρση* in l. 60 belongs to it also—a point which is against separating *φίλε κασίγνητε—σχῶμεν* from the following clause. In the view which we have taken a fresh start begins with *ὥσπερ*, after which the actual summons follows in the present *ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ σέ παρακαλῶ*.

55. *ἔφη Ὀμηρος*. Iliad XXI 305 foll. *οὐδὲ Σκάμανδρος ἔληγε τὸ δὴ μένος ἄλλ' ἔτι μᾶλλον χῶετο Πηλείωνι—Σιμβεντι δὲ κέκλετ' αὐσας· Φίλε κασίγνητε, σθένος ἀνέρος ἀμφοτέροί περ σχῶμεν, ἐπεὶ τάχα ἄστὺ μέγα Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος ἐκπέρσει*. This *ἐκπέρσει* explains the occurrence of *ἐκπέρση* in line 60, although (as Heindorf shews) the same metaphor is occasionally found in tragedy (but hardly in prose), e.g. Trach. 1104 *τυφλῆς ὑπ' ἄτης ἐκπεπύρθημαι τάλας*.

59. *ἀτὰρ*: cf. supra 335 D.

61. *μουσικῆς*: 'culture', as often; here not without some sarcasm, in reference to Prodicus' *ὀνομάτων ὀρθότης*, exemplified in 337 A foll.

340 B 62. *βούλεσθαι—ἐπιθυμεῖν*. *βούλεσθαι* is of will: *ἐπιθυμεῖν* of desire. The distinction is generally well marked in Plato: see note on Apol. 25 C and compare Cope on Arist. Rhet. II 19. 9. Prodicus does not touch on this example in his speech in 337, but it is quite in Plato's way to select a fresh example (compare Theaet. 147 A—B, 166 E by the side of 159 C, 169 A—B), which may in this case be supposed to come from Prodicus' lectures (cf. 341 A). We should expect the article to be repeated with *ἐπιθυμεῖν*, as the two words are to be distinguished (cf. infra in line 67 *τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ εἶναι*): but the article is sometimes dropped with the second of two words even when the words are contrasted, e.g. Euthyphr. 9 C *τὸ ὄσιον καὶ μῆ*. Here the effect of its omission is perhaps to suggest that the two notions are after all more like than different.

67. *γενέσθαι—εἶναι*. The distinction though long ago recognised by the philosophers was not always present in ordinary speech: otherwise (as Kroschel points out) Protagoras' censure of Simonides would be too absurd, and Socrates' pretended bewilderment out of place. But that Simonides in this poem drew a distinction between *γενέσθαι* and *εἶναι* is certain: whether it was the same distinction as Socrates himself draws later is another question: see on *γενόμενον δὲ ἀδύνατον* in 344 B.

73. *τὸ αὐτόν*. B and T here have *τὸ αὐτόν*, which Schanz retains: 340 C the form occurs on inscriptions and once or twice in Plato's MSS: v. Schanz Vol. XII p. vii.

74. *ἔλεγεν, τὸ χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι*. So Heindorf. *ἔλεγεν* is 'said', not 'meant', and the sentence is intended to prove what is stated in the last sentence, viz. that Pittacus *οὐ τὸ αὐτόν ἐαυτῷ ἔλεγεν* (said), *ἀλλ' ἄλλο*. *τό* goes with the whole clause *χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν*; the emphasis is on *γενέσθαι*: for which reason *τὸ ἔμμεναι* in the next line (for *τὸ ἔμμεναι ἐσθλόν χαλεπόν*) suffices. It is unnecessary to read (with Schanz and Kroschel) *ἔλεγε(ν) χαλεπόν, τὸ γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν, οἱ ἔλεγε χαλεπόν, γενέσθαι ἐσθλόν* with Sauppe.

79. *Πρόδικος ὅδε καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί*. Socrates dissociates himself from the others, because he is about to give a different solution of Simonides' apparently contradictory statements (in 344 B foll.).

80. *Ἡσίοδον*: in Works and Days 289 foll. *τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς* 340 D *ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάρουθεν ἔθηκαν ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, ῥηιδίη δῆπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐούσα*. This passage was very famous in antiquity: Plato cites it again in Rep. II 364 C, Laws IV 718 E. Hesiod in effect says it is difficult to become good, but easy to be good. Simonides himself refers to Hesiod's verses in Frag. 58 (Bergk) *ἔστι τις λόγος τὰν ἀρετὰν ναλεῖν δυσάμβάτοις ἐπὶ πέτραις, νῦν δὲ μιν θεῶν χῶρον ἀγνὸν ἀμφέπειν,.....οὐδ' ἀπαντᾶν βλεφάροις θνατῶν ἔσοπτον, ᾧ μὴ δακέθυμος ἰδρῶς ἐνδοθεν μόλη θ' ἵκηται τ' ἐς ἄκρον ἀνδρείας*.

84. *ἐκτῆσθαι*: to be taken with *ῥηιδίην*. B and T read *κτῆσθαι*, but cf. 349 E. For the form see above on 319 A.

CHAPTER XXVII.

After some dialectical skirmishing, Socrates volunteers to give a continuous exposition of the poem.

340 E 7. **ἰώμενος μείζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ.** Socrates is thinking of the proverb *κακὸν κακῶ ἰᾶσθαι*.

9. **ποιητοῦ—ἐκτῆσθαι.** The poet is not of course Hesiod but Simonides. Socrates nowhere said that in censuring Pittacus Simonides implies that it is *easy* to 'keep virtue', i.e. to be virtuous: the quotation from Hesiod was put in the mouth of Prodicus and ἄλλοι πολλοί (340 C). At the same time Protagoras might fairly turn Socrates' fallacies (see on 331 A) against himself and say that if Simonides said it was 'not difficult' to be virtuous, he meant that it was 'easy' to be so.

13. **κινδυνεύει γάρ τοι:** the art of Prodicus (Socrates means) can lay as good claims to antiquity as yours: cf. 316 D.

14. **θεία τις εἶναι πάλαι.** Kroschel's reading *εἶναι καὶ παλαιά* would somewhat change the meaning, which is 'has long been an art divine': *divine* because practised by poets and the like, cf. Rep. I 331 E *ἀλλὰ μέντοι—Σιμωνίδῃ γε οὐ ῥάδιον ἀπιστεῖν· σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἀνὴρ*: supra 315 E and note. In *ἦτοι ἀπὸ Σιμωνίδου* there is an allusion to 316 D.

341 A 17. **οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐγώ,** sc. *εἰμί*. The idiom is frequent in Plato, e.g. Symp. 179 E *οὐχ ὥσπερ Ἀχιλλέα—ἐτίμησαν καὶ εἰς μακάρων νήσους ἀπέπεμψαν*.

μαθητής. Socrates calls himself a disciple of Prodicus also in Crat. 384 B, Meno 96 D, Charm. 163 D.

19. **τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο.** *τό* marks *χαλεπὸν* as a quotation: see above on 331 C.

21. **ἀλλ' ὥσπερ κτλ.** The application of the illustration follows in 341 B line 28 foll. *ἴσως οὖν καὶ τὸ χαλεπὸν—ὑπολαμβάνουσιν*, where see note.

341 B 23. **Πρωταγόρας σοφὸς καὶ δεινὸς ἐστίν.** The *ἢ ἄλλον τινά* is neglected, and Πρωταγόρας takes us back to *σέ*: cf. note on *ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι* in 317 C. The collocation *σοφὸς καὶ δεινός* is tolerably frequent in ironical characterizations, e.g. Theaet. 173 B *δεινοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται*.

24. **ἐρωτᾷ** explains *νουθετεῖ*: whence the *Asyndeton explicativum*: see on 335 A above.

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p. 148, where Mr Arthur Sidgwick discusses and illustrates this usage.

341 E 54. οὐ δήπου τοῦτό γε λέγων. οὐ δήπου goes with λέγων, which is 'meaning' not 'saying', and τοῦτο is explained by κακὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι. For the asyndeton see on 335 A: and for the use of εἶτα compare 311 A and Symp. 200 A πότερον ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, εἶτα ἐπιθυμεῖ τε καὶ ἐρᾷ, ἢ οὐκ ἔχων;

55. τοῦτο γέρας. Heindorf reads τοῦτο τὸ γέρας as in 344 C: but γέρας may be regarded as predicative and going closely with ἀπένειμε, so that τοῦτο—τοῦτο balance each other. Sauppe compares Symp. 179 C εὐαριθμήτοις δὴ τισιν ἔδοσαν τοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοί.

56. ἀκόλαστον—οὐδαμῶς Κεῖον. This seems to be the earliest passage making allusion to the sobriety and uprightness of the Ceans, to which, perhaps, Aristophanes sarcastically alludes in Frogs 970 (οὐ Χῖος, ἀλλὰ Κεῖος). In Laws I 638 B (quoted by Sauppe) Plato cites the subjugation of the Ceans by the Athenians as a proof that victory does not always favour the more virtuous side. Strabo (x 486) quotes from Menander the lines καλὸν τὸ Κεῖων νόμιμον ἐστι, Φανία· ὁ μὴ δυνάμενος ζῆν καλῶς οὐ ζῆ κακῶς and explains them by saying that a Cean law required those above the age of 60 to take hemlock so as to make their country's produce suffice to feed the others.

342 A 60. δ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο refers to περὶ ἐπῶν 338 E. For the idiom cf. the usual τὸ σὸν δὴ τοῦτο, e.g. Symp. 221 B.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Socrates introduces his exposition of the poem with a paradoxical theory that Sparta is the oldest home of philosophers. The wise men of old accordingly expressed their wisdom in pithy Laconic sayings, and such a saying is that of Pittacus. Simonides, as a rival craftsman, wrote this entire poem to overthrow that saying.

This chapter is intended as a kind of counterblast to Protagoras' claim on behalf of σοφιστική in 316 D foll. In general tone as well as in many of the particular statements it is elaborately ironical: but it should be remembered that Plato thought highly in many respects of the Cretan and Spartan constitutions and borrowed much from them in constructing his ideal city.

3. φιλοσοφία γάρ κτλ. Compare 316 D ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν κτλ.

4. τῶν Ἑλλήνων: 'among the Greeks'. The genitive belongs rather to ἐν Κρήτῃ τε καὶ Λακεδαίμονι than to πλείστη: cf. Thuc. II 18. 1 ὁ δὲ στρατὸς—ἀφίκετο τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Οἰνόην. Similarly in γῆς ἐκεῖ, γῆς belongs to ἐκεῖ rather than to πλείστοι: there would seem to be no exact parallel to justify us in taking πλείστοι γῆς together. For the meaning of σοφισταί see on 312 C.

6. ἐξαρνοῦνται καὶ σχηματίζονται. σχηματίζεσθαι of 'posing' 342 B as in Soph. 268 A ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἅ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς εἰδὼς ἐσχημάτισται.

9. οὗς—ἔλεγε τοὺς σοφιστάς: viz. in 316 D. The attraction is common enough, e.g. Crito 48 C ἄς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης κτλ. and infra 359 D.

12. τὴν σοφίαν. So B and the second hand in T: the first hand omits the words (so Schanz, Kroschel and Kral).

13. τοὺς—λακωνίζοντας. The editors refer to Ar. Birds 1281 ἐλακωνομάνουν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι τότε, ἐκόμων, ἐπεινων, ἐρρύπων, ἐσωκράτων and Demosth. κατὰ Κόνωνος 34 μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἐσκυθρωπάκασι καὶ λακωνίζειν φασὶ καὶ τρίβωνας ἔχουσι καὶ ἀπλᾶς ὑποδέδενται. The Laconisers in Athens were tolerably numerous: Plato himself (Rep. VIII 544 C) places ἡ Κρητικὴ τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ πολιτεία nearest in merit to his ideal city.

14. οἱ μὲν ὦτά τε κατάγνυνται: thanks, of course, to boxing: cf. Gorg. 515 E τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγόντων (i.e. τῶν λακωνιζόντων) ἀκούεις ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, and Martial VII 32. 5 "at iuvenes alios *fracta colit aure magister*".

15. ἱμάντας περιελίττονται. The ἱμαντες were thongs of 342 C leather bound round the knuckles for greater efficacy in boxing: Hom. Iliad XXIII 685. The *caestus*, being loaded with balls of lead, was a much more brutal instrument (Virg. Aen. V 404—405).

16. βραχείας ἀναβολάς: 'short cloaks' in imitation of the τρίβων (the national Spartan dress: see on 335 D). ἀναβολή (here almost concrete) and ἀναβάλλεσθαι were said of the ἱμάτιον, to wear which rightly and like a gentleman was ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ἀναβάλλεσθαι (Theaet. 175 E), not ἐπ' ἀριστερά (Ar. Birds 1567—1568, a passage which seems decisive against reading ἐπιδέξια in this phrase). From Suidas (s.v. ἀναβάλλει—ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἱμάτιον, οὐ περιβάλλεσθαι λέγουσιν) we may infer that ἀναβολή refers not to the throwing back of the ἱμάτιον over the shoulder (since in point of fact it was thrown back over the *left* shoulder) but to pulling it round the back (from left to right) before throwing the end over the left shoulder in front.

ὡς δὴ—κρατοῦντας is “quasi vero—his superent” (Kroschel). For the construction cf. (with Kroschel) Rep. I 345 E οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχειν ἐκῶν, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτοῦσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν ὠφέλειαν ἐσομένην ἐκ τοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις; Madvig’s Gk Syntax p. 168.

20. ξενηλασίας. Heindorf quotes (inter alia) Ar. Birds 1012 ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ξενηλατοῦνται and Plut. Lyc. 27. 6 τοὺς ἀθροισμένους ἐπ’ οὐδενὶ χρησίμῳ καὶ παρεισρέοντας εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀπήλαυνεν (sc. Λυκούργος), οὐχ, ὡς Θουκυδίδης (II 39) φησί, δεδιὼς μὴ τῆς πολιτείας μιμηταὶ γένωνται καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τι χρήσιμὸν ἐκμάθωσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅπως μὴ διδάσκαλοι κακοῦ τινος ὑπάρξωσιν. The reasons assigned by Plutarch are no doubt the true ones.

23. οὐδένα ἐῶσιν—ἐξιέναι. Plut. Lyc. 27. 5 οὐδ’ ἀποδημεῖν ἔδωκε (Λυκούργος) τοῖς βουλομένοις καὶ πλανᾶσθαι ξενικὰ συνάγοντας ἦθη καὶ μιμήματα βίων ἀπαιδευτῶν καὶ πολιτευμάτων διαφορὰν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀθροισμένους etc. (see last note). In Laws XII 950 C foll. (quoted by Sauppe) Plato lays down similar though less stringent regulations as to ἀποδημία.

342 D 24. ὥσπερ οὐδὲ Κρήτες. There seems to be no other authority for this statement, but (as Sauppe remarks) the resemblance between the Cretan and Spartan institutions is well known.

27. ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες. Women in Sparta held a position of much greater power and influence than in the rest of Greece, partly at least in consequence of their superior education, physical and otherwise: cf. Arist. Pol. II 9. 1269^b 32 πολλὰ διωκεῖτο ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν (sc. τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων) and see Grote Vol. II p. 383 foll. Heindorf remarks that wise and pregnant sayings by Spartan women (such as are given in pseudo-Plutarch’s Λακαινῶν ἀποφθέγματα, e.g. the famous τέκνον, ἦ τὰν ἦ ἐπὶ τᾶς) were probably already current in Plato’s time.

30. εἰ γὰρ ἐθέλει—εὐρήσει. Compare 324 A.

342 E 33. ἐνέβαλεν ῥῆμα—συνεστραμμένον. The aorist is like ‘behold! he has thrown in’: it expresses rapidity by representing the action as no sooner begun than over. The idiom is very frequent in Plato: Turner refers to Stallbaum on Rep. III 406 D ἐὰν δέ τις αὐτῷ μικρὰν δλαιταν προστάττη—ταχὺ εἶπεν ὅτι οὐ σχολὴ κάμνειν. With συνεστραμμένον compare Arist. Rhet. II 24. 1401^a 5 συνεστραμμένως—εἰπεῖν: the metaphor is apparently from an animal gathering itself for a spring (cf. Arist. Hist. Anim. IX 48. 631^a 27 συστρέψαντες

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him in Diog. Laert. I 84) are mentioned together again in Rep. I 335 E Βίαντα ἢ Πιπτακὸν—ἢ τιν' ἄλλον τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν. *Cleobulus* of Lindus in Rhodes and *Chilon* of Sparta (both about the beginning of the 6th century B.C.) are not again referred to by Plato.

The traditions relating to the wise men and many of the aphorisms with which they are credited are given in Diog. Laert. I 22—122 : for the authorities for their lives, and for their sayings, see Mullach's *Fragmenta Philos. Graec.* II pp. 203—234. This passage of the *Protagoras*, apparently the earliest in which seven are named together, probably contributed in large measure to the canonization of the wise men.

44. Λακεδαιμόνιος: Heindorf would read ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος, but Plato may well have said 'a Lacedaemonian, Chilon'.

48. εἰρημένα· οὔτοι. The sentence beginning with οὔτοι shews how one is to learn αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν τοιαύτην οὔσαν: the asyndeton (as Heindorf observes) resembles that after σημείον δέ, τεκμήριον δέ and the like. Here οὔτοι καὶ κτλ. is so far removed from καὶ καταμάθοι—οὔσαν that we might have expected οὔτοι γὰρ καὶ or (as Kroschel reads) ὅτι for οὔτοι, but the emphatic οὔτοι (parallel to οὔτοι in line 44 above) renders the explanatory particle unnecessary. Hermann's correction εἰρημένα ᾧ for εἰρημένα—adopted by Sauppe—gives a wrong meaning: for ἀπαρχή 'first-fruits' (line 49) coming after καὶ κοινῇ ἢ ξυνελθόντες, in marked antithesis to ἐκάστῳ εἰρημένα, cannot mean merely the sayings of each individual—as it will have to mean if ᾧ is read, ᾧ being then in apposition to ἀπαρχήν. Kral's ῥήματα βραχέα ἀξιομνημόνευτα <σκοπῶν> ἐκάστῳ εἰρημένα, ᾧ οὔτοι κτλ. suffers from the same fault, besides that it is very unlikely that σκοπῶν should have fallen out.

κοινῇ ἢ ξυνελθόντες—ἀνέθεσαν. The editors cite Pausanias X 24. I ἐν δὲ τῷ προνάῳ τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς γεγραμμένα ἐστὶν ὠφελήματα ἀνθρώποις εἰς βίον—οὔτοι οὖν οἱ ἄνδρες ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Δελφοὺς ἀνέθεσαν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τὰ ἀδόμενα Γνώθι σαυτὸν καὶ Μηδὲν ἄγαν. The same explanation of the presence of these maxims on the temple at Delphi meets us in other authors; but in each case the author is obviously borrowing the story from Plato. Plato states that these two maxims were the cream of the wisdom of the wise men: it would be hardly too much to say that upon them the whole structure of Greek ethical philosophy was based. For the construction, and for the practice of thus dedicating wisdom to a god, Kroschel aptly quotes Diog. Laert.

IX 6 ἀνέθηκε (sc. Ἡράκλειτος) δ' αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ περὶ φύσεως βιβλίον) εἰς τὸ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερόν.

52. τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; Plato frequently enlivens his style by such self-interrogations: Sauppe quotes (inter alia) Gorg. 457 E τοῦ δὴ ἔνεκα λέγω ταῦτα; Apol. 40 B τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω;

53. τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας. τῶν παλαιῶν in this emphatic place suggests the contrast with Protagoras and the νεώτεροι whose τρόπος is μακρολογία.

54. καὶ δὴ καὶ marks the application to the present case: cf. Apol. 18 A ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν κτλ.—καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν.

57. καθέλοι: cf. 344 C. Sauppe quotes Theocr. 22. 115 (of Polydeuces overcoming Amycus) Διὸς υἱὸς ἀδηφάγον ἄνδρα καθεῖλεν.

60. τούτου ἔνεκα, i.e. τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν ἔνεκα. τούτῳ in τούτῳ ἐπιβουλεύων is τούτῳ τῷ ῥήματι: with the construction cf. Rep. IV 443 B εὐθὺς ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζουσιν and see Stallbaum on Rep. I 342 B.

61. κολοῦσαι. Hdt. VII 10. 5 φιλέει γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κολοῦειν (Sauppe).

CHAPTER XXIX.

Socrates develops his theory of the poem and applies it to the first two lines, not without much sophistry.

3. **μανικόν.** Notice the extreme dogmatism of Socrates, suggesting a weak case: cf. οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον (line 5).

5. οὐδὲ πρὸς ἕνα λόγον: see on 335 D. πρὸς λόγον = εὐλογον or εὐλόγως is frequent in Plato: see on 351 E.

6. **ἐὰν μή τις ὑπολάβῃ κτλ.** The natural interpretation of the μέν (since it follows ἀγαθόν, not γενέσθαι) is this. While it is difficult 'γενέσθαι' truly good, it is yet possible to reach a fair standard of ἀρετή. The antithesis is implied if not actually expressed in the sequel: see 345 D and 346 C. Compare Introd. p. xxvii.

8. **λέγοντος τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ:** a fresh start is made, to explain ὥσπερ ἐρίζοντα λέγειν.

10. **εἰπεῖν** but λέγειν in line 8: the past tense is used because Socrates is about to put Simonides' meaning in the form of an actual address in past time to Pittacus.

11. **ὡς ἀληθῶς** to be taken with χαλεπὸν ἐστίν: see infra 344 A (line 23). Here again Socrates' interpretation is opposed to the

natural sense of the passage, according to which ἀλαθέως in the poem goes with ἀγαθόν, and has nothing to do with χαλεπόν.

343 E 12. ἐπὶ τούτῳ—τὴν ἀλήθειαν. τούτῳ is τῷ ἀγαθῷ, and τὴν ἀλήθειαν = τὸ 'ἀλαθέως'.

14. εὔηθες—Σιμωνίδου. As well might Socrates say it is εὔηθες to use the word ἄριστος.

15. ὑπερβατόν is used in its technical grammatical sense. Heindorf quotes Long. de Sublim. 22 ἔστιν δὲ (sc. τὰ ὑπερβατὰ) λέξεων ἢ νοήσεων ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀκολουθίαν κεκινημένη τάξις καὶ οἷον εἰ χαρακτήρ ἐναγωνίου πάθους ἀληθέστατος.

16. ὑπειπόντα. There is no need to explain ὑπειπόντα here as 'interpreting' (a sense for which no exact parallel is quoted). ὑπειπεῖν is used here in its regular sense 'to say before', 'to say first' as in Ar. Wasps 54—55 φέρε νυν κατέλω τοῖς θεαταῖς τὸν λόγον, ὀλίγ' ἄτθ' ὑπειπὼν πρῶτον αὐτοῖσιν ταδί. The meaning is: if we would arrive at Simonides' meaning, we must regard the adverb ἀλαθέως as transposed, and speak the words of Pittacus first (ὑπειπόντα τὸ τοῦ Πιπτακοῦ): i.e. instead of saying ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν first, and quoting Pittacus' saying afterwards, we should begin with χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι (line 19 εἰπόντα, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι), and make ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν etc. follow as Simonides' answer (lines 20—23), putting ἀλαθέως last. οὕτωςί πως shews that ὑπειπόντα is to be explained in the sequel viz. from ὡςπερ ἄν to ἀλαθέως in line 23.

19. εἰπόντα: i.q. τὸν μὲν εἰπόντα: see on 330 A. Note the precision in the use of the tenses (εἰπόντα, but ἀποκρινόμενον).

344 A 21. οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν. Compare Crito 43 D οὗτοι δὲ ἀφίκται ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἤξειν κτλ. μὲν without following δὲ is frequent in a clause introduced by ἀλλά, the antithesis being contained in the preceding negative clause.

23. οὕτω φαίνεται. After φαίνεται the MSS have τό: "vel expungendum vel in τοι mutandum hoc τό" says Heindorf. For πρὸς λόγον see on 351 E.

25. τὰ ἐπιόντα: see Appendix I. p. 198.

344 B 30. τύπον. Socrates' criticism of the poem so far has been δι' ἀκρίβειας: cf. Rep. II 414 A ὡς ἐν τύπῳ, μὴ δι' ἀκρίβειας εἰρησθαι. See also note on ὑπογράψαντες γραμμὰς τῇ γραφίδι in 326 D above.

31. παντὸς μᾶλλον is frequent in Plato for 'assuredly': cf. Crito 49 B.

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loosely: see infra on 344 E line 27. It is however most improbable that Simonides meant by *γενέσθαι* 'to become', i.e. 'to be made', as Socrates everywhere implies: by *ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν γενέσθαι ἀλαθέως* he meant only 'that a man should prove himself truly good', i.e. quit him like a perfect man: compare Hdt. VII 224 *Λεωνίδης—πίπτει ἀνὴρ γενόμενος ἄριστος*, Xen. Anab. IV 1. 26 *ἐρωτᾶν εἴ τις αὐτῶν ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ἐθέλοι γενέσθαι*. The usage is thoroughly idiomatic.

344 C 7. *ἀλλὰ θεὸς ἂν μόνος—γέρας*. Plato Symp. 204 A *θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι· ἔστι γάρ*.

8. *ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι—καθέλη*: see below on 344 E line 30.

12—14. *οὐ τὸν κείμενον—τὸν δὲ κείμενον οὔ*. For the repetition compare (with Sauppe) Gorg. 521 E *οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων—ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἡδιστον*.

344 D 15. *ὄντα ποτέ—καθέλοι*. *ποτέ* goes with *καθέλοι* as with *καταβάλοι* in line 13.

19. *καὶ ἰατρὸν ταῦτά ταῦτα*. *ταῦτά ταῦτα* is virtually adverbial as in Meno 90 D *οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αὐλήσεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα*;

20. *ἐγχωρεῖ κακῶ γενέσθαι*. Socrates says *γενέσθαι*, although Simonides said *ἔμμεναι*; see on E (line 27) below.

21. *παρ' ἄλλου ποιητοῦ*. Xenophon Mem. I 2. 20 *μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ὃ τε λέγων 'ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἅπ' ἐσθλὰ διδάξει· ἦν δὲ κακοῖσι συμμίσησθαι, ἀπολείς καὶ τὸν ἔόντα νόον', καὶ ὁ λέγων 'αὐτὰρ ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ποτέ μὲν κακός, ἄλλοτε δ' ἐσθλός'*. The first of these quotations is known (see Meno 95 D) to be from Theognis, so that it seems clear that the second must be from some other poet. It is difficult to resist the impression that the author of this line intended *ἀγαθός*, *κακός*, and *ἐσθλός* to have a political sense, and was alluding to the ups and downs of an aristocrat's life in times of civil dissension: compare Theognis 1109—1110 *Κύρην', οἱ πρόσθ' ἀγαθοὶ νῦν αὖ κακοί, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ πρὶν νῦν ἀγαθοί· τίς κεν ταῦτ' ἀνέχοιτ' ἐσορῶν*; Euripides Hecuba 595 foll. (quoted by Cron) pointedly contradicts the sentiment of this line (as interpreted by Socrates) *ἄνθρωποι δ' αἰεὶ ὁ μὲν πονηρὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν κακός, ὁ δ' ἐσθλὸς ἐσθλός, οὐδὲ συμφορᾶς ὕπο* (alluding to Simonides' poem) *φύσιν διέφθειρ', ἀλλὰ χρηστός ἐστ' αἰεὶ*.

344 E 25. *εὐμήχανον καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν*. *εὐμήχανος* is identified with *ἀγαθός* by means of the middle step *σοφός*: *σοφία* being *ἀγαθόν* because it is one of the virtues. See on *τῷ ἐπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαῖοντι* in Crito 47 B.

26. οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι. If Simonides had consistently carried out the distinction between *γένεσις* and *οὐσία* attributed to him (in part rightly: see on 344 B line 4), he would have used *γενέσθαι*, not *ἔμμεναι* here. Socrates throughout interprets *ἔμμεναι* as equivalent to *γενέσθαι* in this part of the poem, in spite of his previous distinction: but so (apparently) did Simonides: see on 344 B.

28. τὸ δ' ἔστιν κτλ. τὸ δέ 'whereas in point of fact' is very frequent in Plato: see on *Apol.* 23 A. Notice how Socrates reverts to the beginning of the poem: see note on 346 D and Appendix I. p. 196.

29. (δυνατὸν δὲ) ἐσθλόν. There is not sufficient ground for rejecting (with most of the editors) *ἐσθλόν*: its position is a trifle awkward, but not more, since *δυνατὸν δέ* is parenthetical, the *μέν* after *γενέσθαι* being balanced by *δέ* in *ἔμμεναι δέ*. Heindorf reads *δυνατὸν δέ, ἐσθλὸν δ' ἔμμεναι* with slight MS authority.

30. πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ κτλ. γὰρ is probably due to Plato, who represents this sentence as adducing a reason for *ἔμμεναι δὲ ἀδύνατον*: see Appendix I. p. 199. *πράξας εὖ* is 'if he has prospered': the whole sentiment is the converse of *ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι* and is characteristic of the ordinary Greek moral code: cf. Homer *Od.* XVIII 136—137 *τοῖος γὰρ νῆος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων οἶον ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ ἄγῃσι πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*. The view that affliction involves moral degeneracy appears in the transition of meaning in *πονηρός* and *μοχθηρός* from 'afflicted' to 'depraved': the common view that 'prosperity' brings virtue is involved in the usual equivocation on *εὖ πράττειν* 'fare well' and 'do well': see on *Crito* 47 E and *Euthyphr.* 3 A. After *κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς*, is to be understood *ἔπραξεν*.

32. τίς οὖν εἰς γράμματα κτλ. In order to read into Simonides 345 A the doctrine that virtue is knowledge and vice ignorance, Socrates assigns to *πράξας εὖ* in the poem the meaning of *acting* well, rather than *faring* well.

36. κακὸς δὲ κακῶς, sc. *πράξας*: a free rendering of *κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς* of the poem, which Kral (following Ast) reads here against the MSS.

40. κακῶς πράξαντες, i.e. *εἰ κακῶς πράξαιμεν*, as the words of the poem shew. Socrates' reasoning is: to become a bad doctor by practising badly, you must first have been a good doctor: for if you cannot become a *doctor* by practising badly, obviously you

cannot become a *bad* doctor. The argument is as fallacious as it is ingenious: it assumes that *κακὸς ἰατρός* is a twofold notion, and more than *ἰατρός*, whereas it is a single notion and less. It would be more in conformity with experience to say that the *ιδιώτης* does become by practising badly a *κακὸς ἰατρός*.

345 B 45. αὕτη γὰρ μόνη—στερηθῆναι. This sentence (necessary as the converse of the statement in 345 A that good action comes from knowledge) is introduced as an explanation of ὑπὸ χρόνου κτλ., because χρόνος, πόνος, νόσος, etc. produce ἐπιστήμης στέρησις.

47. μέλλει—γενέσθαι. See on 312 C above.

345 C 50. διατελοῦντα ἀγαθόν explains ἀγαθόν more precisely: cf. 344 B γεγόμενον δὲ διαμένειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἔξει καὶ εἶναι ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν. διατελεῖν without a participle seems not to be elsewhere found in Plato, though it occurs in Thucydides and others.

52. ἐπὶ πλείστον: “*diutissime*, ut ἐπὶ πολὺ saepe significat *diu*”. καὶ is ‘also’ not ‘and’, and balances οὗς ἂν οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν: οἱ θεοφιλεῖς are also ἄριστοι.

CHAPTER XXXI.

The rest of the poem is now expounded and the theory that no man sins willingly discovered in it.

3. δηλοῖ (sc. εἰρημένα) is used as in Soph. Ant. 242 δηλοῖς δ’ ὡς τι σημανῶν κακόν.

6. κενεάν goes proleptically with μοῖραν αἰῶνος.

8. πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον in apposition to τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατόν. Kroschel compares Simonid. Amorg. πάμπαν δ’ ἄμωμος οὐτις οὐδ’ ἀκήριος (Frag. 4).

εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι—χθονός. Hom. Iliad VI 142 βροτῶν οἱ ἀρούρης καρπὸν ἔδουσιν, Hor. Od. III 14. 10 “quicumque terrae munere vescimur” (Heindorf).

345 D 10. ἐπὶ θ’ ὑμῖν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω: after Bergk’s emendation for the ἐπειθ’ ὑμῖν of the MSS, which cannot be made to scan: see Appendix I. p. 199. It might be possible (in view especially of φησὶν in the next line) to regard ἔπειτα here as no part of the poem, were it not for 346 D where it must be part. ἐπὶ θ’ ὑμῖν is the most probable of the many emendations proposed and accounts by far the most easily for the reading of the MSS. ἐπὶ is to be taken with εὐρῶν, and τε is like the quasi-gnomic τε in Homer, e.g. Il. I 218 ὅς κε θεοῖς ἐπιπέιθηται, μάλα τ’ ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ. Translate “‘trust me,

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ἐπικρύπτεσθαι—ἀναγκάζεσθαι. Plato is probably thinking of Socrates after his trial as he depicts him in the Crito. ἀναγκάζεσθαι 'are constrained' is of course passive.

41. παραμυθεῖσθαι, like *mulcere*, as often. Sauppe quotes Hor. Epod. XIII 18 "deformis aegrimoniae dulcibus *alloquiis*".

43. ἠγήσατο—ἀναγκαζόμενος: 'believed—that he had praised etc.' Plato deals a sly thrust at Simonides' notorious avarice, as Pindar (quoted by Sauppe) does in Isthm. II 6 ἃ Μοῖσα γὰρ οὐ φιλοκερδῆς πω τότ' ἦν οὐδ' ἐργάτις. The words ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος contain the sting: for the life of the χρηματιστής is βίαιος (Ar. Eth. Nic. I 3. 1096^a 5).

346 C 48. ἔμοιγ' ἔξαρκεῖ κτλ. See Appendix I. pp. 196 foll. for the arrangement of this part of the poem.

50. γ' ὄνησίπολιν. The MSS read γ' ὀνήσει πόλιν, which G. Hermann emended to τ' ὀνησίπολιν, Bergk to ὀνασίπολιν.

51. οὐ μὴν: so the MSS, and so, most probably, Plato; but Simonides can hardly have written this, which will not scan; see Appendix I. p. 199.

53. οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος probably belongs to an earlier part of the poem (before ἔμοιγ' ἔξαρκεῖ: cf. οὐ διὰ ταῦτά σε ψέγω, ὅτι εἰμι φιλόψογος in line 47): see Appendix I. p. 199.

55. γενέθλα is Stephanus' correction for γένεθλα of the MSS, a mistake due to supposing that ἀπείρων (not from ἄπειρος) went with ἠλιθίων: it belongs to γενέθλα.

58. πάντα τοι καλά—μέμικται sums up the whole moral teaching of the poem.

346 D 63. καὶ οὐ ζητῶ κτλ. Socrates recapitulates part of the poem by way of interpreting the final text: see note on τὸ δ' ἐστὶν γενέσθαι κτλ. in 344 E above and Appendix I. p. 196.

65. τούτου γ' ἔνεκα: "si hoc spectetur s. requiratur, τὸ πανάμωμον εἶναι" Heindorf: cf. Phaed. 85 B ἀλλὰ τούτου γ' ἔνεκα λέγειν τε χρῆ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅ τι ἂν βούλησθε. The sense is: if I must wait for perfection before beginning to praise, I shall never praise anyone.

346 E 69. ὥς πρὸς Πιπτακὸν λέγων: not serious, of course, nor true.

71. διαλαβεῖν: i.e. make a division, 'pause', virtually 'punctuate'. The editors compare the use of διαστίξαι in Ar. Rhet. III 5. 1407^b 14 τὰ γὰρ Ἡρακλείτου διαστίξαι ἔργον διὰ τὸ ἀδηλον εἶναι ποτέρῳ πρόσκειται.

72. ἄκων δ' ἐστὶν οὗς: see on 344 B.

74. *νῦν δὲ—σφόδρα γάρ.* Compare *Apol.* 38 B *νῦν δὲ—οὐ γάρ* 347 A *ἔστιν* and note in loc. Here *διὰ ταῦτα* sums up the clause *σφόδρα γάρ—λέγειν*.

CHAPTER XXXII.

The original question is now resumed, Socrates expressing himself disparagingly on poetical criticism. With some reluctance Protagoras consents to submit himself again to Socrates' interrogatory.

6. *ἔστι μέντοι καὶ ἔμοι κτλ.* Imitated in *Hipp. Maior* 286 A where Hippias says *ἔστι γάρ μοι περὶ αὐτῶν πάγκαλος λόγος συγκείμενος καὶ ἄλλως εὖ διακείμενος τοῖς ὀνόμασι*. Like Socrates in his recent exposition, Hippias looks upon poetical criticism as a legitimate field for the exercise of sophistry and wit.

7. *ἐπιδείξω*: see on *ἐπιδειξάμενος* in 328 D.

347 B

9. *ὠμολογησάτην*: in 338 D, where however the terms of the agreement are somewhat more stringent.

15. *περὶ μὲν ῥημάτων—ἑάσωμεν.* Heindorf quotes *Alc. I* 113 D 347 C *ἑάσαντες οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν σκοποῦσιν ὀπότερα συνοίσει πράξασιν*.

18. *καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ μοι κτλ.* This passage (from *τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως* down to *κἂν πάνυ πολὺν ὄνον πίνωσιν*) is quoted by Athenaeus III 51. It is doubtful whether Plato is here animadverting on Xenophon's *Symposium*, in which (2. 1 and 9. 3 foll.) both a flute-girl and a dancing-girl appear: the words *τοῖς συμποσίοις τοῖς τῶν φαύλων καὶ ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων* would contain a very pretty hit at Xenophon, if the evidence for the allusion were more complete. There is a similar passage in the *Symposium* of Plato (176 E) *εἰσηγοῦμαι τὴν μὲν ἄρτι εἰσελθοῦσαν αὐλητρίδα χαίρειν ἔαν, αὐλοῦσαν ἑαυτῇ ἢ ἂν βούληται ταῖς γυναιξὶ ταῖς ἔνδον*: this passage Athenaeus (XI 112) cites in support of his theory of a literary rivalry between Plato and Xenophon.

20. *ἀγοραίων*: like the Latin *circumforanei*, "*ἀγοραῖος, vel ut critici veteres volunt, ἀγόραιος, est ὁ ἐν ἀγορᾷ τεθραμμένος, s. qui totes dies forum conterit, quem ἀγορᾶς περίτριμμα Comicus appellat, vilis et ex ima plebe homo, Aristoph. Eqq. 181 ὅτι πονηρὸς κάξ ἀγορᾶς εἶ καὶ θρασύς*: 214 τὰ δ' ἄλλα σοι πρόσεστι δημαγωγικά, φωνὴ μιὰρά, γέγονας κακῶς, ἀγόραιος εἶ" Heindorf.

23. *τιμίας ποιοῦσι τὰς αὐλητρίδας*: "run up the price of 347 D flute-players": *τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον—τίμιον* *Euthyd.* 304 B. Heindorf aptly quotes *Xen. De Vect.* IV 10 *χρυσίον ὅταν πολὺ παραφανῇ αὐτὸ μὲν ἀτιμότερον γίγνεται, τὸ δὲ ἀργύριον τιμιώτερον ποιεῖ*.

27. *καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι*. So Athenaeus (III 51) and the second hand in T: B and T read *πεπαιδευμένοι*. Schanz brackets *πεπαιδευμένοι*, but *ὑπὸ ἀπαιδεύσεως* in line 23 is in its favour.

οὐκ ἂν ἴδοις—ψαλτρίδας. Compare Theaet. 173 D *δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν ἀύλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς* (i.e. *τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφοις*).

347 E 32. *κἂν πάνυ πολὺν οἶνον πίων*: like Socrates in the Symposium: see 220 A, 223 C. In Laws I 637 B foll. Plato argues that wine properly used is the means of teaching self-control, since the man who will be *σώφρων* when drunk will a fortiori be *σώφρων* when sober: cf. *ibid.* II 673 E foil.

33. *εἰ μὲν κτλ. μὲν* suggests that in different society the same would not be the case—an antithesis which is already expressed in 347 C—D. Compare Apol. 17 B *εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογήην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ*. For *λάβωνται* cf. (with Sauppe) Symp. 218 A *νέου ψυχῆς μὴ ἀφυοῦς ὅταν λάβωνται* (sc. *οἱ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγοι*).

35. *οὔτε ἀνερέσθαι—ἐπαγόμενοι τε*: for the sentiment see on 329 A above: for *οὔτε—τε* on 309 B: for *αὐτούς* after *ὦν* on 313 A. *ἐπάγεσθαι* is the regular word for 'cite', e.g. Rep. II 364 C *μάρτυρας ποιητὰς ἐπάγονται*.

38. *ὃ ἀδυνατοῦσιν*: *δ*, not in B and T, was restored by Heindorf: it has since been found in a Vienna MS.

40. *ἔωσιν*: the subject is supplied from *ἀνδρῶν οἰοῖπερ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν εἶναι*.

348 A 43. *καταθεμένους*: for the asyndeton see on 330 A. Both here and in Tim. 59 C *κατατίθεσθαι* is not used in the sense of laying aside for good, but rather (as generally) putting away to be resumed again. 'Putting the poets on their shelves' would give the effect of the Greek.

47. *παρέχειν*: see on *συγκαθεῖναι* in 336 A above.

348 B 53. *καὶ νῦν*: as before 336 B.

56. *ἵνα τούτῳ μὲν ταῦτα συνειδῶμεν*. Symp. 193 E *εἰ μὴ συνήδη Σωκράτει τε καὶ Ἀγάθωνι δεινοῖς οὔσι περὶ τὰ ἐρωτικά*. In *σύννοια ἐμαυτῷ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι συν-* goes with *ἐμαυτῷ*—I am conscious with myself that I am good—by the convenient fiction which separates the observing *ego* from the observed. Cases where the dative is not a reflexive pronoun are later in development and presuppose only knowledge about, not knowledge along with, the object.

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ἡγούμενος. Heindorf refers to his note on Phaedo 102 D λέγω δὲ τοῦδ' ἕνεκα, βουλόμενος δόξαι σοὶ ὅπερ ἐμοί.

348 E 21. ὥστε καὶ κτλ. The reference is to 316 D foll. καὶ does not go with ἄλλων but with the whole sentence (as Sauppe points out).

349 A 22. ὑποκηρυζόμενος 'having had yourself heralded as a sophist': compare Aeschin. in Ctes. 41 ἄλλοι δὲ τινες ὑποκηρυζόμενοι τοὺς αὐτῶν οἰκέτας ἀφίεσαν ἀπελευθέρους. The force of ὑπο- is probably the same as in ὑπεῖπον: see note on 343 E. Notice the effect of the double σεαυτὸν (both of them after a natural pause): σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυζόμενος—σεαυτὸν ἀπέφηνας: the -αυτὸν is brought out so strongly as to suggest that Protagoras is the only true Αὐτός or Master.

25. μισθὸν—ἄρνησθαι: 328 B, where however it is not said that Protagoras was the first to take a fee. The Homeric word ἄρνησθαι is occasionally used by prose writers in the phrase μισθὸν ἄρνησθαι: whence μισθαρνέειν.

28. ἐκεῖνα—τὰ μὲν—τὰ δέ: see above on 330 A.

349 B 30. ἦν δὲ—τόδε 329 C foll.

349 C 42. ἕκαστα attracted for ἕκαστον: so Rep. VIII 546 C δεομένων ἐνὸς ἐκάστων, i.e. 'lacking—each of them—one'.

45. οὐδέν σοι ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι. ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι like ὑπόλογον ποιῶμαι (Lach. 189 B) and ὑπολογίζομαι (Apol. 28 B) is to 'set down against', 'per contra', whence 'object' as here.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

Protagoras gives up what he had contended for before, and contents himself with saying that courage alone is quite different from its sister virtues. Socrates endeavours to identify courage and knowledge in a cumbrous proof, against the validity of which Protagoras rightly protests.

349 D 2. μόρια μὲν. The antithesis to μὲν was already expressed in ἔφησθα οὖν σὺ οὐκ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ ἐνὶ εἶναι 349 B.

4. ἦ δὲ ἀνδρεία κτλ. Protagoras therefore yields to Socrates' arguments so far as they have yet gone, and takes his stand on the only virtue the relation of which to the others has not yet been discussed: see on 333 C and D and Introd. p. xiv.


9. ἀκολαστοτάτους—ἀνδρειοτάτους δέ: like Otho (Tac. Hist. II 49), apropos of whose death Merivale quotes the lines of Byron, which well illustrate the sentiment of Plato:

“And strange to say, the sons of pleasure,
They who have revelled beyond measure
In beauty, wassail, wine and treasure,
Die calm, and calmer oft than he
Whose heritage was misery”.

10. **ἀνδρειοτάτους δὲ διαφερόντως.** The extreme difference (cf. *πάνυ πολὺ διαφέρον* in line 5) between courage and the other virtues is brought out by representing those most lacking in the other virtues as sometimes ‘supremely brave beyond all others’: below in 359 B the *διαφερόντως* is omitted as unnecessary in a recapitulation. Sauppe quotes Tim. 23 C ἡ νῦν Ἀθηναίων οὔσα πόλις ἀρίστη πρὸς τε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατὰ πάντα εὐνομωτάτη διαφερόντως: compare also Gorg. 487 B αἰσχυνηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος. Various suggestions have been proposed, but the text is sound.

11. **ἔχε δὴ.** “Hac sistendi formula aut monetur, qui rectam 349 E
viam ingressus est, ut caveat, ut hic et Gorg. 460 A, aut revocatur,
qui a recta aberravit, ut Prot. 349 D”. Wohlrab on Theaet. 186 B.

12. **πότερον τοὺς ἀνδρείους θαρραλέους κτλ.** Socrates proceeds by reasoning thus: (1) ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλέοι: (2) ἐπιστήμονες are θαρραλέοι (349 A line 19—350 B line 28): (3) none who are θαρραλέοι without ἐπιστήμη are ἀνδρεῖοι (350 B line 28—line 33). From this he infers that σοφοί (i.e. ἐπιστήμονες) are ἀνδρεῖοι, i.e. that σοφία is ἀνδρεία. The reasoning is far from cogent. In the first place, we have to *assume* (it is nowhere stated) that θαρραλέοι contains two classes and no more, viz. θαρραλέοι with knowledge, and θαρραλέοι without knowledge: the assumption would be (to Socrates) a natural one, since (according to the reasoning in Chapter XIX foll.) every one who is not ἐπιστήμων is ἀνεπιστήμων. Now as ἀνδρεῖοι are θαρραλέοι and no ἀνεπιστήμονες (in the class θαρραλέοι) are ἀνδρεῖοι, it follows that ἀνδρεῖοι are ἐπιστήμονες, but even then the conclusion of Socrates is not warranted—that ἐπιστήμονες are ἀνδρεῖοι, since ἀνδρεῖοι may be only a part of ἐπιστήμονες. Socrates—consciously or unconsciously—covers his erroneous reasoning by another fallacy when



about to draw his conclusion in 350 B lines 34 and 38: where see note.

13. **καὶ ἴτας γ', ἔφη:** i.e. they not only have *θάρρος* (which may be quiescent) but they put it into action. In *λέγει* Protagoras contrives to give the derivation of *ἴτης*: Sauppe refers to the Scholiast on Ar. Clouds 444 *ἴτης. ἰταμὸς, ἀναιδής, καὶ δι' αὐτῶν χωρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων. ἀνδρείος* is coupled with *ἴτης* in Symp. 203 D and with *θρασύς* in Ar. Clouds l.c.

14. **φέρε δὴ κτλ.** This section (from *φέρε δὴ* to *ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα* in line 19) is intended to prepare the way for the proof of the third proposition (see on line 12) in 350 B: see note on line 32, and compare Laches 192 C, where the proof that *ἀφρων καρτέρησις* is not *ἀνδρεία* is introduced in much the same way: *σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα—ὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.*

16. **εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε:** 'as I'm a sane man.' This and similar phrases are frequent in Plato, e.g. Euthyd. 283 E, Rep. x 608 D (*εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε*), Gorg. 511 B *οἶδα—εἰ μὴ κωφὸς γ' εἰμι.*

17. **τὸ μὲν τι—τὸ δέ τι.** See on Euthyphr. 12 A. Kroschel quotes Phileh. 13 C *τὰς μὲν εἶναι τινὰς ἀγαθὰς ἡδονὰς, τὰς δέ τινὰς—κακάς.*

350 A 20. **κολυμβῶσιν.** This and the next example are given also in Lach. 193 B foll. Sauppe thinks that the object of such diving (an art in which the Greeks were very expert: see Thuc. IV 26. 8) may have been to clean the wells and the like.

24. **τίνες δὲ πέλτας ἔχοντες.** See Introduction, p. xxxvi.

27. **αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν—ἦ.** The notion 'than' is expressed twice: see note on Crito 44 C *καὶ τοὶ τίς ἂν ἀσχιῶν εἴη ταύτης δόξα ἢ δοκεῖν κτλ.*, and cf. infra 350 E and (with Sauppe) Hdt. VIII 86 *ἐγένοντο—μακρῶ ἀμείνονες αὐτοὶ ἑωυτῶν ἢ πρὸς Εὐβοίῃ.*

350 B 32. **αἰσχρὸν μεντᾶν—ἀνδρεία:** and if *αἰσχρὸν*, not *ἀρετή* (which it is), since all *ἀρετή* is *καλόν* (349 E). Compare Lach. 182 C *ἦ δέ γε ἀνδρεία ὡμολογεῖτο καλόν εἶναι* and with the general sentiment Meno 88 B *οἶον ἀνδρεία, εἰ μὴ ἔστι φρόνησις ἢ ἀνδρεία ἀλλ' οἶον θάρρος τι· οὐχ ὅταν μὲν ἄνευ νοῦ θαρρῆ ἄνθρωπος, βλάπτεται, ὅταν δὲ σὺν νῶ, ὠφελείται.*

34. **λέγεις:** the present is idiomatically used in referring to an earlier part of a discussion not yet ended: see on *ὅπερ λέγω* in Apol. 21 A. With *λέγεις* followed by an accusative in this sense compare Symp. 199 E *πειρῶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα εἰπεῖν· ὁ Ἔρωσ ἔρωσ ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός;*

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proposition in 350 B (28—33), where it is shewn that *θάρρος* without *ἐπιστήμη* is not *ἀνδρεία*: see next note.

52. *πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ κτλ.*, i.e. you might as well argue (1) *οἱ ἰσχυροὶ* are *δυνατοί*, (2) *οἱ ἐπιστήμονες* are *δυνατοί*, therefore *οἱ ἐπιστήμονες* are *ἰσχυροὶ*. This would only be correct if for (1) we substituted *οἱ δυνατοὶ* are *ἰσχυροὶ*. To make Protagoras' picture of Socrates' argument complete, we should have to add (3) none who are *δυνατοί* without *ἐπιστήμη* are *ἰσχυροὶ*—but this is not true, whereas Socrates' third proposition is. The completed picture therefore fails to represent correctly Socrates' reasoning in each of its steps, but none the less are Protagoras' objections strictly relevant, and indeed fatal to Socrates' conclusion as expressed in 350 C (37—40), and that is why Socrates makes no reply.

351 A 62. *ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης—τὴν δύναμιν κτλ.* Protagoras says in effect: *δύναμις* and *ἰσχύς* are of the body, *θάρρος* and *ἀνδρεία* of the soul. *δύναμις* may come from knowledge (as when one has learnt how to wrestle: supra 350 E), or from madness or rage (as in the feats of madmen, or men inspired with the thirst for vengeance: such men have no real physical strength or *ἰσχύς* as it is presently defined, but excel themselves by virtue of *δύναμις*). *ἰσχύς* comes from natural constitution (*φύσις*) and proper nurture of the body (by gymnastics in the widest sense). Similarly *θάρρος* may result from art (*τέχνη* is substituted for *ἐπιστήμη* in view of the illustrations in 350 A), from rage or madness (as when Empedocles leapt into Etna): *ἀνδρεία* comes from the native character and proper nurture of the soul (cf. Rep. III 410 D *τὸ θυμοειδὲς—τῆς φύσεως—ὀρθῶς μὲν τραφὲν ἀνδρεῖον ἂν εἴη, μᾶλλον δ' ἐπιταθὲν τοῦ δέοντος σκληρόν τε καὶ χαλεπὸν γίγνεται, ὡς τὸ εἰκός*).

CHAPTER XXXV.

Here Socrates, taking a fresh start, endeavours to make Protagoras assent to the doctrine that pleasure is good. Protagoras desires to have the question examined. He allows that wherever knowledge is present, it must rule, but this is inconsistent with the view that one can know the better and do the worse. It is agreed to examine this popular view, in case the inquiry should throw light on the relation between courage and the rest of virtue. On the ethical doctrine of this and the following chapters see Introd. p. xxix.

4. εὖ ζῆν εἰ ἀνιώμενος—ζῶη. There is the usual ambiguity in 351 B εὖ ζῆν: see on 344 E above.

6. οὐκ εὖ ἄν σοι δοκεῖ. The MSS have δοκοῖ, which all the editors (except Heindorf) retain. The meaning required is: 'would he not, think you, have lived well?' (to which Protagoras replies *ἔμοιγε* sc. *δοκεῖ*), *not* 'would you not think he has lived well?' and *δοκεῖ* is as necessary here as in *ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἄνθρωπος ἄν εὖ ζῆν εἰ—ζῶη* above. The idiom is attested by abundant examples, e.g. Ar. Plut. 380 *καὶ μὴν φίλως γ' ἄν μοι δοκεῖς, νῆ τοὺς θεούς, τρεῖς μνᾶς ἀναλώσας λογίσασθαι δώδεκα*: Wasps 1404—1405 *εἰ νῆ Δί' ἀντὶ τῆς κακῆς γλώττης ποθὲν Πυροῦς πρῖαιο σωφρονεῖν ἄν μοι δοκεῖς*: in Plato it is extremely frequent, e.g. Rep. I 335 B *πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἄν μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι*, Alc. I 105 C *εἰ αὖ σοι εἶποι—οὐκ ἄν αὖ μοι δοκεῖς ἐθέλειν*, Gorg. 514 E, cf. Euthyd. 294 B, 306 B, Gorg. 522 A, and *infra* 357 A. The corruption is natural: it occurs also in the MSS of Ar. Wasps l.c.

11. ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω: i.e. 'I mean' not 'I say': cf. *infra* line 25 351 C in E. Socrates puts his question in a different form inviting an affirmative answer. After *ἡδέα* in the next line Heindorf would insert *τὰ ἡδέα*, but the subject is easily supplied.

12. μὴ εἴ τι—ἄλλο. So B and the first hand in T. The clause *εἴ τι—ἄλλο* defines negatively the meaning of *κατὰ τοῦτο*, as *καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν* defined it positively. *μὴ* deprecates or forbids the possible misunderstanding: its use in the idiomatic *μὴ ὅτι* is the same in kind: see above on 319 D. To read *εἰ μὴ τι* (with the second hand in T) would be to beg the whole question—*that* step is not reached till 353 D.

20. ἔστι μὲν ἄ κτλ. See on *ἀνθρώποις μὲν—ὠφέλιμα* in 334 A. 351 D

28. ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς λόγον κτλ. *πρὸς λόγον* does not (except 351 E *per accidens*) mean 'relevant' but is equivalent to *εὐλογον*: compare the phrases *μετὰ λόγου, κατὰ λόγον*; and, for the use of *πρὸς*, *πρὸς ὀργήν, πρὸς βίαν* and the like. So in 343 D, 344 A. Here the meaning is further explained by the clause *καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ—ἀγαθόν*. *τὸ σκέμμα* is quite different from *σκέψις*: it is not the inquiry itself, but the *proposition* to be inquired into, viz. that Pleasure is good: if this proposition is reasonable, says Protagoras, we shall accept it, if not, we shall dispute it. The sentiment does not deserve the scorn which Heindorf pours upon it, if only we catch the force of *πρὸς λόγον, σκέμμα* and *ἀμφισβητήσομεν*.

33. δίκαιος—σύ. Plato very frequently omits the copula

ἐστίν: εἶ and ἐσμέν more rarely: εἶναι often: ἦν rarely: parts of the conjunctive and optative very rarely. Schanz, *Novae Commentationes Platonicae* 31—35.

κατάρχεις: a lofty word (here used with a touch of irony) with religious associations: the middle is used of beginning a sacrifice. Cf. *Symp.* 177 E ἀλλὰ τύχη ἀγαθῆ καταρχέτω Φαῖδρος καὶ ἐγκωμιάζέτω τὸν Ἔρωτα and *ibid.* 176 A.

352 A 36. ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι. It is not of course implied that ὑγεία is an ἔργον σώματος, i.e. something δ σῶμα ἐργάζεται. Examples of σώματος ἔργα would be different kinds of bodily labour. ἢ πρὸς ὑγείαν κτλ. is equivalent to πῶς ἔχει ἢ πρὸς ὑγείαν κτλ.: cf. *infra* 352 B πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην;

37. τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τὰς χεῖρας ἄκρας: the rest being covered by clothes. χεῖρ is not hand here (otherwise χεῖρας ἄκρας would be the tips of the fingers), but the arm, as in Homer's φίλας περὶ χεῖρε βαλόντε (*Od.* XI 211).

39. ἐπισκέψωμαι. The word is apt here, as it is often used of a medical inspection: compare *Phaedo* 117 E ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη. With the whole passage compare *Theaet.* 162 A ἄρα κὰν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν—πρὸς τὰς παλαιστράς ἀξιοῖς ἂν ἄλλους θεώμενος γυμνοὺς, ἐνίοις φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδύομενος;

41. θεασάμενος: with the usual asyndeton: see on 330 A.

352 B 44. καὶ τοῦτο: καὶ refers to 351 C—D.

47. ἡγεμονικόν: this word was afterwards selected by the Stoics to denote τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ᾧ αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ ὀρμαὶ γίνονται (*Diog. Laert.* VII 159).

48. ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος: see on 337 E.

352 C 53. περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὡς περὶ περὶ: see the reference in the last note. Aristotle alludes to this passage in *Eth. Nic.* VII 3 1145^b 23 δεινὸν γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὡς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὸν ὡς περὶ ἀνδράποδον.

56. ἐάνπερ γιγνώσκη—μὴ ἂν κρατηθῆναι: a frequent theme in Plato, e.g. *Meno* 77 B ff., *Gorg.* 466 D ff., two passages which contain much in common with the discussion in this and the next chapter.

58. ἢ ἂ ἂν ἦ: the reading of Stephanus: B has ἦ ἂ ἦ: T ἦ ἂν ἦ.

61. αἰσχροὺς—μὴ οὐχί. Goodwin *MT.* p. 327 § 817. As a σοφιστής himself Protagoras must exalt σοφία.

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9. γιγνώσκοντες ὅτι πονηρά ἐστιν: compare Meno 77 C ἢ γὰρ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Μένων, γιγνώσκων τὰ κακὰ ὅτι κακὰ ἐστὶν ὅμως ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτῶν; μάλιστα.

353D 16. κἄν εἶ: see note on 328 A above.

17. ὅμως δ' ἂν κακὰ ἦν. So the MSS: most recent editors (except Kral) read εἶη. The imperfect is used because the answer 'No' is expected and desired: would they be evil just because they give us pleasure? Certainly not. See Goodwin MT. p. 190 § 503. Schleiermacher wrongly rejected δέ after ὅμως: the 'apodotic δέ' is frequent after ὅμως, ὡσαύτως, οὕτω and the like.

18. ὅ τι μαθόντα ποιεῖ κτλ. So the MSS. A variety of emendations have been proposed for μαθόντα, such as ἀμαρτόντα (Schleiermacher, followed by Heindorf), ἀμαθαίνοντα (Orelli), παρόντα (Hermann), παθόντα (Sauppe and others), while Kroschel doubts the entire passage ἦν—ὀπηροῦν, saying "Totus autem locus ita comparatus est ut de eius emendatione desperandum esse videatur". It would be natural to regard this particular passage as corrupt if this were an isolated example of the idiom in question: but—not to mention other authors—it occurs also in the following passages of Plato: Apol. 36 B τί ἀξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτιῆσαι, ὅ τι μαθῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον: Euthyd. 283 E εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον—ἦν εἰπεῖν, εἶπον ἂν, σοὶ εἰς κεφαλὴν, ὅ τι μαθῶν ἐμοῦ—καταψεύδει κτλ.: ibid. 299 A πολὺ μέντοι—δικαιότερον ἂν τὸν ὑμέτερον πατέρα τύπτοιμι, ὅ τι μαθῶν σοφοῦς υἱεῖς οὕτως ἐφύσεν. In each of these cases the MSS reading μαθῶν (not παθῶν) should be retained. In the direct speech τί μαθῶν is used in an impatient question: τί μαθῶν τοῦτο ἐποίησας is 'whatever made you think of doing this?' (e.g. Ar. Clouds 1506, Wasps 251, Ach. 826): cf. the idiom τί ληρεῖς ἔχων; in which τί depends on ἔχων (see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 624). τί μαθῶν becomes in the indirect ὅ τι μαθῶν, but in every case in which this phrase occurs in Plato ὅ τι μαθῶν means not 'why' but 'because'. The transition in meaning is sometimes explained as parallel to the use of οἷος, ὅσος, ὡς etc. for ὅτι τοιοῦτος, ὅτι τοσοῦτος, ὅτι οὕτως, so that ὅ τι μαθῶν = ὅτι τοῦτο μαθῶν: but a simpler explanation is perhaps possible (see my edition of the Apol. Appendix II. p. 123). ὅ τι μαθῶν is an impatient ὅ τι just as τί μαθῶν is an impatient τί: but as ὅτι and ὅ τι are in reality the same word (see on 333 B), and ὅτι means 'because', ὅ τι μαθῶν comes also to mean 'because' (impatiently), the original interrogative force being lost. Similarly, in sentences like ληρεῖς ἔχων, the interrogation is dropped, and

the participle alone survives, conveying the same sense of blame or impatience as in *τί ληρείς ἔχων*; which is probably the form of sentence in which this idiom originated. Here *μαθόντα* is of course the nom. plur.: if (as we suppose) the original force of the participle is no longer felt in this idiom, there is nothing harsh in finding it in agreement with a neuter subject.

31. οὐκοῦν πάλιν ἄν—ἐροίμεθα. There is no sufficient reason 354 A for changing ἄν to αὖ or for omitting ἄν: ἄν points forward to the apodosis in line 37 φαίεν ἄν and is just as idiomatic as ἄν in ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ, e.g. in 311 B above.

33. οἶον τά τε γυμνάσια κτλ. Rep. II 357 C τρίτον δὲ ὁρᾶς τι—εἶδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι καὶ ἰατρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπίπονα φαίμεν ἄν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἕνεκα οὐκ ἄν δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ' αὐτῶν.

34. τὰς στρατείας. Arist. Eth. Nic. X 7. 1177^b 9 οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἄν παντελῶς μαιφόνος τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῖτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίγνοιτο.

35. καύσεών τε—λιμοκτονιῶν. Gorg. 521 E πολλὰ ὑμᾶς καὶ κακὰ ὄδε εἴργασται ἀνὴρ (sc. ὁ ἰατρός)—τέμνων τε καὶ κάων, καὶ ἰσχυαίνων καὶ πνίγων—πικρότατα πώματα διδοὺς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν ἀναγκάζων. λιμοκτονία ("Hungerkur", says Stallbaum) is part of the μικρὰ δίαιτα of Rep. III 406 D.

42. ἄλλων ἀρχαί: 'dominions over others'—not ἄλλων πόλεων: 354 B cf. Gorg. 452 D αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἐκάστῳ. Heindorf's conjecture ἄλλαι (i.e. 'besides') is not necessary, in view of Gorg. 514 A (quoted by Sauppe) ἢ χρήματα πολλὰ λαμβάνειν ἢ ἀρχὴν τινῶν ἢ ἄλλην δύναμιν ἠντινοῦν.

45. τέλος. The philosophical sense of this word—as an end of action—is beginning to appear in Plato: compare Gorg. 499 E ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ οὕτω, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθόν κτλ.

46. ἀλλ' ἢ ἡδονάς is Stephanus' emendation for ἀλλ' ἡδονάς. 354 C

49. ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν: the copula is attracted to the predicate, as regularly: cf. infra 359 D τὸ ἥττω εἶναι ἑαυτοῦ ἠυρέθη ἀμαθία οὐσα.

66. εἴ με ἀνέροισθε: without the φαίην ἄν which we should 354 E expect. Socrates apostrophises the ἄνθρωποι as if they stood before

him; the *φαίην* *ἀν* *ἐγωγε* of line 68 is part of what Socrates says to the *ἄνθρωποι*.

70. *ἐν τούτῳ*: see on 310 D above. *πάσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις* means all the proofs that pleasure is good and pain evil.

71. *ἀναθέσθαι* suggests (as often) draughts-playing: a comparison which is worked up into a simile by Plato in *Rep.* vi 487 B—C.

355 A 73. *ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι*. B and T have *ἦ* before *ἄλλο τι* by a natural mistake: it is corrected in T by a later hand.

79. *ἄνθρωπος*: so the MSS, but *ὁ ἄνθρώπος* in line 82. Kroschel refers to the variation in 321 D *ἄνθρωπον—τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ—ἀνθρώπῳ—ἄνθρωπος*. Compare *infra* 355 E.

355 B 81. *καὶ αὖθις αὖ λέγετε*. We should of course expect *λέγητε*, but the second part of a logically subordinate clause in Greek tends to become an independent clause: see on 313 A.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

The meaning of the phrase 'to be overcome by pleasure' is now explained in conformity with the results of the last chapter.

If we substitute 'good' for 'pleasure', the common saying that we do evil, knowing it to be evil, because overcome by 'pleasure', becomes 'we do evil knowing it to be evil, because overcome by good' (355 B—C). 'To be overcome by good' is shewn to be the choosing of greater evil in place of lesser good (D—E). Similarly, substituting pleasure for good, we have the sentiment 'we do pleasure, knowing it to be pleasure, because overcome by pleasure', and here also 'to be overcome by pleasure' is to choose in place of lesser pleasures greater pains (355 D—356 A). No doubt in this case the pleasures are present and the pains remote, but we make allowance for this in our process of weighing pleasures and pains against themselves and one another (356 A—C). 'Near' and 'Far' have the same bewildering effect on the eyes when we look at size and number: but there the arts of measurement and of arithmetic resolve our perplexity (356 C—357 A). In like manner there must be some art or knowledge whose function it is to settle the value of 'more' and 'less', 'near' and 'far' etc. in their application to pleasure and pain. In other words *τὸ ἠδονῆς ἠττᾶσθαι* is due to ignorance (357 A—357 E).

2. *χρώμεθα ἅμα*. *ἅμα* is due to a correction in one inferior MS,

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argument is extraordinarily ingenious but hardly sound—the flaw lies in substituting ‘the evil in us’ for ‘us’: it was not ‘the evil in us’, but ‘we’ who were overcome by good. See also *Introd.* p. xxix. The usual way of taking *ἐν ὑμῶν* as ‘before your tribunal’ or the like (cf. *Gorg.* 464 D) makes the false step much more serious—since it substitutes not ‘the evil in us’ but simply ‘the evil’ for ‘us’.

23. ἀνάξιά ἐστιν τὰγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν should be translated literally—‘the good is unworthy of the bad’. The expression—in Greek as in English—is somewhat strained in order to correspond to οὐκ ἀξίων above (line 19): but after all ‘I am unworthy of you’ is much the same as ‘I am less worthy than you’. The Greeks can even use ἀνάξιος in the sense of ‘more worthy than’, ‘too good for’: e.g. *Soph. Philoct.* 1009.

24. τὰ μὲν μείζω—ἦ: i.e. when τὰ κακά are μείζω and τὰ ἀγαθὰ μικρότερα, then τὰγαθὰ are ἀνάξια τῶν κακῶν: τὰ κακά are ἀνάξια τῶν ἀγαθῶν, when τὰ ἀγαθὰ are μείζω, and τὰ κακά μικρότερα. Similarly with πλείω and ἐλάττω. It must be borne in mind that ἀξιος does not here denote moral, but rather physical strength or value: good is ἀνάξιον κακοῦ, because it is smaller or less numerous.

355 E 25. πλείω, τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω ἦ. See on 330 A.

28. μεταλάβωμεν, i.e. ‘let us change and take the names pleasant and painful and apply them to etc.’ Compare *infra* 356 D. ἐπί follows ὄνοματα as in τίθεσθαι ὄνομα ἐπὶ τινι and the like.

356 A 33. καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία. This—the MSS reading—is undoubtedly right. Plato coins the word ἀναξία for ‘unworthiness’ to complete the parallel with D above: cf. lines 19—23 οὐκ ἀξίων ὄντων νικῶν—κατὰ τί δὲ—ἀνάξιά ἐστι τὰγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν κτλ. Similarly in *Phaedo* 105 E Plato coins ἀνάρτιος, in 106 A ἄθερμος (rightly accepted, in spite of MS authority, by editors) and ἄψυκτος (see MSS, but Wyttenbach’s ἄψυχρος is—we think rightly—accepted by some editors) as pointed and convenient negatives to ἀρτιος, θερμός, ψυχρός. Cicero’s translation “quae igitur potest esse indignitas voluptatis ad molestiam, nisi in magnitudine aut in longitudine alterius utrius posita?” (*Nobbe’s Cicero*, p. 1313) shews that ἀναξία was read in his time: so in Ficinus’ “quae vero alia inest ad dolorem indignitas voluptati quam excessus inter se atque defectus?” The word ἀναξία hardly took root in Greek, though occasionally found in the writings of the Stoics, whose regular word for this notion is ἀπαξία. ἡδονῆ (now found to be the reading of some MSS) for ἡδονή is due to Heindorf.

35. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ: as Sauppe remarks, we should expect ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μείζω—γίγνεσθαι, but the words are said as if for καὶ τίς ἄλλη ἀναξία κτλ. had been written καὶ πῶς ἄλλως ἀνάξια τὰ ἡδέα πρὸς τὰ λυπηρά, ἀλλ' ἢ ὑπερβάλλοντα ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐλλείποντα;

37. μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον: this case is not given above (D—E) because the notion of *intensity* is more applicable to pleasure (and pain) than to good (and evil): cf. Phileb. 24 A foll. with 27 E ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πέρασ ἔχετον, ἢ τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον τε καὶ ἥττον δεχομένων ἐστὸν; ναί, τῶν τὸ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

εἰ γὰρ τις λέγοι. So far we have reached this point. To be overcome by pleasure is to choose in place of lesser pleasures greater pains and the like. But here the element of time comes in: a man might fairly say—yes, but the pleasures are *now*, the pains remote. Socrates tries to shew that this makes no real difference.

38. τὸ παραχρήμα ἡδύ. When we are overcome by pleasure, we do the pleasant, not the painful: therefore the contrast is between the present *pleasure* and the remote consequences, whether pleasure or pain. For this reason it would be wrong to supply καὶ λυπηρόν after ἡδύ.

41. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι κτλ. Compare Rep. x 602 D 356 B ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἰστάναι βοήθειαι χαριέσταται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὥστε μὴ ἀρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μείζον ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ πλεον ἢ βαρύτερον κτλ.

42. καὶ τὸ ἐγγύς κτλ.: in order that a near pleasure might count for more than a remote.

44. εἰάν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα κτλ. Compare Laws v 733 B ἡδονὴν βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν εἶναι, λύπην δὲ οὐθ' αἰρούμεθα οὔτε βουλόμεθα, τὸ δὲ μηδέτερον ἀντὶ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐ βουλόμεθα, λύπης δὲ ἀλλάττεσθαι βουλόμεθα· λύπην δὲ ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος ἡδονῆς βουλόμεθα, ἡδονὴν δὲ ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος λύπης οὐ βουλόμεθα κτλ.

47. εἰάν τε τὰ ἐγγύς κτλ. When once you have equated 'near' and 'far' (see last note), then (but not till then) your final choice is not affected by the question of proximity in time. Theoretically, no doubt, this is right: but no man is so ἀγαθὸς ἰστάναι as to weigh ἐγγύς and πόρρω correctly; whence the saying "Let us eat and drink for to-morrow we die". 'Near' and 'far' can only be weighed aright on the supposition that man is immortal and will live hereafter under the same moral laws as rule us here: but of immortality there is no hint in this dialogue.

49. ταῦτα: i.e. τὰ ἡδέα.

53. ὅτε: the notion of time readily passes into that of cause as in quoniam and cum.

54. φαίνεται ὑμῖν κτλ. Two examples are given: (1) size—of which παχέα and φωναὶ μεγάλαι (according to the Greek and Roman way of viewing sound) are special varieties, (2) number, i.e. τὰ πολλά. The specific varieties παχέα and φωναὶ μεγάλαι are not dealt with in the sequel. With what follows compare (besides Rep. x 602 D cited above) Euthyphr. 7 B foll. and Alc. I 126 C foll., and with the present passage Phileb. 42 A and Rep. VII 523 C—524 C. The resolution by the intellect of such contradictory sense-perceptions is made the basis of Plato's scheme of higher education in the Republic.

57. αἱ ἴσαι is Heindorf's correction for ἴσαι.

356 D 59. μήκη—πράττειν: as we ἠδέα πράττομεν. πράττειν (with μήκη) is explained by λαμβάνειν: see above on 314 A.

61. ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη. See Introd. p. xxxii.

62. ἢ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις. ἢ is omitted in B and T. 'The power of that which appears' is its power to affect us.

63. ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει κτλ. ἄν is not to be supplied. Plato is reverting to the illustration in c. The imperfect is idiomatic for 'causes us, as we saw, to wander' etc. (viz. because τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη seem to us both μείζω and ἐλάττω): it is what Goodwin calls the 'philosophic imperfect': compare Crito 47 D διαφθερούμεν ἐκείνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὃ τῷ μὲν δίκαιῳ βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο (becomes as we saw), τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλλυτο. By adding καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν—σμικρῶν Plato treats his hypothesis that εὖ πράττειν is to select μεγάλα μήκη as a fact: he does so also in ἄν ἐποίησε κτλ. i.e. 'would have made', viz. if we had made use of it, but we did not. If the hypothesis were still treated as a hypothesis, we should have had ἄν ἐποίει (and not ἄν ἐποίησε) to correspond to what would then have been ἄν (expressed or understood) ἐπλάνα καὶ ἐποίει.

ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω. ἄνω κάτω (Theaet. 195 C) and ἄνω καὶ κάτω (Gorg. 495 A) are other forms of this proverbial phrase.

357 A 79. ἀριθμητική. In Gorg. 451 B foll. ἀριθμητική is said to be a science concerned with τὸ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττόν, ὅσα ἐκάτερα τυγχάνει ὄντα: whereas the function which is here assigned to ἀριθμητική is there given to λογιστική: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καθάπερ ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ ἢ λογιστικὴ ἔχει· περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐστὶν τό τε ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ περιττόν· διαφέρει δὲ τοσοῦτον, ὅτι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα πῶς ἔχει πλήθους (cf. lines 73 ff. τὸ πλεον—τὸ ἐλαττον ἢ

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knowledge, but of the knowledge which you have further admitted above to be measuring knowledge'. The attraction of the relative extends to *μετρητική* also in spite of *ὅτι*: compare Apol. 37 B *ὧν εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων* for *τούτων ἃ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι κακὰ ὄντα* (*ὅτι* being used with the participle as in Gorg. 481 E: see note on Apol. l.c.).

357 E 111. *ἀμαθία ἢ μεγίστη*: compare Laws III 689 A *τίς οὖν ἢ μεγίστη δικαίως ἂν λέγοιτο ἀμαθία;—ταύτην τὴν διαφωνίαν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν ἀμαθίαν φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ἐσχάτην, μεγίστην δέ, ὅτι τοῦ πλήθους ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς.*

113. *οὔτε αὐτοί*: the verb hangs fire: we should expect Plato to continue *οὔτε οἱ ὑμέτεροι παῖδες ἔρχονται κτλ.* Stephanus thought *προσέρχεσθε* had fallen out after *αὐτοί*, Madvig *ἔτε*, while Kroschel suggests *οὔτ' ἐφοιτᾶτε αὐτοί*. It seems probable that the text is corrupt: at all events no parallel has yet been adduced. The two cases quoted by Sauppe (Dem. *πρὸς Ἀφοβον* § 54 and pseudo-Dem. *πρὸς Τιμόθεον* § 52) are more than doubtful in respect of their text, which (as Sauppe quotes it) is not according to the MSS. Madvig's *ἔτε* is simplest, but the future seems out of place: perhaps *ἦτε* should be read.

115. *ὡς οὐ διδακτοῦ ὄντος*: i.e. *τοῦ μὴ ἡδονῆς ἠττᾶσθαι.*

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Socrates begins to apply the results of the previous discussion to the subject of his dispute with Protagoras.

Pleasure is good and pain evil, and no one willingly encounters what he believes to be evil. But fear is the expectation of evil: therefore no one will willingly encounter what he fears.

358 A 3. *ὦ Ἰππία τε καὶ Πρόδικε*. Here and in 358 E and 359 A *ὦ* has dropped out in the MSS after preceding *-ω*. The effect of its omission would be to render the address unduly abrupt.

4. *ὑμῖν*. So the MSS. Sauppe's *ἡμῖν* is not necessary. *ὑμῖν* means all three sophists: and *ὁ λόγος* is not the discussion as a whole, but the speaking, viz. in answer (cf. *δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον*). Throughout this chapter all the Sophists reply: in the next Socrates makes use of their united admissions to destroy Protagoras alone.

9. *διαίρεσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων*: see note on 314 C.

358 B 10. *εἴτε ὀπόθεν καὶ ὅπως—ὀνομάζων*. This mode of address insinuates that Prodicus was a *θεῖος ἀνὴρ*, since a God was addressed in a similar way. See Crat. 400 E *ὡς περ ἐν ταῖς εὐχαῖς νόμος ἐστὶν*

ἡμῖν εὐχεσθαι, οἵτινές τε καὶ ὀπόθεν χαίρουσιν ὀνομαζόμενοι and compare Euthyd. 288 A θαυμάσια γὰρ λέγεται, ὧ ἄνδρες Θούριοι, εἴτε Χίιοι εἴθ' ὀπόθεν καὶ ὀπη χαίρετον ὀνομαζόμενοι and Symp. 212 C ὅτι καὶ ὀπη χαίρεις ὀνομάζων, τοῦτο ὀνόμαζε. A similar effect is produced in Symp. 176 C by the words Σωκράτη δ' ἐξαιρῶ λόγου, since there was a proverb τὸ θεῖον ἐξαιρῶ λόγου: cf. Rep. VI 492 E θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου. The multitude of epithets given to gods is best illustrated by such a hymn as the Homeric Hymn to Ares line 1 foll. Ἄρες ὑπερμενέτα, βρισάρματε, χρυσεοπήληξ, ὀβριμόθυμε, φέρασπι, πολισσόε, χαλκοκορυστὰ κτλ. In the multitude of names the suppliant hopes to include the acceptable one.

12. πρὸς δὲ βούλομαι: emphatic 'with a view to my meaning')(πρὸς δὲ ὀνομάζω.

14. ἐπὶ τούτου. This usage can only be on the analogy of ἡ ἐπὶ Σάρδεων ὀδοῦς and the like: actions are looked on as ways leading to a goal or destination or τέλος: cf. supra 354 C and D. To take the words (with Sauppe) as 'in the case of this' 'in this domain' would give a wrong meaning: the moral character of an art being determined by its end, it is καλόν only if it aims at the end. The expression is however very curious, and perhaps unique. I once thought that ἄπασαι might conceal some present participle such as ἄγουσαι—agreeing with πράξεις: but the occurrence of ἀπάσας below in 359 E shews ἄπασαι to be probably genuine here. The reasoning is this. Pleasure, the end, is good, pain evil: consequently all actions aiming at the end are καλαί, and therefore good (as usual ὀφέλιμος is but a synonym for 'good'): therefore—as no one willingly selects evil rather than good—no one willingly does the worse (i.e. selects evil actions) when he might act better. As it is with πράξεις that bravery and cowardice are concerned it is necessary for Plato to establish that 'no one willingly seeks the worse' is true of individual acts as well as of ultimate ends.

15. ἄρ' οὐ καλαί. The words καὶ ὀφέλιμοι which follow οὐ καλαί in the MSS are rightly rejected because they anticipate the identification in the next line.

18. ἢ ἄ ποιεῖ, καὶ δυνατά is Heindorf's emendation of the corrupt ἢ ἄ ἐπολεῖ καὶ δύναται of the MSS.

20. ἦττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ κτλ. The phrases ἦττων αὐτοῦ and 358 C κρείττων αὐτοῦ are here substituted for ἦττων τῆς ἡδονῆς and κρείττων τῆς ἡδονῆς. Compare the discussions in Rep. IV 430 E foll. and Laws I 626 E foll., where κρείττω and ἦττω εἶναι αὐτοῦ are inter-

preted as the victory of the better part in us over the worse and conversely. As the worse part is the part which seeks *ἡδονή*, i.e. τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, the identification is just.

358 D 31. καλεῖτέ τι δέος. Heindorf's emendation for καλεῖτε δέος of the MSS. See note on 330 C above.

33. προσδοκίαν τινὰ—κακοῦ: a common definition: cf. Lach. 198 B δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ. φόβος in Laws I 644 C is defined as 'expectation before pain' (πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς).

358 E 36. δέος, φόβος δ' οὐ. Prodicus' distinction is just, though often dropped in practice: in φόβος 'the physical agitation due to present danger (ἡ παραυτίκα πτόησις, says Ammonius) is the leading idea', in δέος the apprehension of evil to come (κακοῦ ὑπόνοια). See note on Euthyphr. 12 B, where Plato implicitly recognises the difference.

37. ἀλλὰ τόδε: sc. διαφέρει. οὐδὲν διαφέρει does not of course mean 'there is no difference', but 'it doesn't matter'.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

It is here proved that courage is wisdom.

Socrates first reverts to the point at which the discussion on *ἡδονῆς ἠττᾶσθαι* began (359 A—C): next, Protagoras asserts that *ἀνδρείοι* and *δειλοί* are willing to encounter opposite things, but Socrates shews that both encounter what they take to be *θαρραλέα*, i.e., so far, the same things (359 C—E). Protagoras thereupon objects that *ἀνδρείοι* will encounter e.g. war, while *δειλοί* will not. Socrates replies by shewing that if cowards do not willingly enter upon war, the reason is their ignorance (359 E—360 A). In general, while brave men fear and feel courage honourably, i.e. well, the reverse is true of cowards, owing to their ignorance (360 A—360 B). And since it is through *δειλία* that men are *δειλοί*, and we have shewn that men are *δειλοί* through *ἀμαθία τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν*, cowardice is ignorance, and consequently bravery is wisdom, viz. *δεινῶν τε καὶ μὴ δεινῶν* (360 B—360 E).

359 A 5. τότε: 330 A foll.

9. τὸ ὕστερον: 349 D foll.

359 B 18. ἠρόμην: 349 E.

19. καὶ ἴτας γ', ἔφη. The recapitulation stops here. ἔφην ἐγώ in the next line is the usual 'said I' of narrated dialogue.

359 C 22. ἐπὶ τί: so MSS: the second hand in B reads ἐπὶ τίνα, but cf. infra line 27 where the question is repeated with ἐπὶ τί. For the

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used in Plato with the accusative, but the construction is a natural one and occurs in Thucydides: in Rep. I 338 A we have *προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον*.

CHAPTER XL.

Socrates points out that while Protagoras' theory would point to the conclusion that virtue is not teachable, he himself in trying to prove that virtue is knowledge goes near to maintaining that it is. Thus the interlocutors have as it were changed places. The dialogue ends with mutual compliments.

4. *αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετή*: 'virtue itself', literally 'virtue, the thing itself'. Compare Crat. 411 D *εἰ δὲ βούλει, αὐτὸ ἡ νόησις τοῦ νέου ἐστὶν ἔσις*: Theaet. 146 E *γινῶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν*: "*αὐτό (per se) substantivis et adiectivis adiunctum rei alicuius naturam ac vim per se et universe spectatam significat*", says Ast. This use of *αὐτός* furnished Plato (as in *αὐτοάνθρωπος* and the like) with a convenient way of denoting his Ideas, but here of course *αὐτό* does not denote the Idea but is *ipsam* as opposed to *τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς*.

361 B 14. *πάντα χρήματα*: exaggeration—as if Socrates held *ἐπιστήμη* to be the *ἀρχή* of the universe and said *ἐπιστήμη πάντα* as Heraclitus might say *πῦρ πάντα*.

19. *ὄλον*: i.e. *ἡ ἀρετή*—the gender is like *αὐτό* in line 4. Sauppe cites Meno 79 B *ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὄλον εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν*.

361 C 22. *ἔοικεν σπεύδοντι*: a frequent usage in Plato: see on Apol. 27 A *ἔοικεν γὰρ—διαπειρωμένω*.

24. *ἄνω κάτω*: see on 356 D above.

27. *ἐξελθεῖν—ἐπί*. There is a slight hint of military metaphor: 'fare forth against virtue also to see what she is', 'also attack the question what is virtue': cf. Rep. II 374 A δ (*στρατόπεδον*) *ἐξελθὼν—διαμαχεῖται τοῖς ἐπιούσιν*: cf. the similar use of *ἰέναι ἐπί* in Rep. V 473 C *ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰμι δ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσεικάζομεν κύματι*. Here *ἐξ-* is appropriate, because the first campaign is as it were ended (*ταῦτα διεξεληθόντας*): it is moreover natural to retain it, on account of the tendency noted on 311 A. A later hand in T has *ἐλθεῖν*, but the MSS reading is unobjectionable, nor is there any need to read *διελθεῖν* or *διεξελθεῖν τὴν ἀρετήν* as Kroschel suggests. For the sentiment cf. Meno 100 B *τὸ δὲ σαφὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰσόμεθα*

τότε, ὅταν πρὶν ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις παραγίγνεται ἀρετή, πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ζητεῖν τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἀρετή.

28. ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ: Siebeck (in the treatise cited on p. 187) here and in 361 E εἰσαῦθις—διέξιμεν finds a promise of the Meno and the Gorgias.

29. μὴ πολλάκις: *ne forte*, as often in Plato. What often happens may happen in a future case: so Lucretius uses 'saepe' for 'ut saepe fit'.

32. Προμηθεὺς—προμηθούμενος. Puns on proper names are 361 D frequent in Plato: see Riddell's Digest of Idioms § 323.

35. κατ' ἀρχάς, viz. 348 C ff., 320 B.

38. οὔτε—τε: see on 309 B.

361 E

41. ὧν ἐντυγχάνω: a somewhat rare attraction, since in the unattracted form the relative would be in the dative and not in the accusative case: compare Theaet. 144 A ὧν δὴ πρόποτε ἐνέτυχον—καὶ πάνυ πολλοῖς πεπλησάκα—οὐδένα πω ἡσθόμην κτλ., where Wohlrab cites also Gorg. 509 A.

42. τηλικούτων: Socrates was about 36 at the date of action of the Protagoras.

47. ἔφην: 335 C.

362 A

Καλλία τῷ καλῷ: see on 336 B above. For καλῷ cf. Symp. 174 A ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν (viz. Agathon) ἴω. Sauppe reminds us of the use of καλὸς on vases, and also cites Ar. Ach. 143 ἐν τοῖσι τοίχοις ἔγραφ' Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὶ (of Sitalces) and the famous Κριτία τοῦτ' ἐστὼ τῷ καλῷ of the dying Theramenes (Xen. Hell. II 3. 56).

APPENDIX I.

ON THE POEM OF SIMONIDES.

THE difficulties of this poem are well known, and have called forth many pages of comment¹. The restoration proposed by Schneidewin has met with most favour, and is printed in most texts of the Protagoras, not because it is thought to be certain, but as the nearest approach to certainty of which the case admits. It may be at once allowed that no restoration can claim to represent with certainty just what Simonides wrote in the order in which it was written. Plato is seldom careful to make his quotations accurate, and the perverse exposition of the meaning of this particular poem is hardly calculated to increase our confidence in his verbal accuracy here. Nevertheless, Plato is our sole authority for the poem in question, and consequently that restoration will be the most probable which, while it satisfies every metrical requirement, involves the fewest changes in the text and sequence of the poem as it stands in Plato.

The words apparently quoted from the poem, as they occur in the Bodleian manuscript, are according to Schanz as follows (we note obvious corrections at the foot of the page).

339 B. ἀνδρα² ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν χερσί³ τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον

¹ On p. 20 of his fourth edition of the Protagoras, Sauppe enumerates the discussions on the subject down to 1884. The most important contribution since that year is *Das Gedicht des Simonides in Platons Protagoras*, von J. Aars, Christiania, 1888. Aars's restoration has received the approval of Peppmüller (in the *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift* for 1890, p. 174 foll.) and others: and there now seems to be some prospect of finality in the criticism of the poem. In his program (*Das Simonideische Gedicht in Platons Protagoras und die Versuche dasselbe zu reconstruiren*, Graz 1889) Schwenk follows Aars in every essential point.

² ἀνδρ'.

³ χερσίη.

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Ἄντιστροφή.

οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον νέμεται,
καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσλὸν ἔμμεναι.
Θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας· ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
δν ἂν ἀμάχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.
Πράξαις γὰρ εὔ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς, καὶ
τοῦπίπλειστον ἄριστοι, τοὺς κε θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

Ἐπιφθόσ.

Ἐμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ
δς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ἦ
μῆδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος εἰδῶς τ' ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν, ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ.
οὔ μιν ἐγὼ μωμάσομαι·
οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ φιλόμωμος.
τῶν γὰρ ἀλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα.
πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται.

Στροφή β'.

τοῦνεκεν οὔποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν
διζήμενος, κενεᾶν ἐς ἀπρακτὸν ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,
πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός.
ἔπειτ' ὕμμιν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω.
πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω,
ἐκὼν ὅστις ἔρδη
μηδὲν αἰσχρὸν, ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

There is little probability in this arrangement. Schneidewin altogether neglects the evident metrical resemblance between the words from ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ to τοῖσί τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται¹ and the other sections of the poem. But the obvious and indeed fatal objection to Schneidewin's restoration is that he makes a wide departure from the order of the words as they come in Plato, placing the ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ κτλ. of 346 C before the τοῦνεκεν οὔποτ' ἐγὼ of 345 C. That Socrates *reverts* in 346 D to τοῦνεκεν οὔποτ' ἐγὼ κτλ. is no reason for placing these words in the last part of the poem, any more than we should place the words Ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως κτλ. after ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι κτλ. because Socrates reverts to them in 344 E. A man who professes to be giving a continuous exposition of a poem may revert to the middle of it when he has come to the end, in order

¹ See the restoration below on p. 198.

to illustrate the sentiment with which the poem concludes, but it would be the superfluity of naughtiness to put the end of the poem into the middle, which is what Schneidewin makes Socrates do. If οὐ ζητῶ κτλ. in 346 D were in reality the conclusion of the poem, we ought to frame our Στροφή β' out of these very words, and not from τοῦνεκεν οὔ ποτ' ἐγὼ κτλ. We should then have to omit the words ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται, because they are not found in 346 D—E, but it is beyond question that these words are part of Simonides' poem. It is tolerably certain that in 346 D we have but a recapitulation of part of the argument, presented as a commentary on the concluding text πάντα τοι καλὰ κτλ., which sums up the whole ethical teaching of the poem. This is practically admitted by Schneidewin himself when he writes his final strophe not as it appears in 346 D, but as it stands in 345 C—D.

Bergk¹ arranges the poem in three complete strophes. His restoration has the merit of recognising the similarity in rhythm between Schneidewin's Epode and the other parts of the poem: several of his emendations are also in all probability right². It may however be doubted whether he does well in altogether excluding from the poem the words ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ and οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος, and he deserts the Platonic order even more ruthlessly than Schneidewin when he places δὲ ἂν ἦ³ κακὸς—μὴ μέμικται directly after ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον, besides that Plato clearly indicates by the words προῖόντος τοῦ ἄσματος (339 C), ὀλίγον—εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν προελθῶν (339 D), and ὀλίγα διελθῶν (344 B), that there is a lacuna after τετυγμένον.

Blass⁴ agrees with Bergk in regarding the poem as a sequence of strophes, but discovers four of these in place of three. In the first strophe Blass's arrangement agrees with that of Schneidewin: in the second, he supposes the two first verses to be lost, and the rest to contain δὲ ἂν ἦ κακὸς κτλ. down to τοῖσι τ' αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμικται: the third consists of οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως—τούς κε θεοὶ φιλῶσιν: the fourth and last extends from τοῦνεκεν οὔ ποτ' ἐγὼ to ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται. This arrangement (which further agrees with that of Bergk in rejecting ἔμοιγ' ἐξαρκεῖ and οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος) upsets even more completely than either of the others the sequence of the poem as it is given by Plato, and for that reason is most unlikely to be right.

¹ Poetae Lyr. Graeci⁴, III p. 384 ff.

² See the footnotes on p. 195.

³ Bergk's emendation for μή.

⁴ In the Rheinisches Museum for 1872, p. 326 ff.

The only arrangement which faithfully adheres to the Platonic order of citation is that of Aars, in the treatise referred to already¹.

STROPHE 1.

1. Ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν,
2. χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόφ' τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.

Verses 3—7 are wanting.

STROPHE 2.

1. Οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιπτάκειον νέμεται,
2. καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ' ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.
3. Θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας· ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
4. ὃν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλη.
5. Πράξας μὲν εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
6. κακὸς δ' εἰ κακῶς <τις> ,
7. καὶ τὸ πλείστον ἄριστοι, τοὺς κε θεοὶ φιλῶσιν.

STROPHE 3.

1. Τοῦνεκεν οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν
2. διζήμενος κενεᾶν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,
3. πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·
4. ἐπὶ δ' ὕμιν εὐρῶν ἀπαγγελέω.
5. Πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω,
6. ἐκῶν ὅστις ἔρδη
7. μηδὲν αἰσχροῦ· ἀνάγκη δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται.

STROPHE 4.

1. Wanting.
2. — — — — — [οὐκ εἰμ' ἐγὼ φιλόμωμος·] ἔξαρκεῖ γ' ἐμοί,
3. ὅς ἂν ἦ κακὸς μηδ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδώς γ' ὀνησίπολις δίκαν,
4. ὑγιῆς ἀνὴρ, οὐδὲ μὴ μιν ἐγὼ
5. μωμήσομαι· τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων
6. ἀπείρων γενέθλα·
7. πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ' αἰσχροῦ μὴ μέμκται.

This restoration seems to us on the whole the most probable. In line 4 of Strophe 2 Plato no doubt wrote *ὃν ἂν* (the MSS reading) for *ὄν*, using the more common construction in defiance of metre,

¹ p. 194, note 1.

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have noted, the poem is most probably complete, for Socrates is trying to prove that Simonides attacks Pittacus throughout the *whole* poem: see 345 D οὕτω σφόδρα καὶ δι' ὅλου τοῦ ᾄσματος ἐπεξέρχεται τῷ τοῦ Πιττακοῦ ῥήματι and 343 C, 344 B.

We add a translation of the poem, incorporating the few changes which we have made in Aars's restoration.

STROPHE 1.

It is hard to quit you like a truly good man, in hands and feet and mind foursquare, fashioned without blame.

(The five lost *vv.* may have further elaborated the meaning of 'truly good').

STROPHE 2.

Nor do I deem the word of Pittacus well said, wise though he was that spake it: 'it is hard,' he said 'to be noble.' To a god alone belongs that meed: a man cannot but prove evil, if hopeless calamity overthrow him. Every man if he has fared well is good, evil, if ill: and for the most part best are they whom the gods love.

STROPHE 3.

Therefore never will I cast away my portion of life vainly upon a bootless hope, seeking what cannot come to be, an all-blameless man, of us who take the fruit of the broad earth: when I find him, look you, you shall hear. I praise and love all them that willingly do nothing base: against necessity even gods do not contend.

STROPHE 4.

---[I love not fault-finding]: enough for me if one be not evil nor exceeding violent: yea sound is the man who knoweth justice, benefactress of cities: nor will I find fault with him: for the tribe of fools is infinite. Surely all is fair wherein is no alloy of foul.

The easy-going morality of the poem is in harmony with what we know both of the life and poetry of Simonides: he was ever 'a genial and courtly man,' anxious to make the most of life, "dwelling with flowers like the bee, seeking yellow honey" (Sim. *Frag.* 47).

APPENDIX II.

PROTAGORAS' LIFE AND WORKS.

WE give the life of Protagoras as recorded by Diogenes Laertius (IX 50—56) and add the fragments of his works, according (in the main) to Frei's arrangement¹.

ΒΙΟΣ ΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΟΥ.

Πρωταγόρας Ἀρτέμωνος ἦ, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρος καὶ Δείνων ἐν Περσικοῖς, Μαιανδρίου, Ἀβδηρίτης, καθὰ φησιν Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός ἐν τοῖς περὶ νόμων, ὃς καὶ Θουρίοις νόμους γράψαι φησὶν αὐτόν· ὡς δ' Εὐπολὶς ἐν Κόλαξι, Τήϊος· φησὶ γάρ,

Ἐνδον μὲν ἐστὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁ Τήϊος.

οὗτος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος λόγους ἀναγινώσκοντες ἠρανίζοντο· καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ φησὶ βαρύφωνον εἶναι τὸν Πρόδικον. διήκουσε δ' ὁ Πρωταγόρας Δημοκρίτου. ἐκαλεῖτό τε Σοφία, ὡς φησὶ Φαβωρίνος ἐν παντοδαπῇ ἱστορίᾳ. καὶ πρῶτος ἔφη δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις· οἷς καὶ συνηρώτα, πρῶτος τοῦτο πράξας. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἤρξατό που τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· Ἐπιφανῶν χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος· τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι· τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.' ἔλεγέ τε μηδὲν εἶναι ψυχὴν παρὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις (καθὰ καὶ Πλάτων φησὶν ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ) καὶ πάντ' εἶναι ἀληθῆ. καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ δὲ τοῦτον ἤρξατο τὸν τρόπον· Ἐπιφανῶν μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἶδέναι οὐθ' ὡς εἰσὶν οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἶδέναι, ἢ τ' ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχυὸς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.' διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ συγγράμματος ἐξεβλήθη πρὸς Ἀθηναίων· καὶ τὰ βιβλί' αὐτοῦ κατέκαυσαν ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, ὑπὸ κήρυκι ἀναλεξάμενοι παρ' ἐκάστου τῶν κεκτημένων. οὗτος πρῶτος μισθὸν εἰσεπράξατο μνᾶς ἑκατόν· καὶ πρῶτος μέρη χρόνου διώρισε καὶ καιροῦ δύναμιν ἐξέθετο

¹ Quaestiones Protagoreae, p. 176 foll., where the references are fully given.

καὶ λόγων ἀγῶνας ἔθετο, καὶ σοφίσματα τοῖς πραγματολογοῦσι προσήγαγε· καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀφείλκε πρὸς τοῦνομα διελέχθη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιπολάζον γένος τῶν ἐριστικῶν ἐγέννησεν· ἵνα καὶ Τιμῶν φησὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ,

Πρωταγόρης τ' ἐπίμικτος ἐριζέμεναι εὖ εἰδώς·

οὗτος καὶ τὸ Σωκρατικὸν εἶδος τῶν λόγων πρῶτος ἐκίνησε. καὶ τὸν Ἀντισθένης λόγον τὸν πειρώμενον ἀποδεικνύειν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, οὗτος πρῶτος διελέκται, καθά φησι Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθυδήμῳ. καὶ πρῶτος κατέδειξε τὰς πρὸς τὰς θέσεις ἐπιχειρήσεις, ὡς φησὶ Ἀρτεμίδωρος ὁ διαλεκτικὸς ἐν τῷ πρὸς Χρύσιππον. καὶ πρῶτος τὴν καλουμένην τύλην, ἐφ' ἧς τὰ φορτία βαστάζουσιν, εὗρεν, ὡς φησὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ περὶ παιδείας· φορμοφόρος γὰρ ἦν, ὡς καὶ Ἐπίκουρος φησὶ. καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἤρθη¹ πρὸς Δημόκριτον, ξύλα δεδεκῶς ὀφθελς. διεῖλε τε τὸν λόγον πρῶτος εἰς τέτταρα· εὐχωλήν, ἐρώτησιν, ἀπόκρισιν, ἐντολήν· οἱ δέ, εἰς ἑπτὰ· διήγησιν, ἐρώτησιν, ἀπόκρισιν, ἐντολήν, ἀπαγγελίαν, εὐχωλήν, κλήσιν, οὗς καὶ πυθμένας εἶπε λόγων. Ἀλκιδάμας δὲ τέτταρας λόγους φησὶ· φάσιν, ἀπόφασιν, ἐρώτησιν, προσαγόρευσιν. πρῶτον δὲ τῶν λόγων ἑαυτοῦ ἀνέγνω τὸν περὶ θεῶν, οὗ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἄνω παρεθέμεθα· ἀνέγνω δ' Ἀθήνησιν ἐν τῇ Εὐριπίδου οἰκίᾳ ἢ, ὡς τινες, ἐν τῇ Μεγακλείδου· ἄλλοι δ' ἐν Λυκείῳ, μαθητοῦ τὴν φωνὴν αὐτῷ χρησαντος Ἀρχαγόρου τοῦ Θεοδότου. κατηγόρησε δ' αὐτοῦ Πυθόδωρος Πολυζήλου², εἰς τῶν τετρακοσίων. Ἀριστοτέλης δ' Εὐαθλὸν φησιν.

ἔστι δὲ τὰ σωζόμενα αὐτοῦ βιβλία τάδε. Τέχνη ἐριστικῶν. Περὶ πάλης. Περὶ τῶν μαθημάτων. Περὶ πολιτείας. Περὶ φιλοτιμίας. Περὶ ἀρετῶν. Περὶ τῆς ἐν ἀρχῇ καταστάσεως. Περὶ τῶν ἐν ἄδου. Περὶ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρᾶσσομένων. Προστακτικὸς. Δίκη ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ. Ἀντιλογιῶν δύο. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν αὐτῷ τὰ βιβλία. γέγραφε δὲ καὶ Πλάτων εἰς αὐτὸν διάλογον.

φησὶ δὲ Φιλόχορος, πλείοντος αὐτοῦ ἐς Σικελίαν, τὴν ναῦν καταποντωθῆναι· καὶ τοῦτο αἰνίττεσθαι Εὐριπίδην ἐν τῷ Ἴξιῳ. ἐνιοὶ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν τελευτήσαι αὐτὸν, βιώσαντα ἔτη πρὸς τὰ ἐνενήκοντα· Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ φησὶν ἐβδομήκοντα, σοφιστεῦσαι δὲ τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ἀκμάζειν κατὰ τὴν τετάρτην καὶ ὀγδοηκοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα. ἔστι καὶ εἰς τοῦτον ἡμῶν οὕτως ἔχον,

Καὶ σεῦ, Πρωταγόρη, φάτιν ἔκλυον, ὡς ἄρ' Ἀθηνέων

Ἐκ ποτ' ἰὼν καθ' ὁδὸν πρέσβυς ἐὼν ἔθανες.

Εἴλετο γὰρ σε φυγεῖν Κέκροπος πόλις· ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν που

Παλλάδος ἄστου φύγες, Πλουτέα δ' οὐκ ἔφυγες.

¹ (?) ἤχθη.

² Fortasse scribendum Ἐπιζήλου: v. Arist. Pol. Ath. 29. 1.

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E. Rhetorical.

5. (?) δύο λόγοι εἰσι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικείμενοι ἀλλήλοις (from the ἀντιλογιῶν δύο αρ. D. L. IX 51).

6. τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν (from the τέχνη ἐριστικῶν αρ. Arist. Rhet. II 24, p. 1402 a 23).

The δίκη ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ (D. L. IX 55) and the “rerum illustrium disputationes, quae nunc communes appellantur loci” (Cic. Brut. 46) have apparently left no trace.

F. Various.

7. φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται, καὶ ἀπὸ νεότητος δὲ ἀρξάμενους δεῖ μαθάνειν (from the μέγας λόγος—probably identical with the Προστακτικός—: see Cramer Anecd. Paris. I p. 171).

8. [Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε] μηδὲν εἶναι μήτε τέχνην ἀνευ μελέτης μήτε μελέτην ἀνευ τέχνης¹ (perhaps from the same, αρ. Stob. Flor. 29. 80).

Another fragment, probably from the same work, is quoted by J. Gildermeister and F. Bücheler from a Syriac translation of Plutarch's περὶ ἀσκήσεως [Rhein. Mus. vol. xxvii (1872) p. 526]. The original perhaps ran:

9. οὐ βλαστάνει παιδεία ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, εἰ μὴ τις εἰς βυθὸν ἔλθῃ.

Of the περὶ μαθημάτων, and the περὶ τεχνῶν (of which perhaps the περὶ πάλης was a part) nothing (so far as is certainly known) survives. Gomperz's ingenious and learned attempt² to prove that the ‘Defence of Medicine’ which under the title of περὶ τέχνης appears in the collection of Hippocratean works³ was written by Protagoras and belongs to the treatise περὶ τεχνῶν has not, as yet, commended itself to critics⁴.

¹ Compare Gomperz (cited in the next note), p. 11.

² Reprinted from the Sitzungsberichte der Kais. Akademie der Wissenschaft in Wien: Philosophisch-Historische Classe, Band cxx.

³ Littré, vi 1—27.

⁴ See Wellmann in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, v p. 97 foll.

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