

1        Revealing the drivers of antibiotic resistance trends in *Streptococcus*  
2                    *pneumoniae* amidst the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic:  
3                    Insights from mathematical modeling  
4

5 Aleksandra Kovacevic<sup>1,2</sup> David R M Smith<sup>1,2,3,4</sup>, Eve Rahbé<sup>1,2</sup>, Sophie Novelli<sup>2</sup>, Paul Henriot<sup>3,5</sup>,  
6 Emmanuelle Varon<sup>6</sup>, Robert Cohen<sup>7,8,9,10,11</sup>, Corinne Levy<sup>7,8,10,11</sup>, Laura Temime<sup>3,5</sup>, Lulla  
7 Opatowski<sup>1,2</sup>  
8

- 9        1. Institut Pasteur, Université Paris Cité, Epidemiology and Modelling of Antibiotic Evasion  
10                    (EMAE) unit, Paris, France  
11        2. Université Paris-Saclay, Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, Inserm  
12                    U1018, CESP, Anti-infective evasion and pharmacoepidemiology team, Montigny-Le-  
13                    Bretonneux, France  
14        3. Modélisation, épidémiologie et surveillance des risques sanitaires (MESuRS),  
15                    Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, Paris, France  
16        4. Health Economics Research Centre, Nuffield Department of Health, University of  
17                    Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom  
18        5. PACRI unit, Institut Pasteur, Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, Paris, France  
19        6. Centre National de Référence des Pneumocoques, Centre Hospitalier Intercommunal de  
20                    Créteil, Créteil, France  
21        7. Institut Mondor de Recherche Biomédicale-Groupe de Recherche Clinique Groupe  
22                    d'Etude des Maladies Infectieuses Néonatales et Infantiles (IMRB-GRC GEMINI),  
23                    Université Paris Est, 94000 Créteil, France  
24        8. Groupe de Pathologie Infectieuse Pédiatrique (GPIP), 06200 Nice, France  
25        9. Unité Court Séjour, Petits Nourrissons, Service de Néonatalogie, Centre Hospitalier  
26                    Intercommunal de Créteil, France  
27        10. Association Clinique et Thérapeutique Infantile du Val-de-Marne (ACTIV), 94000  
28                    Créteil, France  
29        11. Association Française de Pédiatrie Ambulatoire (AFPA), 45000 Orléans, France  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41

42 **Keywords:** *Streptococcus pneumoniae*; antibiotic resistance; AMR; invasive pneumococcal  
43 disease (IPD); COVID-19 pandemic; virus-bacteria interactions; pathogen interactions;  
44 pneumococcal carriage; co-infection model  
45

## 46 Abstract

47  
48 Non-pharmaceutical interventions implemented to block SARS-CoV-2 transmission in early 2020  
49 led to global reductions in the incidence of invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD). By contrast,  
50 most European countries reported an increase in antibiotic resistance among invasive  
51 *Streptococcus pneumoniae* isolates from 2019 to 2020, while an increasing number of studies  
52 reported stable pneumococcal carriage prevalence over the same period. To disentangle the  
53 impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on pneumococcal epidemiology in the community setting, we  
54 propose a mathematical model formalizing simultaneous transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and  
55 antibiotic-sensitive and -resistant strains of *S. pneumoniae*. To test hypotheses underlying these  
56 trends five mechanisms were built in into the model and examined: (1) a population-wide reduction  
57 of antibiotic prescriptions in the community, (2) lockdown effect on pneumococcal transmission,  
58 (3) a reduced risk of developing an IPD due to the absence of common respiratory viruses, (4)  
59 community azithromycin use in COVID-19 infected individuals, (5) and a longer carriage duration  
60 of antibiotic-resistant pneumococcal strains. Among 31 possible pandemic scenarios involving  
61 mechanisms individually or in combination, model simulations surprisingly identified only two  
62 scenarios that reproduced the reported trends in the general population. They included factors (1),  
63 (3), and (4). These scenarios replicated a nearly 50% reduction in annual IPD, and an increase in  
64 antibiotic resistance from 20% to 22%, all while maintaining a relatively stable pneumococcal  
65 carriage. Exploring further, higher SARS-CoV-2  $R_0$  values and synergistic within-host virus-  
66 bacteria interaction mechanisms could have additionally contributed to the observed antibiotic  
67 resistance increase. Our work demonstrates the utility of the mathematical modeling approach in  
68 unraveling the complex effects of the COVID-19 pandemic responses on AMR dynamics.

69  
70  
71  
72  
73  
74  
75  
76  
77  
78  
79  
80  
81  
82  
83  
84  
85  
86  
87  
88  
89  
90  
91

## 92 Introduction

93  
94 In the early 2020, international responses to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)  
95 pandemic led to unprecedented worldwide change in population mixing, healthcare-seeking  
96 behavior, and infection prevention and control practices. This modified the ecology and  
97 epidemiology of many infectious diseases at a global scale. Strong impacts of COVID-19 on  
98 infectious disease dynamics have been reported for common viral and bacterial respiratory  
99 infections, sexually transmitted pathogens like HIV, vector-borne diseases like dengue, and even  
100 non-communicable diseases (Braunstein et al., 2020; Brueggemann et al., 2021; Chen et al., 2022;  
101 Palmer et al., 2020). Antimicrobial resistance (AMR), however, remains one of the leading threats  
102 to global health. In 2019, estimates showed that AMR in clinically relevant bacteria was associated  
103 with 4.95 million deaths, of which 1.27 million were directly attributable to resistance (Murray et  
104 al., 2022). Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on AMR dynamics remain relatively poorly  
105 understood.

106  
107 A joint report from the World Health Organization (WHO) and European Centre for Disease  
108 Prevention and Control (ECDC) has reported 2020 AMR trends across 29 European countries for  
109 eight antibiotic-resistant bacterial pathogens of concern, including *S. pneumoniae* (European  
110 Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and World Health Organization, 2022). While the  
111 situation varies widely across bacterial species, antimicrobial groups, and regions, most European  
112 countries, including France, documented an increase in pneumococcal resistance to both penicillin  
113 and macrolides between 2019 and 2020. The resistance rates rose from 12.2% in 2019 to 15.6% in  
114 2020 for penicillin and from 14.5% in 2019 to 16.9% in 2020 for macrolides, as reported in the  
115 EU/EEA (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and World Health Organization,  
116 2022). However, increased pneumococcal resistance was accompanied by a sharp worldwide  
117 decline in invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) incidence (Brueggemann et al., 2021; Shaw et al.,  
118 2023).

119  
120 Similar declines in bacterial disease during early waves of COVID-19 have been observed  
121 in the context of sentinel community-acquired infections in New Zealand (Duffy et al., 2021),  
122 IPDs in Taiwan (Chien et al., 2021) and Hong Kong (Teng et al., 2022), and lower respiratory tract  
123 infections in China (Chen et al., 2021). Yet, surprisingly, a growing number of studies have  
124 reported mostly stable pneumococcal carriage throughout the COVID-19 pandemic containment,  
125 including among infants in Belgium (Willen et al., 2022), children in Vietnam (Nation et al., 2023),  
126 Serbia (Petrović et al., 2022), France (Rybak et al., 2022), South Africa (Olwagen et al., 2023),  
127 and Israel (Dagan et al., 2023), adults in Connecticut (Wyllie et al., 2023), and households in  
128 Seattle (Bennett et al., 2023). In contrast, a study conducted in Denmark reported a decrease in  
129 pneumococcal carriage among older adults during the COVID-19 lockdown (Tinggaard et al.,  
130 2023).

131  
132 Understanding the cause of these trends is not straightforward, as many responses to the  
133 COVID-19 pandemic, such as the implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs),  
134 changes in healthcare-seeking behavior, and alterations in antibiotic prescribing, occurred over the  
135 period (Knight et al., 2021). To gain a comprehensive understanding of the changes in AMR  
136 epidemiology during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is essential to simultaneously consider a range  
137 of scales and indicators. These include the rates of incidence of invasive bacterial diseases, the

138 proportion of antibiotic-resistant isolates among total invasive bacterial isolates, and the  
139 prevalence of asymptomatic bacterial carriage in healthy individuals.

140  
141 Several mechanisms may underlie the explanation of these contrasting observations. First,  
142 NPIs implemented to block SARS-CoV-2 transmission, such as lockdowns and mask mandates,  
143 may have led to reduced bacterial transmission. Containment measures also massively reduced  
144 circulation of common respiratory viruses, which are known to be associated with invasive  
145 bacterial disease (Domenech De Cellès et al., 2019; Smith and Opatowski, 2021). Second, the  
146 lockdown was associated with reductions in primary care consultations (Homeniuk and Collins,  
147 2021; Read et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2021) leading to a global decrease of antibiotic prescriptions  
148 (Högberg et al., 2021). In contrast, frequent antibiotic prescribing to COVID-19 outpatients may  
149 have exacerbated AMR (Clancy et al., 2020; Knight et al., 2021). Differences in the duration of  
150 pneumococcal carriage may have also played a role (Lehtinen et al., 2017). Finally, potential  
151 within-host interactions between SARS-CoV-2 and *S. pneumoniae* could also have an impact on  
152 infection risk (Amin-Chowdhury et al., 2021), although strong evidence for such interactions  
153 remains limited (Wong et al., 2023).

154  
155 Mathematical models incorporating the co-transmission of multiple pathogens within the  
156 same host population provide a framework for investigating different hypotheses that underlie the  
157 observed patterns in antibiotic resistance and incidence of IPD in *S. pneumoniae* and help to  
158 enhance our understanding of the mechanisms involved. Co-circulation models have been used  
159 previously to disentangle the public health consequences of interactions between pathogens such  
160 as influenza and *S. pneumoniae* (Arduin et al., 2017; Domenech De Cellès et al., 2019; Shrestha  
161 et al., 2013) and could similarly be used to understand impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on  
162 pathogens coinciding with SARS-CoV-2. However, in a systematic PubMed search conducted on  
163 4 December 2023, we identified no epidemiological models describing the simultaneous  
164 transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and antibiotic-resistant bacteria specific to the community setting  
165 (Appendix 1).

166  
167 Here, to disentangle how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the epidemiological  
168 dynamics of antibiotic resistance in *S. pneumoniae*, we propose a mathematical model that  
169 formalizes the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and both antibiotic-sensitive and -resistant strains of  
170 *S. pneumoniae* in the community setting, and which includes mechanistic impacts of COVID-19  
171 burden on epidemiological parameters. Through simulation, we assess all possible combinations  
172 of these mechanisms to evaluate their overall impact on IPD incidence, antibiotic resistance, and  
173 the prevalence of pneumococcal carriage. Furthermore, we assess the changes in the incidence of  
174 antibiotic-resistant IPD as we vary the basic reproduction number ( $R_0$ ) of SARS-CoV-2 during the  
175 first COVID-19 outbreak in Europe. We also consider assumed within-host pathogen interactions  
176 between SARS-CoV-2 and *S. pneumoniae*.

177

## 178 Results

179

### 180 Antibiotic resistance trends and incidence of invasive pneumococcal disease in 2020

181 In routine surveillance data reported to the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance  
182 Network (EARS-Net), most European countries reported an increase in antibiotic resistance in *S.*  
183 *pneumoniae* from 2019 to 2020, as indicated by increases in the proportion of invasive isolates

184 with phenotypic resistance to both penicillin and macrolides (Figure 1A). On the contrary, the total  
185 number of reported isolates in the EU/EEA decreased by 44.3% from 2019 to 2020 (European  
186 Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and World Health Organization, 2022) suggesting a  
187 decrease in incidence of invasive pneumococcal disease (Appendix 2 – Table 1).

188  
189 Invasive pneumococcal isolate data for France provided by the French National Reference  
190 Center for Pneumococci (CNRP) revealed similar trends. In France, the total number of reported  
191 invasive pneumococcal isolates decreased by 45.1% from 2019 to 2020 (from 1119 to 614), while  
192 antibiotic resistance in *S. pneumoniae* isolates to penicillin and macrolides showed an increasing  
193 trend from 26.2% in 2019 to 35.5% in 2020 for penicillin, and from 20.9% in 2019 to 23.0% in  
194 2020 for macrolides (Figure 1B). General decreasing trend in antibiotic resistance from 2017 to  
195 2019 in *S. pneumoniae* was interrupted in 2020 (Figure 1 – figure supplement 1). These variations  
196 in antibiotic resistance manifested differently across age, with some age groups showing an  
197 increase in antibiotic resistance in 2020 compared to 2019, while others showed no significant  
198 change (Figure 1B).

199  
200 **Coinfection model of SARS-CoV-2 and *Streptococcus pneumoniae***  
201 As mentioned above, several mechanisms may underlie the explanation of these contrasting  
202 observations (Figure 2A). COVID-19 NPIs may have led to reduced person-to-person bacterial  
203 transmission, potentially contributing to reduced rates of IPD incidence. These containment  
204 measures also massively reduced circulation of common respiratory viruses and the incidence of  
205 influenza-like-illnesses (ILIs). Respiratory viruses are known triggers and risk factors for  
206 developing an invasive bacterial disease from otherwise asymptomatic carriage; in that context,  
207 their reduction may have led to reduced infection risk (Domenech De Cellès et al., 2019; Smith  
208 and Opatowski, 2021). Due to reductions in primary care consultations in 2020, 26 European  
209 countries reported an estimated average decrease of 18.3% in overall antibiotic consumption,  
210 aligning with the global trend of reduced antibiotic prescriptions compared to 2019 (Högberg et  
211 al., 2021). On the other hand, frequent prescribing of azithromycin, a macrolide antibiotic initially  
212 hypothesized to be effective in COVID-19 treatment, has raised concerns for pandemic-associated  
213 antimicrobial overuse or misuse and may have exacerbated AMR during and following the first  
214 wave of the pandemic (Clancy et al., 2020; Knight et al., 2021; Kournoutou and Dinos, 2022;  
215 Langford et al., 2021; PRINCIPLE Trial Collaborative Group, 2021; Rusic et al., 2021). There are  
216 still uncertainties about pneumococcal ecology and the evolutionary processes that enable the  
217 robust coexistence of strains sensitive and resistant to antibiotics. The role of carriage duration,  
218 along with the impact of antibiotic consumption, is also not fully understood in this context. Longer  
219 carriage duration of antibiotic-resistant pneumococcal strains is a proposed explanation for this  
220 coexistence (Lehtinen et al., 2017). If so, antibiotic-resistant pneumococcal strains may have had  
221 an advantage during the lockdown period due to smaller clearance rates, ultimately leading to an  
222 increase in antibiotic resistance. Finally, among individuals with COVID-19, potential within-host  
223 interactions between SARS-CoV-2 and *S. pneumoniae* could also have had an impact on bacterial  
224 colonization and infection dynamics (Amin-Chowdhury et al., 2021).

225  
226 To test mechanistic impacts of responses to the COVID-19 pandemic on pneumococcal  
227 epidemiology, we developed a compartmental, deterministic transmission model describing  
228 infection with SARS-CoV-2 being introduced on 1 Jan 2020 (Figure 2B) after colonization with  
229 *S. pneumoniae* reached an equilibrium in a large, well-mixed human population (Figure 2C). Two

lockdowns were implemented in the model in agreement with the two lockdowns implemented in France in 2020. The model was parameterized to *S. pneumoniae* and five mechanisms were built into the model: (1) a population-wide reduction of antibiotic prescriptions in the community by 18% due to the reduced healthcare-seeking behavior, (2) lockdown reducing pneumococcal transmission by 25%, (3) a reduced risk of developing an IPD from asymptomatic carriage due to the absence of common respiratory viruses during the first lockdown (reduced by a factor  $IPD_{risk} = 0.2$ ), which continues after the first lockdown, albeit at a diminished level ( $IPD_{risk} = 0.4$ ), (4) community azithromycin use in 10% of COVID-19 infected individuals, (5) and a longer carriage duration of antibiotic-resistant pneumococcal strains giving them a fitness advantage over antibiotic-resistant strains (40 vs. 30 days).

240

### 241 **Exploring the mechanisms and identifying the optimal scenario for explaining reported** 242 **trends**

243 We conducted assessments on five distinct hypotheses, each characterized by a precise underlying  
244 mechanism, and explored these hypotheses in combination within 31 pandemic scenarios, along  
245 with two pre-pandemic (baseline) scenarios, which assume no SARS-CoV-2 circulation in the  
246 population and allow for the same 30-day carriage duration (pre-pandemic 1) of both antibiotic-  
247 sensitive and -resistant strains ( $d_S = d_R$ ) or a longer, 40-day carriage duration (pre-pandemic 2)  
248 of -resistant strains ( $d_S > d_R$ ) (Table 1).

249

250 We assessed how different combinations of mechanisms may impact: (i) a change in the  
251 annual IPD incidence as compared to the pre-pandemic (baseline) period, (ii) antibiotic resistance  
252 rate in IPDs, defined as the annual number of antibiotic-resistant IPD cases over the total number  
253 of IPD cases, and (iii) daily prevalences of antibiotic-resistant and total pneumococcal carriage in  
254 a simulated population of 100,000 individuals (see Appendix 2 – Table 2 for parameter values).  
255 To identify scenarios most compatible with the reported trends, results from model simulations  
256 were compared to reported data trends from France in 2020 and more broadly to general EU/EEA  
257 reported trends that followed similar patterns. Surprisingly only two scenarios were compatible  
258 with reported trends. Scenarios S19 and S29 univocally reproduced increased antibiotic resistance  
259 in the general population (AR%) accompanied by a reduction in the annual IPD incidence by  
260 almost 50% (IPD inc.) with generally stable pneumococcal carriage prevalence in healthy  
261 individuals during lockdown (Sp.). In contrast, model simulations revealed that a reduction in the  
262 community antibiotic consumption alone (-18%) could not explain the reported trends and  
263 generally led to a reduction of antibiotic resistance (Table 1, S1). Assuming a longer duration of  
264 antibiotic-resistant pneumococcal carriage alone did not explain either the rise in antibiotic  
265 resistance (Table 1, S5). Hypothesizing that lockdown reduced the transmission of pneumococcal  
266 carriage (by 25%) in addition to a reduced community antibiotic prescribing did not seem probable  
267 since, in simulations, this yielded a major reduction in pneumococcal carriage during containment  
268 measures in all scenarios where this mechanism was implemented. On the other hand, considering  
269 an indirect impact of lockdown on pneumococcal carriage where we implemented a reduction  
270 factor for the risk of developing and IPD from otherwise asymptomatic carriage due to the absence  
271 of viral respiratory infections during ( $IPD_{risk}=0.2$ ) and after lockdown ( $IPD_{risk}=0.4$ ) reproduced  
272 the reported reduction in the annual IPD incidence while maintaining a stable prevalence of  
273 pneumococcal carriage during lockdown (Table 1, S3). By itself however, this scenario did not  
274 allow to observe an increase in antibiotic resistance.

275

276 When we combined reduced antibiotic prescribing and a reduced risk of developing an IPD  
277 with community azithromycin use in a proportion of COVID-19 infected individuals, which  
278 remains in the body for an additional 15.5 days after the last dose, in a single scenario, this scenario  
279 satisfied the observed trends in AMR (Table 1, S19). Similar outcome was observed in scenario  
280 S29 when adding a longer carriage duration of antibiotic resistant strains on top of this, however,  
281 in the absence of community azithromycin use in COVID-19 infected (Table 1, S20) trends of  
282 increasing antibiotic resistance cannot be reproduced. Therefore, our best model scenario for  
283 describing the observed trends combined: (1) a reduction in the overall community antibiotic  
284 consumption; (2) the assumption that lockdown effectively reduced SARS-CoV-2 transmission  
285 including transmission of other respiratory viruses, but not pneumococcal carriage transmission,  
286 indirectly reducing the risk of developing an IPD; (3) either identical or longer carriage durations  
287 of antibiotic-resistant strains compared to antibiotic-sensitive strains, and (4) the community  
288 azithromycin use in a proportion of COVID-19 infected individuals.

289

### 290 **Effect of age**

291 Next, we used the pandemic scenario S19 that best explains the reported trends to test the model  
292 using different parameter combinations to mimic different subpopulations (children and the  
293 elderly) considering that SARS-CoV-2 infection risk, pneumococcal disease risk, disease severity,  
294 bacterial carriage prevalence, and antibiotic prescribing are all highly heterogeneous across age  
295 groups. Using scenario S19, we initialized the model with lower and higher baseline carriage  
296 prevalence (10%, 20%, and 30%) (Cohen et al., 2023; Rose et al., 2021; Rybak et al., 2022;  
297 Tinggaard et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2017), we varied durations of pneumococcal carriage (20, 30,  
298 and 45 days), pneumococcal invasion rate, and considered reductions of antibiotic consumption at  
299 various levels (-13%, -18%, and -39%) consistent with the French data along with a range of  
300 community azithromycin use in COVID-19 infected (0-20%). For a full list of parameters see  
301 Appendix 2 – Table 2. Simulations showed that annual IPD incidence decreased between 43% and  
302 51% compared to the pre-pandemic (baseline) scenario for children, the elderly, and the general  
303 population (Figure 3, grey bars). Although the overall antibiotic prescribing in the community was  
304 reduced (between 13% and 39%), antibiotic resistance is expected to increase (from 20.1% up to  
305 23.6% in the elderly and from 32.8% up to 36.0% in children) compared to the pre-pandemic  
306 period in all age groups and in all scenarios where azithromycin was used in COVID-19 infected  
307 individuals (Figure 3, red bars). Daily prevalence of total pneumococcal carriage remained  
308 relatively stable, exhibiting higher levels of decrease with increased azithromycin use, while the  
309 prevalence of antibiotic-resistant pneumococcal carriage is expected to increase since clearance of  
310 antibiotic-susceptible strains due to azithromycin use shifts the competitive balance in favor of the  
311 existing resistant strains (Figure 3, third panel).

312

313 General trends produced in model simulations using scenario S19 remained unchanged  
314 across different age groups. The extent of the impact depended on the combined magnitude of a  
315 decrease in the general antibiotic use in the community and a degree of azithromycin use in  
316 COVID-19 infected individuals belonging to a particular age group or a subpopulation. In the  
317 elderly ( $\geq 65$  years-old) and the general population, antibiotic resistance is expected to increase  
318 due to azithromycin use in COVID-19 infected. Black arrows indicate model outcomes that  
319 approximate the reported trends in antibiotic resistance in France for different age groups including  
320 general population (Figure 3). Only in instances when there was no azithromycin use in COVID-  
321 19 infected individuals, we observed a decrease in antibiotic resistance relative to the pre-

322 pandemic period (e.g., children <5 years-old). When combining the largest decrease in overall  
323 antibiotic use with no or minimal azithromycin use in COVID-19 infected individuals, we expect  
324 to see the largest decrease or no change in antibiotic resistance relative to the pre-pandemic period.  
325

### 326 **Effect of SARS-CoV-2 basic reproduction number ( $R_0$ ) and within-host pathogen** 327 **interactions on AMR**

328 Considering that model simulations reproduced an absolute increase in antibiotic resistance  
329 comparable to that of 2% reported for macrolides in France but did not reproduce the reported  
330 larger increase in penicillin resistance, which was more than a 9% rise (35.5% relative increase)  
331 in France, we explored additional factors that may have amplified this increase. Using model  
332 scenario S19, we show that an association between higher values of SARS-CoV-2  $R_0$  and a greater  
333 percentage of COVID-19 infected individuals taking azithromycin leads to increased cumulative  
334 incidence of antibiotic-resistant IPDs and elevated antibiotic resistance (Figure 4A). For example,  
335 if pre-lockdown  $R_0$  of SARS-CoV-2 was 3.8 instead of 3.2, model simulations predict an increase  
336 of 3.5% (23.5%) in antibiotic resistance from the pre-pandemic levels instead of 2%. As the  $R_0$   
337 value increases, the impact of azithromycin use becomes more pronounced.

338 Assuming within-host interactions where SARS-CoV-2 infection favors progression from  
339 pneumococcal colonization to disease ( $\psi_c > 1$ ), we found that surges in COVID-19 cases  
340 accompanied by increasing levels of azithromycin use lead to excess number of cases caused by  
341 antibiotic-resistant strains. Indeed, a rate of disease progression increased by a factor  $\psi_c = 40$  in  
342 in scenario S19 with 10% of infected using azithromycin applied to the general population results  
343 in approximately 0.75 additional cases of antibiotic-resistant disease per 100,000 inhabitants over  
344 the course of one year compared to 0.06 additional cases if there are no within-host interactions  
345 (Figure 4B). This represents 5% rise in resistance from the pre-pandemic levels (25% relative  
346 increase).  
347

## 348 **Discussion**

349  
350 We propose a novel co-circulation model describing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and antibiotic-  
351 resistant bacteria in a community setting to show how human behavioral responses to the COVID-  
352 19 pandemic can differentially impact antibiotic resistance. Our model simulations assessed  
353 different hypotheses proposed to explain the observed trends of antibiotic resistance, IPD  
354 incidence, and pneumococcal carriage. We identified the most plausible mechanisms underlying  
355 the observed patterns of resistance and disease incidence, showing how lockdowns indirectly  
356 substantially reduce the incidence of IPD, while surges in COVID-19 cases accompanied by  
357 antibiotic prescribing in COVID-19 infected individuals increase antibiotic resistance.  
358

359 Many studies have reported trends on the incidence of community-acquired bacterial  
360 infections since the onset of the pandemic (Brueggemann et al., 2021; Shaw et al., 2023). There  
361 was a significant reduction in the risk of invasive disease caused by *S. pneumoniae* (risk ratio 0.47;  
362 95% CI 0.40–0.55) (Shaw et al., 2023). Initially, this observation seemed to support the hypothesis  
363 that NPIs implemented to control SARS-CoV-2 transmission may have simultaneously reduced  
364 the incidence of bacterial infections by preventing bacterial transmission and acquisition  
365 (Brueggemann et al., 2021; Kadambari et al., 2022). Indeed, the scenario of lockdown impact on  
366 pneumococcal transmission reproduced such trends. However, incorporating a mechanism of  
367 reduced risk for developing an IPD due to the absence of circulation of common respiratory viruses



368 led to similar estimates of the relative reduction in IPD incidence as reported in the EU/EEA for  
369 2020 (Brueggemann et al., 2021; European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and World  
370 Health Organization, 2022). This finding, coupled with the outcome of other studies that found a  
371 generally stable pneumococcal carriage prevalence in healthy individuals, both children and adults,  
372 during COVID-19 containment measures (Nation et al., 2023; Petrović et al., 2022; Rybak et al.,  
373 2022; Willen et al., 2022; Wyllie et al., 2023), supports the alternative hypothesis. This explanation  
374 accounts for the decreased incidence of IPD, rather than attributing it to reduced pneumococcal  
375 transmission, which resulted in a significant reduction in carriage according to the simulations  
376 (Smith and Opatowski, 2021). Furthermore, a study in Vietnam found that reductions in IPD  
377 associated with NPIs may be due to reductions in overall pneumococcal carriage density rather  
378 than carriage prevalence, driven by reductions in capsular pneumococcal carriage density  
379 frequently implicated in IPD (Nation et al., 2023). Considering that common respiratory viruses  
380 such as influenza increase pneumococcal carriage density, which contributes to transmission and  
381 disease, this hypothesis seems plausible (Alpkvist et al., 2015; Diavatopoulos et al., 2010;  
382 McCullers et al., 2010; Short et al., 2012; Wolter et al., 2014).

383  
384 Globally, community antibiotic consumption dropped during the first year of the COVID-  
385 19 pandemic compared to the pre-pandemic period. Decreasing temporal trends were observed in  
386 England (Hussain et al., 2021), Canada (Mamun et al., 2021), the United States (Buehrle et al.,  
387 2021), China (Zhang et al., 2021), South Korea (Ryu et al., 2021), New Zealand (Duffy et al.,  
388 2021), and across European countries (Högberg et al., 2021). In France in particular, the number  
389 of antibiotic prescriptions decreased by 18.2% in the general population; however, this reduction  
390 ranged from 13% to 39% for the oldest and youngest age groups, respectively (Bara et al., 2022).  
391 These trends in antibiotic prescribing may largely be explained by reduced incidence of seasonal  
392 respiratory tract infections and reduced primary care consultations (Andrews et al., 2022;  
393 Homeniuk and Collins, 2021). On the other hand, the advent of telemedicine, pandemic-induced  
394 patient stress, and increased antibiotic demand may have partly offset prescription reductions due  
395 to decreased consultations and healthcare-seeking behavior (Hsu, 2020; Read et al., 2023). In a  
396 global analysis of antimicrobial sales, Khouja et al. found that antibiotic consumption initially  
397 increased by approximately 7% in March 2020, prior to subsequent declines through to August  
398 2020 (Khouja et al., 2022). While overall antibiotic prescribing may have decreased, prescription  
399 of specific antibiotics has increased, particularly those associated with COVID-19 patient  
400 management. Across continents, a rise of 10% in monthly COVID-19 cases exhibited a correlative  
401 trend with elevated macrolide sales of 0.8%, 1.3%, and 1.5% in Europe, North America, and  
402 Africa, respectively (Nandi et al., 2023).

403  
404 Community consumption of azithromycin, a macrolide, increased during the first year of  
405 the pandemic in multiple countries with significant variation across geographic locations and with  
406 greatest prescribing among older patients (Bara et al., 2022; Bednarčuk et al., 2023; Bogdanić et  
407 al., 2022; Crisafulli et al., 2022; Parveen et al., 2020; Weill et al., 2021). In an outpatient setting  
408 in southern Italy between February 2020 and January 2021, azithromycin represented 42.1% of all  
409 drug prescriptions to individuals diagnosed with COVID-19, while all other antibiotics combined  
410 represented just 20.9% (Crisafulli et al., 2022). A study in northwest London across two epidemic  
411 waves between January and August 2020 found that, among COVID-19 patients prescribed an  
412 antibiotic by a general practitioner during the study period, 31.5% received their prescription  
413 within 14 days of a positive SARS-CoV-2 test (Zhu et al., 2021). Two large USA-based studies

414 have also described early pandemic antibiotic prescribing among COVID-19 patients. From April  
415 2020 to April 2021, approximately 30% of outpatient COVID-19–related visits among Medicare  
416 beneficiaries ( $\geq 65$  years-old) have resulted in a filled antibiotic prescription, 50.7% of which were  
417 for azithromycin (Tsay et al., 2022). For 0-to-5 year-olds and 45-to-64 year-olds, 4% and 16% of  
418 outpatient COVID-19–related visits have resulted in a filled antibiotic prescription, respectively  
419 (Wittman et al., 2023). In the Alsace region in France, there was a clear peak azithromycin  
420 prescribing during the first wave of the COVID-19 (Danion et al., 2023). During the first lockdown  
421 in France, community azithromycin consumption increased by 25.9%, with the increase varying  
422 from 13.4% to 47.3% depending on the week (Weill et al., 2021), while the overall number of  
423 azithromycin prescriptions across France in 2020 increased by 10.1% relative to 2019 (Bara et al.,  
424 2022). Azithromycin treatment usually lasts 3-5 days depending on the disease, but the drug stays  
425 in the system for about 15.5 days after the last dose due to the long half-life of more than 60 hours  
426 (Foulds et al., 1990; Girard et al., 2005). On the other hand, penicillin has an elimination half-life  
427 of approximately 1.4 hours and leaves the body in 7.7 hours after the last dose. This suggests that  
428 if azithromycin consumption increased during the first year of the pandemic, antibiotic exposure  
429 time also increased as a result, although the overall number of antibiotic prescriptions decreased.  
430 Moreover, the use of azithromycin has been associated with selection of both macrolide and non-  
431 macrolide resistance (Doan et al., 2020). In a study investigating the direct effect of antibiotic  
432 exposure on resistance in the oral streptococcal flora of healthy volunteers, use of azithromycin  
433 (500 mg once daily for 3 days) significantly increased the proportion of macrolide-resistant  
434 streptococci in healthy individuals (Malhotra-Kumar et al., 2007). Resistance peaked at day four  
435 in the azithromycin group and this increase remained significantly higher in the azithromycin  
436 group than in the placebo group until day 180 (Malhotra-Kumar et al., 2007). A clinical trial of  
437 mass azithromycin distributions for treating trachoma in Ethiopia resulted in an increase in  
438 resistant *S. pneumoniae* isolates among children under the age of 10 (Keenan et al., 2018, 2015).

439  
440 Our model simulations show that antibiotic resistance increases with surges in SARS-CoV-  
441 2 infections when there is a corresponding increase in azithromycin use, but that lockdowns can  
442 moderate this increasing trend by effectively limiting transmission of SARS-CoV-2 (Salje et al.,  
443 2020). Conversely, surges in azithromycin prescribing during SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in the  
444 absence of effective measures to prevent transmission, as reported in certain regions and pandemic  
445 periods, may cause substantial increases in antibiotic resistance. Our model successfully captured  
446 the main trends of antibiotic resistance and IPD incidence observed in Europe in 2020 for *S.*  
447 *pneumoniae*. However, not all European countries reported an increase in antibiotic resistance.  
448 This inter-country heterogeneity may not be due only to heterogeneity of antibiotic use as shown  
449 in our model but may be attributed to other pandemic factors not directly implemented or assumed  
450 in the model scenario, such as different adherence to COVID-19 control measures across countries  
451 and different age groups, including impacts on disease surveillance and data reporting during the  
452 pandemic. Real-life scenarios are significantly more complicated and involve multiple alterations  
453 of many pandemic factors at different points in time and heterogeneity across populations (e.g.,  
454 antibiotic prescribing increases in some demographic groups and decreases in others, multiple  
455 lockdowns, curfews, or telework).

456  
457 In our model simulations, we used SARS-CoV-2 parameter value  $R_0 = 3.2$  (Liu et al., 2020)  
458 in the absence of population immunity, best reflecting epidemiological dynamics from early in the  
459 pandemic. The most common estimates of SARS-CoV-2  $R_0$  in France and other European

460 countries ranged from  $R_0 = 2$  to 4 (Flaxman et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020). Modeling results suggest  
461 that higher SARS-CoV-2  $R_0$  estimates combined with higher proportion of COVID-19 infected  
462 individuals using azithromycin exacerbated impacts of COVID-19 on antibiotic resistance (Figure  
463 4A). However, the overall impacts of COVID-19 on AMR are difficult to predict, likely vary over  
464 the short, medium, and long term, and depend on the organism, setting, and subpopulation  
465 considered.

466  
467 SARS-CoV-2 bacterial coinfection has been reported relatively rarely over the course of  
468 the pandemic, suggesting that most COVID-19 patients probably do not require antibiotic therapy  
469 (Garcia-Vidal et al., 2021; Karami et al., 2021; Langford et al., 2020), although extensive  
470 prophylactic antibiotic use may have limited observed co-infection incidence. The inflammatory  
471 immune response resulting from COVID-19 likely predisposes patients to subsequent progression  
472 to an invasive bacterial disease (IBD) to some extent (Sender et al., 2021), but antibiotic use may  
473 also favor progression to IBD for patients colonized with drug-resistant strains (Baggs et al., 2018).  
474 We do not explicitly model the dynamics of interaction since strong evidence for such interactions  
475 remains limited (Wong et al., 2023). The results presented in Figure 4B suggest that such within-  
476 host interactions could have important consequences for the resistant IPD incidence during  
477 COVID-19 waves, especially in the elderly and high-risk groups. The model's structure allows for  
478 easy integration of mechanistic interactions as more information becomes available on this  
479 phenomenon.

480  
481 Our study focused on the general community, but COVID-19 distinctly influenced AMR  
482 in hospitals and long-term care facilities. Extensive antibiotic use in COVID-19 patients and  
483 disruptions to antibiotic stewardship programs may have increased antibiotic-resistant carriage in  
484 these settings. A meta-analysis conducted on studies published until June 2020 found that 68-81%  
485 of hospitalized COVID-19 patients and 74-94% in intensive care received antibiotics (Monnet and  
486 Harbarth, 2020). The disorganization in hospitals during the COVID-19 pandemic might have  
487 reduced antibiotic resistance surveillance, allowing resistant organisms to spread. However, the  
488 early implementation of antibiotic stewardship programs in March 2020, patient isolation, and  
489 widespread use of personal protective equipment (PPE) have mitigated this increase to some  
490 degree (Henig et al., 2021; Monnet and Harbarth, 2020; Seaton et al., 2020; Van Laethem et al.,  
491 2021). Models analyzing these impacts in hospitals contribute to understanding COVID-19's  
492 specific role in the antibiotic resistance burden in different settings (Smith et al., 2023).

493  
494 A limitation of our model is the lack of age structure and contact patterns between age  
495 groups, as SARS-CoV-2 infection risk, pneumococcal disease risk, disease severity, bacterial  
496 carriage prevalence and antibiotic prescribing are all highly heterogeneous across age groups.  
497 While this choice was made to keep the model as simple as possible, we tested the model using  
498 different parameter combinations to mimic different subpopulations (children and  $\geq 65$  years-old).  
499 This included varying durations of pneumococcal carriage, initializing the model with lower and  
500 higher baseline carriage prevalence, considering reductions of general antibiotic consumption at  
501 various levels, and varying a percentage of COVID-19 infected individuals using azithromycin.  
502 Simulations of the different age groups individually interestingly reproduced realistic trends by  
503 age.

504

505 In conclusion, we introduce the first epidemiological model outlining the impact of the  
506 COVID-19 pandemic on the dynamics of AMR in the community. Our work demonstrates the  
507 utility of mathematical modeling approach in unraveling the complex effects of the COVID-19  
508 pandemic responses AMR dynamics. While our model was structured and parameterized based  
509 upon *S. pneumoniae*, its adaptability allows for application to various bacteria and epidemiological  
510 scenarios in the community (e.g., impacts of SARS-CoV-2-bacteria interactions in the context of  
511 seasonal outbreaks of endemic pathogens). Future research would benefit from fitting the model  
512 to real-world data for different bacterial species to enhance our understanding of AMR trends.

513

## 514 Methods

515

### 516 *Streptococcus pneumoniae* surveillance data

517

518 Antibiotic resistance trends reported in 2019 and 2020, provided by EARS-Net (European  
519 Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network) were acquired from a joint 2022 report on  
520 antimicrobial resistance during 2020 by WHO and ECDC (European Centre for Disease  
521 Prevention and Control and World Health Organization, 2022). The annual incidence of *S.*  
522 *pneumoniae* invasive isolates for 2019 and 2020 was measured as the number of invasive isolates  
523 from blood or cerebrospinal fluid. The proportion of resistant isolates represents the proportion of  
524 isolates with phenotypic resistance to penicillin and macrolides using standardized bacterial  
525 culture methods and EUCAST breakpoints. Out of 28 European countries that reported antibiotic  
526 resistance data for *S. pneumoniae*, 24 countries had enough samples to establish 2019-2020  
527 resistance trends for penicillin and macrolides. The resistance data for France, which were  
528 subsequently analyzed, were provided by the CNRP (The French National Reference Center for  
529 Pneumococci).

530

### 531 Model structure

532

533 We developed a pathogen co-circulation model (Appendix 2 – Figure 2) written using systems of  
534 ordinary differential equations (ODEs) (Appendix 2; code available online at  
535 [https://github.com/alekskovacevic/antibiotic\\_resistance](https://github.com/alekskovacevic/antibiotic_resistance)). The model simultaneously describes  
536 potential infection with SARS-CoV-2 and colonization with antibiotic-sensitive and/or -resistant  
537 strains of *S. pneumoniae* in a well-mixed community population. SARS-CoV-2 infection is  
538 modeled by a Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) process where individuals  
539 become exposed to SARS-CoV-2 at rate  $\beta_C$  upon contact with other infected individuals. Infection  
540 begins with a non-infectious exposed period lasting  $1/\epsilon$  days and is followed by an infectious  
541 period lasting  $1/\gamma^C$  days, eventually leading to recovery and immunization against future re-  
542 infection. Waning immunity and competitive multi-strain SARS-CoV-2 dynamics are not  
543 considered.

544

545 Individuals in S, E, I, and R compartments can be uncolonized with *S. pneumoniae* (U),  
546 colonized with either a drug-sensitive ( $C^S$ ) or a drug-resistant strain ( $C^R$ ), or co-colonized with two  
547 strains ( $C^{SS}$ ,  $C^{RR}$ ,  $C^{SR}$ ). Colonization with each respective strain is acquired at rates  $\beta_S$  and  $\beta_S f$   
548 upon contact with other colonized individuals (Appendix 2 – Table 2). We assume a metabolic  
549 cost of resistance, whereby the drug-resistant strain has a reduced intrinsic transmission rate  
550 relative to the drug-sensitive strain due to reduced fitness,  $f$ . Bacterial carriage is cleared naturally

551 after an average duration of  $\frac{1}{\gamma^S} = \frac{1}{\gamma^R} = \frac{1}{\gamma^{SR}} = \frac{1}{\gamma^{SS}} = \frac{1}{\gamma^{RR}}$  days, which we assume to be the same for  
552 all types of carriers in our baseline scenario (in the scenarios assuming longer carriage duration of  
553 antibiotic-resistant strains,  $\frac{1}{\gamma^S} = \frac{1}{\gamma^{SS}}$  and  $\frac{1}{\gamma^R} = \frac{1}{\gamma^{SR}} = \frac{1}{\gamma^{RR}}$ ). We further assume that some share of  
554 the population is exposed to antibiotics at any given time, independent of bacterial carriage, with  
555 individuals initiating antibiotic therapy at rate  $\tau$ , which lasts for an average duration of  $\frac{1}{r}$  days.  
556 Another model assumption is that a proportion ( $p_{az}$ ) of those infected with COVID-19 in the  
557 community (between 0% and 20% of individuals in an I compartment) receive azithromycin  
558 prescription from general practitioner reflecting azithromycin prescriptions in the early pandemic,  
559 while the rest of the infectious individuals ( $1 - p_{az}$ ) are exposed to the baseline antibiotic therapy.  
560 We assume baseline treatment duration of seven days, on average, regardless of the antibiotic  
561 prescribed and without any assumed persistence of the antibiotic in the system after the last dose  
562 ( $\frac{1}{r}$ ). In case of antibiotic treatment with azithromycin for COVID-19 infected individuals we  
563 assume the treatment lasts three days with antibiotics remaining in the system for additional 15.5  
564 days after the last dose for a total of 18.5 days of antibiotic exposure where COVID-19 recovered  
565 individuals ( $R_{az}$ ) treated with azithromycin retain azithromycin in their system for an additional  
566 11.5 days ( $\frac{1}{r_{az}}$ ) after COVID-19 recovery. Individuals treated with antibiotics are unable to acquire  
567 the sensitive strain. Antibiotics are assumed to clear colonization with sensitive strains at a rate  $\omega$   
568 while having no direct impact on colonization with resistant strains. This bacterial colonization  
569 process results in antibiotic selection for resistance via competition for limited hosts, facilitates  
570 epidemiological coexistence between strains and is adapted from previous models of *S.*  
571 *pneumoniae* (Colijn et al., 2010; Lipsitch et al., 2009; Mulberry et al., 2020). For a full list of  
572 parameter values see Appendix 2 – Table 2.

### 573 574 **Simulation in an early COVID-19 pandemic context**

575  
576 ODEs were integrated numerically using the R package deSolve to simulate and quantify  
577 epidemiological dynamics (Soetaert et al., 2010). First, bacterial dynamics were simulated until  
578 endemic equilibrium was achieved, under the assumption that *S. pneumoniae* was at endemic  
579 equilibrium upon the emergence of COVID-19. Second, using equilibrium states as initial  
580 conditions and re-initializing simulation time to  $t=0$ , a single SARS-CoV-2 infected individual  
581 was introduced into the population and ODEs were again integrated numerically to  $t=365$  days.  
582 Parameter values used for simulation were taken from prior studies prioritizing French data and  
583 are provided in Appendix 2 – Table 2.

584  
585 These simulations were conducted in the context of an “early pandemic scenario”  
586 coinciding with the implementation of population-wide NPIs to slow SARS-CoV-2 transmission.  
587 This was conceived as the implementation of two 60-day lockdown periods starting on day 75 and  
588 on day 305 in response to the simulated surge in COVID-19 cases. Lockdowns were assumed to  
589 have three major potential impacts on population behavior and, in turn, the transmission dynamics  
590 of SARS-CoV-2 and *S. pneumoniae*. These impacts were incorporated into simulations by  
591 modifying epidemiological parameters in the model coincident with lockdowns. Three such  
592 modifications were considered and switched on and off, considering all possible combinations.  
593 First, lockdown led to reduced SARS-CoV-2 transmissibility by a factor  $\theta_c$ . Second, lockdown led  
594 to a population-wide change in antibiotic initiation rate by a factor  $a$  (representing modified

595 healthcare-seeking behavior leading to a reduction in the number of antibiotic prescriptions).  
596 Finally, lockdowns changed the pneumococcal disease risk by a factor  $IPD_{risk}$  (representing a  
597 reduced risk of developing an IPD due to the absence of other respiratory viruses).  
598

### 599 **Effect of SARS-CoV-2 basic reproduction number ( $R_0$ ) on AMR**

600  
601 Impacts of SARS-CoV-2 on antibiotic-resistant IPD incidence may also depend on the  
602 characteristics of locally circulating SARS-CoV-2  $R_0$ . To account for potential impacts of SARS-  
603 CoV-2 transmissibility and azithromycin use in the community, in simulations we varied (i) values  
604 of  $R_0$  (basic reproduction number) for SARS-CoV-2 in France ( $2 \leq R_0 \leq 4$ ) and (ii) the proportion  
605 of the COVID-19 infected individuals using azithromycin at simulation outset (from 0% to 20%).  
606

### 607 **Effect of within-host interactions on AMR**

608  
609 SARS-CoV-2 infection may impact progression from bacterial colonization to invasive bacterial  
610 disease at the within-host level. To incorporate this mechanism in our model, we included a within-  
611 host interaction term in scenario S19: the ecological interaction term ( $\psi_c$ ) increases the rate of  
612 progression to invasive disease among colonized individuals who are also infected with SARS-  
613 CoV-2. The equations for calculating daily IPD incidence assuming within-host interactions due  
614 to SARS-CoV-2 co-infection with accompanying details can be found in Appendix 2.  
615  
616  
617  
618  
619  
620  
621  
622  
623  
624  
625  
626  
627  
628  
629  
630  
631  
632  
633  
634  
635  
636  
637  
638  
639  
640

641 Tables

642

<b>Mechanisms:</b>								
<b>1</b>	Reduced community antibiotic prescribing.							
<b>2</b>	Lockdown effect on reducing transmission of <i>S. pneumoniae</i>							
<b>3</b>	Reduced risk of developing an IPD							
<b>4</b>	Community azithromycin use in COVID-19 infected individuals							
<b>5</b>	Longer carriage duration of antibiotic-resistant pneumococcal strains							
Scenarios	Mechanisms					IPD inc.	AR (%)	Sp. (%)
	1	2	3	4	5			
<i>Pre-pandemic 1 : (d<sub>S</sub> = d<sub>R</sub>)</i>						10.8	20.0	NA
<i>Pre-pandemic 2 : (d<sub>R</sub> &gt; d<sub>S</sub>)</i>					x	11.3	20.0	NA
<i>Pandemic:</i>	<i>S1</i>	x				10.9	19.2	+1.3
	<i>S2</i>		x			8.9	20.1	-36.1
	<i>S3</i>			x		5.9	20.0	0
	<i>S4</i>				x	9.9	23.7	-9.1
	<i>S5</i>					x	11.3	20.0
	<i>S6</i>	x	x			9.1	19.4	-35.2
	<i>S7</i>	x		x		6.0	19.4	+1.3
	<i>S8</i>	x			x	10.1	22.9	-8.0
	<i>S9</i>	x					x	11.5
	<i>S10</i>		x	x		5.2	20.0	-36.1
	<i>S11</i>		x		x	8.9	20.1	-36.1
	<i>S12</i>		x				x	9.4
	<i>S13</i>			x	x	5.6	22.5	-9.1
	<i>S14</i>			x			x	6.2
	<i>S15</i>				x	x	10.4	23.4
	<i>S16</i>	x	x	x		5.3	19.6	-35.2
	<i>S17</i>	x	x		x	8.3	22.4	-41.3
	<i>S18</i>	x	x				x	9.6
	<i>S19</i>	x		x	x	5.7	22.0	-8.0
	<i>S20</i>	x		x			x	6.3
	<i>S21</i>	x			x	x	10.6	22.7
	<i>S22</i>		x	x	x	5.0	22.0	-42.1
	<i>S23</i>		x	x			x	5.5
	<i>S24</i>		x		x	x	8.7	23.9
	<i>S25</i>			x	x	x	5.9	22.3
	<i>S26</i>	x	x	x	x	5.0	21.6	-41.3
	<i>S27</i>	x	x	x			x	5.6
	<i>S28</i>	x	x		x	x	8.8	23.2
	<i>S29</i>	x		x	x	x	5.9	21.8
	<i>S30</i>		x	x	x	x	5.2	22.5
	<i>S31</i>	x	x	x	x	x	5.3	22.1

<b>REPORTED TRENDS:</b>	<b>IPD inc.</b>	<b>AR (%)</b>	<b>Sp. (%)</b>
Pre-pandemic (FR, 2019)	10.5 [10.3-10.7]	26.2 (PENI) and 20.9 (ERY)	NA
Pandemic (FR, 2020)	5.8 [5.7-5.9]	35.5 (PENI) and 23.0 (ERY)	Stable
<i>Pandemic (EU/EEA, 2020)</i>	<i>Decrease by 44.3% on avg.</i>	<i>Majority of EU countries report an increase</i>	<i>Generally stable</i>


643  
644 **Table 1. Five mechanisms implemented in 31 pandemic scenarios proposed to explain the**  
645 **reported trends of IPD incidence, antibiotic resistance, and pneumococcal carriage in *S.***  
646 ***pneumoniae*.** Scenarios explore all possible combinations of mechanisms proposed to test  
647 hypotheses that can explain the reported trends of annual invasive pneumococcal disease incidence  
648 (annual no. of cases per 100,000 inhabitants), antibiotic resistance (% of annual antibiotic-resistant  
649 IPD cases among total IPD cases), and % change in the pneumococcal carriage prevalence at the  
650 end of the first 60-day lockdown compared the prevalence before the lockdown. Model simulations  
651 were initiated assuming the initial 20% antibiotic resistance. Two pre-pandemic scenarios assume  
652 no SARS-CoV-2 circulation in the population and allow for the same 30-day carriage duration of  
653 both antibiotic-sensitive and -resistant strains ( $d_S = d_R$ ) or a longer, 40-day carriage duration of -  
654 resistant strains ( $d_R > d_S$ ). When implemented, these five mechanisms assume 18% reduction in  
655 community antibiotic prescribing, a reduced risk of developing an IPD during (0.2) and after the  
656 first lockdown (0.4), a 25% reduction in transmission of pneumococcal carriage during the first  
657 lockdown, a 10% of azithromycin use among COVID-19 infected individuals, and a longer 40-  
658 day carriage duration of -resistant strains. For a full list of parameters see Appendix 2 – Table 2.  
659 Reported trends in European countries showed a decrease in annual IPD incidence by 44.3% on  
660 average, an increase in antibiotic resistance, and generally stable asymptomatic pneumococcal  
661 carriage in healthy individuals during the first lockdown period. Only scenarios S19 and S29 fulfill  
662 all three reported trends during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 simultaneously while accounting  
663 for the reported reduction in community antibiotic prescribing ( $d_S$  = carriage duration of antibiotic-  
664 sensitive pneumococcal strains;  $d_R$  = carriage duration of antibiotic-resistant pneumococcal  
665 strains; PENI = penicillin; ERY = erythromycin).

666  
667  
668  
669  
670  
671  
672  
673  
674  
675  
676  
677  
678  
679  
680  
681  
682  
683  
684  
685  
686  
687  
688



689 Figures

690



691

692

693 **Figure 1. Antibiotic resistance trends in invasive *Streptococcus pneumoniae* isolates for the**  
 694 **years 2019 and 2020. A.** The proportion of invasive *S. pneumoniae* isolates resistant to penicillin  
 695 and macrolides (azithromycin/ clarithromycin/ erythromycin) reported to EARS-Net (European  
 696 Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network) for 24 European countries. Error bars show 95%  
 697 confidence intervals. **B.** The proportion of invasive *S. pneumoniae* isolates resistant to penicillin  
 698 (MIC > 0.064 mg/L) and macrolides (erythromycin) according to age. Error bars show 95%  
 699 confidence intervals. The total number of invasive pneumococcal isolates reported in France  
 700 decreased by 45.1% from 2019 to 2020 (from 1119 to 614). Data are provided by the French  
 701 National Reference Center for Pneumococci.

702

703

704

705

706

707

708

709

710

711


712

713

714


715

716




717  
 718  
 719 **Figure 1 – figure supplement 1. Antibiotic resistance trends in invasive *Streptococcus***  
 720 ***pneumoniae* isolates in France, 2017-2020.** The proportion of invasive *S. pneumoniae* isolates  
 721 resistant to penicillin (A) and macrolides (B) according to age. Error bars show 95% confidence  
 722 intervals. Across the period 2017-2020, a consistent decline in antibiotic resistance is observed for  
 723 both penicillin and macrolides. Notably, this general trend experienced an anomaly in 2020,  
 724 coinciding with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Data are provided by the French National  
 725 Reference Center for Pneumococci.

726  
 727  
 728  
 729  
 730  
 731  
 732  
 733  
 734  
 735  
 736  
 737  
 738  
 739  
 740  
 741  
 742  
 743  
 744  
 745  
 746



747  
 748 **Figure 2. A modelling framework describing the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and**  
 749 ***Streptococcus pneumoniae* in the community setting, in the context of both general antibiotic**  
 750 **prescribing and azithromycin prescribing for COVID-19 infected individuals. A.** Non-  
 751 pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) implemented to control SARS-CoV-2 transmission  
 752 (lockdown, face mask use, improved hygiene practices, travel restrictions, quarantine,  
 753 telemedicine, and physical distancing) may also modify transmission of other pathogens, in  
 754 addition to impacting antibiotic prescribing due to altered inter-individual contact and health-care  
 755 seeking behavior. **B.** SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Recovered) model with antibiotic  
 756 treatment compartments depicts interaction between SARS-CoV-2 infection and antibiotic  
 757 prescribing, including both general community prescribing and azithromycin prescribing among  
 758 individuals infected with SARS-CoV-2. **C.** Diagram depicting how pneumococcal colonization  
 759 and the community antibiotic prescribing are affected by the COVID-19 pandemic impacts.  
 760 Initiation of antibiotic treatment is assumed independent of bacterial carriage, reflecting  
 761 widespread bystander selection for commensal bacteria like *S. pneumoniae*. For a complete  
 762 modeling framework, see section S2 in Supporting Information.


763  
 764  
 765  
 766  
 767  
 768  
 769  
 770  
 771  
 772  
 773  
 774




775  
776

777 **Figure 3. Annual incidence of invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD), antibiotic resistance**  
 778 **(AR%), and pneumococcal carriage prevalence for three different subpopulations. A.** The  
 779 elderly ( $\geq 65$  years-old) **B.** general population (all ages), and **C.** children ( $< 5$  years-old). Using  
 780 pandemic scenario S19, which includes a combination of three different mechanisms: reduced  
 781 community antibiotic prescribing, a reduced risk of developing an IPD, and community  
 782 azithromycin use in COVID-19 infected individuals, we ran model simulations for three different  
 783 subpopulations. For a full list of parameter values see Appendix 2 – Table 2. Annual IPD incidence  
 784 (grey bars) decreased between 43% and 51% relative to the pre-pandemic (baseline) period with  
 785 magnitude of a decrease depending on an age group and the level of azithromycin use in COVID-  
 786 19 infected individuals. Antibiotic resistance (red bars) increased compared to the pre-pandemic  
 787 (baseline) period in all age groups whenever azithromycin was used in COVID-19 infected.  
 788 Black arrows indicate model outcomes that approximate the reported trends in antibiotic resistance in  
 789 France for different age groups. Daily prevalence of total pneumococcal carriage remained  
 790 relatively stable (solid-colored lines), exhibiting higher levels of decrease with increased  
 791 azithromycin use. The prevalence of antibiotic-resistant pneumococcal carriage increased (dashed  
 792 colored lines) over time in relation to SARS-CoV-2 outbreak (black dashed line) and higher  
 793 azithromycin use. Highlighted time intervals (days 75-135 and 305-365) represent two lockdown  
 794 periods.

### A Annual cumulative resistant IPD incidence and levels of antibiotic resistance (%)



### B Ecological interaction: Annual excess incidence of antibiotic-resistant IPDs



795  
796  
797 **Figure 4. The impact of varying SARS-CoV-2  $R_0$  and percentage of COVID-19 infected**  
798 **individuals taking azithromycin in scenario S19 on antibiotic resistance (%) and the annual**  
799 **incidence of antibiotic-resistant invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD). Hypothetical within-**  
800 **host interactions contribute to an excess incidence of antibiotic-resistant IPDs. (A)**  
801 **Cumulative incidence of antibiotic-resistant IPDs and antibiotic resistance increase with**  
802 **greater values of SARS-CoV-2  $R_0$  and higher percentage of the COVID-19 infected**  
803 **individuals taking azithromycin. The reproduction number for SARS-CoV-2 ( $R_0$ ) in the**  
804 **community corresponds to the most common estimates of  $R_0$  in France and other European**  
805 **countries ranging from  $R_0 = 2$  to 4 (Allieta et al., 2022; D'Arienzo and Coniglio, 2020; Di**  
806 **Domenico et al., 2020; Flaxman et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Roux et al., 2020; Salje et al., 2020).**  
807 **(B) Annual excess in cumulative antibiotic-resistant IPD incidence in scenario S19 due to**  
808 **synergistic within-host ecological interactions compared to the same scenario with no within-**  
809 **host interactions and no azithromycin use (1.17 resistant IPD cases/100,000 inhabitants). A**  
810 **rate of disease progression increased by a factor  $\psi_c = 1$  (no within-host interaction) and  $\psi_c = 40$**   
811 **in scenario S19 applied to the general population assuming azithromycin use in 10% of the infected**  
812 **individuals resulted in approximately 0.06 and 0.75 additional cases of antibiotic-resistant disease**  
813 **per 100,000 inhabitants over the course of one year, respectively, compared to the scenario S19**

814 assuming no within-host interaction and no azithromycin use (indicated by the black arrow). For  
815 more details, see Appendix 2 - Figure 1.

816

## 817 References

818

819 Abdullahi O, Karani A, Tigoi CC, Mugo D, Kungu S, Wanjiru E, Jomo J, Musyimi R, Lipsitch  
820 M, Scott JAG. 2012. Rates of acquisition and clearance of pneumococcal serotypes in the  
821 nasopharynges of children in Kilifi District, Kenya. *J Infect Dis* **206**:1020–1029.  
822 doi:10.1093/infdis/jis447

823 Allietta M, Allietta A, Rossi Sebastiano D. 2022. COVID-19 outbreak in Italy: estimation of  
824 reproduction numbers over 2 months prior to phase 2. *J Public Health* **30**:2719–2727.  
825 doi:10.1007/s10389-021-01567-1

826 Alpkvist H, Athlin S, Nauc ler P, Herrmann B, Abdeldaim G, Slotved H-C, Hedlund J, Str lin K.  
827 2015. Clinical and microbiological factors associated with high nasopharyngeal  
828 pneumococcal density in patients with pneumococcal pneumonia. *PLOS ONE*  
829 **10**:e0140112. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0140112

830 Amin-Chowdhury Z, Aiano F, Mensah A, Sheppard CL, Litt D, Fry NK, Andrews N, Ramsay  
831 ME, Ladhani SN. 2021. Impact of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic  
832 on invasive pneumococcal disease and risk of pneumococcal coinfection with severe  
833 acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2): prospective national cohort  
834 study, England. *Clin Infect Dis* **72**:e65–e75. doi:10.1093/cid/ciaa1728

835 Andrews A, Bou-Antoun S, Guy R, Brown CS, Hopkins S, Gerver S. 2022. Respiratory  
836 antibacterial prescribing in primary care and the COVID-19 pandemic in England, winter  
837 season 2020–21. *J Antimicrob Chemother* **77**:799–802. doi:10.1093/jac/dkab443

838 Arduin H, Domenech De Cell s M, Guillemot D, Watier L, Opatowski L. 2017. An agent-based  
839 model simulation of influenza interactions at the host level: insight into the influenza-  
840 related burden of pneumococcal infections. *BMC Infect Dis* **17**:382. doi:10.1186/s12879-  
841 017-2464-z

842 Baggs J, Jernigan JA, Halpin AL, Epstein L, Hatfield KM, McDonald LC. 2018. Risk of  
843 subsequent sepsis within 90 days after a hospital stay by type of antibiotic exposure. *Clin*  
844 *Infect Dis* **66**:1004–1012. doi:10.1093/cid/cix947

845 Bara W, Brun-Buisson C, Coignard B, Watier L. 2022. Outpatient antibiotic prescriptions in  
846 France: patients and providers characteristics and impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
847 *Antibiotics* **11**:643. doi:10.3390/antibiotics11050643

848 Bednar uk N, Goli  Jeli  A, Stoisavljevi  Šatara S, Stojakovi  N, Markovi  Pekovi  V,  
849 Stojiljkovi  MP, Popovi  N, Škrbi  R. 2023. Antibiotic utilization during COVID-19: are  
850 we over-prescribing? *Antibiotics* **12**:308. doi:10.3390/antibiotics12020308

851 Bennett JC, Emanuels A, Heimonen J, O’Hanlon J, Hughes JP, Han PD, Chow EJ, Ogokeh CE,  
852 Rolfes MA, Lockwood CM, Pfau B, Uyeki TM, Shendure J, Hoag S, Fay K, Lee J,  
853 Sibley TR, Rogers JH, Starita LM, Englund JA, Chu HY. 2023. *Streptococcus*  
854 *pneumoniae* nasal carriage patterns with and without common respiratory virus detections  
855 in households in Seattle, WA, USA before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. *Front*  
856 *Pediatr* **11**.

857 Bhowmick S, Sokolov IM, Lentz HHK. 2023. Decoding the double trouble: a mathematical  
858 modelling of co-infection dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 and influenza-like illness.  
859 *Biosystems* **224**:104827. doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2023.104827

- 860 Bogdanić N, Močibob L, Vidović T, Soldo A, Begovać J. 2022. Azithromycin consumption  
861 during the COVID-19 pandemic in Croatia, 2020. *PLoS ONE* **17**:e0263437.  
862 doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0263437
- 863 Braunstein SL, Lazar R, Wahnich A, Daskalakis DC, Blackstock OJ. 2020. COVID-19 infection  
864 among people with HIV in New York City: a population-level analysis of linked  
865 surveillance data. *Clin Infect Dis Off Publ Infect Dis Soc Am* **ciaa1793**.  
866 doi:10.1093/cid/ciaa1793
- 867 Brueggemann AB, Jansen Van Rensburg MJ, Shaw D, McCarthy ND, Jolley KA, Maiden MCJ,  
868 Van Der Linden MPG, Amin-Chowdhury Z, Bennett DE, Borrow R, Brandileone M-CC,  
869 Broughton K, Campbell R, Cao B, Casanova C, Choi EH, Chu YW, Clark SA, Claus H,  
870 Coelho J, Corcoran M, Cottrell S, Cunney RJ, Dalby T, Davies H, De Gouveia L,  
871 Deghmane A-E, Demczuk W, Desmet S, Drew RJ, Du Plessis M, Erlendsdottir H, Fry  
872 NK, Fuursted K, Gray SJ, Henriques-Normark B, Hale T, Hilty M, Hoffmann S,  
873 Humphreys H, Ip M, Jacobsson S, Johnston J, Kozakova J, Kristinsson KG, Krizova P,  
874 Kuch A, Ladhani SN, Lãm T-T, Lebedova V, Lindholm L, Litt DJ, Martin I, Martiny D,  
875 Matheus W, McElligott M, Meehan M, Meiring S, Mölling P, Morfeldt E, Morgan J,  
876 Mulhall RM, Muñoz-Almagro C, Murdoch DR, Murphy J, Musilek M, Mzabi A, Perez-  
877 Argüello A, Perrin M, Perry M, Redin A, Roberts R, Roberts M, Rokney A, Ron M, Scott  
878 KJ, Sheppard CL, Siira L, Skoczyńska A, Sloan M, Slotved H-C, Smith AJ, Song JY,  
879 Taha M-K, Toropainen M, Tsang D, Vainio A, Van Sorge NM, Varon E, Vlach J, Vogel  
880 U, Vohrnova S, Von Gottberg A, Zanella RC, Zhou F. 2021. Changes in the incidence of  
881 invasive disease due to *Streptococcus pneumoniae*, *Haemophilus influenzae*, and  
882 *Neisseria meningitidis* during the COVID-19 pandemic in 26 countries and territories in  
883 the invasive respiratory infection surveillance initiative: a prospective analysis of  
884 surveillance data. *Lancet Digit Health* **3**:e360–e370. doi:10.1016/S2589-7500(21)00077-  
885 7
- 886 Buehrle DJ, Wagener MM, Nguyen MH, Clancy CJ. 2021. Trends in outpatient antibiotic  
887 prescriptions in the United States during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. *JAMA Netw*  
888 *Open* **4**:e2126114. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2021.26114
- 889 Cascante-Vega J, Galanti M, Schley K, Pei S, Shaman J. 2023. Inference of transmission  
890 dynamics and retrospective forecast of invasive meningococcal disease. *PLOS Comput*  
891 *Biol* **19**:e1011564. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011564
- 892 Chen C, Zhu P, Zhang Y, Liu B. 2021. Effect of the “Normalized epidemic prevention and  
893 control requirements” on hospital-acquired and community-acquired infections in China.  
894 *BMC Infect Dis* **21**:1178. doi:10.1186/s12879-021-06886-y
- 895 Chen Y, Li N, Lourenço J, Wang L, Cazelles B, Dong L, Li B, Liu Y, Jit M, Bosse NI, Abbott S,  
896 Velayudhan R, Wilder-Smith A, Tian H, Brady OJ, CMMID COVID-19 Working Group.  
897 2022. Measuring the effects of COVID-19-related disruption on dengue transmission in  
898 southeast Asia and Latin America: a statistical modelling study. *Lancet Infect Dis*  
899 **22**:657–667. doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(22)00025-1
- 900 Chien Y-C, Lee Y-L, Liu P-Y, Lu M-C, Shao P-L, Lu P-L, Cheng S-H, Lin C-Y, Wu T-S, Yen  
901 M-Y, Wang L-S, Liu C-P, Lee W-S, Shi Z-Y, Chen Y-S, Wang F-D, Tseng S-H, Chen  
902 Yu-Hui, Sheng W-H, Lee C-M, Chen Yen-Hsu, Ko W-C, Hsueh P-R. 2021. National  
903 surveillance of antimicrobial susceptibilities to dalbavancin, telavancin, tedizolid,  
904 eravacycline, omadacycline and other comparator antibiotics and serotype distribution of  
905 invasive *Streptococcus pneumoniae* isolates in adults: results from the Surveillance of

- 906 Multicenter Antimicrobial Resistance in Taiwan (SMART) programme in 2017-2020. *J*  
907 *Glob Antimicrob Resist* **26**:308–316. doi:10.1016/j.jgar.2021.07.005
- 908 Clancy CJ, Buehrle DJ, Nguyen MH. 2020. PRO: The COVID-19 pandemic will result in  
909 increased antimicrobial resistance rates. *JAC-Antimicrob Resist* **2**:dlaa049.  
910 doi:10.1093/jacamr/dlaa049
- 911 Cohen R, Bidet P, Varon E, Béchet S, Cohen JF, Bonacorsi S, Levy C. 2023. Unprecedentedly  
912 high rates of Group A Streptococcus nasopharyngeal carriage in infants and toddlers in  
913 France, 2022–2023. *Infect Dis Now* **53**:104720. doi:10.1016/j.idnow.2023.104720
- 914 Colijn C, Cohen T, Fraser C, Hanage W, Goldstein E, Givon-Lavi N, Dagan R, Lipsitch M.  
915 2010. What is the mechanism for persistent coexistence of drug-susceptible and drug-  
916 resistant strains of *Streptococcus pneumoniae*? *J R Soc Interface* **7**:905–919.  
917 doi:10.1098/rsif.2009.0400
- 918 Crisafulli S, Ientile V, L'Abbate L, Fontana A, Linguiti C, Manna S, Mercaldo M, Pagliaro C,  
919 Vezzaro M, Santacà K, Lora R, Moretti U, Reno C, Fantini MP, Corrao S, Barbato D,  
920 Tari M, Trifirò G, the ITA-COVID: COV-OUT Group. 2022. COVID-19 patient  
921 management in outpatient setting: a population-based study from Southern Italy. *J Clin*  
922 *Med* **11**:51. doi:10.3390/jcm11010051
- 923 Dagan R, Barkai G, Givon-Lavi N, Sharf AZ, Vardy D, Cohen T, Lipsitch M, Greenberg D.  
924 2008. Seasonality of antibiotic-resistant *Streptococcus pneumoniae* that causes acute  
925 otitis media: a clue for an antibiotic-restriction policy? *J Infect Dis* **197**:1094–1102.  
926 doi:10.1086/528995
- 927 Dagan R, Beek BA van der, Ben-Shimol S, Greenberg D, Shemer-Avni Y, Weinberger DM,  
928 Danino D. 2023. The COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity for unravelling the  
929 causative association between respiratory viruses and pneumococcus-associated disease  
930 in young children: a prospective study. *eBioMedicine* **90**.  
931 doi:10.1016/j.ebiom.2023.104493
- 932 Danion F, Margue M, Ruch Y, Séverac F, Hansmann Y. 2023. Seasonal variation in  
933 azithromycin prescription. *Lancet Infect Dis* **23**:277–278. doi:10.1016/S1473-  
934 3099(23)00009-9
- 935 Davies NG, Flasche S, Jit M, Atkins KE. 2019. Within-host dynamics shape antibiotic resistance  
936 in commensal bacteria. *Nat Ecol Evol* **3**:440–449. doi:10.1038/s41559-018-0786-x
- 937 D'Arienzo M, Coniglio A. 2020. Assessment of the SARS-CoV-2 basic reproduction number,  
938 R<sub>0</sub>, based on the early phase of COVID-19 outbreak in Italy. *Biosaf Health* **2**:57–59.  
939 doi:10.1016/j.bsheat.2020.03.004
- 940 Di Domenico L, Pullano G, Sabbatini CE, Boëlle P-Y, Colizza V. 2020. Impact of lockdown on  
941 COVID-19 epidemic in Île-de-France and possible exit strategies. *BMC Med* **18**:240.  
942 doi:10.1186/s12916-020-01698-4
- 943 Diavatopoulos DA, Short KR, Price JT, Wilksch JJ, Brown LE, Briles DE, Strugnell RA,  
944 Wijburg OL. 2010. Influenza A virus facilitates *Streptococcus pneumoniae* transmission  
945 and disease. *FASEB J* **24**:1789–1798. doi:10.1096/fj.09-146779
- 946 Doan T, Worden L, Hinterwirth A, Arzika AM, Maliki R, Abdou A, Zhong L, Chen C, Cook C,  
947 Lebas E, O'Brien KS, Oldenburg CE, Chow ED, Porco TC, Lipsitch M, Keenan JD,  
948 Lietman TM. 2020. Macrolide and nonmacrolide resistance with mass azithromycin  
949 distribution. *N Engl J Med* **383**:1941–1950. doi:10.1056/NEJMoa2002606



- 950 Domenech De Cellès M, Arduin H, Lévy-Bruhl D, Georges S, Souty C, Guillemot D, Watier L,  
951 Opatowski L. 2019. Unraveling the seasonal epidemiology of pneumococcus. *Proc Natl*  
952 *Acad Sci* **116**:1802–1807. doi:10.1073/pnas.1812388116
- 953 Duffy E, Thomas M, Hills T, Ritchie S. 2021. The impacts of New Zealand’s COVID-19  
954 epidemic response on community antibiotic use and hospitalisation for pneumonia,  
955 peritonsillar abscess and rheumatic fever. *Lancet Reg Health West Pac* **12**:100162.  
956 doi:10.1016/j.lanwpc.2021.100162
- 957 Ekdahl K, Ahlinder I, Hansson HB, Melander E, Mölstad S, Söderström M, Persson K. 1997.  
958 Duration of nasopharyngeal carriage of penicillin-resistant *Streptococcus pneumoniae*:  
959 experiences from the South Swedish pneumococcal intervention project. *Clin Infect Dis*  
960 **25**:1113–1117. doi:10.1086/516103
- 961 Elias C, Sekri A, Leblanc P, Cucherat M, Vanhems P. 2021. The incubation period of COVID-  
962 19: a meta-analysis. *Int J Infect Dis IJID Off Publ Int Soc Infect Dis* **104**:708–710.  
963 doi:10.1016/j.ijid.2021.01.069
- 964 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, World Health Organization. 2022.  
965 Antimicrobial resistance surveillance in Europe: 2022 : 2020 data. LU: Publications  
966 Office.
- 967 Flaxman S, Mishra S, Gandy A, Unwin HJT, Mellan TA, Coupland H, Whittaker C, Zhu H,  
968 Berah T, Eaton JW, Monod M, Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, Perez-  
969 Guzman PN, Schmit N, Cilloni L, Ainslie KEC, Baguelin M, Boonyasiri A, Boyd O,  
970 Cattarino L, Cooper LV, Cucunubá Z, Cuomo-Dannenburg G, Dighe A, Djaafara B,  
971 Dorigatti I, Van Elsland SL, FitzJohn RG, Gaythorpe KAM, Geidelberg L, Grassly NC,  
972 Green WD, Hallett T, Hamlet A, Hinsley W, Jeffrey B, Knock E, Laydon DJ, Nedjati-  
973 Gilani G, Nouvellet P, Parag KV, Siveroni I, Thompson HA, Verity R, Volz E, Walters  
974 CE, Wang H, Wang Y, Watson OJ, Winskill P, Xi X, Walker PGT, Ghani AC, Donnelly  
975 CA, Riley S, Vollmer MAC, Ferguson NM, Okell LC, Bhatt S. 2020. Estimating the  
976 effects of non-pharmaceutical interventions on COVID-19 in Europe. *Nature* **584**:257–  
977 261. doi:10.1038/s41586-020-2405-7
- 978 Foulds G, Shepard RM, Johnson RB. 1990. The pharmacokinetics of azithromycin in human  
979 serum and tissues. *J Antimicrob Chemother* **25**:73–82. doi:10.1093/jac/25.suppl\_A.73
- 980 Garcia-Vidal C, Sanjuan G, Moreno-García E, Puerta-Alcalde P, Garcia-Pouton N, Chumbita M,  
981 Fernandez-Pittol M, Pitart C, Inciarte A, Bodro M, Morata L, Ambrosioni J, Grafia I,  
982 Meira F, Macaya I, Cardozo C, Casals C, Tellez A, Castro P, Marco F, García F, Mensa  
983 J, Martínez JA, Soriano A, Rico V, Hernández-Meneses M, Agüero D, Torres B,  
984 González A, de la Mora L, Rojas J, Linares L, Fidalgo B, Rodriguez N, Nicolas D,  
985 Albiach L, Muñoz J, Almuedo A, Camprubí D, Angeles Marcos M, Camprubí D,  
986 Cilloniz C, Fernández S, Nicolas JM, Torres A. 2021. Incidence of co-infections and  
987 superinfections in hospitalized patients with COVID-19: a retrospective cohort study.  
988 *Clin Microbiol Infect* **27**:83–88. doi:10.1016/j.cmi.2020.07.041
- 989 Girard D, Finegan SM, Dunne MW, Lame ME. 2005. Enhanced efficacy of single-dose versus  
990 multi-dose azithromycin regimens in preclinical infection models. *J Antimicrob*  
991 *Chemother* **56**:365–371. doi:10.1093/jac/dki241
- 992 Grant J, Saux NL. 2021. Duration of antibiotic therapy for common infections. *J Assoc Med*  
993 *Microbiol Infect Dis Can* **6**:181–197. doi:10.3138/jammi-2021-04-29

- 994 Henig O, Kehat O, Meijer SE, Chikly A, Weiss-Meilik A, Egoz E, Ben-Ami R, Paran Y. 2021.  
995 Antibiotic use during the COVID-19 pandemic in a tertiary hospital with an ongoing  
996 antibiotic stewardship program. *Antibiotics* **10**:1056. doi:10.3390/antibiotics10091056  
997 Högberg LD, Vlahović-Palčevski V, Pereira C, Weist K, Monnet DL, ESAC-Net study group.  
998 2021. Decrease in community antibiotic consumption during the COVID-19 pandemic,  
999 EU/EEA, 2020. *Eurosurveillance* **26**. doi:10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2021.26.46.2101020  
1000 Homeniuk R, Collins C. 2021. How COVID-19 has affected general practice consultations and  
1001 income: general practitioner cross-sectional population survey evidence from Ireland.  
1002 *BMJ Open* **11**:e044685. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2020-044685  
1003 Hsu J. 2020. How covid-19 is accelerating the threat of antimicrobial resistance. *BMJ*  
1004 **369**:m1983. doi:10.1136/bmj.m1983  
1005 Hussain AZ, Paudyal V, Hadi MA. 2021. Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the prescribing  
1006 patterns of first-line antibiotics in English primary care: a longitudinal analysis of  
1007 national prescribing dataset. *Antibiotics* **10**:591. doi:10.3390/antibiotics10050591  
1008 Kadambari S, Goldacre R, Morris E, Goldacre MJ, Pollard AJ. 2022. Indirect effects of the  
1009 covid-19 pandemic on childhood infection in England: population based observational  
1010 study. *BMJ* **376**:e067519. doi:10.1136/bmj-2021-067519  
1011 Jenness SM, Le Guillou A, Chandra C, Mann LM, Sanchez T, Westreich D, Marcus JL. 2021.  
1012 Projected HIV and bacterial sexually transmitted infection incidence following COVID-  
1013 19-related sexual distancing and clinical service interruption. *J Infect Dis* **223**:1019–  
1014 1028. doi:10.1093/infdis/jiab051  
1015 Karami Z, Knoop BT, Dofferhoff ASM, Blaauw MJT, Janssen NA, van Apeldoorn M,  
1016 Kerckhoffs APM, van de Maat JS, Hoogerwerf JJ, ten Oever J. 2021. Few bacterial co-  
1017 infections but frequent empiric antibiotic use in the early phase of hospitalized patients  
1018 with COVID-19: results from a multicentre retrospective cohort study in the Netherlands.  
1019 *Infect Dis* **53**:102–110. doi:10.1080/23744235.2020.1839672  
1020 Keenan JD, Bailey RL, West SK, Arzika AM, Hart J, Weaver J, Kalua K, Mrango Z, Ray KJ,  
1021 Cook C, Lebas E, O'Brien KS, Emerson PM, Porco TC, Leitman TM. 2018. Mass  
1022 azithromycin distribution for reducing childhood mortality in sub-Saharan Africa. *N Engl*  
1023 *J Med* **378**:1583–1592. doi:10.1056/NEJMoa1715474  
1024 Keenan JD, Klugman KP, McGee L, Vidal JE, Chochua S, Hawkins P, Cevallos V, Gebre T,  
1025 Tadesse Z, Emerson PM, Jorgensen JH, Gaynor BD, Lietman TM. 2015. Evidence for  
1026 clonal expansion after antibiotic selection pressure: pneumococcal multilocus sequence  
1027 types before and after mass azithromycin treatments. *J Infect Dis* **211**:988–994.  
1028 doi:10.1093/infdis/jiu552  
1029 Khouja T, Mitsantisuk K, Tadrous M, Suda KJ. 2022. Global consumption of antimicrobials:  
1030 impact of the WHO Global Action Plan on antimicrobial resistance and 2019 coronavirus  
1031 pandemic (COVID-19). *J Antimicrob Chemother* **77**:1491–1499.  
1032 doi:10.1093/jac/dkac028  
1033 Knight GM, Glover RE, McQuaid CF, Olaru ID, Gallandat K, Leclerc QJ, Fuller NM, Willcocks  
1034 SJ, Hasan R, Van Kleef E, Chandler CI. 2021. Antimicrobial resistance and COVID-19:  
1035 intersections and implications. *eLife* **10**:e64139. doi:10.7554/eLife.64139  
1036 Kournoutou GG, Dinos G. 2022. Azithromycin through the lens of the COVID-19 treatment.  
1037 *Antibiotics* **11**:1063. doi:10.3390/antibiotics11081063  
1038 Kuitunen I, Jääskeläinen J, Korppi M, Renko M. 2023. Antibiotic treatment duration for  
1039 community-acquired pneumonia in outpatient children in high-income countries—a

- 1040 systematic review and meta-analysis. *Clin Infect Dis Off Publ Infect Dis Soc Am*  
1041 **76**:e1123. doi:10.1093/cid/ciac374
- 1042 Langford BJ, So M, Raybardhan S, Leung V, Soucy J-PR, Westwood D, Daneman N,  
1043 MacFadden DR. 2021. Antibiotic prescribing in patients with COVID-19: rapid review  
1044 and meta-analysis. *Clin Microbiol Infect* **27**:520–531. doi:10.1016/j.cmi.2020.12.018
- 1045 Langford BJ, So M, Raybardhan S, Leung V, Westwood D, MacFadden DR, Soucy J-PR,  
1046 Daneman N. 2020. Bacterial co-infection and secondary infection in patients with  
1047 COVID-19: a living rapid review and meta-analysis. *Clin Microbiol Infect* **26**:1622–  
1048 1629. doi:10.1016/j.cmi.2020.07.016
- 1049 Lauer SA, Grantz KH, Bi Q, Jones FK, Zheng Q, Meredith HR, Azman AS, Reich NG, Lessler J.  
1050 2020. The incubation period of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) from publicly  
1051 reported confirmed cases: estimation and application. *Ann Intern Med* **172**:577–582.  
1052 doi:10.7326/M20-0504
- 1053 Lehtinen S, Blanquart F, Croucher NJ, Turner P, Lipsitch M, Fraser C. 2017. Evolution of  
1054 antibiotic resistance is linked to any genetic mechanism affecting bacterial duration of  
1055 carriage. *Proc Natl Acad Sci* **114**:1075–1080. doi:10.1073/pnas.1617849114
- 1056 Lipsitch M, Colijn C, Cohen T, Hanage WP, Fraser C. 2009. No coexistence for free: neutral null  
1057 models for multistrain pathogens. *Epidemics* **1**:2–13. doi:10.1016/j.epidem.2008.07.001
- 1058 Liu Y, Gayle AA, Wilder-Smith A, Rocklöv J. 2020. The reproductive number of COVID-19 is  
1059 higher compared to SARS coronavirus. *J Travel Med* **27**:taaa021.  
1060 doi:10.1093/jtm/taaa021
- 1061 Malhotra-Kumar S, Lammens C, Coenen S, Van Herck K, Goossens H. 2007. Effect of  
1062 azithromycin and clarithromycin therapy on pharyngeal carriage of macrolide-resistant  
1063 streptococci in healthy volunteers: a randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled study.  
1064 *The Lancet* **369**:482–490. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(07)60235-9
- 1065 Mamun AA, Saatchi A, Xie M, Lishman H, Blondel-Hill E, Marra F, Patrick DM. 2021.  
1066 Community antibiotic use at the population level during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic in  
1067 British Columbia, Canada. *Open Forum Infect Dis* **8**:ofab185. doi:10.1093/ofid/ofab185
- 1068 McCullers JA, McAuley JL, Browall S, Iverson AR, Boyd KL, Henriques Normark B. 2010.  
1069 Influenza enhances susceptibility to natural acquisition of and disease due to  
1070 *Streptococcus pneumoniae* in ferrets. *J Infect Dis* **202**:1287–1295. doi:10.1086/656333
- 1071 Melegaro A, Gay NJ, Medley GF. 2004. Estimating the transmission parameters of  
1072 pneumococcal carriage in households. *Epidemiol Infect* **132**:433–441.  
1073 doi:10.1017/S0950268804001980
- 1074 Melnyk AH, Wong A, Kassen R. 2015. The fitness costs of antibiotic resistance mutations. *Evol*  
1075 *Appl* **8**:273–283. doi:10.1111/eva.12196
- 1076 Monnet DL, Harbarth S. 2020. Will coronavirus disease (COVID-19) have an impact on  
1077 antimicrobial resistance? *Eurosurveillance* **25**. doi:10.2807/1560-  
1078 7917.ES.2020.25.45.2001886
- 1079 Mulberry N, Rutherford A, Colijn C. 2020. Systematic comparison of coexistence in models of  
1080 drug-sensitive and drug-resistant pathogen strains. *Theor Popul Biol* **133**:150–158.  
1081 doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2019.12.001
- 1082 Murray CJL, Ikuta KS, Sharara F, Swetschinski L, Robles Aguilar G, Gray A, Han C, Bisignano  
1083 C, Rao P, Wool E, Johnson SC, Browne AJ, Chipeta MG, Fell F, Hackett S, Haines-  
1084 Woodhouse G, Kashef Hamadani BH, Kumaran EAP, McManigal B, Achalapong S,  
1085 Agarwal R, Akech S, Albertson S, Amuasi J, Andrews J, Aravkin A, Ashley E, Babin F-

- 1086 X, Bailey F, Baker S, Basnyat B, Bekker A, Bender R, Berkley JA, Bethou A, Bielicki J,  
1087 Boonkasidecha S, Bukosia J, Carneiro C, Castañeda-Orjuela C, Chansamouth V,  
1088 Chaurasia S, Chiurchiù S, Chowdhury F, Clotaire Donatien R, Cook AJ, Cooper B,  
1089 Cressey TR, Criollo-Mora E, Cunningham M, Darboe S, Day NPJ, De Luca M, Dokova  
1090 K, Dramowski A, Dunachie SJ, Duong Bich T, Eckmanns T, Eibach D, Emami A,  
1091 Feasey N, Fisher-Pearson N, Forrest K, Garcia C, Garrett D, Gastmeier P, Giref AZ,  
1092 Greer RC, Gupta V, Haller S, Haselbeck A, Hay SI, Holm M, Hopkins S, Hsia Y, Iregbu  
1093 KC, Jacobs J, Jarovsky D, Javanmardi F, Jenney AWJ, Khorana M, Khusuwan S,  
1094 Kisson N, Kobeissi E, Kostyanov T, Krapp F, Krumkamp R, Kumar A, Kyu HH, Lim  
1095 C, Lim K, Limmathurotsakul D, Loftus MJ, Lunn M, Ma J, Manoharan A, Marks F, May  
1096 J, Mayxay M, Mturi N, Munera-Huertas T, Musicha P, Musila LA, Mussi-Pinhata MM,  
1097 Naidu RN, Nakamura T, Nanavati R, Nangia S, Newton P, Ngoun C, Novotney A,  
1098 Nwakanma D, Obiero CW, Ochoa TJ, Olivas-Martinez A, Olliaro P, Ooko E, Ortiz-  
1099 Brizuela E, Ounchanum P, Pak GD, Paredes JL, Peleg AY, Perrone C, Phe T,  
1100 Phommasone K, Plakkal N, Ponce-de-Leon A, Raad M, Ramdin T, Rattanavong S,  
1101 Riddell A, Roberts T, Robotham JV, Roca A, Rosenthal VD, Rudd KE, Russell N, Sader  
1102 HS, Saengchan W, Schnall J, Scott JAG, Seekaew S, Sharland M, Shivamallappa M,  
1103 Sifuentes-Osornio J, Simpson AJ, Steenkeste N, Stewardson AJ, Stoeva T, Tasak N,  
1104 Thaiprakong A, Thwaites G, Tigoi C, Turner C, Turner P, Van Doorn HR, Velaphi S,  
1105 Vongpradith A, Vongsouvath M, Vu H, Walsh T, Walson JL, Waner S,  
1106 Wangrangsimakul T, Wannapinij P, Wozniak T, Young Sharma TEMW, Yu KC, Zheng  
1107 P, Sartorius B, Lopez AD, Stergachis A, Moore C, Dolecek C, Naghavi M. 2022. Global  
1108 burden of bacterial antimicrobial resistance in 2019: a systematic analysis. *The Lancet*  
1109 **399**:629–655. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(21)02724-0
- 1110 Nandi A, Pecetta S, Bloom DE. 2023. Global antibiotic use during the COVID-19 pandemic:  
1111 analysis of pharmaceutical sales data from 71 countries, 2020–2022. *eClinicalMedicine*  
1112 **57**:101848. doi:10.1016/j.eclinm.2023.101848
- 1113 Nation ML, Manna S, Tran HP, Nguyen CD, Vy LTT, Uyen DY, Phuong TL, Dai VTT, Ortika  
1114 BD, Wee-Hee AC, Beissbarth J, Hinds J, Bright K, Smith-Vaughan H, Nguyen TV,  
1115 Mulholland K, Temple B, Satzke C. 2023. Impact of COVID-19 nonpharmaceutical  
1116 interventions on pneumococcal carriage prevalence and density in Vietnam. *Microbiol*  
1117 *Spectr* **11**:e03615-22. doi:10.1128/spectrum.03615-22
- 1118 Olesen SW, Lipsitch M, Grad YH. 2020. The role of “spillover” in antibiotic resistance. *Proc*  
1119 *Natl Acad Sci* **117**:29063–29068. doi:10.1073/pnas.2013694117
- 1120 Olwagen CP, Downs SL, Izu A, Tharasimbi L, Merwe LVD, Nunes MC, Madhi SA. 2023.  
1121 Bacterial nasopharyngeal colonisation in children in South Africa before and during the  
1122 COVID-19 pandemic: an observational study. *Lancet Microbe* **0**. doi:10.1016/S2666-  
1123 5247(23)00260-4
- 1124 Opatowski L, Varon E, Dupont C, Temime L, van der Werf S, Gutmann L, Boëlle P-Y, Watier  
1125 L, Guillemot D. 2013. Assessing pneumococcal meningitis association with viral  
1126 respiratory infections and antibiotics: insights from statistical and mathematical models.  
1127 *Proc R Soc B Biol Sci* **280**:20130519. doi:10.1098/rspb.2013.0519
- 1128 Palmer K, Monaco A, Kivipelto M, Onder G, Maggi S, Michel J-P, Prieto R, Sykara G, Donde S.  
1129 2020. The potential long-term impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on patients with non-  
1130 communicable diseases in Europe: consequences for healthy ageing. *Aging Clin Exp Res*  
1131 **32**:1189–1194. doi:10.1007/s40520-020-01601-4

- 1132 Parveen M, Molla MMA, Yeasmin M, Nafisa T, Barna AA, Ghosh AK. 2020. Evidences on  
1133 irrational anti-microbial prescribing and consumption among COVID-19 positive patients  
1134 and possible mitigation strategies: a descriptive cross sectional study. *Bangladesh J Infect*  
1135 *Dis* S3–S7. doi:10.3329/bjid.v7i00.50155
- 1136 Petrović V, Milosavljević B, Djilas M, Marković M, Vuković V, Andrijević I, Ristić M. 2022.  
1137 Pneumococcal nasopharyngeal carriage in children under 5 years of age at an outpatient  
1138 healthcare facility in Novi Sad, Serbia during the COVID-19 pandemic. *IJID Reg* 4:88–  
1139 96. doi:10.1016/j.ijregi.2022.07.001
- 1140 PRINCIPLE Trial Collaborative Group. 2021. Azithromycin for community treatment of  
1141 suspected COVID-19 in people at increased risk of an adverse clinical course in the UK  
1142 (PRINCIPLE): a randomised, controlled, open-label, adaptive platform trial. *Lancet Lond*  
1143 *Engl* 397:1063–1074. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(21)00461-X
- 1144 Read B, McLeod M, Tonkin-Crine S, Ashiru-Oredope D, Quigley A, Brown CS, Lecky DM.  
1145 2023. Changes in public health-seeking behaviours for self-limiting respiratory tract  
1146 infections across England during the COVID-19 pandemic.
- 1147 Rebelo JS, Domingues CPF, Dionisio F, Gomes MC, Botelho A, Nogueira T. 2021. COVID-19  
1148 lockdowns may reduce resistance genes diversity in the human microbiome and the need  
1149 for antibiotics. *Int J Mol Sci* 22:6891. doi:10.3390/ijms22136891
- 1150 Rhee C, Baker M, Vaidya V, Tucker R, Resnick A, Morris CA, Klompas M, CDC Prevention  
1151 epicenters program. 2020. Incidence of nosocomial COVID-19 in patients hospitalized at  
1152 a large US Academic Medical Center. *JAMA Netw Open* 3:e2020498.  
1153 doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.20498
- 1154 Rose MA, Laurenz M, Sprenger R, Imöhl M, van der Linden M. 2021. Nasopharyngeal carriage  
1155 in children after the introduction of generalized infant pneumococcal conjugate vaccine  
1156 immunization in Germany. *Front Med* 8.
- 1157 Roux J, Massonnaud C, Crépey P. 2020. COVID-19: One-month impact of the French lockdown  
1158 on the epidemic burden (preprint). *Epidemiology*. doi:10.1101/2020.04.22.20075705
- 1159 Rusic D, Vilovic M, Bukic J, Leskur D, Seselja Perisin A, Kumric M, Martinovic D, Petric A,  
1160 Modun D, Bozic J. 2021. Implications of COVID-19 pandemic on the emergence of  
1161 antimicrobial resistance: adjusting the response to future outbreaks. *Life* 11:220.  
1162 doi:10.3390/life11030220
- 1163 Rybak A, Levy C, Angoulvant F, Auvrignon A, Gembara P, Danis K, Vaux S, Levy-Bruhl D,  
1164 van der Werf S, Béchet S, Bonacorsi S, Assad Z, Lazzati A, Michel M, Kaguelidou F,  
1165 Faye A, Cohen R, Varon E, Ouldali N. 2022. Association of nonpharmaceutical  
1166 interventions during the COVID-19 pandemic with invasive pneumococcal disease,  
1167 pneumococcal carriage, and respiratory viral infections among children in France. *JAMA*  
1168 *Netw Open* 5:e2218959. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2022.18959
- 1169 Ryu S, Hwang Y, Ali ST, Kim D-S, Klein EY, Lau EHY, Cowling BJ. 2021. Decreased use of  
1170 broad-spectrum antibiotics during the coronavirus disease 2019 epidemic in South Korea.  
1171 *J Infect Dis* 224:949–955. doi:10.1093/infdis/jiab208
- 1172 Salje H, Tran Kiem C, Lefrancq N, Courtejoie N, Bosetti P, Paireau J, Andronico A, Hozé N,  
1173 Richet J, Dubost C-L, Le Strat Y, Lessler J, Levy-Bruhl D, Fontanet A, Opatowski L,  
1174 Boelle P-Y, Cauchemez S. 2020. Estimating the burden of SARS-CoV-2 in France.  
1175 *Science* 369:208–211. doi:10.1126/science.abc3517
- 1176 Seaton RA, Gibbons CL, Cooper L, Malcolm W, McKinney R, Dundas S, Griffith D, Jeffreys D,  
1177 Hamilton K, Choo-Kang B, Brittain S, Guthrie D, Sneddon J. 2020. Survey of antibiotic

- 1178 and antifungal prescribing in patients with suspected and confirmed COVID-19 in  
1179 Scottish hospitals. *J Infect* **81**:952–960. doi:10.1016/j.jinf.2020.09.024
- 1180 Sender V, Hentrich K, Henriques-Normark B. 2021. Virus-induced changes of the respiratory  
1181 tract environment promote secondary infections with *Streptococcus pneumoniae*. *Front*  
1182 *Cell Infect Microbiol* **11**.
- 1183 Shaw D, Abad R, Amin-Chowdhury Z, Bautista A, Bennett D, Broughton K, Cao B, Casanova  
1184 C, Choi EH, Chu Y-W, Claus H, Coelho J, Corcoran M, Cottrell S, Cunney R, Cuypers  
1185 L, Dalby T, Davies H, Gouveia L de, Deghmane A-E, Demczuk W, Desmet S,  
1186 Domenech M, Drew R, Plessis M du, Duarte C, Erlendsdóttir H, Fry NK, Fuursted K,  
1187 Hale T, Henares D, Henriques-Normark B, Hilty M, Hoffmann S, Humphreys H, Ip M,  
1188 Jacobsson S, Johnson C, Johnston J, Jolley KA, Kawabata A, Kozakova J, Kristinsson  
1189 KG, Krizova P, Kuch A, Ladhani S, Lãm T-T, León ME, Lindholm L, Litt D, Maiden  
1190 MCJ, Martin I, Martiny D, Mattheus W, McCarthy ND, Meehan M, Meiring S, Mölling  
1191 P, Morfeldt E, Morgan J, Mulhall R, Muñoz-Almagro C, Murdoch D, Murphy J, Musilek  
1192 M, Mzabi A, Novakova L, Oftadeh S, Perez-Argüello A, Pérez-Vázquez M, Perrin M,  
1193 Perry M, Prevost B, Roberts M, Rokney A, Ron M, Sanabria OM, Scott KJ, Sheppard C,  
1194 Siira L, Sintchenko V, Skoczyńska A, Sloan M, Slotved H-C, Smith AJ, Steens A, Taha  
1195 M-K, Toropainen M, Tzanakaki G, Vainio A, Linden MPG van der, Sorge NM van,  
1196 Varon E, Vohrnova S, Gottberg A von, Yuste J, Zanella R, Zhou F, Brueggemann AB.  
1197 2023. Trends in invasive bacterial diseases during the first 2 years of the COVID-19  
1198 pandemic: analyses of prospective surveillance data from 30 countries and territories in  
1199 the IRIS Consortium. *Lancet Digit Health* **0**. doi:10.1016/S2589-7500(23)00108-5
- 1200 Short KR, Reading PC, Wang N, Diavatopoulos DA, Wijburg OL. 2012. Increased  
1201 nasopharyngeal bacterial titers and local inflammation facilitate transmission of  
1202 *Streptococcus pneumoniae*. *mBio* **3**:e00255-12. doi:10.1128/mBio.00255-12
- 1203 Shrestha S, Foxman B, Dawid S, Aiello AE, Davis BM, Berus J, Rohani P. 2013. Time and  
1204 dose-dependent risk of pneumococcal pneumonia following influenza: a model for  
1205 within-host interaction between influenza and *Streptococcus pneumoniae*. *J R Soc*  
1206 *Interface* **10**:20130233. doi:10.1098/rsif.2013.0233
- 1207 Smith DRM, Opatowski L. 2021. COVID-19 containment measures and incidence of invasive  
1208 bacterial disease. *Lancet Digit Health* **3**:e331–e332. doi:10.1016/S2589-7500(21)00085-6
- 1209 Smith DRM, Shirreff G, Temime L, Opatowski L. 2023. Collateral impacts of pandemic  
1210 COVID-19 drive the nosocomial spread of antibiotic resistance: a modelling study. *PLOS*  
1211 *Med* **20**:e1004240. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1004240
- 1212 Soetaert K, Petzoldt T, Setzer RW. 2010. Solving differential equations in R: package deSolve. *J*  
1213 *Stat Softw* **33**:1–25. doi:10.18637/jss.v033.i09
- 1214 Teng JLL, Fok KMN, Lin KPK, Chan E, Ma Y, Lau SKP, Woo PCY. 2022. Substantial decline  
1215 in invasive pneumococcal disease during coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic in Hong  
1216 Kong. *Clin Infect Dis Off Publ Infect Dis Soc Am* **74**:335–338. doi:10.1093/cid/ciab382
- 1217 Tinggaard M, Slotved H-C, Petersen RF, Hovmand N, Benfield T. 2023. Decreased  
1218 pneumococcal carriage among older adults in Denmark during the COVID-19 lockdown.  
1219 *Open Forum Infect Dis* **10**:ofad365. doi:10.1093/ofid/ofad365
- 1220 Tsay SV, Bartoces M, Gouin K, Kabbani S, Hicks LA. 2022. Antibiotic prescriptions associated  
1221 with COVID-19 outpatient visits among medicare beneficiaries, April 2020 to April  
1222 2021. *JAMA* **327**:2018. doi:10.1001/jama.2022.5471

- 1223 Van Laethem J, Wuyts S, Van Laere S, Dirx S, Seyler L, Mertens R, Ilse B, Lacor P, Pierard  
1224 D, Allard SD. 2021. Antibiotic prescriptions targeting bacterial respiratory infections in  
1225 admitted patients with COVID-19: a prospective observational study. *Infect Dis Ther*  
1226 **10**:2575–2591. doi:10.1007/s40121-021-00535-2
- 1227 Wang L, Fu J, Liang Z, Chen J. 2017. Prevalence and serotype distribution of nasopharyngeal  
1228 carriage of *Streptococcus pneumoniae* in China: a meta-analysis. *BMC Infect Dis* **17**:765.  
1229 doi:10.1186/s12879-017-2816-8
- 1230 Weill A, Drouin J, Desplas D, Cuenot F, Dray-Spira R, Zureik M. 2021. Usage des médicaments  
1231 de ville en France durant l'épidémie de la Covid-19 – point de situation jusqu'au 25 avril  
1232 2021. Étude pharmaco-épidémiologique à partir des données de remboursement du  
1233 SNDS. EPI-PHARE (Groupement d'intérêt scientifique ANSM-Cnam), 27 mai 2021.
- 1234 Willen L, Ekinçi E, Cuyper L, Theeten H, Desmet S. 2022. Infant pneumococcal carriage in  
1235 Belgium not affected by COVID-19 containment measures. *Front Cell Infect Microbiol*  
1236 **11**:825427. doi:10.3389/fcimb.2021.825427
- 1237 Wittman SR, Martin JM, Mehrotra A, Ray KN. 2023. Antibiotic receipt during outpatient visits  
1238 for COVID-19 in the US, From 2020 to 2022. *JAMA Health Forum* **4**:e225429.  
1239 doi:10.1001/jamahealthforum.2022.5429
- 1240 Wolter N, Tempia S, Cohen C, Madhi SA, Venter M, Moyes J, Walaza S, Malope-Kgokong B,  
1241 Groome M, Du Plessis M, Magomani V, Pretorius M, Hellferscee O, Dawood H, Kahn  
1242 K, Variava E, Klugman KP, Von Gottberg A. 2014. High nasopharyngeal pneumococcal  
1243 density, increased by viral coinfection, is associated with invasive pneumococcal  
1244 pneumonia. *J Infect Dis* **210**:1649–1657. doi:10.1093/infdis/jiu326
- 1245 Wong A, Guevara LAB, Goult E, Briga M, Kramer SC, Kovacevic A, Opatowski L, Cellès MD  
1246 de. 2023. The interactions of SARS-CoV-2 with cocirculating pathogens:  
1247 epidemiological implications and current knowledge gaps. *PLOS Pathog* **19**:e1011167.  
1248 doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1011167
- 1249 Wyllie AL, Mbodj S, Thammavongsa DA, Hislop MS, Yolda-Carr D, Waghela P, Nakahata M,  
1250 Stahlfeld AE, Vega NJ, York A, Allicock OM, Wilkins G, Ouyang A, Siqueiros L,  
1251 Strong Y, Anastasio K, Alexander-Parrish R, Arguedas A, Gessner BD, Weinberger DM.  
1252 2023. Persistence of pneumococcal carriage among older adults in the community despite  
1253 COVID-19 mitigation measures. *Microbiol Spectr* **11**:e04879-22.  
1254 doi:10.1128/spectrum.04879-22
- 1255 Zhang T, Shen X, Liu R, Zhao L, Wang D, Lambert H, Cabral C. 2021. The impact of COVID-  
1256 19 on primary health care and antibiotic prescribing in rural China: qualitative study.  
1257 *BMC Health Serv Res* **21**:1048. doi:10.1186/s12913-021-07082-z
- 1258 Zhou C, Jiang Y, Sun L, Li H, Liu X, Huang L. 2023. Secondary pulmonary infection and co-  
1259 infection in elderly COVID-19 patients during the pandemics in a tertiary general  
1260 hospital in Beijing, China. *Front Microbiol* **14**:1280026.  
1261 doi:10.3389/fmicb.2023.1280026
- 1262 Zhu N, Aylin P, Rawson T, Gilchrist M, Majeed A, Holmes A. 2021. Investigating the impact of  
1263 COVID-19 on primary care antibiotic prescribing in North West London across two  
1264 epidemic waves. *Clin Microbiol Infect* **27**:762–768. doi:10.1016/j.cmi.2021.02.007
- 1265