

verilmektedir.¹²

Bütün bu söylediklerimizden çıkaracağımız sonuç; gayrimüslimlerin kendi dinlerine inanma ve onun gereklerini yerine getirme konusunda tam bir hürriyete sahip olduklarıdır.

İslâm Tarihinde Hoşgörü Örnekleri

İslâm dünyasının öbür dinlere karşı müsamaha ve hoşgörüsünün temelini indığımızda birinci unsur olarak din faktörünü görüyoruz. Yani –önceki bölümde de zikrettiğimiz gibi– Kur'ân'ı ve Resûlullah'ın uygulamalarını, Kur'ân, Ehl-i Kitaba öteki toplumlardan farklı bir muamele yapmış ve Ehl-i Kitaba ilgili münasebetlerin düzenlenmesi konusunda detaylı bilgiler vermiştir.

İbrâhimî üç dinin, Yahudiliğin, Hıristiyanlığın ve İslâm'ın tecrübelerini göz önüne alırsak, hoşgörünün, diyalogun ve bir arada yaşamının dinî temellerinin hemen hemen her üç dinin kaynağında da mevcut olduğunu görürüz. Gerek Tevrat'ta, gerek İncil'de, gerekse Kur'ân-ı Kerim'de teorik olarak insanları sevme, barış içerisinde yaşama ve insanlara karşı hoşgörümlü davranmayı öngören pek çok ahkâm ve pek çok ayet bulunmaktadır. Bunun tarihsel süreç içerisindeki tatbikatına baktığımızda –yani teoriden pratiğe intikal ettiğimiz zaman– bu noktada bütün dinlerin aynı seviyede olumlu örnekleri sergilediklerini söylememiz mümkün değildir.

Aşağı yukarı 15 yüzyıllık tarihinde İslâm dünyası, kendinden olmayanlara, yani ötekilere karşı hoşgörümlü davranmış ve onlara karşı engin bir müsamaha göstermiştir. Bu arada tarihsel süreç içerisinde (bazı) karanlık noktalar bulunması gayet tabiidir. İslâm Dünyası, Kur'ân'ın ve Resûlullah'ın getirmiş olduğu prensipler çerçevesinde, gerçekten mümkün olabildiğince en güzel hoşgörü ve diyalog anlayışını sergilemiştir.

Bu çerçeve içerisinde özellikle Abbasiler Dönemi Bağdat'ında Hıristiyan cemaatler arasındaki ilişkiler ve Hıristiyanlara karşı Müslümanların tavrında gördüğümüz hoşgörümlü yaklaşım, –o kadar ki, sarayın en üst makamlarına kadar ulaşıp diyalogu kurabilen ve onlardan çeşitli imkânlar elde edebilecek duruma gelen özellikle Süryaniler ve Nesturiler için söz konusu olan– bir hoşgörü ortamının mevcut olduğunu görüyoruz. Keza aynı anlayışın ikinci bir örneğini Emevîler devri Endülüs'ünde görüyoruz ki, burada gerek Yahudi cemaati, gerekse *mu'arreb* diyebileceğimiz birtakım-Araplaşma sürecini yaşayan yerli halkların devlet kademesinde gördükleri hoşgörümlü nezaretin en üst makamına çıkararak devleti yönetecek bir kuvvete ulaşacak

¹² *Ebû Davud*, Harâc, 29–30; Ebû Yusuf, *Harac*, s.72; Belâzurî, *Fütûh*, s. 92; Hamidullah, *el-Vesâik*, s. 194; Peygamber Efendimiz (s.a.s.) anlaşma öncesi Necran Uskuflarına yazdığı mektupta da onları İslâm'a davet etmiş, kabul etmedikleri takdirde cizye ödemeleri gerektiğini belirtmişti, Hamidullah, *el-Vesâik*, s. 194.



safhaya varmasıyla görmekteyiz. Nihayet bunun en yakın ve en son örneđi, Osmanlı toplumu ve pâyitahtı olan İstanbul'da tarihin uzun asırlarında devletin egemenliğini tam olarak sağlayabildiđi, görevini tam olarak yapabildiđi, toplumsal yapının canlı, dinamik ve yeterli olduđu en sıkıntılı dönemlerde bile, Batı'daki veya dünyanın başka yerlerindeki ortamlarla mukayese ettiđimiz zaman fevkalâde mükemmel bir örnek teşkil ettiđini görmekteyiz.

İslâm Dini tarafından ne başlangıçta ne de sonraları diđer din mensupları düşman olarak görülmemiştir. Sadece geniş halk kitlelerinin İslâm'la tanışmaları hedeflenmiş, hu hususta zorlayıcı tavırlar söz konusu olmamıştır.

Türk-İslâm Devletlerinde Diđer Din Mensuplarına Gösterilen Hoşgörü Örnekleri

Türk-İslâm devletleri, Müslüman olmayanlara karşı iyi niyetli, müsamahalı davranmış; dinî değerlerine saygılı olmuşlardır. Bu şekilde davranmalarının sebeplerinden biri "insanî duygular" olmakla beraber, asıl sebep "dinî"dir. Zira milletçe mensubu buldukları "İslâm Dini", kendi dışındaki diđer dinlere en çok tolerans ve serbestlik tanıyan; o dinlerin mensuplarının inançlarına, ibâdetlerine, her türlü haklarına saygı gösterilmesini, adaletli davranılmasını emreden bir dindir. Türk-İslâm devletlerinin kurduđu bu sistem, hiçbir zaman bir hükümdarın, bir vezirin veyahut da yüksek bir memurun gelip geçici bir iyi niyetinden çıkmamıştı.. Türk-İslâm devletleri, gayrimüslimler gibi Müslümanların da temel hak ve hürriyetlerini zaten temelden Allah'ın bir ihsanı olduğunu kabul etmekte, yoksa Batı hukukundaki gelişmede olduđu gibi kralın veya idarecilerin ihsanı olarak görmemektedir. Avrupa'da, 17. yy.'da bir felsefi sistem olarak beliren "lâiklik" prensibi ve onun sonucu olan "din ve vicdan hürriyeti", İslâm âleminde çok daha önce, bir uygulama sahası bulabilmiştir.

İslâm'ın, "adalet" konusunda koyduđu prensipler ise, gerçekten çok dikkate değer bir durumdadır. Allah Resûlü (s.a.s.) zamanından beri (Dört Halife de dahil), hükümdarlar "Meşrutî" bir devlet başkanındırlar ve devletin sıradan bir uyruđu gibi, memleketin kanunlarına tâbidirler. Peygamber Efendimiz tarafından ihdas edilen gelenek, İslâm devlet başkanının "kanun üstü" olmamasını garanti eder. Tarih, o zamandan itibaren sıradan bir tebaanın, hatta bir gayrimüslimin bile, hükümdarı mahkemeye verebildiđini göstermektedir.¹³ (Fâtih'in, bir Hıristiyan Rum tarafından dâva edilip, mahkûm olması tarihî gerçeđi, pek çok örnekten sadece bir tanesidir.)

¹³ Hamîdullah, *el-Vesâik*, s.83.

Kur'ân, Hadis ve bütün zamanların örnekleri, Müslüman olmayanların kendi hukuk (kanûn)larına sahip olmalarını, Müslüman otoritelerin müdâhaleleri olmadan ister dinî, ister içtimaî (sosyal) hususlarda kendi hâkimleri tarafından, kendi mahkemelerinde yargılanmalarını ister¹⁴. (ilerde görüleceği gibi- Fâtih, patrikhaneye mahkeme kurma yetkisi vermiş; hükümet, bu mahkemenin kararlarını uygulamaya kendini mecbur saymıştır).

Osmanlı Devleti'nin, devlet yapısı içinde gayrimüslimlere tanınan haklar, daima İslâm'ın genel dinî tutumu istikametinde olmuştur. Bu dinî tutumda, İslâm dışı unsurlara Peygamberimiz (s.a.s.) döneminden başlayarak, insan hakları açısından gerekli hakların verildiği görülmektedir. Bu hakların başında, din ve vicdan hürriyeti, nesli koruma, canı koruma, malı koruma ve aklı koruma hürriyeti gelmektedir. İslâmî otoriteler, tarih boyunca fetih hareketlerinde bu hakları dâima göz önünde bulundurmuşlardır. Böylece bu ince ve nazik dinî tutumun Peygamber Efendimizden itibaren, dört halife, Emevîler Abbasiler, Büyük Selçuklular, Anadolu Selçukluları ve Osmanlı Devletinde aynen uygulandığını görüyoruz.

a. Osmanlı Öncesi Türklerde Hoşgörü ve Diyalog Örnekleri

Türkler, kendi toplumları içerisinde yaşayan diğer toplumlara karşı dâima hoşgörülü davranmışlar, onların din ve âdetlerine dokunmamışlar, işlerini tam bir güvenlik içinde yapmaları için onları serbest bırakmışlardır.

Selçuklu idaresi, çeşitli dinden olan toplumların din işleriyle ilgili konularda özel bir hürriyete sahip olmaları esasını kabul etmişti.

Ermeni ve Gürcü kaynakları, "Melikşâh'ın kalbinin, bütün Hıristiyanlara karşı şefkatle dolu olduğunu, geçliği memleket halkları için baba gibi davrandığını ve bu sebeple de birçok ülkelerin, kendi istekleriyle onun idaresine girdiklerini" yazar.¹⁵

Kaynaklar Melikşâh'ı, insanların en seçkini olarak gösterir ve Hıristiyanlara karşı adalet, iyilik ve yüksek özelliklerini belirtir. Bu seçkin şahsiyeti ve tesiriyledir ki, ölümünde cenâzesine Müslümanlar gibi, Hıristiyanların da katıldığını tarih kaydeder.

Türk hükümdarları, Hıristiyan mukaddesatına saygı gösterilmesini, kendi vazifeleri icâbı olarak biliyorlardı. O kadar ki, Emir Karaca'nın 1182'de, "haç" a hakaret ettiği için, Ahlat Şâh'ı tarafından cezalandırıldığı rivayet edilir. Müslüman ve Hıristiyan halk arasında dinî anlayış ve hoşgörü o dereceye varmıştır ki, Düveyn şehrinde cami ve kiliseler, "hilâl" ve "haç" yan yana bulunuyor; Müslüman hükümdarları, Ermeni ve Gürcü prensesleriyle evleniyorlardı.

¹⁴ Hamîdullah, *el-Vesâik*, s. 66-72.

¹⁵ Osman Turan, *Türk Cihan Hâkimiyeti Melkûresi Tarihi*, İst. 1979, I,288-289.



1071'den sonra Anadolu'da yaşamaya başlayan Selçuklu Türkleri, dinî hoşgörünün yanı sıra Hıristiyanların mal, can emniyetlerini de azamî derece korumaya dikkat etmekteydiler. Mesela 12. yüzyılda Erzurum, Erzincan gibi Anadolu şehirlerini ticaret maksadıyla dolaşan Latin tüccarların ibadetleri için bile buralarda özel kiliseler yapılmıştı. Hatta Selçuklu sultanlarının birçoğu kiliseleri, manastırları ziyaret edip rahiplere bağışlarda bulunurken, bazıları da manastırlardan vergileri kaldırmıştı.

Bu müsâmahacılık, Türk Devletleri'nde, İslâm'ı kabullerinden önce de vardır. Fetih seferlerine çıkan komutanlara olduğu gibi, eyâletleri idare eden valilere de verilen eski tâlimâtname'lerde, inkıyat etmiş kitap ehli'ne, serbestçe ibâdet edebilme izniyle birlikte, kendilerine insanî muamelede bulunulması emrediliyordu.¹⁶

b. Osmanlılarda Hoşgörü ve Diyalog Örnekleri

600 yıl dünya siyasetine yön vermiş olan Osmanlı Devleti, bugün hemen her ülkenin yakından ilgisini çekmekte ve özellikle çokuluslu devletlerin bir tecrübe kaynağı olarak gördükleri ibret alıcı bir hüviyet taşımaktadır. Onun bu kadar ilgi çekmesi, sadece Avrupa, Asya ve Afrika'da sahip olduğu geniş stratejik topraklar değil, aynı zamanda Doğu Roma gibi bir devletin varisi olarak yönetiminde çok farklı milletleri ve dinleri bir araya getirmesidir. Zira Osmanlı Avrupa'sında ve Anadolu'da o günün Batılı devletlerini gerek etnik, gerekse dinî açıdan yakından ilgilendiren önemli bir nüfus bulunmaktaydı. Aslında Osmanlı Devleti'nin 624 yıllık bir ömre sahip olmasında Türk ve Müslüman olmayan bu nüfusun önemli bir yeri vardır. Gerçekten de Osmanlıların kendi dinlerinden olmayan pek de azımsanamayacak bu topluluklara uyguladıkları hukuk ve hoşgörülü yönetim, Rumeli topraklarında Osmanlıların beklendiğinden daha fazla yayılmalarına ve kalmalarına zemin hazırlamıştır. Nitekim İspanya'da baskı altında kalan Yahudilerin Osmanlı topraklarına getirilerek koruma altına alınması ve yerleştirilmesi, ülkedeki gayrimüslimlere hoşgörünün ve güçlü bir devlete tâbi olmanın avantajını göstermiş ve devlete bağlılıklarını artırmıştır.¹⁷

Diğer Misaller

Çok uzun bir süre ayakta kalan Osmanlı Devleti'nin, sınırları dâhilinde bulunan gayrimüslimlerle olan münâsebetleri, onlara karşı davranışları hakkında çok geniş bilgi sunmak mümkündür; ancak, konunun hacmini fazla arttırmamak için, bazı örnekler vermekle

¹⁶ I. Goldziher, *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, "Ehlü'l-Kitâb" md.

¹⁷ Yusuf Halaçoğlu, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Gayrimüslim Vakıf ve Dinî Teşekküllerin Statüsü", *Osmanlı'da Hoşgörü, Birlikte Yaşama Sanatı*, Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı yay., İst., 2000, s. 127-129.

yetineceğiz.

– Devletin kurucusu Osman Bey, uygulamalarında ve verdiği kararlarda, Hıristiyanların dîni haklarına dokunmamıştı.

– İlk Osmanlı hükümdarları zamanında çeşitli memuriyet sahiplerinin, hatta bazı komutanların Hıristiyan oldukları düşünülecek olursa, hakan ve idarecilerin, onlara ayrıca ne gibi izinler ve siyâsi haklar vermiş oldukları hususunda bir fikir elde etmiş oluruz.

– Fâtih Sultan Mehmed, 29 Mayıs 1453'de İstanbul'a girip, Ayasofya'ya kadar gelmiş, âyin yapmakta olan halk, korkudan dehşete kapılarak birbirlerine sarılmışlar. Çünkü onlar, her şeylerini yitirecek ve yok edileceklerini sanıyorlardı. Fâtih, rahip'e, "evlerine dönmelerini; herkesin can, mal ve namusunun emniyet altına alındığını; iş ve sanatlarına devam etmelerini" söylemesini emretmiş, şehrin daha sonra düzenini temin edip halkın, Türklerle beraber kendi âdet, anane ve dinlerine göre serbestçe yaşayabileceklerini ilân etmiştir.

– Fâtih, Ortodoks Rumlarını yeniden teşkilâtlandırmış ve patriklik makamıyla ilgilenmiştir. Boş olduğunu öğrenince, kendi örf ve âdetlerine göre yeni bir patrik seçmelerini emretmiş, bunun üzerine toplanan kilise başkanları, ruhban ve halk, Georgios (Kortesios) Skolarios'u "Gennadios" adıyla, ittifakla patrik seçmişler. Böylece Gennadios, Türk hâkimiyeti altında ilk İstanbul Patriği olmuştur.

– Fâtih, seçimden sonra Patriği yemeğe davet etmiş, kendisine özel bir saygı ve resmen iltifat edilmek üzere yaşlı vezirlerini karşılamaya göndermiştir. Kendisi de yerinden kalkarak on adım ilerleyip Patriğin elinden tutmuş ve yanına oturtmuştur. Onunla uzun sohbetten sonra, dîni idare ve mezhep işlerinde ona haklar takdim etmiştir. "Millet Başı" unvanını da vererek onu, bütün dindaşlarının meseleleri üzerinde yetkili kılmıştır. Sonra da hürmetkâr bir şekilde sarayın kapısına kadar uğurlamış; kendisi, beyaz bir ata bindirilmiş, Patrikhâne'ye kadar bir hükümdar gibi uğurlamak üzere bütün saray erkânı ve Devlet Ümerâsına emir vermiştir.

Fâtih, Patriğe bir de ferman (berât) vermiştir. Bu "berât'a göre Patrik ve büyük papazları rahatsız edilmeyecek; genel hizmetler (vergi vb.)'den muaf tutulacaktır. Ayrıca kiliseleri de ellerinde kalacak yani camiye çevrilmeyerek, dîni âyinleri serbest olacaktır. Nikâh ve cenaze işleri, törenleri, eskisi gibi yapılacaktır. Patrik, vezir ile aynı derecede tutuluyordu. Kendisine, bir de "muhafız birliği" verilmişti.

"Din imtiyazları" denebilecek olan bu haklara, Fâtih'ten sonraki padişahlar zamanında da birtakım yenileri eklenmekle beraber, genellikle eskileri teyit edilmiş ve netleştirilmiştir.

– Kanunî Sultan Süleyman, Fransa Kralı F. François'un, Kudüs'teki bir kilisenin camiye çevrilmesi sebebiyle yazdığı rica mektubuna gönderdiği cevapta, önceki imtiyazların devam

edeceği belirtilmiştir.¹⁸

- Osmanlı Ülkesinde din hürriyeti, en geniş bir şekilde tanınmıştır ki, bu duruma tanık olan, Kânûnî'nin çağdaşı, Protestanlığın kurucusu *Luther* bile, muvakkat bir kadirşinaslıkla "*Türkler gelip de Almanya'da âdilâne idarelerini acaba kuramazlar mı?*" diyerek düşüncesini ve beslediği ümidi belirtmiştir.¹⁹

- Ayrıca, Avrupa devletlerindeki azınlıkların zor bir hayat sürdürdüklerini gören Volter (Voltaire) de, Türkiye'deki azınlıklar hakkında şunları yazmak zorunda kalmıştır: "*Küçük dünyamızdan çıkalım ve kıtanın kalan kısmını inceleyelim; Türkler, çeşitli dinlere mensup yirmi milleti huzur içinde yaşıyorlar. İstanbul'da iki yüz bin Rum güven içindedir. Türk tarihçileri, bu milletlerin hiçbirinin isyanından söz etmiyor. Demek oluyor ki, Osmanlı İdaresi, gayrimüslim unsurlara tam bir hürriyet ve adalet sağlamıştır.*"²⁰

- Devlet'in sağladığı tam hürriyet ve uyguladığı adalet sebebiyle gayrimüslimlerin ruhanileri ve bizzat kendileri Devlet'e şükranlarını sunmuşlardır. Meselâ, "Patrik-i İstanbul-ı Rûm ve Âsitâne'de mukim Cemâat Metropolitân" imza ve mühürünü taşıyan belge, bunlardan bir tanesidir.

Verilen örnekler ve insafılı Batılıların ifadelerinden, İslâm devletlerinin İslâm'ın buyruğu istikametinde, Müslüman olmayanlara karşı nasıl âlicenap, âdil ve müsamahalı davrandıkları açıkça görülmektedir.

- İspanya Kralı Ferdinant'ın, Yahudileri yok etmek istemesi üzerine Sultan II. Bâyezid, onu kınamış ve bir "kanun" çıkararak onları Türkiye'ye getirip kurtarmıştır.²¹

- Fatih'in 1463'te papazlar için gönderdiği fermanın bir cümle:

"Ben ki Sultan Mehmed Han'ım. Cümle avam ve havassa malûm ola ki, bana gelen Bosna ruhbanlarına mezid-i inayetim meydana gelip buyurdum ki, mezburlarına ve kiliselerine kimesne mani ve müzahim olmaya, ihtiyatsız memleketlerinde duralar. Ve kaçıp gidenler dahi emn u emânda olalar, gelip bizim hassa memleketimizde korkusuz sakın olup kiliselerinde mütemekkin olarak yüce hazretimden, vezirlerimden, kullarımdan, reayamdan, cemi memleketim halkından kimesne, mezburlara dahl ve taarruz edip incitmeyeler. Canlarına, mallarına, kiliselerine dahi yabandan hassa memleketimize âdem gelürler ise yemin-i muhallasa ederim ki, yeri göğü yaradan perverdigâr hakkı için, mushaf hakkı için, ulu Peygamberimiz hakkı için, 124 bin peygamberler hakkı için, kuşandığım kılıç hakkı için

¹⁸ Süreyya Şahin, *Fener Patrikhânesi ve Türkiye*, İst. 1980, s. 48.

¹⁹ Tarih, III, Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti, Yeni ve Yakın Zamanlarda Türk Tarihi, İst. 1931, s. 52.

²⁰ E. A. Murat, *Millî Işık*, Sy. 1, s. 31.

²¹ M. Süreyya Şahin, "Osmanlı Devleti'nin Hıristiyanlarla Münasebetleri", *Asrımızda Hıristiyan-Müslüman Münasebetleri*, İSAV, İst., 1993, s.111-120.

bu yazılanlara hiçbir ferd muhalefet etmeye..”

- Osmanlı Devletinin din hürriyeti konusunda gösterdiği önemli bir müsamaha misali: Sırp kralı Brankoviç'in Macar İmparatoru'na yazdığı "Osmanlı bizi güneyden, siz de kuzeyden sıkıştırıyorsunuz. Biz Hıristiyan olan sizlere itaat etmek istiyoruz. Acaba Ortodoks kiliseler konusunda nasıl bir muamelede bulunacaksınız?" sorusuna verilen cevap çok enteresandır: "Bütün Ortodoks Kiliseleri yıkılacak, yerine yeni kiliseler inşa edilecektir." Bunun üzerine aynı heyet Fatih Sultan Mehmed'e gönderilmiştir. Fatih'in cevabı şudur: "Herkes kendi Hâlikına, kendi mabedinde ibadet etmeye devam edecektir." Eğer bugün Kumkapı'da, özellikle Cumartesi ve Pazar günleri çan sesleri duyulurken, ikinci namazında Allahuekber sesleri yükseliyorsa, eğer Mihrimah Sultan Camii'nin hemen yanında kilise inşasına müsaade edilmişse, bu ruhun önemli bir tezahürüdür. Daha da enteresanını, yine Halil İnalcık'ın neşrettiği Arnavutluk Defteri gösteriyor. Osmanlı Devleti yeni fethettiği Rumeli'de Hıristiyan veya Yahudi vasıflı insanları en yüksek makamlara getirmekte hiçbir beis görmüyor. Gayrimüslimlere, Osmanlı Devleti'nde sadrazamlık, valilik, sancakbeylik, belli yerlerde kadılık ve devlet başkanlığı dışında bütün görevler verilmiştir.²²

Sonuç olarak: Osmanlılar, kendilerinden önceki Müslüman ve Türk devletleri gibi Müslüman olmayanlara karşı iyi niyetli ve toleranslı davranmışlar ve dinî değerlerine saygılı olmuşlardı. Osmanlı Devleti, idaresi altındaki Hıristiyanların dinlerini yaşamaları için onları koruma altına almıştı. Bu konuda Şer'iyye Sicilleri, Piskopos Mukataatı Kalemî Defterleri, gayrimüslim cemaatlere ait devlet defterleri ve en önemlisi Hıristiyan azınlıkların kendi özel arşiv belgeleri şahitlik yapmaktadır. Öyle ki Osmanlı Devleti, 22 değişik millet ve dinden oluşan etnik bir mozaik olarak, farklı dinlerden insanların birlikte yaşamayı başarabildikleri tarihteki en büyük Müslüman devlet tecrübesi olarak karşımızda bulunmaktadır. Günümüzde bile farklı iki dinden toplumun bir arada yaşamasının pek çok problemlere yol açtığı düşünülürse, bu kadar dinî veya etnik kimliği ve bu unsurların getirdiği sosyal ve kültürel yapıyı bir arada tutabilmeyi Osmanlı Devleti'nin engin hoşgörüsünde aramak lazımdır. Çünkü Osmanlılar, farklı dinî cemaatlerin işlerine müdahale etmemiş; onların din, dil ve milliyetlerini korumalarına, ekonomik ve sosyal hürriyetlere sahip olmalarına izin vermişlerdi.²³ Öyle ki Osmanlı Devleti'nin 16. yüzyılda dünya politikası üzerinde hâkimiyete ulaşmasından 19. yüzyıldaki dağılmasına kadar hem Müslüman hem de Müslüman olmayan vatandaşlarının birlikte barış içinde yaşadıkları bilinen bir tecrübedir. Osmanlılara türlü

²² Ahmet Akgündüz, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Barış ve Hoşgörünün Hukukî Temelleri", *Osmanlı'da Hoşgörü, Birlikte Yaşama Sanatı*, Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı yay., İstanbul, 2000, s. 64-73.

²³ Ziya Kazıcı, "Osmanlı Devletinde Dini Hoşgörü", *Kültürlerarası Diyalog Sempozyumu*, İstanbul 1998, 106-109.



iftiralar atan bazı Batılılar bile bu uzun döneme "Osmanlı Barışı" adını vermektedirler,

Medeniyetler Çatışması Ve Diyalog

Geçmişte olduğu gibi günümüzde de, gelecekle alakalı bir kısım tahminlerde bulunmaktadır. Geleceğin bilgi çağı olacağı iddiası da bunlardan biridir. Günümüzde geleceği tartışanlar, daha çok bazı fütüristlerdir. Böylesi tahminleri, 2000'li yılların kerameti olarak görenlerin sayısı da bir hayli fazladır. Tarihi çevrimler içinde gelecekle alakalı ileri sürülen iddialar, objektif değerlendirmelerden daha çok, bazı husûsî arzu ve istekler etrafında düşünce oluşturmaya yönelik bir gayret olup, herhangi bir ihtimalden öte bir değer ifade etmemektedir. Böylesi iddialar neticesinde insanlar, âdeta birer dua mahiyetinde beklentilere girmektedirler. Bu tür tahminler, "ileride böyle olacak" beklentisi içinde bir cehd ve gayret doğurmakta, derken bir hedef ve bir gaye-î hayal haline gelmektedir. Bir defa hedef belirlendikten sonra, bu hedefe ulaşmak için değişik strateji ve politikalar üretilecek ve o hedefe varmaya çalışılacaktır. Her hâlde, işin esprisi de bu olsa gerek.

Huntington'ın iddiası

Bu türden iddialarla, gelecekle alakalı gerçekçi değerlendirmelerden daha çok, dünya hakimiyetini elinde tutan güç adına yeni hedefler belirleme ve bu hedefler çerçevesinde kamuoyunu şartlandırma gayesinin güdüldüğü kanaatindeyiz. Sovyet bloğu dağılıncaya kadar, bir Doğu-Batı veya NATO-Varşova çatışması etrafında parçalanmış insanlığın düşüncesi, bu defa da yeni bir sun'î düşman üretilerek, din ve kültür farklılığı üzerinde bir medeniyetler çatışmasına hazırlanmakta ve böylece hâkim bloğun hâkimiyetinin devamı için yeni bir zemin oluşturulmaya çalışılmaktadır.

Aslında bugüne kadar çatışma, hep bazı güç merkezleri için arzu edilen bir şey olmuştur. Yani, sık sık var olduğu vehmedilen ve büyük bir tehlike gibi gösterilen hayali bir düşmana karşı kitleler alarma geçirilmiş ve bu şekilde yığınlar savaşın her çeşidine hazır hale getirilmişlerdir.

Aslında dünden bugüne ister Hz. Musa (a.s.) ve Hz. İsa (a.s.) ile, ister Hz. Muhammed (s.a.s.) ile temsil edilmiş bulunsun, Allah'ın razı olduğu hiçbir İlahî din, çatışma temeline oturmamıştır; oturmak şöyle dursun, bu dinler ve hususiyle de İslâm, yeryüzünde fitneye, fesada, çatışmaya, zulme ilan-ı harp etmiştir. İslâm sulh, güven ve esenlik demektir. Dolayısıyla, sulhun, emniyetin ve dünya barışının esas olduğu bir dinde, savaş ve çatışma gibi şeyler ârizîdir. Sağlam bir bünyeye musallat olan mikropları savmak için, bünyenin kendini savunması gibi bir tavır istisna edilecek olursa -ki bu da belli prensipler çerçevesinde cereyan etmektedir- o hep sulh ü salâh soluklamıştır. İslâm, savaşı insan

tabiatının yol açtığı tabii ve ârizî bir hâdise olarak ele almış, onu dengelemek için de kaideler koymuş ve onu sınırlamıştır. Meselâ, “*Bir topluluğa, bir millete olan kininiz, sizi adaletli davranmaktan alıkoymasın*” (Maide, 8) buyurarak, adaleti ve cihan sulhunu esas almış; modern hukuk sistemlerinin de kabul ettiği, dinin, canın, malın, neslin ve aklın korunması hususunda prensiplere dayalı bir müdafaa sathı oluşturmuştur. Buna karşılık Hıristiyanlık, ta baştan mücerret bir sevgi dini olma mülhazası içinde, bir insanlık realitesi olan savaş konusunda kaideler koymamakla. Batı’da dünya savaşlarının, yüzyıl savaşları gibi daha başka savaşların, Nagazaki ve Hiroşimaların meydana gelmesine mani olamadığı gibi, bunların çok fazla kanlı ve birer fecaat halinde tecelli etmesini de önleyememiştir. Evet, Batı tarihi, İslâm’ın ta başında Mute ve Yermuk’la başlayan, Haçlı seferlerinde ve onu takip eden süreçte devamlı İslâm’a karşı saldırılarla süren ve ayrıca kendi içinde âdeta bitmeyen savaşların tarihi olagelmıştır. Huntington ve benzerlerinin geleceğe bakış açıları da aynı mantalitenin ürünü olup aynı ruh haletini yansıtmaktadır.

Biz, Allah’ın lütuf ve keremiyle şimdilerde başlayan ve bir ölçüde bütün dünyaya yayılma istidadı gösteren hoşgörü ve diyalog esintilerinin devamı için elimizden geleni yapmaya çalışacak ve inşallah tahminçileri yalancı çıkaracağız. Zira biz inanıyoruz ki, bu meltemler, öldürücü silahları, mekânize birlikleri ve daha başka pek çok olumsuzlukları alt edecek güçtedir. Planı çok eskilere dayalı bu yepyeni mesajın toplumun her kesiminde ifade edilip sahneye konması, günümüzün muhabbet fedailerine İlahî bir iltifattır. Bu açıdan da diyoruz ki, hoşgörü ve diyalog, ülkemizde en iyi bir şekilde temsil edilmeli ve bu konuda mutlaka bütün dünyaya örnek olunmalıdır. Asya, Allah’ın inayet ve keremiyle bu hususta dirilirse, bütün bir dünyanın onun etrafında kümelenmesi hayal olmasa gerek. Bu da çatışma değil, temelde aynı değerler üzerine oturan İlahî dinlere mensup olanların, bu temeller etrafında bir araya gelmesine sebep olacak ve insanlık, kıyametten önce inşallah yeni ve kutlu bir bahar daha yaşayacaktır.

NETİCE

Kur’ân-ı Kerim âyetlerinin emrettiği, Peygamber Efendimiz (s.a.s.) ve O’ndan sonraki Müslümanların hayatlarında tatbik ettiği diğer din mensuplarıyla diyalog ve onlara karşı hoşgörü bugünkü Müslümanların da yapması gereken önemli bir iştir.

Diyalog görüşmeleri uzun vadeli çalışmalardır. Aceleci davranıp, ciddi bir şey elde edilmiyor, bir faydası yok diye hemen vazgeçilmemeli ve sabırla devam edilmelidir. Zira din mensuplarının ve hiçbir dine mensup olmayanların güçlerini, kavga ve düşmanlıkta harcayacaklarına, böyle müspet şeylerde harcamaları elbette ki daha faydalıdır.



Dinlerarası diyalog görüŖmeleri neticesinde, bize saygı gösteren diđer din mensuplarına karŖı, bize saygı gösterdikleri sebebiyle biz de onlara saygı gösterelim demek dođru deđildir. Çünkü biz Müslümanlar, dinimizin emri olarak herkese karŖı saygılı oluruz. Eđer biz, bugün, yarın herkese dinimizin geređi saygılı davranırsak, yarın veya daha sonrasında diđer din mensupları da bize karŖı saygılı davranmaya başlayacaktır. Böylece din mensupları arasında ve bütün dünyada barıŖ meydana gelecektir. Bundan da elbette ki, sadece dindarlar deđil, bütün dünya insanları istifade edeceklerdir.

Bu cümleden olarak Müslümanlar, muhatabı olan Hıristiyan, Yahudi ve diđer din mensuplarıyla, hatta ateistlerle bile diyaloga girmeli ve onlara sert davranmamalıdır. Mesela Ŗimdilerde, deđişik din mensupları, Müslümanlarla böyle bir temasa geçme çabası içindedir. Böyle bir çabada onların gerçek niyetleri ne olursa olsun, zâhirî durumdan hareketle dünya barıŖı adına bu fırsat mutlaka deđerlendirilmelidir. Tarihi hadiseleri, tarihsellik çukuru içine gömerek, hiç mevzubahis etmeden, onları kendilerini tarif ettiđi konumları içinde kabullenmek suretiyle, belki de tarih boyunca gerçekte olmayan ortak deđerler etrafında bir birleşme gerçekteşebilir. Yeter ki biz, bize düşeni, belli yol ve yöntem içinde yapabilelim.

Gelecekte uzaklar daha da yakın olacak ve dünya küreselleşerek, bir köy haline gelecektir. Dolayısıyla Hıristiyan, Yahudi, Budist ve ateist demeden her kesimden insanla münasebet kurmak ve onlarla bir diyalog ve anlaşma zemini aramak Ŗimdiden kaçınılmaz görünmektedir. Dinlerarası diyalogdan kaçınmak, dindarlara büyük bir vebal yükler. Siyasilerin, insanlığın geleceđini kana ve savaşa bođmak maksadıyla, diyaloga deđil savaşa ve çatıŖmaya yönelik, *medeniyetler çatıŖması* gibi teoriler ürettiđi bir ortamda, dindarlar, bugün çok zayıf bir ışık da olsa, fakat gelecekte aydınlığın ve barıŖın hakim olmasına yönelik bu tür çalıŖmalara destek vermelidirler. Eđer diyalogun alt yapısını hazırlamaz ve gereken önlemi almazlarsa, o zaman Huntington'un insanlığın geleceđi adına ürkütücü teorisi, meŖruluk kazanmış olur.

Diyalog, Müslümanlar için kaçırılmaması gereken bir fırsattır. Diđer din mensuplarını diyaloga iten sebepler, ister bazılarının söylediđi gibi siyasi, isterse bazılarının artık açık bir şekilde ifade ettikleri gibi misyon faaliyetinin bir parçası geređi olsun, Müslümanlar açısından bunun çok fazla bir önemi yoktur. Çünkü Batı, tarihin hiçbir döneminde (Müslümanlarla birlikte yaşamak zorunda kaldıđı Endülüs de dâhil), İslam'ı ve Müslümanları ön yargısız bir şekilde anlamaya çalışacağı bir ortama sahip olamamıştır. Öyleyse bu müspet havanın çok iyi deđerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir. Bazı olumlu müşahhas neticelerini gördüğümüz dinlerarası diyaloga, daha fazla vakit ayırıp, dünya barıŖını bir an önce gerçekteşirmek için çalışmalıyız.



Russians as Asiatics: the Memory About the Present

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While postmodernists have asserted that it is ideology that shapes the political reality and defines the nature of political alliances, the opposite is actually true. It is the political/geopolitical arrangements that shape the historical imagination and provide the ideological framework for actions. One could state here that the ideological trappings of historical logic, or, to be precise, the “pseudo-logic,” are actually the result of political pragmatism. The Europeans’ view—especially that of the French—of Russians in most of the 19th century could be a good example of this use of history. As would occur later, during Putin’s rule the Europeans would return to their early vision of Russia as not a European, but actually an Asiatic power. Asiatic is defined here in a sort of pejorative context as the symbol of despotism, brutality and aggressiveness. It discards the 18th century notion that the Russian elite had desperately tried to make Russia a true member of the European community, which was endowed with all possible positive characteristics.

In the 16th-17th centuries, the Europeans had finally discovered Russia, and their view of Russia was in many ways similar to what the West thought about the USSR during the Cold War, in fact, during most of Soviet history. The pundits, of course, I refer only to conservatives—for the Left, the USSR was a most democratic country—asserted that the USSR was a despotic regime, pretty much related to the regime’s bad historical genetics. It was asserted in this respect that nothing positive could emerge in a country that had had a thousand years of autocratic rule and had produced such monsters as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, both of whom wasted human life without further ado. The very fact that Stalin was fascinated with both of these chaps further proved that Russians—and at that time, most pundits did not distinguish between Russia and the USSR—could not escape their historical destiny to be ruled by tyrants to the end of time. While through the 16th-17th centuries, Europeans had presented Russia as invariably despotic and barbaric in all possible respects, the situation had changed by the time of Peter the Great’s reforms, when the Russian elite had started the long process, at least externally, of Westernization.

Throughout most of the 18th century nearly all of the members of the French, and one could say European, elite had approached Russia in many ways similar to what one could find throughout the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras (1985-2000), i.e., during the time of

Perestroika and the early post-Soviet period. It was asserted by that time that the Western political and social/economic model was universal; at least, definitely applicable to Russia, which had been seen as part of the West. It was just the Bolsheviks with their millenarian and totalitarian proclivities and, of course, insatiable drive for power and criminality that subverted these healthy trends in Russian life. And it was now, after a long and painful zigzag, that Russia had gotten back on the right track. Following this political contingency, Western pundits were busy revealing the democratic tradition deeply imbedded in Russian history and blasted the Bolsheviks for their millenarian utopianism and brutality that separated Russia from the democratic and market-oriented West. At the same time, since the beginning of the Putin tenure (2000–___), when Russia once again reasserted its position vis-à-vis the West and acquired distinct authoritarian features, the Western pundits have changed their vision of Russia and the country's past. Some Western pundits just pause to find an explanation for the reversal of the "natural" drive for liberty; others, however, quickly rediscover Russia's authoritarian past. To them, this explains not just Putin's penchant for authoritarianism but also his flirtation with the Chinese, the Iranians and similar authoritarian Asiatics, instead of reaffirming his commitment to be a part of the European community with its entrenched democracy and market. The situation here is quite similar to what one could find in the beginning of modern history.

In the 16th and 17th centuries Europeans had discovered that Russians were barbarians who lived under a despotic government. One could assume that in the eyes of the Europeans of that era Russians were even worse than Turks. The Turks, while also seen as brutal, despotic Asiatics, had at least a powerful military machine that Europeans envied. The Russians did not have even this, and for this reason were deeply despised. The dislike of Russia was related not just with the assertion of the European self-image—which had emerged by the beginning of the modern era—and the beginning of colonial expansion, where Europeans as a whole had confronted the rest of the globe, but also had other, internal implications. Indeed, in a way, the Russians as a whole were seen as the low masses of the European countries. European aristocracy and the emerging middle class regarded the European populace as dirty, promiscuous, lazy and obsessed with a love for strong liquor. While viewing Russians, in fact, all non-Europeans with contempt, the European elite pretended that they feared neither external barbarians (e.g., Russians) nor internal barbarians—the European masses. Indeed, the European elite believed that while brutish by their very nature, the Russians as a whole—similar to the European populace—could be easily suppressed/controlled by a "civilized," organized force of European elite.

By the 18th century, when Russia had engaged in a long process of at least external



Westernization, the view of Europeans had changed, at least for some of them. It was acknowledged now that while the Russian populace still lived in a state of barbarism, the Russian elite had been engaged in the hard labor of civilizing the Asiatic/barbarian masses. However, the reason for such a benevolent approach was not the external Westernization of the regime. As a matter of fact, the major aspect of Russian life was serfdom, which was distinctly non-Western, for this institution had almost completely disappeared in Western Europe by the 18th century. Serfdom not only had been preserved but also had expanded throughout the entire 18th century; and during all of this period, conditions of the Russian peasants worsened. Indeed, by the end of the 18th century the condition of the Russian peasantry was not much different from that of slaves. Thus, the position of Western observers toward Russia, often positive, or at least neutral, was due not so much to the external Westernization of the Russian elite and a façade of Russian statehood but was due to pragmatic geopolitical consideration. Not only was Russia not a threat to Europe as a whole but also was even helpful to some European states. The situation, however, had changed by the beginning of the 19th century. Russia had become a major force that had led to the Napoleonic collapse; or, in any case, Russia had emerged as a major military power in Europe, and, because of the nature of European global domination, the world. In fact, only England, with its strong navy was definitely out of reach of the armies of the tsar. And it was this rise of Russia in Europe that had led to the change in the Russian image. Russia was no longer a part of Europe, and its political alienation from Europe was immediately translated into civilizational alienation. Russia was thus once again relegated to Asia and received all the attributes of the nasty Asiatics—brutality, a penchant for despotism, etc., images harkening back to the 16th and 17th centuries. Still, these were new elements in Russia's image, the images of the Oriental powers in general. In this new interpretation, the Orient's political tradition, despotism and brutality were not just cultural/geo-cultural traits so to speak, e.g., the assumption that anyone outside of Europe should be brutal and despotic, but also racial characteristics. The Russians thus, as all Asiatics, were brutish beasts because of their biology; and it was this that made their acculturation impossible. Europeans could not transform Russians into Europeans in the same way as one could not transform monkeys into humans. The monkeys, of course, could be taught to perform various tricks and be dressed in human's clothes. Still, regardless of all of this, they remained beasts and could easily forsake their human-like actions. The same could be said of Russians. Their Westernization/ Europeanization was skin-deep; and the pundits had implicitly supported Napoleon's statement that one should look at Russians the better to find Tatars—e.g., brutal Asiatics under a European veneer.

There were other differences in the Russian image in the 16th and 17th centuries and that of the Russian image in the 18th century. In the imaginary picture of Russia in the 16th–17th centuries, Russians were disgusting Asiatics but of no match for the European military machine. The situation had changed by the beginning of the 19th century.

The Asiatics/Russians received not just the trappings of Western culture but also assimilated all the advantages of modern Western technology. And it was this that made them deadly dangerous for the West, especially if one would remember that the Russians had acquired ambitions for global predominance. While being brutal to all Europeans, Russians were especially so in dealing with those Europeans who were in the confinement of the borders of the Russian empire—the Poles.

These views of Russians had become circulated among travelers and social scientists with a sort of general interest and finally had become the framework for discussion among those who regarded the study of Russia as the focus of their scholarly interest or at least an important part of it.

It was the Marquis de Custin (1790–1857), whose book on Russia, composed on the basis of his travels to the country, that was the most important in this respect; and was what laid the foundation for the further works, especially those authored by the Frenchman. The works of Slavic scholars, especially Poles, who had grudges against Russians for centuries, provided West Europeans—mostly French scholars—with the argument that Russians were Asiatics who just pretended to be Europeans.

Schnitzler: the Early Follower

Jean-Henri Schnitzler (1802–1871) was among the first professional scholars who followed in Custin's footsteps and elaborated on Russia's non-European and, implicitly, its Asian nature early on, in the 1830s and 1840s. Schnitzler pointed out one could easily trace the non-European nature of Russians if one would look at the Russians' origin. Indeed, it was the region around the city of Suzdal¹ that became the nucleus of the Russian nation, and Schnitzler stated that the people around Suzdal were Finns who plainly had adopted Christianity and the Slavic language.¹

Following this vision of Russians as Finns, Schnitzler did not see Russians as

¹ Viquesnel, M. Augusté, *Coup d'Oeil Sur Quelques Points de l'Histoire Geneale die Peuples Slavs et de Leurs Voisins les Turcs et les Finnois*, Lyon Imprimerie et Lithographie de Pinier, 1865, p. 31.



Europeans,² and, therefore, foreign to the benign aspects of European civilization. For example, according to Schnitzler, the Russians' political culture had nothing to do with the European tradition of liberty, which could be found, for example, among the Germans. Schnitzler had pointed out that the Russian spirit was absolutely different from that of the German spirit, which was implicitly European and thus embedded in the idea of liberty. In sharp contrast to Germany, in fact to all Europeans, Russians were drenched in the spirit of "Asiatic despotism and communism."³ And the spirit of communism and Asiatic despotism, just as implied, had reinforced each other. The inability to hold on to their own was another Russian characteristic.

Schnitzler had supported Custine's vision of Russians as barbarians who were just regulated by power, and who would invariably lapse into brutal anarchy without the power of Oriental autocrats. As true Asiatics, Russians lacked any creative abilities and had no talent for developing a culture on their own.⁴ At the same time, the Russians did have a talent for imitation; this talent was used by Peter the Great. This imitating skill was not taken in account, as Schnitzler implied, by Europeans who could not believe that Asiatics with their intellectual dullness, absence of creativity, and debilitating oriental power could absorb the achievements of European civilizations. But the Russians under Peter had demonstrated that this was possible; and as a result they were able to create an immense empire that combined Europe and Asia.⁵

Later in his career, Schnitzler also elaborated on Russia's quest for the creation of a global empire and saw the building of a Pan-Slavic empire as an essential path to achieving world domination. Russia had already created the ideological justification for this by hammering on the idea of Pan-Slavism. Schnitzler pointed out that the idea of Pan-Slavism was, in many ways, the imitation of Pan-Hellnism and implied the unification of all under the aegis of the Russian tsar. The idea, however, Schnitzler pointed out, was Utopian.⁶

Pan-Slavism could not be regarded as a viable political design. Slavs could not live in

² Martin, Henri, *La Russie et l'Europe*, Paris: Furne, Jouvet et C, Libraires-Éditeurs, 1866 p. 126.

³ p. 128

⁴ Schnitzler, J.H., *Histoire Intime de le Russie Sous les Empereurs, Alexandre et Nicolas*, 2 vols. Paris: Jules Henouard, et Cie, 1847, 2, p. 44.

⁵ p. 35

⁶ Schnitzler, J. H., *De l'Unité Germanique on de Régénération de l'Alleman*. Paris/Strausbourg: Chez Treuttel et Wuatz, Chez Frederic-Charles Heitz, 1832, p. 397

one state. The unity of the Slavs could just be reduced to cultural similarities.⁷ At the same time, Schnitzler believed that the Russian elite had understood that the Slavs would never voluntarily band together with Russians and, for this reason, they used Pan-Slavic arguments more as an ideological propaganda ploy rather than as a tool of real politics. It was not an appeal to the common Slavic bond but force that the Russian tsar saw as the way to build up his Pan-Slavic empire and that led Russia to subjugate other nations, including Poland,⁸ with horrible brutality.⁹ Here, Schnitzler, of course, pointed to the Russians' brutal suppression of Poland in 1830–31 when the Poles rose up against Russian hegemony. Russians could suppress a Polish uprising, but they would never be able to make Poles obedient subjects of the tsar. Thus, Schnitzler supported the view of those Polish nationalists who regarded the unity of Poland and Russia as being impossible.¹⁰ Thus, he viewed Russia as essentially not just non-Western but actually as an anti-European, power. This has been elaborated on even more by a new generation of French historians who had published his works in the second half of the 19th century.

The New Realities and Russia's Image

The views of Russia, as, of course, all other countries, have been shaped by political reality. And here the situation was in many ways different for those French historians who started to publish on Russian subjects by the middle of the 19th century. They, as well as Schnitzler, who dabbled in Russian subjects in the first half of the 19th century, did not have much of a direct problem with Russia. It was clear that for these generations the memory of the Napoleons' wars with Russia were fresh, and veterans could easily depict to youngsters everything that was horrible that they had faced in Russia—from unimaginable cold to ferocious attacks by guerrillas and mounted non-European-looking cavalrymen.¹¹

Nicholas I was defined as the policeman of Europe, and the French were probably

⁷ Schnitzler, *Histoire Intime de le Russie Sous les Empereurs, Alexandre et Nicolas*, p. 402

⁸ Schnitzler, *De l-Units Germanique on de Régenésation de l-Alleman*, p. 8

⁹ p. 8

¹⁰ Schnitzler, *Histoire Intime de le Russie Sous les Empereurs, Alexandre et Nicolas*, p. 399

¹¹ (The Russians, of course, had their own groups of veterans who had conveyed their vision of the war to a young generation of Russians. They often, of course, proclaimed the glory of Russia's victory, one of the best examples could be the poems of Lermontov—the classic Russian poet,



aware of his intentions to intervene in their affairs during the 1830 Revolution. And, with their romantic imagination, they were probably terrified by the image of Delacroix's Liberty ravished by savage Russian Cossacks on the very barricade from which she called the people for final liberation. They were also aware of the poor Poles suffering under the boots of Russian autocracy. Still, they had no immediate contact with Russians, and their apprehensions about Russia were of a rather theoretical nature. Finally, their actual knowledge of Russia and, in fact, of the entire world outside of West Europe was extremely limited and almost anecdotal. The situation had changed by the second half of the 19th century. More or less abstract antipathy toward Russia had been replaced by real conflicts. In 1848, when the revolutions had swept across Europe, Russian troops had played an active role in putting the revolts down. Later, the coalition of power, with the French and British playing the leading role, had engaged in open war with Russia, known as the Crimean War. A new uprising in Poland also played quite an important role in the shaping of this image of Russians as Asiatic beasts. One could assume that the new Polish uprising had played an even more important role in maintaining the negative vision of Russia than did the Crimean War. Indeed, the Crimean War had been launched by Nicholas I, whom, the Marquis de Custin in his celebrated book,¹² had presented as a harsh authoritarian; but, in fact, despite his European veneer, Nicholas, and certainly the bureaucratic system that supported his power, was more Asiatic than European. His brutal suppression of the Polish uprising of 1830–31 was just another manifestation of the Russian regime's brutality and was almost to be expected.

The story with his successor, Alexander II, could have been different; at least, it could have been expected to be so. Indeed, Alexander had launched a variety of changes aimed at transforming Russian society in the most radical way since the time of Peter the Great. Both Alexander and Peter had engaged in the Westernization of Russian society. Still, the nature of Westernization was different. Peter, while creating a modern western-type army, navy and educational institutions, had dramatically increased the power of the state; and, in fact, after his reign, serfdom did not decline but started to proliferate.

The story with Alexander's Westernization was altogether different: Alexander was the first Russian ruler who had not increased by decree the power of the state. In the course of what was called, the Great Reforms, he had freed Russian serfs—the peasants who constituted the vast majority of the Russian population—and, mostly for these deeds,

¹² Marquis de Custine, *Empire of the Czar: A Journey Through Eternal Russia*, New York: Doubleday, 1989.

had gone down in Russian history as the tsar liberator, Europeans who watched this process—or, at best, could have concluded—that after suffering a humiliating defeat in the Crimean War, the Russians had understood that despotic Asiatism would hardly make them strong. And that they would be defeated in the same way as all other Asiatics who had never been able to stand against first-rate European powers. Having understood this, the weakened and more humble Russian tsar would try genuine Western-type reforms and more humane treatment of his subjects.

Alexander's brutal suppression of the Polish uprising—in a fashion that was hardly different from that of his father, Nicholas I—had confirmed to European observers that a change of reign and even more so an element of western-looking liberalization of the country's life—did not mean much. And Russia preserved not just a streak of what Europeans had regarded as Asiatic brutishness—of course, their own unsavory treatment of non-Europeans was conveniently overlooked—but also, and this was implied albeit not elaborated upon, had preserved its geopolitical vitality. Thus, even after a humiliating defeat, Russia constituted a danger for Europe as a whole.

The European powers' relationship with the Asian nations had also played a role in shaping the image of Russia and in placing it in a broad historical/geo-political context. On one hand the European global predominance was not challenged, and no Asian power could defeat Europeans in direct confrontation. This had led to the image of Asia, which Edward Said (1935–2003) called "Orientalism" in his seminal work. This was the image of the Orient, mostly Middle East, which corresponded with Europeans' feelings of domination over the non-European world.

In this vision the Orient was loaded with images of erotica and mystery; it was a source of pleasure and entertainment. Still, European dealings with Asia were not always smooth, at least from the European point of view. Asians had always resented European encroachments. And for these reasons, the image of Asia as a place of pleasure and mystery had co-existed with the older image of Asia and Asians. This image implied that Asians are a brutal and destructive force that would bring much harm to civilized Europe.

There is also another dimension of this negative image of Asia; it was related with the internal problems of European society, albeit European intellectuals did not always acknowledge this. The point is that the image of the revolution started to change in the minds of a considerable part of the middle class, and this change was related to the changes of the images of the masses. This new trend, of course, was just one among many; and, to be sure, it co-existed with the old one, which often saw revolution as a positive phenomenon and the people as a noble force that had the right to fight against



tyranny. The new image of revolution was related with the rise of the “fourth estate”—the urban proletariat that puts forward its own demands—and a rise in revolutions in which it openly opposed the middle class. This was the case in the 1848 Revolution in Paris. In this new reading, the noble free-loving people of romantic legend of the early 19th century have been transformed into a vicious mob. This image of the populace as dirty, drunk and promiscuous had, of course, a very long history. It could be traced to the beginning of the modern era, when the aristocracy, together with the middle class, started to undergo what Norbert Elias (1897–1990) called the civilizational process, i.e., accepting self-restraint in daily life. Still, there were substantial differences between the old, negative vision of the masses and the new negative images; the old implied that the masses were, of course, ugly and brutal but they were not much of an organized force. The new negative image implied that the masses were not just brutal and destructive but they could not be easily subdued. In this later image, the masses became “mobs,” not just unpleasant but also quite dangerous animals not easily tamed. And it was this negative image of the masses that became fused with the image of the dangerous Asiatics. And this image of dangerous Asiatics was fused with the image of Russia. Russia, in this context, became the embodiment of all the evils of Asia; and these evils were often mutually exclusive. Russia as Asia was the symbol of brutal despotism, which suppressed liberty in Europe—the drive of the Europe middle classes—and maintaining intact multi-national empires such as Austria-Hungary. It was Russian Asiatic despotism that had prevented the European proletariat from rising, and this was the reason why Marx directed numerous invectives against not just Russian czarism but Russia in general. These statements of the supposed founder of “proletariat internationalism” and the father of the famous slogan, “the proletariat of all countries, unite!” was so anti-Russian and, in fact, openly racist that Soviet scholars have tried to avoid these passages. And, of course, Nazis in the future would quote them with special enthusiasm. While Russia had emerged as the symbol of Asiatic despotism, it had another, negative, side opposite to the previous one: it manifested destructive Asiatic anarchy, the unruly behavior of the Asiatic beast. Thus, all of these aspects of internationalism and external European developments shaped European and French scholars’ vision of Russia as a non-European and dangerous Asiatic force. There were other aspects of this approach to Russia: by the middle of the 19th century, European pundits could employ an emerging racism framed in the context of the developed studies of non-European civilization. The French intellectuals could also appeal to the authority of Polish pundits who more than anybody else were anxious to help Frenchmen—actually all Europeans—to develop the notion that Russia was not just a danger for Poland but for all

of Europe.

The View of Professional Historians: Augusté Viquesnel

Auguste Viquesnel (1800–1867) was one of the French scholars, a specialist on the Ottoman Empire, who could be a good example of the new generation of scholars who looked at Russia as a solidly Asian power and who related all the problems of Russia with the country's Asiatic nature. The major framework of his view of Russians was the assumption that Russians were not Slavs but people close to Turks¹³ and could well have the blood of other Asiatics such as the Chinese and others¹⁴

And it was these Asiatic roots of Russian ethnicity/culture that was the very reason for the Russians' problems. Elaborating on these assumptions, Viquesnel pointed out that "Moscovites had nothing to do with Europe and belong to Asia."¹⁵ Consequently, the idea of Russia belonging to Europe should be dismissed, and the geographical and cultural/racial definition of Europe should be reconsidered. In connection with this, Viquesnel stated that Europe was defined by Martin both as a geographical and ethnographical entity, but it was wrong to assume that Europe ended at the Urals. And Viquesnel fully supported Martin's assumption that Europe actually ended along the Dnepr.¹⁶

Elaborating on Russia's Asiatic position, Viquesnel stated that this notion of being Asiatic was not pleasing for Russians, and they discarded the notion of being Asiatics and pointed out that it was their attachment to Christianity that attested to their belonging to European civilization. Still, their attachment to Christianity could be questioned, for they had 200 various sects and, as Viquesnel implied, the very "Christianity" of these sects could well be questioned.¹⁷

While Russians could well be displeased by their relegation to Asia, Viquesnel pointed out that his views on Russia should not be seen as an exception and that they were in accord with the views of the other savants. He especially praised Duchinksi, the Pole, as one of the most important scholars who revealed the Asiatic nature of Russians.

¹³ Viquesnel, M. Augusté, *Coup d'Oeil Sur Quelques Points de l'Histoire Geneale die Peuples Slavs et de Leurs Voisins les Tures et les Finnois*, Lyon Imprimerie et Lithographie de Pinier, 1865, p. 1.

¹⁴ p. 84

¹⁵ p. 85

¹⁶ p. 85

¹⁷ p. 35



Franciszek Duchinski was certainly not the only one, Viquesnel believed, who understood the nature of Russian ethnicity and political culture; and Viquesnel quoted a variety of pundits who supported his view that Russians were not actually a Slavic people.¹⁸ Thus, Viquesnel implied, he just followed and elaborated on what had been discovered by others, Duchinski first of all.

Elaborating on the Russian's Asiatic nature, Viquesnel stated that one could not understand that Russia belonged to Asia unless one would look at Russian history and explore it from the very beginning. Following Duchinski's outline of Russian history, Viquesnel discarded the idea that the Kievan state had anything to do with Russia. The Kievan state was Slavic by its nature, but there was no relationship between it and the Russian state in the future.

Viquesnel regarded Vladimir Dolgorukii as the founder of the Russian state, and a close analysis of this state would reveal its non-Slavic and, therefore, non-European origin. To start with, the territory that he controlled was a territory occupied not by Slavs but by Turkic and Finnish people who professed Islam and Judaism. The very name "Moscow" is not of Slavic origin (this has been proven by Russian savants). A close look at Dolgorukii's dynastic lineage also revealed that even the elite of the early Russian state had nothing to do with Slavs and Europeans in general. It is clear from Viquesnel's perspective that the dynasty that had created the principality around Moscow should not be related with the dynasty of Kievan princes at all or had experienced a strong infusion of Asiatic blood. Dolgorukii's name revealed that he had been connected with "Khitani" whom Viquesnel related with Polovtsy and the Chinese. And, Viquesnel believed, it was these Asiatic roots of the earlier Russian rulers that had strongly influenced his political behavior. He became quite autocratic. Elaborating on the actual Asiatic roots of Russian statehood, and, therefore, not the European nature of the Vladimir-Suzdal' principality, Viquesnel had appealed to the views of those specialists on Russia who discarded the notion that Russia's origin could be found in Europe. It was the Asiatic ethnicity and the despotic political culture that had been derived from this ethnicity that implied the way that the later Russia had been created upon the rise of Moscow, the legitimate heir, as Viquesnel suggested, of the Vladimir-Suzdal' principality. The widespread notion among Russian historians who studied the rise of Moscow was the idea that Moscow had been a "unified" Russian state. This process of unification is usually related to the 14th-15th centuries when Moscow had been able to forge a unified state out of many Russian principalities.

¹⁸ p. 76

The word “unification” implies voluntarism or at least natural gravitation of the other Russian states to Moscow. This notion of almost voluntary union has been discarded. In Viquessel’s view, there was actually no unification of Russia. Moscow had conquered various Russian principalities.¹⁹ Force was clearly in the foundation of the Asiatic Russian state. Still, this Asiatic principle of unification, e.g., the principle based not on the free unity of people but the domination one political center over others—did not lead, as Viquessel implied, to too much resentment among the majority of the subject of Russian rulers. The point here is that most of the people who lived in Russia were not actually Slavic people.²⁰ It was thought here that these people were Asiatic Turanians who accepted despotism as the normal way of ruling. Thus, a unified Russia, as Viquessel believed, was not so much European but Asiatic.

The future expansion of Moscow’s realm was also much facilitated by the fact that the Russian neighbors were also often non-Europeans who could easily accept Russian conquest for a variety of reasons. First, they accepted violence/conquest as the normal way of political interaction. Secondly, they did not resist too much because they found in the Russians their Asiatic kin. As a result of these conquests, Russia as a great Asiatic empire was formed. This demonstrated the possibility of the creation of great alliances/empires that included a variety of people who shared similar racial/cultural origins. These grand empires of Turanians, unified by despotic governments, it was implied, had created problems for Aryan Europeans.

Indeed, the threat from the Asiatic hordes was a constant problem. And Viquessel proclaimed that “Cossacks, Tatars and Mongols are eternal enemies of our race.”²¹ Europeans, while engaged in political arrangements and international alliances always take into account that primordial threat to Europe came from the East. And it was this that had shaped the nature of many European alliances early on. The fear of Mongols/Tatars and Kipchaks (Cumans or Polovtsy) drove the Slavs of Kievan Russia, as well as the Lithuanians, to create a volunteer union with the Poles. From Viquessel’s view, it was the Mongol invasions that were the most serious threat for Europeans; and he placed the Mongol onslaught in the context of his general vision of global history, particularly the relationship between Russia and the rest of Europe. Elaborating on the Mongol invasions, Viquessel implicitly attacked the Russian interpretation of events. In this interpretation,

¹⁹ p. 32

²⁰ p. 33

²¹ p. 83



Mongols were brutal Asiatic hordes that attacked Russia, seen here as an essentially European nation. Moreover, in this interpretation, it was Russia that shielded Europe from the Mongols and sacrificed itself to make it possible for Europeans to flourish. Alexander Pushkin, Russian seminal poet, saw events from this perspective. Viquesnel had discarded this theory. In his view, the Mongols were definitely an Asiatic menace for Europe, but actually not, for Russians, Russians had actually fused themselves with the Mongols,²² and actually became part of the Mongols who fell upon Europe. This fear of Asiatics from the East had been a powerful shaper of European politics in the past and, now, also in the present. In the past, Europeans formed powerful alliances and started the trend for unification of Europe, the only efficient way to save themselves from the Asiatic menace. The same trend, Viquesnel insisted, should speed up at present and should require a truly all-European dimension for the threat from present-day Asian colossuses is much greater than it had been from the Mongols. Indeed, while the Mongols were simple Asiatics, Russians were Asiatics with modern technology, as he implied, and this is what made them especially dangerous. And while the creation of a united Europe could stand against the Russian threat, it was absolutely essential for Europe's very survival to forge one grand alliance, or to be precise, one state—which would be something that Europeans could not do. As a matter of fact, this union could be easy, for all Europeans shared common racial and cultural roots. Indeed, Viquesnel emphasized that Martin pointed out that Europeans belonged to the Aryan race and should finally create a great pan-European confederation. He said, that while this model "is not Utopia," it is the logical consequence of European development. Elaborating on the great push to unity, he pointed to the USA where many different people were unified. And, while the analogy with the USA was appropriate, he implicitly discarded the notion that this alliance should have anything in common with a "Holy Alliance" in which Russia would play the leading role. One could assume that the logic here was as follows: the people who compose the USA, those, who had merged in a new nation of Americans, were all of European extraction. All of them had belonged to similar racial stock; and this would make their assimilation in the melting pot natural. The situation with a "Holy Alliance," as was clearly implied, was altogether different. Here Europeans would be in alliance with racial foreign entities—Russians; and the amalgamation of these groups—Aryan-Europeans and Asiatic Russians—was impossible. Moreover, even their peaceful coexistence was out of the question; and a collision between Europeans and Asiatic Russians was almost inevitable as a conflict between the

²² p. 32

races/species. And while Viquessel, who had explicitly framed the conflict between Russia and Europe in the context of racial theories, it was Henri Martin who had developed this theory to its almost logical end.

Henri Martin: Russians and Europeans as Battle of the Races

Henri Martin was probably the most important among all described intellectuals, and for several reasons. It was not just that he was the well-known author of many books on various subjects of European/French history, but for other reasons. First, he had stayed on top of the pyramid of scholarly or quasi-scholarly investigations. He could easily build what one could describe as a sort of defense line and also easily support/justify his statements for reference to his peers of both the West and East Europeans. Secondly, he, maybe more than anybody else, could frame his views in the context of racial theories, which became increasingly popular in France and, in fact, throughout Europe. While quite a few Europeans—both West and East—entertained the notion that Russians were nothing but Asiatics and had nothing to do with European civilization, it was Henri Martin who seemed to be mostly responsible for the popularity of such views in the wake of the Crimean War and a new Polish uprising.

The Importance of Race

Similar to Duchinski, scores of French and other Europeans believed that Russians were a race that had ultimately defined the nature of the nation's history. It was race that primarily shaped the course of national history; national characteristics had played the secondary role in the process.²³

As one of a score of scholars who studied the problems of race, Martin did not approach race from the position common in present-day American academies and, in fact, in most Western academies, where race is usually connected with the color of one's skin. For him and the majority of other Europeans who were interested in these problems—including those who actually could be regarded as the fathers of racism (e.g. Arthur Gobineau (1816–1882) skin color was not of great importance. The definition of race was

²³ Martin, Henri, *La Russie et l'Europe*, Paris: Furne, Jouvet et C, Libraires-Editeurs, 1866, p. 2



much broader; and people with the same skin color—e.g., white/Caucasians, actually belonged to different races, which defined the course of their history, and, consequently, of global history.

Similar to many European racists in the future—German National-Socialists were, of course the best example—Martin had paid great attention to facial features, which, besides the color of the skin, clearly distinguish one racial group from another. For Martin, the different facial characteristics of the various nations, actually, races, did not just imply that the nations were different. The facial features are indicative of the race to which the individual belongs—have actually defined one's position in the hierarchical order of the human species. And keeping this idea in mind, Martin had approached those nations/races that had interested him most. While there are many races in humanity, it was the Aryans and Turanians that attracted Martin's attention most of all. In his view, it was the conflict between Aryans and Turanians that defined the nature of human history.

Most, if not all, Europeans are Aryans. Aryans, in Martin's view, are definitely superior members of the human race, and they are endowed with a variety of positive attributes. The Aryans are a creative people²⁴ who are responsible for the building of European society, which became the beacon for the rest of humanity. The European society rested upon personal liberty, family and property and, of course, respect for the law, he concluded.²⁵ At the same time, Asians seemed to be placed at the bottom of the racial hierarchical ladder. The Turanians were a people of intermediate position; and he placed them between Aryans and Chinese and the people of Indo-China. In his view, Turanians were close to the Chinese in their social systems and values.²⁶ In fact, Turanians were Caucasian-looking Asiatics who, while having the artificial external appearance of Caucasian-Aryans, were almost Asian in their essence.²⁷ Or, at least they had much more in common with Asiatics than with Europeans. Still, with all of their closeness to Asiatics, Turanians were not 100 percent Asiatic and had an intermediary position in the pecking order of the races. While the pure Asiatics, and implicitly Blacks, had no positive characteristics and became a clear wasteland of the historical process, the story was different with Turanians; they had some positive faculties and made a contribution to

²⁴ p. 10.

²⁵ p. 1

²⁶ p. 9

²⁷ p. 98

global history. For example, Turanians had a penchant for religion²⁸ and had been quite creative in this area. Still, despite some positive characteristics, Turanians had actually quite negative features, which made their overall contributions in world history questionable. The most important difference was the Turanians' penchant for arbitrary despotism, which had led to their confrontation with Aryans.

Martin acknowledged that Europeans had not always been ruled by democratic governments throughout their history. Europeans had also experienced rule by one man, but European Caesarism had never become the rule of absolute arbitrariness²⁹ as was the case with Turanian/Asiatic despotism, which required "absolute submission." It was thus implied that the rule of Caesar and Napoleon had still provided their subjects with a sort of autonomy and with rights, whereas in the case of Turanians/Asiatics such an arrangement did not exist and a person here was nothing but a slave of the ruler. It was also suggested here that the Turanians' racial characteristics denoted aggressiveness, brutality and drive for global predominance. And, consequently, this also led to inevitable conflict between Turanians and Europeans; the geopolitical/political conflict was here actually nothing but racial/biological and could not be resolved by negotiation. Despotic as they were, Turanians were able to build a grand empire founded on global conquest. With a talent for building a military machine, as a sort of compensation for the Turanians' lack of any real creative abilities, they had created a mortal threat for Europeans since the dawn of European history. And it was these Turanians who had finally created the most powerful empire—the Russian Empire.³⁰

Russians as Turanians

The very fact that the Russians were not Slavs—the benevolent branch of Aryan people—was Martin's unshakeable axiom. Elaborating on his view that Russians actually were not Slavs, Martin pointed out that he was hardly the only one who espoused this sort of theory. This view of Russians was supported, Martin insisted, by leading Slavic scholars,³¹ such as Pavel Schafarik, (1795–1861)³² and Duchinski³³

²⁸ p. 1

²⁹ p. 133

³⁰ Martin, Henri, *La Russie et l'Europe*, p. 9



European savants in general and French in particular also had no doubt that Russians did not belong to Slavs and, therefore, Europeans. In fact, the view that Russians were not actually Slavs was widespread among the pundits in Austria and France.³¹ It was the French who had elaborated on this in detail. For example, Martin stated that M. Auguste Viquesnel, a specialist on the Ottoman Empire, had come to the conclusion similar to that of Duchinski, i.e. that Russians were more close to Turkic people than to Slavs.³² Other scholars supported this idea.³³ And it was this belonging to Asiatic /Turanian stock that predestined their historical development and their relationship with neighboring European nations. Russian “spirit” was absolutely different from that of Aryans. Russians had no sense of personality. Logically, Russia was a society without personal liberties and was based on arbitrariness,³⁴ which provided the opportunity for a despotic ruler to create the great Turanian Empire, which was a greater threat to Aryan Europeans more than any other empire. This mortal threat for Europeans, actually for the entire global community, was not an invention, as Martin believed.

In order to understand the nature of the Russian threat and substantiate his assumption that Russians were not Slavs–Aryans but Turanians, who constituted a mortal threat to Europe, Martin had turned to history. And here he had followed in the footsteps of other similar-minded scholars of Russia from East and West Europe.

Russians as Turanians: Historical Roots

The point of Martin's views of Russians was that they had never been a Slavic people but actually had been a Turanian folk, absolutely different from European. And Martin believed one could easily reveal this Turanian core of Russian civilization if one would look closely at the very beginning of the country's history. Following the view of other specialists in Russia, Martin had discarded the notion that Kievan Russia had anything to do with Russian history or that Kiev could be seen as a Russian city.

³¹ p. 117

³² p. 119

³³ p. 123

³⁴ p. 120

³⁵ pp. 120–121

³⁶ p. 100

Yuri Dolgorukii was the founder of Moscow, and this event could be seen as the actual beginning of Russian history. Dolgorukii did not rule over Slavs; his state was nothing but a state of "Russo-Finns."³⁸ Still, Martin assumed that the fact that Russians were non-Slavic, actually not the European natives of Dolgorukii's realm, did not preclude a tiny elite of being of Slavic or Scandinavian origin. At least one could assume that Martin implied this. Dolgorukii did not just collect tribute from the conquered tribes but also spread new religious beliefs; and it was him who spread "Christianity among the Finns."³⁹ Christianity could not spread without the Slavic language, and this was the reason why the Slavic language had spread among the Finnish tribes of Dolgorukii's realm."⁴⁰

This artificial "Slavonization" and, therefore, "Europeanization," manifested in the Russians' acceptance of the Slavic language and Christianity, did not make them Slavs and Europeans. And, therefore, this did not instill them with love for liberty, which was essentially a characteristic of Europeans. And here, Martin pointed out, it was not just his assumption but was shared by other savants. Schnitzler's view could here be seen as an example.

It was from that time on, Martin believed, that the peculiar nature of Russians had been shaped. Externally, they looked like Slavs—because of their Christianity and Slavic language—and, therefore, could be taken for European. Yet they were not European by their very nature and *were* Asians, or at least they were much closer to Asians than to Europeans.

The Mongol invasion in the 13th century thus did not constitute a break with the past but actually the reinforcement of the old Asiatic-Turanian tradition. There was actually only one novelty that the Mongols had brought to Russia: Mongols had made Russians more aggressive; and, after being "Mongolized," Russians had adopted the Mongol dream of creating a worldwide empire.⁴¹ Upon liberation from Mongol rule, the Russian elite had proceeded in the context of the model that they had shaped long before. At the same time, while preserving their Asiatic nature, they acquired the trappings of European civilization and its material achievements. It was this combination of Asiatic ruthlessness, Mongolian drive for global conquest and the desire to acquire the material achievements of European

³⁷ p. 1

³⁸ p. 291

³⁹ p. 29.

⁴⁰ p. 50.

⁴¹ pp. 104-105.



civilization that had actually made Russians so dangerous for Europe, actually for the entire world.

While the Russians' attempt to appeal to the cultural/material achievements of European civilization had started early on, it was only in the 16th century when it had begun in earnest. Since the time of Ivan the Terrible, the Russian state had tried to adopt and use the material achievements of European civilization. This attempt culminated in the reforms of Peter the first.⁴² Peter I had replaced the huge, bureaucratic machinery of Ivan with scientific and military copies of the West, which had been implemented with the rigorous logic of despotism.⁴³ And it was since his rule that Russia had become the true and major menace of European civilizations. In this capacity, Russians became the true successors of the Turanian/Asiatic threat that had created problems for Europeans since the dawn of European history. And, in fact, Martin had insisted that the Russian empire was more dangerous to Europe than any Asiatic empires of the past.

Russians were different from other Asiatics of the past, who could not combine modern technology with ruthless determination and one-man will. The acceleration of the acquisition of modern technology for global conquest had been started by Peter the Great who had acquired modern technology and other achievements of the West to establish Russia's global domination, and Peter elaborated on these plans in his testament.⁴⁴ Peter had set in motion quite a dangerous plan, and it threatened not just continental Europe but even such maritime empires as England. Indeed, Russia's drive to dominate the world would leave no room for other empires. In their drive to global conquest, Russians poised to conquer India, and this certainly alarmed the British,⁴⁵ who remember well that plans to invade India had been entertained already by Peter the Great.⁴⁶ This plan for global conquest designed by Peter had been executed by those rulers who had followed him and had been accelerated even more by the late 19th century. At that time, the Russian quest for global domination had been manifested among other things in the drive to conquer Central Asia and Constantinople.⁴⁷

In its drive for global predominance, Russia wished to be the empire that actually would be not one but several empires combined. It wanted to be "Pan-Turanian," which

⁴² p. 67.

⁴³ p. 70.

⁴⁴ pp. 74–76.

⁴⁵ p. 252

⁴⁶ p. 252

implied domination over Asia, a “Pan Slavic” empire that would have domination over Asia, and a Pan-Greek-Slavic empire that would have domination over the West.⁴⁸

The Defense of Europe

While Russia had a sort of aggregate force of Asiatic despotism, which aimed for world domination, Europe had also acquired cohesiveness and stamina that made it possible for Europeans to defend themselves from the Asiatics/Russians. And here two countries stood as the leaders of European civilization: France and Poland.

According to Martin, Europe acquired the sense of a common identity at the dawn of history. This formation of a common identity had started early on when Europeans had formed a “Christian republic” against a Muslim invasion.⁴⁹ It was largely formed by the Renaissance rulers and later by the political activities of such great leaders as Richelieu and Henry the IV. In fact, it was France that became the leader of the Europeans. France had acquired this leading position because its leader understood, as Martin implied, that all nations of Europe should be independent and Europeans could maintain their civilizational unity only through and by preserving the political individuality of each European nation. This was not understood by Austria, which wanted to subject Europeans to its rule. As Martin implied, Austria had actually followed in Russia's footsteps and was a traitor to Europeans. It was the defense of Europeans against Austrian encroachment that made France the acknowledged leader of the European community. While the Austrians could not have been regarded as reliable partners in the fighting against Asiatic Russians, this job could be done by the British. And Martin pointed out here that France and England should be together to stop Russia's encroachments.⁵⁰ And here he, of course, evoked the memory of the Crimean War when the British and French were allies in fighting Russia. While the alliance with Britain was important to defend Europe, it was the Slavs, especially the Poles, who, besides the French, became the most valiant defenders of European civilization from the Russian-Asiatic onslaught.

⁴⁷ p. 251

⁴⁸ p. 79

⁴⁹ p. 2

⁵⁰ p. 253



The Role of Poland

The primordial racially/biologically-based conflict between Russians/Turanians (actually Caucasian-looking Asiatics) and Aryan-Europeans explained the reason for the conflict between Russians and European, especially the Poles. Slavs are European people, and they enjoyed the characteristics of these Europeans. They were characterized by individualism, desire for progress, drive for democracy⁵¹ and loved liberty.⁵² And they are the ones who had laid the foundation of a democratic, freedom-loving European/Aryan state in East Europe. Not only Poles and other Slavic nations of the region were important because they were a beacon for liberty in the area but for more important reasons. It was these people who were on the eastern edge of European civilization, and it was them who, since the dawn of European history, had been the first who had faced an onslaught from the Asiatic East.

The Poles were close to Europe, an integral part of Europe, because of their special service to Europe. According to Martin, Poland was the most Eastern among all European nations. This could easily be understood if one would remember that Martin believed it was the Poles who had built Kievan Russia.

Russia claims that it was Kievan Russia that was the beginning of Russian history. In fact, Russians had nothing to do with the Kievan state. It was the Poles who had been the founders of Kiev.⁵³ While Kievan Russia was one of the best examples of a Slavic-Aryan state that had emerged on the eastern edge of Europe, it was not the only one.

Slavs, and, therefore, Aryan Europeans, were also responsible for the creation of the state in the north of present-day Russia. Indeed, Slavs had not only populated the Dnepr River but also the region near Valdai, Volkhov and Ladoga,⁵⁴ where they also created states with Novgorod and Pskov as their center. All of them had looked on the Polish states of the south and southwest as their natural allies. And in the North, the Slavic Republics of Novgorod and Pskov had recognized the supremacy of Lithuanians.⁵⁵

The Kievan state was just one among Polish states that had emerged in the dawn of European history. And—with due importance to the Kievan state—it was Poland that

⁵¹ p. 97.

⁵² p. 97

⁵³ p. 25.

⁵⁴ p. 99

⁵⁵ p. 39.

emerged in the early modern era as the major state of Polish people and the major bulwark of European civilization on the East. And in manifestation of their fine European qualities, the Poles were quite different from their eastern neighbors and future masters—the Russians.

Elaborating on the Poles' national character, Martin pointed out that Poles were genuine European people with a genuine love for individual liberty.⁵⁶ The Polish soul was a Slavic soul, and for this reason it could not stand the despotism of Moscow. This attachment to liberty had manifested itself in the principle "*liberum veto*" which had developed this principle to the extreme.⁵⁷

It was not just the feudal liberties of the elite that made the Poles quite different from the Russian elite, the virtual slaves of the Russian tsar. The position of Polish peasants, the majority of the population, was absolutely different. Serfdom, at least what one could find in Russia, had never existed in Poland. The peasants in Poland were mostly free and proprietors. The European, freedom-loving nature of Poles made their peaceful coexistence with Asiatics from the East impossible. And at the same time, the Poles, while fighting against tyrannical forces from the East, had played a great role for Europe: it was the Poles and other Eastern Slavs who were the first who took the heaviest brunt of invasion from the Asiatic East. Poland actually protected Europe from invasion from the East, whether it was Mongols, Turks or Russians.⁵⁸

Poles had started their heroic feat of protecting Europeans from the Turanic-Asiatic threat early on. It was Slavic Poles who had defended Europe from the Mongol horde in the 13th century. According to Martin, the Galicians had rendered them courageous resistance.⁵⁹ After the conflict with the Mongols, the Poles had engaged in a century-long conflict with other Turanians-Russians. This conflict was inevitable because of the bio-social/political incompatibility of Polish-Aryans and Turanian-Russians; it was not just an episode in European history but the central part of it.⁶⁰ And the centrality of the Polish experience for the entire European history lay not just in the fact that Poles had demonstrated that freedom-loving Europeans could render the heroic resistance to much stronger Asiatic force. But it was also because Poles and other Slavic Aryans of East

⁵⁶ p. 111.

⁵⁷ p. 53.

⁵⁸ p. 121.

⁵⁹ p. 57.

⁶⁰ p. 111.



Europe had provided the example of broad geopolitical thinking. Indeed, as Martin implied, it was the Poles who demonstrated to the Europeans early on that individual European countries would not be able to stand alone against Asiatic monsters such as the Mongol Empire or its successor, the Russian Empire. European nations should be united to stand against the threat, and Poland had shown the example early on. By the 16th century, Poland and Lithuania had feared Russia's encroachment and had been united to defend their independence.⁶¹

In the 17th century, the conflict between freedom-loving Poles and Russians, drenched in the culture of despotism, had resumed with even greater intensity. And from this position, Martin approached the struggle for Ukraine. Ukraine had been a part of the *Rechi Pospolitna* until the middle of the 17th century, and it was the Bogdan Khmel'nitskii uprising that had marked the beginning of the crumbling of Polish control over mostly Orthodox Ukrainians. The uprising was a combination of religious, ethnic, political and social protest for most Ukrainian peasants were Orthodox, whereas their landlords were often Catholic Poles. The uprising was also enmeshed in horrific anti-Jewish pogroms.

While Khmel'nitsky most likely had entertained dreams of creating an independent Ukrainian state, it seems that he soon understood that he alone would not be able to beat the Poles, and he swore allegiance to the Russian tsars, the Orthodox rulers. Upon accepting Ukraine under the aegis of the tsar, Russia had entered the war and was finally able to beat the Poles. And at least one part of Ukraine became part of the Russian Commonwealth. The event has had, of course, different interpretations by historians. Russian historians, pre-revolution and Soviet, invariably saw in Ukraine the incorporation in Russia the marriage/fusion of two brotherly Slavic people, ethnically, culturally, and religiously close to each other. Ukrainian nationalist-minded historians have seen the event from a different point of view. There was no free unification of Ukraine with Russia; force and deception were implicitly used to incorporate Ukraine into the Russian empire. Martin has brought his own interpretation of events. The problem for Martin was the fact that he regarded Ukrainians as Slavs and, therefore, ethnic/racial kin to Poles but not to Asiatic Russians. And here he needs to explain why Ukrainians, in the majority, were on the side of Russians rather than Poles. Martin had found a convenient explanation of this. According to Martin, Cossacks were not Slavic but rather people with Turkic blood.⁶² Thus they were more close to Russians, and this explains why the Cossacks had joined Russians

⁶¹ p. 49

⁶² , p. 111.

in fighting against Aryans—both Poles and Ukrainians. Thus, Cossacks were racial-cultural kin of Russians and Mongols, and the fighting for Ukraine was actually the continuation of the centuries-old struggle of the Europeans-Aryans and Asiatic Turanian hordes. Russians-Turanians had finally succeeded in defeating the Poles. Finally, by the 18th century, Poland was not just defeated but partitioned, with most of Poland absorbed, as Martin implied, by Russians. Freedom-loving Poles could not reconcile themselves with being enslaved by Asiatic Russians and rose endlessly against their masters. Still, they were not able to stand against the Russians, and the Russians had suppressed the Polish uprising with the ruthlessness of Tatars.⁶³

This was done, as Martin implied, because the rest of Europe had not defended the Poles from Russian encroachment; and this brutal treatment of Poles has lasted up to the present. This image of Russians as the Asiatic horde against which Europeans should be united—and led, of course, by France—had persisted in French thought for most of the 19th century. But by the end of the century, it had started to crumble. The major strike, of course, was inflicted in the battle when the Prussians had delivered a humiliating defeat to the cockish French. A unified Germany emerged as the major threat to France for coming generations, and the idea of an all-European alliance against Russia had disappeared from the minds of not just French but seemingly to the majority of European politicians. By the end of the 19th century, France had embraced Russia in alliance; and by that time, all discussions about Russians as “unholy Asiatics” against whom France should protect Europe had ceased.

As WWI struck, it was the Germans who were dubbed “Huns”—the Asiatics who somehow emerged in the middle of Europe. In the future, Hitler would try again to resurrect the image of Russians as the Mongols reincarnated from his Reich’s need to save Aryan Europe. But, of course, besides Germans, no one took these comparisons seriously. And, in addition, Hitler was not consistent in his views on Mongols and in some instances tried to equate himself with not just Roman or Greek leaders but with Genghis Khan.

“To a certain extent, Hitler’s policies in the east were designed to remedy the ‘Mongol problem’—not as salient as the Jewish question, but perceived as a long-term danger nonetheless. In other ways, however, Hitler was consciously following what he had learned about Genghis Khan’s methods.”⁶⁴

⁶³ p. 103.

⁶⁴ Breitman, Richard, “Hitler and Genghis Khan,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 25, No. 2/3, p. 337.



THE LINGUISTIC CONNECTION IN ASIAN COMMUNITY

Communication in Asian world: Linguistic aspects

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Introduction

Lady and Gentlemen,

Dear professors and colleagues,

The organizers of the Second International Conference of the Asian Philosophical Association, in particular Professor Choi Woo-Won, the President of DaeDong Philosophical Association, kindly invited me to participate in this Conference.

These days people talk on social sciences in relation to the new age of Asian Community. Mongolia, the country I represent, is today among those countries that have been successfully achieving democratic reforms. Mongolia is somehow told stepped over the line of developing country, which is still subject matter in debates. Anyway, nowadays when globalization of the world community has become a major subject of interest in both developing and developed countries, the process doesn't avoid our country. Although the process of the globalization is mainly mentioned in relation to the economic matters, the process has spread to ideology, culture and all aspects of social life. Globalization has already been criticized. Its advocates see not only the increases in incomes but also the spread of democratic values. Opponents worry not just about loss of jobs but about the loss of local culture. Supporters of globalization point out that it enables each country to learn from the lessons of others.

In my presentation I join those who are optimistically seeking a rationality in the whole process of globalization.

The presentation will concern some linguistic aspects of communication between peoples of Asian World.

People conduct each other with the help of many factors existing in the society. Asia is a community of people ruled by different political ideologies, speaking different languages, having different cultures and traditions, practicing different religions. For better communication one should respect the other's native culture, beliefs and laws. Generally, people conduct through various organizations, associations and business entities. Unfortunately, in practice not every conduct is successful and effective. The reason of this usually addresses to language barrier and legal aspects or regulations.

1. English as an international language in Asian Community

UNESCO has identified 6,500 languages in the world. And yet only around 40 of these are economically significant. Among them English is an official language of all international organizations of world concern such as the United Nations Organization, World Trade Organization, World Labor Organization, etc. Today, the participants of this International Conference also talk in English. Many countries have accepted English as the second official language of the nation. In Mongolia English has been taught in secondary schools and universities' programs. English is required in government institutions. The Government has accepted English as the second official language. For Mongolian students who apply to foreign either western, or eastern universities certain knowledge of English is a primary requirement. In global concern, English is essential everywhere when an international relation is established.

English is spoken in various international youth and professional unions and associations that have become very popular in Mongolia in recent years. In comparison with the past when we could communicate with representatives from socialist countries only in Russian, today English prevail in our communication. Of course, it does not diminish the importance of use of other languages, but English is usually required by the other party.

Thus, in Mongolia, English is taught in all pre-academic and academic levels. Teaching English in local communities, mean in separate national scope, varies. For Mongolian pre-academic level it is approved by the Ministry of Science and Education an English teaching Program at the secondary schools. The Program includes necessary grammar, text and practice books of all levels and covers teacher training courses and facilities. But private foreign languages and English oriented secondary schools have had their own special programs, mainly dictated by the sponsor institutions.



The situation is a bit different in the academic level. Unfortunately, linguistic institutions where English is a major or one of the major disciplines have different English teaching programs which depend on the policy of the professors' staff. Although the program of the department of Great Britain and American studies of the National University of Mongolia include country, history, culture, language and other relevant disciplines, British English is a major subject. The English teaching of Non-linguistic universities and schools mostly depend on the knowledge of the professional staff. As a rule, their English programs include beside basic English knowledge, the professionally oriented vocabulary and terminology in texts.

2. The significance of legal translation in communication

As societies became more complex, governments took over the role of codifying appropriate behavior before disputes developed. In a democracy, legislators are expected to provide protection from those who wish to take advantage of others. In an international relation justice and equality are the primary principles. People make all kinds of contracts everyday. In brief, contracts can be oral and written, and unilateral and bilateral. To deal successfully with foreign partners one should have clear understanding of every word in such a contract. How to know is the action of the partner fair, or does he take advantage, especially if the contract is made in foreign language? People may face this question at any time. Of course, it is difficult to predict the future, but it is better if you consider all matters before the deal. To avoid any disputes can mean to keep friendly and peaceful relations.

In any society laws, or legal regulations, describe what is allowed, how rule breakers will be dealt with and what procedures are to be followed in enforcing the rules. The goal is to provide ways to resolve or avoid disputes peacefully, predictably and with limited confusion. Laws define relationships among individuals and groups and serve as guides for people in planning and carrying out their individual and collective affairs. Nobody can argue that in today's litigious society, being involved in a lawsuit is complex, time consuming, stressful and expensive. The above ideas are said to emphasize briefly the role of law in the society. We can talk on law related matters endlessly.

I intend to focus upon the importance of translation of legal terms in communication. According to the information by the UNESCO, 40 000 official translations published every year, which means about hundred books are published every day. The number seems to

increase more and more. Translation of literary texts have been the priority of linguists and poets for ages. I think, the audience will not argue that philosophers have ever been very good translators, they are considered the most experienced in translation of humanitarian sciences' theoretical matters. Years passed and the societies have become more complicated, hence people have become more practical. Practice has been engendering various problems, overwhelming part of which is related to legal regulations. Generally, problems arise when people don't do what they should do. People don't fulfill their promises and duties intentionally or unintentionally. Intentionally means they don't want to do something for some reasons, or there is a fact of unwillingness. Meanwhile, misunderstanding can be the reason for an unintentional failure to fulfill the promise. Misunderstanding occurs when the word, which is the main means of the communication, is understood in wrong way.

I believe that the Lexical fund of every nation has been enriching as the society progresses. New words appear in the vocabulary everyday. They appear as due consequence of the development and are conveyed straightly to the communication. Sometimes new words have specific links to the national culture and traditions. And now the question arises. How to translate them correctly? Regular popular dictionaries are to facilitate the translation, but in practice sometimes there are situations when neither bilingual, nor monolingual dictionaries can provide with the necessary definition. Thus, people have to apply to professionals for the explicit explanation and use of the word. In Mongolia the linguistic services companies, or translation services agencies are not developed in such a level as they have become common in western and other countries. But translation bureaus and licensed legal translators provide with official translations. Nevertheless, the quality of the translation is left for discussions. The knowledge of legal terms will certainly protect you, your business and your family from everyday legal problems. But sometimes the explicit definition of an unfamiliar word is found not in the dictionary, but in the explanation of the professionals of that field as well as in that branch of dictionary they recommend.

We should acknowledge that professional explanations require certain experience in the field, knowledge of the national specifics, local traditions and internal relations. Many lexical items and special terms make sense only in one language and cannot transfer to others. Especially in cases when the word or term originates from ancient legal norms or traditions.

I think, students who learn English, or any other foreign language will need to know something about translation. Translation classes can help develop three characteristics



essential for language learning: flexibility, accuracy and clarity. An acquisition of new words and terms is always followed by discussion, thus the communication occurs. In legal translation classes of the School of Law, National University of Mongolia, legal terms are taught to law students in legal environment. In other words, students learn terms in legal surrounding: legal sources, such as written laws, codes, international conventions, and model court rooms. It is clear that the best quality translation will be achieved in practice, in communication.

Conclusion

Countries of Asian world are generally divided into two major legal systems: Romano-Germanic or Civil Law system and Anglo-Saxon or Common Law system. Basically, legal norms of different law branches of these two systems have the same philosophical background. However, they differ in the concept of law making process and legal procedure. Some countries of Asian world are pertained to the Common Law system, others to the Civil Law system. As laws can be based on moral, economic, political, or social values of the nation, misunderstanding of legal terms by representatives of other nations are expected to arise in the communication. So a good translation of any legal term will help to avoid problems. There is a wide arena for researchers of all branches of sciences to do in this field. The topic "Translation as a sign of communication" will probably encourage researcher to conduct each other, cooperate in working out on the drafting dictionaries and unite in the conference rooms.

Thank you for attention.



Beyond the Altaic horizons

Kiyoshi Shimizu*

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5. Concluding remarks

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0.1. The true story of Korean languages

In ICAPA 2005 held in Fatih University, Istanbul, we were able to present data enough to prove that Korean and Japanese belong to the Altaic family of languages¹. Nine months since then, through further comparison of these two sister languages, technically called Peninsular 半島 and Insular 列島 Korean 韓語, with Altaic languages, the following four important facts have become apparent:

a. Insular Korean 列島韓語, or Japanese, retains the old phonological and morphological features of Altaic lexicon much better than Peninsular Korean 半島韓語, or Korean, while the latter, a typical innovating language, has drifted in its own particular direction and diverted very much from the general Altaic, especially in its phonological features.

b. The languages of Ancient Korea 古朝鮮 and Koguryo 高句麗, technically called Continental Korean 大陸韓語, now seem to be more or less the same as the oldest stratum of Insular Korean, which can technically be called proto-Japanese 祖日本語. In other words Insular Korean can be said to retain not only the linguistic features of Continental Korean but also the word roots themselves, in cases they are lost, or not documented, in Continental or Peninsular Korean.

c. Proto-Korean 祖韓語 can now be set up in parallel to three other branches of Altaic family, i.e. Mongolian, Turkic and Tungusic. This hypothetical ancestor language, proto-Korean, very soon develops into Continental Korean, whose speakers migrated down the Korean Peninsular as far as the present-day Japanese Islands, around B.C. 400 or even earlier. Thus what we call Peninsular and Insular Korean languages developed out of the Continental Korean.

d. The four branches of Altaic family were very close to each other. Once the basic facts concerning the Korean branch as stated in a through c above have been grasped, and the fact that proto-Korean was much more similar to general Altaic in phonology as well as in other linguistic aspects than to modern Peninsular Korean, the Altaic family can be considered to be much more compact and easily comprehensible than some other larger and more complex language families in the world such as Indo-European or Niger-Congo or Afro-Asiatic.

0.2. Our feeling of linguistic distance

Having thus come to know more exactly what Altaic family is, we are now ready to have a look at the scenery beyond the Altaic horizons. To the west beyond the Altaic horizons



we see the Uralic languages including Hungarian and Finish. On the same Eurasian Continent we also have the Germanic and Slavic branches of Indo-European family. Down south we meet the Semitic branch of Afro-Asiatic family, and further south in the African continent there was the Ancient Egyptian, and in West African Sahel Hausa language of Chadic branch of the same family is still spoken now. The largest language family spreading in West, East and South Africa is the Niger-Congo family, including the whole of 500 Bantu languages.

Thus it is not difficult to grasp the geographical spread of languages, but it seems generally considered as much more difficult to grasp the linguistic distance in time. But this is not so. Thus as we all know, any of us can learn to speak and read any of the old and new languages on the earth. Even classical languages such as Greek, Latin and Sanskrit can be learnt. The dead language of Ancient Egypt is being taught and newly discovered hieroglyphic texts of over 5,000 years ago are actually read and translated. Japanese children can learn to understand and memorize 8th century Manyoushuu songs and easily recite them. Many Koreans know the word "video", even if they might never have read Julius Caesar's famous sentence in Latin original: *vinī, vidī viki*.

If we can all do that, linguistic distance in time should also be comprehensible as easily as that in space, that is, if only we stop to think about it, or if we are informed, or even get trained in comparing languages. For instance, if we realize that the famous Brazilian name 호나우두 Honaudu is originally the same name as US President Reagan's name Ronald, we have already come to witness the linguistic changes due to weakening: $r > h$ and $l > u$. One way to measure the linguistic distance is to do so by the degree of linguistic changes. Since understanding comparative linguistics needs long experience of observing actual linguistic changes, we are going to write the following pages using as much actual materials comparative linguists have gathered from Altaic and other families of the world languages as possible.

0.3 Comparative methodology and some key words

a. Glocalism²: local and global as stages of linguistic descent

As we compared Peninsular and Insular Korean, each of these two language areas constituted a local area, and Proto-Korean is the global area including the two local areas. We try to reconstruct Proto-Korean on the basis of local information and then work out the linguistic descent on the basis of this proto-language. Concerning levels of linguistic diversification (classification), without knowing local situation well, global

situation cannot be grasped, and vice versa. This should be how "glocalism" in linguistics works.

"Local and global areas" can also be called "local and global stages", when we talk about linguistic descent and time depth. As we next compare Korean branch with the other three branches of Altaic family, each of the four branches is the local area/stage and the reconstructed language Proto-Altaic is the global area/stage. Here again "glocalism" works in the same way. Our paper for ICAPA 2005, "New horizons in Altaic linguistics", was written from the point of view of Proto-Altaic area/stage of linguistic descent.

We wrote at the beginning of 0. 2, above: we would like to have a look at the scenery beyond the Altaic horizons. This becomes possible, only if we consider that the language Proto-Altaic, too, has descended from another ancestor language. Indeed we think that linguistic descent and diversification accompany the descent and diversification of homo sapiens, and that our linguistic descent goes as far back as the beginning of human history³.

b. Adamica, or Nostratic, and other stages of linguistic descent

The final proto-language to which we should arrive at in the linguistic history of homo sapiens is called Adamica or Nostratic, the first human language, which is supposed to have been spoken by Adam and Eve. How exactly we descended from there to the stage of Proto-Altaic is not yet known. But it is well-known that the linguistic family closest to Altaic is the Uralic. The next closest should be the Sino-Tibetan family, and then should come other groups of Asian languages such as Mon-Kmer and Malayo-Polynesian, and finally the ancestor language spoken by the forefathers of all Mongoloid population, which could be called Macro-Mongolian, perhaps including the American Indian languages.

Next to the Macro-Mongolian in Eurasian continent must have lived the speakers of the Indo-European family as a whole. We can talk of Eurasian roots, if word roots are found to be spread over the whole of Eurasian Continent. And when we go down to African continent, the largest linguistic families are called Niger-Congo and Afro-Asiatic (over 800 and 300 languages each), as mentioned in 0.2.

c. Look-alikes to cognates with established sound correspondences

Comparative linguists work from look-likes to cognates step by step. Though it may seem very speculative at first, without gathering look-alikes, we cannot proceed to finding out regular sound correspondences. On the basis of regular sound correspondences we work out the phonological system of the proto- language.



d. Retention and innovation in root morphemes

Old features are constantly renewed in a language. If in a language otherwise obsolete features still remain, this is called retention and the new features are called innovation. For instance English word 'hound', which is cognate with German 'Hund' is a retention of old Germanic root, which in turn is cognate with Latin 'canis' >Fr. 'chien' and is an Indo-European root. The word 'dog', which has almost replaced 'hound' in modern English is an innovation.

But, the moment we become aware of the similarity between Lat. 'canis' [kan-is] and Chinese 犬견개 giɔn [kiɔn], the possibility arises that both Latin and Chinese words (and even the Altaic Korean 개 gai) could be retentions of an older, perhaps a Eurasian, root.

e. Genetic cognates or loan words (transmission without migration?)

How to define a linguistic "loan" is not so easy as generally considered. Let us look at the word list below to think about this.

Example 1

German	Maß <Math /messen	'mass, measure'
English	mass/measure	'질량 質量/측정測定하다'
<hr/>		
pA (StADB191)	*māl 'a (*mal ² - KS)	'to measure, a measure'
pMo, WMo	malu	'vessel, basket (for grain)'
pTk	*b(i)al 'gan	'a measure'
OTk	bašyān	'a measure'
pTg, Lit.Ma.	miali-	'to measure, a measure of weight'
Pen 말	mar <말(斗)	'a measure (about 18liters)'
OJ (Mi, JJS 1976)	mar-i	'a cup shaped container'
Ins 枡ます	mas-u A187	'a measuring box'

This is one of the words, in which Germanic and Altaic roots are similar, or they look alike and linguists call them 'look-alikes'. A culture word such as this can be easily borrowed. But this might as well turn out to be a 'genetic cognates', once sound correspondences should be established between the Altaic and Indo-European families. In the following case of 'a horse' linguists' consensus seems to consider it 'a loan', but "who borrowed from whom?" is not yet known.

Example 2

PAL	*mar-i	'a horse'	(Sidorov p. ??)	
Xalx	морь	mor-i	'a horse'	
(Yak		?at	'a horse'	v. PAL *agt-)
Pen	말 <마리	mar <mar-i	'a horse'	
Ins	馬うま	u-ma		
Chn	馬: *mag, 北京ma; 말마 mal ma; 呉音まま, めめ, 漢音ば ba.			
Eng	mare	'a fully mature female horse', cognate with <OHG mar(i)ha.		

Cited below are eleven further items of widely distributed roots. They are "look-alikes" at this stage of our research, but we cannot ignore them. Rather than offering a solution we would like to pose questions about how to deal with comparative linguistic problems such as these.

1. Uralic roots in Altaic

First, the following Uralic comparative list of two items is from James Forsyth's *History of the people of Siberia* (Cambridge 1992):

<u>English</u>	<u>Khanty</u>	<u>Mansi</u>	<u>Hungarian</u>	<u>Finnish</u> <u>Proto-Uralic</u>
womanne	ne	nõ	nainen	*nai-
four	nyate	nila	négy nelya	*niaT

It is not difficult to see that the Uralic 'woman' root given above are similar to 'mother, sister, wife' root in Altaic in Example 3 below. Only difference is that the former has the syllable structure CV-whereas the latter VC-, the consonant being the same -n-.

Example 3

PAL	*ən-i-a	'mother, sister, wife'	(Sidorov p.34; StaDB72)
рА		*eña	'mother, elder sister'
OMo	(-	-	-)
Yak	ийэ, иньэ	iy-e, in-ye	'mother'
Turk	-	an-a	'mother'
pTg		*eñi-	'mother, female'
Ev.		eñi-n	'mother, female'
Lit.Man.		eñen	'mother, female'
Pen	언니	ən-ni	an elder sibling of the same sex'
	누이	n-ui	'boy's sister'



누나	n-un-a	'boy's elder sister'
아내	an-ai	'wife'
Ins. 姉, お姉さん	an-e < *ana-i, on-ee +saN	'a sister, my sister'

The problem for Altaic linguists with the numeral 'four' is how to derive Korean form 넷 *nai-s* from PAL *dǝ-rt, *dǝǝ-rt. Here it should be easier and safer if we connected the Korean form with the Uralic form *niaT. Then this should be a retention from the Ural-Altaic stage. But this root has even wider distribution in Africa: Niger-Congo *nai. For example in Swahili 'four' is *nne* < *n-nai and 'eight' is *nane* (< *nai nai 4+4=8). In Fula in Senegal 'four' is *nai* and 'nine' is *jowe nai* (5+4=9).

Example 4

PAL	*dǝ-rt, *dǝǝ-rt	'four'	(Ozawa p. 154/70; Mil. pp. 78-)
Mo. (mo.)	dǝ-rbe(n)	< *dǝ-rt-be(n)	'four'
	dǝ-čin	< *dǝ-rt-in	'forty'
Khal дәрәв ~ дәрвән	dǝ-rǎb-dǝ-rǎb(ǎn)		'four'
Türkic	*dǝ-rt	(< *tǝǝrt Poppe)	'four'
Turk (Mil.)	*tǝrt		'four'
Tungus 基本語 (村山)	*dǝ-gin	(< *dǝǝ-rt Ozawa/Poppe)	'four'
Tung. (Mil.)	dǝ-gin		'four'
Man	du-jn	(< *dǝǝ-gǝn Poppe)	'four'
Ewenki (Lamut)	di-gin, di-gen		'four'
<hr/>			
Pen	넷	<i>nai-s</i>	'four'
OJ	ヨ	<i>yǝ</i>	四 (記・万・他) 'four'
Ins	四ヨ	<i>yo-N</i>	'four'
<hr/>			
Proto-Uralic		*niaT	'four'
Fin		ne-lya	'four'
Niger-Congo.		*nai	'four'

2. Sino-Tibetan, and Macro-Mongolian

Is it a historical contradiction, if a word root for 'wheat' or 'barely' originated in the languages of nomadic peoples and went into the agriculturalists' languages? This seems to be the case as shown in Example 5 below. Or were we all originally nomadic? Interchange of *b* and *m* seen in this item, and for which proto-Altaic sound *mb- is here

postulated, is one of the very wide-spread phonological features of Altaic languages. Certainly the Chinese forms 麥보리맥bori maig and 牟보리모bori 모人麦 are very similar to this Altaic root. Further, Korean 보리 bori and English 'barley' are similar, too.

Example 5

PAL	*mbyrgu-	'wheat' (Ozawa p. 150/66;	StaDB206)
pA	*mūrgu		'wheat'
Mo. (mo.)	bu y u-dai <Tk		'wheat'
Khal	б у у д а й	buud-ay	'wheat'
pTk	*bogu <*borgu		'wheat'
Tur	buğ-day		'wheat'
Chuv.	pōwri		'wheat'
pĪg	*murgi		'wheat'
Lit. Ma.	muži		'wheat'
Jur.	mir-yei	'product of agriculture'	
pK, MK	*mir(h)		'wheat'
Pen	밀	mir	'wheat'
pJ	*mūnki		'wheat'
OJ	ムギ	mugi	麦(記・上) 'wheat'
Chn	麥보리맥bori maig		'wheat'
	(牟보리모bori mo 人麦)		'barley')
Eng.	barley		

3. Germanic and Indo-European family as a whole

From a very naïve Korean-speakers' point of view, English might be seen as almost Korean! For instance, English: one, two, three! is almost Korean: 하나, 둘, 셋! han(a), tu(r), se(t)! There are many such cases, and the verb 'to go' is only one of such items:

Example 6. a.

pA	*šīgu	'to hurry, run' (StaDB396-97)
PMo	*šiyi-	'run, gallop'
WMo	šiyi-	'run, gallop'
Khal.	šī-ge	'run, gallop'
PTk	*jūg-ūr-	'to hurry, run'
OTk	jūg-ūr-	'to hurry, run'
Yak	sūr-	'to hurry, run'



pŭg	*ʒig-	'running fast, race horse; to streak'
Ev.	ʒiyar	'running fast, race horse'

Pen	가다	g-a-da	'to go'
Ins	行く(ゆく)	ik-u, yuk-u	'to go'
	来る	k-ur-u	'to come'
Cf.	PAI	*əg-	'to go' v. かけ, かよう, くる
Cf.	English go ; German	gehen etc.	

Honourable Altaic comparative linguists such as Starostin, actually none of them, wants to place Peninsular Korean 半島 가다 g-a-da and Insular Korean 列島 行く(ゆく) ik-u, yuk-u together. But we have a reason to put them together: there are -ka/ga- forms as auxiliary verbs in Insular Korean:

Example 6. b. (reproduced from Park Chung-Su/Jung Jay-Kyum's
 Research Report: 2006 No.5, 2006,2,22: Example 22. Auxiliary verbs)

가다 ga-

- a. 行いく, ゆく ik-u, yuk-u 'to go'
- b. かう<かふ - ga-u <ga-hu 예. 従うsita(좃아)-ga-u 'follow'
- c. 古離かる-ka-r-u 예. 遠ざかるtoo-za-ka-ru 'go away'
- d. かす -ka-s-u 예. してかすsi-de-ka-su 저지르다 'commit'
- e. -가 -ga 'go'. ex. 流れるna-ga-r-er-u, 流すna-ga-su,
 <나가다 'flow'; 探すsa-ga-s-u < 찾아가다 'look for'.
- f. 来る k-ur-u 'come'. 探るsa-g-ur-u 'search'. v. 探すin e.

Actually the Insular roots of VC- syllable structure corresponds to Peninsular CV- in many items (v. Example 7 below). One of the Altaic solutions to this problem is the Altaic initial *ji-/di-, from which the consonant j-/d- has disappeared in the Korean branch, as shown in above in Example 6.a.

When speakers of Korean languages see the English words such as no! or no- in 'nothing, nobody', or naught (v. German nicht, Hindi nehiin), or nil, he may not be aware that the same negative -n- is in Korean, both in Peninsular 半島 and Insular 列島 Korean 韓語. And this -n- is not only proto-Korean but Proto-Altaic:

Example 7

pA	*anV	'not' [Negative Verb] (StadB11)
pTk, Chu.	an	'not' (prohibitive particle)
pTg	a(n), ā(n)	'not'
Na.	anā	
Olč, Orok	ana	
Neg. Ev.	āčín	
Ud	ančí	
Lit.Ma.	aku <*anku (Vo, JSF01997)	
Ma.	aqu	
pK, MK	an-	'Negative'
Pen	아니다	'an-. not
OJ	-(a)n-, na-	
	az- <*-an-s(e)	
Ins	ない	na-i. 古: ぬ n-u. A278
	鹿兒島なか	na-ka (cf. Ma.)
Cf.	Uralisch-Indogermanisch Negativum <i>ne</i>	(Menges 1975, 96-110)

The Insular VC-; Peninsular CV- correspondence is observed here again (v. Example 6 above). If this n- or ne is Uralic and Indo-European as Menges says, it is more or less a Eurasian root.

For the life of homo sapiens, and life itself on earth, the most important element would be 'water'. It changes form and meaning from 'rain' to 'river, lake, sea; tears, urine' etc.. For this reason it is difficult to come to agreement as to which forms to be included or dismissed, out of chaotic array of forms in order to reconstruct a proto-root 'water'. So far as we take the initial labial consonant p/b/m- and the second dental or alveolar consonant -s/r- as permissible, including the deletion of p/b/m-, this root is certainly Eurasian, and can even be Adamica.

Example 8

PAI	*mpos-	'water' (Sidorov p. 26, 41; Ozawa p.90, 143/63)
Xalx	yc(aH)	ʔos(an) 'water'
mo.(秘)	兀速-兀孫	usu(n) <*husun <*busun(<*bulsun <*bil) 'water'
	monguwor	fudzu 'water'
mo.	nilbusu(n) <nil	+busu(n) 'tears (eyes +water)'



Yak	y y	ʔuu	'water'
Turk	su	su	'water'
<hr/>			
pA	*müür <i>i</i> , ~*müür'		'water' (APPJ255,268,278; StaDB207)
pMo		*müre-n	'river'
WMo		mören	'river'
Khal.		mörön	'river'
Mtk.		mürän <Mo.	'river'
<hr/>			
pTg, Ev.Orok, Olč.Neg.		mü	'water'
Lit.M. Ma.Na.		muke(e)	'water'
(Man		fusu	'sprinkle water')
Pen	물 <물	mur <mur	'water'
OJ	ミヅ ~ミツ 瀧豆, 瀧部	mid-u ~mit-u	水(紀・歌謡83,94,118その他)
Ins	水みず(みづ)	miz-u <mid-u	'water'
	おふう	o-buu <-buw-u	'hot water'
	湯ゆ, おゆ	(o)-yu	'hot water'
	(白)水(しろ)おず	sir-o tod-u(family name=白川)	'white water'
<hr/>			
Cf. Chn	水 毋 所 水 mo-so so	Rhinoceros	(*water buffalo)
Finland	(金田一春彦)	ves-i	'water'
Hungary	(金田一春彦)	víz	'water'
Eng		water: OHG wazzar, akin to Hittite watar, Gk hýdōr.	
Rus		voda	'water'
Arb		maaʔ-	'water'
Niger-Congo:		>Swahil ma-ji 'water'; Jukun ja-pe; Yoruba omi.	

This root has been discussed in : Park ChungSu/Jung Jay-Kyum's Research Report: 2006 No.17 (2006.6.6) 3. 'Amur' river 黑龍江 may include the Altaic 'water/river' root. Starostin places the M(ongol)/T(urkic) *müre-n 'river' root under proto-Altaic 'water' root, but we prefer the M/T *pos-u.

We thought that fish names were not original Altaic, for there is no sea in the real sense of the word in Siberia. But Professor Lee Hong-Kyu was not of the opinion. He was right, for we have found the Altaic root for 'whale' in Ozawa's Mongolian-Japanese comparison. We have supplemented the word list from various other languages in Eurasia.

Our conclusion is: the root **kwal* 'whale' is almost Proto-Eurasian, spreading to Russian, Germanic (cf. 'what': *wh-/w-/hv-* < **qu-/*k-*) and Arabic, and Chinese word may also be related to this root.

Example 9 (Reproduced from: Research Report: 2005 No.2, 2005,11,16)

PAL	<i>*kal-</i>	'whale'	Ozawa(p. 114)	
Mo.	<i>kal-im</i>	鯨,	'a whale'	
(Tur	<i>bal-ina</i>		'Walfisch, a whale' Cf. <i>bal-ık</i> 'fish')	
Pen	고래	<i>kor-ai</i>	'a whale'	
OJ (in Hitati Fudoki)	<i>kuzi, kuzi-ri</i>		'a whale' (Whit,1985,223)	
Jp.	<i>kudira</i>	鯨	<i>kud-i-ra</i>	'a whale'
Rus	кит	<i>kid</i>	'a whale'	
Arb	<i>khut, pl. khiit-aan</i>		'a big fish, a whale'	
Eng	<i>whale</i>	[bef. 900; ME; OE <i>hwael</i> , cognate with OHG <i>wal</i> , ON <i>hvalr</i>]		
	(Cf. <i>what</i>	[bef. 900; ME; OE <i>hwaet</i> , cognate with OHG(h) <i>waz</i> , ON <i>hvæt</i>]		
	Latin <i>quod</i> , Skt <i>kād</i>)			
Proto- Eurasian	<i>*kwal-</i>	> <i>*kal-</i> (~ <i>*bal-</i> ?)		
Chn	鯨 고래 경	<i>giŋŋ</i> (北京語 > <i>jīng</i>)	'a whale'	

4. Niger-Congo and Afro-Asiatic and Adamica/Nostratic

Africa may be well known only to those who study Africa as a whole, and this may be the same for Altaic area. Here as an Africanist we would like to emphasize the sheer size of the Niger-Congo family of over 800 languages including 500 Bantu languages, and Afro-Asiatic family with Ancient Hieroglyphic Egyptian, Semitic, Berber, Kushitic, Omotic and 150 Chadic languages including Hausa in Nigeria and Niger.

Example 10

PAL	<i>*ɲag-</i>	'a cow'	(Sidorov p. 59)
Омо	үнигэн, үнийэн	<i>ɲig-en, ɲiy-en</i>	'a cow'
Yak	ынах	<i>ɲnaχ</i>	'a cow'
Chn.	牛: <i>*nɲjəŋ</i> > <i>*ŋɲjəw</i> > <i>jəw</i> (北京) <i>niú</i> ; 牛: <i>*u</i> ; 牛: <i>ギユウ</i> <i>gyuu</i>		'a cow'.
Miyanma	<i>nwa</i>		
Niger-Congo	<i>*nak-a</i>		'a cow'.

The **nak-a* root is found very widely among Niger-Congo languages of Sub-Saharan Africa, from East Africa to West Africa. Not only Homo Sapiens came from Africa, but they



also seem to have brought word-roots for cows, bulls and oxen from Africa.

Example 11

PAL	*ykyz-	'bull, ox'	(Sidorov p. 59; Sta,DB382-83)
pA		*usu (-o-, -i)	'animal, cow'
OMo	γκγρ, γκκγζ	yky r, ykkyz	'bull, ox'
Yak	о̄ус	o y us	'bull, ox'
(PAL	*quru-γa	'a lamb' (Ozawa p.47))	
(Mo.	*quru-γa	子羊 'a lamb')	
(Yak	?)	
(Tur	kuzu	'a lamb')	
(Tur	kız	'lamb?)	
pTg	*us-	'herd, flock; game, wild animal'	
Ev.	us-uŋa	'herd, flock'	
Na. Oic, Orok	us-elte	'game, wild animal'	
Proto-Korean	*usiu <*uksy <*ykyz		
Pen	수<소	so <sjō	'cattle(cow, bull, ox, calf etc.)'
Ins	牛<우	usi	'cattle(cow, bull, ox, calf etc.)'
Cf. Chn	犀 모소 서	mo-so so	'Rhinoceros (*water buffalo)
Tibet	yak		
Arb.	Θaur		'a bull' (cf. Latin taurus).
Hausa:	saa f. saaniyaa, pl. shaanuu		'cattle'
Eng.	ox, German Ochse, OHG ohso, ON uxi, oxi.		

It is surprising that the words for cattle in the languages of nomadic peoples in Africa and Eurasia are so similar. The *y- prefix for animals are found, for example in 'dog' (PAL *ynvg- 'fox, wolf, dog' , where 늑대 nuŋ +da-i 'wolf' is cognate with 犬 inu 'dog'). In both cases, the prefix *y- is dropped from the Peninsular 半 forms and is retained in the Insular 列 forms.

In the following example, Professor Itabashi explains how the genitival markers -n- and -ga- go back to the two forms of Altaic structures,

Example 12

pA	*n	genitive case suffix	(Itabashi CAJ 1991,233-78)
pA	*n	genitive case suffix <?pA oder pUr-A	*n (Me,1960,15-20)
pM,Mo.	n	'genitive case suffix'	

pMo, WMo,	n-ki	'genitive suffix +adjectival suffix'
WMo.	yin/un/u	'genitive case suffix'
pTk, Chuv, Tk, Az, Kirg, Nog	n	'genitive case suffix'
the rest of Turkic lags.	ŋ <n+q/ki	'genitive suffix +adjectival suffix'
OTk	in, iŋ	'genitive case suffix'
pTk, OTk	n-ki	'genitive suffix +adjectival suffix'
pTg, Tg.	n	'genitive case suffix'
pNorthTg, Lam	ŋgī <n-ki	'genitive suffix +adjectival suffix'
pSouthTg.	ŋga <n-ka	'genitive suffix +adjectival suffix'
Ma.	ŋgā/ ŋge/ ŋgo	'possessive case suffix'
Na.	ŋgo/ ŋgu	'possessive case suffix'
Oič	ŋgu	'possessive case suffix'
Pen -네	no-i <*n +li (KS) 예: 엄마네 집 母の所 A280	
의	wi <MK ūi/li	'genitive case suffix'
pJ, OJ	n, nō, na	'genitive case suffix'
OJ<pJ	ŋga <n-ka	'genitive case suffix'

Further details: (from: Park Chungsu/Jung Jay-Kyum's Research Report: 2006 No.8. 2006.4.4).

(1) -의 no A279. -네 no-i 예: 엄마네 집 母の家 'mother's house' A280.

-나-na- ex. 水: 미나카미 mi-na-kami, 眼: 마나코 ma-na-ko.

(2) 모두>모든 mod-u-n. もろもろ의 moro-moro(=subete) -no A279.

빨간 bbarg-a-n. 赤의 aka-no. 只赤な makka-na. 赤ん坊 aka-n-boo A279.

좋은 jo-h-un A279. 好きな suki-na. 変な人 hen-na hito. 馬鹿 baka-na.

The genitival linker *-n- has the form 네 noi in 半島 and there are two forms in 列島: old form な na, and new form の no as in (1). If a relative clause, or 연체형連體形·れんたいけい連體形, qualifies a noun as (2) above, the Peninsular 半島 form is 은 un or ㄴ-n. In modern Insular Korean 列島 this relative form れんたいけい連體形 has been lost, showing some similarity to the case of English, where the relative marker that or which or where is often dropped: the book that I saw = the book ØI saw.

A verb, adjective, or adjectival noun, or so-called けいようどうし 形容動詞, has in general a predicative and a qualificative use. In the former the Subject of a sentence is



the main word or head of the structure, and in the latter a Substantive (a noun) is the head. In the latter use the element which connect the head and the qualifier is called a genitival linker traditionally or an associative marker, as stated below.

This point can be conveniently explained, if we took a series of Chinese sentences as in (3) below.

- (3) Chinese 중국어: 我的书 'my book' . 我家 'my house' (Ø a zero marker)
 我看书 'I read a book'
 我看过的书 'the book that I have read'
 很好的书 'a very good book' .

Here the associative marker is obviously 的 de. The word order does not matter. But this element is in general *-n- in many other languages. Hence the mistakes such as ** 「私が読だの本」 etc.

This genitival linker *-n- is clearly Proto-Ural-Altaic. As this is so well known that I do not need to cite any proof from Ural-Altaic languages. It is also Proto-Afroasiatic, for it appears in Ancient hieroglyphic Egyptian as well as in Chadic.

- (4) Hausa(Chadic): gida-n ubaa 'father's house'
 saabo-n gidaa 'a new house'
 Cf. 새로운 집 sai-row-un jib. 'a new house'

There is a whole group of Russian adjectives which has the suffix -н-.

- (5) Russian: ч е р н ы й jior-n-шy 'black'
 Cf. Insular 列島: 黒の kuro no 'black < of black (colour)'
 (End of citation)

Finally, we come to an item, whose Proto-Altaic and Niger-Congo roots are more or less the same both in form and meaning.

Example 13

pA	*tyāl ²	'stone'	(Mil. p. 95-96; Ozawa p. 88; StaDB344)
Niger-Congo	*tali, *tade	'stone'	
pA	*tiol'-i, *tō'1-ī	'stone'	
.pMo	*čil-a-γu	'stone'	
OMon	čil-a-γun	'stone, rock'	
(mo.)	čil-a-γun	'a stone'	
Khal	чулуу(н)	cul-uu(n)	'a stone'
pTk	*dial	'stone'	

Chuv.	čol		'stone'
Yak	qylyy	cul-uu <Mo	'better, best'
Yak	tās		'stone'
Turk, . Tk	*tyaš, taš		'stone'
pTg	*žol-a		'stone'
Ev.	žol-o		'stone'
ラムート	jol		'stone, rock' (p. 96)
エヴェンキetc.	jol-o		'stone, rock'
pK	*tior		
MK	tōr(h)		'a stone'
Pen 돌	tor		'a stone'
돌멘, 고인돌	tor-moin		'a dolmen'
pJ	*(d)isi		'a stone'
Ins 石 いし isi (<*yisi Pre-OJ)			'stone, rock'
石の :	iso (<isu) no kami		'on the stone'
磯いそ	iso	자갈 해변), a stony sea-shore	
砂, 小石	isa-go		'sand, small stone'
cf. Chin. 석(石)	sag		'a stone' A230

This item seems to have been noted by the scholars doing Altaic comparison rather early, with its second consonant - l²-, which turns up as (or technically, whose reflex is) -s- in a part of Turkic and Korean branches. Miller believes this global Altaic sound correspondence can be applicable to this item, not a local development occurring repeatedly in widely separated individual languages. Cf. Ex.1. pA *māl ā (*mal²- KS) 'mass/ measure'

The Niger-Congo root *tali, *tade 'stone' belongs to ri-/ma- noun class (with nouns denoting round things such as 'egg'). For this reason its reflexes are often similar to pA *tyāl² 'stone' due to the assimilation of root initial t- to the prefix vowel -i: ex. ri-tyali etc.

5. Concluding remarks

In this paper we gathered together 13 look-alikes of wider distribution than just in Altaic. These and many others came to our notice in the process of Altaic comparison by chance. A lot more should be found if we did a systematic, exhaustive comparison of whole vocabulary in all the human languages, if that is possible.

Beyond the Altaic horizons till we arrive at the Adamica or Nostratic stage, the way



seems to be long and fairly complicated. How many stages can be set up in between? Exact numbers are not yet known but some suggestions have been made in this paper.

What are the linguistic criteria that can effectively define such stages? Point of articulation of plosives could provide a fairly reliable guide. The nasal *n seems particularly stable and its correspondence among many languages in different language families is almost regular as can be seen from the look-alikes introduced in this paper: Ex. 3-4: Proto-Uralic *niaŋ 'four', *nai- 'woman' ; ex. 7: negative- *n-; ex. 10: PAL *vnag- 'a cow'; ex. 12 genitive -n-.

N.B.1. Kiyoshi Shimizu and Park Myoung Mi; "New horizons in Altaic linguistics. presenting lexical, phonological and semantic features enough to include Korean and Japanese into the Altaic language family." ICAPA, Istanbul, 2005.

N.B.2. "Glocal(ism)" is a term coined by Professor Choi Woo-Won as a motto for ICAPA 2005.

N.B.3. This is the reverse direction I took as I wrote the following paper: Kiyoshi Shimizu. "From Africa over Siberia to Far East: [aspiration] and [voice] features in the consonantal systems of human languages" Altai Forum, University of Seoul, 2004, Readable at //www.bongwoo.org//. Translation: "아프리카에서 시베리아를 거쳐 극동으로..." . 번역: 봉우사상연구소. 이 홍규 교수 편집: 『바이칼에서 찾는 우리민족의 기원』 서울, 정신세계원 2006.

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The Need for a Pluralistic Attitude towards Ethical Problems in a Globalized World

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One of the major problems in history is the question of "What is morality?" and "Where does it come from?" Through the history of thought, the answers given to this question have varied according to the worldviews. In the present paper after a brief survey on these given answers about the morality, it will be stated that to encompass all the different and rival theories we need a pluralistic view of morality. To derive such an embracing theory of morality we need to know both western and eastern attitudes towards morality.

The assumptions of globalization of the world became more acceptable after the globalization of the media. However it is a reality that one third of the world population has no connection with modern communication tools. We have all become familiar with live scenes from sports events, concerts, meetings and unfortunately the wars. So the word "globalization" is meaningful for the users of communication. On the other hand, there is a great population who has no idea of what is going on in the world other than their homeland. Globalization has led to the basic problem of the stronger and richer countries' hegemony over the underdeveloped and developing countries not only in economics but also in cultural issues. I intend to draw attention to the ethical needs of a globalized world. The discussions between universalists and relativists being well-known, my aim is not to arise a new debate. It is, on the contrary, to give a new solution by referring to glocalised ethics, which I will present alongside a pluralist attitude of ethics.

My aim in this paper is to show that to look at the attitudes towards human nature will help to build a new glocal understanding of ethics. I chose two famous names –Hume and Mencius– who have very similar tendencies towards ethics which are both characterized on human nature.

Although ethics have a variety of definitions, I will define it in short as a body of principles or standards of human conduct that helps us to examine the difference and

causal relation between “right” and “wrong” or “virtuous” and “vicious” behaviors of individuals or groups. There is a consensus on the onset of ethics: the humankind’s appearance on the Earth. However, its source has led to debates. Therefore, the goals which shape the ethical rules and principles are various. If we find the basic cause of the difference of goals, it will also show the reason why the foundations of ethics vary.

In the history of ethics there have been diverse answers to what morality is and where it comes from. Some believe that moral values are derived from God commands. Some argued that moral values are the products of human reason which are based on some objective truths of universe. Some think that moral values are a result of human nature, or human desires. And some assume that moral values are only some social conventions. It is my point of view that these various thoughts are a result of different worldviews. To count all answers is not plausible so I will pin on most common ones which I think will be also helpful to show the relation between worldviews and ethics.

The relation between religion and ethics is one of the most common issues for philosophers, since both of the areas are aimed at to find the ways how to promote human flourishing. It is obvious that a big sum of believers asserts that religion is the most appropriate place for morality. On the contrary there are some philosophers who support the independence of ethics from religious teaching. Plato is a good example who called attention to the possibility of independency of goodness and obligation from the divine will. Moreover, there are some philosophers who argued that the acceptance of religious basis for ethics is compatible with a more generally accepted philosophical perspective. Jeremy Bentham, J. Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, and William Frankena are some examples to these compatibilist philosophers.

Indeed Frankena claims that morality is autonomous phenomenon from religion in his Ideal Observer theory of moral justification he assumes our position when making moral judgments –to say whether something is right or good– is similar to the position of a person acting as if he is being observed by the “Ideal Observer” that will question him on “the Day of Judgment”. Of course this assumption may not prove the existence of a Divine Judge. However it points the fact that the best position to determine the moral values can be held by a wise, omniscient, and benevolent deity.

On the other hand there are some philosophers who built their theories on religious



bases. In this kind of religious ethics there are some contemporary names like Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann who supported Thomas Aquinas' thesis that God is the essential goodness. Stump asserts that we have a faculty or an ability to know evil and goodness which functions in a similar way that we are able to recognize people's faces. She believes that our experiences with evil can prepare us for the tastes of true goodness which will lead to the source of all goodness. She clarifies it as: "The mirror of evil becomes translucent, and we can see through it to the goodness of God."¹ This kind of theory, I think, concerns a type of human nature basis ethics. The main assertion of mirroring can be done by a human ability or a faculty which should have some common characteristics through all human beings. A symmetric thought can be found in Islamic ethics. The Prophet Mohammed says that "All human beings born in *fitrah*" which means all human beings have ability to differentiate right and wrong at the basic level.

On the other hand, there are some moral philosophers who argue for the autonomy of ethics in a wider sense. Patrick Nowell-Smith, Karl Marx, and Erich Fromm, Simone de Beauvoir are some of these philosophers who see the obedience of a will of a higher or external being as an obstruction to human flourishing.

One of the most famous attitudes towards the foundation of ethics is called as the cosmological or rational basis, which means that moral values arise from the rational reflections on objective truths about the universe.

Kant bases the ethical norms on reason. To him, to have any moral worth, the subjective principle, the maxim, must coincide with the objective principle, which is the moral law in the absolute sense.

According to Kant, the conception of an objective principle which is necessitating for a will is called an imperative; and an imperative is a moral law because it is unconditioned. He claims "So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle establishing universal law."² He maintained that only categorical imperative formulated in universal moral law is moral law. He says "... through reason we are

¹ E. Stump, "The Mirror of Evil" in *God and the Philosophers*, ed. Thomas Morris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.242

² I. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*: translated by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1978), p.30

conscious of a law to which all our maxims are subject as though through our will a natural order must arise. Therefore, this law must be the idea of a supersensuous nature, a nature not empirically given yet possible through freedom; to this nature we give objective reality, at least in a practical context, because we regard it as the object of our will as pure rational beings".³ Bluntly, in Kantian tradition, the foundation of ethics is reason.

On the other hand, Kantian ethics has been attacked as being ill-founded by some modern moral philosophers such as Anscombe, McIntyre, and Williams. Considering the agent's social spheres including families, friends and societies, they offer returning to Aristotelian ethics, which is virtue ethics centered on agent's character, dispositions and emotions. Moreover Anscombe offers to do "moral psychology" instead of philosophy.

Since human nature is one of the most popular issues in philosophy, there are a lot of philosophers who based their theories on it. It is well-known that Hobbes was accused of the "selfish human" portrait. His social assertions depend upon the assumption of his "selfish human". The life in the state of nature is "nasty, brutish and, short". However, there are some positive theories of human nature. Having no idea about each other, both Mencius and Hume had a positive attitude towards human nature. Hume and Mencius argued that human nature is not all selfish. On the contrary, they believe we can draw some moral judgments from our sense of sympathy, which is a basic characteristic of human nature. Mencius is famous for his claim that human nature is good because it has some good seeds inside.

According to Hume, sympathy is a lively idea that is converted into an impression. It can occur when we consider the future possible or probable condition of any person. If we visualize the probable outcomes of an act so vividly in our thoughts in such a way that we become concerned and feel the pleasure or the pain of another agent even before its happening with a supposed position and without any real occurrence, we convert the vivid idea into an impression. To illustrate this moral notion of sympathy, he gives an example. He claims that when we see a person who is unknown to us sleeping in the fields under the danger of being trod by foot of horses, we should immediately run to help him. The reason for such a reaction is that our idea of feeling the probable pain of being trod by foot of horses causes an impression, which results in sympathy to a stranger under the threat of

³ Ibid., 45



that pain. The feeling of sympathy, from which our moral judgments arise, is the basic character of human nature.

There are some naturalist views of ethics in accordance with the goodness of human nature; however, I want to mention that whether moral values are learnt by education or arise from human nature is not important in this sense because in either way human beings have to have ability or a tendency to choose and learn good or right. Therefore to concentrate on human nature will lead to finding the sources of morality in each case. Moreover, it is human nature that can give us the most common moral values. Hume was aware that Hobbes was not absolutely wrong when pointing on the selfishness of human nature. He accepts that we are not certainly born saints but we are not born sinners either. He says:

“... there is some benevolence, however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of friendship for human kind; some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wolf and serpent.”⁴

He believes that how small the good part of human nature is is not important. In either case it has the determination power to be good. He continues saying:

“Let these generous sentiments be supposed ever so weak; let them be insufficient to move even a hand or finger of our body, they must still direct the determinations of our mind, and where everything else is equal, produce a cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous”.⁵

It is obvious that human nature concerns both Hobbesian and Humean characteristics. However, I think Hume is right when assuming the power of the supposed small part which can result in goodness.

Similarly, Mencius established four seeds of moral virtue about twenty centuries before Hume. He is also famous like Hume for his positive claim that human nature is good.

⁴ D. Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, reprinted from the posthumous edition of 1777 and edited with introduction, comparative table of contents, and analytical index by L. A. Selby-Bigge, third edition with text revised and notes by P. H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), p. 272.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 271

He was a defender of the doctrines of Confucius but Mencius is known to have advanced his master's doctrines. He was against the egoist attitudes of Yang Zhu. Mencius assumed that humans have innately budding tendencies toward virtue. He asserts there are sprouts in human which correspond to his four seeds. Each virtue has an emotion; or, in other words, is characterized by certain attitudes. To him, benevolence is characterized by compassion. Shame and disdain are the emotions of righteousness. Approval and disapproval are the emotions of wisdom. Respect is for ritual propriety. He exemplifies the sprout of benevolence by his famous example of well. He asserts that when we suddenly see a child in danger of falling to a well, a spontaneous feeling of alarm and compassion occur in us because of the sprout of benevolence and we run to help the child.

Here we can analyze some examples from different cultures but I want to concentrate on similar tendencies of human nature towards virtues. Of course an example about a horse is sympathetic in Britain and a child in danger of falling to a well is more sensible to people living in China. The pictures Mencius and Hume draw seem different but the theme is the same. Therefore, it is the cultural differences and the variety of worldviews which veil the general characteristics of human nature. If we purify these cultural differences we will reveal the common feature of human nature which Hume mentions. He believes that: "The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it"⁶

After a brief survey of foundation of ethics, I want to mention worldview as a factor, which I suppose, any foundation of ethics considers. A worldview is a set of assumptions, perspectives, and beliefs which we use consciously or unconsciously to interpret and evaluate the universe. Alparslan Açıkgenç claims that "A worldview is an architectonic whole, which usually arises in the mind throughout our daily life out of a natural process."⁷ Therefore, whatever we are— whether a believer or a non-believer or moral, immoral, virtuous or vicious— we have our own worldviews throughout our life spans. However, it is inevitable that we have some multi-cultural worldviews if we are the members of the

⁶ D. Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, reprinted from the posthumous edition of 1777 and edited with introduction, comparative table of contents, and analytical index by L. A. Selby-Bigge, third edition with text revised and notes by P. H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), p. 272.

⁷ A. Açıkgenç, *Scientific Thought and its Burdens* (İstanbul: Fatih University Publications, 2000) p. 67.



modern communication willingly or unwillingly. As we can see, foundations of ethics are various. It is not an easy task to make them one –because as I mentioned all these moral attitudes are the results of different worldviews– but it is not impossible.

From the beginning of humanity, there have always been believers and non-believers. The history of philosophy is like history of the war between reason and emotions. We live in an era which is full of ethical dilemmas. The moral problems become really complicated. I never support relativist assumptions, which I believe will make problems more complicated but I believe that we should be tolerant of pluralist view. It is not a monster to be afraid of. I chose two different names from two different eras and from two different parts of the world but they basically have a common idea of human being and virtue. It is not easy to derive a universal law from the similarities of Hume and Mencius; however, we can assert that without any modern communication tools and completely unaware of the existence of each other, the different local pictures of these two people draw a glocal picture of ethics, which permits any kind of worldview– whether Confucian or Calvinist. Glocalism is mentioned as the attitude towards the phenomenon of global rapprochement among all societies and civilizations, which, at the same time, sustain their local characteristics and identity by the founders of this seminar. However I think glocalism is the most appropriate way of globalization or, rather, it is the positive side of globalization. Therefore glocalism is not a new thing to invent but it needs to be rediscovered in the history of thought. Human is a social being and open to any kind of interaction with all kinds of beings and even climates, which makes people local beings who are affected at first hand by their families, cities, and home countries. That is to say, it is a being that lives in a particular space and in a particular time. On the other hand, human being has reason, emotions, desires and beliefs which make it possible to travel in space and time with the power of imagination. Human can always go further from his particular space and time. We have different traditions, different customs, different opportunities but we all have some similar natures. If we describe our local attitudes towards morality we will reach different pictures which tell the same story indeed. This is what glocal ethics is.

As mentioned earlier, globalization is inevitable in a communication era. We should find ways to eliminate the negative aspects such as the hegemony of the developed countries over developing countries. That is why we need a pluralist attitude towards ethics. We should be tolerable to cultural differences. It will be a sign of the loss of humanity if we disregard the multiplicity of cultures. According to moral pluralism, moral values, norms,

ideals, duties and virtues are varied. Still, it is different from moral relativism. Moral pluralism insists that there are rational constraints on what a moral value is. Glocal ethics offers to convene the common points which usually stem from human nature. Therefore, it is glocal ethics' job to find out the similarities between the ethical theories and attitudes towards human being as well as state an acceptable definition of moral value on the basis of human nature.



A Reasonable Approach to Pluralist Religious Society

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Many people complain about religious conflicts happening in the world, while ignoring any other kind of debates. For those people, religious problems seem to lead to wars but the other problems are some sorts of the states of affairs easily resolved. In other words, the other problems can be easily re/solved when both parts can agree if given a good visible condition, while religious ones cannot be given such a condition. Is it really impossible that conflicts between religions are solved?

To this question, those who believe that religious conflicts are so ideological that solving such things is impossible, will definitely say, "Yes, it is." In a sense, we will agree, as we can see in "religious wars" here and there in the world, with them. In fact, where more than two religious people live together, we can see any kind of conflicts between them. Many of us suppose that such conflicts will become "wars" before long. Is this only the way we can expect to go? Isn't there any other reasonable way by which many religions go together?

From One To Many

Many theories have been so far suggested to solve religious conflicts by western thinkers. However, those come to failures in the end, for they have been done in western countries which are not plural in religion and by western thinkers who are used to a uni-coded / Judeo-Christian religion. So they could not find any reasonable way to deal with plural religions, only to distinguish right from wrong about religions. As a result, those theories have never succeeded in solving problems among people or cultures of different religious backgrounds.

Asia is a great land where most religions began, and it might bring into a somewhat reliable way that they agree to keep company with. Each country might have a religion as a main stream of letting its people go. But as time passed, cultures have been mixed this way in one country and that way in another so that one cannot articulate where the origins

were, finally making religions live at the same space(so-called a plural religious society). South Korea, for instance, is a representative of such countries, where many religions are alive at the same price.

From War To Competition

It seems that there are few conflicts between different religions or even denominations of one religion nowadays; to Koreans recent news or long history of western countries of religious problems or wars are regarded as some ironies. To turn to Korea even tens of years, it was quite easy to find such conflicts between religious people. Among families they did easily become wars. Coming closer to scrutinize them, people took them to be ideological rather than different ideas or styles or forms of life. As well known, ideologies tend to be tied blindly to one's own interest while ignoring the others' concern.

People addicted to a certain ideology would reject any productive discourse, finally to be seduced to make wars. Since they think their own opinions to be true, they regard as enemies those who disagree with themselves. They declare war with ease against those disagreeing, breaking into other forms of life. Wars break down everything, deliberately destroying both parties. Wars invite as a result another, making vicious circles. Wars occur when a people or country accepts another one as a part with the equivalent, i.e., the one with right to compete for a success. A religion needs to consider another religion a reasonable competitive partner, rather than a war partner.

From Outer To Inner

Reasonable competitions are quite different from ugly wars in the sense that the former have good processes while the latter only focuses on the final victory. To be reasonable, a competition must have a certain rule or regulator by which it is measured to be right or wrong; in this sense its good process is a reliable cause of successive effects. Otherwise one's success would be cancelled. On the other hand, wars do not have any rule or regulator to follow or measure, only trying to get the final victory. Good processes are ignored but tricky methods or strategies are investigated. Thus hostility or antagonism has been used to serve that victory.



Naturally this kind of misleading happened to exist in relation to religions. To have success or victory among religious wars, each religion has made use of many kinds of negative processes so that it has never had a good production of religious fertility. All this kind of attempts are concerned with outer figures of religions, while anything inner needs to be deepened and investigated to serve the religious fertility. Basically religious values, if any, are or more over should be concerned with INNER rather than OUTER part. In a word, to change a religious conflict into religious, it should be screened from a perspective of inner part by religion.

From Subjective To Objective

Normally religious values come true when religious people act or behave silently following their rules. As used to, once a religious practice works well, people, within or without, are satisfied by what it does, disregarding what it is shown to be. However, once it goes astray, people with- and without begin to complain against that religion; people within start to propagate what their religion is and how right they are ...etc., while people without argue against its disorders. Before long they fight against each other, naturally making their dialogues nothing.

To say that something is about values of inner part is not the same as to say that something is subjective. Good trees bring about good fruit. Likewise a good religion shows how good it is by objective rules, regulations AND good practices. People in it must show good behaviors and custom and forms of life whoever outside will see and follow in one. Then it is to be a good religion. That is, it should have anything objective as a criterion by which others can measure it. Otherwise, it can be called an ideology rather than a (high) religion.

As a result, to resolve serious conflicts between religions, as it were in a pluralist society, religious people belonging to a religion needs to: take them to be competition rather than war by focusing on their own inner content of practice; make a goal expressed in its own regulation or rule for its own success; attempt to bring about good objective fruit so that outsiders and even rival religious believers might follow its own satisfactorily.

It is happy that in Korea, pluralist religious societies, we can see think that kind of religious believers nowadays. Korean believes begin to succeed in their faith.



A REASEARCH ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE ELDERLY TOWARDS OLD AGE

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Abstract in Turkish

Yaşlıların Yaşlılıkla İlgili Tutumları Üzerine Bir Araştırma

Türkiye' de yaşlı nüfus oranı iyileşen yaş am koşulları na bağlı olarak artmaktadır. Genel nüfus içindeki oranı giderek artan bu nüfus grubunun gereksinimlerini ve beklentilerini karşılamak üzere sosyal ve politik temel çalışmaların yapılması zorunlu olduğu gerçektir. Türkiye' de halihazırda aile yapısı ve kuşaklar arası ilişkiler yoluyla yaşlıların ihtiyaçları karşılanmaktadır. Ancak yaşlılığın ne olduğu nun anlaşılması ve konu ile ilgili farkındalık kazanılması, toplumsal kalıplar yargılara dayalı olduğu hallerde konuya ilişkin yeniliklerin toplumsal yaşama aktarılması güçlüğünü getirir. 2025 ' de nüfusun %20' sini oluşturacak olan 60 yaş ve üstü nüfusa hazırlık yapmak zorunlu hale gelmiştir. Bu çalışmada, 60 ve üstü yaş grubunda olan Üniversite de akademisyen olarak görev yapan ve emekli olmuş kişilerin yaşlılıkla ilgili tutumlarını ve beklentilerinin neler olduğu araştırılacaktır. Çalışmanın örneklemini Ankara' da Üniversite öğretim üyesi olan ve ulaşılabilen 60 yaş ve üstündeki hocalar oluşturacaktır. Paltmore' ın (FAQ) " yaşlanma testi" nin uygulanması ndan elde edilen veriler SPSS ile değerlendirilecektir.



On the Formation of Mongolian and the Origins of Koreans

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Advances in molecular genetics and its application to the anthropologic investigations throughout the world made it possible to reconstruct fascinating history of human migration. Proposed by late Alan Wilson in 1980s, theory of African origin of modern human is now well established. It says all the extant humans living on earth now are sons and daughters of small group of people lived somewhere eastern Africa 150,000 years ago. Following years, studies of various population around the world revealed evidences that people migrated out of Africa 80,000 years ago, then dispersed to Asia, Australia, Europe and then lastly to new world, 15,000 BP.

Because American indians were evidently have genetic fingerprint of Mongolians, and had close relationship with Mongolians or native Siberians, and as they showed closer genetic linkage to Europeans than southern Asians, it became clear that Mongolians were formed from common Eurasian ancestors. As anthropologic features of Mongolians shows the evidences of cold adaptation, it was clear that these features should have acquired during an adaptive process to cold temperature.

When and where this adaptation had occurred? Y chromosome analysis of Mongolians showed that representative marker of Mongolian is haplotype O, and its distribution is compatible with north to southward flow. Closely related Y chromosome haplotypes R goes to America. Formation of Mongolian ancestor in Siberia, coming from west, from common ancestor sharing with Europeans, is only plausible explanation for these patterns.

Archaeologic research last 40 years in Siberia revealed that modern human arrived trans-Baikal region about 40-50,000 years ago, replacing Neandertals, and making rise of upper paleolithic culture. I want to point out that neolithic microblade industry first found at this region, from nowhere, coincide with the formation of proto-Mongolian. In summary, proto-Mongolian was formed sometime during last glacial period and migrated out after meltdown of ice barriers present at northern China and Bering strait.

However, as people had lived in mainland China, Korean peninsula and Japan islands before the arrival of proto-Mongolians for millenia. Analysis of mitochondrial DNA distribution, which trace maternal lineage, are compatible with a scenario that these people arrived 70,000 BP through southern route, via India and Malay peninsula. Many

archaeologic studies, particularly from Japan, clearly support this notion.

Genetically, Koreans, Chinese and Japanese are mixed populations of northern proto-Mongolians and southern Asians, only slightly different in their composition.



Heuristics, autonomy and English teaching: An experimentation in the Web-based English classes

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Introduction

Using technology in the English class has been one of the staple approaches in English education since the introduction of Audio-lingual method, which made it possible to use the native speaker's vocal materials in an EFL environment. With the advent of the Internet and the high availability of personal computers today, there has been a drastic development in utilizing technology in an electronic way. In this presentation, I would like also to focus on how technology can assist the heuristic and autonomous skills on the students by introducing my English classes.

By heuristic, I mean the ability for the student to find a problem themselves, rather than to respond passively to the problem provided by the instructor. Autonomy of the student refers to the ability to self educate in a learner community environment¹, which can take place in the physical classroom and/or a virtual setting in the cyberspace. Thanks to the rapid progress of the web technology, our task has become way more feasible in making this happen.

A few pedagogical appropriations

My approach here suggested falls in general into the categories of the Silent way, Community Language Learning and Communicative Language Teaching outlined, for example, by Jack C. Richards and Theodore S. Rodgers, but is not quite identical to any of them, for I try to appropriate such features as can be integrated into my style. I emphasize on the learner autonomy in the same sense that the Silent way does: "Learning is facilitated if the learner discovers or creates rather than remembers and repeats what is to be learned." (Richards and Rodgers 81) Community Language Learning is attractive to me in its focus both on the interactive practices in language learning and on the holistic approach, which can be aptly termed "whole-person learning." (92) Group and pair works are duly often

involved in my class. I think these concepts are especially important for a college learner, whose linguistic skills are deemed to have reached a workable label thanks to the intense grammatical and translational trainings at junior high and high schools. As the community is at the core of this method, learners and teachers will assume a slightly different role compared to other traditional approach, that is, they "socialized" in the way they do in an actual society. **Communicative Language Teaching** focuses on the communicative and contextual elements in the language learning. Departing from its predecessors of Situational Language Teaching and Audiolingualism, it maintains that the leaning can take place in communication: its aim being "(a) make communicative competence the goal of language teaching and (b) develop procedures for the teaching of the four language skills that acknowledge the interdependence of language and communication." (155) It is no wonder that the teacher's role be changed to be mainly that of the facilitator of communication here, which makes more sense in the current classroom environment where a self-access study often takes place in the computer assisted language learning (CALL).

Overview of the experimentation courses

The university I belong to has the mandatory English courses for all the students, who respectively belong to eleven faculties of Letters, Law, Economics, Business Administration, Human Development, Cross-Cultural Studies, Technology, Science, Agriculture, Medicine, Health Science and Maritime Science. In general they take six courses (Reading1-3 and Oral 1-3) in three semesters, each of which meet once a week in a 90 minute lesson. It is regarded as a part of general education to help them smoothly land in the pursuit of their major studies. Class size is 40 to 45 in average and the instruction language is both Japanese and English.

I have introduced a web-based support for these several years, and one of the most useful ones is a mail form (refer to the figure right), which is a form to be filled and sent on the web site. It is useful in that we can get a csv format file to be handled by Microsoft Excel.

Dictation Report 2005s	
<small>【注意】間違ってもESCを押すと、入力した内容がすべて消えることがあります。 写真帳など、別のソフトで作ってから下にコピーペーストしてください。</small>	
曜日クラス(必須)	<input type="checkbox"/> 金2スピーキング <input type="checkbox"/> 水1実用英語 <input type="checkbox"/> 水2プロダクティブ
名前(必須)	<input type="text"/>
WebName(公開用)(必須)	<input type="text"/>
提出回(必須)	第1回News1(金曜4/13締切) 水曜4/18締切) <input type="checkbox"/> 第2回News2(4/21 第4回Oz2(5/11 18締切) <input type="checkbox"/> 第5回HP1(5/18 23締切) <input type="checkbox"/> 第6回 6/6締切) <input type="checkbox"/> 第8回HP4(6/8 13締切) <input type="checkbox"/> 第9回BC1(6/15 20締切) BC3(6/29 7/4締切)
Dictation(改行禁止)(必須)	<input type="text"/>
感想(日本語or英語)(必須)	<input type="text"/>
<input type="button" value="送信する"/> <input type="button" value="やり直し"/>	

(Fig. 1 Mail form)



Class specifications are as follows:

Experimentation (1)

Class titles: Productive, Practical English, Speaking

Faculty: Law, Cross-Cultural Studies and Technology

Size: 10 to 30 students

Period: First semester from April to July in 2005

Experimentation (2)

Class title: English Reading IIA

Faculty: Economics

Size: 45 students

Period: First semester from April to July in 2005 and 2006

Experimentation (3)

Class title: English Reading IIA

Faculty: Literature and Economics

Size: 30 to 45 students

Period: First semester from April to July in 2006

Experimentation (1): Dictation practice in the Oral English class (Dictation)²

Dictation, so generally resorted to, is inefficient as orthographical exercise. ... Dictation, so universally resorted to, only because it gives little trouble to the instructor and demands on his part neither talent nor information. -Claude Marcel, 1853 (Davis 1988: 122)

Dictation as a practice in language learning seems to have started as a way of the orthographical acquisition of the native tongue as we can see from the quotation above. According to Paul Davis and Mario Rinvolucri, who cites the following merits, it is not without the reason. Transplanted in the foreign language teaching, it has thrived as an efficient way of integrating the learner's skills of the target language.

The students are active during the exercise

Dictation leads to oral communicative activities

Dictation fosters unconscious thinking

Dictation copes with mixed-ability group

- Dictation deals with large groups
- Dictation will often calm groups
- Dictation is safe for the non-native teacher
- For English, it is a technically useful exercise
- Dictation gives access to interesting text (Davis and Rinvoluceri 4-8)

Saegusa suggests that the correlation of the achievement between dictation and other skills like reading and listening rates fairly high.


Correlation figure between TOEIC Listening score and dictation score	0.830
Correlation figure between TOEIC Reading score and dictation scores	0.825
Correlation figure between TOEIC and dictation scores	0.872

(<http://www.voa-study.net/SAEGUSA.htm> 7/27/2006)

Dictation test does not only rate the orthographical competency, for the learner can modify the data by resorting to their grammatical resources, too. When you miss the -s sound at the end of the verb, you can reconstruct it by applying the rule of accord in a sentence like "He usually put(s) a hat on outside." Or they can use a contextual and commonsensical tip when they are not certain whether the word read was "rice" or "lice". With these advantages, dictation can be a staple diet for English teaching.

In my experimentation class, I have introduced a web-based data collection feedback system to utilize the student's heuristics in the following procedure.

- Give the dictation material on MD in advance as homework
- Students fill in dictated English in the mail form, which will be stored in a cvs format
- Edit the above file in Microsoft Excel and highlight the mistakes (Fig. 2)
- Discuss why the mistakes took place



(Fig. 2 Feedback data)

By giving a feedback in the above format, you can easily identify the mistakes and can figure out how they came about. For example, you can notice variants of "newly formed" in the field of (1): newly form, nearly formed, new reform, new form, etc. It is also noticeable that [f] sound in the beginning of the sentence can be confused with [p] and [th] for some students (field 4). The point here is that not only the students can notice the mistake themselves, but they can think how those mistakes take place, either by the lack of their listening skill or grammatical competences. They are encouraged to talk with their partners to identify the mechanism the mistakes are generated, by which they can detect their own problems in a heuristic and autonomous way. The role of the teacher would, thus, be a facilitator rather than an instructor, for the problems can found by the students themselves in a learning community of the classroom.

Experimentation (2): Reading practice in the Reading English class (Harry Potter)³

The students are asked in this class to choose three key sentences from the textbook of *Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets*. The rationale here is that students read a whole book in the course paying the attention to the overall comprehension of the book rather than specific details such as grammatical difficulties and advanced-level vocabulary. Overall comprehension is to be checked in the practice of finding key sentences embedded in the text, for that search necessarily involves following the plot and relating to the story-telling devices. Key sentences are also chosen in term of the relevance to the theme of the story as a whole.

The advantage of providing the feedback of the list of key sentences lies in that it becomes evident how their choices can be mutually related to each other. It is not hard to predict that some sentences are more favorably chosen for an obvious reason. By reviewing the results (Fig. 3), which are accompanied by the students' comments, they can share the feelings and perceptions in this reading community.

At the outset of the story, Harry is down with no birthday cards from the friends of Hogwarts in a home he doesn't fit in. Attached to the key sentence of "Happy birthday to me... happy birthday to me..." are the following comments.

- 1) I feel that he is very sorry, because he did not get a present on a birthday.
- 2) Harry thought he has no friend in both Muggle's world and magician's world.
- 3) Harry had wanted to someone celebrate his birthday, but anyone gave presents or cards. Harry would be so sad, I think.

4	He wore round glasses, and on his forehead wa	It is very famous that he has that scar, so I know that before I read this sentence.
4	It was this scar that made Harry so particularly	I thought that this scar has so important key, but there are few informations about it
4	This scar was the only hint of Harry's very mys	After reading this sentence, the reader, who is basically interested in the evolution
5	Now, as we all know, today is a very important	Harry amazed this word. But this word means Mr. Vernon Dursley's business talks.
5	back to being treated like a dog that had rolled	At Dursley's house, Harry is treated so bad that I feel pity for him.
5	The Dursleys hadn't even remembered that tod	I think that this sentence foretells what happens in this story.
6	"I'll be in my bedroom, making no noise and pr	It is clear for the reader that Harry is excluded from the Dursley family. He's consid
6	"And you?"	Contempt is included in this word, you
6	"I'll be in my bedroom, making no noise and pr	Harry says these three times of lines, and spirit gradually loses.
6	"I'll be in my bedroom, making no noise and pre	This phrase is repeated, and finally Harry said the same line three times. This scene
6	This was too much for both Aunt Petunia and I	I think this sentence means Dudley's flattery made a shocking impression on Aunt Petu
6	"My perfect little gentleman!" sniffed Aunt Petu	I think this sentence means that Aunt Petunia dotes and indulges her son.
7	"Happy birthday to me... happy birthday to me..."	I feel that he is very sorry because he did not get a present on a birthday.
7	"Happy birthday to me... happy birthday to me..."	Harry thought he has no friend in both Muggle's world and wizard's world.
7	"Happy birthday to me... happy birthday to me..."	Harry had wanted someone to celebrate his birthday, but anyone gave presents or ca
7	Harry hadn't told the Dursleys this, he knew it wa	I think the Dursleys hate and fear Harry. I feel their feelings are often too intense.
7	"Happy birthday to me... happy birthday to me..."	This sentence is very sorrowful. Harry is lonely in this family. The family wound him d

Fig.3 Feedback of the key sentences

- 4) This sentence is very sorrowful. Harry is lonely in this family. The family wound him deeply.

They may have picked up this sentence primarily for its interesting expression of "Happy birthday to *me*" and added their comments about how they read Harry's sad line. Their comment is diverse in the style and form but the understanding is of the same nature: they are all sympathetic to this lightning-scarred, wizard. We can use these comments to elicit the students' opinion about how they would feel if they were in Harry's position or what their saddest birthday like.

And here are diverse comments put to the last line of the first chapter, "The trouble was, there was already someone."

- 1) This sentence fascinates us with mystery. This author is very clever at fascinating readers.
- 2) A tale begins to move from here.
- 3) When I wrote it, I feel what happens to Harry who is very unhappy and lonely.
- 4) This sentence was a warning of the next chapter. When I read this sentence, I was excited.
- 5) This sentence means an appearance of a new important character.
- 6) I think this will be connected with the next story.
- 7) The KS2 leads this sentence and the "Two green eyes" appeared this time.
- 8) This sentence hints that the situation of this moment is willing to change quite a lot. I wish that the person is his best friend! I want him to help him rapidly!



10) This sentence is interesting and made me excited.

Comment (1) and (6) refer to the author's technique in story telling, an indication that this commentator is aware of the construction of the story itself beyond a mere comprehension of the story. Commentator (8) is empathetically involved with Harry's fate while (3) and (10) express a mild interest in the story. Again we can use these comments in an interactive way to encourage discussion in the lesson. These feedbacks are put on the web page and they can read and print it down anytime they like. Some key sentences are more often quoted than others and it is interesting to ask them the reason of it. And when the sentence of their own is solitarily chosen by themselves only, they can think why it is so by browsing the list.

This task is both heuristic and autonomous in the sense that they have to find a meaningful sentence by themselves, and is collaborative, too, because it presupposes all the involvement from the students. Also noteworthy is the fact that this kind of feedback would not be possible without using the web-based data collection system and the computer-based sorting device.

Experimentation (3): Reading practice in the Reading English class (Newspaper)⁴


In this course, I used the same format as experimentation (2) with a change of the textbook from *Harry Potter* to an English newspaper *Daily Yomiuri*. Here again the focus was on the heuristic and autonomous procedure by the students. Newspaper in Education or NIE has been started in the United States in 1955 and spread to other regions of the world. Other than the obvious merits of it⁵ for the younger students in learning their own language, it is also beneficial for a language education at university. Also it is relevant to use a newspaper in the classroom in considering a changed role of the instructor as a facilitator as Kumaravadivelu lists ten macrostrategies in communicative language teaching as the role of the teacher: 1) Maximize learning opportunities, 2) Facilitate negotiated interaction, 3) Minimize perceptual mismatches, 4) Activate intuitive heuristics, 5) Foster language awareness, 6) Contextualize linguistic input, 7) Integrate language skills, 8) Promote learner autonomy, 9) Raise cultural consciousness, 10) Ensure social relevance, (Yoshida, Watanabe and Yamabe 110) Compared with the usage of a textbook of a traditional type (essays or short stories of a short volume) in a grammar-translation method, the task will involve more heuristic and autonomous nature such as skim reading and commenting activities.

I have decided to use it in my class because it is the best authentic language material for the students: updated, fully informational and a lot of variety in topics and styles. It is not, though, without some difficulty in actually bringing them to the classroom. One of the hurdles

is obviously the sheer volume of it. It is rather too bulky to be read in one lesson. Yes, we can read one newspaper during the range of three or four lessons by closely translating it and risk losing the updated-ness of the articles. Instead I decided to incorporate the web-based data collection and feedback system again here.

The procedure being:

- At each lesson, the latest newspaper is handed out to the students
- They are asked to choose three articles of their interest and post the comments on it on the web
- With the data being edited for feedback, the class will talk about those popular contents
- Comments are utilized to encouraged the class discussion



Daily Yomiuri2			
毎日 毎日毎日毎日毎日 Comment 0/225 (7/24/06)			
クラス名(必須)	クラス名	Avalanches leave 5 dead, 4 missing (2)	Snowy mountains are very dangerous. There are many accidents on mountain in winter. If we climb the snowy mountain, we have to be careful.
名前(必須)		Avalanches leave 5 dead, 4 missing (2)	I felt that natural phenomena is very terrible when I read this article when I walk on mountain road.
記事1(Header) (必須)		Blossoming knowledge	I think The Emperor and The Empress's smile is a symbol of peace. But, now, reality, I think it is not possible but, to make up for past is possible.
記事1(Comment) (必須)		Blossoming knowledge p3	The Emperor and Empress look at a tree as they visit the Ko no Ma as Japanese symbol. I think they are busy everyday.
記事2(Header) (必須)		Cell phone safety study questioned	It was easy to read this article. A report of a research organization in this article. What I can talk for all investigation is "Too much information."
記事2(Comment) (必須)		Cell phone safety study questioned	Some people say Cell phone is safe, but others say danger. I know about this risk and take care not only not to use in traffic but also to use in traffic.
記事3(Header) (必須)		Cell phone safety study questioned 13	We might regard cellular phones as necessities. I believe that we should use them carefully.
記事3(Comment) (必須)		Disanshrine' war criminals, Ozawa says (3)	This article says about visiting Yasukuni Shrine. I think war criminals should not have been enshrined at Yasukuni, and South Korea. But I think it isn't wrong to respect the ancestors.

By allowing the students to choose the headlines, we can focus on the few selected articles in the class and can compare various comments to each other, thus to involve other students in the discussions on the issue. The rationale here is that students will learn not only the contents of the news, but will develop a sense of skim the information to discern an interesting article to them. Also, by commenting on the article, they get the skill to respond to the news in a critical and analytical way.

Here is a list of comments given to the article of "Hankyu set to buy Hanshin share" (April 25, 2006 *Daily Yomiuri*): One of the major private railway company in Kansai region decided to its rival company which has a famous baseball team, Hanshin Tigers. This attracted many comments presumably for most students are from Kansai area.

- I was just relieved to hear that Tigers won't change its name to "Hankyu Tigers"
- I like Hanshin tigers, so I have bad feel for this shares. Murakami thinks only his own



profit, but he is always saying he is thinking social profit. So I hate Murakami and his company.

--I am from Amagasaki city. This city has two faces, south and north. There are Hankyu in the north area, and there are Hanshin in the south area. Each have different atmosphere, so I can't think of Hankyu in the south area too. I want to keep Hanshin being what it has been.

--I'm satisfied with this offer because I don't believe the Murakami Fund.

--Major private railways at Kansai, how do they think this? I worry about it. If they quarrel, who will be disadvantaged are the passengers.

--My impression is that Hankyu is high-class and Hanshin is folksy. So I'm reluctant to combine these companies.

--I was very surprised when I heard of this news. But I think if I hadn't come to Kobe, I would have taken little notice of this news. Only by this article, I couldn't understand this trouble well, because hanshin's opinion was not mentioned. however, I think 'unify' is as good as 'control'. (It is doubtful that these words are proper.)

--At first, I thought Murakami Fund sells shares, gets money and it ends. But Mr.Murakmi is seeking Hanshin board majority. I don't know his intention well.

--I'm not from the Kinki district, so I'm not a fan of Hanshin Tigers baseball team. However, I have lived Kobe City for a year, I came to like the team. Therefore, if the brand of Hanshin Tigers disappear, I'm sad.

--About this subject, this article focuses on business. On the other hand, on TV they focus on changing name of "Hanshin" Tigers. Surely, changing name is big problem, but to trade is business. In fact, Hanshin Electric Railway Co. is in bad business situation, so this trade would be aid. For keeping name, is it good choice to refuse this suggestion?

--In this area, Hankyu and Hanshin are at hand. The two corporation of electric railway have a strong image that they are public facilities for travel to me in fact they are not, so I think words of purchase or takeover oddly.

The comments are diverse in volume and sophistication, but what counts most is how they express themselves. We can use them as a cue to elicit their opinions in the classroom about related topics: regionalism, baseball, economics and shares and so on. It is also beneficial that their comments are to be grammatically and pragmatically corrected by each other. The skill in presentation can be developed by asking them to make a verbal comment on the article of their choice in front of the peers. Four skills of reading, writing, listening and speaking are seamlessly integrated in this way.

Making most of the students' autonomy, however, does not come without the weakness, that is, they tend to choose the articles based on their linguistic and conceptual competency.

In the lesson above most and least popular and headlines they chose were:

[Most popular]

- Hankyu set to buy Hanshin shares
- Tokyo train halted due to building tracks
- Man crosses Japan in glider
- New version of old toys proving a hit with adults , kids
- Young athletes aim for pros

[Least popular]

- Pension rates to be unified by '18
- Are Japan-U.S. ties fraying?
- Defective law behind fabricated data
- JR West must do more to dispel safety concerns (editorial)
- Socialists win new term in Hungary
- Israeli parties to sign coalition pact
- Polls open in Kashmir amid heavy security

There is a tendency that the domestic and sensational are more picked than the international and controversial. Sports are preferred to business, and accidents and crimes to opinions and essays. This suggests that an instructive guidance would be needed to assist the students in gaining various types of literacy in cultural, social and political arenas. Designating a few articles for the practice of translation and paraphrasing might be an idea here.

Reflection

I have shown how heuristics and autonomy could be utilized in the classroom by resorting to the technological device of electronic data collection. Although not all evaluation comments from the students were favorable, this can get fixed by creating a more sophisticated feedback system. It is crucial to get plural voices in the lesson other than the teacher's authoritative instruction, by which they are to learn things themselves. They are also expected to find the problems themselves and be stimulated by their peer's views. To re-comment on the peers' comment as well as preparing for the comment on the articles is an indispensable activity here. With the least intervention from the teacher to provide negative and corrective feedback, they will feel more relaxed and motivated to learn English



in a learning community of the classroom.

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¹ Relevant here is a succinct outline about autonomy by Arao (2006): she lists Holec's definition of it as "the ability to take charge of one's leaning" and Little's as "essentially a matter of the learner's psychological relation to the process and content of leaning - a capacity for detachment, critical reflection, decision-making, and independent action".(p. 23)

² I have reported this experimentation in the 9th general meeting of the Kansai English Language Education Society on May 28, 2005.

³ This section was presented in the 31st general meeting of the Japan Society of English Language Education on August 6, 2005.

⁴ This section was resented in the 10th general meeting of the Kansai English Language Education Society on May 27, 2006.

⁵ "There is substantial evidence that using newspapers in schools contributes to students' reading skills, writing skills, and current event knowledge. The effects are most dramatic among minorities." (Edward F. DeRoche, Dean, School of Education, University of San Diego) Literacy experts believe that adults with low level literacy skills lack a sufficient foundation of basic skills to function successfully in our society. By providing schools with newspapers, sponsors can help prevent illiteracy at time when young people have a support system of educators in place. Newspapers open the world to them and give them a chance to succeed." (http://www.press-enterprise.com/nie/more_about.html, 7/27/2006)



Russian literary migration of the XXth century

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For Russia, XXth century appeared extremely complicated, burdened set of a various sort of cataclysms: revolutionary, military, economic, etc. It is thought, that attempts to understand their causes and effects will make mainstreams of scientific and public idea of the come century. In the article, I address to that phenomenon, where the tragedy of the Russian culture of last XX century opens: Russian emigration of the beginning of century. Here the problem is not put to consider all aspects of this most complicated problem. In the center of attention there will be a Russian literary emigration. I shall try to present its general characteristic, and also I shall reveal those basic problems, that were reflected in creativity of one of its outstanding representatives – Zinaida Gippius.

In work the methodological approach based on a principle of ' the uniform block' will be applied. It enables to track strategy of creative destiny of this, or that writer, dynamics of his creativity by the rather – typological analysis, to reveal those changes, that have taken place in his outlook during the migratory period, and to show, how they were reflected in poetics of his main products. What it for a historical phenomenon – Russian emigration after revolutionary accident? What type of culture it personified?

Emigration from Russia in 1917 and emigration from the USSR in second half XX centuries has very little the general among themselves. Distinction is not in time of emigration, and in its cultural – historical sense. Left Russia as a result of revolution and Civil war has made abroad separate community. " Any emigration (...) did not receive so imperative order to develop business of native culture, as foreign Russia (Abdank-Kosovsky, 1956)" . Preservation and development of Russian culture in traditions of ' silver age' also puts emigration of this period in position of a cultural phenomenon. Outside Russia there was hardly probable not a most part of creatively active carriers of former culture. The unique situation was created: there is no state, there is no policy, and however, there is a culture. The history has put severe experiment which confirmed stated still figures of ' silver age' true: the main greatness of the national person is not the state and not economy, and culture. Disintegration of the states is equal itself to destruction of the nation. Only the destruction of culture means disappearance of the nation. This ' new Russia' , not having neither capitals,

nor the governments, laws, scattered on the different countries of the world, kept only one – preservation of former culture in an other national environment. In it emigration saw unique sense of the existence. " We are not in exile, We – in the message" , – spoke Dmitry Merezhkovsky. The problem of preservation of culture of the missed old Russia has developed into a problem of Russian emigration. The culture of the Russian abroad appeared phantom reflection of that century in which atmosphere its representatives had grown.

Formation of the cultural centers around of libraries, publishing houses corresponded to cultural mission of Russian emigration; they provided some kind of a layer of other cultural environment, promoted preservation of own cultural traditions. Representation about the Russian literary emigration given to the world the whole galaxy of remarkable artists and without a name Zinaida Gippius will be the extremely incomplete. She is the biggest representative of the literature of ' silver age' , the poet, the prose writer, the playwright, the critic and the publicist. " From a literary life, philosophical-aesthetic consciousness of an epoch of the beginning of a century ' the literary image' is integral Z.Gippius which influence on literary process admitted hardly probable not all writers symbolical to orientation: ' the decadent madonna' , ' witch' , around of which arise hearings, gossips, legends and which actively multiplies them. She draws people unusual beauty, cultural refinement, an acuteness critical instinct (Biographical dictionary of Russian writers, 1989)" .

Still Pythagoras Samosky, the most ancient emigrant in a history of the European culture, being sent in exile to Sicily, explained the act rather simply: " it is immoral to Reasonable person to remain under authority of the tyrant" . The philosopher has found the true decision for itself is unique. Russian exiles of XX century this alternative (the native land or freedom) were solved where more difficultly. The feeling of loss of the native land and comprehension of all depth of the happened accident did their life bitter and painful. " Zina, what for you is more important: Russia without freedom or freedom without Russia?" She thought minute. – " Freedom without Russia, – answered she. – And consequently I' m here, instead of there" . – " I' m also here, instead of there because Russia without freedom for me is impossible. But ..., and it reflected, on anybody not looking, – on what freedom if there is no Russia, actually, is necessary for me? What shall I do with freedom without Russia?"

In Taephy, you may read about sufferings of the compatriots who have run from Russia to Istanbul, Paris, Berlin or Prague: " there come our refugees emaciated, turned black from



famine and fear, to be eaten off, calm down, look round, as though to adjust a new life, and suddenly die. Eyes grow dull, languid hands fall and the soul, the soul inverted on the east fades. In anything we do not trust, we wait for nothing, we want nothing. Have died ... we Think only that now there, instead of that comes there from. And in fact it is so many affairs. It is necessary to be rescued and to rescue others. But so remained both will, and force a little. Only at night when the weariness closes consciousness and will, the Great Grief conducts soul in its native land (Taephy, Novels and memoirs, 1989)" . Bitterness of exile adjoined to poverty and fear. Hope to return sometime home has helped them to survive. For it during long exile years prayed also Zinaida Gippius. Addressing to this literary phenomenon, it is not necessary to forget about that role of the intellectual catalyst which has played Zinaida Gippius in a public life of emigration. And, it, first of all, was appreciable on the literary evenings which are carried out in the Parisian interiors.

Emigration did not isolate Zinaida Gippius and has not closed in itself. She and Paris suited religious – philosophical assemblies which were continuation Petersburg, there was the inspirer of a known society the ' Green Lamp' . The atmosphere of discussions, the cultural creativity, reined in their house, brought here habits of 10th to disputes and searches new, the special attitude to value of individuality, originality, and a cult of creativity. Asserted, that at Sunday meetings it was forbidden to speak only about two things: about weather and about a life. The literary society the ' Green Lamp' appeared popular and there were many years. At his sessions listened to reports on culture and the literature, read new products. On one of such sessions one young poet in enthusiasm has exclaimed, that the capital of Russian culture now is not in Moscow, but in Paris.

Secular beauty and at the same time one of the most odious figures in the literature, the largest critic, whose ' man's' , rational mind threw into confusion, and even simply fear of authors, and scientific the lady – philosopher whose theosophical reasoning surprised world renowned philosophers, – all faces of one woman known more under a name " Petersburg' s Sapho" – Zinaida Gippius. The life of ' Russian Paris' was not imagining outside of her destiny. Gippius ' for herself' and ' for others' . What sort of the nature her division? Whether casually irony, laughter, and at times airs and graces and intrigues became the instrument of her protection, her belief? Secret searches, disappointing, doubts – ' for herself' , as if one half crying – an antique mask. In public disturber household, and moral foundations pretentious mistress. " And as she dominated over everything when in the center of drawing room of Vinover' s of her hardly gravelly voice covered other voices or

when spoke Dmitry Sergeevich, and she waited for the moment to attack him, either to support it, or to enter conversation between it, as his opponent. As she dominated over people and as she loved it, probably, above all, loved this ' authority above souls' , and all its pleasures and torture have been connected to it authority above the small, unknown poet above whom she spread the dark wings to peck it; above editors of the magazines, increased to herself a thick leather at which she found sensitive places that up to blood to scratch them" (Berberova, N. A Silver Age. Memoirs. 1990).

Behind all her spiritual impulses, creative both simply everyday good lucks and disappointments stood persevering desire of finding of that many-sided freedom identified by her with ' Trembling Eternity' . Sergey Makovskiy's certificate supplements a portrait Gippius: " All she was provoking, not as all: mind shrill it is even more, than an exterior. Judged all self-confidently, frankly, not beginning from accepted by concepts, and liked to surprise with judgment on the contrary" (Annensky, I. Modern lyric poetry, 1909). Eccentric certainly, but also behind external extravagance the deep person wishing thus to save secret hiding places the soul was hidden from human looks. At a meeting with it Pavel Florensky has paid attention on strange, from his point of view, paradox: that is capable to excite disappointment, is the result of known internal cleanliness. It is external deforming, display of internal fear to be false. There are such people which, being afraid of unnaturalness, put on a mask of unnaturalness which does not deform the original nature of the person, and simply hides her.

What is the secret of a face of Zinaidy Gippius – the poet, the prose writer, criticism, philosopher and publisher? Ways on which its poetry developed, it is possible to tell, did not submit to logic, conscious outlook of the author. It is not surprising; that firstly she was under the strongest influence Bodler, Verlen and Nietzsche Practically all ' senior' symbolists acted in the literature in an atmosphere of their doctrines. Nietzsche' s motives in a combination with Verlen' s ' music above all' gave appreciable shoots on ground of Russian poetry. Having peered in Gippius's early poetry, we shall see instead of the expected ' platitudes' describing verses of the majority of beginning poets, original both on rhythms, and on language, and the main thing – on depth of ideas containing in them, the poems, declaring about exclusiveness of talent of their author.

In emigration where Gippius appears in 1919, she has issued two collections of poems. Last ' Lights' (1939) in spite of the fact, that one of the best experts on poetry George



Adamovich will coldly consider his edition, and as a whole to its inheritance, were its best poetic book. It specifies numerous responses of its memoirists. 'Uniqueness' Gippius speaks, first of all, special shrillness of its mind. Whether not therefore products of the poet always were long-awaited in the best emigrant anthologies? Melancholy, languor, consciousness of dissociation with people – all this the themes dictated by complex attitudes with after revolutionary Russia.

*... Who could think of the death?
(Sleds at an entrance... evening... snow).
Nobody knew. But as was to think.
What it – absolutely? For ever? For ever?..
Be silent! It is not necessary your hope!
(Street... Evening... Wind... Home...).
But how was to know. what there is no hope?
(Evening... A blizzard... Darkness...).*

In comparison with the early poetic products carrying strongly pronounced symbolical character, in the subsequent poems it was possible to observe incessant dialogue between two 'n' her hero. Love herself and the need of belief, playful pathos, sensation of the God, but also the sinfulness too – are those poles attitudes Gippius. The spirit of fight with God continually gives an up the place to the gained and realized feeling of being left by God.

*For a devil of you I ask,
God! And he is your creation.
I love a devil for that.
That I see in it – my suffering.
Бо́р я с ь and being tormented, it a network
The carefully weaves ...
Also I can regret
The one who, as well as I, suffer.
When our flesh arise,
In your court, for forgiveness
About, release to it, God,
His madness for suffering.*

Z.Gippius's lyric entirely is in authority 'mania of the contradiction'. "In mutinousness and impudence – sanctity; in a pray – blasphemy; in arrogance – love" (Korney Chukovsky). The poetess emphasized, that dual there is already an attribute imperfection, incompleteness: "never tell me, that there are two truths and two Gods. (...). And at whom two truths – are not present any". Hypotheses about inadequacy of poetic individuality Gippius to themselves set, and all of them speak passionate aspiration of last to two opposite

metaphysical infinity, We shall recollect lines: " the God is close to me – but I can not pray / I want love – and I can not love" . Question about her ' two universes' not an idle question. Proceeding from a duality of human consciousness, she considered the person as an essence forking and unambiguous, forking between despair and belief. " The person not only from this world, but also from the world of other; not only from necessity, but also from freedom; not only by nature, but also from the God" (Berdjaev, N. Philosophy of freedom, 1989). As one of infinite symbols of the God the Love acts. From here often egoistical and ambitious immersing in itself meaning explosion of the person and the world. Thus the sensation of dissonance becomes a certain spiritual engine Gippius and love – attribute of soul, the maximum astral feeling bringing the human good luck. " In the Human it is made not only an image of the world, but also an image of the God taken in aggregate of his infinite attributes. It divine presence on the Earth" (N.Berdjaev). The secret of the God – in soul of the poet, and soul of the last is developed in silence. " It is better to be silent, than to be to the world with not ready ideas ... " , is a unity Googol' s attitudes and attitudes to creativity made his separateness in the Russian literature. That ups to Zinaida Gippius, her silence – more likely a religious condition, rather than a way of renunciation of the world in the name of creativity.

At everyone the magic words: they as though mean nothing.

But will be recollected, will flash, will slip hardly – and heart will laugh and will begin to cry.

I to repeat them I do not like; I protect them for itself, purposely overlooking.

They to me will meet on new coast: they are written on a door of paradise.

Avaricious on emotional displays of feelings, but at the same time distinguished by depth of idea, this poetry was extremely original. Not casual statements, that on its verses it is possible to track a history of Russian modernism. The love, death, the maximum metaphysical measure and tragically impossibility of its achievement – are those themes Zinaida Gippius in which the art nature of its creativity has been designated. Verses Gippius – the quiet, cold ideas covered with breath of poetry. The shape of this unique creative person is those poetics. The alive, sharp idea bound with complex emotions, is pulled out from verses in searches of spiritual integrity and finding of a harmonious ideal. Zinaida Gippius belonged to a class which during two centuries created Russian culture. She understood, that the empire is doomed, and dreamed of the revived native land, but with arrival of revolution has seen wreck of culture, terrible moral run wilds. And, probably, therefore her creativity always expressed a pain of Russia.



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A Study on Marriage and Similar Marriage Customs in Turkish and Korean Cultures

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Since the creation of humans as male and female individuals, marriage, which allows them to live together, has been established automatically. The dynamics of marriage shows differences between cultures and may change depending on time. There are many rules and traditions, which are different in each culture for the establishment of the family, which is the smallest part of even the most developed nations. The formation of these rules and tradition has taken a long time and each of them has different meanings. These rules and traditions are formed in order to keep the duration of marriage long, to keep it peaceful, full of happiness and away from evil souls. The ancient cultural values, religious beliefs, regional effects etc. are the main factors affecting the formation of the traditions. Because of having close relations since ancient times, Korean and Turkish societies have many similarities probably as a result of cultural interaction.

A. Marriage and Marriage Traditions in Turkish Culture

1. Looking for a girl, asking for a girl and matchmaking

In today's culture, while many couples meet each other according to their own choice and wish, the old traditions are still carried out in many regions of Turkey. The family and the relatives of the groom to be search for the best bride candidate and after finding her, they visit the bride candidate's house. They see the girl, and tell the family of the girl the main purpose of their visit.

If the family accepts, the boy meets the girl. If they both like each other, the next step is the matchmaking step. In earlier times, the girl did not have the right to choose her husband. She would marry whoever her family wanted. But nowadays this situation has almost completely been removed.

In the matchmaking step, the older members of the family and the boy visit the girl's house. They take dessert, chocolate, flowers etc. with them. The girl gives them Turkish

coffee. The oldest member of the family asks for the girl. The girl's family may not accept at once. The boy's family may come two or three times more. After matchmaking, the next step is promise.

2. Promise

After the girl's family accept the marriage, in order to inform more people, that the boy and the girl are on the way to being married, the promise step is carried out in a more crowded environment. In the promise step, some gifts are given to the girl's family and the parents talk about the engagement and the wedding. A ring is given to the girl by the boy's family. The boy's family gives Turkish delight, biscuits etc. to visitors.

3. Engagement

The step after promise is called the engagement. But in some regions, the promise and engagement are done at the same time. Engagement may be carried out by the attendance of only members of both families or in a more expanded manner similar to the wedding. Engagement is done in the girl's house but expenses are paid by the boy's family. Before the engagement, families go shopping and the girl's family buys some clothes for some members of boy's family who do the same for the girl's family members. These gifts are sent to girl's house as an engagement package.

In the expanded engagements, visitors are invited to the engagement as if they are invited to a wedding. In some regions, the hosts serve food for the engagement. In some other regions, only biscuits and delights are served. The boy's and girl's relatives give money or jewelry to them as gifts. An old member of one of the families makes a short speech containing good expectations for the future. The girl and the boy wear rings that are tied to each other with a ribbon and then ribbon is cut. The boy and the girl kiss the hands of older family members. After that, entertainment with music or serving food is preferred.

4. Wedding

Wedding traditions are different in every region although some general traditions are as follows: In the old days, the weddings used to start on Tuesday and end on Thursday. However, today they start on Friday and end on Sunday. In the week before the wedding, the girl's belongings are prepared and exhibited in the girl's house. During carrying the chest, containing the girl's belongings from the girl's house to boy's house, the boy's



family has to pay chest money and feed the people that carry the chest.

In some regions, the girl's belongings are taken during wedding and in some regions before wedding. Some people who are invited to the wedding are informed by others that they are the reader and caller who visit all the houses in the area to share the time and the location of the wedding.

a. Henna Night

Henna night is carried out in the girl's house and it contains sorrow due to being the last night of the girl in her house. Applying henna is an old Islamic tradition. It is thought to have an effect on making the couple love each other and connecting them. Henna night is normally carried out only with the attendance of women, but the groom would attend the henna night sometimes. Henna is bought by the boy's family and sent to the girl's house together with some foods. The boy's women relatives meet and go to the girl's house together. After some entertainment, the henna application step is carried out. In some regions, a piece of gold is put in the henna. This is done for abundance, fertility and good luck. In addition, two candles are put in henna one of which represents the girl and the other one the boy. Henna is applied to the girl's hands and feet. But during this event, the girl does not open her hands, until her mother-in-law puts money or gold in her hand, then she opens her hands. Her relatives cry while she is applied the henna. Some ballads that are special for henna night are sung and after the henna application the girl is taken to a room to sleep. In some regions, henna is also applied to little finger of the boy.

b. Wedding Day

The wedding is the last stage of the period that has started with looking for a suitable girl. Marriage officially starts after this stage. As aforementioned, weddings last one week, three days and finally two days in recent years. In the last day of the wedding, the bride is taken from her house to groom's house. This event generally occurs on Sunday. The boy's family and relatives meet at the boy's house and go to girl's house by cars, in old days with horses, in companion with drums and shrill pipes. The bride's group ask questions to the groom's group. If they know the answers they have fun together, if not the groom's group should give a tip to the bride's group. When the group come close to the bride's house some people may stop them and ask for money. If the groom's group came from a long distance, the group is divided and fed by neighbors. The groom's group plays outside. In old times, people used to wrestle and sometimes watch horse and javelin shows. After the entertainment is over, the bride kisses the hand of her father. Her father ties a red

ribbon around her waist. Then bride kisses the hands of other older people. When the girl leaves the house, people throw wheat, candy etc. over her head. These are done in order to give her new house fertility.

When she leaves the house on a horse they take a trip inside the village, around some places like the mosque or cemetery. Sometimes people ask for money from the group. When the bride arrives at the groom's house she does not get out of or off the car or horse. After getting a valuable gift from her father-in-law or mother-in-law, she moves to a room with groom. In the room, they are served sweet drinks and after drinking, they go out together. The groom throws candies to the crowd from a bag full of candies that is given to him before. The bag also contains a small bag, which is full of money. The groom's friends take him and women visit the bride.

In the evening, a religious marriage, which is as important as the official marriage, is carried out. A religious qualified person, imam, declares them as husband and wife in front of witnesses. This religious marriage can be carried out earlier, so that the bride and groom can behave more comfortably in the Islamic society. Then the groom's friends punch his back and take him to the room. The bride asks for face-appearance gift, otherwise she does not talk. The groom gives her a gift. Later, they pray.

5. Traditions about Wedding and Different Applications

Some of them have been mentioned above but there are many other different traditions apart from those. Some are still applied but most of them have disappeared. Of course, these traditions may change from one region to another. Some of these are as follows:

- While leaving her family's house the bride kicks the door in order to leave her bad habits in her house.
- When she goes to her new house some people show her a mirror, so that she can have a bright fate and future.
- Before she leaves her house, the groom's family has to pay door money to her brother.
- Before she arrives at her new house, her pillow is taken to her new house and people are paid a tip.
- She steps on a sheepskin while getting out of the car in order to be a calm and easygoing person.
- In one hand, she holds the Koran and in the other, a loaf of bread so that she can be a religious person.



- Peanut, dried grapes etc. are poured onto bride's head. This means symbolizes fertility.
- She jumps over iron and fire so that se can be strong and stable and she can stay away from evil.
- A male child sits on the bride's lap so that she can have a lot of children.
- Her mother-in-law feeds the bride with fried eggs and oily bread so that her personality can be good.

B. Marriage and Marriage Traditions in Korean Culture

1. Before Wedding Ceremony

a. Finding The Suitable Girl

In the old days, when the girl and the boy are old enough to marry, their family used to ask people and friends for a suitable candidate. When they found a suitable person, a negotiator that is accepted by both families used to tell the ideas of one family to the other and check the affairs and availability of the marriage. The boy's mother and some other women used to visit the girl's house and ask some questions to her and finally used to decide. But in recent years, young people find the person that they are going to marry themselves and afterwards their family meets the girl or the boy. Also nowadays there are marriage companies that are widely used. Candidates give some information about themselves and clarify what kind of a person they are looking for. When there is a suitable candidate, they meet each other.

b. Date Setting

After getting the consent of the families, the next step is an application for an engagement. The boy's family sends a letter to the girl's family including the birth year, month, day and hour of the boy (90 cm width and 40 cm length). The letter is folded five times, put in a white envelope and tied with red and blue strings. The envelope is put in a blue box the inside of which is red and it is sent to the girl's family. The best wedding day that is determined by a fortuneteller is announced to the boy's family. In some regions, letter sending is assumed as the engagement, so this ceremony is carried out in girl's house or in a restaurant.

c. Exchanging Valuables

Before the wedding, the family of the boy sends a chest that is full of gifts to the girl's family. This chest contains two clothes for the girl one of which is yellow and the other of which is red. If the boy's family is rich the number of clothes can be four. At the same time, the chest contains marriage documents and girl keeps them for life. Again if the boy's family is rich, the chest may contain rings, necklaces or earrings. In some regions, it contains hot pepper, cottonseed or charcoal, which means good luck and many offspring.

"Ham" is brought to the girl's house by the groom, his friends and the "Ham" carrier. The "Ham" carrier stays apart from the girl's house and one of the girl's friends should give him a tip, drink or food in order to get the "Ham". The friends of the girl and the boy have fun all together,

2. Wedding Ceremony

In the old days, wedding ceremonies used to be carried out in the bride's house. The groom used to come to the girl's house on a horse. After the groom arrived, an older person that knew the traditions used to direct the ceremony with his loud voice. The ceremony used to start when the groom entered the girl's house. He used to go to the table beside the entrance. His friend used to bring wooden geese to the groom and he used to put them on the table. Then he bows to the geese four times. Later, the bride's mother takes the girls to the room inside which the bride sits. The groom sits on the east side of the table, which contains many foods including fruits and grains. The bride is prepared and she sits on the west side of the table.

The bride and groom wash their hands. The bride bows to the groom twice and the groom greets her once. Then she greets him once more. They drink two cups of wine. They fill the third cup and change the cups. The bride takes the cup to her mouth but she does not drink. The groom drinks the wine. Lastly, the bride and groom bow to the guests three times. The first time they greet their families, the second their ancestors and lastly the guests.

In recent years, the wedding ceremonies are generally carried out in wedding halls. The guests come to these halls and they give money as a gift. These weddings are in a western style. First of all, the bride is brought by her father and given to the groom. A person makes a speech. Then the bride and groom bow each other and also the guests. Afterwards, they move to a room, wear traditional clothes and the ceremony that is mentioned above is carried out. The bride and groom bow to the groom's family and serve



them drinks. Then they do the same for the groom's relatives, the bride's family and relatives. At this moment both families throw chestnuts and small dates on the bride's skirt for fertility and many offspring. All the guests and families eat at a restaurant together and the wedding ceremony ends.

3. After Wedding Ceremony

The people who came to the bride's house leave the house without the groom. The groom spends his first night in the bride's house in a specially designed room. Because there are many guests, the bride comes very late to the room. First of all, they drink together. The bride is still in the ceremony dresses. The groom should take off her dress. Young relatives may observe the room.

In the morning, the groom bows to the family of the bride. All the members of the family drink together. They ask some questions to the groom about the previous night. Symbolically, they hit the groom's feet with a stick. The groom serves food and drink to family members.

On the third day, the bride and groom go to the groom's house. This tradition is carried out in recent years. In the past, the groom used to leave the bride and visit her later. Sometimes the bride went to the groom's house two years later.

Nowadays, after completing the wedding ceremony, couples go on a honeymoon directly. After returning, they spend one night in the bride's house and then go to groom's house.

a. Take The Bride to Groom's House

Taking the bride to the groom's house is a very similar ceremony with the groom's arrival to the bride's house. The bride, one person from the bride's family, two women and many guys carrying the bride's chest go to the groom's house. In the old days, the groom used to go by horse and the bride was taken on a sedan chair. When the group arrived at the house, a woman threw red beans and cottonseeds onto the sedan chair in order to make the evil souls stay away. Also in some villages the bride jumped over a fire at the doorstep of the house for the same reason. When the bride enters the house, she sits on a cushion and always stares at the ground. Later, the bride's servant prepares a small table containing fruit, chicken and drink for the groom's family. The bride greets the groom's family members. They reply to her greeting and get a glass of drink. The groom's family

gives gifts to the bride. The bride greets all the family members. Later, senior members drink.

The next morning the bride has to get up early and greet her new family until they say stop. This situation may last three days sometimes one week. The bride does not enter the kitchen in the first three days. Her mother in law takes her to the relatives and introduces her. They prepare meals for her. Because some relatives do not have the chance to attend the wedding ceremony, they are informed about the bride in this way. After the third day, she starts to work in the kitchen.

Nowadays, the bride visits her family one-week later and stays there for three days and takes her family many gifts. In the past, the bride used to prepare cakes and drinks and visit her family after the harvest time. Traditional marriage customs may last for two years.

4. Beliefs about the Marriage

a. Kireogi: (Wild geese): Wooden geese represent the bride and the groom from the past until now; they are definitely used in all traditional wedding ceremonies. In Korean marriage culture, this is a very old tradition. Normally this bride is not exactly a duck or a goose, it is a different one. In ancient Korean culture, only this bird reaches god by flying. It also means that the couple is going to live together, if one them dies the other one will not look for someone else. It also has meanings to obey the rules and to inherit and pass on the heritance to their children, which they took from their ancestors.

b. Chickens: On the traditional wedding table there is one chicken and one rooster, which have been covered with blue and red clothes. The rooster represents the new days. The sound of the rooster keeps the evil souls away from the house of the bride and groom. Also the sound of the rooster means the start of a new day. Marriage is like a new day. The spawning of the chicken represents the hope that the couple may have many children.

c. Eum-yang : Eum resembles the female and the darkness, whereas Yang resembles daylight. The marriage ceremonies are generally carried out before evening so the couples can reach each other.

d. Others: In the past and now for a good marriage it is important to go to a fortuneteller who uses the birth dates of the boy and girl, and gets the best wedding day. This tradition has been influenced by shaman culture. The pictures of a crane and stork



are hung on the wall, which is at the back of table on which the marriage ceremony is carried out. These pictures resemble long life.

C. Similarities Between Two Cultures about Marriage Traditions

First of all, it should be stated that the old traditions are being lost day by day in both cultures. The main reason for this is that western culture deeply influences both cultures. For example in Korean culture, the honeymoon is one of the most important parts of a marriage. But in the past, there was not such a tradition. Maybe in the past, there were many more similarities between the two cultures than we have determined but most of them have vanished. The ones we have determined do not cover the whole society but it may change from region to region.

- One of the most important determinations is the "saci" tradition in Turkish and "saju" in Korean. They are similar functionally and also phonetically. In both cultures, this is an important part of the wedding that is carried out before the wedding. "Saci" is the name of the properties (food, clothes, money, jewellery etc.) that is sent to the bride's house by the groom's family. "Saju's" content is a bit different, in Korean culture. "saju" is the name of the documents about the groom that is sent to the girl's house by the groom's family. However, in addition it includes a gift, which is "saci".
- In Turkey, in order to protect the bride from evil souls and to be stable, she jumps over the fire or iron at the gate of the house. In Korea, for the same purposes, the bride jumps over fire or a sack of grain.
- When the bride enters the groom's house in Turkey, people throw roasted chick peas, dried grapes, peanut etc. at the groom's and bride's head in order to wish them to be fertile and have many children. The same tradition is carried out in Korea by using red beans and cottonseeds. It also is to keep evil souls away from the house.
- The Bride Price (Asking a big amount of money from the groom's family) is a tradition that is still applied in some regions of Anatolia. In the past, the same tradition could be seen in especially southeastern parts of Korea. This tradition also could be carried out not only asking for money, but also asking for meat, rice or clothes. Some people think that this tradition is a part of the culture.

- In Turkish culture, the bride's chest is not given easily. Generally the bride's brother sits on the chest and he receives "the chest money". In Korea, the "Ham" carrier receives money for giving "Ham".
- Traditionally, looking for the right girl for the boy is in the same style in both cultures. The boy's mother used to search for the suitable girl by asking the neighbors and the relatives. When they found a candidate, they used to visit the girl's house and talk to her and her mother. If they liked her, they would allow the boy and girl to see each other. In Korea, in some regions this happens in the same way. But in the past, both families agreed on a person and that person communicated with the families.
- In Turkey, after the first day of the marriage, a party is organized with the attendance of women and young girl. In Korea also the same kind of party is organized and some questions are asked to the groom about the night.
- Drinking something in the weddings can be seen in the weddings of both Turkish and Korean cultures. In Turkish tradition, after the bride is taken to the groom's house, the bride and groom drink a kind of sweet drink together. In Korea, the bride and groom serve drinks to each other and to their families. This is an important part of Korean weddings.
- In the old Turkish society, only the parents could decide on marriage. The person to get married did not have the right to choose. Sometimes the boy and girl did not see each other before marriage. Also in old Korean weddings, sometimes the bride and the groom used to see each other for the first time in the wedding.
- In the past, both countries used to be highly agricultural, so that having many children was important for both societies. So in Turkey, a male child sits on the bride's lap. In Korea, a chicken and a rooster are put on the table in the wedding. This is carried out in order to have many children.
- In Turkish culture, the promise and the engagement ceremonies are carried out with the attendance of families and close relatives. Even though there is not a complete engagement in Korea, the sending of "saju" to the girl's house, going to the fortuneteller and getting the best wedding date and telling this to the groom's family can be seen as an engagement. And sometimes this event is done in the girl's house or in a restaurant. But nowadays, with the influence of western culture, wedding-like engagement ceremonies can easily be observed.
- Especially in Korean culture, the marriage of two young people means to combine the families as well. Families see each other very often. This is the same in



Turkish culture. In the past, the adaptation of the families was much more important than the adaptation of the bride and groom.

- In Turkish society, one week after the wedding, the bride gets a present or a dessert and visits her family. They eat together. The same tradition can be seen in the Korean culture.
- In Turkey, the hairstyle of the bride is different in every region. This is the same in Korean culture.
- In Turkey, especially in Edirne and Kırklareli regions, some play with animal skulls were played in the past. In Korea, while bringing the "Ham" similar kinds of play can be observed.
- In Turkish society, during the wedding while the bride leaves her house a red ribbon is tied to her wrist by her father. This is called an effort ribbon. In Korea, red and blue ribbons are used to tie or cover the gifts.

D. Conclusion

As aforementioned, marriage and its customs are very important regarding the social life in both of the societies. In both of the societies, from the beginning to the end of the marriage, everything goes in a parallel way and some steps are even performed almost the same. Considering the fact that customs are born within communities and developed over time, we can clearly state that both communities must have had close relationships with one another in the past. And if we extended our analysis of similar customs for other communities, it would definitely much more solidify the relationship of the Turkish and Korean communities.

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Conflict Management in Islam: The Qur'anic Truth about Struggle, War and Terror

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Introduction

In this paper I want to elucidate the concept of *Jihad* in Islam and briefly trace its conceptual development through out history to the present. For centuries, the West viewed Islam as a threat to itself and did not miss the slightest opportunity to equate Islam with violence, belligerence and terror. In doing so, many Western scholars tended to support their arguments by zooming on some Qur'anic texts detaching them from their contexts and thus they paved the way and gave legitimacy to the misinformed discourses of so many western opinion leaders and lobbyist. For instance, such scholars tend to regard the Qur'anic concept of *Jihad* (Struggle) as a call for belligerence that informs all Muslims subsequent behavior and culture at large.

In the words of Maxime Rodinson "Western Christendom perceived the Muslim World as a menace long before it began to be seen as a real problem."¹ This view is reiterated by the British historian Albert Hourani who maintains that Islam from the moment of its inception was a problem for Christian Europe. Christians believed that "Islam is a false religion, Allah is not God, Muhammad was not a prophet; Islam was invented by men whose motives and character were so deplored, and propagated by the sword."² Oliver of Paderborn, a thirteenth century crusader and polemicist asserts, "Islam began by the sword, was maintained by the sword, and by the sword would be ended."³ Such pessimistic and antagonistic perception of Islam is still prevalent in the post-enlightenment and post-modern west: Professor Richard Bulliet of Columbia University maintains that Americans have quite readily accepted the notion that acts of violence committed by some Muslims "are representative of a fanatic and terroristic culture that can not be tolerated or reasoned with."⁴ Obviously, ages of interaction have left astringent legacy between the Islamic world and the Christian West, stemming mainly from the fact that both civilizations

claim a universal message and mission and share much of the same Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman heritage.

The Traditional Concept of Jihad

Derived from the Arabic word *Jahada*, the word *jihad* literally means “to struggle” or “to strive” or to work for a noble cause with determination.⁵ Ibn Rushd describes *jihad* as an effort directed against any object of disapprobation by use of the heart, the tongue, the hands and the sword.⁶ *Jihad* does not mean, as many western scholars assumed, “holy war”. “Holy war” in Arabic means *al-harb al-muquadassa*, and there is a great semantic difference between the two terms.

In the Qur'an *jihad* (considered by some jurists as the “sixth pillar” of Islam) is only one of several duties incumbent upon the Muslim. Ann Lambton maintains that the duty of *jihad* was so much exalted in the traditions as a result of the “Arab conquests that gave a psychological twist to Islamic thought.”⁷

As a matter of fact, Muslim scholars have disagreed throughout their history about the meaning of the term *jihad*. In the Qur'an *Jihad* is more than often mentioned in the context of fighting in the path of God, (*fi sabil Allah*).⁸ In the sayings of the Prophet (*Hadith*) *jihad* is occasionally used to mean armed combat, and a good number of Islamic theologians and jurists in the early Islamic period perceived this commitment to be in a military sense.⁹

Bernard Lewis rightly contends that Islamic jurists perceived *jihad* in the context of conflict in a world divided between the *Dar al-Islam* (territory under Islamic control) and the *Dar al-harb* (territory of war consisted of all lands not under Muslim rule).¹⁰ However, this obligation to maintain *jihad* until the entire world is integrated in the territory of Islam does not signify that Muslims must wage nonstop warfare. In fact, Islam allowed for the negotiation of truces and long-term peace treaties. Furthermore, extending the territory of Islam does not signify the annihilation of all non-Muslims, nor even their conversion: *jihad* does not at all imply conversion by force, as the Qur'an clearly states “There is no compulsion in religion.”¹¹

Streusand argues that *Jihad* is traditionally perceived not as an obligation of each



individual Muslim (known as *fard 'ayn*) but as a general obligation of the Muslim community (*fard kifaya*). Only in emergencies, when the Dar al-Islam comes under unexpected attack, do all Muslims have to take part in *jihad*.¹² Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, a thirteenth century philosopher and jurist, challenged this traditional view of a limited, defensive version of *jihad*.¹³ He confirmed that a ruler who neglects to implement the shari'a methodically in all facets of life, including the conduct of *jihad* is an apostate and consequently forfeits his right to rule. Ibn Taymiyya vigorously advocated *jihad* as warfare against both the Crusaders and Mongols who then occupied parts of the Dar al-Islam; and above all, he radically departed away from the mainstream of Islam by declaring that a professing Muslim who does not live by the faith is an apostate. By going well beyond most jurists who put up with pragmatic rulers who failed to abide fully by the shari'a for the sake of community stability, Ibn Taymiyya laid the foundation for the intellectual arguments of contemporary radical Islamists.

Classical Jurists, as a matter of fact, distinguished three ways by which *Jihad* can be conducted. In addition to the traditional legal view of *jihad* as a compulsory, communal effort to defend and expand the Dar al-Islam, and Ibn Taymiyya's notion of active *jihad* as an indispensable feature of legitimate rule, there was also the Sufis' doctrine of *greater jihad* or the *Jihad* of the heart. The *jihad* of the heart in essence is directed against the flesh, called by the Sufis the 'carnal soul'. It was to be accomplished by fighting temptation through purification of the soul. For Sufis the *greater jihad* is a necessary part of the process of gaining spiritual insight. Hassan Fadhl asserts, "most Muslims see *jihad* as a personal rather than a political struggle, while physical actions taken in defense of the realm are considered the *lesser jihad*."¹⁴ In the light of such hermeneutic acrobatics emanating from varied Islamic schools of thought, it is not surprising, then, that disagreement over the meaning of *jihad* has continued into the postmodern era.

Sunni and Shi'a Interpretations of *Jihad*

Both Sunni and Shi'a agree that *jihad* applies to the defense of land, life, faith, and possessions; it is mandatory and warranted to ward off invasion or its threat; it is necessary to ensure freedom for the dissemination of Islam; and that difference in religion alone is not an adequate foundation for *jihad*. Some Islamic scholars have distinguished

between disbelief and persecution and injustice, and claimed that *jihad* is “justified only to fight those unbelievers who have initiated aggression against the Muslim community.”¹⁵ Others such as Mawdudi and Qutb, however, have entrenched behind a more belligerent position instigated by the Islamic resistance to the European powers during the colonial phase: in this position, *jihad* as “aggressive war” is sanctioned against all non-Muslims, whether they are persecuting Muslims or not¹⁶.

The issue of right authority, that is to say, no *jihad* can be launched unless a legitimate ruler initiates it, also has been divisive among Muslims. The Sunnis deemed all of the Muslim caliphs as legitimate callers of *jihad*, as long as they had the support of the dominion’s *ulama* (Islamic scholars and jurists).¹⁷ The Shi’a regard this authority as the sole domain of the Imams. The lack of proper authority after the disappearance of the 12th (“Hidden”) Imam in 874 A.D. also posed problems for the Shi’a. This Problem was resolved by the *ulama* increasingly taking upon themselves this authority. In this tradition all legitimate forms of *jihad* may be considered defensive, and there is no restriction on the kind of war that may be waged in the Hidden Imam’s absence so long as a just ruler authorizes it.

Both camps, however, concur on the other fundamentals for *jihad*. The *niyyah* or the right intention is essentially important for under taking *jihad*. Battling for the sake of conquest, spoils, or any other selfish motives will merit no recompense; the only legitimate rationale for *jihad* is to get closer to God.¹⁸ *Jihad* may not be embarked on unless the enemy has first been alerted and offered the triple alternative: accept Islam; pay the poll tax (*jizyah*) or fight.

Jihad in the Modern Era

Sayyid Abu al-A’la Mawdudi¹⁹ is the first Islamist writer to approach *jihad* systematically. Struggle, he stipulates, is carried out not just to “expand Islamic political dominance, but also to establish just rule; one that includes freedom of religion”.²⁰ Mawdudi perceived *jihad* as analogous to war of liberation, and is meant to “establish politically independent Muslim states.”²¹ Mawdudi’s *jihadist* position drastically altered the notion of *Jihad* in Islam and instantly coupled it with anticolonialism and national liberation movements. Further more, his approach prepared the ground for Arab resistance to



Zionism and the existence of the state of Israel to be regarded as *jihad*. Mawdudi's activist and nationalist conception of *jihad* and its role in establishing a truly Islamic government influenced Radical Egyptian Islamist thinkers Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) who further incorporated Ibn Taymiyya's earlier perception of *jihad* that embraces the notion of ousting governments that fall short of implementing the *shari'a*. This idea of revolution incites the radicals to first target their own un-Islamic rulers²² before Muslims can direct *jihad* against external enemies. Hasan al-Banna unequivocally asserts, "impure and untrue Muslim leaders are not eligible to lead *jihad*, not even against a legitimate target such as Israel or any colonizing force."²³ Significantly, radical Islamists consider *jihad* compulsory for all Muslims, making it an individual rather than a communal obligation. On the other hand, under the impact of the writings of early Islamic exegetes such as al-Shafi' about the Islamic concept of "*Dar al-Sulh*" Land of Peace or "*Dar al-'Ahd*"²⁴ Land of Truce, scholars of the caliber of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida sought to show that peace, rather than enmity, was the normative state of affairs between Muslims and non-Muslims in Islam.

Jihad Versus Terror

In spite of the various hermeneutical interpretations of the nature, duration, subjects and objects of *Jihad*, the Islamic juristic tradition is very antagonistic toward terror as an instrument for *Jihad*. Orthodox Muslim jurists were extremely intolerant toward warriors who carried out attacks against innocent and defenseless victims or who spread terror through rape, abduction, poisoning of wells and the use of poisoned arrows and spears, arson, attacks against travelers, and nocturnal attacks. In such cases, Donner maintains, jurists demanded harsh penalties, including death, and ruled, "the punishment was the same whether the perpetrator or victim was Muslim or non-Muslim."²⁵ Restrictions also are sternly imposed on the conduct of warriors in *jihad*: distinction of civilians from warriors is mandatory, along with the strict prohibition of harm to noncombatants such as women, children, the disabled, monks and rabbis, and those who have been granted protection. Also in *Jihad* proportionality in any armed conflict is of primary importance, denoting that the minimal amount of force is used to attain the desired ends in combat.²⁶

Sheikh Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of Lebanese *Hizb Allah*, confirms that acts of

terrorism which include the destruction of life, kidnapping, or the hijacking of airliners or ships are not valid or warranted in Islam. Fadlallah asserts "militants have gone too far in the conduct of their struggle when they employ such means."²⁷ Nevertheless, he concludes by informing the American public that it is in their interest to ameliorate the situation by "pressing for reforms in the policies of their government."²⁸

The *jihad* tradition, commandeered at the moment by Islamic radicals, makes it unambiguous that not everything is permissible and tolerated. Although the language in the Qur'an, hadith and in other conventional Muslim sources is relatively militant in many places, this is only a manifestation of the Muslims' world in the seventh century, that consisted initially of confrontation with a variety of more powerful non-Islamic tribes followed by successful military campaigns to extend the faith. Though Islamic sacred texts are replete with exhortation to fight, they have equally established divine rules for engagement with the enemy, which included prohibitions against the killing of noncombatants such as women, children, the aged, and the disabled. These sacred texts also stipulate that a notice should be passed to the opponent before an attack; necessitate that a Muslim army must seek peace if its opponent does, and prohibit suicide and committing aggression against others.

To conclude, in her book *Muhammed*, Karen Armstrong writes: "Fighting and warfare might sometimes be necessary, but it was only a minor part of the whole *jihad* or struggle. A well-known tradition (hadith) has Muhammad say on returning from a battle, ' We return from the little *jihad* to the greater jihad,' the more difficult and crucial effort to conquer the forces of evil in oneself and in one's own society in all the details of daily life."²⁹ Islam with its philosophy, instigated from the Qur'an, Hadith, Ijtihad (informed opinion) and Ijma'(consensus) while calling for fighting in self-defense, accentuates the struggle to defeat the evil in oneself, abhors and denounces violence committed against non-combatants and approaches conflict management with humane, ecological and environmental outlook.

Notes

¹ Maxime Rodinson, *Europe and the Mystique of Islam*, trans. Roger Veinus (London: I. B. Tauris, 1987), 3.



² Albert Hourani, *Islam in European Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10

³ Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), 127.

⁴ Richard Bulliet, *Under Siege: Islam and Democracy* (New York: CUP, 1994), 3.

⁵ Edward Lane, *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, bk 1 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1965), 473.

⁶ Ibn Rushd, *Kitab al-Muqaddimat* (Cairo, A.H. 1325), 1, 259.

⁷ Ann Lambton, "A Nineteenth Century View of Jihad," *Studia Islamica* 32, 1970: 181-192, quotation on p. 181.

⁸ The Qur'an is replete with verses that insight Muslims literally to fighting:

"But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the infidels wherever ye find them; and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem; but if they repent and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity then open the way for them; for God is forgiving, Most Merciful." *Al-Tawba* (9:5)

"O Apostle! Rouse the believers to the fight, if there are twenty amongst you, patient and persevering, they will vanquish two hundred; if a hundred, they will vanquish a thousand of the unbelievers; for these are a clan without understanding." *Al-Anfal* (8:65)

"Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you" *Al-Baqara* (2:216)

"And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out.....Refrain from fighting them in the vicinity of the Holy Mosque, but if they fought you there, slay them; such is the punishment of the infidels." *Al-Baqara* (2:191)

"Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and his apostle, nor acknowledge the religion of truth even if they are the people of the book, until they pay the Jizya (poll tax) with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued." *Al-Tawba* (9:29)

"... I will instill terror into the hearts of the unbelievers: smite ye above their necks and smite all their finger-tips off them." *Al-Anfal* (8:12)

"O ye, who believe, when ye meet the Unbelievers in hostile array, never turn your backs to them. If any do turn his back to them on such a day - unless it be in a stratagem of war, or to retreat to a troop of his own- he draws on himself the wrath of Allah, and his abode is Hell, - an evil refuge, indeed." *Al-Anfal* (8: 15,16)

"O Prophet, strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites! Be harsh with them. Their ultimate abode is hell, a hapless journey's end. *Al-Tawba*." (9:73)

"Allah hath purchased of the believers their persons and their goods: for theirs in return is Paradise: they fight in His cause, and slay and are slain: a promise binding on Him in truth, through the Law, the Gospel, and the

Qur'an." *Al-Tawba* (9:111)

"O ye who believe! Fight those of the disbelievers who are near to you, and let them find harshness in you, and know that Allah is with those who keep their duty unto Him." *Al-Tawba* (9:123)

"Fighting for the Cause of Allah (*Jihad*) was sanctioned widely in *sahih hadiths*. A great number of *Bukhari's*, Islam's principal collector of *Hadith*, focused on *jihad* as physical war. See *Bukhari* book 52. Volume 4, sayings no. 42, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 61, among many others. See Hasan Abd al-Baqi, ed., *Sahih Al-Bukhari*, (Cairo: Sha'b Press, 1985).

¹⁰ Bernard Lewis, *the Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1988), 72.

¹¹ *Al-Baqara* (2:256).

¹² Douglas E. Streusand, "What Does *Jihad* Mean?" *Middle East Quarterly*, 4 (September 1997), 2.

¹³ See Ahmad Rashid, *Turath ibn Taymiyya* [The Legacy of Ibn Taymiyya] (Cairo: Cairo University Press, 1997)

¹⁴ Hassan Fadhl, *al-Mutassawifoun* [The Sufists] (Beirut: Academic Press, 2002), 87.

¹⁵ Ali Hasan al-Halabi, *Fundamentals of Commanding Good and Forbidding Evil According to Shaykh Ul-Islam Ibn Taymiyya* (Cincinnati: Al-Qur'n wa-s-Sunna Society of North America, 1995), 9.

¹⁶ See Musa abo Farj, *al Ussouliyah fi Misir* [Islamic Fundamentalism in Egypt] (Cairo: Shatheli Press, 2003)

¹⁷ see Muhiyeldin Sha'rawi, *Thaqafat al-Jihad fi al-Islam* [The *Jihad* Culture in Islam] (Beirut: Sayda Press, 2000)

¹⁸ W. Montgomery Watt miss read the essence of *jihad* by claiming that several of Muhammad's early military expeditions were instances of *razzia*, that is, nomadic incursions in pursuit of booty, and that many of the early wars of expansion were concerned with material gain rather than with the spread of Islam. See Thomas Patrick Murphy, ed., *The Holy War* (Columbia: Ohio State University Press, 1976), 143.

¹⁹ Mawdudi (1903–1979) is a prominent Indo-Pakistani Islamist ideologue and scholar who agitated for Pakistan's independence from India.

²⁰ Muhsin Abbas, *Jihad from Mawdudi to Qutb* (London: Reis Press, 1998), 45.

²¹ Muhsin Abbas, 48.

²² Qutb labels the Muslim rulers who fail to live up to the standards of sharia as "the closer enemy." See Muhsin Abbas, 81.



²³ Muhammad abu Kharoubeh, *Hasan al-Banna's Circle: Radical Islam in Egypt* (London: Abacus, 1987), 92.

²⁴ See al-Mawardi, *al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya*, ed. Musa Shalhoub (Baghdad, al-Rasheed Press, 1969), 87.

²⁵ Fred M. Donner, "The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War," in *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions*, ed. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 69.

²⁶ "God tells the Muslims in the *Qur'an*"... and do not aggress; GOD dislikes the aggressors." *Al-Ma'eda* (5:87); ".....You shall resort to pardon, advocate tolerance, and disregard the ignorant." *Al-A'raf* (7:199).

²⁷ Joseph Massad, "11 September, Islam and the Intifada: An Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, 2 (Winter 2002), 83.

²⁸ Joseph Massad, 84.

²⁹ Karen Armstrong, *Muhammed: A biography of the Prophet* (San Francisco: Harper, 1993), 27.



The inward values of Taekwondo

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I . Introduction

Taekwondo is a representative cultural heritage of Korea that has spread all over the world. With 60,000,000 apprentices from 181 countries and having been chosen as an formal event at the Olympics at the 2000 Sidney Olympic, Taekwondo has positioned itself as an sport to excite people throughout the world. In spite of that popularity, however, a philosophical reflection of Taekwondo has not clearly been known.

Western people usually suppose Taekwondo as a mystified fighting skill or a way to exert a kind of supernatural power. The special value of Taekwondo, different from Western sports, explains the reason of that mysticism. What are the inward values of Taekwondo? The objective of this paper is to explain them. We need to set a definition of Taekwondo before any direct approaching to inward values of it.

II . The Definition of Taekwondo

As mentioned above, it should be provided with a definition of 'What is Taekwondo?' as a precondition to explain its inward values. The discussion of definition will be developed on the basis of the factual and normative concepts by Song, Hyeong-suk(2006).

1. Taekwondo as a factual concept

A factual concept of Taekwondo is used to designate an event of sports in a general sense. According to it, Taekwondo appears as a neutralized form of action consisting in a series of bodily skills and rules, as a event of sports like soccer, volleyball, basketball, handball, judo, etc. Then Taekwondo can be defined as a martial arts of Korea that a weaponless player usually strike with kicks maintaining some distance from the opponent. This kind of perspective is focusing on the technical part of Taekwondo which means things like the improvement of exciting skills as destructions or flying kicks and the win-

for-win principle of games. As a factual concept, therefore, Taekwondo is like all the other sports in that a player must be stronger than the others physically and skillfully, and he/she must dominate the opponent to win. The opponent appears not as his/her partner but only as an enemy to always stand against. The meaning of competition in every sport including Taekwondo is wholly self-interested, and crowd gathers to enjoy the scene of difference between winner and loser in a stadium or gym(Lee, Jung-hak, 1995).

2. Taekwondo as a normative concept

The normative concept of Taekwondo varies according to the meaning of Tao(道). In East, the Tao is the basic principle to explain the forming and changing of all things in the universe. Tao is the essence, the true form of everything, and it is the achievement of perfection for men to reach it. In East this idea gave rise to the traditional task of mind-training. The traditional bodily training in East is still based on the concept of Tao, that the meaning of Tao, a system of thought in training, is not an idealistic one but a practical one to be practically exercised.

1) Taekwondo as a way of men

Men are of necessity social beings to live together with others. Upon that necessity it is called the ethic to understand, adhere to, and practice the order and custom of community. In Taekwondo the traditional idea of East and the traditional ethic of Korea are included, for it is the very product out of those backgrounds. Those kinds of value consider both the movement of body and mind at the same time and do not discriminate between them. The objective of Taekwondo, therefore, is to pacify my mind as a completed character and not to dominate the enemy, that a real victory is to purify one's mind that was once troubled. The true value of Taekwondo training lies in a perception to pursue the completed character as a social being. We can have a chance of self-reflection and formation of character not just with simple things as technics and wins, but with a realization of a wisdom of life including the harmony among things as nature, human being, universe, and the respect and love towards men.

Now we have to exalt Taekwondo as a global culture of bodily and social training for 60 million people from 181 countries outside the local particularity of Korea.

2) Taekwondo as a way of art

The normative concept of Taekwondo includes a value of art. The art here refers to a value to seek powerfulness and healthiness at the same time. According to it, it is not the



true meaning of Taekwondo to take one over another. We can have powerfulness through training. Training is a process of effort to reach the ideal state of a perfect powerfulness. The process to a perfect powerfulness presupposes healthiness. We cannot continue in training without healthiness. This value of Taekwondo seeks the principle of non-violence and non-attacking based on the powerfulness and healthiness, which are sought at the same time through the endless training and Gyorugi as a law of animating, not killing.

3) Taekwondo as a self-discipline

In East, the martial arts was taken for a long time not only in a sense of winning and skills of fighting, but in a more profound sense of ethic and morality. According to that, a man who trains martial arts should be perfect in his/her character as well as in his/her skills. This kind of expectation can be found in a traditional Eastern concept of self-discipline. In East self-discipline means both bodily training and the discipline of human mind through it. The word standing for self-discipline itself has a certain nuance as the mind training or forming of character.

What draws our attention in the study of archery and arts at Japan or the Far East is that they are for mind training and not for a utilitarianism or an aesthetic pleasure. Herrigel(1971) described this feature of Eastern martial arts well in his point that it is "to be united with the ultimate reality." Taekwondo is also same in seeking a perfect character through bodily training. It explains the perfectness of self-realization with things as self-control, law-abidingness, patriotism, pacifism. The outcome of bodily training in Taekwondo is the sublimating of one's character.

This kind of concept of discipline is founded on the thought that body and mind are inseparably related to each other. In India there is a word tapas as an analogous concept of discipline. Tapas is usually translated into a concept as asceticism, but originally refers to an activity of heating something as heat or fire does. Tapas can then be taken as an energy to generate or awaken a new self or a new activity of mind inside one's spirit through training every competence in one's body. As we have seen, in East the thought that sees bodily training as mind training has since long been passed on. This sort of view on discipline has a very important implication for Taekwondo as a way of education nowadays.

III. Conclusion

Having been chosen as a formal event at the Olympic Games, the competitive and win-

for-win side of Taekwondo has stood out and the commercialism and spectacular character of Taekwondo have spread rapidly according to it. It causes a threat as a harm to the identity of and a misunderstanding of Taekwondo(Kim, Dong-gyu, Kim, Hyeong-gyu, Joo, Dong-jin, 1995). This game-centered trend will degrade Taekwondo into a game of mere spectacle and winning with fragmentary learning of techniques, and further into a brutal fight matching crowd's taste and commercialism. Therefore a fixing of inward values of Taekwondo has an critical role in the desirable development of it.

We shall look briefly over the factual and normative concepts aforementioned to finally draw a conclusion of this study.

The inward value of Taekwondo as a factual concept tries to 'show' an superficial feature and reality. Spectacular kicks, thundering shouts, tensed looks are never to be failed in catching the eyes of the world. Especially the magnificent kick at the final heavyweight match of Olympic Athens 2004 showed the essence of Taekwondo skills.

But this kind of one-sided pursuit will promote popularizing of Taekwondo and make it fall down to the mere win-for-win principle and spectacle. The factual concept of Taekwondo will be properly fixed presupposing a broader value of mind training.

Another inward value of Taekwondo as a normative concept emphasizes the concept of Tao in the tradition of East and the discipline of body and mind in a community to attain the perfectness of character through bodily training. And the value of powerfulness and healthiness seeks the principle of non-violence and non-attacking and fixes itself as a law of animating, not killing.

If the factual concept of Taekwondo centers on things to 'be shown', the normative concept centers on things to 'be felt.' The expression of manner and respect at the match is taken as a part of mind training pursuing not the winning itself but the love and respect for men.

Now Taekwondo should spare no efforts in uplifting itself from the factual concept to 'be shown' to the normative concept to 'be felt'.

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THE IDEA OF CREATION IN IQBAL 'S PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract in Turkish

İKBAL'İN DİN FELSEFESİNDE "YARADILIŞ" FİKRİ

Hindistan'ın Madras, Haydarabat ve Aligarh gibi çeşitli üniversitelerinde 1928 ve 1929 yıllarında verdiği İngilizce konferanslarının bir araya getirilmesiyle oluşmuş bulunan *İslam'da Dinî Düşüncenin Yeniden Kuruluşu* adlı eserindeki ilk konferansına İkbâl şu sorularla başlar: "İçinde yaşadığımız evrenin karakteri ve genel yapısı nedir? Evrenin kuruluşunda sürekli olan bir unsur var mıdır? Evrenle ne gibi ilişkiler içindeyiz? Evrendeki yerimiz nedir? ve Hangi tutumumuz bu yere uygundur?" Evrenin "yaradılış"ı fikri onun din, felsefe ve edebiyat alanlarında ortak bir nitelik taşıdığına işaret ettiği bu sorulara verilmiş cevapların ışığında ele alınacaktır.

Tanrıya atfedilen yaratmanın her şeyi yoktan ve ezelden bir defada gerçekleştirilmiş bir yaratma olduğundan söz edilebildiği gibi, yine her şeyi yoktan ama ezelden bir defada değil, ezeli bir şimdinin içinde her an ve sürekli yaratma olduğundan da söz edilebilmektedir. İkbâl bunlardan ikincisini benimsemiş olan bir düşünürdür. İslam'ın öngördüğü Tanrı anlayışına uygun bulduğu bu sürekli yaratılış modelini açıklarken o, bu konudaki düşüncelerini Bergson, Whitehead ve Hartshorne gibi süreç metafiziğinin Batı'daki önemli temsilcilerinin fikirleriyle destekler. Kur'an'da yaratmayı anlatmak için kullanılmış olan "halk", "ibda" ve "kün" gibi sözcüklerin anlamlarını İkbâl yine Kur'an'da geçen "sünnetullah" kavramının ışığında anlamaya çalışırken, süreç felsefesinin kendisine büyük bir kolaylık sağladığı söylenebilir.

İkbâl'in evrenin yaratılışına ilişkin fikirlerini tartışmaya geçmeden önce "yaratma" kavramının düşünce tarihinin akışı içinde kazanmış olduğu anlamlara çok genel hatlarıyla bir göz atmanın yararlı olacağı kanısındayız. Genel, sanatsal ve teolojik anlamlardaki kullanılışları dikkate alındığında bu kavramla, eğer herhangi bir şeyin önceden varolan unsurlar aracılığıyla yeni bir biçime kavuşması kastedilirse, bundan bir sanat eserinin yaratılması, bir yolun yöntemin ortaya çıkarılması, yaratıcı bir düşüncenin kendini göstermesi v.s. anlaşılır.

Teolojik anlamda, eğer evrenin Tanrı'yla birlikte ezeli olmadığı, belirli bir zamanda Tanrı'nın iradesiyle var olmaya başladığı kabul edilirse, buna da onun yoktan yaratılması (*création ex nihilo*) denilir. Yaratmanın bir de Batı felsefe geleneğinin önce skolastikleri ile kartezyenlerinde daha sonra da Whitehead ve Hartshorne gibi panenteistlerinde görülen bir "*sürekli yaradılış*" biçiminden söz edilir ki, bununla Tanrı'nın evrenin her anını bir varoluş sürecinin içinde muhafaza etmesi kastedilir.

Hartshorne'a göre, "yaratmak daha önce belirsiz olanı belirlemek, tahsis edilmemiş tahsis etmek ve böylece realitenin zenginliğine yeni bir şey eklemektir". Yaratıcılığı bilfiil varlıkların bir *sebebi* olarak değil, bilfiil varlıkları yaratıcılığın *anları* olarak gören Whitehead'e göre ise, zamanın içinde akıp giden bütün süreç yaratıcılığın içinde gerçekleştiğinden yaratıcılığın tükenmesi diye bir şey söz konusu olamaz.

André Lalande *Vocabulaire*'inde J.Lachelier'ye dayanarak, yaratmaya yaratıcısı olmayan bir başlangıç denilemeyeceği gibi, onun bir başlangıç fikrini içermesinin de zorunlu olmadığını; M.Bernès'e dayanarak da, zamandaki başlangıç fikrinin ancak yoktan (*ex nihilo*) yaratma fikrinin belirli bir formuna bağlı bulunduğunu, dolayısıyla, yaratma sözcüğünün bu anlamıyla yalnızca öze değil aynı zamanda varoluşa, yalnızca forma değil aynı zamanda maddeye radikal bir bağımlılığı, bu bağımlılığın zamanın dışında bile tasarlanabileceği bir biçimde, gösterdiğini öne sürer.

Buraya kadar İkbâl'in yaradılış kavramı ile ilgili olarak, özeti verilmiş olan düşünceleri asıl bildiri metninde daha ayrıntılı biçimde ele alınıp tartışılacaktır.



MEVLANA VE 13.YY.IN BAZI SUFİLERİNDE EVRENSEL BİRLİK FİKRİ

(The Universal Concept of Unity of Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi and the Other
13th Century Turkish Poets)

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Asrımızın büyük düşünürlerinden Toynbee, Ikeda ile yaptığı kitaplaşmış uzun söyleyişinde (Yaşamı Seçin, Ankara Üniv. Yay.)günümüz insanlığının içinde bulunduğu şu temel paradoksa dikkat çeker. Bu çağın insanı olan bizler atalarımıza göre çok daha bilgiliyiz fakat daha ahlaklı değiliz. Bu yüzden erişmiş olduğumuz bilgi ve teknoloji bir silah gibi yine kendi kendimizi tehdit eder hale gelmiştir. Medeniyetimizin kendi kendisini mahvetmemesi için bu bilgiyi kaldırarak bir ahlak omurgasına ihtiyacı vardır. Diğer taraftan mademki dünya global bir köy haline gelmiştir ahlaki değerlerin de bütün insanların paylaştığı ortak hümaniter değerler olması lazım gelir. Peki ama bu ortak değerleri nereden bulacağız? Düşünürümüz bunun için en iyi kaynağın yine mevcut büyük dinler olduğu fikrindedir. Ne var ki Toynbee'ye göre dinlerin çatışmacı bir yanı da vardır, dolayısıyla bu özellikleri ayıklanmalı ve bir nevi ıslah edilerek ehlileştirilmelidirler. Bizce bu tavır tipik bir sektüler bakış tarzıdır. Dinin ilahi olduğuna inanan bir mümin için dine müdahale etmek söz konusu olamaz. O halde sorumuz şu olmalıdır? Globalleşmenin zaruretine inanan bir fert yahut toplum kendi dini değerlerine bağlı kalarak evrenselleşebilir mi? Başka kültürlerle yan yana ve barış içinde yaşayabilir mi? Sözelimi İslam böyle bir paylaşımına açık mıdır? Bu kısa tebliğimizde 13.yy.da Anadolu'da yaşamış 3 sufiden hareketle bu sorunun cevabını arayacağız.

Fikirlerine başvuracağımız üç sufiden biri gerek eserleriyle gerek Mevlevilik diye bilinen tarikatıyla bütün dünyada çok tanınan bir şahsiyet olan Mevlana Celaleddin Rumidir. (1207-1273)Onun fikri takipçileri ve çağdaşları olan diğer ikisi ise Türkçenin en büyük şairlerinden olan Yunus Emre(1240 -1320) ile Garipname isimli büyük bir Mesnevi yazmış olan Aşık Paşa(-1332)'dir. Aşık Paşanın Garipnamesi daha sistematik bir yapıda olduğu için biz her üç sufide paralel olan hümaniter fikirleri öncelikle bu eseri merkeze alarak incelemek istiyoruz.

Bir mühendis kafasına sahip olan Aşık Paşa 10 bin beyti aşan hacimli eserini

oldukça ilginç bir sistemle yazmıştır. Yazar kütüphanecilikte kullanılan 10'lu Dewey sistemi gibi her rakamı bir konuya tahsis etmiştir. Sözgelimi –kendi içinde de 10 kısma ayrılan – ilk bölümde konu birlik ve bir olan şeylerdir. İkinci bölümde ikiler, üçüncü bölümde üçler vs. ele alınmıştır. Yazar ilk bölümde birliğin önemine vurgu yapar ve çeşitli örnekler verir. Buradaki birlik şüphesiz öncelikle tasavvufi bir kavramdır. Ancak yazar bu kelimeye aynı zamanda ;politik, sosyal ve pratik bir mana yükler. Buna göre Tanrı birdir ve birliği sever. Aslında –Budizm anlayışına benzer tarzda–insan da dahil gelmiş ve gelecek her şey tek bir bütünün parçasıdır ve insan bu evrensel birlikle uyum içinde olmalıdır.

Aşık Paşa insanların birliğini ve sürekliliğini çeşitli benzetmelerle açıklar: Buna göre insanlık bir bedene benzer , her insan da birbirlerini tamamlamaları bakımından bu bedenın uzuvları gibidir.

- 271 Baş gibi vü göz gibi kulak gibi
Dil gibi hem el ü hem ayak gibi
272 Her birisi bir şekil yumuşdadır
İlla baksan kamusu bir işdedir.

Bu insanlık bedeninde; Hz.Adem ayak, gemi yapan Nuh el, Tanrı ile konuşan Musa dil, Davut kulak, İbrahim göz, her dilden anlayan Süleyman gönül, ölüleri diriltten İsa ruh, peygamberlerin sonu olan Hz.Muhammed başı temsil eder. Şairin bu benzetmelerden asıl amacı insanın bir parçası olduğu diğer insanlara karşı görevlerini hatırlatmaktır. Mesela insanda iki göz vardır ama bunlar birlikte bakarlar,birlikte uyurlar, birlikte gülüp birlikte ağlarlar. İnsan da böylece başkalarının acısına sevincine ortak olmalıdır.Sufiler arasında çok yaygın olan bu fikir en iyi ifadesini yine 13. asrın şairi olan Şeyh Sadinin şu mısralarında bulmuştur:

- Beni adem aza-yı yek-digerend
Ki ez-aferineş zi-yek gevherend
Çü uzvi be-renc avered ruzigar
Uzvha-yı digerra nemaned karar

(İnsanlar bir beden ve her insan bu bedenın azası gibidir. Çünkü insanların hepsi aynı kaynaktan gelmektedir. Eğer bedendeki bir organ hastalanırsa diğer organlar da rahatsız olurlar.) Buradaki mesaj açıktır:Sen de bir organ hükmündesin; o halde hemcinslerinin acılarına lakayt kalma!

Aynı fikir Mevlanada şu çarpıcı cümleyle ifade edilir: "Benim tek bir canım, yüz bin benim var.. Binlerce insan gördüm ki ben onlar olmuşum sanki. Onların arasında yalnız kendimi göremedim." (Rubailer, 954, 1067)

Medresede baş hoca olan Mevlananın gezgin bir derviş olan Şemsele dostluğu bir çok menkıbenin konusu olmuştur. Aşağıdaki menkıbe yukarıya aldığımız cümlelerin de izahı gibidir. Talebeleri hocalarını Şemsten kıskanır ve ona sorarlar:

-Sen zaten bu asrın ilimde ve fazilette biriciğisin. O halde bu fakir ve cahil dervişten ne öğredin ki onun etrafında pervane olmasın. Mevlana onlara şu cevabı verir:

-Ben Şemsi tanımadan önce, dışarıda aç insanlar dolaşırken yemek yer , çıplak insanlar kış soğuklarında üşürken ocak başlarında ısınırdım. Şimdi ocak başında bile olsam dışarıda çıplak bir insan oldukça ısınmaz oldum, zengin sofralarda da otursam dışarıda açlar dolaşırken doymaz oldum. İşte Şems bana bunu-yanı insanların bir parçası olduğumu hissetmeyi- öğretti.

Tekrar Garipnamedeki bütün insanların ve peygamberlerin birbirlerini tamamladığı fikrine geri dönelim. Pekala her insan ve her peygamberin farklı özellikler taşıdığını dolayısıyla aralarında böyle bir birlik olmadığını düşünebiliriz. Aşık Paşa'ya göre birlikten kasıt fikirde birliktir, yoksa aynı amaca farklı yollardan gidilebilir. Bu yüzden zahiri farklılıklara aldanmamalı içteki birliği yakalamalıdır. Şair farklılıktaki birliğe örnek olarak insana kendi eline dikkat etmesini salık verir. Eldeki bütün parmaklar tek bir bilekten-kökten çıkmış ve farklılaşmıştır. Görüntüde hiç biri diğerinin aynı değildir. Ama bu farklılık yanıltıcıdır, Zira bir iş söz konusu olunca bunların hepsi aynı gaye etrafında kenetlenirler. Aynı kökten gelen ama daha sonra meslek ve meşrepçe farklılaşan insanlar da elin bu yapısını model almalı ve ortak insani gayelerde tekrar birleşmelidirler.

Yazarın bu fikre verdiği diğer bir örnek de sudur. Yeryüzündeki bütün sular tek bir sudan çoğalmış dağılmışlardır:

441 Bir denizdendir kamu sular başı

Dağıluben tuttular dağı taşı

Her su damlası aslına geri dönmek ister ama tek başına bunu başaramaz; karşısına çıkan dağ, taş ona mani olur. Ancak damlalar bir araya gelip pınar, pınarlar ırmak, ırmaklar nehir olunca dağı çözü aşır denize ulaşırlar. İnsanlar da tek bir evden çıkıp kainata dağılmışlardır ve amaçları tekrar o eve dönmektir. Ancak birleşen damlalar gibi aynı gayedeki insanların da bir araya gelmesi gerekir ki maksat hasıl olsun. Yunus Emre aynı fikri şu mısralarla ifade eder:

Dirildik pınar olduk

İrıldık ırmak olduk

Aktık denize dolduk

Taştık elhamdülillah

Aşık Paşa bir toplulukta toplumu teşkil eden bütün insanların toplam gücünü aşan bir güç olduğuna da dikkat çeker. Bu konuda kullandığı ilginç örnek şudur: Çölde yemek için kav ve çakmak taşıyla ateş yakan bir Arap oturup düşünmeye başlar.. Ne kavda ne taşta ateş mevcut değilken bunların bir araya gelmeleriyle nasıl olmuş da ateş zuhur etmiştir? Demek ki bir araya gelen iki şeyde her ikisinde de olmayan üçüncü bir şey ortaya çıkmakta.. Birinci bölümün 10. ve sonuncu kısmında ise birlik fikri bütün insanları kuşatan bir manaya büründür.Aslı Mevlana'nın Mesnevisinde bulunan bu hikayeye göre bir Türk , bir Arap ve bir Ermeni yolda buldukları bir akçe ile yiyecek almak isterler. Her biri kendi dilince üzüm ister. Ancak birbirlerini anlamadıkları için farklı şeyler istediklerini zannederler ve aralarında kavga çıkar.. Bu nüktenin Mevlanadaki şeklinde Ermeninin yerini Rum ve İranlı alır. Bunlar kendi dillerince *üzüm, ineb, engur* ve *istafil* isterler ve tartışmaya başlarlar.Neticede hepsinin dilini bilen biri üzümü getirip ortalarına koyunca hepsinin yüzü güler ve aslında aynı şeyi istediklerini anlarlar. Böylece Mevlana insanlar arasında dilleri aşan bir dil, bir insanlık dili olduğunu ifade etmek ister.Bir anlamda Mevlana bu diller üstü dili bilen kişinin kendisidir.Nitekim şöyle der:

"Bizim bu dilden başka bir dilimiz, cennetten, cehennemden başka bir yerimiz vardır. "
(Rubailer, 304, 306, 344)

Bu diller üstü dilden kastın ortak insani özellikler olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Dinimiz ve dilimiz ne olursa olsun bütün insanlarla ortak doğrularımız ve yanlışlarımız , ortak insani kodlarımız bulunmaktadır. Farklı olan sadece bunları ifade ediş biçimimizdir. Yine Aşık Paşayı dinleyelim:

- 653 Bes bir evdendir bu cümle mevcudat
Muhtelif düşmüştür illa mahlukat
- 655 Yetmiş iki milletin maksudu ol
Matlubu maşuku ve maksudu ol
- 656 Gam değil ger dilleri ayrığ ise
Hal içinde eksik ü artuk ise
- 658 Çün garaz birdir bire bitmek gerek
Biriküben bir yola gitmek gerek

(*Bütün yaratılmışlar tek bir evin halkıdır ama görünüşleri farklılaşmıştır. 72 millet kendi dilince O tek Tanrıyı ister.Madem ki istekleri birdir, dilleri farklı olsun ne çıkar. Gaye bir ise o birlik etrafında birleşmek ve birlikte yola koyulmak gerek.*)

Bu mısralarda şair aslında bütün islam sufilerinin anlayışına tercüman olmakta. Sufi



için kainat Tanrının evi ve mevcut her şey Tanrının halkı olmakta. Hal böyle olunca yaratılmışlar arasında bazılarını beğenip bazılarını beğenmemek, sonuçta Tanrının eserine ve isteğine karşı gelmek demektir. Yunusun ifadesiyle sufinin kimseye kin tutma lüksü yoktur:

Adımız miskindir bizim
Düşmanımız kindir bizim
Biz kimseye kin tutmayız
Kamu alem birdir bize

(Bizim tek bir düşmanımız var, o da düşmanlığın kendisi. Kimseye kin beslemeyiz çünkü sevgili olan Tanrının yarattığı her şey bizim için sevgilidir)

Bütün bilgilerin başı işte bu bakışı öğrenmektir:
Cümle yaratılmışa bir göz ile bakmayan
Halka müderris ise hakikatte asidir

Bütün insanlar Tanrının ailesi hükmünde olduğuna göre insan kendisi için istediğini başkası için de istemelidir. Yunus bütün dinlerin bu evrensel hakikat için geldiğini söylüyor:

Sen sana ne sanırsan ayrığa da anı san
Dört kitabın manası budur eğer var-ise

(Kendin için ne istiyorsan başkası için de onu iste. Dört kitabın da özü özeti budur.)

Mesneviden aldığımız şu küçük nükte de sufinin yaratılış karşısındaki saygısını pek güzel ifade ediyor:

Meşhur sufilerden Behlül bir dervişe;

-Nasılsın, ne haldesin ? diye sordu. O da:

-Bu dünyadaki bütün işler kendi istediği gibi olan biri nasıl olursa öyleyim. Her sabah güneş benim istediğim gibi doğup batmada. Gece yıldızlar benim isteğime göre parlamada, nehirler benim istediğim yere akmada. Hayat, ölüm, hastalık, sağlık, bunların hepsi tam benim gönlümün muradı üzre... Daha nasıl olayım! Behlül:

-Nasıl her şey senin isteğin üzre oluyor bakalım, diye sorunca beriki şöyle der:

- "Değil mi ki bütün bunlar Hakkın irade ve isteğiyle olup bitmekte. Ve madem ki ben de Hakkın takdirine razı olmuş, Onun isteğini istek edinmişim. O halde her şey tam olması gerektiği gibi.

Evrensel saygının ikinci adımı evrensel sevgi ve özellikle insana yönelik olan hümaniter sevgidir. Ancak bu sevgide klasik hümanist anlayışla sufist hümanizmin hareket noktaları bakımından farklı olduğunu söylemek gerekir, Hümanizmde insana duyulan sevgi

yine insan kaynaklıdır. Sufi ise insanı bütün varlıklar arasında Tanrının güzelliklerini en iyi yansıtan bir ayna olması bakımından değerli bulur. Yunusun ifadesiyle prensip şudur:

Yaratılanı severiz yaratanından ötürü

Mevlana Tanrıyı güneşe, bütün varlıkları ve insanları ise güneşin ışığını yansıtan aynalara benzetir. İnsan aynadaki ışığı sevmekle gerçekte güneşi sevmiş olur. Çünkü ışık güneşten ayrı değildir. Bunun tersi de doğrudur: Güneşi seven onun ışığını yani yarattıklarını da sevmek durumundadır. Yoksa kendi kendisiyle çelişmiş olur. Mevlana bu fikri aşk konusuna da başarıyla uygular. İslam edebiyatlarının meşhur hikayesi Leyla ile Mecnunda aşk önce tamamıyla insanidir; Mecnun Leylayı sevmektedir, o kadar.. Ancak zamanla Leyla kabından taşmaya ve bütün kainatı kaplamaya başlar. Artık Mecnuna her şey Leyla gibi görünmektedir. Gece onun saçlarıdır, yıldızlar dişleri, ay yanağı, güneş güllümseyiştir. Leylanın sokağından geçen bir köpek bile onunla ilgisi bakımından sevgili ve sevimlidir. Kısacası Mecnun Leylada gördüğü güzelliği artık bütün yaratılanlarda görmeye ve sevmeye başlar. Böylece Leyla gaye olmaktan çok evrensel sevgiye ulaşmanın basamağı olmaktadır.

Biz yukarıdan beri özetlemeye çalıştığımız bu fikirlerin günümüzün problemlerini çözmeye pratik bir değeri olduğunu da düşünüyoruz. Günümüzde ana sorunumuz bir yandan kendi farklılıklarımızı ve yerel kültürlerimizi korurken diğer taraftan nasıl evrensel bir barış tesis edebileceğimiz konusudur. Mevlananın şu beyti bu konuda oldukça fikir vericidir:

Hem-çü pergarim der-pa der-şeriat üstüvar

Pay-ı diğer seyr-i heftad ü dü-millet miküned

(Bir ayağım sımsıkı islamın üzerinde. diğer ayağımla 72 milleti dolaşıyor ve kucaklıyorum.)

Bu sözler bize "Vaymarlıyım ve dünya vatandaşıyım Yani bir milliyetim var ama aynı zamanda dünyanın adamıyım." diyen Göthenin sözlerini hatırlatmaktadır. Demek ki burada hem kendisi kalmak hem hem kendini aşmak söz konusudur. Peki bu mümkün mü? Şekil olarak hayır, ruh olarak evet. Mevlâna, insanlığın birliğini, dinlerin ve kültürlerin şekil birliğinde aramaz. Ona göre şekil, çeşitli renk ve desendeki kaplara benzer. Mana ise sudur. Dış gözü kabı, iç gözü ise suyu görür. Aslanan kapta değil suda bir olaktır. Kısacası herkes kendi dininin şekli yapısını korumalı ama özdeki müşterek noktalar üzerinde diğer din mensuplarıyla dostça, sıcak alakalar kurmalıdır. Rûmî'nin diğer dinlere yönelik bu tutumu bazan onun dinler üstü bir şahıs gibi algılanmasına yol açmıştır. Aslında onun fikirleri Kur'an'ın Hûd suresi 118-119. ayetlerindeki esprinin şiire dökülüşüdür. Bu ayetlere göre, Allah dileseydi tüm insanlık bir tek ümmet olur, bir tek imanda birleşirdi ama



Allah insanları kendi seçimlerinde serbest bırakmıştır. O halde diyebiliriz ki günümüzde muhtaç olduğumuz evrensel değerlerin pek çoğunu kendi bünyesinde barındıran İslam sufizmi bu prensipleri dine rağmen değil doğrudan doğruya dinin kendisinden almaktadır.

Görülüyor ki Rûmî, 7 asrı aşkın bir zaman önce, bugün bile ulaşamadığımız bir kozmik-evrensel kültüre, bir kültürlerüstü düzeye (transcultural state) ulaşmış ve bunun gereklerini de yaşamıştır. Nicholson, Rûmî'nin- ilahî Komedyası'nda İslam Peygamberi'ni cehennemde tasvir eden- Dante'ye üstünlüğünden bahsederken, şöyle der: "Rûmî, Dante'nin doğumundan birkaç yıl sonra öldü. Fakat, Hıristiyan şair, çağdaşı Müslüman şairin ulaştığı enginlik, merhamet ve hoşgörüden uzaklardadır." (Nicholson, 100) Ruminin inandığı değerleri kendi hayatına tatbik ettiğini ondan bahseden bir çok kaynaktan öğreniyoruz. Çok sayıdaki örnekten sadece bir tanesini alıntılatalım:

Bir sema meclisinde sarhoş bir Hıristiyan yalpalayarak Mevlâna'ya çarpıyor ve sürekli onu rahatsız ediyordu. İçerdekiler adamı engellemeye kalktılar. Mevlana buna razı olmadı ve dedi ki: Dokunmayın ona. Şarabı o içmiş, sarhoşluğu sizler yapıyorsunuz." (Fûrûzanfer, 192) Mevlana ve diğer sufilerin "yalnız başkalarını düşünme" diyebileceğimiz sevgisi ancak nebilere ve velilere mahsus olan karşılıksız ve ayrımsız bir sevgidir. O insana toprak gibi, güneş gibi, su gibi olmayı öğütler. Toprak, güneş ve su insanlığın ortak nimetleridir. Su hiçbir kirden iğrenmez ve bütün kirleri temizler. Yağmur din ve dil seçmeden bütün tarlalara yağar, güneş her bacadan girer. "Benim tekkem âlem, medresem dünyadır." diyen Rumi de kendisini insanlığa adayan böyle büyük ruhlardandır.

Tebliğimizi Gandhi'nin pek sevdiği bir Mesnevi beyti ve Yunusun birkaç mısraıyla bitirelim:

Ma-bera-yı vasl kerden amedim

Ne bera-yı fasl kerden amedim

(Biz bölmeye, parçalamaya gelmedik. Biz ayrılanları buluşturmaya, uzak düşenleri kavuşturmaya geldik)

Yunus Emreden:

Gelin tanışık idelim için kolay kılalım

Sevelim sevilelim dünya kimseye kalmaz

—

Ben gelmedim dava için benim işim sevi için

Dostun evi gönüllerdir gönüller yapmağa geldim

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Confucius Views on the Soul

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1. Introduction

There have been various discussions exploring the relationship between the soul and the body. While some argue that the soul is an independent entity separated from the body, others assert the soul perishes along with death. In fact, not a few think the human soul becomes a spirit or a ghost.

Is the soul immortal indeed? Or does it perish with death? Since the term soul is referred to as a ghost in Confucianism, Confucius views on the soul are, so to speak, related with views on ghosts (*gui shén* 鬼神).

2. Views on Ghost

1) Ancient Times

God meant Heavenly God in ancient times. Supreme Emperor was the almighty god signifying a king and below Him were Five Emperors representing His subjects. God was a reflection of earthly human beings. In this sense, god was human-god in those days. *Qui*(鬼) is intrinsically conceived as the meaning of returning. 『說問(*Shuo Wen*)』 explains that man returns; that is *Qui*. Even today we refer to 'death' as 'returning'. This is an evidence that man, admitting the existence of this world and next, has held the belief that man goes to the *Qui* world upon death from this world.

『禮記(*Li Chi*)』 mentions '形氣(*xing qi*)' returns to heaven and its soul to earth. These words imply people have hold a vague conception about afterlife, a plain expression for the other world after death. *Qui*(鬼) is a significant concept revealing the existence of the other world which bears causal relationship with this world. They also regarded ghosts as a being, closely related with this life, which has to return after this life. Ancient people admitted the existence of previous life but they, it seems, didn't view the world after this life as a transcendental world. Ghosts in this sense is not pure spiritual beings. They are

beings with both mental and physical aspects. In sum, ancient people didn't view the mind and the substance in dualistic sense.

2) Pre-Qin Confucius Views on Ghosts

There were many changes of the ideas on ghosts in *Cūn Qiū Zhàn Quó* era(春秋戰國). These changes arose centering mainly on Confucianism and Taoism. They tried to understand ghosts in philosophical, not religious, terms. Confucius and Mencius, in particular, attempted to view them in terms of practical utility.

When asked about ghosts and death by a pupil (子路), Confucius replies,

"How could we possibly worship ghosts with no regard to man?"

"How could we know what death is without any idea of life?"

『論語』

We can conclude his words as follows:

First, man and ghost as well as life and death are one, and if we know life and man we can know death and ghost. Next, the world of death and ghost are beyond our knowledge, so it's better not to mention the unknown. Confucius tried to view death and ghost in line with this world. He thus didn't refer to supernatural beings. (『論語』 ch.<先進>). He didn't completely deny that man, once dead, transforms into ghosts. He recommends we hold memorial rites for ghosts. This contradicts his previous claim. How can we accept it?

Worshiping ghosts were intended to arm human beings in this life with morality through pious propriety, not meant for ghosts. (『論語』 ch.<八佾>) His intention was to arouse *xiao*(孝) by observing rites for human-ghosts and *jing*(敬) by ceremonies for Heavenly God. He also tried to understand ghosts in human terms and give ethical explanations about them. "Respecting but staying away from ghosts would be wise." (『論語』 ch.<雍也>)

『周易 (Zhōu Yì)』 explains such discussions as follows:

"As *Yi*(易) can be equally and universally applied to heaven and earth, the principles of *Yi* can possibly cover those of heaven and earth. In making original *Yi*, the Great Teacher looked up and observed heaven and looked down and observed earth. In doing so, he came to know 'the principles of heaven and earth' (幽 *you*) and 'the laws of human affairs' (明 *ming*). Exploring where the origin begins and where the end returns, we learn laws of death and life. Spirits gathers and become substances, transforming into spiritless state. For this reason we can know the true existence of ghosts."

『周易』 ch. <繫辭 上>

In 『周易 (Zhou Yi)』, '幽明 (*you ming*)', '死生 (*si sheng*)' and '鬼神 (*qui shen*)' are regarded



as the principle of the world. And these are explained by '陰(yin)' and '陽(yang)'. <朱子註> '精(yjing)' as '陽(yang)' and '氣(qi)' as '陰(yin)' make all things in the world through diving and mixing. '生(sheng)' is what comes from '神(shen)' and '死(si)' is what goes to '鬼(qui)'. '神(shen)' and '鬼(qui)' is not the conception about being but the conception about operation. The principle of the world is achieved by the circulation of '陰陽(yin yang)'. Therefore, the idea that human's soul can exist after death is not correct. '鬼(qui)' means "returning to another state of the circulation". It doesn't mean "existing forever in the same state before death".

The views on ghosts of Confucius was established as a concrete principle in the *Sung Confucianism*(性理學).

3) Views on ghost in Sung Confucianism

朱子(*Zhu zi*) explained the human beings and the world with the principle of 理氣(*li qi*). For him, 死生(*si sheng*) and '鬼神(*qui shen*) are also included in the movement of 理氣(*li qi*). His principle of 理氣(*li qi*) is based 『太極圖說(*Tai Chi Tu Shuo*)』 of 周濂溪(*Zhou lian xi*), "Everything is 無極(*wi chi*) and 太極(*tai chi*) at the same time. 太極's movement results in 陽(*yang*). When the movement reaches the extreme stage, it gets still. And the stillness brings about 陰(*yin*). When the stillness reaches the extreme stage, it gets active again. One movement and one stillness becomes one root and is divided into 陰(*yin*) and 陽(*yang*), which become 兩儀(*liang yi*). the delicate operation produces 五行(*wu xing*) -water, fire, wood, gold and earth-. 『太極圖說』(*Tai Chi Tu Shuo*)

According to 周濂溪(*Zhou lian xi*), 太極(*tai chi*) is the fundamental substance and the source of 五行(*wu xing*). 太極(*tai chi*) is 理(*li*) and 陰陽五行(*yin yang wu xing*) is 氣(*qi*).

The principle of 理氣(*li qi*) is the theory in which 程伊川(*Cheng yi chuan*) explained the human beings and the world by the relationship of 理氣(*li qi*). "The principle 道(*dao*) can't exist without 陰陽(*yin yang*). The way 陰陽(*yin yang*) cooperate is the principle 道. 陰陽(*yin yang*) is 氣(*qi*), which composes the visible things(形而下者). The principle is 理(*li*), which composes the invisible things(形而上者). <vol. 15-25 『二程全書』>

理(*li*) means the principle, laws and rules. On the other hand, 氣(*qi*) means the phenomenal active energies.

In Sung Confucianism, the significance of ghosts is given a new definition by the principle of 理氣(*li qi*). When one of his pupils denies the existence of ghosts but cannot discard their possibilities, 程伊川(*Cheng yi chuan*) says:

"Human death, it is already a change. Existing things disappear. Solid substances with shapes get rotten, things worth mentioning no longer exist. Talks of ghosts are simply like

that." <vol. 18-11, 『二程全書』>

Once dead, individual beings gathered and scattered disperse away. Even if we suppose the dispersed individual qi is gathered again and used for a new being to be born, its external figures will not correspond to it, and the qi used is no longer its previous individual qi.

* Meanings of *qui* and *shen* <vol. 28-1~7, 『性理大典』>

鬼(<i>qui</i>)	神(<i>shen</i>)
bend : 屈	disperse 伸
disappear : 消	grow : 長
陰, 靜	陽, 動
精	氣
earth	heaven
moon	sun
night	day
fall, winter	spring, summer
human ghost	heavenly ghost

qui and *shen* are mutually opposite but complementary. This is the same with the logic of the relationship of for-against of *yin-yang* in 易(*yi*). Whereas *yin* and *yang* is terms for birth and change of the whole universe, *qui* and *shen* are concepts explaining phenomena of individual world. *Yin* and *yang* are concepts of entity, and *qui* and *shen* of phenomenon. *Sung Confucianism* ends up insisting the the theory of *ti yong yi yuan* (體用一元) that entities will become phenomenal.



BUDDHISM AMONG THE TURKIC PEOPLES IN HISTORY AND TODAY

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1. The Religions Among the Turkic Peoples in the Past and the Present

The Turkic peoples¹ had accepted Shamanism, Manichaeism, Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism and Islam as their religion and used Kopturk, Uyghur, Arabic, Latin and Cyril alphabets (Tekin 1997) to write their languages.

The Kopturks who lived in a land reaching the Northern Icy Sea in the north, to China in the south, and from Japanese Sea in the east, to the Caspian Sea in the west were Shamanist and pagans in general. The Kopturks believed that there is a unique God who created everything and that there were other gods having divine powers (Inan 2000, 26-66). The Kopturk monuments² (550-745) are located within the Mongolian territories of today. The language of these monuments is Turkish and the names of people as Turk is inscribed on these monuments in the literary meaning that is used today (Tekin 2000; Taşagıl 1995). In Chinese sources the building of these Kopturk monuments is also mentioned and even the Chinese artists who helped in the inscription. On one face of these monuments there is a message from the Chinese emperor at the time written in the Chinese language.

Although the Kopturks had very intensive interactions with the Chinese and other people, they were very conservative with their language, religion and culture. Repeatedly

¹ The term "Turkish" in this text is used for Turkey's Turkish and "Turkic" is used for other Turkic languages (Turkmen, Kazakh, Uyghur etc.). The Turkish language is spoken and known in Turkey, in the Balkans, in Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus. The Turkic peoples in the past were Karakhanids, Kharezm, Ghaznavids, Seljuks in Iran and in Anatolia, Ottoman, Mamluks, Ilkhanids, Baburids, Khazars, Kopturk, Uyghur, Kazak, and Kirghiz. The Turkic Republics of today are Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan. The autonomous Turkic Republics and groups are Yakut, Dolgan, Chuvash, Tatar, Bashkir, Tuva, Altay, Shor, Khakas, Kumyk, Nogay, Karachay-Balkar in Russian Federatinon, Azerbaijan in Iran, Uyghur in China, and Gagauz in Moldovia.

² The script and the language of the Kopturk monuments were deciphered by a Danish linguist Thomsen in 1893.

it is asked why Kokturks had not accepted Buddhism. The fact that the Kokturk Kaghans in align with Bilge Kagan were against the culture and policy of the China is clearly instructing. They wished that the Kokturks would always remain in their homeland. I believe that if the Kokturks had accepted Buddhism they would have lost their native language, and thus would have been assimilated into the Chinese civilization.

The Karaim Turks who are descendents of the Khazars converted to Judaism in the 8th century, live in Eastern Europe with a population amounting to several thousands (Johanson 1988, 54). The Yakutians, the Altays and the majority of the Shors who are in the Russian Federation today still keep to their Shamanist belief. In addition there are some groups of Turkic peoples (e.g. Tatar, Chuvash) who converted to Christianity during the period of Czarist Russia. The Orthodox Gagauz Turks who live in the Balkans and Eastern Europe converted to Christianity since early time.

The Turks who came down to the west started to convert to Islam from the beginning of 8th century. After the 8th century they established and ruled states in Central Asia, Iran, the Caucasus, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Yemen, North Africa, the Balkans, Anatolia and Eastern Europe (Klever 1978). The great part of the Turkic world today is Muslim and the political ascent of the Turkic peoples since the 10th century in the whole area is closely connected with Islam (Johanson 1988, 55). "Turks inherited three grand cultural heritages: Rural nomadic civilization, which contains shamanistic and buddhistic cultures, Islamic civilization which came into existence in the Middle East and spread up to Central Asia, Western Europe, Roman and Byzantine realms, and the cultural heritage of the Balkan, Black Sea, the Mediterranean, Middle Eastern and Aegean civilizations, and they ruled over various communities in Europe, Asia and Africa, except for America and the new world. During this process, they established relations with different civilizations and languages. As a result of these relations, Turkish language and culture were affected by other cultures and languages" (Kutalmış 2005, 129–130).

2. Buddhism among the Turkic Peoples in the Past

Uyghurs were living in the southern territories as compared to Kokturks and had close cultural and economic relations with the historic people such as Chinese, Tibetans, Indians and Iranians. Uyghurs who also used a Turkic language had defeated the Kokturks and established the Uyghur State in 745. While studying the religions of Turkic peoples in history, one should avoid generalizations. When a Turkic people accepts a new religion this was generally limited to the ruling family, later on some of the soldiers and citizens



had converted to that religion as well. The Uyghurs converted to Manichaeism which started as a sect of Christianity and later on evolved to a separate new religion. There are Uyghur texts written in manuscript about the Manichaeism³. As it was the case in the historic and modern peoples except for the Kopturk, Cyril, and Latin alphabets and all the other alphabets were accepted and used by Turks. They were religiously oriented and the various alphabets were used in the religion they had accepted.

Although Uyghurs have not become politically very effective, but due to the influence of Manichaeism, they had become more settled as compared to their previous nomadic life-style. They established outstanding civilizations in cities such as Turpan, Kashgar and Beshbalik. Since the acceptance of Buddhism by the Uyghurs, the influence of this ancient Asian religion started to be reflected in the linguistic and cultural life of Turkic peoples. Buddhism is one of the oldest and most widely spread religions of Asia. It is still being practiced in countries such as Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Tibet and Vietnam.

Bukhara is a city which was famous for its Islamic schools and scholars, in addition to still being one of the biggest and holiest cities of Uzbekistan and Central Asia. It was one of the holy cities of Buddhist Turks prior to Islam and Manichaeism (Frye 1965). In the 8th century in the city Belch of Afghanistan, was born Mevlana Jelaleddin Rumi (1207- 1273), there were great Buddhist temples and huge Buddha statues and some of these were made of gold. Especially between the 8th and 10th centuries there was great tolerance among the Turks. Buddhist, Manish, Christian and Muslim people could be seen in the same region or even in the same family (Caferoğlu 1984, 149-158; Kitapçı 2004, 34-36).

Through intense interactions of Uyghurs with the Chinese, Tibetan and Indian Buddhist neighbors, Uyghurs accepted the Buddhism religion which they had acquaintance before and lived according to this religion for centuries, left many works of art, and thousands of pages of Buddhist texts which were written in the Uyghur script⁴. Most of the Uyghurian Buddhist texts were translated from Chinese. Thus this translation process enriched the Uyghur Turkic, new vocabulary and terms had to be invented for some philosophical and abstract concepts (Barutçu-Özönder 1998, 9). This vocabulary enlargement process continued in the early stages of Islam, and many Islamic concepts were in Turkish; but

³ www.bbaw.de/bbaw/Forschung/Forschungsprojekte/turfanforschung/de/Turfanforschung#5

⁴ One of the most important folktales of the time which was translated to Uyghur Turkic in the 800's is the "Good and Evil Hearted Buddhist Prince Kalyanamkara and Papamkara" (Hamilton 1998). For the Uyghur studies s. [www.bbaw.de/bbaw/Forschung/Forschungsprojekte/turfanforschung / bilder/ turfananhang.pdf](http://www.bbaw.de/bbaw/Forschung/Forschungsprojekte/turfanforschung/bilder/turfananhang.pdf)

later on especially after the 12th century, due to the intensive interaction with Muslim Arabs and Iranians, Islamic concepts, words and terms were started to be used in the Arabic or Persian language, such as (Tengri – Allah 'the God', yalavaç – peygamber- 'the messenger', alğış – dua –'the prayer'. okıgu – Kur'an – 'the Koran', kopgu – qiyamet–resurrection etc.).

In the later stages some of the Buddhist Turks in Central Asia converted to Nestorian Christianity and in the Caucasus to Catholic Christianity. The Ratio of Nestorian Christian Turks was limited, because Nestorian Christians in the Middle Ages traveled as missionaries from Anatolia to Central Asia. In the Caucasus and in the Pontic area Catholic missionaries were very active. A considerable number of the generals of Genghis Khan were Uyghur Turks who were Buddhist as were the Mongolians. On the other hand Uyghur Turkic had influenced Mongols very much and a time came when the language of the Mongolian Buddhists became Uyghur Turkic (Ligeti 1998, 276). The Mongolians lost their language and culture in the territories they had conquered, because of the influence of the highly intellectual and militaristic Turks. They became Turkish and Muslim in Iran, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Central Asia⁵. The Baburids, the Timurids, the Ilhanids and the rulers of the Altinordu States by acquiring Turkish as their native language became Turks who were ethnically Mongolians that had converted to Islam (Spuler 1986). But on the other hand some of the Turks living in a mixed community with Mongols under the Mongolian administration became Mongols because they were all Buddhists after all. As a

⁵ On the Turkicization of some peoples there are amazing examples. Christian Armenians in the Anatolia had used Turkish for their communication and rituals (Kutalmış 2003). Similarly the Greeks in Anatolia were using Turkish for their prayers and communication. Both of these peoples have kept their religion namely Christianity but have forgotten their languages. There is no way that they were forced to do so. If it was the case then the Muslim Turks would like to convert them to Islam instead of leaving them in Christianity. In another region this time in Crimea, Christian Armenians used Christian Kipchak Turkic language as their written, spoken and liturgical language between the 14th and 18th centuries (Kutalmış 2004). Similarly Christian Hungarians were using Kipchak Turkic even in the first half of the 19th century (Bodrogligeti 1992, 175–176). Golden states: "Historically, in its contact with other populations, as can be discerned even from this brief survey, Turkic speech has usually prevailed. Clearly, then, linguistic assimilation has been a crucial element in the ethno genesis of the Turkic peoples. In all their areas of settlement, Central Asia, Western Siberia, the Volga region, the Caucasus and the Near and Middle East, they have absorbed linguistically smaller peoples and made serious inroads on larger populations as well (e.g. the Iranians of Central Asia, Northern Iran, the Armenian, Greek and Hellenized populations of Asia Minor)" (1992, 37).



result we can see many Mongolian words in Kazakh, Altay, Tuva, and Kirghiz languages due to these intensive interactions. Some Turkic groups, which came with the Mongols in 13th century as soldiers or as immigrants to Anatolia, were most likely Buddhist. In the last days a Buddhist temple was found during archeologic excavation in Ahlat-Bitlis in East Anatolia. In addition it is well-known for a long time that there is in this area the Bugatayaka mausoleum, which belonged to one buddhist Mongol king⁶.

In the first century Islam became a neighbor with Buddhism. From the European and American viewpoint Buddhism and Islam was seen as very interesting and mysterious religions and cultures of the Orient. "Another channel through which Buddhism has reached the West has been through the work of certain writers and philosophers. In Germany, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) was struck by what he saw as parallels between his philosophy and the ideas of Buddhism and Hinduism (which he conflated to some extent). /.../ In the 1860s and 1870s, hundreds of thousands of Chinese immigrants came to the West Coast of America and Canada to work in the gold mines and on the railroads. After 1882 Japanese laborers followed" (Harvey 1990, 302-304).

3. Buddhism among the Contemporary Turkic Peoples

3.1. Tuva

In the 13th century Tuva Turks were under the Mongolian Empire and Mongol Lamas were in Tuva territories acting as missionaries and establishing Buddhist temples. Since there was not a religious center in the Tuva region at the time these temples were bound to the religious centers in Mongolia. In the 1920's there were Buddhist temples, monks and schools in Tuva.

But all of these were annihilated and disappeared as was the case in all of the Soviet republics due to the banning of religious activities. When China occupied Tibet in 1959, the Dalai Lama who is leader of the Buddhists in Tibet, in Tuva, Mongolia, Himalayas and in western China escaped to India. Starting from the 1990's the Buddhist heritage and information in Tuva started to surface when the Soviet Republic collapsed. The national culture and Buddhism is lively in the autonomous republic of Tuva in the Russian federation. The Tuva people are one of the most active of the southern Siberian Turkic peoples in terms of education, culture, commerce, and politics.

The Tuva people live in the Tuva Autonomous Republic with a population of 200,000

⁶ www.kenthaber.com/Arsiv/Haberler/2006/Eylul/11/Haber_164457.aspx

people (Boeschoten 1998, 14). According to some researchers Lamaism has widely disintegrated from Buddhism today. But as it is the case in most of the modern religions, different interpretations of the religions and even the sects of the same religion has lost its importance. The people today do not practice the rituals of their belief as they used to in the past but still continue the culture and traditions bound to their religion. Boeschoten states: "The Tuvans mainly live on the slopes of the Sayan Mountains, but also in the Altay Mountains and northern Xinjiang. At least those living in the Autonomous Republic of Tannu-Tuva are of Buddhist belief with a strong Shamanist substratum. Most of them are sedentary cattle breeders" (1998, 11).

3.2. Yellow Uyghurs

According to the statistical data of 50 years ago, the populations of the Yellow Uyghurs (Sarig Yugurs) who are descendents of Kansu region Uyghurs (Çandarlıoğlu 2004) were about ten thousand (Thomsen 1959, 564). Today they live in far distance, to the Muslim New Uyghurs, in the north western part of China. Their language has widely deviated from the Uyghur language or the other Turkic languages in that area. They are of the same religion as the Chinese and population wise they are a small ethnic group. As a result in contrary to Tuva Turks they had mostly forgotten their language and assimilated among the Chinese. Boeschoten says: "A very different group are the Yellow Uyghur or Yughur in the Hexi corridor of China's Gansu province. This small group of approximately 12,000 people, who are traditionally Buddhist in faith, are almost equally divided into speakers of Turkic, Mongolic and Chinese. Turkic Yellow Uyghur is spoken in the western part of this region" (1998, 10).

4. Concluding Remarks

Some of the Siberian and the Central Asian Turkic peoples have kept their Buddhist belief up to date. Especially among the contemporary Buddhist Turkic peoples the yellow Uyghurs and the Tuva people Buddhism is still widely in practice despite the atheist education in the Soviet Socialist Republics and the People Republic of China. Although the majority of Turks today are Muslim, there are Buddhist and Orthodox Christian Turkic peoples as well. Since the Turkic peoples had not accepted Islam at the same time as a whole population, the traditional religious manners of Buddhism and Manichaeism prevail among the Muslim Turks. Even the influence of Shamanist belief on the modern Turkish life can be seen today (Inan 2000, 204).



In addition it can be said that fundamentals of the Buddhist belief system also exists in the Islamic belief, the reflection of these values to life results in the similarities of both cultures. There might be differences in the life style of the followers of a religion and the application of rules and regulations of that religion. But when we compare the written scriptures of Buddhism (Schuon 1968, 17–33; Harvey 1990, 9–29) and Islam it can be said that some of the basic tenets are the same or similar. For example the five basic forbidden sins in Buddhism; committing adultery, theft, killing of a person, lying, getting drunk are also among the fundamental prohibitions of Islam. In addition the characters which are evil in Buddhism such as falsehood, gossiping, froth, grudge, jealousy are also condemned and forbidden in Islam (Schimmel 1999, 122–134). There are similarities between Islamic Sufism such as purification of ones soul, education and disciplining of human personality, submission and praying to God, kindness to mankind as the basic characteristics of faith; and the principles of Buddhism uplifting of human values without any expectations.

In the Ottoman sources Buddha is mostly mentioned as the messenger of God sent to the Indian people. Buddhism is considered as one of the major religions prior to Christianity and Islam (Ilkul 1999, 215). A considerable number of Turks had accepted Buddhism in the past. As it is a known fact, religion reflects on all aspects of life, traditions which were affected by their belief do not totally disappear by change of geography or a new religion. In the daily lives, written and spoken literature, belief system and traditions, proverbs, sayings, sins, and good deeds of contemporary Muslim Turkic peoples; in addition to Judaism and Christianity, the traces of Buddhism and Shamanism can also be seen. The answer to which aspects and rituals are still in use in today's Muslim Turkish life, is to come in next stage of this research, because it can only be answered, after studying the local beliefs, customs, traditions and applications of these Turkic peoples and their written literatures.

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ISLAM AND CIVIL SOCIETY: WITH A SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TURKISH CASE

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In the political science and thought literature, civil society and state are defined as distinct spheres, which nonetheless complement each other. Under conditions in which civil society has developed sufficiently in a given society, the state is likely to have limited activities, act in a non-partisan manner and abide by law. This is indeed an instrumental state. Conversely, in societies where civil society is weak and deficient, all sorts of political, economic and ideological power remains in the hand of the state, which exerts absolute monopoly over all walks of social life. In such a milieu, the state is not only seen to be acting as a political organisation but is seen as a metaphysical and abstract entity which is beyond the grasp of ordinary individuals. The development of civil society is closely linked to the size and activities of the state. A ripening civil society replaces the state in the performance of certain functions and compels the state to turn into an impartial institution in relation to different segments of society. Wherever civil society is advanced far enough, the state, rather than commanding the society to adopt a particular ideology or way of life, is transformed into an instrumental organisation, which seeks to serve the individuals and protect their basic rights.

There are three prerequisites for the development of civil society: differentiation, forming organisations, creation of an autonomous sphere. All sorts of social differentiation should be encouraged if civil society is to strengthen. Accordingly, the society ought to be differentiated along sociological categories such as ethnic, cultural, religious, ideological, occupational and other linkages. The second necessary requirement for the strengthening of civil society is the accordance of freedom for all those representing different formations, who are willing to engage in politics. Social organisations in this sense act as an intermediary for the enjoyment of individual rights. Finally, the strengthening of civil society requires that the social groups, identities and categories enjoy an 'autonomous' status *vis-à-vis* the state. In other words, social groups and categories should have the right to determine their 'self' and translate this into practice without the intervention of

the state. In short, today, the term 'civil society' implies the existence of a democratic society and state characterised by the rule of law in which the primary goals are securing maximum freedoms enjoyed by individuals, widespread participation in social and political life, and individual self-determination.

In the sense defined above, civil society obtained the chance of development only after the industrial revolution in the West. The notion of 'world state' set up by the Catholic church had resulted in the restriction of individual rights and freedoms and had opened all the realms of social life into the hegemony of the state. The process of social differentiation, which occurred as a by-product of industrial revolution inevitably resulted in the process of political differentiation; together they set the course on the path of democracy. Therefore, the concepts of democracy and civil society have simultaneously evolved in the West. The lack of democracy always meant the absence of civil society. The rigid, centralising, totalitarian and tyrannical states, built on socialist principles in Eastern Europe in this century, were also characterised by the conspicuous absence of civil societies.

Islam and Civil Society: A Historical Analysis

When regard is made to the nature of the link between Islam and civil society, we may easily note that Islam is essentially a 'civil' religion. Unlike Christianity, which fell into the hands of the Catholic Church, Islam did not encourage the establishment of rigid, centralising, authoritarian or totalitarian states. The primary purpose of Islam is to show the human person what is right and what is wrong and to guide him/her into the true path. The task of guidance is not accorded to a rigid and centralising state. It is the revelation, which constitutes the primary reference for anyone to accept Islam and find the true path. The revelation, according to Islam, can be recognised through reason and conscience. Islam has taught the humankind the right and the wrong and left the choice to the free will of the individual. In a way, every human being possesses the freedom to decide for himself/herself.

Acting upon this point, Islam enjoins Muslims to rule the society on the principles of justice, consultation and peace. The Quran does not anticipate the building of totalitarian political structures and the imposition of a single way of life. On the contrary, the non-



Muslims are accepted as a different category. There are certain clues within the Quran itself to indicate that both the *ehl-i kitap* (people of the book, i.e. Christians and Jews) and idol-worshippers should peacefully live side by side with Muslims. The verse 'to them is their religion and to you is yours' provides an important instance of this understanding. But we should not lose sight of the cardinal precondition for peaceful cohabitation, which is avoidance of betrayal to Muslims. The society, which came into existence in Medina at the time of the Prophet Muhammad was founded on 'Medina Contract', which was unprecedented in its recognition of the principle of 'social differentiation'. Hence the ideal model of society envisioned by Islam is not an ideological society, which is both monolithic and monotonous.

Likewise, the form of governance, which Islam encourages is neither authoritarian nor totalitarian in character. It is known that there were periods in Muslim history when authoritarian or totalitarian methods were pursued by rulers. However, this practice stems neither from the principles of the Quran nor from the deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. The two basic principles found in the Quran that relate to governance are 'consultation' and 'justice'. These principles are surely in conformity with the preferred type of society perceived from the perspective of civil society. We note that these criteria were also observed in the practices, as the guiding principles at the time of the Prophet Muhammad. Although he was the recipient of revelation, the Prophet always made his societal decisions on consultation and acted on the dominant views of his companions in preference to his own, although his views would later prove correct. That is what happened in the war at Uhud when the Prophet chose to apply the military tactic, which his companions had suggested although he had had a different plan.

In short, Islam is disposed to 'social differentiation' as well as to 'social participation'. In other words, Islam contains within its own epistemology the idea of opposition by individuals against the views imposed by the state who may even make the state to accept them; such examples were not infrequent in the early years of Islam. The historical documents reveal that the first caliphs (succeeding the Prophet) were always disposed to social participation and gave due consideration to the grassroots opinion.

Rather than through a centralised authority, Islam anticipates the expansion of religion through religious scholars. The 'use of force' as a means of spreading religion has never been accepted as a legitimate method in Islam. On the contrary, Islam seeks

' persuasion' in the transmission of the message. Accordingly, the main frame of reference for Islam is, unlike the totalitarian states, which address themselves to the ' masses' , the individual himself/herself. The emphasis of Islam is not on the mass of peoples, classes or particular social groups, but on each and every individual. As the human person is the main addressee of the message, Islam seeks persuasion through science (Islamic learning). Not unexpectedly, therefore, the Quran has a higher regard for scholars than rulers.

The emphasis of Islam on the ' human person' has close affinity with the ' individual' in democracies. To a significant extent, the principles of democracy, such as the individual, social group, civil existence, private life, free enterprise, political participation, elections, human rights, the rule of law, limited state, agree with those of Islam such as the centrality of the human person, community (*cemaa*), intimate sphere of life, free trade conditions, consultation in decision-making, justice, human rights, fairness and law. The principles, which are indispensable for democracy are surely the products of particular social and historical conditions. To try to find the traces within Islam of social practices, which would entirely conform with them, would not be a reasonable approach. Since every society has its own historical background, naturally, every society develops its own basic principles. This implies that we should not try to find within Islam the democratic principles as they are practised in Western societies. Given that democracy is organically linked to the rights and freedoms of individuals, the subject of our inquiry must be limited to an examination of whether Islam is disposed to such principles as they exist in the West. As a matter of fact, basic human rights such as life, freedom and property, which are enforced in democratic societies, are likewise guaranteed under Islamic theology.

What has been argued by now in this paper relates to the thesis that the basic principles of Islam are disposed to the existence of civil society. When regard is made of the social practice of Islam, we can identify different historical phases. Islam started off as a civil movement in the person of the Prophet Muhammad. The civilian character of Islam survived until the establishment of centralised states in different parts of the Muslim geography. We observe that a rich mix of different understandings and approaches, profound religious perspectives, and various interpretative approaches developed during the ' civilian' phase of Islam. It was before the institutionalisation of centralised authorities that we witness the presence of the most vivid and dynamic forms of sectarian



differentiation, philosophical revival, Sufi tradition, and various Islamic currents of thought. In other words, Islamic vitality belongs to the period when 'civil' Islam predominated. It is at this time that imaginative interpretation of Islamic law (*ictihad*) was common occurrence, which enabled the translation of Islam into the practical needs of social life. In this epoch of 'civil' Islam, Islam managed to lay down principles, which addressed themselves to the life of individuals and permeated the core values of social life. Concepts such as reason (*akl*), revelation (*vahy*), inspiration (*ilham*) and sovereignty (*valayet*) which concerned every individual, and others like politics, consultation and justice which concerned only rulers, easily gained different meanings (from the later strict definitions) in this period. This was a time when Farabi's project of a 'virtuous society' based on political participation could be formulated. This same period was also ripe with a multitude of ideas, which suggested that reason was as important, continuous and lively a source as revelation in the construction of social life.

In conclusion, we understand that, both in terms of the wealth of experience and wealth at the level of social values and symbols, Islam took firm roots in society during its 'civil' phase. Islam thus reached the 'civilisational' stage, and its particular modality of life became a centre of attraction for other societies. The extent of richness, which Islam gained during its 'civil' episode enabled its expansion into other societies and cultures.

The civil stage of Islam eventually lost its ascendancy to the 'political' phase of Islam, which resulted in rigid and centralising institutionalisation. With the rise of the *political* cosmos, we observe the incorporation of the religious sphere into the domain of centralised states, like other spheres of social life. The realm of religious life and institutions, not unlike other spheres, were completely dominated by centralised states. As a result, the society's ability to take initiative faded while centralisation took the upper hand. A wide rift began to open between centre and periphery as a result of centralisation, and this laid the foundations of a transcendental state, which had little ties with society. The Ottoman Turkish experience is a lively example of the kind of transformation in the history of Islam mentioned above and thus merits some analysis here.

Islam and Civil Society in the Turkish Case

When looked at from the perspective of civil society, we witness three distinct stages

which characterise the Ottoman history. During the first of these stages which lasted until the 16th century, we observe sound examples of civil society. A distinctly Ottoman model manifested itself at this time. The state was the type of organisation governed by those who sought to keep the idea of Jihad (*holy war*) alive. These organisations, rather than establishing monopoly over social life, sought to expand the Ottoman dominions by conquering new territories. The principal values and dynamics of social life were determined by the elements of civil society. The theological schools (*medrese*) and religious orders (*tarikât*) appeared as significant religious institutions. The Islamic foundations, which sponsored theological schools mostly flourished independently of the state in this first stage. It was the theological schools, which organised social education free of state involvement, and the main actors in this process were religious scholars (*ulema*). Likewise, religious orders established themselves as autonomous institutions independent of the state. The state did not interfere with education, and was only partially involved in the economic realm. During the same period, the guilds (*lonca*), which were the basic economic units in cities performed their functions entirely free of state involvement and those who administered the guilds were elected by the artisans themselves. Acting as the patron of different religions, the Ottomans granted some kind of autonomy to every religious group under the *millet* system. Every religious group was accorded the freedom to choose its own leader to administer the community affairs.

The period preceding the 16th century witnessed the climax of Ottoman power as well as the golden age of civil society. Behind the peak of Ottoman grandeur lay the existence of a state which directed its energy toward the outside world and a society which took the initiative in organising social relations. This was a time when 'social differentiation', 'tolerance' and 'freedom' were guaranteed. An interesting proof of this 'tolerance' is the freedom of propagation accorded to an atheist sect called *sürrinizm* which even had some adherents from the palace.

From the perspective of civil society, the second stage materialised from the 16th century onwards. This was the stage when the business of the state took precedence over that of the people. During this stage, which lasted until the 19th century, elements of civil society such as theological schools, pious foundations, religious orders, guilds, the *millet* system and farmers gradually came under the domineering influence of the centre and, compelled to pursue their activities in accordance with the priorities of the state, in time lost their autonomy. In this second stage when the centralist bureaucratic state



consolidated itself, civil society began retreating and the atmosphere of difference and tolerance began to vanish. A peculiar feature of this period was the excessive increase in the number of edicts issued by the Sultans, which sought to imprint social life with prohibitions.

The third stage from the perspective of civil society began in the 19th century and lasted until the 1920s when Turkey was proclaimed a republic. This stage carried within itself a major paradox as far as civil society was concerned. On the one hand, civil society became slightly more active with the spread of modernity, on the other, the centralist structure, after gaining in strength, began to assert absolute domination over civil society and was eventually in a position to absorb it. By virtue of these peculiarities of the centralist structure, civil society became more active at the turn of the 20th century, although it was controlled by the state. Hence civil society was significantly enriched by new elements, which were introduced in addition to conventional elements. Such modern elements included political parties, the media, different currents of thought, associations, economic groups, banking sector, trade, legal and administrative reforms all of which played a cardinal role in the development and expansion of civil society during the Ottoman rule.

This brief recapitulation of the Ottoman history may also be regarded as a summary of the evolution of the Islamic world. The Ottoman experience in the 20th century was astonishingly parallel to that which was experienced by other Islamic societies elsewhere. The summary of this experience is this: The reactions evoked by the colonisation of the Islamic world at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century by Western powers, *inter alia*, resulted in the emergence of rigid, authoritarian and centralist states in the Islamic world. The 'political' stage of the Islamic history which roughly began in the 12th century was reinvigorated yet again in this century via authoritarian nation-states. The greatest single obstacle, which has hindered the growth of civil society in the Islamic world is the single-party politics or authoritarian oligarchic regimes which have remained in the hands of particular families. Such regimes not only disable the invigoration of civil society and, by implication, of democracy, but also constrain the political influence and freedom of activity enjoyed by Muslim masses.

Given that the republican era in Turkey has provided an interesting and important example for the Islamic world in the 20th century. The republican regime, proclaimed in

1923, inherited from the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, a centralist tradition and, on the other, a fair number of civil society institutions. However, Turkey was effectively ruled by a single party regime during the period between 1923–1950, which pursued policies of forcible westernisation. Civil society institutions were completely destroyed by the single party rule, which was bent on changing and transforming the entire society along western values. As the regime chose to take socialist values rather than liberal values as a point of reference in its pursuit of westernisation, it was not late before a rigid state structure was built. Neither modern nor traditional elements of civil society stood any chance of survival in 1923–1950. While no political parties other than the ruling Republican Peoples Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) were permitted, no association, no social movement, or even a member of the press with a different orientation existed in this period. As the state totally permeated the economic and social realms, the civil society was crippled to an extent unprecedented in the history of the Turks.

The introduction of multiparty politics in 1950 opened the route for a revival of civil society in Turkey. The most extensive resurgence of civil society in Turkey coincides to the period between 1980–1993. This was the time when Turgut Özal, as the leading political figure in Turkey, began to inject democratic liberal values into Turkish politics. In spite of all the democratic trappings of the Turkish political system since the 1950, this process was not buttressed by a liberal democratic culture given that the area of economics and politics was under the shadow of the state. From the early 1980s, Özal began to reinforce the democratic process by encouraging the expansion of a liberal and civic culture. As part of this objective, he tried to limit the influence of the bureaucracy, lay the foundations of a free market economy, diminish the role of the state over the economy by means of privatisation, ensure greater acceptance by Turkey of Western democratic values, and devised policies which accorded greater social freedoms.

This process resulted in considerable convergence between Islam and democracy in the person of Islamic groups. While various Islamic groups began, on the one hand, to register their influence in the public sphere through the use of democratic mechanisms, they elaborated formulas to establish accommodation between Islam and democracy on the other. As the indispensable conditions of this peaceful coexistence, the Islamic groups almost pressurised the state into accepting an impartial role for the state, passing new legislation to consolidate the free market economy and engaging more extensively into international trade. Today Islamic groups in Turkey have come to a position where they



occupy a distinguished place in the educational, intellectual, political as well as economic fields. It is the civil society institutions established by Islamic groups, which have set the most essential, firmly rooted and vibrant examples of such institutions in the post-1980s. It is likewise these groups, which have asked the state to adopt the rule of law and democracy.

In conclusion, it may be asserted that the Turkish experience is not separate from those experienced in other parts of the Islamic world. The civil society has never flourished under the shadow of centralist, rigid, and authoritarian states anywhere in the world, and this is also the case with Muslim societies. Where such states still run supreme, Islam manifests itself as a source of reaction, since Muslim masses live under oppression, rather than synthesis. Under conditions of peace and freedom, Muslims are likely to search for synthesis and, on this basis, utilise Islam as an essential source of motivation in this world. This means that, under democratic conditions, Islam may constitute a significant frame of reference in the democratic struggle for civil society and for individual rights and freedoms. In short, for Islam to become a source of tolerance, peace, freedom, justice, differentiation and development, there has to be law-abiding democratic states with limited functions. Undoubtedly, Islam will, in the hands of such states, bring peace, prosperity and happiness to the entire world in general, and to the Islamic world in particular.

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Islamism and Christianity for World Peace

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1. The necessity of multi dimensioned ecumenism

Every religion hopes their disciples to be free and equal. In 21th century the political values to realize the peace for human beings are the freedom and equality. But if these two are applied politically only to the democracy as the core concepts, every political discourse starts from the conflictual dichotomy between the superior-western and the inferior-non-western world.

If the democracy is conceived as the western, the non-western dominated by the western since the 18th century could take the political system way as the closed nationalism as a strong counter democratic regime, even though they agree that the freedom and equality are the universal values for human rights. The western have to count the realistic responses of the non-western. The Pax Britannica and Americana inevitably related to the Christianity are still dominating our political reality. And the various, such as liberal, social or people's democracies could be in conflicts if they insist on the ideological forms: if the democracy -faced nation States are in competition about the problem of which form of democracy is better, they have to wage war against each other. The problems of two Koreas are in this context. The point is the real and practical contents of the freedom and equality. Beyond the face values, some political system could be recognised as the sane one if they keep these two cores in their particular ways and ethnologico-historical context. No more wars for democracy!.

It's same to every religion. Don't divide the religions into the western and non-western one. Don't insist on it's peculiar form of rites. "Confidence to my religion, respect to other's religions" is impending. The ecumenism in the theological and metaphysical level('metaphysical' for Buddhism and Confucianism cause of the absence of 'God') is necessary to find the different and common elements. No more wars for the hegemony of any religion! The point is man, and man's free and equal life. To be for man is to be for God.

The human being have to be provided with the comfortable natural environment for its

free and equal life. For its sustainable survival the sustainable exploitation of nature have to be sustainable. The sustainable development is the sustainable exploitation. Every religion teach to keep the nature as it was and as it is. More than half of the world population have their own religion, so the religion can solve more than half of the environmental problems.

Furthermore these are politico-economical ones: development-under development, independent development-mutual aid, war-peace, and the competition for the soft or hard energy. The religions are called together to provide the common practical programmes to these problems. The ecumenism in the political and economical level is necessary to release the common religious attitudes and to make the common practical grounds for the disciples. The secular conflicts lead to war, war to environmental destruction and this last to the breaking down the life conditions for the free and equal life. The world peace is impossible without the sane environment. The religions could not be satisfied only with making man spiritual in criticising the narrow individualism and materialism. Man is born to be selfish; hope to be absolutely free and equal. But the point is to make the selfishness at least half in the national and international community. This is to harmonize the secular and spiritual life, and the religions' positive roles to avoid the wars to preserve and protect the nature. To be for nature is to be for God.

To be for man is to be for God, and to be for the nature is to be for God. These are the just one for the world peace. For the free and equal life of human being, the multi: theological, metaphysical, political, and economical, dimensioned ecumenism have to be deepened for the world religions. This ecumenism is passively to avoid the wars, and positively to make the sustainable peace.

2. The intermingling of theological politics and political theology

Our history shows that these dimensions of ecumenism were and are so intrinsically intermingled that we cannot be satisfied with these plausible assertions. Each religion in the monotheistic camp started from and with the purely theological level: Judaism from pantheism, Christianity(or Islamism) from Judaism, and Orthodox, Anglican, Protestant Church from Roman Catholic. We can call Judaism and Islamism as the 'God-ism'(Yahweh, Allah), and the all the others 'Christ-ianism'(Jesus Christ). But after the confirmed theological establishment, the politico-economic elements always have intervened in their process of development of evolution. And this also played a role to change their theology or make a sector. Before and after the separation of Religion Church and State, for



example Kemal Ataturk in Islam and the Concordat in Catholic at the beginning of the last century, there always were laid the political or economic interests overtly or covertly in the wars for God: for example, firstly, the supremacy of Empire which is intimately related to the papacy in the controversy of Iconoclast in the 8th century and the official division of Roman and Orthodox Church in 1054 were the outcome of the differences of the emphasis rather than the principle; the Icon and the hesychast mysticism were less important than the sharing the belief in Trinity, Jesus Christ and the Cross. Secondly, the secular and commercial interests of Popes and merchants in the Byzantin invasion (Crusade) in the 11th - 13th century(Catholic as Islam); in spite of the tolerance of Islam, Catholic were really armed with one hand the Bible and the other hand the Sword in the terrible massacre. Thirdly, the individual political power and the interests of the rising bourgeois in the Reformation in the 16th-17th century(Catholic vs Anglican, Protestant); the State Church movement and the individual marriage are another one, and the protestants each in emphasizing the particular elements in Christian believes wanted their political and economic interests protected by the State; the principles are same except Ste. Maria. Finally, the imperialistic interests of U.S.A. GB, France in the process of breaking down of Ottoman Empire, foundation of Israel and Palestine in the 20th century(Islamism vs Christianity).

War for God was war for Man, and war for Religion is war for politics. And now in this century Jihad is proceeding against war for Democracy: the liberal democracy and market economy.

3. Islamism and Christianity for World Peace

For today's Muslim fundamentalist and Christian American, the State is no more 'given', but 'made'. The division of Religion and State have created the individual. The Religion plays a less important role than before in the secular society. The negation of the individual is anachronistic and even decadent. The Islam world is already open the other Christian world in experiencing each other in every day life. And we can analyse the Islamic world by the criteria: division of individual, society, and State: the eye of the modern western political thoughts. And if this is possible, the Islamic world is in the possible way to the democracy: the right and duty, the freedom and equality of the individual, the free associations in society, and the tolerance of consciousness.

But if some muslim eagerly deny this possibility in hoping the Pan Islamic World or the

Pax Islamica to realize Umma and Millet against the Pax Britannica and Americana, one can say that it is less possible than the way to democracy, the return or the Royal Road to the Sultan, Imam and Caliph system. And furthermore, we can find sufficiently the democratic elements in the history of the Arabic, Islamic and Turkish Empire. In these Empires, the individual and the State or the religious community were really the one? There were no conception of the individual and no antithesis between the individual and the State or the government? And today the Islamic jurisprudence which was the ultimate source of the secular authority, automatically and naturally become the Islamic political Ideas? There is no mind to deny the Islamic jurisprudence: Quran, the Tradition(Sunna), Consensus(ijma), analogy(qijas). How we can interpretate or make accept in this pluralistic society the divine law, Sharia which is over the human reason and the natural law? Are there no more conflicts between the jurists in the tradition of the Sunnis, the Shia and Mutazila etc. ? The Royal Road is no longer royal. To systematize Ibn Khaldun by the Thomism is not the fundamental loss of Tradition.

For the American waging war for Democracy or against terrorism, the respect of the Islamic tradition, first of all, of the religion should be absolute. Don't intermingle the politics with the theology. Don't impose democracy to the Islamic world. If the muslims keep the two cores, freedom and equality, in their particular ways and ethnologico-historical context, 'laissez-passer'! No more wars for democracy! It should be recognized that the terrorism is the outcome of the world imperialistic politics with the hands of Christianity and Judaism from 19th century. The Christians have to start ecumenism with Islamism to shorten the discrepancy at least in the religious level before or after the internal ecumenism in the Christian camps.

For the politically radical muslim waging war for Religion or against Pax Americana also, the respect of the American tradition, first of all, of the Christianity should be absolute in confirming that in Umma and Millet coexisted the Judaism and the Christianity with the Islamism. Their violent actions are against the political Pax Americana related to the Christianity, but the terrorism is not the war for Religion. The Islamic society maintains the democratic elements from the beginning, so in keeping and modernizing the tradition the realization of the freedom and equality in their particular ways and ethnologico-historical context is the tasks for the world peace. The link of the 'Over there' to the 'down here' or the agency of the salvation of the muslim is not the suicide bomb and not the superficial destruction of the social infra of the western world. The Church and Mosque, and the Bible and Quran should go together. The point is for the



fundamental muslim to catch up with and surpass the Americans in the economic and scientific fields. The American standards are overwhelming this world. Even in the academic associations for the Asians searching for the Oriental values over the Asiatic Values, the official language is English or American English.

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PROCESSING OF LEGAL MAP OF LAW

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Before starting my speech I would like to quote a work of Italo Calvino "The invisible cities" the plot of this work is a conversation between Kublai Khan, and his ambassadors and young traveler Marco Polo.

It is said that looking carefully at the Marco Polo's maps of the cities where he's been traveling Kublai Khan started to realize and refused to his thought of that he was the one and only Emperor of the universe. So on Marco Polo provided 55 different types of metaphor of the cities.

In response to Kublai Khan's final order to describe the city of Venice, Marco Polo noted that "it is tend to be forgotten the memories in my mind when expressed by words thus I have fear that I might loose my memories of Venice by doing so. Instead I will tell you about other cities which I am forgetting bit by bit".

So he continued with a description of mysterious town Esmeralda. The Esmeralda is located on the riverbank where all the streets are connected with canals and bridges. Where everywhere you go you have to use boats. Most confusing streets are annoying even local residents and not mentioning visitors.

Everybody wanted to find a way to reach their destination by a shorter and an easier roots but life of Esmeralda kept it mysterious and adventurous life for a long time.

The streets of Esmeralda where stray cats, thieves and prostitutes wander in and out doors. A dripping roof, running rats in sewage, seeking some food that is the face of the Esmeralda as it is has been.

However, to draw the map of Esmeralda, one need many different colors of inks to mark narrow and wide streets disclosed and closed areas. All the water ways, pavements, and connections, also it seems hard to show and fix the wind along roads and dead ends. In that case, can we really draw a legal map?

The subject I am going to present you today had two factors to choose. Firstly, although, after my first curious discussion with my professor a year ago, my research still has not brought me satisfactory result, as I still consider this one of my unfinished works.

Secondly, my ultimate goal is to learn what is the hardship of making a legal map. My concern is basically to describe a manner of law and legal system on the world map based on geographical and mental map.

1. Most people may think that to describe a law by map is senseless and impossible, claiming that reflecting law against social relations brings out the invisible theory. However, it is obvious now that the imaged expression may be rapidly developed as computerized, and informative society of ours combined with law and legal education dependant on algorithm, continues graphics, imagery logical order and video imagery. It is already outdated the theory of the geography only about landscape and biography of a person. Although geographers see that mapping science as a simple item of their research subject, researcher *Kim Economize* proves that "they somehow joins and adapts to social and legal researchers' interest".

However, the idea I promoting today is not brought up from the point of jurisprudence.

By the definition the Geographical mapping is an image of a certain geographical area in full or partial scale. And it reflects natural scale rather than any social or other relations.

There are certain specific methods for those who making geographical maps, making a good geographical map there are essentials to relate its original purpose and investigate the connections of dimensions and spreads.

At the other side of this question, the purposes to make geographical maps are implements to express a someway organized mental theory. Thus I'm here relating the both methods of making geographical and mental mapping, making the base to make the legal map.

The Idea of making a legal map based on the methods of geographical map is to build a map in our minds. By choosing the Italo Calvino's "The invisible cities", I let myself to build a legal- invisible city in my mind.

And let me explain the idea here.



It is said the Calvino gave 55 different metaphors of description of cities to Kublai Khan. They were all different and were only imaginary descriptions.

Thus one may take them as 55 different cities or either 55 different description of a same city. It might sound too much as 55 different description for one city, yet it is nothing to compare to city of London's 25 000 types of descriptions, known to us.

All this different descriptions and maps vary depending on its purpose and peoples perspectives. Say, surgeons, engineers or advocates may have different perspectives of life and theories.

Therefore if we talk about the city from the side of residents and visitors, there must be complete different perspectives. This example tells us the advantage of seeing things from different angles. And I think this method will be very useful to make a legal mapping.

Marko Polo made it clear that to describe anything, one needs not only a speech, but maps and images.

As I said of my opinion to describe the legal system by map is the same as describing a town with a map, the objects are complex. In other word, both the town and the legal system are deeply set to the ground as a tree route by the passing time.

And both the town and the system of law, everybody sees them with their own understanding. As many number of participants, the greater the measure of theory, imagines, vision and experience.

To have a complete knowledge of any town or legal system, one has to consider many other perspectives of points of view. The purpose of legal science is to improve the understanding and knowledge of law. Law is a complete and complex subject as a town is.

2. The modern imagery of legal system is a completion of national legal systems by numbers of different states and countries.

Thus it can be defined as, an imagery of laws between legal system, in broader scale national legal system of the countries of the world. This imagery may also be done in micro level.

With my experience of research works on laws on legal systems of many other countries of the world, I've finally decided to start to draw my own "Legal Map".

So I started to mark the countries in different colors on a world map with their legal systems. Also I have drawn the borders by their familiarities of legal systems. As I remember now, I would mark the German–Roman system in brown, Post socialist systems in red, Anglo–American in blue, Islam system in yellow and by green the common and conservative systems. But the systems with plural systems, I have marked them with stripes of different colors.

But for this work, my first try, I was still in doubt and thinking how to improve.

So I started to research the other researcher's works.

For example on combination of colors, John Henry Wigmore has found a neat solution. by simple combination of letter and numbers he marked up mixed systems and even the era of legal system– ages of legal system.

Yet some other researchers still believe that Wigmore's has its weaknesses by simplifying things.

So after my researches, the following questions came to me.

1. What exactly of a country's legal system needed to be shown on the map?
2. to find out the combinations of legal system with religion and the nation's specific uniqueness
3. more specific research on the "legal family"
4. difference of nations legal languages

Although this first try was only a rough direction to me, it later helped a lot to my researches followed.

Because, *firstly*: from this imagery, I could see continental– European "civil" legal system, Anglo–American "common" system, mixed, or soviet influences.



Secondly: it was obviously visible that the systems have influence of their colonies.

Thirdly: regarding to this imagery, the current Mongolian legal system has got the influence of the continental "civil" system, as well as the "mixed" in a legal adjustment level. That is not only for Mongolia, but Continental-European "civil" legal system and Anglo-American "common" system are getting closer on material based and processing law systems.

Fourth: Although this imagery has the world countries legal families, it also kept the difficulties to describe the relations between official law and the real life legal systems.

On the other hand, I felt that the map was serving me on certain points. I also saw a base to build a process of a legal system and legal measure making system from this map.

From this point, the legal map making is seems highly useful as the world is globalizing, countries tend to adapt or improve their legal systems with other country's better systems.

And finally, the questions will com out, do we really need a legal map, or is it useless and unnecessary effort?

The response for this question is connected with the globalization, and its one concealed idea, to tell the time to renew the global legal system, to research for the sake of whole world.

Making of a world legal map includes in the attention of the legal system's complete research.

It is a open question that what period of time after the legal system would be learned and researched in the whole world scale,

However by timing wise, it is becoming a main perspective to follow the principle "create in a world scale and implement in the home country scale"

Thank you for your attention.



Korean “Unification” as Ideology – Its History, Structures and Prospect –

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I . Setting – Korean “Unification”: Mission Impossible?

Korea has been divided for more than 60 years, and the two Koreas are still trying to move ahead with their national “unification”. A famous cabinet member of South Korea's Government, Lee Jong-suk, Korean Unification Minister, said “South Korean governments historically make use of Korean unification for seizing and keeping their power.”¹⁾ Although his intention was understood, many people, both Korean and non-Korean, believe that North Korea will never abandon its plan to unify the Korean peninsula under Kim Jung-il's initiative in the form of communizing South Korea.

Of course, South Korea and the United States will prevent North Korea from taking such an action. If they do so, Kim Jung-il's regime will not be able to pursue their unification in a violent way, because a second Korean War would cause their absolute collapse. Frankly speaking, Korean unification will not materialize and Korea will remain as two nations for at least several decades. As the deadlock over “reconciliation and co-operation” showed us last summer shortly after North Korea's firing of the Taepodong II and Nodong missiles²⁾, Korean unification remains very remote for the two Koreas.

This paper studies Korean “unification” as an ideology after the Korean War. Its history, structural transformations and prospect show us the real political, economic and social meanings of Korean “unification” and its functions. It is certain that a lot of people would agree to Korean unification and disagree with me because of its ideological effect, though they would understand my assertion. However, we should take part in academic discussions of Korean “unification” as ideology because public opinion is controlled by power holders with ideological propaganda in both South and North Korea. Now it is time for us to find a way to treat the Korean unification problem.

II. Korean "unification" – Its History

In August 1945, Korea was liberated from Japanese colonization, and South Korea was occupied by US forces and North by the then Soviet troops as divided by the 38th parallel. The line along the 38th parallel was just a boundary to accept Japanese surrender, but it became the national border for the two opposing regimes which were established between August and September, 1948. On the one hand, the United States supported Syng-man Rhee's regime (ROK), which held the strong anti-communist ideology for unifying their nation with the free world. On the other hand, Kim Il-sung's regime (DPRK) formed by the Soviet Union had the communist ideology of overthrowing Rhee's "cat's-paw" state and "pro-Japanese" Koreans and unifying the Korean peninsula under his initiative.

Kim Il-sung started the Korean War with the military backing of the Soviet Union and Communist China in June 1950. The Korean People's Army broke through the 38th parallel and rushed through South Korea, when most people actually thought it would bring Kim victory and Korean "unification." But UN forces entered the war and the Chinese Voluntary Army, too, to save North Korea. Consequently, the Korean War concluded with the cease-fire treaty between the UN forces and the Chinese-Korean allied forces in July 1953.

In this war, Korean troops and many ordinary civilians, both South and North, participated in large-scale massacres and hated each other very deeply³⁾. The Korean War as "*ultima ratio regum*" brought the Korean people into political, economic, social and physiological division along the military border near the 38th parallel. The Korean division was fixed in the form of confrontation between each regime, although a conference was held in Geneva for the unification of Korea after the war.

III. Korean "Unification" – Structural Transformations

Both Koreas have accepted the Cold War logic and taken it into their inner domestic structure through the Korean War. Rhee Syng-man continued his oppressive rule by strengthening the anti-communist ideology, and Kim Il-sung succeeded in establishing his dictatorship in the form of himself as the sole figure of worship⁴⁾.

1) The Structure of "Mutual Dependence in Antagonism"


After the retirement of Rhee Syng-man due to the Student Revolution in April 1960, Park Chung-hee seized power through his Military Revolution of May 1961 and formulated a



national policy of anti-communism. It was a political method for power holders in South Korea to exclude their political rivals from the domestic arena and sometimes punish them by death. If a person was condemned as "Pargengi (빨갱이)" or communist, he or she could not live normally in society, and this is true to some extent even now.

As in this method, Kim Il-sung used the same logic to purge his political rivals from the Korean Worker's Party (KWP) from 1952 to 1956. For example, Park Hun-yung, the Vice-Prime and Foreign Minister in the first cabinet of DPRK in the No. 2 position following Kim Il-sung, was the first target of the purge, when he was labeled "a spy of American Imperialism". Also, Kim Il-sung spread his individual worship in the KWP and over North Korean society in order to falsify his legitimacy for ruling North Korea because he had failed to bring about Korean unification despite waging the Korean War.

Both Park Chung-hee and Kim Il-sung so severely lacked legitimacy that they had no way but to legitimize their rules by connecting their political rivals in the domestic arena with foes over the military border who were absolutely evil. In short, each regime was making use of its foe to integrate, mobilize and rule their people in each territory. And to keep power, they always present two issues, national security and economic development, to avoid the real issues of unification/ division and legitimacy (see the figure below of the relations between each issue):



In this "Mutual Dependence in Antagonism" structure, economic development reinforced the lack of legitimacy in the Park Chung-hee period, but at the same time liberalization and democratization were postponed under the pretext of national security and human rights were neglected for a long time, so that a lot of people felt that they should endure the pain until the day of Korean "unification."

2) Structural Transformations

July 1974. Although this declaration was not for the realization of Korean unification but for three principles to pursue it, we can recognize through this Communiqué that both Korean regimes neither could nor would attempt Korean unification. Each regime loathes

losing power despite Korean people's demanding more efforts to carry out its "unification".

And from the 1980's to 1990's, decisive changes came to both Koreas. South Korea developed their "northern policy" in the No Tae-u regime, and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games allowed ROK to form friendly relations with ex-communist states, for example, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Communist China. In these states, the end of the Cold War caused the collapse of communist rule and the tremendous shock in North Korea, which had imported much cheaper materials from them. Since DPRK was in economic difficulties and fell into international isolation, it started to introduce foreign capital into several special areas like Rajin-Sonbong or Shiniju and to exploit WMDs (weapons of massive destruction; nuclear weapons and ICBMs or Taepodong II missiles) to deter the United States and Japan from attacking their last communist nation in the world.

3) "Co-operative Disunion" Structure in Transition

North Korea tried to reform its economic system and accepted foreign investment as China did, which succeeded in developing its industry into the so-called "world factory". At the same time, it fell into the dangerous tendency to exploit nuclear weapons and ICBMs, so the United States was afraid of direct nuclear attacks from Asia. Thus, the Clinton administration formed the 1994 Geneva nuclear agreement with North Korea and supplied a light water reactor to it through KEDO. Of course, we now know that North Korea's strategy was a brinkmanship policy which means that the top leader Kim Jung-il, after the death of Kim Il-sung in July 1994, was eager to keep his regime and make peace with the United States. Nevertheless, his strategy was in vain.

Fortunately, Kim Tae-jung, the most famous victim of the anti-communist ideology, was elected South Korea's President in 1997 and converted its North Korean policy into the so-called "haepyt" or inclusion policy. As a result, the summit between both Koreas in June 2000 showed the transformation of "Mutual Dependence in Antagonism" to a "Co-operative Disunion" structure in transition. The latter has several characteristics in functional terms as follows:

a) Both parties in power in South and North Korea continue the Korean division and help each other to keep political power by forming a common front against their foes in other areas. This is the so-called "domestic politics of the inner peninsula"⁵⁾.

b) In foreign policy, both parties pursue the same purposes as much as possible to lighten each other's burden. This is the so-called "foreign policy of the total peninsula" which tries to seek after "reconciliation and co-operation"⁶⁾.

c) Korean "unification" is downgraded to just "peaceful co-existence" between South



and North Korea in the concept of the same race and defines itself as an ideology for keeping the Korean division. Many Koreans realize this meaning, and do not want to unify Korea immediately.

These three characteristics encouraged political, economic, social and cultural interchange between both Koreas and moved the Japanese Koizumi administration to enter negotiations with North Korea for normalization of diplomatic relations. But this transformation is only one in transition, and North Korea cannot yet abandon its unique "Urishik (우리식)" socialist system under Kim Jung-il's dictatorship with himself as the sole figure of worship, while South Korea has succeeded in liberalization and democratization on the basis of its national capitalist growth.

IV. Korean "unification" – Its Prospect

Now we are in trouble because North Korea is not coming back to the 6 parties talks and is developing WMDs under the name of the right of a sovereign state. South Korea has no choice but to persuade its counterpart into giving up its plan. The United States and Japan are keeping a very firm stance toward North Korea's criminal activities including the abduction of many Japanese in the past, although Communist China and Russia are keeping their appeasement policy toward North Korea.

Many people feel that it is impossible for South Korea to make North Korea change into a normal state and abandon its desire to complete WMDs. As seen when Lee Jong-suk was criticized very strongly in July 2006, some scholars believe that the present South Korean "inclusion policy" has already finished unsatisfactorily. Of course, we must research this policy enough to discriminate between right and wrong in the light of its political mission.

But it is clear that the true Korean unification will never become a reality while North Korea does not make concessions and give up their military plans. As long as North Korea holds its "super firm policy" toward the United States and Japan, Korean "unification" will remain ideology and has no effect because the life of ideology is in its political execution. Many young people in South Korea do not wish for Korean unification. They know the North Korean reality, which is strange and scaring for them. North Koreans are just the same race living to the north of the border.

Consequently, this paper shows the prospect that Korean "unification" as ideology has finished its historical mission, which will get most Koreans, at least South Koreans, to

rethink their desire for unification. It is certain that Korean unification is the mission of Korean people and should not be disturbed by other nations around the Korean peninsula, but we need no longer treat this problem as a real issue. Korean "unification" is almost impossible if the North Korean regime remains active. The only possibility of unification for both Koreas is in North Korea's collapse, though we cannot predict when the day will come which will bring a huge chaos to the peninsula.

The important matter is that the day of true Korean unification may be the start of a second Korean War. We should prevent Korean unification from causing a new tragedy and perform a new soft-landing policy to save North Koreans living without any human rights there. I have no space to discuss concrete policies here, but peaceful unification is the precondition for a new Korean nation. We have to make a road map to perform peaceful unification and persuade the North Korean regime to agree to it.

Notes

- 1) Lee Jong-suk, Bundan Shide wi Tongilhak (분단 시대의 통일학) Seoul, 2002, p.178.
- 2) North Korea shot 7 missiles toward the Japan Sea on the 5th of July 2006. This incident broke up the deadlock of exchanges between both Koreas. North Korea even requested withdrawal of the staff from Kaesung industrial complex, which was a symbol of "reconciliation and co-operation".
- 3) Park Myung-lim, Hanguk 1950-Chunhyeong gwa Pyunghwa-(한국1950-전쟁과 평화-: Korea 1950-War and Peace-), Seoul, 2002, chap. 8.
- 4) MORI Yoshinobu, "Chosen Hantou no Bundan Kouzou to Heiwa Kouchiku (朝鮮半島の分断構造と平和構築)"Nagasaki Heiwa Kenkyu (Nagasaki Peace Studies), No.17(Nagasaki, May 2004), pp.105-115.
- 5) In the South Korean presidential race in 2003, North Korea condemned the Hannara party's candidate Lee Hae-chang, saying that a second Korean War would break out if he won the race. This statement influenced South Koreans' voting so that No Mu-hyun won.
- 6) For example, Kim Tae-jung recommended Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to visit North Korea and meet Kim Jung-il directly several times. Koizumi did so, but the problem of the abduction of Japanese citizens never allowed the public opinion to become friendly to North Korea.



BODHI PROP GATE

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Objective

The thesis is to introduce the Bodhi Prop Gate 'revealed' by Master Geumta Sunim (1898-1948) of Korea. It offers a prop to succeed in attaining the Enlightenment. The Bodhi Prop Gate is not known to the Buddhist circles in the world, and even in Korea, it is acquainted to a limited number of Buddhist monks and lay devotees for it is circulated only in the Buddhist family of Master Geumta Sunim.

About the Author

Master Geumta Sunim was born in 1898, at Gochang County, Jeolabukdo, South Korea. In the bitter aftermath of the Independence Movement of March 1St, 1919, that swept all over the Korean peninsula, he ran away and hid himself in the Moonsoo Temple in the Gochang County. There, he happened to read the Diamond Sutra to have aspiration for enlightenment, and turned away from the world to become a monk at the age of 22.

After completing the curricula at the monastery and the College of Buddhism, he exerted himself for enlightenment grabbing 'Nothingness' hua-tu of Chao-chou for 18 long hard years, but he did not earn anything to his disappointment. However, he resumed his spirit once more at the age of 39, 1936, and started the second round of meditation guided anew by the instructions of the Complete Enlightenment Sutra (圓覺經) and the Diamond Sutra(金剛經).

On the 3rd day, he suddenly encountered and see in his mind the whole text of the Bodhi Prop Gate while sitting in deep samadhi. Thereon, HE STARTED TO EXERT HIMSELF IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDELINES OF BODHI PROP GATE AND ATTAINED THE ENLIGHTENMENT 32 DAYS THEREAFTER !!

Hence, he busied himself to be transformed into what he had attained (保任) over 10 years and finally, succeeded in attaining the Maha-Bodhi, the Great Awakening, at the end

of 1947. Concerning his second round of discipline and his death, many stories of miracles and supernatural phenomena are known. He left this world at the beginning of the next year, 1948. His stone monument is standing at Seongryunsa Temple at Gokseong County, Jeollanamdo, South Korea.(1)

TEXT OF BODHI PROP GATE

'Bodhi' means the Enlightenment and the Bodhi Prop Gate is a prop to reach there. It is an ingenious device to rest our mind in Oneness through the means of Samadhi-plus-Wisdom. Therefore, your considerate reading and understanding are in order. In a quiet place, write the first clause on the paper and hang it on the wall in front of you for meditation. Then, contemplate on it so that the Samadhi of Oneness befall on you, and maintain the Samadhi of One Act to attain Enlightenment.

"Suppose that the mind is a clear and immeasurably vast space where neither a cloud nor a shadow is traceable, to assume Vairochana – the clean and pure Dharmakaya.

In this vast space of mind, suppose that it is filled with the pure water of golden hue forming a vast golden ocean full of blissful merits and power, to assume Locana – the Sambhogakaya.

Again, suppose that the Formless Beings arising and subsiding in our mind, and the Inanimate Beings, such as, the sun, the moon, the stars, the mountains, the rivers, the earth and all the nature, and all the Animate Beings, such as, the humans, animals including all the wriggling living beings,

As the bubbles in the self-undulating golden waves in the windless ocean that is full of blissful merits and power, to assume Buddha Sakyamuni – manifested in millions, trillions forms of Nirmanakaya.

Once again, remind that the clean and immeasurably vast space of mind, and the pure ocean filled with golden water which is full of blissful merits and power, and all the bubbles manifested as all kinds of phenomena and beings, which are represented as Vairochana(A), Locana(Mi), and Nirmanakaya(Ta), are all the same one body, to assume Amita Buddha.

Consequently, consider all innumerable beings and phenomena in the internal and



external world of ourselves, and their ephemeral millionfold activities arising out of the rolling of mind along the millionfold spheres, as the Great Operations of Amita Buddha, and thus understand and thus contemplate."

ORIGINAL TEXT

菩 提 方 便 門

菩提란 覺의 義로서, 菩提方便門은 見性悟道の 方便이라.
定慧均持의 心を 一境에 住하는 妙訣이니 熟讀了義한 後 寂靜에 處하고
第一節만 寫하여 端坐正視의 壁面에 付하여서 觀而 念之하되.
觀의 一相 一味로 見性하고 念의 一行 一味로 悟道함.

心은 虛空과 等할새 片雲隻影이 無한 廣人無邊의 虛空적 心界를 觀하면서
淸淨法身인달하여 毘盧遮那佛을 念하고,

此虛空의 心界에 超日月의 金色光明을 帶한 無垢의 淨水가 充滿한 海象의
性海를 觀하면서 圓滿報身인달하여 盧舍那佛을 念하고.

內로 念起念滅의 無色衆生과, 外로 日月星宿 山河大地 森羅萬象의 無情衆生과,
人畜乃至 蠢動含靈의 有情衆生과 一切衆生을, 性海無風 金波自洄인 海中淵로
觀하면서 千百億化身인달하여 釋迦牟尼佛을 念하고,

다시 彼 無量無邊의 淸空心界와 淨滿性海와 淵相衆生을, 空性相 一如의
一合相으로 通觀하면서 一身一佛인달하여 阿(化)彌(報)陀(法)佛을 常念하고,

內外生滅相인 無數衆生의 無常諸行을 心隨萬境轉인달하여 彌陀의 一人行相으로
思惟觀察할지니라.(2)

EXPLANATIONS ON THE CONTENTS

The contents of Bodhi Prop Gate (abbreviated as BPG hereunder) is almost self-explanatory, but a little explanations are provided here for the terminology and context.

BPG is starting with MIND and ends with AMITA BUDDHA. It concludes that the two entities are the same one. In the course, the mind is classified into three categories according to the degree of generalization or refinement; Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya. The first one is to designate the Buddha-body per se, or in its essential nature, Sunyata. Sambhogakaya represents, here, the body of the glorified virtue and power embedded in the former, Nirmanakaya represents the body of creatures including Sakyamuni and all the phenomena and beings in the universe executing and displaying the virtue and power given by their originator, Dharmakaya, the body of non-duality. BPG unites the three bodies into one to be represented under the name of Amita Buddha.

BPG is describing the reality that Nirmanakaya is melting into Sambhogakaya which in turn, is melting into Dharmakaya employing the analogy of the relations between the bubbles, the Golden Waves and the windless Golden Ocean, and the vast cloudless sky-like space in an ascending order to induce the Enlightenment. When we follow the descending order, we fall down into the ordinary, mundane world.

Christianity has their own Doctrine of Trinity of Holy Father, Holy Spirit (Ghost) and Holy Son. The gap between the three entities is rigid and firm, and they are not interchangeable. Each one should keep its own territory to be faithful to its role. But in Buddhism, the barriers between the entities of Trinity seem to be installed temporarily so that the practitioner may easily set aside as his spiritual power develops. Buddhistic Trinity is more flexible and free, suggesting that it is an artificial device or formulation serving the purpose of the emancipation of practitioner.

In the last paragraph, BPG advises us not to turn away from the phenomena – the mundane world, while cherishing the realm of Sunyata. It recommends us to walk the Middle Path(中道), Madhyama-pradipad.

The Formless Beings (無色衆生) mean the thoughts and ideas arising and fleeting in our mind. They are also included in the body of beings along with humans, animals and



lightening, etc. by Buddhistic definitions, What the Formless Beings lack is their physical bodies, but their life is given by Dharmakaya like all other beings.

In ordinary usage, the word Buddha denotes the historical Sakyamuni exclusively, but in a wider scope, all the beings can be named as Buddha in its essential meaning. The difference lies in that Buddha Sakyamuni is awakened one while the rests are not awakened yet.

Samadhi of Oneness means to regard all the beings in the universe as one single entity of True Suchness Buddhahood, while Samadhi of One Act is to continue the Samadhi of Oneness incessantly, in meditation.(3) The use of these techniques dates back earlier than the 6th century C.E. in the Pure Zen Age in China.

THE SIGNIFICANCE & EVALUATION, APPLICATION & EFFECTS OF BPG

In short, BPG is the description of the ultimate Wisdom of Buddhism. BPG takes a decisive step to present us the ultimate goal and orientation to the shortcut to cultivate Enlightenment by designating the mainline of Buddhism.

The beginners of Buddhism peruse every literary works, sutras, sermons, lectures, books but, hindered by the highly theoretical, metaphysical structure of Buddhistic doctrines, and also, tied up by the his or her vocational, academic or professional bias, they cannot digest those doctrines easily. They feel a considerable gap between the doctrines and their practical sense of life. Therefore, to get over these hindrances, the beginners should undergo an extensive trial and errors, and a very long time span is needed to grasp the mainline of Buddhism and to have an bird's-eye view on their external and internal world, BPG enables them to start their initial study with the higher point of view in this respect.

BPG is comparable with the Heart Sutra, the Diamond Sutra, and some other abstracts of very voluminous sutras of Buddhism. While these abstracts are based on their mother sutras to represent them in a simple format, BPG is of an independent origin without any linkage to the existing sutras. This is a unique feature of BPG along with its uncommon

emergence. Another feature is that the description of BPG is much more visual than the Heart Sutra, the Diamond Sutra, or the other abstract sutras. As it is known well, the visual appeal is far superior to those delivered by other means. BPG is effectively mobilizing this visual images to 'reveal' the mysteries of Enlightenment. As a result, the reader can get the point of the description of BPG in a precise, speedy, concrete and effective way.

Master Geumta Sunim experienced himself that what he had failed to attain after 18 years' hard work was achieved in 32 days by utilizing the guidelines of BPG. He is the most striking example of demonstrating what a miraculous vehicle the BPG is. Due to its speedy and effective productivity, it is possible that BPG will open a new horizon for the education of Buddhism.

It has been repeatedly emphasized by Patriarchs of Zen that 'Wisdom-plus- Samadhi' meditation is the true meditation. For, in many cases, the practitioners attain nothing after 10 years of meditation! Considering the reasons for the failure, it is apparent the practitioners neglected the guidance on the part of Wisdom or, their master failed to deliver personally the essential information on the Wisdom.

"The most important mode of study is the Samadhi-plus-Wisdom method. This is the nucleus of the Tripitaka Koreana. Our mind should be stuck to the lantern light of our mind i.e, the True Suchness of Buddha Nature, and proceed the study without missing it. The procession is called, according the Six Patriarch Hui-neng, "Samadhi of One Act". Samadhi of Oneness is Wisdom-wise and Samadhi of One Act is action-wise. Therefore, the two must go hand in hand to form a meditation in its true sense. The two should be balanced."(4)

Now, it is apparent that BPG will fill the place of 'Wisdom' for Zen practitioners, as its name indicates. It plays the role of a crutch, Wisdom-wise, to rely on until he attains Enlightenment. Keeping the contents of BPG firmly in his or her mind, the practitioners proceed with their mantra reciting, hwa-du meditation, Buddha recollection, or whatever methods they adopted.

Let's consider another side of BPG teaching for its concreteness. It is known that the Wisdom and Compassion are the most important properties of Buddhahood. The two virtues are commonly proclaimed as the utmost ones by Buddhism, Christianity and



Confucianism and other important religions. They are likened to the two wings of a bird for the religious maturity. However, it is not intelligible to the beginners why it should be so, especially in this competitive and egocentric modern society.

In BPG, it is described that all of our existences are bubbles which is ephemeral and transient. Then, our natural instinct is to search for something opposite, for we cannot stop at and be satisfied with the reality of the ephemerality of our existence. Here, the Golden Wave emerges to answer the quest. It is so natural and easy to understand the relations of bubbles and the Golden Waves that we cannot but move over to the Golden Waves to assume them as our true nature. Hence, the bubbles are destined to love each other, because they are the same in their essence or origin i.e. the Golden Ocean, and that means all the bubbles are one body. That is exactly what Jesus Christ taught, and explains why WISDOM IS COMPASSION in Buddhism. BPG gives the answer in a superb analogy.

Now, we can guess that many other deductions or reductions to and from BPG is available in relation with the doctrines of Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhism.

Thus, BPG leads the practitioners of meditation as a background mentor until his attainment of Enlightenment, and after then, the enlightened practitioner stands on his own and proceed without the help of this crutch, since he starts to rely on the contents of his own Enlightenment until he or she attains Maha-bodhi, the Great Awakening. The adoption of Trinity in Buddhism and the personification of respective Buddhahood are mechanisms to facilitate the explanation and understanding on Wisdom and Enlightenment. However, it should be noted that BPG is valued as the cause and, at the same time, the result, or the alpha and Omega of Enlightenment.

PROSPECTS

It is expected that many Buddhist scholars over the world would be interested and participate in the study of BPG to establish its value and develop ways of application.

With the participation of Western society in the study of Buddhism, it is urgent now to modernize and renovate Buddhistic heritage to meet the requirements of current generations. Above all, the need to enhance the productivity in the education of Buddhism

and the entailing creativity in the application of Buddhism for the problems in modern world are in order. Therefore, the texts and practice of Buddhism should be provided anew reflecting the current terms and mentality of modern environments.

BPG can be an option for the 'Lesson One', or the first lesson of modern Buddhism, and thus, be a cornerstone to build it.

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THE ALLEGED IMPORTANCE OF DIALECTICS FOR SCIENCE IN SOVIET MARXISM

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Abstract : Traditionally Marxism-Leninism has had a deep respect for science. Marxist-Leninists declared Marxism-Leninism to be "a coherent scientific theory" and have always defended the idea that their philosophy is a science or inseparable from science. Such pronouncements, like other Marxist claims in general, have largely been abandoned in most, if not all, parts of the world now. Nowadays we hear much less frequently than in the past the phrase "scientific socialism" and exaltations of Marxist theory for its scientificity. Nevertheless, a recollection of those voices today, a critical look back at them, could help us realize and appreciate how far we have come in the way of freeing our scientific thought from the specter of an enslaving ideology. In this paper I briefly examine the claim, popular among Marxists especially before the downfall of Soviet Union, that dialectical principles have much to contribute towards the development of science.

Traditionally Marxism-Leninism has had a deep respect for science. Marxist-Leninists declared Marxism-Leninism to be "a coherent scientific theory"¹ and have always defended the idea that their philosophy is a science or inseparable from science. Such pronouncements, like other Marxist claims in general, have largely been abandoned in most, if not all, parts of the world now. Nowadays we hear much less frequently than in the past the phrase "scientific socialism" and exaltations of Marxist theory for its scientificity.² Nevertheless, a recollection of those voices today, a critical look back at them, could help us realize and appreciate how far we have come in the way of freeing our

¹ A.P. Sheptulin, *Marxist-Leninist Philosophy* (English translation) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), p.15.

² Many Marxists today are in very good terms with such science/rationality-unfriendly philosophies as continental postmodernism.

scientific thought from the specter of an enslaving frame of mind. In this paper my aim is to briefly examine the claim, popular among Marxists especially before the downfall of Soviet Union, that dialectical principles have much to contribute towards the development of science. In what follows, when I use the term 'Marxism' or 'Marxists,' I shall have in mind "garden variety" (if not "orthodox") Marxism and Marxists before the demise of the Soviet Union, and their not too many current adherents.³

Marxists put special emphasis on the relationship between science and philosophy. This emphasis appears to derive, first, from their belief that both the history of science and the latest developments in it confirm, or are "in line with," the doctrine of dialectical materialism; and secondly, from their hope that a grasp by scientists of dialectical materialism would help them become more proficient in their profession, and further the development of science by furnishing scientists with useful ideas in solving the problems they encounter. Thus Marxists keep stressing the great importance for them of adequately understanding how science works and develops.

Marxists have typically defended the position that there must be an "alliance" between scientists and philosophers. The Soviet philosopher Kedrov believes that to effect this, "a businesslike approach is particularly needed."⁴ Such an approach is necessary to carry out Lenin's "behests" about strengthening the cooperation between scientists and Marxist philosophers, according to Kedrov.⁵ In what ways can philosophy help the development of science? Science is part of the superstructure in a society and is determined or "shaped" by the world view, i.e. philosophy, of the dominant class so as to further that class's own interests. (This orthodox view was changed by Stalin, however, who recognized science to be a class-independent, neutral phenomenon.) Within the framework of Marxist philosophy we can distinguish two ways in which philosophy influences science: in an indirect way and in a direct way. The indirect kind of influence is exerted by the dominant class by way of,

³ There is no question that interest in classical Marxist philosophy has been waning in the world and that this phenomenon started with Gorbachev's coming to power in the USSR in 1985. For a statistical picture of this situation, see my "Is Marxist Philosophy Withering Away?" *Studies in East European Thought*, 45(1993), pp.313-315.

⁴ B.M. Kedrov, "V.I. Lenin on the Dialectics of the Development of Natural Science," *Soviet Studies in Philosophy*, 10(1971-72), p.231. The journal *Soviet Studies in Philosophy* will hereafter be referred to as 'SSP.'

⁵ *Ibid.*



for example, investing large sums of money on scientific projects which are likely to reinforce their world view in the society or by preventing publication of scientific books and journals which would threaten their world view. The second type of influence philosophy exerts on science, which is of greater interest to us, is supposed to occur in more direct ways; for example, by way of providing scientists with inspiration or with new methods, or at least with heuristics, for solutions of scientific problems.

The Soviet astrophysicist-philosopher Ambartsumian says that there are several ways in which philosophy can help science. One way is this:

... the philosophical ideas of atomic construction, causality, development, and many others have by no means lost their significance to methodology, even now. And they play an active role in the synthesis of new notions in natural science... Moreover, the heuristic value of philosophical categories, principles, and ideas is to be observed at all levels of research in natural science. In recent years, the heuristic role of materialist dialectics has been comprehensively revealed in the synthesis of the present-day scientific picture of the world.⁶

Let's take Ambartsumian's claim about contribution of the "philosophical idea of causality" to science. Many philosophers in the West (such as J.L. Mackie, G.H. von Wright, Wesley Salmon, D.H. Mellor, and David Lewis) studied our concept of causality. Now, even if scientists think this concept is indispensable in their accounts of natural phenomena,⁷ it is not at all obvious that they do benefit from philosophers' work on that concept, as Ambartsumian claims. The situation seems rather to be this: scientists employ the notion of "causation" in their theories, research reports, etc., and philosophers try to analyze this notion as it occurs in scientific talk, to pinpoint its meaning and its relations to other concepts. It is not in general expected (in the Anglophone West, at any rate) that

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.216.

⁷ There has been some debate among Western philosophers as to whether the notion of "cause" should have any place in modern science. Russell declared it to be a "relic of a bygone age" and contended that causal relations should be replaced by other relations, expressed by, e.g., differential equations. However, many other philosophers, like Nagel and Suppes, argued that the notion of "cause" is indispensable for science. See, Bertrand Russell, "On the Notion of Cause," in Russell's *Mysticism and Logic* (the paper was originally published in 1910); Ernest Nagel, "Types of Causal Explanation in Science," in D. Lerner (ed.), *Cause and Effect* (New York: The Free Press, 1965); Patrick Suppes, *A Probabilistic Theory of Causality* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1970).

scientists should always check what philosophers will come up with in their endeavors to analyze this notion, and then employ the philosophers' findings profitably in their scientific research. Hence the distinction Anglophone philosophers generally draw between the tasks of philosophy and of science. The situation with regard to the "philosophical idea of atomic construction" similarly doesn't help the thesis that philosophy significantly aids science in the latter's development. It may be that historically the scientists who first proposed the atomic theory of matter had been inspired by the philosophical ideas of the Ancient Greek philosophers Democritus and Leucippus (which I doubt), but the claim that those ideas, or the ideas of any recent philosophical atomism, do *currently* help modern science seems unfounded. It is true that physics is now seeking for "elementary particles," or the ultimate atoms of matter, but atomistic philosophy has little to contribute to this kind of research.

The idea that philosophy has directed science by formulating its methodology has come under attack by a school of history of science which is associated with Thomas S. Kuhn. According to this school, science develops its own methodology and does not borrow it from philosophy. Science never used the methodology developed by Francis Bacon, for example. Philosophy's formulation of a certain methodology comes later, not earlier, than the actual employment of that methodology in science. And this is particularly true for natural sciences and for the more recent periods in the history of science. Thus science has had a great measure of independence from philosophy in the methods it actually uses, which is to say that it hasn't really entered any "businesslike" interactions with philosophy.

Therefore Ambartsumian's claim that philosophy effectively helps science by way of contributing to its methodology or by aiding scientists as a heuristic source, and that philosophical ideas play "an active role in the synthesis of new notions in natural science" is an overstatement. However, it is clear enough that when he makes these claims Ambartsumian generally has in mind the philosophical ideas of dialectical materialism and not just *any* philosophical ideas (although he sometimes speaks as if some other philosophical doctrines could also contribute to science). Then we will have to evaluate such a view separately, and we will do so in a moment. But let me mention the other ways in which, Ambartsumian claims, philosophy helps science.⁸ He says philosophy plays an

⁸ See *op. cit.*, p.216.



important role in constructing and developing fundamental theories of modern physics. Another role of philosophy is "in creating theories descriptive of regularities of complex phenomena on the basis of knowledge of fundamental laws of nature." Thus philosophy, on this conception, tries to discover laws of natural phenomena. In modern Western philosophy it is not regarded as a task of philosophy to discover the laws of nature. To continue with Ambartsumian, he says "in speaking of the importance of philosophy to the development of the sciences, it is necessary to place particular stress on the role of philosophical ideas in the further development of and drawing of conclusions from the fundamental notions of natural science." All these claims are made under the assumption that dialectical materialism provides a powerful "logic" or methodology for science. Ambartsumian quotes V.A. Fok: "In the future as well, the governing ideas in solving [scientific] questions will have to be those of dialectical materialism, formulated with such clarity and universality by V.I. Lenin."⁹ This strong prophecy of Fok was shared by most Soviet philosophers who wrote on the nature of science.

It will be of interest to refer to the ideas of Kopnin, another Soviet author, on the question of how philosophy can help science solve its problems. He says:

Of course, in the more than a millennium during which it has existed, philosophy has accumulated a number of different ideas that can still, from time to time, have a productive influence upon scientific thought. For example, the notions of "chaos" among the ancient Greeks, or Leibniz's "monad," not to speak of the atomists, will still serve for a long time as the source of various ideas in science. For all its rigor of logic, scientific knowledge today needs bold, or as it is now customary to say, "crazy" ideas. And in that, as we know, philosophy always excelled!¹⁰

It should be immediately pointed out that Kopnin does not hold that dialectical materialism is a source of crazy ideas... It is only other philosophies that might provide scientists with such ideas. The function of dialectical materialism is different; its categories comprise the method, indeed the only method of thought in sciences allowing theoretical synthesis as a result of which new ideas and constructs in science are

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.217.

¹⁰ P.V. Kopnin, "Contemporary Science and the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Knowledge," *SSP*, 10(1971-72), p.229.

formulated.¹¹ The crucial question is: Has dialectics really proved itself to be the “only method” of thought in science?

According to Omel'ianovskii, “modern physics, including its completed theories, cannot make do either without philosophy in general or without materialist dialectics in particular.”¹² Soviet scholars so praised the so-called materialist dialectics and so strongly urged its use that one might think it must have been a highly developed and convenient technique, vastly and fruitfully employed in entire science. But the actual situation is quite different. In the first place, it has never been given an explicit, comprehensive formulation, comparable to, say, Francis Bacon's inductive methodology or J.S. Mill's canons for discovering causes of phenomena. A Western author, Boeselager, however, defends the contrary view. According to him: (1) a fairly detailed and technically competent dialectical methodology, i.e. an application of dialectical logic to methodology of science has been developed; (2) this methodology affords answers to many questions regarding the understanding of science within the system of Marxism-Leninism.¹³ Boeselager does not give a concrete example of an actual employment of dialectics in science. Moreover, his claims are not supported by the avowals by the Soviet philosophers themselves about the current underdeveloped state of the “dialectical logic” and their urge that it be put into an adequate form.¹⁴ Marxists expect dialectics to achieve too much in the scientific arena—while Western philosophy has much humbler expectations from its “Aristotelian logic”—but there aren't many signs to indicate that the theory of dialectics has met the demands made of it.

Marxists officially believe that dialectical principles have been unshakably established and that “science, and particularly twentieth century natural science, provides brilliant confirmation of materialist dialectics.”¹⁵ How is that? A favorite example of Engels for the employment of the categories of dialectics in scientific thinking is Mendeleyev's discovery of the periodic table of elements. Mendeleyev, “by unconsciously employing Hegel's law of transition from quantity into quality, performed a great feat in science.”¹⁶ In the view of

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.230.

¹² Omel'ianovskii, *op. cit.*, p.245.

¹³ W.F. Boeselager, “Soviet Dialectical Methodology,” *Studies in Soviet Thought*, 6(1966), p.136.

¹⁴ See, Kopnin, *op. cit.*, pp.225–227; Omel'ianovskii, *op. cit.*, pp.249–250; Kedrov, *op. cit.*, p.239.

¹⁵ Kopnin, *op. cit.*, p.225.

¹⁶ Quoted from Marx and Engels by Omel'ianovskii, *op. cit.*, p.240.



Marxists, even those scientists who have never heard of such a thing as “dialectical method,” actually, “unconsciously,” use the principles of dialectics when they are involved in a discovery or solving a problem. The explanation given of this is roughly that workings of nature are in conformity with the laws of dialectics, and hence, the scientist’s thinking has to conform to the same laws to reflect those workings correctly; the scientist has to think dialectically. Obviously there are many gaps in this account which Marxists have never been able—nor even seriously bothered—to fill satisfactorily. Dialectical materialism has not been the most rigorous, hair-splitting philosophical theory in the world. But here is a puzzle for the dialectical materialist. If the entire world or reality obeys the laws of dialectics always and everywhere, then a scientist always thinks dialectically, no matter what she thinks. For, according to dialectical materialism, thoughts are part of reality, or part of the material world, like everything that exists. So to say that scientists should think dialectically is an unnecessary advice, for they already do so all the time. To assent that sometimes scientists fail to think dialectically is to admit that there is a domain of the material world—the thinking mind—which is (occasionally) not governed by the laws of dialectics! Since dialectical materialists wouldn’t like to embrace this horn of the dilemma, they are left with the other horn: That not only correct scientific thoughts but also thoughts that are dead wrong, such as the thoughts of an idealist philosopher, are dialectical in nature. In other words, dialectical thinking does not equal correct thinking.

The dialectical materialist view that correct thinking conforms to the workings of nature is a species of naïve realism, or naïve representationalism, which holds that our (scientists’) minds can simply and passively picture reality, without contributing anything of its own to our perception of and thinking about reality. The naïve realist faces a perennial problem of philosophy, viz. the problem of the external world, in the most acute way: to be able to say that my thoughts are true pictures of the outside world, I need a vantage point from which I can check my mind’s contents to see if they are in agreement with (are correct pictures or copies of) the contents of the external world. Such a vantage point of course is not available. According to one Western author, the Marxist theory involves a serious problem in this connection: the theory harbors a contradiction in it, a contradiction that even a dialectical materialist couldn’t tolerate. Gordon Leff says that Marxist theory contains

the paradox that through historical materialism we are able to discern the fallacy of dialectical materialism. For whereas the latter assures us that our consciousness is a true reflection of reality, historical materialism is concerned to show the

essentially incomplete and transitory nature of our awareness: its “false-consciousness.” Where dialectical materialism, as expounded by Engels and Lenin, affirms the direct correlation of what is to what we experience, historical materialism shows the complexity of the connection; where the one seems to imply that the world is an open book, the other points to the need to pass beyond appearance to reality...¹⁷

As for the quantum theory, the establishment of which is advertised by Marxists as an example of application of the dialectical method, this theory “with its complementarity concept, arose and was constructed with the help of the same method of observability in principle as well as the method of the mathematical hypothesis.”¹⁸ The two methods, presented here as if they are peculiar to and distinctive of (or in the monopoly of) dialectics, are not enough for the so-called dialectical method to reap any credit for the spectacular successes of the quantum theory. It is sometimes claimed by Marxists that the quantum theory has attested to the validity of the dialectical law of the “unity of the opposites” by unifying the corpuscular and undulatory aspects of matter. In some sense, one could say that matter does possess these two “opposite” characters. But from another point of view, the assertion is false: a piece of matter is *not* both particle-like and wave-like *at the same time*. For any given time moment, those opposites are not found “unified” or “in unity” at that moment. For the Complementarity Principle advanced by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory tells us that in any given experimental setup, we can either treat matter as wave or as particle, but not both at the same time.¹⁹ So, the assertion that the wave-particle duality of matter exemplifies the dialectical law of the unity of opposites sounds correct only if we are using a loose terminology. One could also respond to the Marxist position on this issue by saying that what the Complementarity Principle has taught us is that the corpuscular behavior and the undulatory behavior are not opposites after all. Quantum Mechanics has revealed that what we earlier took in the macro world to be opposite behaviors are not really opposites in the micro world. Marxists having failed to offer any solid criteria of what counts as “opposites,” there

¹⁷ *Tyranny of Concepts: A Critique of Marxism* (University of Alabama Press, 1969), pp.107–108.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ For example, an experiment designed to measure the position of electrons, which is a particle-like property of them, does not allow us to measure any wave-like property of those electrons, such as wavelength.



seems no reason we couldn't dismiss the wave-particle duality as an example of the "law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites."²⁰

As another example of the efficacy of dialectical analysis for understanding the problems of quantum theory, "the problem of the subjective and objective" is cited by Omel'ianovskii. He says that idealists, like the physicist Heisenberg, think that quantum theory, together with the theory of relativity, has paved the way for the abandonment of materialism by blurring the distinction between the subjective and the objective as a consequence of the uncertainty principle. But closer analysis of the concepts of those theories revealed that the notions of "subjective" and "objective" were handed down from classical physics which treats them as isolated and regards their difference as absolute. Quantum theory has not discarded them completely, but showed their difference to be only relative. This much is what physicists say. How does dialectical materialism relate to this problem? According to Omel'ianovskii,

Here materialist dialectics opens the necessary paths toward solution of the paradoxes that arise. The significance of Lenin's ideas on the interrelation between the subjective and objective (between relative and absolute) is particularly great in the case before us. In the works of contemporary Marxists, this is also demonstrated in all clarity with respect to the philosophical problems of physics—how the subjective and objective are related, how they are compared, how they are referred to each other. In this connection, I should like to recall two observations by Lenin. He wrote, "The difference between subjective and objective does exist, but *it, too, has its limits.*" And further, "In (objective) dialectics, the difference between relative and absolute, too, is relative. For objective dialectics, the

²⁰ Marxists also like to say "contradictory," instead of "opposite," and when they do so, they are using the term 'contradictory' in a much too liberal way. The terms 'contradictory' and 'contradiction' are strictly and historically terms that belong to formal deductive logic, and their use is clearly circumscribed in that logic. Marxists, following Hegel, can take any arbitrary A and B to be opposites or contradictories, if that usage is going to serve them to "illustrate" that the law of the unity of opposites holds in the case in question. Many examples that Engels gives (in *Anti-Dühring*, for example) as illustrations of this law makes one think that, when Engels says A and B are opposites or contradictories, he means nothing more than that A and B are some two *different* entities or interacting factors. For a criticism of the loose and arbitrary use that dialectical materialists make of the terms 'contradictory' and 'negation,' see also Karl R. Popper's classic article, "What is Dialectic?" in his *Conjectures and Refutations* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp.312-335, and Leff, *op. cit.*, pp.39-73.

relative *contains* the absolute. For subjectivism and sophistry, the relative is purely relative and excludes the absolute.”²¹

Historically, it was not contemporary Marxists who first resolved many paradoxes in quantum theory. Lenin’s pronouncements like “The difference between relative and absolute is relative” and “The relative contains the absolute,” even if they make any sense, hardly seem illuminating and helpful to the practicing scientist to resolve any quantum puzzles. At any rate, in contemporary books on quantum theory or any other science books, we don’t find many acknowledgements to Lenin’s and other dialectical materialists’ ideas.

Other examples of alleged employment of dialectical analysis in science are given by Omel’ianovskii.²² One such example is this:

Or consider the idea that the essence of Einstein’s general theory of relativity lies not in extrapolating relativity to accelerated motion but in establishing the fact of an organic connection between the gravitational field and space-time properties. This is a new and profoundly dialectical and materialist point of view, containing what is valuable and noteworthy in Einstein’s theory.²³

The idea that the general theory of relativity establishes an “organic connection” between gravitational fields and space-time properties does not only seem to be a useless, superfluous idea, that doesn’t add anything to our understanding of these matters, but the term ‘organic connection’ is unfortunate because it carries animistic associations. It is a remarkable fact that Marxists are generally not hesitant to use terms with animistic or anthropomorphic associations, as in the dialectical law of the “unity and *struggle* of opposites.” It is doubtful that using anthropomorphic-animistic notions, even when intended as metaphors, provides better understanding of physical phenomena. Such terms are avoided in serious science texts, but not in dialectical materialist philosophy of science literature.

As a last example, let me mention the alleged use of dialectics as a suggestive principle in Ambartsumian’s construction of his astronomical theory. He says that dialectics suggested to him the idea of instability in celestial bodies as a natural stage in

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.249.

²² *Op. cit.*, pp.246-247.

²³ *Ibid.*, p.247.



the developments of cosmic processes. However, arriving at that notion doesn't seem to involve any use of prominently dialectical principles. After all, the same notion could have been reached "unconsciously" by another cosmologist who never took dialectics seriously. And if dialectically-unconscious scientists like Einstein or Bohr can be as successful, if not more so, in their trade as scientists who take pains to apply dialectics in every scientific problem, then maybe nobody needs to bother to develop dialectics as "the only methodology" of scientific activity, nor be regretful about the incomplete and underdeveloped state of the dialectical method.

To sum up, my examination of some Soviet claims about the virtues of the dialectical method in relation to science suggests that this "method" is largely a sterile one, both as a suggestive principle and as a comprehensive methodology for scientific inquiry. The related claim that the tools of dialectical analysis help us better understand the nature of science sounds equally unconvincing. As to the stronger claim of most Marxists, which I haven't stressed in this paper, that dialectical materialism is a complete science by itself, this claim too wouldn't seem to hold water in view of what I have already said above. Today, about 20 years after the downfall of the Soviet Union, we are lucky to be in a much better position to apprehend that dialectical materialism is devoid of any real scientific virtues. There are much fewer champions of the scientific (and economic and political) value of the dialectical and historical materialism today than there used to be, and this can't be just a historical accident.



A Comparative Analysis of Turkish and South Korean Foreign Policies and International Perspectives

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This presentation intends to analyse the normative perspectives and key political choices of Turkey and South Korea respectively with regard to the outside world in the aftermath of the Second World War. The choice of this subject of enquiry may at first sight seem rather arbitrary and even unnecessary for a variety of reasons: Turkey is a Middle Eastern country and is overwhelmingly Muslim, whereas South Korea is an East Asian country and is home to Buddhists, Christians and others. There is hardly any historical or cultural connection between the two countries. The trade between them is not necessarily impressive. Turkish participation into the Korean War of 1950–53 in support of the United States (US) and South Korea seems to be about the only thread of any significance that binds the two nations together. However this does not alone justify the investigation of the topic at hand.

However, I happen to think that, a deeper insight into the peculiarities of Turkey and South Korea may provide sufficient grounds for the analysis made below. After all, both of them may be categorized as middle-rank powers. They both are American allies and thus host to quite a number of American bases in their territory. Contrary to both states' exaggerated reliance on the US and emphasis on the desirability of close links with this superpower, the largest fraction of the peoples of both countries have a negative view of the US. Both Turkey and South Korea have a status-quo oriented view of the outside world, shaped mostly by Western group of states, as manifested in their foreign policy behaviour, government pronouncements and voting preferences in international organizations. Turkey is a Middle Eastern country, and yet it conceives itself as a Western state, whereas South Korea is an Asian state, and yet it often sees the world one to one with the US. Both of the countries in question profess their attachment to democracy, competitive party politics, rule of law, and human rights, and yet their political systems have too often been abused by military regimes and human rights violations. Finally, union with North Korea is the prime national goal in South Korea, whereas Turkey considers the Cyprus and

Aegean problems with Greece, which also brings forth the question of Turkish borders, as a 'national' issue/problem. I hope that the accounts given above justify the presentation of this work to our distinctive audience.

This presentation endeavours to make a comparative analysis of the Turkish and South Korean perspectives of international law and international society in the aftermath of the Second World War. What parallels can we draw of the conceptions and practices of both countries vis-à-vis the world outside them? What differentiates them in the way in which they perceive the role of international law in contemporary international relations? What sort of expectations do they cultivate vis-à-vis international organizations, and, in particular, the United Nations? What is their conception of human rights and freedoms and their status in international relations? Do they have a propensity to pursue a proactive or reactive course of action towards international society? Do they consider themselves as part of the Western world or the non-Western world? How do they approach the prohibition of force in international relations as a cardinal rule and principle of international law generally and of the UN law specifically? What international strategies do they put into use in the pursuit of "national objectives"? What are the major international disputes that preoccupy their respective foreign policies? These are the substantive questions around which this paper is organized.

Politics, Democracy, Human Rights

As an independent state, South Korea owes its existence, first and foremost, to the protection afforded by the US in the post-Second World War era. The Korean peninsula was partitioned between the north and the south following the surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945. After they arrived at an agreement on the future of Korea, the Soviet Union assumed authority in the north of the thirty-eighth parallel and the US firmly established itself in southern Korea. Officially procuring the name, Republic of Korea, South Korea was founded as a republic on August 15, 1948. Within a couple of weeks, on September 9, 1948, the socialist state of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) proclaimed itself as a separate state. The bitter division of Korea was interrupted by the outright occupation of the south by North Korean troops on June 25, 1950. Most of South Korean territories fell into the hands of the invading army within a few weeks. This precipitated the US intervention into the war:



"The United States, fearing that inaction in Korea would be interpreted as appeasement of communist aggression elsewhere in the world, was determined that South Korea should not be overwhelmed and asked the United Nations (UN) Security Council to intervene,"¹

This fanned the flame of the Korean conflict that escalated into a devastating war. The Korean War lasted for three years until July 27, 1953. There was no doubt that the "the war left indelible marks on the Korean Peninsula and the world surrounding it. The entire peninsula was reduced to rubble; casualties on both sides were enormous. The chances for peaceful unification had been remote even before 1950, but the war dashed all such hopes."²

A study of country file on South Korea makes a fine summary of the evolution of South Korean politics after it gained independence in 1948:

"Fair elections in 1952 were followed by corrupt ones later that decade. A succession of military leaders assumed power in South Korea starting in 1961 with a *coup* led by army officers. Growing frustration with repressive rule among South Koreans led to demonstrations in May 1980 in the city of Kwangju. These demonstrations were violently suppressed, killing hundreds of civilians. Whereas the South Korean economy flourished, democratic institutions and a free press often did not. In spite of political violence in the form of brutal crackdowns against civilian protests and the assassination of government leaders, a civil society emerged to lead the South Korean democracy movement. In 1987, after years of regular protests, the military leaders of South Korea were forced to hold free and democratic elections. Their handpicked successor, Roh Tae-woo, won, as opposition parties failed to unite around a single candidate and split the vote. In 1992 Kim Young-sam was elected, followed in 1997 by longtime opposition leader Kim Dae-jung. In 2002 South Koreans elected a human rights lawyer and relative political newcomer, Roh Moo-hyun president."³

¹ Library of Congress - Federal Research Division, Country Profile: South Korea, May 2005, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/South_Korea.pdf

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

The history of democracy in South Korea has striking similarities to that of Turkey. Fair elections in Turkey were held in 1950 when the reign of the Republican Peoples Party, which had been ruling the country single-handedly since the foundation of the Republic in 1923, came to a halt. The civilian government, formed by the Democrat Party, was overthrown by a *coup d'état* in 1960, a year preceding the military takeover in South Korea. While a military junta from 1961 up until 1987 governed South Korea, the political system in Turkey alternated between outright military rule and civilian authority during this period. However even during the course of civilian rule, the hand of the army was always visible right at the heart of politics. The Cold War years were mostly marked by oppression and prohibitions, rather than freedom and political participation in South Korea and Turkey. The denial of basic human rights, such as freedom of expression, was justified on a long list of arbitrary grounds in both countries. "The survival of the homeland" was one of them. A 1990 study on South Korea noted that, "in divided Korea, almost any act of opposition to the South Korean government could be and has been characterized as benefiting North Korea".⁴ Similar restrictions on the freedom of expression in Turkey during the course of the Cold War were justified, *inter alia*, by referring to the possibility of the partition of the "Turkish homeland". While the military junta in South Korea was obliged to step down in 1987 on account of public protests, the hard grip of the Turkish army in civilian politics began to loosen roughly in this period.

The rise to presidency of KIM Yo'ng-sam in 1993 meant more than simple replacement in South Korean politics, since he was the first civilian president after well over 30 years of military rule in this country. The degree of democracy that South Korean people enjoy today far exceeds the limited rights and freedoms that the authoritarian state had permitted in the past. This development likewise has its parallels in Turkish politics. Turkey's morally and culturally conservative, but politically and economically liberal-minded Prime Minister Turgut Özal became the new president of Turkey in 1989. Almost all of his predecessors in the presidential office had been generals with little interest in democratising the country. By contrast, Özal's term in office was marked by a liberalization of Turkish politics and higher standards of human rights protection. It was during this time that Turkey recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, while according Turkey's Kurds the right to publish in their own language. An episode in Turkish politics, which separated out Turkey from South Korea between 1997–2002, was the abrupt dissolution of the government by the collaboration between Turkey's new

⁴ <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12353.html>



president, the armed forces, dominant media and civilian bureaucracy. This incident is commonly known in Turkey as the post-modern *coup d'état* of February 28 –1997. The threats, intimidations and resignations of some ministers from the cabinet and some parliamentarians from their parties gave way to a new coalition government that chose to act as the mouthpiece of the pro-status quo forces in Turkey. However the elections held in November 2002 brought the newly established Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to power. Those who wanted change in Turkish politics and resented the post-modern *coup d'état* of February 28 and the suppression of rights that this process had unleashed, voted for the new party. The government of Justice and Development Party has embarked on an ambitious reform program in the economic and political realms which is commensurate with the “road map” which the European Union had presented to Turkey to lay the necessary ground work so that the parties could begin accession negotiations at the appropriate time. Greater transparency in Turkish politics, better guarantees of human rights protection for all sections of Turkish society, harsher punishment for torturers and other abusers of human rights, a lessening of the overweening powers assumed by the army, and higher priority to international human rights treaties in the Turkish legal system have been among the signs of the changing face of Turkish politics.

Relations with the US

As said before, both Turkey and South Korea may be considered as middle-sized powers with close association and military alliance with the US. There is no doubt that the US perspectives of the outside world have significantly influenced their official worldview. South Korea owed its existence and the ejection of North Korean forces from the south during the Korean War of 1950–53 largely to the US. Not unexpectedly the 1954 *Mutual Defence Treaty* with the US is the most significant treaty which South Korea has signed with a foreign country. The extent of South Korea's identification with the US during the Cold War was such that South Korea did not hesitate to dispatch 320,000 troops to Vietnam to fight alongside the US against the North Vietnamese forces. Besides, for too long the US has been South Korea's number one trading partner and a vital source of foreign investment.

While in the 1950s South Korea was economically poor, politically fragile, and militarily weak, this began to change in the decades that followed: “During the subsequent four

decades, ... Seoul came of age economically, politically, and even militarily and was no longer as economically or militarily dependent on the United States. Instead, by the 1990s it was seeking to establish a partnership for progress. The Seoul–Washington relationship in this transition was increasingly subject to severe strains."⁵ These strains were caused by frictions over the trade surplus of South Korea in its trade with the US, the dilemma as to whether the US should maintain its troop presence in South Korea, and by the resentment of many South Koreans about the US involvement in the crushing of the radical opposition in the country.⁶ The hypocrisy of the US which has always depicted itself as the champion of democracy, human rights and freedom in the world was all too visible in South Korea, as in many other places. Hence the US image was also tarnished by the long time US support for succeeding South Korean governments that committed egregious human rights violations and all sorts of other abuses. This naturally resulted in the questioning by many Koreans of US motives in South Korea. The new American image was as worse as it could be. As a result, "the past image of the United States as a staunch supporter of democracy in South Korea was replaced with that of defender of its own interests, a policy impervious to injustices committed in South Korea."⁷

Today, even when listening to those in the high echelons of the South Korean state who tend to paint a rather rosy picture of the US–South Korean alliance, one could hear views that draw on the pitfalls of the intricate network of relations between the two countries: "Unfortunately, even such a strong and well-founded partnership as the one between the two countries has no immunity to new challenges."⁸ The fury and hatred felt by most of the South Korean people have become even more intense in the last few years. There is now utter frustration and anger about the US invasions and interventions in many parts of the world and its lack of respect for international law since the termination of the Cold War and, *a fortiori*, since September 11, 2001.

However in spite of growing misgivings of the South Korean people about the US motives, those who shape the policies of the state seem determined to maintain the "special" ties with the US. Indeed South Korea has always been vocal about its support

⁵ <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12357.html>

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ <http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/27.htm>

⁸ Sun Joun-yung, "Notes from the Field: North Korea and the Security of Northeast Asia and Beyond", *Santa Clara Journal of International Law*, Vol. 3, 2005, 1-16, p.10, speech given at Santa Clara University, September 29, 2004, www.scu.edu/scjil



for US designs in Asia, if not elsewhere. It did not hesitate to send 3,200 South Korean servicemen to the US-occupied Iraq to serve the US war aims. South Korea has thus chosen to contribute to this imperial American project “despite the persistent efforts of Koreans to stop deployment of Korean troops and to withdraw existing troops.”⁹

Like South Korea, Turkey became a US ally in the aftermath of the Second World War. It is common knowledge that Turkey is the most secular of all the Muslim countries in the Middle East. Most of its territories lie in Asia, and only a small fraction in Europe. The destiny of the people of Turkey had long been historically tied to the Arab and Kurdish peoples of the Middle East. As a world power which remained in existence from the end of the 13th century up until the end of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire skilfully brought together numerous ethnic and religious communities in the Middle East, North Africa and the Balkans under its sovereignty. Turkey has an obvious commonality of religion (Islam), culture (common traditions mostly rooted in Islam), history (Islamic empires from the Abbasids to the Ottomans) and geography (Near East or Middle East) with the countries of the Middle East. In spite of that however, the state has chosen to identify and ally itself with the Western world as manifested in its membership of NATO in 1952 and current negotiations for membership of the European Union. “State ideology” that idealizes and idolizes pro-Western outlook is the key to understanding the motives behind the Turkish foreign policy. Turkey has opened its soil to a significant number of American bases since the 1950s. Furthermore, it became the first Muslim country to recognize Israel (1949) to please the US. It has always maintained contacts with Israel, if at times they were kept secret. In order to obtain the approval of NATO members concerning its request for membership, Turkey did not hesitate to send 4,500 of its soldiers to South Korea right at the start of the war in 1950 to fight alongside the US-led coalition against North Korea and its allies.¹⁰ Turkey became part of NATO in 1952. It soon began to receive US military and economic aid on account of its NATO membership, its permission of the privileged use by the Americans army of the Turkish soil in the form of American bases as registered by bilateral treaties, and Turkey’s sympathetic view of and often support for American arguments in the international arena.

⁹ Quoted from the “Summary of the Decision” taken by People’s Tribunal on War Crimes, in the Case entitled Charges Regarding the War Crimes Committed in Iraq. <http://www.worldtribunal.org/main/?b=38>

¹⁰ Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası*, 6th edition, Vol.1, (İstanbul, İletişim, 2002), pp.545-47.

This relationship survived the vicissitudes and mutual frictions springing from issues such as the Johnson Letter of 1964, written by the US President, which sent a threatening signal to Turkey in case it intended to take military action to protect the Turks of Cyprus against Greek militias, the American arms embargo imposed against Turkey in the period between 1975–78 as a punishment for Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, and Turkey's frequent complaints about the inadequacy of American aid to a "self-sacrificing Turkey" throughout the Cold War.

Although the Cold War ended and the "Soviet threat" disappeared in the early 1990s, Turkish-American relations, contrary to what one would expect, gained a new lease of life under a new concept called "enhanced partnership" which was introduced in 1991. Only a few months earlier, Turkey had given its full political and logistical support to the US endeavours pertaining to the ejection of Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1990–91 under the strong Presidency of Turgut Özal in the first major international crisis that had erupted after the Cold War. In the official website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is said that the enhanced partnership, which is still at currency, has been aimed at "diversifying and deepening the Turkish-American relationship as well as developing it on a more substantial basis." Besides, the paragraph goes, Turkey and the US are "close allies" that "consult one another, coordinate their efforts and cooperate, as appropriate, in conflict prevention and crisis management and in containing regional conflicts, deterring rogue states, curbing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism." We are also told that "the values and ideals that they subscribe to are identical."¹¹

Although, since November 2002, Turkey is supposedly ruled by an "Islamist government" (which is, of course, a misnomer), the government of Justice and Development Party under the premiership of Tayyip Erdoğan had signalled its willingness to cooperate with the US in the run-up to the latter's impending invasion of Iraq. The extent of mutual commitment between the parties on a host of different issues had been so broad that Turkey's new government felt that it could not afford to refuse any cooperation with the US in this hyperpower's upcoming military campaign against Iraq. On the other hand, the government of Justice and Development Party was looked at suspiciously by Turkey's conventional elites, ranging from the army to the dominant media, on account of

¹¹ Official site of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Turkish-U.S. Political Relations", http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/NorthAmerica/USA/USA_Political.htm, July 5, 2006.



its conceived threat to Turkey's hard-line secularism, which meant that the government feared that its survival could be at risk without the external support of the US. Turkey's excessive economic and financial reliance on the US and the largely US-controlled IMF and World Bank meant, from the spectrum of the government, that outright rejection of US designs might directly or indirectly cripple the Turkish economy. I think that these three factors explain a great deal about why the Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdoğan, enjoined the parliament to vote in favour of allowing a large contingent of US troops (above thirty thousand) to use the Turkish territory in order to enter northern Iraq, although the overwhelming majority of the people detested the idea of the US troops invading Iraq, and Turkey collaborating with this hegemonic and aggressive power. Surprisingly enough, the motion tabled before the Grand National Assembly on March 1, 2003 did not get the necessary votes, because some members of parliament from the AK Party voted against the motion alongside those from the opposition Republican Peoples Party. When two years later, the US introduced its Greater Middle East (GME) plan which was designed to inject political and economic reforms into the Muslim World, especially in the Middle East, triggering structural changes in this part of the world, Turkey did not fail to jump on the US bandwagon. It thus supported the plan, albeit distancing itself from its imperial overtones, and became one of the co-chairmen of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue, as part of the GME initiative.

To make an overview of the issues raised in this section, although it is clear that the prevailing view about the policies pursued by the US around the world is fairly negative in Turkey¹² and South Korea, the governing elites in both countries have no intention to abrogate their alliance with the US. This political strategy is commensurate with the pragmatism of the peoples of both countries: In spite of their deep-seated mistrust and misgivings of the US, public opinion in Turkey and South Korea seems to have resigned to the idea of the sustenance of military alliance and the complicated network of other links with the US out of sheer "national interest" considerations.

Respective Perspectives of International Society

South Korea failed to act truly as an "independent" variable in international

¹² The most recent survey conducted by an American pollster, PEW, indicates that only 12 percent of the people in Turkey approve of US policies in general and 14 percent think positively of the "US war on terror." (PEW Global Attitudes Project, June 13, 2006, <http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/252.pdf>)

relations for a very long time. During the Cold War, "South Korea found itself swept over by ideological confrontation as it lacked the capability to function as an independent, sovereign state."¹³ The division of Korea into two separate states, South Korea and North Korea, in the aftermath of the Second World War, and South Korea's reliance on the US for protection and integration into the prevalent world economic system, debilitated its capacity for independent action vis-à-vis other actors in international society. South Korea maintained its hope of unification with its northern brethren which was the leitmotif in the overall construction of its foreign policy. This "national cause" was the linchpin against which all other deliberations were to be assessed. The polarization that characterized the international system up until the early 1990s undermined the possibility of a union between the two Koreas, considering that acted submissively towards their respective bloc leaders, namely the US and the Soviet Union. The constraints of the Cold War reverberated, at a micro level, at South Korea's parochial approach towards the outside world.

There is no denying that South Korea does not, unlike Turkey, consider itself as a "Western" state. Rather it tends to emphasize its Asian character and expresses some affinity to developing nations by virtue of its unceasing search for economic expansion. Turkey too occasionally emphasizes its difference from Europe and the US on account of its low level of economic development. However none of the two states has made any tangible contributions to the cause of the Non-Aligned Group of States in the latter's long struggle to achieve a more just and peaceful international order. It is solely out of pragmatic considerations that Turkey and South Korea have paid some attention to the activities of the Non-Aligned grouping. To be able to muster at least a fraction of the support of the members of the Non-Aligned Group of States during the UN General Assembly discussions (and voting) on Cyprus, was a cardinal motive behind Turkey's "warmer" approach towards the group. Similar pragmatism underlined the motives behind South Korea's attempts to improve relations with the Non-Aligned Group "in apparent competition" with North Korea. However even in this case, South Korea tends to emphasize the classical principles of international law such as "the principles of good neighbourliness, reciprocity, and equality"¹⁴, a language hardly palatable to those seeking to force radical changes in the international system and international law. This language strikes a chord with the static and formalistic overtones of Turkish foreign policy that characterised Turkish foreign policy until very recently. Both Turkey and South Korea

¹³ Wolfgang Gieler, Kemal İnat, Claudio Kullmann (eds.), *Foreign Policy of States: A Handbook on World Affairs*, (Istanbul, Tasam, 2005), Sedat Azaklı, "Republic of Korea", 453-462, p.453.

¹⁴ <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12362.html>