

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013


PHOTOS

28 OCT 73


SHOOTING
INCIDENT



CONF XGDS-2







DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 76509

By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

USMLM SHOOTING INCIDENTS 1972-1974

<u>TABS</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
TAB 1	Shooting Incident No Action	July 1972
TAB 2	Shooting Incident	16 Sept, 1973
TAB 3	Shooting Incident	21 Oct 1973
TAB 4	Shooting Incident CINCGSFG Protest Letter	28 Oct 1973
TAB 5	Shooting Incident C/S USAREUR to C/S GSFG Protest	6 Sept 1974

SUBJECT

TAB 4
 TAB 3
 TAB 2
 TAB 1

copy

8 2

of the 14

series



DISPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL AEAGB-C(GO)	SUBJECT USMLM Incident, 6 Sep 74 (U)	DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 76509 By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013
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TO **Chief of Staff** FROM **DCSI** DATE **27 SEP 1974** CMT **1**
Mr. Stater/cd/8395

1. (U) This is a decision paper. (NO SUSPENSE)
2. ~~(P)~~ PROBLEM. To obtain the Chief of Staff's signature on a letter of protest to the Chief of Staff, GSFG concerning the shooting incident on 6 Sep 74.
3. ~~(F)~~ FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.
 - a. On 6 Sep 74, an East German soldier fired one round over a USMLM tour (details at TAB A, ~~red~~ flag).
 - b. A written, Chief of Staff, USAREUR protest was proposed (TAB A, green flag).
 - c. USCINCEUR concurred with the protest as written (TAB B) (Orange Flag)
 - d. AMEMB Bonn concurred but suggested the last line be changed (TAB C) (white flag)
4. ~~(D)~~ DISCUSSION. AMEMB Bonn amended the last line to avoid soliciting a reply from the Soviets. This change is acceptable.
5. (U) RECOMMEND. The Chief of Staff:
 - a. note the above.
 - b. approve, sign and return for delivery through Chief, Allied Contact Section the letter at RED TAB.

APPROVED *Thomas W. Bowen*

4 Incls
as

K 02 OCT 1974

THOMAS W. BOWEN
Brigadier General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Intelligence

6. (U) COORDINATION.

POLAD: concur/~~nonconcur~~ *J. D. Moffatt* Date 30 Sept 74

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to _____

Exempt 25X _____ Date _____

No Objection, Refer to _____

Date 16/87 By [Signature]

CLASSIFIED BY (DCSI...)
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2...)
DECLASSIFY ON (31 Dec 2004...)

CONFIDENTIAL

A

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

01 XX 2551045 PP PP CCCC 201314Z SEP 74
NO

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY //AEAGB-C//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY //ECJ2-R//
AMEMB BONN GERMANY //POL MIL//
INFO CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GERMANY //IN//
CINCUSAFE LINDSEY AS GERMANY //INC//
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON ENGLAND //N2//
USCOB BERLIN GERMANY
CUSMLM BERLIN GERMANY
CALLIED CONTACT SEC FRANKFURT GERMANY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: USMLM INCIDENT, 6 SEP 74 {U}

- A. CINCUSAREUR MSG, AEAGB-C, 021435Z NOV 73 {C} {NOTAL}
- B. CINCUSAREUR MSG, AEAGB-C, 091719Z NOV 73 {C} {NOTAL}

1. ~~EC~~ ON 6 SEP 74, AN EAST GERMAN ARMY {EGA} SENTRY FIRED ONE
ROUND AT A USMLM TOUR EAST OF DRESDEN. THE ROUND WAS FIRED OVER
THE VEHICLE FROM A DISTANCE OF SEVERAL HUNDRED METERS AND THERE
WERE NO INJURIES. DETAILS OF INCIDENT FOLLOW:

A. AT 061120Z SEP 74, USMLM TOUR {MAJ MEEHAN, SGT WHEAT} LEFT
DRESDEN-BAUTZEN AUTOBAHN AT BRETNIG {VS 3467} TRAVELING SOUTH

DIST: SGS COORD: POLAD

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to _____
 Date 2/6/07 By [Signature]

THE ACTING COFS APPROVED THIS MSG

JOSEPH STATER, GS-13, AEAGB-C {G0}
WINTHROP WHIPPLE, LTC, GS
ASST SGS, AEAGS, HM 6504

[Handwritten Signature]
TAB A

CLASSIFIED BY (DCS7...)
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2...)
DECLASSIFY ON (31 Dec 2004...)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

121078

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

02 XX 2551045 PP PP CCCC

SEP 74

NO

TOWARD SEELIGSTADT {VS 3362} ON GROSSROEHRSDORF {VS 3267}-
SEELIGSTADT ROAD.

B. TOUR PASSED AN EGA SENTRY AT VS 323638. A SECOND SENTRY
WAS OBSERVED AT VS 325635. WHEN THE SECOND SENTRY'S SIGNAL FOR
THE TOUR TO STOP WAS IGNORED, HE LOADED HIS AKM AND FIRED ONE
ROUND OVER THE VEHICLE. THE TOUR CONTINUED RAPIDLY SOUTH.

C. APPROX 1 KM NORTH OF SEELIGSTADT, TWO VOPO HAD POSITIONED
THEIR MOTORCYCLES ACROSS THE ROAD IN AN EFFORT TO HALT THE TOUR.
A THIRD VOPO WAS NEARBY. THE TOUR DROVE AROUND THE MOTORCYCLES ON
THE SHOULDER OF THE ROAD AND CONTINUED, FOLLOWED BY THREE VOPO
MOTORCYCLISTS. THE USMLM VEHICLE TRAVELED ONLY FAST ENOUGH TO
PREVENT THE MOTORCYCLES FROM PASSING {80-90 KPH}.

D. IN FISCHBACH {VS 3160}, TWO MORE VOPO ON MOTORCYCLES ON
THE SIDE OF THE ROAD WAVED FOR THE TOUR TO STOP BUT NEITHER
ATTEMPTED TO BLOCK NOR PURSUED.

E. AT THAT POINT, ONLY ONE VOPO REMAINED BEHIND THE TOUR AND
FOLLOWED IT ALONG THE ROUTE STOLPEN {VS 3656} - DUERROEHRSDORF
{VS 3054} - WILSCHDORF {VS 3057} - NEUDOERFER {VS 3557} -
FRANKENTHAL {VS 3756}. IN FRANKENTHAL, THE VOPO WAS LOST AND THE

AEAGB-C{60}

WW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

04 XX 2551045 PP PP CCCC

SEP 74

NO

QUOTE "AT APPROXIMATELY 1230 HOURS, 6 SEPTEMBER 1974, WHILE DRIVING SOUTH ON AN UNNUMBERED ROAD LEADING FROM GROSSROEHRSDORF TO SEELIGSTADT, IN AN AREA 10 KILOMETERS WEST OF BISCHOFSWERDA, TWO MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION WERE FIRED ON BY A SOLDIER OF THE EAST GERMAN ARMED FORCES. THE TOUR WAS NOT IN A RESTRICTED AREA AND HAD EVERY RIGHT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE HUEBNER-MALININ AGREEMENT TO BE IN THAT AREA. FORTUNATELY, THE USMLM PERSONNEL WERE NOT HIT. ON 9 NOVEMBER 1973, MY COMMANDER IN CHIEF MADE HIS VIEWS UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR TO YOUR COMMANDER IN CHIEF CONCERNING THE USE OF FIREARMS BY SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN PERSONNEL AGAINST MEMBERS OF USMLM.

I MUST STRONGLY PROTEST THIS DELIBERATE AND IRRESPONSIBLE USE OF WEAPONS AGAINST USMLM PERSONNEL, AND I REMIND YOU OF YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF USMLM PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES, GERMANY. [YOUR ASSURANCE THAT] DISCIPLINARY MEASURES [WILL BE TAKEN] AGAINST THE SOLDIER AND [THAT] STEPS [WILL BE TAKEN] TO PRECLUDE SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE WILL SERVE TO CONTINUE THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN US, PERSONALLY, AND OUR

AEAGB-C(60)

WV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

03 XX 2551045 PP PP CCCC

SEP 74

NO

TOUR REMAINED HIDDEN FROM 061210Z-1345Z SEP 74.

F. THE TOUR THEN RETURNED TO THE DRESDEN-BAUTZEN AUTOBAHN VIA BRETNIG. IN BRETNIG, AN EGA BTR-152 PULLED IN BEHIND THE TOUR VEHICLE BUT MADE NO EFFORT TO HALT USMLM TOUR. TOUR RETURNED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

2. {U} AT NO TIME DID THE VOPO USE EITHER SIRENS OR LIGHTS TO TRY TO STOP THE CAR. THE TOUR WAS NEITHER IN OR NEAR ANY PRA AND HAD NOT PENETRATED ANY MISSION RESTRICTION SIGNS.

3. ~~set~~ THE USE OF WEAPONS AGAINST USMLM TOURS CANNOT BE CONDONED, REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND ON 9 NOV 73 CINCUSAREUR PROTESTED SIMILAR INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED IN SEP AND OCT 73 {REF A}. THAT PROTEST APPARENTLY HAD THE DESIRED EFFECT, BECAUSE THERE WERE NO SHOOTING INCIDENTS FROM THEN UNTIL 6 SEP 74. THIS MOST RECENT INCIDENT CANNOT GO UNPROTESTED; HOWEVER, IT IS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO LODGE THE PROTEST AT THE CHIEF OF STAFF LEVEL, MAKING REFERENCE TO CINCUSAREUR'S LETTER WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO CHIEF, SMLM-F ON 9 NOV 73 {REF B}. THE FOLLOWING CHIEF OF STAFF, USAREUR LETTER TO CHIEF OF STAFF, GSFG IS RECOMMENDED:

AEAGB-C{G0}

Reverse side

WW
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

05 XX 2551045 PP PP / CCCC

SEP 74

NO

COMMANDS." UNQUOTE

4. {U} REQUEST CONCURRENCE. "XGDS-2" DECLASSIFY 31 DEC 2004

AEAGB-C{G0}

WW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1952-53 - CASUALTY REPORT

REPORT CONCERNING

COMMUNIST PARTY

NO. 100

1952

3

1952-53

State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

* P R I O R I T Y *

ACT-- | *Antel*
INFO- | *C SIC*

00165

PTTCZYUW USNAAA1038 2641209-CCCC--RUFDAAA.

ZNY CCCCC

P 211115Z SEP 74

FM USCINCPAC VAIHINGEN GERMANY

TO RUFDA A/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY //AEAGB-C//

INFO RUFHOL/AMEMB BONN GERMANY //POL MIL//

RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GERMANY //IN//

RUFFECA/CINCUSAFE LINDSEY AS GERMANY //INC//

RUDONRA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON ENGLAND //N2/15

RUFLEVA/USCOB BERLIN GERMANY

RUFLEVB/CUSMLM BERLIN GERMANY

RUFLFDA/CALLIED CONTACT SEC FRANKFURT GERMANY

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ECJ2-R 16563

SURJ: USMLM INCIDENT, 6 SEP 74 (U)

TAB B

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to
 Exempt 25X Date
 No Objection, Refer to *EXM*
Date *9/6/07* By *[Signature]*

~~* C O N F I D E N T I A L *~~

A. CINCUSAREUR MSG AEAGB-C 201314Z SEP 74, ABOVE SUBJ

~~(C)~~ CONCUR WITH TEXT OF RECOMMENDED PROTEST LETTER, SUBJECT TO
CONFIRMATION BY EMBASSY, BONN.

GDS 31 DEC 2004

BT

#1038

NNNN

R 00165/21SEP/1313Z/ACK 012

~~* C O N F I D E N T I A L *~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

*STASER got
STC*

Coll

DME

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

* IMMEDIATE *

|
|
ACT—| INTEL
|
INFD—| SGS CISIC
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00309

OATCZYUW RUFHOLA5063 2671131-ECCC--RUFDAAA.

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O R 241129Z SEP 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG IMMEDIATE

INFO RUSNAAA/CINCEUR VAIHINGEN IMMEDIATE

RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN

RUFFECA/CINCUSAFE LINDSEY

RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON

RUFLEVA/USCOB BERLIN

RUFLEVB/CUSMLM BERLIN IMMEDIATE

RUFLFDA/ALLIED CONTACT SEC FRANKFURT

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 15063

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MILI, PFOR, US, UR, GE

1974 SEP 24
CHANNEL # 309
11:36

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to STC
Date 9/6/87 By [Signature]

TABC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

* ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ *

SUBJECT: USMLM INCIDENT, 6 SEP 74

REF: CINCUSAREUR 201314ZSEP74

CONCUR WITH TEXT PROPOSED PARA 3 REFTEL EXCEPT FOR LAST
LINE, WHICH EMBASSY PROPOSES BE ALTERED TO READ AS

FOLLOWS: QUOTE PROMPT ACTION, INCLUDING APPROPRIATE
DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AGAINST THE SOLDIER INVOLVED, TO
PRECLUDE REPETITION OF SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE
WILL SERVE TO CONTINUE THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS
BETWEEN US, PERSONALLY, AND OUR COMMANDS. END QUOTE

HILLENBRAND

BT

#5063

NNNN

R 00309/24SEP/1134Z/ACK 014

ADVANCED STRIP PROVIDED TO INTEL

201314Z(R) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 20SEP74 INTEL

* ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ *



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE and SEVENTH ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
APO 09403

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

2 October 1974

Dear General Grinkevich:

At approximately 1230 hours, 6 September 1974, while driving south on an unnumbered road leading from Grossroehrsdorf to Seeligstadt, in an area 10 kilometers west of Bischofswerda, two members of the United States Military Liaison Mission were fired on by a soldier of the East German Armed Forces. The tour was not in a restricted area and had every right under the terms of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement to be in that area. Fortunately, the USMLM personnel were not hit. On 9 November 1973, my Commander in Chief made his views unmistakably clear to your Commander in Chief concerning the use of firearms by Soviet and East German personnel against members of USMLM.

I must strongly protest this deliberate and irresponsible use of weapons against USMLM personnel, and I remind you of your responsibility to guarantee the safety of USMLM personnel accredited to the Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. Prompt action, including appropriate disciplinary measures against the soldier involved, to preclude repetition of similar incidents in the future will serve to continue the improvement of relations between us, personally, and our commands.

W R Kraft, Jr.
WILLIAM R. KRAFT, JR.
Major General, GS
Chief of Staff

Lieutenant General Dimitri A. Grinkevich
Chief of Staff
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

AEAGS (17 Sep 74)
SUBJECT: USMLM Incident, 6 Sep 74 (U)

TO DCSI FROM Acting Chief of Staff DATE 20 Sep 74 CMT 2
MAJ Indreland/bm/6504

1. The Acting Chief of Staff approved the message at RED TAB. Message dispatched. (DTG 201314Z Sep 74).
2. Noted by the Commander in Chief.

FOR THE ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF:

2 Incl
wd RED TAB



WINTHROP WHIPPLE
LTC, GS
Asst SGS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to _____
 Date 9/16/07 By [Signature]

6-10-817 PLO MZ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when
Separated from Classified Incls

DISPOSITION FORM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL	SUBJECT	DECLASSIFIED
AEAGB-C(GO)	USMLM Incident, 6 Sep 74 (U)	Authority NND 76509 By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

TO Chief of Staff FROM DCSI DATE 17 SEP 1974 CMT 1
Mr. Stater/cd/8395

1. (U) This is a decision paper. (NO SUSPENSE)
2. (e) PROBLEM. To determine what, if any, action USAREUR should take as a result of the USMLM incident of 6 Sep 74 and to obtain USCINCEUR and AMEMB Bonn approval of that action.
3. (e) FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.

a. On 6 Sep 74, when USMLM personnel on tour east of Dresden (see map, TAB A) passed the second of two East German Army sentries and ignored his signal to halt, the sentry was seen to load his rifle and fire one round over the tour. The sentry was several hundred meters distant by that time and the tour rapidly departed the immediate area. A short time later, the tour had to pass a VOPO roadblock and was pursued by VOPO motorcyclists. The tour avoided detention and returned to Potsdam without further incident. (Details of incident are in message at RED TAB)

b. Following three shooting incidents in the Fall of 1973, the Chief of Staff, on 29 Oct 73, and CINCUSAREUR, on 9 Nov 73, protested the use of firearms against USMLM (TAB B). This is the first shooting incident since then.

c. Chief, USMLM, recommended no action be taken but rather he use the incident as an example of violations of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement that do not contribute to improvement of relations.

4. (e) DISCUSSION.

a. This office does not concur with Chief, USMLM's recommendation. The use of weapons against USMLM tours must be strongly protested in consonance with the CINCUSAREUR's position stated to the Soviets on 9 Nov 74.¹³ A Chief of Staff, USAREUR protest is definitely warranted.

b. A protest from the Chief of Staff, USAREUR to the Chief of Staff, GSFG, delivered by Chief, ACS to Chief, SMLM-F, will express USAREUR's concern and might prevent injuries to USMLM personnel. The seriousness of the threat to USMLM personnel, which this type of action poses, demands a written statement.

CLASSIFIED BY (DCSI) 18 SEP 1974
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)
DECLASSIFY ON (31 Dec 2004)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 76509

By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

AEAGB-C(GO)

SUBJECT: USMLM Incident, 6 Sep 74 (U)

5. ~~(S)~~ CONCLUSION. The Chief of Staff, USAREUR should protest the 6 Sep 74 incident.


6. (U) RECOMMEND. The Chief of Staff approve:

a. the conclusion above;

b. dispatch of the message at RED TAB.

APPROVED

19 SEP 1974



THOMAS W. BOWEN
Brigadier General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Intelligence

3 Incls
as



7. (U) COORDINATION:

Eugene R. Lanzillo LTC GS

POLAD: concur/~~nonconcur~~

Date 18 Sept 74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE and SEVENTH ARMY
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
APO 09403

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

8 November 1973

Dear General Ivanovski:

I recall that during my recent visit to your headquarters in September of this year, we reaffirmed the desirability of maintaining harmonious relations between our commands. We also agreed that our respective missions should be free to pursue their assigned tasks under the provisions of established agreements.

It is with regret that I must invite your attention to a series of three incidents within a period of 42 days which appear to be in direct violation of our understanding.

On 16 September 1973 a Soviet guard fired at a United States Military Liaison Mission vehicle near Wittstock. My Chief of Staff protested the incident and received the reply that the Soviet guard had acted "strictly according to regulations." I am sure your regulations do not direct sentries to shoot at obviously unarmed personnel.

On 21 October 1973 an East German guard fired two shots at a United States Military Liaison Mission vehicle in Gueterfelde. Fortunately, neither the personnel nor the vehicles were hit in either of these two incidents.


At 0630 hours on 28 October 1973, an East German guard fired several bursts from his automatic weapon at a United States Military Liaison Mission vehicle within the city of Leipzig. One round hit the vehicle and traveled into the car striking the boot of the driver. Fortunately, the driver was not hurt. I have attached some photographs and am prepared to have the vehicle made available for your personal inspection should you desire this.

TAB B

Such irresponsible acts cannot be condoned. The risks in terms of human life are obvious. The need to maintain good will between our commands is too vital to permit individual soldiers to act so irresponsibly and use firearms against liaison personnel based upon that individual soldier's interpretation of what are or are not the established rules of conduct for the military liaison missions. Every step possible has been taken to ensure that your liaison mission in Frankfurt has not been fired at when they have been in violation of established rules. I am sure that you will take the appropriate steps and assure me that the same will be done for my mission.

I regret these incidents have served to mar the excellent relations between us and I am convinced the measures you will take, will serve to restore these relations to their proper, excellent level.

Respectfully,



MICHAEL S. DAVISON

General, USA

Commander in Chief

General of the Army Y. Ivanovski
Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE and SEVENTH ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE
APO 09403

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

AEAGB-C(GO)

10 SEP 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: USMLM Shooting Incident, 6 Sep 74 (U)

1. (c) The attached message from Chief, USMLM describes an incident in which an East German Army sentry fired one round at a USMLM tour. The tour continued on, evaded two detention attempts and returned without further problems.
2. (c) Following a rash of shooting incidents last year, CINCUSAREUR lodged a strong protest on 9 Nov 73. This is the first shooting incident since that time. A decision paper concerning this incident will follow, with clarifying details.

Thomas W. Bowen

THOMAS W. BOWEN
Brigadier General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Intelligence

1 Incl
as

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to 2024
 Date _____ By _____

6-101 8/17 file mta

CLASSIFIED BY (.DCSF...)
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2.....)
DECLASSIFY ON (...31 Dec 2009.....)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATER

PRIORITY

CC NR
4966

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCNPAG76

PTTCZYUW UUFTBE0674 2521200-CCCC--UUFTB.

ZNY CCCCC

P 091155Z SEP 74

FM CUSMLM BERLIN GER

TO DCSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG GER//AEAGB-C//

BT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to _____
Date 8/6/07 By [Signature]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJ: INCIDENT REPORT (U)

1. (C) THIS MSG COVERS AN INCIDENT INVOLVING A USMLM TOUR IN THE VIC OF BRETNIG (VS3467) ON 6 SEP 74.

A. PERSONNEL INVOLVED: MAJ MEEHAN AND SGT WHEAT.

B. TOUR DPTD BERLIN 060250Z SEP 74; RETURNED 071555Z SEP 74.

C. DURATION OF INCIDENT: 061120-061210Z SEP 74.

D. GEN TOUR RTE: SOUTH FM DRESDEN (VS1257) - BAUTZEN (VS6070) ABHN, THRU BRETNIG AND STOLPEN (VS 3656) AND VIC.

E. SURVEILLANCE: TOUR WAS APPARENTLY FIRST RPTD PASSING THRU BRETNIG.

F. TOUR WAS NOT IN A RESTRICTED AREA NOR WAS NOT, IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA, BEHIND SIGNS (CLOSEST: 4 OR 5 KMS AWAY WITH NUMEROUS OTHER ACCESS ROUTES TO INCIDENT AREA AVAILABLE).

G. PHYSICAL CONTACT WAS NOT INVOLVED.

2. (C) CIRCUMSTANCES: AT 061120Z SEP 74 TOUR PROCEEDED SOUTH

PAGE 2 UFTBE0674 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

THRU BRETNIG ENROUTE TO SEELIGSTADT (VS3362); TOUR PASSED AN EGA SENTRY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD VIC VS 340615; AND FURTHER SOUTH ALONG THE SAME ROAD AT VS 325525, A SECOND EGA SENTRY SIGNALLED THE TOUR TO HALT. WHEN THE TOUR BYPASSED HIM, THE SENTRY WAS SEEN TO LOAD HIS AKM AND DISCHARGED ONE ROUND OVER THE TOUR CAR AT A DISTANCE OF SEVERAL HUNDRED METERS. TOUR PROCEEDED RAPIDLY SOUTH ALONG THE ROAD TO SEELIGSTADT IN AN EFFORT TO CLEAR THE AREA. VIC VS 329628 TWO VOPO HAD POSITIONED THEIR MOTORCYCLES ACROSS THE ROAD IN AN EFFORT TO HALT THE TOUR. AGAIN, TOUR BYPASSED AND CONTINUED SOUTH W/THREE VOPOS ON MOTORCYCLES IN PURSUIT. AS THE TOUR ENTERED FISCHBACH (VS3160), TWO MORE VOPOS MADE AN ATTEMPT TO HALT THE TOUR W/O SUCCESS. AT THIS POINT, ONLY ONE OF THE VOPO MOTORCYCLES REMAINED BEHIND THE TOUR. THE SINGLE VOPO FOLLOWED THE TOUR ALONG THE GENERAL RTE STOLPEN-DUERR-ROEHRSDORF (VS3054)-WILSCHDORF (VS3157)-NEUDORFEL (VS3557) TO FRANKENTHAL (VS3865) WHERE THE TOUR MANAGED TO EVADE PURSUIT. FROM 061210-061345Z THE TOUR REMAINED HIDDEN, THEN PROCEEDED BACK THRU BRETNIG AND NORTH TO THE ABHN. IN BRETNIG AN EGA BTR-152 PULLED IN BEHIND THE TOUR CAR, BUT NO ADDITIONAL ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO HALT THE TOUR. THE TOUR THEN PROCEEDED W/O INCIDENT.

D

PAGE 3 UFTBE0674 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

3. (C) COMMENTS: FROM START TO FINISH, IT APPEARS THAT E. GERMANS WERE WELL COORDINATED. MOST OF THE VOPOS INVOLVED WERE ON RADIO EQUIPPED MOTORCYCLES. AN EGA COMMUNICATIONS DEPLOYMENT WAS NOTED ALONG THE NORTH-SOUTH ROAD FM BRETNIG AT VS 336625. THIS COULD ACCOUNT FOR THE SENSITIVITY OF THE AREA. THE FACT THAT THE EGA SENTRY DISCHARGED HIS WEAPON AT THE TOUR INDICATES THAT

1953

(100)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

The attached letter to the Director from the [Illegible] dated [Illegible] is being referred to you for your information. The letter is in reply to [Illegible] dated [Illegible]. The letter is being referred to you for your information.

A recommended course of action will follow by [Illegible]

[Handwritten Signature]
[Illegible Title]
[Illegible Name]

1953

[Faint, mostly illegible handwritten notes and text]

AEAGB-C(GO)

21 NOV 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, USAREUR
SUBJECT: CINCSFG Letter to CINCUSAREUR (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to _____
 Date 9/6/07 By JV

1. (c) The attached letter from GEN Ivanovsky, CINCSFG, (TAB A) was presented to Chief, Allied Contact Section (ACS) by the Chief, Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt (SMLM-F) on 19 November 1973. The letter is in reply to CINCUSAREUR's letter of 8 November 1973 (TAB B) which protested three incidents wherein USMLM personnel were fired on by Soviet and East German guards.
2. (c) A recommended course of action will follow by separate correspondence.

THOMAS W. BOWEN
Brigadier General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Intelligence

2 Incls:
as

26 NOV 1973

DCSI:

(1) This reply should not have been broadcast without comment. Ambassador & Gen Ende probably have a distorted view of Turner. Prepare a follow on msg for my approval containing comment^{or} points CINCUSFG raises.

(2) What is status of ^Ymas party?

CLASSIFIED BY 770261
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)
 DECLASSIFY ON (CANNOT BE DETERMINED)



*Главнокомандующий
Группой советских войск в Германии*

17
"17" ноября 1973.

№ 267.

Уважаемый господин генерал!

Мне приятно отметить наметившееся улучшение отношений не только между правительством США и СССР, но и непосредственно между нами. Я также вполне разделяю Ваше мнение в том, что наша встреча во время Вашего визита в ГСВГ была плодотворной и что наши миссии связи действительно должны быть свободными при выполнении стоящих перед ними задач в соответствии с установленным соглашением ХЮБНЕРА-МАЛИНИНА.

Случаи обстрела автомашин военных миссий связи - действительно вопиющие факты, служащие в целом не разрядке международной напряженности, а ее нагнетанию, независимо от того, кому бы эти машины ни принадлежали - американской или советской военной миссии связи. Мне кажется, что это в одинаковой степени должны понимать не только мы с Вами, но и все военнослужащие как ГСВГ, так СВ США в Европе.

Поэтому я крайне удивлен тому, что Ваши подчиненные, используя необъективные данные, ставят нас с Вами друг перед другом в исключительно неловкое положение как Главнокомандующих. Ведь факты обстрела машин АВМС, которые Вы приводите в своем письме от 8.II.73 г., могут быть только следствием крайне необдуманных действий начальника АВМС полковника Фредерика С.ТЁРНЕРА или действий хорошо продуманных, но направленных на то, чтобы посеять недоверие и ухудшить отношения между нами.

Наши часовые не имеют никаких инструкций стрелять в безоружных людей. Вы, как опытный генерал, безусловно, понимаете, что солдат на посту не знает и не может знать, вооружен или не вооружен нарушитель зоны его действия. Именно поэтому он действует в строгом соответствии с Уставом и может применить оружие в равной мере как против американца, так и против немца или русского, если нарушитель не подчинится его приказу.

Например, Вы пишете, что 21.10.73 г. часовой ГДР произвел два выстрела в машину АВМС в Гютерфельде. Я понимаю, что Вы пишете то, что Вам доложил полковник ТЁРНЕР. В действительности же, после проведенного нами расследования, выяснилось, что в этот день военнослужащие ННА ГДР проводили занятия на стрельбище в этом районе. Во время стрельб никаких происшествий, связанных с задержанием машины, принадлежащей АВМС, не было. Более того, никто из присутствовавших на стрельбище никакой американской машины даже не видел.

Случай 28.10.73 года, где "часовой ГДР, якобы, дал несколько очередей по машине АВМС в районе города Лейпциг", расследованием также не подтверждается. Вполне возможно, что машина АВМС оказалась в районе учебных стрельб, что и могло привести к изложенным Вами последствиям. Однако и в этом случае совершенно непонятно, как могла оказаться машина на территории, которая со всех сторон ограждена знаками, запрещающими въезд из-за опасности для жизни.


Случай же 16 сентября 1973 года действительно имел место, с той лишь разницей, что советский часовой стрелял не по машине, а произвел предупредительный выстрел вверх, в воздух, хотя он имел право стрелять и по машине, т.к. члены АВМС, находившиеся в машине, попав в зону ответственности часового, требованиям последнего не подчинились и скрылись, в связи с чем начальник моего штаба генерал-полковник ЯКУШИН В.З. вынуж-

ден был направить 25.10.73 года генерал-майору господину Уильяму Р.КРАФТУ соответствующее заявление. В свою очередь, видимо, правильным и целесообразным было бы оставить машину на месте для разбора происшествия органами советской комендатуры.

Таким образом, Вы видите, что только неправильные действия членов АВМС являются причиной вышеупомянутых фактов. И самое удивительное - это то, что зачастую незаконные действия членов АВМС приводят к инцидентам непосредственно в районах охраняемых объектов. Кстати должен заметить, что члены АВМС под руководством ее начальника полковника ТЁРНЕРА, как никогда ранее под руководством других начальников, имеют такое большое количество различных нарушений и инцидентов. Видимо, полковник ТЁРNER не вполне отвечает своему предназначению, о чем начальник штаба ГСВГ уже неоднократно информировал Ваших начальников штабов генералов АЛМКВИСТА и КРАФТА.

Выражаю уверенность, что отношения между нашими Командованиями будут крепнуть и развиваться, и что ни полковник ТЁРNER, ни другой человек его категории не смогут помешать их улучшению.

Примите, господин генерал, мое искреннее заверение в этом.



Е.ИВАНОВСКИЙ
генерал армии
Главнокомандующий ГСВГ

Генералу Майклу С.ДЭВИСОНУ
Главнокомандующему СВ США в
Европе

ГЛАВНОКОМАНДУЮЩЕМУ СВ США В Европе и 7 ПА
Генералу М. ДАВИСОНУ

7 November 1973

No. 267

Dear General!

I am pleased to note the marked improvement of relations not only between the governments of the USA and USSR, but also in our direct relations. I also fully share your opinion that our meeting during your visit to GSFG was fruitful and that our liaison missions must really be free to accomplish their assigned tasks in accordance with the Huebner-Malinin Agreement.

The shootings of automobiles of Military Liaison Missions are truly despicable facts which on the whole contribute not to a relaxation of international tension, but to its intensification, regardless of the fact to whom these vehicles belong -- American or Soviet Military Liaison Missions. It seems to me that this must be understood in the same degree not only by you and me, but by all military personnel of GSFG as well as US Ground Forces in Europe.

I am, therefore, extremely amazed that your subordinates, using biased data, put us, personally, in an exceptionally awkward position as Commanders-in-Chief. But the facts of the firing on USLM vehicles, which you cite in your letter of 3 November 1973, may be merely the result of extremely thoughtless actions of Chief, USLM, Colonel Frederick C. Turner, or of well thought-out actions intended to create distrust and to worsen relations between us.

Our sentries do not have any instructions to shoot at unarmed people. You, as an experienced General, undoubtedly understand that a soldier on his post does not know, and cannot know, whether or not a trespasser into his zone of action is armed. Because of this, therefore, he acts in strict compliance with regulations and may use weapons in equal measure against an American, a German or Russian if the transgressor does not obey his order.

For example, you write that on 21 October 1973 a sentry of the GDR fired two shots at a USMLM vehicle in Queterfelde. I understand that you are writing that which Colonel Turner reported to you. In actuality, after our investigation, it became clear that on that day servicemen of the NPA (NOTE: National People's Army) of the GDR conducted training on the firing range in that area. During the firing there were no incidents relating to the detention of vehicles belonging to USMLM. Moreover, none of those on the range even saw an American vehicle.

The incident of 28 October 1973, where "a sentry of the GDR, allegedly, fired several bursts at a USMLM vehicle in the city of Leipzig," is also not corroborated by investigation. It is entirely possible that the USMLM vehicle appeared in a region of a firing training range and this could lead to the conclusions you stated. However, in this incident it is completely incomprehensible how a

vehicle could appear in a territory which is surrounded on all sides by signs prohibiting entry because of the danger to life.

The incident of 16 September 1973 actually took place, with only this difference, that the Soviet sentry fired not at the vehicle, but fired a warning shot into the air, although he had the right, however, to fire at the vehicle itself since USMLM members who were in the vehicle, having entered the sentry's zone of responsibility, did not obey the demands of the latter and did. It was in this connection that Chief of Staff Colonel-General V.E. Yakushin was forced to send an appropriate statement to Major General William R. Kraft on 25 October 1973. In turn, it would have been proper and advisable, it seems, to have left the vehicle in place for investigation of the incident by agencies of the Soviet Kommandatura.

Thus, you see, only the improper actions of USMLM members is the reason for the aforementioned facts. And the most amazing is the fact that frequent unlawful actions by USMLM members lead to incidents directly in areas of guarded objectives. In turn, I must note that USMLM members under the direction of its Chief, Colonel Turner, as never before under the direction of other Chiefs, have such a large number of various violations and incidents. It seems that Colonel Turner is not completely fulfilling his

responsibilities, about which the Chief of Staff, GSEFG,
has already repeatedly informed your Chiefs of Staff,
Generals Almquist and Kraft.

I express the conviction that relations between our
commands will strengthen and develop, and that neither
Colonel Turner nor another person of his category can
hinder their improvement.

Accept, General, my sincere committment on this matter.

S/ E. Ivanovsky
E. Ivanovsky
General of the Army
Commander in Chief, GSEFG

General Michael S. Davison
Commander in Chief, US
Ground Forces in Europe



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE and SEVENTH ARMY
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
APO 09403

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

8 November 1973

Dear General Ivanovski:

I recall that during my recent visit to your headquarters in September of this year, we reaffirmed the desirability of maintaining harmonious relations between our commands. We also agreed that our respective missions should be free to pursue their assigned tasks under the provisions of established agreements.

It is with regret that I must invite your attention to a series of three incidents within a period of 42 days which appear to be in direct violation of our understanding.

On 16 September 1973 a Soviet guard fired at a United States Military Liaison Mission vehicle near Wittstock. My Chief of Staff protested the incident and received the reply that the Soviet guard had acted "strictly according to regulations." I am sure your regulations do not direct sentries to shoot at obviously unarmed personnel.


On 21 October 1973 an East German guard fired two shots at a United States Military Liaison Mission vehicle in Gueterfelde. Fortunately, neither the personnel nor the vehicles were hit in either of these two incidents.

At 0630 hours on 28 October 1973, an East German guard fired several bursts from his automatic weapon at a United States Military Liaison Mission vehicle within the city of Leipzig. One round hit the vehicle and traveled into the car striking the boot of the driver. Fortunately, the driver was not hurt. I have attached some photographs and am prepared to have the vehicle made available for your personal inspection should you desire this.

Such irresponsible acts cannot be condoned. The risks in terms of human life are obvious. The need to maintain good will between our commands is too vital to permit individual soldiers to act so irresponsibly and use firearms against liaison personnel based upon that individual soldier's interpretation of what are or are not the established rules of conduct for the military liaison missions. Every step possible has been taken to ensure that your liaison mission in Frankfurt has not been fired at when they have been in violation of established rules. I am sure that you will take the appropriate steps and assure me that the same will be done for my mission.

I regret these incidents have served to mar the excellent relations between us and I am convinced the measures you will take, will serve to restore these relations to their proper, excellent level.

Respectfully,



MICHAEL S. DAVISON

General, USA

Commander in Chief

General of the Army Y. Ivanovski
Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 76509

By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

01 01 3131630 PP PP

CCCC

091719Z

NOV 73

NO

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY //AEAGB-C//

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY //ECJ2-R//


INFO AMEMB BONN GERMANY //POL MIL//

CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GERMANY //IN//

CINCUSAFE LINDSEY AB GERMANY //INC//

CUSMLM BERLIN GERMANY

ACTION COLL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: SHOOTING INCIDENT, 28 OCT 73 {U}

A. CINCUSAREUR MSG AEAGB-C, 021435Z NOV 73 {U}

1. {U} AT 091505 NOV 73, CHIEF, ALLIED CONTACT SECTION {C/ACS} DELIVERED THE CINCUSAREUR PROTEST {REF A} IN A SEALED ENVELOPE TO THE CHIEF, SOVIET MILITARY LIAISON MISSION, FRANKFURT {C/SMLM-F}.

2. {U} C/SMLM-F STATED HE WOULD DELIVER THE LETTER TO HIS CINCUS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND INQUIRED IF C/ACS KNEW THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER. C/ACS STATED HE DID NOT.

3. {U} C/SMLM-F, COL TYUTENKOV, INDICATED DURING THE MEETING THAT HE MIGHT BE LEAVING SOON TO "GO BACK HOME".

4. {C} THIS MESSAGE IS CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SOLELY BECAUSE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ODCSI AND THE ACS. "XGDS-2"

SGSV
POLAD

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Sec 3.4 EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to _____

Exempt 25X _____ Date _____

No Objection. Refer to _____

Date 9/6/01 By [Signature]

MANUEL LAMONICA, CPT, AEAGB-C {G0} HBG8395

R. W. HALL, CO1, GS, XO, ODCSI

R. W. Hall

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOV 9 7 52 PM '73

083919

13

DISPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

AEAGB-C(GO)

SUBJECT

United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM)
Shooting Incident, 28 Oct 73 (U)


TO Chief of Staff

FROM DCSI

DATE **7 NOV 1973** CMT 1
CPT LaMonica/Ilh/8395

1. (U) This is a decision paper. (NO SUSPENSE)
2. ~~(C)~~ PROBLEM. To obtain the signature of CINCUSAREUR on approved protest letter.
3. ~~(C)~~ FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.
 - a. CINCUSAREUR approved the text of a written protest to the CINCGSFG concerning the shooting incident (TAB A).
 - b. EUCOM approved the level and text of protest (TAB B).
 - c. AMEMB Bonn approved the level and text of protest (TAB C).
4. ~~(C)~~ DISCUSSION. The Soviet Military Liaison Mission-Frankfurt (SMLM-F) is hosting a reception on 7 Nov 73 at which US officers will be in attendance. It is considered proper to deliver this protest subsequent to this reception.
5. ~~(C)~~ CONCLUSION. That CINCUSAREUR's protest to the CINCGSFG concerning the shooting incident be delivered no earlier than 8 Nov 73.
6. (U) RECOMMEND.
 - a. That the Chief of Staff approve the above conclusion.
 - b. That the CINC sign the letter at RED TAB and return to DCSI for delivery to C/SMLM-F by C/Allied Contact Section.

4 Incl
as



THOMAS W. BOWEN
Brigadier General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Intelligence

7. (U) COORDINATION. None required

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Sec 3.4 EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to _____

Exempt 25X _____ Date _____

No Objection. Refer to _____

Date 9/6/87 By [Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

CLASSIFIED BY (AEAGB...)
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)
DECLASSIFY ON (Cannot be determined.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE and SEVENTH ARMY
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
APO 09403

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

8 November 1973

Dear General Ivanovski:

I recall that during my recent visit to your headquarters in September of this year, we reaffirmed the desirability of maintaining harmonious relations between our commands. We also agreed that our respective missions should be free to pursue their assigned tasks under the provisions of established agreements.

It is with regret that I must invite your attention to a series of three incidents within a period of 42 days which appear to be in direct violation of our understanding.

On 16 September 1973 a Soviet guard fired at a United States Military Liaison Mission vehicle near Wittstock. My Chief of Staff protested the incident and received the reply that the Soviet guard had acted "strictly according to regulations." I am sure your regulations do not direct sentries to shoot at obviously unarmed personnel.


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I regret these incidents have served to mar the excellent relations between us and I am convinced the measures you will take, will serve to restore these relations to their proper, excellent level.

Respectfully,



MICHAEL S. DAVISON
General, USA
Commander in Chief

General of the Army Y. Ivanovski
Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 76509

By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

01 XX 3031325 PP PP

CCCC

021435Z

NOV 73

NO

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY //AEAGB-C//

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY //ECJ2-R//


AMEMB BONN GERMANY //POL MIL//

INFO CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GERMANY //IN//

CINCUSAFE LINDSEY AFB GERMANY //INC//

CUSMLM BERLIN GERMANY

CALLIED CONTACT SEC FRANKFURT GERMANY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: SHOOTING INCIDENT, 28 OCT 73 {U}

A. CINCUSAREUR MSG, AEAGB-C, 291625Z OCT 73 {C}

{C} ALTHOUGH A WRITTEN PROTEST FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF, USAREUR TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, GROUP SOVIET FORCES GERMANY WOULD BE THE NEXT NORMAL LEVEL OF ESCALATION, THE PROTEST FOR THIS THE THIRD SHOOTING INCIDENT SHOULD BE ESCALATED ABOVE THE CHIEF OF STAFF LEVEL TO THE CINC-CINC LEVEL. A WRITTEN PROTEST FROM THE CINCUSAREUR WILL UNDERSCORE THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH USAREUR VIEWS THESE INCIDENTS AND INDICATE THAT THE USE OF WEAPONS AGAINST UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION TOURS {REF A} CANNOT BE CONDONED BY USAREUR, REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. / THEREFORE, REQUEST IMMEDIATE APPROVAL OF

ESGS ✓
POLAD
DCSOPS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Sec 3,4 EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to _____
 Date 9/6/01 By [Signature]

NOV 7 4 18 PM '73

MANUEL LAMONICA, CPT, AEAGB-C{G0}, HBG
 ROBERT BENTLEY, MAJ, GS
 ASST SGS, AEAGS, HM 6504

THE CINC APPROVED THIS MSG

Robert J Bentley

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

081333

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

02 XX 3031325 PP PP CCCC

NO

THE FOLLOWING WRITTEN PROTEST FROM THE CINCUSAREUR TO THE CINC,
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES GERMANY.

QUOTE: DEAR GENERAL IVANOVSKI:

I RECALL THAT DURING MY RECENT VISIT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS IN
SEPTEMBER OF THIS YEAR, WE REAFFIRMED THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING
HARMONIOUS RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COMMANDS. WE ALSO AGREED THAT OUR
RESPECTIVE MISSIONS SHOULD BE FREE TO PURSUE THEIR ASSIGNED TASKS
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ESTABLISHED AGREEMENTS.

IT IS WITH REGRET THAT I MUST INVITE YOUR ATTENTION TO A SERIES
OF THREE INCIDENTS WITHIN A PERIOD OF 42 DAYS WHICH APPEAR TO BE IN
INDIRECT VIOLATION OF OUR UNDERSTANDING.

ON 16 SEPTEMBER 1973 A SOVIET GUARD FIRED AT A UNITED STATES
MILITARY LIAISON MISSION VEHICLE NEAR WITTSTOCK. MY CHIEF OF STAFF
PROTESTED THE INCIDENT AND RECEIVED THE REPLY THAT THE SOVIET GUARD
HAD ACTED "STRICTLY ACCORDING TO REGULATIONS." I AM SURE YOUR
REGULATIONS DO NOT DIRECT SENTRIES TO SHOOT AT OBVIOUSLY UNARMED
PERSONNEL.

ON 21 OCTOBER 1973 AN EAST GERMAN GUARD FIRED TWO SHOTS AT A
UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION VEHICLE IN GUETERFELDE.

AEAGB-C{G0}

(B)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

03 XX 3031325 PP PP CCCC

NO

FORTUNATELY, NEITHER THE PERSONNEL NOR THE VEHICLES WERE HIT IN EITHER OF THESE TWO INCIDENTS.

AT 0630 HOURS ON 28 OCTOBER 1973, AN EAST GERMAN GUARD FIRED SEVERAL BURSTS FROM HIS AUTOMATIC WEAPON AT A UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION VEHICLE WITHIN THE CITY OF LEIPZIG. ONE ROUND HIT THE VEHICLE AND TRAVELED INTO THE CAR STRIKING THE BOOT OF THE DRIVER. FORTUNATELY, THE DRIVER WAS NOT HURT. I HAVE ATTACHED SOME PHOTOGRAPHS {DETAILED PHOTOGRAPHS OF BULLET HOLE IN VEHICLE AND BOOT OF DRIVER} AND AM PREPARED TO HAVE THE VEHICLE MADE AVAILABLE FOR YOUR PERSONAL INSPECTION SHOULD YOU DESIRE THIS.

SUCH IRRESPONSIBLE ACTS CANNOT BE CONDONED. THE RISKS IN TERMS OF HUMAN LIFE ARE OBVIOUS. THE NEED TO MAINTAIN GOOD WILL BETWEEN OUR COMMANDS IS TOO VITAL TO PERMIT INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS TO ACT SO IRRESPONSIBLY AND USE FIREARMS AGAINST LIAISON PERSONNEL BASED UPON THAT INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER'S INTERPRETATION OF WHAT ARE OR ARE NOT THE ESTABLISHED RULES OF CONDUCT FOR THE MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS. EVERY STEP POSSIBLE HAS BEEN TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT YOUR LIAISON MISSION IN FRANKFURT HAS NOT BEEN FIRED AT WHEN THEY HAVE BEEN IN VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED RULES. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL

AEAGB-C1600}

(B)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

04 04 3031325 PP PP CCCC

NO

TAKE THE APPROPRIATE STEPS AND ASSURE ME THAT THE SAME WILL BE DONE FOR MY MISSION.

I REGRET THESE INCIDENTS HAVE SERVED TO MAR THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND I AM CONVINCED THE MEASURES YOU WILL TAKE, WILL SERVE TO RESTORE THESE RELATIONS TO THEIR PROPER, EXCELLENT LEVEL. ~~UNQUOTE~~

RESPECTFULLY,
MICHAEL S. DAVISON
GENERAL, USA
COMMANDER IN CHIEF UNQUOTE

"XGDS-2" DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

AEAGB-C{G0}

(B)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

01 XX 3031325 PP PP

CCCC

021435Z

NOV 73

NO

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 76509

By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY //AEAGB-C//

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY //ECJ2-R//

AMEMB BONN GERMANY //POL MIL//

INFO CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GERMANY //IN//

CINCUSAFE LINDSEY A3B GERMANY //INC//

CUSMLM BERLIN GERMANY

CALLIED CONTACT SEC FRANKFURT GERMANY

ACTION COLL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: SHOOTING INCIDENT, 28 OCT 73 {U}

A. CINCUSAREUR MSG, AEAGB-C, 291625Z OCT 73 {C}

{C} ALTHOUGH A WRITTEN PROTEST FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF, USAREUR TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, GROUP SOVIET FORCES GERMANY WOULD BE THE NEXT NORMAL LEVEL OF ESCALATION, THE PROTEST FOR THIS THE THIRD SHOOTING INCIDENT SHOULD BE ESCALATED ABOVE THE CHIEF OF STAFF LEVEL TO THE CINC-CINC LEVEL. A WRITTEN PROTEST FROM THE CINCUSAREUR WILL UNDERSCORE THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH USAREUR VIEWS THESE INCIDENTS AND INDICATE THAT THE USE OF WEAPONS AGAINST UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION TOURS {REF A} CANNOT BE CONDONED BY USAREUR, REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. / THEREFORE, REQUEST IMMEDIATE APPROVAL OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Sec 3.4 EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to _____

Exempt 25X _____ Date _____

No Objection, Refer to _____

Date 9/6/07 By [Signature]

SSGS ✓
POLAD
DCSOPS

NOV 6 4 38 PM '73

081325

MANUEL LAMONICA, CPT, AEAGB-C {GO}, HBG
ROBERT BENTLEY, MAJ, GS
ASST SGS, AEAGS, HM 6504

THE CINC APPROVED THIS MSG

Robert H Bentley

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

02 XX 3031325 PP PP CCCC

NO

THE FOLLOWING WRITTEN PROTEST FROM THE CINCUSAREUR TO THE CINC,
GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES GERMANY.

QUOTE: DEAR GENERAL IVANOVSKI:

I RECALL THAT DURING MY RECENT VISIT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS IN
SEPTEMBER OF THIS YEAR, WE REAFFIRMED THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING
HARMONIOUS RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COMMANDS. WE ALSO AGREED THAT OUR
RESPECTIVE MISSIONS SHOULD BE FREE TO PURSUE THEIR ASSIGNED TASKS
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ESTABLISHED AGREEMENTS.

IT IS WITH REGRET THAT I MUST INVITE YOUR ATTENTION TO A SERIES
OF THREE INCIDENTS WITHIN A PERIOD OF 42 DAYS WHICH APPEAR TO BE IN
INDIRECT VIOLATION OF OUR UNDERSTANDING.

ON 16 SEPTEMBER 1973 A SOVIET GUARD FIRED AT A UNITED STATES
MILITARY LIAISON MISSION VEHICLE NEAR WITTSTOCK. MY CHIEF OF STAFF
PROTESTED THE INCIDENT AND RECEIVED THE REPLY THAT THE SOVIET GUARD
HAD ACTED "STRICTLY ACCORDING TO REGULATIONS." I AM SURE YOUR
REGULATIONS DO NOT DIRECT SENTRIES TO SHOOT AT OBVIOUSLY UNARMED
PERSONNEL.

ON 21 OCTOBER 1973 AN EAST GERMAN GUARD FIRED TWO SHOTS AT A
UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION VEHICLE IN GUETERFELDE.

AEAGB-C{60}

(B)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

03 XX 3031325 PP PP CCCC

NO

FORTUNATELY, NEITHER THE PERSONNEL NOR THE VEHICLES WERE HIT IN EITHER OF THESE TWO INCIDENTS.

AT 0630 HOURS ON 28 OCTOBER 1973, AN EAST GERMAN GUARD FIRED SEVERAL BURSTS FROM HIS AUTOMATIC WEAPON AT A UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION VEHICLE WITHIN THE CITY OF LEIPZIG. ONE ROUND HIT THE VEHICLE AND TRAVELED INTO THE CAR STRIKING THE BOOT OF THE DRIVER. FORTUNATELY, THE DRIVER WAS NOT HURT. I HAVE ATTACHED SOME PHOTOGRAPHS (DETAILED PHOTOGRAPHS OF BULLET HOLE IN VEHICLE AND BOOT OF DRIVER) AND AM PREPARED TO HAVE THE VEHICLE MADE AVAILABLE FOR YOUR PERSONAL INSPECTION SHOULD YOU DESIRE THIS.

SUCH IRRESPONSIBLE ACTS CANNOT BE CONDONED. THE RISKS IN TERMS OF HUMAN LIFE ARE OBVIOUS. THE NEED TO MAINTAIN GOOD WILL BETWEEN OUR COMMANDS IS TOO VITAL TO PERMIT INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS TO ACT SO IRRESPONSIBLY AND USE FIREARMS AGAINST LIAISON PERSONNEL BASED UPON THAT INDIVIDUAL SOLDIER'S INTERPRETATION OF WHAT ARE OR ARE NOT THE ESTABLISHED RULES OF CONDUCT FOR THE MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS. EVERY STEP POSSIBLE HAS BEEN TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT YOUR LIAISON MISSION IN FRANKFURT HAS NOT BEEN FIRED AT WHEN THEY HAVE BEEN IN VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED RULES. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL

AEAGB-C{600}

(B)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

04 04 3031325 PP PP CCCC

NO

TAKE THE APPROPRIATE STEPS AND ASSURE ME THAT THE SAME WILL BE DONE FOR MY MISSION.

I REGRET THESE INCIDENTS HAVE SERVED TO MAR THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND I AM CONVINCED THE MEASURES YOU WILL TAKE, WILL SERVE TO RESTORE THESE RELATIONS TO THEIR PROPER, EXCELLENT LEVEL. ~~UNQUOTE~~

RESPECTFULLY,

MICHAEL S. DAVISON

GENERAL, USA

COMMANDER IN CHIEF UNQUOTE

"XGDS-2" DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

AEAGB-C{G0}

(B)

CONFIDENTIAL

DISPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

AEAGB-C(GO)

United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM)
Shooting Incident, 28 Oct 73 (U)

TO Chief of Staff

FROM DCSI

DATE 1 NOV 1973

CMT 1

CPT LaMonica/1lh/8395

1. (U) This is a decision paper. (NO SUSPENSE)
2. ~~(P)~~ PROBLEM. To determine if USAREUR should protest an incident in which an East German guard shot at a USMLM tour. If decision is affirmative, to determine the level and manner in which the protest should be made.
3. ~~(P)~~ FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.
 - a. At 0630 hours, 28 Oct 73, while photographing East German installation 047 and 493 within the city of Leipzig, East Germany, a USMLM tour was shot at by an East German guard. The tour was neither in a temporary nor permanent restricted area, but was behind a mission restriction sign (Orange TAB A).
 - b. Approximately 20 rounds were fired at the tour. One round hit the lower forward corner of the left front door of the tour vehicle; tore through the sole of the driver's left boot without injury to the driver; and penetrated into the floorboard (Orange TAB B).
 - c. The Chief of Staff recently protested two similar incidents that occurred on 16 September and on 21 October 1973 respectively (Orange TAB C).
4. ~~(P)~~ DISCUSSION.
 - a. This is the third incident in 42 days of live rounds being fired at USMLM touring personnel. USAREUR cannot condone such actions.
 - b. An oral protest from the Chief of Staff concerning the 16 Sep 73 shooting incident was delivered by the Chief, Allied Contact Section (ACS) to Headquarters Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) via the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt (SMLM-F) on 25 Sep 73. On 27 Sep 73, Chief, USMLM received a written reply from the Chief of Staff, GSFG addressed to the Chief of Staff USAREUR protesting the fact that a USMLM tour was "photographing a Soviet military objective", and insisting that the Soviet sentinel acted "strictly according to regulations" (White TAB C, Blue Flag).
 - c. On 29 Oct 73, another Chief of Staff oral protest in stronger language was delivered to Acting C/SMLM-F concerning the second shooting

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Sec 3.4 EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to _____

Exempt 25X _____ Date _____

No Objection Refers to _____

Date 9/6/81 By [Signature]

CLASSIFIED BY (AEAGB...)

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)

DECLASSIFY ON (Cannot be determined)

DA FORM 2496
1 FEB 62

REPLACES DD FORM 96, EXISTING SUPPLIES OF WHICH WILL BE
ISSUED AND USED UNTIL 1 FEB 63 UNLESS SOONER EXHAUSTED.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 76509

By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 NOV 1973

AEAGB-C(GO)

SUBJECT: United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) Shooting Incident, 28 Oct 73 (U)

incident of 21 Oct 73 (Orange TAB D). No reply has been received from this second protest.

d. Although a written protest from C/S USAREUR to C/S GSFG would be the next normal level of escalation, the protest for this, the third shooting incident, should be escalated above the Chief of Staff level to the CINC-CINC level because:

(1) The previous oral protest made in the name of the Chief of Staff has gone unheeded as reflected by the two latest shooting incidents.

(2) Rendering a CINCUSAREUR written protest now, without waiting for a Soviet response to a USAREUR Chief of Staff oral protest delivered on 29 Oct 73, would preclude the Soviets from formulating a counterprotest similar to their reaction to our protest on 25 Sep 73.

(3) In addition, a written protest from the CINCUSAREUR would underscore the seriousness with which USAREUR views these incidents.

e. Escalation of this matter to the CINC-CINC level does have political ramifications and USEUCOM/Am Emb Bonn approval would appear to be required under the provisions of EUCOM Directive 40-18.

5. ~~(C)~~ CONCLUSIONS. That CINCUSAREUR should initiate a written protest to the CINCGSFG concerning the incident on 28 Oct 73.

6. (U) RECOMMEND.

a. That the Chief of Staff approve the conclusion above.

b. That the Chief of Staff approve the dispatch of message at RED TAB.A.

Harold R. Aaron
HAROLD R. AARON

Major General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Intelligence

6 Incl
as

7. (U) COORDINATION.

POLAD: concur nonconcur NOT Available Date _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

CC NR
7182

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCNPA 939

OTTCZYUW UUFTBE 0817 3012050-CCCC--UUFTB.

ZNY CCCCC

O 282045Z OCT 73

FM CHIEF USMLM BERLIN GER//AEUS-MLM//

TO DCSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG GER//AEAGB-C//

BT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Sec 3.4 EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to _____

Exempt 25X _____ Date _____

No Objection, Refer to _____

Date 9/6/07 By [Signature]

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

SUBJECT: SHOOTING INCIDENT INVOLVING USMLM TOUR ON 28 OCT 73. (U)

1. ~~(C)~~ TOUR CONS OF MAJ CORCORAN AND SGT BEHNY IN VEH NR 25. TOUR RTE: POTSDAM, BITTERFELD, LEIPZIG. TOUR DEP POTSDAM HOUSE AT

APPROX 280200 OCT 73. AT APPROX 280630 TOUR WAS FIRED UPON BY EGA SENTRY AT THE ROAD INTERSECTION OF LANDSBERGER STRASSE &

MOECKERNSCHERWEG (US 15 95 9580) IN LEIPZIG.

2. ~~(C)~~ TOUR WAS NOT UNDER MOTORIZED SURVEILLANCE; HOWEVER THE ROAD INTERSECTION IS ADJACENT TO EG INSTL 047 TO THE S AND INSTL 493 TO THE W.

3. ~~(C)~~ TOUR WAS NOT IN A PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREA; TOUR WAS BEHIND MRS.

4. ~~(C)~~ CIRCUMSTANCES: AT 0630 HOURS 28 OCT TOUR WITH MAJ CORCORAN AND SGT BEHNY IN CAR 25 APPROACHED INTERSECTION IN NW SECTION OF LEIPZIG AT US 15 95 9580 FM THE NE ON MOECKERNSCHER WEG. THE AREA APPEARED DESERTED. SEVERAL PICTURES WERE TAKEN OF THE INSTL S OF

THE INTERSECTION AND THE TOUR THEN CROSSED THE INTERSECTION TO GET A VIEW OF THE TRAINING AREA TO THE W OF THE INTERSECTION. THERE WAS STILL NO ONE IN SIGHT. MAJ CORCORAN OPENED THE RIGHT DOOR, TOOK A FEW QUICK PICTURES OF THE TNGA AND THEN STARTED TO TAKE PICTURES OF THE INSTALLATION ON THE LEFT. AT THIS POINT SGT BEHNY NOTICED AN ARMED SENTRY IN GREY EGA UNIFORM AND EGA HELMET APPEARING OUT OF THE MIST APPROX 150M AHEAD MOVING TOWARD THE CAR AND UNSLINGING HIS WEAPON. AS SGT BEHNY STARTED TO BACK UP, A CIVILIAN VEHICLE PASSED THE INTERSECTION AND THE SENTRY FIRED ONE SHOT, POSSIBLY A WARNING SHOT, SGT BEHNY THEN EXECUTED A U-TURN TO THE ACCOMPANIMENT OF SEVERAL BURSTS OF AUTOMATIC FIRE, ABOUT 20 ROUNDS IN ALL, WHICH WAS RICCOCHETING AROUND THE VEHICLE. BY THIS TIME THE TOUR CAR WAS HEADING BACK NE THROUGH THE INTERSECTION. ONE ROUND HIT THE BOTTOM FORWARD CORNER OF THE LEFT FRONT DOOR, AS THE VEHICLE FISHTAILED LEFT, ENTERED THE CAR, TORE THROUGH THE TOE AND FORWARD PORTION OF THE SOLE OF SGT BEHNY'S LEFT BOOT (WITHOUT INJURING HIS FOOT) AND CUT INTO THE FLOORBOARD. EXCEPT FOR THE BULLET HOLE IN THE DOOR, NO SIGN OF OTHER HITS WAS FOUND. BOTH MEMBERS OF THE TOUR ALSO OBSERVED FRAGMENTS OF COBBLESTONE OR RICCOCHETS FLYING AROUND THE CAR, BUT THEY LEFT ONLY ONE POSSIBLE NICK ON THE RIGHT FRONT FENDER. THE EG CIVILIAN

CAR WHICH HAPPENED INTO THE INTERSECTION IN THE MIDDLE OF THE MELEE, DID NOT APPEAR TO DETER THE GUARD FROM FIRING.

5. (C) TOUR RETURNED TO WEST BERLIN AT 281900 OCT, DAMAGED VEHICLE HAS BEEN PHOTOGRAPHED AND WILL REMAIN GARAGED AT USMLM BERLIN UNTIL FINAL DISPOSITION IS DETERMINED.

XGDS-(2).

BT

0817

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Handwritten signature or initials

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

01 02 3021100 PP PP CCCC 291625Z OCT 73
NO


CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY //AEAGB-C//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY //ECJ2-R//
INFO AMEMB BONN GERMANY //POL MIL//
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GERMANY //IN//
CINCUSAFE LINSEBURY AB GERMANY //INC//
CALLIED CONTACT SEC FRANKFURT GERMANY ACTION COLL
CUSMLM BERLIN GERMANY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

SUBJECT: SHOOTING INCIDENT, 28 OCT 73 {U}

- A. CINCUSAREUR MSG, AEAGB-C 241127Z SEP 73 {C}
- B. CINCUSAREUR MSG, AEAGB-C 231643Z OCT 73 {C}

3. ~~{C}~~ ON 28 OCT 73, WHILE PHOTOGRAPHING EAST GERMAN INSTALLATION
047 AND 493 IN EILEIPZIG, EAST GERMANY, A USMLM TOUR WAS SHOT AT BY
AN EAST GERMAN GUARD {EGG}. AFTER OBSERVING THE EGG APPROACHING,
THE TOUR IMMEDIATELY STARTED TO BACK UP WHEN A SHOT WAS FIRED,
POSSIBLY A WARNING SHOT. AS THE TOUR EXECUTED A U-TURN SEVERAL
BURSTS FROM AN AUTOMATIC WEAPON WERE FIRED, APPROXIMATELY 20 ROUNDS
IN ALL. ONE ROUND HIT THE BOTTOM FORWARD CORNER OF THE LEFT FRONT
DOOR, ENTERED THE CAR, TORE THROUGH THE TOE AND FORWARD PORTION OF



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to FORM
 Date 11/6/73 By [Signature]

OCT 29

080779

MANUEL LAMONICA, CPT, AEAGB-C {G0}, HBG8395

R. W. HALL, COL, GS, XO, ODCSI

BY (AEAGB) _____
 FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY _____
 DECLASSIFY ON (Cannot be determined)

Williamson Col GS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

02 02 3021100 PP PP CCCC

OCT 73

NO

THE SOLE OF THE DRIVERS LEFT BOOT (WITHOUT INJURING HIS FOOT) AND CUT INTO THE FLOORBOARD.

2. ~~(C)~~ PERTINENT DATA:

A. NO BODILY DAMAGE SUSTAINED.

B. OTHER THAN THE ONE ROUND ENTERING THE CAR NO OTHER DAMAGE WAS SUSTAINED EXCEPT FOR A NICK ON THE RIGHT FRONT FENDER, POSSIBLY FROM A RICHOCHET OR FLYING COBBLESTONE.

C. TOUR WAS IN NEITHER A TEMPORARY NOR A PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREA.

D. THE TOUR WAS BEHIND A MISSION RESTRICTION SIGN.

E. TOUR WAS NOT UNDER SURVEILLANCE.

F. PHYSICAL CONTACT WAS NOT INVOLVED.

3. (U) ADDRESSEES WILL BE KEPT INFORMED OF ACTIONS PLANNED AS A RESULT OF THIS THIRD SHOOTING INCIDENT WITHIN A 42 DAY PERIOD.

"XGDS-2" DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

AEAGB-C{G0}

R. W. HALL, COL, GS, XO, ODCSI

RW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INSTRUMENTS AND

THE STATE OF THE PROVER

CUT INTO THE PROVER

PERTINENT DATA

NO BODY DAMAGE

CAN BE OTHER DAMAGE

AND TEST

OTHER THAN THE

OUT FENDER, POSSIBLY

ON THE

WAS SUSTAINED EXCEPT FOR A

BELETS

FROM A RECOGNIZED OR FLYING

BEFORE NEXT PESTICID

LABORATORY

TOUR WAS IN THE

THE TOUR WAS DONE IN THE SECTION OF THE SECTION

TOUR WAS NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE

INSTRUMENTS AND TEST

IT WILL BE NOT INFORMED OF SECTION, PLANET

THIS SECTION, ACCIDENT, IN A PERIOD

APPLICATION, CASE CANNOT BE DETERMINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

01 02 2971600 PP PP

CCCC

261325Z OCT 73

NO

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY //AEAGB-C//

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY //ECJ2-R//

CALLIED CONTACT SEC FRANKFURT GERMANY

INFO AMEMB BONN GERMANY //POL MIL//

CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GERMANY //

CUSMLM BERLIN GERMANY

1761
3021530

P 29/530



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION COLL

SUBJECT: SHOOTING INCIDENT, 21 OCT 73 (U)

A. CINCUSAREUR MSG, AEAGB-C, 231643Z OCT 73, SUBJECT AS ABOVE (C).

1. ~~IT~~ THE USE OF WEAPONS AGAINST USMLM TOURS (REF A) CANNOT BE
CONDONED, REGARDLESS OF CIRCUMSTANCES; THEREFORE, REQUEST CHIEF, ACS
MAKE THE FOLLOWING ORAL STATEMENT TO ACTING CHIEF, SMLM-F:

QUOTE: COL SEMIN, MY CHIEF OF STAFF WISHES THAT YOU PASS THE FOLLOW-
ING STATEMENT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS.

AT 0755 HOURS, 21 OCT 73, AT GUETERFELDE, TWO MEMBERS OF THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION WERE FIRED ON BY AN EAST
GERMAN GUARD. FORTUNATELY, NEITHER THE PERSONNEL NOR THE VEHICLE
OF USMLM WERE HIT. THIS IS THE SECOND INCIDENT OF SHOOTING AT USMLM
PERSONNEL IN 35 DAYS AND INDICATES, ABOVE ALL, A COMPLETE LACK OF

SGS
POLAD

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to _____
Date 9/6/07 By _____

001 70 37 73

000400

MANUEL LAMONICA, CPT, AEAGB-C(60), HBC
WINTHROP WHIPPLE, LTC, GS,
ASST SGS, AEAGS, HM 6504

THE CINC APPROVED THIS MSG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

02 02 2971600 PP PP

CCCC

OCT 73

NO

RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE AND A TOTAL DISREGARD OF MY PROTEST OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1973. I WANT TO REITERATE THAT OUR COMMANDERS IN CHIEF AGREED THAT US AND SOVIET MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS SHOULD BE FREE TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR TASKS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ESTABLISHED AGREEMENTS OF THIS NATURE. ACTS OF THIS NATURE COMPLETELY CONTRADICT THIS PRINCIPLE.

I VIGOROUSLY PROTEST THE ACTIONS OF THE EAST GERMAN PERSONNEL INVOLVED AND REQUEST THAT STEPS BE TAKEN TO INSURE THAT INCIDENTS OF THIS TYPE ARE NOT REPEATED. FURTHER, I HOLD THE GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES GERMANY RESPONSIBLE SHOULD ANY INJURY ACCRUE TO USMLM PERSONNEL OR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AS A RESULT OF UNDISCIPLINED, IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIONS OF THE EAST GERMANS. UNQUOTE.

2. (C) REQUEST CHIEF, ACS INFORM THIS OFFICE WHEN THE PROTEST HAS BEEN DELIVERED. "XGDS-2" DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

AEAGB-C1601

WW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISPOSITION FORM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

AEAGB-C(GO)

United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM)
Shooting Incident, 21 Oct 73 (U)

TO Chief of Staff

FROM DCSI

DATE **25 OCT 1973** CMT 1
CPT LaMonica/1lh/8395

1. (U) This is a decision paper. (NO SUSPENSE)
2. ~~(U)~~ PROBLEM. To determine if USAREUR should protest an incident in which an East German guard shot at a USMLM tour and, if so, the level and manner in which the protest should be made.
3. ~~(U)~~ FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.
 - a. At 0755 hours on 21 Oct 73, while driving on a dirt road into the East German and Soviet Gueterfelde (Installation 404) training area in East Germany, a USMLM tour was twice fired upon by an East German guard. The tour was neither in a PRA or TRA nor behind any mission restriction signs. Neither the USMLM personnel nor the vehicle were hit (TAB A).
 - b. The Chief of Staff recently protested a similar incident that occurred on 16 Sep 73 (TAB B).
 - c. On 27 Sep 73, Chief, USMLM received a written reply from the Chief of Staff, GSFG protesting the fact that a USMLM tour was "photographing a Soviet military objective", and insisting that the Soviet sentinel acted "strictly according to regulations" (TAB C, blue flag).
4. ~~(U)~~ DISCUSSION.
 - a. The firing of live rounds at USMLM touring personnel is a practice that USAREUR cannot condone.
 - b. A Chief of Staff, USAREUR protest made orally to Acting Chief, Soviet Military Liaison Mission, Frankfurt by Chief, Allied Contact Section (ACS) will:
 - (1) Advise the Soviets that the USAREUR command element has been made aware of the incident involving the use of weapons against USMLM and strongly objects to this, the second incident of this nature.
 - (2) Keep Chief, USMLM from becoming involved in the initial protest by raising it above the level of Chief, USMLM.
5. ~~(U)~~ CONCLUSION. That USAREUR should register a protest to the Soviets concerning the incident on 21 Oct 73.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Sec 3.4 EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to _____

Exempt 25X _____ Date _____

No Objection. Refer to _____

Date 9/10/87 By [Signature]

CLASSIFIED BY (AEAGB)

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)

Exemption cannot be determined

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DA FORM 2496
1 FEB 62

REPLACES DD FORM 96, EXISTING SUPPLIES OF WHICH WILL BE ISSUED AND USED UNTIL 1 FEB 63 UNLESS SOONER EXHAUSTED. ☆ U.S. GPO: 1972 - 473-063 P.O. 13

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 76509

By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AEAGB-C(GO)

SUBJECT: United States Military Liaison Mission (USMLM)
Shooting Incident, 21 Oct 73 (U)

6. (U) RECOMMEND.

- a. That the Chief of Staff approve the conclusion above.
- b. That the Chief of Staff approve the protest at RED TAB 1 which Chief, ACS will make on behalf of the Chief of Staff.
- c. That the Chief of Staff approve the dispatch of message at RED TAB 2.

5 Incl
as

26 OCT 1973

HAROLD R. AARON
Major General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Intelligence

7. (U) COORDINATION.

POLAD: concur ~~nonconcur~~

Date 25 Oct 73

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO

1762 302 1531

P 291531Z

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY //AEAGB-C//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY //ECJ2-R//
INFO AMEMB BONN GERMANY //POL MIL//
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GERMANY //IN//
CINCUSAFE LINDSEY AB GERMANY //INC//
CALLIED CONTACT SEC FRANKFURT GERMANY
CUSMLM BERLIN GERMANY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION COLL



SUBJECT: SHOOTING INCIDENT, 21 OCT 73 {U}

A. CINCUSAREUR MSG, AEAGB-C, 241127Z SEP 73 {C}

1. ~~REF~~ ON 21 OCT 73 WHILE DRIVING NORTH ON A DIRT ROAD AT
UU742019 INTO THE EAST GERMAN/SOVIET GUETERFELDE {INSTALLATION 404}
TRAINING AREA, A USMLM TOUR WAS TWICE FIRED UPON BY AN EAST GERMAN
GUARD. NOTING TWO GUARDS RUNNING TOWARD THE TOUR VEHICLE, THE TOUR
OFFICER INSTRUCTED THE DRIVER TO TURN AROUND AND LEAVE THE VICINITY
OF THE INSTALLATION. AS THE TOUR CAR WAS TURNING AROUND A WARNING
SHOT WAS FIRED INTO THE AIR AND AS THE TOUR CAR WAS MOVING RAPIDLY
TO THE SOUTH A SECOND SHOT WAS FIRED IN THE DIRECTION OF THE VEHICLE.

2. ~~REF~~ PERTINENT DATA:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

~~Sec 3.4~~ EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to

Exempt 25X Date

No Objection, Refer to ESOM

Date 9/6/07 By [Signature]

TURN OVER

OCT 23

073513

MANUEL LAMONICA, CPT, AEAGB-C{G0}, HB68395

R. W. HALL, COL, GS, XO, ODCSI

[Signature: R. W. Hall]

CLASSIFIED BY (AEAGB...)
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2...)
DECLASSIFY ON (Cannot be determined...)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

02 02 2961500 PP PP

CCCC

OCT 73

~~NO~~

- A. NO BODILY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE SUSTAINED.
 - B. TOUR WAS IN NEITHER A TEMPORARY NOR A PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREA.
 - C. TOUR WAS NOT BEHIND MISSION RESTRICTION SIGNS.
 - D. TOUR WAS NOT UNDER SURVEILLANCE.
 - E. PHYSICAL CONTACT WAS NOT INVOLVED.
3. {U} ADDRESSES WILL BE KEPT INFORMED OF ACTIONS THAT MAY BE PLANNED AS A RESULT OF THIS SECOND SHOOTING INCIDENT* WITHIN A 35 DAY PERIOD.

"XGDS-2" DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

AEAGB-C{G0}

R. W. HALL, COL, GS, XO, ODCSI

Hall

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY

CC NR
6981

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCNP915

PTTCZYUW UUFTBE0793 2950925-CCCC--UUFTB.

ZNY CCCCC

P 220920Z OCT 73

FM CUSMLM BERLIN GER

TO DCSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG GER//AEAGB-C//

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

SUBJECT: INCIDENT OF 21 OCT 73. (U)

1. ~~(C)~~ THIS REPORT COVERS INCIDENT OF USMLM TOUR IN POTSDAM LOCAL AREA ON 21 OCT 73.

A. PERSONNEL INVOLVED: 1LT KIMMEL, AND SGT PERK.

B. TOUR DEPARTED BERLIN 201400, INVOLVED IN INCIDENT 210755, RETURNED TO USMLM POTSDAM HOUSE 210825. DURATION OF INCIDENT WAS ONE MIN.

C. TOUR RTE: POTSDAM LOCAL AREA.

D. TOUR WAS NOT UNDER SURVEILLANCE.

E. TOUR WAS NOT BEHIND MISSION RESTRICTION SIGNS (MRS).

F. PHYSICAL CONTACT WAS NOT INVOLVED.

2. ~~(C)~~ CIRCUMSTANCES: AT 0755 HOURS 21 OCT 73 KIMMEL/PERK WERE ON THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE GUETERFELDE (404) TRAINING AREA ON A HARD SURFACE ROAD. TOUR THEN TURNED NORTH INTO THE TRAINING AREA AT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date: _____
 No Objection, Refer to _____
Date 9/6/07 By [Signature]

UU 742019 ON A DIRT ROAD. THE TOUR PROCEEDED UP THIS ROAD (NORTH)
FOR A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 700 METERS WHERE TOUR WAS THEN

PAGE 2 UFTBE0793 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

ABOUT 150 METERS SOUTH OF A BUILDING GUARDED BY AT LEAST TWO EGA
GUARDS CARRYING AK AND DRESSED IN RAINCOATS. UPON SEEING THE GUARDS
RUNNING TOWARD THE TOUR VEHICLE, THE TOUR OFFICER INSTRUCTED THE
TOUR DRIVER TO TURN AROUND AND LEAVE THE VICINITY OF THE INSTALLATION.
AS THE TOUR CAR WAS BEING TURNED AROUND (BROADSIDE IN ROAD) A
WARNING SHOT WAS FIRED INTO THE AIR. WHEN THE TOUR CAR WAS TURNED
AROUND AND MOVING RAPIDLY TO THE SOUTH A SECOND SHOT WAS FIRED IN
THE DIRECTION OF THE VEHICLE. BOTH SHOTS WERE FIRED FROM A DISTANCE
OF 60-70 METERS. NO BODILY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE WAS SUSTAINED. TOUR
IMMEDIATELY CLEARED THE AREA.

XGDS-(2)

BT

0793

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

PRIORITY

CC NR
6401

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCNPA849

PTTCZYUW UUFTBE0727 2710712-CCCC--UUFTB.

ZNY CCCCC

P 280710Z SEP 73

FM CUSMLM BERLIN GER

TO ODCSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG GER//AEAGB-C//

BT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to
 Exempt 25X Date
 No Objection, Refer to ECM
Date 9/6/07 By JK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MEETING AT
SERB ON 27 SEPT. (U)

1. ~~(C)~~ RECOMMEND THAT A WRITTEN REPLY BE SENT TO CHIEF OF STAFF, GSPG STATING THE FACTS AND POINTING OUT THAT FACT THAT ANY SHOOTING OF USE OF FIREARMS IS DANGEROUS AND UNWARRANTED AGAINST MISSION PERSONNEL AND THE USE IN THIS CASE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF ROUNDS FIRED AT THE VEHICLE IS INTOLERABLE. THE CASE OF COL SEMIN'S PRA VIOLATION SHOULD ALSO BE USED TO CONTRAST WHAT IS A REAL VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED RESTRICTED AREAS, AN ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE OF THE SOLDIER TRYING TO BLOCK HIS ESCAPE, AND THE SUBSEQUENT VIOLATION OF TRAFFIC LIGHTS ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF CIVILIAN MOTORISTS AND PEDESTRIANS. THE POINT SHOULD BE MADE THAT EVEN IN THIS CASE NO USE WAS MADE OF FIREARMS. THE PHOTOGRAPHY OF A "MILITARY OBJECTIVE" CAN NOT BE REFUTED. THE CASE OF MRS VIOLATION IS ALSO BEST LEFT UNREFUTED AT THIS TIME.
2. ~~(C)~~ THE SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY WARN THEIR PEOPLE NOT TO SHOOT

BUT WILL CERTAINLY NOT GIVE US ANY OPEN SATISFACTION ON THE MATTER. HOPEFULLY THE MATTER WILL BE LAID TO REST AFTER THE US REPLY IS RECEIVED.

3. ~~(S)~~ USMLM PERSONNEL ARE BEING ADVISED TO COOL IT FOR SEVERAL WEEKS TO AVOID ANY FURTHER INCIDENTS WHICH THE SOVIETS CAN USE TO SUPPORT THEIR CASE IN THE SHOOTING INCIDENT. PERSONNEL ARE BEING ADVISED TO REMAIN AWAY FROM SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS, FROM FENCES, AND TO AVOID VIOLATION OF MRS IN THE VICINITY OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS UNTIL THE SOVIETS HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PASS THE WORD DOWN THROUGH THE RANKS AND THE INCIDENT BECOMES HISTORY.

XGDS-(2)

BT

0727

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

01 XX 2750845 PP PP

CCCC

031504Z OCT 73

NO

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 76509

By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY //AEAGB-C//

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY //ECJ2-R//

INFO AMEMB BONN GERMANY //POL MIL//

CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GERMANY //IN//

CINCUSAFE LINDSEY AS GERMANY //INC//

CUSMLM BERLIN GERMANY

CALLIED CONTACT SEC FRANKFURT GERMANY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: USMLM SHOOTING INCIDENT, 16 SEP 73 {U}

A. CINCUSAREUR MSG, AEAGB-C, 241127Z SEP 73 {C}

1. ~~ref~~ PROTEST OUTLINED IN REF MSG WAS DELIVERED TO ACTING CHIEF, SMLM-F, COL SEMIN, ON 25 SEP 73 BY CHIEF, ACS. NOT BEING KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE INCIDENT, ACTING CHIEF, SMLM-F CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS AN ORAL STATEMENT FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF, USAREUR, AND SAID HE WOULD INFORM HIS HQS.

2. ~~ref~~ DURING A MEETING WITH CHIEF, SERB ON 27 SEP 73, CHIEF, USMLM RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF, GSF6 TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, USAREUR:

QUOTE: GENERAL, ON 25 SEPTEMBER 1973 A STATEMENT WAS MADE TO THE

SGS (100M)
POLAD

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to _____
Date 9/6/07 By [Signature]

JOSEPH STATER, GS12, ZAEAGB-C(60)
WINTHROP WHIPPLE, LTC, GS,
ASST SGS, AEAGS, HM 6504

Winthrop Whipple

THE COFS APPROVED THIS MSG

ACTION COLL

100 3 05 PM '73

074321

02 03 2750845 PP PP CCCC

NO

CHIEF OF THE SOVIET MILITARY LIAISON MISSION TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE US ARMY EUROPE ABOUT THE IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIONS OF A SOVIET SOLDIER WHO WAS STANDING WATCH AT A MILITARY POST. THESE ACTIONS SUPPOSEDLY TOOK PLACE ON 16 SEPTEMBER 1973.

IN ACTUALITY, THE ESSENCE OF THE MATTER APPEARS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS, THE FACT THAT YOUR SUBORDINATES ARE INCORRECTLY INFORMING YOU AND THEREBY HINDERING THE IMPROVEMENT OF MUTUAL RELATIONS AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR COMMANDS, IS EXTREMELY SURPRISING TO ME.

AS A RESULT OF A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION, IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET SENTINEL WERE PRECIPITATED BY THE CRUDE VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED RULES BY THE MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY LIAISON MISSION. THE SENTINEL, STANDING WATCH ON A MILITARY POST, ACTED STRICTLY ACCORDING TO REGULATIONS. HAVING SEEN THE FOREIGN CAR APPROACHING THE POST, THE SENTINEL TRIED TO STOP THE TRESPASSERS, FIRST BY SHOUTING IN RUSSIAN AND GERMAN, AND THEN BY FIRING INTO THE AIR. DURING THIS TIME, ONE OF THE TRESPASSERS ~~CLIMBED~~ CLIMBED ONTO THE BODY OF THE CAR AND BEGAN PHOTOGRAPHING A SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVE. THE ~~REST~~TRESPASSERS DID NOT REACT TO THE ACTIONS

AEAGB-C{G0}

ww

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

03 03 2750845 PP PP CCCC

NO

OF THE SENTINEL AND CONTINUED TO PHOTOGRAPH THE OBJECTIVE. WHEN THE SOVIET SENTINEL ATTEMPTED TO APPROACH THE CAR, THE CAR QUICKLY PICKED UP SPEED AND DISAPPEARED. THE SENTINEL DID NOT OBSERVE THE LICENSE NUMBER OF THE CAR. IT WAS ONLY ON 25 SEPTEMBER 1973, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATEMENT MADE IN YOUR NAME, THAT IT BECAME KNOWN THAT THIS WAS AN AMERICAN MILITARY LIAISON MISSION CAR.

IN CONNECTION WITH THIS, I RESOLUTELY PROTEST {THESE ACTIONS} AND REQUEST YOU TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES REGARDING YOUR SUBORDINATES TO PRECLUDE THE RECURRENCE OF SUCH INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE. UNQUOTE.

3, ~~ICT~~ IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE CHIEF OF STAFF, GSFG LETTER DEMANDS NO ANSWER, AND NO PURPOSE IS SEEN IN ~~CONTIN~~ CONTINUING A DISCUSSION OF THE INCIDENT, USAREUR INTENDS TO MAKE NO REPLY TO THE LETTER. "XGDS-2: DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

AEAGB-C{G0}

ww

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISPOSITION FORM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

AEAGB-C(GO)

USMLM Shooting Incident, 16 Sep 73 (U)

TO Chief of Staff

FROM DCSI

DATE **2 OCT 1973** CMT 1
Mr. Stater/11h/8395

1. (U) This is a decision paper. (NO SUSPENSE)
2. ~~(e)~~ PROBLEM. To determine the course of action USAREUR should adopt following receipt of a Chief of Staff, GSFSG counterprotest.
3. ~~(e)~~ FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.
 - a. On 16 Sep 73, a USMLM tour photographing a Soviet SA33 site was fired on by a Soviet guard. The tour was not in a restricted area (TAB A).
 - b. On 25 Sep 73, Chief, ACS delivered an oral protest from the Chief of Staff, USAREUR to Hqs, GSFSG over the use of weapons against USMLM personnel (TAB B).
 - c. On 27 Sep 73, Chief, USMLM received a written reply from the Chief of Staff, GSFSG protesting the fact that a USMLM tour was "photographing a Soviet military objective," and insisting that the Soviet sentinel had acted "strictly according to regulations" (TAB C, blue flag).
4. ~~(e)~~ DISCUSSION.
 - a. Notwithstanding the fact that the USMLM tour was in the immediate vicinity of a "military objective," USAREUR issued an oral protest to Hqs, GSFSG with a view toward precluding the use of weapons against unarmed USMLM personnel in the future. While this objective may, or may not, have been met, the protest did serve to notify the Soviets that USAREUR does not accept the use of weapons against USMLM tours.
 - b. Replying to the Chief of Staff, GSFSG 27 Sep 73 letter would only aggravate a situation in which USMLM's aggressiveness contributed somewhat to the incident. The Chief of Staff, GSFSG letter does not demand a reply and no purpose is seen in making the incident the subject of further correspondence.
5. ~~(e)~~ CONCLUSION. That USAREUR should make no reply to the 27 Sep 73 letter from the Chief of Staff, GSFSG.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 76509

Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to _____
 Date 9/6/07 By [Signature]

CLASSIFIED BY (AEAGB...) By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)
 DECLASSIFY ON (Cannot be determined)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AEAGB-C(GO)

SUBJECT: USMLM Shooting Incident, 16 Sep 73 (U)

- 6. (U) RECOMMEND. That the Chief of Staff:
 - a. Approve the conclusion above.
 - b. Approve for dispatch the message at RED TAB.

4 Incl
as

HAROLD R. AARON
Major General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Intelligence

7. (U) COORDINATION.

POLAD: concur ~~nonconcur~~

Date 3 Oct 73

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(10)



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
TELEPHONE (202) 547-2000
FACSIMILE (202) 547-2000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DATE: 11/1/88

RE: [Illegible]

TO: [Illegible]

FROM: [Illegible]

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

1. [Illegible]

2. [Illegible]

3. [Illegible]

4. [Illegible]

IMMEDIATE

CC NR
6/55

~~CONFIDENTIAL LIMDIS~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

VZCZCNPA819
OTT CZYUW UUFTBE0697 2610807-CCCC--UUFTB.
ZNY CCCCC
O 180805Z SEP 73
FM CUSMLM BERLIN GER//AEUS-MLM//
TO ODCSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG GER//AEAGB-C//
BT

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to
 Exempt 25X Date
 No Objection, Refer to ECM
Date 9/6/07 By [Signature]

Caveat removed per USMLM
msg 181435Z SEP 73

~~CONFIDENTIAL LIMDIS NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

SUBJECT: INCIDENT OF 16 SEP 73 (U)

1. ~~(C)~~ THIS REPORT COVERS INCIDENT OF USMLM AIR TOUR IN AREA "A"
ON 16 SEP 73 (WITTSTOCK SA-3).

A. PERSONNEL INVOLVED: CAPT PATTERSON, LT COL CHANEY, MSGT
SPITZENBERGER.

B. TOUR DEPARTED BERLIN 161420, INVOLVED IN INCIDENT 161620, RETURNED
TO USMLM POTSDAM HOUSE 172030. DURATION OF INCIDENT WAS ONE MIN.

C. TOUR RTE: POTSDAM, RTE 273, RTE 5, KYRITZ, STOLPE, HERZSPRUNG,
DAPENBRUCH, WITTSTOCK SA-3.

D. TOUR WAS NOT UNDER SURVEILLANCE.

E. TOUR WAS NOT IN A RESTRICTED AREA. WITTSTOCK SA-3 (UV 277020).

F. PHYSICAL CONTACT WAS NOT INVOLVED.

2. ~~(C-LIMDIS)~~ CIRCUMSTANCES: TOUR APPROACHED SA-3 SITE AT APPROX.
161615 SEP. TOUR OFFICER CHECKED SITE FOR SENTRIES AT DISTANCES
OF 2 KM AND 1 KM; NONE VISIBLE. TOUR PROCEEDED TO SITE FENCE,
PHOTOGRAPHED LOW BLOW, AND PROB VISUAL TRACKING STATION. TOUR

PAGE 2 UUFTE0697 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMDIS NO FOREIGN DISSEM
OFFICER BRACED SELF ON CAR DOOR TO SHOOT OVER THE TOP OF FENCE;
SAW SENTRY; SENTRY SAW TOUR OFFICER. SENTRY YELLED "HALT, ZURUECK",
UNSHOULDERED AK-47, FED CLIP INTO CHAMBER, FIRED 15-20 ROUNDS AT TOUR.
WHILE SENTRY WAS FEEDING CLIP, TOUR OFFICER JUMPED IN CAR AND
DRIVER BEAT A HASTY RETREAT FROM THE AREA WITH DIRT FLYING
AROUND THE CAR. NO INJURIES WERE SUSTAINED BY USMLM PERSONNEL, NOR
WAS THE VEHICLE DAMAGED.

3. ~~(C)~~ COMMENT: CHIEF USMLM INTENDS TO PROTEST THIS APPARENTLY
DELIBERATE FIRING AT THE USMLM TOUR THE SOVIET RESPONSE WILL
UNDOUBTEDLY BE THAT WE HAD NO BUSINESS IN THE AREA OF A MILITARY
INSTALLATION (SA-3 SITE), BUT THIS INDISCRIMINATE USE OF WEAPONS
MUST BE CALLED TO THEIR ATTENTION. I WOULD SUSPECT THAT THE
SOVIET SENTRY FEARED SABOTAGE AND POSSIBLY MISTOOK THE CAMERA
FOR A GRENADE LAUNCHER OR OTHER TYPE OF UNKNOWN WEAPON.
I WILL CALL FOR A MEETING TO MAKE THE PROTEST AFTER RECEIPT
OF GUIDANCE FROM USAREUR.

XGDS-(2)

BT

0697

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NNNN

0, XX 2620745 PP PP

CCCC

241127Z SEP 73

No


DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY //AEAGB-C//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY //ECJ2-R//
CALLED CONTACT SEC FRANKFURT GERMANY
INFO AMEMB BONN GERMANY //POL MIL//
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GERMANY //IN//
CUSMLM BERLIN GERMANY

Intel

ACTION COLL

of
0



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: SHOOTING INCIDENT, 16 SEP 73 {U}

THIS MSG IN TWO PARTS; PART I FOR ALL

~~REF~~ ON 16 SEP 73, WHILE PHOTOGRAPHING AN SA-3 SITE NEAR WITT-
STOCK, EAST GERMANY, A USMLM TOUR WAS SHOT AT BY A SOVIET GUARD. THE
TOUR WAS NOT IN A RESTRICTED AREA. FORTUNATELY, NEITHER THE USMLM
TOUR PERSONNEL NOR THE VEHICLE WERE HIT BY THE 15-20 ROUNDS FIRED D
URING THE ESCAPE. ALTHOUGH THE USMLM TOUR WAS NEAR A SENSITIVE
INSTALLATION, THE USE OF WEAPONS AGAINST USMLM TOURS CANNOT BE
CONDONED, REGARDLESS OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

PART II FOR CHIEF, ACS

~~REF~~ THEREFORE, REQUEST CHIEF, ACS MAKE THE FOLLOWING ORAL
STATEMENT TO ACTING CHIEF, SMLM-F:

SGS C 10001
POLAD
DCSOPS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to _____
Date 9/16/07 By JUK

SEPH STATER, GS-12, AEAGB-C{G0}, HBG 8395
INTHROP WHIPPLE, LTC, GS,
SST SGS, AEAGS, HM 6504

THE CINC APPROVED THIS MSG

Whitby Whipple

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEP 24 3 01 PM '73

0725007

NO

QUOTE: COL SEMIN, MY CHIEF OF STAFF WISHES THAT YOU PASS THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS.

AT 1620 HOURS, 16 SEPTEMBER 1973, AT WITTSTOCK, THREE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION WERE FIRED ON BY A SOVIET SOLDIER. THEY WERE NOT IN AN AREA RESTRICTED TO THE ALLIED MISSIONS. FORTUNATELY, NEITHER THE PERSONNEL NOR THE VEHICLE OF USMLM WERE HIT. IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIONS SUCH AS THIS EVIDENCE, FIRST OF ALL, A COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE AND, SECONDLY, A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF HOW FAR RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COMMANDS HAVE PROGRESSED AND HOW MUCH EFFORT HAS GONE INTO ESTABLISHING CONTACTS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. OUR COMMANDERS IN CHIEF AGREED THAT THE US AND SOVIET MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS SHOULD BE FREE TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR TASKS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ESTABLISHED AGREEMENTS; HOWEVER, THIS ACT IS IN COMPLETE CONTRADICTION OF THAT PRINCIPLE. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE ACCORD REACHED BY OUR COMMANDERS IN CHIEF HAS NOT BEEN MADE KNOWN TO THE LOWEST ECHELONS OF GSFG.

I VIGOROUSLY PROTEST THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET SOLDIER AND MUST REQUEST THAT YOU TAKE STEPS TO INSURE THAT INCIDENTS OF THIS TYPE DO NOT REPEAT THEMSELVES. THE RISKS, BOTH IN TERMS OF HUMAN LIFE AND

AEAGB-C{G0}

WV~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

N

THE PROMOTION OF GOOD WILL BETWEEN OUR COMMANDS, ARE TOO GREAT TO ALLOW SOLDIERS TO PRESUME MORE AUTHORITY THAN THEY HAVE. UNQUOTE

PLEASE BE AWARE OF MY CONTINUING RESPECT FOR YOU AND YOUR COMMANDER IN CHIEF GENERAL IVANOVSKIY UNQUOTE

3. ~~LET~~ REQUEST CHIEF, ACS INFORM THIS OFFICE WHEN THE PROTEST HAS BEEN DELIVERED. XGDS-20 DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE

DETERMINED.

ll
of
2

E AGB-C{G0}

llw



ШТАБ

**Группы советских войск
в Германии**

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 76509

By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

27 сентября 1973 г.
№ 237

Господин генерал,


25 сентября 1973 года начальнику Советской военной миссии связи при Главнокомандующем СВ США в Европе от Вашего имени сделано заявление о якобы имевших место 16 сентября 1973 года безответственных действиях советского солдата, стоявшего на боевом посту.

В действительности существо дела выглядит совершенно иначе, в связи с чем меня крайне удивляет тот факт, что Ваши подчиненные неправильно информируют Вас и тем самым препятствуют улучшению взаимоотношений и взаимопонимания между нашими Командованиями.

В результате тщательного расследования установлено, что действия советского часового были вынужденными в связи с грубейшим нарушением членами АВМС установленных правил. Часовой, стоявший на боевом посту, действовал строго по Уставу. Увидев приближавшуюся к посту иностранную машину, часовой сначала окриком на русском и немецком языках, а затем выстрелом вверх пытался задержать нарушителей, один из которых в это время взобрался на кузов машины и начал фотографировать советский военный объект. На действия часового нарушители не реагировали и продолжали заниматься фотографированием объекта. Когда советский часовой попытался подойти к машине, машина быстро набрала скорость и исчезла. Чтобы до конца выполнить свой долг, советский часовой выстрелил еще раз вверх. Однако машина не остановилась и скрылась. Номера машины часовой не заметил. И только 25 сентября 1973 года, согласно заявлению, сделан-

ному от Вашего имени, стало известно, что это была машина
Американской военной миссии связи.

В связи с этим я выражаю решительный протест и прошу
Вас принять должные меры к своим подчиненным, направленные
на недопущение подобных случаев в будущем.



В. ЯКУШИН
генерал-полковник
начальник штаба ГСВГ

Генерал-майору У.Р.КРАФТУ МЛ.

Начальнику штаба сухопутных войск США
в Европе

Генерал-майору У. Р. КРАФТУ МЛ.

Начальнику штаба сухопутных войск
США в Европе

DISPOSITION FORM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

For use of this form, see AR 340-15; the proponent agency is The Adjutant General's Office.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

AEAGB-C(GO)

USMLM Shooting Incident, 16 Sep 73 (U)

TO Chief of Staff

FROM DCSI

DATE **20 SEP 1973** CMT 1
Mr. Stater/llh/8395

1. (U) This is a decision paper. (NO SUSPENSE)
2. ~~(e)~~ PROBLEM. To determine if USAREUR should protest an incident in which a Soviet guard shot at a USMLM tour and, if so, the level and manner in which the protest should be made.
3. ~~(e)~~ FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM. On 16 Sep 73, while in the process of photographing a Soviet SA-3 site near Wittstock, East Germany, a USMLM tour was fired on by a Soviet guard. The tour was not in a restricted area. Neither the USMLM personnel nor the vehicle were hit (TAB A).
4. ~~(e)~~ DISCUSSION.
 - a. Even though the tour was near a sensitive installation, the use of weapons against USMLM personnel is a practice that USAREUR cannot condone.
 - b. A Chief of Staff, USAREUR protest made orally to Acting Chief, SMLM-F by Chief, ACS will:
 - (1) Advise the Soviets that the USAREUR command element has been made aware of the incident involving the use of weapons against USMLM.
 - (2) Keep Chief, USMLM from becoming involved in the initial protest by raising it above the level of Chief, USMLM.
5. ~~(e)~~ CONCLUSION. That USAREUR should register a protest to the Soviets concerning the incident on 16 Sep 73.
6. (U) RECOMMEND.
 - a. That the Chief of Staff approve the conclusion above.
 - b. That the Chief of Staff approve the protest at RED TAB 1 which Chief, ACS will make on behalf of the Chief of Staff.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Sec 3.4 EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to _____

Exempt 25X Date _____

No Objection. Refer to _____

Date 9/6/07 By [Signature]

CLASSIFIED BY (AEAGB...)

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)

DECLASSIFY ON (cannot be determined)

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority NND 76509

By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

DA FORM 2496
1 FEB 62

REPLACES DD FORM 96, EXISTING SUPPLIES OF WHICH WILL BE
ISSUED AND USED UNTIL 1 FEB 63 UNLESS SOONER EXHAUSTED.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 76509

By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

AEAGB-C(GO)

SUBJECT: USMLM Shooting Incident, 16 Sep 73 (U)

c. That the Chief of Staff approve the message at RED TAB 2 notifying interested agencies of the protest.

3 Incl
as

24 SEP 1973
[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten signature: Harold R. Aaron]

HAROLD R. AARON
Major General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Intelligence

7. (U) COORDINATION

POLAD: concur ~~nonconcur~~

[Handwritten signature: J. S. Moffett]

Date 20 SEPT. 73

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

01 XX 2620745 PP PP

CCCC

241127Z SEP 73

NO

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY //AEAGB-C//

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY //ECJ2-R//

CALLIED CONTACT SEC FRANKFURT GERMANY

INFO AMEMB BONN GERMANY //POL MIL//

CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GERMANY //IN/

CUSMLM BERLIN GERMANY

Intel

ACTION COLL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: SHOOTING INCIDENT, 16 SEP 73 (U)

THIS MSG IN TWO PARTS; PART I FOR ALL

1. ~~LET~~ ON 16 SEP 73, WHILE PHOTOGRAPHING AN SA-3 SITE NEAR WITT-STOCK, EAST GERMANY, A USMLM TOUR WAS SHOT AT BY A SOVIET GUARD. THE TOUR WAS NOT IN A RESTRICTED AREA. FORTUNATELY, NEITHER THE USMLM TOUR PERSONNEL NOR THE VEHICLE WERE HIT BY THE 15-20 ROUNDS FIRED DURING THE ESCAPE. ALTHOUGH THE USMLM TOUR WAS NEAR A SENSITIVE INSTALLATION, THE USE OF WEAPONS AGAINST USMLM TOURS CANNOT BE CONDONED, REGARDLESS OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

PART II FOR CHIEF, ACS

2. ~~LET~~ THEREFORE, REQUEST CHIEF, ACS MAKE THE FOLLOWING ORAL STATEMENT TO ACTING CHIEF, SMLM-F:

SGS C 1copy
POLAD
DCSOPS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to *PSM*
Date *9/6/07* By *JL*

JOSEPH STATER, GS-12, AEAGB-C(60), HBG 8395
WINTHROP WHIPPLE, LTC, GS,
ASST SGS, AEAGS, HM 6504

THE CINC APPROVED THIS MSG

Winthrop Whipple

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEP 24 3 01 PM '73

072500

NO

QUOTE: COL SEMIN, MY CHIEF OF STAFF WISHES THAT YOU PASS THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS.

AT 1620 HOURS, 16 SEPTEMBER 1973, AT WITTSTOCK, THREE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION WERE FIRED ON BY A SOVIET SOLDIER. THEY WERE NOT IN AN AREA RESTRICTED TO THE ALLIED MISSIONS. FORTUNATELY, NEITHER THE PERSONNEL NOR THE VEHICLE OF USMLM WERE HIT. IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIONS SUCH AS THIS EVIDENCE, FIRST OF ALL, A COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE AND, SECONDLY, A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF HOW FAR RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COMMANDS HAVE PROGRESSED AND HOW MUCH EFFORT HAS GONE INTO ESTABLISHING CONTACTS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. OUR COMMANDERS IN CHIEF AGREED THAT THE US AND SOVIET MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS SHOULD BE FREE TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR TASKS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ESTABLISHED AGREEMENTS; HOWEVER, THIS ACT IS IN COMPLETE CONTRADICTION TO THAT PRINCIPLE. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE ACCORD REACHED BY OUR COMMANDERS IN CHIEF HAS NOT BEEN MADE KNOWN TO THE LOWEST ECHELONS OF GSFG.

I VIGOROUSLY PROTEST THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET SOLDIER AND MUST REQUEST THAT YOU TAKE STEPS TO INSURE THAT INCIDENTS OF THIS TYPE DO NOT REPEAT THEMSELVES. THE RISKS, BOTH IN TERMS OF HUMAN LIFE AND

AEAGB-C{60}

WV~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO

THE PROMOTION OF GOOD WILL BETWEEN OUR COMMANDS, ARE TOO GREAT TO ALLOW SOLDIERS TO PRESUME MORE AUTHORITY THAN THEY HAVE. UNQUOTE

PLEASE BE AWARE OF THE CONTINUING RESPECT FOR THE ABILITY OF THE COMMANDER IN THE FIELD GENERAL AND HIS STAFF TO MAKE THE BEST USE OF THE SITUATION

3. (C) REQUEST CHIEF, ACS INFORM THIS OFFICE WHEN THE PROTEST HAS BEEN DELIVERED. XGDS-20 DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

THESE ARE THE REASONS FOR THE PROMOTION OF GOOD WILL BETWEEN OUR COMMANDS, ARE TOO GREAT TO ALLOW SOLDIERS TO PRESUME MORE AUTHORITY THAN THEY HAVE. UNQUOTE

AEAGB-C160

WW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DCSI - INFO *J Hall*

PRIORITY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CC: *16400*
1HNY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____
 No Objection, Refer to ECAM
Date 9/6/07 By JW

SECT ONE OF TWO

VZCZCNPA847

PTTCZYUW UUFTBE0725 2702220-CCCC--UUFTB.

ZNY CCCCC

P 272215Z SEP 73

FM CUSMLM BERLIN GER

TO ODCSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG GER//AEAGB-C//

BT



~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO SECTIONS

ACTION COLL

SUBJECT: MEETING AT SERB ON 27 SEP. (34-73) (U)

1. ~~(C)~~ GENERAL. CHIEF AND DEP CHIEF USMLM MET WITH CHIEF AND DEP CHIEF SERB AND SERB INTERPRETER LT YEGOROV AT SERB ON THURSDAY 27 SEP FROM 1600 TO 1630 HRS. THE MEETING WAS REQUESTED BY SERB. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE: (1) SHOOTING INCIDENT IN VICINITY WITT-STOCK AND C/S, GSGF WRITTEN COUNTER PROTEST TO C/S, USAREUR, (2) LETTER OF APPRECIATION FOR SOVIET MUSEUM VISIT, (3) EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR FLOWERS PRESENTED AT CROSSING POINT BY SOVIET COMMANDANT, (4) PASS EXCHANGE, (5) EG EMPLOYEES NEEDED, AND (6) STATUS OF REQUEST FOR KITCHEN EQUIPMENT REPAIR OF MIRROR, ETC.
2. ~~(C)~~ BACKGROUND. SERB CONTACTED PDO AT 1245 HRS AND REQUESTED MEETING AT 1500. CHIEF USMLM REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL 1600 HRS. TIME WAS AGREED.
3. ~~(C)~~ MEETING.
 - A. METTING BEGAN AS USUAL WITH LT YEGOROV ESCORTING US REPS UPSTAIRS TO MEETING ROOM WHERE CHIEF AND DEP CHIEF SERB WERE WAITING. THEY

WERE FRIENDLY AS USUAL AND REQUESTED THAT ALL BE SEATED.

B. SHOOTING INCIDENT C/S, GSFG WRITTEN PROTEST. CHIEF SERB SAID THAT HE HAD A LETTER FROM HIS CHIEF OF STAFF TO GENERAL KRAFT AND HANDED CHIEF USMLM ACROSS THE TABLE WHAT APPEARED TO BE A SEALED ENVELOPE. CHIEF USMLM TOOK THE ENVELOPE, LOOKED AT THE ADDRESS AND SAID THAT HE WOULD PASS IT TO HIS CHIEF OF STAFF. CHIEF SERB SAID THAT WAS ALL HE HAD TO BRING UP. CHIEF USMLM DID NOT OPEN THE LETTER AND CHIEF SERB SAID, "YOU KNOW WHAT IT'S ABOUT". CHIEF USMLM PROFESSED IGNORANCE AND CHIEF SERB SAID ITS ABOUT THE 16TH OF SEP. CHIEF SERB THEN REACHED ACROSS THE TABLE TOOK THE LETTER BACK, OPENED IT AND TOLD CHIEF USMLM HE COULD READ IT. THE LETTER READS AS FOLLOWS:

HEADQUARTERS

GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES GERMANY

27 SEPTEMBER 1973

NO. 237

GENERAL, ON 25 SEPTEMBER 1973 A STATEMENT WAS MADE TO THE CHIEF OF THE SOVIET MILITARY LIAISON MISSION TO THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE U.S. ARMY EUROPE ABOUT THE IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIONS OF A SOVIET SOLDIER WHO WAS STANDING WATCH AT A MILITARY POST. THESE ACTIONS SUPPOSEDLY

TOOK PLACE ON 16 SEPTEMBER 1973.

IN ACTUALITY, THE ESSENCE OF THE MATTER APPEARS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT. IN CONNECTION WITH THIS, THE FACT THAT YOUR SUBORDINATES ARE INCORRECTLY INFORMING YOU AND THEREBY HINDERING THE IMPROVEMENT OF MUTUAL RELATIONS AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR COMMANDS, IS EXTREMELY SURPRISING TO ME.

AS A RESULT OF A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION, IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET SENTINEL WERE PRECIPITATED BY THE CRUDE VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED RULES BY THE MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY LIAISON MISSION. THE SENTINEL, STANDING WATCH ON A MILITARY POST, ACTED STRICTLY ACCORDING TO REGULATIONS. HAVING SEEN THE FOREIGN CAR APPROACHING THE POST, THE SENTINEL TRIED TO STOP THE TRESPASSERS, FIRST BY SHOUTING IN RUSSIAN AND GERMAN, AND THEN BY FIRING INTO THE AIR. DURING THIS TIME, ONE OF THE TRESPASSERS CLIMBED ONTO THE BODY OF THE CAR AND BEGAN PHOTOGRAPHING A SOVIET MILITARY OBJECTIVE. THE TRESPASSERS DID NOT REACT TO THE ACTIONS OF THE SENTINEL AND CONTINUED TO PHOTOGRAPH THE OBJECTIVE. WHEN THE SOVIET SENTINEL ATTEMPTED TO APPROACH THE CAR, THE CAR QUICKLY PICKED UP SPEED AND DISAPPEARED. THE SENTINEL DID NOT OBSERVE THE LICENSE NUMBER OF THE CAR. IT WAS ONLY ON 25 SEPTEMBER 1973, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATE-

PAGE 4 UUF TBE0725 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

MENT MADE IN YOUR NAME, THAT IT BECAME KNOWN THAT THIS WAS AN AMERICAN MILITARY LIAISON MISSION CAR.

IN CONNECTION WITH THIS, I RESOLUTELY PROTEST (THESE ACTIONS) AND REQUEST YOU TAKE THE NECESSARY MEASURES REGARDING YOUR SUBORDINATES TO PRECLUDE THE RECURRENCE OF SUCH INCIDENTS IN THE FUTURE.

SIGNED

V. YAKUSHIN

COLONEL-GENERAL

CHIEF-OF-STAFF GSFG

TO: MAJOR GENERAL W.R. KRAFT, JR. CHIEF-OF-STAFF, US ARMY EUROPE

WHEN CHIEF USMLM HAD FINISHED READING THE LETTER CHIEF SERB ASKED HIM IF HE UNDERSTOOD IT. CHIEF USMLM SAID THAT HE COULD READ THE WORDS, BUT THE THOUGHTS AND INFORMATION WERE NOT UNDERSTANDABLE. CHIEF SERB THEN SAID IN A RATHER LOUD AND OBVIOUSLY THEATERICAL VOICE WITH A STERN VISAGE AND RED FACE THAT THE USMLM OFFICERS HAD VIOLATED SOVIET RESTRICTED AREA SIGNS (MRS), PHOTOGRAPHED A SOVIET MILITARY INSTALLATION, DISREGARDED AND DISOBEYED A SOVIET SENTINEL'S ORDERS, AND THE SENTINEL WAS JUST CARRYING OUT HIS ORDERS. HE THEN ASKED WHAT THE CHIEF WOULD DO OR WHAT A US SOLDIER WOULD DO IN A SIMILAR CASE. CHIEF USMLM SAID THAT WHAT HE OR ANY US SOLDIER WOULD NOT DO WAS TO

TAKE SUCH ACTION AGAINST UNARMED PERSONNEL - AND THAT WAS WHAT HAPPENS WHEN AN ARMED SENTINEL FIRES 15 OR MORE ROUNDS WHICH LAND ON BOTH SIDES OF THE VEHICLE. CHIEF SERB SAID THE USMLM OFFICERS HAD OBVIOUSLY NOT TOLD THE TRUTH TO THEIR CHIEF. CHIEF USMLM SAID THE POINT ONE TO BE REMEMBERED WAS THAT THE USMLM WERE NOT IN A RESTRICTED AREA AND HE COULD POINT THAT OUT ON A MAP (HE ASKED CHIEF SERB FOR A MAP AND FOR HIM TO POINT OUT WHERE THE SOVIETS SAID THE USMLM TOUR WAS LOCATED WHEN SHOT AT). CHIEF SERB SAID CHIEF USMLM KNEW BETTER THAN HE DID WHERE THE TOUR WAS SINCE HE HAD SENT IT THERE. HE FURTHER SAID THAT THE LOCAL COMMANDANT HAD INVESTIGATED THOROUGHLY AND THE REPORT WAS IN WUNSDORF. CHIEF USMLM SAID THE SECOND POINT WAS THAT WHEN AN ARMED SENTRY FIRES THAT MANY ROUNDS IN THAT MANNER AT UNARMED PERSONS IT IS NOTHING LESS THAN ATTEMPTED MURDER. CHIEF SERB RETORTED THAT THE USMLM TOUR HAD VIOLATED THE RESTRICTION SIGNS, HAD PHOTOGRAPHED THE INSTALLATION, AND HAD REFUSED TO STOP WHEN APPREHENDED BY THE SOVIET SENTRY WHO USED BOTH GERMAN AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGES.

AFTER A MOMENT OF SILENCE, BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE REALIZATION THAT EACH SIDE WAS GOING TO REPEAT ITS THESIS, CHIEF USMLM COMMENTED THAT HE HAD EXPECTED THE LETTER FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO EXPLAIN

WHAT THE DEP CHIEF AND ACTING CHIEF OF SMLM WAS DOING IN A PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREA. AFTER A SHORT PAUSE, CHIEF SERB SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT CHIEF USMLM WAS TALKING ABOUT. CHIEF USMLM TOLD HIM THAT HE SURELY MUST KNOW ABOUT THE VIOLATION OF THE PRA BY COLONEL SEMIN AND THE PROTEST FROM CHIEF OF STAFF, USAREUR. CHIEF SERB SAID HE DID NOT. CHIEF USMLM THEN POINTED OUT THAT THE FIRST PROTEST MADE BY CHIEF ACS IN THE NAME OF C/S, USAREUR AT THE MEETING ON 25 SEP WAS THE BLATANT VIOLATION OF AN ESTABLISHED PRA BY NONE OTHER THAN THE DEP CHIEF AND IN FACT THE ACTING CHIEF OF THE SOVIET MILITARY LIAISON MISSION. CHIEF USMLM SAID THAT HE HAD EXPECTED THE LETTER TO PERHAPS EXPLAIN JUST WHAT COL SEMIN WAS DOING IN A US PRA. COLONEL NYUNIN SAID THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT IT. CHIEF USMLM SAID THAT CERTAINLY GEN YAKUSHIN MUST KNOW SINCE THAT HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF THE MEETING AND COL SEMIN HAD NOT ONLY DISREGARDED THE ORDERS OF THE US MILITARY POLICE TO HALT, BUT HAD NEARLY RUN OVER AN AMERICAN SOLDIER AND HAD RUN THROUGH TWO RED LIGHTS ENDANGERING THE LIVES OF MOTORISTS AND PEDESTRIANS. AT THIS POINT CHIEF USMLM PICKED UP THE LETTER AND STUDIED IT CAREFULLY SAYING THAT THERE CERTAINLY MUST BE SOMETHING IN THE LETTER EXPLAINING THIS CRUDE VIOLATION.

XGDS-(2)

BT

0725

PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CC NR

6400

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Sec 3.4 EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to _____

Exempt 25X _____ Date _____

No Objection, Refer to ECOM

Date 9/16/07 By J

Sec II

VZCZCNPA848

PTTCZYUW UUFTBE0726 2702220-CCCC--UUFTB.

ZNY CCCCC

P 272215Z SEP 73

FM CUSMLM BERLIN GER

TO ODCSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG GER//AEAGB-C//

BT



ACTION COLL

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ FINAL SECTIONS OF TWO SECTIONS

CHIEF SERB TRIED TO CHANGE THE SUBJECT, POINTING OUT THAT THE USMLM OFFICERS HAD VIOLATED REGULATIONS, HAD DISREGARDED AND VIOLATED THE INTRUCTIONS OF A SOVIET SOLDIER FOR THEM TO HALT. CHIEF USMLM SAID THAT THOSE WERE GOOD POINTS WHICH SHOULD APPLY TO ALL AND THAT THERE WAS NONE OTHER THAN THE DEP CHIEF OF SMLM VIOLATING NOTHING LESS THAN A PERMANENT RESTRICTED AREA AND NOT ONLY VIOLATING THE ORDERS OF US MILITARY TO HALT, BUT INDEED ATTEMPTING TO RUN OVER THE MAN IN WHAT CAN BE LITTLE LESS THAN ATTEMPTED MURDER. HE POINTED OUT THAT EVEN IN SUCH A PROVOCATIVE ACTION SUCH AS A PRA VIOLATION AND A THREAT TO THE LIFE OF A US SOLDIER, THE US PERSONNEL DID NOT OPEN FIRE WITH EVEN A WARNING ROUND. THIS COULD BE CONTRASTED WITH THE ACTIONS OF AN IRRESPONSIBLE SOVIET SENTRY WHO FIRES SOME 15 ROUNDS AT THE US PERSONNEL IN AN ACT WHICH WAS NOTHING SHORT OF ATTEMPTED MURDER. CHIEF SERB GOT STILL REDDER IN THE FACE, STRESSED AGAIN THAT HE DID NOT KNOW OF THE INCIDENT AND THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHY HIS C/S HAD NOT ADDRESSED THE SUBJ, AS HE (NYUNIN) DID NOT

COMMENTS: IT APPEARED THAT CHIEF SERB WANTED TO SIMPLY DELIVER THE LETTER AND NOT GET INVOLVED IN ANY DISCUSSION. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SMLM DEP INTO THE MATTER APPEARED TO CATCH CHIEF SERB BY COMPLETE SURPRISE. I DOUBT THAT ACTING CHIEF SMLM INFORMED HIS C/S ABOUT HIS TRANSGRESSIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT C/S PROTEST THINKING THAT SINCE IT WAS ORAL IT WAS LOW KEY AND NOTHING MORE WOULD BE SAID. I WOULD SUSPECT THAT IN THE PERIOD OF THE CINC-CINC MEETING AND ITS IMMEDIATE WAKE (8 SEPT) GSFG PROBABLY ORDERED ITS PERSONNEL TO AVOID PRA TRAVEL. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT COL SEMIN EITHER DISREGARDED THIS ORDER OR EVEN POSSIBLY GOT LOST AND DARED NOT REPORT THE PROTEST TO HIS C/S. CHIEF USMLM WAS FORTUNATE TO HAVE THE SOVIET PRA VIOLATION AND NEAR RUN DOWN OF US PERSONNEL TO USE IN CONTRASTING THE ACTIONS OF THE TWO SIDES IN THE TWO INCIDENTS. IT IS INTERESTING THAT IT DIDN'T TAKE THE SOVIETS LONG TO LAUNCH A COUNTER PROTEST ONCE THEY FOUND OUT WHO IT WAS THEY WERE FIRING AT AND THAT THE US HAD PROTESTED. I DOUBT THAT THEY WOULD HAVE REACTED SO QUICKLY AND SO STRONGLY IF C/S, GSFG HAD KNOWN ABOUT THE OTHER SMLM INCIDENT. IT MIGHT BE INTERESTING TO WATCH COL SEMIN IN THE FUTURE, IF HE IS THERE THAT LONG!

IT WAS INTERESTING TO OBSERVE LT YEGOROV AND LT COL SKURIKHIN

DURING THE VERBAL EXCHANGES. YEGOROV WAS QUITE SERIOUS AND SKURIKHIN KEPT HIS EYES ON CHIEF AND DEP CHIEF DURING DISCUSSION OF THE SHOOTING INCIDENT. HOWEVER, DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THE SOVIET PRA VIOLATION, YEGOROV HAD A HALF SMILE ON HIS FACE, WHILE SKURIKHIN KEPT HIS EYES LOWERED AND DIDN'T LOOK AT THE CHIEF OR DEP CHIEF USMLM. ALSO OF INTEREST IS COL NYUNIN'S INSISTENCE THAT THE SHOOTING TOOK PLACE AT 1720 HRS WHERE AS IT ACTUALLY OCCURED AT 1620 HRS. HE REFUSED TO BE CORRECTED ON THE MATTER.

C. LETTER OF APPRECIATION FOR MUSEUM VISIT. CHIEF USMLM HANDED CHIEF SERB A LETTER EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED THE USMLM OFFICERS ON 17 SEP 73 TO VISIT THE GSFG MUSEUM AT KARLSHORST AND FOR THE LUNCHEON WHICH FOLLOWED IT. CHIEF SERB ACCEPTED THE LETTER GRACIOUSLY.

D. EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR COURTESY AT CROSSING POINT. CHIEF USMLM EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE FLOWERS AT THE HIRSCHBERG CHECKPOINT. CHIEF SERB SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT ANY FLOWERS. CHIEF USMLM INFORMED HIM THAT THE COMMANDANT, A FRIENDLY LTC, HAD APPEARED AT THE CROSSING POINT WITH A LARGE BOQUET OF RED CARNATIONS WHICH HE HAD PRESENTED TO THE CHIEFS WIFE. CHIEF SERB ONCE AGAIN SAID THAT HE KNEW NOTHING ABOUT THAT AND THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY DONE AT THE

PERSONAL INITIATIVE OF THE COMMANDANT. CHIEF USMLM SAID THAT IT WAS A VERY KIND GESTURE AND HE WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING THE WORD PASSED TO THE SOVIET OFFICER. CHIEF SERB SAID HE WOULD DO THAT.

E. PASS EXCHANGES. CHIEF USMLM ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED THE ACCREDITATION FOR MAJOR GUILER IN RETURN FOR THAT OF SGT CORBETT WHO HAD DEPARTED SUDDENLY ON EMERGENCY LEAVE. HE THEN INQUIRED REGARDING ANOTHER DRIVER PASS CHANGE AND REQUESTED THAT IT BE EXPEDITED. NO PROMISE WAS MADE.

F. MISSING EG EMPLOYEES. CHIEF USMLM REMINDED CHIEF SERB THAT HE HAD BEEN LONG AWAITING THE COOKS HELPER, NEEDED A REPLACEMENT FOR HERR MATHIS WHO RECENTLY DIED, AND NOW WOULD NEED A SECOND MALE FIREMAN FOR HERR BERGMAN WHO WAS LEAVING FOR ANOTHER JOB NEXT WEEK. CHIEF SERB SAID THAT HE WAS WORKING ON THE PROBLEM. CHIEF USMLM REMINDED HIM THAT THE WEATHER WAS GETTING COLDER EACH WEEK AND HE NEEDED THE FIREMAN TO KEEP THE HOUSE WARM. CHIEF USMLM POINTED OUT THAT SMLM HAD 11 EMPLOYEES (4 COOKS, 4 KITCHEN HELPERS, 2 MAIDS AND A HANDYMAN) WHEREAS USMLM HAD ONLY 7 EMPLOYEES.

CHIEF USMLM SAID THAT AS LONG AS HE WAS TALKING ABOUT SMLM, HE MIGHT MENTION THE FACT THAT CAPT NOSKOV HAD BEEN REQUESTED TO GIVE THE NUMBER OF THE CAR CROSSING AT W-h AND HE HAD REPLIED THAT THAT WASN'T NECESSARY. CHIEF USMLM COULDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS NECESSARY FOR

FOR HIM TO PROVIDE THE SAME INFORMATION ALTHOUGH HE DID IT QUITE WILLINGLY AND ALSO COULDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY THE SOVIETS WERE SO UNWILLING TO FOLLOW THE DIRECTIONS FROM HIS HQS. CHIEF SERB SAID THAT CAPT NOSKOV WOULD BE COMING TO POTSDAM SOON AND THAT HE WOULD INSTRUCT HIM TO PROVIDE WHATEVER INFORMATION (CAR AND PASSENGERS) MIGHT BE REQUIRED OR DESIRED BY ACS TO ARRANGE THE CROSSING. COMMENT: THE SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS REQUIRED THE CAR NUMBER AND LIST OF OCCUPANTS TO MAKE THE OUTBOUND CROSSING AT W-H.

G. STATUS OF REQUEST FOR KITCHEN EQUIPMENT, MIRROR REPAIR, WALL REPAIR. CHIEF USMLM ASKED WHAT WAS THE STATUS OF THE KITCHEN UTENSILS WHICH WERE NEEDED. SERB INTERPRETER INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT THE REQUEST HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN AUGUST. CHIEF SERB SAID THAT HIS ASSISTANT (NOT SPECIFIED) WAS ON LEAVE BUT HE WOULD TAKE CARE OF IT SOON. REGARDING THE MIRROR, CHIEF SERB SAID THAT THE COMMANDANT HAD BEEN NOTIFIED AND INSTRUCTED TO REPAIR THE MIRROR AND NOTHING MORE COULD BE DONE. DEP CHIEF POINTED TO THE LETTER FROM C/S CSFG AND SUGGESTED THAT THE C/S SHOULD WRITE A LETTER TO THE COMMANDANT.

H. END OF MEETING. THE MEETING HAD BEEN CONDUCTED ENTIRELY THROUGH INTERPRETERS WITH CHIEF USMLM NOT SPEAKING A WORD OF RUSSIAN ONCE THE PROTEST LETTER WAS INTRODUCED. THE DEPARTURE AMENITIES WERE

SOMEWHAT COOLER THAN AT THE ARRIVAL.

4. ~~(C)~~ ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS JM A. THE SERD BUILDING IS BEING REPAINTED AND E SIGN IS MISSING FROM THE FRONT DOOR, WHICH IDENTIFIES IT AS A SOVIET BUILDING. D, IT IS UNCERAIN AT THIS STAGE OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS WHETHER THE SOVIETS DID NOT PROTEST IMMEDIATELY AS IS THEIR CUSTOM AND TO GAIN THE ADVANTAGE (RE: SHOOTING INCIDENT) BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T KNOW WHICH MISSION OR VEHICLE WAS INVOLVED OR BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT THAT THE US MIGHT NOT PROTEST AND AT THE PRESENT STAGE IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO LET THE MATTER DROP. C. I SUSPECT THAT THE WORD WILL GO OUT TO THE SOVIET SENTRIES AS A RESULT OF THIS INCIDENT TO AVOID FIRING AT THE MISSIONS. THE SOVIETS NEVER DID ADMIT THAT MORE THAN TWO WARNING SHOTS IN THE AIR WERE FIRED. POSSIBLY THE SOVIET SENTRY HAD THE WEAPON ON FULL AUTOMATIC BY MISTAKE AND DIDN'T WANT TO ADMIT IT, OR PROBABLY THE SOVIETS DID NOT WANT TO ADMIT THAT SUCH A LARGE NUMBER OF ROUNDS WERE FIRED IN SUCH A MANNER AT AN ALLY.

XGDS-(2)

BT

w726

NNNN

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

01 02 2971600 PP PP

CCCC

261325Z

OCT 73

NO

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 76509

By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GERMANY // AEAGB-C//

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY // ECJ2-R//

CALLIED CONTACT SEC FRANKFURT GERMANY

INFO AMEMB BONN GERMANY // POL MIL//

CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GERMANY // H//

CUSMLM BERLIN GERMANY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION COLL

SUBJECT: SHOOTING INCIDENT, 21 OCT 73 {U}

A. CINCUSAREUR MSG, AEAGB-C, 231643Z OCT 73, ~~SECRET~~ {C}.

1. ~~{C}~~ THE USE OF WEAPONS AGAINST USMLM TOURS (REF A) CANNOT BE
CONDONED, REGARDLESS OF CIRCUMSTANCES; THEREFORE, REQUEST CHIEF, ACS
MAKE THE FOLLOWING ORAL STATEMENT TO ACTING CHIEF, SMLM-F:

QUOTE: COL SEMIN, MY CHIEF OF STAFF WISHES THAT YOU PASS THE FOLLOW-
ING STATEMENT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS.

AT 0755 HOURS, 21 OCT 73, AT GUETERFELDE, TWO MEMBERS OF THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY LIAISON MISSION WERE FIRED ON BY AN EAST
GERMAN GUARD. FORTUNATELY, NEITHER THE PERSONNEL NOR THE VEHICLE
OF USMLM WERE HIT. THIS IS THE SECOND INCIDENT OF SHOOTING AT USMLM
PERSONNEL IN 35 DAYS AND INDICATES, ABOVE ALL, A COMPLETE LACK OF

SGS ✓
POLAD

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Sec 3.4 EO 12958

Declassify Downgrade to _____

Exempt 25X _____ Date _____

No Objection, Refer to ECOM

Date 9/6/07 By [Signature]

MANUEL LAMONICA, CPT, AEAGB-C (G0), HBC

WINTHROP WHIPPLE, LTC, GS,

ASST SGS, AEAGS, HM 6504

THE CINC APPROVED THIS MSG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

001 70 07 1001 73

080400

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

02 02 2971600 PP PP

CCCC

OCT 73

NO

RESPECT FOR HUMAN LIFE AND A TOTAL DISREGARD OF MY PROTEST OF 25 SEPTEMBER 1973. I WANT TO REITERATE THAT OUR COMMANDERS IN CHIEF AGREED THAT US AND SOVIET MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS SHOULD BE FREE TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR TASKS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ESTABLISHED AGREEMENTS. ACTS OF THIS NATURE COMPLETELY CONTRADICT THIS PRINCIPLE.


I VIGOROUSLY PROTEST THE ACTIONS OF THE EAST GERMAN PERSONNEL INVOLVED AND REQUEST THAT STEPS BE TAKEN TO INSURE THAT INCIDENTS OF THIS TYPE ARE NOT REPEATED. FURTHER, I HOLD THE GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES GERMANY RESPONSIBLE SHOULD ANY INJURY ACCRUE TO USMLM PERSONNEL OR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AS A RESULT OF UNDISCIPLINED, IRRESPONSIBLE ACTIONS OF THE EAST GERMANS. UNQUOTE.

2. ~~IT~~ REQUEST CHIEF, ACS INFORM THIS OFFICE WHEN THE PROTEST HAS BEEN DELIVERED. "XGDS-2" DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

AEAGB-C{60}

WW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CC NR
3590

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 76509
By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

ACTION COLL

VZCZCNPFA724

OTTTCZYUW UUFYTB0444 1961325-CCCC--UUFYTB.

ZNY CCCCC

OTTTCZYUW RUFLEVB5019 1961325-CCCC--RUFYTSWA.

ZNY CCCCC

O 141320Z JUL 72

M CHIEF USMLM BERLIN GER//AEUS-MLM//

TO ZEN/ODCSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG GER//AEAGB-C//

INFO RUFTSWA/CINCUSAFE LINDSEY AS GER//INC//

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Sec 3.4 EO 12958
 Declassify Downgrade to _____
 Exempt 25X _____ Date _____
 No Objection, Refer to EO 12958
Date 9/6/07 By JW

SUBJECT: SHOOTING INCIDENT INVOLVING USMLM TOUR (C)

1. ~~(C)~~ AT APPROXIMATELY 121615 JULY A USMLM TOUR CONSISTING OF MAJOR HANSEN AND SGT KRUTZ IN USMLM VEHICLE "26 WAS FIRED AT BY A SOVIET SOLDIER AT THE REINSDORF AUXILIARY AIRFIELD INNER MARKER BEACON AT UT784515. THE TRACER ROUND WAS OBSERVED PASSING 10-15 FEET IN FRONT OF THE TOUR CAR, NEITHER THE VEHICLE NOR ITS OCCUPANTS WERE HIT. THE TOUR DEPARTED THE AREA IMMEDIATELY AND RETURNED TO THE POTSDAM AREA. NO FURTHER DIFFICULTY WAS ENCOUNTERED DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE TOUR. NO MENTION OF THE INCIDENT HAS YET BEEN MADE BY SERB TO USMLM.

2. ~~(C)~~ CIRCUMSTANCES:

A. ON 12-13 JULY THE TOUR WAS DISPATCHED TO COVER THE POTSDAM LOCAL AREA AND TO MAKE A QUICK TRIP TO REINSDORF AUXILIARY AIRFIELD TO OBTAIN PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF A DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT FROM

PAGE 2 RUFLEVB5019 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

JUTERBOG TO REINSDORF.

B. THE TOUR COMMENCED COVERAGE OF THE POTSDAM AREA AT 121230 JULY. AT 121430 THE TOUR DEPARTED THE LOCAL AREA AND ARRIVED AT REINSDORF (UT759516) AT 1600 HOURS. TOUR PHOTOGRAPHED THE AIRCRAFT AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ON THE AIRFIELD AND THEN PROCEEDED TO CHECK THE LANDING APPROACH MARKER BEACONS.

C. AFTER PHOTOGRAPHING THE INNER MARKER BEACON TOUR PROCEEDED PAST THE BEACON TRAVELING TO THE NORTH. AS TOUR PASSED THE BEACON A SOVIET SOLDIER WAS OBSERVED ATTEMPTING TO PUT A CLIP INTO HIS AK-47. TOUR ACCELERATED AND WAS PAST THE SITE WHEN A SHOT WAS FIRED. TOUR THEN RETURNED VIA THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS ROUTE TO THE POTSDAM LOCAL AREA AND CONTINUED ITS COVERAGE OF THE LOCAL AREA AT 1800 HOURS. TOUR RETURNED TO BERLIN AT 131430 JULY 72.

3. ~~(C)~~ COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: I DO NOT PLAN OR RECOMMEND ANY PROTEST ON THIS INCIDENT AT THIS TIME. IF THE SOVIETS SHOULD BRING IT UP I WOULD THEN PROTEST MOST VIGOROUSLY. THE REASON FOR THE DELAY WOULD OSTENSIBLY BE THE TIME TO COMPLETE A FULL INVESTIGATION. HOWEVER, I DO NOT FEEL THAT A PROTEST WOULD GAIN USMLM ANYTHING EXCEPT TO ASSUAGE OUR WOUNDED PRIDE AND HOPEFULLY EMBARRASS THE SOVIETS AND CAUSE THEM TO WARN THEIR SOLDIERS ABOUT SHOOTING AT ALLIED MISSIONS. I FEAR IT WOULD

PAGE 3 RUFLEVB5019 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

ALSO BRING A DEMAND FOR AN EXPLANATION AS TO WHAT WE WERE DOING BEHIND

320



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE and SEVENTH ARMY
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
APO 09403

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 76509

By BKT/NC on 29 May 2013

8 November 1973

Dear General Ivanovski:

I recall that during my recent visit to your headquarters in September of this year, we reaffirmed the desirability of maintaining harmonious relations between our commands. We also agreed that our respective missions should be free to pursue their assigned tasks under the provisions of established agreements.

It is with regret that I must invite your attention to a series of three incidents within a period of 42 days which appear to be in direct violation of our understanding.

On 16 September 1973 a Soviet guard fired at a United States Military Liaison Mission vehicle near Wittstock. My Chief of Staff protested the incident and received the reply that the Soviet guard had acted "strictly according to regulations." I am sure your regulations do not direct sentries to shoot at obviously unarmed personnel.


On 21 October 1973 an East German guard fired two shots at a United States Military Liaison Mission vehicle in Gueterfelde. Fortunately, neither the personnel nor the vehicles were hit in either of these two incidents.

At 0630 hours on 28 October 1973, an East German guard fired several bursts from his automatic weapon at a United States Military Liaison Mission vehicle within the city of Leipzig. One round hit the vehicle and traveled into the car striking the boot of the driver. Fortunately, the driver was not hurt. I have attached some photographs and am prepared to have the vehicle made available for your personal inspection should you desire this.

Such irresponsible acts cannot be condoned. The risks in terms of human life are obvious. The need to maintain good will between our commands is too vital to permit individual soldiers to act so irresponsibly and use firearms against liaison personnel based upon that individual soldier's interpretation of what are or are not the established rules of conduct for the military liaison missions. Every step possible has been taken to ensure that your liaison mission in Frankfurt has not been fired at when they have been in violation of established rules. I am sure that you will take the appropriate steps and assure me that the same will be done for my mission.

I regret these incidents have served to mar the excellent relations between us and I am convinced the measures you will take, will serve to restore these relations to their proper, excellent level.

Respectfully,



MICHAEL S. DAVISON
General, USA
Commander in Chief

General of the Army Y. Ivanovski
Commander in Chief
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany