There is a tendency to assume that, under certain circumstances, lying is morally justifiable. There are numerous logical and philosophical arguments, which claim to have objective validity, point out that a world where only truth exists would be unbearable. This brings, as a necessary consequence, the relativization of the importance of truth and its function of being the pillar mode of the moral principle of honesty, turning truthful discourse into a tool, as usable as lying for pragmatic matters that are sometimes disguised as moral. Frankly in disagreement with such positions, this essay aims to present a detailed counter argument, claiming that lying is always immoral.

Before addressing the morality of lying, one must start with an account of what constitutes a lie. This is important in order for one to see which speech acts fall under the condemnation of lying and which do not. Just as an incorrect definition of murder may free the guilty (or unjustly condemn the innocent), so too an incorrect definition of lying has moral implications. There has been much discussion in the literature in the last few decades concerning what constitutes a lie. Many different definitions have been proposed. For the sake of greater clarity, I begin with a broad division of definitions of lying into what I call the moral and non-moral definitions of lying (each of which has further subdivisions). The moral definitions of lying include moral terms such as “right,” “undue,” “unreasonable,” or “wrong” within the definition. Non-moral definitions, by contrast, include no moral terms either explicitly or implicitly. Non-moral definitions are overwhelmingly the more widely accepted view, both among philosophers and the common man. Nevertheless, it is important to treat the moral definitions, which would, if correct, have a significant impact on the debate over the morality of lying.

What happens when we lie? What do we lie for? Are we always aware of it? Can we define its nature once and for all? Since the beginning of history, human beings have tried to define and interpret lying according to criteria provided to them by changing cultural environments and worldviews, so to give this phenomenon a definite place in their existence. All domains of human knowledge – from mythmaking to philosophy, from theology to neuroscience, from art to linguistics – have been involved. This special issue of Linguæ & aims to contribute to this multi- and interdisciplinary discourse by proposing a common core of insights on lying through contributions from the humanities and psychology.

There is a tendency to assume that, under certain circumstances, lying is morally justifiable. There are numerous logical and philosophical arguments, which claim to have objective validity, point out that a world where only truth exists would be unbearable. This brings, as a necessary consequence, the relativization of the importance of truth and its function of being the pillar mode of the moral principle of honesty, turning truthful discourse into a tool, as usable as lying for pragmatic matters that are sometimes disguised as moral. Frankly in disagreement with such positions, this essay aims to present a detailed counter argument, claiming that lying is always immoral.

The ability to detect lies and tell lies is a critical addition to the arsenal of tools police have against the criminal element. Whether performing roles in Witness Protection, Child Protection, Counter Terrorism, front line uniform policing, or undercover roles to integrate with criminal syndicates, our ability to be a convincing liar or detect lies in others is vital in the policing world. Yet police have been shown to overestimate their skills in lie detection and underestimate their skills in lying.