Open access
Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe (Eds.)
THE SHIFTING
BOUNDARIES
OF PREJUDICE
Antisemitism and Islamophobia
in Contemporary Norway
The Shifting Boundaries of Prejudice
Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe (Eds.)
The Shifting Boundaries of
Prejudice
Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Contemporary Norway
Scandinavian University Press (Universitetsforlaget AS)
© Copyright 2020
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legalcode.
ISBN printed edition (print on demand): 978-82-15-03467-6
ISBN electronic pdf-edition: 978-82-15-03468-3
DOI: 10.18261/978-82-15-03468-3-2019
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Contents
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe
1.
A FADING CONSENSUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
Public Debates on Antisemitism in Norway, 1960 vs. 1983
Christhard Hoffmann
2.
THE GAARDER DEBATE REVISITED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
51
Drawing the Demarcation Line between Legitimate and Illegitimate
Criticism of Israel
Claudia Lenz and Theodor Vestavik Geelmuyden
3.
A GROWING CONSENSUS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
76
A History of Public Debates on Islamophobia in Norway
Cora Alexa Døving
4.
ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A Survey Analysis of Prevalence, Trends and Possible Causes of Negative
Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims
Ottar Hellevik
5.
COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM . . . . . . . . . 155
An “Elastic View” of Antisemitism
Werner Bergmann
6.
CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY . . . . . . . . 187
Asbjørn Dyrendal
6
CONTENTS | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
7.
HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER? . . . 211
Between Prejudice and the Willingness to Cooperate
Werner Bergmann
8.
“MUSLIMS ARE…” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
Contextualising Survey Answers
Cora Alexa Døving
9.
HOW PEOPLE EXPLAIN ANTISEMITISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
Interpretation of Survey Answers
Vibeke Moe
10.
NEGOTIATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN GROUP
CONVERSATIONS AMONG JEWS AND MUSLIMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
Claudia Lenz and Vibeke Moe
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
DOI: 10.18261/978-82-15-03468-3-2019-01
Introduction
CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN AND VIBEKE MOE
In present-day Europe, antisemitism has again become an issue of public concern.
According to a recent survey, 28 per cent of European Jews experienced antiJewish harassment over the last year and close to 40 per cent have considered emigration during the last five years because of rising anti-Jewish hostilities.1 The
new threat for Jews in Europe is often attributed to antisemitic attitudes among
Muslim immigrants. At the same time, Islamophobic ideas have gained ground in
Europe as a political tool and have become an integral part of an ideological
worldview, particularly on the far right of the political spectrum. Intensified by
deeply divided opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this constellation has
framed a view of antisemitism and Islamophobia as essentially different.2
The present volume challenges this view. Based on varied and comprehensive
survey data about attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway, it provides a
more differentiated picture. While the empirical evidence shows that Muslims in
Norway support stereotypical ideas about Jews to a greater extent than the general
population, and that opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are connected to
attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in opposite directions, it also indicates that
antisemitism and Islamophobia are closely related phenomena, and are linked to
xenophobic ideas in the general population. The minorities’ experiences of discrimination show that Jews and Muslims share a number of the same problems
associated with being minorities in Norway, and therefore see a possibility to
cooperate on combating prejudice and discrimination.
1. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism. Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018), 12.
2. As James Renton and Ben Gidley have observed, this view is often influenced by the present
political situation, “in which the figures of the persecuted Jew and the political Muslim are on
opposite sides of a war waged by the West.” James Renton and Ben Gidley, eds., Antisemitism
and Islamophobia in Europe. A Shared Story? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 4. On the
problems of comparing Islamophobia and antisemitism, see Brian Klug, “The limits of analogy:
Comparing Islamophobia and antisemitism”, Patterns of Prejudice 48:5 (2014): 442–459;
Gideon Botsch, Olaf Glöckner, Christoph Kopke, Michael Spieker, eds., Islamophobie und Antisemitismus – ein umstrittener Vergleich (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2012).
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.
8
CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN AND VIBEKE MOE | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
Part of the public debate on both antisemitism and Islamophobia has been concerned with the definition of the terms themselves. The term “antisemitism” was
coined in 1879 in Germany as the brand name of a socio-political movement that
attributed negative traits of modern society to “Jewish influence”, combining social
criticism with ideas of race and unifying under the slogan “Fight against Jewish
domination!” Although the term was a misnomer (since there is no such thing as
“Semitism” and the movement was not directed against “Semites” in general), it
gained currency and is today used as a generic term to denote all forms of Jew-hatred
throughout history. While there is a general consensus that “antisemitism” means
hostility towards and discrimination against Jews as “Jews” (as defined in the antisemitic worldview), it has been controversial whether hostility toward Zionism
(anti-Zionism) and the State of Israel (anti-Israelism) is principally to be classified
as a form of Jew-hatred (“new antisemitism”) or not.3 In the present volume and the
surveys it is based on, attitudes towards Jews have been researched separately from
attitudes towards the state of Israel. This is done for methodological reasons – in
order to explore correlations and differences between the two phenomena.
The term “Islamophobia” goes back to the early twentieth century, and was used
more frequently in the 1980s and 1990s. It gained prominence in 1997 with the
publication of the report Islamophobia – A Challenge for Us All by the Runnymede Trust, which described the word as “a useful shorthand way of referring to
dread or hatred of Islam – and therefore, to fear and dislike of all or most Muslims.”4 While the term took root in Western societies after that, its definition and
public use have been the object of controversial debate both within politics and in
academia. Critics found the concept imprecise because it blends together divergent phenomena, such as criticism of Islam as a faith, and negative stereotypes
about Muslims. In the academic study of Islamophobia, more precise definitions
have been developed in recent years.5 The present volume perceives of Islamophobia as an ideology that attributes inherently negative traits to Muslims solely
by virtue of being Muslim. Islamophobia is thus perceived as a form of racism.6
3. On the question of defining antisemitism, see Kenneth Marcus, The Definition of Anti-Semitism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). On debates in the Norwegian public about the definition of antisemitism, see chapters 1 and 2 in the present volume.
4. Islamophobia – A Challenge for Us All (London: The Runnymede Trust, 1997), 1.
5. See, for example, Erich Bleich, “What is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing
and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept”, American Behavioral Scientist 55:12
(2011): 1581–1600.
6. This understanding corresponds with the most recent definition by the Runnymede Trust: “Islamophobia is a form of racism.” Farah Elahi and Omar Khan, Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for
Us All (London: Runnymede Trust, 2017), 1.
INTRODUCTION
Furthermore, Islamophobia is understood as widespread prejudice, acts and practices that attack, exclude or discriminate against people on the ground that they are
– or are assumed to be – Muslim.7
The research presented in this volume is based on a rich and unique set of quantitative and qualitative data: two population surveys about Norwegian attitudes
towards Jews (2011) and towards Jews and Muslims (2017), and, in addition, separate surveys among Norwegian Jews and Muslims about their experiences as minorities in Norway and about attitudes towards the respective other minority (2017).8
By applying the same questionnaire over time (2011 and 2017) and to different samples of respondents at the same time (2017), the quantitative data allow for the study
of trends in attitudes and for direct comparisons between different samples. In presenting a comprehensive survey analysis, the volume aims at providing innovative
perspectives for the study of attitudes towards minorities in general.
Our approach is specifically informed by the assumption that attitudes are formed
within certain communicative contexts and that quantitative studies therefore need
to be supplemented with qualitative research, exploring the historical and societal
framework conditions of attitudes towards and among minorities. In particular, the
discursively constructed boundaries of “what can be said or not be said” about Jews
and Muslims need to be analysed. This is conceptualised in our volume as “communication latency”, a concept that was first introduced into the study of contemporary
antisemitism by sociologists Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb in 1986 and has
since been influential.9 Applied to the history of antisemitism in West Germany, the
7. John Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin, eds., Islamophobia: The challenge of pluralism in the 21st
century (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2. For a further discussion of
Islamophobia and the relation to racism, see chapter 8 in the present volume.
8. Christhard Hoffmann, Øivind Kopperud and Vibeke Moe, eds., Antisemitism in Norway? The Attitudes of the Norwegian Population towards Jews and other Minorities (Oslo: Center for Studies
of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, 2012); Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway 2017. Population Survey and Minority Study (Oslo:
Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, 2017). The center has changed its name
since the publication of the reports, to “Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies”.
9. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, “Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung.
Theoretische Überlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, Kölner
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 38 (1986): 223–246. On the significance of the
concept of communication latency for the research on antisemitism, see Jan Weyand, “Das Konzept der Kommunikationslatenz und der Fortschritt in der soziologischen Antisemitismusforschung”, Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 26 (2017): 36–58. On its relevance for
empirical research of antisemitic attitudes, see Heiko Beyer and Ivar Krumpal, “The Communication Latency of Antisemitic Attitudes: An Experimental Study”, in Global antisemitism. A
Crisis of Modernity, ed. Charles Asher Small (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 83–96.
9
10
CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN AND VIBEKE MOE | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
concept explained why antisemitic attitudes, which were still widespread in the
German population after 1945, could not be communicated publicly under the new
political conditions. They were not acceptable in a democratic state that was eager
to integrate into the Western alliance. Increasingly ostracised by the public, antisemitic prejudices could only be expressed in the private sphere or in marginal
extremist groups. Drawing a clear dividing line between psychological latency
(Bewusstseinslatenz) and communication latency, Bergmann and Erb turned scholarly attention away from the psyche of the antisemites and towards the study of public communication and its norms.10 Consequently, language, semantics, political
culture and public conflicts became major focuses for the growing field of antisemitism studies (Antisemitismusforschung). It reconstructed the mechanisms by
which the boundaries of prejudice were established, transformed and contested.11
Our study has been influenced by these developments within the field of
research on antisemitism. Through discourse analysis of public debates in the
period from 1960 to present-day Norway and in-depth analysis of three sets of
qualitative data from the survey in 2017, the book explores how these boundaries
are established and negotiated in different social contexts. Are they equally effective towards expressions of Islamophobia as towards expressions of antisemitism?
What is the connection between attitudes towards Israel and attitudes towards
Jews? How are attitudes towards Jews and Muslims expressed, distributed and
regulated? Is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict relevant for the attitudes and the relationship between the minorities? By investigating these questions, the book aims
at providing new knowledge about the prevalence and social acceptance of antisemitic and Islamophobic attitudes in contemporary Norway.
Antisemitism and Islamophobia have been subject to comprehensive previous
research. While numerous surveys have been conducted on antisemitism after the
Holocaust, particularly in the European context, there also has been an increase in
research and monitoring of Islamophobia in recent years.12 The surveys include
10. On the differences between social psychology and cultural science approaches in the study of
antisemitism, see Jan Weyand, Historische Wissenssoziologie des modernen Antisemitismus.
Genese und Typologie einer Wissensformation am Beispiel des deutschsprachigen Diskurses
(Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016), 24–44.
11. For a good example of this approach, see Werner Bergmann, Antisemitismus in öffentlichen
Konflikten. Kollektives Lernen in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik, 1949–1989
(Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 1997).
12. Some recent studies on antisemitism include: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
(FRA), Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU Member States: experiences and
perceptions of antisemitism (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013);
the follow-up survey five years later: Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism (Luxembourg:
INTRODUCTION
comparative studies of attitudes and experiences. However, in combining different
sets of data and different (quantitative and qualitative) approaches, the current volume represents something new. Few prior studies focus specifically on antisemitism among Muslims or include Jewish views of Muslims.13 A relevant previous
study on the subject of Muslim antisemitism was conducted by Günther Jikeli.14
By focusing on negative attitudes, however, his analysis does not include the
broader context of Muslim-Jewish relations.
A relevant context for the present volume is also provided by the body of
research that includes historical perspectives on antisemitism and Islamophobia.15
This research has pointed to some characteristics of contemporary antisemitism
that are part of the discussion in the present volume. More specifically, the book
is a contribution to present-day scholarly and public debates about the “new antisemitism” in Europe, which is mostly expressed as hostility towards Israel and
often attributed to left-wing anti-Zionists and Muslim immigrants.16 For the first
13.
14.
15.
16.
Publications Office of the European Union, 2018); the yearly overviews of the situation in the EU,
also from the FRA, Antisemitism. Overview of data available in the European Union 2004–
2014/2005–2015/2006–2016/2007–2017 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European
Union, 2015/2016/2017/2018); FRA, Young Jewish Europeans: Perceptions and experiences of
antisemitism (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019); Daniel L. Staetsky,
Antisemitism in Contemporary Great Britain: A Study of Attitudes Towards Jews and Israel (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2017); Antisemitism Worldwide. General Analysis (Tel
Aviv: Kantor Center for the Study of Contemporary European Jewry, 2009–2018); ADL Global
100 (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2014/2015). Some recent studies on Islamophobia
include: FRA, Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey – Muslims Selected
Findings (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2017), and Eines Bayrakli
and Farid Hafez, eds., European Islamophobia Report 2015/2016/2017, Istanbul: SETA, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, 2016/2017/2018. See also the database accessible from the FRA that provides an overview of hate crime, hate speech and discrimination against
Muslims in the EU from 2012 to 2017: https://fra.europa.eu/en/databases/anti-muslim-hatred/.
A survey review has been conducted by Günther Jikeli, see, Antisemitic Attitudes among Muslims in Europe: A Survey Review (ISGAP Occasional Paper Series, 2015).
Günther Jikeli, European Muslim Antisemitism. Why Young Urban Males Say They Don’t Like
the Jews (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015).
See, for example, Renton and Gidley, eds., Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Europe; Matti
Bunzl, Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds old and new in Europe (Chicago: Prickly
Paradigm Press, 2007). The former is primarily a historical analysis while the latter is an
interpretation of ideological similarities and differences between the two prejudices. See also
Mikael Shainkman, ed., Antisemitism Today and Tomorrow: Global Perspectives on the Many
Faces of Contemporary Antisemitism (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2018).
On the scholarly debate on the “new antisemitism”, see most recently Christian Heilbronn,
Doron Rabinovici and Nathan Szaider, eds., Neuer Antisemitismus. Fortsetzung einer globalen
Debatte (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2019).
11
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CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN AND VIBEKE MOE | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
time, our book provides a comprehensive analysis of Norwegian Muslims’ attitudes towards Jews and compares these with the attitudes of the general Norwegian population. In addition, the book is a contribution to the study of Islamophobia. It presents a comprehensive analysis of the population’s (and Norwegian
Jews’) attitudes towards Muslims. Moreover, it includes information about the
experiences of Jews and Muslims as minorities in Norway. This approach, combining quantitative and qualitative data from different perspectives, has not been
applied in previous research (where antisemitism and Islamophobia are typically
studied separately) and will, we believe, be of general methodological interest to
national and international scholars in the field.
THE NORWEGIAN SURVEYS (CHM 2011 AND CHM 2017)
The two quantitative surveys at the core of the present volume were conducted by
the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies in 2011 and 2017. The
surveys were commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Children, Equality and
Social Inclusion and funded by five ministries of the Norwegian government. The
surveys were conducted among representative samples of the population (N=1,522
in 2011 and 1,575 in 2017). The two minority samples in the survey from 2017
consisted of self-identified Muslims with an immigrant background (N=586) and
members of the Jewish communities in Oslo and Trondheim (N=162). The survey
of the Muslim respondents was limited to immigrants with a minimum of five
years’ residence in Norway and Norwegian-born citizens with immigrant parents.
The respondents’ country backgrounds represented the key countries of origin for
Muslims in Norway. While the Muslim sample is representative for the immigrant
population in terms of geographical distribution, gender and age, the question of
representability is difficult to assess for the Jewish sample as there exists no comparable data on the Jewish population in Norway.17 Another variable known to
impact the prevalence of negative attitudes is level of education. The education
level among the respondents in the population samples in 2011 and 2017 was representative for the general population. There is a lack of reliable data on the level
of education in the immigrant population in Norway. However, in 2017, the level
was equal in the Muslim sample as in the population sample, with one third of the
respondents having a high level (up to four years of university/university college
education or higher). It was significantly higher in the Jewish sample, with three
17. For a discussion of the representativity of the two minority samples, see chapter 7 in the present
volume.
INTRODUCTION
quarters of the respondents having a high level of education. This difference has
to be kept in mind when interpreting some of the results.18
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND RELEVANCE OF THE NORWEGIAN
EXAMPLE IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The first mentions of individual Jews in Norway can be traced to the 1600s and the
so-called Portuguese Jews (Sephardim).19 Jews had limited access to Norway at the
time. Further limitation was introduced in 1687 in the law by Christian V, which
banned Jews from entering the country without special permission. The inclusion
of the prohibition against Jews, Jesuits and monastic orders seemed an anomaly in
the Norwegian constitution of 1814, which was considered one of the most liberal
constitutions of its time. The fact that the exclusion was explicitly written into the
constitution represented a significant tightening-up compared to the traditional
practice that had allowed for exceptions by issuing temporary travel and residence
permits (letters of safe conduct) for Jews.20 The clause against Jews was lifted in
1851, but immigration after that was slow and limited. It took forty years before the
first Jewish community was established in Oslo, in 1892. Pogroms in Russia in the
early twentieth century increased the number of Jewish immigrants. By the outbreak of World War II, approximately 2,100 Jews lived in Norway.
Antisemitism was evident in Norwegian pre-war society, both on the level of popular attitudes, cultural expressions and among the authorities, but there was no organised antisemitism comparable to that found in other European countries at the time.21
18. For more details on the methodology in the survey from 2017, see Hoffmann and Moe, eds.,
Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims, 20–27. The methodology of the survey from 2011 is described in Hoffmann, Kopperud and Moe, eds., Antisemitism in Norway? 17–19.
19. The history of the Jewish minority in Norway is described in Oskar Mendelsohn, Jødenes historie i
Norge gjennom 300 år. 2 vols. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969 and 1986). New Edition (Oslo: Press
forlag, 2019). For a study of the first Jewish immigrants’ geographical and socio-economical position
in Norwegian society between 1851 and 1945, see Martha Gjernes, Jødar i Kristiania: dei fyrste
innvandrarane si geografiske og sosioøkonomiske plassering i samfunnet frå 1851 til 1942
(Master’s thesis, University of Oslo, 2002).
20. Christhard Hoffmann. ed., The Exclusion of Jews in the Norwegian Constitution of 1814. Origins, Contexts, Consequences (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2016), 14; Håkon Harket, Paragrafen:
Eidsvoll 1814 (Oslo: Dreyer Forlag, 2014); Frode Ulvund, Fridomens grenser 1814–1851.
Handhevinga av den norske “jødeparagrafen.” (Oslo: Scandinavian Academic Press, 2014).
21. For the status of historical research on antisemitism in Norway, see Christhard Hoffmann, “A Marginal Phenomenon? Historical Research on Antisemitism in Norway, 1814–1945”, in Antisemitism in the North: History and State of Research, ed. Jonathan Adams and Cordelia Hess (Berlin
and Boston: De Gruyter, 2020), 155–171; Kjetil B. Simonsen, “Norwegian Antisemitism After
1945: Current Knowledge”, in Antisemitism in the North, 173–190. For an analysis of cultural
13
14
CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN AND VIBEKE MOE | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
Significant historical incidents such as World War I, the Russian Revolution and
the economic crisis of the 1920s and 1930s contributed to an increase in expressions of antisemitism and to the establishment of exclusionist antisemitic practices
in Norway that proved effective in the prohibition of kosher slaughter in 1929, the
rejection of Jewish refugees in the 1930s, and the collaboration in the arrests and
expropriation of Norwegian Jews under German occupation. Antisemitism was
also part of the political platform of the Nazi party, Nasjonal Samling, founded in
1933; however, the party had marginal support.
The German occupation of Norway on 9 April 1940 had immediate consequences
for the Jewish population.22 The two Jewish communities in Oslo and Trondheim
were ordered to produce lists of members, and radios were confiscated. There were
also sporadic antisemitic campaigns against Jewish shops, though they were soon
stopped by the Nazi authorities to avoid public concern. Systematic registration of all
Jews started in January 1942. In March, Vidkun Quisling, the appointed Minister President in the pro-Nazi puppet government, reintroduced the “Jewish clause” from the
1814 constitution. On 26 October 1942, all Jewish men were arrested and Jewish
assets were liquidated. One month later followed the arrest of women and children.
Approximately 1,000 Jews fled to Sweden during the war to escape the persecution.
A total of 773 Jews – one third of the population – were deported from Norway during
the Holocaust, almost all to Auschwitz-Birkenau. Only 38 of those deported survived
the genocide; 230 families were eliminated entirely. Today, the Jewish community in
Norway is still small in a European context, consisting of an estimated 1,500 people.23
expressions of antisemitism in the Norwegian interwar period, see Lars Lien, “‘...pressen kan kun
skrive ondt om jøderne.’ Jøden som kulturell konstruksjon i norsk dags- og vittighetspresse 1905–
1925”, (PhD diss., University of Oslo, 2016); Kjetil B. Simonsen,“‘Den store jødebevægelse.’Antisemittiske bilder av jøden i bondeavisene Nationen og Namdalen, 1920–25”, (Master’s
thesis, University of Oslo, 2009); Vibeke Moe and Øivind Kopperud, eds., Forestillinger om jøder
– aspekter ved konstruksjonen av en minoritet 1814–1940 (Oslo: Unipub, 2011).
22. The most comprehensive study of the history of the Holocaust in Norway is Bjarte Bruland,
Holocaust i Norge. Registrering, Deportasjon, Tilintetgjørelse (Oslo: Dreyer, 2017). On the history of antisemitism and the Holocaust in Norway, see also Per Ole Johansen, Oss selv nærmest.
Norge og jødene 1914–1943 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1984); Terje Emberland, “Antisemittismen i
Norge 1900–1940”, in Trond Berg Eriksen, Håkon Harket and Einhart Lorenz, Jødehat. Antisemittismens historie fra antikken til i dag (Oslo: Damm, 2005), 401–420; Andreas Snildal, “An
Anti-Semitic Slaughter Law? The Origins of the Norwegian Prohibition of Jewish Religious
Slaughter c. 1890–1930” (PhD diss., University of Oslo, 2014).
23. According to Statistic Norway, there were 789 members of the Jewish congregations in 2018 and
166 861 members in Islamic congregations. However, not all those identifying as Jews or Muslims
are members of congregations, and the exact size of these populations in Norway is unknown. See,
https://www.ssb.no/kultur-og-fritid/statistikker/trosamf. Accessed on May 15 2019.
INTRODUCTION
There are few registered incidents of antisemitic hate crime in present-day
Norway.24 Similar to the situation in other countries, antisemitic expressions in
the Norwegian public are primarily found on the internet. Cases of public antisemitic expressions have been more visible in connection to anti-Israel demonstrations.25 In 2006, shots were fired at the synagogue in Oslo; the Norwegian
Islamist Arfan Bhatti was later convicted of the shooting.
The international relevance of Norway with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is primarily linked to the Oslo Accords, the set of agreements signed in
1993 and 1995 between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation
Organisation (PLO). Norwegian attitudes towards Israel have undergone a significant change since the first decades after 1948, when the relationship to Israel was
very positive and close.26 Particularly in the years following the Israeli invasion
of Lebanon in 1982, a predominantly negative view towards Israel emerged. At
the time of the first population survey in 2011, Norway was accused by some critics of being a country with relatively widespread negative attitudes towards Jews
based on anti-Israel views.27 The two population surveys showed a link between
anti-Israel attitudes and antisemitism, though the majority of respondents were
critical of Israel without harbouring negative attitudes towards Jews. The index of
antisemitism from the survey in 2017 showed marked prejudice among eight per
cent of the population, comparable to other countries in northern Europe.
Muslim immigration to Norway started in the late 1960s and consisted of labour
migrants from Pakistan, Turkey and Morocco. A ban against labour immigration
was introduced in the mid 1970s; however, family reunification and later refugees
24. However, the national registration of antisemitic incidents as a separate category in police records has only recently begun. In Oslo police district, three per cent of the registered hate crime
was categorised as antisemitic in 2018; a total of eight incidents were registered (two incidents
were registered in 2017 and 2016, four incidents in 2015). Oslo politidistrikt, Hatkriminalitet.
Anmeldt hatkriminalitet 2018 (Oslo: March 2019), 12.
25. See Eirik Eiglad, The Anti-Jewish Riots in Oslo (Porsgrunn: Communalism Press, 2010).
26. See Hilde Henriksen Waage, Norge – Israels beste venn. Norsk Midtøsten-politikk 1949–1956
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1995); Åsmund Borgen Gjerde, “The Meaning of Israel. Anti-Zionism and Philo-Zionism in the Norwegian Left, 1933–1968” (PhD. diss., University of Bergen,
2019).
27. The main proponent of this view is the Israeli political analyst Manfred Gerstenfeld. Manfred
Gerstenfeld, Behind the humanitarian mask: the Nordic countries, Israel, and the Jews. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2008. See also, Manfred Gerstenfeld, “Something rotten in Norway”, YNet, March 27, 2011. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4048299,00.html
Accessed May 16, 2019 and “Norway: The Most Anti-Semitic Country in the West”, blog
posted on July 22 2015. http://www.manfredgerstenfeld.com/norway-the-most-anti-semiticcountry-in-the-west/ Accessed May 16, 2019.
15
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CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN AND VIBEKE MOE | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
contributed to the growth of the Muslim population. Today, Norwegian Muslims
form a heterogeneous group in terms of country background, religious tradition
and degree of religiosity. The national backgrounds of the Norwegian Muslim
population are predominantly Somali, Pakistani, Syrian, Iraqi, Afghan, BosniaHerzegovinian, Iranian and Turkish.28 Norwegian Muslim communities comprise
different religious orientations and interpretative traditions, though the majority
can be placed within the broad category of Sunni Islam. Since the 1990s there has
been an increase in organisations that are independent of national background,
doctrinal or linguistic lines.29 Muslim congregations can be found in all Norwegian counties, though the largest population is to be found in the Oslo area.
According to estimations based on the number of immigrants from “Muslim countries” and members in Islamic congregations in Norway, the Muslim population
amounts to approximately four per cent of the total population.
Attitudes towards immigration have steadily become more positive in recent
years, and there is also a positive trend concerning attitudes towards Muslim congregations.30 Results from the population survey in 2017 show, on the other hand,
that Islamophobia, defined as anti-Muslim racism, is widespread: one third of the
population (34 per cent) have high scores on the prejudice index.31 Furthermore,
Norwegian society has experienced attacks motivated by anti-Muslim ideology.
The terrorist attack on 22 July 2011 by Anders Behring Breivik, in which 77 people were killed, was aimed at government offices in Oslo and the annual summer
camp of the Labour Party’s youth movement (AUF) on the island of Utøya outside
Oslo. Marking a lasting point of reference for the understanding of right-wing
extremism in Norway as well as internationally, the attack was motivated by
Islamophobic ideology, white supremacist ideas and hatred against the Norwegian
Labour Party.32 A new awareness emerged in the aftermath of the attack concerning the violent potential of the far-right anti-Muslim discourse.33
28. Statistics Norway, https://www.ssb.no/innvandring-og-innvandrere/faktaside/innvandring (accessed August 30 2019).
29. Cathrine Jacobsen, Islamic traditions and Muslim Youth in Norway (Leiden: Brill 2011); Oddbjørn Leirvik, “Muslims in Norway: Value Discourses and Interreligious Dialogue”, Tidsskrift
for Islamforskning 8, no. 1 (2014): 140; Kari Vogt, Islam på norsk. Moskeer og islamske organisasjoner i Norge (Oslo: Cappelen, 2000), 165–181.
30. Ottar Hellevik and Tale Hellevik, “Changing attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in
Norway”, Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning 58, no. 3 (2017): 250–283.
31. Hoffmann and Moe, Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims.
32. Sindre Bangstad, Anders Breivik and The Rise of Islamophobia (London and New York: Zed
Books, 2014).
33. For a discussion of the impact that the attack had on the public debate on Islamophobia, see
chapter 3 in this volume.
INTRODUCTION
While Norway has a strong tradition of interfaith dialogue, the state church, The
Church of Norway, has contributed to a close association between the Norwegian
state and Lutheran Protestantism. The state church was abolished in 2017, largely
based on considerations related to secularisation and increased heterogeneity in
terms of religion. An increasingly multicultural society has contributed to a focus
on minority rights and religious practices in the public debate. Particularly relevant for the Jewish and Muslim communities have been extensive debates on male
circumcision, kosher slaughter (forbidden since 1929) and halal slaughter.34
CONTRIBUTORS
Major parts of the research for this volume were conducted within the scope of the
project Shifting Boundaries: Definitions, Expressions and Consequences of Antisemitism in Contemporary Norway, funded by the Norwegian Research Council
and located at the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (2017–
2021). The group of researchers contributing to the book consists to a large extent
of the members of the project group that has conducted the two surveys. The disciplinary backgrounds of the contributors include sociology, history, political science and statistics, the history of religion, and comparative literature, providing a
broad range of different methodological and conceptual approaches to the analyses.
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
The book has three sections. The first section explores the ways in which antisemitism and Islamophobia have been defined and treated as issues in the Norwegian public in recent decades. Based on an analysis of newspaper articles, the three
chapters reconstruct how discursive boundaries of what can be said about Jews
and Muslims were formed and negotiated in the Norwegian public.
Chapter 1: A fading consensus: Public debates on antisemitism in Norway, 1960
vs. 1983.
Comparing and contrasting two central debates about antisemitism that took place
in 1960 and 1983 respectively, Christhard Hoffmann traces a fading consensus
and growing confusion about the definition of antisemitism among the Norwegian
34. See Cora Alexa Døving, “Jews in the News – Representations of Judaism and the Jewish Minority
in the Norwegian Contemporary Press”, Journal of Media and Religion 15, no. 1 (2016): 1–14.
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CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN AND VIBEKE MOE | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
public. In 1960, the concept of antisemitism was shaped by the experience of the
Holocaust and, consequently, any flare-ups of Nazi ideology, racism and antisemitism were unanimously condemned and ostracised. In 1983, there was still a consensus that antisemitism was an evil that needed to be combated, but a bitter dispute emerged about the boundaries of the concept, concretely about the question
of whether the radical condemnation of Israel (“Zionism is racism”) that had
developed in the Norwegian radical Left after 1967 should be seen as illegitimate
antisemitism or as legitimate criticism protected by the freedom of speech. Hoffmann concludes that only Nazi-style antisemitism was ostracised from public
expression in Norway during these years, whereas there were no restrictions on
anti-Zionist and anti-Israel polemics.
Chapter 2: The Gaarder debate revisited: Drawing the demarcation line between
legitimate and illegitimate criticism of Israel.
Following up this topic to the present, Claudia Lenz and Theodor Vestavik Geelmuyden provide a new interpretation of the “Gaarder debate” in Norway, which
was triggered by the polemical article “God’s Chosen People” published by the
internationally renowned Norwegian author Jostein Gaarder during the war
between Israel and the Hezbollah in July 2006. Written in the style of a biblical
judgement-day prophecy that anticipated (and seemingly justified) the end of the
Jewish state as a punishment for its inhumanity, Gaarder’s article was immediately
regarded as antisemitic by several voices in the emerging debate. While Gaarder
protested against the accusation of antisemitism and affirmed that he was only
motivated by a humanitarian concern about the civilian victims of Israel’s brutal
warfare, his portrayal of Judaism as an archaic, revengeful and inhumane religion
was heavily criticised as tainted with traditional anti-Jewish tropes. Lenz and
Geelmuyden argue that the Gaarder debate signified a turning point in the understanding of antisemitism in the Norwegian public. In later debates, it served as a
kind of “narrative abbreviation” indicating the demarcation line between legitimate and illegitimate criticism of Israel.
Chapter 3: A growing consensus? A history of public debates on Islamophobia in
Norway.
Whereas antisemitism has been regarded as an issue of concern in the Norwegian
public ever since the Holocaust, the awareness of Islamophobia as a societal problem that needs to be addressed developed rather slowly and was never undisputed.
The emergence of a specific anti-Muslim discourse in the right-wing populist Norwegian Progress Party in the late 1980s was, as Cora Alexa Døving shows in her
INTRODUCTION
historical overview, originally understood as a form of xenophobia. Only later, the
phenomenon was specified as Islamophobia, although the term itself was not frequently used in Norway. Public concern about the possible rise of anti-Muslim
attitudes in Norway was regularly expressed in the aftermath of major events, such
as the Rushdie affair, the terror attacks on 9/11 or the cartoon affairs, but it was
typically limited to the left-wing spectrum of Norwegian politics. It was only after
the terror attacks of 22 July 2011 in Oslo and Utøya, when Anders Behring Breivik
killed 77 people in the name of self-defence against the “Islamisation” of Europe,
that the right/left polarisation on this topic became less prominent and a consensus
gradually emerged according to which Islamophobia existed in the midst of Norwegian society and constituted a problem that called for public awareness.
The second section contains in-depth analyses of the comprehensive data material: the two Norwegian population surveys and the surveys among Muslims and
Jews in Norway.
Chapter 4: Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway – a survey analysis of
prevalence, trends and possible causes of negative attitudes towards Jews and
Muslims.
In a comprehensive survey analysis, Ottar Hellevik presents the main findings of
the two representative population surveys about attitudes towards Jews (2011 and
2017) and Muslims (2017) in Norway, conducted by the Norwegian Center for
Holocaust and Minority Studies. Attitudes towards the two minority groups were
measured by indices of prejudice, dislike, social distance and a summary index of
antisemitism and Islamophobia, respectively. The results show that the level of
negative attitudes towards Jews is low and declining, whereas negative attitudes
towards Muslims are more widespread. The incidence of both antisemitic and
Islamophobic attitudes is higher among men than among women, among older
people, and among people with lower levels of education. Hellevik further
discusses possible explanatory variables and finds that opinion on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict affects antisemitism and Islamophobia in opposite directions,
while both are strongly influenced by xenophobia. Negative attitudes towards
Jews and Muslims tend to coexist in individuals.
Chapter 5: Counting antisemites versus measuring antisemitism – an “elastic”
view of antisemitism.
Applying Daniel Staetzky’s concept of an “elastic view” of antisemitism to the
Norwegian survey data, Werner Bergmann attempts to explain why Jews often
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CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN AND VIBEKE MOE | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
regard antisemitism as a severe and growing problem, while at the same time survey results indicate a low level or even a decline in negative attitudes towards
Jews in the population. This gap may partly be explained by the ways antisemitism is measured in surveys, typically focusing on the small number of convinced
antisemites. Including also those who agree only sporadically to negative stereotypes without expressing a general dislike towards Jews might give a better picture about the spread of attitudes that Jews consider to be antisemitic. Bergmann
explores this approach by analysing the association between the emotional (sympathy/antipathy) and cognitive dimensions (prejudices) of attitudes towards Jews,
by researching the overlap of antisemitism and anti-Israelism, and by investigating a possible correlation between negative attitudes and the justification of violence against Jews and Muslims. Comparing the Norwegian results tentatively
with those of Staetzky’s survey on Britain, he concludes that Staetzky’s “elastic
view” approach, which differentiates between convinced antisemites and the
wider diffusion of stereotypical ideas, is a helpful tool in understanding Jewish
perceptions on the dissemination of antisemitism.
Chapter 6: Conspiracy beliefs about Jews and Muslims in Norway.
Making use of data from four different Norwegian surveys, Asbjørn Dyrendal puts
international research findings on conspiracy beliefs to the test. Although the surveys were only partly designed to specifically record conspiracy mentality, the
available data allow for an analysis of conspiracy stereotypes of outgroups, i.e.,
the presentation of Jews and/or Muslims as obsessively striving for domination,
engaging in deceptive conspiratorial action and being characterised by a high
degree of group egoism. In applying this concept, Dyrendal finds out that conspiracy stereotypes of Jews and Muslims in Norway are closely linked to general xenophobia and measures of social distance. In general, belief in conspiracy theories
was more often found among the adherents of the political far right than those of
mainstream or left-wing parties. In contrast to international findings, anti-Muslim
conspiracy beliefs in Norway were more closely tied to a conspiracy mentality
than antisemitic ones.
Chapter 7: How do Jews and Muslims in Norway perceive each other? Between
prejudice and the willingness to cooperate.
In this chapter Werner Bergmann presents and analyses the results of the survey
about attitudes and experiences of the two minority groups. Using the results of
the population survey as tertium comparationis, he is able to examine to what
extent Jews and Muslims share the views of the general population. While Jews
INTRODUCTION
show less emotional rejection and stereotypical views of Muslims than the general
population, Muslims are more likely to show an emotional rejection of Jews and
endorse antisemitic stereotypes more frequently than the general population. On
the other hand, Jewish respondents are more likely to show an emotional and
social rejection of Muslims than they themselves experience from the side of the
Muslims. Bergmann explores further to what extent these mutual prejudices are
correlated to other phenomena, such as taking sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the justification of violence, and whether they have an effect on the willingness of the two minorities to cooperate in combating prejudice and discrimination in Norway.
The third section explores the discursive and societal contexts of antisemitism
and Islamophobia by analysing qualitative data (open questions, group interviews) based on the surveys.
Chapter 8: “Muslims are…” – Contextualising survey answers.
Taking the finding that 34 per cent of the Norwegian population display marked
prejudices against Muslims as a point of departure, Cora Alexa Døving examines
the answers to the open-ended question about the possible reasons for existing
negative attitudes towards Muslims. About a third of the respondents explain antiMuslim sentiments solely by pointing to the alleged characteristics of Muslim culture and behaviour, such as their religion, their lack of integration, oppression of
women and exploitation of the welfare system. Exploring the question why negative stereotypes about Muslims are widespread in one of the world’s most wealthy
and stable countries, Døving refers to politicised and ideological Islamophobic
discourses and argues that they have moved from the margins to the mainstream
of society and have affected attitudes in the general population. While expressions
of racism and antisemitism are socially sanctioned in Norway, the boundaries of
what can be said about Muslims are less restricted. In order to avoid accusations
of racism, the rhetoric of a “battle of values” has developed in which Muslims are
presented as a threat to democratic and liberal ideals. Døving argues that Islamophobia probably would be met with stricter sanctions in the Norwegian public
sphere if it were understood as a variety of racism.
Chapter 9: How People Explain Antisemitism. Interpretation of Survey Answers.
In a parallel study of the open-ended question about the reasons for existing negative
attitudes towards Jews, Vibeke Moe detects three different contexts that the respondents mainly use for the explanation of antisemitism: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
21
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CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN AND VIBEKE MOE | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
the “import” of Muslim antisemitism, and the age-old tradition of anti-Jewish prejudice. These contextualisations share a tendency to place the source of antisemitism
into the remote distance, either spatially (Middle East), “ethnically” (Muslim immigrants) or chronologically (bygone past). While referring to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is clearly the most widespread explanation of anti-Jewish attitudes, the
applied arguments might be different, and either pointing to Israel’s violent and
expansionist politics or to biased presentations of Israel in Norwegian media as the
main cause. As Moe’s in-depth study shows, many answers include very strong statements against Israel, indicating that the communication boundaries of anti-Israelism
are less restricted than those of antisemitism, and that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
constitutes a subject where negative views of Jews may escape what are otherwise
perceived as boundaries of expression. That (some) respondents are aware of the differences is demonstrated by the ways they try to avoid a conflation between antiIsrael and anti-Jewish attitudes. The observed tendency also to understand the origins
and manifestations of antisemitism as something distant, which is projected onto others (for example onto Muslim immigrants), may, as Moe argues, be related to the
ostracism of antisemitism in Norwegian society after the Holocaust.
Chapter 10: Negotiations of antisemitism and Islamophobia in group conversations among Jews and Muslims.
Based on six group interviews with either Jewish or Muslim participants carried
out in 2016 and 2017, Claudia Lenz and Vibeke Moe explore Muslim-Jewish relations and inter-group attitudes between Muslims and Jews in Norway. The use of
visual stimuli (photographs) related to the dual face of the topic – prejudice, hate
crime and conflict on the one hand, and inclusion, recognition and participation
on the other – allows for detailed insights into the processes of how attitudes
towards the other minority are formed and negotiated in specific social settings.
The qualitative method thus reveals nuances and ambivalences in the formation of
attitudes that quantitative surveys with fixed response alternatives cannot register.
The results show that the relationship between Jews and Muslims in Norway is
characterised by ambivalent sentiments: feelings of togetherness and solidarity on
the one hand, and of mistrust and competitive victimhood on the other. Proceeding
from the observation that latent negative attitudes towards the other group may be
linked to a feeling of bitterness about the stigmatisation and lack of acknowledgement experienced by their own group, Lenz and Moe argue that the study of attitudes among minorities needs to account for the impact of public discourse and
broader social contexts on inter-group relations.
INTRODUCTION
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25
DOI: 10.18261/978-82-15-03468-3-2019-02
1.
A Fading Consensus
Public Debates on Antisemitism in
Norway, 1960 vs. 1983 1
CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN
ABSTRACT The chapter explores how the concept of antisemitism was used in the
Norwegian public sphere in the post-Holocaust period. Was antisemitism regarded as a
problem for Norwegian society and accordingly scandalised? How were the boundaries
of expression (of what can be said about Jews) defined and negotiated: by consensus or
conflict? Analysing two central debates that took place in 1960 and 1983 respectively,
the chapter traces a fading consensus about the definition of antisemitism. In 1960, the
Norwegian public unanimously condemned any flare-up of Nazi ideology, race hatred
and antisemitism, and did not allow any space for expressions of neo-Nazism and Holocaust denial. In 1983, by contrast, there was no consensus in the Norwegian public about
the question of whether the radical condemnation of Israel (“Zionism is racism”) that
had developed in the Norwegian radical Left after 1967 should be seen as illegitimate
antisemitism, or as legitimate criticism protected by the freedom of speech.
KEYWORDS antisemitism | anti-Zionism | public discourse | Norway | Oslo
International Hearing on Antisemitism 1983
1. INTRODUCTION
After the destruction of six million European Jews during the Holocaust, antisemitism in Western societies has largely lost its legitimacy and been gradually
banned from public discourse. Instead, the social norm of anti-antisemitism was
established in the public sphere after 1945. As Henrik Bachner observed: “The
1. I am grateful to Åsmund B. Gjerde, Kjetil B. Simonsen, Helge Årsheim and Jan Jacob Hoffmann for comments and advice.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.
1. A FADING CONSENSUS
culture of prejudice, which was earlier tolerated to a certain degree, was no longer
socially acceptable. Anti-Jewish and antisemitic attitudes and ideas were made
taboo.”2 This development did not mean that the phenomenon of antisemitism disappeared altogether, but that it changed its forms of expression. In a pioneering
article, sociologists Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb have described the specific
mode of antisemitic expressions after the Holocaust using the concept of “communication latency”.3 It explained the latency of antisemitism in West Germany
after 1945 not by psychological factors, but by changes in political culture. The
new self-image of Germany as a Western democracy did not allow for public
expressions of antisemitism anymore. In a long learning process, which resulted
from public conflicts and scandals, the norm of anti-antisemitism was firmly
established among the West German public.4
Taking this approach as a point of departure, this chapter explores how the concept of antisemitism was defined and used in the Norwegian public sphere in the
period of the Cold War. Was antisemitism (both in Norway and internationally)
regarded an urgent issue after 1945 and accordingly scandalised and opposed?
How were the boundaries of expression (of what can and cannot be said about
Jews) negotiated: by consensus or by conflict?
By analysing two central debates on antisemitism that took place in 1960 and
1983, the chapter aims to uncover long-term patterns of argumentation and thus
provide a historical background to the studies in this volume, which are primarily
focused on the present.
2. POSTWAR NARRATIVES OF ANTISEMITISM IN NORWAY
After 1945, a patriotic memory culture developed in Norway that used the heroic
resistance to Nazism during the German occupation as the ideological basis for
national unity and community. While there were certainly also critical voices, the
2. Henrik Bachner, Återkomsten. Antisemitism i Sverige efter 1945 (Stockholm: Natur och Kultur,
1999), 15. Unless otherwise stated, all translations are by Christhard Hoffmann.
3. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, “Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung.
Theoretische Überlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, Kölner
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 38 (1986): 223–246. On the significance of the
concept of communication latency for the research on antisemitism, see Jan Weyand, “Das Konzept der Kommunikationslatenz und der Fortschritt in der soziologischen Antisemitismusforschung”, Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 26 (2017): 36–58. For a more detailed
presentation of the concept of “communication latency”, see the introduction to this volume.
4. See Werner Bergmann, Antisemitismus in öffentlichen Konflikten. Kollektives Lernen in der
politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik, 1949–1989 (Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 1997).
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CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
dominant view regarded Nazism and antisemitism as “un-Norwegian”, predominantly associated with the German occupiers and their Norwegian collaborators.5
The history of the rescue of Norwegian Jews served as a case in point. While the
deportation of 773 Norwegian Jews to Auschwitz appeared as the most horrific
event in the history of the occupation, there was also a ray of hope, as the Norwegian paper Arbeiderbladet wrote in an editorial in September 1946:
[It could be seen] in the firm and cold stance that the Norwegian people took
towards the antisemitic agitation of the Germans and in the natural readiness
to help that was shown the Norwegian Jews when it really mattered to save the
lives of fellow human beings. When people in Norway acted this way, they did
so in accord with our entire national tradition. The people of Wergeland and
Nansen could not act differently.6
Understanding the experiences of wartime resistance as paradigmatic, the postwar patriotic narrative constructed an unambiguous national tradition of antiantisemitism, thereby effectively glossing over incidents of anti-Jewish discrimination in the country’s past. Taking the radical exterminatory Jew-hatred of Nazi
Germany as the benchmark for defining antisemitism, less radical forms of exclusion and everyday prejudice fell out of this category.7 When the trial against the
German SS officer Wilhelm Wagner began in Oslo in October 1946, Public Prosecutor Harald Sund argued that antisemitism was largely unknown in Norway
before the German occupiers arrived:
Apart from the clause in the Constitution that forbade Jews admission to the
realm and that was repealed by the efforts of Henrik Wergeland, in this country
we have not felt any animosity towards the Jews, with the exception of some
sporadic instances of Nazi mentality before the war. Our little Jewish colony
lived their lives unaffected by antisemitic biases. When the war came, howe5. On patriotic memory culture in Norway, see Anne Eriksen, Det var noe annet under krigen. 2.
verdenskrig i norsk kollektivtradisjon (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1995); Synne Corell, Krigens ettertid –
okkupasjonshistorien i norske historiebøker (Oslo: Scandinavian Academic Press/Spartacus
Forlag, 2010); Arnd Bauerkämper, Odd-Bjørn Fure, Øystein Hetland and Robert Zimmermann,
eds., From Patriotic Memory to a Universalistic Narrative? Shifts in Norwegian Memory Culture After 1945 in Comparative Perspective (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2014).
6. Editorial, “Norge og jødene”, Arbeiderbladet, September 27, 1946, 4.
7. See Ingjerd Veiden Brakstad, “Jødeforfølgelsene i Norge. Omtale i årene 1942–1948. Framstilling og erindring av jødeforfølgelsene i Norge under andre verdenskrig, i et utvalg aviser og illegal presse” (Master’s thesis, University of Oslo, 2006), 66; Bachner, Återkomsten, 14.
1. A FADING CONSENSUS
ver, it eventually became clear that the Jews probably would not be allowed to
live here in peace.8
The view that antisemitism was non-existent (or at least insignificant) in Norwegian history before the German occupation became part of a patriotic memory culture and formed post-war Norwegian identities. Consequently, antisemitism
appeared mainly as a problem belonging to others, not as a problem of one’s own.
There were, however, other views as well. In January 1947, the winter meeting
of the Nordic branches of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom in Oslo took up the topic of antisemitism and discussed possible methods of
combatting it.9 Following the initiative of the Swedish branch of the League that
had established a special committee and prepared informative material about antisemitism, attention was drawn to the possible sources of antisemitic attitudes in
(religious) education. As Nora Salomon, one of the speakers at the Oslo meeting,
argued, almost all people in “our civilised circles” were openly or latently infected
by antisemitism. It was therefore necessary to stop the influence of anti-Jewish
ideas inherent in the education system. The League’s initiative ran by the watchword: “Away with the Jew-hatred of the Sunday School, the Church and the
School!”10 As was to be expected, these general accusations provoked a negative
response in Christian quarters, above all the Christian newspaper Vårt Land (Our
Country). It first asked Salomon to specify her claims, and in an editorial in reaction to the interview,11 dismissed them as biased and unsubstantiated.12 On a more
general level, the issue of the religious roots of antisemitism and of the tradition
of anti-Jewish persecution within the Churches figured occasionally in public
debates after the League’s initiative in 1947.13
Already during the war, Norwegian socialist writers of the paper Håndslag
(“Handshake” or “Solidarity”), which was produced in Sweden and smuggled as
an illegal newspaper into occupied Norway, regarded the fight against antisemitism as crucial for the rebuilding of civilisation after the defeat of Nazi Germany.
In an article, published one month before the end of the war, author Sigurd Hoel
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
“Wagner nekter at han ga ordre til jødedeportasjonene”, Aftenposten, October 2, 1946, 5.
“Kvinneligaens vintermøte i Oslo avsluttes i dag”, Aftenposten, January 8, 1947, 3.
“Vekk med søndagskolens, kirkens og skolens jødehat!” Dagbladet, January 8, 1947, 3.
“Drastisk angrep på kirken, skolen og søndagsskolen”, Vårt Land, January 15, 1947, 1 and 8.
Editorial, “Smeden og bakeren”, Vårt Land, January 17, 1947, 3.
See, for example, Adolf Drewsen Christensen, “Kirken og Jøderne”, Aftenposten, March 29,
1947, 2 and 5; Christian Ihlen, “Kirken og jødene”, Aftenposten, April 17, 1947, 3; Theo Findahl, “Kirken og Jøderne”, Aftenposten, April 29, 1947, 2.
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CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
warned that unconscious forms of Nazism, in particular antisemitism, could survive the defeat of the Nazis:
If Nazi-Germany is beaten on all fronts […], but antisemitism wins, making it
global, so that like a poison it seeps into the thinking of all countries, then
Nazism will still have prevailed. Like a small seed, antisemitism contains all
the chromosomes of Nazism. Hatred against strangers, chauvinism, racial thinking, the doctrine of the master race […].14
After the war, in reaction to antisemitic remarks by a British general and other
incidents in Europe in early 1946, another writer of the Håndslag circle, Torolf
Elster, now a journalist in the foreign affairs section of the socialist newspaper
Arbeiderbladet, argued that antisemitism was an internal threat to civilisation and
incompatible with democracy. It needed to be fought in two ways, both as a struggle of the spirit (åndskamp) and politically:
It is a dangerous illusion to think that the Nazi peril is eradicated with the
defeat of Germany, as long as its societal base is allowed to exist, as long as
the victors – all of us – are not aware that the war must continue as a struggle
of the spirit and as a political fight against all forms of Nazi poison, until it
becomes impossible for any person in a democratic society to stand up as a
spokesman of open or concealed Nazi ideas. The Nazi race hate – antisemitism
– is not a random, peripheral element of Nazism. It is a central part of it and is
closely connected to its innermost core. It is the starkest manifestation of the
societal undercurrents that threaten civilisation, and if this race hatred were to
be tolerated in the new world we will build after the war, it would only be a
slight exaggeration to say that we have lost the war despite the ruins of Berlin
and the corpse of Hitler.15
Åsmund Gjerde, in his dissertation on anti-Zionism and Philo-Zionism in the Norwegian Left, has recently shown that Elster’s article, by advocating greater empathy with the Jewish struggle for self-preservation after the breakdown of civilisation in Europe, marked a turning point in socialist thinking about Zionism.16 In the
14. “Den ubevisste nazisme”, Håndslag no. 5, April 9, 1945, quoted in Brakstad, “Jødeforfølgelsen”, 44. The translation is taken from Åsmund Borgen Gjerde, “The Meaning of Israel: AntiZionism and Philo-Zionism in the Norwegian Left” (PhD diss., University of Bergen, 2019),
130. Gjerde argues that Sigurd Hoel was the author of this article.
15. Torolf Elster, “Den nye antisemittismen”, Arbeiderbladet, January 8, 1946, 5.
16. Gjerde, “Meaning of Israel”, 135–136.
1. A FADING CONSENSUS
context of this chapter, it is important to emphasise that Elster’s article was also
significant for the development of an anti-antisemitic consensus in post-war Norway. It defined the fight against antisemitism as a continuous task of high priority
and it understood the Western democracies’ attitudes towards Jews as a kind of litmus test for the status of civilisation after the Holocaust.
3. ANTISEMITISM AS A SOCIETAL PROBLEM: THE GRAFFITI WAVE
1959/60 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
One such test came in early 1960. On Christmas Eve 1959, the newly opened synagogue in Cologne was daubed with Nazi symbols and antisemitic graffiti (“Germans demand Jews out”).17 The incident sparked a wave of antisemitic actions in
West Germany, Europe and all over the Western world. When the graffiti wave
ebbed in March 1960, almost 2500 cases at 400 places had been registered globally.18 The “swastika epidemic” of 1959/1960 caused concern among educators
and politicians in the West and led to the first attempts to combat antisemitism and
regulate hate, in particular in the UN Declaration (1965: Convention) on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1963.19
In Norway too, a few incidents occurred: the Roosevelt monument in front of
Oslo’s City Hall was covered with antisemitic graffiti; swastikas and antisemitic slogans appeared on several buildings in the capital and other towns, such as Stavanger.
A Jewish businessperson received a letter threatening to “make soap” of him.20
As in other countries, several public voices initially downplayed the significance of these incidents in Norway. When the antisemitic actions were taken up
in the Norwegian Parliament, the Minister of Justice assessed them as “infantile
mischief”.21 In the same spirit, the largest Norwegian newspaper, Verdens Gang,
maintained:
17. On the German reactions to the antisemitic graffiti wave, see Werner Bergmann, Antisemitismus
in öffentlichen Konflikten, 235–250.
18. See Karl Egil Johansen, ‘Jødefolket inntar en særstilling’: Norske haldningar til jødane ot staten Israel (Kristiansand: Portal, 2008), 89. On the debates about antisemitism in 1960, see also
Oskar Mendelsohn, Jødenes historie i Norge gjennom 300 år, vol. 2 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget,
1986), 365–72. On the antisemitic wave in the United States, see Howard J. Ehrlich, “The Swastika Epidemic of 1959–1960: Anti-Semitism and Community Characteristics”, Social Problems
9 (1962): 264–272.
19. See Natan Lerner, The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, revised reprint (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
20. Johansen, Jødefolket, 89.
21. Stortingsforhandlinger 1959–60, 1356.
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CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
that this hardly can be called a deep-rooted neo-Nazi movement […] We think
it would be wrong to ascribe too much significance to these events: in most
cases they appear to be pranks done by irresponsible and thoughtless youths.22
Other voices were more critical and argued that these new manifestations of antisemitism had to be taken seriously:
[W]orld opinion has all reason to take this wave of demonstrations as seriously
as it does. Because it is no coincidence that a wave of demonstrations specifically against the Jews is catching on. The ancient antisemitism is festering in
new generations. The cruelty that the Jews have experienced for two thousand
years now shows its face again. The roots of antisemitism run so deep that it
survived even the devilish extermination chambers of the Nazis […] Let our
answer to the thugs and the more-or-less conscious neo-Nazis be that we
scrape away the last remains of antisemitism from our minds, and grab hold of
it when we see it in others. Some remnants are stuck in the minds of many of
us. They are especially dangerous because they, in certain circumstances, can
infect the entire mind and expand to a blind and hysteric mass hatred.23
In the same tenor, Arbeiderbladet argued on 4 January 1960 that under no circumstances could renewed manifestations of antisemitism be tolerated. The struggle
against antisemitism applied primarily to Germany with its legacy of Nazism, but
was also relevant for all democratic countries affected by the antisemitic episodes:
The authorities of the Federal Republic [of Germany] must make it clear to the
young what heinous crimes antisemitism is responsible for in Germany. Those
who did not experience this time as adults must be given the full message of
what they are getting involved in if antisemitism once again will be tolerated.
Fifteen years have passed since the war was over. We must have learned that
we have to react sharply and quickly to events such as what we experienced on
New Year’s weekend. This also includes episodes that took place outside of
Germany. No one can be in any doubt about how a democratic state responds
to actions that give new life to the most inhuman race hatred our world has ever
known.24
22. Verdens Gang, January 4, 1960, quoted in Johansen, Jødefolket, 89–90.
23. Editorial, “Vondskapen tyter fram”, Rogalands Avis, January 5, 1960, 2.
24. Editorial, “Rydd opp straks”, Arbeiderbladet, January 4, 1960, 4.
1. A FADING CONSENSUS
In a public appeal in January 1960, the Norwegian Church and 23 representatives
of Christian organisations expressed their concern about the antisemitic incidents.
Against the background of the anti-Jewish persecutions during World War II, the
new wave of antisemitism appeared as very serious and dangerous. Everything
possible should be done to “stop these demonstrations and eliminate these tendencies.”25 The Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions (LO) sent a resolution to their
partner organisation in West Germany underlining the necessity to fight all forms
of race discrimination: “Any tendency towards antisemitism must be nipped in the
bud.”26 On 30 January 1960, the Norwegian Student’s Organisation arranged a
demonstration against antisemitism. It expressed solidarity with Jews who had
been harassed and persecuted around the world, and urged the Norwegian Ministry for Church and Education to ensure that Norwegian youths received “proper
knowledge about the nature of Nazism and the methods and effects of antisemitism, and the entire philosophy that underlies racial persecution and discrimination.”27
As the new manifestations of antisemitism appeared to result from insufficient
knowledge about the Nazi past, the task of fighting antisemitism was largely committed to the education system. In substantiating her question raised in Parliament
to the Minister of Justice, Labour MP Aase Lionæs emphasised the responsibility
of the schools in countering race prejudices and antisemitism and suggested the
examination of textbooks by a special committee.28 Consequently, the question of
stereotypical presentations of minorities in textbooks gained public attention.29 In
March 1960, journalist Arne Jørgensen of the Norwegian Communist Party submitted an interpellation to the Oslo Educational Board about educational measures
against antisemitism. He argued that students in schools were not receiving proper
information about the Nazi period and suggested a critical examination of textbooks.30 After a controversial debate over the “duplicity” of the communist initiative, the Board agreed to the request that “teachers must be on their guard for all
kinds of antisemitism.”31 In an official recommendation directed to school boards
and teachers, the Norwegian Ministry of Church and Educational Affairs took up
25.
26.
27.
28.
“En skamplett for den kristne sivilisasjonen”, Aftenposten, January, 9, 1960, 2.
“L.O. fordømmer jødeforfølgelsene”, Morgenposten, January 26, 1960.
“Nazismen glemmer vi IKKE”, Dagbladet, February 1, 1960, 5.
Stortingsforhandlinger 1959–60, 1355. See also “Rasehatets ugress må lukes bort – Viktig oppgave for skolene”, Morgenbladet, January 26, 1960, 5.
29. “Rasehatet i lærerbøkene”, Dagbladet, January 27, 1960.
30. “Halvannen linje om jødeforfølgelsene i våre skolebøker”, Friheten, March 3, 1960, 1 and 6.
31. “Lærerne må være på vakt mot enhver form for antisemittisme”, Arbeiderbladet, March 18,
1960, 3.
33
34
CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
this rather vague formulation and suggested a special awareness towards antiJewish stereotypes in religious education and the need for proper historical information about the disastrous consequences of racial theories for Jews and other
groups.32 The extent to which these recommendations did have a real effect on
teaching about antisemitism and the Nazi period is difficult to assess within the
limits of this chapter. Since there were no textbooks that covered the Nazi persecution of Jews in any detail, it seems that teachers helped themselves out by showing films. The 1960 Swedish documentary “Mein Kampf”, directed by Erwin Leiser, (Norwegian title “Sannheten om hakekorset” – the truth about the swastika)
was apparently widely used in Norwegian schools at the time.33
Responding to Lionæs’s question regarding legal measures against racial persecutions in Norway, Minister of Justice Jens Haugland informed the parliament that
existing criminal law did not include specific provisions against racism. He maintained, however, that the existing law was sufficient to punish serious hate crimes
and insults directed against an individual, while attacks against loosely defined
groups of people were more difficult to punish. In general, Haugland was
convinced that “public opinion and our democratic world view” were the best
weapons to fight antisemitism, but he did not rule out legislative measures.34 In
the end, the graffiti wave led to a sharpening of the Norwegian penal code. In May
1961, the Norwegian parliament passed an amendment to Article 135 that
expanded the ban on hate speech to include the protection of certain groups of people, “defined by a specific faith, descent or other common origin.”35
Reacting to the wave of antisemitic incidents in 1959/60, the social norm of
anti-antisemitism was firmly established in the Norwegian public, especially in
the press, the educational sector and the criminal code. The significant public
attention and the strong commitment of civil society actors produced a climate of
opinion that did not tolerate negative attitudes towards Jews or the spreading of
neo-Nazi and antisemitic propaganda. While many protests aimed at the failed
32. “Skolens holdning til rasediskriminering”, Norsk skole: opplysnings- og kunnskapsblad for skoleverket 6, no. 8 (September 21, 1960), 107.
33. See Mendelsohn, Jødenes historie, 365; Johansen, Jødefolket, 91.
34. Stortingsforhandlinger 1959–60, 1356.
35. Mendelsohn, Jødenes historie, 370. In 1970, article 135 of the Norwegian penal code was amended further (article 135a) in order to comply with the UN Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination. See Helge Årsheim, “Giving Up the Ghost: On the Decline and
Fall of Norwegian Anti-Blasphemy Legislation”, in Blasphemy and Freedom of Expression:
Comparative, Theoretical and Historical Reflections after the Charlie Hebdo Massacre, ed. by
Jeroen Temperman and András Koltay (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 566–
73.
1. A FADING CONSENSUS
denazification in West Germany, a self-critical tone was heard as well, which
addressed persistent antisemitic attitudes in Norway.36 For example, Professor of
Philosophy Harald Ofstad drew attention to the findings of a survey carried out by
himself together with other researchers at the Institute of Social Research in Oslo
in the early 1950s as part of a larger research project on the dynamics of nationalist
attitudes.37 According to the survey, 44 per cent of a sample of Oslo’s population,
agreed (totally or partly) with the statement “It is to a large extent the Jews’ own
fault that they have been persecuted.”38 Moreover, 43 per cent of the sample disagreed (totally or partly) with the statement “The Jews are no more greedy for
money than other people.”39 The publication of these results, which were previously unknown to the public, caused a discussion about the formulations in the
questionnaire (response bias) and the assessment of the results.40 Consequently,
Ofstad, in an article published in several newspapers, provided more background
information. Referring to the results of the Berkeley study on the authoritarian
personality (1950)41 and of the Oslo study on nationalism,42 he argued that antisemitic attitudes were part of a more comprehensive personality structure and
often combined with ethnocentric and anti-democratic attitudes. The fight against
antisemitism had to consider these findings:
For in the end racial prejudices can be stopped neither by laws nor by enlightenment alone, but only by a politics that comprises of organising the social
institutions in such a way that the authoritarian urges have no chance to
develop.43
While there emerged a growing consensus in the Norwegian public that antisemitism was a serious evil that must be opposed, a few voices were critical to the
36. See, for example, Jon Dørsjø, “Jødene og det offisielle hykleriet”, Dagbladet, January 18, 1960.
37. Christian Bay, Ingemund Gullvåg, Harald Ofstad and Herman Tønnesen, Nationalism I–III
(typoscript, Oslo: Institutt for samfunnsstudier, 1950–1953). On the nationalism project, see
Stein Rokkan, Report on Activities 9 February 1950–9 February 1952 (Oslo: Institute for Social
Research, 1952), 20–23; Harald Ofstad, “Nasjonalisme og uskyldig aggresjon”, Tidsskrift for
samfunnsforskning 2–3 (1966): 199–240.
38. Harald Ofstad, “Anti-semittismen i Norge”, Dagbladet, January 18, 1960.
39. Harald Ofstad, “Anti-semittismen i Norge”, Dagbladet, January 25, 1960.
40. See John Baardsgaard, “Antisemittisme i Norge. Et svar til professor Harald Ofstad”, Dagbladet, January 20, 1960; Olav Pels “Oslofolks antisemittisme”, Dagbladet, January 21, 1960.
41. Theodor W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950).
42. Harald Ofstad, “Antisemittismen og autoritære innstillinger”, Bergens Tidende, February 8,
1960, 4.
43. Ofstad, “Antisemittismen og autoritære innstillinger”.
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CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
establishment of an anti-antisemitic norm. Among those was the poet Alf Larsen,
who had been opposed to Nazism during the war and probably was the most radical antisemitic intellectual in post-war Norway.44 In a polemical article published
in March 1960, he denounced the public reactions towards the antisemitic incidents as hysterical. Although it was obvious that no Nazi organisation backed the
“swastika influenza”, the alarm sirens went off as if a nuclear attack was imminent.45 In Larsen’s view, the measures against antisemitism were an attack against
the freedom of speech:
Freedom of speech is abolished everywhere, and with equal efficiency in the
democracies as in the dictatorships. The battle for world opinion is the true
struggle now […] and as an individual, as an outsider, you can no longer participate. Into the ranks with you, or be silent!!46
Even more explicitly, Alexander Lange, one of the editors of Folk og Land (People and Country), the journal of the veterans of the Norwegian Nazi party (Nasjonal Samling), interpreted the situation with help of antisemitic conspiracy theories. When interviewed in January 1960 about the ongoing graffiti wave, Lange
declared that former members of NS had nothing to do with the actions and suggested that they were most likely provocations instigated by “communists or the
Jews themselves”.47 In the same breath, he doubted the numbers of Jewish victims
in the Holocaust and challenged the fact that Jews were systematically murdered
in gas chambers. As historian Kjetil B. Simonsen recently has shown, the denial
of the Holocaust was a core element in the ideological worldview of Folk og
Land.48 It was linked to conspiratorial thinking about Jewish power and influence,
which, in the post-1945 world, was supposedly based on moral blackmail and
therefore needed to magnify Jewish victimhood.49 Lange’s insinuations were
unanimously dismissed by the Norwegian press as the antisemitic fantasies of an
old Nazi.50 In this way, the Norwegian mainstream press categorised the antisemitic ideas of Nazi veterans as beyond the limits of acceptable debate. As a result,
44. On Larsen, see Jan-Erik Ebbestad Hansen, En antisemitt trer frem. Alf Larsen og Jødeproblemet
(Oslo: Press forlag, 2018).
45. Alf Larsen, “La dem skrike”, Farmand, March 26, 1960, 25–31; see also Ebbestad Hansen, En
antisemitt trer frem, 208–9.
46. Larsen, “La dem skrike”, 29.
47. “NS-folk fornekter jødeaksjonene”, Verdens Gang, January 5, 1960, 9.
48. Kjetil B. Simonsen, “Holocaustbenektelse i Folk og land (8. mai), 1948–1975. En diskurs tar
form”, Historisk Tidsskrift 98, no. 1 (March 2019): 7–24.
49. Simonsen, “Holocaustbenektelse”, 17–20.
1. A FADING CONSENSUS
the open expression of antisemitism was banned from the public sphere (communication latency) and isolated within the segmented public of the circle of former
Nazis. If anybody transgressed these boundaries and openly voiced racist or antisemitic ideas, scandal and sanctions would follow. This happened in 1975, when
high school teacher Olav Hoaas, who had attracted attention in the 1960s with
racist statements, denied the existence of gas chambers during the Holocaust and
demanded that all alien races, including Jews and immigrant workers, leave Norway. If Jews did not want to move voluntarily, they should be segregated and live
together in a “Jewish society” of their own.51 These declarations stirred up strong
reactions, especially among the Jewish community. After four Jewish personalities, among them two Holocaust survivors, had asked the Prosecuting Authority
to investigate the case, Hoaas was charged with incitement to racial hatred (article 135a) and convicted in court. In view of public concern that the antisemitic
high school teacher might influence his pupils ideologically, the case was investigated by the school authorities and, in 1978, Hoaas was fired from his teaching
position. This decision was upheld by the Norwegian Supreme Court in a trial in
1982.52
4. THE EMERGENCE OF ANTI-ZIONISM
While the graffiti wave of 1960 had consolidated a widespread consensus in Norwegian society about the necessity to fight racism and antisemitism, discussions
about antisemitism became more controversial at the end of the 1960s, following
the Six-Day War, the formation of a radical “New Left” and the concomitant rise
of anti-Zionism. The turn against Israel occurred first in small circles of the
emerging radical Left. According to Gjerde, three distinct positions on the IsraelPalestinian conflict evolved in these groups, rejecting the traditional pro-Zionist
stance of the “Old Left”. (1) The “bridgehead of imperialism position” that took
Israel for an outpost of Western imperialism. (2) The “anti-Zionist position” that
regarded Israel as an illegitimate state that should be replaced by a different kind
of state. (3) The “pro-Palestinian position” that supported a Palestinian struggle
50. See, for example, “Eks-nazistenes formodninger”, Verdens Gang, January 6, 1960, 2; Nils Rønning, “Jødehaterne iblant oss”, Verdens Gang, January 22, 1960, 2.
51. Mendelsohn, Jødenes historie, 373–74. On Hoaas’s ideological background, see Irene S. Grimstad, “Holocaustbenektelse på norsk? En studie av Olav Hoaas sitt ideologiske standpunkt”
(Master’s thesis, University of Oslo, 2014).
52. Mendelsohn, Jødenes historie, 374–377. On the second trial in 1982, see: https://arbeidsmiljoloven.com/verdict/rt-1982-1729/ (accessed 1 August, 2019).
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CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
for national self-determination against occupation and foreign rule.53 While these
positions were certainly related to each other, their significance changed over
time. In the beginning, the understanding of Israel as “bridgehead of imperialism”
dominated, whereas the pro-Palestinian position became prevalent only in 1969.54
Shortly after the Six-Day war, at its annual conference in October 1967, the youth
organisation of the Socialist People’s Party (SF) adopted a resolution stating, “The
state of Israel, in its present form as a bridgehead of imperialism, must cease to
exist.”55 It is true that the delegates had toned down the original wording of the
resolution by inserting the “bridgehead of imperialism” attribution and by adding
a sentence saying that the present population of Israel should receive “guarantees
about their right to live in the Middle East.”56 Nevertheless, the blunt call for an
end to Israeli statehood provoked strong negative reactions within the establishment of the party and the Norwegian public at large.57 Among the points of criticism were charges of antisemitism. An article in the weekly Morgenbladet characterised the resolution as “antisemitism at the lowest level.”58 The journalist and
author Sigurd Evensmo, an influential socialist intellectual, expressed the concern
that the resolution, being so “massive in its aggressiveness towards Israel,” might
“nourish the primitive antisemitism that still exists in Norway as well.”59 In an
attempt to counter the criticism, the youth organisation argued that the editorial
board of the party’s newspaper Orientering consisted of socialists who still were
affected by their personal experience of the Nazi period and therefore did not see
that the situation had changed since then:
[They] all were young when the Nazis ravaged Europe with their persecution
of Jews. It is therefore understandable that they are preoccupied with the history of Jewish suffering and care about the rights of Jews. Now, however, time
has come to recognise that the tables are turned and that today it is the Arabs
who suffer injustice.60
53. Gjerde, “Meaning of Israel”, 275.
54. Tarjei Vågstøl, “Den norske solidaritetsrørsla for Palestina, 1967–1986” (Master’s thesis, University of Oslo 2007), 27–30, 42.
55. Gjerde, “Meaning of Israel”, 296.
56. Gjerde, “Meaning of Israel”, 296.
57. See, for example, Editorial, “Motsetninger”, Orientering, October 14, 1967, 3; “SF-ungdom vil
avskaffe Staten Israel”, Dagbladet, October 9, 1967, 1 and 11.
58. Ulf Gleditsch, “Jødehat i dagens SF-regi”, Morgenbladet, October 13, 1967, 2.
59. Sigurd Evensmo, “På parti med Mao”, Orientering, October 28, 1967, 13.
60. “SUF og Midt-Østen”, Orientering, October 21, 1967, 10.
1. A FADING CONSENSUS
The conflict within the party was not only caused by different generational perspectives on the Middle-East conflict, but also rooted in fundamental antagonisms
of political ideology. The young radicals who had proposed the anti-Israel resolution were Maoists trying to direct the party’s youth organisation towards a more
revolutionary line. That the party conference followed them meant a breakthrough
for the nascent Maoist movement in Norway. Two years later, the ideological conflict led to a split between the Socialist People’s Party and its radicalised youth
organisation. The latter became independent and added the label “Marxist-Leninist” to its name (SUF-ml). Its leading figures were also crucial in the founding of
the movement’s newspaper Klassekampen in 1969 and the establishment of the
“Workers’ Communist Party” (AKP-ml) in 1973. The new party did not compete
at the ballot box, but, as a party of activists, had great influence within the radical
milieu of the new social movements, in particular the anti-imperialist solidarity
movements. In 1970, the Norwegian Palestine Committee was established, bringing together activists in the fight against “U.S. imperialism and the Zionist State
of Israel,” solidarity with the “national struggle for freedom of the Palestinian people on its own terms,” and the support of the “establishment of a democratic Palestine in which Jews, Christians and Muslims have the same rights and duties.”61
While the Palestine Committee recruited members beyond the hard core of the
Worker’s Communist Party, the Maoists dominated the ideological profile and
practical agenda. Internal conflicts escalated in 1975, resulting in the establishment of a second solidarity organisation, the Palestine Front.62 It was associated
with the non-Maoist radical Left, in particular the Socialist Left Party (SV), and
had a broader effect on other groups and organisations, especially the trade unions.
In spite of internal conflicts caused by political differences, ideological dogmatism and sectarian strife, the solidarity movement with the Palestinians largely
agreed on practical measures, such as the close cooperation with the PLO, fundraising and anti-Israel boycott actions.63 By the end of the 1970s, its message
increasingly found fertile ground within the Norwegian public when sympathies
with the Palestinian cause grew stronger. This was mostly due to Israel’s military
attack against the PLO in South Lebanon in 1978 in retaliation for a PLO terror
61. “Referat fra det konstituerende møte for Palestinakomiteen i Norge”, Fritt Palestina, no. 1,
1970, quoted in Vågstøl, “Solidaritetsrørsla”, 35.
62. See Vågstøl, “Solidaritetsrørsla”, 45–71.
63. Vågstøl, “Solidaritetsrørsla”, 67. On the main narrative of the Norwegian anti-Zionists, see
Eirik Eiglad, “Anti-Zionism and the Resurgence of Antisemitism in Norway”, Resurgent Antisemitism. Global Perspectives, ed. by Alvin H. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2013),
144–50.
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attack. The following full-scale invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 and
the massacres against Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps of Shabra and
Shatila, committed by Christian militias allied with Israel, constituted the turning
point in Norwegian attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Whereas the
vast majority of Norwegians had supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War in
1973, nine years later most Norwegians (60 per cent) sided with the Palestinians.64
During the 1970s, the rise of anti-Zionism periodically caused controversial
debates in the Norwegian media about the relationship between anti-Zionism and
antisemitism. While critics emphasised the similarities between antisemitic and
anti-Zionist ways of argumentation and stressed continuities,65 proponents of the
anti-Zionist movement categorically denied any such connection, arguing that
since antisemitism and Zionism had a common foundation in ethnocentric and
racist thinking, anti-Zionism was in fact anti-racist and could not possibly be antisemitic.66 A year after the Lebanon war, the relationship between anti-Zionism
and antisemitism was taken up more systematically at a special hearing in Oslo.
5. IS ANTI-ZIONISM ANTISEMITIC? THE INTERNATIONAL HEARING
ON ANTISEMITISM IN OSLO 1983
In June 1983 the Nansen Committee, the Norwegian Committee against the persecution of Jews, arranged an international hearing on antisemitism in Oslo. The
hearing was the first of its kind; it convened international experts on antisemitism,
Norwegian scholars, religious leaders and journalists, and the chairpersons of the
parliamentary groups in the Norwegian parliament. At the end of the two-day conference, a public declaration, the Oslo Declaration 1983, was signed and published that appealed to “all free women and men everywhere to fight the rising
new anti-Semitism and thereby help us all, non-Jews and Jews, to create a better
world.”67
64. Johansen, Jødefolket, 133–34.
65. See, for example, Judith Vogt, “Tema uten variasjoner”, Dagbladet, February 6, 1970, 3–4, and
“I Goebbels fotspor”, Dagbladet, April 3, 1970, 3–4; Arne Skouen, “Ringen”, Dagbladet, September 28, 1977, 4.
66. See, for example, “Sionisme og rasisme”, Klassekampen, October 5, 1977, 12; Eldbjørg Holte,
“Er det ‘rasisme’ å fordømme rasismen”, Dagbladet, October 20, 1977, 14. For an example of a
historically founded and more nuanced position, see Nils Butenschøn, “Antisemittisme eller
krav om rettferdighet”, Dagbladet, June 23, 1975, 3–4.
67. Leo Eitinger, ed., The Antisemitism in Our Time. A Threat against Us All. Proceedings of the
First International Hearing on Antisemitism, Oslo 7.–8. June 1983 (Oslo: The Nansen Committee, 1984), 4.
1. A FADING CONSENSUS
The Nansen Committee was established in 1980 and chaired by architect Eigil
Nansen, the grandson of Fritjof Nansen and son of Odd Nansen. Like his ancestors, Eigil Nansen was committed to humanitarian work. In 1979, he was coorganiser of a campaign for Vietnamese boat refugees. The Nansen committee
against the persecution of Jews was especially concerned with the burdensome situation of Jews in the Soviet Union. By February 1981, the Nansen Committee
decided to arrange an international hearing on antisemitism. The main intellectual
driving force behind this project was Leo Eitinger, a Jewish physician from
Czechoslovakia who had come to Norway in 1939 as a refugee from Nazism. During the War II, he was deported to Auschwitz and was among the very few Jews
from Norway who survived the Holocaust. After his return to Norway, he specialised in psychiatry and became professor at the University of Oslo. Eitinger was a
pioneer in studying the long-term effects of traumatic experiences among refugees
and Holocaust survivors. His commitment to fighting antisemitism was deeply
connected to his personal and professional experience.
In order to discuss the international problems of antisemitism on a high level,
the organisers of the hearing had invited eminent scholars and experts from Western Europe, Israel and the United States. Among them were the historians Yehuda
Bauer (Jerusalem), Jean Halperin (Zürich), Leon Poliakov (Paris), Reinhard
Rürup (Berlin), Bela Vago (Haifa), and Erika Weinzierl (Vienna); the French philosopher Bernard-Henry Lévy; the British Chief Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits, and
the author and President of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council Eli Wiesel. The
President of the Socialist International, former Federal Chancellor of West Germany and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Willy Brandt, sent a message of greeting to
the hearing. There can be no doubt that the organisers had succeeded in winning
the support of influential experts and religious and political leaders for the fight
against antisemitism.
Nevertheless, the hearing did not succeed in re-establishing a consensus in Norway about the definition and boundaries of antisemitism. On the contrary, the controversial public debate about the agenda of the hearing clearly demonstrated the
deep rift between those who wanted to include anti-Zionism in the definition of
antisemitism and those who were opposed to this.
While it mentioned various manifestations of antisemitism in the contemporary
world, the Oslo Declaration emphasised in particular the significance of antiZionism: “The traditional, vulgar stereotypes of anti-Semitism are now being
applied to the Jewish state.”68 The history of antisemitism before 1945 was
68. Eitinger, Antisemitism, 4.
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thereby used as interpretational key for understanding the opposition to Israel in
the present:
In the past anti-Semitism in its most virulent form has endeavoured to deprive
Jews of the very right to exist. […] Today’s antisemitism frequently denies
Jews the right to a secure, national existence in their homeland, thereby following the traditional pattern, trying to establish a situation where the world
again become Judenstaatsrein (free of a Jewish state).69
The declaration went on by differentiating between (legitimate) criticism of Israel
and (illegitimate) denial of Israel’s right to exist:
No one should be denied the right to fairly criticize policies or actions committed by the government of any country, including the government of Israel. But
when criticism turns into denial of the right of the Jewish state to exist in line
with other independent nations, and when Jews are deprived of their right to
choose nationhood, like other people, then we are confronted with the age-old
monster of anti-Semitism, conveniently camouflaged in a new disguise. An
anti-Zionism that denies the Jews fundamental freedoms and rights which
other individuals and nations take for granted, equals discriminations against
Jews as a group.70
During the hearing, several speakers addressed the issue of anti-Zionism, especially the Swedish politician and journalist Per Ahlmark and the French philosopher Bernard-Henri Lévy, who stated that anti-Zionism was the modern form of
antisemitism.71 There were, however, also other voices: the British Chief Rabbi
Immanuel Jakobovits acknowledged that Israel was often criticized and condemned more harshly than other nations, but he thought it “neither true nor wise
to attribute this discrimination simply to antisemitism.”72 Historian Reinhard
Rürup suggested the use of different terms for the main manifestations of antiJewish tendencies in history: (1) traditional Jew-hatred, which was based on religion and economic relations; (2) modern antisemitism (opposed to Jewish emancipation and integration); and (3) anti-Zionism. Although there were certain over69. Eitinger, Antisemitism, 4.
70. Eitinger, Antisemitism, 4.
71. Per Ahlmark, “Sweden and The New Antisemitism”, in Antisemitism”, 63–69; Lévy’s contribution to the hearing is not included in the volume, but partly quoted in Klassekampen, July 25,
1983, 5.
72. Immanuel Jakobovits, “Antisemitism Today – Some Jewish Perspectives”, in Antisemitism, 94.
1. A FADING CONSENSUS
laps between these different forms, Rürup argued against subsuming them all
under the umbrella term of antisemitism.73
The major Norwegian newspapers covered the Oslo hearings on antisemitism
in detail. While comments were not unanimously positive, and for instance Per
Ahlmark’s attacks against the anti-Zionism of the Swedish government under
Olof Palme were treated with reserve,74 there was a certain understanding that the
issue of anti-Zionism needed public scrutiny. Reflecting on the strange coincidence that the Oslo hearing started exactly on the anniversary of the Israeli campaign in Lebanon in June 1982, an editorial in Aftenposten stated:
It is clear that a marked anti-Israel mood has developed after Israeli soldiers
moved into their neighbouring country. It is equally certain that this mood has
triggered antisemitic forms of expression. They unquestionably arise from
latent anti-Jewish feeling. It is a frightening reaction when criticism of Prime
Minister Begin’s policies awakens that evil and ancient hatred of the Jews.
People must be able to distance themselves from Begin’s political actions without at the same time spreading antisemitic declarations.75
In an even stronger way, the liberal daily Dagbladet supported the Oslo declaration and hoped that it could become a common base for the fight against antisemitism irrespective of political differences. Its editor-in-chief, Jahn Otto Johansen,
who was one of the Norwegian panelists at the hearing, made the following
appeal:
Antisemitism is not only a threat against the Jewish people. […] It affects
humanity as a whole. First the Jews, then the rest of us. That is why indifference is dangerous. The fight against antisemitism must be taken up everywhere – through teaching and information campaigns, through actions of solidarity and in local communities. Irrespective of whether one stands on the left
or the right of the political space, it should be possible to unite in a common
struggle against antisemitism and all racism. It concerns all of us.76
The idea of a united front against antisemitism as defined by the Oslo declaration
was, however, unrealistic. Even before the hearing began, the radical Left in
73.
74.
75.
76.
Eitinger, Antisemitism, 60.
“Olof Palme anti-semitt?” Dagbladet, June 9, 1983, 18.
Editorial, “Til felts mot anti-semittismen”, Aftenposten, June 9, 1983, 2.
Jahn Otto Johansen, “Det angår oss alle”, Dagbladet, June 10, 1983, 2.
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CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
Norway mobilised against it, accusing Eitinger of a pro-Israel agenda. Reacting to
Eitinger’s claim that the left-wing paper Klassekampen included articles with antisemitic content, the leading representative of the Norwegian Maoists and longterm editor of Klassekampen Finn Sjue attacked Eitinger’s definition of antisemitism and claimed that it meant an “ideological pollution of an important political
debate.”77 Among Norwegian papers, Sjue argued, it was Klassekampen that had
been most active in the fight against all forms of racism, including antisemitism.
Anti-Zionism was something very different and should not be conflated with antisemitism:
We have understood it to be extremely important to draw a sharp divide between antisemitism, i.e. the hatred of Jews, and anti-Zionism, which is the
opposition to the political movement that was the impetus for the founding of
the state of Israel. Our criticism of the state of Israel is clearly political: the
state is founded on the expulsion of an entire people. The character of the state
of Israel as an exclusively Jewish state further makes it an apartheid state.
These two things put together are more than enough not to recognise this state.
Eitinger uses an ugly ploy when he attempts to eliminate the difference between antisemitism and anti-Zionism. For him, anyone who will not recognise
the state of Israel is a Jew-hater by definition.78
During the time of the Oslo hearing, Klassekampen, together with the Maoist
party and the Norwegian Palestine Committee, tried to de-legitimise the hearings
as a mere propaganda show for Israel. It appeared, as Sjue put it, as “a somewhat
desperate attempt at a counter-offensive after Israel was so thoroughly discredited
following the war in Lebanon last year.”79 The Norwegian Palestine Committee
invited the Jewish-Palestinian politician and journalist Ilan Halevy to Oslo.
Halevy, who lived in France, was one of the few Jewish members of the PLO.
While his participation in the hearing as an expert panellist was denied by the
organisers (as was to be expected), Halevy gave several interviews to counter the
message of the hearings. He saw the Oslo event as part of a campaign directed at
journalists in Europe and described it as “verbal terror against public opinion in
the West.”80 Halevy admitted that antisemitism had become stronger in recent
77. “Jødehat i Klassekampen?” Klassekampen, May 27, 1983, 1; Editorial, “Eitingers løgn”, Klassekampen, May 27, 1983, 3.
78. “Ideologisk forurensning”, Klassekampen, May 27, 1983, 10.
79. “Ideologisk forurensning”.
80. “Når ofrene blir bødler”, Klassekampen, June 11, 1983, 15.
1. A FADING CONSENSUS
years, but saw one major cause for this development in Israel’s claim to act on
behalf of all Jews:
[O]ne very important reason is that Israel has committed these crimes against
Palestinians and the Lebanese in the name of the Jews and not in the name of
an ideology. The Zionists have demanded solidarity with Israel from all Jews
across the world, and labelled those who have disagreed as traitors against the
state of Israel. There are surely also forces in the right in Europe that have
exploited this situation.81
A week after the hearing, initiator Leo Eitinger gave a critical summary of the
event in Aftenposten.82 While he was generally satisfied with the resonance the
hearing had received among the Norwegian public, he expressed a concern that its
main message, i.e. that “antisemitism in our time is a danger for us all as human
beings,” was lost in the discussion about minor questions. Eitinger identified three
such questions that had gained public attention but that he regarded as “derailments”: Did the Lebanon war trigger antisemitism? Is the relationship of Jews
towards Israel decisive for the emergence of antisemitism? Are antisemitism and
anti-Zionism identical? In answering these questions, Eitinger emphasised that
antisemitism in post-Holocaust Europe had existed long before the 1982 Lebanon
war, and independently of Israel’s actions. Regarding the last question, he insisted
that the main political aim of anti-Zionism – the liquidation of the state of Israel –
in the current political situation in the Middle East would necessarily mean major
harm to millions of Jews. “You can call it what you want, but to work (indirectly)
for the destruction of millions of Jews is antisemitism.”83 Moreover, a common
element of anti-Zionism and antisemitism was given in the “anti”, the hate against
a group. This point constituted, according to Eitinger, the key message of the hearing:
To hate someone blindly, just because that person belongs to a particular
group, […] is an evil in itself. No one has the right to generalise and no one has
the right to attempt to find reasons for their general hate within the group that
is being hated. Antisemitism is only the oldest and most tragic example of
blind and meaningless hatred.84
81.
82.
83.
84.
“Når ofrene blir bødler”.
Leo Eitinger, “Hatet var høringens tema”, Aftenposten, June 16, 1983, 2.
Eitinger, “Hatet”.
Eitinger, “Hatet”.
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CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
Eitinger’s summary was not the end of the affair. On the same day, Dagbladet published an article by the chairman of the Norwegian Palestine Committee, Trond
Lindstad, entitled “Zionism is racism”.85 Four days later, in an op-ed article in
Aftenposten under the title “Questions after an anti-Jewish hearing”, Ebba Wergeland, another representative of the Norwegian Palestine Committee, came to a
very different conclusion about the hearing than Eitinger. Challenging the hearing’s conclusion that a denial of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state equalled
antisemitism, and directly addressing the Norwegian participants in the hearing,
she argued that the conference had missed an opportunity to deal with the traditions of antisemitism in Norwegian history:
The hearing in Oslo could have shed light on Norwegian antisemitism, which
contributed to almost half of the Norwegian Jews being deported to Auschwitz
and murdered there. It could have been a reckoning with both antisemitism and
anti-Arab racism, with policies that rejected Jews at Norway’s borders, but
supported the idea of a separate state for Jews in the homeland of the Palestinians. Instead, you concluded with the Zionists paradoxical answer to antisemitism: on behalf of the Jews, you demand the “right” to a ghetto colony, a
“Jewish state” – far from Norway’s doorstep. And all of us who do not support
this ghetto project you have labelled Jew-haters. Can all of you really approve
of the conclusion from the hearing?86
Instead of forming a new consensus, the Oslo Hearing on Antisemitism revealed
a deep division within the Norwegian public on this matter. While antisemitism
was unanimously regarded as an evil that needed to be fought, there was no consensus about the definition of antisemitism and how its boundaries should be
determined. Consequently, only Nazi-style antisemitism was ostracised from public communication, whereas there were no restrictions on anti-Zionist and antiIsrael polemics.
6. CONCLUSION
In an article on anti-Zionism and antisemitism in Britain, historian David Feldman
has recently shown that the controversial debates about the concept of antisemitism that emerged in the aftermath of the Six-Day War in many Western countries
85. Trond Lindstad, “Sionisme er rasisme”, Dagbladet, June 16, 1983, 4.
86. Ebba Wergeland, “Spørsmål efter en antijødisk høring”, Aftenposten, June 20, 1983, 2.
1. A FADING CONSENSUS
are in many ways still ongoing today and reflected in contrary interpretations
among scholars of antisemitism.87 Whereas some historians, for example Robert
Wistrich and Anthony Julius, see the rise of anti-Zionism and anti-Israel activities
within the European Left as a new form of antisemitism, other scholars, such as
Brian Klug and Jonathan Judaken, are sceptical about this equation and point to
the different background conditions of both phenomena.88 In this respect, the Norwegian development from consensus to conflict was quite typical for debates on
antisemitism in Western Europe in general.
In order to bring greater clarity to these debates, Feldman distinguishes between
three different uses of the concept of antisemitism in contemporary Britain. (1)
The traditional use of the term, denoting hostility towards Jews as “Jews” (as
defined in the mindset of the antisemites). (2) The new understanding of institutional (or structural) antisemitism, coined parallel to the concept of institutional
racism, focusing on the results of a societal practice, for example a boycott, rather
than the intentions or world views of the actors. It implies that the outcome of a
measure can be antisemitic even if there are no antisemitic intentions. (3) In connection with harassments and attacks, a third understanding of the concept of antisemitism has emerged that makes the perception of the victims define whether an
incident should be regarded antisemitic or not.89
Feldman’s distinctions are based on the analysis of present-day debates in Britain, but they also might help to better understand the emotional and largely fruitless controversies about antisemitism in Norway after 1967. While the leftist antiZionists clung to the traditional definition of antisemitism and insisted their political attacks against Israel were not directed against Jews as “Jews”, Leo Eitinger,
and the other initiators of the Oslo Hearing, used an extended concept of antisemitism that included principal opposition towards Jewish national self-determination
and a denial of Israel’s right to exist as defining characteristics. In addition,
Eitinger, without employing the term, indicated an understanding of “institutional
antisemitism”. It focused on the possible outcome of anti-Zionist activities and
argued that under present conditions in the Middle East the consequences of a liquidation of the state of Israel would necessarily be damaging to millions of Jews.
The fading consensus and growing conceptual confusion about antisemitism in
the Norwegian public after 1967 was thus due to the fact that the antagonists
indeed used different concepts of antisemitism. Moreover, the concept was eroded
87. David Feldman, “Antizionismus und Antisemitismus in Großbritannien”, Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung, vol. 23, 2014: 42–49.
88. Feldman, “Antizionismus”, 42–43.
89. Feldman, “Antizionismus”, 47–48.
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CHRISTHARD HOFFMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
by the polemical use of the term. Since the charge of antisemitism was a powerful
rhetorical weapon in the post-Holocaust world, it could be readily applied to delegitimise political opponents. In this way, Christian Conservatives attacked the
radical Left as being antisemitic, and the Left responded by calling the supporters
of Israel racist and, in essence, anti-Jewish. As the 1983 Oslo Hearing on antisemitism made clear, it proved impossible to find common ground on antisemitism as
long as these ideological antagonisms prevailed.
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Grimstad, I. S. (2014). Holocaustbenektelse på norsk? En studie av Olav Hoaas sitt ideologiske
standpunkt. Master’s thesis, University of Oslo, 2014.
Halvannen linje om jødeforfølgelsene i våre skolebøker (1960, March 3). Friheten, p. 1 and 6.
Hansen, J. E. E. (2018). En antisemitt trer frem. Alf Larsen og Jødeproblemet. Oslo: Press forlag.
Holte, E. (1977, October 20). Er det ‘rasisme’ å fordømme rasismen. Dagbladet, p. 14.
Ideologisk forurensning (1983, May 27). Klassekampen, p. 10.
Ihlen, C. (1947, April 17). Kirken og jødene. Aftenposten, p. 3
Jakobovits, I. Antisemitism Today – Some Jewish Perspectives. In Eitinger, L. (Ed.) Antisemitism (p. 91–97).
Johansen, J. O. (1983, June 10). Det angår oss alle. Dagbladet, p. 2.
Johansen, K. E. (2008). ‘Jødefolket inntar en særstilling’: Norske haldningar til jødane ot staten
Israel. Kristiansand: Portal.
Jødehat i Klassekampen? (1983, May 27). Klassekampen, p. 1.
Kvinneligaens vintermøte i Oslo avsluttes i dag. (1947, January 8). Aftenposten, p. 3.
Larsen, A. (1960, March 26). La dem skrike. Farmand, p. 25–31.
Lerner, N. (2015). The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Revised reprint. Leiden: Brill.
Lindstad, T. (1983, June 16). Sionisme er rasisme. Dagbladet, p. 4.
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Nazismen glemmer vi IKKE (1960, February 1). Dagbladet, p. 5.
NS-folk fornekter jødeaksjonene (1960, January 5). Verdens Gang, p. 9.
Ofstad, H. (1960, January 18). Anti-semittismen i Norge. Dagbladet.
Ofstad, H. (1960, January 25). Anti-semittismen i Norge. Dagbladet.
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DOI: 10.18261/978-82-15-03468-3-2019-03
2.
The Gaarder Debate Revisited
Drawing the Demarcation Line between
Legitimate and Illegitimate Criticism of
Israel
CLAUDIA LENZ AND THEODOR VESTAVIK GEELMUYDEN
ABSTRACT This chapter explores the afterlife of the newspaper op-ed article “God’s
chosen people”, written by Jostein Gaarder in 2006, and the intense and heated debate
it sparked off. In this debate, Gaarder was accused of antisemitism due to his portrayal
of the Jewish religion as archaic and violent and his indication that Israel, following its
brutal warfare in the region, had lost its right to exist. The chapter looks into how the
opening of the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies and a growing
public awareness of the Holocaust may be seen as possible reasons for the fierce criticism of Gaarder and how his op-ed became the prime example of criticism of Israel
crossing the line to antisemitism. The chapter argues that the “Gaarder debate”, despite
Gaarder’s own attempts to free himself from the stigma of antisemitism, lives a life of its
own as a narrative abbreviation. As such, the allusion to Gaarder is used to mark the red
line between criticism of Israel and antisemitism. The “Gaarder trope” is even used to
discuss latent antisemitism in contexts outside Norway.
KEYWORDS antisemitism | criticism of Israel | communication latency | Gaarder
debate | Norway
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.
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CLAUDIA LENZ AND THEODOR VESTAVIK GEELMUYDEN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
1. INTRODUCTION
“The outcome of this debate will say a lot about Norwegian culture.”
Odd-Bjørn Fure, interview with VG, August 8, 20061
The above quote from Odd-Bjørn Fure, at the time director of the Norwegian
Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (CHM), gives an idea of the significance the “Gaarder debate” had for one of its main participants. Nothing less than
“Norwegian culture” was at stake in this controversy, which began when the internationally renowned Norwegian author of Sophie’s World, Jostein Gaarder, published an op-ed article with the title “God’s chosen people” in the Norwegian
newspaper Aftenposten on August 5, 2006. 2
The article, in which Gaarder fiercely criticised the ongoing Israeli warfare in
Lebanon against Hezbollah, is held in a “prophetic”, judgement-day style, opening with a statement indicating that Israel’s right to exist had ceased:
There’s no turning back. It’s time to learn a new lesson: We no longer recognise
the State of Israel. We could not recognise the apartheid regime of South Africa,
nor did we recognise the Afghani Taliban regime. Then there were many who did
not recognise Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or the Serbs’ ethnic cleansing. We need to
get used to the idea: The State of Israel, in its current form, is history.3
Throughout the entire op-ed, Israeli warfare is characterised with attributes associated with the Old Testament and Judaism as confronted by a collective voice
(“we”), which is identified as humanist and Christian:
We do not recognise the old Kingdom of David as a model for the 21st century
map of the Middle East. The Jewish rabbi claimed two thousand years ago that
the Kingdom of God is not a martial restoration of the Kingdom of David; the
Kingdom of God is within us and amongst us. The Kingdom of God is compassion and forgiveness. Two thousand years have passed since the Jewish
1. Odd-Bjørn Fure, “Gaarder viser farlig kunnskapsløshet”, Verdens Gang, August 6, 2006,
https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/OL7nA/gaarder-viser-farlig-kunnskapsloeshet (accessed
14.05.2019). This and all following translations from Norwegian have been provided by the authors.
2. Jostein Gaarder, “Guds utvalgte folk”, Aftenposten, August 5, 2006, https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk/i/weW34/Guds-utvalgte-folk (accessed 14.05.2019); translation,
http://emanzipationhumanum.de/downloads/israel.pdf (accessed 14.05.2019).
3. Gaarder, “Guds utvalgte folk.”
2. THE GAARDER DEBATE REVISITED
rabbi disarmed and thoroughly humanised the old rhetoric of war. Even in his
time, the first Zionist terrorists were operating.4
The antagonism between Jewish/anti-humanistic and Christian/humanistic culminates in expressions such as: “We do not recognise a state founded on anti-humanistic principles and on the ruins of an archaic national and warlike religion”, or
“For two thousand years, we have rehearsed the syllabus of humanism, but Israel
does not listen.” In this last statement, the state of Israel takes the place of Judaism
as confronted with the Christian/humanist “we”.
This overall tone is accompanied by classical anti-Judaist stereotypes. Expressions like “We call baby killers baby killers” or “we reserve the right to not eat
Jaffa oranges as long as they are foul tasting and poisonous”, resonate the myths
of Jews poisoning wells and drinking the blood of children.
All this builds up to the leitmotiv of the op-ed, held in a prophetic language:
Israel has lost its legitimacy and therefore has already ceased to exist, with all the
consequences this must have for the civilian population:
If the entire Israeli nation should fall to its own devices and parts of the population have to flee their occupied areas into another Diaspora, then we say:
May their surroundings stay calm and show them mercy.5
During the intense debate that was kicked off by the op-ed, Gaarder’s scenario of
displaced Jews being without a country of their own at the mercy of other people
was met with the most intense criticism. This “prophecy” was interpreted as a
legitimisation of yet another persecution of the Jewish people.
An important aspect of the debate is its immediate internationalisation. Gaarder
was internationally known for his famous children’s book Sophie’s World and recognised as a moral authority. The news that he had authored an antisemitic pamphlet gained interest in the international media. The reactions in Israeli media
were especially stark. Haaretz, on August 11, 2006, quoted Professor Dina Porat,
head of the Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Anti-Semitism
and Racism at Tel Aviv University as follows:
This is a classic anti-Semitic manifesto, which cannot even disguise itself as
criticism of Israel.6
4. Gaarder, “Guds utvalgte folk.”
5. Gaarder, “Guds utvalgte folk.”
6. Assaf Unai, “Norway Up in Arms After Author Claims Israel Has Lost Its Right to Exist”, Haaretz, August 11, 2006, https://www.haaretz.com/1.4861209 (accessed 14.05.2019).
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Gaarder’s defenders, on the other hand, insisted that he only had chosen the drastic
rhetoric necessary to highlight the severity of Israeli war atrocities. One of the
most prominent intellectuals on the left, Thomas Hylland Eriksen,7 came to his
defence in Aftenposten8 four days after Gaarder’s op-ed had been published:
As I read it, the op-ed is neither more or less than a hard criticism of the Israeli
regime’s Apartheid-like politics against the Palestinians and bombardments of
civil targets in Lebanon, formulated in a language with associations to the
Bible.9
At the end of the day, went Hylland Eriksen’s argument, it was Israeli politics, not
Gaarder, which was putting the existence of the Jewish nation at risk.
Looking back at the debate, one can get the impression that neither Gaarder nor
his defenders realised that something new was happening: the emergence of a new
awareness in the Norwegian public that certain expressions of criticism of Israel
are problematic because they are loaded with generalisations, drawn on negative
stereotypes against Jews and implying justifications of violence against Jews. In
this way, Gaarder, who would define himself as anything but a Jew hater, found
himself being the author of what was seen as the iconic text crossing the red line
towards antisemitism. This shift calls for an explanation.
To a certain extent, the answer can be found in the choice of stylistic means in
Gaarder’s article. But even if anti-Judaist stereotypes became starker and more
obvious due to the “prophetic” style of this text, many other provocative elements
were already familiar from previously expressed criticism of Israel. Neither the
comparison with the South African Apartheid regime and its downfall, nor the
accusation of “child murder” and the allusion that Israeli military operations followed an archaic “revenge” logic of the Old Testament, were really new in the
Norwegian debate. But in 2006, a new public constellation had emerged related to
Holocaust commemoration and the public awareness about its ideological roots.
In Norway, this was related to the establishment of the Center for Holocaust and
Minority Studies (CHM), which was to be officially opened at the end of August,
only a few weeks after the publication of Gaarder’s article.
7. Hylland Eriksen is a social anthropologist and was at the time the research leader for a research
project on cultural complexity in Norway (CULCOM) at the University of Oslo.
8. There were fewer contributions in defence of Gaarder in the rather conservative Aftenposten
than in the left-wing newspaper Klassekampen, which was an important platform for the proPalestinian political spectrum.
9. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Den vanskelige kritikken”, Aftenposten, August 10, 2006, https://
www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk/i/47k4G/Den-vanskelige-kritikken (accessed 14.08.2019).
2. THE GAARDER DEBATE REVISITED
This chapter argues that one of the main reasons for the critical reactions and
interpretations of Gaarder’s text can be found in the fact that the Holocaust had
become a strong frame of interpretation – both in Norway and internationally. We
will first show how references to the Holocaust contributed to the widely spread
opinion of Gaarder’s text being antisemitic and, thus, unacceptable. Besides the
impact of the Holocaust as a frame of interpretation, the particular constellation of
the Lebanon war in 2006 needs to be taken into consideration. Israel fighting
against Iranian-supported Hezbollah – and thereby against a strong power representing a real threat against the existence of the state of Israel – did not fit into previously established patterns of interpretation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
We will then demonstrate how Gaarder’s article was turned into a symbolic red
line marking the boundaries between legitimate criticism of Israel and antisemitism. References to the Gaarder debate can be understood as narrative abbreviations,10 meaning a narrative fragment which only needs to be alluded to in order
to recall an entire story and its “morals”. The morals in this case are related to the
red line towards antisemitism being crossed. The ongoing reference to this boundary has the discursive function of establishing and upholding an anti-antisemitism
norm. The Gaarder op-ed and the debate following it have thus become one of
those turning points in public discourse that, according to Bergmann and Erb, contribute to establishing communication latency.11
MATERIAL AND METHODOLOGY
The material used for analysis is a corpus of Norwegian newspaper articles from
2006 to 2018 retrieved from the search engine Retriever.12 The analysis focuses
on the most important contributions to the debate by going through the biggest
national and regional newspapers in Norway, with the criteria of having more than
10. Jürgen Straub, Narration, Identity, and Historical Consciousness, Vol. 3 (New York: Berghahn
Books, 2005).
11. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, “‘Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung.
Theoretische Überlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’,” Kölner
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 38 (1986): 223-246; see also chapter 1 in this
volume, written by Christhard Hoffmann.
12. The media archive Retriever is a research tool that contains the original issues of national, regional and local newspapers, including magazines and journals. One types in the desired search
word combination, e.g., “Gaarder + Israel”, and chooses a date range for the search. The result
will contain every article, including paper versions and online versions, that contains that specific search combination. Retriever also provides the opportunity to see different graphs and other
statistics about the search such as hits over time or which paper provides the most hits for your
search. Retriever is owned by NTB and TT.
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CLAUDIA LENZ AND THEODOR VESTAVIK GEELMUYDEN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
ten article hits on a keyword combination to be included in the analysis.13 The initial search comprised the keywords Gaarder + antisemitism, Gaarder + antisemite,
Gaarder + antisemitic, Gaarder + Israel, Gaarder + Israeli criticism, Gaarder + Jew
hater, Gaarder + chronicle, Gaarder + Holocaust in order to try and get the broadest picture of the debate.14 As the approach towards the material was qualitative,
this combination of keywords secured to catch as many contributions to the debate
as possible. Possible double hits represent no methodological problem as no quantitative calculations are intended. The corpus of our research consists of op-ed
articles and articles where these keywords appeared together within the text.
The analysis showed that these keywords had several peaks in the time after its
publication. Most of the hits were from 2006, the year of publication, but other
important peaks were in 2009 and 2014.15 Because of this initial observation, the
analysis looks into the contexts in which these combined references to Gaarder,
antisemitism and the Holocaust recurred. It is quite striking that the focus on the
Holocaust had a major impact on the outcome of the Gaarder debate in 2006, just
weeks before the official opening of the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and
Minority Studies. Further, debates related to intensifications in the Middle East
conflict (escalation between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza strip in 2008-2009 and
2014), as well as a population survey on attitudes towards Jews in Norway conducted in 2011 were identified as triggers for references to the debate from 2006.
Each of these contexts is explored in this chapter.
More specifically, the chapter also analyses which actors in these debates have
had particular impact by promoting viewpoints and arguments that shaped the
entire debate. As perspectives and arguments expressed by journalist Mona Levin
and the director of the CHM Odd-Bjørn Fure were taken up by other contributors
throughout the debate, they proved decisive for how the article was received.
Therefore, searches with extra keywords Gaarder + Levin and Gaarder + Fure
were run in order to follow and mirror the afterlife of the original debate. The analysis pays particular attention to these two contributors, their positions and arguments, as well as to Gaarder’s responses, which in some cases were directly
addressed to them.
13. For an overview over these newspapers, see Annex, this chapter.
14. Keywords in original; Gaarder + antisemittisme, Gaarder + antisemitt, Gaarder + antisemittisk,
Gaarder + Israel, Gaarder + israelkritikk, Gaarder + jødehat, Gaarder + kronikk, Gaarder +
Holocaust.
15. In total, the search resulted in approximately 4,000 hits using these keywords in Retriever. The
specific numbers for the peaks were: 2006: 3,178 combined hits; 2008/09: 239 combined hits;
2011: 174 combined hits; 2014: 90 combined hits.
2. THE GAARDER DEBATE REVISITED
2. THE HOLOCAUST AS A FRAME OF INTERPRETATION
Jostein Gaarder published “God’s chosen people” when the short but intense military conflict between Lebanon/Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 was at its culmination point. Following military provocations by Iranian-supported Hezbollah
against Israel in July 2006, Israel responded with massive airstrikes, a ground
invasion and a naval and air blockade against Lebanon. As the airstrikes and
blockade hit the Lebanese civil population heavily,16 Israel was accused of disproportionate brutality and war crimes. The Norwegian debate about the war followed an established “David and Goliath” narrative, in which Israel figures as a
reckless giant and oppressor, while its enemies are inferior, but brave in their
resistance. Even more dominant was the focus on innocent civil victims, which in
some way remained unrelated to the military provocations that time and again
triggered Israel’s counterattacks. It is within this morally loaded climate of debate,
establishing clear lines between guilty and innocent, that Gaarder’s text has to be
situated.
However, another interpretative framework was about to emerge and gain
strength. From the early 2000s, Holocaust remembrance was institutionalised in
many Western countries. The Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum
on the Holocaust (“Stockholm Declaration”), which led to the establishment of the
Task Force for Holocaust Remembrance (today: International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance/IHRA), stressed the obligation to prevent antisemitism:
With humanity still scarred by genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, antisemitism and xenophobia, the international community shares a solemn responsibility to fight those evils.17
The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (CHM) was established in 2001 “as a consequence of the historical and moral settlement related to
the handling in Norway of the financial liquidation of the Jewish minority during
the Second World War.”18 The process of economical restitution of the Norwegian
Jews, whose assets had been expropriated by the Norwegian state in 1942,
resulted in the foundation of the CHM and had contributed to an awareness of the
co-responsibility of Norwegian actors in the persecution and deportation of the
Norwegian Jews in 1942/43. In this way, Norway became part of an international
16. Middle East crisis: Facts and figures. BBC news, August 31, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
middle_east/5257128.stm (accessed 14.05.2019).
17. https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/stockholm-declaration (accessed 14.05.2019).
18. https://www.hlsenteret.no/english/about/statutes/ (accessed 14.05.2019).
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trend not only to remember the fate of the Jews, but also to acknowledge coresponsibility and antisemitism among perpetrators and bystanders in Germanoccupied countries.19
THE OPENING OF THE NORWEGIAN CENTER FOR HOLOCAUST AND
MINORITY STUDIES
Gaarder’s op-ed was published three weeks before the official opening of the
CHM at its new premises on the peninsula of Bygdøy.20 The opening ceremony
on 26 August was attended by the Queen and the Crown Princess, and a range of
foreign politicians and diplomats. Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre gave one of
the main speeches, underlining the responsibility of Norwegian society to come to
terms with the active participation of Norwegians in the Holocaust.21 Arguably,
the public attention to the establishment of the CHM and the emphasis on the discourse of responsibility had a crucial impact on the reception to Gaarder’s article.
With the Holocaust as a frame of interpretation, the destructive power of antisemitism came into focus as it had served to legitimise the persecution and genocide
against Jews. This interpretative framework added a moral dimension to the
debate, which made it much more difficult to downplay references to antisemitism
as deviations of pro-Israel propaganda, as had happened in previous debates.22
This also gave a particular authority to some of Gaarder’s critics.
One of those critics, who very early contributed towards setting the agenda for
the debate, was journalist Mona Levin. Levin is daughter of the pianist and composer Robert Levin and belongs to one of the Norwegian Jewish families who
escaped Nazi persecution and survived in Sweden during World War II. As a longstanding journalist and theatre critic for the newspaper Aftenposten, Levin is a
well-known person in Norwegian cultural life. She was one of the first to strongly
criticise and accuse Gaarder of antisemitism after the publication of the article. In
an article from 5 August (the same day that Gaarder’s article was published), in
19. Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).
20. The centre had been operative since 2006, with its director Odd-Bjørn Fure and a small administrative and scientific staff in place and being a part of public discourse about issues related to the
Holocaust and antisemitism.
21. Claudia Lenz, “Linking Holocaust Education to Human Rights Education – a Symptom of the
Universalization and De-Nationalization of Memory Culture in Norway?” In From Patriotic
Memory to a Universalistic Narrative? ed. Arnd Bauernkämper et al. (Münster: Klartext Verlag,
2014), 87-103.
22. See chapter 1 by Christhard Hoffmann in this volume.
2. THE GAARDER DEBATE REVISITED
which Aftenposten had interviewed a number of Norwegian authors about their
reactions to the article, she is quoted as saying: “This is the ugliest thing I have
read since Mein Kampf.”23 Levin put the Nazi stamp on Gaarder’s text, interpreting it as a call for violence against Jews.
He attacks (...) each and every Jew in the world, in the USA, Norway or the
Middle East. (...) He knows what he is doing. I feel more damage and threat
against myself and those close to me by Jostein Gaarder than anyone who
smears the Synagogue.24
She interpreted Gaarder’s “prophecy” of the destruction of the state of Israel, with
the consequence of Jews being expelled and living at the mercy of other countries,
as a threat against the entire Jewish people. Given the historical background of the
1930s when many Jewish refugees met closed doors in other countries, this reaction is not at all astonishing. This historical frame of interpretation adds an uncomfortable notion to Gaarder’s “literary device”. Director of the Holocaust centre
Odd-Bjørn Fure, too, drew upon historical references in his reaction to Gaarder.
It is awkward to play with concepts such as the evacuation of refugees and
‘final solution.’ This touches upon really grave tragedies in Europe.25
In a longer interview published a few days later, Fure elaborated his criticism:
His statement ‘We no longer acknowledge the state of Israel’ and ‘Israel does
not exist’ are irresponsible word games, which can be exploited by circles who
wish to erase Israel from the map. (...) Most problematically, Gaarder contributes towards moving boundary lines – towards deconstructing constraints in
describing Judaism and Israel.26
Here, we find many of the elements of criticism that were reiterated throughout
the debate. In this way, Fure had a strong impact on the discourse. However, in
23. Mona Levin, “Styggeste jeg har lest”, Aftenposten, August 5, 2006, https://www.aftenposten.no/
kultur/i/wOzzG/--Styggeste-jeg-har-lest (accessed 30.04.2019).
24. Levin, “Styggeste jeg har lest.”
25. Odd-Bjørn Fure, “Gaarder viser farlig kunnskapsløshet”, Verdens Gang, August 6, 2006,
https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/OL7nA/gaarder-viser-farlig-kunnskapsloeshet (accessed
30.04.2019).
26. Odd-Bjørn Fure, “Ansvarsløst spill med ord”, Aftenposten, August 10, 2006, https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/6kGbO/--Ansvarslost-spill-med-ord (accessed 30.04.2019).
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contrast to Levin, he did not assume that Gaarder consciously alluded to genocidal
fantasies. Rather, he attributed Gaarder with a pitifully low level of understanding
and awareness of the historical and cultural context.
So far, we have highlighted the impact of the Holocaust as a frame of interpretation
gaining strength both internationally and in Norway at the beginning of the 2000s. Of
course, the significance of the Holocaust was not the only aspect that contributed to
the enormous furore after the publication of Gaarder’s article: It has to be seen as one
strong parameter, interconnected to others, not least the situation in international politics in which Norway’s role and reputation as “peace nation” related to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict was at stake. A Norwegian celebrity publishing what could be
interpreted as a legitimation of violence against Jews and the destruction of the state
of Israel, and being regarded as representing mainstream or even official Norwegian
positions, was a serious problem for Norway’s international reputation.
GAARDER’S RESPONSES
It quickly became obvious that the reactions to Gaarder’s article were different
from the reactions towards previous expressions of anti-Zionist rhetoric. Even if
Gaarder’s text, as we have shown, didn’t contain a substantially different criticism
of Israel than, for example, the one the extreme left wing (AKP-ml) had been promoting for years, the political context and Gaarder’s position as an internationally
recognised author seemed to enforce a different normative coordinate system in
this case. The dynamics in the public debate were different this time, and
Gaarder’s piece was read as proof of a more widespread and mainstream antisemitism hidden behind the criticism of Israel.27
Still, the heavily attacked author made attempts to (re)gain interpretative power.
His first reaction to the criticism was published in Aftenposten on 7 August, only
two days after the publication of the original article. With its title “Response from
Gaarder: Dear Mona Levin”,28 the very short text addresses his most outspoken
critic directly and personally – but also as a representative of “Jews in Norway”,
whom he was allegedly anxious to avoid hurting.
While underlining that he acknowledges the Holocaust and the right of the
Israeli people to their nation, and apologising for having mocked the Jewish reli27. Manfred Gerstenfeld, Behind the Humanitarian Mask: The Nordic Countries, Israel, and the
Jews (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2008).
28. Jostein Gaarder, “Svar fra Gaarder: Kjære Mona Levin”, Aftenposten, August 07, 2006, https://
www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/i/PoGRX/Svar-fra-Gaarder-Kjare-Mona-Levin (accessed
14.05.2019).
2. THE GAARDER DEBATE REVISITED
gion, he expressed hurt feelings about Levin’s comparison with Mein Kampf. This
response, in which Gaarder presents himself as a victim of misunderstandings and
bad-will interpretations, gives the impression that at this point Gaarder had not yet
grasped the dimension and bearings of the debate he had sparked.
The second, longer response, with the title “Attempt at clarification”, was published on August 12, one week after the original article.
As the debate was raging, Gaarder tried to explain that he had been misunderstood due to the stylistic devices he had used under the emotional impact from the
news about Israeli war atrocities. He underlined that it was his wish to fiercely
criticise the state of Israel, but on the point about Israeli civilians, he announced:
Of course, I do not call for Israeli citizens to leave their country. I do not even
regard this to be a possibility. When I evoked the image of Israeli civilians fleeing ‘occupied territories’ (as Jerusalem or the West Bank), I understand that
this might trigger strong emotions. But the message is crystal clear: Regardless
of context (...) we can never tolerate violence against civilians.29
Gaarder’s further line of argument in this second response was entirely based on
the attempt to make a conceptual distinction between his strong but misunderstood
criticism of Israel and “real” antisemitism, which he exclusively associated with
Nazism.30 He indicated that accusing him of antisemitism would trivialise the
problem and could even result in more antisemitism. This rhetorical strategy
shows that at that time Gaarder was unable to grasp that the debate was about to
change the notion of antisemitism from exclusively denoting hatred of Jews to
also covering the underlying and even unintended negative and stigmatising portrayal of Jews and Judaism.31 At this point, Gaarder, insisting on the difference
between the rhetoric he had used and his real felt attitudes, felt like a victim of
misunderstandings.
29. Jostein Gaarder, “Forsøk på klargjøring”, Aftenposten, August 12, 2006, https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk/i/x8j3j/Forsok-pa-klargjoring (accessed 14.05.2019).
30. Communication researcher Marie Lund is not convinced by Gaarder’s “attempt to separate stylistic and literary devices from the ‘real message’.” She rather interprets the style as an integral
part of the “line of argument that Gaarder stood by in his clarification.” Marie Lund, An Argument on Rhetorical Style (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2017), 174.
31. In this respect, we see parallels to the debate in 1983, analysed by Hoffmann in this volume: In
1983, however, the issue of generalised anti-Jewish notions in forms of criticism of Israel as
highlighted by Leo Eitinger was not acknowledged, despite the fact that Eitinger was a Holocaust survivor.
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REFERENCES TO HOLOCAUST BY GAARDER’S DEFENDERS
It is interesting to see that those who defended Gaarder also actively referred to
the Holocaust as an interpretative framework, albeit with the opposite conclusion
as that drawn by Levin and Fure. Far from accepting that certain forms of criticism
are problematic in the light of the historical genocide, the reference to the Holocaust is regarded as an emotional obstruction to rational argumentation. The newspaper Klassekampen had previously labelled attempts to explore contemporary
antisemitism as “pro-Israeli propaganda”.32 Now, it doubted that Gaarder’s equating of Israel and Judaism was at all problematic, as the following quote by Sandra
Lillebø shows:
It is not unusual to wish an in-depth debate on Islamic ideology and its impact
on the politics of Muslim countries. While this is regarded as legitimate, participants in the debate about Israel are seeing that all references to Judaism as
a religion are strongly rejected as antisemitic. Does the shame about World
War II make it difficult to criticise Israel today?33
Here, Lillebø suggested that the reference to the Holocaust serves to create a double standard, restraining all forms of criticism of Israel. So, while the critics of
Gaarder asked: Do certain forms of criticism of Israel go too far? his defenders
continued to ask: Do the reservations against criticism of Israel go too far?
This indicates an ongoing discursive struggle about what is acceptable/unacceptable with regard to criticism of Israel despite the strong impact of the Holocaust as a frame of interpretation. Following Ernesto Laclau and Chantal
Mouffe,34 the contest about the demarcation line between criticism of Israel and
antisemitism constituted a hegemonial struggle, in which the power of definition
is linked to far-reaching questions of political legitimacy, authority and influence.
BULLETS AGAINST THE SYNAGOGUE – FROM WORDS TO DEEDS?
During the night of 17 September 2006, 13 gunshots were fired at the synagogue
in Oslo. No humans were injured, but the shots left visible marks on the walls of
the synagogue building. The attack was shortly after classified as antisemitic and
32. Hoffmann, “A fading consensus?”, chapter 1, this volume, 44.
33. Sandra Lillebø, “Raserer debatten”, Klassekampen, 11 August 2006, https://www.klassekampen.no/38517/article/item/null/-raserer-debatten.
34. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical
Democratic Politics. (London: Verso, 1985).
2. THE GAARDER DEBATE REVISITED
an act of terrorism.35 Four persons from the Islamist scene, among them the wellknown Islamist activist Arfan Quadeer Bhatti, were arrested shortly after the
attack.
Searching for the deeper causes of the attack, some public voices immediately
referred to Gaarder and his op-ed article. Mona Levin placed the attacks in the
broader societal context, which she regarded to be hostile towards Israel and Jews
in general. Without blaming Gaarder as directly co-responsible for the shootings,
she referred to his article as the most recent and most drastic example of a climate
of debate that can encourage others to take the step towards violence:
Gaarder’s articles, the debates accompanying them, and the Norwegian left
wing’s one-eyed criticism of the entire Middle East complex (...) have contributed to acts of violence against Jews.36
The bullets fired against the synagogue confirmed the perception that Gaarder’s
words could be read and had been read as a legitimation of acts of violence against
Jews in general. In this way, the notion of Gaarder’s text being antisemitic was
reinforced.
3. THE GAARDER DEBATE AND THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT
In late December 2008, armed conflict erupted in the Middle East, lasting for three
weeks between 27 December and until a ceasefire was agreed upon on 18 January
2009. This conflict between Israel and Hamas, which mainly took place in the
Gaza strip, gained a lot of attention in Norway and led again to a strong public
debate. In Oslo, violent demonstrations took place outside the Israeli embassy for
several days. The demonstrations led to riots in the city centre, with large-scale
vandalism against houses, cars and shops nearby as the police fired the crowd with
tear gas.37 With the Gaza conflict gaining so much public attention and raising so
many passions, the question of how to criticise Israel became relevant again.
35. Camilla Ryste, “Fire terrorsiktet etter synagoge-skudd”, Aftenposten, September 23, 2006,
https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/odEjV/fire-terrorsiktet-etter-synagoge-skudd (accessed
22.08.2019).
36. Harald S. Klungtveit, “Jeg har aldri sagt at Gaarder har skylden”, Dagbladet, September 24,
2006, https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/jeg-har-aldri-sagt-gaarder-har-skylden/66255900.
37. Dennis Ravndal, “Demonstranter raser mot støttemarkeringen for Israel: Politiet bruker tåregass
mot demonstranter”, VG, Januar 8, 2009, https://vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/a5qeA/demonstranter-raser-mot-stoettemarkeringen-for-israel-politiet-bruker-taaregass-mot-demonstranter
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In this debate, the issue of defining the line between criticism of Israel and antisemitism also came up again. The basic positions in the public debate had not changed.
However, it now became evident that Gaarder and his article figured as negative examples and a narrative abbreviation, indicating the red line that should not be crossed.
A NEW SENSITIVITY?
At the same time as the Gaza conflict rumbled on, US president-elect Barack
Obama appointed Rahm Emanuel as the White House Chief of Staff.38 Former
Norwegian prime minister Kåre Willoch judged the appointment as worrying, and
later explained there was reason to believe that by being an American Jew who
had served as a (civilian) volunteer in the Israeli Army, Emanuel would be proIsrael. Willoch’s statement was criticised for being antisemitic, especially by
Mona Levin, who labelled him a Jew hater.39 In an interview with Aftenposten on
15 January 2009, Gaarder re-entered the debate, claiming that the labelling of anybody criticising Israel as an antisemite was derailing the debate.
None of those who participate in the debate, neither Willoch nor myself, are
anti-Semites, but every time we talk about Israel, we have to distance ourselves
from the Holocaust. It shouldn’t be necessary.40
The borderline between criticism of Israel and antisemitism was discussed with
Gaarder once again at the heart of the debate, despite him having withdrawn from
it before. He claimed that the accusation of antisemitism is a planned and calculated derailment, stating that “the Israel lobby and the religious right wing in the
US are contributing to an inflation of the word.”41
Interestingly, Gaarder again brought in the Holocaust as a frame of interpretation
in order to accuse his opponents in the debate of abusing the term. From the outset
of the uproar between Willoch and Levin, the Gaarder debate was lingering in the
background. Through Gaarder’s intervention, it became a new edition of the battle
about legitimate and illegitimate criticism of Israel – and Gaarder’s culpability.
38. http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/11/06/emanuel.reaction/index.html.
39. Ole Berthelsen, “Kåre Willoch er rasist og jødehater”, TV2, January 19, 2009, https://
www.tv2.no/a/2509336 (accessed 04.05.2019). The debate between Willoch and Levin flared up
again in 2015: Mona Levin, “Klassisk antisemittisme”, Dagsavisen, February 23, 2015, https://
www.dagsavisen.no/nyemeninger/klassisk-antisemittisme-1.451162.
40. Flemming Trondsen, “Willoch er ikke en jødehater”, Aftenposten, January 15, 2009, https://
www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/O3r4E/--Willoch-er-ikke-jodehater (accessed 04.05.2019).
41. Trondsen, “Willoch er ikke en jødehater.”
2. THE GAARDER DEBATE REVISITED
GAARDER AS A STIGMATISED PARTICIPANT IN THE PUBLIC DEBATE
In late 2008, the interference of Manfred Gerstenfeld from the Jerusalem Center
for Public Affairs, an Israeli think tank focusing on Israeli security, regional diplomacy and international law, took the debate to an international level. Gerstenfeld
gained attention in Norway in 2008 when he published the book Behind the
Humanitarian Mask: The Nordic Countries, Israel, and the Jews, in which he
vehemently criticised Norway and Sweden, claiming that parts of the social elites
were responsible for “many pioneering efforts in demonising Israel.”42 Gerstenfeld also wrote in the Jerusalem Post that “Norway has a long history of anti-Semitism“,43 and accused prominent Norwegians, such as comedian Otto Jespersen,
of being antisemitic. Gerstenfeld mentioned Gaarder in particular as a prime
example of latent Norwegian antisemitism, writing that the “op-ed by Jostein
Gaarder [...] until this day remains the vilest anti-Semitic article published in a
European mainstream paper since the Second World War.”44
Gerstenfeld’s harsh criticism of Norway caused quite a stir in Norwegian
media, leading to a small but fierce debate. Per A. Christiansen, Middle East correspondent for Aftenposten, and Thomas Hylland Eriksen were among those who
questioned Gerstenfeld’s methods and understanding of the Norwegian debate
culture.45 Gerstenfeld replied in his article “Latterliggjøring av Holocaust” (Ridiculing the Holocaust)46 by saying that both Christiansen and Hylland Eriksen
toned down and whitewashed what were clearly antisemitic actions. Furthermore,
Dore Gold, Chairman of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, advised Norway
to use Gerstenfeld’s “disturbing findings” for self-examination.47
42. Gerstenfeld, Behind the Humanitarian Mask.
43. Manfred Gerstenfeld, “Norway – a paradigm for anti-Semitism”, Jerusalem Post, December 13,
2008, https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Norway-a-paradigm-for-anti-Semitism (accessed 14.04.2019).
44. Gerstenfeld, “Norway – a paradigm for anti-Semitism.”
45. Per A. Christiansen, “En nasjon av jødehatere?”, Aftenposten, December 19, 2008, https://
www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kommentar/i/Ewyx2/En-nasjon-av-jodehatere. Thomas Hylland
Eriksen, “Ingen løsning i sikte”, Aftenposten, January 07, 2009, https://www.aftenposten.no/
meninger/i/m1P0E/Ingen-losning-i-sikte (accessed 15.05.2019).
46. Manfred Gerstenfeld, “Latterliggjøring av Holocaust”, Aftenposten, January 27, 2009,
https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/i/175OQ/Latterliggjoringen-av-Holocaust (accessed 15.05.2019).
47. Dore Gold, “Grunnløs kritikk”, Aftenposten, January 03, 2009, https://www.aftenposten.no/
meninger/debatt/i/04VqB/Grunnlos-kritikk (accessed 15.05.2019).
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2014 – THE USE OF GAARDER AS NARRATIVE ABBREVIATION
In 2014, when tensions in the Middle East escalated once more with new hostilities between Israel and Hamas, Gaarder’s original article was again read and
shared on social media for a few weeks. This was the first time that the content
and message of the article were discussed to any degree for quite a long time.
However, newspapers and, in particular, Ervin Kohn, vice director of the Norwegian Center against Racism (Antirasistisk Senter) and president of the Jewish
Community in Oslo, were keen to stress that the op-ed was already eight years old,
thereby playing down its relevance and credibility. Many might have felt that the
article described the current climate of the conflict, but Gaarder’s article was now
seen as an example of unacceptable criticism of Israel. In many ways, Kohn shut
the debate down before it started again by saying that the original text was a “horrible, antisemitic article” that we were all now finished with.48
The conflict of 2014 did, however, attract much attention in the media and in
Norwegian politics and reignited a debate about how to criticise Israel. In an article, Snorre Valen, a high-ranking politician in the Socialist Left party (SV),
claimed that “of course we should expect more from Israel” and that “we should
hold Israel to a higher moral standard.”49 The Socialist Left party, now no longer
a junior partner in a coalition government after the coalition lost the election in
2013, had long since been critical of Israel’s policies towards Palestine and especially its support for the settlements. Valen’s criticism of Israel made active use of
Gaarder’s article by labelling it “criticism that misses the target” and showing
where the line between legitimate and illegitimate criticism should be drawn. By
doing so, Valen’s article shows how Gaarder now serves as a well-established
marker of failing criticism of Israel – and to place one’s own position within the
realm of legitimate criticism. Gaarder’s article is neither explained nor discussed,
merely referred to, leaving Gaarder in the position of an ever-present and stigmatised participant in the debate – even if he does not take active part in it.
48. Maren Ørstavik, “Gammel Israel-kronikk vekker nytt engasjement”, Aftenposten, July 22, 2014,
https://www.aftenposten.no/kultur/i/L0OL4/jostein-gaarders-israel-kronikk-vekker-nyttengasjement (accessed 15.05.2019).
49. Snorre Valen, “Så klart vi forventer mer av Israel”, Verdens Gang, July 24, 2014, https://
www.vg.no/nyheter/meninger/i/49Xb6/israel-er-et-av-verdens-mest-utviklede-land-og-vi-maaholde-israel-til-en-hoeyere-moralsk-standard-enn-avskummet-i-isil-skriver-sv-politiker-snorrevalen-kronikk-saa-klart-vi-forventer-mer-av-israel (accessed 15.05.2019).
2. THE GAARDER DEBATE REVISITED
4. GAARDER AND THE QUESTION OF ANTISEMITISM IN NORWAY
As indicated in the introduction, the Gaarder debate had also brought up the question of antisemitism as being a part of mainstream discourse in Norway and, as a
consequence, the question of how widespread antisemitic attitudes were in the
Norwegian population.
In 2010-12, the Holocaust Center conducted a population survey investigating
attitudes towards Jews and other minorities. This was the first population survey
of this kind in Norway, and was commissioned by three ministries: the Ministry
of Children, Equality and Inclusion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice.50 The support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can, among other
things, be interpreted as a consequence of the “bad reputation” Norway had gained
through international media coverage of alleged antisemitism related to the Middle East conflict.
An article in the newspaper Aftenposten from January 2011, covering the work
with the survey, underlined that “Norway has been criticised for an alleged rising
antisemitism by individuals and media in Israel.” Higher Education Minister Tora
Aasland is quoted saying that “the Council of Europe has requested more information about attitudes towards Jews in the Norwegian population.”51
Accusations of antisemitism had become an issue of international reputation for
Norway, and there can be no doubt that the “Gaarder affair” was an element in this.
In the same article, the director of the Holocaust Center, Odd-Bjørn Fure,
referred to the Gaarder article as the very symbol of an antisemitic incident:
We’ve had a number of problematic issues. We need to ask if they are a result
of an environment of anti-Jewish attitudes, or if these are more random cases.
Fure further highlighted Gaarder’s article as an indicator of these attitudes, in
addition to the shooting at the synagogue or the bullying of Jewish school
children.52 The examples given by Fure here show that Gaarder’s article is
placed in a “line of events” culminating in the shooting at the synagogue and is
50. https://www.hlsenteret.no/forskning/jodisk-historie-og-antisemittisme/holdningsundersokelse/
(accessed 15.05.2019).
51. Olav Olsen, “Kartlegger nordmenns holdninger til jøder”, Aftenposten, January 26, 2011,
https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/Qmmxq/Kartlegger-nordmenns-holdninger-til-joder (accessed 31.08.2019).
52. With this he might be alluding to a survey conducted in Oslo in 2010 bringing to the fore the
extended use of “Jew” as a swear word among pupils; http://2v2ae13etcm31s6bzloe3jz1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Rapport_UDA_7.6.2011.pdf.
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even mentioned as the most prominent example of recent antisemitic incidents
in Norway.
Conceptually, this use of the “Gaarder trope” is interesting as it also marks a
shift in the conception of antisemitism, bringing it closer to the international discussion and research on the topic. As mentioned before, the perception of antisemitism in the Norwegian public debate tended to be limited to hatred of Jews,
strongly associated with Nazi ideology. This hatred would only be found in antisemites, who most likely would be placed on the extreme right fringes of the political spectre. This, on the other hand, meant that a person who did not hate Jews
could not be accused of antisemitism. Even if this perception had been challenged
before – e.g. by Holocaust survivor Leo Eitinger53 – it took the Gaarder debate to
significantly change this view in the broader public. Not only the antisemite and
his or her intentions and attitudes, but the antisemitic denotation of utterances or
expressions came under the spotlight. As a consequence, it would not be that any
kind of criticism of Israel would fall under the definition of antisemitism, as
claimed by Gaarder’s defenders, but those forms of criticism that carried antisemitic or anti-Judaist stereotypes and generalisations would.
However, Fure’s indication that Gaarder’s article was some of the most striking
proof that antisemitism was an issue in contemporary Norwegian society provoked another attempt by Gaarder to rid himself of this stigma. In his article “Not
antisemitic attitudes”, Gaarder stressed that his polemic in 2006 had not been an
expression of an anti-Jewish sentiment:
In numerous interviews and debate programmes, and in a new article in Aftenposten after the first one, I made it crystal clear that my engagement was not
an expression of anti-Jewish attitudes. It was an expression of humanism and
empathy with the victims of war.54
The quote shows that Gaarder’s argument was still informed by an understanding
of antisemitism as anti-Jewish attitudes. As he considered himself to be accused
of such attitudes, he defended himself, emphasising his real attitudes as being
humanistic and empathic, and then turning into a mode of attack:
53. See Hoffman, chapter 1, this volume.
54. Jostein Gaarder, “Ikke antijødiske holdninger”, Aftenposten, January 29, 2011,
https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk/i/rgAkw/Ikke-antijodiske-holdninger
15.05.2019).
(accessed
2. THE GAARDER DEBATE REVISITED
But Odd-Bjørn Fure also knows that those who criticise the politics of Israel
are automatically accused of antisemitism. Fure knows this mechanism or
master suppression technique.55
Unwilling or incapable to accept the distinction between antisemitic expressions
and anti-Jewish attitudes, Gaarder used the reoccurring defence strategy of claiming that any criticism of Israel would be defined as antisemitic. Consequently,
Gaarder positioned himself as a victim of a master suppression technique.
Four months later, Gaarder appeared with yet another attempt at clarification.
In an article entitled “Afterthought”, he accepted the point that his stylistic devices
and expressions, not his attitudes, had been under scrutiny, and seemed, for the
first time, to accept the “verdict” of public opinion.
Moreover, Gaarder himself insisted on the necessity of distinguishing legitimate
criticism of Israel from expressions of antisemitism:
From my side, the op-ed was not at all an expression of anti-Jewish attitudes.
But my way of expressing myself in 2006 could easily be interpreted like that.
[...]
We never must express ourselves in such a way that legitimate criticism of the
politics of the state of Israel can be confused with an illegitimate and in any
regard unacceptable agitation against Jews or Judaism. The first to take the
consequences of this insight should be myself. My intention was to draw attention to the victims of war and the responsibility of the state of Israel. Unfortunately, I did not realise in time that I was about to formulate several thoughtless
and ambiguous statements, and I apologise for that. It has become a case of
conscience for me to be very clear about this issue.56
In this response, Gaarder gives the impression of a total turnaround. There are no
more traces of self-victimisation and accusations to his critics of purposely misunderstanding and misinterpreting him. Instead, there is an expression of regret
for not being aware of the offensive meaning of his text and a sense of moral obligation to take responsibility for his fault. Given the development that had transformed his article into the major landmark indicating the red line between legitimate criticism of Israel and antisemitism, Gaarder changed his position from
55. Gaarder, “Ikke antijødiske holdninger.”
56. Gaarder, “Ikke antijødiske holdninger.”
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denial to embrace, and even to becoming one of the “gatekeepers” himself by
exclaiming that “We never must express ourselves in a way that […]”.
5. THE MOVING TROPE: GAARDER REFERENCES IN DIFFERENT
CONTEXTS
As shown, altogether Gaarder came up with four excuses, or attempts at clarification in 2006 and 2011. Apparently, the burden of being associated with a “horrible
text that cannot be mitigated by anything else than speaking about the text itself”57
was too heavy to bear for Gaarder. His attempts at exculpation were commented
upon rather ironically by the editor of Bergens Tidende, Olav Kobbeltveit, a week
later:
Recently, almost five years later, Jostein Gaarder found that even more repentance was necessary. Therefore, he came with one more public confession of his
sins on 20 April this year. In Aftenposten, he writes under the heading ‘Afterthought’: ‘We must never express ourselves in such a way that legitimate criticism of the state of Israel by any means can be confused with absolute illegitimate and unacceptable bullying of Jews.’ Okay, but who sets the boundary
marker between justifiable criticism of the state of Israel and unacceptable bullying against Jews and Judaism?58
While pointing to the impossible task of defining an indisputable demarcation line
between criticism of Israel and antisemitism, Kobbeltveit did not seem to recognise that Gaarder’s article had become the very symbol of such a red line. However, despite Gaarder’s attempt to place himself on the “right” side of legitimate
and illegitimate criticism of Israel, the op-ed had started to live a life of its own. It
had turned into a narrative abbreviation, telling the story of a failed criticism of
Israel and conveying the moral that even unintentionally expressed antisemitism
was unacceptable.
Years later, references to the Gaarder debate served to indicate the red line
between acceptable and unacceptable rhetoric related to Israel, Jews, and Judaism.
In 2015, Gaarder was put under the spot light in connection to the debate about
a free speech prize awarded to Kari Jaquesson, a TV personality and journalist
known for fitness programs as well as for her outspoken feminist opinions and
57. Inge Lønning, “En tekst og en utblåsning”, Kirke og Kultur, no. 03 (2006): 313.
58. Olav Kobbeltveit, “Omstridd antisemittisme”, Bergens Tidende, May 2, 2011, https://www.bt.no/
btmeninger/kommentar/i/5bLPz/Omstridd-antisemittisme (accessed 15.05.2019).
2. THE GAARDER DEBATE REVISITED
criticism of pornography. Some days before she was to receive the price at a philosophy festival in southern Norway, Jaquesson posted a comment on a Facebook
page in which she insinuated that Israel stood behind IS attacks in Europe. Jaquesson was criticised for playing with old antisemitic rhetoric and a conspiracy theory
that led to a whole new debate. The Facebook post caused one member of the jury
to step down from her position because she could not persuade the rest of the jury
to withdraw Jaquesson’s award. The remaining members of the jury believed the
opinions from Jaquesson to be “legitimate political utterances”, rejecting the proposal to withdraw. Jostein Gaarder was a board member of the festival, and somehow saw himself thrown back into the discussion about antisemitism. Again, in
this context of antisemitic utterances, Gaarder’s op-ed was used as an example of
previous antisemitic posts. Interestingly, even if the criticism of Israel was not an
issue here, Gaarder still served as a narrative abbreviation in order to highlight that
even subtle and unintended antisemitic expressions need to be addressed as what
they are: antisemitic.59
The final incident to be analysed here took place during the French presidential
elections in 2016. Due to his previous working relation with the Rothschild bank,
negative associations to Emmanuel Macron as a representative of moneyed and
economic elites circulated. These negative associations had classical antisemitic
undertones, such as the “the money Jew”. In an article in VG explaining this controversy, Gaarder is referred to once again as an example of antisemitism. The article, titled “Den evige påstanden”, (The eternal claim) by the Norwegian journalist
and media commentator Anders Giæver, explains how the Rothschild bank has
held a central role in antisemitic conspiracy theories for over 200 years, and that
it was a convenient misunderstanding to think that “if a person is not a racist, he
or she cannot make a racist statement.”60 In the discussions of latent antisemitism
in contexts outside Norway, Gaarder is used as an analogy or reference.
6. CONCLUSION
By exploring some of the main elements of the Gaarder debate in 2006 and following the debate throughout its afterlife for a decade, the analysis has shown that
it marks a turning point in several ways. Most obviously, there is a before and after
59. Didrik Søderlind, “Kunsten “Å bare stille spørsmål”, Verdens Gang, May 29, 2015,
https://www.vg.no/nyheter/meninger/i/52awK/kunsten-aa-bare-stille-spoersmaal (accessed
15.05.2019).
60. Anders Giæver, “Den evige påstanden”, Verdens Gang, March 30, 2017, https://www.vg.no/
nyheter/meninger/i/jWwPb/den-evige-paastanden (accessed 04.05.2019).
71
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CLAUDIA LENZ AND THEODOR VESTAVIK GEELMUYDEN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
Gaarder when it comes to what is assumed as legitimate and acceptable forms of
criticism of Israel and what is regarded to be crossing a red line towards antisemitism. This does not mean that there is an established consensus regarding where
exactly this red line lies, or when it is crossed, but there is an awareness that such
a line exists and that it should not be crossed. This shift is particularly interesting
in light of previous debates in Norway, such as those related to a hearing on antisemitism held in Oslo in 1983, when the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate criticism of Israel was broadly rejected in the public debate in Norway.61
Another insight regards the importance of the Holocaust as interpretative
framework internationally, and the impact of the establishment of the Holocaust
Center for the shifting boundary between assumed legitimate criticism of Israel
and antisemitism in the Norwegian context. In the light of the persecution and
murder of the European Jews during World War II, the denial of the right of the
state of Israel to exist was interpreted as a legitimisation of violence against Jews
– and became more problematic.
The impact of the Gaarder debate on the discourse on antisemitism even goes
beyond the issue of criticism of Israel. While Gaarder repeatedly defended himself
against the accusation of being a Jew hater, the debate had consolidated the awareness that neither hatred of Jews nor an anti-Jewish intention are decisive for qualifying utterances or expressions as antisemitic, but the possible interpretations and
consequences of the expressions are.
The material analysed shows that references to the Gaarder debate have become
a discursive trope recalling and re-establishing this boundary, and that it is used as
a narrative abbreviation, alluding to the boundary without repeating the arguments
that established it.
In these ways, the debate has contributed to a higher sense of alert related to
other forms of antisemitism. As references to the Gaarder op-ed, problematising
antisemitic allusions to Jewish conspiracy, occur even ten years later, the debate
has contributed to the communicative latency of antisemitism.
And Jostein Gaarder? Despite his attempts to explain and whitewash himself,
he has become a symbol of non-intentional antisemitism. After having tried to free
himself from this stigma, often by accusing his critics of willingly misinterpreting
his good intentions, he finally embraced the criticism. Beyond that, he turned into
a moral defender of the demarcation line he involuntarily contributed towards
establishing.
61. See Hoffmann, chapter 1, this volume.
2. THE GAARDER DEBATE REVISITED
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barkan, E. (2001). The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Bergmann, W. & Erb, R. (1986). Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung. Theoretische Überlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Kölner
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 38, 223–246.
Berthelsen, O. (2008, January 14). Kåre Willoch er en rasist og en jødehater. TV2.
Christiansen, P. A. (2008, December 19). En nasjon av jødehatere? Aftenposten.
Eriksen, T. H. (2009, January 7). Ingen løsning i sikte. Aftenposten.
Fure, O.-B. (2006, June 8). Gaarder viser farlig kunnskapsløshet. Verdens Gang.
Fure, O.-B. (2006, August 10). Ansvarsløst spill med ord. Aftenposten.
Gaarder, J. (2006, January 29). Ikke antijødiske holdninger. Aftenposten.
Gaarder, J. (2006, August 6). Guds utvalgte folk. Aftenposten.
Gaarder, J. (2006, August 7). Svar fra Gaarder: Kjære Mona Levin. Aftenposten.
Gaarder, J. (2006, August 12). Forsøk på klargjøring. Aftenposten.
Gaarder, J. (2011, March 20). Ettertanke. Aftenposten.
Gerstenfeld, M. (2008). Behind the Humanitarian Mask: The Nordic Countries, Israel, and the
Jews. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
Gerstenfeld, M. (2008, December 13). Norway – a paradigm for anti-Semitism. Jerusalem Post.
Gerstenfeld, M. (2009, January 27). Latterliggjøring av Holocaust. Aftenposten.
Giæver, A. (2017, March 30). Den evige påstanden. Verdens Gang.
Gold, D. (2009, January 3). Grunnløs kritikk. Aftenposten.
Klungtveit, H. S. (2006, September 24). Jeg har aldri sagt at Gaarder har skylden. Dagbladet.
Kobbeltveit, O. (2011, May 2). Omstridd antisemittisme. Bergens Tidende.
Laclau, E., Mouffe, C. (19859. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso.
Lenz, C. (2014). Linking Holocaust Education to Human Rights Education – a Symptom of the
Levin, M. (2006, August 5). Styggeste jeg har lest. Aftenposten.
Levin, M. (2015, February 23). Klassisk antisemittisme. Dagens Næringsliv.
Lillebø, S. (2006, August 11). Raserer debatten. Klassekampen.
Lund, M. (2017). An Argument on Rhetorical Style. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.
Lønning, I. (2006). En tekst og en utblåsning. Kirke og Kultur, 3, 313–314.
Mouffe, C. (2008). Critique as Counter-Hegemonic Intervention. Transversal multilingual webjournal. Vienna: European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies. http://eipcp.net/transversal/0808/mouffe/en/print (accessed 14.05.2019).
Olsen, O. (2011, January 26). Kartlegger nordmenns holdninger til jøder. Aftenposten.
Straub, J. (2005). Narration, Identity, and Historical consciousness (Vol. 3). New York: Berghahn
Books.
Søderlind, D. (2015, May 29). Kunsten å bare stille spørsmål. Verdens Gang.
Trondsen, F. (2009). Willoch er ikke en jødehater. Aftenposten.
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Universalization and De-Nationalization of Memory Culture in Norway? In Bauernkämper, A.,
Fure, O.-B., Hetland, Ø., Zimmermann, R. (Eds.), From Patriotic Memory to a Universalistic
Narrative? (87–103). Münster: Klartext Verlag.
Valen, S. (2014, July 24). Så klart vi forventer mer av Israel. Verdens Gang.
Ørstavik, M. (2014). Gammel Israel-kronikk vekker nytt engasjement. Aftenposten.
2. THE GAARDER DEBATE REVISITED
ANNEX: OVERVIEW OVER INCLUDED MEDIA WITH MORE THAN 10
CONTRIBUTIONS/ BY KEYWORDS
Kilde
Aftenposten
Aftenposten
Gaarder+
Israel
Gaarder+
Gaarder+
antisemittisme Kronikk
Gaarder+
antisemitt
Gaarder+
Gaarder+
antisemittisk jødehat
Gaarder+
Holocaust
Gaarder+
Levin
120
48
107
16
16
19
30
24
0
45
86
17
13
19
26
20
Dagbladet
55
14
37
7
9
9
13
16
Klassekampen
43
19
28
12
4
4
14
11
Dagbladet
35
15
22
7
7
5
14
9
NTBtekst
34
9
16
5
1
2
5
5
VG
40
10
16
9
5
4
5
7
Bergens Tidende
30
13
18
5
3
8
5
8
Dagen
23
15
19
2
7
7
4
2
Adresseavisen
23
11
17
8
3
6
6
5
Norge IDAG
35
7
16
0
2
6
6
2
Dagsavisen
26
6
24
4
1
3
6
1
Vårt Land
23
9
18
3
3
2
3
4
VG Nett
18
9
17
6
2
3
4
5
Bergens Tidende
19
8
17
4
3
4
5
4
Dagsavisen
23
9
14
5
1
4
6
1
Morgenbladet
14
8
14
8
5
3
3
2
Fædrelandsvennen
18
6
14
3
2
2
6
2
Nettavisen
21
6
15
2
2
1
3
4
Tønsbergs Blad
17
6
12
4
1
2
4
1
Adresseavisen
13
4
10
4
2
2
2
3
Stavanger Aftenblad
20
5
7
2
2
1
3
2
NRK
14
4
10
2
1
0
4
2
Fædrelandsvennen
14
4
9
1
2
0
3
0
Klassekampen
7
6
7
3
2
1
5
2
Bergensavisen
13
4
8
4
0
1
2
1
Nationen
10
4
7
2
2
2
2
0
Sarpsborg Arbeiderblad
11
6
5
3
1
2
1
2
9
5
6
2
1
3
2
1
Nationen
75
DOI: 10.18261/978-82-15-03468-3-2019-04
3.
A Growing Consensus?
A History of Public Debates on
Islamophobia in Norway
CORA ALEXA DØVING
ABSTRACT The term Islamophobia is seldom used in Norwegian public debates, but
people are increasingly recognising the phenomenon to which it refers. Regardless of
the labelling – anti-Muslim sentiments, discrimination against Muslims, prejudice, harassment, or enmity against Muslims – there seems to be a new awareness of Islamophobia
as a problem that needs to be addressed. Although only 56 per cent of the respondents
to the population survey conducted by the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (CHM) saw a need to combat harassment against Muslims, 81 per cent believed negative attitudes towards Muslims were widespread. The population’s perception
of prejudice as being prevalent in Norwegian society might be a reflection of a growing
concern for Islamophobia expressed in public debates. This chapter gives an overview of
the cases that put Islamophobia on the map in Norway: When are anti-Muslim discourses seen as problematic – and why? It identifies developments in the understanding of
Islamophobia and asks whether the acknowledgement of the phenomenon has resulted
from a growing consensus of Islamophobia as a social and political problem that cuts
across various political standpoints.
KEYWORDS Islamophobia | public discourse | conspiracy theory | 22 July | antiMuslim racism | Norway
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
1. INTRODUCTION
The term Islamophobia has never become properly established in Norwegian public debates. The phenomenon it refers to – widespread prejudice, acts and practices that exclude or discriminate against people on the grounds that they are or
are assumed to be Muslim – however, is increasingly recognised.1 The aim of this
chapter is to locate when and in what ways Islamophobia (regardless of what it is
called) has been debated in the Norwegian press: When was Islamophobia first
recognised as a problem? What are the cases that triggered discussions of Islamophobia, and how have the boundaries of what can be said about Muslims been
negotiated?
Not surprisingly, the history of an understanding of Islamophobia is linked to
the history of Muslim migration to Norway.2 Xenophobia, discrimination, and
racism have been side effects of debates on migration, and an understanding of
Islamophobia has developed hand-in-hand with these issues being publicly discussed.
The late 1980s marked the start of a long-lasting and often conflict-oriented
public debate on migration and integration in Norway. An important – almost paradigmatic – shift in these debates was when “the migrants” became “the Muslims”. To begin, Norwegians of Muslim background were generally understood to
be immigrants with highly varied national backgrounds, and described with reference to their country of origin rather than their religious affiliation. This changed
during the 1990s. The understanding of Islamophobia as a specific phenomenon,
different from general xenophobia, is linked to this change. A change from “ethnicity” to “religion” as an identifying marker was not necessarily a one-sided
affair, as an increasing number of young Norwegians of Muslim background during the same decade started self-identifying publicly as “Muslim” rather than
“Pakistani”, “Moroccan”, or “Turk”.3 Towards the end of the chapter, I will discuss whether the understanding of Islamophobia can also be seen as part of a discourse of “resistance” and identity politics among Muslims.
1. For a definition of the term Islamophobia, see the introduction to this book; and for a discussion
on how Islamophobia is related to racism, see chapter 8 in this book, Cora Alexa Døving, “Muslims are…: Contextualising survey answers”.
2. See chapter 8, “Muslims are…: Contextualising Survey Answers”, for a brief introduction to the
history of Muslims in Norway.
3. Cora Alexa Døving and Siv Ellen Kraft, Religion i pressen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 2013);
Christian Stokke, A multicultural society in the making. How Norwegian Muslims challenge a
white nation (PhD, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Social
Anthropology, 2012), 7.
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CORA ALEXA DØVING | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
One of the debates that has triggered discussions about Islamophobia is that on
the term itself, and how it should be conceptualised.4 These conceptual discussions, however, did not enter the wider public sphere in Norway until 2001, which
is late compared to discussions in Britain, Sweden, and France. In Norway, conceptual variations of the term were discussed seriously first around 2009 and then
again after the terror attacks of 22 July 2011. In the search for data in the archives
of national newspapers, the term Islamophobia was therefore not useful as a starting point for identifying the understanding of what it refers to. Since the aim of
this text is to identify some sort of public understanding of the phenomenon rather
than tracking the history of the term, the chapter will refer to debates that centred
around a concern about prejudices, aversion, discrimination, anti-Muslim sentiments, or attacks on Muslims as a point of departure. To simplify reading, I will
use the term Islamophobia when addressing these phenomena, regardless of the
term used in the different debates.
The numbers of articles on Islam and Muslims that appeared in the Norwegian
press between the end of the 1980s and 2012 is overwhelming; the press seemed
to possess an unlimited interest in the presence of Muslims. This chapter has no
intention of covering the breadth and depth of these debates and how they have
been fed into Islamophobia.5 Rather, I have selected a few cases based on the criteria that they, in addition to starting with a negative angle on Muslims, also produced a meta-discussion (often marginal) on the consequences that such negative
depictions could have for Muslims. I have chosen some of the cases that can be
defined as milestones in the history of both Islamophobia and the attempts to
counter it in Norway. I refer to them as milestones because the cases have become
references in the national history of Muslim migration, as well as having promoted
discussions on Islamophobia.
The rise of Islamophobia in Norway is intimately linked to the rise of populist rightwing formations that mobilise on an anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim platform.6
4. The history of the term has been of little interest in these debates. It was first used in French in
the book La Politique musulmane dans l’Afrique Occidentale Française from 2010, by Alain
Quellien. The book criticised French colonial administrators’ attitudes towards Muslims. The
first usage of the word in the English language can be cited in the works of Edward Said, from
1985. He used the word when arguing for the close association between “Islamophobia and antisemitism” throughout history.
5. Arranged marriages, Koran schooling, Muslim values (whatever they may be), imams and the building of mosques are examples of typical themes in the general debates. Due to their ongoing nature,
they are not discussed in this chapter other than as a general backdrop for more time–specific events.
6. Sindre Bangstad, Anders Breivik and the Rise of Islamophobia (London and New York: Zed
Books, 2014).
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
When Islamophobia is recognised and discussed, it is therefore often entangled
with political arguments raised against the right-wing populist party, the Progress
Party (Fremskrittspartiet). Consequently, the issue of Islamophobia has often been
framed as part of a right/left polarisation established in Norwegian politics. In other
words, Islamophobia is often seen as a politicised concept used rhetorically with
references to different views on migration or multiculturalism. Inasmuch as the title
of this chapter indicates that there is an increasing consensus concerning Islamophobia in Norway, it is because Islamophobia seems to be (slowly) becoming an
issue for political parties and debaters independent of a right/left axis in politics
(2019). I suggest that the increase in populist and more extreme right-wing milieus
in recent years has led to a more hegemonic understanding among politicians of
Islamophobia as a phenomenon that needs to be politically addressed, and that it is
a phenomenon that combines conspiracy theories and racist elements.
2. MUSLIMS IN THE PRESS – A GENERAL BACKGROUND
The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has pointed out that debates on the
understanding of a multicultural society in all Western European countries have
become debates on Islam and Muslims.7 This is also the case in Norway.8 A media
survey for 2009 showed that the terms “Islam” and “Muslims” were used more
often than the term “swine flu”, which relates to the biggest news of 2009, and that
the term “Muslims” was used almost as many times as the name of Norway’s
prime minister.9 The finding illustrates a public sphere with a certain obsession
with the issue of Muslim presence.
The press is the primary source of information about Islam and Muslims for
most Norwegians.10 It is therefore reasonable to assume that the media image
affects the population’s beliefs and attitudes towards Muslims. Due to the “logic
of media”, Islam/Muslims are often visible through exceptional events.11 Emphasis on sensational rather than everyday matters applies to news in general, but
7. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (New York: Harvard University Press, 2007).
8. Fritt Ords medieanalyse 2016: http://www.frittord.no/images/uploads/files/Muslimer_og_islam_i_mediene_2016.pdf.
9. Retriever medieanalyse 2009: https://www.imdi.no/contentassets/e187852a18ca46afb6f2bc7e4915d6ad/medieanalyse-innvandring-og-integrering-i-norske-medier.
10. Elisabeth Eide and Anne Hege Simonsen, Mistenkelige utlendinger. Minoriteter i norsk presse
gjennom hundre år (Oslo: Høyskoleforlaget, 2007).
11. Stefano Allievi, “The Media and debates on Islam”, in Brigitte Marechal, B., Allievi, S., Dassetto, F., Nielsen, J. eds., Muslims in Enlarged Europe. Religion and Society (Boston: Brill,
2003), p. 291.
79
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CORA ALEXA DØVING | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
because Islam is linked to a part of the population that is vulnerable on account of
its migration background and minority status, the consequences of the media logic
can be serious. Several studies of ways in which Islam is presented in mass media
have documented how stereotypical notions are produced or reproduced.12 A
recent study of representations of Muslims in the British press (from 2000 to
2015), found that Muslims are generally negatively framed, whilst Islam is characterised as an intolerant and violent religion.13 The history of so-called migration
debates in Norway is similarly marked by depictions of Muslims as “a political
problem that must be solved”, even in cases where there is no breach of policy or
social norms.14 But some changes have occurred in recent years: Norwegian
newspapers today provide a more nuanced picture of Islam than they did just a few
years ago, not least because of the increasing number of Muslims participating in
public debates. Muslim voices are, as will be shown, central to the increased recognition of Islamophobia as a societal problem in the arena of public debates.
National newspapers also have journalists who have covered Islam-related issues
for several years and who have actively sought knowledge of Islam and Muslims.
Several of these journalists have contributed to an increased focus on discrimination and prejudice against Muslims in the press.15
The real turning point in the history of the public awareness of Islamophobia in
Norway is to be found in the aftermath of the terror attack on 22 July, 2011. Just
before the right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik killed 77 people, he
posted a manuscript on the internet titled 2083: A European Declaration of Independence. The manuscript explained that Breivik defined the attack as a legitimate
act of self-defence on behalf of the European people. His core message was that
in the face of an ongoing Islamisation of Europe, the political and social “elite”
have entered into a pact with the enemy. These ideas led to a public identification
of right-wing extremism as a producer of Islamophobic ideology and of conspiracy theories as essential elements of Islamophobia. However, the first recognition
of conspiracy theories as a specific element of xenophobia is to be found twenty
years earlier, in the debates triggered by a fake letter from a Muslim to a politician.
12. Elisabeth Poole, “Reporting Islam: media representations of British Muslims” (New York: Tauris 2002); Peter Hervik, Elisabeth Eide, and Kunelius, R., “A Long and Messy Event”, in Transnational Media Events. The Mohammed Cartoons and the Imagined Clash of Civilizations, eds.
Eide, E., Kunelius, R., and Phillips, A. (Gothenbeug: Nordicom, 2008); Cora Alexa Døving and
Siv Ellen Kraft, Religion i pressen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2013).
13. Saifuddin Ahmed and Jörg Matthes, “Media representation of Muslims and Islam from 2000 to
2015: A meta-analysis”, The International Communication Gazette 79, no. 3 (2017).
14. Døving and Kraft, Religion i pressen.
15. Ibid.
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
3. A LETTER FROM MUSTAFA
The so-called Mustafa letter was a fabricated letter written to the chairman of The
Progress Party, Carl I. Hagen. The Progress Party developed from being an antitax protest movement to becoming an anti-immigrant right-wing populist party,
with a breakthrough in 1987 when anti-immigration politics really entered the
stage in Norway.16 At an election rally in September the same year, Hagen read
out the “Mustafa letter” for his audience, and the content was immediately circulated by the press:
Allah is Allah, and Muhammad is His Prophet! You are fighting in vain, Mr.
Hagen! Islam, the only true faith, will conquer Norway too. One day, mosques
will be as common in Norway as churches are today, and the children of my
grandchildren will live to see this. I know, and all Muslims in Norway know,
that one day, the Norwegian population will come to (our) faith, and that this
country will be Muslim! We give birth to more children than you, and many
right-believing Muslims come to Norway each year, men in fertile age. One
day, the heathen cross in the flag will be gone too!17
Hagen used the letter as “evidence” for his argument that asylum seekers were
about to take over the country. VG, one of the national newspapers, quickly
revealed the letter as fake. Mustafa existed but had not written the letter.18
The letter’s content gave rise to a new concern over migration politics and the
year 1987 represents a milestone in the history of the Progress Party’s growth as
it tripled its election results that year. But the letter also led to public reflection on
a new type of xenophobia: fear of an intended Muslim takeover.19 Journalists
described the letter as “something that would spread racist attitudes” and reported
that Mustafa himself and his children were subjected to several threatening phone
calls with racist statements. In the newspaper Aftenposten, the President of Parliament Jo Benkow condemned reference to the letter as it would spread fear of
immigrants.20 Hagen was also sued for racism by an immigrant organisation.
16. The Progress Party has become the country’s third largest political party, and a part of the centre-right government coalition.
17. If not otherwise indicated, all translations are by Cora Alexa Døving.
18. Sindre Bangstad, “Re-coding nationalism: Islam, Muslims and Islamophobia in Norway before
and after July 22 2011”, in Islamophobia Studies Yearbook, ed. Farid Hafez (Vienna: New Academic Press, 2016 ).
19. “Hagens falske brevhets” VG, September 8, 1987, front page and 6–7.
20. Jo Benkow, “Hvirvler opp rasistiske holdninger”, Aftenposten, September 9, 1987, 4.
81
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CORA ALEXA DØVING | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
Even though the word “Muslim” occurred several times in the letter, the public
responses referred to xenophobia (innvandrerhets/frykt) and racism against Pakistanis rather than to fear or hatred of Muslims. This illustrates an interesting gap
between the content of the letter, which consists of what would become classic
Islamophobic claims, and the reception to it, which saw it as racist, xenophobic,
and as targeting migrant workers from Pakistan. Still, the Mustafa letter has
become an important reference in later years’ understanding of Islamophobia, as
it was the first time the depiction of a Muslim takeover appeared in the public
press and was acknowledged as being a substantial component of xenophobia and
racism.
4. FROM LABOUR MIGRANTS TO POLITICAL MUSLIMS – FROM
XENOPHOBIA TO ISLAMOPHOBIA
In the introduction, I referred to the transition when “the migrants” became “the
Muslims” as a paradigmatic shift in public debates on Islamophobia. This shift is
related to, or rather overlaps with, a shift from seeing immigrants as a category of
“poor non-organised people” to a depiction of Muslims as a minority group with
the potential to mobilise politically. It is when a minority is associated with some
sort of political threat that stereotyping of them seems to increase.21 When the
Runnymede Trust, in its now-classic report from 1997, Islamophobia – A Challenge for Us All, re-launched the term Islamophobia, it described the Rushdie
affair as one of the “formative and defining events” of processes that would come
to stereotype Muslims because the case made the Muslims visible as a political
force.22
THE RUSHDIE AFFAIR
In 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini’s religious ruling (fatwa) that Salman Rushdie, the
author of The Satanic Verses, deserved the death penalty, led to a diplomatic crisis
between Iran and several Western countries. It also led to Muslims all over Europe
demonstrating against a book they saw as blasphemous, and “Muslims in Europe”
becoming visible as a political force. Although the Rushdie case did not feed into
general debates on multiculturalism and integration, which were few in Norway
21. Historian Frode Ulvund illustrates this connection in a book on different religious minorities in
Norwegian history: Nasjonens antiborgere. Forestillinger om religiøse minoriteter som samfunnsfiender i Norge, ca. 1814–1964 (Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademiske, 2017).
22. The Runnymede Trust Report, Islamophobia – A Challenge for us all (1997) 27.
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
at that time, the press coverage of “angry Muslims burning books in England” led
to the beginning of a long-lasting public discussion on freedom of speech versus
“Muslim values”.
As a response to the fatwa, the Islamic Defence Council (IDC) 23 was established in Norway as an organ representing 20,000 Norwegian Muslims who proclaimed that they would use all legal means to stop the publication of a Norwegian
edition of the book. Demonstrations were organised24 and, according to the newspaper VG, this was the “biggest Muslim event ever held in Norway.”25 The press
referred to individual Muslims, stating that this was not a demonstration against
freedom of speech, but more generally against abusive language targeting Muslims. Although most comments and letters to the editors of different newspapers
adopted a negative approach in using adjectives such as “fanatics”, “mediaeval”,
and “barbaric”, attention was also paid to the problem of negatively stereotyping
Muslims.
When a Muslim who was a member of Oslo City Council and the Labour Party
in Oslo stated that he would not hesitate to kill Rushdie, the press coverage of the
affair became even more marked by anger and shock. At the same time, organisations working against discrimination and racism reported an increase in experiences of prejudice among Muslims in general. A few Muslim voices were also
present in public debates, reporting how negative depictions of Muslims in general had led to negative experiences for them personally.26
It was in the aftermath of the Rushdie affair that references to prejudice against
Muslims rather than against immigrants (Pakistanis) emerged for the first time in
the Norwegian press.27 One example is the reaction to a population survey showing
that attitudes towards Muslims’ right to practice their religion had changed dramatically after the Rushdie affair: several politicians and researchers commented on
the finding with warnings against negative generalisations of Muslims.28
In 1993, the Rushdie affair once again became a media event when an attempt
was made to assassinate William Nygaard (who barely survived), the publisher of
the Norwegian version of The Satanic Verses. Very quickly, Muslim organisations
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
Later to become the organisation Islamsk Råd Norge.
On February 25, 1989, 3,000 Muslims gathered in Oslo.
“Siste sjanse”, VG, February 27, 1989, 11.
Norsk Telegram Bureau, February 24, 1989.
In Britain, the affair led to debates about whether existing laws could be used to protect groups
against blasphemy, and the question of whether religious groups should have the same legal protection for “the collective dignity” as the protection given to groups defined by “race” and “gender”. I found no record of this type of debate in Norwegian newspapers.
28. Norsk Telegram Bureau, April 18, 1989.
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cooperated in making a public statement saying that the murder attempt was a
“violent act from which they strongly distanced themselves.”29 In addition to this,
Oslo’s largest mosque made a public statement: “We condemn the book. But we
kill no one.”30 These reactions illustrate a climate in which Muslim organisations
knew that solely by being Muslim, they could be held responsible, or at least be
seen as representatives of extremism. Muslim debaters tried to explain how it felt
to be asked constantly to take a stand against the banning of the book. Still, most
of the national newspapers reported an increase in experiences of anti-Muslim
attitudes and warned against it: “Rhetorical clichés such as ‘fanatical Muslims’
make us blind to the diversity within the Muslim world.”31 The editor of Aftenposten warned against “making Islam our new enemy.”32 Although the press, both in
terms of op-ed articles, letter to the editor and pieces written by journalists, was
dominated by expressions such as “Muslim values at war with European values”,33 several commentators in different papers and media channels warned
against seeing Muslims as a single mass.
According to the Runnymede Trust’s first definition of Islamophobia (1997),
the understanding of Islam as a monolithic and static religion, as well as the collectivising of Muslims as aggressive by nature, is the core of the phenomenon.34
The Rushdie affair was the starting point for recognising these two traits of Islamophobia and for combating them. However, there was no discussion of what to call
this form of prejudice. This discussion started at the time of the terrorist acts on
September 11, 2001 in the United States, hereafter referred to as 9/11.
9/11
It is widely documented in Western countries that the framing of Muslims in mass
media changed dramatically in the aftermath of the terror attacks on 9/11 in 2001:
Muslims were now described as a threat to civilisation.35 The expression “fear of
29. “Muslimer i Norge: Tar avstand fra Nygaard attentatet”, NTB in Dagbladet and VG, October 11,
1993.
30. “Sunnimuslimer: Vi dreper ingen”, Aftenposten, October 12, 1993, 4.
31. Jo Bech-Karlsen, “Media skaper kulturkonflikter”, Bergens Tidene, October 13, 1993, 6.
32. Harald Stanghelle, “Blir islam vårt nye fiendebilde?” Aftenposten, October 13, 1993, 14.
33. For example, “Verdikamp på liv og død”, Aftenposten, October 16, 1993, 4.
34. The Runnymede Trust Report 1997, 4. These elements are still central in the latest report in
which Islamophobia is defined as anti-Muslim racism.
35. The Runnymede Trust Report 2017; Mattias Gardell, Islamofobi (Oslo: Spartacus Forlag, 2011);
Sindre Bangstad, Anders Breivik and The Rise of Islamophobia, (London and New York: Zed
Books, 2014).
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
Muslims” (muslimfrykt) suddenly became one of the most common concepts in
Norwegian newspapers. Media coverage of extremism was naturally overwhelming, but it also led to a discourse on how this might feed into Islamophobia. The
press functioned as an arena for expressions of fear of Muslims and as an arena
for warning against such fear. One month after 9/11, The Norwegian Centre
against Racism organised a campaign to combat fear of Muslims. With funding
from the state and from the private sector, the organisation hung up posters in
buses and trams. These consisted of the text “Hate at first sight?” and a photo of a
veiled woman. The press referred to the campaign, but only briefly.36
Several politicians and academics reminded the public of how important it was
not to fear or hate Norwegian Muslims because of the terror attacks in in USA.
Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, also the leader of the Christian Democrat
party, warned against seeing the attacks as a “war between religions”,37 and 11
bishops sent out a message warning against the “harassment of Muslims”.38
“Anti-Muslim sentiments on the increase in Europe” was a title of an article
referring to a report on incidents in the EU countries after 9/11. 39 The EU report
was titled “Islamophobia in the EU” and several papers referred to the examples
it gave of how Islamophobia might appear: spitting, vandalism of mosques, harassment of Muslim schoolchildren, and so forth. In an article titled “In the shadow
of September 11”, Klassekampen used the EU report as a source to gain a better
understanding of Islamophobia as more than an attitude; it was also actions.40
After 9/11, Islamophobia continued to be understood as a way of negatively
generalising Muslims, but greater attention was paid to harassment (actions). An
example illustrating this is a demonstration organised by The Islamic Council
against stereotypical depictions of Muslims in the press, with the two main slogans: “Against generalisation” and “Stop harassment of Muslims”.41
The first opinion text (op-ed) discussing the term Islamophobia was written by
a student named Peder Jensen. Jensen was later known as the blogger Fjordman,
who inspired the right-wing extremist and terrorist Anders Behring Breivik.
Jensen argued that Islamophobia was a trend word, and that it was being used as
a weapon against the critique of Islam. Islam, he argued, is a religion that people
must be allowed to criticise since many Muslims were very open in saying that
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
For example “Kampanje mot muslimfrykt”, VG October 31, 2001.
Radio, P4, November 8, 2001.
“Biskoper advarer mot muslimhets”, VG, September 25, 2001.
“Antimuslimske holdninger på frammarsj i Europa”, NTB, May 23.
“I skyggen av 11. september”, Klassekampen May 27, 2002, 6–7.
“Demonstrerer for felles framtid”, Aftenposten, February 9, 2002, 4.
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“one day Islam will cover the whole planet and replace all other religions and ideologies.”42
Islamophobia after 9/11 was generally discussed in three different ways in Norway: 1) as a cognitive way to make generalisations about Muslims (with references to fear/terror); 2) as harassment (also physical) of Muslims; and 3) as a rhetorical means to hinder the legitimate critique of Islam. This last view escalated
with our next example – the cartoon affairs – in which Islamophobia was often
degraded to being a term that was useful for Muslims who saw the benefit of
depicting themselves as victims.
THE CARTOON AFFAIRS
The response to cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad made the Muslim
minority visible as a minority that could mobilise politically in a much broader
way than the Rushdie affair did. In 2005, the Danish cartoons of Muhammad (12
in total) were published in the country’s largest newspaper, Jylland Posten.
According to the editor of the paper, the intention was to stop what they called
political correctness based on a misunderstood respect for not hurting the feelings
of religious minorities.43 One of the faces showed the prophet with a bomb in his
turban and with the Islamic profession of faith written on it. The printings led to
some debates on a new kind of hate speech, but the dominant messages in the press
were that “Muslims are too sensitive” or “too demanding”. The understanding of
the cartoon affairs as a “clash of civilisations” was more or less hegemonic when
the cartoons were printed in Norway a year later.
The Norwegian context for reprinting the cartoons was different than the Danish, which may explain why the debates included more concern about Islamophobia than they had in Denmark. Norway had an established arena for inter-religious
dialogue, and when a Christian journal, Magazinet, published one of the cartoons,
the foreign minister of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre, apologised for the offence felt
by many Muslims.44 The Norwegian Islamic Council accepted the apology that
soon came from the editor of Magazinet, and called off planned protests.45 An
42. Peder Jensen, “Islam og det åpne samfunn”, VG, August 21, 2003, 41.
43. For an analysis of the cartoon debates in Denmark and Norway, see Hervik, Eide and Kunelius,
“A Long and Messy Event”, and Jytte Klausen, The Cartoon that Shook the World (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2009).
44. Jonas Gahr Støre, “Dialog som prosjekt”, Dagsavisen, March 10, 2006, 4.
45. Christian Stokke, A multicultural society in the making. How Norwegian Muslims challenge a
white nation (PhD, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Department of Social
Anthropology, 2012), 7.
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
independent group of Muslims, the Volunteers (De frivillige), however, proclaimed that they were not satisfied because the government had not addressed
anti-Muslim sentiments in general. They organised their own demonstration on
February 11, 2006 with slogans about how the press gave a false impression of
Muslims, and that free speech had nothing to do with telling lies (about the
prophet). The demonstration gathered 1,500 Muslims and was reported in all the
main newspapers. Most of the reports had a negative angle with a focus on the
threat of Muslim political violence. In fact the only violent act that took place in
Norway with reference to the cartoons was when a Palestinian was stabbed with a
knife while he being asked: “Why do you burn our flag in the Middle East?” This
act of violence did not lead to debates on racism, since the police categorised it as
an accident caused by alcohol.46
The Volunteers managed to draw some attention to negative portrayals of Muslims in the press. For example, Dagbladet used the slogans from the demonstrations, such as “Shame on you, media”, as illustrations the day after the demonstration.47 Several newspapers also recited slogans such as “Media, mouthpiece of
lies”. It is therefore reasonable to describe this as a public recognition of the connection between Islamophobia and the media. The demonstration also made it
clear that young Muslims did not necessarily listen to leaders in Muslim organisations (who had tried to stop the event).48 Several newspapers highlighted fear of a
new and more fundamentalist generation, though they also gave access to a variety
of Muslim viewpoints.49 Through the press, several young Muslims had expressed
the idea that a peaceful demonstration was a means to counter a stereotype of Muslims as aggressive.50 They proclaimed that protecting Muslims against hate
speech was just as important for them as protesting against the cartoons.
Public support of the Volunteers came first and foremost from members of the
International Socialists in Oslo, who addressed anti-Muslim racism as a problem.51
46. “Frykter hevnaksjoner”, Dagsavisen, February 6, 2006, 9.
47. “Muhammed tegningene”, Dagbladet, February 12, 2006, 12–13.
48. The debate that ensued after Magazinet published the Mohammed cartoons suddenly started
conveying an impression of Norwegian imams in a positive way. This was a result of their warnings against angry uproar. The imams’ desire to engage in dialogue was reiterated in several
press reports. However, the caricature also led to imams being characterised as “out of step with
younger generations”. Cora Alexa Døving, “Position and Self-understanding of Sunni Muslim
Imams in Norway”, Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014): 209–233.
49. Stokke, A multicultural society in the making. How Norwegian Muslims challenge a white
nation, 75.
50. Dagsavisen, February 7, 2006.
51. Alf Skjeseth, “Still opp for muslimene”, Klassekampen, February 10, 2006, 9.
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Professor of Social Medicine Per Fugelli, a well-known voice in public debates,
gave his vocal support to the demonstrators and referred to them as “our neighbours” rather than Muslims, thereby addressing the importance of respect.
Internationally, several academic works were written on the issue of Islamophobia related to the cartoon affair.52 In these texts, the authors discussed the severe
lack of recognition of anti-Muslim racism. The main argument was that Western
countries understand Islamophobia as hatred against a religion, and not as racism.53 These academic responses are important contributors to a subsequent
understanding of Islamophobia in Norway: the framing of the cartoon affair in
terms of racism and the question of legislation (laws against hate speech) were
brought into Norwegian public consciousness.54 Even if their arguments were not
prevalent in the debates, they offered an important alternative way of understanding the rise of Islamophobia. The concept of racism turned up in some of the
debates on Islamophobia55 and in relation to the UN’s international day to focus
on the problem of racism, the national paper VG printed a long text discussing
whether it was relevant to understand anti-Muslim attitudes as a form of neo-racism.56 The article also refers to antisemitism and asks, rhetorically, whether members of the press would have covered cases relating to Muslims in the same way
if they exchanged the word “Muslim” with “Jew”. This comparison did not – as it
would later – result in harsh reactions. It was simply not commented upon.
A second cartoon affair occurred in Norway four years later. On February 3,
2010, Dagbladet used its front page to show a cartoon of the Prophet Mohammad
as a pig. As a response six individual Muslims organised a demonstration that
gathered 3,000 people carrying slogans such as “Islam condemns terror”, “Dagbladet divides the nation”, “Stop publishing the cartoons” and “Islam is part of
Norway”. However, none of these slogans reached the headlines: one of the organisers made a speech containing a threat towards Norway by referring to what happened on 9/11. He said “When will Norwegian authorities understand that this is
serious? Maybe not before it is too late? Maybe not until we get a 9/11 on Norwe52. Most cited is Tariq Modood’s work on the cartoons: “Muslims, Religious Equality and Secularism” in Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship, ed. Tarique Modood and Brahm
Levey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Saba Mahmood and Judith Butler:
Is critique secular? Blasphemy, Injury and Free Speech (UC Berkeley University Press, 2009).
53. Nasir Meer and Tarique Modood, “Refutations of Racism in the ‘Muslim Question’”, Patterns
of Prejudice, 43, no. 3–4 (2009).
54. Anthropologists Sindre Bangstad and Thomas Hylland Eriksen and philosopher Arne Johan
Vetlesen were among the contributors.
55. Cora Alexa Døving, “Islam er er også en norsk religion”, Aftenposten, February 7, 2006, 5.
56. Finn Erik Thoresen, “Den nye rasisme”, VG March 21, 2006, 31.
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
gian soil? This is not a threat but a warning.”57 The result was that the cartoon
affairs that had led to some interest in and focus on Islamophobia in 2006 now
resulted in the strengthening of a one-sided debate on extremism. Even if the other
organisers distanced themselves from the speech and tried to argue that the
demonstration had been a peaceful gathering communicating views quite different
from those of the speakers, anger from the public characterised the news for several weeks.
Leader of the Progress Party, Siv Jensen, who one year earlier had warned
against “Islamisation by stealth”, demanded that “it is time that the silent majority
among Muslims also speaks up clearly.”58 She stated that Norwegian values were
under pressure and that Islamisation was proceeding at full strength. With references to the demonstrations in 2010, Aftenposten printed a long text by a wellknown debater, Hege Storhaug, in which the demonstrators were referred to as
“Quislings”; a traitor and enemy within.59 The seriousness of the threat made by
the speaker at the demonstration is probably the reason for the lack of critical
responses to generalisations such as those made by Jensen and Storhaug.
Generally speaking, the second cartoon affair led to a setback in public discussions on Islamophobia and warnings against it. Attempts to address the phenomenon were now quickly defined as “naivety against extremism”. Islamophobia,
which had been recognised as a problem of generalising and harassing Muslims,
was reduced to a marginal problem and a conceptual tool for people who were
unwilling to talk about Muslim extremism or to criticise Islam.
ISLAMOPHOBIA UNDERSTOOD AS AN IDEOLOGY
Between the two cartoon debates, Islamophobia was discussed with the general
backdrop of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, even more cartoons, the assassination of the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh, terrorist attacks, the increase in
hate speech on the internet, and a more or less continuous debate on integration.
However, probably of greatest significance for a deepening understanding of
Islamophobia was the range of books published after 2001, the so-called warning
literature, of which Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (2005) has been the most influential. This category of literature, with a myriad of titles in English, also includes
57. His message was printed in several papers; see, for example, “Tre tusen i tog” Dagsavisen,
February 13, 2010, 6.
58. Siv Jensen was interviewed in several papers on this issue, for example, Aftenposten, February
14, 2010, 3.
59. Hege Storhaug, “En stigende uro”, Aftenposten, January 6 2011, 4.
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books translated into Norwegian as well as books written by Norwegian
authors.60
The underlying premise of this literature is that Norway, as well as other states
on the European continent, are becoming “Islamised” by Muslims wishing to
introduce Shari'a into Europe and who are transforming Europe into an Islamic
domain (“Eurabia”). The word “Islamophobia” is often addressed in these books,
but then always as a term developed to cover up information about the alleged
takeover and to stop sensible critique of Islam. The so-called Eurabia literature
became a well-known phenomenon after 22 July, 2011, as the perpetrator’s worldview was greatly influenced by these books. However, the books also raised
awareness of Islamophobia as being linked to conspiratorial thinking. In other
words, the books contributed to Islamophobia becoming visible as part of an ideology in which Muslims were portrayed as an enemy of western civilisation.
The term “Islamophobia” is not often used even when the warning literature is
being criticised, but when it is, it addresses a fear of an increase in the belief in
conspiracy theories. Compared to earlier times when “racism” was used to
describe anti-Muslim sentiments (1980s), the concepts of racism and Islamophobia, especially after 9/11, have been kept apart. The increase in conspiracy theories
did, however, lead some debaters to question the connection between racism and
fear of a takeover. Henrik Lunde, a sociologist and the then-leader of The Norwegian Centre against Racism, was one of the first to actively use the term Islamophobia with references to the warning literature. He saw Islamophobia as a phenomenon that would lead to an increase in racism.61 The Ministry of Children and
Equality also used the word Islamophobia in an opening speech at a conference on
racism and discrimination.62 An expert on Islamic terrorism, Thomas Hegghammer, also used the term when he warned the public of how Islamophobia is a phenomenon that could easily lead to discrimination against Muslims – which in turn
could lead to an increase in radicalisation among Muslims.63
60. Examples are Pim Fortuyn, Against the Islamization of Our Culture (2001); Oriani Fallachi, Fornuftens styrke (Gyldendal Forlag, 2004); Bat Ye`or, Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (Farleigh
Dickinson University Press, 2005); Bruce Bawer, While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is
Destroying the West from Within (Random House/Broadway Books, 2006); Mark Steyn, America
Alone: The End of the World as We Know It (Regnery, 2006); Melanie Phillips, Londonistan,
Encounter (2006); Walter Laqueur, The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent (Thomas Dunne/St. Martin Press, 2007); Bruce Thorntorn, Decline and Fall – Europe’s Slow Motion
Suicide, Encounter (2007); Hallgrim Berg, Amerikabrevet: Europa i Fare (Koloritt Forlag, 2007).
61. Lunde interviewed in “Islamofobien øker rasismen”, LO aktuelt, December 9, 2005.
62. The ministry’s homepage, November 28, 2007, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dep/bld/id298/.
63. “Rasisme er et sikkerhetsproblem”, ABC nyheter, January 8, 2008.
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
Professor in Social Anthropology, Thomas Hylland Eriksen, a well-known contributor to debates about the multicultural society, suggested that Islamophobia
should be discussed without linking it to general debates on integration, his main
point being that integration processes in Norway are going rather well at the same
time as Islamophobia is increasing.64 He suggested that Islamophobia should be
understood as a phenomenon with no direct relation to how well Muslims in Norway
are integrating into society. His attempt, however, did not generate much support.
With references to the international Holocaust Remembrance Day in 2007, Aftenposten printed an opinion piece asking whether we could learn anything from history:
Are there any common features between the antisemitism of the interwar period and
the conceptions of Muslims today?65 The text pointed to semantic similarities between
antisemitism in the years before the Nazi period and Islamophobia today and listed
several examples. The comparison generated a heated debate for a few weeks.66
One of the first debates about Islamophobia as a term addressing an ideology
was initiated by Marthe Michelet, an editor for the newspaper Dagbladet. Michelet wrote a review of one of the Norwegian books warning against a Muslim takeover.67 Michelet described the book as elucidating because it gives insight into
what Islamophobia consists of – namely, a worldview based on the generalisation
of Muslims, the propaganda of fear, and representations of Islam as equivalent to
radical Islamism.68 Michelet also expressed how shocking it was that the book
was given positive reviews in many newspapers, and she warned against how the
press contributed to reproducing author Hege Storhaug’s statements by giving her
a platform. Michelet’s review was responded to by Storhaug and others with the
argument that Islamophobia did not exist in Norwegian society, but was used as a
concept to stop “vital criticism of Islam”.69 Michelet continued to address the
problem and argued, in line with Hylland-Eriksen, that Islamophobia should be
seen as one of our time’s most dangerous ideologies with a life of its own, separated from the minority it targeted.70 Furthermore, she said, Islamophobia is not
64. Interview, NRK, January, 5, 2007. His point is similar to what I suggest is part of an increasing
consensus among politicians: the understanding of Islamophobia as detached from a general
debate on integration.
65. Cora Alexa Døving, “Muslimen og jøden”, Aftenposten February 6, 2007, 4.
66. For example, Herman Willis, “Muslimer ikke som jøder” Aftenposten, February 9 2007, 5, or
Sara Azmeh Rasmussen, “Fortjent islamkritikk” Aftenposten, February 13, 2007, 3.
67. Tilslørt og avslørt by Hege Storhaug (2007).
68. Marte Michelet, “Burkafobi”, Dagbladet, October 5, 2007, 2.
69. For example, Jens Tomas Anfindsen, “Useriøst fra Michelet” Dagbladet, October 12, 2007, 42.
70. Marte Michelet, “Muslimhore”, Dagbladet, March 17, 2008, 3, and “Løgn og bedrag”, Dagbladet, March 28, 2008, 40.
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only dangerous for Muslims but also for democracies in Europe, as it fertilises the
soil of the extreme right. This she underlined by referring to specific organisations
that distribute an Islamophobic ideology. Her texts provoked many reactions –
especially in the online comments – some of which accused Michelet of not seeing
that Islam is a form of Nazism or that the term Islamophobia was used to censor
important critique.71 The debates on Islamophobia would continue, but the dominant argument – regardless of political differences – was that the term itself
destroyed a healthy debate on “the boundaries of tolerance”.72
After the Progress Party warned against “Islamisation by stealth” in 2009, the
term Islamophobia gained more support among critical debaters, not least among
Muslims who warned against the rhetoric of a creeping Muslim takeover.73 The
author Aslak Nore responded to this with the argument that Islamophobia was
nothing but a myth created by Muslim leaders and European liberals. “The allegations of Islamophobia,” he claimed, “are promoted without exception by Western
multiculturalists and Islamists.”74 He suggested there was a conspiracy between
super-conservative Islamists and liberal politicians, and that this could be an
explanation for the rising prevalence of the term. Although negative to the term
Islamophobia, Nore saw discrimination and poverty among immigrants as the real
problem, claiming that “discrimination in Europe is due to racism.”75 Nore’s
standpoints were representative for the dominant view in the public at the time
(2009): Islamophobia was understood as solely connected to Islam and therefore
mostly used to hinder criticism of it; it was not seen as intending to discriminate
against Muslims or as an expression of anti-Muslim racism.
Historian of religion Lars Gule responded to Aslak Nore with arguments
defending the use of the term Islamophobia. Gule defined it as an important concept for addressing conspiracy theories against Muslims. The seriousness of
Islamophobia, he argued, could be mirrored in history: “The central element of
antisemitism is not in the devaluation of Jews as a race, but the notion that the
Jews are dangerous because they conspire.”76 Furthermore, he argued, since we
all agree on the fittingness of the term “antisemitism” to describe cases in which
Jews are accused of conspiracy, the same should be the case with Islamophobia.
Gule received some negative reactions, mostly in short letters from readers.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
Hege Storhaug, “Av en annen verden”, Dagbladet, March 27, 2008, 40.
For example, Ole-Fredrik Einarsjon ““Vi tolererer oss til døde”, Aftenposten, October 2, 2008, 4.
For example, “Siv Jensen og muslimene”, VG, February 23, 2009, 2.
Aslak Nore, “Islamofobi-myten”, VG, March 1, 2009, 2.
Ibid.
Lars Gule, “Islamofobi er ingen myte”, VG, March 5, 2009, 43.
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
In 2009, the broadest of the various debates on the use of the hijab turned the
focus on Islamophobia away from conspiracy theories to the issue of discrimination and civil rights for Muslims.
5. ISLAMOPHOBIA AND A MUSLIM STRUGGLE FOR MINORITY
RIGHTS
There is a relation between, on the one hand, increased integration and increased
recognition of minority rights, and on the other hand, a certain understanding of
Islamophobia as a violation of human rights.77 In Norway the so-called hijab
debate is an example of how an understanding of Islamophobia as a threat to civil
and minority rights developed alongside a struggle for recognition as practising
Muslims. More than any other Islam-related debates, the debates on whether the
hijab should be allowed or not in public institutions introduced the public to a plurality of Muslim voices who argued their case with the vocabulary of a human
rights discourse.78
There have been several debates related to the use of hijabs,79 but in Norway
the biggest took place in 2009, starting with a letter from a Muslim woman to the
Police Directorate. The woman was applying for the right to wear the hijab if she
was admitted to the Police Academy. The applicant received a positive response
from the Ministry of Justice, but the go-ahead was immediately criticised. Among
other things, the critique referred to the processing of the case, as the political or
bureaucratic management had not granted permission. The Standing Committee
on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs80 investigated what had now come to be
known as the “hijab case”. The case became a part of numerous debate programs, news programs, newspaper articles, and a Facebook group was created to
77. David Feldman, “Islamophobia and antisemitism”, in Islamophobia. Still a challenge for us all.
A 20th-anniversary report, Elahi Farah and Khan Omar, eds. (Runnymede Trust, London
School of Economics, 2017), www.runnymedetrust.org.
78. For an analysis of the different hijab debates in Norway, see Cora Alexa Døving, “The Hijab
Debate in the Norwegian Press: Secular or Religious Arguments?” in Journal of Religion in
Europe, 5, no. 2 1–2 (2012).
79. The hijab and to what extent it should be used in different public sectors and professions constantly surfaces as a theme in debates, but there have been two main hijab debates in Norway:
the first in 2004, which took the introduction of a ban on the hijab in schools in France as its
starting point, and the second in 2009, which was about to what extent the hijab could be used as
part of the Norwegian police uniform for those who wished to wear it.
80. Stortingets kontroll- og konstitusjonskomite.
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campaign against the decision. On February 20, 2009, the Minister for Justice
withdrew the permission.
In the debates that followed the withdrawal, Muslims, mainly women who wear
the hijab, argued for their equal rights: to wear the hijab as part of a uniform would
be in line with international human rights conventions on freedom of religion. Islamic
Council Norway (IRN) claimed that being a minority means one sticks out in society,
but that this should not lead to questioning the motives and integrity of the minority.
The loyalty of the employee is not weakened by the hijab, they argued.81
Four young women wrote an op-ed titled “We are underestimated”, in which
they argued that women who are practising Muslims are discriminated against if
they are denied the possibility of fully participating in all parts of society: “Lots
of ads encouraging multicultural Norwegians to apply for jobs don’t help when in
reality there is no possibility of this in some professions.”82 Bushra Ishaq, a leader
of a Muslim students’ organisation, drew a connection between the democratic
state and the core of the case: “The democratic rights of minorities are weakened
when women who would like to wear the hijab are not allowed to in the police
force. … we are talking about the integrity and freedom of action of Muslim
women.”83 Ilham Hassan, also one of the most profiled debaters that year,
focussed on the state in large parts of her argumentation.84As a hijab-wearing law
student, she saw herself as a future representative of the state, wanting a job as a
legal practitioner in the police force. Her main argument was that it was important
not to let fear of Islam or prejudices against Muslims influence the state’s efforts
to maintain a modern, pluralistic, and democratic society.85
Several debaters saw resistance to the hijab as a result of Islamophobia, and that
this could come to challenge freedom of religion.86 Pervez Ambreen and Khan
Farah claimed that the government’s retreat in the hijab case was a sign of the xenophobia present in Norwegian society. Their contribution to the debate ended with
a few declarations: “Muslim girls demand to be treated as equal citizens in our
own society”; “We refuse to let ourselves be oppressed and underestimated.”87 It
is not just the relationship with the Norwegian state, but also the proximity to the
81. Shoaib Sultan and Asghar Ali, “Beskytt trosfriheten”, Dagbladet, February 12, 2009, 39.
82. Tajamal Hajra, Javed Mariam, |Hussain Sophia, Hussain Sahr M: “Vi blir undervurdert”, Aftenposten, February 13, 2009, 3.
83. Interview with Bushra Ishaq, “Et skritt tilbake for Norge”, Klassekampen, February 21, 2009, 13.
84. Hassan took the initiative, with Iffit Qureishi, to establish the “Hijab Brigade” and to set up a
Facebook page for Muslim girls to support them in wearing the hijab.
85. Ilham Hassan, “Hijab for dommere”, Dagbladet, February 18, 2009, front page and 8–9.
86. Iffit Qureshi, “En kamp for likeverd”, VG, February 18, 2009, 39.
87. Pervez Ambreen and Khan Farah, “Hijab kommet for å bli”, Aftenposten, March 1, 2009, 5.
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
Norwegian identity that is emphasised by several debaters: “We are a part of the
red, white and blue” is the title of Hajra Tajamal’s text.88
Counting the concepts used by hijab wearers shows that “identity”, “integrity”,
“freedom of religion” and “democracy” are most frequently used. Although many
of the arguments against the use of hijab as part of the police uniform was based
on arguments that had nothing to do with either Muslims or Islam; like the importance of neutrality of the state or similar rational arguments, the hijab debate
pushed forward an understanding of Islamophobia as prejudices that could lead to
discrimination. However, this understanding of the phenomenon was forgotten in
the light of the extreme nature of Islamophobia that came to public consciousness
in the aftermath of 22 July 2011.
6. IN THE AFTERMATH OF RIGHT-WING TERROR IN NORWAY
The terrorist attacks on 22 July, 2011 started with a bomb placed outside a government building and continued with a mass killing on the island of Utøya, where the
Labour Party Youth League was holding its summer camp. The perpetrator himself
defined the massacre as an act of terrorism, based on a specific ideology conveyed
through a manifesto which he published online prior to the killings. In this document, entitled 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, Breivik defined the
attacks as legitimate acts of self-defence on behalf of the European people. The document consists of well-known arguments from several anti-jihadist writers and bloggers, the core message being that in the face of an ongoing Islamisation of Europe,
the political and social elite had entered into a pact with the enemy. The underlying
motive for Breivik’s actions was, he claimed, to be found in the dream of an ethnically and culturally homogenous (pure) society, and in hating those who allow ethnic “impurity” to develop (politicians, multiculturalists and what he called cultural
Marxists). Discussing Islamophobia became a way of issuing a counter message.
WHAT IF ANDERS WAS NAMED AHMED?
The hegemonic discourse that arose already in the first week after the attacks can be
characterised as a “progressive narrative”.89 This term refers to the development of
88. Hajra Tajamal, “Vi er en del av det røde, hvite og blå”, Dagbladet, July 22, 2009, 50.
89. In his study of the responses to the bombing in Oklahoma City in 1997, in which 168 people
were killed, Edward Linenthal calls the hegemonic response a development of a progressive
narrative. Edward Linenthal, The Unfinished Bombing: Oklahoma City in American Memory
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 41.
95
96
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a story about how the horrible events rendered visible the true essence of the nation
as warm and good. The idea of a new beginning – initiated by evil, yet which would
enable people in Norway to create a new and warmer society – was declared by the
then prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg and other politicians, the Crown, religious
leaders, journalists, and newspaper editors alike. The parallel to the reconstruction
of the country after 1945 was rhetorically activated “Never again April 9” – “Never
again July 22”. However, another part of this progression consisted of recognising
and countering the message of the terrorist – namely racism and Islamophobia.90
After the first hours following the attack, during which some voices in the
media claimed that the perpetrators of such terrorist attacks could only possibly be
of Muslim background,91 the general message was that the only way to respond to
the terror was to embrace the “multicultural Norway” that the Labour Party’s
youth organisation represented.92 Journalists and editors selected headlines, pictures, and perspectives that conveyed an ideological response to the terrorist's
motives. Never before were churches, synagogues, temples, and mosques featured
in such a positive light as during the weeks after the attacks. Minority religions
were not measured against Norwegian values, but described as part of Norwegian
public values: the multicultural aspect was simply not up for debate. The newspapers mediated the “multicultural society” as the image of the nation. Alongside
this new embrace of the multicultural Norway, there ran a debate on what could
explain the terrorist’s worldview.
Several reporters asked what Norwegian society would look like if a Muslim
had been behind the terror, and several newspapers reported unpleasant incidents
experienced by dark-skinned individuals in the city centre in the hours after the
horrific events. The editor of the national newspaper Aftenposten wrote that Muslims had good reason to be relieved that the perpetrator was not a Muslim.93 It is
reasonable to say that the massacre made the general public in Norway aware of
the extent of anti-Muslim sentiments both at street-level and in online discussions
and blogs. The press wrote about Breivik’s ideas, thus bringing the so-called antijihadist blogosphere to the wider public’s attention.94 Critical journalists wrote
90. For an analysis of the press’s counter messages after the terror, see Cora Alexa Døving (2018),
“Homeland Ritualized: An Analysis of Written Messages Placed at Temporary Memorials after
the Terrorist Attacks on 22 July 2011 in Norway”. Mortality, 23(3).
91. Sindre Bangstad, Anders Breivik and The Rise of Islamophobia (London and New York: Zed
Books, 2014), 286.
92. As examples are several pieces in VG July 28, 2011 and Dagens Næringsliv July 28, 2011.
93. “Han er ingen fremmed”, Kommentar, Aftenposten, July 24, 2011.
94. The most central ideological inspiration for Behring Breivik’s ideas about Muslims was the
Norwegian extreme right-winger Peder Jensen, who called himself “Fjordman”.
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
pieces on the prevalence of Islamophobia,95 and several politicians expressed
shock over their new insight into the hatred found in some online milieus.
ISLAMOPHOBIA COMPARED TO ANTISEMITISM
Two prominent political leaders expressed shock over online Islamophobia by
comparing it to antisemitism. The leader of the Liberal Party (Venstre), Trine Skei
Grande, suggested in a radio interview that from now on, claims made about Muslims should be tested by exchanging the word Muslim with the word Jew or Black.
Negative reactions to the comparison with historic antisemitism exploded when
the leader of the Conservative Party (Høyre), Erna Solberg, compared the antisemitism of the 1930s to expressions about Muslims in contemporary debates.96 She
was quickly accused of putting Muslims in a similar position to that of Jews during the 1930s and 1940s. Solberg refuted this accusation and defended herself by
making it clear that she was not making any comparisons between the situations
of Jews and Muslims. Rather, she had essentially wanted to highlight some of the
similarities in the stereotypes and conspiracy theories:
I have not said Muslims today are treated as Jews were in the 1930s. On the
contrary, I stated that they are NOT treated equally. What I said was that
extreme anti-Islamic groups’ mentions of Muslims is reminiscent of the way
antisemites referred to Jews in the decades before World War II. 97
Solberg also referred to research done at the Norwegian Centre for Holocaust and
Minority Studies that shows similarities between conspiracy theories and specific
patterns in depicting the two minority groups as an enemy.98 She defined the real
danger to be in the mechanisms of Islamophobia that collectivised Muslims; for
instance, the mechanism of making a whole minority group responsible for acts
committed by individuals.
Solberg’s attempts to nuance the issue apparently had little effect; VG had to
shut down its online comments function following the case, as it filled up with racist comments against Muslims.99 Several intellectuals soon entered the debate,
95. Examples are to be found in Dagsavisen July 25, 2011, Vårt Land July 26, 2011, Aften Aften July 28
2011, Dagens Næringsliv July 28, 2011, Klassekampen July 28, 2011, Aftenposten July 24, 2011.
96. Interview with Erna Solberg, VG, August 4, 2011, 4–5.
97. Erna Solberg “Lærdom fra historien”, Dagbladet, August 6, 2011, 65.
98. Cora Alexa Døving, Anti–Semitism and Islamophobia: A Comparison of Imposed Group Identities, Dansk Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, nr. 2, 2010.
99. Comments on VG, August 5, 2011.
97
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CORA ALEXA DØVING | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
referring to the long history of Jewish suffering (from medieval, religiously reasoned hatred to the Holocaust) as an argument for the unique character of antisemitism. In the following three weeks, Solberg’s statement was the focus of several
opinion pieces. Debaters, historians, and other academics from different disciplines called Solberg’s comparison a result of lack of knowledge. Others pointed
to her lacking acknowledgement of Islamophobia functioning as a concept to stop
an open debate on Islam.
An argument frequently cited in the responses to Solberg was that Muslims are
not a race; they are followers of a religion. Antisemitism, however, is racism
because it attacks a race, a nation, namely “the Jews”.100 A well-known professor
in the history of ideas, Trond Berg Eriksen, argued against Solberg by defining
Islamophobia as something qualitatively different from antisemitism. Racism
played a central part in the persecution of Jews and had no such part to play in
Islamophobia, he argued. He referred to Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, and proclaimed that even among extremists, racism is not a part of the xenophobia against Muslims. He further described Islamophobia as a marginal phenomenon. Compared with antisemitism, he claimed, anti-Muslim harassment
comes from anonymous persons who only represent a margin of the population.101
His text illustrates both how racism is understood in solely biological terms and
also how Islamophobia is reduced to a phenomenon existing solely among
extremists. The social anthropologist Sindre Bangstad wrote a follow-up in which
he agreed upon historical differences between antisemitism and Islamophobia, but
pointed out the structural similarities that Edward Said found as early as 1985. He
also argued that Islamophobia had racist elements and should not be seen as something qualitatively different from racism.102 Bangstad’s arguments were heavily
criticised in the following issues of the same newspaper, and his arguments never
reached a broader media coverage.
Another wave of reactions to Solberg’s statements came from spokesmen on
behalf of the Jewish community, who found the analogy impropriate. The leader
of the Mosaic Faith Congregation, Ervin Kohn, called it a comparison that
revealed a lack of historical knowledge because antisemitism had been integrated
into Norway’s judicial system in the 1930s, while Islamophobia obviously was
not.103 Aftenposten’s theatre reviewer, Mona Levin, also reacted strongly. With
the title “Cannot be compared”, she asked how an industrialised genocide could
100. Bjørn Nistad, “Vår tids jøder?”, VG August 10, 2011, 47.
101. Trond Berg Eriksen, “Noe annet enn rasisme”, Morgenbladet August 12, 2011, 9.
102. Sindre Bangstad, “I professorens verden”, Morgenbladet August 19, 2011, 19.
103. Ervin Kohn, “Historieløs sammenligning”, Dagsavisen August 5, 2011, 7.
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
be used as a comparison.104 Harassment of Muslims is terrible, she wrote, but to
compare it with antisemitism is a way of relativising the Holocaust as well as Jewish history. Other spokespersons from the Jewish community warned against putting antisemitism in “‘a sack’ of bullying, racism, and hate crimes”.105
One of the reasons why the use of antisemitism as a basis for comparison was
met with harsh reactions seems to be that the term antisemitism makes the mind
leap directly to the Holocaust. In spite of the heatedness of the debates, they
opened up for new recognition of the danger of depicting a minority group as the
enemy of society. As I will argue at the end of the chapter, today’s debate climate
is much more willing to make analogies between patterns of prejudice.
ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE QUESTIONING OF POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY
A year before the terror attacks on July 22, 2011, two members of the Progress
Party, Christian Tybring-Gjedde and Kent Andersen published an opinion piece in
Aftenposten in which they accused the governing Norwegian Labour Party of
“wanting to tear the country apart” by allowing “thousands of immigrants” with
their harmful culture into the country every year.106 The two authors also referred
to the Labour Party’s ideas as a multicultural Disneyland that would destroy Norwegian culture. This text became an important reference point in public debates
after the terror attacks: Did Anders Behring Breivik’s ideas have some sort of resonance in the established discourses on migration and Islam, particularly those in
which “our culture” was portrayed as falling apart because of the politics of the
Labour Party?
The newspaper Klassekampen offered critical self-reflecting questions on behalf
of the nation. It reminded readers about criticism from the European Council (ECRI)
in 2009, which stated that the government of Norway did not recognise the growing
Islamophobia in the country.107 The politician from the radical-left party Rødt,
Aslak Sira Myhre, stated that he hoped the discovery of “the heart of darkness” in
the midst of our own society would lead to changes in our depictions of minorities
as an enemy and that we would “go through a process of self-examination.”108
104. Mona Levin, “Kan ikke sammenlignes”, Aftenposten August 9, 2011, 5.
105. Vårt Land August 6, 2011.
106. Christian Tybring–Gjedde and Kent Andersen, “Drøm fra Disneyland”, Aftenposten August 26,
2010, 4.
107. Eivind Trædal, “Vær varsom” Klassekampen August 8, 2011. The report from ECRI concluded
on the basis of interviews with NGOs, politicians, researchers and representatives from Muslim
organisations.
108. Aslak Sira Myhre, Klassekampen August 27, 2011.
99
100
CORA ALEXA DØVING | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
Most debaters were careful not to give the Progress Party responsibility for the
terror attacks, but the party’s contribution towards mistrust in Muslims in general
was highlighted by several politicians and debaters. Four well-known scholars
discussed publically the distinction between words and actions with the goal of
pointing to the moral responsibility that follows hate speech (“the rhetoric of war
always precedes a war”).109 Dehumanising Muslims is a form of action, and so is
depicting Muslims as enemies, they argued, pointing to the highly polarised and
heated debates on migration in the years preceding July 22, 2011. They ended their
text by stating that “after July 22nd, we are obliged to struggle against Islamophobia and racism.”110
The term Islamophobia was also discussed after the terror attacks. Marthe
Michelet, who was also one of the persons the terrorist referred to by name as an
enemy in his document, introduced the debate by asking “What shall we call
it?”111 She argued that Norwegian society needed a term for anti-Muslim sentiments and hate. Politicians and editors of various newspapers who had condemned the word Islamophobia had to look at it again, she claimed: “After Utøya,
the word has to be taken out of the taboo box.”112 Michelet was immediately confronted with how the word could be used to silence an important debate on Islam
and how the term implied that a rational fear was a psychiatric diagnosis.113 The
attempt to merge a certain understanding of Islamophobia as a phenomenon with
the term Islamophobia was, in other words, heavily criticised.
“Make yourself familiar with what Islamophobia is” was the title of an op-ed
trying to counter the accusations of the term being used to silence critiques by
examining what sort of phenomenon it referred to.114 The message was that by
being able to recognise Islamophobia, one would also be able to criticise Islam;
some characteristics of Islamophobia were listed. The op-ed also warned about
placing Islamophobia solely in the landscape of the extreme right and gave some
examples of how it is part of mainstream society as well.
To sum up: Before 22 July, 2011, the term Islamophobia was almost nonexistent in the Norwegian public discourse, but in at least the first six months after
109. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Arne Johan Vetlesen, Sindre Bangstad, and Bushra Ishaq, “Uakseptable ytringer”, Aftenposten August 22, 2011, 4 (part 2).
110. Ibid.
111. Marte Michelet, “Hva skal vi kalle det?”, Dagbladet, August 14, 2011, 2.
112. Ibid.
113. For example Morgenbladet August 29, 2011, or Aftenposten August 15, 2011. Human Rights
Service published on their homepage a much–quoted piece on Islamophobia being a useless concept and a tool of illegitimate power (hersketeknikk) to silence voices, https://www.rights.no/.
114. Cora Alexa Døving. “Gjør deg kjent med islamofobien”, Aftenposten August 7, 2011, 4 (part 2).
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
the terror, it was used every day in several mass-media channels. Interestingly, and
probably because of the seriousness of the terror attack, it did not end up in a
debate on the term, but kept focus on the phenomenon. This, however, did not last:
The meaning of, as well as the legitimacy of the term, did not become hegemonic.
After being used more or less without reflection in the first shocking description
of the ideology motivating the terrorist, the concept ended up figuring in warnings
against using the very concept. Islamophobia became a term for describing the
worldview of the extreme right and nothing else. So did the general debates on the
phenomenon; it was something belonging to the margins. The rejection of the term
Islamophobia, then, has made it difficult to refer to the seriousness of negative
experiences of discrimination among Muslims, as well as to discuss more mainstream examples of anti-Muslim sentiments.115
The debates on the comparison of Islamophobia and antisemitism – in spite of
not being very fruitful (since it ended up centring on differences in historical periods rather than on the understanding of the phenomenon) – did, however, engage
voices across the political left/right axis in Norwegian politics. It was in the aftermath of the terror attack that Islamophobia as a phenomenon was thoroughly discussed for the first time without being connected to statements from the Progress
Party. This was the beginning of an understanding in which the danger of collectivising Muslims through negative prejudices became a reference point for the
understanding of Islamophobia. It also started the process of a broader acceptance
of seeing a link between antisemitism and Islamophobia: not only because they
are attitudes that society must combat, but also because they are two key aspects
of right-wing radicalism and are related to racism as a phenomenon.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS: ISLAMOPHOBIA – A GROWING
CONSENSUS?
The review of when and how Islamophobia has been debated in Norway illustrates
a development in the understanding of the phenomenon: from general xenophobia
and discrimination of migrants, to a way of thinking that generalised Muslims in
particular. This cognitive dimension of attitudes was again explained as a result of
seeing Muslims as a homogenous group of fanatical religious people. Islamophobia was also understood as a phenomenon linked to positioning on the right/left
115. This has its parallel in what Christhard Hoffmann describes in his chapter in this book, “A
Fading Consensus: Public Debates on Antisemitism in Norway, 1960 vs. 1983”: when antisemitism is only associated with Nazi ideology and genocide, more moderate forms slip under
the radar.
101
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CORA ALEXA DØVING | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
axis of Norwegian politics, and Islamophobia was mainly addressed as part of criticism against the Progress Party. After the terror attacks of 9/11 in 2001, Islamophobia was commonly referred to as “fear of Muslims” (muslimfrykt). This fear
was often described as understandable, but still something that could harm innocent Muslims and expose them to discrimination. Due to reports of the harassment
of Muslims, the understanding of Islamophobia went from addressing a cognitive
dimension of attitudes to also incorporating actions – practices – and the expression “harassments against Muslims” (muslimhets) became the dominant way of
referring to Islamophobia. A few years after 9/11, Islamophobia was once again
closely linked to debates on migration, with references to political statements usually from members of the Progress Party. Islamophobia was also largely understood as a phenomenon in the mass media; Muslim voices, in particular, referred
to the press as a place where negative portrayals of Muslims were broadcast. Due
to the growing number of Muslim voices, the issue of equal rights and minority
rights became part of an understanding of Islamophobia as discriminating against
the rights of a religious minority. However, parallel to the increase in literature that
warned against a Muslim takeover, and the explosion of online hubs circulating
negative images of Muslims, Islamophobia increasingly came to be understood as
a worldview and an ideology belonging to the landscape of the far right. In the
aftermath of 9/11, it became almost synonymous with a belief in, and fear of, a
Muslim conspiracy to take over Western society. Such an understanding placed
Islamophobia at the margins of the population, but it also led to an important
understanding of Islamophobia as attitudes existing in a part of the majority population, independent of the how well the Muslims were integrated. Islamophobia,
especially after July 22, 2011, became a phenomenon recognised as not only dangerous for Muslims, but also for democracies in Europe because of its link to the
extreme right. Seeing Islamophobia as an ideology also opened up for an understanding of it in the light of other prejudices, such as antisemitism.
The years after 22 July 2011 have featured several debates on Islam, Muslims
and Islamophobia in which the understandings of the concept have alternated
between those presented above. However, some recent policy measures (2019)
make it reasonable to suggest that increased consensus on how to address Islamophobia is in the making, and a new interest in the concept of racism seems to play
a role in this.
When the Runnymede Trust put Islamophobia on the map in 1997, its writers
stated that the term referred to three phenomena: “unfounded hostility towards
Islam”; “practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against
Muslim individuals and communities”; and “exclusion of Muslims from main-
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
stream political and social affairs.”116 In a follow-up report, they have kept this
broad understanding, but shifted the weight from negative images of Islam to a
more specific concentration on the exclusion of Muslims. They also offer a new
definition: “Islamophobia is anti-Muslim racism.”117
Islamophobia, understood as anti-Muslim racism, is, as I have argued in chapter
118
8 , very far from being a common understanding of Islamophobia in the Norwegian population. In 2015 the Norwegian government was criticised by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) for not using the word
“racism” in any political plans and programs. Warnings like this, in combination
with the prevalent negative attitudes towards Muslims found in the CHM report
(broadly referred to in the media), and the increase in hate-crime statistics for Muslims and darker skinned citizens, have led to new concerns about Islamophobia as
a form of racism at the political level. An illustrative example of this is that various
political parties have initiated the development of a national action plan to combat
racism towards ethnic and religious minorities. In the notes written in preparation
for the plan, “hostility towards Muslims” is specifically addressed. Islamophobia
is on the verge of being understood as a variant of racism existing in the midst of
our society and not solely in the worldview of right-wing extremism.
Political differences on the issue of Islamophobia have by no means disappeared from public debates, but it seems like the growing visibility of extreme
milieus and arenas for expressing hate and anti-Muslim racism has created room
for at least some cooperation across party boundaries in combating the phenomenon. An example of this is the consensus in parliament to implement a national
action plan against racism in which Islamophobia is specifically addressed (2019).
According to historian of religion Mattias Gardell, Islamophobia is a “regime of
knowledge” in the Foucaultian sense of the expression.119 It is in the framework of
an Islamophobic regime of knowledge that “certain statements, beliefs, and claims
about Islam and Muslims through the logic of repetition are perceived as adopted
truths because it matches what we have always heard, and thus know.”120 In many
ways, combating Islamophobia has also been restricted by a “regime of knowledge”: that of discursive borders protecting a specific understanding of what racism
is, namely something solely connected to ideas about race or skin colour. It is this
116. The Runnymede Trust Report, Islamophobia – Still a challenge to us all (2017) 1 (referring to
the old report).
117. Ibid.
118. Cora Alexa Døving: “Muslims are…: Contextualising survey answers”, chapter 8 in this book.
119. Michelle Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London and New York: Routledge, 1969).
120. Mattias Gardell, Islamofobi (Oslo: Spartacus, 2011).
103
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CORA ALEXA DØVING | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
regime of knowledge that is at the very beginning of opening up for new perspectives – perspectives that acknowledge Islamophobia to be a phenomenon with
mechanisms and consequences that are similar to those of other types of racism.
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SOURCES (LIST OF ARTICLES FROM NORWEGIAN NEWSPAPERS)
Articles with authors
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Anfindsen, J. T. (2007, October 12). Useriøst fra Michelet. Dagbladet, p. 42.
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Bech-Karlsen, J. (1993, October 13). Media skaper kulturkonflikter, Bergens Tidene, p. 6.
Benkow, J. (1987, September 9). Hvirvler opp rasistiske holdninger, Aftenposten, p. 4.
Døving, C. A. (2006, February 7). Islam er også en norsk religiom, Aftenposten, p. 5.
Døving, C. A. (2007, February 6). Muslimen og jøden, Aftenposten, p. 4.
Døving, C. A. (2011, August 7), Gjør deg kjent med islamofobien, Aftenposten, p. 4.
Einarsjon, O.-F. (2008, October 2). Vi tolererer oss til døde, Aftenposten, p. 4.
Eriksen, T. B. (2011, August 12). Noe annet enn rasisme, Morgenbladet, p. 9.
Eriksen, T. H., Vetlesen, A. J., Bangstad S., Ishaq, B. (2011, August 22). Uakseptable ytringer,
Aftenposten, p. 4 (part 2).
Gule, L., (2009, March 5). Islamofobi er ingen myte. VG, p. 43.
Hajra, T. J. M., Hussain S., Hussain, S. M. (2009, February 13. Vi blir undervurdert, Aftenposten, p. 3.
Hassan, I. (2009, February 18). Hijab for dommere. Dagbladet, front page and p. 8–9.
Jensen, P., (2003, August 21). Islam og det åpne samfunn, VG, p. 41.
Kohn, E. (2011, August 5). Historieløs sammenligning, Dagsavisen, p. 7.
Levin, M. (2011, August 9). Kan ikke sammenlignes, Aftenposten, p. 5.
Michelet, M. (2007, October 5). Burkafobi, Dagbladet, p. 2.
105
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CORA ALEXA DØVING | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
Michelet, M. (2008, March 17). Muslimhore, Dagbladet, p. 3.
Michelet, M. (2008, March 28). Løgn og bedrag, Dagbladet, p. 40.
Michelet, M. (2011, August 14). Hva skal vi kalle det?, Dagbladet, p. 2.
Myhre, A. S. (2011, August 27). Vi må ta et oppgjør. Klassekampen, p. 2.
Nistad, B. (2011, August 10). Vår tids jøder? VG, p. 47.
Nore, N. (2009, March 1). Islamofobi-myten, VG, p. 2.
Qureshi, I. (2009, February 18). En kamp for likeverd, VG. p. 39.
Rasmussen, S. A. (2007, Februar 13). Fortjent islamkritikk, Aftenposten, p. 3.
Skjeseth, S. (2006, February 10). Still opp for muslimene, Klassekampen, p. 9.
Solberg, E. (2011, August 6). Lærdom fra historien, Dagbladet, p. 65.
Stanghelle, H. (1993, October 13). Blir islam vårt nye fiendebilde? Aftenposten, p. 14.
Storhaug, H. (2008, March 27). Av en annen verden, Dagbladet, p. 40.
Storhaug, H. (2011, January 6). En stigende uro, Aftenposten, p. 4.
Støre, J. G. (2006, March 10). Dialog som prosjekt, Dagsavisen, p. 4.
Sultan, S. and Ali, A. (2009, February 12). Beskytt trosfriheten, Dagbladet, p. 39.
Tajamal, H. (2009). Vi er en del av det røde, hvite og blå, Dagbladet, p. 50.
Thoresen, F. E. (2006, March 21). Den nye rasisme, VG, p. 31.
Trædal, E. (2011, August 8). Vær varsom, Klassekampen.
Tybring-Gjedde, C. and Andersen, K. (2010, August 26). Drøm fra Disneyland Aftenposten, p.
4 (part 2).
Willis, H. (2007, February 9). Muslimer ikke som jøder Aftenposten, p. 5.
Editorials, interviews and news reports
Antimuslimske holdninger på frammarsj i Europa. NTB, May 23.
Biskoper advarer mot muslimhets (2005, September 25). VG.
Demonstrerer for felles framtid (2002, February 9). Aftenposten, p. 4.
Et skritt tilbake for Norge (2009, February 21). Klassekampen, p. 13
Frykter hevnaksjoner (2006, February 6). Dagsavisen, p. 9.
Hagens falske brevhets (1987, September 8). VG, front page and p. 6–7.
Han er ingen fremmed (2011, July 24). Aftenposten.
I skyggen av 11. september (2002, May 27). Klassekampen, p. 6–7.
Islamdebatten er blitt mer åpen (2010, February 14). Aftenposten, p. 3.
Islamofobien øker rasismen (2005, Dece,ber 9). LO aktuelt.
Kampanje mot muslimfrykt (2001, October 31). VG.
Muhammed tegningene (2006, February 12). Dagbladet, p. 12–13.
Muslimer i Norge: Tar avstand fra Nygaard attentatet (19932, October 11). NTB in Dagbladet
and VG.
Måten ekstreme antiislamske grupper omtaler muslimer på i dag, ligner måten antisemittiske
grupper omtalte jøder (2011, August 4). VG, p. 4–5.
Norsk Telegram Bureau (1989, February 24).
Norsk Telegram Bureau, (1989, April 18).
Rasisme er et sikkerhetsproblem (January 8) ABC nyheter.
Siste sjanse (1989, February 27), VG, p. 11.
3. A GROWING CONSENSUS?
Sunnimuslimer: Vi dreper ingen (1993, October 12), Aftenposten, p. 4.
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107
DOI: 10.18261/978-82-15-03468-3-2019-05
4.
Antisemitism and Islamophobia
in Norway
A Survey Analysis of Prevalence, Trends
and Possible Causes of Negative Attitudes
towards Jews and Muslims
OTTAR HELLEVIK
ABSTRACT The aim of the chapter is to establish how widespread negative attitudes
towards Jews and Muslims are among the Norwegian population, and to look for factors
that may stimulate such attitudes, through an analysis of the two representative population surveys conducted by The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies in
2011 and 2017.
Attitudes towards Jews are measured by indices of prejudice, dislike, social distance, and
a summary index of antisemitism. Islamophobia is measured by a corresponding set of
indices in 2017. The level of negative attitudes towards Jews is low and declining for all
indices. Negative attitudes towards Muslims are more widespread. Women, younger
people and those with higher education have a lower level of negative attitudes towards
the two minorities. Opinion on the Middle East conflict affects antisemitism and Islamophobia in opposite directions, while both are strongly influenced by xenophobia. Negative attitudes towards the two minorities tend to coexist in individuals.
KEYWORDS Islamophobia | antisemitism | population survey | xenophobia |
attitudes towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict | Norway
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
1. OUTLINE OF CHAPTER
The analyses use data from the two representative population surveys from 2011
and 2017, conducted by The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies (CHM). Each survey had a little over 1,500 respondents (section 2). Indices of
prejudice, dislike and social distance, which are combined in a summary index of
antisemitism, were measured in the same way in both surveys (section 3). For
Islamophobia, a corresponding set of indices was used in 2017 (section 4).
The importance of the respondents’ own attitudes for how they perceive the
prevalence of negative attitudes towards the two minorities in Norway, and
whether they see a need to combat such attitudes, is analysed in section 5. The
relationship between attitudes towards the two minorities, whether they are opposing or go together at the individual level, is the topic of section 6.
Variations in attitudes towards Jews and Muslims depending on respondent
characteristics such as social background, religiosity, opinion regarding the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, xenophobia and scepticism towards
immigrants are studied in order to shed light on possible causes for antisemitism
and Islamophobia (section 7). Changes in these variables and their contribution to
the effect of generational replacement and individual changes in attitudes on the
trend for antisemitism between 2011 and 2017 are analysed (section 8). The concluding section (9) summarises the main findings from the analyses.
2. THE DATA
The population surveys were conducted electronically using GallupPanelet, Kantar TNS’s access panel. The sample members received email invitations to complete a web questionnaire.1 The gross samples were stratified prior to distribution
and selected in proportion to the Norwegian population’s distribution by education, gender, age and geographical region. Weights were calculated to correct for
observed biases with regard to these variables in the net sample.2
One reminder was issued during the field period. The number of interviews
obtained was 1,522 in 2011 and 1,575 in 2017 (response rates 48% and
1. The questionnaire in Norwegian is an appendix in the report from the study: Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway 2017 (Oslo: Center
for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, 2017): 126–153, https://www.hlsenteret.no/english/research/jewish-history-and-antisemitism/Population%20survey%3A%20Attitudes%20towards%20Jews%20and%20Other%20Minorities/index.html
2. More information on samples and response rates is given in the report. Hoffmann and Moe, eds.,
Attitudes: 22–25.
109
110
OTTAR HELLEVIK | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
54%).3 The interviews took place in November 2011 and January to April 2017.
In 2017, three minority samples (Jews, Muslims and non-Muslim immigrants
from predominantly Muslim countries) were also interviewed. Results from these
surveys are presented in chapter 7 of this volume.4
3. MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
Determining the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews in the Norwegian
population through the help of a survey is no easy task. The distribution of
responses to a specific question will depend not only on the subject matter, but
also on the wording and response options provided.5 The research group at CHM
therefore decided to use multiple questions to construct indices that combine questions with related content. This way, more reliable measures may be obtained by
reducing the impact of random errors, as well as more valid measures of complex
phenomena that cannot be captured by a single question.
The indices cover three aspects of antisemitism: an affective dimension of dislike of Jews, a dimension of social distance from Jews, and a cognitive dimension of prejudice where negative characteristics are ascribed to Jews.6 Finally,
the three indices are combined in an overall index of antisemitism. These measures were the same in the 2011 and 2017 population surveys. Although there may
be some uncertainty regarding the estimated level of antisemitism in each year,
since this will depend on the measuring instruments, there will be less uncertainty regarding the direction of change in that level between the two points in
time.
3.1 INDEX FOR DISLIKE OF JEWS
The index is mainly based on a question asking how respondents react to the statement “I have a certain dislike of Jews” (Table 4.1). In 2011, three out of four
respondents felt that the statement did not fit with their own opinion, 43% not at
3. Most of the tables and figures in this chapter show distributions for the entire samples (N=1,522
for 2011 and 1,575 for 2017). For tables/figures containing distributions for subgroup where Ns
are not included, they are given in Table A1 and A2 in the appendix.
4. See Werner Bergmann, “How do Jews and Muslims in Norway perceive each other? Between
prejudice and cooperation”, in the present volume.
5. Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser, Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys. Experiments
on Question Form, Wording, and Context (London: Sage, 1996).
6. Steven Breckler, “Empirical validation of affect, behavior and cognition as distinct components
of attitude”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47, no. 6 (1984): 1191–1205.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
all, and 34% rather badly.7 In 2017, the corresponding figures were 49% and 33%.
The share for the two negative responses taken together fell by 3.7 points, from
11.2% to 7.5%, a significant reduction (1% level). These answers were scored 1
and 2 on the index, and all other answers scored 0.
TABLE 4.1. Negative and positive feelings towards Jews (Percent. Population samples)
Impos. to
Rather answer /
NA
badly
How well do these statements
fit with your own opinion?
Year
Not at
all
I have a certain dislike of Jews
2011
43.4
33.9
11.5
2017
48.6
32.7
2011
21.3
2017
22.0
I have a particular sympathy
for Jews
Rather
well
Completely
Total
9.5
1.7
100.0
11.3
5.9
1.6
100.0
31.7
20.4
20.8
5.9
100.1
27.6
23.3
20.8
6.3
100.0
The responses to the statement concerning sympathy were more evenly distributed, with a majority that did not find it fitting, down from 53% in 2011 to 50% in
2017, and a quarter of the respondents who did. This question was used to adjust
the index score, by assigning the score of 0 on the index for respondents expressing both dislike and sympathy. This contradictory pattern may be a case of
response error, but it may also reflect a genuine ambivalence. Feelings can be positive due to, for instance, the particular history of the Jews, yet simultaneously
negative due to, for instance, Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians today.
Regardless, there may be grounds for disregarding such an ambivalent response
pattern when defining dislike of Jews, and only including respondents who only
express dislike.
This adjustment reduces the percentage scoring high on dislike of Jews (score 1
or 2 on the 0–2 index) from 11.2% to 9.8% in 2011 and from 7.5% to 6.7% in 2017
(Figure 4.1), compared to the share of respondents expressing dislike (Table 4.1).8
7. These response categories were used instead of agree-disagree scales in order to reduce the
amount of yea-saying (response acquiescence), as discussed among others by Arthur Couch and
Kenneth Keniston, “Yeasayers and naysayers. Agreeing response set as a personality variable”,
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 60, no. 2 (1960): 151–174.
8. The sum for scores 1 and 2 in 2011 is 9.9 in Figure 4.1. The percentage 9.8 reported for a high
score is the result when two decimals are used in the calculations, as is done in this and other
figures/tables.
111
112
OTTAR HELLEVIK | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
Dislike
% High
1,5
2 High
1,5
2011
9.8
2017
6.7
8,4
1
5,2
90,2
0 Low
93,3
FIGURE 4.1. Index for dislike of Jews (Percent. Population samples).
The reduction of 3.1 percentage points in the share of respondents scoring high on
the index for dislike of Jews between 2011 and 2017 is significant (1% level).
3.2 INDEX FOR SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM JEWS
This index uses questions similar to items from Bogardus’s social distance scale.9
When asked how much they would like to have Jews as neighbours or in their circle of friends, most respondents replied “wouldn’t mind it”. Between 2011 and
2017, the combined share for “dislike a little” or “dislike a lot” fell from 10.6% to
7.0% regarding Jews as neighbours, and from 9.8% to 7.0% for Jews as friends.
Both reductions are significant (1% level).
TABLE 4.2. Social distance from Jews (Percent. Population samples)
To what extent would
you like or dislike:
Having Jews as neighbours?
Having Jews in your
circle of friends?
Year Like it
Wouldn’t
mind it
No
answer
Don’t
know
Dislike Dislike
it a little it a lot
Sum
2011
13.6
73.0
0.0
2.9
7.4
3.2
100.0
2017
13.6
75.4
0.2
3.8
5.3
1.7
100.0
2011
13.9
72.8
0.0
3.4
6.4
3.4
100.0
2017
17.9
70.5
0.3
4.3
5.0
2.0
100.0
9. Emory S. Bogardus, “Measurement of Personal-Group Relations”, Sociometry 10, no. 4 (1947):
306–311. Two of his items were the following: Accept a person “in my close circle of friends”,
“as neighbours in the same street”.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
For each question the answer “dislike a little” was scored 1 and “dislike a lot” 2
on the index. Top scores are quite rare (Figure 4.2). When the index is dichotomised so as to consider scores 2–4 as a high social distance, the share is 8.5% in
2011, falling to 5.9% in 2017, a reduction of 2.6 percentage points (significant at
1% level).
Distance
4 High
3
2
1
3,0
1,6
0,6
0,3
% High
Population 2011
8.5
Population 2017
5.9
5,0
4,0
3,5
2,5
0 Low
88,0
91,6
FIGURE 4.2. Index for social distance from Jews (Percent. Population samples)
3.3 INDEX FOR PREJUDICES AGAINST JEWS
The questionnaire included a series of statements about Jews that express stereotypical, generalised, negative images that are commonly found in antisemitic
ideas regarding issues such as power, finance and blame. In antisemitism research
there are several prejudice indices, which served as a basis for the construction of
our index.10 Table 4.3 shows the share of the respondents in 2011 and 2017 who
find that a statement fits “completely”, “rather well”, “rather badly” or “not at all”
10. See Anti-Defamation League, Global 100, Index of 11 antisemitic statements, 2014; Werner
Bergmann and Rainer Erb, Anti-Semitism in Germany. The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945 (New
Brunswick: Transaction Publ., 1997), German edition: Der Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1945–1989. Ergebnisse der empirischen Forschung (Opladen:
Leske+Budrich, 1991); Andreas Zick et al., “The Syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity: The
Interrelation of Prejudices Testes with Multiple Cross-Sectional and Panel Data”, Journal of
Social Issues 62, no. 2 (2008): 363–383; Henrik Bachner and Jonas Ring, Antisemitic Images
and Attitudes in Sweden (English Summary), (Stockholm: Forum för levande historia, 2005),
https://www.levandehistoria.se/sites/default/files/material_file/antisemitiska-attityder-rapport.pdf . Some of the questions have been used directly, others have been partly modified.
113
114
OTTAR HELLEVIK | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
with their own opinion. “Impossible to answer” was also a response option, and
the few respondents who did not tick any response alternative are listed under NA
(“No answer”) in the table.
The statements are ordered according to how many respondents chose one of the
two answers expressing a negative opinion in 2011, varying between 13% and 26%.
In 2017 the corresponding proportions range from 8% to 18%. For all statements the
percentage expressing agreement is smaller in 2017, with a decrease of between 3
and 8 percentage points. All the changes are statistically significant (1% level).
TABLE 4.3. Prejudices against Jews (Percent. Populations samples)
Below is a list of statements
that have previously been
made about Jews. How
well do they fit with your
own opinion?
Jews consider themselves to
be better than others
Jews have too much influence on the global economy
World Jewry is working
behind the scenes to promote
Jewish interests
Jews have always caused
problems in the countries in
which they live
Jews have enriched themselves at the expense of others
Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted
Statement fits:
Year
Not at
all
Rather
badly
Impos. to
answer/
NA
Rather
well
Completely
Sum
2011
15.8
21.6
36.3
19.9
6.4
100.0
2017
20.0
23.7
38.4
13.6
4.3
100.0
2011
17.1
24.5
37.5
16.4
4.4
99.9
2017
19.8
26.0
41.4
9.8
3.1
100.1
2011
17.4
20.7
42.9
15.2
3.9
100.1
2017
20.9
21.2
44.8
9.6
3.5
100.0
2011
27.2
30.3
27.9
11.2
3.4
100.0
2017
31.0
31.3
29.4
6.0
2.3
100.0
2011
22.2
28.1
35.1
11.8
2.8
100.0
2017
23.1
28.6
36.7
9.0
2.6
100.0
2011
38.6
27.1
21.7
10.3
2.3
100.0
2017
39.4
30.5
22.0
6.4
1.7
100.0
For the index of prejudice against Jews, a score of 1 is assigned to the response
“fits rather well” and 2 to “fits completely”, giving an additive index ranging from
0 to 12 points (Figure 4.3). The distributions show high proportions for the lowest
score (0), telling us that most of the respondents did not find that any of the six
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
negative statements matched their own opinion. This holds for 55% in 2011 and
69% in 2017, an increase of as much as 14 percentage points.
The percentage of respondents scoring in the 10–12 interval was just 1.3 in 2011
and 1.4 in 2017. Above the midpoint of the scale (7–12 points) the percentages
were 4.6 in 2011 and 3.3 in 2017. The decrease of 1.3 percentage points is small
but significant (5% level).
Prejudice
10-12 High
1,3
% High
1,4
7-9
1,9
4-6
2011
12.1
2017
8.3
3,3
7,4
5,0
32,9
1-3
22,5
0 Low
55,0
69,2
FIGURE 4.3. Index of prejudice against Jews (Percent. Population samples)
On the dichotomised prejudice index, the cut-off point between high and low was
set between scores of 3 and 4. This means that as a minimum, two of the six negative statements have been considered to fit with their own opinion. According to
this dichotomy, 12.1% of the respondents showed high levels of prejudice against
Jews in 2011, falling to 8.3% in 2017, a decrease of 3.8 percentage points (significant 1% level).
3.4 INDEX OF ANTISEMITISM
The summary index of antisemitism is an additive index of the three dichotomised
sub-indices scored 0 and 1 (Figure 4.4). The vast majority have no high scores on
the sub-indices, increasing from 80% to 87% between 2011 and 2017. In some of
the analyses that follow, the combined index is dichotomised with a high score on
115
116
OTTAR HELLEVIK | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
at least two of the three sub-indices defined as a high level of antisemitism. This
applies to 7.8% of the population in 2011 and 5.5% in 2017. The reduction of 2.3
percentage points is significant (1% level).
Antisemitism
3 high
2
1
% High
2,4
2011
7.8
2017
5.5
2,1
5,3
3,4
12,5
7,9
0 Low
79,8
86,7
FIGURE 4.4. Combined index of antisemitism (Percent)
3.5 TESTING THE VALIDITY OF THE ANTISEMITISM INDEX
We can test whether the index in fact captures what we mean by antisemitism by
examining the association between index scores and various opinions where attitudes towards Jews can be expected to create clear differences in the distribution
of responses. Figure 4.5 shows such associations, with sharply increasing or
decreasing proportions as we move from score 0 to 3 on the combined antisemitism index.
The difference between the two extreme groups scoring respectively 0 and 3 on
the index is 65 percentage points regarding acceptance of a Jew as prime minister,
46 percentage points for seeing harassment and violence against Jews as an attack
on our society, or as justifiable considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, and
75 percentage points for thinking that Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their
own purposes. The higher the distance between two extreme groups, the stronger
is the relationship between antisemitism and the attitude in question. This pattern
gives reason to conclude that the index is a valid measure of antisemitism, actually
measuring what was intended.
117
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
Antisemitism:
Statement fits rather well / completely:
3 High
2
1
0 Low
0
It would be fine by me if a Jew were to
become prime minister (All: 59%)
7
32
65
33
Harassment and violence against Jews
concern everyone and constitute attacks on
our society (All: 77%)
Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians,
harassment and violence against Jews are
justifiable (All: 12%)
60
62
79
54
38
30
8
90
Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their
own purposes (All: 22%)
69
64
15
FIGURE 4.5. Validity test for antisemitism index (Percent. Population 2017)*
*N for the first question is reduced from 1,575 to 804 due to a split ballot procedure for this question and
the one concerning a Muslim as prime minister (Figure 4.10).
In 2017, the gaps in the distribution of responses for the test questions are larger
between scores 0 and 1 than between scores 1 and 2. This means that the group
with score 1 more closely resembles the group with score 2 than the group with
score 0. This is an argument for using the dichotomy 0 versus 1–3, which would
give the percentages of 20.3 in 2011 and 12.4 in 2017 for a high level of antisemitism. Such a dichotomisation would imply a slightly sharper reduction in antisemitism in Norway between 2011 and 2017, with a 6.9 percentage point drop
instead of the 2.3 points shown in figure 4.4.11
When validity was tested in the report for the 2011 survey using other test questions, the largest gap in the distributions occurred between scores 1 and 2 on the
combined index.12 This was one reason why the dichotomisation of 0–1 versus
11. The difference will be less if the decrease is estimated in terms of relative rather than absolute
differences (percentage points). Relative to the initial value, the decrease from 20.2 to 13.3
represents a 34% reduction, while the decrease from 7.8 to 5.5 in relative terms is 29%.
12. Christhard Hoffmann, Øivind Kopperud and Vibeke Moe, eds., Antisemitism in Norway? The
Attitudes of the Norwegian Population Towards Jews and Other Minorities (Oslo: Center for
Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, 2012), 54–56.
118
OTTAR HELLEVIK | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
2–3 was chosen. It was also seen as reasonable not to use the antisemitism label
for respondents who had a high score on just one of the three sub-indices. Both in
2011 and 2017, it is a high score on the prejudice index alone that is most common
for those scoring 1 on the combined index (this holds respectively for 41% and
47% in 2011 and 2017). The prejudice index may be more open for discussions
regarding the choice of indicators than the other two sub-indices.
In order to get results comparable with those reported for 2011, the following
analyses will stick to the dichotomy used in the prior report, with 0–1 versus 2–3
for low versus high level of antisemitism. The same dichotomisation is also used
for the summary index of Islamophobia.
There is no denying that the decision of where to draw the line when the subindices are dichotomised is also somewhat arbitrary, and will affect the estimated
prevalence of antisemitism in Norway.13 The extent of this is seen when we compare the two extremes of a narrow and a broad definition of dislike, social distance
and prejudice (Figure 4.6). In the first case, only a top score on the sub-index is
considered a high value; in the second case, all index scores above 0.14 The result97
87
Broad definition
Index used
67
Narrow definition
24
8
2
Low 0
6 3
1
3 2 0
2
High 3
1
Antisemitism
FIGURE 4.6. Alternative indices of antisemitism (Percent. Population 2017)
13. For a discussion of the arbitrariness in defining cutting points and the validity of the antisemitism construct, see Bergmann and Erb, Anti-Semitism in Germany. The Post-Nazi Epoch since
1945, Appendix 1: Problems in the Development of Anti-Semitism Scales (1997): 326–337.
14. For the prejudice index, the score 11, in addition to score 12, is counted as high in the narrow
definition. Score 11 means that five of the six statements are seen as completely fitting and the
remaining one as somewhat fitting with one’s own opinion.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
ing proportions for a score of 0 on the combined index vary between 67% and
97%. A high score (2–3) varies less, from 1% with a narrow to 9% with a broad
definition.
The dichotomisation used for the three sub-indices lies between the broad and
narrow definitions, with around two-thirds of the index scale defined as a high
value. The result for the dichotomised antisemitism index of 5.5% high is slightly
closer to the result for the broad than the narrow definition.15
4. MEASURING ISLAMOPHOBIA
In the 2017 population survey, negative attitudes towards Muslims were measured
using the same kind of indices as for Jews. The questions in the dislike and social
distance indices are identical with those in the corresponding indices for Jews. The
statements used to measure prejudice are necessarily different, although some of
them have content resembling statements in the index for prejudice against Jews.
4.1 INDEX FOR DISLIKE OF MUSLIMS
A majority of 56% find the statement of dislike as “not at all” or “rather badly”
fitting with their own opinion, compared to 30% who see it as “rather well” or
“completely fitting” (Table 4.4). The result though, is far more negative for Muslims than for Jews in 2017, where 81% found the dislike statement “not fitting”
and only 8% “fitting” (Table 4.1).
TABLE 4.4. Dislike of Muslims (Percent. Population 2017)
Not at
all
Rather
badly
Impos. to
answer /
NA
I have a certain dislike of
Muslims
23.1
32.9
13.5
22.5
7.9
99.9
I have a particular sympathy for
Muslims
32.3
32.9
20.4
11.8
2.6
100.0
How well do these statements
fit with your own opinion?
Rather
well
Completely
Total
15. To see whether the results of our analyses depend on the how the sub-indices are dichotomised,
we have made robustness tests using the three alternative indices of antisemitism from Figure
4.6 as well as the dichotomised version as dependent variables in multivariate regression analyses, with quite similar patterns for the effects of a set of independent variables (Table A3 in
appendix).
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After adjusting for respondents indicating sympathy as well as dislike, the proportion with a high score on the dichotomised index is 28% for Muslims (Figure 4.7),
as compared to 7% for Jews (Figure 1).
Dislike
% High
2 High
7,3
27.7
1
20,5
0 Low
72,3
FIGURE 4.7. Index for dislike of Muslims (Percent. Population 2017)
4.2 INDEX FOR SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM MUSLIMS
The questions regarding social distance from Muslims were asked also in 2011. A
negative feeling towards Muslims as neighbours (dislike it a little or a lot) was
expressed by 28% in 2011 and 26% in 2017. The corresponding results for dislike
of having Muslims in circle of friends are 25% and 21% (Table 4.5). These figures
are substantially higher than those for Jews, which lie between 7 and 11% (Table
4.2). The reductions in the share of negative answers, which are most pronounced
for “dislike a lot”, are small (2.2 and 3.8 percentage points), but the latter is significant (5% level). The trend may appear surprising for some in view of a general
impression of a growing scepticism towards immigrants and Muslims in particular
among Norwegians. Such a negative trend has not, however, been confirmed by
opinion research.16 There also is a positive correlation between the share of immigrants in a local community and positive attitudes towards them, suggesting that
part of the explanation for the observed trend towards more positive attitudes is
immigration itself.
16. Ottar Hellevik and Tale Hellevik, “Utviklingen i synet på innvandrere og innvandring i Norge”
(“Changes in the opinion on immigrants and immigration in Norway”), Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning 58, no. 3 (2017): 250–283, https://www.idunn.no/tfs/2017/03/utviklingen_i_synet_paa_innvandrere_og_innvandring_i_norge.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
TABLE 4.5. Social distance from Muslims (Percent. Population samples)
To what extent would
you like or dislike:
Having Muslims as
neighbors?
Having Muslims in
your circle of friends?
Year
Like
it
Wouldn’t
mind it
No
answer
Don’t
know
Dislike
it a little
Dislike
it a lot
Sum
2011
6.9
62.6
0.0
2.7
15.3
12.6
100.1
2017
8.0
60.4
1.4
4.6
14.9
10.8
99.9
2011
9.5
62.7
0.0
3.4
12.8
11.7
100.1
2017
13.2
59.1
1.7
5.3
11 .4
9.3
100.0
The social distance index for Muslims has shares of high scores around one-fifth
of the population (Figure 4.8), compared to between 8% and 6% for distance from
Jews (Figure 4.2). There is a modest decrease of 2.4 percentage points between
2011 and 2017 (significant 5% level).
Distance
% High
10,1
4 High
3
2
1
8,4
2011
22.0
2017
19.6
2,7
2,1
9,2
9,1
9,7
8,2
0 Low
68,3
72,2
FIGURE 4.8. Index of social distance towards Muslims (Percent. Population samples)
4.3 INDEX FOR PREJUDICE AGAINST MUSLIMS
The statements used to measure whether the respondents hold negative, stereotypical opinions of Muslims necessarily differ from those in the index for prejudice
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against Jews.17 The results in Table 4.6 are thus not directly comparable to those
of Table 4.3. The share of negative answers for Muslims varies between 29% and
47%, as compared to between 8% and 18% for prejudices against Jews in 2017.
TABLE 4.6. Prejudices against Muslims (Percent. Population sample 2017)
Below is a list of statements
that have been made about
Muslims. How well do they fit
with your own opinion?
Statement fits:
Not at all
Rather
badly
Impos. to
answer/
NA
Rather
well
Completely
Sum
Muslims largely have themselves
to blame for the increase in antiMuslim harassment
10.8
22.6
19.1
30.9
16.5
100.0
Muslims consider themselves
morally superior to others
9.7
16.6
28.6
27.6
17.5
100.0
Muslims pose a threat to
Norwegian culture
15.8
30.0
14.8
24.6
14.8
100.0
Muslims do not fit into modern
Western society
14.4
31 .8
17.4
23.2
13.2
100.0
Muslims want to take over
Europe
20.1
23.0
26.6
16.6
13.7
100.0
Muslims are more violent than
others
18.0
27.5
25.5
19.1
9.9
100.0
On the index for prejudice against Muslims, nearly 20% of the respondents score
above the midpoint of 6 on the scale, and 34% score high (4–12) on the dichotomised index (Figure 4.9). This is far above the corresponding results for prejudice
against Jews of 3% and 8% in 2017 (Figure 4.3).
17. In contrast to our situation when selecting statements for the index on prejudice against Jews,
there are few international attempts to construct such indices with regard to prejudice against
Muslims. One example is the index presented in the article by Ronald Imhoff and Julia Recker,
“Differentiating Islamophobia: Introducing a New Scale to Measure Islamoprejudice and
Secular Islam Critique”, Political Psychology. 33, no. 6 (2012): 811–824.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
Prejudice
10-12 High
9,7
7-9
9,7
% High
34.1
4-6
14,8
1-3
28,9
0 Low
37,1
FIGURE 4.9. Index of prejudice against Muslims (Percent. Populations sample 2017)
4.4 INDEX OF ISLAMOPHOBIA
For the summary index of Islamophobia made from the dichotomised sub-indices,
nearly 60% of the respondents have a low score on all three (Figure 4.10). The rest
is evenly split between 1, 2 and 3 high scores, with shares of 13–14%. For the
dichotomised index of Islamophobia, 27% have a high score. Once again, the
result for Muslims is markedly more negative than for attitudes towards Jews,
with a high score of 5.5% in 2017 (Figure 4.4).
Islamophobia
3 High
13,6
2
13,4
1
13,8
% High
27.0
0 Low
59,2
FIGURE 4.10. Index of Islamophobia (Percent. Population sample 2017)
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4.5 TESTING THE VALIDITY OF THE ISLAMOPHOBIA INDEX
As for the antisemitism index, we have tested the validity of the Islamophobia
index by looking at the association between index scores and other attitudes one
would expect to be highly correlated with negative attitudes towards Muslims.
The first two questions in the test, and to some degree also the third one, are similar in content as those used in the test for antisemitism. As expected, figure 4.11
shows markedly increasing or decreasing proportions as we move from score 0 to
3 on the combined Islamophobia index.
The difference between the two extreme groups is 45 percentage points regarding acceptance of a Muslim as prime minister, 27 percentage points for seeing harassment and violence against Muslim as an attack on our society, 26 percentage
points for seeing harassment and violence against Muslims as justifiable considering recent terrorist attacks, and 52 percentage points for thinking that harassment and violence against Muslims would not be a problem if there were fewer
Muslim asylum seekers. These differences, although somewhat smaller than the
corresponding results for the antisemitism index (Figure 4.5), suggest that the
index is a valid measure of Islamophobia.
Statement fits rather well / completely:
Islamophobia:
3 High
0
2
6
It would be fine by me if a Muslim were to
become prime minister (All: 28%)
23
1
45
0 Low
46
Harassment and violence against Muslims
concern everyone and constitute attacks on
our society (All: 73%)
Considering recent terror attacks, harassment
and violence against Muslims are justifiable
(All: 10%)
Harassment and violence against Muslims
would not be a problem if there were fewer
Muslim asylum seekers
(All: 32%)
61
71
83
29
20
12
3
68
58
41
16
FIGURE 4.11. Validity test for Islamophobia index (Percent. Population 2017)*
* N for the first question is reduced from 1,575 to 771 due to a split ballot procedure for this question and
the one concerning a Jew as prime minister.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
Even more than for the antisemitism index, how the sub-indices are dichotomised
affects the estimated prevalence of Islamophobia in Norway. This becomes clear
when we compare the two extremes of a narrow and a broad definition of dislike,
social distance and prejudice, as explained earlier in section 3.5. The resulting proportions for a score of 0 on the combined index vary between 35% and 81% (Figure 4.12). A high score (2–3) varies from 8% with a narrow to 34% with a broad
definition, as compared to the result of 27% for the index used in our analyses.18
Broad definition
81
Index used
Narrow definition
59
35
31
14 11
19
15 13
5
Low 0
1
2
Islamophobia
14
3
High 3
FIGURE 4.12. Alternative islamophobia indices (Percent. Population sample 2017).
5. PERCEPTION OF THE PREVALENCE OF ANTISEMITISM AND
ISLAMPHOBIA
How widespread are negative attitudes towards the two minorities perceived to be
by members of the Norwegian population? Far more respondents believe negative
attitudes towards Muslims to be widespread than negative attitudes towards Jews
(Table 4.7). The proportions in 2011 and 2017 respectively answering “fairly” or
“very” widespread are 86% and 81% in relation to Muslims and 20% and 19% in
relation to Jews.
18. As for antisemitism, the effects of the various definitions of a high score on the sub-indices are
tested in a multivariate regression analysis. For Islamophobia, the results are also quite similar
(Table A3 in appendix).
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The change with regard to the perception of negative attitudes toward Jews is
too small to be significant. However, at the same time there was an increase in the
proportion who believed negative attitudes towards Jews not to be widespread at
all, from 7% to 10%, which is significant (1% level). This tendency for the change
in the general impression of the prevalence of antisemitism coincides with the
actual opinion trend as measured by our indices, all of which, as we have seen,
show a modest decrease for negative attitudes towards Jews in the Norwegian
population between 2011 and 2017.
For the Muslims, we only have trend data for attitudes regarding social distance,
which show a modest decrease (Figure 4.8). As for antisemitism, this is in line
with how the opinion climate regarding Muslims is perceived as somewhat less
negative in 2017 than in 2011.
TABLE 4.7. Impression of the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews and
Muslims (Percent. Population samples)
How widespread do you
think negative attitudes
are in Norway today?
Towards Jews
Towards Muslims
Year
Very
widespread
Fairly
widespread
Not very Not widewidespread at
spread
all
Impossible
to answer
2011
1.7
18.7
12.7
60.1
6.7
99.9
2017
2.4
16.9
11.8
58.8
10.1
100.0
2011
20.7
65.7
3.2
10.1
0.3
100.0
2017
16.5
64.3
4.7
14.0
0.5
100.0
Sum
Does the public acknowledge the need to combat harassment against these minorities? Most of those who expressed an opinion believe that measures to combat
anti-Jewish harassment are needed, increasing from 38% in 2011 to 41% in 2017
(Table 4.8). The corresponding figures with regard to anti-Muslim harassment are
higher, but slightly decreasing, from 59% to 56%. The results mean that while
twice as many respondents considered it important to combat anti-Jewish harassment as believed negative attitudes towards Jews to be widespread, the pattern is
the opposite for negative attitudes towards Muslims. In this case, a larger proportion believed such negative attitudes to be widespread than saw a need to combat
anti-Muslim harassment.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
TABLE 4.8. Need for combating anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim harassment (Percent.
Population samples)
Do you see a need to do
something to combat harassment in Norway?
Year
Yes
No
opinion
No
answer
No
Sum
Against Jews
2011
37.5
32.5
0.1
29.9
100.0
2017
40.7
31.2
0.0
28.1
100.0
2011
59.3
20.9
0.0
19.7
100.0
2017
56.1
26.1
0.1
17.7
100.0
Against Muslims
There is a strong correlation between respondents’ own attitudes and their impression of the prevalence of negative attitudes in others. High scores on the antisemitism or Islamophobia indices tend to go together with the belief that such attitudes
are widespread. In the 2017 survey, 17% of respondents who scored 0 on the combined index for antisemitism believed negative attitudes towards Jews to be very or
fairly widespread (most answered “fairly”). In the small group with the top score
of 3 on the index, 51% believed negative attitudes towards Jews to be widespread
(one-fifth answered “very”). In other words, respondents who themselves are prejudiced towards a certain group tend to think that others are too (Figure 4.13).
80
75
70
60
50
45
38
40
30
20
Antisemitism very / fairly
widespread
53
25
37
25
17
Not necessary to combat
antisemitism
10
0
0
Low
1
Antisemitism
2
3
High
FIGURE 4.13. Antisemitism and opinion on prevalence of negative attitudes towards
Jews in Norway and the need to combat them (Percent. Population sample 2017)
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There is also a high correlation between respondents’ own attitudes and their
assessment of the need for measures to combat anti-Jewish harassment in Norway:
the more negative the attitudes of respondents according to the antisemitism
index, the less need they see for such efforts. The pattern suggests that people who
are themselves negative would rather promote than combat such attitudes.
Similarly, the results for the Islamophobia index show that the more negative
the attitudes of the respondents themselves, the more often they believe such attitudes to be widespread in the general population. In the 2017 survey, most of the
respondents in the population sample have the impression that negative attitudes
towards Muslims are very or fairly widespread, increasing from 77% of those who
scored lowest on the combined index of Islamophobia to 93% of those who scored
highest (Figure 4.14). The proportion that answered “very widespread” rose from
12% to 39%.
100
93
89
90
80
77
77
Islamophobia very / fairly
widespread
70
60
49
50
40
25
30
20
20
Not necessary to combat
Islamophobia
8
10
0
0
Low
1
Islamophobia
2
3
High
FIGURE 4.14. Islamophobia and opinion on prevalence of negative attitudes towards
Muslims in Norway and the need to combat them (Percent. Population sample 2017)
A similar pattern as for antisemitism also exists with regard to the relation
between respondents’ own attitudes and their opinion on whether it is necessary
to combat anti-Muslim harassment in Norway. The more negative the attitudes of
respondents according to the index of Islamophobia, the less often they see the
need for measures to combat anti-Muslim harassment.
129
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
6. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANTISEMITISM AND
ISLAMOPHOBIA
Are antisemitism and Islamophobia related phenomena, or attitudinal opposites?
Is it a matter of both–and or of either–or when it comes to such attitudes? The former is conceivable if xenophobia is a dominant influence behind these attitudes.
The latter might be expected if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict plays a decisive role
in the attitude formation, and individuals develop positive attitudes towards the
party they sympathise with and negative attitudes towards its opponent.
That there is a tendency for antisemitism and Islamophobia to coincide in individuals is reflected by the correlation between these two indices and the two sets
of sub-indices. All coefficients (Pearson’s r) are positive in the population sample
in 2017 (Table 4.9). For the two summary indices the coefficient equals 0.24, a
clearly significant though not very strong correlation.19
TABLE 4.9. Correlations between indices for negative attitudes towards Jews and
Muslims (Pearson’s r (p <0.001 for all). Populations sample 2017).
Negative attitudes: Jews
Prejud. Dislike Distan.
Antisem.
Negative attitudes: Muslims
Prejud. Dislike Distan. Islamo.
Prejudice against Jews
1
0.56
0.47
0.78
0.27
0.19
0.21
0.22
Dislike of Jews
0.56
1
0.53
0.80
0.18
0.16
0.17
0.16
Social distance towards Jews
0.47
0.53
1
0.74
0.23
0.20
0.33
0.25
Antisemitism
0.78
0.80
0.74
1
0.25
0.21
0.27
0.24
Prejudice against Muslims
0.27
0.18
0.23
0.25
1
0.68
0.70
0.85
Dislike of Muslims
0.19
0.16
0.20
0.21
0.68
1
0.66
0.84
Social distance towards
Muslims
0.21
0.17
0.33
0.27
0.70
0.66
1
0.80
Islamophobia
0.22
0.16
0.25
0.24
0.85
0.84
0.80
1
19. The Group-Focused Enmity Studies find stronger correlations between antisemitism and Islamophobia in 2003: r=.58 for the West Germans, r=.60 for the East Germans. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, “Gruppenbezognene Menschenfeindlichkeit. Die theoretische Konzeption und
empirische Ergebnisse aus 2002 sowie 2003”, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer, ed., Deutsche Zustände,
Folge 2, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp (2003): 19.
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Table 4.10 presents three versions of the relationship between the two dichotomised summary indices. The left part shows that the likelihood for scoring high
on Islamophobia is far greater for people with a high level of antisemitism than for
people with low. The difference is 30 percentage points. Correspondingly, the
middle part of the table shows that scoring high on Islamophobia increases the
likelihood of having antisemitic attitudes. The difference is 8 percentage points.
TABLE 4.10. The relationship between antisemitism and Islamophobia (Percent.
Population 2017)
Islamophobia
Antisemitism
Low
High
%-d
H-L
High
25
55
30
Low
75
45
–30
Sum
100
100
0
Islamophobia
Antisemitism
Low
High
Sum
Islamophobia
High
89
11
100
Low
97
3
%-d H-L
–8
8
Antisemitism
Low
High
Sum
High
24.0
3.0
27.0
100
Low
70.5
2.5
73.0
0
Sum
94.5
5.5
100.0
The pattern in Table 4.10 means that the combinations high–high and low–low for
the antisemitism and Islamophobia indices will occur more frequently than chance
would predict. This is shown to the right in the table. Here, the distribution of the
respondents on the two dichotomised indices is shown as percentages of the Grand
Total. A majority of 70.5% of all respondents score low on both indices, while 3%
score high on both. Antisemitism alone is found in 2.5% of the sample, while
Islamophobia alone is found in 24%.
If the responses had been distributed in the cells of the table randomly (by drawing lots), and in such a way that we kept the marginal distributions for the two indices (94.5–5.5 and 73–27), the proportion that fell in the high–high or the low–low
cells would be 1.5 percentage points lower in each cell (resulting in 1.5% instead
of 3% located in the high–high cell, for example). Correspondingly, the proportion
in each of the two cells with a low value on one index and a high on the other,
would be 1.5 percentage points higher.
This shows that there is a tendency for antisemitism and Islamophobia to occur
in combination. They are, in other words, related attitudes rather than opposites.20
20. Another illustration of how antisemitism and Islamophobia tend to go together is found when we
look at the attitudes of the voters of Norwegian parties. There is a clear tendency that the higher the
level of antisemitism in a group of voters, which in the population sample from 2017 varied between 0.7% and 13.3% for a high value on the combined index, the higher the level of Islamophobia, varying between 4.5% and 63.2%. See Hoffmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes: 99–100.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
It is clear, however, that they also do occur alone, especially in the case of Islamophobia, since negative attitudes towards Muslims are far more widespread in
Norway than antisemitism according to our measures.
7. POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA
It is difficult to draw causal conclusions based on non-experimental survey data.
What the data can show are statistical correlations, but these do not necessarily
reflect causal influence. Correlations may be spurious, brought about by prior
causal variables affecting both variables in question. This section will attempt to
reveal non-causal association through analyses where such variables are controlled for. However, one can never be absolutely sure that such a control will
cover all the relevant variables. Another problem is causal direction, i.e. in which
direction an influence between the variables flows. For example, this can be difficult to know in the case of the relationship between attitudes towards Jews and
views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In many cases, it is reasonable to assume
that an influence will work both ways.
Which factors may influence peoples’ attitudes towards Jews or Muslims? We
will look at how attitudes vary between groups defined by gender, age, and education, as well as religiosity, opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, xenophobia, and scepticism towards immigrants in Norway.
The aim of the analyses is to form a picture of what may have contributed to
individuals in the Norwegian population developing negative attitudes towards
Jews or Muslims. For this purpose, separate indices were constructed for opinions
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, xenophobia, and attitudes towards immigrants.
7.1 OPINION ON THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
Two to three times as many respondents in the population sample support the Palestinians in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as support Israel (Table 4.11). Very few
choose the extreme alternatives “support solely”, and more than half of the
respondents refrain from expressing an opinion. The results from the 2017 survey
show a slight decrease since 2011 in the proportion that supports the Palestinians
and an increase in the proportion not taking sides. In the subsequent analyses, the
two categories at either end of the spectrum were combined, as were the two categories in the middle expressing no support for either side, thereby reducing the
number of values for the variable from eight to five.
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TABLE 4.11. “People have conflicting views on the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians. Which side do you support most?” (Percent. Population samples)
Year
Solely
Israel
Mostly
Israel
To
some
extent
Israel
Neither
Impossible
to answer/
NA
To some
extent
Palestinians
Mostly
Palestinians
Solely
Palestinians
Sum
2011
1.3
6.8
4.7
30.3
20.8
12.7
21.1
2.2
99.9
2017
2.1
6.7
4.5
31.9
22.5
10.5
18.3
3.6
100.1
Table 4.12 shows that statements expressing positive positions on Israel (the first
two) received less support than those expressing positive positions on the Palestinians (last two).21 Norwegians have more faith in the sincerity of the Palestinian
than the Israeli leaders when it comes to solving the conflict. The distribution of
responses to the pro-Israeli statements was quite similar in both surveys, while the
pro-Palestinian statements received slightly less support in 2017.
The content of the two remaining statements (the third and fourth in Table 4.12)
is critical of Israel.22 Around one-third of the respondents answered fits “rather
well” or “completely” to the statement “Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly
21. The statement on the right to a state of their own is seen here as pro-Palestinian in its content,
since it is for the Palestinians that such a right is not fulfilled at present. Since there are groups
that do not accept Israel’s right to existence, the statement may also be seen as pro-Israel. This is
reflected by the positive responses in the Jewish sample. The interpretation of the statement as
pro-Palestinian is, however, supported by the results of the factor analysis.
22. Researchers have so far used various items and indices to measure hostility towards Israel without yet reaching a consensus. Edgar H. Kaplan and Charles Small, “Anti-Israel sentiment predicts anti-Semitism in Europe”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (2006): 548–561, used
the data of the ADL survey, “Attitudes toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in
Ten European Countries”, New York 2004; for Germany see the study of Aribert Heyder, Julia
Iser and Peter Schmidt, “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus? Meinungsbildung zwischen Öffentlichkeit, Medien und Tabus”, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer, ed., Deutsche Zustände, Folge 3 (Frankfurt/M. 2005): 144–165; L. Daniel Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain
(London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2017); Wilhelm Kempf, Israelkritik zwischen
Antisemitismus und Menschenrechtsidee. Eine Spurensuche (Berlin 2015). The items used in
our study were first used by Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb for the construction of an antiZionism index: Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eretgebnisse der empirischen Forschung von 1946 bis 1989, Opladen 991 (English
edition: Anti-Semitism in Germany. The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945, Chapter: “Antizionism
and Antisemitism”, 182–191). (Bergmann and Erb, “Antizionism and Antisemitism”, in AntiSemitism in Germany. The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945, English).
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
133
as the Jews were treated during World War II”, the proportion being slightly
smaller in 2017 than in 2011. The statement “As long as the State of Israel exists
there can be no peace” was supported by 20% in 2017 and 16% in 2011.
TABLE 4.12. Opinions regarding the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Percent. Population samples)
Statement fits:
How well do these statements on
the Middle East conflict fit with
your own opinion?
Israel's leaders genuinely want to
find a solution to the conflict
Israel is at the forefront of the war on
Islamic terrorism
As long as the State of Israel exists
there can be no peace
Israel treats the Palestinians just as
badly as the Jews were treated during
WW2
Both the Israelis and the Palestinians
are entitled to a state of their own
The Palestinian leaders genuinely
want to find a solution to the conflict
Year
Not at
all
Rather
badly
Impos.
to answer/NA
Rather
well
Completely
Sum
2011
12.9
32.1
34.2
16.6
4.2
100.0
2017
10.0
31.2
37.0
17.8
4.1
100.1
2011
12.4
20.4
46.9
15.9
4.5
100.1
2017
8.0
20.9
51.9
14.7
4.5
100.0
2011
24.9
23.7
35.6
11.7
4.1
100.0
2017
13.2
20.9
45.6
15.8
4.6
100.1
2011
11.5
21.0
29.4
29.1
9.0
100.0
2017
9.9
20.5
37.4
25.4
6.9
100.1
2011
2.5
3.7
17.4
27.8
48.6
100.0
2017
2.2
4.4
23.1
30.9
39.5
100.1
2011
6.1
21.8
34.4
31.6
6.2
100.1
2017
7.3
19.2
40.4
28.2
5.0
100.1
A factor analysis23 of the six statements resulted in three dimensions, each with a
pair of the statements. When the responses for each statement are coded from 0 to
4, this gives three additive indices with scores ranging from 0 to 8, called proIsraeli attitudes (statements 1 and 2), anti-Israeli attitudes (statements 3 and 4),
and pro-Palestinian attitudes (statements 5 and 6). Table 4.13 shows the distribution on the indices and how they are dichotomised. The scale is divided just above
the midpoint so that scores of 5 to 8 are defined as high values on the index.
23. Principal component analysis with varimax rotation. A similar analysis in 2011 with four statements in addition to these six produced the same dimensional solution.
134
OTTAR HELLEVIK | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
TABLE 4.13. Indices for opinions on the Middle East conflict (Percent. Population
samples)
Index score
8
Sum
High
5-8
1.8
1.2
100.1
19.0
6.6
2.3
1.4
100.0
20.6
12.8 12.8 33.5 12.1
7.8
3.8
1.1
100.1
24.8
12.2 11.2 38.7 12.6
9.3
3.4
2.0
100.0
27.2
2.4
5.2 24.8 20.9 19.7
20.2
5.3
100.2
66.0
3.0
5.3 28.8 19.3 21.8
15.7
3.8
100.2
60.5
Index
Year
0
1
Pro-Israeli
attitudes
2011
5.2
7.8
13.1 15.5 39.4
2017
3.0
2011
Anti-Israeli
attitudes
Pro-Palestinian
attitudes
2
3
4
5
6
7
9.3
6.8
5.8
15.2 14.6 40.8 10.3
7.5
8.7
2017
5.2
5.4
2011
0.7
1.0
2017
1.2
1.3
The proportion with a high value remained stable at around 20% from 2011 to
2017 for the pro-Israeli index. Around a quarter of the population sample had a
high value on the index for anti-Israeli attitudes, with an insignificant increase
from 25% in 2011 to 27% in 2017. The proportion of respondents on the lower end
of the scale (scores 0–3), not supporting the anti-Israeli statements, decreased
from 42% to 34%. Most of the respondents are located above the midpoint on the
pro-Palestinian index, with 66% in 2011 and 60.5% in 2017. Both of these
changes are significant at 1% level.
In addition to being dichotomised in multivariate analyses, the indices are trichotomised in some tables. Then a low value will denote scores 0–2, a medium
value 3–5 and a high value 6–8.
7.2 XENOPHOBIA
Earlier we presented the attitude towards social contact with Jews and Muslims,
defined by whether respondents would like or dislike having them as neighbours or
friends. An index of social distance was constructed by assigning 1 point for the
response “would dislike it a little” and 2 points for “would dislike it a lot” for each of
the two types of contact. Table 4.14 shows the distribution on a similar index of social
distance towards Roma, Somalis and Poles. The first two groups in particular stand
out with respect to a high level of scepticism in the population sample. The proportion
with high scores (2–4) in the 2017 survey is 44% for Roma, 27% for Somalis and 8%
for Poles. For the purpose of comparison, the score for Americans was 4% and for
Catholics 3%, and, as already presented, 21% for Muslims and 6% for Jews.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
135
TABLE 4.14. Indices of social distance towards Roma, Somalis and Poles (Percent.
Population samples)
Index score
Index of social
distance:
Towards Roma
(Gypsies)
Towards Somalis
Towards Poles
Year
0
1
2
3
4
Sum
High
(2-4)
2011
36.8
19.7
19.3
10.5
13.7
100.0
43.5
2017
41.7
13.9
19.6
5.4
19.4
100.0
44.4
2011
52.0
16.2
16.1
6.6
9.2
100.1
31.9
2017
62.2
11.1
12.4
2.8
11.6
100.1
26.8
2011
80.4
8.3
8.0
0.8
2.4
99.9
11.2
2017
87.1
5.2
5.6
0.6
1.5
100.0
7.7
Table 4.14 shows stability between 2011 and 2017 in negative attitudes (score 2–
4) regarding social contact with Roma and significantly less scepticism towards
contact with Somalis and Poles (1% level).24
Could reluctance to have contact with Jews or Muslims be part of a more general scepticism towards foreigners, or xenophobia, as it is also known? To measure
xenophobia, we use an additive index of the total scores for the three groups in
Table 4.14. With three indicators scored 0 to 4, the result is an index ranging from
0 to 12. If a high level of xenophobia is defined as a score above the midpoint on
the scale (7–12), we find this in 15% and 13% of respondents in 2011 and 2017
respectively.
TABLE 4.15. Xenophobia index based on social distance towards Roma, Somalis
and Poles (Percent. Population samples)
Index score
Year
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Sum
High
(7-1 2)
2011
32.0 12.5 12.0
8.8
9.8
4.9
5.3
2.8
5.7
2.5
2.1
0.6
1.0
100.0
14.7
2017
37.9 10.6 13.9
4.7
10.3
3.0
6.1
2.6
5.8
0.9
2.6
0.2
1.2
99.8
13.4
24. A minor change was made to the wording of the question. In 2011, the wording used was “When
you think about xx, what type of contact do you think you would feel comfortable with? To what
extent would you like or dislike …?” In 2017: “We will now ask you some questions about contact
with people of different nationalities and religions. To what extent would you like or dislike …?”
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7.3 SCEPTICISM TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS
The respondents were asked about their views on the economic and cultural consequences of immigration. The questions were presented in the form of a discussion between two people, A and B, and the respondents asked to indicate with
whom they agreed most (Table 4.16).25
Majorities of 54% (2011) and 57% (2017) believe that the effect of immigration
on Norwegian culture is positive, supporting statement A. Around a quarter of the
respondents chose the negative statement of a “threat”. The view concerning the
economic effects is not quite as positive, but there is a clear trend towards less
scepticism. In 2011, the two alternatives were chosen by 37% each, while in 2017
this had changed to 31% for the “exploit” alternative (A) as opposed to 44% for
“contribute” (B).
TABLE 4.16. Attitudes towards immigrants (Percent. Population samples)
Two people are discussing the possible effects of immigrants from other cultures
arriving in Norway. With whom do you agree most, A or B?
A says: Immigrants contribute to greater cultural
diversity in Norway, introducing new and
exciting food, music, art, etc.
A says: Immigrants want to exploit our
welfare system and enjoy benefits which
they played no part in creating.
B says: Immigrants’ ways of life don’t fit into
Norwegian society. Their foreign customs are
problematic for those around them and could
threaten Norwegian culture.
B says: Immigrants are hard-working,
diligent people who make a valuable
contribution to the Norwegian economy
and working life.
Year
A
Diversity
Imposs.
to choose
/NA
B
Threat
Sum
2011
54.2
20.9
25.0
100.1
37.1
2017
56.8
18.4
24.8
100.0
31.0
A
Imposs.
Exploit to choose
/NA
B
Contribute
Sum
25.9
37.1
100.1
25.4
43.6
100.0
An index of scepticism towards immigrants was created by assigning a score of 0
for a positive response, 1 for not expressing an opinion, and 2 for a negative
25. The questions were copied from the Norsk Monitor surveys, which were previously used in
analyses of trends in attitudes of Norwegians towards immigrants; see Hellevik and Hellevik,
Utviklingen. Norsk Monitor uses telephone interviews and postal questionnaires, whereas our
survey is a web survey. Nonetheless, the results are quite similar both with regard to the level
and with regard to the trend in scepticism towards immigrants from foreign cultures.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
response. When the scores of 3 or 4 on the index are regarded as high values, 31%
of the sample is classified as being sceptical towards immigrants in 2011 and 29%
in 2017, a reduction too small to be significant. The proportion expressing two
positive attitudes (score of 0) increased from 31% in 2011 to 38% in 2017 (significant 1% level).
TABLE 4.17. Index of scepticism towards immigrants (Percent. Population samples)
Index score
Year
0
1
2
3
4
Sum
High
(3-4)
2011
30.7
17.4
21.4
11.5
19.1
100.1
30.6
2017
38.2
14.9
18.2
10.9
17.9
100.1
28.8
7.4 POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS
JEWS AND MUSLIMS
When the respondents are grouped according to social characteristics or opinions
measured by the indices discussed above, variations in the incidence of antisemitism or Islamophobia between the groups may provide clues as to what stimulates
development of such attitudes. The dichotomised summary indices, where a high
value denotes a high score on at least two of the three sub-indices, are used. Table
4.18 shows how the proportion of respondents displaying high levels of antisemitism or Islamophobia according to this definition varies between different groups
in the population.
The incidence of both antisemitism and Islamophobia is higher among men,
among older people, and among people with lower levels of education. Belief in
God and regarding religion as important in one’s life show no clear correlations
with antisemitism or Islamophobia in the general population, though the proportion displaying high levels of Islamophobia among those who answered “yes” to
the question about belief in God is larger than for those who answered “no” (significant 1% level).
137
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TABLE 4.18. Variation in antisemitism and Islamophobia (Percentage with high scores on the combined indices. Population sample 2017)
Variable
Values
(index scores)
Gender
Female
3
20
50
786
Male
8
34
50
789
18–29 years
2
11
18
282
30–44 years
5
27
28
434
45–59 years
7
30
27
417
60+ years
6
34
28
442
University level
3
18
32
506
Lower
7
31
68
1069
Yes
6
31
34
528
Not sure
4
28
25
398
No
6
23
41
649
Very important
4
31
12
104
Fairly important
5
29
28
235
Neither
6
32
36
304
Not very important
4
38
18
149
Not important at all
7
32
7
55
Solely/mostly Pal.
12
13
22
345
To some extent Pal.
6
18
11
165
Neither /No opinion
3
28
54
856
To some extent Israel
5
47
5
70
Solely/mostly Israel
2
60
9
138
Strong (6–8)
3
52
10
162
Medium (3–5)
4
24
63
1035
Weak (0–2)
11
26
23
378
Age
Education
Belief in God
Importance of
religion
Support for
parties in
Middle East
conflict
Pro-Israeli
attitudes
High anti- High Islam- Percent of
semitism
ophobia
sample
N
(=100%)
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
Variable
Anti-Israeli
attitudes
Pro-Palestinian attitudes
Xenophobia
Scepticism
towards immigrants
All
Values
(index scores)
High anti- High Islam- Percent of
semitism
ophobia
sample
N
(=100%)
Strong (6–8)
22
36
15
231
Medium (3–5)
3
23
66
984
Weak (0–2)
2
34
24
360
Strong (6–8)
7
20
41
650
Medium (3–5)
4
31
53
840
Weak (0–2)
9
45
5
85
None (0)
2
5
38
597
Weak (1–2)
2
15
25
387
Some degree (3–4)
7
36
15
236
Medium (5–6)
8
55
9
144
Strong (7–12)
19
83
13
211
None (0)
3
3
38
602
Weak (1 )
4
12
15
234
Medium (2)
4
29
18
286
Quite strong (3)
4
42
11
171
Strong (4)
13
80
18
282
5
27
100
1575
Which side the respondents support in the Middle East conflict and what opinions
they hold on the conflict clearly correlate with antisemitism and Islamophobia in
the expected direction. The exceptions are that the correlation between pro-Palestinian attitudes and antisemitism is weak, and that strong anti-Israeli attitudes go
together with Islamophobia. The first finding indicates that having pro-Palestinian
attitudes is not necessarily a result of antisemitism.26 The second finding may be
a result of xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants stimulating both antisemitism and Islamophobia. These attitudes have clear correlations with antisemitism and, in particular, Islamophobia.
26. But the ambiguity of one of the indicators, the statement supporting the right to a state for both
parties to the conflict, may also have contributed to this result.
139
140
OTTAR HELLEVIK | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
In terms of incidence of high levels of Islamophobia, the difference between the
groups at the extremes of the indices of xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants is almost 80 percentage points. It could be questioned whether there is any
merit in considering scepticism towards foreigners or immigrants on the one hand
and antisemitism or Islamophobia on the other as separate phenomena that may
influence each other, as we have done here, or whether they should instead be considered as different aspects of the same phenomenon, a syndrome that has been
called group-focused enmity.27
Several of the variables in Table 4.18 are correlated. For example, individuals
displaying high levels of xenophobia will often also be sceptical towards immigrants. In order to see what a characteristic in itself means for negative attitudes
towards the minorities, the groups to be compared must be made equal with
respect to the other variables through a multivariate analysis were these variables
are included. This can be done by means of a multivariate regression analysis
(Table 4.19). Since importance of religion according to Table 4.18 did not correlate with antisemitism or Islamophobia, this variable is omitted from the analysis.
To ease comparison of the importance of the different explanatory variables,
they are dichotomised in the multivariate analysis. The exception is which side
respondents supported in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is represented by
two dummy variables, with not taking sides as reference group. With the dichotomised indices of antisemitism and Islamophobia, coded 0 for low value and 1 for
high value, as dependent variables, the linear regression coefficients equal proportion differences. When multiplied by 100 as shown in the table, the coefficients
can be interpreted as percentage differences.28 The bivariate association between
gender and antisemitism in Table 4.19 (−4.9) for example corresponds to the difference in percentage points between women and men in Table 4.18 (3–8 = –5).
The variables in the table are divided into two categories. The first contains the
social background variables and belief in God, the second opinion on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants. The latter
group of variables lie closer to antisemitism and Islamophobia in the causal chain,
and can be considered as intervening variables producing an indirect effect
27. Andreas Zick, Beate Küpper and Andreas Hövermann, Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination. A European Report (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2011).
28. For arguments for using linear instead of loglinear regression analysis with a dichotomised
dependent variable, see Ottar Hellevik, “Linear versus logistic regression when the dependent
variable is a dichotomy”, Quality & Quantity 43, no. 1 (2009): 59–74, and Carina Mood,
“Logistic regression: Why we cannot do what we think we can do, and what we can do about it”,
European Sociological Review 26, no. 1 (2010): 67–82.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
between the first group of variables and negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims. They represent potential mechanisms that may explain the correlation
between them.
It could also be possible that the influence works in the opposite direction; for
instance, that Islamophobia leads to scepticism towards immigrants, or that it
works both ways, meaning that these phenomena stimulate each other. This is
impossible to determine with the available data, making the causal interpretation
of the effects uncertain.
The multivariate analysis is performed in two stages. In the first, the social
background variables and belief in God are included. Changes in the bivariate correlation for a variable show how much of this correlation can be explained by the
other variables in the group. For some, such as gender and age, this part of the
association will be indirect effects. For others, it may also be a case of spurious
(non-causal) association caused by variables in the group prior to them in time. In
the second stage, all the variables are included, and the remaining association constitutes the direct effect of the variable in question, given the variables included in
the model and its assumptions of causal direction.
Table 4.19 shows that when we remove differences between women and men
with regard to the other variables, the gender difference for antisemitism is
reduced, but only marginally (from –4.9 to –4.4 percentage points). For Islamophobia, however, the effect of gender is radically reduced when controlled for all
other variables (from –14.2 to –5.1). This can largely be ascribed to the clear gender differences with regard to xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants evident in the correlations in Table 4.20. The fact that these correlations are negative
indicates that women – who are assigned high value on the gender variable – have
lower incidences of such attitudes than men. Table 4.19 shows that both xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants have a strong effect on the likelihood of
scoring high on Islamophobia, and thereby transmit a negative indirect effect
between gender and Islamophobia according to the model.
The results of the final multivariate analysis show that xenophobia has the
strongest effect on the antisemitism index, followed by anti-Israeli attitudes and
supporting the Palestinians in the Middle East conflict, while being a woman
reduces the chances for a high score.
Xenophobia has strongest effect on the level of Islamophobia, closely followed
by scepticism towards immigrants, which had little effect on the incidence of antisemitism. Supporting Israel in the Middle East conflict increases the chance for a
high level of Islamophobia. Supporting the Palestinians reduce the chances, and
so does being a woman or young in age.
141
142
OTTAR HELLEVIK | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
TABLE 4.19. Bivariate and multivariate regression analysis with dichotomised
indices of antisemitism and Islamophobia as dependent variables (Regression coefficients multiplied with 100. Population sample 2017)*
Antisemitism
Islamophobia
Variable
High value
(index scores)
Gender
Female
–4.9
–4.8
–4.4
–14.2
–14.0
–5.1
Age
–44 years
–2.4
(–2.2)
(–0.5)
–11.5
–9.9
–5.1
Education
University
–3.5
–2.9
(–1.7)
–12.7
–10.4
(–0.8)
Belief in God
Yes
(0.5)
(0.3)
(1.9)
6.1
4.9
Bivariate
Multivariate
Bivariate
Multivariate
–2.6
Israeli-Pal. conflict (2 dummy Support Israel
var.) (Refer. group: Do not
take sides)
Support Palest.
(–2.6)
(–1.3)
33.0
13.9
6.6
5.4
–18.7
–8.0
Pro-Israeli attitudes
Strong (5–8)
(–2.6)
(–1.9)
12.7
(0.6)
Anti-Israeli attitudes
Strong (5–8)
12.6
10.3
5.0
5.5
Pro-Palestinian attitudes
Strong (5–8)
(0.3)
(–1.6)
–11.1
(–0.3)
Xenophobia
Strong (7–12)
15.9
14.6
64.1
39.9
Scepticism towards immigrants
Strong (3–4)
6.2
(1.0)
54.4
36.4
Explained variance (adjusted R squared)
0.016
0.130
0.056
0.419
* In brackets: Not significant (5% level).
Education has a clear bivariate correlation with Islamophobia, which shows little
change when controlled for other social background variables, but disappears
when controlled also for attitudinal variables. Thus, according to our analysis,
education does not have a direct effect, but rather an indirect one, primarily via
xenophobia and scepticism towards immigrants. Such attitudes are less common
among people with university or university college education (Table 4.20).
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
143
–0.15 –0.01
–0.06
Age 18–44
–0.04
1
0.05
–0.06 –0.01
–0.08 –0.07
–0.08 –0.12 –0.14
Education
University
0.06
0.05
1
–0.11 –0.17
–0.03
Xenophobia
High
–0.09 –0.06
Immigrant
scepticism
High
Israeli-Pal.
conflict
Age
0.04 –0.03
0.11 –0.04 –0.07
0.03
1
0.41
0.09 –0.12
0.06
0.05 –0.12
–0.15 –0.01 –0.17
0.41
1
0.1 6
–0.2
0.07
0.03 –0.16
Support
Israel
–0.15 –0.08 –0.03
0.09
0.16
1
–0.28
0.4
–0.18 –0.17
Israeli-Pal.
conflict
Support
Palest.
–0.01 –0.07
0.11
–0.12
–0.2
–0.28
1
–0.19
0.27
0.31
Pro-Israeli
attitudes
High
–0.06 –0.08 –0.04
0.06
0.07
0.4
–0.19
1
–0.07
0.03
Anti-Israeli
attitudes
High
0.04 –0.12 –0.07
0.05
0.03
–0.18
0.27
–0.07
1
0.14
Pro-Pal.
attitudes
High
–0.12 –0.16
–0.17
0.31
0.03
0.14
1
–0.03 –0.14
–0.11
Pro-Palest. attitudes
Pro-Israel attitudes
–0.09 –0.15
Female
Anti-Israel attitudes
Support Palestinians
0.06
Gender
Support Israel
–0.04
High value
Xenophobia
Education
1
Variables
Gender
Age
Immigrant scepticism
TABLE 4.20. Correlation matrix for the independent variables (Pearson’s r. Population samples 2011 and 2017 combined)
0.03
An intuitive and perhaps more easily understandable way of documenting the
effects of these variables on antisemitism or Islamophobia is through a tabular analysis. However, there is a limit to how many characteristics that can be examined
simultaneously in order to avoid getting too few respondents in the cells of the
table. Tables 4.21 and 4.22 use two of the independent variables shown by the multivariate analysis to have the greatest effect on antisemitism and Islamophobia,
namely xenophobia and opinion on the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Limiting the number of independent variables to two allows the use of five values
for each in the table, instead of the crude dichotomy used in the regression analysis.
144
OTTAR HELLEVIK | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
With two independent variables of five categories each, we get 25 combinations, which provide a wide variation in the proportion with a high level of antisemitism (Table 4.21). The percentage ranges from 0 in the bottom left-hand corner for respondents with no xenophobia who support Israel, to 52 in the upper
right-hand corner for respondents with high levels of xenophobia who support the
Palestinians. Between these extremes, the percentage with high antisemitism
gradually increases in a pattern that follows the main diagonal of the table.
TABLE 4.21. Percent high antisemitism depending on xenophobia and opinion on
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Population samples 2011 and 2017 combined)
Which party supported in the conflict
Xenophobia
Solely/
Mostly
Israel
To some
extent
Israel
Both/
none
To some
extent
Palestinians
Solely/
Mostly
Palestinians
Difference
Very high
5.9
11.8
19.6
33.2
52.0
46.1
High
2.0
3.8
6.9
5.0
20.6
18.6
Medium
0.0
2.4
2.1
7.7
22.1
22.1
Low
1.5
0.0
1.5
7.4
7.5
6.0
Very low
0.0
0.0
1.1
0.7
4.7
4.7
Difference
5.9
11.6
18.5
32.5
47.3
41.4
Table 4.22 for Islamophobia is set up in the same way as Table 4.21. Since the correlation with opinion on the parties in the conflict has the opposite sign as for antisemitism, the proportions increase from the bottom right-hand corner to the upper
left-hand corner along the bi-diagonal. The variation ranges from 2% among
respondents with no xenophobia who strongly support the Palestinians, to 91%
among respondents with very high levels of xenophobia who strongly support
Israel.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
TABLE 4.22. Percentage of high Islamophobia depending on xenophobia and opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Population sample 2017)
Which party supported in the conflict
Xenophobia
Solely/
Mostly
Israel
To some
extent
Israel
Both/
none
To some
extent
Palestinians
Solely/
Mostly
Palestinians
Difference
Very high
90.9
92.5
83.7
72.6
66.7
24.2
High
87.4
56.5
49.3
40.2
57.2
30.2
Medium
67.7
44.4
34.5
33.3
20.3
47.4
Low
42.1
14.1
15.4
7.1
6.3
35.8
Very low
17.3
22.1
5.8
1.2
1.9
15.4
Difference
73.6
70.4
77.9
71.4
64.8
8.8
In Table 4.21 for antisemitism, the distance between the extreme groups is slightly
greater for xenophobia (columns) than for opinion on the Middle East conflict
(rows), with mean differences of 23.2 and 19.5 percentage points respectively.
This applies even more so for Islamophobia (Table 4.22), with mean differences
of 71.6 and 30.6 percentage points. The pattern testifies to the importance of xenophobia – a general scepticism towards foreigners – for the development of negative attitudes towards Jews and, in particular, Muslims.
8. EXPLAINING TRENDS IN ANTISEMITISM
The two population surveys have shown a reduction in the share of respondents
with high scores on the antisemitism index in Norway in 2017, down from an
already low level in 2011. The question raised in this section is what can explain
such a trend. It will be addressed first by looking at the role played by generational
replacement versus individuals changing their opinion, secondly by looking at
changes in the variables that, according to the analysis in the previous section,
affect antisemitism.
145
146
OTTAR HELLEVIK | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
8.1 GENERATIONAL REPLACEMENT OR PERIOD EFFECTS
Table 4.18 showed that a high level of antisemitism is three times more common
in the oldest than in the youngest age group: 6% versus 2%. The same holds for
Islamophobia, with 34% versus 10% for the 60+ years old compared to the young
of 18–29 years old.29 Does this reflect a life-phase effect, where people grow more
sceptical toward strangers and foreign cultures as they age? Or is it a sign that new
generations have developed attitudes that differ from those of older generations
due to changed circumstances during adolescence, the formative years for the values of an individual?30 If the latter is the case, this means that generational
replacement over time will change the population opinion climate. The question
is to what extent replacement explains the reduced antisemitism in Norway, or to
what extent this trend is a result of individuals present through the whole period
changing their opinion, so-called period effects.
These are questions addressed by cohort analysis, where cohorts (generations)
are followed over time to see whether they have stable characteristics that differ
between them, giving rise to generation replacement effects.31 Or does the opinion
of the individuals within the cohorts change over time due to the impact of historical events or processes, producing so-called period effects that change popular
opinion? This is in contrast to individual changes related to life phase, which will
not affect overall opinion unless the age distribution of a society changes markedly.
Table 4.23 is a standard cohort matrix, with age groups six years wide placed
along the left margin, and the two points of observation, six years apart, placed
over the columns. In this way, we may follow a cohort by reading the table diagonally as indicated by the shading. The tendency within the cohorts, as captured
by the mean of their changes, is a reduction of the percentage of high antisemitism
within the cohorts of 1.7 points. It is unlikely that this should be a life-phase effect,
since the tendency is away from, rather than towards, the more negative attitudes
of older people. The reduction is a little less than the change for the population as
a whole between 2011 and 2017 of –2.3 percentage points, indicating that generational replacement has also played a role.
29. With one decimal 6.0 / 2.2 = 2.7 for antisemitism and 34.2 / 10.8 = 3.2 for Islamophobia.
30. Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution—Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western
Publics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
31. Norman D. Glenn, Cohort Analysis. Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, vol. 5.
(Newbury Park: Sage, 1977).
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
TABLE 4.23. Percentage with high antisemitism (Standard cohort matrix, population samples)
Year
Age
2011
2017
Birth
cohort
18–23
8.0
3.0
1988–93
24–29
2.1
1.8
1988–93
30–35
5.3
5.9
36–41
6.1
42–47
N=100% (weighted)
Cohort
change
2011
2017
177
94
–6.2
145
188
1982–87
3.8
148
199
5.2
1976–81
–0.1
156
155
7.7
4.3
1970–75
–1.8
168
153
48–53
5.1
7.7
1964–69
0.0
157
142
54–59
16.7
7.9
1958–63
2.8
143
203
60–65
9.0
5.7
1952–57
–11 .0
239
154
66–71
8.8
4.8
1946–51
–4.2
143
168
72–77
11.9
9.4
1940–45
1.6
35
102
78–
(8.9)
(0.0)
1934–39
–
9
17
All
7.8
5.5
Change –2.3
Mean –1.7
1522
1575
Simplified matrix
2011
2017
G.in 3.0
Stayers
Time 1
7.6
Stayers
Time 2
5.6
Gen. out
9.4
The cohort patterns in Table 4.23 are varied, which to some extent may be a result
of random errors due to small bases for the percentages in the cells. An alternative
to the full matrix is a simplified version where we distinguish between cohorts taking part in the replacement process – the out-going and the in-coming generation
– and cohorts present at both times (called stayers at time 1 and time 2). The ingeneration is respondents 18–23 years in 2017, who were too young to be part of
the sample from the adult population in 2011. The members of the out-generation
are not as easily defined. It should be those members of the adult population in
2011 that have died between 2011 and 2017. They would have come from several
age groups, but predominantly the oldest ones. In the analysis, we let the age
groups 66 years and older represent the out-generation.
The difference between the in- and the out-generation in the prevalence of high
antisemitism is 3.0 – 9.4 = –6.4, and the change between 2011 and 2017 for the
“stayers” is 5.6 – 7.6 = –2.0. Table 4.24 also gives the results for the three subindices. The differences between the in-coming and the out-going members of the
147
148
OTTAR HELLEVIK | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
population are larger than the changes in opinion for those present at both points
in time.32 This especially holds for prejudice.
TABLE 4.24. The importance of generation and period effects for negative attitudes towards Jews (Percent. Population samples)
Indices for negative attitudes
towards Jews
Change over time in
popular opinion due to:
Change of members of
population (generational
replacement)
Relevant differences:
Dislike
Distance
Prejudice
Antisem.
N
(=100%)
In: 18–23 years 2017
2.0
3.9
3.9
3.0
94
Out: 66+ years 2011
9.1
10.8
19.6
9.4
187
Difference In – Out
–7.1
–6.9
–15.7
–6.4
7.0
6.0
8.5
5.6
1481
1335
2017: 24+ years
Change of opinion among
stayers between 2011 and 2011: 18–65 years
2017
Change Time2–Time1
9.9
8.2
11.0
7.6
–2.9
–2.2
–2.5
–2.0
Resulting population change from 2011 to 2017
–3.1
–2.6
–3.8
–2.3
When the actual changes from 2011 to 2017 for the total samples lie close to the
period effects, the reason is that the group of stayers is so much larger than the
groups being exchanged. This is due to the short time span of six years. Over a
longer period, the generational replacement would involve larger shares of the
population and contribute more to the population trend, but in the present six-year
period not more than 6% are newcomers in 2017.
8.2 CHANGES IN VARIABLES AFFECTING ANTISEMITISM AND
ISLAMOPHOBIA
Why do the in- and out-going generations between 2011 and 2017 differ in attitudes towards Jews? What has caused a net shift in the attitudes of individuals in
the cohorts present at both points in time? This may have to do with changes in
the independent variables that, according to the analyses in section 7.4, have an
effect on antisemitism. For this to be the case, the variables – in addition to affect32. Since this is a time series and not a panel study, the respondents are not the same in 2011 and
2017. The results thus are estimates of the net changes taking place within a cohort.
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
149
ing antisemitism – must have changed in the “right” direction in this time period
(i.e. show a decline for the value that increases the likelihood of antisemitism or
an increase for the value that reduces this likelihood).
The criterion of change in incidence excludes variables such as gender and age,
where the composition of the population will not have changed much during the
time period in question. It also excludes variables with negligible direct effect on
antisemitism in the multivariate analysis in Table 4.19, such as religiosity. This
leaves us with the variables in Table 4.25.
A variable’s contribution to changes in the incidence of high levels of antisemitism equals how much it has changed multiplied by its effect on antisemitism. It
turns out that the changes in incidence in particular are so negligible that this contribution amounts to only a few tenths of one per cent. The greatest contribution –
for anti-Israeli attitudes – even has the “wrong” sign; the trend towards slightly
higher incidence of such attitudes should have contributed to more, not less, antisemitism. The result, when contributions for all the variables are added up, is –0.2
percentage points.
Considering the actual decline of 2.3 percentage points, we must conclude that
the changes in the variables in Table 4.25 cannot explain the decline in antisemitism in Norway between 2011 and 2017. In order to understand the background
for this development, we must look for trends or events during this period that are
not captured by these variables. One possibility might be increased media and
political attention to antisemitism as a social issue during this period, generated by
terrorist attacks against Jews in Europe, among other things.
TABLE 4.25. Effect of changes in independent variables on the trend in antisemitism (Percent. Population samples)
Incidence
Direct effect
Change
on antisem.
x
Change
(2017)
Direct effect
Variable
High values
(index scores)
2011
2017
Education
University
28.4
32.1
3.7
–1.7
–0.06
Middle East conflict
Support Palest.
36.0
32.4
–3.6
5.4
–0.19
Anti-Israeli attitudes
Strong (5–8)
24.8
27.2
2.4
10.3
0.25
Xenophobia
Strong (7–12)
14.7
13.4
–1.3
14.6
–0.19
Scepticism towards immigrants
Strong (3–4)
30.6
28.8
–1.8
1.0
–0.02
Antisemitism
High (2[g] 3)
7.8
5.5
–2.3
Total:
–0.21
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OTTAR HELLEVIK | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
For Islamophobia we only have data for social distance in 2011, which show a
small reduction in 2017. For the other indices, the actual amount of change is not
known. Although modest in size, the reduction in xenophobia and scepticism
towards immigrants shown in Table 4.25 may have contributed to a reduced incidence of all kinds of negative attitudes due to the strong effects these variables
have on Islamophobia (Table 4.19).
9. CONCLUSION
The level of negative attitudes towards Jews in Norway is low and declining,
according to our measures. In the 2017 survey, 6.7% scored high on the index of
dislike, a reduction of 3.1 percentage points from 2011. On the index for social
distance, 5.9% scored high in 2017, down 2.6 points from 2011. The percentage
scoring high on the index for prejudice was 8.3 in 2017, down 3.8 points from
2011. The summary index of antisemitism showed that 5.5% had a high score on
at least two of the three sub-indices in 2017, a reduction of 2.3 points from 2011.
The corresponding levels of negative attitudes towards Muslims in 2017 are
much higher. For the dislike index, 27.7% score high, for social distance 19.6%,
for prejudice 34.1% and for the summary index of Islamophobia 27.0%. The only
index where we have results also for 2011 regarding Muslims – social distance –
shows a reduction in high scores of 2.4 percentage points.
In 2017, negative attitudes towards Jews were perceived to be very widespread
by just 2.4% of the respondents. If we add fairly widespread, the result is 19.3%,
a figure which seems high compared to our results for measures of actual popular
opinion. The same holds for the perception of negative attitudes towards Muslims,
which is 16.5% for very widespread and 80.8% when we add fairly widespread.
The perception of the opinion climate regarding Muslims has become less negative from 2011 to 2017 (5.6 percentage points for the two answers combined).
Regarding Jews there is a tendency in the same direction, but this is too small to
be significant.
There is a clear tendency that the more negative the attitudes of a person
towards Jews or Muslims are, the more likely it is that he or she will perceive the
general opinion climate as negative, and the less likely it is that an effort to combat
harassment against these minorities is seen as necessary.
It turns out that there is a tendency for negative attitudes towards the two minorities to go together. Accordingly, antisemitism and Islamophobia can be seen as
related phenomena rather than opposites, with xenophobia as the most important
4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
stimulating factor. In addition negative attitudes towards Israel go together with
antisemitism, and scepticism towards immigrants with Islamophobia.
In the years to come, will we see a continuation of the trend towards less negative attitudes towards these minorities? The development for antisemitism and
Islamophobia in Norway will depend upon generational replacement as well as
individuals changing their opinion influenced by current events. Judging from the
present generational differences, the first process may be expected to stimulate a
continued gradual reduction in the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews
as well as Muslims, among other things as a result of an increasing level of high
education in the new generations.
The effect of historical events on attitudes is more uncertain. Up until now the
growing number of immigrants in Norway seems to have affected the attitude of
Norwegians towards Muslims positively, but what will happen in the future
depends on factors such as the level of immigration and the success of the process
of integration. For antisemitism, it is primarily events in the Middle East conflict
that may have an impact on the attitudes of Norwegians.
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4. ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN NORWAY
APPENDIX: N AND TEST OF ROBUSTNESS
TABLE A1: N for Figures 4.5, 4.11, 4.13, 4.14 and Table 4.10 (Population sample
2017)
0
Combined index for
Antisemitism
Islamophobia
1
Scale
2
Low
0–3
1342
Low-High
High
136
61
1478
0–3
885
Low-High
3
36
97
234
217
1119
239
456
TABLE A2: N for Table 4.21 and 4.22 (Populations samples 2011 and 2017 combined)
Which party supported in the conflict
Xenophobia
Solely /
Mostly
Israel
To some
extent
Israel
Both/
none
To some
extent
Palestinians
Solely /
Mostly
Palestinians
Sum
Very high
68
22
246
31
59
426
High
34
22
164
31
50
301
Medium
58
32
271
70
105
536
Low
56
32
386
104
174
752
Very low
58
32
544
136
312
1082
274
140
1611
372
700
3097
Sum
153
154
OTTAR HELLEVIK | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
TABLE A3. Multivariate regression analysis with different versions of the antisemitism and Islamophobia indices as dependent variable (index with values 0–1, 0–3 or
0–3 versions narrowly and broadly defined. Regression coefficients for the last three
divided by 3. Population sample 2017)*
Antisemitism index
High value
Variable
(index scores)
0–1
0–3
0–1
0–3
Gender
Female
–0.044
–0.052
–0.024
–0.090
–0.051
–0.036 (–0.013)
–0.064
Age
–44 years
(–0.005) (–0.017)
(0.001)
–0.026
–0.051
–0.064
–0.029
–0.073
Education
University
(–0.017) (–0.019) (–0.007)
–0.026 (–0.008) (–0.022)
–0.026
–0.033
Belief in God
Yes
(0.01 9)
0.021
(0.012)
–0.026
(0.012) (–0.001)
(0.012)
Middle East conflict (2 dummy
variables)
(Reference group:
No opinion)
Support
Israel
(–0.013)
–0.032
–0.018 (–0.017)
0.1 39
0.054
0.058
Pro-Israeli
attitudes
Strong
(5–8)
Anti-Israeli
attitudes
Strong
(5–8)
Pro-Palestinian
attitudes
Strong
(5–8)
Xenophobia
Strong
(7–1 2)
0.146
0.136
0.057
0.155
0.399
Scepticism towards Strong
immigrants
(3–4)
(0.010)
0.024
(0.011)
0.039
0.130
0.198
0.096
0.211
Support
Palestinians
Explained variance (adjusted Rsq)
(–0.019) (–0.022)
0.103
0.104
Narrow
Islamophobia index
(0.002)
0.017
Broad
0.079
(0.005) (–0.028)
0.032
(–0.016) (–0.017) (–0.009)
–0.080
0.144
Broad
0.060
0.125
–0.085 (–0.009)
–0.109
(0.006) (–0.012)
(0.020) (–0.004)
0.068
0.032
0.208
(0.007) (–0.003) (–0.008)
–0.025
(0.009)
0.341
0.262
0.305
0.364
0.347
0.163
0.303
0.419
0.513
0.409
0.450
0.132
0.055
Narrow
* Regression coefficients in brackets: Not significant (5% level). In bold: Two strongest effects.
Distribution on the indices: see Figure 4.11 (antisemitism) and 4.12 (Islamophobia). Meaning of broad and
narrow definition: see section 3.5.
DOI: 10.18261/978-82-15-03468-3-2019-06
5.
Counting Antisemites versus
Measuring Antisemitism
An “Elastic View” of Antisemitism
WERNER BERGMANN
ABSTRACT In a recent study on “Antisemitism in Contemporary Great Britain”, Daniel
Staetsky introduces a promising new way of thinking about the level of antisemitism in
society, which exists at different levels of intensity.1 By differentiating a more or less
coherent “learned antisemitism” (the diffusion of antisemitic ideas and images) from
open dislike of Jews, he proposes the concept of an “elastic view”. In this chapter,
Staetsky’s concept and the different ways to measure antisemitic ideas and open dislike
of Jews, as well as anti-Israelism and the relationship between antisemitism and antiIsraelism are used to analyse the data of the Norwegian Survey “Attitudes toward Jews
and Muslims in Norway 2017”. Furthermore, this chapter will also examine how the legitimation of violence against Jews is influenced by the levels of antisemitism and antiIsraelism. Lastly, although the Norwegian and the British studies mainly do not use the
same questions to measure antisemitism and anti-Israelism, the results for Norway will
tentatively be compared with the results of the British study by looking at the underlying
patterns and correlations instead of the numerical data.
KEYWORDS antisemitism | stereotypes | antipathy | anti-Israelism | justification of
violence | Norway | Great Britain
1. My special thanks go to Ottar Hellevik, without whose help in the calculation of data this contribution in the present form could not have been written. My thanks also go to the two anonymous
reviewers for their constructive criticism of an earlier version of this chapter.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.
156
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, studies on antisemitic attitudes have revealed all over Europe a big
gap between the findings of surveys about attitudes toward Jews and the perception of the Jews themselves concerning the spread of antisemitism. While the nonJewish populations do not consider antisemitism to be a widespread phenomenon,
and while surveys on antisemitic attitudes in many European countries attitudes
even show a slight downward trend, Jews assess the situation quite differently: a
large majority of them rates antisemitism to be a very widespread and growing
problem.2 In order to tackle this problem, L. Daniel Staetsky proposes to differentiate between a more or less coherent “learned antisemitism” (antisemitic ideas)
from open dislike of Jews, which “exists in society at different levels of intensity
and with different shades to it”.3 Many studies have shown that on a cognitive
level there are a large number of people believing in a small number of antisemitic
ideas without being consciously hostile or prejudiced toward Jews on the emotional/affective and behavioural level. Therefore, the “elastic view” takes these
possibilities explicitly into account:
Some people may be strongly antisemitic, others less so; and while others may
not fit into either of these categories, they may still hold certain negative ideas
about Jews – even if these are small in number and weak in intensity – that
have the potential to make Jews feel offended or uncomfortable. Thus, no single figure can capture the level of antisemitism in a given society.4
2. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Discrimination and Hate Crime
against Jews in EU Member States: Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism, 2013; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism. Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU, 2018. Andreas
Hövermann et al., Jüdische Perspektiven auf Antisemitismus in Deutschland. Studie des Instituts
für Konflikt und Gewaltforschung der Universität Bielefeld für den Unabhän-gigen Expertenkreis Antisemitismus, Bielefeld 2016.
3. L. Daniel Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain. A study of attitudes towards
Jews and Israel (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, September 2017), 3.
4. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 3. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb
used a similar approach by measuring antisemitic attitudes in their cognitive, affective and
behavioural dimensions, and have also worked with three broadly defined antisemitism scales.
For the first time they also developed an anti-Zionism scale; Der Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1945–1989. Ergebnisse der empirischen Forschung (Opladen:
Leske+Budrich, 1991); Enlarged English edition: Anti-Semitism in Germany. The Post-Nazi
Epoch since 1945 (New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Publishers, 1997).
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
In this chapter, Staetsky’s approach to measuring the different dimensions of antisemitism is used to analyse the data of the Norwegian Survey “Attitudes toward
Jews and Muslims in Norway 2017”.5 A one-on-one comparison between the
Norwegian and the British studies is not possible mainly because they do not use
the same questions to measure antisemitism and anti-Israelism. The following
chapter does not directly compare the quantitative results, but the results for Norway can tentatively be compared with the results of the British study by looking
at the underlying patterns and correlations instead of the numerical data.6
2. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
How widespread are negative feelings and opinions about Jews in Norway?7 In
both the Norwegian and the British studies, there are findings on the emotional,
the cognitive and the behavioural level. Following Staetsky, the most straightforward approach is used in “clarifying the extent of negativity toward Jews [...] by
5. The survey consists of a representative sample of the Norwegian population (N=1,575). Since
there are 13 Muslims among the 1,575 respondents, these are not included in the questions concerning the attitudes towards Muslims, so that in these cases the sample comprises only 1,562
respondents. Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe (eds.), Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims
in Norway 2017. Population Survey and Minority Study (Oslo: Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, 2017).
6. In order to make comparisons of the British and Norwegian study possible, some of the indexes
for measuring antisemitism and anti-Israelism in the Norwegian study are aligned with those in
the British study. Thus, they differ from the construction of the indexes in the report of the Norwegian study and the other chapters in this volume.
7. Recently in social psychology the importance of specific emotions for research on prejudice has
been stressed. See Eliot R. Smith, “Social Identity and Social Emotions: Toward New Conceptualizations of Prejudice”, in Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping. Interactive Processes in
Group Perception, ed. Diane M. Mackie and David L. Hamilton (New York: Academic Press,
1993), 296–315; Diane M. Mackie, Thierry Devos and Eliot R. Smith, “Intergroup Emotions:
Explaining Offensive Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context”, Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 79, no. 4 (2000): 602–616. The only survey in which emotions play an
important role in analysing antisemitism and anti-Israelism is a Swiss study from 2007: Kritik
an Israel von antisemitischen Haltungen unabhängig. Antisemitismus-Potenzial in der Schweiz
neuartig bestimmt. Schlussbericht zur Studie Anti-jüdische und anti-israelische Einstellungen in
der Schweiz, by Claude Langchamp et al. (Bern, 2007). A factor analysis shows that emotions
towards Jews as “respect, admiration, incomprehension, disappointment, rejection, anger, contempt, envy and hatred” load on two dimensions: a positive dimension with respect and admiration, and a negative dimension of incomprehension, disappointment, rejection, anger, contempt,
envy and hatred. “On an emotional level, Jews are perceived by respondents with little differentiation”, according to the authors of the study (p. 2).
157
158
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
presenting people with a direct question about their feelings toward Jews”.8 In the
Norwegian study, participants were asked two questions concerning their emotional attitudes towards Jews compared to those towards Muslims.
/ŚĂǀĞĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĚŝƐůŝŬĞŽĨ:ĞǁƐͬDƵƐůŝŵƐ;WŽƉϮϬϭϳͿ
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJ
ŽĨDƵƐůŝŵƐ
ϴ
ŽĨ:ĞǁƐ
Ϯ
Ϭ
Ϯϯ
ϲ
Ϭ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůů
Ϭ
ϭϭ
ϭϬ
ŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
ŝŵƉŽƐƐ͘ƚŽƐĂLJ
ϭϯ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌďĂĚůLJ
ŶŽƚĂƚĂůů
ϯϯ
Ϯϯ
ϯϯ
ϮϬ
ϯϬ
ϰϴ
ϰϬ
ϱϬ
ϲϬ
ϳϬ
ϴϬ
ϵϬ
ϭϬϬ
FIGURE 5.1. Dislike of Jews and Muslims (Percent. Population sample).
Only a minority of 7.5% of the Norwegian population show an openly declared
negative attitude toward Jews, and those who declared their opinion strongly
(opinion fits completely/dislike a lot) are an even smaller group (1.6%). Accordingly, 81% disagree with the “dislike” item. As Fig. 1 shows, an unfavourable
view/dislike of Muslims is more widespread compared with Jews.
A second question, “I have a particular sympathy for Jews/Muslims”, also
asked the other way round about the spread of a positive emotional attitude
towards Jews and Muslims. In this case “a particular sympathy” for Jews is clearly
more widespread compared with Muslims: 27% of the Norwegian population
have “particular sympathy” for Jews, compared to only 14% for Muslims.
Twenty-three per cent (for Jews) and 20% (for Muslims) chose the “no response”
and “impossible to say” option.
Another way to measure attitudes towards other groups is to measure the social
distance between them.
Concerning the attitude toward Jews, we can again identify a group of 7% in the
general population harbouring an aversive attitude. The proportion of those opting
out by choosing the “don’t know” or “no response” option is very small (4%). The
“elastic view” includes two groups “marked by varying intensities of anti-Jewish
attitudes”, which amount to about 7% of the Norwegian population: about 2%
show a hard-core negativity in relation to Jews, while another 5% hold a “somewhat unfavourable” view.
Looking at this rather small proportion of respondents showing their negative
emotional attitude towards Jews openly, it would be hard to understand why Jews
in Norway see antisemitism as a very widespread and rising phenomenon. Given
8. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain,16.
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
ΗtŚĞŶLJŽƵƚŚŝŶŬŽĨ:ĞǁƐǁŚĂƚŬŝŶĚŽĨĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŽƵůĚLJŽƵĨĞĞůĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůĞǁŝƚŚ͍dŽ
ǁŚĂƚĞdžƚĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚLJŽƵůŝŬĞŽƌĚŝƐůŝŬĞŝĨƚŚĞLJ͍͘͘͘;WŽƉϮϬϭϳͿ
ĚŝƐůŝŬĞĂůŽƚ
ĚŽŶǭƚŬŶŽǁ
ĚŝƐůŝŬĞĂůŝƚƚůĞ
ǁŽƵůĚŶDzƚŵŝŶĚ
͘͘͘ǁĞƌĞďƌŽƵŐŚƚŝŶƚŽLJŽƵƌĐŝƌĐůĞŽĨĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ͍
Ϯ ϱ Ϭϰ
͙ďĞĐĂŵĞLJŽƵƌŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌƐ͍
Ϯ ϱ Ϭϰ
Ϭй
ϭϬй
ŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
ůŝŬĞŝƚ
ϳϭ
ϭϴ
ϳϱ
ϮϬй
ϯϬй
ϰϬй
ϱϬй
ϭϰ
ϲϬй
ϳϬй
ϴϬй
ϵϬй
ϭϬϬй
FIGURE 5.2. Social distance towards Jews (Percent. Population sample).
that unfavourable attitudes towards Jews in Norway as well as in Britain are
minority phenomena, and that there exists only a loose connection between violence and negative attitudes in the sense that the threat against Jews is not necessarily dependent on the prevalence of negative attitudes, it can be concluded in
line with Staetsky that “the real meaning of this level – i.e. is it dangerous for the
Jewish population […] or what level does it have to reach to become socially or
politically problematic or dangerous – remains unclear.”9
3. IDEAS AND IMAGES OF JEWS
To give an answer to this question, Staetsky suggests widening the view by looking to the other dimension of prejudice since the attitudes toward Jews (and other
groups) are not limited to a simple emotional characterisation, but rather also have
a cognitive dimension. “People may have a favourable or unfavourable opinion of
Jews, but they may also have absorbed some specific ideas about what Jews are
or are not in terms of their pattern of behavior, their loyalties, or their political tendencies”,10 which need not necessarily be linked to strong negative feelings.
In the Norwegian study the same items were used that are common in other surveys on antisemitism.
9. Ibid., 20.
10. Ibid.
159
160
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
Opinions held by the Norwegian population on specific statements about Jews,
including three positive items: family oriented, artistically gifted and more intelligent than others.
,ŽǁǁĞůůĚŽƚŚĞƐĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŝƚǁŝƚŚLJŽƵƌŽǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ;ĂďŽƵƚ:ĞǁƐͿ;ƉŽƉ͘ϮϬϭϳͿ
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůů
ŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
:ĞǁƐĂƌĞĨĂŵŝůLJŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚ
ŝŵƉŽƐƐ͘ƚŽƐĂLJ
ϭϴ
:ĞǁƐŚĂǀĞƚŽŽŵƵĐŚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶh^ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐLJ
ϳ
ϮϮ
ϰ
ϭϰ
tŽƌůĚ:ĞǁƌLJŝƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞƐƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ:ĞǁŝƐŚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ
ϰ
ϭϬ Ϭ
:ĞǁƐŚĂǀĞƚŽŽŵƵĐŚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵLJ
ϯ
ϭϬ Ϭ
:ĞǁƐŚĂǀĞĞŶƌŝĐŚĞĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƚƚŚĞĞdžƉĞŶƐĞŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ
ϯ
ϵ
:ĞǁƐĂƌĞĂƌƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůůLJŐŝĨƚĞĚ
:ĞǁƐĂůǁĂLJƐĐĂƵƐĞĚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞLJůŝǀĞ
ϭϮ
Ϯ ϲ Ϭ
:ĞǁƐĂƌĞŵŽƌĞŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ϭ ϳ Ϭ
Ϭ
Ϭ
ϯϴ
ϰϬ
Ϭ
ϰϱ
ϰϭ
ϮϬ
Ϯϭ
Ϯϭ
ϮϬ
Ϯϯ
ϯϵ
ϯϭ
ϱϱ
ϭϮ
ϭϴ
ϯϭ
ϯϭ
ϯϲ
Ϯϰ
Ϯϵ
ϮϮ
Ϯϵ
ϭϯ
Ϯϲ
ϯϳ
Ϭ
ϭϮ
ϭϴ
ϯϴ
Ϭ
Ϯ ϲ Ϭ
Ϯ
ŶŽƚĂƚĂůů
ϰϮ
:ĞǁƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƚŽďĞďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ
:ĞǁƐůĂƌŐĞůLJŚĂǀĞƚŽďůĂŵĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĨŽƌďĞŝŶŐƉĞƌƐĞĐƵƚĞĚ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌďĂĚůLJ
Ϯϯ
ϯϮ
FIGURE 5.3. Opinions about Jews (Percent. Population sample)
On average, the percentage of those who agree with the six prejudice items in Norway is 12% (range is from 8%–18%).11 To agree with just one of these antisemitic
ideas may not be a good indicator of a pronounced antisemitic attitude. Therefore,
it will be useful to look at the distribution of the volume of antisemitic ideas. In a
first step, it is possible to clearly differentiate those respondents who do not agree
with any of the antisemitic statements presented to them from those who agree to
at least one statement.
11. In addition to the three positive items, we also decided to exclude the item “Jews have too much
influence on US foreign policy” from consideration, since the significantly higher approval rate
compared to the other items indicates that many respondents perceived it more as a matter of
political opinion rather than a negative verdict on Jews. Perhaps the approval of this item may
be primarily referred to the US Middle East policy – that is, it may be more of an anti-Israeli
than anti-Jewish statement. If this item was included in the Prejudice against Jews index, it
would increase the measured prevalence of antisemitism among the Norwegian population considerably. On average, the percentage increases from 9.1% to 12.7% (the range increases from
8% to 29%).
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
In the Norwegian case, 69.2% do not agree with any antisemitic statement,
while 30,8% agree with at least one of the six statements: 14.5% agree with one
statement, 5.7% with two, 3.2% with three, 2.8% with four, 2.7 with five and 2%
with all six statements. This means that 7.5% of the respondents agree with the
majority of at least four out of the six items. This amounts to the same quantity
that was determined for the emotional dimension of antisemitism (7.5%).
To determine the association of emotional attitudes and cognitive ideas, Staetsky proposes to cross-tabulate the answers to one’s opinion of Jews (dislike/don’t
dislike or neutral – Fig.1.) with the volume of specific antisemitic ideas.12 In the
Norwegian survey there is a clear association between the emotional and cognitive
dimension.
ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĚŝƐůŝŬĞŽĨ:ĞǁƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǀŽůƵŵĞŽĨĂŶƚŝƐĞŵŝƚŝĐ
ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ
ĂŐƌĞĞƚŽϭŽƌŵŽƌĞŽĨϲƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ
ĚŽŶDzƚĂŐƌĞĞƚŽĂŶLJƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ
ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞƚŽĚŝƐůŝŬĞ
Ϯϲ
ϳϰ
ŶĞƵƚƌĂů
Ϯϳ
ϳϯ
ĚŝƐůŝŬĞ
ϴϵ
ϭϭ
FIGURE 5.4. Feelings toward Jews and support of antisemitic statements (Percent. Population sample)
For the Norwegian population, we get the same pattern of association between the
emotional dimension (like/dislike) and antisemitic ideas as in Britain. Three quarters of those who disagree to the dislike item did not agree to any antisemitic statement, compared with just one-tenth of those who held an unfavourable view, i.e.
who dislike Jews. This means that among the Norwegian population the association between dislike of Jews and the agreement to antisemitic ideas is quite close.
Only one in ten (11%) of those who have a certain dislike of Jews did not agree to
any antisemitic idea and only very few of the neutral respondents may have chosen this option out of social desirability (latent antisemitism). Given that 11.3% of
the sample chose the neutral option, of whom 27% agree with at least one antisemitic statement (2.9% of the total population), and another 26% of those who
12. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 22.
161
162
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
disagree with having a certain dislike of Jews nevertheless agree with at least one
antisemitic statement (this is 21.1% of the total population), one can say that 24%
of the Norwegian population disagree with disliking Jews, although they agree to
one or more antisemitic statements. To this number we have to add the 89% of
those among the respondents who have a certain dislike of Jews (8%) who also
agree to at least one antisemitic statement. This is another 6.6% of the total population.
ŝƐůŝŬĞŽĨ:ĞǁƐĂŶĚͬŽƌƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ:ĞǁƐ;ƉŽƉϮϬϭϳͿ
ϳĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ
Ϯ͕ϬϬ
ϲĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ
Ϯ͕ϬϬ
ϱĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ
Ϯ͕ϬϬ
ϰĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ
Ϯ͕ϬϬ
ϯĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ
/ŶĚĞdžŽŶƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞ
ϰ͕ϬϬ
ϮĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ
ϲ͕ϬϬ
ϭĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ
ϭϰ͕ϬϬ
ŶŽĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ
ϲϴ͕ϬϬ
Ͳ
ϭϬ͕ϬϬ ϮϬ͕ϬϬ ϯϬ͕ϬϬ ϰϬ͕ϬϬ ϱϬ͕ϬϬ ϲϬ͕ϬϬ ϳϬ͕ϬϬ ϴϬ͕ϬϬ ϵϬ͕ϬϬ ϭϬϬ͕ϬϬ
FIGURE 5.5. Additive Index of the Prejudice against Jews (6 statements) and expression
of dislike (one statement) (Percent. Population sample)
Following Staetsky’s suggestion to adopt a “multifaceted view of the prevalence
of antisemitism”, we include in the calculations of prevalence all people “who
either hold an unfavourable opinion of Jews or who endorse at least one antisemitic statement”.13 Accordingly, one can say that 30.8% of the Norwegian population endorsed at least one antisemitic statement. Of those 7.5% of the Norwegian
population, who hold an unfavourable opinion of Jews (see Fig. 1) one in eleven
(0.8%) does not agree with any antisemitic statement (see Fig. 4) Integrating these
respondents into an enlarged 0–7-point index, the numbers together add up to
31.6% of the Norwegian population, which in Staetsky’s view marks a boundary
of the diffusion of antisemitic ideas in society. It is important to keep in mind,
13. Ibid., 24.
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
however, that Staetsky interprets this figure “not as the proportion of antisemites
that exists (…)14 but rather as a boundary of the diffusion of antisemitic attitudes
in society.”15 The new term diffusion is of great analytical significance to him
because it signals “a shift in emphasis from counting antisemitic individuals to
quantifying the spread of attitudes that Jews consider to be antisemitic” and which
may be a source of discomfort or offence to many Jews.16 This view is supported
by the fact that in Norway, one-half of those who agree to antisemitic statements
agree to only one of them (13.8% – see Fig. 5); another 6.3% agree to two statements. From this fact one can conclude that these persons do not have a closed
antisemitic world view.
This assumption is supported by the result presented in Figure 5.6. In the Norwegian survey the sympathy/antipathy (dislike) dimension is split into two items:
on the one hand, we asked about antipathy (dislike) to Jews. However, those who
have rejected this need not necessarily have a special affinity with Jews. That’s
why we asked a second question about particular sympathy towards them.17
ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐLJŵƉĂƚŚLJĨŽƌ:ĞǁƐďLJŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
ĂŶƚŝƐĞŵŝƚŝĐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ
ĂŐƌĞĞƚŽĂƚůĞĂƐƚϭŽƌŵŽƌĞŽĨϲƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ
ŶĞƵƚƌĂů
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐLJŵƉĂƚŚLJ
ŶŽƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐLJŵƉĂƚŚLJ
ϭϱ
ĚŝĚŶŽƚĂŐƌĞĞƚŽĂŶLJƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ
ϴϱ
ϰϯ
ϱϳ
ϳϳ
Ϯϯ
FIGURE 5.6. Sympathy towards Jews and support for antisemitic statements (Percent.
Population sample)
14. This claim would in Staetsky’s view “simply not stand up to any reasonable scrutiny” (Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 24).
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. In the survey, some interviewees agreed to have a “certain dislike” of Jews as well as to harbour a
“particular sympathy” toward Jews. Unlike in Ottar Hellevik’s chapter (3.1), where the approval
of the “dislike” item of these respondents was not counted for the “index for dislike of Jews”,
here all those who agreed to the “dislike” item are included in the calculation, even if they also
responded positively to the “particular sympathy” question. The same applies to those who
agreed to the “particular sympathy” question, even if they agreed to the “dislike” question too.
163
164
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
The figure shows that among respondents considering themselves to feel a particular sympathy for Jews (27% of the sample), 43% nevertheless agree to at least
one antisemitic statement. The self-assessment of being especially attached to
Jews hardly corresponds with being a staunch antisemite. The finding that out of
the large neutral group of respondents (23% of the total sample), far less agree to
at least one antisemitic statement than the sympathetic respondents (15% to 43%),
is harder to explain. One explanation may be that the “neutral respondents” also
use the “impossible to answer” option for the prejudice questions or do not
respond to them.
With the data of the Norwegian survey, it is possible to compare the pattern of
association between the dislike of Jews and the dislike of Muslims and the respective antisemitic or anti-Muslim (Islamophobic) statements.
ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĚŝƐůŝŬĞŽĨDƵƐůŝŵƐďLJŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
ĂŶƚŝͲDƵƐůŝŵƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ
ĂŐƌĞĞƚŽĂƚůĞĂƐƚϭŽƌŵŽƌĞŽĨϲƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ
ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞƚŽĚŝƐůŝŬĞ
ŶĞƵƚƌĂů
ϰϴ
ϱϮ
ϱϰ
ĚŝƐůŝŬĞ
ĚŽŶǭƚĂŐƌĞĞƚŽĂŶLJƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ
ϰϲ
ϵϲ
ϰ
FIGURE 5.7. Feelings towards Muslims and support of anti-Muslim statements (Percent. Population sample)18
It is obvious that the emotional attitude toward Muslims is less closely connected
with the approval or rejection of Islamophobic ideas than the dislike of Jews with
antisemitic ideas. Though almost all of those who dislike Muslims also agree to a
least one Islamophobic statement (96%), which is quite similar to the quantity of
respondents who dislike Jews (89%), half of those who take a favourable or neutral stance toward Muslims agree anyway to a large portion to at least one Islamophobic statement (48% and 54%), compared to just a quarter of respondents in
the case of attitudes towards Jews (26% and 27%). Therefore, we can conclude
that agreeing with anti-Muslim prejudices seems to be relatively independent of a
18. In this case, N=1,562. See footnote 4.
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
negative emotional attitude toward Muslims. Such opinions about Muslims seem
to be understood more as a description of a social reality rather than a pejorative
prejudice and are therefore considered more acceptable and quite compatible with
a positive or neutral attitude towards Muslims.19
ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐLJŵƉĂƚŚLJĨŽƌDƵƐůŝŵƐďLJ
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĂŶƚŝͲDƵƐůŝŵƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ
ĂŐƌĞĞĂƚůĞĂƐƚƚŽϭŽƌŵŽƌĞŽĨϲƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ
ŶĞƵƚƌĂů
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐLJŵƉĂƚŚLJ
ŶŽƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐLJŵƉĂƚŚLJ
ϰϬ
ĚŽŶDzƚĂŐƌĞĞƚŽĂŶLJƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ
ϲϬ
ϰϱ
ϱϱ
ϳϱ
Ϯϱ
FIGURE 5.8. Sympathy towards Muslims and support of anti-Muslim statements (Percent. Population sample)20
When respondents are asked about their “particular sympathy toward a group”,
the picture depicted for Jews and Muslims is rather similar, with just one exception. While those who have a particular sympathy and no particular sympathy
agree to the same amount to at least one antisemitic (43% and 77%) or antiMuslim statement (45% and 75%), those who take a neutral stance agree more
often to at least one Islamophobic statement (40%) compared to those agreeing to
at least one antisemitic statement (15%). This result may confirm the supposition
that the emotional attitude toward Muslims has less influence on the cognitive
dimension of prejudice than in the case of the attitude toward Jews. It means people have prejudices toward Muslims without strong anti-Muslim feelings.
19. See in this volume the debate on the relation between (realistic, acceptable) descriptions and
prejudice in terms of characterisations of Muslims, in Claudia Lenz and Vibeke Moe, “Negotiations of Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Group Conversations among Jews and Muslims”
chapter 10. For the connection between events such as the Rushdie affair and the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 2001 with the framing of Muslims as “a threat to civilisation”, see also Cora Alexa
Døving, “A Growing Consensus? The History of Public Debates on Islamophobia in Norway”.
20. In this case N=1,562. See footnote 4.
165
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WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
4. ANTI-ISRAELISM
In many other European countries, Jews have a deep emotional and religious
attachment to Israel. Therefore “negativity toward Israel expressed by non-Jews
is likely to be a cause for significant concern and apprehension among many
Jews”.21 In the FRA Study and in a German study on “Jewish perspectives”, it
becomes clear that a large majority of Jews evaluates the comparison of Israeli
politics toward the Palestinians to be like that of the Nazis toward Jews, the support of the boycott of goods from Israel and a “distorted presentation” of Israel’s
politics in mass media as an expression of an antisemitic attitude.22 For many
years now there has been a lingering debate about the relationship between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes. Some scholars even believe that antisemitism
today comes mainly in the guise of hostility to Israel. Since the beginning of the
21st century, some speak therefore of a “new antisemitism”, treating Israel as a
kind of “collective Jew”.23 So on the one hand it is important to examine the extent
to which antisemitism and anti-Israelism overlap, but on the other hand – as the
following results show – respondents with a very negative attitude toward Israel
do not agree to any of the antisemitic ideas and it is therefore necessary to decide
if their anti-Israel statements should be classified as antisemitic or as a “pure” hostility directed only against the state of Israel, but not against Jews in general.
Our study follows Staetsky’s proposal to explore the attitude of the population
toward Israel “along the same lines as their attitudes toward Jews: first, at the level
of favourable or unfavourable opinion, and second, testing the prevalence of specific ideas about Israel”.24 The connection between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes is treated here as on open research question.25
Unlike the British study, the Norwegian survey does not include a direct sympathy/dislike question like for the attitude toward Jews.26 As a makeshift, the survey uses the positioning of respondents on either the Israeli or Palestinian side as
an indicator of sympathies or antipathies towards Israel.27 It is clear that this
replacement is not without problems and that it is less suitable for measuring the
emotional attitude compared to the direct favourable/unfavourable item in the
British survey. In Norway the respondents showed less indifference or uncertainty
compared to the British respondents, since nearly half of them side with one of the
21. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 27.
22. FRA, Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in EU Member States; Hövermann/Jensen/
Zick/Bernstein/ Perl/Ramm, Jüdische Perspektiven auf Antisemitismus in Deutschland, 12 and 16.
23. Brian Klug, “The collective Jew: Israel and the new antisemitism”, Patterns of Prejudice 37, no.
2 (2003): 117–138.
24. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 27.
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
conflicting parties (in Britain only 24%). This may support our choice of attitude
towards the Middle East conflict as a measure of emotional rejection of Israel.
Therefore, we suppose the 32% siding with the Palestinians to have an unfavourable opinion of Israel, especially those 22% of them who chose the option solely
or mostly, while 14% have a favourable opinion of Israel (9% solely/mostly; 5%
to some extent). One third of the respondents do not tend to either side (32%) and
22% don’t have an answer.
The next problem that makes a comparison between the British and Norwegian
results difficult is the fact that while the British study used twelve specific positive
and negative statements about Israel (eight of them negative), the Norwegian
study only used six items, and only two of them are clearly negative. That is why
we can construct only a very short index of anti-Israel attitudes of two items. The
large difference in the length of the scales may affect the comparability of the
results.
25. There are already a few studies investigating the link between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes. Edgar H. Kaplan and Charles Small, “Anti-Israel sentiment predicts anti-Semitism in
Europe”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (2006): 548–61, used the data of the Antidefamation League survey, Attitudes toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Ten
European Countries (New York: ADL, 2004); for Germany, see the study by Aribert Heyder,
Julia Iser, and Peter Schmidt, “Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus? Meinungsbildung zwischen
Öffentlichkeit, Medien und Tabus” in Deutsche Zustände, Folge 3, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer
(Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2004): 144–165. The most comprehensive study to date is by Wilhelm Kempf, Israelkritik zwischen Antisemitismus und Menschenrechtsidee. Eine Spurensuche
(Berlin: Verlag Irena Regener, 2016). For a discussion of these and some other studies (on Sweden and Switzerland) see Werner Bergmann, “Is there a ‘New European Antisemitism?’ Public
Opinion and Comparative Empirical Research in Europe”, in Politics and Resentment. Antisemitism and Counter-Cosmopolitism in the European Union, ed. Lars Rensmann and Julius H.
Schoeps (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 83–115, here 89ff.; see for an early example also Bergmann and
Erb, Anti-Semitism in Germany. The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945, Chapter: Antizionism and
Antisemitism, 182–191. Bergmann and Erb, “Antizionism and Antisemitism”, in Anti-Semitism
in Germany. The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers,
1997), 83–115.
26. The British study uses the item “I’d like you to consider how you feel about certain countries
overall. Please tell me if you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, very unfavourable opinion of the following countries” (List of seven countries) to
measure an anti-Israel attitude.
27. In the British survey, both measures – the favourable/unfavourable item, and the sympathies in
relation to the Middle East conflict – differed considerably: while 33% show an unfavourable
opinion toward Israel, only 18% side with the Palestinians. As far as a negative attitude towards
Israel is concerned, among Norwegians this may also be determined by the political orientation
of the Israeli government, as the country has been ruled by a right-wing coalition government
for several years.
167
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WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
,ŽǁǁĞůůĚŽƚŚĞƐĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŝƚǁŝƚŚLJŽƵƌŽǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ
DŝĚĚůĞĂƐƚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͍
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůů
ŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
ŝŵƉŽƐƐ͘ƚŽƐĂLJ
ŽƚŚ/ƐƌĂĞůŝƐĂŶĚ:ĞǁƐĂƌĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŽĂƐƚĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ
ŽǁŶ
ϱϱ
ƐůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŽĨ/ƐƌĂĞůĞdžŝƐƚƐƚŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞŶŽ
ƉĞĂĐĞ
ϭϰ
/ƐƌĂĞůŝƐĂƚƚŚĞĨŽƌĞĨƌŽŶƚŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƌŽŶ/ƐůĂŵŝĐ
ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ
ϵ
/ƐĂƌĞůƚƌĞĂƚƐƚŚĞWĂůĞƐƚŝŶŝĂŶƐũƵƐƚĂƐďĂĚůLJĂƐƚŚĞ:ĞǁƐ
ǁĞƌĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚŝŶtŽƌůĚtĂƌ//
ϳ
WĂůĞƐƚŝŶŝĂŶůĞĂĚĞƌƐŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůLJǁĂŶƚƚŽĨŝŶĚĂƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ
ϱ
/ƐƌĂĞůDzƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůLJǁĂŶƚƚŽĨŝŶĚĂƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽ
ƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ
ϭϭ
ϴ
ϰ ϲ ϲ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌďĂĚůLJ
ŶŽƚĂƚĂůů
ϭϱ
ϲ
ϯϱ
ϲ
Ϭ
Ϯϴ
ϯϳ
Ϯϰ
ϮϬ
ϭϮ
Ϯϯ
Ϯϭ
Ϭ
ϯϱ
ϮϬ
ϭϰ
ϰϯ
Ϯϱ
ϰ
ϭϬ
ϰϬ
Ϯϭ
ϳ
Ϯϵ
FIGURE 5.9. Opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Percent. Population sample)
Negativity towards Israel is significantly more common among Norwegian
respondents than negativity toward Jews. While the level of endorsement of antisemitic statements is in the range of 8–18%, anti-Israel statements range between
25–32%.
In the Norwegian population the difference between those agreeing to at least
one antisemitic statement (30.8%) and those agreeing to at least one anti-Israel
statement (40%) is not very large. This may be partly because of the fact that in
this case, the anti-Israel Index consists of only two items.
Parallel to the connection between the emotional and the cognitive dimension
in the case of attitude toward Jews, we can do the same for the attitude toward
Israel. All in all, the pattern for both attitudes is rather similar: the large majority
of those holding a favourable opinion of Israel (93%) does not agree with any antiIsrael statement, and again, as was the case with attitudes toward Jews, the profile
of those who claim neutrality in relation to Israel, or who did not respond to a
question, is much closer, with 79%, to those with a favourable opinion of Israel
than to those with an unfavourable opinion.
As already mentioned above, using the positioning of respondents on either the
Israeli or Palestinian side as an indicator of sympathy or antipathy towards Israel
in the Norwegian study is not without problems, because the partisanship for one
of the conflicting parties does not necessarily mean having a decidedly unfavourable view of the other party. Compared with the British study, an even larger
majority of those supporting Israel in the Middle East conflict (14% of the sample)
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
ƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƚŚĞDŝĚĚůĞĂƐƚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚďLJĂŶƚŝͲ/ƐƌĂĞů/ŶĚĞdž;ϬͲϮͿ
;WŽƉϮϬϭϳͿ
ĚŽŶDzƚĂŐƌĞĞ
ƉƌŽWĂůĞƐƚŝŶŝĂŶƐ
ŶĞƵƚƌĂů
ƉƌŽ/ƐƌĂĞů
ĂŐƌĞĞƚŽĂƚůĞĂƐƚϭ
ϱϱ
ϰϱ
ϳϵ
Ϯϭ
ϵϯ
ϳ
FIGURE 5.10. Opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and support for Israelis or
Palestinians (Percent. Population sample)
does not agree with any anti-Israel statement (93%), and as was the case with attitudes toward Jews, the profile of those who claim neutrality in relation to the Middle East conflict is even much closer to the pro-Israel camp than to those who side
with the Palestinian cause. Even a small majority of those who claim to be proPalestinian does not agree to any anti-Israel statement. This may be due to the fact
that the indicator for an “unfavourable opinion” (to be pro-Palestinian) used in the
Norwegian study is too closely connected with a partisanship in the Middle East
conflict. The positioning on the part of the Palestinians in the Middle East conflict
is only partially motivated by negative attitudes toward Israel.
5. ATTITUDES TOWARD JEWS AND ISRAEL: ARE THEY LINKED?
The question of the extent to which antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes are linked
(or are almost identical) is the most hotly debated issue in recent research on antisemitism.28 So far, no consensus has emerged. For Staetsky, a “strictly empirical
social scientific approach to this question requires an ‘overlap-test’”.29 The finding that negativity towards Israel is significantly more common than negativity
28. Robert Fine, “Fighting with phantoms: A contribution to the debate on antisemitism in Europe”,
Patterns of Prejudice 43 (2009): 459–479; David Feldman, “Antizionismus und Antisemitismus
in Großbritannien”, Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 23 (2014): 43–49; Klug, “The collective Jew”, 117–138.
29. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 33.
169
170
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
toward Jews in Norway (and in Great Britain as well) gives a first hint that it cannot be expected to find a complete overlap between the two.30
The findings show that in the Norwegian survey, more respondents agree to the
negative statements concerning Israel than those concerning Jews.
KƉŝŶŝŽŶƐŽŶ:ĞǁƐĂŶĚ/ƐƌĂĞů;WŽƉͿ
ĨŝƚǁŝƚŚŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐŽŶ/ƐƌĂĞů
ĨŝƚǁŝƚŚŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐŽŶ:ĞǁƐ
ϳϯ
ŽƚŚƚŚĞ/ƐƌĂĞůŝƐĂŶĚƚŚĞWĂůĞƐƚŝŶŝĂŶƐĂƌĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŽĂƐƚĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ
:ĞǁƐĂƌĞǀĞƌLJĨĂŵŝůLJŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚ
ϲϬ
ϯϯ
ϯϮ
WĂůĞƐƚŝŶŝĂŶůĞĂĚĞƌƐǁĂŶƚƚŽĨŝŶĚĂƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ
/ƐƌĂĞůƚƌĞĂƚƐƚŚĞWĂůĞƐƚŝŶŝĂŶƐũƵƐƚĂƐďĂĚůLJĂƐƚŚĞ:ĞǁƐǁĞƌĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚĚƵƌŝŶŐtŽƌůĚtĂƌ//
:ĞǁƐŚĂǀĞƚŽŽŵƵĐŚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶh^ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐLJ
Ϯϵ
/ƐƌĂĞůDzƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůLJǁĂŶƚƚŽĨŝŶĚĂƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ
ϮϮ
:ĞǁƐĞdžƉůŽŝƚƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚǀŝĐƚŝŵŚŽŽĚĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ
ϮϮ
Ϯϭ
ϮϬ
ƐůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŽĨ/ƐƌĂĞůĞdžŝƐƚƐƚŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞŶŽƉĞĂĐĞ
/ƐƌĂĞůŝƐĂƚƚŚĞĨŽƌĞĨƌŽŶƚŽĨƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ
:ĞǁƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ
ϭϴ
tŽƌůĚ:ĞǁƌLJŝƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞƐƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ:ĞǁŝƐŚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ
ϭϰ
ϭϰ
ϭϯ
ϭϮ
:ĞǁƐĂƌĞĂƌƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůůLJŐŝĨƚĞĚ
:ĞǁƐŚĂǀĞƚŽŽŵƵĐŚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵLJ
:ĞǁƐĞŶƌŝĐŚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƚƚŚĞĞdžƉĞŶƐĞŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ
:ĞǁƐĂƌĞŵŽƌĞŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ
:ĞǁƐůĂƌŐĞůLJŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƚŽďůĂŵĞĨŽƌďĞŝŶŐƉĞƌƐĞĐƵƚĞĚ
:ĞǁƐŚĂǀĞĂůǁĂLJƐĐĂƵƐĞĚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞLJůŝǀĞ
ϴ
ϴ
ϴ
FIGURE 5.11. Opinions about Jews and Israel (Percent finding that the statements fit
completely or rather well with your own opinion (Percent. Population sample).
To test how antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes are linked, Staetsky proposes
comparing the degree of endorsement of antisemitic opinions in the general population with that of those respondents holding anti-Israel attitudes. We can see that
both attitudes are connected since holding anti-Israel attitudes has a reinforcing
influence on antisemitic attitudes. Those holding strong anti-Israel attitudes on the
enlarged anti-Israel index (0–3/N=339)31 also clearly agree more often with antisemitic statements than the general population (Figure 12).
On average, the agreement of the general population to the eight items in Figure
5.12 is 16%, while those holding strong anti-Israel attitudes agree on average to
30. For the British case, the correlation between the antisemitic and the anti-Israel index is statistically significant: the Pearson correlation (r) is 0.48; and 23% of variation in the anti-Israel index
is explained by variation in the antisemitism index (Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary
Great Britain, 35, Footnote 24). In the Norwegian survey, the Pearson correlation of the antiIsrael index and the prejudice against Jews index is smaller (r= 0.31) than in the British study.
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
ŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĂŶƚŝƐĞŵŝƚŝĐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞǁŝƚŚƐƚƌŽŶŐĂŶƚŝͲ/ƐƌĂĞůĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ;ƉŽƉϮϬϭϳͿ
ϱϭ
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞh^ƉŽůŝĐLJ
Ϯϵ
ĞdžƉůŽŝƚ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ
ϰϭ
ϮϮ
ϯϱ
ďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ
ϭϴ
:ĞǁŝƐŚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ
ϭϰ
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĞĐŽŶŽŵLJ
ϭϯ
Ϯϳ
ĂŶƚŝͲ/ƐƌĂĞůĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ
Ϯϵ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
Ϯϱ
:ĞǁƐĞŶƌŝĐŚ
ϭϮ
ďůĂŵĞĨŽƌďĞŝŶŐƉĞƌƐĞĐƵƚĞĚ
ϴ
ĐĂƵƐĞĚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ
ϴ
Ϭ
ϭϬ
Ϯϭ
ϮϬ
ϮϬ
ϯϬ
ϰϬ
ϱϬ
ϲϬ
ĂŐƌĞĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJͬƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůů
FIGURE 5.12. Antisemitic statements held by the general population compared to
those who strongly agree on the anti-Israel Index (2+3 points) (Percent. Population
sample).
31%.32 The ratio between the general population and those harbouring anti-Israel
attitudes in Norway is 1 to 2.
In the British survey, Staetsky added those who have an unfavourable view of
Israel but do not agree to any of the eight statements on the anti-Israel index to
create an index that increases from an eight-point to a nine-point scale. In the Norwegian case, a comparable question (unfavourable opinion of Israel) does not
exist, so we measured the attitude toward Israel by asking for the partisanship in
the Middle East conflict instead. One can expect that those taking sides with Israel
will be antisemitic less often than those siding with the Palestinians.
31. The enlarged anti-Israel index is composed of the two anti-Israel statements (“Israel treats the
Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War Two”; “As long as the State
of Israel exists there can be no peace”) and those who solely/mostly side with the Palestinians in
the Middle East conflict. Those who agree to two or all of the three items are labelled as having
strong anti-Israel attitudes.
32. The increase in support for the eight antisemitic statements is eight percentage points lower
using the extended anti-Israel index (0–3) compared to using the anti-Israel index (0–2). In addition to the two anti-Israel statements of the shorter index (0–2), the enlarged anti-Israel index
(0–3) also contains those respondents with a strong sympathy for the Palestinian side in the
Middle East conflict. This may be due to the fact that the Palestinians’ support is less often associated with antisemitic prejudices than the two strong anti-Israel statements.
171
172
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
WĞŽƉůĞŚĂǀĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶŐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ/ƐƌĂĞůĂŶĚƚŚĞ
WĂůĞƐƚŝŶŝĂŶƐ͘tŚŝĐŚƐŝĚĞĚŽLJŽƵƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŵŽƐƚ͍
;WŽƉϮϬϭϳͿ
ŵŽƐƚůLJƉƌŽ/͘
ƐŽŵĞĞdžƚĞŶƚƉƌŽ/͘
ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ
ŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
ƐŽŵĞĞdžƚĞŶƚƉƌŽW͘
ŵŽƐƚůLJƉƌŽW͘
ϵй
ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽƐĂLJ
ϱй
ϮϮй
ϭϬй
Ϭй
ϯϮй
ϮϮй
FIGURE 5.13. Support for Israelis or Palestinians (Percent. Population sample).
From those who side with the Palestinians, only those for the anti-Israel index,
who do so “solely/mostly” (22%) were selected because one can rather assume
that it is more likely that they will have a negative image of Israel compared to
those who answered only “to some extent”. We then cross-tabulated the enlarged
anti-Israel index (0–3) with the enlarged prejudice against Jews index (0–7).
Although in the Norwegian case the anti-Israel index is quite short, we find the
same pattern of connection between antisemitic and anti-Israel attitudes, but it
could be that the level of those harbouring anti-Israel prejudice is underestimated
because of the shorter index compared to the British one.
Of the Norwegian respondents, 43.7% agree neither to any statement on the
prejudice against Jews index, nor to any on the anti-Israel index. One can see by
comparing the columns that the higher the percentage of anti-Israel opinions, the
higher the percentage of people with antisemitic attitudes. Based on this approach,
Staetsky’s conclusion “that the existence of an association between the antisemitic
and the anti-Israel attitudes tested, is unambiguous”33 can be approved.
Two-thirds of those who exhibit only a low level of an anti-Israel attitude (score
1) score 0 on the prejudice against Jews index (62%), while those who exhibit a
high level of anti-Israel attitudes (2–3) show a low level of those scoring 0 on the
prejudice against Jews index less often (46% and 35%), and 19% and 32% score
highly on the antisemitism index (4–7).
33. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 33.
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
TABLE 5.1. Prejudice against Jews and anti-Israel attitude (Percent. Population sample)
Anti-Israel index and mostly pro-Palestinian
Prejudice against Jews 0–7
0
1
2
3
Total
0
82
62
46
35
1
11
14
21
14
2
3
10
9
13
3
2
6
5
6
4
1
3
8
3
5
1
2
4
8
6
0
2
5
7
7
0
1
2
14
Total %
100
100
100
100
N
841
393
238
101
1,575
From the sample of 1,575 Norwegian respondents, 12.3% score highly on the antiIsrael index (score 2–3) and also hold at least one antisemitic attitude. However,
38% of those scoring 1 on the anti-Israel index also show a least one antisemitic
prejudice (this is 9.5% of the total sample), and 18% of those scoring 0 on the antiIsrael index hold at least one antisemitic prejudice (9.6% of the total sample),
while a clearly larger proportion of 24.6% of the Norwegian population agrees to
one or more anti-Israel statements, but to none of the antisemitic statements. If we
understand antisemitism and anti-Israelism in a softer sense (23% being labelled
as antisemitic or 46.5% as anti-Israel, when agreeing with at least one negative
item on both indexes), both kinds of prejudice overlap in 21.8% of the Norwegian
population.
If focussing on those scoring highly on both indexes (2–3 on the anti-Israel
index (21.5% of the total sample) and 4–7 on the antisemitism index (8% of the
total sample) – 3% are just antisemitic and 16.6% are just anti-Israel. Both attitudes overlap in this case by 4.9%. This means that 75.5% of the Norwegian
respondents do not harbour very strong antisemitic or anti-Israel attitudes.
173
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂŶƚŝͲ/ƐƌĂĞůĂŶĚĂŶƚŝƐĞŵŝƚŝĐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ
;WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳͿ
ϯ
ŶƚŝͲ/ƐƌĂĞůŝŶĚĞdž
174
ϲϱ
Ϯ
ϱϰ
ϭ
Ϭ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůƉŽƉ
ϯϴ
ϭϴ
Ϯϳ
ĂŐƌĞĞƚŽĂƚůĞĂƐƚϭĂŶƚŝƐĞŵŝƚŝĐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ
FIGURE 5.14. Anti-Israel attitude and agreement to a least one antisemitic statement
(Percent. Population sample).
But Staetsky is right with the restriction that this association between antisemitic
and anti-Israel attitudes is demonstrated here at “a population level, not at an individual level”. “An individual holding even the highest volume of anti-Israel opinions is not necessarily antisemitic; rather it indicates that the probability of such
an individual of being antisemitic is considerably higher than an individual who
does not hold anti-Israel opinions”.34 On the basis of our data, it is not possible to
answer the question of causal direction: Is being critical of Israel caused by antisemitic attitudes, or are antisemitic attitudes a result of critical attitudes towards
Israel?
6. VIOLENT ORIENTATIONS: DO ANTISEMITIC OR ANTI-MUSLIM
ATTITUDES COINCIDE WITH THE JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST JEWS OR MUSLIMS?
A third dimension of attitudes is called conative or behavioural, i.e. meaning the
behavioural tendencies of a person toward a particular object, such as acceptance,
readiness to help but also withdrawal and aggression (for example, the readiness
34. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 35. The statistical analysis cannot solve
the problem of political communication – whether in a specific case an anti-Israeli statement
actually justifies the assumption that the speaker is antisemitic or not – although there exists a
certain probability.
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
to use or excuse violence against an individual group). Of course, there is no direct
and unambiguous connection between the existence of a cognitive and emotional
prejudice with violence, because many other factors come into play (psychological dispositions, cultural context, situational factors etc.).35 Readiness to use or
excuse violence takes us, as Staetsky has phrased it, “metaphorically ‘half-way’
between attitudes and behavior, and somewhat closer to an empirical assessment
of the potential for violence”.36
In the Norwegian survey, we measured the readiness to justify harassment or
violence against Jews by asking “Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians,
harassment and violence against Jews is justifiable”. This operationalisation is, of
course, somewhat problematic due to the connection with the Middle East conflict, because although it is explicitly asked about violence against “Jews” and not
against “Israelis”, it could also be understood as if it were about the use of violence
by Palestinians against Israeli Jews in the context of the conflict.37 So it could be
that some Norwegian respondents who consider violence against Jews to be justifiable do not want to justify violence against Jews outside Israel, but in the Antisemitism survey of 2012, 4% of Norwegians agreed that the shooting incident at
the Oslo Synagogue in 2006 to be justifiable given Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians.38 So, we can assume that at least a part of the 12% consider harassment
and violence against Jews in Norway or other countries to be justifiable.
35. Howard Schuman and Michael P. Johnson, “Attitudes and Behavior”, Annual Review of Sociology 2 (1976): 161–207; Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pearson, 1980); Icek Ajzen and Martin
Fishbein, “The influence of attitudes on behavior”, in Handbook of attitudes and attitude
change, ed. Dolores Albarracín, Blair T. Johnson and Mark P. Zanna (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum,
2005), 173–221. Mackie, Thierry and Smith, “Intergroup Emotions: Explaining Offensive
Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context”, 602–616.
36. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 39.
37. However, the British study, in which the justification of violence against Jews is not asked in the
context of the Middle East conflict, shows that in Great Britain violence against Jews is often or
sometimes considered justified by 4.1%, while a further 9.8% consider it “rarely justified”.
When asked about violence against Zionists or Israelis, the values are very similar (4.4%/10.1%
and 4.8%/10.4%) (Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 40). The question was
asked in the British survey as follows: “Thinking about Britain today, to what extent do you feel
that using violence against any of the following groups or institutions would be justified in order
to defend your political or religious beliefs and values?”
38. HL-senteret, Antisemitism in Norway? The Attitudes of the Norwegian Population towards
Jews and Other Minorities, Oslo 2012, p. 23, Fig. 5 (“Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, such acts are justifiable”).
175
176
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
,ŽǁǁĞůůĚŽĞƐƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚĨŝƚǁŝƚŚLJŽƵŽǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ͍
ΗŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐŚŽǁ/ƐƌĂĞůƚƌĞĂƚƐƚŚĞWĂůĞƐƚŝŶŝĂŶƐ͕ŚĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ:ĞǁƐĂƌĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĂďůĞΗ͘
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJ
Ϯ
Ϭй
ϭϬ
Ϭ
ϭϬй
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůů
ŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
Ϯϱ
ϮϬй
ŝŵƉŽƐƐ͘ƚŽƐĂLJ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌďĂĚůLJ
Ϯϯ
ϯϬй
ϰϬй
ϱϬй
ŶŽƚĂƚĂůů
ϰϬ
ϲϬй
ϳϬй
ϴϬй
ϵϬй
ϭϬϬй
FIGURE 5.15. Attitude towards Israel and justification of harassment and violence
against Jews (Percent. Population sample).
Almost two-thirds of the Norwegian population (63%) reject this opinion fully or
mostly; 25% say it is impossible to answer/or did not respond, and only 12% agree
to it “completely or somewhat”. If we cross-tabulate the answers to this question
with our prejudice against Jews index (0–7), the percentage of those agreeing to
four and more items of this index increases from those who reject this statement
fully (3.1%) over those who reject it somewhat (8.4%) to those who agree somewhat (23.9%) and those who agree completely (48.9%). Among those who chose
the option “impossible to say”, 5.9% agree, so they rank between those who reject
the question fully or somewhat. Of the Norwegian respondents, 4.3% show a high
level of antisemitic prejudice and legitimise harassment or violence against Jews,
but 3.2% of those respondents rejecting the question fully or somewhat also show
a high level of antisemitic prejudice. Therefore, a high level of antisemitic prejudice does not necessarily lead directly to a legitimation of violence, but we can see
that there is a closer connection between prejudice and legitimation of violence
among those who show a high degree of antisemitic prejudices than among those
who show no or only a small degree of prejudice.
The proportion of those respondents who justify harassment and violence
against Jews “completely or somewhat” grows with the increasing number of antisemitic prejudices, and among the high-scorers on the antisemitism scale (4–7)
between one-third to two-thirds justify harassment and violence.
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
,ŽǁǁĞůůĚŽĞƐƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚĨŝƚǁŝƚŚLJŽƵƌŽǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ͍
ΗŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐŚŽǁ/ƐƌĂĞůƚƌĞĂƚƐƚŚĞWĂůĞƐƚŝŶŝĂŶƐ͕ŚĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ:ĞǁƐ
ĂƌĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĂďůĞΗ ;ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJͬƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůůͿďLJĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƚŽ
ƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ:ĞǁƐ;ϬͲϳͿ
ϲϲ
ϯϰ
ϯϲ
ϯϴ
ϯϬ
Ϯϰ
ϭϱ
ϱ
ĂŐƌĞĞϬ
ĂŐƌĞĞϭ
ĂŐƌĞĞϮ
ĂŐƌĞĞϯ
ĂŐƌĞĞϰ
ĂŐƌĞĞϱ
ĂŐƌĞĞϲ
ĂŐƌĞĞϳ
FIGURE 5.16. Justification of harassment and violence against Jews and level of antisemitic prejudice (Percent. Population sample).
Norwegian population: Those justifying harassment and violence completely/rather well, N=182
Agree 0 N=58; agree 1 N= 34; agree 2 N=24; agree 3 N=16; agree 4 N=13, agree 5 N=11 agree 6 N=11
agree 7 N=15
When we look at those respondents who justify harassment and violence against
Jews “completely or somewhat”, we can see that their proportion also increases
with the increasing number of anti-Israel prejudices. Among those who do not
agree to any anti-Israel item, 5.4% justify harassment and violence against Jews
“completely or somewhat”, the proportion increases among those who agree to
one anti-Israel statement up to 11.3%; among those who agree to two statements
it increases to 19%, while the percentage of those who agree to all three items
of the anti-Israel index increases to even 34% justifying harassment and violence.
Among the Norwegian respondents, about the same proportion justifies harassment and violence against Jews (12%) as against Muslims (10%), while they
reject violence against Muslims (73%) more often than against Jews (63%).
177
178
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
,ŽǁǁĞůůĚŽĞƐƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚĨŝƚǁŝƚŚLJŽƵŽǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ͍
ΗŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƌĞĐĞŶƚƚĞƌƌŽƌĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕ŚĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚDƵůŝŵƐĂƌĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĂďůĞΗ͘
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJ
ϯ
ϳ
Ϭй
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůů
ϭϳ
ϭϬй
ϮϬй
ŝŵƉŽƐƐ͘ƚŽƐĂLJͬŶ͘ƌ͘
ƌĂƚŚĞƌďĂĚůLJ
ŶŽƚĂƚĂůů
Ϯϲ
ϯϬй
ϰϳ
ϰϬй
ϱϬй
ϲϬй
ϳϬй
ϴϬй
ϵϬй
ϭϬϬй
FIGURE 5.17. Recent terror attacks and justification of harassment and violence against
Muslims (Percent. Population sample)39
The following Figure 5.18 shows a clear connection between anti-Muslim prejudice
and the readiness to justify the use of violence against Muslims in Norway. The
higher one scores on the anti-Muslim prejudice index, the greater the likelihood that
one justifies violence against Muslims. While only a small proportion of those who
do agree to violence are among those who agree 0–3 times on the anti-Muslim index,
their share increases with those who agree 4–6 times with each stage and reaches a
peak with half of those who agree to all items on the anti-Muslim prejudice index.
,ŽǁǁĞůůĚŽĞƐƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚĨŝƚǁŝƚŚLJŽƵƌŽǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ͍
ΗŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŽƌĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕ŚĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚDƵůŝŵƐĂƌĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĂďůĞΗ
;ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJͬƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůůͿ
ďLJĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƚŽWƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚDƵƐůŝŵƐ/ŶĚĞdž
ϱϬ
ϭϲ
ϭϮ
ϴ
ϲ
ϲ
Ϯ
ĂŐƌĞĞϬ
ĂŐƌĞĞϭ
ĂŐƌĞĞϮ
ĂŐƌĞĞϯ
ĂŐƌĞĞϰ
ĂŐƌĞĞϱ
ĂŐƌĞĞϲ
FIGURE 5.18. Justification of harassment and violence against Muslims and level of
anti-Muslim prejudice (Percent. Population sample).40
Norwegian population: Those justifying harassment and violence completely/rather well, N=156
Agree 0 N=12; agree 1 N=4; agree 2 N=10; agree 3 N=9; agree 4 N=19, agree 5 N=25; agree 6 N=77
39. In this case N=1,562. See footnote 4.
40. In this case N=1,562. See footnote 4.
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
For Norway (as for Great Britain too), the readiness to justify violence against
Jews, Muslims and other groups is a minority position that is more likely to occur
among people with highly biased attitudes.
Among the Norwegian respondents, 24% of those who “somewhat” justify harassment and violence against Jews also justify violence against Muslims (somewhat or completely) and even 36% of those who completely justify harassment
and violence against Jews also justify violence against Muslims (somewhat or
completely). This group amounts to 3% of the total sample (N=47 out of 1,562).
For comparison: only 5% of those who do not justify harassment and violence
against Jews at all do justify violence against Muslims “completely or somewhat”.
7. COMPARING NORWAY WITH GREAT BRITAIN
The present analysis followed the procedure used in Daniel Staetsky’s survey on
contemporary antisemitism in Great Britain. Finally, the results of the Norwegian
survey will now be compared with those of the British study. A one-on-one comparison between the Norwegian and the British study is not possible, mainly because
they do not use the same questions to measure antisemitism and anti-Israelism. Due
to this, it was not possible to compare the quantitative results directly, but the results
for Norway can be tentatively compared with the results of the British study by looking at the underlying patterns and correlations instead of the numerical data.
The Norwegian findings corroborate what Staetsky has determined for Britain
– that “an unambiguous, well-defined antisemitism is distinctly a minority position”.41 By combining different ways of measuring attitudes toward Jews, we
found that approximately 8% of the Norwegian population (see Figure 5.5 – those
agree more than 3 times the 7–point index) “hold attitudes of a kind and intensity
that would qualify them as being called antisemitic”.42 In the Norwegian case, this
41. Ibid. These results are in line with the results of many surveys on antisemitism in which the UK
and the Scandinavian countries have the least prevalence of antisemitic prejudice in Europe
(Antidefamation League, Global 100. An Index of Anti-Semitism (New York: ADL, 2014) –
http://global100.adl.org/).
42. In the study Hoffmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway 2017,
Figure 5.13, a combined index on antisemitism is used, which includes items on prejudice,
social distance and antipathy. On this scale 5.5% of the respondents are labelled as “high scorers”, while 86.7% score zero on this index. 7.9% show a lower degree of antisemitic attitudes.
See the discussion in Ottar Hellevik’s chapter of where the limit for “high” scores on the antisemitism scale should be drawn. His analyses provide a good argument to draw the boundary
between low and high scorers elsewhere, which would result in an increase of the proportion of
high scorers to 12.4%. This would argue for a greater spread of antisemitic attitudes in Norway.
179
180
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
value more or less matches the proportion of those who openly admitted to having
a “certain dislike of Jews” (7.5%). In Great Britain 5.4% declared having a “very
or somewhat unfavourable view” of Jews,43 and 6.1% agree with more than 3
items on the combined antisemitism scale (ranging from 0 to 8).44 In both countries, the proportion of those who declare this opinion very strongly (very unfavourable/dislike completely) is even smaller (1.6% in Norway, and 2.4% in Great
Britain). To come back to the “elastic view” concept, the 8% of the Norwegian
population that can be counted as “antisemites” are not the whole story, since
another, larger part of the population endorse a number of antisemitic statements.
Among British respondents, 28% agree with at least one out of seven antisemitic
statements, while in Norway 30.8% agree with at least one out of six antisemitic
statements, which “a majority of Jews are likely to perceive or experience as antisemitic”.45 If we take the presence of an unfavourable opinion (emotional dimension) and/or the endorsement of at least one antisemitic statement (cognitive
dimension)46 together, the maximal diffusion of antisemitic attitudes for the British population is about 30%, of which 6.1% are to be qualified clearly antisemitic,
while the other 23.9% express some degree of prejudice towards Jews. For the
Norwegian case, we determined the widest diffusion of antisemitic attitudes at
31.6%, 8% of which are to be qualified as antisemitic persons, with the other
23.6% showing some degree of prejudice toward Jews. In this regard, the degree
of agreement and the ratio of convinced antisemites to those who agree with only
some antisemitic statements are also quite similar for Norway and Great Britain.
In light of these findings, it is surprising that a larger part of the Norwegian
respondents (12%) justify harassment and violence against Jews, 2% of them even
completely.47 This 12% go beyond the 8% that were classified as clearly antisemitic. In Britain, the percentage of those who agree to anti-Jewish violence is
43. Because 47.9% of the British respondents opted for “neither favourable nor unfavourable” and
“Don’t Know/Refused” Staetsky omitted the “neither favourable nor unfavourable” option in an
additional question. Under this condition another 7.2.% went to the unfavourable side, so that
Staetsky added to 5.4% another 7.2% of respondents with a “latent negativity towards Jews”. So
the range of people with an unfavourable view of Jews is between the minimum of 5.4% and the
maximal estimate of 12.6%.
44. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 24, Figure 5.8.
45. Ibid., 63.
46. This means that to the 7-point index of the British study and the 6-point index of the Norwegian
study, which measured antisemitic ideas and images, those were added who do not agree to any
of these ideas but nevertheless harbour an unfavourable view of Jews, so that we get an 8-point
index and a 7-point index respectively.
47. The consent to violent acts against Jews (and Muslims) belongs to the behavioural or conative
dimension of attitudes.
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
within the range of those with strong antisemitic attitudes (4%). The higher
approval in the Norwegian case is probably due to two factors: to refer to the treatment of Palestinians by Israelis in measuring the justification of harassment and
violence against Jews is connecting Jews with Israel’s policy, therefore the much
more widespread anti-Israel attitudes among the Norwegian population come into
play here. In addition, it is likely significant that the British study asked for the
justification of violence, while in Norwegian study it is asked for the justification
not only of violence but also of the less harmful harassment.
Among the Norwegian respondents, about the same number justifies harassment and violence against Jews (12%) and Muslims (10% – see Figures 5.15–
5.18), while respondents reject violence against Muslims (73%) more often than
against Jews (63%). In contrast, in Britain violence against Jews is less often justified (4% “often or sometimes”; another 9.8% say “rarely”) than against Muslims
(7.5% “often or sometimes”; another 10.8% say “rarely”). Correspondingly, violence against Jews (71.2%) is rejected somewhat more frequently than violence
against Muslims (67.1%).48 Overall, however, the differences in the approval of
violence and harassment against Jews and Muslims in both countries are only
small. Moreover, that which survey research has found in the context of prejudice
against various minorities49 also applies to the willingness to justify violence,
since the results of the British study confirm that “strongly antisemitic people
showing relatively high levels of justification for violence against other targets”,
such as Muslims and immigrants but also against banks, big business and British
military personnel.50 Because these other targets do not seem to indicate the existence of a coherent ideological worldview, Staetsky concludes from the non-exclusive
tendency to justify violence that these respondents may be “simply more likely to
consider violence to be an acceptable method of protest in general”.51
Attitude towards Jews cannot be considered without reference to the attitude
towards Israel and the Middle East conflict, since in Norway a strong negative
attitude toward Israel is more widespread (21.5%) than a strong negative attitude
towards Jews (7.9%). As in Great Britain too, the proportion of those who agree
with anti-Israel statements is higher than the proportion of those who agree with
48. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 40, Figure 5.20.
49. The Group-Focus-Enmity project; see: Andreas Zick, Beate Küpper and Andreas Hövermann,
Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination. A European Report (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, 2011); Wilhelm Heitmeyer, ed., Deutsche Zustände, vol.1–10 (Frankfurt/Main, Berlin:
Suhrkamp, 2002–2012).
50. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 40.
51. Ibid.
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antisemitic statements. This is proven also by the different level of endorsement
between antisemitic statements and anti-Israel statements. While the range of antisemitic statements is 2–15% in Great Britain, it is much higher in the case of antiIsraeli statements (9–24%). The same pattern exists in Norway, but the level of
endorsement is higher for both antisemitic statements (range of 8–18%) and antiIsrael statements (between 25–32%). These differences may in part be due to the
fact that the wording of negative items concerning Israel is harsher in the British
compared to those in the Norwegian survey. What applies to the cognitive dimension of antisemitism can also be observed in regard to the emotional dimension of
anti-Jewish prejudice. Of the British respondents, 33% have a “very or somewhat
unfavourable” view of Israel (17% have a “very or somewhat favourable view”)
compared with only 5.4% harbouring a “very unfavourable or somewhat unfavourable” view of Jews, and only 6% declare that their sympathies lie with the
Israelis, while 18% lean on the side of the Palestinians. However, in general Staetsky characterises the attitude of the British population towards Israel “as one of
uncertainty or indifference, but among those who hold a view, people with sympathies toward the Palestinians are numerically dominant”.52 Uncertainty and
indifference are also characteristic of the attitude of the Norwegian respondents,
since 54% of them answered the question on which side they are in the conflict
between the Israelis and Palestinians with “impossible to say” or opt for “neither
side” (Figure 5.13). However, compared with the British respondents, the Norwegian respondents showed less indifference or uncertainty since nearly half of them
take sides with one of the conflicting parties (in Britain only 24%).
The proportion of British respondents agreeing to at least one anti-Israel statement is 47% higher than in the case of antisemitic statements (28%). This means
that half of the British population “agrees to some extent with at least one in the
eight anti-Israel statements”.53
In the Norwegian population, the difference between those agreeing to at least
one antisemitic statement (30.8%) and those agreeing to at least one anti-Israel
statement (40%) is much smaller. This may be partly due to the fact that in this
case the anti-Israel index consists of only two items, compared to eight in the British survey. It is surprising that Staetsky did not include the fact of this greater dissemination of anti-Israeli attitudes in his considerations as to why Jews perceive
widespread antisemitism. As the FRA Study has shown, many Jews evaluate negative comments about Israel – especially in the mass media – as an expression of
52. Ibid., 28. 76% do not declare their sympathy for one of the conflicting parties; in Norway the
proportion is much smaller: 46%.
53. Ibid., 30.
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
antisemitism.54 To explain the paradox with regard to the feelings among Norwegian Jews of rising antisemitism while at the same time the spread of antisemitic
attitudes among the Norwegian population decreased, this may be partly due to the
fact that anti-Israel attitudes are playing a role here. Yet, it is also possible that
internet communication and media have a greater influence on the Jewish perception than public opinion (see below).
8. CONCLUSIONS
Staetsky discusses these findings from a Jewish perspective. He states that even if
only 5% as in the British case, or 8% as in Norway can be labelled with the
extremely negative label “antisemite”, and while this label could not be used
indiscriminately in relation to the remaining quarter of the population, which
holds some antisemitic attitudes, the latter group nevertheless plays an important
role in the Jewish perception. Jews may not meet regularly with extreme antisemites, but they encounter people much more frequently who hold – and may sometimes even express – opinions about Jews or Israel that make Jews feel uncomfortable or even offended. In a single encounter, it is difficult for a Jewish individual
to assess whether a complete antisemitic worldview stands behind a single
expressed negative opinion toward Jews, or whether it is just an isolated opinion
that is only of minor importance to the person in question.55
In this circumstance, Staetsky explains the fact that while in many European
countries Jews continue to perceive widespread antisemitism, the number of pronounced antisemitic persons is not very high. While 30% of the population in Britain and 31.6% in Norway “holding potentially uncomfortable or upsetting views
from a Jewish perspective, anxieties among Jews about widespread antisemitism
become more understandable”.56 The chances of meeting a hard-core antisemitic
individual is about one in twenty in Britain, or one in about fourteen in Norway,
54. FRA, Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in EU Member States, Figure 5.3.
55. For the estimation of the spread of antisemitic or racial attitudes in the majority population,
however, the corresponding expectation of members of the minority also plays an important role.
As social psychological studies of intergroup contact show, “members of majority status groups
typically involve being perceived as prejudiced by individuals of lower status groups, whereas
the concern of members of minority status groups involve becoming the target of prejudice from
individuals of higher status groups”;” “Intergroup attitudes of minority group members are often
based in the anticipation of prejudice by majority group members” (Linda R. Tropp and Thomas
F. Pettigrew, “Relationships Between Intergroup Contact and Prejudice Among Minority and
Majority Status Groups”, Psychological Science 16, no. 12 (2005): 951–52).
56. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, p. 64.
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but it is about one in three if we refer to the diffusion of antisemitic ideas in the
populations of Britain and Norway.
If one considers what Staetsky has not done in his analysis, that anti-Israel attitudes are more widespread and some of them are also perceived by the Jews as antisemitic, then the likelihood of meeting an individual with strong anti-Israel attitudes
or a person who makes anti-Israel remarks increases even further. In the British case,
the probability of meeting a person with a strong anti-Israel opinion (9.2% of the
population) is almost one in ten, but it is one in two if we refer to the diffusion of
anti-Israel statements (56%). In Norway, the probability of meeting a person with a
strong anti-Israel opinion (21.5% of the population) is even one in five, but– like in
Britain – it is one in two if we refer to the diffusion of anti-Israel statements (53.4%).
With the concept of the elastic view, Daniel Staetsky offers an interesting and
at least a partial explanation for the gap between the Jewish perception of the dissemination of antisemitism and the number of convinced antisemites. This is
important for the public debate because it helps to better understand that there is
a difference between a small number of convinced antisemites and a larger number of people who harbour one or the other negative stereotype about Jews without
holding a negative attitude towards Jews.
However, the perception on the Jewish side is not determined solely by personal
contacts with persons making antisemitic remarks. The FRA study shows that the
communication on the internet and media coverage plays an especially big role
here.57 In order to explain the gap between Jewish perception of antisemitism and
the results of survey research, not only personal communication, but also the role
of public communication on the internet and in the media must be included. It is
not only the occurrence of antisemitic remarks experienced by Jews themselves,
but also the reporting on antisemitic occurrences, discussions about antisemitism
in Parliament, on talk shows, publications by the government or the police, and
even programs to combat antisemitism that greatly influence the perception of the
dissemination of antisemitism in society.
57. In the FRA Study, Discrimination and Hate Crimes against Jews”, figure 5.3, 75% of the
respondents in eight EU countries see antisemitism on the internet as a problem, 59% choose
antisemitism in the media, while 54% see antisemitic remarks in public space as a problem. In
2018 the second FRA survey, Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism, 21, Table 2, an even
larger majority of respondents in 12 EU member states consider antisemitism expressed online
as a problem in the country they live in. In the German survey Jüdische Perspektiven auf Antisemitismus in Deutschland by Hövermann et al., 87% of the respondents agree that antisemitism
on the World Wide Web and social networks is a concerning problem, and 84% agree that the
distorted media coverage about Israel is a concerning problem, while 74% agree that antisemitic
remarks in personal contacts (at school, at the work place etc.) are a concerning problem.
5. COUNTING ANTISEMITES VERSUS MEASURING ANTISEMITISM
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DOI: 10.18261/978-82-15-03468-3-2019-07
6.
Conspiracy Beliefs about Jews
and Muslims in Norway
ASBJØRN DYRENDAL
ABSTRACT Studies of conspiracy beliefs in Scandinavian countries have been few and
qualitative in nature. This chapter analyses recent surveys and gives tentative answers as to
how international research findings about conspiracy beliefs hold up in a Norwegian setting.
Some of the expected effects were found. Two surveys validate the five-item conspiracy mentality scale for Norway, a measure of the generalised propensity towards believing in conspiracy theories. Scores on conspiracy mentality predicted belief in single-item
conspiracy beliefs regarding Jews and Muslims, but the effect size was small. Conspiracy
stereotypes of Jews and Muslims were a contributing factor in a more general xenophobia and correlated positively with measures of social distance. The conspiracy stereotypes contributed to explaining differences in views on the legitimacy of violence
towards members of outgroups in general.
Contrary to expectations, anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs were more closely tied to
conspiracy mentality than antisemitic ones. With regard to the debate on whether
adherents of the political far left and far right believe in conspiracy theories more than
those of centrist and mainstream parties, the Norwegian left-wing adherents generally
scored lower on conspiracy beliefs about Jews and Muslims. Conspiracy theories were
for election winners: the populist right generally scored significantly higher than other
political orientations. The differences in scores were particularly strong for anti-Muslim
beliefs.
The analyses were run by adopting questions asked for other purposes. With the
exception of conspiracy mentality, scales were constructed by using those survey items
that were arguably approximate items to those in reliable measures. Further inquiries
should adapt established scales for more robust answers and in order to build reliable
models.
KEYWORDS Islamophobia | antisemitism | conspiracy mentality | conspiracy
stereotypes | conspiracy theories | conspiracy beliefs | Norway
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There exists, states social psychologist Roland Imhoff boldly, “an intrinsic affinity
between conspiratorial thinking and anti-Semitic ideology”.1 He argues that this
relation is specific to antisemitic ideology. Prejudicial attitudes towards Roma
(anti-Ziganism) and Muslims (“Islamoprejudice”2) do not have the same intrinsic
relation to conspiracy thinking. Imhoff’s conclusion is built on research findings
in several countries showing that antisemitism and a general propensity towards
conspiracy thinking correlate substantially, even when the former is measured
without reference to conspiracy beliefs, and the latter without reference to Jews.
The relatively strong relation between antisemitism and conspiracy mentality –
compared with prejudice against Muslims, for instance – has been confirmed by
studies on several regions. Is it also true for Norway?
Before we attempt to answer that question, we should ask why this kind of relation exists at all. There is an extensive literature on antisemitism and its tradition
of conspiracy theories. This chapter will draw on the findings of the evolving field
of conspiracy theory research, and primarily its social psychological branch.
Instead of concentrating on questions about history and tradition, this field has
looked at questions such as “what are conspiracy beliefs and how do they relate to
prejudice?” Here, the questions are more specifically about Norway. To begin
answering, I will first introduce some basic concepts.
2. CONSPIRACY THEORIES, CONSPIRACY MENTALITY, AND
CONSPIRACY STEREOTYPES
Humans are narrative creatures. We make up stories about the world as a way of
inhabiting it. These stories often serve as entertainment, but more generally, we
make stories to understand, communicate, and memorise. This is also true for conspiracy narratives – tales about hidden, intentional threats, and hidden, intentiondriven causes behind undesirable events. Narratives commonly dubbed “conspiracy theories” are typically speculative, driven, among other things, by overly sen1. Roland Imhoff, “Beyond (Right-Wing) Authoritarianism: Conspiracy Mentality as an Incremental Predictor of Prejudice”, in The Psychology of Conspiracy, ed. Michal Bilewicz, Aleksandra
Cichocka, and Wiktor Soral (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 125.
2. “Islamoprejudice” is a term minted in an attempt to differentiate between analytically different
sides to what is usually termed Islamophobia, underlining the difference between actual fear of
Islam and prejudice against Islam and Muslims in general. See Roland Imhoff and Julia Recker,
“Differentiating Islamophobia: Introducing a New Scale to Measure Islamoprejudice and
Secular Islam Critique”, Political Psychology 23, no. 2 (2012): 811–824.
6. CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY
sitive pattern perception and agency detection.3 Moreover, they often express an
underlying preference for conspiracy as explanation. Conspiracy belief is, in one
important manner, a “unitary” phenomenon. Belief in one conspiracy theory is
one of the best predictors of whether a person is likely to believe another, unrelated conspiracy theory.4 Context matters in making conspiracy theories seem
plausible or not. It works in two ways: threatening social situations raise levels of
suspicion, with attendant focus on hidden agency and patterns; and conspiracy
theories directed against groups that are already defined as suspicious form a context that predicts heightened belief.
Even considering context, however, some people are more prone to believe in
conspiracy theories than others. This is a robust observation that has led researchers to coin the concepts of “conspiracist mindset” or, more commonly used, “conspiracy mentality”.5 It is usually measured on a scale, asking about the propensity
to suspect powerful actors, and to ascribe intentional secrecy and hidden, sinister
acts to them. It is a measure of political, not abnormal, psychology. While very
high scores on conspiracy mentality are almost certainly associated with some
measure of psychological and social problems,6 the scale draws from common
cognitive capacities, emotions, and motivations. We all score somewhere along
the continuum, some higher than others, and as noted above, more of us will score
higher in specific situations that trigger the underlying motivations and capacities.
What kinds of motivation drive conspiracy beliefs? Social psychologists focus
on three overarching categories of motivation: epistemic, existential, and social.7
These are related. The epistemic dimension relates to understanding and being
able to explain what is going on, especially in chaotic or ambiguous, threatening
circumstances. The quest for understanding is both a social venture and an individual one. On the individual as well as the interpersonal level, it is existentially
important to feel that we understand and have some sort of explanation for ongoing events. Knowledge gives a feeling of relative control. Telling ourselves a narrative about how things really are may give a relative feeling of safety, or at least
3. Rob Brotherton, Suspicious Minds. Why We Believe Conspiracy Theories (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).
4. See for instance Brotherton, Suspicious Minds, 81–98.
5. Martin Bruder et al., “Measuring individual differences in generic beliefs in conspiracy theories
across cultures: Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire”, Frontiers in Psychology 4 (2013): 225,
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00225.
6. Daniel Freeman and Richard P. Bentall, “The concomitants of conspiracy concerns”, Social
Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 52 (2017): 592–604.
7. Karen M. Douglas, Robbie M. Sutton, and Aleksandra Cichocka, “The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories”, Current Directions in Psychological Science 26, no. 6 (2017): 538–542.
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of autonomy and agency. Rather than being thrown into chaos and anomie with no
way out, the conspiracy narrative tells us that there is some order to the world, and
that there are effective ways of acting intentionally within it.8
The social part of motivation to believe in conspiracy theories appears at several
levels. Conspiracy theories are “social knowledge”. They are constructed, narrated,
and used in social processes. They also typically have an intergroup dimension.9
Conspiracy theories form knowledge-claims as part of the same social processes as
rumour and gossip.10 This means that they contribute to constructing, maintaining,
and mobilising community. One of their functions is to manage group- and selfimage, and one way they do so is by exaggerating differences between ingroup and
outgroup. Conspiracy theories then typically present the outgroup as a cause of
social ills and a threat to the moral order constructed by the (good) ingroup. It is still
an open question as to whether this means that conspiracy beliefs are more common
at the far ends of the political left-right spectrum,11 more common only on the political far or populist right,12 or whether the degree of such beliefs are basically related
to one’s side being in or out of power.13 But while few data are available, there is
good theoretical and empirical reason to expect that higher scores on conspiracy
beliefs are associated with increased acceptance of violence as a legitimate tool of
politics.14 I will have a closer look at both these questions later in this chapter.
There are both individual and group differences in prevalence of conspiracy beliefs.
Both are partially tied to social situations. Conspiracy theories about outgroups are
typically tied to situations in which feelings about intergroup threats run higher and
8. There is, however, a growing body of evidence that attempts to use conspiracy theories thus tend
to fail, and rather lead to the aggravation of the problems they attempt to counter.
9. Jan-Willem van Prooijen and Paul A.M. van Lange, “The social dimension of conspiracy theories”, in Power, Politics and Paranoia: Why People are Suspicious of their Leaders, ed. JanWillem van Prooijen and Paul A.M. van Lange (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014), 237–253.
10. Nicholas DiFonzo, “Conspiracy Rumor Psychology”, in Conspiracy Theories and the People
Who Believe Them, ed. Joseph E. Uscinski (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019),
257–268.
11. Jan-Willem van Prooijen, André P. M. Krouwel, and Thomas V. Pollet, “Political extremism
predicts belief in conspiracy theories”, Social Psychological and Personality Science 6 (2015):
570–578.
12. J. Eric Oliver and Thomas J. Wood, Enchanted America. How Intuition and Reason Divide Our
Politics (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2018).
13. Joseph E. Uscinski and Joseph. M. Parent, American Conspiracy Theories (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2014).
14. J. M. Berger, Extremism (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 2018); Uscinski and Parent, American
Conspiracy Theories.
6. CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY
ingroup identification is less secure, leading to increased collective narcissism.15 Such
situations may lead to an increase in expressions of conspiracy stereotypes.16
Conspiracy stereotypes, as conceptualised by the Polish psychologists Miroslaw Kofta and Grzegor Sedek, have three central elements. The stereotyped outgroup is represented as committed to (1) obsessive, collective striving for domination; as (2) engaging in deceptive, conspiratorial action to achieve these goals;
and having (3) a high degree of group egoism. This sort of stereotype ascribes
exceptionally high group entitativity to the outgroup. In practice, it presents the
outgroup as a single entity, moreover an entity that is “a dangerous, potent, and
deceptive enemy”.17 The group level is central to conspiracy stereotypes. While
visible individuals and episodes may illustrate the stereotype, it covers the whole;
outgroup members are mere “subordinated executors” of the collective will.18
As measured by these three dimensions, conspiracy stereotypes are positively
related to both conspiracy mentality, and to series of specific conspiracy beliefs.19
Specific beliefs in conspiracy stereotypes tend to be positively related to conspiracy beliefs against some, but not all, other social groups. Conspiracy stereotype
beliefs are mainly related to those groups deemed to be strong or otherwise a
threat,20 and less to minorities and other socially devalued groups.21 Belief in
15. Aleksandra Cichocka et al., “Grandiose delusions: Collective narcissism, secure in-group identification, and belief in conspiracies”, in The Psychology of Conspiracy, ed. Michal Bilewicz,
Aleksandra Cichocka, and Wiktor Soral (New York, NY: Routledge 2015), 23–41.
16. Miroslaw Kofta and Grzegorz Sedek, “Conspiracy Stereotypes of Jews under Systemic Transformation in Poland”, International Journal of Sociology 35, no. 1 (2005): 40–64.
17. Kofta and Sedek, “Conspiracy Stereotypes”, 42.
18. (Ibid.)
19. Monika Grzesiak-Feldman, “The relationship between conspiracy beliefs about events, conspiracy stereotypes and prejudice towards out-groupers” (Conspiracy Theory Conference, University of Miami, 2015).
20. Kofta and Sedek’s concept will have us focus on groups deemed powerful. It is a both common
and logical assumption that conspiracy beliefs against outgroups target those who are deemed
powerful and thus a threat. This is clearly not always the case, as we see in examples of conspiracy beliefs about slaves in the 18th-century British colonies or about LGBTQ in the current
era. Often more elaborate conspiracy theories will tie weaker outgroups to a more powerful
enemy, such as Jews, in e.g., “gypsy crime” conspiracy narratives and anti-immigration theories,
but in less elaborate versions, notions of lesser conspiracy (“fomenting slave rebellion”, “recruiting our youth to homosexuality”, “organised crime syndicate”) are quite common.
21. Monika Grzesiak-Feldman and Anna Ejsmont, “Paranoia and conspiracy thinking of Jews, Germans, Arabs, and Russians in a Polish sample”, Psychological Reports 102 (2008): 884–886;
Monika Grzesiak-Feldman and Herbert Suszek, “Conspiracy stereotyping and perceptions of
group entitativity of Jews, Germans, Arabs, and Homosexuals among Polish students”, Psychological Reports 102 (2008): 755–758.
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these stereotypes also correlate positively to non-conspiratorial prejudices and to
measures of social distance against the same groups.22
The concept of conspiracy stereotypes was built on the tradition of antisemitic
conspiracy theories where Jews control vast wealth and hidden networks in a
search for world domination. Power is central to the concept as it has been used.
When Imhoff concluded that there is an “intrinsic affinity between conspirational
thinking and anti-Semitic ideology”,23 it was also based on the strength of association between conspiracy mentality and prejudice against outgroups societies consider to be powerful.24 When the same measure was found to be either weakly
related or not at all related to prejudice against Muslims or anti-Ziganism, this
may be explained by the fact that these groups were not widely seen as powerful,
and accordingly a threat, in the same sense. However, outgroup stereotypes vary,
and they may include ideas about conspiracy and high group entitativity without
necessarily involving vast power, as in conspiracy theories about LGBTQ. Outgroup stereotypes also change, as do social (“folk”) threat assessments.
This potentially calls into question the special relation between conspiracy
mentality and antisemitism stated in the opening quote. Conspiracy mentality as
measured by the relevant scale centres on suspicions directed upwards towards
e.g. authorities and big businesses. It measures suspicion that the powerful are
secretly up to no good. The imaginary Jews of Kofta and Sedek’s conspiracy stereotypes are part of this elite. Their elite status is why scores on antisemitism correlate so well with conspiracy mentality. But if we do not take the attribution of
elite status and powerful threat for granted, this relation could change. If Jews are
regarded as a less powerful threat and Muslims as a more powerful one, it seems
reasonable to expect that the relative relations between prejudice and conspiracy
mentality changes. If we take threat assessment as the primary driver and conspiracy narratives as consequences, an increase or decrease in feelings of being threatened should influence levels of conspiracy beliefs, but they should also influence
the correlation between specific conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy mentality. An
increased belief in the conspiracy theory about Muslims “taking over” should correlate with them being seen as more powerful and threatening. As a consequence,
the general measure of conspiracy mentality should predict prejudice against
22. Michal Bilewicz et al., “Harmful ideas. The structure and consequences of anti-Semitic beliefs
in Poland”, Political Psychology 34 (2013): 821–839; Grzesiak-Feldman, “Relationship between conspiracy beliefs;” Kofta and Sedek, “Conspiracy Stereotypes”.
23. Imhoff, “Beyond (Right-Wing) Authoritarianism”, 125.
24. See Roland Imhoff and Martin Bruder, “Speaking (Un-)Truth to Power: Conspiracy Mentality
as a Generalised Political Attitude”, European Journal of Personality 28 (2014): 25–43.
6. CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY
Muslims equally well as – perhaps in some cases even better than – it predicts antisemitism.
Some recent results suggest that this may be the case. While using a less powerfocused measure of conspiracy mentality than the best established scales, Dyrendal et al. found only weak relations of conspiracy mentality to conspiracy stereotypes about Jews and Muslims among (mostly) American Neopagans.25 Moreover, even though both associations were weak, the correlation was higher for antiMuslim conspiracy belief.
No such study has been conducted for Norway. As mentioned above, the
research on both conspiracy beliefs and the intersection of conspiracy theory and
prejudice in Norway has so far been wholly qualitative.26 While there are ongoing
projects that attempt to remedy this, no studies have yet been completed. This
chapter is therefore exploratory, and I will mostly be making use of data gathered
for other purposes and in different research designs. In the following, we will see
which, if any, of the theoretically expected patterns hold up. But given that the
data were gathered for other purposes, which patterns could we look for?
3. FOUR SURVEYS, MEASURES AND GOALS
Like the chapters by Bergmann and Hellevik in the current volume, this chapter
uses data from the surveys conducted by the Center for Holocaust and Minority
Studies (CHM) in 2011 and 2017.27 In addition, it uses data from wave 8 (2017)
of the Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP-8),28 and from a 2016 student survey conducted at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU).29 The
25. Asbjørn Dyrendal, Leif E. O. Kennair, and James R. Lewis, “Conspiracy Mentality and Paranormal Beliefs Predict Conspiracy Beliefs, but not Conspiracy Stereotypes. Results from the Pagan
III Survey”, International Journal for the Study of New Religions 8, no. 1 (2017): 73–97.
26. Asbjørn Dyrendal, “Conspiracy theory research in and about Norway”, COST Action 15101
internal paper (2017).
27. For details on these surveys, see Hellevik’s introductory chapter on survey data, “Antisemitism
and Islamophobia in Norway”; Christhard Hoffmann, Øivind Kopperud, and Vibeke Moe, eds.,
Antisemitism in Norway? The Attitudes of the Norwegian Population towards Jews and other
Minorities (Oslo: Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, 2012); and
Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway
2017 (Oslo: Center for the Study of Holocaust and Religious Minorities, 2017).
28. The Norwegian Citizen Panel conducts web-based surveys “of Norwegians’ opinions toward
important societal matters”. It is run by four departments at the University of Bergen and the
Rokkan Center. See https://www.uib.no/en/citizen#.
29. Participants in NCP-8; N = 2133, NTNU-2016; N = 891.
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ASBJØRN DYRENDAL | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
student survey draws on a convenience sample of students from most of NTNU’s
campuses; the others use representative population samples.
The NCP-8 and NTNU surveys contain items that were expressly designed with
the purpose of testing hypotheses about conspiracy beliefs. This was not a topic in
itself for the CHM surveys. The first survey, CHM-2011, has only one explicit
conspiracy item: “World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish
interests”. The three other surveys each have one conspiracy theory item about
Muslims and one about Jews. In addition, the NCP-8 and the NTNU 2016 surveys
also include an internationally validated, five-item measure of conspiracy mentality. The latter also asks about a host of unrelated conspiracy theories. Taken
together this allows for taking a closer look at the relation between the antisemitic
and anti-Muslim conspiracy items. It will also give an indication about the relation
of these beliefs to a general propensity towards conspiracy thinking. The theory
of an underlying conspiracy mentality predicts a positive correlation between conspiracy beliefs. We can test both the construct and its prediction of positive correlation between beliefs directly from data in CHM-2017, NCP-8, and NTNU-2016.
Each of the surveys covers political affiliation in some way, mainly through
questions about past and planned electoral behaviour. This facilitates comparison
on whether political affiliation plays a role, and if so, which political affiliation
plays a larger role for which conspiracy belief – if it differs (as expected). As mentioned above, international research also gives us reason to expect the conspiracy
items in CHM-2017 to correlate positively with items about the legitimacy of violence against Jews and Muslims.
While the concept of conspiracy stereotypes was not explicitly involved in the
design of the CHM-surveys, the surveys nevertheless ask questions relevant to the
concept, implicitly or explicitly asking about group egoism and obsession about
power as well as conspiratorial behaviour. These are, indeed, part of the scales of
prejudice employed by Hellevik and Bergmann.30 Even though it is ad hoc, this
theoretically opens the possibility for testing the predictions related above on a
“poor man’s version” of conspiracy stereotypes. However, there are some preconditions. The conspiracy items should correlate positively with the other theoretically related prejudices (egoism, power obsession, etc.) at a high enough level so
they combine into an internally consistent, acceptable scale.31 If they do, it is possible to get an idea about the degree to which Norwegian findings correspond to
those from countries whose societies differ greatly from Norway.
30. See Hellevik’s and Bergmann’s contributions to this volume.
31. Rule of thumb says Cronbach’s alpha should be 0.7 or higher.
6. CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY
Most of the relevant questions are scored on a Likert-like scale, typically 1–5
for the CHM-surveys and 1–7 for NCP-8 and NTNU-2016. In almost all
instances, I have chosen to score “don’t know/impossible to answer” as a midpoint, thereby interpreting the answers along a “probability of truth” continuum.
As Bergmann’s analyses show,32 there is no clear tendency of the “impossible to
answer” responses going in any particular direction, such as hiding open expressions of antisemitism. They thus seem to be true midpoints.33 I have made one
exception: when scoring the items on social distance, I only made use of respondents who chose to state a preference for or against having the outgroups in their
neighbourhood or circles of friends. The choice was made pre-analyses, on consideration that this group of questions seems to call even more for respondents’
reflections on the specific qualities of the hypothetical individual (e.g. neighbour)
in question.
All scales were computed as mean scores of all the items mentioned.
4. ITEMS AND LEVELS OF CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS AND
MUSLIMS
The first survey, CHM-2011, explored levels of antisemitic attitudes. Among the
statements respondents were asked to assess as fitting or not fitting to their own
opinion, there was one conspiracy item: “World Jewry is working behind the
scenes to promote Jewish interests”. This was repeated in 2017, when items about
prejudice against Muslims were added. Again there was one conspiracy item:
“Muslims want to take over Europe”. The conspiracy item about Muslims in NCP8 addressed the same notion in more detail (“Muslims participate in organised,
religiously based lies to hide a plan for societal takeover”.). The item about Jews
in the same survey was “American politics is controlled by Israel”.34
In the student survey (NTNU-2016), the conspiracy item about Muslims was
the same as in NCP-8. The antisemitic conspiracy theory was reverse-phrased and
related explicitly to group stereotype: “Jews are not more likely to engage in conspiracy than others”. This item created some problems that need to be discussed
briefly.
32. Bergmann, “Counting Antisemites versus measuring Antisemitism”, this volume.
33. I have also, separately, run most of the analyses with the “don’t know”/“impossible to answer”
responses left out. As suspected, this tends only to make the effect of e.g. the conspiracy items
stronger, while leaving the direction, etc., intact.
34. For the thinking behind this item, see Pierre-André Taguieff, Rising from the Muck. The New
Anti-Semitism in Europe (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004).
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While pre-tests on students at master level had discovered no problem with the
item, in practice it turned out that the phrasing was unclear. Some of it was related
to miscalculation of the time needed to complete the full questionnaire. Mean time
of completion increased by around 50% when most of the students were in their
first year. This item came towards the very end of the survey, when students were
pressed for time. I was contacted by several students who said they had first misread the item as asserting the opposite, and two students explicitly stated that
because of this misreading they had answered the item in a misleading manner.
The first look at the data also showed a disproportionate response of (especially
complete) disagreement with the statement. Since there was no pattern to explain
the responses otherwise, it was concluded that misreading was the likely explanation. Thus we recalculated responses to fit the response style of the students in the
following manner: When responses to the items immediately before and after
were fully or almost fully negative to the conspiracy theory and responses to the
antisemitic item that were positive, were recalculated to fit the response style (i.e.
7=1, 6=2, etc.), and vice versa. While obviously not optimal, the resulting changes
made responses fit the larger pattern better, and as we shall see, makes sense
within the larger set of investigations.
So what proportion of Norwegian respondents express belief in the conspiracy
theories presented to them? Mean response is on the side of disbelief. This is very
clear in the student survey and NCP-8, where the graph is highly left-skewed by
the proportion of answers in the category of “disagree”. The surveys conducted by
the Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies stand out in that these surveys show
a normal distribution, with “impossible to answer” the most popular response for
all items. Since the items vary in how they are framed, and two surveys were
scored on 1–5 scales and two on 1–7 scales, they are not fully comparable, but if
we look at those who score highest, “strongly agree”, we get an impression of
those who really want to express belief.
TABLE 6.1. Frequency of strongly agree with conspiracy items
Survey
Antisemitic
Islamophobic
CHM-2011
3.9%
–
CHM-2017
3.6%
12.9%
NCP-8
4.0%
9.5%
NTNU-2016
1.7%
1.8%
6. CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY
We see some notable differences between antisemitic and anti-Muslim conspiracy
beliefs. The Muslim conspiracy clearly has more believers than the Jewish conspiracy does, except for in the student survey. This may be partially accounted for
by three things: (1) the students in question are the Utøya generation, and the conspiracy item is known as Breivik’s partial motivation (we also had Breivik’s antiLabour belief covered); (2) anti-Muslim attitudes is a known, partisan issue for the
right, and the student sample was highly left-leaning; (3) the students are students,
thus both with regard to age and level of education, we would expect a negative
effect on belief in conspiracy theories compared to weighted data from representative samples.
There is also a difference in the level of belief between CHM-2017 and NCP-8
which may not be accounted for by the different Likert scales used, and the difference only grows as we calculate the total on the “belief” side. It seems reasonable
to suspect that the different, more elaborate framing of conspiracy in NCP-8 made
more respondents negative.
5. CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND CONSPIRACY MENTALITY IN THE
SURVEYS
As noted in the introduction, those who believe in one conspiracy theory tend to
believe in more than one, and those who dislike one outgroup also tend to dislike
more than one. Both would lead us to expect that conspiracy beliefs about Jews
and Muslims should correlate. We also have some reason to expect that it could be
otherwise. Political and religious ideologies may select certain groups as allies or
as what J. M. Berger calls “eligible in-groups”.35 To the degree such views of the
outgroups are partisan issues, it could reduce or remove an expected correlation.
For instance, any full-on identification of Jews with Israel could activate political
identities strongly invested in the Israel-Palestine conflict as well as religious
identities, making one group an ally and the other the enemy. So what do we see
in the data?
Briefly put, we find that one conspiracy belief about an outgroup predicts belief
in the other. Using weighted data, the conspiracy items about Jews and Muslims
in CHM-2017 correlate in the medium range.36 We find exactly the same correlation size for NCP-8, again using weighted data, correcting for gender, age, education,
35. Berger, Extremism.
36. r = 0.33; p < 0.001
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and county of habitation. The student sample gives a correlation size that is effectively the same.37
As predicted by theory and previous research in other countries, we do find a
positive correlation between the conspiracy beliefs. While the items vary somewhat between the surveys, the relation between them is stable, suggesting that
they tap into similar underlying phenomena. Moreover, the correlation is of a
moderate, rather than small size. Considering only these two variables, we have
“accounted for” between 11–13% of their shared variance.
I say “accounted for” because the relation between scores on the conspiracy
items are obviously not explained merely by pointing to the correlations. The correlations show that there is something here that underlying factors might explain.
Previous research says a generalised propensity to conspiracy thinking – conspiracy mentality – should be one such factor. However, we also have competing
hypotheses about how well the measures we use for conspiracy mentality should
do in explaining conspiracy beliefs about Jews and Muslims. To the degree the relevant respondents just dislike (certain) minorities, including Jews and Muslims, at
face value it is not apparent that conspiracy mentality should correspond to any
significant degree. Certainly, a general dislike might predispose respondents to
also ascribe conspiratorial activity on the part of the outgroup, but then we would
expect correlation to other conspiracy beliefs to fall, or even reverse direction.38
No measure of conspiracy mentality has previously been employed in a Norwegian (or Scandinavian) setting. The 5-item measure of conspiracy mentality used
in NCP-8 and NTNU-2016 is geared towards shadowy and powerful actors. Both
surveys have at least one conspiracy item in addition to the two about Jews and
Muslims. This should make it possible to validate the scale for Norway, and in
addition test its power to predict conspiracy beliefs about the two groups. The
degree of correlation with other conspiracy beliefs may also indicate something
about whether the items primarily express correlation with other conspiracy theories and if so, what kind of conspiracy beliefs they are. If our items of interest share
more than surface characteristics with unrelated conspiracy items, they should
correlate positively. If the measure of conspiracy mentality is valid, the anti-
37. r = 0.36, p < 0.001. As explained above, the item about conspiracy belief about Jews in NTNU2016 is problematic. That the correlation size here is effectively the same as in the other surveys
indicates that the item was handled in a manner that does little to distort the underlying relations.
38. Cf. Michael J. Wood and Debra Gray, “Right-wing authoritarianism as a predictor of pro-establishment versus antiestablishment conspiracy theories”, Personality and Individual Differences
138 (2019): 163–166.
6. CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY
Jewish and anti-Muslim items should correlate well with it if the respective group
is seen as powerful, but less if it is seen as less powerful.39
The 5-item scale of conspiracy mentality showed good reliability in both NCP8 and NTNU-2016,40 and all items loaded on one factor. Both surveys also show
a positive correlation between conspiracy mentality and conspiracy beliefs about
Jews and Muslims. The correlation size is small, and only at its highest reaches
“almost medium” size.41 As mentioned above, this is what we would expect if
respondents do not see Jews and Muslims as particularly powerful. An alternative
hypothesis is that conspiracy beliefs about Jews and Muslims in the Norwegian
setting do not share much with generalised tendencies towards conspiracy thinking of any kind. This was what Dyrendal et al. found earlier for American Neopagans: the items about Jews and Muslims did not correlate with other conspiracy
items at the level of other intercorrelations. Only the item about Muslims reached
even the level of “low” correlation with conspiracy mentality, and anti-egalitarianism and political position explained more of the variance on conspiracy beliefs
about Jews and Muslims than conspiracy mentality did.42 In the NTNU student
survey, however, scores on the anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim items correlate highly
with mean scores on 14 other conspiracy theories.43 This indicates that the antiJewish and anti-Muslim conspiracy items are partially explained by one or more
underlying factors of generalised conspiracy belief, including those theories that
explicitly address conspiracy from above.44
These survey results also allow for tentatively answering the introductory question: will the relative strength of the relation between antisemitism, Islamophobia
and conspiracy mentality be the same in Norway as that found elsewhere? The
answer seems to be “no”. In both surveys, the measures of conspiracy mentality
correlate higher with the item about Muslims than it does with the one about Jews.
To the degree we can trust Imhoff and Bruder’s results,45 this would indicate that
Norwegians tend to consider Jews less powerful and threatening than Muslims.
39. Imhoff and Bruder, “Speaking (Un)Truth”; cf. Dyrendal, Kennair, and Lewis, “Conspiracy
Mentality and Paranormal Beliefs”.
40. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83 and 0.86, p < 0.001
41. R ranges from 0.18–0.29.
42. Dyrendal, Kennair, and Lewis, “Conspiracy Mentality and Paranormal Beliefs”.
43. R > 0.5, p < 0.001
44. Other conspiracy items in these surveys, specifically those implicating governments and big
business, correlate more highly with conspiracy mentality. This is as it should be, since these
items cover more specific theories along the general lines asked about in the measures of conspiracy mentality.
45. Imhoff and Bruder, “Speaking (Un)Truth”.
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So far, we have looked only at single items of anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim conspiracy beliefs. We do not have full data related to our questions about conspiracy
stereotypes, but we do have some data that could speak to our questions: the ones
from the two CHM surveys, and particularly CHM-2017.
6. CONSPIRACY STEREOTYPES OF JEWS AND MUSLIMS: MEASURES
AND CORRELATIONS
There is no single Norwegian survey or experiment addressing the topic of conspiracy stereotypes as theorised by Kofta and Sedek explicitly.46 However, in the
first survey conducted by the Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies in 2011,
six out of the ten statements about Jews are relevant to conspiracy stereotypes. We
remember that conspiracy stereotypes typically presented prejudice along three
dimensions: striving for domination, conspiracy, and high group egoism. The survey presented the following six propositions for participants to evaluate:
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
Jews consider themselves to be better than others.
World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests.
Jews have enriched themselves at the expense of others.
Jews have too much influence on the global economy.
Jews have too much influence on US foreign policy.
Jews have always caused problems in the countries in which they live.
Items one, two and six are tied clearly to group egoism, number two explicitly also
to conspiracy. Items three, four, and five are tied to (successful) striving for domination, and they can be implicitly tied to conspiracy. The items do not divide specifically into the three dimensions mentioned by Kofta and Sedek. However, the
dimensions blend into each other both explicitly, as in item two above, and more
implicitly, by drawing on cultural stereotypes. The listing of the items thus allows
for each to prime respondents to react to stereotypes they may already know. Do
they scale into a single scale for conspiracy stereotype, with or without our
explicit conspiracy item?
The answer is yes, they do. The different items correlate highly; the only item
generally falling (just) below r > 0.5 with other components is the one about US
foreign policy.47 Using six items, the internal validity shows as Cronbach’s alpha
46. Kofta and Sedek, “Conspiracy Mentality”.
47. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was 0.87, Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (p < 0.001).
6. CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY
of 0.85, and if we delete the explicit conspiracy item, it only falls to 0.82. Principal
component analysis showed only one component with Eigenvalue above one. This
was true also for CHM-2017, where Cronbach’s alpha was 0.87 for six items and
0.84 for five.
The items about Muslims that were first included in CHM-2017 are less suited
to the theoretical formulations of conspiracy stereotypes based on classical antisemitism. Arguably, and again before looking at the data, there are four items that
theoretically fit into a reasonable test of similar conspiracy stereotypes:
Muslims consider themselves morally superior to others
Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture
◗ Muslims want to take over Europe
◗ Muslims are more violent than others
◗
◗
None of the items are optimal for measuring conspiracy stereotypes after the
model of antisemitic conspiracism.48 Item three is the closest to an explicit appeal
to conspiracy here. With item three and four, it also addresses “striving for domination”. Arguably, item one addresses group egoism. The four items show remarkable consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha at 0.9. Intercorrelations are high, ranging
from r at 0.66 to 0.77. Principal component analysis showed only one component
(i.e. with Eigenvalue above one). The correlation between conspiracy stereotypes
of Jews and Muslims is medium-sized and positive, just as it was for the single
conspiracy items.49
Above, I have operated with the items that seem most directly relevant to the
concept of conspiracy stereotypes. However, the scales could equally have taken
into account all the negative stereotype-based items for each: factor analysis show
that both the seven negative items about Jews and the nine negative items about
Muslims (one reverse-phrased) load on a single component. The intercorrelations
for the prejudice items about Muslims are so high that it almost seems like one has
asked the same question over and over. Cronbach’s alpha for anti-Muslim prejudices was 0.94;50 for antisemitism 0.88. From this observation alone, it seems
likely that “conspiracy” is a factor in xenophobic prejudices as just one more
48. Since stereotypes vary, one may argue that they should not be exactly the same.
49. r = 0.35
50. Again, several of the items used in CHM-2017 are related to, but not identical with the ones
used to construct the scale for “Islamoprejudice” (see Imhoff and Recker, Differentiating Islamophobia). Alone, the items on the cognitive dimension of Islamophobia should not be mistaken for the whole, thus my choice of a different term here.
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negative trait; negatively viewed outgroups are seen as also conspiring. With that
caveat, in the following analyses we shall nevertheless continue to use scales
based only on items that should theoretically be part of conspiracy stereotypes.
7. CONSPIRACY STEREOTYPES, SOCIAL DISTANCE, AND THE
LEGITIMACY OF VIOLENCE
One of the predictions from previous research was that conspiracy stereotypes
should predict social distance not only to the group in question, but also to other
outgroups, especially those of a similar social status.51 This holds for the Norwegian data as well. Scores on our measure for conspiracy stereotypes typically correlate positively with social distance to all groups in the questionnaire: Catholics,
Americans, Poles, Roma, Jews, Muslims, and Somalis. There was one exception.
Conspiracy stereotypes about Muslims did not correlate at a significant level with
disliking having American neighbours. All other correlations were significant.52
The correlations were, as expected, highest with the group in question. Conspiracy stereotypes about Jews correlated most strongly with disliking Jews as neighbours or in the circle of friends, and, stereotypes about Muslims social distance
towards Muslims. The latter showed a large effect.
TABLE 6.2. Pearson Correlation Matrix Conspiracy Stereotypes and Social Distance
1. Antisemitic CS
1
2
2. AntiMuslim
CS
3. Dislike
Jews as
neighbours
4. Dislike
Jews
among
friends
4. Dislike
Muslims as
neighbours
4. Dislike
Muslims
among
friends
.35***
.39***
.42***
.21***
.22***
.24***
.28***
.63***
.63***
***p < 0.001
If we look further, conspiracy stereotypes about Muslims predicted social distance
to denigrated social groups strongly (i.e. Roma, r = 0.53; Somali, r = 0.58). It predicted social distance to groups of higher status and those of lower socio-cultural
51. Grzesiak-Feldman, “Relationship between conspiracy beliefs”.
52. As all correlations mentioned in this article (unless otherwise noted), it was significant at p <
0.001.
6. CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY
difference less well.53 The effect on social distance towards Jews was relatively
weak, only just above the distance towards Catholics.
Conspiracy stereotypes about Jews also showed a general effect on social distance, but the effect was weaker and more specific to distance towards Jews. All
other correlation sizes were small.54
One of the main reasons for the (almost) consistently significant, positive correlations was the high degree of intercorrelation of scores on social distance.
Those who dislike contact with one outgroup were more likely to dislike contact
with any other outgroup. Conspiracy stereotypes about Jews and Muslims thus
seem to be a contributing factor in a more general xenophobia.55 Especially with
regard to the measure we have used for conspiracy stereotypes about Muslims, the
relation to xenophobia seems strong.56
Xenophobia is tied to both violent behaviour and attitudes that condone violence. As noted in the introduction, conspiracy beliefs in general also seem to predict views that violence can be a legitimate form of political behaviour.57 That
finding was, however, from the United States alone, and it is uncertain how well
this transfers over to a very different political culture, such as the Norwegian. The
2017 CHM survey asks Norwegians directly whether violence against Jews or
Muslims can be legitimate, considering terrorism/Israeli behaviour against Palestinians. Taken on their own, the single questions show the expected pattern: conspiracy beliefs show a moderate, positive correlation with support for violence.
This is a general effect. Belief in the antisemitic conspiracy item correlates positively with support for violence against Jews, but it also correlates with support
for violence against Muslims. We see the same general relation for conspiracy
belief about Muslims.
53.
54.
55.
56.
E.g., Polish, but not Americans, and Catholics only at r ≈ 0.2
R ranged from 0.14 to 0.28
See Hellevik, “Antisemitism and Islamophobia”, this volume, for more on this.
This would not be surprising since intergroup conspiracy theories tend to add to prejudice across
outgroups; see Daniel Jolley, Rose Meleady, and Karen M. Douglas, “Exposure to intergroup
conspiracy theories promotes prejudice which spreads across groups”, British Journal of
Psychology (2019).
57. Uscinski & Parent, American Conspiracy Theories.
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TABLE 6.3. Pearson Correlation Matrix, Conspiracy Beliefs and Support for Violence
1. Antisemitic
CT
1
2
3
2. Anti-Muslim
CT
3. Support for
violence against
Jews
4. Support for
violence against
Muslims
.33***
.35***
.31***
.28***
.46***
.41***
4
***p < 0.001
If we exchange the single items with the scales for conspiracy stereotypes, some
of the “noise” is reduced. This results in a slightly increased correlation with support for violence against the “conspirator” group and a slight decrease in correlation with support for violence against the other group. However, there seems to be
a general dimension of finding retributive violence legitimate. Support for violence against one group is the best predictor for support of violence against the
other.58
8. CONSPIRACY BELIEFS AND IDEOLOGY: PARTY-POLITICAL
AFFILIATION
Specific conspiracy beliefs should vary according to party political affiliation.
Conspiracy theories do, after all, address different culprits as causes of the world’s
(or “our”) ills. Moreover, the trend is that those whose political party are out of
power should be more vulnerable in general to conspiracy beliefs than those in
power.59 However, theories about outgroups may not be similarly vulnerable to
being in or out of power. Specifically, populists and extremists should be less
influenced, perhaps even be encouraged in such beliefs by power. What do we see
in the Norwegian data?
58. Regression analysis confirms the impression: a general support for violence seems to lie behind
most of the effect. Using only these factors, support for violence against the other contributes
most to a combined R2 of 0.23 for violence against Jews, and R2 of 0.3 for violence against
Muslims, but conspiracy beliefs contribute separately in both cases. For a broader discussion,
see the section on violence in Bergmann, “Counting Antisemites”, this volume.
59. Uscinski and Parent, American Conspiracy Theories.
6. CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY
It is quite clear that the framing of the antisemitic conspiracy items varies
enough to appeal somewhat differently between the surveys. There is some consistency: for all the representative samples, those who vote for the Christian Democratic Party score lowest on the explicit conspiracy item, and the mean score for
all parties is below the “don’t know” value. At the other end, the Progress Party
voters score highest. Although still unbelieving at the mean value, there is a large
difference (d ≈ 1) between them and the Christian Democrats in both CHM surveys. This difference is somewhat smaller when we use the broader measure of
the conspiracy stereotype. The differences between the parties, which generally
are not big, smooth out more. What we do not really see is a left-right difference.
The voters of Socialist Left, less a radical-left party than a competing, social democratic party to the left of Labour, scores at about the same level as Christian Democratic Party voters, while voters for Red, a far-left socialist party, built on the
ruins of an ex-Maoist communist party, scores at about the same level as the Conservative party. When we use the conspiracy stereotype, the leftists go further into
disbelief, as do the Progress Party voters, while those voting for Christian Democrats score slightly higher. Overall, there is something of a consensus of disbelief
in Jewish conspiracy in these surveys.
Those who vote for the largely rurally based Centre Party score at about the
level of voters of the Conservative party and Labour in the CHM surveys. In NCP8, they score highest, while Christian Democratic Party voters again score lowest.
Again, the difference is large (d ≈ 1), but again, no party’s voters have a mean
score on the side of belief. All are on the side of disbelief in the conspiracy. This
repeats itself in the student survey. Even though we can observe some middle to
large differences between political party preferences, disbelief in the Jewish conspiracy is a consensus position. This is not true for the Muslim conspiracy theory.
In CHM-2017, there is a clear left-right divide with regard to belief in the antiMuslim conspiracy item. The voters of the Progress Party score highest, and at a
mean of 3.89, the score is clearly into the realm of belief. The voters of the two
leftist parties score lowest, at 1.67 and 1.52, making for a very large difference
between the left and right (d = 2.1 to the Socialist Left, larger for Red). This means
that given a random selection from either group, one is all but guaranteed (> 90%)
that a Progress Party voter will score higher than one voting for the Socialist Left.
Moreover, the relation seems relatively linear, with voters of the Conservative
Party (3.02) and two of the old “centre” block following the Progress Party. This
time, when we use the conspiracy stereotype scale, the differences become larger,
not smaller. Standard deviations become smaller, and scores on the right rise while
they fall on the left.
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We find similar results in NCP-8, where those who vote for the leftist parties
again score lowest. Voters for the Green party, which with the Liberal Party voters
also scored very low in CHM-2017, score at the level of the leftist parties with
regard to the conspiracy items. The differences are large, but not quite as big as
they were in CHM-2017. In the student survey, the tendency is the same, but the
effects are smaller and disagreement with the items more universal.
Overall, we see an interesting pattern, where the political left tends to score
slightly – but often not significantly – higher on the conspiracy item about Jews
than they do on the one for Muslims. The opposite is true for those on the political
right, but here the difference is often large. Taken as a whole, the left scores lower
on both conspiracy items than the right, and only voters for Red (in NCP-8) come
close to scoring at the top on the antisemitic item. Since the item in NCP-8 was
formulated with the explicit intention of appealing most to the far left, using a
combination of complaints observed earlier among conspiracist segments of the
far left, it is perhaps more surprising that other parties still scored higher.
When we move our attention to the views on legitimacy of violence (CHM2017), we observe something similar. There is a clear consensus in that terrorism,
state-sponsored or not, is not seen as a legitimate excuse for violence against innocents by voters of any party. However, the left is least prone to seeing violence as
legitimate, with “realist” Conservative and Labour voters closest behind the populist Progress Party at the top of the list. There is a clear difference between socialdemocratic left and populist right in attitudes about violence against both Muslims
(d = 1.09) and against Jews (d = 0.7), even though mean scores are solidly on the
side of violence being illegitimate for all parties.
For all the differences between voters, disbelief in a Jewish conspiracy is also
the consensus position at the aggregate level for each political party. This is not
true for allegations about Muslim conspiracy. This is clearly a divisive, partisan
issue.
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The findings in this chapter should be interpreted with some caution. We have
seen that the discussion is based mostly on adapting survey data for purposes to
which they were not primarily intended. The conspiracy items about Jews and
Muslims suffer from the fact that there is only one of each in the three surveys that
include both. As noted by Hellevik,60 a combination of several valid items would
60. Hellevik, “Antisemitism and Islamophobia”, this volume.
6. CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY
reduce noise and give us more solid ground on which to stand when analysing the
data.
The survey material we have examined in this chapter goes some way to
strengthening a number of previous observations. We have seen that conspiracy
beliefs about outgroups generally do predict increased social distance to the outgroup and increased support for violence as a political tool. We have also seen that
measures of conspiracy mentality predict conspiracy beliefs about both Jews and
Muslims, and that both these conspiracy beliefs predict increased belief in other
conspiracy theories.
On the surface, this gives us some strange talking points: the more one believes
in conspiracy theories about Jewish world domination, the more likely one is to
think that violence against Muslims is legitimate. The more one believes Muslims
are trying to take control, the more likely one is to believe Jews are misusing the
Holocaust.61 This is, obviously, because conspiracy beliefs predict increased
belief in other conspiracy theories of a similar kind. Furthermore, because conspiracy beliefs are tied to other, underlying factors, it is as expected that when
turned around, we also note that the more negative people are to refugees, the
more they express belief in conspiracy theories. In CHM-2017, those who think
we cannot afford to help refugees are moderately more likely to believe in conspiracy theories about Jews (d = 0.55), and much more likely to believe in conspiracy theories about Muslims (d = 1.51), than those who think we can afford to
do so. Conspiracy beliefs about outgroups express as well as contribute to a more
general xenophobia, and agreeing to conspiracy beliefs is also a way of justifying
the xenophobia.
Other results do not fit quite as well into the expected pattern. International
research into conspiracy thinking and antisemitism has noted that there is an
intrinsic affinity between them that we do not find for prejudice against other
social groups. As we have seen, there is also such an affinity in the Norwegian
data, but it is not clearly separate from the affinity of the other xenophobic prejudice. Conspiracy beliefs about Jews and Muslims were moderately correlated
throughout the surveys, no matter the exact phrasing of the items. They also
showed moderate correlation with general measures of conspiracy mentality, but
contrary to what we would expect from previous research, conspiracy mentality
was more highly correlated with conspiracy beliefs about Muslims than it was
with those about Jews.
61. r = 0.24, CHM-2017
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Following Imhoff and Bruder,62 this could indicate that Muslims were seen as
more closely related to other, hidden, powerful actors guiding political developments. When looking at the items we used for conspiracy stereotypes, however,
we see that the antisemitic items are clearly in line with the kind of power usually
attributed to the hidden world conspiracy, and these items are highly intercorrelated. The anti-Muslim items are of a slightly different kind. While they do attribute power to Muslims, they more clearly present them as a threat. Moreover, the
threat indicated is of a kind that is known to activate authoritarian responses, i.e.
threats against group values and norms.63 Authoritarianism, when activated, is
related to conspiracy beliefs, but most of the beliefs it reliably relates to are
thought to be predicted better by measures of right-wing authoritarianism than
conspiracy mentality.64 This could indicate that there may at times be less difference between measures of authoritarianism and conspiracy mentality in predicting
certain types of conspiracy beliefs than has been shown.
Another pattern that may fit local intuitions better than international research
regards the political dimension of beliefs. We have seen that belonging to the
edges of the established political landscape in and of itself does not predict conspiracy beliefs all that well. The populist right, as was expected, generally scored
higher on conspiracy beliefs than other ideologies. Only when appealing specifically to other dimensions of their political ideology (anti-USA and anti-Israel
combined) did the far left rise to a level close to “don’t know”, and even then, it
was only voters for the farthest left, i.e., Red. The Socialist Left voters stayed
firmly at or near the bottom of the list and with a clear disbelief in conspiracy theories throughout. These attitudes were not visibly affected by the populist right
being part of the ruling coalition since 2013. The populist right stayed at the top
of conspiracy beliefs, and the far left stayed at the bottom. Turning Uscinski and
Parent’s finding that “conspiracy theories are for losers” on its head,65 we might
say that for this combination of beliefs and politics, conspiracy theories are, rather,
for election winners. This pattern may be specific to conspiracy beliefs about
minorities, particularly Muslims, thus mirroring ideological differences, or it may
be relevant to other conspiracy beliefs as well. If so, it might be related to political
patterns of trust and distrust in a society that are still characterised by a high level
of trust.
62.
63.
64.
65.
Imhoff & Bruder, “Speaking (Un)Truth”.
Cf. Karen Stenner, The Authoritarian Dynamic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Imhoff & Bruder, “Speaking (Un)Truth”; cf. Wood & Gray, “Right-Wing Authoritarianism”.
Uscinski and Parent, American Conspiracy Theories, 130–153.
6. CONSPIRACY BELIEFS ABOUT JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY
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DOI: 10.18261/978-82-15-03468-3-2019-08
7.
How Do Jews and Muslims in
Norway Perceive Each Other?
Between Prejudice and the Willingness to
Cooperate
WERNER BERGMANN
ABSTRACT For more than a decade, there has been a discussion about the scope and
character of a “Muslim antisemitism” in Europe, spurred on by anti-Jewish harassment
and terrorist attacks by Muslims in some European countries.* However, there are only
a few major studies on the attitudes of Muslims towards Jews in Europe, while larger studies on the attitude of Jews towards Muslims have so far been missing completely. Based
on the data from the 2017 survey, “Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway.
Population Survey and Minority Study” (CHM), it is now possible to investigate how
Jews and Muslims in Norway perceive each other, whether they see opportunities for
cooperation as minorities and have common experiences of discrimination, what their
positioning in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict looks like, and whether it influences their
mutual perception. While the focus is on the relationship between Muslims and Jews, in
some cases the results for the general Norwegian population are included as a tertium
comparationis, since Jews and Muslims form part of Norwegian society.
KEYWORDS antisemitism | Islamophobia | Jews | Muslims | Israeli-Palestinian
conflict | Norway
*
My special thanks go to Ottar Hellevik, without whose help in the calculation of data this contribution in the present form could not have been written. I am also thankful for the critical
remarks of both editors and the reviewers on an earlier version of this chapter.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.
212
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
1. INTRODUCTION
Since 2002, when an escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict triggered a wave
of anti-Jewish and anti-Israel offences in some Western European countries in
which young immigrant Muslims were for the first time alongside/among the
usual right-wing extremist perpetrators, there has been a discussion about the
scope and character of a “Muslim antisemitism” in Europe. Some blame Muslim
immigrants for the spread of antisemitism in Europe, while others see them as a
“scapegoat” diverting attention from antisemitism in the general population and,
at the same time, inciting hostility towards Muslims. Up to now, there exist only
a few empirical studies on this issue, but all results available so far indicate that
antisemitic attitudes are more prevalent among Muslims immigrants than among
the general populations of the respective European countries.1 The study for Norway confirms this finding with some modifications, namely those related to
social distance and emotions. The European Union Agency for Fundamental
Rights (FRA) has undertaken two surveys on Jewish experiences and perceptions of antisemitism, discrimination and hate crime, first in eight then in twelve
EU Member states, but there is no specific focus on the Muslim population.2
Small-scale surveys of Norwegian Jews’ attitudes towards Muslims have been
conducted in Norway, in which this topic has been one among other larger prob1. See Günther “Jikeli, Antisemitic Attitudes among Muslims in Europe: A Survey Review”,
ISGAP Occasional Paper Series 1, 2015; see also for a recent overview: “The Norwegian
Results from an International Perspective”, in Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway. Population Survey and Minority Study (Oslo:
Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities, 2017), 117–120.
2. In two studies by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in which Jews
were ask to give a “Description of person(s) making negative judgements about Jewish people
in the past 12 months” in eight EU member states, extremist Muslims were quite often mentioned as making anti-Jewish remarks. On average, 53% of the respondents answered “someone
with a left-wing political view”; 51% answered “someone with a Muslim extremist view”; 39%
answered “someone with a right-wing political view” and 19% answered “Someone with a
Christian extremist view” (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Discrimination
and hate crimes against Jews in EU Member States: experiences and perceptions of antisemitism (2013) 27, Table 6). In a recent study on Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism. Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU, also conducted by the
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in 2018, Jewish respondents in 12 EU Member States state that on average the “perpetrators in the most serious antisemitic incident of harassment in the 5 years before the survey” were most frequently “someone else I cannot
describe” (31%), followed by “someone with a Muslim extremist view” (30%) and “someone
with a left-wing political view” (21%). Less often are named “work or school/college colleagues
(16%), “a teenager or group of teenagers” (15%) and “an acquaintance or friend” (15%). Surprisingly only 13% named “someone with a right-wing political view” (54, Table 6).
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
lem areas.3 The survey on attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway in
20174 was the first broad-based empirical study to include a sample of both Muslim and Jewish respondents, allowing the investigation of the relationship between
the two groups in terms of various aspects. It is now possible to look at mutual
opinions and feelings, the question of social distance, opinions on the prevalence
of negative attitudes, opinions on the need to combat anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim
harassment, willingness to cooperate, common experience of discrimination and
exclusion, and last, but not least, positioning in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
While the focus of this chapter is on the relationship between Muslims and Jews,
it is important, for a better understanding of the results, to include in some cases the
results for the general Norwegian population.5 The survey of 2017 has three target
groups and samples: a representative sample of the Norwegian population
(N=1,575),6 and samples of Jews N=162) and of Muslims (N=586) in Norway.
Surveys among religious and ethnic minorities always face the problem of getting representative samples and often having low response rates. This problem
could not be completely solved in the present case either. This should be borne in
mind when evaluating the following results. The survey among Jews (total population in Norway about 1300 persons) was distributed to 504 members of the Jewish communities in Oslo and Trondheim. The response rate was 29% (N=170 –
this is 13% of the whole Jewish population in Norway).7 The educational structure
of the Jewish sample deviates from the population sample and the Muslim sample
by a larger proportion of people with higher education. Due to a technical error in
the data collection process, 60 respondents were not asked some of the questions.
Analyses show this group not to differ systematically from the rest with regard to
the questions answered by all, indicating that the loss of respondents is random
3. R. Golombek, Irene Levin, and J. Kramer, “Jødisk liv i Norge”, Hatikva, no. 5 (2012); C. Alexa
Døving and Vibeke Moe, “Det som er jødisk”. Identiteter, historiebevissthet og erfaringer med
antisemittisme. En kvalitativ intervjustudie blant norske jøder (Oslo: Center for Studies of the
Holocaust and Religious Minorities, 2014).
4. Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway.
Population Survey and Minority Study (Oslo: Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious
Minorities, 2017).
5. As representative of their religious group, those who stated respectively Judaism or Islam as
their religious affiliation are chosen (see Hoffmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and
Muslims, 22–25).
6. Since there are 13 Muslims among the 1,575 respondents, these are not included in the questions
concerning the attitudes towards Muslims, so that in these cases the sample comprises only
1,562 respondents.
7. Of these 170 respondents, only 162 stated Judaism as their religious affiliation, so the sample of
Jews comprises 162 respondents.
213
214
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
rather than systematic in character. Even if a sample of only 110 respondents gives
large random errors, the absence of a systematic bias would mean that we can rely
upon clear-cut results.
The target population for the survey among Muslims were people of immigrant
background (immigrants and Norwegian-born citizens with immigrant parents)
with a minimum of five years of residence in Norway and from the following
countries: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Iran, Kosovo, Morocco,
Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, Turkey. TNS Kantar used addresses selected from
the National Registry, and randomly selected 7,000 individuals disproportionately
pre-stratified based on previous survey response rates from the various national
groups. After two reminders, 826 replied, which gives a response rate of 12%. Of
these, 586 answered Muslim to the question of religious affiliation, and this is the
sample used in the analyses that follow.8 The respondents have lived in Norway
for different lengths of time; only some were born in Norway to immigrant parents. However, all had lived in the country for five years or more and were
expected to be able to answer the questionnaire in Norwegian. In any case, we are
dealing with a considerably heterogeneous minority.9
The response rate is low, but similar to what is often the case in present-day surveys.10 Tests have shown that low rates do not necessarily result in a biased sample.11 For the Muslim sample, the response rates vary somewhat according to
country of origin, but very little with regard to age and gender. The resulting composition of the sample corresponds quite well to the immigrant population with
regard to these variables. This also applies to the educational structure of the Muslim sample, which largely corresponds to that of the Norwegian population (in
contrast to the Jewish sample).12 Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that the kind of
attitudes we were studying may have had an influence on the willingness to participate in the survey, which would affect the results. Furthermore, it is to be
8. The sample of 242 non-Muslim immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries are not
included in the analyses in this chapter.
9. 326 respondents of the Muslim sample came to Norway in 2000 or later, 192 came before 2000,
and 68 were born in Norway (second generation). See Hofmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes
towards Jews and Muslims, 103, Table 54.
10. PEW Research Center (2012). Assessing the Representativeness of Public Opinion Surveys.
http://www.people-press.org/2012/05/15/assessing-the-representativeness-of-public-opinionsurveys/
11. This is the case for Norsk Monitor, with a response rate of 4 per cent (Ottar Hellevik, “Extreme
nonresponse and response bias. A ‘worst case’ analysis.” Quality & Quantity, 50 no. 5 (2016):
1969–1991. See also Robert M. Groves, “Nonresponse Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Household Surveys”, Public Opinion Quarterly, 70 no. 5 (2006): 646–675.
12. Hoffmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims, 22–25.
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
expected that difficulties in answering a questionnaire in Norwegian may have led
to higher non-response rates among the less well-integrated immigrants. This
must be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
Another problem is the risk of respondents considering what they think is
socially acceptable or wise when answering the attitude questions.13 Here, it is an
advantage that the interviews were done by means of a self-completion questionnaire, thus avoiding an interviewer effect.
2. ATTITUDES OF JEWS AND MUSLIMS TOWARD EACH OTHER
According to attitude theories, one can differentiate between three dimensions of
attitudes: the affective or emotional dimension, the cognitive dimension, and the
conative or behavioural dimension.14
To measure mutual feelings, respondents were asked if they had a particular
sympathy or a certain dislike of the other group.
Η/ŚĂǀĞĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĚŝƐůŝŬĞŽĨ:ĞǁƐΗ͘,ŽǁǁĞůůĚŽĞƐƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚĨŝƚ
ǁŝƚŚLJŽƵŽǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJ
ďLJDƵƐůŝŵƐ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůů
Ϯ ϳ
ϲ
ďLJWŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ Ϯ ϲ ϭ
Ϭй
ŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
ϯϲ
ϭϭ
ϭϬй
ŝŵƉŽƐƐ͘ƚŽƐĂLJ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌďĂĚůLJ
ϭϯ
ϯϲ
ϯϯ
ϮϬй
ϯϬй
ϰϬй
ŶŽƚĂƚĂůů
ϰϵ
ϱϬй
ϲϬй
ϳϬй
ϴϬй
ϵϬй
ϭϬϬй
FIGURE 7.1. Dislike of Jews (Percent. Population and Muslim samples)
13. If one assumes that negative attitudes towards Jews are perceived as socially undesirable in Norway, then the values collected for the Muslim sample as well as for the general population sample are likely to deviate more into the positive rather than into the negative (phenomenon of
communication latency).
14. The three dimensions: Cognitive – thoughts, beliefs, and ideas about something; affective – feelings or emotions that something evokes (sympathy, fear, love or hate); Conative, or behavioural
– tendency or disposition to act in certain ways toward something or someone; See Steven J.
Breckler, “Empirical validation of affect, behavior and cognition as distinct components of attitude”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 (1984): 1119–1205.
215
216
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
Η/ŚĂǀĞĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĚŝƐůŝŬĞŽĨDƵƐůŝŵƐΗ͘,ŽǁǁĞůůĚŽĞƐƚŚŝƐ
ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚĨŝƚǁŝƚŚLJŽƵƌŽǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ͍
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJ
ďLJ:ĞǁƐ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůů
ϯ
ďLJWŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
ϭϴ
ϰϬ
ϴ
Ϯϯ
Ϭй
ŝŵƉŽƐƐ͘ƚŽƐĂLJ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌďĂĚůLJ
ϯϳ
Ϭ
ϭϯ
ϮϬй
Ϯϱ
ϯϯ
ϰϬй
ŶŽƚĂƚĂůů
Ϯϯ
ϲϬй
ϴϬй
ϭϬϬй
FIGURE 7.2. Dislike of Muslims (Percent. Population and Jewish samples)15
Η/ŚĂǀĞĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐLJŵƉĂƚŚLJĨŽƌ:ĞǁƐΗ͘
,ŽǁǁĞůůĚŽĞƐƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚĨŝƚǁŝƚŚLJŽƵƌŽǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ͍
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůů
ϲ
Ϯϭ
ϵ͕Ϭ
ϭϱ
DƵƐůŝŵƐ
Ϭ͕Ϭ
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ŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
ϭ
Ϯϯ
ϰ
ϮϬ͕Ϭ
ŝŵƉŽƐƐ͘ƚŽƐĂLJ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌďĂĚůLJ
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ϰϬ͕Ϭ
ϭϮ
ϱϬ͕Ϭ
ϲϬ͕Ϭ
ŶŽƚĂƚĂůů
ϳϬ͕Ϭ
ϭϴ
ϴϬ͕Ϭ
ϵϬ͕Ϭ
ϭϬϬ͕Ϭ
FIGURE 7.3. Sympathy for Jews (Percent. Population and Muslim samples)
Η/ŚĂǀĞĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƐLJŵƉĂƚŚLJĨŽƌDƵƐůŝŵƐΗ͘
,ŽǁǁĞůůĚŽĞƐƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚĨŝƚǁŝƚŚLJŽƵƌŽǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ͍
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ϯ
:ĞǁƐ
ϰ
Ϭ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůů
ϭϮ
Ϭ
ϮϬ
ϭϵ
ϭϬ
ŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌďĂĚůLJ
ϯϯ
ϭ
ϮϬ
ŝŵƉŽƐƐ͘ƚŽƐĂLJ
ϯϮ
Ϯϲ
ϯϬ
Ϯϴ
ϰϬ
ϱϬ
ŶŽƚĂƚĂůů
ϲϬ
Ϯϯ
ϳϬ
ϴϬ
ϵϬ
ϭϬϬ
FIGURE 7.4. Sympathy for Muslims (Percent. Population and Jewish samples)
15. In this case, the population sample is N = 1,562, as among the respondents thirteen were Muslims who were not counted. Due to a sampling error, this question was only asked of 110
respondents in the Jewish sample.
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
In both cases, the Jews less often show negative feelings and more often positive
feelings towards Muslims, while the Muslims more often show negative feelings
and less often positive feelings toward Jews compared to the attitudes of the general population. However, when both minorities are compared directly, Muslims
less often express negative feelings toward Jews (9.1%) than vice versa (20.9%)
while the groups are equal in their degree of mutual sympathy (24.3% and 22.7%).
Since a large proportion of Muslim respondents chose neutral or evasive answers
as “impossible to say” and “no response”, one nevertheless has to be careful with
a conclusive assessment. To decide if this is to be “interpreted as a manifestation
of unclear feelings or lack of opinion” or as a conscious refraining from answering
in order to hide a negative view,16 one has to look more closely at these respondents by cross-tabulating them with the index on prejudice against Jews (see
below).17 Both groups seem to follow approximately the same tendencies as the
general population: Jews are generally seen less negative and more often positive
than Muslims – that is, Muslims reject Jews only a little more frequently (9.1%)
than the general population (7.5%), while Jews reject Muslims more often
(22.3%) than they were rejected by Muslims (9.1%), but still reject them much
less compared with the general population. The same picture emerges when we
look at the answers to the “particular sympathy” question. Muslims show only a
little less sympathy for Jews (24.3%) than the general population (27.1%), while
Jews show clearly more often sympathy for Muslims (22.7%) than the general
population (14.4%).
To get information about the social relationship between groups, one can try to
measure the social distance or proximity between them. In order to do this, we
used two questions of the “social distance scale” developed by Emory Bogardus.18
The respondents were asked to give their opinion on having Jews or Muslims as
neighbours or in their circle of friends. The answers to the question of Jews as
16. Hoffmann and Moe (eds.), Attitudes toward Jews and Muslims, 30.
17. That the proportion of those respondents choosing a neutral option (impossible to say/no
response) is larger for all groups in case of the “particular sympathy” question may be due to the
specific wording of this item. The fact that someone feels no particular sympathy towards a
group does not necessarily mean that he has an antipathy, but only that his sympathy may not be
very pronounced. Therefore, many respondents seem to have chosen the option “impossible to
say”. The answers to the more clearly worded “dislike” item show that far less respondents
chose the “neutral option”, with one exception: the very large proportion of the Muslim
respondents choosing this option in case of the “dislike Jews” item.
18. Emory S. Bogardus, “Social Distance in the City”, Proceedings and Publications of the American Sociological Society, 20 (1926) 40–46; Emory S. Bogardus, Social distance (Los Angeles:
University of Southern California Press, 1959).
217
218
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
neighbours or friends show almost the same picture as the “dislike” item: 7% of
the general population and 8.5% of the Muslim sample dislike having Jews as
neighbours, and again 7% of the population and 11% of the Muslims dislike them
in their circle of friends, while an overwhelming majority of 89% and 88.4%
among the population and between 85% and 79% of the Muslims would like or
would not mind to have them as neighbours or friends. As in the case of the item
of “a certain dislike”, Muslim respondents are only slightly more often negative
than the general population. Both the general population and the Jews dislike
Muslims as neighbours and in the circle of friends more often: 26% of the population and 20% of the Jews dislike Muslims as neighbours, and both reject them a
little less often as friends (21% and 12%). The same pattern emerges as in the case
of having “a certain dislike” of Muslims: Muslims were clearly more often disliked as neighbours or friends than Jews, and Jews show this dislike of Muslims
less often than the general population. Contrary to the expectation that respondents would rarely accept Jews or Muslims as friends, i.e. closer to them than
neighbours, in the case of social distance from Muslims, the situation is exactly
the other way around. The finding that the general population and Jews would like
Muslims more often among their friends than as neighbours may be explained by
the fact that one can choose socially similar persons as friends, while this is not
the case with neighbours. In the case of rejection as a neighbour, apart from ethnic
or cultural differences, social status also plays an important role. Since Muslims
in Norway are immigrants, it is possibly assumed that they have a different lifestyle and more often belong to a lower social class.
With regard to the emotional components of antipathy and social distance, one
can conclude, that the responses of the two minorities are not very different from
those of the general population.19 Muslims show dislike and social distance towards
Jews only slightly more frequently than the general population; Jews show this
towards Muslims even less compared to the attitude of the population. However,
Jews are more likely to show dislike and social distance to Muslims than vice versa.
While the differences between the attitudes of Muslims and the general population towards Jews are quite small with respect to the emotional and social dimension
of prejudice, they become larger in the cognitive dimension, as the following figures
19. We find the same pattern in the attitudes of Jews and Muslims towards some other groups: While
Muslims reject Roma (27%) and Somalis (16%) less often than the general population (57% and
36%) and the Jews (44% and 26%), Muslims reject Americans and Poles a little more often (8%
and 12%) than the Jews (3% and 7%) and as often as the general population (7% and 12%). Muslims feel closer to groups seen as outsiders (Roma) or stemming from non-western countries,
while Jews, like the general population, feel closer to people from western/European countries.
219
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
7.5 and 7.6 show. Muslim respondents agree clearly more often than the general
population to all negative items.20 Concerning the three positive items (Jews are
family-oriented, artistically gifted and more intelligent), there is no clear pattern.
Muslims see Jews as more intelligent than the population does; this may be due to
the ambiguous meaning of intelligence, which is seen as a very positive characteristic for members of one’s ingroup, but can be seen as dangerous (in the sense of sly
or crafty) as a characteristic of members of an outgroup.21 Concerning the positive
item of family orientation, Muslims clearly agree less often (34%) than the general
population (60%), which may be due to a comparison with the self-image of Muslims, who see themselves as very family-oriented, while the general population
compares the Jewish orientation with their own nuclear family situation.22
,ŽǁǁĞůůĚŽƚŚĞƐĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŝƚǁŝƚŚLJŽƵƌŽǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ;ĂďŽƵƚ:ĞǁƐͿ;ƉŽƉ͘ϮϬϭϳͿ
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůů
ŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
:ĞǁƐĂƌĞĨĂŵŝůLJŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚ
ŝŵƉŽƐƐ͘ƚŽƐĂLJ
ϳ
ϰ
ϭϰ
tŽƌůĚ:ĞǁƌLJŝƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞƐƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞ:ĞǁŝƐŚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ
ϰ
ϭϬ Ϭ
:ĞǁƐŚĂǀĞƚŽŽŵƵĐŚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵLJ
ϯ
ϭϬ Ϭ
:ĞǁƐŚĂǀĞĞŶƌŝĐŚĞĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƚƚŚĞĞdžƉĞŶƐĞŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ
ϯ
ϵ
:ĞǁƐŚĂǀĞĂůǁĂLJƐĐĂƵƐĞĚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞLJůŝǀĞ
ϭϮ
Ϯ ϲ Ϭ
:ĞǁƐĂƌĞŵŽƌĞŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ ϭ ϳ Ϭ
ϯϴ
ϰϬ
Ϭ
ϭϯ
ϯϴ
Ϯϰ
ϮϬ
ϰϱ
Ϯϭ
Ϯϭ
ϮϬ
Ϯϲ
ϯϳ
Ϯϵ
Ϯϯ
ϯϵ
ϯϭ
ϮϮ
Ϭ
ϭϮ
ϭϴ
ϰϭ
Ϭ
Ϯ ϲ Ϭ
Ϯ
Ϭ
Ϭ
ϮϮ
:ĞǁƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƚŽďĞďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ
:ĞǁƐĂƌĞĂƌƚŝƐƚŝĐĂůůLJŐŝĨƚĞĚ
ŶŽƚĂƚĂůů
ϰϮ
ϭϴ
:ĞǁƐŚĂǀĞƚŽŽŵƵĐŚŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶh^ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐLJ
:ĞǁƐůĂƌŐĞůLJŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƚŽďůĂŵĞĨŽƌďĞŝŶŐƉĞƌƐĞĐƵƚĞĚ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌďĂĚůLJ
ϭϴ
ϱϱ
ϯϭ
ϯϭ
Ϯϵ
ϯϲ
ϭϮ
Ϯϯ
FIGURE 7.5. Opinions regarding Jews (Percent. Population sample)
20. But compared to the widespread dissemination of antisemitic attitudes in many of the countries
of origin of Muslim immigrants, these attitudes are much less common among Muslim respondents in Norway. See Antidefamation League, Global 100. An Index of Anti-Semitism, New York:
ADL, 2014, http://global100.adl.org/.
21. For the latter speaks that the percentage of high scorers on the “Index of Prejudice against Jews”
who consider Jews to be “more intelligent than others” is two-thirds, while their share among
those who disagree is only one-third. That is, those who consider Jews to be particularly intelligent often do so against the background of an antisemitic prejudice.
22. It could be that behind the widespread opinion that Jews are very family-oriented stands the idea that
Jews stick together too much (“clannishness”), which is often used as an item in antisemitism scales.
ϯϮ
220
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
,ŽǁǁĞůůĚŽƚŚĞƐĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŝƚǁŝƚŚLJŽƵƌŽǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ;ĂďŽƵƚ:ĞǁƐͿ;DƵƐůŝŵƐĂŵƉůĞͿ
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJ
h^ƉŽůŝĐLJ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůů
ŶŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
Ϯϴ
ĞĐŽŶŽŵLJ
Ϯϭ
Ϯϭ
ϭϱ
ϭϴ
ϲ
ϭϰ
ϮϬ
ϲ
ĞŶƌŝĐŚ
ϭϯ
ďĞŚŝŶĚ
ϭϯ
ϳ
ϵ
ŐŝĨƚĞĚ
ϳ
ϭϬ
ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ
ϲ
ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚ
ϱ
ϭϬ
ϭϰ
ϲ
ϴ
ϯ ϯ
ϰϲ
ϲ
ϭϬ
ϭϯ
ϰϵ
ϴ
ϭϮ
ϴ
ϭϲ
ϯϵ
ϵ
Ϯϲ
ϱϲ
ϰϬ
ϯ
ϰ
ϭϬ
ϱϱ
ϰϬ
ϱ
ϱ
ϰϮ
ϳ
ϲ
ϰ
ϰϮ
ϲ
ϭϱ
ŶŽƚĂƚĂůů
ϯϵ
ϳ
ĨĂŵŝůLJ
ϭϯ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌďĂĚůLJ
ϱ
Ϯϭ
ďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
ďůĂŵĞ
ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ
ϭϬ
ϭϮ
Ϯϯ
Ϯϳ
FIGURE 7.6. Opinions regarding Jews (Percent. Muslim sample)
Table 7.1 shows the differences between the two samples in agreeing with the six
negative statements about Jews:
TABLE 7.1. Percent. who find that the statements fit rather well or completely with
own opinion (Population and Muslim samples)
General population
Muslims
Difference
Jews have too much influence on
the global economy
13
42
29
Jews have too much influence on
US foreign policy
29
49
20
Jews consider themselves to be
better than others
18
33
15
World Jewry is working behind the
scenes to promote Jewish interests
14
28
14
Jews have enriched themselves at
the expense of others
12
26
14
Jews have always caused problems
in the countries in which they live
8
16
8
Jews have largely themselves to
blame for being persecuted
8
16
8
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
In the Muslim sample, statements about the international influence of Jews are the
most important. This may perhaps be explained by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
in which Israel/the Jews are seen to receive much greater international support, especially from the US, than the Palestinians. The ancient topos of Christian theology
that Jews have to attribute their visible misfortune and persecution to themselves as
punishment for the denial of Jesus as the Messiah and their killing of Christ may be
not so important for the Muslims. Another reason could be a feeling of a common
fate: as a minority in Norway (and in other European countries) Muslims also see
themselves confronted with prejudice and discrimination (see below).23
With six out of seven negative items in Table 7.1, we built an index on “Prejudice
against Jews” in which the statements are arranged by the proportion of those
respondents that answered “rather well” (getting one point on the scale) and “completely” (2 points).24 This results in a scale ranging from 0 to 12. If we determine the
cut-off point between 3 and 4 points to differentiate the low from the high scorers,25
ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐĂŵƉůĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŶĚĞdžŽŶƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ:ĞǁƐ
ϲϵϮ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
DƵƐůŝŵƐ
ϰϲ
ϮϮϱ
Ϯϱϭ
ϭϴϮ
ϱϵ
ϱ
Ϭ
ϭͲϯ
ϭϵ
ϰͲϲ
ϳͲϵ
ϰϴ
ϭϰ
ϭϬͲϭϮ
/ŶĚĞdžŽŶƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ:ĞǁƐ
FIGURE 7.7. Index on prejudice against Jews (Percent. Population and Muslim samples)
23. See also Claudia Lenz and Vibeke Moe, “Negotiations of Antisemitism and Islamophobia”,
“Ring of Peace”, chapter 10 in this volume, pp. 312–320.
24. We decided not to use the item “Jews have too much influence on US foreign policy”, since the
significantly higher approval rate compared to the other items indicates that many respondents
perceived it more as a matter of political opinion rather than a negative verdict on Jews.
25. To give an example: to get at least 4 points on the index, one has to agree either to 2 items “completely”, or to one item “completely” and to two items “rather well”, or to four items “rather well”.
221
222
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
with 28.9% the Muslims range much more often among the high scorers compared
to the general population, with only 8.3%.26
dŽǁŚĂƚĞdžƚĞŶƚĚŽLJŽƵĂŐƌĞĞŽƌĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ͍
Ϭй ϭϬй ϮϬй ϯϬй ϰϬй ϱϬй ϲϬй ϳϬй ϴϬй ϵϬй ϭϬϬй
DƵƐůŝŵƐĚŽŶŽƚĨŝƚŝŶƚŽŵŽĚĞƌŶtĞƐƚĞƌŶƐŽĐŝĞƚLJ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ
ϯϮ
ϭϰ
DƵƐůŝŵƐĂƌĞŐŽŽĚEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶĐŝƚŝnjĞŶƐ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ
ϲ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ Ϯ ϴ
DƵƐůŝŵƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŵŽƌĂůůLJƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƐ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ
DƵƐůŝŵƐƉŽƐĞĂƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶĐƵůƚƵƌĞ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ
DƵƐůŝŵƐŽƉƉƌĞƐƐǁŽŵĞŶ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ Ϯ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ Ϭ
DƵƐůŝŵƐĚŽŶŽƚǁĂŶƚƚŽŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞŝŶƚŽEŽƌǁĞŐŝĂŶƐŽĐŝĞƚLJ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ
DƵƐůŝŵƐǁĂŶƚƚŽƚĂŬĞŽǀĞƌƵƌŽƉĞ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ
DƵƐůŝŵƐůĂƌŐĞůLJŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƚŽďůĂŵĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ͙
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ
ŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ
/ŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĂŶƐǁĞƌ
WĂƌƚŝĂůůLJĂŐƌĞĞ
Ϯϱ
ϭϱ
ϭϲ
ϭϬ
ϭϭ
Ϭ
Ϭ
Ϭ
ϭϬ
ϮϬ
Ϯϲ
ϭϴ
Ϯϭ
Ϭ
ϭϱ
ϯϬ
Ϯϯ
ϭϵ
ϭϬ
ϯϭ
WĂƌƚŝĂůůLJĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ
EŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
ŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJĂŐƌĞĞ
ϭϯ
ϭϯ
ϴ
ϭϰ
ϵ
ϭϳ
ϵ
Ϯϱ
Ϯϴ
ϱϯ
Ϯϴ
ϭϳ
ϯ
Ϯϲ
ϰ
ϰϱ
Ϭ
ϭϵ
ϯϭ
Ϭ
ϯϳ
ϮϮ
ϱ
Ϯϵ
ϯ
ϭϲ
Ϯϯ
ϭϭ
ϭϱ
ϮϬ
Ϭ
ϰϰ
ϯϭ
ϱ
Ϯϴ
ϯϵ
Ϯ
ϯϬ
ϮϬ
ϭϱ
ϭϴ
ϰ
ϰϭ
Ϭ
ϮϬ
ϭϬ
Ϯϱ
Ϭ
ϰϬ
ϴ
ϭϭ
ϭϴ
Ϯϲ
ϰ
ϭϱ
ϯϬ
ϭϱ
ϭϮ
ϭϲ
Ϯϴ
Ϯϯ
ϲ
ϭϱ
ϰϮ
Ϯϴ
Ϯϰ
ϭϰ
ϭϴ
Ϯ
ϱϴ
Ϯϲ
ϭϲ
ϭϯ
Ϯϯ
ϭϯ
ϭ
ϭϳ
DƵƐůŝŵƐĂƌĞĨĂŵŝůLJŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ Ϯ ϲ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ Ϭϭ ϭϯ
DƵƐůŝŵƐĂƌĞŵŽƌĞǀŝŽůĞŶƚƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ
ϭϳ
ϰϬ
Ϯϱ
Ϯϱ
ϭϳ
Ϭ
ϱ
ϭϵ
ϭϵ
ϭϬ
ϳ
FIGURE 7.8. Opinions on stereotypes of Muslims (Percent. Population and Jewish samples)27
26. For the building of this index, see Ottar Hellevik, “Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway”,
Section 3.3, chapter 4 in this volume.
27. In this case the population sample is N = 1,562. See footnote 6. Due to a sampling error, this
question was only asked of 103 respondents in the Jewish sample.
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
Turning to the list of statements about Muslims, we can see that in this case the
general population agrees more often to the negative statements and less often to
the positive ones than the Jewish respondents. But both groups agree more often
to the Islamophobic prejudices compared to the prevalence of anti-Jewish prejudices among the general population and the Muslims. Since the scales of prejudice
against Jews and Muslims consist of different items, one cannot, of course, compare the results directly. Nevertheless, in this case one can at least say that they
point in the same direction as the emotional rejection and social distance, which
are higher with respect to Muslims than to Jews.
Looking at the eight negative statements, one can see that the general population and the Jews differ most in those statements, which formulate doubts about
the ability or the will of Muslims to adhere or to integrate into Western society and
in particular into Norwegian culture and society, while both groups are closer
together in statements dealing with Muslim violence, the oppression of women
and the fear that Islam might want to take over Europe.28 The reason why Jews
believe in the ability of Muslims to integrate more often than the general population lies probably in the historical experience of the Jews, whose ability to integrate and belong to European society had similarly been doubted for a long time.
The very high education level among the Jewish sample may also have exerted an
influence here.
28. The approval of Jews to fearing that Muslims want to take power in Europe is a rather surprising
since Jews have long faced similar conspiracy accusations. See also Asbjørn Dyrendal, Conspiracy beliefs about Jews and Muslims in Norway (in this volume).
223
224
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
TABLE 7.2. Percent. who find that the statements fit rather well or completely with
own opinion29
General
population
Jews
Difference
Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture
40
23
17
Muslims do not fit into modern Western
society
36
21
15
Muslims do not want to integrate into
Norwegian society
42
27
15
Muslims have themselves to blame for the
increase in anti-Muslim harassment
48
35
13
Muslims consider themselves morally
superior to others
46
36
13
Muslims oppress women
69
59
10
Muslims want to take over Europe
31
22
9
Muslims are more violent than others
29
26
3
Out of these eight negative statements, six were chosen for the construction of a
“Prejudice against Muslims index”.30
Prejudices against Muslims are less widespread among Jews than among the
general population, which may be due to the higher level of education of the Jewish respondents and possibly also to a form of minority solidarity (see section 3).
While 34.1% of the general population are among the high scorers (4–12), there
are only 22.8% scoring high among the Jewish respondents. In case of the antiMuslim prejudice, the general population and the Jews differ less (11.3 percentage
points) compared to the situation concerning prejudice against Jews, where the
29. In this case, the population sample is N = 1,562. See footnote 6. Due to a sampling error only
110 of the total Jewish sample were asked this question, which was answered by 103 respondents (7 missings).
30. We left out the items on integration into Norwegian society because two others items (threat to
Norwegian culture, fit into Western society) measured quite similar things, and we left out the
item “Muslim oppress women”, which received the highest percentage of approval. The high
level of approval may be an indicator that the respondents evaluate this as a kind of common
knowledge with a certain basis in reality. For the building of the “prejudice against Muslims
index”, see chapter 4 by Ottar Hellevik in this volume.
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐĂŵƉůĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŝŶĚĞdžŽŶƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
DƵƐůŝŵƐ;йͿ
ϲϬ
ϱϬ
ϱϬ
ϰϬ
ϯϳϭ
Ϯϴϵ
Ϯϳϯ
ϯϬ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ϭϯϲ
ϭϰϴ
ϮϬ
:ĞǁƐ
ϵϳ
ϭϬ
ϵϳ
ϰϲ
ϰϲ
Ϭ
Ϭ
ϭͲϯ
ϰͲϲ
ϳͲϵ
ϭϬͲϭϮ
FIGURE 7.9. Index on prejudice against Muslims (Percent. Population and Jewish samples)
difference between the population and the Muslim sample is 20.6 percentage
points. When we compare the number of high scorers in both minorities, i.e. those
harbouring prejudice against the other group, the difference is clear (6.1 percentage points), but not as large as one may have expected given the focus of public
discussion on the danger of antisemitism among Muslims.31
In a last step, we build combined indexes of antisemitism and Islamophobia by linking up the three indexes we build to measure dislike, social distance and prejudice.32
When the cut-off point is determined between 1 and 2 points between low and
high scorers, one gets not only a small proportion of high scorers among the population (5.4%), but also among the Muslims (6.9%), while there is a quite large
difference when choosing a cut-off point between 0 and 1 point (13.3% compared
to 34.5%). The lower difference between the general population and the Muslims
on the surveys combined index on antisemitism is due to the fact that in the other
dimensions of prejudice, “dislike” and “social distance”, both samples show more
similar results. Therefore, one can say that antisemitic ideas are quite widespread,
especially among the Muslims, but that the number of hard-core antisemitic
respondents is rather small.
31. A problem here is rather the small Jewish sample, because of a sampling error only 110 of the
total Jewish sample were asked this question, which was answered by 103 respondents (7 missings).
32. For the construction of combined indexes on antisemitism and on Islamophobia, see Ottar Hellevik, “Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway”, section 3.4 and 4.4.
225
226
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐĂŵƉůĞƐĨŽƌĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚŝŶĚĞdžŽŶĂŶƚŝƐĞŵŝƚŝƐŵ
;ŝŶйͿ
ϭϬϬ
ϵϬ
ϴϬ
ϳϬ
ϲϬ
ϱϬ
ϰϬ
ϯϬ
ϮϬ
ϭϬ
Ϭ
ϴϲ͘ϳ
ϲϱ͘ϱ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
DƵƐůŝŵƐ
Ϯϳ͘ϲ
ϳ͘ϵ
Ϭ
ϯ͘ϰ ϰ͘ϵ
ϭ
Ϯ
Ϯ͘ϭ
Ϯ
ϯ
FIGURE 7.10. Combined index on antisemitism (Percent. Population and Muslim sample)
ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƐĂŵƉůĞƐĨŽƌĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚŝŶĚĞdžŽŶ/ƐůĂŵŽƉŚŽďŝĂ
;ŝŶйͿ
ϲϲϰ
ϳϬ
ϱϵ͘Ϯ
ϲϬ
ϱϬ
ϰϬ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ϯϬ
:ĞǁƐ
ϭϵ͘ϭ
ϮϬ
ϭϯ͘ϴ
ϭϯ͘ϰ ϭϬ͘ϵ
ϭϯ͘ϲ
ϭϬ
ϯ͘ϲ
Ϭ
Ϭ
ϭ
Ϯ
ϯ
FIGURE 7.11. Combined index on Islamophobia (Percent. Population and Jewish sample)33
The picture is not as good when we look at the combined index on Islamophobia,
where we count a much higher proportion of respondents who are among the hardcore Islamophobes – despite the low approval on the dislike dimension and the
33. In this case the population sample is N=1,562. See footnote 6. Due to a sampling error, this
question was only asked of 110 respondents in the Jewish sample.
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
social distance dimension. This holds true for both samples, although we find the
high-scorers twice as often among the general population (27%) as among the
Jews (14.5%). One has to keep in mind that both indexes (of prejudices against
Jews and against Muslims) consist of different statements, so the results cannot be
compared one to one. Nevertheless, negative attitudes are much more prevalent
towards Muslims than towards Jews.
One can assume that an emotional rejection (dislike) of a group will be closely
connected with negative opinions towards them. But given the clearly smaller proportion of those who declared having a certain dislike of Jews or Muslims compared to those agreeing to one or more antisemitic or Islamophobic statements,
both dimensions of prejudice seem only partly to overlap.
ŝƐůŝŬĞŽĨDƵƐůŝŵƐďLJƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚDƵƐůŝŵƐ
Ϭ
Ϭ
ϭƚŽϯ
ϭ
Ϯ
ϳ
ϰƚŽϲ
ϳƚŽϵ
ϭϬƚŽϭϮ
ϲ
ϭϯ
ϭϭ
Ϯϱ
WƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚDƵƐůŝŵƐŝŶĚĞdžϬͲϭϮ
ϭϯ
Ϯϳ
ϮϮ
ϯϯ
ϰϰ
ϳϱ
ϲϯ
ϯϳ
ϭϳ
ϰ
ŶŽƚĂƚĂůů
ƌĂƚŚĞƌďĂĚůLJ
ŝŵƉŽƐƐ͘ƚŽƐĂLJͬŶŽĂŶƐǁĞƌ ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůůͬĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJ
ĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŽƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚΗ/ĨĞĞůĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĚŝƐůŝŬĞŽĨDƵƐůŝŵƐΗ
FIGURE 7.12. Dislike of Muslims by Prejudice against Muslims (Percent. Jewish sample)
Jews N=110: 28 – 41 – 18 – 23 (because of very small N for “completely” (N=3) the option is summed up
with “rather small”; the option “no answer” (N=4) is summed up with “impossible to say”).
227
228
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
ŝƐůŝŬĞŽĨ:ĞǁƐďLJƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ:ĞǁƐ;DƵƐůŝŵƐϮϬϭϳͿ
Ϭ
ϭƚŽϯ
ϯ
ϰ
ϭϭ
Ϯ
ϰ
ϭϰ
ϴ
ϭϱ
ϰƚŽϲ
ϳƚŽϵ
ϭϮ
ϭϬƚŽϭϮ
ϲ
ϭϳ
ϭϮ
ϮϮ
Ϯϭ
ϯϮ
ϭϭ
Ϯ
ϱ
ϮϮ
ϯϱ
ϯϰ
ϭϭ
ϳϳ
ϯϭ
ϱϴ
ϰϳ
ϭϴ
ϭϱ
ŶŽƚĂƚĂůů
ƌĂƚŚĞƌďĂĚůLJ
ϰϰ
ϭϰ
ŝŵƉŽƐƐ͘ƚŽƐĂLJ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůů
ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJ
ŶŽĂŶƐǁĞƌ
FIGURE 7.13. Dislike of Jews by prejudice against Jews (Percent. Muslim sample)
N=586: 210 – 74 – 215 – 42 – 13 – 32 (The unexpected result for “completely” may be due to low N)
The Jewish respondents answered on both dimensions of prejudice in a coherent
way. Those who score low on the “dislike” statement also rank low on the prejudice index (0 to 3 points), and a clear majority of those who agree to the statement
rank high in the prejudice index (4–12).
For the Muslim respondents, the emotional and the cognitive dimensions of
antisemitism seem not to be very closely connected. Of those who dislike Jews
“completely”, 46% don’t agree to any antisemitic statement and another 8% rank
low on the prejudice index, while 20% of those who agree “not at all” to the “dislike” statement score high on the prejudice index, and even the majority of those
who answered “rather badly” does so. There is also an interesting difference
between the samples concerning those who chose the “impossible to say” option:
while among the Jewish respondents they rank in the middle between the “likers”
and “dislikers” and show a tendency to score high on the prejudice index compared with the “likers”, the Muslim respondents who chose the option “impossible
to say” tend more to the “likers”, yet score zero even more often on the prejudice
scale than those agreeing “not at all” to the “dislike” statement. Therefore, we can
say that the correlation between the emotional and the cognitive dimension of
prejudices differs greatly between the two groups.
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
229
An important question for the relationship between Jews and Muslims in Norway concerns the attitude towards the Holocaust, whereby here, too, the attitude
of the Norwegian population as a benchmark is important. On the subject, three
questions were included in our survey.
TABLE 7.3. How well do these statements fit with you own opinion?
Not at
all
Rather
badly
Population
20.2
29.6
27.7
0.1
16.8
5.6
100
Muslims
10.1
12.5
33.8
13.8
15.9
13.8
100
Jews
72.6
16.9
4.8
2.4
2.4
0.8
100
Because of the HoloPopulation
caust Jews today are
Muslims
entitled to their own state
where they can seek pro- Jews
tection from persecution
13.2
17.9
35.5
0,1
22.9
10.4
100
11.9
10.9
33.7
13.5
16.3
13.6
100
6.5
16.9
12.9
2.4
20.2
41.1
100
Population
0.7
2.5
8.9
0,1
31.4
56.4
100
Muslims
3.6
4.0
21.9
13.9
19.8
36.7
100
Jews
0.8
0.8
1.6
2.4
13.7
80.6
100
Jews exploit the Holocaust for their own
purposes
Knowledge about the
Holocaust is important
for preventing the oppression of minorities
today
Impossible
No
to answer response
Rather Comple- Total
well
tely
Population N= 1,535; Muslims N=476 (only those respondents that have heard about the Holocaust); Jews
N=124
First, it is important to note that the Muslim respondents have frequently chosen
the options “impossible to answer” and “no response”. Muslim respondents who
have never heard of the Holocaust (25.6% compared with only 2.2% of the general
population) are omitted from the sample; another 8.3% were not sure, and 2.5%
did not respond. Only 63.7% have heard about it compared with 95.7% of the general population.
It is no surprise that Jewish respondents almost completely disagree that Jews
exploit the Holocaust (89.5%), and almost all of them consider the knowledge of
the Holocaust an important means of prevention the oppression of minorities
(94.3%). Half of the Muslim respondents cannot answer the question of whether
Jews exploit the Holocaust; after all, almost a third (29.7%) agrees here, while
only 22.6% reject this allegation, compared with half the Norwegian population.
Nevertheless, a quarter of the latter cannot answer the question, while 22.4% agree
to the allegation of exploitation too. Especially among Muslim respondents, this
opinion may be based on the general view that in Norway and other Western
230
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
countries, Jewish victims of the past are acknowledged more than Muslims in the
present (Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, etc.). Muslims see themselves
in a kind of victims’ rivalry with Jews. The impression that as an obligation from
the consequences of the Holocaust, the United States especially, but also Western
European states tend to support the side of Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
or, for example, do not sufficiently criticise its settlement policy, may also play a
role here.
Concerning the question about the importance of knowing about the Holocaust,
almost none in the three samples contest the assumption that this would help in
preventing oppression of minorities. However, while a large majority of the Jews
and the general population is convinced that the knowledge of the Holocaust is a
suitable means of prevention, the Muslim respondents are less likely to believe it.
Concerning the question of whether Jews today are entitled to their own state
because of the Holocaust, there are no clear-cut answers in either group; even
38.9% of the Jewish sample disagree or cannot answer the question. It is, however,
likely that there are different reasons for this refusal. While Jews may feel they
have a right to their own state regardless of the Holocaust, Muslims and a part of
the general population could contest that Jews are entitled to their own state in
spite of the Holocaust. This may be especially true of those who agree with the
statement that there “can be no peace as long as the State of Israel exists” (25% of
the Muslim sample, 21% of the general population). In the face of the conflict over
land between Israelis and Palestinians, it is surprising that Muslims reject this
opinion less frequently than the general population and agree with it as often as
the population. Both among the Muslims and among the general population, it is
striking that a large proportion cannot answer this question, or did not answer.
Overall, the opinions on Holocaust-related issues are clearly divergent between
the Muslim and the Jewish sample, with the population taking a middle position
that is, nevertheless, closer to Muslims than to Jews – with the exception of the
item about the importance of knowledge about the Holocaust for the prevention of
racism.
3. THE RELATIONSHIP AND EXPERIENCES OF JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN
NORWAY
As we have seen, antipathy and social distance between Jews and Muslims in Norway are not very widespread, despite the existence of mutual prejudice. It is therefore not surprising that a large majority in both groups, as minorities in the country, want to cooperate in the fight against prejudice and discrimination. Only a
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
small minority in both groups does not believe that Jews and Muslims can cooperate in this respect.
TABLE 7.4. Do you think that Muslims and Jews can cooperate on combating prejudice and discrimination? (Percent. Muslim and Jewish samples)
Yes
Don’t wish to answer/ no response
Don’t know
No
Total
Muslims
69.5
6.6
19.6
4.1
100
Jews
81.5
2.4
7.4
8.6
100
TABLE 7.5. Do you think that Muslims and Jews as minorities in Norway have any
common experiences? (Percent. Muslim and Jewish samples)
Yes
Don’t wish to answer/ no response
Don’t know
No
Total
Muslims
48.1
6.3
39.6
5.8
100
Jews
74.7
3.1
4.9
17.3
100
The distribution of the answers in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 reveal the same pattern. A
majority sees the possibility for cooperation based in common experiences as
religious minorities. Jews are here more often optimistic than Muslims,
although their proportion is also a little bit larger among those who disagree with
both statements. The high proportion of those who do not answer or respond
“don’t know” is quite large among Muslim respondents (26.4% and 46.2%). The
reason could be that the Jewish community in Norway is very small so that the
respondents never came into contact with Jews or do not feel well informed
about activities of the Jewish community, but it could also be grounded in the
fact that Muslims do not want to be associated with the Jews as a “persecuted
minority”.
Do the attitudes towards the other group have an influence on the answers to
the question of common experiences? In the case of the Jews, a clear relation
can be seen between the answers to this question and the level of Islamophobia,
measured by the combined index on Islamophobia. Because of the small Jewish
sample (N=103) the distribution has a certain amount of contingency, but what
can be said is that a large majority of those who harbour no prejudice against
Muslims (point 0 – 81%) see common experiences with the Muslim community,
231
232
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
while only very few (9%) do not see it. Those who show at least some degree of
Islamophobia, and especially those scoring at the top (point 3 – 75%) contest
much more often that Jews and Muslims have any common experience as minorities.
The answers of the Muslim respondents (N=586) to this question differ from
those of the Jewish respondents. What is most significant in comparison with the
Jewish sample is the high proportion of those who say they do not know or give
no response (ranging from 27% to 49%) – regardless of their attitude towards
Jews. Obviously, part of the Muslim population in Norway does not know much
about the Jewish community and therefore cannot say anything about common
experiences (lack of contact) or they are accustomed to thinking here in different
categories (victim rivalry), so that the idea of similarities seems unusual. In contrast to the distribution of responses in the Jewish sample, about half of the Muslim interviewees, regardless of whether they have an antisemitic attitude or not,
also see common ground between the experiences of Jews and Muslims. As
expected, the proportion of those who deny this increases with the strength of prejudices against Jews (from 2% at 0 points on the combined index on Antisemitism
via 11% and 23% to 27% reaching 3 points on the index).
An important point for the readiness to cooperate concerns the question of equal
treatment of both groups. In this case, a majority of the respondents of both samples seem to have no clear idea about how the authorities treat the other group.
TABLE 7.6. Do you think that Norwegian authorities treat Muslims and Jews equally?
(Percent. Muslim and Jewish samples)
Yes
No response
Don’t
know
No, they
treat Jews
better
No, they
treat Muslims better
Total
Muslims
27.6
18.9
32.0
21.3
0.1
100
Jews
22.2
7.4
46.3
7.4
16.7
100
Only about a quarter in both groups presumes an equal treatment by the Norwegian authorities, and each group believes the other would be treated better, while
large parts do not respond or choose “don’t know”. Almost no respondent in the
Muslim sample sees a better treatment of their own group. This judgement may be
based on real experiences. Muslims more often have the feeling that they are
treated unfairly compared with the Jewish respondents (see Table 7.7). While an
Islamophobic attitude has no significant influence on the judgement of Jewish
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
respondents concerning equal treatment,34 Muslim respondents with antisemitic
attitudes see a preference for Jews.35
TABLE 7.7. Do you feel that you have been treated unfairly by Norwegian public
institutions?
Muslims
Jews
Yes
Not sure
No response
No
Total
14.6
16.9
2.4
66.1
100
6.8
5.6
0
87.7
100
(Labour and Social Work (NAV), school, health service, police) because of your religious affiliation?
(Percent. Muslim and Jewish samples)
This difference only occurs when we ask about unfair treatment by public institutions, but it obviously does not apply to the behaviour of the general population.
In this case, the answers of the respondents of both groups are quite similar. When
asked if they “have been made to feel that they don’t belong in Norwegian society
in the past 12 months” and “if anyone behaved negatively towards them in Norwegian society in the past 12 months”, Jewish respondents agree here a little bit
less often (18.5% to 26.7%) than Muslim respondents (26.9% to 35.5%), but the
differences are quite small. We find the same pattern in the answers to the question
if “one had experiences of harassment in Norway in the past 12 months because
of one’s religious affiliation”; 14.2% of the Muslims and 11.1% of the Jews
choose the option “often/sometimes”.
TABLE 7.8. Do you ever avoid showing your religious affiliation out of fear of negative attitudes? (Percent. Muslim and Jewish samples)
Yes
No response
No
Total
Muslims
26.0
2.1
71.8
100
Jews
63.6
0.0
36.4
100
Although members of both minorities state having experienced harassment
because of their religious affiliation, both groups react quite differently. Jews
34. This may partly be due to the small sample, since 67% of the high scorers (3 on the combined
Index on Islamophobia) see a better treatment of the Muslims, but in that category we find only
three respondents. Therefore, we cannot make a statistically assured statement.
35. The proportion that agrees here increases from 15% scoring zero on the antisemitism index to
44.8% scoring 2, and even 66.0% scoring 3.
233
234
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
much more often avoid showing their religious affiliation than Muslims, although
they declare having experienced unfair treatment and harassment less often than
Muslims. In our report we try to explain this as a manifestation of the minorities’
different historical experiences, “where the Jews in Europe have often kept a low
profile so as to avoid persecution”, while for Muslims as a more visible and
numerous group it may be “less relevant ... to avoid showing their religious affiliation”,36 as some were accustomed to from their countries of origin.
TABLE 7.9. How widespread do you think negative attitudes towards Muslims are
in Norway today?
Very
widespread
Fairly
widespread
Impossible to
answer
No
response
Not very
widespread
Population
16.5
64.3
4.7
0.0
14.0
0.5
100
Muslims
18.1
34,2
19.0
3.1
20.5
5.2
100
8.7
71.8
6.8
1.0
11.7
0.0
100
Jews
Not wide- Total
spread at
all
Population: N=1,568; Muslims N= 387; Jews N=103
The evaluation of how widespread negative attitudes toward Muslims are differs
between the general population and the Jews on the one hand, and the evaluation
of the Muslims on the other. While among the former about 80% believe those
attitudes are “very” or “fairly widespread”, only about half of the Muslims do so,
and for another fifth the question is “impossible to answer”. On the other hand,
almost two-thirds of the Muslim sample (63%) believe that negative attitudes
toward them have become more widespread in the past five years.37 The opinion
on this matter among the population is slightly influenced by the degree of Islamophobia: those scoring high on the combined index on Islamophobia see negative
attitudes as more widespread than those scoring low on the index. This is not the
case for the Jewish respondents.
36. Hoffmann and Moe eds., Attitudes Towards Jews and Muslims, 75.
37. Due to a sampling error, this question was only answered by 18 respondents of the population
sample.
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
TABLE 7.10. How widespread do you think negative attitudes towards Jews are in
Norway today? (Percent. Population and Muslim samples)38
Very
widespread
Fairly
widespread
Impossible to
answer
No
response
Not very
widespread
Not wide- Total
spread at
all
Population
2.4
16.9
11.8
0.0
58.8
10.1
100
Muslims
1.7
8.0
37.1
0.4
34.3
18.6
100
The response pattern concerning the spread of antisemitism in Norway is quite
different from the pattern regarding the spread of Islamophobia; neither the population nor the Muslims see negative attitudes towards Jews as very widespread,
while the few Jewish respondents see such attitudes as very or fairly widespread.
Although one cannot make reliable statements about the distribution of opinions among Jews in Norway because of the small number of respondents, surveys
among Jews in a number of European countries suggest that Jews perceive antisemitism to be very widespread and increasing.39 This is also supported by the fact
that 69.4% of Jews in Norway believe that antisemitism has spread more widely
in the last five years (25.0% say as widespread as before; 4.8% say less widespread than before).
Jews and Muslims were also asked if it was necessary to combat antisemitism
and Islamophobia in Norway. Since Muslims are less likely than the general population and Norwegian Jews to think that Islamophobia is very widespread in Norway, they are also less likely to agree to the need to combat Islamophobia than the
general population (54.3% to 56.0%), and even less than the Jews (67.2%).
38. Due to a sampling error, this question was only answered by 20 Jewish respondents (of them,
58% see antisemitism as very or fairly widespread, while 30% see it as not very widespread); we
cannot make a statistically assured statement here.
39. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Discrimination and Hate Crime. In a
recent study, 89% of Jewish respondents in 12 EU Member States agreed to the statement that
the level of antisemitism has increased a lot or a little in the last five years since the first study.
See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism, Figure 7.2.
235
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WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
4. VIEWS ON HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AGAINST THE OTHER
GROUP
Antisemitism and Islamophobia are not just attitudes, but manifest themselves
also in harassment and even violence against members of the Jewish and Muslim
populations. In the 2017 study we used five items for each group to measure the
attitudes of the three samples toward this topic.
dŽǁŚĂƚĞdžƚĞŶƚĚŽLJŽƵĂŐƌĞĞŽƌĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ͍
Ϭй ϭϬй ϮϬй ϯϬй ϰϬй ϱϬй ϲϬй ϳϬй ϴϬй ϵϬй ϭϬϬй
,ĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚDƵƐůŝŵƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞǀĞƌLJŽŶĞĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂƚƚĂĐŬƐŽŶŽƵƌƐŽĐŝĞƚLJ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ
ϭ
ϭϱ
ϯ ϴ
ϭϱ ϱ Ϯ
,ĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚDƵƐůŝŵƐƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚ/ƐůĂŵŽƉŚŽďŝĂŚĂƐ
ďĞĐŽŵĞĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƉƌŽďůĞŵŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ
ϯ ϭϬ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ
ϱ ϲ
ϯϮ
ϰϭ
ϱϮ
ϯϱ
ϭϴ
ϭϱ
Ϭ
ϭϵ
ϱϭ
ϰ
Ϯϭ
ϱϬ
,ĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚDƵƐůŝŵƐĂƌĞƚŚĞĂĐƚƐŽĨĞdžƚƌĞŵŝƐƚƐ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ
Ϯϱ
Ϯϭ
ϰ
ϯϭ
ϴ
ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƌĞĐĞŶƚƚĞƌƌŽƌĂƚƚĂĐŬƐ͕ŚĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
DƵƐůŝŵƐĂƌĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĂďůĞ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ
ŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ
EŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
ϰϬ
ϭϭ
ϯϴ
ϭϮ
ϭϳ
Ϯϲ
ϰϳ
ϯϭ
Ϯϯ
ϭϰ
Ϯϰ
WĂƌƚŝĂůůLJĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ
WĂƌƚŝĂůůLJĂŐƌĞĞ
Ϯϯ
ϭϴ
Ϭ ϳ ϯ
ϴ ϯ ϳ Ϯ
ϭϳ
ϲϰ
:ĞǁƐ;ϭϬϯͿ
,ĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚDƵƐůŝŵƐǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĂƉƌŽďůĞŵŝĨ
ƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞĨĞǁĞƌDƵƐůŝŵĂƐLJůƵŵƐĞĞŬĞƌƐ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϲϮͿ
Ϭ
ϴ ϰ
Ϭ
Ϯϰ
ϴ
ϰ
Ϯϯ
ϴ
/ŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĂŶƐǁĞƌ
ŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJĂŐƌĞĞ
FIGURE 7.14. Views on harassment and violence against Muslims (Percent. Population
and Jewish sample)40
Figure 7.14 shows that the distribution of the answers given by Jews and the general population concerning harassment and violence against Muslims are quite
similarly distributed. A large majority of both samples agrees that violence and
harassment against Muslims show that Islamophobia has become a serious problem in Europe, and both ascribe these acts to extremists. Both also disagree that
terror attacks justify harassment and violence against Muslims; only 10% of the
population and 9% of the Jewish sample agree here. But one-third of the popula40. In this case, the population sample is N = 1,562; see footnote 6. Due to a sampling error, this
question was only asked of 110 respondents in the Jewish sample.
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
dŽǁŚĂƚĞdžƚĞŶƚĚŽLJŽƵĂŐƌĞĞŽƌĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐ͍
Ϭй ϭϬй ϮϬй ϯϬй ϰϬй ϱϬй ϲϬй ϳϬй ϴϬй ϵϬйϭϬϬй
,ĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ:ĞǁƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞǀĞƌLJŽŶĞĂŶĚ
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂƚƚĂĐŬƐŽŶŽƵƌƐŽĐŝĞƚLJ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϳϱͿ
ϭϲ
DƵƐůŝŵƐ;ϱϴϲͿ
ϴ
,ĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ:ĞǁƐƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚĂŶƚŝƐĞŵŝƚŝƐŵŚĂƐ
ďĞĐŽŵĞĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƉƌŽďůĞŵŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϳϱͿ
ϭϲ
ϲ
ϯ
ϭϳ
ϯϭ
DƵƐůŝŵůĞĂĚĞƌƐŵƵƐƚĚŽŵŽƌĞƚŽĐŽŵďĂƚĂŶƚŝƐĞŵŝƚŝƐŵŝŶƚŚĞŝƌůŽĐĂů
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϳϱͿ
DƵƐůŝŵƐ;ϱϴϲͿ
ŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ
EŽƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ
Ϭ
ϰϬ
ϯ
ϭϱ
ϴ
ϭϯ
ϭϬ
ϭϴ
Ϯϯ
Ϯϴ
WĂƌƚŝĂůůLJĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ
WĂƌƚŝĂůůLJĂŐƌĞĞ
ϱ
Ϭ ϭϬ Ϯ
ϭϯ
ϴ
ϰϬ
ϱ
ϭϰ
ϭϵ
ϯϴ
ϯϱ
ϭϮ
Ϯϱ
Ϭ
Ϭ
ϭϲ
ϯϯ
ϰϯ
Ϯϲ
ϭϭ
ϲ
ϭϯ
ϳ
ϵ
Ϯϵ
ϯϴ
ϯϵ
Ϯϵ
DƵƐůŝŵƐ;ϱϴϲͿ
ϯϵ
ϱ
ϭϱ
ŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐŚŽǁ/ƐƌĂĞůƚƌĞĂƚƐƚŚĞWĂůĞƐƚŝŶŝĂŶƐ͕ŚĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ:ĞǁƐĂƌĞũƵƐƚŝĨŝĂďůĞ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϳϱͿ
DƵƐůŝŵƐ;ϱϴϲͿ
ϯϴ
ϯϯ
ϭϯ
DƵƐůŝŵƐ;ϱϴϲͿ
sŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ:ĞǁƐŝƐƚŚĞĂĐƚŽĨĞdžƚƌĞŵŝƐƚƐ͕ĂŶĚƐĂLJƐŶŽƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ
ƚŚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƵƌŽƉĞ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶϮϬϭϳ;ϭϱϳϱͿ
Ϭ
ϭϴ
ϯϭ
ϱ
ϮϬ
Ϯϭ
/ŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĂŶƐǁĞƌ
ŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJĂŐƌĞĞ
FIGURE 7.15. Views on harassment and violence against Jews (Percent. Population and
Muslim samples)
tion and the Jewish samples agree that there is a connection between the number
of Muslim asylum seekers and the problem of violence against Muslims, i.e., the
immigration of Muslims to Norway is seen as a causal factor in this respect.
By contrast, figure 7.15 shows quite clear differences between the distribution of
answers given by Muslims and by the general population. Muslims clearly agree
less often that harassment and violence against Jews concern everyone and constitute an attack on “our society”, that they are an indication of strong antisemitism,
or that Muslim leaders must do more to combat antisemitism in their local communities. This is partly due to the fact that a large part of the Muslim respondents
chose the option “impossible to say” or did not answer the question. Correspondingly, if one looks at those who disagree to the above-mentioned statements, Muslim respondents differ a little less from the general population. This may be an indication that the parts of the Muslim population who have not lived in Norway for
long are unfamiliar with these issues and have not formed a clear opinion yet (as
can also be seen in the distribution of their answers to other items of the study).
237
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WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
In the following, I will investigate what these results tell us about the relationship between Jews and Muslims in Norway. For Jews who have a long history of
harassment and violence in Europe, the attack on a minority is a warning sign that
should concern everyone, and is not only seen as a problem of the affected group
because it may spill over to other minorities. Muslims see these attacks less often
as something that concerns the whole society, to which some of them as immigrants may not feel yet closely related. The answer to the question “Muslim leaders must do more to combat antisemitism in their local communities”, is supported
by a clear majority of the population (69%),41 but is seen as necessary by only
41% of the Muslims. Accordingly, 19% disagree (compared to 4% of the population) or were not able to give an answer (40%). It may be that the latter either do
not see antisemitism as being widespread among them, or they do not support this
demand because they have experienced that the Muslims are implicitly given the
primary responsibility for antisemitic violence.
A third dimension of prejudice is called conative or behavioural, meaning the
behavioural tendencies of a person toward a particular object, such as acceptance
and readiness to help, but also withdrawal and aggression (for example, the readiness to use or excuse violence against an individual group). Of course, there is no
direct and unambiguous connection between the existence of a cognitive and emotional prejudice with violence, because many other factors come into play (psychological dispositions, cultural context, situational factors etc.).42 Readiness to
use or excuse violence takes us, as Daniel Staetsky has phrased it, “metaphorically
‘half-way’ between attitudes and behaviour, and somewhat closer to an empirical
assessment of the potential for violence”.43 The question is, do antisemitic or antiMuslim attitudes coincide with legitimisation of violence against Jews or Muslims?44
41. This question is unfortunately not posed to the Jewish respondents, but we can expect that a
large majority of them would have also supported this demand.
42. Howard Schuman and Michael P. Johnson, “Attitudes and Behavior”, Annual Review of Sociology 2 (1976): 161–207; Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pearson, 1980).
43. L. Daniel Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain. A study of attitudes towards
Jews and Israel, jpr/report (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, September 2017), 39.
44. Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, “The influence of attitudes on behavior”. In Handbook of attitudes and attitude change, edited by Dolores Albarracín, B.T. Johnson and M.P. Zanna (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 2005), 173–221; Laura R. Glasman and Dolores Albarracín, “Forming
Attitudes that Predict Future Behavior: A Meta-Analysis of the Attitude-Behavior-Relation”,
Psychological Bulletin, 123, no. 5 (2006): 778–822. For this relationship among the general
population, see my chapter “Counting Antisemites versus Measuring Antisemitism – An “Elastic View” of Antisemitism”.
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
In the CHM survey, the readiness to justify harassment or violence against Jews
is measured by asking “Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, harassment
and violence against Jews are justifiable” (12% of the population and 21% of the
Muslims agree). Here a higher percentage of Muslims agree, which is partly influenced by the connection that the statement formulates between the violence
against Jews and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which some Muslim countries,
as neighbours of Israel, are much more involved than Norway.45 It may also be
that both groups generally have different ideas about violence. Norwegians generally do not consider violence and harassment justified.
The other way around, the readiness to justify harassment and violence against
Muslims is measured by asking the population and the Jews “Considering recent
terror attacks, harassment and violence against Muslims are justifiable” (10% of
the population and 9% of the Jews agree here).
One can now ask how the justification of harassment and violence against the
other group is related to prejudices against the other group. For this purpose we have
crossed the two questions “Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, harassment and violence against Jews are justifiable” and “Considering recent terror
attacks, harassment and violence against Muslims are justifiable” respectively with
the index on Antisemitism and with the index on Islamophobia. We consider here
only those whose opinions fit with these statements “completely and rather well”. In
both cases, justifying harassment and violence against Muslims and against Jews,
there is a steady increase from point 0 to point 3 on the index of Islamophobia/on
the index on Antisemitism for the population sample as well as for both minority
samples (the fact that the pattern differs somewhat in the case of the Jewish respondents (high scorers: 2 and 3 on the index) is due to the small number of respondents
in the Jewish sample (N=110), especially among the high-scorers (N=16). The general trend remains nonetheless.46 This means that the proportion of respondents who
consider harassment and violence against another group justifiable increases steadily with an increase in antisemitic or Islamophobic attitudes. Therefore, we can conclude that there is a correlation between the strength of antisemitic or Islamophobic
attitudes and the justification of violence against Jews or Muslims.
45. The readiness to justify harassment or violence against Jews is measured by asking “Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, harassment and violence against Jews are justifiable”.
This operationalisation is, of course, somewhat problematic because of the connection with the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although it is explicitly asked about violence against “Jews” and not
against “Israelis”, it could also be understood as if it were about the use of violence by Palestinians against Israeli Jews in the context of the conflict, which some of the general population and
the Muslim population may find more often justified than violence against Jews in general.
239
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WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
Although there is a clear correlation between prejudice and justification of violence, the figures (footnote 39) also show that a large majority of those considering harassment and violence against Jews as justified harbour no or only low levels of antisemitic prejudice. Looking at the absolute numbers, of the 183
interviewees among the population that consider harassment and violence against
Jews justifiable, 146 (or 79.8%) are among the low scorers (scores 0 and 1) on the
index on Antisemitism, while only 37 (20.2%) are among the high scorers (scores
2 and 3). Among the Muslim respondents, the ratio is similar: of the 122 respondents who believe that violence against Jews is justifiable, 102 (75.6%) are low
scorers and 20 (24.4%) are high scorers.
In the case of Islamophobia, we find the opposite picture. Looking at the absolute numbers, of the 157 respondents who consider harassment and violence
against Muslims to be justifiable, only 53 (or 33.7%) are among the low scorers
on the index on Islamophobia, while 104 (66.3%) are high scorers.47 Thus, a large
majority of those who justify violence against Jews can do so without a decidedly
antisemitic attitude,48 while the majority of those who justify violence against
Muslims also harbour an Islamophobic attitude. In other words, there is a closer
connection between Islamophobia and justifying violence against Muslims. That
one does not find such a close connection in the case of antisemitism and justifying violence against Jews may be partly due to the fact that the justification in this
case is connected with the policy of Israel and so may be closer connected to an
anti-Israel attitude than with an antisemitic attitude. Those who score high on the
anti-Israel index (score 2) clearly hold harassment and violence against Jews more
often to be justifiable than those who score low on anti-Israel sentiment (score 0
and 1 – see Table 7.11).
46. “Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, harassment and violence against Jews are justifiable” by combined index on Antisemitism: Population: index 0: N=913; index 1: N=218;
index 2: N=211; index 3: N=214 (total N=1556); Jews: index 0: N= 73; index 1: N=21; index 2:
N=12 ; index 3: N= 4 (total N=110); “Considering recent terror attacks, harassment and violence
against Muslims are justifiable” by combined index of Islamophobia: Population: index 0:
N=1365; index 1: N=124; index 2: N=54; index 3: N=32 (total N=1.575); Muslims: index 0:
N=392; index 1: N=165; index 2: N=30; index 3: N= 12 (total N=598).
47. The proportion of Jewish respondents who believe that violence against Muslims is justifiable
(N=10) is too small (N=10) to make reliable statements, but the response distribution is similar
to that in the total population.
48. Since the question is related to Israel's behaviour, it may be necessary to restrict the meaning of
this result somewhat. Perhaps it should be discussed in light of the “new” forms of antisemitism
related to Israel.
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
TABLE 7.11. “Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, harassment and violence
against Jews are justifiable” (completely and rather well) by anti-Israel index (0–2)49
Group/Anti-Israel index (0–2)
0
1
2
Population
6.5
9.4
29.4
10.0
14.8
39.1
Muslims
Population N= 1,575: index 0: N=360; index 1: N=984; index 2: N=231
Muslims N= 598 (weighted sample): index 0: N= 78; index 1: N=367; index 2: N=153
One can also look at two others items in which a kind of justification of violence
or persecution is mentioned. Among the items of the “Prejudice against Jews
index”, we find the following statement: “Jews largely have themselves to blame
for being persecuted” (see Figures 7.5 and 7.6), to which 8% of the population and
16% of the Muslim sample agree fully or somewhat. Among the list of stereotypic
statements toward Muslims, we find a rather similar item: “Muslims largely have
themselves to blame for the increase in anti-Muslim harassment” (see Figure 7.8),
to which a rather large part of the population (48%) and of the Jews (35%) agrees.
Those who harbour antisemitic and/or anti-Israel prejudice blame Jews more often
than those ranking low on the respective indices. While only 2% of those among
the population scoring zero on the anti-Israel index agree, 26% of the high scorers
do so. Among the Muslim respondents, 9% of the low scorers compared to 34%
high scorers agree. Among those of the population who score high on the index on
antisemitism (scores 2+3 N=86) 54.6% (N=47) are blaming Jews for being persecuted while only 5% (N=82) out of the low scorers (0+1, N=1,489) do so. Among
the Muslim respondents, 61.9% (N=26) of those who score high on the combined
antisemitism index (2+3; N=42) blame Jews, while only 13.4% (N=75) among the
low scorers (N=557) do so. We find here a clear correlation between antisemitic
attitudes and justifying persecution of Jews by putting the blame for this on the
behaviour of the Jews themselves.50
49. We have to keep in mind here that the anti-Israel index is composed of two items, one of which
deals with the same subject, namely treatment of the Palestinians by Israel (“Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II”), to which 32% of the population and even 50% of the Muslims agree completely or somewhat.
50. When using the combined Index on antisemitism, however, it must be pointed out that in this
case the item “Jews have largely themselves to blame…” is at the same time a component of the
Prejudice against Jews index and thus has an (albeit minor) influence on the correlation measured here.
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WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
Among those of the population who score high on the index on Islamophobia
(scoring 2 and 3), as much as 92.4% blame Muslims for an increase in anti-Muslim harassment, and even 20% of the low scorers do so, which is quite a difference
compared to the number of respondents who put the blame on the Jews. Among
the Jewish respondents, we find almost the same distribution, but the number of
Jewish respondents (N=16) is too small to make reliable statements here.51 We can
see an even higher correlation between Islamophobic attitudes and justifying harassment against Muslims by putting the blame for this on the behaviour of the
Muslims themselves, compared to the blaming of Jews for being persecuted.52
This result may reflect in part the greater rejection of Muslims, who are more
often perceived as a threat to Western societies, but this is also partly due to the
choice of words, as in the case of the Jews there is talk of persecution, whereas in
the case of the Muslims it is harassment that is spoken of. Especially against the
background of the Holocaust, blaming of Jews could be considered particularly
problematic.
Both minorities are affected by discrimination and harassment; this would be an
area where cooperation would be useful. That’s why we asked in the study what
the opinion on combating anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim discrimination and harassment is.
TABLE 7.12. Do you see a need to do something to combat anti-Jewish harassment
in Norway? (Percent. Population and Muslim samples) 53
Yes
No opinion
No response
No
Total
Population
40.7
31.2
0.0
28.1
100
Muslims
27.8
48.4
3.6
20.3
100
51. 93.7% (N=15) of those Jewish respondents who score high on the combined index on Islamophobia (scoring 2 and 3) blame Muslims, while 14.6% (N=13) among the low scorers do so.
52. When using the combined index on Islamophobia, however, it must again be pointed out that in
this case the item “Muslims largely have themselves to blame for the increase in anti-Muslim
harassment” is at the same time a component of the Prejudice against Muslims index and thus
has an (albeit minor) influence on the correlation measured here.
53. Due to a sampling error, this question was only asked of 20 respondents in the Jewish sample, so
the number of Jewish respondents is too small to get reliable data, but the responses were as
expected: 90.0% answered “Yes”, another 10.0% chose “no response”.
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
TABLE 7.13. Do you see a need to do something to combat anti-Muslim harassment in Norway?
Yes
No opinion
No response
No
Total
Population
56.1
26.1
0.1
17.7
100
Muslims
54.4
26.9
3.8
14.9
100
Jews
67.0
24.3
1.0
7.8
100
Population N= 1,575; Muslims N= 387; Jews N=103
The responses to these questions seem to mirror the opinion about how widespread the respondents of all three samples consider antisemitism and Islamophobia to be distributed in Norwegian society (see Tables 7.9 and 7.10). Accordingly,
the general population and the Muslims are less likely to see the need to fight antiJewish harassment than harassment directed against Muslims. The fact that Jews
almost all consider the fight against anti-Jewish harassment necessary corresponds to the expectation, since Jews have a long history of fighting against antisemitism in whatever form it appeared.54 This experience, connected with an
above-average level of education, is presumably also the reason why Jews more
often also consider a need to combat anti-Muslim harassment than the population
and even the Muslims themselves, since they know from history that each form of
anti-minority offence can spill over to them.
Among the Muslim respondents, there seems to be a great deal of ignorance or
indifference to anti-Jewish harassment. This is even true for harassments against
their own group, since almost half of them (45.6%) has no opinion, does not
answer the question, or views a fight against harassment as unnecessary, which is
even higher than among the Jewish respondents (32.1%). As far as cooperation
between Jews and Muslims in the fight against attacks is concerned, there is a
widespread awareness of the problem on the Jews’ side, but not yet on the side of
the Muslims.
54. One has to keep in mind here that in the question of harassment and violence there exists a special, asymmetrical situation, inasmuch as Jews in Europe often become the target of transgressions on the part of Muslims, whereas the reverse is not yet known. Qualitative interviews in the
Norwegian report of 2017 reveal that “Jewish informants showed signs of ambivalence: on the
one hand they feared the growth of antisemitism among Muslims and felt vulnerable to the
aggression that could be directed at them. On the other hand, several Jewish informants conveyed that the presence of such a large minority helped to promote acceptance of diversity in
Norwegian society” (Hoffmann and Moe eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims, 75).
243
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WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
5. PERCEPTIONS OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT BY JEWS
AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY
Jews in many European countries have a deep emotional and religious attachment
to Israel. Therefore, “negativity toward Israel expressed by non-Jews is likely to be
a cause for significant concern and apprehension among many Jews.”55 In the FRA
Study and in a German study on “Jewish perspectives”, it becomes clear that a large
majority of Jews evaluates the equating of Israeli politics toward the Palestinians
to Nazis politics towards Jews, the support of the boycott of goods from Israel and
a “distorted presentation of Israel’s politics in mass media” as an expression of an
antisemitic attitude.56 While only a part of Muslims in Norway come from the Middle East, many of them are likely to be supportive of the Palestinians, and accordingly show a rather negative attitude to the state of Israel and its policies towards
the Palestinians. Accordingly, we can assume that the attitude to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict has a repercussion on the relationship between Jews and Muslims in Norway as well. This is clearly confirmed by the following table 7.14.
TABLE 7.14. People have conflicting views on the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians. Which side do you support most?
Solely/
mostly
Israel
To some
extent
Israel
Population
8.8
4.5
31.9
22.3
0.2
10.5
21.9
100
Muslims
2.9
0.4
17.3
15.5
4.7
7.2
52.0
100
65.9
13.5
5.3
14.1
0.0
1.2
0.0
100
Jews
Neither ImpossiNo
To some
Solely/
Total
ble to response
extent
mostly
answer
Palestinians Palestinians
Population N=1,575; Muslims N=598 (weighted sample); Jews N=170
It comes as no surprise that the Jews and Muslims in Norway clearly vote for their
“own” party in the conflict. Most of all, Jews take sides with Israel and are less
often undecided, while the attitude of the Muslims is less clear and one-third is
undecided or unable to answer the question. In the population sample, there is
55. Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain, 27.
56. FRA, Discrimination and Hate Crime; FRA, Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism, 29,
Table 5 (seen by Jews as antisemitic opinions: “Supports boycotts of Israel or Israelis” (82%
agree); “Criticizes Israel” (38% agree) Andreas Hövermann, Silke Jensen, Andreas Zick, Julia
Bernstein, Nathalie Perl and Inna Ramm, Jüdische Perspektiven auf Antisemitismus in
Deutschland. Studie des Instituts für Konflikt und Gewaltforschung der Universität Bielefeld
für den Unabhängigen Expertenkreis Antisemitismus, Bielefeld 2016, 12,16.
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
even a half that does not tend to either side or cannot answer the question. If the
population takes sides, it does so especially for the Palestinians (32.3%): only a
minority, 13.3%, sides with Israel.
The positioning in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is correlated with the emotional attitude, in this case dislike/antipathy towards Jews and Muslims. The influence can, of course, go both ways. Israel’s policy may affect which side one supports, which again may lead to the dislike of Jews.
TABLE 7.15. “I have a certain dislike of Jews”. How well does this statement fit with
you own opinion?
Dislike /Position in IsraeliPalestinian
conflict (%)
pro Israel
Neither/no
response
pro Palestinian
Total N
Population
Muslims
Population
Muslims
Population
Muslims
Population
Muslims
Not at all/rather
badly
15
4
54
31
31
65
1279
294
Impossible to say
/no response
4
2
76
50
20
48
178
250
Completely/
rather well
7
5
27
16
66
79
118
54
TABLE 7.16. “I have a certain dislike of Muslims”. How well does this statement fit
with your own opinion?
Dislike /Position in IsraeliPalestinian
conflict (%)
pro Israel
Neither/no
response
pro Palestinian
Total
Population
Jews
Population
Jews
Population
Jews
Population
Jews
Not at all/rather
badly
9
75
49
22
42
3
873
69
Impossible to say
/no response
8
83
69
17
23
0
229
18
24
100
57
0
19
0
473
23
Completely/
rather well
Table 7.15 shows that the emotional attitude towards Jews plays only a minor role
in taking side with Israel, since there is almost no difference between those who
245
246
WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
dislike or like Jews or take a neutral position. Among the population, those who
reject the dislike question are more often pro-Israel than those who dislike Jews
or take a neutral position. What can be seen is that there is a clear correlation
between dislike of Jews and taking side with the Palestinians: two-thirds of the
population who dislike Jews chose this option compared to one-third of those who
do not dislike Jews. Among the Muslims respondents, many take sides with the
Palestinians regardless of whether they like Jews or not. The proportion of those
79% who profess to disliking Jews is not so different from the two-thirds (66%)
who disagree to disliking Jews.
Concerning the emotional attitude of the population towards Muslims, the distribution in respect of taking sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is as expected.
Those respondents who dislike Muslims are more likely to have a pro-Israeli attitude than those who are neutral or positive in this regard, while those who dislike
Muslims less often side with the Palestinians compared to those who have a pos-
,ŽǁǁĞůůĚŽƚŚĞƐĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĨŝƚǁŝƚŚLJŽƵƌŽǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ
DŝĚĚůĞĂƐƚĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ͍;ĨŝƚĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůLJĂŶĚƌĂƚŚĞƌǁĞůůͿ
:ĞǁƐ
DƵƐůŝŵƐ
WŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
ϴϭ
ŽƚŚ/ƐƌĂĞůŝƐĂŶĚWĂůĞƐƚŝŶŝĂŶƐĂƌĞĞŶƚŝƚůĞĚƚŽĂƐƚĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶ
ϳϬ
ϳϭ
ϭϯ
WĂůĞƐƚŝŶŝĂŶůĞĂĚĞƌƐŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůLJǁĂŶƚƚŽĨŝŶĚĂƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ
ϰϰ
ϯϮ
ϭ
/ƐƌĂĞůƚƌĞĂƚƐƚŚĞWĂůĞƐƚŝŶŝĂŶƐũƵƐƚĂƐďĂĚůLJĂƐƚŚĞ:ĞǁƐǁĞƌĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ
ĚƵƌŝŶŐtŽƌůĚtĂƌ//
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ϲϱ
/ƐƌĂĞůDzƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůLJǁĂŶƚƚŽĨŝŶĚĂƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ
ϭϬ
ϮϮ
ϰ
ƐůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞŽĨ/ƐƌĂĞůĞdžŝƐƚƐƚŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞŶŽƉĞĂĐĞ
Ϯϱ
ϮϬ
ϲϯ
/ƐƌĂĞůŝƐĂƚƚŚĞĨŽƌĞĨƌŽŶƚŽĨƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ
ϭϳ
ϮϬ
FIGURE 7.16. Opinions about the Middle East conflict (Percent. Population, Jewish and
Muslim samples)
Jews N= 124
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
itive attitude towards Muslims – and vice versa. Those, however, who do not
choose sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (which is more than half of the sample), do so largely regardless of their emotional attitude towards Muslims.
Concerning the emotional attitude of Jews towards Muslims, one can say that
Jews side with Israel almost regardless of their feelings towards Muslims. While
those who agree to the dislike item side totally with Israel, partisanship for Israel
among those who reject the dislike item is a little lower, but even among them, only
3% choose the Palestinians’ side and almost a quarter occupies a neutral position.
If we compare the positioning of the Norwegian Jews and Muslims in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is striking that both groups very rarely support “the
other side”, regardless of their emotional attitudes towards members of the other
group. However, Muslims more often choose a neutral position in the conflict,
whereas only a small proportion of the Jews occupy a neutral position. In both
cases those who take a neutral position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reject the
“dislike” question or show a neutral attitude toward the other group.57
The two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the only question in
which all three samples agree and in which there is also a high level of consensus.
Jews have the clearest position in this question; they not only show the highest
percentage of agreement, but also of disagreement (11% compared to 6% of the
Muslims and the population), and only very few of them are unable to answer the
question (8% compared to 20% of the Muslims and 25% of the population). It
57. The hypothesis that Muslims from countries more involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
(Palestinians, Iraq, Iran) are less likely to take a neutral position than those who are less
affected, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Pakistan or Somalia, cannot be confirmed for
the Norwegian sample. The table of the country background on antisemitism for Muslim immigrants shows surprising results that differ completely from the results of the ADL Global 100
study (Anti-Defamation League, Global 100. An Index of Anti-Semitism, (New York: ADL,
2014 – http://global100.adl.org/) on antisemitism for their countries of origin. Immigrants from
Iraq, Morocco and Palestine, countries in which the ADL study has determined values above
80% and even 90%, are on average in the Norwegian sample of values for all Muslims, while
immigrants from countries that show a significantly lower level in the ADL Study have scores
of antisemitism such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Pakistan at 21.5% and 11.8%, respectively,
well above the average for all Muslim immigrants of 6.9%. See Hoffmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims, 103, Table 55. These findings contradict the results of a German survey, which confirms that Muslim migrants from Arab and North African countries and
their descendants more often display antisemitic attitudes than do migrants from the Balkans,
Afghanistan and Pakistan. See Lebenswelten junger Muslime in Deutschland: Ein sozial- und
medienwissenschaftliches System zur Analyse, Bewertung und Prävention islamistischer
Radikalisierungsprozesse junger Menschen in Deutschland, Abschlussbericht von Wolfgang
Frindte, Klaus Boehnke, Henry Kreikenbaum, and Wolfgang Wagner (Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern, 2011).
247
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WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
comes as no surprise that none/almost none of the Jewish respondents agree to the
two statements accusing Israel of treating Palestinians as badly as Jews were
treated during World War II and that the pure existence of Israel is an obstacle to
peace, statements to which the Muslim respondents agree quite often (50% and
25%) and which also find resonance among the Norwegian population (33% and
21%). The other way around, Jews view Israel as a means for resolving the conflict with the Palestinians and in a leading role in fighting Islamist terrorism, a
view shared only by few Muslims and respondents of the population. Correspondingly, Jews have little faith in the will of the Palestinian leaders for a peaceful solution of the conflict. As was to be expected, Jews and Muslims form contrary opinions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The answers make it clear once again
that the respondents in the general population are more inclined to support the Palestinian side in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
An index on anti-Israel attitudes is set up from the two negative statements
“Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated in World War
II” and “As long as Israel exists there will be no peace.” The index ranges from 0
to 8 and we set a cut-off point between 4 and 5 points on the scale in order to differentiate low from high scorers. Given this cut-off point, 38.9% of the Muslim
respondents show a high level of anti-Israel attitudes, compared with 27.2% of the
general population.58
First, we have to ask about the correlation between anti-Israel and antisemitic
attitudes.59 The correlation between the two is r = 0.32 for the general population
58. See Ottar Hellevik, “Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway”, section 7.
59. There are already some studies investigating the link between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes. Edgar H. Kaplan and Charles Small, “Anti-Israel sentiment predicts anti-Semitism in
Europe”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no.4 (2006): 548–561, used the data of the ADL
survey, Attitudes toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Ten European
Countries (New York, 2004); for the British case, the Pearson correlation (r) between the antisemitic and the anti-Israel index is 0.48 (Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain,
35, Footnote 24); for Germany, see the study by Aribert Heyder, Julia Iser and Peter Schmidt,
“Israelkritik oder Antisemitismus? Meinungsbildung zwischen Öffentlichkeit, Medien und
Tabus”, in Deutsche Zustände, Folge 3, ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp,
2004) 144–165. For a discussion of these and some other studies (on Sweden and Switzerland),
see Werner Bergmann, “Is there a ‘New European Antisemitism?’ Public Opinion and Comparative Empirical Research in Europe”, in Politics and Resentment. Antisemitism and CounterCosmopolitism in the European Union, eds. Lars Rensmann and Julius H. Schoeps (Leiden:
Brill, 2011), 83–115, here 89ff.; for an early example, see also Werner Bergmann and Rainer
Erb, Anti-Semitism in Germany. The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945 (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publ., 1997) Chapter: “Antizionism and Antisemitism”, 182–191. See also probably the most
detailed study on this question by Wilhelm Kempf, Israelkritik zwischen Antisemitismus und
Menschenrechtsidee. Eine Spurensuche (Berlin: Verlag Irena Regener, 2016).
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
and it is only marginally stronger for the Muslims with r = .37. Among the Muslim
high-scorers on the anti-Israel index (5–8), 18.7% also score high on the combined
antisemitism index (4–12), while the same is the case for only 5.3% of the population.60 There is a certain overlap between the two attitudes among Muslims, but
on the other hand, we have to keep in mind that 81.3% of the high scorers on the
anti-Israel index do not harbour strong antisemitic attitudes, and even 94.7% of
the population with an outspoken anti-Israel attitude do not score high on the combined antisemitism index. It is strange, however, that high scorers on the antiIsrael index, with 12.4%, are also high scorers on the Islamophobia index. In other
words, a negative attitude towards Israel does not have to go hand in hand with a
positive attitude towards Muslims.61 This is due to the fact that both attitudes are
an expression of xenophobia as a general background variable. 62
If we look among the general population for the possible influence of Islamophobic attitudes regarding attitudes toward Israel and towards the Palestinians, we
find only quite low positive correlations with a pro-Israel attitude (r=.12)63 and
also a quite low negative correlation with a pro-Palestinian position (r= –.18).64
We get another picture for the Jewish respondents. Here there is a higher positive
correlation with pro-Israel attitudes (r=.36), and a higher negative correlation with
a pro-Palestinian attitude (r= –.28).65 However, an Islamophobic attitude exerts a
stronger influence concerning partisanship in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Here
there is a negative correlation of –.32 for the population, which is even more pronounced for the Jewish respondents, with –.42. An antisemitic attitude, measured
by the combined index on antisemitism, exerts a smaller influence on the attitude
towards the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the positive correlations
for the population are .20 for the general population and .25 for the Muslim
respondents. That leads to the conclusion that an Islamophobic attitude in both
60. The negative correlation between the combined antisemitism index with siding with Israel in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also not very high (r= –.17) for the general population, but also for
the Muslim sample (r= –.12). All correlations are significant on the <.001 level.
61. This is also supported by the fact that the combined antisemitism index has no significant correlation (r = .06) with a pro-Palestinian attitude in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the population sample, but the same holds true for the Muslim sample (0.9).
62. Ottar Hellevik, “Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway”, section 7.2.
63. See Fig. 16: Index build out of two statements: Israel is at the forefront of the war on Islamic terrorism; Israel’s leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict.
64. See Fig. 16: Index build out of two statements: Both the Israelis and the Palestinians are entitled
to have a state of their own; Palestinian leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict.
65. The correlations for the population sample are significant on the <.001 level; for the Jewish the
correlation of the Islamophobia index and a pro-Israel position is significant on the .001 level;
the negative correlation with a pro-Palestinian attitude is significant on the .05 level.
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WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
the population and among Jewish respondents exerts a stronger influence in
favour of taking sides with Israel than an antisemitic attitude does in the direction
of taking sides with the Palestinians.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In order to better understand the relationship between Jews and Muslims in Norway, it makes sense to include the Norwegian population in general as tertium
comparationis. This allows examining to what extent the minority samples share
the views of the general Norwegian population.
Comparing the mutual prejudices between Jews and Muslims with those of the
general Norwegian population towards both groups, then Jews show less emotional rejection and less negative stereotypes towards Muslims than the general
population, while conversely Muslims are more likely to show an emotional rejection of Jews and agree clearly more frequently with antisemitic stereotypes than
the general population.
On the other hand, if we compare both minorities, Jews and Muslims, directly,
Jews are more likely to show an emotional and social rejection of Muslims than
they themselves experience from the side of the Muslims. Jews and Muslims thus
both seem to follow the attitudinal pattern of the majority population. As far as the
spread of negative cognitive attitudes (prejudices) is concerned, Jews and Muslims agree with each other’s prejudices to about the same degree.66 An interesting,
but not easily explicable finding is that, among Jews, the emotional and cognitive
attitudes towards Muslims correspond to each other – that is, that the emotional
rejection is associated with a higher approval of Islamophobic stereotypes – while
the dimensions do not seem to be very closely connected among Muslim respondents.
Despite mutual prejudices, a majority of Jews and Muslims in the survey agrees
that the minorities can co-operate in combating prejudice and insults. Jews who
have the experience of a long history as a minority among other minorities in
Europe are much more likely than Muslims to believe that the two minorities share
common experiences. Perhaps the immigrant Muslim population may have little
knowledge of the small Norwegian Jewish community and less experience of
being a minority. Although large parts of the two minorities assume that they have
66. On average, 27.1% of Jews agree with the six items of the “Index of Prejudice against Muslims”
(Table 7.2), while on average, 28.5% of Muslims agree with the six items of the “Index of Prejudice against Jews” (Table 7.1).
7. HOW DO JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER?
shared experiences, only a quarter of them believe that they are treated equally by
the Norwegian authorities. Muslims more often than Jews feel treated unfairly and
more often experience harassment, but both groups react, however, very differently to these experiences. While Jews avoid showing their religious affiliation in
the public, Muslims are much less likely to do so. This different reaction may be
due to the fact that Jews, because of their long history of discrimination, are more
likely to fear the spread of negative attitudes and violence towards them, but also
towards other minorities, than groups who have not had the same experience so
far. That is why it is not surprising that Jews and Muslims are also particularly different in their assessment of the spread of antisemitism and Islamophobia and the
evaluation of harassment and violence against both groups. Since both minorities
are affected by discrimination and harassment, we asked for the opinion of combating anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim discrimination and harassment. Among Muslim respondents, we find a great amount of indifference or ignorance concerning
anti-Jewish harassment; surprisingly, this is also true for the harassment against
their own group. The Jews show a greater attention to both, and see the need to
combat anti-Muslim harassment even more often than the Muslims themselves.
As far as cooperation between Jews and Muslims in the fight against discrimination and prejudice is concerned, there is an asymmetric distribution of attention
between the two groups, which may be a certain obstacle to understanding the
necessity for cooperation.
As for the behavioural dimension of prejudice, in the given context of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and terrorism, Muslims more often than Jews consider
harassment or violence against the other group as justifiable. While the Muslims
differ from the general population in this respect, the general population and the
Jews show the same amount of agreement in the question of harassment or violence against Muslims. This may partly be due to the fact that the justification of
violence against Jews is not connected with the behaviour of Jews, but rather with
the treatment of Palestinians by Israel. Thus, a large proportion of the Muslim
respondents who justify violence against Jews does so without a decidedly antisemitic attitude, but may instead be motivated by a widespread anti-Israel attitude,67
while in the question of violence against Muslims only a third of the Jews does so
without a decidedly Islamophobic attitude.
One area where the attitudes of Muslims and Jews are expected to diverge
widely is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where Jews are almost entirely on the
67. 38.9% of the Muslim respondents show a high level of anti-Israel attitudes and even 50% agree
to the statement that “Israel treats the Palestinians as badly as Jews were treated during World
War II”.
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WERNER BERGMANN | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
side of Israel and the Muslims are predominantly in favour of the Palestinians.
Those among the Jewish and Muslim respondents who show a dislike of the other
group more often take their “own” side in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but overall, the emotional attitude to the other group does not make much of a difference
concerning taking sides in the conflict. This does not apply to the general population, for whom the emotional attitude toward Jews or Muslims influences their
partisanship in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Evidently, greater influence than
the emotional dimension is exerted by the mutual prejudices, since for Islamophobia and antisemitism we find middle-range correlations with partisanship in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the respondents to all three samples.
If we look at the statements on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is only one
major consensus between Jews, Muslims and the general population – namely that
both Israelis and Palestinians are entitled to a state of their own. On all other
issues, Jews and Muslims are more or less distinct from each other, and the opinion of the general population is much closer to the opinion of the Muslims.
All in all, it can be said that Jews and Muslims in Norway see themselves as
minorities exposed to discrimination on the part of the majority population, so that
for parts of both groups there exists a willingness to cooperate, while on the other
hand there are mutual prejudices and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular
can be seen as a divisive factor.
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Hövermann, A., Jensen, S., Zick, A., Bernstein, J., Perl, N., Ramm, I. (2016). Jüdische Perspektiven auf Antisemitismus in Deutschland. Studie des Instituts für Konflikt und Gewaltforschung der Universität Bielefeld für den Unabhängigen Expertenkreis Antisemitismus,
Bielefeld.
Jikeli, G. (2015). Antisemitic Attitudes among Muslims in Europe: A Survey Review, ISGAP
Occasional Paper Series 1.
Kaplan, E. H., Small, C. (2006). Anti-Israel sentiment predicts anti-Semitism in Europe. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(4), 548–561.
Kempf, W. (2016). Israelkritik zwischen Antisemitismus und Menschenrechtsidee. Eine Spurensuche. Berlin: Verlag Irena Regener.
Lebenswelten junger Muslime in Deutschland: Ein sozial- und medienwissenschaftliches System zur Analyse, Bewertung und Prävention islamistischer Radikalisierungsprozesse junger
Menschen in Deutschland. Abschlussbericht von Wolfgang Frindte, Klaus Boehnke, Henry
Kreikenbaum, and Wolfgang Wagner, Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern, 2011.
Schuman, H., Johnson, M. P. (1976). Attitudes and Behavior, Annual Review of Sociology, 2,
161–207.
Staetsky, L. D. (2017). Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain. A study of attitudes towards
Jews and Israel, jpr/report. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.
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DOI: 10.18261/978-82-15-03468-3-2019-09
8.
“Muslims Are…”
Contextualising Survey Answers
CORA ALEXA DØVING
ABSTRACT Negative stereotypes of Muslims are widespread in Norway: 34 per cent
of the population displays marked prejudices against Muslims and 28 per cent also dislike and show hostility towards Muslims. The fact that these numbers are from a population survey and not from a survey conducted in established anti-Muslim milieus shows
a disturbing degree of anti-Muslim attitudes among “ordinary Norwegians”. This chapter consists of an analysis of the answers to an open-ended question that was part of the
population survey: “What do you think might be the reasons for existing negative attitudes to Muslims?” The findings are interpreted in light both of claims about Muslims
found in the quantitative part of the survey and of different public discourses that took
place the same year as the survey was conducted. I argue that the increase in anti-Muslim
discourses that has developed at the margins of the public sphere cannot be understood
as fully separated from the public mainstream, and that it has affected attitudes in the
general population. The chapter also discusses whether the results from the survey can
be explained by a lack of recognition of the racist elements in Islamophobia. Islamophobia is commonly understood as “fear of a Muslim takeover” or as something similar to a
critique of Islam. This understanding has concealed the racist elements in Islamophobia:
Would Islamophobic statements be met with stronger self-sanctioning if they were understood as varieties of racism?
KEYWORDS Islamophobia | population survey | stereotypes | social media | racism |
Norway
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.
8. “MUSLIMS ARE…”
1. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, for the first time in Norway, a population survey (hereby referred to as
the CHM survey) was conducted on attitudes towards Muslims.1 Although prejudices towards Muslims proved widespread, the total picture of attitudes towards
Muslims is multi-faceted: 52% agree with the statement “Muslims are good Norwegian citizens”. Moreover, annual population surveys show that a larger majority is positive towards a multicultural society and to immigrants having the same
rights as the rest of the population.2 Seventy-three per cent would not mind having
a Muslim in their circle of friends, and a survey by the Pew Research Center in
2018 shows that 82% of the Norwegian respondents are willing to accept a Muslim as a member of their family.3 These results may caution against an alarmist
view. They illustrate the importance of measuring attitudes along different dimensions: Stereotyping and prejudice is often far more prevalent than the wish for
social distance. An illustrative example is that at the same time as 39% agree with
the statement “Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture”, more than 80%
would like to have a Muslim as a friend or neighbour. One third of the respondents, however, score high on all three dimensions measured: cognitive, affective,
and degree of social distance.
Similar to other Western European countries, Norway is undergoing demographic and social change, and increasingly Islam and Islamist extremism are
subjects of intense politicisation and debate. Public scrutiny on this topic is very
likely one of the factors that may explain the degree of negative attitudes towards
Muslims. Nevertheless, different dimensions of xenophobia, fear of terrorism, or
a general feeling of loss or anxiety are only part of the explanation. Norway is a
country that has not experienced terror or violent riots conducted in the name of
Islam; furthermore, it is a country with relatively low unemployment and a good
welfare system. The integration of Muslims into Norwegian society on a general
level has been successful.4 Socio-economic factors alone cannot therefore
explain why negative stereotypes of Muslims are so widespread in one of the
1. Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway
2017. Population Survey and Minority Study, (Oslo, Center for Studies of the Holocaust and
Religious Minorities, 2017).
2. IMDIs integreringsbarometer: https://www.imdi.no/om-integrering-i-norge/innvandrere-ogintegrering/fellesskap-og-deltakelse/
3. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/01/qa-measuring-attitudes-toward-muslimsand-jews-in-western-europe/
4. IMDIs integreringsbarometer: https://www.imdi.no/om-integrering-i-norge/innvandrere-ogintegrering/fellesskap-og-deltakelse/. Statistisk sentralbyrå (SSB): “Fakta om innvandring 2019:
https://www.ssb.no/innvandring-og-innvandrere/faktaside/innvandring
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CORA ALEXA DØVING | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
world’s most stable countries. In the following, I argue that it is an increase in
ideological anti-Muslim discourses has affected attitudes in the general population.
This chapter analyses answers to the open-ended question, “What do you think
might be the reasons for existing negative attitudes to Muslims?” Focusing on the
content of this qualitative part of the survey, it asks to what extent the answers of
the respondents correlate with well-known stereotypes from established Islamophobic discourses prevalent in what is often described as marginalised or extreme
milieus. One third of the answers name fear of terrorism as a reason for negative
attitudes, but most common are references to “harmful” cultural and religious values. Some of these answers illustrate, I will argue, how Islamophobia is not only
an expression of hate or fear of Muslims, but also includes racist elements. I therefore find it useful to explore the answers to this open-ended question in light of
theories on racism.
Until some recent changes in political debates on Islamophobia (2019), Norwegian debates on anti-Muslim sentiments was marked by an absence of references
to racism.5 Racist elements, such as hierarchy of groups, essentialisation of the
mentality of individual members of a group, and support for discrimination – often
couched in Islamophobic statements – are rarely recognised as racist. This
absence, I will argue, has created a public space in which Islamophobic statements
are able to pass for “dislike” or legitimate critique of Islam. Racism – when recognised – is strongly sanctioned against in the Norwegian public sphere; it is
therefore interesting to ask whether Islamophobic claims would have been met
with stronger self-sanction if the respondents had recognised them as racism. In a
similar way to antisemitism, expressions of racism have become what Werner
Bergman describes as communicative latency (see chapter 7): expressions of attitudes that are very clearly not acceptable in the public sphere.6 Racism as a phenomenon is therefore surrounded by stronger boundaries for what can be said than
in comparison to Islamophobia.
In accordance with the introduction of this book and chapter 3, the term Islamophobia is used to describe widespread prejudice, acts and practices that attack,
5. For an analysis on public debates on Islamophobia, see chapter 3 of this book: “A Growing Consensus? A History of Public Debates on Islamophobia in Norway”. There, I point to an increase
in the use of the term “racism” when comparing previous years and 2017, when the survey was
conducted.
6. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, “Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung.
Theoretische Überlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, Kölner
Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 38 (1986): 223–246.
8. “MUSLIMS ARE…”
exclude or discriminate against people on the ground that they are – or are
assumed to be – Muslim.7 How Islamophobia is related to racism, and what we
mean by the term racism, will be explained in the last section of the article.
2. MUSLIMS IN NORWAY – A SHORT BACKGROUND
Islam is the biggest minority religion is Norway and Statistics Norway estimates
that around 200,000 inhabitants in Norway are Muslims (4 per cent of the population). Most Muslims still have an immigrant background; i.e., the first immigrants from Muslim societies were men coming as labour migrants in 1967. Until
the early 1970s, labour shortages functioned as a pull factor, and there were few
restrictions on immigration to Norway. The Pakistani group of immigrants grew
rapidly, and even when immigration policies were tightened in 1975, family reunification led to further immigration of Pakistanis to the major Norwegian cities.
Pakistani immigration was a typical chain migration, meaning a type of migration
where new jobseekers already have relatives and friends in the country. Chain
migration, in contrast to individual migration, contributes to close networks and
the maintenance of Pakistani traditions in the new country. Chain migration has
also created a relatively homogenous community among the majority of Pakistanis in Oslo.
Today, Norwegian Muslims form a heterogeneous group in terms of country
background, religious tradition, and degree of religiosity. The majority comes
from Somalia, followed by Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran, and Turkey. In addition to linguistic and ethnic diversity, Islam is
represented by different orientations and interpretive traditions. Different immigrant groups have achieved varying levels of success in education and the labour
market; nonetheless, the integration of Muslims into Norwegian society has generally been successful.8
One characteristic of Islam in Europe is the emergence of new Muslim spokespersons, which is to say new interpreters of Islam. Professor in Islamic Studies
Birgitte Maréchal calls those who achieve such a position “producers of discourse
on Islamic praxis” or “new mediators”.9 In Norway, too, there has been a surge of
7. John Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin, eds., Islamophobia. The challenge of pluralism in the 21st
century (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
8. Statistisk sentralbyrå (SSB): “Fakta om innvandring 2019”: https://www.ssb.no/innvandring-oginnvandrere/faktaside/innvandring
9. Brigitte Marechal et al., “Mosques, organization and leadership”, in Muslims in the Enlarged
Europe. Religion and Society (Leiden: Brill, 2003).
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a string of reform-oriented and highly educated Muslims in leadership positions
in different student organisations, and they are also well-known contributors to
public debates. Maréchal also points to the many arenas outside of the mosque
where Islam is thematised by the modern Muslim elite. This development is relevant in explaining attitudes towards Muslims because it has resulted in a multiplicity of sources of “what Muslims believe” and “who they are”. It is, for example, possible that the positive answers regarding having Muslims as friends can be
explained by the increase in multi-faceted representations of Islam and Muslims.
3. SURVEY DATA: THE OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS
In the CHM survey of 2017, 48% of respondents agree with the statement “Muslims largely have themselves to blame for the increase in anti-Muslim harassment”; 42% agree with the statement “Muslims do not want to integrate into Norwegian society”; and 31% with the statement “Muslims want to take over
Europe”. A relatively large proportion of respondents also expressed negative
feelings towards Muslims and a desire for social distance: 27.8% score high on all
dimensions, and can be categorised as Islamophobic.10 Islamophobia assumes a
level of group construction and hostility concerning Muslims that is not necessarily present in all negative attitudes towards Muslims: Islamophobia is an ideology
that attributes inherent, negative traits to Muslims solely by virtue of being Muslim. Islamophobia can be defined as widespread prejudice, acts and practices that
attack, exclude or discriminate against people on the ground that they are – or are
assumed to be – Muslim.11
Population surveys seldom explain the motives or ideas behind the numbers.
The CHM survey, however, included an open-ended question. Those answers provide certain insight into the respondents’ reasons as to why they answered the way
they did. In the survey, respondents were asked whether they thought negative attitudes to Muslims were widespread. If their answer was “yes” (as it was for 81%
of the respondents), they were asked to elaborate on what they believed was the
reason for this: “What do you think might be the reasons for existing negative attitudes to Muslims?” The formulation of the question opens up for describing what
might explain negative attitudes “out there”, independent of their own beliefs.
Still, many of the responses were formulated as expressions of the respondents’
10. Hoffmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims.
11. John Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin eds., Islamophobia. The challenge of pluralism in the 21st century (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
8. “MUSLIMS ARE…”
own opinions about Muslims. Answers very often lacked expressions of distance,
such as “Many believe that Muslims...”; instead, the majority of them consisted of
essentialised assertions about how Muslims are.12
Methodologically, the data from the open-ended questions were read in two different ways. First, I collected the main arguments in the individual responses (one
response often contained several themes, such as “the media”, “oppression of
women” and “terrorism”). Next, I counted the number of times the main themes
and terms occurred across the different responses. I then read the responses in
light of how ideas on power relations, issues of belonging, good vs. bad etc. were
expressed in the language of the respondents. The themes and expressions in the
responses were then compared with those in other arenas of discourse about Islam
and Muslims, such as media depictions of Muslims.
The answers to the open-ended questions (n = 1,026) were grouped into two different sets as follows: 1) the reasons for negative attitudes were placed within the
respective categories “Muslims” (as if these were designations of groups, e.g. “It
is because of their culture”); and 2) the reasons were placed in external factors (for
example, in stereotypical media representations in Norwegian society). One-third
of the respondents stated that the reasons for negative attitudes lay solely with
Muslims themselves.13 Only the answers from the first category, those that
explain negative attitudes towards Muslims by pointing to specific group characteristics of Muslims, are analysed in the following.
4. THEMES AND PATTERNS
RELIGION AND CULTURE
In a simple word search, the term “terrorism” generates the most hits (using
Words, “find” function)14, but if value-related words like “culture”, “mentality”
and “religion” where counted together they clearly dominated as explanations of
the reasons for negative attitudes.15 “Their religion” is commonly referred to as
12. The question asked for the reasons for negative attitudes, and the material might have looked different
if the respondents had not been asked to focus on the negative. Importantly here, the responses give
insights into the terms, metaphors, and adjectives used when describing issues connected to Muslims.
13. Hoffmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims.
14. “Terrorism” (368 hits) was the main reference of factors explaining negative attitudes in both
the answers that were responsible outside the group and inside the group. Many answers defined
the core problem to be generalisations from extremist/terrorists to “all Muslims”, such as “The
extremist gives the Muslims a bad reputation”.
15. See chapter 9, Vibeke Moe: “How People Explain Antisemitism. Interpretation of Survey Answers” for a similar analysis of the open-ended questions on the reasons for antisemitism.
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fundamentalism and Islam is often described as a tool used to exploit others – or
it is characterised as plain stupidity. Irrationality seems to be fairly directly connected to an understanding of how Muslims are religious. As a religion, Islam is
seen as responsible for the collective mentality of Muslims and characterised by
authoritarian structures. Typical examples referring to religion are:
◗
◗
◗
◗
◗
“They have an incomprehensible religion that does not fit in here.”
“They have a totally different religion, which prescribes revenge and hostilities.”
“It is a religion that puts fanatical religious orders before the society they live in.”
“They live at least 500 years behind us.”
“They say the Quran gives them the right to make hell [gjøre faenskap].”
Expressions like “incomprehensible”, “does not fit”, “totally different”, “behind
us” “the right to make hell” illustrates a “language of othering”.16 The use of the
word “they”, which occurs in almost all of the answers referring to religion and
culture, illustrates the degree of generalising (they have, they are, they say etc.).
The focus on values illustrates that Norwegian citizenship alone does not make a
person Norwegian.
When anger was revealed in the answers, it was usually with references to
Islam. The quote below also illustrates how de-humanising expressions such as
“virus”, “bastards” and “crazy” occur:
They want to force Islam into every society they come to. They behave like a
virus. The majority has to show a lot of consideration towards those bastards.
Call for prayers, screaming from the mosques, pork, Ramadan etc. Laws and
rules that are crazy in a contemporary society, for example stoning, and they
are not interested in adjusting to the society they come to, only interested in the
money…
The use of de-humanising expressions is well known in the history of racist rhetoric. (Words such as “monkeys”, “barbarians”, “cockroaches” and “rats” are
examples from antisemitism as well as racism against black people). The quote
above is clearly hierarchising all Muslims as subordinates as it states that Muslims
behave like a virus, are bastards and that their traditions “are crazy” in modern
society. In addition to this, Muslims have the intention of exploiting our resources
(money).
16. Stuart Hall, Representation: Cultural representations and signifying practices (London and
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage in association with the Open University, 1997).
8. “MUSLIMS ARE…”
INTEGRATION AND THREAT
Another central theme in the answers is the supposedly lack of Muslims’ will to
integrate. This corresponds with the quantitative data from the same survey: 42
per cent agree with the statement “Muslims do not want to integrate into Norwegian society.” Examples from part of the freely written answers that refers to integration and culture are:
“They don’t really want to become Norwegian.”
“They expect us to adapt to them instead of them having to adapt to Norwegian
society.”
◗ “They do not respect our values and culture and way of living. They believe
they have the right to force us to live like them (…) our culture is being watered
down and Muslims are the people [folkegruppen] that are doing most harm to
our way of living and to our culture”.
◗ “They have little understanding of democracy and are responsible for very
much of what is going on of wars in Europe. They use violence to convert people to their religion. If you read the history of their prophet Muhammad, it does
not give you much confidence.”
◗
◗
The unwillingness to integrate is often put together with “they” showing resistance against democracy, as the last quote above illustrates. Expressions like “don’t
really want to”, “expect us to adapt”, “the right to force”, “our culture is being
watered down”, “harm”, “war”, “violence” all point to something threatening. A
group being construed as having bad intentions – or a will they seek to conceal –
is also well known from the literature on how fear of minorities can be part of a
racist worldview.17 The idea of Muslims not respecting the values of the majority
and putting pressure on the host society to change is a well-known trope from
Islamophobic discourses. I will return to the sources of ideas about the threatening
Muslims in the section on social media.
WOMEN
The word “woman” was the second most used (again using Word’s “find” function). Phrases such as “the way they treat women” show that Muslims (“they”) are
largely understood as a community of men; men represent Muslimness/Islam,
17. See as an example: George Moss, “The Jews: Myth and counter-myth” in I Back Les and John
Solomos Theories of Race and Racism, A reader (London: Routledge, 2000).
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while women are victims of it. The construal of Muslims as having a violent mentality was often part of the answers concerning women:
“They are responsible for far too much violence, crime and lack of equality.”
“Islam and everything it involves, like oppression of women, child brides, rape
of women, children and animals, beheading […] and harassment of ethnic
Norwegians.”
◗ “Muslims hostile attitude, being extremely demanding, provocative – criminals and fortune hungers, liars”.
◗ “Oppression of women, child abuse, honour killings, poor integration, religious fanatics, sharia taking over Norwegian law, crime, rape, other acts of
violence, identity falsification, terror – do not fit into a Norwegian society!”
◗
◗
To some extent, the frequency of references to “women” mirrors Norwegian public debate about Islam in which the theme of suppression of women has been prevalent.18 This interest in Muslims’ lack of gender equality can be explained by the
facts that Islam as a religion holds a clear gender ideology which in several ways
is in opposition to Norwegian political values: Gender equality as a national core
value is hegemonic in the Norwegian political discourse. In other words, both
aspects of Islam and aspects of the majority society may explain why the theme of
women is so prominent in the responses. However, even if we can explain the
extent of references to women by pointing to public discourse, public discourse
does not sufficiently explain the harshness and degree of generalisations in the
allegations. See how the responses relating to women quoted above include terms
such as “rape”, “child bride”, “abuse”… It is difficult to explain the character of
these formulations without linking them to the more marginal but well-established
anti-Muslim discourses.
The parts of the answers that refer to gender equality is especially interesting in
the light of Gordon Allport’s pioneering work on prejudices and how they seem to
be ethnocentrically organised (the making of prejudice reflects a social and
national identity)19. Gender equality is an important theme in a Norwegian
national self-image, and this renders the subject very forceful when being
employed in the making of prejudice: References to “women” effectively explains
why “Muslims do not fit in”.
18. Cora Alexa Døving and Siv Ellen Kraft, Religion i pressen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2013).
19. Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New York: Anchor Books, 1958).
8. “MUSLIMS ARE…”
EXPLOITING THE WELFARE SYSTEM
Politicians’ “preferential treatment” of Muslims and other references to a conflict
of interest over the use of resources was also quite common in the answers to the
open-ended questions. Muslims are said to have easier access to welfare benefits
and are favoured by the authorities:
“The way politicians squander money on them (Muslims). It is the elderly in
nursing homes here in NORWAY who are suffering.”
◗ “Many came to Norway to exploit our welfare system and without an intention
of contributing themselves. In addition to this, they look upon persons who are
not Muslims in a negative way and they have a low degree of willingness to
adapt to Norwegian values.”
◗ “They have no respect. They get great benefits from the state compared to our
elderly at nursing homes. If a Norwegian worker needs help from the social
office for a short period it is a lot of paper work and always ends up with an
offer of a loan…”
◗
The answers show traits of the respondents perceiving themselves as victims: Victimised by politicians who “give priority to Muslims”, and victimised by Muslims
because they have a “will to dominate”.
*
In general, one third of the answers to the open-ended question include nationalistic (protectionist) elements. The nation is seen as threatened by Muslims. This
threat is not only due to their numbers, but also to a fear of a value-related takeover
in which “they” are subverting society’s traditional morality, religion, and way of
life. “They are too different” is the essential message: “They have a religion which
is not compatible with how we live in Norway … if they cannot live the same way
as we do here in Norway they should not be here”.
The last sentence from the quote above they should not be here, is a direct call
for the expulsion of Muslims. Stuart Hall’s expression “the spectacle of the Other”
– that is, gazing at representations of racialised others – fits well with how the
answers operate with an “us” (the imagined community in which those who are
the perceived normal are bound together) who are very different from the others
who are sent into “symbolic exile”.20 By “symbolic exile”, Hall referred to the
20. Hall, “Representations: cultural representations and signifying practices”, 258.
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CORA ALEXA DØVING | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
language and practices that were used to legitimise the exclusion of others. It is
primarily the open-ended answers’ “sending of Muslims to a symbolic exile”
through formulas of not fitting in that renders the answers as vehicles of elements
of racism.
5. THE GENERAL PUBLIC – POLITICIANS AND THE MEDIA
Turning to those respondents who put the explanation for negative attitudes to
Muslims on external factors, many referred to the media as a reason. They argued
that the media focuses too much on Islam/Muslims as a problem, and that onesided portrayals in the media explain why prejudices are widespread.21 According
to research on correlations between depictions of Muslims in the media and attitudes towards Muslims, they might be right.22
Research has shown that when Islam is in the news, it is very often presented as
a political problem that needs to be solved (terrorism, radicalisation, refugees and
niqabs were the main topics in 2017). Research has also shown a close correlation
between the representation of Islam in the media and public opinion.23 Media representations seem to have great influence on the majority’s interpretation of
minority groups, especially in communities where contact between majority and
minority is small.24
Norwegian media are in general very critical of Islamophobic statements (see
chapter 3), and Norwegian newspapers today provide a relatively nuanced picture
of Islam, not least because of the increasing number of Muslims participating in
the public debate. But even if the media is an arena for negotiating different views
rather than just reproducing negative portrayals of Muslims, it is still the main
arena in which ideas about Muslims circulate. Further, it is reasonable to assume
that the media’s influence is strong when the news is dominated by politicians
speaking about Muslims. The year of the survey was also the year of the general
21. More than one-third of the respondents in the Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies survey
considered negative portrayals of Muslims in the media to be the main cause of prejudice and
xenophobia against Muslims in the population (Hoffmann and Moe 2017).
22. Elisabeth Poole, Reporting Islam: Media representations of British Muslims (New York: Tauris,
2002).
23. Elisabeth Poole, “Reporting Islam: Media representations of British Muslims”, 240 and 250;
Peder Hervik, Elisabeth Eide & Risto Kunelius, “A Long and Messy Event” in Eide, E.; Kunelius, R. and Phillips, A. eds., Transnational Media Events. The Mohammed Cartoons and the
Imagined Clash of Civilizations (Gothenburg: Nordicom, 2008), 29–38.
24. Peter Morey and Amina Yaqin, Framing Muslims: Stereotyping and Representation after 9/11
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011).
8. “MUSLIMS ARE…”
election (autumn 2017), which resulted in four more years with a coalition government consisting of the liberal Conservative Party and the populist Progress
Party (Fremskrittspartiet).25 Stereotyping of Muslims played a part in the Progress Party’s election campaign. The Progress Party is well known for its antiimmigration policies, and it is reasonable to say that the party’s success was due
to its focus on immigration as a threat not only to the Norwegian welfare state, but
also to “our security” and “our values”.26 This political message was naturally discussed in the general media.
Of relevance in a contextual explanation of the content of the answers is also
that from 2015 to 2018 the post of Minister for Immigration and Integration was
held by the Progress Party, represented by Sylvi Listhaug. During 2017, Listhaug
was the most prominent governmental voice concerning the issue of Islam, Muslims, refugees and immigration. Her rhetoric has been criticised by political colleagues, journalists, and a range of different debaters for inciting anti-Muslim
sentiments in the population. During 2017, the minister made several statements
that indicated a reason to fear Muslims: “We are fully aware that there are wolves
in sheep’s clothing”27; and “Fundamentalists who hate our Norwegian system are
coming to exploit the boundless Norwegian naivety”.28 Such statements are
worth mentioning because it is the first time in Norwegian political history that
a member of the government has used expressions so close to those found in antiMuslims organisations online.
In addition to her rhetoric, Listhaug figured in three debates in 2017 about regulating Muslim traditions where she suggested a prohibition against hijabs at elementary school (because they sexualise young girls), but received no support from the
other coalition parties. The government also proposed a national ban on the use of
niqabs in schools and institutions of higher education that won broad parliamentary
support and was based mainly on references to teaching situations rather than on references to Islam as such. The Progress Party has also proposed banning the circumcision of baby boys as part of its party political manifesto (but has won no parliamentary support). The three cases all led to several public debates.
25. The survey data show a correlation between high values on the index for Islamophobic attitudes
and belonging to the voters group of the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet): The percentage of
the Progress party voters that scored high on the combined index (62 per cent) is far greater than
for the other parties voters” (Hoffmann and Moe, eds. Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims, 99).
26. https://forskning.no/moderne-historie-valg-politikk/2015/05/frps-vei-mot-valgtoppen
27. https://www.abcnyheter.no/nyheter/politikk/2017/08/04/195321874/listhaug-foran-500-muslimer-vi-er-fullstendig-klar-over-det-finnes-ulver-i-fareklaer
28. https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/politikk/i/bG1A/10-sitater-som-viser-at-Sylvi-Listhaug-likera-sla-med-storslegga
265
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As referred to in the former section, ideas about Muslims’ views on women being
the antithesis of “all things Norwegian” to some extent mirror Norwegian public
debate about Islam.29 However, as already mentioned, while the media may explain
why the theme of women is so prominent in the responses, it cannot explain the
harshness and degree of generalisations in the allegations in the survey. It is far more
relevant to point to the influence of the more marginal but well-established antiMuslim discourses from different online forums. Islam as uniquely sexist, and Islam
as inherently violent, are myths that are recycled in several online arenas.30
6. FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM – THE ROLE OF
SOCIAL MEDIA
As has been demonstrated, the statements put forward in one-third of the answers
to the open-ended questions are much harsher and less complex than the media’s
depictions of Islam and Muslims. An explanation resting on the influence of discursive contexts needs to look beyond the mainstream public sphere and include
the ideology of the anti-Muslim blogosphere and alternative news sources.
Similar to other European countries, Norway’s media landscape is seeing an
increase in right-wing populist alternative news sources carrying biased stories
about Islam or Muslims.31 Established anti-Muslim/anti-Islamic organisations
increased their activities during 2017,32 and there has been a steady increase in the
number of open Facebook groups that, in spite of some differences in political ideology and degree of radicalism, can be categorised as belonging to the far right as
they are marked by ethnic nationalism, a distrust in democracy, and the identification of Muslims as “the enemy within”.33
Research has shown that right-wing online milieus are not impermeable
enclaves or simply echo chambers; they also act as gateways to wider digitally
networked audiences.34 It is reasonable to suggest that the following quotes of the
29. Døving and Kraft, Religion i pressen.
30. Mattias Wahlström, Anton Törnberg, and Hans Ekbrand, “‘A beating is the only language they
understand’: Dynamics of violent rhetoric’s in radical right social media” (C-Rex conference,
UiO, Oslo, 28–29 November 2018).
31. Tore Bjørgo ed., Høyreekstremisme i Norge (PHS Forskning, 2018), 4.
32. The most active among the more established anti-Muslim organisations are Stop Islamisation of
Norway, Human Rights Service and Document.no.
33. Tore Bjørgo ed., Høyreekstremisme i Norge (PHS Forskning, 2018).
34. Samuel Merril and Matilda Åkerlund, “Standing up for Sweden? The Racist Discourses, Architectures and Affordances of an Anti-Immigration Facebook Group”, Journal of Computer-mediated Communication 23, no. 6 (2018): 1–22.
8. “MUSLIMS ARE…”
answers to the open-ended question are such examples since they illustrate a high
degree of thematic overlap with statements well known to be circulating in Islamophobic discourses in social media.
I don’t think there is only one reason [for negative attitudes towards Muslims].
For example, they suppress women and they do not want to be integrated. They
hate Christians, Jews and non-believers. Around them you find war and misery. And a lot of terror. They stick together in gangs and ghettos.
Terror, fatwa, religious warfare, honour killings, religion, their general way of
living, burka, niqab and no respect for Norwegian values and way of living,
wishes for sharia laws and a desire to take over the whole world.35
Typical statements selected from anti-Muslim Facebook groups are: “Muslims
have a built-in desire for occupation”; “areas in Norway are already ruled by Sharia”; “Muslims conduct a modern form of warfare by multiplying and using their
networks”; “Muslims pretend to be modern, but hate liberal Norway”; “Muslims
are violent; rape will become an everyday experience”.36 Sometimes Muslims are
described as “irresponsible individuals” because Islam has presumably removed
their personal will. They have “Allah-infested brains” or are “slaves to religion”
and are thus mindless tools in the service of Islam. It is thus not only Muslims who
act, but Islam itself that has agency.37
Terje Emberland and Alexa Døving followed eight open Facebook sites closely
between September 2016 and May 2017 with the aim of identifying various conspiracy theories, or elements of such. 38 They found several examples of, or rather
fragments of, Islamophobic conspiracy theories.39 Muslims were depicted as what
Asbjørn Dyrendal calls a “conspiracy stereotype” (see chapter 6): one group
seizing territorial and social power and subverting a society’s traditional morality,
35. Two of the answers to the open-ended questions in the survey.
36. Cora Alexa Døving and Terje Emberland, “Konspirasjonsteorier I det ytterliggående høyrelandskapet”, in Tore Bjørgo ed., Høyreekstremisme i Norge (PHS Forskning 2018), 179–235.
37. Døving and Emberland, “Konspirasjonsterorier I det ytterliggaende hørelandskapet”.
38. A representative example of a new and active open Facebook group is Slå ring om Norge (Protect Norway). It defines itself as a patriotic defender of the nation and portrays Muslims and leftwing politicians as “the enemy within”. The group had 35,502 followers as of April 2017.
39. The main reference for Islamophobic conspiracy theories is the so-called Eurabia theory, which
claims that the European Union, since the 1970s, has collaborated with North African states via
EAD (the Euro-Arabian Dialogue), and have secretly worked to turn Europe into an Islamic
caliphate. The theory was launched in 2005 by the author Bat Yeor, but has since been supplemented with other books with the same basic theme.
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CORA ALEXA DØVING | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
religion and way of life. Islamophobic conspiracy theories concern an alleged war
between civilisations, one where symbolic-cultural usurpation plays the main
role. Markers for what it means to be Norwegian, such as traditions, symbols and
values, are presented as being under threat. Comments on conspiracy revolve particularly around the nation’s identity, where a national ingroup stands in contrast
to an outgroup.
In the literature on conspiracy theories, authors often use the concept “conspiracy stereotype”. The concept underscores that the stereotypes contain an idea that
the group seeks power over other groups. The idea of a purportedly unified,
destructive goal also involves the notion that the group members have a mutual
and fixed pattern of behaviour linked to precisely this kind of destructive and subversive activity.40 As shown, the mix between distrust, fear and claims about certain Muslim behaviour (subversive activity) is exactly what characterises many of
the answers to the open-ended questions. The answers referring to religion, culture
and the welfare state in particular are hints to the threat of a Muslim takeover.
The claim that moderate Muslims actually do not exist is a common theme in
Islamophobic Facebook communities. A normal illustration of such claims is the
image of a snake in tall grass, with the caption: “Radical Muslims are snakes,
moderate Muslims are the grass they hide in”.41 The claim that Muslims are fundamentalists who lack the will to integrate, even if they pretend to do so, was also
frequently found in many of the answers to the open-ended questions (“they don’t
really want to become Norwegian”).
That the nation and the identity of the majority is threatened by Muslims is the
main messages in the alternative news sources and Facebook sites on the far right,
and the same narrative, as I have shown, can be found in the answers from the survey. In the quantitative part of the survey, as many as 34% agree with six out of
eight statements about Muslims that circulate on the so-called anti-jihadist websites and social media. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the borders
between the margin and the mainstream are porous.
7. “ISLAMOPHOBIA” AND “RACISM”
There is no consensus concerning how to use the term “racism”, either in the field
of research or in public debates. Because the term “race” has been used and is used
40. Fatih Uenal, “The ‘Secret Islamization’ of Europe: Exploring integrated Threat Theory of Predicting Islamophobic Conspiracy Stereotypes”, International Journal of Conflict and Violence
10, no. 1 (2016): 94–108.
41. Døving and Emberland, “Konspirasjonsteorier I det ytterliggående høyrelandskapet”, 179–235.
8. “MUSLIMS ARE…”
for a variety of forms of diversity and ways to differentiate between people,42 two
supplementary concepts related to racism have been introduced: “cultural racism”43 and “neo-racism”.44 These terms reflect not only a change in the theory of
racism, but also in the well-documented fact that racism in European society
changed during the 1970s and 1980s. It was in this period that the focus shifted
from skin colour (understood as an expression of race) to culture and/or religion
as a dominant sign of inequality and subordination; in other words, “racism without races”.45 That “they” are so different that they should not be part of the community is a central claim in cultural racism, and clearly reflected in the material
analysed here. The concept “culture/neo-racism” is meant as a tool for capturing
racism’s forms without becoming dependent on race as an analytical category. As
M. Ekman argues in his article concerning online Islamophobia, by using “cultural
elements to distinguish groups from each other, cultural racism also denies the
very notion of race and racism.”46 The references to narrow biologically based
definitions of racism are common in online milieus when accusations of racism
are denied. The arguments seem to be that immigrants or Muslims cannot be the
victims of racism because they are not a single race.47
The understanding of racism as a concept that also includes references to religion and culture is not historically new. The term “race” has been used in European languages to denote descent and family or groups of people who were
bound by virtue of their beliefs and way of life: Historically, the categories of
race and religion overlapped.48 Racism, whether old, new, cultural, or biological, consists of assigning specific properties to people on the basis of their putative membership of a particular group of origin, with these properties defined as
so negative that they constitute an argument for keeping members of the group
42. Ann Lentin, A. (2016): “Eliminating race obscures its trace: Theories of Race and Ethnicity
symposium, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39:3, p. 383–391; Ann Lentin, “Eliminating race obscures its trace: Theories of Race and Ethnicity symposium”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 39, no. 3
(2016): 383–391.
43. Franz Fanon, Black Skins, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967).
44. Etienne Balibar, “Is there a Neo-Racism?” in Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, ed.
Etienna Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London, New York: Verso Press, 1991).
45. David Goldberg, “Racial Europeanization”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 21, no. 2 (2006): 331–
364.
46. Mattias Ekman, “Online Islamophobia and the politics of fear: Manufacturing the green scare”,
Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 38, no. 11 (2015).
47. David Goldberg, Are We Postracial Yet? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015).
48. Georg Fredrickson, Racism: A Short History (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). The
classical example of this overlap is the expulsion of Arabs and Jews from Christian Spain in the
name of “purity of blood” in the fifteenth century.
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CORA ALEXA DØVING | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
at a distance, excluding them, and if possible, actively discriminating against
them:
Racism is to attribute negative traits to people based on their belonging to a
category linked to ideas about origin (cultural, biological, religious, national,
and so forth), and to allow this to legitimate their subordination.49
The represented data from the survey clearly state who does not belong and why,
and the why is often a clear-cut example of defining an entire category of people
(Muslims) as subordinate due to ideas about their natural way of being. In The
Multiple Faces of Islamophobia (2014), Ramón Grosfoguel writes on the place of
religion in racism:
In the new cultural racist discourses, religion has a dominant role. […] Focusing on the “other’s” religion is a way to escape being accused of racism. However, when we examine carefully the hegemonic rhetoric in place, the tropes
are a repetition of old biological racist discourses and the people who are the
target of Islamophobic discourses are the traditional colonial subjects of the
Western Empires, that is, the “usual suspects”.50
Grosfoguel notes how in Great Britain, Muslims are associated with Egyptians,
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (colonial subjects from former British colonies) and
that Islamophobia in Britain is therefore associated with anti-black, anti-Arab and
anti-South Asian racism. In France, Muslims are mostly North Africans from former colonies. Additionally, in Norway, Islam and Muslims are associated with
immigrants, and highlighting specific ethnicities is often part of Islamophobia.
Still, I do not think that racism referring to religion or culture should only be seen
in the light of how they overlap with the “old race categories”. As an example, the
material analysed in this chapter lacks references to ethnicity, skin colour or other
genetically inherited differences. Grosfoguel’s argument could therefore be taken
further by saying that religion and culture alone often make up the core elements
in racist ideas about Muslims (Norwegian white-skinned converts seem to be particularly popular hate objects in Islamophobic arenas).
In research, the term Islamophobia has developed from referring to specific
clusters of prejudice against Islam and Muslims to being defined as racism against
49. Sindre Bangstad and Cora Alexa Døving (2015).
50. Ramón Grosfoguel, “The Multiple Faces of Islamophobia”, Islamophobia Studies Journal 1, no.
1 (2012): 9–34, 13 and 14.
8. “MUSLIMS ARE…”
Muslims.51 However, in Norwegian public debates, “Islamophobia” is mainly
understood as an ideology belonging to the far right, or it is understood as a synonym for “fear of a Muslim takeover”, a conspiracy.52 Islamophobia, then, is often
referred to as a form of dislike built solely upon a fear of Muslim dominance. Consequently, references to Islamophobia usually lack the recognition of racist elements in the phenomenon. The aspects of hierarchising, de-humanising and exclusion – usually part of an Islamophobic argument (aspects that are prevalent in the
examples from the open-ended questions) – are seldom identified in Norwegian
debates.53 This might be a reason for why Islamophobia is commonly explained
as something similar to a critique of religion, or simply a specific form of xenophobia.
Until very recently (2019), the concept of racism in general has seldom been
used in Norwegian public debates,54 and when the term is applied, it is often
linked exclusively to a belief in biological differences and racial hierarchies.
When recognised (most often if a black person has been subject to harassment),
racism is widely condemned in Norway. To be accused of Islamophobia, then, is
something quite different from being accused of racism or antisemitism – here the
borders for what is allowed to be said are clearer.55 I therefore find it difficult to
explain the degree of negative generalisation and stigmatisation in the data from
the population survey other than by asserting that a specific rhetoric established in
the discourses about Muslims serves to disguise content that is racist.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The idea that “being a Muslim” is intrinsically linked to having a threatening mentality, poor morals, and terrible cultural values, as is stated in several of the
answers to the open-ended questions, is of a racist nature. Returning to the question of what might explain the degree of negative statements about Muslims in a
51. This development is significant if one compares the first and second report on Islamophobia
from the Runnymede Trust (1997 and 2017).
52. See chapter 3 in this book: “A Growing Consensus? A History of Public Debates on Islamophobia in Norway”.
53. Sindre Bangstad and Cora Alexa Døving, Hva er rasisme (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2015).
54. In 2015 Norway was criticised by the UN Racial Discrimination Committee for not using the
word racism. Politicians were asked how they intended to combat racism if they never referred
to it, https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16330&LangID=E
55. See chapter 1 in this book by Christhard Hoffmann: “A Fading Consensus: Public Debates on
Antisemitism in Norway, 1960 vs. 1983”
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population survey undertaken in a country where anti-racism (as an ideal) is
hegemonic: The answer is likely to be found in the general acceptance ‒ even
among liberal anti-racist voices ‒ of discrediting Muslims as adherents of Islam.
This widespread attitude has given way to a rhetoric that conceals its message to
avoid accusations of racism. The most common way of doing this is to present
oneself as a participant in a battle of values in which Muslims are defined as a
threat. Examples of such rhetoric are, for example, that those who oppose a Muslim presence in Europe do so in the name of freedom because Muslims are said
not to endure liberal values. A fight for freedom is a moral battle and can thus be
a useful rhetorical means of hiding racism.
In the Norwegian public sphere, racism is strongly sanctioned. It is therefore
relevant – or at least tempting – to ask whether Islamophobia would have been met
with stronger social sanctions by the Norwegian public if it were elucidated in the
context of, or exposed as, a variety of racism. Even more tempting is to ask
whether the one-third of the answers to the open-ended questions in the population
survey would have looked different if the respondents had recognised their
expressions as racist.
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Balibar, E. (1991). Is There A Neo-Racism? In Balibar, E. and Wallerstein, I. (Eds.), Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, 17‒28. London and New York: Verso. (See below)
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Bjørgo, T. (Ed.) (2018). Høyreekstremisme i Norge. PHS Forskning.
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9.
How People Explain
Antisemitism
Interpretation of Survey Answers
VIBEKE MOE
ABSTRACT This chapter explores antisemitism in contemporary Norway through an
analysis of data from open-ended questions in the population survey Attitudes towards
Jews and Muslims in Norway 2017.1 The chapter investigates the part of the survey that
dealt with views on the reasons for negative attitudes towards Jews. By examining the
respondents’ broad range of explanations, the chapter explores different contexts for
antisemitic views in contemporary Norway and possible new forms of expressing such
attitudes beyond the limits of fixed-response questions. The chapter thus contributes to
the discussion of the current development of antisemitism and the seeming paradox
that while surveys show that antisemitic attitudes are decreasing in the general population, Jews around Europe see antisemitism as a serious and increasing problem. The analysis thus simultaneously explores the Norwegian population’s understanding of antisemitism and indicates where the boundaries of what can be said about Jews are drawn.
It shows that answers often described antisemitism as something spatially, “ethnically”
or historically distant. While few answers expressed classic stereotypes of Jews, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict constitutes a communicative arena where negative views of
Jews are more easily tolerated.
KEYWORDS antisemitism | anti-Zionism | population survey | prejudice | MuslimJewish relations | Norway
1. Christhard Hoffmann & Vibeke Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway
2017: Population Survey and Minority Study (Oslo: Center for Studies of the Holocaust and
Religious Minorities, 2017).
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.
9. HOW PEOPLE EXPLAIN ANTISEMITISM
1. INTRODUCTION
Results from the two population surveys conducted by the Norwegian Center for
Holocaust and Minority Studies (CHM) show that stereotypical views of Jews were
less widespread in Norwegian society in 2017 than in 2011.2 Overall, the proportion
of the general population with marked prejudice against Jews has decreased from
12.1 per cent to 8.3 per cent. At the same time, the percentage that does not support
any negative statements about Jews has increased significantly, from 55 per cent to
69 per cent. The development was observed by measuring the percentage that supported a list of statements about Jews that reflected classic antisemitic notions.
While almost one in five respondents in 2011 supported the statement “World Jewry
is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests”, the support in 2017 was
13 per cent. In 2011, 26 per cent supported the statement “Jews consider themselves
to be better than others”, whereas in 2017 the corresponding figure was 18 per cent.
The same trend emerges regarding negative emotions and social distance from Jews,
the two other dimensions of attitudes that were assessed in the surveys.
As shown in the report and in the chapter by Ottar Hellevik in the current volume, the observed decrease in the prevalence of antisemitic attitudes in Norway
between 2011 and 2017 cannot be explained by changes in variables such as levels
of education, opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or level of xenophobia.3 A
possible explanation may lie in a shift in public opinion resulting from an increased
attention to antisemitism as a societal problem in the media and in Norwegian politics. When Jewish respondents report a different trend and see antisemitism as a
serious and increasing problem, this may be due to reports on antisemitic incidents
in other European countries.4 Particularly violent incidents in countries such as
France or Sweden have received much attention. Similar tendencies as in Norway
have been observed in other European countries, where findings of decreasing antisemitism seem to contradict the perceptions of the Jewish population.5 The dis2. Christhard Hoffmann, Øivind Kopperud and Vibeke Moe, eds., Antisemitism in Norway? The
Attitudes of the Norwegian Population towards Jews and other Minorities, Oslo: 2012; Hoffmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims, 2017.
3. Hoffmann and Moe, Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims, 7, 95; see also in the current volume,
Ottar Hellevik, “Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway – A survey analysis of prevalence,
trends and possible causes of negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims”.
4. Almost 70 per cent of Jewish respondents answered that antisemitism had become more prevalent in Norway during the last five years. Hoffmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and
Muslims, 63.
5. See, for example, the latest survey from FRA, conducted among 16,000 Jews in Europe. In this survey,
which was released in December 2018, almost 90 per cent of respondents across all countries surveyed
say they feel that levels of antisemitism have increased in their country over the past five years.
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VIBEKE MOE | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
crepancy between survey results and Jewish perceptions has also been
explained by the emergence of (new) forms and arenas of antisemitism.6 Most
notably, researchers often point to new media and internet-based expressions
of antisemitism. Representing an efficient and far-reaching method for
spreading ideas, the internet may explain the perceived increase in negative
attitudes.
However, further analysis and new methods may also contribute to explaining the findings. As Werner Bergmann suggests in the present volume, the relation between perceptions and prevalence of antisemitism may be measured in
more flexible ways to show, essentially, that experiences of antisemitism do not
necessarily reflect marked prejudices in the persons expressing antisemitic
notions.7 Rather, support of certain antisemitic statements is more widespread
and not limited to respondents categorised as prejudiced against Jews in the
surveys. Consequently, antisemitism may be perceived as more prevalent. This
is a valuable insight that nuances the way prevalence is understood. For the
purpose of the present chapter, it is also relevant to consider how the research
design may influence the understanding of antisemitism as a phenomenon.
More precisely, the chapter explores how antisemitism is reflected and interpreted in answers to the open-ended questions compared to the quantitative
results. While the observed decrease is tied to the specific questions that were
posed in the questionnaire, antisemitism as a phenomenon may have undergone
changes that are beyond the scope of the survey and remain undetected. In other
words, changes may be related to the contents of antisemitic ideas and their
expressions, which are not covered by surveys focusing on traditional anti-Jewish
notions.
In post-Holocaust Western societies, antisemitism was increasingly banned
from public expression following the emergence of the societal norm of anti-antisemitism. While the phenomenon itself obviously did not disappear, expressions
of antisemitism were excluded from the public arena. One effect of the ostracism
6. Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi, “Different Antisemitisms: On Three Distinct Forms of Antisemitism in Contemporary Europe – With a Special Focus on Sweden”, Kantor Center for the Study
of Contemporary European Jewry, Tel Aviv University, (June 2016), https://archive.jpr.org.uk/
object-eur129.
7. Werner Bergmann’s contribution in the current volume suggests a different way of measuring
antisemitism, by means of an “elastic” view”. See Werner Bergmann, “Counting Antisemites
versus Measuring Antisemitism – An ‘“Elastic View’” of Antisemitism”. The chapter makes use
of a method provided in a study by Daniel Staetsky, Antisemitism in contemporary Great Britain. A study of attitudes towards Jews and Israel, JPR/report (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, September 2017), 3.
9. HOW PEOPLE EXPLAIN ANTISEMITISM
and communication latency8 of contemporary antisemitism is that anti-Jewish
attitudes appear “coded”, perhaps most typically in the form of anti-Zionism. Furthermore, antisemitism is regarded a sensitive issue and therefore possibly creates
particular difficulties in terms of measuring because respondents answer what
they believe is socially acceptable and not what they “really” think. In an experimental study from 2013, Heiko Beyer and Ivar Krumpal remark that although the
public sanctioning of antisemitism has influenced theoretical developments in
terms of concepts and explanations, there has been a lack of methodological considerations concerning how to obtain valid measures of antisemitism.9
The inclusion of an open-ended question on the reason for antisemitism (“What
do you think is the reason for negative attitudes towards Jews?”) in the Norwegian
surveys enabled new variations of antisemitism to be addressed and expressed.
This part of the questionnaire was thus used both as a way to explore the respondents’ understanding of antisemitism as a contemporary prejudice in Norway and as
a means of analysing the respondents’ respective views of Jews. Asking respondents directly about sensitive issues may yield socially desirable responses.10 The
indirect formulation of the question, which focuses not on the respondents’ own
views of Jews but on the background for antisemitic attitudes in general, reduced
the problems related to sensitive issues.
This chapter explores how respondents in the Norwegian general population
explain negative attitudes towards Jews by analysing the variety of interpretations
of antisemitism expressed in the material. A particular emphasis is placed on how
the answers relate to traditional stereotypes, such as those referred to in the survey,
compared to possible new understandings of the contexts for antisemitism, especially the role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.11 The chapter thus explores current understandings of where boundaries are drawn when it comes to expressions
about Jews. The analysis traces recurrent topics in the answers, exploring typical
8. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, “Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung.
Theoretische Überlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, Kölner
Zeitschrift für Soziologie u. Sozialpsychologie, 38 no. 2 (1986): 223–246, and Werner Bergmann
and Wilhelm Heitmeyer, “Communicating Anti-Semitism. Are the Boundaries of the Speakable
Shifting?” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte, 33 (2005): 70–89.
9. Heiko Beyer and Ivar Krumpal, “The Communication Latency of Antisemitic Attitudes: An
Experimental Study”, Global Antisemitism: A Crisis of Modernity (2013): 83.
10. See, for example, Roger Tourangeau and Ting Yan, “Sensitive Questions in Surveys”, Psychological Bulletin 133, no. 5 (2007): 859-883. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.133.5.859.
11. The answers to open-ended questions about the reasons for antisemitism and Islamophobia in
the survey from 2011 are analysed in Vibeke Moe, Cora Alexa Døving, Irene Levin and Claudia
Lenz, “‘Hvis de hadde oppført seg som vanlige nordmenn, hadde alt vært greit, tror jeg’ Nordmenns syn på årsaken til negative holdninger til jøder og muslimer”, Flex 3, no. 1 (2016).
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explanations and interpretative patterns as well as how tendencies in this qualitative material relate to the quantitative results. In addition to this content-driven
analysis, some examples are analysed in-depth, interpreting meaning in specific
formulations.
The material consists of answers that were typically short, sometimes consisting
only of a single word (“Israel”). However, the length did vary, and some of the
answers had long and detailed explanations. The question was only posed to
respondents who considered negative attitudes to be widespread, resulting in 247
answers from a total of 1,575 respondents in the general population sample.12 While
this response may express a certain concern about the Jewish minority and the prevalence of antisemitism in contemporary Norwegian society, the results from the
quantitative analysis showed a tendency that respondents who found such attitudes
to be widespread also scored higher on antisemitism. The connection between these
two elements may have influenced the current material in the direction of more negative views. However, the aim of the analysis is not to generalise by assessing prevalence of views, but rather to explore interpretative patterns.
2. ANALYSIS
Similar to the findings in 2012, answers could be categorised according to where
the responsibility for antisemitism was placed, either “inside” or “outside” the
Jewish minority itself. The former category of answers had an affinity to essentialist or even antisemitic attitudes, by blaming Jews for antisemitism. The latter
category, which placed responsibility on external factors, comprised a variety of
explanations, most commonly pointing to culturally transmitted ideas in the
majority population or to the impact from the media. Despite the scarce information provided in some of the cases, even short answers were often clear in terms
of where they placed responsibility. It was, however, not always possible to categorise the answers in accordance with this classification. In particular, some of the
answers briefly mentioning Israel or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were difficult
to interpret. Other answers were also ambiguous in terms of where the responsibility was placed.
12. A similar question was posed concerning reasons for Islamophobia. Because a far larger proportion of respondents believed negative attitudes towards Muslims to be widespread, a far larger
proportion (around four times as many) also answered the question about Islamophobia (n =
1026) than answered the question concerning antisemitism. See also chapter 8 in the current volume, “Muslims are…” Contextualising Survey Answers” by Cora Alexa Døving, which analyses the answers to the open-ended question on reasons for Islamophobia.
9. HOW PEOPLE EXPLAIN ANTISEMITISM
The following analysis identifies three recurring, though not exclusive, interpretative patterns in the material: one pointing to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
including media representations of the conflict; another referring to the Muslim
immigrant population, and a third category explaining antisemitism by pointing to
old, latent prejudices in Norwegian society, i.e. answers referring to classic stereotypes of Jews. Among the answers pointing to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or
to antisemitism as an old prejudice, there were some that placed responsibility
both “inside” and “outside” the minority. The context for antisemitism among
Muslims was rarely elaborated on and the responsibility thus remained comparatively unclear. However, the three categories of explanations share a tendency of
placing the origins of antisemitism far away from Norwegian mainstream society,
either spatially (geographically), “ethnically”/religiously or historically.
THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
Similar to the results of the 2011 survey, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was the
most-cited topic when respondents explained what they saw as the background for
negative views of Jews.13 The proportion of answers that pointed to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict or Israel equated to almost half of the total number of answers.
The material included a variety of explanations expressing different positions
in the conflict. Many included negative characteristics of Israel, focusing on
Israeli aggression or the bare existence of the state, such as: “The establishment of
Israel”, “War against the Palestinians” and “Israel’s occupation of the West Bank”.
However, the material also included answers that defended the Israeli side, particularly with reference to the media’s coverage, claiming a key source of antisemitism was wrongful and negative depictions of the conflict. “Israeli policies, the
coverage by NRK14 can be one-sided;” “The media’s wrongful and deceptive
13. Also in the sample of Jewish respondents, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was commonly cited as
the reason for negative attitudes. However, the number of respondents was very low due to a
problem during data collection. The significance of Israel for explanations of antisemitism
among Jews has been shown in two quantitative surveys conducted by the Mosaic Faith Community (DMT) among its members. The surveys revealed that Norwegian Jews both considered
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be central to the prevalence of antisemitism, and for negative
experiences associated with being Jewish. Furthermore, 83 per cent of the respondents in the
2011 survey considered media coverage of the Middle East conflict to be very important in the
development of antisemitism in Norway in recent decades, while 62 per cent considered 'The
prolonged conflict in the Middle East' to be very important (Levin, 2004), Rolf Golombek, Irene
Levin and J. Kramer, “Jødisk liv i Norge”, Hatikva, no. 5 (2012).
14. NRK is the Norwegian national broadcasting corporation (Norges rikskringkasting).
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representation of the situation between Israel and Palestine” and “The conflict about
land in Israel and Palestine, the coverage in the media, images and the way things
that happen are described” are typical examples of such answers. Not all answers
referring to the media included explicit mentioning of the conflict, although it may
be implied: “The one-sided coverage by TV and press – perhaps they should try to
live with terror every day” is one example suggesting this interpretation.
Part of the background for these answers may lie in public debates about the
coverage by the national broadcaster NRK, which has been accused of being
biased and pro-Palestine.15 Though sometimes rather obscure, the mentioning of
“political correctness” in some of the answers suggests that not only is Israelcritical coverage perceived as the dominant perspective in the media, but also that
it is difficult to express other views in public. One respondent saw this as a politically motivated trend: “Politically controlled media writing things that are politically correct.” References to the Norwegian national broadcaster NRK sometimes
indicated that it was understood as a proponent of “left-wing” political views,
which can be perceived as implying a critical attitude towards Israel, an attribution
that was sometimes made explicit. Some answers merely referred to “media”, not
indicating any details on how the respondents perceived the content. A few of the
answers also mention leftist extremists as a source of antisemitic attitudes, which
may be interpreted as implying a connection to political activists engaged in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Some of the answers pointing to the media imply a consensus in Norway on
how Jews should be viewed (negatively), a claim that stands in contrast to the antiantisemitism norm mentioned earlier.16 One respondent noted, “It is not politically
correct to have positive views of Jews. This is what the media tells us. The ways
things are presented in much of the media make Jews look bad.”
15. The public debate about the coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been extensive. For an
analysis of the coverage by NRK in the period 2008–2011 conducted on behalf of the board of the
national broadcaster (NRK), Kringkastingsrådet, see Cecilie Hellestveit, “Nrks dekning av Midtøstenkonflikten, med særlig vekt på fremstillingen av Israel” (Kringkastningsrådet: April 28, 2011). http://
fido.nrk.no/4143d7a4c31038a1341fc5d22f8e4816ac97307d84b514728b51f7265317410f/
Cecilie_Hellestveits_gjennomgang.pdf. The background for the decision to conduct the analysis
was numerous complaints about the coverage, particularly one complaint from the Israeli embassy.
16. However, as shown by Christhard Hoffmann in chapter 1 in the present volume, a similar consensus does not apply to anti-Israeli expressions. See Christhard Hoffmann, “A Fading Consensus: Public Debates on Antisemitism in Norway, 1960 vs. 1983”. For a discussion of the concept
of communication latency in relation to Israel-related antisemitism, see also Jan Weyand, “Das
Konzept der Kommunikationslatenz und der Fortschritt in der soziologischen Antisemitismusforschung”, Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung 26 (2017): 36–58.
9. HOW PEOPLE EXPLAIN ANTISEMITISM
As shown in these examples, the answers pointing to the media often explicitly
placed responsibility “outside” the Jewish minority by stating that the representations were wrong. Although the answers defined the reason for antisemitism lying
“outside” the group, they also indirectly demonstrated the association between
“Jew” and “Israeli” or “Israel”, which is necessary for the media’s reports from
the conflict to have an impact on attitudes towards Jews. Only one respondent
explained negative attitudes as something directly conveyed through the media,
pointing to “Anti-Jewish/anti-Israel attitudes in the media.” It is not clear whether
the reference in this case is to social media, unedited parts of the internet, or mainstream media. Nevertheless, the close association between Jews and Israel is evident.
When the answers also commented on the tendency to conflate “Jews” and
“Israelis”, “Israel” and “Israeli politics”, this was generally seen as a problem
“others” have, but some respondents also mentioned how the conflict influenced
their own views of Jews. One noted, “Now I associate Jews with Israel, and I’m
strongly opposed to the policies that are being pursued in that country!” The use
of the word “now” in the citation is interesting, as it gives the impression that this
is something that has developed over time, “now” there is a close association
between “Jew” and “Israel”, in contrast to “before”.
Some of the answers were themselves examples of such conflations, explaining
negative attitudes towards Jews with the way “they” behave in Israel. Typical
examples of such answers are, “Do not accept Palestine as a sovereign state”; “The
relationship between Jews and Palestinians. The Jews use violence against the
Palestinians’ terrorists”, and “The way they act in the conflict and the way they
carry on and build settlements.” Another example shows how a generalised perception of “Jews” that lacks a clear distinction between Israelis and Israeli authorities may still include a nuanced perspective in terms of responsibility, “I disagree
with the politics that the Jews lead against the Palestinians in Israel, but that is not
the fault of the Jews in Norway!” Though the counterpart of the Palestinians in the
conflict is perceived as “the Jews”, the citation explicitly rejects blaming Norwegian Jews for the actions of the state of Israel.
Most of the answers did not include very strong negative statements, but
referred to injustice against the Palestinians, occupation of Palestinian territories
or just the “situation” in the Middle East as contributing to antisemitism without
giving further explanations. The material did, however, also contain some answers
that expressed strong anti-Israel attitudes. “The occupation of Palestine, child killings and bombing of settlements” is one example. Another answer was more
detailed in the negative descriptions of Israeli politics:
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Have a government in Israel that kills and steals from the neighbouring countries. Build houses on the neighbour’s land. Ruthless behaviour on another
man’s land. The state of Israel is one of the world’s largest terror organisations.
Kill small children because they do not like anyone going against them. Israel
got its land, but it steals from the neighbours. If they succeed in cultivating the
land, Israel takes this land. Thus, the Israeli people must suffer, because the
government in Israel does not want peace. It is not the Jews that people do not
like.17
After the relatively long and detailed negative descriptions of the state of affairs
in Israel, the last sentence importantly defines where the respondent places the
focus of the antisemitic sentiments, namely not with “the Jews”, but in Israel and
its politics. The insistence on the description of Israel’s counterparty as “neighbours” contributes to an image of an imbalanced situation and underlines the
injustice in Israel’s behaviour. The answer also clearly states that the Israeli population suffers from the government’s behaviour. The citation thus emphasises a
distinction between “Israel” understood as the authorities, “Israeli”, and “Jew”.
However, the concepts seem tightly connected in the central argument, which can
be summarised as “negative attitudes towards Jews are due to the actions of
Israel”. Furthermore, there is a peculiar lack of acting subject in several of the sentences, which almost inevitably raises the question precisely about this distinction:
Who has a government that kills and steals? Who builds houses on their neighbour’s land? Being an explanation of negative attitudes towards Jews, it seems the
answer could also, in contrast to what is claimed in the last sentence, be interpreted
as “the Jews”. Thus an ambiguity emerges based on the answer’s combination of
a distinction between “Jews” and “Israel” and a generalised image of Jews based
on the actions of Israel. The movement from what then appears to be an initial conflation of the concepts to the final clarification may be seen as an expression of the
respondent’s own process of thought, the need for precision emerging as the issue
is given further consideration.
Another example from the material shows similar anti-Israel views and a certain
ambiguity:
17. “Har et styresett i Israel som dreper og stjeler fra nabolandene. Bygger hus på naboens land. Tar
seg til rette på annens man land. Staten Israel er en av verdens største terrororganisasjoner.
Dreper små barn for de liker ikke at noen sier dem imot. Israel fikk sitt land, men stjeler fra
naboene. Hvis de lykkes i å få dyrke land, så tar Israel dette landet. Derfor må det israelske folk
lide for at styret i Israel ikke ønsker fred. Det er ikke jødene som folk ikke liker”.
9. HOW PEOPLE EXPLAIN ANTISEMITISM
Wrong question. It is not the Jews, but the Zionists who are the problem. Israel
is a Zionist state and a terror state. Does not follow international law. Harasses
its own citizens and Palestinians. Those who support Israel are like those who
support ISIS.18
The citation demonstrates particularly strong anti-Israeli views, calling it a terror
state and comparing those who support it with the supporters of ISIS. Contemporary debate on antisemitism often includes the question of definition, not least in
relation to criticism of Israel.19 Though it is not explicit in the citation, it has connotations to a debate where a common trait is the “coding” of antisemitism by
replacement of the word “Jew” with the word “Zionist”. Furthermore, the answer
seems to be rejecting the question of antisemitism altogether, “the problem” being
not the Jews, but “the Zionists”. Once again, the question arises of where the line
is supposed to be drawn: who are the “Zionists”, and who are those who support
Israel? The answer could obviously be the Jews. However, the reference may be
more general, suggesting anyone supporting the Jewish state. In a Norwegian context, the reference is also likely to be conservative Christians, who are among
Israel’s most dedicated supporters.
The association between Israel and attitudes towards Jews may be perceived as
a result of Jewish attitudes towards Israel or even Israeli policies underlining
Israel as a Jewish state, the “conflation” in this sense understood as an effect of
actual identification. The issue has been part of the Norwegian public debate, most
recently when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared in 2015 that
Europe’s Jews should immigrate to Israel to escape the threat of contemporary
antisemitism. The statement was criticised among others by the head of the Jewish
community in Oslo, who declared that Jews in Norway were “Jewish Norwegians” though he also emphasised Israel’s importance to Jews.20 Debate about the
relationship between Jews in Norway and Israel was also caused by the solidarity
event that took place around the synagogue in Oslo in February 2015. The socalled “ring of peace” was organised by Muslim youth and gathered 1300 people.
18. “Feil spørsmål. Det er ikke jøder som er problemet men sionister. Israel er en sionistisk stat og
en terrorstat. Følger ikke internasjonale lover. Trakasserer sine egne innbyggere og palestinerne.
De som støtter Israel er på linje med de som støtter ISIS”.
19. Kenneth L. Marcus, The Definition of Anti-Semitism (New York: Oxford University Press,
2015).
20. See, for example, “Netanyahu ber Europas jøder flytte til Israel” (“Netanyahu asks Europe’s
Jews to move to Israel”), Fedrelandsvennen, February 15, 2015. https://www.fvn.no/nyheter/
norgeogverden/i/v1W4p/Netanyahu-ber-Europas-joder-flytte-til-Israel, consulted April 30,
2019.
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The event was a response to the terrorist attack against the synagogue in Copenhagen. It received widespread and positive attention, but the organisers also met
criticism from individuals within the Muslim community due to the “Zionist affiliation” of the synagogue.21 The discussion demonstrated how strong, negative
attitudes towards Israel may represent an obstacle between the two minorities and
prevent a consensus of anti-antisemitism.22 In the present material, answers rarely
thematised Jewish attitudes. The following is one of the few to describe Jewish
views as central, briefly referring to “Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories
and the Jew’s attitudes towards it.” The relatively short answer offers no clear
interpretation, and the implication may be either that the two elements are equally
responsible for antisemitism, or perhaps that the key to explaining antisemitism is
Jewish support of Israel.
The significance ascribed in the material to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as
context for contemporary antisemitism is interesting. It can be seen to reflect an
international tendency where anti-Israel expressions are sometimes combined
with anti-Jewish stereotypes and where developments in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict have been found to correlate with manifestations of antisemitism, as violence and harassment of Jews have been registered more often in periods when the
conflict has intensified. The respondents may be aware of these tendencies or have
noted similar cases in Norway. In a 2016 meta-study on antisemitism in contemporary Europe, Lars Dencik and Karl Merosi investigated developments in the
manifestations of anti-Jewish attitudes. They identify three kinds of empirically
different “antisemitisms”, namely classic antisemitism, Enlightenment-based
antisemitism (based on religious criticism), and Israel-derived antisemitism. While
strong anti-Israel attitudes have been found to predict antisemitism in some studies, including the analysis of the two Norwegian population surveys, which found
a small, but notable correlation between anti-Israel views and antisemitic attitudes, the two phenomena obviously are not the same. 23 Claims that accusations
about antisemitism are being used politically as a way to silence criticism of Israel
are a frequent element of the discussion.
21. See, for example, “Fredsringen er en alvorlig feil” (“The ring of peace is a serious mistake”),
VG, February 21, 2015. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/5xE91/muslimske-linstad-fredsringen-er-en-alvorlig-feil, consulted April 30, 2019.
22. For a further discussion on perceptions of this event among Muslims and Jews in Norway, see
the chapter by Claudia Lenz and Vibeke Moe in this volume, “Negotiations of Antisemitism and
Islamophobia in Group Conversations among Jews and Muslims”. For a further analysis of attitudes between Muslims and Jews in Norway, see also Werner Bergmann, “How Do Jews and
Muslims in Norway Perceive Each Other? Between Prejudice and Willingness to Cooperate”, in
the present volume.
9. HOW PEOPLE EXPLAIN ANTISEMITISM
The question of the relationship between antisemitism and attitudes to Israel
was a central topic in both quantitative surveys in Norway. In contrast to the clear
decrease found with regard to negative attitudes towards Jews, the results from the
questions on Israel and the Middle East conflict are similar to the findings from
2011, albeit with a small increase in the proportion with high scores on anti-Israel
attitudes. Though they are not pronounced, some of the results are interesting to
look into as a backdrop for the qualitative analysis of the open-ended questions.
One statement from the survey explicitly relates to the association often found
in contemporary anti-Zionism and antisemitism to compare Israeli policies with
the actions of the Nazis during the Holocaust. The statement was, “Israel treats the
Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War 2.” Results
showed a high level of support, with 32 per cent supporting the statement. However, there was a slight decrease both in the rejection (from 33 to 31 per cent) and
the support of the statement (from 38 per cent to 32 per cent) from 2011 to 2017,
resulting in a substantial increase in the proportion that answered “impossible to
answer” (29 to 37 per cent). The results indicate an increased awareness of the
problems related to the analogy in the statement, though not an increase in the
rejection of such a parallel. At the same time, results from a statement regarding
violence against Jews displayed the existence of relatively widespread and strong
sentiments against Israel with impact on attitudes towards Jews. The statement
“Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, harassment and violence against
Jews are justifiable” was supported by 12 per cent of the population. The findings
23. In Norway, Hoffmann, Kopperud and Moe, eds., Antisemitism in Norway, 69–71, and Hoffmann
and Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims, 90–98. See also Werner Bergmann,
“Counting Antisemites versus Measuring Antisemitism – An “Elastic View” of Antisemitism”
in the current volume, and Edward E. Kaplan and Charles A. Small, “Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Anti-Semitism in Europe”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (2006): 548–561.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002706289184. An early discussion of this subject can be found in
Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, “Antizionism and Antisemitism” in Anti-Semitism in Germany. The Post-Nazi Epoch since 1945 (New York: Routledge, 1997), 182–191. See also Wolfgang Frindte, Susan Wetting and Dorit Wammetsberger, “Old and New anti-Semitic Attitudes in
the Context of Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation – Two Studies in Germany”,
Peace and Conflict. Journal of Peace Psychology 11, no. 3 (2005): 239–266; Anti-Defamation
League, Attitudes toward Jews, Israel and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict in Ten European
Countries (New York 2004); Aribert Heyder, Julia Iser and Peter Schmidt, “Israelkritik oder
Antisemitismus? Meinungsbildung zwischen Öffentlichkeit, Medien und Tabus”, in Deutsche
Zustände, Wilhelm Heitmeyer ed., Folge 3, (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2005), 144–165;
Daniel L. Staetsky, Antisemitism in Contemporary Great Britain (London: Institute for Jewish
Policy Research, 2017) and Wilhelm Kempf, Israelkritik zwischen Antisemitismus und Menschenrechtsidee. Eine Spurensuche (Berlin: Regener, 2015).
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are consistent both with the tendency in the qualitative material of pointing to
Israel as a central factor in contemporary antisemitism, and with the decrease in
prevalence of classic antisemitic stereotypes. Few respondents combine antiIsraeli statements with high scores on antisemitism as it was defined in the survey,
and less than five per cent of the respondents combine high scores on antisemitism
and strong support for the Palestinian side in the conflict. The small correlations
indicate that classic antisemitic attitudes are rarely connected to anti-Israel attitudes, though they may have been replaced by Israel-related antisemitism defined
as negative attitudes towards Jews that are based on a negative image of Israel and
a correspondingly negative and essentialised image of Jews.24
ANTISEMITISM UNDERSTOOD AS AN “IMPORTED PROBLEM”
Closely related to the answers referring to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were
those explaining negative attitudes towards Jews as a problem among Muslims.
More than one in ten answers explained antisemitism by reference to attitudes
among Muslims.25 This marks a development since 2011, at which point the topic
of “Muslim antisemitism” was only marginally present in the material. Some
answers expressed anti-Muslim attitudes. The following are two typical examples:
“Too many Muslims in this country!” and “Muslims are spreading lies and
hatred.” The answers may be seen to reflect a tendency in the Norwegian public
in which antisemitic attitudes among Muslims have received much attention, primarily related to anti-Jewish incidents in other European countries, but also in
connection to expressions by individual Norwegian Muslims.
While the question in the survey asked about the reasons for negative attitudes,
it remains unclear in some of the answers referring to “Muslims” whether they are
seen as the origin of the attitudes, or if they rather are seen as the bearers of neg24. For an analysis of correlations between antisemitic attitudes and legitimisation of violence
against Jews, see chapter 7 in the current volume, Werner Bergmann, “How do Jews and Muslims in Norway perceive each other? Between Prejudice and the Willingness to Cooperate”, 25–
26.
25. Contemporary antisemitism among Muslims has been studied increasingly in recent decades.
For an overview on attitudes among Muslims in Europe, see Günther Jikeli, Antisemitic Attitudes among Muslims in Europe: A Survey Review (New York: ISGAP Occasional Papers,
2015); Günther Jikeli, Antisemitismus und Diskriminierungswahrnehmungen junger Muslime in
Europa. Ergebnisse einer Studie unter jungen muslimischen Männern (Essen: Klartext, 2012),
270. See also Juliane Wetzel, Moderner Antisemitismus unter Muslimen in Deutschland (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2014), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-942209_17 and Ruud Koopmans, Religious fundamentalism and out-group hostility among Muslims
and Christians in Western Europe (WZB Discussion Paper, 2014).
9. HOW PEOPLE EXPLAIN ANTISEMITISM
ative ideas that may have other sources. Overall, this category of answers included
a variety of explanations, some pointing to immigration, others to influence from
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In public discourse, the question of Muslim attitudes toward Jews is often closely connected to the debate about the situation in
the Middle East conflict. Manichean representations of the conflict contribute to
the impression that it concerns not Palestinians or Arabs and Israelis, but rather
Muslims and Jews. One answer reflected this view very clearly, pointing to
“Polarisation, Muslims versus Jews, in addition to Jews being held responsible for
everything that the state of Israel does.” Other examples that combine references
to Muslims and the conflict indicate a strong identification with the Palestinian
cause among Muslims: “Muslim colleagues from Palestine say the Jews have
taken their country and the cities that are holy to them” and “That we have Muslim
immigrants who take with them negative attitudes from the conflict between Palestine and Israel.” The citations show how a central premise behind these answers
is the existence of an overarching “Muslim” identity that, based on the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, is constructed in opposition to a “Jewish” identity associated
with Israel. Furthermore, the focus on Muslims as bearers of the negative attitudes
constructs antisemitism as a new phenomenon in Norway.
The so-called new antisemitism concerns a form of antisemitism emerging
particularly in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and anti-Zionism, and
focusing on contributions from the political left and parts of the Muslim (immigrant) population in Europe. Theoretical considerations attempt to distinguish this
“new” form of antisemitism from the earlier expressions of Jew hatred that largely
drew on religious or racial biases.26 However, whether it is really a question of a
“new” form of antisemitism is debatable, and scholars often point to how the antisemitic notions, despite referring to (relatively) new political situations and incorporating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, draw on long historical continuities.27
The “novelty” may instead be connected to the immigrant background of the perceived bearers of antisemitic attitudes.
The present material may also be seen as a reflection of a public debate preoccupied with immigration and where “immigrants” have been understood as
26. Pierre-André Taguieff, Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe (Ivan R. Dee,
2002); Alvin H. Rosenfeld, ed., Resurgent Antisemitism: Global Perspectives (Indiana University Press, 2013).
27. See, for example, Jonathan Judaken”, “So what's new? Rethinking the ‘New Antisemitism’ in a
Global Age”, Patterns of Prejudice, 42, no. 4–5 (Taylor and Francis 2008): 531–560 and Brian
Klug, “Interrogating ‘new anti-Semitism’”, Ethnic and racial Studies, 36, no. 3 (2013): 468–
482.
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“Muslims”.28 Respondents may have interpreted the question as referring to an
increase of negative attitudes instead of antisemitism as such. A question about
recent developments or increase of negative attitudes may have contributed to a
focus on Muslims, understood as relatively recent immigrants to Norway (and as
bearers of antisemitic attitudes, in distinction from the majority population). Some
examples that may be interpreted in this direction are “Increased immigration by
Muslims”; “Increased Muslim population. Most people do not care whether someone is a Jew, Christian or whatever” and “Immigration from Muslims countries
with negative views of Jews following.” In this sense, answers that ascribed antisemitism to Muslims differ from answers that describe negative attitudes towards
Jews as part of a long (Norwegian) history. On the contrary, these answers generally seemed to regard antisemitism as unconnected with the historical and cultural
heritage of Europe and Norway.29
Though there was a clear association between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and negative attitudes among Muslims in the material, many answers also referred
to antisemitism among Muslims without including any details about the background for these perceived attitudes. One answer stated this lack of context explicitly, though suggesting religious beliefs may be one explanation: “Many Muslims
hate Jews. Have no idea why. Maybe the imams preach about them being hated
and killed, like Muhammed did.” Another answer suggested a difference between
“Muslims” and “Norwegians” on this subject: “Among Muslims: indoctrination
and propaganda against Jews in the Muslim world. Among Norwegians: Israel’s
politics, particularly in relation to the conflict with Palestine.” Both answers suggest Muslims are subject to ideological pressure, the first in an Islamic context, the
other even more vaguely, from what is perceived as “the Muslim world”. Interestingly, the second answer connects antisemitism among “Norwegians”, and not
Muslims, to the political situation in the Middle East. It also indicates that
28. The shift in the public conception from “immigrant” to “Muslim” has been described as a general pattern in Europe, see for example Stefano Allievi, “How the Immigrant has Become Muslim”, Revue européenne des migrations internationales, vol. 21(2) (2005). For the Norwegian
context, see for example Christine Jacobsen, Islamic traditions and Muslim youth in Norway
(Leiden: Brill, 2011); Christian Stokke, A Multicultural society in the making. How Norwegian
Muslims challenge a white nation (PhD diss., Norwegian University of Science and Technology,
Department of Social Anthropology, 2012); Cora Alexa Døving and Siv Ellen Kraft, Religion i
pressen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 2013).
29. The question of whether the immigration to Europe of recent years – particularly refugees from
the Middle East and North Africa – has contributed to an increase of antisemitism has been discussed in David Feldman and Ben Gidley, Antisemitism and Immigration in Western Europe
Today. Is there a connection? The case of the United Kingdom (Stiftung EVZ, 2018).
9. HOW PEOPLE EXPLAIN ANTISEMITISM
“Muslims” are different from “Norwegians”; a view that was found in several
answers and resonates with a perception of Muslims as immigrants to Norway and
as having a different cultural background. The following is another example of an
answer that describes antisemitism among Muslims as something unrelated to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, suggesting that “Some is a heritage from Muslim
milieus; some is [due to] the conflict between Israel and Palestine.” Perhaps the
implication here is that Muslims, as adherents of Islam, are negatively inclined
towards Jews, as was also suggested in some of the other answers cited above.
THE TRADITION OF ANTISEMITISM: CLASSIC STEREOTYPES OF JEWS
A third category of answers included references to classic stereotypes of Jews and
the long tradition of antisemitic prejudice. The category contrasts explanations
pointing to Muslims by underlining that antisemitism is a phenomenon with a long
history in Norway. Many respondents seemed to regard the existence of historical
prejudice as an explanation in itself, and negative attitudes towards Jews as a kind
of self-fulfilling prophecy, referring to “old prejudices” and “history” in their
answers as something eternal.30 By referring to antisemitic prejudice as something
that “always” has existed, the answers imply both a distance to the notions and
doubt as to whether this prejudice will ever disappear.
Similar to answers referring to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this category
included both answers that placed responsibility for the negative attitudes “inside”
and “outside” the Jewish minority. The latter included examples that, rather than
pointing to historical prejudice, relied on stereotypes in the explanations, effectively demonstrating the continued presence of the antisemitic tradition. “Old
prejudice” was also seen in relation to developments in contemporary society with
answers accordingly including complex interpretations of processes. The following example combined reference to several categories of the highlighted explanations, stating, “A latent antisemitism has been stimulated by Islamic immigration,
resulting in racist attitudes towards Jews in general and Israel in particular.” The
mentioning of a “latent antisemitism” clearly attributes prejudice to a longer history in Norway, though Islamic immigration stands out as the decisive force in the
spread of contemporary negative attitudes.
Among the answers that placed responsibility for antisemitism in culturally transmitted ideas were some that included very negative descriptions of Norwegians,
30. This was also found in the material from 2011; see Moe et al., “Hvis de hadde oppført seg som
vanlige nordmenn, hadde alt vært greit, tror jeg”, 1–34.
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pointing to widespread prejudice, xenophobia and even hatred in the population.
Below is one of the more detailed examples:
Norwegians have a special ability to deny others becoming a part of us. Norwegian Jews have been criticised and excluded several times over many, many
years. They have always been Norwegian, but in the eyes of many Norwegians, they have always been “Jewish”. #Embarrassing. Norwegians believe
all Norwegians are just like themselves, eating the same and listening to Hans
Rotmo every evening. They forget that there are rather few people in the world
who are as hateful and excluding as they are.31
The main argument in this explanation is that Jews are seen as foreign in Norway and that xenophobic tendencies in the population are at the heart of antisemitism. The description establishes a self-critical distance to “Norwegians”
that suggests the respondent does not fully identify with this category, though
the use of the hashtag “embarrassing” may be interpreted as a sign of identification, albeit ambivalent. The reference to evening listening habits is probably to the Norwegian songwriter and musician Hans Per Rotmo. Rotmo has
caused debate following several controversial statements about Muslims and
immigration.32 In the context of the citation, he seems to be representing a
closed “Norwegian” part of a majority culture as opposed one that is open to
new impulses. The citation’s strong accentuation of “Norwegian” characteristics disturbs the otherwise emphasised point that “Jews” are also “Norwegians”.
Some answers linked the negative attitudes to specific historical situations, such
as World War II or the clause against Jews in the Norwegian constitution from
1814 or to anti-Judaism rooted in the Christian religious and cultural heritage.33
However, there were few references to Judaism or religious beliefs as the reason
31. “Nordmenn har en egen evne til å nekte andre å bli en del av oss. Norske jøder har blitt kritisert
og ekskludert flere ganger i mange, mange år. De har alltid vært norske, men for mange nordmenn har de alltid vært “jødiske”. #flaut Nordmenn tror at alle nordmenn er helt like dem selv
og spiser det samme og hører på Hans Rotmohver kveld. De glemmer at det heller er få i verden
som er så hatefulle og ekskluderende som de selv.”
32. See for example the article in Dagbladet, May 30, 2015, “Kaller muslimer ‘miljøforuresning’”
[“Calls Muslims ‘environmental pollution’”], https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/kaller-muslimer-miljoforurensning/60691243, consulted May 7, 2019.
33. Antijudaism, defined as religiously based opposition towards Judaism and Jews as adherents of
Judaism. See for example Gavin Langmuir, Toward a definition of antisemitism (University of
California Press, 1996) 383.
9. HOW PEOPLE EXPLAIN ANTISEMITISM
for negative attitudes.34 Among the answers that did explain antisemitism by
referring to religious notions, there were few that presented them as independent
arguments. Rather, the answers typically combined the reference with other explanations, for example by relating the concept of Jews as God’s chosen people to
criticism of the actions of Israel. Rather than referring to the historical existence
of prejudice, some answers thus demonstrated the continuity of stereotypes. The
following example combined reference to classical stereotypes with strong antipathy towards Jews:
They think they are God’s chosen people and hence better than others. What
idiots. The ruthless behaviour in Israel does not help [them]. They are belligerent, hateful and have no respect for other people and religions.35
On one level, the citation provides different explanations of negative attitudes;
while the actions of Israel “do not help” the Jews, the actions appear separate from
the explanation related to the religious belief that Jews are the chosen people.
However, an essentialised image of Jews based on a number of classical stereotypes permeates the answer and is the underlying premise of the explanation.
Other examples reflecting classical stereotypes as an integral part of the explanations described Israeli (or “Jewish”) actions as self-righteous, particularly stubborn or revengeful, echoing central elements in anti-Judaistic notions.
Though including references to stereotypes, answers were sometimes difficult
to define in terms of where the sympathy lay. One example pointed to Jews as a
particular group in society: “I think many people believe Jews keep too much to
themselves.” The answer echoes classic representations of Jews as self-centred,
indicating that the main reason for antisemitism is a notion of Jews as isolated
from the rest of society. However, it remains unclear whether people are right to
think that Jews keep to themselves, or if this is a prejudice.
The following example refers to historical prejudice and religious beliefs to
explain negative attitudes towards Jews, though simultaneously suggesting identification with Jews:
34. This constitutes a significant difference between the material on antisemitism and the material
on Islamophobia, both in 2011 and 2017. See Hoffmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews
and Muslims, 66-69.
35. “De tror de er guds utvalgte folk og dermed bedre enn andre. For noen idioter. Det hjelper dem
ikke at de har tatt seg til rette i Israel. De er krigerske, hatske og har ingen respekt for andre folk
og religioner.”
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A remainder of the past, among other things, deceptive information from parents/grandparents – The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and hatred against people like me, who look upon the Messiah as God. I love them. They gave me
their bible and most of all: The Lord Jesus Christ! Soon they too shall meet
Him, He, whom they pierced. What a day it will be!!36
In addition to the references to historical prejudices and the infamous “protocols”,
the citation combines traditional anti-Judaist notions of Jews as Christ-killers with
references to the concept of salvation from Christian eschatology.37 The salvation
of the Jews is central, and introduced in the answer as an explanation of the
respondent’s own, positive views of Jews, which stand in contrast to the negative
attitudes. The answer thus reflects the religious affiliation between Judaism and
Christianity and expresses a corresponding identification with Jews. In addition to
the religiously founded common ground, the answer also indicates mutual experiences of hatred among people who see “the Messiah as God”. The answer thus
includes reference to a general form of religiously based negative attitudes, hatred
aimed not exclusively towards Jews, but towards all who share this perception of
the Messiah.
Among the answers that implicitly or explicitly referred to the long history of
antisemitic prejudice, some gave the impression that antisemitism is almost automatically sustained as part of Norwegian culture. While primarily an expression
of knowledge of the history of anti-Jewish attitudes, this tendency can also be
linked to the traditional antisemitic accusation that Jews are themselves to blame
for negative attitudes. Some answers gave a clear indication of such views: “There
has been a centuries-long dislike of Jews throughout history, possibly because
they are talented business people and because many of them became affluent.
They’ve been blamed for all kinds of things throughout the ages.” Some answers
expressed classic antisemitic notions in fewer words: “Greed”, “Business morals”
and “Only interested in becoming rich”. However, similar expressions of classic
antisemitic stereotypes were not typical for the material.
The association between the “old prejudice” and the minority itself can be compared to the results from the quantitative material, where eight per cent supported
the statements “Jews largely have themselves to blame for being persecuted” and
36. “Henger igjen fra historien bl.a. misvisende opplysninger fra foreldre/besteforeldre – Sions
Vises Protokoller og hat mot slike som meg, som ser på Messias som Gud. Jeg elsker dem. De
gav meg sin Bibel og mest av alt: Herren Jesus Kristus! Snart skal de og møte Ham, Ham som
de gjennomstunget. For en dag det vil bli!!”
37. The biblical reference is to Zechariah 12:10.
9. HOW PEOPLE EXPLAIN ANTISEMITISM
“Jews have always caused problems in the countries in which they live.”38 However,
parallel to the findings in 2011, the material included few references to Jews having
caused concrete societal problems in contemporary Norway. Rather, answers that
blamed Jews for antisemitism by referring to stereotypical characteristic of Jews
typically did so without mentioning specific consequences of these characteristics.
In both 2011 and 2017, this represents a significant difference between the two sets
of open-ended questions concerning reasons for antisemitism and Islamophobia. In
the material on Islamophobia, the attitudes were often explained with reference to
specific societal problems in Norway. However, the numerous references to Israel
may be interpreted as a new form of “societal context” in the case of antisemitism.
Following the conflation between Jews and Israel found in many of the answers, this
reference also suggests that “Jews” have themselves to blame for negative attitudes.
3. CONCLUSION
The analysis of the open-ended question on reasons for antisemitism from the 2017
survey has shown that antisemitism is often perceived as being related to Israel and
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Violence and injustice in Israeli politics were typically mentioned as explanations for negative attitudes; many answers included very
strong negative descriptions of Israel. Answers often included references to biased
representations of the conflict in the media; suggesting political views of journalists
affected the reporting. However, few answers suggested the media directly conveyed antisemitism. The underlying premise for the explanations was rather a tendency to conflations between “Jews” and “Israeli” or “Israel”. Many explanations
pointed to this tendency, but the conflation was more commonly implied. Some
answers were themselves examples of such conflations. The close association
between antisemitism and Israel found in the material may be related to Israeli policies underlining Israel as a Jewish state, a topic that has been part of the public
debate on contemporary antisemitism in many countries, including Norway.
The relation between antisemitism and attitudes towards Israel was also
reflected in the statistical material from the survey in 2017. The findings are an
indication of how Israel and Israeli policies in the post-war period gradually have
become central elements in antisemitic discourse on an international level. This
development may explain why Norwegian Jews experience antisemitism as an
increasing problem, as do Jews in many other European countries, while surveys
find that the prevalence of classic antisemitic prejudice is decreasing. However,
38. Hoffmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway 2017, 33.
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the tendency of pointing to Israel found in the analysis of the open-ended questions
may also be interpreted as an expression of awareness of the debate that connects
these phenomena – antisemitism and anti-Zionism or anti-Israelism. The material
does not provide enough information to conclude with regard to which of these
interpretations best explains the findings; rather it indicates that both explanations
are relevant on some level. Interestingly, some answers suggested that it is difficult
to express positive views of Jews due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and prevalent negative attitudes towards Israel in the Norwegian population. These answers
provide a contrast to what is commonly described as the post-Holocaust norm of
anti-antisemitism, suggesting antisemitism in relation to Israel is manifest and that
the concept of communication latency is thus not generally applicable.39
The material from 2017 showed a slight increase in answers explaining negative
attitudes towards Jews as primarily a “Muslim” problem compared to the answers
from 2011. These answers often described antisemitism as an “imported problem”, having come to Norway with Muslim immigration. The answers reflect a
public discourse that perceives “immigrants” as “Muslims” and where the relation
between Jews and Muslims is constructed in antagonistic terms. The antagonism
in these cases is often related to and nourished by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
This connection was also visible in the current material when explanations pointing to Muslims included references to the conflict. However, antisemitism among
Muslims tended to remain uncontextualised in the material, as if the antagonism
between Jews and Muslims were taken for granted.
The material contained relatively few examples of open expressions of classic
antisemitism, but some answers explained antisemitism by pointing to support of
such ideas among others or to the long history of antisemitism, often termed “old
prejudice”. Some answers in this category included negative descriptions of “Norwegians” as generally prejudiced. More typically, this category of answers
remained vague in the descriptions and indicated that stereotypical views of Jews
were a phenomenon almost automatically sustained as part of a cultural heritage.
In summary, the analysis shows how the answers often defined antisemitism as
something distant, either spatially (geographically), as connected to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, “ethnically”, as related to Muslim immigrants, or historically,
as part of a cultural heritage. Few answers explained negative attitudes by pointing
to “Jewish” characteristics, thus blaming Jews for antisemitism. One explanation
for this tendency may be heightened awareness of antisemitism as a societal prob39. The analysis of the Norwegian public debate in the 1980s in chapter 1 in the present volume
shows a similar lack of consensus regarding the understanding of the concept of antisemitism;
see Hoffmann, “A Fading Consensus”.
9. HOW PEOPLE EXPLAIN ANTISEMITISM
lem, and respondents’ own lack of support for negative views of Jews – they do
not relate to such views themselves, and hence interpret them as something “others”
have. However, it may also be interpreted as an example of how respondents,
instead of confessing to attitudes that are not socially acceptable, project such attitudes onto others. As such, the finding can be related to the ostracism of antisemitism after the Holocaust and the concept of communication latency. The current
material shows how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular constitutes a subject where negative views of Jews may escape what are otherwise perceived as
boundaries of expression.
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DOI: 10.18261/978-82-15-03468-3-2019-11
10.
Negotiations of Antisemitism
and Islamophobia in Group
Conversations among Jews and
Muslims
CLAUDIA LENZ AND VIBEKE MOE
ABSTRACT The following chapter presents findings from group interviews with Muslims and Jews conducted in Norway between May 2016 and May 2017. Six groups were
interviewed; three had Jewish participants and three had Muslim participants. The chapter explores interpretative patterns among the interviewees, focusing on the ways in
which antisemitism and Islamophobia were expressed or rejected in the conversations,
and how antisemitism and Islamophobia were perceived as contemporary societal problems. Photographs were used as visual prompts during the interviews and served as a
starting point for the analysis of the social interaction between the interviewees. A central question of the analysis is how intergroup attitudes were negotiated and eventually
regulated throughout the conversations.
KEYWORDS Latent antisemitism | Islamophobia | group interviews | Muslim-Jewish
relations | photo elicitation | Norway
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, antisemitism among Muslims has emerged as a topic in research
as well as in public debate.1 A recent example of this attention is the massive protests in France following the murder of two Jewish women committed by Muslims
in 2017 and 2018, accompanied by the publication of a “manifesto” against the
“new antisemitism”.2 The manifesto was signed by a range of public persons and
celebrities, among them former President Sarkozy and actor Gerard Depardieu.
The “new” antisemitism is a term often used to describe a form of antisemitism
that has emerged in recent decades among Muslims and in the European far-left
in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and anti-Zionism. This “new” antisemitism is contrasted to “older” forms of Jew hatred that largely drew on religious, nationalist or racial biases.3 However, the novelty of the phenomenon is
debated. A central criticism underlines the continuity of the antisemitic notions,
claiming that instead of representing “new” forms of antisemitism, the expressions are only modifications of traditional anti-Jewish ideas.4 Furthermore, there
is a tendency among some proponents of the term to attribute the “new” antisemitism particularly to Muslim immigrants, and thus to see antisemitism mostly as
an imported problem in today’s Europe. This discourse of “new antisemitism”,
indicating that antisemitism has been overcome in the autochthon populations of
Western European countries, is also present in the Norwegian public debate. Connected to this, we find the assumption that Jews regard Muslims as a potential
threat.
On the other hand, Muslims in Europe are perceived as targets of prejudice and
stigmatisation resembling the antisemitism of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. While this portrayal may promote insight into some common experiences and ideological similarities, the idea of Muslims being the “new Jews” can
contribute to a competition of victimhood and of prioritisation between the two
minorities when it comes to measures fighting prejudice and discrimination.
These two narratives, presenting Muslims either as “the new antisemites” or as
1. See, for example: Günther Jikeli, “Antisemitic attitudes among Muslims in Europe: A survey
review” (ISGAP Occasional Paper Series 1, 2015a); Günther Jikeli, European Muslim Antisemitism:
Why Young Urban Males Say They Don’t Like Jews (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015).
2. http://www.leparisien.fr/societe/manifeste-contre-le-nouvel-antisemitisme-21-04-20187676787.php.
3. Pierre-André Taguieff, Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe (Chicago: Ivan
R. Dee, 2002); Alvin H. Rosenfeld, ed., Resurgent Antisemitism: Global Perspectives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).
4. Jonathan Judaken, “So what’s new? Rethinking the ‘New Antisemitism’ in a Global Age”, Patterns of Prejudice 42, no. 4–5 (2008): 531–560, https://doi.org/10.1080/00313220802377453.
10. NEGOTIATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN GROUP CONVERSATIONS AMONG JEWS AND
MUSLIMS
“the new Jews”, may thus promote negative attitudes between the two minorities.
Professor of Religious Studies Björn Krondorfer states that:
[I]n either case Muslim and Jewish communities are pitted against each other.
Rather than sharing a common experience of facing fears and hatreds directed
at Muslims and Jews, the experience of antisemitism and Islamophobia deepens the mistrust between these two communities.5
By analysing how participants discuss two events linked to the relationship
between the two minorities, this chapter explores these interpretative patterns.
Based on group interviews among Muslims and Jews in Norway conducted in
2016/2017, the study investigates experiences and attitudes among the minorities.
The interviews constituted a subproject within the larger project that also
included the two quantitative surveys among Jews and Muslims and in the general
population.6 While the population survey showed a decrease in the prevalence of
antisemitic prejudices (from 12.1 per cent to 8.3 per cent) and an increase in the
percentage that did not support any negative statements about Jews (from 55 per
cent to 69 per cent), the minority survey in 2017 also showed that two out of three
Jewish respondents sometimes avoid showing their religious affiliation for fear of
negative attitudes. Furthermore, the survey displayed widespread negative attitudes towards Muslims in the general population. One in four respondents (27 per
cent) expressed what was defined as Islamophobic attitudes.
The survey was the first to explore attitudes between Jews and Muslims in Norway. The results underlined the importance of a nuanced approach, most notably
related to how prejudice in the form of stereotypical views may be prevalent while
other dimensions of negative attitudes such as antipathy or social distance may be
less pronounced. The survey also indicated that the Jewish (75 per cent) and Muslim (48 per cent) minorities believe they have common experiences as minorities
in Norway and that they can cooperate in the fight against prejudice and discrimination (Jews: 86 per cent and Muslims: 70 per cent).7
5. Björn Krondorfer, “Introduction: Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia”, CrossCurrents 65, no. 3
(2015): 292‒296.
6. Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway
2017: Population Survey and Minority Study (Oslo: Center for Studies of the Holocaust and
Religious Minorities, 2017).
7. Hoffmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway, 72–75. See also, in
the current volume: Werner Bergmann, “How do Jews and Muslims in Norway perceive each
other? Between prejudice and the willingness to cooperate”, and Ottar Hellevik, “Antisemitism
and Islamophobia in Norway: A survey analysis of prevalence, trends and possible causes of
negative attitudes towards Jews and Muslims.”
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Part of the background for this chapter is a public discourse that is concerned
with antisemitic attitudes among Muslims and tends to portray the relationship
between Muslims and Jews as polarised. Perhaps in contrast to what one might
assume, based on the public discourse, the quantitative survey also revealed that
negative views of Muslims are less prominent in the Jewish minority than in the
general population.8 This may in part be attributed to the very high level of education in the Jewish sample.9
FOCUS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
By focusing on “shared attitudinal patterns”10 in group interviews, and by applying the concept of communication latency,11 this chapter analyses the ways in
which Jewish and Muslim interviewees interpret, express or reject antisemitism
and Islamophobia. Forms of open or latent antisemitism are explored, as well as
the extent to which antisemitism and Islamophobia are regarded as related problems in contemporary society. The diverse composition of the focus groups allows
insight into the impact that generation, gender and religiosity have on inter-group
attitudes. The analysis views social interaction as an intermediate layer between
individual attitudes and discursive frameworks.
The development of antisemitism after the Holocaust and features of contemporary antisemitism constitute an important background for the analysis of this
study. After the Holocaust, antisemitism lost legitimacy and was banned from
8. The question of the Jewish minority’s attitudes towards Muslims was briefly touched upon in a
survey conducted by the Jewish community in 2012. See Rolf Golombek, Irene Levin and J.
Kramer, “Jødisk liv i Norge”, Hatikva, no. 5 (2012). The topic was also touched upon in a qualitative interview study among Jews in Oslo and Trondheim conducted two years later. See Cora
Alexa Døving and Vibeke Moe, Det som er jødisk.. Identiteter, historiebevissthet og erfaringer
med antisemittisme. En kvalitativ intervjustudie blant norske jøder (Oslo: HL-senteret, 2014).
9. Hoffmann and Moe, eds., Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway, 23. High education
levels were associated with less prevalent negative attitudes in the general population towards
both Jews and Muslims (100).
10. Ralf Bohnsack, “‘Orientierungsmuster’: Ein Grundbegriff qualitativer Sozialforschung”, Methodische Probleme der empirischen Erziehungswissenschaft, ed. Folker Schmidt (Baltmannsweiler: Schneider, 1997), 49–61.
11. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, “Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung.
Theoretische Überlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” Kölner
Zeitschrift für Soziologie u. Sozialpsychologie, 38 no. 2 (1986): 223–246; Heiko Beyer and Ivar
Krumpal, “Aber es gibt keine Antisemiten mehr’: Eine experimentelle Studie zur Kommunikationslatenz antisemitischer Einstellungen.” Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 62 (2010): 681–705.
10. NEGOTIATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN GROUP CONVERSATIONS AMONG JEWS AND
MUSLIMS
public discourse in Europe. Instead, the social norm of anti-antisemitism has come
into place. However, this has not led to the disappearance of antisemitism as a phenomenon, rather to its transformation, suppression and coverage. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb describe the “latency” of antisemitism as the underlying
presence of antisemitic interpretative patterns and narratives in public discourses,
social interactions or individual attitudes.12 This latency can take a number of
forms, such as re-framing or moderation of stereotyped language in public contexts (communication latency).
According to the theory of communication latency, negative attitudes toward
Jews will less likely be expressed in the form of “classical” racist antisemitism
that culminated in the Nazi ideology of extermination, but rather in more socially
and politically acceptable forms.13 One way in which antisemitic attitudes can
find legitimacy lies in one-sided portrayals of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
According to Matti Bunzl, “Israel’s policies in the struggle with Palestinians are
giving Europe renewed license to openly despise the Jews.”14 The anti-globalisation
discourse is another area that sometimes triggers antisemitic stereotypes and
conspiracy theories.15 In this discourse, antisemitism hardly appears as open
enmity to Jews, but rather as a perpetuation of negative ideas about Jewishness
and Jewish attributes. For the present study, the concept of communication latency
generates several interesting perspectives related to social regulation and expression or rejection of antisemitism.
A set of visual prompts (photographs) used during the interviews served as a
starting point for the analysis of the social interaction between the interviewees,
asking how intergroup attitudes are negotiated and eventually regulated throughout the conversations. Six photographs were used, all of which were related to
prejudice, hate crime and conflict on the one hand, and inclusion, recognition and
participation on the other. The analysis focuses on two of these photographs,
investigating how they promote different responses and interpretations among the
interviewees both linked to the motifs on the photographs and to broader discursive tendencies in Norwegian society. One element in the analysis explores how
interpretations can be connected to the photographs as “iconic” images, in the
12. Bergmann and Erb, “Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und öffentliche Meinung.”
13. Werner Bergmann and Wilhelm Heitmeyer, “Communicating Anti-Semitism. Are the Boundaries of the Speakable Shifting?” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte 33 (2005): 70–
89.
14. Matti Bunzl, Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds old and new in Europe (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2007).
15. Nicolas Bechter, “Anti-Semitism and Anti-Capitalism in the Current Economic Crisis”, Global
Anti-Semitism: A Crisis of Modernity, ed. Charles Asher Small, (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 27–35.
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sense that they draw on established metanarratives.16 The chapter asks whether
the conversations touch upon antisemitic or Islamophobic stereotypes and interpretations, and if so, whether antisemitism and Islamophobia are referred to as
external phenomena or if the comments themselves convey antisemitic or Islamophobic ideas and interpretations. Do reactions indicate an underlying acceptance,
or is the expression of negative views seen as a transgression of social norms and
sanctioned accordingly? The chapter thus investigates signs of social regulation in
the way that expressions of antisemitism and Islamophobia are discussed and
commented on by the participants, exploring what can be termed the boundaries
of the acceptable.
2. METHODOLOGY
Six group interviews were conducted between May 2016 and May 2017; three
with Jewish participants and three with Muslim participants. Five of these interviews were conducted in Oslo, and one in Trondheim. The groups consisted of
between three and five interviewees.
Being a qualitative study, the aim of the analysis was not to map prevalence of
attitudes, but rather to explore nuances in the expressions and the meaning of
social interactions. To accomplish this objective, the composition of the groups
was broad in terms of variables such as generation, education, gender and religiosity.17 The aim to explore social interaction and “negotiations” of meaning and
normative underlying frames of reference suggested the members of the respective groups should be acquainted prior to the interviews or be recruited within the
same milieu. Only participants in the last interview (J3) were not personally
acquainted, though they too came from the same milieu.
THE FUNCTION OF GROUP INTERVIEWS AS PART OF THE MINORITY
STUDY
The main purpose for supplementing the quantitative surveys with qualitative
group interviews was to enable a deeper insight into the attitudes than that
obtained by a questionnaire. Group interviews provide information such as a
group’s shared values and views, interpretations behind the views, insight into
16. Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites, “Public Identity and Collective Memory (2003)
Public Identity and Collective Memory in U.S. Iconic Photography: The Image of ‘Accidental
Napalm’”, Critical Studies in Media Communication 20 no. 1; 35–66.
17. For the composition of the groups, see appendix to this chapter.
10. NEGOTIATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN GROUP CONVERSATIONS AMONG JEWS AND
MUSLIMS
underlying ambiguities, uncertainties or differences, and the underlying norms
and processes behind the opinions.18
The group interviews also enabled exploration of the dynamic and adaptive
character of the attitudes in question and how these attitudes are related to other
opinions of the interviewees. The conversations between the participants demonstrate how opinions and interpretations may change following interaction with
other people, and thus show how the expressions of attitudes are flexible and
adapted to given social contexts. One of the questions guiding the analysis was
how the interactive regulation of the expression of attitudes took place. The manners in which the interviewees modified their views during the course of the interviews varied, and could involve both directions – either downplaying or intensifying expressions. The conversations also showed how different topics can be
related – for example when the interviewees referred to their own experiences
when asked about the other minority.
The choice of group interviews as a method also made it possible to explore the
significance of interaction and social acceptance in attitudinal development and
expression. Michael Bloor et al. describe how conversations in groups enable
articulation of hidden norms and attitudes:
The situation of the focus group, in principle and with a fair wind, can provide
the occasion and the stimulus for collectivity members to articulate those normally unarticulated normative assumptions. The group is a socially legitimated
occasion for participants to engage in “retrospective introspection,” to attempt
collectively to tease out previously taken for granted assumptions. This teasing
out may only be partial with many areas of ambiguity or opacity remaining and
it may be disputatious (as limits are encountered to shared meanings), but it
may yield up as much rich data on group norms as long periods of ethnographic fieldwork.19
The interviews focused on two questions: “What do you think is the reason for
negative attitudes towards Jews” and “What do you think is the reason for negative attitudes towards Muslims?” The use of photographs facilitated an open conversation driven by the interviewees’ free associations, which enabled the discussion to develop with lesser interference of the interviewer. The photos used in the
interviews were “multi-layered” or even somewhat ambivalent, and could serve
18. Michael Bloor et al., Focus Groups in Social Research (London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi:
SAGE Publications, 2001).
19. Bloor et al., Focus Groups in Social Research, 5–6.
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as a starting point for a broad number of associations.20 The following analysis
focuses on two photographs: no. 3, the “ring of peace”, showing the solidarity
event organised by young Muslims youth outside the synagogue in Oslo, February
21, 2015; and no. 4, “9/11” showing the two airplanes crashing into the World
Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001.
During the interviews, the researcher’s initial assumption, that almost all
images shown were well-known to the interviewees, was confirmed.21 Image no.
3 and no. 4 used in the analysis sparked off rich associations and conversations in
both Muslim and Jewish groups. The two images proved to be particularly valuable for the exploration of mutual perceptions between the minorities. In addition,
image no. 3, “ring of peace”, provides a visual representation of one of the key
questions in the minority survey regarding the cooperation between Jews and
Muslims.
The interviewees were asked to describe and comment on the photos. They
were free to choose whatever topic they preferred to focus on and were not obliged
to comment if they did not want to.
3. ANALYSIS
9/11
The image of the airplanes crashing into one of the Twin Towers was well known
to the participants. The iconic status of the motif was reflected in the way the
photo was discussed in the groups, with almost identical phrases and frequent use
of so-called narrative abbreviations. Narrative abbreviations are short and fragmented expressions that still contain a whole course of events.22 The use of such
abbreviations indicates that the events referred to are expected to be known to the
listener, and that detailed explanations are unnecessary. Below are two examples
20. The photos showed: (1) A pig’s head outside a mosque in Kristiansand (anti-Muslim incident
from 2012); (2) A shop window with the text “Palestine calling. Jews are not tolerated in Norway” (photo from Oslo during World War II); (3) “The ring of peace”; (4) The 9/11 attack on the
Twin Towers in New York; (5) The Norwegian King and Crown Prince wearing kippahs during
a visit in the Oslo synagogue in 2009; and (6) The wall between Israel and the West Bank, with
Jerusalem to the rear.
21. Image no. 2 was an exception, with Muslim interviewees being confused regarding the historical or present-day context of the image.
22. Jürgen Straub, ed., Narrative, Identity and Historical Consciousness (New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2000), 123.
10. NEGOTIATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN GROUP CONVERSATIONS AMONG JEWS AND
MUSLIMS
of how the interviewees talked about the 9/11 photo. The first is from a group with
Muslim participants (M2):
4: To me, when I saw this, it was “the beginning of the war on terror”.
1: “That’s when everything changed” [speaks English], to say it like that.
4: It was a big turning point, absolutely.
1: Yes.23
Almost the same phrases were used in one of the groups with Jewish informants (J3):
2: This is the beginning, I believe, of many things...
1: Yes.
2: Many things that we struggle with today.
1: Very much changed at that point.24
As the examples show, both Muslim and Jewish interviewees perceived 9/11 to be
a turning point in our time, linked to a number of contemporary societal challenges.
However, following these initial remarks, interpretations deviated between the
groups concerning which challenges were included into the narrative.
Different views of consequences
The Muslim interviewees referred to charges of terrorism being used as a pretext
for Islamophobia as one of the effects of 9/11. Portrayals of both Muslims and
Islam were seen as significantly altered in the aftermath of the attack. One interviewee pointed to how the portrayals of Muslims and Islam were politically motivated, and that Islam was interpreted as a religion that “commits terror”. Another
interviewee mentioned how this focus deeply affected Muslims in their day-to23. 4: For meg når jeg så denne her, så er det starten på krigen mot terror.
1: “That’s when everything changed,” for å si det sånn.
4: Det var et stort vendepunkt, absolutt.
1: Ja.
24. 2: Det er jo starten, tenker jeg, på veldig mye …
1: Ja.
2: Veldig mye som vi strever med i dag.
1: Da endret mye seg ...
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day life immediately following the attack: “to look someone in the eyes was
almost impossible.” One of the interviewees contrasted the widespread group constructions of Muslims after 9/11 with the way the Norwegian public had reacted
to the terror attack on 22 July, 2011. The “majority” Norwegian perpetrator made
use of Christian symbols, but a similar group construction of Christians did not
occur in the aftermath of the attack: “No one mentioned that a Christian was
behind the attack, even though he had a cross on his manifesto. He was not ‘a
Christian’ [makes quotation marks with her fingers].” The comment indicates a
sense of injustice in the way Muslims are treated compared to other religious
groups in the Norwegian public sphere, or perhaps more specifically between the
Muslim minority and the majority, which is perceived as Christian.
The discussions in the groups with Jewish informants focused on the “war on
terror” and international conflicts, but also on terrorism as a threat in Western societies (J3). The photo thus promoted interpretations that focused on change and had
Muslims in a central position, but while Muslim interviewees often mentioned the
rise of widespread Islamophobia, Jewish interviewees saw political conflict and
(Muslim) terrorists.
Negotiating Islamophobia
An engaged discussion emerged in the first group of Jewish interviewees in connection to the 9/11 photo. Starting from a discussion about Muslims, Islam and integration, two of the participants later ended up debating the relation between (realistic,
acceptable) descriptions and prejudice, more precisely where the line should be
drawn in terms of characterisations and group constructions of Muslims:
2: You say a lot about Muslims that we don’t like to be said about Jews
1: Really?
2: The generalisation – if you had only said “certain Muslims”, “certain
imams”, “certain mosques” –
1: No, I think it is –
2: then, it would have been ok –
1: a majority of Muslims who have those attitudes.
2: But there are still certain… your moderation comes somewhat late and is too
small…
10. NEGOTIATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN GROUP CONVERSATIONS AMONG JEWS AND
MUSLIMS
1: But would you see it differently, if the same had happened in Norway, which
has happened in Paris and Copenhagen?
2: Yes
1: Would you be a little less for a “colourful community” then?
2: Maybe.25
The initial reaction is concerned with the lack of nuances and a tendency to associate negative characteristics with all Muslims. By drawing attention to similar
group constructions and prejudices towards Jews, the interviewee explicitly
relates the Jewish and Muslim experiences, appealing for self-reflection and moderation in the discussion.26 However, the perspective is not supported. On the contrary, it is met with insistence that the problems can be found among the majority
of Muslims. Furthermore, the interviewee is confronted with the reality of terror
attacks as an ultimate argument against a general sympathy with Muslims.
The atmosphere in the conversation was tense at this point of the interview, and
it was clear that the participants differed both in their opinions about Islam and
Muslim integration and in their view of what was appropriate to express on these
subjects. While displaying a lack of consensus, the discussion thus simultaneously
opened for an articulation and negotiation of norms indicating where the limits of
25. 2: Du sier mye av det om muslimer som vi ikke liker at blir sagt om jøder
1: Å?
2: Den generaliseringen – hadde du bare tatt med enkelte muslimer, enkelte imamer, enkelte
moskeer –
1: Nei, jeg tror det er –
2: Så hadde det vært –
1: et flertall av muslimer som har de holdningene
2: men det er fortsatt enkelte.. modereringen din kommer litt for sent og litt for lite..
1: Får du en annen innstilling hvis det skjer i Norge det som har skjedd i Paris og i København?
2: Ja –
1: Vil du, vil du være litt mindre for fargerikt felleskap da?
2: Kanskje.
26. This perspective is at the core of the Common Identity Ingroup Model, which asserts that perceptions of common experiences of discrimination and prejudice may support the development
of common identities and engender positive attitudes between members of stigmatised groups.
See Samuel L. Gaertner and John F. Dovidio, Reducing intergroup bias: The common ingroup
identity model (Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press, 2000). In contrast to this, research on social
identity threats indicate that perceptions of such threats lead to derogation of members of outgroups. See Nyla R. Branscombe, Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears and Bertjan Doosje, “The
context and content of social identity threat”, Social identity: Context, commitment, content, ed.
Naomi Ellemers, Russell Spears and Bertjan Doosje, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 35–58.
307
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expression should be drawn. The citation also indicates how the severe threat that
Jews may experience from extremist individuals among the Muslim minority can
represent an obstacle towards an inclusive and open approach to Muslims in general and in the question of integration in Europe.
Conspiracy theories
The 9/11 photo promoted references to various conspiracy theories both in the Jewish and the Muslim groups. In one of the Jewish groups, such ideas were referred
to in an ironic manner, underlining the absurdity of the claims. Again, the conversation suggested that the ideas were well known among the participants (J1):
1: Yes, speaking of antisemitism, there were no Jews who died in the attack, so
it must have been Jews who were behind.
3: Yes
2: I too have heard that.
1: Have you also heard this? [turns towards interviewers]
2: Yes, yes, all the Jews working in the building were told to stay at home that
day.
1: Yes, hm.
2: Received a phone call.
1: But that is not really correct, either.
3: It’s rare that antisemitic propaganda is correct, isn’t it, or what do you think?
[laughter]27
27. “1: Ja, apropos antisemittisme, det var ingen jøder som døde i det angrepet, så det må ha vært
noen jøder som har stått bak.
3: Ja.
2: Jeg har også hørt [det].
1: Har dere hørt den historien der også? [henvender seg mot C og V]
2: Ja, ja alle jøder, alle som jobbet i bygget fikk beskjed om å holde seg hjemme den dagen.
1: Ja, mm...
2: Fikk en telefon...
1: Men det stemmer jo ikke, det heller.
3: Det er vel sjelden at antisemittisk propaganda stemmer, er det ikke det da, eller hva tenker
du?”
10. NEGOTIATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN GROUP CONVERSATIONS AMONG JEWS AND
MUSLIMS
The joking indicates a relaxed attitude towards the conspiracies and the otherwise
serious subject. Some of the interviewees also mentioned the similarities that exist
between antisemitic and Islamophobic conspiracy theories.
References to conspiracy theories were typically made in a way that suggested
a distance to the ideas. However, in the group with the older Muslims (M1), a discussion developed indicating that one of the interviewees supported the idea of a
Jewish conspiracy or at least was uncertain of how to relate to it. He started by
defining conspiracy theories as something people believed in “the third world”,
thereby distancing himself and the rest of the group from such ideas. However, as
the conversation continued, he expressed more doubt:
3: What people think is that, to split the Muslims, the Muslim world, and the
USA, in order to create hatred between them, the Jews did this themselves.
They have done it, there is planning behind, and they have done it. I am just
telling what it says in the newspapers. […] Many people in Pakistan and India
or Bangladesh or such places believe that the Jews are behind this, that they
took the day off from work and that there were no Jews at work that day, or just
a few … Important people who did not go to work and who planned this themselves, and they provided training and money and stuff to the Muslims who are
behind it. So, “in reality” [makes quotation marks with his hands], it is Jews
who have played this themselves, to split the US and Muslims. Very many
believe [this], in Asia.
4: But we do not know what the truth is.28
Interviewee no. 3 returned to the claim that Jews were behind the attack several
times, though he did not receive much support from the others. Interviewee no. 4
underlined how shocked they had been over the attacks, and that he was horrified
over the way innocent people had been killed. However, the discussion ended with
him stating that the truth about the attacks is as yet hidden. Though the main purpose
28. 3: “Men det folk tror, var for å splitte muslimer, muslimsk verden og USA, for å sånn, få hat
mellom de to, så har jøder spilt dette selv. De har gjort, de ligger planlegging bak, og de har gjort
dette. Det er bare sånn, jeg forteller deg det som står i avisen. [...] Det er veldig mange som tror
i Pakistan eller i India eller Bangladesh eller noe sånt, at det er jøder som står bak dette, og de
tok fri den dagen fra jobben, ingen jøder ble jo den dagen på jobb, eller noen få som ble jo viktige personer, som ikke gikk på jobb, at de planla jo dette selv, og de ga jo trening og penger og
sånn til noen muslimer som står bak dette. Og så i “realiteten” [lager anførselstegn med
hendene] så er det jøder som har spilt dette selv, for å splitte USA og muslimer, det tror veldig
mange, i Asia
4: Men vi vet ikke hva sannheten er.”
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seemed to be to end the conversation on the topic, the remark effectively served to
spread doubt as to whether the interviewees supported the conspiracy theory.
However, the central issue in the discussion was that such ideas are widespread
among other Muslims in other – “third-world” – countries, not here, or perhaps, more
specifically, not among the participants’ own community. Research has shown how
support for conspiracy thinking rarely involves complete “theories”, but is made indirectly, by pointing to what “others” believe or claim to know, or by hinting at broader
ideas.29 The example demonstrates how different interpretations of the terror attack
may be used to express group identities and group boundaries; while Muslims in various Asian countries are perceived to believe that Jews are behind the attacks, Norwegian Muslims are not. Furthermore, the discussion indicated where the limits of
socially acceptable interpretations were drawn. When one of the interviewees,
despite his initial rejection, indicated support for certain elements of the theory, he
was immediately confronted by his discussion partners. The reaction may have been
reinforced by the interview situation and the presence of the interviewers, but the discussion nevertheless demonstrated awareness that such support was not “ok”.
Interpretations of victimhood
The issue of double standards came up in the discussion in the third group of Muslim interviewees (M3). One of the younger participants mentioned how the victims of 9/11 are commemorated every year in the USA, in contrast to other victims
of war and conflict:
4: Many commemorate this, at least in the USA. Do we have commemorations
every day for those who are killed in Yemen, Afghanistan? And Guantanamo,
where people have been held prison for 14 years, do we talk about that? People
are tortured; I can’t even bear to engage in it. And you call that democracy? It
is probably criticised here and there, but that is not my point. If that is not terrorism, I don’t know what is. If you ask me, the politics of ISIS and of the US
are not that different. It’s the same, just different ...30
29. Wolfgang Benz, Was ist Antisemitismus? (München: C.H. Beck, 2004), 87.
30. 4: “Det er jo mange som markerer dette, i hvert fall i USA. Har vi markeringer hver dag for de
som blir drept i Jemen, Afghanistan? Og Guantánamo, der mennesker har vært 14 år i fengsel,
snakker vi om det? Mennesker blir torturert, og jeg orker ikke sette meg inn i det engang. Og det
kaller man demokrati. Det blir sikkert kritisert, men det er ikke det som er fokuset mitt. Om ikke
det er terrorisme, så vet ikke jeg. Så for min del, så er ikke IS og USAs politikk så forskjellig.
Det er likt, bare andre...”
10. NEGOTIATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN GROUP CONVERSATIONS AMONG JEWS AND
MUSLIMS
The comment describes a difference between the commemoration of the victims
of 9/11 in the USA and the attitude towards what are generally Muslim victims of
war, indicating a difference in the valuation of the victims. The comment was
made by the interviewee who also was critical to the “ring of peace” (see below),
and displays a feeling of injustice that goes beyond the concrete situation of Norwegian Muslims and Jews. The feeling of double standards was related to the way
“the West” and the USA act in the world, particularly with regard to military dominance. The conversation touched on a number of issues where the interviewees
perceived imbalances and injustices. The comment also suggests a reinterpretation of central concepts such as “democracy” and “terrorism”, which essentially
serves to counter the perceived imbalance by reinstating a new understanding
where there is “no difference” between the USA and ISIS.
This sequence of the discussion was from the beginning oriented towards a
comparison of victims, the first remarks pointing to how the war that followed the
9/11 attack had resulted in new victims, and the disproportion between “100,000
deaths because of 1000 people dying there.”31 An important point in this argument
concerns the relation (or lack of such) between the victims and the crime, with the
interviewee underlining how the victims of the post 9/11 war had nothing to do
with the terror attack. However, the innocence of the victims of Islamist terror is
not mentioned; the focus is solely on the victims of war and the perceived opposition between “the West” and “the Muslims”.
In this sequence of the group interview, an interpretative pattern emerges based
on the bitterness over political injustice, resulting in an avoidance or rejection of
empathy with the victims of Islamist terror. The frustration over the lack of attention and focus on the victims of Western/US warfare might be legitimate; however, the comparison, and even competition of victimhood opens the way to a slippery slope. Similar arguments are used in connection to the notion that Jewish
victimhood receives too much attention, while the suffering of other victims is
neglected, particularly as a criticism of Holocaust remembrance. Our informants
did not mention victims of the Holocaust or memory culture after the Holocaust.
Rather, the perceived imbalance in acknowledgement of and attention towards the
victims in question was based on a criticism of Western military power and dominance. However, the conversation later displayed unwillingness to specifically
acknowledge Jewish victimhood and to show solidarity with Norwegian Jews (see
next section), indicating that the anti-antisemitism norm did not have a strong
impact in this group.
31. “100.000 er døde på grunn av at tusen mennesker døde her.”
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In summary, the 9/11 image disclosed a set of interpretations among Jews and
Muslims, some of which contributed to notions of mutual understanding and solidarity, others to mistrust and hostility. The analysis also showed that notions of
conspiracy theory were regarded as problematic and subject to social regulation.
“THE RING OF PEACE”
Reactions in all groups suggest the “ring of peace” photo is iconic in the sense that
everybody was familiar with the reference and talked about it in a manner that
indicated an established narrative of “young Muslims initiating solidarity action
for Norwegian Jews.” The overall response both among the Jewish and the Muslims interviewees was positive, typical examples of comments being, “Then we
have this one [picks up the photo of the circle], this we support;” “That was really
nice, I think. To show that you are together” and “Yes, that was really nice, it was
outside here and a good ambiance.”
Underlying ambivalence
While positive association dominated the immediate reactions among all participants, one of the Jewish interviewees also mentioned the Jihadist terror that
caused the “ring of peace” demonstration. Her remark revealed a certain ambivalence towards the whole event, indicating distrust of the motives behind it and
towards the Muslim participants. She said:
I had just come from Copenhagen, because this was straight after Copenhagen,
so I had just been to Copenhagen that week to lay down flowers with my family. It made a strong impression. Lots of emotion, and I definitely did not feel
safe and I also sensed a certain ambivalence.32
The comment gives an indication of the significant impact the terror against the
Danish synagogue had made. Both the fact that the interviewee travelled to the
place of the incident to lay down flowers and the use of the abbreviation (this was
“after Copenhagen”) indicates the strong impression and may also explain the
insecurity she felt at the event in Oslo. She later referred to the Facebook page of
32. “Jeg hadde akkurat vært i København, for dette var jo rett etter København, så jeg hadde jo nettopp vært i København den uken og lagt ned blomster sammen med familien min der. Og det var
jo så sterkt. Det var masse følelser, og jeg følte meg absolutt ikke trygg og jeg følte også en sånn
ambivalens.”
10. NEGOTIATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN GROUP CONVERSATIONS AMONG JEWS AND
MUSLIMS
one of the organisers, and how it had contained strong anti-Israel statements.
While emphasising her positive view of the ring, she admitted that these statements gave her a “double feeling”. However, the sense of ambivalence seemed
also to be related to how the interviewee viewed those who were behind the ring
in relation to the rest of the Muslim population in Oslo: “I still get goose bumps
when I think about it, that they stood up the way they did. After all, they can get
stabbed in the back by their own for taking that stand. It was brave.” The comment
suggests that the Muslim community did not generally support the attitude behind
the “ring of peace”. The assumption can be linked to reactions in the aftermath of
the event, among others from a Norwegian Muslim convert who claimed the ring
had been “a mistake” due to the Zionist affiliation of the Jewish congregation in
Oslo.33 The fact that the interviewee underlined the “braveness” of the Muslims
who initiated the ring also indicates her mixed feelings: the immediate sense of
insecurity due to the fresh impression from the terror attack in Copenhagen, the
admiration for the organisers of the event, and the assumption that their attitudes
were not supported by many other Muslims.
In the first group of Jewish interviewees (J1), ambivalence was related to how the
event necessarily pointed out the minority identity of the Jewish participants. One
of the interviewees said her goal was that a Jewish identity would be seen as something ordinary, “like hair colour or a hobby.” In contrast to that desired normality,
the “ring of peace” had underlined that the minority was “different, small, protected
and special.” So, while she appreciated the solidarity demonstrated by the event and
liked to take part in it, the interviewee could not embrace it wholeheartedly.
Ownership and pride
The interviewees in the group of young Muslims (M2) expressed a sense of pride
and ownership related to the “ring of peace”:
4: [The act of terror] shows that Muslims are prejudiced, too, and that some
Muslim individuals hate Jews intensely. Still, you see an entire generation of
young, Norwegian Muslims, standing together, hand in hand, in order to protect and create a ring around a synagogue. There is no better response than that.
It is so crystal clear that this is just perfect.
2: Mm [confirms]
33. https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/5xE91/Muslimske-linstad-fredsringen-er-en-alvorligfeil. Accessed December 5, 2018.
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4: Such actions can contribute to breaking up stereotypes.
2: Not just in public, but one also has to work within one’s own groups. Muslim
leaders must be more engaged in the Norwegian debate and establish a dialogue
with different members of parliament that keep some of these attitudes against
Muslims, so we can break up the vicious circle. So, it is of absolute importance that
Muslims go out more and do not defend themselves, but prove the opposite.34
In this short sequence, interviewee no. 1 acknowledges that there are negative attitudes and hate against Jews among Muslims, but describes how these attitudes are
found in a minority (some individuals), which were confronted by “an entire generation of young Muslims” during the event. Furthermore, she sees the event as
the ultimate way of counteracting negative stereotypes against Muslims, a view
that is supported by one of the other interviewees. In this, she accepts the responsibility of (young) Muslims to show society that they stand up against antisemitism in their own community. She also claims that Muslim leaders should more
clearly confront those having negative attitudes by “proving the opposite”. In this
way, she positions the young Muslim organisers of the ring of peace as role models
for the Muslim community, and even as their leaders.
Imbalance
In contrast to the pride and ownership expressed in the group of young Muslims
(M2), one of the interviewees in the group of female Muslims (M3) was sceptical.
Her criticism was mostly related to perceptions of the expectations Muslims face:
4: As Muslim, we really try hard to show that we are not evil. I mean, how
many times have there been “rings of peace” around mosques? Do we really
have to go out, it is almost expected, one always expects that Muslims distance
34. 4: “[Terroren] viser at også muslimer har mye fordommer og enkelte muslimer har mye jødehat.
Likevel ser du en hel generasjon unge, norske muslimer som står samlet, hånd i hånd, for å
verne og slå ring rundt en synagoge. Det finnes ikke noe bedre svar enn det. Det er jo så krystallklart og det er jo så perfekt.
2: Mm.
4: Sånne handlinger er det jo som gjør at man kan klare å bryte ned stereotypiene.
2: Ikke bare i offentligheten, man må også jobbe innad i egne grupper. Muslimske ledere må i
større grad være med i den norske debatten og gå i dialog med ulike norske stortingsrepresentanter som har i seg en del av disse holdningene mot muslimer, slik at vi klarer å bryte den onde
sirkelen, da. Så det er absolutt viktig at muslimer går mer ut og ikke forsvarer seg, men beviser
det motsatte.”
10. NEGOTIATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN GROUP CONVERSATIONS AMONG JEWS AND
MUSLIMS
themselves when something happens, but do the Americans do that? Did all
Norwegians go out in the streets to say “we do not support ABB” [meaning the
terrorist Anders Behring Breivik], or the Jews say: we are against Netanyahu’s
actions? The intentions were surely good, but I wouldn’t have taken part in it.
Because I do not need to go out to say that I do not kill Jews. I do not have
anything against Jews, so why do I have to express it?35
This interviewee is clearly less willing to accept responsibility for distancing herself from acts of terror performed in the name of Islam and Muslims. From her
perspective, it is unfair that Muslims in general are held responsible for whatever
bad things any Muslim does. It is quite interesting that she chooses the Norwegian
terrorist Anders Behring Breivik and the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in
order to illustrate that other people are not held responsible for actions conducted
by individuals. Here, we see another example of comparison. The sequence
expresses what can be termed the counterpart of the interpretative pattern of competition of victimhood, namely the comparison of wrongdoings. By mentioning
Netanyahu, the interviewee indicates that his actions are comparable with Islamist
and right-wing extremist terror.
The two sequences together can serve to illustrate what Bohnsack describes as
underlying collective patterns of orientation in group interviews.36 The interviewees seem to share an underlying view according to which Muslims do not receive
the acknowledgement and respect they deserve, but are blamed and scapegoated
in society. In one of the groups (M3) this seems to result in a rejection of empathy
or solidarity with groups they regard as being favoured.
Towards the end of the quote, the interviewee in M3 stresses that she does not
feel hatred against Jews, though she once again mentions the feeling of being pressured to take distance from such hate. The feeling of imbalance when it comes to
the claims society directs towards Muslims and the lack of solidarity shown to
Muslims (“how many times did we see ‘rings of peace’ around mosques?”) seem
to be the reason for the unwillingness to support the ring of peace around the synagogue. However, this unwillingness to show empathy and solidarity, com35. 4: “Som muslim så prøver vi jo skikkelig hardt å vise at vi ikke er onde. Altså, Hvor mange ganger har man hatt fredsringer rundt moskéer? Må vi virkelig gå ut, det forventes nesten som man
alltid forventer at muslimer tar avstand når noe skjer, men.. Gjør alle amerikanere det? Tok alle
nordmenn i gatene og sa ‘Vi støtter ikke ABB’? eller om jødene sa: Vi er i mot Netanyahus
handlinger? Det var sikkert gode intensjoner, men jeg hadde ikke deltatt der. For jeg har ikke
behov for å gå ut å si at jeg dreper ikke jøder. Jeg har ikke noe imot jøder, så hvorfor skal jeg gå
ut og ytre meg?”
36. Bohnsack, “‘Orientierungsmuster’: Ein Grundbegriff qualitativer Sozialforschung.”
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CLAUDIA LENZ AND VIBEKE MOE | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
bined with the equation of Netanyahu and “Jews” sheds light on the previous
comment about “not hating Jews”. This statement seems to expresses a commitment to the anti-antisemitism norm, understood as the obligation to (at least) not
to hate Jews.
Victimhood versus agency
While there seems to be an underlying agreement in the group of female Muslims (M3) of an unwillingness to show solidarity with Jews due to a perception
of Muslims being more discriminated against, the members of the other group
of young Muslims (M2) conclude differently when talking about the hostility
they experience. One female interviewee talks about how Muslims are being
dehumanised:
1: If we look at Norway as a body, Muslims are almost regarded as a tumour.
The question is if this tumour is benign or malign? If it is malign, how shall we
remove it? How shall we fix the problem? How shall we fix the tumour? Cure
Norway? If it is benign, how can we let it be, not touch it and kind of calm it
down? If we look at Muslims as a vital organ in the body that is Norway, how
can we contribute to making this body a hundred times better? I think this is
underlying the entire debate. (...)
4: I think it is understandable that Muslims somehow take the victim position.
It is also understandable if you think about all that pressure from the media, a
lot of verbal harassment on the internet. It is understandable. The victim position does not come by default. But the problem is that we have very few voices
in the media who manage to give an academic response, few who can break the
media image.37
37. 1: “Hvis vi ser på Norge som en kropp, så blir muslimene sett på som en svulst, nesten. Og så er
spørsmålet om dette er en ondartet svulst eller en godartet svulst? Og hvis det er en ondartet,
hvordan skal vi fjerne den? Hvordan skal vi fikse problemet. Hvordan skal vi fikse svulsten?
Kurere Norge? Og hvis det er en godartet, hvordan skal vi bare la den ligge, ikke røre den og liksom dempe den ned? Hvis vi ser på muslimene som et vitalt organ i kroppen, som er Norge,
hvordan kan vi være med til å gjøre kroppen hundre ganger bedre? Det er dette jeg synes ligger
under hele debatten, da. […]
4: Jeg synes det er forståelig at muslimer går litt i offerrolle. Det er forståelig også med tanke på
alt det mediepresset, mye verbal hets på, nettet.. Det er jo forståelig. Det er jo ikke ubetinget at
offerrollen kommer. Men problemet er at vi har dessverre veldig få stemmer i media som klarer
å gi et akademisk svar tilbake, som kan knekke ned mediebildet.”
10. NEGOTIATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN GROUP CONVERSATIONS AMONG JEWS AND
MUSLIMS
This interview sequence starts with referring to a drastic and dehumanising aspect
of Islamophobic discourse. At this point, it would not be surprising if the conversation turned in the same direction we saw in the other group, rejecting any claims
of the wider Norwegian society. But as the interviewee continues to ponder the
metaphor of Norway as a body, she turns it into the complete opposite, insisting
that Muslims are a vital part of the nation, being able to contribute positively. As
this interviewee refrains from a self-victimisation, the other interviewee reflects
on how the victim position can emerge. However, similar to the first speaker, he
chooses a positive outlook of being able to give an “academic response” and
“break the media image.”
In these two short paragraphs, we see an underlying orientation contrasting
the one in the first group: instead of dwelling on the subject of discrimination
and using it as a pretext for rejecting claims of empathy or solidarity, this group
insists on being able to intellectualise their experience and articulate their own
voice. Positioning themselves as resourceful agents against discrimination,
they also position themselves as agents of solidarity when another minority is
threatened.
Balance of solidarity
In the interview with the Muslim “veterans” (M1), the issue of “balance” was
brought up as the discussion lead on to solidarity. One of the interviewees
referred to an event held in front of one of the Oslo mosques a week after the
“ring of peace” around the synagogue. However, the event by the mosque did
not receive the same amount of support, neither through direct participation or
coverage in national media. On the contrary, due to allegedly antisemitic statements by the mosque’s imam, the initiative was met by a number of critical reactions. Despite this, the interviewees seemed to regard the two events as equally
important:
1: Then it is this here [points to the image of the “ring of peace”], we support
that! We joined it, and we took part in it. And then we had [one] right outside
[mosque X]. So, there are images of them, why do you not have images of [the
other event]?
3: But it was nice, that one.
[…]
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4: We wish to see such kind of solidarity.38
In this short sequence, we see the negotiation concerning the evaluation of the ring
of peace around the synagogue at work. The way the interviewee uses “we” here
suggests an almost formal statement, an “official” attitude towards this issue, indicating that there is little room for different views of interpretations. However,
there was a certain tension between the interviewees, one critically asking why no
representation of the ring of peace around the mosque had been included into the
set of images, while the other underlines the sympathy with the ring of peace
around the synagogue. Is it a necessary condition for the appreciation of the event
that also a similar “ring of peace” around a mosque is acknowledged? Or is the act
of solidarity in itself unconditioned, a “nice thing” which can be appreciated? The
tension was settled by the somewhat open comment on solidarity – which in fact
could have been related to either one or both of the events.
Doubt about long-term effect
As shown in the previous paragraphs, both Jewish and Muslim interviewees
shared an overall positive evaluation of the “ring of peace”. It had clearly given
the participants a positive encounter and common experience with (representatives of) the other minority. Following Gordon Allport and what is known as “contact theory” in the field of research on prejudice, such symbolic and clearly emotionally loaded events can contribute to dismantling existing negative attitudes
towards groups.39 In the case of the “ring of peace”, massive and undivided positive media coverage will have contributed to this effect beyond the persons
directly involved in the event. However, some of the Jewish interviewees
expressed doubts about the prevalence of this effect, as this quote illustrates: “well
intentioned indeed, but unfortunately forgotten two days later. Thank you, next
one please.”
The young Muslim interviewees, who had shown such enthusiasm about the
“ring of peace”, expressed some of the same scepticism:
38. 1: “Så er det den her [viser bildet av fredens ring], den støtta vi. Den var vi med på, og den har vi
tatt der og så har vi tatt rett utenfor moskéen [X]. Så det er bilder av dem, hvorfor har dere ikke
bilder av [den andre ringen]?
3: Men det var en fin en, den der.
[…]
4: Sånn solidaritet vil vi ha.”
39. Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Basic books, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979 [1954]).
10. NEGOTIATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN GROUP CONVERSATIONS AMONG JEWS AND
MUSLIMS
2: But it is a little bit sad, it has been such a golden opportunity for the two
communities to move somewhat closer together. But this has not happened yet,
now in the aftermath. It is maybe more obvious that one should have more
meetings.
4: But it became a little bit like that, somehow (# 2: yes, maybe). We still have
the same grandfather.
[light laughter]
3: Yes.
4: We are family.
2: But, we talk about two minorities, who for sure could have learned from
each other.
3: Yes, I feel that there was somehow, in any case in Oslo afterwards, there was
an intention to stay in touch.
1: Yes, maybe, but it fades out [English in the original]. People have their own
lives and so. It’s like [makes a movement with her head] shall we be mingling?40
The interviewees doubt the long-term effect of the event, yet the scepticism is not
rooted in a deeper sense of mistrust, but is rather explained by hectic lives and
everyday challenges that make such promises difficult to keep. Though the tone
40. 2: “Men det var og litt synd, at det var sånn golden opportunity til at de to samfunnene kanskje
er litt mer sammen da, men det har jo ikke skjedd ennå, nå i etterkant, det er klarere [?] kanskje,
at man skulle hatt mer samlinger sammen
4: Men det ble jo litt sånn, eller sånn
2: Ja, kanskje
4: Vi har jo samme bestefar da, det har vi da
[lett latter]
3: Ja
4: Vi er jo i familie
2: Men, eh, det er jo to minoriteter da, som kunne sikkert ha lært av hverandre
3: Ja, jeg føler at det var litt, i hvert fall i Oslo etterpå, det var litt at man skulle ta kontakt og
sånn
1: Ja, kanskje samme
3: Ja
1: Men det fader [engelsk] jo ut, altså folk har jo sine egne liv og så er det sånn der [lager en
bevegelse med hode], skal man mingle, da?”
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CLAUDIA LENZ AND VIBEKE MOE | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
was disappointed, the interviewees did not seem to think that contact between the
minorities was principally impossible; it was only difficult in practice.
In summary, the image of the ring of peace, being an icon of successful MuslimJewish solidarity, triggered immediate positive reactions among the interviewees.
However, the image was also associated with some ambivalent feelings, insecurity
and even a sense of resistance, the latter being related to perceptions among the
Muslim interviewees of imposed culpability.
4. CONCLUSION
The photographs used as prompts in the group interviews sparked a range of reactions, comments and conversations in the groups, providing an insight into the
attitudes the Jewish and Muslim interviewees hold towards each other. The two
photos of 9/11 and the “ring of peace” were immediately recognised by the participants and seemed to have an “iconic” status in the sense that they were associated
with established interpretations and narratives. Both images were related to different aspects and effects of Islamophobia and antisemitism, which was apparent in
the discussions. However, few examples of open Islamophobia or classical antisemitic stereotypes were expressed, and when they appeared, they did not remain
uncontested. The mentioning of conspiracy theories about the terror attack on 9/
11 was accompanied by a certain unease among the other interviewees and led to
attempts to place these ideas “outside” their respective communities. By suggesting that conspiracy ideas regarding Jews were widespread in other countries, but
unacceptable in Norway, the interviewees distanced themselves from such ideas
and positioned themselves as Norwegian. These interview sequences indicated
how the fine line between acceptable and non-acceptable statements was established and maintained.
The analysis of the group interviews points to a double ambivalence among the
interviewees. On the one hand, this ambivalence is an aspect of the relationship
between the minorities; on the other, the interviewees express ambivalent feelings
related to the experiences of being minorities in Norwegian society. The experience of not being acknowledged as proper Norwegians opens for an interpretation
of having something in common as minorities. This complexity is illustrated by
the fact that the Jewish interviewees were appreciative of the “ring of peace”, but
also expressed doubts and even anxiety towards the solidarity event organised by
Muslims. The reactions thus showed little immediate trust, and indicated doubt as
to whether the organisers and motivation behind the event could be regarded as
representative. The Muslim interviewees were divided in their reactions: some
10. NEGOTIATIONS OF ANTISEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA IN GROUP CONVERSATIONS AMONG JEWS AND
MUSLIMS
interviewees expressed pride and ownership, based on the acceptance of an obligation to distance oneself from antisemitism and terror. In contrast to this, other
interviewees rejected any such obligation and expressed indignation over what
they perceived as asymmetry regarding what the Muslim minority was expected to
“prove” to the majority, compared to what was expected from the Jewish minority.
Methodologically, the study shows the usefulness of images as visual stimuli in
the study of collective underlying orientations and latency. The exploration of
interactions in social groups gives relevant insight into processes of negotiation of
attitudes. The analysis has shown how the boundaries of the acceptable and nonacceptable are not static, but rather framed by existing social and cultural norms
and regulated by social interaction of the groups.
In our study, we found perceptions of communality and solidarity between
Muslims and Jews as well as perceptions of mistrust and competitive victimhood.
Solidarity seems to be undermined when public discourse is perceived to apply
different standards and expectations to the minorities. Latent negative attitudes
against Jews expressed by Muslim interviewees in this study are linked to and
legitimised by feelings of bitterness due to stigmatisation and lack of acknowledgement. The findings thus indicate that the impact of initiatives taken in order
to establish trust and solidarity among the minorities only can be understood when
taking into account the impact of public policy and discourse. The solidary shown
by Muslims and Jews after the recent right-wing extremist terror attacks against a
synagogue in Pittsburgh, USA41 and mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand42
show that a sense of mutual solidary may grow in the face of hate and violence
targeting both minorities. The different ways that societal contexts and public discourse frame attitudes among minorities is a topic for further research.
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APPENDIX
COMPOSITION OF THE GROUPS:
Muslim interviewees
Jewish interviewees
M1:
Three men aged over 70, first-generation
immigrants from Pakistan, no higher education. The informants were mutual acquaintances and attended the same mosque. The
interview was attended by two other individuals who did not actively participate, one of
whom was the imam of the mosque.
J1:
One woman and two men aged between 40
and 60. The woman described herself as
atheist. The two men were religious. The
informants were not personal acquaintances.
M2:
Two women and two men aged between 19
and 25, high level of education, liberal interpretation of religion (one was a convert).
Socially engaged. One individual in the
group was personally acquainted with the
others, but all of them belonged to the same
community.
J2:
Three women and one man aged between 20
and 30 and affiliated to the Mosaic Faith
Community in Trondheim. The informants
were personal acquaintances; two of them
were related.
M3:
Four women; two second-generation immigrants in their twenties, and two women in
their forties of Norwegian descent who had
converted to Islam as adults. All devoutly
religious. The informants were personal
acquaintances.
J3:
Three women aged between 50 and 60, affiliated to the Mosaic Religious Community in
Oslo. All participants had either backgrounds
from countries other than Norway, families
abroad, or had lived for long periods outside
Norway.
323
DOI: 10.18261/978-82-15-03468-3-2019-12
Acknowledgements
This book is the result of a long-time research collaboration between scholars
from various disciplines working together on the topic of antisemitism and Islamophobia in Norway. Based at the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority
Studies (CHM), the project group was formed in 2010, working on the first extensive population survey on attitudes towards Jews and other minorities in Norway
(2012), and five years later on a second survey on attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway (2017). We would like to thank the Center, and in particular its
director, Professor Guri Hjeltnes, for her continued support, encouragement and
enthusiasm for this field of research.
The findings presented in this volume are to a large extent a result of the
research project Shifting Boundaries: Definitions, Expressions and Consequences
of Antisemitism in Contemporary Norway (SHIFTBOUND), financed by The
Research Council of Norway (2017–2021). We are grateful to the Research Council and its Programme on the Cultural Conditions Underlying Social Change
(SAMKUL) for the funding.
In working with this volume, we have received help and support from various
individuals. We are particularly grateful for the thorough and competent help provided by Kaitlin Preusser, who at the time had an internship at the Center, and by
Birgitte Haanshuus, doctoral research fellow.
The cooperation with Scandinavian University Press and its commissioning
editor for open-access books, Helge Årsheim, has been very efficient and pleasant.
We would also like to thank the two anonymous peer reviewers for their critical
comments and helpful recommendations.
This publication was made possible by the generous financial support of the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Oslo, September 2019
Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
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About the Authors
Werner Bergmann (b. 1950), is Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the Center for
Research on Antisemitism, Technical University, Berlin. His fields of research
include sociology and history of antisemitism and interethnic violence. Among Bergmann’s recent publications are Antisemitismus in Zentraleuropa. Deutschland,
Österreich und die Schweiz vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (2011) (with
Ulrich Wyrwa). He was also co-author of Antisemitismus in Deutschland – aktuelle
Entwicklungen report on behalf of the German Bundestag (2017).
Asbjørn Dyrendal (b. 1965) is Professor of the History of Religions at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim. His research areas
revolve around contemporary religion, conspiracy culture, esotericism, and apocalypticism. His latest books with collaborators include The Invention of Satanism
(OUP, 2016), Handbook of Conspiracy Theory and Contemporary Religion (Brill,
2019), and Hva er konspirasjonsteori (Universitetsforlaget, 2019).
Cora Alexa Døving (b. 1966) is a Research Professor at the Norwegian Center for
Holocaust and Minority Studies. Her research areas are within the fields of minority studies, racism and Islamophobia. Her latest publications include: “Homeland
Ritualized: An Analysis of Written Messages Placed at Temporary Memorials
after the Terrorist Attacks on 22 July 2011 in Norway”, Mortality 23: 3 (2018) and
“Jews in the News – Representations of Judaism and the Jewish Minority in the
Norwegian Contemporary Press”, Journal of Media and Religion 15:1 (2016).
Theodor Geelmuyden (b. 1991) is a postgraduate student of Cultural History at
the University of Oslo, specialising in the European Culture-program. His fields
of interest are memory culture, collective memory and the use of history in the
present. He is currently writing his master’s thesis on the commemorative significance of May 8th, Norway’s Liberation day from German occupation in 1945.
Ottar Hellevik (b. 1943) is Professor Emeritus in Political Science at the University of Oslo, where he has worked since graduating in sociology in 1968. He has
been Chairman of the department and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences.
Fields of research include survey methodology and analysis; values and value
change; attitudes and attitude change; social inequality; and political recruitment.
Among his publications are the textbooks Forskningsmetode i sosiologi og statsThis work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0
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326
ABOUT THE AUTHORS | THE SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF PREJUDICE
vitenskap (Research Methods in Sociology and Political Science) (Universitetsforlaget 1971, 7th ed. 2002) and Introduction to Causal Analysis (George Allen &
Unwin 1984, Scandinavian University Press, 1988).
Christhard Hoffmann (b. 1952) is Professor of modern European history at the
University of Bergen and Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies in Oslo. He has developed special research interests in
the history of migration and minorities; antisemitism and Jewish history; the public uses of history and memory. Recent publications include The Exclusion of Jews
in the Norwegian Constitution of 1814 (editor, 2016); Migrant Britain. Histories
and Historiographies: Essays in Honour of Colin Holmes (co-editor, 2018).
Claudia Lenz (b. 1968) is Professor of Social Studies/Chair for prevention of racism and antisemitism at the Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society
and Research Professor at the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies. Her fields of research include contemporary forms and discourses of antisemitism; prevention of group-focused enmity in education; historical consciousness;
memory culture and history politics related to World War II and the Holocaust in
Scandinavia. Recent publications include “Hvis de hadde oppført seg som vanlige
nordmenn, hadde alt vært greit, tror jeg”, FLEKS – Scandinavian Journal of Intercultural Theory and Practice 3:1 (2016, with V. Moe; C.A. Døving, I. Levin) and
Crossing Borders. Combining Human Rights Education and History Education
(2016, with S. Brattland; L. Kvande).
Vibeke Moe (b. 1976) is Research Fellow and Project Coordinator at the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies. Moe’s fields of research include
antisemitism in contemporary Norway; Muslim-Jewish relations; historical consciousness and identity among Jews and Muslims in Norway. Among her recent
publications are Attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway 2017 (ed. with C.
Hoffmann, 2018) and “Hvis de hadde oppført seg som vanlige nordmenn, hadde
alt vært greit, tror jeg”, FLEKS-Scandinavian Journal of Intercultural Theory and
Practice, 3:1 (2016) (with C. Lenz, I. Levin and C.A. Døving
In recent years, harassment and violent attacks against Jews and Muslims have
become issues of concern in many Western countries. However, antisemitism and
Islamophobia are often framed as essentially different phenomena, not least as a
result of political polarization and deeply divided opinions on both immigration
and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The present volume challenges this view and argues that antisemitism and Islamophobia are largely related phenomena and linked to xenophobic ideas in the
general population. The study is based on varied and comprehensive survey data
about attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway, including the attitudes
and experiences of the two minority groups themselves. Moreover, it supplements
survey analysis with qualitative research, exploring the discursively constructed
boundaries of “what can or cannot be said” about Jews and Muslims. Focused on
the rich material of the Norwegian case, the volume thus offers new perspectives
for the study of prejudice in general.
Christhard Hoffmann (b. 1952) is Professor of modern European history at the
University of Bergen and Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies in Oslo. Vibeke Moe (b. 1976) is Research Fellow
and Project Coordinator at the Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority
Studies.
This book is also available open access at Idunn.
ISBN printed edition (print on demand) 978-82-15-03467-6