Governing globalization in South Asia through a legal praxis of human rights, development and democracy

Mohammed A.A Obadi

The implementation blueprint for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Agenda 2030 hinges on human rights because with a clear linkage from SDG1 to SDG17 to UDHR and other human rights treaties and conventions (Universal Rights Group, 2017:3). Besides “the hand-in-hand partnership of human rights and development” for the purpose of accomplishing impartial human development as well as realizing of human rights, regardless of identity, conditions, status, and geographical location in the lives of every human being have always remained the overall goal of the international community (UN, 2015:15).

Global inequality is increasing. Global inequalities are an expression of global social injustices and ‘pathologies of power’. Global governance has been posited as a way forward. However, global governance will not deliver justice unless it embraces a more radical vision of what justice means and permits the voices of the marginalised to be heard in spaces of decision making. We identify two important approaches to building more just forms of global governance: the civil society approach, which is useful when it draws attention to the agency of those at the margins of global circuits of power; and the rightsbased approach, which can provide opportunities for justice claims by marginalised groups. In his seminal analysis of contemporary human rights, Farmer argues that rights violations are a symptom of ‘pathologies of power that are linked intimately to the social conditions that so often determine who will suffer abuse and who will be sheltered from harm’. Farmer’s argument goes b...

The process of globalisation certainly entails much more than what is commonly spoken of-the globalisation of markets. Over the years, globalisation has acquired a multidimensional flavor and has expanded the organization and exercise of political power. As a direct resultant, across the political field, it evokes a sense that political, social and economic life is affected in ways that we have yet to realise and that we cannot prevent. To illustrate, one of the most captivating facet of globalisation has been the attempt to establish democracy as a universal or global norm. A norm that entitles all people's to establish a government that represents their will. 'Democracy' in a normative context is popularized because of its potential to resolve growing concerns affecting all nations. Irrespective of such proclamations, this exercise has continuously been opposed or frustrated for being motivated by various economic and political interests. The first and significant impediment to achieving global consensus is that democracy is defined as inseparable from liberal values. The ideal of liberal democracy is not simply a vehicle for holding elections and permitting elected majorities to implement policies. It is also an ideology rooted in market value and individual liberties. Experts suggest that neo-liberalism or neo-globalism provide legitimacy for unfettered capitalism. Neo-Liberals profess that democracy and free market are natural partners in promoting economic development. They propose a model of governance, wherein free markets and economic prosperity will better fulfill the human right objectives of justice, development, welfare etc that all countries seek to achieve. The prefix 'neo' is only a new manifestation of liberal ideals of democracy and governance. In its modern outlook, it expresses individualist moral primacy of the person against claims of any social collectivity. The thrust of liberal values is often spread through the power of ideas. Francis Fukuyama, a policy maker in the US State Department stated in 1989 that free markets and free people are part

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GOVERNIG GLOBAIZTION SUTH AS THRU A LA PXI OF HUMA RIGHTS, DLPMND DECRY A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Law At the University of Waikato by Suranjika Erangani Tittawella 2008 ? ii ABSTRACT This doctoral thesis in law seeks to understand, and begin to remedy, the immense and avoidable poverty that disenfranchises at least 30 percent of world?s most populous region. Defining South Asia as Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the study analyses the multidimensional nature, historical origins modern dynamics of both this material poverty and poverties of human rights, democracy and development. Both critical analysis creative response are framed within legal history, human rights jurisprudence, constitutional and administrative law, comparative law and public international law, but the author draws extensively on political economy and history, and partially on philosophy, and cultural studies. Chapter 1 traces the Western evolution of the universal human rights regime, first ?globalized? in 1948 by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also traces South Asian sociopolitical and religious articulations of human dignity and limitations on legitimate power through the ages. Mostly contrary to culturally relativist claims, South Asia?s human rights needs are found to be well served by a genuinely universalist regime including justiciable economic, social and cultural rights as inseparable from civil and political. Chapters 2 and 3 survey the historical ?globalizations? that have impacted on South Asia. Although globalization is shown to be a neutral phenomenon, the author identifies the insidious contemporary propagation of a particular neo- liberal ideology as being globalization?s inevitable and optimal form. The study analyses this propagation by the International Financial Institutions the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, acting through Structural Adjustment Policies only partially corrective Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Neo- liberalism supposedly unshackles benign market forces from distorting governmental rules to create spontaneous growth that trickles down to the poor; in fact it employs its own rules to privilege the already wealthy, especially Western capital and transnational corporations (TNCs). The thesis urges South Asia to ?govern globalization? pro-actively, seeking the virtuous circle of human rights, plural democracy and equitable development. iii Positive signs have already included national membership in, and constitutional enshrinement of, universal human rights norms, and certain efforts of civil society and non-governmental organizations, fostered at times by activist judiciaries. Chapter 4 nevertheless catalogues overriding failures to internalize plural democracy and the rule of law, leaving rights nominal and democratic structures hollow. Governments have been obsequious to neo-liberal hegemony, insouciant to their underclasses and exploitative of religious schisms in appeal to tyrannous majoritarianism. The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation is shown as an inadequate response to the region?s multidimensional poverties. Adapting instead the best practices of the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, the African Union, and British Commonwealth from Chapter 5, Chapter 6 details a ?South Asian Union for Human Rights Development and Democracy? to replace SAARC. This new regional response complements global human rights norms and offers South Asia solidarity in confronting neo- liberalism, and holding TNCs, IFIs and especially their own governments accountable to the rule of law, equitable development, deep democracy, wide human rights, and ?larger freedom? in peace and security. iv Acknowledgments The interest in seeking a pragmatic solution to deficits of human rights, democratic governance and development in South Asia was kindled as a student of the Masters programme in Law and Development at the University of Warwick. Undertaking a doctoral thesis on issues relating to South Asia in the relative isolation of New Zealand (despite the interconnectedness that globalization provides) was on reflection a daunting task. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to Professor Margaret Bedggood and Dr Claire Breen for their commitment, intellectual stimulation, guidance especially their patience that facilitated the completion of this thesis. Professor Bedggood?s passion for human rights activism, yet quietly pragmatic approach to legal theory and rights jurisprudence, influenced formulation of a praxis that is efficacious relevant. Dr Breen?s well-constructed discussions, astute comments and attention to detail have enriched the writing of this thesis. Aristotle in Nichomachean Ethics observed that one cannot have many ?true? friends the fullest sense of the word as those who loved what is truly good and ?wished it ?for the other for other?s own sake?. I consider it my privilege to be the recipient of true friendship of Hilary Smeeton, who cared for my wellbeing with unequivocal kindness especially in situations when I struggled between work and family and when the completion of the thesis appeared a far too distant goal. I am truly grateful for Dr Rosemary Tobin?s encouragement and relentless insistence that I complete the thesis within a decent timeframe. Without her daily imperial commands to ?let it go?, this work would have remained uncompleted for longer. My colleagues at the Law Faculty office at Auckland have being remarkably tolerant and cooperative during the past year in particular and I thank them for their stoic acceptance of my sudden decisions to be ?out of action? on some days. David Thompson with great diligence and enthusiasm devoted much time and energy to proof-read the thesis for submission. Working fulltime, caring for two young children and studying would not have been possible but for the unwavering support assistance of my family and v friends in Auckland, especially Margaret and Graham, Tracee, Reena, and Lokuamma who willingly undertook the task of caring for Ashwini while I sat at the computer. It is with much affection that I thank my two sisters, their families and my cousins for keeping my spirits up during the past few years. I am also grateful to global circle of ?e? friends who have kept in touch and obliging my requests for research articles, information and guidance. Access to materials from India, Sri Lanka and the UK would have been much more difficult without their enthusiastic assistance. My father?s aversion to ?derived? notions of development and his passionate involvement in sustainable developmental work at grass-roots level for the past five decades, inspired me to undertake research in the area of law and development. To my mother I owe a debt of gratitude for all sacrifices she has made for the family, her whole-hearted support my endeavours and her unfaltering love. Thisanka patiently entertained his young sister while watching the cricket matches on mute on TV while I sat battling deadlines. I sincerely thank him for his calm confidence in his ability to retrieve lost computer files. Ashwini spent her baby years reading enabling, her to be the fascinating raconteur she is. She has entertained us all with regular bouts of mischievous comments, which put everything into perspective. I have no qualms in stating that this achievement is solely due to at times tested patience of Anil and his love. He willingly gave up his plans for tranquil sojourns in Auckland to take care of the chores around the house while I worked on the thesis. vi This thesis is dedicated to my uncles: Noel, Cuda, Bertram and Ivor for giving me the greatest gifts a child could ever have ~ a thirst for knowledge and a love of reading?. vii CONTENTS Abstract ii Acknowledgement xi Abbreviations xiii Introduction 1 Chapter One HUMAN RIGHTS DICOURSE AND REGIMS IN SOUTH AD T G-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1.1 Introduction 7 .2 Concepts of Human Rights as Evolving from Religions 9 1.3 Concepts of Human Rights in the West: An Overview from Antiquity till the 20 th Century 10 .1 From Classical European Antiquity Until the 16 th Century 1.3.2 The 17 th Century: The Age of Enlightenment 13 John Locke: 1632?1704 15 1.3.4 18 th and 19 th Century Europe 16 .5 Further Evolution, Export and Internationalization of Western Human Rights into the 20 th Century 19 1.4 Antecedents and Alternatives to Human Rights Discourse in Ancient South Asia: An Overview 22 .1 The Influence of major Sub-continental Religions 1.4 Hinduism 23 .1.2 Buddhism 27 1.4.3 Islam 29 .2 Human Rights and South Asian Political Philosophy 30 1.4.3 Recent History of Human Rights in South Asia: from the 18 th to the 21 st Century 35 .5 The ?Globalization? of Human Rights 40 1.1 The United Nations ad the Universal Declartion f Huma Rgh 41 .5.2 Acstios fCultrl Imprils Lvld gist he niverlit Regi,and Peiw ofCultral latis 46 viii 1.6 Contemporary Human Rights in South Asia: Underlying Principles and Problems 47 .7 Social Action Litigation 51 1.8 Disjunction between Normative Obligations and Political Reality 58 1.8.1 The Western Liberal Political Tradition 64 .2 The Individualist Premise 65 1.8.3 The Rol fthe Sta 67 .9 The Legitimacy of the Debate on Cultural Relativism 70 1.10 Conclusion 77 Chapter Two SOUTH ASIA?S TRYSTS WITH GLOBALIZATION: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY 2.1 Introduction 80 2.2 Globalization and some of its historical antecedents 82 2.3 Negative impact of historical globalization ? on colonial South Asia 87 2.4 Contemporary globalization ? a general overview 90 2.5 Conceptualising Contemporary Globalization 92 2.5.1 South Asia encounters contemporary globalization 97 2.5.2 A Critique of the contemporary manifestation of globalisation in South Asia 101 2.5.3 The impact of globalization on the idea of state ? South Asia 102 2.5.4 The threats within the state 106 2.5.5 Globalization fuels religious fundamentalism 109 2.5.6 Contemporary Globalization: impact on Human Rights in South Asia 114 2.6 Significant traits of the renewed waves of contemporary globalization originating in the late 1980s 118 2.7 The anti-globalization movement 121 2.8 Reconceptualizing globalization 126 2.9 Conclusion 129 Chapter Three AGENTS AND INTRUMENTS OF CONTEMPORARY GLOBALIZATION 3.1 Introduction 131 ix 3.2 Objects of Early Global Development Initiatives (1930s?1970s) 133 3.3 The genesis of Globalization?s Key Public Agents, the International Financial Institutions 134 3.3.1 Key Private Agents: Transnational Corporations as Epiphytes of the International Financial Institutions 136 3.3.2 New strategies of global development: restructuring the ?Third World? from the late 1970s onward 138 3.4 Key instruments: The ideological base and main features of Structural Adjustment Policies 140 3.4.1 The Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies 141 3.4.2 End of the era of Structural Adjustment 143 3.5 The Search for a New Instrument: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 144 3.6 South Asian economic development since Independence - A brief overview 147 3.6.1 The post-independence economic trajectory of South Asia 3.6.2 ?Hindu rate of growth? - India 148 3.6.3 Emphasis on Social Welfare ? Sri Lanka 149 3.6.4 Culture of aid dependence Bangladesh 151 3.6.5 Indian economic influence ? Nepal 152 3.6.6 Early neo-liberal leanings Pakistan 3.6.7 Small economies in South Asia ? The Maldives and Bhutan 153 3.7 A critique of the Ideological Leanings of the IFIs and their Impact on Policy Formulation in South Asia 3.7.1 Human Rights Obligations of the IFIs 155 3.7.2 The Weaknesses of IFI Policy Formulation 158 3.7.3 Reinforcement of Structures of Poverty 160 3.7.4 The Cost to Social, Economic and Cultural Welfare 161 3.8 Familiar Trajectory of Failure: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 165 3.8.1 Lack of a Meaningful Contribution from Stakeholders 3.8.2 PRSPs Continue the Ideological Bias towards Neoliberalism 168 3.8.3 International Financial Institutions Taking hostage the future of South Asia 170 3.9 Transnational Corporation operation in South Asia 172 3.9.1 Increased Civic Dissent Against Transnational Corporation Activities 175 3.9.2 Transnational Corporations and Respect for Human Rights 178 3.10 Good Governance 179 3.10.1 Assertion of Liberal Democracy and Anti-corruption as Conditionalities 180 3.10.2 Practical limitations of implementing Governance-Related conditionalities 183 x 3.10.3 Good Governance comes to South Asia 184 3.10.4 UN Convention Against Corruption 188 3.11 Conclusion 189 Chapter Four A POVERTY OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH ASIA AND THE INSUFFICIENT REGIONAL RESPONSE THAT IS SAARC 4.1 Introduction 192 4.2 Manifestations of democratic deficit in South Asia at the level of the state 197 4.2.1 Disenchantment with the Offerings of Democracy in the Hunger for the Good Life 198 4.2.2 A History of Dysfunctional Organs and Failing States 200 4.2.3 Political insecurity of a Heterogeneous People 207 4.2.4 Challenges to the Legitimacy to Govern 210 4.2.5 Inadequate Public Consultation in Policy Formulation Resulting in a Mismatch of Expectations 214 4.2.6 The Embryonic Civil Society217 4.3 The Opportunity for a Regional Mechanism 220 4.3.1 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation - an Inopportune Response 221 4.3.2 Historical evolution of SAARC 222 4.3.3 SAARC and Democracy 225 4.3.4 SAARC and Human Rights 231 4.3.5 The strategic significance of the South Asian Social Charter 234 4.4 Inherent limitations of SAARC 238 4.4.1 ?SAARC fatigue? 242 4.6 Glimpses of success - SAFTA 245 4.7 Conclusion 247 Chapter Five REGIONAL AND CROSS-REGIONAL PARADIGMS AROUND THE GLOBE TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 5.1 Introduction 252 5.2 Drawing Inspiration from Alternative Regional and Cross- regional Paradigms 254 5.3 EUROPE: Exemplary rights jurisprudence created from the most advanced initial conditions 255 5.3.1 The European System: Council of Europe and Convention for xi Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 5.3.2 The European Social Charter: Bringing ESC Rights in from the Cold 260 5.4 THE AMERICAS AND THE CARIBBEAN: A Powerful Mechanism for Democracy through Turbulent History 264 5.4.1 The Organization of American States ? The Organization of American States: Rebuilding democracies and breaking the non- intervention mould 5.4.2 OAS Mechanisms to enhance democracy 267 5.4.3 The human rights protection system under the OAS 274 5.5 AFRICA: from the worst Starting conditions to assertively autochthonous rights and radical potential 280 5.5.1 The African Charter on Human and Peoples? Rights 5.5.2 The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 282 5.5.3 African Court of Human Rights: A Late but Potentially Radical Addition 286 5.6 THE (BRITISH) COMMONWEALTH: going beyond regionalism by redeeming a unique shared heritage 292 5.7 Conclusion 297 Chapter Six THE WAY FORWARD: A NEW, AUTOCHTHONOUS REGIONAL PRAXIS IN SOUTH ASIA FOR PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT 6.1 Introduction 301 6.2 The Search for a New Paradigm of Regional Standard-setting and Co-operation. 306 6.3 The Legitimacy and Efficacy of a Regional Praxis and the Need for a Law-based Regime 309 6.3.1 Creating a normative regime of human rights in South Asia 312 6.3.2 Sociopolitically and Culturally Contextualized Development 315 6.4 UN Policy Guidelines on Possible National and Regional Institutional Frameworks 317 6.4.1 The Vienna Declaration 6.4.2 The Paris Principles 318 6.5 The New Praxis - The South Asian Union on Human Rights Development and Democracy (SAU) 322 6.6 The Charter of the South Asian Union for Human Rights Democracy and Development (SAU Charter) 325 6.7 The objectives of the SAU Charter 6.8 The SAU Governing Council 333 6.9 SAU Secretariat 335 6.10 South Asian Commission on Human Rights, Development and Democracy (SAU Commission) 337 xii 6.10.1 Regional Conflict Resolution 339 6.10.2 SAU monitoring panel on TNC activity 6.11 SAU Sub-Commission for Human Rights 340 6.11.1 Ratification of, or Accession to, International Treaties 344 6.12 SAU Sub-Commission for Democratic Governance 6.12.1 Early warning system for democracy breaches 347 6.12.2 Election monitoring 348 6.13 SAU Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalization 349 6.13.1 Re-empting Human rights violations 352 6.14 SAU Office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption 353 6.15 Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the new regional mechanism 355 6.16 Conclusion358 Conclusion 361 xiii Abbreviations CoE Council fEurope ADB Asia Devlmnt Bak AfDB fricn lopet n AU ia Ui WI Breton Wds Intiuons EBRD Eupa Bk fr Rectruction ad Devlopment EPZ xort Pcesing Zo FI Feign Dirt Ivestmnt HPC Havily Idebt Por Cutries IADB Inter-Amrican velpnt Bak tei Dlomet IR Interationl Bak fr Rcnstruction ad Devlopment DA ttil evlopet Ait IEG Indepnt Ealutin Group MF tratiol Moetry Fd LDCs Les Dvelpd Cunties N Multi Nationl roati OAS Orgnist fAmeicn Stes P peatiol Pliy (stat) CS rtins lic nd Country Servics PA Povety Aemt ER ublic Expnditur Reviw PFM Pli facil angnt SC overty Redutio Suport Cedit PR Pt ctin taegy Papr SIA overty and Soil Impct Anlsi C Suth Asi sciato fr Regioal Corpation SP trctral djutent Pam AR South sin Rgio T Tecial itace (nleding) xiv INTRODUCTION ?Among the most painful manifestations of social injustice in India is the abjct poverty of a lar number of its people. A sigificant prpotio of our citizns do nt get h to et, do nt hv aecur rf ove thir has eogh cloths to cover thir bdies with.[?] Thir slf rsct, the dignity, their rigts ? all beom subient to the prminant nd foruival. But this grt Idian poverty is t a povty aog srtages, it is a povrty amog plety. Idia?s grat pverty, is thfor, nt ae of resurces It is a povty of justic.? 1 This is an empirical study of a region 2 that is dominated by irreverence to pluralism, lackadaisical democratic governance, unequal development patterns, denial of human rights and imprudent policy formulation. Kothari?s observation of the poverty of justice is applicable not only to India but to the whole South Asian region. With 30.8 per cent of the population living below poverty line of US$1 a day, South Asia subjects its people to the worst kind of human deprivation. 3 Misplaced priorities of economic growth have segmented the people of South Asia, with the poorest being disenfranchised from the political and economic spheres, in violation of their civil and political rights as well as their economic, social and cultural rights. The multidimensional quality of poverty is widely acknowledged. 4 In particular, Sen 5 has articulated that poverty can no longer be perceived as a purely economic phenomenon, but inequitable and avoidable lack of opportunities, assets, and entitlements which results in the reduction of a person?s basic human capability is equally a form of poverty; to reprise Kothari?s phrase, it is a poverty of justice in the widest sense, and a poverty among plenty. 1 Rajni Kothari Gowing Amesia(Vikng, Idia, 193) 45. 2 Thsudylfcusth foud mebrsteoftheSouth Asian sociatn for Regional Corpti (SARC), aly(i lphaticl r) Bangld,But,Id, heMaldvs, Neal, Pkstan driLnk. fgnis,atit mebr fhe SAC y i Ari207 hefo sexclude ro te bi ofhs uy.Howvitsnvisgth fghnstwoul bambr fthwrgnlpraxidvcatd inCapr 6of ti sud. 3 pedix A. 4 Fra?osBrgin d Saty RCakrvty ?The Msuremt ofMultidmensial Pvty? (203) 1JourlofEcnomic Inequli25?49. 5 AmrSe?Hma Rights d pbilts? (0) 6Jornal fHan Dvlopt 15? 16; at n CdeaaiOxfrdUivesityPres,Oxfrd, 9).Sen?s notionf cpbiltes? unrpis the United Natons Delpm ogme?saticulatio f ?hudevlowh tumvlpmti asurpvrty hrog f exptay tirth, lvlsofedcatio ic. S Arty Sen DlpntsFredm (OforUnsyPre, Oxr, 19). xv The ubiquitous wealth at hand in South Asia in terms of manpower, natural resources, established (albeit dysfunctioning) structures democracy, and a civilizational heritage with complex and advanced knowledge systems, has not been exploited positively to eradicate poverty or foster human-centred development. The culture of dependence, an inherited trait from a colonial past, has instead made the South Asian subcontinent reliant on the developed world for intellectual guidance and stimulation. Reliance International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for policy formulation and direction for the region?s development drive is a manifestation of that dependence. The contemporary developmental trajectory of the region has been underpinned since the late 1970s by neo-liberal globalization. A scrutiny of the impact of neo- liberal globalization in South Asia and a proposed solution through a new regional praxis that addresses issues of governance of globalization, development, democracy and human rights ? precisely towards remedying the poverties identified above in all these areas is the central focus of this thesis. This study acknowledges the positive contributions of globalization as it offers new avenues for global integration and interaction, an exchange of knowledge and ideas, and opportunities for growth. However, the obsequiousness displayed by the South Asian states towards the IFIs and their policy formulation based on neo-liberal tenets has emasculated capacity of South Asia to determine its own terms of engagement with globalization. This study explores a situation that must compel the South Asian region to grapple with poverty, dysfunctional democracy, and a lack of respect for human rights and the rule of law. Through this exploration the study advocates a functional praxis that would address the dilemmas that contemporary South Asia continues to encounter. Chapter 1 of this study surveys the historical evolution of the notion of human rights and the development of contemporary universal human rights paradigm. This thesis advocates the hypothesis that the idea of rights is not an untranslatable ?Western? construct and that comparable or at least compatible notions of justice, fairness, human dignity, compassion for human frailty and respect for the inherent worth of beings were present in both ancient Western and Eastern xvi philosophical and religious articulations. Chapter 1 also discusses the role of the state and the individual, both essential ingredients of contemporary mainstream discourse on human rights, and examines the impact of globalization on the capacity of the nation state to protect and promote human rights. Chapter 1 also scrutinizes the legitimacy of the assertion of cultural relativism by, in particular, the East Asian states, and relevance that concept to South Asia. The reliance on what can justifiably be called the ?spirit of human rights? by the independence movements in South Asia, and utility that spirit as a weapon to fight against dehumanizing cultural social practices, granted the human rights paradigm a special moral authority within South Asia. The legitimacy of this was further reinforced by the inclusion of human rights charters into the letter of constitutional structures of newly independent states in South Asia. This chapter, however, reiterates the existence of a wide chasm between the theory of human rights and its practical implementation in South Asia. It examines how the international treaty obligations relating to human rights and the constitutional guarantees thereof have been compromised due to economic, political and social exigencies, which this study identifies as a direct corollary of neo-liberal globalization. Chapter 1 identifies Social Action Litigation (SAL) as a phenomenon that has emerged as a response to the impotent mechanisms that are in place to protect human rights in South Asia. The chapter acknowledges the resourcefulness of this response and its considerable, though uneven, contribution towards compensating for that impotence, but the study also notes that SAL cannot be a substitutive means of human rights adjudication, nor should it have to. Its promise would be more fully realized in synergy with the new regional mechanism proposed in Chapter 6. Chapter 2 follows the historical evolution of globalization and the concept?s ramifications in a historical context, particularly its negative impact during the British Raj. Also discussed are contemporary theoretical analyses of globalization, stripping it back to lay bare its essentially neutral and negotiable character, but analysing how the concept?s contemporary articulations and hard-sells have nevertheless indicated a definite skewing towards the neo-liberal brand. The chapter acknowledges that globalization has created irretrievable interdependent global financial and communication networks, and power relations whereby the xvii developing world has felt compelled to integrate globally on terms determined by those skewed neo-liberal dictates. Chapter 2 examines the evolution of the nation state in South Asia and the way in which globalization has mutated its orthodoxy. The chapter acknowledges the emerging resentment towards the iniquitous packaging of globalization, particularly its hard selling as a non-negotiable neo-liberal unit. In this context, it traces the evolution of the antiglobalization movement and interrogates its capability to evolve an alternative vision based on equity justice. The chapter concludes with the need for South Asia to determine its own terms of engagement with globalization in order to obtain the stripped-back concept?s inherent potential benefits. Chapter 3 observes that South Asia?s desire for ?development? is not new but has assumed several characteristics within the last six decades, contemporary globalization being another milestone of that journey. The chapter also identifies the main catalysts of globalization as the major IFIs: the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and slightly more peripherally the World Trade Organization (WTO). Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are identified as the prime beneficiaries of contemporary globalization and this chapter discusses their considerable exploitation of influence and power over the developing world. The enormous human cost of the neo-liberal brand of globalization implemented through the instrument Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and the only partially corrective Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that followed them are the central focus of Chapter 3. This chapter discusses numerous empirical examples of how structures of poverty and marginalization became entrenched as a direct consequence of policies that accorded primacy to economic growth rather than human wellbeing. The chapter examines how SAPs and PRSPs have eroded state sovereignty, rendering the state impotent to formulate people- centred developmental policies, and how these same instruments instead make states accountable to the IFIs. The rejection of these peoples? wishes and aspirations at the policy formulation stage by mainstream neo-liberal globalization has challenged fundamental tenets of universal human rights and rendered meaningless the elaborate structures in place nationally to promote protect xviii human rights and democracy. However, quite paradoxically, the donor-driven aspect of neo-liberal globalization has benefited civil societal mobilization and the drive for good governance within South Asia. These positive manifestations will be among the tools utilized in the proposal of a regional praxis for South Asia in Chapter 6. A distinct aspect of the debate concerning marginalization and endemic poverty in South Asia is region?s democratic deficit and poor governance. Chapter 4 explores the cyclic effect of neo-liberal globalization as it discusses the dysfunctional democratic governance, the militarization of the region, and nexus to economic deprivation and marginalization. Increased state-sponsored violence will be put forward as an expression of the sense of insecurity of the state, which has lost its legitimacy to govern amidst negative repercussions neo-liberal globalization. This study reiterates that such violence also compromises civil and political rights. The increasing crisis of legitimacy to govern in the region, due to deteriorating democracy and human rights standards, prompts this study to explore alternative arrangements that would re-establish functional democracy, foster human rights and offer alternative mechanisms to determine developmental policy formulation in South Asia. The purpose of scrutinizing the role and function of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in the second half of Chapter 4 is to establish whether the SAARC offers a viable alternative vision standard-setting and governance. The chapter concludes that the SAARC cannot infuse member states with genuine commitment to human rights, rule of law, democracy and sagacious, human-centred policy formulation. Chapter 5 turns to the search for alternative visions to ameliorate South Asia?s sociopolitical and economic dilemmas. The author focuses on regional and transnational innovations and structures that have reduced poverty and fostered economic, social and cultural rights, democratic governance and human-centred development: the regional arrangements in Europe, the Americas Africa; and the Commonwealth Organization?s promotion of democratic governance. The chapter concludes that a South Asian solution must be both tailored and autochthonous. xix Chapter 6 concludes the study by advocating such an autochthonous praxis to replace the dysfunctional and outdated SAARC. The proposed South Asian Union on Development, Democracy and Human Rights (SAU) will contain regional mechanisms to ensure democratic governance nationally. The SAU will address inequitable policy formulations impinging upon the rights of the people through a legal regime promoting and protecting human rights in the region, which would in turn enhance both the legitimacy and the efficacy of universal human rights regime. In this regard it will revitalize existing, yet ineffectual and dysfunctional, national human rights commissions and create new commissions in states yet to establish them. Through the Office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption, the SAU will also promote accountable governance and initiate strategies to end culture of corruption pervading South Asia. This study reiterates that human rights, development and democracy are synergistically intertwined in a symbiotic relationship, which Sen envisions as ?development as freedom?: 6 Devlopment ca besn?as proces fexpanding the ral fredoms that pole joy. Fuing o humnfdmcotrstswithnw vief dlot, sh sidtifying vlont ith th roth fgrsntiol ruct, r withtheris persoal inces, rindustrializatio, or ith tehnological advnc, o with scial mdrizatio. The enormous human cost of poor policy formulation that focussed on the ?narrower views of development? and irresponsible governance of globalization in South Asia are highlighted through the poverties of democracy, human rights and democratic governance. The proposed praxis regional collaboration is aimed at creating normative standards relating to human rights, democratic governance and development, which in turn will foster peace, stability and prosperity in South Asia, thus squarely addressing the region?s poverties in their largest sense. 6 Amarty Sen Dvelopmnt asFredom (Alfred .Knopf Icorpated, Wstminster, MD, USA, 19) 3. 1 INTRODUCTION ?Among the most painful manifestations of social injustice in India is the abject poverty of a lar number of its people. A sigificant prpotio of our citizns do nt get h to et, do nt hv aecur rf ove thir has eogh cloths to cover thir bdies with.[?] Thir slf rsct, the dignity, their rights ? all beom subient to the prminant nd foruival. But this grt Idian poverty is t a povty aog srtages, it is a povrty amog plety. Idia?s grt pverty, is thfor, nt ae of resurces It is a povty of justic.? 1 This is an empirical study of a region 2 that is dominated by irreverence to pluralism, lackadaisical democratic governance, unequal development patterns, denial of human rights and imprudent policy formulation. Kothari?s observation of the poverty of justice is applicable not only to India but to the whole South Asian region. With 30.8 per cent of the population living below poverty line of US$1 a day, South Asia subjects its people to the worst kind of human deprivation. 3 Misplaced priorities of economic growth have segmented the people of South Asia, with the poorest being disenfranchised from the political and economic spheres, in violation of their civil and political rights as well as their economic, social and cultural rights. The multidimensional quality of poverty is widely acknowledged. 4 In particular, Sen 5 has articulated that poverty can no longer be perceived as a purely economic phenomenon, but inequitable and avoidable lack of opportunities, assets, and entitlements which results in the reduction of a person?s basic human capability is equally a form of poverty; to reprise Kothari?s phrase, it is a poverty of justice in the widest sense, and a poverty among plenty. 1 Rajni Kothari Gowing Amesia(Vikng, Idia, 193) 45. 2 Thsudylfcusth foud mebrsteoftheSouth Asian sociatn for Regional Corpti (SARC), aly(i lphaticl r) Bangld,But,Id, heMaldvs, Neal, Pkstan driLnk. fgnis,atit mebr fhe SAC y i Ari207 hefo sexclude ro te bi ofhs uy.Howvitsnvisgth fghnstwoul bambr fthwrgnlpraxidvcatd inCapr 6of ti sud. 3 pedix A. 4 Fra?osBrgin d Saty RCakrvty ?The Msuremt ofMultidmensial Pvty? (203) 1JourlofEcnomic Inequli25?49. 5 AmrSe?Hma Rights d pbilts? (0) 6Jornal fHan Dvlopt 15? 166; at n CdeaaiOxfrdUivesityPres,Oxfrd, 9).Sen?s notif cpbiltes? unrpis the United Natons Delpm ogme?saticulatio f ?hudevlowh tumvlpmti asurpvrty hrog f exptany tirth, lvlsofedcatio ic. S Arty Sen DlpntsFredm (OforUsyPre, Oxr, 19). 2 The ubiquitous wealth at hand in South Asia in terms of manpower, natural resources, established (albeit dysfunctioning) structures democracy, and a civilizational heritage with complex and advanced knowledge systems, has not been exploited positively to eradicate poverty or foster human-centred development. The culture of dependence, an inherited trait from a colonial past, has instead made the South Asian subcontinent reliant on the developed world for intellectual guidance and stimulation. Reliance International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for policy formulation and direction for the region?s development drive is a manifestation of that dependence. The contemporary developmental trajectory of the region has been underpinned since the late 1970s by neo-liberal globalization. A scrutiny of the impact of neo- liberal globalization in South Asia and a proposed solution through a new regional praxis that addresses issues of governance of globalization, development, democracy and human rights ? precisely towards remedying the poverties identified above in all these areas is the central focus of this thesis. This study acknowledges the positive contributions of globalization as it offers new avenues for global integration and interaction, an exchange of knowledge and ideas, and opportunities for growth. However, the obsequiousness displayed by the South Asian states towards the IFIs and their policy formulation based on neo-liberal tenets has emasculated capacity of South Asia to determine its own terms of engagement with globalization. This study explores a situation that must compel the South Asian region to grapple with poverty, dysfunctional democracy, and a lack of respect for human rights and the rule of law. Through this exploration the study advocates a functional praxis that would address the dilemmas that contemporary South Asia continues to encounter. Chapter 1 of this study surveys the historical evolution of the notion of human rights and the development of contemporary universal human rights paradigm. This thesis advocates the hypothesis that the idea of rights is not an untranslatable ?Western? construct and that comparable or at least compatible notions of justice, fairness, human dignity, compassion for human frailty and respect for the inherent worth of beings were present in both ancient Western and Eastern 3 philosophical and religious articulations. Chapter 1 also discusses the role of the state and the individual, both essential ingredients of contemporary mainstream discourse on human rights, and examines the impact of globalization on the capacity of the nation state to protect and promote human rights. Chapter 1 also scrutinizes the legitimacy of the assertion of cultural relativism by, in particular, the East Asian states, and relevance that concept to South Asia. The reliance on what can justifiably be called the ?spirit of human rights? by the independence movements in South Asia, and utility that spirit as a weapon to fight against dehumanizing cultural social practices, granted the human rights paradigm a special moral authority within South Asia. The legitimacy of this was further reinforced by the inclusion of human rights charters into the letter of constitutional structures of newly independent states in South Asia. This chapter, however, reiterates the existence of a wide chasm between the theory of human rights and its practical implementation in South Asia. It examines how the international treaty obligations relating to human rights and the constitutional guarantees thereof have been compromised due to economic, political and social exigencies, which this study identifies as a direct corollary of neo-liberal globalization. Chapter 1 identifies Social Action Litigation (SAL) as a phenomenon that has emerged as a response to the impotent mechanisms that are in place to protect human rights in South Asia. The chapter acknowledges the resourcefulness of this response and its considerable, though uneven, contribution towards compensating for that impotence, but the study also notes that SAL cannot be a substitutive means of human rights adjudication, nor should it have to. Its promise would be more fully realized in synergy with the new regional mechanism proposed in Chapter 6. Chapter 2 follows the historical evolution of globalization and the concept?s ramifications in a historical context, particularly its negative impact during the British Raj. Also discussed are contemporary theoretical analyses of globalization, stripping it back to lay bare its essentially neutral and negotiable character, but analysing how the concept?s contemporary articulations and hard-sells have nevertheless indicated a definite skewing towards the neo-liberal brand. The chapter acknowledges that globalization has created irretrievable interdependent global financial and communication networks, and power relations whereby the 4 developing world has felt compelled to integrate globally on terms determined by those skewed neo-liberal dictates. Chapter 2 examines the evolution of the nation state in South Asia and the way in which globalization has mutated its orthodoxy. The chapter acknowledges the emerging resentment towards the iniquitous packaging of globalization, particularly its hard selling as a non-negotiable neo-liberal unit. In this context, it traces the evolution of the antiglobalization movement and interrogates its capability to evolve an alternative vision based on equity justice. The chapter concludes with the need for South Asia to determine its own terms of engagement with globalization in order to obtain the stripped-back concept?s inherent potential benefits. Chapter 3 observes that South Asia?s desire for ?development? is not new but has assumed several characteristics within the last six decades, contemporary globalization being another milestone of that journey. The chapter also identifies the main catalysts of globalization as the major IFIs: the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and slightly more peripherally the World Trade Organization (WTO). Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are identified as the prime beneficiaries of contemporary globalization and this chapter discusses their considerable exploitation of influence and power over the developing world. The enormous human cost of the neo-liberal brand of globalization implemented through the instrument Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and the only partially corrective Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that followed them are the central focus of Chapter 3. This chapter discusses numerous empirical examples of how structures of poverty and marginalization became entrenched as a direct consequence of policies that accorded primacy to economic growth rather than human wellbeing. The chapter examines how SAPs and PRSPs have eroded state sovereignty, rendering the state impotent to formulate people- centred developmental policies, and how these same instruments instead make states accountable to the IFIs. The rejection of these peoples? wishes and aspirations at the policy formulation stage by mainstream neo-liberal globalization has challenged fundamental tenets of universal human rights and rendered meaningless the elaborate structures in place nationally to promote protect 5 human rights and democracy. However, quite paradoxically, the donor-driven aspect of neo-liberal globalization has benefited civil societal mobilization and the drive for good governance within South Asia. These positive manifestations will be among the tools utilized in the proposal of a regional praxis for South Asia in Chapter 6. A distinct aspect of the debate concerning marginalization and endemic poverty in South Asia is region?s democratic deficit and poor governance. Chapter 4 explores the cyclic effect of neo-liberal globalization as it discusses the dysfunctional democratic governance, the militarization of the region, and nexus to economic deprivation and marginalization. Increased state-sponsored violence will be put forward as an expression of the sense of insecurity of the state, which has lost its legitimacy to govern amidst negative repercussions neo-liberal globalization. This study reiterates that such violence also compromises civil and political rights. The increasing crisis of legitimacy to govern in the region, due to deteriorating democracy and human rights standards, prompts this study to explore alternative arrangements that would re-establish functional democracy, foster human rights and offer alternative mechanisms to determine developmental policy formulation in South Asia. The purpose of scrutinizing the role and function of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in the second half of Chapter 4 is to establish whether the SAARC offers a viable alternative vision standard-setting and governance. The chapter concludes that the SAARC cannot infuse member states with genuine commitment to human rights, rule of law, democracy and sagacious, human-centred policy formulation. Chapter 5 turns to the search for alternative visions to ameliorate South Asia?s sociopolitical and economic dilemmas. The author focuses on regional and transnational innovations and structures that have reduced poverty and fostered economic, social and cultural rights, democratic governance and human-centred development: the regional arrangements in Europe, the Americas Africa; and the Commonwealth Organization?s promotion of democratic governance. The chapter concludes that a South Asian solution must be both tailored and autochthonous. 6 Chapter 6 concludes the study by advocating such an autochthonous praxis to replace the dysfunctional and outdated SAARC. The proposed South Asian Union on Development, Democracy and Human Rights (SAU) will contain regional mechanisms to ensure democratic governance nationally. The SAU will address inequitable policy formulations impinging upon the rights of the people through a legal regime promoting and protecting human rights in the region, which would in turn enhance both the legitimacy and the efficacy of universal human rights regime. In this regard it will revitalize existing, yet ineffectual and dysfunctional, national human rights commissions and create new commissions in states yet to establish them. Through the Office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption, the SAU will also promote accountable governance and initiate strategies to end culture of corruption pervading South Asia. This study reiterates that human rights, development and democracy are synergistically intertwined in a symbiotic relationship, which Sen envisions as ?development as freedom?: 6 Devlopment ca besn?as proces fexpanding the ral fredoms that pole joy. Fuing o humnfdmcotrstswithnw vief dlot, sh sidtifying vlont ith th roth fgrsntiol ruct, rwiththeris persoal inces, rindustrializatio, or ith tehnological advnc, o with scial mdrizatio. The enormous human cost of poor policy formulation that focussed on the ?narrower views of development? and irresponsible governance of globalization in South Asia are highlighted through the poverties of democracy, human rights and democratic governance. The proposed praxis regional collaboration is aimed at creating normative standards relating to human rights, democratic governance and development, which in turn will foster peace, stability and prosperity in South Asia, thus squarely addressing the region?s poverties in their largest sense. 6 Amarty Sen Dvelopmnt asFredom (Alfred .Knopf Icorpated, Wstminster, MD, USA, 19) 3. 7 CHAPTER 1 THE DISCOURSES AND REGIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH ASIA AND THEIR GEO-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ?The agnda of human rights still in the making, such as the human rights of indigenous pole, th h rigt toexual orientatio and cot, and th rtsf pple with disbility, more th fifty ys after th Uiversal Dclartio of Huma Rights, testifie to s oiginay prctice of exclusio in th vy poucnf interntioal, regional, ad ntionl humn rights norm and stards. The plitics of exclusio in the mking of h cu depr tha the exigief politic of terovretal desir in th making of humn rts may sugest.? 1 1.1Introduction The Introduction to this thesis noted the abject poverty in much of South Asia and its intimate link the denial of human rights. It also highlighted how contemporary globalization has offered opportunities for worldwide trade and financial integration. Globalization, moreover, has created new patterns of interaction between people and their states. Globalization promised unprecedented material progress for all, yet has delivered compounded economic marginalization and poverty. Legal and political structures in South Asia aimed at protecting and enhancing human rights, particularly socioeconomic rights, and eradicating all species of poverty, appear inadequate for several reasons. It is against this complex scenario that an examination will be made of the mainstream discourse on human rights in South Asia and of the human rights regimes operating in the region. The study will investigate geo-historical background of those regimes, particularly in the West, and the legitimacy and efficacy of their current incarnations. The present chapter therefore traces the evolution and eventual confluence of rights from both ancient Western and Asian political religious thought. Contemporary ?human rights? are commonly regarded as a construct of Western political and 1 Upendra Bxi ?Politcs freadingHuman Rights: Inclusion ad Exclusion withn te productin of humights?SadnMkl-Grc? dBak? (e)TheLgaztfHumaRighs Mltclnry pestivs ofhrits d m rigts l (Rledg, Oxfr, 206) 182. 8 religious ideology which gained universal currency after World War II. 2 However, the tributaries of reasoning that fed into that mainstream, such as the notions of justice, fairness, human dignity, compassion for human frailty and respect for the inherent worth of beings, flowed from both ancient Western and Eastern philosophical and religious thought, and the first part of this chapter maps that progression. In discussing the roles of the state and the individual ? both essential ingredients of the contemporary mainstream discourse on human rights this chapter assesses the viability of those roles in South Asia in the context of globalization. It also queries assertions cultural relativism within human rights discourse highlighted by mainly the East Asian states and that concept?s legitimacy in South Asia. Despite the allegations of Western cultural imperialism levelled against the international regime of human rights, the reliance on the ?spirit? of human rights by the African Americans in their struggle for equality, 3 by those who fought for independence from colonial rule, and, more recently, in the fight against apartheid in South Africa, 4 has created a universal legitimacy for idea of human rights transcending cultural and ethnoreligious boundaries. This position is further reinforced by the inclusion of human rights charters into the constitutional structures of many states including in South Asia, as a corollary of colonial legacy and the assertion of a new, post- colonial identity. Empirical evidence nevertheless shows a wide chasm between the accepted theoretical legitimacy of human rights and the reality of their practical implementation in South Asia. In the last sections of this chapter an examination of the international human rights obligations of the South Asian states and the efficacy of national structures that are in place to realize those obligations will be made. The discussion highlights the essential dichotomy between the 2 This teis mploys the word ?cntemporay?, with respct both uman rights and toecnmic globalzon,ecifalfe h idsncWoldarI. 3 Cr Adrs Es Of t Priz:TUte Ntis n te Afic eric Strugl fr HumRight,194?1955(Cabdge nivrsiyPre,Cmbrig, 203). 4 L bel Polics byther Mns: Law th Stugl Aast parthid, 1980?1994 (Rotledg, ond,5). 9 universal regime and its manifestation in South Asia?s peculiar socioeconomic and political milieu. 1.2 Concepts of Human Rights as Evolving from Religions The idea that human beings deserve humane, just and fair treatment that preserves and enhances their dignity traces back to the origin of most civilizational histories all major religions of the world. 5 Khushlani asserts that, ?the concept of human rights can be traced to origin of the human race itself.? 6 However, civic documentation of human rights applicable to all beings because of their inalienable or ethical qualities, with legal applications actionable against society and its rulers, was by no means common at all times to all major pre-modern Western non-Western societies. 7 The idea of human rights in its contemporary multifaceted package ? described as civil and political rights; social, economic, and cultural rights; individual rights; group rights; and inter-generational rights ? is indeed a construct of the post-World War II human rights regime. 8 All major religions of the world ? Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, and others have pervasive, cogent moral codes. All promote the inherent dignity of humankind, common humanity, the sanctity of human life, justice, 5 PG Lauren Th Evolutin ofIternatiol Human Rights: Vions Se (University ofPensylvani res,ildlpia,198)(Lau); ArtySe?uanghtadAsa Vlu?(197) 3The Nw Rpbc 4; PMrg d Cw (ds) Eticl Ise ix RligosTradits(Ediburgh Univrsityres,Edinbh,196); DainKow ArTr?Humn ht? nBhim?? (195) 2Jounal ofBuist EicsMchel Ishay istoy fais:Fro Ancet Timesth Giztora(Unvrity fClifrniPre,Brkel, 204). 6 YgidrKshln ?Hm Rigs Asi d ca? (1984) unRightsLaw Jural 403- 442. 7 Forthe lal code fte acint Suerian Kig Ur-Nmu, cira 2065 BC, se Ptr NSterns (ed) TEncypiWorldsory(6th d,Houhtn MiflnCopny,otn,201)ad DilC Sl (d) ACmni th AiNr East (Blackwe, Oxfrd 4). Athr coifto f rightswaPersia? yrusCliner. ca 539C:se Iy GrshevitcTheambidgeHstry fIran Vol. 2:T Mdd camiPeriod (mbridgUniy Prs, Cr, 1985)d HenScis-erbrg ?Drus InthPsan Epr? JakMSon ()Civlztios f th Aiet Na Est (Sine, NwYrk, 195)03?1050. 8 LszkKolwki ?odrtyoEdlesTil? iStefa Czerniwsi, Wlfga Freis and gni sa (t.) Uivrsit fChcagoPrs,hicgo, 190)cted inJPyTheIa of HumaRight (OxfrneP,Oxfrd, 198). 10 equality, and compassion, and all stipulate duties and obligations towards fellow humans as well as to God or a higher being or ideal. 9 In Europe, however, these religious codes (based on preoccupation with a good life after death) entered the political and civic arena only in the 17 th century. As this study later elaborates, in South Asia such religious values of non-violence, respect, justice and notions of equality had sporadically infiltrated into governing practices centuries earlier. 10 1.3 Concepts of Human Rights in the West: An Overview from Antiquity till the 20 th Century 1.3.1 From Classical European Antiquity Until the 16 th Century The contemporary international human rights regime is epitomized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 11 which was adopted General Assembly the United Nations in 1948. The UDHR is regarded by many as essentially a representation of ideas through the context of the European liberal political ideology, 12 while others subscribe to a more inclusive position on the basis that the Human Rights Commissioners, the core drafters of the UDHR, were drawn from diverse ethno religious backgrounds but worked in unison to create a Declaration that was truly representative of all major philosophical and religious traditions. 13 However, in structure and ideological content, the contemporary 9 Lauren, above n5, ?10. Laurenasrt hat es comn oral vues ar evidnt ial religous philosphis;JMPk?Bdhim, HunRigandtheJpesSt?(197) HRQ527; LC Gr ?Jdc Ctributio t its? [190] Cai Yr Bok fum ihtsaw AbdulameAn-NaTward Ilamiceforti:vilLbties,ang, nd Intertionl Law (tepyIsue nth Midl Es) (Syracus Unvrity PresSyrcuse, 196). 10 Sbl, tex ton 13, th Edicts ofEpero Ashka nd the iflec ofBudhism; Wila A EdmunsoAn IrducioRg(CambidgUiversiyPrs,Cambrige, 204)3?15. 11 Uiveral Dclat fHuman ihts t pocl yGnalAsbly Resolutin 217A (I)f10 eber1948<tp:/w.unor/Oriw/rights.> (ced18Fb 206). 12 only rgusth t oti fua rights iesntal oed ithest. S JDly iversaHman RisinThrynd Pcte(Crl UivrsityPrs, Ia,9);Prem Kirpal Hu Rihts:?TeCtempa Sition ? oit nuction? loking ahd?in Philospcl Foudios fHuRgh,(UNESO1986);RJVie HmRts Interatinatin (abridge Prs 1986). 13 ? r serh frew nvaltic,tecomison embrs afird tha te history fthe philosphictdito humrihs xend bynd th?arw lito teWsrnadinad [ta] tbgn ntWst l ithEasics the gin ofpilsp.? Miceli IsayHisry fHan Rigtsfro Acet TeoGlbalztEra(Uverityof 11 international human rights regime does appear to have evolved around religious, political and social phenomena of European origin whose normative and ethical lineage derives from classical Greek philosophy of the Athenian era 14 the Stoic stimulus in Roman jurisprudence. 15 Philosophers such as Aristotle 16 were the first to articulate notions of entitlements in philosophical discourse, despite apparently accepting the institution slavery and the disenfranchisement of women. 17 In Roman philosophy evolution of the theory of equality and altruism centred on the articulations of nature made by Stoics. 18 The Stoics held that nature governed all things both physical and ethical, and they premised humans as equal members of the (universal) Roman Society. 19 The Stoic influence is evident in the work of Roman jurists such as Ulpian and Gaius. 20 It contributed to the evolution the distinction between jus gentium, connoting righteousness and justice, and jus civile, based on a positive political order. The basis of jus gentium was jus naturae, and it was at this point that the ideas of natural law first began making contributions to the development of legal philosophy based on Stoic influences. 21 In both Greek and Roman philosophies the notions of equality were drawn from nature and thus laid the foundation for the future development of the theory of natural law. Subsequent articulations of morality, California Pres, Brkely, 204)17(Ishay); se also LChun ?Hman Rights and Democray: the cse dcoupling? (1)5IntertionlJurnfaights19?44. 14 AHRbrts,JGMrils Hum Rgts ith Wrld: AIroduci to Stuy ft Intratinl Ptecio faihz,(MacestUnivesity Pes,6). 15 shy, ov 13. 16 ritle(50BC)litcs Ernest Brke (tr) visd with aitroductin ad otes byRF Staley (Oxfd Unirsity Pre,Oxfod,195);saloFlerJNe, Jsehigtsin Aristol?sPolc(la Prs Oxford, 195). 17 RK Sicair Dmorcy naticptinAthns (Cambridg Univrsity Prs, Cambridge, 198). 18 LEdelstin The Maig ofStism (Harvd Uiversity Pres, Cabridge, 196). 19 oma plosprs Ccer,necthYoungr,MacuAliun atohYounger subcrit ttil asrtios ficsm; Brd Inwod (e)T CmbridCmpanio t The Scs(ambrdgUivyPr, 203). 20 MariL Colih Te Stoc Trditn FAntiquty Tohe Early Mil Ages: I.Stoics i Clsltntru(Bil, 1985);Karse FrsJansAHstorfnciPhlphy:Fro the Bgis Agstin Ruteg, 198). 21 lv RaderEthic adhHmnCounity (Holt, Riehart nd Wisto, New York, 196) 20; s asoSuckl NurlLw Apai EhcsBckwl,Oxfr, 193). 12 natural law and the inherent dignity of mankind, particularly from the 17 th century onwards, drew inspiration from the philosophical reasoning of the earlier era. 22 In medieval Europe natural law became embroiled in a new theological and religious discourse. Thus, was redefined as the will and the command of God, and all humans were to be subjected to the authority of both God and the King under feudalism. 23 The most important philosopher this era, Thomas Aquinas (circa 1225?1274), fused Aristotelian philosophical teachings and Catholic theology in Summa de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra Gentiles (Summa Contra Gentiles) (1259?1264) and Summa Theologica (incomplete) (1265?1273). These works included his perceptions on the nature of God, means of proving God's existence and the relation to natural law. He was the opinion that just positive law was derived from natural law and was achieved through logical deduction or through deliberative human choice. 24 A massive medieval influence on the subsequent rights discourse was the Magna Carta (1215). 25 The Magna Carta articulated the idea of certainty of legal entitlements to (nominally) the people 26 and decreed that monarchical power be exercized in accordance with law. Its significance is not that it is the first legal document to curtail the powers of a King, but that it substantially endured from the 13 th century and has now become the spiritual, and to some extent literal or positive, basis of the rule of law, rights, 27 due process 28 constitutionalism in Western political and legal thought. 22 RTuck Naturl Rights Teoris:Their Oign ad Devlopment (Cabridge University Pres, Cambridge,197). 23 DHlhy (d Te Histry fFudalism (Mcil, Nw Yrk, 1970). 24 Gor?aturlLawndIterntolrde? nRMaplendTNardin (es) Interationl Sciet: ives Ehic Perspcivs (PritUivrsity Prs, riceto,198ch3. 25 JCltMgnCrt (2 nd , Cabg it ,Cmbg 2). 26 Ibid. Th a aaseiflydesnd oaleit he rivansftePop and the Baronsisteusof rbitry powr th Kig. 27 Rwl r thteMgnatasifct ll docut t refrd t?rigts? wic ctiedgalnilmns.S Rsld ?TeConeptf HmanRighs? (195) Philophy an Phomoca Rarch354-97, 362(Rshwal). 28 Ticlusi ftheluse ?No persnhal b. drivdof lie, librty, orperty, itut de proes faw?n ArinBilf igts,icenuratsrghsfhelandrescions n thxrise ofgvnmt wr,dre oa Mna Crt. S HD zlt ?TIflucMa Caro AmeicanCstilDevlopme?(197)ColumbiaLw 13 1.3.2 The 17 th Century: The Age of Enlightenment The evidence of an embryonic evolution of the rights discourse in the mainstream political theory Western Europe can be witnessed in retrospect during English Revolution of 1640. The endorsement of the rights of the people, such as the right to political participation, the freedom religion, and rights against tyrannical government, was the basis of this revolution. 29 The subsequent disintegration of the Civil Administration of Oliver Cromwell can also be attributed in spirit to the notion of people?s rights against autocratic rulers. The fervour of the revolution of 1640 continued through to the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which led to the restoration of a much more curtailed monarchy and the formulation of the English Bill of Rights in 1689. 30 By the 17 th century, the status of rights theory? to the effect that the rights articulated could be vindicated against the rulers and related ideas of limited government were well established in mainstream political discourse in what was to become the United Kingdom. The Bill of Rights of 1689 31 addressed the fundamental political concerns felt not only in 17 th century England but elsewhere in Europe. It made the King subject to the rule of law, like all other inhabitants of the realm, and the notion that the King ruled by divine right and was the sole source of law, therefore above it, was rejected. The King was compelled to respect the wishes of the elected members of Parliament, who now controlled the state's money and property. The Bill of Rights also advocated some basic rights to justice, stipulating that there be no excessive bail or fines, cruel and unusual punishments or unfair trials, and guaranteeing juries, impartial courts independent judges. It repeated some of the commitments made by King John in the Magna Carta to curtail the exercise royal power. Reviw 1?33. 29 CHll TheEnglish Revolutin 1640 (Lawrenc ad Wishart, Lond, 1940) 1. 30 Jonat Ira(d)T Aglo-DutchMomt:Ey eGlriusRevolutinad ItsWorld Impc (mbi Unirsity Pres, 91). 31 TheEglsh Blofh<tp:/nstiuon.rg/bor/ng_bor.htm> (acse 15May 206). 14 The drawback of both these Charters was that they benefited the privileged segments of society and had no universal application. However, as Lauterpatcht has observed, the evolution of the idea of rights is a long and gradual process and ?the vindication of human liberties does not begin with their complete and triumphant assertion at the very outset; it commences with their recognition in some matters, to some extent, for some people, against some organ of the state.? 32 Tracing the evolution of natural rights, Freeman observes that the natural rights theorist Hugo Grotius was a crucial figure in ?transforming medieval ideas into the modern concept of rights?. 33 Grotius is credited with separating natural law from divine law in theoretical reasoning, a departure from the Calvinist position that all ethical values stem from God. 34 Although his position on Christianity is not always easy to determine, for his idea of ethics appears to be based on Christian values, he wrote that, ?[t]he law of nature is a dictate of right reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or enjoined by the author of nature, God.? 35 In the evolution of rights discourse, Grotius is notable for maintaining that the theory of natural law was not premised on the belief in God, thus becoming first philosopher to articulate the theory of natural rights based on secularism. 36 Thomas Hobbes? The Leviathan of 1651 lends particularly graphic empirical support to the position of the present writer that the evolution of rights discourses everywhere is influenced by sociopolitical issues of time and place. This work advocates for a social contract between the people and the sovereign. 37 Hobbes, who survived the three English Civil Wars between the Parliamentaries and the Royalists (1642? 32 HLauterpatch Interationl Lawnd Human Rights (Anchor Bks, 1968) 31. 33 Michl FmHuRights: AIteriscplarypa(PolityCambridge, 20) 18. 34 Grots'DJr Pd (Cmey ot Lw ofPize d ) n D JuBliacPis (One Law ofWan eac) r gardashintrbutonthe vlptof th onepton f turl. 35 ois On the Lw ofr nd Pec (Bobs-Meril, Idiaplis, 1925) 38?39. 36 BTery?OrignsNatulRightsLangu: Txtsn Cotex0?(198) 0History of Plitcal out 617. 37 homsHbesThLevitn (Kesier Pblishg, Whitfs MT, 24). 15 1651), 38 had witnessed the sociopolitical devastation that ensued. He equated war with the ?state of nature? which created insecurity, and said that this state must be prevented by a social contract with a strong government. Founded on the premise that the social contract existed between the people and the sovereign, and that by it the people surrendered some of their liberties for the ?peace and defence? of the realm, Hobbes? theory maintained that the contract would be ended if and when the Leviathan became incapable of protecting the people, at which point man would return to the state of nature. 39 1.3.3 John Locke: 1632?1704 A particularly significant philosopher of the Age of Enlightenment, whose writings have considerably influenced the creation rights doctrine and qualified Hobbes? pessimism about man?s need to surrender to even an arbitrary sovereign, is John Locke. 40 In the evolution of human rights, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau are the three key, early advocates contractarianism. Drawing inspiration from just- concluded Glorious Revolution, Locke advocated the idea of natural rights in his 1689 work, Second Treatise of Government. 41 Of relevance to the current narrative, Locke embarks on his (convoluted) political theory on the premise that in a pre-social state of nature all humans have natural and equal rights to their lives, liberties, and estates. In the absence of government, he claims, these rights have no means of vindication and therefore lie dormant with little or no value. Such a society has no apparatus created for the fortification of these rights, and individual vindication of rights is a potential ground for conflict. Therefore, he claims, human beings created social groups or societies and through societies governments are formed that in turn are vested with the duty to protect and enhance an individual?s natural rights. 38 Jane Ohlmeyr ?The Wars oftheTre Kingdoms The Britsh and Irish Civl Wars? inJohn Kyod JanOly(d) Btsh aIriCvlW?AMltryHitoyf Scotland, Irl Egld 1638?1660(Oxford Uivesty Ps, Oxfor, 198). 39 RTuckNturRihts Teoris: Teign dDelpment(abridge Universit Pres, Cambride, 197) 2131. 40 oshwalboveid n7, 30?371. 41 Jn Lck ScTreatisof Gvernmt ?Chapter I:Of the Sta ofNature <tp:/.frham.u/hl/d/1690locke-sl.ml>(acsd15Jn 206). 16 The legitimacy of a government, asserted Locke, is based on a social contract in the form of an opaque voluntary social union between the rulers and the ruled. Members of the society are obligated to obey the government only if government in turn upholds their human rights, which are held over and above the claims and interests of the government. According to Locke?s theory, the validity of government is thus conditional upon the systematic protection and enhancement of the human rights of its citizens. 42 Building on the thinking of Hobbes as well as modifying it, Locke relentlessly championed supremacy Parliament and justified the 1688 Revolution through his theory of rights. 43 It was his writings that inspired Thomas Jefferson to write of ?life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness? in the Declaration of Independence in the infant United States of America nearly a century later. 44 However, Locke?s ideas were not without criticism ? his notion of natural rights was initially associated with the middle classes. 45 It was the rising bourgeoisie of early modern Europe who made political claims based on Locke?s theoretical reasoning of natural human equality and inalienable natural rights, and did so as a means overcoming their lack of privileged birth and old money. This political revolution had a fundamental limitation because, despite Locke?s claim of universalism in the language of natural rights, he had actually developed a political theory for protection of the rights of landed gentry. Locke?s idea of rights was also essentially individualistic as he repeatedly referred to ?lives, liberties and estates? of the individual members of a privileged segment of 42 Hector Gs Epiel ?The EvolingCocept ofHuman Rights: Westrn, Socialst nd Thir World Apah?inBRamcra (ed) HumanRights: TrtyYearAfhUverlDeclatn. (Mrtinus Njof, Hgu,19741?67. 43 Lockewrit:?Thentrl ibrty ofisto befr o n superio wr onrth, d ot bd h l rlisavehit an,uthavelythlafnatuef isule.Th lirtyfmanisocty to underthr lgisli pwr b t sblishdbycont ite coelt.? e?Ccrig Civl Goemt?1690inSecodTret ofGvrm? Chaptr I:Of hSta fNat<htp:/w.frdha.edu/hals/m/1690lcke-sl.tl> (esd15Jan206). 44 US Dclrtio fIdepnce ofte 13Aericn olis on4 th July 7; s Brnad ilyn ThIoglrigs ofth AmrianRvolut(HarvdUiversitPre,192). 45 nely traes thvluif th tmpry hum ight cn toh pilosphicl euciatf17 th cntry BidriclatoLcke?sSod TraisOfGvernmt,but ods ht is work epsnt a?bouges il rvlutin?.JkDely Uisal Han RightinTeryadPtic (Crel UnivrtyPes,Itha, 198) 04?105. 17 society. Roshwald observes: ?This individualistic-atomistic conception of society becomes the foundation stone of the democratic-liberal trend in political philosophy.? 46 Roshwald reiterates that it is at this time that the ?concept of ?human rights? took shape and became a principle of decisive importance in the political conceptions of people? she continues that further articulation of idea of rights in the 18 th century was essentially an application of the philosophy of Locke to real political life. 47 By the conclusion of the 17 th century, the natural law theory and its outgrowths described above were becoming well established in the legal, political and moral ethos of Western Europe. This liberal intellectual trend had a significant impact on the political thinking of the whole of the Western world. Philosophers such as Grotius, Hobbes and Locke worked in consonance with the expanding theory of natural law to create the doctrine of individual rights that is evident today. Their work concentrated on prominent political concerns of era, such as the liberation of the individual from absolute tyranny and the emancipation of human reason from religious and social dogma. 48 1.3.4 18 th and 19 th Century Europe The Industrial Revolution in Europe simultaneously acted as a catalyst to the culmination of feudal social structures and the genesis of industry-based capitalism. During the 18 th century, Immanuel Kant Jean-Jacques Rousseau 49 were the predominant philosophers who fine-tuned the notion of rights through their theories based on rationalism. It is in their hands that idea natural rights metamorphosed into political liberalism, of which the focal point was the theory of individualism. 46 Roshwald, bove n27, 371. 47 . 48 Ernest Csir Th Pilosphy ofte Enlightenmt (Princeto University Pres, Nw Jersy, 197). 49 Mauric Wransto Nble Savg: Jean-Jacqus Rosau, 1754?1762 (nivrsity ofChicago Pres, hgo, 19). 18 Rousseau?s seminal work, The Social Contract 50 (1762) describes a man?s relationship with society in a more modern and conditional contractarian idiom than Hobbes in particular, but also Locke, had done a century earlier across the English Channel. Rousseau contended that the institutions of law and codes of morals were prerequisites in societies, for in absence of law society will degenerate into a state of chaos. Rousseau, though an ardent follower the natural law school, articulated rights in terms of the ?general will? of the society. Rousseau's perspective on legislation mirrored many other philosophers throughout history, contending that the quest for common good might not always be the best resolution for all concerned. Rousseau relentlessly queried the postulate that will of the majority ? the common good ? is always accurate one, and he contended that objective of government should be to assure freedom, equality, justice for all within the state, despite the will of the majority. Rousseau endeavoured to make his readers comprehend that when people are compelled to obey, they might do so; but when the people are free of this compulsion to conform and are able so voluntarily, they become true to themselves under the rights of liberty, and they obey even moreso. Rousseau maintained that social order is a sacred right that stands as the basis of all other rights, explaining this right does not come from nature but must be founded upon conventions. 51 The philosophical writings about, and the ideas of, the social contract, which restrained the powers of government on basis of morally prior rights of the governed who alone could surrender their sovereignty, inspired the American Declaration of Independence (1776) That Declaration entoned: ?[W]e hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.? 52 This revolutionary fervour had its impact in Europe. The Declaration the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in France on 26 August 1789 spoke in the same idiom rights when it proclaimed: ?Men are born and remain free 50 Jean-cques Roseau ?The SocialContract? nd Other Latr Politcal Writngs (Cambridge Uivrsity Pr,Cmbridg,203). 51 Dobins Jy GrvsItrduig Politcal Pilsphy (In Boks, 203). 52 The cmpletxtoftheDclaion fIepndenbe foudat <tp:/w.aricanrvluti.m/DclartifIpdc.m> (cesd 16May 206) 19 and equal in rights?.? 53 The influence of the idea of a social contract between the people and the state was so deep-rooted that the Declaration of Independence proclaimed that, ?to secure these rights [Life, Liberty and the Pursuit Happiness], the Governments are instituted among Men? and the French Declaration contained words: ?whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it.? 54 The violence of the French Revolution and the anxiety amongst conservative elements in the Old World that the ideas of natural rights were ?too egalitarian and subversive? 55 resulted in these being viewed with scepticism in Britain by the end of the 18 th century. This general discontent was manifested by the universal rejection of natural law principles by British legal scholars. Philosophers such as David Hume (1711?1776), 56 and later Jeremy Bentham (1748?1832) 57 and John Austin (1790?1859), claimed that strict adherence to those principles would lead to social upheavals, and these thinkers sought to explore alternatives to the natural rights theory. According to Freeman, Bentham found the theory of natural rights to be defective in many respects. 58 Natural rights theory did not clearly specify the ambit of a specific right, and the claim that everyone was bestowed with equal rights was not tenable, for the natural rights theory itself did not recognize the rights of women, blacks and poor. Bentham maintained that rights could only be derived from 53 Declartion fthe Rigts ofMand ofthe Citzen Article 1 <htp:/w.yal.du/laweb/vl/rigs.m>(asd6 May 206). 54 MSrh Ris inct Ptcl Pilopy ilan,NewYork,1935), repint of194 quoted inosl,ov 27,3. 55 cal Frema HuaRights: anIterdisclinar Aproch (Plity res, Cambridg, 20) 25?27 (n). 56 Hudi ot ply rejct e ids ofaturl w orthe sial ntrac th ine consierabllicauny.Hwver,Hme'sATaiofHumNure:BgaAtmpt o itc th exrmtl Mtho fRsnig t Mrl Sbjects (1739?40), whic riculaed h dsof?utily?, leras relid byJryBnthinhlaortin oftonetf utilarin. SasoDvbnsaud Groves Iroduig PcalPilspy (I Boks, 203) 57 etow fr his des utilrism, Jery ntham tk the positn th laws mut be crad ntebaofratiny. He jctdhabiguyofnuralw. Bedvocadfor inviuld cnmc o,fro fxprs, ed igts,dt blitn fslvy orpuishetfr l. is thrylw nd rihtswlce inhsoca r dilemas f19 th try Egandi sefctby avoy fortrgt divrce adfor fr td,nbiscouremt oftida ofe sprtinhu ase. SJWlen ()Nose upo tl:Bth,Burk, nMrxnth Rgs fMn(thun,Lo, 1987) 35?40. 58 Frman, bve n56, 28. 20 positive law, and the content and that the ambit of a right should be defined in accordance with principle of utility. 59 As a result, the general incompatibility of the natural law theory with the sociopolitical exigencies of 18 th century caused its relegation to secondary position against the theory utilitarianism during the political reforms of both Britain and France. The rapid industrialization of Europe in the 18 th and 19 th century created new political and social issues, such as urban poverty and the issue of the rights of the industrial labour force, which the natural law theory did not address. Karl Marx, writing from the 1840s onward, critiqued the of natural rights on the distinct basis that ?the so-called rights of man ... are only the rights of the member of civil society, is, of egoistic man, man separated from other men and from the community.? 60 Marx continued that, ?[t]his bourgeois conception of rights ignored the fundamental importance of labour, production and wealth to human wellbeing.? 61 Therefore, to Marx, the bourgeois system represented a process that alienated man from nature, from himself and his own active functioning and stripped him of ?his human essence?. Marx asserted that Communism is the ?actual phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and recovery?. 62 As much as Marx denounced so-called bourgeois concept of rights, however, he had no alternative theory to substitute, a fact which remained a highly significant shortcoming in his political theory, especially in the context of the subsequent abuse of power by the Communist states at the cost of their citizens. 63 59 CB Welch Liberty and Utily:TheFrnch Ideolgues and the ransformatin ofliberalism (olumbiaUnvsiPres,Nw Yok, 1984)3?194. 60 Kr Mrx d Fick EglsOtJwis Qsti Colctd wrks Vl I(trntioal Plishe,NwYor, 1976)2 (Marx nd Egle). 61 Ibd. 62 RanirSngh Reasn, Revoluti Politcal Thory (Peopl?s Publishng House, Nw Delhi, 1976) 21?218. 63 Frem, abov 56, 20. 21 1.3.5 Further Evolution, Export and Internationalization of Western Human Rights into the 20 th Century Sociopolitical issues which today would be classified as human rights issues continued to trouble both Western Europe and elsewhere throughout the latter part of the 19 th century and the 20 th century. Chief among them was the institution of slavery, whose abolition was attempted through two international treaties of 1890 and 1892. 64 Though not explicitly citing a violation of human rights, the anti-slavery movement drew inspiration from natural rights discourse and eventually was naturally incorporated into the discourse of human rights through the UDHR in 1948. 65 The negative social impacts of the rapid industrialization of Europe were emerging during the latter part of the 19 th century, and the labour unions advocated for better working conditions, laws that guaranteed the right to strike, and regulations that controlled the use of child labour. It was against this background that the International Labour Organization (ILO) 66 founded in 1919 with a mandate to create a code of international labour standards. Originally as an affiliated institution of the League Nations, and now as a part of the United Nations, the ILO has worked with governments, employees and management for better work conditions and employment relations. Many of the issues handled by the ILO, such as negotiation of better workers? rights, higher wages, more favourable working conditions, trade union rights, health and safety standards, safeguards on female and child labour, and social security have strong human right connotations and draw inspiration from the rights?ofman discourse of the 18 th and 19 th centuries. 64 In1926 the Slavery Convetionwasformulated ner th aegis ofthe Lague ofNations ad over 30starifdit.Th tiplt htsirywldrkwr elimg lorms flary. DvdWisbro At-Slv Intrtinl Ablishg Slry nd tsContepayFos(Unite Natn, ewYrkand Gea,20) <hp:/w.tislver.g/hmpg/rsurcs/isbot%20rpotfial%20editon%203. pdf> (acsd 16M 206). 65 TeUniveralDclartionfHuan Rihts ates hat ?N ne shal behld inslvry servitude; slvry th sve d shal beprobedinlirfom?(Art.4) <htp:/w.uorg/Orview/rigts.ml> (csd 17Mr 206 66 For anistical unt s <:/w.ilorg/public/english/about/history.htm> (acesd 10 My206). 22 The above analysis further supports the position that the evolution of the theory of rights in Western history was at each stage moulded by the sociopolitical and religious concerns of the time. The theories of reformulation of the political social structures Western world were a direct result sociopolitical turmoil and failure of feudal rulers to respect the principles of liberty, equality and human dignity. The fear of tyrannical rule formed foundation for the ideas of the rights of individuals against the excesses of state power. Significant milestones, such as the Magna Carta accepting idea the rights of ?the people? vis-?vis the ruler, were a covert means of legitimizing rule the feudal powerholders. The maturing of these ideas through the centuries in particular historical, cultural, political and social contexts, imbued them with certain inalienable characteristics, which were compatible with the ethical and moral values of Western civilization. The idea of rights, which constituted the core of the 18 th and 19 th century struggles against political absolutism in Europe and North America, was revived in another context by the nascent struggles for independence from colonial rule Latin America, Asia and Africa. The most significant among them in this context was the Quit India Movement 67 ?the struggle for Purna Swaraj (independence) by Indian National Congress under the leadership of M K Gandhi commencing in 1918. 68 The struggle was fuelled by disenchantment of the Indians with the colonial rule and its systematic violation of civil liberties and political rights. 69 International efforts to create normative standards that enhance human rights and preserve human dignity in the early 20 th century can be traced in a different articulation to the League of Nations. Article 22 of the League?s Covenant, relating to the people of colonies and territories that had lost their sovereignty due to the war, stipulated that colonial rulers must honour ?the principle that the well-being and 67 The Quit India Movemnt wasoficaly unched on9 Augst 1942 and ws charteizd bythe defintveorgz v disobifrtheimeditiepn fomBrian. How, th it fr idepneh alg isy. BChr Ii's Strugl f Ipdce 1857?1947(Pgui Bks,Ini, 198). 68 Jarla Neru Discovry fIa (MrdBoks Ltd, New Dli, 195). 69 Anil SeThe EmgenndiNtioalism: Cpeionadoabrtion the Latr Ntth Cntry (Cabrige Uversy Pre, abrg, 1968). 23 development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization.? 70 With little success, an effort to protect the rights of minorities was also undertaken during the 1920s by the League of Nations, precursor to the United Nations. 71 A result of Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the League of Nations? mandate was the prevention of war through collective security, pacific settlement of disputes between states through negotiation, and the promotion of global welfare. 72 However, its constituting documents made no reference to rights and were concerned exclusively with inter- state relations. 1.4 Antecedents and Alternatives to Human Rights Discourse in Ancient South Asia: An Overview The following section traces the conceptual evolution of notions of humanism, justice and equity in South Asia. As in West, early articulations political philosophy were intrinsically interwoven with religious values in the Indian subcontinent. 73 While the above analysis indicates that the rights doctrine evolved in Western Europe as a tool against absolutist rulers, parallel conceptual thinking Asian political and religious philosophy was articulated more in terms of humanism, munificence and a sense of duty of protection by the rulers towards the people. 74 The evolution of a concise political theory based on the sense of duty of the ruler towards the ruled, the refinement of the ideas of humanism in governance, or a theory of rights based on South Asia?s own cultural or religious identities, did not arrive at its logical culmination in Asia, owing to the interruption from colonialism. Several centuries of external political domination instead bequeathed the legacy of liberal democracy that had evolved in a different sociopolitical and cultural context, which is 70 Leagu ofNations Cvenat Article2 avilbe at <htp:/w.yle.du/lwb/von/gco.htm>(cesd 7May 206). 71 PTrnbr Itrtiol L ad t Ris fMinorit(ClrendoPres, Oxford, 19) 38? 54. 72 FWalters AHistry fthe gue ofNatins (Oxfrd Uivrsity rs, Lnd, 65). 73 or diacounIdian PhilsphcltoughtsePT Raju?TheWsterandIian Philsphcl Trdits? (1947)i Reviw 127?5. 74 AenixB. 24 partially imbued into the sociopolitical mores of the subcontinent. 75 In contrast, Western political philosophy?s exposition rights doctrine enjoyed ?much greater opportunities ? to receive fuller consideration, articulation, and eventual implementation?, 76 and the contemporary human rights regime worldwide is the culmination of that process. 1.4.1 The Influence of Major Subcontinental Religions As the following paragraphs elaborate, in ancient India religion performed a legitimizing function in state affairs, for ?[t]he imagination, the minds, and the hearts of the people of the subcontinent were profoundly shaped by religion ? so it was natural that any traditional ruler in search of legitimizing credentials would turn to religion.? 77 The Hindu Vedas, the hymns and prayers of circa 1200 BC, defined social relations between the King and the people. It was during the Vedic period that the complex social organization based on caste evolved in India. The Brahmins were at apex of the structure, followed by the kshastriya (warriors). The vaishya (traders) occupied the middle social strata, followed by the sudras (the dalits, or untouchables). Malhotra explains the reasons as to why social or political ?equality could not develop at the empirical level? during the Vedic period: 78 ? the anciet Indias could nt devlop the conept of scial and political equality bcusof their faithinthectrin ofkarma, th ateytem the vriationsof th piritul levl iffrt prs. Th dtrinf karmaimliest whtevr estatu anindividul hold inietyisthe rsult opast de, and oe must ungrdingly cept is station life anplay his rcoringly, sincth spiritul merit lies nintheaturofwrkrfmedbt in th spirit hic it is performed. Therefore early religious manifestations during the Vedic period did not promote ideas of social equality but advocated concepts of humanism and human dignity 75 The problems tha ste from thispartil nteralizton are discued inthis capter. 76 Laun avn5,6. 77 RlBltjs ?Idi: Rlign, Politcl Lgitmcy, th Slar Ste? (1986) 43 Anals of theAric AaeyofPtcald Siaen93?10,94.tbURL: <p:/lnks.jtor.g/sic?i=0216%281960%248C3%AIPT%E2.0 CO%B2- K (aed 17Jul 206)> (Bultjens). 78 Shi LalMhtra?TheSocia dPolitcal Orientaios fNeo-Vdantism? (196) Philosphy Est nWst 6?8, 75(Mltr). 25 within the constraints of the social strata, similar to the ideas of ?separate but equal? policies of racially divided America in the 20 th century. Baxter et al. observe that, ?[d]espite repeated attacks on the caste system by subsequent reform oriented social and religious movements, it still exists in India and has a strong impact on socio political behaviour of Hindus.? 79 This is primarily due to the religious sanction extended to the social organization during the Vedic period and subsequently in Hinduism. As ideas of constitutional structures and popular democratic mandates had not evolved, the ?[r]eligious sanction was probably the only credential widely agreed upon by everyone in society?. 80 1.4.1.1 Hinduism Indian religious history provides numerous examples to support the premise that the subcontinent had a rich culture of honouring humanist values and human dignity and accommodating cultural diversity and pluralism within governance. Before the delineation of the main subcontinental religions of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism and Islam, which all expound tolerance and compassion, the Indian epics of Mahabaratha 81 and Ramayana 82 elaborated on the ideas of human dignity, justice and fairness. Both epics depict the intellectual articulations of the ancient Indian religious, philosophical and ethical thinking and contain commentaries on issues that would today be considered as prerequisites of governance. For instance, Ramayana 2.67.31 79 Craig Bxter tal GovernmtandPolitcs inSouth Asia (Westviw Pres, Colard, 201) 3, 5 ?90. 80 ultjns, abov n78. 81 oig18Chapters,Mabhrta dtes from cira 1,952 BC (se Mohan Gupta Mhabrtka Kal-Nry:, Vis-idyl-Pkhn,Cwk,Vnsi-221001).Itisrefrdos te pic depictn thetor fIn d isof is philsophcl ad rligu gicn.T rlvi pestcotextreptan fetimoastnpts. S Jhn L BokigtoTheSakri Epis (Lin, Nerlds,198); EWshbr HokieGratEpic of Inda (Chrles cribn'sSn,w York1902). 82 mpittuted othe lgday ptValmik nthe 4 th cntury BC thug itsxitne i theorl do isacira1,50 BCrbefor. Tepic,wi hasondac elmt, cnaisthe ctry fRm tvth gdisu ad St,iwife, wsbduc byh d kngRavn.WshburnHopkins?T OrnlRyn? (1926)4Jurl ofth AmericOritl Societ 20?219. 26 states, ?[n]o soul is peaceful in a state without a ruler. In such a state men exploit one another like fish who swallow each other.? The epics describe the primary protector of the social organization of ancient India as kshatriya the warrior who protected people from kshat or unhappiness. The essential characteristics of a ruler, according to Mahabaratha, were bravery, courage, vigilance, charity, and the ability to display prowess and not retreat from battle (Mahabaratha 6.42.43). A legitimate ruler was invested with the duty to protect all beings (Mahabaratha 12.120.3) and had to foster the righteous and destroy those who were cruel (Mahabaratha 12.14.16). 83 These ethical guidelines extracted from the two epics denote the existence of acceptable standards of conduct for persons who wielded political power, which in turn demarcated the existence of the idea of a social contract, albeit in embryonic form, between the people and the ruler in ancient Indian political discourse. Hinduism, 84 the main religion of the subcontinent, evolved from the Vedic traditions and advocates concepts Ahimsa (non-violence) and respect for all forms of life ?both human and animal? as well as piety, prayer the notion of personal sacrifice. 85 Hinduism was inherently devoid of egalitarian qualities for it sanctioned the process of social demarcation based on birth (the caste system), but paradoxically it advocated tolerance of other religious traditions and faiths as a fundamental tenet. For instance, Rig Veda asserts, ?ekam sat vipr? bahudh? vadanti?p: ?Truth is One, but sages call it by many names.? 86 The early expositions of human dignity and freedom are also to be found in the Vedas. 87 concept of rita (supreme order) cited in the Vedas is similar to the notion of natural law and denotes freedom and human rights, for it represents ?both satya or the truth of things, as well as dharma or the law of evolution.? 88 Rita in this sense denotes ?the law that governs the universe, 83 Mahbrat (Kaml Subramni (tr),Bhartiy Vida Bhvan, ombay, 1982). 84 Hinduis,heoldstreigo ithewold n w90milo dertsevoldaround 10?700 BC. <tp:/w.n.c/Rligs_Adernts.>(c Jn 07). 85 ALals T Wr ta s Inia (Grv P, New Yrk, 1954)31. 86 Rig Ved1:64:.<hp:/.trojyt.co/sriptursidx.ht(acesd 2May 206). 87 Ths re ancient Hidu ?A relig la consig ofhymn,chntsdprayes datin from,50? BC.SeJChatjWsdmftheV (QuetBks Ii,19). 88 Sdakish Ti Viw ofLi (Unwi Boks, Eglad,1963) 5. 27 law that operates in ritual and sacrifice and the law that, with equal impartiality, regulates the conduct of human beings.? 89 Similarly to Buddhism, the superiority of dharma forms the basis of Hinduism, and is defined as ?implying enjoyment particular rights or fulfilment of certain obligations, individual and collective, with a moral and a spiritual sense duty towards others or towards the society in general. To dharma, both the King and the people owed allegiance. It was a powerful motive for restraining wilful exercise of sovereign authority by the King. In fact, the Hindu-Buddhist political theory vests sovereignty on dharma.? 90 The notion of dharma being superior to the edicts of the King parallels the notion of natural law in Western tradition as articulated by Locke. In terms of the individual, dharma stipulated that individuals were entrusted with certain duties regarding others within the social organization and had to follow the stipulations of dharma in their actions, which would result in a better life. The concept permeates both public and private life for it ?gives coherence and direction to different activities of life ? It is the complete rule of life, the harmony of the whole man who finds a right and just law of his living. Each man and group, each activity of soul, mind, life body, has its dharma.? 91 This South Asian value of social behaviour can be equated to the notion of duty as opposed to rights. Nehru explained: ?If a man did his duty and was ethically right in his actions, the right consequences would always follow. Rights as such were not emphasized ? this outlook stands out in marked contrast with the modern assertion of rights rights of individuals, of groups and of nations.? 92 Values of tolerance of plurality, compassion and non-violence formed the basis of dharma, which is nevertheless compatible with the discourse of contemporary human rights, and were the fundamental tenets that fashioned the subcontinent?s political and 89 Lal-dhoj Desa Ri ?Human RightsDevlopment iAnciet Npal? (198) 3HQR 37?46. 90 Ibi. 91 SRkrisn Ester lio and Wstr Thougt (Lodn, 3) 5. 92 JNehu Te icovyfInd(MeriBkstd,ewDlhi1970 28 cultural tradition. 93 These values were not limited to the realms of religion or to individual conduct alone but rather frequently utilized to elaborate on the fundamentals of good governance by the Kings (rajadharma). 94 ?The King was far more than merely the political head of State,? 95 for he was entrusted with the well-being of entire kingdom and its people. This implied that the kingdom was held in trust by the kings for the benefit of the people. 96 It has also been observed that in this context revolt or rebellion against tyrannical or oppressive kingship was justified. 97 In this sense, the Hindu sociopolitical culture that governs the lives of the people is founded on an amalgamation of notions of freedom, pluralism, common good (in contrast to the values of utilitarianism) and good conscience (the multifaceted notion of dharma). Corti elaborates on the disjuncture between rights and freedoms, and , thus: ?The peoples of Asia neither understand nor desire freedom in our sense of the word, as we understand it. Truth, humanity and liberty belong inseparably together. We ourselves must constantly bear this interdependence in mind.? 98 93 Arvind Sharm Hinduism and Huan Rights: AConceptual Aproach (Oxford University Pres, 204). 94 Rajr is coept ofgverce draw frm Vdi lteru (Rig Vea Athar Vda) whic sbaednthduis th Kingtosthelfarofh pol.Thsnceof econept tutis f Kn tmai sil r, protc t land mitr justi. Governtreoxpresd etayintsfedutis fteruls.SMhal (d) The Ccpt ofRajdha (SuPrksh, New Dlhi, 205). 95 JhWSlmn Plitcl Thoy fAcitIdia:ASty ofKingship fro earlist imes tocira 30AD (reores,Oxfrd,1964) 21. 96 ?Tebids tha flyi t ain tewildanimls th el ite jules v th s rights you,O grKing,tvwhervhy sh orawrvhywi.Telandbelone plft cour nd tol tr bigtibit ,hil o ar nl itsguri? Arat Mahind, sfAshkaMaunEper KngDeanmpitsofSrLk c250?1 BC fou ark iript iPloaruw,asquotd iNil Jyckrm The Jdilplicton Hm RigtsLw: Nn, Regil nd Ierurisden(Cabrge Universy Pres, Cbrde, 20)v. 97 Thaathproidestha t pol ca rvolt aginst yraicl poitcl adrs. S Lal- dojDs i ?Humn gDvelmentiAnieNpl?(198)3HRQ 37?46. 98 WR rtTerlft iidu ih Idlcl Strue ofut Time?inToyHgen (d) Nepal(Oxfod a IBM Publcty Co,NwYork, 196)25. 29 1.4.1.2 Buddhism Like Hinduism, Buddhism 99 evolved from a common spiritual and philosophical heritage through dhamma. 100 Buddhism promotes the idea of controlling the mind to overcome actions that are violent and evil. 101 Buddhist philosophy exalts virtues of non-violence and the sanctity of life. 102 The essence of Buddhism is to lead a virtuous, restrained peaceful life based on the madyama prathipadhawa 103 (middle way) with the aim of ending all suffering in life and attaining the ultimate liberation, termed nibbhana. 104 The flourishing of Buddhism amidst orthodox Hindu political and religious culture circa 585 BC is seen by some as a response to the social injustices that prevailed in Indian society at that time, particularly the oppressive caste system and the low status accorded to women. 105 Buddhism, in contrast, articulated respect for all living beings, which included women 106 and 99 Religous philosphy ofGautmBudha cir 5 th century BC. 100 Dham(Pa) rd (Snskrit) enotshtr,spitality orthe naturl aw inboth Budist nd Hiueligsphilopy.A pr wo lv nsgwiDhmsain te Mok(i)or Nvan (udst) atfligtenmt.I ti ctx dets virts utfl idre cilonduct. S RadhkrsaIndiaPilosphyVol.1 (CenaryRevs E, OUP,Ia,196). 101 ?1. id prcalmntl st. Mis their cief; ty re lmi-wrugt. Ifwit an impurson pekorcuferngfolwsmlikth tha folshe of the ox. 2.Mind recds altal ste. id sthir cief; thy are lind-rugt. Ifit apur mind a persopkorcts hpinfolwmlksnv-dptg shaow.?No1The Dhma (VenNrd tr,Cb Apotari Co. Lt, 1972). 102 ?If ersdsty lifeisa huter,ses hwihblod, isengd inklig and woundig, iomrcltods livng bi,e, as reut fhkli,he bormogst ak wlbesht livd.? NrMahTra BudnHis Tacs (Acite Nespersf CynL,Clmb, 1972) 309. 103 ?Th midla iscoer yPerfctOne vois bth es xtrems; itgves ion, itgvs knolg, n itledt pac,to di aquitace,dicovy,o niba. ndwhasa ide way?Ismlyhnblghtflph, ist a, rigt w,rhtiti; rit spch,rit cio, rigt ive; ri efortigmnfules,iht cero.Ts he mil dsvedbaPrfctOn,wic ves io, whic vesknoldg, and iclads to ea,t irt aquint, odisvry,tniba."GatBuda frm th Dhckpt St<htp:/.astsig.r/ipt/s56/s.01.th.tml> (csd 17Jn 208) 104 PetrHaveyAItroductin toBudhism: Techins, Hitory and Prcties (Cabridge Univsi Prs, 19). 105 NlSwiBuhism,Ha Rigts an Soial Rewl (Asi Human Rights omison, ogKn, 20) and Sn MurcoTheFirtBudhist Women:Trsltiodetari the Triath(PbGropWest, 19). 106 Bd Fure Th wr fDial: udism, Prity, ad Gr (Pincet Univrsity Prs, 203) 1?51. 30 animals, and Buddhist philosophy sought social reform through attempts at social assimilation of the marginalized lower castes and the granting of equal recognition to women within the sanga (Buddhist priesthood). 107 Gender equality was a basic tenet of Buddhism as, ?[t]he Buddha saw the spiritual potential of both men and women and founded, after considerable hesitation, the Order of Bhikkhunis or Nuns, one of the earliest organizations for women. The Sasana, or Church, consisted of the Bhikkhus (Monks), Bhikkhunis (Nuns), laymen and laywomen so that the women were not left out of any sphere of religious activity.? 108 Buddha?s teachings were not restricted to the spiritual well-being of individuals, according to Walpola Rahula Thero, for Buddhist scriptures articulated duties of Kingship which maintained that a just King would be liberal, generous and charitable. The qualities of a King also included the practice of non-violence and the ability to sacrifice one?s self for the benefit of community. 109 Several analogies between Buddhist teachings and contemporary rights discourse can be drawn. 110 Jayawickrama observes that Buddha encouraged the idea of travel amongst his disciples so that the word of the could bring welfare and happiness to many; intrinsic in this is idea that Buddha promoted freedom of movement. 111 Citing another similarity with rights discourse, Jayawickrama observes that Mahaparinibbanasutta (a Buddhist sermon) states that the people must assemble frequently and peacefully and transact business peacefully. 112 Buddhism was advocated as a way of life that had universal validity. Norms advocated in the Buddhist philosophy were based on rationality and the followers were encouraged to follow the Buddhist way of life only after rational deliberation. 107 ?To this day the galitrn ethosfBudhism apels tohe marginlzed comunites iIndia. Budm'plforw-casHi? Mony,5Nvb201, <tp:/news.bc.uk/2hi/ut_sa/163924.st> (csd 3My206). 108 LS Darj The Pstn ofWme iBudhiThe WelPublicatonN280, Budhist Publicto ity,Kady,198) . 109 The ndus of ig (asrja dhra) inalpo Ral Ther Wht e a tgt (GrFraeGler,Bfo, 67)85. 110 P mstas th cnetivy betw Budhist rincpls and t Univrsl Declrtion f HuanRight; LPNra udhsmandHan Rg(KrueaSo,Comb, 19). 111 Nil Jyawickr T Jil Aplicto fm ihts Lw: Ntil Rginal d Itertol uspdenc(Cbrige UversityPres,20)12. 112 bid. 31 Such requirements would be regarded in the contemporary human rights discourse as respect for the right to freedom of thought and expression. 113 1.4.1.3 Islam Islam, as a religious force that impacted on the political and cultural ethos of India, commenced with the Delhi Sultanate, circa 1211 AD, before the formal establishment of the Mogul Empire in 1526 AD. 114 Owing to Arabian traders, relations between Arabia and the Asian subcontinent were long-established even before the advent of Islam. The initial Islamic rule of the subcontinent was violent and repressive for it was essentially an invasion to plunder and control. 115 The Muslim rule was based on the laws of the Qur'and Sharia 116 (Islamic law) but the humanist qualities that are essence of Islamic law were not evident at these initial stages in South Asia. Because of repeated invasions by the Arabs, the notion that Islam was a destructive and violent force was fairly well-embedded in Hindu psyche, as illustrated by the observation by Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister: ?The impact of invaders from the north-west and of Islam on India had been considerable. It had pointed out and shone up the abuses that had crept into Hindu society ? the petrification of caste, untouchability, and exclusiveness carried to fantastic lengths.? 117 The establishment of the Mogul Empire by Babur in 1526 brought a systematic administration to the occupied territory based on Islamic traditions and law. 118 Both the Qur?an and Sharia laws spring from the desire to create a society based on the type of moral responsibility and justice that would enhance human dignity. 119 Malik 113 Baidynath Lb ?Human Rightsinte Budhist Perspctive? inBP.Singh (ed) Human Rights in In(DepdDepPblicto, NwDl, Ina,195) 24. 114 Crig xtr tal. GoveradPoitcsiSout Asia(Wstiw rs, 201) 6?8, 2527. 115 WluanAril unt The Stry fCvlzinEton Pre,19). 116 On the oris d pmfhistria dersdigf shari, see "Abdulahi Amed An-Naim"TwanIslic Roratin: lLbti, HumaRitndIterntioLw ( Edtn, Syrcue Uversity Pes,196) ch 2. 117 Jhleh Diso fIndi (MridaBoks td, New Dlhi, 195) 218. 118 KS La T Lgaf MuslimRulIn (New DliAityaPrkasn,) 119 MIlik? Cnceptf Ha ightsiIlmicJurspnc? (8) 3HRQ 56?7 (Malik). 32 further asserts that the ?Muslim jurists regarded human rights as an integral part of faith,? 120 and therefore during the Mogul Empire, especially during the reign Akbar, 121 religious tolerance and freedom to follow one?s own religion was vigorously advocated. Akbar?s reign was marked by this general ethos of equality and tolerance, which resulted in a revival of Hindu literature and arts as well as philosophical debates between Islam, Hinduism and Jainism. 122 Similar to the Hindu and Buddhist philosophical ethos, ?[j]ust ? and accountable ? government has long been considered a desideratum in Islamic political and religious thought. The Qur'an states that the righteous ?inherit the earth?, righteous in this case referring to the morally upright rather than members of any privileged confessional community. A righteous and just leader ruling by at least the tacit consent of the people and liable to being deposed for unrighteous conduct remained the ideal for most Muslims through much of the Middle Ages ?? 123 The early Islamic concept of shura refers to public consultation, which can include matters of governance, and to public affairs, and it is similar to the concepts of democratic governance that evolved centuries later in Western Europe. However, the emergence of political absolutism in the Arab region stifled the evolution of shura into a sustained ideology. Asserting values of religious pluralism, Qur?anic teachings indicate that a person?s faith is a matter between himself and God and that all persons have the freedom to choose their faith. 124 Several comparable notions between Islam and contemporary human rights discourse can be discerned. The Qur?an contains values of equality between people and equality before the law, freedom of religion, the right to hold property, freedom of the person and freedom of expression. These humanistic and tolerant facets, which were inherent in early manifestations of Islam, held a special attraction to the socially marginalized 120 Malik, bove n120. 121 RuerfthMughalEmpire fo 156 until 1605. 122 Amy S T AruntaivIndia:WrgsonIdian History, Cultre and Ietiy (Pengui, Lond,205)39?42,87?293. 123 sa fsrudin olerc Diersity nIslam (20) Peac loqy <htp:/w.e/~kinst/olqu/2/fetur_fsarudin.shtm>(acesd2 June 206). 124 Mlik, bov 120. 33 communities (untouchables) in India, which helps explain the religion?s rapid establishment in the region. 1.4.2 Human Rights and Early South Asian Political Philosophy The earliest articulations of justice, equity and good governance in Indian political philosophy are found in the Arthashastra 125 or the Science of Economics, compiled by Kautilya, a Minister Court of the Mauryan Emperor Chandragupta circa 321 BC. It is often alleged that his work exalts stringency in governance and intolerance, but Sen draws attention to another aspect less often highlighted. Sen explains, ?First, Kautilya is a consequentialist of quite a narrow kind. While the objectives of promoting the happiness of the subjects and the order in the kingdom are strongly backed up by detailed policy advice, the King is seen as a benevolent autocrat, whose power, albeit to do good, is to be maximized through proper organization.? 126 His treatise on the essence of effective governance included issues such as the impartiality of judges similar to a contemporary code of conduct for the judiciary, saying, ?judges and magistrates shall not impose a fine when it is not prescribed, impose a fine which is higher or lower that the prescribed one, award physical punishment when it is not prescribed.? 127 The Arthashastra presents ideas and suggestions on such practical subjects as famine prevention and administrative effectiveness that remain relevant even today ? and ?at the same time advises the King about how to get his way, if necessary through the violation of the freedom of his adversaries.? 128 Despite the essential non-egalitarian flavour in his treatise, he emphasizes that the duty of King is to ?provide the orphans, the aged, the infirm, the afflicted, and helpless with maintenance,? along with providing ?subsistence to helpless women when they are carrying and also to the 125 LN Rangrjan (ed) Kautily:TheArtashtra (Pengui Boks, New Dlhi, 192); se also RP KaleTh KutilyArthsr (Moil Bnidsblsher,India197). 126 S (197)bov 5. 127 Artastra4917,8 quted iicheli Isay History fHumn Rights from Anciet Times ohe Gllizton Era(Unvrsty ofCaforniPre,Bkel, 204)9 128 Sn,bvn 127. 34 [newborn] children they give birth to.? 129 Kautilya?s observations that the King has a duty to serve the people and foster social welfare are illustrated by following excerpt: ?In happiness of subjects lies his happiness; in their welfare his welfare; what ever pleases him he shall not consider as good, but what ever pleases his subjects he shall consider good.? 130 This also encapsulates the intrinsic relationship between the governor and the governed in ancient Indian politics especially the notion that kingship denotes idea of a ?trustee? of the peoples? well-being rather than a ruler. Sen observes that in the Arthashastra the ?tolerance of heterodoxy? is absent and in that sense Kautilya?s writings do not reflect the values freedom and charity. 131 In this context, Baxter et al. assert: ?There was little of the theoretical basis of politics and political institutions in Hindu India. Unlike ancient Greeks, the ancient Hindus did not develop a formal political philosophy.? 132 Paradoxically, Kautilya?s Arthashastra was not meant to be an exposition on the virtues of freedom, or a treatise on rights, nor was it concerned with theoretical issues of political philosophy. It was rather a manual for effective governance or state-craft, and traces of it are echoed in the modern concept of good governance. The earliest expressions of values of dignity, non-violence and equality in the subcontinent are found in the emperor Ashoka?s Edicts in the third century BC. These Edicts were essentially based on Buddhist strictures to which Ashoka converted after realizing the futility of war. 133 Emperor Ashoka modelled himself on the notion of the ?righteous king? on the basis of Buddhist dharma. 134 His Edicts, erected in four corners of his empire such as at Erragudi, contain the teachings of Buddha that 129 Sen, above nt 127. 130 QutdiSaishKumar?Huan Rights and Econmic Devlopment: The India Trditon? (198) 3 Hm Rgt Qrtely 3. 131 Aartyen?HnRights d Asi Vlues: What L Kua Yw a LPg 't undesd bout Asia? (197)21TheNwpblic3. 132 CrigBxrl.Govermnt a Politcs inSot Asi (estvi Pres, Boulder, 201) 4. 133 Fo ancnt fshka?s ulsMdLegay:Sarch fotOign fCivlzation (Wrldwie,Ldn,19). 134 PMg ?uis.? iPorgan Cwton (ds) Etil Isue iSx Religous Trdits (EdinburhUnivrty res,Edibuh,196)5?98. 35 exalted the virtues of ahimsa, upeksha, mettha, muditha, and karuna (non-violence, kindness, tolerance, empathy and compassion). 135 Edict XII at Erragudi states: 136 ? amn ust not d revnce tohis own sect or disparge that of nther man without rea. Depcatio shouldbfrpificsn oly, bcusesctsof th ple ll sr r as rthr. By th ting, exaltshiswnt, ndt the samtimedoevicto e stsforple. By cting otrariwise, a hurts is wn sct, ndodisrvice tothe scts of othrpele. Fo hwosvrctohis w sct hile ispargine f s llyfrm ttacent to his o, ithinteto enc th slendur f his own sct, in reality by suh codut inflicts the svrst injury o his ow sct. Sen provides other examples from the Edicts 137 relating to marginalized communities such as the forest dwellers, tribal people and the peasantry which support the premise that Ashoka?s theory of governance based on dharma was inspired by religious teachings of the time. Ashoka?s rule was based on values of ?non-injury, restraint, impartiality, and mild behaviour,? which were applicable to all within his empire. 138 He abolished the death penalty 139 and was committed religious pluralism as ?[t]he best traditions of both Buddhism Indian kingship coincided in Ashoka?s declared support for all religions. This support went far beyond passive toleration: he dedicated caves to non-Buddhist ascetics, repeatedly said that Brahmins and renouncers (?ramaa) all deserved respect, and told people never to denigrate other sects but to inform themselves about them.? 140 The influence of Buddhism had fundamentally altered Ashoka?s world view. Justice, equality and humanism formed the core of his political philosophy, which has been described by Romila Thapar thus: ?Buddhism of [Emperor Ashoka's] age was not merely a religious belief; it was in addition a social and intellectual movement at 135 Lord Avebury ?Hman Rights?Nay Dut (1978) Nepal Br Asociatn 25. 136 VenSDhaik Edctof Kin AshokTheWl Pubictn N. 386/7,Budhist Publicat oct,Ky,193). 137 (197)bve n5. 138 Senpits uthatAsoka's ?toleratin ofdiversity? contributed gratly othe scularist ehos if th itlcaliory fIdiwhic slct nCofIni.Hcnrt udrsdig fseclism ntWt Iiasularism, whic st spionf cur fom te nth rto religousmfetio, btetlraeofarfuseligons, nfwic spivlged bythsta. Ary (205)v n12, 34?44. 139 Pilar EdtIV, KRNrn ??k andCpital Puisht?Jurnlf the Royal Asitc Socety,16?24. 140 Rihr Gombrich ?A?oka The Grt? iurh Senviratn (ed) Up?saking ?k nd BudsHistalnd LitrySudes(BdistPublcoScity,Kdy, Sri La,194). 36 many levels, influencing many aspects of society.? 141 The Emperor and his Ministers would make tours of the land every five years to check on the welfare of the subjects. Ashoka had appointed plenipotentiary supervisors termed dharma-mahamatra (ministers of morality) who would regulate the welfare funds, charities and religious affairs. 142 Such sociopolitical organization during the Ashokan era not only denotes governance based on dhamma but also the existence of a highly evolved concept of duty towards the people by the rulers, which is the converse of the rights discourse that evolved in Western Europe; both were essentially mechanisms to rein in the absolutism of the rulers. Notions of fairness and equity were familiar concepts to the rulers of other parts of the subcontinent as well. The Mahawamsa 143 recites story of King Erala fixing a bell at his palace to be rung by his subjects in the event there was a need for justice to be administered by the King. This is perhaps one of the earliest recorded instances where the King ensured universal access to justice. Mechanisms to control monarchical power also existed in South Asia, as Sheth and Nandy observe: 144 ? rules, althoug they di not fen dpe onthe dirct onset ofthe subjct poulations, soghtrinlimachirul thrugamul-ayrdrcrfahry ht acmdte vars itrst a is it sit. T l, wile seig pwer ascifd uthoy,peidover ayeoflpegovrnasntoct. Such governance, though not based on the democratic governing mechanisms as in the West, nevertheless sought legitimacy through the various institutions of the society such as councils of ministers. 145 These councils appear to have wielded considerable power and some are attributed with having the powers of electing the King. Sharma describes the Vedic councils, sabha and samithi, which the sabha 141 Romila Thpar History fIndiaVolume 1(Pngui Boks, 196) 85. 142 D Ksbieculea civzatiof AcetIndia(ViasPublishng House, Nw Delhi, 197)41?48. 143 Achroniclfth istory fSri Lnk. Itvrs th prio frm te coi fKing Vijay in543 BCt e g oKngMahsea(34?61D)andwstenbyMahnmaBudhst mok 6uryD. 144 DL Sht ad Ashi Ndy (s) Multi Vers ofemocra (Sg Pulictos, Deli,196) 4. 145 JonWpelmnPolticalTheoryfAnctIndi :A tudyofKinshp frarst esto cira 30 (Cr rs, Oxd, 1964). 37 ?was a comparatively small council chiefly composed of the most influential members of the community whereas the samithi was a bigger assembly consisting of the Heads Families of Tribes.? 146 The councils wielded considerable political power within the kingdom where decision-making was done on the basis of consultation and consensus. 147 While these structures were perhaps not comparable to the democratic systems of governance that emerged later in Western Europe, ideas of consensual and republican governance did exist the subcontinent as early as 200 AD. The Licchavi Kings 148 ruled their kingdom (present day Nepal) from 200 AD to 900 AD through a system of governance that resembles a contemporary republican system. At the apex of the power structure was a Maharaja who in theory commanded absolute power, but in reality had little impact on the daily lives of the people. The Maharaja was aided by the Amsuvarman (the Prime Minister) and other officials. Though not a theocracy, Licchavi rule was governed by the values of Hindhu-Buddhist principles of dharma. Dharma, which can be equated to collective good and the rule of law among other things, ?was considered to superior the King? 149 formed the fundamental tenet of the ?entire range of Indian thought.? 150 The rituals of governance during the Licchavi rule included purohitas (advisers), which again symbolizes governance by consultation and consensus. 151 The Licchavi rule was also significant for the use of people?s organizations of Panchalis, Gosthis, and the Sangas. These organizations curtailed absolutism, and equally functioned as institutions of the collective will of the people. They were responsible for the formulation and direction of educational, health and religious affairs of the kingdom. 146 JPSharm Republics nAcientIdia c150 BC ?50 BC (EJ ril, 1968) 3. 147 Ibid. 148 TeLicvi Kgs ofVaisl h estblished tir ule inNpal bycira 20 AD. Se Kashint aot n IaAlpun-priodScuptr,TLchv KigsPulshedonsirt.com <hp:/w.sinart.cm/rticles/jay/kings.ml> (asd16Fe 205). 149 Ll-Dhj eo Ri ?H Rights evloenti Anit pal?(1983 HRQ 40(esa). 150 Jon WSplPoltalTorfAcit Id:Stuyofingship fromearlisti to cira30A (Carnd res, Oxd, 1964)8. 151 Mitzel?O the itynthePrsnt Sate ofVeic Tradit iNel? (1976) XV VASUDH (Kmu) 12, 7?4, 35?39 38 The continued existence of some of these institutions in modern Nepal, 152 against the backdrop of the incessant quest for modern democracy, suggests the nexus and compatibility between these institutions and the idea of human rights and freedom, which will be elaborated in Chapter 4 of the present study. 1.4.3 Recent History of Human Rights in South Asia, from the 18 th to the 20 th Century The recent history of the subcontinent has been dominated by struggles for independence from British as well as a struggle within against the repressive features of subcontinental culture. Agitators for independence, such as Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore and Nehru, drew both inspiration and legitimation from the ancient Hindu philosophical teachings as well as 18 th century Enlightenment rights rhetoric. Social reformers like BR Ambedkar and Ram Mohan Roy likewise relied on egalitarian religious traditions such as both Buddhism and Hinduism. 153 Roy, the ?Hindu Unitarian?, synthesized other religions including Christianity and Islam into his vision. 154 Roy is also regarded as a pioneer of the revival of the Vedantic philosophy in the 19 th century, for he claimed that, ?monotheism, as expounded in the Upanishads, represented the true religion of the Hindus. For him it not only constituted India?s national religion but furnished basis for a universal religion that embraced all worshippers of God irrespective of national and denominational peculiarities.? 155 He condemned idol worship, polygamy, the immolation of widows, and, like Tagore, he advocated equal educational opportunities. As Buultjens observes, ?[t]he great Indian nationalists of the nineteenth century were not only political figures, but also religious revivalists or reformers. Most of them saw the liberation of India in both political and religious terms. Their close association with religion helped to legitimize their nationalist 152 Deosa, bove n150, 46. 153 Bultj 78 154 CA yl ?Ramohan Roy and the Advnt ofCnstiuonal Liberalism inIdia, 180?3? (207) 4ModernItectul 25-41;Mlr,abe79. 155 alh, bv79. 39 aspirations in the public mind.? 156 The bells of social equality and non-discrimination that had tolled Western Europe and America were echoed in the comprehensive rights charter in the Independent Constitution of India. Article 17 of the Constitution, abolishing untouchability, perhaps epitomizes reform of Indian social structures through advocacy of equal human rights. 157 The architect the Article, and Chairman of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, himself a dalit, was BR Ambedkar. 158 Ambedkar?s education in America and England exposed him to egalitarian rights discourse. He also revived the egalitarian features of the Indian socioreligious culture, particularly Buddhism, after centuries Hindu domination. This religious aspect was no mere add-on, for Ambedkar realized Constitutional stipulation alone would not alter deeprooted religious and cultural biases. 159 The author Tagore 160 viewed himself as made up of ?a confluence of three cultures: Hindu, Mohammedan, and British.? 161 His writings were non-sectarian and liberal, and his political outlook reflected a similar universalist approach: British imperialism was not a primary evil, but a ?political symptom of our social disease.? [emphasis added] 162 Tagore bravely defied nationalism?s violent overtones that engulfed India in the guise of the freedom struggle in the late 19 th century and, in the words of Isaiah Berlin, he ?condemned romantic over-attachment to the past, what he called the tying of India to the past ?like a sacrificial goat tethered a post?.? 163 His own words in, 156 Bultjens, above n78. 157 ?Aric17AlitofUntuchabilty ??Untouchabilty? isabolished an itspractie nay form is fobd. Th frcme f dsilt arisg of?Untucilty?hl bofce punhaleinacodan witl.?<tp:/w..r/eprs/19//Ii94-15.ht> (cs 2Ju 06). 158 CGtmLife Bbsheb Aedkar (2 nd ed, Ambdkar Mmorial Trust, Lond, 20). 159 BR AbdkarUntoucalorTh CilnofIi'sGhet <htp:/w.r.g/mc/>(cs 29ay 206) (Abdkr). 160 ainrth Te (186?941), a f ledroftBrahoSaj, was exposd the idesof ialism ndfro strugletn rg. His nest inscilrfm,libralisof frmd te o huani rpst inhwrtg. 161 RabinrhTgreT RelofMa (2 nd ed,Ui, Lod, 193, 61) 05 quoted in Arty S ?a andHisIdi? <hp:/oelpriz.or/bl_prz/lteru/rticls/n/iex.html> (acesd 4Feb 2) (S). 162 KDuta nd ARis (es) Rabindah Tgor: AogySt Mrtin'sPrs,197239? 240. 163 Isih Berli ?abindrath Tgore te Cnsciunes fNatinlit? iThe Snse ofRality: 40 for instance, the poem Githanjali, emphasized the need for self-help and the intellectual uplift of the masses through education, on the basis that true freedom could be achieved only through a social transformation of India: 164 Wher th mind is without fear and hea heldig r knowleg is fr he th wrld hs not ben brok up into famts y nar doestic wlls Wher th cler str of reason s not lost itsay into th dray dert snd of dd hbit Into tht hv freedom m Fthr, let my coutry awake. Tagore?s vision of ?openness? to the best of educational, cultural and technological integration between the West and East is nevertheless especially pertinent in the contemporary globalization context. Significantly, he discerned the values of freedom, respect for the rule of law and notions of equity that were an integral part the British political philosophy, from the repressive manifestation of British colonial rule. Tagore?s 1941 speech ?The Crisis in Civilization? acknowledged positive liberal legacies of Britain, but he later commented that what ?was truly best in their own civilization, the upholding of dignity of human relationships, has no place in the British administration of this country.? 165 After the massacre in Amritsar, 166 Tagore wrote to the Viceroy of India requesting to be relieved of his knighthood. 167 Indian philosophy emphasizes ?unity in diversity?, and the ethnoreligious pluralism in South Asia is a living example of this notion. Gandhi, through his activism for purnaswaraj, synthesized the ancient religious and philosophical teachings of non- violence, tolerance and search for truth oneness as an effective means of advocating for national freedom, equality, freedom from exploitation, and for a Studies nIdeas nd Their History(Far, Straus nd Giroux, New York, 197) 265. 164 Rabrthgo,Ganjli, SngOfeig<htp:/.sacd- txs.com/i/r/itjli.tm>(csd 16Nov 206). 165 Sen ve n16. 166 O13April9inAritsa, India, the Britsh army opend fire ona pecful protes march kilg 79 o ad woudgover20. 167 Sen,abven16. 41 change in the inequitable social order based on caste. Despite a dislike for ?rights- talk?, Gandhi expressed his struggle at least once in the idiom of rights when he said, ?I wish I could persuade everybody that civil disobedience is the inherent right of a citizen ... Civil disobedience ... becomes a sacred duty when State has become lawless, or ... corrupt ... [The right to civil disobedience] is a birthright that cannot be surrendered without surrender of one?s self-respect.? 168 The salient feature of his political and philosophical doctrine was the pursuit of common good (sarvoyada) through non-violent and truthful means (satyagraha). 169 In the longer view, of course, Gandhi was by no means the first to merge the pursuit of peace or virtue with political activism. Aristotle, Plato and Thomas Aquinas, to name but a few, had all espoused wisdom, truth and justice in political theory, though not non-violent protest. To Gandhi, politics and dharma were intimately linked. Moreover, the Mahatma said, ?those who want to be passive resisters for the service of the country have to observe chastity, adopt poverty, follow truth and cultivate fearlessness.? 170 Each of these qualities has special resonance with early Indian philosophical teachings and was compatible with Gandhi?s ideas of swaraj, which denoted ideological political independence from colonial rule; while Raychaudhuri observed that, ?Underlying Gandhi?s statements on the superior worth of India?s civilization one can detect his attachment to a pattern of social interaction which did not privilege the individual or emphasize achievement over other objects of human aspiration.? 171 Although Gandhi?s philosophy was never applied globally to remedy injustice, his theory of non-violent civic protest did gain legitimacy as a moral and political force. 172 Ghandhi?s philosophy has inspired many struggles of liberation across the 168 MKing ahtm Ghandi Martin Luther King Jr: The Power fNonvilet Action (UNESCO,Pris,19)286?7. 169 Jery Tke ?e Politcal Power fNo-Vilt Rsitanc: Th Gadhi Thique? (197) 24 hWstrnolitcaQurey775?78; and segnerly JVBournt Coquest ofVlnc (aliforia P, Brly, 1967); aul FPrGhi oWrld Afis(Pblic AairPs, sngtDC1960). 170 MK Gdhi HndSwarj Indi Home Rl (Aamedba, 190) ch17. <htp:/w.mkgahi.og/sarjy/cvrpag.ht> (cse2Nov206) 171 Tan Raycur Pecptis, Etins, Ssilti: Eys nIdia?s Colnial d Post- colilExperines(Oxfrd Uneri PreNw Deh,19). 172 Pu Fo Gadhi oWl Afas(WashigtonC Public Afirs Pes, 1960). 42 globe, such as the fight against apartheid, the protests for democracy in Tian?anmen Square, and struggle for democracy in Myanmar, as well as the mass protests against globalization in places such as Cancun, Davos, Quebec, Geneva, Port Algiers and Melbourne. South Asia has a rich tradition drawn from both political philosophy and religious teachings that celebrates notions of human dignity, cultural diversity human freedoms, which together comprise the spirit of the UDHR. However, the fundamental distinction between Western and South Asian expositions of rights is that the South Asian theoretical reasoning did not use the idiom of rights itself. The idea of rights and its spirit is evident in the religious, cultural and political articulations but seldom expressed in rights terms. Gewirth distinguishes between ?having or using a concept and the clear or explicit recognition and elucidation of it ... Thus persons might have use concept of a right without explicitly having a single word for it.? 173 Values of tolerance, non-violence and the quest for justice and equity were prevalent in the ancient philosophies of the subcontinent but they were not articulated in the language of rights as Locke, Rousseau or Hobbes articulated them in Europe Age Enlightenment. It bears repeating that the contemporary mainstream human rights discourse emphasizes ?individual rights vindicated against the liberal democratic state,? and this is essentially a construction of post-War international politics. Similar end results of safety from tyrannical rule were achieved in Asia through different conceptual articulations. Cmiel succinctly elaborates this point 174 when he observes that ?Mohandas Gandhi, for one, is mentioned in several of the books discussed here as a friend of human rights. Yet Gandhi generally disliked ?rights-talk? of all kinds, associating it with the self-indulgence of the modern age.? 175 173 Richard Dger ?Rights? inTerc Bal etl. (ed) Politcal Inovatin d Conceptual Change (CmbeUnivsty Pre,Cambidg,198)26,92. 174 Kil ?Th cHistory fHun Rights? (04) 19 The Amric Histril Rview <htp:/storycperativ.p.ic.e/joral/r/./cil.tl> (aed 23Mar205). 175 Gandi exsd s trus frghts-lk sely as nHidSwrj; sAnthoy JParl (e)Mhi: inSwajndO Writng,(Cmbridge,197) 81?2.Ite 194s,e xprs is cptsm bot hmarispojcts oth G Wlsan UNESCOmpiu 43 Gandhi emphasized the importance of obligation not only as a basis of, but as prior to, rights: ?I learnt from my illiterate but wise mother that all rights to be deserved and preserved came duty well done. Thus the very right to live accrues to us only when we do the of citizenship of world. From this one fundamental statement, perhaps it is easy enough to define the duties of Man and Woman and correlate every right to some corresponding duty to be first performed. Every other right can be shown to be a usurpation hardly worth fighting for.? 176 Thus what is articulated as a right of the individual against society and the state in the Western philosophical discourse was traditionally voiced in South Asian political philosophy as one of its reciprocals, namely a duty of the society or the ruler towards the individual or the ruled. 177 Those who spearheaded independence in the subcontinent synthesized the European rights discourse and the fundamental tenets of South Asian philosophy: humanism, non-violence dharma. It is this synthesis that formed the foundation of the constitutions of South Asia and their charters of fundamental rights. These charters conform to the structure of the Western liberal constitutional model but represent a synthesis of ancient Indian and Enlightenment European discourse. 1.5 The ?Globalization? of Human Rights Historians compete to locate the point of re-emergence of rights discourse onto the global stage in its modern form. Burgers points to Roosevelt?s State of the Union address of 1941, just months before Pearl Harbour brought America actively into the tha sked for his coments otheprosed Universal Declartion fHuman Rights. Inboth case, h urgpltk abuir duti taof ght.S Gdhit Wels,dae,H.GWl Ps, Fr G-2,RrkanScil Clcis Libry,Uvrity ofIlis Cmpign- Urban;JcquesMitn, etl. Hm Rghts: menta Intepans (NwYork, 194) 8. Quoted iK.Cmil ?ThcistoryfHuaRighs? (204)19/ TheAmrican istrical Rviw<htp:/storypratve.p.ic.ed/jorl/r/.cil.tl> (ed 23Mr 205) 176 Gandi te n-vilnt h touman rights quted inPoly Vizard ?ntcnts ofthe Ida of HumRghs:ASureyOfPerspcives?HanDvlpmetRpot20 BakgruPpr. <htp:/r.p.or/port/glbal/dr20/prs/oy%20vir.f> (esd 4Fb 208) 177 Se t discuin Dasj h abo. 44 world?s most global ever war. 178 The President defined liberty in rights terms: ?Freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere.? By the end of that year the newly reinforced Allied Powers had incorporated as one of their war aims ?to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands well as in other lands.? 179 Lauterpatcht, however, observes that constitutional protection of human rights had emerged in the 19 th century and many constitutions in Europe including those of Scandinavian states had included charters of fundamental rights into their national constitutions. 180 Ironically, the world had to be plunged, again, into the truly global conflict of World War II, and be shocked by the unprecedented scale and publicization of that conflict's associated atrocities, before a truly global consciousness could emerge for the need for global human rights protection. German and Japanese genocide and persecution of vulnerable minorities, and the culmination of it all with the devastation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, became catalyst for the founding of contemporary international human rights regime. 181 Before the Holocaust, atrocities such as the Russian pogroms and the Turkish massacre of Armenians drew little attention from the international community, for the concepts state sovereignty and the sanctity of internal matters were ardently protected. According to Jayawickrama, those twin concepts were the most significant ?obstacle to the development of the international law of human rights? in the first half of the 20 th century. 182 1.5.1 The United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights The modern narrative of human rights instruments begins with the Charter of the United Nations, which was the eventual successor to the League of Nations The 178 JHBurges ?The Road tSanFrciso: The Rvial ofHuman Rights Ideas? The Human Right Ideain th wntiCury? (192) 4HumanghtsQrtely47?. 179 <p:/.fdrlb.mist.edu/frs.tl> (cd 29J 208) 180 Luteratch Itenatol Law n RitsGarln,NwYork,1973) 8. 181 Stvn Rnr JsSAbrsAcountably fo Hum Rights AcitesinIterationl aw:Byodt Nubrg ecy (Oxfrd UiversitPres, Oxfrd,20). 182 Nihl Jawickram Thudialplitf uan ightLa: tional, Rgiol d Intertnl spdenc (Cmbrige nrsityrs,Cbrie,) 17.(Jywckram). 45 unpardonable actions of the Nazis made the international community realize that there was a lacuna in its legal and political machinery to condemn and to punish the German Government, as, ?[a]ccording to the strict doctrine of state sovereignty, any foreign criticism of the domestic laws that authorized these atrocities was illegitimate; according to theory of legal positivism, it was also meaningless.? 183 The atrocities of World War II, however, highlighted the need to define parameters for state behaviour in relation to warfare and human rights; and, aided by the lobbying of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the final draft of the UN?s Charter adopted as a basic principle and a legal obligation upon member states the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The sense of urgency in the creation of a human rights regime was viewed with cynicism by some who observed that the post-war leaders ?either displayed a moral reaction to fascist atrocities, or they believed that states engaging in gross violations of human rights were also likely to violate the law against aggressive war.? 184 On the other hand, ?[h]earing about and experiencing horrors of the war convinced drafters of the rightness of what they were doing. The moral outrage thus created gave them a common platform from which to operate and do the drafting.? 185 This concern was translated into the UDHR adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. The number and nature of rights since declared by the UN have evolved from the UDHR following several interlinked trends . The first trend is from purely moral aspirations to more politically and even legally binding guarantees. The second is the gaining by the UDHR rights and later coinages of universal legitimacy as at least a benchmark of aspiration. The third is a trend from few rights to many and from less to more specific, but with a division between, on the one hand, civil political 183 Above n18, 20. 184 DaidPForsytheHuman Rights and Worl Plitcs (University ofNebrask Pres, Lincol and Ln, 9) ?11. 185 JohesMrsinkTUiversl Declratin fHuma Rights: Origns, Drftig ad Ite (Uivrity ofPylva P,hidph,19) 37(Mornk). 46 rights, essentially enjoyed as individuals; and, on the other hand, economic social and cultural rights, more often associated (correctly or incorrectly) with groups. The most fundamental contribution of the UDHR was the contribution it made towards the development of the international legalistic character of human rights. The creation of several treaties to safeguard individual rights had the result of transforming the individual from an ?object of international compassion? to a subject of international law who has recourse to international remedies protect their fundamental rights. 186 According to Eleanor Roosevelt, at inception the UDHR did ?not purport to be a statement of [even] basic principles of law or legal obligation?. 187 Morsink confirms this: ?The view that the Declaration had no and only moral force was nearly a unanimous of delegations involved in the drafting.? 188 However, neither Roosevelt nor Morsink believed this made Declaration toothless. Roosevelt hoped that by being freely adopted by the General Assembly, the rights in the UDHR would serve as ?a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations? 189 . History has largely borne out this hope; looking back, Morsink reflects that there was indeed ?tremendous philosophical and moral power in this position [moral rather than legal status] and it explains why the Declaration has become a moral beacon in the affairs of individuals as well as of states.? 190 As well as becoming part of international law, rights become entrenched through incorporation into domestic constitutional laws either as a ratification and adoption of the UDHR or later instruments, or as a mirroring of those instruments in member states? creation of their own charters. The United Kingdom is a recent example, its 1998 Human Rights Act reflecting the European Convention on Human Rights, which in turn reflected the UDHR. 191 186 HLauterpacth Interationl LawInterationl Law nd Human Rights (Garlnd, New York, 1973) 4. 187 Elnor Rsvlt ?Adpti fth Dclrti f its? <htp:/w.udhr.og/isory/egas48.tm> (acesd 14Feb205)(osevlt). 188 Mrsik, abe n187, 295?296. 189 oevltv. 190 rsin, o , 6. 191 <htp:/w.psi.go.uk/acts/t198/ukpga_198042_en1> (acesd 4Feb 208). 47 The evolution of a comprehensive human rights body with specialized treaty regimes within the span three to four decades is a considerable achievement. 192 The creation of legally formulated documents enshrining specific rights has helped the idea rights to emancipate from the realms of ethics and moral stipulations into enforceable law. 193 A significant impediment in the evolution of human rights from a moral ideal to a legal regime is the differentiation of civil or political from economic, social and cultural rights. The two key UN instruments building on the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 194 and International Covenant on Economic Social Cultural (ICESCR), 195 which came into effect in 1976, have evolved separately of each other, claiming legitimacy from two different political ideologies that dominated world politics in the post-World War II era. The fundamental civil rights were the kernel of the political struggles of the 17 th -19 th century in Europe emerged in UDHR in form of civil and political rights and were converted into legal obligations under the ICCPR. The economic, social cultural rights reflecting a more socialist ideology were incorporated into a second covenant and remained in the realms of ?progressive realization? on the basis of available resources. 192 Interationl Coventio theElimnatio fAl Forms fDiscrimnatio 1969 Adopte adopd frsigatur draifco byGerlseblyeluto 2106 (X)f21Dcmbr 1965 tryit c 4Jy 196,icdc with rtic 19; Inetil Cnvetin theSuesonPnishmet fh Ciofpad76Adp adopd for signatr, atifti bGralAsblyreslutin 3068 (XVI) of30Nvembr1973, ty o fc18July 1976,i codnc wit atic XV;Coventithe Elinti fAlFs DisimntioagnstWe198dopad pd fr sgnaur,atfcoand ceion by Geral Asebl relui 34/0 f Dember197,tyito f 3Septber198, acodcwith tic27(1);Convtinth Rigts ofthe ld190Ad pfr signtur, faon d acesi byGeralAslyrluin 4/25 f Novmr 198,eyint reSptmr190, icodnce wit atc;Coventiaginst Totue ad Oth Cul,Ihu oDgadngTtoPishmet 1987 dpte dpdfr signur,atifction adcesi byeral smbly rlutn3/46f0Dcbr 1984, ety ito re 26Je1987, ncorcwithrtice27(1) dclartios an rsvations. <hp:/w.hr.g/lish/law/idx.> (s 4Feb208). 193 Draing spiaton frm te UDHR, manyst avopt justible hum rights reims ntioly;efr explConstiuo fIdin Sri Lank. 194 IertiolCvt ivl ad PlitclRghts,G.Aes 20A (XI), 21U.N GAOR Sup. (N.16) a52, U.N Doc.A/631(96),9 U.NT. 17, trditofrce3March1976. 195 Intrtinlenat Econmic Soialnd CultralRighs, pd an oped for sigue, fcati desi byGer Asemby eolutn20(I)Decmber 196 tryito r3Jury 1976,i c withrtic 7. 48 Meanwhile, rights have also been strengthened from top down to some extent through the UN itself by the creation of monitoring, reporting, enforcement and some adjudicative bodies. 196 However, these mechanisms have lagged behind the coining of new treaties. Tony Evans observes that, ?the international community has not matched its enthusiasm for setting human rights standards with similar enthusiasm for creating necessary machinery to implement those standards. Although the Commission on Human Rights has developed monitoring procedures and advisory programmes for implementing state obligations under international law, the commentators generally agree that these are weak.? 197 A comprehensive international legal framework for the implementation of human rights, through which a state?s obligations to ensure human rights domestically can be legally challenged, is yet to be achieved. This is predominantly due to a lack of effective mechanisms at international level to make states adhere to, and comply with, the legal obligations they undertake as treaties. 198 The division between the ICCPR and the ICESCR points up another, more arguable distinction. Because human rights were regarded as a quintessential weapon of the individual against the state, some view the notion that human rights can be associated with social groups, communities, tribes, castes, races or any other collective entities a degree of scepticism. 199 Others consider the dichotomy between individual rights and group rights can be resolved by perceiving that ?group rights? also serve the interests of the individual. 200 However, the adoption of several international 196 Philp Alston ?Reconivg theUN Human Rights reim: chalengs confrtig the nw UN HumanRighCuil.(TheCulrsof )?(206)7Mbue JualofItrationl Lw 185?225. 197 Toy EvasTe Politcs fan Rights: AGlobal Perspctive (Plto rs, Lnd, 201) 5. 198 heunierljursdno theItronaCrimnCou sanxcepibutschjurisdction dst xd tvilati fum its. Se Wl Shb, Itrdt oe Ital CrimalCor(mbrgeUivrstyPr,201); Mas HAsjai ?TheRmSe fthe Intetin inl Cot? (19) 3AicanJourl ofIntertionlLw2?43. 199 r Szb?Hstrica Fundatiosf Hum RightsdSubsq Dvlopnts?i Karl Vask(d)The IlDmen (Grwd,Cectiu, 1982)1;Jck Donely, Univrsl Rights iThery and PractieConel Uirsity PrsIthc, 9) Jean-BraMi?elatonBw Popls'ighs d HumaRgh:Smani d Mthdlogicl Dstncis? (1986) 7Hu Rt. LJ195. 200 Neus TrbCl GrupRightsamanits ALiberl Aproac tMulticlturalism (Sprin,ethrlads,206). 49 human rights treaties concerning the issue of group rights has transformed the narrow conceptualization of human rights which equated human rights to individual rights. 201 It is in the form of a ?common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations? as Eleanor Roosevelt hoped that the UDHR has gained prominence and legitimacy today. The Declaration contains a universally acknowledged set of norms and standards dictating all perspectives of our relations as individuals and as collective members of groups, within communities and among the states. The UDHR is a comprehensive moral code, which created a political consensus on the idea of rights that is a unique creation at a time when there was no articulation of human in the international arena. However, the UDHR has set the precedent for the creation of standards and not the creation of implementation mechanisms. The ICCPR, the ICESCR and the corresponding Protocols, which were envisaged to be the enforceable mechanism, fell short of that expectation due to political bickering and insecurities related to the Cold War. The long list of subsequent conventions and resolutions identified specific areas of human rights that needed to be addressed, but, as the culture of abstract standard setting was well established, little effort was made to proceed with enforcing those rights in an international or national context. One reason for the lack of vigour in implementation, according to Shale Horowitz and Albrecht Schnabel, is the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, a principle that has great prominence in the UN Charter. 202 201 Se for example Article 27ofICPR whic stipulates hat person belongi toehnic, religous, r linguistcinrits?hant bedniterg,n comuiywithr mbrs ftpt jy hr w culr, tprfs a pai tirw rlg, r usthi wlau.? Se <tp:/../ml/u3/_cr.h> (aesd 21Nov205) andteConvetionth Prevntio ad Pnishent ofthe Crime ofGencid? ?ncie sy f flg acs comitt tdsry,nwlr iprt,tioal, thl, rcil,rigus rp, suh: ()Klg br ft grup; (b)Causg eus bdiyor mnta h tomebof the grp;c Deibratelyinlciothegro cnditfle cluedobrinat isyical desttion who r part; (d) Imsinesr tntprvt ts wthigrup; () Forbly rasfrigcildefrup tathgoup.? <htp:/.eb.r/l/gnocie.hl>(csed 21Nv205). 202 Sle Horitz an Abrht Sab ds) HumanRihts andSociets inTrasiton: Cause, Consquncs, Rpose(UNPrs,2045. 50 1.5.2 Accusations of Cultural Imperialism Levelled against the Universal Rights Regime, and a Preview of Cultural Relativism Despite the imperfections of the implementation strategies, the UDHR and the two Covenants of 1976 represent mainstream human rights discourse that has established itself as the universal standard of rights. However, this assertion of universal relevance and legitimacy has exposed the UDHR to accusations of cultural imperialism. 203 These challenges, arising mainly from the non-Western developing world, raise important queries as to whether the contemporary human rights norms warrant the predominance they have attained, whether their claims to universality are legitimate, and whether such claims of universality are realistic given the contemporary political, cultural, economic and social ethos of the Third World, and the fact that the UDHR was formulated at a time when most developing world was under colonial rule. 204 For instance, questions regarding the relevance of the rights enshrined had been made by the Islamic states at the drafting stages UDHR. In 1947, the Saudi Arabian delegation queried legitimacy of Article 16 (free marriage choice), and Article 18 (freedom of religion). Regarding 16, the Saudi delegation complained to the drafting committee that the draft UDHR had considered only Western sociocultural practices and disregarded more ancient civilizations that had passed the experimental stage with institutions such as marriage and evolved their own rules and values regarding it. The Saudi delegates further asserted that it was not for the Committee to proclaim the superiority of one civilization over all others or to establish uniform standards for all the countries. 205 The Saudi delegation?s 206 query was a defence of the Islamic faith and patriarchal authority, for an essential manifestation of the Islamic culture was deemed to be 203 Michael Ignatief ?The AtackonHuman Rights? (201) Foreign Afairs. 204 Syrsl. HumanRigs d WrlPblcOrder YalUvrtyPe, 1980). 205 fo dti lyftheces ofte Islmic utis SWlz?UniversalHuman Rights:TeCnrbtio Musli Sta?(204)6HRQ79?84. 206 On basi fhesbjectonArils 1and 18, the Sadi elgatio rfusd tortify the declartio.Svtr ris likewbtie:ouAfrc,th SRniveEasrn 51 undermined by the values in the UDHR. From a Western liberal and gender- egalitarian perspective, it is easy to dismiss the Saudi argument as a self-interested attempt to perpetuate the indefensible restriction of female choice in marriage that was central to intolerable patriarchal property relations in Islam. Yet the Saudi argument still raises tensions of principle that are at least prima facie problematic, and the ensuing paragraphs the present chapter query the legitimacy of such cultural relativist contentions. This ideological incongruity continues to raise questions about the validity and the relevance of the universal regime of human rights. 207 However, suffice it to say for now that such cynicism as surely underlay the Saudi case and will be noted in certain other protestations of ?relativism? against alleged ?cultural imperialism? does not detract from what the present writer agrees with the consensus of commentators to be the very real value and the legitimacy of the UDHR. Indeed, that consensus has if anything actually grown, to point where we even risk forgetting that some such objections were ever seriously raised. As Steiner reiterates: ?[h]owever self evident it may appear today, the Declaration bore a more radical message that many of its framers perhaps recognized. It proceeded to work its subversive path through rooted doctrines of international law, forever changing the discourse of international relations on issues vital to human decency and peace.? 208 1.6 Contemporary Human Rights in South Asia: Underlying Principles and Problems The success of a universal regime of human rights depends ultimately on individual states implementing the obligations they have undertaken to guarantee for the benefit of individuals at national level. Some commentators believe that there has been Bloc untries. 207 Seh frdiscuion cultral etivsm below. 208 Hryti SergHm Rights:T FrtHafCentury ofThe Universal Declartion ad Beyond, quonti ad AlstonIrtionl u RighsiCtx (OfodUvsy Pres20) 48. 52 ?amazing progress in guaranteeing human rights? 209 since the UDHR. However, the empirical reality of South Asia is that there is a disjuncture between the international human rights regime, the constitutional prescriptions and the actual implementation of the at national level. The comprehensive charters enshrined in many of the South Asian constitutions prescribe legal remedies for violations. In reality, the laws and institutional practices in place for the protection of human rights prove to be insufficient or unworkable and the ?rights regimes? articulated in the national constitutions are rendered powerless due to lack of resources and infrastructure for effective implementation. Therefore, despite the apparent universal subscription to the ?idea? of human rights, its effective implementation in the particular sociopolitical context of South Asia is questionable. 210 British colonial rule has significantly influenced the governing structure and the political ethos of modern South Asia. 211 The British managed to consolidate their rule over the entire Indian subcontinent by acquiring Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 1815 and India in 1858 with the result that, ?[a]dministratively, India became one ? an achievement unparalleled in the political history of India.? 212 The result of such territorial integration was supposed establishment of a British system of centralized administration based on principles of the rule law, respect for personal liberty, and equal treatment for all colonial people without caste-based or religious distinction. 213 Adoptions of Bills of Rights in former colonial territories have been either as a recommendation the colonial power; an initiative of the post-independence 209 TOpsahl ?Instruments for implentig human rights? (198) 0Human Rights Quartely 3. 210 BP Sig(ed) HaRghts Ida:ProblesdPerpctives(DepdDepPbictons, NewDl, 195;Sti Tf MaSte, city Human Rgh iSot Asi (Mnhr, 196); AR marsinh dWijertn (s)HuanRights,Valus nhRulof Law(egal idFoudto,Clomb, 203). 211 nji Guha Dinacwithout egmoy: istory and Power iColial Idi (Hrvd UiverstyPres, rdge, as.,198); KMDeSlvAHistyfSi Lnk(VjthaYp Publcaio, 205). 212 Crg Bxtrt alGovrnmt nd Politcs inouth sia (Westvi Pres, 201) 7. 213 Fncunfhe taditoalscargzaindowh colnialuimpactedon it,se Berad Soh, Clils ItFms fKwleg: T Brits Id (PrnUvrity Ps,196). 53 constitutional councils; or the result of a revolutionary process. 214 The request to include charters of human rights into the constitutional structures of the countries in South Asia was made by their political leaders, especially India?s, long before independence in 1947. Years of exposure to Western education had molded a new class of political elite who were familiar with the concepts of constitutional liberalism and the rights theory that was articulated in Western Europe. The need to include the newly flourishing norms of equality, social justice and standards of human rights into the constitutional structures was justified on the basis that it would remedy the inherent social inequalities that existed in traditional Indian political culture. 215 The relentless quest to establish a liberal constitutional structure in India by the political elite in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries was described by Field as one where ?Indians struggled against Englishmen for the right to run a British system in India.? 216 India, during its struggle for independence from the British Raj, demanded the inclusion of a Bill of Rights into its Constitution. The Simon Commission was entrusted with the formulation of the Indian Constitution but rejected this request on the basis that: ?Experience however, has not shown [such constitutional enshrinements] to be of any great practical value. Abstract declarations are useless, unless there exists the will and the means to make them effective.? 217 Jayawickrama observes, however, that the will to make the Bill of Rights work did exist amongst the Indian political elite, such as Jawahalal and Motilal Nehru, Chittaranjan Das, and Subhas Chandra Bose, who were all exposed to English education in the early years of the 20 th century and were familiar with the Western European political struggles and quests for human rights. 218 In situations where the British did not recommend the inclusion of a Bill of Rights into the Constitution of a 214 Nihal Jywickram The JudicalAplicaton fHuman Rights Law: Ntional, Regional d Intertonl uspdnc(Cmbrige UversityPres,20)127. 215 S ediio BR kb 159 d lted xt. 216 JhOsg Felsolidatin Docra:olitczaionParticption Idia (Mnohar, New Dli, 1980)347. 217 Cmd356(2?3. cite iJaywikrm abv 18, 103. 218 Jayickra bove n18Slso f the istoriclakgroundBrij Kshore Sarm Introutn thCstiuo fIndi(PrncH fIndi, 204). 54 colony, it was justified on the basis of their own circumstances. Britain, until recently, had no domestic regime of human rights 219 and placed reliance on common law to offer protection for human rights violations. Sir Ivor Jennings, essentially taking the same view as the Simon Commission, explained the position of Britain in 1958 by saying, ?in Britain we have no Bill of Rights; we merely have liberty according to law; and we think ? truly, I believe ? that do the job better than any country which has a Bill of Rights or a Declaration of the Rights of Man.? 220 Contrary to the position in India, when constitutional preparations were made to grant independence to Ceylon, the British government requested that the Council of Ministers submit a proposal of a Bill of Rights to the Constitutional Commission. Though a draft rights charter was formulated, Sir Ivor encouraged its exclusion on the basis that such a Charter not required in the context of the unitary constitution fashioned on the Westminster model. 221 As there was also no request from the minority communal parties for the inclusion of a Bill of Rights, the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 1946 (the Soulbury Constitution) was formulated without a Bill of Rights. The nearest to a Bill of Rights in the Ceylon Constitution of 1946 was Article 29 (2). 222 It was the belief the drafters of the ?that the customs and the conventions of the British parliamentary practice and British judicial precedent would fill the gaps.? 223 Some hailed the enactment of Article 29 as a comprehensive mechanism and claimed that Soulbury Constitution ?entrenched in it all the protective provisions for minorities 219 The Human Rights Act 198 isaUnited Kingom Act ofParliment whic ame into frce on2 Octobr20.ItvefnK lw ohrtsnied thEuropenCvHuma Rigs, wic sdiusd ietiCapt 5f hi tuy. 220 WIJengTh Aproach Slf Gvernt(Cabrig University Prs, 1958) 20. 221 adhik ComarswyIogyd th ositon Esao CnituonalJurispdenc (KorPublise Pvt Ld, 197) 20. 222 InepncnsiunfCeln1948. ?29.() No sh la hl - (a) rhibtretritefr xrcis ofay religon; r bmke psn ofy comuntyrelignabtdisabiltes orestricons twhic person f otr cuitrligs are md l; r ()nfr oers faitoriony pivlg radvtag i snt frd pesf thcounits orlgns? 223 RadhikCmarswy Idely ad theCstiuo Esy onCstiuonal Jurispdenc (Konr Publise Pvt L,N Di,197) 20. 55 that the wit of man could devise.? 224 Subsequent communal strife in Ceylon, however, made even Sir Ivor alter his views on including a Bill of Rights into the Constitution. In a BBC interview in the early 1960s he conceded that if he had an intimation of the political troubles that would emanate in heterogeneous societies such as Ceylon he would have insisted on the inclusion of a comprehensive Bill of Rights into the Soulbury Constitution. 225 The second attempt at creating a charter of fundamental rights, which was for India in 1949, was more successful. The 1949 Independent Constitution, remains force, contained an elaborate Charter of Fundamental Rights, soon followed by Pakistan establishing one in 1956. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka followed suit in 1972. However, the Bill of Rights the 1972 First Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka was ?hamstrung by an ideological debate on the relative supremacy a Bill of Rights and parliament.? 226 The result was an impotent Bill of Rights secondary to the legislature, the latter being the ?supreme instrument of state power.? 227 The Second Republican Constitution of 1978 contained an entrenched comprehensive Charter of Fundamental Rights, which specified enforcement procedures of rights guaranteed under the Constitution. 228 The Fundamental Rights Charter enshrined in Part III of the 1949 Indian Constitution guarantees the basic fundamental rights of equality, non-discrimination, religious freedom, freedom from exploitation, freedom of speech and expression and other analogous civil and political rights. The Constitution also guarantees the means of vindicating these rights following applications made to the Supreme Court or the High Courts of India. This fundamental ?rights charter? was designed to be a tool of social transformation for it was ?set to make a confluence of human rights and social welfare by evolving a concept of social justice?. 229 Therefore, constitutional 224 Charles Jfries Cylon ?ThePato Indepnce (Prager, Nw York, 1963) 7. 225 JALoaytiual nd Amistraiv Lw ofSi Lnka(HnsaPublicatons,Clomb, 1973) 509. 226 Jaywickrm bove n18,2. 227 2 ConstiufSriLakrticle 5. 228 Artile17 fth 97 Costiuon<htp:/w.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constiuon> (acesd 23 Jun 05). 229 hadriand aturvedi?s Law fFudamentl Rihts, Pael fLawyers (d) (Lw Publishr 56 provisions abolishing untouchability (as already mentioned) and forced labour, and prohibiting discrimination on grounds of ethnic, religious, caste gender identities, were included. 230 1.7 Social Action Litigation In the context of human rights jurisprudence of the subcontinent the most significant development has been the judicial activism through Social Action Litigation that was first initiated in India. 231 With the intention of promoting social justice and enhancing access to the judicial process, the Indian judiciary have expanded the interpretations of Articles 14 232 and 21 233 of Constitution to include due process. The result has been the initiation class action suits and writ petitions from, or on behalf of, the marginalized segments of Indian society, who under normal circumstances would have been excluded from the judicial process due to lack of resources or sociopolitical acumen. 234 This brief discussion on Social Action Litigation is directed towards the possible expansion of SAL across the region and to establishing common regional procedures in relation to protecting economic, social and cultural rights, which do not have the (India) Private Ltd., 195) 8. 230 Atcls 15,7an23ofthe Constiuon fIdia <htp:/indacoe.nic./oiweb/lcome.htl> (e23Ju 0). 231 For anhistoriclut ad ctempray relvnce fiy, s Upndra Bxi ?Taking SufigSey: SocilAionLigtionth SuprmCourtfIndia? Nelruchelv and Rk Cmarswy (s) Th Rl fJdiay inPll Socets(St. Mti's Prs, NewYor,1987) 32; WuterVade?Hua RgtsLw,Devpm ndoal Ation Litgin Idi?(0) 2si Pcif Jornlou ights and thLaw136?20;Upedra Bax ?Jucial Dscors:Th Dltsthe Fc nd teMk?(193)5 Jurl fth Ii Iste;Jmie Cael?Judia AivmaPblicItrst igtionIdia:mtng the Impoibl?? (198)37Aricn orl ofCprtv Law 45?; Uper Bx ?ntrductoni IP Msy mistieLw (3 rd ed,ukno, Luckw Estnok Cpay, 190); SK Agarwl,ubliIter gatniIi:A Critqe(N Tria, bay,1985); PN Bhagwti?Jdic tivs and PublicIrs tgao?(1985) lJnIt L561. 232 ?rcle 14. Eqly eforlw- The Sthl t deny taprsoequlitefor the law or tequprotin ofthls ittrioyfIi. 233 Artil2. Prteci fiand prsnal bert -No prs hl bdprivd fis lf r psona betyxpargtocedursalishedbylaw.? 234 JyKohari ?Soil Rihs th Ii Cntuin 204 () Law, Social Justice and Global Devlpmt Junl(LGD)<tp:/w.gorwick./ljgd/0_2/kthr>(s26 Mar 205). 57 same constitutional protection as civil and political rights in South Asia, but are rather claimed to be protected and promoted through public policy and ordinary legislation. 235 Commonly perceived to be a judicial innovation rooted in the repressive regime of Indira Gandhi, the liberalization processes that induced economic hardship on the poor also fuelled SAL in India. The ubiquitous inequitable power relations that dominated the Indian legal system saw the economically and the politically powerless being discriminated against, negating effectiveness of rights enshrined in the Constitution. The empathy of the judiciary towards the marginalized segments of society resulted in creative judicial activism which challenged the ?received notions of the judiciary.? 236 This was evidenced in the case Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India, when the Court observed: 237 [t]he coner shown [by the law] tothe por and the isadvntaged ismuch greater that totherichandll-dbcuslatter c, oant ofthir dminscial ad com psition a larg mterial esusrisrsion on their rights rth r thepivedjst o nt hav the cpity the will to rsist an fight. In the same case Bhagwati, CJ, who ardently justified the concept of Social Action Litigation, described it as an obligation of the judiciary towards the marginalized: 238 The waker sctions ofIdian humanity have bn deprivd ofjustice for long years; thyvhd aces tojsticeocout fthirpvrty, igcd illiterc. Tyr t warof th rigts its cnfe p thm bth constitution athla. Onacnt ftheirsoiallyandeonically disavtagedposition ey k the pity toart thir rights, thy dot he th mterial rourcsithwhicnfc escial cic ntitlents a cbat exploitation ad injustice. The most innovative aspect of SAL was the relaxation of the rules relating to standing. The Indian Supreme Court invited public, provided they were acting 235 Social, eonmic and ultralightsare tditonaly cited inthe ?Directiv Princples ofStae Ply?dr teforeb y cous,b refuamlgudlnsfogvrnc whict te issi wnfrmlting pli lw. 236 Kothari bov n234. 237 BiLeglSuport Sciety v.Chief Justice ofIndia 1986 4SC 76. 238 Ibd. 58 bona fide, to initiate judicial proceedings on behalf of another in situations where the legal rights of a person were being denied, through the relaxation of the locus standi rules. 239 As Bhagwati J observed: 240 [i]t may now betakn aswell sttled that Article 32does nt merly confer power n this Curt toissu dirctio, orrwit foenfrcf thfudatal ights bt it ls laaostitunal bligtio this Curt toprotet th famtal rights oftheple fr tht pursth rt as ll incidental ncillary pwersincludingthepweto foge nremdiend fashio wstrtegies dign to enforc th fundamtal rights. Therefore, the Court declared that an injured party could invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme through Article 32 and the High Court through Article 226, and that in the event that the person whose rights were violated could not invoke the jurisdiction of the court any member of the public could do so on their behalf. 241 The judgment in S. P. Gupta v. Union of India paved the way to ?epistolary jurisdiction? and displayed the proactive role the judiciary in creating room for grievances to be brought before the courts by people without locus standi, through letters and even news items. 242 A reduction in the conventional procedural formalities further enhanced SAL as a tool of empowerment to those whose grievances against the executive and the legal system had always been ignored. 243 The Supreme Court also took the initiative to provide schemes of legal aid to litigants for whom legal 239 S.P Gupta v.Unio fIndia (1982) 1 (Sup) C 87per Justice Bhagwti ?Wher algl wrongrlegljuryscuetopersonrtadetrminatlofprsnbyrsonfviotin f ay cstil lgl rih ay be isos ctravti of ctiul r lelprvon rwithotatflwryuch lglwrg leljurilegal brdeis thrted asuc persn rdermint clas ofprsn byesonf pty, hpsno disabilyrilycicaly dsvntged itoi uabltaroct court frlif, n m ofbi a tplifra prt direcin, derwihe HighCurtnder Atle26 n ise ofay bchfndmlghtsfuh prsn r detria clsfprso,ithcurtndrAtile 32sekig juia rot legalong o ll jryau tuc perso mi aof prs.? 240 M.eht v.Uni fIndiaAIR1987 SC.1089. 241 SP Gpv.ol 2 .R 365 The ?istolary jurisdction? very inovatiely refomulatd rcedura equirentsi vokingtSuprme Cta HghCutjrsdcn. 242 Cr Br?Sial AtinLtgao Ida: e Oratin dLiisf t Wl? Mt ActivJicy? (1990) 19Pl?y StJ140,2?147; RjvDhan ?w Sre: Pbli Inerst Law nIdi(4) 36Jfhe Ini LwInst302, 306?308. 243 MGlter ?Nw aternso LgalSrvcesi dia? in jev han (ed) Law nd Society in odr Idi (OxfoUivityPrs, 198) 279?95. 59 costs were often prohibitive further dismantling the debacles to invoke its jurisdiction. 244 SAL in the Indian context created a pathway to litigate the rights enshrined in Part IV of the Constitution ? the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs). These include a myriad of social, economic and cultural rights, such as the right to education, the right to livelihood and the right to health and housing, but which are deemed non-justiciable, unlike the rights which are enshrined in Part III of the Constitution and which are declared fundamental rights. 245 The conceptualization SAL was based on the premise that there was no distinction between Parts III and IV of the Indian Constitution and they supplemented each other in achieving the common end of creating a society where rights and entitlements were ensured by Constitution. 246 To this end Justice Reddy declared: ?The provisions of Part III and IV are supplementary and complementary to each other and not exclusionary of each other and [?] the fundamental rights are but a means to achieve the goal indicated in Part IV.? 247 Judicial innovation was creatively utilized enforce DPSPs through Article 21 of the Constitution, which guaranteed the right to life. 248 The concept of SAL has since been utilized in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh, with varying degrees of success, to expand access to the judicial system. 249 Litigation relating to access to basic social and economic rights, environmental rights, consumer protection and tribal rights has taken place in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 244 The Comite onImplentaiof Legal Aid Schems (CILAS) was etblished in1980 by the govrn fIdiawith Sure CurtJstic(s waten) PBhg aCrof Budg Actis. 245 rle 37of the Ini onstion stae: ?The provis cotaied intis prt shal nt be enfoabyacourt,bhe prcilrinladnrevrthlfudmetih gvrnc ft y aditsal bth duty ft st tply s ricls ikg laws.? 246 Kead Bhrti v.Ste ofKrl 1973 4SC 25. 247 UnikrshnJP .a fAP,IR178. 248 ?Atcl 21: Nopersnhlb dprived ofhis lfe orpsnal iberty xcept acording to proedurestablid bylw.?SeFancsraMuli v.UoTiorfDelh 198 SC 608. 249 Bnzir huto vs.The Fdrtio fPkistn d others 198 PLD SC 416 and Sla Zi v. WAPD194PLDSC693in Paksn;ad RHquTakingjuticesriously:jicpubcnterst ad costinal ctismBglehCotempry S Aa 20; get Ahj Popl, Lwn Jue:ebok ubic Itrs Ligtio(mBks,Lndo,197);G.L irs. ?PubliItrst Ligtinthe IndaSubcont: Curent Dienio" () 40The IteraolandCparivLwQrtely 6?90. 60 Nepal. 250 The impetus to promote and safeguard human rights through SAL in other states in South Asia emanates largely from the media and the NGO community, which agitates for greater accountability in political governance in South Asia, with less enthusiasm from the judiciary. The influence of SAL is that the subcontinent goes beyond a narrow focus of the constitutions? rights and instead gives teeth to the otherwise impotent constitutional provisions assuring socioeconomic and cultural rights. SAL has assumed a vibrant character that agitates for restoration the continuance of democratic governance where is broken, 251 and for social justice, both of which are pivotal to the sustenance of human rights in South Asia as explained by Mehta: 252 The PIL [ublic Interest Litigation] movent has llowed all kinds ofpublic- interst mattersto had, givehudr ofproplerutebywhic to apoc the Cort. Wile PIcs toateve mix sces at srinkg vertyrcting injustic, thprision fafruto ic citizens ginalisd by thecorption ofutine oliticscn tu hasrgublyiv srious morl anpshloical reinrcmt to the legitimcyof the dmoratic yte. However, in general the commitment to SAL that has been displayed by the Indian judiciary is not reflected in other jurisdictions across the subcontinent and this has limited its success. Observing the operation of SAL in an Indian context, Peiris in 1991 commented: 253 ? the novelty and vigour of the judicial initiative, which has disturbed assumptions relating to the judicial function and cast judicial policy adrift on uncharted waters, have been the precursor of intractable dilemmas. These involve core elements of relationship between the judiciary and other organs of government, each discharging its constitutional responsibility. At the heart the problem is the political accountability of the courts, the legitimacy, if not the practicality, of their leadership role in formulation and implementation of broad social policy, often impinging on matters of acute controversy. 250 Sar Hosain, Malik ShadenadMusa Bshra (eds) Public Interst Ligation Suth Asia: Rights inechf Remds(D UivrityPreLt,197. 251 T isuocrtigoce nSo Asi isd iChapter 4f tis tdy. 252 PratpBan Mha ?Te Ris fJudialvregnty? (207)18 JounloDemocra70?83. 253 GL eirs ?PbliIntrtLati the India Subcotinet:rt insi? (19)4 TheIntto d Compiv wQrly6?9, 4. 61 The long term viability of SAL as an innovative concept for social transformation has been queried also by Baxi, who observes that judicial activism can never be a substitute for ?political action? in the battle against impoverishment. He observes that ?[c]ourts are, at the end of the day, never an instrument of total social revolution; they are, at best, in images of Roscoe Pound and Karl Popper, instruments of piecemeal social engineering?. 254 Although conceptually appealing, it has since met with hurdles with regard to the courts? inability to resolve issues relating to disputed accounts of fact, and with regard also to providing effective remedies and effective means to implement those remedies. 255 To ensure the success of SAL litigation the Supreme Court has established specialized commissions to establish the facts of a particular litigation. 256 The Commissions are vested with the responsibility of finding data and facts relating to fundamental rights violations. 257 The Court also appointed an Ombudsman to ensure the implementation of its orders in the case of People?s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, which concerned implementation of the labour laws by the city contactors and the Delhi City Council. 258 In Sheela Berse v. State of Maharashtra, 259 a female judicial officer was appointed to supervize the implementation of the Court?s order relating to the treatment of prisoners. The effectiveness of SAL remedies firstly depends on the extent to which the judiciary is going to expand the constitutional mandate relating socioeconomic rights, as illustrated by the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which has been especially successful in guaranteeing socioeconomic rights. Secondly SAL must be regarded as just one of the several mechanisms that are or can be established to eradicate poverty and ensure social justice. 254 Upendra Bxi ?The Avatrs ofIndia Judical Ativsm: Exploratins ithe Gographies of [I]justic?iKusmndSKVerm(es) FfyYerofthe SuemCourfIndi: ItGrap nd Reach (Ofor Unirity Prs, 20) 164. 255 SKAgawlPblcIetLigation Idia: ACritq (Tripathi, Bbay, 1985). 256 Thru the Agra otiv He cstheBndhuaMk rcsethCourt instionlizdt?pfpit cio-lgl comisonf iquir fr pse of gaerg rvn mteril nubl nrstlat?per PN Bhagwt,tdn?Jdicaltivm d publicterstligao?(1985)23Cumbi JunalfTrsial L 561. 257 PNBhawi ?Scl Ati Litgaio: theId Exince? JuciryiPlurl Soiets N ThirlvndR Crswmy (eds)(FrancsPiter, Lod,1987). 258 eop?s UiofrDeoctiRit v.Uio fInaAIR 3 SC43. 259 SlaBer v.Sta fMahrsaAI 1983SC 78. 62 Post-apartheid South Africa, with its endemic social and economic inequalities that were accentuated by the neo-liberal macroeconomic policies, 260 has incorporated justiciable social and economic rights into its Constitution. 261 The Constitution, which enshrines the right to have access to health services, food, water and social security and guarantees the right to education, nevertheless has a restriction clause to the effect that ?[t]he State must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.? 262 The recognition of these rights was a reaction to the endemic material deprivation and the moral obligation to provide access to land, healthcare, housing and public services to a nation that has endured apartheid policies. The combined effect of poverty and social marginalization justified the inclusion of socioeconomic rights in the South African Constitution. 263 The South African Constitutional Court, in several instances, has been able to utilize the Constitutional mandate relating to social and economic rights creatively. In the case of South Africa v.Grootboom Justice Yacoob observed, ?I am conscious that it is an extremely difficult task for the State to meet these obligations in the conditions that prevail in our country. This is recognized by the Constitution, which expressly provides that the State is not obliged to go beyond available resources or to realize these rights immediately. I stress however, that despite all these qualifications, these are rights, and the Constitution obliges the State to give effect to them. This is an obligation that Courts can, and in appropriate circumstances, must enforce.? 264 Therefore, the Constitutional Court directed the state to ?devise a comprehensive and 260 JDaniel, AHabi nd RSouthal(eds) Stae ofthe Nation Suth Africa 203-2004 (HRSC Pres, ohsburg203). 261 C RSstei ?ocial Ecnomic Rigts? Ls frm ot fri? May 201 Uof ica,PlcLawWrkngPaper N.12 <htp:/w..uhi.edu/is/publicaw/resources/12.CRS.pdf.> (cesd Jan 207). 262 Arile 27() 263 Fo ancontf t ongi strgle for sinmi qity nost-Aarthi South Africa se DsiW r hePr:Cmuniy Stul Post-AparthedSuh fic (MntlyRevw Pre, NwYk,203). 264 Govrnmt oftRpublic ofth Africa &Ors v.Grotb &Ors 20 ICHL 724 October 2000. 63 workable plan to meet the needs of people in desperate need.? 265 The relevance of SAL goes beyond outcome in the courtroom, as Schultz and Gottlieb observe when they say, ?the most important aspect of judicial influence [is] the power of courts to redefine structures and expectations.? 266 As the best possible outcome not only will the judgment be implemented but the repercussions can be wider with possible legislative or policy changes. It also creates opportunities of public debate on issues of social concern that were denied public and institutional attention before. 267 In the context of South Asia, as much as the role of SAL is a means of affirming social and economic rights justiciable human rights, it is also evolving into an avenue for defining social policy. Judicial deliberation on social policy is a means of scrutinizing policy and this is significant in a climate where other avenues of public and parliamentary debate are defunct or dysfunctional and results of elections may not be a true reflection of public opinion. The rich jurisprudence emanating from the SAL process in South Asia indicates that it has immense capacity to vindicate socioeconomic rights of the poor in the South Asian region particularly as a tool to audit policy formulation relation to socioeconomic development and poverty eradication. 1.8 Disjunction between Normative Obligations and Political Reality The sustained success of a charter of rights depends on other sociopolitical circumstances of the state and the legal infrastructure that sustains it, as explained by Read: 268 265 The Court said th te Sta wsobliged toake ?rasonble gislative nd other masure?to acivtpgresivrlisnf thr?with virourcs?,buintd thain dong s St coul co ea n fmsur. F nlyi ft Grob jumet,irGpen?Public ItrestLigation, ScialRightsAd SoalPlicy? The Arus Cfrc New Ftirs fSaolicy? 1215Deber 205. 266 DShultzandSE olLeg Funtlis d ilCane: Resment of Rosenbrg's T Hl p: Crs BrngaoutSc hg?(196) 2/1 Jural Law ad Plitc66. 267 V?ro ?Remaking urban evironmets: he plitl eoly fair polutin Delhi? (206) 38/1 Envit dPligA 2093?2109. 268 James STheprotcfHua Rigts inMuicpal Lw? CF rsyt ad JESciler (d) 64 The nw state emrged often huriedly from authoritaian colonialism with dominat tionalist vtsbt esntiallywek plitical sytes, vulnrble pliticl prties a institutio like th jdiciary, the pr ad the pfesionto ek toexrt fectiv prsurogovnmt, ithorn orly ducateoulations d struglin cnmies ?rck soil fr the utu f hm rights. In terms of content the South Asian states have gone to extreme lengths to create extensive charters of human rights reflecting the UDHR but these rights are often restricted on the basis national security or emergency. 269 For instance, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, the Maldives and Bangladesh have comprehensive charters of fundamental rights and directive principles in their constitutions and provide judicial mechanisms for partial adjudication. 270 However, few of the countries in the region have institutionalized a durable system to achieve the rights enumerated constitutions. Protection of human rights cannot be restricted to the creation of intricate mechanisms but requires political will and commitment, which for reasons articulated in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study are lacking within the governments of South Asia. Furthermore the commitment to pluralist democracy based on respect for the rule of law and true constitutionalism with effective systems of checks and balances is absent within the governance structures of states in South Asia.. 271 Pakistan and Bangladesh have both been under military rule and Nepal has had a long history of struggle against monarchical power. 272 Free media and an impartial judiciary, integral features that should help sustain human rights lend legitimacy to the democratic regime, are absent in many of the countries in South Asia. 273 Human Rights: e Cap Town Cfernc (Juta nd Co Ltd, ape Town, 197) 56. 269 NserHuinhJurisd ofEmergcy:lnilsmd theRulofLaw(University of Mich Ps, 203); Rhka arsw har lsys ?le byEmgc: Sr Lank'otclialonstiunl xprin?(204) Iternatiol JrnfCostiunal w27?295. 270 ApedixC. 271 Ear Koldziej (d) AForce Pofnde (Uiversity ofPensylvani Pres, 203) 14?62; Rohn isnha ?nstuins withut Cstiuonalm:Sri Lk? Cofntiuonal First Pricple? ARBmargadSWjr (ds) HuaRights,Huma vles dtheRul f Law (glFoudtio, Clob, ri Lank, 203. 272 Dimn ?Is Pksnthe (Rves)veofthe Ftre?? (20) 1Jornl OfDmocray 91? 106. 273 Maldives -Hua rigts violatins ith cntx fpolitcal rfoms Aesty Iterntil Report 2005 htp:/wb.ney.r/bry/dex/gas29015;netyItrnaiol RporPakisn t:/rotmstegRiosAi-Pifc/kist s tat ?Nal te.a.or/pa/139/n/ mnesty Ieraiol RportSi Lk 65 The South Asian states are signatories to several international covenants on human rights but the international obligations undertaken through the treaties are rarely converted into domestic legal obligations. 274 Though ratification of human rights treaties denotes acceptance of international human rights standards, inaction in the domestic sphere indicates that the states are not committed to honouring the treaty obligations. 275 Few states have initiated programmes that give effect to their obligations nationally, as all of the South Asian states have a ?dualist approach? in relation to the applicability international treaty obligations nationally. There is an urgent need create a system that encourages South Asian states to systematically realize the human rights obligations the states accept at an international level through the initiation of legislation nationally. The dire need to synchronize the international human rights obligations of South Asian states with domestic laws is well illustrated by the recent Supreme Court case of Nallaratnam Singarasa vs AG. 276 In this case Supreme Court of Sri Lanka determined that Sri Lanka?s becoming a party to the Optional Protocol the ICCPR was ultra vires Article 4 (c) of the Constitution of Sri Lanka, for it bestowed ?a judicial power? upon the Human Rights Committee at Geneva. 277 Based on this judgment the government of Sri Lanka claimed: 278 The govrnmet of Sri Lank was unble torespond tothe Human Rights Comittee bysuitting itsbsevtio, oing thSumCort jdget inNallartna Sinar?sCa. While the gvrmet f ri Lak iscsio ofits bligtions Tetie, ontionsadPtocls, it is also imperative that the Government of Sri Lanka respects the judgments of its domestic courts. htp:/terpot.amnesty.org/pae/126/eng/ ad Amnesty Iternatiol Report Bangldesh 5(cs 1Nov207) sSChtr 4oftistudy. 274 Andix D 275 Eric Neuayer ?o Interationl Human Rights Treatis Iprove spect for Human Rights? (205)49JolfCflic Rsti 925?953. 276 alrtnm Sigarsv.The AGS.Cpl (LA) No. 182/9 06. 277 Atice .?TheoeigntyoftPeolshabexrcisedanejoyd inthe folwing aner: ()hjudial pwr f Ppl sa bxrcisd yPlmt hrugcrs,tbulsd instions rtdanstablished,rcgniz thCostiu eat d aih by law, exctimer lng to ivles,munie and pwersofPrliment ofts Mmbrs, hrithjudiclpwrf th Pople aybxrci dicty brlicrding to l.? 278 The rply ofte govrnmet ofSri Lank th cuniato uner frenc G/SO 215/ SRI (16)S/EAR/sn1432/05da01.3207. 66 This is a strange position for the government to adopt as a previous ruling of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka had maintained per Fernando J: 279 A person deprivd ofpersonal liberty has right of aces tothe judiciary, and that right iswintenatiolly trcd, tothe xtent tht adtain who iseie that rt may ev cmlain to th Humn Rigts Cmitte. Should this Court hae rgad tothe provisios ofthe Covenat? I think it must. Article27(15)eqirsthState"ndaurtoterspct frternatiol law and treaty bligtion inlins amg tions". That imlie tht e State st likwisrspct interatiol lawtretyobligtios initsdealingswithitson citiz, ticulaly whe thir librty isinvlved. eState must ford tothm the benefit o the safgrds wich intenatiol law rcgniss. Hathaway in her extensive study of state compliance with international human rights treaties observes that ?because human rights treaties are generally only minimally monitored and enforced, there is little incentive for ratifying countries to make the costly changes in actual policy that would be necessary to meet their treaty commitments.? 280 She continues domestic implementation of international human rights norms may be more successful in a regional context ?because regional political and economic interdependence generates greater external pressure on countries to exhibit a commitment to human rights norms.? 281 Hathaway?s final observation is that: 282 the strongest dmocraies may beor likely toadher totheir traty obligations bcau th xistene finternl nitosmaksit oifficult frsuchtrie to l asetw thir xpriv n ctual bhvio recus liberl docrie hav truorativecoitet tothe spirationsmbd in th humn rigts trties. This appears anomalous, as some states in the region such as India and Sri Lanka do have a long tradition of democratic governance and international co-operation. However, even in states like India and Sri Lanka, which have done better than many 279 Werawns v.AG and othersSCaplicton N. 730/96. 280 Oo AHthay?DHuman Rights TreaisMake Difernc?? (20) 1 The Yal Lw Jurnl1935, 20 (twy). 281 Ibid. 282 athwy, above n280. 67 others in the region in terms of adhering to orthodox liberal democratic constitutional structures and practices and have reached certain goals implicit in the mainstream ideology of human rights, there appear to be human rights violations of epidemic proportions. 283 Chapters 3 and 4 of this study examine the reasons for these incongruent patterns of near-perfect formal structures and horrific empirical evidence of human rights abuses particularly in sociocultural and economic spheres. The issues discussed above highlight the dilemmas relating to the scope and the validity of the universal regime of human rights, the substantive human rights within the domestic sphere, and the methodology of protecting rights. A Human Rights Watch report illustrates empirical dilemmas of implementing human rights amidst poverty and insecurity in South Asia in the following manner: 284 Poverty contributes tobonde child labor, ut it is not the only cause. A lack of acstoredit alack faonerted scial welfarschmtofgrdginst hungr a illns; insible, low quality, nd isiminary shols; th la f employnt livg we frlts; oruptiond pthn vernmt oficials; d historical conmic elatioship baseoe ieracyfcaste re thr ke lemets. Mrvr, bond cildrr liklystined or ptys adults, anlikly tobd their en indto urviv. Futeen-year-old Ashish M. toldHuanRightsWatch that ould t leaehis lom wr bcause e wpying of vc, wicin tw yarsh d rcedfroRs. 2,50 (U.S.$52) toRs. 475($9.90). ?Te onrpbt deuctsfoth avnce,? hid. ?H ductsbt wn't rite fthhle vn. . W nlykug to eat.? 285 With wages too lo tosurvive, workes ar forced tokep borwing from their employr, nuringthat y n pyfll thirts, vn thuhthirlabr has, in fct, pid em timsvr. And sNHRC Scial Raprte Can Ll xlaed, ?ovrtyis oe fthe caueof childlabor t lsoneof the consequences - bcausit shpit sadult nemloyt dwg supresion. The reason for the high incidence of child labour in India is perceived by the above Report to be primarily economic. The Report also acknowledges another significant contributory factor ?views among Indians about the social order, notions concerning 283 Fredom inthe World 207 (Fredom Huse, Rowman d Litlefild Publisher Inc, 207) htp:/w.frduse.rg/tplat.cf?pag=36&yer=207 (acs 19 th Ja8. 284 Inia Sl Cag: Bn Chi Lbr inIdi's Silk IustryJnry203 Vol.15, No (C) t:/.hr.o/rpots/203/nd/(es 1Nov). 285 Hum Rits ch ierviw it fourt-year-ld b,Varsi, Utar Pdesh, 3March 2002. 68 the respective roles of upper and lower social strata and the tacit belief in the role of education as a tool to maintain differences among social classes. These sociocultural notions premised on the caste system and the deep cleavages between ethnic and religious groups dominate the list of obstacles to the realization of human rights in South Asia. The violent manifestation these diversities, often fuelled by political and economic considerations, is contrary to the humanistic and tolerant image that South Asia presents through its philosophical articulations. 286 As discussed later in Chapter 4 of this study, manipulation of the political system, state- sponsored or sanctioned abuse human rights, and the increasing incidence of social inequity has resulted in internal political instability within the states in South Asia. These incidents have undermined the confidence amongst people in traditional judicial institutions and orthodox structures in place for the remedying of human rights violations. The situation also raises fundamental questions about the ?utility value? of the human rights structures within the countries that have a penchant for authoritarianism rooted in their history, and about the viability of genuine human rights culture reflecting the international normative standards. The norms of human rights enshrined within the constitutional structures were regarded as the formal goals designed to realize hopes and aspirations of the people who live within the state. However, given the complex economic, social and political matrix of states in South Asia, these goals were not materialized have been relegated to the side as some romantic idealism of the first generation of political leaders after independence from colonial rule. In essence, while the institutional frameworks to entrench liberal democratic political processes and reflect international human rights norms have been perfected, the implementation has consistently ignored de facto the recognition of the rights and freedoms of individuals. This has resulted in the escalation ethnic, religious political violence that threatens the very foundation of these states. 287 286 Se Chapter 4of this tudy. 287 PjiSclarVlesfor Secular Indi (Manohr, New Dlhi, 195); Rohan Guartn War and c nr Lnk: With aPt-AoReprtFmJafn.(IstuefFudmetl Sdies, SriLka,1987);RmesCndr Thkr Oy Wig d) So Asi t or: 69 In addition, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this study, the neo-liberal obsession with economic development has also been deemed a sufficient justification to restrict certain fundamental rights and liberties. 288 The states that followed a socialist political ideology often justified the limitation of civil and political rights with the assertion that economic and social rights must take precedence over others. As in rest of the Third World, in South Asia too, the existing human rights norms are questioned in economic terms. Successive governments have argued that the emphasis should be on economic progress rather than on human rights, negating identity of the individual against a common aspiration of economic prosperity. 289 This position reflects the viewpoint that development is a collective process precipitated by state agencies and that human rights can be set aside for this common good. Workers? rights other related are conceived as less important than economic development and if these rights infringed upon it is regarded as a consequence of the development process to which the state has attributed precedence. 290 There is no promise that once a satisfactory development stage is realized there would be an automatic extension of rights. Leaving human rights aside until economic progress is achieved assumes a trade-off between basic needs and luxuries, but with human rights classified as luxuries. 291 The validity of the argument of a trade-off between human rights and the collective good appears to be entrenched in the political and legal jurisprudence of states in the region. The following is the view of a Supreme Court judge of Sri Lanka: 292 Problem Solving Perspctives onSecurity, Sustainble Dvlopment ad Go vernace, (UN s,Tky,204). 288 h ajr comis th rgi ?ri Lk, Idia, Pkist Bngaldsh ?v adopte liberlfeet plceandecomtedto heMF/WB polciesofcomicelopmn. Ind, wi hdrsit is lst univrsalrn, sucmbedt 19. Se CD Wa Ecic RformsnIia n hMrk Ey (AiPr, Nw Dlhi,4) 289 Iia? coservtieBathJathPrt BJ) asvryoca nopsing urestid entry of theultil compis bu s grdualcquiecd te ivitble trda nfacthsb gy sprtf th olcieince196. Th Popl?sAlf SLk priot 197 pted a clodeconiliyt rvs itsnwn rauming powrin 194.Smlredscan bsrv lswer ntgi. 290 Sthiusio workes?rights iSouth si Chter 4f this tudy. 291 e Jack Dly?Human RandDevlpent:coplnaryocpeting coerns?? i GWprdJ an VP Nd(s) Hum Rigts ad Tir Wd Devlm (GrwdP, 1987) 2?8. 292 ARBmrsighe Our Fnaetl ihts ofPersonl Liberty an Scurity (Sarvoya Publisher, S Lank,196)27. 70 We must recognize both e fact tht fundametal individual fredom neds tobe odifie inaplictiohvingr toth con go n th act tht rights f thividul rcgnizd n elarbythplesbingfutal a, er, imotat a ot baitrily interfed with ythe state. Attepting to achieve ablaebtwe th rights ofthividual ndobligation ofthe statendth cmunity isnt esymatter. Hoevr, in th last alysis inividul rightsst wighd agint th inteests fth cmunity whle. That is wy evr atio roupsf ntiorcgnisright to derogte from grntesandsuncestoinividlsofudatal rigts wridinests e at pril. This almost Bentham-like postulate relying on the principle of utilitarianism has created a hierarchy of state obligations in which human rights rate a low score. It is in this circumstance that a sense of scepticism arises regarding the contemporary norms of human rights and their implementation in South Asia. Despite the formal excellence mechanisms in place to adhere to and maintain international human rights norms, the universal norms become have become an unrealistic aspiration because of intervening socioeconomic circumstances and because they are wilfully ignored for political expediency. In the context of ineffectual human rights regimes within South Asia the following paragraphs explore the legitimacy of the arguments of the alleged Western liberal political bias within the universal rights paradigm. 1.8.1 The Western Liberal Political Tradition The following analysis highlights different aspects of the debate regarding the ?legitimacy? of universal human rights regimes in the context of globalization and dilemmas that this debate poses to the South Asian states. A fuller conceptual analysis of globalization and its impacts on human rights, on the state and on governance is contained in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively. The brief discussion below is intended to be a prelude to the detailed discussion in the ensuing chapters, which underline the need to explore alternative methods of protecting human rights in South Asia. 71 The contemporary culture of human rights has been seen to have its roots in the liberal political tradition that the West espouses. Therefore, for such a culture of human rights to be successful one must not only accept it but also adopt Western liberal political tradition that facilitates and fosters a theory of human rights from a characteristically individualistic stand-point. The requirement adopting the liberal political state is emphasized by Howard and Donnelly, when they contend that: 293 [i]t is often argued that internatiolly recognized human rights are comn toall cultural trditiosnptable toat vrietyofscial strutusadpoliticl regims. Sch rmts cofusehm igts with dignity. All scieties po oneptios fhan digitybut theneptioof hn igity undrlyingteranl rts standars quirs articulartypeof?liberal? regim. This clusio isrecthrogh coparisofcial strcturs idl typ of liberl, minimal, trditioal, mt, crtist and vlomnta rsand thir pt on utoy, equlity, rivy, soial oflict ad the definitio of societal mebrship. The present writer agrees that any claims 294 of equal compatibility between human rights and other political regimes are thus a result of confusing human rights with human dignity. 295 The classical tenets of liberalism, which propound individualism to act as a constraint on the excessive use power by the state, are clearly visible in the international documents that constitute the international regime of human rights. 296 The dignity and the autonomy of the individual, equal protection before the law, and equal opportunities for all form the cardinal values of political liberalism. The liberal state stems from the consent of people that constitutes the state. This consent, expressed in terms of the social contract, is manifested through representative government and periodic elections. The international regime of human rights has recognized these liberal tenets and has legitimized them. 297 However, many of the 293 RE Howard n Jack Donely?Human Digty, Human Rights and Politcal Regims? (1986) 0 Americn PlitlSieRviw 801. 294 Laksh Mrsgh ?Tradtol Rihts Coceptios iAfri? inCE Wlch Jr& RI Mltzr (d)uman itsn epentAfria(lbanyStaeUvesty,New YokPes, 1984);Polis ?Liberl, Socilt Third Wold Pestivs Hum Righ? iAli and Schwab (e)TwdsHuma RigtsFamwrk(rgr Pulihrs,ork,1982). 295 olisid. 296 ICPRhtp:/.nhcr./htl/enu3/ba_cpr.ht (acesd 17Oct 206). 297 Article 21of e UD ??Te wi ofth pole sl beioftheauorityf 72 states in the developing world, particularly in South Asia, do not enjoy the luxury of de facto liberal democracy, which creates problems for the effective implementation of the liberal democratic construct of human rights. 1.8.2 The Individualist Premise In South Asia, individuals conceptualize themselves in terms of the kinship system, the clan, the caste, the tribe, the village ? regardless underlying diverse ethnoreligious and cultural manifestations of the society. Despite encounters with the West which reiterate the advantages secularism, and in spite also of the anti- hierarchical currents within the society, people still perceive themselves to be members of a society based on varna (caste), particularly the Hindus, who form 64 per cent the region?s population. 298 The rights and duties of an individual in the traditional Hindu society are determined by their position within the hierarchical caste-based system and therefore one is never perceived as an autonomous individual with specific rights detached from one?s communal life. From such a stand-point, Chiriyankandath argues that ?the duty of any Hindu [state] ruler is to recognize and maintain the caste system ... and consequently reject the primacy accorded to individual rights and to the idea of human equality.? 299 However, the juridical character of human rights in the liberal legal system is given effect through areas of law, such as constitutional law, administrative law and international law. As a part of the region?s colonial heritage, this individual bias in the regime is reflected in all of the charters of rights in domestic constitutions whereby human rights are exclusively vested in individuals and not in social groups, communities, tribes, castes or other such entities. Socialist thinkers critiqued this overwhelming obsession with the notion of individualism in human governmet? and Article 25of theICPR guarntes th fre xpresion fthe wil ofthe lctors.? 298 BC Pol??Iasprudcuntrybtwoidcasytm hldgcuntrybak.Majiy takigprti the ol (%) bliv a he ?cst yt ia bri tsial m? Tse vws re cnage,inome drligurp. <ht:/w.lbsca./ws_cs/b_inda/etil.htl> (acesd 16Apr 207). 299 JCirykdth Hu Right inIia: cots conextsContoraySouthsia2/3 245?263, 50. 73 rights theory long before Third World countries raised their objections. This chapter has already considered (at text to footnote 61 above) Marx?s critique of the rights of man as being ?nothing but ? the rights of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community.? 300 Commenting on this individualist premise, Legesse asserts that a person?s individual worth, ?his personal autonomy and property?, is not the conception of human rights for every person in this world. 301 He continues, ?If Africans were the sole authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they might have ranked rights the communities above those individuals.? This individual-centred philosophical premise of the Western liberal human rights concept is also criticized by Yamani. He argues that ?[Western society] is overzealous in its defence of individual freedom, rights and dignity so that it overlooks the acts of some individuals in exercizing such in a way jeopardizes community?. 302 In contrast to the individualist approach of the West, the African or the Asian approach to society is essentially communitarian. The argument is brought out forcefully by James Hsiung when he asserts that, ?pressing for one?s own interests without regard for the interests of others is seen as no more than the pursuit of individual self-interest not pursuit human rights defined as rights of fellow humans.? 303 Legesse therefore argues that any system that claims to be universal must contain elements in it that are definitely of African, Asian, Latin American or Arabic derivation and the regime must be representative of community or group rights as well as individual rights. 304 300 Marx nd Egels ibd n61,2. 301 AsmoL?Huma Rights inAfrican Politcal Cultre? inKW Thompsn (ed) The Moral Ipertivs fua ights:AWorldSuvey(UversityPsofAerica, higto,1980)24. 302 hadYni IslcLw Ctmpr I (Th Sadi PublsHus Ji, 6 15. 303 Jmes Hiug man Rights inEast Ai: acultral persctive (ragon se, Nw York, 1985)2. 304 Asora Les ?Hu its ifrin Politcl Cultr? inKW Thmpson (d) The Mral IpetivsfuanRights:AWorldSuvey(UversyPesofAerica,igt,1980)24. 74 1.8.3 The Role of the State Just as the dominant discourse of rights conceives of rights-holders primarily as individual citizens of a nation, so it conceives of the reciprocal duty-bearers as being those citizens? respective nation states. A huge proportion of the Third World consists of colonial territories. Many have inherited territorial segments as independent states devoid of a politically constituted ?nation?. Under a universal human rights regime, states are primarily responsible for the realization as well as the protection of human rights. But in situations where very notion of the state is still uncertain, and at times in actual jeopardy due to competing issues warfare for self-determination, it is difficult to presume that the state as an entity is capable of ensuring the rights of those it seeks govern. 305 This issue is particularly pertinent to situation in Jammu Kashmir and to the Tamils in Sri Lanka where the identity of the ?state? is vehemently contested. 306 A significant aspect of the idea of individual rights in the Western notion of rights is thus precisely the empowerment of the individual with the corresponding disempowerment, or subjection to obligations, of the state and its executive organs. The philosophical premise of human rights is that individual must be bestowed with rights to be exercized against the state, for the very evolution of the dominant discourse on human rights was based on the protection of the individual against absolutism by the state. A literal interpretation of this position poses a dilemma to most developing countries that wish to subscribe to the universalist approach human rights. As Baxi succinctly argues: 307 The notio fdisempowernt makes ne. But shold it go all the way? Obviously t. Activistsask that layb made resinorst frmof violatios fhunrightsinth Civil Societysally ciated ith the st regiveors focial beaviorsiate with thrvival freligion, cultur and thicity. Sld thr not trict lasandstate tion o xaple osati, owrymurds, exsletivbrtion throughthebusfmioeteis 305 Se Chapters 3and 4of this tudy. 306 RobrJoAReginTrmoil (Reaktion, Ldon a New York, 205). 307 Und Bxi ?Lw Dca, nHughts? iHrshStiandSmithuKotari (eds) ethikgHumanihts(LokyNw Dli, 198)0?109. 75 techniques, ntritional sex discrimination, whic creates new forms f differ female infaticide, childbu, fmilial violegint , atrcitieaginst dlits, xploitatio ofigrt d cotrat labour? Th ser isy. Th ifficulty with this answer is that it epers th state. Baxi?s contention is a dilemma for India as well as other developing countries where there is an appeal for group or peoples? rights to be recognized and safeguarded through the positive intervention of the state over individual rights. Such schemes of social engineering do not always rest comfortably with the idea of classical liberal rights. The imposition of the liberal democratic political structures by the political leaders who assumed power from the colonial rulers can also be viewed through this prism. For example, the agnostic Jawahalal Nehru, India?s first Prime Minister and the chief architect of Indian Constitution, was a progressive political leader who sought relentlessly to sever the ties with, as he saw it, absurd Hindu traditionalism and to modernize the popular psyche of India. 308 He oversaw the introduction of the Independent Constitution of India that was fashioned on a liberal democratic model. This secular constitution imposes legal obligations to secure the rights enshrined in the UDHR and could be regarded as a huge state-sponsored project towards developing a secular state. Traditionally, under the universal regime states are primarily responsible for the realization of human rights as well as their protection. International human rights instruments also constitute among other things inter-state obligations in protecting human rights. The methods of protection available to parties such as monitoring, reporting and holding state-parties accountable for non-compliance, take into account and operate within the concept of state sovereignty. However, it is becoming increasingly evident that international control and compliance mechanisms based on the state system and the very idea of a sovereign state are fast being rendered impotent with the supervention of contemporary globalization. As Chapters 2 and 3 indicate, the view that the international system is dominated by sovereign states is 308 WJ Moris-Jnes ?From BeyondtheGanges: Aletr fom Jawhla Nehru? inDL Shet and AshiNandy ()Multivsf Dmcry (SPublictns,eDi,196)20. 76 also fast becoming obsolete. The Westphalian system of absolute state sovereignty, which has been the cornerstone of international relations since the Thirty Years? War, is now diminishing, and a complex novel system of international institutions and transnational corporations is dominating the international scene, beyond the power and the will of national governments to control. As Chapters 2 and 3 also illustrate, globalization assaults the traditional concepts of nation state sovereignty. These concepts have undergone a metamorphosis resulting in the erosion of the authority of the state. Diluted state structures and the narrowed range of sovereignty have resulted in individual states being impotent to control the flow ideas (good, bad or ugly), money, drugs, and crime across their borders. The reduction of state sovereignty has also resulted in an inability to hold together its people who belong to diverse sociocultural heritages. Thus state sovereignty is diminished from both outside and within: by agglomerative and homogenizing globalization on the one hand, by bitterly fragmentative struggles for independent identity by those sociocultural subsets of the state, sometimes to the point of civil war. If state structures are permeable and facing the danger of fragmentation, and if state sovereignty is dwindling, how credible is it to presume that a regime of human rights founded on nation states will be successful in protecting those very rights? If the state has experienced a transmutation crippling it from executing the responsibilities of the contemporary international human rights regime, which is founded on the basis nation states, an alternative regional normative framework on a consensual may be more realistic to promote and protect human rights. It would also complement and enhance the universal regime make it more compatible with contemporary global trends. The impediments and the obstacles to implementing the universal normative human rights regime in Asia have been articulated on basis of cultural relativism by several East Asian states. The following section explores the idea of cultural 77 relativism and inquires into the legitimacy of the relativist approach to human rights implementation. 1.9 The Legitimacy of the Debate on Cultural Relativism The claim of the framers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that it has universal validity and does not underpin any particular cultural tradition has been challenged by many on the basis of cultural relativism. Cultural relativism is defined as an ?assertion that human values, far from being universal, vary a great deal according to different cultural perspectives. Some would apply this relativism to ? human rights. In other words, according to this view, human rights are culturally relative rather than universal.? 309 Those who subscribe to this viewpoint premise their articulations on the idea that normative values derive authority from context and that a particular society does not have the moral authority or the legitimacy to judge the political and social practices of another society. Huntingdon, observing the contemporary debates surrounding cultural relativism, comments: ?Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state often have little resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures. Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction against ?human rights imperialism? and a reaffirmation of indigenous values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism ??. 310 The critics of the universal validity claim, particularly in East Asia and Western Asia, view the contemporary regime of human rights as a hegemonic thrust of the powers. Secondly they argue that different societies have different moral standards and therefore the moral claims of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have no legitimacy outside the Western cultural context. Thirdly the critics claim that the 309 Dian Ayton-Shekr, ?The Caleng ofHuman Rights and Cultral Reltivsm? <w.urg/it/dpil1627.tm> (csed 17Feb208). 310 Smel PHugon ? lsf ivlztios?? (193) Foreign Afirs 72 htp:/.foreiafirs.g/93/.ht(acDec05). 78 sociopolitical and economic reality of their societies demand a different approach to human rights, which they claim the mainstream paradigm does not take into account. 311 The most recent reiteration of the universal validity of human rights is the Vienna Declaration and Programme Action, 1993, where the states reaffirmed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ?constitutes a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations? and that the, ?universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question.? 312 While asserting the quintessential universal legitimacy of human rights, the participant states acknowledged quite contradictorily that human rights must also be regarded in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm- creating, taking into consideration the regional and national particularities and the varied historical, cultural and political backgrounds. Therefore, the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights provides: 313 All human rights are universal, indivisible and interepndt and inter elated ? wile thesificcof tionl regiol pticulaities vioushistorical, clturl d rligiosbkgrusmut b or inm, it is the ty ofStates, regalesoftheir plitical, ecoic andcultual sytestopromteandprct ll humn rights and funtal freos. However, the same Conference became a forum where the validity of the assertion of the universal quality of human rights was queried as statement Foreign Minister of Singapore indicated. His contention was that the ?universal recognition of the ideal human rights can be harmful if universalism is used to deny or mask the reality of diversity.? 314 311 This apect ofaserting a?socialnd ecomic relativsm? was dicused insubection 1.8 fthis ctr. 312 Vin Dlrti Ad Prm OfAtin, World Cnfer O Hma Rights, Viea, 14? 25Jue193 <htp:/w.unhcr./hurioca/huridoca.sf/(Symbl)/A.NF.157.23En?peDocumnt > (acsd 0e 205) 313 IbiSc.1, par. 314 ForegnMist Wong Ka Seng ofSingapore ?Ral World fHuman Rights? athe World Cf oHumRihts,Via,16 Ju 193 inJmes.Tg (ed)unigsan IntratilRelatis A PcifRi(Ptr, Ln Nw York, 195) 24. 79 The Chinese Delegation to the Vienna Conference also reiterated the notion of cultural relativism, stating: 315 The conept of human rights isa product f historical devlopment. It is closely asiated withspecificsocial, liticl aneonm conitios ad thepific istory, ultur d vlu f rticlar try. Diffrt historicl vlomnt stage have iffnt huanright equirtsCutries adiffent e rem rmen. ont rdelopt sta orwith difft istoical trditiosadclturl bckgous also hav diffent urstaning and prctices ofhu rights. Thus ne hldnt d cathink fthe huights tanars noelsfrtaintries the oly prop os ad dm that all ctrie cmply with thm. The above statement follows the trend of arguments that allege that the contemporary regime of international human rights representing the mainstream paradigm of human rights lacks universal legitimacy because of particular cultural, political and religious foundations it represents. 316 The proponents of the relativist position claimed that the UDHR and the two Covenants that reflect existing regime of international human rights are alien, disruptive and insensitive to non-?Western? cultures and political structures, particularly to East Asian cultures which do not conform to the Western model. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia was an ardent proponent of this stand-point. He claims that so-called universal values enshrined in the mainstream paradigm of human rights are in fact of Western origin and therefore not compatible with the East Asian sociopolitical ethos. 317 This particular perspective of Asian Values was further elaborated by the proponents of the Singapore School 318 thought headed by Lee Kwan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore. Explaining their position, Singapore?s representative to the United 315 Spech ofLiu Haqiu ead oftheCines dlegation the Vina Conferc onHuman Rights. Vina15Jne193 nJmsTH ag umRhsdItrtlRlatisithe AsPcfi (Ptr, d, 5)21 316 Aolis PSchwab?un Rihts: AWestrn Costruct wih Limted Aplicabilty? in lis, an (eds) agCulaldIelgalPrspciv(Pregr,NewYork, 197)?18. 317 Mhtirb Moham ?The Asin Vales Dbt? spch dliverd athe 29 th Intratinl Genral etngf te PcifBaEcomicouncilat Wsngto,D.Co1My 196. 318 Toial brs t Sl? wr Sr Mier L Kun Yw, FreigAfirs Prmt Scrty BilahiKusikn,basdth UtdStaes,haHn Che, and fesrmKof te Inte ofPlicy tuies nSigpor. 80 Nations, Kishore Mahbubani, elaborated that, ?it is necessary for a developing society to first succeed in economic development before it can attain the social and political freedoms found developed societies.? 319 The essence of argument of the Singapore School is that it is necessary to create a hierarchy human rights where economics take precedence over civil and political rights, for there is a need for economic development for the effective realization of the economic and social rights of the Asian community. 320 The representative Chinese government at the World Conference further explained the rationale for this stand-point on Human Rights. The Chinese representative, Liu Huaqiu, stated, ?when poverty and lack of adequate food and clothing are commonplace and people's basic needs are not guaranteed, priority should be given to economic development.? 321 The South East Asian leaders also claimed that the emerging nation states in the region that were accommodating sociocultural pluralism needed specific political and legal arrangements that were not acceptable to Western liberal democracies. The very stringent laws curbing political rights such as freedom of speech and political association in Singapore and Malaysia were justified on this basis. Those seeking cultural specificity in human rights, particularly from Western Asia, also attempted to reiterate exclusion of Asian cultural leanings and beliefs from the mainstream discourse. It is along these lines that the Iranian Foreign Minister explained, 322 ? [t]o enhace th universality ofhuman rights and relevant instruments it is imprativto bogizt of thclturl divesityofthhum fily adrspect the vlusfvrios clturs. Tis wld t ly ctribtetothich of humn rights nm, but als providthbsgarne for eir univrsal 319 Kishore Mahbuni ?A sianPerspctive onHuman Rights and Freom fthe Prs? inKishore abuni(d) CsaThk? (imBkItertol,Sigp andKualLmpur,198) 73. 320 eli hew ?Humn Rigts inSigapore: Prcptins ad Probles? (194) XIV Asian Survy 934?935. 321 tamnt byE Li aqiu, Hed fth Cinse Dlgti th World Cnferc onHum Righs (Viea,15June,193).Alsohe WtPapr onCesPgesiHumaRights publd th Cis Govrnmt in19, 95 di197 tp:/w.ch- easy.org/n/ztpflg/t62.h(acesdt1My 206). 322 Stemt byDr MJ Zarif, si Rgiol eing oHuman Rights, Bangko, 31March 193 as prf AsiaIeovnetletn 29arch tApril, 193juprit heSndWold Conc nHu Righs d iVie. 81 observance. The political predominance ofne group fcountries internatiol latio, wicistemy bturdhistoy, cant rvidealicec fo the impsitio of ast f guidlins rms fr the bhior of thtir internatiol cunity, espciallyincetheStatesdont psnt a idal, fesible or pticl modl in thory o pratic ? The international regime of human rights is a construct of the post-World War II framework. However, as this study indicated above, the notions of human dignity that the regime enshrines are common to all civilizational histories from time immemorial. It is this aspect of human dignity that the international regime of human rights seeks to protect on the basis of universal validity. The respect for dignity is also affirmed by peremptory norms of international law or jus cogens which all states regard as universally binding. The non-derogable principles of international law include the right to life, freedom from slavery, torture, prohibition of genocide and racial discrimination 323 rights that are replicated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights creating a normative framework of human rights by which all states must abide. Relativism rejects this position, claiming instead that particular cultures can be exempted from this normative framework and external critique on the basis ?each state should espouse its own conception of what human rights entail as a social institution based upon its cultural preferences and political ideology.? 324 Not all believe in the cultural and political distinctiveness of Asia that fails to accommodate the human rights standards set by the international human rights documents. 325 Yash Ghai refutes the various premises upon which the Asian governments refuse to acknowledge standards imposed by the international human rights treaties. 326 He rejects the Asian political leaders? assertion that there is a distinct Asian approach to human rights and that it is based on perspectives that 323 Theodr Meron ?O aHierachyofInterationl Human Rights,? (19) 80American Joural of IntratinlLaw11. 324 Dugs Dh Rltivsm Vrsu Uiversli iuan ights: T Srh fr eiflStdrs?(19) 27StanfodJnal ofInteratolLw354. 325 Yash Gai ?Human igtsd Gerc:ThAsi Dbe? Ocsional Pper ies No. 1, TAinFotio'sCerfoAsi Pif frNvmr194; MchCDav, ?Costulis d Plitcal ultr:Debat oe Huan Rightsd Asi Vlus? (98) Harvd aRghtsJurn109. 326 YshGi ?Huma ights dGovernac: Th Asia Dbte? (194) 5ustral. YBk IntL 1.5 82 emerge from Asian culture, religion or Asian realities. Thakur, who supports Ghai?s position, claims that, ??[r]elativism is often the first refuge of repressive governments. The false dichotomy between development and human rights is usually a smoke screen for corruption and cronyism.? 327 In these circumstances cultural relativism is an instrument of political or economic manipulation not an aspiration of higher values or a quest to protect human rights. Ghai sees no foundation to the contention that the individual bias in the international regime of human rights, problems of fragmented nationalism and fragile statehood, and economic underdevelopment render the political civil rights irrelevant to Asia. He claims that it is indeed almost impossible to discern one particular Asian perspective since neither Asian cultural professions nor cultural realities are homogenous throughout the continent. As the religions and political ideologies differ in the region, so too do the economic conditions; therefore he asserts: 328 perctions ofhuman rights are flective ofscial and clas positions inociety. What vey pet pictuo aunifrm A pertive humarights is thit is th rsctiv of rticlar gp, tht ofth ulinglites, wicge interntioal ttentio... thliticl sytes y rsnt ar not pn or democrtic, d their publicly exprsed viewnhuanights eatiof thes sytems, of th nd to jstify th authoritaiaism ad ocsiol rresio. Jack Donnelly endorses Ghai?s view that cultural relativism is often used as a tool for political gain. ?Arguments of cultural relativism are far too made by economic and political elites that have long since left traditional culture behind ?. Leaders sing the praises of traditional communities ? while they wield arbitrary power antithetical to traditional values, pursue development policies that systematically undermine communities, and replace traditional leaders with corrupt cronies and party hacks. Such cynical manipulation of tradition occurs everywhere.? 329 Therefore, 327 Ramesh Takur ?Teaming UptoMake Human Rights aUniversal Fct? Special toThe IntrtionlHeldbu,Thursdy,10Dcebr,198 hp:/w../hqif/ei/r7.htl (cesd3My 206). 328 Yash Gai ?uan Rgts an Govena:TAian Dbate?Ocasionl Paper Sies No. 1, TeAinFodtio'sCrfAsi Pcif frsNovmr 194. 329 S sertis fvelism hurghtsi Jck lyUiversl Humn Rights inThery andPrc (Crnl UirtyPres, Ita, 198). 83 according to Donnelly, the claims of cultural relativism often themselves mask schemes of insidious governance that imperil the rights of its citizens. 330 The legitimacy the narrow debate on ?Asian values? per se remains questionable. Political leaders such as Mahatir Mohamed and Lee Kwan Yew, who began to command considerable power due to the success of the Asian Tiger economies in the 1980s and 1990s, were the chief proponents this view. The credibility of their arguments dwindled rapidly with the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and the enormous socioeconomic burdens that ensued. Despite the lack of legitimacy of the Asian Values discourse as expounded by the East Asian states, their discontent and skepticism highlights the fact that although there is universal validity for the value of human dignity, means of expressing that value in rights terms and structures and mechanisms that protect the rights do not have unquestioned universal validity. Many states outside the Western world have included chapters of fundamental rights in their constitutions. Each of these states has diverse socio-cultural and political landscapes and they will not take on homogeneous means to resolve issues in relation to human rights. Many of these states utilized the language of rights as a weapon against colonialism and will rely upon it heavily to assert rights to development and a more equitable global financial order. The Asian debate on relativism highlights the inadequacy of the mainstream paradigm to accommodate concerns relating to social justice and an equitable global financial order, which compels the developing world to devise new strategies to maintain and expand human rights protection nationally. The rationale for the notion of universal rights to prevail, and the need to work on the existing structures to improve and enhance them, are pointed out by Higgins: 331 It is sometims ugested that er can be o fully niversal conept of human rights, if it isncary totak intoout thdiverscltu d litical sytes 330 Jack Donely ?Cultral Reltivsmand Uiversal Human Rights? (1984) 6Human Rights Qurtely412. 331 Rs Higs Probls nd Proces: Itrntiol Lw d How We Us It(Clredon Pres, Oxford,98)7. 84 of the world. Inmy view this a point advnced mostly byStates, and byliberal schlasaxiousot toimposethwester iewfthingon ther. It is ly advnd by the presd, h r lytooaxious toefit om prcivd uiversl tanrds. Th n uivsal, rlativist viefha rightsisin fat y te ctrviewaloseigt of the fcthmn rigtse unrights andot pet o state, or gpingstates? Ibeliev, profdly, in the uiversality fhumnpirit. Individuals vrywherat th sa stial gs: to hv uiciet fd a shelter; tobele tospk frly; torctice thir own rligion? tokowtht ywold t rtud, oetaind without har?. I belie that er isning thsapirtions that is pnet pn ltue, r rligioorstagfdvelopment. They r kely flt by th Africtribsmnas y th Eup city ller, bthinbitat of thLtinma shty-tow b the rsident of a Manhtta aartmnt. The present study agrees with Higgins and asserts that the quest for qualifications on the application of the existing universal human rights standards on the basis of cultural relativism is, in the great majority of cases, unsubstantiated. The universal human rights culture that evolved through the Declaration and the two covenants not only is, but deserves to be, an integral part of global sociocultural and economic mores. The greatest relevance of relativism to the present study, where such relativism is advanced in good faith and not used as a stalking horse, is to keep the language of rights living, breathing adaptable, dynamic and dialectical, receptive and responsive to the genuine best of all cultures? contributions. At the same time, paradoxically, it also teaches us to remain realistic and to some extent pragmatic: it teaches us to use normative standards creatively to realize social justice, taking into account the genuine economic, social and political needs and limitations that presently exist in South Asia. This study endeavours to do exactly that. 1.10 Conclusion This chapter first traced the trajectory of the concept of human rights from a ?Western? perspective. Though ideas of natural law and natural rights, quintessential articulations of Western liberal political thought, significantly influenced the contemporary discourse on human rights, the idea of human rights nevertheless did not derive from a single cultural tradition. Notions dignity, tolerance, communal obligations, governmental responsibility and social justice were articulated 85 through the religious and philosophical history of South Asia before the advent of the colonial powers in the region. As the analysis indicated, the late 19 th and early 20 th century struggles of national liberation and social transformation in the subcontinent drew inspiration from the philosophical political traditions of West as well as from South Asia. The discussion also traced the incorporation of human rights charters into the national constitutions of the South Asian states and the efficacy of those charters. The study identified specific issues relating to the state individual that create difficulties for the effective implementation of human rights. Globalization and dysfunctional democracy are specific issues that hinder the efficacy of the human rights charters, as will be discussed further in ensuing chapters. This chapter identified the debate on cultural relativism, as advanced for instance by certain voices from South East Asia, as a means of demonstrating that the dominant paradigm of human rights is certainly not without its critics. Perhaps most defensible argument made in the name of relativism is that the mainstream rights discourse must of necessity take into account the concerns of periphery if it is to be sustained. The need to accommodate issues such as group rights and the right development, for instance, quite legitimately opens doors for a broad-based approach to the existing normative structure of human rights. The relativist argument has value to the extent that it demonstrates the need for flexibility within the dominant discourse to accommodate the concerns of, in particular, the developing world, and at the same time the need for the developed world to examine both whether it is sincerely pursuing concepts of rights it claims to put forward, and there is ever mere self-interest in those very choices of concept. Such flexibility will ensure the legitimacy of the universal paradigm human rights within the developing world. The refusal to grant legitimacy to the voices from the Third World within the dominant ideology would imply that it is designed to serve the interests of a neo-liberal world order which contemporary economic globalization promotes as discussed in Chapter 2 below. 86 Kothari and Seth observe the universal paradigm remains as yet not a statement of reality, but ?an ever expanding set of objectives waiting to be actualized. And their realization is possible only through a process of constant struggle.? 332 The authors go on to say that such a struggle will lead to the evolution of a social praxis which will help realize the needs of the most oppressed communities by the rights guaranteed through universal human rights regime. The present study endorses that viewpoint and acknowledges the need to use the established normative structures of the UN system and make existing human rights network more meaningful to the people of South Asia. Each culture or social system could claim a moral superiority as expressed by the states that endorse cultural relativism in human rights. This study asserts that universal regime of human rights envisaged by the Declaration of 1948 advocates cultural egalitarianism and that this regime is no longer regarded by the community of states as a mere invitation to strive towards a common standard of achievement, but as a norm that each state must give priority to in the name humanity. Unless human rights are regarded as a normative concept that overrides the cultural and ideological differences, the oppression that is created by their denial will continue. The idea and the scope of human rights is subject to continuous metamorphosis as a result of diverse influences particularly globalization. To maintain its legitimacy and effectiveness new frameworks of thinking particularly in relation to human rights, poverty and development are emerging. The emerging paradigm of human rights is focusing on enhancing human capability, human-centred development and democratic governance, aspects that will be elaborated in later chapters of this study. South Asia?s endeavour must be to take into consideration the anomalies in relation to human rights implementation in the region and create a system that will complement and enrich the universal regime. 332 Haresh St and Smithu KotariRethinkg Human Rights (Lokayn, New Dlhi, 19) 27. 87 Andrey Sakharov once wrote from his internal exile in the Soviet Union: 333 The idology fhuman rights isprobaly the only e whic can becombined with sucdivrseidologiescomunis, scial dmcray, religio, tehnracyn th idloie wic y bedscribed atiol d inigous. It ls srve asfothldfrthse. wh avtirof the bunc fidelogie, of whic ave bought impleun hpins. Th efs hman rights isa clerpthtoard th nificatio ofele r tulet world, d pthtowrd the rlief o sfin. It is important to reiterate that there do exist different paths towards the relief of suffering and that South Asia does need to rely on the inspiration which universal normative regime of human rights, and the sincere and serious relativists, provide in order to be creative in evolving new living mechanisms to realize human rights. Other states have created effective systems of realizing and enhancing rights through mechanisms founded on geographical proximity, as Chapter 5 of this study illustrates, and Chapter 6 will bring that same approach to bear on South Asia. Moreover, as Maritain observed, ?No declaration of human rights will ever be exhaustive and final. It will ever go hand in hand with the state of moral consciousness civilization at a given moment history. And it is for that reason that even after the major victory achieved at the end of the eighteenth century by the first written statement of those rights, it remained thereafter a principal interest of humanity that such declarations should be renewed from century to century.? 334 The next chapter will discuss the origins and history of the phenomenon of (largely economic) globalization and its relevance to South Asia. It will trace the evolution of the concept of globalization through colonial history, identify its salient characteristics in the colonial setting, and draw parallels with the phenomenon?s contemporary manifestations. The chapter will discuss the impact of contemporary globalization on the notion of nation state and governance in South Asia. 333 Andrey Sakhrov quted inBursH Weston ?Human Rights? (1984) 6Human Rights Quartely 257,81. 334 Jaqus Mritn ?Twars Uivrsal Dclartio fuan ights? i its Tchings (UNESCOIV 1958). 88 CHAPTER 2 SOUTH ASIA?S TRYSTS WITH GLOBALIZATION: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY ?Econmic globalizton has becom awr gainst ure and the por. But he ruls of glbalztre gd-iv.Thycnbeched?.Sictl,afqntyed phrs te fr ul-s ystm Globlizn ist rl f coecandit has ltWalStt o nsure fvlue,dsarsult tings t soulvhig worh ?nare, cultre, th ft? ar big evd adrye. Te rulsflbliztdighlsofjstcn tainity, fcompsion a srin.? 1 2.1 Introduction The previous chapter traced the evolution of the idea of human rights in Western and South Asian history. The study indicated that in a broad sense the values which human rights are seeking to protect were present in both civilizational histories though they were articulated in different idioms. Human rights in a recognizably modern legal formulation were traced back to various national jurisdictions in the West beginning in the late 18 th century. Their progressive articulation was tracked from there into new universalist moral, political, and finally legal norms of international law after World War Two. In South Asia, legislated human rights norms followed the wave of independence from the British. The rights discourse was introduced into the political and social ethos of South Asia by the (often European-educated) political elite, as a means of fighting against colonialism. The idea of rights was also utilized to fight the repressive and iniquitous traits of the subcontinent?s own sociopolitical culture. Chapter 1 also traced the evolution of the rights mechanism within the constitutional structures of South Asia and efficacy of the international human rights regime in South Asia. The discussion identified greatest challenges to the contemporary safeguards of human rights as those which emanate from the sociopolitical ramifications of globalization. 1 Vand Shiva ?Globalizton adPoverty? (20) 2 Resurgnce <htp:/w.resugnce.rg/esurgc/isu/shiva.htm> (asd17 Dec 207). 89 The often glorified, overused, abused and rightly contested phenomenon of globalization which impacts every aspect of contemporary society is the central focus of this chapter. However, this study is restricted to the specific research question relating to the quest, specifically in South Asia, for a trajectory of specifically human-centred development which above all honours human rights. Therefore the study concentrates on the implications for that quest which flow from globalization and its current ideological counterpart, neo-liberalism. 2 With this end in mind, Chapter 2 traces the progression of historical globalization and discusses the contemporary (post-World War II) theorization of the concept. The historical account of globalization will culminate in analysis how international trade and colonial rule have affected the societal and economic arrangements of the South Asian subcontinent. The study acknowledges that contemporary globalization has influenced the region?s interdependent global, regional and local financial and trade relations and political structures. Perusal of the corollaries that emanate from the globalization process indicates that globalization unleashes forces that have immense potential to create environments for human growth and advancement if those forces are managed wisely. A paradox already becomes apparent between the hugely constructive (and literally reconstructive) global human rights regime set up after World War II as described in Chapter 1, and what have turned out to be increasingly destructive forces of more economically based and often self- interested globalization as will be described in the present chapter. In a theme that is to be developed and returned to, the latter is at odds with and undermines the former. The chapter will also focus on impact of contemporary globalization on the structures of the nation state in South Asia. As the ensuing examination indicates, the potential benefits of integration into world economy through trade liberalization and deregulation are compromised by globalization?s neo- liberal thrust and the mismanagement of globalization by the South Asian states. The chasm between the included and the excluded created during the decades of exposure to globalization in the subcontinent has resulted in two worlds ? one inclusion into the globalized world economy dominated by burgeoning trade 2 For scilogical implicatons fglobalizton se Malcom Waters Modern Socilgical Theory (SagePubsher,Lond, 194)d fr mpactfgbiztn cultshe thrtn () GlblCultre (SePulishr, Lnd, 190). 90 deals, transnational corporations, digital technology and improved standards of living; and the other a world of total exclusion dominated by poverty, deprivation and social outsiderness. 3 In this context the chapter will analyse the relevance of the burgeoning anti-globalization movement and its capacity to help evolve a praxis which would infuse a sense of equity justice into the concept of globalization. 2.2 Tracing the Evolution of Contemporary Globalization through Some of its Historical Antecedents Despite the intense focus on the concept of globalization over the past two decades, many analysts observe that it is a fallacy to claim that globalization is a peculiarly modern phenomenon of the last fifty years. 4 Instead, they agree to varying extents that the has had a longer history, spanning many centuries. 5 Hopkins usefully argues that globalization can be seen as a continuing concept which historically has taken different forms that he calls, in order, ?archaic, proto, modern and post colonial?. 6 It is to be noted the present thesis uses the term ?contemporary globalization? mean what Hopkins calls its ?post- colonial? version. As early as 300 BC people in the Asian continent had created links with disparate locations forming an extensive system of communication, migration, and trade. 7 This formation of interaction and interconnectedness between the global, the 3 Joseph EStigltz GlobaliztonadIts Dicontes (W. Nortn, ew York, 20) (Stigltz); HumanDveopmnti Suh Asi 201:GlbalitonadHumaDvlpment:TheMabul q letCtre(Oxfr Uvrsy Pres, Oxfrd, 20). 4 Wters clistha t wods glbaliston,gllizgloblizngidot rg into conuage nil1960.Macm Wer bastn (Rute, Ln,20).Seals Rlad obrtsGbliztn SoilThyd GlobalClr(Sae, , 194 5 AreG Frak nd BryKGs () heWr Systm: FivHudrYears oFiv Thousand? (Rutleg,Lo, NewYrk,196. 6 Hopkinsd) lblizatniold History(Pilco, Lndo, 20) 3(pkins). 7 Segeraly Chanr Mu AJurne hug Iia'sPt:FrmEarliet Tmeto he Last idu Emeo(NtherBkCt,Iia, 205);Mre-a?ise nd J-Fra?is lAthns,d, Arikmd: Esay o treltions btwn I,Arbi nd t Ester Mitran (anorPublisherndDisur,NDlhi 205);JogierK ChawlI's OvelTre wit ntl Asia Psia ig teTrteth a th Fourtnth Cturis (Mushiaor,Newlh,206). 91 regional, and the local has been a crucial driving force in world history. As Sen comments, globalization: 8 ?is, in fact, neithr new or necsarily Western; ad it is not a curse. Ovr thousndo yas, globalistioh ontribu totheprgesfth wold rgh trvl, trdmigr, sprdf clturl influc, d ismination f kwlee n uestanding (luing that o sien atechnlogy). Tes lobal interlatio haveoften bevrypdutiveinthe vet of diffrt cotries. Ty t csily tak th forf inrasd Wsten influenIde, thctiv agts ofglobalistionhaten b loca frm th Wst. In 325 BC, Alexander the Great sued for peace with Chandragupta, the Mauryan Emperor, at Gerosia. This encounter marked the eastward link among overland routes between the Mediterranean, Persia, India, and Central Asia. 9 This is the first documented encounter whereby religion, trade, economy, and even imperial armies of the West and East began the long journey of global dissemination. The eastward expansion of this interconnectedness and associated diffusion of information and culture is marked with the reach of Buddhism as far as China in the 1 st century AD with the conversion of Han dynasty. 10 Although it had long existed, the Silk Road became significant from the 1 st century when it was militarily protected under the Hans and as such opened up a region hitherto unfamiliar to Central Asia. Cultural links trade flourished between the two civilizations, which previously had developed independently. The influences of that cultural exchange are still visible in Asia and China today. Much later, throughout the Song Dynasty in China (960?1279 AD), the exchange of trade, technologies, culture and religion continued between India, East Asia and China. 11 This exchange in turn created an impetus for the medieval world economy to flourish as India had by then linked Europe and China by land and sea across Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. 12 8 Amarty Sen ?How tJudge Globalism? (20) 13American Prospect 1?4. <htp:/opl.cisk.e/~a/Miceny/globalis.htl> (d8Nov207). 9 Bur t try fIni (Blkw Puer, UK,?19). 10 RicadCFlz Rligosfth SiRd:OvlndTrae nCultral Exchange from Antqty otheifteth Ceury(tartins rs, Nw Yok,). 11 F-HsinA crd fBdis Kgom(JaeLg trlrendo Prs, Oxfrd, 186) repitd Mak Kislank ()Surces fWrld Histyv 1(HapClinoleg Publsher,NwYor, 195)4?158. 12 Fit Cin dtheRom Orient:Rsarhes into heir Anciet nd Meiavl Rlatins RprsdOlCins cds (Shgi dgK,185)(sc nde by Jeom SArkebrg, DparttofHitry,Clfria St Uivrity, Fulrto)35?96. <ht:/w.foha.edu/hls/eas/omchin1.tl>(cesd Nov205 (Hirth) 92 The expansion of Islam through the western Mediterranean, Central Asia, India and eastwards during 650?850 AD marks another milestone in the history of globalization. 13 Islam brought cultural rituals and ways of life alien to peoples of Asia. The migration of people from the western Mediterranean region to parts Asia particularly for trade was also a significant development of that era. Later, the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in 1300 AD, spanning Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, facilitated this process. The Ottomans established political commercial ties overland with Safavids and dynasties in Central Asia and India, creating a vast imperial network of integration that led to an immense expansion of trade with Europe. 14 By 1450 AD, the trade networks involving movements of people, animals, precious minerals, goods and money extended from England to China. Most significant among them were the land route across Central Asia, and the sea route along the Red Sea across Indian Ocean through the Straits of Malacca to the Chinese coast. 15 As early as 1500 AD the Mongols in Central Asia had established an efficient political framework for overland trade network via the Silk Road, as recounted by both Ibn Battuta 16 and Marco Polo. 17 During the same period the spread of Islamic trading communities along the numerous ports of the Indian Ocean created a world of sea trade in the region parallel to the land routes. 18 This early exchange ideas, knowledge and merchandise in era before industrialization and the birth of the nation state is identified by Hopkins as archaic globalization, 19 which was powered ?by great kings and warriors searching for wealth and honour in fabulous lands, by religious wanderers and 13 Andre Wink Al-Hind The Makingofthe Indo-Islamic World, Early Medival Indi a the ExpasiofIsam, 7 th ?1tCtursvl1& (Brl,theNtens, 204). 14 C Byl TheBirtof de Wr780?194. Glbl Coctio Comprison (lckwe,Oxfod, 204). 15 Ronald FinlayGlbaliztn a th European Ecomy: edival Origns the Idustrial evuti (Dscuin Pper#:012-8,Dttf nocs,oumbaUivriy, New Yrk, 27Mrh 20)<ht/w.clmbi.d/uei/ipr/DP012-8.pf> (acsd 3J6; Roald Finay n Kevin HO?Rurke Cdity Mrket Ingration, 1500?2000 (iscuinPper#:012-30,parttof Ecnoics, olubiaivsiy, e ork, 27arh 20) <ht/.colubi.du/cemi/dpar/P012-30.pdf >(acesd t3J6). 16 R EDun Te advntures fIbn Bat, aMsli travelr ofthe fourtenth cetury (CromHl,Lo, 198). 17 John are MrcPolad Th Discovery fThe World (Yl Univrsity Prs, Nw Haven, ectiu,19). 18 Khdri Taden Civlstin th India Ocan: AEcomic Histor fm th Ris of Islam to750(CmbrigUeryPres,Cmbrge, 1985); Hirth, abven 12. 19 Hpkins, aov 6, 4. 93 pilgrims seeking God in distant realms, and by merchant princes and venturers pursuing profit amidst risk across borders and continents.? 20 The internationalization of trade and the resultant political developments from circa 1600 to 1800 constituted a new phase which Hopkins calls proto- globalization and which ?in structure, scale and geographical reach, [?] was a departure from its archaic precursor.? 21 This trading process, which placed reliance on the trading posts in the Mediterranean and Western Asia, created an intermediary between Europe and Far East for trade, a kind of middleman raising the cost of trade in the Far East for Europeans. This in turn prompted the Europeans, especially Spanish and the Portuguese, to seek an entirely seaborne route, whether westward or eastward, to the Indies and beyond. The result was of course the journeys of Columbus and da Gama, who travelled westwards and eastwards to the ?Indies? in 1492 1498 respectively, laying the foundation for the European seaborne empires. 22 Trading between Asia, Americas and Europe intensified and the Europeans not only bought commodities that were available for sale but commenced to commission specific types of goods more suitable to the European markets, perhaps creating the very first export processing zones in regions. As trade expanded, banking systems and major trading companies became established in the region that were controlled by, or had direct links with, Europe. 23 By 1700, several European trading companies travelled regularly to Asia on ships insured and protected by European and governments with goods produced for sale in the Asian markets, and generated substantial profits for investors in both the ships and their cargo. A century later, the Atlantic and Indian Ocean system were connected to one another via the flow of currencies and commodities and by the operations of the British, French, and Dutch overseas trading companies. The 17 th and 18 th centuries were classified as the age of mercantilism, in which state power in Europe depended directly on sponsoring 20 Hopkins, above n6, 4 21 . 22 Oliver JThtcr (d) The Libray ofOrignal Sources: 9th o16th Centuris (University RsacExensioC.,Mlwuke,1907) v.V,26?40 (canedbyJS Akebrg, Dpof Hitory, Clifra St Univrsit Flert <hp:/w.dhm.ed/hal/mod/4dgam.htl> (s 23Jun 206). 23 arles Tily ? Europ fClubs n Byzid?192) 78MidleEastReport 2?5. 94 and control of merchant capital. 24 As the European imperial expansion shifted into Asia, the use military power by nation states for the protection of their international interests became a standard feature of trade. 25 By the beginning of the 18 th century the British East India Company monopolized all commodities imported into Britain from the what was called the East Indies ? land east of Lebanon. 26 The company epitomizes a very early version of a multi-national corporation. It had consolidated its position with the assistance the British government and in fact, until reined in by legislation in early 19 th century, came to rival the British state as a power in itself. It did so much as modern multinationals have often done to their parent states, only in their case, shall be shown, it has generally been without such a curtailment. 27 The fundamental shift in terms of policy from trading to colonization had become established in the region east Lebanon, including South Asia, under the British during this period. The British Empire, which expanded into Asia and then to Africa along with the French and Dutch, first evolved as a means of economic imperialism rather than territorial domination. This stage of the evolutionary process of globalization is termed ?modern globalisation? by Hopkins and it is dominated by the ?rise of the nation state and industrialisation?. 28 The political developments taking place in Europe in the 18 th century further fuelled the expansion of the notion of establishing empires by the European nations. In particular, the French Revolution of 1789 eventually paved way for the establishment of strong modern states throughout Europe where military and business concerns were now managed by governments elected through democratic representation (though democracy still fell far short of today?s connotation of a universal franchise). The strong nationalist governments, elected or not, were eager to acquire and consolidate assets for economic growth. This in turn led to 24 David Ormod The Ris ofCmercial Empires: Englad n the Nterlands ithe Ag of Mercntls,1650?1770(abidgUnvtyP, NewYork,203). 25 Ashi a Gupta n MN Prso Ii d h IiOc 15?1800 (Oxfor Univrsity Pr,eli,987). 26 Nick Robns ?Lot: Isearch fte East Inia Company, the orld?s firt anstial orpati?(20)14EnviomndUrbzti 79 <ht:/eu.sgepub.c/gt/stc/14/>(cs 17Feb 206). 27 Gr PLandow The Brish Ea Iia opany ?TheCompanythOwned aNtion (r Two) <t:/.vitianb.org/istry/emir/ei.tl (acsd 4e 08). 28 Hpkins, be 6, . 95 more militarized British, Dutch, and French imperial growth in Asia and Africa. In the last decades of the 19 th century, the colonial expansion of Africa was closely associated with the notion of so-called white man's burden, which perceived colonialism as a noble enterprise. 29 This era of modern globalisation was signified by the colonial territories of Africa and Asia producing raw materials for Europe?s centres of industry, trade, finance. This era has remarkable similarities with what the present thesis calls contemporary globalization, which is termed ?post colonial globalisation? by Hopkins and dates from the 1950s. 30 This brings in two vital new players: in the east, Japan, in the west, USA ? the exception of a former colony that had broken off from the British Empire while the latter polity continued to grow elsewhere. Contemporary or post-colonial globalization refers to the more major decolonialization of two hundred years after the American Revolution and is dominated by ?new types of supra?territorial organization and new forms of regional integration?. 31 It has both continued to build on the foundations the nation state as the basic formal unit of political organization (though in reality discreteness, integrity and sovereign power of such a unit in many ways have already been seen in Chapter 1 to be under strain) and added to the ranks of such states the newly independent ex-colonial nations. This phenomenon has been accompanied by the general consolidation in the older, parent states particularly but to some extent also in their newly independent offspring, of a liberal form of democracy which accommodates pluralism. As Cook and Kirkpatrick observe, international trade in the conventional form became less significant in this era and the USA, Europe and Japan established themselves as global economic superpowers: 32 The internatiolization ofecnomic activity isnot a ew phenomn ...The rct gowth interal integrtionisqualitativlydiffrt, wevr, fom th rlie expsio ftertiol trde, in tht it hs b carteizd by eintensificationoecnoic linkas tht trnsce natiol oundies, ften at th fucl levl. 29 Mick Hume ?Dos Africa nedthsecrusader baring the Wite Man's burden?? The ims (Lond,Englad,17Ju205) <p:/w.timsol.couk/rcl>(cs17Jun205). 30 pis bv n6, 8. 31 k,oe 32 PCo and CKirkpatrick ?Globalizton, Regionalizton ad Thir orld Devlopment? (197)31Rgil Sudes5(Ck dKirkptrck). 96 Post-colonial globalization represents ?a world order? that is in transition and where the ?boundaries of the ?global village? are fluid; its inhabitants highly mobile.? 33 Advocates post-colonial globalization seek to promote the virtues of its particular neo-liberal version as the only panacea for poverty and underdevelopment, while its critics ?see it a means of expropriating the resources of the poor countries by drawing them into debt, encouraging the use of sweated labour and accelerating environmental degradation.? 34 The analysis of contemporary globalization, its theoretical foundations and its manifestations is the main thrust of this chapter. This analysis will be resumed in section 2.4 of this chapter after analysing the impact of (prior) historical globalization on the socioeconomic and political structures of colonial South Asia. 2.3 Negative Impact of Historical Globalisation on Colonial South Asia As discussed above, South Asia has been a major ? though often passive ? participant in international trade for many centuries. 35 Among their well-known interactions were with the Portuguese and then the Dutch who took over the ports and maritime areas exposing the people to European religions, customs and even legal systems. 36 However, Portuguese and Dutch era had only a marginal impact on the domestic economic arrangements society and no political in region. The self-sufficient economies of South Asia, their crucial methods of domestic production, and their patterns consumption remained undisturbed until the region was drawn into the emerging global capitalist system as part of the British Empire in the early 19 th century. As much as the contemporary manifestation of globalization with its emphasis on economics has had a negative impact on South Asia, the earlier globalization 33 Hopkins, above n6, 9. 34 C dKirkpatrickabove n32, 64. 35 DPhilut Cs-ultrlTadeinWorld History (Cambridge University Pres, 1984). 36 Te ortgeswre di yth Dutch tfhe Mlucs thal dcaofth7 th cntuy; fMalcb164;ofSri Lankb1658.T Dutcsorv u e Brish EastIndi ompn fro te pie Isldt itis en?di em f?bcas te ti aywntceroIdavryssuly. Se ?Hitory ofDucire? <htp:/w.hstoywrld.net/rldhis/PlainTxtHistries.p?historid=a61> (acsd 21Jan 208). 97 process of the 19 th century during the period of the expansion of the British Empire also resulted in negative repercussions for region. 37 Military and political domination by the British, which was consolidated throughout the subcontinent, resulted in brutal repression and exploitation of the local society, culture and economy. 38 The administration, executed initially through the East India Company, exposed South Asia far more pervasively than before to the trading of goods and capital transfers with Britain. Before the subcontinent succumbed to British rule, the region had a thriving self-sufficient textile industry. The import of cheaper textiles from Lancashire and crippling tariffs ruined the self-sufficient cottage industry. 39 Robins observes that, ?it was the Company?s plunder that first de-industrialized [India] and then provided finance that fuelled Britain?s own industrial revolution. In essence, the Honourable East India Company found India rich and left it poor.? 40 The British were also responsible for the deforestation and the compulsory acquisition of rural agricultural land for coffee and tea plantations, yields of which were sold in the global commodity markets. The rural peasantry who had existed for centuries on subsistence agriculture were coerced into growing export crops, making them directly dependent on the fluctuating global markets. This transformation not only had profound immediate economic consequences but also created other social and political problems that South Asian states are still attempting to solve. 41 The rural peasantry were plunged into a state of chronic poverty and exposed to famine conditions throughout the period British rule. Davis claims that the colonial authorities aggravated conditions of famine by denying access to 37 Romesh Cunder Dut The Econmic History fIndia (Publicatons Divson, Mistry of Infrati Boacsig,Gvt.fInda,1970) Sg Bead AyehaJldern Sut As: Histry, Cltr Plial E (Rotle,Ld Nw Yrk, 198). 38 Theviolnce dtheadtosufer bythcniz islutr inRudngshu Mkrj ?SatL os Upn th:TKapur Macre inIathe volt f57? (190) 28Ps Prnt92?16.Sal UL: <t:/liks.jtor.g/sic?i=031- 2746%190%2903A8%3C923A%2ET%320CO%3B2-> (acsed 6Feb ). 39 IrfanHbi ?Studying aolnial Econmy without Percivng olnialsm? (1984) 2Social Sciets 3-27. ableURL:<htp:/ks.jtr.g/si?=097- 029819429123A123CASCEW3E2.CO3B2-T> (cesd 6Feb 6); Amiy Kur Bagci Te Politcal ony ofUndervlopentCabrigUnivrsity Pres,). 40 Nick Robins ?Lot: inserh ft Est Idia mpa, th wrld?s firt sntioal orpat?(20)14EvionmeanUrbnztio <ht:/eu.sgepub.c/gct/14/79> (cesd17 Feb 206). 41 Fr intc, xort fhap Idi lourtSri Lanktorkontheplantios ha resultd itxsfaunityofep amidsthplis wi cizprigtin Sri Lak orIdi. 98 grain reserves for starvation as a useful weapon of asserting sovereignty over the people. 42 During the period 1876?1901, the Indian subcontinent experienced 18 major famines. Digby, the British economist and a member of the Famine Commission in India, estimated that over 30 million Indians, one out every 10, died of starvation under British rule in the 19 th century alone. 43 The collapse of domestic trade and rural industry had forced the migration of artisans into the rural economy agriculture. The victims of starvation deaths were these displaced people belonging to the poorest sections of the society, such as the low castes. 44 After decolonization the moderate nationalists who came to power throughout the region inherited functioning capitalist market economies, though many of market institutions were weak. South Asia had become unretractably a part the global trading system. Many states in the region like Sri Lanka relied heavily on their commodity export economies. 45 However, by the 1960s, the negative impact of the unreliable global economy was felt within countries. Many erected barriers to both international trade and investment and increasingly turned to state controls and centralized planning for industrialization growth. Both balance of payments difficulties and ideological commitment to import substitution contributed to this policy shift. 46 By the mid-1970s, India?s share of world trade, for instance, was half that of 1950s. 47 South Asia thus became heavily protectionist with the state controlling every aspect of economic activity. As we shall see, Sri Lanka was the first to undertake a decisive break with this protectionist paradigm, embracing liberalization in 1977?1978, 48 and the 1980s 42 Mike Davis Lte Victorian Holcaust: ElNi?o Famines ad the Making ofthe Tird Worl (Vrso,20). 43 Apndix E 44 BM hatFmines iIndia: AStudy inSoe Aspct ofthe Econmic History fIndia with SecilRefrc to Problems (Delh, Kark PublisrPvt Ld,1985). 45 Hnry OlivJrEcic OpioaliynCeyn (DukUiversit Pres, Durm 1957). 46 Smita ehrota ?oni Perfnce fIdia Paist: AComparti Evaltion 1970?93? inMh LalShma tl.(s)Globlston, ecry nd Goernce outh Asi:Isu dAtrtivs(Kiga, Dlhi, 203)9?350. 47 DBHeo?Cycles inIdn EcocLerasti, 1696? (198) 31Cmpartive Plitcs 43?60. 48 rmahndrathukoralg Sarth Rajptirn Liberalizton ad Inustrial Tnsfoti Si Ln:riLnkiIneolPspcve(Oxfor Uvesity Pres, USA, 20). 99 saw Nepal, Maldives and Pakistan move towards more liberal policies. 49 Bangladesh?s economic policies were exceptional: they had never reflected the dirigisme of its neighbour India. Rather, since its creation in 1971, Bangladesh had placed heavy reliance on the IFIs for formulation of policy on development and aid. India, confronted with a major balance of payments crisis in 1991, finally joined the reform process in the early 1990s. Though initially there were vehement criticisms about desirability and consequences of such a drastic change in policy, subsequently the dialogue has focussed on the pace and scope of reforms rather than their basic direction. Thus the present economic liberalization in South Asia at least seems irreversible. The experience of colonization, or what Hopkins refers to as modern globalization, was political and military domination. 50 Yet, this experience continues to affect the South Asian psyche even today, as the region wrestles with the new wave of contemporary globalization. Some take view that the opening up of the national economies of South Asia to the world economy will once again be an opportunity for the West to subjugate and exploit as in the colonial era. 51 This scepticism is a result of the impact of the British rule, which was oppressive as it destroyed the pre-existing, prosperously self-sufficient social order, creating in its place an economy that was dependent on the global markets, which benefited only a small elite segment of the societies. 2.4 Contemporary Globalization: A General overview As mentioned, in this thesis contemporary globalization refers to the world after World War II and coincides with what Hopkins calls post-colonial globalization. Though contemporary globalization has its roots in the immediate post World War II era, we can say that the concept was rejuvenated 40 years later by the end of the Cold War. This next geopolitical shift has been claimed many as 49 Mustaph Kaml Pash ?Liberalizton, Stae Ptronage d the ?Nw Inequality? inSouth Ai? nelidJSeidnRchd LHris(d)CitclPrspctivso Gbztad Neolbrs nT DvlopigCut : Irtional SudiScilg cil thplogy(BrilAcam Pbliser,USA,20) 71?79. 50 Hkins, abve 6, 8-9. 51 MutKmlPsh?Neo-liral Rcipe and Pkistan? (204) South Asian Joural. <htp:/w.soutaindia.nt/Mgz/Jourl/eolbrl_pakisn.m>(cesd6Feb 208). 100 marking the commencement of a new world order. The shift heralded the triumph of Western liberal democracy over Communism as what Francis Fukuyama, at first questioningly and later more assertively, called the ?final form of human government?; 52 the capitalist ideals promoted by the winners were going to be the foundations of the fresh world order. Capitalism in its current, neo-liberal form, which includes the radical ? but still selective and unequal ? promotion of free markets on a global scale, was hailed as the greatest achievement of socioeconomic evolution and a panacea for all economic and social ills, and globalization became the medium that promoted neo-liberal capitalism worldwide. 53 The pro-globalization economists who subscribed to this theory claimed that liberalization and integration into global markets and privatization of state assets would create an environment that would foster economic growth. 54 The same philosophy with the added attraction of seemingly endless foreign direct investment, rapid industrialization and transfers of technology was advocated for the developing countries. 55 In theory at least, such integration would result in industrial growth and employment opportunities for the millions who were unemployed and living in conditions of absolute poverty in the Third World. According to Fukuyama, one the greatest advocates of this position, global political and economic homogenization is inevitable and liberal democracy and the (supposedly) unregulated market economy coupled with globalization is only option available for global prosperity. 56 The conceptual explanations of contemporary globalization are so 52 ?What we may bewitnesig notjust he nd ofthe Cold War, othe pasing ofa prticular periodfpost-rhsory, buthed firyasuc:tistndt mkind's lgicl vluti adivrsalizto fWtrn lbrl emcryshe fl frof huan ern.?Frncis Fkym ?TheEnd ofHisty??(198) 6T NatioItest4. LterFkyam wote ofidentlft samecep ihs bokEndf Hisry and st M(rPrs,New Yr, 193). 53 ThoJ Biestk ?Th?iuph?of Librl Eonic Idas inte Dvlopig Worl? i Barb Stalng (d)Global Cnge, RnaRespe:ThNwIratinCtexf Devlpm Cbrige UivrsityPrs, Cmridg, 195) 74?198 54 Jhwti?Fe T:Old a Nwhls?(eEcomic Joural 104; Paul Krugan PdlnProsprit:Econic Sen a on-s in theAgfDimnished Expectios (W. Ntn, e Yrk,194);IsrtHuai ?Glbalzi and Lberlzto: A OrtuityReducvty?i UCTAD Glblzt d Lrlizto: Efcsf Intrainl Econmi latios nPoverty (nitedNtions, ewYork Gev,196). 55 TN Svas ?ThCs fHeita dRluca lalitn: Iia?VKRamswai Memoril Letur, delivrdth DliScho fEmcs 21Mrch 203 <htp:/w.con.ya.u/~srinvs/> (es26 ov 206). 56 Francis Fkm, Th E ofitryand tLastMn(Fre Prs, New York, 193). Se lsoSuelHtigtClashe Cvilzio (193) 7/oignAfais,ndimonad htr Ran ofe Wrld Or(New Yrk,6. 101 intermingled with neo-liberal economic terminology that globalization is often defined in terms of the key principles of economic liberalization. 57 Analysts nevertheless concede that as globalization and liberalization are open to such wide interpretation, disagreement about precisely when countries may be said to have globalized or liberalized is unsurprising. 58 In fact, the modern manifestation of the idea of globalization is perceived to be a part of neo-liberal economic agenda. Tabb succinctly explains the contemporary articulation of globalization with its neo-liberal leanings when he observes that in the era of contemporary globalization, ?[t]he ideologically hegemonic position has been the neo-liberal agenda (widely called the Washington Consensus). It calls for trade and financial liberalization, privatization and deregulation, openness to foreign direct investment, a competitive exchange rate, fiscal discipline, lower taxes and small government.? 59 2.5 Conceptualizing Contemporary Globalization An in-depth theoretical analysis of the concept of globalization is beyond the scope of this study. The purpose ensuing discussion is nevertheless to highlight what this thesis argues to be a crucial ?hijacking" of the concept that has then been passed off as a necessary and inevitable corollary it. That is, although globalization as a concept is ideologically neutral and capable of taking on different contents, the contemporary trajectory of globalization has assumed a particular character because the proponents the concept within academia and policy formulation have relied on the propagation of a particular genre of theoretical reasoning for the concept of globalization. This ideological bias in the guise of an inherent attribute to which ?There Is No Alternative? has been fundamental basis upon which the contemporary theorization of globalization has been constructed. 57 Adamntia Polis alo cnedsthesntial chrater ofcntemporay globalizton tbe ?a ulti-evldphenm, urly udrped byidlg fneirsm?.APlis ?H Rigts Glblizato?(204) 3Jourlf Hua Rihts34. 58 JfryouaJoh Wle ?Glbaliztn aPoverty:Iplicaosf South sian Expeinc fr the idrDt inMr Bsl nd Jf .und(e)Glblto and Pvt:Cnls n PolcyRspoes(RoutegWarwikStis laist, 206) 76. 59 Wilam KTabb Ecomi Gvernac inth A fGloblizton (Clumbi University Pres, NewYork,205) 3. 102 A perusal of the mainstream conceptual inquiries indicates that globalization eludes precise definition. Academic attempts at theorizing the concept have resulted in various descriptions. 60 Manders compares contemporary theorization of globalization to the ancient Buddhist parable of six blind scholars? description an elephant and observes that there exists no general definition of the term except broad generalizations such as ?increasing global interconnectedness?, the ?rapid intensification of world wide social relations? or ?the compression of time and space?. 61 Some assert that globalization is an all- encompassing term utilized to describe the progression of national states into integrated global arena, propelled by transnational actors such as the international financial institutions and multinational corporations with latter taking on varying degrees of power, orientations, identities and networks. Others assert that modern manifestations of the globalization concept indicate a stretching of social, political and economic activities beyond political frontiers, regions and continents. 62 The idea of contemporary globalization is closely associated with deterritorialization and shrinking to the effect that in the globalized world social and economic activities take place irrespective of geographical location of the actors. 63 For instance, Giddens observes: 64 Globaliztion ca ? be dfine as the intensification of wrldide social relatios whiclinkistant loclitieuch wy tht local hpningare shpdyevts ouring may iles aydvicers. Tis a dialeticl rocs bcausch lol hpeningm o inan obverirectio from the vristaniated[sic] rlatios tht shpeth. Lcl transfornisas muh pt of glbalistioa lateral xtensio fsiatio r tim and sace. 60 UBeck What isGlobalizton?(Plity res, Cambridge, 20) 1. 61 ManfrdSegr sm The NwMktIeoly(RowmandLitlefild Publisher Inc, SA, 201) 79. 62 ryofintos fglobalizton(s) ca bgaind thrug perusal ofFrank JLcr and Jh Bl (eds) TheG Redr(BlckelPblisOxfd,20),d also mesima?lbaliztn: Ast Prim?? <tp:/w.colr.du/spec/gaonf/paes/tlan.htl> (aces 3Jun 06); Rnald Robrsn Gbizton: Sil Thry d Globl Cure (Sge,Lond,192);Athoy GideTher WayhRnwlfSciDcybri Plity res, 198). 63 Malcm atslblizto (uteg, New Yrk, 195) (Wats). 64 Antoyidn Te Cseqcs ofMdrnity(StanfordUniverit rs, Stanford, 0) 64. 103 It is the ?intensification of global consciousness which is a relatively new phenomenon? that delineates the contemporary and sets it apart from previous manifestations of globalization. 65 Sholtes observes that as a manifestation of the notion of global compression, ?global events can ? via telecommunication, digital computers, audiovisual media, rocketry and the like occur almost simultaneously anywhere and everywhere in the world.? 66 Exposure to contemporary globalization has resulted in a metamorphosis of civic life unparalleled in human history for it creates a sense of social interconnectedness through amalgamation of trade, investment, finance, migration, culture or any other type of human interaction. The ?intensification of economic, political and cultural relations across borders? which we are witnessing today is considered by some to transcend the political organization of the world which is made up of sovereign and independent, self- determining ?nation states? ? a form of organization prevailing since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 67 Just as the medieval order gave away to the nation states system after 1648, it is evident that states-system is likely be eclipsed in our times by the forces of globalization. In this sense, globalization transforms ?the organisation of human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and continents? 68 as cultures and societies have become intimately bound through political, financial technological forces in a hitherto unprecedented manner. The increasing intensity of global intimacy results in a concentrated velocity of global interactions and processes, which directly influences the evolution of world-wide systems including transport and communication, and results in a rapid dispersal of ideas, goods, information, capital, and people. 69 In this context, globalization is regarded not as an end point, but rather as the beginning for an enlarged and protracted process. Giddens, among others, seems to reiterate the position that globalization is a constitutive feature of the modern world and that 65 Waters bove n63, 4. 66 Jn AtSchlt?Beyond the Buzword: Tards crital theory fGlobalizton? iE Kofmd GYug (s)GlbalistnheoynP(Pint,Lnd, 196)45. 67 CharlesKelJr.a Egn RWitkpf rl olits (6 th d StMrtisPres, Nw Yk, 197) 249. 68 DvidHltalobl Trsformatins (Stafrd University Pres, 19) 5(Hld tal.) 69 Ib, -6. 104 modern history can trace its gradual evolution 70 Contemporary globalization is also projected as a multidimensional process since it manifests itself in a diverse range of areas of social activity such as the economic, the political and the cultural. 71 Held et al. have analysed the diverse accounts of globalization found in both public and academic discourse and discerned three broad accounts of the nature and meaning of contemporary globalization. They refer to these as accounts by the hyperglobalists, the sceptics, and the transformationalists. 72 Hyperglobalists, according to Held et al., argue that contemporary lives are led in an increasingly global world in which states are experiencing incalculable economic and political processes of change. These changes are eroding and fragmenting nation states and diminishing the political power of the governments. 73 In these circumstances, by analogy to the economic terms of passive price-takers and active price-makers, states are increasingly the decision- takers and not the decision-makers. The capacity to govern in Westphalian style is diminishing, resulting in challenges within and beyond the state. The very legitimacy of the state is increasingly questioned through globalization. Thomas Friedman is an ardent promoter of this view and his theorization of globalization holds accordingly that it is the: 74 inexorable integration ofmarkets, natio-state and technologies toa degr nv witnesd bef? in wy tht is enblinginividuals, crpotions tio-tate torch rudthorldfrth, fster, epr d hrtha er bfor. The sceptics strongly oppose this stand-point and assert, firstly, that current global conditions are not unparalleled in the history of civilization. Secondly and concomitantly, in their perception, while there has been an intensification of international and social activity in recent times, this process has toughened and enhanced the role of the state, making it a key player and, in the terms used above, a decision-maker in the process rather than mere decision-taker. 70 Anthoy Gidens The Consequncesof Mdernity (Stanford University Pres, 190). 71 Held al.,bov68,2?6. 72 t . 73 KnichOmeThBordels World: Power and Straegy inthe Itrlinked Econmy (Balger Pub C, Nw Yk,190)(Ohm). 74 T FidanLxusan th live Tr (Fr, trus d Giroux, Nw Yr, 19). 105 Immanuel Wallerstein?s theorization of globalization places him within the sceptical school. He contends that the present phase is one point of a historical process whereby the capitalist world-system extended across the globe ? globalization is its culmination, 75 and he acknowledges that ideological celebration of so-called globalization is in reality the swan song of our historical system. 76 He traces the modern world system as a continuum from circa 1500 through feudalism, industrialization, colonial trading systems and the growth of the market institutions. Wallerstein?s rationalization of globalization is essentially Eurocentric in the sense that his theory is based on an analysis of core and peripheral states in terms of skilled/unskilled labour, capital-intensive/labour- intensive production methods, and greater/lesser military strength. 77 His analysis of globalization therefore peripheralizes the alternative historical trajectory that can be traced from the developing world?s perspective. Sceptics also appear to subscribe to the position that globalization is not an inevitable process but a deliberately engineered ideological project of economic liberalization that forces states, systems and individuals into the free market process. 78 The transformationalists contend the whole process has constructed a novel political, social and economic ethos, which diaphanously transforms the nature and the function of the state within its own geographical boundaries as much as it interrelates with other entities in the global arena. There is no certain outcome at the culmination of the process but transformationalists claim that the state can no longer go back to pre-globalization era when state sovereignty was regarded as sacrosanct and the foundation of all transactions in the global arena. 79 From the above brief discussion it is evident that the theorization of globalization accepts that the globalization concept marks a complex juncture in the evolution of the history of mankind. It concedes that individual, institutional and state transactions are undergoing convoluted alterations and profound transformations 75 IWalerstin Utopistc: Or, Historical Choices fthe Twnty-First Century (The Nw Pres, NewYok, 198). 76 Ibid, 32. 77 alerstin ?The Ris and Futre Dmise ofthe World-Capitlst Sytem: oncepts for CompvAaly?(1974)6 CopartvSuisn ScendHisr387?415. 78 PMci Dvopmet Scil ng: AGlblPrsctv (3 rd d, Pi Frge Prs, 2003); HrstndG Thsn,?GbztioNecsay Mh??iirstanThompn (eds)GlobaliziQuti (Polity res, Camridg, 196)?17 ( s). 79 Jam NRsea rblec WldPlitcs (Pnto UniversityPres,190); Aty insCquncof Mdrnit(it r,brie,0). 106 in the light of globalization. It also concedes that the culmination of the process of globalization is still not evident for the process possesses a self-evolving quality. However, at this point [not the same juncture just referred to?] it is vital to note that regardless of the direction globalization is heading, and what form the process may take at its end point, its current practice excludes other rationalizations of globalization than the articulation of the mainstream, dominant neo-liberal paradigm. The multi-dimensional quality of globalization is widely acknowledged and its conceptualization is undertaken within several disciplines of the social sciences such as economics, sociology, psychology, history, politics and cultural studies. However, this conceptualizing of globalization within the context of social science paradigms appears faulty, as the conceptualisation is distant from the contemporary world reality. Like many other dominant theories of the social sciences ? such as colonialism, modernism, multiculturalism and liberalism ? globalisation also suffers from a theoretical rationalisation that takes on a distinct Western (northern) perspective while nevertheless claiming universality. The major rationalisations of globalization, whether explored in terms of a world- systems theory, political theory or a cultural perspective, share this defective analysis. This study is of the view that contemporary theoretical constructions of globalization primarily ignore the rudimentary principle that globalization by definition should be a diffusion of ideas and other influences from any point of the globe to another and not from a core centre to the peripheries. In fact, a major theoretical rationalization of globalization recounts narrative of globalization from a Western perspective. Despite the acknowledgement that Globalization is not spread of diffusion of ideas from the West to the rest, 80 theories of contemporary globalization source the idea of globalization to a series of events, including the Enlightenment, the Peace of Westphalia, the Industrial Revolution, colonial trading networks, two World Wars and creation of the supranational institutions that share common Western European genealogical roots. These highlights in the mainstream sociopolitical discourse are seen through a particular Western perspective that not only ignores but rejects the 80 se Sn above n8. 107 civilizational accounts of the rest of the world. Such an account?s inevitable destination if it is allowed uncontrolled is a concept which celebrates liberalism, the ?free? market (often subtly rigged for the benefit of the wealthiest players, as will be shown in Chapter 3) epitomized by flow capital and privatization, which has little political, cultural or social resonance outside the Western world. 81 Furthermore, the theoretical analysis of contemporary globalization also presupposes that its present trajectory from the West to the rest is a natural evolution, which precisely is inevitable and cannot be resisted. 82 This perspective creates the illusion that an alternate trajectory is not possible and cannot be conceived within the contemporary global political, social economic dynamics. 2.5.1 South Asia Encounters Contemporary Globalization South Asia has not been insulated from the new wave of contemporary globalization, which emerged fully as a recognizable transnational regime in the early years of the 1980s. Its influence has reached every aspect of human existence from science and technology to culture and the environment. However, the impact of globalization the reaction to it in South Asia have not been uniform. Some have actively promoted the idea of globalization in South Asia 83 and others viewed it with a range emotions from a deep sense of scepticism to absolute resentment. 84 The term globalization is often used in two different contexts particularly in relation to the developing world. The term is utilized in a positive sense to 81 Friedman?s ertion tha ?globalizton emrges fro belw ?from pel?s very soul and fothir p asis?i n gvxpinthainstadfintof glblzo. Thm LFredmThLus ad th Oliv Tr: Urstg Glblizt (Ancr Bks,USA,20) 38. 82 Histadpon abvn7 83 TN Srivsa Gllizto: Ist God rBad? (Stanford Istiue for Ecnomic Poliy Resch ?PolicyBref, Dcembr,20);JgishNgwan Dsf Glbaztn (OxfordUnerst PsUSA, 4. 84 Va Siva?lobaliztonadPoverty? (20) 2 Resurce <htp:/w.rsugnce.rg/cets/20.hm>acesd0Fb 205);Asha Kushik Globlizton, Demy Culr: Situing Ghian Altrativ (Pointer, Japr,20); Rajn KhariRthikDvopmntIerofHumenesMPblisher, Idi,190). 108 describe the process of increased integration into the world economy, and in a normative sense to prescribe a strategy for development on the basis of intensified global integration. 85 The socioeconomic reality of South Asia, as much as elsewhere in the developing world, tends to equate the discourse on globalization to the intensified global economic relations, greater liberalization, few or no boundaries to the power of the IFIs and TNCs and their state sponsors, denationalization, and the free transfer of capital finances, which are the fundamental tenets of the neo-liberal economic discourse. 86 As stated before in this study, out of the states in South Asia, Sri Lanka embarked on a path of liberalization and privatization 1977 becoming subject to a new wave contemporary globalization. The change of trajectory from previous dirigiste economic policy was prompted by economic expediency and global political influences as well as a profound change in political ideology. Bangladesh and Maldives have had a longer history of open economic policies. Bangladesh, in particular, has been reliant on external financial assistance for most of its short existence since 1971. This dependence has allowed Bangladesh?s policy formulation to be heavily influenced by international financial institutions and international NGOs upon whom Bangladesh has become heavily reliant. Pakistan?s exposure to the globalization process in the form of external trade and financial relations and migration of workers to West Asia occurred in the mid 1980s, predating the exposure to contemporary globalization of India, which commenced in earnest as late as 1991. The Indian experience of the new wave of contemporary globalization thus has a shorter history than the rest of South Asia, and the porous border between Nepal and India has meant that the liberalization of Indian economy automatically led to the liberalization of Nepali economy simultaneously. 87 Therefore, remembering Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Pakistan, India and 85 Depak Nyar ?Globaliston:Whatdoes itmean for Devlopment?? iShyaml Nagrj and KSJom(eds)z Versu Dvlpt(Plga Macila,UK, 201)?23. 86 Ths r olices whicf libriz, ritzi, d stbilztion wichre refrttvlya t ?ashngto Cnseus? poles?furhe arted Captr 3 o tis udy. 87 Fraetilacount fte xpsure fSth Asia tcntmporay globlizton s Achin Vnik () GblizadSoth Aia:Mulidmeol Pesctives(MahrPubliatos, NewDlhi,204); Dp t ()Ecnoic Lbrlistad Iunl Refms S Asia :Recnt ExerincesFutre Pspet(tanc, Dlhi,20). 109 Nepal as being the thesis?s definition of South Asia (but noting that Bhutan, the exception, remains economically and politically isolated), South Asia encountered the new wave of contemporary globalization gradually. Though the trajectory into global integration was broadly similar the impact of globalization was uneven, as the following paragraphs of this chapter, and Chapter 3 of this study, will indicate. There is ardent support for globalization and economic liberalization within academic policy circles in the South Asian subcontinent. Most significant among the supporters are Jagdish N Bhagwati and TN Srinivasan. Bhagwati has long maintained that economic liberalization, global trade and a transfer of resources from the developed world to the under-developed world, in the form capital flows through state-tostate grants and private investments, would enhance the process of development. 88 He has always argued that, ?economic globalisation, which offers economic prosperity to those who embrace it for the opportunity it presents instead of renouncing it due to the peril they fear it poses, is also generally speaking a force for advancing several social agendas.? 89 Bhagwati?s earlier works, such as India: Planning for Industrialization 90 and Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: India, 91 have provided both the foundation and the intellectual stimulus to embrace the process of globalization that India embarked on in the early 1990s. Convinced of inherent goodness of the globalization process as an apt vehicle and a ?force for advancing several social agendas?, Bhagwati has continued to argue for the relaxation of trade barriers, the liberalization of the economy and the privatization of state- owned enterprises. 92 Despite globalization being attacked from many quarters, Bhagwati has maintained that it is a positive force that has a ?human face? and he rejects the allegation globalization contributes negatively to global poverty 88 Jagdish NBagwti The Econmicsof Undervloped Countries (McGraw-Hil Bok C., NewYork,196) 20. 89 Jis ti InDfse fGlbalizt (Oxfr Uivrsity Pres, Incrpated, ary, rth Carlin, USA,4) 21. 90 Jgdis NBhagwti adPma si Indi: Planig for Industrialztio: Idustrilztion anTrePolicesnce95(OxforUverstyres,x, 1970). 91 Jis ti TN Sinvsa Foi Td ReimsndEcnmic Devlpmet: Id (Clumbia UvrstyPres, wYrk, 1975). 92 Jagish NBgwi India sitn:eing th Econy (Clareo Prs, Oxford, 193). 110 eradication. 93 In Stiglitz style he observes that globalization has an enormous capacity to be a positive force but its potential as a means of contributing to human development has been prevented through poor management the concept by the developing world. TN Srinivasan is another prominent voice in the South Asian academic circle who has relentlessly advocated for greater global integration. He continues to focus on the positive nexus between globalization and poverty reduction, asserting that pro- poor policies will become redundant if the state ensures greater access to markets, financial deregulation and more market-friendly insurance. 94 Srinivasan also identifies the greatest obstacle to smoother global integration and globalization to be the states themselves: 95 Globalistion is, in esnce, a proces that cretes oprtunities for aster gowth nd more apidovrty dution ino putries inwhicthedmestic ecicd litical virmt is nduiv. C cruption is , thlegsyte isefctive oris crpt, thefinanial syte dourages risktain, ndcivil strif aflictsith nighbors e rvaive sely not fertile rou for globlistion toyieldits fuits. Thpimr chlle fr th dvlopingntries who veb left t th globliztion prosismstic: hw totrafrmthdsticnviroment intoone that is nduive to globaliztion. Even Amartya Sen has no qualms with the idea of globalization per se: 96 Globaliztion has much toofer; but evn aswe dfn it, we must also, without ny cotrdictio, eth legitimcyofmayqustionthe anti- gloliztio protesr ask. Thr m b isiagois abot hrthmin prblems lie(they dnot lie inloaliztion, sch), t the ical d hu coneat ieldthse qustion cll for eiou reasmntsf theqacy f th tionl aglobal intitutiol argnts that chrteriz the tepory world and shp globalizd ecnmic ad soial relations. Academic opinions like these served as catalysts for the liberalization policies that emanated out of India in the early 1990s. The current dominant political thought in South Asia is pro-globalization. Though during the first years (1980s) the new wave of contemporary globalization had tended to promote the neo-liberal version 93 Jagdish NBagwti InDefsofGlbalizton (Oxford University Pres Incorpated, Cary, Nort Crolin USA,,204) 65. 94 TNSvsd Jsica SeddonWlck ?Glbalizt, Growth, ad th Pr? (204) 152/ DeEcmit, 251?272. 95 T rnasGloblizton: Ist God rBd? (Stnfrd Istiue for Ecnomic oliy Rsah ?Plicy Bref Dcembr,20) <iepr.tford.eu/pas/rifs/plicybrief_c02.pf> (aces 25Mar 205). 96 Amy Sn ?How tJudg oas? () 13ThAmrianPospect ht:/l.cisk.e/~ab/Mieln/gloalis.tl (sd 18Nv 7). 111 of globalization, which advocates ideas of liberalization, privatization and deregulation, a quest for a gentler, more human-centred version has been articulated within the dominant paradigm in recent years. Despite Manmohan Singh being an ardent supporter of the Bhagwati/Srinivasan thesis regarding the benefits of intensified globalization, many believe that his tenure in office will act as a harbinger for the adoption of a more humane version of globalization. 97 Whether there will be political will and strength to advocate for a humane version of globalization is, however, yet to be seen. 2.5.2 A Critique of the Contemporary Manifestation of Globalization in South Asia Held et al. concede that any comprehensive account of globalization must include a conceptualization of causation, periodization, impacts and the trajectories of globalization. 98 However, that analysis does not admit that discussion should be broad-based or diverge from its conventional position within the dominant paradigm to encompass a more universal approach. As observed in previous paragraphs of this chapter, globalization is recounted and conceptualized in quintessentially Western terms which ignore the possibility of it being recounted in a different theoretical context that may inject concept with different values or dimensions. There is a need to locate the theorization of globalization within the global, and not only Western, context to enhance its legitimacy beyond the Western world. As Stiglitz observes, ?[g]lobalization has enhanced the opportunities for success, but it has also posed new risks to developing countries. The rules of the game have been designed for the most part by the advanced industrial countries, or more accurately, by special interests in those countries, for their own interests, and often do not serve well the interests of the developing world, and especially the poor.? 99 97 Pratp Bhanu Mehta ?India?s Kindera Gentlr lobalizton? (204) 3Yale Global, <h:/ylegobl.y.u/ply.ticl?id=4315>(cesd Ju6. 98 Held t., v 68, 4. 99 JospEStiltz ?Deloment Polies InA World OfGlobalizton? Paper sentd athe minar ?New Inratin Trdsfr EcmicDevpment? hecsiof hfi vsyofth BlEciad Sal lBk (NDES),Ri Jiro, 12-13 Sp 20 112 The fundamental human problems witnessed in the contemporary formulation of globalization are not unique 100 but rather reflect a historical parallel in colonization. 101 This chapter has already traced how poverty and marginalization as by-products of globalization were experienced in the history of South Asia particularly during the time of British colonial occupation. However, new problems have added to old, and thus social dislocation, deterioration of the self-determination of states, terrorism and environmental degradation are all repercussions of contemporary globalization. Globalization has impacted on both the states and individuals, and it has transformed the relations between the individual, society and state. The following section of this chapter concentrates on the impact of globalization on the South Asian state, nationhood, national identity and the idea of human rights. 2.5.3 The Impact of Globalization on the Idea of State ? South Asia A general definition of the nation state is that it is a political unit in which divergent groups religious affiliation, ethnic groups, culture and nationalities have formed a cohesive political entity representing a common set of standards and values of governance. 102 The contemporary system of sovereign nation states has its origins in the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The birth of the nation state saw the consequent development international law and international relations based on notion of sovereign equality of states. The current wave of globalization has been the single significant force that raised challenges to the Westphalian model and its sacrosanct notion of sovereignty in its entire history, rendering the concept ?no <htp:/w3.gsb.columbia.edu/faclty/jstigltz/downlad/DevlopmentGlobalizton.pdf> (acesd 26May 206). 100 ?Wmust findewlns fro whi e ca sily btin raw trils d the sam tie xploit hplv bor thaivalbfromthenatvesofhecolne.Thcolniwouldaso rvdeaigudfr te surps gds proucd iur ftris? Cei Rs, Engih businn, colialst n?ond?fRi (Zimba) di1902,qtei L NzirChryFrm clials tohe?gll vlge?? (201)stanc os Fr Eqity,Kai, Pkist. 101 Jmes HroldTe End ofGlbliztn: Lsn fro th Grat Deprsio (Hrvad Univrites, arv,20). 102 S gnralyChistpher Pirso The Moder Stae (Rutledg, Lnd, 196). 113 longer theoretically or empirically serviceable in the face of internationalization of economic and social activity.? 103 The notion of a nation state is a relatively new phenomenon to the Indian subcontinent, legacy of colonialism with a history of less than 75 years. 104 Pre- colonial South Asia was largely divided into territorial units with traditional administrative systems ranging from feudal monarchies to tribal chiefdoms. These units were at times unified into a number of regional republics or hereditary monarchies. 105 Each territorial unit devised appropriate forms of governance, which were complex and drew substance from the unit?s own civilizational past. The rulers sought to maintain legitimacy of their rule by relying on a multi- layered structure of authority that represented the various identities and interests of the governed society. As much as the ruler was perceived as the ultimate repository of power and authority, the legitimacy of the rule was sought and maintained through critical institutional linkages with traditional power bases such as village councils. Territorial units of governance often depended on the military strength of the ruler and were often delineated on the basis of ethnicity or race. 106 The quest to carve out Westphalian-model nation states with a common national culture and political identity can be seen in the national freedom movements of South Asia. The impetus for suppressing diverse affiliations for the common goal of political independence in the middle of the last century provided sufficient legitimacy for the creation of nation states. 107 In this sense the creation of states in the subcontinent was not a result of social contract, as it was in Europe, but an artificial creation of the region?s colonial history. The project of nation-building after decolonization consisted of submerging a multitude of religious, ethnic and 103 Kanishka Jysuria ?Globalizton, Law, nd the Transformatin ofSverignty: The EmergceofGlblRegutry verce?(19)6Idi Jurl GlobalLalStudis 425?45 (Jsri). 104 Sthdiuon?sta? inChaptr Stion .82 ofthis tdy. Until he cnsolitn of theBris clial re h rtoes feRaj dthesurngreiosadvr xpnetehditWlin s. 105 T Idi subcon was l thom tnros mpirs cmncig with e MauryEmpri 326BCndcuiagihe MughalEeira 150aenurybfor the ival oftheastIi ompy rud 164. 106 S IWb (d)Paters fKinsipn Atority nTrditonl Asi (Dovr, Ne Hapsir, 1985). 107 Fo nexclnt acount fth stae-buildg rject ithe subctiet, se Gyandra Pandey RmberigPri:Violnc, NationlismandHitory nIda(Cmbrige Uivrsity Prs, Cbde a w Yrk201). 114 cultural identities to create a common nation with a single political and legal system. 108 Commenting on the creation of India in 1948, Sudip Kaviraj says, ?[T]he nation, in India ? is a thing without a past. It is radically modern. It can only look for subterfuges of antiquity. It fears to face and admit its own terrible modernity, because to admit modernity is make itself vulnerable...? 109 Sri Lanka, as a unitary state, has an equally short history, since 1815, when the British gained control of the whole island. Pre-colonial Sri Lanka was also ruled as different territorial units which were unified from time to time under strong monarchs. 110 The concept of sovereignty is intimately linked to the idea of the nation state. The fundamental idea is that a state has exclusive right to control all affairs within its territory. 111 Marc Williams further elaborates the concept by noting that it contains two features: 1) internally the state has absolute control over its territory and subjects; and 2) externally concept manifests as the sovereign equality of all states in that no state or entity is recognized as higher in authority than another. 112 Within the past two decades the process of globalization has had impacts on the notions of both sovereign equality nation states and internal sovereignty in ways that challenge the viability of the state paradoxically. On one hand globalization encourages global integration and interaction of nation states. the other hand such integration curtails the assertion of sovereignty of individual states in both the developed and developing world. This is particularly pertinent sphere of economic activities of the states. As Bonvin observes, ?[t]he autonomy and effectiveness of national economic policy have decreased as a direct result of globalization of financial market and financial deregulation.? 113 108 Meghnad Desai evlopmentadNtionhd: Esay inthe Politcal Eonmy ofSuth Asia (Oxfor UivrtyPrs, Nw Dlhi, 205). 109 SuipKj nd SuilKiCvilSciety: Histor d siblties (Cabridge niversty Pres,Cabrge, 201) 8. 110 DSilv AHistoyfSriLank(. urst &C., Lno, 198). 111 PrMax ubrn Ild Plms e (ThUnitedStaesfAmericav Nethrlands) Scot, Hague CortRepts283(192),(r CtArb 1928), N Rp Intl bAw 829,3. 112 rcWilm ?ehikng Soveigny?iElorKfdGi Yougs(e) Glbliztn: Tory ad Prcti (Ptr, Ldn, 6) ch8. 113 JBovGlblizt Lkas:halegsfrDevlopment Plicy? (197) 40 Delpet 39?42. 115 In relation to the developing states, the increased influence of the IFIs as global policymakers, and the operations of TNCs that dominate world finance and trade, 114 have had a negative impact on the sovereignty of the state, for these entities usurped the decision-making and policy-creating powers of the states in relation to national economies. From developed states? perspective, ?offshoring creates a space economy that goes beyond the regulatory umbrella of the state? affecting the ?territoriality and sovereignty in context of a global economy?. 115 In the context of both the developed and the developing world, it is largely true that ?those tolling sovereignty's death knell have been unable to convince the world that the concept is now obsolete.? Yet, globalization has impacted on concepts of sovereignty in respects discussed above. 116 Sassen?s observations above support Held et al.?s thesis that globalization?s primary actors challenge the sovereignty of nation states. 117 Held et al. assert that the threat to state sovereignty is posed by the global economy, especially dominant role played by the multinational corporations and the global capital markets, followed by supranational entities, such as The World Bank, IMF, WTO and UN. The remaining forces that offer challenge are international laws and hegemonic powers. 118 Each of these entities or regimes prescribes and influences the manner in which the state conducts its business both internally in relation to integration into global economy. 119 Commenting on this scenario, Ohmae says that: 120 in recnt decas we have watched th fre flow of ideas, individuals, vstmts, nindustriegro intoanoganicbndmong evloped economies. Not ly r trditionlly trd s a scurities frly exchanged inthe intelinkecmy, but s tore uchrial atsalan, 114 Se Capter 3of this tudy anlsoe, for adetil acount fow te TNCs have cquired unprcdnwerermie th rajctyf oni glbaliznaormuost hm itrst, DKt WCpins Rulth Wrd(Kmr Prs, BlfilCT, 196);NoeaHrz ThSilnt Tkover: Globa Cpials n the Dthfecray (Harp Clins, 203) 115 SskiSassenLosing otrl? Srignty in Age ofGlbalizton (Clumbi Universit Pre, olumbia, 196)(Sasen). 116 Michae Fwlerd Juli Bck Law, Poer, ad th Svreig Ste: Th Evolti ad Apltnfth Concptofvreignty(Thnsylani taUnivrsityPres, NwJersy, 195) 3. 117 Sase, abve 14. 118 RortJHoltnGlobalizton ad the Nation-Stae (Macilan, Lodn, 198) 06 quoted in Held l., 68; Sus rg?T fhte? TheRtratoftheSta:Th DifusinfPweritheWlEcomy (Cbridg UnivrsityPrs, Cmbridg, 19) ?87. 119 S Chapt 3of s tdy. 120 Ome, bvn7,216 116 companies, oftware, comercial rights ? and exprtise. Invitably, the ergec th intelinkd onmybringswithit an osio fationl svigtys pwr finratio directly touchlocal muities; acdic, profeional, a scial instituns, corptios, ad inividls. This transformation of the state, as Mann has analysed, is yet another stage of globalization?s historical development. 121 In his study he traces the gradual expansion of the character and functions of the nation states through time. Mann asserts that prior to the 18 th century the actual role of the state (though the concept and legal entity of nation states was well-established under the post-Westphalian world order) was indeed minimalist and extended little beyond conducting war and diplomacy, and internal repression. The state's role was expanded during the 19 th early 20 th centuries with the introduction of citizenship rights and concentration on the economic and social infrastructure. The 20 th century witnessed the creation and expansion of the welfare state and the state was also involved in macro-economic planning activities (in particular stabilization policies referred to in Chapters 3 and 4 of the present study). It was also bestowed with specific functions relation to war and military affairs. Considering these historical dynamics, Mann argues that the state is in a sense maturing rather than nearing decrepitude. He goes on to assert that certain state functions may have grown or receded in significance but the institution itself is healthy. Globalization has transformed the character of state rather than eradicated it. That transformation has been into a facilitator of the global trade and financial liberalization process. In this sense, if the institution of the state is malleable to serve a particular goal it can also be manipulated to serve interests of the poor and marginalized ? the primary victims of the globalization process, whose plight in South Asia largely motivated the present thesis. This shift of decision-making power from the state to multilateral institutions, which are increasingly vociferous in shaping trade, investment and economic policy, is rationalized within the state on the basis of the ?There Is No Alternative? syndrome (TINA). 122 The policy formulators who advocate the 121 Michael n Has GlobalistonEde th Rise ofthe Nation Stae? (197) 4Reviw of IntertoPlitcEnmy 472?96. 122 grt Ther fquetls t pras ?tr is ltertiv? sBritan t hrug th-libealstutalfor duringhetnueBtan?Pm Mnie he1980s. Tatcr?s nc sn bcakow byis croym, TINA, whics rfrdto a syndometherpsif-lal gblistoavbcom aprvsie ire. S also Ca 3of th tud. 117 merits of global integration portray the neo-liberal economic ideology as the only viable option available. 123 Yielding to TINA, the South Asian states have continued to display an ideological aridity, which manifests itself in the form of the tacit embracing of the whims of the multilateral institutions and acquiescing to pressures transnational corporations at enormous human costs. With relentless external pressures contributing to the ?erosion of the internal sovereignty of the state? there is an urgent need for a ?fundamental reconstitution of the conventional Westphalian inspired ideas of statehood and sovereignty.? 124 The present thesis advocates the idea of a strong regionalism for South Asia as an alternate paradigm in the context the changing conceptualization of the state, to safeguard the sovereignty of the people of South Asia. 125 2.5.4 The Threats Within the State As empirical evidence indicates, the process of nation state building in South Asia is far from complete and remains fragile. Despite political drives towards democratic nation-building through centralized governance schemes and common legal systems, a common system of values, and national identity, such endeavours have proven to be largely futile with continued demands for self-determination and secession by ethnic and religious identities in South Asia. 126 Increasing poverty and deprivation are the by-products of economic liberalization policies and have added momentum to burgeoning secessionist movements that have been increasingly militant during the past two decades. 127 In fact, the fledgling nation state consolidation process has not benefited from a character change of the that globalization initiated. 128 Increasingly, 123 Stigltz, above n3. 124 Jaysuri 102. 125 e Chptrs 4ad 6ofthistudy. 126 GrgAling?Ecnmic Lberalizton ad Separtis Nationlism: The Cas ofSri Lank d Tibt? (197) Jourl fItnt Afirs51; IhqAhed Sta, NtindEthctyi onempraySthAsia (Pir, , NwYork, 196). 127 Rajt ngl and IMcduf(es)Ethnic flictan scions iSout an Souteast Asi:cus, mics,oltins Sag Publats, NewDlh, 203). 128 The rowipoer fhe IFwhicmpose rtios w the sta fctis i manifstan fntprayloblztn. SChpr3ftisudynlso KOhmaeThe Ed Nti Sa ( Ps, Ne Yrk,195) e hart t tebundris r icresigly porustheflfcuicatocroatins, cpil,acrci, lof wh afctshe dion tion svrgny. 118 governments? control over parts of their territory and the concept of a unitary state have become contested issues. Rajni Kothari, who is deeply apprehensive about the influence of globalization, with its homogenizing thrust, asserts that globalization will not only jeopardize the process of consolidating the nation state but will unleash the fragmentative tendencies that lay latent in pluralistic society within nation state. 129 He goes on to elaborate on his reservations about the transformation and comments in a subsequent study, saying that: 130 the autonomy fcivil society too will declin and with it may lso gdwn the odr searhor demraticr. Th omgeisingthrust tht isinhert in th pc fn globlisation?ill oly einfce teativ teniestht r lryt ork, quite psitefth ?aro? ingre desig of the popets of the nw wld orde. In the face of the increasingly iniquitous globalization process, marginalized groups defined along the lines of ethnicity, regional or even political orientation as in the case of Maoist guerrillas in Nepal and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, have experienced a growing sense of disenfranchisement. Their insecurities and disenchantment previously lay latent, but these groups have now begun to question the mainstream governance process. Their attempts to undermine the legitimacy of existing state structures and national governments often result in violent upsurges. 131 Punjab and Kashmir are home to rebellious factions that demand autonomy from the Indian state, and a quest for a separate homeland by the Tamil Tigers in northern Sri Lanka is not yet abandoned. Maoist guerrilla activism in Bangladesh is a reactionary manifestation of the ubiquitously and gruelling economic conditions that have been brought about by the neo-liberal economic policies. These fragmentative forces constantly challenge idea of nation-building in the region, though paradoxically the nation-building process was consolidated by constitutional and legal structures within states when independence was gained from colonial rule. Presently the success of nation- 129 Rajni Kothari Gowing Amesia:An Esay onPverty and Human Cosciunes (Vikng, NewDl,193)4?16. 130 ji tri ?Wil th tio st hld ur glblisto?? (195) 30Eomic ad Politcalekly26. 131 umros vemnts uc aste Jam Kashmir Leratin Frot (JKLF), Dlitsn Orgnizt,Hzb-Mghln,UitdLibertonF ofAsm,NainlSocaCoucil of Nal and Roltiry Popl's Front fMipur(RP) hve bgu tively thretg theuitrychrter fe sta.Thecucris Neal btwntr,gislare nd Mois guilainr xamle. ?al:EctingCaos? ia Rpot Brfn ?1,31Janry 206 <htp:/w.risgroup.rg/hom/dex.cfm?d=29&l=1#C> (aces 7Ap). 119 building and the extent to which the concept is internalized by the people of the region remain uncertain, makes the need to consolidate nation-building process a priority in the region. The state, incompetent to cope with these internal challenges to its authority, resorts to coercion and violence, which in turn results in the further erosion of its authority and legitimacy. Use of authoritarian power by state in its turn consolidates strengthens the marginalized groups, who thrive on the denial (real and perceived) of justice, resulting in a vicious spiral of contention for power authority. 132 This scenario is significant for the challenges within the state to its authority in contemporary times because process is either brought about or accentuated through globalization. This dynamic yet again reinforces the thesis that contemporary globalization unleashes paradoxical forces within everything it comes into contact with. For globalization, despite its homogenizing thrust, has accentuated religious and ethnic cleavages within state structures and created avenues for the multiple identities within the state to demand autonomy from the unitary centre, often through violent means. While the Westphalian state structure has thus been almost irretrievably altered, perhaps it is premature to announce the ?end of the state.? 133 As Ramesh Babu comments, while ?the post Cold War world is certainly not state-centric, it is also not stateless or a state free dispensation ? [the] state is being sucked in by forces of supra-national integration at one end and sub-national disintegration at the other end of the spectrum. Furthermore, this simultaneous dual transformation varies in extent and depth across issues, time, locale and space. 134 The state has experienced a transmutation of character in the contemporary globalization phase but remains crucial to the economic, political and cultural mores of the global arena. It is unlikely be replaced by another entity or phenomenon in the 132 Se KM deSilva (ed) ConflictandViolenc iSouth Asia (ICES outh Asia Study eris, Sri Lank,20);snkPr Lvg wth Trtes andtersyfinervon:Lank ocity Cultr litsiPerspiv(ICE,lmbo,195); Ja Pfaff-Czrc tl. EthFeThStae nd th Inty Politc ii (Sag NewDlhi,19); KusJ Azam (d) Etnicy, Itiyat Saen SuhAsIntrtion Acdemicbliher, USA 20)za. 133 Richr FlkStae ofsige: Wil goblisto wi out? (197) 3/1 Itrnatiol Afairs 123? 135. 134 Bames Bbu th Asia n Glalizng Wrld (Sth Asian Publisher Pvt Ld, Ini, 198)5. 120 foreseeable future and any alternate paradigm would still evolve with the state at its foundation. The impact of secessionist movements on democratic governance in South Asia is further elaborated in Chapter 4 of this study. It is in this context of the dilution of the character of the state with the onslaught of globalization that Chapter 6 this study advocates a regional praxis to govern globalization in South Asia. 2.5.6 Globalization Fuels Religious Fundamentalism In South Asia the survival and the rejuvenation of state-centred politics has been sought through insidious means of flirting with the resentments and insecurities of civil society. 135 There appears to be a perturbing trend of the state shedding its religious secularity at the political centre, which will have a negative impact on the fostering of religious equality and tolerance in South Asia. 136 As elaborated below, due to reasons of political survival and electoral gains, the governments appear pander to majoritarian sentiments embrace a populist stand on issues such as appeasing the tendencies of religious fundamentalism. In relation to the issue of state patronage of religion in the subcontinent, all states in this study have had diverse and tumultuous histories mingled with an overarching ethos of general acceptance and tolerance of religious diversity. 137 Since decolonization India has constitutionally committed itself to a secular state, while such a commitment was withdrawn by Sri Lanka with its Republican Constitution in 1972. 138 Mahayana Buddhism is the state religion of Bhutan. The 135 Nik RKedi ?The Nw Religous Plitcs: Wher, hen, ad Why Do ?Fundametlis? Apear??(198)40Compartv Stdien SoityandHistory69?723. 136 Stmnt oligus inlranc ut As? rcv bUnite Natis Coison Hu ighs(Genv,4A 204).Th wrietemtfth AsLglReurce tre (LRC) ?lis itoleri Sotsa (E/CN.4/20/GO/48) ws ditbtd31 Marc 204at 60thSsin fteUnid tions ison Humanhs inGva. <htp:/w.lrc.ne/prmal.ph/204pr/5> (ced 6pr206). 137 ?eligous Rvils iout Asia? Eits?t (203) SthAsiJoral t:/.thaed.n/Mgzne/Journal/prviousie.> (acesd24Jul 04). 138 Th 1978 Cnsiuto fSri Lk byticl 9stegthnd t positnf Bhismby acordingtapecl camposia d Sa rcd str. Hwev, Aril 9tines tguarnteothr liostits guare byAticles10and 14(). tc 10sur fd fhg,cnsec nd relon,ilingth rg tohve or adpa religon abli o?s ci. Artil 14()guats pc maifsaif t ightidvly rnagrup. 121 Constitutions of Pakistan, Maldives and Bangladesh have established Islam as the state religion while providing constitutional guarantees for other religions to be practised, albeit subject to law, public order and morality. The Constitution of Nepal describes it as a Hindu Kingdom but falls short of claiming Hinduism as the state?s religion. Thus, in the South Asia region, most the governments have until the past two decades appeared to cherish secular values in relation to religion but have been profoundly conscious of the powerful influence that can exert on domestic and regional politics and have too often yielded to that influence. 139 In quite paradoxical terms, state patronage of religion, whether on a majoritarian basis or otherwise, is also ingrained into the political culture of the subcontinent. 140 In sociocultural terms the divorce of religion from the state would be perceived to be governance without moral or ethical values. It is on this fundamental basis that state benefaction of religion is regarded with a sense of tolerance, as it is perceived to be imbuing ethical values into governance. The term ?secularism? therefore appears to have a specific South Asian meaning of tolerance of all religions rather than the Western construction of the term, which connotes absence of state sponsorship of all religions. So extensive was the intermingling the with religion that Mahatma Gandhi was prompted to retort, ?those who say that has nothing to do with the state do not know what religion means.? 141 The onset of the renewed and ongoing waves of the overarching post-World War II contemporary globalization ? first in the late 1980s, with the end of the Cold War ? saw the relationship between religion and politics metamorphose into a sinister political force in South Asia. State patronage of religion, whether it was Hinduism in India, Islam Pakistan and Bangladesh, or Buddhism in Sri Lanka, commenced to mean an inevitable undermining of the pluralistic basis of society. The secular worldview of tolerance extended by state disappeared with the government seeking political power by patronizing the majority religion. The 139 Pfa-Czarnecka tl.; Azam,boven 13. 140 R deSilv ?Suport f RligiContemporay Sri Lank? iAmita Shstri and AJ Wilson(s)ThPost ClnilSts fSuth Asi: Dc,DevlopendIey (Pagr, Lond,201). 141 MKGai Autbigraphy orte story f exprients with truh (Navjin, Ahmedb,194) 38. 122 devastating effects of globalization on the culturally, ethnically and religiously divided societies the subcontinent were both exploited to some extent distracted from by cynically pandering to selected religious and cultural identities within the state. The politicians in power, and those elements aspiring to be in power, were acutely aware of the lack of legitimacy and support for their pro- globalization policies and therefore manipulated the insecurities in society by offering patronage to the majoritarian cultural and religious identities, thus fuelling fundamentalism. 142 These holders of power had no hesitancy in crafting and consolidating forces of religious fundamentalism in order to subvert the growing dissent of people against their policies. The state had realized that the people?s discontent and insecurities could be funnelled into any space, including fundamentalism, in an atmosphere that offered little hope via the existing options. The trend of religious fundamentalism emerging in India had the patronage of the then ruling coalition party ? the Baratha Janatha Party (BJP) and its affiliated organizations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 143 (?Association of National Volunteers?), and the Hindutva movement (Hindu nationalist movement). 144 BJP rule initiated a process of transforming secular nationalism in India into Hindu nationalism, and its political importance was displayed by sporadic incidents of violence that erupted in various parts of India. The Gujarati massacres of 2002 were blatant displays of the nationalistic jingoism that took root during the BJP rule in India. During Gujarati riots the Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi, who is a member of the BJP, was accused of facilitating the massacres by his inaction during the riots. The aftermath of the riots has been grueling for the victims, with the courts unwilling to proceed with cases and the witnesses systematically pressured by the extreme Hindu nationalists to refrain from giving evidence. 145 142 Lancy ob Glaliston, HiduNationlism and Christan iIdia (Rwat, Ne Dlhi, 20);AshkaBndrge ?By GlbztEto-elgous Fnmlis?(204) Devlpmet 35?41; AlDglsRelig Policl fictSth Asi (Grnwod Prs, Lond,20); SN Eisntad ?TheRsurgen fRs MvetPcesf Glbalit ?eyond ofHisry oClah fivlsation. <htp:/uesc.usc.rg/ime/013/08/1385e.pdf#g=6> (acsed 7Mar 205). 143 Arigt wing plital scatin tha grew inprominc uri theBJP rul. 144 S raly(204)1FrolMz <htp:/.fotlieont./f2106/fl2106.ht> (aesd 7Mar 205). 145 ?Te Ris Hdu Exremis and the RpresionfChritanusliminorites in India?t:/w.frhou.rg/lion/ublctis/pub.ht> (cesd 7Ma205). 123 Confirming the emerging trends of ultra-nationalism, Modi, with explicit support from Prime Minister Vajpayee, went on to lead the party in the State of Gujarat elections the same year, which resulted in a victory both for him and for the BJP. The rising discord between ethnic and religious minorities in various parts of the subcontinent, such as Delhi, Rajasthan and Gujarat, and the direct nexus to economic policy formulation, raises disquieting questions about the future prospects of communal harmony within the subcontinent in face of globalization. 146 The allegations that extreme right-wing Hindu groups with connections to the then ruling BJP were involved in the attacks on the minority community, especially in incidents such as the communal riots in Gujarat, raise the issue of governmental patronage of activities, the human rights aspect and the very legitimacy of the elected governments. 147 Kamal Mustapha Pasha, commenting on Pakistan?s flirtation with religious extremism, writes, ?[t]he appeal of Islamisation is closely linked to the disconcerting and mixed results the expansion of capitalism as a social system and as a way of life; it is a particular expression the strains and stresses of a society experiencing cultural haemorrhage in a time of structural change.? 148 Religious fundamentalism and intolerance has become rampant in Pakistan, making the prospects of consolidation of democratic governance extremely slim in the near future. 149 The fundamentalist Islamic political parties are striving to enhance the already operational shari?a laws, and the effort by the Pakistani President Musharraf to curb the drive does not appear to have succeeded. 150 146 BC ?Hindu ationlism: Haronyr discor?? 13 Februay 204, 12:37 GMT <htp:/ews.bc.k/2h/ut_si/34786.tm>(acsd13Mar05). 147 Prav Si fr ?Ter Pltal Direin A Police Supot Enableh Death Squds OfTh nduRigto RnioInMuslNeighbrs? (2) 19FrontLi <htp:/.rotlieo.cm/fl2106/fl2106.ht (asd 7ar05. 148 Msta Kam Pash ?Isaist, Civl SociyndPolitcf Tnsit iPakist? in Dougl Alen(d)Rlignd Policalnft uth As (OxorUvertyre,Nw ehi,193) 2. 149 FP /azhrbas ?Fears frise rligous itleranc iPakistn? 14No 203 <tp:quickst.cli.nt/q_/wbn/wed/hQpkist-relgo.RCb_DE.html> (acesd 4Jn 206) 150 SthFBrges?Strugle for the Cotrl fPaistn: Musharf Takes On te Islaist Rils? iay RchnidanJld Mst (ed)KowTy Enmy:ProfilfAdvery LeadrndThirta Cltrs (USAFunrplifertiCetr, Alba, 203) <htp:/w.uf.mil/uw/cgte/pc-bs/ko_thyn/idx.ht> (ces7No 207). 124 A similar, familiar trend is occurring in Sri Lanka. 151 The Buddhist monks? decision to contest the 2004 April parliamentary elections was a sinister development in the religious polarization process in Sri Lanka. 152 The monks? newly established political party, Jathika Hela Urumay (JHU), 153 claimed that Buddhism, despite state patronage and constitutional guarantees, is under threat through exposure to various forces brought about through the contemporary globalization ethos. The monks promised a righteous state (dharmarajya) if they assumed political power. The proportional representation system ensured the election of the nine JHU monks from its 260 candidates into Parliament and they emerged as kingmakers of the new legislature. The JHU did not draw support from the rural areas, from which it claimed to have a solid vote base; rather it was the urban, middle-class voters, disenchanted with the mainstream Sinhalese political parties, who cast their vote in JHU?s favour. The voting pattern of the 2004 elections highlighted a disturbing development, which is that any political party offering a militant version of Sinhalese nationalism along with a message of moral regeneration seems to have had more appeal to the electorate than the moderate mainstream political parties that represent modern secularism. The resounding election of the JHU monks from the capital city and the surrounding electoral districts is all more disturbing as it reinforces hypothesis that religious or nationalistic extremism in South Asia has a direct correlation to the existing economic conditions. A poll taken a few days before the Sri Lankan elections of 2004 indicated that 48.2 per cent of the people declared that the rising cost living was the most important issue day, whereas only 18.8 per cent were perturbed by existing civil war with the Tamil militants that had cost 65,000 lives within the past 20 years. 154 The election of the JHU monks into Parliament was the culmination of a series of events that firmly established the emerging trend of religious nationalism in Sri Lanka. This development followed similar trends elsewhere in the subcontinent. 151 Mahind Degal ?Politcs ftheJatik Hela Urumay onks: Budhism and ethicty in cotemporySri Lnk? (204)5 ConmporyBdhis83?10(Degl). 152 BC ?uhstMs?EltiBid? Nws 2Mrc 204 <htp:/ws.bcouk/> (aesd 4Jun204); e alo Wiam shlera,StevnFikelbanPrad Pir ?The 205 Presidtialnd204Prlenty Ecios Sr L? (7)26EletalStdis ?209. 153 Th m, rughly tsd s?inlhitg, otly revid Buis rlgou sntitblso cn thia f sige nalesradino sta. 154 Feizal Sat?Plitcs?SrLk:Ecomic W HghrPiry than Pec? 24March 2003 <htp:/w.ipsnew.t/srilank/ote_2403.shtl> (aesd 20Feb 206). 125 Religious intolerance fuelled by economic considerations has created volatile situations in many parts of the subcontinent. State patronage of the campaign is sought through the demand for legislation against unethical conversions in Sri Lanka and elsewhere in the subcontinent. 155 Ironically, in Sri Lanka the demand is made not only by the majority Buddhist community but by the Hindus as well. In June 2004 the Supreme Court, hearing petitions against two bills presented to Parliament seeking legal status for two Christian organizations involved in charity work, held in two judgments that while the Sri Lankan Constitution upheld a citizen's right to worship and practice his or her religion (Article 9), it did not recognize a fundamental right to propagate a religion. Both Buddhist and Hindu organizations have long protested against Christian charities? and missionaries? activities in rural Sri Lanka, alleging that they lure poor people into Christianity by offering them food, money, medicine and dry rations. The JHU monks in Parliament reiterated that their support of the minority government in power is dependent on the enactment of the Prohibition of Forcible Conversion Bill, but, facing opposition from moderate political groups, as of this writing in Dec 2007 the enactment of the Bill appears to be abandoned by the Sri Lankan legislature. 156 Such developments aptly confirm the argument that globalization, while threatening the existing foundations of human rights discourse within the state, also, and in a more sinister vein, opens up new territories in the human rights field to be exploited by various forces. It also confirms the case that the nexus between economic conditions and human rights is not limited to economic and social rights alone but involves civil and political rights as well. While the reality makes it impossible for national economies to survive in isolation from globalized markets, it is crucial to the present study note that national governments are not yet impotent to intervene and create structures would enhance the basic human rights of the people. However, the governments appear unable to extend the traditional human rights regimes to include protective 155 The Proibtn ofFrcible Conversion fReligon Bil was ped bythe Tamil Nadu Stae Asmly Oce20.ThFdm,inimlarvin,sreybn nactd inthrisa d May Prash. It Himaly kgo fBut, Chist r forbieo lbtorpinpublic npriesre dievis tetr iocounras su tprtec ut fro Crsti funtlst. 156 Dgal, vn150. 126 mechanisms against the arbitrary actions of multinational corporations or the pressures of international financial institutions. This is because the new threats that emerge in the discourse of human rights cannot be regarded as violations of rights per se for they are not within the traditional rights matrix of state against the individual or group. In most instances state is not directly involved but is a passive observer. The perpetrators are obviously liable under common law the legal structures that are in place inadequate to offer reasonable redress. 157 This highlights the need for the ?rights contract? between the state and the individual or group to be renegotiated, with the ultimate onus placed on state to protect basic human rights. This study asserts that the renegotiation of the ?rights contact? can be best achieved at regional level with co-operation all states in South Asia. 2.5.6 Contemporary Globalization: Impact on Human Rights in South Asia As much as in other spheres of sociopolitical affairs, with human rights too, globalization has had a paradoxical impact. Its impact on individual rights is discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study. The remaining discussion in the present chapter will focus on the general impact of globalization on the universal rights regime and the states. Contemporary globalization, with its influence on culture, media, economy and technology, has contributed to the expansion of the idea of universal human rights while simultaneously creating a need to enhance protection mechanisms to safeguard the victims and the marginalized of the globalization process, given that states themselves are most often not the direct violators. The withdrawal of the state from regulating economic activities has created new freedoms in relation to the economic activities within and beyond the state, enhancing the rights of people in terms of creating new business and trade opportunities, increasing the prospects capital and resource transfer, and liberalizing the decision-making powers of the individuals in relation to economic activity. In this context, it appears that content and the extent of human rights, 157 Maurizo ur ?Bhopal 20YearsOn: Globalizton ad Corpate Rsponiblty? (204) Helth PlcyandDevmnt 49?254. 127 too, is now determined by market forces, as globalization has restricted the state?s role in determining economic policy. Yet again, the paradoxical effect of globalization comes into play whereby it reinforces and expands the rights the inclusive or the privileged while the acknowledged human rights of excluded segments of society remain threatened or are rendered impotent by the globalization process. As several academic enquiries into the effects of globalization indicate, the phenomenon has had a devastating impact on economic, political and cultural rights of the peoples of, in particular, the poorest segments in the poorer states. 158 The most devastating challenge to contemporary discourse of human rights is the endemic poverty that globalization appears to perpetuate. As Khan and Larik reiterate: 159 South Asia ishome to1.4 billion peole, about a qrte ofthe world pulation, bt ha43%f thworld?srad nly 2%fwld?sGDP?Thergio is crterizedbypvty, illitecylo life xpctany. It is th most mlnouis rgion fthe orld, with halfofitshildre bing undr-wight, par with30inSub-ahn Afric. It is th least gdr-seitive gion nd it hsthe higest hmn dprivtio, in termsfc tohalth fcilities, afe rinkg wter, sanitatio fcilities ad opotunity for wk an leisur. Poverty by definition is the dearth of opportunity in every aspect of personal life, further exacerbated by chronic hunger, unemployment, illiteracy, lack of educational opportunities and poor access to healthcare and other basic necessities. The sense of social exclusion that is brought about by poverty includes the denial mainstream benefits such as social and economic development, non-exposure to either indigenous and/or modern knowledge systems and the exclusion from influencing policy formulation. Since decolonization, South Asian states have systematically failed to adhere to correct social engineering schemes that would eliminate inequalities in terms of resource and land distribution, infrastructure development, capital, market credit, 158 MKhor Rethinkg Globalizton:Critcal Isue and Policy Choices (Zd Boks, New York, 19); DaidrHsi GoneTFr?(Istuefr Intratinl Ecnmics Wasingt C, 197); Michel sudvsky h GlblizaOPvy: Ipats fIMF and orld BkReforms(ZdBok,197). 159 Hier AKhan ulfiqar Li lobalizton ad Regionl C-operation South Asi: PltcalScilEnyApch(CIRJEDiscui Paprs,207) <hp:/w.e- toky.jp/irje/srch/03resr02dp.tml> (5Dc . 128 and education and information and would thus have paved the way for a different outcome rather than the conditions of poverty that exist today. In human rights parlance this translates into systematic denial of basic human rights, such as education, health, and decent standards of living. Regarding this denial of human rights, the developing states have traditionally taken the view that these rights are unattainable given the prevailing economic conditions, to which the United Nations Human Rights Commission in its recent report has responded: ?The negative impact on one dimension of human rights, e.g. economic rights, necessarily has a domino effect on other rights. This reality reinforces the principle enunciated in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993) that human rights are ?universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated?.? 160 It is becoming increasingly clear that it is no longer tenable to draw a neat distinction between the nature of state obligations with regard civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other. 161 United Nations human rights mechanisms have debunked the traditional view that civil and political entail only negative obligations, while economic, social cultural rights give rise to the more complex issue of positive state obligations, which require resources be expended. Gauging development purely on the basis of economic indicia is increasingly viewed with scepticism, as it often does not reflect the ground realities, especially those relating to disparities in income distribution and living standards. Such a position ignores the human dimension of development and the important linkage between development, human rights and peace. It overlooks violent social and political forces that invariably are unleashed by extreme poverty and the denial of other human rights. If the forces of globalization are allowed to operate freely ? overlooking the central premise human-centred development ? the spectre of massive levels of human rights violations resulting in grave social and political upheavals becomes a reality. 160 ?Globalizton ad Itsmpactonthe Ful Enjoyment ofHuman Rights? Sub-Comison thePrm Preci fHuaRights, Fif-scd seoIe4f the prval agnd. reliy ortsbitd byJ. OlkaagDpika Udga,icrdce witSub-Coisnln 19/815une 20. <hp:/w.uhcr./huridca/hurioc.sf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4Sub.20.13En?Opeoum nt> (acesd 17Jl 205). 161 St VinaDeartion <htp:/.uhcr./hudoca/huridoca.nsf/(Sybol)/A.OF.157.23En> (acesd 17Dec 207). 129 Globalization has affected the social and economic structures of communities in a manner that throws into question the legitimacy of the existing mechanisms and values relating to the contemporary form of governance and policy formulation. A good example of such a question is the case of the Adivasi (indigenous forest dwellers) in Madhya Pradesh. 162 They have continuously fought against the highly destructive, so-called ?eco-development? policy programmes that were initiated under the aegis of the World Bank in their forests. These programmes invariably result in forced eviction of Adivasi from their natural habitat and a prohibition of their activities such as rotation cultivation, fishing, extraction of forest produce and hunting. It is on these activities that the Adivasi have based their livelihoods since time immemorial. Prohibition of life-sustaining practices on the basis of their presumed threat to the environmental and ecological balance, combined with the idea of forestry conservation as a good business venture, has threatened the very existence of these forest people. Therefore, they vigorously demand that their rights in relation to their indigenous way of life be protected rather than be sacrificed the cause of globalization and economic growth. The rights that are contested here are not limited to the Adivasi in India alone but also apply to several other indigenous peoples and rural communities in the region who seek challenge the state in relation to the systematic obliteration of their traditional way of life, using the terms of the rights discourse. Furthermore, this notion of competing rights in development discourse has another dimension. The scale to which global competitiveness has condensed the economic and political role of the state has directly influenced the government's image as protector of citizens? rights. The decreased role of state has created an authority vacuum in which novel forces emerge in response to individuals? desire for security, welfare and power. 163 Sriskandarajah observes that there is a strong connection between economic marginalization and the ethnopolitical conflict in the context of Sri Lanka. The policy formulation process that has ignored minority concerns since Independence aggravated the real and perceived 162 AGandhi ?Devloping complianced resitance: th stae, trnsationl scial movents andtriblpols? (203)Gb Ntwok481. 163 Jo SncrSi Lak: Hisry n th Rots fCoflict (Rutledg, Lnd, 190). 130 grievances that created the current ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. 164 The state, overburdened with complexities of global economic competition and the simultaneous political challenges by the numerous power groups, attempts to consolidate its threatened role in society through various insidious means including brutality and violence. Similarly, the newly threatened identities attempt to play their ethnic, nationalist or religious game depending on the circumstances consolidate their position amongst real and imagined threats to their existence from various quarters. Such internal conflicts, whatever the extent, invariably result in compromising human rights. 165 However, in order to assimilate into the world capitalist system under the aegis of the multilateral institutions, almost all the governments in South Asia have adopted the rhetoric of liberal democracy and universal human rights in the process of good governance along with economic liberalization policies. The reality is that the operation of the liberalization policies augurs well only for the markets and meanwhile undermines the social, economic and cultural rights of people. In an atmosphere where market is accorded preference over other considerations, it is impossible to ensure functional mechanisms for human rights protection, as is detailed by Chapter 3 of this study. 2.6 Significant Traits of the Renewed Waves of Contemporary Globalization Originating in the Late 1980s The fundamental flaw of contemporary manifestations of globalization is its obsessive focus on economic globalization and its homogenizing thrust. The neo- liberal ideological thrust that underpins contemporary globalization is portrayed as the panacea for all ails the developing world. It determines the normative nature of ?development?, international relations and trade. It is nonchalant to the possible existence of other systems of knowledge and other paradigms of progress. The promoters of this paradigm of globalization portray it to be 164 Dhanjyan Sriskandrjah ?Soci-eonmic nequality nd etho-plitcal onflict: some observtios fm L?eptbr (205)14ComporaSut As341?56. 165 RcrdPierClue BurnsHWst (ds) H Riginthe Wrld Cunity: Isu an Actn (UivrsityofPylvani,Penylvi,192). 131 infallible and imply that all communities must be redesigned according to its dictates. It is this portrayal of the neo-liberal economic ideology through globalization that has given the process a negative identity. Many critics have seen through the globalization of the neo-liberal political and economic ideology since the early 1980s and how it has consolidated the values the interests of the West at the expense of the rest. Susan George, 166 among many others who passionately concur in this critique, claims that in its present manifestation globalization has become a ?threat to the poor rather than an opportunity for global action to eradicate poverty.? 167 Contemporary manifestations of globalization do not appear to refute its penchant to globalize neo-liberalism at the expense of other dimensions such as equitable global human development. 168 There is increased empathy for the quest for more ?controlled? globalization even from the more ardent supporters of genre of globalization that is personified by Washington Consensus. 169 For instance, Bhagwati acknowledges the need for appropriate management of globalization especially as to the speed at which nations embrace the globalization process, and he refers Russian and Asian financial crises, which he claims were triggered by ?imprudent and hasty freeing of capital flows.? Therefore, he asserts, ?globalisation must be managed so that its fundamentally benign effects are assured and reinforced. Without this wise management, it is imperiled and at risk.? 170 However, the adherents of the Washington Consensus, like Bhagwati, see no inherent fault in this particular ideological brand of globalization, which they still maintain contributes to 166 Susan Georg ?A Short HistoryfNeolibralism? Conferc onEcomic Sverignty ia lobliWld24-26Mach 19 <htp:/w.glbalpiy.rg/lbalz/n/hsol.hm> (cesd 8Fb 208); BRmesBau ?Aricizt fth Wd: Myt rRalit? (194) 42 Fromirst(oby) 23?7;Vnda Shv ?GlolisaonPove?i Vernika Bnhlt-Thn, NichlasFrcls etl.Terisan Atertive (Z Bks,Lod, 20); ila Kab., eAr Eleph:Gobiztdh SuglfrScial Juticthe Twety-First Ctury (MontyRviw Prs, 201); Di Rorik Has GobztnG To Far? (InefoIail conmic97. 167 Obadi ?Glblist,hua rghts and evlopment? [198] Africa Tdy 32?33. 168 Ae Krugr olizt:Pevithbfis.Whilegoblztonhasit crits, slipngck intoptecns inot wy frad. (203) 40/21 OECD bev <w.odbserv.rg> (aced7Fb208). 169 Se Chapt 3tx t47fr fitn a iscuion fthe ashingto nsus. 170 Jagis Bgwai?Globlizton a Aprote Gvrac?(IERAal Lectrvol 4, UNWorld Instue fr DevlpmetEcmisR UN/WD), sh and Trin etf hUnitdNtis Uivrsty, 20). SelsoBhagwti Infof Globalsi (Oxord rsy PrOxfod4 132 economic growth ? the benefits of which will ?trickle down? to eliminate economic disparities amongst the world?s poor. Victims of globalization come from diverse walks of life. Poverty, both urban and rural, urbanization, deforestation, annihilation indigenous cultures and ways of living, deterioration of democratic processes, increased fragmentation of society and the marginalization the weak and minorities are some of the many sins further attributable to the process of globalization which contributes to poverties of South Asia: 171 Gros pverty and inequalities have worsend quite dramtically inthe last two decainSouthAsia. Temultipleimiosofpvertycludunqal s tosts, mrkts, nd infrstrctur a nn distribtio ofskill. Thispritie inhealth ationmogd withinounie, the imedntscrted bysocial bries d rsarels imesiofill- bing. o thes wois de thvulneability tovrshck, naturl isaster, isa, n persnal politicl iolenc. Statistic obtaind from the Wld Bnk dtauc inicte tht dspite rent grwth apvrty reductio, South Asia till hs nearly 40 millio p eple(ut f a pola of 1.37 billion). In fact, exposure to globalization has initiated a chain of events in the Third World that is poignantly compared by Pakenham to colonialism generally: 172 First came th foreign bakers ager tolend at extortionate rs; then finacial ontrllerstotht intet wspaid; th thousdof rigdvisers taking thir cut. Finlly hn th coutry s bkrpt helples, it w tim freforigntropsto?res?e rlefromhis ?ebllio? p. Onlast ulp and th cy had go. A cursory glance at the UNDP 2005 World Development Report illustrates the extent to which mass poverty and inequality have become entrenched globally: 173 Global integration isforgin depr interconetions betwn coutries. In econmic sthespace btwn ole ad utrieishrinkgrapidly, a trd, technoloy d invstmt linkll tries ina w oftedece. I ua devmnt ter the space btwencotriesismar by nd, insos, wideing qulitieinm d life chns. On-fifthof 171 Shantyan Devarjn ad IjzNabi ?Econmic Growth inSouth Asia: Promisng, U- equlizg,?Sustibl??Jue,206.Wrld BakRepWasignDCSuth AiaReion; s so Hm opmt Rport 5Itertinal cert t crsds:, trd andcrity naeqal wrld? <h:/.un.og/rots/lbl/205>3 (at6 Fb206). 172 ThasPkh Tscbe fr Afica: hit M? nqust oftherkontietfrom 1876to 192 (AvoBk, NYok,19)57. 173 HumnDelpmentRprt 205 ?Intertionl coperatio ta crsads: Ai, trad secrity a uqal wrld?<h:/d.up.rg/ts/glbl/205/> 3(ce6Feb206). 133 humanity live incountries wher many peole think nothing ofspending $2a dy o cpu. Athrfifthofuitysurvivelesa $1a ynlive in ctries whr cild die fr wt of a simple ati-mquito b net. Empirical evidence indicates that the assertion that the neo-liberal form of globalization is the only viable means of achieving economic growth and development is no longer tenable. Alternative visions of human development based on different global and regional structures are being articulated both within the developed and the developing world. As Cavanagh and Manders observe: 174 [A]fter decas ofMarget Thatcer and other globalistion cherleaders telling us thwrn ltentivs, tht fictiohs expos. Thare alterntivs. Tsfthusd ofm. T failinleitimay fth institutions of global corpate rle cbine with thepoliticl forc nelived civil sciety hve dnprcntednt ptuit torthinka trnfrmthinstitutios ofoic lif, avceth demraticpojt, n realis th agle huma drea of liberty, justic, a prosity f all. 2.7 The Anti-Globalization Movement The contemporary globalization process claimed to have the potential to produce prosperity for all; the reality is its manifestations bring prosperity only a select few, with penury, deprivation and misery for the rest. 175 If globalization is not a new phenomenon in the evolutionary process of civilizations and has the proven potential to unleash unlimited benefits, there is also a place for scepticism, defiance and alternative visions to contemporary globalization. 176 Defiance to the dominant paradigm of globalization, and a demand for its better governance and alternative visions are increasingly evident. This ?[r]esistance is localized, regionalized, and globalized at the same time that economic globalisation slices across geopolitical borders.? 177 While a single, monolithic theory of globalization is unlikely to emerge to displace the dominant 174 John Cavngh ad Jery Mander(s) Alternatives toEcnomic Globalizton: ABetr WrldIsPible(2n,Brt-KohlrPubhr,204) h1. 175 B Rme Bu Globliz t St si Sta(Aadei Bks, Dvr, Colrad, 198). 176 Gustavo Lins Rier Other Globaliztons. Alter-Ntive Trnstional Proces an Agents S?rieArplga389<w.un.r/cda/Si389mpdf.> (cesd30 Ju206). 177 Jms HMitmn lobalizt Sym :Transforati&Rit(rito UnivrityPres, Ei,NJ, UA,20) 17. 134 position enjoyed by its contemporary version, pockets of sporadic resistance in various forms nevertheless are emerging. Central to the contemporary globalization paradigm is the process of exclusion. The process of global integration through liberalization and deregulation is determined by the IFIs and certain powerful states excluding the masses from the deliberation and negotiation process of economic reform, for ?[g]lobalization ultimately fortifies those with privilege. Premised on a market-based order, the new global political economy is closed to those who cannot be valorized.? 178 This process of exclusion of large segments of the society from the globalization is encountering justifiable resistance. 179 Visible and violent protests against the contemporary trajectory of globalization are an all too familiar sight in the media today. 180 During the past few years there have been incidents of mass public protest against globalization, particularly in London, 181 Quebec, 182 Seattle, 183 Genoa, 184 and South Africa. The overwhelming public support for protesters at these events is an indication of the uniform attempt to reprise the forces of economic globalization from all quarters. The ferocity and the fervency of the protests and the obvious in-egalitarian manifestations of globalization, which are no longer denied, have resulted in the acquisition a certain legitimacy by the anti-globalization discourse. However, this movement exclusively relates to political resistance to neo-liberal globalization and does not focus on alternative, more constructive visions. 185 Amidst the anti-globalization protests in various locations around the globe, individual defiance at grass-roots level focusing on alternative paradigms is also 178 MK Pash ?Globaliston adPoverty inSouth Asia? (196) 25Milenium Jornal of IntertionlStudie 635. 179 Rj r Pvrty: Hum Cscies nd te mnesia ofDvlpet (Zd Bks, NwDlhi,195). 180 BC ?ots break ot aGeran Rly? <htp:/ws.bc.uk/2hi/euro/671429.stm> (acesd7Nv207). 181 InLn, Eugn d Orgo 19Jue 19, Carnivl aginst Capitlsm. 182 SumitoftheAmricashelinQbcityQuebc,d,o he wkend of20 April 2001. 183 TheWO Mting Novmbr 19. 184 Gnoa rupofEhtSuitpotesfrom 18to 2July 201. 185 icldwars d Jn Gan (d)GlbalCitzenAction(Lye Riner Publisher, Bulder, 201); JnKealblCivlSciety? (bridg UvrsitPrs,Camdgan Nw Yok3rgt Eeck KahrnSik tistBd o (orl Univrsity Ihac Ps, 198);diYu?Itoductn?i Ee Yunetl.eds)TheBtle of Seatl:enwlento aptlst globliz (ftSkulPrs,Nw rk, 201 3?20. 135 evident. 186 There is a plethora of academic and activists? opposition documented through books, 187 reports, 188 films 189 and street protests that have all contributed to the creation of a vast array of alternative thinking on globalization. Some, such as Shepard and Hayduk, 190 see the creation of a global coalition, a coalescing of alternative visions aimed at displacing the dominant world view of globalization based on neo-liberalism. Others, such as Held and McGrew, 191 analyse the contemporary character of globalization and highlight its negative aspects and advocate alternative visions, in this case proposing a potential future trajectory through cosmopolitan social democracy. In a similar vein, the report A Fair Globalisation Creating Opportunities for All 192 seeks to alter character of globalization by infusing a ?strong social dimension based on universally shared values, and respect for human rights and individual dignity; one that is fair, inclusive, democratically governed provides opportunities and tangible benefits for all countries and people.? The report recommends that globalization should focus on people, facilitate the creation of 186 Veronika Benhioldt-Thomsnetal(ds)There isan Alterative: Subsitenc ad Worlwide RsitctCrpae Glbalizo Ze Bok,Lod, 201);Poa grjPro-Poor Grwh d GvcinSut Asi?DcntrliztrticptryDvlpment (Sag Publiatons,New Dlh, 204);Fred almy Aeaive Visn ?hs inte GoblVile (m LitfiedPblishInc,US,198); JohnCaget al.Aratis t Ecoiclbalzon: ABtr Wol IsPoibl(Brt-KohlrPubis, SnFraciso, 20). 187 JosephE Stiglt Glbaliztn ad itsDicntes (W. Nrtn ad Co, New York, June ); NamiKlin Fecs nd iows: ipths from th Front Lies fth Glbalizt Dbat (Picdor, wYork,20),NamKlen NLg:TakigAmatBrandues (Picdor, e k20); Aita Rick Titrsnly (Hrpe Clis Publisr, USA,201); Z Baun Glbalizn:heuosqucePolit s,rge, 198). 188 J.Oo-nygo d Dpia Udga Th Razn ofEcnoicSoial nd Cultral Rights: lliztaitsImctn tFlEnjymetuma Rhts PrgesRpo,UN ESC,m' Hu R., 53rSes., Provisl Agd Ite4,UND. /N.4/sub.2/01/ (2Jly01) avilbat <htp:wnhcr./ridoc/Hurdc.nsf/(Sybol)/E.CN.Sub.201.En> (acesd 17 Jly 6); AFai Glbalztin Cetig Oprtunites For Al (World Cmison th SociaDimesiofi,Aprl 204) <htp:/.lrg/pulc/eglish/faiobalizto/rt/idx.htm> (aces at17 Jul 206). Inertina Lb Oanizto: Wrld Lur Rep 20 Incoesurityndsoci occhi wrld) <htp:/w.ilorg/publc/egish/protecin/soc/wlrbu.ht> (acse 17Jul 206). 189 Avi Les and Nmi Kn ?T ak? Flm <htp:ek.org/lif.ph>(acesd Jun206). 190 BShpr RHayduk From AC Up toe WTO: urban prts and cmunity bilng i tera ofglbalizton (Ves,Lnd,20). 191 DvidHe, AhMcGrw lbaliztn/Ati-Glolizto (Plity res, Caride, 20). 192 AFairGlobalizton Creating Oportuites Fr l (rld Cmison th Socil imens flit, Arl204) <htp:/w.ilrg/public/ish/fairlbalizton/rept/inex.ht> (acesd 17May 206). 136 democratic and effective states, foster sustainable development, encourage productive equitable markets and promote fairer rules of engagement and the creation of a globalization that has greater accountability to people, which it seeks to bring about through the strengthening of the United Nations. The main contention of the protest is that the current process of globalization has no room for participation, access, transparency, and accountability at the policy formulation stage, although these policies are ultimately prescribed to individual states to create inquitos frameworks tha violte nt oly socioeconomic but civil and political rights as well. 193 In fact, a positive consequence of globalization has been the coalescing of activists on issues as diverse as child labour, the environment, anti-capitalism, Third World debt, and human rights, creating an international grassroots movement that strives towards a common agenda for the marginalized. 194 They have the added advantage of being able to add value to existing debate by stressing issues such as democracy, equity and justice which, when articulated by the dominant discourse, are dismissed as mere rhetoric. This activism, however ardently articulated, emerges from a wide range of affected interests, which are not necessarily harmonious or even coherently related. This incoherency in anti-globalization politics directly relates to the lack of a paradigmatic framework to address the concerns of an alternative paradigm. There is an urgent need work out a pragmatic solution that addresses the diverse concerns at ground level. The image that the anti-globalization movement presents today appears to focus only on the short-term protest rather than seeking a long-term global policy framework through which tangible change could be achieved. 195 However, the movement has initiated a process in which the global 193 The bst example ofa slidarityeconmy isthe 36od autonmus nicpalites formed by Zaptiaurtcunte h igladfCips,Mexic.Idef fhinquits nd rs tn byth govrtf Mxic n194 th Zpatis omuits theiownedatio,eal,nacenoi srucrswhnar acover alost a r fth s. S Hr MClvr J?The ?Zapta Efet?: Te Itetnd thRisf nAltivPlitclFbic?[198]ualfInrionlAairs51d THyn (d) Zpisa Redr (Naion Bks, 20). 194 ?Thlrg ptes theWTOmetings, tIMF, Wrld Bk, G8 n other such mits hat are sn toyhvypicl bn ahecurntfomsfglobalizadt mgialzin tis aung,swls t iasig iparite twe t ri n te por th ts predcbled toalredy?ApS ?PblcsrundhWol? <w.loblis.r/TRt/ FreTde/rots> (c 5Mar 205). 195 Rai V?yrn Ati-GlblizonMvmn aheCros-Roads(KcInstiuePolicy Bref#4,Nvemr20) <htp:/w.u/~krcist/plbief/pbrief4.hml> (acsd20 Jun 206). 137 discontent about the nature and content of contemporary globalization can be voiced. The inherent potential of the anti-globalization movement is explained by Sen: 196 The anti-globalistion protests can beproductive not becaus globalistion isa vil initself. Ide, famit. Ev th ati-glolistionprotests reprt of th rl procs globlistio, frmwhic thr is cd g reason tosk p. But ther a citicllyimpotat sue that ntobe dedinthemixd woldfsive ofrt and extrmisry inwhic w liv ?often fartoaclly ndlacetly. Thr is dtoruc thcntrast btw ur niversofrmarkble posibilitiesanthe stubon prevlee of rletles dptio. At the moment numerous grass-roots movements carry out such work, albeit for a common cause. However, a sustained framework of action on a global scale would better respond to the adverse impact of policy formulation by multilateral institutions and help in creation of common legal and constitutional structures and standards that would address the negative impact of the iniquitous and unjust manifestations of globalization. There are numerous individual efforts by grass-roots movements that comprise victims, activists and bureaucrats who have successfully strived for a change in terms of policy formulation. The most successful of such endeavours in Sri Lanka was perhaps the sustained opposition by environmental activists and bureaucrats against the implementation of the US Government Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998 (TFCA). 197 In a measure that was portrayed as an answer to the country's unpaid debt problem and a means of preserving natural resources and bio-diversity, especially in the tropical forests, the US government introduced a new concept. A closer scrutiny of the measures suggested, however, indicated that it was a nature swap ? in exchange for the debt owed by Sri Lanka to the US, Sri Lanka to implement conservation mechanisms designed and monitored by the US to protect tropical forests of Sri Lanka including the Sinharaja forest which is declared a world heritage site by the UNICEF. If the TFCA was implemented, Sri Lanka's most pristine forests ? the Sinharaja rainforest, Peak Wilderness, Namunukula forest and the Knuckles forest range ? 196 Amarty KSen ?Globalizton,Iequality nd Global Protes? (20) 45Devlopment 1?16. 197 <hp:/w.usaid.gv/ur_wrk/vromet/fresty/fca.hml> acsd 8Ju 206). 138 would be managed under the aegis of the US. 198 The Act, according to a US Embassy press release, would allow developing countries to shed their debt burden, while helping them to preserve natural forests. In consultation with the US government the debtor country could set up a fund or board consisting of local NGO representatives to preserve tropical forests. The value of debt would be converted to local currency and programmes initiated by the board paid in local value. There was so much vehement opposition to this proposition by both the environmental NGOs and the state bureaucracy that plans to implement the TFCA were abandoned. The success of the All India Insurance Employees Association (AIIEA), which is the strongest workers? union in the financial sector and which represents the most unionized industry in India, prevents the insurance industry from being completely sold to private and foreign interests and is another example of popular resistance to economic globalization forces. 199 The constantly vigilant and innovative judiciary of India also resisted the policy of privatization by issuing a stay order against the stake sale of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd (HPCL) and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd (BPCL), two of the largest oil companies in India, creating a major setback to the disinvestment drive. 200 In its final verdict on a petition challenging of the two oil majors, the Supreme Court said that the central government should obtain Parliament's approval for selling its stake in two state-run oil companies. The Court went on to elaborate by stating that the central government could not go ahead with the disinvestment of HPCL and BPCL without amending the Parliamentary Act through which the two companies were privatized in the 1970s. The decision indicated that Supreme Court was wary that the government was not adhering to its own avowed policy on privatization, which was rationalized on the basis that the government will privatize inefficient public enterprises, not efficient ones. 198 ?America's pound ftropical fesh?Sunday Observ 19Augst 201. 199 <htp:/w.tribei.m/19/mr03/iz.htm>(aceda8June 206) and for a second s fsta s (20) 8Fotl Magin <t:/.ronliont.co/fl6/fl216.t (s 7Mr 5). 200 ?Th gvemt hd ke th advice the AdvocteGral,whobelivdtha te disnett fgverquiyntwontis i not equi parmnrysncio. The govrhnpoc tos t mpa.Hv,tis ciso tl til majs wa cld anWri petioserfild iublic trs dretlbefrheSuprm CurtnderAtie32fthCnsun I.?SreCoufInia [203] AIR C250. Se lso ? bk osl oil majr?(203) Fontli Magzi <htp:/.frntlinet.c/f16/fl16.htm> (csed t7rch 5). 139 Perhaps one of the most resounding rejections of the neo-liberal globalization juggernaut occurred through democratic process in 2004 General Election of India. The ruling nationalist BJP-led alliance dissolved Parliament and went for an early election, secure in the knowledge that amid an economic boom and promising attempts of peace between Pakistan and India it would be voted back into power. However, the election result was an unexpected yet resounding vote for the opposition Congress party. The BBC's Adam Mynott, analysing the outcome of the elections, observed that the masses ignored by the globalization process promoted by the governing BJP had spoken against iniquitous process. 201 The results indicated that millions of rural poor marginalized by the rapid economic globalization process epitomized by the ?India Shining? campaign used their democratic right to protest. The result is also seen as a rejection of the BJP?s Hindus-first position in favour of the secularism of the Congress party. 2.8 Reconceptualizing Globalization The contemporary South Asian state is being constricted between the twin pressures of globalization externally and political and economic challenges internally. On the external front the state is constantly urged by the multilateral institutions and donor agencies to conform to the neo-liberal model by further deregulation greater integration. Resistance on an individual state basis appears to be impossible; at best the developing states can only exercise marginal influence over the forces that shape and determine global finance or markets. The states that sought integration into the capitalist system through liberalization, financial aid, debt and structural adjustment policies have now become subservient to the global markets for their very existence. 202 However, an intriguing twist scenario is the formation of the G 22 ?1 at the Cancun WTO Foreign Ministerial Summit in Mexico in September 2003. A group of developing states (the G-21) has been able to present a coherent stand against 201 Gandhi trumphs inIdian elction<htp:/news.bc.ouk/1hi/world/suth_asi/37120.stm> (t12J05). 202 Se Cter 3of tis tuy. 140 unfair structures that discriminate against them in world trade. 203 It is as yet premature to judge the success of Cancun as the viability and the future of the coalition are uncertain. However, if effectively consolidated ?the emergence state-civil society coalitions, aided by the increasing power of middle-ranking countries, may mount a serious challenge to western hegemony over the long- term.? 204 Palley agrees that such a coalition consolidated could be tantamount to a crucial challenge to Euro-American hegemony of the world economy and the supremacy of the neoliberal economic ideology. 205 The triumph and the confidence with which the multilateral institutions and the proponents of economic globalization have exalted its virtues have waned as gruelling evidence of abject poverty and marginalization, in direct consequence of the mismanagement the globalization process, emerges. The World Bank itself has of late adopted a cautious approach whereby in a strategy paper it recommends the creation of social protection programmes (safety nets) for those rendered vulnerable from the economic development process and its downturns. 206 Similarly, in its annual World Development Report, 207 the World Bank acknowledges that it is imprudent to totally withdraw the state from all spheres of economic activity or abandon its regulatory function. In an ironic twist of positions the World Bank requests that the nation states play interventionist role (actively discouraged in the past) and recreate the welfarist measures, nurture social safety nets and rekindle their regulatory functions to provide a bulwark against the economic downturns. This implies that there is a need for a reconceptualization of the policies and instruments of international trade, investment and finance, the core ingredients of contemporary globalization. Such a reconceptualization must cease treating human rights issues as peripheral to the formulation and operation of globalization. Concentrating on human rights as the pivotal point in the new 203 Balkrishna Rjagopl ?A NewOportunity Cancu's Failure Aliance ofivl society and devopg coutryvernmtsculd ae glbltrde rl?YGobl3Dmbr203 <ht:/ylebl..du/ilay.rti?i=2937> (sd 23Mr 205). 204 Ibi. 205 TomasI Pley ?After Cnc: Posiblties for aNew orth-Sut rand Brgain oTrade? Freign licnFocus(NM: Iter-hmphcRurcCne, ilveCity,203). 206 RHz tal. Sialin Str Stgy: Fm aftyNt oSpribr yWrl Bank(WorldBkPbton, 203). 207 The n "AckigPverty" 20/1 World Devlopent Rrt <tp:/w.rla.r/aulpo/veiw.ht> (acsda3Mar 206). 141 reconceptualization process has the advantage of formulating a new regime that is not geographic, racial or historically specific. It can focus on humanity irrespective of political and economic power structures. Reforms can include managing the process of globalization through the creation of a normative framework, which is equitable in operation. Targets, such as ensuring the benefits of international trade, technological and scientific advancements are shared equitably by all, are achievable ends in a world that is not segmented along economic, political or social lines. In so far as the traditional system of rights is inadequate to deal with the new demands made by the globalization process, mechanisms for the vindication and protection of human rights would have to be more broad-based and innovative. The reforms envisaged for a new globalization paradigm are neither unrealistic nor unachievable, for, as Shiva comments in the quotation that opened this chapter, ?economic globalization has become a war against nature and the poor. But the rules of globalisation are not god-given [and] can be changed ....? 208 The quintessential character of neutral phenomena is their pliancy. Therefore, the contemporary attributes that have been acquired by globalization are not inexorable or inevitable. As much as there is a Washington-Consensus or Anglo- American (or Euro-American, or Japanese-Euro-American, or Western) definition of globalization there is the potential to define the character of globalization taking into consideration core values of whichever region is under consideration. There exist other examples of different methods in which the states, particularly in East Asia, have handled globalization. From the onset, East Asian states attempted to control the terms on which they engaged with the global economy. Their growth was based on taking advantage of the global market for exports and on closing the technology gap with the developed world. Perceiving that it was not merely disparities in capital and other resources that separated the developed from the less-developed countries, but also differences in technological knowledge, East Asia took advantage of the globalization process itself to reduce 208 Vand Shiva ?GlobalistonadPoverty? inVeroika Benhodlt-Thomsn ad Nicholas Frclas TersnAterve (Z Bks,Lod, 201). 142 this disparity. While some of the countries in the region grew by opening themselves up to multinational companies, others, such as Korea and Taiwan, grew by creating their own enterprises. Another discerning element of the East Asian response to globalization is that the state remained active in the process of economic growth using industrial capitalism as a tool. The lack of regulation investments, particularly financial markets, and the disastrous socioeconomic consequences, indicate that the terms of engagement relating to economic globalization by East Asia were deeply flawed 209 but it nevertheless remained a unique way of approaching globalization. Other new approaches to handle and manage globalization are being experimented with elsewhere in the world. 210 The ?Beijing Consensus?, China?s initiative towards better management of development, was prompted by the need for a more equitable, non-aggressive and more human-centred developmental process that questioned the legitimacy of the drives for liberalization, privatization and free trade in their contemporary form. Ramo, in his analysis of the initiative, hastens to say that it is not a particular doctrine, for the Beijing Consensus does not prescribe a solution to every crisis of globalization but projects it more in terms of a defensive or reactionary process to contemporary globalization. 211 The above examples indicate that there are diverse means of approaching globalization, determining the pace and content of change, rejecting the basic tenets of the Washington Consensus, which argues for a minimalist role for government and rapid privatization and liberalization. 2.9 Conclusion The present chapter defined the contemporary articulations of globalization and observed that the concept enjoyed a long history dating back to the early civilizations. The study also analysed the impact of globalization on nation 209 JEStigltz ?The Insider-WhatIlernd athe world ecnomic ris? (20) New Rpublic <htp:/w.mifuly.og/TO/Josp-Siglz-IMF17apr0.ht>acesd12ov05). 210 Josua Copr Bijn Cu: Nts nth Nw Pysi ofChin Pr (Freign Plicy entr, Geatrta,204). 211 Jsh r Ro ?The ijngoseus? <tp:/tim.duf..cn/wc/ashitncens/beijngcosenus.pdf> (acesd at28 Mar 206) 143 state and society. The discussion also considered the distinct neo-liberal bias of the contemporary globalization and the repercussions it has generated, particularly the anti-globalization movement. This study observes that globalization is a neutral concept with the capacity to promote a variety of values and ideologies. To condemn globalization as Westernization or to equate the globalization paradigm with neo-liberalist capitalism is not only futile; it also precludes us from taking advantage of the positive benefits that lie latent within the concept. As Amartya Sen asserts: 212 ? [t]he cntral issue ofcntetion isot globalistion itself, nor isit the us of th markt s intitutio, but theinquity inthe ovrall blacefintitutional rngts? whic prdcs vrynqul shing f th bfits f loblistion. Tequstionis ot jt whethr pr, too, ainsomthingrom a, bt therygea fir sadafir prtunity. The isan urgent ed for fmin stitutionl rngmets?in ditio totiol ones ineto ovrc both e ros f oissio adthos f comissio that tend givepacthewrldsuch limited prtunitie. Globlisatiodsrv arsnd fnc, bt it lsnes reform. Chapters 3 and 4 of this study will discuss the devastating manifestations of contemporary globalization with its neo-liberal bias in South Asia. The increased dissatisfaction with the contemporary globalization process and the backlash against the governmental liberalization and privatization policies, which progressively assume sinister forms, will be the focus of these chapters. The Indian subcontinent has a long civilizational history founded on tolerance and a strong sense of humanism. 213 Its societies are founded on values such as equity, pluralism, self-reliance, and non-violence. The region has long cherished its subsistence economies the consumerist culture that the West promotes is viewed with a degree of scepticism. The South Asian region with its unique and complex ethnic, religious and cultural dimensions cannot simply ape models solutions formulated in other regions to manage globalization and envisage their successful implementation. The region has the capacity to design its own direction of economic and social development preserving its core values and its identity and 212 Amarty Sen ?How tJudge Globalism? (20) 13The Amrican Prospect 1?4. <htp:/opl.cisk.e/~ab/Miscny/globalis.tl>(aesdt8 Nv207) 213 Se Chtr 1f this ty. 144 not be coerced to accept the iniquitous and the non-egalitarian facets of contemporary globalization. The new regional praxis that is advocated in Chapter 6 of this study promotes a conceptual framework to manage globalization, according precedence to regional concerns that include the need for accountable governance, respect for human rights and human development rather than unmitigated global market demands. 145 CHAPTER 3 AGENTS AND INSTRUMENTS OF CONTEMPORARY GLOBALIZATION ?Those w eat their fill speak to the hungry of the wonderful times to come. Those w led th country to th abys call rlin to difficult fo ordinary mn.? 1 3.1 Introduction The previous chapter traced the trajectory of globalization and South Asia?s trysts with its various incarnations. It drew attention to what this study calls generically the ?contemporary? phase of globalization ? which coincides closely with Hopkins? ?post-colonial? phase, and which took real shape after World War II. This whole contemporary phase spanning 60 years coincided not only with a new wave of independence struggles by the colonies as noted by Hopkins, but also with the very first truly global wave of human rights regimes, whose international agents (from the UN down) and international instruments (from the UDHR onwards) arose, like the seminal agents discussed in this chapter (the World Bank and IMF), out of ashes of the same global conflagration: World War II. Thus, the trajectory economic globalization traced in Chapter 2 can be seen to have run parallel to the trajectory of internationalized ? one could say ?globalized? ? human rights regimes traced in Chapter 1. However, as the ensuing discussion illustrates, the relationship between these two phenomena is extremely unbalanced. Chapter 2 also discussed the impact of contemporary globalization on the state, nationhood and human rights in South Asia. Of sharpest concern was impact of the neo-liberal genus of the broader ?contemporary? species of globalization, which has gained ascendancy in that species during the last 30 years. The chapter concluded that if South Asia is to avoid being a victim of, specifically, this neo- liberal version of contemporary globalization then the region must determine its own terms of engagement with the process. 1 Bertol recht ?From AGeranWrPimer? inPoems 193?1956 (Methun Limted, Great ian,1976). 146 This chapter focuses on several related issues. Firstly, it traces the roots of the drive for development in the former colonies; it observes varied forms ?development? has adopted, and the role of the IFIs as the initiators and policy- setting, rule-making, public agents contemporary globalization ever since Bretton Woods. The term IFIs is widely understood, and is used here, to mean the IMF and the World Bank. This chapter further identifies the TNCs as the private agents that have been the biggest commercial players and primary beneficiaries of all contemporary globalization, but especially its neo-liberal form. The chapter traces the manner in which the TNCs consolidated their operations on a global scale and were assisted in doing so by the conducive economic environment skewed rules of the economic game under-pinned by neo- liberalism promoted by the IFIs and also the WTO. The present chapter describes the historical circumstances of the economic crisis that precipitated the rise of specifically neo-liberal development policies that is synonymous with that subset of contemporary globalization that predominated under the Washington Consensus from the late 1970s. The key instruments of that process will be identified as the Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) period, followed eventually by Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) that aimed to rectify the incongruity of the SAPs. The chapter considers the manner in which developmental policy formulation that was left in the hands of the IFIs has enhanced the agenda of the mainstream which, since late 1970s, continues to be based on ideals neo-liberalism. 2 This acquired ideological bias of the World Bank and the IMF prescribes policies aimed at ?reorienting the economic structures policies of indebted and impoverished Third World societies, [but which,] far from being designed to make the world order equitable, are addressed to the overall good of the world?s hegemonic economies, in all their complexity and contradiction? at cost of the developing world. 3 The 2 Noam Chosky Profit Over Pople:Noliberalism nd Global Orde (Sven tories Prs, New Yrk,198). 3 UpendrBaxi?Vics furing ad th futr ofHu Rights? (198) Trasntioal L aotpory Problem 167. 147 socioeconomic costs of the neo-liberal policy formulations are discussed in the context of South Asia. 4 Returning to the parallel but unbalanced trajectories identified in Chapters 1 and 2 of the internationalization human rights and economic globalization, this Chapter?s analysis of the repercussions of SAPs PRSPs will highlight how economic globalization has challenged the cocooned existences of both human rights and economic development regimes. The contemporary international economic human rights regimes, two parallel post-World War II developments, have evolved to cater to the global requirements in their respective fields. These parallel developments have strived for efficient and optimal systems for the enhancement of international human rights and international economic development. International development was supposedly meant in a disingenuous aggregation, to benefit ?the whole globe?, as much as human rights also were. However, the rights regime and the economic development regime were not synthesized or given any kind of equal footing; rather, as has been seen, they conveniently separated, causing a dysfunctional and highly asymmetric relationship between them. Chapter 3, nevertheless, also underlines the positive outcomes of the donor-driven developmental process, particularly issues such as the capacity for mobilization of civil society and the articulation of good governance, both a by-product the PRSPs. This chapter concludes with the observation that the present isolation of the human rights regime from the development regime adversely affects millions of people across, specifically, South Asia. The analysis emphasizes the need to focus on human-centred development and economic growth, separating them from neo-liberal ideological foundations, to seek a just and workable rationalization between the two disciplines and trajectories of human rights and development. 3.2 Objects of Early Global Development Initiatives (1930s?1970s) 4 The discuion fthe IFs? policyfrmulation d their mpact islited oSuth Asia, thoug rlvantrearrmotrdeving esabnlieduon casinoence isi. 148 The idea of development and the need to provide assistance and aid to the ?under- developed? former colonial territories gained global currency simultaneously with the initiatives to provide financial assistance and policy guidance to rehabilitate war-torn Europe in the early 1950s. The encouragement to pursue a particular trajectory of development was contained in the inaugural congressional speech of President Truman in January 1949. 5 Truman noted that the majority of the world still lived in ?underdeveloped areas? and that a central mission his presidency was to transform the world because ?[t]heir poverty is a handicap and a threat both them and to more prosperous areas.? 6 Therefore Sachs observes that, ?[c]lothing self-interest in generosity, Truman outlined a program of technical assistance designed to ?relieve the suffering of these peoples? through ?industrial activities? and promote ?a higher standard of living?.? 7 Truman?s pledge in fact also ensured allegiance to the West and to capitalism, in the context of the Cold War. 8 Since then ?development? has been both sought by decolonized world and imposed on it by the United States of America and the UN, its allied agencies other international developmental agencies, which form the core of the mainstream developmental drive. Since the Programme of Action of first UN Developmental Decade of 1960?1970 pronounced that the ?problem with the underdeveloped countries is not just growth, but development,? 9 various attempts were made to integrate economic growth with specific aspects of development, such as environmental concerns, rural development and gender issues. The development rhetoric expanded the conceptual analysis from ?another development? as conceptualized by the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation in 1975 10 to a ?basic needs approach? ILO in 5 David Simon ad Klaus Dods?Introductin: Rethinkg Georaphies ofNrth-Sout elpet?(198)Thir Wl Qarly59?60;Jn Ikbry ?Te MyfPost- Co Wr Chs 6 FegAfirs71?96. 6 <ht:/w.truanlibry.or/calend/viewpaers.ph?id=103> (acsd 13 Jan 206) 7 lfgan Scs ?Dvpmt: gui toh uin? [192] NewIntertionlist. 8 oh(ed) elDcry,AgtoKnlg sPwer (Z Boks, Ld, 197) 2?3. 9 UN Devlopmnt ca ?Progame ofctin (U Dept fEconmics and Scial Afirs, wYrk, 6). 10 ?Whatn? g Hmrskj?ld rpt devlopmt and iteratil opertion evlopetadInteration Coeaion? (1975) /2evlopn Dgu 1?128. 149 1976 11 and then to ?integrated development? from UNESCO in 1977. 12 Crucially, the IFIs? assumption of their role as chief protagonists of the development agenda was another natural milestone. The IFIs continued with the mainstream intellectual assumptions relating to development with greater emphasis on global financial streamlining and multilateral management. 3.3 The Genesis of Globalization?s Key Public Agents, the International Financial Institutions This section briefly surveys the genesis of the IFIs, the rationale for their establishment, and policy frameworks that are in place for promotion of global economic growth. 13 Their contemporary role the global economy will be discussed later in relation to the SAPs and PRSPs. 14 The foundations of the contemporary global economic order pre-date the conclusion of World War II. The financial crisis of the 1930s highlighted absence a mechanism to monitor global financial relations, and the idea of a multilateral was mooted with vigour during the aftermath of Great Depression. 15 World War II and the resultant economic devastation required a systematic restructuring of the Western European economic order. It is in this context that the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 explored the idea of an international regulatory mechanism with limited supra-national authority to supervize and direct the global monetary regime and the economic reconstruction. An institution for international monetary regulation (the IMF) and a multilateral entity for the channelling of capital for economic reconstruction (the World Bank) were conceptually innovative, as capital transfers had been the exclusive domain 11 Ajit Sngh ?Te Basic Neds Aproach tDevlopment vs. The Nw Interationl Econmic Orde:ifinofThirWldInustriazti?(197)WorldDvlpet586. 12 Gustavo Estv Dvlmnt? ifg Schs d) Dlpmt ictry, Aguide t Knwlge Power(Zd ks,Lo, 197)0?18. 13 Th discinil fcuso the IMF andte Worl Bank, lthoug idential poics wr implnt bythrltiarldvlpmbanks(Ms)biatrl geando coutries alo ad i ntiits. 14 Fhrgiztlstrucre ofheIFd their main fuctions, ref Apix D. 15 Mic Obsfel Aa Taylr ? GraDps aWatshd: Interationl CaptloiltyovrtheLngR?(197)NBER WorkigPper N. 5960. <h:/w.n.g/prs/w5960.pdf >(cesd27 Se 206). 150 of private markets or bilateral agreements. 16 The planning for post-war monetary reconstruction and the ideas for a global institutionalized financial regulatory mechanism came largely from the Treasuries of the UK and USA. Although 40 allied countries and one neutral member (Argentina) participated in the Bretton Woods Conference, its proceedings were dominated by Harry Dexter White from the USA and John Maynard Keynes from the UK. These two countries most shaped the new international economic order, though more so the USA 17 , reflecting its greater economic power. 18 The IMF and the World Bank were significant creations of the Bretton Woods Conference in three respects. The Conference created the first global financial regulatory mechanism that administered rules relating to currency values and conversions. Secondly, the system provided capital transfers for economic reconstruction and development, and assistance for countries with balance of payments issues, by injecting capital to manage such crises on a short-term basis. Thirdly, the system was a source of intellectual inspiration and institutional support on issues of monetary co-operation and capital liquidity, while respecting the principle national sovereignty. The original proposal for the WTO?s predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), also dates to the Bretton Woods Conference. 19 3.3.1 Key Private Agents: Transnational Corporations as Epiphytes of the International Financial Institutions This section focuses on the nature and social impact of TNCs, which have benefited immensely from IFIs? neo-liberal economic philosophy manifested in the form of the two main instruments to be discussed below: the SAPs and the 16 Michael Gvin ad Dni Rodrik ?The World Bank iHistorical Perspctive? (195) 8The AmrnEcomcevw329?334. 17 Ricad Nar Strlig-lar Diplmcy: the rigns d rosect ofur Interationl EoOe (McGaH, USA,196) (Gardn). 18 ?In WashingtoLrd lifxonce whiseto Lr Keys: /It's rue thy ave th mey bags/But we v althebras.? Qutd nareabv n17,2. 19 PetrVdBsc T LaPolicy fth WrldTa Organizto: Txt, Cas nd Mils (CambrigUnivrsity res, NYrk,205) 9?80. 151 subsequent PRSPs. 20 TNCs, opportunistic profit-seekers, flourished naturally on the back of the IFIs and in this sense can be called their epiphytes. TNCs are ?legally discrete entities (i.e. companies) established in several countries, forming a single economic unit (enterprise) which engages in operations transcending national borders under the direction of a sole decision- making centre.? 21 The ten largest TNCs in world have their headquarters in the USA and the UK and their shareholders are drawn from Europe and North America. 22 TNCs can relocate operations anywhere to maximize profit. Thus fiscal incentives, cheap labour, flexible legal regimes, lax health and safety regulations and poor environmental protection conditionalities are corollaries through which countries in the developing world compete against each other to attract TNCs. 23 The crucial role that the TNCs play in global finance is illustrated by the volume and diversity of their activities. 24 According to the World Investment Report of 2003, 7,000 TNCs in 1970 had multiplied into 64,000, with 870,000 global affiliates that controlled nearly 30 per cent of world GDP. 25 The World Development Report of the World Bank 2001 data indicate that less than 60 states have GNPs of US$ 20 billion in contrast to the estimation of Fortune Global 500 list of TNCs in 2001 which indicated that 245 of them had annual revenues of more than UD$ 20 billion. 26 Kinley and Tadaki call the ?driving agents the global economy? with ?considerable political leverage in both domestic and 20 Noreena Hertz The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy (Free Press, New York, 2002). 21 AFatours ?Transtional Eterpis nthe Lawof Stae Rsponiblty? inRichard BLilch (ed) Inetil Lw fStRobilyfrInjurisAli (UverstPesofVrgna, Chrltsvl,1983)62. 22 Ga Ectri (U,Exon Mil (US), Microsft (US), Pfizer (S), Citgrup (US), Wl- MrtSores(S),BPK) AmercaInteratnlGrup,BankofAmecaRoya Duch/l Ntherlands/,Th Wold?s 10 Lgest blic Cpis, dtrined bThe Wal trJu Mket DatGrup 3Au24. 23 Cisna ztl.?MulinalEnteris and Human Right? (19/20) 8Uivrsity of m It?l& Comp LRv 244?246. 24 Strchisthaoftheworld?sbigt 10 ecoies oly 4are countries and 51are copaions: Gr Srcan 01 ?Stopinhrt abutgbist? <t:/w.vefl.nt.u/~bizrief/arcl_.m>(csd 17M 206). 25 Uied Ntis Coer oTd Devlopent WorlInvestmntReport203 (United atons, Yrkad Gva,203)14. 26 Leli Sklai?mpeting Cceptions fGlbalizt? iChristopher KChase-Du a SalvtrJBbons ()lobal SalChge: Hsoricalnd ativPrpctivs(John Hopins UiverityPr, UA,206) 1. 152 international spheres.? 27 The TNCs operate within national economies in several ways. They can directly invest and be in charge of the operations or conduct business through outsourcing. In the case of South Asia, many of the TNCs operate outsourcing as this is most profitable and least responsible way of operating. 28 TNCs are a valued source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for the developing world and their sphere operations extends beyond the traditional Export- Processing Zone (EPZ). The deregularization process under SAPs has enabled the TNCs to penetrate into areas beyond industry and production. 29 TNCs are now involved as service providers in healthcare, education, infrastructure construction. 30 Not only do their activities transform the urban industrial sector, but their sphere of influence permeates into the rural society as they become active in domestic markets such as food, agricultural products, medicine and textiles. Operating under the neo-liberal economic agenda, TNCs are primarily motivated by profit. The wider issues of equitable economic growth, development and social justice have not entered into their realms of consideration until recently. 31 The concerns over the operations of the TNCs range from their global financial role to the impact on global environment, their accent on profits above social goals and individual states? impotency to regulate their activities. 3.3.2 New strategies of global development: restructuring the ?Third World? from the late 1970s onward Although the freedom of policy formulation for global economics was vested with the WB and IMF at inception, neither institution did much to manipulate or 27 David Kinley ad Junko Tadki?From Talk toWalk: The Emrgenc ofHuman Rights RespobtsforCprtins tIeniLw?(203?04) VirgiJoralof Intrtil Lw 931?1024. 28 JdzjGergFrynas ?Therastioal Grent Idustry inSouth and Suth Est Ai: Focus nabou Rit?iJdzj ergFysaScoPeg(s)Trsaionl Crptis dHm Rgts(Plv Mcil, Hmpshir, Nw Yk, 203). 29 PAhkrln Sajpiran Libralizton dInutalnsformti:SriLak in Interation Pespctive (OxfodUesy Pres,Oxfor d e Dlh, ). 30 Fyz Btiad hzrMur ?Hlth Cit aSevicivryinouthAsi? [206] Southsi Jurnl14. <p:/w.otsimedia.nt/agzine/Journl/priousis14.htm> (acesd 17Jun 207). 31 Thisaect ftheir oprtios idscud latr ithis capter. 153 reformulate the economic policies of individual states in the developing world until the late 1970s. Intervention became inevitable with poor performance of the heavily debt-ridden economies and when debt repayment snowballed into a global financial crisis during that decade. The shift of focus of the IFIs from being still partly on the European economies devastated during World War II to more exclusively poverty-stricken and/or Communism-prone poor states, grew gradually from the global financial disasters between 1970 and 1980. 32 The USA, Western Europe and their dependent economies during the 1970s experienced two recessions largely due to rising oil prices that fuelled inflation and interest rises. The demand of these states for commodity exports from developing countries consequently fell, while the prices of goods manufactured in the industrial world conversely increased. 33 The origin of the debt crisis, though commonly attributed to the above, was also the result two further factors. The first is the poor financial policy formulation of IMF and the lackadaisical monitoring of loan repayments by the World Bank in the 1970s. The transfer of what were known as petrodollars, in terms of loans from oil producing countries to low/middle-income countries Latin America, Asia and Africa, was perceived be potentially lucrative. This scheme was initiated by Western commercial banks under the aegis of the World Bank. The transfer of funds was done with no risk assessments and entire process was poorly managed. The second cause for crisis is the financial mismanagement by the debtor states. 34 During the Cold War loan allocation was often based on political affiliation without prior risk assessments. Loans were rarely utilized for the intended purposes such as infrastructure development projects or income generating projects, but were often misused or misappropriated. The donors conditioned 32 Petr Koner tal. The IMF andtheDbt Cris: AGuide tohe Tird Worl?s Dilema (Zed BoksLd, AlicHigls,Nw Jrsy,1986)5?73,128?187. 33 rugma?Extrn ock omtic poliy rspns? iR Drnbusch and FLCH Hels (e) The OpEny: Tls frmake idevlopig eoies(Oxford UnivrityPrs,Nw Yr, 198)54?108. 34 Oluwol Akanl Rschedulig ofhe Extrnal Dbt (Lon Club, Articl Rfrnc: Dcmet.1,Cptr 3,Fbray192) <htp:/uitr.og/fm/Rsc_Ctr/ocumet_Sries/Docment1/C_kale.htm> (asd 8Fb 208) 154 aid/financial assistance on establishing democratic governing processes, but these conditions were often ignored for political expediency. 35 As ideas such as transparency, accountability and good governance had not gained the political currency they have today, sporadic condemnation did have a lasting impact or change governmental practice. 36 At the initial stages the receiving countries were not perturbed by the prospect of repayment but welcomed the loans to settle immediate financial crises. With time, high rates of inflation and poor economic growth in the developing countries made interest payments impossible, for interest rates had risen from an average of 0.5 per cent to an average of 13.1 per cent. 37 This crisis initiated another round borrowing for the purposes of refinancing the loans obtained previously. 38 The escalating oil prices, interest rate rises and balance of payment and loan repayment issues emphasized the structural weaknesses and policy inadequacies of the Bretton Woods institutions to manage the global financial process satisfactorily. It had also become apparent that financial contributions alone could not resolve the financial troubles of the developing economies, and that correction of inappropriate financial and trade policies was also required. The neo-liberal economic orthodoxy 39 came into operation when the crisis point was reached with the Mexican Finance Minister declaring that Mexico would withhold debt repayments for three months in August 1982. 40 The IMF and the World Bank, encouraged by the US Treasury, agreed to assist Mexico reschedule the loans. However, conditions of such assistance included institutional and economic reforms termed Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), 35 JF Toye tal. Aid an Power:TheWorld Bank d Policy-based Lnig (Routledg, Lnd,195) 36 Patric dms Odius Dbts (Eartsc, Lo, 19); Dvsh Kapur d ichar Wb Govee-rlateCondilie ofheIntratinlFiancilItions (UNCTAD/GS/MPB/G24/6 UntdNais Publcto, Uted N, ?20). 37 Fr background tbt isus <tp:/w.deirl.rg/bt-isue/>(acesd16 Jun 206). 38 By the rly 1980s, Africa's debt cris as ograv th te ratio fAric?s forign bt oits exporincmgewto5%.SKvnWtkin el.TOxfmPvety Rpt(Oxfam Publs, Oxfrd, ) 74; s also Jan Vdrmot ?Ar MDGsfrdable?? [2003] DvetPlicyJurnal 1?21. 39 aid Harv ABief History fNelibralis (xfrd University Pres, xfor, 205) 9. 40 Robtstor(d)LAmican Dt C:Ajustg fo hatlanigforthe Futre? (Lyne Rinr, uldr, Colrd,1987) . 155 which were privatization of state-owned enterprises, cuts in social welfare and governmental expenditure, the opening up of the economy and flexible labour laws. The prescriptions to Mexico were replicated globally. If the WB and the IMF now became more than ever pressed into service as the agents of neo-liberal economic globalization, the SAPs (and their successors) were the instruments. 3.4 Key instruments: The ideological base and main features of Structural Adjustment Policies The ?neo-liberal counter-revolution? 41 was supported by orthodox economists such as Mandel, Krugman and Bhagwati. 42 They all favoured the liberalization and integration of global markets as a means of promoting economic growth and eradicating poverty. It was also promoted with vigour by the right-wing leaders of the USA and the UK, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, in the 1980s. 43 In contrast to existing pessimism in the developing world relating to state-centric economic policies, the new paradigm which advocated market-driven economic growth for poverty eradication and development was burgeoning. 44 The World Bank and the IMF epitomized the West?s neo-liberalism 45 and maintained that financial assistance alone would not stimulate economic growth, whereas policies merging domestic and global markets would. 46 SAPs ? the 41 JFJ Toye, Dilmas ofDevlopment: rflections the counter-volutin devlopment ecnmics(Backwel,Oxrd, 193). 42 JMadl ?h Gd SifGig lbal? [197] Cmwal <htp:/w.enylopa.co/c/1-584062.htl> (acesd12Jan 07); Jagdish N Bgti Fr Trae: l nd New Chlengs [4]TEonmicourl14Pul KrumaPdligPsrity:Eomi SadNon-s ith Age fDimnise Expections (W. . No, Yrk,194) Ihrat Hua?Glbalzt ad Librlzt:AOprtunitReduc Poverty?iUCTD oio ai Efects fIeaionlEnic Rltons Pverty (Unted Ntions, ew York nd Geva,196). 43 lBlo Drk Vitory: US d Global Pverty (Istiu for F a Dvelpmt Picy, Oa,4). 44 Jhgwti nd AKruegr Feign Tre Rgims and Ecnmic Devlopnt: Libralizton Atempts Cosqncs(Bal,Cabrde,1978). 45 PrKer tal. Th IM d th Dt is: AGuie toh Tird Wrl?s Dilem (Zed Boks, tlanicHigds,NewJrsey,1986)5?3and 2?187. 46 Vitriorb tl (e) Ajutmnt Lding Revist:Plices toRestr Gowth (Worl an Pulti,192. 156 ?basic policy instrument of the neo-liberal resurgence? 47 and supported by the ?Washington Consensus? 48 Washington DC based institutions precisely IMF World Bank and the US Treasury Department? catalysed that change and were justified by failures of previous developmental efforts and the alleged prodigality of the developing world. 49 The IFIs made loans aid conditional upon the successful implementation of the SAPs and encouraged competition, price deregulation, and removal subsidies devaluations to correct imbalances of trade. Recipient countries had to establish monitoring regimes and safeguards conducive to foreign and private investment. Legislation promoting foreign investment, favourable taxation and labour market deregulation was also integral, as was a reduction in governmental size and expenditure ? including on welfare ? to decrease budget deficits and inflation, 50 and privatization. 51 3.4.1 The Impact of Structural Adjustment Policies SAPs differed radically from previous developmental theories in two aspects. Firstly, SAPs ensured the transformation of the state from an active participant in developmental processes to a passive facilitator of the neo-liberal market ideology. Secondly, SAPs were the catalyst that displaced sacrosanct position held by the concept of non-interference in internal affairs of individual countries, hitherto strongly supported by the United Nations. 47 Karen Brock, Andrea CornwalandJohn Gavent ?Power, Knowledg an Politcal Spces in thFmig fPvtyPlicy? (Working Ppr No143 Istiu fDvlpme udi(ID), rigt,Otbr 201) 3. 48 Te Washinonseus a symus with sabilztion, liberalizton a erglation policdvcted yth IF.SeJilaon?Wud hWd Bkhibou he ashngto Csus??(20) 15The rld Bk ResrcOsrv2. 49 TikaMnawire and Carls.Su(e) Contiet u Ftre. African Perspctves StctlAjutmnt (Africa orl Prs,201);rancesSwadjustmet and ory:Opios hoices (Roledg,NwYk 95. 50 Bla lsa trutaldjtt pis indevlpingecomis (Working Pper no. SWP 46 1,WrdBnkSf, 198) anJ.F. TyStructa Adjustnt&Eplymtlicy: Isue& Expeice (ItrtiolLbourOgaizo,195). 51 AnaGuorgvad Kahre Blt ACtcl Reviw ftheLitratue onStructal djstmet nd the Enirmnt:TInrinBkrRconscid Devopent (Eviralcocs Sris Rach Papr No. 90, T Wrld Bk, 203). <htp:/lwb18.rlbak.g/ed/vext.sf/4yDcame/ACitalReviwfthLit> (acesd 6Jun 206); Vitori Crbo nd Sle Fushr ?Strucr justmn, Sablztion n PolicyReformDescnItatiina vlopntEoic?iJBerma TN Srivas (d) Hadk fDevlpmt Ecis Vl I(lsevr, Astd, 195). 157 The influence of the SAPs permeated every layer of the national economies, yet ignored the human dimension of growth and development. 52 The IFIs manipulated domestic financial policy formulation controlled public expenditure through the ?Public Expenditure Reviews? (PERs). 53 The PERs promoted cost-recovery on all public expenditure, causing deliberate extraction of payment for several essential services such as healthcare, education, transport and public housing. These ?austerity measures in the social sectors ?have largely being responsible for the collapse of schools, health clinics and hospitals? in the developing world consolidating the cycle of poverty and marginalization. 54 The SAPs? authoritarian implementation by the IFIs and their devastating social, political and economic impact initiated debates across international fora 55 , academia 56 the developing world. Criticisms focussed on their moral legitimacy and impact on the universal human rights regime and whether the IFIs had an obligation to abide by the international human rights treaties. Globally, SAPs transferred resources from the South to the North. Loans continued to be serviced from funds that countries could have utilized for development work. 57 During the period from 1982 to 1989 total debt repayment amounted to $615 billion in interest and amortization, while to commercial banks soared from $493 to $629 billion . 58 A great proportion of the loans obtained the WB-IMF were utilized in debt servicing to banks on basis 52 Paul Stren ?Structral Adjustment: ASurvey ofthe Isu and Opions? (1987) 5World Devopmt1462?1482. 53 rdha Afrework f valtig th ll and cmposit fublic expditures (OtinsEvluatinsDison (OED),WorBk,196). 54 T apect idced ecti 3.75 fthis caterSe also Michael Chosdvsky ?Structrljstmt?(195) 24/Ntebforudy nRer 59;Gile Mhan Auen: Thory,Pati nd Impats (Rtlg,Ld, 20). 55 J.Oloka-yagodDepik UdgaTh lizan fEcomicSoial nd ultrl Rights: Gblizt a itsmcto te fuljoyetohuan rghts Preryepo submed ncrncwh Sub-Cisn rsli 19/8/CN.4/ub.2/0/13 <tp:/w.uh./huridoa/ridca.f/(Smb)/E.CN.4Sb.2013En?Odcume nt> (acs 15J 206); 56 WilEaterly?Watistructrl justent adjust? The asocitn ofplices a growth th reptd IMF nd orld Bank djt lo?(205)76JuralDevmnt Econmics1?2. 57 Mil Chouvsky The Glblizton fPverty: Impacts ofIMF nd Worl Bak Refors (Thrdrd Netwr,Pnag,197) 51. 58 UDP Han Dlopmt Rprt9 (Oxford University Pres, Nw Yrk, 19). 158 of structural adjustment lending. 59 Toussaint and Comanne identify the true benefactors of the SAPs and quote President Mitterand, who observed, ?[d]espite the considerable sums spent on bilateral and multilateral aid, the flow of capital from Africa toward the industrial countries is greater than of capital from the industrial countries to the developing countries.? 60 An in-depth evaluation of these aspects and of human dimension of IFIs? policies relating to SAPs follows the discussion of SAPs in South Asia later in this chapter. 3.4.2 End of the era of Structural Adjustment Policies As empirical evidence 61 of the disastrous consequences of too much emphasis on economic growth emerged critics sought a synergy between human development and economic growth. Such a synergy has been called for repeatedly by the UNDP, which denied the efficacy of the trickle down theory let alone its equity. 62 The obvious question as to why those at bottom deserve only the benefits that trickle down from the neo-liberal adjustment policies was also raised. This position is contrary to that of Dollar and Kraay, who argue that the emphasis on growth and exposure global trade has no substantial adverse impact on the poor and that policy-induced growth is beneficial to the overall economy as it is to the poor. 63 Therefore, even though the Bank and Fund appear to have taken cognizance of the human dimension in the developmental paradigm, issues such as the eradication of poverty and human development are largely seen through the prism of market efficiency rather than through an equitable allocation of resources. 59 PKrugman &M Obstfed Intrationl Econmics: Theory and Policy (2 nd ed, Harpe Colins, NewYok,19)62. 60 ETsit d DComa ?Glblizat d Dbt? (195) 24/5 Ntboks fr Study a Rsarch 0?.Thescilstof the rnsferofcapilothedvlopedwrlilbenlse in te tion rlating te cialct SAPs nSu Asia. 61 PovrySuAsia206:Cv SiyCr. <htp:/w.spe.or.p/rsoures/publatios/pvety_rpot06/poverty_port06.htm > (acesd 5March 7); Hman Dmen Suh sia 25 -Human Secuiy nSouth Ai (Oxfo Univsity Pres,Oxfrd 206) 51?65. 62 UNDP HumDelopt Rpot19 Trdsingrowt nd h dvlopt (Oxfrd niversityrs, Oxfrd, 196). 63 ad olan AatKrayGrwth IsGo fr the Pr (Devlopment Rsearch Group, The WorlBnk, Mrch20) <htp:/.rldbank.og/tml/pdr/tas/rp0/gs15-6.tm> (ces25 5. 159 Many observers have queried whether the IFIs are bound by moral responsibilities. 64 Others ask why the IFIs are immune from obligations of international human rights law. 65 Despite these legitimate queries IFIs have continued economic policy formulation which creates dysfunctional sovereignty within states 66 which are unable to formulate and implement strategies of development in the interests of the people they govern. For SAPs to succeed, concerns such as poverty eradication, responsible governance and human development needed to be ?internalised into the policies of economic development?. 67 In reality, years of adjustments dictated by the World Bank and IMF 68 neither consolidated states? economic capacity nor ensured acceptable standards of living and human development. 3.5 The Search for a New Instrument: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) The failure of the SAPs reinforced the message that any developmental strategy that ignores human dimension cannot be considered successful. As Cornia, Jolly and Stewart point out, ?the call for a more people-sensitive approach to adjustment is more than a matter of economic good sense and political expediency. It rests on the ethic of human solidarity, of concern for others, of human response to human suffering.? 69 The growing civil society movement coalescing around issues of international debt, inequitable development and poverty began to challenge the supposed beneficial role of the IFIs in the global community. Forced to defend their 64 Toni Erskine Ca Instiuons HaveRsponiblties? Colectiv Moral Agency ad IteatlRltio(PalgrMcmila, Nw Yrkand Bsngtk,203). 65 Jl Ostrch ?Te ights siltis fthWrld : Busie Prdigm? (204)Sciloly5?76. 66 aul Colier Larng fr faiure: t interationl fiancil stiuons agncis of restint Afc? iAdesSchdll.(ds) TheS-Retrag Ste:Powerad Acbilty iNewDmoris (Ly RirPublis, Bldr,Clrd Ln, 19) 319?320. 67 CSeskar tal. (ds) Structal Adjustment olices inSri Lank: AStuy for the NGO- WBGroup (Scilient?Aoin,Colb,193). 68 An-LisCog Hzrs tHelth: T Wrld Bak d IMF ifrica (frica Ation Psit Paer, UA,20). 69 oniRJly andFStwart (ds) Ajustment with aHumn e: Prteig the vulnerbl d promtigroh (ClenoPre, Oxford,1987)3. 160 unimpressive track record, the World Bank and IMF have tried to allay criticisms of the SAPs. In a number of studies spanning the 1990s the World Bank and the IMF have acknowledged the burgeoning issue of world poverty. 70 The relentless dissent from all quarters and a measure self-realization provided the momentum to seek alternative avenues to consolidate the neo-liberal project. The evolution of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) was the result of that impetus. The new development paradigm was unveiled by the Senior Vice-President and Chief Economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, in 1998. 71 Stiglitz acknowledged the failures of the previous strategies that had assumed a technical approach to development and concluded that participation and ownership are essential ingredients of any development strategy. The exclusion of states from formulation of development policy was identified as among fundamental reasons for the failure SAPs. As research concluded by the World Bank supported Stiglitz?s position, at the Annual General Meetings of IMF and World Bank in 1999, the member states decided to adopt the Poverty Reduction Strategy approach. 72 The PRSPs were designed be consensus-building and inclusive of all the stakeholders of the development process, thus minimizing the risk engendering resistance or a lack of commitment to the development initiative. 73 The PRSPs were to expand consideration to embrace issues relating to governance and human development. PRSPs are designed country-specifically, applying the observation of the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) of World Bank 74 that financial, economic, social, environmental and structural issues of a country must 70 Globalizton, Grwth and Poverty:Buildng aInclusive World Econmy (A co-publicaton f theWrd Bkad OxfrUisi Pres,Oxford, 20). 71 JsphStiglt?Ts Nw aim Delpmnt: Srategis, Plies and Pres? (9tRaul Prebsch Leturdelivrdt halis Natios,UNCTDGv,19Octobr 18);H-JonCag () Th RbelWin (bld Publihn ompay Lo, 201) 57?93. 72 CarlJyarjh d Wilam HBranso rld Bank Strctal d Sectrl Adjustment ?World Bnk Expeince1980?92(old kOpetiosEvluiontuy,WoBank, ahigtn, D.C,195). 73 IMF Idt Evalutin fice Evalutin fPerty Rdctin Stregy Ppers d te PovertyRuctiondGrowhFalty(Iseapr/Tmsofer,31Jan203) <hp:/w.mf.rg/xtel/NP/io204/rgfrpt.> (asd 6Ar 6). 74 T CDF bris tr fur pncls: lon-ter, hlisc frwork;eultsoientaio; countryonehp;and coty-led artehip. <:/w.oldbn.g/va/cdf/ > (aesd 3Mr 206). 161 be dealt with in an integrative approach and that each country must be responsible for the successful implementation of its own PRSP. A PRSP is thus designed to be a collective, country-driven, long-term endeavour that considers the viewpoints of stakeholders such as the elected entities, civil society including poor, and NGOs and involves coordinated participation of development partners bilateral, multilateral, and non-governmental, while trying to remain fiscally and institutionally feasible. 75 The PRSPs prescribed by the IFIs were soon adopted by other multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) identifies six characteristics needed by a PRSP: to be a country-driven process, indicating there was broad-based participation by civil society and the private sector in all operational steps; to be results oriented, and focused on outcomes that would benefit the poor; comprehensive in recognizing the multidimensional nature of poverty, but also to be a process that prioritizes concerns so that implementation is feasible, in both fiscal and institutional terms; to be partnership-oriented, involving the coordinated participation of development partners bilateral, multilateral, and non- governmental; and to be viewed from a long-term perspective to reduce poverty. 76 In 2000, states began preparing PRSPs as a prerequisite for World Bank/IMF adjustment loans. Each PRSP outlined, after broad consultative process, a state?s poverty-reduction priorities and the economic policies needed to achieve them. The PRSPs were to be the base document for all IFI and bilateral donor lending, based on five fundamental principles determined by the World Bank: a description of the country?s participatory process in the PRSP, identification of the poverty areas and achievable goals, indicators and monitoring systems, and a definition of priority public actions. 77 The PRSP has created a system whereby the responsibility and the obligations of successful implementation of development and poverty eradication goals rests with individual countries. The previous SAPs were criticized for being forced 75 PRS olicy paer (UK Departmentfor Interationl Devlopment, Africa Policy Department, Februa20).<w.dfi.gov.uk/pbs/il/cspmrn.df> (ased17207). 76 Iid. 77 Rvwof the Povrty Rectin Straegy Paers (PRS) Aproch: Erly xperince with Interim SsandFulSPs (Wold Bnk,Apil20 <hp:/.if.rg/xtrnal/pie/20/rs/dx.htm> (aesd 17Dec 207). 162 upon unwilling yet helpless states. Failure of the PRSPs can now be attributed to a particular state for failure to recognize its own limitations, poor design and ineffective implementation. The World Bank claims that the PRSPs? increased sense of ownership of the government?s poverty alleviation strategies and created avenues for dialogue between civil society, governments and the IFIs. Furthermore the Bank claims that the PRSPs have made poverty a priority of development policies and programmes. The PRSPs have also contributed to the evolving governance culture based on transparency, accountability, participation and the rule of law. PRSPs can also include human rights targets in their strategies for poverty eradication. 78 The PRSP ? I of Bangladesh included such as ?pro-poor economic growth for increasing income and employment of the poor, human development of the poor for raising their capability through education, health, nutrition and social interventions, women's advancement and closing of gender gaps in development, [and] social safety nets for the poor against anticipated and unanticipated income/consumption shocks?. 79 Despite the adoption of a new development paradigm by both the World Bank and the IMF, allegations abound that the PRSPs are following same trajectory as SAPs. The limitations of process, the extent in which they imitate the SAPs and the negative repercussions of their application are discussed in 3.7 of this chapter. 3.6 South Asian economic development in the post colonial era- A brief overview The focus of this chapter is the impact of globalization in South Asia. The ensuing overview highlights how different economic circumstances have resulted in a similar set of symptoms which compelled South Asia to join the reform wave advocated by the IFIs in the early 1980s. The following paragraphs evaluate the respective economies of South Asia prior to the wave of contemporary globalization and its repercussions. 78 Sergio Peria Leit ?Human Rightsand the IMF? (201) 38Finace nd Devlopment 4. 79 NatnlStgyforEcocGrowPovrtyReducto IPRS (raft r iscuio, Bldsh Ecni ltis Divs, ist fina,GvrmhPl? RepubiofBaldesh,20). 163 Evaluation of the ramification of both SAPs and PRSPs in South Asia confirms that they neither contributed to equitable economic growth nor reduced external debt. 80 However, the new policy formulations compelled interaction with the global market economy, reformulated the role of the state, and introduced new regimes of taxation and labour. The initiatives created similar adverse repercussions within each state in South Asia. 81 3.6.1 The post-independence economic trajectory of South Asia The relationship between the IFIs and South Asia has a long history. 82 India participated at Bretton Woods. In 1949, India sought World Bank assistance for a railway reconstruction and development project. 83 Both Pakistan and Sri Lanka have approached the Bank with specific requests for infrastructure development projects. 84 In keeping with the Bank?s mandate and philosophy the Bank in these early years was providing funding through loans or grants for specific projects such as transportation, power generation and industry. 85 However, the Bank?s involvement in South Asia was not limited to sporadic loans for infrastructure development. The Bank initiated the First Aid Consortium in August 1958 for India, on which the foundation for first five-year plan for India was laid. The Aid Consortium was a result of the deteriorating balance of payments, the need 80 Wilam Esterly ?What di structral djustment adjust? The asocitn ofplices and growth itpadIMFnolBnklon?(205) 76Jura Dvlopmet Ecncs 1?2. 81 AiVanik(e) Globalizt ad South Asia: Multidmesional Perspctives (Manhr Publtos, NwDhi, 204). 82 Dip ut(d) Ecnmc Lierlistn d Instional Rfrs iSouth Asi: Rcet Exernces aFutre Pospt (Aaic,Delh,20);ehanban?d,Govrnand Owhi?(204) Sth ianJourl <tp:/.sothsiand.et/gzin/Journal/prviousis14.htm> (ces 18Ju 2006). 83 WorldBank pertios iIia b i194 with lan fUS$3 ilon fr aIndia Raiwys. prject<ht:/w.rldbnk.org.in/WBSITE/XRNAL/CONTRIES/OUTHASIEXT/I NDIAEXTN0,conteMDK:201589~pagePK:1437~piPK:217854~theitPK:29584,0.ht ml >(ased 24Jul 06). 84 he Lxpargneratig rojct inSri Lank i1954 was fund bya World Bank grnt. 85 I rgion 40% ofth sitne was fr power geration, ith 25% goin trsprtio adiusty.Ariculrewacordlity,cvgly8ftheval ance <htp:/webldbak.g >(s 24Ju 06). 164 for infrastructure and industrial development and poor economic growth in India. A similar consortium was followed for Pakistan in 1960. 86 At the time of decolonization the economies of the region portrayed similar characteristics with liberalized export markets closely linked and dependent on the global markets and a self-sufficient rural economy that appeared unhindered by turbulences of the global markets. Since independence they have followed different trajectories due to political and ideological differences of the political leaders at the time of independence. 87 Post-independent economic planning was influenced by colonial experiences, such as the disastrous famine in the subcontinent in 1943, the partition of India and Pakistan at independence and dependency on external markets. The South Asian economy since its different states gained independence has been dominated by sluggish growth 88 referred to in the Indian context disparagingly as the ?Hindu rate of growth?. 89 This sluggishness was directly attributed to the dirigiste economic policies 90 in place from the time of decolonization. South Asian economies during the pre-liberalization era were generally characterized by import substitution, protection for domestic industries, large scale state-owned operations, bureaucratic inefficiency and lethargy, mismanagement, and corruption. 3.6.2 ?Hindu rate of growth? - India Pursuing the dream of self-sufficiency, India attempted to rectify all the injustices of colonial rule through its economic policy. Based on the ideals of socialism, 86 Ane CM Sald Historical Dictonary fthe World Bank (Scareow Publisher, USA, 196) 57?58. 87 Sisra Jysuri ?Glblist, Equit nd Pvrty: The outh Asian Exprinc? (Paper predfo the4tAnua obalevlopmetConfcfeGloblDevlomtNtwok on Glbliz ad Eqity.Cir, gyt, 19-2 Jaur 20). 88 Ax E 89 Hidu rateof grwth ?te sluish rate ofcnoic growth ic was round 3.5% ofthe post inepnunilontf tlblizat phasefe1980.Thetmwascindby th comist Raj Krsa dwsftn rpedirinly. S ls Vijy Jh IMD Lil(d)I: Mcemic adolitcl onm 1964-1991(WorldBnk,Wsigton, DC, 1994). 90 JalnBian Idia's Eoni Poliy: repaig fr the Twnty-first Cetury (Peguin Bks, New lh,196). 165 India, after independence, opted for a system of economic governance that was essentially protective of domestic industries and that was state regulated. The first Prime Minister, Nehru, supported policies enhanced poverty eradication, domestic industrial growth and food self-sufficiency. 91 However, the system became characterized by inefficient government bureaucracy, over-regulation, and deep scepticism of external trade and foreign investment, and widespread corruption. 92 The five-year economic development plans formulated in conjunction with the IFIs were soon stymied by droughts, war, poor resource allocation (often from agriculture to inefficient industry), population growth and adverse global economic conditions, such as the escalation of the oil prices. 93 Industry and production stifled with the operation of the License Raj. Tentative attempts at economic liberalization commenced during the last tenure of Indira Gandhi. 94 Under Rajiv Gandhi, India?s liberalization process became selective and cautious. 95 The policies during this time concentrated on selected changes such as the elimination of price controls, the revision of taxation policies, and the relaxation of subsidies and quotas. 96 A wholesale liberalization process was not undertaken until 1991. 97 Recurrent balance of payment problems, the economic success of liberal policies particularly in South East Asia, political pressure for reforms and the ideological leanings of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh contributed largely to shift away from the existing paradigm of closed door policies. 91 Stanley Wolpert India (UniversityofCalifornia Pres, Brkely, 19). 92 DvidH.Bay ?TheEfc ruptDvlopingNation?(6) 19The Wstern Poltcl Qurtl 719?732. 93 FranieFnkeIdia'sPolital Econmy, 1947?: The Grdul Revolutin (Pricto Uivsty Prs, rctn, N.J,1978); BaldevRaj NyarIndi'sMixEcmy:The Rlf IdeolgdIt isDevlpet(PpulrPblis, Bombay, 198). 94 nira Gnhi?slatprmirhi ws 0?1984. 95 Atmpts gre ibalztonrrsedyajiv Gandhi 4, but ineral poitcal turoil litdycorui scadl ow th lberliztoprcesdg histnure. andhwas r flielgtheIincmon g scl, aw oftrlg scieicbaksh wi oul st hi plitcaly.OtheBfrsnal, se <tp:/.dni.com/rpt.as?NID=10826> (sd 26Ju 206);DvidBH Dno ?Cyles Idan Eic Liberalizton, 9?1996?(198)31Comprt Politcs 43?60, RJki?CivlSiety VrsuCoup?(7) 8Jornal fecay5?69. 96 AtulKhl Docry Dont: Indi's GrwigCris fGvrnbilt (bridge UniversityPres, ambidg, Nw Yrk,198);Bimal Jn (ed)The Idi Eo Polms ad opct(ngu BoksIdia204. 97 Di Rdrik Arvin SubrmniFro ?Hiu rowt? toPructivy Surge: Th MysterftheIia GthTsto (WkingPapeWP/047,IMF ResarhDpatnt, a 204). 166 3.6.3 Emphasis on Social Welfare ? Sri Lanka At independence, the Sri Lankan economy was primarily a commodity export market heavily reliant on global markets. Domestic industrial capacity was poor and the country was not self-sufficient in food production. British rule had left behind a mature administrative system, a multi-party democracy and a healthy trade union system, 98 which facilitated independent Sri Lanka to implement successfully a robust social welfare system with free healthcare, education and pension schemes; living standards in the early post-independence era were the best in the region. 99 The economic strategies of the Indian subcontinent heavily influenced post-independent policy makers Sri Lanka who opted to pursue the socialist ideals, resulting in heavy state regulation. 100 State-regulated economic policies, falling prices in the commodity markets, and the stagnation of the domestic economy began to take a toll and by 1975?1976 Sri Lanka was faced with rising inflation and balance of payments problems. Overwhelming state intervention and inefficient bureaucracy had created an ethos of corrupt, rent-seeking, inept, unproductive economic governance. The government?s response to the growing dissatisfaction of the people was the brutal use of state authority and severe austerity measures. 101 A stringent rationing system essential items such as bread, rice and clothing was introduced and the protests against the escalating cost of living general political dissent were violently suppressed. The social and political crisis created by the stagnant economy was evident everywhere the people were ready to dispense with the government that espoused the socialist ideology. At the 1977 General Elections, the United National Party (UNP), seeking a mandate to introduce fundamental changes in the economic sphere through liberalization, deregulation and privatization, as well as a new system of constitutional governance, was elected 98 HWrigns Dilemas of Newation (Priceton Uiversity Pres, rinceto, 1960). 99 ASe ?rLak'Achivms: Had Wh?? nTNSiva dPKBardhn (eds) RuralPovty iSut s (ClubiUivrsityPrs,w York, 198)54?556. 100 mn KlegndGani ore () Econmic oliyIiLnk: Isue Debts(a Pblictos, Ld,204. 101 Alfrd Jyrtam WilPlitcs inSri Lak, 1947?1979 (Palgrve Macmilan, USA, 197). 167 into office with a landslide majority, making Sri Lanka the first country to liberalize its economy in the region. 102 The decision to abandon the inward-oriented economic policies was due to an ideological commitment to neoliberalism as a panacea, and to appease international economic and political influences. Sri Lanka under the aegis of the IMF and the World Bank followed the familiar trajectory of privatization, devaluation of rupee, reform in taxation policy and the creation of EPZs. 103 The immediate economic benefits of deregulation, privatization and liberalization were quickly visible ? the stagnant economy revived with inward capital transfers into the EPZs, and new infrastructure projects generated employment opportunities. The new culture epitomized development through economic growth and the benefits were to trickle down to the lower segments of society where poverty was ?treated as a residual element, i.e., as [being reduced by] the acceleration of growth.? 104 The policy makers had no qualms about the potential hazards ?increased financial volatility, inequality in income distribution, decline in commodity prices, growing job and income opportunities, and threat to indigenous culture,? 105 issues that would cause enormous social political turmoil in later years. 3.6.4 Culture of aid dependence ? Bangladesh Bangladesh, the youngest state in the region, has been dependent on IFI assistance from the day of its creation. Bangladesh?s economic policies were an exception in 102 Samn Kelgam. ?Liberaliztonad Inustrialztion: The Sri Lank Experinc ofthe 1980s?(Idustrilzton Ss N. 2,tie ofPcytudis,Colmb,192); Mkr, ?Ecoic LbivruPlitcl Prlism iSri Lak?? (190) 4odr Asian Studies 345?82; M deila nd HowadWgnJ.RewrdenfSri Lan:Polticl Bgraphy(Universityofires, i, 198); C Abysa tl.tuctrl Ajstmt Polc nSri Lk: AStuyfrtheNGO-WBroup (ciiessiatn, Colb,193). 103 nad Ae Th acro enm ofSri Lank fter Libraliston (St. Catheri's leg, Oxfor,andUivrsityfEsx,Clchest,1984);PmchdraAukolg nd SarthRjpti Lblz d Iustri Trforatin Si L: ri Li Ininl Persctie (OxforUniveriy Ps,USA, 20). 104 WD Lakhman dRHS amtg?tructrldjustet Polices in Sri Lank: Implictos fr tMr Ecy d Vulneabl Gops inSociy?inStrutalAdjustmet, Gendr ndEployet:The riLk Exprine (Itratl Lab Ofice, Gv 20). 105 Achi Vaik (d) Glbalizton ad South Asia: Multidmnsiol Perspctives (Manohr Publtons,NewDhi, 204). 168 the region: they had never reflected the dirigisme of its neighbour India. An early embracing of adjustment programmes is an indication of the country?s heavy dependence on external financial assistance. 106 Bangladesh has not followed systematic global economic integration but accession to the neo-liberal ideology has been a means of last resort to resolve internal economic debacles. 107 The ad hoc adoption of the liberalization ideology has created internal financial instability, balance payment problems, external debt and economic recession. Poor policy formulation and weak institutional structures have been the major cause of Bangladesh?s economic woes. 108 3.6.5 Indian economic influence ? Nepal Indian influence contributed to Nepal?s liberalization process, which commenced in 1986 with a structural adjustment credit by the World Bank. 109 The fundamental change in its economy was to end its dependence on India as an export market and allow it to venture into global markets. Nepal, with its political instability small industrial sector, has been slow to attract capital-intensive foreign investment. There has been sporadic private investment in power generation, the construction industry and the finance sector, but lack of industrialization, a dearth of skilled labour, poor infrastructure, and political turmoil have not been conducive to economic growth. 110 Therefore, the liberalization process, or the attempts at global integration, have not yielded effective outcomes. 3.6.6 Early neo-liberal leanings ? Pakistan 106 Mustaph Kaml Pash ?Liberalizton, Stae Ptronage d the ?Nw Inequality? inSouth Ai?(20)16erpctivon GlDvlpm Tcnolgy71?85. 107 Ren Sobn ?Sou Asi?Wk t? <htp:/w.ias.rg/bliat/briefng/19/weakdv.pf.d> (acesd 9Dec 205). 108 uamed Mqtd e l. (ds) Balsh: EconmiAn Social ChlngesOf Globliston(ThUnivrsityPrs,Dhk,20). 109 Strcrl Ajuste Npal <hp:/lweb18.orldbak.org/ed/oclib.nsf/DocUNIViewForJavSerch/592D15BFC B41E85267F50D57> (cs 13Mar 206). 110 Premachnra thuraln KihrSm ?Freign vestmnt ia Lest evloped County: t Neplse xpiec?(2006) 5TranstoalCrpoas 2. 169 Pakistan?s relationship with the IFIs has been long-standing and the country?s commitment to neo-liberal ideology was visible from the time of the creation of the state in 1947. 111 With continuous political turmoil and intermittent military rule, Pakistan?s economic woes were no better than its regional neighbours. 112 Pakistan?s economy remained open and it continued in the import/export tradition that the British left behind. The chief contributors to economic grievances of Pakistan have been its rulers, both military and the democratically elected. Foreign capital borrowings from the IFIs and private banks continued in Pakistan throughout its existence since Independence due to high defence spending. The five year development plans formulated through the World Bank have never succeeded owing to poor governance. Structural Adjustment policies not brought the anticipated economic growth but exacerbated poverty and marginalization. 113 3.6.7 Small economies in South Asia ? The Maldives and Bhutan The Maldives has maintained a liberalized economy that is heavily reliant on the service industry. Despite healthy economic growth, concerns have been expressed with regard to the equitable distribution of wealth and democratic governance. 114 Bhutan?s deliberate policy of economic isolation its emphasis on the ?cultural dimension of development? means it is shielded from the vagaries of global markets and their ramifications. 115 The panacea advocated by the IFIs for the economic malaise in South Asia was identical though the root causes varied degrees of political stability, economic advancement and sociocultural development in each state were vastly different. 111 Hasn NGardezi ?lobaliztonad Pkistan' Dilema ofDevlopment? (Adistnguished lectur deliv th20t ul metigof hePkstnScity fl Ecomt, hiIsmb1- Jnry205) <p:/w.c.t/pksan/Grdzi06205.l> 6 Fbray 205 (acesd Dec . 112 JSohilfiy AftabMlikand Sultan Nargis Pakistn' Ecomic Perfoance 1947 to 193:A Desrptvnlys (SurPbisher,Lhoe,194). 113 Tilatnwa ?Sructrdjstmet Pvty: T Cse fPakistn? (196) 35Th Pks lome Rview 91?926. 114 hviFaiz Yahynoney Sbastin ?ourism and the South Asia Litoral: Voices from teMaldes?(205) 8Jural fuh AStde457?480. 115 nr PL?Bt:cgidevlpt rig? inRmesh knt ad isrChahutn: Sociey nd Polty (outh siaues Ctre,Uivrityof Rjsh, 196) 5?16; TDeviHagrtSuhAsianWrld Politc(owa d LleilIc, USA 208113. 170 The only common feature was that all states experienced sluggish economic growth, balance of payments problems, a dearth of capital investment, poor global market integration and inadequate human development. 116 These factors were blatantly ignored when introducing the standard adjustment policies, and many share Easterly?s view that ?[i]f original objective was ?adjustment with growth?, there is not much evidence that structural adjustment lending generated either adjustment or growth.? 117 3.7 A Critique of the Ideological Leanings of the IFIs and their Impact on Policy Formulation in South Asia This section of the study evaluates the social cost of IFI policy formulation relating to SAPs and PRSPs based on ideals of neo-liberal capitalism in South Asia. The speciousness, limitations and the social cost of neo-liberal capitalism were revealed by Polanyi in his book The Great Transformation 40 years before the first SAP. 118 He argued that to promote a market economy excluding other organizing principles of the society is to invite economic and social destabilization. 119 The global financial policy makers ignored his warnings and the neo-liberal market fundamentalism predictably resulted in economic social chaos in the developing world at enormous human cost. The IFIs? simulacrum of development was globalization based on neo-liberal capitalism. 120 The ensuing paragraphs illustrate that the institutional structures of the IFIs and their ideological standpoints that seek to eradicate poverty and foster human development are untenable as they were created to cater for a vastly 116 Aghevli Bijan iSu Kim andHNeis ?Growth and Ajustment iSouth Asia: Experincs ofBands, Id,Pkst Sri LankiImpletig djt PrgmSuotdby t IMF? Exte Fnd cilty?(198) Ecc Rviw (ple's Bnk Plia, Clmbo). 117 Wila strly ?What i strutral djustent adjust? The asocitn oflices d grwth itepadIMFndol Bnkmlon?(205) 76Jura Dvlopment Econcs 1?2, 8. 118 Karl PlnyiThGreat Trsfrmati (eacon Pres Bks, USA, 194); se ls Richard H RbisGobal oblmsnd the CulfCpitl(AlynadBcon,ton,19)1?12 (olny). 119 Pai,id 71. 120 st TheHstoryf Devlopment: From Westrn Oigns toGlbal Fith (Zed Boks, 197). See loma, ?Inatin adiacilIiuo adScindEconmicHuan Rights: An Explrti?, Es(.) Hu Rghts FiftyYers O: AReprasl (Mchestr UnveriyPres, Mchestr, 1986 171 different circumstance that demanded the fulfilment of distinct objectives: first to rehabilitate war-torn Europe and subsequently to facilitate, enhance and consolidate international trade global financial markets. These policies structures founded upon the ideals of neo-liberal capitalism were designed to facilitate economic globalization and growth of the developed world precisely at the cost of the developing world. Although the IFIs have developed a persona within the past two decades which appears to be sensitive to poverty alleviation and human development, their ideological commitment to neo-liberal capitalism is, if anything, renewed: 121 ?[o]ne major change that hs afected the World Bank over its50 years h ben th shift to?pur? no-librl sytem, dvctedbyHakndFiema ag thrs. HyksT R toSrfd, prsting inst govrt interventio inthe maret, waspublishe in194, theme yr aBetton Wods; but wasnot fully takn ntil thlate 70s andly1980s both interatiolly d sprticlarlyatiolly bythgovrts ofU.S.Aad U.K uner Rld Reagn ad Mget Thtcer. The revival of capitalism termed the ?neo-liberal revolution? by Harvey occurred in the early 1980s in the West through democratic means, but through undemocratic means and often with brutal force elsewhere. 122 It is inevitable that an ideology that champions the free market sees the end result in terms of profit. Such policies are inherently iniquitous and cannot be expected to contribute towards eradicating poverty or promoting human development. The following analysis on South Asia illustrates this through empirical examples of the iniquitous manifestations of these policies. The advocates of neo-liberal economic globalization often provide philosophical justifications that call for the acceptance of the economic strategy as an inevitable process that it must be yielded to with grace because ?There Is No Alternative? ? or the TINA syndrome already discussed. 123 The developing states are compelled 121 Jean Hrdy ?The istory and chagin objectivs ofthe World Bank? <htp:/w.gnp.g.uk/resoures/WrldBank.m>(aces16Jun 206). 122 rv bov 35, 9 123 AasecidbyBritsh Prim Minstr rget Thtr inth 98s. For adiscuion TIN TKrshna uanage ofDevlopni ewlyemrginGlbl Emic Enviromnt(196)31Ecoic dPlitca ky 1598;for itsdiastu eftse Mustaph al Ps ?Glblst n rt iSuth Aa?(196) 25Miliu Jornal fIertiStudie. 172 to feel that they are left with no option but to accept the market-oriented policy reforms under which production tends to be export-oriented, rendering the basic needs of the people less significant. Both the Bank and the Fund refuse to acknowledge that a system founded on the ideals of the free market is inherently flawed and does not cater for the needs of the developing world that require a different approach. 124 3.7.1 Human Rights Obligations of the IFIs The former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, identified poverty as the worst form of human rights abuse and observed that if ?human rights were respected, conflict, terrorism and war could be prevented.? 125 Criticism regarding the IFIs? impact on human rights is demonstrated by the massive protests each year at the World Bank Headquarters and WTO Ministerial meetings. 126 The core argument of protestors is that the IFI activities go beyond financial regulation and undermine the interests of poor compromizing norms of international human rights law. The central problem between IFI policy formulation and is the lack of an independent arbiter or a mechanism to determine whether policies the IFIs violate human rights law. The presence of an apolitical international mechanism to scrutinize policy formulation is urgently needed. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights envisages the promotion and protection of human rights to be the collective responsibility of both society the state, and asserts that ?everyone has duties to the community in which alone free and full development of his personality is possible.? 127 Article 29, liberally construed, would oblige entities created by states to honour the UDHR. But neither the IMF nor the World Bank has been inclined to adopt such a construction. 124 Martin Khor ACitque OfTheIMF's Role &Policy Conditality Global Econmic Seris No.4p:/w.nsd.org.s/til/gri4.htm (aes 20Feb206). 125 A itervi ath lacin ofPvty pr203 SuthAsi line Pvrty Eradcon (SPE)<w.sape.r.n>(acesd 17May 6). 126 Disudi Cpter 2ubti 6f thi tuy. 127 UHR rtcl9.1 <ht:/w.udr.og/UDHR/efult.hm> (acesd 12Feb 08). 173 As discussed earlier, at their creation the IMF and the World Bank had specific mandates related to financial stability economic growth. Therefore the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, and the Bank?s constitution documents have no reference to human development or human rights. However, through a variety of theses, many have claimed that IFIs come within the purview of international human rights law and therefore the IMF and the World Bank have an obligation to respect human rights. 128 The rationalization of these authors regarding the legal obligations of the IFIs to respect human rights is diametrically opposed to that of the IFIs. The IFIs, particularly the World Bank, have from time to time adopted policies, internal rules and strategies that touch upon human rights issues; on the other hand, the Bank refuses, at the same time, to recognize that it is bound by a formal obligation to respect human rights. The Bank maintains that the final responsibility for the protection of human rights rests with states and claims that its development work overtly promotes rights. Therefore the Bank has maintained that human rights play no part in its operational schemes: 129 [E]xcept in situations wher th violation ofhuman rights as creted conitios hostile tofectivimplemntatio fprjects sothvsemic nquns, or r thr einteatiol bligtio rlent to th Bak, sc asth mandtebydg isions ofthe U.N. SecurityCouncil, the WorldBkes t take into acout theplitical dimnsio fh rights in its lending dcisio?.. . 128 Mac Drow Betn Light andShow: The World Bank, the Intrationl Monetary Fund ndItentialHumaRsL (HartPublisng,USA203)(Dw);GgKt?The Rols fIrtil OriztoiAdvnc Nutri Rigts? 194 Fd Plic 357? 36;Fr?ic ?gretnd Flren fm ?Theas Hmaniht Violatr?Some eflctinsoth UiNatisChagi ight espobles? (203) 5Huan igh Quarely314?342; Sgru koly Humn ROligtin fthWrldBkd t IMF(Cvdis Publishn,Ldn,201)(Skoly); Dan LCark?T o a Humn Right: Ted for Geatr Actabilt? (2015Hvd umanRightsJournal <htp:/w.la.rva./sus/og/hrjs5/clr.shtml> (ces8 Feb 208). 129 Goverce: Wl Bnk? Expeine (Wod Bank, 94)3. Thrlvtsctif the Articls fAgrmntreds:l?Thak ditsfierslot inrf int polal irs f anyb; o shal ty beifluc h ci byhepltcalraterft mebr oercrn.Oy eonmiconsidratsal revt hi dcison, d thscnsidtis l wighd ipartly er toci th purost ArilI.? Wrl BankArticesof Ar, .IV,sc.10(s mnd16Fb 198), avbeathtp:/w.ldbank./tl/extdr/bkgrd/ibr/at4.#I. ?Devlpment ad Humn Rigs Te Rol fth Wrld Bank?< hp:w.olkorg/htl/xtdr/ighs/> (csd7 Nov207). 174 Though the Bank acknowledges that economic development endeavours promote human rights, it has ?never accepted any legal obligations in this sphere.? 130 The Bank?s Articles of Agreement set out its broad scope of activity in economic and social development and its limits. In particular, the Articles state that, all its decisions, ?only economic considerations shall be relevant.? 131 Looking at the existing internal rules (Operational Policies or OPs) of the World Bank, de Feyter observes that the OPs obligate the Bank to support projects that do not violate state obligations on international environmental treaties and ?the failure to adopt parallel human rights preconditions for the Bank's financing of projects seems to be the outcome, not of legal constraints, but of a simple policy choice.? 132 Amidst numerous calls to address concerns of social responsibility and accountability of World Bank operations, a quasi-independent Inspection Panel to investigate claims against the Bank was instituted as per the Wapenhans report. 133 While the Fund has also adopted policies and strategies that are pro-human rights, and articulated the significance of the human dimension in the development process, it continues to reject the proposition that the IMF should come within the purview of the international human rights regime. Commenting on applicability of ICECSR, the General Counsel for the IMF observes: 134 for itspart, the Covenat is atrety among States whic ontains obligations adesd toStates. Nithrby itsters, rbytheterm fthe Fud' rlationhipgrmt w thUnited Ntiois it posible tocludt the Covat is aplicble toe Fu. Morevr, th nrsontain in evenot attaind astatu gnal inteatiol law that ould mk th alicle to th Fn indeptly of the Covt. 130 Sigrun kogly ?Inspecting theWorld Bank?s Reponsiblties? (20) 18Hungry for What is Rht405. 131 Devlpmet ad Huma Rits: The l ofth Wrld Bank ?The World Bak Grup jins tintrationlcnitycomratinge50tAivrsyftUniveslDeclarto of Hu Rghts? (Worl Bk, 198) p:/w.orlb.og/tml/xr/ght/ (sd 7 Nv207). 132 Ken dFeytr quted inChristna Gile and Stefani Ricard s orld Bank, IMF an umaRighs:Confcl TburgUivrsy(201)3LegalCuteGrmLw Jorl 2. 133 <htp:/wrldbak.rg/WBSIE/XRNAL/EXTBOUTS/EXTARHIVES/0,conte MDK053~menuPK:6372~pagePK:3672~piPK:36092~theitPK:2956,.htl > (aces 17My 20). 134 Frn?oisGiavitEcoic, Soil nd Cultral Human Rigts and the Intrationl ty ud (rking PaperE/.12/01/WP.5,EcomcSocilCoucl: Cmite o Ecmic,Soil adCultl Rights, Ofice ofthe i Cisr f HRghs, Genva, 201)pr56. <htp:/w.unhc/tbsoc.nsf/(SymbolSar)/58dfb286fe9c1256a8b0519f6.tl > (csd 7Nov 207). 175 In reality, neither the Bank?s nor the Fund?s activities are confined to the creating Articles of Agreement. For instance, the World Bank on its website provides information on the Bank?s activities in relation to anti-corruption, poverty eradication and disabilities, issues beyond the scope of the original mandate. 135 If global political social exigencies demanded this additional focus that are beyond the scope of its original mandate, adopting a rights-focussed approach to development and incurring obligations under international human rights law can also be justified on similar grounds. The central argument in Darrow?s thesis is that the World Bank and the IMF must be subjected to a similar regime as states, in they must also follow rules of accountability and transparency. 136 He also contends that if the IFIs are regarded as entities under public international law they must be independently held accountable for transgressions of international law, including international human rights. He also asserts that it is vital to provide a flexible and dynamic interpretation of the IFIs? Articles of Agreement so as to take on board the issues relating to human rights law. Comparing the Bank and the Fund, Darrow concedes that the Bank is more inclined to embroil itself in social development issues as well as explore the development agenda through rights discourse. With the IMF?s narrower operational parameters, and a special focus on multilateral financial regulation, Darrow estimates that the Fund is less likely to integrate human rights issues within its agenda. In this light, Darrow admits that ?it is difficult to imagine human rights penetrating beyond very superficial levels . in the short term.? 137 Darrow?s optimism regarding the Bank?s commitment towards human rights is not shared by Sigrun Skogly, who asserts that ?although willing to take part in a dialogue about human rights, the Bank has never accepted any legal obligations this sphere.? 138 135 < htp:/worldbank.org >(acesd7Nov 207). 136 Dar ave 12 137 , 01?202. 138 Skogly bo n34. 176 3.7.2 The Weaknesses of IFI Policy Formulation The unilateral, authoritarian imposition of the SAPs by the IFIs completely overhauled macroeconomic policies, resulting in an erosion of legitimacy in the governing structures of the developing world. 139 This overhaul was particularly significant in states that had cherished a strong culture of social democracy or socialism. 140 Reductions in social welfare and public expenditure, privatization of public amenities and labour reforms resulted in increased privation for the poor, raising discontentment that paved the way for civil conflict. 141 The anti- government protests, such as those experienced in Sri Lanka 1988?1993 in response to the growing discontentment of the people, due to rising living costs, and to curtailment of social and workers? rights, became a common occurrence in many developing countries that experienced SAPs. Another fundamental flaw of the formulation of SAPs was their ?one size fits all? nature. 142 The strengths and weaknesses of individual countries, such as the successful welfare programmes in Sri Lanka or Pakistan?s long tradition of liberal economic policy being coupled with poor management and corruption, were ignored. The need for Nepal to establish a viable local economy before attempting to integrate into the global economy was not considered by the World Bank before liberalization measures were introduced. No policy directives were issued to India, to consider its massive social problems of illiteracy, infant mortality and child labour, which are the direct result of under-investment in human capital. The lack of an investigative study prior to the policy implementation stage saw identical policy directives issued by the IFIs to countries in diverse stages of development and economic growth. Two decades elapsed before the World Bank 139 ?In theory, the Fund sportsdemocrati nstiuons ithe natios itasit. Inpractie, it udrmismocratic byipg plce[wu] culowith r palt rcivl sey. Stis the IMFdiss itpretnc fes togethandegtisr ovena.?Joh Stglitz.,?Th Isid-Wat Ilrnd athe wrld coi rs? Th NwRpublic (17 April,20) t:/w.trom/(cs8Fb 208). 140 SGerg ?Wrld Bank d IMF atentry?s end? (195) 24/5 Ntebks fr Study an Rsach21. 141 Moan Ll Shrm Olive Pcok Krisha Gopal (eds) Gloaliston, Democr d overeioutAsia:Isuand Alternatve (ling,Dhi,203). Thaspt isfuther labtd Cper 4of thi ty. 142 JsphStigltz Glblz itsDicots (Lod, Pengui Boks, 20) 47. 177 admitted the inadequacy of its appraisal process and acknowledged in its 2003 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness that development was ?hampered in some cases by inadequate country knowledge, in others by inadequate sensitivity to country policy making styles, and still attempts to transplant policies and institutions ? some of which ?travel? more readily than others ? ? without adequate analysis of the context.? 143 After decades of inward-oriented policies, and despite the eagerness to liberalize the economy, global integration remains sporadic and partial in South Asia. Successful economic integration requires considerable planning and a build-up of institutional, legal and resources infrastructure. The need for protracted planning was ignored because the liberalization process was conceived and promoted to be a solution to the immediate economic woes. Liberalization in Sri Lanka was a political reaction previous socialist governing ideology. In Pakistan it desperate measure to keep the existing economic system that had been devastated by decades of poor management floating and in India the shift was made as the previous inward-oriented governance was no longer tenable, as it not sufficiently productive to cater to the economic exigencies of India. In each economy, despite the policymakers? decision to integrate into the global market, significant imperfections in relation to the infrastructure remained. Rather than falling into the dangers of lackadaisical market integration, ?it is time for a different approach to global integration, whereby living standards of the world?s poor are raised rather than jeopardised .? 144 3.7.3 Reinforcement of Structures of Poverty 143 203 Anual Reviw ofDevlopment Efectivnes The Efctivens ofBank Suport f PolicyReform(Th WrldBank, Washigo, D.C,204)<p:/w.rldb.g/ed> (asd t17 My206). 144 ChrianEelr, obertE Scot nd Aam SHersh Te unrmakle rco flibraliz te. ?After 20asfglalicergultion,pvtyd iquityaspevseas vr?(PIBifg Ppr, nmi Ply Is Octbr 201). htp:/w.pnt.or/cte.cf/brfinpar_e01iequalit (cesd 17My 206). 178 Empirical evidence of how SAPs entrenched endemic poverty and were in fact a disincentive for economic growth is readily available. 145 At the end of the experience with the SAPs, the South Asian region has been described as ?[a] region divided ? divided between the hopes of the rich and the despair of the poor,? and where the ramifications of SAPs are still very much evident even today. 146 On average 433 million people in South Asia (37.7 per cent of the total population) live in abject poverty, reinforcing the claim that SAPs contributed to the system of apartheid created by capital liberalism. 147 Refuting the claims that benefits economic growth trickle down to reach every echelon of society, the SAARC Poverty Profile shows that the richest 10 percent of South Asia earns 80 percent more than the poorest 10 percent of the population. 148 Issues such as social justice and equity are not factored into adjustment policies that focus on economic growth, this contributes to the growing demography of destitute and marginalized people. 149 The following scenario from India is common to other parts of the region: 150 Expenditure cuts inthe post SAP period have bn arelity, whic as dversly afcte thlivgcnditiofalagsctioofth por nmrginalisd olefIia. Bth irt withrl of umptiosutsto th por n indiret withdralsrough vell cutsinblic exnditure scial sectos hav bn quite istubinthis regad ?thris inpic ftial comitiesoverth period fstrtul justmt hasbnormus, and price incra hd, ironicallynouh, bn more fr the or tha f the wll- f. Withdwl f subidies e aimptant sfeincrsin rics ofsentia item. Bt les rha bn th role fothr plicie whic hav mde basic nd fulfilmet ev more difficult f many. The realization that the adjustment programmes were having a devastating social impact was documented by UNICEF as early as 1984 in its State of the World?s Children Report. 151 A subsequent study titled Adjustment with a Human Face, 152 145 Poverty inSouth Asia 206 avilbe at <htp:/w.sape.rg.np/resourcs/pulicons/pverty_port06/poverty_port06.htm > (acsd 7Nv 207) 146 UDPSouthAsiHuma Dvelmt Rert (Oxfrd Uniersit Prs, Oxfrd, 197). 147 SARC eginal Povertyofi 203(SACSectat, KahmnduNepal). 148 <tp:/w.sipr.nt/P-0.ph >(s17 My 206. 149 Povrty iSouth 206 avilbe a <htp:/w.sae.rg.n/resourcs/pulictons/verty_port06/povert_port0.htm > (acesd 7Nv 207) 150 AroaDly?Structral djstment rgam d gnr cnrs inIdia? (19) 2Journal fCntmpra Asi 328. 151 The sudget or quitabl esur tobe ilude imcroenmic plicy forlatio ch saredntonitrvntis,andmotrngf th wl-bg,vng stnds,altnd uti fplos UNICEF St fh Wrld?sCidr (Oxford Uiverity Pres, Lo, 1984). 179 which drew upon empirical evidence from 10 country studies, declared that the 1980s were a ?lost decade? for developing countries. The study elaborated means to avoid the negative impacts of SAPs on vulnerable groups, emphasizing that strategies that generate employment, maintain basic health and education opportunities and support nutrition among children must be integrated into national planning when economic restructuring is envisaged. 3.7.4 The Cost to Social, Economic and Cultural Welfare Though overall literacy levels have increased in South Asia within the last decade it still remains the most illiterate region the world, at 55 per cent. 153 Implementation of SAPS resulted in increased inequality in the standard of education between poor and rich communities. As a region, South Asia spends the least on education has marked gender disparities in relation to primary school enrolment. 154 Education cuts increased student-teacher ratios and school fees and reduced the number of teachers (due to wage freezes) and teaching standards (due to deteriorating facilities). 155 Liberalization increased the choice of private schools for the wealthy but decreased public enrolments, as poor chose between feeding their children and paying for school uniforms, stationery and school fees. 156 Due to the cultural bias against a girl child in the region, females are frequently denied educational opportunities. The impact of SAPs on women and girls is particularly harsh and iniquitous for ?[t]he increasing burden of poverty itself pushes women children to find work to sustain them.? 157 Decreased government subsidies ? a hallmark of SAPs ? reduced the health and welfare services available to the poor. The conditions attached to loans obtained for 152 Cornia bove n63. 153 WkgfrsultiSouth Asia <htp:/w.orldbank.org> (acesd 16Feb 206). 154 rld Dlpm Repr204: Mking Sevics W fPropl <htp:/w.ordbank.g> (cesd16Fb206). 155 Martin Cay ?Structraljutmt a th Cangi Face fEducatin? (195) IntelLeviw 134. 156 Povrt Asemnt Docentof the orld Bak (20) ?Poverty iPakist: Vuleabil, SocialGps, ad RuralDynaics?PovertyRducindEconmicMangemnt Sctr Unt uths Regipt N. 2496-AK aist. 28Ot 20. 157 Dolyr ?rturl jstmerogm ndgr oersiIia?(19) 2Joural fCtempoayAsia 328. 180 infrastructure and essential services development often stipulated user fees payable to the government for such as schools, health clinics, electricity and clean drinking water. For very poor people, even modest charges for these services resulted in the denial of access to life-sustaining services, contributing to the decrease in quality of life. 158 Typically for the region, Nepal does not provide a systematic social security system unemployed. 159 The peasantry often lack skills and education. Their only known means of survival remains subsistence farming on lands for which they cannot show legal title. Increasingly, this land is appropriated for agribusinesses or for industrial use without prior public consultation and deliberation, and the state can ill deal with resulting social and economic problems of particularly the displaced rural peasantry. 160 Issues such as violations of the right to information, the right to welfare and employment were never considered at the policy formulation stage. The displacement and the ensuing marginalization of people is an indication of poor policy formulation which has been reliant on instead ?market magic?. Unemployment, especially in small businesses, stemmed from interest hikes, cheap imported competition and inability to access credit. In fact, the transformations in relation to credit facilities, mortgages and complex patent regimes are poignantly described in the SAAPE India Poverty Report thus: 161 The Interationl Baias [traders nd moey lenders] ae nobetter than our ld pot blly fellows hou totakawumfprductio: ladn mrtgghicevr cmbc, slling srtte grin tht will mke sick is n diffrnt fro slling sBT rophic ill akes ic. Thlevl of vigilace dtodal withthesinternatiol rules, rulations, tecnlgies ar [sic] nw ? but the issu ar th sme. 158 Infat mortaliy s84 per 10births inPakistn, 74i Bhutan d 67in Idia: UNDP Human Devlpen Rprt20(UniveyofOxrd esNwYork,203).OlyBhutnspeds or 2% fGDP nublic halt. T Reptcitzd te gvmets ite rgio fr disgadi thed torsistmn ?humanlpn?adlbldtiscal n fncl pocis a?sle toh craiof pro scia iront fr acivlzedf?. 159 PtriJutnSci curiyIDevlgCtie:MythO Necsiy?En From Ida(RU WrkgPapN. 20, Prty Resarch Unt Susx,Spt 203). <w.sex.a/Uits/R/wps/.pdf>(sd7ov, 207). 160 Suhm Joshi ?Nel nhe WTO? Neal tio Wekly (1Jne 4. 161 APEovrtyRport?SriLank203 <tp:/.sa.g./sucs/documnts/idx.htm>(acsd 7Nov, 207). 181 The IMF and World Bank?s core beliefs, such as that elimination of protective tariffs would force domestic industries to become more competitive, rarely materialized in South Asia. As a consequence of SAPs, domestic manufacturing collapsed and imported consumer goods replaced domestic production. 162 The disastrous consequences of implementing policies of privatization uniformly, even in situations where an injection of private capital was not warranted, saw the transfer of several state-owned enterprises into private sector ownership with resulting social issues of high rates of redundancy and an increase in prices for goods and services. 163 Most state-owned enterprises were heavily overstaffed as state sector employment was often based on nepotism and political patronage. Privatization caused 40?50 per cent of redundancies, amounting to 120,000 workers being made redundant in 1991 alone, in Sri Lanka. 164 In certain situations the capital gained by privatization had to be utilized for payouts for employees who were made redundant through restructuring leaving the enterprises with cashflow problems like those they experienced before privatization. 165 The combined effect of the reduction of employment as a result of public sector ?restructuring?, withdrawal governmental subsidies, and cuts to healthcare, education and welfare expenditure was severe hardship for the poorest, impacting on workers? rights and socioeconomic and cultural rights. 166 There was an expectation mismatch between the people who experienced the operations of the neo-liberal policy overhaul in expectation of ?development? and the IFIs who spearheaded the programmes that aimed at macroeconomic stability and growth. The World Bank applauded Sri Lanka?s performance for ?good macroeconomic management and progress in trade liberalization, privatisation, 162 Ibid. 163 Malthy Knight-Jon ?Distrbutional Impact ofPrivatzion: The Sri Lank Experinc? Ppersetd aIsituefo PlcyStudies,Clb, Sr Lak,Dcmber20. 164 AFizbiLbr Rhmet Rnympesti t Owdtrise: ThCas ofSr nk(Wrld Bank,Washigto D., 192). 165 RKeml,?PivatzioPit: ScalEfectsandRstructring? Paper sentd at Sub-rgin Meg rvtizout Ai, Kh, 24-6Novmb,19. 166 atk oy, ClmTisdel an Mhmdlui ?ralrb irtin povrty in SouhAsi?(192) JourfCteporay sia 57?72;S egaPeySituaid Plicy nSr Lankw.b.rg (cs 27Jn206); Dvidunh d isr Jsria ?Eqt,Goth d Isrection:Librlizt d theWlfar bteiContmpoy S Lak? (197)28Oxfo Dvlpmet Sudes9?1;G Si K.Sreivas R(eds) StructlAdjustment aIiatofHman Rigts(rls, NwDlhi, 203);Mlth Knigh-John ?Dirbuil c Privtzo:The i Lank Exprnc? Pper snt at IsteforPlcy Stdes,Colb, S Lk, Dcmbr20). <p:/w.gdev.org/nt/aendr/etail/3254>(asd 8J 208). 182 and financial sector reform?, 167 when the reality was a catastrophe of rising living costs, the withdrawal of subsidies for agriculture and domestic industry, a scarcity of secure employment, a general decrease in the quality of life and an escalation poverty for the people who were subjected to SAPs. The emphasis on economic growth as end result of the liberalization process had shifted the focus from issues of poverty alleviation and human development. During the early era of adjustment SAPs were never articulated as a method of poverty eradication or human development, such ends being regarded as beneficial by-products of economic growth, trickling down to the poor. 168 Susan George has accurately summed up the results of the SAPs and globalization when she wrote about the ?global apartheid economy?. According to George, 169 [t]he Brtton Wods twins have bcome th angers ofa global prtheid conmy inwhicthetrntionl litefrboth ?Nth?nd?South? lay rle fthe?ites?; a srinkg d anxiousiddle clas, e rleofth ?lourds?; and finlly, t the botto, thevt ea fwretchsmade up black, whtevr their literl sin clour. Nonetheless, South Asia still relies on the IFIs for policy direction, creating a culture of dependence on donor-driven policy formulation. No innovative policy alternatives have been explored at national level nor were grass-roots level alternative strategies ever fostered. The psychology of dependence on donors has become ingrained in the psyche of political and bureaucratic decision-makers and they remain convinced that without the support of the donor institutes their political survival is at stake. For example, President Kumaranatunga?s praise of the World Bank?s relationship with Sri Lanka ignores the reality of ill-considered policy choices. 170 The reverence extended to IFIs is indicated by the International Financial Organization Order (Amendment) Act 2004 of 167 World Bank Sri Lank: Recapturing Mised Oportunites (World Bank Country Report, ,shgtoD.C 20). 168 Se rl . Implnti the Worl Bank?s tragy truce pvrt. Prgs and chalngs(orldank, Wasgn,D.C,193)8;JoephE.Sigltz?Dmocatizthe Itratil MetryFud t rld ? (203) 16Govrna nd Aubily Govece1;S Ab Zi?GlobalistoinPakistn:TImct theEy ndo Lbur? (203)Qartely Newer fSuth A liae FrPovry raict Jaur; MstaphKaml Psh istndveryiSouth si?(196) 25Mleuml of InertionStudi3. 169 Sus Grge ?Worl Bank d IMF atcntur?s nd? (195) 24/ Notbks for Stdy an Rarch. 170 ijv Sirman 50 yer socit with Worl Bak wil gro frm strength stregth ? Presdnt?Dly News(SiLank, 16July204). 183 Bangladesh, which has accorded absolute immunity from prosecution to the World Bank, IMF and their operations in Bangladesh. 171 3.8. Familiar Trajectory of Failure: the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers The PRSPs were designed to conflate two contradictory aims: the need for creating a more efficient system that contributed genuinely to economic growth and human development and the desire to have development policies that were autochthonous and therefore more acceptable to the people. However, the PRSPs have failed to achieve either objective. 172 A closer scrutiny would confirm that in fact the SAPs, which were based on macroeconomic policy overhauls, contributed to greater indebtedness of the developing countries in terms of resources as well as ideas. The previous adjustment programmes failed to address the structural sources of poverty and yet the PRSPs once again place heavy reliance on the macroeconomic policy model of SAPs, which the IFIs claim to have been internalized by the recipient countries through the PRSPs. 3.8.1 Lack of a Meaningful Contribution from Stakeholders Under the tutelage of the World Bank, the larger borrowers of South Asia ? Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka ? have submitted their PRSPs to the IMF, World Bank and the general donor community. 173 Despite the rhetoric of country ownership civil society contributions, the countries submitting the PRSPs had little to do with the actual conceptualization or drafting of 171 Anu Mhamd ?Crime and Reward: Imunity Tohe World Bank? Cotercnts.org6Novbr,204<htp:/w.cuntcets.org/l- mhad0614ht> (cs 7Nov 207). 172 Gsk Dijstra ?TePS ApracndteIlsio fImprvd Ai Efectivnes: Lson froBlv, Hondurs andigu? (5) 3/4 DevlentPolcyRw 43?64;H. Ade FrFrkEliRurl LvelihosAPrty Rduci is (outldg, 205); lasti ase ?Pverty ctionstray paers: Nowh alstht??205) Reviw of rcnolitcal onm 104?105. 173 <htp:/wb.rdbk.rg/WBSITE/XRL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/XPS/0,conte ntMDK2068~pePK:258~piPK:2106~theitK:384201,.html> (acesd 23 Aril ). 184 documents or the policy statements, 174 and therefore they still bear the design flaws of the previous process, i.e., weak ownership, and emphasis on economic growth over and above poverty eradication and other social concerns. The alienation of the people from policy design in the era of the SAPs echoes in the new mechanism despite the assertion of endogenous strategies of development, especially in the respect that there is no visible ideological shift from market liberalization. The ground realities in the countries that prepared PRSPs do not change overnight. In South Asia, absence of meaningful dialogue between the policy framers and civil society, the strength the civil society to influence policy formulation is in its infancy. As Grusky observes, 175 [f]irst of all civil society inthe borwing countries eds information ad tranprey but the nwprcs? . Sedly, ltationwith civil society must g nd infrmatio dismination, to aeinly participtory pes in whic rcos of non-gvrtal actors c influe plic. NGOs and other stakeholders from the South Asian region have unanimously criticized the process in which the World Bank-initiated PRSP documents have been prepared in the region. 176 Many claim that the process has little public acceptance and essentially incorporates World Bank-propagated structural adjustment policies such as liberalization of tariff regimes and cutbacks in state expenditure. 177 Critiquing the PRSPs, Tahsin, a Pakistani activist, claims that, ?[t]hese reforms have no established link with poverty reduction and are nothing more than a new manifestation of the Bank-propagated disastrous Structural Adjustment Policies.? 178 He pointed out that the PRSP, which is defined by the World Bank as a country-owned strategy, has hardly come into the public domain 174 Masod Ahmed ?Brign Resarch nd Policy? Paper sentd athe Dvlopment Sudies AcitnualCofec204:Big Resch Policy,Lond, 6Nbr204; Kr Crisn Ii Hovl Te SInitiv:Mutrl PlicyChag th Rolefech(OvrsaDepmntIstiu (ODI) Wrking ape21, Lond:ODI, ugst 203). 175 SGrky?T World Bnk d IMF itae nw refom pc? Bra Fr the World (Bead fo the lIstiue,ashingo, .C,20)<ht:/w.bed.og/indx.tm> cs24Apri 205). 176 Shfqt Mun?Pakistn? bdet 203-4 The conics ofypcrisy? Hial South Asian <tp:/w.himlg.com/203/july/rpot_.tm>(aed8 Feb 208). 177 Conferc oReil stains Mry Csnus-South Asi ht:/.nwathfd.c/ews/n351.html Ocer20> (acesd 24 April 205) 178 MoamedTahsi repsnt SAP-K aNGO iPakistn quoted inMahtb Hidr ?Reginl picy xtlamRproces?HoldyInteri20Dec 20. 185 for discussion in Pakistan and has been prepared unilaterally by the government without public consultation or debate. A closer scrutiny of PSRPs indicates that the documents prepared by each state are generic and fail to address the state?s unique problems. By contrast, in Bangladesh there have been extensive consultative processes, yet these have had little impact on the ultimate contents of the PRSP. Bangladesh completed drafting an interim PRSP ?A National Strategy for Economic Growth, Poverty Reduction and Social Development? in 2003, which has been presented to the donor community. In this interim paper lofty aspirations of removing ?the ugly faces of poverty? by eradicating hunger, chronic food- insecurity and extreme destitution, reduce the number of people living blow the poverty line by 50 percent, provision of universal primary education, reduction of infant mortality and reduction of maternal mortality by 75 percent was envisaged. 179 Meanwhile, the People?s Empowerment Trust (PET), a private think-tank, concluded that the government?s PRSP would ultimately turn into a donordriven strategy. The PET Chairman, M. Akash, said the government?s position on the PRSP was positive and focussed on human centred development ?[b]ut I doubt whether the donors will agree with many of those issues. So ultimately, I fear, we have to accept a totally changed strategy.? 180 Therefore the required public consultation initiatives and the identification of country specific developmental goals are regarded empty gestures as the prevalent civil societal perception is that the ultimate power to determine the content of the PRSPs would rest with the IFIs. Although the PRSP process is advocated as a bottom-up solution to development and poverty eradication, in reality it is still very much a top-down approach comprising a selective group of individuals and NGOs that share similar ideological beliefs. For instance, Syed Mohammad Ali reiterates the absence of a consultative process in Pakistan. 181 The reforms contained in Sri Lankan PRSP imitate the common macroeconomic measures propagated as the panacea 179 Econmic Relations Department,Mistry ofFinace, Governmt ofthe Poples Rpublic of BagldeshMrh 203. 180 S Sd?Bgldsh-ors dialgue prty liatin Tik-tan s ?taly? chnP? anle aily Tie(Bnldsh, 20Ocober 204). 181 yed ohm Ai?PRSrtrc rity? ?PakistnDilyimes (Pist, 10Augst 2004). 186 for economic growth by the World Bank for at least two decades 182 . There is widespread scepticism about consultation process that led to the finalization of the PRSP by the Sri Lankan government, and more importantly, ramifications of have not been widely discussed or understood among the general public. 183 An analysis of the content of the PRSP for Sri Lanka reveals that its relationship to poverty alleviation is rather problematic. 184 In terms of policy, the PRSP still appears to be engrossed with economic growth with little or no credible methodology outlined redistribute this growth to the poor. 185 In this sense, the PRSP process appears not so much a poverty reduction strategy as a growth strategy and the link between economic growth and the resultant poverty reduction is rather tenuous. For instance, the proposals to construct a modern expressway with the introduction of mechanized road toll systems to lower the transport and marketing costs faced by the poor highlight the dire need to prioritize rationalize poverty eradication goals with available, yet limited, resources. The lack of political space to discuss concerns relating to policy formulation on developmental issues and a sense of alienation and detachment by the people from the policy making process and its repercussions, is brought out Whaites?s observation: 186 Without genin democratic prticipation byordinary peole inthe dvlopment f ecmic policy, n ic olicce mtostick?nocy ca batousf thle. It isth ridiculosly uia aprh fuh onic therat kes it difficlt fo IMFconiststo edown to erth dtointeg civil ocietyparticipationd pverty duction intotheir cmic plas. Only ifnmic licies aginbom b in soietiesanre ubordinate todeocrticintitutions sial relatioscan we xpct ginticiptioin th evlopmet ofecic pogme. Andly th ca w hpe for cnicrgas that will gnuinly rdu ovrty. 182 <htp:/overty.worldbank.org/files/Sri_Lank_PRS.pdf >(acesd 24May 206). 183 <50es./cmupdat/story/20 >(aces7 Nov07). 184 Sri Lank: Prt Ruti trg pe(). htp:/overty.oldbank.org/s/ontr/16/ sd 2). 185 T ecti Stey pae ?Rgain SriLank?VisonfrGowth 1 <t:/w.r.gv.l/>(csd26My20). 186 Alan Whaits (d) Mastr ofThir Ow Devlopmet? PRSs ad the Prspect fr te Por (ordVsoInertionl,20) ?7. 187 3.8.2 PRSPs Continue the Ideological Bias towards Neo-liberalism The ideological bias towards the market-driven mechanisms for development which blatantly disregards social and political consequences is still clearly visible in the PRSPs. It is plain that the World Bank and the IMF are yet to evolve a development model that synthesizes economic growth, poverty eradication and human development. The failure of the Bank and the Fund to think of an alternative paradigm for poverty alleviation is once again reinforced through the PRSPs. The core of a PRSP still follows the SAP?s mainstream ideology of exposure to international trade, and domestic liberalization continues to have little impact on economic growth, let alone shared growth with corresponding benefits for the poverty-stricken. Pro-poor strategies of ?promoting opportunity, facilitating empowerment, and enhancing security? 187 are evoked, but these strategies are peripheral to fostering economic growth, greater integration with global market forces by encouraging foreign direct investment, and extended liberalization and privatization schemes. Despite claims that pro-poor human-centred strategies are integral to the PRSPs, they echo the economic growth strategies of SAPs. In the course of drafting PRSPs, for instance, Sri Lanka amended the strong worker-biased labour laws, ostensibly so as to maintain flexible labour markets that attracted foreign investment. 188 The Minister of Labour justified the amendment to the Factories Act on the basis that a large number of countries had similar practices and that the TNC in the garment trade had requested the change in the law. 189 The Report on the Evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) by the Independent 187 World Devlopment Rport 20-2001 Atacking Poverty (Oxford University Pres, World Bank,ashingt C,NwYk, 0). 188 IJuly 20vrentfSriLn souht rais th legislat cilng ovrtime t 10orspe oth, algdly sohat iakwld emintrioypeti, espcial ftrremo fquder t MtifbrAr (MFA) i205,and to nfrmh cds fcnt mjbnlls, pit he facthtmstcos fcut rogise tlaburlaw r14hors pr k overtiouldrvil, wievr ibetr). Asia Lbour Upte <htp:/.ac.g.h/Ach/3804.tm> (sd 7N207 189 ?PrvtisnAricls Sri Lnk's dati dlpen? <.aronat.org> (acsed 5 ug 205); Sam Guad?rin overnmt ioslnge hus femlwork?4 Septber02<htp:/w.s.org/ticls/20/s20/ri-s04.tl>(csd 27My 6). 188 Evaluation Office of the IMF acknowledges several limitations of the whole process, such as that, ?participatory processes were typically not designed to strengthen existing domestic institutional for policy formulation and accountability (e.g., through Parliament)? and that, ?the PRS process has had limited impact in generating meaningful discussions, outside the narrow official circle?. 190 The most substantial criticism is that the PRSP approach is ineffective in identifying constraints on accelerating growth and making it more pro-poor. The approach has so far not contributed significantly to understanding the linkages between growth, poverty incidence, and macroeconomic policies nationally. These issues present analytical challenges that are not necessarily resolved through participation alone. 191 The PRSPs have proven that strategies for poverty eradication must look beyond the neo-liberal framework. The requirement is not a redefinition of the strategies of poverty eradication based on the existing ideological paradigm but an alternative vision that controls neo-liberal quest for economic growth at the cost of human development. Development-focussed multilateral agencies must overcome the IFIs? ideological aridity and unwillingness to evolve new pragmatic strategies. State ownership of policy formulation, civil societal participation and new dialogue have changed the status quo little. Responsibility, participation, civil society, inclusiveness are new terms for the concept of Cabinet responsibility to the Parliament, a legacy of the Westminster constitutional tradition which had taken root in South Asia, but has lately which has been hijacked by the IFIs in the name of economic growth. The contemporary problem is that despite having functioning democracies their use has been relegated to the background of periodic, flawed elections. 192 However, despite the dysfunction, ideology democracy and representative governance is embedded in the psyche of the people of South Asia. If functional democracy is restored it can be an effective mechanism to scrutinize developmental policies by the electorate. 190 Report nthe Evalution fPovertyRduction Straegy Papers (PRSs) and The Povrty duciadGrowh Fclty(GF) (Iep EvlutionOfice oftIMF, 6Jul204) <ht:/w.imf.g/xtera/pi/204/rsgf//idx.hm > (as 27a 6). 191 Ibi htp:/.if.ogExternalNPio204rspgf/e/#ft1>ed y 192 SeCaer 4of ths tudy. 189 3.8.3 International Financial Institutions taking hostage the future of South Asia Stephen Gill observes intriguingly that globalization has in fact resulted in the: ?redfinition ofthe political in the mrgin world rde. Part of this redfinition involvs emrgcf nwconstitutionalism. N cnstitutionalism limits craticctrl vrcetrl lets fecicplicy rgulatio by loking future omts toliberl orks faulatio preisd on fredo o entepris.? 193 The new constitutionalism therefore redefines the relationship between the ?political? and the ?economic? and creates constitutional structures to prevent future governments from retreating from the commitments made to the economy. The PRSP of the Sri Lankan government put before the IMF and the World Bank in June 2002 is an excellent example of ?new constitutionalism? in operation. It contained the policy proposals of the government in relation to development strategies that it would undertake in ensuing three years. The policy document was formulated secretly without other stakeholders in the process such as local NGOs, opposition political parties or civil society. 194 The PRSP mirrored much of the IMF/WB policy recommendations for Sri Lanka. Pursuing the policy recommendations the government initiated a substantial revision of legislation relating to land, labour and taxation in July 2002. Subsequent civil societal protests against the PRSPs compelled the government to stall the law reform. 195 Labour union pressure obtained an assurance from the government that the new laws would not be implemented until an adequate social safety net existed for those who lost jobs. 196 193 Stephn Gil ?ConstiuonalisgInequality nd the Clash ofGlbaliston? (20) 4 InraioStudie Rvew 47?65. 194 PR sTar?bckstepolicy-mkig t futre fthe PRS prach (Bckgrn Pp, IDSE Carts Interatonlis,Spmb204) htp:/w.cidse.org/ds/204927130271.pdf. (acsd 13Marc 207). 195 <t:/cite.om/lrsk/ws/le/linetingwithb6203.htm> (aces 15Marh 7) 196 Sri Lank: AtiongaistPRS Aliance for th Protci ofNaturl Resources and Huan Rghtsri <tp:/w.50yers.g/ms/updaes/try/20 (cd 5h204). 190 In fact the commitment to the ?new constitutionalism? was made almost two decades ago when the process of liberalization, the fundamental tenet of contemporary globalization, was entrenched into system with the state voluntarily reducing its role in the domestic economy. 197 Granting corporations total freedom of operation and creating favourable fiscal frameworks for the foreign investments were some of the ways in which the entrenchment was achieved. Such freedoms ensured through the Constitutional mechanisms as evidenced by Article 157 of the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka which states that: 198 ??any Treaty orAgremnt betwn the Governmt of Sri Lank d the Govemt fny foig State forptio andptectioof instmts inSri Lak fsuchig State, its ls, r frpations, cpaniesdothe siation inrpad orcnstitute ueits law, uch Trety or Agnt shll have th foce of law in Si Lak? This mechanism shifted the power from the state to the markets, making state regulation of the market activities almost non-existent. Another disquieting trend closely associated with the ?new constitutionalism? is the gradual reduction of the welfare system through legal mechanisms. The tradition of governance in subcontinental region has included at least a modicum welfare support to its people. The strong welfare system in Sri Lanka, which includes free education and healthcare, has been pivotal controlling the downward spiral of the living condition of its people. However, when provision of welfare and food subsidies and the state-run, people-centred economic ventures prima facie conflicted with marketled globalization, the government retreated from these commitments. 199 The state is no longer considered the benevolent protector of the people. These transformations, utterly alien to the centralized state structures of the previous decades, were portrayed as justifiable and inevitable as globalization 197 The 1978 2 nd Republican Costiuon fSri Lank whic reatd strong excutive dparting fromtprviosWtmsteryle fCstuoisndionfhwonstiolsm. See AJ lsn The Gli SmiAia: The Ctui fSr Lka (1978) (Ma, Lnd,1980). 198 7 Sri Lak Constiuon article157. <htp:/w.piu.gv.lk//1978Constiuon/hapter_20Amd.htl> (acesd 17Nov 20). 199 Davidnham &Sisra Jysuria ?Eqity, Grwt n Isurection: Librlizatn d the Welfr ebtiContepo SLnk?(20) 8OxfodDvlpet Sudes97?110. 191 took its contemporary form. Politicians, technocrats, academics and policy formulators who contribute to the mainstream globalizing ideology exalt its virtues of rapid economic growth intermingled with the rhetoric of democracy, transparency, and good governance. It is easy to subvert potential remonstrations regarding the increasing social polarization by people who query the rationality for denationalization, deregulation and devaluation while the memories of the dysfunctional, unproductive governmental enterprises of pre-liberalization period that were riddled with poor management, lethargy, kleptocracy, unaccountability and corruption are still fresh in their minds. The reality is that the abdication by Government the of the role of provider in terms of welfare to the people has exacerbated poverty in region and resulted further deterioration of education, healthcare and living standards. The ensuing frustration of the deprived has evolved into a powerful political force creating new and ominous crises within the democratic governing structures in the region. 3.9 Transnational Corporation operation in South Asia The following paragraphs will focus on TNCs and their impact on individual and community economic/cultural sustainability, actions that lead to the compromise of traditional human rights, particularly labour rights, and the TNCs? disregard for social or environmental considerations. 200 The impact of the involvement of TNCs in the national economies of South Asia is manifold and some of the operations violate international human rights. 201 Also disquietingly, the activities infringe upon traditional ways of life, destroying indigenous knowledge bases and life patterns. 202 This destruction cannot be described in terms of a breach of a generic paradigm of rights; however, such intrusions violate cultural identity and the unique relationships within the region, which the communities have maintained over generations with subsistence agricultural patterns and the land. TNCs, more than any other entity involved in the economic 200 John Madely Big usine, Porepls: The Impact ofTranstional Crpoatins othe Wrl'sPor (Zok Ltdn, 19). 201 F cpthmarihs vilatis Busin d Hu Rights eurce tr wbsit at<ht:/w.busine-urgh.or>(ace20Feb207). 202 Dvid NFag ?Acin Restiun: Th Potial Unjst Enricmnt Clais ofIndigeous PeoplsAistMltaolCrpatis?(201) 76NwYokversiyLwRev 62, 31? 640. 192 globalization process, can annihilate cultures, obliterate the distinct character of a locality, trade or resource and engulf it in the global market where the only criterion for existence is profit. In the overwhelming rush to liberalize, privatization was undiscriminating and some profitable public enterprises were privatized. 203 Under foreign, often monopolistic, control, price increases invariably burdened local consumers. Restructurings of the newly privatized state enterprises often cut jobs to raise profitability, creating increased economy-wide unemployment and labour market insecurity. 204 Under relaxed employment regimes companies can make employees redundant without adequate compensation. Strict regulations curtail unionization of workers? rights and bargaining powers. 205 Unemployment of often unskilled labour, without welfare, increases poverty, with gross denial economic and social rights. 206 The havoc created through myopic policy formulation without systematic appraisal of social and economic repercussions is amply demonstrated by the impact TNC activity on subsistence agriculture. The mass-scale style of TNCs threatens small-scale farming and cottage industries, especially through limiting land access: 207 Large tracts of land have bn ought p by so called agriculture basd businsMultintiol Crpations, e.g. nempnyis sidtohve cqird ver 8,850 crs tolat tek tr a log ter invetmnt. Erlie agricltual landeilinglawrohibitedyprsofowg ore tha 15 es. Wht would hav pen toall the mll res? failiesdisplacdby this compy? Emor imrtat, wht as hpndto ll th nles laburs ld b ployd onthisla, hicisnowver with a plantatio whic neds a ver sall wrkfce. 203 RK Mishra nd BNavin Restructing Public Enterpis inIdia :Privatsion ad Disnvetmt(itlPub,w Dlh,20). 204 Bur Srivs ?Labour Isi rivatsio fPublic Eterpis inIdi,? (20) South AsiaJoal ofangemnt 91. 205 nt rcus FTZ: rasionlistn fNatinl onmy a Misery ofWmen WrkesiSiLk?<htp:/w.rg/actrv/> (cesd 15Sept205). 206 Umh padhy ?Ic fGlblizo ihFral&Ifrl ctr: Rsps & Rsitanc?APESeminar,duin AsnSl ou, Hyabd,Inia, ?7Janury20. 207 Adl Dor ?Th As Ecomic CrisanditsSocil Impts orkig Childeni Ii(198/9) 14CWNewlter <htp:/w.ca.tne.cot/Pubians/Nwsletrs/vl14_3-vl15_/v14_3- v5_damorhml> (acsd 15Sp 205). 193 Similarly, in 1998, India conformed to the conditionalities of the World Bank and lifted its restrictions on TNCs, such as Monsanto and Cargill, from entering agriculture markets. 208 Complex new patent laws prevented the traditional usage of seedlings from previous crops. The new seedlings required pesticides and fertilizers unaffordable to small farmers. Policies based on global trade interests and ignoring national interests thus fundamentally altered the life of the peasantry farmer across South Asia, as epitomized by the dramatic number of farmer suicides. 209 Shiva describes the human costs: 210 197 witnesd the first emrgenc ofarm suicides inIndia. A rapid increas in indebten, a ot f are tking thirlivsDebt isfletionof a gtiv cony, alosiny. Twofactor hv trnsormd th positivm fgriculture to native nmyfopats -theising cts fprdutiod th fllingprices frdities. Bths factors arete inthe policiesotrad liblistio crte globlistion? fmingislinkfr the rth, soil, thebioivsity, anthe climte, d linkd tolobal cations global mrkts, and the rosityfthe arth is replac ythe grd ofcrpotions, th viailityofsmll fr nsmll fas isestro. Fmes? uicide rest trgic and raticypto o th cr of survival f by Idia pasnts. The increased convergence amongst national governments, TNCs and IFIs in terms of policy to promote the ideals of the liberal market economy is a regrettable outcome of the contemporary globalization paradigm. India?s permission of field trials of the controversial genetically-engineered (GE) cotton has raised similar social turmoil. Lack of public information and inadequate risk assessment appear to be the greatest concerns among activists. There is widespread criticism that Monsanto-Mahyco?s Bt-Cotton import process bypassed public scrutiny and debate, particularly since the European Union and several other countries have banned the planting or import of Bt-Cotton. 211 Shiva asserts that this is another attempt to introduce monoculture farming in the country has already proven disastrous for tens of thousands of small farmers. She maintains that the strength of Indian agriculture lies in its myriad 208 V Shiva ?Globaliston ad Growing Fod Insecurity? 198 Forest Tres And Peopl Newslter36/7. 209 SH Ahmd,HJil ?Chgi pater fsi and prasuicd inKarchi? (198) 31 JPak Mdsoc ?8; BMoanty?WLik theLivgDe: FrmeSuidesnMahrstr, WetrnIia? (205) 32Jurl ofPsnSuds 243?76. 210 VaShv?TheSicdeEcmy ofCrpoatGlobaliston? ZNET Cometry, 19 Fb204. <Htp:/w.zmag.r/bis/heag.cfm?uthrI=90>(acesd20 ach205). 211 Sumnai B Cotn ofun Prvils? (20) 37Ecmi A PlitclWkl 1973-1974. 194 smallholdings and its biodiversity, which will be destroyed through the introduction of monolithic farming as a result of acceding to IFI conditionalities. 212 Upheaval from TNC activity pervades South Asia, for instance in milk prices in Sri Lanka. Before economic liberalization the 400gr milk packet was SLRs 6.00 (US$ 0.07) but has now risen to more than SLRs.100 (US$1.11), beyond the reach of a majority of Sri Lankans. 213 A written statement submitted by the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) to the UN Economic and Social Council detailed the inimical effect of unrestricted TNC activities within the developing world: 214 ?about 20 years go fresh, inexpnsive milk was idely avilable. Howevr, in 198 thgvnmt ? udr aolicyflibrlistiond privatistion ? closed Ntiol MilkBo sigd ngmt withNestl? todlop th airyinustry. The airy intracoslidated ur fourcmies Nstl?, Anchor, Laksprndalibn ?ll f hoslittle sypathy for the pligt of million of fmilies who ct ar their milk prdts. The chairman of Nestl? Lanka has gone so far as to assert that it is improper to ask for a reduction in milk prices or bring the issue the attention of foreign diplomats in Sri Lanka, for he argued that application of pressure to reduce milk prices is a violation of free market principles. 215 Meanwhile, domestic dairy producers able to provide milk for the country prior to 1981 are no longer able to do so, and Sri Lanka has become dependent on foreign producers of milk. Privatization measures and the unregulated entry of TNCs into milk production in Sri Lanka have not only obliterated the small scale domestic producers who could not compete with the industry giants but created a price monopoly which the 212 Ranjit Devraj ?India: Flk orNdTo C Gentic Cotn Trial? <htp:/w.tse.org.s/tile/fak.htm(acsd7Nv 207). 213 ?Podr Kg ?Si Ln brcing fr ilk powr pieburst 20March 207 t:/.lankbusli.o/ulsty.h?nesID=68518&no_view=1&SEARCH_T ERM=10 (ced 12Nov 07) 214 Comiso OHmanRights,Fift-eigt sio Itm 0of the prisal genda cn, SialA Cultrl Wrnatensubidbyt ALlResource etr (ALRC), o-ventaloaizt igeral cnsulaivstu. Th Stay- Galhs recivd th folwig rte st whii rced inacordan wih EconmicndSaluci rsluin196/31. Disr.GENRL E/CN.4/20/NGO/6731 Jury 20 <htp:/w.uhcr./Hridoa/Hridoca.sf/0e52d381d7c1256b37c41?pend ocent > (aesd 7Nv 207). 215 Ibid 206. 195 government cannot control. The social cost of the whole operation is a generation of malnourished children in Sri Lanka. 216 3.9.1 Increased Civic Dissent Against Transnational Corporation Cctivities Governments welcoming TNCs rarely stipulate adequate environmental impact assessments relating to their operations, and despite the Bhopal tragedy, examples of environmental disasters continue 217 such as incident where a license was issued to draw water for a Coca-Cola plant in Plachimada, Palghat, Kerala in 2000. The company electrically extracted ground water in excess of the licence, and ground water levels depleted and the residue from the manufacturing process began to pollute the soil of surrounding paddy fields, canals and wells. The adivasi women in Plachimada commenced a dharna (sit-in) outside the Coca- Cola factory. The local panchayat filed public interest litigation in Kerala High Court against Coca-Cola. The Court supported the demands of the women and Justice Balakrishnana Nair ordered Coca-Cola to stop pirating Plachimada?s water, stating: 218 The Public Trust Doctrine primaily rests on the principle that certain rsorcslikeair, e watesnd thfhavsuha gret impon to th ple s hletht it ould bwlly jtifiedto mk th asubjet frivteonrship. Tesaidresorcesbin ift fature, thy hold be made fly avilale tovyn irrespctive oth statuin lif. Thctrinejoins upnth gt to rtect reurcesfr th njoynt f thgeral public rathr an prmit thir u fo pivate owrship or cmcial pose ? Our legal sytem ? based on Eglish on law ? includes th pblictrt doctrineprt fitsjurispdec. TheStateisthtrute of ll nturl surs, whic ae by natur mat for public s an ejyet. Pblic at lage isthficiayof thsahre, ing waters, ir, forestsnd coloiclly rgile lads. Te State s trustee is und alegl utytoprtet thenatul reurc. rorc met fr public us cat be cvrted into pivate ownrship ... 216 60% ofthe cildren uder thageof 5are sufring from alnutrion <unpa1.unrg/taoc/gps/ ublic/dmt/APCITY/UNPA02364.pdf> (acesd 17 My 25) 217 w.bhopal.m.> (esd 7Nov 207). 218 Perumaty GraPnchaytvStaefKral[204] (1) KLT 731. lso e Vand Shiva ?Indi: SofDinks, Hrd Cs? LMnd ipomtiqueMar205) <htp/.fuly.og/Wter/205/I-Cc-la-Ppsi4mr.ht> (cse 15ept 205); Aathrisan Ai ?Th Alure fThe rnstonl: Notes nSomApctof h PolitclEonm ftr India?(7)2ultl Ahrgy640?658. 196 This judgment indicates that the ownership of underground water rests with the public, and the state as trustee has a duty to safeguard natural resources. Failure to do so would be tantamount to violation of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, guaranteeing the right to life. 219 Such extreme action as a dharna from civil society indicates that the community is aware of its rights and the corresponding responsibilities of the TNCs. Similar civic protest is taking place against the plans for the Eppawala phosphate mining project by a multinational corporation, IMC Agrico. If the project is granted approval not only will there be environmental devastation but a flourishing village consisting of 30,000 mainly small scale farmers, paddy fields that produce the highest yields of rice in the country, and an ancient but still operational irrigation system will be destroyed together with the region?s ecology, not to mention heritage areas, including significant archaeological sites which will also be destroyed or rendered unapproachable. 220 Such civil mobilization now transforms itself into systematic yet informal regulatory authority relating to TNC ventures in the region. 221 While this process highlights governmental impotency to provide adequate supervision of such ventures, as well as the incapacity formulate suitable policy relating to FDIs, it also emphasizes expectation mismatch in relation to developmental issues between civil society and the governments. The effect of global market pressure to provide preferential treatment to TNCs over and above human rights considerations is best demonstrated through the operations of the Export Processing Zones. Hazardous and often arduous working conditions, lack of legal protection in terms of work conditions and minimum wages within EPZs is common South Asia. Amendment of labour laws to permit compulsory overtime at the request of garment manufactures has been 219 MC ehta vKmalnth ad others(197) SC 38. 220 ?S.Judget VidcesEpawl Objectors?riLank unday Isln, 1Ju 20 <t:/.pugwah.g/eports/im/pi12.htm >(acesd 7Nov 207);eoMalikWanigsudr ?Rsitn r S LankTNCsing l? <htp:/w.tsde.or.s/tle/al-cn.htm> (csd7Nv207). 221 S t civl rgnizt ht ve risithe rgion tobilzepole aist he inequiableopats fTNCs<p:/w.bopal.t>(acesd v 207). 197 justified by the Labour Minister of Sri Lanka 222 and the Chairman of the Board of Investment as imperative for Sri Lanka to remain competitive, especially after the removal of quotas under the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) of 2005. 223 Similar scenes abound across the region. 224 The evidence shows increased Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) and presence of TNCs have harmed, not benefited, the developmental process human welfare. 225 Host countries must stringently control the content of FDIs and the manner in which FDIs are introduced. Rules must include issues technology transfers, consolidate domestic manufacturing capabilities, training of skilled labour, infrastructure development and environmental concerns. Policy formulation relating to FDIs should also necessarily take into consideration the protection of indigenous life systems, knowledge bases and subsistence rural agriculture, which is an integral part of any developing nation. The activities of the TNCs and their detrimental effects cannot be combated by one country alone. It demands a regional effort so that the burdens and benefits of regulation can be shared by all. 3.9.2 Transnational Corporations and Respect for Human Rights TNCs, traditionally, have not been recognized as subjects of international law and therefore exist beyond the legal parameters of the conventional international human rights regime. 226 The impact of their operations, including human rights violations, is ignored by national governments reliant on their financial 222 Samn Guads ?Sri Lankgovernmt ipose lnger hours nfemal workes? 4 eptber20 <htp:/w.s./acle/20/p20/il-04.ht>(cd7Nov 207). 223 ThDaindu Colectiv ?Probles Fd By Women orking ISri Lank's Export Procesig Zs?(Januy?Mach201)38Asia Lbu Update <tp:/w.mr.g.hk/l_rtil/xport_cg_zs/rblms_fcedby_wmen_orki ng_isri_lanks_exportesng_. Se als Dinh Sprite ?Who j toin th multo?(Itviw it Dbrh)TePaust(Austria,23O203) <hp:/.prgust.cm/P03/2/Art/1023/ws6.> aced 17My 5. 224 Bangldesh: Nationl Garent Wokes' Fdrtion <htp:/w.ronwt.org/?lid=172> (ces 7v207). 225 DRorik?T lbl ovrac fTra sif Devlment Raly ater? (UNDP akgund Paper,U.SA.,201). 226 NiclJ?gs h Legl Stusof the Multinaol Crpoti Undr Itrnatiol Law? in Mihe KAo(d)HumanRihandrs Ad TheRsnblyOfTs Corpatins (lwr Itrtil, 19)259,62; aym JMichalowki d Rld C m ?Th SpacebteLws: TeProblem forpte rien rnstnalotex? (1987) 34oilProls 34?53;Silva Dniv?The cunbltyfN-Se Actrs f HuanRigts Vtin:thpcCsf rasntial Corpaios? (Gv,198) <w.harihs.c/me/ulod/f/03_dlv_stdie.f> ced 7o 207. 198 benevolence. The atrocities the TNCs commit often include complicity in the violent suppression of civil dissent against neo-liberal policies, violations of labour rights, child labour, suppression of trade union rights, violation of property rights that extend to intellectual property rights and infringement of environmental rights. 227 Numerous attempts have failed to compel the TNCs to abide by international human rights obligations. Attempts through labour and environmental protection laws fail due to the legal nature of the entity. Often the TNCs are more powerful economically than host country and wield considerable political clout within it. However, economically powerful countries, such as the US, have created legal regimes that enable non-nationals to seek remedies in US courts for breaches of human rights both within and outside America. 228 Yet, practical limitations, such as poor access to legal representation and an inability to travel to the US, render such avenues nugatory. Quasi-legal regulatory regimes, such as the UN Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, 229 the EU Parliament Resolution on Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, 230 the International Labour Organization?s (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises 231 and OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 232 and Global Compact, initiated under the aegis of Secretary General Kofi Annan at the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum in 1999 233 , have all had a limited impact on convincing the TNCs of their human rights responsibilities. The latest initiative to compel to honour their 227 David Kinley ad Srah Joseph?Multinaol crpoatins ad human rights Question About TherRltoship?(20)7Altrve LwJunl 1. 228 ?mt nte Lw -IntilCrimLw:v. Corpte Liblity fr Vilatis of IntratinlHuaRightsa? (201) 4 HR 2025. 229 Uied Nos Drft Irioldeofnducton Trasntial Corpations (1984) 23 ILM62. 230 n Kaminga ?olding Multinal Crpatis Acoutble fr Hum Rights Abuse:ChlefrtheEC? Phlp Aston (ed) TheEUand anRights(Oxford Uivrity Prs, Ox, 20) 56?577. 231 <hp:/w.ilorg/public/nglis/emlyt/multi/owl/elis.pdf. >(aces 5 No206). 232 <t:/.ecd.r/oet/280,34,en_2649389_23752_1_1,0.html > (acesd 5Nov 206); Ans Klk, Rob va Tuldr a Crlijn Weltrs Interationl cdesof onutanrpatcialrpnsilty:ctstoacpoai gutlv? (19) 8Tsil Coti 143-180. 233 KfiA ?heGbl mact?(Adresathe rld Enmic For, Davos, UN Doc. SG/M/64(19), 31Jan9; <hp:/w.unglobacpact.org/Ptal/>(ced7v 207). 199 rights obligations has been promoted by the UN Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. 234 Widely regarded as a comprehensive guide to corporate social responsibility, the Code of Conduct focuses on issues of labour rights, corruption, consumer protection and environmental safety. 235 TNCs circumvent even efficient regulatory regimes, particularly in the developing world. The only visible mechanism of control which is partially successful is civil society vigilance and activism. The activism that followed the Bhopal disaster, and Apparel Industry Partnership, which is a result of child labour and the sweatshop industry, are examples of such civil mobilization. It is important that such activism is channelled and supported through a regional mechanism which prescribes normative standards of behaviour to ensure that the TNCs? operations are conducted in a way that they respect human rights and take into consideration environmental concerns. 3.10 Good Governance By the late 1990s, after two successive waves of SAPs, many contended that the Bank and the Fund?s aggressive yet inept dealings with developing nations, which were often ruled by dictatorial regimes, exacerbated the burgeoning economic crisis, devastating local ecologies and indigenous communities. The ?good governance? as an aid conditionality emerged largely due to the need to allay 234 Human Rights Comison Sub-Comison the Promtin ad Protecin ofHuman Rights Norerpilties ftratialcpsh buse terpis wed tuan ights (Ffy-hes, E/CN.4/Sub.2/03/12Rv.26 Ags 203 <tp:/w.hcr./Huridoca/Huridoc.nfTestFre615e78438c15dc5e 8?> On omet (ces 7Nv 207) 235 CarliHilan?UrmsntheRspibltis ofTranstional Crpoatins a the Bus Etrpis with egard ouman gh?(203) 4GermLw Jurl- Eropn &IeolLa<tp:/w.grlwjurl.c/ticl.h?id=30> (cesd 7 Nv207). 200 these accusations. 236 The purpose of good governance from an IMF perspective was elaborated in Michael Camdessus? address to the UN in 1996: 237 God gvernace isimportant for cuntries at ll stage ofdevlopment. . . Oupohto cetrate thoepcts grac that r mst loslyrlated torsvillanvr acroic policies?nae, th trnspecy f grment unts, the efctive of publicreour manet, ad th stability ad transrcyth cicdrulatory virot forpivte to ativity. Similarly, Paolo Mauro claims to trace the roots of corruption to the pre- liberalized, state-centred economies, and says policies of liberalization, stabilization, deregulation, and privatization can bring about a marked reduction in corruption and rent seeking behaviour. Therefore, to him, liberalization of the economy is a means of weeding out ?policy related sources? of corruption. 238 In essence, the governance agenda for the IFIs was a means reinforcing the status quo of growth through macroeconomic policies. The governance-related conditionalities were also a part of the evolution of the institutions themselves and the changes that taking place within the institutions. 239 They were promoted to protect the integrity of the IFIs themselves. 240 During their initial stages, IMF Governance Related Conditionalities (GRCs) centred on monetary and fiscal issues while the World Bank?s conditionalities also had a similar narrow focus, concentrating on micro, sector-specific financial issues such as structural adjustment lending. In the late 1980s the scope of the GRCs widened embracing the liberalization agenda encapsulated in Washington Consensus. By end of the 1980s, with increased demands on IFI lending and the risks of non-payment escalating, the conditionalities attached to loans began to widen. 236 Adrian Leftwich ?Governace,thStae nd the politcs fdevlopment? (194) 25 Devlopm adCag 36?8 provisaid unt factrsifluecingthe rgcfgovrncitdlmt g. 237 Mihel esu IMF angi DirecrAres tohe Uited Ntions Eomic and Soal Cunil 2Jly197<htp:/w.f.o/xtnal/pubs/fxrp/gver/gvindex.ht> (csd7 Nov0). 238 Pl ar ?Whory About Cruptin?? 197 Iternatiol Montary Fu Econic Isue6<htp:/w.imf.g/exrnal/bs/fsue6/isu6.pdf. >(cesd7Nov207). 239 JBogn Silet Rvlti: The Itratiol MotryFu, 19?89? (IM, WasitDC,19). 240 evh Kapur d ichard Wb ?Govrnce-Rlated Cnitoalites ofthe IFs. This a risd rsionftepeprf the XI ThniclGrup Mng Intgmel Grou f24 o Inrailotry Afaishld iLima, Pru, on1-3 March 20. 201 3.10.1 Assertion of Liberal Democracy and Anti-corruption as Conditionalities Governance based on the liberal democratic model was being thrust into prominence with the end of the Cold War and the ensuing need to establish democracy within former communist states. 241 The promotion of GRCs by IFIs, which prior to this were confined to economic issues, thus was considered timely. The economic boom of East Asia, where governance had a particular strong and interventionist nuance, was asserted by the World Bank to mean governance had a particular role to play in economic growth. 242 More significantly, the notion of state sovereignty was fast losing its sacrosanct position within international discourse. Globalization had refashioned the notion of state sovereignty through subtle changes in international rules and norms. The establishment of the International Criminal Court and international conventions that allowed crimes against humanity to be tried extra-territorially symbolized fundamental change. 243 These changes created a conducive environment for the IFIs to introduce GRCs as an integral part of wider macroeconomic policy formulation. The prelude to the contemporary GRCs was the policy statement of the Bank in September of 1997 that ?corruption should be explicitly taken into account country risk analysis, lending decisions and portfolio supervision if it affects 241 Met Kjoer and Klav inerup?God vernace: How des itrlate oHuman Rights?? in HansOSGumd Alfsn(s) umRightanGdvrce? Buildg Bris (Mrtis NijhoPblihr,Th, 20) 1?18. 242 WolankTheEan Mirace: Eoic GrotdPublicoliy (Oxford Univrsity Pres, Nw Yor, 193). 243 Thtitstoverigty isnvilabe was delt sver lws ith e ictmets of botince nSpai nd th UK,ad th formChianictao,H?nabr?n a Segalsourt20fr?tureity?. Ecpsulg the mod ftot h Uitd Nti cety-Gel, ofi Ana, delrd t itlrtUNer secan no lerhbhind protsatinstlsovignywhen y flagnly vilatigts fcitzns. H rtahi byaig ht ?th it[Uitedtios]Chr prludacogi tterrtsbeyndbrs? N York Tm (ew Yok,21Sep 19). 202 project or country performance.? 244 The Twelfth Replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA), negotiated in 1998, stated: ?good governance is critical to the development process and to the effectiveness of development assistance; this is a key concern of the IDA.? 245 The exact nature and the scope of the GRCs remained ill-defined at this point. The IMF also issued a rather tenuously drafted document on Good Governance in 1997. 246 The Fund focused on reiterating that good governance was a necessary precondition to infuse and maintain the confidence of the financial sector. In keeping with the mandate of the IMF its Good Governance definition included 247 ?issue sch asintitutional refoms fthe trasury, bdget pration ad aproval proedur, tax dinistration, conting an uit mechiss, CntrBnk tiosth ficial statistics fctio, ?.rfors frket mechisswld foc primilyo the xhae, trde picytes, ad spts oftheinanial sytem. Inrgulatory n legal rs, IMF advic wouldfcus taxtio, baking scto wsrulationthe establishent of fr ad fir mret etry.? The changing reality was quickly felt within the community of states that heavily relied on donor assistance. In a meeting of African Ministers Finance, the President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, declared that: 248 ?in the fac ofdeclining oficial devlopment asistance, thre isa relization d acptanmn Africancutries that individul otrieswill hv tojustify thir s fr itiol sista. Thisst b th bais ofigprfomce oeisuesof gd overance, oervnceferule la and zro toleranc fr crption.? This view was further reinforced by the fact that the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s was largely blamed on corruption, lack of accountability, supervision and poor regulation among governments of the region. 249 244 Helping Countries Combat oruptin:The Rol fthe World Bank Poverty Reduction ad EcomcMatTheWld Bak Sptmbr197 <ht:/w1.rldank.rg/icsetor/icupt/crupt/crix.htm >(acs 8Feb 208). 245 Aditons tIDA Resources: Twlfth Rplenishent IDA 12(98) (Intertionl Dvlopmnt sca,WrldBank, ahingoDC). 246 G vec: TIMF's le (Itratiol Motary Fud, 2July 197) <htp:/w.imf.ht>(ced17ay206). 247 Ibid argp 6 248 DevloentNws 1Sp 9. 249 Gr Mis ?ThFutreofGlbalizton? (198) 6South African Joural ofInterationl Afais1,83. 203 From the perspective of the IMF and the World Bank it was vital that the new genre of conditionalities were more effective than the previous ones. In Fund?s case, the new conditionalities supposed to induce confidence not only in the IMF but in allied private creditors as well. To maintain the continuous flow of private capital, countries urgently needed to establish credibility in the form acceptable political behaviour that was predictable and legitimate. In defence of political conditionality, the insistence on democratic reforms is premised on three essential, interdependent elements: 1) the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders; 2) the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive; and 3) the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. 250 Since the early 1990s, Good Governance has been incorporated as a conditionality in all of IFIs? financial and technical assistance programmes. However, the term has not been clearly defined nor specified by the IFIs. Frequently, reliance is placed on the IDA 12 th Replenishment 1998, which describes the ?four pillars? of good governance as accountability, transparency, the rule of law, and participation. This rather vague definition has great potential. As a principle there has been widespread acceptance of the good governance concept within the donor communities, the NGOs and the civil society of the borrower countries. It has also touched a chord with the deep discontentment and disillusionment within the civil societies of developing countries concerning governance, corruption and mismanagement of development programmes and external aid and loan assistance. The culture of pervasive corruption and the lack of accountability in governance in South Asia, which until now, were never addressed by other stakeholders, apart from the oppressed civil society whose only available recourse had been sporadic incidents of violence or civic uprising that were in the most part unsuccessful. Raising the issue of governance, the IFIs have given voice to a concern that was deep-rooted yet rarely articulated ? and often in fact denied ? by the developing 250 WH More and JRScarit ?IMFConditality nd Polity Charcteristc inBlack Africa: n ExplratyAlsi? [190]Africa Ty 37, 49. 204 nations themselves. However, reservation and scepticism about the implementation of good governance and IFIs? mandate to implement and monitor GRCs have been raised. The present study advocates for a regional framework that will also be mandated to deal with issues of governance and corruption. 251 3.10.2 Practical Limitations of Implementing Governance-Related conditionalities In practical terms a government may be requested to implement anti-corruption laws as part of donor driven conditionalities but questions of compliance and policing the legal regime rarely emerge. Policy formulation through consultation and participation remain difficult within immature civil societies such as those in South Asia. Transforming good governance from a mere banality into an effective conditionality continues to remain a problem that the IFIs are grappling with even today. Joseph Stiglitz, the former Chief Economist of the World Bank, recently argued that, ?There is increasing evidence that [conditionality] was not [effective] ? good policies cannot be bought, at least in a sustainable way. Equally critically, there is a concern that the way the changes were effected undermined democratic processes.? 252 T.N. Srinivasan, like many others, does not appear to be impressed by the sudden infatuation of the IFIs with governance. He comments that the IFI policy makers suddenly declared that: 253 ?we now see the centrality of issues of governance, both in the public and private sector. Pray, what took so long to see this? ?Governance?, to use the buzz-word, is not a new issue ? one already knows that rampant corruption is deleterious, or for that matter that openness to foreign trade and technology, macro-economic stability, investment, etc., are all important! Quite apart from the GRCs serving the interests of the IFIs, good governance has also had a positive effect on the political culture developing nations. Good 251 Se Chapter 6of this tudy. 252 Josiglz?WrlBankt he Milnium? (19) 09 The Econmic Journal 591. 253 TN rnvs Lets toeior,FaclTiesLond,24Sp 19). 205 governance created an environment where issues of corruption, whether it was unaccountability, bribery, money laundering or misuse of public resources for private benefit, could be discussed openly within civil society. Media and the NGOs that had been hesitant to address issues of corruption began to voice their concerns with greater conviction, secure in the knowledge that the issue had a resonance within the international community. This open discussion of good governance has helped to move the issue away from the prescriptions the World Bank or the IMF and make it a domestic issue like human rights or rule of law. 3.10.3 Good Governance comes to South Asia The evolution of GRCs has certainly helped create a focus on the complex relationship that exists in South Asia between corruption, terrorism, money laundering and political decay. Asia?s experience of corruption is well documented by Transparency International (TI). 254 In TI?s Corruption Perception Index 255 measuring transparency in about 90 to 100 countries, India ranked 71 st equal in 2001 and 2002, and 83 rd 2003 in the countries listed where corruption was rife. 256 In fact, all countries in South Asia rank poorly. Disturbingly, in 2002 and 2003, Bangladesh was ranked the most corrupt country in the world and, in 2006, it just managed to creep up a few places past Haiti and Iraq. External findings of surveys by the likes of TI are also confirmed by public opinion, media and research within South Asian states. 257 There is considerable academic analysis on corruption and its impact on poverty and development. 258 While Guhan and Paul reiterate that the endemic culture of 254 Gurhapl Singh ?South Asia?inRobin Hodes tal. (eds) Global Coruption Report 203 (Pofile Boks,Ld, 203). 255 <t:/w.trasprencyrg/plicy_resarch/survys_incs/pi201> (acsd 1Fb 208). 256 RobinHdes tl. (ds) Global Cruption Report 201 (Trasrency Iterntioal, Berlin). 257 BJal ThFureofIni:Pitcs, Emics,andGoven (Pgui, Vkg205; ert,Mrian, Sim DjkvRea H Shil Muliath?Obti Divng Lices Ida:AExperimntlAprohttuygCorpn? (207) 1The QuartlyJourlof Ecnoics 1639?76; NMen ad Bem ?Godgvernac in Bdsh: Pstiutadfutr chalengs?(205)7 ?uari blmi59?176. 258 K eSilva, GH Peris SWReSrih (soptinSuth As (ICES anyubcton20);lsofr istory fcouptin the bce ivViyanth 206 corruption permeates into every aspect of life exacerbating conditions of poverty and social marginalization from which there appears little escape, they further contend that it has a negative impact on development initiatives, for: 259 [t]he advrse fcts ofcruption othe conmy and opublic administration rmnifold. Gvernmt exditursarinflatewstefl projects d pogs ar tak in r tobta kicbcks. Star gt ilutein investmts(.g. das, roas, bidges nduilding), ods(e.g. drus) an ric e. qulity fdctorinr a teaher cauin hzto safty, lifan helth. Gvenmt rvest run cont f tax evion. Sbsidiean intivs ae bud. T po rthewrsaected sinc they cot pybrib inordto otainbenfitsto hic thy r legitimatelyntitled. Wose, thy nieasic justic inthandsofupt oficials, suh asthe lic and villageficials. Crptiogrvte ineqality in anlredy uqul sciety. South Asia?s high levels of corruption in public life and the private commercial sector co-exist with equally high levels of mass poverty, illiteracy, underdevelopment and the increasing criminalization of politics. It is public knowledge that ?corruption is severely undermining development objectives in South Asian countries by hindering economic growth, reducing efficiency, acting as a disincentive to potential investors, and above all, diverting critical resources meant for poverty alleviation,? 260 yet the absence of effective mechanisms has been the greatest obstacle to elimination. The general perception that corruption is part and parcel of public office is reinforced when it is commonplace to find news items such as: ?Public servants to take ?country forward? in comfort?, 261 an account of the officials of an Asian Development Bank (ADB) -sponsored development who ordered a fleet luxury cars for their use with the funds, and a report that ?corruption in public life is one of the most daunting issues facing the country. Things have come to such a pass that all politicians evoke public ridicule.? 262 On a more pragmatic note, the results and Hrsh Seti Foul pay: chronicles ofcruption 1947?97 (Banyo ks, New Dlhi, 198) and OAzfa,YLendASwmy ?ThCase dCsequces fCruption?(20)573 The ls t mri ad fPlitla Sil i42?56. 259 SGundPSaulCoruptionId: AgnforAtn (VisonBks, e lhi, 197) 3. 260 Corptio oth Asia, Isight &Bechmarks f Citze Fdbac Survys inFive unties (Transprecynteronal,Db20) <h:/w.t .o/psrs_rive//dnl/south_sirepot.df >(acsd 17 May 205) 261 TeIslnd9Jul 204. 262 h ribe (Chandigrh,25 Nov 203). 207 of bad governance are documented in the Human Development Reports because poor governance and poverty have a direct correlation. 263 Although the World Bank, the IMF, the Asian Development Bank and other national development agencies have contributed immensely to highlighting the issue of corruption and contributed to the open discussion of the subject nationally, effective regimes of anti-corruption are a long way from evolving both domestically and regionally. In a positive development in November 2001, India signed up to the ADB-OECD Anti-Corruption initiative for Asia-Pacific. 264 There has been considerable internal pressure from an increasingly vocal civil society to establish effective mechanisms to curb corruption in all of the South Asian countries. These societies persistently agitate for more access to information, particularly relating to policy formulation (e.g., preparation of PRSPs), accountability audits, 265 and more significantly for effective implementation of the existing mechanisms to curb corruption. Despite these concerns the anti-corruption drive has created an atmosphere whereby stakeholders are able to demand standards of good governance from the power holders and have also been able to initiate measures that would provide positive results once the processes are more established. Chief among these developments is the growth of civil society networks engaged in anti-corruption work. The rise of civil activism has witnessed a corresponding demand for greater transparency within government and the structures of power that basically translates into agitation for freedom of information legislation. The quest for such 263 Human Devlopment Rport 203(Oxford University Pres, Nw York, 203). 264 The iti cisachsignatry thlopmntofanti-cuptionacti plan wicrqrsth tdre tre pilsf ati-crui ctivy: vil ser refom, rduton fbiery,an tlosvoemnf vil se.Dorag,vr he be mrest tprgam fundig stiedorpifal tnti-coruptin lics anpcdu. Gurhl SinhCrpt,Trancy d theGd veaceAgda in Idi EU-ia: Beyond te Nw Deli uit (Europe Istiue for Asian Stuis, Brusl, 4Dec 2003). 265 Gurhpl Sigh ?Undrstandig Politcal Crtion iCtmpory Idian Politcs? (197) 45 Politcatudes62?638. 208 legislation has escalated during the past few years with the expansion of investigative journalism. 266 Good governance has also rekindled concerns relating to election procedures and particularly issues related to the funding of political parties. Legal regimes to supervize such activities are poorly formulated and implemented in many of the South Asian states. 267 An outright ban on corporate funding implemented in 1970 in India merely aggravated the problem as moneys still changed hands on the black market. 268 The strong nexus between corruption and the collapse of democracy in the region is obvious. The intermittent military rule in both Pakistan and Bangladesh has its roots in poor governance, allegations of political corruption and economic mismanagement. In the indictment former premier Nawaz Sharif, after the military coup of 1999, General Pervez Musharraf pointed specifically to Mr Sharif?s record economic misgovernance as a justification for military rule. Therefore ?bad governance? not only weakens economic performance but also affects the region?s political stability. Partha Ghosh?s analysis of corruption in India and her suggested remedies take a multidimensional approach and are relevant to all South Asia. According to Ghosh: 269 To deal with the malaise ofcruption ther isa ned for ams ovemnt attacking ll kindsof vil lik the asteystem, owryste, cualis, rimliztion plitics nds. Mr legl fts toel with th pr oupt is ot suficiet. It ca ur th sptos rtim timebt not the diseas. Mch mre invstmet isnedin India?huancpital tha is c nw?.Tisno p from urgo back tothe Mhtm?sdictum tht politics and ralityrinsablea tht edms are on the same thing. 266 Dilp ?Souza ?Investigave Journalism: Those who Expse U? inNali Rajn (ed) PractsngJrlim: Vlus,Ctt,Iplicatns(SagPublctos,wDlhi,205) diue th e fThk.c websi t x s ratig ruptio Ia. For tdvastingpat ofinvstigavjournlism,e<w.Tehlka.cm>. 267 T iclr vde thr nxs betw coruptin d fnig flitcl prties. Se NVtCouti Idia(AcdemicFdain,203). 268 Ibid. 269 ParthGsh ?rption Ii: aholist proch tCoruptin South India? inK M eSilv, HPeiad SWRde Srnghe upin ShAsia:,Pkstad rLnk(ItrntolCetrfrEtnic tudis,Kandy, SrLak, 20). 209 Good governance cannot be achieved by the efforts of individual states alone but demands international and regional cooperation. The laws on banking secrecy combined with increasingly integrated financial markets have inadvertently created a safe haven for many people to launder their swindled wealth without fear of prosecution. Even in highly publicized instances, such as that of Mobutu or Marcos, the countries have been unable to recover their looted wealth. 270 The importance of protection for those who collaborate to wipe out corruption in the domestic context is underscored by the death of 30-year-old engineer Satyendra Kumar Dubey, in Bihar, India in November 2005, which has been linked to exposure of corruption in the construction of the giant Golden Quadrilateral road project. His death emphasizes the urgent need to enact whistle-blowers laws similar to those of the UK, New Zealand and South Africa. 271 3.10.4 UN Convention Against Corruption The fight against corruption in the region received another boost with the adoption of the UN Convention Against Corruption by the General Assembly on 31 October, 2003. 272 Article 13(1) of the Convention states that each: State Party shall take appropriate measures, within its means and in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, to promote the active participation of individuals and groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, non-governmental organizations and community- based organizations, in the prevention of the fight against corruption and to raise public awareness regarding the existence, causes gravity of and the threat posed by corruption. 270 ?A recnt repot bythe US enatPermanet Ivestigaons Subcomite charged tha foigs,wihCiank?slp,usd liblyopqu etwrk fshlopions,fore trus ad tr strumt ohiltr dtis thystlyanrd y ut ti wncie.T cesrview yheCngreinal ivigos ivlingCitbak, il: tns ofilon fdlarstsfr byRuSas deGrtout fMexco nd ito oversacut 193 194 dui tprsidcy ofhibh, arlsSlise Gti; mre ha$40 milovethrog aconttrl yAsifi .Zard, huba f Bnzto, ltePre Mins fPkist; mre an $130mlon ve tog acouts crdby ElHadjOarBn, reidtfGbo sice 1967;rn $10 ilve thugcouts coetdoMha, Irhadba cha,sfthe te GnralSniAah, frmeilry lar fNigeria.?vrn-reltd Coitalis ofhIttol Finial InstunsUCTAD/S/MDPB/24/6 (UniNtns Public, 20). 271 Rasmezhed ?Dubey Gts Whistlebowr ard? Times ofIndia (Moday 2arch 204). 272 GAs. 58/4 (31 Oct, 203). 210 Chapter 3 of the Convention calls upon parties to ?consider adopting? laws to establish other actions as criminal offences, including trading in influence, abuse of functions, illicit enrichment, and bribery in the private sector. The chapter contains a series of articles on measures for promoting adherence to such criminal laws ? for example, measures for freezing and confiscating the proceeds of a crime, overcoming bank secrecy laws, and cooperation among law enforcement authorities of the parties. 273 The swift adoption of the Convention indicates the great enthusiasm with which the community states are subscribing to a regime against corruption, bribery and money laundering by both state and private sectors. 274 Governance related conditionalities initiated by the World Bank and the IMF ensuring transparency and accountability within structures of governance were aimed at further consolidating the chain of accountability running upwards from national governments to the IFIs. However, the positive ramification of the GRCs was that civil societal activism and the media seized the opportunity to create a dialogue between national governments and civil society on issues relating to GRCs. The insistence by the IFIs on honouring the GRCs provided the necessary impetus for the media to expose incidents of corruption and misuse of power by the national governments and contributed to the consolidation investigative journalism in the region. 3.11 Conclusion This chapter traced the impetus to generate a culture of development assistance to the inaugural speech of Truman in 1949. The genesis the international financial institutions was rooted in the economic downturn of 1930s and the need to create a vibrant yet systematic financial regulatory framework in aftermath of the World War II. The chapter analysed the ideological affiliations of the IFIs 273 Sean DMurphy ?Adoptin ofUNConvetion Agaist Coruptin? (204) 98The Amrican JourlofItenatil Law182. 274 As c 207 Srk, Paist, Bagldsh, d the Maldives hae cptd trey but ntIdia,BhutdNepl.<hp:/w.unoc.rg/unoc/tr/CA/signaoris.hl> (aces 1Feb 8). 211 based on neo-liberalism upon which multilateral financial policies are determined. Sections 3.3 and 3.3.1 of this chapter elaborated the symbiotic relationship between the key public and private agents of neo-liberal globalization, the IFIs and TNCs respectively; whose operations have a fundamental impact on economies of the developing world. The analysis also focussed on the historical antecedents of the 1970s debt crisis and the circumstances that compelled the IFIs to advocate policy changes in relation to global financial markets. In this context section 3.6 of this chapter discussed the national economic policies of South Asia until the period of economic liberalisation and their particular strengths and weaknesses. The reasons for the embracing IFI-propelled economic restructuring programmes through the SAPs were discussed. The ideological leanings of the IFIs which emphasize economic growth with particular disregard for human dimension of development werew analysed. The social and human costs of these policy changes, in relation to South Asia, discussed. The study highlighted the parallel existence of the human rights regime and the development regime and the reluctance of the IFIs to seek an amalgamation of the two. A significant observation of this chapter is that the neo-liberal market-based globalization process aggravates conditions of poverty and intensifies democratic dysfunction within the structures of government. The implementation of the SAPs and the PRSPs, which this study identifies as the instruments contemporary globalization, diminishes the significance of concept of state sovereignty and creates a structure of accountability that places the IFIs at the apex. The role of the TNCs in the economic activities of the developing world, particularly South Asia, was analysed in section 3.9 this chapter. The study discussed the exploitative tendencies of the TNCs which were abetted by the conducive fiscal and regulatory regime created by the host countries competing with each other for the much-craved FDI. The need for stronger international regime monitoring of transnational corporations was emphasized in this chapter. Further analysis of the ramifications of the IFI policy overhauls in this chapter identified the mobilization of civil society and the articulation of ?good 212 governance? as positive outcomes of that process. Civil society mobilization and good governance are both concepts which have great potential and have not been explored sufficiently in the South Asia context. This chapter concludes with two general observations: first, that developmental and economic growth concepts must be extricated from their contemporary ideological base in neo-liberalism. Secondly, there must be a tangible rationalization between the human rights regime and the developmental regime so that the benefits of development are shared equitably between all people. The following chapter is presented in two distinct sections. The chapter first considers the impact of neo-liberal policy formulation on democratic governance in South Asia. As reiterated in the Introduction to this thesis, human rights, development and democracy form a symbiotic relationship which mutually supports the success of each other in their sphere of operations. The neo-liberal economic policies that compelled fundamental alterations in the operation of national economies had the effect of refocusing the centre of accountability the governments from people to the IFIs. The need to placate IFIs resulted in creating situations of civic dissent, undermining the functioning of democracy, will be analysed in Chapter 4 of this study. Secondly, Chapter 4 explores the South Asian Association of Regional Coorpeation (SAARC) that has been established as a mechanism to coordinate the regional effort to secure human rights and social development. The discussion will focus of the goals of the SAARC its inherent limitations that is reflective of the regional political insecurities. It will analyse the efficacy and viability of existing mechanisms in the context of contemporary globalization and whether the SAARC has fulfilled expectations since its inauguration two decades ago. 213 CHAPTER 4 A POVERTY OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH ASIA AND THE INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE REGION?S NEEDS THAT IS THE SAARC ?While genrating a proliferation of electoral regims and celebrating ?democray? in th abstrct, ne-libl globliztion h urmin th posibility of dmocrtic conl ovr state policies ad insulate th mst funtal plic eisios frm e th fiction of democratic contrl. It ha hd pervasively crsiv effets o ay sens of self-wrth tht is bsed o locl cultu, diffenc ad idntity. Finally, it is now aciated with a rtur to military anturism whos potential futur dstrutiv effectsre frightening to coteplate.? 1 4.1 Introduction As Chapter 3 indicated, globalization has demanded transformations in areas such as trade, investment, technology, communication and state sovereignty. It has offered opportunities to re-evaluate the global relationships between states, international organizations, transnational corporations and individuals. The contemporary wave of globalization has also compelled a rethinking about several issues: about the capacities and the obligations of the agents of globalization; about the meaning of poverty (or poverties); and also about the relationship between material poverty, economic development the full panoply of human rights. It has also created opportunities for discussion relating to regionalization as a crucial means of both insulating states and individuals from the adverse effects of globalization and harnessing and channelling its positive effects: in short, better, conscious, active regional governance of globalization. As reiterated at the conclusion of Chapter 3, formulation of effective strategies to combat all species of poverty required firstly the identification of the primary perpetrators. Chapter 3 identified the first source of problems as lying at the supranational level. At that level ?perpetrators? were shown to be the IFIs and TNCs, being the key public and private agents, respectively, of neo-liberal economic globalization. Chapter 3 illustrated how inopportune and imprudent 1 Petr Evans ?Counter-hgemonicGlobalizton: Trasntioal Scial Movemnts ithe ConmporyGlbal Plital Ey? hm Jk,Aexndr HickadMilrd Schwtz (eds) Hdk fitl Scilgy (Cbridg Uivrsity Ps,Nw York, 205) 422. 214 policy formulation by IFIs in the last 30 years, through the instrument of the SAPs in particular but also PRSPs, added to the endemic material poverty that denied the people their economic, social and cultural rights within the region. It also illustrated how the TNCs exploited the weak economic climate and poor governance of region for profit, further exacerbating conditions of poverty and social exclusion. That discussion in Chapter 3 also touched on a second source of problems, namely the inadequate responses of individual states in both to rampant neo-liberal economic globalization and their mismanagement or abdication of management of their own economies and domestic affairs. It is natural that thinkers have drawn the link between, on the one hand, the policies and actions of the global actors; and, on the other hand, the domestic responses to those policies and actions. These responses could be viewed as non- management, successful management and mismanagement. In this respect, Chapter 3 recognized the single most significant positive outcome of the IFI policy formulation was Governance Related Conditionalities (GRCs). Though the GRCs are a furtive mechanism to ensure that the IFI policies have a conducive environment in which to flourish, they created opportunities in South Asia for public debate and discussion on issues such as corruption, democratic deficits and accountability. Chapter 3 concluded with the observation that need-based policy formulation, democratic governance and control of the IFIs? and TNCs? activities should be the foundation of an effective mechanism that would eradicate poverty and foster human-centred development in South Asia. In this transition between Chapters 3 and 4, it is timely to tie together several threads of argument that have now been individually teased out, just as the introduction to Chapter 3 wove together explicitly two threads of globalization: essentially economic globalization from Chapter 2 and the internationalization ? one might equally say ?globalization? ? of human rights from Chapter 1. Taking this further, the three threads to be woven together in this chapter are human rights, development, and democracy. It has been adumbrated that there exists a nexus between these indeed, effectively, they plait into a single cable, each gaining strength from the others. That cable will now be analysed. 215 Human rights are in many ways the most basic element of the cable. Not surprisingly, Chapter 1 identified them as the dominant and most powerful response to the universal quest to promote human dignity solve the problem of poverty in its widest senses. Yet development, too, aims to remedy poverty and bring prosperity, and it, too, is surely a necessary condition for overall progress. Development connotes not only such spontaneous economic progress as simply happens to occurs via market mechanisms, but also the deliberate and wise management, channeling, stimulating, checking and co-ordination of economic interactions specifically aimed at fostering such economic progress, in particular by poorer states. This thesis observes that the ideal paradigm of development that should be strived for is not just the somewhat miserly and resigned hope of a (possibly non-existent) trickle-down to the poor that (allegedly) happens as beneficial byproduct of market forces, but rosier picture and altogether bolder aspiration of the rising tide that lifts all boats. As such, development can be seen as a necessary means for, and a complement to, satisfying human rights. For development both answers basic material needs and offers new opportunities for ways to flourish and to express freedoms. 2 Development is nevertheless not a sufficient condition for progress, because crude aggregates such as GDP growth risk mistaking greater expenditure or higher technology for ends in themselves, rather than means. They also risk ignoring both the issue of damaging and unsustainable growth (consider unsustainable environmental degradation) the problem of growth whose fruits are inequitably distributed. Respect for rights (such as rights to equality of process and to some extent of outcome, and of future generations) serve at once to curb, channel and define development which otherwise might well become indiscriminate or inequitable, and might all too easily leave the poor behind. Another way of saying this is that development must be ?human-centred?. In short, economic growth must serve people, not vice versa. The third strand of this trio, intertwining with human rights and development, will be shown in the present chapter to be democracy. That word will be shorthand for, 2 Kofi Ana fmously describdthejoint aspirton asth towards ?large frdom? and e anthervlue,th fpaful ry.SeRfeScey-GnlIn lrgefro: wds nt, srityan um rights r l. <tp:/.org/lefdo/ctn.>(acsd 12Fb 08). 216 more specifically, a plural, tolerant, welfarist democracy, with regular elections from a universal franchise. In addition, it must operate under a thoroughly internalized and honoured rule of law, and be equipped with a strong, independent judiciary. Such specifications are necessary to distinguish the ideal conception of the term from usages of it that really mis-usages. For instance, Pakistan?s use of democracy is in reality a militarized executive, despite the existence of multiple political parties. 3 Sri Lanka and Bangladesh allow opposition parties to function in principle but in practice disable them by intimidation and accusations of corruption. 4 For instance after the Fourth Constitutional Amendment to extend the life of the Parliament, the President of Sri Lanka stated blatantly his aim to ?demolish and completely destroy the opposition politically. After that I say you, roll up the electoral map of Sri Lanka. You will not need it for another ten years.? 5 Once again, the three strands ? human rights, development and democracy ? reinforce and depend on each other. Democracy that disregards civil and political rights negates the very fundamental role of the concept, as much as democracy that ignores economic rights is of little benefit to materially marginalized; and which would deny social and cultural rights will ill adapt to groups? idiosyncratic needs and will stifle expression. The right self- determination is an implicit premise of a democratic state, as well as being a force in tension with splintering into smaller units that the state must negotiate and manage. As to the relationship between democracy and development, a democratic state benefits from development insofar as development multiplies the realizable freedoms and the well-being of people. Three other strands of another whole category also need to be woven together at this pivotal point in the study. These strands are the national, regional and international/global responses to the problems of how to achieve the three aims just described: human rights, development and democracy. The ?top? or global tier, includes attempts to render the structures, powers and actions of both IFIs 3 Aqil Sha ?Democray onHldinPakistn? (20) 13Journal ofDemocray 67?75. 4 Dougsln Rlig tcl Coflict SthAsi:Idi, Pkistn,d SriLank (GrenwdPubsh, Westpr, USA,19). 5 Piya Sarkoe ?TCondutfthe Rfrendum,? inJaes Manor (ed.) ri iChge dCrsi (mHl, L, 84)6. 217 and TNCs answerable for violations of widely defined human rights. In the case of IFIs at least, the top tier also includes further infusing sincere rights consciousness into their mission and their policy formulation. Considering the ?bottom? tier next, this study reiterates the significance of the states themselves, who will remain key actors in creating, constituting, voting on and opting into both regional and global mechanisms. It will further be argued that states will remain the first ? though not the only ? repository of duties corresponding to human rights. Despite being weakened by the supranational and subnational forces mentioned in Chapter 1 and 2, and despite redefinition of abridging of Westphalian sovereignty, it is only all the more necessary for states to effectuate plural, rights-based democracy and development inside their own borders through setting their own terms of engagement with globalizing forces. Finally, the ?middle? tier remains to be discussed ? that of the region. The present study argues that regional integration of organizations to supervise human rights, democracy and development offers much unrealized potential. Too often overlooked, regionalism can rightly be seen as the pivot and potentially the place of most purchase over human rights and functional democracy. Regional organizations are more responsive to particular needs of culture and stage of development than the global power bases. For the same reason, albeit put more pragmatically, guidance, supervision and greater interventions by a regional body of states that come together in free association and on their own terms, are less easily rejected as inappropriate, ignorant or imperialist. Regionalism mediates between impossible and suffocating isolationism on one side (consider North Korea), implosion on another (consider the former Yugoslavia) and total submergence and defeatism in the face of global brute forces on another, as neo-liberalism, at its worst, claims is not only inevitable but desirable. Chapter 4 thus picks up strands from above and focuses on two distinct but related aspects of the predicament of South Asia today. Firstly, picking up the strand of democracy from the trio values discussed above (along with human rights and development), chapter assesses the current health and functioning of the democratic apparatus in each of South Asia?s states. The author discusses 218 democratic deficit and poor governance in South Asia that exacerbates marginalization endemic poverty in the region. 6 This chapter will focus on the nature of the democratic deficit in South Asia and its impact on the legitimacy of governance. It will analyse the legitimacy challenges that are faced by national governments across the region as they fail to deliver on the minimum expectations of the people they seek to govern. It will discuss the civil dissatisfaction that has taken on militant overtones and analyze this as a natural corollary to the contemporary IFI policy formulation and the impact of policy formulation on human rights. The study will focus on the necessity to create a normative stand democracy and governance at a regional level as accepted norms of democratic governance are subverted nationally in South Asia. Secondly, picking up on the third tier between globalism and nationalism, this chapter will also evaluate efficacy of existing regional mechanisms in synthesizing the development efforts with strategies to realize human rights anddemocracy. In this context this chapter will analyse the inauguration, work and the impact of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which is by far the most significant regional mechanism in the subcontinent. This study argues that the SAARC is ineffective and cannot deal with contemporary global exigencies have a negative impact on South Asia. The present chapter concludes with the observation that an effective regime of human rights protection is dependent on mechanisms that ensure democracy and on sagacious policy formulation that addresses issues of human development. 4.2 Manifestations of democratic deficit in South Asia at the level of the state The impact of globalization on South Asian states and the issues relating to diminished sovereignty were discussed in Chapter 2 of this study. The discussion also mentioned issues relating to Governance Related Conditionalities (GRCs), 6 Se Chapter 3of this tudy. SealsoHL Rot Smal Countries, Big Leson: Gvernace nd tRisofEstAa(OxforUnivrityPres,196)d Parmur ?Makig SsofG Gvrnc? Dicsin Pap N. 98/5 ap rsetstf nd stts t,ity a eaenMelrject,irsitofapu Nw GuieCocilRom Ausrln Ntiol Uivrsity, Cb Jun 1. 219 which were elaborated in Chapter 3 as a positive ramification of the globalization process. The relevance of good governance to development is highlighted by several international policy statements. These include the Millennium Declaration, which states, ?Success in meeting these objectives [of poverty reduction] depends, inter alia, on good governance within each country.? 7 This section analyses the impact of globalization on democracy and democratic processes in South Asia. As Held et al. observed, ?[g]lobalization is not an end state, or a single thing, any more than is democracy or industrialization. These are processes involving changing relations of human affairs.? 8 In a similar vein this study observes that the role and function democracy has changed in the face of neo-liberal globalization, creating a democratic deficit in South Asia at level of the state. The democratic deficit 9 challenges the legitimacy of the established governing structures and leads to civic dissent and militancy, which in turn create a sense of insecurity among political power holders. Ironically, states which are currently in large part not receptive to the good ideas of the GRCs, that insecurity is simply compounded by the concepts of governance imposed by the IFIs to enhance governments? political legitimacy, responsible governance and social equity. 10 The concept of good governance demands transparency, accountability and responsibility in governance and policy formulation, aspects which are currently non-functional South Asian regimes. This study observes that governance procedures of Asia at the state level are dominated by ?[u]nsophisticated political institutions and procedures, weak governmental capacity, a strict 7 <htp:/w.unorg/mileniu/declartion/ares52.htm> (acesd 3Mar 206). 8 David Hel ad P Hrst ?Globiz ft 1Spebr:Thargumentofurtime? (20)2ODecay(i) <w.glblnviso.g/liy/6528> (csd7Nov 7. 9 Thetrm ?orti efict? as firt coied yBil Newtn Du toindate h lack f docaywithn stuonlmehnsfthEuropaUi.Se MRDimtrisnd Crsu Decray ih Eurp Uin 20 (I Trs Cpy, Lo, New Yk, 20)2?17 fodsci ofdocratdefictneltionth EU.hrschou exploresth orignture fcrati efi ifs w arlexlantry ts. Th fi edclig siniae fhprlmtarylglaturit ntio gvenig rcs,ws futowr bingtrsfd ohe stces ofgvrmthEU. Seond ith iha ruesth docratifiof hEUi edus d ot absfaconstnlmcaistha nswe suumanrhts, lgilative rpti d plit rsponbly.SlChritpe Cobz?TDcrti Defict in the EurpeU: MuhAd ut Notig?? (203)4Erpe ion Plits 10?120. 10 SCat 3of thisty alsJeanGruelDocratizn:ArtcaIrodutin (Palgrv Mcmilan,Lon,201). 220 hierarchical relationship between the state and citizens/civil society, and especially the propensity of ruling parties in these countries to crave popular support without unsettling the status quo?? and that these are all impediments to effective implementation of good governance. 11 The inability of the rulers disassociate themselves from illiberal governing practices compounds the democratic deficit in the region and undermines development and the realization of human rights. The democratic deficit manifests itself in several ways and the following paragraphs trace some of its manifestations in South Asia. 4.2.1 Disenchantment with the Offerings of Democracy in the Hunger for the Good Life The post-independence political leaders of South Asia had a clear vision of the core and the content of development. Their idea of development was to create a people-centred concept, which aimed at ending the many impediments people were compelled to endure as a consequence of colonial occupation. Nehru?s articulation of development at independence was a common aspiration of almost all the political leaders of the region: 12 ?What is the Dvelopment of aNtion? You can use it in the limited but importansof raising thstadrs ftheple, btterlivgconitios, the crie lif, tc., bing poviddr ll th pole ?Obvioly we wat to devlopn the terial lane; w ant touildasiety herit is opn to ery prso to lead wht might b clle the Gd Life.? As this study identifies, four decades later poor policy choices by national governments, reacting to global forces over which individual countries at least seemed to have little control, have exacerbated the pervasive poverty in South Asia and resulted in a denial of economic, social and cultural rights for people. 13 In fact, the search for Nehru?s ?good life? has gone awry and as a result: 14 11 Habi Zafrulah ?Globalizton,stae nd politcs inBagldesh: Implicatons fr democrati governce? (203)6 Jur fSuhAsiaSude283?296. 12 Exptsfrom specdelivrd byPt Jwhrl Nru,Pri Mister fIi, the Cyl Aiatnfor th Aancemt ofcin, 15Oct 1962 <ht:/w.sf.lk/sa/pulits/Se Jue20.pdf>(acesd 16Sp 205). 13 ?Poverty iSut i 206: Cvl ityCrs? tp:/.sape.org.n/resorces/publcaons/pvty_reot06/povrty_eort6.htm> (acsd 5Dc 206) 14 MNVenkthli?Thr a sm thigs fetral rit? (2) 17Frntlie <htp:/w.flonet.om/fl1704/03.t> (csed 10Feb 08. 221 Today we hav the dismal situation ofa scial infrastructure whre 670 million peleinthiscountryon't hvebicnitary ilitie, and2illiodo't hv table ter. Frty pr ct f the wold's tubrlosis patients are in India, 25 pert f thewld'slindarinIdia. Fifty pe ct of thwld's illiterates inIndia. ifty er nt of th rld's lerosyaflictedrein Idia. ?Th thristh issuofthrmuscouption inub lif, lectoral mlprctices, tyray alth, d the inleefthrity. Thy v ll ade th lif ofthecmn onfisnhatmt with e institutionsof democracy. These conditions are mirrored in other parts of the subcontinent as well. The inevitable corollary of neo-liberal globalization was the reduction in the role of the state in economic governance, creating a greater dependency on market forces to regulate the economy 15 This development resulted in a system of economic discrimination particularly in respect of land, employment and capital, and aroused discontentment among the economically marginalized segments of society. As reiterated in Chapter 3, there is a steady decline of delivery of public services throughout the region. Poor resource allocation for health and education by the government accentuates social fragmentation. Incidents of violence against women and children, such as dowry deaths, female infanticide, foeticide and the selling of children have intensified and are largely caused by economic deprivation. 16 The situation implies that the South Asian Parliaments and the executive organs have abdicated the constitutionally defined and allocated responsibilities of addressing issues of public welfare and at the same time overstepped constitutional limits on their proper powers. The result is not only the breakdown of governance but the denial of human rights often guaranteed through the Constitutions. The absence of proper fora and means to address governmental inaction contributes to the discontentment of the people, prompting them to resort to extra- legal means voice their concerns and challenge the governmental apathy and abuse. There is also a disturbing trend of people seeking redress through militancy, which creates enormous social and political repercussions including violent reaction by the governments, exacerbating the crisis of legitimacy of 15 This apect has ben labortedinChapter 3of this tudy. 16 VSvWr:Pivz, Poluin,aProfi(Suth End Pres, 20) and Jyanti Ptel ?Indi: Gujt rits -cmuizt fste n cvi society?<htp:/w.mukto- moa.c/hman_gh/ujart/gjra_pl.hm>(ae25 Ju 6). 222 governance in the region. 17 South Asia has seen many conflicts arising through people?s sense of desperation and insecurity and these have expanded into conflicts of caste, religion, race region, all of which are rooted in poverty and destitution. 18 State response to civil dissent is often brutal, and legal measures? such as India?s Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) 2002, 19 apparently inspired by the anti-terrorism laws of the USA and Britain; 20 the much earlier Sri Lankan Prevention of Terrorism Act 1979; Bangladesh?s Suppression of Terrorist Offences Act 1992; Nepal's Terrorism Ordinance of November 2001; and Pakistan?s Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002 21 ? permit the concentration of power in the hands of the executive, rendering civil and political rights vulnerable to abuse by the state. 22 Such legislation also curtails the transparency and the accountability of the government regarding issues relating to terrorism and national security, which are traditionally regarded as secretive. 4.2.2 A History of Dysfunctional Organs and Failing States Colonization brought the Western structures of governance to South Asia replacing what were feudal structures of monarchical rule. Despite being home to the world?s largest democracy (India) and having two of the developing world?s oldest democracies (India and Sri Lanka), the region?s general commitment to democratic governance is low. 23 The governing structures of the South Asian countries are a curious blend of democracy founded on federalism, 17 Se Richard Flk ?RespondigtoSevr Violatins? iJorge I.Dominguez tal. (eds) Enhag GlobHuma hs (McGaw-H, NewYk,197)205, 6. 18 tlyJerja TbiLevlin Crds:Ethtinalist Cflictsd Colctiv Violenc iSou Asi (Universty ofCaforPe, alifor, 6);NArunalke,SJaysuradS Kelgam?hEcoicst th WarinS Lk?(201 9Wo Dvlpment 1483? 150. 19 htp:/w.satp.rg/satporgt/countries/di/ocument/acdrinaces/POTA.ht (acesd 9Feb 28) 20 BjornHetn ?South Asi d th ar ginst ris? iRvir Kur (d) Religon, Vilc adPlitcalMblaionSouthAa(Sge Publcatons,Idia,205. 21 <htp:/w.sp.rg/stprgt/ctries/rilk/dom/rnc/prvtion_of_t eroism.t> (ed 9Fe 207). 22 Radk CoarswmyandCharmin dlos Reys ?ule byergy: Sri Lank's pstclnialctiuol xpice? (204)IntrationJrnal ofCnstuolw27? 295. 23 Idi, Sri Lka, Pistan d Bangldsh ave structres frml decrati gvernace but wth fentdegrof plitclofict.NplndMalivhauthoinrims respctivly wh tesgi vl soity gito fr docry. Bt, fol monar,israuly abrnfeaturf emcry.Fe inteWrld207. <ht:/.fedomhs.o/tmpl.c?pa=36&ar=207> (acse 1Feb208). 223 secularism and socialism, coupled with authoritarian rule, military dictatorships and monarchical rule that indicates strong leanings towards religious governance based on Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism. 24 In a region where cultural, religious, caste and race specificities play a pivotal role in politics, Western democracy and its accompanying political institutions have been synthesized with the sociocultural idiosyncrasies with a peculiar sense of functionalism. Political rulers are traditionally regarded with awe and reverence in the subcontinent. 25 The prevalent political culture seemingly bestows upon the leaders an undisputed authority to rule. The ideas of limited and responsible government have neither penetrated sufficiently into the political fabric of these societies nor they been internalized by the people they govern. Therefore, abuse of power in whatever form is the norm rather than the exception. ?People may grumble in private about autocratic leaders but they still defer to them and often vote them back into power or acquiesce in their perpetuity.? 26 In this context, an attempt to apply a Lockian articulation of the role and the purpose of government that gains legitimacy through the consent people in order to protect the rights of the people and promote the public good is essentially inapplicable. The governments in South Asia are highly centralized, despite the federal structures within some states. Appurtenances of democracy ? notably universal franchise and periodic elections, which were part and parcel of the colonial legacy, play a large yet empty part in civic life. Though principles democracy and democratic institutions are enshrined prominently in the constitutions of all 24 Pakistn, Maldives and Bgladeshar Islamic stae tha tend tomanipulate rligous fervou forplcltg.Nep i Hinute ndBurSriLk?s Bdhst majity wild it ifuc. Isu rltorlgiositl w scueiCr2f hs. Se alsAyeshaJlDmocay d AthraisinothAia: optivend Hitoricl Prptive (CbrieUnivesiy, 195). 25 uHsonIsid th T Worl:TeAtmy fPverty (Vikng Prs, 193). Plitaldynati trgionarcmn phoen.Sucsmebinthesam fm sch ka? But fily, tNru-Gadhi fail nIdia, t Bnries ofSri Lkhvebned twr.Dsptehir poltclpilopi bsed o libeal dcytemrs ofth proine politcl filser agne thaty havihrit lgiat igtigvacre.Bnazr ut?swil ig r sn CanofPksnPepl? Party is mifstai ofthblif: <tp:/ews.bc.u/2hi/out_si/716498.t> (cd10 Fe 208.) Simlary Rahul Gadhi t frt gerat nter to Indiapolit. RjivDsai,thfore Mdi AvsroIndiaGndi, cmd,?Thres ben [othr] ngl ily ths lve tir lie f ts btrc thle th ati ?Ithikwa eypret sacrif.Tha's thrcarimeiriga.? <p:/new.ano.a/CNEWS/orld/204/51/4613-p.html> (aced 2Feb 05). 26 KCrist ?Rgi curity n Human Rights inSout Asia?195) 43PolitcalStudies (Secal Iu). 224 South Asian states, functional democracy is absent in the region. The facade of democracy is maintained through intervallic elections where people exercise their voting rights but have little influence on direction and formulation of policy, nor have any power to initiate proactive reforms. Despite claims multiparty democracy, political parties rarely contest elections on genuine policy issues as votes are often cast on the basis of religion, caste and ethnicity. Elections are usually based on political rhetoric such as the creation of unattainable utopias like J.R. Jayawardene?s quest to create a dharmishta samajaya (?just society?) in 1977 in Sri Lanka, Indira Gandhi?s gharibo hato (?remove poverty?) in the 1976 general election, or Vijaypayee?s ?India shining? campaign in 2003, rather than comprehensive policy formulation. The function and the role of the legislature as an organ of democratic government is also dysfunctional and perverted. 27 There exists a disturbing culture of an absence of political party loyalty and a lack of conviction of principles within elected Members of Parliament, which create potential defectors who contribute adversely to the insecurity of the governments in South Asia. In many countries the Cabinet is oversized, as Cabinet office is created not on a needs basis but as a reward for political support. 28 This political culture, deriving from a lack of vision and commitment within political parties and the opportunistic way in which Members of Parliament design their agendas, undermines functional democracy. Kamal draws a realistic picture of the legislative incapacity of the Parliaments in South Asia when he says, ?parliaments in reality are much less powerful than other organs of the government. People often take it as a ?house of controversy and irrelevant speeches?.? 29 There is little confidence in the elected organ of the government to influence policy decisions or represent civil society?s will. 27 Sumit Ganguly ?India's MultipeRvolutins?, Aqil Sha ?Democray onHld inPakistn?, HowrdBSchferBcknd Forth inBagldendNilVt?Iliberasm Ehic Cnflit ri L?, litsy?Sth sia Fces t Futr? (20) 13Jourlof Decray;Kam?Deraizt povrtylviaoniSothAsi?Ppe sentd at South Asin Regionl Wokshp onDemcr nd Prty: AMsing Lk? Kathu, Npl,10-pr20. 28 JCWeiau Psit aer ga Cbiets, Trasprenc Iteratiol Sri Lnka. < ht:/w.tsrilank.org/-liby/pers/pon-paper-onmga-bns-in-l>(30Jan 207). 29 AmedKl Acutale Govrnac Demcray Foru 20. South Asia Chpter 2The orkshp ashedin Khmdu, Nepl10, Apil,20(Centrfrdeon Dmocay an Govr)s ls Rh Sobhn?Sth sia? cis igvrc:vidng flselutins? iaijHaq() Tut sialg(OxforUnisity Pres, Oxfr, 20). 225 As Ghai observes, ?[t]he inherent tendency of economic globalization is to diminish democracy and to privilege market-oriented rights, reducing the importance and feasibility of social and solidarity rights.? 30 Therefore, with consolidation of economic globalization in the region and the IFIs undermining internal sovereignty, representative institutions in South Asia have gradually transformed into empty shells that exist for political convenience rather than for responsible governance. 31 The illiberal democracy, ineffectual representation, weak central governments and ineffective federalism which have dominated the political landscape since independence have succeeded in alienating mechanisms of constitutional governance from the people. 32 The adoption of elaborate constitutional structures, but the total rejection of ?the classical notion of constitutionalism?, which Oketh-Ogendo describes in the African perspective, is also relevant in a South Asian context. 33 Internalization of democracy in the region is uneven. Bhutan?s historical isolation and the resulting lack of influence by Western liberal political ideology meant that political power was vested in the traditional monarchy, which has overwhelming public support within the kingdom. The governing structure in Bhutan consists of the Tshogdu National Assembly, which is regarded as the antecedent to an elected legislative body. 34 The ruling monarch, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, who is regarded as a political reformer, has completed a draft Constitution. 35 However, political change is slow in a nation where Rutland, commenting on the efficacy of swift political changes, observes: ?[t]he grass-roots rural society is profoundly traditional, and religion too is deep-seated in the minds of the people. It is not 30 Yash Gai ?Human Rights andSocial Devlopment Toward Democratizon ad Social Jutice?UNDeocry,GoverendHua RighsPg Ppe Number5Otber 201; s ls , Yash i ?its, il jsticd lbliztniEstAi? J BundD Bl(d)ThEast AnChalgforn its(Carde UvryPrs,Carig, 9. 31 Reman Sob ?How Bd Gvernace Impdes Poverty Aliaton iBangldesh? (OE DvlpetCntreWrkingPps 143,OECDlpmnt er,198). 32 Ni Va i La's olitldy: Analysig th Ocb 20 Dcmbr 201 parlntrylcto? (203)4Coweth dCoartivPolitcs5?14. 33 HWO keh-gend?Cnstiuns ithu ostiunls: Refn oan African PolitclPardx? iIsa GShvj (ed)SantiimA riebto demry. SoutAfrcPolitcalEomy eris (Sher frca Pritg &Pul. Huse 19) 65?82. 34 ThirMath ?litl Refr inBhutan: Cag ina Budhist Monarchy? (19) 3Asian Suvey 613?632. 35 ?Btn olds econd 'fak' pol?<tp:/ews.bc.ok/2i/sot_si/69730.stm> (acs7Nv207). 226 surprising that development creates tensions between innovation and tradition ??. 36 In this context, many analysts believe that the slow but steady transformation to democratic governance will be beneficial to Bhutan. If a consensus on democracy is reached within the regional association, as advocated in Chapter 6 of this study, it is unlikely that Bhutan will attempt to sabotage such a development. The political experience of Sri Lanka provides an excellent example of continued ostensible commitment to structures of democratic governance which does not ensure peace and stability. Apart from the Westminster-styled constitutional structure that Sri Lanka inherited as a colonial legacy, Sri Lanka experimented with two other Constitutions, the last being a Gaullist-styled Presidential Constitution in 1978 37 which was designed to consolidate executive power. Liberal constitutionalism, supposedly was expressed through each of the Constitutions of Sri Lanka, is designed to safeguard the interests of the multi- ethnic state. However, the actual manifestation of Constitution is the consolidation of ethnic-based politics to the extent that the mainstream has criminalized the articulation of political rights based on ethnicity, which resulted in the further alienation the ethnic minorities, who resorted to violence in order obtain political power. 38 Subsequent attempts to introduce federalism through the constitutional structure did not resolve the political and economic insecurities of minorities but in fact accentuated them. 39 Today, Sri Lanka has an elaborate constitutional mechanism that holds together a malfunctioning system of democratic governance. Unprecedented corruption is rampant in all spheres political life and governance is increasingly violent. 40 Despite the 36 MRutland ?Bhutan: from the diaevl tohe milniu? 19 Asian fairs 284?294. 37 AJWisoThe GlisSyn As:TCstofSriLk1978 (Mcmilan, Lond, 1980). 38 Jeyartnmilson The Brak-up ofSri Lank: Tail-nhales Conflict (C. Hurst &Co, ); A.JeyartmWilsnm Ntoim(. urso.Pblisher Lond,19NDv Ctr Decry, Istiul Dcy, dtheQt fr Eeam: Explaig Ethnic oflictn SiLak (20)73PacfiAfairs5?76. 39 FrcesSwart&MeghaO'ulivn?eory, Conlt n vlopnt -Thr Cse? (Wokin Ppes qps15, Qe Ezbth HuseUiversiyofOxrd). <htp:/3.h.oxc.uk/RPc/q/wp/qp15.df> (aces12Feb 08). 40 AJeyartm Wilsn Th Brak-up ofSri Lank: Tamil-Snhl Cnflict (C.Hurst&o, Lond 198);RadComsydChre os Rys?uymgency:Sri ak'spotclil cstiunl exriec?, (204)Itratil Joral ofstial w 27?5; NeDVa,. ?Iibalsm nEtic Cnflc SriLnk?ith ud ?outh AsiFes thFutr? (20)13 JourofDoray8?98. 227 dysfunctionalism that is inherent in the constitutional apparatus, Sri Lanka has, however, indicated an enduring commitment to the processes of democracy. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh 41 have had a tenuous relationship with democracy since independence. 42 Periodic intervention by the military in democratic governance has not assisted the consolidation of democratic values within the civil society. Ethnic violence, which negatively impacts on democratic governance, has become common in Bangladesh in recent years and most commentators agree that such violence is carried out with the tacit consent of the ruling party. During the 2001 communal riots against Hindus, ?[t]he deliberate inaction of the state, and in some instances, active connivance with the attackers, also [made] it an instance of state sponsored violence?. 43 The sporadic interruptions of the democratic order by the military have contributed to the institutionalization of violence within structures of the governments of both Pakistan and Bangladesh. The last military coup in Pakistan was justified as putting an end to the corrupt and non-effective government of Navaz Sharrif. As Mallik observes, ?[t]his was rooted in a pervasive abhorrence for Sharif?s second administration itself established in February 1997 following a massive electoral mandate. The optimistic view of the military takeover was premised on the drifting nature of Sharif?s administration, lacking political stability, contrasted with unlimited desire to amass power and wealth?. 44 When the Supreme Court validated the coup on the premise of ?necessity?, it created a precedent whereby legitimately elected governments can be replaced through unconstitutional means if they subvert democracy and the rule of law. Though Musharaff?s promise to reintroduce legitimacy in governance and consolidate a constitutionally accepted system of government which is accountable and transparent appears to have provided sufficient legitimacy for the Supreme Court to uphold the legality of the coup, such precedents will undoubtedly create problems for democratic governance in the region, for they legitimize the 41 Bangldesh a d emocratilyelctd governmts ince arly 19. Se Habi Zafrulah ?Globizton,tnpls nBash:Iplicaofdmocratigovrnce?(203) 26 Jurl fSu Asia Studie283?96. 42 ASha?DemcryoHl Pkistn?20 13Jurnl OfDery 67?75. 43 li Rz God Wilng: Thoitc fIlam iBagldesh(Rowan &Litlefild,Lanhm, Mryn,204). 44 Iftikhar H.Malik iltary ?Cup InPkistn: usin AsUul rmocray O Hold?? (201)360 Te RoundTble357?. 228 unconstitutional gain of political power. Moreover, despite parliamentary elections in 2002, which reinitiated the democratic process, the army still continues to be the dominant influence on Pakistan?s political sphere, an influence which, according to Ziring, will be an enduring feature of Pakistani politics despite the setback suffered by Musharaff in the recent elections. 45 Furthermore, the situation in Pakistan has become more complex since 9/11/2001, where radical Islam has become a political force that challenges the fragile mainstream liberal ethos of South Asian governance. The overwhelming support of the USA towards Musharaff?s government as a means of quelling radical Islamic activism in the region is viewed with scepticism by many who opine that the USA should do opposite and pressurize Musharaff to consolidate and expand democracy, as ?[d]emocratic reform that allows secular politicians to compete freely for power is more likely to reduce the influence of radical Islamists.? 46 Nepal?s democratic structures of governance have been experiencing a legitimacy crisis for the past decade as the country grapples with the Maoist rebels, who are waging a ?People?s War?; 47 an array of ineffectual political parties; and a monarch who has become increasingly authoritarian as a result of his impotency to deal effectively with the crisis of governance. 48 King Gyanendra has declared a state of emergency twice since he assumed the throne in 2001 and there have been severe restrictions placed on civil and political rights. 49 The popular uprisings against the monarch in April 2006, in Kathmandu and in other main cities, resulted in his reinstating the House of Representatives Nepal, who have drafted a constitution heralding the end monarchical rule and control in 45 Lawrenc Zirng Pakistn: AtheCroscurent ofHistry (One World, Oxford, 203). Se also ?Pkistpoltlturmolus? <tp:/di.c.m/207/RLD/asipcf/917/ p.is.p/idex.tl>17S 207 (ased Nv ); Frhn Ali ? Pst- Musharf Paktn Plcy? WashingtoPstMrh 7,8 <t:/w.shigtot.o/wp-dy/cnet/icl/20/307/A20837023.html> (cesd 8r 208). 46 HuainqaniPkistan: Betn osqu ad iltary (Carnegi Endowment for Intrtol ec, hgo, 205);elStephnPilp ohT IaPkistan (BkigsItiuores, Wshigt, 204). 47 Jh Wlpn AHityfNepal (CmbridgUivrsity res, abridge, 205). 48 Ibid. 49 Marty Loga ?Nepal: D urfw Fols Politcal Arst? <hp:/w.isnw.t/nes.ap?idne=31845>(ed12Dec 06) 229 Nepal. 50 Against this background of political turmoil and democratic dysfunction, 2005 saw a curious development with regard to India?s view on democracy. India, which by far has the most stable democracy, appears to be taking on a lead role to foster democracy in region. It increasingly that India is conscious of the lack of South Asia and the political and security implications being surrounded by failed states. It is with an ambitious agenda that India?s Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, declared that: 51 India would like th whole f South Asia toemrge as comunity of florishingdmocraies. Weblieveat docaywouldprvide are e an b-d funatio fr neific fpc nd rtio in our sb-ctinet,? ut hdtht ris?sethingtht wy ncg ad prote; it is not smeing that w can imo up oers. These sentiments of democratic consolidation were again reiterated by the Indian Prime Minister when he addressed the UN General Assembly in September 2004. He was disdainful of the US policy on South Asia, particularly the political alliance with Pakistan?s military government, and observed, ?[w]e choose to overlook the absence of democracy in too many cases for reasons of political expediency.? 52 India?s stance on regional democracy was further highlighted when India decided not to attend the SAARC summit scheduled for February 2005, in Dhaka, due the political situation in Nepal, and repeatedly requested the King of Nepal not to assume absolute powers, postpone elections nor sideline political parties that demanded a return to democratic pluralism. 53 It was deemed by the Indian government that India?s participation at the summit meeting with King Gyanendra would imply India condoned political situation in Nepal. The King, in turn, was keen to represent Nepal at the regional summit for it would have enhanced his legitimacy as the ruler of mountain kingdom. While the media criticized India?s decision to withdraw from the summit, the 50 Michael Hut ?A Nepalse Triangle:Monarchy, aoist And Politcal Prties? (207) 38Asian Afrs12?22 51 Foign Scretay Mr. Shym r?s pe ?Indi itsNeighbours ath India InteratlCn(IC) ewDlhi14Fbruay,205 <hp:/w.idbas.org/pes_rls//Feb/3.htm.>(acsd 12Dec 06). 52 Adrs byDr. hn Si, Pie Mintr ofIndi, te 59thSsionfthUnited NationGealAsemly,23tmbr,Nw Yk. hp:/.indbas.org/p/_usp_2304ht (acsd 12ec 06). 53 J Chr ? suit ntule? 205 Fronlie12?5. t:/w.fotlie.c/f4/stories/5630.htm (asd Nov 206) 230 decision indicated that India was reluctant to be identified as a passive observer of the political situation in Nepal. India?s role as the democratic ?watchdog? South Asia was confirmed when the King assured Prime Minister Singh during during the SAARC Summit in November 2005, that he would hold elections in Nepal by April 2007. 54 He repeated this undertaking to the plenary session. 55 As the above analysis indicates, the operation of democracy and its effects are not uniform in the region. The countries appear to be incapable of adhering to standards of democracy, yet the governing machinery continues to be manipulated for political expediency rather than being abandoned altogether. As much as the rapid phase of contemporary globalization has underlined the need for a viable mechanism to address and adjudicate violations or threatened violations of rights that occur as a direct consequence of the globalization process, a common standard of democratic governance and means to deal with democratic lapses on a regional scale is urgently required. The absence of such mechanisms has enabled national governments in the region to ignore the insecurities of the people, and by turns exploit the governing machinery for personal aggrandizement and/or cave in to global forces by imposing neo-liberal policy changes that intensify social and political discontent. 4.2.3 Political Insecurity of a Heterogeneous People The contribution of the political map of South Asia ? consisting of territorial units that were carved out of the British Raj in the middle of the last century ? to the present political volatility South Asia has been discussed before. 56 Along with practical problems of state demarcation, the ideological barriers resulting from the colonization era and the elitist sociopolitical dynamics, South Asia also inherited an extreme sensitivity to issues such as ?unity?, ?security? and 54 ?Singh tels Npal king torestrdemocray? Sujoy Dhar (IANS) Dak,13ovmber205 <tp:/w.industis.c/nws/18_54819,03190.htm.> (acesd 12Nov 206). Thes lc wre poted a re schdule tobe ld inerly208. 55 AdrfroHisMajstyGarBikam SahDv,Kgof Np, thTirtenth Sumit t ed ofS rvnt oftt Asia sciatforRegoal Cooperan(SARC) Dhk Pl?s public fBangldesh 12Nvebr, 205 <htp:/w.src- sc.rg/i.h?id=168&t7.1> (cd Dc6). 56 Se Capter 2an Urmil Phisan RjatGnguly Etnicty and Ntion-Buildng iSouth Asi( Publictos, Lndo, 20). 231 ?territorial integrity?. 57 The extreme preoccupation with these concepts by majority and minority communities in South Asia is regarded as a natural corollary of colonization according to Rajan Phillips, who observes: ?[i]deas of nationalism and nationalist ideologies implanted during the colonial encounter have sunk roots in South Asia ? generating, if not ersatz, certainly hybrid versions of nationalism.? 58 It is claimed that ?South Asia presents as different political order and power structures as one seldom finds in any other geo-political region of the world?. 59 This uniqueness stems from the region?s religious, lingual, caste and ethnic heterogeneity, which was never formally accommodated within the governing structures of South Asia. 60 The sense of dislocation and the alienation felt by different ethnic groups through the failure to accommodate diverse identities within the state structures has contributed violent uprisings against the state in India, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Nepal. 61 Saravanamuttu observes that ?problems of governance in South Asia stem in large measure from the failure to acknowledge the pluralism inherent society through political and constitutional structures and propagation of this value in the political culture. This gives rise to and sustains a crisis of legitimacy of the state.? 62 Issues of ethnicity dominate the national political discourse in India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but nowhere is the state presented as a neutral entity that addresses the grievances of the plural society it seeks to govern. Manipulation of the ethnic diversity for political gain is common. 63 There is evidence tacit complicity by the 57 PSahdevan ?Ethic Conflict AndMiltarism InSouth Asia? Kroc Instiue Ocasionl Paper #16:O:4 (JoB.KrIsuefor IenolPeacde,UiveryofNtre Dm,Jun 9). 58 RajnPhilps ?Nationlism, Slf Dtriatn Sri Lank Ethnic Grups inSri Lak: Globl Caengd taCris? Rj Philps(ed)(cumealIstiefotudyn Digud Socilies AocatinofSrLk, Colb 201). 59 ajn Mh?T aturfSuh s egin: Asnat fints,Disnat Diversit? in Kusik an d Rmpnt (eds) Inia d South si (South Asia Publisher, Nw lhi, 19)24-25. 60 ay Ch Builg Docry it Asia: Indi, Nepl, kistn (Ly Rienr Publiser,Lond20). 61 S ptr abve and ls Stanle J.Tmbih ?Prsitial Adres: flectios omalVilciSouthAi? (190) 4eJounl ofsnStui741?760. 62 Pkiysoth Srm ?Plurlis,Dcray dGverc oth Asia: The cas of SrLn? iRaesh Takrnd Ony Wign (s)Sth sia theWrld(UNPr, To, 204), loSwRajgopalSte NionSouAsia (Lno, Lyn RierBoldrCrd, 201). 63 SWD anaike?sinhles-nly lic n1956 ad Iira Gndhi?s plitcal stce i Punjab,Asm Kmr t 970sarexmples. 232 governments, in situations such as the incidents relating to ethnic genocide in Sri Lanka in 1983 and the Gujarati riots of 2003. 64 The result of this legacy of political cataclysm is a culture of loose constitutional governance often by the elite with intermittent exceptions of military rule or civilian dictatorships. 65 The political elite?s allegiance in the past to the colonial rulers and now to the neo-liberal ideology espoused by West and IFIs is evident through region. The manifestation of such allegiance is the wariness of the politicians of civil and political rights, such as freedom of expression, thought and assembly. The manipulation of national security laws to render the exercise of these rights meaningless, the detention of political dissidents without trial and the subversion of the rule of law are common in South Asia despite constitutional provisions guaranteeing human rights. 66 The essential character of a democratic state is that it represents the majority view of its people, though safeguards exist against the abuse of power from a majoritarian thrust. However, in the context of heterogeneous South Asia, often the exercise of democracy results precisely in a tyranny by an ethnic or religious- based majority. 67 Recent elections in the region give evidence of this dangerous development of a tyranny by a majority. With the new threats and insecurities created by economic globalization, the ethnic and religious-based majority in the electorate responds to the new threats through circumventing the existing traditional safeguards for protection of human rights of the minorities. 68 The enactment of legislation that circumscribes religious rights, provision of state patronage to a particular religious/ethnic sector, the resolution of issues not through unbiased constitutional terms but through taking on board the concerns of 64 Nelan Thirucelvam ?Devolutinad Ilusive Qust for Peac inSri Lank iAaron Tsado G,Sml G.Egwu(ds). FerlismnAfrcaFmingthQuestoVl1(ficWrl Prs Ic, Asr, rit203 97-30; Upd Bx, ?T d Gujrt Ctsrphe? (20)EonicanPolitcalWkly,519?31,< htp:/w.s.et/ujr/index.htl> (aces 10Feb 208). 65 Sugat B d ysh Jl Mor SouAi: Hitory,Cultre,Politcal Eonmy (Roled,Lon203). 66 Vit Mtabhr ?Asia Human Rights and the Nw Milenim Ti fr Regial Huan ghsCre?198TrtiolLwCotmporay Probles841. 67 ajoitn politcs inS k s ctribud thcti fone fth most edrig rmed surgouthsia.SeAJeyatnWilsn ThBrak-upSriLank:Taml- Sinhlflit (C. Hr &Co, 198); rat ilo Si L Tl Ntiis (C. Hrst &o.Publise,19). 68 Mayhad Bdng Dmcray inSouth Asi: Indi, Nepal, Pkistan (ye Riner Publiser, ler,lora,20). 233 the majority, and policy formulation that is biased towards the majorities are the manifestation of these insecurities. 69 4.2.4 Challenges to the Legitimacy to Govern It is easy to draw a comparison between the sociopolitical repercussions of neo- liberal globalization in South Asia today and Dani Rodrik?s analysis the financial crisis encountered by the developing world in the 1970s. Rodrik argues that the 1970s crisis was precipitated by the weak abilities of the domestic structures to weather the cataclysms of world markets in era of import substitution industrialization. It is Rodrik?s diagnosis that the absence of ?complementary institutions at home ?in areas of governance, judiciary, civil and political liberties, social insurance, and ? education? exacerbated the social cost of the economic downturn. 70 The inhabitants of every state have minimum expectations of their state and government. These are legitimate expectations, which constitute ?the irreducible duties of any ruling apparatus to its subjects, such that a failure to discharge these vitiates the legitimacy of the regime's assertion of authority.? 71 In South Asia globalization and its many demands have rendered the governmental apparatus dysfunctional by failing to realise the minimal expectations of its people. As Jack Donnelly observes, ?[t]he link between a regime's ability to foster development (prosperity) and the public's perception of the legitimacy is close to a universal, cross-cultural political law. Whatever a ruling regime's sociological and ideological bases, its sustained or severe inability to deliver prosperity, however that may be understood locally, typically leads a serious political challenge.? 72 Across South Asia governments have fallen victim to this dilemma. 69 Rita Mnchad ?Cris ofMinrityRights inSouth Asia? (206) South Asian Joural <hp:/w.soutanmeda./aze/jral/13_cr-ofminriy.m>(cesd10 Jan 207). 70 Danidrik ?Glblizto, Scil Conflict nd Eoni Growth? (198) 21Th Worl Ecomy 43?158. 71 BrRothvernmtal Iegitmay iIteratil La (Oxfrd University Pres, Oxfrd, NewYk, 20) 1. 72 Jac Dnely?Hu Rihts, Docr nd Dvelopment? (19) 21Human Rights Qurtly68?3, 609. 234 In South Asia, the political processes, electoral mechanisms, adjudication procedures and welfare systems have not matured with the speed of the liberalization of the economy, the repercussion being that benefits have not percolated to people. Implementation of SAPs resulted in the creation of a chain of accountability extending upwards from government upwards towards the IFIs resulting in a dysfunctional relationship between the state and society. Policy formulation is based on the will of the IFIs and TNCs rather than on the needs of the people. The consequence this dynamic was a breakdown of democratic process and the alienation of the people from the government?s policy formulation, which contributed to a loss legitimacy in governing process. The inadequate structures of governance have also failed to locate an economic growth agenda within the desired human-centred context. A lack of a policy formulation capacity and absence of publicconscious policies indicate that the national policy makers are hostages the IFIs? conditionalities. The result has been an ?erosion of national sovereignty and [the contraction of] the ability of governments and people to make choices from options in economic, social and cultural policies.? 73 For example, despite the obvious disadvantages the financial hardships to the poor, the World Bank?s Water and Sanitation Programme South Asia is continuing its schemes of privatizing water provision to the region. 74 ?The proposal is to replace community rights and the common good with individual rights and the private interest. Under conditions of inequality, this implies that powerful individuals get exclusive access to the water commons through[the] water market. In effect, the Bank would like monopolies instead of democracy. the case of irrigation, the World Bank report states, ?Here an approach which begins with acknowledgement of and respect for the private interests of individual farmers will be far more successful than approaches which resort to command and control, or ones based on a communitarian ideal.?? 75 73 Martin Khor ?Glbalizton adtheSouth: ome Critcal Isue? Discuion Paper No. 147 (UedNtisCnfercTr andDvlpn,Gv,20) 4. 74 Llit Srar Wt: the Pivtsi bat? iIdi Togthr.gNvmbr 203. <hp:/w.idtogr.og/203/o/e-wrdet.h>(acesd 17o 7). 75 Vand hv ?Inia's tr Futr? ZNt ily Cmntri3er5 <htt:/.zma.r/uines/cnt/205-1/03siv.f. (s v 20). 235 A further example of the Indian government?s failure to formulate social policy to reflect grass-roots needs, which undermines the government?s legitimacy govern, is their failure to allocate sufficient funds for elementary education. 76 The result is that only 61 per cent of adults in India are literate compared with Sri Lanka?s 90.4 per cent. 77 In line with Sen?s 78 articulation of the capabilities approach to human development, Dreze and Sen identify education as a fundamental means of enhancing development, which has retarded in India due to injudicious policy formulation. 79 A series of public interest litigation cases, mass protests and an eventual Constitutional amendment that spanned almost a decade finally saw Constitutional recognition of compulsory free education at primary level. The misplaced allegiance to the international donor community by South Asian governments and the reliance on IFIs for policy agendas has reduced the to stooges of the multilateral and bilateral donors. One commentator observes: ?[i]n Nepal, one fthe porest countries ofthe world, devlopment policy makingis thusgvrdbytw adictorypcsth ocratic rces d thimrtiv frignaid. The first quir dvlopnt licieto b nte bythepole Nepl; thiswatheonstitutio fthe landsay. The latteris gvrnedby dmans of aid ytemasit operte domsticallydinteatiolly. The twprcsrincflict, cuing m thr cntrictios incongruitiesto ege the host ntryand agvting proedevlopt anmnt. Irt, plicies d prosaet implemte ina staind ar, sucs are ot ue efctivly and eficiently, a corutio spres.? 80 As much as there is a dependency upon external intellectual inspiration, within the government structures there is a dearth of sociopolitical aspirations, as genuine democratic representation has been stifled by the prevailing political culture. According to the UNDP Human Development Report on South Asia for 2002, more than 515 million people, 40 per cent of South Asians, have experienced a 76 Primay Education Idia -Report(Washingto, Wrld Bank, 197) and JGB Tilak ?Public Subsdeini ?(204) 39/ EcmicPolitclWekly34?359. 77 <htp:/r.p.rg/sttics/ta/cyt_fIND.htl.> (esd 5M 206). 78 Aary S Devlomen Fredom (Anor Pes,20). 79 JDezndAn Idia:Eoi Dvelptand SocialOportunity (Oxford University Prs, Nw lhi,196). 80 vraRj Pay?Mtching ocray Devlment Plicmakig a Ai- epndt Countr: n IlusraoFrm Nepl?(20) 4HardAs Qurtely1?6.(Pnday) 236 decline in their incomes over the last few years. The Report identifies that this is rooted in the ?dislocation between Government and people.? 81 The governments without exception have been unable to locate a development model that is both growth-oriented and human-centred. This scenario prompted commentators to dub the region ?the most poorly governed region? in the world. 82 A manifestation of the democratic deficit in South Asia is the inability to formulate regional/country-specific economic development strategies that reflect the needs of the people. ?This democratic deficit is widespread in local, national and global economic policy-making ? reflected in slum clearances that wantonly deprive people of housing, dams that flood houses and farms, budget allocations that favour water for middle-class suburbs rather than slums, logging that destroys the environment, oil wells that pollute fields and rivers from which people draw livelihoods.? 83 That lacuna of inspiration and drive for policy formulation and implementation is provided by the IFIs compelling the South Asian governments to function through policy agendas that are created by IFI officials who have little knowledge of, or sensitivity to, local issues. The dilemma created by this ignorance is elaborated by Panday: 84 Ostenibly, governace gnda incorpates isues and progames for enabling the ta aswll s leteivil sietyctor. Hwve, th leitimcyf the stembdimt of repntative institutios inchrf th utr's contitutionl ate sus both unts. Firt, forth state, donrsa now mre tha er pviderf aid. Thyar ?prtnes?, anutomlytake initiativsfofring thst intitutio within the rcipiet sciety. Th stitution tob formd cludenythgfomthe parliaent, th judiciary, adtheplitical prtiesat th tr to letedlol bodies inthe istrts villags. On licie, tecfajr nrs toprmote homgenisthinkdstanrd pratices, irrespctivefthetage f dvlopt of acoutry, makesthisitution mo ritical or hst institutios. 81 Mahbul Haq uman DevlopmentCtre Human Devlopment iSouth Asia 20: AgricltrendRrl (OxfodUivrsityPrs, Oxfrd, NewYork,3). 82 l lttr lt it si ; Rehman Sobhan ?SouthAsia' Weakveopen: TheRolOfGovernace? <tp:/w.ei.org/publictns/brifg/19/wakd.pf.d.> (sed 23Jun 206). 83 UNDP Hmn Dvm Rt 20 (xfr Unirsity Prs,Oxfor,NwYork,0) 8. 84 andy, aboe 80, 1. 237 Historical reasons also play a vital role in the developing countries being subservient to the prescriptions of dominant paradigm. As has been discussed in Chapter 1, generation politicians who took over political power from the colonial rulers were all educated in, and had close links to, colonial Britain. They were a generation of local elites who emulated the colonial political, economic and value systems. Kothari observes that these ruling political elites and their political and ideological links to the colonial rulers have also contributed largely to the failure to formulate a viable alternative paradigm of development. 85 As the above analysis indicates, South Asia?s political situation is at a critical juncture, which is exacerbated by the economic and social dilemmas that face the region. South Asia is unable to grapple with the challenges of population explosion, poverty and deprivation, social exclusion, rapid urbanization and environmental degradation caused by ill-conceived development ideology. With more than one fifth of the globe?s population concentrated in the subcontinent, the issue of effective governance is both a challenge and a necessity. The impact of abysmal governance is borne by the chronically poor, marginalized people who face hardships due to anti-poor policies, market-located priorities and inadequate institutions. In fact, the region can be characterized in terms of ineffective political parties, ineffectual national governments, alienated national parliaments with an impotent civil society who are unable to counteract the abhorrent policy formulation of the IFIs. 4.2.5 Inadequate Public Consultation in Policy Formulation Resulting in a Mismatch of Expectations. The principle of public participation directly or through representative democracy is an integral aspect of the Western liberal democratic tradition. With the global expansion and consolidation of liberal democracy this principle has been accepted as a prerequisite of national policy formulation and the decision-making process, for it is a true indication of the efficiency of representative democracy. 86 The 85 Rajni Kothari Poverty: HumanCosciunes ad the Amnesia ofDevlopment (Zd Boks Ltd, ndNwJse, 195). 86 The pricl s bn dicseda imprtiv ofu dlnt ith UN?s 238 following analysis illustrates the stalling of the operation of this principle in South Asia. There was no formal consultation between the people of South Asia and the policy makers about the introduction of the neo-liberal economic policy replacing the previous political dogma of import substitution industrialization. Perhaps the nearest political consultation in the context of South Asia was the Sri Lankan Elections in 1977 where the United National Party (UNP) election manifesto, A Programme of Action to Create a Just and Free Society, included a pledge to end the economic stagnation of the previous rule. 87 However, the post-election open policies failed to deliver the prosperity they promised and in turn contributed towards irresponsible governance. The dictates of the World Bank and the IMF were such that the government?s ?own? policy choices undermined the government?s legitimacy in eyes of the electorate. The SAPs also stole bargaining power people had gained through people-based movements, such as unions and cooperatives, while consolidating the corresponding power of foreign investors and international institutions. 88 Dunham and Jayasuriya provide a succinct account of the transformation: 89 Inthe 1970s, Sri Lank was idely considerd apecful and stable democray withaimpeivrecodf huma vlomnt by evlopinguntr stadrs. Tody, it is untryplagby iolesoial thnic flicts, mive n rvasivrtio, wekad inefctivgoret, ad idspracivil n hma ights aus. Dspitea risin stat, vn the econic rfocesfllenll blo xtation. Civil wr ilitaryexditurs v eclated. Plicsuort fr the gormet has wad; thr isgwingdisillusiomet with plitical ledrship aco the hole plitical spectrum an prtion ofincresing cial xlusiond inequlity. discourse ndvelopment; se UnitedNations Devlopment Progame Huan Devlopment Report 2002, ?Dpig cray ia frgmtd wrl? (Oxfrd Uivrsity Prs, Oxfrd, Nw York203) 51?6. 87 Jhn MartinRichardson, Prdise Poisne: Larnig about Cnflict, Teroism, an evlpme fo Si Lka? CvlWar (Ittlerr EhiStudeKdy, Sri Lak 205)341. 88 Didunha nd isr Jysuri ?Liberaliston ad Politcal Decay: ri Lank's Journe Fro Welfr StetoaButalied Socty? (kgper352,ORPAS-IstuefScial Stuis-P.OBx 2976 502LTh Hgu-The Ntlns tobr 201). 89 avd unhamndSisrJysuria?EnomicLibraitad ci-olitcal Dy: A Csetyof Sri Lka? <htp:/w.evstu.org.u/pblictos/pers/f01/conf01unhm..> (esd 16ug 205). 239 As a result, a vital part of national decision-making on social and economic policies had been transferred to multilateral aid organizations foreign policy institutions, which created policy without taking into account the local reality or exigencies. 90 Therefore the Washington Consensus had severe implications beyond the economic realm. In so far as that dynamic alienated the people within the state from the governing process, the effects of the policies that were implemented caused severe hardship to common people. The government failed to realize that the requirement was for an effective state and not a minimalist state as IFIs desired. Due to the minimalist approach to governance, democracy as a governing mechanism soon became dysfunctional and the survival strategies of the vulnerable began to include ethnic and religious mutinies and crime, which soon transformed into violent militancy against the state. 91 As observed by Thede, ?[w]e know that even in established democracies globalization is leading to the development and aggravation of a democratic deficit, characterised amongst other things by the erosion of legislative oversight of policy decisions at the national level ? .? 92 Therefore it is vital that public consultation processes remain active through the democratic process in the developing economies where fundamental policy changes that affect the social, political and cultural life of the people are initiated and implemented. Furthermore, the initiation of policy is often devoid of a sense of equity or fairness, which creates mistrust and resentment towards the democratic governance process. The power retained by governments for policy implementation is exercized arbitrarily and discriminatorily politicizing the liberalization measures as well as the free market ideology. In particular, policy development in relation to trade, privatization and tariffs often appeared to be arbitrary and, the words of Cuthbertson Athukorala, ?[t]he greatest policy failure was not to apply a policy of gradual (even very gradual) overall reductions to this new set of tariff-only barriers. Instead, the government fine-tuned the 90 Se gneraly Rvan der HovenadL Taylor ?Structral djustment, labour makets and mployt:Somcsiatis forensibpel? (20)36 JorfDvlopStuies 4. 91 The isu isdused ingretr dtail Chatr 3above ut als e Ghai (ed) The IMF and tSot:TheSocialIpc ofCisnAdjusment(ZdBk,Lond, 19. 92 Nancy DmrtiDvlpmet 190?2: AOriw (Itrtionl Ctr for HumRigtsndea o, 20)<htp:/w.ichr.c/english/cdoc/publicatons/demDv/dOerviw10Years.html> (acesd 8Feb 208) 240 tariffs on a discriminatory basis. It would have been much better to have taken further across-theboard measures. This was apparently judged be politically impossible.? 93 The same authors also argue that, in the case of Sri Lanka: 94 much ofthe fin tuning ?was imed at sving the monply osition ofcertain pblicrpatios, forexmple, tyr, cheicals, pr, adharmuticals? Its fgchillies nd oions grown inth Jf einslar byTmil fareswre libralis, hileadytatoesgrownproinntly Sinhle fams ein prtec. Favrd te teiss (that provided ?jobs rth boy?)wralso ket outsidethlibralistioeft, uing loated wge bills andttrcting lar fiscl trnsf.? The diminishing of governmental responsibility in relation to economic policy formulation has also affected areas such as infrastructure development and ecological planning. These reform policies have worsened interregional disparities, 95 eroded the ecological environment 96 and created a situation where previously self-sufficient economic systems have collapsed and are now dependent on external aid or debt. 97 Similarly, privatization of state-owned enterprises and other publicly owned assets, such as land and housing, which has been an integral component of neo- liberal economic reforms, has been done haphazardly. The justification for privatization has been that public ownership of assets is inefficient because it distorts incentives, hampers resource allocation and impedes innovation. In addition, it is alleged that state-owned enterprises are a drain on public resources and a source of rent-seeking and corruption. However, the evidence on the impact of privatization on efficiency has been generally unconvincing. 98 In some cases, 93 Andrew GCuthbertson ad Premachndra Athukoral, ?Liberalizng Foreign Trade: th Expicof Sri Lak?iAMCoksi, MiceyndDPprius D(s)Libralizng Forg Trad:Exprc fIe, Pst Sri k (Balckwl, Oxfod, 190)287?428. 94 Ibid. 95 RNayr Rual Poverty inIdia: nalysi ofinter-stae difrencs (Oxford University Pres, Bomb,NwYk,19). 96 Anxple isth tEpwl iOctober 20. <w.hiag.com/c20/featurs.hml#Th%Epawl%20example> (acesd 23June 205); seJonCvnh ad Jery Mndr (s) Alternatives toGlblizton (Brt-Khlr Pblishr Ic., Sa Frciso,204)12; PayLad VJha udca Aivs and eEnvoment idiImplt fTrastiol Crpotis (OcsinlPper 6UNCTAD/BS rjc). <w.bs.k/deartment/iklcbem>(ces 2Nov05). 97 Shiva, ov n16. 98 eCptr3fthistudy. 241 efficiencies can be improved without changing ownership of assets. 99 The exclusion of civil society from the decision-making process in such critical situations as disposal of public assets increases the alienation between governments and civil society, aggravating the dysfunctionality of the conventional democratic mechanisms. The above analysis highlights several manifestations of democratic deficit in South Asia. Individual countries have not been successful in overcoming the defects of the democratic processes or reinstating functional democracy. There are no swift methods of dealing with democratic lapses, as evidenced by Pakistan and Nepal. Restoration democracy is always time-consuming and has a significant social cost. Concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity, which are ardently defended by all countries in the region, and endorsed by Article 2.1 of the SAARC constituting document, 100 have prevented ad hoc assistance in instances of interruptions to democracy by other countries in the region. It is this context that this study reiterates the significance of creating a permanent mechanism that addresses issues of democratic lapses at a regional level. 4.2.6 The Embryonic Civil Society Civil society is a term that is increasingly gaining significance in relation to human rights, development and democracy both nationally and at global level. Its historical roots are attributed to Hegel?s theorizations of the concept. 101 The notion of civil society presupposes that the society is capable of organizing itself to promote its interests and aspirations through legitimate constitutional means. Varshney locates the definition of civil society ?to that space which (1) exists between the family, on the one hand, and the state, on the other, (2) makes interconnections between individuals or families possible, and (3) is independent 99 Hulya Dgdevirn ad Ben Fie?Privatzion the Asia-Pcif? Draft hematic suary on privtzion f thAsi-PcfRgonl rgamonte Mroenis ofPvert Redc,204. 100 Charte fte Sout sian Asciat fr Reil Cprati <htp:/w.sarc- s.og/min.ph?id=10&t4>(ed17Nov207). 101 Fr strcal se m Sligan,Th Idea ofivl Society (Princeto University Pes,ieo,92). 242 of the state.? 102 He further qualifies the notion with the observation that ?the civic space be organized in associations that attend to cultural, social, economic, and political needs of the citizens; and that the associations be modern and voluntaristic, not ascriptive.? 103 The effectiveness of civil society is conditional upon the political environment, for ?[c]ivil society means democratic culture, which is based on equality, justice, tolerance and pluralism and the willingness of the individual to accept divergent views. On the one hand, civil society stands for established rule of law, on the other hand it means the broad development of autonomous institutions, i.e. institutions which are not run by the state, vested interests or by donors, but which act as agents of the will of the people.? 104 The civil activism of the people in South Asia, stemming from the desperate need to garner a better deal through governance, has a long history dating back to the British Raj when Gandhi mobilized civil society in his quest for swaraj (self rule). 105 Since then peasant, tribal, Dalit, backward castes, women, students, workers? movement and many others have mobilized themselves to express dissent against the status quo. These groups have entered the political arena transcending orthodox societal distinctions and influencing the political process. Opinion is divided on the success of civil societal activism. Some claim it appears vibrant and a potent force that harbours the potential to contribute positively to socioeconomic and political transformation. In the context of India, despite the high levels of illiteracy and poverty, Sarkar observes that ?India still retains a capacity to surprise external observers: the enthusiastic participation in elections even (and often particularly) by many of poorest, for instance, or the quality of roadside conversations about politics.? 106 There is also evidence of sustained social activism in particular areas, such as public interest litigation, and local non- governmental organizations, but South Asia is still behind the point at which such activism is likely to transform into a sustained force that impacts on political 102 Ashutos Varshney ?Ethnic Coflict and Civl Society: India Beyond? (201) 53World Politc, 362?98, 36. 103 Ibd.. 104 Sim Kal?Democray nd Poverty: AMisng Lik? Democratison ad poverty alevtoni Suth Asi?persndathe Docrayfu, 20,SuthAsianRgional Wrkshp,and, Nl 10, pr 20. 105 JPS Uberi, ?O CivlSocity?iNJym On Civl Siet: Ise nd Perspctives (Se ulicatonsNwDeh, Lnd, 25) 67?89. 106 mi ark IndiaemractheHistorical Iheritanc? iAtul Kohli () Th ucs ofId?secy (brig Univry Pe,bdge,201)3. 243 outcomes, as the civil society in the classic sense is still at an embryonic stage in the region. 107 Others also observe that civil societal activism is still in varying embryonic stages and in itself is a privileged method of expressing concern and dissent in South Asia, for ?civil society [is] bourgeois society ? restricted to a small section of culturally equipped citizens [it] represents.? 108 Chaterjee views India to be an ?exclusive? state that does not regard all of its people as ?citizens?, for; ?Most of the inhabitants of India are only tenuously, and even then ambiguously and contextually, rights-bearing citizens ? They are not, therefore, proper members of civil society and are not regarded as such by the institutions of the state.? 109 To the critics such as Chaterjee, therefore, civil society in South Asia by definition is not an inclusive entity representing all of its people. Civil societal activism is not always directed against the governments alone, and South Asia has many examples of social mobilization against the discriminatory and inequitable features of the society as well as specific ideologies. 110 Presently the civil societal involvement in influencing the process of governance or policy formulation in South Asia remains marginal largely due to the absence of specific fora to express civil societal concerns. In the context of contemporary globalization, where the strength and capacity of state has diminished, civil society has the capacity to act as a critic especially in the context of challenging policy formulations relating to development. Mobilization civil society to implement evidence-based advocacy in relation to developmental projects that have an impact on traditional livelihoods, ecology and rural agriculture will be a valuable force in transforming the trajectory of contemporary development drives. 107 Pona Wignarj nd Akmal Husain The Calengs iSouth Asia Devlopment, Docray adReil Copetio(SgePblctos,Nw Dlh,198);Rn SbhadM hmtuh fvl city OrgiziIfcing T Plicyiscurs i Bngls EGMnEad Govnae fr Po-r Poles?out?ot Coperation Cob,SriLak, 9?1 De203. <htp:/un1.uorg/itrc/grups/blic/duments/UN/PA01382.pdf> (csd 27 Mar 206). 108 PtChaterj ?emoray nd the Viole ofth Stae: olitcal Negotian of Deh? (1) 2Intr-Asi CultrlSus 8?10. 109 Ibid8?10. 110 Gansym Sha ocial Movents iIndia Reviw ofthe Litratue (Sage Publicatons, New lhi, 190). 244 Quadir traces the newly emerging trend of ?regionalism from below? in South Asia which he describes as a coalescing of a plethora of civil societal organizations from the South Asian region on issues that have a particular relevance to the region, particularly alternative agendas for development and security. Quadir specifically explores the viability of establishing a ?new social order? through ?regionalism from below?. 111 However, he concedes that despite widespread support for the civil society groups in South Asia it is unlikely that they would emerge as creators of an ?alternative form of human society in the region?. 112 The regional praxis advocated in Chapter 6 of this study details specific means of harnessing civil societal concerns and views. The new regional praxis can be an effective forum to highlight regional civil societal concerns which would strengthen the ?new concept of citizenship in South Asia that transcends existing ethnic, religious, political and cultural divides?. 113 This thesis maintains that human rights, democracy and development maintains a symbiotic relationship and the above analysis indicated that poor governance and absence of a culture of democracy has contributed significantly to the entrenchment the structures of poverty in South Asia. The lack of legitimacy in the governments and the disillusionment of the people in the procedures of democracy have resulted in fostering militant tendencies within society. As much as there is a need for the creation of a normative supra national structure that honours the commitments towards human rights and equitable development strategies, there is also a call for the establishment of normative standards on democratic governance at regional level which will ensure the democratic functions are maintained nationally without jeopardizing the rights of the people. 4.3 The Opportunity for a Regional Mechanism 111 Fahimul Qadir ?Civl SocietyandIformal Regionalism inSouth Asia: The Prospect for PecndHnecurtn h Twety FistCtury? Jes JHntz,MtnB??(ds)New Critl Srity d Rgilis:Bnd h Nit (AshgaePubshgLt.,UK, 205) 13 ?126. 112 Ibid 125. 113 Ib 245 As evidenced in the previous discussion, South Asian governments are largely ineffective and lack capacity to make appropriate, viable development policy choices. There are no feasible mechanisms available either nationally or within the region to challenge poor, unviable policy decisions that are made by national governments, and very limited judicial fora are available to challenge such choices. There is no impetus nationally or regionally to promote economic policy that fosters social integration and that advocates emancipation for the millions who are trapped in the cycle of poverty. 114 There is no demand democratic structures to be reformulated so that they not only foster market integration and the promotion of the economy but create an environment that would integrate the marginalized segments of society into the mainstream developmental process. Experience has shown that none of countries in the region can realistically advocate for a fundamental change to the contemporary trajectory of globalization in isolation, even though collective efforts to challenge the course have also been only partially successful elsewhere in the world. 115 Integration into global markets necessarily implies the end of isolationism for the countries in South Asia and it is this momentum that led to the creation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Regionalization has provided effective means of promoting trade and economic cooperation between countries in Europe, Asia and in the Americas. Regional on issues such as security, peace human rights is also increasing. 116 The next few paragraphs will consider the efficacy of the SAARC as a regional mechanism and whether it can deal with exigencies that have arisen corollary of economic globalization. 4.3.1 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation ? an Inopportune Response 114 Oliver Mndelsohn, Marik Viczany The Untouchables: Subordinatio, Pverty and the Sta inodIia (CmbdgeUversitPrs,Cmridg,198). 115 Th mr sucsful xpl ofdig ti w trs fegmet wih comic glbaliztne thEan thASEN. Thesanlesucul conrpasredisuedin det apr5of tisdy. 116 Chter f tisu wilalse t sucs ofrginal ehais thr tn SARC, particulyincrengcmon tdrinrelatint democry, poltcalouabilty mn rigts ad vlpe. 246 Despite the civilizational similarities of the polities in the region, and in spite of being a geopolitical entity which shares many problems stemming both from a common colonial past and from adverse global economic conditions, South Asia?s constituent parts avoided moves towards regional integration until the beginning of the 1980s. The SAARC was established when its Charter was formally adopted on 8 December 1985 by the Heads of States or Government of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 117 Although the organization was created two decades ago, if one makes a quick appraisal of SAARC against the objectives listed in its Charter, the regional arrangement has been a resounding failure. 118 Its most significant accomplishment is its nonchalant survival, for the mechanism united seven countries with apparent civilizational similarities yet deeply entrenched divisions in terms of religion, ethnicity, political affiliations and a variety of bilateral issues. 119 Therefore, although the SAARC has failed in terms of achieving its Charter objectives, it has succeeded in creating an overarching institution that has brought together a diverse group of countries and fostered a common relationship that has endured for two decades, proving that there is at least some fertile ground for a more effective regional alliance as will be advocated later in this thesis. 4.3.2 Historical evolution of SAARC The idea of a regional unit, especially in terms of economic and political concerns, is not concept that is alien to the region South Asia, which emerged from British colonial rule less than six decades ago. 120 The effort to restore the economic union, which had functioned in the India-Pakistan subcontinent before it achieved independence in 1947, had been advocated by some at the time of 117 <htp:/w.sarc-se.org/main.ph?id=76&t1 >(acesd 2Feb 06). Afghanist becam te8 th mebr ofSARC te 13Nov 205. Senot 2fthIntroductinto udysto xclusinghnistfrtistuy 118 Art If te ha <hp:/w.sarc-s.rg/dat/s/harte.pf> (aces 2 Feb206). 119 Lowel Ditmr ME Srpe (ds) Sout Asi? Nuler Scurity Dilem: Indi, Pkistn, ad China (5); SephnPCohnIia:EmergnPow(BokngsItuiores201); Strb Tlot?alig wit Bb ith sia? [Mrh/April 19] Fig Afairs Crig Bxet. GvrdlitcsnSouA (Westvi Pes,USA,20)(Bxtetl.) 120 HaidrAKhn d Zulfiqar Lk ?Glalizton d Rgonal C-operation Souh si: A Poltcl n SocialEomyApah? (CIRJEF-SrisIJEF48, IRJE,Facltyf Emis,Uverst fTko, 207). 247 independence or soon thereafter. 121 However, the bitter aftermath of the partition between India and Pakistan and the ensuing mutual distrust, the overt political domination of Nepal by India other bilateral yet contentious issues between Bangladesh, Pakistan and stalled any sort of a regional union for a long time. 122 The contemporary global economic climate that is dominated by balance of payments issues, protectionist measures, growing debt and stagnant development ? issues that concern the poorer regions of the world ? have in fact been accentuated by the creation of regional blocs elsewhere in the world. 123 The impetus to integrate regionally is fuelled by the dominant paradigm?s preoccupation with the notion that ?[e]conomic regionalisation is the key to economic success in next century and beyond.? 124 The tendency to ?integrate?, a term that broadly encompasses a variety of sociopolitical, economic and cultural issues through the common bond geographical proximity, is a growing phenomenon, 125 and success of regional organizations based on particularly economic considerations is self-evident, considering for instance the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, the composition the degree the regional unions can differ from organization to organization ranging from economic to customs unions or to a lesser degree of multilateral preferential trade agreements. The quest for regionalism is part emulative, part defensive, and it maybe also be pre-emptive of other areas forming their own blocs. The SAARC is only too aware of the significance of regional co-operation in the face of globalization. 121 Se A Reza, Wadhw etal.Regional Econmic Coperation Asia: Bngladesh, India, Pakistn,SriLnk(AliPubishr PvteLited,Nw Dlh,Id,1984). 122 For hstocl ont s SndpWslkr ?Tak-imcy iSoutAsi? CDIS Ocsial PperItrailCetr fo acInitivs Boba, Ina,Resarch fte Prgmns Cl, Dsarmt,d erlSecuritUivrit fIlinos a Ub-ChignSecodEitn Ocber195 d Eri Gnsle d NnyJt(d)The Dynaics ofSuth Asia: RglopationARC(ag Pblisher, w Delhi, 19. 123 KyaLlwli Cr mg evlopicount(itspca refe tRC) (SB Publshe, Jiur,19). 124 M uEconmicegionaiztonite Asia-Pcif: halegs tEcomi Coertion (Edwarlgar Publsh Ltd, UK,). 125 MozeHi, IylurIslm,RzaibrSouthAsin Ecomi Devlpent: Trnsfrtion ptusadchlenges (tledg, Lond, New York, 19) 45. 248 Noting the primacy of poverty reduction/elimination in SAARC, the Secretary General has reiterated that: 126 ?In this increasingly lobalizing world, I believ the rlevance of regional groupgs v important. Thecallengsmantingfomglobliztioc be vewhlminfrsmlledles quippd coutries. Thy r fte uleto tak adntae the portuitie fre byloaliztion.Therfo, rgiol coprationrains the ainstay fthir respoe caism to lobliztio. Ithis ctext, bSARCndASEN triving rd fce the nw enmic ad politicl rlities.? Globally the changes in political dynamics of the past 20 years, particularly the collapse of Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany and the parallel democratization of other European states from the former communist Eastern Bloc, have obliterated the need to create sub-global unions based on political convictions, yet have highlighted the need for regional arrangements for the surveillance and reinforcement of democratic governance. The recent developments in Europe, the Americas and Africa support this position. 127 In the South Asian context, the idea of a regional mechanism was most ardently advocated in the early 1980s by late President of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman, who was a zealous believer in the value of regional cooperation in dealing with issues of international relations, economy and security. The regional political climate at that time, particularly the combination of personalities forming the heads of states in the region, rather unstable security situation such as aftermath Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the assurance of economic assistance for multilateral cooperative projects such as sharing waters of the Ganges and Brahmaputra by both the USA and the UK, and the intellectual inclination to believe that regional corporation would enhance development in the region were some of the reasons for Rahman?s urging for a regional cooperation. 128 126 ?Recnt Devlopments iSARCand Futre ofSARC-SEAN Coperation? Staemnt of th Sray-Gral f Mr. QA..ahim the Sc20Jury 204<tp:/w.sc.org/sc_spech_printble.>(acsed 10Fb 8). 127 e Chter 5of thi tudy 128 Kisor Das?TePlialeonmy ofRegioal Copertion South Asia? (196) Pacf Afi <tp:/w.mthk.du/ac/ntr/dsh.m >(acesd5Jn205. 249 Therefore, the evolution of the SAARC was primarily a response to the domestic political, security and economic exigencies of the South Asian countries. 129 Cheema in his analysis for the raison d'?tre of SAARC observes that: 130 [u]nlike North Atlantic Treaty Organiztio (NATO), Warsw Pact, South East AsiaTatyOgaiztio(SEA), dCentral rety gniztio (CNTO), whic r pducts of dsir forclletiv fotsinst perivdthrets SRCsbornsllectivesp todsir fr aioal ognizatio that could failitate pration d rmote ecnmicinterctio m th regionl ctries. Rather than security concerns SAARC concentrated more on co-operation relating to socioeconomic and cultural development ofthe South Asian people. 131 The SAARC creators also harboured long-term ideas of creating a tariff free region for the movement of capital, people, goods and services, 132 emulating the EU. When the SAARC was formally established in 1985, the regional initiative was regarded as an opportune response to the common economic, social and political problems that were besetting the region at the time and a mechanism also for capturing positive synergies. 133 This was acknowledged in the Dhaka inaugural summit 134 when the: ? Heads ofState orGvernmts acknowledge that e countries ofSuth Asia, whcnstitud -fifth ofhuity, rfcdwith thermidable chllengs pe byprty, dervlopmnt, lo levlsfpdction, uemloyt aresu fplation coueby xloitatio ofthe past d othr dv legacies. Thy flt that, bd asthircountrieswrby ncnlusroted intheirsial, thnic, ltural d histoical tritios, regioal cpetionprovidd logicl respoe tothesprolems. They w osu fthir inivual nreioatrgs, ir tential a ugmrkt, thirsubtatial hm d nturl ourcsad the copleentaities fe conies. Tywrcofident that with efctiv reioal copration, thyld ake optimu s s pitiesor th 129 SD Muni ad Anuradh MuniRegional Coperation South Asia (Ntional Publishng House, Newlh,1984). 130 Prviz Iqbl Cem ?SAC Nds vmig? iEric Gnslve d cy Jetl (ds) ThynamcsofSuthsia: RegionaloperatondSARC(SagPubliatons,NwDlhi 19) 3. 131 MIqbl ?AR ?probls and rsct? (192) 1eionl tdies 35?62. 132 MJ Vinod ?Reginalgnizatofor tadeandsecurity: S,ASE,PEC?in CS La Rue,LIulph, SH udlh POlnburg () TheIdia Hbok (Fitzroy Dearbo, Chicag, 197)242?252. 133 Fornistorical ontse ran Chopra ?SARC an Asymetry Isue? inP Wignarj ndAkml Hun(ed) Thleg iuth si:Devlopn,Docray dReol perati(Sg, NwDli, 198)326?43. 134 Fis RCmit akclartion pargp 7. <ht:/w.ofa.v.bd/3srum/1stumitdeclartion.html>(acesd 2Feb 06). 250 benfit o their poles, acelerate the pac oftheir conmic devlopment ad hacnatiol nd ollectivslf-rlian. They wrcoinc tht thir utries, whic m imtat tributiostoth richof mniviliztio, could togethrplay their d role internatiol elations ad influec deisions wic afcted thm. The structure and the ideological outlook of the SAARC were essentially based on the ASEAN. However, drawing inspiration from other regional mechanisms would have been more pertinent to the SAARC in terms of the issues that came within its purview. When tracing history of the creation SAARC, Khatri observes that ?[t]he propensity of South Asian bureaucrats to draw largely from the ASEAN example may be due partly to the convenience and partly to the failure to scrutinize the experiences of other third world regional organizations which may be more relevant for the subcontinent.? 135 Khatri goes on to assert that functionalism was not a consideration at the stage of creation for multilateral political agendas played more predominant role in the establishment of the SAARC. He acknowledges that there are limitations following that path for even ? ?ASEAN as a regional organization has yet to epitomize the success of regionalism worthy of emulation. ASEAN shows some lustre today not because it has succeeded in contributing to the development of its member countries, but because the growing prosperity of South-East Asian region in general has sustained its image ...?. The preoccupation with the notions of achieving economic prosperity through regionalism convinced SAARC to focus on the ASEAN as a model although it would have been more rewarding emulate other regional institutions that focussed on human development and common problems of the region rather than aim for a ?more grandiose goal of an economic or political union.? 136 Two decades after the creation of the SAARC a successful economic union is as yet an unattainable utopia for South Asia as experience shows that economic prosperity forms a critical pre-condition for such success. 137 4.3.3 The SAARC and Democracy 135 Sridhar Ktri ?A deca ofSuthAsian regionalism: Retrospct and prosect? (192) ContempoySouhsi5?9. 136 Ibi. 137 dTatri ts ithe rason fr the failure ofse othr egional expriments ithe evloping coueucLtiAmcnFTradAsct(LAFT) adEast Africa Cmn Mrkt (EACM). 251 The SAARC?s attitude towards democracy, which is apathetic, is symptomatic of the region?s dilemma in relation to democracy. The SAARC Charter, which highlights the principles of ?sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use force, non-interference in internal affairs of other states and peaceful settlement of all disputes?, is resolutely silent on the issue of democracy. 138 At the inception of the organization the inclusion of above principles into Charter defined extent of cooperation which was regarded as crucial to the viability of the organization. The formulators of the SAARC Charter stipulated that the member states were to adhere strictly to notions of ?non-interference in internal affairs of other states?, which precluded member states from making queries as to the state human rights or democracy, which undermine the government?s legitimacy at national level. 139 Yet the precise issues of human rights and democracy have been identified earlier in present chapter as two of three central strands (along with development) which this study aims to plait into a strong metaphorical cable for their mutually beneficial and necessary achievement. The exclusion of democracy from the SAARC Charter indicates the lack of significance attached to the concept regionally and the reluctance of member states to take a collective stance on an issue which is relegated into the realm of ?internal affairs? of individual states. Crucially, within the last two decades, the global perception of democracy has changed, altering principle of non-intervention according to the former Secretary General of the UN: 140 [t]he principle ofdemocray isnow uiversally recognized. The rigt of all oleto takepart in th gvermt fthir utry thru fand egular ctions, hArticle 21f th Univrsl DlaatiooHumRights, is t puliar tony cultu?. Crtainly, the cord shw tht eocrtically goverd stateaelyifver ake w oathe. But evnr imptant, in thisaof intr-states, isthfct tht mratic goan ? by prtecting mritie, ncourgin pliticl plurlis, ndphldin theruleof law ?nchel interal dissent aefully, and thus elp vrt civil ws ?. Thusdeoray ofs ble romis ?agt ofea ll a libratio. 138 SARC harte <htp:/w.sarc-se.org/dat/ocs/harte.pdf> (acesd 2Feb 06.) 139 PadmjMuy?Role fSml Mbs inhe SARC Forum?198)Stragic nlysi: ontl Jurnal thIDSA 8. 140 UNSecrta-G Kfina (Untiled spc tohe nity ofDemocries, Warsw, 27Jue 20) <htp:/.norg/News/Pres/doc/20/sgm746.t> (acsed 3Nv 205). 252 The discussion of the interdependence of plural, tolerant democracy, human rights and development preceding the body the present chapter sketched the same capacity of plural democracy under the rule of law as a force of both liberation and facilitation of human rights. Kofi Annan?s words just quoted add a fourth virtue to the trio democracy, human rights and development: namely, peace, both intra-nationally and internationally. Peace synergizes with the other three qualities, and is often invoked as a parallel aspiration. 141 Elsewhere Annan himself has also described how human rights as encapsulated in the UDHR have been linked to democracy, when he reiterated the UN position on democracy and the evolving global norm of democratic governance, asserting that: 142 The Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, adopte bythe Gnral Asembly in1948, uiated thestials ofdecry. Eversincitsdoption, it has spird costitutio-mking evry fth wld, a it hs ctributed greatlytothe vntual lobal cptan emocra suniveralvlue. T ight show they r uled, awhrules the, t b th irthright of ll pole, ad itsuivsl hievet t b ctrl ojctiv an Organiztio devte to th ca of larg freedom. As foreshadowed by that earlier discussion in this study, democracy as a form of governance indeed has a universal appeal for its inherent capacity for the promotion of rights and freedoms, human development ? and peace. 143 Taking the link between human rights and democracy one step further, there are many authoritative assertions of a ?right to democracy? 144 and through sustained state practice and universal acceptance it is fast becoming a ?normative rule of the international system?. 145 Although, from the stand-point of Sen, the universal legal norm asserting a right to democracy is unclear, he nevertheless argues that during the twentieth century, ?democracy became established as the ?normal? 141 One isrminde tha esntialythesam uthors fthe UDHR also exprsed athe vry opgof th Prbltoh Cr ofteUniedNaionstirdtminato?s sucditis frmtescug wr?; plg flw ih it nxt breath by ther qual dernati ?rafirfaithfumethuargts? <p:/w.nog/bu/ht/> (cesd 10Fb 208). 142 Kofi A ?I lre frdo: r vlopnt,scritynd human rights for al? (RerttheSctay-Gna,lUnitdNatins Geral AeblFifty-tSein, /59205, 1Mr 205) <htp:/w.urg/lfdom/ts.> (csd 8Feb 206) 38. 143 obert Dahl On emocray (Yale niversity Pres, Nw Haven, Co, 19). 144 JamsCwford?DdItaonlLa?(193)64BritYInt?lL13; ary Dind, velpig rc: Towr Csidtion Jhs pks UiversityPes, BltorM., 19);Rolan ih?Big DemcryItInteratiolaw? (20) 12 Jual fDocray 20?34. 145 Thms . Fnk?The Emrgin Riht Torati Govrc? (19) 86The AericnJurlf Itrnatiol Law46?91(Franck). 253 form of government to which any nation is entitled ? whether in Europe, America, Asia or Africa ? in the general climate of world opinion, democratic governance has now achieved status of being taken to be generally right.? 146 According to Frank, democracy has also become a rule of legitimacy in two respects, in that ?governments recognise that their legitimacy depends on meeting the normative expectation of the community of states?, and that the international community?s is that ?those who seek validation of their empowerment patently govern with the consent of the governed.? 147 Michael McFaul is more confident in acknowledging the existence of a democratic norm in international law but is less sure about norm of promoting democracy, though he concedes that there is widespread support for such practice, which is spearheaded by the USA. ?The legitimacy and practice of external actors promoting democracy has grown ? The community of democratic states has accepted the legitimacy of [democracy] promotion. In fact, within this community, normative burden has shifted to those not interested in advocating democracy promotion; they are the state leaders who must explain why they are not doing more to advance democracy?s cause worldwide.? 148 It is by drawing strength from this international political climate that there is increased emphasis placed on democracy by the other regional mechanisms whose positions on democracy will be elaborated in Chapter 5 of this study. For instance, the European Union is ?founded on the principles liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.? 149 Entry into European Union is conditional upon establishing democratic governing structures at national level. 150 Therefore, both the old established states and the new states of Eastern Europe have attempted to consolidate both constitutional and institutional 146 Amarty Sen ?Dmocray saUniversal Vlue? (190) Journal ofDemocray 3. <htp:/w.jouralfdec.org> (cd7Oct27. 147 Frnck, bv 145. Fr the tiultio fth onrarithery fgvrnet sarting EligtetErpnu,s Chaper1tis tudy witdscus Hobd,more espaly, Loce ad Rosa. 148 MichFul?DemcryPromtin sa Worl Vale? (204) 8The Washingt Qurtl 147?63 <htp:/ges.zdne.c/pl/id154.htm>csed5Mr206). 149 Aieof tEUTrat <wurtes.c/srdtabl.pf> (csed8Feb 207). 150 rticl 49f the rety; se also Frank Shielfnig ?The Comunity Trap: Liral Noms,RhetoricalAtionadhEtlrgmt othEU?(201) 5Ietionl Organiz 7?80. 254 structures to strengthen democracy in order to gain membership of the EU. Traditionally, states seeking membership of the EU gain admission to Council of Europe (CoE), which is an intergovernmental organization distinct from the EU. As will be elaborated in Chapter 5, the entry into the Council of Europe is dependent on establishing democratic governance at national level. As the discussion in Chapter 5 will also elaborate, the Organization of American States (OAS) has been remarkable in asserting obligation to promote democratic governance in that region. 151 In fact, the OAS has played a pivotal role in persuading authoritarian governments in region to adopt democratic approach to governance. The OAS Charter was the first of its kind to proclaim a right and duty of the following type: ?the people of Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it.? The OAS Charter further states in its preamble that ?representative democracy is indispensable for the stability, peace and development of the region? and that one of the essential purposes of the OAS is to ?promote and consolidate representative democracy, with due respect for the principle of non intervention.? 152 The Washington Protocol to the OAS Charter stipulates that a state?s membership of the OAS is conditional upon its democratic governance. Further, Article 9 of the Protocol enables the OAS to suspend the membership of a state which has reverted back to authoritarian rule and thus violated the principles of democracy. 153 Fostering of democratic governance and protection internalized democratic ethos in emerging democracies is now regarded as an obligation of the OAS. 154 Therefore in the Americas the principle of ?non intervention? has been modified to impose democracy, albeit overtly. 151 Se Chapter 5of this tudy. 152 rt fOrganziofAmerican Stes Article 2(b). <htp:/w.s./jc/English/r.hml>(acessed8Fe 207). 153 Wasingto Prtol rtile 9? Mb oft Orgnizatowhsedmocratily contued venmhasbovrtwnycey bsupn fr he xrciseof the righ prticat ite ins fhe Gral Asl,the MtigCnsultn, t Cils ofhOrgzo dtSpcizdConfrcsal asi t cois, workngrus nd y thrbis tblshe. Te pw toupendhlbexredoly he sc diplmaticiaive unerakn ytOrgaiz fr t urps fpmting the rtratiofrest dmocy itafcd mbeSavnucsful.? <.s.g/juido/english/Sigs/b-46.hml> (es 5Mr 206). 154 Jun Mz ?Th Itr-Aeran steofPrtion:ItsContributios the Itrnatiol LawofHmanRits?i atPowr and Gah Al (eds) RealzngHum Rghs: vig Fr IpraontImpc (St. Mti?sres,NwYrk,20 1?142. 255 As detailed in Chapter 5, the (British) Commonwealth Association, of which five members of the SAARC are also members, has a strong commitment to democracy and good governance. During the past decade the Commonwealth has devised unique mechanisms to maintain democracy within member states and any violation of the Harare Declaration of Democracy is met with strong disapproval Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Hararer Declaration (CMAG), as General Musharaff of Pakistan has realized several times in recent years. 155 Despite the acclaimed positive nexus between democracy and development 156 and the developing international normative standards regarding democracy, the SAARC Charter, unlike the constituting documents of the EU, OAS or African Union (AU), is silent on the issue of democracy. The SAARC?s collective position on democratic governance is dubious despite individual assertions of commitment by Heads of States or through state practice. 157 Of the SAARC member states, India and Sri Lanka have had a continued history of constitutional governance since independence. Pakistan 158 and Bangladesh both have had sporadic interruptions of military governments with presently ruled by a ?democratically? elected government in name only. Nepal?s political landscape is dominated by an authoritarian monarch, a Maoist guerrilla movement, ineffective political parties and a helpless yet deeply disgruntled civil society. Bhutan?s government, which is traditional Buddhist monarchy, has been making tentative overtures towards constitutional democracy only in the past 155 Comnwealth Minsterial ActionGrup Staemnt oPakistn (Foreign ad Comnwealth Ofice, Ldo,13Nov207) <htp:/.britusa.cm/stis/articles_howt1.sp?d=0&i603L1=0&20=473 13> (ase 5Jn 8); Ian Tlbo ?nral Pervz Muharf: saviour destroy f Pkitn' dmocry??(201CtmpyStAsi 31?328. 156 JosphSigl ?Devlopig Decra Docrir?SrpisnglyBright Dvlpment Recr? (204) 6IntratnlTd <ht:/i.havd.eu/atce/1236/>(acsd25Fb 206);andseJa z ArtyK Sen Ii: Dlom d Prtitio (Oxfor Uivrity Pr,Oxford20). 157 Bxl. bve n1; Richard Crok ad Jes Manr Deocray nd DecntralistoniSuthAsnWestAfic:Prticptio,Acuntbilt(Cambrige ivy Pre, Caridg 98); yh Jl Dmy d hris South Asia: A ComptivHstocalPrspctiv(abridge UniversitPes, Nw Yrk,195);tul Khli, Jan Brn, GP wthn, e Jl, PtcaJf, DarmKua(eds) The SucesfIdia'sDemry (CmbridgUniersiy rs, Cbidg, 201). 158 Lry J od ?Is akist h (Rv) WveoftheFutre??(Journal of Dmoac91?06. 256 three years. 159 The Maldives? facade of democratic political governance conceals an authoritarian regime that severely curtails the civil and political rights of the people. 160 While internal and bilateral issues have been strictly outside the agenda of SAARC meetings, Nepal?s unilateral assurance of a commitment to democracy has added a new dimension to the role and purpose of the SAARC in the region. 161 As prelude to this development both Pakistan and India were not opposed to engaging in informal bilateral discussions outside SAARC meetings at the 12 th SAARC Summit at Pakistan in 2004. These developments, though minor, are significant for they indicate the way the SAARC is heading. Despite General Musharaff?s questionable democratic credentials, he has reiterated the need for an amendment of the SAARC Charter, for ?[w]ithout desirable peace there could be little progress in region. Bilateral differences must be resolved in the SAARC on the basis of justice and fair play.? 162 He repeated at the 12 th SAARC Meeting that ?we must expand the SAARC Charter to discuss bilateral issues at regional level. If we fail, cynicism will take over.? 163 The SAARC Charter envisions the goals of the organization to be the acceleration of economic growth and promotion social and cultural development through collaborative efforts in various fields of activity across the region and collective self-reliance of the region, 164 while reiterating South Asia?s commitment to respect ?the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and peaceful settlement of all disputes.? 165 As successive Summit Declarations have reiterated, the enhancement and consolidation of socioeconomic development is the fundamental purpose of the 159 Harld Nestroy ?Bhutan: TheHimalyn Budhist Kingdom? (204) 38 Asian fairs 338? 352. 160 Freomhus Ctry Rport Mldives. <htp:/w.fredohuse.g/eatcf?page=251&year=207> (acesd 5Jan 208). 161 S tx atn 5. 162 ulhi??AsWl sSomthin Cocrt? Asi Tims (Hong K, 8J ) <htp:/times.co/id-pak/D08f2.l>(aesd5Oct205) 163 ?Sag tfr betr ltins? Te ribu hnigarh, India, Mday, 5Jan 204) t:/w.iuni.co/4/015/2.t>(es Oct). 164 Apendix F 165 257 SAARC. It is with this view that the inaugural summit at Dhaka in 1985 approved the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) that was formulated during the first Foreign Ministers? Meeting the SAARC in August 1983, two years before formal establishment of the body. The IPA created Technical Committees in nine areas, which were intended to coordinate activities of the specific areas within the region in the spirit of regional cooperation. 166 4.3.4 SAARC and Human Rights In relation to the commitment towards human development, the SAARC has identified several areas for cooperation and initiated several treaties related to the areas above. 167 Member countries have already signed conventions on narcotics, 168 combating trafficking in women and children for prostitution, and the promotion of child welfare and poverty alleviation. Several agreements have also been signed on Food Security. 169 In this sense the SAARC has reached a general consensus a variety of issues that has enormous potential to evolve into an effective scheme for human development. However, these schemes are yet to move on from a norm-creating stage to the next stage of binding obligations and implementation. As regards poverty, the SAARC created the independent South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation, which is mandated to evolve policies and strategies of implementation on poverty eradication, social mobilization, rural 166 The ars wer agricultre, uraldevlopment, etorlgy, telcomunicatos, cientfic and tcnilco-pton, hanpti, rasp, and sprarts, ltre. 167 SARC ilCvtio Ssi fTri(indiKhdu 4 Nov 1987)adta Prtcl(sged inIlbdo 6J 204); SARC onvtin Nrcoti Drugs ndsyhrpi ubstaces (igneiMaleo 3Nv190);SARC Cnveorevtig andComigthTrafckg inWmen ad hilre frPostiuon. (sigd iKathmu o5J 20); SARC ovt Rgilrangmt he Promtf CildWlfreiuthsia (inedi Kahduo 5J 20); Slaf Acin Poverty Aviatn. Te PlnofctPerty Aleviatwsrecond by the TrdMingfth SRCFie/lig MinsnPry Alviat (Isl, 8?9p 20) ad wsprod byth TwfthSARC Sumit (Islbd, 4?6J205). 168 rabincryan mitavAcar?Huma ecritya:Conceptulmbigutiesand Com Uestigs? <htp:/w.orku./robt/rhies/hndigrth/pdf/ahr_delhi.f> (ased 17My 205). 169 TeFd Secrity arngemt ca ito frce in198 n sic tn fo rsv has ben acumlatfo mcis. ThFodSeuityRsrveBoardtamisteher bn fiurnw t12 th ARC m acpt e obli aFd Bnk d eprsed. <htp:/.sarc-s.rg/ain.ph?t=2.13.>(csd 20Apr206). 258 agriculture and human development. 170 The Commission on Poverty Alleviation is also entrusted with the responsibility of evaluating the impact of the open economy and structural adjustment strategies pursued by SAARC member countries. Unfortunately, like most initiatives of the SAARC, the work of the Commission has failed to have a positive impact on reducing regional poverty. 171 South Asian human rights activists are increasingly realizing the great truth in Falk?s assertion that ?[available] research strongly suggests that most Third World countries possess the resources to eliminate poverty and satisfy basic human needs if their policy makers were so inclined.? 172 This sits well with Kothari?s analysis of the poverty in India that it is a ?poverty among plenty?, 173 and therefore implicitly remediable by wiser and fairer stewarding of available resources. There is also a general consciousness and growing resentment that avenues available for meaningful regional collaboration on human development are disabled by poor and unaccountable governance at national level. 174 Individual governments are increasingly pressurized by activists to put aside bilateral resentments and insecurities and to move forward towards a regional initiative for the protection of human rights. 175 The impetus and the need for a regional mechanism on human rights has been expressed in the various human rights fora in South Asia for the past twenty years. Despite existence of the capacity to create a regional human rights mechanism through the SAARC, lack of political consensus and regional insecurities that hampered successful implementation of the SAARC manifesto have also a regional initiative on human rights. The has not adopted a human rights charter, nor has it envisaged, let alone realized, the creation of an institution or mechanism to monitor effectively the adherence to and the 170 Bishwa Keshar Mskay ?PovertyAleviaton d SARC Social hrte Prspectiv and Iue nRgionlCopertin? Isiut fFreigfairs1pr203 <tp:/.fr./cl/articl9.ph>(cs 3Jn 6). 171 abir ay hudry ? exise nmak-blive? ht:/w.lonet.om/205/103/tori/20510590.htm> (acesd 20Apr 206). 172 Ricrd Fk ?Rspnig toSv Vltios? inJorg I.Doinguzt l.(s) Enhacig Global Humaight (McGraw-Hil,97) . 173 Sethopenquoti fthe Introducti this tudy. 174 Cndr Jyrte ?SrLnkCy NePromngReional Itegration South Asia: Privat ctPsctiv? out AsiaRginal Itati <hp:/sierour.wrldba.rg/ITSOUHAS/surcs/SriLk-Fil.pdf> (cesd 3 Mr 206). 175 adviBasnet ?South si' eional Iitaive onman Rights? (197) 4Human Rights Brief WshngtoClegfLaw,Amrcnrsty. 259 implementation of various international human rights conventions, charters and treaties to which the member states are parties. Nonetheless, against this background the SAARC Social Charter was adopted in the 12 th Summit in Islamabad in 2004. 176 Despite the assertion in the SAARC Charter that the organization?s objective is to promote welfare of people in the region, an initiative towards a Rights Charter was not contemplated until the 1998 SAARC Summit in Colombo. Formulated by an Inter-Governmental Group of Experts, the Social Charter was a tentative attempt at creating a set of principles relating to ESC rights at regional level. There was little preparation in terms of public consultations from stakeholders, such as NGOs, human rights activists or civil society, prior to the creation of the Charter. Such consultations would have perhaps avoided its obvious shortcomings. In many respects the member states were ignorant of the colossal commitment they had undertaken when signing the SAARC Social Charter in January 2004. By no means is it an exhaustive enumeration of social and economic rights. In fact, there are many shortcomings and inadequacies in terms of both the rights contained in the Social Charter implementation mechanisms. However, the Charter has contributed immensely to the establishment of normative standards on ESC rights in the region, 177 revitalized the stagnant collaborative/regional initiative and provided a valuable and a necessary impetus to challenge the mainstream development ideology at a time when the region is in dire need of such an initiative. Theoretical assertions of the core and content of poverty eradication have been elaborated from global policy to national initiatives but pragmatic implementation mechanisms are slow to evolve within the developing world. The best working mechanism that addresses issues of social and economic rights as well as poverty issues on a regional basis is the European Social Charter. 178 The African Charter on Human and Peoples? Rights 1981 179 and the American Convention on Human 176 <htp:/w.infopak.gv.pk/sarc/harte.tm> (acesd 3Mar 206). 177 Tis a sgct hiemnt ilg ofhft htonlyfivecountriesof the svn SARCmebr snd tICESR(Pkisnl iN 4). BandMalies ar not prtis tohICESR. 178 <h:/w.uropaleuit/coparl/ibe/lsj/charte/chapter_n.htm> (ces 5Dc 2006). 179 <.unicr.it/.lgl_framewrk/docs/afrin_rtoua_dpol_srights_27 june_198pdf -> (acesd 5Dc 206). 260 Rights of 1969, and its Protocols of 1988 and 1990 180 , also offer valuable insights into the formulation of social and economic rights and to the processes of implementing those rights. At national levels, both the Indian Constitution and the South African Constitution provide valuable insights into innovative judicial methodologies of implementing social and economic rights. 181 The South Asian Social Charter needs to draw on the experiences of these mechanisms to create a viable structure to implement the rights enshrined in the Charter. 4.3.5 The Strategic Significance of the South Asian Social Charter Despite its weak structure, especially in relation to the implementation process, the Social Charter is a document with enormous potential not only in the context of human rights but as an effective weapon in the fight against poverty. However, the Charter?s intrinsic worth lies in its potential to form the foundation of the bulwark against the neo-liberal global order. In theoretical terms the South Asian Social Charter 182 appears to be an assertion of the classical ESC rights, although it does not directly refer the rights that are subject matter of the ICESCR. In contrast, it takes on a pragmatic approach regarding the burning issues of the region such as poverty alleviation, health, education. human resource development and youth mobilization, promotion of the status of women, promotion of the rights well-being of the child, population stabilization and drug addiction rehabilitation and reintegration, which essentially come within the purview of the rights enshrined in the international covenant . The development goals articulated in the Social Charter reflect the region?s desire to approach economic development taking into account human dimension, especially the task of eradicating poverty. The Charter focuses on several significant aspects social development, which almost transforms it from the realms of a social charter into a rather vaguely worded human rights instrument, 180 <htp:/w.oas.rg/juridco/English/treais/b-32.html > (acesd 5Dec 206). 181 Se abve Chpte 2f ths tuy, d lo Jyan Kori?SoilRightsandtheIndia Constiun?(204)Law,SialJsticGllDevlpnt Jurl ; Mrus Pir ?omig toTrms t jl enfret fcia is?y204Sot Aficn JalfHaRihtConfer. 182 <htp:/w.infpk.gv.pk/sac/hart.tm> (aesd 6Mrch 6). 261 albeit with a bias towards ESC rights. Examining it munificently one could say that in spirit the Charter is all encompassing, enshrining several principles of human wellbeing, which Maskay asserts to be: (a) enlightenment (access to education); (b) enablement (capacity building); (c) enfranchisement (embracing all sectors of the society) (d) empowerment (promotion of participation opportunities to people to make decisions that affect them); and (e) entitlement (observance and protection of human rights and all fundamental freedoms). 183 Analysing the content of the Charter against the backdrop of contemporary economic and social dilemmas faced by the region, Maskay considers that the Charter reflects the ?deep concern? that SAARC leaders share about poverty and human development and is an attempt to infuse a ?spirit of humanness? into the development drive within the region. A perusal of the content of the Social Charter indicates that it takes into cognizance need for the social development of the people to be a prime national responsibility, and that there should be an integrated approach towards policy formulation in the areas of economy, culture and social issues so that they reinforce each other. Containing a general Preamble 12 Articles, the Charter calls upon all parties to maintain social policy and strategy that ensures a balanced social development of their people. The Charter recognizes the interdependence of the public and private sectors in relation to development activities and reiterates the significance of the concepts of participatory governance, social equity, tolerance, non-violence, pluralism, non-discrimination and respect of diversity within and among societies. The Charter seeks to promote environmental security by ensuring inter-generational equity and sustainable use of the environment and natural resources. 183 Bishwa Keshar Mskay ?PovertyAleviaton d SARC Social hrte Prspectiv and Iue nRgionlCopertin? <hp:/w.ifrg.p/artile/rt9.p>(a7J 208). 262 The Charter appears to encompass the most significant issues concerning the lives of the people in the region. The access to basic education, primary healthcare, sanitation and safe drinking water; gender equality; an adequate standard of living including adequate shelter, food and clothing, had never been articulated at regional level until the adoption of the Social Charter. However, the Charter falls short of addressing major sociopolitical issues in the region, such as dysfunctional governance, limited political accountability and issues relating to violation of rights as a corollary of corruption ? issues which directly impact on the wellbeing of the people. In terms of its contents it has been described as ?a mixed bag of tall statements, important doable national actions, significant omissions, ambiguous sections and incoherent provisions?. 184 Though the incoherent approach to the rights enshrined in the Charter can be regarded as an attempt to locate Charter within the socioeconomic concerns of the region, this tends to dilute its normative significance. In South Asia, following the mainstream structures of human rights, relief for victims of rights violations is provided through judicial or quasi-judicial fora. The jurisdiction to provide relief is highly restricted generally to conventional civil and political rights, which are enumerated in special legislation or in the Constitution. There are stringent procedural limitations in relation to rights applications, in that jurisdiction can only be invoked by the aggrieved party within limited time-frames and the grant of relief is critically dependent upon the quality of evidence in each case. Except India, which can boast of a highly evolved concept of public interest litigation or representative action, 185 countries in the region actively discourage collective actions for human rights violations, or limit them to specific interest areas. In most instances applications are entertained by the superior courts, to which access is restricted due to legal costs, lack of legal advice and long delays. The Social Charter did provide an opportunity, which South Asia failed to grasp, of creating a regional 184 Zafr Miza ?SARC Socialhrte: Cautios Optims? <htp:/w.thentwrk.g.pk/sls04-0118.h>(acesd 3Mar 206). 185 Se Udr Bxi The vtr ofIndi Jdical Ativ: ExplortinsitheGographies of[In]Justic?iSKVrnad Kusm (es)FftyYers ofSume Cur ofIndi: Its and Rah (Ofor UisityPre,NwDlhi, 20)156?209. 263 mechanism to address these issues, by providing an effective implementation mechanism. The fundamental weakness of the Charter lies in its implementation strategy. It is at the implementation stage that the historical inhibitions, insecurities and reticence of the region re-emerge. Despite the numerous similar mechanisms available elsewhere in the world, the South Asian Social Charter failed to follow them and provide an effective mechanism to realize the rights enshrined in the Charter. SAARC?s own proposed implementation scheme, which is to be determined by national governments in consultation with the SAARC Secretariat, is rather vague and dilutes the efficacy of the Charter. Article 10, which spells out the implementation process of the Charter, provides for the appointment of a National Co-ordinating Committee, formulation of a national plan of action through a broad-based participatory process, and the participation stakeholders to implement objectives of the Charter. 186 In this respect the Charter acknowledges that the rights enshrined in it impose a positive obligation for national governments to formulate policies and put in place programmes of action to realize the rights, not only an obligation to compensate once a violation of a right occurs. The Charter envisaged that the national governments would initiate legislation that would give effect to rights stipulated by the Charter, but in reality national governments lack not only the impetus but capacity and the resources to implement it at national level. Effective implementation of the Charter at national level would necessitate not only fundamentally overhauling existing laws but initiating new legislation through Parliament possibly including Constitutional amendments. 186 1.The implentaio fthe SocialChrte shal befacilted bya Ntional Cordinato Coto y priant mcnimy ciiechuty. Infrainsuches wilbexgd twnSts Prts trg heSARC sectt. Ariat SARods hal revihe ipleaionf ocialrteat th rgiolevl. 2.Mmbr Stashl formulate ntil pn ofactin ormdify the xistng e, ifny, i orde tpionietpviso fheScilChre.Ths albdoehroua tansrt d br-asd rtcptry s. tklrprc sal s bflowed in rct ofiletionealuinoftprogas unde NtinPActi. 264 The Charter also provides for the implementation process at national level to be reviewed by ?appropriate bodies? at regional level. However, there is no elaboration on the nature and composition of the review bodies, their terms of reference and how the process is to be implemented. The Charter also justifies the position that ESC rights are rights that can be achieved only ?progressively? and are therefore eligible to be enshrined within the Directive Principles of State Policy to be realized at an undefined future date when sufficient economic growth is achieved through neo-liberal economic globalization. As reiterated above, this is a reinforcement of the essential weakness of the mainstream ESC rights paradigm, which promotes concept of progressive realization of through the political rather than the legal domain. The current non-radical framework envisaged by the SAARC Social Charter is an acknowledgement of the traditional mainstream paradigm?s paradoxical position on ESC rights, also endorsed by the Constitutions of the South Asian states which subscribe to the theory that developing countries cannot reasonably be expected to fulfil their obligations on ESC rights in their current socioeconomic context. Therefore, the socioeconomic remain unrealized, consolidating the cycle of underdevelopment. 4.4 Inherent limitations of the SAARC Twenty years and thirteen Summit Meetings later, the SAARC, its role in the region, and its present and potential success as an effective mechanism to address issues of regional concern such as the economy, poverty alleviation and development, all remain contentious. 187 However, in a region which is diverse in terms of religion, ethnicity, political culture and economic strength, the establishment of a regional organization is in itself an achievement. 188 Nonetheless, when there is a need for aggressive lobbying for common interests, especially in the province of socioeconomic development, such as poverty 187 Se Abul hsan ?SARC Secrtait: ACritque? [Nov-Dec 204] South Asian Joural 6; amnKegmouth siangonlsm and SriLank? iRanjPilp(ed)Si Lnk: Glol Cls dNol ris (TheocltsAoit, r Lk,201); Nihal Rdri?SRan istuilfawrk fr pori Suhsia?n RamesTur an Ony Wiges()Sh Asi nt Wld(UN Pes,Tky, 204). 188 KrishaGopl oplitcalReltoReginalCration:Atdy ofSuth A (T AsiaPubns, N Dlhi, I, 196). 265 alleviation, equitable terms of trade, capital investment and rational strategies of aid and assistance, the SAARC has remained a passive body left these issues to be resolved through bilateral and multilateral negotiations outside the purview of the SAARC. Even on conservative estimations, the two decade fallow period which regional leaders have labelled as the ?confidence-building stage? intended ?to create the basic infrastructure? and ?a testing period for both the concept of regionalism and the member nations?, 189 is an enormous squandering of time and resources especially considering the socioeconomic calamities the region has endured during this period. The 13 th SAARC Summit in Dhaka, held in November 2005, was supposed to change now familiar ritualistic avowals into implementation, according Bangladeshi Prime Minister, Khaleda Zia, who claimed ?For Bangladesh, the 13 th summit of the seven-nation grouping marks the commencement of a third cycle of summits in which the focus will be on implementation rather than declarations.? 190 But as Summit concluded it followed a similar pattern to the previous dozen, where rhetoric dominated over action. The political euphoria with which the state leaders initiated regional cooperation 20 years ago did not equate to tangible operational schemes that fostered a spirit of regional unity in any field. What it created was essentially an empty structure that was founded on certain restricted modalities of cooperation. The lethargic performance of the SAARC is attributed to the inherent limitations imposed on the organization through its Charter. 191 At evolutionary stages Pakistan and India were both reluctant participants in the regional cooperation initiative as the two states were apprehensive regarding security and power relations between the countries in South Asia (especially each other). However, arduous diplomatic negotiations resulted in the establishment of the regional organization, but two principles were included when formulating treaty, 189 Sridhar Khatri ?A deca ofSuth Asian regionalism; retospct and prosect? (192) Contempoy Sousi5?23. 190 Qu in mr Dhk RC sumit: Hih On Abit, Shrt On Prges (Paper . 16241, thsianlysiGrop,205) <htp:/w.sag.or/per17/pae16.htl> (acesd 6May 206) . 191 SG Pndi ?Mvin South Asi? cniesbyonthIno?Pkistanpradigm inthe South AsiaRegolAscatfrCortio? (20) 1Cempr Souh As329?4 266 mainly at India?s insistence. 192 They were that the organization was precluded from discussing contentious bilateral issues; and all decisions would be taken on the basis of unanimity. 193 Added to the above preconditions were the self-imposed limitations on the collective endeavours when the SAARC Charter proclaimed that cooperation within the framework of Association shall be based on respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non- interference in the internal affairs of other States and mutual benefit and ?that such cooperation shall not be a substitute for bilateral multilateral cooperation but shall complement them and such cooperation shall not be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral obligations. 194 Effective collaboration has been hindered by these clauses, for the SAARC is perceived as an organization that exists for political expediency and is rarely by the member states as an effective forum for advocating common or bilateral interests. Unanimity in all decisions has been insisted on for reasons of underlying mistrust and political divisions, which is hardly a promising start for effective regional alliance. As Thomas astutely prognosticates: 195 ?failure isalmost in-built in itsconeption ? o rganiztio can survive by poscibing bilateral isse. Theurs fveryinstitu ?startingfomth fmily t themic levl to th UitedNatio mo le isto ntribute towrdsconflict rsolution, sinc onflict isan inevitabpart f evrydalif. Phap the maingle frumws cretedbcaus ny othe fo fsociatio ssidred athepatu. If tht is o, thit is mst perful eonto ?nufctuonst? ronSouAsia-es rugh a prc o th prductio o cltur.? This ?functionalist approach? with clearly defined areas for cooperation, which were non-controversial, was regarded as a ?maturing process? that would yield to 192 RAhmed ?Should SARC BeWound Up?? [Dec 20] The Journal, Ntional Istiue of Public instrain.Pakistn<htp:/w.ia-khi.du.pk/RasidAhmed.pf.>(cd14 Sep206). 193 Th Carte ofS rticle X? ar 1& 2;lso e Eric Gonslv an y Jetl (s) DynmicsuthAsa,RgonlCoperatindSAC(Sage,NwDelhi,19)249? 253. 194 SAR harte rticle 2.se pdix E 195 KJoeTos?Subontital fretae utopia SFT has ben hyped foling the C sumit, t wil ly h rndte pol?Awatsrvcs??[204] Perspctiv<hp:/.hmg.com/204/jry/rsctiv.tm >(c 5Ju 6) 267 genuine cooperation in all spheres at a later stage. 196 If, however, the member states were able to discuss contentious issues such as the Kashmir conflict, 197 General Musharraf's military coup in Pakistan, 198 or the Gujarat riots in India, 199 the anti-Ahmadiya activities in Bangladesh, 200 ethnic problem in Sri Lanka, 201 democratic crisis in Nepal, 202 or the authoritarian rule in the Maldives, 203 the SAARC?s role the region would have been enhanced and it would have acquired credibility as an effective organization and contributed greatly to the atmosphere of mutual cooperation. The SAARC?s commitment to the doctrine of non-interference and the concept of state sovereignty is increasingly hindering the effective collaboration the SAARC as a regional organization. 204 If at infancy and in the past two decades the has been unable to address deep-rooted contentious bilateral issues and create a culture of cooperation within the framework of the existing Charter, it is now time for a more aggressive means of action through the amendment of Article 10. In retrospect, the present Charter has to be perceived as a transitional arrangement which helped create a framework of regional cooperation but which has now outlived its purpose. The SAARC as it stands now is a transient arrangement ?which member nations have agreed upon [to] serve as test of the way nations may be able to accrue benefits via means of cooperation, without actually sacrificing anything big or gaining anything substantial from the current conditions. As a test period, nations have also been conferred with special privileges to display their willingness for cooperation, without actually testing 196 Iftekharuzman ?The SARCinProges: Achievmnts, Old Problems, New Dimensio? (1987) Regioltudis1?2. 197 SBos?Kshir: orc Offlict, Dinsio fPeac? (19) 41Survial 149?171. 198 Aha DcaynHld? (02)Joural ODory67-75. 199 NndyObitur f Cutre? Siety UderSig -? ASmposi On The Brakdown OfCivl Socie InGjt<hp:/w.In-mn.C/20/513.Ht>(acs1 Mr 206). 200 Anad Kumar ?overnmt Yields ToAti-hadiy liance IBangldesh? (IstieFoCnflict Magntrticle N.1285, 0Jury,204. <hp:/w.Ips.Org/Suth_AsiasJp?ction=Shwvi&Kvlu=1294&Country=10 16&Staus=rtile&od=> (cesd 7May 6). 201 Neil Dvoa ?mcray,IntiuonlDedteQust for Eelam: xplaing ethic conftriLnk? (20) 73Paf Afirs 5?7. 202 PC Ses Thetorusrd tmcay: mocrati cris inNl (Lct, ond, 201). 203 AMisra ? trisng fsal n iro ste bhviur sig the Maldives, Bhuta Nepl? (204)13Cotempory SouthAsa133?148. 204 rbind chary d Aitvcry ?Human Scrity nAsia: Concptul Ambigties and ComUestnigs? <htp:/w.orku./robat/rhies/handigrth/pdf/ahr_delhi.f >(aesd 10F 206). 268 their will to co-operate.? 205 It is time that South Asia moved beyond the stage of creating a ?culture of cooperation? to effective regionalism that yields concrete results. South Asia?s capacity for sustained civil societal agitation in relation to politics is highlighted by the struggles for independence. Feasible strategies counteract the adverse impact of globalization demand active cooperation and the mobilization of both state and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations, private commercial entities and civil society. However, the SAARC is an initiative that has been created without consultation with such stakeholders, and no attempts have made to accommodate civil societal participation that would have contributed positively to, and derived benefit from, a regional alliance. Opportunities for NGO and civil society participation in the proceedings of the SAARC are absent in contrast with other regional bodies. 206 Therefore, people have no real affinity to the regional alliance and remain alienated from its operations though ostensibly its purposes lie close to the everyday lives of the people of the region. 207 This detachment from the people has also contributed to the lack effective collaboration. There is a growing consensus amongst the regional NGOs that the people do not feel the real impact of a regional collaboration as SAARC activities are restricted to heads of Governments and Foreign Ministries of the member states. 208 205 Sridhar Khatri ?A Decad ofSuth Asian Regionalism: Retrospct And Prospect? (192) 1 Contempoy Sousi5?7. 206 AfricnUi n O. Bangldes-bsd Cpign fr G vera (CG), a cglate fvlscietydloc NGO, harequstedhpatication fNOsinSARC proedisiimar fh thUWol Bnk a WTO. S? codems atiton fNpls,Pkpremir nSARsmit?FinilExpres (1/205) <h:/w.iciexrs- bd.cmidex3as?nd=1/205&sectio_id=2&newsid=6470&scl=no> (acesd May 205) Also Fil Staent fro h S South Aan Peopl Sumit. <htp:/.is.org/ws//ja20/asimirls12.ht (s 5 205) 207 San Kelam ?A Nd fr New Drectn f RC: Ecnoic Perpctive?(3 9 outsi Survey;SanKlgm?Souhsiad Othergial i Groupings in . Bhrg nd htri (s) t Ai 201:alns &Oprtunts(Kark, NewDli, Iia,20) 208 S <tp:/w.sarcivlsociety.rg/ >and Fial stemt fro the scod Sth Asin Popl'sumit 7Jn 2, Kahmndu<htp:/orgn.udaybsev.lk/20/127/fea03.tml> (aced 5May,205). 269 4.4.1 ?SAARC fatigue? 209 In general, many analysts believe that ?SAARC remains hostage to the deep undercurrents of political and strategic dissonance in the region.? 210 This atmosphere suspicion mistrust has also affected scheduling of SAARC Summits on several occasions. The failure to hold the 5 th SAARC summit in 1989, due to tensions between India and Sri Lanka, and postponement of the 11 th Summit (from December 2000, when it was initially scheduled to be held, to January 2002, when it was finally convened) due to the eruption of hostilities between India and Pakistan, are indicative of apathy and lack willingness among SAARC nations to resolve bilateral issues. The 13 th SAARC Summit scheduled in January 2005 was also postponed until November 2005. 211 In contrast, ASEAN has maintained an uninterrupted practice of frequent regional consultations even when being threatened by the outbreak of bilateral tensions. 212 Despite the high expectations there is a growing consensus that the SAARC has not accomplished much in comparison with other regional alliances in its 20 year existence, and ?[m]ost programmes and achievements of SAARC exist on paper.? 213 Whether it is related to SAFTA, drug trafficking, or the environment, the creation of regulatory frameworks has always proved to be gruelling and time consuming and the unanimity clause resulted in producing weak, ineffective regulatory frameworks in the treaties. This general lethargy, which contributes little to bringing tangible benefits to the people in the region, led to an expression of concern by many who are actively involved SAARC. The President of Sri Lanka voiced her disquiet by saying, ??.what fruit has SAARC truly borne? 209 Samn Kelgam ?South AsianRegionalism nd Sri Lank? iRajn Philps (ed) Sri Lank: GloblChsndNil Crs (EcueicalIstueforStudyDaogu,201) 49? 160. )( 201). 210 Rajsre Jtly?Coflictangent sratgis nASEN: prsectivs fr SARC? (3) 16 Th PcifReviw 53?76. 211 Quds Akhlaqu13thSARC sumit posted: Pakistn disapointed, cals for new ate? Dawn:T Intre Editon(3Feb205)<hp/w..cm/205/203/tp9.htm> (cs30 J206). 212 Rjhretly ?Coflict magt srategis nASEN: perstives for SARC? (203) 16/T PacifRevw53?76. 213 HidrAKhn ad ZulfiqrLik ?Globlizto ad Rgional C-pratin outh sia: A Poltcl n SoilEcoy Apach? (CIRJEF-SerisIJEF480, IJE,Faclyf Economis,Uverst fTko, 207). 270 Do we need to prune those activities which do not bring significant yield and more carefully nurture others that do?? 214 The discontent over the progress of the SAARC has also prompted countries to seek membership in other regional bodies such as the ASEAN by India and Sri Lanka and the NAFTA by India. India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have become members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association Regional Corporation formed in 1997. The others have attempted initiating bilateral ties with the countries the region, effectively, albeit not formally, abandoning the SAARC framework. Such moves obviously do augur well for the region as a whole, which needs the cooperation provided by the Association long term economic growth and human development of region. There are several root causes for the malaise within the SAARC. The Charter, which can be regarded as the foundation of a regional collaboration, has now outlived its purpose, and Secretariat?s mandate and structure is ineffectual in the face of the tasks it is compelled to deal with. The absence of dispute settlement machinery to settle inter-state conflicts on security, border and resource disputes has also proven to be a fundamental weakness of the SAARC. 215 Although greater economic benefits were one of the main objectives of the SAARC collaboration, success in that regard remained low. 216 The region?s major trading partners such as Western Europe and America, remain outside the region making inter-regional trade approximately 5 per cent. 217 The success of newly formulated SAFTA discussed below can be seen only after the scheme has been in operation for a while. The South Asian region is home to many complex conflicts dating from the colonial era. The struggles for independence from the British and the ensuing battles of partition still remain fresh in the minds of subcontinental people. 218 Some the contentious issues have their roots in the ethnoreligious composition 214 Kelgam bove n209, 15. 215 MohdMhsi?Thewlfth SARC Sumit Quest for Duable South Asian Cprtin? (205) / Sout sianurvey35?46. 216 ReaSobaRginalEcomc opration Sth Asi? nPrdp KGosh (ed) Dvloig uth As: mderzstiPscve(Grenwodres Wstrt,Cnctiu, Lnd,1984)26. 217 Nai al ?Salvgin SAFT? he Katmndu Pst,(10 Nv 205). Newspaers tile <htp:/w.ste.or/uploads/rticls/f.ph>(aced5Jan6 218 Sumit Gnguly Cfict Ueng: Idi-Pkist Tsio Sice 1947 (Columbi Univrsity PresadWorwlsnCtrPes, Nw YornWhgto,20). 271 of the region?s people, scarce resources and colonial demarcation of state boundaries, and over the years these contentions have been fuelled by antagonism and mistrust. 219 The political acrimony between Sri Lanka and India over the Tamils 220 and Pakistan and India over Kashmir 221 provides examples of ongoing issues of contention that have the potential to evolve into full-scale warfare. 222 A similar controversial issue is Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship of July 1950 223 and the dispute relating to the border between the two states. 224 The sharing of waters islands in the Ganges by India and Bangladesh is another fertile ground for intermittent political bickering that contributes to the situation of mistrust and antagonism. 225 The oppressive policy of forcible repatriation of people in Bhutan of Nepalese origin has created friction between these two countries, 226 for appears to ignore the humanitarian crisis created by the Bhutanese refugees living in refugee camps in Nepal. 227 The escalating arms race between Pakistan and India, especially on the nuclear front, is another example of the depth of the antagonism between various countries that make up the region. 228 In its 20 year existence the SAARC has succeeded only in creating a forum that highlights contentious issues of the region, such as the inherent mistrust of neighbouring states, political domination by India, immature democratic 219 Rajshre Jtly ?Conflict mangent srategis nASEN: persctives for SARC? (203) 16T PcifReviw 53?76. 220 KMdSla rLak: Survi Ethic Strif? (197) 8Journal fDmcray 97?111. 221 ajen Hrsh?IndiPistan Cofli oveKashmirPeacthgevlopent Coprtio? (205) 12ohAi Sury47?60 . 222 Zglu aier Cise fReglptinSout Asi? (201) 32/4 Scurity Dialogue 427. 223 Ibid n2; Th raty ofPac nd Friedship betwn Idia n Nepal is major pint f eatetwIndiNeplsitompltygnorsNepl?srghtodcenythgs o sphr. Some ci ferai a liv th t y islf ws ill becau (tyinta)itas gndbyth ctkeriemsrofepalniartafrom sae frs ju pe Iianruls. 224 VidBiSgh Kskr?Nep-IdiaOpn Bord: Prsct, Problems nd Chlengs? Dmocray Neal <htp:/w.npdmocray.org/cumets/reatis_gremnts/ep_indap_bor.tm> (aesd 17M 206) 225 oicaBht?Chlens tRional Coprtion South Asi: New Prsectiv? [Augst 9] Onli JouralofPec dflc <hp:/w.rntu.og/jp/o23.ht> (aced17y206). 226 John Quigle ?htnes rfugs inNepal: wat role n for the Erpean ui and te UitNatosi comion rfugs??(204)13Cmpay SothAs187?20. 227 Bred Gr Mur th15t Aivry fris: T PligtfBe Rfug Womn Childen? (20)4 Jral ofsiand AfcanStudes 345?69. 228 MVRa aAHNayr?Indi,Pkt theBob? ?hIniasubcontit ishe stlikey plci t wold f ucler w?[Dcmr 201]citf Amera <hp:/w.Senfcmeric.om.> 272 governance, political instability, and lack of security. In some quarters, however, the creation of that forum in itself is ?being seen as no mean achievement given the acrimony between the states of this region.? 229 However, this study endorses the view that it is time for SAARC to move on from the so-called confidence building stage, where in reality it was at worst ?merely a talking shop, which can provide nothing more than a lip service to the various issues of peace and development in the region? and at best a space ?that provided an opportunity for the policy makers, administrators experts to meet regularly and hold informal dialogues on important regional issues such as security, trade transport, social development etc.? 230 It is time that the Association progressed beyond rhetoric and considered actions regarding region?s critical issues, commencing with a radical reformulation of the Charter. The need is for a regulatory structure that aggressively addresses issues of poverty eradication, democratic deficit, good governance of globalization, and human development, for the needs of the region can no longer be contained within the consensus-building mechanism that the SAARC essentially represents. A regional initiative should have the concerns and the problems of the region at its core, whether they be development, trade or security, and should fashion the structures of the alliance so that they best achieve its objectives. However, SAARC reversed this operation and created the structure first, then sought to absorb issues that it was comfortable resolving. Therefore, issues of social and economic development that were non-controversial were the central focus of the Association, which never matured into strategies of implementation for fear a m?l?e amongst member states. If the SAARC aspires to evolve as a viable regional mechanism it would have to undergo a fundamental restructuring process in terms of its structure, core objectives and principles. 231 4.6 Glimpses of success ? SAFTA 229 CK Lal ?The ncsary mnufactre ofSuth Asia? Himal South Asia 206 <htp:/w.imlg.o/203/jy/asi_pecl_2.ht>(ced5Jn07). 230 ishor Das ?The Plitl Enm fRgion Cprtin South sia?(196) Pacf Afi <tp:/w.hoke.du//trl/das. (aseJ 25. 231 SMun ?Sou Asia regi? [Ag-Sep203] Suth AsiJrl. <htp:/w.sthnmdi.nt/Mazin/Jornal/revioe1.htm>(acsed th June 2005) 273 Amidst all the criticisms, and somewhat optimistically, Ananya Mukherjee Reed argues that there is an emerging ?new? sense of regionalism based on economic considerations in South Asia, which is an inevitable corollary of ?the contradiction of globalization, increases competition on the one hand, and the need for collaboration on the other.? 232 Despite the apparent defunct nature of SAARC, it harbours at least an embryonic potential to provide a comprehensive structural background to the mechanisms that are needed to address the adverse effects of globalization. In this respect, the 12 th Summit was significant for it represented a sense of realism about the contemporary dilemmas of the region as well as infusing of hope regarding its future trajectory. 233 It finalized the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA, launched January 2006) agreement with the aim of regional economic integration by year the 2015. 234 These regional trade agreements appear to mushroom in the developing as well as the developed world as a reaction to the adverse global trading climate, and South Asian initiative draws inspiration from the NAFTA and the custom union initiatives, such as the Mercosur 235 and the obviously successful European Union. 236 The previous attempt of SAARC Preferential Trade Agreement of 1993 (SAPTA) always appeared a non-starter. SAPTA?s failure is attributed to many causes 237 and the new initiative appears to have rekindled the desire for economic union that is born out of ideological convictions as much as economic expediency. 238 232 Anay Mukherj Red ?ationlisaton iSouth Asia: Theory and Praxis? (197) 0Pacif firs 235?239. 233 uchdDby ?Th welfth SARC mit: Depr Itgrti South Asi? (25) 1Sot sian Surve21?34; MoaedMohsn?Th wlfh SARCm:Quetfor DrabletAsi Copratin?(205) 12Sut AiaSurvey35?46. 234 As il tphgemt sktrcerf om t xistnglevls to0?5 pr cnt twnthyears206 nd 2015iwo phas. 235 Lai micrioaltgratinmnis with rgentia, Brzil, Parguy ad Urugsful bes, Bliv d Cile aocbs <htp:/.redrur..y/portl/rcosur.htl> (sd 5J 206). 236 opa.int/> (aces 5Jan 206) 237 Editrl ?Such rmigilict? <htp:/w.imalg.com/4/janury/editoral.htm> (aces17My206). 238 Sman Kelga ?SouthAsian Regionalis nd Sri Lnk? iRaj Philps () Sri Lnk : GloblChsndNilCrs (EcumeicalIstueforStudynDaogue,201)49? 160. 274 Easing of foreign trade among members has generated a new enthusiasm regarding the relevance of the SAARC in promoting regional economic cooperation in South Asia. 239 The process is perceived to be an umbrella framework of rules providing for gradual liberalization of intra-regional trade that would facilitate the moves towards eventual economic integration. Global economic development, particularly the impact of the WTO, has provided a new impetus for SAARC to pursue its agenda economic integration with vigour. Secondly, the invigoration of the ASEAN following the South East Asian crisis also contributed to the urge to pursue other possible avenues of economic integration. Regional integration in the economic sphere undoubtedly strengthens the collective bargaining of the region 240 However, considering past experience with SAARC, the scepticism that Alok Bansal expresses when he says, ?[t]here is no doubt that SAFTA is in the interests of the region but the political environment in the region makes any forecast its outcome extremely hazardous,? 241 is entirely justified. If economic pragmatism was the fundamental driving force behind the successful implementation of SAFTA, other imperative issues common to region must provide a similar impetus for more functional regional integration. Chief among these are the obvious concerns relating to poverty eradication, meaningful realization of human rights and equitable development. The incidents of 9/11 and the subsequent ?war on terror? should also be of special concern to the region. Until September 11, 2001, South Asia?s bickering centred on poverty, corruption, settling of ethnic, religious and caste issues and bilateral concerns relating to Kashmir or the Tamils in Sri Lanka. These were essentially intra-regional concerns that had no impact outside of South Asia. However, the events of 9/11 have challenged the security and the territorial integrity of 239 Alok Bansl ?Troubled Roa tSAFT? he Cntral hronicle (8Mar 205). <htp:/w.id.in/pictns/ratcomnts/alokbs1035.htm>(cesd16 Feb 208) (ansl). 240 Muckn Dubey ?The wlfth SR Suit: Depr Integration? (205) 2South Asian Srvey 21?34. 241 Basl,aov 230. 275 region as the ?war on terror? has a direct military impact on Pakistan and the new SAARC member, Afghanistan. 242 As the above analysis illustrated that the SAARC lacks the structural and normative capacity to deal with issues relating to human rights, development or governance. The latest security exigency which invites hegemonic intervention by the USA in the form of the ?war on terror? is an opportunity for the region to re- evaluate it?s measures regional corporation and move towards a collaboration that places the interests of South Asia and its people first. 4.7 Conclusion The title of this chapter set up two distinct but related topics for analysis: democracy, or rather the lack thereof; and the SAARC, or more precisely its inadequacy. The chapter has addressed two topics in that order. It has also brought out several levels of relationship between them. Firstly, the majority of the seven countries under consideration have at least formally aspired to reinvent or consolidate themselves as independent democracies in the post-colonial period. The SAARC in turn represents the free association of those sovereign states (plus latterly Afghanistan) in a limited union of inter-reliance, assistance and respect. The members of the SAARC have thus essentially entered a form of social contract to yield a small measure of control and scrutiny to the whole for their greater good. This structure could itself be described as democratic; even, in ideal terms, a hoped-for democracy of democracies. More concretely, democracy and the SAARC are linked because the promotion of democracy is at least nominally honoured by the regional alliance. In words the chapter title, the ?poverty of democracy? is one of the ?region?s needs? to which SAARC purports to respond. In reality, failures democracy within the member states have tended overstrain and subvert the current structure and self- imposed limits of the alliance, while the converse has also occurred with SAARC?s inadequacy deserting the promotion of democracy. 242 Farhn Ali ? Post-MusharfPakistn Policy? Washingto Pst March 7,208 <tp:/w.ashingpt.com/wp-dy/te/rtile/208/307/AR3732.html > (cesd 8r 208). 276 Finally, returning to the level of more abstract principle, constitutional democracy and regional co-operation are related because both represent attempts at deliberate, normative governance. Specifically, the governance being practised, or at least aspired to, here is the discipline, definition and management of intra-state and inter-state civic affairs respectively. The attempted means governance in both these cases are political. The poverty of democracy was seen to mean failures of both democratic form and function. The introduction to the chapter clarified that the kind of state being advocated by this thesis is a plural, tolerant, welfarist democracy, with regular elections from a universal franchise. In addition, to be declared functional rather than merely formal, it must operate under a thoroughly internalized and honoured rule of law and separation of powers, and must be fortified by a strong and independent judicial branch. The chapter identified democracy, as thus defined, to be one of three key desiderata in this thesis, alongside human rights and human-centred development. The synergies between these three values their interdependence were analyzed. Civil and political rights were noted as being classically democratic rights, being at once required for democracy and protected by it. A measure of egalitarian redistribution of economic wealth though a welfare system goes towards vindicating economic rights, while the kind of active civil society and open media required for true pluralism promote social and cultural rights. Guarantees of the human rights of individual citizens as well as minority segments population in turn guard against majoritarian subversion of democracy or the seductive charms of abuses of utilitarianism. While democratic states rise on a tide of development that lifts all boats, development itself becomes at once more vigorous, more reflective of a people?s needs, and more fully ?owned? by the people in a functional democracy. In such a state, people participate not only as independent economic agents but also as citizens in debating and articulating the desired as well as social direction of the state, actively help constitute, then elect, monitor and hold to account, governments chosen for their promise to deliver that vision. 277 Although the region was seen to boast the world?s largest democracy and two of the oldest democratic states in the developing world, by its very history South Asia lacked any deep well-spring of democratic tradition on which to draw. The actual record of democratic governance was marred both by overt failures of form, where countries have slid back into authoritarianism or never emerged from it in the first place, and by more insidious failures of functioning even within technically correct structures. Both types of failures were catalogued country-by country and region-wide. One leading cause of region-wide failures was identified as the effect of neo- liberal economic reforms. In this regard, the World Bank seems to be aware of only part of the problem. It acknowledges: ?market-oriented reforms [?] can go awry, with painful consequences for poor people. Lack of supporting institutions, mistakes in sequencing reforms, or the capture of the reform process by powerful individuals or groups lie at the bottom of most failed reforms.? 243 Yet, while all these faults can be laid doors many South Asian governments, a deeper problem, to which this report seems blind, has lain in the more basic diverting of accountability inherent in the neo-liberal control of domestic policy. Instead being answerable first and foremost to the real human needs of their respective electorates, governments whose (admittedly sometimes rubber) arms were being twisted by the conditionalities of SAPs and PRSPs, have in practical terms felt more answerable to the constituencies of the IFIs, major donors and, indirectly, the TNCs.In so doing they have also tended to buy into a ?one size fits all? approach instead of reflecting idiosyncratic national needs. The foregoing paragraphs have encapsulated the governance crisis of South Asia and depicted how the dysfunctional democratic systems have a negative impact on the socioeconomic rights, as well as civil and political rights, of the people in the region. South Asian governments are weak and lack the capacity to make appropriate policy choices. There is no feasible mechanism available nationally or within the region to challenge poor, unviable policy decisions that are made by the national governments, and very limited judicial fora are available to challenge 243 World Devlopment Rport 20/01: Atacking Poverty (World Bank, Oxford University Pres,NwYrk, 201)64. 278 such choices. 244 There is a dearth of policy initiatives to promote a structure for economic development that also fosters social integration and advocates emancipation for the millions who are trapped in the cycles of poverty. 245 As highlighted in the introduction of this chapter, the previous analysis has focussed on the international and national mechanisms that attempt to deal with neo-liberal globalization its ramifications. This chapter focussed on another available whole tier of mechanism that has huge potential to grapple with both inherent regional problems and the undesirable imported corollaries of neo-liberal globalization. This is the regional tier. Executed in a non-aggressive and non- protectionist way, tier is not only compatible with the global but synergises with it as a means of pursuing human rights, democracy and development. It also builds on, and consists of, the nation state, since states are the members that form such alliances. With this aim in mind an analysis of the existing regional mechanism of the SAARC was undertaken. The discussion highlighted the absence of regional standards relating to democracy and the reluctance of the member states to involve themselves in norm-establishing exercizes relating to democracy or governance. The analysis indicated that SAARC, as a regional apparatus will remain impotent until the structural and jurisdictional failures of the system highlighted in the above discussion remained unaddressed. Since its inception, critics have expressed doubts about the effectiveness of the SAARC as a regional organization for it failed to address many poverties of the region, mainly human rights, development, democracy and intra-regional tensions. As Dash observes, without addressing these issues, ?[g]iven the low level of mutual trust, spill over effects of the ethnic and religious conflicts, and the magnitude of bilateral disputes in South Asia, it is unrealistic to believe that any substantial growth of regional cooperation is possible without easing political tensions.? 246 244 Se Chapter 2above inrlationtSocial Ation Litgaion. 245 OlivrMndlshdMk ViznyTheUuchbles:Subordinatio, Pverty and the ta no Ii (CmbrigeUversit Prs, Cmrid, 198) 0-12dtailsoflof hemultipe iscrnatos tha t utocablfe t steiltig fc rm povry. 246 KisC Dash ?Te Plitcl Enmy fRgional opration South Asia? Suer (196) PcifAfir<hp:/w.tholke.du/c/itel/dsh.tm >(ced5 Jn 205. 279 One key failing of SAARC was thus seen to be its abdication of responsibility and authority for dealing with particular bilateral tensions, and also with internal strife that reaches the point of civil war. While these conflicts go diplomatically ignored, issues such as Kashmir remain the undiscussed but massively uncomfortable ?elephant in the room?. In this respect it was notable that in Kofi Annan?s words and those of others, peace and security are also desiderata which a regional mechanism can and should aspire to deliver. Peace and security are not only compatible with democracy, development and human rights, but mutually necessary to them. A regional framework that prescribes fixed and enforceable normative standards in relation to human rights, democracy governance, and establish procedures to prevent democratic backsliding within member states can be achieved. In the interests of the people of the region it is imperative that individual states institute and honour both the form and the function of democracy, as separate nations together with each other. At same time, a new and better regional response to the poverty of democracy and the other needs noted will be advocated in Chapter 6 of this study. In the meanwhile, inspiration and concrete models for structures and rules that will optimally suit South Asia will be sought in the Chapter 5. To that end, this next chapter distils the best and most relevant practices of several regional and cross-regional mechanisms from around the globe. 280 CHAPTER 5 THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN REGIONAL AND CROSS-REGIONAL PARADIGMS ?[i]n a world of interconeted threats and challenges, it is in each country?s self- interest that all of them ars effectively. Hc, th cuse of large frdom can oly b advncd byra, dp a sustain globl coprtio am States ? States, how, cnot d the joblon. W ned anctiv civil society an yaic privte sector?W also ned agile effee rgional ad global intergvemtal institutions to milis corinate clletive atio ? We thefo nd n mhaism eur acuntability ? th acoutability of States to thir citizens, of States toah other, of interntiol institutions to thir mebr ad of the prnt gatio to futue gra.? 1 5.1 Introduction The previous chapter highlighted the absence of a deep-rooted culture of ?functional? democracy in South Asia and the impact this lack on governance. The analysis concluded with the observation that it is impossible to inculcate responsible governance ?from bottom up? through the individual states in the region and that the best means of achieving good governance is by an infusion of normative standards through a regional mechanism. Chapter 4 then discussed the effectiveness of the SAARC as candidate for such a regional mechanism and identified its many weaknesses, particularly the structure which precludes it from addressing bilateral or national issues and absence of legal obligations upon states to ensure human rights norms of democracy within their own jurisdictions. Finally, Chapter 4 concluded with the observation that if a South Asian regional mechanism is to be effective it must address the specific critical issues of eradicating material poverty, closing democratic deficits and promoting equitable development which remain urgent region-wide. The present chapter acknowledges that the eradication of poverty and the promotion of equitable development requires a pragmatic and multidimensional effort centred on the promotion of universally accepted human rights. Few initiatives, whether regional, national, or international, do in fact specify an 1 Kofi Ana ?In large frdom:twards evlopment, scurity and human rights for al? (/59205)<htp:/w.unrg/lf/cha1.> (es5M206). 281 integrated approach towards the eradication of poverty, promotion of democratic governance, just development and human rights. Chapter 1 at section 1.7 already noted the innovative procedures of Social Action Litigation (SAL) that have been created in South Asia at national levels to enhance human rights through Social Action Litigation. That section observed SAL?s proven ability to extend into an avenue for scrutinizing and even defining social policy, and the chapter noted the extra significance of this in South Asia as ?a climate where other avenues of public and parliamentary debate are defunct or dysfunctional and results elections are not a true reflection of public opinion.? While SAL will remain extremely valuable, it is neither safe nor sufficient to rely on the ability or willingness of an activist domestic judiciary within each state promote human rights and democracy, especially given precisely those proven tendencies towards manipulation by the executive; nor is it necessary to plant the burden of such initiatives on bold judges. Chapter 1 itself stated rather that best possible outcome of SAL would include wider repercussions in the form of ?legislative or policy changes? as well as enhanced public debate. 2 In fulfillment of that promise, the present chapter looks beyond even such legislative and policy changes to more radical, regional and cross-regional restructurings that have occurred around the globe. It will be argued in this chapter and Chapter 6 that SAL not only facilitates the introduction of such wider mechanisms in South Asia but is compatible with them and will in fact synergize with them ? though they will also be strong enough to work without it if necessary. To this end, the present chapter specifically survey certain key aspects of the mechanisms established at regional levels in the Americas, Europe and Africa and at an inter-regional level through the Commonwealth Association to safeguard human rights, nurture democratic governance and foster development ? the three broad aims discussed in the introduction to Chapter 4. The approaches to regional governance in Europe, the Americas and Africa have taken into consideration the history, socioeconomic and political exigencies of the states in each region and focused on specific issues that were regarded as significant concerns of the particular region. The normative content and 2 RV?ron ?Remaking urban evironmets: he politcal eolgy fair polutin Delhi? (206) 38/1 EvitdPlg A2093?2109. 282 implementation strategies contained in each mechanism are aimed at resolving the region specific exigencies. Ghai observes that regional mechanisms also represent a general agreement ?as to the standards of government behaviour acceptable in the region? and he adds that absence a regional mechanism in Asia and the Pacific is indicative of the absence of such a common consensus. 3 No mechanisms, however efficient, can be completely transported to another region, as they have to be synthesized into each economic, cultural and political milieu. However, these arrangements can be a valuable guide an inspiration when creating a mechanism that is particular to South Asia. 5.2 Drawing Inspiration from Alternative Regional and Cross-regional Paradigms As much as globalization entrenched structures that facilitated global economic integration, it has also created an impetus for entrenching systems of justice, law and human rights. These structures extend from systems incorporated under the United Nations, particularly in relation to environmental law regimes 4 and international criminal law 5 , to rejuvenating and enhancing the existing regimes of regional solidarity founded in Europe, the Americas and Africa. These endeavours at global and regional level indicate an increased desire to create definitive legal regimes involving legal rights, responsibilities and obligations. Regionalism as a means of enhancing human rights and consolidating democracy is not a new idea. Several regional mechanisms that work towards protecting and enhancing human rights exist and they have evolved around the sociopolitical mores of the area concerned. Fawcett describes the advantages of regionalism as follows: 6 3 Yash Gai Human Rights and SocialDevlopment Toward Democratizon ad Social Justice (Democry,overceHumn Rights Prge PpNube 5,UiteNtn Rs Insti f Soil Devlp,Ocb 201)3. 4 Cliatrlgiundrth Kyot rtolsMustaf Bikra, Hnry DJoh MReilyc andvi MReirc Th linfaliae rgime: Kyotechadbend(20) 5 Eronmtal SeaPoc 195-206. lies Glius, IntrtilCrimnl Court: AGlbal Civl Soity Aivmt (RutdgNew York206). 6 Lois Fact ?Expligreional dais: cmprtie histr freginalis? (204) 8 283 [aprt] from proting econmic, political nd security coperation ad counity, it can slidate state-building moatiztion, hckevy- hde bhviourbytr, create ndlock inrs ad vlus, inrs traspry, ke state nd intentiol institutionse coutableand hlp to mng th ngativfectsof globliztio. Ret xaples frm Europe, th Aerics, Afric ad pr o Asia suport this asmt. Each of these systems is founded on the premise that rights are illusory unless the procedural means of enforcement is compatible with the political, cultural and social ethos of the region. The legal and institutional framework of each regional organization addresses the specific issues that have a special resonance within that region. None of the arrangements have proven to be instantly efficient for each took years to evolve into viable systems and they are still evolving and adjusting to the exigencies of the times. This chapter does not attempt to make an exhaustive study of all the regional mechanisms in place to promote human rights, democracy and equitable developmental policies. Rather it discusses the key aspects of the various regional mechanisms and their relevance to the new South Asian praxis that is advocated in Chapter 6 of this study. The proposed mechanism is discussed Chapter will draw inspiration from other relevant regional mechanisms already established, but of necessity it differs from them in terms of the normative rights content and the mechanisms of realizing them. However, in terms of the scope and content, the South Asian mechanism will go beyond the traditional European, American and the African regional mechanisms because it has to face new dilemmas challenges that have been brought to the forefront by globalization. 5.3 EUROPE: Exemplary rights jurisprudence created from the most advanced initial conditions 5.3.1 The European System: Council of Europe and Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Interationl Afairs 429?6, 429. 284 The post-war impetus to create regional instruments for the protection and enhancement of human rights was hailed as the most ?radical development in the whole history international law.? 7 Among these, the European system (under the aegis of the Council of Europe) is widely regarded as the ?most advanced and effective? 8 international regime for formally enforcing human rights in the world today. The Council of Europe is a legal regime that caters to a like-minded group of countries that not only share common political ideology but have joined together to defend the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The states share similar established systems of democracies that endeavour to protect and promote human rights, an endeavour which has in turn facilitated and streamlined an efficient regional rights regime. The region also has the advantage of economic prosperity, which provides resources for procedural implementation of a human rights system effectively ? phenomena that are absent in South Asia. The Council of Europe, which created the European human rights regime and is administered through the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), stipulates that, ?[e]very member of Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction human rights fundamental freedoms? 9 and must contribute to the aims of the Council, which, among others, are the protection of the common heritage, facilitating economic and social progress and ?the maintenance and further realization of human rights fundamental freedoms.? 10 It is after the preconditions of the rule of law and the respect for human rights are satisfied that the Committee of Ministers invites a state party to become a member of the Council of Europe. By 2007, 47 states had become members of the Council Europe; 11 all them had ratified the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (the European Convention) and had also accepted the right of individual petition to the Commission of Human Rights 7 John PHumphrey ?The Rvolutinthe Intrationl Law ofHuman Rights? (1974) Human Rigts205, 8?209. 8 L ekin, Grald LNma, Di FOrtlicher, d Dvi WLebron Human Rights (Foundatio PrsewYork, 19)51. 9 Articl 3fth Stu ftheCuncil ofEurp <hp:/venis.c.in/Traty/Treatis/Html/01.ht> (acesd 16Apr 206). 10 rtil 1B ofte ta of l froe :/cis..it/ret/nrtis/tl/.t (s r ). 11 Se list fmbr s fCucil ofEurp <htp:/w.oe.int/TE/om/Abt_e/Mmber_stae/dfault.sp> (acesd 12Feb 08). 285 (during its existence until 1998) and the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 12 The acceptance of the European Convention, the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and of the binding nature of its judgments is a prerequisite for membership of the European Council. 13 Therefore, a state?s respect for human rights and its domestic human rights record is assessed and ensured before it is accepted into the Council. For instance, Russia?s domestic human rights record was deemed inadequate for the country to be admitted to the Council in 1994. 14 The initial mechanism for the vindication of rights in operation from 1953 until 1998 was the two-tiered structure of the European Commission of Human Rights and the Court. During the initial stages this process was deemed efficient as the Commission was designed to be a filtering mechanism for the cases before Court. As with all regional instruments, which need to evolve with time to meet contemporary exigencies, the European system, too, was adjusted and underwent a major overhaul in 1998. The changes were designed to streamline create efficiency in the processing of complaints of human rights abuse. 15 The role of the Commission of Human Rights appeared increasingly redundant with many cases being brought to the Court and therefore the Commission was abandoned and the Court was restructured to be more administratively efficient under Protocol 11 of the European Convention in 1998. 16 The implementation mechanism of the European Convention is now the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 17 and the Committee of Ministers, which is 12 <htp:/w.coe.int/TE/Com/About_COE/> (acesd 16Apr 206). 13 Inerim Rslut RsDH(201)8 cnerigth jugmentoftheEuropean Court fHuman Rigtsof28Jy,198i the cas fLizdou insTrky <hp:/cd.oe.int/Vwo.jp?id=2701&La=e> (acsd 16Ar 206). 14 Vi Mrt ?W te Cuncl ofErpe Shld PutCongleratRusiaonld? Interatinl HeraldTrib(Thrsay Fbruay195) <htp:/w.ihtcom/tcls/195/02/dt.p>;seals Din Ethier ?Is Demcray Promti Efiv? paring oitnli nd Icntiv?(203)1/otizon 99?120. 15 Clents, Mole and Sis Eurpea Huma Rights: Takig Case undr The Cveti (2d, Swtxwel,Lond, 19); PietrvnDijetl.ThoryPactiof h Europavti oHuma Rights(3rd , Klwer, Hu, 198); RBrndt?Rrm f the ntrol achnry rteEuopanCotiomanigts:otl N. 1? (195)8 AJIL145?154. 16 ProtclN. to e Covnti fr the Prtcin fu Rihts ad Funametl Fedms, retucringthcrlmacinysablshedtreby <htp:/nvis../Teaty/Cou/QVouzos.ap?NT=15&CM=7DF2/0 8&CL=EG >(aed 10Fb 208). 17 RicardPier Clu,BrnsHWestn(eds) Hman Rights inte World munity: Isue anAton (Uivrsity ofPeylvai Pr,192). 286 also the key political institution of the Council of Europe. The European Convention has entrusted the monitoring and the supervision of the Court?s judgments to this body. The Court?s jurisdiction is wide and offers redress to all persons whose rights, which have been guaranteed under the European Convention, have been violated. The Court entertains applications from individuals as well as states and though it is rare for a state to make an allegation of rights violations by another state, nevertheless the lingering memories of the Holocaust make such a provision essential to legitimacy of the mechanism. The Court?s judgments are final and legally binding on respondent states. 18 However, as the are declaratory in nature, while the Court can pronounce upon violation of European Convention articles and award compensation, it cannot compel a state to amend the offending legislation or alter the practice to avoid similar future violations. 19 The requirement that all domestic remedies must be exhausted before an applicant 20 petitions the Court reiterates the position that the regional judicial forum is a place of last resort and that European Convention envisages that the national governments have appropriate fora to offer redress for human rights violations. The proceedings of the Court usually involve nine judges including a judge from the country in question, but have provision to seat a Grand Chamber of 21 judges in what is essentially an appellate process. Once the case is declared admissible the Court initially strives for an amicable settlement, which can range from the payment of compensation to the amending of offending legislation or administrative process. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which is the implementing organ of the European Human Rights mechanism, is vested with the duty to ensure that judgments are implemented by individual countries in terms of payment of compensation or the requisite amendments to the laws or 18 Articles 4& 6? 1of the Convetion asmend byProtcl No. 1(formely Article 53) povd:?ThHigCnracigParudrtk toaie hefinaljudgntfhCourtin any s towc they pts?. 19 SieYe InriolLwnthe Post-Cld Wr old: Esy iMeory fLi Hapei (Routldg,Ld, UK, 201) 49 (Y). 20 Th aplicts theCurtmstb anymous an they must beking rdes for viltinof ra isnhied itheveti.Iisloipraiv that ptine nkes juisdctoft Erop Court wh x ts fth flomscharig. 287 administrative proceedings being carried out. It can also assist with the reopening of proceedings if necessary. The European Convention on Human Rights, while prescribing a regional mechanism for the protection of human rights, places significant emphasis on the point that primary responsibility for securing human rights is vested with individual countries 21 and that the implementation machinery at regional level is activated only once all domestic remedies are exhausted. This preference for national remedies through national rights legislation is efficacious in a region where there are effective and efficient judicial systems and monitoring bodies and the spirit of human rights is deeply entrenched within the governing structures. 22 In this sense the European system of human rights vindication is a system with sophistication and maturity and also a forum of last resort. In most instances the purpose of the European system has been the reinforcement of rights and procedures that can better safeguard human rights in a domestic context. The ECHR has inspired the legal systems of the member countries significantly in terms of altering legislation, policy stances and the legal perceptions regarding human rights within the system. 23 In this context there is veracity in the Court?s pronouncement that European Convention is ?a constitutional document of European public order.? 24 The significance of the emergence of regional mechanisms on human rights lay in the fact that its evolution reflects a particular response to the dilemmas and the concerns of region at a particular time. The impetus create the European system human rights was rooted in the horror of the Nazi atrocities, deep scepticism towards the Soviet Bloc and slow development of universal mechanisms to protect human rights under the aegis of the United Nations. 25 In this sense, the European system, as any other regional mechanism, was a reaction to the needs and the concerns of an era and political demography, which is 21 ECHR Articles 1& 3. 22 obeBakburnTheEuropean Coventio nHuman Rights: Te Impact ofthe European nvtin oma Rigts thLgal dPlitclSyeofMbrSs(Csl, Ld,198). 23 rice DiksHun its and te Europen Covnti: Th Efects ofthe onvetion thUntKngdo adIrel(Sw&Maxwl,Ld,197). 24 Loizdu v.Trey310 Eu. Ct. H.R sr. A195 27. 25 HeryStei PhilpAlston ItetionlHumanRights inCotex: Law, Politcs, Morals (Oxf nrsitrs, 2)78. 288 reflected by the exclusion of social rights in the Convention except the Paris Protocol of 1952 to the Convention, Article 2, which decreed no-one is to be deprived right education. 26 Pierre-Henry Teigen, one of the architects of the Convention, explained the reasons for this exclusion by saying that the primary duty of the Convention was to safeguard the ?political democracy of Europe? and issues of social democracy were to be addressed later. 27 Therefore, the issue of social and economic rights was shelved to emerge later as the European Social Charter in 1961. The European system was the first attempt at transforming the ideals enshrined in the UDHR into a working legal framework, and half a century later it has matured into an efficient system of implementing human rights and monitoring violations and has contributed immensely to the evolution of contemporary human rights jurisprudence particularly in the field of civil and political rights. At this moment it is also vital to highlight a fundamental distinction between the European system and the proposed South Asian praxis. The European human rights regime under aegis of the Council of Europe is a mechanism that empowers individuals against their respective states. The regime ensures governmental accountability internally to a predetermined normative standard. The regime in this sense is a second line of defence, or a tool of reinforcement, for citizens of the participant states, because by definition their states will already have complied with the normative standards that are prerequisites for membership of the Council. The regime in this sense is a tool of empowerment the people for European system at a regional level as it caters to human rights lapses at domestic level. A functional mechanism to safeguard rights is presupposed at national level as democracy is a prerequisite to the membership of the European Council. As the discussions of Chapters 2 and 4 indicated, the luxury efficient domestic human rights systems is unavailable in South Asia. In the South Asian context it would be the regional human rights mechanism?s responsibility to 26 Protcl tohe Convetion frtheProtcin ofHuman Rights and Fuamentl Fredoms asmendbyPrtcl N.1,ais, 20.I1952ediofriclesd xtane crig t pisf rtclN (ETS N. 15) s ttryitofrc 1 Novr198<ht:/onveions.e.int/raty/nratie/Hl/09.h> (aesd0Fb 2008). 27 Qutedin Hery Steir ad Philp Alsto Itertiol umn rigts inCotx: Law, Polics, Moals(OxfoUniverstyre,20)794. 289 determine normative standards, foster them nationally and ensure the correct implementation of the human rights occurs at domestic level. 5.3.2 The European Social Charter: Bringing ESC Rights in from the Cold The European Social Charter, adopted in 1961 and substantially revised in 1996, 28 is a specialized human rights mechanism that has evolved through the Council of Europe and is regarded as the natural counterpart in the ESC realm the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the latter being aimed at safeguarding civil and political rights. The primary concern of the Social Charter is the classic social and economic rights in the universal system, and the states parties to the Charter seek to honour the obligations of the Charter in spirit as well as implementing strategies nationally to realize rights contained in the Charter. 29 The Social Charter enshrines the right to work, education, right to vocational guidance and training, non-discrimination, prohibition of forced labour, trade union rights and the right of women and men to equal pay for work of equal value, as well as elaborate measures on social protection, rights of children and young persons, right to healthcare protection, social, legal and economic protection and to social security. 30 It is designed to address concerns including social welfare, issues of social cohesion, which would enhance the quality of life of the people. The revised Social Charter (1996) has broad-based rights that encompass protection against poverty and social exclusion, the right to adequate accommodation and protection in instances of unjust termination of employment 28 The rvised Social Chrte of196,whic ame into efct in19, reflcts he cangi social cirumtanctembstae. Itonsldtasigldoumntrigtrzedn t oigl Chr f196, rigregiz ith Aital Prol f198 rti newrts.Se alsoRinhucl a UrfanKliq?Te CctiveCplaintsSymof th Eupnci harte: A EftivMcism for Ensurig lice wh Ecnic adocial Rights??(204)15rJornl ofIt Lw417?56.(hr andKliq). 29 DJHrs?Te Europn Scial Chte?July(96) 3/ Te Ittiol Copartive LwQutly176?87. 30 For ighs rating thsig, elt, dcation, employnt, lgal nd scial prtecin, mventofpes,ad no-iscrmin, sArtics 1?3EuropeSohar196 <htp:/cvti.coe.it/raty/Tte/Htl/163.h>(cs 23Ju 205); s lso Nial Jywkram Jul Aplito fuan Rigts Law: Ntinal,Rginld Intertionl Juispdn(CbrdgUnivrsityPre,Wetyk Y USA, 2) 74. 290 and rights related to the movement of people. The Additional Protocol to the Social Charter entered into force in 1998 and expanded the jurisdiction of Charter and provided an opportunity for workers? groups and NGOs to initiate collective complaints to the European Committee of Social Rights. 31 The Explanatory Report on Protocol justified the collective complaints mechanism on the basis that it is: 32 designed to increase the efficiency of supervisory machinery based solely on the submission of governmental reports. In particular, this system should increase participation by management and labour and non- governmental organizations ... The way in which the machinery as a whole functions can only be enhanced the greater interest that these bodies may be expected to show in the Charter. At the centre of the monitoring and the implementation system of the Social Charter is the European Committee of Social Rights, 33 which scrutinizes the periodic governmental reports submitted to it on the implementation of Charter. The Committee, quasi judicial in nature, comprises independent experts who evaluate the reports and submit their observations in the form of ?Conclusions? to Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, who in turn issue recommendations to governments asking them to change their national legislation or policies to ensure compliance. In addition to the above mechanisms, the European system also has a Commissioner for Human Rights, 34 an office that was created in April 1999. The European Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) elects the Commissioner for a period of six years and the Commissioner is vested with specific mandate ?to promote education awareness of human rights, to identify areas of laws that fail to recognize human rights to a full extent and 31 Aditonal Protcl tohe EuropeanSocial Chrte Providng for aSystem ofClectiv ComplsCETS N:158;sls hurndKalq, be25. 32 uci furpe,xlantryRt t ctieCmplintsPrtcl (195) pars 1?8 <ht:/nvetions.c.it/e/nepors/HTML/158.h.> (aced 10Feb208. 33 ?Th Era m ofScial ight aertins wtroutrishav onured th undertakigs tui thCart. Itsrnidpe, iptil rlcbye Cocl frope ite fMine fo rio fsxyears,newbl . T mitedtins wro t aila nracti th StasPrtiesarin nfry wih hart.? (Aicl24f theCrte, smdy 19 u Potcl) <htp:/.co.it/TE/Human_Rghts/Ec/1_Gl_Prentaio/Crt_glnc.sp#TOfP age> (acesd 14May 206) 34 <htp:/w.coe.int/TE/Coisoner_H.R/Comunicato_Unit/> (acesd 14May 206). 291 human rights laws that are not fully implemented and to promote a respect for and enjoyment of human rights in COE member states.? 35 The Commissioner does not have powers investigation into individual complaints relating to rights that have been violated. The distinction that is maintained by the European states in relation to civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights on the other, has its roots in ideological convictions as much as administrative expediency. Economic, social and cultural rights being progressive in nature are traditionally considered to be lacking in justiciability, a quality that is regarded as an integral characteristic of civil and political rights ?but whose nature is now being questioned. 36 In keeping with the ideological premises, the European states have adopted a dual-pronged mechanism for human rights protection. The implementation mechanism of the Social Charter is distinctly different from that of the ECHR. Issues such as prevention, education and the general supervision of national human rights legislation are vested in the Human Rights Commissioner, a role which is essentially administrative. The European Human Rights system is a fine blend of common political ideological convictions, social expediency and administrative functionalism. The human rights protection mechanism in Europe was created half a century ago; however, the system remained sensitive to the changing conceptual articulations of human rights, and the content and scope of the Convention have been amended through subsequent Protocols. The European Human Rights Commission was disbanded when it was deemed dysfunctional in the contemporary context of human rights litigation. The scope and the reach of Social Charter have been repeatedly enhanced to respond to insecurities that were felt with the rapid expansion of the economic globalization process. 37 The 35 Resolutin (9)50 ofthe CouncilfEurope Cmisoner f Human Rights adopte bythe CmfMisr7May 19. 36 ichal Ad ?JuticabiltRe-xind? iD Hil &R Bdr (eds) Ecnmic Sial nd ultrRigts19 nd E ?coc Soalndutralightaua ghts?A Eide, Kue aRos(ds) Emici C s ATxtBok (2 nd e, 201). 37 Chrcil nd hliq, abve n25. 292 success of the European Court as an effective mechanism for human rights protection has been proved over the years. As Yee observes: 38 The xprience ofand with the European Court f Human Rights demonstrates that, t least thregional levl, individal ights cbe prtec by interntiol urt. States r, rg log period, rlutat to apt the juisdic ofthe EopCout, bt overths an insiteofdeisions cosiderablyrstricting the svreignty fStates, t firt thewtern Eura State n inc 190naly ll thrEuropea States hav cpte the inrtiol contrl ad th compulsoy jisdiction of th Court. The implementation apparatus of the ECHR is the most sophisticated and best executed of all of the regional mechanisms considered in this chapter. This success is largely dependent on the mature and well established national adjudicatory systems and the functional democratic governance which is the norm in the region. Social rights, while traditionally sidelined especially within the Western European discourse of human rights, have been prominent on the agenda in Europe in recent years. The debate about providing equal status to both social and economic rights gathered a new impetus with the influx of post-communist states into the Council of Europe. Moreover there is increased academic observation that ?to consider that all of the rights that are found in treaties which promote and protect economic and social incapable of being judicially determined is an oversimplification.? 39 The revision the Council of Europe's European Social Charter to allow for a collective complaints procedure also appears to endorse this position. Today, the European human rights system that operates through the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and European Social Charter is a fundamental facet of the European regionalization ethos despite the challenges that have emerged, particularly through the expansion of its membership to states that not always shared a liberal democratic political history. ?In the first few decades of its existence, the organs of the European Convention system, in contrast to those of other regional systems for the protection of human rights, were privileged in that their field of application 38 Ye, above n16. 39 ChurcildKhaliq, bove n25, 40. 293 extended, on the whole, to a relatively homogeneous region of Europe where democracy and rule of law were well-established.? 40 However, increasingly both the Council of Europe and, at a slower pace, the EU are embracing states that have evolved in the past with different political and social ideologies. 41 These states have vastly different legal systems and the concept of rights embraced by them is from the familiar liberal rights theories of Western Europe. While democratic governance and acceptable human rights standards are deemed to be preconditions for acceptance into the Council of Europe, such values are not yet fully embedded in the sociopolitical and cultural mores of many of the states that are classified as ?transitional democracies?. 42 It is these new member will test the capacity of the European regional system and offer challenges in terms of substantive rights enshrined in the Convention the Social Charter and the adequacy of the mechanisms place to vindicate these rights. Chapter 6 will illustrate how the proposed South Asian system can learn from the coherence and the systematic implementation of human rights within the Council of Europe?s States. It will also debate the efficacy of introducing a Social Rights Charter and whether in respect of monitoring and implementation South Asia should go further than its European counterpart, which has a restricted and clearly defined collective complaints system that the states have the prerogative to opt into and also operates a of annual country reports to the Council of Ministers. 5.4 The Americas and the Caribbean: A Powerful Mechanism for Democracy through a Turbulent History 40 Ye, above n18. 41 ThCucilfEurope has 47mebrs aof 207 mebr stae includig 2from the fore Sovit Bl. Ithas gntdbrv tut5rcounti(hHoy Se,thUnidSats, and,JapndMxic). 42 hle Horwitz ?Cuseaconseqnces ofvarit ipst cmunist a rights prctis?i ShleHorwitz d Albrht Sbel (ds)uanRight adSocietn Tan(UNnivsyPrs,204)2. 294 5.4.1 The Organization of American States ? The Organization of American States: Rebuilding democracies and breaking the non- intervention mould The Inter-American system is a remarkable example of regional collaboration that not only promotes human rights but also contributes to the evolution of a new ethos of democratic governance, which is an essential pre-condition for the success human rights. Latin America, notorious for its brutal political history, 43 authoritarianism and military dictatorships, has evolved a ?well-established norm of civilian, constitutional government in the hemisphere.? 44 Many observe that within the past three decades the American states have being a part of the global ?third wave? transition to democracy. 45 Diamond expands on Huntington?s classification of the period stemming from the mid 1970s as the ?third wave? of global democratic expansion and explains that Huntington ?defines ?a group transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period?. 46 He identifies two previous waves of democratization: a long, slow wave from 1828 to 1926 and a second wave from 1943 to 1964. Significantly, each of these ended with what he calls a ?reverse wave? of democratic breakdowns (the first lasting from 1922 to 1942, the second from 1961 to 1975), in which some of the newly established (or re-established) democracies failed.? 47 This democratic transition in Latin America is remarkable as this was the era when stabilisation and privatisation policies introduced by the IFIs had devastating repercussions on the region?s political and social life, 48 often 43 For abief historical ount seJuan EMendz a Jvier Mariezcurena ?Human Rights In LtinAmrcandTheCrib: ARgiolPrspct?Pp sbitdtohe Devlpt Rprt 20 Hmihts Hum Dlomnt; ls Jrg IDo?uez ad MihelSif(s)onstructnDecratiGvernace iLaiAica (Jns Hpkins Unrsty Prs, 3 Medz a arizen). 44 Te idWavofDcrtioLt Aric:Ads nd Setbks Fres agoi adScot inwrig (s) (Cmbridge Uivsty Pes, Cambrig205);MichlSifter ?nsi Tde-OfinLati Aca?(197)8/2Journl ofDocray 116. 45 Mhael so a oldJckson ?Hrizontal ctity inTsitonalDmocrais: THumnRightmbus iElSlvdGaela?(204) 6/ Lti Aen Politcs &Scey 1?27. 46 SaelP utintoTheird Wave: Dmocratizon ith Lte Twntieh Cntury (UnivrsitofOkla Prs,Non19) 5. 47 Ly Damd ?Is ti Or??(6)7Joural fDmocray 20?37, 20. 48 Riordet,Crolse(ds)Post-Stabilztion PlitcsinLti Aei: ompetion, Tanst, olps (Bking Itiuon Pres,203). 295 fuelling civil dissent and resentment against the governments, which in turn created opportunities for the governments to react with violence and brutality. The Americas and the Caribbean are a region that has a peculiar political history and culture which is heavily influenced by more than one nation?s colonialism as well as by indigenous traditions. 49 The region?s relationship with democracy and human rights has been at best sporadic, with dictatorships, coups-d??tat, autogolpes and military juntas dominating the political landscape of the region particularly in the 1970s and the 1980s. 50 Referring to this period as era of the ?Doctrine of Security of State?, 51 Gomez explains how the military carried out ?disappearances? to eliminate subversive elements that sympathised (at least allegedly) with the theories of communism. Such a political climate, which disregarded finer traditions democracy and the rule of law, also contributed to massive human rights abuses that were perceived to be the price one paid for containing communism. 52 The end of the Cold War eradicated past insecurities 53 and the region has emerged as one that has experienced a ?democratic renaissance?. 54 According to Ambassador Odeen Ishmael of Guyana, Caribbean countries played a crucial role in this revival: ?The CARICOM nations have a long tradition of representative democracy and the respect and protection of human rights, and the fresh ideas they brought to forum of the OAS encouraged this hemispheric body to adjust its perspective. Issues relating to democracy in the hemisphere became more important, and programs to encourage democratic development such as promoting 49 Maxwel ACameron ?ThreatsoDemcray inthe Amricas? (Policy dument, Cadin Foundtiofr th ic, Owa, M 20)<p:/w.f.a/pf/thrs.pf> (cesd 5 r 205). 50 ELtz and KSikn ?Iterntiol Huan Rights La nd Prctie inLati Amria? () 4Iertoal rgaiz 63?59. 51 Veroic Gmz ?TheIt Amrica Systemfor te Protci ofHuma Rights? Hun Rights LawCntrNwslr20June1 , 3.<p:/.oiga.ck/lw/hrl/nws/jun96.htm> (aesd 16Mr 205). 52 Conie Pck Sustble P: T Ro fthe UN ad Regionl OrganiztosinPrevntig flct (Rman d Litfildubliser,York,18) 39. 53 As FraiscoVilgr?ne ?n, Gatmla's fe Abasdr the Uited Natios ad the OS,pont ut, ?The ColWarcosrinedthrlthte Sanornrnl orgizswrablt py iy s pcudy fctiv fts bythe OAS to mte dcti dvment.? ThOASaDemoraticDvelpmt(idSas InsiuofPe,shigto, Spber 192) 8. 54 T Far ?Coltely Dfdig Dmocyin th Westrn Hisher: Introuctin d Overiw?inByd Svrinty:Cltivl efdigocay ntAias (Jhs Hopks UversitPrs, Balore, 196) 7. 296 and supporting programs to reduce poverty and to combat crime became more and more significant as the years progressed.? 55 The Caribbean influence as a phenomenon in itself, apart from the exhaustion of the civil society from endless political strife and the changing ethos of world politics, indeed also contributed to the transformation. Today, other than Cuba and perhaps Haiti, all countries in the Caribbean and also the Americas enjoy some form of democracy although a majority of the regimes are classified by analysts as ?semi democracies?, ?near democracies? or ?partially illiberal democracies?. 56 Diamond also agrees with this point of view and concedes that the democratic governance in the Americas is yet to be internalized to achieve a sense of legitimacy within both the elite political circles and the people. 57 Democratic consolidation is a long and arduous trajectory and the neo-liberal economic drive in the Americas have not aided in creating a conducive environment for democracy to thrive. In this context the achievements in relation to democratic transition within the member states of OAS are laudable. The OAS asserts that one of its essential purposes is ?[t]o promote and consolidate representative democracy.? 58 The OAS, through both the creation of institutions and the adoption of several instruments, has created a unique framework to foster democratic governance in the region. Not only have the OAS Charter and supporting treaties emphasised significance of democracy, they also reiterate 59 the natural nexus between democracy, human rights and development as discussed in the introduction to Chapter 4 of this study. To Spehar, the action of the OAS ?reflects a long-term commitment to institutional strengthening and to promotion of democratic political culture in the Americas, which in itself 55 Staemnt by Ambasdor OenIshmael ofGuyan ithe Prmanet Council ofthe OAS Durig iscuio n theIt-AricDcrtiCrWshigD,20Jun201 <htp:/w.g.rg/Spcs/il_s0621.hml> (acd 7Mr 5). 56 Giler O?Dl ?Dlgatve oray? (94)5/1 Journalofemocray 55?69; Frdom Huse203bFredom inhWld cuntrtings,92 thg 203? vilbe on- lin at:<htp:/w.fhus.r/atings/e0.xl> (acesd1r5). 57 Lry iaond Csoliatg eocy th Amrics17) 50 Te Anals ofth AeicAeyf Pclnd Siliec12?41. 58 rtl 2B -hartthe Oraiztn frianStes, amend byth Prtcl f Bunosirsignd o27Fbuy 1967;byth Potcl fCrtga Iiason5 Dember 1985; ad byte Prtcl fWsigto, 4Decmber192;by hProtcl fMgua, 10 Je3<hp:/w.as.r/jrdc/enlis/at.htl>(acesd 10r20). 59 Ibi Articl . 297 can be considered a form of prevention against future conflicts or ruptures in the democratic process in Member States.? 60 5.4.2 OAS Mechanisms to enhance democracy The Unit for Promotion of Democracy (UPD) 61 established in 1990 under Resolution 1080 is the principal body of the OAS responsible for activities in support of democratic consolidation within member states of the OAS. It provides immediate and effective technical support and guidance to strengthen democratic institutions procedures. Over the nearly two decades of its existence it has evolved into the fundamental source which the countries in the region can rely on to provide an impetus for national peace building and reconciliation processes, especially after emerging from often volatile and violent autocratic regimes. The UPD is also responsible for the provision of education and training and information about democratic practices for the region. It has furthermore played a pivotal role in providing modern technology to the countries so that they are able to effectively implement electoral processes. 62 The Electoral Observation Missions, undertaken by the UPD on behalf of the Secretary General of the OAS since 1990, have contributed to the fostering democratic practices in region. Although elections are not a sufficient guarantee of the health of a democracy they are certainly necessary and help to create or restore legitimacy and transparency to the process of governance. 63 The OAS mission of promoting and consolidating democracy in the region has also involved several amendments to the OAS Charter and other resolutions. The OAS Charter?s Preamble, which was amended through the Cartagena Protocol of 1985, is in many ways the prelude to the Organization?s renewed commitment to democracy, for the amendment succinctly declared ?representative democracy as 60 ESpehar ?Te Rol fthe Organizto fAmerican Stes inCoflict Prevntio? (201) 8/ IntrtionlJurnaMioity d GrupRights 61?70. 61 <:/w.pd.s.r/lbt.htl> (d 10Mar 205). 62 Prestai byElizeth Spear, ExecivCorinatorf theUnitforthe Promtin of Dmoc,GS/OA, 18Fruy20 <tp:/w.sumi- aris.rgCI%20tings/18-FEB-00 EGI/Prtai> (acsd 5Mar 205). 63 Tha others ?The Obrve bservd?[197] Jonl ofDemory8. 298 an indispensable condition for the stability, peace, and development of the region?, thereby elevating democracy into a core concern of the organization. 64 The commitment to democracy was further enhanced when the OAS General Assembly adopted the resolution ?The Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of Inter-American System? in June 1991, which reiterated the member states? stance on democratic governance and undertook to create ?efficacious, timely and expeditious procedures to ensure the promotion and defence of democracy?. 65 The Santiago Commitment, although devoid of legal strength or systematic procedures to implement the commitment to democratic governance, was nevertheless significant as it indicated the member states? intolerance [dislike sounds weak]of undemocratic governance. The Santiago Commitment also reaffirmed the ?inescapable commitment to the defense and promotion of representative democracy and human rights ... within framework of respect for the principles of self-determination and non-intervention.? In this sense, the Santiago commitment was paradoxical. While it affirmed the members? commitment to the ?principle of non intervention? it also laid foundation of the radical idea that a domestic political crisis can justify regional intervention. In a region where the notion of sovereignty appeared sacrosanct, such a step indicates the level of disenchantment with recurring military governance as well as the genuine desire the member states to establish democracy in the region. 66 In fact, this was the point where Mu?oz claims the right to democracy transmuted from being a mere ?moral prescription? to ?an international legal obligation?. 67 64 Protcl fAmendt otheCarte ofthe Organizto fAmerican Stes "Protcl f CagenadIias", O.AS.Trty SisN.6, erdint 16Novmb198. <htp:/w.o.rg/juric/nglis/rt/-50.tml> (acesd5 207). 65 <.sxaehdocagdoc42_3rv.pf (acesd5207). 66 Article 19, chapter 4 of t S Crte, ?Fundaetl Rightsn Dutis ofStaes,?taes ths gudlinsly:?NtaepfSts hr oirvne,ircly or indrty, for rsn whvr, inth itrlorxtnal frsf ay th st.Th foeipiclepoibts otlyarmedfce bu lsythermofirfenr atmt hrat gist eprit ot Stargi ispolitcl, enic, ad cultal lns.? 67 Heraldo Mu?z ?The rigt odecray inthe Amricas? (198) 40(traslte byMar D?L)JrnalofIntamican Stuis&Worldf?. 299 The Santiago Commitment was a declaration and lacked legal force. By contrast, the subsequent Resolution on Representative Democracy (Resolution 1080) 68 provided for the Secretary General to call for the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council in the event of any sudden interruption to the democratic political institutional process or to the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization?s member states. In such an event the permanent Council could be convoked in order, within the framework of Charter, to examine the situation, and to decide on and convene an ad hoc meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or a special session of the General Assembly, all which must take place within ten days. 69 Resolution 1080 has been relied upon on several occasions as a means of responding politically to interruptions to democratic governance and has proven to be an effective tool defuse volatile situations as well as instances of ?democratic backsliding? 70 in the region. The Santiago Declaration and Resolution 1080 created the procedure for swift regional action in situations of democratic backsliding in the form of military coups and/or the assumption power by dictators, such as those cases which occurred in Guatemala, Peru, Haiti, and Ecuador. This process placed the OAS in the forefront of efforts by international organizations to promote democracy the central and southern American region. 71 The two documents discussed above initiated the evolution of a new principle of the multilateral defence of representative democracy in the region, which diminished the significance the doctrine of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention from intra- regional relationships. The essential spirit of the two documents succeeded in creating ?a new, automatic procedure to follow for organizing an external response to democratic breakdown. Second, they issued a 68 AG/RES.108(XI-O/91) Reprsntaive Dmocray (Resolutin adopte athe fit plenary seion, held on5 Jue, <ht:/w.as.g/juidc/gh/rs108.m>(acsd10 Mar 205). 69 Ibirticle 1. 70 un Squirs ?Democray Without Brdes Cros-Regional Survey of Multiaerl Pro- DemorayEfot?Ppdfrpesnaioath wrkshpTnsatinDmnsif ctizn ih Aris, Mt Als University, N Brwck, Cd, 14?26 June 2005 <htp:/w.ta.c/fulty/soci/nteratiol_rlatios/rkshop/PDFs/_quires.pf> (acesd 17 Oc 206) 71 ElenLutznd Kthrn Sik ?Itrntil Humn Rigts Law nd racti nLti Amria? ()54IeatolOrgaizo 63?659. 300 license to the OAS to undertake a wide range of collective activity so long as such actions were approved by its member states? foreign ministers or the General Assembly. Finally, they established the principle of rapid response.? 72 The drive for democratic consolidation achieved another milestone at the 22 nd OAS General Assembly in Nassau, Bahamas, in May 1992, where member states resolved to take specific action against the democratic delinquents in the region by suspending the governments of member states when a sudden or irregular interruption of the institutional democratic process takes place. 73 Furthermore, the creation of a new regional norm of democratic governance achieved another boost through the adoption of the Managua Declaration for the Promotion of Democracy and Development in June 1993. 74 This declaration was significant in that it not only incorporated the need for democratic governance but also reiterated the essential nexus between democracy and broader issues such as freedom, social justice, human rights and peace. It also highlighted the need for an overall approach to resolve these issues if democratic governance is to succeed in the region. The Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) of 2001 75 was the culmination of a long period of effort by the OAS in creating a multilateral response to interruptions democracy in region. It is significant that democracy was regarded as a condition for member states to participate in the proceeding?s summit process, which adopted the Democratic Charter. 76 The Charter heralded in a new era for intra-regional relations as ?[t]he normative purpose behind the charter centred on the collective right to democracy as opposed to the traditional 72 Andrew Coper and Thomas Leglr?The OAS Democrati Solidarity Pardigm: Question f Colctivand Ntilerhip? (Sing201)43 LnAecnolitcs nScy106. 73 rl 9?[]Mbr ft Oazto wsdrtil sueovrt has benertho yfocaybesuedfr the xcs ofthrigt patiateine sios fGenral Asml, th MtingConsultain,e Cncilsf h Orgztio ad tSpcialsd Cfernslas cmis wrki roundy hr biestbh.?dt ote Crtehrg the WhgtPtl f193wic cm no fre in197 <htp:/w.s.og/juido/nlis/care.ml> (aces 5Mar 205);salsFacisoVilagr?n dL?n T OAS ad Dotic Dvopnt(Uited Stae Itiu fPe, Wsto,Septmber,192)0. 74 [AG/DEC.4(XI-O/93)] <h:/.ud.os.rg/lbhistry.htl> (acesd 17ar 205) 75 htp:woas.rgchart/dcsrltin_p4tm (aced 7Nov20). 76 ndre Fpe ?Te Mking ofe Ir-AericnDorticCrt: ACase ofmplex Multialism? (204)5/1IteratilStudis Ptivs 92?113. 301 defence of sovereignty.? 77 Article 1 of the Charter states that ?[t]he peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it?, 78 thereby promoting democracy as a specific right as well as a hemispheric principle. The IADC is a special document in its genre because it has taken into account the political climate of the region and caters specifically to the exigencies that will arise during democratic governance, especially the prevention of the emergence of new authoritarian practices in the hemisphere. The Charter expanded notion democratic crisis beyond traditional coup-d??tat or military rule to include an undefined ?unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state.? 79 It created a response mechanism in event of an intended threat to democracy. 80 That mechanism can be invoked by a member state voluntarily if it deems that there is an imminent threat to democratic governance. In the event of a breach of the IADC the Permanent Council can be convened at request any member state or Secretary General to undertake a collective assessment and appropriate ?diplomatic initiatives?. 81 The Permanent Council is empowered to recommend an immediate meeting of the General Assembly, and the General Assembly, with a two thirds majority, can suspend a member state for violations of the Charter through an unconstitutional interruption to the state?s democratic order . 82 From this perspective the IADC contains a deterrent against any actions that disrupt democratic order within a state. 77 Ibid.. 78 <htp:/w.oas.rg/charte/docs/reolutin1_ep4.htm> (acesd 10Mar 205). 79 Aricle 19<htp:/w.s.ghat/dcs/roluin1_p4.ht>(cesd18ar 205). 80 t7: ?Wen t vrnm f mb ta cosidr ismortic politcl insuionalrocsrisleittexrise fpwerit k,itayrqus asne frmthe Secrty Gel th Pra Counclorth stngheng d pevti fit dmistm.? Artil 18: ?hn situaions rie a mebr stae t may fct h lopment ofits eocratipolitcltalpocs thlgiexriseofpwer, th ScrayGenral r th Pee Cil y, with rionst ofth govnt ncd,g fr vist rtinsirdetonlzestuai.TeScrtay Gralil subit repoth eman oucl, whic i udrke cltiv smetof the taion,whr csry,a ptsfo thpsronfth dcrisym d its trgtheig.?<:/.as.rg/cat/ds/reluion1_p4.t>(ce 6Mar 205). 81 Ibid Arcl 20 82 ti1. 302 In many ways the IADC transformed democratic rhetoric into reality in the Americas. This is not to say that words themselves, alone, are meaningless. Indeed, as Munir Squires says, ?[i]t is important to note however that words, even without action, play an important role of creating and sustaining norms that have an impact on state behaviour.? 83 The IADC nevertheless goes the extra mile and as such is an action-backed reiteration of members? commitments to democracy. It has proven that doctrines of ?[t]erritorial inviolability, nonintervention, and self-determination? 84 are luxuries that can only be afforded by states with democratic governance. The drive for a ?collective defence of democracy? 85 has made delinquent states? boundaries porous to the regional organization as well as bilateral and multilateral intrusions. The OAS procedures that are in place to defend democracy have been invoked several times with varied degrees of success 86 and with scepticism from various quarters. 87 Democratic consolidation in the region has been only partially successful, resulting in a situation of ?insufficient democracy? whereby even seemingly established democratic regimes encounter issues of legitimacy. 88 There have been accusations made against the OAS that the organization has reacted haphazardly in instances of democratic disruptions and moreover that they appear satisfied with the ?appearance? of democracy ?with a nominal return to elections, as long as they are more or less defensible as expressions of majority opinion, though not fully free and fair by more rigorous standards.? 89 Indeed, as has been 83 Munir Squires ?Dmocray WithoutBrdes: Cros-Regional Survey ofMultiaerl Pro- DemocayEfot? Pepdfrpesnatioth wrkshpTsnati Dmnsif rtizn ihAi, M AlsnUivity, New Brck,Cd, 14?26 Jun, 205. <htp:/wta.c/fulty/soci/nteratiol_relations/rkshop/PFs/_quires.pf> (acesd Je 6) 84 AndrCoper nd Thmas Lglr ?Th OAS iPru: AMdel fr the tr?? (201) 2 Joual fDmcay4. 85 extrM Bif ?A eocrti Norm fr te Wstern Hmispr? An alysi ofthe Orgnizo erinStas,19?psn?Lai ca Studiesoctn(LAS) Cofce LasVgas, Nvd 7- Oct 204 <htp:/wb.rolis.e/~bfe/> sd 17 ay 206)(nifc). 86 Ibidt Tbls 2,3 4. 87 nhiaMcCitok?The AS inPeru: Rom fr Iprovemnt? (201) Journal ofDemocray 124; Wuker Hait: oMaystp?(204)1/ Wld Policy rl41?49. 88 LryDimnd ?nslidtg Dcray inthe Aricasi?NAFT Revistd: Expectaos a Rlite? nlsof the Arcaey flitalndSocal ienc (197) 5012?4. 89 Mndz Mrizcura, bv n42 303 noted above, 90 a majority of the regimes are classified by analysts as semi democracies, near democracies or partially illiberal democracies. 91 While there has been no automatic democratic transformation within the region, the OAS certainly, through its multilateral effort, contributed to creation of a ?principle of collective intervention for democracy? which the member states are willing to support. 92 In many instances, while the democratisation drive of the OAS did not entirely succeed through formal procedures, the informal presence the in the form of facilitators of democratic processes, conveners of mesas de di?logo (roundtable discussions), diplomatic missions and threats economic embargos has contributed to avert the immediate political crisis. 93 The OAS has, in principle, also not rejected options of ?economic sanctions, including the interruption of aid from multilateral financial institutions? in instances of interruptions to democratic governance. 94 Such informal multilateral scrutiny and action has also proven to be a deterrent against the consolidation of authoritarian rule. 95 In the 1980s the OAS embarked on the arduous task of creating an enduring democratic norm in a region that was not only predominantly governed by assorted authoritarian regimes but also beleaguered with problems of extreme poverty, social exclusion, and corruption, and had a disastrous human rights record. While it seemed the earlier Declarations on commitments to democracy went little beyond rhetoric, they were in reality the catalysts of the democratic metamorphosis that subsequently occurred and contributed to process of consensus-building within the region. Although democracy remains shallow, troubled and illiberal in much of the Americas, it at least still exists in most countries a decade or more after transitions to it. This in itself is an achievement without precedent in hemispheric history. Any multilateral effort 90 Se th ext oftnoe 5f thiscapter. 91 GuilrmO?Dl?lgave Dmocay? (194) 5Journal ofDemocray 55?69; Fredom Hos 203b ?Fredm it Worlduntr tings, 72thg203,? vilbeon-liat <htp:/w.fohuse.r/tis/le0.xl> (acesd 7N7). 92 Andre Cpr an Toa Leglr ?Th OAS DmortiSoliarity Pardig: Qusti of Colctivand Ntildrship?(201)43Latinn PcsnSocety103?126. 93 Bfbove 85. 94 Rihr JBlmfil?Making te wstern hispher safe or demora? Th OAS Defns- of-Demcay rg? (194)7 ThWaigto Qutly157?169 95 Hrldo Mu?z ANew OAS for t N Tims? inVir Pkynd Heraldo Mu?z The Fut ftheOS(TntiCenuyFndPre, wYok,193) 82?83. 304 takes time to evolve, to create and to fine-tune its capability, structures, modalities and priorities, and the democratic initiative of the OAS has proven this. As Mendez and Mariezcurrena emphasise ?[i]t is a mistake to assume that democracy and human rights are in full effect only because elections are generally held. On the other hand, it would be an even more serious mistake to overlook the immense benefits and opportunities that the new democratic period offers.? 96 While some analysts hail the hemisphere as playing an active role in the global ?third wave? towards democracy, replacing illiberal democracies and dictatorships, others remain sceptical about the region?s continued commitment to democracy. This scepticism prevails especially in the context of the many poverties that the region faces in terms of lack of respect for human rights and inequitable spread of economic growth, which in turn fuels social discontentment threatening the delicate democratic systems. For instance, Diamond and Jackson assert that fledgling democracies in the region demonstrate a ?fragile commitment? to the rule of law for there exists a ?disturbing undertow? of ?pervasive corruption and politicisation of justice sector institutions.? 97 This observation supports the position that the establishing of democracy must take on a multidimensional approach also addresses issues of human rights and equitable development. 5.4.3 The Human rights protection system under the OAS The normative framework of the Inter-American system of human rights protection stems from two instruments: The Declaration the Rights and Duties of Man 98 and the American Convention. 99 The structure that is in place for the protection of human rights in the Americas consists of the Inter-American 96 Mendz a Mariezcurena, boven42. 97 ichlDodsn d DoldJcks?Horizntal Acountabilty inTrasitonal Democraies: T Hum RightOmbs iEl Savd Gtem?(204) 6/ LiAin Polits &Scey 1?27 98 Aerian lartionfthe Rigts n Duties ofMan (proved bythe Ninth Iteratiol CnfofAc Sas,Bo?,Colmb,1948) <htp:/w.cidh.s.rg/ic/basic2.ht> (acsed 6Jan 208). 99 merian Cventio nHumn g Adpt thIter-AmericanSpecialzed Conferc onHuRigts, SaJs?, CostRi,Novebr19; d to fr 18Jul978 <htp:/.cdh.rg/Bic/Elh/Basic3.mican%20Convi.h>(s16Ja 208). 305 Commission on Human Rights 100 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Inter-American system of human rights protection is claimed to be more complex than its European counterpart especially as it is based on two complementary instruments. 101 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is the principal organ for the protection and promotion of human rights in Americas. 102 Comprising seven independent experts who are elected to four-year terms by the OAS General Assembly, the main function of the IACHR is to entertain and scrutinise petitions relating to human rights abuses by member states of the OAS. The functions and the powers of the Commission are enshrined in the Commission?s Statute and Regulations. Individuals, groups or NGOs who have a legal link to a member state (or a state that has formally recognised the competence of the Commission) of the OAS can initiate a petition for human rights violations. A third party also has capacity to submit against individual violations of human rights with or without the knowledge of the victim. 103 In each petition the information relating to the individual or individuals filing the petition, the issue and the procedural posture of the petition must be indicated. The Commission entertains both individual petitions and group petitions, and petitions may include several sequences of rights abuse. Similarly to the European system, the Commission will entertain petitions only if all available domestic remedies have been exhausted, access to local judicial fora to vindicate the rights abuse has denied or prevented, or if avoidable delay in providing satisfactory remedy, a denial of sufficient legal advice or a legal lacuna in domestic legislation hinders due process to protect the rights violated. A petition must be filed within six months of exhausting all domestic remedies for the right violation. 104 100 <htp:/w.cidh.oas.rg/what.m> (acesd 16Jan 208). 101 David Hars ?Reinl PoecinofHunRights:eItrAmerican Ahievmnt? i inSLvst (ds) Th Itr-Amrc Sy ofHuRgts (Claredo Pres, Oxfor, 198) (Hari). 102 TmJ Fae?Theis ofthe Intr-erican uan ights Regi: No Lnr Unicr, NotYtn? (7)19umRights Qutrly510?46(Far). 103 Aricls 4?of t Arica Covio d Articles 2nd32?41 ithe Comiso's Reguat. 104 rile 56f the rin enti. 306 The Commission is empowered to entertain an oral hearing if it is deemed necessary and also to carry out in loco investigations in the country in question. 105 The Commission will in loco investigations for allegations of widespread human rights violations within a country, and then investigate the individual cases in the course of a wider investigation. After concluding a decision on a petition the Commission issues a judgment, including recommendations to be adopted by the state concerned. If the state concerned is party to the American Convention, Commission must attempt to formulate a ?friendly settlement? as far as possible. 106 The Commission, following this outcome, drafts a report for each party and for the OAS Secretary General. If a friendly settlement has not been achieved the Commission prepares a report with the facts of the case and the Commission's conclusions, recommendations and proposals. There is a period of three months within which the Commission the state determine whether or not to submit the case to Court of Human Rights or to negotiate a settlement. If the state is a party to the American Convention and has accepted the Court's optional jurisdiction, Commission or the state has the capacity to refer petition to the Court of Human Rights for a new evaluation which will result in a judgment that is binding on the state party. If a state is not a party to the Convention it will be beyond the purview of the friendly settlement clause. Therefore, the Commission will conclude examining the petition, determine the merits and adopt a final decision with recommendations and deadlines. The Commission may recommend compensation to the victims, but does not have the power to officially award such compensation. The decisions of the Committee are not legally binding. The Commission also has the capacity to investigate on its own initiative and to issue a report on the human rights situation in any OAS member state. The investigations of Commission can be founded on independent research from reports from NGOs and individuals. The Commission also submits an annual report to the OAS General Assembly, with information on resolutions of particular cases, reports on human rights situations in various states, and 105 Article 48.2 106 s?49. 307 discussions of areas needing further action to promote and protect human rights. With a history of military dictatorships, violent suppression of political opposition, terrorism and incidents of gross human rights abuses in the region, the Commission?s capacity to investigate has been valuable in ameliorating the state of regional human rights situation. The power to undertake on-site visits have been critical to the reporting of gross human rights abuses by OAS countries. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), which is a part of the American Convention, may hear cases only where the state involved has ratified the Convention on Human Rights and has accepted the Court?s optional jurisdiction. 107 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights first completes its investigation on a particular case and it is then referred to the Court by either the Commission or the state involved in the case within three months of the release of the Commission?s report. The Court lacks the capacity to entertain individual petitions independently without the cognizance of the Commission. Proceedings of the Court can be both written and oral. If there are complex legal issues involved, petitioners request a supporting amicus curiae brief from an NGO. The Court?s deliberations are held in secret and are confidential; its judgments and opinions are published. If the Court determines that a right has been violated, it will order appropriate remedies. It may award compensation to the victim for actual damage, emotional harm and/or litigation costs, but it does not award punitive damages. The protection of human rights in the Americas has been a difficult task especially in the context the political situations 108 of the member countries where the abuse of political and civil rights were part and parcel of the process of safeguarding ?national security?. 109 107 Articles 48and 50. 108 DavdSotPlmer?Colectivly Defndig Democray inthe Wstern Hmispher? inTom Fr () By Svign: octivly fndig eocrayi hAca (Jos HopkinsUiersitrs, Baltimr, M,19). 109 Medz a Maezcue, ben42. 308 The move towards economic liberalisation through Structural Adjustment Policies has also contributed to the deterioration of human rights standards in the region. Edwards, observing the complexity of the situation, writes that: 110 [a] comprehensive view of the reasons behind the human rights explosion is difficult to gain, because activity is new and growing. But one can point to four factors. First, Latin America has suffered major social breakdowns. These breakdowns greatly increase the incidence of human rights violations. Human rights advocates criticise governments for indiscriminate repression, torture, and denial of habeas corpus. They also oppose governments for not promoting wide participation of ordinary citizens in the countries? political life. The socioeconomic woes of the classes at bottom have meant, as Latin Americans were saying, that many poor went from being marginalised to being excluded. The situation was further complicated by a weak and often corrupt judiciary in most of the countries, which was not willing or able to do much to ameliorate the situation human rights. The regional human rights mechanism played a fundamental role in critiquing poor governance and highlighting incidents of human rights violations in the region. 111 The Commission?s work essentially centres on addressing issues of endemic violations of the human rights norms, which have been exacerbated by the non- existent or impotent domestic mechanisms available to deal with such violations. According to Medina, during the initial years of its existence: 112 [t]he main objective of the Commission was not to investigate isolated violations but to document the existence of these gross, systematic violations and exercise pressure to improve the general condition of human rights in the country concerned. For this purpose, and by means its regulatory powers, the Commission created a procedure to ?take cognizance? of individual complaints and use them as a source of information about gross, systematic violations of human rights in the territories of the OAS member states. 110 Edwar LCleary Stugle forHuman Rights inLati America (Grenwod Publishng Group, Incoptd,Wspo, CT,USA, 197)64. 111 Khryn Sikn ?Hman RihtsPricpled Isue-Ntworks, d Svrigty iLati Ameia? (193) 47/ Iteratiol Orgizaton 411?441. 112 CcilMdin ?TheInt AercCmison Human Rights and the Intr American ourt fHuRgts: fltis Jt Vetr?(190)2HuRigsQuatly40. 309 The Commission systematically reported that the commonest violations of human rights in member countries were forced disappearances and torture. 113 While the reports appeared to have had no immediate impact, the recording and publication of the reports over the years has led to an increasing international awareness of the situation. The natural corollary of that international awareness is international condemnation, which has helped to eradicate the culture of violence within member states. 114 This been a vital part of Commission?s work and it has contributed to the general rising of human rights standards in the region. According Donnelly, the ?Inter American Commission has aggressively exploited its powers, to at least some effect in a number of countries? 115 to achieve an amelioration of human rights in the region. In a region where inequality and poverty are high and ?where many governments are not consistently successful at meeting the basic needs of the majority for food, shelter, employment, medical care, education, and physical security from private and official villains,? 116 there appears little significance accorded to economic, social and cultural rights in the hemispheric rights protection system. This is despite the vehement assertion of an Additional Protocol that: 117 [c]onsidering the close relationship that exists between economic, social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights, in that the different categories of rights constitute an indivisible whole based on the recognition the dignity of the human person, for which reason both require permanent protection and promotion if they are to be fully realised, and the violation of some rights in favour of the realization of others can never be justified. The OAS Charter and the two main documents on human rights in the American system ? the Declaration and the Convention ? acknowledge existence of economic, social and cultural rights. 118 The American system, following the 113 Fare, bove n10. 114 DvidHaris?Rgional Protecin ofHuman Rights: Te Intr American Ahievmnt? i d SLvs (ds)TheItrAercanSyofHuRigts (Clardo Pres,Oxfor,198). 115 Jack nely Interationl uan Rigts (Wstviw Pres, Blder, 193) 0. 116 TmJFar?ColcvyDefdDemocray naolfSovignStaes:The Wstern Heisph's Ppt? (193) 5HQ 746. 117 AdtionlrlTohArianCveti On Huma Rihts I Ara Of Econc, Sia And utral Rigts, ?Potcl f Salvdor?DneASanlvdo17 Nvembr198OSrey Se69. 118 Th Ple ts.3,4 nd 48f the arte ofthe AS; rts. XI, I, I, XIV, XV,Iand XIofh mricaDeclarion;dA.26ftmeicanCoventio. 310 hierarchical presentation of the early universal model of human rights, does not accord justiciability to social, economic or social rights, but maintains that they are to be achieved progressively. 119 The ?Additional Protocol To The American Convention On Human Rights In The Area of Economic, Social And Cultural Rights? (Protocol of San Salvador) of 1988, which was intended to enhance the means of protection ESC rights, seeks to do so through the submission of periodic reports to the IACHR. 120 The exception is trade union rights and the right to education: where these are violated by action directly attributable to a state party, the Protocol makes them justiciable through an individual petition to the IACHR. The segregation of rights into those that are ?justiciable? and those that must be ?progressively achieved? in the Inter-American system is a huge drawback for a region that is beset with economic deprivation. Little effort has gone into changing the status quo, and Mendez and Mariezcurrena assert, ?[t]o date, the division of rights into different categories, the paradigm of the progressive development rights, have served only one purpose: to provide those States that do not fulfil their obligations with a means of justifying their position.? 121 All in all the chief flaw of the OAS human rights structure is the opportunity for non-compliance with human rights mechanism. Unless OAS member states have specifically ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, they will remain beyond its jurisdiction and will have obligations only under the American Declaration of the Rights Duties of Man. Even where states have ratified the Convention and have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court has no authority to compel the states to abide by its decisions. The only recourse available to the Court is to 119 Art. 26of the Amrican Coventio: ?The Stas Parties undertak toadpt measur, both intealyndrug tetial cpration,peclyho fnecicnd tcnial ur, wit aviwtohig prsivly blgisti rtr prt s,e fu lizofthe ris litin the cmi, oal,educail,sinfi,a ltrl standrs nteCareofOrganzt fAmrn Stae mendby h PrclfBuos Airs.? 120 Atie 19 ?MaofPrtcin 1.Purst othe provis of this articl a te orspndgrles t be mulatedfo thipursby the GnerlAebyofh Ogaizto fmricnStas, h Stsares ti Prcludtak tsumit pridc rets hprsv rtyv tknosed rspc forhrigftn thiPrcl.? 121 MndezaMariezcurena, bove n42. 311 report the delinquency to the OAS General Assembly. This is quite different from its European counterpart, ECHR, which makes both democratic governance and the ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights preconditions for the membership of the Council of Europe. 5.5 AFRICA: from the worst Starting conditions to assertively autochthonous rights and radical potential 5.5.1 The African Charter on Human and Peoples? Rights 122 The African continent has grappled with myriad socioeconomic and political issues such as illiberal governance and lackadaisical and muted development both in the economic and social spheres. It is a region that was combating colonialism until two decades ago and still struggles to distance itself from the legacies of colonialism which linger in the form of an ideological reliance on the West. 123 The creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was in many ways an initiative to let go of Africa?s colonial past, particularly the inhibitions and the insecurities that were part of that legacy, and to create a common agenda for African development. At the inception of the OAU now replaced by the Union (AU), 124 human rights were not included in its list of priorities although the Charter did make overt reference to the Universal Declaration in relation to its aim of extending international co-operation. 125 The OAU focussed its attention on colonialism and issues of racial domination, particularly in relation to the apartheid regime of South Africa. However, as Mathews observes, ?the OAU Charter, for instance, does not contain any provision for the protection of the rights of the African masses?.. it appears to be an institution of the African heads states, by the heads of states for the heads states?. 126 The Organization?s own document on human rights ? The African Charter of Human 122 The African Chrte onHumandPeopls? Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/673 rev. 5? (1982) 21ILM58, vilba<w.chpr.g> (aced5ct206) 123 rt Hse ?Afric Refgs: Dfin efndig Their Human Rights? inRonald Cohenal.(ds) unitd Govrna Afrca(versityPrefFlri, Gaisvi, Foria,193) 9?16. 124 T OUws etblished i3 a frmly bolished in20 asth AU came into existncei Mrch20. TConstiuveActo theU trtofrceon26Mrh201. h oftAt isavil at<w.fri-uni.rg>(acs 5J 0). 125 GJNaldi TergnztfArica Uty (2 nd d, Mnel, Lnd,19?18. 126 Kthws?h oion fi?iDomioazeo (d) African Regional Orgniso (Cambride Uiversity Pres, Cabrge 1984) ?84 ,7. 312 and Peoples? Rights (?the African Charter?) ? was created fully two decades later came into force in 1986. 127 Today all of the AU?s 53 member states have ratified the African Charter and it is one most widely accepted regional conventions on human rights. 128 The uniqueness of the African mechanism for human rights protection lies in the normative content Charter, which ventures beyond the traditional first and second generational rights as represented in the universal model. 129 The inclusion of social, economic and cultural rights Charter at inception rather than as an after-thought stemmed from the conviction that the Charter of Rights had to be located ?in our values of civilization and the real needs of Africa.? 130 Through the inclusion of social and economic rights Charter highlights the economic and developmental inadequacies of the African subcontinent and seeks to establish mechanisms of resolving the issues from a rights perspective as well. Drawing inspiration from the African culture and way of life, the African Charter also accords a place to what is now classified as group rights. A further attempt at cultural location of the African Charter is the inclusion of the duties of the individual towards others (both groups and individuals). Zeleza, commenting on the efficacy of the inclusion of the third generation of rights into the African Convention, says: 131 neither the North nor the South, the developed nor the developing worlds can claim to be on side of angels where human rights are concerned. Yet, ethnocentrism continues in discourse about conceptualisation, constitution and contextualisation of human rights. A more holistic global regime of human rights would have to encompass all the so-called three generations [rights]. The growing list of rights [is] itself a reflection of [the] emergence of an increasingly universal human rights regime as more and more societies and social constituencies, 127 Rachel Muray Human RightsinAfrica: From the OAU tohe African Uio (Cambridge UnivrsityPs,Cbrde,204). 128 ?Afric? (19) 7NQHR 350. 129 Articles2?18 othonvtion ctaintheraditonal civl and politcal rights awel as eonm andial rigts. 130 drsf PresLepld Segor t Dkr Metig fExerts Peprin th Drft fric Chto Humn aPpls'Rihs,OAUoc. CAB/LG/67X,ediPilp Kung,WlfganBdk Cta Malu (eds) Rinal Protcin OfHuma Rgts By Iteratio Lw: The ErgiAfricn SystmNs, de-ade,rny,1985)21. 131 Pl ZelziPulZlez d PhlpJcConaughy(s) Hum Rights Te ul Of LwAndDvpmnt Ifrica(Uiversit fPeslvi Pr,hillpa,204)6. 313 hitherto excluded from human rights claims, make their demands for inclusion. In fact, the outright rejection of the dominant paradigm of human rights is a significant normative feature African model that sets it apart from its counterparts in Europe and the Americas. 132 The African Charter on Human and Peoples? Rights attempts to harness the potential of the ?relativism? debate within human rights to highlight issues of socioeconomic development such as poverty and self-sufficiency in a human rights context. Agbakwa rationalises the departure of the African Charter from the conventional paradigm and justifies it in terms of the African social, cultural and economic exigencies: 133 Unless there is a committed rejection of the dominant Western paradigm that has historically viewed civil and political rights as the rights that are most worthy of enforcement, substantial progress towards enforcement of ESCR in Africa may continue to elude African states. The West may be able to maintain such a model, because its attainment of an appreciable standard of living provides an environment that enables the enjoyment of civil and political rights. African states do not enjoy this luxury. They cannot afford this model without facing widespread civil and social strife. Already, by adopting a charter that departs markedly from the European Convention and Inter-American Convention, African states demonstrated an understanding of the inadequacies of the two systems for their purposes. A rejection of Western model, therefore, merely requires a practical commitment to the noble intentions expressed in the African Charter. However, the content of the substantive rights has not been matched by an effective implementing mechanism, for many agree that, ?[a]lthough the African Charter makes a significant contribution to the human rights corpus, it creates an ineffectual enforcement system.? 134 5.5.2 The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 132 Obina ker ?The ProtcinofHuman Rights inAfrica nd the African Chrte onHuman adPeopls'Rigts:ACmpartve AlysweEuopemSys? (1984)6 Hum iht Quarly 14. 133 Srackbkwa?Rcling huanity: cnmic, sial, nd cultral ights athe cornesto fricn huan rhts?520 YleHua Rght DevopentLwJournl 177?216. 134 Muta ?The Afri Hm igts Court. ATwo?Led Stol?? (19) 212 HRQ 342? 36(). 314 The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, whose establishment was contemplated by Article 30 of the Charter, is the principal organ of the African human rights system, which will soon be relegated into a secondary role with the establishment of the Court in mid-2007. 135 The Commission was established in July 1987, less than one year after the African Charter on Human and Peoples? Rights came into force. 136 It is mandated with the broad goals of ?promoting human and peoples? rights, protecting human and peoples? rights and interpreting the African Charter on Human and Peoples? Rights.? 137 Article 45 of the Charter stipulates the specific functions of the Commission to be the following: to collect documents, undertake studies and researches on African problems in the field of human and peoples? rights, organise seminars, symposia and conferences, disseminate information, and encourage national and local institutions concerned with human and peoples? rights. The African Commission appears to have taken its role as the promoter and educator of African human rights seriously and has held ordinary sessions regularly in a number of countries around the continent. The regular and its work relating to education about human rights have contributed considerably to the Commission?s ?growing credibility? 138 in terms of its promotional functions. However, the previous rather questionable individual backgrounds of the Commissioners, their relationships to the respective governments, the lack professional expertise such as adequate Special Rapporteurs, and financial constrictions have all compromised the effective working of the Commission. 139 The African Commission on Human and Peoples? Rights is also deemed to be a quasi-judicial body that resembles the UN Human Committee with what 135 Mashod ABaderin ?Recnt Devlopments ithe African Regional Human Rights Sytem? (205) HRL117?149. 136 Article31 fric Chart oHua d Popls Rigts <hp:/w.ahp.og/enlis/_inf/chrte_n.ht>(aced 12Jan 08). 137 frin Crte Hum ad Peopls? Rigs, Mndt OfTheComisonArticle 45. 138 ?Teficisoumad Peopls? igts (AHPR): New Changsad Oportuts or an Rghts rtinrtco?Inratinlfr Orie by h AHPR,TheNrdicAfiIse, CODESRI ad The Swdsh G Foudto fr Hmanigts InClboton wt SDA&NAtklm,9?10 Jue204 <tp:/w.codria.g/Links/earch/tivs/hun_cofstckol.pf> (aces 16 Mr 205) 139 NUdban ?Twrd th Afrin Court nHma d Pepls? Rights: Betr Lt hn evr? ()3Yle HumanRgtsadDevlopentLwJourna71. 315 has been termed an ?ambiguous? 140 protective function. It is entrusted with the role of providing ?protection of human and peoples? rights under conditions laid down by the present Charter.? 141 The Commission also examines the reports that are submitted by the state parties every two years, it considers communications regarding violations of the Charter, and it expounds the Charter at the request of a state party, an institution of the OAU or an African Organisation recognised by the OAU. 142 The meagreness of the enforcement procedure accorded to the Commission can be excused as a reflection of the insecure political climate in continent at the time of creating the Charter. At point of adoption only three countries in region could be classified as having governing structures that respected the rule of law. 143 Article 62 of the Charter requires the member states to submit periodic reports to the Commission on the ?legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms? within national jurisdictions. However, in the absence of further guidelines on the reporting system set out in the Charter, 144 and with a characteristic lack of imagination and innovation by Commission itself, the Commission simply borrowed its guidelines from other systems. The lack of interest in the actual reports made by the Commission and the state parties has reduced it to a hollow process with no consequence. 145 With a more robust Commission the reporting system could have evolved into a valuable exercise where the Commission played an active role in the formulation of national rights protection schemes that were being created emerging democracies in the continent. However, the member states do not seem to take seriously responsibility of submitting reports to the Commission. Many fail to submit entirely and although a few do submit, sporadically, the Commission does not provide comprehensive analysis in these cases of reported success of the efforts to enhance the rights regime within the national jurisdiction. In this 140 Maku ta The African HumanRights Sytem ACritcal Evluation <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2000/papers/mutua.pdf> (accessed 17 Jun 2006). 141 Article 45(2). 142 3 143 Only Gambi, Sengal, nd Botswan the tim had eocrati sytems ofgvernace. S Makut?ThAfricHum RigsSynCpvPrpcti 193 Afrin Coiso Hu Pepls't? 3Rv Afr m'n Hu. &Ppls'Rt5 (t). 144 FelicDGaer ?First uits: orting By Staes Under th Africa Chrte onHuman d Pops' Rights?(192)0 NehQ Humts29. 145 EvlynA kumahTAfricaCio Human d Popls' Rights: Prctie an rcedurs(ordect: Mrtins jof Pblsher,196) 7?10. 316 respect, ?[w]hether the African Commission on Human and Peoples? Rights will be perceived as an effective institution for the protection of human rights in Africa will largely depend on how far and how much the state parties to the African Charter take seriously, respect, Commission?s views and recommendations. So far, they have not.? 146 [emphasis in original] Although the Commission lacks the capacity to condemn states legally for human rights violations, or to compel them to make reparations, the Convention allows the Commission consider complaints termed ?communications? filed by individual victims as well as NGOs and state parties. 147 This power has not been effectively utilised by the Commission to promote its quasi judicial role. The Commission in the past has made uninspiring evaluations of the rights violations and conveyed its findings to the African Union Assembly, 148 which in practice has resulted in their gaining little publicity. 149 The Assembly in turn has no capacity to act on the findings although it has the right of publication. 150 Therefore, despite an elaborate catalogue of rights, rights are meaningless in the context of the African Convention for they offer no real redress nor do they contribute to creation of better national legal systems that would seek to protect rights in the future as in the case of the European system. 151 With respect to specific functions and to its performance in general, the African Commission has therefore been a disappointment. Critically evaluating the Commission?s performance, Mutua says that the ?[h]opes by observers of African Commission that its commissioners would robustly construe the Charter's powers to alleviate its weaknesses have largely gone unrealised.? 152 In role of a catalyst protect, enhance and vindicate the rights enshrined in the Charter, the Commission has, according to this school of thought, been an abysmal failure. This can be partly attributed the inherently impotent quasi-judicial role created 146 Human Devlopment Rport 20(Background Paper, U.N Devlopment Progame, Oxford UniversityPrs, NwYk,?) 147 Acl 47?5f th Cventi. 148 Copsedo HeadsofSta d Governmt ortheir duly acredit repsntaives. This dem tbthuprm rgfthUi. 149 Mua,v n140. 150 .OdinkladC hristen ?Te African Coison Human d Peopls? Rights: Te Devlopet ofitsNo-a ComunitPredur?(198) 20HRQ235(Odinkalund Christ). 151 Ibd. 152 Muta,bove n143. 317 for it through the Charter; in other words, the Commission should never have been placed in this position where it needed to construe the Charter in a robust, or even an activist, way simply to overcome a handicap from birth. Under these circumstances, even a charitable assessment is that the Commission has so far ?only been able to make a modest contribution to protection of the rights enshrined in the Charter.? 153 There is, nonetheless, a school of thought that is more charitable and optimistic. According to this school, the poor articulation and the inadequacy of the contributions of the Commission can perhaps be forgiven as being symptomatic an evolving regime. Certainly, Odinkalu and Christensen appeared to be more sympathetic to, and hopeful regarding, the Commission when they observed of the non-state communications jurisdiction that ?the decisions of the Commission have been both more substantive and elaborate on the issues law and fact that are raised in and considered by communications. This is a welcome development now enables the Commission to contribute meaningfully to the creation of an international human rights jurisprudence that authoritatively reflects the experience of Africa. In addition, the judiciary and other national institutions for the protection human rights, as well as NGOs in African states, can now increasingly look to the Commission for guidance the interpretation and implementation of nationally-applicable human rights norms.? 154 5.5.3 African Court of Human Rights: A Late but Potentially Radical Addition Perhaps consonant with this sympathetic view of an evolving regime, the impetus for the creation of a more efficient mechanism to adjudicate human rights violations in the region is reflection of the amelioration of the region?s political climate. The late inclusion of the Court into African human rights system has been attributed to several causes. Among these are the political instability of the region emanating from the colonial period, 155 the power relations of the Cold War 153 Ane Pitr Van Der Mi ?TheNw African Court nHuman d Peopls? Rights: Towards n EfctivHumRightsPotcin hsmfAfic? (205)18LinJuralf Iraol Lw 14 (an ri). 154 OdinkandCriste,bve 149. 155 Mh itz dSubjct:Conteporay Africa nd the Lgacy ofLate Colilsm(PrictonUrsityPrs, 6); ad wdYoug?THrit 318 and the volatile national political systems, all of which augured badly for a systematic evolution of a human rights regime in the continent. Africa was inundated with enormous social, economic and political problems at the time of the creation of the African Human Rights system and, as has been mentioned, very few countries in Africa had functional democracies that respected the rule of law, let alone human rights. In this context the elaborate trappings of a formal court of rights may have appeared ill-timed to the drafters the African Charter. In many respects the African Charter was initially an affirmation and an acknowledgement of general human rights culture rather than an attempt at formalizing a regional enforcement and compliance control mechanism. However, to Kunig, ?[t]he real objection to a human rights court was much more practical in nature: in the early 1980s Africa?s leaders were simply still not willing to subject themselves to a supranational court.? 156 As the democratic governing culture of Africa has improved over the last decade or so, the inadequacy of the Human Rights Commission?s mandate and its limited sphere of operation have become the subject of discussion amongst activists 157 as well as in the African regional fora. 158 The idea of the creation of a Court to complement Charter became increasingly attractive when ?[i]t had become clear by the mid-1990s ? that the African system was a disappointment, if not an embarrassment for the continent,? 159 and that the Commission was incapable of catering to the growing exigencies of human rights in the region. It is against this background that in 1994, under the direction of OAU Heads of State Assembly, a panel of experts was summoned to devise methods in collaboration with the African Commission ?to enhance the efficiency of the Commission in considering particularly the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples? Rights.? 160 The Court was thus a result external agitation as much as a Colnialsm inAfrica? inJoh WHarbeson ad Donald Rothscild (es) Africa nWorld Plitcs: Post-dWChlegs (estviw P,Buler,Cra,19519 156 PH Kuig ?T Prtif umRights byIttinl Lw infri? (1982) 3 GeranYerbokfInratonlLa 716. 157 Ahmd Mtal ?No GvertlOranizto ithe Africa System? inMalcom Evans adRcelury(eds)Th Afic Chte HumandPopl?Rights:Te Systi Prti, 1986?2000 Cambridg UnivrsiyPrs, Cbrig, End, 20). 158 Josah ob?fValue d t RhtsDebat:Anfrican Prspectiv? (1987) HRQ 309. 159 Muta, ven143. 160 ReporfGormetExperts Meting, AHG/es 2,30th Ordinary Sesion fthe Asmbly ofHds St ad ovn,Tusuisa,Jun194,cteIbhmliBadwi E- 319 process of self-realization. In terms of creating the Protocol, the Court now has enormous potential and in many areas it has included innovative features that are absent in both the European and the Inter-American systems. 161 The creation of the African Court of Human Rights as a result of the subsequent Protocol to Rights Convention expanded the avenues available for the resolution of human and peoples? rights considerably. The Court technically became operational in January 2004 and with this development the Commission is vested with the responsibility of the preparation of cases for submission to the Court's jurisdiction. In the African context a formal adjudicatory forum in form of a court was very much a response to the needs and the expansion of capacity the region to accommodate a judicial body dealing with human rights issues. This contrasts with the European and the Inter-American systems of human rights, where the judicial branch of the implementation mechanism was an integral component of the regime?s operations from the outset. The Protocol does not define the exact relationship between the Court and the Commission, although Article 2 of the Protocol stipulates that should ?complement the protective mandate African Commission?. This ?notion of complementarity, prescribed by the Protocol, would seem to require a prior Commission procedure. Vague as it may be, the notion of complementarity does make it clear that the Commission will continue to play an important role in the future African human rights protection system.? 162 Still in embryonic stage, Court and the Commission?s relationship is yet to be established. In normative terms the jurisdiction of the African Court reaches beyond both the European and Inter-American human rights system. Through a ground- breaking initiative, the Protocol to the African Court stipulates that it has the capacity to entertain actions that are brought to its cognizance on the basis of any instruments, including international human rights treaties, which have been Sheik ?Draft Protcl tohe African Chrte onHuman d Peopls' Rights onthe Establishment of anAficnCunHumadPeopls'Rights: Itrouctry Nte?(197)AfrJIn' & Cmp L943, .1 161 O?Shea?ritclReflctin th ropsed Afrian Cort nHuman d Peopls? Rigts? (201) Afan uagsLawJurnal285. 162 VanDrMi,bov152. 320 ratified by the state party in question. 163 The Protocol also proclaims that the Court can take into consideration such instruments as a source of law. 164 Thus in theoretical terms the Protocol of the African Court has mandated that all human rights instruments created under aegis of the United Nations and other relevant legal codifying human rights, such as treaties dealing with issues of humanitarian law and treaties adopted through the ILO, are justiciable in the African Court provided that the state in question has ratified those instruments. Therefore, in theory at least, the African human rights system provides a forum for dispute resolution and implementation of several international treaties relating to human rights law, which the individual treaty itself may not have envisaged. However, some argue that Article 3(1) of the Protocol refers only to other relevant human rights instruments. According to Heyns, only treaties that explicitly confer jurisdiction on the Court would or should be perceived to come within the ambit of Article 3(1). 165 A broader interpretation would result in infringing upon the jurisdiction of the adjudicatory institutions created by other treaties, leading to inconsistent interpretations and undermining the effectiveness of those treaty regimes. Further, Heynes asserts that African states would prefer a restrictive interpretation of Article 3(1), for the states may have ratified other human rights treaties with the knowledge that rights guaranteed under them were not enforceable in a court of law. 166 The contentious jurisdiction of the Court can be invoked by the Commission, a state party that has brought a complaint before the Commission, a state party whose citizen is a victim of violation, or an African intergovernmental organization. 167 In fact, the African Commission, state parties, and African intergovernmental organizations enjoy unfettered or ?automatic? access to the Court once a state ratifies the Protocol. An individual?s capacity to invoke the jurisdiction is severely restricted by the stipulation that such a complaint can be made by an individual (or an NGO) only 163 Article 3.1 ofthe Protcl. 164 A7 165 CHyns ?T Afrian Regional Human Rights Sytem: InNed ofRerm?? (201) African uma RightLawJoul16?168. 166 Ibid167?8. 167 Artcle 5oftePrtcl. 321 if, at the point of ratification of the Protocol or thereafter, the state under scrutiny has made a declaration accepting jurisdiction of Court to hear such cases. 168 This position was reached when it was made clear at the drafting stages of the Protocol that states were not eager to be in a position where their human rights record was challenged by individuals or NGOs. This limitation is certainly an anomaly considering the other innovative features of the Protocol. If individual petitions were allowed without this barrier it would contribute significantly to the advancement of international procedural law. However, after a state has made a declaration accepting the Court?s jurisdiction in cases brought by individuals and NGOs, individuals and NGOs do not have to show any other particular interest. ?More specifically, unlike the European Convention (Article 34), the Protocol does not require individuals to show that they themselves are victims of a human rights violation.? 169 However, according to Anne Pieter Van Der Mei, ?[t]his compromise may have been necessary to get enough states on board, but it is, especially from the perspective of ?recourse judicial process command?, a disappointment.? 170 So far only Burkina Faso has accepted the Court?s jurisdiction relating to individual and NGO petitions despite the fact that 24 African states have ratified the Protocol. 171 Though Pieter Van Der Mei has lamented that ?[m]ore than 40 years after ?Lagos? it thus appears that African states are still not willing to subject themselves to a court is accessible to victims of human rights violations,? 172 it is indicative of the extent of the sense of insecurity that the African states harbour even after many the states have emerged from dictatorships and undemocratic systems of governance and implemented democratic rule. In fact, such conservatism reiterates that in the African system the concerns of the states still outweigh the interests of people. 173 168 Articles 5.3 and 4.6 169 VanDrMei,boven153. 170 a 171 sof15Oct207<htp:/w.achpr.og/enlish/_info/idex_ratifctions_e.html > (aced 3Jn 8). 172 VnDrei,aboven153. 173 JHigt ?Th AfricaCourt nHuman d Peopls? Rights? inEvas nd Muray (eds) The Afrca CrtHum dPeopls?Rights? ThSyemPrctie,1986?20 (CambideUnivesiy Pres,Nw Yrk, 201) 329. 322 The evolving stakeholders of the human rights discourse are also acknowledged by the Protocol to the African Charter, as it enables the NGOs with consultative status with the AU seek advisory opinions by Court. This measure is an affirmation of valuable role that NGOs perform in the region through their activism relating to the promotion and education of human rights throughout Africa, as much as NGO contribution to the formulating of the Protocol that created the Court. According to Pieter Van Der Mei, ?[i]ndeed, it is no exaggeration to state that the Protocol is above all the product of the NGOs? work.? 174 The Protocol provides that the Court?s judgment will be final and without appeal 175 and that the states will be bound by its judgments. 176 In its annual report to the AU, the Court can list the states that are in violation and those that have not complied with Court?s judgments. 177 The AU Council of Ministers is entrusted with the duty of monitoring the execution of the judgments. Another issue of contention regarding the effectiveness of the mechanism provided by the Charter is the ?clawback? clauses that pervade African Charter and allow states to restrict basic human rights to the maximum extent allowed by domestic law. 178 Such clauses are especially regressive considering the immature legal systems that prevail, as a colonial legacy, in many African states, which do little to enhance human rights in the domestic sphere. Many states still cherish the draconian laws that curtail freedom of expression, association and assembly, movement, and conscience. The ?clawback? provision of the Charter, which was perhaps included as an inducement for wider participation in the regime, in fact does little to ameliorate national human rights conditions. However, these provisions are of only academic relevance at this stage as the Court is yet to be fully functional. 174 Van Der Mi, above n153. 175 Articl28(). 176 30pridg, ipart, ht sate "undertak tocmply with e judgment iay cse in whi teya teswthn eimipult byhCurt andogarnt isxutio") (empsi d). 177 Artcl31. 178 Mua, boven 143, 7. 323 The African human rights regime with all its imperfections is a remarkable achievement. The African Charter on Human and Peoples? Rights was formulated at a time when illiberalism was the norm rather than the exception in African governance. It was no exaggeration to describe the then political climate and rulers as follows: 179 Asdictators ingle-party ormilitary state ?and insome cas ofbth hues ? halyanyof the Aficnleadewhoprticipte thngtiationad optio ftheChrtein Nirbi in 198 culd claimdrtic mte. With wxcptions uchs thlateJliusNyer ofTaziaadfore Presidnt Kth ad ofZamia, ho did nt ich theslve thugh hig political ofie, st thes ruleswralswidly upcte f imvrishing thir wn peleg acmbintion ofrn-headed licies ndbrzncrutio at tim henth prioity ftheleadship ofthe continet was ot the otecofthindividul t prsvtioir prl prad influenc teritoies inhite from th n rtly drted mtrplita cloial pwes. The global context in which Africa operates has changed significantly since the 1980s. 180 The rule of law, good governance, transparency and respect for human rights are pre-conditions to maintaining good relations with international organizations and other states. The cultivation and maintenance of relations is essential to the existence and the development of Africa. It is in this context that the African states have been eager to establish more pluralistic political systems and to hold free elections. In such a political climate violations of democracy are swiftly challenged by national and international media and civil society organizations that have become more competent and confident in scrutinizing violations of rights and liberties. Most countries in the continent have some sort of democratic governance in place and the natural corollary of democracy is the increased accountability for rights abuses. The proliferation Truth Commissions 181 and the increase of human 179 Anselm Chid Oinkalu ?Analysiof Parlysi orPalysi bAnalysi? Implentig Ecoic,Soal, Ctr RghtUnde thAficn Chrteo Hunad Pols'Rihts? (201) 3HRQ 2. 180 See Jlk-nygo ?Beyond T toric: Reivgoratig Th Strgle Fr Ecnmic And Social ights IAfrica?(195)26/1CalW InlLJ42?3; sMainPruaRghtsI Afr:Comptve Stu Ofhe AfriHuma AndPepl' Rts Cht Ad Te Nw Tnzi Bil OfRighs(GrenwodPs, estport,C., 190)7?1;odHwr?Ful Bely hes:Suld Ecomic Rigt Takriy Ovril And Plitcal igts? Evinc FroSub-arnAfria? 1983HQ5467; hdNas buah ?umn Riht Ptcin Ifi: Trdfetiv Mecnism? [196]fr Je&ts3 1. 181 rslBHyer ?Fiftn TruhCoo?74 to194: Coparive Sudy? (194) 6/ HRQ 597?655. 324 rights mechanisms in the domestic constitutional systems are examples of this trend. The unfolding scenario is similar to the wave of decolonization processes: 182 Ther isalredy a?Second War ofLiberation? inAfrica, n ?explosion ofager aginst th busf pw, violations ofhumaightscomic filur, nd rdip, n login fr pcd re.? Tr isatimis w peving thecotinent, similatothat thwvofindepnce inthelate 1950s arly 1960. Th cange, of urs, ill nt cur sdly, bcaus th rot is dp ad ctinuos. It will cme gadlly. The change from the OAU to the AU, the adoption of the Protocol to the Human Rights Convention, democracy clauses in NEPAD framework, the Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples? Rights on Rights of Women in Africa, The Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa adopted by the African Commission in 2003 are all indications of that trend towards sociopolitical transformation, which is both widespread and sustained. There is a need for yet greater expansion of the rights regime as well as more creative ways of interpreting the existing rights the Charter. 5.6 THE (BRITISH) COMMONWEALTH: going beyond regionalism by redeeming a unique shared heritage The Commonwealth, which is an association of states that were part of the British commonwealth of India, Maldives, Bangladesh, Pakistan (with qualifications discussed below) and Sri Lanka are members as a result of their common colonial history. The member sates of the Commonwealth co-orperates on issues of common interest and work towards ?promotion of world peace? and ?international understanding?. 183 Operating without a formal constituting Charter the principles, objectives and the scope of the Commonwealth is enshrined in several Declarations Statements issued at Heads of Government meetings. Stemming from the 1971 Singapore Declaration 182 Nsongura JUdomban ?CaTheLopard Change ItsSpots? The African Uio Treaty And Huma Rihts?(20) 17/6Aricn UivesityIrainlLawRv17?26 (fote ited). 183 <hp:/w.teconwealth.org/subhompage/15236/comnealth/> (acesd 5Fb 206). 325 the Commonwealth has commenced an ambitious project of creating a rule- based regime to foster and maintain democracy and good governance within its member states. 184 The 1971 Declaration on Commonwealth Principles states that the Commonwealth believes in the ?inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic political processes in framing the society in which they live. We therefore strive to promote each of our countries those representative institutions and guarantees for personal freedom under the law that are our common heritage.? 185 The Singapore Declaration laid foundation for the creation of a norm of good governance and democracy within the member states. Two decades later the Harare Declaration 186 was a significant step in the new role that the Commonwealth had acquired for itself, for in 1991 Heads of Government Meeting in Zimbabwe commenced the ?global norm creating? mission of the Commonwealth. The Harare Declaration reasserted the ?fundamental political values of the Commonwealth to be: democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government,? 187 and further stated that the Commonwealth was willing to collaborate with NGOs the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association for the promotion of these values. As Alison Duxbury 188 elaborates, ?standard-setting, supervision and the enforcement of values? are all significant elements of an international organization and the Harare Declaration was one such significant exercise of standard-setting for Secretary-General, Emeka Anyaoku, addressing CHOGM, described the Harare Declaration to be a ?our guiding compass? 189 which implied that the Declaration was not intended to create binding legal obligations on democracy or good governance. Duxbury also appears to agree with this position 184 Singapore Dclartion fComnwealth Princples 197 <ht:/w.thmwealth.rg/Tps/Itra.?NodeID=32987>(acesd 5Feb 206); s ls MKi ? olh Scrtait: Lking ForwtohNxt40 Year?(2005)94/380T Roundable293?0 (MKin). 185 Th Declartion fCth Princples,197, sued the Hads fGvernmt Mting Sgpre 2Jary17. 186 Jyl?mcatizng the Comwalth? (8) 74/2 Intrtionl Afairs 379?392. 187 Hare clartio IsudbHads fGovernmtinHare, Zmbawe20October19. 188 ADuxb Rejvti t nlt ?e huights rdy? (1) 46 IntrtionldCparveLQurty 34?7(Dxbry). 189 Qe hi-Kn wnc Cha ??Maliceto Nn, Godwil toAl??: The Lgitmacy of Cmwalt Eforcmt?(205)6JpnsJuralfPcaSience259?7 (Chu). 326 in that the Harare Declaration was essentially a recapitulation of generally accepted principles of state conduct rather than creation of a series legally binding obligations. 190 However, Srinivasan appears to perceive the Harare Declaration as a prelude to the evolution of a rule-based regime for democracy monitoring throughout the Commonwealth. 191 The character of the Harare Declaration changed with the adoption of the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Declaration 1995. 192 The Action Programme laid the foundation for the evolution of a normative commitment to democratic governance through Harare Declaration, for it was decided that if a government is perceived to be clearly in violation of the Harare Declaration by an unconstitutional overthrow of a democratically elected government, action ?should be taken to express the collective concern of Commonwealth countries and to encourage the restoration of democracy within a reasonable time frame.? 193 The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), created pursuant to the Millbrook Commonwealth Programme in 1995, established institutional mechanisms to deal with interruptions to democracy within member states. The CMAG assesses the nature of the violation and formulates a collective action to restore democracy and rule law. The CMAG is also empowered to take certain punitive action in the form of bilateral and multilateral sanctions by all member states ranging from restrictions on governmental contacts and trade, and if the errant member persists in violating the Declaration the ultimate result is the suspension and expulsion of a member state from Association. 194 A 190 Duxbry, above n18. 191 KSins?Afrcefor democray, human rights and the rul oflaw? Do Hare nd Milrok gt tanug??(197)344RouTb513?516. 192 IsuedbyHeadsofGvrt Milbrok, New Zl, n2 Nvembr 195 <htp:/w.thcmnwelth.or/Tepates/Intral.sp?NodeI=458> (acesdOct 206). 193 Comnealt Srtait Cmolth te Sumit I:Couniq? of hHds ofGvernt etings1987?1995(onwealth Secrtait, Lond, 197). 194 ?Suceasur inclu a idiat public exprsi by t rty-Gerl fthe Comnwlth?oetvdsprovlfnyshinfgemnofhe Har pincs; enrag fbilarl ?mches bmer outrs, pcialtos with t rgion, bth exprsdpan turt alstaiofdry;ulaiofupt oy a timefr for trsoainofdcry; exlusin fthe gvrnmet cerd frm rticon tiseil-vel tgs th Cmweal,icldi CHOGMs; an inalsupesifpartcatn tCmwealtigs d ofCowalth icl 327 significant feature of the Commonwealth mechanism for democracy monitoring is that the Commonwealth Secretary General is empowered to alert the CMAG on his/her own initiative or at the request of a member of government any disruptions to democratic governance within state. 195 As Cghau observes, ?the CMAG was a protection mechanism set up for the Commonwealth to monitor member states? compliance with the organization?s principles, and this transformed the Commonwealth into a rules-bound institution,? 196 a quality that was not a part of the Commonwealth before. ?This ?democracy watchdog?, empowered to suspend member countries when they are in breach of fundamental Commonwealth principles, has given a great deal of influence and moral authority to the organization globally. On its 10th anniversary CMAG is still the only international mechanism of its kind.? 197 The Commonwealth Democracy clause was soon put into action in 1995 when the reacted strongly against Sani Abacha?s regime Nigeria, 198 issuing sanctions and then suspending its membership for executing political dissidents. It was considered that the severity of the actions against Nigeria by the Commonwealth prompted a positive response from undemocratic regime. The democracy watchdog CMAG has since brought The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, and Solomon Islands under its scrutiny for the violation of democratic principles under the Harare Declaration. This definitive and often punitive action for the violation of democratic principles ?marked a major transformation from former, rather easy-going, permissive, fudging Commonwealth towards a more rules- or normsbased Commonwealth.? 199 The CMAG enforcement mechanism was activated by the Commonwealth against asitnce.? Ian Tylor ??The Dvilsh Ting?: The Comnwealth nd Zimbawe?s D?oumt?Jul(205)94/380 Roundable367?80,36 (Tylor). 195 Artil Bhe Milbrk Cmwealt Actio Prath H Declartion, 195, Ised byHadsofGvent aMibrk,NwZlnd, o12 Nvebr195 <htp:/w.tcmwlh.org/Tplts/Inter.sp?eID=3458> (sd Oct 206). 196 Cau,bove n189. 197 Don McKi?TheComnealth Secrtait: Loking Forwad tohe Nxt 40Years? (205)94/380 Rund abl 294. 198 JTemi?roblisiNigri? htp:/w.aficflct.or/Dwnloads/Nigeria_ACJ.pdf>. Also e JMayl ?Democratizng Conelth? (198) 74Itertil fs 379-392. 199 Duxbry ovn. 328 Fiji in 2000, 200 when its membership was suspended and economic sanctions imposed after the coup. Fiji?s membership was restored in December 2001 pursuant to elections in 2001 where the Commonwealth Elections Observer Team declared that the elections in general were free and fair and George Speight was arrested for treason. However the 2006 coup-d??tat saw Fiji being suspended from the Commonwealth once again. 201 Ironically, the spirit of the Harare Declaration does not seem to have an effect on President Mugabe?s authoritarian regime with which the Commonwealth has been waging a battle on behalf of democracy and the rule of law. 202 The authoritarian rule of Mugabe during the elections of 2002 was vehemently criticized by the Commonwealth Observer Team and Parliamentary Forum of the Southern African Development Community for creating ?a climate of violence and fear that had impeded Zimbabweans in the exercise of their democratic rights.? 203 The Commonwealth Association reacted to the breach of the Harare Declaration with a gamut of offensives, which included suspension of Mugabe from Council meetings despite the opposition by both South Africa and Nigeria. The Commonwealth?s suspension and the subsequent deliberations at CHOGM 2003 regarding Zimbabwe?s political climate resulted in Mugabe withdrawing from the Commonwealth in 2003. 204 The current political situation in Zimbabwe persuades one that the Commonwealth?s efforts in restoring democracy to the country have not been successful. Pakistan, despite its close affinity for constitutional governance which it regards as a legacy of British colonial rule, has had numerous encounters with military governance, 205 the latest being the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif in a military coup by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999. In an era where authoritarianism and military governance is looked upon with disdain, paradoxically in May 2000 the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld 200 Robertsn ad WSutherlandGovernmt bythe Gun: the unfished busine ofFij?s 2000 coup(Plu ,yn, 201) TS Elio?'CifsadTiv aOtr PplBed': The MakigfGeorg pigt'sCup?(20) 35Jorl ofPcfHisoy.281-293. 201 Fijspnd mConwealth <t:/news.bc.uk/2hi/-pcif/6587.stm> (c 12Fb08). 202 Taylor,ave 194 203 Jhn ku?Zibae's Hijacked Elction? (20) 13/4 Journal ofDemocray 87?101. 204 WDid McIntyr COGM203:thple'sCmnwelth fist k hedlins? (204) 9NewaldIntrtionl Rviw 2-26. 205 Iftikhar Hik ?Pisa :StarngAor Stalt?? (201) XLI Asia Survey 1. 329 Musharraf?s coup as ?legitimate under ?the doctrine of state necessity? provided that elections were held within three years of the takeover.? 206 As Pakistan was in clear violation of the democracy principles promoted by the Commonwealth, the CMAG suspended Pakistan from the Councils of the Commonwealth in October 1999. However, the ensuing global political developments in the wake of the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA and a promise from Pakistan to return to civilian rule within three years resulted in the lifting of the suspension of Pakistan in May 2004. The continued political crisis in Pakistan emanating from the military rule of Pervez Musharraf troubled the Commonwealth Organization that issued an ultimatum to restore the suspended Pakistani Constitution and suspend the emergency rule on 12 November 2007. Non-compliance with these terms resulted in the suspension of Pakistan from the Commonwealth Organization on 22 November 2007. 207 Within the last decade the Commonwealth has distanced itself from its previous ?political culture? of not mentioning ?the internal problems of and disputes between other member countries.? 208 The new impetus to promote democracy and good governance is perceived by some analysts rather cynically as a means of creating a raison d??tre for its own survival. Evaluating the disappearing political significance of the Commonwealth, Akinrinade observes that ?[t]he continued existence any institution has to be for a purpose. If the Commonwealth is to continue to function it relevant in terms of meeting the needs of its members. Indeed, a test of the relevance of any institution, be it political, economic, social or whatever, is extent to which it addresses the problems of its members.? 209 The transformation also reflects the concerns of Commonwealth leaders regarding the Association?s political standing, its role and significance within member states and its general international profile. The emergence of the Association as a watchdog of democracy fulfils a lacuna in the global arena that was present since the conclusion of the Cold War. The decline of the sovereignty of nation-states 206 Aqil Sha ?Democray onHldinPakistn? (20) 13/ Journal ofDemocray 67?5 . 207 Fauretot dliebrigs freh Comwealthspesi <htp:/w.gurin.uk/wl/207/v/3pkin.ltc> (csd 5e 20). 208 C, bv 189 209 OAkinrade?Th71 Declartion foealth prinles aftr 20yars? (19) 321 Roud Tl 3. 330 and the increasing involvement of international organizations has been justified as a corollary to economic globalization and integration into global markets and not so much in terms of democracy the rule of law. The democracy standard setting and evaluation machinery in form the CMAG, as McIntyre elaborates, is ?a demonstration that the Commonwealth aspires to having some teeth? 210 to deal with problems within its own membership. From the perspective of South Asia, where the rhetoric of constitutional governance is ingrained into the sociopolitical fabric of society, the standard setting mechanism of the Commonwealth does serve an invaluable function. In this context, the drive to promote and protect fundamental political values in the Commonwealth and the implication that in future any interruption to democratic governance within a member state may result in the intervention in the domestic affairs of a member state, with validity international law, is a welcome development. 5.7 Conclusion This study advocates a new praxis of regional co-operation for South Asia that would determine its own terms engagement with contemporary globalization, and defines the normative content of governance to contribute meaningfully towards eradication of poverty, the enhancement of equitable development and the realization human rights. It is not the task the present study somehow to rank the four systems discussed with respect to any one variable or using some overall weighted aggregate, in a form of league table, then adopt this wholesale. For one thing, there is no need to do so: inspiration for the South Asian praxis can and should borrow as eclectically as necessary. As the above regional mechanisms of Europe, the Americas and Africa indicate, each system has adopted particular groups of rights in a manner to a degree that is best suited to the sociopolitical exigencies of the region. The European system operates against a quintessential atmosphere regulated democracies that 210 WD McIntyre AGuide toheContemporay Comnwealth (Palgrve, Basingtoke, UK, 201). 331 take pride in independent judiciaries and governing structures that value the rule of law. 211 With its economic prosperity established welfare states, civil and political rights take more significance than the second-generation rights but balance has been partly restored by the Social Charter. The European system has, after five decades of existence, moved beyond both the norm creating and procedural establishment stages to a stage of procedural fine tuning. The abolition of the Human Rights Commission and the expansion of the capacity of the Human Rights Court and the amendments to Social Charter are milestones of that procedural fine tuning. The political circumstances of the American continent are vastly different, as many of the countries were governed by military dictatorships. It is a region where rights declarations predate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, the violent and repressive governing structures of the region resulted in mass scale denial of rights freedoms. As much as reviving dormant human rights system, the establishment of democratic governance was a regional priority. Therefore, OAS was compelled to devote similar energies to the revival of democracy as well as to the establishment of an effective human rights regime. The African continent, emerging from years of colonial rule, faced not only issues in relation to the nation state and governing structures but also massive problems of under-development and poverty. Coming out from a repressive and violent colonial past the African nations were sceptical about the adoption of rights treaties that appeared to reduce their national sovereignty. The sense of individualism that is pervasive in the established human rights treaties also appeared to sit uncomfortably with African social and cultural values that emphasize the family and the community over the individual. Therefore, the human rights regime that Africans created for themselves places an emphasis on group as well as those of the individual. Taking into cognizance the endemic poverty and under-development of the region it accords equal emphasis to both civil and political rights and social and economic rights. 211 David Haris ?Regional Protecinof Human Rights :e Intr American Ahievmnt? i ndSLvst(ds) TheItr-AercanSyofHuRigts (Clardo Pres, Oxfor, 198). 332 This chapter evaluated the cross-regional mechanism of the Commonwealth that have evolved to deal with similar social, political and economic issues. Each system has identified the pertinent issues of the region ranging from democratic governance to enforcement of socioeconomic issues and has devised mechanisms to address them. As reiterated before, each system is a product of its own socioeconomic and political circumstances and no system can be transplanted unchanged to another region to address its unique concerns. However, successful regimes in other regions remain an example and an inspiration to South Asia as it grapples with the task of formulating its regime. The new regional system that is advocated for South Asia is a harnessing of resources from the South Asian region. There is great expertise and a wide knowledge base that would prove to be an effective bulwark against the contemporary neo-liberal forces of globalization. A regional coalition would not only counteract the adverse impact neo-liberal globalization; it help reinforce the capacity of national governments in developing countries to act in the interests of their people in the context of formulating development policies. As Kofi Annan observes in his report In Larger Freedom: 212 [i]n a world of interconnected threats and challenges, it is in each country?s self-interest that all of them are addressed effectively. Hence, the cause of larger freedom can only be advanced by broad, deep and sustained global cooperation among States ? States, however, cannot do the job alone. We need an active civil society and a dynamic private sector ?.We also need agile and effective regional global intergovernmental institutions to mobilise coordinate collective action ? We therefore need new mechanisms to ensure accountability ? the accountability of States to their citizens, of States to each other, of international institutions to their members and of the present generation to future generations. The regional praxis advocated in Chapter 6 is founded on the postulates that democratic governance and effective realization of ESC rights contribute to the amelioration of endemic poverty (in all its senses, starting with material poverty), which is the single most debilitative feature of the socioeconomic and political landscape of South Asia. Effective regional co-operation can be the basis for 212 Kofi Ana ?In Large Frdom:twards evlopment, scurity and human rights for al? (/59205)<htp:/w.ung/lref/cha1.>(es5M206). 333 creating an effective mechanism that addresses the issue of poverty from a normative stand-point. The new praxis will contain procedural mechanisms executed at regional level to enhance democratic governance at national level. Issues of equitable development and the promotion of economic and social rights will be addressed through a policy filtering mechanism that would encourage accountability and transparency at national policy formulation. The need for good governance of globalization will be addressed at regional level to extract the benefits of global integration. The new regional initiative will also emphasize norm-creation and consolidation relating to democratic governance. The new scheme will devise a mechanism for education, promotion and consolidation of democratic governance in the region. The regional praxis will encourage empowerment of people through providing avenues for expression of public opinion in relation to public policy formulation nationally. As Amartya Sen explains, ?democracy has an important instrumental value in enhancing the hearing that people get in expressing and supporting their claims to political attention (including claims to economic needs).? 213 The remedy mechanism would go beyond the conventional systems of seeking remedies for rights violated and incorporate measures to negotiate aid and loan conditionalities of the IFIs trade-based policy formulations from the WTO. Procedural mechanisms to challenge policy formulation of member states and IFIs on the basis of rights violations will be incorporated into the new praxis. In essence the new praxis advocated for South Asia in Chapter 6 envisages a pragmatic expansion of the concepts of a rights-based approach to development and inclusive democratic governance which enhances and consolidates the universal paradigm of human rights. The mechanisms advocated in the new praxis aim to shift the concepts from their normative premise to a stage of viable implementation. 213 Amarty Sen ?Dmocray saUniversal Vlue? (19) 0Journal ofDemocray 3-17 <htp:/us.jh.du/e/jd/10.3.htm>(csd7Feb28). 334 CHAPTER 6 THE WAY FORWARD: A NEW, AUTOCHTHONOUS REGIONAL PRAXIS IN SOUTH ASIA FOR PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT ?Still, though nt radiclly ameliorative of hre-andnow suffering, internatiol human rights standars an nors epow pople?s movmts ad conscietious policy-makers evywe to qetio pliticl prctic. That toy min is inetimbletetial of uma rigts lagua, nt available in previous centuries. Huma Rights langaes arll tht w hav to interogte the braianowr, ev when ths rain indqute to hmniz fully th brbic pactics of politic.? 1 6.1 Introduction Chapter 1 traced the evolution of the universal paradigm of human rights, which shared resonances with the South Asian ethos of compassion, humanism and the notion of tolerance. South Asia, through the influence of colonialism, embraced conceptual developments of human rights and utilized the rights idiom not only in the struggles against colonialism but also against its own ?social evils? and ?culturally sanctioned indigenous human rights violations?. 2 The Western articulation of human rights therefore had affinity and relevance to the South Asian context and was incorporated into the governing mechanisms of the states in the region. Chapter 1 also analysed the inadequacy and the failure of contemporary national regimes that were put in place to protect human rights and achieve social justice in the region. These dysfunctional mechanisms exacerbated the marginalization of the poor and the vulnerable segments of society, contributing to both disenfranchisement disenchantment, fertile grounds for civil dissension and militarism ? aspects that were further elaborated in Chapter 4. 1 Upendra Bxi ?Voices fSuferingad the Futre ofHuman Rights? Fal (198) Transtional Lw aCotmprayPrblm 126?75,126?127. 2 Stig Tf Mdsn St, ocity, Hmn Rights inSt Asi (Mnohr, New Dlhi, 196) 4. 335 Against this background, Chapter 1 nevertheless gave credit to one peculiarly creative and expansive response to this dysfunctionality: Social Action Litigation. The chapter discussed how SAL has been accepted and expressly facilitated by a sympathetic and activist judiciary, largely in India. If human rights were being ?more honoured in the breach than the observance?, then the courts? adoption of SAL had represented a step into this breach. The study nevertheless stressed that and judicial activism alone are not a sufficient response to dysfunction, which still needed to be addressed systematically, although public interest litigation and judicial activism on a broad range of justiciable rights could remain very valuable adjuncts to any overhaul of the system. Chapter 2 began the analysis of globalization, and specifically its economic drivers. It started by identifying that economic globalization is not new but has had historical antecedents. The chapter traced the geo-historical evolution of those antecedents by reference particularly to the apt chronology used by Hopkins, who delineated archaic, proto, modern and post-colonial phases respectively. What Hopkins termed post- colonial globalization, the present study included under a slightly broader period that the author called ?contemporary?, dating essentially from the end of the Second World War. Broadly speaking, ?contemporary? globalization remains so in sense of that word as meaning current and topical. For, even today, the overarching institutions of the global economic system remain those founded at Bretton Woods in the 1940s, above all the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, but also World Trade Organization. In a parallel that was made more explicit in the introduction to Chapter 3, contemporary globalization has also been contemporaneous with the internationalization of human rights discourse and regimes, which again rose out of the ashes of World War II. Chapter 2 signalled that out of the phases of globalization, the prime interest of this study is in contemporary globalization, to which the other phases serve mainly as antecedents or historical context. For the reasons just given, the post-war or contemporary era was seen to be coherent enough to warrant being considered a discrete entity. This, even though on a different scale one could sensibly recalibrate it 336 more finely into, for instance, the Cold War and post-Cold War stages, or more recently the acceleration and magnification of the phenomenon since the rise of the internet, and so on. Crucially though, Chapter 2 began to focus in on subset contemporary form that this thesis argues is the most powerful, pervasive, insidious and the most destructive to the vulnerable in South Asia as elsewhere. That subset is contemporary phenomenon?s neo-liberal form, which has enjoyed ascendancy since the late 1970s on the back of what later came to be known as the Washington Consensus. Neo-liberal globalization has trumpeted itself as, so to speak, the one, true contemporary globalization: not only inevitable and inexorable, but also, as if by market magic, ideal and optimal ?for the whole globe?. It is equally crucial to the argument of this thesis, however, that neo-liberalism is in fact none of those things, but rather only one possible version of globalization. To have successfully sold itself as being generic and synonymous with globalization is simply the greatest, most insidious marketing achievement of the neo-liberal brand. Specifically, the neo- liberal brand is a form of globalization which allows the owners and other beneficiaries of economic wealth ? predominantly Western capital ? to perpetuate, redouble and spuriously justify their own economic privilege and associated ideological hegemony. That reinforcement of privilege rides on the back of the already exploited ?margins? of society that in truth represent an enormous chunk the globe: more than two-thirds the world. Forty per cent of that number are in turn clustered in South Asia and therefore of particular relevance to this thesis. Chapter 2 demonstrated how individual states, particularly the developing states, have proven to be too weak to resist the neo-liberal onslaught of contemporary globalization. Yet, because neo-liberalism is only one possible content globalized structures, and the rules of the economic game can in fact be rewritten, Chapter 2 concluded on optimistic note that better governance of the globalization process and new rule-setting could potentially ameliorate this situation. In particular, given that individual states in South Asia, as elsewhere, lacked the capacity 337 individually to determine the terms of engagement with globalization, in principle a collective initiative in the form of a regional alliance would have better success. Chapter 3 opened by drawing together the two strands teased out in the first two chapters, both pivotal to the discussion on the poverties of South Asia. It thus compared and contrasted internationalization (or effectively globalization) of human rights traced by Chapter 1 with economic globalization, and specifically its still-prevailing neo-liberal form, as tracked by Chapter 2. These opening comments identified the key public and private agents of specifically neo-liberal globalization ? the IFIs and TNCs respectively ? and its main instruments: the SAPs and PRSPs. The analysis illustrated in more detail than that of Chapter 2 way in which neo- liberal globalization with its false inevitability (?There is No Alternative?) has in turn mutated the concept of sovereignty 3 and transferred much of the traditional power base from nation state to international financial institutions, bilateral donors and transnational corporations, creating a fissure of accountability and rendering individual national governments in many ways impotent. It illustrated the specific manner in which the phenomenon has rendered states ineffective in terms of negotiating new terms of conduct for global trade, defining aid conditionalities or prioritizing issues such as social expenditure and other critical policy decisions that affect the people above debt repayment. On the positive side, Chapter 3 identified the Governance-Related Conditionalities, which at their best recognize that plural democracy both is required for and itself requires the vindication of human rights. As Sen observes ?[d]evelopment consists of the removal of various types of unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little opportunity exercising their reasoned agency. The removal of substantial unfreedoms, it is argued here, is constitutive of development.? 4 This study regards the GRCs as a weapon of empowerment in the development discourse which assists elimination of ?unfreedoms? in society, even though the GRCs were not deliberately conceived to achieve this. 3 DL Shet ?Democray nd Globaliston iIdia: the post cld war iscourse? (195); 40 The ANofth AeiAcemy fPltclnSialien24-39; PnaWignarjnd kmal HusinTChlg iSuthAsi: Devmt, Dory,dRol Coptio (SgePblcats, Nw D,198). 4 Amarty Se Dvelopmnt asFredo(nchor Bks, New Yrk, 19) xi. 338 The focus of Chapter 4 was upon the third strand of discussion of the many poverties of South Asia: a poverty of democracy. The chapter reiterated that human rights, development and democracy draw sustenance from each other and rights and equitable development cannot be sustained in the absence of democracy. Chapter 4 narrated this poverty of democracy in terms of national circumstances of South Asian states, describing how governing institutions lack accountability to their people in policy formulation, avoid transparency in executing these policies, and reject public participation in evaluating critical policy decisions. This chapter illustrated increasing public frustration regarding corruption, autocratic governance, and the absence of an effective means of influencing policy formulation. The chapter showed how these developments have resulted in civic strife and insurgency, and the deterioration of the relations between the government civil society, in turn culminating in massive violations of human rights. Chapter 4 also discussed the regional response to the resolution of the poverties of human rights, development and democracy in South Asia. Identified as ?middle tier? between national and global levels, regionalism holds great potential a means of addressing all the poverties of South Asia. In this context the existing regional attempt at integration through the Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was analysed in detail. The analysis showed that SAARC has failed to answer not only the need for the vindication of human rights, but also the needs for equitable, human-centred development, and for the flourishing of reliable democracy ? all of these aspects being bound up together and mutually reinforcing. This study therefore advocated an urgent replacement of the existing regional mechanisms to improve governance, the conditions of human deprivation and the state of human rights in the region. Chapter 5 focused on selected supranational mechanisms and their legal or treaty instruments that have been used within or among regions around the globe to ensure the protection of human rights, democratic governance and the advancement of social justice among other particular purposes such as breaking the ties various colonialisms or buffering against Communism. 339 Chapter 5 noted the regional disparities in terms of the institutionalization of human rights and the general effectiveness of the normative standards relating to rights. The protection regimes appeared most legalized in a European and an American context, while in Africa the regime is at a stage of establishing norms evolving mechanisms to protect and promote human rights through a functional Human Rights Commission. An examination of these various mechanisms in operation to ensure the establishment of democracy and prevent democratic backsliding in Europe and the Americas was also undertaken in Chapter 5. The efforts of the Commonwealth Association to create a normative framework for democratic governance were discussed. The discussion throughout Chapter 5 highlighted the need to create mechanisms that responded to the particular exigencies of each region, and observed the corresponding futility of trying to transplant root and branch any normative regime that had evolved in an incompatible different socioeconomic and historical context to the soil of the South Asian subcontinent, which has its own civilizational history and its own distinct blight of afflictions ? as well as its own landscape of resources to be tapped in curing them. The present chapter proposes a new regional praxis that is designed for South Asia, taking into consideration the issues that were discussed in all the preceding chapters. The underlying quest of new praxis is to formulate an efficient autochthonous mechanism that responds to the exigencies and poverties of the region, in that it would close the material poverty gap, vindicate rights and enhance human-centred, equitable development and democratic governance ? all synergistic aims, as has been shown. The proposed new praxis of regional governance, to be called the South Asian Union for Development, Democracy and Human Rights (SAU), is put forward to replace the dysfunctional SAARC. It is envisaged that the contemporary members of the SAARC ? India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, the Maldives and Afghanistan 5 will be the constituting members of the SAU. In formulating the regional mechanism this study reiterates the significance of the Vienna Declaration of 1993 as a restatement of the international law relating to 5 Refr n2 ofthe Introductin tohetsi. 340 human rights. 6 This study also adapts and applies the Paris Principles, which were formulated to provide guidance for the creation of national mechanisms for the protection of human rights, as a loose framework for a regional structure. 6.2 The Search for a New Paradigm of Regional Standard-setting and Co- operation. Regionalism as a means of maintaining regional co-operation and preserving and advancing the common interests of states within the geographical proximity has been in ?vogue? 7 since the end World War II but has far deeper validity than any passing fad and instead rightly remains a ?central concept for organising world politics?. 8 As highlighted in Chapter 5, human rights ? both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights ? have been incorporated in principle into the regional mechanisms in Europe, the Americas and in Africa for many decades. But analysis indicated that success with which rights are vindicated is determined to a large extent by the mechanisms that are in place within each regional mechanism realize the rights. Moreover, massive buffeting forces impinge from without, and it is to a large extent these forces with which the regional mechanism must deal. This study reiterates that the existing mechanisms in place to vindicate human rights particularly in the context of Americas and Africa are compromised by the forces of neo-liberal globalization especially through the dictates of the IFIs. The underlying presumption of the universal regime of human rights is that national governments are the ultimate repository and determinant of obligations relating to human rights. The reason for presuming this is partly the further assumption that states have the power to fulfil those rights and parallel that they 6 Viena Declration d Progameof Actin World Cnferc onHuman Rights, Viena, 14?25 Ju 193UN A/CONF.157/23 1July193 <htp:/w.uhr.churicdhrida.sf/(Smbl)/A.ONF.157.23E> (csd 6Nov 206) (iena eclartion) 7 KrsSidRegial opertion outh sia nd South East Ai (Instiue ofSuth East Ai tus, iapr,207) 1. 8 Petrazent ?inlStas: Ja d Asi, Germy nd urope? iKz Yamr nd Wolfg Srck(eds) The Ed ofDiversity?PropctsfoeraJanseCpitls (CrnlUivsity Pr,Itc,203) 89. 341 are the most likely to violate them: if both assumptions were true, there would be no need either to protect or to empower citizens against anything other than their own state. Clearly, this is not the case. Yet, governments do continue to be the organs which deliberate and vote on content and sphere of human rights obligations they undertake through the various treaties on human rights before they accept those treaty obligations (either by ratification after signing or by accession) and take any further necessary steps to implement them into domestic law. The success of the treaties is measured by the extent to which they are implemented and are adhered to within each state. Previous chapters indicated how globalization has strongly induced developing states to compromise the obligations they had thus accepted under the universal human rights regime. This occurred because, despite the declared obligations of the states to promote the rights, including ESC rights, of their own peoples, in reality priority was instead required (as a condition of assistance) to be given to policies that facilitated the states? integration into the global market economy on the terms stipulated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and by bilateral donors. Direct, legal control over policy formulation, which has traditionally been the exclusive domain of national governments, may thus have remained in the hands of states. However, de facto leverage over the scope and content of that policy has instead been gained by IFIs and bilateral donors. This has resulted in a fundamental restructuring of the domestic sphere to reflect (currently, though this need not continue to be the case) neo-liberal values. 9 Although conditionalities may technically be agreed to rather than simply imposed, the bargaining power of a monolithic ? and, in the case of the unique IFIs, monopolistic ?holder or controller of desperately needed funds has thus far been so much greater than that of the individual decision-?taking? state that the latter?s input has been nugatory. These changes, particularly in the constitutional and legal realms, are impacting negatively on social, economic and cultural rights of citizens in the 9 Se Chapter 3of this tudy. 342 recipient states. 10 At the same time, however, states, by giving effect nationally to human rights obligations undertaken at international level through treaties, will some extent try to counteract the fall-out from policy prescriptions of the IFIs upon whom the developing world is economically reliant. This paradoxical situation can be resolved only by effecting a change to the terms of engagement in the globalization process and more specifically demanding a change of its neo-liberal hue. As reiterated in previous chapters, this change cannot be achieved through individual state efforts alone. Instead it has to come through the collective action of states. This can occur at both the global level or tier, under auspices of the United Nations and associated agencies, and at the regional level. Regional mechanisms bring together states which have geographical, cultural and historical affinity, and which, more significantly, are affected in a common way by the common predicaments that globalization has precipitated. It is in this context that following section of this study emphasizes the justification for negotiating a regional initiative for South Asia that deals with issues relating to human rights, democracy and poverty eradication in the context of globalization. Two prerequisites before even entertaining the setting up of a (new) regional organization stand out. Firstly, this study has accepted as a foundation since Chapter 1 the norms and structures of the universal human rights regime as established under auspices of the UN. In endeavouring to treat the ills of rights violations, democratic deficit and mutated development, any proposal must be legitimate within, and compatible with, the global human rights regime. Secondly, lest time and effort be misdirected and wasted, there must be at least some reason to believe that such a mechanism would also be efficacious at treating those ailments. The following section therefore demonstrates both the legitimacy of a regional mechanism within global rights organizations ? in other words, compatibility between them ? and the potential efficacy of such a mechanism. Indeed, it shows 10 Impacts onESC rights due tohecanges rlating toaxtion, labur laws, ubside ofbasic neds and f,wateoingad srviuch seducdhetcehv niui Chter 4f his tuy. 343 that regional arrangements are not only compatible with UN structures and norms, but expressly contemplated by them, and it recalls the incomplete yet considerable success of other regional and cross-regional structures. Other regional structures have evolved systems that address these sociopolitical and economic issues faced by the regions. The praxis advocated in this study aims to establish regional monitoring systems of policy formulation for its compatibility with and promotion of equitable and human-centred development human rights protection democratic governance. Collective responsibility in initiating and executing strategies for development, human rights protection and effective democratic governance will strengthen the South Asian regional capacity to manage the process of globalization more effectively. 6.3. The Legitimacy and Efficacy of a Regional Praxis and the Need for a Law-based Regime The praxis takes the form of a legal regime, for this thesis acknowledges the unique capacity of law to achieve social transformation, govern the process of globalization and instil democratic governance in the region. This capacity was summed up elegantly by the Dominican Republic envoy to the United Nations in 1966 during the UN General Assembly proceedings relating ICCPR. In a quotation to which this chapter will return, the envoy said: ?we, the unarmed, the economically under developed, the technologically under privileged, have no strength except the strength of law? .[and so] we are pleased to vote for the draft Covenants on Human Rights?. The thesis has also stressed since Chapter 1 primacy ? as well as the sheer ubiquity ? of the language of human rights. The unique value of rights talk is repeated in opening quotation of this chapter from Upendra Baxi, and will be taken up again. For these reasons, will focus on a synthesized proposal to achieve a common legal standard in relation to human rights, democratic governance in the context of globalization and to equitable, human-centred development in South Asia. In doing so it takes into consideration the historical and cultural affinity of the South Asian region, the common obstacles that prevent effective realization 344 development, and the norms required to inculcate democratic governance in the region, including tying together of both democracy and development as rights themselves. The impetus for a regional coalition for the promotion of human rights, democracy and human development is supported by international legal jurisprudence and other regional collaborations. The United Nations envisages cooperation among states for human development, and such an intention is included in major documents of the UN. The UN Charter requires member states to take ?joint and separate action? to promote the following UN purposes stipulated in Article 55: 11 a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 12 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that ?[e]veryone, as a member of society . is entitled to [the] realization, through national effort and international cooperation . . of economic, social and cultural rights.? 13 The ICESCR also presupposes that the realistic realization of ESC rights is through ?international assistance and co-operation". 14 This position was reiterated by the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights when it stated: ?The Committee wishes to emphasize that in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, with well-established principles of international law, and with provisions 11 Charte ofthe United Nations, Article 56, signed 26June 1945 (entrd into frce 24Oct 1945). <tp:/w.urg/bu/ch/>(a17Oct06)UNChae). 12 Nrt, abv 9, rtile 5)-C. 13 UniveslDeclrtionfHmanRightsAdopte and prolaimed byGnral Asembly Resolutin 217 A(I) of10 ebr 1948 rtcle 19<:/w.ug/Ovriew/ight.>(acd 17 May06. 14 rticle 2,Interationl Cvenat oEnomic, Soial nd Cltural Rits. dopte n ope for signuraifc dacsibyGeralAsebyResoin20A(XI) f16Dcmb 196 ty to r3Jury 1976, icd with rticl 7 <htp:/w.unh./html/enu3/a_sr.ht>(acsd1Oct 6) (ICESR). 345 of the Covenant itself, international co-operation for development and thus for the realizations of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States.? 15 The legitimacy, compatibility, and potential efficacy of a regional effort for human development is further reinforced by the UN Declaration on the Right to Development, which encourages collaborative efforts in realizing goals of development: ?[a]ll human beings have a responsibility for development, individually and collectively, taking into account the need for full respect for their human rights fundamental freedoms as well as their duties to the community, which alone can ensure the free and complete fulfilment of the human being, and they should therefore promote protect an appropriate political, social and economic order for development.? 16 More significantly, the UN Declaration on the Right to Development also stipulates that ?[s]tates have primary responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions favourable to the realization of right to development.? 17 Of most direct relevance to this study is a resolution on regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 3 March 1997. This resolution expressly ?[i]nvites States in areas where regional arrangements in the field of human rights do not yet exist to consider concluding agreements with a view to the establishment within their respective regions of suitable regional machinery for promotion and protection of human rights.? 18 The subsequent UN Human Rights Commission Resolution on Regional Arrangements for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights endorsed the UN General Assembly Resolution. 19 15 The Nature ofStaes Prties? Obligations, Geral Coment No. 3adpte 13?4 Dec 190 UN ESCOR,mn EcomcSo dCultRights, 5Ss,49th n50thmtings,4 Doc /12/90/8(190). 16 elartio the RigtDevlpment, aopted 4Dec 1986 GA Res 1/28, UN GAOR, 1st Ss. up N53Anda I 10 at86UNcA/53(7). 17 Ibid,Art2(). 18 <ht:/wuorg/cuments/gres/51ares51-02.htm> (acesd 5Nov 206). 19 Comisn Ha Rih olutin 23/7 6ndting,2April3[Adopte without a vte. S chap.XVI.-E/CN.4/203/L./Ad.]Ofice of Ut atns High Cmsner frHuRigts Genv, Switzerlad <htp:w.aphr./docume/ER/rsluti/E- N_4-E-2003-75.doc>(acs5Nov 206) 346 Nowhere in the international framework for the protection of human rights does it specify one procedural mechanism for rights. Historical factors such as the Westphalian state system and British colonialism, which established Westminster-styled constitutional systems in former British colonies, contributed to a general acceptance of international legal norms such as the concept of sovereignty and the notion that the primary duty bearers regarding human rights are the states. The same jurisprudential ethos has propagated the mainstream paradigm of human rights with justiciable rights and the judiciary as primary forum for the resolution of issues relating to violations. However, the preceding chapters have noted the unreality, given globalization, of the conventional paradigm that posited states as being sovereign and equal and each powerful enough to craft its own destiny and supply all the needs of its citizens. This realization necessitates exploring beyond the conventional paradigm for the resolution of the current afflictions and real limitations of the developing world in general and South Asia in particular. One can also properly recall the need for human rights to be contextualized, which is the grain of truth in the often overdone, easily abused and potentially divisive, even anarchic, assertions of cultural relativism. 20 This need is articulated for instance in the Bangkok Declaration. This document recognizes that, ?while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.? 21 This further legitimizes the exploration of other avenues to safeguard human rights. 6.3.1 Creating a Legal Regime of Human Rights in South Asia 20 Se Chapter 1of this tudy, sbection 1.9 21 FinlDcltineRgional MgforAsia ofThe World Cnferc onHuman Rights T Mistr d prstvsfAsia Ste,MtingAtBagk F29MrchTo2 April 193,PuatoGal Ambly Reluin 46/1 Of17 Dcembr1 Ite Ctexf repations fr The WordCnfrco HmaRihtsUNo /onf.57/P <ht:/w.jticnitive.g/dsr2?res_d=0629>(asd 0Nov 206). 347 There is an enormous capacity within the human rights paradigm to use it creatively and to make human rights both relevant and inclusive. 22 The rights paradigm has distinguished itself as the vehicle of choice for articulating notions of human dignity and well-being and for granting these notions legal and constitutional validity. 23 The legitimacy of the rights paradigm was consolidated in the developing world, as Mutua observes, through ?popular mass struggles by marginalized groups and colonized peoples ?Examples of these are the anti-colonial anti-racist movements by the peoples of Africa, Asia, Pacific, the Caribbean and Latin America. These struggles for self-determination and independence have left an indelible mark on human civilization.? 24 The right to self-determination as a legal right is a result of such struggles 25 proving that diverse manifestations of dissent against oppression and marginalization can contribute to the evolution and expansion of the rights paradigm. As the previous chapters of this thesis illustrated, the current crisis within the human rights paradigm, which includes the gross violation of ESC rights and resulting poverty, is an inevitable consequence of policy decisions based on neo-liberal economic principles. Neo-liberal globalization has created a new base of unaccountability and established new structures of systematic rights violations. Echoing the popular mass struggles against colonial rule and apartheid, people have come together against the inequitable manifestations of neo-liberal globalization. 26 The mass dissent contemporary trajectory globalization reflects the need for the evolution of a normative regime to govern and regulate its negative impact on people. 22 Maku ta ?Stndar SetingHuman Rights: Critque and Prognsi? (207) 9Human Rights Qrtely547?630,52(Mua). 23 S Chpter 1of this ty dlso KSik and S Rop Th wer fHuman Rights: IntrationlNmandDometicChange (brigeUniversityPs,19); dcardPier lude HBurs Wet Hu Ritsith Wl Cmu: I Atio (Unvstyof PsylviPe,192). 24 Mta, bo n. 25 Aricle1.Alpoleshave t right ofsel-dterinato. By virtue oftha rigt hey frl detmn thir itc tundfelypur h cmic,salnd cultldvlopmentof boh IatnlCt oCiv an PlitlRight (ICPR) eInrati Cvat Ecoic, Soi ad lralRghts(IESC). 26 Capter 2fthstuyn s e J lrk Worlds Apart: ivl Socity d the Btle for thilGbaliz (Erthc,UK,203). 348 The rights paradigm has demonstrated the ability to recreate innovatively its duty- bearers, identify new violators and evolve new mechanisms to protect and enhance human rights. 27 Such standard-setting through the rights paradigm has been successful in instances of overwhelming global support. The ICCPR, 28 the ICECSR, 29 and the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights 30 are instances where such universal standard setting efforts have had global support and empathy. On the other hand, the Declaration on the Right to Development is an instance where support has been divided. The UN Human Rights Commission initiated the idea of a right to development in 1977 and a decade later the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration. 31 Sengupta?s observation is that ?[i]n effect the right to development emerged as a human right which integrated economic, social, and cultural rights with civil and political rights in the manner that was envisaged at the beginning of the post-World War II human rights movement. The world got back, so to speak, to mainstream of the movement, from which it was deflected for several years by Cold War international politics.? 32 Despite the ardent support extended by Sengupta for the Declaration there has not been a consensus on the legitimacy of the right to development, particularly due to its incompatibility with neo-liberal ideology, ?which see[s] the global redistributive justice discourse of the right to development as incompatible with free market and capitalist structures of the global economy.? 33 The lack of consensus regarding the normative validity of the right to development and the academic debate surrounding it have highlighted uncertain capacity of the rights paradigm to contextualize issues in economic, sociopolitical and cultural terms, 27 Tony Evans The politcs fhumanrights: aglobl persctive (Pluto res, Lond, 205); David Kilead RclCaber?Te UN HunRihtNomfrCpati:ThePrivate Impctisof Pui InttiolLw?(206) Huan Rights Lw Rv 47?497. 28 <h:/w.hr.c/hl/n3/ba_cpr.t> (cesd16Feb20). 29 t tmeuesh 30 p:/.unr./uridoc/hrido.nf/(Symbol)/A.CON.57.3En>(acesd 16Feb 207). 31 .CHRes. 4(XI), UN ESCOR, ' oHu Rts (21 Feb 9). Th Dlrtion th ight oDvlopment wasdopte bytheUnitedNatinGeralsmly,Resouti 4/1284 ecmbr 1986 <h:/.unhcr./ml/3/b74.htm> (cd 16Fb 207). 32 ArjunSegutaT Rigt Dvlopt s u Rig <htp:/shn3.rvd.e/fxbetr/FXBC_WP--Senupta.f. (aces 8Mar 8); se also rj pt, Achna Ni and Mushi as flctios nthRigt oDvelopmnt(Sg Publicato, Ldo,205);ArjSgpt?Relizg hgo Dvlpnt? (20) 31 Devmenta Cge 3?578. 33 Mt, bv. 349 and to promote normative standards in situations where there is a lack of universal consensus against neo-liberalism. While the developed states view the right to development with great trepidation the developing countries have been quick see its potential, particularly the prescription that declares: ?States the duty to take steps, individually and collectively, to formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the full realisation of the right.? 34 Despite uncertainty of its legality as a human right, right to development provides means of channelling the concerns of the anti-globalization movement, such as the demand for global distributive justice, equitable terms of trade, debt relief and better governance of globalization. The preceding chapter highlighted how regional mechanisms strive to cater to the new exigencies that underpin globalization within various sociopolitical and cultural contexts. In the South Asian context too, it is vital that there is regional collaboration to circumvent gross violation of human rights that poor management of globalization produces. The crisis requires the formulation of new strategies and new structures not only to vindicate the rights that are violated but to create filtering mechanisms, which will avert potential future violations. Claiming evolution from a vastly different ideological base, the ESC rights, unlike the ?first generational? civil and political rights, are not consistent with the demands of neo-liberal economic agenda. 35 The UN Special Rapporteur on ESCR?s warns ?[t]he flurry of many States romantically to embrace the market as the ultimate solution to all society's ills, and the corresponding rush to denationalize and leave economics, politics and social matters to the whims of the private sector, although the theme of the day, will inevitably have an impact upon full realization of economic, social and cultural rights. History has adequately shown that many aspects social 34 Article 4Dclartion the RigtoDevlopment Adopte byGenral Asembly Resolutin 41/28ofemb1986<tp:/w.unhcr./hl/nu3/74.ht>(csd16 Fb207). 35 Fr adisui s Car 2f this tdy a ls Mical JDis d Davi PStwart ?Justicblty ofEcnoic,Soial,ClrlRigt:SodTerBnIteronl Cmplaints MehnsAdjite h Rgts oF, Wter, Husing, Halth?? (204) 98Aeric Joral fIteratlLaw462?515. 350 policy cannot be attained through blind reliance on market forces.? 36 Indeed, such reliance has created mass social, economic and cultural devastation. Therefore the regional praxis that is advocated here is premised on the endeavour to discard strong neo-liberal bias of contemporary globalization and create a normative standard regionally in relation to human rights, development policy formulation and democratic governance. 6.3.2 Sociopolitically and Culturally Contextualized Development Chapters 3 and 4 of this study raised the issue of the homogenizing thrust of contemporary development and its negative impact on South Asia. Observing the trajectory of the mainstream developmental ideology, Ashis Nandy comments, ?I think that drive for homogenization is written into the birth certificate of development. Despite what many like to believe, development presumes that, in the long run, you will have only one particular kind of society all over the world.? 37 The mainstream paradigm of development therefore ignores intricacies of multiculturalism and the diversity of South Asia and of traditional knowledge systems. The proposed South Asian Union Charter (SAU) will strive to incorporate the notion of sociopolitically and culturally contextualized development into its regional mechanism. This notion is significant from the perspective of what are currently the marginalized and the disenfranchised segments under the mainstream paradigm of development. As a conceptual notion it acknowledges human rights discourse and the consensus on human dignity which this represents, but it rejects the pervasive neo-liberal ethos and the homogenizing thrust that has been articulated through the last three decades of contemporary globalization. Regional assertion of 36 Danilo T?rk, Special Rporteufthe Sub-Comison Prevntio fDiscrminato nd PrtecfMinorts,Th alizonfEcnc, Siald CulralRght (Fl rept) E/CN.4/ub.2/19/6 3Jly 192<htp:w.ucr./uridca/huridoa.sf/(ybol)/E.N.4SUB.219.6En?Odocu ment> (acesd a 20). 37 SituKotari?RevistngtheViolen fDevlpment: A Interviw ith Asi Nay? (204) 47Devlpmn 8?14, . 351 the notion of contextualized development will focus on the unique requirements of the region with its sociopolitical and cultural exigencies, rather than formulating policies that cater to the self-interest of Western capital but which are then passed off as being both inevitable and optimal for all. Any assertion of cultural relativism in human rights often invokes violent outbursts that such claims are an attempt to dilute the validity of the ?universal? quality of human rights. 38 But in era where homogeneity has assumed the central place in every conceivable aspect of human life, cultural and regional identities offer a real alternative, a genuine sense security and belonging for both communities and individuals who are pressurized to adjust to economic and social change precipitated by neo-liberal globalization. 39 Sociopolitical and cultural contextualization is not an attempt to reinforce or speciously justify socially debilitating practices, such as ethnoreligious, caste and gender discrimination or the marginalization of the vulnerable segments of society. Rather, it is an attempt to locate development within the socioeconomic context of a particular community. It is a means of identifying the vulnerable segments of society ? aspects of culture and sections the national economy that are threatened by the expansion the neo-liberal globalization process. Contextualized development creates a safety mechanism to deal with the insecurities and the vulnerabilities of the marginalized segments of society who end up as the victims of the globalization process, such as communities displaced by macro development or urbanization schemes, marginalized small-scale farmers, and the urban poor. The new regional mechanism proposed by this thesis is premised upon the conceptual foundation articulated above and will take into account the key recommendations of the Paris Principles on human rights mechanisms. 38 Yash Gai ?Human Rights andGovernace: Th Asian Debat? (Ocasionl Paper Sies No. 1, TeAinFodtio?Cerfr Asi Piffr,Novmer194);MichlCDav ?Costulis Plitclult: Dbte Hun Rights d As Vus? (98) Harvd aghtsJurna 109, and lso hasrtisftuiveralimofnrightsin Jck Dnely Univerl HmRightiTerynd Pce (Corl Unsty Pres, Itac, 198). 39 Se Chaptrs 3ad 4of this teis. 352 6.4 UN Policy Guidelines on Possible National and Regional Institutional Frameworks The following section discusses the recent policy statements regarding national and human rights endeavours to establish mechanisms that foster and promote human rights. The Vienna Declaration is regarded by this study as a restatement of international human rights law. It provides the conceptual basis for the initiation a regional mechanism to protect human rights in South Asia. The Paris Principles prescribe the framework and the essential requirements to establish a national human rights enforcement mechanism. However, the guidelines can be foundation for a regional framework. 6.4.1 The Vienna Declaration Significant among several policy statements relating to the creation of regional arrangements for human rights protection under the auspices of United Nations is the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 1993, which declares that: 40 Regional rngemts play afundametal role inpromting and protecting human rights. Ty should reinforce ivrsl huan ights stars, ntained in intenatiol an ights strunts, ad their protection. The World Cfrnc o Hum Rights edorse forts er wy tostrngthe s angemts ad to increas their fctivn, while at th ame tim strin th importance of option with the Uited Nations hun rights activitie. The World Conference on Human Rights reiterates the need to consider the possibility of establishing regional and subregional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights where they do not already exist . 40 Viena Declartion, abve n6. 353 Inherent in the Declaration is the presumption that a regional normative framework can be more effective in reinforcing universal human rights values, can expand their scope and can re-contextualize rights in the light of the cultural, political and economic peculiarities of the region. A regional mechanism, often focussing on a specialized set of issues, has capacity to evolve conceptually adding new ideas into the rights paradigm. The overwhelming endorsement of the Vienna Declaration by 171 states clearly supports the view that the Declaration is a restatement of the international law on human rights. Donnelly observes that such approval is also indicative of the ?dramatic change in dominant international attitudes? in relation to the contemporary paradigm of human rights. For he says, ?[w]hatever the gap between theory and practice, most states today prominently feature appeals to human rights, democracy, and development in their efforts to establish national and international legitimacy.? 41 The Vienna Declaration therefore has remained a significant milestone in the trajectory of incorporating human rights standards into national policy formulation. The Vienna Declaration asserts that ?the universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question? and ?reaffirms the importance ensuring the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of consideration of human rights issues.? 42 The Declaration also reinforces the notion that human rights are indivisible and interdependent and rejects the perception of generational human rights. 43 6.4.2 The Paris Principles The significance of effective national level structures for implementing human rights has been reiterated by the UN Human Rights Commission several times. The UN General Assembly in December 1978 adopted a resolution which created the 41 Jack Donely ?Human Rights,Democray, nd Devlopment? (19) 21/3 Human Rights Qurtely608?32,61. 42 Vi clartio bve 6, Artil 1. 43 KBol?Stk-ngHuanRghts:Te World Cnferc onuan ights, Viena 193? (195) 43 Plil tudis 79?95. 354 guidelines on the structure and functioning of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights. 44 The resolution specified methods of effective implementation international human rights standards and created basic ground rules for such national mechanisms at a meeting in Paris in 1991. 45 This meeting culminated in the in-depth guidelines commonly known as The Paris Principles 46 that established structures for the protection of human rights on a national basis. 47 The present study asserts that these principles can also be the foundation for a South Asian regional mechanism of human rights, since the underlying purpose of the Paris Principles is the promotion decentralized/localized effective human rights protection mechanisms. The Paris Principles of 1991 stipulate the following basic parameters for a general human rights mechanism: Competence and Responsibilities: 48 The Paris Principles do not envisage empty structures that are unable to yield sufficient power to make an effective difference in the human rights sphere within a defined geographical area. The Principles encourage scrutiny of legislation and procedures for compatibility with established human rights norms and encourage conformity through amendments to existing laws or adoption of new legislation. They encourage human rights treaty ratification and the harmonization domestic regimes 44 Nationl Istiuons fr the Promtin ad Protecin ofHuman Rights A/RES/346 1Decmber 1978 <htp:/w.g/dcus/gres/3as3.ht> (cesd12June 207). 45 JulieMrs The Uit Natin Hu Rigt: AGidfor New ra(outledg, Lond, 205). 46 Nationl istuions fr the promtin ad protecin ofhuman rights Adpte byGral AsembyRel48/13f20 Decbe193 <tp:/w.cr./ml/nu6/2fs19.htm > (cd 12J 07) (Paris ils). 47 Thsprinclswerubeqnty dor ythe UN Coison Hua Rights (eolutin 192/54 of3 Marh 192) d hUNGenalAsmbly(Relut48/13 of20Decbr 193). e samtsritai aumbr f-pnsrd cfercsnmn ritsies, includig the Rgionl eng forAfic ofthWorld fon ua ights,ld Tuni 192; atiLtnerica theCariba,hldiS Joe i193; th Reioalti fr Asa, hld iBagkn193; mwet Wrksp Naiol Humn ighs IntuioneOtw i2; dtworksp for Aia nd PacifRegn Rse, l iJkrn193. 48 Paris icple, abv45,ticle A. 355 to reflect the universal human rights norms. Expansion of avenues available for human rights protection and education is recommended. Composition, Guarantees of Independence and Pluralism: 49 The principles envisage that devoid of ?Autonomy/independence and pluralism? guaranteed through a legally binding mechanism, any institution designed to protect human rights would be unable to carry out the tasks mandated to it. Taking into consideration the complex power relations, the institution should include representation of various sections of civil society actively involved in the promotion and protection human rights. Pluralism ought to be reflective of society represented. Methods of Functioning: 50 The Paris Principles envisage that the institution would have the freedom to consider any question within its competence and enjoy free access the people, directly or through media; free access also to information from any department or authority; complete freedom to promote and propagate awareness among the people about human rights and basic rights, remedies and entitlements of people; adequate powers to conduct enquiries, to undertake investigations, or intervene in any proceedings, make mandatory recommendations and conduct the trial and hearing of specific cases; and adequate powers also to submit to the government or Parliament and other competent bodies, reports, requests and proposals on any matter concerning the promotion and protection of human rights. Quasi--judicial competence: 51 The national apparatus will have the competence to receive, hear and decide complaints and petitions of any individual or group of persons or any NGO concerning human rights issues or violations; to seek an amicable settlement through conciliation or to decide disputes in accordance with the law. This fourth principle 49 Paris incples, above n45, ArticleB. 50 C 51 ris ils, , rtil D. 356 envisages an expansion of the conventional rules relating to standing before judicial bodies. If the Paris Principles are applied, SAARC falls down seriously as a regional mechanism to ensure human rights. Abdul Ahsan, the first Secretary General of the SAARC, acknowledges that there are inherent weaknesses in the SAARC secretariat; tellingly, he asserts that it is only an institutional structure and that it is impotent to make a meaningful contribution towards the realization of the Association?s objectives. 52 Ahsan?s assertion is particularly significant in terms of the Social Charter. The Charter in its current form does not contain a regional institutional framework for the implementation of its objectives, which renders it effectively meaningless. While there are inherent weaknesses in the SAARC Social Charter it is undoubtedly a major breakthrough in relation to creating a regional consensus for the protection and advancement of social and economic rights within the region. The Social Charter can be the foundation upon which the strategy for a regional mechanism for implementing universal human rights and equitable development policies can be founded. The new praxis advocated in this thesis needs to expand through the space provided by the Social Charter to initiate and implement fundamental changes in the spheres of development, human rights governance in the region. The new praxis must, on the basis of social, political and cultural contexualization of development, do the following: a) Address concerns related to poor governance, especially corruption on a regional or sub-regional level; b) Create a mechanism to realize human rights in the region and promote national policies for poverty alleviation and equitable development; and 52 Abul hsan ?SARC Secrtait:ACritque? (204) 6South Asian Joural. <htp:/w.outhasinmdi.n/Mgazn/jornal/_sarcertt.hm>(cesd 16Aug 207). 357 c) Be a medium for effecting a fundamental change in the mainstream development ideology and renegotiate the terms of engagement in relation to globalization. The South Asian mechanism can draw inspiration from other regional mechanisms already established in Europe, Africa and the Americas as discussed in Chapter 5. However, it must go further in the normative scope of rights and the mechanisms for realizing them. Taking into account the critical problems encountered by South Asia in relation to neo-liberal globalization, poor governance and ineffective human rights mechanisms, 53 this study reiterates that the regional praxis advocated for South Asia would be compelled to extend beyond conventional systems of seeking remedies for rights violated. It will incorporate measures to negotiate aid and loan conditionalities from the IFIs and trade-based policy formulations from the WTO, and to challenge developmental policy formulation of states, all of which has the potential to violate human rights contained in the SAU Charter. 6.5 The New Praxis: The South Asian Union for Human Rights Development and Democracy (SAU) The South Asian Union on Development and Human Rights (SAU) will be a syncretic effort that reflects the collective identity and the sociopolitical and economic challenges of the region. Its specific objective is creation, through law, of a structure and a culture of sociopolitical and economic governance in the region that respects the rule of law, fundamental tenets of plural, representative democracy and universal human rights norms. To achieve these fundamental objectives the SAU charter will create a legal regime with specific obligations and responsibilities of and to member states. Therefore, it will move away from the previous aspirational rather toothless premise that was created under the aegis of the SAARC. As the Dominican Republic envoy to the UN General Assembly, Ornes-Caiscou, observed in 1966 during the General Assembly proceedings relating to the ICCPR, ?we, the 53 As higlihted insection 6.2 fthiscapter nd also Chapters 2,3 and 4of this tudy. 358 unarmed, the economically under developed, the technologically under privileged, have no strength except the strength of law? .[and so] we are pleased to vote for the draft Covenants on Human Rights.? 54 Similarly, this thesis endorses the intrinsic value and the potential benefits of a legal regime to a region such as South Asia that is economically weak and politically unstable. 55 The creation of a legally binding normative framework will contribute positively to the enhancement human rights; functional, plural democracy; equitable development; and the governance of globalisation in the region. However, the political reality is that the regional praxis will be compelled to strive for a regime that is acceptable to all states in the region. The new praxis will therefore necessarily deal with issues of sovereignty and self-determination and strive for an achievable compromise that would not affect the viability of the regime and would reflect the growing world consensus regarding these concepts. The consensus is that ?the emergence of a serious human rights process at regional and global levels would seem to be the most impressive ethical achievement of the past century? and that the emerging human rights standards and their implementation are ?definitely challenging the idea that sovereignty provides governments with insulation against accountability provided their actions are confined to territorial limits, and that their leaders have an immunity respected throughout the world.? 56 Against this background, and given embarrassment at the track record of poor governance, corruption human rights violations, no state in South Asia would want to be seen to reject a regional venture that strives for such laudable and credibility-enhancing aims as democratic governance, human rights and the regulation of globalisation. The South Asian states will also be compelled to reflect the growing global consensus on the adverse impact of neo-liberal gobalization and accept the articulation of the 54 Ornes-Caicou speaking atheGnral Asembly Plenary Meting, pars 137?8, UN GAOR, 21 st s,1495 th mtg,16Dc196quotd iMhodBid RobetcCorqudale(s) Ecoi,Sil d Cultrl Rigs ctin (Oxfr UvrsityPrs, Oxf, 207 3. 55 Se hapters3an4of hsty. 56Rird Flk ?verigtyand Huma Rights: Te Sarch for ecnilation? May (0) Isue of Dmocy<htp:/w.lblpoic.r/naio/fut/0312alk.htm> (cesd23Nov26) (Falk). 359 concept of sovereignty from another perspective that has gained global currency in the past few years. Kofi Annan elaborates this alternative articulation of sovereignty: 57 State soverignty, in itsmost baic sen, is being rdefin ?not least by the forcs fglobalistio adterntiol co-pration. States arw idely undrstod e instrumtst the svice fthir les, ot vicrs. At tham time dividl sovrigty?bywhicIme the fundmetal fro fch inal, enhind th carte ofth UNandsbqt intenatiol treties ? has b cbyarendnspring coios ofindividual rigts. Wen w r the te toy, e a oethevr cious tht its im isto protect individual hm bings, not to prtet ths wh abse thm. This conceptual enunciation that sovereignty is held by the people is not new and has been expressed in several constitutions that emerged from colonial rule. 58 As Falk observes: 59 [I]f soverignty isunderstood as inherg in the pole, the ida of pular r that hs b hisricllysociatedwith FrnchRvlution, thein many situtio eraliztion fumn rigts isrcislyth politicl rjct bg epoed b"thsovig"(i.e., theple). Even ifsoverigty isasoiated with th stateas rpntative of o, articularlya dmcrticta, thenit is till ibletoceivsvrignty s bdle fights and uties at cb modifie byth lawmaking pws fthetate, therby retingthepoibility that the aceptaneof hunrights, v with posct f sm externl uility, is a flfilmet of sorignty udr cntemray cnditio. From this perspective the proposed regime is an exercise of empowering the people of South Asia to hold their countries accountable at a regional level for violations of democracy and human rights including in their policy choices. The regional apparatus containing a commission and an ombudsman will enable the people to challenge national governments at a regional level for the violations of their regional commitments. 57 Kofi Ana ?Two cnepts ofverignty? The Econmist (The Econmist Newspaer Ltd, Ld,18Septmbr19). 58 The Prl fh 2 nd Rublica Costiu fSri Lak sta: ?WHERAS its h wil of topl friLanktoestashtble galordebsdonSupre La ineformfa Cnstiunwc ?Srgn iuinsf vnc; rs widrshrg pe; ehre dmortivlus, cljstc hum rightsfailtcomic,sial ndcultrl advct; a potepae, hiaroyado verne; NO THERFOE, W THE POLEFSRI LANKint xeis fr sverilgislativper,do herbygive untorselv this COTIUIO.?In linAtc 2.(1) ults: ?Intpulc, SvigntyiePople ad isalibl.? 59 Falk, bo 57. 360 Therefore, the legal regime espoused by the SAU will be premised on two parallel foundations, which are an expression of sovereignty of the people of South Asia represented by their collective wishes and aspirations, and universal validity of the human rights paradigm. Article 8 of the Bangkok Declaration observes that ?while are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.? 60 This thesis acknowledges that diversity, and the new praxis will both take cognizance of intra-regional disparities in terms of economic strength, democratic maturity, and legal structures, and work towards common human development goals in the region. It will focus on the collective efforts and as well as each member state making a commitment to redesign the structures of governance, and reformulate, or create, legal regimes so as to enhance objectives of the regional organisation particularly in relation to democratic governance, human rights and eradication of corruption. The common socioeconomic reality of the region is one of abject poverty and a lack of legal and political sophistication amongst the people, which the new praxis will take into consideration. The SAU will encourage the participation of civic organisations to litigate and make representation at a quasi-judicial forum that will promote the rights of the people. It will formulate new policies to foster avenues for meaningful participation of civil society in policy formulation, provide educational opportunities that increase the peoples? consciousness on issues that affect their livelihoods, and end the culture of elite governance that has made the structures of democratic political processes all too often a meaningless mockery. 6.6 The Charter of the South Asian Union for Human Rights, Development and Democracy (SAU Charter) 60 Bangko Declartion HumanRights Final Declartion fthe Rgional Meting for Asia ofthe World Cfrn O it, Bako,7Ap 193(Pursat TGralsembly Resuti 46/1f17 Decber19) UN /Cf.57/c9(13) <htp:/w.justiceitaiv.og/dsurce2?rs_id=062> (esd5Dec 206). 361 The constituting document of the South Asian Union on Development and Human Rights (SAU) will be the SAU Charter to promote regional solidarity, peace and social justice for all people in the region. Similar to Article 3(d) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, SAU will promote and defend ?common positions on issues interest to the continent and its peoples?, 61 particularly in relation to development, global trade and human rights. While the normative content of the SAU Charter will be based on universally accepted values of human rights it will also reflect regional exigencies, such as the need for democratic governance and equitable development. Therefore, the SAU Charter, while incorporating the rights that are contained in the ICCPR and ICESCR, will also include the right to development and the right to democratic governance. The SAU Charter will also delineate the rules and the procedures of the regime, prescribe the specific organs of the SAU and their functions, and detail methods of implementing the objectives of the Charter. 6.7 The Objectives of the SAU Charter The objectives of the SAU Charter are to create a normative schema to resolve the sociopolitical and economic afflictions that prevail in contemporary South Asia. Therefore, the primary objective of the SAU Charter is the establishment of the rule of law that fosters functional democracy and respect for human rights. The collective identity of the regional coalition of states will also be able to create and establish practices to govern the contemporary globalisation process. More specifically, the objectives will be as follows: a) Good governance of globalisation and development in the region This study observed that the devastating human cost of globalisation could have been avoided with prudent policy choices that did not place economic growth and profit over social justice. The SAU will facilitate the member states to negotiate policy 61 Constiuve Act ofthe AfricanUio Article 3(d) <htp:/w.afric- ui.rg/ot/abu/Costuve_n.tm#Aricle3> (esd 16Oct 207). 362 selection with IFIs that is human-centred and promotes principles of social justice. To this end the SAU Charter will create the Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation, which assist member states to negotiate aid and loan conditionalities. 62 b) Promotion of regional solidarity and territorial integrity and intra-regional conflict resolution As discussed in Chapter 4, the colonial legacy of regional conflicts still hinders cordial inter-state relations in region. The SAARC adopted a myopic attitude regards regional conflicts by excluding bilateral issues from the mandate of the regional association. This study is of the view that bilateral conflicts hinder overall progress and the prosperity region, and the best avenue for bilateral conflict resolution is a regional forum. Therefore, echoing the Charter of the Organisation of the American States, all disputes between two or more states will be resolved amicably through good offices or negotiation and mediation. 63 The SAU Charter, however, will go beyond Article 27 64 of its OAS counterpart and will determine that all bilateral or multilateral conflicts will be resolved within three years though the assistance of the Governing Council of the SAU. 65 When creating a legal regime to resolve issues this region has to take into consideration regional circumstances. The African continent, with a large number of states with long- standing bilateral and multilateral disputes, had to consider a strategy based on a set of principles attempting to promote and consolidate peace and security in the region. 62 Se sction 6.13 ofthis capter. 63 PaifelmeDus ?Charte ofthe Organizto fAmerican Stes ?Artl 24- Itratinl ditbwnMmb Steshalb sudohpaceful pocedursfoh share. Tis prvislt intrpt s imirntothe right an bligtf t MmrStaeuder Atics34d 35ofheCarte ft Uid Ns.??Arce 25-Teoling cflpoedur:irectgtion,gdcs, medito, ivstiaon d clto,jia stlmnt, abin, d s whi teparties to th spuemy pilyagr up any te.? ?Aricl 26-Inthevt htisterisbw to rre Amrica Stes ic, inth onof of,cno bld thoug thusaldiplatihnl,hpartesalgre se trpaul predurthawilnalem trech solu.? ?rticl27- Aseitay il ss qtns ftetetof disut nd wil dmnrtint rocrforecpecful aua ndisp bwe AmericaStes ay reai whudfintv stlmnt ihnresoble priof tm.? <htp:/.os.rg/jr/Egih/ar.tml> (cd26 Oc206) 64 Ibid Article 27 65 Sesn6.10below. 363 Therefore, with the objective of preventing and resolving inter-state conflicts the African Union adopted the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact. 66 This is an extensive document that deals with wide-ranging issues including situations of armed conflict. The present initiative is in fact one of several such attempts to deal with the ?security challenges? that Africa faces. 67 In South Asia, with far fewer states, though mutual distrust and bilateral tensions are rampant, the legal obligation to resolve bilateral and multilateral issues within a prescribed time frame on a peaceful basis will augur well for peace and security in the region. c) Consolidation of democratic governance based on transparency, accountability and promotion of popular participation in governance Issues relating to the democratic deficit in South Asia were discussed in Chapter 4 of this study. This study endorses the caution expressed by Alston regarding the creation and recognition of ?new rights? 68 in the context of democracy. This study maintains that if the key conventional safeguards enshrined in representative democracy, such as parliamentary responsibility to the electorate, Cabinet responsibility to Parliament, separation of powers and judicial independence, are operational at optimum levels in South Asia the search for new paradigms to enhance democracy in the region is not required. There is a need for strict implementation of the familiar processes and values of representative democracy, which are already partially, but only partially, internalised in the South Asian psyche, as a means of rectifying the malfunctioning of the structures, and safeguards must be put in place for effective democratic governance. In this context the task of the SAU is to establish regional procedures that will implement the familiar safeguards just mentioned to enhance democratic governance and help citizens, politicians and public servants internalise the normative concepts of corruption-free representative democracy. 66 Asembly ofthe African Uio,Furth Ordinary Sesion 30-1 Janury 205, African Uio, docuntsbly//De.5?72 (IV) Asmbl/AU/Dec.? (IV). 67 Oar Tura ?T Cm Africa Defc d curity Poli? 14 fri Afairs 635?656. 68 Philp Alston juring Up New Rights: Propsal for Qalit Cntrol (98) 7mericn JournafIeratil La607?621. 364 The SAU Charter will consider the promotion of democratic governance a fundamental tenet. Given the contemporary political climate of South Asia, it is unrealistic to demand functional democracy and respect for the rule of law as prerequisites from prospective member states to obtain membership in the SAU, unlike its European counterpart. 69 Therefore, on a more pragmatic basis SAU Charter, echoing Article 3 (f) of the OAS Charter, will consider that ?The elimination of extreme poverty is an essential part of the promotion and consolidation of representative democracy and is the common and shared responsibility? all member states of the SAU. 70 The Charter of the SAU will mirror the mechanisms embodied in Resolution 1080 of the OAS and Washington Protocol in situations of democratic lapses and will include provisions for the Council of Ministers of the SAU to convene consider appropriate measures in situations democratic disruptions. 71 d) Consolidation of national mechanisms to combat corruption and foster a culture free from corruption The endemic corruption in the structures of governance and the limited success of national endeavours to combat it has been discussed previously in Chapter 3 this study. The study identified a lack of common standards and effective complaints mechanisms that would curb corruption and provide information about corruption to independent investigative authorities, a lack which further aggravated within South Asia. 72 The World Development Report?s empirical study of corruption and its devastating impact on poverty in 2000/2001 demands that corruption be viewed from a human rights perspective, since: ?[t[he burden ofpetty coruption falls disprotionately on pr eople ? . For thoswitht myand ecs, etty crupinublichalthrlice 69 Se Articles 3and 4of the Staueofthe Council fEurope <htp:/w.o.it/T/C/bt_c/>(ased5 Ag207). 70 ril (f) <hp:w.s.rg/jridEglih/art.html>(acesd 5Aug 207). 71 SeCater5sction 542 ofths tuy. 72 Trnspy IeralAnalReport204 (Trnsprey Intrtional, Berlin, Germany, 204). 365 servics can hve dbilitating consequnces. Coruption afects the livs ofpr polethrougmanyotherhals awll. It biasegovrmnt pdingawy frm sially lule ds, sdation. t divts public rsurces frm inatrctreinvstmtstht could benfit por ple, schaselth linic, nd tends toa public speningcital-intesive invtmnts that ofr ore oprtuities forkicak, h asdfce ntrats. It lowrs qulityf infastrucre, ince csremorlurtiv o equipmet prchas. Crtion als undrmin public svic dlivy.? 73 Rampant corruption as described in Chapter 3 subverts national initiatives to combat corruption through the creation of legislative mechanisms such as Bribery Commissions and Offices of Ombudsmen. 74 In this context, the SAU Charter proposes the establishment of an Ombudsman Against Corruption with quasi-judicial powers to investigate allegations of corruption. 75 The office of the Ombudsman will liaise with national institutions to evolve strategies to combat corruption. e) Promotion and protection of human rights in accordance with universal human rights principles and eradication of poverty The SAU Charter?s provisions for human rights will echo universally acknowledged human rights but will also incorporate specifically the right to development. The SAU Charter, which the rights enshrined in the ICESCR as well as the ICCPR, will follow the recommendation of the Limburg Principles: 76 [T]he obligation toachieve progesivly the full realiztion ofthe rights requirs Stateprties move sxditiou aposibletowds theraliztionofthights. Und cirusta all thisbinterted implying f States t rt to efrinefitely frtstoensr fll elization. O thcontrryll tatepaties 73 World Devlopment Rport f20/1: Atacking Poverty The World Bank 2001. <htp:/wb.rdbak.g/WBSITEXRNL/TOICS/EXPOVERTY/0,cotenMDK:201958 9~agPK:148956~iPK:2168~theitPK:3692,0.tml >(acse 12Nv 06). 74 rt SGhos ?Cruption Ida? nCoruption ouhAi? nKMDSila,GHPeirs and SRdeAamringhe (ds)CES(y blca,02). 75 sctin 6.13 fticater. 76 ThLburgPipls onhImplentaio fthe Intrationl Cvenat oEcnomic, Soial and Cltal Rhts adt8 J 1987 UN ESCOR,om? HumRts 43rdSes. AgedIte8 UNDoc E/N4/1987/Aex(),rited i?T Librg Picpl thIplni f theItrntiol Cvnt oEcnoc, oalnultal ihts? (1987)Hua Rihts Quarly 2 avibe a<hp:/w.la.u/gish/i/nstr/lburg.as> (cesd5 Oc 206). 366 have th obligation tobegin immediately totake step tofulfil their obligations uder Cnt. As stated before, this thesis is of the view that it is no longer tenable to assert the progressive realisation of ESC rights on the basis of ?available resources?. The SAU Charter instead, following the Limburg Principles, will expressly commit to and invite scrutiny of the ?effective use of available resources? as described in the next paragraph, since any lack of systematic protection or apathy towards the implementation of obligations would render the ESC rights incorporated into Charter meaningless. Therefore, the rights contained in the SAU Charter will go beyond the traditionally under-specified commitments to ESC rights and impose specific time-related targets of compliance in relation such as primary education, healthy environment and access to healthcare and shelter. These rights have been litigated with limited success in South Asia already, thanks only to champions of activism in the judiciary, and that aspect has been discussed in Chapter 1 this study; the success expected under the new regime which actively commits to these rights and provides for their inspection will of course be much greater. 77 The significance of social, cultural and economic rights to the process of poverty eradication has been elaborated in Chapter 3 of this study. The concept ESC rights that are justiciable through public interest litigation is familiar to the human jurisprudential culture of some of the South Asian countries. 78 The evolution of the concept in South Asia is founded on economic deprivation and sociopolitical marginalisation of vast segments of the community. In the context of abject poverty and social deprivation, ?generational? rights which accord primacy to civil and political rights have little validity. The circumstance is best elucidated in Para 30 of the judgment in the case of C.E.S.C. Limited v. Subash Chandra Bose, by the Supreme Court of India: ?To the tillers of the soil, wage earners, laborers, wood cutters, rickshaw pullers, scavengers and hut dwellers, the civil and political rights 77 Se also SGlpen ?Public InterstLigation, Scial Rights and Social Plicy? Paper sentd at AruhCnfercNwFro ofScl Ply12?5Dec205. 78 t 1subti 1.7this tud. 367 are mere cosmetic rights. Socio-economic rights and cultural rights are their means and relevant to them to realize the basic aspirations of meaningful right to life.? 79 In the above context this thesis reiterates that a disparate recognition of ESC rights is no longer tenable for it affects the enhancement and protection all human rights. While the significance of having judicial mechanisms to enforce rights cannot be underestimated, in the particular sociocultural context of South Asia it is important to have concrete strategies to implement fundamental ESC rights, such as education, health care, shelter and minimum standards of living through quasi-judicial methods as envisaged by the SAU Charter. This study recommends that the South Asian Commission on Human Rights (SAC) should be the first step towards establishing a comprehensive human rights protection regime that would include a court at a later stage. As with the African regime of human rights protection large amount of consolidation work has to be done at national level before a comprehensive regional legal mechanism can instituted. The suggestion of regional court at this point in time is premature in the context of member states that have yet to consolidate the national human rights protection regimes already nominally established. The quasi-judicial nature of the SAC has the attraction of a more broad-based reach that is not hampered by procedural requirements, affords easy access and is cost effective. f) Creation of avenues to challenge policy formulation by both national governments and global institutions, to ensure maintenance of sustainable environments, to promote self-reliance, traditional knowledge systems and indigenous livelihoods This thesis acknowledges the significance of democracy and human rights for human development. Therefore, there is a need for positive synergy between economic development and investment in social welfare to see results of poverty eradication. It is at this point that pragmatic policy creation comes into play. There is no precise 79 C.ES. Limted v.Subhas Chandr Bose [192] SC 41. 368 means of scrutinising policy formulation for violation of universal human rights norms and this difficulty is acknowledged by Mary Robinson, who concedes that ?[p]roblems of precision in how human rights standards can be applied in different policy making situations remain.? 80 The Human Development Report of 1990 observed that the ?[d]eveloping countries are not too poor to pay for human development and take care of economic growth?, 81 intimating that choice of policy relating to development can remain the exclusive domain of the developing world. However, as empirical evidence indicates, the freedom policy choice is not always exercised wisely and poor prioritisation of objectives by national governments results in large amounts of resources being diverted to military spending, ineffective parastatals, and a focus on global market integration at the cost of compromising the livelihoods of the rural peasantry, which in turn exacerbates poverty. A topical example is the hosting of the Commonwealth Games of 2010 in India. 82 In terms of the prioritisation of the concerns that need to be resolved by the Indian government, Games must be regarded as secondary the provision of education, healthcare and a long list of public expenditure. 83 There is no effective forum in the present context for civil society to question such policy decisions of government, which frequently prioritises policy in an iniquitous manner. Non-prioritisation or poor prioritisation of issues and policies is a huge contributory factor to the mal-development of South Asia. Empirical examples cited in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study prove that the supposed existence of country-specific aid or conditionality is a currently a fiction in the context South Asia as much as elsewhere in the global South. Policies are formulated with the uniform neo-liberal makeup, which prioritises the concerns of the 80 Mary Robins ?Advancig Econmic, Soial, nd Cultral Rights: Te Way Forwad? (204) 6 HumnghtQurtely 86?72, 86. 81 DevlpmRprt 190(UN Devlpmet Prome, Oxford University Pres, Nw York, Oxford, 190) <ht:/d.unp.org/nrots/glbal/hdr190/>(aces 17Dc206). 82 Theiahalrey comecd iqui i rtinlity fspig.S for instac Rit Brjnt ?Is t Gswrth tIa? Ilnofs ucovrty lt's haveuerbut fcGme,noxtravgno? The Hidu (30 Mar206) <htp:/w.hidu.c/206/30/stris/206894.htm>(acesd 1Apr 206). 83 Inotras t Sprts Mister fN Zaln has intted Nw Zlanisuabletohst e ae i2014eoheugcotwhicelflsiouldb tofrd <htp:/s.nimsn.c.a/ril.aspx?d=93084> (c 17Apr 206). 369 IFIs, and individual countries are coerced into accepting them without protest. 84 This thesis has also observed that the ideological leanings of the IFIs or the dominant development paradigm cannot be transformed through individual state resistance. It is in this context that a regional collaborative mechanism to negotiate the terms of engagement of development and globalisation with the IFIs and bilateral donors is envisaged. The SAU Charter, therefore, will provide for a mechanism of collective bargaining through the Commission of the SAU to assistance in negotiating policies and aid conditionalities. It is envisaged that collectively through the regional organisation the conditionalities attached to development assistance and loans that are not compatible with South Asia?s commitment to values of human rights, equity and social justice can be resisted. To achieve the specified objectives cited above the SAU will comprise a non- politicized Governing Council that will be at apex of the framework of the regional apparatus, sitting above a Secretariat that would service all the organs SAU, and in turn a SAU Commission on Human Rights, Development and Democracy and, at the same level, an Ombudsman Against Corruption. The Commission of the SAU will have three Sub-Commissions that will focus exclusively on development, democracy and human rights respectively, these being crucial goals of the region. As an embryonic regional mechanism it is envisaged to keep its structure and organs simple to garner state support and commitment to the objectives of the SAU Charter. To implement the mandate of the Charter these organs of the regional mechanism will have both quasi-judicial powers and administrative powers. The following sections of this study will elaborate on the composition, the mandate and functions of each organ of the SAU. 6.8 The SAU Governing Council 84 A Marshl, JWodrfe and PKjel?Polices torl-back the Sta nd privatse? Poverty ReductionStraegy Ppsivstigad. D RSPcnstiuprogs??WIDERlpmnt Cfr DbtRlf, 201. 370 The Governing Council of the SAU will reflect a fusion of the powers, and the mandate, of the following organs of the OAS: the General Assembly, the Governing Council and Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 85 The Governing Council will comprise three members who are nominated from each member state and it constitute the supreme governing body of the Organization. The members of the Governing Council will be nominated by the member states and will hold office for a period of five years serving in their personal capacity. 86 The member states will have the power of nominating persons other than their own nationals to serve on the Council. In this sense the nature of the governing body of the SAU will be different from that of the African Union, where the Executive Council comprises the Ministers Foreign Affairs for each member state. 87 The SAU will depart from this position as such a membership would politicise the governing body of the regional union and subvert the overall objectives of the SAU. Such politicisation governing body would be detrimental to the viability of SAU in the context of the national political scenarios of member states such as Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan, where democratic governance is not functional. The Head of the Governing Council will be the President of the SAU, who will be appointed to office for a five-year term by members Governing Council of the SAU. The Charter of the SAU, reflecting the basic spirit of the Paris Principles, will define the powers and functions of the President. Each member state will have the right of nominating a President on a rotational basis. As the governing body of the SAU, the Council will have a mandate to oversee the functions of its organs. The Council will be entrusted with the formulation of policy 85 Articles 54to 69f the Carteofthe OAS. <hp:/w.as.rg/consj/GENRL%20EMBLY/overiw.asp> (acesd 26Oct 207). 86 Taking t ut plitcl rality ofthe subcntit, actnflxibltyrgainhe metodfhepimetf embsGvrg Cunils requrd. Th SAU Crt wil spciy t t r noiaons fr ec m staehodbmatentiolgisaturs f asandbdrs ythHadofStaeofc. Ir st wiu fctnl deor, util ecis tblish, nitns theGovrgil bemd by th HeofS. 87 Aricl10 th Constiuve Act ofte Africa Uio <tp:/w.africu.rg//aurgans/Exeutv_Cuncil_e.htm> (acesd 4Feb 206). 371 based on the objectives of the SAU Charter, monitoring the progress of the SAU objectives, introducing new areas of collaboration and general overview of the organisation. 88 In this regard the Governing Council will be responsible for scrutiny of initiatives that are undertaken by the SAU Secretariat and the Commission to achieve the objectives of the SAU Charter. As the preceding analysis indicates, intra-regional insecurities are a source of ongoing tension and bilateral conflict. 89 Article X.2 of the SAARC Charter, which stipulated that ?[b]ilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations? of the organization, will be abandoned and instead a clause to effect that ?bilateral disputes shall be resolved by peaceful means under the aegis of the SAU Commission and the Governing Council? will be incorporated into Charter. A member state will be required to bring to the cognizance of the SAU Commission any bilateral or multilateral issues that need peaceful resolution. 90 Initial efforts at dispute resolution will be carried out in the SAU Commission and failure to settle will result in alerting the Governing Council of the SAU. The Governing Council have the authority to compel the member states to resolve the issue amicably and, in the event of a failure do so, to urge the disputing states to refer the dispute to international arbitration or to the International Court of Justice. Such a process is necessary because it provides an opportunity for member states to resolve their disputes promptly and through peaceful means, which is essential for the enduring legitimacy of the regional organization. 91 Mirroring the requirements of Article 42 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 92 the Charter of the SAU will require member states to submit reports on 88 Largely simlar toArticle IVoftheSARC harte <htp:/w.sarc- sc.o/dt/cs/h.pdf>(acsd 4Feb206). 89 S Chpr 4f tis tuy; s loJnso ARgion Turmoil: Suth Asian Coflicts Since 1947(iagoUnverPre,Chig, 5). 90 e sct 6.10 fthis captr. 91 BthV YrbuadRobMYarbouh ?Dispute Stlent iIternatiol Trade: Rgionalismnd Proeurl rdint? inEdwarMasfilda Hl VMin(s)The Pltc Eoyf ginaism (CliaUnivsity Pr, NwYork,197)34?135. 92 ?Arile42 -ThStas Prteha trsmt othe Comison cpy feach ofterpots and studs thatsubiuly toeExcuite ftheItrAmrinEcmic SocilCouncil d te Intr Aricn l fr Educai,Si, and Cult, ithr estive fes, ttComisa wthovthepotn oft rgtsipice on, 372 the status of human rights within each member state to the SAU Sub-Commission on Human Rights. 93 The Sub-Commission will review Annual Reports on the status of human rights and will make recommendations to the Governing Council in relation to measures in place to promote and protect human rights. In situations of gross violations of human rights, or the establishment of inadequate or dysfunctional mechanisms for the protection of human rights within member states, the Governing Council will have mandate under the SAU Charter to create an ad hoc committee of ?eminent persons? to visit individual member states evaluate human rights conditions. The Governing Council will determine the means and methods of coordinating the activities of the SAU, its interactions with United Nations and other regional and international bodies. The SAU Charter will abandon one of the fundamental debilitating features of the SAARC Charter, namely that it demanded unanimity in decision-making. 94 In terms of the decisions of the Governing Council the SAU will instead align itself with Article 11 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 95 and state that the decision of the Governing Council will be by unanimous consensus but in the absence of unanimity it will be by a simple majority. 6.9 SAU Secretariat As stated earlier, the greatest significance of the SAU will lie in its implementation mechanisms. As with OAS Secretariat 96 and the African Union Commission, 97 so the SAU Secretariat, which is the administrative organ of the regional mechanism, will facilitate the implementation of the objectives SAU Charter. The SAU social, educationl, scientfic, and cultral stndars etforth inte Charte ofthe Organizto f AmrnSeamdbythePocf BuAs.? <htp:/w.idh.s.org/Bsi/Eglish/si3.mrica%20ovnti.tm> (cesd 7Nv 207). 93 Sesction 6.10 fthis capter. 94 ?ArlXDecisonl vlshal betakn othe basi ofunaity.? <htp:/w.sarc- sc.og/dat//art.df>(d4F 206). 95 <htp:w.fi-uirg/ot/uAotu/Cstiuv_Acte.htm> (acesd 4Feb 206). 96 rile 12 othe OAS Chate. 97 Atc0fnstivctf the frican Uio <htp:/w.afri- unio.rg/t/auboU/onsiuv_t.htm#ricle10> (cesd 26Oct 206). 373 Secretariat, similarly to its counterpart in the OAS, will be entrusted with the functions relating issuing notices to member states convening the Permanent Council, the preparation of rules of procedure, the functions relating to budget, to being custodian documentation relating to Governing Council proceedings, to the depository of the SAU treaties and conventions, the preparation of the annual reports of the SAU and the establishment and the maintenance of relations with national and international organisations. The SAU Secretariat will be headed by a Secretary General who will be appointed for a fixed term of office of four years the Governing Council on the nomination of member states. Six Deputy Secretaries General will be appointed by governing Council to assist the Secretary General with the functions of the Secretariat. The functions of the Deputy Secretaries General will take the form of the Specialised Technical Committees of the African Union. 98 The scope of the functions of the Deputy Secretaries General will essentially be administrative and to provide technical assistance to coordinate policy formulation in the specific areas cited below. Taking into consideration the socioeconomic exigencies of the region, the core areas that would need such technical and administrative coordination would be: a) Agriculture, Environment Healthcare, Education, Women and Children; Poverty Eradication b) Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Information and Communications Technology, Transport, Infrastructure Development, Trade, Foreign Direct Investment , Intellectual Property Rights, Tourism c) Multilateral and Bilateral Aid, Developmental Loans, Aid and Loan Conditionalities, IFI Policy Negotiation d) Democracy Consolidation and Intra-Regional Conflict Resolution e) National Human Rights Enforcement Mechanisms and Assistance with International Human Rights Treaty Ratification 98 Article 14of the Constiuve Actofthe African Uio <htp:/w.afric- uno.g/r/auAbU/Cnsiuv_t.htm#Aricle10> (cesd 26Oct 206). 374 The Deputy Secretaries General will coordinate and enhance the work undertaken in each of these areas in consultation with the specialised Sub-Commissions of the regional mechanism. This thesis acknowledges that a certain amount of regional consensus and norm creation has been achieved in areas such as food security, the suppression of terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking of children, women and prostitution, intra-regional tariff reduction and regional trading by SAARC. 99 The SAU will consolidate these areas of cooperation and make these regimes more efficient. 6.10 South Asian Commission on Human Rights, Development and Democracy (SAU Commission) The South Asian Commission on Human Rights, Development and Democracy will essentially reflect the mandate and powers of the OAS Permanent Council. 100 The SAU Commission will also include three Sub-Commissions in the following areas: human rights, democratic governance and developmental policy formulation. It is to be noted that the latter will also be referred to as the Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalization. The Commission and Commissions will be headed by a Commissioner who will be appointed by the Governing Council of the SAU from list of candidates nominated by the member states. Following Article 34 of the Inter American Commission on Human Rights, the Commissioners appointed ?shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the fields? of 99 Agremnt oestablishng SARCFod Security Resrv (signed iKathmndu 4Novembr 1987); r PrefntialTngAmtSAPT) (sigeiDhak n1Apil 3SRCgil Covti prsio fTrois (i t 4 Novebr 1987); anditnal rocl (iedIslabdn6Jaury204); SARC CntionNrcoti DrugsdPsyhtrc Subtnce (sige iMl? on3Nvembr 190); SA vetiPevti Cmbatingh TrfkWmead hilnfo Prostiu(sgd nKathmno5Jury 20);ARC onvti Rgoa angemt forthroi fhild Welfi Sout sia(igd Ktu5Juary 20); dheSARC Pl ActnPovrtlevian. The PlafAcin Pvert Alvit was rcendby e Tir Ming fth Fine/Plag Minson Poery lviton (Islam,8-9pl20) adwsprovd byt Twfth SARC Sumit (Islambd, 4-6 Jury 204) <ht:/w.src-se.or/main.hp?=3.2>(csed4 Feb206). 100 rticls80?9f theOASCare. 375 human rights, constitutional law and development. 101 The Commissioners will hold office for a period of five years in their personal capacity. The main function of the SAU Commission will be the maintenance of friendly relations between state parties within SAU. It also carry out the decisions and the recommendations of the Governing Council unless the implementation of is assigned to another specific organ of SAU. It will facilitate the relations between the SAU and other regional organisations, the UN and affiliated bodies, and the IFIs. In this respect the SAU Commission will be responsible for drafting agreements and memoranda of understanding between the SAU, the UN agencies and the IFIs. Such documents will then be submitted to Governing Council for approval. The SAU Commission will collate and study the reports submitted by the Sub-Commissions and the Ombudsman Against Corruption and make necessary recommendations to the Governing Council of the SAU. The Commission will be entrusted with the execution and monitoring of common regional policies and the formulation of regional treaties. While policy initiation will be the responsibility of the Governing Council, the Commission will conduct feasibility studies on necessity, advantages and disadvantages and the likely repercussions of the proposed policies. The Commission will consult Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) or NGOs and individual stakeholders and assess the economic, social and political implication of regional policies advise Governing Council of the SAU. It will be the responsibility of the Commission to facilitate discussion on proposed policies and regional treaties at grass-roots level within the member states. With the rejection of Article X.2 102 of the SAARC Charter, the SAU will incorporate the principle of subsidiarity as it operates in the European Union. 103 The adoption of will enhance promotion of the regional concerns while it will also safeguard notions of individual sovereignty, latter having been a concern of member states at the inception of the SAARC. The 101 Article 34of the Intr AmericanCoventio nHuman Rights. <hp:/w1.um.du/ts/isr/zas3c.ht>(ced17 Oct 207). 102 ?X.2 Bilatrl a cotiou hl bexlde fro t elibraions?<htp:/w.sarc- secorg/n.ph?i=10&4>(acesdMr206). 103 <ht:euro.eunt/sdpl/rpan_covntio/subiarity_n.htm> (cesd 5Mr 206). 376 justification for the inclusion of a mirror of Article X.2 is mainly to alleviate the insecurities of smaller member states that feared intimidation by India and to an extent Pakistan given that the SAU will have jurisdiction over bilateral issues. 104 The two main functions of the SAU Commission will be regional conflict resolution and the monitoring of the activities of the transnational corporations. 6.10.1 Regional Conflict Resolution The Council will have a specific mandate to resolve issues relating to intra-regional conflicts and the promotion of democracy. The Council?s mandate resolve disputes will largely reflect the mandate the Permanent Council of the OAS. 105 The Charter of the OAS stipulates that the Permanent Council shall encourage member states to maintain friendly relations. In event of a dispute between the Commission shall ?recommend procedures? for the peaceful settlement of the dispute including the setting up of ad hoc committees with the consent disputing parties. In event of a failure to resolve a dispute between member states within a three-year time period, the Commission shall alert the Governing Council for resolution. After the Commission has referred the dispute to the cognizance of the Governing Council, Governing Council will urge its resolution by peaceful means. If the endeavours of the fail, the dispute will be in the first instance submitted to a Panel of Eminent Persons who shall be drawn from relevant fields and not be restricted to persons from the region. 106 The Panel will determine the course of action to resolve the dispute, whether it is the use of good offices, investigation, 104 Padmj Murthy ?Role fSmalerMmbers inthe SARC Forum? Nov (198) 2/ Straegic AnlysiNoveb<tp:/w.ciont.g/olja/_98mup01.htl> (acesdov07). 105 rtcl 84t Articl 90f th Cr fh O. <hp:/w.as.g/juridco/englis/ater.tl#ch12> (acesd 5Ot 206). 106 Te id ofnlt up femin poe nsoiplitalisueisnotew tohe rgion. SInet CmisDs <ht:/dam.rg/ws_vnt/pr91.hm>(acsd15Sep 207). 377 direct negotiation, mediation, or conciliation. In the event that the dispute is not resolved the option of arbitration or judicial settlement will be made available. 6.10.2 SAU Monitoring Panel on TNC Activity There is an urgent need for regulation of the activities of TNCs as elaborated in Chapter 4 of this study, they can intimidate smaller or economically weak countries. As discussed, TNCs exercise an enormous influence over local laws and policies that directly affect human rights, which range from unfair treatment of employees in breach of labour regulations, exploitation of natural resources and the pressuring of governments to quell labour unrests. The conduct of TNCs can also have a dramatic impact on poverty, either by directly undermining human welfare (for instance, limiting a community's access to land or food) or influencing relevant government policies and laws. As the previous discussion indicated there cannot be a meaningful realisation of ESC rights if TNCs are allowed to operate with impunity to national laws. The SAU Commission has a significant role to play in this aspect by formulating guidelines and helping initiate national laws to control the activities of TNCs. The SAU Commission will function as an auditing body to evaluate TNC operations in the region and to monitor whether their activities are within the spirit of the SAU objectives. Violations of SAU objectives by TNCs can be queried by the Commission and disputes will be referred to a Panel of Independent Experts for resolution. 6.11 SAU Sub-Commission for Human Rights Echoing the Statute of the Council of Europe at Article 3, the SAU Charter will require every member state to accept the ?princles ofthe rul oflaw nd ofthe enjoyment by al person withn its jurisdtio fuman igts fuamtl 378 fredoms?? 107 Howevr, unlike th Council ofEurpe, th SAU does nt have t luxy ftipulating pcodits rlatig th l oflaw rhuma rigts with regad torsectiv mebr tae. Inoder tprevnt bckslidng, oev, te SAU chtr wil tipulat ht onc dmcray th ul ofla ietablishd its algl obligaton tint derati govence and respct r humn rigt n th no mer c derogat fro this ll bito. The SAU Sub-Commission on Human Rights will be the conventional human rights advocacy and implementation unit of the regional mechanism. It will reflect the role and the function of the OAS Commission on Human Rights, ?whose principal function shall be to promote the observance and protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the Organization in these matters.? 108 The SAU Charter shall be explicit in terms mandate of the Human Rights Commissions at both regional and national level. The functions Sub-Commission on Human Rights will be an amalgamation of that of the Human Rights under the OAS and the European Commissioner for Rights, which was introduced to the Council of Europe human rights protection mechanism in 1998, replacing the Human Rights Commission. 109 Similarly to Article 46 of the Inter American Convention on Human Rights, the SAU Sub-Commission for Human Rights will be empowered to disseminate information on human rights among the people in the region, promote legislation and constitutional measures to promote human rights among member states, to monitor human rights implementation in the region. 110 As with the mandate of the Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner, the SAU Sub-Commission for Human Rights will identify shortcomings in the legislation and practice of member states. 107 Articles 3and 4of the StaueoftheCouncil fEurope. <hp:/ovtis.c.in/Trty/m/QeVlzsap?NT=01&CM=1LENG> (asd 12My 207) 108 rticle0 fOAS Charte <htp:/w.oas.rg/juridco/english/carte.html#ch5> (acesd 20 O27). 109 fi ofth omisonr f Humn Rihts <w..it> (sd 20Nov 207). 110 Artcle41-erca vetioaigts, OASTreaty Seri 3614UNTS 123 entd in frc 8July1978 <hp:/w1.un.edu/hmants/oinst/zascn.htm> (acesd0 O 207). 379 Despite the widespread knowledge and acceptance of international human rights few of the South Asian countries under consideration have constitutional guarantees of human rights. 111 Only India, Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives have independent functional institutions to receive complaints offer redress on human rights issues. 112 Pakistan has presented a Bill in Parliament to create a National Human Rights Commission in 2005 which is yet to materialise. 113 The restrictive mandate and the implementation of the recommendations of the Commissions are inherent problems in these institutions. The SAU Charter will stipulate that the existing human rights commissions will come within the purview of the SAU Sub-Commission on Human Rights. The national human rights commissions can seek assistance and guidance for effective functioning from the SAU Sub-Commission on Human Rights. The SAU Sub-Commission will draw strength from the existing national commissions, taking advantage of their established legitimacy in cases where they enjoy this (at other times their legitimacy has been contested and functioning threatened), 114 and will initiate processes to establish national human rights commissions in member states that do not yet possess them. As the task of establishing national human rights commissions falls within the purview the Secretariat, the Sub-Commission for Human Rights will supervise time-related framework for establishing new commissions and enhancing the competence of the existing commissions. The initiative for the establishment of a national human rights commission and the administration of existing human rights commissions will be allocated to the Sub- Commission on Human Rights, a measure that will enhance the legitimacy of the 111 Se Chapter 2of this tudy. 112 Ntionl HumanRgComison, Stae Human Rights Comison ad Human Rights Court wr sbisd iIia npracehProtciofHuan RghtAct193.TeNnal HumaRghtosi Nl ws tblishd er tActf 197, s idpt tonus atry bd.SirytuanigtsisoinSriLankwas blished i Mrc 197ndehHuman Rghs Comiso Ac of196. Maldves? Hum RightComon is thelats ito, creti203. 113 AmnyIrail Docet -Pakistn: Remendtios fr nfctive Natinl Hua Rigts Coisn. Rndaiofr fctiv NaluaRighsCoso <hp:/w.etyrg/elibry/set/AS3/019/205/39bfc7d-a2f5-11dc-8d74- 6f45f399845/as301925.html> (csd 8Mr 8). 114 Se n16 blow. 380 national commissions. Any issues or disputes related to the functions and operations of human rights commissions and the appointment of commissioners would be resolved by the Sub-Commissioner for Human Rights in consultation with the relevant member state. This is especially relevant in an environment when national human rights commissions are failing to garner credibility both internationally and nationally. 115 The SAU Charter will maintain the spirit of the advancements made through judicial activism in the region through public interest litigation. Therefore, affected individuals and interested parties in the form of both individuals and CSOs will have the right to petition the national commission initially the regional Sub- Commission in an appellate capacity against the violations of human rights enshrined in the SAU Charter. 116 Taking into consideration the nascent procedures relating to advocacy regarding human rights violations within member states, the SAU Charter will not be as restrictive as Article 46 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 117 The Charter will stipulate that any violation must be brought into the cognizance of the respective national human rights commission irrespective of whether other avenues for rights having been explored or exhausted. Time restrictions in relation to submitting violation petitions will be set aside until the Sub- Commission for Human Rights is satisfied that the people in the region are sufficiently familiarised with rights complaints procedures. The Sub-Commission for Human Rights shall supervise the implementation of the recommendations of the national commissions through a mechanism of biennial reporting. There shall be a right of appeal from the national commissions to the SAU Sub Commission on Human Rights which includes a request for intervention when the recommendation of the national commission is not implemented. 115 ?Sri Lank: Human Rights Comison Dwgrade? Human Rights Watch (no authr given) <htp:/w.org/elis/doc/207/128/lak1758.ht>(cesd10De207). 116 iml tAtc 4f te Aric Cvetion it OAS Trty Seris No 36, 14UNTS123,ntreinf July9,rpited inBasocumnsPangtHuman Rights inte It-mca SystmOE/Sr.LV/I.82oc.6rev.1 t25 (192). 117 Ibd,ricl46. 381 The SAU Charter will echo Article 62 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples? Rights, and require state parties to submit every two years a report on the legislative or other measures taken with a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the SAU Charter. The Sub-Commission on Human Rights will scrutinise the reports and make recommendations to member states for implementing the Charter rights. Failure to implement these recommendations shall result in the member states being reported the Governing Council of SAU, who shall call for explanation from the member state. Continuous non-compliance will result in a series of repercussions ranging from a ?naming and shaming? campaign to economic sanctions against offending states. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has created several mechanisms termed ?human dimension? to ensure that member states adhere to the human rights and democracy commitments they have undertaken under the Charter of the OSCE. The SAU Charter will also provide a mechanism based on Vienna Mechanism of the ?human dimension? mechanisms of the OSCE in Europe, which enables participating states, through an established set of procedures, to raise questions relating to the human dimension situation in other OSCE States. 118 Such queries by a member state will be first communicated to the Sub-Commission on Human Rights, which will raise the issue with the member state concerned. Such a provision will assist in the establishment of a normative standard of human rights in the region. 6.11.1 Ratification of, or Accession to, International Treaties One of the fundamental duties of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights will be to formulate guidelines and policies relating to ratification and the implementation of international human rights treaties. As discussed in Chapter 1 of this study, apart from India, Sri Lanka and Nepal few member states have ratified the core 118 <htp:/w.osce.rg/odihr/13497.html> (acesd 19Oct 207). 382 international treaties on human rights 119 or initiated legislation to give effect to these core instruments. Therefore, it is imperative that the Sub-Commission for Human Rights implements strategies that facilitate the ratification of, or accession to, treaties, without which it is impossible to build an enduring culture of human rights within member countries. As encouraged by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the Sub- Commission will be entrusted with the task of promoting and encouraging member states to ratify or accede to international treaties on human rights. 120 The Secretariat, in conjunction with the Sub-Commission for Human Rights, will initiate a programme and a database to monitor the ratification of, or accession to, the human rights treaties will provide the necessary administrative backing to member states for such ratification or accession. The Sub-Commission can facilitate the implementation of international human rights treaties at national level by providing expert guidance on establishing mechanisms to give effect to the international treaties. 6.12 SAU Sub-Commission on Democratic Governance With South Asia?s notorious reputation as ?one of the most poorly governed regions in the world, with exclusion of the voiceless majority, [and] unstable political regimes?, 121 the second Sub-Commission of the SAU will be assigned the role of a democracy watchdog and will be responsible for implementation of strategies to foster democratic governance in the region. Again, the luxury stipulating democracy as a precondition to entry is not available to SAU unlike its European 119 ?SARC?s Benchmarks HuanRights il ano gare? Human Rights Featurs HRF/162/07 31 Mar207 <htp:/w.dc.et/srdc/rfeturs/HRF162.ht >(ced19 Oc207). Sealso pendix. 120 ?rtcl 3 egional rngmts play fndametl roe inproting a proteing humn righs. Tyshuld rfce uiverhurights ndas,caediala tintrmt, thirpotcn. Te WolCfr Hum Rhts drs forts uder wa osrengs argtsand tices theirftivn,wile thei stigthiptace feti wih Ud Naons a rgts actvs? <hp:/.uhr./uridoc/hurdoc.sf/(Symbl)/A.OF.157.23E?OpnDocumnt > (acesd 19Oct 207) 121 THman Devlpment Rprt f outh siaThe Cris ofGverae (xfrd Univrsity Pres,xford, 19);MayChadBildng DocayinSuth Asi:Inia,Nepl, Pak(L RiBuldr, O, 20). 383 counterpart. The OAS Charter 122 also requires adherence to principles of representative democracy as a requirement of membership and indicates repercussions for interruptions of democracy. 123 As explained before, the erratic democratic culture of South Asia makes it impossible for the SAU creating document to stipulate such stringent preconditions. However, it can provide strategies to consolidate the normative quality of the right to democratic governance. In this context, Sub-Commission will regard the tenets of good governance, as elaborated by Reif to be ?a basket of many practices: a professional civil service, elimination of corruption in government, a predictable, transparent and accountable administration, democratic decision-making, the supremacy of the rule of law, effective protection of human rights, an independent judiciary, a fair economic system, appropriate devolution and decentralization of government, appropriate levels of military spending?, to be the fundamental manifestations of democratic governance. 124 It is also important to move beyond the premise that democracy must be a mere aspirational goal and instead initiate time-bound conditions to achieve democratic governance within member states. Stipulations for democratic elections and the creation of legislation related to free and fair election procedures are especially vital in the context of the Maldives, Nepal Pakistan, where the authenticity of democratic governance is questionable. In the case of Bhutan, which has taken tentative steps towards establishing democratic rule with a constitutional monarchy, the role of the SAU should be one of a facilitator. 125 122 ?Chapter IArticle 3of the OASCharte d)The solidarity ofthe Amrican Stes and the ig aimswicsoughtrugitrqui politcgnztose totbsofthe eftv xri fpsnav dmcry? <p:/w.s.rg/jurid/Eglis/crt.ml> (csed4205). 123 Chaptr IArticle9<ht:/w.oas.rg/juridco/English/carte.html> (acesd 4Aug 205). 124 L Rif?Budng Dmocrati Intin: The R fNtionl HunRightIntionsi GodveraHu Rghs Prteci?Spri(20) 13rvd u h Jral 17. 125 Bhutan's fit ioal etiprodu ayoug co flawkes tersPblised:uy2, 208, IrnlrdTrbne, <tp:/w.ihtcm/ticls/208/102/si/bhtan.ph>(csd 1March 208); ?Dmocrati huan Ser poe ra ploy?? Aian Cer for Human Righteviw(no authr given,4J 206)t:/w.ahb.g/Revw/6/10-6.t(es 7Ot 7);S Sgupta Lie Up d Pick Drgn: Bhutn Lrs toVt New York TiApril24,0 <ht:/w.nytmes.co/207/42/ld/ai/24bhutan.tl?_r=1&oef=sogin>(acesd 1 March 208); Bhua vts ifrst elctins AJzr 384 In this regard, the SAU Sub-Commission on Democratic Governance can seek guidance from Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 126 The Election Democratization Section of the OSCE aims to strengthen democratic institutions and civil society under the Moscow Mechanism (1991, amended 1993). The Moscow mechanism enables missions of experts to assist in the resolution of a particular problem relating to democracy, elections or human rights within the member states. The underlying purpose of the Moscow Mission is the creation of a standard whereby the OSCE strives to assist member states dealing with issues democracy, rather than isolating them and thus precipitating democracy backsliding. The Sub- Commission on Democratic Governance will have the responsibility of assisting governments with the drafting of constitutional documents that enshrine the principles of democracy and the relevant legislation to regulate election procedures. It can locate the necessary expertise in the field by recommending panels of experts in the field of constitutional law to provide assistance to individual governments. 127 Each member state will submit a mandatory report on the state of democracy within each country every three years. Reporting systems have benefit of attracting global attention regardingthe status of democracy 128 and will create avenues for public debate. The report will include an evaluation of the progress and consolidation of democratic governance through constitutional and legislative means. The reporting system will be an opportunity to discuss issues such as the reasons for the postponement of elections, dissolution of Parliaments against constitutional stipulations, amendments to constitutional provisions without following the required procedures and unconstitutional measures such as dismissal of judges or dissolutions <htp:/english.aljzera.nt/NR/exrs/9D86BF7E-CA89-44E8-B2D8-43A7E5BD731.htm >(acsd 1Mrc 208) 126 <t:/w.os.rg/>(csd 17Jun 20). 127 Pnels finepdnt exprt oaistthedrafting ofcnstiuons have bn used bfore, fr istaciIraq, Nal,Zimbawe Fj. 128 Th dvtgsof roting sytmavb questid ite ctx ofth AU rginal menis whertesl ui repots: eMak ua?ThAfrianHumanRhtsCourt: A o-L Sl?? (19)21 Hn RighQrtly342?63. Su pcedrl efc be vrce itsipuations fandtrysubsion d hrog tesrviso ftsubisn iathCuncl ofMer. 385 of commissions appointed for the inquiry into bribery and corruption, which are all common occurrences in the region. 129 In an era where concepts of good governance and democracy have gained global currency intentional deficit in these aspects will affect the country?s image in the arena ? something which many countries would wish to avoid. The Sub-Commission on Democratic Governance will also have a responsibility at grassroots level for the education and promotion of democracy and its intrinsic worth, which will contribute to the consolidation the normative value of democratic governance. Commenting on of democracy in the developing world, Pinkney concedes that ?[t]he justification for democracy has never been simply that it offers a better means of material advancement, but unless it can give voters something in return for their votes, no amount of philosophical argument about liberty, human rights, or political choice will ensure its survival. That is the challenge facing both third world governments and Western governments that proclaim a belief in democratic values.? 130 Therefore, public education and dissemination of information regarding governance, electoral rights, election processes are implemented, there is an urgent need to initiate a norm-creating process on democratic governance in the region. 6.12.1 Early Warning System for Democracy Breaches As reiterated above, consolidation of democracy will form a large part of the SAU?s work. As the culture of democracy is weak in the region, the SAU will first embark on an initiative that will encourage the member states to establish democratic governance nationally. Initially for a period of five years democracy backsliding within a state will not result in negative consequences implemented by the regional community. During this initial phase the negative repercussions, which would take 129 Se Chapters 3and 4of this tudy. 130 RobrPinkyDemcrayne Third Worl (Lyne Riner Publisher, Colrad, 204) 6. 386 the form of excluding the delinquent state from agreements and organizations, 131 the denial visas to high-ranking officials or the withholding of aid and commercial restrictions, will not be resorted to by SAU until a culture of democracy is initiated and inculcated. Such measures are regarded as unwarranted by this study as international reaction to democracy backsliding has proven to be fickle based on larger political agendas, as proven by the circumstances surrounding Pakistan. The mandate of the Sub-Commission on Democratic Governance will focus on creating a common culture of democracy in the region. After the democracy consolidation period, the SAU Covenant will stipulate stringent conditions including the above for deterring democratic backslides, as in the OAS Charter and as stipulated by the Commonwealth Organization. 132 The monitoring of democratic backsliding and responsibility of alerting the Governing Council will be one of the functions of the Sub-Commission on Democratic Governance. It act as an independent unit with a mandate to monitor the democratic performance of member states and determine if breaches of democracy have taken place. Impartial monitoring of democracy breaches or backsliding in this manner will enhance the legitimacy the commitment to democratic governance in the region. With regard to monitoring democracy situation, the SAU Charter will contain articles similar that of the OAS. 133 Imitating the Inter American Democratic Charter if a member state is situated in a predicament as stipulated by Article 17, where ?the government of a member state considers that its democratic political institutional process or its legitimate exercise of power is at risk,? it can alert the SAU Sub-Commission for Democratic Governance for assistance. Similarly, if or the Governing Council is informed of an imminent democracy breach by a member state the Sub-Commission can offer necessary assistance to the affected member state. 131 Article 21of the Intr AmericanDemocrati Charte. <hp:/w.as.rg/ca/dos/lutin1_ep4m>(acesd 12Nov 07). 132 S Chpt 5f tis tuy. 133 rticles 17o2heInrerica ocrati hrt (Aopte bythe Gnral Asembly at its pain ld iLima, Pu, on1Sepbe201) <h:/w.as.rg/OASpg//Dmts/Drcti_Chart.tm> (acsd 17Oct 207). 387 6.12.2 Election Monitoring Election rigging, corruption and violence at elections are all manifestations of dysfunctional democracy 134 and they are an integral part of the current reality South Asian politics. The recent election in Pakistan 18 th February 2008 is evidence of this predicament 135 where the Human Rights Watch has claimed ?[t]here have been numerous complaints of improper government assistance to the ruling party and illegal interference with opposition activities. But the election commission has done nothing significant to address these problems, raising serious questions about its impartiality.? 136 Despite periodic elections many have little faith in the legitimacy of the electoral process. 137 There is an urgent need to create and monitor standards in relation to the whole electoral process commencing with the misuse of governmental resources and funds to finance elections, the abuse of state apparatus for the benefit of the ruling parties, bribery of governmental officers who handle elections, bribery and voter intimidation, stuffing of ballot boxes and fraud in election results. International NGOs, such as the International Republican Institute, 138 the National Democratic Institute, 139 the OSCE 140 and the Commonwealth Organisation regularly send teams of election observers to countries that request them. The Electoral Observer Missions under the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy undertake such observer missions within OAS member countries. 141 The SAU Sub-Commission on Democratic 134 Neil DVota ?Iliberalism ndEthic Conflict Sri Lank? Janury (20 )13 Journal of mocray 84?9;Ly JDiao?IsPakshe(Rvers)WveoftheFte??(20) 1 Junl fecr91?06. 135 TriqAli ?Pakistn' plight?Te Ntin (1 Jn 208) .<htp:/w.torg/deta_.pml?ac_id=79&print_format=Y> (acesd 10Feb 208); 136 Brad ms, i rcor tHu Rghts Watch. Paks: ElecionCmionNtImpartil ElectolMachinryCntledby MsrfApoie,HuRghts Wth <hp:/..og/eish/cs/208/21/kst18034.t> (ad1Mar208). 137 David u ad Sra Juria Liberalin ad PoliclDecy: Si Lnk?sJourney fro WelfrSte tBrutlisoiety (ORPS, InstuefS tuis, Otober1). 138 < htp:/w.iog/> (csd 6y207). 139 <.ndr (ae Ma). 140 < www.osce. s 141 Se Chapter 5of thi tudy. 388 Governance can be the focal point which co-ordinates international observer missions for election monitoring. Election monitoring missions of the SAU can follow the process of Articles 23, 24 and 25 of the Inter American Democratic Charter. 142 6.13 SAU Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation Pursuant to the need to contextualise development, the SAU will incorporate a policy filtering mechanism, which is envisaged to challenge policy proposals and formulation before they reach the implementation stage. It will echo the World Bank inspection panel but the emphasis will be to encourage only encourage challenges regarding policy formulation before implementation. 143 In this context the mandate of the SAU Sub-Commission Good Governance of Globalisation (which has also been referred to as Sub-Commission on Development) is to scrutinise policy creation and implementation extending upwards towards monitoring the policy formulation of the international organisations and downwards towards national governmental policy choices and implementation that affect ESC rights and human development. Many of the smaller South Asian states do not have the capacity or adequate resources for policy formulation which is truly representative of the needs of the country, or to resist development policies and conditionalities that are imposed on them. The Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation inthis context is designed to be a filtering mechanism for policy formulation enabling stakeholders to evaluate the efficacy of policy. The stakeholders may include national governmental officials and segments civil society, including individuals and NGOs. The lack of legitimacy in policy formulation due to the absence of public consultation can be avoided if the Sub-Commission on Good Governance Globalisation has the role of facilitator in process. The co-ordinating role of the Sub-Commission on Good 142 Inter American Democrati Charte(Adopte bythe Gnral Asembly atis pecial seion held in Lia,Pu, o1Sptbe201). <htp:/w.s.rg/OAg/n/Dcumnts/Docrti_Chrt.t> (sd 17Oct 207). 143 t/ebldank.orWBSITE/XRNAL/EXTINSPETIONPAEL/0 menuPK:64129~pePK:6413208~piPK:6413205~teitK:380794,.html> (aesd 6 Oct 20). 389 Governance of Globalisation will reduce allegations of civil society exclusion from participation in policy formulation, particularly the drafting of PRSPs, where public consultation is often reduced to an empty ritual 144 by both IFIs and national governments. Public debate on aid conditionalities and their inclusion into aid packages can help consolidate accountability and transparency in governance and minimise the sense of disenfranchisement experienced by the poor in the region. The SAU Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation would be vested with quasi-judicial functions to determine disputes in terms of implementing the spirit of the Charter between IFIs, bilateral donors and individual states. Specifically, it would take form of a ?pre-emptive arbitral panel? that would scrutinise the feasibility of specific developmental initiatives, such as the Narmada Dam project or fundamental policy changes like the water privatisation schemes or the health system overhauls that seek private-public partnerships, and which fundamentally affect the wellbeing of millions of people. Such a scrutinising process would enable policies to be evaluated in terms of feasibility at the blueprint stage rather than at the execution stage as often happens presently. Protests and resistance to major developmental projects at implementation stage contribute to an enormous wastage of resources, which could have been utilised elsewhere and prevented both human and environmental catastrophes. 145 The lack of prior public consultation, prior impact assessments and long or short term schemes to address the socioeconomic consequences of massive developmental schemes, is an issue that South Asia needs to address urgently. 146 However, most individual states in the region lack the institutional capacity and the expertise to address these issues nationally. 144 Se Chapter 4of this tudy. 145 JaynSiNank?Ligation delays devlopment? Suday Observ (Sri Lank, Sunday 2 M 205); Bby Rm WmFr PrtsRlice?SEZ 23July207. <htp:/w.thesoutsi.r/chivs/207/w_fars_prots_riance.html >(ces 10 Feb 8); An Ienatiol Publc Staent ?Idi: Dah inWet Bgduring prot aginsteidstrialprj? <hp:/apcf.msty.rg/liray/Indx/ENGAS20407?op&f=ENG-2S4> (acesd 10 Feb 208). 146 Agrwal ?Special Eonmic Zoes: Rvistng the Policy Debat? (206) 41conmi n Politcal Weky453?4536. 390 Similarly, within multilateral institutions the member states of the SAU can seek assistance from the Sub-Commission on Good Governance Globalisation of the regional union to make decisions and avoid situations where weak states can be coerced into decision-making. 147 A strong regional body that carries the mandate of representing the region?s concerns would be able to resist such intimidation. The failed WTO meeting in Cancun in September 2003 where the ad hoc G20 coalition of states was able to unite on the issue of agriculture and resist outcome favoured by the EU and the USA is an example where strong coalitions can resist policy decisions that adversely affect the developing world. 148 The justification for a regional mechanism which makes policy formulators answerable will have the following effect elaborated by Etienne Mureinik: 149 [A]ny decision-maker who isare inadvnce ofthe risk ofbeing rquired tojustify a is will lwyscnid it moloslyaifwnoisk. Acision- mkr alivto tht ris udrpur iously tocsidr a mt all the objections, cosioulytooside andthghtfllydisar ll thelterntivs, to th disio ntemplate. An ifincort e ovrnmet ouldnt of plauible justificatiofrthe rgatht it h s ?th prgawld have to be truck dow? The kwledgthat ygrt rme cob summoninto curt forsrcin scrutin would fce its uthsloslyto articlate theirrasn dismthebjctionsadthalterntiv the pgm, d peislytoarticulate ras tht link videc todecisions, reiss toconlusio. The n toarticlatethoersouring isio-making wouldxpe waksinthpogme t ight fc onsidrtio lo bfr th nd arse for judicial chllen. 147 Chosudvsky provides atypicalexmple ofintmidaton the tim ofrulating policy fr the adptin ftheWTO ?thMrksh tig whc egvrntswe rlerdino ceg cratinf WTO witu aylibrtit ail vl.?Ioth ws, t ros ftul ote folin te Fnal AcofUrugay Rund isblatnly?ilegal?. Namlya?oir? irgvrnmt bdhssuly instlediGev, empord under itrntal wth ade?plic? otr evcomc socilics, og he svrein risoftil governms?.Morr, thartilf WTO are nt ly ictrdicto tpe-xin tial d iternatil awsey satviwih TheUnvsal Dlari fHumaRhs.Acpc fheWTO lgite orgsto s tamoutn?iefntorti? orel oftUivrslDcaron fHumn Ris? Micl Chsdovsky ?Wld Te Oganist(TO): An g istthavlates h nveraeclartifuanihts? <htp:/w.hs.rg/izkor/c/riulos/chsudovskye.html >(acesd 16Feb 205) 148 Amrit Nrlik nd D Tsie ? G20 ate Canc Minsril: DvlopingCountriesand TeEvolng CoalitsithO?(4)7TWrlEoy947?966. 149 tie Mur ?Beyo aCrt ofLuxris: Eoi Rights ite Csti? (192) frcaJl fHumn Rigts46?7, 1. 391 Therefore, the scrutiny of policy prior to implementation will help in the creation of a culture of accountability within the governments of member states that would require the governments to justify their socioeconomic policies and priorities. Such a culture will provide the impetus to develop consistent policy that encourages wise investments and conserves resources necessary for sustainable development, and will also enhance transparency and accountability in governance. 6.13.1 Pre-empting Human Rights Violations Mary Robinson reiterates the versatility of human rights commissions at national level and comments that they are a vital part the ?preventive strategies? that could be utilised to consolidate ESC rights regime, for: 150 [i]n the context of ESC rights I have become increasingly convinced of the necessity to focus on preventive strategies. This has me importance of creating strong, independent national human rights institutions to provide accessible remedies, particularly for those who are most vulnerable and disadvantaged. Frequently these institutions ?human rights commissions?, ? It is precisely their capacity to contribute substantially to the realization of individual human rights which makes independent institutions so significant. As the South Asian regime will focus on preventive strategies for human rights violations, the Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation will have the mandate to appoint inspection panels to inquire into potential human rights violations. 151 Such a situation may arise as a result of commencing developmental projects or policy changes that affect ESC rights, for instance the World Bank-funded 150 Mary Robins ?Human Rights:Calengs for the 21st Century? First Anual Dg Hamrskj?ld Lectu(1Oct 98)(ep ad), qutdiLRif?BildgDemocrtiIstiuon: The ol fNial itsItios G vrac Hu Rh Precti? Spring(20) rvdun ghs Jrnal13. 151 e Ispection Pels ofWrldBak <ht:/wb.rlbak.rg/SITE/XRNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPAEL> (acesd 19Jan 207) and isui its viblity nthe contmporay frm inhapter 3of thistudy. 392 Sardar Sarovar dam project in India or the Arun III Hydroelectric Dam Project in Nepal. 152 As elaborated in Chapter 4 of this study the success of the World Bank?s Inspection Panel has only been in ?raising the internal profile and legitimacy of the broader package of minimum safeguard policies but it has not led to more targeted or institutionalised pro accountability reforms, such as credible sanctions for non compliant managers or staff.? 153 Under anticipatory breach of human rights interested parties shall have the capacity to alert the Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation of potential occurrences of rights violations as a result of development policy implementation. This mechanism is aimed at preventing governments from embarking on action programmes that have the potential to violate human rights without conducting impact assessments. The mandate of the Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation to investigate anticipatory breaches of human rights violations is to report on the anticipatory breaches to the SAU Governing Council. The Governing Council will have the mandate act on recommendations of the Sub-Commission and require policy changes or demand alterations of the proposed development schemes on the basis of potential human rights violations. 6.14 SAU Office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption The SAU Office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption will be a separate organ of the and will be on a par with the SAU Commission. The SAU Charter articles relating to corruption will reflect regimes created by the 1996 Inter American 152 Lori Udal, World Bank IspectionPael Indpent Expert, USA. Prepad for Thematic Reviw V4: Regultin, Cmplice d Imlti Otios. Fr futhr informtin se <hp:/w.das.org/> 153 Joat AFx ?The rl Bank Ispectin Pael: Lso fr the First ive Yars? 1July 20 Cenr fGlobl,IntratidRgioalSudisRprintSeisPapCGIRS-pint-2005-7. <htp:/esitres.cdlib.og/cirs/ert/CGI--2005-7> (csd 5Oct 207). 393 Convention against Corruption, 154 the 1997 EU Convention on the Fight Against Corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union 155 and Council Civil Law Convention on Corruption. 156 However, taking into consideration the social and political reality of the subcontinent and the need to create a regional normative framework against corruption, the SAU will create the post of Regional Ombudsman Against Corruption 157 with an overarching mandate to deal with national governments directly regarding allegations of bribery, corruption and administrative irregularities. The purview of this office shall be determined by a SAU Covenant while the office of the Ombudsman will have great flexibility and considerable amount of independence to determine the procedures and the means of executing this mandate. The Ombudsman will be appointed for a five-year term by the SAU Council of Ministers and will have the capacity to entertain petitions alleging corruption from both individuals interested parties from within member states. The Office of Ombudsman is a familiar concept to South Asia in the form of Lokayukta and the lok pal and the office has a long history pre-dating colonial period. 158 As opposed to the creation of judicial body to combat corruption the Ombudsman will have several advantages. A quasi-judicial body in the form of an ombudsman is more suited to a region where the people of several member countries are unfamiliar with, and lack the resources for, lengthy and complex judicial proceedings, especially at regional level. Prosecution for corruption in South Asia is often cumbersome, expensive and detrimental to the person making the complaint. In his traditional role the Ombudsman is the repository of grievances against the malfunctioning of governance, of which corruption is one significant aspect. The 154 <htp:/w.oas.rg/juridco/English/treais/b-58.html> (acesd 26Oct 206). 155 eurpecplse/vbl3027.t (aces ct). 156 t:/cnvtins..it/ratyTrtis/Hl/174.t(se t ). 157 Aomarbl of exs und he Souh Afrin Cosiuon. 158 Indi, Pkist,SriLakBgladsave idversfth clasil ombudsan with varee. 394 SAU Ombudsman Against Corruption will accept allegations of corruption and malpractice of government officials from both individuals and interested parties. The Ombudsman will carry out independent investigations into allegations of corruption and inform the national governments of the outcome. The SAU Office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption will be mandated to coordinate the national institutions initiated to combat corruption in the region. While national institutions dealing with allegations of exist in most of the member states, 159 mechanisms to ensure protection for persons exposing corruption (legal protection for whistle blowers) is very much an alien concept in South Asia. 160 It will be the responsibility of the SAU Office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption, in conjunction with Commission on Development, Democracy and Human Rights to initiate programmes to encourage legislation to combat corruption and consolidate, and ensure the functioning of, the existing mechanisms to combat corruption in the region. 6.15 Role of the Non-Governmental Organisations in the New Regional Mechanism. A wide range of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) both indigenous and transnational operate in a majority of the South Asian countries. Chapter 4 observed that civil society activism is still at embryonic stages in the region but the NGOs that are active perform a valuable role as observers and critics of public policy and are seeking an equitable developmental ideology. 161 As Breen observes, ?within the liberal paradigm of international law, international NGOs have been described as 159 Central Viglance ComisonfIdia <htp:/cv.ni./cv_back.htm>; Anti Coruptin omisof Bhut<htp:/w.t-coruiorgbtjuly17.p>; SriLak'smso t Ivt Alis fBribey rCtn (CIABO) <hp:/w.ica.org.k/nsl/u23eg/b5.htm>;nti-Corutin oison fBangldesh tlbladeh.orgcrptioidexp>; os frheIvtgai Abu of Auority (CI) <tp:/w1.d.r/af/SIc/utrie/pal.tm.> (cesd12My 207). 160 MRaj ?Victories nIdia's r oncruption? Asia Tims (29 Jun 206). <htp:/w.m./tme/Suth_Asa/HF29Df03.htl>acesdOct207). 161 Jmes APul ?NGOs lbl Pliy-Mkig June (0) Global Pliy Forum t:/.gobaplicy.org/ns/as/nl.t;dCrk?Nn-Gvental Organizts (NGOs) d Plitc ithe vopi Worl? (198) 6litcal Stdis 36?52. 395 helping to bridge the gap between law and policy, thereby becoming useful citizens of the global community.? 162 This observation is especially relevant in the South Asian context where the civil society role in policy formulation is dysfunctional. The NGOs perform a useful function of evaluating the viability of policy and developmental schemes and of disseminating information to the public, including public education on the negative impacts of policy and developmental schemes. Many of the NGOs have a strong involvement in human rights and developmental issues. Therefore, the endorsement of NGOs often contributes to the legitimacy of policy changes and developmental projects. The United Nations recognises the valuable function the NGOs play in creating standards relating to human rights and has stipulated that: 163 Article 71 The Econmic and Social Council may ke suitable arngemts for csultatiowith-gvertal rgniztiowhiccordwith matter in its mpte. Sh rgnts my a intentioal oraniztios and, we aproiate, withntioal orgizs fte cultatio ith thMbe fthe Uited Ns concerned. It is on this basis that the UN Charter allocates a special consultative role to NGOs in relation to human rights issues, which is exercised through the Economic and the Social Council (ECOSOC). 164 The consultative relationship with the NGOs is to ?secure expert information or advice from organisations having special competence, and?. To enable international, regional, sub regional and national organisations that represent important elements of public opinion to express their views.? 165 Taking into consideration the valuable role the NGOs play in relation to both policy formulation and human rights standard setting, the SAU will enable the NGOs operating in the region to contribute towards achieving objectives of the regional mechanism. It will be the responsibility of the SAU Secretariat to accord observer 162 Claire Bn ?Rationlisg theWork fthe UN Human Rights Bodies rReducing the Input of NGOs?ThCg efHumanRigsGOst heUeNatn?(205) NoStaAcrs nd Itrtiol Lw10?26 (Br). 163 <p:/.unr/abot/chte/>(acesd 20ov 207). 164 Bre, abve 6. 165 ECOSrsolti196/31, 49UN.ESCOR up.(N1) U DOC E/196/31(96) quoted in rn, n1. 396 status to the regional NGOs and CSOs on the basis of established criteria determined by the Secretariat, which will follow guidelines formulated by the African Union on same issue. 166 South Asian Regional NGOs will have the opportunity to submit an application to be granted observer status in regional organisation. In making the for observer status the NGOs will be required to abide by the ?Guidelines for the Participation of NGOs in SAU Process?, which will be drafted along similar lines to the Guidelines for the Participation of Civil Society Organizations in OAS Activities. 167 As discussed in Chapter 5 of this study the innovative procedures relating to Social Action Litigation are recognised by this study as a creative means of expanding the avenues available for the vindication of human rights. Using the conceptual innovations of Social Action Litigation, the SAU Charter will enable NGOs who have been granted observer status to alert national human rights commissions and the SAU Sub-Commission on Human Rights about violations of rights protected under the Charter. This process will be analogous to the American Convention on Human Rights Article 44, 168 The European Convention on Human Rights Article 25, 169 and Article 55 of the African Convention on Human and Peoples? Rights. 170 A similar process is also available in the European Social Charter?s collective complaints as observed by Wouters: ?The 1995 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing a System of Collective Complaints includes as sources of such complaints those international NGOs in consultative status with the Council Europe listed for this purpose, as well as national NGOs if the State in 166 ?Critea for Gantig ObservStaus nd for aSystem ofAcreditaon Withn te AU? July 205 <htp:/w.ic- unio.rgsumt/JULY%205/bserv%20tus20Crit%20sadopt%20- %20Jly205.do> (acesd 23Jan 7). 167 <htp:/civl-sity.o.rg/Ps/Registraion_1ENG.htm>(aces 16Oct 6). 168 <w.a.rg/juri/Elihcr.hml> (cesd 26Ot 20). 169 t:/hiodcs/CHR50.tl> (csed26Ot0). 170 Aricle 5ACHPR e not place ny restion who an subit case tohe Comison. Thspovsin implyts:?Bfrh,tScretyftheCminsal kealist of t ucaton hr t tos fStas Pris prs rt?. T is h inertd his rvisasgivng lcundiothevtimtlvsandothevict? fils as wl aNGOd ter ct their blf <htp:/1.umn.u/hrs/i/z1acr.t> (acesd 26Oct 206). 397 question has made a declaration to this effect when becoming a party to the Additional Protocol.? 171 Though the SAU Charter proposed in this thesis does not have a justiciable human rights mechanism comprising a Regional Court, the status of the amici curiae accorded to the NGOs in Court proceedings of the European Court Human Rights under the Council of Europe?s Convention on Human Rights will be operative in relation to the NGOs who support the complainants of human rights violations through Sub-Commission on Human Rights as well as complainants of bribery and corruption to the SAU office of the Ombudsman Against Corruption. 172 6.16 Conclusion This introduction to this chapter summarized the argument from the first five chapters of the thesis. For a more condensed distillation of all six chapters, with meta comments as to themes, the reader is also referred to the separate Conclusion that follows this chapter. The task of the present section is encapsulate the main points of the current chapter, albeit in the greater context of those chapters that preceded it. Following the introduction, in the next sections this study illustrated that a regional mechanism even in principle was legitimate within the terms of the United Nations and the global human rights regime. Numerous citations from UN documents showed that a regional mechanism was not only compatible with the rights regime but in places expressly contemplated by it. This legitimised initiative of creating a regional mechanism for South Asia ? the SAU, on lines proposed in the preceding sections. The specifics were derived partly from the models used Council of 171 Jan Wouters and Igri Rosi?Human Rights NGOs: Role, Structre and Legal Stus? 201 orkigPpNo.14,ntue fr ItertoalLw,KULvn 9Novmbr201; ealo Adtl rtcl th ErpScil Crte Prvidg frayst fColctivCmpints Srasbu<9.XI95t:/convtns..in/Tty/enTtie/Hl/158.ht> (sd 26Oc 206). 172 erticles 34and 36f the Eurpea ovetio Huma Rights <htp:/w.hriog/cs/CHR50.tml>(csd26Oct 206). 398 Europe, the African Union, the Commonwealth, and the Organization of American States, but were devised with special sensitivity to the needs of South Asia. The SAU was to be constituted by a Charter with the following objectives: (a) Good governance of globalisation and development in region; (b) Promotion of regional solidarity and territorial integrity and intra-regional conflict resolution; (c) Consolidation of democratic governance based on transparency, accountability and promotion popular participation in governance; (d) Consolidation of national mechanisms to combat corruption and foster a culture free from corruption; (e) Promotion and protection of human rights in accordance with universal human rights principles, eradication poverty; and (f) Creation of avenues to challenge policy formulation by both national governments and global institutions; maintenance of sustainable environments, and promotion of self-reliance, traditional knowledge systems and indigenous livelihoods. Notably as regards (e) above, the human rights to be implemented and made justiciable were to incorporate ESC rights in accordance with the Limburg principles. The continuation and expansion of Social Action Litigation would also be encouraged with relaxation of rules as to standing, for instance, using a quasi-judicial jurisdiction. These Charter objectives were to be achieved by a structure derived partly from the best and most relevant practices identified from the other models in Chapter 5, particularly the OAS, and outlined as follows, ?from top down?: at the apex, a non- politicized Governing Council under a rotating Presidency; beneath that, a Secretariat; and beneath the Secretariat, at equal status with each other, the SAU Commission and the Office of Ombudsman Against Corruption. The Commission would have three Sub-Commissions as described below, but the recapitulation, for the purposes of this concluding section, begins with the Council. The Council would have the mandate to oversee the other organs, to formulate policy based on the Charter and to monitor the SAU?s progress towards the Charter 399 objectives. The Governing Council would also be alerted if the Commission failed to resolve disputes between members, whereupon it would have authority to compel member states to resolve the issue amicably on ?pain? of referral to international arbitration or the International Court of Justice. So as to avoid paralysis, decision- making of Council would not require unanimity (as under the SAARC), though it would naturally seek it in the first instance. The Governing Council would additionally have the mandate under the SAU Charter to create an ad hoc committee of eminent persons to visit individual member states evaluate human rights conditions. The SAU Secretariat would service the other organs and would also, among other things, accord observer status to regional NGOs CSOs on the basis of criteria of its own devising. The SAU Commission would have its own existence separate from its three Sub- Commissions to be outlined below. In its capacity it would, inter alia, be responsible for drafting agreements and memoranda of understanding between the SAU, UN agencies and the IFIs, before those documents went to the Council for approval. The Commission would also have the power to query violations of SAU objectives (including the protection and promotion of widely defined human rights) by TNCs, with disputes to be referred to a Panel of Independent Experts. The three Sub-Commissions would be (with equal status and here listed in no order) those on Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance of Globalization. The latter objective has also been described as the promotion of (equitable, human-centred) development. The Sub-Commission on Human Rights would be empowered to disseminate information on human rights among the people in the region, to promote legislation and constitutional measures to promote human rights among member states, and to monitor human rights implementation in the region. 173 This Sub-Commission would both encourage the creation of national human rights commissions where none 173 Article 41- American Covention Human Rights, OAS Treaty Seris No 3614 UNTS 123 entdnofrc8 July1978 <hp:/w1..edu/mants/oint/zacn.htm>(acesd0 O 207). 400 existed and monitor the operation of such mechanisms in countries which had them. A right of appeal would lie from national commissions to the Sub-Commission. The Sub-Commissioner on Human Rights would be mandated settle disputes with the national commissions. The implementation of the human rights mechanism was to be gradual and realistically staged. Eventually a comprehensive court would be created, but this was considered premature at present. Salient points of the Sub-Commission on Democracy were its early warning mechanism for breaches, its role in receiving three-yearly reports on the state of democracy in each country, and its additional function of monitoring elections. The Charter would, relevantly, build in the condition of a legal obligation to prevent back- sliding in regard to democracy. Meanwhile, the mandate of the SAU Sub-Commission on Good Governance of Globalisation would be to scrutinise policy creation and implementation extending upwards towards monitoring the formulation of the international organisations and downwards towards national governmental policy choices and implementation that affect ESC rights and human development. It would thus act as a policy filtering mechanism. This Sub-Commission would also have the mandate to monitor and report on apparent and potential breaches of human rights, most relevantly ESC rights. The Ombudsman Against Corruption was seen to have precedents not only in the European and Inter-American systems but also in traditional offices in South Asia itself. It was to have an overarching mandate to deal with national governments directly regarding allegations of bribery, corruption and administrative irregularities. The purview of this office was to be determined by a SAU Covenant but would the Ombudsman would have great flexibility and a considerable amount of independence to determine the procedures and the means of executing this mandate. The Ombudsman would be appointed for a five-year term by the SAU Council of Ministers and will have the capacity to entertain petitions alleging corruption from both individuals and interested parties from within member states. 401 After this summary of the proposed regional praxis, several points should now be noted so as to locate Chapter 6 in the wider context of the thesis. Chapter 6 sets out one, vital but not exclusive, level of ?prescription? to ills besetting the seven countries studied in South Asia. It does so on the basis of a ?diagnosis?, as it were, made in the first four chapters and applying evidence collected in Chapter 5 as to the best and most appropriate approaches used elsewhere. The mechanisms of the new autochthonous regional praxis thus represent one creative response that applies the critical thinking that has gone before. The scope of this critical thinking was necessary in order to analyze the multiple, complex causes and dynamics of the present problems facing these seven countries of South Asia with the necessary understanding of their civilizational backgrounds and traditions, and their modern history. These backgrounds and histories have included idiosyncrasies of the individual states, their regional commonalities, and their place in the larger South- North context, all of which have been shown to be relevant context. More broadly, contextualization has been a key theme overarching the whole thesis, which balances general but relevant principle with specific but important detail. Most obviously the study has recognized the need to contextualize rights. It has also noted that one flaw of the neo-liberal approach taken by the IFIs has been its assumption that ?one size fits all?, ignoring the significant differences of context. The place of the present chapter in context is thus as follows. It sets out what can be seen as a multi-pronged response to the seven countries? problems at the regional level. Both the prongs and the level of operation are consonant with context of the rest of thesis, as follows. To start with the ?prongs?, three of these are most conveniently represented by the three Sub-Commissions of the SAU, on human rights, democracy and development (or good governance globalization) respectively. These promote three key values that the thesis has expressly espoused elsewhere. The governance of globalization is also ensured by the steps as spelt out above which were to be taken to confront the IFIs, as well as South Asia?s bilateral or multilateral 402 partners and the TNCs. Moreover, the need to actively govern globalization has been a recurring theme of the thesis, heralded by the opening words of its title. The fourth main prong of the SAU can be represented by the Ombudsman Against Corruption. This thrust, too, is consonant with the rest of thesis. It can properly be seen as shoring up the rule of law which is necessary for functional democracy, as well preventing diversion of resources from development and the erosion of human rights. The other key prong can be seen as being the promotion of pacific settlements to bilateral and national conflicts. This fits with espousal by the thesis of the need for both peace security, as evoked by the words earlier quoted from Kofi Annan. Finally, the place of regionalism needs to be recalled. Like the multiple prongs of this regional mechanism, the mechanism?s very nature as a regional entity is compatible with the rest of the study. Regionalism was seen to be both compatible with, and complementary to, global tier of the universal human rights regime, with the mixed status of the latter as so-called hard and soft international law. The mechanism of the SAU has sought to give that regime, where dismissed as soft or purely political and aspirational, more and harder bite, thus notably making rights of all kinds justiciable and holding IFIs TNCs accountable to them, for instance. The regional mechanism has in the same breath indicated its relationship to the malign neo-liberal influences of global economic regime (so far more powerful than the rights regime), which consists precisely of the IFIs as prime public agents but feeds directly into the operation of their private epiphytes, the TNCs. Finally, regionalism fits with the ability and responsibility of governments to act at a national level, for their own peoples, rather than in obsequious deference to stakeholders in global neo-liberalism. National commissions of human rights are thus encouraged, for instance, as are other domestic legislative mechanisms to implement treaties and to regulate the operations of TNCs. Thus, in a post-Westphalian world of abridged sovereignty, states nevertheless retain more capacity than they might have realized to resist hegemony and to craft their own destinies, especially by 403 forming alliances along the lines of the SAU proposed. As such, a regional mechanism does not do away with states? authority, but allows them strength in numbers. The enshrining of that regime in law rather than relying on market economics or pure politics maximizes its strength. 404 CONCLUSION ?And what is the argument for the othr side? Only thisat no cse ha ben foud in whic it hs ben do bfo. That agumnt dos nt apel to m in th lest. If we nvr do ything, whic has not bn do bfor w, shll nvr gt nywhr. Th lawill stad still wile the rst of the wld ges on ad that will be bad fo both? 1 This study was a journey in search of a pragmatic but just solution, through law, to the empirical and theoretical poverties human rights, democracy and development ? poverties that disenfranchise, dehumanise and segment the people of South Asia. Guided thus by the quest for justice, but mindful also of vital need for efficacy as well as legitimacy, study has applied a broad range of tools to deal with the study?s widely varying intellectual tasks. These tasks have consisted of the following: documenting the material and other poverties of South Asia; analyzing their geo- historical origins and their interrelationship, their causes and dynamics; interrogating greed and the neglectful, dysfunctional or exploitative use of power in all its manifestations, indigenous as well as imperialist; dissecting the failed regional response that is the SAARC; analysing and evaluating alternative regional and cross- regional paradigms along with the overarching global mechanism of universal human rights; and, finally, formulating a new, specific, legitimate and effective regional mechanism ready to use alongside the global rights regime to address this multidimensional poverty. From the traditional legal toolkit the study has drawn particularly on human rights jurisprudence, legal history, constitutional law, public international law, comparative law and law and economics. However, where necessary it has also relied on other disciplines such as history, philosophy, political economy, and cultural and religious studies. An interdisciplinary approach was regarded as necessary to formulate an intellectually integrated and pragmatic legal praxis for South Asia in the high-speed swirling together of many sociopolitical, and economic currents irrespective of national borders that is the reality of the globalised world. 1 Lord Denig nPacker vPacker [1953] 2AER 127, 9. 405 As the world?s most populous region with its greatest wealth being the people, the seven South Asian countries examined in this study have, for decades, exploited their most valuable resource and deprived them of their basic material necessities, responsible governance human rights, rendering them impoverished. Sen?s observation that poverty is multidimensional has been crucial to this thesis; it relates to any severe, inequitable and avoidable limitation of human capability. Material impoverishment is nevertheless the most pervasive form, and brings with it many other dimensions. It is in this spirit that the thesis has framed wider denials of capability as ?poverties?. Hence, the study has focussed on the poverty of functional democracy, the poverty of equitable development, and the poverty of justice itself. In examining the process of entrenching the structures of poverty, Chapter 1 of this study traced evolution the universal paradigm human rights from the ancient Greco-Roman times through its Western trajectory to its contemporary (post-World War II) character, which is based originally on individualism and a right against the state. This chapter also reiterated that notions of human dignity obligations of rulers towards the ruled were present in the South Asian subcontinent?s own political and religious culture. The South Asian rights culture in fact received a boost through the exposure to the Western human discourse, particularly through the quest for self-rule independent from colonial rule, and social reformers in the early twentieth century relied on the egalitarian articulations of the Western rights discourse to discourage the repressive features and rights violations of the subcontinent?s own societies. The chapter concluded with the observation that, despite the elaborate constitutional proclamations and several mechanisms to institute national human rights, adherence to values of human rights is extremely low in South Asia. Social Action Litigation, which has emanated from a pro-active judiciary, primarily in India, has expanded the methods of addressing injustice in society. However, the very need for such action is symptomatic of the dysfunctional mainstream methods that are in place to safeguard the rights people, and it can only partially compensate for the dysfunctionality of such methods. This study observes the assertions of cultural relativism which dismisses the universal legitimacy of mainstream paradigm of human rights but does so motivated more often by sociopolitical reasons rather than 406 an altruistic desire to substitute with an alternative relevant vision of human rights. However, such critique has created a space within the mainstream paradigm to explore alternative means of vindicating the developing world?s concerns in relation to human rights against the backdrop of neo-liberal globalization. Solow, a Nobel prize winner for Economics, is said to have exclaimed that globalization is a marvellous excuse many things 2 and Chapter 2 explored the theoretical enunciations of the phenomenon and its manifestations. This chapter traced the historical stages globalization the manner in which the phenomenon contributed, during the colonial era, to the exploitation of previously self-sustaining people, particularly destruction of their livelihoods and the integration of these communities to the global trading system and its capital markets, but at only the lowest rung. Though this study maintains that globalization is a content-neutral phenomenon, Chapter 2 highlighted how a particular version of it ? the neoliberal version ? was promoted by the IFIs, especially under the Washington Consensus from the late 1970s, as a panacea for the woes of the developing world. This version or brand was also sold being both its best and its only viable form, through the assertion that ?There Is No Alternative?. The iniquitous operation of this particular version of globalisation has exacerbated conditions of social marginalisation and material poverties, diminishing the orthodox role the state under the inherited Westphalian model. The conditions of exploitation created by neo-liberal version of globalisation have provided an impetus for consolidated global activism, resulting in ?globalization of the movement against globalization?. 3 Chapter 2 stressed the need to build upon this resistance even further and to advocate alternative terms of engagement for South Asia if the benefits of globalisation are to be enjoyed by its people. 2 Quoted inTomy Jseph ?HumanRights and Poverty ?The cas ofMusahr? inSN Chaudry (e) HmaRghts adPovrtyi Id Vol4(CcpublisngCmpny, NewDli,205)89. 3 Jh PwlUit SasGloblizt st Nwt Exprsi fRcilubordtion: Intertion Inrtina Evenc(IernatiolcloHua ghts Plcy,Geva, 201) 8. 407 The poverty of development, particularly the inequitable manifestation of globalization that created effectively a global apartheid system, was the focus Chapter 3. That is, the inherent inequity of neo-liberal globalization has contributed to the emergence of ?new kinds of ethnic and racial minorities, and the persistent and growing inequalities between the ?haves? the ?have-nots? in a global economy?. 4 The chief public agents of new version of global apartheid were identified as the IFIs, and their policy instruments identified as SAPs and PRSPs. These policies mainly benefited the developed world and the TNCs, which were described as neo- liberalism?s private agents and as the epiphytes of the IFIs. The concomitant withdrawal of the state from economic activities and its assumption of the role of a mere facilitator liberalisation process, was accompanied by cuts in welfare system, and the elimination of subsidies, on the strength of the policy prescriptions of the IFIs. This, in turn, avoidably weakened capacity states identified in this study, and many other developing states, to create policies that would not only benefit their own populations, but, perhaps more importantly, result in the complete abandonment of the already marginalised. The result of the IFI?s policies was to entrench the structures of poverty within the state whilst TNCs benefited from the newly globalised environment, which welcomed their presence in South Asia through relaxed taxation, labour law and intellectual property law regimes. 5 The impact of neo-liberal globalisation on governance was the focus of Chapter 4. This chapter discussed how the process of recipient states? re-addressing of accountability to IFIs in terms of creation and implementation of policy has resulted in the abdication of the traditional, proper, accountability governments in South Asia to their own peoples. Images of ?legislatures failing to legislate, governments rules by ordinance and the need for consensus and bargaining that was ignored in Parliament? 6 were invoked to reiterate the democratic deficit in the region. The accompanying political dysfunctionality has prompted militant reactions by 4 Rodlf Stavenhgens StructalRcism and Tres inthe Global Econmy (Interationl Cuncil nHumRigts Policy, Genv, 19)2. 5 Va ?FdRightsFreTre Fscim? iMtw Jibe (d) Glblizg Rihts (OxfordUniversit rs, Oxfod, 03)1. 6 Si AhTheail Basf Dmoray inPakistn? iAmita Shstri an AJWilson (eds) ThepstCloial Sts fSuthAiecDevlopetd Ieniy(Plgve,NwYrk, 201) 4. 408 various groups within South Asia, which has in turn led to cycles of violence compromising the very human rights that were many cases legally ?guaranteed? by states? constitutions. Chapter 4 also explored the efficacy of the existing regional mechanism, the SAARC, to deal with the many poverties South Asia. The chapter concluded that in many ways the SAARC has outlived its purpose, and that a new regional arrangement to deal with contemporary exigencies of South Asia was urgently needed. It was with this purpose in mind that Chapter 5 sought ?best practice? aspects of other regional mechanisms that have emerged to deal with issues that afflict other specific regions. This chapter examined firstly the Council of Europe which has created a regime of last resort in protecting human rights the people of the European member states. In the Americas, the study concentrated on the efficacy of the mechanisms which OAS has established to consolidate and promote democratic governance. The subsequent analysis of the African system was aimed at evaluating the efficacy of a regional mechanism that operated against the backdrop of neo-liberal globalisation, pervasive poverty, poor governance and ineffective developmental endeavours. Finally, the Commonwealth initiative of consolidating democracy was discussed as an attempt at creating a normative standard of democratic governance within member states, which shared a common colonial history rather than geographic proximity. This thesis has reiterated that, unless there is a challenge to how the dominant paradigm perceives development, democracy and poverty, there will be no opportunities for alternative and more effective paradigms of poverty eradication and human development to emerge. The praxis that was advocated in Chapter 6 harnessed the pressures from the marginalised and the exploited to reformulate the mainstream development discourse. It attempted to build an alternative paradigm that locates the endeavours of development within a human, social and political context that is relevant to South Asia. The proposed praxis addressed the development discourse to the needs of the marginalised and disenfranchised segments of society in South Asia and aimed to formulate policies that will be specific and sensitive to the needs of each 409 state. These policies were contrasted against-the neo-liberal ?one-size-fitsall? approach, which is supposed to be optimal for all sectors of all countries at all times, and yet in fact favours overwhelmingly the interests the already economically privileged West. The praxis soughtto resurrect democratic governance on a national basis with such governance being based upon principles of responsible and responsive administration under the rule of law and which would realise the constitutional guarantees of human rights. Stiglitz highlights that the neo-liberal version of globalization has inherent traits which advantage developed world, when he makes the observation that: ?Globalization has enhanced the opportunities for success, but it has also posed new risks to developing countries. The rules of the game have been designed for the most part by the advanced industrial countries, or more accurately, by special interests in those countries, for their own interests, and often do not serve well the of the developing world, and especially the poor.? 7 Yet the rules of globalization, as Stiglitz himself implies, as Vandana Shiva explicitly observes elsewhere, 8 are not ?god- given?, nor is it true that there is no alternative; rather, the rules can be challenged and to a large extent rewritten. The praxis advocated in Chapter 6 is in many respects a challenge to the neo-liberal articulations of globalisation by rewriting rules. Broadly speaking, the tools identified by this study as being the best to eradicate the poverties of South Asia have been a plural, tolerant democracy under the rule of law; equitable development; and the universal human rights paradigm. These features have been shown to reinforce each other. The mechanism of instituting all of them is wise use of law, given the insufficiency of bare economics and the fact that politics is both too easily manipulated and not sufficiently enforceable. Continuing to speak broadly, human rights as a legally enforceable minimum also guards against both majoritarian abuse of democracy, and the beguiling charms of utilitarianism, in that rights draw a line underneath both; rights mark a point beyond which neither a tyrannous 7 Joseph EStigltz ?DevlopmentPolices InA World OfGlobalizton? Paper sentd athe minarNw Inratin Trds fr EomicDevpment he csiofth fi vsyofth BlEciad Sal lBk(NDES), RJiro, 12? 13 Septber 20.tp:/w.gsb.clubi.u(csd 26May 206). 8 n 1fCapter 410 democratic majority nor a seductive argument in favour of net social utility gains is allowed to go. A further overarching or meta theme to emerge from the study is that the role of the state remains crucial. The study holds the governments of South Asia accountable for bowing to the will of the IFIs. It argues that they have abdicated responsibility and power, which, with better guidance and greater courage, they could have utilised to challenge the dictates of the IFIs. However, this thesis continues to hold states account even though extent of sovereignty in a globalized world has been abridged in ways that the Westphalian system did not envisage. It is still the state that formulates laws, structures its own government, and in free association with other states jointly forms the global and regional architecture that has been discussed in order to buttress all those values. At the same time, civil society including NGOs, will also partake in and enrich dialogue within such states in the manner that a plural democracy inherently relies on, fosters, and thrives on. The new regional mechanism proposed in Chapter 6 envisages the creation of a collective power base, the resolve, the confidence and the accountability of these eight states to redefine their terms of engagement with neo-liberal hegemony. This thesis attempted to address the ?vast gap between theories of socio-political change and the realities on the ground; between the developments in international law and the realization of those rights where people live and work; between the formal institutions of democracy and the deeper realization of democratic rights; between the commitments and pronouncements of our political and developmental leaders and achievement of dignity and justice? through a legal praxis that advocated a regional collaborative endeavour. 9 Nevertheless, such remedial measures, however well designed and instituted, will be futile if the states and the peoples of the region are unwilling to take control of the future trajectory of South Asia. 9 Smitu Kothari ?Reflctions 50years ofDevlopment? (207) 5Devlopment 4?32, 18. 412 Appendix B The Mahabharata, Book 12: Santi Parva: Section LXV ?Indra said, 'Kshatriya duties, O king, which are possessed of such energy, which include in their exercise all other duties, and which are the foremost of all duties, should be observed by persons that are, like thee, so high-souled and so employed in seeking the good of the world. If those duties are not properly discharged, all creatures would be overtaken ruin. The kings possessed of compassion for creatures, should regard these to be the foremost of his duties, reclaiming the land cultivation and fertilizing it, performance of great sacrifices for cleansing himself, a disregard for begging, and protection of subjects. Abandonment (gift) is said by the sages to be the foremost of virtues. Of all kinds of abandonment, again, that of body in battle, is the foremost. Thou hast seen with thy eyes how the rulers the earth, ever observant of Kshatriya duties, having duly waited upon their preceptors and acquired great learning, at last cast off their bodies, engaged in battle with one another. The Kshatriya, desirous of acquiring religious merit, should, after having gone through the Brahmacharya mode, should lead a life of domesticity which is always meritorious. In adjudicating upon ordinary questions right (between his subjects), he should be thoroughly impartial. For causing all the orders to be observant of their respective duties, for the protection they afford to all, for the diverse contrivances and means and the prowess and exertion (with which they seek the accomplishment of their objects). Bhishma said, 'The protection of all creatures is regarded as the highest duty of the Kshatriya. Listen now to me, O king, as to how the duty of protection is to be exercised. A king conversant with his duties should assume many forms even as the peacock puts forth plumes of diverse hues. Keenness, crookedness, truth, and sincerity, are the qualities that should be present in him. With thorough impartiality, he should practise qualities of goodness if he is to earn felicity. He must assume that particular hue or form which is beneficial in view of the particular object which he seeks to accomplish. 2 A king who can assume diverse forms succeeds in accomplishing even the most subtle objects. Dumb like the peacock in autumn, he should conceal his counsel. He should speak little, and little he speaks should be sweet. He should be of good features and well versed in the scriptures. He always be heedful in respect of those gates through which dangers may come and overtake him, like men taking care of breaks in embankments through which the waters of large tanks may rush and flood their fields and houses. He should seek refuge Brahmanas crowned with ascetic success even as men seek the refuge or loudly rivers generated by the rain-water collected within mountain lakes. That king who desires to amass wealth should act like religious hypocrites in the matter of keeping a coronal lock. 3 The king should always have the rod of chastisement uplifted in his hands. He always act heedfully (in matter levying his taxes) after examining the incomes and expenses of his subjects like men repairing to a full-grown palmyra for drawing its juice. 4 He should act equitably towards his own subjects; cause the crops of his enemies to be crushed by the tread of cavalry, march against foes when own wings have become strong; and observe all the sources of his own weakness. He should proclaim the faults of his foes; crush those that are their partisans; and collect wealth from outside like a person plucking flowers from the woods. The Mahbrata Kisari Mohan Ganguli, tr.[183-1896] http://ww.sacred- texts.com/hin/m01/index.htm (cesd 28 My 206). 413 Appendix C Ratifications of UN Human Rights Treaties by Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka Country Convention Status Signature Date EIF Date Rec. of Instr. Afghanistan CAT-Convetion Agaist Tortue and Other rul IhmarDerding tmo Pist Ratifction 04/285 26/087 01/487 CAT-OPOpionl Protcl tohe Cnvetin Against TrtueadCuelInaor Derdigtmt rismt No Actin CCPR-Itrniolvt Civl nd Politcal Rihts Acesion 24/083 24/0183 -OP1-pial Protcl tohe Intertinl Coven CivlandPlitcal Righs N cti CCPR-P2-DPScd Optiol rotcl to te Intrationl CvenaCivland Policl Righs N Action CED-Cveti frth Proteci ofAl ersn from EnocedDisaprance No Actin CEDAW-vti t Elimti fl Fors fDiscriaigist Wo Ratifctio 14/08 04/203 05/320 -OPOptionl Protclhe Cnvetion heEliin fAlFrs of Discrimati gaist m No Actin CERD-ItilCovetio the Elinio fAl Frs fRacil Discriatin Acesion 05/83 06/783 CESCR-Iertioal Cvent o Econmic, Sil dultralRights Acesion 24/083 24/0183 CMW-Itrnatilvi e Prteci ofhe Rigts ofAlMirnt okrsdMbrThei Famils N cti CPD-Cnvtin t igtsofPro with Disabiles No Actin -OPOptioal Protcl the Convetin hRigsfPrson with Disabils cti CRC-vtio nte ihts fte Cild Ratifction 27/09 27/049 28/0394 OPAC-OpialProclo Convetin th Rigts ft il nthe ilmtofcildrenirmedcfli Aesi 13 CRC-OPSC-ptial Potl toh Convetin h RigsfCilnthe sal fchildrecildrtiuin ad cil prgrpy Acesion 19/02002 19/02 Bangladesh CAT-Convetion Agaist Tortue and Other rul IhmarDerding tmo Pist Acesion 04/198 05/198 414 CAT-OPOptional Protcl tohe Convetion Against TruedCuelInmar Derdigtmt rist No Actin CCPR-Itrnaiolvt oCivl nd Politcl Rihts Acesion 06/120 06/920 -OP1-pil Prtcl the Interatinl Covenao CivlandPolitcal Righs N cti CCPR-P2-DPScd Optil rtcl t te Intrationl CvenaoCivland Policl Righs No Actin CED-Cveti frth Prteci ofAl ersn from EnocedDisaprance No Actin CEDAW-vti t Elimti fl Fors fDiscriaigist Wo Accesi 06/1284 06/184 -OPOptionl Protclhe Cnvetion heEliin fAlFrs of Discrimati gaist m Ratifction 06/920 /0 /920 CERD-ItilCovetio the Elinio fAl Frs fRacil Discriatin Acesion 1/079 1/0679 CESCR-Iertioal Cvent o Econmic, Sil dultralRights Acesion 05/19 05/198 CMW-Itrnatilvi e Prteci ofhe Rigts ofAlMirnt okrsdMbrThei Famils Sigatur only 07/198 CPD-Cnvtin t igtsofPro with Disabiles Sigature only 09/5207 -OPOptioal Protcl the Convetin hRigsfPrson with Disabils NAction CRC-vtio nte ihts fte Cild Ratifction 26/019 02/90 03/890 OPAC-OpialProclo Convetin th Rigts ft il nthe ilmtofcildrenirmedcfli ii 1262 CRC-OPSC-ptial Potl toh Convetin h RigsfCilnthe sal ofchildrecildrtiuin ad cil prgrpy Ratifction 06/920 06/120 06/920 Bhutan CAT-Convetion Agaist Tortue and Other rul IhmarDerding tmo Pist No Actin CAT-OPOpionl Protcl tohe Cnvetin Against TrtueadCuelInaor Derdigtmt rismt No Actin CCPR-Itrniolvt Civl nd Politcal Rihts No Actin -OP1-pial Protcl tohe Intertinl Coven CivlandPlitcal Righs cti CCPR-P2-DPScd Optiol rotcl to te Intrationl CvenaCivland Policl Righs N Action CED-Cveti frth Proteci ofAl ersn from EnocedDisaprance No Actin CEDAW-vti t Elimti fl Fors fDiscriaigist Wo Ratifctio 17/08 30/981 31/08 -OPOptionl Protclhe No Actin 415 Convetion the Elimnatio fAl Forms f Discrimaigis Wen CER-Ittil Cvti th Elinio fAlFors fRacil Discriatin Signature oly 26/037 CESCR-Iertial Cvent o Econmic, Soil dultralRights N Action CMW-Itrnatilovi e Prteci fhe Rigts fAlMirnt okrsdMbrThei Famils cti CPD-Cnvtion t igtsofPro with Disabiles No Actin -OPOptial Prtocl the Convetion hRigsfPrson with Disabils cti CRC-vti onte ihts fte Cild Ratifction 04/690 02/90 01/890 OPAC-OpialProclo Convetion th Rigts ft il nthe ilmtfcildrenirmedcfli Sigure only 1525 CRC-OPSC-ptioal Potl tohe Convetion h RigsfCil nthe sal fchildrecildrtiuin adcil prgrpy Sigature only 15/0925 India CAT-Convetion Agaist Tortue and Other rul IhmarDerding tmo Pist Signature oly 14/097 CAT-OPOpionl Protcl tohe Cnvetin Against TrtueadCuelInaor Derdigtmt rismt N Action CCPR-Itrniolvt Civl nd Politcal Rihts Acesion 10/79 10/479 -OP1-pial Protcl tohe Intertinl Coven CivlandPlitcal Righs N cti CCPR-P2-DPScd Optiol rotcl to te Intrationl CvenaCivland Policl Righs N Action CED-Cveti frth Proteci ofAl ersn from EnocedDisaprance Signature oly 06/207 CEDAW-vti t Elimnati fl Fors fDiscriaigist Woe Rtifctio 3/8 08/93 09/73 -OPOptionl Protclh Cnvetion heEliin fAlFrs of Discrimaigaist me N Actin CERD-ItrtilCovtio the Elinio fAl Frs fRacil Discriatin Ratifction 02/367 04/169 03/1268 CESCR-Iertioal Cvent o Econmic, Sil dultralRights Acesion 10/79 10/479 CMW-Itrnatilvi e Prteci ofhe Rigts ofAlMirnt WokrsdMbrThei Famils N cti CPD-Cnvtin t igtsofPro with Disabiles Signature oly 30/207 -OPOptioal Protcl the Cnvetion on te Righs fsnwiDisabilts NActio CRC-Cnvti the Rigt of hildcesin 1/093 1/29 416 CRC-OPAC-Optional Protcl tohe Convetion he RigsfCildnthe ilmtfcildr irm cfli Ratifction 15/204 30/1205 30/1205 CRC-OPSC-ptionalPotltohe Convetion he Rigs f Cild nthe sal fchildrcildrtiuinacil prgrpy Ratifction 15/204 16/0925 16/0825 Maldives CAT-Convention Agaist Tortue and Other Cruel InhmarDerding tmo Pist Acesion 20/504 20/40 CAT-OPOpionl Protcl tohe Cnvetin Against TrtueadCuelInaor Derdigtmt rismt Ratifction 14/0925 2/06 15/026 CCPR-Itrniolvt Civl nd Politcal Rihts Acesion 19/206 19/026 -OP1-pial Protcl tohe Intertinl Coven CivlandPlitcal Righs csi / / CCPR-P2-DPSecond Optiol rotcl to te Intrationl CvenaCivland Policl Righs N Action CED-Cveti frth Proteci ofAl ersn from EnocedDisaprance Signature oly 06/207 CEDAW-vti t Elimti fl Fors fDiscriaigist Wo Acsio 31/0793 01/793 -OPOptionl Protclhe Cnvetion heEliin fAlFrs of Discrimaigaist me cesin /62 /206 CERD-ItrtilCovtio the Elinio fAl Frs fRacil Discriatin Acesion 24/058 24/08 CESCR-Iertioal Cvent o Econmic, Sil dultralRights Acesion 19/206 19/026 CMW-Itrnatilvi e Prteci ofhe Rigts ofAlMirnt okrsdMbrThei Famils N cti CPD-Cnvtin t igtsofPro with Disabiles No Actin -OPOptioal Protcl the Cnvetin on te Righs fsnwiDisabilts cti CRC-Cnvti the Rigt of hildRatifction 21/089 13/091 1/0291 OPAC-OpioalPrclte ovetio t its fth Cil nte inlmntfchildrenirmdcofli ii 52254 CRC-OPSC-ptioal Potl te Covetio RigsfhCilnthe sal fchildrenchildrtiuin ad cil prngrpy Ratifction 10/520 10/620 10/520 Nepal CAT-Convetion Agaist Tortue and Other rul IhmarDerding tmo Pist Acesion 13/0691 14/0591 CAT-OPOpionl Protcl tohe Cnvetin Against TrtueadCuelInaor Derdigtmt rismt No Actin 417 CCPR-Interationl Cvenat oCivl and Politcl Righs Acesion 14/0891 14/0591 -OP1-ptil Prtcl the Interatinl Covenao CivlandPolitcal Righs csi / / CCPR-P2-DPScd Optil rtcl t te Intrationl CvenaoCivland Policl Righs Acesion 04/698 04/398 CED-Cveti frth Prteci ofAl ersn from EnocedDisaprance No Actin CEDAW-vti t Elimti fl Fors fDiscriaigist Wo Ratifctio 05/291 2/0591 2/0491 -OPOptionl Protclhe Cnvetion heEliin fAlFrs of Discrimaigaist me Signture ly 18/0 CERD-ItrtilCovtio the Elinio fAl Frs fRacil Discriatin Acesion 01/37 30/17 CESCR-Iertioal Cvent o Econmic, Sil dultralRights Acesion 14/0891 14/0591 CMW-Itrnatilvi e Prteci ofhe Rigts ofAlMirnt okrsdMbrThei Famils N cti CPD-Cnvtin t igtsofPro with Disabiles No Actin -OPOptioal Protcl the Cnvetin on te Righs fsnwiDisabilts cti CRC-Cnvti the Rigt of hildRatifction 26/019 14/09 14/09 OPAC-OpioalPrclte ovetio t its fth Cil nte inlmntfchildrenirmdcofli Sigure only 8 CRC-OPSC-ptioal Potl te Covetio RigsfhCilnthe sal fchildrenchildrtiuin ad cil prngrpy Ratifction 08/920 20/06 20/106 Pakistan CAT-onvetion Agaist Tortue and Other rul IhmarDerding tmo Pist No Actin CAT-OPOpionl Protcl tohe Cnvetin Against TrtueadCuelInaor Derdigtmt rismt No Actin CCPR-Itrniolvt Civl nd Politcal Rihts No Actin -OP1-pial Protcl tohe Intertinl Coven CivlandPlitcal Righs cti CCPR-P2-DPScd Optiol rotcl to te Intrationl CvenaCivland Policl Righs N Action CED-Cveti frth Proteci ofAl ersn from EnocedDisaprance No Actin CEDAW-vti t Elimti fl Fors fDiscriaigist Wo cesi 1/0496 12/0396 -OPOptionl Protclhe Cnvetion heEliin fAlFrs of Discrimaigaist me N Action CERD-ItrtilCovtio the Ratifction 19/06 04/169 21/096 418 Elimnatio fAl Forms fRacil Discriin CESCR-Iteratil Cvent o Econic, Soil dultralRights No Actin CMW-Itrntilovi e Prteci fhe Rigts fAlMirnt okrsadMmbrThei Famils cti CPD-Cnvtion t igtsofPro with Disbiles No Actin -OPOptial Prtocl the Cnvetin on te Righs ofsnwiDisabilts cti CRC-Cnvti the Rigt of hildRatifction 20/9 12/90 12/90 OPAC-OpialPrclte ovetio t its fth Cil nte inlmntfchildrenirmdcofli Sigure only 60 CRC-OPSC-ptioal Potl te Covetio RigsfhCilnthe sal fchildrenchildrtiuin ad cil prngrpy Sigature only 26/091 Sri Lanka CAT-Conventio Against Tortue and Other Cruel IhmarDerdig tmo Pnist Acesion 02/94 03/194 CAT-OPOpionl Protcl tohe Cnvetin Agaist TrtueadCuelInaor Derdigtmt rismt No Actin CCPR-Intrionlvt Civl nd Politcal Rihts Acesion 1/098 1/068 -OP1-pial Protcl tohe Intertinl Coven CivlandPlitcal Righs csi 3/ 3/97 CCPR-P2-DPScd Optiol rotcl to te Intrationl CvenaCivland Policl Righs N Action CED-Cveti frth Proteci ofAl ersn from EnocedDisaprance No Actin CEDAW-vti t Elimti fl Fors fDiscriaigist Wo Ratifctio 17/08 04/18 05/108 -OPOptionl Protclhe Cnvetion heEliin fAlFrs of Discrimaigaist me Acesin 5/203 5/2 CERD-ItrtilCovtio the Elinio fAl Frs fRacil Discriatin Acesion 20/382 18/02 CESCR-Iertioal Cvent o Econmic, Sil dultralRights Acesion 1/098 1/068 CMW-Itrnatilvi e Prteci ofhe Rigts ofAlMirnt okrsdMbrThei Famils csi /723 /39 CPD-Cnvtin t igtsofPro with Disabiles Signature oly 30/207 -OPOptioal Protcl the Cnvetin on te Righs fsnwiDisabilts NActio CRC-Cnvti the Rigt of hildRatifctin 26/0190 1/0891 12/0791 OPAC-OpioalPrclte ovetio t its fth Cil nte inlmntfchildrenirmdcofli iio828 CRC-OPSC-ptioal Potl te Signature 08/520 419 Convetion the Rigts ofthe Cild onthe sal fchildrcildpriuinacil prgrpy only Source United Nations Human Rights http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/newhvstatbytreaty?OpenView (accessed 8 March 2008) 420 Appendix D Organizational Structure and the functions of the IFIs. The World Bank The World Bank is an affiliated specialised agency of the United Nations, situated in Washington, D.C, which currently has 183 state members 1 . All members of the Bank are automatically members of the International Monetary Fund. The Bank was created for the purpose facilitating economic, industrial and infrastructure growth by providing loan assistance to the countries that were affected by World War II. 2 Although the rebuilding of post-war economies was the primary mandate of the Bank's work, Bank?s focus has expanded beyond post-conflict rehabilitation and infrastructure development to include the provision of both short and long- term funding for natural disasters, humanitarian emergencies and Third World development. 3 The creditors of the World Bank are not restricted to sovereign states but under government guarantees and assurances the Bank has the mandate to extend its loan facilities to private investors as well. The operation of loan schemes to both the public and sector are aimed at facilitating productive investment, encouraging foreign trade, and streamlining and easing of international debt repayment. The Bank?s operations are similar to those of a commercial bank in that it is self- sustaining and has managed to maintain a profit on its lending activities. Its other area of operation includes the Economic Development Institute, which is entrusted with the training of officials of the member countries in relation to issues of economic development. An affiliated agency of the Bank is the International Finance Corporation, which was established in 1956. The IFC?s main function is to invest in private enterprises without governmental assurances or guarantees. The International Development Association, another affiliated agency of the Bank established in 1960, also extends credit on less stringent terms to developing countries. The late 1980s saw harsh criticism of the Bank?s lending policies particularly to developing countries to finance development projects with scant regards to environmental issues. 4 The environmental fund created in 1990 that provides low interest loans for developing countries is a result of that criticism. The World Bank Group also includes the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the International Centre for Settlement of Disputes. 5 1 htp:/w.orldbank.org/ (acesd17th July 207) 2 World Bank Repts 1947-196 alsoesicaEinhor, ?The World Bank's Mison Crep FmeigAfir, Septmbr/Otbr1 htp:/.orafis.org/201fsy567/jesica-inr/t-wrl--smis- cre.tl (acsd 16th Jun 6). 3 t:/web.rlbnk.r(acesd th June 20). 4 Chryl P The Wol Bk: ACritcal Alysi(New York, Lndo, Mnthly Reviw Pres, 1982)5-52. 5 Se t orld ank's publicaton, Wrld Bank Opratis: Sectral Progams nd olics (7);E.SMsdR.E sherT osnce Brton Wds(1973);C.Payer The 421 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) The Bretton Woods Conference also included discussion of the need to create mechanisms to stabilise foreign currency exchange rates, regulate the international monetary system and to eliminate currency restrictions relating to trade in goods and services, which in turn would promote global trade. 6 The result of these concerns was the creation of the IMF, which was originally envisaged to foster steady economic growth and full employment by offering unconditional loans to states that were in dire financial crisis. 7 The IMF's statutory purposes included promoting the balanced expansion of world trade, the stability of exchange rates, the avoidance of competitive currency devaluations, and the orderly correction of a country's balance of payments problems. To serve these purposes, the IMF monitors economic and financial developments and policies, in member countries and at the global level, provides policy advice to its members and makes short- term loans available to member countries with balance of payments problems. It is also a resource provider for governments and central banks in terms of technical assistance and training in its areas of expertise. 8 The articles of agreement of the IMF also provide a supervisory role 9 to the IMF over its members. This in effect means that the IMF monitors the exchange rate policies in order to guide the international monetary system and to ensure its smooth operation. The economic policies of a country are scrutinised to see whether they would enhance sustainable economic growth financial stability. The effectiveness of these surveillance schemes was severely tested in the Mexican debt crisis 1994 and again in the South East Asian financial crisis 1996/97. 10 The preventive mechanisms that IMF is said to wield in the event of an impending crisis proved impotent on both occasions. 11 The governing structure of the IMF is similar to that of the World Bank. 12 The Executive Directors are responsible for the conduct general operations of World Bank: ACritcal Anlysi(1982); S.Pleas The Hobled Giant: Esay onthe World Bank (1984). 6 Lel Yegr Itertioal Monetary Rltions: ry, istory, d Plic (Nw Yr, Harp&Row, 196). 7 Aticl IfthArticls fAgrmt s ut he IMF's main respniblties: promting inernal meayopeation; faciltingxpodalcd grthf erationl tad; potig xhn sblys t stblisht of multialsyt f payts; dki trur vilbe(uderaqute grs) oebr exriencibalceofpaymentsdfcts. 8 Atls ofgrnt IMF. 9 Survie pisfthIF se Artiles ofAgremnt ofthe IMF. 10 GahmBird?The I and DvlopngCuntis: RviwfteEvidenc ad Policy Options? 196 IntatiolOrgizat 503 47-513. 11 Tpectislbr futhe hesctirelatig tohe South Asian comi lea creatd bySAP. 12 Bor fGoverns iat lm, wih usly cnstis te Fie Minstr ofthe mcuntris. OfthExecuivDirector,?fiveExuveDircors apoedby ebrs wh i lrgst nbs fas (rtl h UntdSt, Ja, Grman, FrandteUtedKido). Thtrciirrs e lctedth oter rs. In FC an IDA, Executivirecos nd Alternats ofthBanksrv x-fic s ExecutivDirctorsltrnas fIFC andID(asog ecury th points ,r any o fthe utie h lthm, il mbr fIFCdIDA). Membs of 422 the Bank and the Fund and exercise all the powers delegated to them by the Board of Governors under the Articles of Agreement. The eight countries that make the most contributions to the funds the Bank and the Fund are able to nominate their own directors on Boards with other countries being represented on the Board on a ?block? basis. 13 The power of the Board of Directors is exercised through unique voting system in both institutions. Unlike the UN voting system of one member one vote, this voting system is determined on the basis of the financial contributions made by each country to each institution. 14 With almost identical governing structures, the management and control of both the IMF and World Bank is securely vested with the developed world. 15 Therefore, the philosophy and operations of these institutions reflect the ideological leanings of the western world. 16 2.1.3 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) The WTO is the global institution that was created to facilitate trade between diverse trading partners, from producers to ultimate consumers. Though the idea of an institutional mechanism to regulate global trade was discussed during Bretton Woods Conference, the lack of enthusiasm for a third international organisation resulted in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947. 17 The GATT treaty served as the regulatory framework for international trade among the 23 member countries in ensuing years. However, with the complexity of global trade the absence of an institutional structure and formal dispute resolution mechanisms were felt acutely amongst the members of the GATT treaty. Formal discussions to resolve issues were recommenced in 1984 through the Uruguay Round negotiations, which ultimately resulted the the MIGA Board fDirectors aelcted spartely. Elections fr Executiv Directors ae hld vrytwes,nmaly inionwith Bnk?sAualMtings. Oh y,itas bn cusry fr truls tsur id grphi d bald rpsnt b maitd othod fExeciv Diectors. ices toeumer oflectd Executiv Drerseqirs aecisn ofthBard fGverno byan80% jity hotal ng pow. BfNvmbr1,92, w2 ExutivDirctrs,17 fwrtd. In 192,in iw ofth lage umberof nemrs h d joiedthBank, te number of elctd ExecutDirecorswincasdt 19. Tetwonesa, Rusidaw gp arouSizrland, but h tl ubrofExcuiv irctrt pret lvlf24,? htp:/b.ok.rg/.TeIMFsoh asilar gg sue. 13 Te ridculse oft ovrnig trctref bthe Fnda th Bank r aled bythe factth irtrapindby teUSA nidviulywilvof17%,whrs2 dirorspsnig su-Sahrfriaoth IM oar s 4.3 votes btn tm. 14 Sne t Utedte it lgst drctr,iteldrughlyfe ofhe IMF.Ifach worl?svnreinustilsed cunris make p5 th tat IMF. 15 Th votigp inboth azto ynowtconicoweri 30d OECDse trlg 63.5% fhIFvts a 61.58% fth Wrld Bankvotes.The G8 stae lncaimersipt48.1 ad45.7of teIMFat rpctivly. hp:/w.thirdworltavl.com/IM_WB/I_BFacs.ml (t 17 th Augs206) 16 Ut Pipe Lnc Tyr he Rvil ofthe Librl Cd:ThI,theorld Bank,d InequaltynaGlblizedEnyrkngPapNo.4Jnury 98 (Cn fEcomic olic Alsi, N Shol fr Social esrc t:/w.escol.du/cpa(t 17 th Augst 2006) 17 The Brton Wds Cnfer disud th iea ofcreating th Interatinl Trde Organis(ITO)u th agof teUN.Ismnd sodlwh suofta, trifs, ittal ivestmscmiy agrt. Butvrl itorit h ry cludihUSA di not rify t. 423 establishment of the WTO in January 1995. The creation of the WTO was essentially an implementation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which focussed on trade of goods. However, as a result of the Uruguay Round intellectual property rights, government procurement, and investment measures also came within the scope and purview of the WTO, vesting the institution with immense powers to influence control global finance and trade. 18 The decision-making organ of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference comprising trade ministers of member countries, which meets every two years. The decision- making of the WTO is by the consensus of the general membership, which stands at 150 states 19 and therefore 95% of the world trade comes under the auspices of the WTO. The daily operations are in hands of the General Council that comprises national representatives of member states. The is entrusted with the management the dispute resolution process of the WTO. In its capacity as Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) it encourages consultation between member states when a dispute arises. If direct consultation fails, the DSB appoints a dispute panel to resolve the issues and the panel is vested with the mandate to report back the DSB. If the dispute is not resolved and complaint is upheld, the DSB may be requested by the complainant to suspend its obligations and allow retaliation. The General Council is also in charge of the scrutiny and evaluation of national trade policies. 20 The budget of the WTO is funded by the contributions member countries who contribute according to the share of world trade based on trade in goods, services and intellectual property rights. The General Council also overseas the work of the Council for Trade in Goods, which monitors policy trading practices including anti- dumping and unfair trade practices, the for Trade in Services, which monitors the Uruguay Round agreement on trade in services, and the The Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). TRIPS Council monitors the intellectual property rights that were reached during the Uruguay Round and supervises members? compliance. The other functions of the WTO includes the administration of WTO trade agreements, the provision of a forum for trade negotiations, provision of technical assistance and training for developing countries and cooperation with other international organisations. 21 The operations of the WTO are based on principles of reciprocity and non- 18 John H.Jackson ?FragmentaiorUnifcation mg Interationl Istiuons: The World TradeOrgizt?19 Nw Yk versyIteraiol JufLaw dPlitcs314 826-827. 19 Atpresnt her a 3observ goernts and sevn iterationl rganisto bservs h:/w.o.g/. 20 Scrutiy fte natil trade plices itrme Trae Policy Reviw Mechaism (TPRM). The TPRM pcsscrunrthUrugay Roundgrmntsonabl t rutiny of natioltrad oli. Th PRM xainsthri pli fh furoeswt lrges hesfwrldtaewicre vwe vytwoears,text16 largt radsre viwvry u s. Countsit lsrar inld arsctinzvy ix yars nd tothrsnh i arntd btheWTO. PRMt ch ogt eluee actry isprgmkefrily rpolices hwould eae lbal tr. 21 htp:/w.to.rg/ (at16 th June 206). 424 discrimination. 22 The principle of reciprocity comes into operation when trade barriers between countries are mutually reduced to foster intra-state trade. Non- discrimination, in principle, refers to the policy between member states that benefit from tariff reductions on goods and services that are made available to all member states. In this sense, the principle of non-discrimination is an extension of the principle of reciprocity which spreads the benefits of the reduction of trade barriers to all the members of the WTO. 23 Deviation from two fundamental policies of WTO is permitted in the circumstance where a country allows preferential treatment for the developing countries. The WTO working culture also encourages open information on all rules and regulations, pre-negotiated limitations on trading barriers and an elaborate dispute resolution mechanism. 22 Article Iof the GAT. 23 hp:/w..rg/enlish/tewto_/hatis_e/tif/act2_e.htm (at26h June 206). 425 Appendix E Compartive Growth Rates of Devloping Econmies Averag Anual Rtes 1960- 88 Country Industrial Production GDP 1960-1980 1980-1988 1960-1980 1980- 1988 South Korea 15.2 12.6 8.8 10.1 Taiwan 12.8 7.2 9.6 7.4 Singapore12.1 4.5 9.2 6.9 Hong Kong 10.3 7.5 9.9 7.4 Thailand 6.6 7.4 6.5 Indonesia 8.9 5.1 5.9 5.7 Pakistan8.0 7.2 4.4 6.3 Malaysia 9.6* 6.1 7.9* 4.6 India 4.6 7.6 3.5 5.4 Bangladesh 6.1 4.9 5.8* 3.5 Sri Lanka5.3 4.4 5.2 3.9 Mayanmar 4.2 7.3* 3.5 3.3* * - 1970-1980 Source: The Economist May 4, 1991, Survey page 7 426 BIBLIOGRAPHY Reports/Papers/Sechs 19 Humn Dvlopmnt Report f South Asia The Cris of Governace (Oxford Uiversity Pres Oxfd, 19). 203 Aal Riew of Dvlomnt Effectivens T Effectivs of Bk Suprt fo Policy Rfor (Th World Bak, Wahingto, DC, 204) <http://w.worldbak.og/oed> (sd 17 May 26. 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Governing globalization in South Asia through a legal praxis of human rights, development and democracy

Governing globalization in South Asia through a legal praxis of human rights, development and democracy

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