CLIMATE AND
SECURITY IN
LATIN AMERICA
AND THE
CARIBBEAN
Adriana Erthal Abdenur,
2019
Giovanna Kuele and
Alice Amorim, eds.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
INDEX
INTRODUCTION Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Giovanna Kuele and Alice Amorim ................. 2
HOW CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS MAGNIFY ECONOMIC AND SECURITY
VULNERABILITIES CASE STUDY: VENEZUELA AND ITS NEIGHBORS
Oliver Leighton Barrett......................................................................................... 13
CLIMATE CHANGE, INEQUALITY AND SECURITY IN COLOMBIA: SOME
REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBJECT Saul Rodriguez ............................................ 27
CLIMATE CHANGE, SOCIAL CONFLICT AND THE COMPLEXIFICATION
OF CRIME IN BOLIVIA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF FLOODS AND
STORMS IN CHAPARE AS A COCA GROWING REGION Marilia Closs ............ 40
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED GOVERNANCE OF TRANSBOUNDARY
AQUIFERS IN SOUTH AMERICA: BALANCING SECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND TERRITORIALITY Beatriz Mendes Garcia Ferreira ......................................... 52
CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN BRAZIL: THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN THE
DISCUSSION AND PROMOTION OF PUBLIC POLICIES Eloisa Beling Loose ..... 64
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY IN THE AMAZON: VULNERABILITY AND
RISKS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ON THE ACRE - UCAYALI BORDER
Marco Cepik and Hannah Machado Cepik ................................................................ 76
CLIMATE EVIDENCE-BASED POLICING: THE INFLUENCE OF RAINFALL ON
THE CRIMINAL DYNAMICS OF THE CITY OF MANAUS Moisés Israel Silva dos
Santos, Antônio Gelson de Oliveira Nascimento, Márcio de Souza Correa and Charlis Barroso
da Rocha
......................................................................................................... 90
CLIMATE SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:
AGGRAVATING DOMESTIC PUBLIC SECURITY RISK IN THE FRAME OF
LOW INTERSTATE CONFLICT Matias Franchini and Eduardo Viola ...................... 108
THE ‘BOOMERANG EFFECT’ AND THE UNINTENDED SIDE EFFECTS
OF CLIMATE ACTION: EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL’S INTERVENTIONS IN
AMAZON RIVER BASIN Luis Paulo B. da Silva, Larry Swatuk and Lars Wirkus ......... 121
1
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
INTRODUCTION
Climate change has been recognized by the United
Nations (UN) and by regional organizations, such as
the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) to
be a multiplier of insecurity and vulnerability, especially
where efforts to mitigate and adapt are not implemented.
Discussion around the nature and dynamics of the links
between climate and security have intensified since the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
released its Global Warming of 1.5 Special Report
(2018), which stresses that the international community
has only until 2030 to limit the increased risks brought on
by climate change (IPCC 2018).
The connections between climate change and security
are complex. The interaction with other factors and
the speed and type of social change vary across
different contexts. Climate change rarely, if ever, causes
insecurity directly; intervening variables – most of them
related to governance, development and resource
management – mediate this relationship.
While reliably quantifying how much climate change
contributes to a single event is challenging, the
literature has made progress in terms of identifying
the causal paths through which climate conditions
worsen insecurity. In general, climate change tends to
exacerbate existing social tensions and may generate
new ones altogether. This augmentation effect can
happen through “outlier” crises, such as disasters,
or as a result of more incremental changes, such
as gradual soil erosion. In many contexts, these
dynamics occur simultaneously or feed one another.
These links are increasingly recognized not only by
a number of states – including Germany, Denmark,
and Czech Republic – but also by the UN Security
Council (UNSC)—which has held debates since
2007. In 2017, the Council issued a resolution
underlining the need to assess and address the
risks associated with climate and security more
proactively (UNSC 2017; SCR 2018). There is also
growing concern across the UN system that the
impact of climate change on security is hampering
the achievement of the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) (UN 2019). Private sector actors,
including insurance companies and security
consulting firms, also acknowledge that climate
poses additional security risks. In the 2019 World
Economic Forum annual report, environmentrelated risks account for three of the top five
risks by likelihood and impact, according to the
businesspeople interviewed (WEF, 2019).
In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), climate
change is affecting specific areas in different ways.
From the melting glaciers of the Andes to the
increasingly unpredictable floods in the Amazon
Basin, from intensifying droughts in the Brazilian
cerrado (tropical savannah) to growing food
insecurity in Central America, from extreme weather
events in the Caribbean to shifting rain patterns in
Patagonia, the entire region faces a series of emerging
challenges. Far from being confined to remote or
sparsely populated areas, these challenges also affect
residents of densely populated places, including major
cities such as Mexico City, Lima, Rio de Janeiro and
Manaus. The IPCC 2018 Special Report underlines
the potential impact of sea-level rise in highly
populated coastal areas, with the potential need of
resettlement of communities and the rearrangement
of public services provision – phenomena that are
directly relevant to the millions of Latin Americans
living along the region’s coastlines.
The articles in this volume explore how climate
contributes to insecurity in the LAC region. They resulted
from a partnership between the Igarapé Institute and
the Instituto Clima e Sociedade (iCS), both in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, with the support of the German Embassy
in Brasília. This partnership yielded a workshop, held in
July 2019, that brought together the twelve researchers
and practitioners from across the region to discuss how
climate and security are linked in LAC.
The publication has two key goals. First, it is
meant to provide an initial trove of evidence-based
research on the links between climate and security
in LAC. Most of the articles focus on case studies or
comparisons, while others tackle more conceptual
dimensions of the climate security debate and the
role of governance in LAC. Second, it is intended
to raise awareness of these links and to promote
solutions-oriented debate among researchers and
policymakers within the region.
2
COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
SCHOLARSHIP ON CLIMATE
AND SECURITY
Research on the links between climate and security
has been growing rapidly over the past five years,
but much of this literature remains fragmented,
in the sense that there is inadequate dialogue
across sectors and institutions. Most scholars
and policymakers working on the topic agree that
climate change means “a change of climate which
is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity
that alters the composition of the global atmosphere
and which is in addition to natural climate variability
observed over comparable time periods,” as
underlined in Article 1 of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UN 1992).
In contrast, the definition of security is more
controversial. Two key ways in which scholars
have conceptualized this term revolve around state
security or human security. The former focuses
on the national level and is strongly associated
with the realist and neo-realist perspectives in the
International Relations field, whether in reference to
inter-state conflict or intra-state conflict. The latter
tends to emphasize individuals and communities
and is often associated with the constructivist
tradition (Dellmuth et al. 2017). In the LAC, the most
commonly used term is public security, which is
typically used to refer to the function of governments
(and, to a lesser extent, non-state actors) in ensuring
the protection of citizens, persons in their territory,
organizations, and institutions against threats to their
well-being. In practice, issues seldom fall squarely
within just one of these categories; many security
challenges (and some solutions) transcend the
boundary between national and international security.
An earlier wave of research on the links between
climate and security explored the impacts of climate
change on the United States’ national security (for
instance, Schwartz and Randall 2003). Hence,
these studies focused on state security. IIn contrast,
most of the recent literature has adopted a human
security lens (Barnett 2011). Since climate change
is not confined within state borders and demands
3
concerted policy responses among not only state
actors but also international and governmental
organizations, civil society entities, and private sector
firms, most of the articles in this volume analyze the
relations between climate and security from a human
security perspective.
In addition to the different concepts of security,
the literature on climate and security has covered
a number of policy areas. Research on national
security has emphasized diplomacy, security, peace,
and conflict, whereas work on human security has
stressed development dimensions (Barnett and
Adger 2007), disaster risk reduction (Birkmann and
Von Teichman 2010; Schipper and Pelling 2006), and
refugees (Hartmann 2010; Baldwin, Methmann and
Rothe 2014) (Dellmuth et al. 2017). Since the mid2010s, some topics have gained prominence within
this literature, particularly global governance, food
security, migration, and violent conflict.
On global governance, the literature has debated
the securitization of climate change – i.e. that is,
the framing of climate change as a security or
defense issue – by governments and international
organizations (Gilman, Randall and Schwartz
2011). On the one hand, securitization is useful for
actors who are willing to push for collective action
(Floyd 2015). For governments and international
organizations, this process allows them to frame
climate change as a global challenge (Adger 2010).
For instance, the EU has attempted to securitize
climate-induced migration since 2008 (Trombetta
2014). On the other hand, some governments
and individuals fear the securitization of climate
change, especially since the first debate on this
topic was held at the UNSC in 2007 (Scott 2009,
2012, 2015). They argue that climate and security
should be discussed in plural and open spaces,
such as the UN General Assembly. They also fear
that securitization can lead actors to gloss over the
development and human rights aspects of the issue.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
With respect to food security, Wheeler and
Von Braun (2013) underline the risks of climate
change for global food systems. They argue,
more specifically, that food insecurity will become
more severe in the most vulnerable countries.
Schmidhuber and Tubiello (2007) find that the
impact of climate change on food security depends
on socio-economic development. The authors
emphasize the need for urgent mitigating measures
as their stabilizing effects on the agricultural sector
can take decades to be realized.
Writing on large-scale migration, Gleditsch, Nordas,
and Salehyan (2007) emphasize that, although the
literature remains speculative, people seem to be
migrating to minimize the impacts of climate change,
which - in the absence of adequate policies – can
generate security threats, including violent conflict.
This shows that the impacts of climate change on
security depends at least in part on adaptation policies
(Barnett and Webber 2009). These authors suggest a
number of policy responses – from ensuring the rights
of migrants in the host community to strengthening
regional emergency response systems – that, if put into
practice, could curb the risks associated with climaterelated migration.
On violent settings, researchers have worked to identify
the key causal links between climate and security.
Homer-Dixon (1999) proposes an environmental conflict
model, arguing that scarcity of food, water, and forests,
leads to migration and violent conflict in the developing
world, especially in Africa. Years later, Hartmann (2010)
criticizes Homer-Dixon’s model, calling attention to the
danger of treating climate change as a security threat
inasmuch as it might lead to a militarization of the
responses, such as in the provision of development
assistance for African countries.
Some of the differences in findings in the literature
on climate and armed conflict may be due to
methodological divergences. Barnett and Adger
(2007), for instance, highlight that the direct impacts of
climate change (on individuals’ lives) but also indirect
impacts (for instance, on governmental functions) may
increase the risk of violent conflict. In contrast, wheeler
and Von Braun (2013) and Bernauer, Bohmelt and
Koubi (2012) argue that the effects of climate change
on violent conflict depend on economic and political
DECEMBER 2019
conditions. They find that qualitative case studies
suggest environmental stress can contribute to violent
cases; however, they note that results from large
quantitative studies always call for caution in drawing
general conclusions. Finally, reviewing the emerging
literature on climate and conflict, Burke, Hsiang and
Miguel (2015) find that deviations from moderate
temperatures and precipitation patterns systematically
increase conflict risk.
While some scholars believe that climate change
has exacerbated vulnerabilities in conflict-affected
regions (Scheffran et al. 2012; Seter 2016; Gleditsch
2012; Buhaug 2015; Detges 2017), others have
disputed whether the effects are significant.
While some evidence-based research has emerged
on Africa (Brown, Hammill and McLeman 2017;
Hendrix and Glaser 2007) – and, to some extent,
on Asia – the ways in which climate and security are
interlined in the LAC remain largely unexplored. Few
existing studies of climate and security encompass
the region, and even fewer focus on it. Lobell et
al. (2008), studying the necessary changes to
cope with climate change in food security, include
(and compare) Central America and Brazil to other
regions, while Scheffran and Battaglini (2011) explore
climate and conflict, particularly water insecurity in
Latin America, yet case studies and comparisons
within the region have been rare.
High-quality diagnostics that draw explicitly on
regional, national and local data can help to
consolidate the evidence linking climate and
security in LAC. Promoting quality research can also
contribute to building an interdisciplinary epistemic
community cutting across climate, development,
human rights and security agendas. This research
can also contribute towards the creation or
improvement of risk assessments, such as early
warning systems, and early response mechanisms
through the incorporation of relevant climate
stressors and pathways.
4
COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
POLICY INITIATIVES AND
ISSUES IN CLIMATE AND
SECURITY
The articles in this volume offer a variety of
perspectives on climate security in LAC.
Nonetheless, some key political initiatives and issues
run across them that may be central not only for
understanding those dynamics, but also for decision
making on climate security in the region.
First, some states within the region have engaged
directly with climate and security at the regional
and global levels. IIn January 2019, the Dominican
Republic organized an open debate within the UN
Security Council on how climate disasters threaten
international peace and security. In addition, a
UN Climate and Security Mechanism has been
established to propose new risk assessments and
tools, and in 2018 Germany and Nauru launched the
Group of Friends on Climate and Security, which has
expanded to include dozens of member states.
Second, civil society is also starting to engage with
the topic. Youth leaders like Greta Thunberg are
breathing new life into climate activism, bringing
attention to catastrophic risks and to the idea of a
climate emergency. A new Global Commission on
Adaptation, announced by the Washington-based
World Resources Institute in 2018, is preparing
a report with recommendations on how to curb
climate-related security risks. In addition, think tanks
and companies are starting related initiatives on
research and policy, from Adelphi (Germany) and
Igarapé Institute (Brazil) to Sipri (Sweden) and the
Center for Climate and Security (US). In February
2019, a group of think tanks announced the creation
of the International Military Council on Climate
and Security (IMCCS), an umbrella organization of
senior military leaders, security experts and security
institutions working on the topic.
5
Third, some of the countries that are most vulnerable
to climate change are also spearheading innovative
initiatives, initially focused on raising the political
profile of the links between risks and vulnerability
under the 2013 Warsaw International Loss and
Damage Mechanism, and more recently through
international cooperation. The Pacific Island
Forum, for instance, included climate change as
a security issue during its 2018 Nauru Summit. In
Latin America, the Caribbean Disaster Emergency
Management Agency organized a conference to
debate the effects of climate change in the region.
Yet the reality is that most governments have not
begun incorporating a climate and security theme
into their policies. And when they did, the policy
implementation challenges are substantive, like
in the case of Brazil, where the National Defense
Policy acknowledges the climate implications for
national security (Brazil 2012) but the guideline is not
translated into concrete action plans.
Finally, climate security continues to be controversial
at the UN, which is part of the challenge. Some
member states, such as India and Brazil, worry
that linking these two thematic areas can lead to
securitization – reframing the issue as requiring
military solutions and thus distributing the allocation
of resources away from development and human
rights toward hard security. Many countries fear
that the securitization of climate change could
also threaten principles of national sovereignty;
for instance, climate change being invoked as
justification for military intervention.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
Moreover, some Pacific island nations fear that
turning climate and security into a global agenda
at the UN may provide fodder for conservative
governments to channel resources narrowly into
challenges at home, at the expense of climaterelated assistance to developing countries.
Nonetheless, some UN member states have begun
to address the relationships between security
and climate change more directly. Diplomats and
researchers have noted that nowhere on the planet
can climate change contribute toward insecurity
more than in the Arctic, where geopolitical rivalries
are mounting as the ice melts with global results.
There is a growing awareness within the UN that
climate and security priorities must be streamlined
across the UN system and other international
organizations. Some countries have started to
incorporate appropriate stressors, risk factors and
associated outcomes into their diagnostics and
planning. UN officials note that climate and security
factors should be included, wherever possible, in
national development strategies – while keeping
DECEMBER 2019
in mind that poorly planned adaptation responses
can lead to unintended consequences, as when
newly introduced crops damage ecosystems and
livelihoods. Responses should also address the
disproportionate effect of climate and security on
vulnerable populations, from the poor to women,
children and indigenous communities.
Addressing the challenges posed by the
connections between climate and security
requires sensitizing people at the UN,and regional
organizations as well as among governments in
making climate and security a human-centered
agenda. Given the increase in the global rejection
of multilateralism and leadership that dismisses
science for politics, breaking the complex vicious
cycles linking climate and security requires creating
incentives to shift institutional preferences and
behavior toward improving people’s lives. This
publication is intended to contribute towards this
process by launching a conversation on the need to
evidence-based research on climate and security in
the LAC.
ABOUT THIS ISSUE
The articles in this issue represent an incipient effort
to build evidence on the links between climate
and security in LAC. The workshop that generated
these papers brought together a wide variety of
actors engaged in evidence-based research: think
tanks and NGOs representatives, academics
and practitioners from both civilian and military
backgrounds and institutions. Three key take-away
points emerged from this meeting.
First, the plurality of concepts related to security
adopted by the authors enriches the debate about
climate and security in the LAC. Rather than adhere
to a narrow definition, the articles presented here
run the gamut from human security to public
security and inter- and intra-state conflict. This
diversity reflects the heterogeneity of perceptions
of the climate and security links in ways that are
relevant for policymakers.
Second, the workshop identified several emerging
themes in this incipient body of research.
Given the region’s high rates of socioeconomic
inequality, taking into account the distribution of
income, wealth, access to public services and
other indicators is essential in understanding the
differential impacts of climate and LAC societies.
In addition, authors called attention to the need
to address climate and security not just in rural
locations but also in urban zones, including the
cities and towns of the Amazon Basin. Themes as
infrastructure and gender were especially underlined.
The role of infrastructure in climate and security
also merits further attention, especially given the
6
COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
region’s long history of betting heavily on large-scale
development projects that leave vast social as well
as environmental footprints. Infrastructure has an
especially important role in shaping migratory flows
that are often present in the analyses of how climate
change impacts security in the region. Finally, the
importance of gender in mediating the relationship
between climate and security – as well as in
designing innovative responses to the associated
challenges – was noted by several of the participants
as a key gap within the existing literature.
Across all these themes, the role of governance
was debated, with a special focus on the
construction of regional and subregional regimes
that may nudge LAC states towards more climateand conflict-sensitive policymaking. This need for
more robust governance is all the more essential
given that, like other parts of the world, LAC has
seen a deterioration of the commitments made to
climate change as some of the region’s key states,
including Brazil, back away from international
regimes such as the Paris Agreement. At the
same time, participants expressed concern with
the potentially excessive securitization of climate
phenomena, at the expense of their social,
economic and human rights dimensions.
The papers fall roughly into two categories. The
first set of papers analyzes specific case studies –
whether particular countries or subregions within
the LAC – and how climate contributes to insecurity.
These papers adopt varying definitions of security,
from national security to human security. In the
second set of papers, authors address issues
that are relevant to governance and public policy,
exploring key challenges in the design of climatesensitive responses that may help to curb insecurity
in parts of the region.
In the first set of articles, Oliver Leighton Barrett,
looking at Venezuela, underlines how climate
change risks magnify economic and security
vulnerabilities in and around the country. The
paper focuses on the role of water shortages and
overdependence on hydroelectricity in the social
tensions in and around Venezuela.
7
Saul M. Rodriguez, considers climate change
as a potential threat multiplier within the context
in Colombia, both during the conflict and in the
aftermath of the peace agreement signed between
the government and the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). The paper
underscores the importance of considering how
socioeconomic inequalities mediate the impact of
climate change on security in Colombia.
Marilia Closs highlights the connection between
climate change in Chapare, a coca production
region in the department of Cochabamba, Bolivia,
and the increase in crime linked to the production
and distribution of illicit substances. She finds out
that floods and intense storms have altered the
relationship of individuals with the territory, the
economy, and the social production of space,
intensifying a process of criminalization.
In the second set of articles, Beatriz Mendes
Garcia Ferreira sheds light on an often-neglected
aspect of climate change, namely how it impacts
transboundary aquifers for water security in South
America. Her research invites the question of
how better governance for such aquifers can be
implemented.
Eloisa Beling Loose’s paper looks at a key element in
the construction of climate governance: the perception
of climate risks and how they are related to security,
drawing on analysis of Brazilian news sites. She finds
that media coverage of climate risks remains largely
disconnected from security issues, which presents
challenges for public policy in this area.
Marco Cepik and Hannah Machado Cepik hone
in on the indigenous people in the Brazilian-Peruvian
border. By comparing the floods along the Jordan
river in Acre (Brazil) and those along the Ucayali River
(Peru), they analyze how public mitigation policies can
have differential impacts on human security outcomes,
depending in part on the timing of such interventions.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
Moisés Santos, Antônio Nascimento, Márcio
Corrêa and Charlis Barroso da Rocha
investigate how extreme weather events, namely
abnormally high rainfalls in the Amazon, affect levels
of crime in urban areas. Focusing on the city of
Manaus, their analysis suggests that heavy rains
may temporarily curb criminal activity, but also calls
attention to several methodological challenges that
future research will have to address to draw more
precise conclusions.
Matias Franchini and Eduardo Viola build a
climate security risk index and analyze trends across
Latin America and the Caribbean. They conclude
from this data analysis that the region has higher
risks of climate aggravating domestic security
problems than exacerbating inter-state conflicts.
Luis Paulo B. da Silva, Larry Swatuk and
Lars Wirkus investigate the “boomerang effect”
– the largely unanticipated consequences of
climate mitigation and adaptation on domestic
non-state actors that create negative feedback.
Analyzing Brazilian hydropower initiatives in two
other Amazonian states – Peru and Bolivia – the
authors note some of the harmful consequences
of dam-building projects from a climate and
security perspective.
DECEMBER 2019
The analyses in this publication invite a series of
questions that may help to guide further research on
the topic:
How do the links between climate and security work
in Latin America and the Caribbean, and how do
these dynamics vary by local context?
How can better policies be designed to as to curb
this magnification effect?
More broadly, what constitutes effective governance
of climate and security within the Latin American and
Caribbean context?
The papers in this publication are part of the first
step towards a broader solutions-oriented discussion
of the relationship between climate and security in
LAC. But these papers are by no means exhaustive.
Further research is needed on thematic areas such
as gender, climate and security; the impact of climate
on patterns of organized crime; and the role of
regional organizations in mitigation and adaptation
as they relate to climate and security. Likewise,
while the paper selection process for this publication
has yielded a geographically diverse range of case
studies, more research is needed on the dynamics
and impacts of climate and security in Central
America, the Caribbean and the cerrado region of
South America, among other subregions that are
highly vulnerable to climate change. Yet, by launching
a debate about key concepts and methodologies and
by fomenting evidence-based research, Igarapé and
iCS hope that research on climate and security in LAC
will gather momentum. Ultimately the goal is not only
to understand the drivers and diagnose the emerging
challenges, but also to shed light on invisible crises
and to foment the design of effective solutions by all
of the relevant actors, including government bodies,
international organizations, civil society entities and
private sector actors.
8
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IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
Venezuelan Refugee Camp in Roraima. Photo: CSP Conlutas
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
HOW CLIMATE CHANGE
RISKS MAGNIFY
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY
VULNERABILITIES.
CASE STUDY:
VENEZUELA AND ITS
NEIGHBORS
Oliver Leighton Barrett
ABSTRACT
Climate risk assessments for South American
nations such as Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela
are increasingly severe and suggest that critical
infrastructure, energy and water security strategies
are not sufficiently climate-change sensitive.
Recent climatic shocks, particularly the 2013-2016
El Niño event that significantly disrupted rainfall
patterns, have played a consequential role in
Venezuela’s water, energy and food security crises
specifically, and its overall human security challenges
more generally. Lack of available research and data
Keywords: climate
13
complicate accurate assessment of the effects
of climatic shocks on Venezuelan instability and
insecurity. However, there is enough data to make
informed hypotheses about the role of environmental
variability in the crisis, and to invite further study.
While many of the climatic risks the region faces are
unprecedented, the capability to foresee these risks
is also unprecedented. Preventing, preparing for,
adapting to and mitigating these risks will require
that policy makers, thought leaders and other
stakeholders take action in the near term.
change, Venezuela, Latin America, vulnerabilities, resilience.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
INTRODUCTION
This study1 examines the role of climate change
and environmental variability as contributing factors
that undermine national security across Venezuela
and neighboring states by analyzing the interaction
of recent climate trends and human security
vulnerabilities.2
The principal question this research effort seeks to
answer is, how much of Venezuela’s ongoing human
security crisis (and other similar crises emerging
in the region) can be attributed to environmental
variability and climate change. Through an
investigation of climate-exacerbated changes in
the unfolding Venezuelan human security crisis,
this research offers direct and circumstantial
evidence that can be of value in informing conflict
mitigation, resilience and security planning efforts.
Although many Latin American states have made
measurable developmental advances in recent
years, there is a dearth of research regarding how
the convergence of climate change and underlying
economic and security vulnerabilities (hereafter
referred to as climate-security vulnerabilities), may
stymie development, resiliency and peacekeeping
efforts in the region in general, but in Venezuela most
particularly.3
One of the focus trends discussed in this study is
how emigration from Venezuela may be contributing
to social tensions in some Eastern Caribbean states
(e.g. Trinidad and Tobago and Aruba), Colombia
and Brazil. It also explores how the exploitation of
vulnerable migrants during the migration process,
and at reception zones, may be another indirect
climate-security outcome (Otis 2018a). Sciences &
severely strained (report. that addressed the “hallnge
ore robust, with research and policy institure like
IGarapThough there is some evidence to support
these linkages, the role of climate-exacerbated
changes as a contributing factor in regional
insecurity is largely understudied and underreported.
However, a key finding that is not in question is that
governments across the region are not adequately
prepared for the slow moving but very consequential
impacts of both anthropogenic climate change and
environmental variability events such as the El Niño
phenomenon. This failure to mitigate and to adapt
to these trends exposes states and communities in
the region to forces that further will only continue to
jeopardize food, water and energy security.
The information gleaned through this research
effort should not only enrich regional climate
security discourse but will also aid policy makers in
formulating disaster response and security policies
that are more climate sensitive. This research also
reviews the potential of Venezuela (and neighboring
states) to anticipate climatic risks to critical
infrastructure/services and its use of this information
to develop mitigating and adaptation-oriented
policies to reduce the likelihood of climatic shocks
and increased state fragility. Lastly, it briefly explores
how better incorporating climatic trends/risks into
water, energy and security policies can reduce the
likelihood of additional stress and potential conflict.
1
A very special thanks to all reviewers especially, Shiloh Fetzek, Senior Fellow for International Affairs at the Center for Climate and
Security.
2 For the purposes of this research effort, the term national security is to be understood to include non-military dimensions of security,
including security related to crime, economic security, energy security, environmental security, and food security. Similarly, it also includes
risks associated with the effects of natural disasters and climate change.
3 For the purposes of this paper, the term climate-security denotes the security related effects and outcomes related to destructive
climate or environmental effects. Representative climate-security outcomes include displacement of populations due to droughts, energy
shortages due to hydro-dam reservoir depletion; salination of aquifers due to sea level rise associated salt-water penetration and extreme
weather events that cause casualties.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
A literature review of Spanish, Portuguese and
English languages articles, analyses, and reports
related to the subject matter was conducted.
Interviews with key leaders, environmental activists
and researchers will inform and round out the final
iteration of this study. The main challenge of this
approach is that, since it is focused on Venezuela,
some data may be inaccessible due to the
political sensitivities and poor security conditions
within the country. Therefore, the information
that informs this seed paper’ was gleaned from
reliable academic and media sources, as well as
research and policy institutes. The final iteration
of this paper will have the benefit of information
produced through joint research arrangements
with academic and policy institutes in the region
that are already studying human security trends
across Venezuela and its neighbors.
KEY STAKEHOLDERS
UNDERSTANDING OF
CLIMATE-SECURITY
Latin American policy makers and security community
officials are the key stakeholders most responsible
for formulating policies and plans to mitigate and
adapt to climate-security risks, however, there is not
much evidence that these risks are being factored
into new policies. In our professional opinion based
on environmental security work conducted on
behalf of the United States Southern Command, the
majority of these stakeholders are not aware of the
security implications of shifting climatic conditions.
Appreciation of the linkages between climate change
and the economic and political stability of states and
populations is generally low across policymaking
communities globally, especially when compared to
awareness of the linkages between climate change
and easily traceable and measurable impacts such as
heat stress and coastal erosion.
15
Policymaking addressing environmentally driven
economic and political insecurity is in a nascent
stage in Latin America, and at this point in the
region’s climate response agenda does not
adequately factor scientific evidence and prognostics
into plans and strategies that would enable climatesensitive responses commensurate with the
severity of the challenges. The disconnect between
the research and policymaking communities in
particular further exacerbates poor understanding
of the climate-security risks the region faces. This
“disconnect” leads to an under-appreciation of the
fact that anthropogenic climate change, in many
scenarios, will act insidiously and slowly, but will
have cross-sectorial impacts, to include outcomes
that could require more frequent involvement or
intervention of national security services (i.e. militaries
and domestic security services), which may not be
desirable for a variety of legitimate historical reasons.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
Current security sector policies and strategies in particular, do not give due consideration to environmental
factors in security affairs for several reasons. Chief among them are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Biases towards traditional threats/challenges;
A resistance to “non-traditional” security risks narratives;
Political sensitivities surrounding climate change matters;
National authorities and institutional doctrines that restrict how resources can be spent; and
Lack of policy-ready climate information that can be integrated into security policy/strategies.
Imbuing broader and richer understanding of climate risks across regional security communities will require
more energetic advocacy by academics, analysts and activists to elevate the regions’ policymaking and
security communities understanding of the risks, and the consequences of inaction.
THE LINK BETWEEN
CLIMATE CHANGE
AND SECURITY IN AND
AROUND VENEZUELA
Risks such as water scarcities, rapid urbanization,
fragile economies which reduce a nation’s resiliency
to shocks are features of South American states
like Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela (We Are
Water Foundation 2017). The region is not only
falling behind in keeping up with their burgeoning
populations’ demand for water but are also heavily
dependent upon hydro-energy production to satisfy
their growing energy and water needs (Belt 2015).
Reporting from an American technical consulting
firm that tracks water issues and trends across the
continent reported in early 2018 that
Water deficits of varying severity for much of the
continent, with large pockets of exceptional deficit
in Brazil. Intense deficits are also forecast for
southern Venezuela, southern Guyana, Suriname,
French Guiana, the Argentine Pampas, the Gulf of
Corcovado in southern Chile, and along many rivers
(Isciences, 2018).
The water scarcity trend is particularly alarming
because energy production in many of the most
populous South American cities is highly dependent
upon the water levels of the dams that feed hydroelectro turbines.
Hydroelectricity is one of the cleanest forms of
energy production, however, the benefit is betrayed
by the risks hydro-energy dependent nations face
when the river systems and reservoirs become
water depleted. Reporting produced by the Center
for Climate and Security, suggests that within only
the last five years, both Brazil and Venezuela have
experienced significant underproduction of their
main hydro-electric facilities due to water depletion
across major reservoir systems (Barrett 2018).
Water scarcities also have detrimental impacts on
agriculture, especially on small farmers that do not
have the resources to survive protracted drought
periods. Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador are
representative examples of how drought-driven food
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
security crises can exacerbate and catalyze both
internal and external migration.
According to the Food and Agricultural Organization
(FAO) of the United Nations, “The Dry Corridor in
Central America, in particular Guatemala, Honduras
and El Salvador is experiencing one of the worst
droughts of the last ten years with over 3.5 million
in need of humanitarian assistance (Barrett 2019).”
Some of the “3.5 million in need of humanitarian
assistance” may make the decision to migrate north
for a chance of asylum in the United States. The
same kinds of decisions are being made across
Venezuela as citizens faced with some of the direst
economic and security conditions in the world –
aggravated by drought – seek legal residency in
The UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, and the UN
Migration Agency, reported in November 2018 that
the number of refugees and migrants from Venezuela
globally is approximately three million. Colombia
leads in the number of refugees and migrants
received (over one million) with Peru hosting over half
a million, Ecuador over 220,000, Argentina 130,000,
Chile over 100,000 and Brazil 85,000 (Spindler
2019). The scale and the longevity of the migration
is concerning for countries in the region and beyond,
increasing the importance of understanding the
forces that are driving the phenomenon, to include
trends that have been traditionally overlooked.
CLEAR EVIDENCE OF
CONTRIBUTION – WATER
SHORTAGE LINKAGES
According to the UNHCR, “Hyperinflation, shortages,
political turmoil, violence and persecution have caused
more than 2.7 million Venezuelans to flee [the] country
since 2015 to seek safety or a better life abroad” (The
Guardian 2018). With over three million Venezuelans
now living abroad, the vast majority in countries within
South America, this is the largest exodus in the recent
history of Latin America (Spindler 2019). The dominant
political and media narratives which frame and
attempt to explain the reasons for one of the largest
humanitarian crisis in the region’s history center
on the dismal economic and security conditions
across the country caused by sustained government
mismanagement of not only the economy, but of
political and justice processes.
Domestic and international critics of the current
Venezuelan government allege that corruption and gross
mismanagement of the economy, as well as a departure
from democratic norms, are the proximate causes for
the degradation of human security in this nation of 32
million people. More specifically, they contend that
17
nations across the hemisphere.
two decades worth of farm nationalizations, currency
manipulations and a government takeover of food
distribution as a few of the most obvious causes
for the ongoing crisis which has as one of its most
defining features the mass migration of over three
million citizens—one of the largest mass migrations
in Latin American history. (Spindler 2019)
At the other end of the political spectrum are
domestic and international proponents of the
Venezuelan government who allege that foreign
interference in Venezuelan domestic affairs, along
with depressed global oil prices (well above $100
a barrel in 2014 to just over $51 in June 2019) are
most responsible for the crisis (Ghitis 2018) However,
neither of these narratives include the 2013-2016 El
Niño event that significantly disrupted rainfall patterns
and affected water, energy and food security during
this period, with ripple effects across all sectors of
national life.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
Assessing the degree to which adverse environmental
trends, such as drought, contribute to Venezuela’s
problems is challenging. This is especially true as
the country is embroiled in a crisis with multiple
converging adverse socio-economic and political
trends, and in which data gathering and research
efforts are hampered due to the prohibitive diplomatic
and security environments. Nevertheless, a growing
body of direct and indirect evidence suggests that
the 2013-2016 El Niño driven dry period, more
specifically, its impacts on the nation’s primary energy
production facility, the Simón Bolívar Hydroelectric
Plant (also better known as the “Guri Dam”)
contributed significantly to the humanitarian crisis.
According to the United States government’s entity
most responsible for tracking climatic trends, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), “El Niño is one of the most important
climate phenomena on Earth due to its ability to
change the global atmospheric circulation, which
in turn, influences temperature and precipitation
across the globe.” It causes a pattern of
unusually warm water stretching across the surface
of eastern equatorial Pacific that occurs every 3-7
DECEMBER 2019
years (L’Heureux 2014). Due to the localization of
the phenomenon (the Pacific Ocean), North, Central
and South American states often are significantly
affected by its impacts, the most common of which
is drier than normal conditions. There is some
evidence that suggests that climate change may
make the impacts of El Niño more pronounced than
previously understood.
In an article published in January 2014 in the online
periodical, Nature Climate Change, researchers
argued that climate change could double the
frequency of super El Nino events, which have
increased in intensity roughly 20% over the course
of the 20th century (Cai and Simon 2014). Although
research is ongoing as to whether or not climate
change is intensifying contemporary El Niño events,
vulnerable regions would be best served planning
for the worst rather than hoping for the best. This is
especially true as it concerns how drier conditions
produced by climate change and El Niño interplays
may affect the South American states most heavily
dependent on hydroelectricity.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
CLIMATE CHANGE AND
HYDROELECTRICITY
OVERDEPENDENCE
Precipitation variability may be one of the most
impactful global climate change trends Temperatureprecipitation interactions and urban heat island
phenomena are made worse by the increased water
demands for core industries (especially extractive
industries) and population growth, increasing water
stress. These dynamics are increasingly exposing the
vulnerability of global hydropower generation systems
and processes, especially in South America, a
region with a significant dependency on hydropower,
particularly in Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil, states
that invested heavily in hydropower decades ago to
mitigate their overreliance on fossil fuels.
Variability in regional hydrology affects the capacity
of hydroelectric facilities to perform as designed with
consequences for domestic and industrial users
(Belt 2018). Brazil is the most hydro-dependent
country in the hemisphere, making it vulnerable to
climate-related hydrological changes. As a mitigating
action, Brazil is currently building more dams with
expanded reservoirs and is stepping up its reliance
on fossil fuels to meet energy needs. However,
as recent developments demonstrate, Venezuela,
due to existing vulnerabilities and fragilities, has a
population that is most exposed to the risks of an
underperforming hydroelectric system. A recent
episode illustrates how protracted drought can affect
hydroelectric function and, when combined with
other aspects of national dysfunction, can cause
ripple effects that can affect the national security of
neighboring states.
According to Venezuela’s Ministry of Electricity,
between 2013 and 2016, Venezuela’s rainfall
measured 50-65% lower than normal due to El Niño
(Schneider 2016). This rainfall deficit dramatically
reduced Venezuela’s capacity to generate electricity
via its hydroelectric power generators. Further,
19
Venezuelan Dr. Alejandro Álvarez Iragorry, an expert
in environmental education, biologist and founder
of the Venezuelan Environmental Education Forum
explained that,
Eighty percent of Venezuela’s citizens live in the
north of the country and 80% of the freshwater
stores are located in the south. Drinking water
service is poor in availability, quality and continuity,
and water safety is threatened by pollution,
deterioration of basins and climate change. Most
existing wastewater treatment plants are damaged
or not functioning at all. (Alvarez 2014)
The shortage of reservoir stores led to the
government imposing rolling blackouts and water
rationing in 2016, compounding the stress already
felt by the majority of Venezuelans due to the
economic contraction and its attendant food crisis
(Kurmanaev and Otis 2016). The government
even took the extreme measure of shortening the
workweek to four days in the months of April and
May in an effort to save electricity (Mills 2016).
The protracted drought deeply affected all aspects
of the economy at a time when many Venezuelans
were already in financial extremis and vulnerable
to shocks. Further, according to Venezuela’s
Confederation of Farmer Associations (a trade
group), an under-performing agriculture sector,
featuring a 60% reduction in the domestic production
of rice, corn and coffee in the past decade, also
exacerbated economic and food security stresses.
Consequently, when the 2013 rainfalls were far lower
than needed to replenish dam stores the impacts
were profound (Barrett 2019).
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
Venezuelan national, Professor Juan Carlos Sánchez
(co-recipient of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for
his work within the IPCC) warned in a June 2017
interview that climate models forecast that by midcentury there may be an 18% decrease in rainfall
in the natural reservoir and tributary system that
leads to the Guri dam (Ahmed 2019). According
to the International Energy Agency, the Guri dam
hydroelectric facility generates almost 70% of
Venezuela’s electricity and is the second-largest
hydroelectric plant in the world, after Itaipu in
neighboring Brazil.
Venezuela did have national power woes prior to
El Niño 2013-2016, including a major blackout
in 2009. However, two major blackouts in 2013,
with unclear causes, coincided with the start of El
Niño effects in the region. According to Javier Val,
Environmental Engineer from the Cranfield University,
Venezuela has battle with El Niño is not new and will
likely be prolonged with significant consequences
for the nation. He argues that the country suffered
over the past twenty years from the intensification
of droughts caused by the El Niño phenomenon,
he further explained that [t]hese effects will become
ever stronger and have their impacts on the
country, so we need to adapt to them. Some of the
forecast effects include droughts that will affect the
hydroelectric generation system, which accounts for
approximately 60% of the total power generation of
the country.
Mr. Val explains that other related El Niño forecast
impacts are:
•
Droughts that will affect water reservoirs
levels in the country;
•
Certain crops will stop growing in areas
where they normally grow;
•
Rising sea levels will put at risk coastal areas
in Delta Amacuro, Zulia, Falcón, Nueva
Esparta, among others;
•
Vector-produced diseases (dengue, malaria,
Zika, among others) will expand throughout
the national territory reaching places where
they do not arrive today (Val 2016).
DECEMBER 2019
It is important to note that Venezuela’s increasing
electricity demand is largely residential related.
For example, in Zulia state, 60% of the electricity
consumption is due to household appliances like
air conditioning units. With rising temperatures,
demand for these residential cooling units have
increased annually and though the nation’s hydro
and thermoelectric plants are increasing to generate
capacity, the very poor conditions of these facilities
lead to power outages and government rationing. A
general global warming trend, superimposed upon
by stronger El Niño events, are together increasing
the frequency of droughts across the nation, thus
making energy and water scarcities more frequent
and prolonged (González 2018).
During the first blackout in early September 2013,
70% of the country plunged into darkness with 14 of
23 states reporting they did not have electricity for
most of the day. The second blackout in early
December 2013 left most of Venezuela in the dark
again and occurred a few days before elections (The
Guardian 2013). The twin outages in the year of
onset of El Niño in the region (2013) invites a more
thorough investigation into the possible linkages
(Newman 2019). However, the environmental
variability occurring due to El Niño specifically, and
climate change more generally, significantly affects
other vital sectors of the Venezuelan economy.
Venezuela is also heavily dependent upon waterintensive mining industries, agriculture and other
sectors sensitive to climate change impacts. Should
these services/sectors underperform for protracted
periods the degradation will interact with preexisting
security vulnerabilities causing consequential adverse
outcomes that the state may not be able to address
effectively (Barrett 2014). The El Niño drought, and
the damage it inflicted upon the nation’s energy, water
supply and agriculture catalyzed economic contraction,
illicit criminal activity, and food and water insecurity.
This damage not only intensified domestic social
unrest, but also compounded dissatisfaction with
government performance that may have contributed
to the decisions of tens of thousands of individuals and
families to migrate.
20
COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
REGIONAL SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS
The breakdown of Venezuelan economic and security
order resulted in the historic displacement of people
across the country’s borders and into neighboring
states like Ecuador, Peru, Panama and Colombia. Of
Venezuela’s numerous neighbors that have received
migrants, perhaps none have been more affected than
Colombia. The Colombian immigration department
reported in December 2018 that there were more
than half a million Venezuelans in Colombia, most
of whom immigrated within the two previous years.
The steady inflow of Venezuelans in the spring of
2018 alarmed the Colombian government so much
that then president Juan Manuel Santos requested
“international aid to cope with the large numbers of
immigrants, many of whom are impoverished, hungry
and desperate” (Otis 2018b).
According to the UNHCR, the majority of
Venezuelans arriving in neighboring countries are
families with children, pregnant women, elderly
people and people with disabilities. Often obliged to
take irregular routes to reach safety, they fall prey to
smugglers, traffickers and irregular armed groups.
(UNHCR 2019)
Host nations and regions such as Brazil,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Peru,
and the southern Caribbean, have struggled to
accommodate these rising migration numbers,
though many continue to strive to meet their
obligations as signatories to asylum treaties.
According to Eduardo Stein, UNHCR-IOM Joint
Special Representative for Refugees and Migrants
from Venezuela “Countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean have largely maintained a commendable
open-door policy to refugees and migrants from
Venezuela; however, their reception capacity
is severely strained” (Spindler 2018). There are
concerning signs that “this generosity and solidarity”
is under strain in receiving states.
21
Cross-border migration, and sometimes-harsh
responses from populations in receiving countries,
has contributed to the ratcheting up of tensions
in states bordering Venezuela, with clashes
between migrants and local residents becoming
more frequent. One notable example occurred in
August 2018, when Brazilians in the border town
of Pacaraima attacked and burned a migrant camp
designed for new Venezuelan migrants, which
triggered the deployment of Brazilian troops to the
border. According to military officials, “as many as
1,200 Venezuelans who feared for their safety rushed
back into the country they had fled.”
At one point, some Venezuelans ran for the hills
as Brazilians chased them, an attack fueled by
an allegation that a group of Venezuelans from
the squatter camp assaulted a local Brazilian
merchant (Andreoni, 2018). In border towns such
as Pacaraima, Brazil there is growing resentment
about the continuous flow of migrants into
communities struggling to deliver public and social
services to their respective populations. In another
Brazilian border state, the governor proposed
a plan to return Venezuelans to their country,
demanded that the federal government close the
border, and that her state be compensated for
rising education and health care costs (Londoño
2018). However, social pressures driven by
transnational migration and sometimes-harsh
responses from receiving countries is not limited to
Venezuela’s large, continental neighbors.
As of September 2018, an estimated 98,500
Venezuelans were living in the southern Caribbean,
concentrated in Trinidad and Tobago (40,000; Trinidad
lies 12km from Venezuela’s north coast), Aruba
(20,000) and Guyana (15,000). As a proportion of
its population (only 1.3 million people), Trinidad and
Tobago has received more Venezuelans than almost
any other country. In this context, some governments
are taking a harder line on the migration crisis, to
include the deportation of migrants.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
Trinidad is one example. In 2018, the government
failed to process the petitions from approximately
10,000 Venezuelan asylum applicants, and in April
2018, authorities deported 82 Venezuelans—an
action the United Nations protested at the time
(UNHCR2018). In an April news conference following
the deportations, island’s Prime Minister Keith
Rowley defended his policy explaining that “We
are not in China. We are not Russia. We are not
DECEMBER 2019
America”, he said. “We are a little island — limited
space — and therefore we cannot and will not allow
the U.N. spokespersons to convert us into a refugee
camp” (NPR 2018). It is projected that the ongoing
economic and political instability in Venezuela could
amplify migrant outflows to the Caribbean placing
further strain on already fragile economies and
possibly instigating more hardline responses from
island governments (UNHCR 2018).
CONCLUSION
More research needs to be done to estimate how
much of Venezuela’s human security crisis was
exacerbated by the 2013 – 2016 El Niño driven
drought episode. Nevertheless, what is known is
the that the drought served as a multiplier of water,
food and energy scarcities, aggravating preexisting
weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Such climatesecurity outcomes should be viewed as harbingers
of future conditions not only for Venezuela, but
also for the region as a whole. Since the risks and
consequences are significant, there is an urgency
for more in-depth research on how climatesecurity outcomes can stimulate unrest, water/
energy insecurities, immigration and possibly even
contribute to political reordering in some nations
across the hemisphere.
The implications of these research findings are that
many nations are direly underprepared for both the
slow moving and faster impacts of both environmental
variability to anthropogenic climate change. A key
takeaway from this research is that since the impacts
are crosscutting and cross-sectorial, responses need
to reflect this multifaceted character of the challenges.
Whole-of-society solutions will need to be applied, so
will public resourcing commensurate with the scale of
the forecast effects and impacts. This is especially true
for Latin American states with high-compound risks
and exposure to their respective economies, energy
and water supplies. The primary research gap is the
need for a more nuanced understanding of the extent
to which recent environmental/climate stressor events
adversely affected the supply/distribution of resources
such as energy, food and water. A natural extension
of this research problem is to determine what set of
mitigating policy prescriptions could start to tame the
human security implications of environmentally related
stressor events.
Lastly, while many of the climatic risks Venezuela
and its neighbors are facing are unprecedented, the
capability to foresee these risks via climate modeling
are also unprecedented. One of the principal y
features that differentiates the 21st century from past
periods of widespread crises is the ability employ
new technological tools to better forecast, track and
prepare for a range of plausible future scenarios
(Werrell 2017).
Venezuela and its neighboring states – all with
burgeoning populations causing increasing
demands on critical resources – should harness the
technological and scientific advantages available
to them to inform policy prescriptions that can
prepare their populations for climate driven perils and
scenarios currently forecast.
22
COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
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DECEMBER 2019
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25
Val, J. (2016) ‘El Cambio Climático en Venezuela’, Venezuela Sostenible. Accessed 4 August 2019 <https://
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We Are Water Foundation (2017) Water, A Top Priority for the Future of Latin America. Santiago de Chile.
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responsibility-to-prepare_unsc.pdf>
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DECEMBER 2019
Slum of Bogotá, Colombia. Photo: Flora Baker
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
CLIMATE CHANGE,
INEQUALITY AND
SECURITY IN COLOMBIA:
SOME REFLECTIONS ON
THE SUBJECT
Saul M. Rodriguez
ABSTRACT
Colombia is considered a key territory to tackle
climate change. However, the current scenario
under a post-conflict process is, at the same time,
challenging and volatile both for the consolidation of
peace agreement and enhancing protection of the
environment that is rapidly under threat. The longlasting internal conflict shielded the environment
in some regions but destruction of these have
become a hot topic. Likewise, some of the structural
problems of the conflict persist, particularly land
unequal distribution. The literature progressively
is interested in the relation between security and
climate change; however, the correlation to inequality
has been sidelined, despite its relevance. This paper
Keywords: climate
27
intends to be a primary approach to the relationship
between climate change (environment), security
and inequality in Colombia, considering a path
dependence approach, considering historical facts to
provide inferences about probable impact of climate
change in the coming years as a “threat multiplier”.
This is a sensitive country where violence and several
social disruptions have been present along the years.
The findings show that, due to the local situation
where land is one of the most valuable commodities,
the pressure produces for climate change can push
the reemergence of conflict.
change, security, inequality, Colombia, post conflict.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
INTRODUCTION
Colombia and the global society face one of the most
critical conjectures in recent history regarding peace
and ecological sustainability, as the future depends
on today’s decisions. This is not an easy task due to
economic pressures, lack of political will and insufficient
global society´s awareness. Along to other Latin
American countries, Colombia is considered a key
territory to keep and improve ecological stability to
confront climate change, probably the most relevant
challenge and threat for humanity in the coming years
(Hollingswoth 2019). This country has the second
largest biodiversity in the world, and a half of its territory
is natural rainforest surrounded for hundreds of rivers
that help drastically to tackle global warming, likewise
mountains, flat regions and coral ecosystems assist
to stabilize global temperature and to process excess
of greenhouse gases (Rangel 2015; Duque 2018). As
well as other countries, Colombia is also vulnerable to
the impact of climate change. Even, if nothing is done
urgently to reverse it, in the next 50 years, the country
could have an increase of temperature between two
and four-centigrade degrees and reduction of rainfall
between 10 and 40 percent, destroying biodiversity
and altering directly the quality of life of millions of
Colombians (IDIGER 2019).
Some experts have pointed out that climate change is
a “threat multiplier”, and although there is no consensus
about its impact on society and what kind of actions
should be displayed to confront it, its relevance is
undeniable in the current international agenda (McDonald
2018). The link to security issues has become stronger
not only for a steady “securitization” process sponsored
by some international actors to position this issue as a
top priority (Trombetta 2008), but also, for the indirect
consequences of climate change in the conventional
security sphere, such as increase of conflictivity in some
regions because of radical weather changes (Mobjörk
2016: 2). Right now, Colombia is undergone a sensitive
moment regarding at least three interconnected factors.
Firstly, implementation of the peace agreement between
state and left-wing guerrilla FARC. Secondly, rapid
deforestation that is happened in the former territories
controlled for this guerrilla. Thirdly, the persistence of
many of the variables that have fueled the conflict across
the years, particularly, high socio-economic inequality. In
this respect, climate change can put an extra burden in
the local scenario in the nearest future that added to long
lasting tradition of violence and low level of social capital
emphasize for socio- economic differences among
citizens may produce unexpected consequences.
According to the Institute for Hydrology, Meteorology
and Environment Studies (IDEAM), climate change
could generate in the country:
In this respect, this paper intends to address preliminary
the question: ”What are the possible scenarios in the
relationship between climate change, security and
inequality in Colombia after the peace agreement?”
For that, we will move back and forth in the conflict
and post-conflict settings to point out some facts and
inferences about the relationship between these three
variables considering a historical path dependence
perspective. Although, it is not an easy task due to
conflicting perspectives about these topics, we can
take advantage of some previous studies to apply to
Colombian case. This paper will be a mixture between
secondary literature and observations and evidence
gathered from fieldwork and interviews in the last 10
years. It will also be a primary approach to start an
academic discussion in the local context. The first
part reviews the theoretical literature; the second,
security and environment (climate change); and the
final part, provides an analysis about the link between
environment, and inequality with emphasis on the
Department of Cauca.
1. Rising of sea levels affecting coastal
populations.
2. Melting of moorlands that will affect the
production of fresh water.
3. Extreme climate seasons (drought and
flooding).
4. Heat waves in the cities.
5. The decrease in agriculture production.
6. Extreme desertification.
7. Loss of water resources; and
8. The radical increase in diseases (IDEAM
2017: 27).
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
A ‘SPECULATIVE’
APPROACH: CLIMATE
CHANGE, SECURITY AND
INEQUALITY
Many scientific agencies, international organizations
and governments have recognized the negative
impact of climate change on the humanity´s
wellbeing and stability. From skepticism to concern
in government and military spheres, climate change
has begun to occupy a central role in the political
and academic discussions as a probable trigger
of violence and conflict. This influence directly on
security, understood like the search of predictability
against durable disorder (Hettne 2010) and the
actions to prevent or deal with these issues. Then,
climate change is a source of uncertainty.
Along to these issues, inequality is another important
concern that have emerged in the contemporary
world that however has been marginalized in the
discussion related to climate change and security,
despite certain empirical link. In this respect, our
first goal will be attempted to stablish a connection
analyzing three conceptual sets of concepts:
“climate change-security-violence”, “climate changeinequality”, “inequality-violence” following some
literature in these issues and attempting to link these
topics for shedding light on our case of studying.
We consider violence as an extreme form of threat
upon security of individual and communities driven
for different motivations (including sense of scarcity
produce by climate change).
The literature about climate change and security
coincides that change in weather impacts directly on
the risk of violence. The conventional approaches
consider that climate change is a “new” security
threat, in the way that this unfolds or amplify other
drivers for human conflict related to environment
like drought, desertification, land degradation,
29
deforestation among others (Brown et al. 2007). This
goes together to many international organization’s´
perspectives, including the United Nations, that
asserts that climate change is a threat for the
livelihood and security of human beings (United
Nations Trust Fund for Human Security n.d.).
In the same line, a growing literature – including
some articles in this book – point out how climate
change leverages violence and delinquency. In
this respect, a recent study based on an extensive
analysis of empirical studies asserts that climate
change, including heat waves, decrease of rainfall
and sea level rise multiple probabilities of collective
violence such as armed conflict, state-sponsored
violence and organized violent crime. In this analysis,
the authors suggest “the role of climate change
in causing or contributing to collective violence
is greatest in places that are already at high risk
of collective violence” (Levy et al. 2017). Even,
Nordqvist and Krampe (2018: 6), studying South
Asian countries, point out that radical climate
changes have been used tactically by violent actors
“to gain power in an ongoing conflict” recruiting
disaffected people.
The relationship between climate change and
inequality can be considered in global and domestic
terms. Paraphrasing United Nations, we understand
inequality as a mixture between inequality of
outcomes or unequal level of material wealth, and
inequality of opportunity or the impossibility of
choosing one type of life any society or individual
wants due to disadvantage opportunities (United
Nations 2015). Recently, a team of researchers
proved that increase in the global temperature might
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
get the rich countries richer and the poor countries
poorer regarding to income in the coming 70 years.
This due to global north countries probably will
experience better weather useful to agriculture and
production; meanwhile, global south countries will
become hotter which may deteriorate the agriculture
and quality of life (Burke et al. 2015).
In domestic terms, it is recognized that climate
change exacerbate the inequality within the
countries, particularly mid and low income ones,
in the way that most vulnerable people will face
directly the effects of radical weather changes like
natural disasters, scarcity, difficulties to access
to fresh water and reduction of land productivity.
In this respect, Islam and Winkel point out that
“social inequality” is impacted for climate change in
a kind of “vicious cycle”, because initial inequality
is exacerbated due to adverse effects of climate
change that resulting in greater subsequent inequality
and fewer possibilities to cut this cycle (2017). In
this way, vulnerable people, like poor women and
children are the innocent victims of global warming;
meanwhile young men are an available workforce for
many activities, including illegal ones, in this respect
“climate change can therefore compound existing
inequalities (Colenbrander and Sudmant 2018). In
other way, inequality can produce a driver for climate
change in the way that disadvantage people can
became predators of natural rainforest due to lack of
opportunities or low level of awareness about their
impact in these regions.
DECEMBER 2019
Probably the most controversial duo in this analysis is
“inequality-violence”. The literature about this couple
is extensive and full of controversies. Some studies
suggest that inequality is not a driver of violence,
meanwhile other studies point out that inequality is
a powerful trigger for violence (Østby 2013). Many
analyses conclude while inequality is not the only
factor for violence this is an important booster and
predictor of lethal actions when it is combined
with other variables like state repression, injustice,
no future sentiments among others (Brinkman et
al. 2013). Likewise, inequality more than poverty
“create conditions more conducive to the outbreak of
violence” (Barnett and Adger 2007: 645).
On a different line, violence, and particularly conflict,
influence over increase of inequality during combat
actions due to destruction of economy, difficulties of
state action, disruptions on agricultural production.
In this line, after the legacies of war vanish inequality
decrease (Bircan et al. 2010). Therefore, the link
between these two variables is not conclusive,
nonetheless this can fuel volatile scenarios. In this
respect, meanwhile climate change is a trigger for
inequality and violence deteriorating the quality of life
of millions of people due to its consequences, the
pauperization of living conditions among population
embedded into a society with deep inequalities can
produce recurrence of violence.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
POST-CONFLICT, SECURITY
AND ENVIRONMENT
(CLIMATE CHANGE): A
VOLATILE SCENARIO
For many years, the brutality of the Colombian
conflict invisibilized the richness of local environment.
The signed of the peace agreement between the
Colombian state and the left-wing guerrilla FARC
in 2016, opened the Pandora box related to
environmental issues. This, not only regarding the
natural marvels presented like the forefront of the
country abroad via mass media campaigns, but
also because blow up all the risks that is confronting
the local nature, including illegal activities like coca
and poppy production, mining, cattle ranching,
deforestation, openness of agricultural frontier and
precarious laws and state apparatus to preserve
these regions. The role of domestic environment is
highly recognized for its usefulness to help to reduce
climate change. In this way, this trait was crucial to
achieve the international support for the late peace
agreement due to former president Juan Manuel
Santos sold the idea that local conflict resolution was
and is crucial in this global environment campaign.
Together to the peace accord, the post-agreement
actions related to environment have included
enhancing the protected natural areas that have
been three folded during the last years, the
commitment with sustainable development and the
establishment of policies to protect the environment
(Paz 2018). Perhaps, the most important action
was the enactment of the Law on Climate Change
(LCC) in mid-2018, which is part of the Colombian
commitment with the Paris Agreement (2016) to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 20% until 2030
and to unfold subnational actions to mitigate climate
change (Congreso de Colombia 2018).
31
Nonetheless, the political and legal spheres crashed
against reality in Colombia, characterized for a
structural violence that has mutated during the post
agreement era and the difficulties to implement
environmental laws and the agreement itself. While
the FARC are no more a threat for the state like
the main guerrilla group that wanted to change
the political system throughout violence, and the
majority of its combatants laid down their weapons.
The government of Ivan Duque has carried out a
slow action to fulfill the agreement and to unfold the
necessary state apparatus to take the control of the
areas left by the FARC. In a detailed report, Lorenzo
Morales (2017: 7-8) identified that the most violent
zones during the peak of the conflict occupied for this
guerrilla group matched to those when the natural
resources are more valuable in terms of biodiversity
and impact on the mitigation of climate change.
In this vein, two years after the signed of the
agreement, several dissidences of FARC added to
other illegal groups have filled the vacuum left for this
armed group, and at the same time have carried out
predatory activities against natural rainforest such
as mining, cattle and seeding illegal crops (personal
interviews, 2018-2019). In the same perspective, the
Red Cross has asserts that multiple illegals groups
have been fighting to control the illegal activities
left by FARC and civil population are at the middle
of this confrontation generating a sense of anxiety
and lack of protection (Vanguardia 2019). Thus,
the initial promise of state action contained on the
pact has been delayed, including actions related to
security, education, health, land, infrastructure and
opportunities to change illegal activities in several
regions historically affected for the conflict.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
At the middle of the controversy about
implementation of peace agreement, deforestation
have become a real hot topic for society and
current government. For many years, conflict was
waged in the these regions, and left-wing guerrillas
organized a kind of para-states throughout the
“law of violence”, imposing restrictions to access to
remote and most biodiverse zones, and likewise,
establishing some rudimentary conservationist rules
to keep biodiversity (Personal interviews in Cauca,
2015). These actions helped to preserve natural
rainforest and kept away extractivist industries.
However, the situation has change radically after
demobilization of FARC. According to Fundación Paz
y Reconciliación the huge deforestation is a direct
byproduct of the authorization of illegal leaders to
exploit wood from the natural rainforest, the illegal
mining activities and logging of the jungle to plant
different crops, added to the incapacity of the state
to repel these illegal groups (2018). Indeed, the
expert Sebastian Lama, points out that deforestation
goes in tandem with livestock as a way to take and
hold the land at the hands of landowners and illegal
groups, contributing with greenhouse gas emissions
(2019). These have broken the natural equilibrium
across different regions, making disappear not only
the jungle but also rivers due to overexploitation.
For the first time, environment and climate change
have become a concern for the state and society
into an instable scenario. For two reasons mainly:
Firstly, because of predatory action of different
illegal groups against nature that is condemn by
environment activists, mass media and international
organizations. Secondly, because the awareness
about this critical situation has been positioned like
a security problem by the President Ivan Duque, in a
notorious process of securitization. This is particularly
worrisome due to in Colombia there has been a
DECEMBER 2019
tradition to militarize different problems that in the
long term end up making the situation worse. Now,
the natural resources are considered like “strategic
assets” and in this line will be protect according to
the National Defense and Security Policy guidelines.
In an interview the Ministry of environment, Manuel
Rodriguez, asserted that deforestation and other
activities against nature will be managed with a national
security perspective to counter the criminal activities
and degradation of environment (El Tiempo 2019).
Despite punctual empirical evidence about
relationship about climate change and security is still
difficult to find in Colombia. With the background
and the instability in the post-conflict scenario, it is
easy to infer the exacerbation of current situation is
highly possible. The climate change may multiple the
insecurity atmosphere due to absence of the basic
services from the state, the illegal activities, and the
unsatisfied needs of the people in this particular
conjuncture. In an empirical study about the
indigenous communities of the Amazon Region in
Colombia, the professor Juan Echeverri, shows how
the climate change is changing rapidly the social
relations into indigenous communities. The difficulties
to access to food and resources due to climate
change, and the need for money to pay services
like education and health pushed the members of
these communities to predate natural resources, or
to participate in the illegal activities to earn money
(Echeverri 2009: 26-28). This is a small sample how
climate alterations can push people that traditionally
defend the nature to be involved in illegal activities
that in some respect fuel the conflict and destroy the
social ties and nature.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
POST-CONFLICT,
ENVIRONMENT AND
INEQUALITY
It is not a secret that Colombia is a developing
country with high levels of poverty and inequality
that was exacerbated for the internal armed conflict.
According to the official institution of statistics
(DANE) in 2018 with almost 50 million population,
there was 27% of people in poverty and 7% in
extreme one (DANE 2018). Likewise, the inequality is
considered high according to world standards. The
Gini coefficient is 49.70 for 2017, and the 10 % more
rich population controlled 39 % of the economy
(Knoema 2019). The most ambiguous issue is that
even during the peak of conflict the Colombian
economy was considered like stable and wellperformed in macro-economic terms, between 2005
and 2015 the GDP growth 4.5 % per year (ANIF
2017), almost equal and better than many regional
neighbors without conflict. For the World Bank, the
balance after the peace agreement, and despite
world economic slowdown, is the local resilience
and proven structural economic strength across the
years (World Bank 2019).
Historically, the political elites have been proud about
the well-economic performance, however, the actions
to spill over the economic growth across the most
vulnerable population have been weak, in part, due
to political elites´ selfishness, lack of inclusive national
project and the conflict itself. The post-conflict
environment has opened the opportunity to change
this situation and it is estimated that could improve
local GDP between 0.5 to 1 % per year until 2022 if
the right decisions are taken (Fedesarrollo 2019: 4).
In this respect like an unprecedented event, the
peace accord recognized the root causes of the
conflict, and the central point was the unequal
distribution of land – a source of wealth – and
exclusion of the citizens, particularly those living in
the remote regions of the country due to historical
33
state negligence. Likewise, the agreement included
some guidelines to change this situation, including
evaluating, and supporting judiciary branch to help
to get back the land to the real owners. Thousands
of peasants who were deprived of their properties
during the conflict for different illegal actors and its
sponsors, likewise, to redistribute fertile land among
poor peasants.
This is a critical issue in Colombia because the
majority of commodities both legal and illegal use the
land as the primary resource of production. In this
respect, in a report elaborated for Oxfam, Colombia
is categorized as the most unequal country in the
region related to land distribution. The productive
land is only 38.6 % of Colombian territory and the
remaining is natural rainforest and urban spaces.
According to this information, 73.78% of productive
land is owned by 1 % of the population, and the
majority are large “haciendas”, the remaining land is
in hands of 99 % of the population, many of them
victims of conflict, and minority communities like
Indigenous and Afro-Colombians (Oxfam 2017).
The fight for the land is embedded in the nature of
the Colombian conflict, and despite some analyst
underestimate the impact of this as a trigger of the
conflict, due to many people live now in the cities.
The historical and empirical evidence shown that
unequal distribution of land and wealth in Colombia
has been a source of discomfort and animosity to
push the people to combat against state and some
sectors of the society, particularly the people who
have monopolized the land (Personal interviews,
2010-2018). Like has been stated in the first section,
climate change will affect the reduction of fertile land
and natural rainforest, adding to the decrease in job
opportunities. This hypothetical, but close to real
situation, may push the most vulnerable people to
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
fight for the productive land violently, to continue with
the recurrent practice of destroying the rainforest
to plant and cattle, or to become an available
manpower for illegal groups taking advantage of
despair situation. Likewise, the international demand
for cocaine and heroin is increasing the pressure to
struggle for productive land.
The department of Cauca located in the
southwestern region of Colombia will be useful
to speculate about the relationship between
inequality, climate change and conflict in Colombia
following a historical path dependence approach.
This department not only is central in the current
post-conflict process related to demobilization
and programs to consolidate a sustainable peace;
at the same time in the scale of vulnerability to
climate change is located in the rank 8th among 32
departments (Gonzalez et al. 2010: 34). According
to official institutions, the impacts of climate change
will be the increase of temperature that will oscillate
between 0.5 to 1 centigrade degrees and reduction
in rainfall, which will influence negatively in the food
security of people confronting them to obtain their
livelihood in the coming years (Ministerio del Medio
Ambiente 2016: 18-19).
This department has a long history in the internal
conflict, particularly related to the struggle for
productive land and widespread inequality. Since
the 20th century indigenous, afro-Colombians and
mestizo communities have been clashed against
landowners and state for a better redistribution of
land, perhaps the most famous leader was Quintin
Lame. Cauca has a privilege geostrategic position,
two of the most important rivers of Colombia: Cauca
and Magdalena born there, and the mountains make
this territory perfect to fight different kinds of warfare,
even among Colombian military became known
as “Caucanistán” due to its dangerous landscape
(Personal interviews, 2016).
DECEMBER 2019
The historical demands of poor communities along
to geography have made this territory ideal for two
of the most critical security issues in Colombia:
widespread violence (originally left-wing guerrillas)
and illegal drug production. Despite indigenous and
afro-Colombians tried to expel the armed actors
from their territories this was a difficult activity due
to armed pressure and unsatisfied needs of people
that took some of them to be involved in these illegal
activities (Personal interviews in Cauca, 2015). In the
last half century, the main economic activities of this
department became legal and illegal crops. However,
less of 40% of the land in the department is useful
for agricultural activities (Rodriguez 2016: 648). At
the same time, this department has had a historical
poverty and inequality (Radio Super Popayan 2016).
Thus, in the nearest future the climate change will
reduce the possibilities of individuals and society to
fight against poverty and inequality (Gonzalez et al.
2010: 29), increasing the clashes for the land, that is
a limited resource in this department.
All these factors together make the department of
Cauca a perfect example about how the historical
trajectories between inequality, conflict and probably
climate change can push an extra pressure if the
unequal distribution of land is not solved in the
post-conflict scenario. However, this imply a state
and society commitment that is not easy to achieve
due to historical egoism and socio-economical
division between high-income elites and low-income
majorities. In this respect, the possibilities of the
increase of security instability is highly probable.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
CONCLUSION
The studies about security and climate change has
not incorporated the discussion about inequality, a
topic that is crucial in the context of Latin America
and Colombia, which in some respect has been
identified as a key variable to understand tits
high rates. Despite of that, several political actors
and high-income elites have tried to minimize the
relevance of this issue as one of the triggers of
this chaotic situation. Historically, Colombia has
not solved the problem about inequality in the
distribution of land, which has been identify as
a crucial issue in the persistence of the internal
armed conflict across the years, even recognized
in the last peace agreement. Likewise, widespread
inequality in other spheres is highly know as
a driven force behind for domestic mayhem.
Among these: income inequality, unfair access to
public goods, weak political participation and low
opportunities to be listened for the authorities,
perhaps the most evident example is the huge
number of social and environment leaders that has
been killed in Colombia without effective action of
the civil or military authorities.
The post conflict scenario is, at the same time,
a challenging period and a volatile setting due to
the historical violence related to the conflict and
the current situation that has mutated from the
violence and para-state duties exerted by FARC
to predatory violence of other illegal groups. The
unequal distribution of land, the lack of opportunities,
the competence for fertile land and the predation
on natural rainforest together to problems related
to climate change may make worsening the
situation altering the instable consolidation of peace,
particularly in the regions where the internal war was
waged like the Department of Cauca.
35
This paper has departed from the preposition that
climate change is a threat multiplier. In this vein, it
used historical and current facts to infer about what
will be the relation between climate alterations,
security and inequality in Colombia both at the
present moment and in the future. We have given
examples taking into account several theoretical
perspectives applied to local case, nonetheless, we
think this seminal correlation can be used to analyze
other scenarios where violence and inequality are
present, particularly across Latin America.
In the future, it is urgent to research empirically
regions vulnerable to climate change where
inequality and violence will be a common feature
to test the preliminary hypothesis of this paper
observing if climate alterations exacerbate inequality
and this booster conflictivity. For this goal, it
is important to create multidisciplinary teams
including social scientists, environmentalists and
authorities, combining fieldwork, statistical data and
environmental information. Likewise, a subnational
comparison between two regions, one vulnerable to
climate change and other non-vulnerable could be
very useful to test the validity of this hypothesis.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
Rurrenabaque storm. Photo: Phil Whitehouse
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
CLIMATE CHANGE, SOCIAL
CONFLICT AND THE
COMPLEXIFICATION OF
CRIME IN BOLIVIA:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT
OF FLOODS AND STORMS
IN CHAPARE AS A COCA
GROWING REGION
Marília Closs
ABSTRACT
This paper aims to understand the connection
between climate change in Chapare, a coca
production region in the department of
Cochabamba, Bolivia, and the increase in crime
linked to the production and distribution of illicit
substances. It assumes that the relationship
between climate and security - in the crime
research agenda - is indirect. Due to the role
of natural resources for subsistence, climate
change has opened up structures of opportunity
for new forms of sovereignty and relationship
with territory, which consequently gives room for
Keywords: climate
a new role for crime. Climate change therefore
multiplies threats to stability and security. In the
coca growing region of Chapare, in particular, the
findings indicate that floods and intense storms
have altered the relationship of individuals with the
territory, the economy and the social production of
space - which intensifies an existing social conflict
and brings new dynamics of crime to the region.
Therefore, it was noted that this is the beginning of
a process of criminalization, especially in Villa Tunari
and TIPNIS Polygon 7, which has been intensified
due to climate change.
change, floods and storms, crime, coca production,
Chapare.
40
COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
Bolivia is among the countries most affected by
climate change on the globe. Increased rainfall,
the definitive disappearance of lakes by droughts,
the significant rise in temperatures, landslides,
fires and climate anomalies in the El Niño and La
Niña phenomena - all these have been diagnosed
in recent years and have a bearing on the social
stability of the country. The situation is aggravated
by the fact that Bolivia is a state marked by deep
social inequality and a condition of vulnerability. In
central Bolivia, on the fertile land in the department
of Cochabamba and near the border with the
department of Beni, lies the province of Chapare.
The region, one of the wettest on the globe, is the
scene of some of the most dramatic climate change
in Bolivian territory. Although it is a space of high
volume of precipitation, a considerable growth can be
observed in the last years. The region is also located
in one of the most dangerous flooding points in the
country. In the Isidoro Secure National Indigenous
Territory Park (TIPNIS in Spanish), a park that has
much of its territory within Chapare, the situation is of
calamity. It is in this part of the country that much of
the coca leaf production occurs. The cultivation and
consumption of coca leaf is a fundamental part of
Bolivia’s political, social and economic life and plays a
significant role in its economy.
This paper aims to understand the relationship
between climate change in Chapare and
the increase in crime linked to irregular coca
production. Research is focused on hydrological
disasters such as inundation, torrents and floods,
and meteorological disasters such as heavy rainfall.
In order to achieve the objectives, the region’s
security and climate dynamics will be observed
between 2015 and 2019. As this is a very present
temporal delimitation, news on the themes will be
used such as the online published versions of the
two most widely circulated newspapers in Bolivia:
La Razón and El Deber.
RELATION BETWEEN
CLIMATE AND SECURITY: A
BRIEF INITIAL DEBATE
If security is a constant on the political agenda, only
in recent decades has the climate change debate
become more present in national or interstate
debates. Today it seems consensual in the literature
and public debate that climate change and
emergencies are disruptive and structuring elements
within various social dynamics. More rare and
difficult, however, is the debate about the relationship
and implications between climate and security. A first
difficulty in the debate that relates the two elements
is the multiplicity of the concept of security. If, until
the first half of the twentieth century, the concept of
security referred internationally to interstate war and,
41
at the domestic level, to public security, at the end of
the twentieth century this would be re-signified.
This was from the “opening” of the concept to the
conception of human security, in which the individual,
not the state, is the object; the physical security
of the population becomes fundamental. From
this notion, human security embraces within itself
previously ignored themes such as food security,
health, epidemics or ecological disasters; that is, it
becomes a multidimensional concept. This work,
however, looks specifically at a traditional (public)
security theme: crime. Because it is a mainstream
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
security theme, one caveat should be made. Even
considering the multidimensionality of security,
one cannot fall into the risk of securitization and,
consequently, militarization of some social agenda.
Just as the security debate is multiple, so is the
discussion about both climate and the relationship
between the two. Among the many relevant
interpretations on the subject, this paper is dedicated
to observing how much impact the climate has in the
field of conflict. It was opted for trying to understand
the relationship between climate change and crime,
that is, when the impact of climate favors situations
that lead to the mobilization of force. Although
there is a greater number of studies that seek to
understand the relationship between climate and
human security (UNGA 2009; Schaeffer et al. 2008),
studies on the relationship between climate change
and “traditional” security have been growing in the
research agenda - which mobilizes the use of force
and overcomes the barrier of “structural violence”.
Examples are works that seek to understand the
relationship between climate and non-state armed
actors (Nett and Rüttinger 2016) or with violent
conflict (Scheffran et al. 2012).
Of particular relevance are the conclusions reached
by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI) on the subject that try to understand
the relationship between climate and security risk
(Van Baalen and Mobjörk 2016). For them, there
is already some consensus that there is no direct
relationship between climate and the eruption of
violent conflicts, either intra- or inter-state. After all,
“the following of events that lead to outbreaks of
violence are always multifactorial and complex and
it is usually not possible to identify a single triggering
factor” (SIDA 2018: 9).
However, it seems to be a consensus, too, that
the climate does have indirect impacts regarding
the rupture of security stability; “Factors that play a
role in increasing the risk of conflict are likely to be
reinforced by climate change” (SIDA 2018: 9). Van
Baalen and Mobjörk (2016) conclude that there are 5
ways in which climate change can increase the risk
of conflict:
DECEMBER 2019
1. Deterioration of means of subsistence. This
is mainly because the opportunity costs
for resource control regarding more normal
situations decreases - especially when it
comes to sudden crises;
2. Migration in larger quantities in an unforeseen
way, which certainly changes the local
dynamics;
3. Changes in the mobility patterns of the
peasant sectors;
4. Tactical considerations among armed groups
participating in the conflict; and, finally,
5. The use and exploitation by political and
economic elites of local demands and
dynamics.
For this research, it is important to note, mainly, item
1. Despite some changes and the construction of
some social policies since Morales and the MAS
took over the Bolivian state, the country remains
deeply unequal and with a series of regions where
populations live in vulnerable conditions. This is not
only due to the crossing of Bolivian structural poverty
- with major markers of gender and race - but also
due to the scarcity of public goods and the effective
presence of the plurinational state with adequate
institutions. The existence of a political-economic
regime unable to cope with socio-economic inclusion
is dramatized by climate emergencies - which will
likely build larger opportunity structures for other
armed actors such as organized crime.
More than that, it is important to note that ensuring
livelihoods and climate - and the causality of both
with respect to violence - are intimately connected
with territoriality. Since this research deals with a
rural region in which the livelihoods and survival
of the actors involved depend profoundly on their
production - in this case coca - a very particular
relationship was built between the actors with natural
resources and territories. More than the construction
of social movements based on leaf production,
the very identities and collective subjectivities of
various actors in the region are linked to land and
production. The very word cocalero, used later in
42
COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
this text, has in itself cultural and ancestral weight
beyond meaning economic activity. Therefore, once
a climate emergency changes the actor’s relationship
with land and territory, it certainly has security impacts
as it affects identities as well. After all, it opens space for
new resource dynamics and new sovereignties for the
social production of space.
Even if it recognizes that this pattern of observation
and causal construction are of great importance, rather
than applying them rigidly, this paper intends to grasp
the notion that climate change multiplies threats to
stability and security. Climate is not a direct intervening
factor in the outbreak of armed conflict or violent social
phenomena - just as probably no social science variable
given the complexity of the processes is. However,
changing climate urgencies certainly reinforce the
elements that can lead to conflict.
SITUATION IN CHAPARE
Coca Leaf Cultivation and Social Conflict
In Bolivia, coca leaf is of enormous social, cultural,
religious, ancestral and economic value. Along with
Peru and Colombia, it is among the largest leaf
producing countries. Since Evo Morales’s election
to the presidency in 2006 by the Movimiento al
Socialismo (MAS), the country has been trying
to resignify the national and international leaflet:
campaigns like “Si a la coca, no a la cocaina”
and “La hoja de coca no es droga” have tried to
demystify the notion that leaf and cocaine are
the same thing. For this reason, for almost 15
years, the government’s policy has been that of
regulating the leaf production – restricting it to
confined spaces while combating the production
and trafficking of illicit substances. Since then, the
government has been working to limit hectares of
coca production to regulated spaces, and in 2015
it reached approximately 20,000 hectares of legal
limits. According to a report by the United Nations
Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2013), of the
three countries that produce the most, Bolivia was
the only one that achieved a substantial decrease in
the 21st century. Coca regulation in Bolivia defines
two specific spaces where production is allowed: in
Chapare and Yungas de La Paz (Miranda 2017).
43
In 2017, Law 906 was passed, which changed
the maximum amount of hectares that could
be produced in each region: in the Yungas, the
maximum goes from 8,800 to 14,300; at Chapare, it
goes from 3,200 to 7,700. To be marketed, Yungas
production goes to the Villa Fatima market, while
Chapare coca goes to the Sacaba market. Until it
reaches commercialization, coca leaf goes through
three stages: 1) the delivery of the product by the
producer to the intermediaries; 2) the negotiation
of retailers for the sale of the sheet; 3) the arrival
of the product to the market. In Chapare, there
are 6 federations responsible for production and
much of the local production goes to the Santa
Cruz department. The largest recipient of Yungas
paceños cultivation, in turn, is northern Argentina the only region of the Southern Cone country where
consumption is regulated.
Law 906, passed in 2017, officially replaced that
of 1981, which was far more restrictive with the
production. However, since 2008 Morales had
already negotiated with cocaleros sectors for
the expansion of the production. In addition, the
2017 Act regulates different types of use of coca
production, such as traditional use for leaf chewing
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
(accullicu), traditional medicine and sacred use or
for marketing the leaf itself or in food products,
among others. The approval of the law took place
in a somehow conflictive way: Yungas producers,
articulated in the Departmental Association of Coca
Producers (Adepcoca in the Spanish abbreviation),
were against the delimitation of hectares, since, for
the region, despite the expansion of the maximum
allowed, this still did not account for including within
the law all the amount produced on the site. More
than that: Adepcoca paceña announced that the
Chapare region was being privileged over the Yungas,
since the former is Morales’ social base. Regardless
of the perspective adopted, it can be noted that the
relationship between producers, workers and union
leaders of Bolivia’s two largest coca production zones
is not peaceful (El Deber 2019).
The cocalero sectors have been, for decades,
mobilized and organized collectively to claim their
demands. The restrictive law of 1981 was one of
the main objects of dispute and was a driving force
for union organization among the producers. In this
process, Evo Morales personally built himself an
image as the cocalero leader of the Chapare region
and reached the highest rank of union leader in the
category. More than that: Cochabamba department
is also a region that historically goes through deep
social conflicts. An example of this are the protests
and collective action cycles that took place between
1999 and 2003 in opposition to the processes of
deregulation and privatization of hydrocarbons and
water supply services, which would be known as
the Water War and the Gas War. Another point of
tensions in the department is the Isidoro Secure
National Indigenous Territory Park (TIPNIS), park
that has much of its territory within the Chapare.
This is a disputed territory: while communities of
native and peasant populations claim the space
for themselves, the Morales government, after
several comings and goings, resumed in 2017 the
project of building a road inside the park territory
to integrate Cochamamba and Beni departments.
The issue is controversial and has already generated
several waves of protests across the country. The
Bolivian plurinational state’s relationship with natural
resources is one of the biggest tensions in the
country. Summing up, it can be seen that this is a
region with latent social conflicts that have been
getting worse in recently.
DECEMBER 2019
Between 2006 and 2016, the coca production in
Bolivia had finally stagnated, almost reaching the
amount targeted by the government. Since then,
however, UNODC has released a report (UNODC
2016) that showed the change in this trend, with a
14% increase in cultivated hectares in 2016. In 2017,
the cultivation territories in the country rose 6% over
the previous year, reaching 24,500 hectares. For
UNODC, most of this increase was in the Chapare
region: Yungas cultivation increased from 15,700 to
15,900 hectares, while in the Cochabamba Tropic
from 7,200 to 8,400 hectares (Montero 2018).
In addition to that, in recent years, as the production
has increased, tensions around coca leaf production
in Chapare have become more complex. According
to the latest UNODC report, about 90% of Chapare’s
coca leaf production goes to the illegal market – that
is, it never arrives in Sacaba; The data regarding this,
however, are conflicting (UNODC 2018). According
to Felipe Cáceres, deputy minister of Social Defense
and Controlled Support and one of the main names
in the policy against drug trafficking, it is precisely in
the Yungas that the largest coca production destined
for illegality is to be found. However, it is clear that
since 2016, a greater amount of coca leaf production
has been leaking out of legal markets. Specifically
in TIPNIS, coca cultivation is allowed on about
400 hectares, divided between 66 communities;
However, according to UNODC report, in 2017 there
was cultivation on about 1100 hectares, of which
65% was destined for illegal markets.
As a result, the groups considered to be drug
traffickers have multiplied. This was especially true
in two main locations: the municipality of Villa Tunari
and TIPNIS Polygon 7. In Villa Tunari, in March 2019,
15 cocaine factories (or pozas de maseración) were
found in the city and a crystallization laboratory, as
well as a clandestine track for aero-motor vehicles
carrying the base paste (la pasta base). The group of
about ten people responsible for such instruments
was linked to the San Rafael cocalero union. In
addition to the main group, there was a support
group of about fifty people - many of them armed.
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Even though Chapare itself contains coca-producing
territories, what has been seen in recent years
is that, in addition to the expansion of irregular
production, there is a multiplication of new actors
involved in crime. An example of this is the increase
in the number of people who work as street
vendors, who are responsible for the transit of illicit
substances both between communities and outside
Chapare and even Bolivia. The illicit activities related
to coca are three: production of unregulated coca,
preparation of substance in the maseración pools
or factories and transport to other locations in order
to be commercialized. Due to the illegality, these
activities have taken advantage of the force so that
they can continue to occur due to the expansion
of repression. In summary, in Villa Tunari the issue
is complex because legality and illegality are
mixed, especially in the San Rafael cocalero union,
which seems to be involved in the production and
transportation (or aid) of illicit substances.
At TIPNIS, and in particular at Polygon 7, the situation
between 2016 and 2019 is more complex. As already
mentioned, the TIPNIS is a space of constant tension,
mainly between poblaciones originarias and the
central government of Bolivia. Polygon 7 is in the
south of the park and has both native population
and colonizing cocalera population. The situation has
become even more tense since, in 2017, the Morales
government returned with the proposal to build a road
linking Villa Tunari and San Ignacio de Moxos within
the park’s territory. The indigenous population that
lives in the TIPNIS often complains that their territory
is invaded by the cocalera population, who would
not respect the environmental conditions necessary
for a healthy life in the place. According to UNODC,
between 2015 and 2016 the coca growing territory in
the Polygon grew by 43%. In 2017, there were 1,109
hectares of cultivation in the locality - more than 700
hectares beyond the allowed. In the same year, the
government announced that it had reached its goal of
zeroing illegal coca production at TIPNIS and Polygon
7 after eradicating 181 hectares - when production at
Polygon reached 450 regulated hectares (Paco 2018).
However, this is an area of constant dispute, and
government data are controversial.
45
Bolivia, however, is not the final destination of illicit
substances. In general, unregulated coca leaves
Chapare towards the departments of Beni and
Pando to cross the Brazilian state of Acre from there
to Peru; This route is mainly between the cities of
San Pedro de Bolpebra (Pando / Bolivia), on the
triple border with Assis Brasil (Acre) and Iñapari
(Peru). The traffic also takes place between the cities
of Cobija (Pando) and Brasileia (Acre).
Although the government claims that the major
Brazilian factions, such as the First Capital Command
(PCC in Portuguese) or the Comando Vermelho (CV),
are not acting on Bolivian soil, it is already possible
to observe the action of factions like the B13 in
transit of coca from Bolivia. It should be noted that
this type of dynamic is linked to the construction of
the new South American drug geopolitics. Since the
dismantling of the largest Colombian cartels between
1990 and 2000, Brazilian factions have gained greater
prominence in the production and distribution chains.
In recent years, these have also expanded to other
countries; Such a process is relevant as it builds new
transnational networks - and Chapare seems to be
embedded in this dynamic.
Between 2016 and 2019, one can also notice
transformations in the way the multi-national state
deals with drug trafficking – and this is consequently
reflected in the way the Morales government deals
with coca production. If, at first, the State sought to
separate coca from cocaine, in addition to adopting a
less secure approach to trafficking, from 2016 onwards
the use of force as a method became a priority again.
In 2018, in Chapare alone more than 8,300 hectares
of surplus coca production were eradicated – rising by
more than 5,000 hectares eradicated from the previous
year (Cuiza 2019). Also, according to the government,
it is in Chapare that most (more than 75%) of antidrug operations and activities take place (Montero
2018). The official rhetoric is to increase operations of
“eradication and rationalization”; however, the main
instruments used are the Rural Patrol Mobile Unit
(Umopar in Spanish), the Special Drug Fighting Force
(FELCN in Spanish) and the Special Crime Fighting
Force (FELCC in Spanish), in addition to the Joint Task
Force (FTC in Spanish) and the Regional Center for
Anti-Drug Intelligence (CERIAN in Spanish), opened in
May 2019.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
Some more controversial examples stand out,
such as the FTC operations within TIPNIS for crop
eradication (Ariñez 2017) or Umopar operations
mainly in Villa Tunari, where clashes took place
that led to the death of both sides (Valdés 2019).
In the same location, the number of confrontations
between coca producers and alleged traffickers with
FELCN also grew. In March 2019, when the cocaine
factories were seized as described above, Umopar
was working on operation COLMENA, and the
drug trafficking group ambushed two injured police
officers and a dead civilian (Valdés 2019). Following
the ambush, the FLCN acted in support of Umopar,
confirming the presence of a group of more than
50 people involved in support of criminals carrying
DECEMBER 2019
high-caliber weapons, as well as pistols, revolvers
and shotguns (El Día 2019). The ten Bolivians
accused of leading organizers of illicit activities are
responding for criminal association, attempted murder
and illegal possession of a firearm. The accusation
regarding involvement with drug trafficking is still
under discussion. According to Carlos Romero, the
country’s government minister (Ministro de gobierno),
it is the third time in the last 5 years that the FTC has
ambushed illegal irregular coca eradication operations
(Ariñez 2019). Since then, FELCN, FELCC, and police
intelligence have acted jointly to address the issue,
according to Romero. Another element to be taken
into account is the greater role of the Armed Forces in
combating illicit coca-related activities.
Climate Change and Emergencies
Bolivia is a country composed of great biodiversity
and multiple ecosystems while being among the
countries most affected by climate change. The
definitive disappearance of lakes such as Poopó in
Oruro, rising temperatures, landslides and climate
anomalies have all been diagnosed in recent years,
with consequences for the country’s social stability.
The El Niño and La Niña phenomena deserve special
mention, as the major consequences and climate
change are felt from both. Clear data is still lacking
for us to understand the intensification of the two
phenomena and their relation to the accentuation of
climate change in Bolivia; It can be noted that since
the end of the twentieth century, the two natural
phenomena have intensified - and it seems to be
related to terrestrial heating (BMI 2015). In addition,
climate change in the country has also caused the
emergence of diseases in previously non-endemic
areas such as malaria and leishmaniasis (Magrin et
al 2016). In addition to the dramatic security impacts
that leave diverse populations and communities
without access to basic livelihoods, climate change
has had truly structuring effects in Bolivia: changing
water flows, land-related behavior, loss of biodiversity
- impacting even the mode of production and land
use (Magrin et al 2016; UNDP 2011). It can be said,
therefore, that it is a disruptive element for political
and social organization.
The main object here is the flood and heavy rainfall
climate stressors and their impacts on the Chapare
region. It is worth pointing out that rainfall imbalances
are among the most notable consequences of
climate change. During the high season (from
December to March), precipitation became more
abundant, extending to April, while from September
to October there were deep reductions, with a
further increase in the degree of precipitation in
November (UNDP 2011). Chapare is the scene
of some of the most dramatic climate change
in the country. Although this is a high volume of
precipitation, considerable growth can be observed
lately. The region is also located in one of the
country’s most dangerous flooding points. According
to a UNDP report (2011), around 1000 families have
lived there in regions at constant risk of river overflow
since 2011, when the situation only got worse. At
least once a year, rainfall has been heavier than usual
since 2014, causing flooding and destroying the
region’s infrastructure.
In January 2014, Chapare was historically flooded
when 11 rivers in the town overflowed and
affected more than 20,000 families (BBC 2014).
The department of Beni, bordering Chapare,
was also affected by the incident (Sistema de las
Naciones Unidas e Cruz Roja Boliviana 2014). In
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
47
January 2015, the municipalities of Villa Tunari and
Shinahota, home to one of the main regulated coca
markets, were flooded by the September 24 river
overflow, affecting 600 families and 1589 hectares of
cultivation (Los Tiempos 2015); other municipalities,
such as Chimoré and Puerto Villarroel, also entered
a state of emergency due to rain and flooding. By
December, the dead and missing were reported
in Cochabamba and Beni due to rainfall and river
overflows (Pérez 2015). In March 2016, the Chipiriri
River overflowed.
In January 2017, nearly 2,000 families, mainly
riverside families, were affected by the depletion
of rivers such as Chapare, Mamoré, Beni, Ichilo,
Yacuma, Acre, Madre de Dios and Tuichi in the
Cochabamba, Beni and Santa Cruz departments
(Aliaga 2017). In the same year, heavy rains lasted
until April, a month when overflowing rivers such as
Sajta, Ichilo, Ivirgarzama, Sabala and Chancadora
affected more than 20 communities and 5300
families. Not only communities were affected, but
also roads, livestock and other crops, and the local
market. In the previous month, the landslides due
to rain had left nearly 30 dead and 15,000 families
affected in Bolivia. In January 2019, according to
the Cochabamba government, the overflows of the
Chapare and Isiboro rivers affected more than 7,000
families, the production of over 10,000 hectares of
bananas mainly in the cities of Tunari, Chimoré and
Puerto Villarroel (Ariñez 2019).
Above only some of the most striking cases of
flooding in the Chapare region have been reported.
Since 2014, every year there have been dramatic
situations involving rainfall and river overflows,
which have systematically damaged bridges, roads,
crops, and especially placed entire communities in
conditions of deep vulnerability. In addition to more
structural elements linked to climate change in
Bolivia, the literature has pointed to local elements
of Chapare as influencing the calamity that has
unfolded in the region. Firstly, it should be noted
that the region’s soil has been damaged mainly due
to deforestation for the expansion of agricultural
crops - especially for coca leaf cultivation. This
causes the loss of depth in the region’s rivers by the
accumulation of sediments that were previously held
by trees. The region’s soil has also lost its ability to
channel rivers, bringing another dramatic element to
the floods
Much of this materializes in TIPNIS - and especially
in Polygon 7. TIPNIS’s native populations have
constant conflicts with the expanding cocalera
population in the region. In order to try to build
capacity for mediation between the two social
sectors, a new instrument for organizing native
populations was created - the Consejo Indígena del
Sur (CONISUR in Spanish). This has not, however,
eliminated local contradictions - especially regarding
the land exploitation model and the possible limits
to coca plantations in the region. It is in the midst of
these tensions that climate emergencies develop.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
CONCLUSION
This text is an essay about an ongoing research. It
was an attempted to analyze the impacts of climate
change - with particular attention to flooding and
heavy storm - for a specific security issue - the
spread of coca-related crime in Chapare. The
impossibility of drawing direct correlations between
the two variables was announced. After all, when
dealing with complex social phenomena, it is
impossible to find unique variables that prove to be
triggers for the outbreak of violence. However, the
research provided an understanding of what the
indirect relationship is between the two phenomena
mainly from the notion that climate changes affects
the livelihoods of people in vulnerable zones.
Flooding and heavy rainfall have been found to
affect living conditions in the region. In addition to
the transformations in natural resource dynamics,
which are now being contested with less opportunity
costs due to calamity situations, it was noted that
flooding, river overflows and storms also affected
infrastructure and trade - consequently, the economy
- of local communities. If climate and security breach
cannot be directly correlated, it can certainly be
said that the dismantling of the social structure
that guarantees access to income for citizens is an
element that helps them move towards irregularity
and illegality.
In Chapare, social conflict is latent. From collectively
organized cocaleros - historically marginalized and
who, with the election of Morales, managed to reach
some state apparatuses - to original communities
that claim for themselves the totality of TIPNIS
and denounce the exploitative character of the
government - all these are elements that put the
Chapare in the center of some of Bolivia’s greatest
political disputes. The combination of natural
resources and their tense relationship with the central
state and social mobilization was already enough
to be a space with tensions. The cultivation of coca
leaf and all its significance, however, has been
causing new problems. What can be seen is a region
whose risks of conflict eruption that mobilize the
use of force are high. More than that: it was noted
that flooding and intense storms have altered the
relationship of individuals with the territory, with the
economy and with the social production of space which intensifies an existing social conflict and brings
new dynamics of criminality to the region. Climate
emergencies are therefore multipliers of the threats of
conflict in Chapare. What’s more, by helping to lead
to the expansion of illegality, the two processes not
only link indirectly, but also malnourish each other
- as the growth of irregular coca cultivation directly
impacts soil deterioration, increasing the chances of
overflowing rivers.
Chapare’s panorama of illegality linked to coca
cultivation cannot properly be called organized
crime: neither does the Bolivian government
know how to define the characters involved in the
observed scenario. Vague names such as “alleged
traffickers” or “narcos” are used. However, between
2015 and 2019, there was a complexification of the
legality / illegality relationship in Chapare. One of the
great examples of this is the alleged action of the
San Rafael union in illicit activities related to cocaine
production and transportation. It can be understood
that it is a phenomenon that is in its infancy and that
it is a process that is being systematically aggravated
by climate emergencies. Understanding and
analyzing it involves understanding the territoriality
and climate change in the region.
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DECEMBER 2019
Paco, Jesús (2018) ‘Gobierno Confirma que en el Polígono 7 Hay unas 400 Hectáreas de Coca y Pozas de
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La Razón Digital 3 de março. Available at: http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/seguridad_nacional/umoparemboscada-narcos-policia-villa-tunari-heridos_0_3104089568.html
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Stockholm: SIPRI.
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Iguaçu river. Photo: Diego Silvestre
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED
GOVERNANCE OF
TRANSBOUNDARY
AQUIFERS IN SOUTH
AMERICA:
BALANCING SECURITY,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND
TERRITORIALITY
Beatriz Mendes Garcia Ferreira
ABSTRACT
The present research aims to address the
conjunctural scenario related to the governance of
South American transboundary aquifers, through the
perspective of water security and human rights. To
this end, it will discuss the impact of climate change
on the South American’s aquifer systems, while
understanding the structural challenges posed to
this region countries in the face of a humanitarian
and economic crisis scenario triggered by global
water scarcity. Thus, considering this conjecture, and
understanding the importance of protecting these
large potable water reserves and democratizing
the access to these sources, we will address the
current debate in the international forums, related to
the status of water as a human right, as well as the
consequence of this debate on resolutions related
to the management of transboundary aquifers.
Therefore, understanding that this conjunction
of factors contributes to the definition of the
panorama of this theme, as well as its extent, it is
considered that the projection of the challenges
brought by climate change, as well as its geopolitical
consequences, situate South America as a region
with a major importance in the implementation of an
integrated and effective governance of this strategic
water resource, due to the fact that the region holds
the two largest aquifer systems in the world.
Keywords: climate change, South America, aquifers, security, governance.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
The continuous movement that guides human
beings’ relationship, as an individual and a social
agent, with the environment in which he operates
can be addressed through Hannah Arendt’s1
concept of vita activa and its symbiotic connection
to the human condition. Consequently, the need
for social organization is fundamentally associated
with the actions of man’s bios politiko involving
the surrounding environment. Thus, it is possible
to observe that the interaction between human
beings and nature permeates all levels of the
human condition, insofar as it is necessary for the
maintenance of their own existence.
Based on this premise, it can be said that water is
emerging as a key element in the 21st century. Because
it is fundamental to life in all its aspects, it is established
as a strategic and irreplaceable element, unlike other
natural resources, which makes it the most valuable
and threatened resource in the long term, an object of
disputes and conflicts (Chellaney 2013).
As a consequence, the contemporary water
resource dilemma is fundamentally related to
the escalating security challenges of states
and organizations. One of the main axes of this
discussion regards to transboundary aquifers,
which corresponds to a recent theme that catalyzes
a series of resolutions and policy formulations
aimed at the effective, strategic and cooperative
governance of this resource.
Another axis on that matter that has been generating
recent debates is the correlation between aquifers and
the permanent threats brought by climate change.
In this sense, groundwater is a vital element for the
terrestrial hydrological cycle, as well as being of central
importance for the support of streams, lakes, wetlands
(UNESCO 2015: 3). Consequently, there is a growing
concern about the extent to which climate change
may affect the intensification of water scarcity in several
regions, including the quality of the natural process of
recharge, discharge and storage of aquifers.
From this background, the theme to be developed in
this paper is the governance of transboundary aquifers
in South America, as the region emerges as the largest
holder of freshwater reserves on the planet, largely due
to the volume and capacity of replenishment of water
from its aquifers (Bruckmann 2011).
Therefore, the object of the research is to indicate
the importance of governance based on cooperation
between the countries of the region, which takes
into account the security challenges posed by
the increasingly tangible global water scarcity
scenario, as well as the opportunities to establish
mitigation measures over the impacts of climate
change. Because large aquifer systems have high
strategic value, given their volume and extent, these
transboundary waters make most South American
countries mutually dependent and responsible.
In this manner, the methodology will focus on a broad
bibliographic research, emphasizing mainly on the
discussion of the relationship between water security
and climate change, as well as its impact on geopolitical
issues. Likewise, the importance of guaranteeing this
resource as a human right will be listed, considering the
structural inequalities of the region.
In general, essential factors for effective governance
will be considered, bearing in mind the natural
characteristics of transboundary aquifers and their
importance to sustain ecosystems, as well as their
relationship with food and water security. Also, the
importance of establishing territoriality as a strategic
factor will be addressed, balancing between
governance, infrastructure and social issues, all priority
factors to be adopted by public policies.
1 The reflection based on the definition of the vita activa expression is brought by Arendt in her book The Human Condition, based
on the concepts brought by Aristotle, defining two spheres for human activities: oikia, family and private life, and polis, common life and
space for political debate. It is within the framework of the polis that man develops his bios politiko.
53
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
WATER SECURITY AND
CLIMATE CHANGE:
GEOPOLITICAL DIMENSION
Conceptual Formulations and The Connection to
Impacts of Climate Change
As one of the main contemporary global
challenges, protection against threats related to
water security and disputes over water resources
has led to the need for a strategic planning
aimed at preserving potable water sources.
Consequently, the conceptual debate on this issue
is relatively recent.
One of the first milestones regarding the formulation
of this concept was put on the agenda in the
document produced at the II World Water Forum
(FMA 2000), which establishes, with the participating
community, the common goal of thinking about
water security in the 21st century. According to this
document, such an objective can only be achieved
through sustainable development and efficient public
management, which must be guided by affordable
access to safe potable water and the protection of
those in exposure (FMA 2000).
In this sense, water security concerns risks
and threats that may cause different levels of
environmental, social and economic impacts. These
include scarcity and drought, leading to a lack of
water to meet the short and long-term demand
of individuals and industries. In addition, there is a
risk of a declining water quality as well as flooding,
and the risk of deterioration of freshwater systems,
causing irreversible damage to the hydraulic and
biological functions of surface and groundwater
(OECD 2013a).
Such water security paradigms are associated with
the global agenda of the environmental sector as
the impact of climate change becomes a possible
focus of international systemic destabilization.
This is because climate change catalyzes complex
interactions between climatological, environmental,
economic, social, political and institutional processes
(European Commission 2009). These include the
destruction of ecosystems, which comprise the
problems caused by pollution, as well as energy
insecurity issues, caused mainly by the scarcity
of natural resources and food security problems,
stressed by hunger, poverty and loss of soil
fertilization (Buzan et al. 1998).
One of the most recent provisions aimed at this
purpose is the Paris Agreement, a multilateral pact
signed with the central objective of articulating
measures to slow down and prevent the impacts
of climate change, especially at the national level
(UNFCCC 2015).
This agreement was widely adopted to by the South
American countries at the time of its conception in
2015. Although the implementation measures in the
Agreement provide for the distribution of responsibilities
through Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs),
there was some consensus at the time that there would
be an effort on the part of the region’s governments
to pursue economic growth through the sustainable
development alternative by fostering the low carbon
economy (Pontes 2016) and protecting vital natural
resources such as water.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
However, due to changes in the political and
economic scenario in most South American
countries, the implementation of NDCs is likely to
become a major challenge in the coming years. This
shows that South American countries do not always
take the same stance on climate change (European
Commission 2009). Since there are economic and
geographical disparities, there are also differences
in how to deal with vulnerabilities and economic
dependence on fossil fuels, highlighted by the level
of asymmetry in the energy matrix of these countries.
The threats posed by climate change in South
America concern primarily the rise in temperature
and the risk of decreasing soil humidity as a
consequence. One of the biggest risks is the
decline in food productivity, especially for livestock
and agriculture, which would further increase the
rate of hungry people in the region (IPCC 2007). In
addition, changes in precipitation patterns and the
risk of glacier disappearance would significantly
reduce the availability of water for human
consumption and other subsistence activities
(IPCC 2007).
The previous arguments demonstrate an increasing
need for governments to take a more proactive
approach to managing water security and climate
change issues, which are increasingly placing
themselves as turning points on the global agenda.
The process of adaptation and the adoption of
long-term measures will require assertive planning,
as well as water governance that takes into account
climate variability and risks to water systems that
must be minimized (OECD 2013b).
Specifically, the risks posed by climate change
to groundwater will be significant for this century.
The reduction in the reserve level of this resource,
due to the change in rainfall periodicity, which is
mainly responsible for the recharge process, may
permanently affect the hydrological cycle and the
quality of water resources (Treidel et al. 2012).
In this sense, the importance of aquifers is primarily
that of the supply of drinking water in times of
greater demand, especially in periods of drought
when the availability of surface water resources is
low (UNESCO 2008). Globally, this resource is to
be found in a state of crisis, caused by excessive
55
extraction in arid and semi-arid regions (UNESCO
2015). Similarly, there is the process of urbanization,
population growth and changes in the use of land
as potential aggravating factors for aquifers as a
result of climate change (UNESCO 2015).
Some of the major threats to aquifers that
policymakers must address are also related to
short-term effects of human action and longterm climate change, such as mining and surface
water pollution in general (UNESCO 2008). An
example of this is fracking, which is characterized
as a process of drilling the earth through the
injection of water and other chemical components
under high pressure for oil and gas extraction.
This practice is potentially hazardous to aquifers
as there are serious risks of contamination and
long-term social impacts.
In South American countries, this practice is
increasingly more developed for the exploration of
unconventional hydrocarbons, as exemplified by
Argentina in the Vaca Muerta region of Patagonia,
with extensive exploration of shale gas reserves. In
Uruguay, in 2017, the government banned fracking
over the next four years, understanding that this
mechanism, among other factors, would endanger
the Guarani Aquifer.
In general, human actions and climate change can
affect aquifer recharge, discharge and storage
processes as they affect the storage conditions
of aquifers, especially when the water table
approaches the ground’s surface and the plants’
roots (UNESCO 2008).
Considering the importance of aquifers in improving
access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene, as well
as their use in agriculture and industry, this resource
has been neglected for some time in development
strategies and projects. The importance of aquifers
for adaptation measures, especially transboundary
aquifers, which in great number are large water
reserves, shows a promising perspective for
groundwater governance (UNESCO 2008). Therefore,
these adaptation measures should be appropriate to
the water security challenges of a given location.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
When dealing with transboundary water resources
there must be a contribution and implementation of
proper management, thereby having an integration
axis (Peña 2016). So, the main challenge for
governments is to concentrate efforts on this
DECEMBER 2019
subject, mutually conditioning different public
policies related to water, and guiding sustainable
economic development.
Geopolitical Dimension
21st century geopolitics is being increasingly shaped
into a reordering of agendas and priorities, where
climate and security issues are central. The agenda
of climate change impacts for the coming decades is
related to the adaptation of key sectors for the global
economy and society, such as energy transition,
food security and water security. This convergence
can occur within the Paris Agreement process or
through other policy initiatives (Dalby 2017).
The fact is that the worldwide configuration that
is built up around the climate change topic is
marked by ambivalence in the political and security
sectors regarding decision-making processes.
This implies a changing context of cooperation
(Dalby 2017), in which the global climate agenda
will be focused on articulating the implementation
of national or regional adaptation and mitigation
measures, aiming at global outcomes. Otherwise it
will generate interstate conflicts mainly due to the
context of resource scarcity.
Regarding to water, it is important to recognize that
disputes, armed conflicts and, consequently, internal
and regional crises resulting from the demand
for this resource are fundamentally related to its
appropriation and commercialization (Chellaney
2013). This potential accumulation of tensions
increases further when cross-border water resources
are included in this agenda, as the degree of conflict
and competition between local units and nations
tends to be intensified as a result of the division
of this good, which may increase dependency or
the asymmetric power interactions of some states
relative to others in a given region (Chellaney 2013).
Insofar as two or more sovereign states share
this common good with diverging interests, the
conflicts for water sources may be intensified. At
present, some of the conflicts that exist over ground
or surface water are caused by its appropriation,
commodification and control of one state over
another. These factors contradict the logic of good
governance and are part of the process of geopolitical
and ecological disorder (Bruckmann 2011).
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
TRANSBOUNDARY
AQUIFERS: DEMOCRACY
AND TERRITORIALITY
Transboundary Aquifers in South America
The existence of three large aquifers - the Amazon
Basin, the Maranhão Basin and the Guarani Aquifer
System – along with a large affluence in its water
reserves (which show a high supply capacity), South
America is the region with the largest availability of
freshwater reserves in the world (Bruckmann 2011).
As a result, almost a third of the world’s renewable
water resources are in the region. Since the region’s
most important aquifers are cross-border systems,
there is a need to promote integrated infrastructure
and distribution policies and agreements. However,
in practice, poor infrastructure networks make
supply difficult, especially in desert areas (Puri and
Aureli 2009), where scarcity and high prices become
an imperative of exclusion.
On the other hand, some regional cooperation
agreements are present, especially in the Southern
Cone. In this sense, although it shows a low degree
of institutionalization - with few effective responses
towards integrated management of transboundary
water resources, Mercosur has begun to address the
issue through the establishment of an Agreement on
the Environment (1991), which includes a provision
related to “Sustainable Management of Natural
Resources”, including water resources (Ribeiro 2008).
Regarding the transboundary aquifer agreements,
recently, in 2010, the organization launched the
Mercosur Agreement for the Guarani Aquifer System
57
(SAG, in Portuguese), which “establishes a set
of rules for the development of conservation and
sustainable use of SAG’s resources, respecting the
territorial domain of each party over the portions
of the aquifer” (Senado Federal 2017). Among
the document’s guidelines, the commitment to
transparency and the fostering of an administrative
structure for the region both stand out, making it
an important institutional basis for implementation
in the region. However, since the management and
administration of the SAG in some countries such as
Brazil is done through subnational units, there is a
volatility in overseeing the protection and sustainable
use of this aquifer.
Considering the topics just described, one of
the main variables related to the governance of
this resource is equity, an essential concept for
determining the level of cooperation between states
that hold a particular aquifer. It is also essential for
the negotiation and ratification of any shared-water
governance agreement, since it shall be a factor
used to identify and respect measures that show an
equivalent impact on each party to the agreement
(Brooks and Linton 2011). Another variable is the
economic efficiency of shared water, considering that
in order to be successful in the long term, each party
to a water sharing agreement needs to be certified
that others are using their share of the resource
efficiently (Brooks and Linton 2011).
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
Water as a Human Right
Nowadays, much of the world’s population,
especially the most vulnerable, is still subject to
the highest mortality rates due to inefficient water
management or unequal distribution of this service
(Castro 2016a). This articulation between water
governance and citizenship involves structural
aspects, such as the development of water property
rights and the institutions that govern water
management and its related services (Castro 2016a).
Thus, the recognition of the human right to water
was only put to a vote at the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) in 2010. From this event
emerged the Resolution 64/292 (United Nations
2010), which deals with the human right to water
and sanitation and acknowledges that the right to
clean potable water and treated sewage is essential
for the complete development of life. In addition, it
assigns responsibility to states and organizations in
promoting financial resources, capacity building and
technology transfer in order to enhance accessibility
(United Nations 2010). Accordingly, the advancement
of the results of this resolution, despite controversies
regarding its breadth and lack of implementation,
offers an opportunity to rethink and reconfigure the
priorities and mechanisms to be adopted in the
post-2015 UN’s sustainable development strategies
(Castro et al. 2015).
With regard to transboundary aquifers, it is important
to highlight that in recent years, the growing relevance
of these large freshwater reserves and the ensuing
debate on the challenges of defining a convergence
point for the establishment of cooperation
agreements. As a result, an integrated management
of this resource demonstrates the urgent need to
develop mechanisms to protect these aquifers as a
means of maintaining the sovereignty of the natural
resources of states that share this asset in order to
secure these reserves for future generations.
Therefore, the biggest challenge is attributed to
the complexity of management, regulation and
the guarantee that this good is destined to the
basic needs of the population in an equitable way.
Although of the utmost importance, subregional
discussions of cooperation on transboundary aquifer
management and governance are relatively recent,
producing few resolutions and regulatory norms.
Territoriality as a Strategic Factor
The concept of territoriality can be defined as the
determination of the political field of action within
a physical space, manifesting itself as a kind of
geography of power. In this sense, the political
extract of social activities projected in a space
permeates territoriality, organized under a dialectical
process resulting from the society-space-time
relationship (Costa 1992).
The subjectivity and complexity that constitutes this
concept is understood here as a strategic factor for
the relationship between state and natural resources,
concerning the jurisdiction that the former exercises
over the latter and the social groups that compose it.
This implies that geographic issues permeate social,
political and economic factors, revealing in many
cases the asymmetrical character of power to the
detriment of social movements that defend the right to
access land and vital natural resources such as water.
This notion about the concept of territory was
also explored by Carlos Walter Porto-Gonçalves
(2009), stating that new territorialities are necessary
according to the changes of time and space
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
paradigms (2009: 157). Hence, this reinvention of
territories indicates that land is not only a means
of production, but also, from a different rationality,
becomes the basis of another form of social
organization, founded on collectivity and a real use
of natural resources (Porto-Gonçalves 2009). This
CONCLUSION
The debate on surface and groundwater currently
comprises a latent political issue in multilateral
institutions and is progressively taking a leading role
on the global agenda in the face of the increasingly
manifest threats of climate change.
As one of today’s most relevant geopolitical issues,
climate change shows a close relationship with water
security issues, leading to a need of strategically
thinking about adaptation and mitigation measures
to protect ecosystems and potable water sources,
aiming at the final goal of ensuring human survival.
In this sense, it should be emphasized that universal
access to water as an inalienable human right is
of great importance for the democratization of
access to this resource. However, universal access
to this asset depends on effective distribution
policies, infrastructure improvement and sustainable
technical-scientific development, based on the
environmental dynamics themselves.
In the case of transboundary aquifers, the issue
becomes more complex as fundamental questions
arise, such as how states, regions and subnational
units can create axes of cooperation for the
promotion of equitable and sustainable management
and use of water, taking into account the risks and
consequences of climate change.
59
implies, for example, the attempt to link science
with the ancestral knowledge of native peoples and
with nature-based innovations, such as harnessing
resources and biomes for research and the
generation of a sustainable economy.
Consequently, the scenario that has been shaped
up in this century is that of cooperation in the
shared management of this resource, aiming at a
strategic articulation for the use of groundwater for
sustainable development. In contrast, there is also
the projection of crises and conflicts by the control
of transboundary groundwater extraction, generated
mainly by the aggravation of water scarcity.
Therefore, the current challenge for the governments
of South America is to concentrate their efforts on
this subject and to mutually determinate the different
water policies, since the irrational use of this good
implies the permanent loss of important reservoirs
that have the capacity of supplying humanity for
decades, besides causing border destabilization.
However, the current scenario puts at risk social groups
that are part of a network to defend land rights and
access to water. In this sense, the strategic knowledge
is ignored - something that could be incorporated into
the empirical knowledge and that relates not only to the
environmental agenda, but also to the defense of life
itself.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
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OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2013a) Water Security for Better Lives: a
Summary for Policymakers. OECD Publishing, Paris.
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United Nations (2010) ‘Resolution Adopted by The General Assembly on 28 July 2010: 64/292. The human
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Law of Transboundary Aquifers’. U.N. General Assembly.
WWAP (World Water Assessment Programme) (2018) ‘Relatório mundial das Nações Unidas sobre
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Newspaper. Photo:Waldemar-brand
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
CLIMATE AND SECURITY
IN BRAZIL:
THE ROLE OF THE PRESS
IN THE DISCUSSION AND
PROMOTION OF
PUBLIC POLICIES
Eloisa Beling Loose
ABSTRACT
This exploratory article aims to understand how
the concept of security has been used in the
context of climate change by the press in Brazil
to discuss its role in promoting public policies.
Besides bibliographic research, the paper presents
a descriptive and interpretative analysis of the uses
found in the two main Brazilian news sites, G1
and UOL, from December 2018, at the event of
the last Conference of the Parties - COP, until May
2019, totaling six months of coverage. The text
articulates journalistic practice, its relationship with
the perception of climate risks and its influence on
Keywords: journalism,
the formulation and implementation processes of
security-related public policies. Among the results
found, it was verified that the expression “climate
security” is scarce in the analyzed vehicles, as well
as its tensioning in the scope of Communication
studies. Thus, the contribution of the press to the
advancement of public policies on this topic is
still shy, despite its potential for amplification and
public debate. In the case of climate change, risk
coverage is disconnected from the security and / or
prevention debate.
climate change, security, climate risks, public policies.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
Climate change is increasingly noticeable in
the daily lives of citizens, but the response
to such consequences remains vague. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
has been reiterating the need to act to prevent
the average rise in global temperature (reducing
greenhouse gas emissions) for years.
In this scenario, the understanding of people about
climate risks - and hence the means to address
them for security - becomes extremely relevant. And
the press ends up exerting a strong influence on this
mediation, either through silencing or through a more
incisive and systematic approach. In addition to
individual actions, journalism influences the different
stages related to public policiesand state action
mechanisms for social development, from setting
the agenda, through the evaluation and selection of
options, implementation and monitoring. Penteado
and Fortunado (2015: 140) point out that “there
is media interference on the public policies cycle,
especially in democratic societies where the media
are central to social relations, such as is Brazilian
society”. Similarly, Miguel (2002: 171) underlines
that “the media has the capacity to formulate public
concerns”, guiding the themes that will be seen as
the most important of the day for both citizens and
politicians, who will be forced to position themselves
or respond to the demands exposed by the press
and the delivery of narrative schemes (frames) that
favor some interpretations over others.
A survey made by Ipsos Institute (Earth Day 2019)
reveals that the majority of the interviewed (37%)
perceives global warming as the main environmental
problem today, a growing number in comparison
to the perception identified in 2018, when the topic
topped concerns with 30% of the answers, but
65
tied to two other problems (air pollution and dealing
with the amount of waste generated). In Brazil, the
most important theme is deforestation, with 53% of
the answers. In this theme, Brazilians are the most
concerned among the 28 countries consulted.
Datafolha’s latest research on climate change
(2019) shows that 85% of the Brazilians believe
that the planet is getting warmer, although the level
of information on the subject has decreased over
the decade. Within the portion that believes that
the planet is getting warmer, 72% say that human
activities contribute a lot to this warming.
Such perceptions derive, in part, from the visibility
or invisibility that journalistic media provides about
environmental issues. The work of the press is a
fundamental link between politics, science and
society. It has the potential to amplify the discussion
and foster the construction of public policies, but
few studies have focused on how climate security is
being presented through journalism or who are the
social actors being made visible in the public sphere
to address the link between climate and security.
The purpose of this research is to identify how the
press has been portraying climate security in Brazil,
highlighting the actors who have repercussion on
their speech. Therefore, in addition to bibliographic
research, the content on the theme published in
G1 and UOL, the most accessed Brazilian sites,
according to the Digital News Report 2018 (Newman
2018) was analyzed. The analyzed period totals six
months and comprises the last Conference of the
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (COP).
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
BRIEF BRAZILIAN
PANORAMA
Brazil is among the top ten Greenhouse Gas (GHG)
emitting countries and has historically played a key
role in climate discussions. Obermaier and Pinguelli
Rosa (2013) point out that, within the Climate
Convention, the country had na important role in
establishing the Clean Development Mechanism and
other flexible mechanisms, as well as contributing
to the discussion of historical responsibilities and
presenting a self-inflicted commitment at COP15 o reduce between 36.1% and 38% of their
projected emissions by 2020. This commitment is
mainly supported by the reduction of deforestation
and the increased use of renewable energy, and
is compatible with the National Policy on Climate
Change (Brasil 2009). The fact that Brazil has 60%
of the Amazon rainforest in its territory is another
aspect that makes it evident in the debate of climate
change in the international scenario.
Even so, Brazilian coping strategies (including
mitigation and adaptation) to Changes are not
widely known – and much less taken into action.
Mitigation, which seeks to reduce or remedy the
adverse impacts of climate change, was the initial
approach taken by the Brazilian government, but,
according to Obermaier and Pinguelli Rosa (2013),
adaptation measures have only been incorporated
in recent years. According to the National Policy on
Climate Change, adaptation consists of “initiatives
and means to reduce the vulnerability of natural and
human systems to the current and expected effects
of climate change” (Brasil 2009), being necessary to
the construction of climate security, a list of actions
that seeks to combat the direct and indirect negative
effects related to climate change. Both strategies,
mitigation and adaptation, have a preventive aspect
and are included in the discussion on security
against climate risks.
Warner and Boas (2017) point out that securitization
enters the climate issue aiming at mitigation and
adaptation measures among the international
community based on arguments related, above all,
to migration. Managing the context of the climate
change will be the main challenge of our societies,
according to Welzer (2010), who points to wars
for natural resources, such as water and soil for
cultivation or exploitation. For this author, the
displacements and migrations that will be forced
by climate change tend to generate tension in
those countries (or regions) with greater capacity to
adapt to the process. Such a situation would not
only mobilize disaster and risk reduction plans and
strategies to create conditions for staying in more
vulnerable places, but would also include military
action.
However, it must be said that the current federal
government, which began its mandate in January
2019, runs counter to what Brazilians think and
the country’s history in discussing the climate.
Environmental public policies, in general, are
being dismantled, making the Brazilian agenda
incompatible with the urgent need to act in the face
of the climate crisis. The Climate Action Tracker
Consortium, made up of scientists and research
NGOs to monitor progress towards global climate
stabilization, found that in just over 100 days in
office, President Jair Bolsonaro distanced himself
from meeting his goals in the Deal. Noting that a
climate denier had been appointed as chancellor by
that time, civil society participation in environmental
councils had been cut, the budget cut for the
Ministry of the Environment by 95%, among other
actions that may be called environmental setbacks.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
CLIMATE
SECURITY
Spratt and Dunlop (2019) warn that the worst-case
scenarios of climate change are ignored (usually
public policies start from intermediate forecasts,
showing some resistance to more radical change),
although their impacts and threats are already part
of our reality. The document signed by the authors
states that the effects of climate change on food
and water systems, with reduced production and
rising prices, were catalysts for social collapses and
conflicts in the Middle East, Maghreb and Sahel,
which resulted in migration to Europe. Thus, the
aknowledgement of climate risks is essential to
address security.
Security and risk are interconnected concepts. One
seeks security when one is being threatened, when
one perceives risk. Otherwise, one feels unsafe when
assessing the vulnerability of a situation. Giddens
(2010: 45) sets the following relationship: “Risk and
insecurity are a double-edged sword. Skeptics say
the stakes are an exaggeration, but the reverse
situation is perfectly possible.”
This author points out that the introduction of security
into society is something that has been happening in
recent decades and, therefore, the tendency to see
more threats is higher than before. But of course, not
all risks carry equal weight or seriousness. From a set
of constituents such as beliefs, values, knowledge
and contexts, each individual will be more concerned
about some factors over others. The way risks are
presented by the press (recurrence, emphasis,
approach) also influences the way they are perceived.
Even if climate risk is dramatized and gives rise to
momentary concern, it does not mean that concrete
action will be triggered. Giddens (2010) points out that
there are many risks and dangers competing for our
attention and that the emphasis on the subject can
have a reverse effect: since the subject is so serious, it
may be better to stop worrying about it because there
is no possible or appropriate solution.
67
Climate security can be addressed from specific
trends focusing on water (water security), the access
to food (food security) and energy (energy security).
The term derives from the concept of environmental
security (Buzan et al. 1998), which is concerned
with the international security of regional and global
problems. According to Viola:
Climate security refers to maintaining the
relative stability of the global climate, which
has been instrumental in building civilization
since the end of the last glacial period - 12,000
years ago - significantly reducing the risk of
global warming through its mitigation and
promoting the adaptation of climate change. the
international society and its national units to new
warmer planet conditions and the more frequent
and intense existence of extreme weather
phenomena. (Viola 2008: 183)
In other words, climate security aims to minimize
the negative effects of climate change intensification
through mitigation and adaptation strategies, and it
is a concept that is strongly associated with climate
governance, “(...) related to the socio-political and
economic management of climate issues” (Loose
2016: 170). It is recalled that climate governance
practices have been mostly top-down and with
an emphasis on adaptation, although developing
countries cannot afford to implement this approach.
The discussion of climate security is also associated
with the fomentation of the crisis idea, which
amplifies the possibilities of visibility, urgency
and prioritization of the theme in relation to other
demands. Highlighting the threat or crisis is essential
to make room for security discussion. The theory of
securitization (known as the Copenhagen School), by
discursively determining the framing of a given issue
as an existential threat, acknowledges that there is a
difference in the way it will be dealt with (either by the
press or by political actors).
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Just as risks can be viewed as social constructions
(Douglas and Wildavsky 2012) and their definitions
are based on criteria, the idea of crisis also involves
selections. “As a result, not all major events are
labelled catastrophe, while not all publicly declared
disasters are major events. For a constructivist,
whether something represents a crisis is a social
decision” (Warner and Boas 2017: 210).
From this perspective, the social context, its values
and the interests of the subjects who have the
authority to define risks and crises need to be
considered. Warner and Boas (2017), based on
Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998), show that by
presenting a problem as a risk to our existence,
an opportunity opens up to establish exceptional
measures to combat it. Thus, naming an issue as a
crisis creates possibilities for breaking with protocols,
rules and procedures that would not be permissible
in a normal situation.
Clearly, in order for this to happen, this denomination
needs to come from a place of authority, which
may be someone from the government, a political
representative, but also from the press - which
has credibility among the public - or NGOs - who
usually have moral authority. In addition to discursive
articulation, concrete evidence (such as research or
disaster) needs to reinforce this dynamic. According
to Warner and Boas, “there is, therefore, political
capital in the representation of a crisis and its
solution, as a national or even global concern, rather
than a particularistic one” (2017: 210).
While there is an alarmist discourse of the climate
change, associated with the need for means
of coping to ensure security, it seems that the
responses to this crisis are of little significance.
Warner and Boas (2017) argue that the amplification
or dramatization involved in the theme has not
DECEMBER 2019
generated the expected securitization. While much
is said about the need for climate security, it has little
reverberation in international and national policies.
Emerging countries, such as Brazil, China and
India, are the ones that most reject the security
discourse on climate change, calling for caution
in the link between security and use of natural
resources (Warner and Boas 2017). However,
given the precarious situation of island countries,
these countries stand as supporters of the climate
challenge, even though they are somewhat
skeptical of more preventive measures. This
position is linked to the perspective that there is a
historical right to pollute.
Even so, there are some responses to climate
change being implemented. Brazil has had a leading
position in the climate change mitigation debates,
but its action in terms of adaptation is quite fluid, as
in most resource-dependent countries. Obermaier
and Pinguelli Rosa (2013) also point out that
adaptation strategies are usually adopted only by
government policies, although adaptation actions
should occur at all levels.
Barbieri and Viana (2013), based on literature
review, state that there is a prevalence of mitigation
measures in relation to adaptation in the urban
environment and, even when there are adaptation
strategies, their reach seems to be limited. Moreover,
they say that coping public policies are often fragile
in Latin America due to the absence or deficiency
of a broad and participative debate with society,
very technical proposals or the mere reproduction
of actions from international organizations without
proper articulation with the local scale.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
JOURNALISTIC
COVERAGE
Internationally, the climate change got on the radar
of journalism especially since the IPCC’s emergence
in 1988, when the subject got into political debate.
Nevertheless, the agenda is not very comprehensive,
persisting in the dissemination of scientific predictions
and findings or in international meetings that bring
together heads of state, such as the COPs. Boykoff
(2011) argues that there are spikes in coverage, as
happened in 2007, with the release of the 4th IPCC
report and the release of the movie An Inconvenient
Truth, and in 2009, with the holding of COP-15, one
of the largest diplomatic meetings. of the story about
which there were expectations about the treaty that
would replace the Kyoto Protocol. At such times,
there is a concentration of media attention on the
subject, but it does not hold up on a regular manner.
Studies on climate change coverage in Brazil (eg.
Rodas and Di Giulio 2017; Loose 2016) show that
the theme is presented with global emphasis, from
a political-economic and risk-centered perspective,
disconnecting its readers from the reality they
know. Vivarta (2010) coordinated a study with 50
newspapers from different Brazilian states, between
2005 and 2008, and verified a shift from the
approach of risk, focused on climate impacts, to a
more preventive approach, which focused on coping
strategies. This framing change was not identified in
the analysis of Loose (2016), based on the Gazeta
do Povo, as the risk framing was dominant, but it is
possible to infer that the process is ongoing, since
the framing of the coping was the second most
recurrent in the corpus of the researcher.
The fact that climate risks encompass uncertainties,
high complexity and an idea of future entails, to
some extent, psychological barriers to their coping,
hindering concrete actions such as responses. Just
as the proportion of climate risks can lead to paralysis,
the discursive construction of a global crisis can
generate inertia by believing that nothing more can be
69
done. Giddens (2010) states that climate change are
set aside, because people cannot assign the same
weight to something that is visible and present in
parallel to what is invisible and future.
The difficulty of dealing with climate risks is no
different in the field of journalism, which deals mainly
with present and concrete facts. Reporting forecasts
and projections, with portions of uncertainty, is
always delicate. Kitzinger and Reilly (2002) state
that the news media act better on retrospective
than on prospective news, highlighting the lack of
an anticipatory look at the problems that may affect
us. When discussing ways of coping, this impasse
encompasses the preventive aspect, little introjected
in the news selection and composition criteria.
The daily coverage and the organizational system
of subjects within the vehicles, usually by editorials,
tends to give isolated emphasis to this theme, which
is transversal to different themes. Bringing together
different facets of the problem and connecting them
palatably to different audiences remains a challenge
for journalists, even when talking about a global crisis.
Loose and Girardi (2018) reflect that it is necessary
to review aspects of journalistic logic in order to
contribute to the minimization of climate risks.
A more precautionary and preventive approach
should be incorporated into journalistic practice
in order to enable citizens to know the risks
that threaten them and to take their actions
consciously and responsibly. (Loose and Girardi
2018: 220)
When risks are not experienced, one of the
main ways to become aware of them is through
journalistic discourse. The media play a key role in
mediating climate change by amplifying or minimizing
their risks (Kasperson et al. 1988). However, either
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
because of the priorities assumed by governments,
or because there are more concrete problems in
Brazil (public security, education, unemployment,
etc.), there is little climate coverage. Journalistic
DECEMBER 2019
discussion about adaptation and mitigation in Latin
America is even more scarce, despite vulnerability to
climate risks in that region (e.g. Takahashi 2013).
ANALYSIS OF PUBLICATIONS
IN ‘G1’ AND ‘UOL’
In order to map what is being said about climate
security, searches were made on the G1 and UOL
sites - the most accessed sites in Brazil - to retrieve
as many publications as possible from December
2018 to May 2019. As the chosen vehicles have
several publications per day, it is believed that
six months is sufficient to reveal the journalistic
treatment given to the theme, especially since it
includes even the month of the COP.
“How our brains disrupt the fight against climate
change”, from 25 May 2019; and an opinion piece
called “Concern for Security Causes Military to
Create International Council on Climate Change”, 20
February 2019.
Therefore, in an initial research the term “climate
security” was used in search engines of the news
sites themselves. After the low number of results,
a new research was carried out with the following
combinations: “security” + climate; “Energy security”
+ climate, “food security” + climate; and “water
security” + climate. It must be clarified that the
results obtained by the searchers of G1 and UOL
often brought results outside the chronological order
and with repetition, besides presenting news with
part of the expressed combinations (and, therefore,
were not in the context of this discussion; the word
security in many cases referred to the physical
protection of an event or authority). The interpretation
of the corpus was made from a descriptiveinterpretative analysis.
Therefore, the first result already signals the
silencing of the subject. In another study (Loose et
al. 2017), the press had been silenced in the face
of environmental regarding journalistic logic, which
seeks events - not predictions. Of the four texts
found, two fall into the informative format (news) and
two into the opinionated (blog and columnist text).
The UOL text, signed by Alessandra Niro, criticizes
the first positions of the current president, Jair
Bolsonaro, in the area of foreign affairs, especially
those related to the implementation of the 2030
Agenda. It is not a specific text on climate security,
but it disapproves the decision of leaving the Global
Compact for Safe, Ordered and Regular Migration,
in which the country deals with migratory flows,
many of them due to the climate change, and the
government’s own skepticism about the existence
of global warming. The researched term “climate
security” appears only once but is neither deepened
nor explained.
The first finding is that the two main Brazilian
websites hardly mention the term “climate security”,
which is a timid discussion in the Brazilian scenario.
The search identified only one article in UOL during
this period, “A New Itamaraty of Old and Dangerous
Ideas for Brazil”, an opinion column published on
18/01/2019. Already in the G1 two news were
found: “Climate change is the biggest global security
concern”, published on 11 February 2019, and
In the other opinion text, published by the G1, Amelia
Gonzalez focuses on the key theme of this paper
when it comes to the creation of the International
Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS).
According to the publication, the Council will
produce independent security and climate reports
with the purpose of “boosting communications and
policies supporting action on the security impacts
of a changing climate - at the national, regional and
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
international levels. “ The author questions the fact
that the Council has no members of the scientific
community and assumes a role already played by
the IPCC itself, and notes that US President Donald
Trump, while skeptical of climate change, has a
strong interest in the topic ‘security’.
To highlight this “watershed,” the author reports
that the White House is setting up a Presidential
Committee on Climate Security, to be led by William
Harper, director of the National Security Council.
The committee, among other things, will advise the
president on how climate change can achieve US
national security. According to the text, this is in line
with evidence long discussed by environmentalists:
[R]esearch by the Austrian-based International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)
showed for the first time a causal link between
climate change, conflict and migration. The case
of the war in Syria is emblematic in this sense,
and has always been mentioned, but they had
never done a study that clearly demonstrated
this. Now there is one. (Gonzalez 2019)
The text signed by Gonzalez highlights a new
approach to discuss the issue, via militarization something not present here in Brazil - and calls for
the need for dialogue between the many spheres that
are trying to address climate risks. In other ways, it
indicates a concern of the US government about the
potential for conflict inherent in climate change.
The two informative texts that came into the
analysis have quite different aspects, although they
were published in the same place. One of them,
“How our brains disrupt the fight against climate
change”, does not cite the expression searched,
but brings together the issue of security. The text
is signed by Matthew Wilburn King of the BBC,
which indicates for reproduction of news agency
content - something common when it comes to
the topic of climate change, as seen by Loose
(2016). In this news, by listing consequences of the
intensification of the phenomenon, risk and security
are listed side by side: “we can expect increased
risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water
supply, human security and economic growth”. It is
noteworthy that the expression ‘food security’ was
more easily identified in the searches, but, in most
71
cases, it is only cited - without any context or direct
explanation with the climate change. This text does
not have strong resonance with the discussion that is
proposed, but it exemplifies how little technical terms
are explained to the public. It is believed that “human
security” in this case was related to climate security,
but there is no unfolding of the expression in the
following of the text.
The other news, sourced from Deutsche Welle, was
the only one found with the search expression as its
central focus. From the title you can see the relevance
given to the link between climate and security:
“Climate change is the biggest global security
concern”. The news subtitles: “Research shows
that climate change on the planet is a security factor
that most worries people in the world, followed by
terrorism and cyber-attacks, and indicates increased
fears about US influence,” which shows us the
strength of the scientific authorities to indicate what
most worries the population and allows us to relate
U.S. military concerns to this construction process.
This article, while emphasizing the relationship
between climate change and national security, does
not discuss their causes and what could be done to
minimize the current picture by merely disseminating
research - another recurring problem when analyzing
environmental news. The texts found lack further
contextualization and signalling for viable solutions.
The second search, with more specific terms, resulted
in more content. In the exploratory research done in
G1, during the same period of time, eight different
contents dealt with some kind of relationship between
climate change and water, energy or food security; at
UOL only two more were found. It is noteworthy that
the texts that are taken into consideration here do
bring the search words within the proposed debate.
This sample will not be analyzed descriptively, but it
indicates that the analyzed vehicles are approaching
climate security in a fragmented manner, presenting
news with more specific cut-outs, but belonging to
the discussion of the interface between security and
climate. This link is still fragile, but it offers a broad and
interdisciplinary debate landscape that can mobilize
various forms of coping with climate change and
expand the perspective of prevention.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
Among the actors that appear to address this link in
Brazil are, above all, scientists, who point out climate
risks and warn of the need to take effective and
urgent measures, NGOs, which act at different levels
to confront climate change, and political leaders and
international institutions, such as the World Bank,
who are committed to combating climate change
DECEMBER 2019
and look forward to economic development. This
finding is in line with the general treatment that the
climate agenda has received in the country, giving
more room to international sources (especially due
to the reproduction of news agency content) and
ignoring researchers, activists and citizens who make
a difference on a local scale.
CONCLUSION
As much as Brazil is vulnerable to climate change
and Brazilians show some concern about the
theme, it is clear that there are many gaps in the
communication, which originate in the scientific field,
the main source of this subject, and in the political
field. In Brazil, it seems that the climate agenda
has been neglected, affecting the whole society
through journalistic treatment. While understanding
journalism as a key role in leveraging public
discussion on climate security, this brief study reveals
an informative void on the two most accessed news
sites in Brazil, G1 and UOL.
The climate risk frameworks persist, but the effect
expected by the securitization theory of immediate
and exceptional action to combat them is difficult
to achieve. There are many forms of climate coping
that can be associated with mitigation, adaptation,
governance and security and their variables, but
these responses need more space in the press and
society. Generally speaking, there must be a turn
to the question that journalism has difficulty dealing
with what is prospective, and which is prediction. In
this sense, there is some insistence on a review of
“its modus operandi, (of) its present-day logic, since
we are living in a future-oriented society” (Loose and
Girardi 2018: 220).
In addition to other frameworks, other actors,
those who experience the realities of each region
of this country, need to be heard. There is a great
need to increase citizen participation to include
everyone in the fight against climate change.
And for collective mobilization to address climate
challenges, journalists must first commitment to the
public interest. News may contribute to increasing or
reducing perceptions of risk, but also perceptions of
security and prevention.
As Miguel (2002) argues, journalism plays a major
role in shaping the public agenda, pointing out
what is most relevant, and in the way audiences will
interpret given issues through their work. Penteado
and Furtado (2015: 137) point out that “the main
element of the influence of the media lies in its
visibility capability (or not) of the social problems,
the alternatives presented, the options under
consideration, implementation and the evaluation
and monitoring of the results achieved by the
public policies”, being crucial for the discussion and
promotion of policies that guarantee the security or
the proper coping with the climate risks.
This brief exploratory study identifies that, despite
the potential in journalistic practice to promote and
monitor public policies related to climate security,
the analyzed vehicles have little news production on
the subject and resort to international sources, with
little contextualization and / or proximity to their own
public. The Brazilian perspective on the subject is not
given relief, is it being problematized too little. The
discussion needs to be broadened and popularized
to reach citizens globally and foster policy actions
aimed at reducing climate impacts.
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River in Acre, Brazil. Photo: National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) - 'Suomi NPP' satellite
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DECEMBER 2019
CLIMATE CHANGE
AND SECURITY IN THE
AMAZON:
VULNERABILITY AND RISKS
FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
ON THE ACRE-UCAYALI
BORDER
Marco Cepik
Hannah Machado Cepik
ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the mechanisms causally linking
climate change and human security. A common
trajectory is found to be aggravation of pre-existing
social vulnerabilities, occurrence of extreme weather
events, institutional failures and / or predatory policy
enforcement, and increased insecurity of specific
population groups. In the Amazonian context, two
similar cases are compared, in which floods on the
Jordan River (Acre) and the Ucayali River (in the
Peruvian department of the same name) impacted
indigenous communities of the Pano language
group. Case-specific dynamics have allowed
Keywords: climate
us to identify how public mitigation policies can
distinctly affect the resulting insecurity depending
on the point in the chain of events at which they
are implemented. It was also possible to see how,
in the face of institutional failures and even in the
presence of powerful coalitions of interests against
environmental protection and indigenous peoples,
affected populations are able to formulate consistent
responses that result in improved human security
through demands and proposals for transversal
public policies.
change, Amazon, Huni Kuin, Shipibo-Conibo, security.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
The insecurity of indigenous peoples in the Amazon
is compounded by climate change and the actions
and omissions of various actors in the region. The
perceptions and struggles of indigenous groups
about the nexus between climate change and
security, as well as the speeches and silences of
local, national and international governmental actors,
constitute the empirical referent of the work.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY:
MECHANISMS
It is important to start with some basic definitions
because the connection between climate change,
global warming and international security is
controversial (Mach et al. 2019).
In the World Bank’s Climate Change Knowledge
Portal glossary of terms, the phenomenon is defined
as an observable transformation in the average and
/ or variability of climate properties over a prolonged
period of time caused by natural and human factors
(World Bank Group 2019). In turn, global warming
is defined by the estimated increase in the average
surface temperature of the planet (GMST) over a
30-year period, considered from a reference year
or decade, in relation to pre-industrial temperature
levels. (IPCC 2018).
Security can be defined as “a relative condition of
protection in which one can counteract discernible
threats against the existence of someone or
something” (Cepik 2001). When it comes to living
beings, anything that threatens life is a security
problem. However, to avoid excessive expansion of
the concept, it is necessary to link human insecurity
77
This article seeks to answer two questions. What are
the mechanisms that causally link climate change
and the insecurity of specific population groups?
What public policy demands related to insecurity can
be identified in the case of the Huni Kuin (Kaxinawá)
indigenous people in Acre and Shipibo-Conibo in the
Ucayali, on the Brazil-Peru border? To answer them,
the article was organized into three sections, followed
by a conclusion in which we sought to include
recommendations based on the research conducted.
to the existence of violence. According to a definition
adopted by the United Nations,
violence is the intentional use of physical force or
power, threatened or performed, against oneself,
another person or against a group or community,
which results or is highly likely to result in injury,
death, psychological damage, poor development or
deprivation. (United Nations 2014: 84)
The intensity and scale (local, national, regional
and global) of the causal link between climate
change and international security vary significantly
across different models and theories. For example,
Thomas F. Homer-Dixon (1991) characterized the
degradation of the environment as a result of human
action as a direct (resource scarcity) or indirect
(relative deprivation and identity) cause capable of
increasing the likelihood of violent conflict involving
affected social groups. Intervening variables such as
social network institutions, technology and topology
were also considered relevant to explain specific
outcomes as well as adaptation and mitigation
potentials (Zhang et al. 2007). There is no consensus
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I expert opinions on future scenarios with nonlinear
emerging properties. Still, in a study using a panel of
11 of the world’s most cited experts on climate and
conflict (expert elicitation), Katherine J. Mach et al
(2019) identified climate change as a causal factor
cited by experts at 3-20% of intra-state conflicts
in the last century. In addition, experts’ average
estimate is that the risk of violent conflict will increase
by 13% in 2° C global warming scenarios and 26%
in scenarios approaching 4° C.
Recognizing that more research is needed, we
provisionally adopt the model developed by Jürgen
Scheffran et al (2012), summarized in Figure 1,
for monitoring and evaluating the relationships
DECEMBER 2019
between climate change, natural resources, social
stability and human security at different space-time
scales. The model’s premise is that security risks
are causally linked to the unequal effects of climate
change for different social groups and ecosystems.
Vulnerability would be, even when there are no direct
armed conflicts over scarce resources, the most
important variable in contexts of uncertainty about
future impacts. The degree of vulnerability would
therefore depend on 1) the degree of exposure to
climate change; 2) sensitivity to climate change; 3)
adaptation and mitigation capabilities. Reducing
vulnerabilities would therefore be the main focus
of public risk prevention policies and mitigation of
negative effects.
Figure 1 - Diagram of Relations between Climate Change and Security
Source: Scheffran et al. 2012: 870
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
It is also worth adding one last argument about the
dialectical relationship between vulnerability and
threat. Extreme weather events, such as droughts,
fires, storms, and floods, for example, do not
constitute “threats” in the literal sense of the hostile
intention to harm others. However, as the scientific
and political consensus on the specific human
causes of global warming advances, actions and
omissions of the rulers and the powerful that cause
harm (often irreversible) become malicious.
That is, environmental conflicts are not restricted
to distributive and redistributive economic and
cultural aspects involving natural resources.
They are, ultimately, issues of life and death and,
therefore, must also be analysed from the point
of view of international security. After all, since
the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992) until the
last Conferences of UNFCCC signatories (Bonn
and Santiago, 2019), the international recognition
of the collective right to development and the
responsibilities differentiated in preserving the
environment. That is why the Trump administration’s
decision to remove the United States from the
Paris Agreement is indeed a threat to global
collective security (Zhang et al. 2017). Similarly, the
disastrous actions and statements of the Bolsonaro
government in the area of environmental governance
directly threaten the security of the most vulnerable
populations (Trigueiro 2019).
AMAZON: ENVIRONMENTAL
MISMANAGEMENT AND
HUMAN INSECURITY
According to the World Bank’s Climate Change
Knowledge Portal, the average annual temperature
in Brazil has increased by about 0.7° C over the past
fifty years (World Bank Group 2019). Moreover, all
variables on drought and rainfall in Brazil are strongly
sensitive to what happens to the Amazon in the
coming decades.
The Amazon rainforest covers most of the South
American Amazon Basin, but important ecosystems
and the headwaters of major rivers are found in
neighbouring countries. Overall, the Amazon plays
an important role in the planetary carbon cycle,
while being a vulnerable and sensitive region to
climate change and global warming. The climatic,
ecological and environmental stability of the Amazon
rainforest is threatened by natural (including specific
hydrological cycles of the western Amazon basins)
and anthropogenic events, both global and local.
Despite research carried out with different modelling,
79
“science still cannot pinpoint how close we are to
a possible breaking point of ecosystem equilibrium
and even much of the Amazon biome” (Nobre et al.
2007: 25). In the context of global climate change,
it is estimated that the average temperature in the
Amazon could rise to 4ºC according to the models
analyzed by Ambrizzi et al. (2007). According to
Brandão (2019), currently the main changes reported
in the rainforest are related to the amount and
patterns of rainfall and deforestation.
In Brazil, the administrative region called the Legal
Amazon (formed by the states of Acre, Amapá,
Amazonas, Maranhão, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia,
Roraima and Tocantins) covers 59% of the Brazilian
territory, and about 23 million inhabitants live there
according to the 2010 Census. The largest biome in
the Legal Amazon is the equatorial forest. In addition
to having more than 11,300 km of borders with seven
countries and more than 25,000 km of navigable
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
rivers, the equatorial climate and the rain cycle (34%
of annual precipitation comes from evaporation)
positively affect other biomes such as the Pantanal,
the savannah and even the Atlantic Forest.
As the largest of Brazil’s six major biomes, with the
largest biodiversity on the planet, large hydroelectric
potential, mineral riches and cultural diversity (much
of Brazil’s indigenous population), the Amazon
faces important challenges from the standpoint
of sustainable development and human security.
In recent decades there have been important
institutional advances. As a result, there was a
marked reduction in the deforested area of the Legal
Amazon (from 27,800 km2 in 2004 to a historic
low of 4,600 km2 in 2012), according to data from
the National Institute for Space Research (INPE in
Portuguese). Since then, and more intensely since
the fall of president Dilma Rousseff in 2016, the pace
and deforested area has increased. If preliminary
INPE figures are confirmed, between August 2018
and July 2019 about 6,200 km2 were cleared in the
Legal Amazon.
Along with deforestation, other forms of natural
resource degradation have increased over the past
three years through burning, illegal mining, land
grabbing and biopiracy of fauna and flora. Such
criminal acts, perpetrated by different groups and
companies, pose direct threats to the security of
the most vulnerable populations, such as slavelike workers, women, indigenous people, and
quilombolas. For example, according to data
DECEMBER 2019
from the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT in
Portuguese), in the Brazilian Legal Amazon there
were 48 of 61 murders in field conflicts (79%), 50
of 74 assassination attempts (68%), 391 of 571
physical assaults, 192 out of 228 arrests and 171
out of 200 registered death threats (86%) in 2016.
Since the 2018 elections, Bolsonaro has adopted
increasingly destructive stances and policies against
environmental governance institutions, vulnerable
populations and funding mechanisms including
the Amazon Fund. In August 2019, when 74,000
outbreaks of Amazon fires were detected, the
Bolsonaro government reiterated a hostile course
of action and the crisis took on an international
dimension (Phillips, 2019).
Environmental degradation affects the most
vulnerable social groups the most. In the Amazon,
traditional communities and indigenous peoples
are among the most vulnerable groups (Rocha
et al. 2012). In general, the security of the region
and its inhabitants would therefore depend on an
increasingly integrated and democratic role of the
Brazilian state, neighbouring countries and affected
populations, especially indigenous peoples (Abdenur
et al. 2019). However, the Bolsonaro government’s
foreign policy is also moving toward dismantling
regional cooperation structures in South America.
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CLIMATE AND INDIGENOUS
INSECURITY IN ACRE AND
UCAYALI
In the Amazon region, therefore, if climate change is
not necessarily a cataclysm, it usually operates as
an aggravation of previous problems experienced
in a region or group. This is the case of indigenous
peoples in the border region between Brazil and
Peru, corresponding to the state of Acre and the
department of Ucayali.
In the case of Acre, according to the Instituto
Socioambiental (ISA in Portuguese), many of the
state’s 26 approved indigenous lands (LIs) (2.39
million hectares, or 14.56% of Acre’s area) are near
rivers where there were significant hydrological
variations in the last years. As one of the largest
indigenous groups in the region, the Huni Kuin
are divided between Brazil and Peru, having been
separated in the twentieth century as a result of
violent conflicts with rubber tappers (“seringalistas”
in Portuguese) (Aquino 1993). Groups that focused
on a “seringal” on the Envira River, for example,
moved to the headwaters of the Purus River in Peru.
The relationship between different groups in the two
countries is reproduced through marriages, but there
are striking differences. For decades, the migratory
movement has not ceased, and free movement
across borders is done across rivers (Aquino and
Iglesias 1994; 1999). There were about 10,818 Huni
Kuin living in Acre in 2014.
Ever more vulnerable and struggling for their rights,
the increased risk of insecurity for the Huni Kuin can
be seen in the floods that have occurred in Acre in
recent years. In 2015, in the face of floods in various
places in the state of Acre, a state of calamity was
decreed. In the Acre River, about 20 villages were
affected in the municipalities of Assis Brasil, Seine
Madureira, Feijó and Tarauacá. Heavy rains that
started in January of that year and caused the
81
river to rise 24 centimetres in one day affected the
Huni Kuin, Yawanawá, Jaminawa and Manchineri
peoples. It was the largest flood recorded (17.92
meters), surpassing the record of 1997, when the
river rose 17.66 meters. Although February is the
state with the highest rainfall in the state (Duarte
2006), the river’s ebb was affected by heavy rainfall
over a 24-hour period. In 2017, a sudden flood on
the Jordan River made Huni Kuin families homeless
(Nascimento 2017). At the time, the Acre Fire
Department reported that a non-working telemetric
station of the National Water Agency (ANA) should
have made the reading of the river, which has no
ruler. The flooding of the river left uninhabited people
unattended until the river could flow. In the face of
the 2017 floods, the only official pronouncement
was made by the mayor of the city of Jordan (AC),
in an interview with journalists: “this is how it is, by
the river being located at the headwaters, it fills and
leaks fast. It doesn’t stay long. It seems that there
was no flood” (sic). The city council, which made
cars and boats available for families to evacuate
in a palliative measure in a place hard to reach for
emergency relief, interpreted the event, although
sudden, as something to be expected and about
what there would not be much to do. Through this
kind of mechanism, the vulnerability of indigenous
people becomes insecurity.
Conscious of the risk they are taking, in the open
letter to governments and society released in Boa
Vista in May 2019, representatives of Ashaninka,
Huni Kuin, Shawadawa, Yawanawa, Nukini, Noke
Koe (Katukina), Shanenawa, Puyanawa, Manxineru,
Kuntanawa, Jaminawa and Madija included in their
claims the recognition that the impacts of climate
change as an issue that aggravates risks to life and
the forest.
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The same indigenous protagonism in the face of
increased vulnerability and insecurity is found in
the case of Shipibo-Conibo living in the Ucayali
department of the Peruvian Amazon. The name
Shipibo-Conibo results from alliances of various
populations in the face of demographic losses, as a
result of the shock with the European presence. “Since
then, Shipibo-Conibo lands have been dotted with
other ethnic groups (Piro, Campa, Ashaninka, Cocama)
and mixed villages (Caseríos), with which relations are
sometimes courteous, often tense” (Colpron 2005). On
the streams of the Ucayali River live more than 11,000
Shipibo-Conibo in over 140 communities.
Due to flooding that occurred on the Ucayali
River in 2010-2011, Shipibo-Conibo communities
experienced an unexpected increase in food
insecurity. Drawing on structured fieldwork and
using participatory research methods across
multiple seasons, the research by Sherman et al.
(2016) documented how flooding initially created
opportunities for increased fishery and agricultural
production in the locality of Panaillo. However,
indigenous families lacked the resources to
exploit the opportunities presented by extreme
conditions and increasingly turned to migration as a
mechanism to address vulnerability. International aid
organizations have set up in the region in response
to the floods, introducing programs and providing
training sessions for local institutions. However,
weakened local institutions have continued to
disregard the growing magnitude and frequency of
climate extremes, well documented in the region in
recent decades.
That is, even when climate events create
opportunities, depending on previously existing
vulnerability and institutional and community
responses, the result may be increased insecurity.
The Shipibo-Conibo case highlights the importance
of considering both slow and fast impulses in
assessing the vulnerability of the food system to an
extreme hydrological event. For example, according
to Sherman et al. (2016), many of Panaillo’s residents
were forced to migrate to urban centers. ShipiboConibo women continued their production and sale
of handicrafts, but the profits did not cover the full
cost of living in the city. In turn, migrant men began
to work as labourers in plantations, logging and
DECEMBER 2019
even construction. Food insecurity reproduced both
inside and outside Panaillo. As local institutions and
social participation were already relatively weak,
even external mobilization was insufficient to prevent
increased food insecurity. During the interviews,
Sherman et al. also identified a low perception in
Peruvian institutions about the importance of climate
change. About 25% of respondents denied that
Ucayali droughts and floods had any connection with
global climate change. One respondent said that for
him, climate change was just a word, but extreme
floods and droughts had worsened over time.
As in the case of the indigenous people of Acre,
it was up to Peruvian indigenous leaders to link
climate change and increasing insecurity in vulnerable
communities. During COP 24 in Katowice, Poland,
women leaders of indigenous associations and
organizations took a firm stand in favour of mitigation
and adaptation actions. At the event, the leaders
emphasized the participation and empowerment of
women in the theme, as well as the allocation of joint
activities for the entire indigenous population. In Peru,
it is common for indigenous women to be responsible
for family food sustenance, to be knowledgeable
of medicinal plants, and to carry ancestral wisdom
through shamanism (Colpron 2005).
According to leaders, many of the problems of
adaptation within indigenous communities have
been solved by women seeking to ensure family
food sustenance (Servindi 2018). In addition to
the problems posed by climate change, Peruvian
indigenous leaders also denounced environmental
degradation and negative social impacts caused
by large timber, oil, natural gas and other mineral
resources projects. According to the report The
Human Rights Situation of Indigenous Peoples on
the Acre-Peru Border,
projects for oil and natural gas exploration
by the Brazilian and Peruvian governments
are being defined and implemented without
any free, prior and informed consultation
with the local communities and their
organizations (Servindi 2018).
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Beyond the local level and the strengthening of
vulnerable groups themselves seeking to improve
their security and experience a more sustainable type
of development, the systemic characteristics of the
climate transition and the enormity of the Amazon
region also depend on institutional, political, national,
regional and global responses.
For example, already in 2015, the National Indian
Foundation (FUNAI in Portuguese), in its territory
protection training program ‘Environmental services:
the role of indigenous lands’, stated:
In recent times, indigenous peoples have
verified and reported different facts that
prove the impacts of climate change on their
daily lives and on their traditional ways of
life. Stories about longer periods of drought
or rain, as well as changes in tree fruiting
and fish reproduction. (FUNAI 2015: 98)
Indigenous Lands (ILs), through their leadership
and indigenous agroforestry agents, must know
and mitigate the unknown effects of the climate
transition, as well as to reduce deforestation and
environmental degradation in the Amazon. The
ILs comprise 25% of the Brazilian Legal Amazon
territory, and the historical rate of deforestation in its
interior corresponds to 2% of its extension. Thus,
The National Policy for Environmental and
Territorial Management in Indigenous Lands
(PNGATI [in Portuguese]), established
by Decree 7,747 of June 5, 2012, aims
to promote the protection, restoration,
conservation and sustainable use of
natural resources of indigenous lands
and territories. The policy also ensures
the integrity of the indigenous heritage,
the improvement of the quality of life and
full conditions of physical and cultural
reproduction of the present and future
generations of indigenous peoples,
respecting their sociocultural autonomy.
That is, PNGATI aims to maintain the
environmental services provided by
indigenous peoples. Therefore, it is the main
instrument for thinking and discussing PES
83
strategies in Brazilian indigenous lands.
These instruments need to be used with
skill by indigenous peoples, so that their
rights are guaranteed, new alternatives for
environmental and territorial management
and future projects are designed with
protagonism and autonomy. (FUNAI, 2015)
As the Huni-Kuin and Shipibo-Conibo cases
demonstrate, indigenous peoples perceive the
link between social vulnerability, environmental
degradation and increased risks to their security
(forced displacement, food insecurity, violence,
etc.). And indigenous leaders demand public
policies for prevention and mitigation. As institutions
fail or aggravate stressors, they contribute to
increased insecurity.
In this sense, the “disastrous scenario” of the current
policies of the Brazilian federal government for the
environment constitutes a threat to the security of the
most vulnerable social groups. In addition to openly
flirting with the crudest denialism about climate
change, the Bolsonaro government systematically
acts in favour of predatory interests (Trigueiro 2019).
Suffice it to mention the deliberate weakening of the
oversight and punishment capacity of the Ministry
of Environment’s bodies in 2019, the untying of the
National Water Agency (ANA), the suspicion cast
by the minister on all 334 Conservation Units in the
country, the attempt changes in the way Indigenous
Lands are instituted in Brazil, the denial of the
criminal character of burning and the open defence
of the end of legal reserves.
Even at the state level, the current government of
Acre threatens to dismantle or divert the purpose of
previously created structures such as the Institute
for Climate Change and Environmental Services
Regulation (IMC), created by Decree 1,471 / 2011.
Bodies such as the BMI and institutions such as the
Acre Indian Commission (CPI Acre, in Portuguese)
interacted with civil society entities such as the Acre
Indigenous Agroforestry Movement Association
(AMAAIAC, in Portuguese), the Acre Indigenous
Teachers Organization (OPIAC, in Portuguese) or the
Huni Kuin Artists Movement (MAHKU, in Portuguese),
for the development of projects and actions.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
To exemplify the connection between local and
international, it is worth highlighting an initiative of
S.O.S. Amazon together with the Acre Pro-Indian
Commission, supported by Amazon Cooperation
Treaty Organization (ACTO, or OTCA, in Portuguese)
and the Acre government between 2004 and 2012.
Under that partnership, the project Strengthening
Acre-Ucayali Border Integration was able to
actively incorporate indigenous and agro-extractive
community leaders (OTCA 2011). It also recognized
the chain of causal links linking threats to human
security from organized crime (loggers and drug
traffickers), environmental degradation and lack of
sustainable development. In Acre, eight Indigenous
Lands and residents of four communities on the
DECEMBER 2019
banks of the Juruá River received support from
that project. In Peru, the Pronaturaleza Foundation
and the Universidad Nacional de Ucayali supported
communities in the Abujão River Valley (SOS
Amazonia 2012).
Such an initiative would hardly be supported by the
current framework of institutional dismantling and
threats to forest peoples. Suffice it to recall the failure
of the ACTO, the difficulties in implementing the Paris
Agreement and the crisis triggered by the burning of
the Amazon region in 2019. Hence the importance
of the leading role of indigenous people, social
movements and citizenship.
CONCLUSION
Climate change projections indicate an increase in
the frequency and intensity of environmental hazards
such as droughts and floods (Sherman et al. 2016).
However, it is not yet possible to accurately predict
the intensity and consequences of such risks (Nobre
et al. 2007). Thus, the importance of understanding
the vulnerability of indigenous and traditional
communities in the Amazon rainforest in the face of
extreme weather events grows (Bursztyn et al. 2012).
Based on an explicit model of the mechanisms
causally linking environmental degradation, social
vulnerability and insecurity, two cases of flooding
affecting Huni Kuin communities in Acre and ShipiboConibo communities in Ucayali were analysed.
Although it is the same type of weather event (flood)
the lessons and implications of both events are
distinct and complementary.
The Huni Kuin case demonstrates an event
considered isolated by the municipal and state
government. The individual consequences of people
affected by the floods of the Jordan River are large
for personal life, but it is not even considered as
a problem by local and federal authorities. It thus
represents the early phase of a chain of nonlinear
events that tends to result in insecurity. Bolsonaro
government statements and actions amplified the
chances of increasing risks being taken as fatalities
or isolated cases. In the case of Shipibo-Conibo,
research-reported food insecurity indicates a more
advanced stage in the causal chain. Flooding,
combined with weak local institutions, has enhanced
the transformation of vulnerabilities into insecurity.
In common, both cases indicate how institutional
neglect and failure to deliver consistent public
policies over time can aggravate the links between
social vulnerability and insecurity. On the other hand,
it is extremely important that the proposals made by
the indigenous leaders themselves in Acre and Peru
are incorporated and prioritized as a way to reduce
vulnerability and increase resilience. For example,
in the Acre Indigenous Leadership Letter there is
a demand for the restoration of indigenous health
policies dismantled by the Bolsonaro government
in 2019. In practice, indigenous health public
policies are configured to mitigate environmental
degradation because many of the problems of
indigenous health are aggravated by climatic and
environmental events on indigenous lands. The
letter also mentions “disregard for the evidence
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85
and impacts of climate change” on Amazonian
lives. From the state government is required,
among others, that programs, policies and actions
for indigenous lands follow the National Policy for
Territorial and Environmental Management (PNGATI).
International cooperation is also requested that, in
view of the political conjuncture described in the
letter, consideration should be given to opening
direct financing lines for indigenous associations as
a way of contributing to the defence of rights and
protection of the Amazon Forest and its biodiversity.
Events such as the ‘Meeting of Indigenous Peoples
of the Border’ between Brazil and Peru, which
promote cooperation between indigenous leaders
of the region, residents of extractive reserves and
institutions such as FUNAI, much to the contrary
as “threatening Brazilian sovereignty and national
security”, contribute to make effective the regional
integration advocated in the Brazilian Constitution.
For over ten years, the meetings have contributed
to highlighting social and environmental issues,
the situation of indigenous peoples and threats to
territories (CPIAcre 2019). Similarly, the Working
Group on Cross-Border Protection advocated that
all border development actions be carried out with
the full participation of the indigenous and traditional
peoples of the region, based on the principles of
sustainable development and forest conservation,
respecting the territories and modes of life.
As is well known, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) scenarios range from 0.3
to 1.7 ° C (lowest), or between 2.6 and 4.8 ° C
(highest) for the planet as a whole. Even in the most
optimistic scenario, rising sea levels and acidification,
degradation of biomes, expanding deserts in tropical
regions, recurrence of extreme weather events
such as (droughts, floods, heat waves, storms),
and biodiversity reduction are stressors that can
create or sharpen violent conflict. In the case of
indigenous peoples of the Amazon, particularly in the
recent experience of the Huni Kuin of Acre and the
Ucayali Shipibo-Conibo, it was possible to verify the
mechanisms through which prior social vulnerability,
combined with extreme weather events, institutional
failures and predatory behaviour of dominant social
groups, tend to turn into insecurity. In documents
and testimonies prepared by indigenous leaders, it
was also clear that the social groups most affected
by climate change themselves are able, when
supported, to build consistent and sustainable
responses to mitigate risks and mitigate negative
effects. The fight against global warming and the
improvement of human security stand together for
the indigenous people of the Amazon.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
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Storm in Manaus. Photo: Lubasi
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
CLIMATE EVIDENCEBASED POLICING:
THE INFLUENCE OF
RAINFALL ON THE CRIMINAL
DYNAMICS OF THE CITY OF
MANAUS
Moisés Israel Silva dos Santos
Antônio Gelson de Oliveira Nascimento
Márcio de Souza Corrêa
Charlis Barroso da Rocha
ABSTRACT
The Welfare State promotes the common good and
public security as of great relevance and essential for
the life in society. Violence is a problem that affects
all societies in the world. Therefore, Public Security
cannot be studied in isolation, otherwise it will only
stick to the technicality present in the execution
of police’s security actions. In this scenario, the
analysis must transcend the purely criminal issues
reaching the various factors - such as rainfall
occurrences - that can influence social activities, as
well as the criminal dynamics. Thus, the study of
the spatiotemporal distribution of the frequency and
intensity of rainfall is relevant since its understanding
is extremely important for monitoring both natural
disasters and aspects that may pose risks to the
population. Evidence-based policing stands out
as a management model in which data analysis,
intelligence gathering and intelligence production
are essential for the decision-making process while
elucidating and deterring crime in predetermined
areas. The analysis presented in this paper represent
an initial attempt to define whether there is a
connection between rainfall and criminal dynamics
over a defined time and space.
Keywords: Public
Safety, evidence-based policing, rain and crime, Criminal
dynamics, rainfall and crime.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
Violence is a problem that affects all societies in
the world. There is a clear challenge in achieving
the welfare state when it comes to crime in
contemporary societies. In this sense, the locus
of violence is the city whereas the subject is the
individual devoid of protection and security, who at
every moment perceives himself as secluded from
the Social Contract that is forged in the right to life,
property and security.
Thus, Public Security cannot be studied in isolation,
otherwise it will only be limited to the technicality
present in the execution of security actions where
the State seeks to fulfill the process of affirmation of
this fundamental right. In this scenario, the analysis
must transcend purely criminal issues by reaching
the various factors that may influence social activities
as well as criminal dynamics.
There is a consensus in the public security
specialized literature that crime intensifies as
temperature increases and decreases as the amount
of rainfall or cooling increases.
Consequently, the study of the distribution
and frequency of rainfall is relevant since its
comprehension is extremely important not only for
the monitoring of natural disasters (which does not
constitute the objective of this research), but also for
other aspects in social dynamics that may bring risks
91
to the population, such as the occurrence of crime.
The present study has the main objective of
establishing whether or not there is an apparent
correlation between climate and crime, by
comparing the climate parameter of rain and the
crimes reported as robbery on public roads in the
city of Manaus. The selected criminal reports were
delimited to the type of robbery on public roads due
to its great expressiveness in records found during
the studied period.
The other types of reports (homicide, theft, rape,
murder), as well as the other climate parameters
(temperature, relative humidity) will be studied in
a next phase of the research which proved to be
necessary in order to establish an applicable model
to the Amazon region.
Accordingly, this study is intended to support the
government in the decision-making process so as to
achieve better planning and greater efficiency in the
implementation of security actions based on climate
evidence. Moreover, it may be encouraging for more
research to be carried out in this subject’s universe,
which has revealed a lack of studies on climate as
an influence factor to human behavior and, therefore,
criminal dynamics.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE
ON CRIMINAL DYNAMICS
AND THE TECHNIQUE OF
CLIMATE EVIDENCE-BASED
POLICING
The Influence of Climate on Human Behavior
Climate is one of the environmental components
that stands out. It affects the processes of soil
formation, the growth and development of plants,
but also the main bases of human life, such as air,
water, food and even the shelter or habitation of
man (Ayoade 2003).
Anderson and Anderson (1984), in turn, concluded
in a survey conducted in two different cities in the
United States that the number of violent crimes is
directly related to the rise in temperature. However,
regarding nonviolent crimes, they could not
demonstrate the existence of this correlation.
Toledo (2008) states that extreme cold, extreme
heat or a storm makes humans, like other living
things, tend to take shelter. Therefore, assuming
that weather and climate have a direct influence on
life in society, the author recognizes the influence of
climate on human behavior.
Although there are not many studies related to the
subject, Francisco Mendonça, a Brazilian author, has
already developed a work in this area. Mendonça
(2001) compared temperature with crime rates
over ten Brazilian cities. The author found that in
the northern portion of the country, where climate
variability is not significant between Manaus and
Belém, only Manaus showed a good correlation
between temperature increase and crime increase.
For this reason, Manaus proves to be a fertile
territory to conduct this research, considering the
climate factor of rain.
For this reason, Beltrando and Chemery (cited in
Mendonça 2001:36), when conducting studies in
Europe and the United States, showed that violence
is related to the seasons in their results: crimes
against individuals increase in summer and property
crimes increase in winter.
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Climate Evidence-Based Policing
According to Muniz (2010), the phenomenon of policing
has its comprehension articulated to the notion of social
control and its discontinuous dynamics in social life.
That is, in order to carry out social control, the State
must undertake activities such as overseeing, regulating,
imposing, supervising, patrolling, guarding, containing,
among others that are useful for maintaining public
order, ensuring the Constitutional provision contained in
Article 144 of the Brazilian Constitution.
Policing is conceptualized in Muniz as a
pragmatic, functional, utilitarian and invasive
form of how to sustain the submission, under
some consent, to the rules of the game,
viewed as the object of law enforcement, or
the imposition of an order, agreed or not, with
the use of force-based coercion. (Muniz 2010)
Evidence-based policing thus emerges as a
management model in which data analysis, information
gathering and intelligence generation are essential for
an objective decision-making model that supports the
identification and deterrence of crime in predetermined
areas (Azevedo et al. 2011).
This model challenges the fundamental beliefs,
attitudes, and convictions of managers in public security
institutions over what constitutes effective policing,
since the strategies and tactics employed historically in
the public security system have always been based on
anecdotal reflections.
For this reason, Sherman (1998) states that day-today policing activities, strategies and tactics should
be driven by analytical intelligence, criminal analysis
and maps, use of hot spots, criminal densities,
systematically collected observations or results-related
performance measures.
The use of maps for the study and understanding of
social phenomena enables the identification of where
the incidence of phenomena occurs – for example, the
old paper maps and pins, used in various moments by
security institutions in their planning and management of
daily activities.
Claudio Beato (2008) states in his work Compreendendo
e Avaliando Projetos de Segurança Pública:
The simple visualization of information on
a map allows us an easier understanding,
thus presenting a greater possibility to share
information. This property is essential for
anyone wanting to develop crime prevention
projects and programs, as maps can be an
easy way to design, visualize and analyze a
problem. (Beato 2008: 16)1
Supporting this understanding, Freitas (1991) states
that there are several possibilities resulting from this
type of analysis:
Crime Hot Zone Analysis (areas of high level of crime
incidence are not determined by administrative
boundaries); Analysis of the direction, distance and
recovery time of robberies and thefts; Identification of
gang territories; Automatic calculation of road networks;
Planning of police barriers; Fast location of vehicles;
Time Mapping (selecting and displaying on maps every
crime occurring at a particular time, day, month and
year); Space mapping (selecting and displaying on
maps every crime in a certain neighborhood of the city);
Mapping by recorded characteristics (any time, space,
victim, suspect and modus operandi characteristics
can be established). (Freitas 1991: 3)2
1 “A simples visualização de informações em um mapa nos permite uma compreensão mais fácil, apresentando, consequentemente, melhor
possibilidade de compartilhar informações. Essa propriedade é essencial para quem quer desenvolver projetos e programas de prevenção de
crimes, pois mapas podem ser uma maneira fácil de conceber, visualizar e analisar um problema.”
2 “Análise de Zonas Quentes de Crimes (áreas de alto grau de incidência de crimes não são determinadas por limites administrativos); Análise
da direção, distância, e tempo de recuperação dos roubos e furtos; Identificação de territórios de gangues; Cálculo automático de redes viárias;
Planejamento de barreiras policiais; Localização rápida de viaturas; Mapeamento de tempo (selecionar e visualizar em mapas todos os crimes
ocorridos em determinada hora, dia, mês e ano); Mapeamento do espaço (selecionar e visualizar em mapa todos os crimes ocorridos em
determinado bairro da cidade); Mapeamento por características registradas (pode-se estabelecer qualquer característica de tempo, espaço,
vítima, suspeito e modus operandi).”
93
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
Hence, the tools of the geographic information
system appear in an integrated and systemic way
within a spatiotemporal analysis, in support of the
evidence-based policing model and through the
management of the trends and patterns of the
various phenomena involving criminality.
Sherman (1998) believed that information resulting
from systematic or scientific investigation as well as
crime analysis should be used regularly by the police
to make strategic and tactical decisions, because
DECEMBER 2019
the strategies and tactics that are generated from
information and based on scientific knowledge are
more likely to reduce crime when employed.
In this sense, the following analyzes represent an
initial attempt to define if there is a relationship
between the occurrence of rainfall and the
concentration in criminal dynamics, observed over
the defined time and space.
METHODOLOGY
This study used monthly reports’ data held in
the Integrated Public Security System (SISP, in
Portuguese) and made available by the Assistant
Executive Secretariat of Intelligence (SEAI, in
Portuguese) of the Secretariat of Public Security of
the state of Amazonas (SSP/AM, in Portuguese),
from January 1st, 2013 to December 31st, 2018, in
the city of Manaus. Climate data related to rainfall
were obtained through the Civil Defense of the state
of Amazonas (DCEA, in Portuguese) and the National
Institute of Meteorology (INMET, in Portuguese), with
information for the same period, from January 2013
to December 2018.
After preliminary analysis of the data, the reports
of robbery within a generic public place were
selected. These reports were compared with the
rainfall rates observed in the city of Manaus during
the study period.
The selected time segment was 6 years because
it is the period in which it was possible to collect
georeferenced reports in the city of Manaus. There
was also a division of the months in the study,
divided into two annual periods based on the
disposition of the seasons, which in the Amazon
region are characterized as being a rainier and a less
rainy time in the year. According to Table 1.
Table 1: Monthly Seasons
Season
Less rainy months
Rainy months
1st
June to November 2013
December 2013 to May 2014
2nd
June to November 2014
December 2014 to May 2015
3rd
June to November 2015
December 2015 to May 2016
4th
June to November 2016
December 2016 to May 2017
5th
June to November 2017
December 2017 to May 2018
Source: National Institute of Meteorology (INMET).
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
The comparison between the climate parameter
of rain and the criminal reports is shown in bar
graphics. It is not possible to work a more accurate
statistical model or treatment due to the lack of basic
data related to the distribution of the rainfall, since
it was not possible to gather georeferenced rainfall
data by zones or neighborhoods, except in the city
in general, that being a limitation coming from the
responsible agencies that also represented one of
the difficulties faced in the research.
UNIVERSE OF ANALYSIS
Climate and Location of Manaus
The Amazon Basin has an estimated area of
around 6.3 million square kilometers. According
to the Brazilian Institute of Geography (IBGE, in
Portuguese), the Legal Amazon area in Brazil
comprises 5,032,925 km2, which includes the
states of Pará, Amazonas, Rondônia, Roraima,
Acre, Amapá, a part of Tocantins, Mato Grosso
and Maranhão. The remaining area is divided
between the countries of Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador and Peru.
The Amazon Rainforest is also the largest rainforest
on Earth and has a wide biological diversity,
containing about 30% of the planet’s total biomass.
Consequently, it has the ability to act as a climate
regulator on a global scale, an important regulator
of water and energy balance (Marengo and Nobre
2009).
This region has a warm-humid equatorial climate,
with an average annual rainfall of around 2300 mm
and temperatures ranging from 24ºC to 28ºC, a vital
characteristic to the maintenance and balance of the
Amazon’s climate. This factor is closely related to
the high rate of evapotranspiration, which makes the
forest a strong influencer to the rainfall and also to
the regional circulation of people.
95
Criminal maps of robbery reports were analyzed
using Arcgis geoprocessing software. The
symbology standard was adopted as the 15-layer
equal interval class, with a color spectrum
ranging from green to red (green for low robbery
concentrations and, as the red gradation
approaches, robbery concentration increases).
For better viewing, we adopted the default of 45%
transparency on the overlaying in the map.
The city of Manaus, which is the focus of the
study, is the capital of Amazonas and is located
in the middle of the Amazon Basin (the largest
hydrographic basin in the world), presenting the
aforementioned climatic characteristics. Manaus
has high rainfall rates throughout the year, with only
two well-defined seasons: dry (less rainy) and rainy.
Some authors consider this classification with the
nomenclature of “rainier” and “less rainy” periods.
The rainy period is observed from December to May,
while the less rainy period is from June to November.
March and April are the months with the highest
rainfall and August and September with the lowest
rainfall rates.
According to the weather data of the National
Institute of Meteorology (INMET), as of 2009, the
city had an average annual rainfall rate of 2,307.4
mm. These values are observed as an average for
following years, and may exceed 2700 mm, as
observed in 2013.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
DESCRIPTION AND
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Description of Rainfall Data
Data on rain precipitation shown in Table 2 were provided by the Civil Defense and the National
Institute of Meteorology.
Table 2: Pluviometric Precipitation of the Period (mm)
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Jan
314.60
253.30
303.70
129.60
402.10
215.30
Feb
342.10
245.40
214.00
234.00
257.40
331.40
Mar
427.40
527.70
373.70
277.00
270.00
242.90
Apr
420.60
255.00
165.50
309.10
338.40
280.80
May
238.40
425.00
280.80
83.40
135.80
179.40
Jun
32.30
211.70
83.90
118.10
126.50
188.60
Jul
167.10
66.10
47.30
103.20
75.70
54.10
Aug
53.00
32.20
10.70
46.60
20.10
19.50
Sep
121.00
0.60
15.80
73.60
166.40
80.80
Oct
193.00
190.90
31.30
165.90
148.10
56.70
Nov
312.20
196.00
91.30
221.60
287.70
148.40
Dec
101.30
173.80
154.20
518.80
414.90
349.70
Total (mm)
2723.00
2577.70
1772.20
2280.90
2643.10
2147.60
Source: Civil Defense of the State of Amazonas (DCEA) and National Institute of Meteorology (INMET)
Preliminarily, it can be observed that the city of
Manaus has a high record of pluviosity. During this
period, this city presented a daily average of 6.46
mm of rain per day.
rainy periods that can exceed expressively 140 mm.
On the other hand, it can be noted that for several
weeks the record was 0.00 mm of rain in the dry or
less rainy season.
Espinoza (2014) classifies rainfall on a scale from
“very weak” to “extreme”, ranging from 0.2 mm of
rainfall to “> 18.3”. In this approach, the rains would
be classified from moderate to strong. However, the
phenomenon that is observed in the city of Manaus
is the hot and humid equatorial climate, with days of
Detailed charts of the annual rainfall records for
the period studied can be observed through the
reports of the Manaus weather station, contained in
Appendix 1 of this article.
96
In this matter, each day with a record of rainfall
during the studied period was listed in a comparative
ranking and it was found that, from the 2,190 days
analyzed from January 2013 to December 2018,
only 142 days were responsible for concentration
and accumulation of 50% of the rainfall for the whole
period, as shown in Graphic 1.
Graphic 1: Days That Presented 50% of the Rainfall in the City of Manaus from January 1st, 2013 to
December 31st, 2018
Precipitation
160.00
140.00
120.00
Precipitation
COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
In order to analyze the existence of any specific
pattern and aiming to find out if there is a connection
between an intense rainy season and a possible
reduction in robbery records in the city of Manaus,
the days that presented the highest precipitation
rates during that period were highlighted.
140.00 (04/22/2013)
117.40 (04/21/2013)
100.00
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
04/05/17
11/21/16
10/01/13
12/21/16
11/10/14
12/04/18
04/11/16
02/14/18
05/10/15
05/12/14
02/16/13
11/01/14
09/29/17
03/23/15
11/13/14
06/22/17
03/25/14
12/14/17
02/04/17
11/13/17
03/02/14
09/07/13
12/10/17
09/30/16
02/10/18
12/17/17
09/12/13
12/15/16
03/24/16
01/14/18
03/24/14
01/20/15
09/10/16
02/27/14
03/12/16
07/04/13
10/20/18
05/20/14
06/08/18
02/24/14
04/18/14
12/07/18
12/09/17
05/13/13
12/25/15
10/31/16
04/08/18
10/31/17
0.00
Data
Source: Civil Defense of the State of Amazonas (DCEA) and National Institute of Meteorology (INMET)
It is possible to infer from this graphic that from
the 142 days with the highest rainfall records, the
closest days and those with the highest precipitation
concentration were April 21st and 22nd, 2013, both
classified as the 2nd and 5th days respectively with the
highest incidence in the given years. The sum of both
97
days showed 257.40 mm of rain, a value equivalent
to 9% of all rain cataloged for the year of 2013.
This was the year with the highest rainfall in the last
decade, with 2,723 mm of rainfall.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
Description of Criminal Reports’ Data
The data refer to the crime of robbery in the period from 2013 to 2018. They were provided by the Assistant
Executive Secretariat of Intelligence (SEAI) of the Secretariat of Public Security of the state of Amazonas (SSP/
AM) and are shown in the following Table 3, arranged month by month, in each year of study.
Table 3: Robbery Reports in Manaus (2013-2018)
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Jan
2122
2610
3211
3387
3668
3883
Feb
1916
2545
3408
3056
4083
3607
Mar
1987
2881
3807
3355
5052
3883
Apr
2080
2882
3832
3229
4401
4038
May
2216
3008
3604
3410
4604
4153
Jun
2132
2629
3638
3462
4176
3740
Jul
2279
2877
3310
3493
4031
3802
Aug
2312
2694
3230
3733
4443
3820
Sep
2107
2755
3266
3513
4012
3305
Oct
2149
2858
3425
3548
4287
3457
Nov
2372
2959
2895
3378
4134
3624
Dec
2022
3001
3295
3287
3418
3598
Total
25694
33699
40921
40851
50309
44910
Source: Assistant Executive Secretariat of Intelligence – SEAI/SSP/AM
It is possible to observe through the disposition of the data in Table 3, that the records of reports increased
considerably over the years of the study in the rainy periods as well as in the less rainy periods.
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Map 1: Kernel Density in Robberies in the Period of 2013-2018
Source: Assistant Executive Secretariat of Intelligence – SEAI/SSP/AM
Map 1 georeferenced all reports of robbery in the period from January 2013 to December 2018.
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IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
The Connection between Rainfall and Records of
Criminal Reports
Graphic 2 shows crime records in orange and rain records in blue. Within the time periods during the months
with little rain and a lot of rain, it was observed that the greatest precipitation was from December 2016 to
May 2017, with a precipitation of 1,922.50 mm. And the period with the lowest rainfall was from June to
November 2015, with 280.30 mm of precipitation.
Graphic 2: Robberies by Rainfall Periods in Manaus City
rainfall
Total of robbery occurences
robberies
Source: Assistant Executive Secretariat of Intelligence – SEAI/SSP/AM
When analyzing the robberies presented in Graphic
2, it can be observed that in the rainier period of
2014, with a measure of 1807.7 mm of rain, there
was a record of 824 fewer reports than in the less
rainy period. This phenomenon is again observed
in 2016, when in the rainier period there were 1395
fewer reports compared to the period of lower
rainfall rates.
By isolating the months with less rainfall (June to
November), it was observed that the robbery records
only increased with each new presented period, as
shown in Graphic 3.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
Graphic 3: Robberies by Rainfall Periods in Manaus City during the Less Rainy Months (June to November)
robberies
rainfall
Source: Assistant Executive Secretariat of Intelligence – SEAI/SSP/AM
Therefore, it is possible to observe a growing number
of robbery records (in blue) from June 2013 to
November 2017, during the less rainy period.
On the other hand, when analyzing the rainy months
(December to May), it was possible to observe
that the records of robbery vary from one year to
the next, unlike the phenomenon observed in the
periods of less rainfall, where the reports indicated a
linear increase from 2013 to 2018.
101
In Graphic 4, it is possible to observe that, even
though there is a general increase in the number of
robberies recorded (Table 3), and a growth in the
less rainy periods of each year (Graphic 3), in the
less rainy periods there is a reduction in absolute
numbers and percentages in the period of Dec 2015
- May 2016, when it is possible to verify -5.4% of
reports in relation to Dec 2014 - May 2015, and also
a reduction in Dec 2017 - May 2018 in the order of
-8.4% in comparison to Dec 2016-May 2017.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
Graphic 4: Robberies by Rainfall Periods in Manaus City During the Rainier Months (December to May)
robberies
rainfall
percentage comparison
Source: Assistant Executive Secretariat of Intelligence – SEAI/SSP/AM
In this sense, considering that in general there
was growth according to the analysis of Graphic
1, the crimes committed in public roads that could
suffer with greater incidence the effects of the
interference of rainfall were isolated, presenting
the rain as a discouraging factor or obstacle to
committing such a crime.
For this reason, the impact that the rain had on these
two days was analyzed, as well as in the second half
of April 2013, and its correlation with the increase or
reduction of robberies, compared to the other years
of the study as shown in Graphic 5 and following.
Moreover, the analysis of the period demonstrated
by heat maps, which are present in Appendix 3 of
this article, was also performed.
Still, according to Graphic 1, the fortnight of 16 April
2016 to 30 April 2013 presents the days that had the
highest precipitation rates in recent years. Namely,
the consecutive days that rained the most were April
21 and 22, 2013.
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Graphic 5: Robberies in the Fortnight from 04/16/2013 to 04/30/2013 in Manaus
rainfall
robberies
Source: Data on Crimes - Secretariat of Intelligence SSP/AM; Meteorological Data – INMET
It is apparent from Graphic 5 that during the days
when there was considerable rainfall (in blue), the
records of robberies were lower and during the
days when there was no rainfall or on those days
when the rates were lower, the amount of robberies
(orange) was higher or increased.
In order to verify if this phenomenon was repeated
as a pattern, an analysis of the same period that
includes these two fortnights of April in the following
years was performed, for they also presented
considerable rainfall rates within the rainy periods of
their respective years.
103
Thus, it is possible to verify through Graphic 6 the
amount of precipitation and reports of robbery
observed on public roads from the 16th to 30th of
each year of the study. It is concluded that the same
pattern occurs on days when rainfall records are
higher, the amount of robberies is lower or reduced,
and on days when rainfall is reduced, there is an
increase in reports, as observed in 2015, 2016 and
2017. There seems to be a connection between
criminal dynamics and rainfall, in which crime
reports’ growth is inversely proportional to the levels
of rainfall.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
Graphic 6: Robberies in the Fortnight from 04/16 to 04/30 of 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 in Manaus
robberies
rainfall
Source: Data on Crimes - Secretariat of Intelligence SSP/AM; Meteorological Data – INMET
This fact is also observed when studying in isolation the days that had the highest rainfall rates. As rainfall
intensifies, there is a slight or significant reduction in reports of robbery, and as rainfall decreases, there is a
slight increase in these reports.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
CONCLUSION
Public Security cannot be studied in isolation,
otherwise it will only stick to the technicality present
in the execution of state security actions. In this
scenario, the analysis must transcend the purely
criminal issues reaching the various factors that can
influence social activities, as well as the criminal
dynamics.
Thus, regarding climate-based policing, it
becomes justified as a importantsupport for police
practices in detriment of informal methods and
traditional anecdotal reflections, since strategies
and tactics that are generated from information
based on scientific knowledge are more likely to
reduce crime when employed.
In this new way of studying, research is conducted in
order to examine and understand why crime occurs
in specific places under certain conditions, whether
these are traditional conditions contained in the
analysis of criminologists such as the offender, the
victim and the proceeds of crime, or factors related
to climate conditions, such as rain, the object of
study in this article.
In this sense, regarding the climate factor, there
seems to be a connection between criminal dynamics
and rainfall, in which crime reports’ growth is inversely
proportional to the levels of rainfall. A simple yet
reasonable explanation is that rain is a discouraging
factor on many occasions as people tend to avoid
leaving home on heavy rainy days, thereby reducing
the number of potential victims, as well as the
number of criminals on the streets. This explanation is
grounded in the Routine Activity Theory.
105
Regarding the difficulties encountered, as previously
discussed, it was not possible to correlate rainfall
and crime data in order to establish an applicable
model for measuring crime increase/decrease. After
all, to make this possible, it would be necessary the
use geo-referenced rainfall data by sectors, zones
or even neighborhoods, considering that Manaus
is a city with more than 60 neighborhoods and
approximately 2 million inhabitants.
It was found that there is a limitation in the rainfall
measurement capacity, and it is not possible to know
the amount of rain that was poured by locality, but
only in general in the whole territory of the city of
Manaus. The correlation between the rainfall data
provided and the records of criminal reports was
then sought through simple statistical analysis and
the disposition through the geoprocessing of the
data, allowing to produce and visualize some heat
maps in the study.
Regarding the next steps the research should take,
future work should aim to explore the connections
between various climate factors, such as air humidity
and temperature, and extend to other types of criminal
reports through the development multiple regression
models, considering that crime is multicausal.
Therefore, this research has demonstrated the
indispensability of the production of new studies
related to the subject, since crime is a complex and
multi-causal phenomenon and rain is only one of the
external factors that can influence criminal dynamics.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
REFERENCES
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Azevedo, Ana Luísa Vieira de; Riccio, Vicente and Ruediger, Marco Aurélio (2011) ‘A Utilização das
Estatísticas Criminais no Planejamento da Ação Policial: Cultura e Contexto Organizacional Como Elementos
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Ayoade. J. O. (2003) Introdução à Climatologia para os Trópicos. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil.
Beato, Claudio (2008) Compreendendo e Avaliando Projetos de Segurança Pública. Belo Horizonte: UFMG.
Eck, John E. and Emily B. Eck (2012) ‘Crime Place and Pollution: Expanding Crime Reduction Options
Through a Regulatory Approach’, Criminology & Public Policy 11: 281-316.
Freitas, Henrique (1991) Informação e Decisão: Sistemas de Apoio e Seu Impacto. Porto Alegre: Ortiz.
Marengo, J. A. and Nobre, C. (2009) ‘Clima da Região Amazônica’ in Fonseca de Albuquerque Cavalcanti,
I.; Ferreira, N.; Justi da Silva, M. and Faus da Silva Dias, M. (eds) Tempo e Clima no Brasil, pp. 179-212. Sao
Paulo: Oficina de Textos.
Mendonça, F. de Assis (2001) Clima e Criminalidade: Ensaio Analítico da Correlação Entre Temperatura do Ar
e a Incidência de Criminalidade Urbana. Curitiba: UFPR.
Muniz, Jacqueline de Oliveira and Paes-Machado, Eduardo (2010) ‘Polícia Para Quem Precisa de Polícia:
Contribuições aos Estudos de Policiamento’, Caderno CRH 23 (60): 437-447.
Espinoza, N. S. (2014) ‘Caracterização dos Eventos de Precipitação Registrados na Estação Meteorológica
da Est/UEA em Manaus’ (trabalho de conclusão de curso de Meteorologia. Manaus: Universidade do Estado
do Amazonas.
Sherman, Lawrence W. (1998) Evidence-Based Police. Ideas in American Police. Maryland: Police Foundation.
Toledo, Rafael Godoy de (2008) ‘A Influência do Clima Sobre a Criminalidade na Cidade de Rio Claro’, Rio
Claro: Estado de São Paulo.
Vergara, Sylvia Constant (2000) Projetos e Relatórios de Pesquisa em Administração. São Paulo: Atlas.
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Puerto Rico huricane disaster. Photo: U.S. Coast Guard - Vicente Vélez.
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IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
CLIMATE SECURITY IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN:
AGGRAVATING DOMESTIC
PUBLIC SECURITY RISK
IN THE FRAME OF LOW
INTERSTATE CONFLICT
Matias Franchini
Eduardo Viola
ABSTRACT
This article discusses the relationship between
security and climate change in Latin America and
the Caribbean. We conclude that levels of climate
vulnerability in the region, in short and medium-term,
will result in an aggravation of the domestic public
security situation, rather than increased interstate
conflicts. To support our claims, we compared the
climate security risk of each country in the region
using data on climate vulnerability, state capacity,
democracy, and crime. This enabled us to build a
climate security risk index for countries in the region.
Keywords: climate
security, index, Latin America and the Caribbean,
public security, interstate conflict.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, studies from different
disciplinary areas focused on the relationship
between climate change and violence, drawing
attention to the potential for interpersonal and
intergroup conflict (interstate and intrastate)
increase as global temperatures rise and extreme
weather events accelerate.
(although there are exceptions, as in the Colombian
case). We choose to focus on domestic security
precisely because it is a topic of high relevance
to the region and there is scarce literature. At the
same time, this provides a necessary delimitation
compared to more comprehensive concepts such as
human security.
This article discusses this relationship in Latin
America and the Caribbean (LAC) for the next two
decades. We pose a reflection on the future impact
of climate effects on LAC security, extrapolating
some of the region’s key elements on the issue,
particularly its high vulnerability to climate extremes,
low inter-state conflict, and high crime rates. We
studied a causal - but exploratory - connection
between the negative effects of climate change and
the worsening violence in the region.
Our discussion operates in two-time horizons. The
first is the short and medium-term, i.e. the effects of
climate change on the security situation in the region
within the next 10 years. The second time horizon
is the long term, i.e. beyond 10 years. For the first,
we argue that climate impacts will be drivers of
crime increase. For the second, we argue that the
potential for conflict between countries and civilian
populations within states increases when there aren’t
adequate mitigation measures available at all levels
of governance.
Thus, our discussion is inferential in nature, oriented
to anticipate or estimate risks that eventually may not
occur. In this sense, there are still great uncertainties
regarding the concrete global and local impacts
of climate change, and even more uncertainty
about its effects on social relations. However, such
fluidity should not be a reason to avoid substantial
considerations about the social and political impacts
of global climate change.
Our main conclusion is that levels of climate
vulnerability in the region, in the short and mediumterm, will result in aggravation of the domestic public
security situation rather than an increase of interstate
or civil conflicts in the region. This is mainly because
climate effects tend to act as catalysts for existing
phenomena. The region’s most immediate problem
of violence and security is the crime rather than
confrontation between states or between civil groups
109
Our main source is the research literature on climate
security generated from different disciplinary fields
and various databases on climate vulnerability,
democracy, state capacity and crime in the region.
To achieve our results, we organized the article as
follows. In the first part, we summarize findings of the
literature on climate and violence; In the second, we
detail the climate vulnerability situation in LAC. In the
third, we discuss the issue of violence and climate
in the region and we justify our focus on crime,
including a list of the greatest risks. In the fourth
part, we present the Climate Security Risk Index to
measure the risk level of each country in the region,
to finally conclude the article.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
CLIMATE CHANGE AS A
SECURITY VECTOR
Over the past decade, a wide range of academic
work focused on the relationship between violence
and climate change. This multidisciplinary literature
can be divided into two major fields: one that
focuses on climate impacts on group violence
(political and civil violence, land invasion and war)
and one that focuses on interpersonal violence
(crime against people and property). There is also
a literature that focuses specifically on interstate
violence, which shares some basic elements with the
literature on group violence.
In all three cases, the literature points the potential
for increased violence as a consequence of
climate change effects, from hurricanes to rising
temperatures, in both developed and developing
countries, although the causal mechanisms are still
unclear in every case given the complexity of this
kind of social process (Burke et al. 2014; Hsiang et
al. 2013; Heilmann and Kahn 2019; Ranson 2014;
Crank and Jacoby 2014; Plante et al. 2017)Allen,
and Anderson 2017.
However, this literature tends to be consensual in
assuming that climatic conditions do not operate
as isolated causes of conflicts, but as catalysts of
pre-existing factors. This conclusion is particularly
relevant to our study as it supports our focus on the
impact of climate on public security, due to the high
crime rates in most LAC countries. Additionally, part
of this literature tends to highlight the importance
of adaptive capacities (of state and society) as
mediators of climate impacts on violence (Burke et
al. 2014; Heilmann and Kahn 2019). This is relevant
to the construction of the climate security risk index.
In this sense, Crank and Jacoby (2014) state that
climate effects may have profound impacts on the
degradation of state security mechanisms, both in
the intrastate (security forces) and interstate (armed
forces) dimensions.
Regarding the literature that focuses on group
violence, there are some studies correlating climate
effects and increasing conflict. After analyzing 55
case studies, Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2014)
conclude that deviations from moderate temperature
patterns and precipitation systematically increase the
risk of conflict in societies around the world, raising
the potential for civil confrontation and political
instability. Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel (2013) noticed
that the El Niño climate phenomenon – which tends
to aggravate the incidence of climate extremes – is
associated with a twofold increase in the risk of civil
strife in the most affected countries between 1950
and 2004. One possible explanation is the scarcity
of resources generated by El Niño in contexts of
populations dependent on agricultural production or
fisheries, a feature shared by large proportions of the
LAC population. Moreover, Burke et al. (2009) find a
strong correlation between civil war and temperature
in sub-Saharan Africa.
Regarding the literature that focuses on interstate
conflict, it assumes that climate change is starting to
change the security context for decades to come.
According to Mabey (2008) and Youngs (2009), this
change is due to the expected effects of climate
destabilization on resource availability, environmental
degradation, and extreme weather phenomena.
Wallace (2009) and Youngs (2009) point out that part
of this production assimilates the climate as a “threat
multiplier”, especially regarding food and energy issues.
Similarly, CNA (2007) analyzes the destabilizing
effects that climate change can have, exacerbating
conflicts around access to water, food and other
basic resources; damage to basic infrastructure as
a result of extreme weather events and / or sea-level
rise; massive internal and cross-border migrations;
delegitimized and potentially failed governments;
and claims of climate equity that can lead to violent
extremes, including terrorism.
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There are also studies correlating individual violence
with expected effects of climate change, particularly
rising temperatures (Schutte and Breetzke 2018;
Heilmann and Kahn 2019; Ranson 2014; Hu et
al. 2017). First, some experiments in the field of
psychology noticed that people tend to behave
more violently in high-temperature environments
(Burke et al. 2014; Heilmann and Kahn 2019; Plante
et al. 2017). In this regard, other studies found that
high temperatures tend to increase the incidence
of violent crime – such as violations, murder, and
domestic violence – in many places such as India,
Mexico, the Philippines, the United States, China
and Australia (Burke et al. 2014; Heilmann and Kahn
2019; Hu et al. 2017). However, Heilmann and Kahn
(2019) suggest that high temperatures negatively
impact the intensity of policing.
Although the evidence is restricted to the case of
Los Angeles, it is worth mentioning that increasing
temperature tends to raise intimate partner violence
(Heilmann and Kahn 2019), which increases the
incidence of gender violence. This finding is in line
with other studies stating that natural disasters
are correlated with sexual and gender violence
against women increasing (UN Women 2014), a fact
particularly worrisome about the potential impacts of
such phenomena on LAC, the most violent region for
women in the world (UN Women 2017).
111
There is also evidence that extreme conditions
affecting agricultural production are correlated with
increasing violence in low-income populations,
particularly property crimes (Hu et al. 2017; Burke
et al. 2014). The literature correlating climate
disasters with increases in crime is scarcer (Burke
et al. 2014). However, there is evidence that in the
months following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, cities
receiving refugees from affected areas experienced
increases in crime (Plante et al. 2017). At the
same time, there is evidence that in the aftermath
of hurricane strikes in Honduras and Saint Martin
crime has increased - through criminal groups
monopolizing humanitarian aid to launder money
in the first case and through increased property
crimes in the second (Albaladejo 2017).
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
CLIMATE RISKS AND
VULNERABILITY IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN
A large portion of LAC’s population is at high or
extreme climate risk, especially in the Caribbean, the
Gulf of Mexico and some parts of the endangered
Andean glaciers. According to Maplecroft (2018), 10
of the 33 countries in the researched region are at
extreme risk, another 8 are at high risk, 7 at medium
risk and 8 at low risk.
Despite the overall risk situation, however, LAC is a
profoundly heterogeneous region: Haiti is the third
most vulnerable country in the world, while Uruguay
is among the three least vulnerable countries on the
planet. In general, South America presents lower
risks as a region than Central America and the
Caribbean, which are among the most vulnerable in
the world, only after Africa (Maplecroft 2018).
These high levels of vulnerability are not only
correlated to physical exposure to climate
extremes, but also to the limited adaptive
capacities – material and human resources – of
LAC societies, which makes the development
problem not just environmental.
Some negative effects of climate change are already
being experienced in the region, such as prolonged
Amazon droughts in 2005 and 2010, catastrophic
flooding in Colombia in 2010/2011, intensifying cycle
of hurricanes and storms in Central America and the
Caribbean, drastic loss of tropical glaciers, prolonged
droughts in Pampa Argentina and Northeast Brazil
(Maplecroft 2018; Magrin et al. 2014). Variations
in temperature and precipitation will only tend to
increase in the future.
The Andean region and Northeast Brazil are
particularly vulnerable in South America, due to the
projected reduction in food production capacity. On
the other hand, the Andean cryosphere in retreat
will generate flood risks and then cause the risk of
water scarcity in the vulnerable semi-arid areas of
the sub-region. Changes in land use, particularly
the deforestation in the Amazon and Cerrado, tend
to exacerbate climate risk in the region, including
the risk of drought. Rising sea levels, in turn, pose
risks to industries such as the tourism industry, and
limits to disease control. In this regard, the changes
already observed are negatively affecting health in
the region, increasing mortality, morbidity and the
emergence of diseases in previously non-endemic
areas. (Magrin et al. 2014). In the Caribbean and
Central America, one of the main threats is the
intensity of hurricanes growing, intensified by the
expected rise in sea level.
In the medium and long-term, the “savannization” of
the Amazon rainforest – due to extreme deforestation
and climate change (Nobre et al. 2016) – may trigger
major changes in the atmospheric circulation of the
area, threatening the economic and social prospects
of a region that relies heavily on agriculture,
particularly for poverty alleviation and food security.
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CLIMATE RISKS IN A REGION
OF LOW INTERSTATE
CONFLICT
As stated, the connection between violence and
climate change can be considered from three main
categories: individual violence, group violence, and
interstate violence.
In relation to the latter, LAC has historically been
a region of low interstate conflict, although there
has been a history of US intervention in Central
America and the Caribbean throughout the twentieth
century. In South America, larger states less subject
to external interference, there has been a positive
history of resource management in recent decades,
both in the Amazon Basin, where the context was
usually cooperative, and in the La Plata Basin, where
the high geopolitical rivalry in the 1960s and 1970s
was surpassed in the following years (Viola and
Franchini 2018). In this context, we do not expect
the effects of climate change in the region to act
as drivers of interstate conflict – struggle for scarce
resources or migration – in the short and mediumterm. The fact that this region has not resorted to
attacks on the territorial sovereignty of neighbors,
even in face of Venezuela’s humanitarian tragedy, tilts
us in the direction of this analysis.
This situation, however, may change dramatically
over the long-term, depending on the dynamics
of climate change in the region and the adaptive
capacities developed by LAC countries – in the
areas of food production, energy and water security,
and state responsiveness to stressors related
to variations in the weather. The situation of the
Amazonian ecosystem, which plays a key role in
both regional and global climate regulation, will be
particularly relevant in this context. A continued
deforestation leading to a savannization of the region
113
will lead to catastrophic changes in the regional
climate, affecting patterns of food production,
energy, water supply, etc. Within this framework,
conflicts similar to those described by the literature
specialized in interstate conflict –confrontation over
scarce and migrant resources – could be present in
regional politics.
Regarding the group violence, the presence of
violent domestic conflicts – in the form of civil wars of
different types and intensities – has been a historical
consistency in the region until the late 1980s, with
the exception of Colombia. As stated, the literature
has also found correlations between this type of
conflict and climate change, particularly increasing
temperature and changes in rainfall patterns. As
these two types of phenomena are expected in the
region for decades to come, there is potential for a
growth in violence in the region. This seems to be a
fundamental research theme for LAC in the future,
however, as stated, in this article we choose to focus
on the most urgent issue of violence in the region.
In this sense, organized and common crime has been
a major threat to the security of the region’s citizens
for the past three decades, particularly in the North
Central American Triangle, Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago, Venezuela, Brazil, and Colombia. The regional
homicide average (22,3) was 4 times higher than the
world average in 2015 (5.3) and only Chile has lower
rates than the global average. In addition, the only full
democracies in the region, Costa Rica and Uruguay,
have very high rates, 11.6 and 8.5 respectively,
compared to other democracies of the sort.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
In this context, we conclude that the main security risks associated with LAC climate change impacts in the
short and medium-term will be as follows:
•
Erosion of public security as a result of weather extremes such as hurricanes, extreme rainfall and
flooding, making the action of the state in an already deficient area in most LAC countries even more
difficult. If there is a systematic lack of response from the police and civil defense in face of extreme
situations, the absence of the state can be translated into organized crime entering places where it
previously had no presence. As stated, there is a history of crime increasing following natural disasters,
as in the cases of Saint Martin and Honduras.
•
Regarding the above, drought and flood cycles in large cities with high crime levels, such as São Paulo
or Caracas are particularly relevant as impacts on public security.
•
Increased violence against women, associated with rising temperatures and the incidence of extreme
weather phenomena.
•
The decline in agricultural and fishery production impacting the degradation of food security,
employment and exports has the potential to increase crime. In particular, the migration of populations
deprived of such economic opportunities can supply criminal networks in the cities. However, there
is some evidence that the population growth in large cities tends to increase the incidence of crime.
(Gaviria and Pages as cited by Crank and Jacoby 2014)”plainCitation”:”(Crank and Jacoby 2014
•
The worsening of water scarcity in vulnerable semiarid regions, such as Greater Lima and the Brazilian
semiarid, has the potential to yield similar results to the previous point. As stated, there is a correlation
between such events and increased crime, particularly regarding property crimes.
•
The erosion of energy security through water balance changing (Crank and Jacoby
2014)”plainCitation”:”(Crank and Jacoby 2014, since LAC is the most intensely hydroelectric region in
the world, can also increase criminal activities by reducing economic opportunities or generating crimerelated situations.
•
The growth of climate refugees, both predominantly domestic refugees in South America with effects
on the growth of urban metropolises, and also cross-border refugees in Central America and the
Caribbean, increasing the potential for conflict between them and North American countries, including
the militarization of borders.
•
In Amazon’s case, there is a direct redoubled connection between climate change and public security
in all countries of the region: organized crime and corruption are direct actors of deforestation and
consequent carbon emissions that are very important as a proportion of the national total of Brazil,
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.
•
Particularly, catastrophic climate change in the Amazon, with the savannization of the Western Amazon
and continuing large forest fires, would lead to a profound change in atmospheric circulation in the
subcontinent, with drastic effects on food, energy and public security. As suggested, this process
does have the potential to incite interstate conflicts in the region along the lines of those stated by the
interstate climate security literature: massive migrations and competition for scarce resources.
•
Finally, if the negative effects of climate change outweigh the reactive capacities of Latin American and
Caribbean states, an erosion of trust in public authorities could endanger governance and democracy
in the region, increasing the potential of authoritarian regimes or failed states. It’s well known that the
level of confidence of Latin American citizens in their institutions – government, congress, political
parties, and police forces – is relatively low and declining, as well as the support for democracy as the
preferable regime of government (Latinobarómetro 2018).
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CLIMATE RISKS RELATED TO
SECURITY
This paper focuses on the effects of climate on
crime. Therefore, to clarify the potential risks of each
country in the region, we have developed a regional
climate security risk index combining the Maplecroft
(2018) vulnerability index, government effectiveness
measured by the World Bank, the murder rate and
the level of democracy measured by The Economist.
The position in the index ranking is the result of the
sum of the relative position of each country in each
of the selected indicators. Thus, Venezuela is ranked
first in the index because it has low scores on the
four selected indicators.
Table 1: Climate Security Risk Index for Latin America and the Caribbean: Vulnerability (Maplecroft 2018), Government
Effectiveness (World Bank 2017); Homicide Rate (World Bank 2015), Democracy (The Economist 2018)
Country
Vulnerability
Government
Effectiveness
Homicide
Rate
Democracy
Total
Positions
Ranking
Argentina
6,66 (18)1
0,16 (17)
6,5 (18)
7,02 (16)
69
19
Bolivia
2,48 (9)
-0,39 (7)
6,3 (20)
5,7 (7)
43
13
Brazil
5,77 (17)
-0,29 (1)
28,4 (7)
6,97 (15)
50
9
Chile
9,54 (22)
0,85 (22)
3 (22)
7,97 (20)
86
22
Colombia
4,98 (15)
0,07 (16)
26,5 (8)
6,96 (14)
53
15
Costa Rica
7,7 (20)
0,25 (18)
11,6 (11)
8,07 (21)
70
20
Cuba
3,9 (12)
-0,20 (12)
5,4 (21)
3 (1)
46
10
Ecuador
3,76 (11)
-0,32 (10)
6,5 (18)
6,27 (11)
50
13
El Salvador
0,79 (3)
-0,37 (8)
105,4 (1)
5,96 (8)
20
5
Guatemala
0,75 (2)
-0,64 (4)
29,4 (6)
5,60 (5)
17
2
Haiti
0,58 (1)
-2,06 (1)
10 (13)
2
4,91 (4)
19
3
Honduras
0,92 (4)
-0,51 (6)
57,5 (3)
5,63 (6)
19
3
Jamaica
1,5 (7)
0,49 (21)
42 (4)
7,02 (16)
48
12
Mexico
4,47 (14)
-0,03 (14)
16,5 (10)
6,19 (9)
47
11
Nicaragua
1,19 (6)
-0,64 (4)
8,6 (15)
3,63 (3)
28
6
Panama
5,57 (16)
0,01 (15)
11,3 (12)
7,05 (18)
61
17
Paraguay
1,58 (8)
-0,81 (3)
9,3 (14)
6,24 (10)
35
7
Peru
4,3 (13)
-0,13 (13)
7,2 (17)
6,60 (13)
56
16
Dominican Republic
1,01 (5)
-0,35 (9)
6,54 (12)
35
7
Trinidad and Tobago
7,22 (19)
0,26 (19)
30,1 (5)
7,16 (19)
62
18
Uruguay
8,33 (21)
0,42 (20)
8,5 (16)
8,38 (22)
79
21
Venezuela
3,64 (10)
-1,40 (2)
3,16 (2)
16
1
17,4 (9)
61,9 (2)
3
4
Source: Own Elaboration based on Maplecroft 2018; World Bank 2017; World Bank 2015; The Economist 2018
1 In quotation marks is the relative position of the country in the respective indicator. In this case Argentina is placed 18 out of 22 in
terms of climate vulnerability.
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2
Data from 2012.
3
Data from 2014.
4
Data from 2014.
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Table 2: Relative Position of Climate Security Risk in Latin America and the Caribbean
Country
Score
Ranking
Venezuela
16
1
Guatemala
17
2
Haiti
19
3
Honduras
19
3
El Salvador
20
5
Nicaragua
28
6
Paraguay
35
7
Dominican Republic
35
7
Bolivia
43
9
Cuba
46
10
Mexico
47
11
Jamaica
48
12
Brazil
50
13
Ecuador
50
13
Colombia
53
15
Peru
56
16
Panama
61
17
Trinidad and Tobago
62
18
Argentina
69
19
Costa Rica
70
20
Uruguay
79
21
Chile
86
22
Source: Own elaboration
As shown in the table above, the most vulnerable
countries in the region to climate security risks are
Venezuela – submerged in a collapse of governance
with the region’s biggest humanitarian tragedy in the
last half-century; the Northern Triangle countries –
hit by the state’s inability to respond to the threat of
crime; and Haiti – a failed state. This lack of state
capacity results in poor capacity to cope with high
levels of climate risk exposure.
On the other hand, Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay
– the region’s most developed democracies – show
the least vulnerability to security risks from climate
extremes. The large LAC economies, Brazil and
Mexico, occupy intermediate positions, with Mexico
being more exposed in terms of overall climate
vulnerability and Brazil due to the high homicide
rate per capita.
LAC’s level of exposure to climate security risks
is aggravated by the lack of preparation of most
countries in the region to the negative effects of
climate change. This lack of preparation occurs
in both the security area and the more general
adaptation area. Regarding this last point, most
countries in the region have no sound strategies for
responding to climate extremes or long-term issues
such as infrastructure or energy, nor rapid responses
to phenomena such as hurricanes or floods,
although the picture is mixed (Franchini 2016).
Regarding the specific security issue, most of the
region’s police forces are not prepared to deal
with the current impacts of crime, much less to
respond to an increase in crime due to climate
extremes. Therefore, the development of doctrines
and practices is necessary to deal with the present
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and expected effects of the climate, a scenario that
appears to be of low probability as many of these
forces are overwhelmed by current threats.
At the same time, as the armed forces are being
called in to combat threats to public security – crime
in its various expressions – in some countries of the
region – particularly Brazil, Mexico and Colombia
– they also need to incorporate home security
issues into their climate risk doctrine. This would
become a regional feature of its own, becoming a
CONCLUSION
The risk of climate security in Latin American
and Caribbean countries will be more associated
with domestic citizen security issues related to
interpersonal violence than with interstate and civil
conflict issues over the next decade. The status of
the region as an area of a low interstate conflict and
a high incidence of crime are the factors that support
this analysis. The main findings of the literature on
violence and climate anticipate a growth in crime
in the region, further demanding the capabilities of
security forces – and in some cases – the armed
forces of the region.
The growth of the security risk will be mainly
associated with the effects of weather extremes
events and increasing temperature on crime,
particularly in large cities. The deterioration of food
security and depreciation of jobs in agricultural
and fisheries areas, leading to domestic or crossborder migrations. In addition to the deterioration
of energy security by water stress. In this context,
the most vulnerable populations, particularly women
and children, affected by the potential increase in
domestic violence, are of particular concern. If LAC
states are unable to deal with these effects, their
legitimacy may deteriorate even further, with negative
effects on democratic governance within the region.
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significant difference to the climate security doctrines
developed in US and European forces (Viola and
Franchini 2018). However, this type of development
is not covered in the mainstream climate security
literature either, i.e., there is an uncharted and open
field of research development in this area, combining
the characteristics of LAC as peaceful in their
interstate relations, but violent within its borders.
Nonetheless, in the medium and long-term, the
eventual destabilization of the regional climate due
to the savannization of the Amazon rainforest could
aggravate the panorama to the point of operating
as a catalyst for interstate conflicts. Within this
framework, the literature on climate security that
focuses on inter-group violence may offer better
analytical resources to examine the potential
escalation of conflicts over scarce resources and
migrant populations.
As a way of assessing climate security risk with
the features of countries in the LAC region, we
propose an index that combines data on climate
vulnerability, state efficiency, homicide rate and level
of democracy. As a result, we find that Venezuela,
Haiti, and the Northern Triangle countries are the
most vulnerable countries in the region, while Chile,
Costa Rica, and Uruguay – LAC’s most consolidated
democracies – occupy the opposite place in the
spectrum.
The climate-related security risk situation worsens
as most countries in the region have not been able
to develop strategies to reduce these risks, including
sound adaptation strategies or incorporating climate
risk into doctrines of military and police forces.
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DECEMBER 2019
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Rio Amazonas. Photo: Taxis en rio Amazonas, Leticia Departamento del Amazonas.
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THE ‘BOOMERANG
EFFECT’ AND THE
UNINTENDED SIDE
EFFECTS OF CLIMATE
ACTION:
EVIDENCE FROM BRAZIL’S
INTERVENTIONS IN AMAZON
RIVER BASIN
Luis Paulo B. da Silva
Larry Swatuk
Lars Wirkus
ABSTRACT
This paper concerns the “boomerang effect”, defined
as the largely unanticipated and unintended negative
consequences of climate change adaptation and
mitigation policies and programs on domestic nonstate actors that result in negative feedbacks on the
state. Questioning the drivers, the decision-making
process, and the negative feedbacks on local
and state levels, this article presents a preliminary
assessment of Brazil’s actions undertaken at its
neighboring countries – Peru and Bolivia – within
Amazon river basin in order to produce hydropower.
In Peru, dam projects are already in operation, while
in Bolivia there are ongoing projects where Brazilian
actors (state or non-state) intervene by finance,
Keywords: climate
construction and management of hydropower
plants,. Although dam building projects started as
development enterprises, during the first decade
of 21st century, they were “greenwashed” by
technological changes and redefined as suitable
alternative to fossil-fuels, hence presented as climate
actions. Amazon’s dams have negative feedbacks
on local level that threaten environmental, food
and water security of affected population, which
spread along the river basin. Moreover, in Peru, the
misconduct of diplomatic, business and political
ties among non-state and state actors imperil state
legitimacy and security. Finally, some attentive
elements for future actions in Bolivia are presented.
change, boomerang effect, Amazon river basin,
maladaptation, dams.
121
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DECEMBER 2019
INTRODUCTION
This article concerns the “boomerang effect”, defined
as the largely unanticipated and unintended negative
consequences of climate change adaptation and
mitigation policies and programs on domestic nonstate actors that result in negative feedbacks on the
state. This paper draws on the theoretical findings
presented in Swatuk et al. (2018) and is based on
desk research, thus its findings are more indicative
rather than definitive.
The rush to action to adapt to or mitigate the
effects of climate change present the danger of
generating unanticipated and unintended negative
impacts at the site of the intervention, what we label
as Local Level Side Effects (LLSE), which may be
regarded as synonymous with maladaptation (e.g.
Barnett and O’Neill 2010; 2013; Magnan 2014;
Magnan et al. 2016). However, the distinguishing
idea of the “boomerang effect” framework is the
specific consideration of negative feedbacks upon
state actors on different levels (municipal, regional
and national boomerang effects) at various scales
(watershed, forest, landscape, ecosystem), thereby
creating (economic, political, societal, environmental)
risks to state sustainability. These negative side
effects are labeled as State Level Boomerang Effects
(SLBEs), or simply “boomerang effect”. According to
some scholars, these negative local level side effects
may have transboundary characteristics, particularly
where populations are mobile, political economies
are overwhelmingly informal, and states are weak
(Swatuk 2007).
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Figure 1: The “Boomerang Effect”
Source: Swatuk et al. 2018: 4
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IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
Figure 1 illustrates how climate change actions can
develop unintended and unanticipated negative side
effects at local and state’s levels. This paper presents
an analysis of the negative effects of Brazilian actions on
Peru and Bolivia, while aiming to increase the production
of hydropower, thus attaining greenhouse gas emissions
reduction. Those initiatives are being implemented in
South American Amazon river basin (Fearnside 2014;
Latrubesse et al. 2017; Anderson et al. 2018)
On the one hand, Amazon river basin has important
roles on climate change mitigation and adaptation
policies in a global scale. It held roughly 10-15%
of global biodiversity, and its rivers discharge
approximately 15% of total global fresh water
input into the ocean (Nobre et al. 2016). On the
other hand, Amazon river basin has been suffering
by intensive land cover and land use changes,
related with development projects that threaten
its socially diverse population and its natural
systems, more severely over the last 50 years.
One of the most pervasive drivers of change within
the Amazon river basin is the construction of
hydropower plants. Amazon’s hydropower projects
encompass many complexities connected with
the region’s peculiarities. Local level side effects
are well documented, including deforestation,
interruption of the fluvial systems, change in water
quality, proliferation of diseases, displacement and
resettlement, and threats to the rights of native
population (Schaeffer et al. 2013).
Moreover, Amazon river basin is included among Brazil’s
climate change hotspots, where IPCC’s climate models
predict raising temperatures but an uncertain outcome in
its rivers outflow, thus affecting the Amazonian countries’
energy security. The vulnerability of hydrological balance
on climate change and its effects on river dependent
dwellers tend to increase the social responsibilities of
power plant’s towards dam’s affected people (Soito
and Freitas 2011). Finally, the insecurity related with
hydrological cycle changes and the negative local level
side effects of dams can scatter through a wide area,
crossing international boundaries and following the
fluvial network. Therefore, acknowledging the local and
state level side effects of climate actions, specifically
the building of dams to produce “green” energy, can
underpin policy formulation, state and non-state actions
within Amazon river basin.
DECEMBER 2019
Given the boomerang effect framework presented
here and the security issues at stake in Amazon’s
hydropower projects, the paper examines real and
potential unanticipated and unintended negative
effects regarding Brazil’s actions in Peruvian and
Bolivian Amazonian region. Evidence is drawn from
critical readings of secondary (academic) and grey
(government-related) literature. Therefore, the case
investigates four main research questions:
•
What are the (social/economic/ecological/
political) drivers behind a particular
development or climate intervention?
•
What is the decision-making process that
leads to this specific climate
action or development intervention?
•
What are the LLSEs (social/economic/
ecological/political) of the action? and are any
of these unintended and/or unanticipated and
negative in consequence?
•
What are the Boomerang Effects felt by
the state?
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section
describes the boomerang effect framework, presenting
the different pathways that it can take, with a focus on
blue water actions. In this paper, regarding dams and
investments on hydropower, the main concern is on the
use and allocation of blue water for energy. The second
section presents Brazil’s actions on its neighboring
countries. The first case is presented as a known
case of negative effects of hydropower plans at the
local and the state level, then, in Bolivia, it is assessed
how the Peruvian case can be used as an example
of the challenges at stake while building new dams in
consortium with Brazil. Finally, the paper addresses
how these cases can shed some light on the effects of
climate change actions.
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125
THE BOOMERANG EFFECT
PATHWAYS
The Boomerang Effect can travel through two kinds
of pathways: through a “green water pathway – e.g.
biofuels development and REDD+ – and through a “blue
water pathway” – e.g. dam building for “green” energy.
It’s argued that better information must be made
available to inform decisions at various stages and
of various stakeholders. Important is the distinction
between green and blue water. Green water is
water that is utilized by plants from the soil directly
following rainfall. Productive green water is defined
as that which transpires through a plant creating
biomass. Unproductive green water is defined
as rainfall which evaporates directly back to the
atmosphere. Blue water is that which is available
as run-off after rainfall. It takes the form of surface
water (rivers, lakes, streams, impounded behind
dam walls) and readily accessible sub-surface water,
i.e. groundwater (through borehole/well technology)
(Falkenmark and Rockstrom 2004). Swatuk et al.
(2015) further refine unproductive green water into
a “socioecological unproductive pathway”, meaning
water that is productively used by plants that either
(i) are destructive of the local ecosystem (e.g. alien
or invasive species); and/or (ii) ultimately benefit
only a few users (e.g. privately owned sugar cane
plantations exploiting land and labor for profits
accruing to the few).
It is generally agreed that climate change will lead to
more extreme events. It also will lead to more water in
some places and less water in others; and to widely
fluctuating hydrological cycles that will be increasingly
unpredictable. To ensure water security for human
activities, therefore, this unpredictability must be dealt
with through infrastructure development – what Conca
(2006) calls, “damming, diverting and draining”. This is
primarily an adaptation pathway, though multipurpose
hydraulic infrastructure often claims mitigation
elements as well, where, for example, hydropower
displaces thermal power as a primary means of
electricity generation.
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DECEMBER 2019
BRAZIL’S INTERVENTIONS IN
AMAZON RIVER BASIN
Adding an important perspective in examining the
negative side effects of climate change actions and
its transboundary features is analyzing Brazilian
investments in its neighboring countries during
the first decade of 21st century. Brazil, as the
biggest economy in the region, has a central role
to play in neoextractivist projects, with financing
and building expertise. Stemming from a period of
strong economic growth along the first decade of
the 21st Century, a political engagement in regional
integration, the boost of commodity prices at the
international market and the increasing concerns
on climate change actions, Brazil has carried out
foreign direct investments with public support. The
progressive political and economic affinities among
South American governments have set in motion
a process of increased extraction of their natural
resources, however, with a range of compensation
measures created in order to assure poverty
alleviation and social legitimacy, thus defined
as “neoextractivism” or “neodevelopmentism”
(Gudynas 2012).
The neoextractivist policies have created a new
demand for energy across the continent in order to
foster agricultural and mining projects, many of them
in Amazon. Hydropower plants were among the
big infrastructural projects envisioned during middle
of the 20th century in South America; however,
Amazon river basin kept its rivers without dams,
because of environmental and social concerns. At
the beginning of the 21st century this perception
had changed. Various governments and financial
institutions have pushed for construction of big dams
as a viable way to supplant fossil-fuel (International
Rivers 2014), so using the climate change mitigation
narrative as a support for relatively traditional
developmental practices. An iconic example of the
rush for hydropower was Belo Monte dam, in Xingu
river, which was built neglecting all the judicial and
international complaints regarding its aggressions on
indigenous rights and environmental laws (Durst et
al. 2018).
Peru and Bolivia were chosen as case studies
because of the different stages that Brazilian
actions had reached in these countries and their
willingness to engage climate change actions through
investments in hydropower. Starting in the 2000s,
Amazon river basin became the target of several
hydropower projects. Brazilian economic growth and
the availability of undammed rivers set the Amazon
river basin as the final frontier for hydropower plants
in 21st century South America (Anderson et al. 2018;
Fearnside 2014; Brasil 2017).
According to the network Amazonia Socioambiental
(RAISG), within Amazon river basin there are more
than 134 constructed and under construction dams,
and 140 planned installations (Figure 2). It is predicted
that a chain of hydropower plants is going to disrupt
the geomorphologic and ecological connectivity
between the headwaters, and the floodplains, therefore
cutting the annual pulse of sediments, nutrients and
organic matter that feeds a diversity of natural habitats
(Anderson et al. 2018; Finer and Jenkins 2012).
Those habitats are related with many local based and
traditional uses of land and water, thus the connectivity
along the river basin is responsible for a complex
set of hydro-social cycles (Tundisi et al. 2014). With
documented cases of involuntary resettlement, logging,
pollution and violence are some of the main impacts
related with hydropower, thus bringing social insecurity
issues to Amazon region (Fearnside 2014; Latrubesse
et al. 2017).
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Figure 2: Proliferation of Hydropower Plants within Amazon River Basin
Peru was one leading foreign investment target of
Brazil, due to its very open market for neoextractivist
projects during the first decade of 21st century
Brazilian private investors and the government
have taken part in this process through financing
works, via such entities as the National Economic
and Social Development Bank (BNDES) and by
increasing the share of Brazilian companies in Peru,
in a strategy of intensifying its regional hegemony in
South America. Therefore, Peru and Brazil created
an entangled relationship connecting diplomacy,
business and environmental strategies (Gaspar
2017). At the local level many of these projects had
negative effects, such as resettlement, pollution and
increasing poverty (Medina et al. 2014). At the state
level, connections of Peruvian projects with the “Car
Wash” criminal investigation and its spillovers in Latin
American countries led to corruption and enduring
political instability (G1 2017; Gaspar 2017).
In contrast to Peru’s “open door” policy, Bolivian
policymakers have taken more nationalistic
measures regarding natural resources and
127
extractivist investments. During Evo Morales’ first
term that began in 2006, the Bolivian government
implemented substantial changes, such as the direct
control of its oil and gas fields. For that reason, new
infrastructure projects such as hydropower plants
had less presence in Bolivia than in other South
American countries. However, since around 2010,
Bolivia has been experiencing the tensions and
contradictions of the commodity price crises that hit
the region and the growing influence of an economic
liberal opposition. At this moment the projects of
hydropower plants in the Amazon river basin in
consortium with Brazil gained new importance. Along
the Brazil-Bolivia border the Madeira river sub-basin
is the target of new developments in hydropower.
Two already existing dams (Santo Antônio and Jirau),
situated in Madeira river, within Brazilian territory,
added with two projected dams (Guajará-Mirim and
Cachuela Esperanza) would form the Madeira river
hydropower complex, with huge impacts predicted
along the Amazon river basin (Fearnside 2014; Pires
do Rio et al. 2015).
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
Brazilian Actions in Peru and its
Negative Side Effects
Peru is one of the main foreign direct investment
partners of Brazil in South America since the 1970s,
when neoliberal policies had opened the country for
foreign direct investments, mainly due to its natural
resources (Metaxas and Kechagia 2017). Brazilian
companies have taken this opportunity to engage
in Peruvian market, especially through construction
companies. One of then, Odebrecht S.A., the
biggest Brazilian construction company, has played
a key part in the growth of investments in Peru by
participating in more than 40 projects, including
hydropower plants, irrigations systems, highways,
and subways, thereby becoming the biggest
construction company working in Peru (G1 2017;
Gaspar 2017).
Brazilian investments in Latin American economies
have changed their pattern since 2000. In the
political sphere, the rise to power of a group of
left-wing governments, including Brazil and Peru,
strengthened affinities among South American
countries. Simultaneously, across the global
economy the appreciation of commodity prices
directed investments towards economic growth
based on developing mineral and agricultural
activities (Gudynas 2012). Peru was riding this wave
by investing in hydropower projects and including
new areas for its agricultural crops. Brazilian private
investors and the government have taken part in this
process through financing works, via BNDES, and by
increasing the share of Brazilian companies in Peru,
in a strategy of intensifying its regional hegemony in
South America.
Two projects are emblematic of this moment. The
first is the Chaglla dam, situated at the Huallaga
river, at the bottom of Andes mountains. This is the
third biggest dam in Peru, responsible for roughly
13% of the energy produced in the country. It was
built by a co-financing of Interamerican Development
Bank (BID), Development Finance Corporation
(COFIDE) and BNDES, requiring more than US$
1.2 billion and it started its operation in 2016. The
second is the Special Project of Irrigation and
Hydropower Olmos. This project encompasses the
production of hydropower at the Limón dam, and
the transposition of Huancabamba river waters
through a 20 kilometers tunnel under the Andes
mountains in order to irrigate 43,500 hectares
of arable land for agro-industrial development.
Both activities were conceded to Odebrecht S.A.
by the Peruvian government, then creating the
companies Concesionaria Transvalse Olmos (CTO)
and the H2OLMOS.
The roll out of these projects illustrates how Brazilian
actions, whether for construction or financing, do not
comply with international environmental and social
standards. On one hand, Chaglla dam is emblematic
of BNDES’s requirements to change its procedures
since the project was financed in partnership with
BID, which has much stricter safeguards and
transparency norms (Medina et al. 2014). On the
other hand, Olmos project symbolizes a case of land
grabbing with concession of public waters and land
for private companies, causing dispossession and
impoverishment.
The apex of Brazilian-Peruvian partnership and
neoextractivist policies was set in 2009 when Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva, for Brazil, and Alan García,
for Peru, signed an agreement supporting the
joint construction of six dams within Peruvian
Amazon forest. Moreover, in 2011, Peru signed a
law declaring the construction of 20 dams in the
Maranon river as “national interest”, then opening
the way for damming the Amazon river main source
(Hill 2015; Fearnside et al. 2014). These movements
would promptly fulfil Brazilian companies’ appetite
for new constructions with lower environment and
social requirements.
Many reasons would justify the non-completion of
these projects. Environmental and social concerns
are well documented in many press and scientific
documents (Finer and Jenkins 2012; Fearnside
2014; Tundisi et al. 2014; Hill 2015; Latrubesse et
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
al. 2017). However, the main action that took hold of
these projects was the Brazilian Car Wash criminal
investigations and its spillovers in Latin America,
Africa and United States. This money laundering and
bribery investigation discovered how construction
companies have used corruption in order to get
contracts in public services. The same scheme
employed in Brazil was applied in at least fourteen
other countries, but none of them with the same
consequences as Peru. Since the beginning of the
investigations every Peruvian president that were
in office during the bonanza years were accused of
corruption. Since the beginning of investigations,
Odebrecht S.A. was precluded from tendering for
The Negative Effects of Brazilian Actions
in Bolivian Amazon
During the period of augmentation of Brazilian
investment in its neighbors and the increasing of
Brazilian private participation in South American
economy, Bolivia stayed apart from this process. One
reason was the nationalization of Bolivian gas and oil
sector, in 2006, which alienated private investments.
The importance of Bolivian oil reserves has diminished
the thrill to invest in hydropower. RAISG’s data shows
that there are only 11 existing dams in Bolivian
Amazon, contributing with 1,010 MW.
Along the Brazil-Bolivia border, the Madeira river
sub-basin has a huge importance for Amazon
hydropower plans given its geotectonic diversity.
This sub-basin is the main tributary of Amazon river
in terms of drainage area, flux of water and sediment
discharge, and it is aimed for future hydropower
projects, namely 25 at its Andean section, 56 at
its plateau and two at the transition between the
plateau and the floodplains (Latrubesse et al. 2017).
Those two last projects (Guajará-Mirim and Cachuela
Esperanza dams) would be in the border region
between Brazil and Bolivia and built by a BrazilBolivia consortium. Combining with two already
existing Brazilian dams (Santo Antônio and Jirau)
they would form the Madeira river hydropower
complex (Pires do Rio et al. 2015).
129
or participating in any other project and has been
receiving fines at the figures of more than US$
3 billion. However, Peru has not promulgated its
sentence yet. Meanwhile, the company is selling
its assets in Peru, in order to pay its duties with
banks and justice. For instance, the operation of
Chaglla dam was sold to the China Three Gorges
Corporation (CTG), and the companies responsible
for operation and maintenance of Project Olmos
(CTO and H2OLMOS) were sold to Brookfield
Investments and Suez.
Santo Antônio and Jirau dams, situated at Madeira
river, are near the city of Porto Velho, capital of
Brazilian state of Rondônia. They were built by
Brazilian initiative but have effects in Bolivian territory.
According to Fearnside (2014) the Madeira river
project was made in 1987, predicting just one dam
that would flood an area of approximately 254
kilometers along Madeira river, thus, flooding areas
of Bolivian territory. For this reason, the original
project was changed in order to build the actual two
dams. Nevertheless, in 2004, along the process of
environmental licensing, Jirau’s project had to be
changed in order to decrease its reservoir average
level, so ensuring that the Bolivian territory would
not be affected. Even though, in the project, Jirau’s
reservoir starts at the Brazil-Bolivia boundary its
effect is felt into Bolivian territory because of the
sediment deposition at the bottom of the reservoir.
This sedimentation has created a not admitted
“backwater stretch” (Fearnside 2014). However,
during the exceptional floods of 2014, Bolivia stated
formal complaints for Brazilian dam effects within
Bolivian territory.
The Madeira River Hydropower Complex project
was envisioned almost 40 years ago, in 1980, when
the national governments started to assess the
feasibility of these works but, at that time, Bolivia
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
lacked political and economic conditions to engage
in these works (Costa et al. 2014; Lanza and Arias
2011). In 2007, Brazil and Bolivia signed a diplomatic
memorandum in support of mutually beneficial
energy development; and, in 2016, they agreed to
accomplish the inventory studies needed to realize
joint dams and transmission lines. Moreover, Bolivia
agreed to export 7,500 MW of energy to Brazil,
DECEMBER 2019
1,500 MW from the binational projects. Since 2016,
the inventory of binational hydropower plants is held
by state-led energy companies: Eletrobras, in Brazil;
and ENDE, in Bolivia; financed by the Development
Bank of Latin America (CAF) (Brasil 2017; Costa et
al. 2014; Lanza and Arias 2011).
DISCUSSION
The cases discussed in this paper indicate the
negative side effects of the relationship between
state and non-state actors on fulfilling development
and climate change projects. Peru’s and Bolivia’s
hydropower plans are driven by the willingness to
increase the participation of renewable energy in
their energy mix. In a first sight, those projects are
not related with climate change actions; however, the
justification of reducing the use of fossil-fuels and the
implementation of new turbine technologies opened
the Amazon river basin for the rush to hydropower.
In Peru’s case, despite well documented and
ubiquitous negative local effects of dams in such a
vulnerable environment as Amazon, the simultaneity
of political affinities among South American countries
and economic bonanza set the momentum for the
association with Brazil’s state and market actors to
fulfill its goals (Medina et al. 2014). Those conditions
are becoming present in Bolivia currently, given the
disposition to attract more foreign direct investments
inflows to the country.
Concerning the lessons learnt from the hydropower
plans’ decision-making process, the relationship
between market and state actors must be
scrutinized and its security outcomes elucidated.
Odebrecht S.A. actions inflicted extensive impacts
on local level in Peru by its works on hydropower
and agriculture. Although these outcomes demand
in depth research at the local level, it is worth noting
that the company have “greenwashed” its actions,
through participation on Global Climate Action
scheme, where it includes its actions as emission
reduction projects. This raises the questions of
the role of market actors on the achievement of
greenhouse emissions reduction. Chan, Brand and
Bauer (2016) criticize the expectancies created by
the participation of non-Party actors on climate
actions after 2016’s Paris Agreement, and the Peru
case illustrates how the lack of transparency in the
mutual influence between companies and state can
jeopardize the development and climate change
actions. Odebrecht S.A. scandals in Peru are having
consequences to the national stability that are
making a shift in the set of stakeholders engaged
in national projects, raising issues of legitimacy
and accountability in managing projects in Amazon
river basin. In Bolivia, a new set of companies,
from China and Brazil are already investing in
hydropower projects, but this country remains
a stronger nationalistic approach on its energy
market investments. Therefore, realization of climate
change actions must embrace transparency and
evaluation of individual actions, in order to assess
its consistency with global goals and guarantee its
legitimacy at the local level.
The consequences of building dams in Amazon river
basin are manifold (social, economic, ecological and
political), spread from local to national levels, and
affect the basin scale. Ecologically, the retention of
sediments by dams produce a chain effect along
the whole basin, cutting the pulse of nutrients that
sustain a set of natural habitats periodically flooded
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
by rivers and hydro social - formations that depends
on rivers (Tundisi et al. 2014; Latrubesse et al. 2017;
Anderson et al. 2018). Therefore, water, food and
environmental security are jeopardized along the
track of changes caused by dams. Energy security is
not accomplished by changing the prevalence of mix
CONCLUSION
The application of the boomerang effect framework
in Brazil’s actions at its neighbors provides analytical
lenses to assess the unintended consequences of
climate actions in Peru and Bolivia. In Peru, the ties
with Brazil in order to build infrastructure works had
local level side effects, such as impoverishment,
resettlement, violence and land grabbing, increasing
the risks to social and water security. Moreover, state
level boomerang effects, such as the outcomes
of corruption scandals and the current political
instability in Peru and Brazil are unintended and
unanticipated consequences of such investments,
creating risks for both national security and
government legitimacy. A critical assessment of
potential consequences of climate change actions
should take into account non-climate-related issues
because, at the end of the day, the social outcomes
of climate actions do not happen in a vacuum.
In the Amazon river basin scale more consequences
are predicted. The systemic effects of damming
Amazon’s rivers stem from the aggregation of local
effects that extrapolate along the river system. In an
extensive and complex system such as the Amazon
river basin, the anticipation and prediction of action
outcomes are a challenging albeit necessary.
Regarding Brazil and Bolivia hydropower projects,
boomerang effect framework can help to envision
possible consequences in the Bolivian state and the
border region shared between the two countries.
The challenge, therefore, for decision-makers is to
avoid committing the same mistakes in future.
The findings presented in this paper do need to be
statistically tested, in order to address the causal
131
of sources to hydropower (Soito and Freitas 2011;
Schaeffer et al. 2014). Finally, the boomerang effect
is felt by state through the strong increase of political
and social instability where the project was carried
out and caused by cunning interactions among state
and private actors.
relations between climate actions, local negative
side effects and their upscaling towards state level
boomerang effects. Notwithstanding, this first
approach is helpful in evaluating the unintended
and unanticipated consequences of development
projects that become climate related through
“greenwashing”.
IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Editors
Adriana Erthal Abdenur is Coordinator of the Peace and Security area at the Igarapé Institute, where she
supervises projects on climate and security; migration and refuge; transnational organized crime; and armed
conflict responses. Dr. Abdenur is a member of the Committee on Development Policy (CDP) of the UN’s
ECOSOC and of the Expert Working Group advising the UN Climate and Security Mechanism. She earned
her Ph.D. from Princeton University and her bachelor’s degree from Harvard University, USA. She co-authored
the book India China: Rethinking Borders and Security (University of Michigan, 2016), and co-edited the book
Emerging Powers at the UN (Routledge, 2015).
Giovanna Kuele is a non-resident researcher for Igarapé Institute and Ph.D. Candidate at the Graduate
Center of the City University of New York (CUNY), USA. Based in New York, she has researched and engaged
with international politics, particularly regarding climate change, global governance, international security,
conflict prevention, and peace operations. She completed her M.A. (2017) and B.A. (2014) at the Federal
University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Porto Alegre, Brazil. She has conducted fieldwork in Congo (2015),
Ethiopia (2018), and Kenya (2018).
Alice Amorim is Coordinator of the Climate Policy and Engagement Portfolio of the Climate and Society
Institute (iCS). Lawyer, she is graduated from the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), Brazil, and has a
master’s degree in Political Economy of Late Development from the London School of Economics and Political
Sciences (LSE), UK. She was partner of Public Interest Management (GIP), working on dozens of consulting
projects for civil society organizations in Brazil and abroad, on topics such as climate change, international
cooperation, and philanthropy. Alice was also superintendent of the NGO Saúde Criança Zona Sul, leading
actions of institutional development and organizational management.
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COLLECTION OF ARTICLES ABOUT CLIMATE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT
Contributors
Antônio Gelson de Oliveira Nascimento is professor of the Master Program in Public Security at the
Amazonas State University.
Beatriz M. G. Ferreira is currently a researcher at the Simulations and Scenarios Laboratory at the Naval
War College Conjuncture Assessment Center, where she also conducts research related to South American
regional security and decision-making analysis in the Performance Analysis group. Previously, she performed
Scientific Initiation in International Politics, focusing on BRICS and WWII Memory. She holds a B.A. in
International Relations from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil.
Charlis Barroso da Rocha is Sergeant of the Amazonas Military Fire Department and State Civil Defense.
Eduardo Viola is a full-time professor at the Institute of International Relations of the University of
Brasilia, Brazil, since 1993 and a senior researcher at the National Council for Scientific and Technological
Development (CNPq). He is the coordinator of the Research Group “The International System on
Anthropocene and Climate Change,” and a visiting professor at several international universities, including
Stanford, Colorado in Boulder, Texas in Austin, Notre Dame, and Amsterdam. Dr. Viola holds a Ph.D. in
Political Science from the University of São Paulo, Brazil (1982). He is a member of several international
scientific committees and has published nine books, over eighty peer-reviewed journal articles, and more than
fifty book chapters in various countries and languages.
Eloisa Beling Loose is a journalist and has a Master’s degree in Communication and Information, and a PhD
in Environment and Development. Her doctoral dissertation won a prize on communication, perception and
governance of climate change from Capes. She has dedicated herself to journalism and environment research
since 2006, focusing on communication in different interfaces with climate issues since 2013. She completed
a post-doctorate on mapping studies in this area in Latin America in 2018. Currently, she researches
journalistic coverage on addressing climate risks.
Hannah Machado Cepik is a social scientist graduated from the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG)
and is currently pursuing a degree in Fine Arts at Guignard School (Minas Gerais State University – UEMG),
Brazil. During her undergraduate degree, she was a Scientific Initiation (IC) fellow at the Women’s Study
and Research Center (NEPEM) and, later, at the Family-School Observatory (OSFE). She did part of her
studies at Utrecht University (UU), Netherlands. Her bachelor’s degree monograph, defended in 2017, is
entitled Be Calin, Be Gajin: Notions of Memory, Kinship, and Gender among Blue Sky Gypsies. Her main
research interests and activism are gender issues, traditional communities, the environment, socio-technical
controversies, and education.
Larry Swatuk is a professor in the School of Environment, Enterprise and Development (SEED) at the
University of Waterloo, Canada. He is also an extraordinary professor in the Institute for Water Studies,
University of Western Cape, South Africa, and external researcher at the Bonn International Center for
Conversion (BICC), Germany. Dr. Swatuk was a lecturer in the Department of Political and Administrative
Studies and associate professor of Natural Resources Governance in the Okavango Research Institute at
the University of Botswana, and senior researcher in the African Centre for Strategic and Security Studies
(ACDESS), Ijebu-Ode, Nigeria. Prof. Swatuk has published widely on the topic of sustainable natural resource
use, with a particular focus on freshwater resources in sub-Saharan Africa.
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IGARAPÉ INSTITUTE |
DECEMBER 2019
Lars Wirkus is Head of Section Data and Geomatics and senior researcher at the Bonn International Center
for Conversion (BICC), Germany. He is responsible for developing and implementing various interactive
databases - and GIS-based knowledge - sharing information applications. Much of his work focuses on
developing data-informed concepts and methods for the assessment and analysis of the manifestations and
dynamics of organized violence at different scales in the context of global environmental and societal change.
Luis Paulo B. da Silva is a post-doctoral researcher at the University of São Paulo, Brazil. Currently, his
research investigates the role of sub-catchments at La Plata’s transboundary river basins governance. He is
also a researcher at Grupo Retis, a research team interested in South American international border regions.
He holds a Ph.D. in Geography from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil.
Márcio de Souza Corrêa is Sergeant of the Statistics Section of the Military Police of Amazonas.
Marco Cepik is full-time professor at the Department of Economics and International Relations (DERI) of the
Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Brazil. He researches in International Security Research
and Comparative Politics. PhD in Political Science (IUPERJ), post-doctorate at the University of Oxford (2005)
and at the Institute of International Relations at PUC Rio (Brazil, 2018). He was a professor at the Department
of Political Science at Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG, 1995-2003) and a visiting professor at the
University of Denver (DU), USA, Renmin University of China (RUC), Higher Institute of International Relations
(ISRI, Mozambique), and Naval Post Graduate School (NPS), Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences
(FLACSO, Ecuador) and Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP), USA.
Marília Closs is a doctoral student and holds a Master’s degree in political science from the Institute of Social
and Political Studies of the State University of Rio de Janeiro (IESP). She is currently a researcher at the South
American Political Observatory (OPSA), where she monitors Bolivia’s domestic and foreign policy, and she is
a researcher and adjunct coordinator of the Center for Studies in Social Theory and Latin America (NETSAL).
She holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
(UFRGS), Brazil. During her Master’s degree, she developed research on the rise and consolidation of drug
trafficking in Colombia between 1975 and 1990.
Matías Franchini is a principal professor of International Relations at the Universidad del Rosario, Bogota,
Colombia. He holds a Bachelor of Political Science from the Catholic University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, and a
Master and Doctorate in International Relations from the University of Brasilia, Brazil. He is a visiting researcher at
Princeton University, USA, under the guidance of Professor Robert O. Keohane. He is a member of the Research
Group “The International System on Anthropocene and Climate Change” and author of several publications in
Portuguese, English, and Spanish. His main areas of interest are International Relations, Global Environmental
Governance, International Political Economy of Climate Change and Latin American Politics.
Moisés Israel Silva dos Santos holds a Master’s degree in Public Security, Citizenship and Human
Rights from the Graduate Program of the Amazonas State University (UEA), Brazil, a Specialist degree in
Management and Security from the Boas Novas Faculty (FBN), Brazil. He is graduated in Public and Citizen
Security and in Law from UEA, with a major in Environmental Law.
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Oliver Leighton Barrett is a senior research fellow at the Center for Climate and Security, USA, where he
focuses on the impacts of environmental degradation and climate change on the stability and security of
states and populations, with an emphasis on Latin America. He is also Americas Liaison at the International
Military Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS). In 2014, he led a multi-author effort to draft the Pentagon’s
Environmental and Energy Issues for Militaries report – a collaborative multi-national assessment of the
impacts of climate change on Latin America and Caribbean militaries’ operations and installations.
Saul M. Rodriguez is a researcher and professor in several Universities in Colombia and a visiting researcher
at the Central University of Venezuela. He is a Ph.D. fellow in the Political School, University of Ottawa,
Canada, and holds a M.A. in Research in Social Sciences (with honor) from the University of Buenos Aires,
Argentina, and a B.A. in History (with honors) from the National University of Colombia. He is the author of
two books and more than twenty articles in Spanish and English. He has been awarded with fellowships,
scholarships and travel grants from several institutions including SIDA (Sweden), CHDS (USA), CLACSO
(Latin America), RedMacro (Mexico), University Van Amsterdam (The Netherlands), University of Gothenburg
(Sweden), the Argentinian Government, LASA (USA), ISA (USA), among others.
The Igarapé Institute is an independent think and do tank devoted to evidence-based policy and
action on complex social challenges in Brazil, Latin America, and Africa. The Institute’s goal is to
stimulate debate, foster connections and trigger action to address security and development. Based in
the South, the Igarapé Institute undertakes diagnostics, generates awareness, and designs solutions
with public and private partners, often with the use of new technologies. Key areas of focus include
citizen security, drug policy, cyber security, building peace and safer cities. The Institute is based in Rio
de Janeiro, with personnel across Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. It is supported by bilateral agencies,
foundations, international organizations and private donors.
igarape.org.br
The Institute for Climate and Society (iCS) is a philanthropic organization that promotes prosperity,
justice and low carbon development in Brazil. We operate as a bridge between international and
national funders and local partners. Consequently, we are part of a wide network of philanthropic
organizations that are dedicated to finding solutions to the climate crisis. iCS outlines plans of action
to overcome climate problems from a social perspective. Therefore, it prioritizes measures that, in
addition to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, also result in improvements in the quality of life for
society, especially for those most vulnerable.
climaesociedade.org
The German Embassy in Brasilia provided the funds for this publication.
Original articles in Portuguese. Translated by Isadora Coutinho.
- CLIMATE CHANGE, SOCIAL CONFLICT AND THE COMPLEXIFICATION OF CRIME IN BOLIVIA: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF FLOODS AND STORMS IN CHAPARE AS A COCA GROWING REGION
- TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED GOVERNANCE OF TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS IN SOUTH AMERICA:
BALANCING SECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRITORIALITY
- CLIMATE AND SECURITY IN BRAZIL: THE ROLE OF THE PRESS IN THE DISCUSSION AND
PROMOTION OF PUBLIC POLICIES
- CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY IN THE AMAZON: VULNERABILITY AND RISKS FOR INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES ON THE ACRE - UCAYALI BORDER
- CLIMATE EVIDENCE-BASED POLICING: THE INFLUENCE OF RAINFALL ON THE CRIMINAL
DYNAMICS OF THE CITY OF MANAUS
- CLIMATE SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: AGGRAVATING DOMESTIC PUBLIC
SECURITY RISK IN THE FRAME OF LOW INTERSTATE CONFLICT
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the external participants of the Climate and Security Workshop in LAC who provided valuable
feedback to the articles: Izabella Teixeira, Natalie Unterstell and Tassio Franchi.
Copyediting
Ana Beatriz Duarte
Art direction and layout
Raphael Durão - STORMdesign.com.br
www.igarape.org.br
www.climaesociedade.org