Three Different Approaches to Virtue – Aristotle, Confucius and Lao Zi By Alicia Hennig1 “[…] no modern discussion can share the outlook of an ancient writer.” Bernard Williamsi Introduction This paper presents an overview on the matter of virtue from different philosophical angles. It concentrates on three different schools of thought coming from the West and the East and their respective concepts of virtue. These schools of thought and the therewith-associated personalities and works discussed in this paper are Aristotelian virtue ethics, Confucianism and Daoism. While the connection between Aristotle and virtue ethics is clear and incontestable, the exact authorship of works associated with Confucianism and Daoism is difficult to ascertain with absolute certainty. Yet, this paper is less concerned with the exact authors of this school of thought than with its most representative works as such. Therefore, this paper focuses particularly on the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) by Aristotle, the Analects belonging to Confucianism, and the Dao De Jing coming from Daoism. However, this article does not particularly aim at pointing out similarities of these three schools. As philosophy is always tied to culture and history, the author herself takes a critical stance towards comparative approaches in this context. Rather than to compare she tries to emphasise that since these three schools arose from different cultural and historical contexts a possibility for comparison (see for example Yu, 1998) is rather not given. A concrete linking of the virtues across the various schools only conflates their real meaning and does not do justice to the particular historical context their emergence is embedded in. Consequentially, this paper presents these three different schools next to each other in order to provide an overview rather than a real comparison on the matter of virtue. But what actually is a “virtue”? The Latin word virtus refers to the roman Goddess Virtus, which was the “Roman personification of manly valour” (A Dictionary of Greek and Roman 1 Contact for correspondence: Alicia Hennig, Assistant Professor, School of Basic Sciences and Humanities, Harbin Institute of Technology, Shenzhen Graduate School. E-Mail: alicia.hennig@t-online.de biography and mythology, n.d.). Yet, neither Aristotle, no Encyclopaedia r Confucius or Laozi developed their philosophies in Rome. The greek word aretē in Aristotle actually means “excellence of manly qualities”, because it comes from aristos, which means “best” or “great” (Yu, 1998). In Confucianism and Daoism, de 德 is used and commonly translated with virtue. Yet, neither of these two concepts particularly point to “manly valour” in general (except perhaps for Aristotle’s virtue bravery). So, accordingly they seem to be best translated with “excellence” in the case of Aristotle and “goodness” ii. or “virtue” in the case of Confucianism and Daoism. 1. Three Different Personalities and Their Works In this part, the background of the three different schools of thought and their associated personalities and works are outlined. This is vital, as all personalities and works emerged in different eras, characterised by different historical events. 1.1 Aristotle Aristotle lived in the 4th century BCE in Greece. He can be considered as one of the greatest philosopher of all times. Aristotle was interested in almost any discipline imaginable from the natural sciences, over social sciences to artistic disciplines, stretching far beyond mere philosophical questions. Consequentially, his research and later teachings were very comprehensive and so were his publications. Due to this fact, his works, a broad body covering various disciplines such as ethics, rhetoric, politics or metaphysics for instance, bear a strong relevance until today (Shields, 2015). Aristotle originally wrote two treatises dealing with ethics. One is called the Nicomachean Ethics, the other one the Eudemian Ethics (EE). However, the name NE was only given ex post, perhaps because Nicomachus, Aristotle’s son, edited his original version of one of his ethical treatises. The original order within the NE is not quite clear. Most probably it has been rearranged through later editing. Furthermore, it is assumed that the NE is an improved version of the EE (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2014a). The NE begins with the subject of eudaimonia, happiness and then explains how happiness can be realised by means of virtue. The NE therefore presents a full account on virtue ethics and can be considered as the “first attempt in any European language to formulate a comprehensive theory of conduct” (Marshall 1906, 16). Aristotle was born 384 BCE in Stagira in Northern Greece, which belongs to the Macedonian region. He lived at the time of “Classical Greece”, which refers to the period between the Persian Wars in the beginning of the 5th century BCE and the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE. Particularly the period, in which Aristotle was born, the “Classical era” was also marked by a time of political disorder due to constant wars. The on-going disorder made it possible for the Macedonian king Alexander the Great, who was educated under Aristotle, to conquer Greece in the second half of the 4th century BCE (History.com, Classical Greece, n.d.). It was a “transition period” from the former city-state structure, the polis, which was based on a democratic regime, a regime by the dēmos, the people, to a political world power under Alexander the Great (Wolf 2008, 10). Despite the wars, this was also a period of unparalleled cultural and political achievements, like for example the Parthenon in terms of architecture, the Greek tragedy regarding culture, or the concept of democracy in the political sphere. Several other well-known figures characterised the period of “Classical Greece”, like Herodotus and Thucydides (historians), Hippokrates (physician) and Socrates (philosopher). 1.2 Confucius Reconstructing Confucius’s life is quite a difficult endeavour, as there is not much reliable information on it. Supposedly he lived from 551 BCE to 479 BCE. Confucius, or better Kongzi 孔子, as Confucius was only the Latinised name, was not only a thinker and political figure but perhaps THE thinker when it comes to the social fabric of China. His thinking shaped the social structure in China fundamentally in terms of relations between the government and the people but also within the family. Confucius was born in Lu State and beyond this there cannot be much more stated, as there is no reliable information on how Confucius was brought up, except for that he had perhaps studied ritual under the Daoist Master Lao Daniii (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2013a). Confucius was a teacher, and like Aristotle he founded his own schooliv, namely ru 儒. Ru refers to those people who were later categorised under the name Confucians (Eno, 2010, 1). But this categorisation was made only in retrospective by Sima Qian, a historian of the Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 CE), who supposedly lived from 145 to 85 BCE (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2013b). However, despite being popular as a teacher he could never succeed in attaining a higher official position. During his lifetime he only held minor offices and his advices were not very welcomed in Lu (Ames/Rosemont, 1998, 4). Yet, later on by the end of 4th century BCE, Mengzi refers to Confucius as the greatest person on earth, and considered him as one of the great sage kings (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2013b). The Analects or Lun Yu, in English “Selected Sayings” (Waley 2005, 21), which presents in large parts conversations with his students, were not written and organised in that way by Confucius himself. Rather, some of his disciples collected these brief passages and turned it into an anthology. Hence, the Lun Yu were organised by various people over several centuries and the original date of each of the books varies, as well as the source author (Ames/Rosemont 1998, 1, 8pp). Therefore, the Lun Yu may appear inconsistent in some way and some of the books included in it are allegedly not even of Confucian origin (Waley 2005, 21). In how far the Lun Yu can be seen as a reliable biographical resource about Confucius and his teachings is also challenged by some writers (cp. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2013b vs. Eno, 2015, 5) 1.3 Laozi The history of Daoism supposedly began with its most well-known personalities, Laozi and Zhuangzi. Laozi is the person associated with the Dao De Jing, one of the most prominent works in the Daoist canon. However, his authorship in connection with the Dao De Jing has been challenged. The person of Laozi is said to have lived in the sixth century BCE (and fifth century, see Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2013b; Kohn 2009, 1) during Zhou dynasty (1027 to 221 BCE) being a contemporary of Confucius who lived from 551 to 479 BCE. The term Laozi is often translated with “Old Master”. Yet, Schipper points out that this is only a title of respect and literally Laozi means “Old Child” (Schipper 1993, 121). The earliest records on Laozi come from the historian Sima Qian who lived during Han Dynasty (206 BC to 220 CE), where Laozi has the family name Li, which means “plum tree” (ibid.). However, the Daoists themselves created a mystic story around Laozi’s birth, existence and name (see Schipper 1993, 121pp). Later, the figure of Laozi also turned into a god of the Daoist pantheon under the Han. According to Kohn, they attributed three roles to him: being an immortal, a cosmic deity and “the saviour humankind” (Kohn 2009, 31) The Dao De Jing was written in the 5th century BCE during a time of political turmoil but several times it was recomposed (Kohn 2001, 3). It appears as if the “body of material was continually being edited and re-edited” (Kirkland 2004, 57). The work was composed and recomposed in ways so to suit the respective purpose, for example particular and by that time suitable socio-political messages. Accordingly, there is no ‘nominal founder’ with regard to the Dao De Jing (ibid.). Text passages of the Dao De Jing were first uncovered in 1973 in tombs that were closed approximately in 168 BCE. These were found in Hunan and called the ‘Mawangdui Version’. Another version of the Dao De Ding was found in 1993 in tombs at Guodian in the province of Hubei, which was the capital of the Zhou Dynasty (Kirkland 2004, 54). These tombs date back to 300 BCE. The version, which is known today and based on eighty-one chapters, dates back to the third century CE, when Wang Bi edited the text (ibid.). However, as Kirkland states “The original order of the materials within the Tao Te Ching [refers to Dao De Jing] seems to remain indeterminable” (Kirkland 2004, 54). 2. Three Different Schools of Thought This chapter introduces the three different schools of thought discussed in this paper, namely the Aristotelian School of Thought as presented in Aristotle’s works, particularly in the Politics and Nicomachean Ethics; Confucianism as presented in the Lun Yu and Daoism as presented in the Dao De Jing. The purpose of this chapter is to present the general ideas characterising the respective school but also explaining the socio-political context in which these thoughts emerged. The history outlined in the previous chapter together with the cultural and political context briefly explained in this chapter provide a broader picture of the respective school of thought itself. This broader picture is necessary in order to understand why these philosophies are very different indeed; precisely because their respective philosophies all emerged from different cultural and historical contexts, which significantly shaped the general understanding of the environment and the society, and consequentially the concepts of each author or school by that time. And this in turn leads to realising the specific limitations inherent in these philosophies or schools, which are discussed as well at a later time. Correspondingly, the chapter starts with a general outline of the respective school. Then the cultural and political context in which this philosophy or thought evolved is briefly explained. 2.1 The Aristotelian School of Thought Aristotle distinguished between different kinds of sciences. He developed three categories: the “productive sciences”, which are concerned with literally creating a “product”; the “practical sciences” like ethics and politics, and the “theoretical sciences”, which were focused on the matter of truth (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2015). This paper concentrates on Aristotle’s NE, which belongs to the category of the “practical sciences”. Originally, ethics is a theory concerned with the right action and the good character (Wolf 2008, 11). Yet, for Aristotle it was not simply about realising what is good but also doing what was good, the right way of acting. He was not only concerned with developing a theory of right action but also with giving concrete instructions (ibid.). Accordingly, there is a deep practical dimension to the ethics presented in the NE, which can be seen as a “philosophy of action”. The focus of Aristotle’s virtue ethics as presented in the NE is on how to reach happiness, eudaimonia. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is equal to the good life, that is living in an ethically good way, eu zēn, and acting ethically good, eu prattein (NE 1095a15). His perception of what actually constitutes happiness is three-fold: pursuing pleasure, pursuing virtue or ethically good actions, eupraxia (which was linked to the political part of life), and pursuing contemplation, theōria (which was linked to the philosophical part of life) (Wolf 2008, 12). Happiness as such, according to Aristotle, could be reached through two different ways: eupraxia, good action in the civic or public sphere or theōria, a life of contemplation mostly concerned with focusing on the sciences and philosophy (ibid., 14). These two ways in turn are linked to Aristotle’s idea of virtue or aretē as the means to realise happiness. Aristotle distinguished between the human being as a citizen and as an individual. Therefore, he wrote two different treatises on good human conduct: one, which refers to the political sphere, the Politics, and one, which refers to the individual sphere, the NE. In Aristotle’s theory, participating in the political life had a high priorityv, as the human being was considered a zōon politikon, a political animal, and this activity was seen as a crucial part of reaching eudaimonia. However, in light of changing political circumstances, he perhaps had realised that not everyone was able to accomplish this part and achieve the complete realisation of eudaimonia. By distinguishing between the political and the individual life (the good citizen and the good man), he still allowed for reaching complete eudaimonia even without participation in the political life (ibid., 10pp). The Cultural and Political Context of the Aristotelian School of Thought Aristotle’s philosophy is inevitably embedded in the cultural and historical context of his time. For example, the Greeks greatly enjoyed the arts, like the performing arts visible in the Greek tragedy and other plays, furthermore music, poetry, fine arts and rhetoric. Arts were a vital part of the overall education of the Greek elite and played a major role in the Greek public life (Nisbett 2003, 5). Accordingly, rhetoric and poetry also count among Aristotle’s works, which he considered together with the arts as “productive sciences”, that is, the result of human productivity, a human’s creation. Furthermore, as the historical context outlined above, his school of thought is marked by the social-political conditions of that time. For example, the idea of democracy was different, as the ancient concept discriminated between various groups within the polis, of which actually only one group could be politically active, namely adult males. Also, since the society by that time was very much focused on the adult male as the only group qualifying for political participation, which was considered a sophisticated form of activity, Aristotle’s virtues presented in the NE appear to be comparably male in concept. 2.3 The Confucian School of Thought When it comes to “Confucian thought” it is important to understand that this way of thinking came into existence through Confucius himself but that the philosophyvi as we know it today evolved over time. Yet, the ideas Confucius proposed are not entirely new, rather they depict what had defined the Chinese culture already over centuries before (Ames/Rosemont, 1998, 11). This also becomes visible in Confucius proposing a particular ideal of social conventions explained further below. Generally, Confucianism is a “humanistic” approach since it is focused on society and social structures. It recognises that man is embedded in social relations and has significant relationships with others. As man is inherently a part of the social fabric, the maintenance of social harmony is vital and facilitated by the ideal of moral self-cultivation and following particular rules (Cheung and Chan, 2005, 49; Kirkland 2004, 23). Yet, the Confucius of the Lun Yu was primarily concerned with the matter of moral selfcultivation, which is linked the “man of virtue” (see for example Lun Yu 6.18) and “the superior man”, the ideal of junzi, the ultimate gentleman (see for example Lun Yu 1.2). His idea of self-cultivation is also tied to following particular social conventions (li), as noted above. He favoured particularly the conventions of the bygone Zhou dynasty, also described as Zhou li, which he saw as being representative of a “society’s proper order” (Kirkland 2004, 32). The Cultural and Political Context of Confucius and the Lun Yu Confucius’ sayings, in so far as it were genuinely his, were apparently produced during his lifetime from about 551 BCE to 479 BCE. This was the time of the Eastern Zhou period (771 to 221 BCE), particularly during the Spring and Autumn period, which lasted from 770 to 475 BCE, followed by the period of the Warring States (475 to 221 BCE). By that time the royal house of Zhou 周 was already losing its power. Its aristocratic culture started to being undermined by particularly powerful warlord families. The increasing power and influence by these families also led to the distortion of the Zhou-way of government and its rituals, which were characteristic for the Lu state. Allegedly, Confucius brought back these ideals of the Zhou period, in particular the “Zhou version” of li 禮 (today 礼), which is often translated as “ceremony”, “ritual” or “propriety” (Yu, 1998, 324). Due to his conviction that the Zhou rituals where the rituals worth following, as well as his mastery of the Zhou cultural forms, he became a teacher for some young aristocrats in Lu. With his teachings, Confucius aimed at “transform[ing] society by cultivating moral virtues and persuading rulers to do likewise”; hence, Confucius’ philosophy included a significant “socio-political” program (Kirkland 2004, 33). Allegedly, he concretely aimed at restoring the old Zhou values in Lu in order to reactivate the power of the ducal house in Lu. He failed to do so and as a consequence had to leave his home state (Eno, 2015, ii-iii). After Confucius’ death, during the Warring States period, a real “Confucian” school was formed to pass down teachings from the master to his disciples, precisely for the purpose of reviving the old Zhou traditions and values in order to construct a new society (Kirkland 2004, 33). Also, in the Lun Yu there are several links to the Zhou traditions Confucius apparently favoured, according to Yu (327pp). 2.3 The Daoist School of Thought The philosophy of Daoism, like any other philosophy or religion, is two-fold. First, there is the underlying concept or Weltanschauung of a philosophy. Second, there is the part of practice. Daoism is the philosophy of the dao 道, which means the “way” while “way” here implies the natural way of things. Therefore, particular ideas and associations linked to the natural way are attributed to Daoism, like a certain way of naturalness, following the flow, or the concept of non-action wu wei 无为 (which will be explained further below in more detail). As mentioned above, the Daoist philosophy was only made more concrete under the Han in the second century BCE. The boundaries of this philosophy cannot be clearly defined. Yet, it is possible to determine where some elements in Daoism come from. According to Kohn, Daoism adopted many elements of the Shang religion, which came into existence in the Shang Dynasty (1600 to 1028 BCE). These elements are mostly linked to the religious practice and included deities of the otherworld, and rituals to please those deities, as well as ‘communication’ with them. They also used oracles but in contrast to the Shang, who relied on oracle bones, the Daoists used the Yi Jingvii, The Book of Changes (Kirkland 2004, 29). It presents a ‘divination manual’ that was meant to help people “determine the inherent tendencies in the course of Heaven and aids them in making good decisions through formal judgments and advice.” (Kohn 2009, 5). Other elements of Daoism rest on the particular cosmology developed by the Han, the yinyang cosmology (Kohn 2009, 67). Here, the two complementary forces of yin and yang represent a particular form of dualism but a dualism without dichotomy, where the two forces are fluent and in constant interchange. Both yin and yang are associated with a particular set of characteristics linked to action and daily life.viii 3. Three Different Concepts of Virtue In this chapter, the different concepts of virtue each work or author or school holds are introduced. Thereby, this chapter particularly aims to highlight the different approaches to virtue as such. 3.1 The Concept of Virtue in Aristotle Aristotle’s ethics, as presented in the NE, is a complex approach to virtues and the good life, together with the objective to reach eudaimonia, happiness. Implicit in Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia is the idea of a telosix, a final goal (Marshall 1906, 23; NE 1094a; 1097b). Morally or ethically good conduct expressed in the idea of virtue or excellence, however, is not a “gift” from nature (NE 1103a). It can be only reached through habituation (Marshall 1906, 31), whereby habit is constituted through repeated actionsx (ibid., 39). Therefore, habit “is a confirmed or settled tendency” (ibid., 98). It is not a mere skill but a disposition, hexis. That means it is not simply a particular pattern of behaviour but “a kind of disposition that itself structures one’s reactions to others” (Williams 2007, 7, 37). As Bernard Williams put it: “one becomes virtuous or fails to do so only through habituation” (ibid., 39). Habituation in turn is linked to proper education, which has to start already in early years and is indispensible for developing aretē (ibid., 47; NE 1103b20-25). Proper education for Aristotle was about “feeling pleasure and pain at the right things” (Marshall 1906, 33; NE 1104b10). The idea of virtue or excellence (aretē) in Aristotle is tied to the concept of ergon, which refers to the specific function of a thing. This ergon is not a concept coming from the outside but is inherent in a thing. If the ergon is fulfilled properly, then the specific thing is said to have aretē, excellence, because it fulfils its function. For example the ergon of a knife is to cut, and if it cuts well than it has aretē (Wolf 2008, 13). And when it fulfils its ergon, its function, it is also striving towards its telos, its end, which is its distinctive inherent and natural purpose. Aristotle does not only apply the idea of ergon and telos to things and non-human beings but also to human beings. According to Aristotle, what differentiates the human being from all other beings is his or her capacity for reason, logos. The existence of this capacity is crucial for making the human being a good human being. Hence, the ergon of a human being is to making use of the capacity for reason, his or her proper “function” as a human being so to say (Yu 1998, 323). While the aretē of a human being on the other hand implies using his or her naturally given capacity for reason, logos, properly, which means in the best possible way. If there is aretē in his or her conduct, then he or she is considered an ethically good human beingxi. Being excellent in using his or her faculty of reason furthermore leads to eudaimonia. Yet, the idea of excellence or aretē has two distinct forms: the “intellectual virtue” according to Yue, which is aretē dianoetike and the “ethical virtue”, the aretē ethike (Yu 1998, 324; NE 1103a5). Hence, the human aretē can be used in an intellectual way, which is contemplation, the theoretical or philosophical part of life, the theōria; or in a practical way by acting ethically and prudent, eupraxia, which refers to the practical part of life, the political life. Both are ways to reach eudaimonia (Wolf 2008, 14). Apparently, Aristotle’s idea of happiness includes two extremely different forms: the contemplating vs. the practical, which are due to the dual nature Aristotle’ describes to the human being: being rational and being social, the zōon politikon (Yu 1998, 325). The concept of aretē is linked to Aristotle’s idea of finding the right mean between two extremes. Yet, the right mean is not arithmetic; it does not follow a static calculation so to say. And this is where the human’s capacity for reason comes into play. Only by using reason it can be decided where the right mean between two extreme actions or characteristics lies. To find the right mean, mesotēs, regarding actions is also important to maintain one’s disposition or hexis, as these can be destroyed by either excess or deficiency (NE, 1104a10; 1104a25). However, as Marshall puts it “to hit the mean is in every case difficult”, and further: “it is not easy […] to conduct yourself properly in time, place and circumstance” (Marshall 1906, 127). 3.2 The Concept of Virtue in the Lun Yu Confucius’ Lun Yuxii contains many “virtues”, amongst those are the often recited Confucian li 禮 (or today 礼), ren 仁 and yi 義 (or today 义). This paragraph focuses particularly on li and ren, as well as their relation to each other, while more details on yi can be found in the subsequent paragraph specifically on the virtues in the Lun Yu as such. Apparently, li and ren are framing Confucius’ approach to virtuous behaviour but ren in specific does not appear to be a virtue in the “traditional” understanding. First, the depth and broadness of its meaning seems to exceed what could possibly a virtue, namely a concrete virtuous act or virtuous characteristic. It rather represents the fundamental and at the same time highest form of being good. Second, whether here the word virtue coming from the Latin word virtus fits altogether must be questioned anyway, as Confucius’ approach is not too much focused on “manly valour compared to his predecessors’ attribution of characteristics of manly valour to the idea of renxiii. Rather, he had in mind an extremely morally and socially cultivated person, namely the junzi. Hence it seems more appropriate to link the concept of virtue in Confucius specifically with goodness. The concrete virtues described in the Lun Yu are oftentimes very practical recommendations and instructions Confucius gave his students. These are built around the concepts of li and ren, which are treated in more length below. Li in Confucius’ Lun Yu has many translations. They vary from “ritual” or “rites” over “etiquette” and “propriety” to even “morals” (Ames/Rosemont 1998, 51). The character of li indicates an altar, which is provided with sacrifices. Hence, li tells us about the proper conduct with regard to serving the spirits and thereby positively influencing fortune. Ames and Rosemont translate li with “observing ritual propriety” (ibid.), which reflects the processual character of actions in Chinese philosophy by adding a verb indicating a particular action, namely observing. They describe li as “those meaning-invested roles, relationships and institutions which facilitate communication and foster a sense of community” (ibid.). As Yu mentioned (326), the li are all-encompassing and include various forms of generally formal conduct, over conduct appropriate in a more ceremonial setting, to appropriate behaviour in particular relationshipsxiv. Basically, li is every kind of societal convention or custom, which was seen as appropriate and imperative for being a good person. These customs are passed down from generation to generation, which provide the younger generation with useful and meaningful guidance (Ames/Rosemont 1998, 51). Ren is commonly translated with “virtue”, “benevolence”xv or “humanity” (Ames/Rosemont 1998, 49). Yet, Confucius’ ren, as including the character for ren 人 (human) and for er 二 (two), rather “points toward human relationships” (Yu 1998, 323). Ames and Rosemont, who turn to the oracle bone description for explanation, provide an alternative translation. According to the oracle bones er 二 could as well mean “coming from above” as in shang 上, which represents the early form of er 二. Therefore Ames and Rosemont suggest, “this reading would highlight the growing distinction one accrues in becoming ren” (48). They reject the prevailing translation of ren as “benevolence” or “humanity”, as ren is about a person in its entireness and not merely about a particular characteristic like being benevolent. Ren, they continue, is “one’s cultivated cognitive, aesthetic, moral and religious sensibilities as they are expressed in one’s ritualized roles and relationships.” (49). This is further supported by Lin, already in 1975, where he remarks that Confucius’ ren “encompasses all other virtues, love, honesty, courage and so forth” and that these are “organically related to jen and different manifestations of jen [author’s note: jen refers to ren]” (Lin, 1975, 184). Lin also describes ren as the “highest attainment of moral cultivation” and “the highest level of moral excellence” (ibid.). Yet, even though ren seems to almost unattainable, Confucius points out in Lun Yu 7.30 that it is “already here” (Slingerland) or “at hand” (Legge), which could be interpreted as “every person has the natural resources or capabilities to develop ren” (see also Lin, 1975, 185, 188). Since ren captures the entire personality and its process of becoming so, one could indeed speak of “growing distinction” xvi , as the entire personality as such is to be cultivated in every imaginable aspect. However, ren does not present an intellectual quality. It cannot be learned in solitude through gaining some kind of scientific knowledge. Quite the contrary, ren can only be cultivated in human relations (Lin, 1975, 193). And this is why ren and li bear a direct connection in the Lun Yu 12.1 (“To master oneself and return to li is jen.”xvii), as li presents the “social and ritual norms” (ibid.). This connection is also mentioned in the Lun Yu 3.3 (“What can a man do with li who is not ren?”, taken from the translation by D.C. Lau 1998, see Yu, 1998, 324 for reference). Where a person does not possess ren, he or she can only follow the social rituals and norms in a mechanic or blind way, which reduces following li to a mere formality in order to either maintain one’s reputation, which is dishonest (Lin, 1975, 194). Or, alternatively, li without ren simply leads to following one’s own moral impulse (ibid.), which does not serve the community anymore. Only ren enables a person to follow li by heart and by what is natural (ibid., 188, cp. Tan 2014, 85). Hence, it appears as if there is a kind of symbiotic relation between ren and li. However, Lin for example considers ren to be and end, while li is a means. Yet, li and an environment, which allows for li are indispensable to develop and cultivate ren in the first place (193). And following li is not possible without having ren, while ren can stand alone (ibid., 194). In brief, while li is about “observing ritual propriety” thereby also standing for a framework of “guiding rules of appropriate behaviour” so to speak, ren could be seen as the encompassing “sensibility, which is necessary in order to develop a “sense for appropriateness” to follow or observe li as it is meant to be, which is yi. 3.3 The Concept of Virtue in the Dao De Jing The general concept of virtue in Daoism is linked to nature and the principles, which can be derived from the “natural way of things”. This concept makes Daoism very different from Western philosophy and other Eastern religions or philosophies like Confucianism. In a commentary on a Daoist book on meditation, The Secret of the Golden Flower, C.G. Jung claims “It is characteristic of the Western mind that it has no concept for Tao.” (Wilhelm 1962, 97). And indeed, for a person raised in the Western world and influenced by Western philosophy and religion a concept like the dao 道 may be quite difficult to grasp. The Western mind is not very familiar with the idea of dualism not being dichotomous but complementary and a Weltanschauung, which is based on cycles, as to be found in nature. In his commentary C.G. Jung also describes the Chinese character of the dao as being “[…] made up of the character for ‘head’ and that for ‘going’.” (1962, 97). Today, the dao is interpreted as the Way (Cheung and Chan, 2005, 49), the way of nature, which inspired the underlying principle of the Daoist philosophy (Miller 2006, 13). The Way in Daoism is “universal”, which means it is above the human being and cannot be changed nor conquered by its wisdom. The Way is autonomous from the sphere of human action (Cheung and Chan, 2005, 49). The ‘natural way of things’, the dao, is founded on the principles we find in nature. Yet, the Daoist perception of nature is a very different one and is focused on the most important value nature symbolises: its inherent balance or harmony. The underlying principle of nature is transformation. According to the Daoist philosophy, the natural things, which surround us, were brought into existence by multiple natural transformations and not within the seven days as written in the Bible (Miller, 2006, pp.7). Nature, ziran 自然, in Daoism is seen as a “selforganizing spontaneity of the universe” (Miller, 2006, 8). Accordingly, Daoists value the transformation process, its spontaneous character and its “capacity for autonomous selftransformation” (ibid.). The Daoist perception of nature is a holistic and non-teleological one. It is based on the natural cycle of life where things come and go but no concrete progress is made towards a particular point of time in the future, in contrast to the Western perception (Miller, 2006, 6). 4. Three Different Sets of Virtues This chapter is about describing and explaining the concrete virtues mentioned in the respective works. Its purpose is to highlight that already the virtues or virtue sets, as some virtues can be grouped or belong together, presented in these works differ significantly. These differences also reveal the distinct understanding each philosopher (or group of philosophers by that time, which is the case for the Lun Yu and the Dao De Jing), had in terms of virtues and virtuous behaviour. 4.1 Virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics As mentioned above, Aristotle distinguishes between two forms of aretē or virtue/excellence: the intellectual one, aretē dianoetike, and the practical or ethical one, aretē ethike. In the NE Aristotle concretely mentions nine virtuesxviii , which are linked to the aretē ethike. Another five virtues he links to reasonxix, which therefore connected with the aretē dianoetike. In addition, he separately discusses the virtue of justicexx and its dispositions. Due to limited space only the practical virtues are discussed here in more detail. But what exactly is virtue or how is it constituted? The ethical virtues are learned on the basis of habituation, as already mentioned. Pursuing an action means activity, energeia. Through activity or energeia the disposition is created (NE 1103b20), and of course through proper education in the first place (NE 1103b25). Yet, a disposition can be good, which then is aretē, or bad, kakia. Hence, aretē or virtue/excellence is that part of disposition, which leads to good conduct and this is also expressed in finding the “middle way” between two actions. Accordingly, the nine virtues Aristotle mentioned are: I. Bravery, andreia Bravery is the middle, mesotes, between fear, phobos and boldness, tharrē/thrasys. For Aristotle, fear is fear of malady and death, while boldness is linked to swagger and bravery, which is only pretended (NE 1115a10, 1115b30). II. Moderation, sōphrosynē Moderation is the middle between intemperance, akolasia and pleasure, hēdonē (in the sense of hedonism, the physical pleasure). Therefore, moderation here according to Aristotle is linked to a moderation of the pursuit of bodily or sensual pleasure (NE 1118a), while intemperance is a characteristic of the animal and therefore inadequate for the human being (NE 1118b). Virtues related to exterior goods Beneficence like magnanimity belongs to the virtues dealing with exterior goods or commodities, like for example money, chrēmata, which are not part of a person’s character. III. Beneficence or generosity, eleutheriotes Beneficence of generosity lay between the extremes avarice, aneleutheria and squander, asōtia. Aristotle viewed beneficence in terms of wealth. While greedy people always try to keep their money at all costs (which is also different to being frugal with regard to money), squanderer do not have a proper idea of spending money at all and tend to waste it. Therefore, the virtue of beneficence is about giving but thereby using the right measure, neither too much nor too less (NE 1119b25-30, 1120a25). IV. Magnanimity, megaloprepeia For Aristotle, magnanimity was in between pettiness, mikroprepeia and blatancy, banausia/apeirokalia. Like beneficence, this virtue is related to wealth. Magnanimity requires the right measure, to realise what is appropriate to give. Accordingly, this virtue is also linked to knowledge (NE 1122a30-35). Magnanimity is in a way similar to beneficence but the difference is, while the magnanimous person can be always beneficent, because he or she always have enough to give; a beneficent person is not necessariy magnanimous (NE 122a30), as beneficence is about using the right measure when giving but in accordance with one’s financial situation. Virtues related to honour Pride and gentleness are virtues related to honour. They describe the right mode of action in situations where honour plays a role. V. Pride, megalopsychia Pride lies in between faintheartedness (being timid), mikropsychos and vanity, chaunotes. For Aristotle authentic pride was a virtue. He perceived it as finding yourself worthy of something great, while at the same time truly being worthy of it.xxi On the other hand, one who thinks of being worthy only of the small things but actually deserves more is fainthearted or to put it more psychologically, lacks selfesteem. Yet, someone who thinks great of him or herself but simply is not is considered as being vain (NE 1123b5-10). Pride is furthermore accompanied by a certain feeling of appropriateness when it comes to acting towards others, for example the pride man according to Aristotle acts greatly towards the wealthy but rather modest towards people from the middle class (NE 1124b20). VI. Gentleness, praotēs Gentleness is in between and a kind of dispassionateness, aorgēsia and quick temper, origlotēs. Dispassionateness does not completely reflect Aristotle’s original meaning. However, the disposition he had in mind was someone who cannot be enraged at all, not even with regard to matters where a certain level of “anger” or even “rage” may be appropriate. A person, who is not capable of any such passion, is a fool according to Aristotle (NE 1126a). Quick temper on the other hand is a vice and here Aristotle differentiates between three different forms: angry, choleric and bitter. While angry implies getting angry about things very quickly, choleric means that someone almost always gets intensively angry about even minor issues, and the bitter person stays angry for a long while and is difficult to propitiate (NE 1126a10-20). The virtue, gentleness, on the other hand does not mean someone cannot be angry at all, because that according to Aristotle is also a vice. The idea of gentleness implies that he or she does not get too emotional about things and does not act on impulse but with deliberation (NE 1125b30-35). Social virtues Kindness, truthfulness, skilfulness and shame count among the social virtues, which properly guide our behaviour towards other people. VII. Kindness, philia Being kind lies in between striving for admiration, areskos and not being concerned about one’s behaviour towards others at all, dyskolos. Here, Aristotle uses the word philia, which actually means friendship. But for him being kind presents also an important quality of a good friend (NE 1126b20). He contrasts it with the demand for admiration, which he links to people who constantly praise things and never disagree in order to avoid unpopularity at all costs. On the other hand, there are people who do not care whether others dislike them or not. This kind of people Aristotle describes as either being merely “difficult” or even contentious (NE 1126b10-15). VIII. Truthfulness or authenticity, aletheia Truthfulness is the middle way between feigned modesty, eirōneia and showing-off, alazoneia. While feigned modesty means denying or making smaller one’s possessions, showing-off is the other extreme by pretending a status so as to appear more prestigious. Both extremes are linked to deceit (NE 1127a15-30). IX. Agility or skilfulness, eutrapelos Agility lies between being a mome, a clown, bōmolochos and being boorish, agroikos or starched, sklēros. People, who constantly ridicule things, are momes or clowns according to Aristotle. They can even be vulgar, as they take things too far. On the other hand, people who are not humorous at all are considered boorish or stiff. These people are not very social, as they do not contribute to a social life and take offence easily (NE 1128a5-10, 1128b). The agile person on the other hand is skilful enough to joke in an appropriate way, which also includes discretion (NE 1128a15). 4.2 Virtues in the Lun Yu The Lun Yu is full of “virtues” or instructions on how to behave properly. In this chapter therefore only a few can be discussed in more detail. After having laid out the framing concepts of li and ren in more detail above, this part concentrates on concrete characteristicsxxii particularly enabling a person to become virtuous or good. In Lun Yu 17.6 Confucius describes five characteristics as constituting “perfect virtue” (Legge) or Goodness (Slingerland), these are namely reverence, gong 恭, magnanimity, kuan 寬 trustworthiness, xin 信, diligence, min 敏 and kindness, hui 惠 according to the Slingerland translationxxiii . In being reverent one avoids disgrace and by being magnanimous one wins over the people. When one is trustworthy or sincere, one will make others trust in him or her. Being diligent is important in order to achieve results and finally kindness is vital in order to make people willing to help. Yet, Ames and Rosemont argue that xin is more complex and is not simply trustworthiness. They state, good intention cannot be enough neither in saying nor in doing. It is also about doing the things said in a good way. And since Chinese philosophy is of processual and relational nature, xin is two-sided: it means both “the commitment of the benefactor and the confidence of the beneficiary” that the things said are carried out well (Ames/Rosemont 1998, 53). Furthermore, in 13.19S Confucius mentions being dutiful, zhong 忠xxiv (along with being reverent 恭 and respectful 敏xxv ) with regard to “perfect virtue” and Goodness. In 9.25S and 12.10S zhong is mentioned together with xin, that is, being dutiful and “trustworthy”, as the so-called “first principles” (Legge) or “guiding principles” (Slingerland). In 4.15 zhong is also mentioned together with shu 恕 as 忠恕. Both characters include the notion of “heart-and-mind”, xin 心 (Ames/Rosemont 1998, 59). They translate this combination with “doing one’s utmost” for zhong and shuxxvi with “putting oneself in the other’s place” (ibid.). However, Slingerland explains that he finds “dutiful“ more appropriatexxvii for zhong and translates shu simply as “understanding” (Slingerland 2003, 34). Yet, his idea of understanding includes taking others into consideration and to “imaginatively project oneself into another’s place” (ibid.), which in turn corresponds with Ames/Rosemont. Accordingly, zhong shu can be seen as doing one’s best or fulfilling one’s duties from the perspective of the other. Shu is furthermore linked to the “Golden Rule” in 15.24S (see also 12.2S): “Do not impose upon others what you yourself do not desire”. Yi 義 (today 义) is often mentioned in connection with ren and li and therefore presents another important concrete characteristic of a good man. More precisely it is the virtue of the superior man junzi 君子 (see 15.18L). Yi is often translated with “righteousness” (ibid.), which means “following religious or moral rules” (see Merriam-Webster Dictionary, righteous, n.d.). In Lau’s translation of the Lun Yu yi is also translated with “moral” or “morality”, as Lau seems to present Confucius particularly as a “moral philosopher” according to Ames/Rosemont (53). However, morality in a contemporary and pre-Kantian Western sense also carries connotations such as “reason”, “autonomy” (ibid.), or “free will” and therefore is not very suitable as translation, as these connections do not consist in this particular context. Ames/Rosemont suggest to translate yi with “appropriateness”, which also better fits into the context of li and ren (ibid., 54). A sense for appropriateness is important in order to well perform li and thereby becoming integrated into the community by signalling trustworthiness and reliability. Ames/Rosemont further remind the reader to keep in mind that yi in Confucius’ writings is also about acting appropriately in a social and religious context (55). In 12.10S this connection is further illuminated, as zhong xin 忠信 and yi are connected here: “Make it your guiding principle to be dutiful and trustworthy, and always move in the direction of what is right”. In brief, there are many characteristics making a person a virtuous or good one. Here namely reverence, magnanimity, trustworthiness, diligence, and kindness, dutifulness and appropriateness have been discussed. Yet, the Lun Yu has much more to offer, which cannot be discussed here due to limited space. 4.3 Virtues in the Dao De Jing From nature as the underlying concept in Daoism concrete virtues or instructions are deducted and presented in the Dao De Jing. The subsequent analysis of the virtues presented in the Dao De Jing is based on eight different translations in English language. Conveniently, these were already compiled by Bolsen in his book Lao Tzu’s Tao-Teh-Ching. Bolsen’s compilation includes translations (in a chronological order) by Yuntang Lin (1942), Arthur Waley (1958), Robert Hendricks (1963), Wing-tsit Chan (1969), Gia-fu Feng and Jane English (1989), John C.H Wu (1989) and Thomas Cleary (1991).xxviii In the Dao De Jing roughly 34 chaptersxxix can be found which deal with virtues. It includes three major themes: passages related to the dao, the virtues and the sage. Furthermore, there are additional chapters on the matter of wu wei and the principle of reversionxxx. Yet, unlike the supposed separation of the Dao De Jing in a first part on the dao (chapter 1 to 37), virtues are also found in many chapters preceding the 37th chapter. Most of these virtues refer to a personal context while a few of them also refer to a political context in the sense of how to govern a country well. The virtues, which are compiled here, present a condensed and consolidated version of the virtues mentioned throughout the Dao De Jing. However, this list is by no means exhaustive. I. II. Being frugal Being benevolent III. Being kind IV. Being efficient and effective in matters V. VI. Being serious and aware of consequences Being supportive I. Being modest or humblexxxi This virtue has several dimensions. First, it indicates of not being too proud, or arrogant, which also means that someone does not show off, boasts or brags about his or her accomplishments. The meaning of this virtue is very pragmatic: just fulfil your duties but do not take credit for it nor expect gratitude or recognition. Being modest and humble in some part also refers to being benevolent. When it comes to benevolence, this should be pursued in an altruistic way without expecting something in return or gratitude. Modesty is also expressed in lowering oneself, following and walking behind instead of taking the lead. Here, not taking the lead can be also linked to not trying to compete with others. Competition is like a spiral: once you are in it you cannot stop to always try being better than others. Competition therefore also goes against modesty. Finally, appreciating the small things in life is very important. It also makes things easier with the attitude of for example accomplishing one step at a time. Even if it is a rather small step, it is an accomplishment. II. Being frugalxxxii Being frugal, economic or sparing is an important virtue in Daoism. One should not be attached to status, material gains or wealth. All these attachments lead to a very uneconomic behaviour and waste of resources. Staying away from desire is important in this context, because desire creates wants and supposed needs. Here, contentment is the key. III. Being benevolentxxxiii The right behaviour towards others is very important. Therefore, for a Daoist it is crucial responding to people in positive way. This is done by being benevolent, gentle and kind towards others and having mercy, love (what is meant here is rather universal love like agape, not like eros), pity or compassion for people. Furthermore, by not pursuing any self-interest or personal interest when acting, a person can be considered as being benevolent as he or she focuses on the other person rather than on him or herself. IV. Being kindxxxiv Being kind is different from being benevolent. It refers to a good-natured character. This means not being violent, aggressive or oppressive towards others and not seeking revenge. Instead, the ideal Daoist person shall be tempered and not angry or mad. Petty-mindedness also stands in the way of being kind. A person, who takes everything overly serious and tends to reckon up things, cannot be considered a truly kind person. V. Being efficient and effective in mattersxxxv Under this virtue there are two themes. One is being efficient in handling one’s affairs, which also indicates achieving results and bringing things to a conclusion. The other one is knowing when to act, choosing the right moment to act and knowing when to stop when it is enough. VI. Being serious and aware of consequencesxxxvi Having certain seriousness is vital for a Daoist. This should be applied in three ways. First, one should not use words lightly. Once expressed words are there and cannot be taken back. Second, things should not be taken too easy. If they are not dealt with in a timely manner they could turn into much bigger and complicated issues, which are then much more difficult to deal with. Third, one should not agree too easily with people. This may undermine his or her credibility. Take your time to rethink the positions, critically examine them and then decide whether you want to agree or not. An agreement, which is made too early, may cause an unnecessarily difficult situation. VII. Being supportivexxxvii Being supportive without using force is one of the main themes regarding the virtues expressed in the Dao De Jing. It is directly linked to the Principle of Non-Action or wu wei. Again under this virtue there are four different sub themes. The first one is to benefit others without expecting gratitude. This is not only linked to modesty, it can be also linked to supportive action. The second one is not to assert oneself and not to interfere with others regarding their affairs, intentions and the like, at least as long as there is not any strong indication for interference given. To assert oneself also means to suppress others, to dominate others, and to be superior to them. This is clearly against other virtues proposed in the Dao De Jing, like lowering oneself, following behind and not taking the lead. The third one is to act without self-interest or personal interest. When a person acts only out of self-interest he or she cannot be a truly supportive. When the personal interest is dominating and a person is following his or her own way, he or she will not be able to focus too much on others and their potential needs anymore. Furthermore, pursuing a personal interest my interfere with others, as in order to accomplish one’s interest one often has to assert oneself, pushing one’s interests ahead. The fourth one is being supportive through leading or stewarding people, through fostering their growth without dominating them, or using one’s authority. The ideal Daoist person just gives support, benefits others in an altruistic way and guides them without force. The Daoist ideal of a virtuous person consists of the seven major virtues named above (of course this interpretation and listing is not exhaustive nor is it outright objective). Generally, the Daoist ideal of a virtuous person is someone who is self-sufficient and modest. It presents an image of a person who is interested in others in a positive way by giving guidance and support, while being benevolent and kind. It is a dutiful person who fulfils his or her tasks without expecting recognition or gratitude. The ideal person is also a person who has the feeling for the right time and knows when to act and when to stop. When acting, this person does not follow his or her self-interest, which could cause interference with other people. 5. Summary & Conclusion Over the past pages three different approaches to virtue have been outlined. In sum, the Western approach differs from the Eastern approach significantly in the aspects outlined below. First, there is a general difference when it comes to the perception of things. The Greek believed in essence, that is the idea that all things have “a reality distinct from their concrete embodiments in object”, which means their essence or substance is independent from how we human beings perceive these objects (Nisbett 2003, 9). Yet, Chinese philosophy generally takes a different stance and perceives things as “events”. Ames and Rosemont explain this by the example of a tree, which appearance changes during the different seasons, i.e. “events”. Every season the tree has a different appearance, which indeed is real, because we human beings can sensually experience it, i.e. seeing it (Ames/Rosemont 1998, 21). Accordingly, the perception in Chinese philosophy is relational, subjective and sensual. The Greeks after Socrates in contrast wanted to derive knowledge independently of these sources, because they started distrusting their senses (Nisbett 2003, 8pp). Second, the here presented philosophies differ with regard to their focus. While Aristotle appears to pursue a “philosophy of action”, as praxis is a considerable part of is approach, Confucius’ philosophy is very much oriented towards society and more of a particularly “social philosophy”, and the approach in the Dao De Jing offers a third option of a “natural philosophy” with regard to the nature or Wesen of the human being, its existence and environment. Third, the approach each school pursues consequentially differs as well. While Aristotle and Confucius are clearly anthropocentric, as they both focus on the human being and its relations, Daoism is focussing on the human being in the context of its (natural) environment. Fourth, the idea of what a good life is differs. Aristotle found the good life, and particularly happiness, in active participation in politics and philosophical contemplation. He tried to unite two very different approaches under his telos of eudaimonia, which could be reached by appropriate behaviour, i.e. excellence. A major part of his idea of the good life is based on action and this is why he developed a comprehensive virtue ethics. However, by excellent conduct the Greeks also thought they could escape the arbitrary force of fortune (Williams, 2007, 5; NE 1099b3). Confucius on the other hand has also developed a comprehensive virtue ethics but he saw the good life in being a part of the community. Yet, in order to becoming a part of a community, one must be familiar with the social norms and conventions and do his best to follow these. Therefore, he emphasised self-cultivation. Daoism in contrast is neither very political not very social. Yet, it is very much about selfcultivation but in a very different sense compared to Confucianism. For in the Dao De Jing self-cultivation actually means leaving the values imposed by society behind and returning to one’s nature, which means adopting the characteristics described further above. Fifth, the values emphasised differ. Aristotle saw a great value in cultivating its behaviour in order to reach eudaimonia but philosophically speaking the object of his philosophy, namely the human being, seems to be very occupied with him or herself and his or her telos. Hence, wisdom and happiness seem to be the main concerns of the Aristotelian individual. While Confucius absolutely underlined the human being in the context of its social relations, particularly familial relations, and therefore put a high emphasis on morally good and appropriate behaviour. In Daoism again, there is not such thing as wisdom in the sense of contemplation, or morally good behaviour towards the society and particularly not in the context of “observing rules of propriety”. The wisdom of the Dao De Jing is about simplicity, modesty and submissiveness and its “social program” is about being kind, supportive and benevolent but without an emphasis on the value of society. Furthermore, there is no specifically morally good behaviour in the Dao De Jing, as the perceptions of morality is necessarily bound to social conventions. In sum, this list could is definitely not exhaustive but it outlines particular differences between these three approaches. However, there are also “similarities”, yet, perhaps more coincidentally so. For example the idea of excellence in Aristotle could be also attributed to Confucius’ virtuous person, as cultivating ren is seen as the highest attainment (see also the idea of junzi, which is not discussed here). Also, both Aristotle and Confucius follow a very practical approach to virtue by giving more or less concrete instructions with regard to appropriate behaviour. This can be also seen in the Dao De Jing. Furthermore, all these practical approaches require a human being, which is not just following rules mechanically but which can use reason (in the case of Aristotle) or some other capacity of knowledge to decide according to the situation given. By this approach Aristotle also differs from later moral ethicists like for example Kant, who had a less action-based approach and highlights concepts of obligation and duty instead. Most certainly there are even more similarities than these to be found in these three approaches. But again, as with the differences, also the similarities here only serve the purpose to outline to the reader some examples. In brief, there are for sure many differences between these three approaches. These come quite naturally, as the cultural and historical context particularly between Western and Eastern philosophy is distinct. Hence, when it comes to comparisons, specifically between Western and Eastern approaches, one should be careful not to conflate the distinct approaches for the sake of merely finding similarities. Each of these approaches is distinctive in it own nature. And instead of skimming these for supposed similarities, in order to “connect” the West with the East, we should rather come to appreciate and embrace these differences for the purpose of using these as an inspiration and additional source for learning about our own philosophies. This article tried to provide an alternative perspective on Western and Eastern virtues, namely those of Aristotle, Confucius and Laozi, by actually not weighing these virtues too much against each other but rather by presenting these next to each other, leaving them their own distinctiveness. However, because of this particular perspective this article for sure has its limitations. 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Philosophy East and West 48.2 (1998): 323. i See Williams, 2006, 49 ii Here goodness and good are written in italic to specifically highlight it as moral goodness or being morally good in contrast of good, which could also merely relate to “being good at something”, like for example swimming. iii Whether Lao Dan can be also linked to the figure of Laozi is challenged (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2013a) iv Allegedly, Confucius also founded the Ju School, according to Liu Wu Chi but this cannot be stated with certainty, as others claim Confucius was only associated with this school, as belonging to the class of Ju. Yet, the school was founded much earlier (see Liu 1955, 13; compare Taylor 2005, 316pp) v Initially it was the theōria, the contemplation and the philosophical activity, which Aristotle considered as the more important part of eudaimonia (Williams 2007, 35). But apparently Aristotle was also a very pragmatic man and he realised that reaching eudaimonia only by contemplation, theōria, required something divine. Accordingly, the individual relies on realising eudaimonia through ethical action, eupraxia (Kullmann 2003, 18pp). Consequentially, there was a shift from a former priority on contemplation to prioritising political action and eupraxia as a means to realise eudaimonia, based on the idea that the human being is a zōon politikon. This shift was followed by a differentiation between the human being in the political sphere and the individual in private life, as another refinement with regard to how to reach eudaimonia in times of political instability. vi It should not be forgotten here that Confucianism is not only a philosophy but also a religion in the broader sense with liturgical elements and in which Confucius has divine qualities. However, these got “lost in translation” for at least two reasons. First, Chinese philosophers of the 19th and 20th century presented Confucianism as a more humanistic approach themselves. And latest during Communism the Marx’ ideal was picked up which viewed religions as deceptive. Second, “enlightened” and intellectual Westerners thought that religion is of less value and primitive compared to philosophy. Hence, it was never in their interest to present Confucianism in its entirety also including liturgical elements (Kirkland 2004, 31, see also 227, endnote 46). vii The Yijing was only compiled into a coherent book by Confucius in the fifth century BCE (Kohn 2009, viii The characteristics linked to action are (first is yang, second is yin): active <> structive, birth <> completion, impulse <> response, move <> rest, change <> nurture, expansion <> contraction. In daily life these characteristics turn into (first is yang, second is yin) heaven <> earth, spring <> fall, summer <> winter, day <> night, big <> small, ruler <> minister, man <> woman (Kohn 2009, 67) ix That everything is striving towards a telos is underlying foundation of Aristotle’s philosophy and his Weltanschauung. The developments in nature, as well as the human being are directed towards a telos, a final end. Reaching this telos means fulfilling its “distinctive purpose that defines its [their] fundamental nature“ (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2014b). x However, the idea of habituation only applies to ethical virtue, the aretē ethike. The intellectual virtue, aretē dianoetike is learned through instruction or guidance (NE 1103a). xi Yu states here that acting rational, which could be seen as the human ergon, does not necessarily imply that this action is also ethical. However, if we take a closer look into Aristotle’s idea of good conduct, we will find that his entire theory of conduct is based on the prudence: “[…] the deliberative division of the mind has two forms, cleverness and prudence, so there are two forms of moral conduct, the natural and the complete, and to the latter prudence is indispensable”, and Marshall referring to Socrates: “he was wrong in thinking that all virtue is prudence, but he was right in saying that it could not exist without it” (Marshall 1906, 34, 368). Accordingly, the concept of virtuous behaviour presupposes prudence. Therefore, it is meant to be acting “prudential”, rather than acting “rational”, which could also imply mere self-interest, as observed by Yu (compare Yu 1998, 325). xii Two different translations of the Lun Yu are mostly used here: the older one by Legge, and a contemporary one by Slingerland. Either a capital L or S indicates the respective translation used after the respective chapter number. xiii The characteristics of a person having ren are also sometimes referred to as being “brave” or “strong”. These connotations are derived from early poems (Lu-ling) from the Book of Songs, which dates back to the 7th century, long before Confucius lived. These proems, however, describe the characteristics particularly of a “noble huntsman”. Therefore, these cannot be seen as general characteristics of a person of ren (see Lin, 1975, 177, 200). Another poem from the Book of Songs points out characteristics such as being “manly” or “manhood”. Yet, these are all connotations of the pre-Confucian era. By the time of Confucius it seems the meaning of the term has changed to also including moral connotations (see Lin, 1975, 180pp). xiv In contrast to later Confucian works the Lun Yu only compass three of the so called five relationships or wu lun 五伦 (Wang et al., 2012, 509; Ip, 2009, 466), namely the relations between parents and son, which is filial pity or xiao 孝, emperor to subject and the relationship between brothers, di 弟. The relationship among friends and between husband and wife are not mentioned here. xv See for ren translated as “virtue” or “benevolent” the Legge translation of the Lun Yu, particularly 12.22, where Legge translates ren with “benevolence”, while in a chapter with a similar structure he translates it with “virtue”, see 13.19. xvi This is further supported by Lin, who states, “moral excellence should be a natural growth of what is distinctive in man, this distinctive human quality is his natural identity. Man should cultivate and develop it in so far as he wants to keep and sharpen this identity” (Lin, 1975, 188) xvii It is not quite clear to which translation Lin is referring here but there are corresponding translations from other translators, such as Sun (“restraining yourself and returning to li is ren”, 1993, 306) and Tu (“to conquer yourself and return to propriety is jen [ren].”, 1968, 30), see here Charlene Tan for reference and longer discussion (Tan 2014, 165). xviii Originally, shame, aidōs is also listed among the social virtues. Yet, in the concrete chapter on shame Aristotle explains that shame is actually not a virtue or a disposition for virtue but rather an emotion, pathos. For Aristotle, being shameful is primarily directed at fear of dishonour. He adds that the feeling of shame is not appropriate at every age but rather applies to the young ones, as they more often tend to make wrong decisions. Furthermore, shame cannot be seen as a characteristic of a good human being since it only occurs in the context of inappropriate actions, which should be desisted anyway (NE 1128b15-25). xix The five dispositions linked to the intellectual virtues, aretē dianoetike, are: craftsmanship, technē; science, epistēmē, sagacity, phronēsis; wisdom, sophia, and intuitive reason or a “higher mind“, nous (for more see NE 1139b15-1141b5). Aristotle also mentions three more virtues particularly connected with sagacity, phronēsis: being prudent or well-advised, euboulia; understanding, synthesis and eusynthesis, and discernment, gnōmē (NE 1142b1143b15). xx Aristotle dedicates an entire book, his fifth book, to the matter of justice, dikaiosynē. There, he discusses two ways of justice, a more general one and a more specific one, where he expands on distributive justice and just ways of exchange. Furthermore, he elaborates on political justice, and fairness, epieikeia (NE 1129a-1138b10). xxi Apparently, modesty in this respect is not appreciated by Aristotle. For him moderateness in terms of pride only meant finding oneself worthy of small things and being worthy of small things (NE 1123b5). xxii Except for wisdom or zhi 智 all other characteristics treated in the Confucian wu chang 五 常, which are meant to “nurture an individual’s inner character and further their ethical maturation” (Wang et al., 2012, 509), have been treated in this chapter. xxiii Compare with Legge, which sounds somewhat awkward: “Gravity, generosity of soul, sincerity, earnestness, and kindness” (Lun Yu 17.6) xxiv Here, Legge translates zhong with faithful, which is somewhat misleading as it can also imply being loyal or trustily next to being diligent. xxv Min 敏 was translated by Slingerland as “diligent” before but the translation of min as respectful here is due to the context. The goodness, which is referred to in 13.19 is linked to proper behaviour among “uncultivated tribes” (Legge) or namely the “Yi and Di barbarians” (Slingerland). Therefore, proper behaviour is more about being respectful than being diligent though both times min is used. xxvi Legge for example translated shu with reciprocity in 15.24, which is totally misleading as reciprocity means „a situation or relationship in which two people or groups agree to do something similar for each other“ (see Merriam-Webster dictionary, Reciprocity, n.d.). xxvii Slingerland prefers to translates zhong with dutiful as opposed to Ames/Rosemont’s “doing one’s utmost”, as he sees it also in the context of the ritual duties of a political subordinate. Therefore, it is not just about personal achievements but about fulfilling one’s duty (see Slingerland 2003, 34 for more details on that discussion). xxviii The idea behind this approach of using different translations was that sometimes the meaning of a passage does not become clear by only reading one translation. xxix These chapters are: 7-10, 13, 15-17, 19, 22-24, 26, 29, 30, 32, 33, 44, 46, 52, 55, 58, 59, 63, 64, 66-68, 71, 72, 76, 77, 79, 81 xxx Passages on wu wei are to be found in chapters 3, 37, 43, 48, 63, 64; passages on the principle of reversion or related to it are to be found in chapters 36, 39, 42, 66, 76, 78 xxxi Being modest or humble is expressed in chapter 9 (“claim wealth and titles and disaster will follow”, Feng&English version), chapter 10 (“working yet not taking credit”, Feng&English version), chapter 22 (“he does not boast himself […], he does not pride himself”, Lin version), chapter 30 (“effective but not proud, effective but not arrogant”, Cleary version), chapter 77 (“he has no desire to display his excellence”, Chan version) xxxii Being frugal or sparing, i.e. acting with restraint is expressed in chapter 44 (“therefore, he who loves most spends most”, Lin version), chapter 59 (“For only if you are sparing can you, therefore, early submit to the Way”, Henricks version) xxxiii Being benevolent and acting without self-interest are expressed in chapter 7 (“Through selfless action, he attains fulfilment”, Feng&English version), chapter 8 (“In dealing with others be gentle and kind”, Feng&English version), chapter 67 (Here referring to the “three treasures”: “The first is deep love”, Chan version), chapter 81 (“Having given what he had to others, What he has is even greater”, Henricks version) xxxiv Being kind in the way of not being aggressive or violent is expressed in chapter 68 (“A good soldier is not violent, A good fighter is not angry, A good winner is not vengeful”, Feng&English version) xxxv Being efficient or effective is mentioned in the chapters 8 (“In business affairs, he loves ability; In his actions, he loves choosing the right time”, Lin version), chapter 15 (Here referring to the right time of action: “Who can wait quietly while the mud settles? Who can remain still until the moment of action?”, Feng&English version), chapter 30 (“Therefore the good are effective, that is all”, Cleary version), chapter 63 (“regard the small as important, make much of little”, Clearly version), chapter 64 (Here referring to the right time of action: “Deal with it before it happens, Set things in order before there is confusion”, Feng&English version) xxxvi Being serious/aware of consequences is mentioned in chapter 23 (with regard to the value of words: To talk little is natural”, Feng&English version), chapter 63 (“if you take it easy a lot, you’ll have a lot of problems”, Cleary version) xxxvii Being supportive is mentioned in chapter 10 (“Help them to grow and don’t rule them”, Henricks version), chapter 30 (“He achieves his purpose but does not aim to dominate”, Chan version), chapter 51 (with regard to “actions” of the Way: “It is the steward yet exercises no authority”, Lau version), chapter 66 (“And leads the people by putting himself behind”, Wu version), chapter 67 (Referring to the “three treasures”: “The third is daring not to be ahead of others”, Feng&English version)