Engaging local
communities in
tackling illegal
wildlife trade
Can a ‘Theory of Change’ help?
Duan Biggs, Rosie Cooney, Dilys Roe,
Holly Dublin, James Allan, Dan Challender
and Diane Skinner
Discussion Paper
Biodiversity;
Natural resource management
August 2015
Keywords:
Wildlife crime, illegal wildlife trade, community-based
approaches, livelihoods, theory of change
About the authors
James Allan is a PhD candidate at the Centre of Excellence for
Environmental Decisions and the Centre for Biodiversity and
Conservation Science, the University of Queensland, Australia.
Duan Biggs (corresponding author) is a research fellow in
the Centre of Excellence for Environmental Decisions and
the Centre for Biodiversity and Conservation Science at the
University of Queensland. Email d.biggs@uq.edu.au
Dan Challender is a programme officer focussing on
sustainable use and trade within the IUCN Global Species
Programme.
Rosie Cooney chairs the Sustainable Use and Livelihoods
Specialist Group (SULi), a joint venture of IUCN’s Commission
on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy (CEESP) and its
Species Survival Commission (SSC).
Holly Dublin is a member of the SULi steering committee
and chair of the IUCN Species Survival Commission’s African
Elephant Specialist Group.
Dilys Roe leads the Biodiversity Team at IIED and is a member
of the SULi steering committee.
Diane Skinner is an independent environmental and wildlife
consultant based in Zimbabwe and a member of SULi.
Acknowledgements
This discussion paper is based on preparation for, and
discussions held at, the international symposium “Beyond
enforcement: communities, governance, incentives and
sustainable use in combating wildlife crime” held in Muldersdrift,
South Africa in February 2015. We would like to acknowledge
the support of USAID, GIZ, and the Austrian Ministry of the
Environment for that symposium. This paper was produced with
funding from UK aid from the UK Government, however, the
views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the UK
Government.
Published by IIED, August 2015.
Biggs, D, Cooney, R, Roe, D, Dublin, H, Allan, J, Challender, C
and Skinner, D (2015) Engaging local communities in tackling
illegal wildlife trade: Can a ‘Theory of Change’ help? IIED
Discussion Paper. IIED, London.
http://pubs.iied.org/14656IIED
ISBN 978-1-78431-236-7
Printed on recycled paper with vegetable-based inks
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The aim of the Natural Resources Group is to build
partnerships, capacity and wise decision-making for fair and
sustainable use of natural resources. Our priority in pursuing
this purpose is on local control and management of natural
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About SULi
The IUCN Sustainable Use and Livelihoods Specialist
Group (SULi) is a joint initiative of IUCN’s Commission on
Environmental, Economic and Social Policy (CEESP) and
Species Survival Commission (SSC). It is a global volunteer
network of around 300 experts in sustainable use of wild
resources and how these contribute to livelihoods. Its mission
is to promote both conservation and livelihoods through
enhancing equitable and sustainable use of wild species and
their associated ecosystems.
About CEED
The Centre of Excellence for Environmental Decisions (CEED)
is a multi-centre network of conservation researchers working
on the science of effective decision-making to better conserve
biodiversity. It includes the University of Queensland, the
Australian National University, the University of Melbourne, the
University of Western Australia, Royal Melbourne Institute of
Technology (RMIT), Australia, and Commonwealth Scientific
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), and Imperial
College (London). Our members working on illegal wildlife trade
are based at the University of Queensland. CEED is funded
by the Australian Research Council’s Centre of Excellence
programme.
IIED DISCUSSION PAPER
Recent alarming rises in illegal wildlife trade (IWT)
show that tough law enforcement is not enough to
stop poachers devastating populations of iconic
or endangered species. Local people must be
empowered to benefit from conservation and
be supported to partner with law enforcement
agencies in the fight against wildlife crime. Here
we present a ‘Theory of Change’ for understanding
how community-level interventions can help in
tackling IWT. Do the ‘pathways’ we present reflect
your experiences from IWT-related projects and
programmes? Do the assumptions that we suggest
hold true? Please join the discussion and help
expand the theory to support better policy and
practice on the ground.
Contents
Summary
4
1 Why involve local communities in the fight
against illegal wildlife trade?
6
2 What is a Theory of Change?
9
3 Towards a Theory of Change for engaging
local communities in tackling IWT
12
Methods and approach
Exploring the four pathways
Importance of enabling conditions
13
13
15
4 Recognising complexity and dynamism
17
Annex 1: Assumptions underlying the
Theory of Change
19
Join the debate
24
Notes
25
Related reading
26
List of acronyms
26
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3
ENGAGING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN TACKLING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE
Summary
Wildlife crime is at the top of the international
conservation agenda. Poaching and associated illegal
wildlife trade (IWT) are devastating populations of iconic
wildlife species such as rhinos, elephants and tigers, as
well as a host of lesser known ones such as pangolins,
some birds, reptiles, primates, medicinal and aromatic
plants and timber species. It is well-recognised that
there is no simple solution to tackling IWT. In the past
few years an array of international policy statements,
initiatives and coalitions have highlighted and adopted
multiple approaches. These can broadly be classified
into three types:
1) Increase law enforcement and strengthen the
criminal justice systems along the value chain,
including sourcing, trafficking, and consumption
stages
TOCs have been widely used in conservation and
community development as planning and evaluation
tools, since they provide a useful framework for setting
goals and objectives against which results can be
evaluated. To date, however, the TOC approach has not
explicitly been applied to the challenge of engaging local
communities in combatting IWT. We fully recognise
that linear, static models are inadequate for describing
the complex dynamic processes that shape the socialecological systems involved in IWT. However, a TOC
can be a useful, heuristic tool that can at least raise
awareness of the different incentives and disincentives
that communities face in deciding whether or not to
engage in IWT. Consideration of these incentives and
disincentives is often overlooked in key IWT policy,
practice and decision-making arenas.
3) Support sustainable livelihoods and local economic
development.
In this paper we present a draft TOC to explore four
different approaches to engaging communities in
tackling IWT. These different pathways reflect the
recommendations emerging from various international
policy discussions and include:
To date, most attention has been paid to the first two
approaches with relatively limited attention given to the
third.
A. Strengthening disincentives for illegal
behaviour. This pathway involves making it more
difficult and costly to trade poached wildlife.
2) Reduce demand for/consumption of illegal products,
and
The international community increasingly recognises
B. Increasing incentives for stewardship. This
the need to engage communities in tackling IWT. A key
pathway involves strengthening both the financial
problem, however, is deciding what to do, and how to do
and non-financial rewards for protecting and
it. There is no one-size-fits-all solution. The conditions
sustainably managing wildlife.
shaping the potential for community engagement
C. Decreasing costs of living with wildlife. This
will vary from context to context. So thinking through
pathway involves reducing the burdens of living with
‘pathways to change’ that can lead from different forms
wildlife.
of community engagement to the overall objective of
reduced IWT, and unpacking the assumptions that
D. Supporting alternative (non-wildlife)
underpin the steps in each, can help strengthen policy
livelihoods. This pathway involves creating
and practice. Articulating such pathways to change can
livelihood and economic opportunities not
structure reflection on what actions and policies are
directly related to wildlife eg bee-keeping, or craft
likely to work best under different ecological, social and
development.
political conditions. Drawing such thinking together into
a ‘Theory of Change’ (TOC) can help in this process.
4
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IIED DISCUSSION PAPER
Each of the four pathways involves sequential
community-level Actions, Outputs and Outcomes that
lead to one common desirable Impact: decreased
pressure on wildlife from IWT. Each step (eg from
Action to Output, or Outcome to Impact) is based on
at least one assumption — all of which require testing
against field-based situations. The pathways are
also underpinned by enabling conditions, which may
themselves need enabling Actions.
IWT is a dynamic and complex process and any
strategies to address it also need to be dynamic and
complex. There are multiple strategies for tackling
IWT, of which engaging communities is just one. This
TOC thus represents just one part of a larger strategic
approach to IWT.
Overall, it is important to view the TOC as reflecting
a dynamic and interactive process of change, rather
than a static snapshot or a simple series of cause and
effect steps. Indeed, practitioners tackling IWT know
to expect unpredictability and surprise. But a TOC
such as the one presented here serves as a simplifying
tool to understand the problems and how to address
them. This TOC is based on extensive discussions and
reviews of evidence, and we believe the four primary
pathways and the cross-cutting enabling Actions
we identify do describe the commonly encountered
pathways to the most likely Outcomes and Impacts.
DISCUSSION POINTS
1) Is a Theory of Change a useful approach to help
policymakers and practitioners think about how and
where to invest resources in community engagement to
tackle illegal wildlife trade (IWT)?
2) Do the four pathways that we articulate make
sense to you? Are there other pathways for engaging
communities in tackling IWT?
3) Do our suggested Outputs and Outcomes make
sense? Are there better alternatives or additions?
4) Do the assumptions (Table 2 and Annex 1) hold true
in the IWT settings you are familiar with? Are there
additional assumptions that we are missing?
5) Are there other key enabling or disabling conditions
that we have overlooked?
We invite those with direct experience of engaging
communities and tackling IWT ‘on the ground’ to join
our discussion on how useful this approach is and
how well our draft TOC represents these complex
issues. Please send feedback direct to Duan Biggs
(corresponding author d.biggs@uq.edu.au) or respond
to our survey at www.surveymonkey.com/r/SH6SWZB
by the end of September 2015.
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ENGAGING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN TACKLING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE
Why
involve local
communites
in the fight
against illegal
wildlife trade?
1
6
www.iied.org
IIED DISCUSSION PAPER
Wildlife crime is at the top of the international
conservation agenda. Poaching and associated illegal
wildlife trade (IWT) are devastating populations of iconic
wildlife species such as rhinos, elephants and tigers, as
well as a host of lesser known ones such as pangolins,
some birds, reptiles, primates, medicinal and aromatic
plants and timber species.
The sudden and rapid escalation of IWT up the political
agenda has partly been driven by a huge increase in
poaching of Africa’s elephants and rhinos and concerns
for the longer-term survival of these and other already
endangered species, such as tigers. But another major
driver is the link to large-scale organised crime and
armed militia and insurgency groups, and subsequent
repercussions for national and international security
and stability.1 These immediate security threats mask a
wider development issue. Wildlife can be a key asset for
rural communities in Africa and elsewhere, providing a
foundation for investment and economic development
through, for example, tourism or timber trade. Poaching
can deplete this asset, limiting options for local and
national sustainable development.
versus those driven by poverty (‘crimes of need’). Most
fundamentally, however, the long-term survival of wildlife
populations, and in particular the success of interventions
to combat IWT, will depend to a large extent on the local
communities who live with wildlife populations. Where
wildlife populations offer people economic and social
value, locals are likely to be motivated to support and
engage in efforts to combat and manage poaching and
illicit trade. But where local people do not play a role in
wildlife management and where it generates no benefits
for them, there will be strong incentives for illegal use
(as well as for conversion of land to agriculture, a much
bigger threat to most species than IWT). Even the most
focused and well-resourced enforcement efforts, which
few countries can afford or have the political will to
implement, will struggle to effectively control wildlife crime
where there are strong incentives for complicity by local
people.
There is increasing recognition amongst the international
community of the need to engage communities.
The ‘London Declaration’4 that came out of a major
intergovernmental meeting on illegal wildlife trade in
February 2014 (and which recognises the African
It is well-recognised that there is no simple solution to
Elephant Action Plan and the urgent measures endorsed
tackling illegal wildlife trade. In the past few years an array
at the African Elephant Summit in December 2013)
of international policy statements, initiatives and coalitions
includes a number of commitments to strengthening the
have highlighted and adopted multiple approaches.
role of local communities — as do other international
These can broadly be classified into three types:
declarations. At the same time as the London Conference
1) Increase law enforcement and strengthen criminal
on Illegal Wildlife Trade was held, United for Wildlife,5
justice systems along the value chain, including
a coalition of international conservation organisations
sourcing, trafficking, and consumption stages
convened by the Royal Foundation,6 hosted a two-day
meeting to explore ‘International Wildlife Trafficking:
2) Reduce demand for/consumption of illegal products,
Solutions to a Global Crisis’.7 One of the solutions to
and
IWT announced by United for Wildlife was to support
3) Support sustainable livelihoods and local economic successful models of community wildlife management.
development.
More recently, the Kasane Conference on Illegal Wildlife
Trade8 (held in March 2015) and the African Common
To date, most attention has been paid to the first two
Strategy on Combatting Illegal Trade in Wild Flora
approaches with relatively limited attention to the third.
and Fauna9 (developed at an international conference
For example, a 2014 European Parliament resolution2
in Brazzaville in April 2015) also emphasised the
on wildlife crime includes over 30 wide-ranging actions
importance of recognising local peoples’ rights to benefit
in support of law enforcement, from strengthening
from wildlife conservation. Table 1 summarises the key
intelligence, enforcement and judiciary systems to
international policy recommendations.
introducing trade moratoria and revised penalties. In
contrast, only one action is directed towards local
The conditions shaping the potential for community
communities — promoting alternative (non-wildlife based) engagement will vary from context to context. Thinking
livelihood strategies.
through the ‘pathways to change’ that can lead from
different forms of community engagement to the
IWT has an enormous impact on the communities3
overall objective of reduced IWT, and unpacking the
that live alongside wildlife. This includes those that
assumptions that underpin the steps in each, can
have wildlife on land which they control as well as
help strengthen policy and practice. Articulating such
those who live next to wildlife areas, such as national
pathways to change can aid structured reflection on what
parks. These communities are affected by insecurity
actions and policies are likely to work best under different
and the depletion of important livelihood and economic
ecological, social and political conditions. A ‘Theory of
assets. They can also be affected by heavy-handed,
Change’ can help in this process.
militarised responses to wildlife crime. Law enforcement
systems often make little distinction between the illegal
activities driven by large scale profits (‘crimes of greed’)
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ENGAGING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN TACKLING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE
Table 1: International policy recommendations on engaging communities in tackling IWT
8
Global Tiger Recovery
Plan (2010)
“Engage with indigenous and local communities to gain their participation in
biodiversity conservation by providing sustainable and alternative livelihood options
through financial support, technical guidance, and other measures.”
African Elephant
Summit (2013)
“Engage communities living with elephants as active partners in their
conservation.”
London Declaration
(2014)
“Increase the capacity of local communities to pursue sustainable livelihood
opportunities and eradicate poverty.”
“Work with, and include local communities in, establishing monitoring and law
enforcement networks in areas surrounding wildlife.”
Kasane Declaration
(2015)
“Promote the retention of benefits from wildlife resources by local people where
they have traditional and/or legal rights over these resources. We will strengthen
policy and legislative frameworks needed to achieve this, reinforce the voice of
local people as key stakeholders and implement measures which balance the
need to tackle the illegal wildlife trade with the needs of communities, including the
sustainable use of wildlife.”
Brazzaville Declaration
(2015)
“Recognise the rights and increase the participation of indigenous peoples
and local communities in the planning, management and use of wildlife through
sustainable use and alternative livelihoods and strengthen their ability to combat
wildlife crime.”
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IIED DISCUSSION PAPER
What is a Theory
of Change?
2
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9
ENGAGING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN TACKLING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE
A Theory of Change (TOC) is a tool to help think
through and plan actions and interventions to address
a specific societal or environmental problem in a
transparent manner.10 TOCs map out the logical
pathways and sequences of events that are needed
for an intervention to lead to a desired outcome and
articulate the assumptions underlying each step.
TOCs have been widely used in conservation and
community development as planning and evaluation
tools as they provide a useful framework for setting,
and then evaluating, goals and objectives.11 A TOC
typically functions according to a sequential logic, or
results chain, that runs from:
• Actions: specific activities undertaken by an agency
such as an NGO or government department for
example to decrease human-wildlife conflict by
initiating or expanding a compensation scheme for
damage caused by wildlife.
• Outputs: the desired direct results of the
Actions, for example the ‘cost’ wildlife imposes on
communities is reduced.
TOCs can vary hugely in their complexity. Figures 1
and 2 provide two examples from the conservation
sector: a very simple one for an alternative livelihoods
project (Figure 1) and a more complex one for linking
direct payment for conservation services with human
wellbeing outcomes (Figure 2).
To date, however, the TOC approach has not
explicitly been applied to the issue of engaging local
communities in combatting IWT – an issue we seek
to address in this paper. We fully recognise that
linear, static models cannot adequately describe
the complex dynamic processes that shape socialecological systems such as those involved in IWT.13
However, a TOC can be a useful, heuristic tool that
can at least raise awareness of the different incentives
and disincentives that communities face in deciding
whether or not to engage in IWT. Consideration of
these incentives and disincentives is often overlooked
in key IWT policy, practice and decision-making
arenas.
• Outcomes: the changes in behaviour that stem from
the Outputs, for example community members feel
less antagonism towards wildlife.
• Impacts: the change in the environmental or social
factors being targeted, for example illegal trade puts
less pressure on wildlife.
A key element of a TOC is making explicit the
assumptions on which the step from one element
of the results chain to the next is based (eg from
Actions to Outputs, or from Outcomes to Impacts).12
For example, a project to incentivise conservation
by allocating tourism revenue to local communities
assumes that enough revenue will be generated to
provide that incentive and that there are no other
significant factors driving poaching. Many conservation
interventions fail because the assumptions on which
they are based simply do not hold true.
Figure 1: An example of a simple theory of change for an alternative livelihoods project
Goats
provided
to main
hunters
Goats provide
equivalent/higher
incomes than
hunting AND/OR
take up a high
proportion of
hunter’s daily
activity budget
Redrawn from Wicander and Coad (2015).14
10
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Main
hunters
spend
more time
in the
village
tending to
goats
Main
hunters
hunt less
than
before
project
Fewer
animals
are killed
in the
village
territory
Prey
pop.
increase
IIED DISCUSSION PAPER
Figure 2: An example of a theory of change with multiple pathways, for linking direct payment for conservation services with human wellbeing outcomes
Existing
conservation
practices
maintained
Increased income
of receipts
Support for
conservation
Direct
payments
More money
to communities
Income available
to buy
equipment,
clear natural
ecosystems
Forest
conservation
Existing
conservation
practices
adopted
Ecosystem
services
maintained
Human
well-being
outcomes
Human health
Forest-dependent
livelihoods
General livelihoods
Unintended
negative
impacts, eg
inequality,
social problems
Redrawn from Bottrill et al. (2014).15
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ENGAGING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN TACKLING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE
Towards a
Theory of Change
for engaging
communities in
tackling IWT
3
12
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IIED DISCUSSION PAPER
Methods and approach
community level. An example Action might be training
and equipping local people as community game guards.
In preparation for the international Beyond Enforcement The Output of this Action would be better trained and
symposium held in 2015,16 we developed a draft
equipped community guards, and an Outcome would be
TOC to explore four different ‘pathways’ to engaging
that stronger action against poachers is now possible,
communities in tackling IWT. These different
leading to related Outcomes of stronger action taken
approaches reflect the recommendations emerging from against poachers from outside of the community and,
the international policy processes discussed earlier and hence, reduced poaching. These Outcomes ultimately
include:
lead to the Impact of decreased pressure on wildlife
from IWT. However there are some key assumptions
A. Strengthening disincentives for illegal
made here (see Table 2 and Annex 1). For example,
behaviour. This pathway involves making it more
moving from the Output of better trained and equipped
difficult and costly to trade poached wildlife.
community guards to the Outcome of stronger action
B. Increasing incentives for stewardship. This
taken against poachers assumes that the community
pathway involves strengthening both the financial
guards will use their new equipment or weapons to
and non-financial rewards for protecting and
tackle poachers, and will not use the weapons to poach,
sustainably managing wildlife.
or sell the equipment to earn income.
C. Decreasing costs of living with wildlife. This
pathway involves reducing the burdens of living with
wildlife.
Increasing incentives for stewardship of wildlife,
pathway B. The types of Actions needed on this
pathway are 1) those that develop or support initiatives/
enterprises that can generate local benefits from
D. Supporting alternative (non-wildlife)
wildlife, and 2) those that build local people’s capacity
livelihoods. This pathway involves creating
to benefit from those initiatives. An example in the first
livelihood and economic opportunities not
category might be developing a community tourism
directly related to wildlife. eg bee-keeping or craft
enterprise and in the second might be training local
development.
people to be nature tourism guides. The Outputs are
We described each ‘pathway to change’, and articulated that communities are more able to benefit from wildlife
the assumptions underpinning each step in the
and obtain greater financial and non-financial benefits.
pathway. These assumptions were drawn from practical The Outcomes of this are that the community will value
experience and published empirical and theoretical
wildlife more, have a higher incentive to protect wildlife
literature. We shared the draft TOC with participants
and therefore take action against poachers, leading
at the Beyond Enforcement symposium, and invited
to the Impact of decreased pressure on wildlife from
them to suggest additions and amendments, based
IWT. There are numerous assumptions nested along
on their own experiences and expertise and in light of
this chain (Table 2 and Annex 1), for example that
symposium presentations and discussions. We then
the community has the capacity to market its tourism
further refined the TOC, which is shown in Figure 3 and product, and that tourism is financially viable.
described in detail below.
Decreasing the costs of living with wildlife,
pathway C. Actions on this pathway are essentially
those that mitigate human-wildlife conflict. An example
Each of the four ‘pathways to change’ involves different
here might be providing a community with better fences
community-level Actions (green boxes), Outputs (red
for their livestock. The Output is that the community
boxes), and Outcomes (purple boxes), connected
loses less livestock so the costs are reduced. The
sequentially and leading to the same overall Impact
Outcome is decreased antagonism towards wildlife
(blue box) of decreased pressure on wildlife from IWT.
and therefore less incentive to engage in poaching or
Each step (eg from Action to Output, or Outcome to
facilitate poaching. This will lead to the further Outcome
Impact) involves assumptions (some examples are
of stronger action being taken against poachers and
provided in Table 2 and described in full in Annex 1).
therefore the ultimate Impact of decreased pressure
There are too many different possible Actions on each
on wildlife from IWT. Here we assume there are no
pathway to capture in one diagram, so for simplicity
perverse outcomes, for example that better livestock
we have described a general type of Action that would
fences do not encourage a community to invest in more
be required. But to clarify how the TOC works, we
livestock which are then detrimental to wildlife (see
also describe an example of a specific Action in each
Annex 1).
pathway and how it can lead to the desired Impact.
Support for alternative livelihoods, pathway D.
Strengthening disincentives for illegal behaviour, The Actions required here are similar to those under
pathway A. Actions that strengthen community
pathway B, ie to develop viable initiatives, and then
engagement in enforcement are needed at the
build capacity to benefit from those. But in this case
Exploring the four pathways
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13
Decreased pressure on wildlife from illegal wildlife trade
Reduced poaching from
within community
Reduced poaching from outside
of community
T
U
Stronger action against
poachers from outside
community
Stronger action against
poachers from within the
community
OUTCOMES:
W
IMPACT:
P
O
More empowered
communities create
positive pressure,
drawing people away
from illegal or corrupt
activities, particularly
unemployed youth
Q
Stronger action
becomes possible
against poachers
Decreased incentive to
tacitly or actively
support poaching
M
Decreased
antagonism toward
wildlife
Communities value
wildlife more
L
G
I
J
H
OUTPUTS:
Better trained and
better equipped local
rangers and
community guards
Stronger collaboration
between local
community and
rangers and other
enforcement agencies
Communities are more
empowered to manage
and benefit from
wildlife
A
B
Costs to
communities
imposed by
presence of wildlife
are reduced
Build community capacity
to benefit from wildlife
initiatives
F
E
Mitigate human-wildlife conflict
Build local capacity non
wildlife-based livelihood
strategies
F4
Support existing or
develop new livelihood
strategies which are not
reliant on wildlife use
F5
F2
ENABLING
ACTIONS:
Support institutional
framework to enforce
against IWT
More empowered
communities have a
greater diversity of
livelihood options
Communities better
able to mitigate
wildlife conflict
D
C
Develop initiatives to
generate local benefits
from wildlife
Strengthen community
engagement in enforcement
Communities receive
financial benefits from
wildlife
F3
ACTIONS:
K
Communities value non-financial benefits from
wildlife – eg meat, pride, sense of ownership
Communities perceive non-financial benefits
from wildlife – eg pride, sense of ownership
Communities less
dependant on IWT as a
source of revenue
N
Increased incentive
to protect wildlife
F1
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There are four pathways to change: A. Strengthening disincentives for illegal behaviour; B. Increasing incentives for stewardship; C. Decreasing costs of living with wildlife; and D. Supporting alternative non wildlife-based livelihoods.
The chain of logic (black arrows) is that Actions lead to Outputs, which lead to Outcomes and the overall desired Impact. Enabling Actions strengthen all Actions and provide enabling conditions. The assumptions behind each step in
the chain of logic are indicated by white letters in the black arrows. Feedback is shown by green arrows. See Annex 1 for a list of assumptions and descriptions of feedback.
Strengthen enabling conditions
Increase perceived
fairness of wildlife laws
A. Strengthening disincentives for
illegal behaviour
Strengthen laws for
community management
of and benefit from
wildlife
B. Increasing incentives for
stewardship
F6
Fight corruption and
strengthen governance
C. Decrease costs of living
with wildlife
Build community capacity
D. Supporting alternative
(non wildlife-based)
livelihoods
ENGAGING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN TACKLING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE
14
Figure 3: Proposed Theory of Change for engaging local communities in tackling IWT
IIED DISCUSSION PAPER
Actions should focus on livelihood strategies that do
not depend on using wildlife. Examples of actions
might include establishing a bee-keeping enterprise
and training local people in honey production and
marketing. The intended Output is that the community
is more empowered and has a greater diversity of
livelihood options. The Outcomes are that communities
depend less on wildlife as a source of revenue and so
are less involved in IWT. Again, the ultimate Impact
will be less pressure on wildlife as a result of reduced
IWT. There are numerous assumptions between each
step, including that the benefits from the alternative
livelihood are enough to out-compete the benefits to
be gained from IWT (see Annex 1).
Importance of enabling
conditions
In addition to the Actions, Outputs, Outcomes and
assumptions, our TOC diagram includes Enabling
Actions (orange boxes). We recognise that all of the
four pathways depend on a number of cross-cutting
enabling conditions for success. These include the
prevailing legislative and institutional framework,
adequately controlled corruption, adequate capacity,
legitimacy and governance. Actions to improve
the enabling conditions for tackling IWT are not
necessarily carried out at the community level. An
example of an Enabling Action could be lobbying
governments to strengthen laws for community
management of and benefit from wildlife.
Table 2: Examples of some of the assumptions which underpin the four pathways
CODE*
ASSUMPTION
PATHWAY A: Strengthening disincentives for illegal behaviour
A1
Community rangers use equipment and training to combat IWT and not to poach themselves
or for other purposes (ie community governance is at an adequate level and corruption is
sufficiently controlled).
A2
Collaboration between communities and other enforcement agencies leads to stronger action
against IWT and not stronger collusion for IWT or other activities (governance and control of
corruption is at an adequate level).
G3
An increased sense of non-financial benefits contributes to willingness to take stronger action
against poachers.
G5
Communities have not already been intimidated by poachers, and are willing and able to take
stronger action against poachers.
O1
Collaboration between communities and other enforcement agencies leads to stronger action
against IWT and not stronger collusion for IWT or other activities (governance and control of
corruption is at an adequate level).
PATHWAY B: Increasing incentives for stewardship
B10
Benefit sharing within the community is sufficiently equitable and ‘elite capture’ – where the
elite capture most or all of the benefits – does not undermine the schemes.
PATHWAY C: Decreasing costs of living with wildlife
D4
Compensation does not lead to perverse behaviour, ie damage from wildlife is not actively
induced to receive payments.
PATHWAY D: Supporting alternative (non wildlife-based) livelihoods
E2 and F2
Alternative livelihood schemes do not generate perverse incentives, ie money is not reinvested
in poaching or other land-uses that damage wildlife.
L
IWT is not so high in value that that all other potential forms of income (through tourism, etc)
cannot compete financially.
*Note: The codes refer to the letters in the black arrows in Figure 3.
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ENGAGING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN TACKLING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE
The Enabling Action ‘Increase perceived fairness of
wildlife laws’ highlights a crucial issue: the ability of
society to participate meaningfully in the policy and
law-making process (the voice and accountability
dimension of governance).17 The laws for wildlife
conservation are often perceived to lack legitimacy and
to be unfair. Indeed, many of these laws date from the
colonial era and disenfranchise local communities from
traditional rights to land and to harvests and benefits
from wildlife. Many conservation laws, regardless of
origin, are outdated, have limited deterrent effect and
reduce people’s livelihood options, thereby increasing
local hardship and feelings of disenfranchisement.
Perceptions of illegitimacy and unfairness are closely
related to poor control of corruption, addressed in
the Enabling Action ‘Fight corruption and strengthen
governance’. For example, under-paying individuals
responsible for implementing laws can pave the way
for corruption. Likewise, if Actions to fight corruption
and strengthen governance are successful, it is likely
that Actions across all four pathways will become
more effective. Indeed, research has shown that
governance quality, in particular corruption control, is a
good predictor of the status of populations of key IWT
species such as the African elephant and the black
rhino.18
16
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IIED DISCUSSION PAPER
Recognising
complexity and
dynamism
4
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ENGAGING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN TACKLING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE
IWT is a dynamic and complex process and any
3) Do our suggested Outputs and Outcomes make
strategies to address it also need to be dynamic and
sense? Are there better alternatives or additions?
complex. There are multiple strategies for tackling IWT,
4) Do the assumptions (Table 2 and Annex 1) hold true
of which engaging communities is just one. This TOC
in the IWT settings you are familiar with? Are there
represents just one part of a larger strategic approach
additional assumptions that we are missing?
to IWT. Even within our focus on communities there
is complexity, such as important interactions and
5) Are there other key enabling or disabling conditions
feedback loops between the four pathways for engaging
that we have overlooked?
communities and between their various components.
For example, as success is reached in pathway B,
and incentives for stewardship and wildlife protection
increase, pressure not to engage in IWT should
increase, which complements pathway A, providing
stronger disincentives for IWT (see feedback arrows F1
and F6 in Figure 3). Descriptions for all the feedback
arrows in Figure 3 are provided in Annex 1.
Local communities’ participation and co-learning
is an inherent and essential element in successful
community-level Actions, and should be coupled with
an ongoing process of adaptive management. The TOC
should not be read as implying a series of activities
imposed by external actors, but as a ‘self-learning’
(heuristic) guide to help partnerships of external
actors and local communities think through activities
to address IWT. Communities’ capacity to effectively
tackle IWT will be strengthened by the capacity building
that takes place through such partnerships.
Overall, it is important to view the TOC as reflecting
a dynamic and interactive process of change, rather
than a static snapshot or a simple series of cause and
effect steps. Indeed, practitioners tackling IWT know
to expect unpredictability and surprise. A TOC, such
as the one presented here, serves simply as a tool to
understand the problem and explore how to address
it. Nevertheless, this TOC is based on extensive
discussions and reviews of evidence and we believe the
four primary pathways and the Enabling Actions that cut
across these do describe the commonly encountered
pathways to the most likely Outcomes and Impacts.
We invite those with direct experience of engaging
communities and tackling IWT ‘on the ground’ to join
our discussion on how useful this approach is and
how well our draft TOC represents these complex
issue. Please send feedback direct to Duan Biggs
(corresponding author d.biggs@uq.edu.au) or respond
to our survey at www.surveymonkey.com/r/SH6SWZB
by the end of September 2015.
1) Is a Theory of Change a useful approach to help
policymakers and practitioners think about how and
where to invest resources in community engagement
to tackle IWT?
2) Do the four pathways that we articulate make sense
to you? Are there other pathways for engaging
communities in tackling IWT?
18
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IIED DISCUSSION PAPER
Annex 1: Assumptions
underlying the Theory
of Change
CODE* ASSUMPTION
NOTES (REFERENCES ARE
FOUND WITHIN THIS ANNEX)
A1
Community rangers use equipment and training to
combat IWT and not to poach themsleves or for other
purposes (ie community governance is at an adequate
level and corruption is sufficiently controlled).
A2
Collaboration between communities and other
enforcement agencies leads to stronger action against
IWT and not stronger collusion for IWT or other
activities (governance and control of corruption is at an
adequate level).
A3
Communities are willing to enforce more strongly
against IWT both within their communities and outside.
A4
Communities are willing to collaborate with external
enforcement agencies, ie historical or existing tensions
with police force, park rangers or other authorities are
not excessively high.
A5
Formal sanctions are fair and proportionate, eg
penalties are reasonable and fines can be avoided.
A6
The community understands and agrees that there is a
wildlife poaching problem.
A7
External enforcement agencies are willing to
collaborate with communities.
B1
Communities hold rights to legally benefit from
harvesting or use of wildlife products, eg trophy
hunting or trade in animal parts (locally, nationally and
internationally).
Many high-value wildlife products (eg
ivory, rhino horn) have restrictions on
domestic and international sale and
export. This impacts on ability to allocate
wildlife rights to communities (eg NortonGriffiths 2007; Stiles 2004).
B2
Harvesting and managing wildlife products is culturally
appropriate and attractive to the community (eg some
communities prefer livestock or crop farming even
where these offer lower returns).
See example from fisheries – where
communities preferred fishing to a higher
earning alternative (Pollnac et al. 2001).
Principle of common property
management (Ostrom 1990).
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ENGAGING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN TACKLING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE
CODE* ASSUMPTION
NOTES (REFERENCES ARE
FOUND WITHIN THIS ANNEX)
B3
There is a market for legally produced wildlife products.
B4
Protected Area authorities are willing to share revenue
(some may feel very cash constrained and are unlikely
to want to share revenue).
B5
There is a donor for any Payment for Ecosystem
Services (PES) scheme.
B6
Ownership leads to pride.
Sense of ownership and pride is an
important outcome of allocating rights
and responsibilities to communities
(Brooks 2010; Salafsky et al. 2001).
B7
Revenue sharing and PES schemes lead to pride in
stewarding wildlife.
Perceptions of benefit may or may not
lead to increased pride – this is often
context dependent – eg Brooks (2010).
B8
Within the community there is sufficient perception
of the link between wildlife and revenue, ie that the
benefits flow from having wildlife populations.
It is possible that communities receive
benefit but do not perceive that that
benefit stems from the well-being of
wildlife.
B9
Adequate monitoring is possible at an affordable cost
for a PES scheme to work
Monitoring the achievement of PES
outcomes can be expensive and difficult
leading to payments for non-achievement
and other ‘fraudulent outcomes’
(Laurance 2004).
B10
Benefit sharing within the community is sufficiently
equitable and ‘elite capture’ – where the elite capture
most or all of the benefits – does not undermine the
schemes.
Elite capture can undermine the
incentives from wildlife ownership or PES
(eg Jones et al. 2012).
B11
Legally produced products substitute for wild products
in the market place, rather than lead to parallel markets.
C1
Communities are willing to engage in capacity building
(eg to become nature guides, engage in PES schemes,
etc).
C2
Donor funds are available to facilitate and support
capacity building.
D1
There are funds available for increased compensation.
D2
There is a functioning mechanism for distributing
money for wildlife damage eg it is not subject to elite
capture.
D3
The strategies to mitigate conflict actually work.
D4
Compensation does not lead to perverse behaviour, ie
damage from wildlife is not actively induced to receive
compensation payments.
There is widespread anecdotal evidence
of perverse outcomes from compensation
schemes.
E1 and
F1
Community governance functions well, including
limiting ‘elite capture’ of alternative livelihood strategies.
Jones (2007) contains an example from
Royal Chitwan, Nepal.
20
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Some communities and individuals may
prefer current activities (eg domestic
livestock) for cultural and other reasons –
even if financial returns are lower. Pollnac
et al. (2001) contains an example from
fisheries.
IIED DISCUSSION PAPER
CODE* ASSUMPTION
NOTES (REFERENCES ARE
FOUND WITHIN THIS ANNEX)
E2 and
F2
Alternative livelihood schemes do not generate
perverse incentives, ie money is not reinvested in
poaching or other land-uses that damage wildlife.
See McAllister et al. (2009) for a vicuna
example and discussion on this.
E3 and
F3
There is a government agency or donor willing to
support schemes.
E4 and
F4
Alternative livelihoods provide jobs opportunities for
the unemployed and would-be perpetrators of wildlife
crimes.
E5 and
F5
‘Alternative livelihoods’ do not become ‘additional
livelihoods’, leaving IWT the same, while an additional
revenue stream is opened up.
G1
Better trained, better equipped guards are willing to
use their skills and equipment to counter IWT and not
use their more advanced equipment for more poaching
or other purposes.
Anecdotal evidence and media reports of
community guard and ranger complicity.
G2
Collaboration between communities and other
enforcement agencies leads to willingness to take
stronger action against IWT and not willingness
instead for stronger collusion for IWT or other
activities (governance and control of corruption is at an
adequate level).
Anecdotal evidence and media reports of
community guard and ranger complicity.
Also see Bennett (2015); Smith et
al. (2003, 2015); and also literature
on combatting illegal narcotics (eg
Chambliss 1992; Cussen and Block
2000).
G3
Increased sense of non-financial benefits contributes
to willingness to take stronger action against poachers.
Brooks (2010) suggests that non-financial
benefits can be an important determinant
of conservation outcomes. Also see
Biggs et al. (2011 and 2012).
G4
Police and rangers are not involved or linked to illegal
activities.
For example: https://www.environment.
go v.za/mediarelease/formersan
parksranger_arrested
G5
Communities have not already been intimidated by
poachers, and are therefore willing and able to take
stronger action against poachers.
For example: http://america.aljazeera.
com/ multimedia/2015/1/the- humancost- ofrhinopoaching.html
H1
Communities that are more empowered to manage
wildlife value it more.
Evidence from a range of natural resource
management settings and behavioural
experiments (eg Child 1996; Gelcich et
al. 2006; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2005;
Salafsky et al. 2001).
H2
When communities receive benefits from wildlife they
value it more.
Evidence from a range of natural resource
management settings and behavioural
experiments (eg Child 1996; Gelcich et
al. 2012; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2005;
Salafsky et al. 2001).
H3
The community has full knowledge about how benefits
are shared and distributed.
See Child (2015).
I1
Communities who value wildlife more have a
decreased incentive to actively or tacitly support
poaching and are more willing to stand up to it.
See Child (1996); Frost and Bond (2008).
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ENGAGING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN TACKLING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE
CODE* ASSUMPTION
J1
Communities for whom the cost of living with wildlife
falls have a decreased incentive to actively or tacitly
support IWT and are more willing to stand up to it.
K
Communities better able to mitigate wildlife conflict
feel decreased antagonism towards wildlife.
L
IWT is not so high in value that that all other potential
forms of income (through tourism, etc) cannot compete
financially.
M
Increased value of wildlife to communities leads to
increased incentive to protect it.
N
Individuals and communities that are less antagonistic
towards wildlife are less likely to actively or tacitly
support poaching.
O1
Collaboration between communities and other
enforcement agencies leads to stronger action against
IWT and not stronger collusion for IWT or other
activities (governance and control of corruption is at an
adequate level).
O2
Poachers have not similarly strengthened their capacity
and equipment to poach, negating any gain through an
ongoing ‘arms race’.
P1
Communities have the willingness, equipment and the
capacity to take stronger action against poachers from
outside or inside the community.
P2
Poachers do not intimidate communities to the level
that even with increased incentives to protect wildlife
they are too scared to take action against poachers
from inside and outside the community.
P3
Community has the sufficient levels of social capital
and cohesion to take collective action against
poachers from inside and outside the community.
Q
Communities with a decreased incentive to poach are
more willing to stand up to poaching.
T1
Communities have the capacity to confront poachers,
ie they are not excessively intimidated or ‘outgunned’
by poachers from outside of the community.
T2
The relative value of illegal wildlife products is not so
high that new players enter into the system and negate
the stronger action against poachers that has come
into place (eg a powerful private security firm, or army
unit, called into defend wildlife does not itself become
an offender because the relative gains are so high).
U
Communities have the capacity to confront poachers,
ie they are not excessively intimidated or ‘outgunned’
by poachers from within the community.
W
The relative value of illegal wildlife products is not so
high that communities participate in IWT anyway.
*Note: The codes refer to the letters in the black arrows in Figure 3.
22
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NOTES (REFERENCES ARE
FOUND WITHIN THIS ANNEX)
Foundational economic assumption.
IIED DISCUSSION PAPER
Literature on which the assumptions are based
Adams, W. and Hutton, J. (2007) People, Parks and
Frost, P.G.H. and Bond, I. (2008) The CAMPFIRE
Poverty: Political Ecology and Biodiversity Conservation. programme in Zimbabwe: Payments for wildlife services.
Conservation and Society 5, 147–183.
Ecological Economics 65 776–787.
Bennett, E.L. (2015) Legal ivory trade in a corrupt
world and its impact on African elephant populations.
Conservation Biology.
Gelcich, S. et al. (2006) Co-management policy can
reduce resilience in traditionally managed marine
ecosystems. Ecosystems 9 951–966.
Biggs, D. et al. (2011) The value of avitourism for
community-based conservation – an analysis from
South Africa. Conservation and Society 9 80–90.
Gelcich, S. et al. (2012) Territorial user rights for
fisheries as ancillary instruments for marine coastal
conservation in Chile. Conservation Biology 26 1005–
1015.
Biggs, D. et al. (2012) Lifestyle values, resilience, and
nature-based tourism’s contribution to conservation
on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. Environmental
Conservation 39 370–379.
Biggs, D. et al. (2013) Legal trade of Africa’s rhino
horns. Science 339 1038–1039.
Bottrill, M. et al. (2014). What are the impacts of nature
conservation interventions on human well-being: a
systematic map protocol. Environmental Evidence 3(1)
16.
Brooks, J.S. (2010) Economic and social dimensions
of environmental behavior: balancing conservation and
development in Bhutan. Conservation Biology 24(6)
1499–509.
Jones, S. (2007) Tigers, trees and Tharu: An analysis
of community forestry in the buffer zone of the Royal
Chitwan National Park, Nepal. Geoforum 38 558–575.
Jones, B.T.B. et al. (2012) Community-based natural
resource management (CBNRM) and reducing poverty
in Namibia. In Roe et al. (eds) Biodiversity conservation
and poverty alleviation: exploring the evidence for a link.
Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 191–205.
Kaufmann, D. et al. (2011) The worldwide governance
indicators: methodology and analytical issues. Hague
Journal on the Rule of Law 3 220–246.
Laurance, W.F. (2004) The perils of payoff: corruption
as a threat to global biodiversity. Trends in Ecology &
Evolution 19 399–401.
Brunckhorst, D.J. (2010) Using context in novel
community-based natural resource management:
McAllister, R.R.J. et al. (2009) Legalizing markets and
landscapes of property, policy and place. Environmental the consequences for poaching of wildlife species:
Conservation 37 16–22.
The vicuña as a case study. Journal of Environmental
Management 90 120–130.
Challender, D.W.S. and MacMillan, D.C. (2014)
Poaching is more than an enforcement problem.
Norton-Griffiths, M. (2007) How many wildebeest do
Conservation Letters 7 484–494.
you need? World Economics 8 41–64.
Chambliss, W.J. (1992) The consequences of
prohibition, crime, corruption, and international narcotics
control. In Traver, H.H. and Gaylard, M.S. (eds) Drugs,
law and the state. Hong Kong University, Hong Kong,
3–33.
Child, B. (1996) The practice and principles of
community-based wildlife management in Zimbabwe:
the CAMPFIRE programme. Biodiversity and
Conservation 5 369–398.
Child, B. (2015) The sustainable use approach,
communities and wildlife trade. Presentation at the
Beyond Enforcement symposium, Muldersdrift, South
Africa, 26–28 February.
Cussen, M. and Block, W. (2000) Legalize drugs now!:
an analysis of the benefits of legalized drugs. American
Journal of Economics and Sociology 59 525–536.
Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the commons: the
evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Ostrom, E. (2005) Understanding Institutional Diversity.
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Phelps, J. et al. (2013) A framework for assessing supply
side conservation. Conservation Biology 28: 244–257.
Pollnac, R.B. et al. (2001) Fishery policy and job
satisfaction in three southeast Asian fisheries. Ocean &
Coastal Management 44 531–544.
Rivalan, P. et al. (2007) Can bans stimulate wildlife
trade? Nature 447 529–530.
Salafsky, N. et al. (2001) A systematic test of an
enterprise strategy for community-based biodiversity
conservation. Conservation Biology 15 1585–1595.
www.iied.org
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ENGAGING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN TACKLING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE
Smith, R.J. et al. (2003) Governance and the loss of
biodiversity. Nature 426 67–70.
Smith, R.J. et al. (2015) Not just the ivory trade:
corruption undermines every aspect of elephant
conservation but can be reduced – a response to
Bennett. Conservation Biology.
Stiles, D. (2004) The ivory trade and elephant
conservation. Environmental Conservation 31 309–321
Vogel, I. (2012) Review of the use of theory of change
in international development. UK Department of
International Development (DFID), London.
Wicander, S. and Coad, L. (2015) Learning our
Lessons: A Review of Alternative Livelihood Projects in
Central Africa. ECI, University of Oxford, Oxford and
IUCN, Gland, Switzerland.
Descriptions of feedback within the Theory of Change
CODE*
DESCRIPTION
F1 and F6
Communities with an increased incentive to protect wildlife are more likely to support and
positively engage in actions to strengthen enforcement.
F2
Strengthening community involvement in enforcement will help to support the institutional
framework to enforce against IWT.
F3
Initiatives that generate local benefits from wildlife will strengthen the perceived fairness of
wildlife laws for community management and benefit from wildlife.
F4
Effectively addressing conflict between humans and wildlife will help strengthen the
governance of human-wildlife relationships.
F5
Building capacity for and developing alternative livelihoods for communities (eg cultural villages)
will help strengthen community capacity more broadly.
*Note: The codes refer to the letters in the green arrows in Figure 3.
Join the debate
DISCUSSION POINTS
1) Is a Theory of Change a useful approach to help
policymakers and practitioners think about how and
where to invest resources in community engagement to
tackle illegal wildlife trade (IWT)?
2) Do the four pathways that we articulate make
sense to you? Are there other pathways for engaging
communities in tackling IWT?
3) Do our suggested Outputs and Outcomes make
sense? Are there better alternatives or additions?
4) Do the assumptions (Table 2 and Annex 1) hold true
in the IWT settings you are familiar with? Are there
additional assumptions that we are missing?
5) Are there other key enabling or disabling conditions
that we have overlooked?
24
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We would very much like your involvement in continuing
to develop and test this TOC and to explore its use as a
practical tool for policy and decision-makers. Please let
us know what you think. We are particularly interested
in your responses to the discussion points in the box to
the left.
Please send feedback direct to the authors (via the
corresponding author Duan Biggs (d.biggs@uq.edu.au)
or respond to our survey at www.surveymonkey.com/r/
SH6SWZB by the end of September 2015.
IIED DISCUSSION PAPER
Notes
1. UNODC (2010) The globalization of crime: a
environmentalevidencejournal.org/content/pdf/2047transnational organized crime threat assessment. United 2382-3-16.pdf
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, Austria.
16. IUCN et al. (2015) Beyond enforcement:
2. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
communities, governance, incentives and sustainable
do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2014use in combating wildlife crime. Symposium report from
0013&format=PDF&language=EN
the Beyond Enforcement conference, Muldersdrift,
South Africa, 26-28 February. Available at http://pubs.
3. The term communities is used here to comprise
iied.org/G03903.html
‘indigenous peoples and local communities’ as per
agreement at the Convention on Biological Diversity’s
17. Kaufmann, D et al. (2011) The worldwide governance
Twelfth Conference of the Parties.
indicators: methodology and analytical issues. Hague
Journal on the Rule of Law 3 220-246.
4. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/281289/london-wildlife18. Smith, RJ et al. (2003) Governance and the loss of
conference-declaration-140213.pdf
biodiversity. Nature 426 67-70.
5. http://www.unitedforwildlife.org/
6. A foundation set up by the UK’s Duke and
Duchess of Cambridge and Prince Harry. http://www.
royalfoundation.com/
7. http://sites.zsl.org/iwtconf/
8. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/illegalwildlife-trade-kasane-statement
9. http://unep.org/PDF/Brazzaville_Strategy.pdf
10. Vogel, I. (2012) Review of the use of theory of
change in international development. UK Department of
International Development, London.
11. Margoluis, R. et al. (2009) Using conceptual models
as a planning and evaluation tool in conservation.
Evaluation and Program Planning 32 138–147.
12. http://www.theoryofchange.org/what-is-theory-ofchange/
13. See, for example, Cundill, G. et al. (2012) Soft
systems thinking and social learning for adaptive
management. Conservation Biology 26, 13–20; Nelson,
D.R. et al. (2007) Adaptation to environmental change:
contributions of a resilience framework. Annual Review
of Environment and Resources 32 395–419.
14. Wicander, S. and Coad, L. (2015) Learning our
lessons: a review of alternative livelihoods projects in
Central Africa. ECI, University of Oxford and Gland,
Switzerland: IUCN. Available at: http://www.eci.
ox.ac.uk/publications/downloads/wicander-coadenglish2015.pdf
15. Bottrill, M et al. (2014) What are the impacts of
nature conservation interventions on human wellbeing: a systematic map protocol. Environmental
Evidence 3 16. Available at http://www.
www.iied.org
25
ENGAGING LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN TACKLING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE
Related Reading
The report of the Beyond Enforcement symposium is
available here: http://pubs.iied.org/G03903.html
A briefing paper summarising the main findings from
the symposium is available here: http://pubs.iied.
org/17293IIED.html
All the presentations from the symposium are available
here: http://www.iucn.org/about/union/commissions/
ceesp_ssc_sustainable_use_and_livelihoods_
specialist_group/communities_and_wildlife_crime/
beyond_enforcement/
A series of case studies highlighting examples of
successful community engagement in tackling IWT is
available here: http://pubs.iied.org/14648IIED.html
A review of the drivers and impacts of wildlife
crime in Uganda is available here: http://pubs.iied.
org/17576IIED.html
A briefing paper on the role of sustainable use
in tackling IWT is available here: http://pubs.iied.
org/17205IIED.html
List of acronyms
CEED
Centre of Excellence for Environmental
Decisions
CEESP Commission on Environmental, Economic and
Social Policy
CSIRO
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organisation
IIED
International Institute for Environment and
Development
IUCN
International Union for Conservation of Nature
IWT
Illegal Wildlife Trade
PES
Payment for Ecosystem Services
RMIT
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology
SSC
Species Survival Commission
SULi
Sustainable Use and Livelihoods Specialist
Group
26
www.iied.org
TOC
Theory of Change
USAID
United States Agency for International
Development
Recent alarming rises in illegal wildlife trade (IWT)
show that tough law enforcement is not enough to stop
poachers devastating populations of iconic or endangered
species. Local people must be empowered to benefit
from conservation and be supported to partner with law
enforcement agencies in the fight against wildlife crime.
Here we present a ‘theory of change’ for understanding how
community-level interventions can help in tackling IWT. Do
the ‘pathways’ we present reflect your experiences from IWTrelated projects and programmes? Do the assumptions that
we suggest hold true? Please join the discussion and help
expand the theory to support better policy and practice on the
ground.
IIED is a policy and action research
organisation. We promote sustainable
development to improve livelihoods
and protect the environments on which
these livelihoods are built. We specialise
in linking local priorities to global
challenges. IIED is based in London and
works in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the
Middle East and the Pacific, with some
of the world’s most vulnerable people.
We work with them to strengthen their
voice in the decision-making arenas that
affect them — from village councils to
international conventions.
International Institute for Environment and Development
80-86 Gray’s Inn Road, London WC1X 8NH, UK
Tel: +44 (0)20 3463 7399
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email: info@iied.org
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This discussion paper was funded by UK aid from the UK
government. However, the views expressed do not necessarily
reflect those of the UK government.
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