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THE  
WORKS OF PLATO.

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RECORDS OF THE

THE  
WORKS OF PLATO,

VIZ.

HIS FIFTY-FIVE DIALOGUES, AND TWELVE EPISTLES,

*TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK;*

NINE OF THE DIALOGUES BY THE LATE FLOYER SYDENHAM,

AND THE REMAINDER

*BY THOMAS TAYLOR:*

WITH

OCCASIONAL ANNOTATIONS ON THE NINE DIALOGUES TRANSLATED BY SYDENHAM,

AND

COPIOUS NOTES,

*BY THE LATTER TRANSLATOR;*

IN WHICH IS GIVEN

THE SUBSTANCE OF NEARLY ALL THE EXISTING GREEK MS. COMMENTARIES ON  
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO,

AND A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF SUCH AS ARE ALREADY PUBLISHED.

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IN FIVE VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

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ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ ΤΥΠΩΝ ΦΑΙΝΗ ΑΝ ΕΓΩ ΕΙΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ ΕΛΘΕΙΝ ΕΠ' ΕΥΕΡΓΕΣΙΑ:  
ΤΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΓΑΛΜΑΤΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΩΝ ΙΕΡΩΝ, ΑΝΤΙ ΤΗΣ ΟΔΗΣ ΑΓΙΣΤΕΙΑΣ ΑΥΤΗΣ, ΚΑΙ ΣΩΤΗΡΙΑΣ  
ΑΡΧΗΤΩΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΓΕ ΝΥΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΙΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΕΙΣΑΓΟΙΣ ΓΕΝΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΙΣ.

PROCL. MS. COMMENT. IN PARMENIDEM.

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THE PARMENIDES:

*A DIALOGUE*

ON THE GODS.

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VOL. III.

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# INTRODUCTION

TO

## THE PARMENIDES.

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IT was the custom of Pythagoras and his followers, amongst whom Plato holds the most distinguished rank, to conceal divine mysteries under the veil of symbols and figures; to dissemble their wisdom against the arrogant boastings of the Sophists; to jest seriously, and sport in earnest. Hence, in the following most important dialogue, under the appearance of a certain dialectic sport, and, as it were, logical discussion, Plato has delivered a complete system of the profound and beautiful theology of the Greeks. For it is not to be supposed that he, who in all his other dialogues introduces discussions adapted to the character of the principal speaker, should in this dialogue deviate from his general plan, and exhibit Parmenides, a venerable and aged philosopher, engaged in the puerile exercise of a merely logical disputation. Besides, it was usual with the Pythagoreans and Plato to form an harmonious conjunction of many materials in one subject, partly in imitation of nature, and partly for the sake of elegance and grace. Thus, in the *Phædrus*, Plato mingles oratory with theology; in the *Timæus*, mathematics with physics; and in the present dialogue, dialectic with divine speculations.

But the reader must not suppose that the dialectic of Plato is the same with vulgar dialectic, which is conversant with opinion, and is accurately investigated in Aristotle's *Topics*: for the business of this first of sciences, which at present is utterly unknown, is to employ definitions, divisions, analyses, and demonstrations, as primary sciences in the investigation of causes; imitating the progressions of beings from the first principle of things, and their continual conversion to it, as the ultimate object of desire. "But there are three energies," says Proclus<sup>1</sup>, "of this most scientific method:

<sup>1</sup> In MSS. Comment. in Parmenidem, lib. i.

the first of which is adapted to youth, and is useful for the purpose of rousing their intellect, which is, as it were, in a dormant state; for it is a true exercise of the eye of the soul in the speculation of things, leading forth through opposite positions the essential impression of reasons which it contains, and considering not only the divine path, as it were, which conducts to truth, but exploring whether the deviations from it contain any thing worthy of belief; and, lastly, stimulating the all-various conceptions of the soul. But the second energy takes place when intellect rests from its former investigations, as becoming most familiar with the speculation of beings, and beholds truth itself firmly established upon a pure and holy foundation. And this energy, according to Socrates, by a progression through ideas, evolves the whole of an intelligible nature, till it arrives at that which is first; and this by analysing, defining, demonstrating, and dividing, proceeding upwards and downwards, till, having entirely investigated the nature of intelligibles, it raises itself to a nature superior to beings. But the soul being perfectly established in this nature, as in her paternal port, no longer tends to a more excellent object of desire, as she has now arrived at the end of her search: and you may say that what is delivered in the *Phædrus* and *Sophista* is the employment of this energy, giving a twofold division to some, and a fourfold to other operations of the dialectic art; and on this account it is assigned to such as philosophize purely, and no longer require preparatory exercise, but nourish the intellect of their soul in pure intellection. But the third energy, which is exhibitivè according to truth, purifies from twofold ignorance when its reasons are employed upon men full of opinion; and this is spoken of in the *Sophista*." So that the dialectic energy is triple, either subsisting through opposite arguments, or alone unfolding truth, or alone confuting falsehood.

Parmenides by means of this dialectic perfects the conceptions of Socrates about ideas. For, as Proclus well observes, the mode of discourse is every where obstetric, but does not confute; and is explorative, but not defensive. But it differs, considered as sometimes proceeding from on high to such things as are last, and sometimes ascending from sensible particulars to such reasons as are accommodated to divine causes; but, according to each of these, it elevates Socrates, calls forth his native conceptions concerning ideas, and causes them to possess an expanded distinction. And in this respect,

spect, says Proclus, Parmenides truly imitates the paternal cause of the universality of things, who from the supreme hypostasis of all beings, preserves and perfects all things, and draws them upwards by his unknown and ineffable powers.

With respect to the dramatic apparatus of this dialogue, it is necessary to observe, that the Athenians had two festivals in honour of Minerva; the former of which, on account of the greater preparation required in its celebration, was called *the greater Panathenaia*; and the latter, on account of its requiring a less apparatus, was denominated *the lesser Panathenaia*. The celebration of them, likewise, was distinguished by longer and shorter periods of time. In consequence, therefore, of the greater festival taking place, sacred to Minerva, Parmenides and Zeno came to Athens, Parmenides being the master, and Zeno his disciple; but both of them Eleateans—and not only this, says Proclus, but partakers of the Pythagoric doctrine, according to the relation of Callimachus the historian. Parmenides and Zeno, therefore, in a place called the Ceramicus, beyond the walls of the city, and which was sacred to the statues of the Gods, met with one Pythodorus, together with Socrates and many other Athenians, who came thither for the purpose of hearing the writings of Zeno. The ensuing dialogue, which was the consequence of Zeno's discourse, was afterwards related by Pythodorus to one Antiphon, the brother on the mother's side of Adimantus and Glaucus, who were the brothers of Plato, both from the same father and mother; and the dialogue is supposed to be again related by Antiphon to Cephalus and his companions, in consequence of their soliciting Adimantus and Glaucus to request Antiphon for the narration.

Zeno, therefore, having read to the audience a book, in which he endeavoured to exhibit the difficulties attending the doctrine which asserts the existence of *the many*, and this in order to defend the favourite dogma of Parmenides, who called *being, the one*; Socrates by no means opposes his arguments, but readily admits the errors which must ensue from supposing multitude to exist, without participating *the one*. However, Socrates does not rest here, but urges Zeno to a speculation of *the one* and the *unities* which subsist in intelligible natures, not enduring to dwell on the contemplation of *the one* which sensibles contain: and this leads him to the investigation of ideas in which the unities of things reside. After this Parmenides,

not in the least contradicting Socrates, but completing the contemplation which he had begun, unfolds the entire doctrine of ideas, introducing for this purpose four questions concerning them: whether they have a subsistence; of what things there are ideas, and of what not; what kind of beings they are, and what power they possess: and how they are participated by subordinate natures. And this being discussed, Parmenides ascends from hence to *the one* which subsists above intelligibles and ideas, and adduces nine hypotheses concerning it; five, supposing *the one* to have a subsistence, and four, supposing it not to subsist; accurately investigating, at the same time, the consequences resulting from these hypotheses. But of this more hereafter.

With respect to ideas, though many invincible arguments may be adduced for their existence, the following appear to me remarkable for their perspicuity and strength. Diversity of powers always indicates diversity of objects. But it is obvious to every one, that the power of intellect is different from the power of sense; that which is sensible, therefore, is one thing, and that which is intelligible another. And as intellect is superior to sense, so is intelligible more excellent than that which is sensible. But that which is sensible has an existence; and by a much greater reason, therefore, that which is intelligible must have a real subsistence. But intelligible is a certain universal species; for universal reason is always the object of intelligence. And hence there are such things as intelligible and common species of things which we call ideas.

Again, all corporeal natures subsist in time; but whatever subsists in time is measured by time; and whatever is thus conditioned depends on time for the perfection of its being. But time is composed of the past, present, and future. And if we conceive that any one of these periods is taken away from the nature with which it is connected, that nature must immediately perish. Time, therefore, is so essentially and intimately united with the natures which it measures, that their being, such as it is, depends on the existence of time. But time, as is evident, is perpetually flowing, and this in the most rapid manner imagination can conceive. It is evident, therefore, that the natures to which it is so essential must subsist in a manner equally transitory and flowing. As we cannot, therefore, affirm with propriety, of any part of time that it *is*, since even before we can form the assertion  
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the present time is no more, so with respect to all corporeal natures (from their subsistence in time), before we can say that they exist, they lose all identity of being. And hence no one of them is truly that which it is said to be. On the contrary, truth is eternal and immutable: for, if any one should assert that truth is not, he asserts this either truly or falsely; but if falsely, there is such a thing as truth; and if truly, then it is true that there is no such thing as truth. But if it is truly asserted, it can only be true through truth; and, consequently, there is such a thing as truth, which must also be eternal and immutable. Hence, truth cannot subsist in any thing mutable; for that which is situated in a mutable nature is also changed in conjunction with it. But all corporeal natures are continually changed, and hence they are neither true, nor have a true existence. If, therefore, the forms of bodies are imperfect, they are not the first forms; for whatever ranks as first is perfect and entire, since the whole reason of every nature is established in that which is first. There are, therefore, certain forms above these, perfect, primary, and entire, and which are not indigent of a subject.

But if the forms of bodies are not true, where do the true forms subsist? Shall we say nowhere? But in this case falsehood would be more powerful than truth, if the former possessed, and the latter had no, subsistence. But this is impossible. For that which is more powerful derives its power from truth; since, unless it was truly more powerful, it would not be that which it is said to be. But, indeed, without the presence of truth, the forms which are said to be false could not subsist; for they would no longer be what they are, unless it was true that they are false. True species, therefore, have a subsistence somewhere. But does not our soul possess truer species than those which are the objects of sensible inspection, by which it judges, condemns, and corrects them, and understands how far they depart from, and in what respect they agree with, such forms as are true? But he who does not behold true forms, can by no means make a comparison between them and others, and rectify the inaccuracy of the one by the accurate truth of the other. For the soul, indeed, corrects the visible circle, when it does not touch a plane in one point only; approves or condemns every artificial structure and musical modulation; and judges concerning the goodness or depravity, utility or detriment, beauty or deformity, of every object in nature.

ture. The soul, therefore, possesses truer forms, by which she judges of corporeal natures. But neither are these forms in the soul first forms, for they are movable; and though not subsisting in place, yet they have a discursive procession through the intervals of time. Nor do they always exist in energy; for the soul does not always energize through them. Nor do they subsist in a total but in a partial intellect. For as the soul is not total intellect, on account of its self-motive nature, so the intellect which is in soul is not a total and first intellect, but suffers a remission of intellectual union, from its connection with the discursive energies of soul. There is, therefore, above soul, and that intellect which is a part of soul, a certain first intellect, in itself entire and perfectly complete, in which the first and most true species of all things are contained, and which have a subsistence independent of time, place, and motion. And this first intellect is no other than that vital nature *αυτοζωον*, or *animal itself*, in which Plato in the *Timæus* represents the artificer of the universe contemplating the ideas of things, and fabricating the machine of the world according to this all-beautiful exemplar.

Again, the artificer of the universe must be a God. Every God operates essentially, or produces from his essence that which he produces, because this is the most perfect mode of production. Every thing which operates essentially produces an image of itself. He, therefore, who fabricated the universe, fabricated it an image of itself. But if this be the case, he contains in himself paradigmatically the causes of the universe: and these causes are ideas. To which we may add, that the perfect must necessarily antecede the imperfect; unity, multitude; the indivisible, the divisible; and that which abides perpetually the same, that which subsists in unceasing mutation. From all which it follows, that things do not originate from baser natures, but that they end in these; and that they commence from natures the most perfect, the most beautiful, and the best. For it is not possible that our intellect should be able to apprehend things properly equal, similar, and the like, and that the intellect of the artificer of the universe should not contain in itself the essentially equal, just, beautiful, and good, and, in short, every thing which has a universal and perfect subsistence, and which, from its residence in deity, forms a link of that luminous chain of substances to which we very properly give the appellation of ideas.

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The following additional arguments in defence of the Platonic doctrine of ideas are given for the sake of the liberal and Platonic reader. The whole is nearly extracted from the MS. Commentary of Proclus on the Parmenides.

This visible world is either self-subsistent, or it derives its subsistence from a superior cause. But if it is admitted to be self-subsistent, many absurd consequences will ensue: for it is necessary that every thing self-subsistent should be impartible; because every thing which makes and every thing which generates is entirely incorporeal. For bodies make through incorporeal powers; fire by heat, and snow by coldness. But if it is necessary that the maker should be incorporeal, and in things self-subsistent the same thing is the maker and the thing made, the generator and the thing generated, that which is self-subsistent will be perfectly impartible. But the world is not a thing of this kind: for every body is every way divisible, and consequently is not self-subsistent. Again: every thing self-subsistent is also self-energetic. For, as it generates itself, it is by a much greater priority naturally adapted to energize in itself, since to make and to generate are no other than to energize. But the world is not self-motive, because it is corporeal. No body, therefore, is naturally adapted to be moved, and at the same time to move according to the whole of itself. For neither can the whole at the same time heat itself, and be heated by itself: for, because it is heated, it will not yet be hot, in consequence of the heat being gradually propagated through all its parts; but, because it heats, it will possess heat, and thus the same thing will be, and yet not be, hot. As, therefore, it is impossible that any body can move itself according to internal change, neither can this be effected by any other motion. And, in short, every corporeal motion is more similar to passion than to energy; but a self-motive energy is immaterial and impartible: so that, if the world is corporeal, it will not be self-motive. But, if not self-motive, neither will it be self-subsistent. And if it is not self-subsistent, it is evident that it is produced by another cause.

For, again, that which is not self-subsistent is twofold, viz. it is either better than, or inferior to, cause. And that which is more excellent than cause<sup>1</sup>, as is the ineffable principle of things, has something posterior to

<sup>1</sup> This is demonstrated by Proclus in his Elements of Theology.

itself, such as is a self-subsistent nature. But that which is subordinate to cause is entirely suspended from a self-subsistent cause. It is necessary, therefore, that the world should subsist from another more excellent cause. But, with respect to this cause, whether does it make according to free will and the reasoning energy, or produce the universe by its very essence? for, if according to free will, its energy in making will be unstable and ambiguous, and will subsist differently at different times. The world, therefore, will be corruptible: for that which is generated from a cause moving differently at different times is mutable and corruptible. But, if the cause of the universe operated from reasoning and inquiry in producing the world, his energy could not be spontaneous and truly his own; but his essence would be similar to that of the artificer, who does not derive his productions from himself, but procures them as something adventitious by learning and inquiry. Hence we infer that the world is eternal, and that its maker produced it by his very essence; for, in short, every thing which makes according to free will has also the essential energy. Thus, our soul, which energizes in many things according to free will, imparts at the same time life to the body by its very essence, which life does not depend on our free will: for, otherwise, the animal from every adverse circumstance would be dissolved, the soul on such occasions condemning its association with the body. But not every thing which operates from its very essence has also another energy according to free will. Thus, fire heats by its very essence alone, but produces nothing from the energy of will; nor is this effected by snow, nor, in short, by any body, so far as body. If, therefore, the essential energy is more extended than that of free will, it is evident that it proceeds from a more venerable and elevated cause: and this very properly; for the creative energy of natures that operate from their very essence is unattended with anxiety. But it is especially necessary to conceive an energy of this kind in divine natures; since we also then live more free from anxiety, and with greater ease, when our life is divine, or according to virtue. If, therefore, there is a cause of the universe operating from his very essence, he is that primarily which his production is secondarily; and that which he is primarily he imparts in a secondary degree to his production. Thus, fire both imparts heat to something else, and is itself hot; and soul imparts life, and possesses life: and this reasoning will be found to be

be true in every thing which operates essentially. The cause of the universe, therefore, fabricating from his very essence, is that primarily which the world is secondarily. But, if the world is full of all-various forms, these will subsist primarily in the cause of the world: for it is the same cause which gave subsistence to the sun and moon, to man and horse. These, therefore, are primarily in the cause of the world; another sun besides the apparent, another man, and, in a similar manner, every other form. There are, therefore, forms prior to sensibles, and demiurgic causes of the phenomena pre-subsisting in the one cause of the universe.

But if any one should say that the world has indeed a cause, yet not producing, but final, and that thus all things are orderly disposed with relation to this cause, it is so far well indeed, that they admit the good to preside over the universe. But, it may be asked, whether does the world receive any thing from this cause, or nothing according to desire? for, if nothing, the desire by which it extends itself towards this cause is vain. But if it receives something from this cause, and this cause not only imparts good to the world, but imparts it essentially, by a much greater priority, it will be the cause of existence to the universe, that it may impart good to it essentially; and thus he will not only be the final, but the producing cause of the universe.

In the next place, let us direct our attention to the phenomena, to things equal and unequal, similar and dissimilar, and all such sensible particulars as are by no means truly denominated: for where is there equality in sensibles which are mingled with inequality? where similitude in things filled with dissimilitude? where the beautiful among things of which the subject is base? where the good in things in which there is capacity and the imperfect? Each of these sensible particulars, therefore, is not that truly which it is said to be: for, how can things, the nature of which consists in the impartible and in privation of interval, subsist perfectly in things partible, and endued with interval? But our soul is able, both to conceive and generate things far more accurate and pure than the phenomena. Hence, it corrects the apparent circle, and points out how far it falls short of the perfectly accurate. And it is evident that in so doing it beholds another form more beautiful and more perfect than this: for, unless it beheld something more pure, it could not say that this is not truly beautiful, and that is not in every respect equal. If, therefore, a partial soul such as ours is able to generate and contemplate

in itself things more perfect than the phænomena, such as the accurate sphere and circle, the accurately beautiful and equal, and, in a similar manner, every other form, but the cause of the universe is neither able to generate, nor contemplate, things more beautiful than the phænomena, how is the one the fabricator of the universe, but the other of a part of the universe? For a greater power is effective of things more perfect, and a more immaterial intellect contemplates more excellent spectacles. The maker of the world, therefore, is able both to generate and understand forms much more accurate and perfect than the phænomena. Where, then, does he generate, and where does he behold them? Evidently, in himself: for he contemplates himself. So that, by beholding and generating himself, he at the same time generates in himself, and gives subsistence to forms more immaterial and more accurate than the phænomena.

In the third place, if there is no cause of the universe, but all things are from chance, how are all things coordinated to each other, and how do things perpetually subsist? And whence is it that all things are thus generated according to nature with a frequency of subsistence? for whatever originates from chance does not subsist frequently, but seldom. But if there is one cause, the source of coordination to all things, and this cause is ignorant of itself, must there not be some nature prior to this, which, by knowing itself, imparts being to this cause? for it is impossible that a nature which is ignorant should be more excellent than that which has a knowledge of itself. If, therefore, this cause knows itself, it is evident that, knowing itself to be a cause, it must also know the things of which it is the cause; so that it will also comprehend the things which it knows. If, therefore, intellect is the cause of the universe, it also coordinated all things to each other: for there is one artificer of all things. But the universe is various, and all its parts do not participate either of the same dignity or order. Who is it then that measures the dignity of these, except the power that gave them subsistence? Who distributed every thing in a convenient order, and fixed it in its proper seat—the sun here, and there the moon, the earth here, and there the mighty heaven—except the being by whom these were produced? Who gave coordination to all things, and produced one harmony from all, except the power who imparted to every thing its essence and nature? If, therefore, he orderly disposed all things, he cannot be ignorant  
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of the order and rank which every thing maintains in the universe ; for to operate in this manner would be the province of irrational nature, and not of a divine cause, and would be the characteristic of necessity, and not of intellectual providence. Since, if, intellectually perceiving himself, he knows himself, but knowing himself and the essence which he is allotted, he knows that he is an immovable cause, and the object of desire to all things, he will also know the natures to which he is desirable : for he is not desirable from accident, but essentially. He will therefore either be ignorant of what he is essentially, or, knowing this, he will also know that he is the object of desire ; and, together with this, he will know that all things desire him, and what the natures are by which he is desired : for, of two relatives, to know one definitely, and the other indefinitely, is not the characteristic of science, and much less of intellectual perception. But, knowing definitely the things by which he is desired, he knows the causes of them, in consequence of beholding himself, and not things of a posterior nature. If, therefore, he does not in vain possess the causes of all things, he must necessarily, according to them, bound the order of all things, and thus be of all things the immovable cause, as bounding their order by his very essence.

But whether shall we say that, because he designed to make all things, he knew them, or, because he understands all things, on this account he gave subsistence to all things ? But if, in consequence of designing to make all things, he knows all things, he will possess inward energy, and a conversion to himself subordinate to that which proceeds outwardly, and his knowledge of beings will subsist for the sake of things different from himself. But if this is absurd, by knowing himself he will be the maker of all things. And, if this be the case, he will make things external similar to those which he contains in himself ; for such is the natural order of things, that externally proceeding should be suspended from inward energy, the whole world from the all-perfect monad of ideas, and the parts of the visible universe from monads which are separated from each other.

In the fourth place, we say that man is generated from man, and from every thing its like. After what manner, therefore, are they generated ? for you will not say that the generation of these is from chance : for neither nature nor divinity makes any thing in vain. But, if the generation of men is not from chance, whence is it ? You will say, It is evidently from seed.

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Let it then be admitted, that man is from seed; but seed possesses productive powers in capacity, and not in energy. For, since it is a body, it is not naturally adapted to possess productive powers impartibly and in energy: for every where a subsistence in energy precedes a subsistence in capacity: since, being imperfect, it requires the assistance of something else endued with a perfective power. This something else you will say is the nature of the mother; for this perfects and fashions the offspring by its productive powers. For the apparent form of the mother does not make the infant, but nature, which is an incorporeal power and the principle of motion. If, therefore, nature changes the productive powers of seed from capacity to a subsistence in energy, nature must herself possess these productive powers in energy. Hence, being irrational and without imagination, she is at the same time the cause of physical reasons. As the nature of man, therefore, contains human productive powers, does not also nature in a lion contain those of the lion; as, for instance, the reasons or productive powers of the head, the hair, the feet, and the other parts of the lion? Or, whence, on shedding a tooth, does another grow in its place, unless from an inherent power which is able to make the teeth? How, likewise, does it at the same time make bone and flesh, and each of the other parts? for the same thing energizing according to the same would not be able to fashion such a variety of organization. But does not nature in plants also possess productive powers as well as in animals? or shall we not say that, in these likewise, the order of generation and the lives of the plants evince that they are perfected from orderly causes? It is evident, therefore, from the same reasoning, that the natures of these also comprehend the apparent productive powers. Let us then ascend from these to the one nature of the earth, which generates whatever breathes and creeps on its surface, and which by a much greater priority contains the productive powers of plants and animals. Or whence the generation of things from putrefaction? (for the hypothesis of the experimentalists is weak and futile.) Whence is it that different kinds of plants grow in the same place, without human care and attention? Is it not evident that it is from the *whole nature* of the earth, containing the productive powers of all these in herself? And thus proceeding, we shall find that the nature in each of the elements and celestial spheres comprehends the productive powers of the animals which it contains. And if from the celestial spheres.

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we ascend to the nature of the universe itself, we may also inquire respecting this, whether it contains forms or not, and we shall be compelled to confess, that in this also the productive and motive powers of all things are contained: for whatever is perfected from inferior subsists in a more excellent and perfect manner from more universal natures. The nature of the universe, therefore, being the mother of all things, comprehends the productive powers of all things; for, otherwise, it would be absurd that art, imitating natural reasons, should operate according to productive principles, but that nature herself should energize without reasons, and without inward measures. But, if nature contains productive principles, it is necessary that there should be another cause prior to nature, which is comprehensive of forms; for nature verging to bodies energizes in them, just as if we should conceive an artist verging to pieces of timber, and inwardly, by various operations, reducing them to a certain form: for thus nature, merged together with and dwelling in corporeal masses, inspires them with her productive powers and with motion; since things which are moved by others require a cause of this kind, a cause which is properly irrational indeed, that it may not depart from bodies, which cannot subsist without a cause continually residing with them, but containing the productive powers of bodies, that it may be able to preserve all things in their proper boundaries, and move every thing in a convenient manner. Nature, therefore, belongs to other things, being merged in, or coordinated with, bodies. But it is requisite that the most principal and proper cause should be exempt from its productions: for, by how much more the maker is exempt from the thing made, by so much the more perfectly and purely will he make. And, in short, if nature is irrational, it requires a leader. There is, therefore, something prior to nature, which contains productive powers, and from which it is requisite that every thing in the world should be suspended. Hence, a knowledge of generated natures will subsist in the cause of the world more excellent than the knowledge which we possess; so far as this cause not only knows, but gives subsistence to, all things; but we possess knowledge alone. But if the demiurgic cause of the universe knows all things, if he beholds them externally, he will again be ignorant of himself, and will be subordinate to a partial soul; but, if he beholds them in himself, he will contain in himself all forms, intellectual and gnostic.

In the fifth place, things produced from an immovable cause are immovable and without mutation ; but things produced from a movable cause are again movable and mutable, and subsist differently at different times. If this be the case, all such things as are essentially eternal and immutable must be the progeny of an immovable cause ; for, if from a movable cause, they will be mutable ; which is impossible. Are not, therefore, the form of man and the form of horse from a cause, if the whole world subsists from a cause ? From what cause, therefore ? Is it from an immovable or from a movable cause ? But if from a movable cause, the human species will some time or other fail ; since every thing which subsists from a movable cause ranks among things which are naturally adapted to perish. We may also make the same inquiry respecting the sun and moon, and each of the stars : for, if these are produced from a movable cause, in these also there will be a mutation of essence. But if these, and all such forms as eternally subsist in the universe, are from an immovable cause, where does the immovable cause of these subsist ? For it is evidently not in bodies, since every natural body is naturally adapted to be moved. It therefore subsists proximately in nature. But nature is irrational ; and it is requisite that causes properly so called should be intellectual and divine. Hence, the immovable causes of these forms subsist primarily in intellect, secondarily in soul, in the third gradation in nature, and lastly in bodies. For all things either subsist apparently or unapparently, either separate or inseparable from bodies ; and if separate, either immovably according to essence and energy, or immovably according to essence, but movably according to energy. Those things, therefore, are properly immovable, which are immutable both according to essence and energy, such as are intelligibles ; but those possess the second rank which are immovable indeed according to essence, but movable according to energy, and such are souls : in the third place, things unapparent indeed, but inseparable from the phænomena, are such as belong to the empire of nature ; and those rank in the last place which are apparent, subsist in sensibles, and are divisible : for the gradual subjection of forms proceeding as far as to sensibles ends in these.

In the sixth place, let us speculate after another manner concerning the subsistence of forms or ideas, beginning from demonstrations themselves. For Aristotle has proved in his *Last Analytics*, and all scientific men must

confess, that demonstrations are entirely from things which have a priority of subsistence, and which are naturally more honourable. But if the things from which demonstrations consist are universals, (for every demonstration is from these),—hence, these must be causes to the things which are unfolded from them. When, therefore, the astronomer says, that the circles in the heavens bisect each other, since every greatest circle bisects its like, whether does he demonstrate or not? For he makes his conclusion from that which is universal. But where shall we find the causes of this section of circles in the heavens which are more universal than the circles? For they will not be in bodies, since every thing which is in body is divisible. They must, therefore, reside in an incorporeal essence; and hence there must be forms which have a subsistence prior to apparent forms, and which are the causes of subsistence to these, in consequence of being more universal and more powerful. Science, therefore, compels us to admit that there are universal forms, which have a subsistence prior to particulars, are more essential and more causal, and from which the very being of particulars is derived.

By ascending from motion we may also after the same manner prove the existence of ideas. Every body from its own proper nature is alter-motive, or moved by another, and is indigent of motion externally derived. But the first, most proper and principal motion is in the power which moves the mundane wholes: for he possesses the motion of a mover, and body the motion of that which is moved, and corporeal motion is the image of that which pre-subsists in this power. For that is perfect motion because it is energy; but the motion in body is imperfect energy: and the imperfect derives its subsistence from the perfect.

From knowledge also we may perceive the necessity of the same conclusion. For last knowledge is that of bodies, whether it be denominated sensible or imaginable: for all such knowledge is destitute of truth, and does not contemplate any thing universal and common, but beholds all things invested with figure, and all things partial. But more perfect knowledge is that which is without figure, which is immaterial, and which subsists by itself, and from itself; the image of which is sense, since this is imperfect knowledge, subsisting in another, and not originating from itself. If, therefore, as in motion, so also in knowledge and in life, that which participates, that which is participated, and that which is imparticipable, are different

from each other, there is also the same reasoning with respect to other forms. For matter is one thing, the form which it contains another, and still different from either is the separate form. For God and Nature do not make things imperfect which subsist in something different from themselves, and which have an obscure and debile existence, but have not produced things perfect, and which subsist from themselves; but by a much greater priority they have given subsistence to these, and from these have produced things which are participated by, and merged in, the darkness of matter.

But if it be requisite summarily to relate the cause that induced the Pythagoreans and Plato to adopt the hypothesis of ideas, we must say, that all these visible natures, celestial and sublunary, are either from chance, or subsist from a cause. But that they should be from chance is impossible: for things more excellent will subsist in things subordinate, viz. intellect, reason, and cause, and that which proceeds from cause. To which we may add, as Aristotle observes, that prior to causes according to accident, it is requisite that there should be things which have an essential subsistence; for the accidental is that in which the progressions of these are terminated. So that a subsistence from cause will be more antient than a subsistence from chance, if the most divine of things apparent are the progeny of chance. But if there is a cause of all things, there will either be many unconjoined causes, or one cause; but if many, we shall not be able to assign to what it is owing that the world is one, since there will not be one cause according to which all things are coordinated. It will also be absurd to suppose that this cause is irrational. For, again, there will be something among things posterior better than the cause of all things, viz. that which, being within the universe, and a part of the whole, operates according to reason and knowledge, and yet derives this prerogative from an irrational cause. But if this cause is rational and knows itself, it will certainly know itself to be the cause of all; or, being ignorant of this, it will be ignorant of its own nature. But if it knows that it is essentially the cause of the universe, it will also definitely know that of which it is the cause; for, that which definitely knows the one will also definitely know the other. Hence, he will know every thing which the universe contains, and of which he is the cause: and if this be the case, beholding himself, and knowing himself, he knows things posterior to himself. By immaterial reasons, therefore, and forms, he knows the  
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the mundane reasons and forms from which the universe consists, and the universe is contained in him as in a cause separate from matter. This, Proclus adds, was the doctrine of the Eleatic Zeno, and the advocates for ideas: nor did these men alone, says he, form conceptions of this kind respecting ideas, but their doctrine was also conformable to that of the theologists. For Orpheus says, that after the absorption of Phanes in Jupiter all things were generated: since prior to this the causes of all mundane natures subsisted unitedly in Phanes, but secondarily and with separation in the demiurgus of the universe. For there the sun and the moon, heaven itself, and the elements, Love the source of union, and in short all things, were produced: for there was a natural conflux, says Orpheus, of all things in the belly of Jupiter. Nor did Orpheus stop here; but he also delivered the order of demiurgic forms through which sensible natures were allotted their present distribution. Proclus further adds: The Gods also have thought fit to unfold to mankind the truth respecting ideas; and have declared what the one fountain is whence they proceed; where ideas first subsist in full perfection; and how in their progression they assimilate all things, both wholes and parts, to the Father of the universe. What Proclus here alludes to is the following Chaldaic Oracle:

Νους πατρος ερροιζησε νοησας ακμαιδι βουλη  
 Παμμορφους ιδεας· πηγης δε μιας αποπτασαι  
 Εξεθορον· πατροθεν γαρ εν βουλητε τελος τε.  
 Αλλ' εμερισθησαν νοερω πυρι μοιρηθεισαι  
 Εις αλλας νοερας· κοσμο γαρ αναξ πολυμορφω  
 Προυθηκεν νοερον τυπον αφθιτον, ου κατα κοσμον  
 Ιχνος επειγομενος μορφης μετα κοσμος εφανθη,  
 Παντοιαις ιδεαις κεχαρισμενος, ων μια πηγη,  
 Εξ ης ροιζονται μεμερισμεναι αλλαι απληται,  
 'Ρηγνυμεναι κοσμου περι σωμασιν, αι περι κολπουσ'  
 Σμερδαλεουσ σμηνεσσιν εοικυιαι φορευονται,  
 Τραπουσι περι τ' αμφι παρα σχεδον αλλυδις αλλη  
 Εννοιαι νοεραι πηγης πατρικης απο, πολυ  
 Δραττομεναι πυρος ανθος ακοιμητου χρονου, ακμη  
 Αρχεγονους ιδεας πρωτη πατρος εβλυσε τας δε  
 Αυτοτελης πηγη.

i. e. "The intellect of the Father made a crashing noise, understanding with unwearied counsel omniform ideas. But with winged speed they leaped forth from one fountain: for both the counsel and the end were from the Father. In consequence, too, of being allotted an intellectual fire, they are divided into other intellectual forms: for the king previously placed in the multiform world an intellectual incorruptible impression, the vestige of which hastening through the world, causes it to appear invested with form, and replete with all-various ideas of which there is one fountain. From this fountain other immense distributed ideas rush with a crashing noise, bursting forth about the bodies of the world, and are borne along its terrible bosoms like swarms of bees. They turn themselves, too, on all sides, and nearly in all directions. They are intellectual conceptions from the paternal fountain, plucking abundantly the flower of the fire of sleepless time. But a self-perfect fountain pours forth primogenial ideas from the primary vigour of the Father."

Through these things, says Proclus, the Gods have clearly shown where ideas subsist, who the divinity is that comprehends the one fountain of these, and that from this fountain a multitude proceeds. Likewise, how the world is fabricated according to ideas; that they are motive of all mundane systems; that they are essentially intellectual; and that they are all-various according to their characteristics.

If, therefore, he adds, arguments persuade us to admit the hypothesis respecting ideas, and the wise unite in the same design, viz. Plato, Pythagoras, and Orpheus, and the Gods clearly bear witness to these, we should but little regard sophistical arguments, which are confuted by themselves, and assert nothing scientific, nothing sane. For the Gods have manifestly declared that they are conceptions of the Father: for they abide in his intelligence. They have likewise asserted that they proceed to the fabrication of the world; for the crashing noise signifies their progression;—that they are omniform, as comprehending the causes of all divisible natures; that from fontal ideas others proceed, which are allotted the fabrication of the world, according to its parts, and which are said to be similar to swarms of bees; and lastly, that they are generative of secondary natures.

Timæus, therefore, places in intelligibles the one primary cause of all ideas; for there animal itself subsists, as is evident from that dialogue. But the

the oracles say, that the fountain of ideas pre-subsists in the demiurgus; nor are these assertions discordant with each other, as they may appear to be to some. For it is not the same thing to investigate the one and total cause of mundane forms, and simply to contemplate the first unfolding into light of every series of ideas; but the comprehension of the former must be referred to the demiurgus, and of the latter to the intelligible order itself, of divine natures, from which the demiurgus is filled, and all the orders of an ideal essence. And, on this account, I think the oracles assert, that ideas proceed with a crashing noise from their intellectual fountain, and, being distributed in different places, burst about the bodies of the world, in consequence of the cause of mundane natures being comprehended in this fountain, according to which, all generated composite natures in the world are invested with form, conformably to the demiurgic will. But the forms subsisting in animal itself, according to an intelligible bound, are neither said by Plato to be moved, nor to leap into bodies, but to impart essence to all things by their very essence alone. If, therefore, to subsist through energy and motion is secondary to a making prior to energizing and being moved, it is evident that the ideas intelligibly and immovably established in animal itself are allotted an order more elevated than demiurgic ideas. And the demiurgus is fabricative of forms in a twofold respect; both according to the fountain in himself, and according to intelligible ideas: for there are the total causes of all things, and the four monads; but, thence originating, they proceed through the whole divine orders as far as to the last of things, so that the last and sensible images of these possess a certain similitude, more clearly of some, and more obscurely of others. He, likewise, who is capable of following the divine progressions will perceive that every sensible form expresses the idioms of all of them. For the immovable and the eternal in sensible forms are no otherwise present than from the first forms: for they are primarily eternal; and hence they communicate eternity to the consequent progressions in a secondary and third gradation. Again, that every form is a multitude, subsists according to a peculiar number, and is filled with its proper numbers, and that on this account a different form is referred to a different divine order to us unknown and ineffable,—this it receives from the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order, and from the forms which there subsist occultly, and ineffably: just as the power of

uniting a diffipated effence, and bounding the infinity of generated natures in common limits, is derived from the connecting order, and from connective forms. But to be entirely perfective of an imperfect nature, and to produce into energy the aptitude of subjects, comprehending the unfigured in figures, and the imperfect in perfection, is solely derived from perfective deity, and the forms which there appear. Again, so far as every form hastens to verge to itself, and comprehends parts uniformly in itself, so far it bears an image of the summit of intellectuals, and the impartible subsistence of forms established according to that order. But so far as it proceeds with life, subsists through motion, and appears immovably in things moved, so far it participates of the vivific series, and expresses the powers of vivific forms. Again, so far as it possesses the power of giving form to matter, is filled with artificial fabrication pervading through nature herself, and evinces a wonder subtilty, and a production of forms according to reason, so far it receives the representations of demiurgic ideas. If, likewise, it assimilates sensibles to intelligibles, and separates the essences of them by mutations according to reasons, it is evident that it resembles the assimilative orders of forms, from which the divisible progressions of mundane natures appear, which invest sensibles with the representations from intelligibles. Further still, if every form pervades to many things, though it be material, and bounds the multitude of them according to its proper form, must it not, according to this power, be referred to that order of Gods which governs with a liberated characteristic the allotments in the world, and draws to itself many portions of divine allotments in the universe? We may behold, therefore, an uninterrupted continuity of the whole series supernally proceeding from intelligible ideas as far as to the last of things, and likewise perceive what peculiarities sensibles derive from each order. For it is requisite that all secondary things should participate of the natures prior to them, and thus enjoy each, according to the order which they are severally allotted.

With respect to *what things there are ideas of, and what not*, I shall summarily observe, that there are ideas only of universal and perfect substances, and of whatever contributes to the perfection of these, as for instance of man, and whatever is perfective of man, such as wisdom and virtue; and consequently matter, particulars, parts, things artificial, evil and fordid natures, are excluded from the region of ideas.

To the question *what kind of beings ideas are*, we may answer with Zeno-crates, according to the relation of Proclus, that they are *the exemplary causes of things, which perpetually subsist according to nature*. They are *exemplars*, indeed, because the final cause, or *the good*, is superior to these, and that which is properly the efficient cause, or the demiurgic intellect, is of an inferior ordination. But they are the exemplars of things *according to nature*, because there are no ideas of things unnatural or artificial: and of such natural things as are *perpetual*, because there are no ideas of mutable particulars.

Lastly, *ideas are participated by material natures*, similar to the impressions in wax of a seal, to images appearing in water or a mirror, and to pictures. For material species, on account of their union with matter, are analogous to the impressions of a seal; but on account of their apparently real, but at the same time delusive subsistence in its dark receptacle, they are similar to images in water, or in a mirror, or a dream; and they resemble pictures on account of their similitude, though very remote and obscure, to first ideas themselves. We may add too, as Proclus beautifully observes, that they derive their subsistence as *impressions* from the *mundane* Gods; their *apparent* existence from the *liberated* Gods; and their *similitude* to supernal forms from the *supermundane* or *assimilative* Gods. And thus much for the first part of the dialogue, or the doctrine of ideas <sup>1</sup>.

But in order to a summary view of the inimitably profound and sublime discussion which the second part contains concerning *the one*, it is necessary to observe, that by *the one itself* the Pythagoreans and Plato signified the first cause, which they very properly considered as perfectly superessential, ineffable and unknown. For it is necessary that multitude should be posterior to unity: but it is impossible to conceive *being* <sup>2</sup> without multitude, and consequently the cause of all beings must be void of multitude and superessential. And that this was really the opinion of the most antient Pythagoreans, from

<sup>1</sup> See more concerning ideas in the first dissertation prefixed to my translation of Proclus on Euclid, in the notes to my translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, and in the notes to this dialogue.

<sup>2</sup> If *being* were the same with *the one*, multitude would be the same with non-being: for the opposite to *the one* is *multitude*, and the opposite to *being* is *non-being*. As *being*, therefore, is not the same with, it must be posterior to, *the one*; for there is not any thing in things more excellent than *unity*.

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whom Plato derived his philosophy, the following citations will abundantly evince.

And, in the first place, this is evident from a fragment of Archytas, a most ancient Pythagorean, on the principles of things, preserved by Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. p. 82, and in which the following extraordinary passage occurs: 'Ὡστ' ἀναγκα τρεῖς εἶμεν τὰς ἀρχὰς, τὰν τε ἐστὼ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τὰν μορφῶν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ κινητικὸν καὶ ἀορατὸν δυνάμει· τὸ δὲ τοῖστον ὃν οὐ μόνον<sup>1</sup> εἶμεν δεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῶν τι κρείσσον· νοῶν δὲ κρείσσον ἐστὶ ὅπερ ὀνομαζόμεν θεὸν φανερόν.—i. e. "So that it is necessary to assert that there are three principles; *that which is the subject of things (or matter), form, and that which is of itself motive, and invisible in power.* With respect to the last of which, it is not only necessary that it should have a subsistence, *but that it should be something better than intellect.* But that which is better than intellect is evidently the same with that which we denominate God." It must here however be observed, that by the word *God* we are not only to understand the first cause, but every God: for, according to the Pythagoric theology, every Deity, considered according to the characteristic of his nature, is superior to intellectual essence. Agreeably to the above passage is that also of Brotinus, as cited by Syrianus in Arist. Meta. p. 102, b. who expressly asserts that the first cause *ἢ παντός καὶ ὀσίας δυνάμει καὶ πρεσβείᾳ ὑπερέχει*—"surpasses every intellect and essence both in power and antiquity." Again, according to the same Syrianus, p. 103, b. we are informed, "that the Pythagoreans called God *the one*, as the cause of union to the universe, and on account of his superiority to every being, to all life, and to all-perfect intellect. But they denominated him the measure of all things, on account of his conferring on all things, through illumination, essence and bound; and containing and bounding all things by the ineffable supereminence of his nature, which is extended beyond every bound." Τῶν θεῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐν μὲν λεγόντων τὸν θεὸν ὡς ἐνώσεως τοῖς ὅλοις αἰτίον, καὶ παντός τε ὄντος, καὶ πασης ζωῆς, καὶ ἢ τε παντελῆς ἐπεκτείνῃ. Μετρον δὲ τῶν πάντων ὡς πασι τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐπιλαμβάνοντα, καὶ ὡς πάντα περιέχοντα, καὶ ὀρίζοντα ταῖς ἀφραστοῖς αὐτῆς, καὶ παντός ὑπερηπλωμέναις περατός ὑπεροχῆς. And again, this is confirmed by Clinius the Pythagorean, as cited by Syrianus, p. 104, in which place *præclari* is erroneously substituted for *Clinii*. "That which is *the one*, and *the measure of*

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *ὃν οὐ μόνον*, which is evidently the true reading, *ὄνομον μόνον* is erroneously printed in Stobæus.

*all things* (says he), is not only entirely exempt from bodies, and mundane concerns, but likewise from intelligibles themselves; since he is the venerable principle of beings, the measure of intelligibles, ingenerable, eternal, and alone (*μονον*), possessing absolute dominion (*κυριωδες*), and himself manifesting himself (*αυτο το εαυτο δηλουν*).” This fine passage I have translated agreeably to the manuscript corrections of the learned Gale, the original of which he has not inserted. To this we may likewise add the testimony of Philolaus; who, as Syrianus informs us, p. 102, knew that cause which is superior to the two first elements of things, *bound* and *infinite*. For (says he) “Philolaus asserts that the Deity established *bound* and *infinite*: by bound, indeed, exhibiting every coordination, which is more allied to *the one*; but by infinity a nature subjected (*υφειμενην*) to *bound*. And prior to these two principles he places one, and a singular cause, separated from the universality of things, which Archainetus (*Αρχαινετος*) denominates a cause prior to cause; but which, according to Philolaus, is the principle of all things.” To all these respectable authorities for the superessential nature of the first cause, we may add the testimony of Sextus Empiricus himself. For in his books against the Mathematicians (p. 425) he informs us, “that the Pythagoreans placed *the one* as transcending the genus of things which are essentially understood.” *Και δη των μεν καθ’ αυτα νοσμενων γενος υπεστησαντο Πυθαγορικων παιδες, ως επαναβεβηκος το εν*. In which passage, by things which are essentially understood, nothing more is meant than intelligible essences, as is obvious to every tyro in the Platonic and Pythagoric philosophy.

But in consequence of this doctrine of the antients concerning *the one*, or the first principle of things, we may discover the meaning and propriety of those appellations given by the Pythagoreans to unity, according to Photius and others: such as *αλαμπια*, *σκοτωδια*, *αμιξια*, *βαραθρον υποχθονιον*, *Απολλων*, &c. viz. *obscurity*, or *without illumination*; *darkness*, *without mixture*, *a subterranean profundity*, *Apollo*, &c. For, considered as ineffable, incomprehensible, and superessential, he may be very properly called *obscurity*, *darkness*, and a *subterranean profundity*: but considered as perfectly simple and one, he may with no less propriety be denominatèd *without mixture*, and *Apollo*; since Apollo signifies a privation of multitude. “For (says Plotinus) the Pythagoreans denominatèd the first God *Apollo*, according to a more secret signification, implying a negation of many.” *Ennead. 5. lib. 5.* To which we

may add, that the epithets *darkness* and *obscurity* wonderfully agree with the appellation of *a thrice unknown darkness*, employed by the Egyptians, according to Damascius<sup>1</sup>, in their most mystical invocations of the first God; and at the same time afford a sufficient reason for the remarkable silence of the most antient philosophers and poets concerning this highest and ineffable cause.

This silence is, indeed, remarkably obvious in Hesiod, when in his *Theogony* he says:

Ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστα Χάος γενετ',—

That is, "*Chaos was the first thing which was generated*"—and consequently there must be some cause prior to Chaos, through which it was produced; for there can be no effect without a cause. Such, however, is the ignorance of the moderns, that in all the editions of Hesiod *γενετο* is translated *fruit*, as if the poet had said that *Chaos was the first of all things*; and he is even accused by Cudworth on this account as leaning to the atheistical system. But the following testimonies clearly prove, that in the opinion of all antiquity, *γενετο* was considered as meaning *was generated*, and not *was simply*. And, in the first place, this is clearly asserted by Aristotle in lib. 3, de Cælo. "There are certain persons (says he) who assert that there is nothing unbegotten, but that all things are *generated*. And this is especially the case with Hesiod."—Ἐἰσι γὰρ τινες οἱ φασιν οὐθὲν ἀγεννητὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα γιγνεσθαι—Μάλιστα μὲν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον. And again, by Sextus Empiricus in his *Treatise Adversus Mathematicos*. p. 383, edit. Steph. who relates, that this very passage was the occasion of Epicurus applying himself to philosophy. "For (says he) when Epicurus was as yet but a young man, he asked a grammarian, who was reading to him this line of Hesiod,

Chaos of all things was the first produced,

from what Chaos was *generated*, if it was the first thing generated. And upon the grammarian replying that it was not his business to teach things of this kind, but was the province of those who are called philosophers—To those then, says Epicurus, must I betake myself, since they know the truth

<sup>1</sup> Περὶ ἀρχῶν.

of things." Κομίδη γὰρ μείρακιςκος ὤν, ἤρετο τον επαναγινώσκοντα αὐτῷ Γραμματιστήν (ἢ τοι μὲν πρῶτιστα Χάος γένετ') ἐκ τίνος το χάος ἐγένετο, εἴπερ πρῶτον ἐγένετο. Τούτου δὲ εἰπόντος μὴ αὐτοῦ ἐργον εἶναι τα τοιαῦτα διδάσκειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καλουμένων Φιλοσοφῶν· τοίνυν εἶπεν ὁ Ἐπικύροσ, ἐπ' ἐκείνους μοι βαδιστέον ἐστίν, εἴπερ αὐτοὶ τῆν τῶν οὐτῶν ἀληθείαν ἴσασιν.

Simplicius, too, in commenting on the passage above cited from Aristotle, beautifully observes as follows —“ Aristotle (says he) ranks Hesiod among the first physiologists, because he sings Chaos was first *generated*. He says, therefore, that Hesiod in a particular manner makes all things to be generated, because that which is first is by him said to be generated. But it is probable that Aristotle calls Orpheus and Musæus the first physiologists, who assert *that all things are generated, except the first*. It is, however, evident that those theologists, singing in fabulous strains, meant nothing more by *generation* than the procession of things from their causes; on which account *all of them consider the first cause as unbegotten*. For Hesiod also, when he says that *Chaos was first generated*, insinuates that there was something prior to Chaos, from which Chaos was produced. For it is always necessary that every thing which is generated should be generated from something. But this likewise is insinuated by Hesiod, that the first cause is above all knowledge and every appellation.” (De Cœlo, p. 147.)

But these divine men not only called the first cause *the one*, on account of his transcendent simplicity, but likewise *the good*, on account of the superlative excellency of his nature; by the former of these appellations considering him as that principle from which all things flow, and by the latter as that supreme object of desire to which all things ultimately tend. And hence Plato, in his Republic, asserts that *the good* is superessential; and Aristotle, in lib. 14, Metaphys. cap. 4, alluding to Plato and the Pythagoreans, says, “ that according to some, *the one* is the same with the good.” ‘Οὐ μὲν φασιν αὐτο το εἶν, το αγαθον αὐτο εἶναι.

With great beauty, therefore, does Proclus <sup>1</sup>, with his usual magnificence of expression, assert of this incomprehensible cause, “ that he is the God of all Gods, the unity of unities, and above the first adyta <sup>2</sup>; that he is more

<sup>1</sup> In Plat. Theol. p. 110.

<sup>2</sup> Ἀδυνατώ is erroneously printed for ἀδύτων.

ineffable than all silence, and more unknown than all essence; that he is holy among the holies, and is concealed among the intelligible Gods.”

Plato, too, in the Republic, that we may be enabled to gain a glimpse from analogy of this transcendent nature, compares him to the sun. For as the sun by his light not only confers the power of being seen on visible objects, but is likewise the cause of their generation, nutriment, and increase; so *the good*, through superessential light, imparts being and the power of being known to every thing which is the object of knowledge. Hence, says Damascius<sup>1</sup>, “this highest God is seen afar off as it were obscurely; and if you approach nearer, he is beheld still more obscurely; and lastly, he takes away the ability of perceiving other objects. He is, therefore, truly an incomprehensible and inaccessible light, and is profoundly compared to the sun: upon which the more attentively you look, the more you will be darkened and blinded; and will only bring back with you eyes stupefied with excess of light.”

And such is the doctrine of Plato and the Pythagoreans concerning the highest principle of things. But, according to the same divine men, the immediate progeny of this ineffable cause must be Gods; and as such must have a superessential subsistence. For what else prior to unities is it lawful to conjoin with *the one*, or what is more conjoined with a God subsisting according to unity, than the multitude of Gods? Besides, progressions are every where perfected through similitude to their principles. For both nature herself, intellect, and every generative cause, leads and conjoins to itself similar natures, prior to such as are dissimilar. For as there can be no vacuum either in incorporeal or corporeal natures, it is necessary that every thing which has a natural progression should proceed through similitude. Hence, every cause must deliver its own form and characteristic to its progeny, and, before it generates that which is hypostatic of progressions far distant and separate from its nature, must constitute things proximate to itself according to essence, and conjoined with it through similitude. As nature, therefore, generates a natural number, soul one that is animal, and intellect an intellectual number, it is necessary that the first unity should produce from itself,

<sup>1</sup> Περὶ ἀρχῶν.

prior to every thing else, a multitude of natures characterised by unity, and a number the most of all things allied to its cause. And hence the fountain of universal good must produce and establish in beings *goodnesses* naturally conjoined with himself; and these exalted natures can be no other than Gods.

But if these divine natures are alone superessential, they will in no respect differ from the highest God. They must, therefore, be participated by beings; that is, each must have some particular being consubstant with its nature, but yet so as not to lose its superessential characteristic. And hence every unity may be considered as the lucid blossom or centre of the being by which it is participated; absorbing, as it were, in superessential light, and thus deifying the essence with which it is connected.

Nor let the reader imagine that this sublime theory is nothing more than the fanatic jargon of the latter Platonists, as is rashly and ignorantly asserted by Cudworth; for it is a doctrine as old at least as Timæus the Locrian. For, in his book *On the Soul of the World*, after asserting that there are two causes of all things, intellect of such as are produced according to reason, but necessity of such as are produced by force, according to the powers of bodies, he adds—"that the former of these, that is intellect, is a cause of the nature of *the good*, and is called God, and is the principle of such things as are best." *Τουτεων δε, τον μεν τας ταγαθω φυσιος ειμεν, θεον τε ονομαινεσθαι, αρχαν τε των αριστων.* But according to the Pythagoreans, as we have abundantly proved, *the good* or *the one* is above essence and intellect; and consequently by intellect here we must not understand the first cause, but a deity subordinate to the first. Intellect, however, is (says he) of the nature of *the good*; but *the good* is superessential, and consequently intellect participates of a superessential nature. And when he adds that intellect is called God, he plainly intimates that every God (the first being excepted) partakes of a superessential nature.

But to return to our inimitable dialogue: This second part consists of nine hypotheses; five of which consider the consequences which result from admitting the subsistence of *the one*, and the other four what must be the consequences if it were taken away from the nature of things. But as Plato in these hypotheses delivers the Eleatic method of reasoning, it is necessary to inform the reader that, according to Proclus<sup>1</sup>, it was as follows:—Two

<sup>1</sup> In lib. 5. MS. Comment. in Parmenidem.

hypotheses being laid down, viz. *if a thing is*, and *if it is not*, each of these may be tripled by considering in each *what happens*, *what does not happen*, *what happens and at the same time does not happen*: so that six cases will be the result. But since, *if a thing is*, we may consider itself either with respect to itself, or itself with respect to others; or we may consider others themselves with respect to themselves, or others with respect to that thing itself, and so likewise if a thing is not: hence, the whole of this process will consist of eight triads, which are as follows:—1. *If a thing is*, what happens to itself with respect to itself, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 2. *If a thing is*, what happens to itself with respect to others, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 3. *If a thing is*, what happens to others with respect to themselves, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. 4. *If a thing is*, what happens to others with respect to that thing, what does not happen, what happens and at the same time does not happen. And the other four, which are founded on the hypothesis *that a thing is not*, are to be distributed in exactly the same manner as those we have just enumerated. Such (says Proclus) is the whole form of the dialectic method, which is both intellectual and scientific; and under which those four powers, the *definitive* and *divisive*, the *demonstrative* and *analytic*, receive their consummate perfection.

*In the first hypothesis*, therefore, Plato considers *what does not follow to the one*, considered with respect to itself and to others. *In the second*, *what does follow*. *In the third*, *what follows and at the same time does not follow*. And this forms the first hexad. But *in the fourth hypothesis* he considers *what follows to others with respect to themselves*, and *what does not follow*, *what follows and at the same time does not follow*. *In the fifth*, *what follows to others with respect to the subject of the hypothesis*, *what does not follow*, *what follows and at the same time does not follow*. And so two hexads, or four triads, are by this means produced from the five hypotheses, if *the one* is. And the reader will easily perceive how each of the other four, which suppose *the one* is not, may form a triad: so that these four triads, in conjunction with the preceding four, will give the whole Eleatic or dialectic method complete.

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It is likewise necessary to observe, that these hypotheses are derived from the triple division of *the one*, and the twofold division of *non-being*. For *the one* is either *above being*, or *in being*, or *posterior to being*. But *non-being* is either *that which in no respect is*, or *that which is considered as partly having a subsistence, and partly not*. This being premised, let the reader attend to the following beautiful account of these hypotheses from Proclus on Plato's Theology, and from his admirable commentary on this dialogue.

The first hypothesis demonstrates by negations the ineffable supereminence of the first principle of things; and evinces that he is exempt from all essence and knowledge. But the second unfolds the whole order of the Gods. For Parmenides does not alone assume the intellectual and essential idiom of the Gods, but likewise the divine characteristic of their hyparxis, through the whole of this hypothesis. For what other *one* can that be which is participated by *being*, than that which is in every being divine, and through which all things are conjoined with the *imparticipable one*? For, as bodies through their *life* are conjoined with *soul*, and as *souls* through their *intellective part* tend to *universal intellect* and *the first intelligence*, in like manner *true beings*, through *the one* which they contain, are reduced to a *separate union*, and are conjoined with *the first cause of all*.

But because this hypothesis commences from that which is *one being*, and establishes the summit of intelligibles as the first after *the one*, but ends in an essence which participates of time, and deduces divine souls to the extremities of the divine orders, it is necessary that the third hypothesis should demonstrate by various conclusions the whole multitude of particular souls, and the diversities which they contain. And thus far the separate and incorporeal hypostasis extends.

But after this follows *that nature which is divisible about bodies and inseparable from matter*, which the fourth hypothesis delivers supernally depending from the Gods. And the last hypostasis is the procession of matter, whether considered as *one* or as *various*, which the fifth hypothesis demonstrates by negations, according to its dissimilar similitude to *the first*. But sometimes, indeed, the negations are privations, and sometimes the separate causes of all productions. And that which is most wonderful of all, the  
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highest negations are only enunciative, but some in a supereminent manner, and others according to subjection. But each of the negations consequent to these is affirmative; the one paradigmatically, but the other iconically, or according to similitude. But the middle corresponds to the order of soul: for it is composed from affirmative and negative conclusions. But it possesses negations similar to affirmations. And since it is alone multiplied, as consisting from wholes, it possesses an adventitious *one*. And this *one* which it contains, though truly one, yet subsists in motion and multiplication, and in its progressions is, as it were, absorbed by essence. And such are the hypotheses which unfold all beings, both separable and inseparable, together with the causes of the universe, as well exempt as subsisting in things themselves, according to the hyparxis of *the one*.

But there are four hypotheses besides these, which by taking away *the one* entirely subvert all things, both such as truly are, and such as subsist in generation, and show that no being can any longer exist. *The one*, therefore, being admitted, all things subsist even to the last hypostasis; and this being taken away, essence itself is immediately destroyed.

The preceding mode of exposition (except in the second hypothesis) agrees with that of the great Plutarch, preserved by Proclus in his commentary on this dialogue, and which is as follows:

The first hypothesis discourses concerning the first God. The second, concerning the first intellect, and an order entirely intellectual. The third, of the soul. The fourth, of material species. And the fifth, of formless matter. For these are the five principles of things. Parmenides in the mean time, after the manner of his own Pythagoreans, calls every separate substance, on account of its simplicity, by the common appellation of *one*. But he denominates matter and corporeal form *different*, on account of their flowing nature and far distant diversity from divine essences: especially since these two do not so much subsist by themselves as through others, and are not so much causes as concauses, as it is asserted in the *Timæus* and *Phædo*. With great propriety, therefore, the three first hypotheses, which inquire how *the one* is related to itself and to others, are considered as treating of principal causes. But the other two, which investigate how other things are related to each other and to *the one*, are considered as representing form

and matter. In these five hypotheses, therefore, these principles, together with what they contain or subsists about them, are confirmed from the position of *one*: of *one*, I say, *above* being, *in* being, and *posterior* to being. The remaining four hypotheses demonstrate how many absurdities follow from taking away *that one* which beings contain, that we may understand how much greater absurdities must ensue from denying the subsistence of that which is *simply one*. The sixth hypothesis, therefore, proves that, if there is not *that which is one* in beings, i. e. if intelligible has no real subsistence, but partly possesses and is partly destitute of being, that which is sensible would alone exist in the order of things. For, if intelligible is taken away, that which is sensible must alone remain; and there can be no knowledge beyond sense. And this the sixth hypothesis demonstrates to be absurd. But the seventh hypothesis proves that, if *the one which beings contain* has no kind of subsistence, there can be no knowledge, nor any thing which is the object of knowledge, which this seventh hypothesis shows is foolish to assert. And again, *if this one partly subsists and is partly without subsistence*, as the sixth hypothesis feigns, other things will be similar to shadows and dreams, which the eighth hypothesis confutes as absurd. But *if this one has no kind of subsistence*, other things will be less than shadows or a dream, that is, nothing; which the ninth hypothesis represents as a monstrous assertion. Hence the first hypothesis has the same relation to those which remain, as the principle of the universe to the universality of things. But the other four which immediately follow the first, treat concerning the principles posterior to *the one*. And the four consequent to these prove that, *one* being taken away, all that was exhibited in the four prior hypotheses must entirely perish. For since the second demonstrates that, *if that one subsists which is conjoined with being*, every order of soul must subsist; the seventh declares that, *if this one is not*, all knowledge, reason, imagination, and sense, must be destroyed. Again, since the fourth hypothesis declares that, *if this one being subsists*, material species also must subsist, which in a certain respect participate of *one being*,—the eighth hypothesis shows that, *if this one being has no subsistence*, what we now call sensible natures would be only shadows and dreams, without any formal distinction or substance whatever. And lastly, since the fifth hypothesis admonishes us that, *if this one being subsists*, matter will

subsist, not indeed participating of *one being* so far as *being*, but considered as *one*; the ninth hypothesis at length shows that, *if this one being* is taken away, not even the shadow of any thing could possibly subsist.

Thus far Plutarch; who likewise observes that this dialogue was considered as divine by the ancients; and declares that the preceding exposition is partly taken from the writings of the ancients, and partly from his own private opinion.

Now from all this we may safely conclude, with Proclus, that all the axioms of theological science are perfectly exhibited in this part of the dialogue; that all the distributions of the divine natures are unfolded in connected continuity; and that this is nothing else *than the celebrated generation of the Gods, and every kind of existence, from the ineffable and unknown cause of the universe*. For the ancients by *generation* meant nothing more than the *procession* of things from their cause; and hence the first cause was symbolically called by Orpheus *time*,—because, says Proclus, where there is generation, there time has a subsistence.

*That first and imparticipable one*, then, who is declared to be the cause of all things after an ineffable manner, but who is without circumscription, and does not possess any power or characteristic of a kindred kind with the other Gods, is celebrated by the first hypothesis. And from this supereminent cause, as from an exalted place of survey, we may contemplate the divine unities, that is, the Gods, flowing in admirable and ineffable order, and at the same time abiding in profound union with each other, and with their cause. And here, says Proclus, an apt resemblance of their progression presents itself to our view. Because a line is the first continuous and divisible nature amongst magnitudes, hence it participates of an indivisible, that is, of a point. And this point, though it is allotted a superlinear condition and is indivisible, yet it subsists in the line, is something belonging to it, and is the summit of the line. To which we may add, that many lines in a circle touch by their several points the centre of the circle. In like manner an intelligible and intellectual essence, because it is the first multiplied nature, on this account partakes of an excellent unity. And this unity, though it is neither essence nor obnoxious to essential multitude, yet abides in essence, or rather subsists as its vertex, through which every intellectual essence is a God, enjoying  
divine

divine unity as the very flower of its nature, and as that which conjoins it with the ineffable one. And as every thing is established in its own species through form, and as we derive the characteristic of our nature from soul, so every God becomes that which he is, or a Deity, through the unity of his nature.

Lastly, says he, the intention of the first hypothesis is to absolve that which is simply one from all the properties and conditions of the unities of the Gods; and by this absolving to signify the procession of all things from thence. But our intention in pursuing these mysteries is no other than by the logical energies of our reason to arrive at the simple intellection of beings, and by these to excite the divine one resident in the depths of our essence, or rather which presides over our essence, that we may perceive the simple and incomprehensible one. For after, through discursive energies and intellections, we have properly denied of the first principle all conditions peculiar to beings, there will be some danger, lest, deceived by imagination after numerous negations, we should think that we have arrived either at nothing, or at something slender and vain, indeterminate, formless, and confused; unless we are careful in proportion as we advance in negations to excite by a certain amatorial affection the divine vigour of our unity; trusting that by this means we may enjoy divine unity, when we have dismissed the motion of reason and the multiplicity of intelligence, and tend through unity alone to *the one itself*, and through love to *the supreme and ineffable good*.

It may likewise be clearly shown, and will be immediately obvious to those who understand the following dialogue, that the most antient poets, priests, and philosophers, have delivered one and the same theology, though in different modes. The first of these, through fabulous names and a more vehement diction; the second, through names adapted to sacred concerns, and a mode of interpretation grand and elevated; and the third, either through mathematical names, as the Pythagoreans, or through dialectic epithets, as Plato. Hence we shall find that the *Æther, Chaos, Phanes*, and *Jupiter*, of Orpheus; the *father, power, intellect*, and *twice beyond* of the Chaldæans; the *monad, duad, tetrad, and decad*, of Pythagoras; and *the one being, the whole, infinite, multitude, and sameness and difference* of Plato, respectively,

spectively, signify the same divine processions from the ineffable principle of things.

I only add, that I have followed the opinion of Proclus in inscribing this Dialogue ON THE GODS: for as ideas, considered according to their summits or unities, are Gods, and the whole dialogue is entirely conversant with ideas and these unities, the propriety of such an inscription must, I think, be apparent to the most superficial observer.

# THE PARMENIDES:

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## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CEPHALUS,		PYTHODORUS,
ADIMANTUS,		SOCRATES,
ANTIPHON,		ZENO,
GLAUCO,		PARMENIDES.

SCENE, *the CERAMICUS*†.

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WHEN we arrived at Athens from Clazomenia, the place of our abode, we fortunately met with Adimantus and Glaucus in the forum: and Adimantus, taking me by the hand, I am glad to see you (says he), Cephalus; and if you are in want of any thing here, in which we are able to assist you, I beg you would inform me. Upon which I replied, I came for this very purpose, as being indigent of your assistance. Tell me, then (says he), what you are in want of. And I replied, What was your brother's name? for I do not remember: as he was almost a child when I first came here from Clazomenia; and, since that circumstance took place, a great length of time has intervened. But his father's name was, I think, Pylilampes. Entirely so (says he), and my brother's name was Antiphon. But what is it you principally inquire after? I replied, These my fellow-citizens are very philosophic, and have heard that this Antiphon was frequently present with one Pythodorus, the familiar of Zeno, and that he treasured in his memory the discourses which Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides had with each other, and which had frequently been heard by Pythodorus. You speak the truth

† See the Introduction.

(says

(says he). These discourses, therefore (says I), we are desirous to hear. But this (says he) is no difficult matter to accomplish: for the young man has made them the subject of vehement meditation; and now with his grandfather, who bears the same name as himself, very much applies himself to equestrian affairs. But if it is necessary, we will go to him: for he just now went from hence home; and dwells very near, in Melita. After we had thus spoke, we proceeded to the house of Antiphon; and found him at home, giving a certain bridle to a copper-smith, to be furnished in a proper manner. But as soon as the smith was gone, and the brothers had told him the cause of our arrival, Antiphon knew me, in consequence of my former journey to this place, and very kindly saluted me: and upon our begging him to relate the discourses, at first he seemed unwilling to comply (for he said it was a very operose undertaking); but afterwards, however, he gratified our request. Antiphon, therefore, said that Pythodorus related that Zeno and Parmenides once came to celebrate the great Panathenæa: that Parmenides was very much advanced in years, extremely hoary, but of a beautiful and venerable aspect, and about sixty-five years of age; but that Zeno was nearly forty years old, was very tall and graceful to the view, and was reported to be the bosom friend of Parmenides. He likewise said that he met with them, together with Pythodorus, in the Ceramicus, beyond the walls; where also Socrates came, and many others with him, desiring to hear the writings of Zeno, for then for the first time they became acquainted with his writings: but that Socrates at that time was very young. That, in consequence of this, Zeno himself read to them. And Pythodorus further related that it happened Parmenides was gone out; and that but a small part of the discourse remained unfinished, when he himself entered, together with Parmenides and Aristotle, who was one of the thirty Athenians. That, in consequence of this, he heard but a little at that time; but that he had often before heard the whole discourse from Zeno.

He further added, that Socrates, upon hearing the latter part of Zeno's discourse, entreated him to repeat the first hypothesis of his first discourse; and that, when he had repeated it, Socrates said—How is it you assert, O Zeno, that if beings are many, it is requisite that the same things should be both similar and dissimilar? But that this is impossible. For neither can things dissimilar be similar, nor things similar be dissimilar. Is not this  
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what you assert? Zeno answered, It is. If, therefore, it is impossible that dissimilars should be similar, and similars dissimilar, is it not impossible that many things should have a subsistence? For, if there were many, they would suffer impossibilities. Is it not then the sole intention of your discourses to evince, by contesting through all things, that *the many* has no subsistence? And do you not consider each of your discourses as an argument in support of this opinion; and so think that you have produced as many arguments as you have composed discourses, to show that *the many* is not? Is not this what you say, or do I not rightly understand you? Upon which Zeno replied, You perceive excellently well the meaning of the whole book. That Socrates then said, I perceive, O Parmenides, that this Zeno does not only wish to connect himself in the bands of friendship with you, but to agree with you likewise in sentiments concerning the doctrines of the present discourse. For Zeno, in a certain respect, has written the same as yourself; though, by changing certain particulars, he endeavours to deceive us into an opinion that his assertions are different from yours. For you in your poems assert that the universe is *one*; and you produce beautiful and excellent arguments in support of this opinion: but Zeno says that *the many* is not, and delivers many and mighty arguments in defence of this assertion. As, therefore, you assert that *the one* is, and he, that *the many* has no subsistence; and each speaks in such a manner as to disagree totally according to appearance from one another, though you both nearly assert the same; on this account it is that your discourses seem to be above our comprehension. That Zeno said—Indeed, Socrates, so it is: but you do not perfectly apprehend the truth of my writings; though, like Laconic dogs, you excellently pursue and trace the meaning of the assertions. But this in the first place is concealed from you, that this discourse is not in every respect so venerable, that it was composed, as you say, for the purpose of concealing its real doctrines from men, as if effecting a thing of great importance: yet you have spoken something of that which happens to be the case. But indeed the truth of the matter is this: These writings were composed for the purpose of affording a certain assistance to the doctrine of Parmenides, against those who endeavour to defame it by attempting to show that if *the one* is *many*, ridiculous consequences must attend such an opinion; and that things contrary to the assertion must ensue. This writing, therefore, con-

tradicts

tradicts those who say that *the many* is, and opposes this and many other opinions; as it is desirous to evince that the hypothesis which defends the subsistence of *the many* is attended with more ridiculous consequences than that which vindicates the subsistence of *the one*, if both are sufficiently examined. You are ignorant, therefore, Socrates, that this discourse, which was composed by me when a youth, through the love of contention, and which was privately taken from me, so that I was not able to consult whether or not it should be issued into the light—you are ignorant, I say, that it was not written through that desire of renown which belongs to a more advanced period of life, but through a juvenile desire of contention: though, as I have said, you do not conjecture amiss. I admit it (says Socrates); and I think the case is just as you have stated it. But satisfy me in the following particulars. Do you think that there is a certain form of similitude, itself subsisting from itself? And another which is contrary to this, and is that which is dissimilar? But that you and me, and other things which we call many, participate of these two? And that such things as participate of similitude become similar, so far as they participate? But those which participate of dissimilitude become dissimilar? And that those which participate of both become both? But if all things participate of both, which are contrary to each other, and become similar and dissimilar to each other through participating of both, is there any thing wonderful in the case? For, if any one should show that similars themselves become dissimilar, or dissimilars similar, I should think it would be a prodigy: but if he evinces that such things as participate both these suffer likewise both these, it does not appear to me, O Zeno, that there would be any thing absurd in the case; nor again, if any one should evince *that all things are one*, through their participating of *the one*, and at the same time *many*, through their participating multitude. But I should very much wonder if any one should show that that which is *one* is *many*, and that *the many* is *one*; and in a similar manner concerning all the rest: for, doubtless, he would produce a proper subject of admiration, who should evince that both genera and species suffer these contrary affections. But what occasion of wonder would there be, should any one show that I myself am both *one* and *many*? and should prove his assertion by saying, when he wishes to assert that I am *many*, that the parts on the right hand of me are different from those on the left, the ante-  
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rior from the posterior, and in like manner the upward from the downward parts (for I think that I participate of multitude): but when he desires to show that I am *one*, should say, that as we are seven in number, I am *one* man, and participate of *the one*? so that he would by this means evince the truth of both these assertions. If any one, therefore, should endeavour to show that stones, wood, and all such particulars, are both *many* and *one*, we should say that he exhibits to our view such things as are *many* and *one*, but that he does not assert that *the one* is *many*, nor *the many one*; nor speak of any thing wonderful, but asserts that which is confessed by all men. But if any one should, in the first place, distribute the forms of things, concerning which I have just been speaking, separating them essentially apart from each other, such as *similitude* and *dissimilitude*, *multitude* and *the one*, and the rest of this kind, and should afterwards show himself able to mingle and separate them in themselves, I should be astonished (says he), O Zeno, in a wonderful manner. But it appears to me that we should strenuously labour in the investigation of these particulars: yet I should be much astonished if any one could solve this doubt, which is so profoundly involved in species; so as to be able no less clearly to explain this affair in the forms which are apprehended by the reasoning power, than in those belonging to visible objects, and which you have already discussed.

Pythodorus said, that when Socrates had thus spoken, he thought that Parmenides and Zeno seemed to be indignant at the several particulars of Socrates's discourse; but that they bestowed the greatest attention on what he said, and frequently looking at each other smiled, as wondering at Socrates: and that, in consequence of his ceasing to speak, Parmenides said—How worthy, O Socrates, of admiration is your ardour in the pursuit of liberal disciplines! Tell me, therefore, have you separated, as you say, certain species apart by themselves, and likewise the participants of these species apart? And does there appear to you to be a certain *similitude* separate from that *similitude* which we possess, and a certain *one* and *many*, and all such other particulars, which you have just now heard mentioned by Zeno? That Socrates said, So it appears to me. And (that Parmenides said) does it also appear to you, that there is a certain species or form of *justice*, itself subsisting by itself; likewise of *beauty* and *the good*, and every thing of this kind? That Socrates said, It does. And likewise of all such things as we

are composed from : so that there is a certain form of *man*<sup>1</sup>, or of *fire*, or *water*? That Socrates answered—I have often been in doubt, O Parmenides, concerning these ; whether it is necessary to speak of them in the same manner as of the former particulars, or in a different manner. And do you doubt, O Socrates, whether it is necessary to say that there is a certain form of every such particular as may appear to be ridiculous, I mean hair<sup>2</sup>, clay, and mud, or any thing else which is vile and abject ; and that these forms are different from the particulars with which we are conversant ? That Socrates said, I do not by any means think that the forms of these can be

<sup>1</sup> It is necessary, says Proclus, that immovable causes of all things which have a perpetual subsistence in the universe should pre-exist in the intellect of the fabricator of the world : for the immutable is present with these, through the eternal power of causes. Hence, of man so far as man, and of every individual form in animals and in plants, there are intellectual causes ; and the progression of all things from thence is not immediately into these material genera. For it was not lawful for intellectual, eternal, and immaterial causes to generate material particulars, which have a various subsistence ; since every progression is effected through similitude ; and prior to things which are separated from their cause as much as possible, such things as are conjoined with, and are more clearly assimilated to, it, must have a subsistence. From *man itself*, therefore, or the ideal man in the demiurgic intellect, there will be, in the first place, a certain celestial man ; afterwards an empyrean, an aerial, and an aquatic man ; and, in the last place, this terrestrial man. All this series of form is perpetual, (the subjection proceeding into that which is more partial,) being suspended from an intellectual unity, which is called *man itself*. There is also another series from *horse itself*, from *lion itself*, and in a similar manner of all animals and plants. Thus, too, there is a fountain and unity of all fire, and a fountain of all mundane water. And that these monads are more partial than those before mentioned, viz. than beauty, similitude, justice, &c. is evident ; and it is also clear that the fountain, or idea, of all the series of man is the most partial of all the forms that are participated by mundane natures.

<sup>2</sup> We have already observed in the Introduction to this dialogue, and shall largely prove in the Additional Notes, that there are ideas alone of *universal* essences, and of such things as contribute to the perfection of these : for *the good*, *the essential*, and *the perpetual*, eminently pertain to forms ; the first of these being derived from the first cause, the second from the highest being, and the third from eternity. From these three elements, therefore, we may define what things are generated according to a paradigmatic intellectual cause, and what things subsist indeed from other principles, but not according to an intellectual paradigm. Of hair, therefore, because it is a part, there can be no idea ; nor of clay, because it is an indefinite mixture of two elements, earth and water, and is not generated according to a physical reason, or productive principle ; since there are ten thousand other things which we combine for the various purposes of life, and which are the works of art, and not of nature. Nor is there any idea of mud, because there are no ideas of degenerations, detriments, and evils, which either arise from a confluence of divulged causes, or from our actions and passions.

different from those which are the objects of our inspection: but is it not vehemently absurd to think that there is a certain form of these? For this has formerly disturbed me, whether or not something of this kind does not take place about every thing: but, after having been fixed for some time in this opinion, I have hastily withdrawn myself and fled away; fearing lest, falling into a certain abyss of trifles, I should utterly perish and be lost; but, returning from thence, I have seriously applied myself to consider those particulars, to which, as we have just now asserted, forms belong. That Parmenides then said, You are as yet but a young man <sup>1</sup>, O Socrates, and Philosophy has not yet received you into her embraces: for, in my opinion, when you are received by her, you will not despise any of these particulars: but now, on account of your juvenile age, you regard the opinions of men.

Tell me, then, does it appear to you, as you say, that there are certain forms, of which other things participating <sup>2</sup> retain the appellations; as, for instance,

<sup>1</sup> Parmenides, as Proclus justly observes, in correcting this conception of Socrates, reproves in what he now says those who consider these little and vile particulars as without a cause. For every thing which is generated, as Timæus says, is necessarily generated from some cause, since it is perfectly impossible that it should be generated without a cause. There is nothing, therefore, so dishonourable and vile which does not participate of *the good*, and thence derive its generation. Since, even though you should speak of matter, you will find that this is good; though of evil itself, you will find that this also participates of a certain good, and is no otherwise able to subsist than as coloured with, and receiving a portion of, a certain good. But the opinions of men are ashamed to suspend from a divine cause things small and vile, looking to the nature of the latter, and not to the power of the former; and not considering that, being generative of greater things, it is much more so of such as are less, as the Athenian guest says in the Laws. True philosophers, however, suspending every thing in the world both great and small from providence, see nothing dishonourable, nothing despicable in the dwelling of Jupiter; but they perceive all things good, so far as they subsist from providence, and beautiful, so far as generated according to a divine cause.

<sup>2</sup> The discourse of Parmenides, says Proclus is perfective of, evolves and elevates, the conceptions of Socrates; praising, indeed, his unperverted conceptions, but perfecting such as are imperfect, and distinctly unfolding such as are confused. But as there are four problems concerning ideas, as we have observed in the Introduction, with respect to their subsistence Parmenides excites Socrates, in order to learn whether he suspends all things from a formal principle, or whether he knew another cause more antient than this; and his reproof of Socrates was in consequence of looking to this first cause. He proceeds, therefore, supernally from the most total forms,

instance, that such things as participate of *similitude* are *similars*; of *magnitude*<sup>1</sup>, *great*; and that the participants of *beauty* and *justice* are *beautiful* and

forms, through the more partial, and such as are most individual, to such things as do not subsist according to an intellectual form, but originate from the monad of all beings, or, in other words, being itself. Hence truly proceeding as far as to the last of things, and suspending all things from a paternal cause, and perfecting the conceptions of Socrates concerning these, he proceeds to the third problem, or the manner in which ideas are participated, again extending obstetric aid. For the mode of the discourse is every where maieutic or obstetric, and does not confute, and is pirastic, or explorative, but not vindicative. It differs, however, so far as at one time it proceeds from on high as far as to the last of things, and at another recurs downwards to assertions adapted to divine causes; according to each of these forms perfecting and elevating Socrates, and distinctly unfolding his conceptions respecting these particulars. Such, then, is the mode of the discourse, calling forth spontaneous conceptions, accurately expanding such as are imperfect, and elevating those that are able to follow them; truly imitating the paternal cause, which from the summit of all beings preserves, perfects, and draws upwards all things by the unknown powers which he contains. Let us now proceed to consider the mode in which forms or ideas are participated, following the divine Proclus as our leader in this arduous investigation.

The participations of intellectual forms are assimilated to the representations in a mirror; for as, in these, *habitude* and *position* cause the image of the person to be seen in the mirror; so, the *aptitude* of matter extending itself as it were to the Artificer of the universe, and to the inexhaustible abundance which he contains, is filled from him with forms. The participations are also assimilated to the impressions in wax. For ideas impart a certain vestige and impression of themselves; and neither is this impression the same with the seal by which it was produced, as neither is the form merged in matter the same with the immaterial and divine form from which it originated. But this latter mode differs from the former so far as it indicates a certain passive property in the recipient; for the mirror does not exhibit passivity sensibly, as the wax does in the latter instance. Hence some of the Platonic philosophers, considering matter as impassive in the participation of forms, assimilate it to a mirror, but call forms images and representations. Others again, considering matter as passive, say, that it is impressed like the wax by the seal, and call forms the *passions* of matter.

Forms also are said to be like the similitudes of icons, whether effected by the painter's, or the plastic, or any other art. For these forms, being fashioned by a divine artificer, are said to be *similar* to divine forms; and hence the whole sensible order is called the icon of the intelligible. But this assertion differs from the former, so far as this separates the maker from the exemplar; but

<sup>1</sup> *Magnitude* here, as Proclus well observes, is not such as that of which geometricians speak; for they denominate whatever possesses interval magnitude, whether it be line, superficies, or solid. But Plato does not denominate the form which is the cause of every interval, magnitude, but that which according to every genus imparts *transcendency* to things.

and *just*? That Socrates replied, Entirely so. Does not every thing which participates either participate the whole form, or only a part of it? Or can there

but those produce the analogy from considering both as one. And such are the modes according to which material forms have been said to subsist with relation to such as are divine.

It must, however, be observed, that each of these is imperfect considered by itself, and incapable of representing to our intellectual conceptions the whole truth respecting this participation. For, in the first place, consider, as to the mirror, that the countenance beheld in it turns itself towards the mirror, while, on the contrary, an intellectual cause beholds itself, and does not direct its vision to outward objects. If, too, the mirror appears to possess a communication of something, but in reality does not, (for the rays are reflected back to the countenance,) it is evident that this also is foreign from the participation of divine forms; for, as they are perfectly incorporeal, nothing can be separated from them and distributed into matter.

In the second place, if we consider the impressions in wax, we shall find, that both that which impresses externally impresses, and that which is passive to the impression is externally passive; but form pervades through the whole of the subject matter, and operates internally. For nature fashions body inwardly, and not externally like art. And above all, in this instance, that which is participated approximates to that which participates. But it is requisite that divine forms should be exempt from all things, and not be mingled with any thing of a different nature.

In the third place, let us consider the analogy from icons, and we shall find this also deficient. For, in the first place, forms fashion the whole of the subject matter by which they are received, and this by an internal energy: and, in the next place, the exemplar and the maker are here separated from each other. Thus, the figure which is painted does not produce its likeness on the canvass, even though the painter should paint a resemblance of himself; for it is the soul which operates, and not the external figure, which is the exemplar; nor does that which makes, *assimilate* that which is produced to itself; for it is soul which makes, and that which is produced is the resemblance of external form. But divine forms are at the same time paradigmatic and demiurgic of their resemblances: for they have no similitude to the impressions in wax, but possess an efficacious essence, and a power assimilative of things secondary to themselves.

No one of these modes, therefore, is of itself sufficient to represent the true manner in which divine forms are participated. But, perhaps, if we can discover the most proper mode of participation, we shall see how each of these touches on the truth, at the same time that it falls short of the whole characteristic.

It is requisite, therefore, in order to this participation, to consider as the causes by which it is effected, the efficacious power of primary and divine forms, and the desire and aptitude of the natures which thence derive their formation. For neither is the fabricative and efficacious power of forms alone sufficient to produce participation; for they are every where similarly present, but are not similarly participated by all things. Nor is the desire and aptitude of the participants sufficient without the productive energy of forms; for desire and aptitude are of themselves imperfect. The prolific essence, therefore, of the demiurgic intellect exerts an efficacious

there be any other mode of participation besides these? That Socrates said, How can there be? Does it then appear to you that the whole form<sup>1</sup> is  
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efficacious energy, which the subject nature of sensibles receives. But, in effecting this participation, it neither makes use of impulsions, for it is incorporeal; nor of any indefinite impetus, as we do, for it is impassive; nor of any projectile force, for it is perfect; but it operates by its very essence. Hence, that which is generated is an image of its maker, intellection there concurring with essence: so that, according as he intellectually perceives, he fabricates; and, according as he fabricates, intellectually perceives. Hence, too, that which is generated is *always* generated by him; for, in essential productions, that which is generated is every where consubstant with its maker. In consequence of this, in things subsisting according to time, form, in *the sudden*, supervenes its subject matter, whatever has been effected previous to its presence alone removing the impediments to its reception. For, *the sudden* imitates according to *the now*, the at-once-collected and eternal generation of all things through the aptitude of the recipient.

If, again, we desire to see what it is which connects demiurgic power with the aptitude of recipients, we shall find it is goodness itself, this being the cause of all possible union. For, participations proceed to mundane causes through a desire of good; and demiurgic forms, through goodness, make their progressions into secondary natures, imitating the inexhaustible and exuberant fountain of all good, which, through its own transcendent goodness, gives subsistence to all the divine orders, if it be lawful so to speak. We have therefore these three causes of the participation of forms, the one goodness of the Father of all things; the demiurgic power of forms, and the aptitude of the natures which receive the illuminations of forms. But, participation subsisting according to these causes, we may perceive how it is possible to assimilate it to representations in a mirror, and to *reflection*. For aptitude and desire, which are imparted to sensible natures from on high, become the causes of their being again *converted* to the sources whence they were derived. This participation too may, after another manner, be assimilated to a *seal*. For the efficacious power of divine causes imparts a *vestige* of ideas to sensibles, and apparent impressions from unapparent forms. For we have said that the demiurgic cause unites both these together. But he who produces an icon effects something of this kind. For in a certain respect he congregates the subject and the paradigm; since, when this is accomplished, he produces an impression similar to the exemplar. So that these modes, in a certain respect, touch upon the truth. But it is by no means wonderful if each is found to be deficient. For the recipients of ideas are partible and sensible; and the characteristic peculiarity of these unapparent and divine causes cannot be circumscribed by the nothingness of corporeal natures.

<sup>1</sup> He who investigates whole and part, not corporeally, but in such a manner as is adapted to intelligible and immaterial forms, will perceive that every sensible nature participates both of the whole and the part of its paradigm. For, as that has the relation of a cause, but sensibles are from a cause, and effects can by no means receive the whole power of their causes, hence, sensibles do not participate of the whole form. For, where can that which is sensible receive the intellectual lives and powers of form? Where can the uniform and impartible nature of idea subsist in matter? Because however, sensibles preserve the idiom according to which *the just*  
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one in each individual of *many things*? Or what other opinion have you on this subject? That then Socrates said, What hinders, O Parmenides, but

in the intelligible world is called *the just*, or *the beautiful the beautiful*; through this again they may be said to participate of wholes, and not of parts. Thus, for instance, the idiom of *the beautiful* is every where and in all things; but in one place it is intellectually, and in another materially present. And it is evident that the participations of more perfect natures are more abundant than of those more remote from perfection; and that some things participate according to many, and others according to a few, powers. For, let *the beautiful itself* be an intellectual vital form the cause of symmetry. Form, therefore, and that which is effective of symmetry, are present to every thing beautiful: for this was the idiom of *the beautiful itself*; so that every thing participates of its whole idiom. But the intellectual nature of *the beautiful* is not present to all beauty, but to that which belongs to soul: for the beauty in this is uniform. Nor, again, is its vital nature present to all beauty, but to that which is celestial; but the splendour of beauty is seen in gold, and in certain stones. Some things, therefore, participate of the intellectual and vital nature of *the beautiful*; others of its vital separate from its intellectual nature; and others participate of its idiom alone. More immaterial natures, likewise, receive more of its powers than material natures. Things secondary, therefore, participate both the wholes and parts of their proper paradigms. And in this manner it is proper to speak to those who are able to look to the incorporeal essence of forms. But to those who are of opinion that the participation is corporeal, we must say, that sensibles are incapable of participating either the wholes or parts of ideas; which Parmenides evinces, leading Socrates to the discovery of the most proper mode of the participation of forms, and, in the first place, that they are not participated according to the whole; for this was the first thing to be shown. And Socrates says, that nothing hinders the participation of the whole form. But Parmenides reprobates the position inferring that one and the same thing will be in many things separate from each other, and so the thing itself will be separate from itself, which is of all things the most absurd. For if a finger, or any thing else which subsists in other things, whether it be a corporeal part or power, should be in many things separate from each other, it would also be separate from itself. For a corporeal power being in a subject will thus belong to subjects, and be separate from itself, since it will be both in one and many. And, with respect to a body, it is impossible that the whole of it should be in this place, and at the same time in another. For it cannot be denied, that many bodies may be in one place when the bodies consist of pure immaterial light, such as those of the spheres in which the planets are carried, but it is impossible for the same body to be at the same time in many places. And hence it is impossible for a whole to be in many subjects corporeally.

But, says Proclus, if you wish to perceive the accuracy of Plato's diction in a manner adapted to theological speculation, divide the words, and say as follows:—Since forms first subsist in the paradigm of intelligibles, as we learn in the *Timæus*, each of the first forms will be *one*, and *being*, and *a whole*. And being such, it is impossible for the same thing to be in many things separate from each other, and at once, except in an exempt manner; so as to be both every where and no where, and, being present with all things without time, to be unmingled with them. For every

but that it should be one? As it is, therefore, one and the same in things many and separate from each other, the whole will be at the same time one, and so itself will be separate from itself. That Socrates said, It would not be so: but just as if this form was *day*<sup>1</sup>, this being *one* and *the same*, is collectively present in many places, and yet is not any thing the more separate from itself; in the same manner, every form may be at once *one* and *the same* in all. That Parmenides then said, You have made, O Socrates, one and the same thing to be collectively present in many places, in a very pleasant manner; just as if, covering many men with a veil, you should say that there is *one whole*, together with *the many*. Do you not think that you would make an assertion of this kind? That Socrates said, Perhaps so. Will, therefore, the whole veil subsist together with each man, or a different part of it with each individual? A different part only. That Parmenides said, These forms then, O Socrates, are divisible<sup>2</sup>, and their participants participate only parts of them: and hence there will no longer be one whole form in each individual, but only one part of each form. So indeed it

every divine form, being in itself, is also present with others. And those natures which are incapable of being at the same time in many things, derive this inability from not being in themselves: for that which is something belonging to one thing is not capable of belonging to another.

<sup>1</sup> That Socrates, says Proclus, derived his example of day from the discourse of Zeno, is evident. For Zeno, wishing to evince how the many participate of a certain one, and are not destitute of the one, though they should be most remotely separated from each other, says in this very discourse, that whiteness, being one, is present both to us and the antipodes, in the same manner as day and night. Ὅτι μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ζηνωνος λόγου τὸ παραδειγμα εἰληφε, ὅλον' ἐκεῖνος γὰρ δηλωσαι βουλομενος ὅπως τὰ πολλὰ μετεχει τινος ἐνος, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐρημα ἐνος, καὶ διεστηκει πορρωτάτω ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, εἶπεν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ μίαν οὐσαν τὴν λευκότητα παρεῖναι καὶ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἀντιποσιν, ὁὕτως ὡς εὐφροῖνῃ καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν. Parmenides, however, corrects Socrates, as no longer preserving, by the example of day, form one and the same; but as introducing the partible instead of the impartible, and that which is one, and at the same time not one, instead of one; such as is whiteness with us and the antipodes. For the intention of Zeno's discourse was not to ascend to separate form, but to lead his auditors to that form which subsists with, and is inseparable from, the many.

<sup>2</sup> Every thing sensible is a multitude which has an adventitious one, but form is a certain one comprehending multitude uniformly. For in divine natures progression begins from the one, and from hyparxis; since, if multitude subsists prior to the one, the one will be adventitious. From these things also, says Proclus, you may understand how fables assert that there are certain divisions and lacerations of the Gods, when they are divisibly participated by secondary natures, which distribute the impartible causes of things partible presubsisting in the Gods. For the division is not in reality of the divinities, but of these secondary natures, about them.

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seems. Are you then willing to assert that one form is in reality divided, and that nevertheless it is still one? That Socrates said, By no means. For see (said Parmenides), whether upon dividing magnitude<sup>1</sup> itself, it would not be absurd that each of the many things which are great, should be great by a part of magnitude less than magnitude itself? Entirely so, said Socrates.

<sup>1</sup> Parmenides, says Proclus, wishing to show the absurdity of admitting that a formal essence is partible, discourses concerning magnitude, equality, and parvitude, because each of these is beheld about quantity. But quantity has not by any means a part the same with the whole, in the same manner as a part of quality appears to preserve the same power with the whole; whence also a part of fire is indeed diminished according to quantity, but according to quality preserves the nature of fire. In magnitude, therefore, equality, and parvitude, he very properly confutes those who say that forms are partible. For, if those forms which especially appear to be partible, because they introduce with themselves the conception of quantity, cannot be divisible, by a much greater reason other forms must be impartible, which do not introduce together with themselves such a conception; such as are the just itself, the beautiful itself, the similar itself, and the dissimilar itself, which Parmenides co-ordinating with magnitude itself inquires how they are participated by sensibles. About these, therefore, which appear to be quantities, he very properly forms the demonstration, and, in the first place, about magnitude. For, let magnitude be corporeally divisible. The part, therefore, will be less than the whole; and, if this be the case, the whole will be greater than the part. So that, if sensible magnitude receiving a part of magnitude in the intelligible world, i. e. of magnitude itself, becomes great, this very thing is called great from receiving that which is smaller: for a part of magnitude itself is less and smaller. But it is supposed that things which participate of *the great* are great, and that things which participate of *the small* are small.

Let us however consider magnitude itself by itself, apart from corporeal division. Do we not, therefore, say that it has multitude, and is not one alone? But, if it has multitude, shall we say that each of its parts is magnitude itself, or that each is less than the whole, but is by no means small? For, if a part is magnitude itself, in no respect less than the whole, there will be a progression to infinity; since this will not only be the case with this part, but also with its parts, and the parts of its parts, the parts always being the same with the wholes. But if magnitude has not magnitudes as its parts, the whole will consist from parts unadapted to it. It is necessary, therefore, that the parts as it were of magnitude itself should be magnitudes, according with the whole, but yet not that which the whole is. For the part of fire is fire, but the power of the whole is greater than that of the part; and neither does the whole consist from cold parts, nor is each part of equal strength with the whole. Hence we must conceive that magnitude itself has twofold powers, one of which infers transcendence in incorporeals with respect to incorporeals; for in these there is a certain magnitude, and the other in bodies with respect to bodies. So that, though form possesses abundance of power, yet it does not depart from its proper idiom in the multitude of the powers which it contains. By speculating intellectually in this manner parts and wholes in ideas, we shall avoid the absurdities with which Parmenides shows the speculation of them in a corporeal manner is attended.

But what then? Can that which participates a part of equal<sup>1</sup> itself, be equal to any thing by this its part of equality, which is less than equal itself?

<sup>1</sup> *Magnitude itself* is the source of transcendency and exempt perfection to all things, whether such transcendency and perfection be intellectual, or vital, or subsisting with interval. But *the equal* is the cause of harmony and analogy to all things: for from equality, as we shall show in the Additional Notes to the Timæus, all the mediums are derived, as well those belonging to the soul and such as are physical, as those that are mathematical; and the end of it is friendship and union. Since therefore the demiurgus, in adorning the universe, employed all the mediums, and the arithmetical, geometrical, and harmonic bonds proceeding from these, it may be safely inferred that the one intellectual cause of these, which generates and adorns them, is this demiurgic equality. For, as the monad which subsists in the demiurgus gives subsistence to every natural number, so the equality which is there, generates all the mediums or middles which are here; since also the equality which is contained in our dianoëtic part generates the mathematical mediums. But, if this be the case in images, much more in intellectual forms is equality the prolific source of all the variety of mediums which proceed about the world. Equality, therefore, is the cause of these to all mundane natures. It is likewise the supplier of co-ordination to beings; just as *magnitude* is the cause of exempt perfection, and *parvitude* of essential subjection. It appears, indeed, that all beings are adorned from this triad of forms, as they impart transcendency to superior natures, subjection to such as are inferior, and a communion of the same series to such as are co-ordinate. And it is evident that the perpetually indissoluble series of wholes are generated according to this triad. For every series requires these three, viz. *transcendancy*, *co-ordination* and *subjection*. So that, if there are certain progressions of every form from on high, as far as to the last of things, and which, together with communion, preserve the distinction between things second and first, they are perfected through this triad.

Let us now see how Parmenides confutes those who think that sensible equals participate parts of equality itself corporeally. For, if any sensible particular thus participates a part of equality, it is evident that it participates of something less than the whole. But, if this be the case, that which participates of the lesser is no longer lesser, but equal. It ought not however to be so; since it is agreed that forms give the appellations of themselves to sensibles. Hence that which participates of the lesser must not be called equal, but lesser; nor must that which participates of the equal be called lesser, but equal; nor that which participates of the greater be denominated equal or lesser, but greater. If, therefore, we direct our view to equality itself as an incorporeal essence, we must say that being one it contains in itself the causes of all equalities, viz. of the equality in weights, in corporeal masses, in multitudes, in dignities and in generations; so that each of such-like particulars, which are all-various, is a certain *equal*, possessing a power and dignity subordinate to the whole. Since every form, therefore, generates all the idioms of the powers which it contains, it follows that there are many equalities comprehended under one equality. Nor ought we to wonder if all equalities, being subordinate to their comprehending unity, suffer this through the participation of parvitude itself. For all forms communicate with all; and magnitude itself, so far as it possesses a lesser power than other forms, participates of parvitude. Parvitude itself also, so far as it surpasses other forms, participates of magnitude itself; while in the mean time every form is participated by sensibles so far as it is that which it is, and not so far as it communicates with others.

It is impossible. But some one of us must possess a part of this small quantity ; and that which is *small itself*<sup>1</sup> will be greater than this, this small quantity

<sup>1</sup> Parvitude itself may be considered as that which is the source of subjection in all forms, or it may be said to be that which supplies impartibility, connected continuity, and a power which converges to the same in every form. For through this souls are able to proceed from a life extended with body and sense to a more impartible form of life. Through this also bodies are compressed and connectedly contained in their indivisible causes ; the whole world is one, and possesses the whole of its life converging in one thing, the middle ; and from this the poles and centres, and all impartible sections, and contacts of circles, are derived. But the present discourse evinces that it is impossible for sensibles to participate a part of parvitude corporeally. For, if parvitude itself had a certain part, it would be greater than its part ; since a part of the small, so far as it is a part, must be smaller than the whole : so that the small will evidently be greater than its proper part, which is smaller than it. But it is impossible that the small simply considered should be greater. For we now consider parvitude itself by itself, without any connection with magnitude. And such is the absurdity attending those that divide parvitude when such division is considered in the form itself. But we may also investigate another absurdity which takes place in the participants of parvitude, and which is as follows : If we divide the small itself, since the part of it is, as has been shown, smaller than the whole, it is evident that the thing, to which the part taken away from the whole of *the small* is added, will become greater by this addition, and not smaller. Hence parvitude must not be divided.

We may also, says Proclus, interpret the present passage in the same manner as our associate Pericles. For, to whatever the part taken away from the small is added, this must necessarily become greater ; but, by adding to that same thing the remaining part of the small thus divided, the whole thing will become small, and not greater than it was before : for the form was small from the beginning. It is absurd, therefore, to think that the small can be divided. Proclus adds, that the present passage to some appeared so difficult, that they considered it as spurious. The words of Parmenides however, by introducing certain ablations and additions, evince that the participation which he reprobates is corporeal.

But we may assert in common, says Proclus, respecting these three forms, magnitude, parvitude, and equality, or rather concerning all forms at once, that they are impartible, and are allotted an incorporeal essence. For every thing corporeal, being bounded according to interval, cannot after the same manner be present to things greater and lesser ; but the equal, the greater, the lesser, and, in a similar manner, every other form are present to their participants, whatever interval they may possess. All forms, therefore, are without interval. For the same reason they are also established above all place ; since without impediment they are every where present to their participants. But things which subsist in place are naturally destitute of this unimpeded presence : for it is impossible that they can be participated by all things which are arranged in different places. In like manner, forms are entirely expanded above all time : for they are present untemporally and collectively to all things ; since generations themselves are certain preparations which precede the participations of forms. And generations indeed subsist in time, but

quantity being a part of *small itself*; and thus *small itself* will be that which is *greater*: but that to which this part which was taken away is added, will become smaller, and not greater than it was before. 'That Socrates said— This cannot take place. But after what manner<sup>1</sup> then, O Socrates, can individuals

forms give the participations of themselves to generated natures, in an instant, impartibly, without being in any respect indigent of temporal extension. Let not, therefore, any one transfer from participants to the things participated, either time, or local comprehension, or corporeal division; nor let him, in short, understand in forms either corporeal compositions or separations. For these things are very remote from the immaterial simplicity of forms, and from the purity of an impartible essence which is contained in eternity.

<sup>1</sup> The whole form of these words, says Proclus, is excitative and maieutic of the conceptions of Socrates. Hence Parmenides does not add, like one who contends for victory in disputation, "sensible, therefore, do not participate of forms," but he excites Socrates, and calls forth his intellect to the discovery of the most proper mode of participation. But we have already observed that whole and part are not to be considered corporeally, but in a manner accommodated to immaterial and intellectual essences. Sensibles, therefore, participate both the whole and the parts of form. For, so far as the idiom of every form proceeds in its participants as far as to the last of them, the participation is that of a whole; but, so far as things secondary do not receive all the power of their causes, the participation is of parts. Hence the more elevated of participants receive more powers of the paradigm; but the more subordinate, fewer. So that, if there are men in other parts of the universe better than us, these, being nearer the idea of man, will have a greater communion with it, and according to a greater number of powers. Hence the celestial lion is intellectual, but the sublunary irrational: for the former is nearer to the idea of lion than the latter. The idiom indeed of idea pervades as far as to mortal natures; and hence things sublunary sympathize with things celestial. For one form, and communion according to this, produce the sympathy. The moon also, says Proclus, as beheld in the heavens is a divinity; but the lunar form, which is beheld here in stones, preserves also a power appropriate to the lunar order, since it increases and decreases in conformity to the changes of the moon. Thus, one idiom proceeds from on high as far as to the last of things; and it is evident that it proceeds through mediums. For, if there is this one form both in Gods and stones, much prior to its being present with the latter must it subsist in the middle genera, such as dæmons, or other animals. For certain series pervade from the intellectual Gods to the heavens, and again from the heavens into generation or the sublunary realms, being changed according to each of the elements, and subsiding as far as to earth. But of these series the higher parts participate in a greater, but the lower in a lesser degree; one idiom being extended to all the parts, which makes the whole series one.

Again, after another manner, we may say that sensibles participate both of the whole and of the parts of form. They participate of the whole, so far as the fabrication of form is impartible; whence also the same whole is every where present to all things, subsisting from itself in the first place, and afterwards filling the essence of its participants with its proper power. But they participate

individuals participate of forms, if they are neither able to participate according to parts, nor according to wholes? That Socrates said, It does not appear to me, by Jupiter, to be in any respect an easy matter to define a circumstance of this kind. But what will you say to this? To what? I think that you consider every form as one <sup>1</sup>, on this account; because, since a certain multitude of particulars seems to you to be great, there may perhaps appear to him who surveys them all to be one idea, from whence you think

participate of the parts of form, so far as they do not participate of form itself, but of its images; and images are parts of their proper paradigms. For image is to its paradigm, as a part to the whole. And if any one, admitting this exposition, examines what has been already delivered concerning ideas, none of those impossibilities will follow, which some of the ancients have considered as the inevitable consequences of the doctrine of ideas. For, will it any longer be impossible that the same thing should be in all things, if we admit that an immaterial and intellectual form subsisting in itself, and requiring no seat nor place, is equally present to all things which are able to participate it? Will it be impossible that essentially impartible form, and which pre-subsists as one, should be divided in its participants and sustain a Titanic division? And how is it not most true that what participates of magnitude itself participates of the lesser? For magnitude in the participant, being divisible, is the image of magnitude itself; but the image is less than the paradigm by a certain part. In like manner, that which we call equal in sensibles is less than the power of the equal itself, and is nothing more than the image of perfection; but the equal itself is greater than this, so far as it is more perfect in power. In short, with respect to each of these three forms, since they are exempt from their participants, measure their essence, and impart the cause of subjection to them; according to exempt transcendence, each employs magnitude itself; according to a measuring power, the equal itself; and according to the gift of subjection, parvitude itself. All, therefore, co-operate with each other in the gifts which they impart to secondary natures. For, if magnitude itself imparts a power which extends to all things, but parvitude impartibility, they are consubstantial with each other; since then pervading more impartibly to a great number of particulars, they are impartible in a greater degree: and both are in a greater degree equal, by being especially the measures both of themselves and others. There is nothing, therefore, absurd, nothing impossible, if whole and part are considered in a manner adapted to the nature of forms; but all things follow appropriately to the hypothesis. Whence also Parmenides appears continually to ask Socrates, how sensibles participate of, and how whole and part are to be surveyed in, forms, elevating him to the most true conceptions concerning ideas.

<sup>1</sup> From what has been already delivered (says Proclus) it is sufficiently evident that forms are not participated in a corporeal manner; whence we may infer that neither do they fabricate corporeally, nor operate by impulsion, like the motions of bodies. But if this be the case, it is evident that the order of forms is incorporeal. In the Sophista, therefore, it is shown that *the one* is incorporeal; for, if it were body, it would require something else to unite its parts. But it is here shown that *true being* and *intellectual forms* have an impartible subsistence: and in the Laws, that

think them to be one great thing. That then Socrates said, You speak the truth. But what if you consider the *great*<sup>1</sup> *itself*, and other things which are

that *souls* are incorporeal through their self-motive hypostasis. These, however, are the three orders prior to sensibles, viz. the order of *souls*, the order of *intellectual essences*, and the order of *unities*, the immediate progeny of *the one*.

But here Parmenides ascends to a more perfect hypothesis concerning ideas, viz. whether sensibles participate of ideas as of physical reasons or productive principles, which are coordinate and consubstantial with their participants, but are at the same time incorporeal: for the doubt prior to this considered the participation of ideas as corporeal. Parmenides, therefore, ascends to a certain incorporeal reason, which, looking to things, we must define to be physical, and must assert, that the mode of participation is indeed incorporeal, but possesses something common with its participants. For if, together with incorporeal participation, we also consider the things participated as perfectly exempt from their participants, there will no longer any doubt remain concerning the participation; since these two things produce the doubt, the corporeal mode of being present, and the possession of something common between ideas and their participants, to which Socrates looking in the *Phædo* says, that it is dubious whether participation is the *presence* of forms, as in the preceding inquiry, whether sensibles participate of the whole of form, or only of a part; or whether it is not a being present. This second inquiry, therefore, considers form as in its participants, and as coordinate with them. For physical reasons and natures are arranged above bodies and the apparent order of forms; but at the same time they verge to bodies, and do not

<sup>1</sup> Ideas must be considered as exempt and separate from, and as generative of, the many; and the transitions from things which are separated must be made, not through privations, but through forms, and in forms, till we arrive at self-subsistent and first natures. For how, through things indefinite and formless, can we arrive at form and bound? Ascending, indeed, from things material to spermatic reasons, we shall find something common in them, but which is imperfect; and proceeding from these to causes subsisting in soul, we shall perceive that the effective power of these is temporal. But if we run back to forms which are truly so called, we shall find that there is nothing common between these and sensibles. For these true forms are perfect, and their energy is incorporeal and eternal, and is above all generation. For the characteristics of all generation are the imperfect from itself, the partible, the temporal, from which forms being purified, they are liberated from all sensibles, and possess nothing in common with them; so that it is no longer possible to make a transition to any other something common. As, therefore, says Proclus, we observed in commenting on the former doubt, that forms are present with their participants through that which they impart, and are not present through their separate hypostasis; so, with respect to this second doubt, we say, that forms communicate with their participants, and do not communicate. They communicate by illuminating them from themselves, but do not communicate, in consequence of being unmingled with the illuminated natures. So that a certain similitude to them is divulged, not from forms themselves, but from the illuminations proceeding from them. Hence, through these they are said to communicate after a certain manner with sensibles; not as in things synonymous, but as in things second and first.

are *great*, in the same manner, with the eye of the soul, will not again a certain something which is *great* appear to you, through which all these necessarily

not connect them exemptly. Hence, also, physical reasons are entirely coordinated with sensible forms. But Parmenides himself clearly teaches how we ascend to physical reasons; since we recur from things common in particulars to the proximate cause of them, which is entirely physical form. For, perceiving many things that are great, and one idea extending to all these, we conceive that there is a certain something *great* which is common to the magnitude in particulars. But that the discourse is about physical form, and a transition from sensibles to this form, is evident, as Proclus justly observes, from Parmenides employing such expressions as *το αἰεθῆαι, το δοξῆαι, το δοκεῖ, το ηγη*, and the like, which could not be employed about things which are objects of science, but are only adapted to physical concerns. In like manner we must say, with respect to men, that we see many men, and one idea extending to all of them, the man in particulars. Whence we think that one man pre-substits in the reasons or productive principles of nature, generative of the apparent man, and that thus the many participate of the one, as of physical reason proceeding into matter; such reason or form not being separate from matter, but resembling a seal verging to the wax, impressing in it the form which it contains, and causing it to be adapted to the whole of the inserted form. As the proximate transition, therefore, is from bodies to natures, Parmenides evinces that physical reasons fall short of the perfection of ideas, which is primary and unmingled with its participants.

From hence it may be inferred, that, as form is that primarily which the multitude under it is secondarily, it neither communicates with this multitude according to name alone, nor is synonymous with it; and that it is not necessary again to investigate that which is common to form and its depending multitude. When, therefore, we consider the one in every form, we ought not to investigate it either doxastically or dianoetically: for these knowledges are not connate with intellectual monads, which neither belong to the objects of opinion, nor to those of the dianoetic part, as we learn from the sixth book of the Republic. But it is fit that we should survey the simple and uniform essence of forms through intellectual intuition. Nor must we conceive that the one in these subsists according to composition from the many, or by an abstraction from particulars: for the intellectual number of forms proceeds from *the good* and *the one*, and does not depart from a union and alliance adapted to the cause which gave it subsistence. Hence, Socrates in the Philebus, at one time calls ideas *unities*, and at another time *monads*. For, considered with relation to *the one*, they are *monads*, because each is a multitude, since it is a certain being, life, and intellectual form; but considered with relation to their productions, and the series to which they give subsistence, they are *unities*; for things posterior to them are multiplied, and from their impartible essence become partible. If, therefore, that which is characterized by unity in forms is exempt from the many, it is evident that the knowledge of intellect, which is profoundly one, is sufficient to the apprehension of the one of forms. Whether, therefore, there is a multitude of participants, it does not multiply the unity of that which is participated; or, whether there are differences of parts in the participants, the impartible nature of forms is preserved immutable; or, whether there is composition in that which participates, the simplicity of intellectual

necessarily seem to be great? It seems so. Hence, another form of *magnitude* will become apparent, besides *magnitude itself* and its participants: and besides

lectual forms remains eternally the same. For they are neither connumerated with their effects, nor do they give completion to their essence; since, if they subsisted in their productions, they could not be beheld as the principle of them, and as their prolific cause. For, in short, every thing which is something belonging to another cannot be a cause, simply considered; since every true cause is exempt from its effects, and is established in itself and from itself, separate from its participants. He, therefore, who is willing to pass from these sensibles, and every way divided natures, to forms themselves, must permit intellect instead of opinion to be the leader of the way, and must contemplate every form uncoordinated and unmingled with objects of sense; neither conceiving that they possess any habitude with sensibles, nor surveying any common definition of essence between them and the many, nor, in short, any coordination of participants and the things which are participated. But he who uses opinion in this transition, and apprehends forms mingled with sensibles, and connumerated with material reasons, will scarcely ascend as far as to nature, and the physical order of forms: whence, again, he must after these contemplate other more total monads, and this to infinity, till, arriving at intellectual boundaries themselves, he beholds in these self-subsisting, most simple, and eternal natures, the definite derivation of forms. Parmenides, therefore, gradually evinces that primary are expanded above divisible forms, and all that is mingled and connumerated with these, and this according to a wonderful transcendence of nature.

And here, what Socrates observes in the Phædo respecting the participation of forms, is worthy of admiration: for he there says, that he cannot yet strenuously affirm whether it is requisite to call this participation *presence*, or *communion*, or any thing else besides these. For, from the first doubt, it may be evinced that it is impossible for the participation to be *presence*, since neither the whole, nor certain parts of them, are able to be present with their participants. But, from this second doubt, we may confute those who contend that the participation is *communion*. If, therefore, there is any thing common to ideas and their participants, there will be a transition ad infinitum from the participants of that which is common to that which is common; and hence this latter doubt is different from the former. For the former was, that form is present with its participants, and is something belonging to them; but the latter, that form is different from its participant, but possesses an abundant communion with it. Hence, in the former, the argument proceeds from the inability of form being present, either according to the whole or a part of itself; but, in the latter, it no longer proceeds in a similar manner, but, from that which is common in form and its participant, again ascends to something else which is more common than the one form, and the many by which it is participated. He alone, therefore, can assign a scientific reason concerning the participation of forms, who takes away that which is corporeal in their being present, and removes that which is common from an incorporeal essence. For thus ideas will be incorporeally present with their participants, but will not be subdued by one relation towards them; that they may be every where, through their incorporeal nature, and no where, in consequence of being exempt from their participants. For a communion with participants takes away

besides all these another *magnitude*, through which all these become great; so that each of your forms will no longer be one thing, but an infinite multitude.

away exempt transcendency. For it is requisite, indeed, that there should be communion, yet not as of things coordinate, but only so far as participants are suspended from ideas; but ideas are perfectly exempt from their participants. Corporeal presence, however, obscures a presence every way impartible. Bodies therefore, are things incapable of being wholly in many things; but essentially incorporeal natures are wholly present to things which are able to participate them; or, rather, they are not present to their participants, but their participants are present to them. And this is what Socrates obscurely signifies in the *Phædo*, when he says, "whether presence, or communion, or any thing else may be the cause of the participation of forms." Forms, therefore, must not be admitted to be the progeny and blossoms of matter, as they were said to be by the Stoics; nor must it be granted that they consist from a comixture of simple elements; nor that they have the same essence with spermatric reasons. For all these things evince their subsistence to be corporeal, imperfect, and divisible. Whence, then, on such an hypothesis, is perfection derived to things imperfect? Whence union to things every way dissipated? Whence is a never-failing essence present with things perpetually generated, unless the incorporeal and all-perfect order of forms has a subsistence prior to these? Others again, of the ancients, says Proclus, assigned that which is common in particulars as the cause of the permanency in forms: for man generates man, and the similar is produced from the similar. They ought, however, at the same time, to have directed their attention to that which gives subsistence to what is common in particulars: for, as we have before observed, true causes are exempt from their effects. That which is common, therefore, in particulars, may be assimilated to one and the same seal which is impressed in many pieces of wax, and which remains the same, without failing, while the pieces of wax are changed. What, then, is it which proximately impresses this seal in the wax? For matter is analogous to the wax, the sensible man to the type, and that which is common in particulars, and verges to things, to the ring itself. What else, then, can we assign as the cause of this, than nature proceeding through matter, and thus giving form to that which is sensible; by her own inherent reasons? Soul, therefore, will thus be analogous to the hand which uses the ring, since soul is the leader of nature; that which ranks as a whole of the whole of nature, and that which is partial of a partial nature. But intellect will be analogous to the soul which impresses the wax through the hand and the ring; which intellect fills that which is sensible through soul and the nature of forms, and is itself the true Porus\*, generative of the reasons which flow, as far as to matter. It is not necessary, therefore, to stop at the things common in particulars, but we should investigate the causes of them. For why do men participate of this peculiar something which is common, but another animal of a different something common, except through unapparent reasons? For nature is the one mother of all things; but what are the causes of definite similitudes? And why do we say the generation is according to nature when man is from man, unless there is a reason of men in nature, according to which all sensible men subsist? For it is not because that which is produced is an animal, since if it were a lion that was pro-

\* See the speech of Diotima in the *Banquet*.

itude. But that upon this Socrates replied, Perhaps, O Parmenides, each of these forms is nothing more than an intellectual *conception*<sup>1</sup>, which ought

duced from a man, it would be a natural animal indeed, but would no longer be *according to nature*, because it would not be generated according to a proper reason. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be another cause of similars prior to similars; and hence it is necessary to recur from the things common in particulars to the one cause which proximately gives subsistence to sensibles, and to which Parmenides himself leads us. That he does not, however, think it proper that we should stop at this cause, he manifests from what follows. For if, looking to these things which are common, we wish, beginning from these, to fashion ideas, in consequence of recurring in a similar manner to them from all things, we shall be in want not only of things of which there are ideas, but also of those of which there are not, such as of things contrary to nature, of things artificial, of things unessential, and of such as have no subsistence, such as an animal mingled from a goat and stag, (*τραγελαφος*), or an animal mingled from a horse and centaur, (*ιπποκενταυρος*); for there are also things common in these, and thus we shall establish ideas of non-entities. To which we may add, that we must likewise admit that there are ideas of infinities, as of irrational lines, and the ratios in numbers: for both these are infinite, and of both there are things common. If, therefore, we fashion certain ideas from these, we shall often make infinities, though it is requisite that ideas should be less numerous than their participants, the participants of each, at the same time, being many. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides direct the mode of transition to ideas, as not being scientific, if it proceeds from the things common in sensibles; for it will always be possible to conceive different things common, and thus to proceed ad infinitum. But this is evident from the words that immediately follow.

<sup>1</sup> The fourth problem concerning ideas is here considered, viz. what kind of beings they are, or in other words, where they subsist, whether in souls, or prior to souls. Socrates, therefore, being separated by Parmenides from physical forms, calls idea a conception belonging to the soul, (*νοημα ψυχικον*), and defines the place of it to be soul. For the form in soul is one and incorporeal; and this dogma is not attended with the former difficulties. For this form is exempt from the many, and is not co-ordinate with them like the forms in matter, in consequence of being allotted a subsistence in soul. There is likewise nothing common between this form and the many; nor is it either according to the whole, or a part of itself, in its participants, so that it may be shown to be separate from itself, or to have a partible subsistence. Socrates, therefore, by adopting this dogma, avoids the above-mentioned doubts. But, says Proclus, when Socrates calls idea a *conception* (*νοημα*), we must not think that he asserts it to be that which is the object of intellectual vision, (*το νοουμενον*) in the same manner as we call that which is apprehended by sense *sensible* (*ως αισθημα φαιμεν το τη αισθησει ληπτου*); but that intelligence itself understanding form, is here called a *conception*; being so denominated as a certain theorem and dogma ingenerated in souls, about dogmatized and deiform concerns. (*Ουτω νοημα λεγομενον ως θεωρημα τι και δογμα ενταις ψυχαις εγγινομενον περι των δογματιζομενων και θεωιδων πραγματων*). This conception, therefore, he says is *ingenerated* in souls, through the word *ingenerated*, (*εγγινεσθαι*), manifesting that it does not subsist in them *essentially*. And this is that form of posterior origin (*το υστερογενες ειδος*), which some of the followers

ought not to subsist any where but in the soul; and if this be the case, each will be one: and the consequences just now mentioned will not ensue. That

Parmenides

of Aristotle, and most of the moderns, so much celebrate, but which is entirely different from that reason or form which abides essentially in souls, and does not derive its subsistence from an abstraction from sensibles. Looking to this essential reason we say, that the soul is all forms, and is the place of forms, not in capacity only, but in that kind of energy, through which we call one skilled in geometry a geometrician in energy, even when he does not geometrize, and which Aristotle accurately calls the prior form of being in energy. This, therefore, which is denominated a conception, as of posterior origin, is very properly said to be different from the essential reason of the soul: for it is more obscure than the many in sensibles, as being posterior and not prior to them. But the essential reason or form of the soul is more perfect, because the conception of posterior origin, or in modern language, abstract idea, has a less essence than the many, but the essential form more.

That it is not, however, proper to stop at conceptions of posterior origin, i. e. notions gained by an abstraction from sensible particulars, but that we should proceed to those essential reasons which are allotted a perpetual subsistence within the soul, is evident to those who are able to survey the nature of things. For, whence is man able to collect into one by reasoning the perceptions of many senses, and to consider one and the same unapparent form prior to things apparent, and separated from each other; but no other animal that we are acquainted with, surveys this something common, for neither does it possess a rational essence, but alone employs sense, and appetite, and imagination? Whence, then, do rational souls generate these universals, and recur from the senses to that which is the object of opinion? It is because they essentially possess the gnostically productive principles of things: for, as nature possesses a power productive of sensibles, by containing reasons, or productive principles, and fashions, and connects sensibles, so as by the inward eye to form the external, and in a similar manner the finger, and every other particular; so he who has a common conception of these, by previously possessing the reasons of things, beholds that which each possesses in common. For he does not receive this common something from sensibles; since that which is received from sensibles is a phantasm, and not the object of opinion. It likewise remains within such as it was received from the beginning, that it may not be false, and a non-entity, but does not become more perfect and venerable, nor does it originate from any thing else than the soul. Indeed, it must not be admitted that nature in generating generates by natural reasons and measures, but that soul in generating does not generate by animastic reasons and causes. But if matter possesses that which is common in the many, and this something common is essential, and more essence than individuals; for this is perpetual, but each of those is corruptible, and they derive their very being from this, since it is through form that every thing partakes of essence,—if this be the case, and soul alone possesses things common which are of posterior origin (*ὕστερογενὴ κοινὰ*), do we not make the soul more ignoble than matter? For the form which is merged in matter will be more perfect and more essence than that which resides in the soul; since the latter is of posterior origin, but the former is perpetual; and the one is after, but the other generative and connective of the many. To which we may add, that a common phantasm in the soul derives its subsistence from a survey of that which is

said, What then? is each of these *conceptions*<sup>1</sup> one, but at the same time a *conception* of nothing? That Socrates said, This is impossible. It is a *conception*, therefore, of something? Certainly. Of *being* or of *non-being*? Of *being*. Will it not be of one particular thing, which that conception understands as one certain idea in all things? Undoubtedly. But now will not that which is understood to be one, be a form always the same in  
all

common in particulars. Hence it tends to this; for every thing adheres to its principle, and is said to be nothing else than a predicate; so that its very essence is to be predicated of the many.

Further still: the universal in the many is less than each of the many; for by certain additions and accidents it is surpassed by every individual. But that which is of posterior origin (i. e. universal abstracted from particulars) comprehends each of the many. Hence it is predicated of each of these; and that which is particular is contained in the whole of this universal. For this something common, or abstract idea, is not only predicated of that something common in an individual, but likewise of the whole subject. How then can it thence derive its subsistence, and be completed from that which is common in the many? For, if from the many themselves, where do we see infinite men, of all which we predicate the same thing? And if from that which is common in the many, whence is it that this abstract idea is more comprehensive than its cause? Hence it has a different origin, and receives from another form this power which is comprehensive of every individual; and of this form the abstract idea which subsists in opinion is an image, the inward cause being excited from things apparent. To which we may add, that all demonstration, as Aristotle has shown in his Last Analytics, is from things prior, more honourable, and more universal. How, therefore, is universal more honourable, if it is of posterior origin? For, in things of posterior origin, that which is more universal is more unessential; whence species is more essence than genius. The rules, therefore, concerning the most true demonstration must be subverted, if we alone place in the soul universals of posterior origin: for these are not more excellent than, nor are the causes of, nor are naturally prior to, particulars. If, therefore, these things are absurd, it is necessary that essential reasons should subsist in the soul prior to universals, which are produced by an abstraction from sensibles. And these reasons or productive powers are indeed always excited, and are always efficacious in divine souls, and in the more excellent orders of beings; but in us they are sometimes dormant, and sometimes in energy.

<sup>1</sup> From the things common in particulars, it is necessary to recur to physical form, which is proximate to these; and after this to the reason or form in the soul which is of posterior origin, or which derives its subsistence from an abstraction from sensibles, and is a conception ingenerated in the soul. But when we have arrived thus far, it is requisite to pass on to the conception of the essential reason of the soul, and from this to make a transition to being itself, to which also Socrates is now led through the obstetric arguments of Parmenides. As in intellect, therefore, that which understands, intelligence, and the intelligible, are united to each other, and intellectual conception every where pertains to the intelligible, it is evident that the intelligible is prior to intellectual conception, in which intelligible, the reason in the soul being firmly fixed, is a *noëma*, or intellectual conception. Hence, we must not stop in ascending from one form to  
another,

all things? This seems to be necessary. That Parmenides then said, But what, is it not necessary, since other things participate of forms, that each should be composed from intellectual conceptions<sup>1</sup>; and thus all of them be

another, till we arrive at true beings, or, in other words, intelligibles. For though we shall find that intellect and intelligibles are connately united to each other, yet intellect is a plenitude of forms according to the intelligible which it contains. And as we unite intellect and the intelligible to each other, so we should consider intelligibles to be the same with beings. For intellect being in itself, and intellectually perceiving itself, is at the same time full of intelligibles. And, as among sensibles, whatever is apparently one, is in reality a multitude; so in intelligibles, intellectual conception and being, which are two things, are profoundly absorbed in unity.

<sup>1</sup> If all things participate of forms, but all things do not participate of intellectual conceptions, forms or ideas will not primarily be intellectual conceptions. For one of these three things must happen, either that things which participate of intellectual conceptions do not participate of intellection, or that forms are not intellectual conceptions, or that things which are destitute of intelligence do not participate of forms, of which three the first and last are perfectly absurd. For every thing which participates of intellectual conception, understands intellectually, since the word *noëma* manifests intelligence; and things deprived of intelligence participate of forms; for inanimate natures participate of the equal, the lesser, and the greater, which are forms. Ideas, therefore, are not intellectual conceptions, nor are they essentialized in intellections, but in intelligibles. We must ascend, therefore, from things partible to the impartible reasons of nature, which do not intellectually perceive the things prior to themselves: for nature is not only deprived of intelligence, but is also irrational and destitute of phantasy. In the next place, we must rise from these to the intelligibles which are proximately placed above physical forms, and are the energies of the intellective soul, according to the position of Socrates concerning them: for he says, that they are ingenerated in the soul, and are *noëmata*, as being intellections of the soul. But from these we must ascend to true intelligibles: for these are able to be the causes of all things which have a formal subsistence, but this cannot be asserted of such things as are intellectual conceptions only.

Here, however, as Proclus well observes, it is worth while to enquire, why, since all things subsist intellectually in intellect, all sensible natures in consequence of participating forms do not intellectually energize? and why, since all things there possess life, all things that are assimilated to them do not live? The answer is, that the progression of beings gradually subsiding from the first to the last of things, obscures the participations of wholes and all-perfect essences. Demiurgic energy also pervading through all things, gives subsistence to all things, according to different measures of essence; and besides this, all things do not similarly participate of the same form. For some things participate of it in a greater, and others in a lesser degree; and some things are assimilated to form according to one power, others according to two, and others according to many powers. Whence also there are certain series which beginning supernally extend as far as to things beneath. Thus, for instance, says Proclus, the form of the moon is beheld first of all in the Gods according to that which is characterized by *the one* and *the good* in form: for all things are

be endued with intellect? Or will you assert that though they are intellectual conceptions, yet they understand nothing? But that Socrates said, This is by no means rational. But, O Parmenides, the affair appears to me to take place, in the most eminent degree, as follows: *that these forms are established paradigms<sup>1</sup>, as it were, in nature; but that other things are assimilated*

are deified from *the good*, as Socrates says in the sixth book of the Republic, through the light of truth. This form is also beheld in angels, according to that which is intellectual in form; and in dæmons, according to the dianoëtic energy. It is likewise beheld in animals which are no longer able to imitate it intellectually, but vitally. Hence, the Egyptian Apis, and the lunar fish, and many other animals, differently imitate the celestial form of the moon. And this form is beheld in the last place in stones; so that there is a certain stone suspended from this form, and which sustains augmentations and diminutions, together with the moon in the heavens, though it is deprived of life. It must not, therefore, be supposed that all things receive all the powers of forms, but, together with proper subjection, some things receive a greater, and others a lesser, number of these; while that alone which is the idiom of the participated form, and according to which it differs from other forms, is necessarily seen in all its participants. To which we may add, that the participation being different, the subordinate idioms of forms first desert the participants, and afterwards those that are more total than these; but those idioms which are primary, and are particularly allied to *the one*, are similarly apparent in all the productions of form. For every form is *one* and a *multitude*, the multitude not giving subsistence to *the one* according to composition, but *the one* producing the many idioms of the form. Form, therefore, uniformly *is*, and *lives*, and *intellectually energizes*; but with respect to its progeny, some participate of all these, others of more or less of them, and others of one idiom alone. Since also in forms themselves, their intellectual nature is derived from the first intellect, their life from imparticipable, or the first life, their being from the first being, and *the one* which they contain from the unity which is beyond beings.

<sup>1</sup> Socrates, says Proclus, being led by the obstetrication of Parmenides to the intelligible essence of forms, thinks that here especially, the order and the mode of the participation of forms should be investigated; asserting, indeed, that forms themselves are established in nature, but that other things are generated as their resemblances. Having, therefore, thus explored the order of forms, he at the same time introduces the mode of participation, and dissolves the former doubts, that he may not be compelled to say that sensibles participate either of the whole or a part of form, or that forms are coordinate with sensibles. For a paradigm is not present with its image, nor coordinate with it. The participation, therefore, is through similitude; which Socrates introduces, calling forms paradigms, but their participants resemblances. And so confident is he in these assertions, that he who before swore that it was not easy to define what the participation of forms is, now says that the mode of participation is eminently apparent to him. But he is thus affected through his acuteness, and the power of Parmenides perfecting his spontaneous conceptions concerning divine natures; by which it is also evident the manner of what is said is maieutic, or obstetric, and not contending for victory (*καταγωνιστικός*). For it would not otherwise

*lated to these, and are their resemblances: and that the participation of forms by other things, is nothing more than an assimilation to these forms. If any thing,*

wife advance Socrates, and perpetually perfect his conceptions. For the end of obstetrication is the evocation of inward knowledge, but of contention, victory. If, therefore, Socrates by every doubt advances, and is perfected, and distinctly evolves his conceptions concerning primary forms, we must say that he is rather obstetricated than vanquished by Parmenides.

This being premised, let us see how the hypothesis of Socrates approximates to the truth, but does not yet possess the perfect. For he is right in apprehending that forms are intellectual and truly paradigms, and in defining their idiom, by asserting that they are *established*; and further still, in admitting that other things are assimilated to them. For the stable and a perpetual sameness of subsistence are the idioms of eternally energizing forms. For, in the Politicus, it is said that a subsistence according to the same, and after the same manner, belongs only to the most divine of all things; and the Eleatean guest, in the Sophista, defines *the being established* (το ἰσταναι) to be nothing else than a subsistence according to the same, and after the same manner. If, therefore, Socrates also says, that forms are *established*, but things established subsist according to the same and after the same manner, and things which thus subsist are the most divine of all things, it is evident that forms will be most divine. Hence, they will no longer be the conceptions of souls, but will be exempt from every thing of this kind. These things, therefore, are rightly asserted; and Socrates also very properly admits union in forms prior to multitude. For the words *in nature* (ἐν τῇ φύσει) manifest the one enad or unity of forms. It is usual indeed with Plato to give the appellation of *nature* to intelligibles. For Socrates, in the Philebus, says, that a royal intellect, and a royal soul, subsist in the *nature* of Jupiter; and Timæus says, “the *nature* of animal itself being eternal,” signifying by *nature* the monad of intelligible ideas. Such, therefore, is that which is now called nature, viz. the one unity and comprehension of intelligible forms. And thus far, as we have said, Socrates is right.

However, as he only attributes a paradigmatic idiom to ideas, and does not assert that they also perfect, guard, and unite, in this respect he will appear to have yet imperfectly apprehended the theory concerning them. For every form is not only the paradigm of sensibles, but also gives subsistence to them; since if it were alone paradigmatic, another nature would be requisite, in order to produce and assimilate sensibles to forms, which would thus remain sluggish and unmoved, without any efficacious power, and resembling impressions in wax. Forms, therefore, produce and generate their images: for it would be absurd that the reasons in nature should possess a certain effective power, but that intelligible forms should be deprived of it. Hence, every divine form is not only paradigmatic, but also *paternal*, and is by its very essence a cause generative of the many. It is also *perfective*: for it leads sensibles from the imperfect to the perfect, fills up their indigence, and brings matter, which is all things in capacity, to become that in energy which it was in capacity, prior to its becoming specific. Forms, therefore, contain in themselves this perfective power. But do they not also possess a *guardian* power? For whence is the order of the universe indissoluble, except from forms? Whence those stable reasons, and which preserve the one sympathy of wholes infrangible, through which the world abides forever perfect,

thing, therefore, becomes similar <sup>1</sup> to a form, can it be possible that the form should not be similar to the assimilated, so far as the assimilated nature is rendered

perfect, without the desertion of any form, except from stable causes? Again, the divisible and dissipated nature of bodies is no otherwise compressed and *connected* than by impartible power. For body is of itself divisible, and requires the connective power of forms. But, if *union* precedes this connection, for every thing connective must previously be one and undivided, form will not only be *generative*, and possess a *guarding* and *perfective* power, but it will also be *connective* and *unific* of all secondary natures. Socrates, therefore, should not only have said that form is a *paradigm*, but should also have added, that it *connects*, *guards*, and *perfects* the things assimilated; which Timæus also teaching us, says, that the world was generated *perfect* and *indissoluble* through the *assimilation* to all-perfect animal itself.

<sup>1</sup> Socrates, as we have before observed, was not accurate in asserting that ideas are paradigms alone, since they also generate, perfect, and guard sensibles; and that sensibles are resemblances alone of ideas, since they are generated and guarded by them, and thence derive all their perfection and duration. This being the case, Parmenides, in a truly divine manner, grants that forms are established as paradigms in nature; but Socrates having introduced similitude, and a participation according to similitude, in order to solve the first doubts concerning the participation of forms, Parmenides being desirous to indicate the primary and total cause of paradigm and its exemption from all habitude to its resemblances, shows, that if sensible is similar to intelligible form, it is not requisite that the habitude should reciprocate, and that the intelligible should be similar to the sensible form, lest, prior to two things similar to each other, we should again investigate some other form, the cause of similitude to both: for things similar to each other entirely participate a certain something which is the same, and through this something same which is in them they are said to be similar. Hence, if it be granted that the participant and that which is participated are similar, or, in other words, the paradigm and its resemblance, there will be prior to these something else which assimilates them, and this will be the case ad infinitum. To avoid this inconvenience, Socrates should have said that the similar is twofold, the one being similar conjoined with the similar, the other being as a subject similar to its archetype; and the one being beheld in the sameness of a certain one ratio, but the other not only possessing sameness, but at the same time difference, when it is similar in such a manner as to possess the same form from, but not together with, it. And thus much may be said logically and doubtfully.

But if we direct our attention to the many orders of forms, we shall find the profundity which they contain. For there are physical forms prior to sensibles, the forms in soul prior to these, and intellectual forms preceding those in soul; but there are no longer others prior to these. Intellectual forms, therefore, are paradigms alone, and are by no means similar to the things posterior to these; but the forms in soul are both paradigms and images. And so far as they are images, both these forms themselves, and the things posterior to them, are similar to each other, as deriving their subsistence from the same intellectual forms. This is also the case with physical forms, which are similar to sensibles, so far as both are images of the forms which are above them. But those forms which are alone paradigms, are no longer similar to their images: for  
things

rendered similar to the form? Or can any reason be assigned why similar should not be similar to similar? There cannot. Is there not, therefore, a mighty necessity that the similar to similar should participate of one and the same form? It is necessary. But will not that through the participation of which similars become similars be *form itself*? Entirely so. Nothing, therefore, can be similar to *a form*, nor *a form* to any other. For in this case another *form* will always appear besides some particular *form*: and if this again should become similar to another, another would be required; and a new *form* would never cease to take place, as long as any *form* becomes similar to its participant. You speak most truly. Hence, then, other things do not participate of *forms* through similitude<sup>1</sup>; but it is necessary to seek after something else through which they participate. So it seems.

That

things are similar through a participation of a certain sameness; but paradigmatic forms participate of nothing, since they rank as the first of things.

We may also say, speaking theologically, that there is one order of forms in the mundane intellect, another in the demiurgic intellect, and another subsisting between these, viz. in participated but supermundane intellect, or, in other words, in an intellect consubstantiated indeed with soul, but unconnected with body, and binding the forms in the mundane intellect with that intellect which is not consubstantiated with soul, and is therefore called imparticipable. To those, therefore, who begin downwards, we may say that the intellectual forms in the world and in soul are similar to each other, so far as all these are secondary to the assimilative or supermundane intellects, and are as it were sisters to each other. But to those who recur to imparticipable intellect, this can no longer be said. For the assimilative order has a middle subsistence; and hence it assimilates sensibles which are subordinate to it to intellectual forms, but not, vice versa, intellectuals to sensibles. For it is not lawful that what is secondary should impart any thing to that which is primary, nor that what is primary should receive any thing from what is secondary. That Parmenides, therefore, might indicate to Socrates these paradigms, which are indeed intellectual, but established in imparticipable intellect prior to assimilative intellects, he shows him that it is not proper that the habitude of forms to sensibles should reciprocate: for this pertains to things secondary to an assimilative cause.

<sup>1</sup> Parmenides justly infers that sensibles do not participate of all forms through the similar; for this is effected through another more principal cause, viz. the uniting cause of wholes. The efficacious power of forms also, in conjunction with the aptitude of sensibles, must be considered as together giving completion to the fabrication of the universe. The assimilative genus of forms, therefore, which are denominated by theologians supermundane, are able to connect and conjoin mundane causes with their participants. This genus also connects according to a medium first intellectual forms and their participants, imparting to secondary natures a habitude to these forms; but the uniting cause of wholes, or in other words *the one*, connects supernally, and with

That Parmenides then said, Do you see, O Socrates, how great a doubt arises, if any one defines forms as having an essential subsistence by themselves? I do very much so. Know, then, that you do not apprehend what dubious<sup>1</sup> consequences are produced, by placing every individual form of beings separate from its participants. But that Socrates said, How do you mean? That Parmenides answered, There are many other doubts<sup>2</sup>, indeed, but this is the

the exempt transcendence, intelligible forms with sensibles. It may also be truly asserted that the third cause of similitude is the aptitude of the recipient. For, in consequence of this being in capacity what form is in energy, that which is generated becomes similar to form. So that the three causes of assimilation are the subject matter, that which collects together the things perfecting and perfected, and that which subsists between these, and binds the extremes in union. What is asserted, therefore, is in a certain respect true. For if we investigate the one most principal cause of participation, we must not say that it is similitude, but a cause superior to both intellectual and intelligible forms.

<sup>1</sup> Parmenides here indicates the essence of divine forms, which is uncircumscribed, and incapable of being narrated by our conceptions. For the discourse is, indeed, dubious to those who undertake to define accurately their essence, order, and power, to behold where they first subsist, and how they proceed; what the divine idioms are which they receive; how they are participated by the last of things, and what the series are to which they give subsistence; with such other particulars of a more theological nature as the speculation of them may afford. And these things, indeed, Parmenides indicates, but Socrates has not yet touched upon the doubts concerning them. For Parmenides was willing, not only beginning downwards to define the order of divine forms, but also beginning from on high to behold their idiom. For he has already spoken concerning physical forms, and such as are simply intellectual, and concerning those that are properly intellectual. Something also will be said concerning those that are called intelligible and at the same time intellectual; and, in the last place, concerning those that are alone intelligible. But how he speaks concerning these, says Proclus, and that his discourse is under the pretext of doubting, is already evident to the more sagacious, and follows from what has been said.

<sup>2</sup> That the discourse concerning ideas, says Proclus, is full of very numerous and most difficult doubts, is evident from the infinite assertions of those posterior to Plato, some of which regard the subversion, and others the admission, of ideas. And those that admit their subsistence think differently respecting their essence; concerning the particulars of which there are ideas, the mode of participation, and other all-various problems with which the speculation of them is attended. Parmenides, however, does not attend to the multitude of doubts, nor does he descend to their infinite length, but, in two of the greatest, comprehends all the subsequent investigation concerning them; through which doubts it appears that forms are neither apprehended and known by us, nor have any knowledge of, nor providentially energize about, sensibles; though, through this we especially embrace a formal essence, that, as being ourselves intellectual, we may energize about it, and may contemplate in it the providential causes of wholes. But, if ideas are

not

the greatest: if any one should assert that it is not proper *forms* should be known, if they are such as we have said they ought to be, it is impossible to demonstrate

not known by us, it is also vain to say that they have any subsistence; for we do not even know that they are, if we are ignorant of their nature, and are, in short, incapable of apprehending them, and do not possess from our own essence that which is preparatory to the speculation of them. Such, then, are the doubts, both of which happen through the exempt essence of forms, which exemption we consider so transcendent as to have no communication with secondary natures. For that which thus subsists is foreign from us, and is neither known by, nor is gnostic of, us. But, if the exempt nature of forms, together with transcendency, is also present to all things, our knowledge of them will be preserved, and they will possess a formal knowledge of secondary natures. For if they are every where present to all things, we may then be able to meet with them, by only making ourselves adapted to the reception of them. And if they adorn all things, they comprehend intellectually the cause of the things adorned. It is necessary, therefore, that those who wish to guard these dogmas, should consider forms as unshaken and exempt, and pervading through all things. And here also we may see how this accords with the unrestrained nature of forms: for neither does that which is demiurgic in them possess any habitude to things secondary, nor is their unrestrained and exempt nature such as to be incommunicable with, and foreign from, sensibles.

But here the divine conception of Plato is truly admirable, which previously subverts through these doubts all the confused and atheistical suspicion concerning divine forms; imitating in this respect intellect itself, which, prior to the shadowy subsistence of evils, gave subsistence to subvertive powers. That it is not proper, therefore, to make that which is generative in forms possessing any habitude to that which is generated, or that which is paradigmatic to consist in verging to that which is governed, Parmenides has sufficiently shown in what has been already delivered. For all habitude requires another collective and connecting cause, so that, prior to forms, there will be another form conjoining both through similitude; since habitude is of the similar, with relation to the similar. But that the exempt nature of forms is not sluggish and without providential energy, and is not foreign from things secondary, Parmenides indicates through these doubts. For, perhaps, some one, alone looking to the unrestrained nature of forms, may say that they neither know their participants, nor are known by us. Hence, he leads Socrates to an animadversion of the mode of the exempt power of divine forms. And how, indeed, he collects that sensibles are not known by them, will be afterwards manifest to us; but he wishes, first of all, to evince that we are not able to know them, assuming, for this purpose, in a manner perfectly divine, that the science which we possess pertains to human objects of scientific knowledge, but that divine science belongs to such as are divine. And this, indeed, appears to deprive us of the knowledge of divine natures. It is, however, true in a certain respect, and not according to one mode, but after one manner when philosophically, and after another when theologically, considered. For let the science which is with us pertain to our objects of scientific knowledge; but what prevents such objects from being images of divine natures? And why may we not know divine natures through them, in the same manner as the Pythagoreans, perceiving the images of

demonstrate that he who asserts this is deceived, unless he who doubts is skilled in a multitude of particulars, and is naturally of a good disposition.

But

the divine orders in numbers and figures, and being conversant with these, endeavoured to obtain from them as from certain types, a knowledge of things divine. Why, also, is it wonderful that the science which is with us should be so called with relation to that which is with us the object of scientific knowledge, and should be conjoined with this? For it is coordinate to that with respect to which it is denominated. It may also, not as coordinate knowledge, but as that which is of an inferior order, be admitted to intelligibles themselves. For coordinate knowledges of all things are of one kind, and those which are arranged according to a different order of things known, of another, and which either apprehend the nature of things subordinate in a more excellent manner, as opinion the nature of sensibles, or which apprehend things more excellent secondarily and subordinately, as opinion that which is the object of science. He, therefore, who possesses scientific knowledge, and he who opines rightly, know the same thing, but the one in a more excellent, and the other in a subordinate manner. Hence there is no absurdity that science should be denominated not with relation to the object of science among intelligibles, but with relation to that with which it is conjoined, and that it should apprehend the former not as coordinate, but in a secondary degree. Agreeably to this, Plato in his seventh Epistle says that the intelligible form is not known through science but through intelligence, or the direct and immediate vision of intellect. For scientific knowledge is of a more composite nature with respect to intellectual intuition; but intellect is properly the spectator of ideas: for these are naturally intellectual, and we every where know the similar by the similar; intelligibles indeed by intellect, the objects of opinion by opinion, and things scientific by science. It is by no means wonderful, therefore, that there should be no science of forms, and yet that another knowledge of them should remain, such as that which we denominate intelligence.

But if you are willing, says Proclus, to speak after another more theological mode, you may say that ascending as far as to intellectual forms, Parmenides shows that the forms which are beyond these, and which possess an exempt transcendency, such as are the intelligible, and the intelligible and at the same time intellectual forms, are better than our knowledge. Hence by asserting that souls when perfectly purified, and conjoined with the attendants on the twelve supercelestial Gods, then merge themselves in the contemplation of these forms, you will perhaps not wander from the divinely-inspired conception of Plato. For as there are three orders of forms prior to the assimilative order as is evident from the second hypothesis of the Parmenides, viz. the intellectual, the intelligible and at the same time intellectual, and the intelligible; intellectual forms indeed are proximate to secondary natures, and through the separation which they contain are more known to us, but intelligible and at the same time intellectual forms are not to be apprehended by that partial knowledge by which we perceive things coordinate with our nature; and hence these forms are characterized by *the unknown*, through their exempt transcendency.

Let us now consider, says Proclus, the words of Plato, because through these he indicates who is a fit hearer of these things, and who is adapted to be a teacher of them. For it is requisite that

But he should be willing to pursue *him* closely who endeavours to support his opinion by a multitude of far-fetched arguments: though, after all, he who

that the hearer should possess a *naturally good disposition*, and this in a remarkable degree, that he may be by nature a philosopher, may be astonished about an incorporeal essence, and prior to things visible may always pursue something else and reason concerning it, and may not be satisfied with things present; and in short he must be such a one as Socrates in the Republic describes him to be, who *naturally* loves the speculation of wholes. In the next place, he must be skilled in a multitude of particulars, not indeed in a multitude of human affairs, for these are trifling, and contribute nothing to a divine life, but in logical, physical, and mathematical theorems. For such things as our dianoëtic power is unable to survey in the Gods, we may behold in these as in images; and beholding we are induced to believe the assertions of theologians concerning divine natures. Thus if he wonders how multitude is contained in *the one*, and all things in the impartible, he will perceive that the even and the odd, the circle and the sphere and other forms of numbers are contained in the monad. If he wonders how a divine nature makes by its very essence, he will perceive in natural objects that fire essentially imparts heat, and snow coldness. And if he wonders how causes are every where present with their effects, he will behold the images of this in logic. For genera are every where predicated of the things of which species are predicated, and the latter indeed with the former, but the former without the latter. And thus in every thing, he who is unable to look directly to a divine nature, may survey it through these as images. It is requisite, therefore, in the first place, that he should possess a naturally good disposition, which is allied to true beings, and is capable of becoming winged, and which as it were from other persuasions vindicates to itself the conceptions concerning permanent being. For as in every study we require a certain preparation, in like manner in order to obtain that knowledge which genuinely leads to being, we require a preceding purified aptitude. In the next place, skill, as we have said, in many and all-various theorems is requisite, through which he will be led back to the apprehension of these things; and, in the third place, *alacrity*, and an extension of the powers of the soul about the contemplation of true beings; so that from his leader alone indicating, he may be able to follow his indications.

Three things, therefore, are requisite to the contemplation of an incorporeal nature, a naturally good disposition, skill, and alacrity. And through a naturally good disposition indeed, faith in a divine nature will be spontaneously produced; but through skill the truth of paradoxical theorems will be firmly possessed; and through alacrity the amatory tendency of the soul to the contemplation of true being will be excited.

But the leader, says Proclus, of these speculations, will not be willing through a long discourse to unfold divine truth, but to indicate it with brevity, framing his language similar to his intellections; nor will he accomplish this from things known and at hand, but supernally, from principles most profoundly one. Nor again, will he so discourse as that he may appear to speak clearly, but he will be satisfied with indications. For it is requisite that mystical concerns should be mystically delivered, and that occult conceptions respecting divine natures, should not be rendered popular. Such then is the hearer and such the leader of these discourses. And in

Parmenides

who contends that *forms* cannot be known will remain unper-suaded. That Socrates said, In what respect <sup>1</sup>, O Parmenides? Because, O Socrates,  
I think

Parmenides you have a perfect leader of this kind; and hence if we attend to the mode of his discourse we shall find that he teaches many things through a few words, that he derives what he says supernally, and that he alone indicates concerning divine natures. But in Socrates you have a hearer of a naturally good disposition indeed, and amatory, but not yet perfectly skilled; whence also Parmenides exhorts him to exercise himself in dialectic, that he may obtain skill in the theorems, receiving indeed his naturally good disposition and his impulse, but supplying what is deficient. He also informs us that the end of this triple power is the being freed from deception in reasonings concerning divine natures: for he who is deficient in any one of these three, must be compelled to assent to many things that are false. I only add that instead of *και μη αφυνης*, as in Thompson's edition of this dialogue, it appears from the commentary of Proclus that we should here read *και μεν ευφυνης*, as in our translation.

<sup>1</sup> The discourse here proceeds to other doubts, one of which takes away from our soul the knowledge of true beings, but the other deprives divine natures of the knowledge of sensibles; through both which our progressions from and conversion to divine natures, are destroyed. Things second and first also appear to be divorced from each other, second being deprived of first, and first being unprolific of second natures. The truth however is, that every thing is in all things in an appropriate manner; the middle and last genera of wholes subsisting causally in things first, whence also they are truly known by them, as they also subsist in them; but things first subsisting according to participation in such as are middle; and both these in such things as are last. Hence souls also know all things in a manner accommodated to each; through images indeed things prior to them; but according to cause things posterior to them; and in a connate and coordinate manner, the reasons or productive principles which they themselves contain. These doubts, therefore, are extended after the two prior to these concerning the order of ideas, because Socrates and every one who admits that there are ideas must be led to this hypothesis, through a causal and scientific knowledge of every thing in the world. Hence those who deny that there are ideas, deny also the providential animadversion of intelligibles. Parmenides, therefore, proposes at present to show that by admitting ideas to be alone exempt from things it must also be necessarily admitted that they are unknown, as there will no longer be any communion between us and them, nor any knowledge, whether they subsist or not, whether they are participated, and how, and what order they are allotted, if they are alone exempt, and are not together with unrestrained energy, the causes of secondary natures. But to the speculation of this the discourse pre-assumes certain axioms and common conceptions; and, in the first place, that ideas are not entirely exempt, and do not subsist by themselves without any communion with things subordinate. For how can this be possible, since both we and all other things are suspended from them? For the place in which they subsist is intellect, not that it is the place as if they required a seat, in the same manner as accidents require essence for their support, or as material forms require matter. Intellect indeed, does not comprehend them, as if they were its parts heaped together by composition, but in the same manner as the centre comprehends in itself the many termina-  
tions

I think that both you and any other, who establishes the essence of each *form* as subsisting by itself, must allow, in the first place, that no one of these  
subsists

tions of the lines which proceed from it, and as science, the many theorems of which it is the source; not being composed from the many, but subsisting prior to the many, and all being contained in each. For thus intellect is many, containing multitude impartibly in the unity of its nature; because it is not *the one* which subsists prior to all multitude, but is collectively one multitude, its multitude being profoundly united through the dominion of unity in its nature. In this manner, therefore, is intellect the place of ideas. Hence, if soul is not the same with intellect, those ideas will not be in us of which intellect is the place. Hence, also, it is evident that the discourse in this dialogue about ideas becomes perpetually more perfect, ascending to certain more-united hypostases of these luminous beings. For the discourse no longer supposes them to be corporeal or physical, or conceptions of the soul, but prior to all these. For they are not in us, says Parmenides; nor are they coordinate with our conceptions.

You may say, then, philosophically with Proclus, that they are exempt from, and are not in us; and that they are present every where, and are participated by us, without being ingenerated in their participants. For they being in themselves, are proximate to all things for participation that are capable of receiving them. Hence, we participate them through the things which we possess, and this is not only the case with us, but also with more excellent natures, who possess in themselves essential images of ideas, and introducing these as vestiges of paradigms to ideas, they know the latter through the former. For he who understands the essence of these, knows also that they are images of other things, but knowing this, it is also necessary that by intellections he should come into contact with the paradigms. But you may say, theologically, that the forms which are exempt from those that are intellectual, are perfectly established above our order. Hence, of intellectual forms, we perceive both in ourselves, and in sensibles, images; but the essence of intelligibles, through its profound union, is perfectly exempt both from us and all other things, being of itself unknown. For it fills Gods and intellects with itself; but we must be satisfied with participating intellectual forms in a manner adapted to the soul. Plato also manifests these things when he makes our life to be twofold, political and theoretical, and assigns us a twofold felicity; elevating the former life to the patronymic government of Jupiter, and the latter to the Saturnian order and a pure intellect. For from hence it is evident that he re-elevates the whole of our life, as far as to the intellectual kings: for Saturn subsists at the summit, and Jupiter at the extremity, of the intellectual order. But such things as are beyond these, he says in the Phædrus, are the spectacles of souls divinely inspired and initiated in them as in the most blessed of all mysteries. So that thus the proposed axiom will be true, when considered as pertaining to a certain formal order. And thus much for the things.

With respect to the diction, says Proclus, the words *πῶς δὲ ὁ Παρμενίδης*; “*In what respect, O Parmenides?*” are the interrogation of Socrates, vehemently wondering if intellectual form is unknown, and not yet perceiving the transition, and that Parmenides proceeds through the whole extent of forms till he ends in the first ideas. But the words *πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν εἴη*; “*For how could it any longer subsist itself by itself?*” are asserted according to common conceptions.

subsists in us. For (that Socrates said) how if it did, could it any longer subsist itself by itself? That Parmenides replied, You speak well. But will you not admit that such ideas as are, with relation <sup>1</sup> to each other, such as they

For every thing exempt is of itself, and is itself by itself, neither subsisting in any other, nor in us. Hence, through these three terms, *itself*, *by itself*, and *essence*, Parmenides unfolds the whole truth concerning these forms. For the first of these indicates their *simplicity*, the second, their *separate transcendency*, and the third their *perfection established in essence alone*. In the next place, the words καλως λεγεις, "You speak well," are not delivered ironically, and as if Parmenides was from them beginning a confutation, but as receiving the spontaneous intuition of Socrates, and his conception about divine natures. For the assumed axiom is true, Timæus also asserting that true being neither receives any thing into itself, as matter does form, nor proceeds into any other place, as form does into matter. It remains, therefore, separately in itself, and being participated, does not become any thing belonging to its participants, but, subsisting prior to them, imparts to these as much as they are able to receive; neither being in us, for we participate, not receiving idea itself, but something else proceeding from it; nor being generated in us, for it is entirely void of generation.

<sup>1</sup> This is the second axiom, says Proclus, contributing to the speculation of the proposed object of inquiry. For the former axiom was, that forms are by no means in us, but in themselves; but this second axiom is, that sensibles when denominated as relatives, are so denominated with relation to each other; and that intelligibles are denominated with relation to each other, and not with relation to sensibles; and that sensibles are not denominated with relation to intelligibles. For, by those who are accustomed to consider these things more logically, it is well said, that universals ought to be referred as relatives to universals, but particulars to particulars; science simply considered to that which is simply the object of science, but a particular science to a particular object of science; things indefinite to the indefinite; such as are definite to the definite; such as are in capacity to things in capacity; and such as are in energy to things in energy. And of these things the logical and physical treatises of the ancients are full. If, therefore, in things universal, and things particular, alternations cannot be admitted in comparing the one with the other, by a much greater reason it cannot take place in ideas and the images of ideas; but we must refer sensibles to sensibles, and intelligibles to intelligibles. These things, then, are perfectly true, if we consider each so far as it is that which it is, and not so far as it makes something, or is generated something. For in this case, sensibles have the relation of things generated to intelligibles, but intelligibles, that of producing causes to sensibles; and as images, sensibles are related to intelligibles, but ideas, as paradigms, are related to sensibles.

If, therefore, we assume dominion itself, it must be referred to servitude itself; but if we consider it as a paradigm, it must be referred to that which is similar to dominion itself; though we are accustomed, indeed, to call the Gods our lords, so that dominion there will be denominated with reference to servitude with us. This, however, is true, because we participate of servitude itself, to which dominion itself has a precedaneous reference. And here you may see how dominion among ideas, or in the intelligible world, evinces that more excellent natures are our lords, because

they are, possess also their essence with respect to themselves, and not with reference to things subsisting among us, whether they are resemblances, or in whatever manner you may establish such things; each of which, while we participate, we distinguish by some peculiar appellation? But that the things subsisting among us, and which are synonymous to these, subsist also with reference to each other, and not with relation to forms; and belong to themselves, but not to those which receive with them a common appellation. That then Socrates said, How do you mean? As if, Parmenides answered,

because we participate of servitude itself. But that which is called dominion with us, with reference to servitude among us, is no longer also denominated with reference to servitude among ideas, because the being of servitude which is there does not subsist from that which is with us, but the very contrary takes place. For things which govern more excellent natures must also necessarily govern such as are subordinate, but not vice versa.

But from all these doubts we learn what idea truly so called is. From the first doubt we assume that it is incorporeal; for if it were a body, neither the whole, nor a part of it could be participated. But from the second doubt we assume that it is not coordinate with its participants; for if it were coordinate, it would possess something common, and on this account we must conceive another idea prior to it. From the third doubt we learn, that it is not a conception of essence, but essence and being; for otherwise all its participants would participate of knowledge. From the fourth, we collect that it is a paradigm alone, and not an image also, as the reason or productive principle in soul, lest being similar to that which proceeds from it, it should introduce another idea prior to itself. From the fifth, we learn that intelligible idea is not directly known to us, but from the images of it. For science in us is not coordinate with it. And from the sixth we infer that it understands things which are secondary to it, and that it knows them by being itself their cause. Idea, therefore, truly so called, is an incorporeal cause, exempt from its participants, is an immovable essence, is a paradigm only and truly, and is intelligible to souls from images, but has a causal knowledge of things which subsist according to it. So that from all the doubts we derive one definition of idea truly so called. Hence, those that oppose the doctrine of ideas, should oppose this definition, and not assuming corporeal imaginations of them, or considering them as co-arranged with sensibles, or as unessential, or as coordinate with our knowledge, sophistically discourse concerning them. Let it also be observed that Parmenides says that ideas are Gods, and that they have their subsistence in deity; in the same manner as the Chaldean oracle also calls them the conceptions of the father: for whatever subsists in deity is a God. Lastly, we must be careful to remember that when we speak of relation as subsisting among ideas, we must remove from them mere, unessential habitudes: for nothing of this kind is adapted to the Gods. But we must assume sameness for habitude; and even prior to this sameness, the hyparxis of each in itself: for each is of itself first, and is both united to itself and to other things. Communion, therefore, according to participations characterizes the power of things which are said to be relatives in the intelligible world.

some one of us should be the master<sup>1</sup> or servant of any one; he who is master is not the *master* of servant, nor is he who is servant, *servant* of master;

<sup>1</sup> How relatives are to be understood, says Proclus, among forms, is I think evident from what has been already said. You will, however, find dominion and servitude peculiarly subsisting there. For what else pertains to despots, than to have absolute dominion over slaves, and to arrange every thing pertaining to them with a view to their own good? And what else is the province of slaves, than to be governed by others, and to minister to the will of their masters? Must not these, therefore, by a much greater priority, be found among forms which are arranged one under the other, and among which some are more powerful, and use those of a subordinate nature, but others are subservient, and cooperate with the powers of the higher orders of forms? *Dominion*, therefore, is an *employing* power (*χρηστικὴ δύναμις*), and *servitude* a *ministrant* power. And both these subsist essentially among forms, and not casually, as in their images: for dominion and servitude among sensibles, are the the last echoes, as it were, of dominion and servitude in the intelligible world.

But if you are willing not only to survey these two in forms philosophically, but also theologically, in the divine orders themselves, direct your intellectual eye to those intellectual and at the same time intelligible Gods, and to the forms which are suspended from them; and you will see how both these are adapted to that order of forms. For having primarily a middle subsistence, they rule over all secondary natures, but are suspended from the forms which are prior to them, and which are alone intelligible, energize with reference to their good, and are from them that which they are. For being first unfolded into light from them, they are governed by, and abide in, them; but they supernally rule over the essences and powers posterior to themselves. Hence, also, in the secondary orders, the more total govern the more partial, the more monadic, the more multiplied, and the exempt, the coordinated. Thus, for instance, in the demiurgic genera, Jupiter in Homer at one time issues his mandates to Minerva, at another time to Apollo, at another to Hermes, and at another to Iris; all of whom act in subservience to the will of their father, imparting their providential energies according to the demiurgic boundary. The angelic tribe, also, and all the better genera, are said to act as servants to the Gods, and to minister to their powers.

But, that dominion and servitude have an essential, and not a casual subsistence only, we may learn from the Phædo: for it is there said, that nature commanded the body to act the part of a slave, but the soul that of a master. If, therefore, these have a natural subsistence in the soul and body, it is nothing wonderful that we should refer dominion itself, and servitude itself, to divine forms, theologians employing these names as indications of the ruling and ministrant powers in the Gods; just as the paternal and maternal there subsist in one respect according to a divine idiom, and in another according to a formal cause, mere habitude having no subsistence in these, but prolific power, and an essence adapted to the Gods.

It must, however, here be carefully observed, that when the Gods are said to rule over us also with absolute dominion, as when in the Phædo Socrates calls the Gods our masters, and us the possessions of the Gods, the mode of dominion is transcendently exempt. For in the divine orders  
the

master; but he sustains both these relations, as being a man; while, in the mean time, *dominion itself* is that which it is from its relation to *servitude*; and *servitude*, in a similar manner, is servitude with reference to *dominion*. But the ideas with which we are conversant possess no power over the ideas which subsist by themselves, nor have *they* any authority over us: but I assert that they subsist from themselves, and with relation to themselves; and ours, in a similar manner, with relation to themselves. Do you understand what I say? That Socrates replied, Entirely so. That Parmenides then said, Is not science <sup>1</sup> itself, so far as it is such, the science of truth <sup>2</sup> itself? Perfectly

the more total rule over the more partial coordinately, and we approach to the Gods, as our masters, through the servitude which is there as a medium. Hence, as all the series of servitude itself is under that of dominion itself, the Gods also govern according to their absolute power. And not only do the more total rule over the more partial Gods, but also over men, participating according to comprehension of servitude itself, which makes subordinate subservient to more excellent natures.

<sup>1</sup> Socrates, in the Phædrus, celebrates divine science, elevating souls of a total characteristic, or which subsist as wholes to the intellectual and intelligible orders, and asserting that they there survey justice itself, temperance itself, and science itself, in consequence of being conjoined with the middle order of these Gods. He also asserts that truth is there, proceeding from intelligibles, and illuminating all the middle genera of Gods with intelligible light; and he conjoins that science with that truth. If, therefore, in discoursing concerning the formal orders, he says that science itself is of truth itself, it is not wonderful. For there science and truth, and all the forms in the middle genera of Gods, participate of science itself, and truth itself, which cause every thing there to be intellectual: for science itself is the eternal and uniform intelligence of eternal natures. For the light of truth being intelligible, imparts to these forms intelligible power. But since there are many orders of these middle forms; for some of them are, as theologians say, the highest, uniform, and intelligible; others connect and bind together wholes; and others are perfective and convertive; hence, after the one and the first science, Parmenides mentions many sciences. For they proceed supernally through all the genera in conjunction with the light of truth. For truth is *the one* in every order, and the intelligible, with which also intelligence is conjoined. As, therefore, total intelligence is of the total intelligible, so the many intelligences are united to the many intelligibles. These middle forms, therefore, which possess intelligences united with their intelligibles, are perfectly exempt from our knowledge; or, in other words, they cannot be directly and without a medium apprehended even by the highest of our powers. Intellectual forms, indeed, are exempt from us; but since we proximately subsist from them, they are

<sup>2</sup> Instead of *της ὁ ἐστὶν ἀληθεια, αὐτης ἀν εἰκείνης εἰς ἐπιστημη*, as in Thompson's edition of this dialogue, it appears from the MS. commentary of Proclus that we should read *της ἀληθειας αὐτης ἀν εἰκείνης κ. τ. λ.* Indeed the sense of the text requires this emendation.

fectly so. But will each of the sciences which is, be the science of each of the things which are? Certainly it will. But will not our science <sup>1</sup> be conversant

are in a certain respect in us, and we possess a knowledge of them, and through these, of the unknown transcendency of more divine forms.

We ought not however, says Proclus, to say, with some of the friends of Plato, that divine science does not know itself, but from itself imparts self-knowledge to other things. For every divine nature primarily directs its energy to itself, and begins its idiom from itself. Thus the cause of life fills itself with life, and the source of perfection produces itself perfect. Hence, that which imparts knowledge to other things, possesses itself prior to other things the knowledge of beings; since also the science which is with us being an image of science itself, knows other things, and prior to other things, itself. Or what is that which informs us what this very thing science is? And must not relatives belong to the same power? Knowing, therefore, the objects of science, it also knows itself, being the science of those objects. As the knowledge, however, of divine science is simple and uniform, so the object of its knowledge is single and comprehensive of all other objects of scientific knowledge. Science itself, therefore, is the cause of scientific knowledge to other things, and by a much greater priority, to itself. For it is an essence essentialized in the knowledge of itself and of being. For science there is not a habit, nor a quality, but a self-perfect hyperaxis subsisting from, and established in, itself; and by knowing itself, knowing that which is primarily the object of scientific knowledge, or that which is simply being. For it is conjoined with this, in the same manner as that which is intellect simply, to that which is simply intelligible, and as that which is simply sense, to that which is simply sensible. But the many sciences after science itself are certain progressions of the one science conjoined with the multitude of beings, which the being of that one science comprehends. For being is many, and in like manner science. And that which is most characterized by unity in science itself, is united to the one of being, which also it knows; but the multitude in science itself knows the multitude of beings which being itself comprehends.

<sup>1</sup> We also participate in a certain respect of truth, but not of that of which those divine forms alluded to in the preceding text participate, but of that which was imparted to our order by the artificer of the universe; and the science which is with us is the science of this truth. There are, however, knowledges more partial than this, some evolving one, and others a different object of knowledge. Some of these, also, are conversant with generation, and the variety it contains; others investigate the whole of nature; and others contemplate supernatural beings. Some, again, employ the senses, and together with these, give completion to their work; others require the figured intellection of the phantasy; others acquiesce in doxastic reasons; others convert pure reason itself to itself; and others extend our reason to intellect. As there is then such a difference in the sciences, it is evident that some form a judgment of these, and others of different, objects of science, and things which contribute to our reminiscence of being. Thus, for instance, geometry speculates the reason of figure in us, but arithmetic unfolds, by its demonstrations, the one form of numbers; and each of the other sciences which have a partial subsistence speculates some other particular of the things with which we are conversant. We must not, therefore, pervert

versant with the truth which subsists among us? And will not each of our sciences be the science of that being which happens to reside with us? It is necessary that it should be so. But you have granted that we do not possess forms <sup>1</sup>, and that they are not things with which we are conversant? Certainly not. Is each genus <sup>2</sup> of beings known to be what it is, through

pervert the name of science by introducing arts into the midst, and the ideas of these, to which the uses of a mortal life gave a being; for they are nothing more than adumbrations of true science. As, therefore, we say that there are ideas of things which contribute to the perfection of essence, but not of things proceeding from these, and alone subsisting accidentally in others, in like manner the arts being the images of the sciences have here their generation. But the sciences themselves are derived from the sciences which pre-substist among ideas; and through the former we are enabled to ascend to the latter, and become assimilated to intellect. However, as there it is necessary that there should be one science prior to the many, being the science of that which is truth itself, just as the many sciences have many truths for their objects (for the peculiar scientific object of every science is a certain truth) in like manner with respect to the sciences with us which are many, it is necessary to understand the one and whole form of science, which neither receives its completion from the many, nor is coordinated with them, but pre-substists itself by itself. But the many sciences distribute the one power of science, a different science being arranged under a different object of knowledge, and all of them being referred to and receiving their principles from the one and entire form of science. The science, therefore, which is with us is very different from that which is divine; but through the former we ascend to the latter.

<sup>1</sup> Here Parmenides, says Proclus, beginning from the preceding axioms collects the thing proposed as follows: Exempt forms substist by themselves; things which substist by themselves and of themselves are not in us; things which are not in us, are not coordinate with our science, and are unknown by it. Exempt forms, therefore, are unknown by our science. All forms indeed, are only to be seen by a divine intellect, but this is especially the case with such as are beyond the intellectual Gods. For neither sense nor doxastic knowledge, nor pure reason, nor our intellectual knowledge, is able to conjoin the soul with those forms; but this can alone be effected through an illumination from the intellectual Gods, as some one speaking divinely says. The nature, therefore, of those forms is unknown to us, as being better than our intellection, and the divisible intuitive perceptions of our soul. Hence Socrates in the Phædrus, as we have before observed, assimilates the survey of them to the mysteries, and calls the spectacles of them entire, tranquil, simple and happy visions. Of intellectual forms, therefore, the demiurgus and father of souls has implanted in us the knowledge; but of the forms above intellect, such as those belonging to the intelligible and at the same time intellectual orders, the knowledge is exempt from our immediate vision, is spontaneous, and alone known to souls energizing from a divine afflatus. So that what Parmenides now infers, and also that we do not participate of science itself, follow from the conceptions concerning this order of divine forms.

<sup>2</sup> The genera of being are not to be considered in this place, either as things appearing in the many, and which are the subject of logical predications, or as universals collected from the many, and which are called by the moderns abstract ideas; for these are posterior to beings. But the genera

through the *form itself* of science? Undoubtedly. But this *form* we do not possess? By no means. No form, therefore, is known by us, as we do not participate of science itself? It does not appear it can. The *beautiful* <sup>1</sup> *itself*, therefore, and the *good itself*, and all such things which we have considered as being ideas, are unknown to us? So it seems. But survey this, which is yet still more dire <sup>2</sup>. What? You will say, perhaps, that if there

is

of being here signify such things as possess a generative power, more total than, and preceding according to cause, the progeny in more partial forms. For as the genera of forms in sensibles, either appear in the many, or are predicated of the many; in like manner genera in intelligibles are more principal, perfect and comprehensive than other forms; surpassing the things comprehended in simplicity and prolific power. These genera we must say are known by the form of science itself, as beginning supernally, and comprehending according to one uniform knowledge, things multiplied, unitedly, and things partial, totally. This also the science which is with us wishes to effect: for it always contemplates the progressions of things from their causes.

<sup>1</sup> *The beautiful*, and also *the good* considered as a form and not as superessential proceed supernally from the summit of intelligibles to all the second genera of Gods. The middle orders of forms, therefore, receive the progressions of these in a becoming manner; according to *the good* becoming full of their own perfection, and of the sufficient, and the undigent; but according to *the beautiful* becoming lovely to secondary natures, leading back things which have proceeded, and binding together divided causes. For a conversion to *the beautiful* collects together and unites all things, and fixes them as in one center. These two forms, therefore, *the good* and *the beautiful* subsist occultly and uniformly in first natures, but are changed in the different orders of things in a manner coordinate to each. So that it is not wonderful if there is certain beauty known only to sense, another known to opinion, another beheld through the dianoëtic power, another by intelligence in conjunction with reason, another by pure intelligence, and lastly another which is unknown, subsisting by itself perfectly exempt, and capable of being seen by its own light alone.

<sup>2</sup> The preceding arguments have led us as far as to the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order of forms: for being false and of a doubting idiom, they alone unfold the truth in intellectual forms. But what is now said, says Proclus, leads us to those forms which presubsist in the intelligible, proceeding indeed in the form of doubt as about intellectual forms, but in reality signifying the idiom of the first forms. The discourse, therefore, shows that forms neither know nor govern sensibles; falsely, indeed, in demiurgic ideas, for sensibles subsist from these, and these rule over their all-various distribution into individual forms; so that they previously comprehend the providence and government of sensibles: but the discourse is most true in the first ideas, which are in the highest degree characterized by unity, and are truly intelligible. For these first shine forth from being in intelligible intellect, uniformly, unitedly, and totally. For they contain the paternal causes of the most common and comprehensive genera, and are superior to a distributed knowledge of and a proximate government of sensibles. Hence these intelligible Gods have dominion over the Gods which are unfolded from them, and their knowledge is beyond all other divine knowledge; to which also Plato looking collects, that the Gods neither rule over us, nor have any knowledge of human

concerns.

is any certain *genus of science*, it is much more accurate than the science which resides with us; and that this is likewise true of beauty, and every thing

concerns. For the divided causes of these, and the powers which rule over them, are in the intellectual Gods. But the ideas which are properly called intelligible, are established above all such divisions; produce all things according to united and the most simple causes; and both their effective energy and knowledge are one, collected and uniform. Hence there the intelligible cause of the celestial genus produces every thing celestial, Gods, angels, dæmons, heroes, souls, not so far as they are dæmons or angels, for this is the peculiarity of divisible causes, and of divided ideas, of which the intellectual forms make a distribution into multitude, but so far as all these genera are in a certain respect divine and celestial, and so far as they are allotted an *hyperaxis* united to the Gods; and in a similar manner with respect to each of the rest. Thus for instance, the intelligible idea of every thing pedestrian and terrestrial cannot be said to rule over things, each of which is separated according to one form, for this is the province of things distributed from it into multitude, but it governs all things so far as they are of one genus. For things nearer to the one, give subsistence to all things in a more total and uniform manner.

As, however, we shall hereafter speak of this, let us rather consider the opinion of Plato concerning providence. The Athenian guest, therefore, in the Laws clearly evinces that there is a providence; where his discourse shows that the Gods know and possess a power which governs all things. But Parmenides at the very beginning of the discussion concerning providence evinces the absurdity of doubting divine knowledge and dominion. For to assert that the conclusion of this doubt is still *more dire* than the former, sufficiently shows that he rejects the arguments which subvert providence. For it is dire to say that divinity is not known by us who are rational and intellectual natures, and who essentially possess something divine; but it is still more dire to deprive divine natures of knowledge; since the former pertains to those who do not convert themselves to divinity, but the latter to those who impede the all-pervading goodness of the Gods. And the former pertains to those who err respecting our essence, but the latter to those who convert themselves erroneously about a divine cause. But the expression still *more dire*, (*δεινοτερον*) says Proclus, is not used as signifying a more strenuous doubt, in the same manner as we are accustomed to call those *dire* (*δεινοι*) who vanquish by the power of language, but as a thing worthy of greater dread and caution to the intelligent. For it divulges the union of things, and dissociates divinity apart from the world. It also defines divine power as not pervading to all things, and circumscribes intellectual knowledge as not all-perfect. It likewise subverts all the fabrication of the universe, the order imparted to the world from separate causes, and the goodness which fills all things from one will, in a manner accommodated to the nature of unity. Nor less dire than any one of these is the confusion of piety. For what communion is there between Gods and men, if the former are deprived of the knowledge of our concerns. All supplications, therefore, of divinity, all sacred institutions, all oaths adducing the Gods as a witness, and the untaught conceptions implanted in our souls concerning divinity, will perish. What gift also will be left of the Gods to men, if they do not previously comprehend in themselves the desert of the recipients, if they do not possess a knowledge of all that we do, of all we suffer, and of all that we think though we do not carry it into effect? With great propriety, therefore,

thing else? Certainly. If, therefore, any one possesses *science itself*, will you not assert that no one possesses the most accurate science more than a God?

fore are such assertions called dire. For if it is unholy to change any legitimately divine institution, how can such an innovation as this be unattended with dread? But that Plato rejects this hypothesis which makes Divinity to be ignorant of our concerns, is evident from these things, since it is one of his dogmas, that Divinity knows and produces all things. Since, however, some of those posterior to him have vehemently endeavoured to subvert such-like assertions, let us speak concerning them as much as may be sufficient for our present purpose.

Some of those, then, posterior to Plato, on seeing the unstable condition of sublunary things were fearful that they were not under the direction of providence and a divine nature; for such events as are said to take place through fortune, the apparent inequality respecting lives, and the disordered motion of material natures, induced them greatly to suspect that they were not under the government of providence. Besides, the persuasion that Divinity is not busily employed in the evolution of all-various reasons, and that he does not depart from his own blessedness, induced them to frame an hypothesis so lawless and dire. For they were of opinion that the passion of our soul, and the perturbation which it sustains by descending to the government of bodies, must happen to Divinity, if he converted himself to the providential inspection of things. Further still, from considering that different objects of knowledge are known by different gnostic powers; as, for instance, sensibles by sense, objects of opinion by opinion, things scientific by science, and intelligibles by intellect, and, at the same time, neither placing sense, nor opinion, nor science in Divinity, but only an intellect immaterial and pure;—hence, they asserted that Divinity had no knowledge of any other things than the objects of intellect \*. For, say they, if matter is external to him, it is necessary that he should be pure from apprehensions which are converted to matter; but being purified from these, it follows that he must have no knowledge of material natures: and hence, the patrons of this doctrine deprived him of a knowledge of, and providential exertions about, sensibles; not through any imbecility of nature, but through a transcendency of gnostic energy; just as those whose eyes are filled with light, are said to be incapable of perceiving mundane objects, at the same time that this incapacity is nothing more than transcendency of vision. They likewise add, that there are many things which it is beautiful not to know. Thus, to the entheastic, (or those who are divinely inspired) it is beautiful to be ignorant of whatever would destroy the deific energy; and to the scientific, not to know that which would defile the indubitable perception of science.

But others ascribe, indeed, to Divinity a knowledge of sensibles, in order that they may not take away his providence, but at the same time convert his apprehension to that which is external, represent him as pervading through the whole of a sensible nature, as passing into contact with the objects of his government, impelling every thing, and being locally present with all things; for, say they, he would not otherwise be able to exert a providential energy in a becoming manner, and impart good to every thing according to its desert †.

\* This opinion was embraced by the more early Peripatetics.

† This was the opinion of the Stoics.

God<sup>1</sup>? It is necessary so to assert. But can a God, being such as he is, know our affairs through possessing science itself? Why should he not?

That

Others again affirm that Divinity has a knowledge of himself, but that he has no occasion to understand sensibles in order to provide for them, since by his very essence he produced all things, and adorns whatever he has produced, without having any knowledge of his productions. They add, that this is by no means wonderful, since nature operates without knowledge, and unattended with phantasy; but that Divinity differs from nature in this, that he has a knowledge of himself, though not of the things which are fabricated by him. And such are the assertions of those who were persuaded that Divinity is not separated from mundane natures, and of those who deprived him of the knowledge of inferior concerns, and of a knowledge operating in union with providence.

With respect to these philosophers, we say, that they speak truly, and yet not truly, on this subject.

<sup>1</sup> Every divine intellect, says Proclus, and every order of the Gods, comprehends in itself the knowledge and the cause of all things. For neither is their knowledge inefficacious, possessing the indefinite in intellection; but they both know all things, and communicate good. For that which is primarily good, is also willing to illuminate secondary natures with a supply from himself. Nor are their productions irrational and void of knowledge: for this is the work of nature and of ultimate life, and not of a divine cause, which also produces rational essences. Hence, they at the same time both know and make all things; and prior to these, according to their will, they preassume both a knowledge and a power effective of all things. Hence, they preside over all things *willingly, gnostically, and powerfully*; and every thing through this triad enjoys their providential care. And if you are willing to unite things which subsist divisibly in secondary natures, and refer them to a divine cause, you will perhaps apprehend the truth concerning it more accurately. Nature, therefore, appears to possess reasons or productive principles effective, but not gnostic; the dianoëtic power possesses as its end, knowledge in itself; and proæresis, or a deliberative tendency to things capable of being accomplished, has for its end good, and the will of things good. Collect these, therefore, in one, *the willing, the gnostic, the efficacious*, and prior to these, conceiving a divine unity, refer all these to a divine nature, because all these presubstist there uniformly together. However, though all the Gods possess all these, yet in intelligibles, the first intelligence, the first power generative of wholes, and a beneficent will, are especially apparent. For the intelligible order subsisting immediately after the fountain of good, becomes that to natures posterior to itself, which *the good* is to the universality of things; expressing his super-causal nature through paternal power; *the good*, through beneficent will; and that which is above all knowledge, through occult and united intellection. Proclus adds, but it appears to me that through this Parmenides now first calls ideas Gods, as recurring to the first fountain of them, and as being uniform, and most near to *the good*, and as thus possessing a knowledge of, and dominion over, all things, so far as each participates of a divine power, and so far as all of them are suspended from the Gods.

That Parmenides said, Because it has been confessed by us, O Socrates, that neither do those forms possess the power which is peculiar to them, through  
relation

subject. For if providence has a subsistence, neither can there be any thing disordered, nor can Divinity be busily employed, nor can he know sensibles through passive sense: but these philosophers, in consequence of not knowing the exempt power and uniform knowledge of Divinity, appear to deviate from the truth. For thus we interrogate them: does not every thing energize in a becoming manner when it energizes according to its own power and nature? as, for instance, does not nature, in conformity to the order of its essence, energize physically, intellect intellectually, and soul psychically, or according to the nature of soul? And when the same thing is generated by many and different causes, does not each of these produce according to its own power, and not according to the nature of the thing produced? Or shall we say, that each produces after the same manner, and that, for example, the sun and man generate man, according to the same mode of operation, and not according to the natural ability of each, viz. the one partially, imperfectly, and with a busy energy, but the other without anxious attention, by its very essence, and totally? But to assert this would be absurd; for a divine operates in a manner very different from a mortal nature.

If, therefore, every thing which energizes, energizes according to its own nature and order, some things divinely and supernaturally, others naturally, and others in a different manner, it is evident that every gnostic being knows according to its own nature, and that it does not follow that because the thing known is one and the same, on this account, the natures which know, energize in conformity to the essence of the things known. Thus sense, opinion, and our intellect, know that which is white, but not in the same manner: for sense cannot know what the essence is of a thing white, nor can opinion obtain a knowledge of its proper objects in the same manner as intellect; since opinion knows only *that* a thing is, but intellect knows the cause of its existence. Knowledge, therefore, subsists according to the nature of that which knows, and not according to the nature of that which is known. What wonder is it then that Divinity should know all things in such a manner as is accommodated to his nature, viz. divisible things indivisibly, things multiplied, uniformly, things generated, according to an eternal intelligence, totally, such things as are partial; and that with a knowledge of this kind, he should possess a power productive of all things, or, in other words, that by knowing all things with simple and united intellections, he should impart to every thing being, and a progression into being? For the auditory sense knows audibles in a manner different from the common sense; and prior to, and different from, these, reason knows audibles, together with other particulars which sense is not able to apprehend. And again, of desire, which tends to one thing, of anger, which aspires after another thing, and of *proairesis*, (*προαιρεσις*), or that faculty of the soul which is a deliberative tendency to things in our power, there is one particular life moving the soul towards all these, which are mutually motive of each other. It is through this life that we say, I desire, I am angry, and I have a deliberative tendency to this thing or that; for this life verges to all these powers, and lives in conjunction with them, as being a power which is impelled to every object of desire. But prior both to reason and this one life, is *the one* of the soul, which often says, I perceive, I  
reason,

relation to our concerns, nor ours from relation to theirs; but that the forms in each division are referred to themselves. It was admitted by us.

If,

reason, I desire, and I deliberate, which follows all these energies, and energizes together with them. For we should not be able to know all these, and to apprehend in what they differ from each other, unless we contained a certain indivisible nature, which has a subsistence above the common sense, and which, prior to opinion, desire, and will, knows all that these know and desire, according to an indivisible mode of apprehension.

If this be the case, it is by no means proper to disbelieve in the indivisible knowledge of Divinity, which knows sensibles without possessing sense, and divisible natures without possessing a divisible energy, and which, without being present to things in place, knows them prior to all local presence, and imparts to every thing that which every thing is capable of receiving. The unstable essence, therefore, of apparent natures is not known by him in an unstable, but in a definite manner; nor does he know that which is subject to all-various mutations dubiously, but in a manner perpetually the same; for by knowing himself, he knows every thing of which he is the cause, possessing a knowledge transcendently more accurate than that which is coordinate to the objects of knowledge; since a causal knowledge of every thing is superior to every other kind of knowledge. Divinity, therefore, knows without busily attending to the objects of his intellection, because he abides in himself, and by alone knowing himself, knows all things. Nor is he indigent of sense, or opinion, or science, in order to know sensible natures; for it is himself that produces all these, and that, in the unfathomable depths of the intellection of himself, comprehends an united knowledge of them, according to cause, and in one simplicity of perception. Just as if some one having built a ship, should place in it men of his own formation, and, in consequence of possessing a various art, should add a sea to the ship, produce certain winds, and afterwards launch the ship into the new created main. Let us suppose, too, that he causes these to have an existence by merely conceiving them to exist, so that by imagining all this to take place, he gives an external subsistence to his inward phantasms, it is evident that in this case he will contain the cause of every thing which happens to the ship through the winds on the sea, and that by contemplating his own conceptions, without being indigent of outward conversion, he will at the same time both fabricate and know these external particulars. Thus, and in a far greater degree, that divine intellect the artificer of the universe, possessing the causes of all things, both gives subsistence to, and contemplates, whatever the universe contains, without departing from the speculation of himself. But if, with respect to intellect, one kind is more partial, and another more total, it is evident that there is not the same intellectual perfection of all things, but that where intelligibles have a more total and undistributed subsistence, there the knowledge is more total and indivisible, and where the number of forms proceeds into multitude and extension, there the knowledge is both one and multiform. Hence, this being admitted, we cannot wonder on hearing the Orphic verses, in which the theologist says:

Αυτὴ δὲ Ζηνὸς καὶ ἐν ὀμμασι πατρὸς ἀνακτοῦ  
 Ναιουσ' ἀθανάτοι τε θεοὶ, Σύνητοι τ' ἀνθρώποι,  
 Ὅσα τε πη γέγαυσα, καὶ ὑπερὸν ὅσα ἐμήλλον.

M 2

i. e. There

If, therefore, there is the most accurate dominion with Divinity, and the most accurate science, the dominion of the Gods will not rule over us, nor  
will

i. e. There in the sight of Jove, the parent king,  
Th' immortal Gods and mortal men reside,  
With all that ever was, and shall hereafter be.

For the artificer of the universe is full of intelligibles, and possesses the causes of all things separated from each other; so that he generates men, and all other things, according to their characteristic peculiarities, and not so far as each is divine, in the same manner as the divinity prior to him, the intelligible father Phanes. Hence, Jupiter is called the father of things divided according to species, but Phanes of things divided according to genera. And Jupiter, indeed, is the father of wholes, though, by a much greater priority, Phanes is the father of all things, but of all things so far as each participates of a divine power. With respect to knowledge, also, Jupiter knows human affairs particularly, and in common with other things: for the cause of men is contained in him, divided from other things and united with all of them; but Phanes knows all things at once, as it were centrally, and without distribution. Thus, for instance, he knows man, so far as he is an animal and pedestrian, and not so far as he is man. For as the pedestrian which subsists in Phanes, is collectively, and at once, the cause of all terrestrial Gods, angels, dæmons, heroes, souls, animals, plants, and of every thing contained in the earth, so also the knowledge which is there is one of all these things collectively, as of one genus, and is not a distributed knowledge of human affairs. And as in us the more universal sciences give subsistence to those which are subordinate to them, as Aristotle says, and are more sciences, and more allied to intellect, for they use more comprehensive conclusions,—so also in the Gods, the more excellent and more simple intellections comprehend according to causal priority the variety of such as are secondary. In the Gods, therefore, the first knowledge of man is as of being, and is one intellection which knows every being as one, according to one union. But the second knowledge is as of eternal being: for this knowledge uniformly comprehends according to one cause every eternal being. The knowledge which is consequent to this is as of animal: for this also has an intellection of animal according to union. But the knowledge which succeeds this is of that which is perfected under this particular genus, as of pedestrian: for it is an intellection of all that genus, as of one thing; and division first takes place in this, and variety together with simplicity. At the same time, however, neither in this is the intellection of man alone: for it is not the same thing to understand every thing terrestrial as one thing, and to understand man. Hence, in demiurgic, and in short in intellectual forms, there is a certain intellection of man as of man, because this form is separated from others in these orders. And thus we have shown how the highest forms do not possess a knowledge of human affairs, and how they have dominion over all things, so far as all things are divine, and so far as they participate of a certain divine idiom. But that in the first order of forms dominion itself, and science itself, subsist, is evident. For there is a divine intellection there of all things characterized by unity, and a power which rules over wholes; the former being the fountain of all knowledge, and the latter the primary cause

will their science take cognizance of us, or of any of our concerns; and in a similar manner, we shall not rule over them by our dominion, nor know any thing divine through the assistance of our science. And again, in consequence of the same reasoning, they will neither, though Gods <sup>1</sup>, be our governors, nor have any knowledge of human concerns. But would not the discourse be wonderful in the extreme, which should deprive Divinity of knowledge? That Parmenides said, These, O Socrates, and many other consequences besides these, must necessarily <sup>2</sup> happen to forms, if they are the

of all dominion, whether they subsist in the Gods, or in the genera more excellent than our species, or in souls. And, perhaps, Parmenides here calls the genus of science the intellect of those forms, wishing to show its comprehensive and uniform nature; but prior to this, when he was speaking of middle ideas, he alone denominated it species. For, from intelligible knowledge the middle orders are filled with the intelligence which they possess; and intelligence in the latter, has the same relation to that in the former, which species has to genus. If, also, the term *much more accurate*, is employed in speaking of this science, it is evident that such an addition represents to us its more united nature. For this is the accurate, to comprehend all things, and leave nothing external to itself.

<sup>1</sup> It is well observed here by Proclus, that the words “*though Gods*” contain an abundant indication of the present doubt. For every thing divine is good, and is willing to fill all things with good. How, therefore, can it either be ignorant of things pertaining to us, or not have dominion over secondary natures? How is it possible that it should not govern according to its own power, and provide according to its own knowledge for things of which it is the cause? And it appears that Parmenides by these words evinces, that for the Divinities to be ignorant of our concerns over which they have dominion, is the most absurd of all things, profoundly indicating that it especially pertains to the Gods, so far as Gods, to know and provide for all things, according to *the one* by which they are characterized. For intellect, so far as intellect, has not a knowledge of all things, but of *wholes*, nor are ideas the causes of all things, but of such as perpetually subsist according to nature; so that the assertion is not entirely false which deprives these of the knowledge and government of our concerns, so far as we rank among particulars, and not so far as we are men, and possess one form. But it is necessary that the Divinity and the Gods should know all things, particulars, things eternal, and things temporal; and that they should rule over all things, not only such as are universal, but such also as are partial: for there is one providence of them pervading to all things. Forms, therefore, so far as Gods, and intellect so far as a God, possess a knowledge of, and dominion over, all things. But intellect is a God according to *the one*, which is as it were the luminous flower of its essence; and forms are Gods, so far as they contain the light proceeding from *the good*.

<sup>2</sup> Parmenides here indicates that what has been said under the pretext of doubts, is after another manner true. For he says that these and many other consequences must *necessarily* happen to forms, viz. the being unknown, and having no knowledge of our affairs. And, in short,

the ideas of things, and if any one separates each form apart from other things; so that any one who hears these assertions, may doubt and hesitate whether such forms have any subsistence; or if they do subsist in a most eminent degree, whether it is not abundantly necessary that they should be unknown<sup>1</sup> by the human nature. Hence he who thus speaks may seem to say something to the purpose; and as we just now said, it may be considered as a wonderful<sup>2</sup> thing, on account of the difficulty of being persuaded, and as the province of a man<sup>3</sup> of a very naturally good disposition, to be able to perceive *that there is a certain genus of every thing, and an essence itself subsisting by itself*: but he will deserve still greater admiration, who, after having made this discovery, shall be able to teach another how to discern and distinguish all these; in a becoming manner. That then Socrates said, I assent to you, O Parmenides, for you entirely speak agreeably to my opinion.

That Parmenides further added, But indeed, O Socrates, if any one on the contrary takes away the forms of things, regarding all that has now been  
been

short, he indicates that all the above-mentioned idioms are adapted to different orders of forms. For it is by no means wonderful that what is true of one order should be false when extended to another.

<sup>1</sup> These things also, says Proclus, are divinely asserted, and with a view to the condition of our nature. For neither does he who has arrived at the summit of human attainments, and who is the wisest among men, possess science perfectly indubitable concerning divine natures; for it is intellect alone which knows intelligibles free from doubt; nor is the most imperfect and earth-born character entirely deprived of the knowledge of a formal cause. For to what does he look when he sometimes blames that which is apparent to sense, as very mutable, if he does not contain in himself an unperverted preconception of an essence permanent and real?

<sup>2</sup> The similar is every where naturally adapted to proceed to the similar. Hence that which is obscure to the eyes, and is only to be obtained by philosophy, will not be apprehended by imperfect souls, but by those alone who through physical virtue, transcendent diligence, and ardent desire apply themselves in a becoming manner to so sublime an object of contemplation. For the speculation of intelligibles cannot subsist in foreign habits; nor can things which have their essence and seat in a pure intellect become apparent to those who are not purified in intellect; since the similar is every where known by the similar.

<sup>3</sup> By these words, says Proclus, Plato again teaches us who is a most fit hearer of this discourse about ideas. Such a one he denominates a *man* (i. e. *ανηρ*, not *ανθρωπος*), not indeed in vain, but in order to indicate that such a one according to the form of his life possesses much of the *grand, robust and elevated*: (*ανδρα μεν ονομαται ου ματην, αλλ' ινα και κατα το ειδος της ζωης τοιουτος η, πολυ το αδρον και υψηλον επιδεικνυμενος.*)

been said, and other things of the same kind, he will not find where to turn his dianoëtic <sup>1</sup> part, while he does not permit the idea of every thing which exists

ΕΠΙΔΕΙΚΝΥΜΕΝΟΣ.) For it is fit that he who is about to apprehend the Gods should direct his attention to nothing small and grovelling. But he calls him a man of a very naturally good disposition, as being adorned with all the prerogatives of a philosophic nature, and as receiving many viatica from nature, in order to the intellectual perception of divine natures. In addition to this, he also again reminds us who is the leader of the science concerning these divine forms, and that he is prolific and inventive, and this with respect to teaching. For some have made such a proficiency as is sufficient for themselves, but others are also able to awaken others to a recollection of the truth of things. Hence he says, that such a one deserves still greater admiration. In the third place, he shows us what is the end of this teaching, viz. that the learner who possesses science may be sufficiently able to distinguish the genera of beings, and to survey in perfection the definite causes of things; whence they originate; how many are their orders; how they subsist in every order of things; how they are participated; how they causally comprehend all things in themselves; and, in short, all such particulars as have been discussed in the preceding notes.

Proclus adds, that by *a certain genus of every thing*, Plato signifies the primary cause presubstisting in divine natures of every series. For idea compared with any other individual form in sensibles is a genus, as being more total than sensible forms, and as comprehending things which are not entirely of a similar form with each other. For how can the terrestrial man be said to be entirely of a similar form with the celestial, or with the man that is allotted a subsistence in any other element?

<sup>1</sup> Very scientifically, says Proclus, does Plato in these words remind us that there are ideas or forms of things. For if dianoëtic and intellectual are better than sensible knowledge, it is necessary that the things known by the dianoëtic power and by intellect should be more divine than those which are known by sense: for as the gnostic powers which are coordinated to beings are to each other, such also is the mutual relation of the things which are known. If, therefore, the dianoëtic power and intellect speculate separate and immaterial forms, and likewise things universal, and which subsist in themselves, but sense contemplates things partible, and which are inseparable from subjects, it is necessary that the spectacles of the dianoëtic power and of intellect, should be more divine and more eternal. Universals, therefore, are prior to particulars, and things immaterial to things material. Whence then does the dianoëtic power receive these? for they do not always subsist in us according to energy. It is however necessary, that things in energy should precede those in capacity, both in things intellectual and in essences. Forms, therefore, subsist elsewhere, and prior to us, in divine and separate natures, through whom the forms which we contain derive their perfection. But these not subsisting, neither would the forms in us subsist: for they could not be derived from things imperfect: since it is not lawful that more excellent natures should be either generated or perfected from such as are subordinate. Whence, too, is this multitude of forms in the multitude of souls derived? For it is every where necessary, prior to multitude, to conceive a monad from which the multitude proceeds. For as the multitude of sensibles was not generated, except from an unity, which is better than sensibles,

exists to be always the same, and by this means entirely destroys the dialectic power of the soul: but you also seem in this respect to perceive perfectly

and which gave subsistence to that which is common in particulars; so neither would the multitude of forms subsist in souls, such as the just itself, the beautiful itself, &c. which subsist in all souls in a manner accommodated to the nature of soul, without a certain generating unity, which is more excellent than this animastic multitude: just as the monad from which the multitude of sensibles originates, is superior to a sensible essence, comprehending unitedly all the variety of sensibles. Is it not also necessary, that prior to self-motive natures, there should be an immovable form? For as self-motive reasons transcend those which are alter-motive, or moved by others, after the same manner immovable forms, and which energize in eternity, are placed above self-motive forms, which are conversant with the circulations of time: for it is every where requisite that a stable should precede a movable cause. If, therefore, there are forms in souls which are many, and of a self-motive nature, there are prior to these intellectual forms. In other words, there are immovable prior to self-motive natures, such as are monadic, prior to such as are multiplied, and the perfect prior to the imperfect. It is also requisite that they should subsist in energy; so that if there are not intellectual, neither are there animastic forms: for nature by no means begins from the imperfect and the many; since it is necessary that multitude should proceed about monads, things imperfect about the perfect, and things movable about the immovable. But if there are not forms essentially inherent in soul, there is no place left to which any one can turn his dianoëtic power as Parmenides justly observes: for phantasy and sense necessarily look to things connascent with themselves. And of what shall we possess a dianoëtic or scientific knowledge, if the soul is deprived of forms of this kind? For we shall not make our speculation about things of posterior origin, since these are more ignoble than sensibles themselves, and the universals which they contain. How then will the objects of knowledge, which are coordinate to the dianoëtic power, be subordinate to those which are known by sense? It remains, therefore, that we shall not know any thing else than sensibles. But if this be the case, whence do demonstrations originate? Demonstrations indeed, are from those things which are the causes of the things demonstrated, which are prior to them according to nature, and not with relation to us, and which are more honourable than the conclusions which are unfolded from them. But the things from which demonstrations are formed are universals, and not particulars. Universals, therefore, are prior to, and are more causal and more honourable than, particulars. Whence likewise are definitions? For definition proceeds through the essential reason of the soul: for we first define that which is common in particulars, possessing within, that form, of which the something common in these is the image. If, therefore, definition is the principle of demonstration, it is necessary that there should be another definition prior to this, of the many forms and essential reasons which the soul contains. For since, as we have before said, the just itself is in every soul, it is evident that there is something common in this multitude of the just, whence every soul knowing the reason of the just contained in its essence, knows in a similar manner that which is in all other souls. But if it possesses something common, it is this something common which we define, and this is the principle of demonstration, and not that universal in the many, which is material, and in a certain

fectly the same with myself. That Socrates answered, You speak the truth. What then will you do with respect to philosophy? Where will you turn yourself,

certain respect mortal, being coordinated with the many: for in demonstrations and definitions, it is requisite that the whole of what is partial should be comprehended in universal and definition. The definitions however of things common in particulars do not comprehend the whole of particulars: for, can it be said that Socrates is the whole of rational mortal animal, which is the definition of man? since he contains many other particulars, which cause him to possess characteristic peculiarities. But the reason of man in the soul comprehends the whole of every individual: for it comprehends uniformly all the powers which are beheld about the particulars of the human species. And, in a similar manner with respect to animal: for, indeed, the universal in particulars is less than the particulars themselves, and is less than species; since it does not possess all differences in energy, but in capacity alone; whence also, it becomes as it were the matter of the succeeding formal differences. But the reason of man in our soul is better and more comprehensive; for it comprehends all the differences of man unitedly, and not in capacity, like the universal in particulars, but in energy. If, therefore, definition is the principle of demonstration, it is requisite that it should be the definition of a thing of that kind which is entirely comprehensive of that which is more partial. But of this kind are the forms in our soul, and not the forms which subsist in particulars. These, therefore, being subverted, neither will it be possible to define. Hence the definitive together with the demonstrative art will perish, abandoning the conceptions of the human mind. The divisive art also, together with these, will be nothing but a name: for the whole employment of division is, to separate the many from the one, and to distribute things preexisting unitedly in the whole, into their proper differences, not adding the differences externally, but contemplating them as inherent in the genera themselves, and as dividing the species from each other. Where, therefore, will the work of this art be found, if we do not admit that there are essential forms in our soul? For he who supposes that this art is employed in things of posterior origin, i. e. forms abstracted from sensibles, perceives nothing of the power which it possesses: for to divide things of posterior origin, is the business of the divisive art, energizing according to opinion; but to contemplate the essential differences of the reasons in the soul, is the employment of dianoëtic and scientific division, which also unfolds united powers, and perceives things more partial branching forth from such as are more total. By a much greater priority, therefore, to the definitive and demonstrative arts will the divisive be entirely vain, if the soul does not contain essential reasons: for definition is more venerable, and ranks more as a principle than demonstration, and again, division than definition: for the divisive gives to the definitive art its principles, but not vice versa. The analytic art also, must perish together with these, if we do not admit the essential reasons of the soul. For the analytic is opposed to the demonstrative method, as resolving from things caused to causes, but to the definitive as proceeding from composites to things more simple, and to the divisive, as ascending from things more partial to such as are more universal. So that those methods being destroyed, this also will perish. If, therefore, there are not forms or ideas, neither shall we contain the reasons of things. And if we do not contain the reasons of things, neither will there

yourself, being ignorant of these? Indeed I do not seem to myself to know at present. That Parmenides said, Before you exercise<sup>1</sup> yourself in this affair,

be the dialectic methods according to which we obtain a knowledge of things, nor shall we know where to turn the dianoëtic power of the soul.

<sup>1</sup> Socrates was alone deficient in skill, whence Parmenides exhorts him to apply himself to dialectic, through which he would become much more skilful, being exercised in many things, and perceiving the consequences of hypotheses; and when he has accomplished this, Parmenides advises him to turn to the speculation of forms. For such particulars as are now dubious are very easy of solution to those that are exercised in dialectic. And this is the whole end of the words. This exercise, however, must not be thought to be such as that which is called by logicians the epichirematic or argumentative method. For that looks to opinion, but this despises the opinion of the multitude. Hence, to the many it appears to be nothing but words, and is on this account denominated by them garrulity. The epichirematic method, indeed, delivers many arguments about one problem; but this exercise delivers the same method to us about many and different problems; so that the one is very different from the other. The latter, however, is more beautiful than the former, as it uses more excellent methods, beginning from on high, in order to accomplish its proper work. For, as we have already observed in the Introduction to this dialogue, it employs as its instruments division and definition, analysis and demonstration. If, therefore, we exercise ourselves in this method, there is much hope that we shall genuinely apprehend the theory of ideas; distinctly evolving our confused conceptions; dissolving apparent doubts; and demonstrating things of which we are now ignorant. But till we can effect this, we shall not be able to give a scientific definition of every form.

Should it, however, be inquired whether it is possible to define forms or not, such as the beautiful itself, or the just itself; for forms, as Plato says in his Epistles, are only to be apprehended by the simple vision of intelligence; to this we reply, that the beautiful itself, the just itself, and the good itself, considered as ideas, are not only in intellect, but also in souls, and in sensible natures. And of these, some are definable, and others not. This being the case, intellectual forms, though they may be in many and partial natures, cannot be defined on account of their simplicity, and because they are apprehended by intelligence, and not through composition; and likewise, because whatever is defined ought to participate of something common, which is, as it were, a subject, and is different from itself. But in divine forms there is nothing of this kind: for being, as Timæus says, does not proceed into any thing else, but though it makes a certain progression from itself, yet after a manner it is the same with its immediate progeny, being only unfolded into a second order. Forms, however, belonging to soul, and subsisting in sensibles, can be defined; and, in short, such things as are produced according to a paradigmatic cause, and such as are said to participate of forms. Hence, dialectic speculates the first forms by simple intuitions; but when it defines, or divides, it looks to the images of these. If, therefore, such a science is the purest part of intellect and prudence, it is evident that it employs pure intellections, through which it apprehends intelligibles, and multiform methods by which it binds the spectacles derived from

affair, O Socrates, you should endeavour to define what *the beautiful*, *the just*, and *the good* are, and each of the other forms: for I before perceived the necessity of your accomplishing this, when I heard you discoursing with Aristotle. Indeed that ardour of yours, by which you are impelled to disputation, is both beautiful<sup>1</sup> and divine; but collect yourself together, and while

from intelligibles, and which subsist in secondary orders: and thus it appears that the assertions of Plato are true.

But it is by no means wonderful if we also define certain other particulars of which there are no ideas, such as things artificial, parts, and things evil. For there are in us reasons of wholes which are according to nature, and also of things good; and in consequence of this, we know such things as give completion to wholes, such as imitate nature, and such as have merely a shadowy subsistence. For such as is each of these, such also is it known and defined by us; and we discourse about them from the definitely stable reasons which we contain.

<sup>1</sup> Some, says Proclus, are neither impelled to, nor are astonished about, the speculation of beings: others again have obtained perfection according to knowledge: and others are impelled, indeed, but require perfection, logical skill, and exercise, in order to the attainment of the end. Among the last of these is Socrates; whence Parmenides, indeed, receives his impulse, and calls it divine, as being philosophic. For, to despise things apparent, and to contemplate an incorporeal essence, is philosophic and divine; since every thing divine is of this kind, separate from sensibles, and subsisting in immaterial intellects. But Parmenides also calls the impulse of Socrates beautiful, as leading to that which is truly beautiful, (which does not consist in practical affairs, as the Stoics afterwards conceived it did, but in intellectual energies,) and as adapted to true love. For the amatory form of life especially adheres to beauty. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides admit the impulse of Socrates as *divine* and *beautiful*, as leading to *intellect* and *the one*. As *divine*, indeed, it vindicates to itself *the one*, but as *beautiful*, *intellect*, in which the beautiful first subsists; and as purifying the eye of the soul, and exciting its most divine part. But he extends the road through dialectic as irreprehensible and most expedient; being connate, indeed, with things, but employing many powers for the apprehension of truth; imitating intellect, from which also it receives its principles, but beautifully extending through well-ordered gradations to true being, and giving respite to the wandering about sensibles; and lastly, exploring every thing by methods which cannot be confuted, till it arrives at the occult residence of *the one* and *the good*.

But when Parmenides says, "if you do not truth will elude your pursuit," he manifests the danger which threatens us from rash and disordered impulse to things inaccessible to the unexercised, and this is no other than falling from the whole of truth. For an orderly progression is that which makes our ascent secure and irreprehensible. Hence, Proclus adds, the Chaldæan oracle says, "that Divinity is never so much turned from man, and never so much sends us novel paths, as when we make our ascent to the most divine of speculations or works in a confused and disordered manner, and, as it adds, with unbathed feet, and with unhallowed lips. For, of those that

while you are young more and more exercise yourself in that science, which appears useless to the many, and is called by them empty loquacity; for if you do not, the truth will elude your pursuit.

That Socrates then said, What method of exercise <sup>1</sup> is this, O Parmenides? And that Parmenides replied, It is that which you have heard Zeno employing: but besides this, while you was speaking with Zeno, I admired your asserting that you not only suffered yourself to contemplate the *wandering* <sup>2</sup> which subsists about the objects of sight, but likewise that which takes place

that are thus negligent, the progressions are imperfect, the impulses are vain, and the paths are blind." Being persuaded, therefore, both by Plato and the oracles, we should always ascend through things more proximate to us to such as are more excellent, and from things more subordinate, through mediums, to such as are more elevated.

<sup>1</sup> If again, says Proclus, Parmenides calls this dialectic an exercise (*γυμνασία*), not being argumentative, we ought not to wonder. For every logical discursus, and the evolution itself of theorems, considered with reference to an intellectual life, is an exercise. For as we call endurance an exercise, with reference to fortitude, and continence, with respect to temperance, so every logical theory may be called an exercise with reference to intellectual knowledge. The scientific discursus, therefore, of the dianoëtic power, which is the business of dialectic, is a dianoëtic exercise preparatory to the most simple intellection of the soul.

<sup>2</sup> Again, in these words Parmenides evinces his admiration of the astonishment of Socrates about intelligibles and immaterial forms: for he says that he admires his transferring the dialectic power from sensibles to intelligibles; and he also adds the cause of this. For things which are especially apprehended by reason, or the summit of the dianoëtic part (for such is the meaning of reason in this place), are intelligibles; since Timæus also says that the reason about sensibles is not firm and stable, but conjectural, but that the reason which is employed about intelligibles is immovable and cannot be confuted. For sensibles are not accurately that which they are said to be; but intelligibles having a proper subsistence, are more able to be known. But, after another manner, it may be said that intelligible forms are especially known by reason, and this by beginning from the gnostic powers. For sense has no knowledge whatever of these forms; the phantasy receives figured images of them; opinion logically apprehends them, and without figure, but at the same time possesses the various, and is, in short, naturally adapted alone to know *that*, and not *why*, they are. Hence, the summit of our dianoëtic part is the only sufficient speculator of forms: and hence Timæus says that true being is apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason. So that forms, properly so called, are justly said to be especially apprehended by reason. For all sensible things are partial; since every body is partial: for no body is capable of being all things, nor of subsisting impartibly, in a multitude of particulars. Physical forms verge to bodies, and are divided about them; and the forms belonging to the soul participate of variety, and fall short of the simplicity of intellectual forms. Hence, such forms as are called intellectual and intelligible, and are most remote from matter are especially to be apprehended by reason.

place in such things as are especially apprehended by reason, and which some one may consider as having a real subsistence. For it appears to me (said Socrates), that after this manner it may without difficulty be proved, that there are both similars and dissimilars, or any thing else which it is the province of beings to suffer. That Parmenides replied, You speak well: but it is necessary that, besides this, you should not only consider *if each of the things supposed is* <sup>1</sup>, what will be the consequences from the hypothesis, but likewise

reason. The dialectic wandering, therefore, is necessary to the survey of these forms, exercising and fitting us, like the preparatory part of the mysteries, for the vision of these splendid beings. Nor must we by this wandering understand, as we have before observed, a merely logical discursus about matters of opinion, but the whole of dialectic, which Plato in the Republic calls the defensive inclosure of disciplines, and which, in the evolutions of arguments, exercises us to the more accurate intellect of immaterial and separate natures.

Nor must we wonder, says Proclus, that Plato calls scientific theory wandering: for it is so denominated with reference to pure intelligence, and the simple apprehension of intelligibles. And what wonder is it, says he, if Plato calls a progression of this kind wandering, since some of those posterior to him have not refused to denominate the variety of intellects in intellect a wandering; for though the intelligence in intellect is immutable, yet it is at the same time one and multiplied, through the multitude of intelligibles. And why is it requisite to speak concerning intellect, since those who energize in the highest perfection from a divine afflatus, are accustomed to speak of the wanderings of the Gods themselves, not only of those in the heavens, but also of those that are denominated intellectual; obscurely signifying by this their progression, their being present to all secondary natures, and their prolific providence as far as to the last of things. For they say that every thing which proceeds into multitude wanders; but that the inerratic alone subsists in the stable and uniform. Wandering, indeed, appears to signify four things, either a multitude of energies, though they may all subsist together, or a transitive multitude, like the intellects of the soul, or a multitude proceeding from opposites to opposites, or a multitude of disordered motions. The dialectic exercise is called a wandering according to the third of these, in consequence of proceeding through opposite hypotheses. So that if there is any thing which energizes according to one immutable energy, this is truly inerratic.

<sup>1</sup> It appears to me, says Proclus, to be well said by the ancients that Plato has given perfection in this dialogue to the writings both of Zeno and Parmenides, producing the dialectic exercise of the former to both opposites, and elevating the theory of the latter to true being. We shall find, therefore, the perfection of the writings of Parmenides in the following part of this dialogue, which contains nine hypotheses concerning *the one*; but we may perceive the perfection of Zeno's writings in what is now said. In addition, therefore, to what we have already delivered respecting the dialectic of Zeno in the preceding Introduction, we shall subjoin from Proclus the following observations. The discourse of Zeno having supposed the multitude of forms separate from *the one*, collects the absurdities which follow from this hypothesis, and this by considering what

likewise what will result from supposing that *it is not*, if you wish to be more exercised in this affair. How do you mean <sup>1</sup> (said Socrates)? As if (said Parmenides)

what follows, and what follows and does not follow: for he collects that they are similar and not similar; and proceeds in a similar manner respecting *the one* and the many, motion and permanency. Parmenides, however, thinks it fit that in dialectic investigations it should not only be supposed if *the one* is, but also if it is not, and to speculate what will happen from this hypothesis; as, for instance, not only if similitude is, but also if it is not, what will happen, either as consequent, or as not consequent, or as consequent and at the same time not consequent. But his reason for making such an addition is this: if we only suppose that a thing is, and discover what will be the consequence of the hypothesis, we shall not entirely discover that of which the thing supposed is essentially the cause; but if we can demonstrate in addition to this, that if it is not, this very same thing will no longer follow which was the consequence of its being supposed to have a subsistence, then it becomes evident to us that if the one is, the other is also.

Some

<sup>1</sup> Socrates not being able to apprehend the whole method synoptically delivered, through what has been previously said, requests Parmenides to unfold it more clearly. Parmenides accordingly again gives a specimen of this method logically and synoptically: comprehending in eight the four and twenty modes which we have already mentioned in the Introduction to this dialogue. For, he assumes, if it happens, and if it follows and does not follow, and both these conjoined; so that again we may thus be able to triple the eight modes. But let us concisely consider, with Proclus, these eight modes in the hypothesis of Zeno:—If, then, the many have a subsistence, there will simply happen to the many with respect to themselves to be separated, not to be principles, to subsist dissimilarly. But to the many with respect to *the one* there will happen, to be comprehended by *the one*, to be generated by it, and to participate of similitude and union from it. To *the one* there will happen, to have dominion over the many, to be participated by them, to subsist prior to them; and this with respect to the many. But to *the one* with respect to itself there will happen the impartible, the unmultiplied, that which is better than being, and life, and knowledge; and every thing of this kind.

Again, if the many is not, there will happen to the many with respect to themselves the unseparated and the undivided from each other: but to the many with respect to *the one*, a subsistence unproceeding from *the one*, a privation of difference with respect to *the one*. To *the one* with respect to itself there will happen the possession of nothing efficacious and perfect in its own nature; for if it possessed any thing of this kind it would generate the many. To *the one* with respect to the many, not to be the leader of multitude, and not to operate any thing in the many.

Hence, we may conclude, that *the one* is every where that which makes multitude to be one thing, is the cause of, and has dominion over, multitude. And here you may see that the transition is from the object of investigation to its cause; for such is *the one*. It is requisite, therefore, that always after many discussions and hypotheses there should be a certain summary deduction, (*κεφαλαιουμενον*.) For thus Plato, through all the intellectual conceptions, shows that *the one* gives subsistence to all things, and to the unities in beings, which we say is the end of the dialogue.

Parmenides) you should wish to exercise yourself in this hypothesis of Zeno, *if there are many things*, what ought to happen both to *the many* with reference to themselves, and to *the one*; and to *the one* with respect to itself, and to *the many*: and again, *if many are not*, to consider what will happen both to *the one* and to *the many*, as well to themselves as to each other. And again, if he should suppose *if similitude*<sup>1</sup> *is*, or *if it is not*, what will happen from

Some one, however, may probably inquire how it is possible for any thing to happen to that which is not. And how can that be the recipient of any thing which has no subsistence whatever? To this we reply, that *non-being*, as we learn in the Sophista, is either that which in no respect has a subsistence (το μηδαμην μηδαμως εν), or it is privation, for by itself it is not, but has an accidental being; or it is matter, for this is not, as being formless, and naturally indefinite; or it is every thing material, as that which has an apparent being, but properly is not; or, further still, it is every thing sensible, for this is continually conversant with generation and corruption, but never truly is. Prior to these, also, there is non-being in souls, according to which they are likewise said to be the first of generated natures, and not to belong to those true beings which rank in intelligibles. And prior to souls, there is the non-being in intelligibles themselves, and this is the first *difference* of beings, as we are taught by the Sophista, and which as we there learn is not less than being itself. Lastly, beyond all these is the non-being of that which is prior to being, which is the cause of all beings, and is exempt from the multitude which they contain. If, therefore, non-being may be predicated in so many ways, it is evident that what has not in any respect being, can never become the subject of hypothesis: for it is not possible to speak of this, nor to have any knowledge of it, as the Eleatean guest in the Sophista shows, confirming the assertion of Parmenides concerning it. But when we say that the many is not, or that *the one* is not, or that soul is not, we so make the negation, as that each of these is something else, but is not that particular thing, the being of which we deny. And thus the hypothesis does not lead to that which in no respect has a subsistence, but to that which partly is, and partly is not: for, in short, negations are the progeny of intellectual difference. Hence, a thing is not a horse, because it is another thing; and, through this, it is not man, because it is something else. And Plato in the Sophista on this account says, that when we say non-being, we only assert an ablation of being, but not the contrary to being, meaning by contrary, that which is most distant from being, and which perfectly falls from it. So that when we say a thing is not, we do not introduce that which in no respect has a being, nor when we make non-being the subject of hypothesis do we suppose that which is in no respect is, but we signify as much of non-being as is capable of being known and expressed by words.—For an account of the Eleatic method of reasoning which Plato here delivers, see the Introduction to this dialogue.

<sup>1</sup> If similitude is, says Proclus, there will happen to itself with respect to itself, the monadic, the perpetual, the prolific, and the primary. But, with respect to sensibles, the assimilation of them to intelligibles, the not suffering them to fall into the place of dissimilitude, and the conjunction of parts with their wholenesses. To sensibles with respect to themselves there will hap-

from each hypothesis, both to the things supposed and to others, and to themselves and to each other; and the same method of proceeding must take place concerning *the dissimilar, motion*<sup>1</sup> and *permanency, generation*

pen, a communion with each other, a participation of, and a rejoicing in, each other. For similars rejoice in, are copassive, and are mingled with similars. But with respect to similitude there will happen a participation of it, an assimilation with, and union according to, it.

But if similitude is not, there will happen to itself according to itself the unessential, the neither possessing prolific power, nor a primary essence. But with respect to others not to have dominion over them, not to make them similar to themselves according to form, but rather in conjunction with itself to take away the similar which is in them; for the principle of similars not having a subsistence, neither will these be similar. But to sensibles with respect to themselves there will happen the immovable, the unmingled, the unsympathetic. But with respect to it, neither to be fashioned by form according to it, nor to be connected by it.

In like manner we say with respect to the dissimilar. For if dissimilitude is, there will happen to itself with respect to itself to be a form pure, immaterial and uniform, possessing multitude together with unity; but with respect to other things, I mean sensibles, a cause of the definite circumscription and division in each. To other things with respect to themselves there will happen, that each will preserve its proper idiom and form without confusion; but with respect to it, to be suspended from it, and to be adorned both according to wholes and parts by it. But if dissimilitude is not, it will neither be a pure and immaterial form, nor, in short, one and not one, nor will it possess, with respect to other things, a cause of the separate essence of each; and other things will possess an all-various confusion in themselves, and will not be the participants of one power which gives separation to wholes.

From these things, therefore, we collect that similitude is the cause of communion, sympathy, and commixture to sensibles; but dissimilitude of separation, production according to form, and unconfused purity of powers in themselves. For these things follow the positions of similitude and dissimilitude, but the contraries of these from their being taken away.

<sup>1</sup> If motion is, there will happen to itself with respect to itself the eternal, and the possession of infinite power; but to itself, with respect to things which are here, to be motive of them, the vivific, the cause of progression, and of various energies. But to these things with respect to themselves there will happen, the energetic, the vivific, the mutable; for every thing material passes from a subsistence in capacity, to a subsistence in energy. To other things with respect to motion there will happen, to be perfected by it, to partake of its power, to be assimilated through it to things eternally stable. For things which are incapable of obtaining good stably, participate of it through motion.

But if motion is not, it will be inefficacious, sluggish, and without power; it will not be a cause of things which are here; will be void of motive powers, and a producing essence. And things which are here will be uncoordinated, indefinite and imperfect, first motion not having a subsistence.

In like manner with respect to permanency, if it is, there will happen to itself with reference

*tion*<sup>1</sup> and *corruption, being and non-being*: and, in one word, concerning every

to itself, the stable, the eternal, and the uniform. But to other things with respect to themselves, that each will abide in its proper boundaries, and will be firmly established in the same places or measures. To other things with respect to it there will happen, to be every way bounded and subdued by it, and to partake of stability in being. But if it is not, there will happen to itself with respect to itself, the inefficacious, and the unstable. To itself with reference to other things, not to afford them the stable, the secure, and the firm; but to other things with respect to themselves the much wandering, the unestablished, the imperfect, and the being deprived of habitation; and to other things with respect to it, neither to be subservient to its measures, nor to partake of being according to it, but to be borne along in a perfectly disordered manner, that which connects and establishes them, not having a subsistence. Motion itself, therefore, is the supplier of efficacious power, and multiform life and energy; but permanency, of firmness and stability, and an establishment in proper boundaries.

<sup>1</sup> Let us now consider, says Proclus, prior to these, whence generation and corruption originate, and if the causes of these are to be placed in ideas. Or is not this indeed necessary, not only because these rank among things perpetual (for neither is it possible for generation not to be, nor for corruption to be entirely dissolved, but it is necessary that these should subsist with each other in the universe, so far as it is perpetual) but this is also requisite, because generation participates of essence and being, but corruption of non-being. For every thing so far as it is generated is referred to essence, and partakes of being, but so far as it is corrupted, it is referred to non-being, and a mutation of the *is* to another form. For through this it is corrupted from one thing into another, because non-being presubsists which gives division to forms. And as in intelligibles, non-being is not less than being, as is asserted by the Eleatean guest, so here corruption is not less than generation, nor does it less contribute to the perfection of the universe. And as there, that which participates of being enjoys also non-being, and non-being partakes of being, so here that which is in generation, or in passing into being, is also the recipient of corruption, and that which is corrupting, of generation. Being, therefore, and non-being, are the causes of generation and corruption.

But it is requisite to exercise ourselves after the same manner with respect to these. In the first place, then, if generation is, it is in itself imperfect, and is the cause to others of an assimilation to essence. But there will happen to other things with respect to themselves, a mutation from each other: and to other things with respect to generation, there will happen a perpetual participation of it, in consequence of its subsisting in them. But if generation is not, it will be itself, not the object of opinion; and with respect to other things it will not be the form of any thing, nor the cause of order and perfection to any thing; but other things will be unbegotten and impassive; and will have no communion with it, nor participate through it of being.

In like manner with respect to corruption: If corruption is, there will happen to itself with respect to itself, the never failing, infinite power, and a fullness of non-being; but to itself with respect to other things, the giving measure to being, and the cause of perpetual generation. But to other things with respect to themselves, there will happen a flowing into each other, and an inability of connecting themselves. And to other things with respect to corruption there will

every thing which is supposed either to be <sup>1</sup> or not to be, or influenced in any manner by any other passion, it is necessary to consider the consequences

happen, to be perpetually changed by it, to have non-being conjoined with being, and to participate of corruption totally. But if corruption is not, there will happen to itself with respect to itself, that it will not be subvertive of itself; for not having a subsistence, it will subvert itself with respect to other things. To itself, with reference to other things there will happen, that it will not dissipate them, nor change them into each other, nor dilacerate being and essence. To other things with respect to themselves there will happen, the not being changed into each other, the not being passive to each other, and that each will preserve the same order. But to other things with respect to it there will happen, the not being passive to it. The peculiarity, therefore, of generation is to move to being, but of corruption to lead from being. For this we infer from the preceding hypotheses, since it has appeared to us that admitting their existence, they are the causes of being and non-being to other things; and that being subverted they introduce a privation of motion and mutation.

<sup>1</sup> We engage, says Proclus, in the investigation of things in a twofold respect, contemplating at one time if a thing is or is not, and at another time, if this particular thing is present with it, or is not present, as in the inquiry if the soul is immortal. For here we must not only consider all that happens to the thing supposed, with respect to itself and other things, and to other things with respect to the thing supposed, but also what happens with reference to subsistence and non-subsistence. Thus, for instance, if the soul is immortal, its virtue will have a connate life, sufficient to felicity; and this will happen to itself with respect to itself. But to itself with respect to other things there will happen, to use them as instruments, to provide for them separately, to impart life to them. In the second place, to other things with respect to themselves there will happen, that things living and dead will be generated from each other, the possession of an adventitious immortality, the circle of generation; but to other things with respect to it, to be adorned by it, to participate of a certain self-motion, and to be suspended from it, in living.

But if the soul is not immortal, it will not be self-motive, it will not be intellectual essentially, it will not be self-vital; nor will its disciplines be reminiscences. It will be corrupted by its own proper evil, and will not have a knowledge of true beings. And these things will happen to itself with respect to itself. But to itself with respect to others there will happen, to be mingled with bodies and material natures, to have no dominion over itself, to be incapable of leading others as it pleases, to be subservient to the temperament of bodies; and all its life will be corporeal, and conversant with generation. To other things with respect to themselves there will happen, such a habit as that which consists from cuntelecheia and body. For there will alone be animals composed from an indefinite life and bodies. But to other things with respect to it there will happen, to be the leaders of it, to change it together with their own motions, and to possess it in themselves, and not externally governing them, and to live in conjunction with and not from it. You see, therefore, that after this manner we discover by the dialectic art the mode, not only how we may be able to suppose if a thing is and is not, but any other passion which it may suffer, such as the being immortal or not immortal.

quences both to itself and to each individual of other things, which you may select for this purpose, and towards many, and towards all things in a similar manner; and again, how other things are related to themselves, and to another which you establish, whether you consider that which is the  
subject

Since, however we may consider the relation of one thing to another variously; for we may either consider it with reference to one thing only, as for instance, how similitude, if it is supposed to be, subsists with respect to dissimilitude; or, we may consider it with respect to more than one thing, as for instance, how essence, if supposed to be, is with reference to permanency and motion; or with respect to all things, as, if *the one* is, how it subsists with reference to all things,—this being the case, Plato does not omit this, but adds, That it is requisite to consider the consequences with respect to one thing only, which you may select for this purpose, and towards many, and towards all things in a similar manner.

It is necessary indeed that this one, or those many should be allied to the thing proposed, for instance, as the similar to the dissimilar: for these are coordinate to each other. And motion and rest to essence: for these are contained in and subsist about it. But if the difference with respect to another thing, is with respect to one thing, to many things, and to all things, and we say there are twenty four modes, assuming in one way only a subsistence with reference to another, this is not wonderful. For difference with respect to another thing pertains to matter; but we propose to deliver the form of the dialectic method, and the formal but not the material differences which it contains.

Observe, too, that Plato adds, that the end of this exercise is the perception of truth. We must not, therefore, consider him as simply speaking of scientific truth, but of that which is intelligible, or which in other words, subsists according to a superessential characteristic: for the whole of our life is an exercise to the vision of this, and the wandering through dialectic hastens to that as its port. Hence Plato in a wonderful manner uses the word *διόφρασθαι* to look through: for souls obtain the vision of intelligibles through many mediums.

But again, that the method may become perspicuous to us from another example, let us investigate the four-and-twenty modes in providence. If then providence is, there will follow to itself with respect to itself, the beneficent, the infinitely powerful, the efficacious; but there will not follow, the subversion of itself, the privation of counsel, the unwilling. That which follows and does not follow is, that it is one and not one. There will follow to itself with respect to other things, to govern them, to preserve every thing, to possess the beginning and the end of all things, and to bound the whole of sensibles. That which does not follow is, to injure the objects of its providential care, to supply that which is contrary to expectation, to be the cause of disorder. There will follow and not follow, the being present to all things, and an exemption from them; the knowing and not knowing them: for it knows them in a different manner, and not with powers coordinate to the things known. There will follow to other things with respect to themselves, to suffer nothing casually from each other, and that nothing will be injured by any thing. There will not follow, that any thing pertaining to them will be from  
fortune,

subject of your hypothesis as having a subsistence or as not subsisting; if, being perfectly exercised, you design through proper media to perceive the truth.

That Socrates then said, You speak, O Parmenides, of an employment which it is impossible to accomplish, nor do I very much understand what you mean; but why do you not establish a certain hypothesis yourself, and enter on its discussion, that I may be the better instructed in this affair?

fortune, and the being uncoordinated with each other. There will follow and not follow, that all things are good; for this will partly pertain to them and partly not. To other things with respect to it there will follow, to be suspended from it, on all sides to be guarded and benefited by it. There will not follow, an opposition to it, and the possibility of escaping it. For there is nothing so small that it can be concealed from it, nor so elevated that it cannot be vanquished by it. There will follow and not follow, that every thing will participate of providence: for in one respect they partake of it, and in another not of it, but of the goods which are imparted to every thing from it.

But let providence not have a subsistence, again there will follow to itself with respect to itself, the imperfect, the unprolific, the inefficacious, a subsistence for itself alone. There will not follow, the unenvying, the transcendently full, the sufficient, the assiduous. There will follow and not follow, the unfolicitous, and the undisturbed: for in one respect these will be present with that which does not providentially energize, and in another respect will not, in consequence of secondary natures not being governed by it. But it is evident that there will follow to itself with respect to other things, the unmingled, the privation of communion with all things, the not knowing any thing. There will not follow, the assimilating other things to itself, and the imparting to all things the good that is fit. There will follow and not follow, the being desirable to other things: for this in a certain respect is possible and not possible. For, if it should be said, that through a transcendency exempt from all things, it does not providentially energize, nothing hinders but that it may be an object of desire to all secondary natures; but yet, considered as deprived of this power, it will not be desirable. To other things with respect to themselves there will follow, the unadorned, the casual, the indefinite in passivity, the reception of many things adventitious in their natures, the being carried in a confused and disordered manner. There will not follow, an allotment with respect to one thing, a distribution according to merit, and a subsistence according to intellect. There will follow and not follow, the being good: for, so far as they are beings, they must necessarily be good: and yet, providence not having a subsistence, it cannot be said whence they possess good. But to other things with respect to providence there will follow, the not being passive to it, and the being uncoordinated with respect to it. There will not follow, the being measured and bounded by it. There will follow and not follow, the being ignorant of it: for it is necessary they should know that it is not, if it is not. And it is also necessary that they should not know it; for there is nothing common to them with respect to providence.

That

That Parmenides replied, You assign, O Socrates, a mighty labour<sup>1</sup> to a man so old as myself! Will you, then, O Zeno (said Socrates), discuss something

<sup>1</sup> By this Plato indicates that the ensuing discourse contains much truth, as Proclus well observes: and if you consider it with relation to the soul, you may say that it is not proper for one who is able to perceive intellectually divine natures, to energize through the garrulous phantasy and body, but such a one should abide in his elevated place of survey, and in his peculiar manners. It is laborious, therefore, for him who lives intellectually to energize logically and imaginatively, and for him who is converted to himself, to direct his attention to another; and to simplicity of knowledge the variety of reasons is arduous. It is also laborious to an old man to swim through such a sea of arguments. The assertion also has much truth, if the subjects themselves are considered. For frequently universal canons are easily apprehended, but no small difficulty presents itself to those that endeavour to use them; as is evident in the lemmas of geometry, which are founded on universal assertions. Proclus adds, that the difficulty of this dialectic method in the use of it is evident, from no one after Plato having professedly written upon it; and on this account, says he, we have endeavoured to illustrate it by so many examples.

For the sake of the truly philosophic reader, therefore, I shall subjoin the following specimen of the dialectic method, in addition to what has been already delivered on the subject. The importance of such illustrations, and the difficulty with which the composition of them is attended, will, I doubt not, be a sufficient apology for its appearing in this place. It is extracted, as well as the preceding, from the admirable MS. commentary of Proclus on this dialogue.

Let it then be proposed to consider the consequences of admitting or denying the perpetual existence of soul.

*If then soul always is, the consequences to itself, with respect to itself, are, the self-motive, the self-vital, and the self-subsistent: but the things which do not follow to itself with respect to itself, are, the destruction of itself, the being perfectly ignorant, and knowing nothing of itself. The consequences which follow and do not follow are the indivisible and the divisible\*, (for in a certain respect it is divisible, and in a certain respect indivisible), perpetuity and non-perpetuity of being; for so far as it communicates with intellect, it is eternal, but so far as it verges to a corporeal nature, it is mutable.*

Again, *if soul is, the consequences to itself with respect to other things, i. e. bodies, are communication of motion, the connecting of bodies, as long as it is present with them, together with dominion over bodies, according to nature. That which does not follow, is to move externally; for it is the property of animated natures to be moved inwardly; and to be the cause of rest and immutability to bodies. The consequences which follow and do not follow, are, to be present to bodies, and yet to be present separate from them; for soul is present to them, by its providential energies, but is exempt from them by its essence, because this is incorporeal. And this is the first hexad.*

The second hexad is as follows: *if soul is, the consequence to other things, i. e. bodies with respect to themselves, is sympathy; for, according to a vivific cause, bodies sympathize with each other.*

\* For soul, according to Plato, subsists between intellect and a corporeal nature; the former of which is perfectly indivisible, and the latter perfectly divisible.

But

something for us? And then Pythodorus related that Zeno, laughing, said—  
We must request Parmenides, O Socrates, to engage in this undertaking;  
for,

*But that which does not follow, is the non-sensitive; for, in consequence of there being such a thing as soul, all things must necessarily be sensitive: some things peculiarly so, and others as parts of the whole. The consequences which follow and do not follow to bodies with respect to themselves are, that in a certain respect they move themselves, through being animated, and in a certain respect do not move themselves: for there are many modes of self-motion.*

Again, *if soul is, the consequences to bodies with respect to soul are, to be moved internally and vivified by soul, to be preserved and connected through it, and to be entirely suspended from it. The consequences which do not follow are, to be dissipated by soul, and to be filled from it with a privation of life; for bodies receive from soul life and connection. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, that bodies participate, and do not participate of soul; for so far as soul is present with bodies, so far they may be said to participate of soul; but so far as it is separate from them, so far they do not participate of soul. And this forms the second hexad.*

The third hexad is as follows: *if soul is not, the consequences to itself with respect to itself are, the non-vital, the unessential, and the non-intellectual; for, not having any subsistence, it has neither essence, nor life, nor intellect. The consequences which do not follow are, the ability to preserve itself, to give subsistence to, and be motive of, itself, with every thing else of this kind. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, the unknown and the irrational. For not having a subsistence, it is in a certain respect unknown and irrational with respect to itself, as neither reasoning nor having any knowledge of itself; but in another respect, it is neither irrational nor unknown, if it is considered as a certain nature, which is not rational, nor endued with knowledge.*

Again, *if soul is not, the consequences which follow to itself with respect to bodies are, to be unprolific of them, to be unmingled with, and to employ no providential energies about, them. The consequences which do not follow are, to move, vivify, and connect bodies. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, that it is different from bodies, and that it does not communicate with them. For this in a certain respect is true, and not true; if that which is not soul is considered as having indeed a being, but unconnected with soul: for thus it is different from bodies, since these are perpetually connected with soul. And again, it is not different from bodies, so far as it has no subsistence, and is not. And this forms the third hexad.*

In the fourth place, then, *if soul is not, the consequences to bodies with respect to themselves are, the immovable, privation of difference according to life, and the privation of sympathy to each other. The consequences which do not follow are, a sensible knowledge of each other, and to be moved from themselves. That which follows and does not follow is, to be passive to each other; for in one respect they would be passive, and in another not; since they would be alone corporally and not vitally passive.*

Again, *if soul is not, the consequences to other things with respect to it are, not to be taken care of, nor to be moved by soul. The consequences which do not follow are, to be vivified and connected by soul. The consequences which follow and do not follow are, to be assimilated and not assimilated*

for, as he says, it is no trifling matter; or do you not see the prodigious labour of such a discussion? If, therefore, many<sup>1</sup> were present, it would not

to soul: for, so far as soul having no subsistence, neither will bodies subsist, so far they will be assimilated to soul; for they will suffer the same with it; but so far as it is impossible for that which is not to be similar to any thing, so far bodies will have no similitude to soul. And this forms the fourth and last hexad.

Hence we conclude, that *soul* is the cause of life, sympathy, and motion to bodies; and, in short, of their being and preservation: for soul subsisting, these are at the same time introduced; but not subsisting, they are at the same time taken away.

<sup>1</sup> It is unnecessary to observe, that the most divine of dogmas are unadapted to the ears of the many, since Plato himself says that all these things are ridiculous to the multitude, but thought worthy of admiration by the wise. Thus also, says Proclus, the Pythagoreans assert, that of discourses, some are mystical, and others to be exposed in open day; and the Peripatetics, that some are esoteric, and others exoteric; and Parmenides himself wrote some things according to truth, and others according to opinion; and Zeno calls some discourses true, and others useful. *Ὅντων δὲ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγορῆοι τῶν λόγων, τοὺς μὲν ἐφασκόν εἶναι μυστικούς, τοὺς δὲ ὑπαιθρίους, καὶ οἱ ἐκ τοῦ περιπατοῦ, τοὺς μὲν ἐσωτερικούς, τοὺς δὲ ἐξωτερικούς, καὶ αὐτὸς Παρμενίδης, τὰ μὲν πρὸς ἀληθειαν ἐγράψεν, τὰ δὲ πρὸς δόξαν, καὶ ὁ Ζήνων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀληθεῖς ἐκαλεῖ τῶν λόγων, τοὺς δὲ χρειωδεῖς.*

The multitude therefore, says Proclus, are ignorant how great the power is of dialectic, and that the end of this wandering is truth and intellect. For it is not possible for us to recur from things last to such as are first, except by a progression through the middle forms of life. For, as our descent into the realms of mortality was effected through many media, the soul always proceeding into that which is more composite, in like manner our ascent must be accomplished through various media, the soul resolving her composite order of life. In the first place, therefore, it is requisite to despise the senses, as able to know nothing accurate, nothing sane, but possessing much of the confused, the material, and the passive; in consequence of employing certain instruments of this kind. After this it follows, that we should dismiss imaginations, those winged stymphalidæ of the soul, as alone possessing a *figured* intellect of things, but by no means able to apprehend unfigured and impartible form, and as impeding the pure and immaterial intellect of the soul, by intervening and disturbing it in its investigations. In the third place, we must entirely extirpate multiform opinions, and the wandering of the soul about these; for they are not conversant with the causes of things, nor do they procure for us science, nor the participation of a separate intellect. In the fourth place, therefore, we must hastily return to the great sea of the sciences, and there, by the assistance of dialectic, survey the divisions and compositions of these, and, in short, the variety of forms in the soul, and through this survey, unwaving our vital order, behold our dianoëtic part. After this, in the fifth place, it is requisite to separate ourselves from composition, and contemplate by intellectual energy true beings: for intellect is more excellent than science; and a life according to intellect is preferable to that which is according to science. Many, therefore, are the wanderings of the soul: for one of these is in imaginations, another in opinions, and a third in the dianoëtic power. But a life according to intellect is

not be proper to make such a request; for it is unbecoming, especially for an old man, to discourse about things of this kind before many witnesses. For the many are ignorant that, without this discursive progression and wandering through all things, it is impossible, by acquiring the truth, to obtain the possession of intellect. I, therefore, O Parmenides, in conjunction with Socrates, beg that you would undertake a discussion, which I have not heard for a long time. But Zeno having made this request, Antiphon said that Pythodorus related that he also, and Aristotle, and the rest who were present, entreated Parmenides to exhibit that which he spoke of, and not to deny their request. That then Parmenides said, It is necessary to comply with your entreaties, though I should seem to myself to meet with the fate of the Ibycean <sup>1</sup> horse, to whom as a courser, and advanced in years, when about to contend in the chariot races, and fearing through experience for the event, Ibycus comparing himself, said—*Thus also I that am so*

is alone inerratic. And this is the mystic port of the soul, into which Homer conducts Ulysses, after an abundant wandering of life.

<sup>1</sup> Parmenides, as Proclus beautifully observes, well knew what the wandering of the soul is, not only in the senses, imaginations, and opinions, but also in the dianoëtic evolutions of arguments. Knowing this, therefore, and remembering the labours he had endured, he is afraid of again descending to such an abundant wandering; like another Ulysses, after passing through various regions, and being now in possession of his proper good, when called to certain similar barbaric battles, he is averse, through long experience, to depart from his own country, as remembering the difficulties which he sustained in war, and his long extended wandering. Having, therefore, ascended to reasoning from phantasies and the senses, and to intellect from reasoning, he is very properly afraid of a descent to reasoning, and of the wandering in the dianoëtic part, lest he should in a certain respect become oblivious, and should be drawn down to phantasy and sense. For the descent from intellect is not safe, nor is it proper to depart from things first, lest we should unconsciously abide in those of a subordinate nature. Parmenides, therefore, being now established in the port of intellect, is averse again to descend to a multitude of reasonings from an intellectual and simple form of energy. At the same time, however, he does descend for the sake of benefitting secondary natures; for the very grace (*χαρις*) itself is an imitation of the providence of the Gods. Such, therefore, ought the descents of divine souls from the intelligible to be, coming from divine natures, knowing the evils arising from wandering, and descending for the benefit alone of fallen souls, and not to fill up a life enamoured with generation, nor falling profoundly, nor agglutinating themselves to the indefinite forms of life. I only add, that Ibycus, from whom Parmenides borrows his simile of a horse, was a Rheginensian poet, and is mentioned by Cicero in *Tuscul. Quæstion. lib. 4.* Pausan. *Corinth. lib. 2.* Suidas and Erasmus in *Adagiis.* There are also two epigrams upon him in the *Anthologia.*

*old,*

*old, am compelled to return to the subjects of my love*; in like manner, I appear to myself to dread vehemently the present undertaking, when I call to mind the manner in which it is requisite to swim over such, and so great a sea of discourse: but yet it is necessary to comply, especially as it is the request of Zeno, for we are one and the same. Whence then shall we begin<sup>1</sup>; and what shall we first of all suppose? Are you willing, since it seems we must play a very serious game, that I should begin from myself, and my own<sup>2</sup> hypothesis, supposing concerning *the one itself, whether the one*

<sup>1</sup> Parmenides, says Proclus, descending to the evolution of arguments, and to scientifically-discursive energies from his intellectual place of survey, and from a form of life without, to one with habitude, asks his participants whence he shall begin, and from what hypothesis he shall frame, his discourse; not suspending his intellect from their judgment; for it is not lawful that the energy of more excellent natures should be measured from that of such as are subordinate; but converting them to himself, and exciting them to a perception of his meaning, that he may not infer arguments in the stupid, as nature implants productive principles in bodies, but that he may lead them to themselves, and that they may be impelled to *being* in conjunction with him. For thus intellect leads souls, not only elevating them together with itself, but preparing them to assist themselves. He exhorts, therefore, his participants to attend to themselves, and to behold whence he begins, and through what media he proceeds, but does not seek to learn from them what is proper on the occasion. That this is the case is evident from hence, that he does not wait for their answer, but discourses from that which appears to him to be best.

<sup>2</sup> The one method of Parmenides assumes one hypothesis, and according to it frames the whole discourse, this hypothesis not being one of many, as it may appear to some, but that which is comprehensive of all hypotheses, and is one prior to the many. For it unfolds all beings, and the whole order of things, both intelligible and sensible, together with the unities of them, and the one ineffable unity, the fountain of all these. For *the one* is the cause of all things, and from this all things are generated in a consequent order from the hypothesis of Parmenides. But perhaps, says Proclus, some one may ask us how Parmenides, who in his poems sings concerning true or the one being, (*το εν ον*), calls *the one* his hypothesis, and says that he shall begin from this his proper principle. Some then have said that, Parmenides making *being* the whole subject of his discussion, Plato, finding that *the one* is beyond being and all essence, corrects Parmenides, and represents him beginning from *the one*. For, say they, as Gorgias and Protagoras, and each of the other persons in his dialogues, speak better in those dialogues than in their own writings, so, likewise, Parmenides is more philosophic in Plato, and more profound, than in his own compositions; since in the former he says, if *the one* is, it is not *one being*, as alone discoursing concerning *the one*, and not concerning *one being*, or *being* characterized by *the one*; and in the following hypotheses he says, if *the one* is not; and lastly, infers that if *the one* is, or is not, all things are, and are not. Parmenides, therefore, being Platonic, calls that his hypothesis which supposes

*one is, or whether it is not*, what ought to be the consequence? That Zeno said, By all means. Who then (said Parmenides) will answer to me? Will the

*the one*. In answer to this it may be said that it is by no means wonderful if Parmenides in his poems appears to assert nothing concerning *the one*: for it is ineffable, and he in his poems generates all beings from the first being; but he might indicate something concerning it, so far as this can be effected by discourse, in his unwritten conversations with Zeno. Very properly, therefore, does he call this business concerning *the one* his own hypothesis. Proclus adds—if, however, it be requisite to speak more truly, we may say, with our preceptor Syrianus, that Parmenides begins indeed from *one being*; (for the hypothesis, if *the one is*, having the *is* together with *the one*, belongs to this order of things); but that he recurs from one being to *the one*, clearly showing that *the one*, properly so called, wills this alone, to be *the one*, and hastily withdraws itself from being. He also shows that *one being* is the second from this, proceeding to being through subjection, but that *the one* itself is better than the *is*, and that if it *is*, together with the *is*, it no longer remains that which is properly *the one*. Hence, it is true that Parmenides makes *true being*, or *the one being*, the subject of his hypothesis, and also, that through this hypothesis he ascends to *the one* itself, which Plato in the Republic denominates unhypothetic: for it is necessary, says he, always to proceed through hypotheses, that ascending, we may at length end in the unhypothetic one; since every hypothesis is from a certain other principle. But if any one should make the hypothesis the principle, we may say to such a one, with Plato, that where the principle is unknown, and the end and middle also consist from things that are unknown, it is not possible that a thing of this kind can be science. *The one* alone, therefore, is the principle, and is unhypothetic; so that what is made the subject of hypothesis is something else, and not *the one*. But Plato ascends from this to *the one*, as from hypothesis to that which is unhypothetic. Whence also it appears that the manner in which Parmenides manages the discourse is admirable. For, if he had assumed the unhypothetic as an hypothesis, and that which is without a principle as from a principle, he would not have followed the method which says it is entirely necessary to consider what is consequent to the hypothesis. Or, if he had not assumed *the one* as an hypothesis, but some one of the things more remote from *the one*, he could not easily have made a transition to it, nor would he have unfolded to us spontaneously and without violence the cause prior to being. That *the one*, therefore, might remain unhypothetic, and that at the same time he might recur from a certain proper hypothesis to *the one*, he makes *the one being* the subject of his hypothesis, which proximately subsists after *the one*, and in which, perhaps, that which is properly *the one* primarily subsists, as we shall show at the end of the first hypothesis of this dialogue. And thus he says that he begins from his own hypothesis, which is *the one being*, and this is, “if *the one is*,” and transferring himself to the unhypothetic, which is near to this, he unfolds the subsistence of all beings from the unity which is exempt from all things. Whence, saying that he shall make his own one the subject of hypothesis, in evincing what things follow, and what do not follow, at one time as using *the one* alone, he demonstrates the *is*, employing affirmations; but at another time he assumes, together with *the one*, the conception of the *is*. But he every  
where

the youngest among you do this? For the labour will be very little for him to answer what he thinks; and his answer will at the same time afford me a time for breathing in this arduous investigation. That then Aristotle said, I am prepared to attend you, O Parmenides; for you may call upon me as being the youngest. Ask me, therefore, as one who will answer you.

That Parmenides said, Let us then begin. If *one*<sup>1</sup> is, is it not true that  
*the*

where reasons as looking to *the one*, either unparticipated, or participated, that he may show that all things are through *the one*, and that separate from *the one*, they and their very being are obliterated.

<sup>1</sup> In the Introduction to this Dialogue we have spoken concerning the number, and unfolded the meaning of the hypothesis about *the one*; let us, therefore, with Proclus, discuss a few particulars respecting principle, that we may more accurately understand the nature of *the one*. The principle, therefore, of all beings and non-beings is called *the one*, since to be united is good to all things, and is the greatest of goods; but that which is entirely separated from *the one* is evil, and the greatest of evils. For division becomes the cause of dissimilitude, and a privation of sympathy, and of a departure from a subsistence according to nature. Hence the principle of wholes, as supplying all things with the greatest of goods, is the source of union to all things, and is on this account called *the one*. Hence, too, we say that every principle, so far as it is allotted this dignity in beings, is a certain *enad* or unity, and that what is most united in every order ranks as first, placing this principle not in parts, but in wholes, and not in some one of the many, but in the monads connective of multitude; and, in the next place, especially surveying it in the summits, and that which is most united in monads, and according to which they are conjoined with *the one*, are deified, and subsist without proceeding, in the one principle of all things.

Thus, for instance, (that we may illustrate this doctrine by an example,) we perceive many causes of light, some of which are celestial, and others sublunary; for light proceeds to our terrestrial abode from material fire, from the moon, and from the other stars, and this, so as to be different according to the difference of its cause. But if we explore the one monad of all mundane light, from which other lucid natures and sources of light derive their subsistence, we shall find that it is no other than the apparent orb of the sun; for this orbicular body proceeds, as it is said, from an occult and supermundane order, and disseminates in all mundane natures a light commensurate with each.

Shall we say then that this apparent body is the principle of light? But this is endued with interval, and is divisible, and light proceeds from the different parts which it contains; but we are at present investigating the one principle of light. Shall we say, therefore, that the ruling soul of this body generates mundane light? This indeed, produces light, but not primarily, for it is itself multitude: and light contains a representation of a simple and uniform subsistence. May not intellect, therefore, which is the cause of soul, be the fountain of this light? Intellect, indeed, is more united than soul, but is not that which is properly and primarily the principle of light. It remains, therefore, that *the one* of this intellect, its summit, and as it were flower, must be the principle of mundane light: for this is properly the sun which reigns over the visible place,

*the one* will not be many? For how can it be? It is necessary, therefore, that

and, according to Plato in the Republic, is the offspring of *the good*; since every unity proceeds from thence, and every deity is the progeny of the unity of unities, and the fountain of the Gods. And as *the good* is the principle of light to intelligibles, in like manner the unity of the solar order is the principle of light to all visible natures, and is analogous to *the good*, in which it is occultly established, and from which it never departs.

But this unity having an order prior to the solar intellect, there is also in intellect, so far as intellect, an unity participated from this unity, which is emitted into it like a seed, and through which intellect is united with the unity or deity of the sun. This, too, is the case with the soul of the sun; for this through *the one* which she contains, is elevated through *the one* of intellect as a medium, to the deity of the sun. In like manner, with respect to the body of the sun, we must understand that there is in this a certain echo as it were, of the primary solar *one*. For it is necessary that the solar body should participate of things superior to itself; of soul according to the life which is disseminated in it; of intellect according to its form; and of unity according to its one, since soul participates both of intellect and this one, and participations are different from the things which are participated. You may say, therefore, that the proximate cause of the solar light is this *unity* of the solar orb.

Again, if we should investigate the root as it were of all bodies, from which celestial and sublunary bodies, wholes and parts, blossom into existence, we may not improperly say that this is *Nature*, which is the principle of motion and rest to all bodies, and which is established in them, whether they are in motion or at rest. But I mean by *Nature*, the one life of the world, which being subordinate to intellect and soul, participates through these of generation. And this indeed is more a principle than many and partial natures, but is not that which is properly the principle of bodies; for this contains a multitude of powers, and through such as are different, governs different parts of the universe: but we are now investigating the one and common principle of all bodies, and not many and distributed principles. If, therefore, we wish to discover this one principle, we must raise ourselves to that which is most united in Nature, to its flower, and that through which it is a deity, by which it is suspended from its proper fountain, connects, unites, and causes the universe to have a sympathetic consent with itself. This *one*, therefore, is the principle of all generation, and is that which reigns over the many powers of Nature, over partial natures, and universally over every thing subject to the dominion of Nature.

In the third place, if we investigate the principle of knowledge, we shall find that it is neither phantasy nor sense; for nothing impartible, immaterial, and unfigured is known by these. But neither must we say that doxastic or dianoëtic knowledge is the principle of knowledge; for opinion does not know the causes of things, and the dianoëtic power, though it knows causes, yet apprehends the objects of its perception partially, and does not view the whole at once, nor possess an energy collective and simple, and which eternally subsists according to the same. Nor yet is intellect the principle of knowledge: for all the knowledge which it contains subsists indeed, at once, and is intransitive and impartible. But if the knowledge of intellect was entirely without multiplication, and profoundly one, perhaps we might admit that it is the principle of knowledge.

that there should neither be any part belonging to it, nor that it should be a whole.

knowledge. Since however, it is not only one but various, and contains a multitude of intellections; for as the objects of intellect are separated from each other, so also intellectual conceptions,—this being the case, intellect is not the principle of knowledge, but this must be ascribed to *the one* of intellect, which is generative of all the knowledge it contains, and of all that is beheld in the secondary orders of beings. For this being exempt from the many, is the principle of knowledge to them, not being of such a nature as the sameness of intellect; since this is coordinate to *difference*, and is subordinate to essence. But *the one* transcends and is connective of an intellectual essence. Through this *one* intellect is a God, but not through sameness, nor through essence: for in short intellect so far as intellect is not a God; since otherwise a partial intellect would be a God. And the peculiarity of intellect is to understand and contemplate beings, and to judge; but of a God to confer unity, to generate, to energize providentially, and every thing of this kind. Intellect, therefore, by that part of itself which is not intellect is a God, and by that part of itself which is not a God, it is a divine intellect. And this unity of intellect knows itself indeed, so far as it is intellectual, but becomes intoxicated as it is said with nectar, and generates the whole of knowledge, so far as it is the flower of intellect, and a superessential one. Again, therefore, investigating the principle of knowledge, we have ascended to *the one*; and not in these only, but in every thing else in a similar manner, we shall find monads the leaders of their proper numbers, but the unities of monads subsisting as the most proper principles of things. For every where *the one* is a principle, and you may say concerning this principle, what Socrates says in the Phædrus, viz. “a principle is unbegotten.” For if no one of total forms can ever fail, by a much greater necessity the one principle of each must be preserved, and perpetually remain, that about this every multitude may subsist, which originates in an appropriate manner from each. It is the same thing, therefore, to say unity and principle, if principle is every where that which is most characterized by unity. Hence he who discourses about every *one*, will discourse about principles. The Pythagoreans, therefore, thought proper to call every incorporeal essence *one*; but a corporeal and in short partible essence, they denominated *other*. So that by considering *the one*, you will not deviate from the theory of incorporeal essences, and unities which rank as principles. For all the unities subsist in, and are profoundly united with each other; and their union is far greater than the communion and sameness which subsist in beings. For in these there is indeed a mutual mixture of forms, similitude and friendship, and a participation of each other; but the union of the Gods, as being a union of unities, is much more uniform, ineffable and transcendent: for here *all are in all*, which does not take place in forms or ideas\*; and their unmingled purity and the characteristic of each, in a manner far surpassing the diversity in ideas, preserve their natures unconfused, and distinguish their peculiar powers. Hence some of them are more universal, and others more partial; some of them are characterized according to permanency, others according to progression, and others according to conversion. Some again, are generative, others anagogic, or endued with a power of leading things back to their causes, and others demiurgic; and, in short, there are different

\* For in these all are in each, but not all in all.

whole<sup>2</sup>. Why? Is not a part a part of a whole? Certainly. But what  
is

characteristics of different Gods, viz. the connective, perfective, demiurgic, assimilative, and such others as are celebrated posterior to these, so that all are in all, and yet each is at the same time separate and distinct.

Indeed, Proclus adds, we obtain a knowledge of their union and characteristics from the natures by which they are participated: for, with respect to the apparent Gods, we say that there is one soul of the sun, and another of the earth, directing our attention to the apparent bodies of these divinities, which possess much variety in their essence, powers, and dignity among wholes. As, therefore, we apprehend the difference of incorporeal essences from sensible inspection, in like manner, from the variety of incorporeal essences, we are enabled to know something of the unmingled separation of the first and superessential unities, and of the characteristics of each; for each unity has a multitude suspended from its nature, which is either intelligible alone, or at the same time intelligible and intellectual, or intellectual alone; and this last is either participated or not participated, and this again is either supermundane or mundane: and thus far does the progression of the unities extend. Surveying, therefore, the extent of every incorporeal hypothesis which is distributed under them, and the mutation proceeding according to measure from the occult to that which is separated, we believe that there is also in the unities themselves idiom and order, together with union: for, from the difference of the participants, we know the separation which subsists in the things participated; since they would not possess such a difference with respect to each other if they participated the same thing without any variation. And thus much concerning the subsistence of the first unities, and their communion with, and separation from, each other, the latter of which was called by the ancient philosophers, idiom, and the former, union, contradicting them by names derived from the sameness and difference which subsist in essences. For these unities are superessential, and, as some one says, are flowers and summits. However, as they contain, as we have observed, both union and separation, Parmenides, discussing this, that he may supernally unfold all their progression from the exempt unity, the cause of all things, assumes as an hypothesis his own one. But this is *the one* which is beheld in beings, and this is beheld in one respect as *the one*, and in another as participated by being. He also preserves that which has a leading dignity, surveying it multifariously, but varies that which is consequent, that through the sameness of that which leads, he may indicate the union of the divine unities: for whichever of these you receive, you will receive the same with the rest; because all are in each other, and are rooted in *the one*. For as trees by their summits are rooted in the earth, and are earthly according to these, after the same manner, divine natures are by their summits rooted in *the one*, and each of them is an enad and one, through unconfused union with *the one*. But through the mutation of that which is consequent, Parmenides at one time assumes *whole*, at another time *figure*, and at another something else, and these either affirmatively or negatively, according to the separation and idiom of each of the divine orders. And, through that which is conjoined from *enad* and what is consequent, he indicates the communion, and at the same time unmingled purity of each of the divine natures. Hence, one thing is the leader, but many the things consequent, and many are the things conjoined, and many the hypotheses.

Parmenides,

is a whole? Is not that to which no part is wanting a whole? Entirely so.  
From

Parmenides, also, through the hypothesis of the one being, at one time recurs to *the one* which is prior to the participated unities, at another time discusses the extent of the unities which are in beings, and at another time discovers that subsistence of them which is subordinate to being.

Nor must we wonder that there should be this union, and at the same time separation, in the divine unities. For thus also we are accustomed to call the whole of an intellectual essence impartible and one, and all intellects one, and one all, through sameness which is collective and connective of every intellectual hypostasis. But if we thus speak concerning these, what ought we to think of the unities in beings? Must it not be that they are transcendently united? that their commixture cannot be surpassed? that they do not proceed from the ineffable adytum of *the one*? and that they all possess the form of *the one*? Every where, therefore, things first possess the form of their cause. Thus, the first of bodies is most vital, and is similar to soul; the first of souls has the form of intellect; and the first intellect is a God. So that the first of numbers is uniform and enadic, or characterized by unity, and is superessential as *the one*. Hence, if they are unities and number, there is there both multitude and union.

Again, the scope of this first hypothesis, as we have observed in the Introduction, is concerning the first God alone, so far as he is generative of the multitude of Gods, being himself exempt from this multitude, and uncoordinated with his offspring. Hence, all things are denied of this one, as being established above, and exempt from, all things, and as scattering all the idioms of the Gods, at the same time that he is uncircumscribed by all things. For he is not a certain one, but simply one, and is neither intelligible nor intellectual, but the source of the subsistence of both the intelligible and intellectual unities. For it is requisite in every order which ranks as a principle that imparticipable and primary form should be the leader of participated multitude. Thus, immaterial are prior to material forms. Thus, too, a separate life, unmingled, and subsisting from itself, is prior to the life which subsists in another; for every where things subsisting in themselves precede those which give themselves up to something else. Hence, imparticipable soul, which revolves in the supercelestial place, is the leader, according to essence, of the multitude of souls, and of those which are distributed in bodies. And one, imparticipable intellect, separate, eternally established in itself, and supernally connecting every intellectual essence, precedes the multitude of intellects. The first intelligible also, unmingled, and uniformly established in itself, is expanded above the multitude of intelligibles. For the intelligible which is in every intellect is different from that which is established in itself; and the latter is intelligible alone, but the former is intelligible as in intellects. The imparticipable one, therefore, is beyond the many and participated unities, and is exempt, as we have before said, from all the divine orders. Such, then, is the scope of the first hypothesis, viz. to recur from the one being, or in other words, the first and highest being, to that which is truly the one, and to survey how he is exempt from wholes, and how he is connumerated with none of the divine orders.

In the next place, let us consider what mode of discourse is adapted to such a theory, and how the interpretation of what is before us may be properly undertaken. It appears, then, that this  
can

From both these consequences, therefore, *the one* would be composed of parts,

can only be effected by energizing logically, intellectually, and at the same time divinely, that we may be able to apprehend the demonstrative power of Parmenides, may follow his intuitive perceptions which adhere to true beings, and may in a divinely inspired manner recur to the ineffable and uncircumscribed co-sensation of *the one*. For we contain the images of first causes, and participate of total soul, the intellectual extent, and of divine unity. It is requisite, therefore, that we should excite the powers of these which we contain, to the apprehension of the things proposed. Or how can we become near to *the one*, unless by exciting *the one* of our soul, which is as it were an image of the ineffable one? And how can we cause this one and flower of the soul to diffuse its light, unless we first energize according to intellect? For intellectual energy leads the soul to the tranquil energy according to *the one* which we contain. And how can we perfectly obtain intellectual energy, unless we proceed through logical conceptions, and prior to more simple intellections, employ such as are more composite? Demonstrative power, therefore, is requisite in the assumptions; but intellectual energy in the investigations of beings; (for the orders of being are denied of *the one*) and a divinely-inspired impulse in the co-sensation of that which is exempt from all beings, that we may not unconsciously, through an indefinite phantasy, be led from negations to non-being, and its dark immensity. Let us, therefore, by exciting *the one* which we contain, and through this, causing the soul to revive, conjoin ourselves with *the one itself*, and establish ourselves in it as in a port, standing above every thing intelligible in our nature, and dismissing every other energy, that we may associate with it alone, and may, as it were, dance round it, abandoning those intellections of the soul which are employed about secondary concerns. The mode of discourse, then, must be of this kind, viz. logical, intellectual, and entheastic: for thus only can the proposed hypothesis be apprehended in a becoming manner.

In the third place, let us consider what the negations are, and whether they are better or worse than affirmations: for affirmation appears to all men to be more venerable than negation; negation, say they, being a privation, but affirmation the presence and a certain habit of form. To forms, indeed, and to things invested with form, affirmation is better than negation; for it is necessary that their own habit should be present with forms, and that privation should be absent, and, in short, to be is more accommodated to beings than not to be, and affirmation than negation: for being is the paradigm of affirmation, but non-being of negation. But it is not immanifest how Plato in the *Sophista* says that *non-being*, by which he means *difference*, is related to being, and that it is not less than being. Since, however, *non-being* is multifarious, one kind subsisting as more excellent than, another as coordinated with, and a third as a privation of, *being*, it is evident that we may also speculate three species of negations; one above affirmation, another inferior to affirmation, and a third in a certain respect equal to it. Affirmation, therefore, is not always uniformly more excellent than negation, since, when negation speaks of that non-being which is above being, affirmation is allotted the second order. But since this non-being is also twofold, one kind being participated by being, viz. the divine unities, the immediate progeny of *the one*, and the other, viz. the ineffable principle of things, not being connumerated with

parts, being a whole and possessing parts? It is necessary it should be so.  
And

with any being; it is evident that to this latter affirmation is not by any means adapted, and that to the former negation more properly belongs than affirmation; though in a certain respect affirmation is adapted to this so far as it communicates with being. However, though nothing can be truly said of that non-being which is uncoordinated with being, yet negation may be more properly asserted of it than affirmation; for, as affirmations belong to beings, so negations to non-being. In short, affirmation wishes to be conversant with a certain form; and when the soul says that one thing is present to another, and makes an affirmation, it adduces some of the kindred natures which it contains. But the first cause of all is above form, and it is not proper to introduce to it any thing belonging to secondary natures, nor transfer to it things adapted to us: for we shall thus deceive ourselves, and not assert what the first is. We cannot, therefore, in a becoming manner employ affirmations in speaking of this cause, but rather negations of secondary natures; for affirmations hasten to know something of one thing as present with another. But that which is first is unknown by the knowledge which is connate with beings, and nothing can be admitted as belonging to, or present with, it, but rather as not present: for it is exempt from all composition and participation. To which we may add, that affirmations manifest something definite; for non-man is more infinite than man. The incomprehensible and uncircumscribed nature of *the one* is therefore more adapted to be manifested through negations: for affirmations may be said to vanquish beings, but negations possess a power of expanding from things circumscribed to the uncircumscribed, and from things distributed in proper boundaries to the indefinite. Can it, therefore, be said that negations are not more adapted to the contemplation of *the one*? For its ineffable, incomprehensible, and unknown nature can alone through these be declared, if it be lawful so to speak, to partial intellectual conceptions such as ours. Negations, therefore, are better than affirmations, and are adapted to such as are ascending from the partial to the total, from the coordinated to the uncoordinated, and from the circumscribed and vanquished form of knowledge to the uncircumscribed, single, and simple form of energy.

In the fourth place, let us consider how, and after what manner, negations are adapted to the first cause. They must not then be adapted as in things capable of receiving negation, but yet which do not receive it, as if we should say that Socrates is not white: for, in short, *the one* does not receive any thing, but is exempt from every being, and all participation. Nor, again, must negation be adapted to *the one*, as in that which in no respect receives negation, which possesses a privation of it, and is unmingled with form; as if any one should say that a line is not white, because it is without any participation of whiteness. For that which is first is not simply divulsed from its negations; nor are these entirely void of communion with *the one*, but they are thence produced: nor can it be said that, as whiteness neither generates a line, nor is generated by it, so things posterior to *the one* neither generate *the one*, nor are generated by it; for they thence derive their subsistence. Nor yet must negation be applied according to that middle mode, in which we say, that things do not receive indeed, but are the causes to others in which they are inherent, of receiving affirmation; as, for instance, motion is not moved, but that which is in motion. Negation, therefore, is predicated of it, viz. the not being moved, though other things

And so both ways *the one* will be many, and not one. True. But it is necessary

are moved through it. And, in short, every passion is itself impassive; since, being simple, it either is or is not. But that which suffers, or the passive subject, is through passion a composite. Negations, therefore, are not after this manner denied of *the one*; for neither is *the one* ingenerated in any thing, but is the cause of all the affirmations, the negations of which we introduce to it; but it is by no means ingenerated in those things of which it is the cause. It may be concluded, therefore, that as *the one* is the cause of wholes, so negations are the causes of affirmations; whence such things as the second hypothesis affirms, the first denies. For all those affirmations proceed from these negations; and *the one* is the cause of all things, as being prior to all things: for, as soul, being incorporeal, produces body, and as intellect, by not being soul, gives subsistence to soul, so *the one*, being void of multitude, gives subsistence to all multitude, and, being without number and figure, produces number and figure; and in a similar manner with respect to other things: for it is no one of the natures which it produces; since neither is any other cause the same with its progeny. But if it is no one of the natures to which it gives subsistence, and at the same time gives subsistence to all things, it is no one of all things. If, therefore, we know all things affirmatively, we manifest *the one* negatively, by denying every thing of it; and so this form of negation is generative of the multitude of affirmations. Thus, the unfigured, when applied to *the one*, is not like that of matter, which is beheld according to a privation of figure, but it is that which generates and produces the order which subsists according to figure.

With respect to matter, therefore, negations are worse than affirmations, because they are privations, but affirmations are participations of which matter is essentially deprived. But, with respect to beings, negations are conjoined with affirmations: and when applied to *the one*, they signify transcendency of cause, and are better than affirmations. Hence, negations of things subordinate are verified in causes posterior to *the one*. Thus, when we say that the soul neither speaks nor is silent, we do not assert these things respecting it as of stones and pieces of wood, or any other insensible thing, but as of that which is generative in an animal of both voice and silence. And again, we say that nature is neither white nor black, but uncoloured, and without interval. But is she without these in the same manner as matter? By no means: for she is better than the things denied. But she is uncoloured, and without interval, as generative of all various colours and intervals. In the same manner, therefore, we say that the monad is without number, not as being subordinate to numbers and indefinite, but as generating and bounding numbers. I mean the first monad, and that which we say contains all the forms of numbers. All, therefore, that is denied of *the one*, proceeds from it: for it is necessary that it should be none of all things, that all things may be its offspring. Hence, it appears that Plato often denies of *the one* things which are opposite to each other, such as that it is neither *whole* nor *part*, neither *same* nor *different*, neither *permanent* nor *in motion*: for it is expanded above all habitude, and is pure from every duad, being the cause of all the multitude of these, of twofold coordinations, of the first duad, and of all habitude and opposition. For nature is the cause of all corporeal oppositions; the soul of all vital causes, and intellect of the genera pertaining to soul. But *the one* is simply the cause of all divisions: for it cannot be said that it is the cause of some, and not the cause

cessary that it should not be many, but one. It is necessary<sup>3</sup>. Hence, it will

cause of others. The cause, however, of all opposition is not itself opposed to any thing: for, if it were, it would be requisite that there should be some other cause of this opposition, and *the one* would no longer be the cause of all things. Hence, negations are generative of affirmations: those which are assumed in the first hypothesis of those which are investigated in the second: for whatever the first cause generates in the first hypothesis is generated and proceeds in its proper order in the second. And thus the order of the Gods subsisting from exempt unity is demonstrated.

But here, perhaps, some one may ask us whether we use negations through the imbecility of human nature, which is not able firmly to apprehend the simplicity of *the one*, through a certain projection of intellect, and adhesive vision and knowledge? or whether natures better than our soul know *the one* negatively in an analogous manner? We reply, therefore, that intellect by its perceptions which are conjoined with forms, knows forms, and comprehends intelligibles, and this is a certain affirmative knowledge: for *that which is*, approaches to *that which is*, and intellect is that which it understands through the intellectual perception of itself. But, by an unity above intellect, it is conjoined with *the one*, and through this union knows *the one*, by not being that which is *being*. Hence, it knows *the one* negatively: for it possesses a twofold knowledge, one kind as intellect, the other as not intellect; one as knowing itself, the other becoming inebriated, as some one says, and agitated with divine fury from nectar; and one so far as it is, but the other so far as it is not, Much-celebrated intellect itself, therefore, possesses both a negative and affirmative knowledge of *the one*. But if intellect, divine souls also, according to their summits and unities, energize enthusiastically about *the one*, and are especially *divine* souls on account of this energy; but, according to their *intellectual* powers, they are suspended from intellect, round which they harmonically dance. According to their *rational* powers they know themselves, preserve their own essence with purity, and evolve the productive principles which they contain; but, according to those powers which are characterized by *opinion*, they comprehend and govern in a becoming manner all sensible natures. And all the other kinds of knowledge which they possess are indeed affirmative: for they know beings as they are; and this is the peculiarity of affirmation. But the enthusiastic energy about *the one* is in these a negative knowledge: for they do not know that *the one* is, but that he is NOT, according to that which is better than the is. The intellection, however, of that which is not, is negation. If, therefore, both divine souls and much celebrated intellect itself knew *the one* through negation, what occasion is there to despise the imbecility of our soul, earnestly endeavouring to manifest negatively its uncircumscribed nature? For nothing pertaining to *the first* is such as we are accustomed to know, i. e. a certain quality of a thing, as Plato says in his second Epistle. This, however, is the cause of every thing beautiful in the soul, viz. to investigate the characteristic of the first, to commit in a becoming manner the knowledge of him to the reasoning power, and to excite *the one* which we contain, that, if it be lawful so to speak, we may know the similar by the similar, so far as it is possible to be known by our order: for, as by opinion we know the objects of opinion, and by the dianoëtic

will neither be a whole, nor possess parts, if *the one* is one. It will not.  
If,

power dianoëtic objects, and as by our intellectual part we know that which is intelligible, so by our *one* we know *the one*.

Again, in the fifth place, let us consider whether Plato denies all things of *the one*, or, if not all, what those are which he denies, and why he proceeds as far as to these. But in the first place, it will, perhaps, be proper to enumerate all the particulars which in the first hypothesis are denied of *the one*. These then are in order as follow: that it is not many; that it is neither whole nor part; that it has neither a beginning, nor middle, nor end; that it has no boundary; that it is without figure; is neither in another nor in itself; is neither in motion nor at rest; is neither same nor different; is neither similar nor dissimilar; is neither equal, nor greater nor lesser; is neither older nor younger; that it participates in no respect of generation or time; that neither does it participate of being; that it cannot be named, and is not effable; and that it is neither the object of opinion nor science. These, then, are briefly what the first hypothesis denies of *the one*; but why these alone, we now propose to investigate: for Proclus informs us, that to some philosophers prior to him this was a subject of much doubt. Some, says he, were of opinion, that whatever the ten categories of Aristotle contain is enumerated in these negations. However, as he justly observes, not these alone, but many other things are contained under the ten categories, which are not mentioned by Parmenides. Others asserted, that these negations were comprehended in the five genera of being, viz. essence, sameness, and difference, motion and permanency. However, not these only are denied of *the one*, but likewise *figure, the whole, time, number*, and the similar, and the dissimilar, which are not genera of being. But those, says he, speak the most probably who wish to show that all these negations subsist in the monad. For the monad contains occultly many things, such as whole, and parts, and figures, and is both in itself and in another, so far as it is present to whatever proceeds from itself. It also is permanent and is moved, abiding and at the same time proceeding, and, in being multiplied, never departing from itself: and in a similar manner other things may be shown to belong to the monad. That these things indeed subsist in the monad may be readily granted, and also, that the monad is an imitation of intellect, so that by a much greater priority all these are causally comprehended in intellect. Hence, these things are denied of *the one*, because it is above intellect and every intellectual essence. For these things, says Proclus, Parmenides also surveying in his verses concerning true being, says, that it contains the sphere, and the whole, the same, and the different. For he celebrates true being as similar to a perfect sphere, every where equal from the middle, and rejoicing in revolving mansion. He also denominates it perfectly entire and unmoved. So that all these subsist primarily in intellect, but secondarily, and after the manner of an image, in the monad, and every thing sensible, physically in this, and mathematically in that. For intellect is an intelligible sphere, the monad a dianoëtic sphere, and this world a sensible sphere, bearing in itself the images of the perpetual Gods.

However, the patrons of this opinion cannot assign the cause why the particulars which Parmenides denies are alone assumed, but by no means neither more nor less. For neither are these things

If, therefore, it has no part, it neither possesses beginning, middle, nor end;

things alone in the monad, but many others also may be found, such as the even and the odd, and each of the forms subsisting under these. Why, therefore, these alone from among all are assumed, they assign no clear reason. Our preceptor, therefore, Syrianus, says Proclus, is the only one we are acquainted with who perfectly accords with Plato in the knowledge of divine concerns. He therefore perceived, that all such things \* as are affirmed in the second are denied of *the one* in the first hypothesis; and that each of these is a symbol of a certain divine order; such as the many, the whole, figure, the being in itself and in another, and each of the consequent negations. For all things are not similarly apparent in every order of being; but in one multitude, and in another a different idiom of divine natures is conspicuous. For, as we learn in the Sophista, *the one being*, or, in other words, the highest being, has the first rank, *whole* the second, and *all* the third. And in the Phædrus, after the intelligible Gods, an essence without *colour*, without *figure*, and without *touch*, is the first in order, *colour* is the second, and *figure* the third; and in other things, in a similar manner, an unfolding of different things takes place in a different order of being. If, therefore, all these things manifest the extent of the first being, but, according to Plato, *the one* is beyond all beings, with great propriety are these things alone denied of *the one*. How each of these is distributed in the divine orders, we shall know more accurately in the second hypothesis. It is apparent, therefore, what are the particulars which are denied of *the one*, and that so many alone are necessarily denied: for so many are the enumerated orders of true beings. Thus much, however, is now evident, that all the negations are assumed from the idiom of being, and not from the idiom of knowledge. For to will, and to desire, and every thing of this kind, are the peculiarities of vital beings; but to perceive intellectually, or dianoetically, or sensibly, is the idiom of gnostic beings. But these negations are common to all beings whatever. For the hypothesis was, If *the one* is, so many things will follow as negations of *the one*, that at last it may be inferred if *the one* is, this *one is not*, as being better than the *is*: for it is the recipient of nothing, which is consequent to the *is*. And it appears that those alone are the things which belong to beings, so far as they are beings; which the second hypothesis affirms, and the first denies; and we shall not find things common to all beings, except these. But, of these, the higher are more total, but the others more partial. Hence, by taking away the higher, Plato also takes away those in a following order, according to the hypothesis. He has, therefore, in a wonderful manner discovered what are the things consequent to being, so far as being, as he was willing to show that *the one* is beyond all beings.

But if any one should think that this hypothesis collects things impossible, he should call to mind what is written in the Sophista, in which the Eleatean guest examines the assertion of Parmenides concerning being, and clearly says that *the one* truly so called must necessarily be impartible, or without parts (*αμερες γαρ δει το ως αληθως εν*). So that, this being granted, all the conclusions of the first hypothesis must unavoidably follow, as in every respect true, and as alone according with that which is truly *the one*. For it is absurd to admit that true being has a subsistence, and

\* Viz. Such things as are respectively characteristic of the divine orders.

end<sup>4</sup>; for such as these would be its parts? Right. But end and beginning

not only true being, but also the truly equal, the truly beautiful, and every other form, but that the true one should nowhere subsist, but should be a name alone, though by this all beings are preserved and have a subsistence. But if it is, it is evident that it is not many: for it would not be the true one, if it were replete with any thing; since the many are not one. If, therefore, it is not many, again the whole of the first hypothesis will follow, this being assumed; and it is by no means proper to accuse it as asserting impossibilities.

Again, in the sixth place, let us consider concerning the order of the negations: for, if they originate supernally and from things first, how does he first of all take away the many, and, in the last place, being, and even *the one* itself? *The one*, therefore, appears to us to be more venerable than multitude, and *being* itself as among beings is most venerable. But if they originate from things last, how, after the genera of being, does he assume the similar and dissimilar, the equal and unequal, the greater and the lesser? For these are subordinate to the genera of being. It is better, therefore, to say, that he begins supernally, and proceeds through negations as far as to the last of things. For thus also in the Phædrus, denying of the summit of the intellectual orders, things consequent to, and proceeding from it, he makes the ablation, beginning supernally; in the first place, asserting that it is without colour, in the next place, without figure, and, in the third place, without contact. For here *colour* symbolically signifies that middle order of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, which is called by theologians *synochike* (συνοχικη) or *connective*; but *figure* indicates the extremity of that order, which is denominated *teleiurgic*, (τελειουργικη) or *the source of perfection*; and *contact* signifies the intellectual order. In like manner here also the negations begin supernally, and proceed together with the series of the divine orders, of all which *the one* is the generative source. But that at the end he should take away *the one* itself, and being, is by no means wonderful. For, if we follow the whole order of the discourse, this will become most apparent. For it is immediately evident, that in affirmative conclusions it is requisite to begin from things most allied, and through these to evince things less allied, which are consequent; but in negative conclusions it is necessary to begin from things most foreign, and through these to show things less foreign, which are not consequent to the hypothesis. For it is requisite, says Plato, that those who use this method should begin from things most known. Hence he first denies *many* of the one, and last of all *the one that is*, which is by position most allied to *the one*, but is participated by essence, and on this account is a certain one, and not simply one. Hence it is necessary, since the conclusions are negative, that the beginning of all the hypothesis should be *not many*, and the end *not one*.

In the seventh place, let us consider what we are to understand by the *many*, which Plato first denies of *the one*. Some of the ancients then, says Proclus, assert that multitude of every kind is here taken away from *the one*, because *the one* transcends all multitude, both intelligible and sensible. But these should recollect, that in the second hypothesis *the many* is affirmed. What sensible multitude then can we behold there? For all things are asserted of true beings, because *the one* is there equal to *being*. Others more venerable than these assert that *intellectual multitude* is denied of *the one*. For the first cause, say they, is one without multitude; intellect, *one many*;  
soul,

ning are the bounds of every thing? How should they not? *The one*, therefore,

soul, *one* and *many*, through its divisible nature, being indigent of copula; body, *many* and *one*, as being a divisible nature characterized by multitude; and matter, *many* alone. This *many*, therefore, viz. intellectual multitude, Parmenides takes away from the first cause, that he may be one alone, and above intellect. It is proper, therefore, to ask these, what intellect they mean? For, if that which is properly intellect, and which is secondary to the intelligible, not only *the one* is beyond intellectual multitude, but the intelligible also, as being better than intellect. But if they call the whole of an intelligible essence intellect, as was the case with the followers of Plotinus, they are ignorant of the difference which subsists in the Gods, and of the generation of things proceeding according to measure. Other philosophers, therefore, more entheastic than these, dismissing sensible, and not even admitting intellectual multitude, say that prior to the intellectual numbers are the intelligible monads, from which every intellectual multitude and the many divided orders are unfolded into light. Plato, therefore, takes away from *the one*, the multitude which is intelligible, as subsisting proximately after *the one*, but he does not take away intellectual multitude. For it is by no means wonderful that *the one* should be exempt from intellectual multitude, above which the intelligible monads also are expanded. And hence the discourse, being divine, recurs to certain more simple causes. It is necessary however to understand that there are many orders in intelligibles, and that three triads are celebrated in them by theologians, as we shall show when we come to the second hypothesis. But, if this be admitted, it is evident that these *many* must be the first and intelligible multitude: for these so far as many alone subsist from *the one*; and from these the triadic supernally proceeds as far as to the last of things in the intellectual, supermundane, and sensible orders; and whatever is allotted a being participates of this triad. Hence, some of the ancients, ascending as far as to this order, considered its summit as the same with *the one*. We must either, therefore, admit that *the many* which are now denied of *the one* subsist according to the intelligible multitude, or that they are the first multitude in the intelligible and at the same time intellectual orders. Indeed, the many unities are not in the intelligible Gods, but in those immediately posterior to them. For there is one unity in each intelligible triad; but the multitude of unities is first apparent in the first order of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods. Thus much, therefore, must now be admitted, that Plato exempts *the one* from all the multitude of these unities, as being generative of and giving subsistence to it; and this he does, by assuming from our common conceptions that *the one* is not many. But at the end of the hypothesis, he takes away intelligible multitude itself from *the one*, conjoining the end with the beginning: for he there shows that *the one* is not *being*, according to which the intelligible order is characterized.

It is likewise necessary to observe, that Plato does not think that the assertion, '*the one* is not many,' requires demonstration, or any confirmation of its truth; but he assumes it according to common and unperverted conception. For, in speculations concerning the first cause of all things, it is especially necessary to excite common conceptions; since all things are spontaneously arranged after it, and without labour, both such as energize according to intellect, and those that energize according to nature only. And, in short, it is necessary that the indemonstrable should

therefore, is infinite<sup>5</sup>, if it has neither beginning nor end? Infinite. And  
without

should be the principle of all demonstration, and that common conceptions should be the leaders of demonstrations, as also geometricians assert. But there is nothing more known and clear to us than that *the one* is not *many*.

<sup>2</sup> It is necessary, says Proclus, that the first negation of *the one* should be that it is not *many*; for *the one* is first generative of *the many*; since, as we have before observed, the first and the highest multitude proceeds from *the one*. But the second negation after this is, that *the one* is neither a whole, nor has any part: for it gives subsistence to this order, in the second place, after the first multitude. This will be evident from considering in the first place logically, that in negative conclusions, when through the ablation of that which precedes we collect a negative conclusion, that which precedes is more powerful; but that when through the ablation of that which is consequent we subvert that which precedes, that which is consequent; and, in short, that which by the subversion of itself takes away that which remains, whether it precedes or follows, is more powerful. Thus, if we say, If there is not *being*, there is not *man*; but also, If there is not animal, there is not man: animal, therefore, is more universal than man. Let this then be one of the things to be granted; but another which must be admitted is as follows:—Every thing which is more comprehensive than another according to power, is nearer to *the one*. For, since *the one itself* is, if it be lawful so to speak, the most comprehensive of all things, and there is nothing which it does not ineffably contain, not even though you should adduce privation itself, and the most evanescent of things, since, if it has any subsistence, it must necessarily be in a certain respect one;—this being the case, things also which are nearer to *the one* are more comprehensive than those which are more remote from it; imitating the uncircumscribed cause, and the infinite transcendence of *the one*. Thus *being*, as it is more comprehensive than life and intellect, is nearer to *the one*; and life is nearer to it than intellect. These two axioms being admitted, let us see how Parmenides syllogizes. If *the one*, says he, is a whole, or has parts, it is many; but it is not many, as was before said: neither, therefore, will it be a whole, nor will it have parts. And again, If *the one* is not many, it is neither a whole, nor has parts. In both these instances, by the subversion of the many, *parts* also and *whole* are subverted. But our position is, that whatever together with itself subverted that which remains in things conjoined, is more powerful and more comprehensive; but that which is more comprehensive is nearer to *the one*. Hence, *many* is nearer to *the one* than *parts* and *whole*. For *parts* are *many*, but *many* are not entirely *parts*. So that *the many* are more comprehensive than *parts*, and are therefore beyond them. *The many*, therefore, first subsist in beings; and in the second place, whole and parts. Hence, *the one* produces the first by itself alone, but the second through the many. For first natures, in proceeding from their causes, always produce, together with their causes, things consequent. Since, therefore, the negations generate the affirmations, it is evident that the first generates such of these as are first, but the second such as are second. We may also see the geometrical order which Plato here observes: for that *the one* is not many, is assumed as an axiom, and as a common conception; but that it is neither a whole, nor has parts, is collected through this common conception. And again, that *the one* has neither beginning nor end, is demonstrated through the prior conclusion;

without figure 6, therefore, for it neither participates of the round 7 figure  
nor

clusion; and thus always in succession according to the truly golden chain of beings, in which all things are indeed from *the one*, but some immediately, others through one medium, others through two, and others through many. After this manner, therefore, it may be logically demonstrated that these *many* are prior to *whole* and parts.

If we wish, however, to see this in a manner more adapted to things themselves, we may say that the many, so far as many, have one cause, *the one*: for all multitude is not derived from any thing else than *the one*; since also, with respect to the multitude of beings, so far as they are intelligible, they are from being, but, so far as they are multitude, they subsist from *the one*. For, if multitude was derived from any other cause than *the one*, that cause again must necessarily either be one, or nothing, or not one. But if nothing, it could not be a cause. And if it was not one, not being one, it would in no respect differ from the many, and therefore would not be the cause of the many, since cause every where differs from its progeny. It remains, therefore, either that the many are without cause, and are uncoordinated with each other, and are infinitely infinite, having no *one* in them, or that *the one* is the cause of being to the many. For either each of *the many* is not one, nor that which subsists from all of them, and thus all things will be infinitely infinite; or each is indeed one, but that which consists from all is not one: and thus they will be uncoordinated with each other; for, being coordinated, they must necessarily participate of *the one*: or, on the contrary, that which consists from all is one, but each is not one, and thus each will be infinitely infinite, in consequence of participating no *one*: or, lastly, both that which consists from all and each must participate of *the one*, and in this case, prior to them, there must necessarily be that which is the source of union both to the whole and parts, and which is itself neither a whole, nor has parts; for, if it had, this again would be indigent of *the one*; and if we proceed to infinity, we shall always have *the one* prior to whole and parts. To this we may also add, that if there was another cause of the many besides *the one*, there would be no multitude of unities. If, therefore, there are many unities, the cause of this multitude so far as multitude is *the one*: for the primary cause of unities is *the one*, and on this account they are called unities. But the multitude of beings is from the multitude of unities; so that all multitude is from *the one*. But whole and parts belong to beings: for, though *whole* should be *the one being*, it is evident that, together with being, it is a *whole*, though it should be *the participated one*. This also entirely consubstitutes with being; and though it should be *being alone*, this is immediately essence. If, therefore, whole and part are beings, either essentially or according to participation, these also will indeed be produced from *the one*, but from essence also, if whole and part belong to beings. Hence, *whole* is a certain being. For all such things as participate of essential wholeness, these also participate of essence, but not all such things as participate of essence participate also of wholeness. Thus, for instance, parts, so far as they are parts, partake of essence, but so far as they are parts they do not participate of wholeness. But if this be the case, essence is beyond essential wholeness. And hence, the essential whole participates of essence, and is not the same with it. Thus, also, if there is any wholeness which is characterized by unity, it participates of *the one*: a part however characterized by unity must indeed necessarily

nor the straight. Why not? For the round figure is that, the extremities of

necessarily participate of *the one*, but is not necessarily a whole; since indeed it is impossible it should be, so far as it is a part. Whole and part, therefore, are either essential or characterized by unity: for whole and part subsist both in essences and in unities. *The one*, therefore, is beyond whole and parts, both the essential, and those characterized by *the one*: and not this only, but the many also subsist prior to whole and parts. For each, as we have shown, is in a certain respect many; but the first *many* alone participate of *the one*. *The many*, therefore, are beyond *whole* and *parts*.

And here it is necessary to observe, that in the first part of this first hypothesis Plato assumes such things as do not follow to *the one* considered with respect to itself. For we assert, that *the one* itself by itself is without multitude, and is not a whole, though there should be nothing else. But in the middle of the hypothesis such things are assumed as do not follow, neither to itself with respect to itself, nor to other things; such, for instance, as that it is neither the same with itself, nor different from itself, nor is the same with others, nor different from others: and after the same manner that it is neither similar nor dissimilar, &c. And at the end such things are assumed as do not follow to *the one* with respect to others alone; where it is also shown that it is neither effable, nor the object of opinion or science, nor is, in short, known by any other gnostic power, but is itself exempt from all other things, both knowledges and objects of knowledge. When, therefore, he says *the one* is not *many*, he does not say that things different from *the one* are not *the one*, as denying them of *the one*, but that it has not multitude in itself; and that *the one* is not also multitude together with *the one*, but that it is alone *one*, and one itself exempt from all multitude.

<sup>3</sup> The caution of Plato here, says Proclus, deserves to be remarked: for he does not say that *the one* is *impartible*, (*αμερες*), but that it has no parts (*μερη μὴ ἔχον*). For the *impartible* is not the same with the *non-possession of parts*; since the latter may be asserted of *the one*, but the *impartible* not entirely. Thus the *impartible* sometimes signifies a certain nature, and, as it were, a certain form. Or rather, it is nothing else than a form characterized by unity; and in this sense it is used by Timæus when he is describing the generation of the soul. But in the Sophista he calls that which is truly one *impartible*: “for it is necessary (says he) that *the truly one* should be *impartible*.” So that he there calls the same thing *impartible* which he says here *has no parts*. Hence, if any thing has no parts, it is *impartible*, according to Plato; but it no longer follows, that what is *impartible* has no parts, if each of the genera of being is either *impartible*, or *partible*, or a medium between both. Thus, a point is *impartible*, not having parts, such as that which is endued with interval possesses: but it is not simply *impartible*, as having no part; for the definition of a point receives its completion from certain things. But all such things as complete, have the order of parts, with respect to that which is completed by them. Thus, also, the monad is *impartible*, because it is not composed from certain divided parts, as is every number which proceeds from it. Because, however, it consists of certain things which make it to be the monad, and to be different from a point, these may be said to be the parts of the definition of the monad. For such things as contribute to the definition of every form are entirely parts of it, and such form

is

of which are equally distant from the middle. Certainly. And the straight figure

is a certain whole passive to *the one*, but is not *the one itself*. But *the simply one* alone neither subsists from parts as connecting, nor as dividing, nor as giving completion to it; being alone *the one*, and simply one, but not that which is united.

Plato also indicates concerning these negations, that they are not privative, but that they are exempt from affirmations according to transcendency: "for it is *necessary* (says he) that it should not be many, but one." By this word *necessary*, therefore, he indicates transcendency according to the good. As a proof of this, we do not add the word *necessary* to things deprived of any thing. For who would say it is necessary that the soul should be ignorant of itself? for ignorance is a privation to gnostic natures. Thus also, in the *Theætetus*, Plato speaking of evils says, "it is *necessary* that they should have a subsistence." At the same time, also, by this word Plato indicates that he is discoursing about something which has a subsistence, and not about a non-subsisting thing. For who would say, about that which has no subsistence, that it is *necessary* it should be?

<sup>4</sup> Here again we may observe how Plato collects that *the one* neither possesses beginning, nor middle, nor end, from the conclusion prior to this, following demonstrative canons. For, if *the one* has no parts, it has no beginning, nor middle, nor end; but that which precedes is true, and consequently that also which follows. By taking away, therefore, that which precedes, he takes away that which is consequent. Hence, beginning, middle, and end, are symbols of a more partial order: for that which is more universal is more causal; but that which is more partial is more remote from the principle. Thus, with respect to that which has parts, it is not yet evident whether it has a beginning, middle, and end. For, what if it should be a whole consisting only of two parts? For the duad is a whole after a certain manner, and so as the principle of all partible natures; but that which has a beginning, middle, and end, is first in the triad. But if it should be said that every whole is triadic, in this case nothing hinders but that a thing which possesses parts may not yet be perfect, in consequence of subsisting prior to the perfect and the whole. Hence, Plato does not form his demonstration from *whole*, but from *having parts*.

And here it is necessary to observe, with Proclus, that *part* is multifariously predicated. For we call that a part which is in a certain respect the same with the whole, and which possesses all such things partially as the whole possesses totally. Thus, each of the multitude of intellects is a part of total intellect, though all things are in every intellect. And the inerratic sphere is a part of the universe, though this also comprehends all things, but in a manner different from the world, viz. more partially. In the second place, that is said to be a part which is complete of any thing. Thus the total spheres of the planets and elements are said to be parts of the universe; and the dianoëtic and doxastic powers are said to be parts of the soul: for the former give completion to the universe, and the latter to the soul. In the third place, according to a common signification, we call a part every thing which is in any way coordinated with certain things to the consummation of one thing: for thus each of us may be said to be a part of the world: not that the universe receives its completion, as the universe, through us; for it would not become imperfect from the corruption of any one of us; but because we also are coarranged with the total parts of the universe, are governed in conjunction with all other things, are in the world as in

figure is that, the middle part of which is situated before, or in the view of  
both

one animal, and give completion to it, not so far as it is, but so far as it is prolific. Part, therefore, being triply predicated, Plato, having before said that *the one* has no part, evidently takes away from it all the conceptions of part. For whatever has parts has multitude; but *the one* has no multitude, and consequently has no parts whatever. But, if this be the case, it has no beginning, nor middle, nor end: for these may be said to be the parts of the things that possess them, according to the third signification of part, in which every thing coordinated with certain things is said to be a part of that which receives its completion through the coordination of those things.

<sup>5</sup> Plato might here have shown, as Proclus well observes, that *the one* is without beginning and end, from its not possessing extremes, and its not possessing extremes from its not possessing parts; but his reasoning proceeds through things more known. For, from its non-possession of parts, he immediately demonstrates that it is without beginning and end, transferring beginning and end to bound, which is the same with extreme. Infinite, therefore, in this place does not simply signify that which is negative of bound, but that which is subversive of extremes. As in the second hypothesis, therefore, he affirms the possession of extremes, he very properly in this hypothesis, where he denies it, demonstrates *the one* to be infinite, as not having extremes, which are accustomed to be called terms or limits.

But in order to understand how *the one* is infinite, it will be necessary to consider, with Proclus, how many orders there are in beings of *the infinite*, and afterwards, how many progressions there are opposite to these of *bound*. *Infinite*, therefore, that we may begin downwards, is beheld in matter, because it is of itself indefinite and formless; but forms are the bounds of matter. It is also beheld in body devoid of quality, according to division ad infinitum: for this body is infinitely divisible, as being the first thing endued with interval. It is also beheld in the qualities which first subsist about this body, which is itself devoid of quality, in which qualities the more and the less are first inherent: for by these Socrates in the *Philebus* characterizes the infinite. It is also beheld in the whole of a generated nature, i. e. in every thing which is an object of sense: for this possesses the infinite according to perpetual generation, and its unceasing circle, and according to the indefinite mutations of generated natures, which are always rising into being and perishing, in which also infinity according to multitude exists, alone possessing its subsistence in becoming to be. But prior to these, the infinite is beheld in the circulation of the heavens: for this also has the infinite, through the infinite power of the mover; since body so far as body does not possess infinite power; but through the participation of intellect body is perpetual, and motion infinite. Prior also to these, the infinite must be assumed in soul: for in its transitive intellections it possesses the power of unceasing motion, and is always moved, conjoining the periods of its motions with each other, and causing its energy to be one and never-failing. Again, prior to soul, the infinite is seen in time, which measures every period of the soul. For time is wholly infinite, because its energy, through which it evolves the motions of souls, and through which it measures their periods, proceeding according to number, is infinite in power: for it never ceases abiding and proceeding, adhering to *the one*, and unfolding the number which  
measures

both the extremes? It is so. Will not, therefore, *the one* consist of parts <sup>3</sup>,  
and

measures the motions of wholes. Prior to time, also, we may survey the infinite in intellect, and intellectual life: for this is intransitive, and the whole of it is present eternally and collectively. That which is immovable, too, and never failing in intellect, is derived from an essence and power which never desert it, but which eternally possesses a sleepless life; through which also every thing that is always moved, is able to be always moved, participating in motion of stable infinity. Nor does the infinite alone extend as far as to these: but prior to every intellect is much-celebrated eternity, which comprehends every intellectual infinity. For, whence does intellect derive its eternal life, except from eternity? This, therefore, is infinite according to power prior to intellect; or rather, other things are indeed infinite according to power, but eternity is primarily power itself. From this first fountain then of the infinite, it remains that we ascend to the occult cause of all infinities whatever, and, having ascended, that we behold all infinities subsisting according to the power which is there. For such is the infinite itself; and such is the chaos of Orpheus, which he says has no bound. For eternity, though it is infinite through the ever, yet, so far as it is the measure of things eternal, it is also a bound. But chaos is the first infinite, is alone infinite, and is the fountain of all infinity, intelligible, intellectual, that which belongs to soul, that which is corporeal, and that which is material. And such are the orders of the infinite, in which such as are second are always suspended from those prior to them. For material infinity is connected through the perpetuity of generation. The perpetuity of generation is never-failing, through the perpetual motion of æther; and the perpetual motion of æther is effected through the unceasing period of a divine soul; for of this it is an imitation. The period also of a divine soul is unfolded through the continued and never-failing power of time, which makes the same beginning and end, through the temporal *instant* or *now*. And time energizes infinitely, through intellectual infinity, which is perpetually permanent. For that which proceeds according to time, when it is infinite, is so through a cause perpetually abiding, about which it evolves itself, and round which it harmonically moves in a manner eternally the same. Intellect also lives to infinity through eternity. For the eternal is imparted to all things from eternity and being; whence all things derive life and being, some more clearly, and others more obscurely. And eternity is infinite, through the fountain of infinity, which supernally supplies the never-failing to all essences, powers, energies, periods, and generations. As far as to this, therefore, the order of infinities ascends, and from this descends. For the order of things beautiful is from the beautiful itself, that of equals from the first equality, and that of infinities from the infinite itself. And thus much concerning the orders of *the infinite*.

Let us now consider supernally the series of bound which proceeds together with the infinite: for divinity produced these two causes, bound and infinity, together, or in other words, speaking Orphically, æther and chaos. For *the infinite* is *chaos*, as distributing all power, and all infinity, as comprehending other things, and as being as it were the most infinite of infinities. But bound is æther, because æther itself bounds and measures all things. The first bound, therefore, is bound itself, and is the fountain and basis of all bounds, intelligible, intellectual, supermundane, and mundane, presubsisting as the measure and limit of all things. The second is  
that

and be many, whether it participates of a straight or round figure? Entirely

that which subsists according to eternity. For eternity, as we have before observed, is characterized both by infinity and bound; since, so far as it is the cause of never-failing life, and so far as it is the supplier of *the ever*, it is *infinite*; but so far as it is the measure of all intellectual energy, and the boundary of the life of intellect, terminating it supernally, it is *bound*. And, in short, it is itself, the first of the things mingled from bound and infinity. The third procession of bound is beheld in intellect. For, so far as it abides in sameness according to intellection, and possesses one life, eternal and the same, it is bounded and limited. For the immutable and the stable belong to a bounded nature; and, in short, as it is number, it is evident that in this respect it participates of bound. In the fourth place, therefore, time is bound, both as proceeding according to number, and as measuring the periods of souls. For every where that which measures, so far as it measures and limits other things, effects this through participating of the cause of bound. In the fifth place, the period of the soul, and its circulation, which is accomplished with invariable sameness, is the unapparent measure or evolution of all alter-motive natures. In the sixth place, the motion of æther, subsisting according to the same, and in the same, and about the same, *bounds* on all sides that which is disordered in material natures, and convolves them into one circle; and is itself bounded in itself. For the infinity of it consists in *the again*, (εν τῷ παλιν), but not in not reverting, (ου τῷ μη ανακαμπτειν): nor is the infinity of it such as that which subsists according to a right line, nor as deprived of bound. For the one period of æther is infinite by frequency (τῷ πολλῶν εστιν απειρος). In the seventh place, the never-failing subsistence of material forms, the indestructibility of wholes, and all things being bounded, particulars by things common, and parts by wholes, evince the opposition in these of bound to the infinite. For, generated natures being infinitely changed, forms at the same time are bounded, and abide the same, neither becoming more nor less. In the eighth place, all quantity in things material may be called bound, in the same manner as, we before observed, quality is infinite. In the ninth place, the body without quality, which is the last of all things except matter, as a whole is *bound*: for it is not infinite in magnitude, but is as much extended in quantity as the universe. For it is necessary to call this body the whole subject of the universe. In the tenth place, the material form which detains matter, and circumscribes its infinity, and formless nature, is the progeny of *bound*, to which some alone looking, refer bound and the infinite to *matter* alone and *form*. And such and so many are the orders of bound.

The *infinite*, therefore, which is here denied of *the one*, is the same as *the not having a bound*, in the same manner as *the not having parts* is the same with the *impartible*, when the impartible is asserted of *the one*. But if *the one* is neither from any other cause, and there is no *final* cause of it, it is very properly said to be *infinite*. For every thing is bounded by its cause, and from it obtains its proper end. Whether, therefore, there is any intelligible or intellectual bound, *the one* is beyond all the series of bound. But if the first God, in the Laws, is said to be the measure of all things, it is not wonderful: for there he is so denominated, as the object of desire to all things, and as limiting the being, power, and perfection of all things; but here he is shown to be infinite, as being indigent of no bound or part. For all things are denied of him in this place, as

tirely so. It is, therefore, neither straight nor circular, since it is without parts.

of himself with respect to himself. *The one*, therefore, is infinite, as above all bound. Hence this infinite must be considered as the same with the non-possession of extremes; and the possession of extremes is, therefore, denied of *the one*, through the infinite. For neither power must be ascribed to it, nor indefinite multitude, nor any thing else which is signified by the infinite.

<sup>6</sup> Parmenides first takes away *many* from *the one*; and this as from common conception: in the second place, he takes away *whole*, and *the having parts*; and this through *the one* not being *many*: in the third place, *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*; and this through not having parts. He also assumes as a consequent corollary, that *the one* is beyond bound, which is coordinated with parts, and which makes the possession of extremes. But bound is twofold: for it is either beginning or end. In the fourth place, therefore, he now takes away the *straight* and the *round*, which in the second hypothesis he arranges after the possession of extremes, and after the possession of beginning, middle, and end. But before he syllogistically demonstrates the fourth, he enunciates the conclusion; for he says, "without figure therefore." For it is requisite that intellectual projections, or, in other words, the immediate and direct vision of intellect, should be the leader of scientific syllogisms; since intellect also comprehends the principles of science. The pre-assumption, therefore, of the conclusion imitates the collected vision of intellect; but the procession through syllogisms imitates the evolution of science from intellect. And here we may perceive also, that the conclusion is more common than the syllogisms: for the latter receive the straight and the round separately, and thus make the negation; but the former simply asserts that *the one* is without figure. But these are the forms common to all intervals. For lines are divided into the straight, the round, and the mixed; and, in a similar manner, superficies and solids; except that in lines the straight and the round are without figure; but in superficies or solids they are receptive of figure. Hence some of these are called right-lined, others curve-lined, and others mixed from these. As it has been shown, therefore, that *the one* is without bounds or extremities, it was necessary that Parmenides should deny of it the straight, and the possession of extremes. But that which is figured is a thing of this kind: for he assumes boundaries comprehensive of the things bounded, which alone belong to things figured. There is also another accuracy in the words, says Proclus, which is worthy of admiration. For he does not say that *the one* is neither straight nor round; since he has not yet collected that it is without figure. For what would hinder it from having some one of the middle figures, such as that of the cylinder or cone, or some other of those that are mixed? For, if we should give to *the one* some figure from those that are mixed, it would participate both of the straight and the round. Thus, for instance, if we should inquire whether nature is white or black, and should find that it is neither white nor black, it would not follow from this, that it is entirely void of colour: for, by the participation of both these, it would possess some one of the middle colours; since the media are from the extremes. Plato therefore says, that *the one* neither participates of the *round* nor the *straight*, that it may not have either of these, nor any one of the media. This also is evident, that this conclusion is more partial than that which is prior to it. For, if any thing participates of figure, it has also extremes and a middle; but not every thing which has extremes

and

parts. Right. And indeed, being such, it will be no where<sup>9</sup>; for it will  
neither

and a middle participates of figure. For a line, number, time and motion, may possess extremes, all which are without figure. A transition likewise is very properly made from figure to the straight and the round. For it is possible universally to deny figure of *the one*, by showing that figure has bound and limitation. But *the one* does not receive any bound. Plato however was willing to deduce his discourse supernally, according to two coordinations; and hence from the beginning he assumes after *many*, *whole* and *parts*, and again *extremes* and *middle*, *straight* and *round*, *in itself* and *in another*, *abiding* and *being moved*, &c. through this assumption indicating that *the one* is none of these. For it is not possible that it can be both opposites, since it would no longer remain one according to the hypothesis; nor can it be either of these, for thus it would have something hostile and opposed to itself. It is however necessary that *the one* should be prior to all opposition, or it will not be the cause of all things; since it will not be the cause of those things which its opposite produces. Proceeding, therefore, according to the two series of things, he very properly now passes from figure to *the straight* and *the round*.

But since in the Phædrus Plato denominates the intelligible summit of intellectuals, which he there calls the supercelestial place, uncoloured, unfigured, and untouched, must we say that that order and *the one* are similarly unfigured? By no means: for neither is there the same mode of negation in both. For of that order Plato denies some things, and affirms others. For he says that it is essence and true essence, and that it can alone be seen by intellect, the governor of the soul; and likewise that the genus of true science subsists about it; because there is another, viz. the intelligible order prior to it, and it is exempt from some things, but participates of others. But he denies all things, and affirms nothing of *the one*: for there is nothing prior to *the one*, but it is similarly exempt from all beings. The mode, therefore, of ablation is different; and this, as Proclus well observes, Plato indicates by the very words themselves. For he calls the intelligible summit of intellectuals *unfigured*; but he says that *the one* participates of *no figure*. But the former of these is not the same with the latter, as neither is the *impartible* the same with that which has no part. After the same manner, therefore, he calls that essence *unfigured*, but asserts that the one participates of no figure. Hence it appears that the former, as producing, and as being more excellent than intellectual figure, is called *unfigured*. This, therefore, was subordinate to another figure, viz. the intelligible: for intelligible intellect comprehends the intelligible causes of figure and multitude, and all things; and there are figures perfectly unknown and ineffable, which are first unfolded into light from intelligibles, and which are only known to intelligible intellect. But the supercelestial place, being the summit in intelligibles, is the principle of all intellectual figures; and hence it is *unfigured*, but is not simply exempt from all figure. *The one*, however, is exempt from every order of these figures, both the occult and intellectual, and is established above all unknown and known figures.

<sup>7</sup> The *straight* and the *round* here are to be considered as signifying progression and conversion: for progression is beheld according to the straight, which also it makes the end of itself. Every intellectual nature, therefore, *proceeds* to all things according to the straight, and is *converted* to its own good, which is the middle in each; and this is no other than the intelligible which it contains. But things are separated from each other according to progression, the *proceeding* from the  
the

neither be in another, nor in itself. How so? For, being in another, it would

the *abiding*, and the *multiplied* from the *united*. For *progression* is that which makes some things first, others middle, and others last; but *conversion* again conjoins all things, and leads them to one thing, the common object of desire to all beings. In these two, therefore, each of these definitions is to be found, of which the intellectual Gods first participate: for these are especially characterized by conversion. In the second place from these, souls participate of the straight and the round; proceeding, indeed, after the manner of a line, but being again inflected into circles, and converting themselves to their principles. But sensibles participate of these in the last place: for right-lined figures subsist in these with interval, and partly, and the spheric form, which is comprehensive of all mundane figures. Hence, Timæus makes the whole world to be a sphere; but through the five figures, which are the only figures that have equal sides and angles, he adorns the five parts of the world, inscribing all these in the sphere, and in each other, by which he manifests that these figures are supernally derived from a certain elevated order.

These two also may be perceived in generation: the *round* according to the circulation in things visible; for generation circularly returns to itself, as it is said in the Phædrus. But the *straight* is seen according to the progression of every thing, from its birth to its acme; and acme is here the middle darkening the extremes; for through this there is a transition to the other of the extremes, just as, in a right line, the passage from one extreme to the other is through the middle. These two, therefore, supernally pervade from intellectual as far as to generated natures; the *straight* being the cause of progression, but the *round* of conversion. If, therefore, *the one* neither proceeds from itself, nor is converted to itself—for that which proceeds is second to that which produces, and that which is converted is indigent of the desirable—it is evident that it neither participates of the *straight*, nor of the *round* figure. For how can it proceed, having no producing cause of itself, neither in nor prior to itself, lest it should be deprived of *the one*, being second, or having the form of the duad? How, also, can it be converted, having no end, and no object of desire? Here, likewise, it is again evident that Plato collects these conclusions from what precedes, viz. from *the one* neither possessing beginning, nor middle, nor end; always geometrically demonstrating things second through such as are prior to them, imitating the orderly progression of things, which ever makes its descent from primary to secondary natures.

<sup>8</sup> As the whole middle order of the Gods called intelligible, and at the same time intellectual, is symbolically signified in these words, Plato very properly in the conclusion converts the whole of it. For, if *the one* has *figure*, it will be *many*. He therefore conjoins figure to *many* through *parts*; but demonstrates that all these genera are secondary to *the one*. So great, however, says Proclus, is the separation of the divine orders, that Plato does not attempt to connect the negations that follow in a regular succession till he has first converted this order to itself; conjoining *figure* to *many*, and indicating the alliance of all the aforesaid genera. In what order of things, however, the *straight* and the *round* subsist, will be more clearly known in the second hypothesis.

<sup>9</sup> The discourse passes on to another order, viz. to the summit of those Gods that are properly called intellectual: and this he denies of *the one*, demonstrating that *the one* is no where; neither as comprehended in another cause, nor as itself comprehended in itself. Before he syllogizes,

would after a manner be circularly comprehended by that in which it is,  
and

however, he again previously announces the conclusion, employing intellectual projections prior to scientific methods; and this he constantly does in all that follows.

It is here, however, necessary to observe, that *no where* is predicated most properly and simply of the first cause. For the soul is frequently said to be no where, and particularly, the soul which has no habitude or alliance with body: for it is not detained by any secondary nature, nor is its energy circumscribed through a certain habitude, as if it were bound by such habitude to things posterior to itself. Intellect also is said to be no where: for it is in a similar manner every where, and is equally present to all things. Or rather, through a presence of this kind it is detained by no one of its participants. Divinity also is said to be no where, because he is exempt from all things, because he is imparticipable, or, in other words, is not consubstantial with any thing else; and because he is better than all communion, all habitude, and all coordination with other things. There is not, however, the same mode of the *no where* in all things. For soul indeed is *no where* with respect to the things posterior to itself, but is not simply no where; since it is in itself, as being self-motive, and likewise in the cause whence it originates. For every where the cause preassumes and uniformly comprehends the power of its effect. Intellect is also *no where* with respect to the things posterior to itself, but it is in itself, as being self-subsistent, and, further still, is comprehended in its proper cause. Hence, it is false to say that intellect is absolutely *no where*; for *the one* alone is simply no where. For it is neither in things posterior to itself, as being exempt from all things; (since neither intellect nor soul, principles posterior to *the one*, are in things posterior to themselves,) nor is it in itself, as being simple and void of all multitude; nor is it in any thing prior to itself, because there is nothing better than *the one*. This, therefore, is simply *no where*; but all other things have the *no where* secondarily, and are in one respect *no where*, and in another not. For, if we survey all the order of beings, we shall find material forms subsisting in others only, and established in certain subjects: for they verge to bodies, and are in a certain respect in a subject, bearing an echo, as it were, and image of a thing subsisting in itself, so far as they are certain lives and essences, and in consequence of one part suffering they are copassive with themselves. With respect to souls that subsist in habitude or alliance to body, these, so far as they have habitude, are in another: for habitude to secondary natures entirely introduces, together with itself, subsistence in another; but so far as they are able to be converted to themselves, they are purified from this, subsisting in themselves. For natures indeed extend all their energies about bodies, and whatever they make they make in something else. Souls employ, indeed, some energies about bodies; but others are directed to themselves, and through these they are converted to themselves. But souls that are without habitude to body are not in other things that are secondary or subordinate to them, but are in others that are prior to them. For a subsistence in another is twofold, one kind being subordinate to the subsistence of a thing in itself, and arising from a habitude to things secondary, but the other being better than such a subsistence; and the former extends as far as to souls that subsist in habitude to body; but the latter only originates from divine natures, and, in short, from such as subsist without habitude. Divine souls, therefore, are alone in the natures prior to them, as, for instance, in the intellects  
from

and would be touched <sup>1°</sup> by it in many places : but it is impossible that *the one*

from which they are suspended ; but intellect is both in itself, and in that which is prior to itself, viz. in the unity which it derives from *the one*, and which is the vertex and flower of its essence. This *no where*, therefore, is by no means subordinate to the subsistence of a thing in itself. For how can *the no where* which opposes a subsistence in some particular thing be adapted to things which have their being in another ? But to those that have a subsistence in themselves better than a subsistence in another, *the no where* is present indeed, but not simply : for each of these is in its proper cause. But to *the one* alone *the no where* primarily and simply belongs. For *the one* is not in things posterior to itself, because it is without habitude or alliance ; nor in itself, because it is *the one* ; nor in any thing prior to itself, because it is the first.

In the next place, let us consider *the every where*, and whether it is better and more perfect than *the no where*, or subordinate to it. For, if better, why do we not ascribe that which is better to the first, instead of saying that *the one* is alone *no where* ? But, if it is subordinate, how is it not better not to energize providentially, than so to energize ? May we not say, therefore, that the *every where* is twofold ? one kind taking place, when it is considered with reference to things posterior to it, as when we say that providence is every where, that it is not absent from any secondary natures, but that it preserves, connects and adorns all things, pervading through them by its communications. But the other kind of *every where* subsists as with relation to all things prior and posterior to it. Hence that is properly *every where* which is in things subordinate, in itself, and in things prior to itself. And of this *every where* the *no where* which is now assumed is the negation, as being neither in itself, nor in any thing prior to itself. This *no where* also is better than *the every where*, and is alone the prerogative of *the one*. But there is another *no where* coordinate with *the every where*, and which is alone predicated with reference to things secondary, so that each is true in consequence of that which remains. For *being* is *no where* because it is *every where*. For that which is detained in some particular place, is in a certain thing ; but that which is similarly present to all things is definitely *no where* : and again, because *no where*, on this account it is *every where*. For, in consequence of being similarly exempt from all things, it is similarly present to all things, being as it were equally distant from all things. Hence, this *no where* and this *every where* are coordinate with each other. But the other *no where* is better than every *every where*, and can alone be adapted to *the one*, as being a negation of every subsistence in any thing. For, whether the subsistence is as in *place*, or as in *whole*, or as the *whole* in its *parts*, or as in the *end*, or as *things governed* in the *governing principle*, or as *genus* in *species*, or as *species* in *genera*, or as in *time*, *the one* is similarly exempt from all these. For neither is it comprehended in *place*, lest it should appear to be multitude. Nor is it any comprehending whole, lest it should consist of parts. Nor is it a part of any thing, lest, being in the whole of which it is a part, it should be a passive one. For every whole which is passive to *the one*, is indigent of that which is truly one. Nor is it in parts : for it has no parts. Nor is there any end of it : for it has been shown that it has no end. Nor does it subsist as in the *governing principle* : for it has been shown that it has not any *beginning*. Nor is it as *genus* in *species*, lest again multitude should happen about it, through the comprehension of *species* ;

*one* which is without parts, and which does not participate of a circle,  
should

nor as species in genera; for, of what will it be the species, since nothing is more excellent than itself? Nor is it as in time: for thus it would be multitude; since every thing which is in time flows; and every thing that flows consists of parts. *The one*, therefore, is better than all the modes of a subsistence in any thing. Hence the negation of *no where* is true: for a subsistence in *some particular thing* is opposed to *no where*; just as *some one* is opposed to *no one*: so that *the one* will be *no where*.

Again, too, Plato gives a twofold division to a subsistence in something; viz. into a subsistence in another, and into a subsistence in itself; comprehending in these two all the abovementioned celebrated modes which are enumerated by Aristotle in his *Physics*; that if he can show that *the one* is neither in itself, nor in another, he may be able to demonstrate that it is *no where*. But this being shown, it will appear that *the one* is exempt from that order to which the symbol of being *in itself* and *in another* pertains. It will also appear from hence that intellect is not the first cause: for the peculiarity of intellect is a subsistence in itself, in consequence of being converted to itself, at the same time that its energy is directed to such things as are first, viz. to intelligibles and *the one*.

<sup>10</sup> Let us here consider how according to Plato every thing which is in another, is after a manner circularly comprehended by that in which it is, and is touched by it in many places. Of those prior to us then, says Proclus, some have considered the subsistence of *the one* in something else, more partially, alone assuming a subsistence in place, and in a vessel, and to these adapting the words. For that which is in place in a certain respect touches place, and also that which is in a vessel touches the vessel, and is on all sides comprehended by it. This, therefore, say they, is what Plato demonstrates to us, that *the one* is not in place, since that which is in place must necessarily be many, and must be touched by it in many places; but it is impossible that *the one* should be *many*. There is however nothing venerable in the assertion that *the one* is not in place, since this is even true of partial souls like ours; but it is necessary that what is here shown should be the prerogative of *the one*, and of that cause which is established above all beings. But others looking to things say, that every thing which being in a certain thing is comprehended by it, is denied of *the one*: and their assertion is right. For *the one* is in no respect in any thing, as has been before shown. But how does this adapt the words to the various modes of a subsistence in something? For a point is evidently said to be in a line as in *another*; since a point is different from a line; and it does not follow, because it is in another, that on this account it is on all sides comprehended by the line, and is touched by many of its parts. It may indeed be said, in answer to this, that though the line does not circularly contain the point according to interval, yet it comprehends it after another manner: for it embraces its idioms. For a point is a boundary only; but a line is both a boundary and something else, being a length without a breadth. A point also is without interval; but a line possesses interval according to length, though not according to breadth and depth. For, in short, since a point is not the same with *the one*, it is necessary that the point should be *many*, not as containing parts after the manner of interval, for in this respect it is impartible, but as containing many idioms  
which

should be touched by a circle in many places. Impossible. But if it were in itself it would also contain itself, since it is no other than itself which subsists in itself: for it is impossible that any thing should not be comprehended<sup>11</sup> by

which have the relation of parts, and which the line comprehending, may be said to touch the point in many places. But that the point is not the same with *the one* is evident; for the latter is the principle of all things, but the former of magnitudes alone. Nor is the point prior to *the one*: for the monad is one, and the impartible in time, or the now. It remains, therefore, that the point is posterior to *the one*, and participates of it. But, if this be the case, it may possess many incorporeal idioms, which are in the line, and are comprehended by it.

Those however who thus interpret the present passage do not perceive how Plato assumes a subsistence in a certain thing, and what he looks to among beings, when he denies this of *the one*. It is better, therefore, says Proclus, to say with our preceptor Syrianus, conformably to that most prudent and safe mode of interpretation, that Plato denies these things of *the one*, which in the second hypothesis he affirms of *the one being*, and that he so denies as he there affirms. In the second hypothesis, therefore, Plato indicating the summit of the intellectual order, says that *the one* is in itself and in another; which evidently applies to that order, because it is converted to itself intellectually, and abides eternally with a monadic subsistence in its causes. For it is the monad of the intellectual Gods; abiding indeed, according to its transcendency, in the intellectual Gods, prior to, but unfolding into light the intellectual idiom, according to an energy in and about, itself. The subsistence, therefore, in another is of such a kind as an abiding in cause, and being comprehended in its proper cause. This, therefore, is the circular comprehension, and the being touched in many places, of which Plato now speaks. For, as this order is contained in its cause, it is more partial than it. But every thing more partial is more multiplied than its more comprehensive cause; and, being more multiplied, it is conjoined with it by the various powers of itself, and differently with different powers. For this is what is implied by the words "*in many places*;" since according to different powers it is differently united to the intelligible prior to itself. To this order of beings, also, a subsistence in itself accords together with a subsistence in another. The multitude likewise of this order is numerous: for it participates of intelligible multitude, and has parts; since it participates of the middle genera in the causes prior to itself. It is also in a certain respect circular; for it participates of the extremity of the middle orders, viz. of the figure which is there. Hence, it is neither one simply, but many, nor impartible, but having parts, viz. incorporeal idioms; nor is it beyond all figure, but is circular. And so far as it is many, it is able to be touched in many things by the natures prior to itself; but so far as it has parts, it is able to communicate with them in many places, and in a remarkable degree; and so far as it is figured, it is circularly comprehended by them. For every thing figured is comprehended by figure. But *the one* neither has parts, nor participates of the circle; so that there cannot be a cause prior to it, which circularly touches it and in many places; but it is beyond all things, as having no cause better than itself.

<sup>11</sup> Let us here consider with Proclus how that which is in itself possesses both that which comprehends,

by that in which it is. It is impossible. Would not, therefore, that which contains be one thing, and that which is contained another? For the same whole <sup>12</sup> cannot at the same time suffer and do both these: and thus  
*the*

comprehends, and that which is comprehended; and what both these are. Every thing, therefore, which is the cause of itself, and is self-subsistent, is said to be in itself. For, as self-motive rank prior to alter-motive natures, so things self-subsistent are arranged prior to such as are produced by another. For, if there is that which perfects itself, there is also that which generates itself. But if there is that which is self-subsistent, it is evident that it is of such a kind as both to produce and be produced by itself. As, therefore, producing power always comprehends according to cause that which it produces, it is necessary that whatever produces itself should comprehend itself so far as it is a cause, and should be comprehended by itself so far as it is caused; but that it should be at once both cause and the thing caused, that which comprehends and that which is comprehended. If, therefore, a subsistence in another signifies the being produced by another more excellent cause, a subsistence in self must signify that which is self-begotten, and produced by itself.

<sup>12</sup> Let us consider how it is impossible for the same whole, at the same time, both to do and suffer: for this Plato assumes as a thing common and universally acknowledged. Will it not follow, therefore, if this be granted, that the self-motive nature of the soul will no longer remain? For, in things self-moved, that which moves is not one thing, and that which is moved another; but the whole is at the same time moving and moved. To this it may be replied as follows: Of the powers of the soul some are generative, and others conversive of the soul to herself. The generative powers, therefore, beginning from the soul produce its life; but the conversive convolve the soul to itself, according to a certain vital circle, and to the intellect which is established prior to soul. For, as the generative powers produce a twofold life, one kind abiding, but the other proceeding into body and subsisting in a subject, so the conversive powers make a twofold conversion, one of the soul to herself, the other to the intellect which is beyond her. Of these powers, therefore, the whole soul participates, because they proceed through each other, and energize together with each other; whence every rational soul is said to generate herself. For the whole participates through the whole of generative powers, and she converts as it were herself to herself; and neither is that which generates without conversion, nor is that which converts unprolific, but a participation through each other is effected. Hence both assertions are true, viz. that the soul generates herself, and that it is not possible for the whole of a thing at the same time both to do and suffer. For though that which produces and that which is produced are one thing, yet together with union there is also difference, through which a thing of this kind does not remain unmultiplied. For the whole soul is indeed produced, but not so far as it produces is it also according to this produced; since that which primarily produces is the generative power of the soul. Since however it is possible in some things for a certain part to generate, and a part to be generated, as in the world that which is celestial is said to generate and fabricate, and that which is sublunary to be generated; and again, not for a part, but the whole to be generated and generate in different times; and lastly, for the whole  
both

*the one* would no longer be one, but two. It certainly would not. *The one*, therefore, is not any where <sup>13</sup>, since it is neither in itself nor in another.

It

both to do and suffer in the same time, but to do one thing, and suffer another, and not the same: for what if a thing should impart heat, and at the same time receive cold, or should whiten and be at the same time blackened?—on this account, Plato taking away all such objections accurately adds the words, *the whole, at the same time, the same thing*, that it may not act in one part and suffer in another, nor at different times, nor do one thing and suffer another.

Hence, since that which is self-subsistent is necessarily divisible into that which is more excellent, and that which is subordinate, for so far as it produces it is more excellent, but so far as it is produced subordinate, it follows that *the one* is beyond a self-subsistent nature: for *the one* does not admit of division, with which a self-subsistent nature is necessarily connected. Indeed *the one* is better than every paternal and generative cause, as being exempt from all power. For though according to Plato it is the cause of all beautiful things, yet it is not the cause in such a manner as if it employed power, through which it is productive of all things: for power subsists together with *hyperaxis* or the summit of essence, to which it is at the same time subordinate. But of the natures posterior to *the one*, some being most near to, and ineffably and occultly unfolded into light from it, have a paternal and generative dignity with relation to all beings, and produce other things from themselves by their own powers. In this, therefore, they abound more than, and consequently fall short of the simplicity of, *the one*, that they generate self-subsistent natures: for additions in things divine are attended with diminution of power. Other natures, therefore, posterior to *the one*, being now separated and multiplied in themselves, are allotted the power of things self-subsistent; subsisting indeed from primary causes, but produced also from themselves. These, therefore, are suspended from the paternal and generative causes of forms, but paternal causes from *the one*, which is more excellent than every cause of this kind, and which in a manner unknown to all things unfolds beings from itself, according to the principles of things. Hence, if this be the case, it is evident that every thing which gives subsistence to itself is also productive of other things. For self-subsistent natures are neither the first nor the last of things. But that which produces other things without producing itself is twofold; one of these being better, and the other worse, than things self-subsistent. Such, therefore, are producing natures. But of things produced from a generating cause, self-subsistent natures first proceed, being produced indeed, but subsisting self-begotten from their proper causes. For they proceed from their cause in a way superior to a self-begetting energy. The next in order to these are the natures which are suspended from another producing cause, but which are incapable of generating and being generated from themselves. And this order of things has its progression supernally as far as to the last of things. For if, among generating natures, that which generates itself also generates other things, but that which generates other things does not necessarily generate itself, it follows that things generative of others are prior to such as generate themselves: for things more comprehensive rank more as principles.

<sup>13</sup> Plato very geometrically, in each of the theorems, first enunciates the proposition, afterwards gives the demonstration, and, in the last place, the conclusion; through the proposition imitating

It is not. But consider whether thus circumstanced it can either stand or be moved<sup>14</sup>. Why can it not? Because whatever is moved is either locally moved, or suffers alteration<sup>15</sup>; for these alone are the genera of motion.

imitating the collected and stable energy of intellect; through the demonstration, the progression of intellections evolving itself into multitude; and through the conclusion, the circular motion of intellect to its principle, and the one perfection of all intellectual energy. This, therefore, which he does in the preceding theorems, he particularly does in this. For it pertains to this order, both to subsist from itself, and to abide in the natures prior to itself. The logical discursus, therefore, imitates the subsistence of this order in itself, but the conclusion, and a returning to the principle, a subsistence in another.

<sup>14</sup> Parmenides here proceeds to another order, viz. the vivific, from the intellectual monad, and evinces that *the one* is exempt from this. The idioms, therefore, of this vivific order are *motion* and *permanency*; the former unfolding into light the fountains of life, and the latter firmly establishing this life exempt from its proper rivers. That it is not requisite, however, alone to take away physical motions from *the one*, Plato himself manifests, by saying, "*the one* therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion." But all energy, according to him, is motion. *The one* therefore is prior to energy. Hence also it is prior to power, lest it should possess power imperfect and unenergetic. Should it be asked why Plato places *motion* before *sameness* and *difference*? we reply, that motion and permanency are beheld in the essences and energies of things: for procession is essential motion, and permanency an essential establishment in causes; since every thing at the same time that it abides in, also proceeds from, its cause. Essential *motion* and *permanency*, therefore, are prior to *sameness* and *difference*: for things in proceeding from their causes become *same* and *different*; *different* by proceeding, but *same* by converting themselves to that which abides. Hence *motion* and *permanency* rank prior to *sameness* and *difference*, as originating prior to them. On this account, in the *Sophista*, Plato arranges *motion* and *permanency* after *being*, and next to these *same* and *different*.

<sup>15</sup> Plato, in the tenth book of his *Laws*, makes a perfect division of all motions into ten, eight of which are passive. The ninth of these is indeed energetic, but is both motive and moved, moving other things, and being moved by a cause prior to itself; and the tenth is energetic from itself, in that which is moved possessing also that which moves, being no other than a self-motive nature. It is however now requisite to make a more synoptical division, that we may not physiologize in discourses about divine natures. Hence Plato concisely distributes all motions into two. For that it is requisite not only to consider the proposed motions as corporeal, but likewise as comprehensive of all incorporeal motions, is evident from his saying, "for these are the only motions." Both the motions of soul, therefore, and such as are intellectual, are comprehended in these two, viz. lation and alteration, or internal motion. It is also evident that every vivific genus of the Gods belongs to these motions, since all life is motion according to Plato, and every motion is comprehended in the two which are here mentioned. Let us therefore consider every thing which is moved; and first of all let us direct our attention to bodies, either as suffering some internal or some external change: for that which changes one place for another sus-  
tains

motion. Certainly. But if *the one* should be altered from itself, it is impossible that it should remain in any respect the one. Impossible. It will not therefore be moved according to alteration? It appears that it will not.

tains a mutation of something belonging to things external; but that which is generating or corrupting, or increasing, or diminishing, or mingling, suffers a mutation of something inward. Hence that which is changed according to the external is said to be moved according to lation: for a motion of this kind is local, place being external to bodies. But that which is moved according to some one of the things within it is said to suffer internal change, whether it sustains generation, or corruption, or increase, or diminution, or mixture. Local motion, therefore, is present with divine bodies, such as those of the stars, but they have no mutation according to essence. For it is necessary, indeed, that these should be locally moved, because, as Plato says in the *Politicus*, always to subsist according to the same, and after the same manner, belongs to the most divine of things alone; but the nature of body is not of this order. The celestial bodies, however, being the first of things visible, possess a perpetual subsistence: for such things as are first in every order possess the form of natures prior to themselves. Hence these bodies are moved according to this motion alone, which preserves the essence of the things moved unchanged. But, ascending from bodies to souls, we may see that which is analogous in these to local motion, and that which corresponds to internal change. For, so far as at different times they apply themselves to different forms, and through contact with these become assimilated to their proper intelligibles, or the objects of their intellectual vision, they also appear in a certain respect to be multiform, participating by their energies of these intelligibles, which are always different, and being disposed together with them. So far, therefore, as this is effected, they may be said to be internally changed. But again, so far as they energize about the intelligible place, and pervade the whole extent of forms, being as it were external to them, and comprehending them on all sides, so far they may be said to be locally moved; Plato also in the *Phædrus* calling the energy of the soul about the intelligible place, a period and circulation. Souls, therefore, are both internally changed and locally moved; being internally changed according to that which is vital, for it is this which is disposed together with, and is assimilated to, the visions of the soul; but, according to that which is gnostic, passing on locally from one intelligible to another, revolving round these by its intellections, and being reflected from the same to the same. Or we should rather say, that souls comprehend in themselves the causes of internal change, and of mutation according to place. In much celebrated intellect, also, we shall find the paradigms subsisting intellectually of these two species of motion. For by participating the nature of the intelligible in intellection, and becoming through intelligence a certain intelligible itself, it is internally changed about the intellectual idiom. For participations are said to impart something of their own nature to their participant. But by intellectually perceiving in the same, according to the same things, and after the same manner, and by energizing about its own intelligible as about a centre, it previously comprehends the paradigm of local circulation. Every where, therefore, we shall find that motions are internal changes and lations, subsisting intellectually in intellect, psychically in soul, and corporeally and divisibly in sensibles; so that we ought not to wonder if these are the only motions; for all others are comprehended in these.

But will it be moved locally <sup>16</sup>? Perhaps so. But indeed if *the one* is moved locally,

<sup>16</sup> Parmenides passes on to the other form of motion, viz. rotation, and shows that neither is *the one* moved according to this. He also divides rotation into motion about the same place, and into a mutation from one place to another. For every thing which is moved according to place, either preserves the same place, so that the whole remains intransitive, and the thing itself is only moved in its parts; or it is moved both in the whole and the parts, and passes from one place to another. For there are these four cases: a thing is neither moved in the whole, nor in the parts; or it is moved in the whole, and not in the parts; or it is moved in the parts, and not in the whole; or it is moved both in the whole and in the parts. But, of these four, it is impossible for the whole to be moved, the parts remaining immovable; since the parts from which the whole consists are moved together with the whole. To be moved neither in the whole nor in the parts belongs to things which stand still. It remains, therefore, either that the whole is not moved, the parts being moved, or that both the whole and the parts are moved. The former of these motions is produced by a sphere or cylinder, when these are moved about their axes; but the latter is effected by a transition from one place to another, when the whole changes its place. It is evident, therefore, from this division, that such are the necessary differences of motion.

These two motions are not only apparent in sensibles, viz. the circular in the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and a motion both according to whole and parts in the sublunary region, but they also subsist in the natures beyond those. For a partial soul, through its ascents and descents, and its transitive energy according to length, contains the paradigm of motions both according to the whole and parts; and intellect, through its intransitive revolution about the intelligible, causally contains the circular motion. And not only intellect, but also every divine soul, through its measured motion about intellect, receives an incorporeal circulation. Parmenides also, says Proclus, when he calls being a sphere, in his poems, and says that it perceives intellectually, evidently calls its intellection spheric motion. But Timæus, bending the progression of the soul according to length, into circles, and making one of these circles external and the other internal, confers both these eternally on the soul according to a demiurgic cause, and an intellectual period prior to that of bodies. Theologians also, Proclus adds, were well acquainted with incorporeal circulation. For the theologian of the Greeks (Orpheus) speaking concerning that first and occult God \* who subsists prior to Phanes, says, "that he moves in an infinite circle with unwearied energy."

\* Ο δ' ἀπειρεσίον κατὰ κύκλου ἀτρυτῶς φοροῖτο.

And the Chaldean Oracles assert that all fountains and principles abide in an *unfluxible* revolution. For, since every thing which is moved in a circle has permanency mingled with motion, they are very properly said always to abide in circulation, the *unfluxible* here signifying *immateriality*. The motions, therefore, of incorporeal natures are comprehended in this division; and so *the one*

\* Viz. the *το ον* or the first being of Plato, the summit of the intelligible order.

locally, it will either be carried round in the same circle, or it will change one place for another. Necessarily so. But ought not that which is carried round in a circle to stand firm in the middle, and to have the other parts of itself rolled about the middle? And can any method be devised by which it is possible that a nature which has neither middle nor parts can be circularly carried about the middle? There cannot be any. But if it changes its place<sup>17</sup>, would it not become situated elsewhere, and thus be moved? In this case it would. Has it not appeared to be impossible that *the one* should be in any thing? It has. Is it not much more impossible that it should *become situated*  
in

is shown to be immovable, as being established above all motion, and not as being partly immovable and partly movable.

<sup>17</sup> That it is impossible for *the one* to pass from one place to another is evident. For either the whole must be within both places; or the whole must be without both; or this part of it must be here, and that in the other place. But if the whole being without is in neither, it cannot be moved from one place to another. If again the whole is within both, neither again will it be moved from the former to the following place. And if one part of it is in this, and another in the remaining place, it will be partible, or consist of parts. But *the one* is not partible; and consequently it cannot be in any thing. And here observe, that though there may be something which is neither without nor within a certain thing, but is both without and within (for thus soul and intellect are said to be in the world and out of it), yet it is impossible for the whole of a thing to be in something, and yet be neither without nor within it. Regarding, therefore, the partible nature of soul, not only ours, but also that which is divine, we may say that it possesses the cause of a motion of this kind, since it is neither wholly within nor yet perfectly without that which is the object of its energy. For the whole of it does not at once apply itself to the conceptions of intellect, since it is not naturally adapted to see these collectively; nor is it wholly separated from intellect, but according to its own different intellections it becomes in a certain respect situated in the different forms of intellect, and introduces itself as it were into its intellections, as into its proper place. Hence Timæus does not refuse to call the soul generated, as he had previously denominated it partible. For soul does not possess a collective intelligence, but all its energies are generated; and in consequence of this its intellections are essentialized in transitions. Hence also time is so intimately connected with soul, that it measures its first energies. Intellect, therefore, appears genuinely to contain the paradigm of a circular motion, possessing as a centre that part of itself which abides, and which is the intelligible of intellect, but the many progressions of forms from this Vesta as it were of itself, as right lines from the centre. But all its energies, which are intellectual of intelligibles, have the relation of the one superficies running round the lines from the centre, and the centre itself. A divine soul, however, contains the paradigm both of a right-lined and circular progression; of the former, as proceeding about the intelligible place, abiding indeed as a whole, but evolving the intelligible by its transitions; but of the latter, as always fixing the whole of itself in the object of intellection: for, as  
T 2 a whole,

in any thing? I do not understand how you mean. If any thing is *becoming to be* in any thing, is it not necessary that it should not yet *be* in it, since it is *becoming to be*; nor yet entirely out of it, since it has already *become*? It is necessary. If therefore this can take place in any other thing, it must certainly happen to that which possesses parts; for one part of it will be in this thing, but another out of it: but that which has no parts cannot by any means be wholly within or without any thing. It is true. But is it not much more impossible that that which neither has parts nor is a whole can be *becoming to be* in any thing; since it can neither subsist in *becoming to be* according to parts, nor according to a whole? So it appears. Hence it will neither change its place by going any where<sup>18</sup>, nor that it may *become situated* in any thing; nor, through being carried round in that which is the same, will it suffer any alteration. It does not appear that it can. *The one* therefore is immovable, according to every kind of motion. Immovable. But we have likewise asserted<sup>19</sup> that it is impossible for

a whole, it both abides and is moved. And in the last place, a partial soul, by its motions according to length, clearly produces the incorporeal cause of a right-lined motion.

<sup>18</sup> Plato here collects all the aforesaid conclusions about motion; and having before enumerated them in a divided manner, he makes one universal conclusion, teaching us through this ascent how it is always requisite in the vision of *the one* to contract multitude into that which is common, and to comprehend parts through the whole. For the things which he had before divided into parts receiving three motions, viz. internal mutation, the right-lined and circular progression, these he now separately enumerates, by saying, that *the one* neither proceeds, nor is circularly borne along, nor is altered; and making an orderly enumeration, he recurs from things proximately demonstrated to such as are prior to them, that he may conjoin the beginning to the end, and may imitate the intellectual circle. And here we may again see that the proposition and the conclusion are universal, but that the demonstrations proceed together with divisions. For stable intellections and conversions contract multitude; but those which subsist according to progression divide the whole into parts, and *the one* into its proper number.

<sup>19</sup> The thing proposed to be shown from the first was to demonstrate that *the one* is unindigent of permanency and motion, and that it is beyond and the cause of both. For the negation of permanency and motion cannot be applied to *the one* in the same manner as to matter. For matter participates of these merely in appearance. It is therefore applied to *the one*, as being better than both these. For, as some one prior to us, says Proclus, observes, because *the one* does not abide, *being* is moved, and because it is not moved, *being* is permanent. For *being* by its stability imitates the immobility of *the one*, and, by its efficacious energy, that which in *the one* is above tension and an establishment in itself. And through both these it is assimilated to *the one*, which is neither.

It

for *the one* to be in any thing. We have said so. It can never therefore be in *same*. Why? Because it would now be in that in which *same* is. Entirely so. But the one can neither be in itself nor in another. It cannot. The one therefore is never in *same*. It does not appear that it is. But as it is never in *same*, it can neither be at rest nor stand still. In this case it cannot. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, neither stands still nor is moved. It does not appear that it can. Nor will it be the same either with another<sup>20</sup>, or with itself; nor again different either from itself or from another.

It is also beautifully observed here by Proclus, that a thing appears to stand still, which is established in *another*, but *to be at rest*, which is able to abide in *itself*. But Parmenides denies both these of *the one*, as not being in another nor in itself. Whether, therefore, there is a certain intellectual tranquillity which is celebrated by the wise, or mystic port, or paternal silence, it is evident that *the one* is exempt from all such things, being beyond energy, silence and quiet, and all the stable signatures which belong to beings.

But here, perhaps, some one may say, it has been sufficiently shown that *the one* is neither moved nor stands still, yet nothing hinders but that he may be called *stability* or motion. To this we reply, that *the one*, as we have before observed, is neither both of two opposites, lest he should become not one, and there should be prior to it that which mingles the opposites; nor is it the better of the two, lest it should have something which is opposed, and thus, in consequence of containing a property opposite to something else, should again be not one, and not being one should consist of infinite infinites; nor is it the worse of the two, lest it should have something better than itself, and this something better should again in like manner consist of infinite infinites. Hence Plato at length even denies *the one* of it, because that which is first is beyond all opposition, and *the one* is opposed to *the many*.

Let it also be observed that the first permanency and the first motion originate from themselves, the one deriving from itself stable power, and the other efficacious energy; in the same manner as every thing else which is first begins its own energy from itself. So that, when it is said *the one* does not stand, and is not moved, this also implies that it is not permanency, and that it is not motion. Hence, neither must it be said that *the one* is the most firm of all stable things, and the most energetic of every thing that is in motion: for transcendencies of participations do not take away, but strengthen the participations. If, therefore, *the one* does not in short stand, it is not *most firm*. For either *most firm* is only a name, and asserts nothing concerning *the one*, or it manifests that it is most stable. And if it is not in any respect moved, it is not *most energetic*. For, if these words signify nothing, they assert nothing concerning *the one*; but, if they signify that which in the most eminent degree participates of motion, *the one* will not be most energetic. For energy is a certain motion.

<sup>20</sup> Plato here appears to characterise for us the whole demiurgic order, in the same manner as the words prior to these characterise the vivific order, and those again prior to these, that which ranks as the summit in intellects. These things, indeed, as Proclus well observes, appear in a most eminent degree to pertain to the demiurgic series, according to the Platonic narrations concerning

another. How so? For, if different from itself<sup>21</sup>, it would be different  
from

cerning it, and those of other theologists; though, says he, this is dubious to some, who alone consider *permanency* and *motion*, *sameness* and *difference*, philosophically, and do not perceive that these things are first beheld about *the one*, and not about *being*; and that, as there is a twofold number, viz. supereffential and essential, in like manner each of these genera of being first subsist in the divine unities, and afterwards in beings. They likewise do not see that these are signs of the divine and self-perfect orders, and not of the genera or species only of being.

Let it also be observed that the genera of being subsist both in the intelligible and intellectual orders, intelligibly in the former, and intellectually in the latter; and this is just the same as to assert that in intelligibles they subsist absorbed in unity, and without separation, but in intellectuals with separation according to their proper number. So that it is by no means wonderful if the intelligible monad comprehends the whole intellectual pentad, viz. essence, motion, permanency, sameness and difference, without division, and in the most profound union, since through this union all these are after a manner one: for all things, says Proclus, are there without separation according to a *dark mist*, as the theologist \* asserts. *Ἀδιακριτῶν παντῶν ὄντων κατὰ σκοτοεσσαν ὁμιχλὴν φησὶν ὁ θεολόγος.* For if in arithmetic the monad, which is the cause of monadic numbers, contains all those forms or productive principles which the decad comprehends decadically, and the tetrad tetradically, is it at all wonderful that among beings the intelligible monad should comprehend all the genera of being monadically, and without separation; but that another order should contain these dyadically, another tetradically, and another decadically? For ideas also subsist in intelligibles, but not after the same manner as in intellectuals; since in the former they subsist *totally, unitedly, and paternally*; but in the latter *with separation, partially, and demiurgically*. But it is every where necessary that the number of ideas should be suspended from the genera of being. If, therefore, intellectual ideas participate of the intellectual genera, intelligible ideas also must participate of the intelligible genera. But if ideas first subsist tetradically at the extremity of intelligibles, it is necessary that there should be a monadic subsistence of these genera prior to the formal tetrad.

Let us now consider why Plato first takes away from *the one*, *motion* and *permanency*, and afterwards *same* and *different*. We have already indeed said what was the cause of this, viz. that *motion* and *permanency* are twofold, one kind being prior to same and different, according to which every thing proceeds and is converted to its cause, but the other being posterior to same and different, and appearing in the energies of beings. But we shall now, with Proclus, assign the reason of this, after another manner, from the problems themselves. In this first hypothesis then, concerning *the one*, some things are denied of it with respect to itself alone: for *multitude* and *the whole, figure, and the being in a certain thing, motion* and *permanency*, are taken away from *the one* considered with respect to itself. But *same* and *different, similar* and *dissimilar, equal* and *unequal, older* and *younger*, are denied of *the one* both with respect to itself and other things: for *the one* is neither the *same* with itself, nor with others, and in a similar manner with respect to

\* Viz. Orpheus. Agreeably to this, in the Orphic hymn to Protogonus, who subsists at the extremity of the intelligible order, that deity is said "to wipe away from the eyes a dark mist."

Ὅσων ὅς σκοτοεσσαν ἀπημαρῶσας ὁμιχλῆν.

*different,*

from *the one*, and so would not be *the one*. True. And if it should be the same

*different*, and each of the rest. But *that which is the object of opinion or science, or which can be named, or is effable*, are denied of *the one* with respect to other things: for it is unknown to all secondary natures, by these gnostic energies. Negations, therefore, being assumed in a triple respect, viz. of a thing with respect to itself, of itself with respect to others, and of itself both with respect to itself and others, and some of these ranking as first, others as middle, and others as last, hence *motion* and *permanency* are denied of *the one*, as of itself with reference to itself, but *the same* and *different* are denied in a twofold respect, viz. of *the one* with reference to itself, and of itself with reference to other things. Hence the former are co-arranged with first negations, but the latter with such as are middle. Nor is it without reason that he first discourses about the former, and afterwards about the latter. Thus also he denies *the similar* and *the dissimilar*, *the equal* and *the unequal*, *the older* and *the younger*, of *the one* with reference to itself and other things. He likewise through these takes away from *the one*, *essence*, *quantity*, *quality*, and *the when*: for *the same* and *different* pertain to *essences*, *the similar* and *the dissimilar*, to *qualities*, *the equal* and *the unequal*, to *quantities*, and *the older* and *the younger*, to things which exist at a certain time. Plato also, says Proclus, denies *the same* and *the different* of *the one*, knowing that Parmenides in his poems places these in *the one being*: for thus Parmenides speaks—

Ταυτον τ' εν ταυτω μιννει, καθ' εαυτο τε κειται.

i. e. *Same in the same abides, yet by itself subsists.*

It is necessary, therefore, to show that *the one* which is established above *the one being*, is by no means *same*, and much more that it is not *different*: for *sameness* is more allied to *the one* than *difference*. Hence, he takes away both *same* and *different* from *the one*, that he may show that it transcends *the one being*, in which both these subsist according to the verses of Parmenides, not confuting these verses, but taking occasion from them to make this additional assertion. For, if that which participates of sameness and difference is not yet *the true one*, it necessarily follows that *the true one* must subsist prior to these: for whatever is added to *the one* obscures by the addition the unity of the recipient.

<sup>21</sup> There being four problems concerning *same* and *different*, as denied of *the one*, Plato beginning from the former of these, and which are more easily apprehended by us, proceeds through those that remain. But the four problems are as follow: *The one* is not different from itself: *the one* is not different from other things: *the one* is not the same with itself: and *the one* is not the same with other things. Of these four the extremes are the clearest: for that *the one* is not the same with other things is evident, and also that it is not different from itself. But the other two are attended with some difficulty. For how can any one admit that that which is one is not the same with itself? Or how is it possible not to be persuaded, that it is not different from other things, since it is exempt from them?

Let us then consider how the first of these problems is demonstrated, viz. that *the one* is not different from itself. It is, therefore, demonstrated as follows: If *the one* is different from itself, it will be entirely different from *the one*. But that which is different from *the one*, is not *one*:

same with another <sup>22</sup>, it would be that thing and would not be itself; so that neither could it thus be *the one*, but it would be something different from  
*the*

for that which is different from man is not man, and that which is different from horse is not horse; and, in short, that which is different from any thing is not that thing. If, therefore, *the one* is different from itself, *the one* is not *one*. And this absurdity leads us to contradiction, that *the one* is not *one*. *The one*, therefore, is not different from itself. Some one, however, may doubt against this demonstration, whether it may not thus be shown that *difference* is not *different* from itself; though indeed it is necessary that it should. For every true being begins its energy from itself, as we have before observed: and the Eleatean guest, in the *Sophista*, says that the nature of *difference* is different from the other genera. But if *difference* is different from itself, it will not be *difference*; and hence *difference* is not different from itself. May we not say, therefore, that difference begins indeed its energy from itself, and makes itself different, yet not different from itself, but from other things? For it is able to separate them from each other, and, by a much greater priority, itself from them: and thus its energy is directed to itself, in preserving itself unconfused with other things. It may also be said, and that more truly, that *difference* so far as it is different from itself is not *difference*: for it is different from itself through the participation of the other genera of being. So far, therefore, as it participates of other things, so far it is not difference. Nor is it absurd that this should be the case with *difference*: for it is *multitude*. But it is absurd that this should be the case with *the one*: for it is *one* alone, and nothing else.

<sup>22</sup> This is the second of the four problems, which is indeed more easily to be apprehended than those that follow, but is more difficult than the one that precedes it. Plato, therefore, confides in the assertion that *the one* receives nothing from other things. For this is an axiom of all others the most true, both when applied to *the one*, and to all other causes; since no cause receives any thing from that which is subordinate to itself. For neither do the heavens receive into themselves any thing of mortal molestation; nor does the demiurgus receive any thing from the generation which is about the whole world; nor do intelligibles participate of multitude from the intellectual order, and the separation which it contains. So that neither can *the one* be filled from the idiom of beings, and consequently it is by no means the same with other things. For it would either participate of the things themselves, or of things proceeding from them, or both they and *the one* would participate of some other one. But both cannot participate of another one: for nothing is better than *the one*, nor is there any thing which is more one; since in this case there would be something prior to *the one*. For the ascent is to *the one*, and not to multitude; since things more elevated always possess more of the nature of unity, as for instance, soul than body. Nor does *the one* participate of things themselves, since these are worse than it, nor of things proceeding from them: for it is at once exempt from all things, and is the object of desire to all beings, subsisting as an imparticipable prior to wholes, that it may be *one* without multitude; since the participated one is not in every respect one. In no respect, therefore, is *the one* the same with others. And thus it appears from common conceptions that the assertion is true.

Let

*the one*. It could not indeed. But, if it is the same with another, must it not be different from itself? It must. But it will not be different<sup>23</sup> from another

Let us now consider the demonstration of Parmenides, which is as follows: If *the one* is the same with any thing else, it will be the same with that which is not one: for it is itself *the one*. Hence also it is at the same time evident, that it is impossible for the true one to be two: for the two will differ from each other. Each, therefore, being one and differing from the other, each in consequence of possessing difference together with unity, will no longer be one. Hence *the one* is alone one. That, therefore, which is different from it is not one. Hence, if *the one* is the same with another, it is clearly the same with non-one: for that which is the same with *the one* is one, and that which is the same with non-man is non-man. If, therefore, *the one* is the same with any other thing besides itself, *the one* is not one. But if not one it is different from *the one*; which was before shown to be absurd. Parmenides also adds, and it would be different from *the one*, that through the absurdity proximately shown the absurdity of this hypothesis also may become apparent. Thus likewise it may be demonstrated that sameness itself is not sameness, if there is any instance in which it is in a certain respect the same with difference, or any thing else besides itself. Thus, it may be said that sameness is the same with difference, so far as it participates of difference. If, therefore, it is the same with difference, it is different, and not the same. Nor is there any absurdity in this: for in its own essence it is sameness, but by participation of difference it becomes different. It becomes however the *same* with *difference*, through the participation of difference; which is most paradoxical, that *sameness* should become *same* through *difference*.

<sup>23</sup> Of the two remaining problems Plato again demonstrates the more easy prior to the other. But it is easier to deny that which is more remote from *the one*; and such is *difference*. But sameness is more allied to *the one*; and hence it has a nature more difficult to be separated from it, and requires more abundant discussion. *The one* then, so far as *one*, does not participate of difference: for, if it did, it would be non-one. But every thing which is different from another is said to be so through difference. *The one*, therefore, so far as *one* is not different, because it does not participate of difference. For to be different alone pertains to that which is different from another, and not to *the one*; and such is that which participates of difference. But if *the one* is different through difference, it participates of difference. For *the one* is one thing, and different another; the former being denominated by itself, and the other with relation to something else: so that different is not different by *the one*, but by that which makes different.

But here a doubt may arise, how *the one* is said to be exempt from all things if it is not different from them? For that which is exempt is separated from those things from which it is exempt. But every thing which is separated is separated through difference: for *difference* is the source of division, but *sameness* of connexion. In answer to this it may be said, that *the one* is exempt and separate from all things, but that it does not possess this separation through difference, but from another ineffable transcendancy, and not such as that which difference imparts to beings. For, as both the world and intellect subsist for ever, but the *ever* is not the same in both, being *temporal* in the former, and *eternal* in the latter, and exempt from all time; so intellect is exempt from the

another while it is *the one*. For it does not belong to *the one* to be different from another, but to that alone which is different from another, and to no other. Right. In consequence, therefore, of its being *the one*, it will not be another; or do you think that it can? Certainly not. But if it is not different from another, neither will it be different from itself. But if not different from itself, it will not be that which is *different*; and being in no respect that which is different, it will be different from nothing. Right. Nor yet will it be the same<sup>1</sup> with itself. Why not? Is the nature of *the one* the same with that of *same*? Why? Because, when any thing becomes the same with any thing, it does not on this account become one. But what then? That which becomes the same with many things must necessarily become many, and not one. True. But if *the one* and *same* differ in no respect, whenever any thing becomes *same* it will always become *the one*, and whenever it becomes *the one* it will be *same*. Entirely so. If, therefore, *the one* should be the *same* with itself, it would be to itself that which is *not one*; and so that which is one will not be one. But this indeed is impossible. It is impossible, therefore, for *the one* to be either different from another, or the same with itself. Impossible. And thus *the one* will neither be *different*<sup>2</sup> nor *the same*, either with respect to itself or another. It

world, and *the one* from beings; but the exempt subsistence of intellect is derived from *difference* which separates beings, but that of *the one* is prior to *difference*. For *difference* imitates that which is exempt and unmingled in *the one*, just as *sameness* imitates its ineffable *oneness*.

<sup>1</sup> This is the fourth of the problems, that *the one* is not the *same* with itself, neither as *sameness*, nor as participating of *sameness*: and, in the first place, he shows that it is not as *sameness*. For, if *the one* is *sameness*, it is necessary that every thing which participates of *sameness* should according to that participation become one. It is however possible that a thing so far as it participates of *sameness* may become many, as is evident in that which becomes the same with many qualities. *Sameness*, therefore, is not *the one*. For, as that which becomes the same with man is man, and that which becomes the same with the white is white, and with the black, black, and, in short, in every thing, that which is the same with any form entirely receives that with which it is said to become the same,—so that which becomes the same with many things, so far as it is many, is the same with them. But, so far as it is many, it is impossible that it can be one. And hence *sameness* is not *the one*.

<sup>2</sup> This is the common conclusion of the four problems, and which reverts to the first proposition. We may also see that Plato begins from *the different* and ends in *the different*, imitating, both by the conciseness of the conclusion and in making the end the same with the beginning, the

It will not. But neither will it be similar <sup>1</sup> to any thing, or dissimilar either to itself or to another. Why not? Because the similar is that which in a certain

the circle of intellectual energy. It is also beautifully observed here by Proclus, that as *difference* in beings is twofold, or rather triple, viz. that of things more excellent, that of things subordinate, and that of things coordinate,—hence in supereffential natures *transcendency* must be assumed instead of the *difference* which subsists in forms between the more excellent and the inferior; *subjection* instead of the *difference* of the inferior with respect to the superior; and *idion* instead of the *separation* of things coordinate from each other. *The one*, therefore, transcends all things; and neither is *the one* different from other things, nor are other things different from *the one*. But if we employ such like appellations, and assert that other things are different from *the one*, we should look to the imbecility of human nature, and pardon such assertions. For that we cannot properly predicate any thing of *the one*, Plato himself indicates at the end of this hypothesis: at the same time, however, we assert something *concerning* it, through the spontaneous parturition of the soul about *the one*.

<sup>1</sup> Parmenides, says Proclus, passes from the *demiurgic* to the *assimilative* order, the idiom of which is to be alone supermundane, and through which all the *mundane* and *liberated* genera are assimilated to the intellectual Gods, and are conjoined with the demiurgic monad, which rules over wholes with exempt transcendency. From this demiurgic monad, too, all the assimilative order proceeds. But it imitates the *sameness* which is there through similitude, exhibiting in a more partial manner that power of *sameness* which is collective and connective of wholes. It likewise imitates *demiurgic difference*, through dissimilitude, expressing its separating and divisive power through unconfused purity with respect to the extremes. Nor must we here admit, as Proclus well observes, that which was asserted by some of the ancients, viz. that *similitude* is *remitted sameness*, and *dissimilitude* *remitted difference*. For neither are there any intentions and remissions in the Gods, nor things indefinite, and the more and the less, but all things are there established in their proper boundaries and proper measures. Hence, it more accords with divine natures to assert such things of them as can be manifested by analogy. For Plato also admits analogy in these, in the Republic establishing *the good* to be that in intelligibles which *the sun* is in sensibles. Similitude, therefore, and dissimilitude are that in secondary which *sameness* and *difference* are in the natures prior to them: and the similar and the dissimilar are the first progeny of *sameness* and *difference*. The equal, also, and the unequal proceed from thence, but prior to these are similitude and dissimilitude: for the similar is more in forms than the equal, and the dissimilar more than the unequal. Hence, they are proximately suspended from the demiurgic monad; and on this account Timæus not only represents the demiurgus making the world, but also *assimilating* it to animal itself more than it was before; indicating by this that the *assimilative* cause presubsists in the fabricator of the universe. With great propriety, therefore, Plato proceeds to the assimilative order after the demiurgic monad, taking away this also from *the one*.

But the method of the problems is the same as before: for here also there are four problems, viz. if *the one* is similar to itself; if *the one* is dissimilar to itself; if *the one* is similar to other things;

certain respect suffers <sup>1</sup> *same*. Certainly. But it has appeared that *same* is naturally separate from *the one*. It has appeared so. But if *the one* should suffer any thing except being *the one* which *is*, it would become more than *the one*: but this is impossible. Certainly. In no respect, therefore, can *the*  
*one*

if *the one* is dissimilar to other things. But all the demonstrations, that none of these is adapted to *the one*, originate from sameness and difference, the media, according to demonstrative rules, being the proper causes of the thing. Hence, he often frames the demonstration from things remote, and not from things which have been proximately demonstrated. For things in a higher order, and which have a prior subsistence, are not always generative of secondary natures, but they perfect, or defend, or employ a providential care about, but are not entirely generative of them. Thus, for instance, Plato demonstrates that *the one* is not a *whole*, and has not *parts*, from *the many*: for thence the intellectual wholeness proceeds. He demonstrates that it has not *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*, from *whole* and *parts*: for the order characterized by *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*, is proximately produced from these. Again, he demonstrates that *the one* is neither *straight* nor *round*, from *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*: for the *straight* and *round* thence receive their generation. But he shows that *the one* is neither in *itself*, nor in *another*, from that order, and not from figure, though according to progression this is arranged before it. And he demonstrates that *the one* neither stands nor is moved, from *not being in any thing*, and from *not having a middle*, and from *not having parts*. Thus, also, in the demonstrations concerning *similitude* and *dissimilitude*, he derives the negations which are negative of *the one* from *sameness* and *difference*: for the latter are the sources of progression to the former.

<sup>1</sup> The syllogism which furnishes us with a proof that *the one* is not similar, neither to itself nor to another, proceeds geometrically as follows, Plato having first defined what the similar is. That, then, which suffers a certain something which is the same, is said to be similar to that with which it suffers something the same. For, we say that two white things are similar, and also two black, in consequence of the former being the passive recipients of the white, and the latter of the black. And again, if you say that a white thing and a black thing are similar to each other, you will say that they are similar from the participation of colour, which is their common genus. The syllogism, therefore, is as follows: *The one* suffers nothing the same, neither with itself nor with another: *the similar* suffers something the same, either with itself or with another: *the one*, therefore, is not similar, neither to itself nor to another. Such being the syllogism, Plato thinks that one of the propositions alone requires assistance, viz. that which asserts that *the one* does not suffer any thing the same, neither with itself nor with another.

And here, as Proclus well observes, we may see what caution Plato uses: for he does not say if *the one* should suffer *the one*, but if *the one* should suffer any thing, except being *the one which is*, *χωρίς του ἐν εἶναι*, for it is *the one*, and does not suffer it; since every thing which suffers, or is passive, is many. For he calls the participation of any thing a passion. Does he not, therefore, in saying that *the one* suffers nothing else, but *the one which is*, indicate in a very wonderful manner that even *the one* is subordinate to the principle of all things? which indeed he says it is at the

*one* suffer to be the same, either with another or with itself. It does not appear that it can. It cannot, therefore, be similar either to another or to itself. So it seems. Nor yet can *the one* suffer to be another; for thus it would suffer to be more than *the one*. More, indeed. But that which suffers to be different, either from itself or from another, will be dissimilar either to itself or to another, if that which suffers *same* is similar. Right. But *the one*, as it appears, since it in no respect suffers *different*, can in no respect be dissimilar either to itself or to another. It certainly cannot. *The one*, therefore, will neither be similar nor dissimilar, either to another or to itself. It does not appear that it can.

end of this hypothesis. He also indicates that the addition of this assertion to the principle of things is foreign to it, though more allied to it than other things, because it is not possible to conceive any thing more venerable than *the one*.

Should it be asked whence it is that what suffers the same is similar, we reply that similitude is the progeny of sameness, in the same manner as sameness of *the one*. Sameness, therefore, participates of *the one*, and similitude of sameness. For, this it is to suffer, to participate of another, and to proceed according to another more ancient cause.

Let it also be observed, that when it is said that all things are similar to *the one*, in consequence of ineffably proceeding from thence, they must not be understood to be similar according to this similitude, but alone according to that union which pervades to all beings from *the one*, and the spontaneous desire of all things about *the one*. For all things are what they are from a desire of *the one*, through *the one*; and in consequence of this parturition every thing being filled with a union adapted to its nature, is assimilated to the one cause of all things. Hence, it is not assimilated to similars; lest the ineffable principle itself should also appear to be similar to other things; but, if it be lawful so to speak, it is assimilated to the paradigm of things similar to this highest cause. Beings, therefore, are assimilated to *the one*; but they are assimilated through an ineffable desire of *the one*, and not through this assimilative order, or the form of similitude. For the assimilative which immediately subsists after the intellectual order, is not able to conjoin and draw upwards all beings to *the one*; but its province is to elevate things posterior to itself to the intellectual demiurgic monad. When, therefore, it is said that every progression is effected through similitude, it is requisite to pardon the names which we are accustomed to use in speaking of beings, when they are applied to the unfolding into light of all things from the ineffable principle of all. For, as we call him *the one*, in consequence of perceiving nothing more venerable, nothing more holy, in beings than unity, so we characterize the progression of all things from him by *similitude*, not being able to give any name to such progression more perfect than this. Thus also Socrates, in the Republic, calls this ineffable principle, according to analogy, the *idea* of the good; because *the good*, or *the one*, is that to all beings which every intelligible idea is to the proper series subsisting from and with relation to it.

But

But since it is such, it will neither be equal<sup>1</sup> nor unequal, either to itself or to another. How so? If it were equal, indeed, it would be of the same

<sup>1</sup> After the assimilative order of Gods, which is supermundane alone, antient theologians arrange that which is denominated liberated, the peculiarity of which, according to them, is to be exempt from mundane affairs, and at the same time to communicate with them. They are also proximately carried in the mundane Gods; and hence they say that they are allotted the medium of the supermundane and mundane Gods. This liberated order, therefore, Plato delivers to us in the second hypothesis, and also there says what the idiom of it is, and that it is *touching*: for it is in a certain respect mundane and supermundane, being collective of those that are properly called mundane Gods, and producing into multitude the union of all the assimilative and supermundane series. Here, however, Plato omits this order, and passes on to those Gods that are alone mundane; the reason of which we shall endeavour to assign in commenting on the second hypothesis.

The peculiarity, therefore, of the mundane Gods is *the equal* and *the unequal*, the former of these indicating their fulness, and their receiving neither any addition nor ablation; (for such is that which is equal to itself, always preserving the same boundary;) but the latter, the multitude of their powers, and the excess and defect which they contain. For, in these, divisions, variety of powers, differences of progressions, analogies, and bonds through these, are, according to antient theologians, especially allotted a place. Hence, Timæus also constitutes souls through analogy, the causes of which must necessarily preexist in the Gods that proximately preside over souls: and as all analogies subsist from equality, Plato very properly indicates the idiom of these divinities by the equal and the unequal. But he now very properly frames the demonstrations of the negations of the equal and the unequal from *sameness* and *the many*, and not from *the similar* and *the dissimilar*, though he proximately spoke of these. For every mundane deity proceeds from the demiurgic monad, and the first multitude which he first denies of the one.

Of this then we must be entirely persuaded, that the things from which demonstrations consist are the preceding causes of the particulars about which Parmenides discourses; so that *the equal* and *the unequal*, so far as they proceed from *the one*, and subsist through *sameness* and *the many*, so far through these they are denied of *the one*. Hence, Plato thus begins his discourse concerning them:—"But since it is such," viz. not as we have just now demonstrated, but as was formerly shown, that it neither receives *same* nor *different*, and is *without multitude*,—being such, it is neither equal nor unequal, neither to itself nor to others: for, again, there are here twofold conclusions, in the same manner as concerning the similar and the dissimilar, and the same and the different. But that *the equal* and *the unequal* are suspended from the twofold coordinations of divine natures is not immanifest. For *the equal* is arranged under *the similar*, and *the same, subsistence in another, the round, and the whole*; but *the unequal*, under *the dissimilar, the different, subsistence in itself, the straight, and the possession of parts*. And again, of these the former are suspended from *bound*, and the latter from *infinity*. Plato also appears to produce the discourse through certain oppositions, as it were, that he may show that *the one* is above all opposition. For *the one* cannot be the worse of the two opposites, since this would be absurd; nor can it be the better of the two, since

same<sup>1</sup> measures with that to which it is equal. Certainly. But that which is greater or lesser than the things with which it is commensurate, will possess more measures than the lesser quantities, but fewer than the greater. Certainly. But to those to which it is incommensurable, with respect to the one part, it will consist of lesser; and with respect to the other, of greater measures. How should it not? Is it not, therefore, impossible that that which does not participate of *same* should either be of the same measures, or admit any thing in any respect the same? It is im-

in this case it would not be the cause of all things. For the better opposite is not the cause of the worse, but in a certain respect communicates with it, without being properly its cause. For neither does sameness give subsistence to difference, nor permanency to motion; but comprehension and union pervade from the better to the worse.

<sup>1</sup> It is by no means wonderful that the demonstrations of *the equal* and *the unequal*, which are here assumed as symbols of mundane deity, should be adapted to physical and mathematical equals, to the equals in the reasons of soul, and to those in intellectual forms. For it is necessary that demonstrations in all these negations should begin supernally, and should extend through all secondary natures, that they may show that *the one* of the Gods is exempt from intellectual, psychical, mathematical, and physical forms. All such axioms, therefore, as are now assumed concerning things equal and unequal, must be adapted to this order of Gods. Hence, says Proclus, as it contains many powers, some of which are coordinate with each other, and extend themselves to the self-perfect and the good, but others differ according to transcendency and subject in—the former must be said to be characterized by *equality*, but the latter by *inequality*. For *the good* is the measure of every thing: and hence such things as are united by the same good are measured by the same measure, and are equal to each other. But things which are uncoordinated with each other make their progression according to the unequal.

Since, however, of things unequal, some are commensurate and others incommensurate, it is evident that these also must be adapted to divine natures. Hence commensuration must be referred to those Gods, through whom secondary natures are mingled with those prior to them, and participate of the whole of more excellent beings: for thus, in things commensurate, the lesser is willing to have a common measure with the greater, the same thing measuring the whole of each. But incommensuration must be ascribed to those divinities from whom things subordinate, through the exempt transcendency of more excellent natures, participate of them in a certain respect, but are incapable through their subjection of being conjoined with the whole of them. For the communion from first to partial and multifarious natures is incommensurate to the latter. If, indeed, *the equal* and *the unequal* are symbols of the mundane Gods, *the commensurate* and *the incommensurate* are here very properly introduced. For in things incorporeal and immaterial this opposition has no place, all things being there effable; but where there is a material subject, and a mixture of form and something formless, there an opposition of commensuration very properly subsists. Hence, as the mundane Gods are proximately connective of souls and bodies, form and matter, a division appears in them, according to *the equal* and *the unequal*.

possible.

possible. It will, therefore, neither be equal to itself nor to another, if it does not consist of the same measures. It does not appear that it will. But if it consists of more or fewer measures, it will be of as many parts as there are measures; and so again it will no longer be *the one*, but as many as there are measures. Right. But if it should be of one measure, it would become equal to that measure: but it has appeared that *the one* cannot be equal to any thing. It has appeared so. *The one*, therefore, neither participates of one measure, nor of many, nor of a few; nor (since it in no respect participates of *same*) can it ever, as it appears, be equal to itself or to another, nor again greater or lesser either than itself or another. It is in every respect so.

But what? Does it appear that *the one* can be either older<sup>1</sup> or younger,  
or

<sup>1</sup> Plato having proceeded in negations as far as to the mundane Gods, always taking away things in a consequent order from *the one*, through the middle genera, or, to speak more clearly, the negations always producing things secondary, through such as are proximate to *the one*, from the exempt cause of wholes, he is now about to separate from *the one* the divine essence itself, which first participates of the Gods, and receives their progression into the world; or, to speak more accurately, he is now about to produce this essence from the ineffable fountain of all beings. For, as every thing which has being derives its subsistence from the monad of beings, both *true being*, and that which is assimilated to it, which of itself indeed is not, but through its communion with true being receives an obscure representation of being; in like manner, from the one unity of every deity, the peculiarity of which, if it be lawful so to speak, is to deify all things according to a certain exempt and ineffable transcendence, every divine number subsists, or rather proceeds, and every deified order of things. The design, therefore, as we have before observed, of what is now said, is to show that *the one* is exempt from this essence. And here we may see how Parmenides subverts their hypothesis who contend that the first cause is soul, or any thing else of this kind, and this by showing that *the one* does not participate of time: for it is impossible that a nature which is exempt from time should be soul; since every soul participates of time, and uses periods which are measured by time. *The one* also is better than and is beyond intellect, because every intellect is both moved and permanent; but it is demonstrated that *the one* neither stands nor is moved: so that, as Proclus well observes, through these things the three hypostases which rank as principles, viz. *the one*, *intellect*, and *soul*, become known to us (ὡς τε δια τούτων τὰς τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστάσεις ἐχοίμεν αὐ γινώσκοντας γεγεννημένας.) But that *the one* is perfectly exempt from time, Parmenides demonstrates by showing in the first place that it is neither older, nor younger, nor of the same age with itself, nor with any other. For every thing which participates of time necessarily participates of these; so that by showing that *the one* is exempt from these which happen to every thing that participates of time, he also shows that *the one* has no connexion with time. This, however, says Proclus, is incredible to the many; and appeared so to the physiologists

or be of the same age? What should hinder? If it had in any respect the same

gifts prior to Plato, who thought that all things were comprehended in time, and that, if there is any thing perpetual, it is infinite time, but that there is not any thing which time does not measure. For, as they were of opinion that all things are in place, in consequence of thinking that all things are bodies, and that nothing is incorporeal, so they thought that all things subsist in time, and are in motion, and that nothing is immovable; for the conception of bodies introduces with itself place, but motion time. As therefore it was demonstrated that *the one* is not in place, because it is not in another, and on this account is incorporeal,—in like manner through these arguments it is also shown that neither is it in time, and on this account that it is not soul, nor any thing else which requires and participates of time, either according to essence or according to energy.

And here it is well worthy our observation, that Parmenides no longer stops at the dyad as in the former conclusions, but triadically enumerates the peculiarities of this order, viz. *the older, the younger, and the possession of the same age*, though, as Proclus justly observes, he might have said dyadically, *of an equal age, and of an unequal age*, as there *the equal and the unequal*. But there indeed, having previously introduced the dyad, he passes from the division of the unequal to the triadic distribution; but here he begins from the triad. For there union precedes multitude, and the whole the parts; but in this order of things multitude is most apparent, and a division into parts, as Timæus says, whom Parmenides, in what is now said, imitating begins indeed from the triad, but proceeds as far as to the hexad. For *the older and the younger, and the possession of the same age*, are doubled, being divided into *itself and relation to another*. That the triad, indeed, and the hexad are adapted to this order, is not immanifest: for the triple nature of soul, consisting of *essence, same, and different*, and its triple power, which receives its completion from the charioteer and the two horses, as we learn from the Phædrus, evince its alliance with the triad; and its essence being combined from both these shows its natural alliance with the hexad.

And here it is necessary to observe, that as the discourse is about divine souls who are deified by always participating of the Gods, *time* according to its first subsistence pertains to these souls,—not that which proceeds into the apparent, but that which is liberated, and without habitude; and this is the time which is now denied of *the one*. All the periods of souls, their harmonious motions about the intelligible, and their circulations, are measured by this time. For it has a supernal origin, imitates eternity, and connects, evolves, and perfects every motion, whether vital, or pertaining to soul, or in whatever other manner it may be said to subsist. This time also is indeed essentially an intellect; but it is the cause to divine souls of their harmonic and infinite motion about the intelligible, through which these likewise are led to *the older* and to *the same age*: and this in a twofold respect. For *the older* in these *with respect to themselves* takes place, so far as with their more excellent powers they more enjoy the infinity of time, and participate it more abundantly: for they are not filled with similar perfection from more divine natures, according to all their powers, but with some more, and with others less. But that is said to be older which participates more of time. That which is older in these divine souls *with respect to other things* is effected so far as some of these receive the whole measure of time,

same<sup>1</sup> age, either with itself or with another, it would participate equally of time and similitude, which we have nevertheless asserted *the one* does not participate.

and the whole of its extension proceeding to souls, but others are measured by more partial periods. Those, therefore, are older, whose period is more total, and is extended to a longer time. They may also be said to be *older and at the same time younger with respect to themselves*, by becoming *hoary* as it were above, through extending themselves to the whole power of time, but *juvenile* beneath, by enjoying time more partially. But, *as with respect to others*, they may be said to be *older and at the same time younger*, according to a subjection of energy: for that which has its circulation measured by a lesser period is *younger* than that whose circulation is measured by a more extended period. Again, among things coordinate, that which has the same participation and the same measure of perfection with others may be said to be of *the same age with itself and others*. But every divine soul, though its own period is measured according to one time, and that of the body which is suspended from it according to another, yet it has an equal restitution to the same condition; itself always according to its own time, and its body also according to its time. Hence, again, it is of the same age with itself and its body, according to the analogous.

By thus interpreting what is now said of *the one*, we shall accord with Plato, in the *Timæus*, who there evinces that *time* is the measure of every transitive life, and who says that soul is the origin of a divine and wise life through the whole of time. And we shall also accord with his assertion in the *Phædrus*, that souls see true being through time, because they perceive *temporally*, and not *eternally*.

<sup>1</sup> Plato here demonstrates that *the one* is neither older nor younger than itself, or another. For, it was necessary to show that *the one* is beyond every divine soul, prior to other souls, in the same manner as it is demonstrated to be prior to true beings, and to be the cause of all things. Nor must it be on this account admitted that *the one* comprehends in itself the causes of all things, and through this is multitude. For every cause is the cause of one particular property; as, for instance, *animal itself* is the cause alone to animals of a subsistence as animals; and, in the same manner, every intelligible produces other things, according to its idiom alone. *The one*, therefore, is the cause of *unities*, and of *union* to all things; and all things are thence derived, either as being unities, or as composed from certain unities: for being itself, and, in short, every thing, is either as *one*, or as consisting from certain unities. For, if it is *united*, it is evident that it consists from certain things; and if these are unities the consequence is manifest: but if they are things united, we must again pass on to the things from which they are composed, and thus proceeding ad infinitum, we must end in certain unities, from which, as elements, that which is united consists. Hence it follows that all things are either unities or numbers. For that which is not a *unity*, but *united*, if it consists from certain definite unities, is number, and this will be the first number, subsisting from things indivisible: for every unity is indivisible. But the number of beings is from beings, and not from things indivisible. So that, if there is a certain cause of beings, it is the cause of all beings; but if there is a certain cause of the unities from which all things consist, it is indeed the cause of all things: for there is no longer any thing which is not either a unity, or composed from unities. Hence, it is not proper to say that the causes of all things are

participate. We have asserted so. And this also we have said, that it neither participates of dissimilitude nor inequality. Entirely so. How, therefore, being such, can it either be older or younger than any thing, or possess the same age with any thing? It can in no respect. The one, therefore, will neither be younger nor older, nor will it be of the same age, either with itself or with another. It does not appear that it will. Will it not, therefore, be impossible that *the one* should be at all in time, if it be such? Or, is it not necessary that, if any thing is in time, it should always become older than itself? It is necessary. But is not that which is older<sup>1</sup>, always older than the younger? What then? That, therefore, which is becoming to be older than itself, is at the same time becoming to be younger than itself, if it is about to have that through which it may become older. How do you say? Thus: It is requisite that nothing should subsist in *becoming* to be different from another, when it *is* already different, but that it should

in *the one*, nor, without saying this, to think that *the one* is the cause of certain things, as of unities, and is not at the same time the cause of all things. Since, therefore, it is the cause of every divine soul, so far as these derive their subsistence as well as all beings from the divine unities, with great propriety is it necessary to show that the one is beyond the order of deified souls: for these souls so far as they are intellectual have intellect for their cause; so far as they are essences, they originate from intellect; and so far as they have the form of unity, they are derived from the one; receiving their hypostasis from this, so far as each is a multitude consisting of certain unities, and of these as elements.

<sup>1</sup> That which participates of time is twofold, the one proceeding, as it were, in a right line, and beginning from one thing, and ending in another; but the other proceeding circularly, and having its motion from the same to the same, to which both the beginning and the end are the same, and the motion is unceasing, every thing in it being both beginning and end. That, therefore, which energizes circularly, participates of time periodically: and so far as it departs from the beginning it becomes older, but so far as it approaches to the end it becomes younger. For, becoming nearer the end, it becomes nearer to its proper beginning; but that which becomes nearer to its beginning becomes younger. Hence, that which circularly approaches to the end becomes younger, the same also according to the same becoming older; for that which approximates to its end proceeds to that which is older. That to which the beginning, therefore, is one thing, and the end another, to this the younger is different from the older; but that to which the beginning and the end are the same, is in no respect older than younger, but, as Plato says, at the same time becomes younger and older than itself. Every thing, therefore, which participates of time, if it becomes both older and younger than itself, is circularly moved. But divine souls are of this kind: for they participate of time, and the time of their proper motion is periodical.

*be* now different from that which *is* different, *have been* from that which *was*, and *will be* from that which is *to be hereafter*: but from that which is *becoming to be* different, it ought neither to *have been*, nor *to be hereafter*, nor *to be*, but to subsist in *becoming to be* different, and no otherwise. It is necessary. But the older differs from the younger, and no other. Certainly. Hence, that which is *becoming to be* older than itself, must necessarily at the same time subsist in *becoming to be* younger than itself. It seems so. But likewise it ought not to subsist in *becoming to be* in a longer time than itself, nor yet in a shorter; but in a time equal to itself it should subsist in *becoming to be*, should *be*, *have been*, and *be hereafter*. For these are necessary. It is necessary, therefore, as it appears, that such things as are in time, and participate an affection of this kind, should each one possess the same age with itself, and should subsist in becoming to be both older and younger than itself. It seems so. But no one of these passions belongs to *the one*. None. Neither, therefore, is time present with it, nor does it subsist<sup>1</sup> in any time. It does not, indeed, according to the decisions of reason. What then? Do not the terms *it was*<sup>2</sup>, *it has been*, *it did become*, seem to

<sup>1</sup> As *the one* is not in *time*, because it is not in motion, so neither is it in *eternity*, because it is not in *permanency*: for *eternity abides*, as Timæus says.

<sup>2</sup> This division of time, says Proclus, accords with the multitude of the divine genera which are suspended from divine souls, viz. with angels, dæmons, and heroes. And, in the first place, this division proceeds to them supernally, according to a *triadic* distribution into the *present*, *past*, and *future*; and, in the next place, according to a distribution into nine, each of these three being again subdivided into three. For the monad of souls is united to the one whole of time, but this is participated secondarily by the multitude of souls. And of this multitude those participate of this whole *totally*, that subsist according to *the past*, or *the present*, or *the future*; but those participate it *partially*, that are essentialized according to the differences of these: for to each of the wholes a multitude is coordinated, divided into things first, middle, and last. For a certain multitude subsists in conjunction with that which is established according to the past, the *summit* of which is according to *the was*, but the *middle* according to it *has been*, and the *end* according to it *did become*. With that also which is established according to the *present*, there is another multitude, the *principal* part of which is characterized by *the is*, the *middle* by it *is generated*, and the *end* by it *is becoming to be*. And there is another triad with that which subsists according to the future, the *most elevated part* of which is characterized by the *will be*, that which ranks in the *middle*, by it *may become*, and the *end*, by it *will be generated*. And thus there will be three triads proximately suspended from these three wholenesses, but all these are suspended from their monad.

to signify the participation of the time past? Certainly. And do not the terms *it will be*, *it may become*, and *it will be generated*, signify that which

All these orders which are distributed according to the parts of time, energize according to the whole of time, this whole containing in itself triple powers, one of which is *perfective* of all motion, the second *connects* and *guards* things which are governed by it, and the third *unfolds* divine natures into light. For as all such things as are not eternal are led round in a circle, the *wholeness* or the *monad* of time perfects and connects their essence, and discloses to them the united infinity of eternity, evolving the contracted multitude which subsists in eternal natures; whence also this apparent time, as Timæus says, unfolds to us the measures of divine periods, perfects sensibles, and guards things which are generated in their proper numbers. Time, therefore, possesses triple powers prior to souls, viz. *the perfective*, *the connective*, and *the unfolding*, according to a similitude to eternity. For eternity, possessing a middle order in intelligibles, *perfects* the order posterior to itself, supplying it with union, but *unfolds into light* that which is prior to itself, producing into multitude its ineffable union, and *connects* the middle bond of intelligibles, and guards all things intransitively through its power. Time, therefore, receiving supernally the triple powers of eternity, imparts them to souls. Eternity, however, possesses this triad unitedly; but time unitedly, and at the same time distributively; and souls distributively alone. Hence, of souls, some are characterized according to one, and others according to another power of time; some imitating its *unfolding*, others its *perfective*, and others its *connective* power. Thus also with respect to the Fates, some of these being adapted to give completion and perfection to things, are said to sing the past, always indeed energizing, and always singing, their songs being intellections and fabricative energies about the world: for the *past* is the source of *completion*. Others again of these are adapted to *connect* things present: for they guard the essence and the generation of these. And others are adapted to *unfold* the future: for they lead into essence and to an end that which as yet is not.

We may also say, since there is an order of souls more excellent than ours divided into such as are first, such as are middle, and such as are last, the most total of these are adapted to *the past*. For, as this comprehends in itself the present and the future, so these souls comprehend in themselves the rest. But souls of a middle rank are adapted to *the present*: for this was once *future*, but is not yet *the past*. As, therefore, *the present* contains in itself *the future*, so these middle souls comprehend those posterior, but are comprehended in those prior to themselves. And souls of the third order correspond to *the future*: for this does not proceed through *the present*, nor has become *the past*, but is *the future* alone; just as these third souls are of themselves alone, but, through falling into a most partial subsistence, are by no means comprehensive of others; for they convolve the boundary according to a triadic division of the genera posterior to the Gods.

The whole of the first triad, therefore, has in common the *once*, for this is the peculiarity of the past, and of completion; but it is divided into *the was*, *it was generated*, and *it did become*. Again, therefore, of these three, *the was* signifies the summit of the triad, bounded according to hyparxis itself; but *it was generated*, signifies an at-once-collected perfection; and *it did become*, an extension in being perfected; these things being imitations of intelligibles. For *the was* is an imitation of *being*, *it was generated*, of *eternity*, and *it did become*, of that which is *primarily eternal*: for *being* is derived to all things from the first of these; a subsistence at once as *all* and a *whole* from the second, and an *extension into multitude* from the third.

is about to be hereafter? Certainly. But are not the terms *it is*, and *it is becoming to be*, marks of the present time? Entirely so. If then *the one* participates<sup>1</sup> in no respect of any time, it neither ever *was*, nor *has been*, nor *did become*: nor is it *now generated*, nor is *becoming to be*, nor *is*, nor *may become* hereafter, nor *will be generated*, nor *will be*. It is most true. Is it possible, therefore, that any thing can participate of essence<sup>2</sup>, except

<sup>1</sup> It is not immanifest how the syllogism proceeds in what is now said: *The one* participates of no time; but every thing which once subsisted *was*, or *has been*, or *did become*; every thing which subsists according to the present *is*, or *is generated*, or *is becoming to be*; and every thing which subsists according to the future *will be*, or *may become*, or *will be generated*. But all these distribute the *wholeness* of time. *The one*, therefore, is exempt from, and is expanded above, this temporal triad and the unity from which it is suspended. From all, therefore, that has been said, it is requisite, as Proclus justly observes, to collect this one thing, that *the one* is established above every divine essence characterized by the nature of soul, and which always energizes after the same manner, such as are the souls of the more excellent genera, whether the division of them is made into three, or into nine, or into any other number.

Should it be said, however, that *the one*, though it does not participate of time, may be time itself, for the first cause is denominated time by Orpheus; to this it may be replied, that *the one* cannot be time; since in this case the perfection proceeding from it would extend no further than souls, and things which are moved. For eternal natures are more excellent than such as energize according to time. *The one*, therefore, would be the cause of subordinate only, and not of superior natures; and thus would not be the cause of all things. But the first cause, says Proclus, was denominated time by Orpheus, according to a certain wonderful analogy: for the theologist symbolically calls the mystical processions of unbegotten natures, generations; and the cause of the unfolding into light of divine natures, Time; for, where there is generation, there also there is time. Thus, the generation of sensibles is according to mundane time, that of souls according to supercelestial time, and that of things eternal according to *the one*. Proclus beautifully adds: As therefore we endure to hear the sleepless energy of divine natures separate from the objects of their providential care, denominated sleep, their union, a bond, and their progression, a solution from bonds, so also we must endure those that introduce time and generation to things without time, and which are unbegotten.

<sup>2</sup> Having proceeded as far as to a deified essence, and which always energizes after the same manner, and having denied all the orders of *the one*, viz. the divine, the intellectual, and such as are psychical, we must again recur through a nature common to all the aforefaid orders, or, in other words, through *being* to the intelligible monad of all beings, and from this also we must exempt *the one*. For, as we before observed, Plato does not make the beginning of his negations from the summit of intelligibles, but from the summit of the intellectual order: for there *the many* are generated, as we shall show in commenting on the second hypothesis. But essence which subsists according to *the one being*, is prior to these *many*, and to all the above-mentioned orders. Hence, from all these, as participating of *essence* in common, we recur to *essence itself*,  
and

according to some one of these? It is not. In no respect, therefore, does *the one* participate of essence. It does not appear that it can. *The one*, therefore,

and make a negation even of this. For every thing which participates of essence participates of it according to some one of these, not indeed of those that are proximately enumerated, but of all together that the first hypothesis contains, such as *whole*, or having *parts*, or having *beginning*, *middle*, and *end*, or *being in itself*, or *in another*, and every thing else which is there denied of *the one*; so that it follows, as was before observed, that such things only are assumed as are consequent to beings so far as they are beings, and not so far as they are certain vital or intellectual natures. For every thing, says he, which in any respect participates of essence, participates of it according to some one of these negations. *The one*, therefore, does not participate of essence. Thus also Socrates, in the Republic, says, that *the good* is beyond essence, and is not essence, but is the cause of it, and is beyond every thing intellectual and intelligible, in the same manner as the sun is the cause of all visible natures, by *essence* meaning the same as *being* ( $\tau\omicron\ \omicron\upsilon$ ). For Plato here clearly says, that it is not possible for any thing *to be*, unless it participates of *essence*: and in the Timæus he makes a similar assertion. If, therefore, the first cause is superessential and above all being, it is false to assert that he *is*: for, since he is beyond *essence*, he is also exempt from *being*. And in this, as Proclus well observes, Parmenides in Plato differs from Parmenides in his verses, because the latter looks to *the one being*, and says that this is the cause of all things; but the former ascending from *the one being* to that which is *one alone* and prior to being, he denies of *the one* the participation of essence.

And here observe, that Plato does not adopt the conclusion that *the one is not* through demonstration, because it was not possible to demonstrate this directly through the alliance of *being* with *the one*. For, as we have before observed, in negations, things more allied are more difficult to be demonstrated. But if this be true, it is evident that *the one is not*. For every thing about *the one* which is added to it diminishes its exempt transcendency.

Should it be asked why Parmenides does not begin his negations from *the is*, but from *the many*, and neither separates the order which immediately subsists after *the one*, and thus proceeds as far as to the last of things, nor, separating *the one* from these, ascends as far as to the summit of beings, we reply, that the negation of essence would be contrary to the hypothesis: for the hypothesis says that *the one is*, but the negation that it *is not*. It would, therefore, be of all things the most ridiculous to say immediately from the beginning, if *the one is*, *the one is not*: for the assertion would appear to subvert itself. Hence, employing the *is*, and saying, as if it made no difference, *if the one is*, Parmenides finds that *the many* appear to be especially opposed to *the one*.

That *the one*, indeed, according to Plato, is above all essence, is evident from the testimony of Speusippus, according to Proclus, who also adds, that Speusippus confirms this from the opinion of the ancients, when he says they thought that *the one* is better than *being*, and is the principle of *being*, free from all habitude to subsequent natures, just as *the good itself* is separated from the condition of every other good. But Speusippus there calls the first being the proper principle of beings, and boundless divinity depending on *the one*.

Parmenides,

fore, *is* in no respect. So it seems. Hence, it is not in such a manner as *to be* one, for thus it would be being, and participate of essence: but, as it appears, the one neither *is one* nor *is*, if it be proper to believe in reasoning of this kind. It appears so. But can any thing either belong to, or be affirmed of, that which is not? How can it? Neither, therefore, does any name belong to it, nor discourse, nor any science, nor sense, nor opinion. It does not appear that there can. Hence, it can neither be named, nor

Parmenides, therefore, beginning supernally from the intelligible summit of the first intellectual Gods, and producing in an orderly series the genera of the Gods, and of the natures united and subsequent to them, and always evincing that *the one* is ineffably exempt from all things, again returns from hence to the beginning, and, imitating the conversion of wholes, separates *the one* from the intelligible or highest Gods. For thus especially may we behold its immense transcendency, if we not only show that it is established above the second or third orders in the golden chain of deity, but that it also ranks before the intelligible unities themselves, and evince this in a manner coordinate to the simplicity of those occult natures, and not by various words, but by intellectual projection alone: for intelligibles are naturally adapted to be known by intellect. This, therefore, Parmenides in reality evinces, leaving logical methods, but energizing according to intellect, and asserting that *the one* is beyond essence, and *the one being*. For this is not collected, as we have before observed, from the preceding conclusions; since in this case the belief concerning the highest Gods, who are implied by *essence*, being derived from things inferior to them, would be void of demonstration: for all demonstration, as Aristotle justly observes, is from things naturally prior to, and more honourable than, the conclusions. Hence, Parmenides at the same time infers, that every kind of knowledge, and all the instruments of knowledge, fall short of the transcendency of *the one*, and beautifully end in the ineffable of the God who is beyond all things. For, after scientific energies and intellectual projections, union with the unknown succeeds; to which also Parmenides referring the whole discourse, concludes the first hypothesis, suspending all the divine genera from *the one*, which, as he also shows, is singularly exempt from all things. Hence it is said to be beyond *the one which is conjoined with essence*, and at the same time all the participated multitude of unities.

It is also beautifully observed by Proclus, that by the appellation of *the one* in this dialogue we are not to understand that which is in itself *the one*; but that the inward one resident in our essence, and derived from the first one, as an occult symbol of his nature, is expressed by this appellation. For in every being there is an innate desire of the first cause; and hence, prior to appetite there is a certain occult perception of that which is first.

Lastly, when Parmenides says that *the one* can neither be named nor spoken of, it follows that we are not only incapable of affirming any thing of it, but that even negations of it, though more safe than affirmations, are not to be admitted. For he who openly denies, in the mean time secretly affirms; since to deny any thing of the first, is to separate something from it; and this cannot be effected without forming in ourselves both the first, and that which we separate from it.

spoken

spoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. So it seems. Is it possible, therefore, that these things can thus take place about *the one*? It does not appear to me that they can.

Are you therefore willing that we should return again to the hypothesis from the beginning, and see whether or not by this means any thing shall appear to us different from what it did before? I am entirely willing. Have we not therefore declared if *the one is*, what circumstances ought to happen to it? Is it not so? Certainly. But consider from the beginning, if *the one is*<sup>1</sup>, can it be possible that it should *be*, and yet not participate of *essence*?

<sup>1</sup> This is the beginning of the second hypothesis, which, as we have observed in the Introduction to this dialogue, unfolds the whole order of the Gods, and establishes the summit of intelligibles as the first after *the one*, but ends in an essence which participates of time, and in deified souls. In the first place, therefore, let us endeavour to unfold what Plato here occultly delivers concerning the first procession or order of Gods, called the intelligible triad.

As the first cause then is *the one*, and this is the same with *the good*, the universality of things must form a whole, the best and the most profoundly united in all its parts which can possibly be conceived: for *the first good* must be the cause of the greatest good, that is, the whole of things; and as goodness is union, the best production must be that which is most united. But as there is a difference in things, and some are more excellent than others, and this in proportion to their proximity to the first cause, a profound union can no otherwise take place than by the extremity of a superior order coalescing through intimate alliance with the summit of one proximately inferior. Hence the first of bodies, though they are essentially corporeal, yet *κατα σχεσιν*, through *habitude* or *alliance*, are most vital, or lives. The highest of souls are after this manner intellects, and the first of beings are Gods. For, as *being* is the highest of things after *the first cause*, its first subsistence must be according to a supereffential characteristic.

Now that which is supereffential, considered as participated by the highest or *true being*, constitutes that which is called *intelligible*. So that every true being depending on the Gods is a *divine intelligible*. It is *divine*, indeed, as that which is deified; but it is *intelligible*, as the object of desire to intellect, as perfective and connective of its nature, and as the plenitude of *being* itself. But in the first being life and intellect subsist according to cause: for every thing subsists either according to *cause*, or according to *hyparxis*, or according to *participation*. That is, every thing may be considered either as subsisting occultly in its cause, or openly in its own order (or according to what it is), or as participated by something else. The first of these is analogous to light when viewed subsisting in its fountain the sun; the second to the light immediately proceeding from the sun; and the third to the splendour communicated to other natures by this light.

The first procession therefore from the first cause will be the intelligible triad, consisting of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, which are the three highest things after the first God, and of which *being*

*essence?* It cannot. Will not essence therefore be the *essence of the one*, but not the same with *the one?* for, if it were the same, it would not be the essence

is prior to *life*, and *life* to *intellect*. For whatever partakes of life partakes also of being: but the contrary is not true, and therefore being is above life; since it is the characteristic of higher natures to extend their communications beyond such as are subordinate. But *life* is prior to *intellect*, because all intellectual natures are vital, but all vital natures are not intellectual. But in this intelligible triad, on account of its superessential characteristic, all things may be considered as subsisting according to cause: and consequently number here has not a proper subsistence, but is involved in unproceeding union, and absorbed in super-essential light. Hence, when it is called a triad, we must not suppose that any *essential distinction* takes place, but must consider this appellation as expressive of its ineffable perfection. For, as it is the nearest of all things to *the one*, its union must be transcendently profound and ineffably occult.

All the Gods indeed considered according to their unities are all in all, and are at the same time united with the first God like rays to light, or lines to a centre. And hence they are all established in the first cause (as Proclus beautifully observes) like the roots of trees in the earth; so that they are all as much as possible superessential, just as trees are eminently of an earthly nature, without at the same time being earth itself: for the nature of the earth as being a whole, or subsisting according to the eternal, is different from the partial natures which it produces. The intelligible triad, therefore, from its being wholly of a superessential idiom, must possess an inconceivable profundity of union, both with itself and its cause, so as to subsist wholly according to *the united*, το ἠνωμενον; and hence it appears to the eye of pure intellect, as one simple indivisible splendour beaming from an unknown and inaccessible fire.

He then who is able, by opening the greatest eye of the soul, to see that perfectly which subsists without separation, will behold the simplicity of the intelligible triad subsisting in a manner so transcendent as to be apprehended only by a superintellectual energy, and a deific union of the perceiver with this most arcane object of perception. But since in our present state it is impossible to behold an object so astonishingly lucid with a perfect and steady vision, we must be content, as Damascius well observes\*, with a far distant, scarcely attainable, and most obscure glimpse; or with difficulty apprehending a trace of this light like a sudden coruscation bursting on our sight. Such then is the preeminence of the intelligible order, to which, on account of the infirmity of our mental eye, we assign a triple division, beholding as in a mirror a luminous triad, beaming from a uniform light; just, says Damascius, as the uniform colour of the sun appears in a cloud which possesses three catoptric intervals, through the various-coloured nature of the rainbow.

But when we view this order in a distributed way, or as possessing separation in order to accommodate its all-perfect mode of subsistence to our imperfect conceptions, it is necessary to give the triad itself a triple division. For we have said that it consists of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*. But in *being* we may view life and intellect, according to cause; in *life* being according to participation,

\* Vid. Excerpta ex Damascio, a Wolfio, p. 232.

essence of *the one*, nor would *the one* participate of essence; but it would be all one to say *the one is*, and *one one*. But now our hypothesis is not *if one*,  
 what

and intellect according to cause; and in *intellect* both being and life according to participation; while at the same time in reality the whole is profoundly one, and contains all things occultly, or according to cause. But when viewed in this divided manner, each triad is said in the Chaldaic theology to consist of *father*, *power*, and *intellect*; *father* being the same with *hyperaxis*, *unity*, *summit*, or *that which is super-essential*; *power* being a certain pouring forth, or infinity of *the one*\* (or the summit); and on this account, says Damascius, it is present with *father*, as a diffused with an abiding one, and as pouring itself forth into a true chaos: but *intellect*, that is *paternal intellect*, subsisting according to a conversion to the paternal *one*; a conversion transcending all other conversions, as being neither gnostic, nor vital, nor essential, but an unseparated surpassing energy, which is union rather than conversion.

Let not the reader, however, imagine that these names are the inventions of the latter Platonists; for they were well known to Plato himself, as is evident from his *Timæus*. For in that dialogue he calls the artificer of the universe *intellect*, and *father*; and represents him commanding the junior Gods to imitate the *power* which he employed in their generation.

This intelligible triad is occultly signified by Plato, in the *Philebus*, under the dialectic epithets of *bound*, *infinite*, and *that which is mixed*. For all beings (says he) consist or are mingled from *bound* and *infinity*; and consequently *being itself*, which we have already shown has the highest subsistence after the first cause, must be before all things mixed from these two; the former of these, viz. *bound*, being evidently analogous to *the one*, or *father*, and *infinity* to *power*. We may likewise consider him as unfolding the intelligible order in the same dialogue, by the epithets of *symmetry*, *truth*, and *beauty*; which, says he, are requisite to every thing that is mixed. And he adds that this triad subsists in the vestibule of *the good*; evidently alluding by this expression to the profound union of this triad with the incomprehensible cause of all things.

But, in the present dialogue, the intelligible order is delivered by Plato according to an all-perfect distribution into three triads; for the sake of affording us some demonstration, though very obscure and imperfect, of truth so transcendent and immense. In this second hypothesis, therefore, which, as we have already observed, unfolds the various orders of the Gods, each conclusion signifying some particular order, he calls the first of these triads *ἐν ον*, *one being*; *power*, or the middle habitude of both, being here concealed through excess of union; so that here *the one* partakes of *being*, and *being* of *the one*; which, as Proclus well observes, is indeed a circumstance of a most wonderful nature. Parmenides therefore calls this triad *one being*, without mentioning *power*, because the whole triad abides in unproceeding union, subsisting uniformly and without separation. But after this the second triad is allotted a progression, which Parmenides characterises by intelligible *wholeness*, but its parts are *being* and *the one*, and *power*, which is situated in the middle, is here distributive and not unific, as in the former triad. But his discourse concerning this triad commences from hence—"Again, therefore, let us consider if *the*

\* Let the reader be careful to remember that *the one* of the Gods is their superessential characteristic.

what ought to happen, but *if the one is*—Is it not so? Entirely so. Does it not signify that the term *is* is something different from *the one*? Necessarily.

*one* is, what will happen. Consider then whether it is not necessary that this hypothesis should signify such a *one* as possesses parts." But he concludes his speculation thus—"That which is *one* therefore is a whole, and possesses a part."

But after these the third triad subsists, in which all intelligible multitude appears; and which Parmenides indeed (says Proclus) calls a wholeness, but such a one as is composed from a multitude of parts. For after that occult union (says he) of the first triad, and the dyadic distinction of the second, the progression of the third triad is produced, possessing its hypostasis indeed from parts, but then these parts compose a multitude which the triad prior to this generates. For *unity*, *power* and *being* are contained in this third triad; but then each of these is multiplied, and so the whole triad is a wholeness. But since each of its extremities, viz. *the one*, and *being*, is a multitude which is conjoined through a collective power, each of these is again divided and multiplied. For this power conjoining united multitude with the multitude of beings, some of these *one being* perfects through progression; but others, *being which is one*, through communion. Here therefore there are two parts of the wholeness, *one* and *being*. But *the one* participates of *being*: for *the one* of *being* is conjoined with *being*. *The one* of *being* therefore is again divided, so that both *the one* and *being* generate a second unity, connected with a part of *being*. But *being which participates of the one*, or *év*, is again divided into *being* and *the one*: for it generates a more particular *being*, depending on a more particular *unity*. And *being* here belongs to more particular deified beings, and is a more special monad. But *power* is the cause of this progression: for *power* possesses dual effect, and is fabricative of multitude.

Parmenides begins his discourse concerning this triad as follows:—"What then? Can each of these parts of *one being*, that is to say *the one* and *being*, desert each other, so that *the one* shall not be a part of *being*, or *being* shall not be a part of *the one*? By no means." But he finishes thus: "Will not, therefore, *one being* thus become an infinite multitude? So it appears." Proclus adds: "Hence this triad proceeds according to each of the preexistent triads, *flowing* (according to the Oracle) and *proceeding into all intelligible multitude*. For infinite multitude demonstrates this flux, and evinces the incomprehensible nature of *power*."

But he likewise evinces that this triad is *first begotten*: for this first imparts the power of generating. And hence he calls the multitude which it contains *generating* (*γεννημενον*). Proclus, therefore, very properly asks, whether the frequent use of the term generation in this part, does not plainly imply that the natures prior to this triad are more united with each other? But the infinity of multitude in this triad must not be considered as respecting the infinite of quantity; but nothing more is implied than that a multitude of this kind is the progeny of the first infinity, which it also unfolds: and this infinite is the same with that which is *all perfect*. For that (says Proclus) which has proceeded according to *the all*, and as far as it is requisite an intelligible nature should proceed, on account of a power generative of all things, is *infinite*; for it can be comprehended by no other. And thus much concerning the third intelligible triad, according to Parmenides.

Let

farily. If, therefore, any one should summarily assert that *the one is*, this would be no other one than that which participates of essence. Certainly. Again,

Let us now discourse in general (says Proclus \*) concerning all the intelligible triads, and the three conclusions in the Parmenides, by which these three orders are characterized: The first triad, therefore, which is allotted an occult and intelligible summit among intelligibles, Plato, at one time proceeding from that union which it contains, and from its separate supremacy with respect to others, denominates *one*; as in the Timæus—For *eternity* (says he) *abides in one*. But reason demonstrates that the first triad of intelligibles is contained in this *one*. But at another time proceeding from the extremities which it contains, that is from that which is participated, and from that which participates, he calls it *one-being*; not mentioning power here, because it is uniformly and occultly comprehended in this triad. And again, sometimes he calls the whole triad *bound*, *infinite*, and *mixed*, according to the monads which it contains. And here *bound* demonstrates divine *hyperaxis*; but *infinite*, *generative power*; and *mixed*, *an essence proceeding from this power*. And thus (as I have said) by these appellations Plato instructs us concerning the first triad; evincing its nature, sometimes by one name, sometimes by two, and sometimes by three appellations. For a *triad* is contained in this, according to which the whole is characterized; likewise a *duad*, through which its extremities communicate with each other; and lastly a *monad*, which evinces through its monads the ineffable, occult, and unical nature of the first God.

But he calls the second triad posterior to this; in the Timæus, indeed, *eternity*; but in the Parmenides *the first wholeness*. And if we attentively consider that every eternal is a whole, we shall perceive that these two are allotted the same peculiarity of nature. For, whatever is entirely eternal possesses both its whole essence and energy at once present with itself. For such is every intellect which perfectly establishes in itself both being and intellect, as a whole at once present, and a comprehensive all. Hence it does not possess one part of being while it is destitute of another; nor does it participate partially of energy, but it *wholly* comprehends *total* being and *total* intelligence. But if intellect proceeded in its energies according to time, but possessed an eternal essence, it would possess the one as a *whole* ever abiding the same, but the other subsisting in generation, differently at different periods of time. *Eternity*, therefore, wherever it is present, is the cause of *wholeness*. To which we may add, that *the whole* every where contains *eternity*: for no *whole* ever deserts either its own essence or perfection; but that which is first corrupted and vitiated is partial. Hence this visible universe is eternal, because it is a whole; and this is likewise true of every thing contained in the heavens, and of each of the elements: for *wholeness* is every where comprehensive of its subject natures. Hence *wholeness* and *eternity* subsist together, are the same with each other, and are each of them a measure; the one indeed of all eternal and perpetual natures, but the other of parts and every multitude. But since there are three *wholenesses*, one *prior to parts*, another *composed from parts*, and a third *contained in a part*—hence, through that *wholeness* which is prior to parts, eternity measures the divine unities exempt from beings; but through that which is composed from parts, the unities distributed together with beings; and through that which subsists in a part, all beings

\* In Plat. Theol. lib. 3. p. 168.

and

Again, therefore, let us say, if *the one is*, what will happen. Consider then whether it is not necessary that this hypothesis should signify such a  
*one*

and total essences. For these partially contain the parts of the divine unities, which preexist unically in the unities themselves. Besides, *eternity is nothing else than an illumination proceeding from the unity connected with being*. But *whole itself* consists of two parts, viz. from *one* and *being*, power being the conciliator of these parts. Hence the duad, according with the middle intelligible triad, unfolds the uniform and occult hypostasis of the first triad. Besides, Plato in the *Timæus* calls the third intelligible triad *animal-itself*, *perfect*, and *only-begotten*. But in the *Parmenides* he denominates it *infinite multitude*, and *a wholeness comprehending many parts*. And in the *Sophista* he calls it *that which is always intelligible, and distributed into many beings*. All these, therefore, are the progeny of one science, and tend to one intelligible truth. For when *Timæus* calls this triad *intelligible animal*, he likewise asserts that it is *perfect*, and that it comprehends intelligible animals as its parts, both according to *the one* and according to *parts*. And *Parmenides* himself, declaring that *one being* is perfect multitude, demonstrates that it subsists in this order. For the infinite is omnipotent and perfect, as we have previously observed, containing in itself an intelligible multitude of parts, which it likewise produces. And of these parts, some are more universal, but others more partial; and (as *Timæus* observes) are parts both according to the one and according to genera. Besides, as *Timæus* calls that which is *animal-itself eternal*, and *only-begotten*, so *Parmenides* first attributes to infinite multitude *the ever*, and *to be generated*, in the following words: "And on the same account, whatever part is *generated* will *always* possess these two parts: for *the one* will *always* contain *being*, and *being the one*; so that two things will *always be generated*, and no part will ever *be one*."

Who then so perspicuously admonishes us of *eternal animal* and of the *first-begotten* triad as *Parmenides*, who first assumes in this order *generation* and *the ever*, and so frequently employs each of these appellations? *Perfect animal*, therefore, is the same with omnipotent intelligible multitude. For since the first infinity is power, and the whole of that which is intelligible subsists according to this, receiving from hence its division into parts, I rather choose to call this triad *omnipotent*; deviating in this respect from that appellation of *the infinite*, by which vulgar minds are generally disturbed.

Such then is the intelligible triad, considered according to an all-perfect distribution, in accommodation to the imbecility of our mental eye. But if we are desirous, after having bid adieu to corporeal vision, and the fascinating but delusive forms of the phantasy, which, Calypso-like, detain us in exile from our fathers' land; after having through a long and laborious dialectic wandering gained our paternal port, and purified ourselves from the baneful rout of the passions, those domestic foes of the soul; if after all this we are desirous of gaining a glimpse of the surpassing simplicity and ineffable union of this occult and astonishing light, we must crowd all our conceptions together into the most profound indivisibility, and, opening the greatest eye of the soul, entreat this all-comprehending deity to approach: for then, preceded by unadorned Beauty, silently walking on the extremities of her shining feet, he will suddenly from his awful sanctuary rise to our view.

one as possesses parts? How? Thus. If the term *it is* is spoken of *one being*, and *the one*, of *being which is one*, and *essence* is not the same with *the one*, but each belongs to that same *one being* which we have supposed, is it

But after such a vision, what can language announce concerning this transcendent object? That it is perfectly indistinct and void of number. "And," as Damascius\* beautifully observes, "since this is the case, we should consider whether it is proper to call *this* which belongs to it *simplicity*, ἀπλοτης; *something else*, multiplicity πολλοτης; and *something besides this*, universality παντοτης. For that which is intelligible is *one*, *many*, *all*, that we may triply explain a nature which is one. But how can one nature be *one* and *many*? Because *many* is the infinite power of *the one*. But how can it be *one* and *all*? Because *all* is the every-way extended energy of *the one*. Nor yet is it to be called an energy, as if it was an extension of power to that which is external; nor power, as an extension of hyperxis abiding within; but again, it is necessary to call them three instead of one: for one appellation, as we have often testified, is by no means sufficient for an explanation of this order. And are all things then here indistinct? But how can this be easy to understand? For we have said that there are three principles consequent to each other; viz. *father*, *power*, and *paternal intellect*. But these in reality are neither *one*, nor *three*, nor *one and at the same time three*†. But it is necessary that we should explain these by names and conceptions of this kind, through our penury in what is adapted to their nature, or rather through our desire of expressing something proper on the occasion. For as we denominate this triad *one*, and *many*, and *all*, and *father*, *power*, and *paternal intellect*, and again *bound*, *infinite*, and *mixed*—so likewise we call it *a monad*, and *the indefinite duad*, and *a triad*, and a paternal nature composed from both these. And as in consequence of purifying our conceptions we reject the former appellations as unable to harmonize with the things themselves, we should likewise reject the latter on the same account."

Now from this remarkable passage in particular, and from all that has been said respecting the intelligible triad, it follows that the Platonic is totally different from the Christian trinity, since the former is a triad posterior to the first cause, who according to Plato is a principle transcendently exempt from all multitude, and is not coordinated or consubstantiated with any being or beings whatever.

A superficial reader indeed, who knows no more of Platonism than what he has gleaned from Cudworth's Intellectual System, will be induced to think that the genuine Platonic trinity consists of *the first cause*, or *the good*, *intellect*, and *soul*, and that these three were considered by Plato as in a certain respect one. To such men as these it is necessary to observe, that a triad of principles distinct from each other, is a very different thing from a triad which may be considered as a whole, and of which each of the three is a part. But *the good* or *the one* is according to Plato superessential; as is evident from the first hypothesis of this Dialogue, and from the sixth Book of his Republic. It is impossible, therefore, that *the good* can be consubstantiated with *intellect*, which is even posterior to *being*, and much less with *soul*, which is subordinate to *intellect*. And hence *the good*, *intellect*, and *soul*, do not form a consubstantiated triad.

\* Vid. Excerpta, p. 228.

† Αλλ' αὐταὶ μὲν οὐκ εἰσι κατὰ ἀληθειαν, οὔτε μίαν, οὔτε τρεῖς, οὔτε μιά αἶμα καὶ τρεῖς.

not necessary that the whole of it should be *one being*, but that its parts should be *the one* and *to be*? It is necessary. Whether, therefore, should we call each of these parts a part alone, or a part of the whole? Each should be called a part of the whole. That which *is one*, therefore, is a whole, and possesses a part. Entirely so. What then? Can each of these parts of one being, viz. *the one* and *being*, desert each other, so that *the one* shall not be a part of *being*, or *being* shall not be a part of *the one*? It cannot be. Again, therefore, each of the parts will contain both *one* and *being*, and each part will at least be composed from two parts; and, on the same account, whatever part takes place will always possess these two parts: for *the one* will always contain *being*, and *being the one*; so that two things will always be produced, and no part will ever be *one*. Entirely so. Will not, therefore, *one being* thus become an infinite multitude? So it seems.

But proceed, and still further consider this. What? We have said that the one participates of essence, so far as it is being. We have said so. And on this account *one being* appears to be *many*. It does so. But what then? If we receive dianoetically that one which we said participates of essence, and apprehend it alone by itself without that which we have said it participates, will it appear to be one alone? Or will this also be many? I think it will be one. But let us consider another certain circumstance. It is necessary that its essence should be one thing, and itself another thing, if *the one* does not participate of essence; but as essence it participates of *the one*. It is necessary. If, therefore, *essence* is one thing, and *the one* another thing, neither is *the one*, so far as *the one*, different from *essence*, nor *essence*, so far as *essence*, different from *the one*; but they are different from each other through that which is *different* and *another*. Entirely so. So that *different* is neither the same with *the one* nor with *essence*. How can it? What, then, if we should select from them, whether if you will *essence* and *different*, or *essence* and *the one*, or *the one* and *different*, should we not, in each assumption, select certain things which might very properly be denominated both these? How do you mean? After this manner: Is there not that which we call *essence*? There is. And again, that which we denominate *the one*? And this also. Is not, therefore, each of them denominated? Each. But what, when I say *essence* and *the one*, do I not pronounce both these? Entirely so. And if I should say *essence* and *different*, or *different* and

and *the one*, should I not perfectly, in each of these, pronounce both? Certainly. But can those things which are properly denominated both, be both, and yet not two? They cannot. And can any reason be assigned, why of two things each of them should not be one? There cannot. As, therefore, these two subsist together, each of them will be one. It appears so. But if each of them is one, and *the one* is placed together with them, by any kind of conjunction, will not all of them become three? Certainly. But are not three *odd*, and two *even*? How should they not? But what then? Being two, is it not necessary that twice should be present? And being three, thrice; since twice one subsists in two, and thrice one in three? It is necessary. But if there are two and twice, is it not necessary that there should be twice two? And if there are three and thrice, that there should be thrice three? How should it not? But what, if there are three and twice, and two and thrice, is it not necessary that there should be thrice two and twice three? Entirely so. Hence, there will be the evenly even, and the oddly odd; and the oddly even, and the evenly odd. It will be so. If, therefore, this be the case, do you think that any number will be left which is not necessarily there? By no means. If, therefore, *the one* is, it is also necessary that there should be number<sup>1</sup>. It is necessary.

But

<sup>1</sup> Parmenides after the intelligible triads generates the intelligible and at the same time intellectual orders, and demonstrates, by subsequent conclusions, a continuous progression of the Gods. For the series and connection of the words with each other imitate the indissoluble order of things, which always conjoins the media with the extremes, and through middle genera advances to the ultimate progressions of beings. As there are then three intelligible triads, consisting of *one being*, *whole itself*, and *infinite multitude*, so three intelligible and at the same time intellectual triads present themselves to our view, viz. *number itself*, *whole itself*, and *the perfect itself*. Hence, *number* here proceeds from *one being*; but *that which is a whole* from *whole itself* in intelligibles; and *the perfect itself* from *infinite multitude*. For in the intelligible triad the *infinite* was omnipotent and perfect, comprehending all things, and subsisting as incomprehensible in itself. *The perfect*, therefore, is analogous to that which is omnipotent and all-perfect, possessing an intellectual perfection, and such as is posterior to primary and intelligible perfection. But *the whole*, which is both intelligible and intellectual, is allied to that which is intelligible, yet it differs from it so far as the latter possesses wholeness according to *the one union of the one being*; but *the one* of the former appears to be essentially a whole of parts characterized by unity, and its being a composite of many beings.

But again, *number* must be considered as analogous to *one being*. For *one being* subsists among intelligibles occultly, intelligibly, and paternally; but here, in conjunction with difference, it ge-

But if number is, it is necessary that the many should subsist, and an infinite multitude of beings: or do you think that number, infinite in multitude, will also participate of essence? By all means I think so. If, therefore, every number participates of essence, will not each part also of number participate of essence? Certainly. Essence, therefore, will be distributed through all things which are many, and will not desert any being, whether the least or the greatest: for how can essence be absent from any being? In no respect. Essence, therefore, is distributed as much as possible into the least and the greatest, and into all things every way, and is divided the most of all things, and possesses infinite parts. It is so. Very many, therefore, are its parts. Very many, indeed. But what, is there any one of these which is a part of essence, and yet is not *one* part? But how can this be? But if it is, I think it must always be necessary, as long as it is, that it should be a certain one; but that it cannot possibly be nothing. It is necessary. *The one*, therefore, is present with every part of essence, deserting no part, whether small or great, or in whatever manner it may be affected. It is so. Can *one being*, therefore, be a whole, subsisting in many places at once? Consider this diligently. I do consider it, and I see that it is impossible. It is divided, therefore, since it is not a whole; for it can no otherwise be present with all the parts of essence, than in a divided state. Certainly. But that which is divisible ought necessarily to be so many as its

nerates number, which establishes the separation of forms and reasons. For *difference* first exhibits itself in this order; but subsists among intelligibles as *power* and the *duad*. And in this order it is a maternal and prolific fountain. With great propriety, therefore, does Plato from the summit of this order begin his negations of *the one*: for *the many* subsist here, through that difference which divides *being* and *the one*; because *the whole*, which is denied of *the one*, is intellectual and not intelligible. The negation, therefore, asserts that *the one* is not a whole, on which account the affirmation must be, *the one* is a whole. For *intelligible whole* is *one being*, but not *the one*. And he thus denies *the many*, "*The one* is not many," the opposite to which is, *the one* is many. But the multitude of intelligibles, and not *the one*, is the proximate cause of *the many*. And, in short, the whole of that which is intelligible is characterized by *one being*. For both *being* and *the one* are contained in this, and are naturally conjoined with each other; and *being* is here the most of all things characterized by *the one*. But when each of these, viz. *being*, and *the one*, proceeds into multitude, the one becomes distant from the other, and evinces a greater diversity of nature; but each is distributed into multitude through the prolific nature of difference itself. And thus it is from hence evident, that the intelligible and at the same time intellectual orders proceed with subjection analogous to the intelligible triads. In the notes to the Phædrus it will be shown how Socrates leads us to this order of Gods.

parts.

parts. It ought. We did not, therefore, just now speak truly, when we said that essence was distributed into very many parts; since it is not divided into more parts than *the one*, but into parts equal to those of *the one*: for neither does *being* desert *the one*, nor *the one, being*: but these two always subsist, equalized through all things. It appears to be entirely so. *The one*, therefore, which is distributed by essence, is many and an infinite multitude. So it appears. *One being*, therefore, is not only many, but it is likewise necessary that *the one* which is distributed by essence should be many. Entirely so.

And, indeed, in consequence of the parts being parts of a whole, *the one* will be defined according to a whole: or are not the parts comprehended by the whole? Necessarily so. But that which contains will be a bound. How should it not? *One being*, therefore, is in a certain respect both one and many, whole and parts, finite and infinite in multitude. It appears so. As it is bounded, therefore, must it not also have extremes? It is necessary. But what, if it be a whole, must it not also have a beginning, middle, and end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one of these be wanting, can it be willing to be any longer a whole? It cannot. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, will possess a beginning, end, and middle. It will. But the middle is equally distant from the extremes; for it could not otherwise be the middle. It could not. And, as it appears, *the one* being such, will participate of a certain figure, whether straight or round, or a certain mixture from both. It will so.

Will it, therefore, being such, subsist in itself<sup>1</sup> and in another? How? For each of the parts is in the whole, nor is any one external to the whole. It

<sup>1</sup> By these words Plato indicates the summit of the intellectual order, or in other words, according to the Grecian theology, Saturn. For, so far as he is a total intellect, his energy is directed to himself, but so far as he is in the intelligibles prior to himself, he establishes the all-perfect intelligence of himself in another. For subsistence in another here signifies that which is better than the subsistence of a thing in itself. Saturn, therefore, being intelligible as among intellectuals, establishes himself in the intelligible triads of the orders prior to him, from which he is also filled with united and occult good; and on this account he is said to be in another. But because he is a pure and immaterial deity, he is converted to himself, and shuts up all his powers in himself. For the parts of this deity, when he is considered as an intellectual wholeness, are more partial

It is so. But all the parts are comprehended by the whole. Certainly. But *the one* is all the parts of itself; and is neither more nor less than all. Certainly. Is not *the one*, therefore, a whole? How should it not? If, therefore, all the parts are in the whole, and all the parts are one, and *the one* is a whole, but all the parts are comprehended by the whole; hence, *the one* will be comprehended by *the one*, and so *the one* will be in itself. It appears so. But again, the whole is not in the parts, neither in all, nor in a certain one. For, if it were in all, it would necessarily be in one: for, if it were not in some one, it would not be able to be in all. But if this one is a one belonging to all the parts, and the whole is not in this one, how can it any longer be a whole in all the parts? In no respect. Nor yet in any of the parts. For if the whole should be in some of the parts, the greater would be in the lesser; which is impossible. Impossible. But since the whole is neither in many, nor in one, nor in all the parts, is it not necessary that it should either be in some other, or that it should be nowhere? It is necessary. But if it is nowhere, will it not be nothing? And if it is a whole, since it is not in itself, is it not necessary that it should be in another? Entirely so. So far, therefore, as *the one* is a whole, it is in another: but so far as all things are its parts, and itself all the parts, it is in itself: and so *the one* will necessarily be in itself and in another. Necessarily.

But as *the one* is naturally such, is it not necessary that it should both be moved<sup>1</sup> and stand still? How? It must stand still, indeed, if it be in itself.

For,

powers, which hasten indeed to a progression from him as their father, but are established in, and on all sides comprehended by, him. And this wholeness is a deity which connectedly contains the intelligible parts in itself, being parturient indeed with intellectual multitude, and stably generating all things. It also receives into its bosom, and again gathers into itself its progeny, and, as the more tragical of fables say, devours and deposits its offspring in itself. For its progeny are twofold; some being, as it were, resolved into itself, and others separated from it.

<sup>1</sup> The middle of the intellectual order, viz. Rhea, is here indicated by Plato: for all life, according to Plato, is motion; since soul is self-motive because it is self-vital; and intellect is through this moved, because it possesses the most excellent life. The first vivific cause, therefore, of the intellectual Gods is primarily allotted *motion*. If this cause, however, was the first and highest life, it would be requisite to call it *motion*, and not *that which is moved*; but since it is life as in intellectuals, and is filled from exempt life, it is at the same time *motion* and *that which is moved*. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides evince that *the one* in this order is moved, because

For, being in one, and not departing from this, it will be in *same*, through being in itself. It will. But that which is always in the same must necessarily without doubt always stand still. Entirely so. But what, must not that, on the contrary, which is always in another, necessarily never be in *same*? But if it be never in *same*, can it stand still? And if it does not stand still, must it not be moved? Certainly. It is necessary, therefore, that *the one*, since it is always in itself and in another, must always be moved and stand still. It appears so.

But, likewise, it ought to be the same<sup>1</sup> with itself, and different from itself; and, in like manner, the same with, and different from, others, if it suffers

cause it proceeds from the causes of all life which rank above it, and is analogous to the middle centre of intelligibles, and to the middle triad of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order; which triad Socrates in the *Phædrus* calls *heaven*, because the whole of it is *life and motion*.

When Parmenides, therefore, says that *the one* is both *moved and stands still*, by *motion* he indicates the vivific hyparxis of the Gods, and the generative fountain of wholes; but by *permanency* coordinated with motion, that pure monad which contains the middle centres of the triad of *guardian* deities, or, in other words, one of the *Curetes* consubstant with Rhea. So that the *motion* in this order is the fountain of the life which proceeds to all things; and the *permanency* establishes the whole vivific fountain in itself, but is thence filled with the prolific rivers of life. Hence Parmenides, delivering to us the progression of these two, shows that *that which is moved* is generated from *that which is in another*, but *that which is permanent* from *that which is in itself*. For *motion* in this order is better than *permanency*. For as *that which is in another* is causally more antecedent than *that which is in itself*, so here that which is *moved* than that which is *permanent*. Hence, according to the Grecian theology, the *Curetes* are powers subordinate to Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter, the parents of the intellectual order, and are contained in them.

<sup>1</sup> Parmenides here delivers the symbols of that deity who subsists at the extremity of the intellectual order, viz. Jupiter, the artificer of the universe. We shall find, therefore, that the number of the conclusions is here doubled. For *the one* is no longer shown to be alone *same* or *different*, as it was shown to be *in itself* and *in another*, and to be *moved* and be *permanent*; but it is now demonstrated to be *the same with itself*, and *different from itself*, and *different from others*, and *the same with others*. But this *twice* perfectly accords with the demiurgic monad, both according to other theologians, and to Socrates in the *Cratylus*, who says that the demiurgic name is composed from two words.

In the next place the multitude of causes is here separated, and all the monads of the Gods appear according to the demiurgic progression. For the paternal order of the demiurgus, the prolific power which is coordinate with him, the undefiled monad which is the cause of exempt providence, the fountain distributive of wholes, and all the orders in conjunction with these  
which

suffers what we have related above. How? Every thing, in a certain respect, thus takes place with relation to every thing: for it is either the same with it or different: or if it is neither same nor different, it will be a part of this to which it is so related, or with respect to a part it will be a whole. It appears so. Is therefore *the one* a part of itself? By no means. It will not therefore be a whole, with respect to itself, as if itself were a part. For it cannot. But is *the one*, therefore, different from *the one*? By no means. It will not therefore be different from itself. Certainly not. If, therefore, it is neither different nor a whole, nor yet a part with respect to itself, is it not necessary that it should be the same with itself? It is necessary. But what, that which is elsewhere than itself, subsisting in *same*  
in

which subsist about the demiurgus, according to which he produces and preserves all things, and, being exempt from his productions, is firmly established in himself, and separates his own kingdom from the united government of his father—all these are here unfolded into light.

Hence that which Parmenides first demonstrates concerning the nature of *the one*, viz. that it is *the same* with itself, represents to us the monadic and paternal peculiarity, according to which Jupiter is the demiurgus. For the term *same* is a manifest sign of his proper or paternal hyparxis: for being one, and the exempt demiurgus and father of wholes, he establishes his proper union in himself. This term also remarkably shows the uniform nature, and the alliance of this deity with *bound*. But his being *the same with others*, is the illustrious good of prolific power, and of a cause proceeding to all things, and pervading through all things without impediment. For he is present to all things which he produces, and is in all things which he adorns, pre-establishing in himself an essence generative of wholes. Hence *bound* and *the infinite* subsist in him fabricatively; the former consisting in a *sameness* separate from *others*, and the latter in a power which generates *others*. The assertion also that *he is different from others*, manifests his undefiled purity, and his transcendency exempt from all secondary natures. Hence by his never ceasing to impart good, by his providence, and by his generating things subordinate, *he is the same with them*: for he is participated by them, and fills his progeny with his own providential care. But by his purity, his undefiled power, and his undeviating energies, he is separate from wholes, and is not consubstant with others. And as Saturn, the first king of the intellectual Gods, is allotted a nature which does not verge to matter, through that pure monad or guard which is united to him, viz. the first of the Curetes; and as the vivific goddess Rhea possesses her stable and undeviating power from the second of the guardian deities; so also the demiurgic intellect guards a transcendency separate from others, and a union withdrawing itself from multitude, through the third monad of the Curetes, who are the leaders of purity.

That deity therefore remains who is the seventh of these intellectual monads, who is conjoined with all of them, and energizes in conjunction with all, but particularly unfolds himself into light in the demiurgic order. This deity, which is celebrated by antient theologians as Ocean, Parmenides

in itself, must it not necessarily be different from itself, since it has a subsistence elsewhere? It appears so to me. And in this manner *the one* appears to subsist, being at the same time both in itself and in another. So it seems. Through this, therefore, it appears that *the one* is different from itself. It does so.

But what if any thing is different from any thing, is it not different from that which is different? Necessarily so. But are not all such things as are not one different from *the one*? And is not *the one* different from such things as are not one? How should it not? *The one* therefore will be different from other things. Different. But see whether *different* and *same* are not contrary to each other. How should they not? Do you think, therefore, that *same* can ever be in *different*, or *different* in *same*? I do not.

menides indicates when he asserts that *the one* is *different from itself*. As, therefore, the demiurgus is the same with himself through paternal union, so he is separated from himself and his father, according to this difference. Whence, therefore, does Parmenides say that the demiurgus derives this power? We reply, From being *in himself*, and *in another*. For these things were unitedly in the first father, but separately in the third. Hence separation there subsists according to cause, but in the demiurgus it shines forth, and unfolds his power into light. For that the cause of division subsists in a certain respect in the first father, Parmenides himself evinces in the first hypothesis, when he says, that every thing which is in itself is in a certain respect *two*, and is *separated* from itself. But the duad is there indeed occultly, but here it subsists more clearly, where all intellectual multitude is apparent. For difference is the progeny of the duad, which is there firmly established. This *difference*, therefore, separates the demiurgic intellect from the Gods prior to it, and also separates from each other the monads which it contains. Hence Parmenides, when he divides the signs of fabrication, shows that the idioms of the undefiled and divisive monads are in the middle of them, so far as they also in a certain respect are comprehended in the one fabrication of things. For the first of the conclusions demonstrates that *the one* is *the same with itself*; the second, that it is *different from itself*; the third, that it is *different from others*; and the fourth, that it is *the same with others*; conjoining the divisive power with the paternal union, and connecting the providential cause of secondary natures—with a transcendency separate from them. For in the Gods it is necessary that union should subsist prior to separation, and a purity unmingled with things secondary prior to a providential care of them, through which the divinities being every where are also no where, being present to all things are exempt from all things, and being all things are no one of their progeny.

I only add, that the reader will find the theology concerning Saturn, delivered by Plato in perfect conformity to what has been above asserted of this deity, in the Cratylus, Politicus, and Gorgias; that concerning Rhea, in the Cratylus; concerning Jupiter in the Timæus, Critias, Philebus, Protagoras, and Politicus; and concerning the Curetes in the Laws.

If

If therefore *different* is never in *same*, there is no being in which for any time *different* subsists; for, if it subsisted in it during any time whatever, in that time *different* would be in *same*. Would it not be so? It would. But since it is never in *same*, *different* will never subsist in any being. True. Neither therefore will *different* be in things which are not one, nor in *the one*. It will not. *The one*, therefore, will not through *different* be different from things which are not one, nor things which are not one from *the one*. Not, indeed. Nor likewise will they be different from each other, since they do not participate of *different*. For how can they? But if they are neither different from themselves, nor from *different*, must they not entirely escape from being different from each other? They must escape. But neither will things which are not one participate of *the one*: for if they did they would no longer be *not one*, but in a certain respect one. True. Hence things which are *not one* will not be number; for they would not be entirely *not one* in consequence of possessing number. Certainly not. But what, can things which are *not one* be parts of one? Or would not things which are *not one* by this means participate of *the one*? They would participate. If, therefore, this is entirely *the one*, but those *not one*, neither will *the one* be a part of things which are *not one*, nor a whole with respect to them, as if they were parts; nor, on the contrary, will things which are *not one* be parts of *the one*, nor yet wholes, as if *the one* were a part. They will not. But we have said that things which are neither parts nor wholes, nor different from each other, must be the same with each other. We have said so. Must we not therefore assert that *the one*, since it subsists in this manner with respect to things which are *not one*, is the same with them? We must. *The one*, therefore, as it appears, is both different from others and itself, and the same with them and with itself. It appears from this reasoning to be so.

But is it also similar<sup>1</sup> and dissimilar to itself and others? Perhaps so.  
Since,

<sup>1</sup> After the intellectual the supermundane order of Gods follows, who are also called by the Grecian theologians *assimilative leaders*. *Sameness* and *difference*, therefore, as we have before observed, define the idiom of the demiurgic order, and of the Gods coordinated with it. But since the whole order of the assimilative Gods is suspended from the demiurgic monad, subsists about, and is converted to it, and is perfected from it, it is necessary to refer the signs of thi<sub>g</sub>

Since, therefore, it appears to be different from others, others also will be different from it. But what then? Will it not be different from others, in the same manner as others from it? And this neither more nor less? How should it not? If, therefore, neither more nor less, it must be different in a similar manner. Certainly. Will not that through which *the one* becomes different from others, and others in a similar manner from it, be also that through which both *the one* becomes the same with others, and others with *the one*? How do you say? Thus: Do not you call every name the name of something? I do: but what then? Do you pronounce the same name often or once? I pronounce it once. When, therefore, you enunciate that name once, do you denominate that thing to which the name belongs: but if often, not the same? Or, whether you pronounce the same name once or often, do you not necessarily always signify the same thing? But what then? Does not a different name belong to some certain thing? Entirely so. When, therefore, you pronounce this, whether once or often, you do not assign this name to any other, nor do you denominate any other thing than that to which this name belongs. It is necessary it should be so. But when we say that other things are different from *the one*, and that *the one* is different from others, twice pronouncing the name *different*, we yet signify nothing more than the nature of that thing of which this is the name. Entirely so.

this order to the demiurgic series, and thence to impart to them a generation proceeding according to order and measure.

As this order of Gods, therefore, according to the Grecian theologians, assimilates sensibles to intellectuals, and produces all things posterior to itself according to an imitation of causes, it is the primary cause of similitude to things subordinate to itself. Hence it is also the cause of dissimilitude coordinate with similitude: for all things which participate of the similar necessarily also participate of the dissimilar.

Similitude also in this order has a subsistence analogous to paternal causes, and to those which convert things to their principles; but dissimilitude is analogous to prolific causes, and which preside over multitude and division. Hence *similitude* is *collective*, but *dissimilitude* *separative* of things which proceed.

But that the idioms of these Gods proceed from the demiurgic monad, and the signs which there preexist, Parmenides sufficiently demonstrates: for demiurgic sameness and difference are the causes, as he says, of the similitude and dissimilitude of this order.

The reader will find the theology relative to this order delivered by Plato, conformably to what is here said, in the Politicus and the Laws, the Gorgias and the Cratylus.

If therefore *the one* be different from others, and others from *the one*, in consequence of suffering the same *different*, *the one* will not suffer that which is different from others, but the same with others: but is not that which in a certain respect suffers the same similar? Certainly. But, in the same manner, as *the one* becomes different from others, every thing becomes similar to every thing: for every thing is different from all things. It appears so. But is the similar contrary to the dissimilar? It is. And is not *different* contrary to *same*? And this also. But this likewise is apparent, that *the one* is both the same with and different from others. It is apparent. But to be the same with others is a contrary passion to the being different from others. Entirely so. But *the one* appears to be similar, so far as different. Certainly. So far therefore as it is *same*, it will be dissimilar on account of its suffering a passion contrary to that which produces the similar: or was it not the similar which produced the different? Certainly. It will therefore render that which is dissimilar the same; or it would not be contrary to different. So it appears. *The one* therefore will be both similar and dissimilar to others: and so far as *different* it will be similar; but so far as *the same* dissimilar. The case appears to be so. And it is likewise thus affected. How? So far as it suffers *same* it does not suffer that which is various; but not suffering that which is various, it cannot be dissimilar; and not being dissimilar, it will be similar: but so far as it suffers *different* it will be various; and being various it will be dissimilar. You speak the truth. Since, therefore, *the one* is both the same with and different from others, according to both and according to each of these, it will be similar and dissimilar to others. Entirely so. And will not this in a similar manner be the case with relation to itself, since it has appeared to be both different from and the same with itself; so that, according to both these, and according to each, it will appear to be similar and dissimilar? Necessarily so.

But consider now how *the one* subsists with respect to touching<sup>1</sup> itself and others,

<sup>1</sup> That order of Gods called by the Greek theologians *απολυτοι* or *liberated*, succeeds the *supermundane* order, and is here indicated by Plato by *the one touching itself and others*. For all the divine genera after the demiurgic monad double their energies, since their energy is naturally directed both to themselves and to other things posterior to themselves, rejoicing in progressions, being subservient to the providence of secondary natures, and calling forth the supernatural, impartible,

others, and not touching. I consider. For *the one* appears in a certain respect to be in the whole of itself. Right. But is *the one* also in others? Certainly. So far therefore as *the one* is in others it will touch others; but so far as it is in itself it will be hindered from touching others, but it will touch itself because it subsists in itself. So it appears. And thus, indeed, *the one* will both touch itself and others. It will so. But what will you say to this? Must not every thing which is about to touch any thing be situated in a place proximate to and after that which it is about to touch, and in which when situated it touches? It is necessary. *The one*, therefore, if it is about to touch itself, ought to be situated immediately after itself, occupying the place proximate to that in which it is. It ought so. Would not this be the case with *the one* if it was two; and would it not be in two places at once? But can this be the case while it is *the one*? It cannot. The same necessity therefore belongs to *the one*, neither to be two nor to touch itself. The same. But neither will it touch others. Why? Because we have said, that when any thing is about to touch any thing which is separate from it, it ought to be placed proximate to that which it is about to touch; but that there must be no third in the middle of them. True. Two things, therefore, at the least are requisite, if contact is about to take

partible, and all-perfect producing power of their father, and deducing it to subordinate beings. This *contact*, therefore, with and separation from inferior natures clearly represents to us a liberated idiom. For *touching* indicates a providence allied to and coordinate with us; and *not to touch*, a transcendence exempt and separate from others. Hence these epithets admirably accord with the *liberated* genus of Gods, who are said to be at the same time conjoined with the celestial divinities, and expanded above them, and to proceed to all things with unrestrained energy. Hence the Fates, as we have shown in a note on the 10th book of the Republic, belong to this order; for they are said by Socrates to *touch* the celestial circulations. In the Cratylus also, the mundane *Core* or Proserpine, who governs the whole of generation, is said to *touch* flowing essence, and through this contact to have been called *Phersephatta*. To which we may add, that in the Phædo, where we are taught what the mode is of the cathartic life of souls, Socrates says, that the soul, when it is not conversant with the body, *passes into contact with being*; through all which Plato indicates that *contact* is the business of an inseparable providence, and coordinate inspection; and that the negation of this is the employment of a dominion separate, unrestrained, and exempt from the natures that are governed.

These *liberated* Gods are the same with those which the Chaldeans call *azonic*, and which according to them are *Serapis*, *Bacchus*, the series of *Osiris*, and of *Apollo*, as we are informed by Pfellus in his exposition of Chaldaic dogmas. He adds, "they are called *azonic*, because they rule without restraint over the zones, and are established above the apparent Gods."

place. Certainly. But if a third thing succeeds to the two terms, these will now be three, but the contacts two. Certainly. And thus one always being added, one contact will be added, and it will come to pass that the contacts will be less by one than the multitude of the numbers: for by how much the two first numbers surpassed the contacts, so as to be more in number than the contacts, by so much will all the following number surpass the multitude of the contacts. For in that which remains one will be added to the number, and one contact to the contacts. Right. The contacts, therefore, less by one will always be as many in number as the things themselves. True. If therefore it is one alone, and not two, there can be no contact. How can there? Have we not said that such things as are different from *the one* are neither one nor participate of it, since they are different? We have. *The one* therefore is not number in others, as *the one* is not contained in them. How can it? *The one*, therefore, is neither others, nor two, nor any thing possessing the name of another number. It is not. *The one*, therefore, is one alone, and will not be two. It will not, as it appears. There is no contact, therefore, two not subsisting. There is not. *The one* therefore will neither touch other things, nor will other things touch *the one*, as there is no contact. Certainly not. On all these accounts, therefore, *the one* will both touch and not touch others and itself. So it appears.

Is it therefore equal<sup>2</sup> and unequal to itself and others? How? If *the one* were greater or lesser than others, or others greater or lesser than *the one*, would it not follow that neither *the one*, because one, nor others, because different from *the one*, would be greater or lesser than each other from their own essences? But if each, besides being such as they are, should possess equality, would they not be equal to each other? But if the one should possess magnitude, and the other parvitude, or *the one* magnitude but *others* parvitude, would it not follow, that, with whatever species magnitude was present, that species would be greater; but that the species would be lesser with which parvitude was present? Necessarily so. Are there not, therefore, two certain species of this kind, magnitude and parvitude? For if they had no subsistence they could never be contrary to each other, and be present with beings.

<sup>2</sup> The *equal* and *unequal* are characteristic of the mundane Gods, as we have shown in the notes on the first hypothesis, to which we refer the reader.

How

How should they? If therefore parvitude becomes inherent in *the one*, it will either be inherent in the whole or in a part of it. It is necessary. But if it should be inherent in the whole, will it not either be extended equally through the whole of *the one* or comprehend *the one*? Plainly so. If parvitude, therefore, is equally inherent in *the one*, will it not be equal to *the one*; but if it comprehends *the one* will it not be greater? How should it not? Can therefore parvitude be equal to or greater than any thing, and exhibit the properties of magnitude and equality, and not its own? It is impossible. Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in the whole of *the one*, but if at all, in a part. Certainly. Nor yet again in the whole part; as the same consequences would ensue in the *whole* part of *the one*, as in the whole of *the one*: for it would either be equal to or greater than the part in which it is inherent. It is necessary. Parvitude, therefore, will not be inherent in any being, since it can neither be in a part nor in a whole; nor will there be any thing small, except smallness itself. It does not appear that there will. Neither will magnitude therefore be in *the one*: for there will be some other thing great besides magnitude itself. I mean that in which magnitude is inherent; and this, though parvitude is not, which ought to be surpassed by that which is great; but which in this case is impossible, since parvitude is not inherent in any being. True. But, indeed, magnitude itself will not surpass any thing else but parvitude itself, nor will parvitude be less than any other than magnitude itself. It will not. Neither therefore will other things be greater than *the one*; nor lesser, since they neither possess magnitude nor parvitude: nor will these two possess any power with respect to *the one*, either of surpassing or of being surpassed, but this will be the case only with respect to each other: nor, on the contrary, will *the one* be either greater or lesser than these two, or others, as it neither possesses magnitude nor parvitude. So indeed it appears. If *the one* therefore is neither greater nor lesser than others, is it not necessary that it should neither surpass nor be surpassed by them? It is necessary. Is it not also abundantly necessary, that that which neither surpasses nor is surpassed should be equally affected? And must it not, if equally affected, be equal? How should it not? *The one* therefore will be thus circumstanced with respect to itself: *viz.* from neither possessing magnitude nor parvitude in itself, it will neither surpass nor be surpassed by itself; but being equally affected it will

be equal to itself. Entirely so. *The one* therefore will be equal both to itself and others. So it appears.

But if *the one* should be in itself, it would also be externally about itself; and so, through comprehending itself, it would be greater than itself; but from being comprehended less than itself: and thus *the one* would be both greater and lesser than itself. It would so. Is not this also necessary, that nothing has any subsistence besides *the one* and others? How should it be otherwise? But ought not whatever has a being to be always somewhere? Certainly. And does not that which subsists in another, subsist as the lesser in the greater? For one thing cannot in any other way subsist in another. It cannot. But since there is nothing else except *the one* and others, and it is necessary that these should be in something, is it not necessary that they should be in one another, viz. others in *the one*, and *the one* in others; or that they should be no where? It appears so. Because, therefore, *the one* is in others, others will be greater than *the one*, through comprehending it; but *the one* will be less than others, because comprehended: but if others are inherent in *the one*, *the one* on the same account will be greater than others; but others will be less than *the one*. It appears so. *The one*, therefore, is equal to, greater and lesser, both than itself and others. It seems so. But if it is greater, equal, and lesser, it will be of equal, more, and fewer measures, both than itself and others; and if of measures, also of parts. How should it not? Being, therefore, of equal, more, and fewer measures, it will also be more and less in number, both with respect to itself and others; and also, for the same reason, equal to itself and others. How? That which is greater possesses more measures than that which is smaller, and contains as many parts as measures; and that which is lesser in the same manner, as also that which is equal. It is so. Since *the one*, therefore, is both greater, lesser, and equal to itself, will it not also contain measures equal to, more and fewer than itself? And if of measures, will not this also be true of parts? How should it not? If, therefore, it contains equal parts with itself, it will be equal in multitude to itself: but if more, more in multitude, and if fewer, less in multitude, than itself. It appears so. But will *the one* be similarly affected towards others? For, since it appears to be greater than others, is it not necessary that it should be more in number than others? but, because it is lesser, must it not also be fewer in number?

number? and because equal in magnitude, must it not also be equal in multitude to others? It is necessary. And thus again, as it appears, *the one* will be equal, more, and less in number, both than itself and others. It will so.

Will *the one*, therefore, participate of time? And is it, and does it subsist in becoming to be younger<sup>1</sup> and older, both than itself and others? And again, neither younger nor older than itself and others, though participating of time? How? *To be* in a certain respect is present with it, since it *is the one*. Certainly. But what else is *to be* than a participation of essence with the present time? In the same manner as *it was* is a communication of essence with the past, and *it will be* with the future? It is no other. It must participate, therefore, of time, if it participates of being. Entirely so. Must it not, therefore, participate of time in progression? Certainly. It will always, therefore, subsist *in becoming to be* older than itself, if it proceeds according to time. It is necessary. Do we, therefore, call to mind that the older is always becoming older, because it is always becoming younger? We do call it to mind. Does not *the one*, therefore, while it is becoming older than itself, subsist in becoming older than itself, while it is becoming younger than itself? Necessarily so. It will, therefore, become both younger and older than itself. Certainly. But is it not then older when it subsists in *becoming to be* according to the present time, which is between *it was* and *it will be*: for, through proceeding from the past to the future, it will not pass beyond the present *now*? It will not. Will it not, therefore, cease becoming to be older, when it arrives at *the now*, and is no longer *becoming to be*, but *is now* older? For while it proceeds it will never be comprehended by *the now*. For that which proceeds subsists in such a manner as to touch upon both *the now* and the future time; departing, indeed, from *the now*, but apprehending the future, because it subsists in the middle of the future and *the now*. True. But if it be necessary that whatever is becoming to be should not pass by *the now* or the present time, hence, as soon as it arrives at *the now*, it will always cease becoming to be, and *is* then that which it was in pursuit of becoming. It appears so. *The one*, therefore, when in becoming older it arrives at *the now*, will cease *becoming*

<sup>1</sup> *Younger* and *older* are characteristic of divine souls. See the notes on that part of the first hypothesis which corresponds to this part of the second.

*to be*, and then *is* older. Entirely so. Is it not, therefore, older than that in respect of which it becomes older? And does it not become older than itself? Certainly. And is not the older older than the younger? It is. *The one*, therefore, is younger than itself, when in becoming older it arrives at *the now*. It is necessary. But *the now* is always present with *the one*, through the whole of its being: for it is always *now* as long as it is. How should it not? *The one*, therefore, always is, and is becoming to be younger and older than itself. So it appears. But *is the one*, or does it subsist in *becoming to be*, in a time more extended than or equal to itself? In an equal time. But that which either *is*, or subsists in *becoming to be*, in an equal time possesses the same age. How should it not? But that which has the same age is neither older nor younger. By no means. *The one*, therefore, since it both subsists in *becoming to be* and *is*, in a time equal to itself, neither *is* nor is *becoming to be* younger nor older than itself. It does not appear to me that it can.

But how is it affected with respect to others? I know not what to say. But this you may say, that things different from *the one* because they are *others*, and not *another*, are more than *the one*. For that which is another is one; but being *others* they are more than one, and possess multitude. They do. But multitude participates of a greater number than *the one*? How should it not? What then? Do we say that things more in number are generated, or have been generated, before the few? We assert this of the few before the many. That which is the fewest, therefore, is first: but is not this *the one*? Certainly. *The one*, therefore, becomes the first of all things possessing number: but all other things have number, if they are *others* and not *another*. They have indeed. But that which is first generated has I think a priority of subsistence: but others are posterior to this. But such as have an after generation are younger than that which had a prior generation; and thus others will be younger than *the one*, but *the one* will be older than others. It will indeed. But what shall we say to this? Can *the one* be generated contrary to its nature, or is this impossible? Impossible. But *the one* appears to consist of parts; and if of parts, it possesses a beginning, end, and middle. Certainly. Is not, therefore, the beginning generated first of all, both of *the one* and of every other thing; and after the beginning all the other parts, as far as to the end? What then? And, indeed,

indeed, we should say that all these are parts of a whole and of one; but that *the one*, together with the end, is generated *one* and a *whole*. We should say so. But the end I think must be generated last of all, and *the one* must be naturally generated together with this; so that *the one*, since it is necessary that it should not be generated contrary to nature, being produced together with the end, will be naturally generated the last of others. *The one*, therefore, is younger than others, but others are older than *the one*. So again it appears to me. But what, must not the beginning, or any other part whatever, of *the one*, or of any thing else, if it is a part, and not parts—must it not necessarily be one, since it is a part? Necessarily. *The one*, therefore, while becoming to be, together with the first part, will be generated, and together with the second; and it will never desert any one of the other generated parts, till arriving at the extremity it becomes one whole; neither excluded from the middle, nor from the last, nor the first, nor from any other whatever in its generation. True. *The one*, therefore, will possess the same age with others, as (if it be not *the one* contrary to its own nature) it will be generated neither prior nor posterior to others, but together with them; and on this account *the one* will neither be older nor younger than others, nor others than *the one*: but, according to the former reasoning, *the one* was both older and younger than others, and others in a similar manner than it. Entirely so.

After this manner, therefore, *the one* subsists and is generated. But what shall we say respecting its becoming older and younger than others, and others than *the one*; and again, that it neither becomes older nor younger? Shall we say that it subsists in the same manner with respect to the term *becoming to be* as with respect to the term *to be*? or otherwise? I am not able to say. But I am able to affirm this, that however one thing may be older than another, yet it cannot otherwise subsist in *becoming to be* older, than by that difference of age which it possessed as soon as it was born: nor, on the contrary, can that which is younger subsist in *becoming to be* younger, otherwise than by the same difference. For, equal things being added to unequals, whether they are times or any thing else, always cause them to differ by the same interval by which they were distant at first. How should it be otherwise? *That which is*, therefore, cannot subsist in *becoming to be*

older or younger than *one being*, since it *is* always equally different from it in age: but this *is* and *was* older, but that younger; but by no means subsists in *becoming* so. True. That which *is* one, therefore, will never subsist in *becoming to be* either older or younger than other beings. Never. But see whether by this means other things will *become* younger and older. After what manner? The same as that through which *the one* appeared to be older than others, and others than *the one*. What then? Since *the one* is older than others, it was for a longer period of time than others. Certainly.

But again consider, if we add an equal time to a longer and shorter time, does the longer differ from the shorter by an equal or by a smaller part? By a smaller. *The one*, therefore, will not differ from others by so great an age afterwards as before; but, receiving an equal time with others, it will always differ by a less age than before. Will it not be so? Certainly. But does not that which differs less in age, with respect to any thing, than it did before, become younger than before, with respect to those than which it was before older? Younger. But if it is younger, will not, on the contrary, others with respect to *the one* be older than before? Entirely so. That, therefore, which was generated younger, will subsist in *becoming to be* older, with respect to that which was before generated and is older; but it never *is* older, but always is *becoming* older than it; the one indeed advancing to a more juvenile state, but the other to one more aged: but that which is older is *becoming to be* younger than the younger, after the same manner. For both tending to that which is contrary they subsist in becoming contrary to each other; the younger becoming older than the older, and the older younger than the younger: but they are not able to *become* so. For if they should *become* they would no longer subsist in *becoming*, but would now *be*. But now they are becoming younger and older than each other; and *the one* indeed becomes younger than others, because it appears to be older, and to have a prior generation: but others are older than *the one*, because they have a posterior generation; and, from the same reason, other things will be similarly related with respect to *the one*, since they appear to be more antient and to have a prior generation. So indeed it appears. Does it not follow, that so far as the one does not become younger or older than  
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the other, because they differ by an equal number from each other, that, so far as this, *the one* will not become older or younger than others, nor others than *the one*? But that, so far as it is necessary that the prior should always differ from such as are becoming to be posterior, and the posterior from the prior; so far it is necessary that they should become older and younger than each other, both others than *the one* and *the one* than others? Entirely so. On all these accounts, therefore, *the one is*, and is *becoming to be*, older and younger both than itself and others; and again, neither *is* nor is *becoming to be* older nor younger than itself and others. It is perfectly so. But since *the one* participates of time, and of becoming to be older and younger, is it not necessary that it should participate of the past, present, and future, since it participates of time? It is necessary. *The one*, therefore, was, and is, and will be; and was generated, and is generated, and will be generated. What then? And there will also be something belonging to it, and which may be asserted of it, and which was, and is, and will be. Entirely so. There will, therefore, be science, opinion, and sense of *the one*, since we have now treated of all these things about it. You speak rightly. A name, therefore, and discourse may subsist about *the one*, and it may be denominated and spoken of: and whatever particulars of the same kind take place in other things, will also take place about *the one*. The case is perfectly so.

In the third place, let us consider, if *the one* subsists in the manner we have already asserted, is it not necessary, since it is both one and many, and again neither one nor many, and participating of time, that because *it is* one it should participate of essence; but that because *it is not*, it should not at any time participate of essence? It is necessary. Is it, therefore, possible, that when it participates and becomes such as it is, that then it should not participate; or that it should participate when it does not participate? It cannot be possible. It participates, therefore, at one time, and does not participate at another: for thus alone can it participate and not participate of the same. Right. Is not that also time, when it receives *being* and again loses it? Or how can it be possible that, being such as it is, it should at one time possess the same thing, and at another time not, unless it both receives and loses it? No otherwise. Do you not denominate the receiving of essence *to become*? I do. And is

not to lose essence the same as to perish? Entirely so. *The one*, therefore, as it seems, by receiving and losing essence, is generated and perishes. Necessarily so. But since it is both one and many, and subsists in becoming to be and perishing, when it becomes one does it cease to be many, and when it becomes many does it cease to be one? Entirely so. But, in consequence of becoming one and many, must it not be separated and collected? It must. And when it becomes dissimilar and similar, must it not be assimilated and dissimilated? Certainly. And when it becomes greater, lesser, and equal, must it not be increased, corrupted, and equalized? It must so. But when from being moved it stands still, and when from standing still it is changed into being moved, it is requisite that it should not subsist in one time. How should it? But that which before stood still and is afterwards moved, and was before moved and afterwards stands still, cannot suffer these affections without mutation. For how can it? But there is no time in which any thing can neither be moved nor stand still. There is not. But it cannot be changed without mutation. It is not probable that it can. When, therefore, will it be changed? For neither while it stands still, nor while it is moved, will it be changed: nor while it is in time. It will not. Is that any wonderful thing in which it will be when it changes? What thing? *The sudden*, or that which unapparently starts forth to the view. For *the sudden* seems to signify some such thing, as that from which it passes into each of these conditions. For while it stands still it will not be changed from standing, nor while in motion will it be changed from motion: but that wonderful nature *the sudden* is situated between motion and abiding, is in no time, and into this and from this that which is moved passes into standing still, and that which stands still into motion. It appears so. *The one*, therefore, if it stands still and is moved, must be changed into each: for thus alone will it produce both these affections. But, becoming changed, it will be changed suddenly; and when it changes will be in no time: for it will then neither stand still nor be moved. It will not. Will *the one* also be thus affected with respect to other mutations? And when it is changed from *being* into the *loss of being*, or from *non-being* into *becoming to be*, does it not then become a medium between certain motions and abidings? and then neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor perishes? It appears so. And in the same manner,  
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when it passes from one into many and from many into one, it is neither one nor many, nor is it separated nor collected. And in passing from similar to dissimilar, and from dissimilar to similar, it is neither similar nor dissimilar, nor is assimilated nor dissimilated. And while it passes from small into great, and into equal or its contrary, it will neither be small nor great, nor unequal, nor increasing, nor perishing, nor equalized. It does not appear that it can. But all these passions *the one* will suffer, if it is. How should it not?

But should we not consider what other things ought to suffer if *the one* is? We should. Let us relate, therefore, *if the one is*, what other things ought to suffer from *the one*. By all means. Does it not follow that because other things are different from *the one* they are not *the one*: for otherwise they would not be different from *the one*? Right. Nor yet are others entirely deprived of *the one*, but participate it in a certain respect. In what respect? Because things different from *the one* are different, from their having parts: for if they had not parts they would be entirely one. Right. But parts we have asserted belong to that which is a whole. We have so. But it is necessary that a whole should be one composed from many, of which one the many are parts: for each of the parts ought not to be a part of many, but of a whole. How so? If any thing should be a part of many, among which it subsists itself, it would doubtless be a part of itself (which is impossible), and of each one of the others; since it is a part of all. For if it is not a part of one of these it will be a part of the others, this being excepted; and so it will not be a part of each one: and not being a part of each, it will be a part of no one of the many: and being a part of no one of the many, it is impossible that it should be any thing belonging to all those, of no one of which it is either a part or any thing else. So it appears. A part, therefore, is neither a part of many nor of all; but of one certain idea and of one certain thing which we call a whole, and which becomes one perfect thing from all: for a part indeed is a part of this. Entirely so. If, therefore, other things have parts, they will also participate of a whole and one. Certainly. One perfect whole, therefore, possessing parts, must necessarily be different from *the one*. It is necessary. But the same reasoning is true concerning each of the parts: for it is  
necessary

necessary that each of these should participate of *the one*. For, if each of these is a part, the very being each, in a certain respect, signifies one; since it is distinguished from others, and has a subsistence by itself, if it is that which is called each. Right. But it participates of *the one* as it is evidently something different from *the one*; for otherwise it would not participate, but would be *the one itself*. But now it is impossible that any thing can be *the one* except *the one itself*. Impossible. But it is necessary both to a whole and to a part to participate of *the one*: for a whole is one certain thing and has parts. But each part whatever, which is a part of the whole, is one part. It is so. Must not, therefore, those which participate of *the one* participate it, as being different from *the one*? How should they not? But things different from *the one* will in a certain respect be many; for if things different from *the one* were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing. They would. But since the things which participate of one part and one whole are more than one, is it not necessary that these very things which participate of *the one* should be infinite in multitude? How? Thus: they are different from *the one*, nor are they participants of *the one*, then when they have already participated of it. Certainly. Are not those multitudes in which *the one* is not? Multitudes, certainly. What then? If we should be willing by cogitation to take away the least quantity from these, would it not be necessary that this quantity which is taken away should be multitude, and not one, since it does not participate of *the one*? It is necessary. By always surveying, therefore, another nature of form, itself subsisting by itself, will not any quantity of it which we may behold be infinite in multitude? Entirely so. And since every part becomes one, the parts will have bounds with respect to each other, and to the whole; and the whole with respect to the parts. Perfectly so. It will happen, therefore, to things different from *the one*, as it appears both from *the one* and from their communicating with each other, that a certain something different will take place in them; which indeed affords to them a bound towards each other, while in the mean time the nature of these causes them to become essentially connected with infinity. It appears so. And thus things different from *the one*, both as wholes and according to parts, are infinite and participate of bound.

Entirely

Entirely so. Are they not, therefore, similar and dissimilar, both to each other and to themselves? Why? Because, so far as all of them are in a certain respect infinite, according to their own nature, they all of them, in consequence of this, suffer that which is *the same*. How should they not? But so far as they suffer to be bounded and infinite, which are passions contrary to each other, they suffer these passions. Certainly. But things contrary, as such, are most dissimilar. What then? According to each of these passions, therefore, they are similar to themselves and to each other; but, according to both, they are on both sides most contrary and dissimilar. It appears so. And thus others will be the same with themselves and with each other, and similar and dissimilar. They will so. And again, they will be the same and different from each other, will both be moved and stand still; and it will not be difficult to find all kinds of contrary passions suffered by things different from *the one*, while they appear to be passive, in the manner we have related. You speak rightly.

Shall we not, therefore, pass by these things as evident, and again consider if *the one* is, whether things different from *the one* will subsist not in this manner, or whether in this manner alone? Entirely so. Let us, therefore, assert again from the beginning, *if the one is*, what things different from *the one* ought to suffer. Let us. Is, therefore, *the one* separate from others, and are others separate from *the one*? Why? Because there is no other *different* besides these, viz. that which is *different* from *the one*, and that which is *different* from others; for all that can be spoken is asserted, when we say *the one* and *others*. All, indeed. There is nothing else, therefore, besides these in which *the one* and *others* can subsist after the same manner. Nothing. *The one* and *others*, therefore, are never in the same. It does not appear that they are. Are they separate, therefore? They are. We have likewise asserted that *the truly one* has not any parts. For how can it? Neither, therefore, will the whole of *the one* be in *others*, nor the parts of it, if it is separate from *others*, and has no parts. How should it not be so? In no way, therefore, will *others* participate of *the one*, since they neither participate according to a certain part of it, nor according to the whole. It does not appear that they can. By no means, therefore, are *others the one*, nor have they any *one* in themselves. They have not.

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Neither, then, are other things many; for, if they were many, each of them, as being a part of a whole, would be one: but now things different from *the one* are neither one nor many, nor a whole, nor parts, since they in no respect participate of *the one*. Right. *Others*, therefore, are neither two nor three, nor is *one* contained in them, because they are entirely deprived of *the one*. So it is. *Others*, therefore, are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor the same with *the one*, nor are similitude and dissimilitude inherent in them. For, if they were similar and dissimilar, so far as they contained in themselves similitude and dissimilitude, so far things different from *the one* would comprehend in themselves two contrary species. So it appears. But it is impossible for those to participate of two certain things which do not participate of one. Impossible. *Others*, therefore, are neither similars nor dissimilars, nor both. For, if they were things similar or dissimilar, they would participate of one other form; and if they were both, they would participate of two contrary forms: but these things appear to be impossible. True. *Others*, therefore, are neither *same* nor *different*, nor are moved nor stand still, nor are generated nor destroyed, nor are greater, or lesser, or equal, nor do they suffer any thing else of this kind. For, if *others* could sustain to suffer any such affection, they would participate of one and two, and of even and odd; all which it appears impossible for them to participate, since they are entirely deprived of *the one*. All this is most true. Hence, then, if *the one is*, *the one* is all things and nothing; and is similarly affected towards itself and towards others. Entirely so.

Let this then be admitted. But should we not after this consider what ought to happen if *the one* is not? We should. What then will be the hypothesis if *the one is not*? Will it differ from the hypothesis if *that which is not one is not*? It will indeed differ. Will it only differ, or is the hypothesis if *that which is not one is not*, entirely contrary to the hypothesis if *the one is not*? Entirely contrary. But what, if any one should say, if magnitude is not, or parvitude is not, or any thing else of this kind, would he not evince in each of these that he speaks of *that which is not* as something *different*? Entirely so. Would he not, therefore, now evince that he calls *that which is not* different from others, when he says if *the one is not*; and should we understand that which he says? We should understand. In the

the first place, therefore, he speaks of something which may be known; and afterwards of something different from others when he says *the one*, whether he adds to it *to be* or *not to be*: for that which is said not to be will be not the less known, nor that it is something different from others: is it not so? It is necessary it should. Let us, therefore, relate from the beginning, *if the one is not*, what ought to be the consequence. In the first place, therefore, this as it appears ought to happen it, that either there should be a science of it, or that nothing of what is pronounced can be known, when any one says *if the one is not*. True. Must not this also happen, that either other things must be different from it, or that it must be said to be different from others? Entirely so. Diversity, therefore, besides science, is present with it; for, when any one says that *the one* is different from others, he will not speak of the diversity of others, but of the diversity of *the one*. It appears so. And besides, that which is not, or non-being, will participate of *that*, and of *some certain thing*, and of *this*, and of *these*, and every thing of this kind. For neither could *the one* be spoken of, nor things different from *the one*, nor would any thing be present with it, nor could it be denominated any thing, if it neither participated of some certain thing or things of this kind. Right. But *to be* cannot be present with *the one* if it is not; though nothing hinders but it may participate of *the many*: but, indeed, it is necessary that it should, if *the one* is *that*, and is not something different from *that*. If, therefore, it is neither *the one* nor *that*, neither will it be; but discourse must take place about something else, and it will be necessary to pronounce nothing concerning it. But if *the one* is established as *that* and not as *another*, it is necessary that it should participate of *that* and of many other things. Entirely so. Dissimilitude, therefore, is present with it as to other things: for other things being different from *the one* will also be foreign from it. Certainly. But are not things foreign various? How should they not? And are not things various dissimilar? Dissimilar. If, therefore, they are dissimilar to *the one*, it is evident they will be dissimilar to that which is dissimilar. It is evident. Dissimilitude, therefore, will be present with *the one*, according to which others will be dissimilar to it. It appears so. But if a dissimilitude with respect to other things belongs to it, must not similitude to itself be present with it? How? If there be a dissimilitude of *the one* with respect to *the one*, discourse would not take place about a

thing of this kind as of *the one*; nor would the hypothesis be about *the one*, but about something different from *the one*. Entirely so. But it ought not. Certainly not. There ought, therefore, to be a similitude of *the one* with respect to itself. There ought. But neither is *the one* equal to others. For, if it were equal, it would according to equality be similar to them; but both these are impossible, since *the one* is not. Impossible. But since it is not equal to others, is it not necessary that others also should not be equal to it? It is necessary. But are not things which are not equal unequal? Certainly. And are not unequals unequal to that which is unequal? How should they not? *The one*, therefore, will participate of inequality, according to which others will be unequal to it. It will participate. But magnitude and parvitude belong to inequality. They do. Do magnitude and parvitude, therefore, belong to a one of this kind? It appears they do. But magnitude and parvitude are always separated from each other. Entirely so. Something, therefore, always subsists between them. Certainly. Can you assign any thing else between these, except equality? Nothing else. With whatever, therefore, there is magnitude and parvitude, with this equality also is present, subsisting as a medium between these. It appears so. But to *the one which is not*, equality, magnitude, and parvitude, as it appears, belong. So it seems. But it ought likewise, in a certain respect, to participate of essence. How so? Ought it to possess the properties which we have already described? for, unless this is the case, we shall not speak the truth when we say *the one is not*; but if this is true, it is evident that we have asserted things which have a subsistence: is it not so? It is. But since we assert that we speak truly, it is likewise necessary to assert that we speak of things which exist. It is necessary. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, as it appears, *is*; for *if it is not*, while *not being*<sup>1</sup>, but remits something of *being* in order to *not being*, it will immediately become *being*. Entirely so. It ought, therefore, to have, as the bond of *not to be*, *to be that which is not*<sup>2</sup>, if it is about *not to be*: just as *being* ought to have as a bond *not to be that which is*

<sup>1</sup> The original is  $\mu\eta \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota \mu\eta \nu\upsilon$ , and this is literally *is not non-being*. But the meaning of this difficult passage is as follows: Any remission of *being* is attended with *non-being*, which is the same with *is not*; and if any thing of *is* be taken away, *is not* is immediately introduced, and so it will immediately become *is not non-being*, that is, *it is being*.

<sup>2</sup> For between  $\mu\eta \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota$  and  $\epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota \nu\upsilon$ ,  $\epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota \mu\eta \nu\upsilon$  must subsist as a medium.

*not*<sup>1</sup>, that it may be perfectly *that which is*. For thus, in a most eminent degree, *being* will *be* and *non-being* will *not be*: *being* participating of essence, in order that it may *be being*; but of *non-essence* in order that it may obtain *to be non-being*, if it is about perfectly *to be*: but *non-being* participating of *non-essence*, in order that it may *not be that which is not being*; but participating of essence, in order that it may obtain *to be non-being*, if it is to be perfectly *that which is not*. Most truly so. Since, therefore, *non-being* is present with *being*, and *being* with *non-being*, is it not necessary that *the one* also, since it is not, should participate of *being*, in order that it may *not be*? It is necessary. Essence, therefore, will appear with *the one*, if it is not. So it seems. And *non-essence*, since it is not. How should it not? Can any thing, therefore, which is affected in a certain manner, be not so affected when not changed from this habit? It cannot. Every thing, therefore, signifies a certain mutation, which is affected and again not affected in some particular manner. How should it not? Is mutation a motion, or what else do we call it? It is a motion. But has not *the one* appeared to be both *being* and *non-being*? Certainly. It has appeared, therefore, to be *thus* and *not thus* affected. It has. *The one*, therefore, which is *non-being* appears to be moved, since it possesses a mutation from *being* into *non-being*. It appears so. But if it be no where among beings, as *it is not* in consequence of *not being*, it cannot pass elsewhere. For how can it? It will not, therefore, be moved by transition. It will not. Neither will it revolve in *same*: for it will never touch *same*, since *same* is *being*. But it is impossible that *non-being* can reside in *any being*. Impossible. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, cannot revolve in that in which it is not. It cannot. Neither will *the one* be altered from itself, either into *being* or *non-being*: for our discourse would no longer be concerning *the one*, if it was altered from itself, but concerning something different from this one. Right. But if it is neither altered, nor revolves in *same*, nor suffers transition, is there any way in which it can be moved? How should there? But that which is immovable must necessarily

<sup>1</sup> So τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ εἶναι is the medium between τὸ εἶναι ὄν and τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὄν: for τὸ μὴ εἶναι μὴ is the same as τὸ εἶναι, and connects with τὸ εἶναι ὄν; and τὸ μὴ ὄν with τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὄν. Thompson had not the least glimpse of this meaning, as may be seen from his version.

be at rest ; and that which is at rest must abide or stand still. It is necessary. *The one which is not*, therefore, as it appears, both abides and is moved. It appears so. But if it be moved, there is a great necessity that it should be altered ; for, so far as any thing is moved, it is no longer affected in the same manner as before, but differently. There is so. *The one*, therefore, since it is moved, is also altered. Certainly. But as again it is in no respect moved, it will be in no respect altered. It will not. So far, therefore, as *the one which is not* is moved, it is altered ; but so far as it is not moved it is not altered. Certainly not. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, is both altered and not altered. It appears so. But is it not necessary that when any thing is altered it should become different from what it was before, and should suffer a dissolution of its former habit ; but that a nature which is not altered should neither be generated nor dissolved ? It is necessary. *The one*, therefore, *which is not*, through being altered, will be generated and dissolved ; but at the same time, from its not suffering alteration, will not be subject to either generation or corruption. And thus *the one which is not* will be generated and dissolved, and will neither be generated nor dissolved. It will not.

But let us again return to the beginning, and see whether these things will appear to us in our subsequent discussion as they do now, or otherwise. It is necessary, indeed, so to do. Have we not already related, *if the one is not*, what ought to happen concerning it ? Certainly. But when we say *it is not*, do we signify any thing else than the absence of essence from that which we say is not ? Nothing else. Whether, therefore, when we say that any thing *is not*, do we say that in a certain respect it is not, and that in a certain respect it is ? Or does the term *is not* simply signify that it is in no respect any where, and that it does not any how participate of essence, since it *is not* ? It signifies, indeed, most simply. Neither therefore can that which is not *be*, nor in any other respect participate of essence. It cannot. But is to be generated and corrupted any thing else than for this to receive essence and for that to lose essence ? It is nothing else. That therefore with which nothing of essence is present, can neither receive nor lose it. How can it ? *The one*, therefore, since it in no respect *is*, can neither possess, nor lose, nor receive essence, in any manner whatever. It is proper

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it should be so. *The one which is not*, will neither therefore be corrupted nor generated, since it in no respect participates of essence. It does not appear that it will. Neither, therefore, will it be in any respect altered; for if it suffered this passion it would be generated and corrupted. True. But if it is not altered, is it not also necessary that it should not be moved? It is necessary. But that which in no respect *is*, we have likewise asserted, cannot stand still; for that which stands ought always to be in a certain *same*? How should it not? And thus we must assert that *non-being* neither at any time stands nor is moved. For indeed it does not. But likewise nothing of beings is present with it; for this, through participating of being, would participate of essence. It is evident. Neither magnitude, therefore, nor parvitude, nor equality, belongs to it. Certainly not. Neither will similitude or diversity, either with respect to itself or others, be present with it. It does not appear that they will. But what, can other things be in any respect present with it, if nothing ought to be present with it? They cannot. Neither, therefore, are similars nor dissimilars, nor *same* nor *different*, different from it. They are not. But what, can any thing be asserted of it, or be with it, or can it be any certain thing, or this, or belong to this, or that, or be with some other thing, or be formerly, or hereafter, or now—or can science, or opinion, or sense, or discourse, or a name, or any thing else belonging to beings, subsist about that which is not? There cannot. *The one* therefore *which is not*, will not in any respect subsist any where. So indeed it appears.

But let us again declare *if the one is not*, what other things ought to suffer. Let us. But in a certain respect *others* ought to subsist; for, unless *others* have a being, we cannot discourse concerning them. True. But if discourse is about *others*, *others* will be different: or do you not call *others* and *different* the same? I do. But do we not say that *different* is different from different, and *other* is other than *another*? Certainly. With respect to *others*, therefore, if they are about to be *others*, there is something than which they will be others. It is necessary. But what will this be? For they will not be different from *the one*, since it is not. They will not. They are different therefore from each other; for this alone remains to them, or to be different from nothing. Right. According to multitudes, therefore,

each is different from each; for they cannot be different according to *the one*, since *the one is not*. But each mass of these, as it appears, is infinite in multitude. And though any one should assume that which appears to be the least, like a dream in sleep, on a sudden, instead of that which seemed to be *one*, *many* would rise to the view; and instead of that which is smallest, a quantity perfectly great with respect to the multitude distributed from it. Most right. But among these masses or heaps, *others* will be mutually different from one another, if they are *others* and *the one* is not. Eminently so. Will there not then be many heaps, each of which will appear to be one, but is not so since *the one* is not? There will so. There will likewise appear to be a number of these, if each of these which are many is one. Entirely so. But the even and odd which are among them will not have a true appearance, since *the one* will not have a being. They will not. But likewise that which is smallest, as we have said, will appear to be with them; but this minimum will seem to be many things and great, with respect to each of the things which are many and small. How should it not? And every small heap will seem in the eye of opinion to be equal to many small heaps: for it will not appear to pass from a greater into a lesser quantity, before it seems to arrive at something between; and this will be a phantasm of equality. It is likely to be so. Will it not also appear to be bounded with respect to another heap, itself with respect to itself, at the same time neither having a beginning, nor middle, nor end? How so? Because, when any one apprehends by the dianoëtic power some one of these prior to the beginning, another beginning will always appear, and after the end another end will always be left behind: but in the middle there will always be other things more inward than the middle; and smaller, because each of them cannot receive *one one*, since *the one is not*. This is most true. But every thing which any one may apprehend by the dianoëtic power, must I think be broken to pieces and distributed; for the bulk will in a certain respect be apprehended without *the one*. Entirely so. But will not such a heap, to him who beholds it afar off and with a dull eye, necessarily appear to be one: but to him who with an intellectual eye surveys it near and acutely, will not each appear to be infinite in multitude, since it is deprived of *the one*, because it has no subsistence? It is necessary it should be so in the highest degree.

Each, therefore, of other things ought to appear infinite and bounded, and one and many, *if the one is not*, and other things besides *the one* have a subsistence. It ought to be so. Will they, therefore, appear to be similars and dissimilars? But how? Since to him who beholds *others* at a distance, involved as it were in shadow, they all appear to be one, they will seem to suffer *same* and to be similar. Entirely so. But to him who approaches nearer they will appear to be many and different, and different from and dissimilar to themselves, through the phantasm of *diversity*. It is so. The heaps, therefore, will necessarily appear to be similar and dissimilar to themselves, and to each other. Entirely so. Will they not also be the same and different from each other, and in contact with, and separate from, themselves, and moved with all possible motions, and every way abiding: likewise generated and corrupted, and neither of these, and all of this kind, which may be easily enumerated, if, though *the one is not*, *the many* have a subsistence? All this is most true.

Once more, therefore, returning again to the beginning, let us relate what ought to happen to things different from *the one*, *if the one is not*. Let us relate. Does it not, therefore, follow that *others* are not *the one*? How should it not be so? Nor yet are they many; for, in *the many*, *the one* also would be inherent. For, if none of these is one, all are nothing; so that neither can there be many. True. *The one*, therefore, not being inherent in *others*, *others* are neither many nor one. They are not. Nor will they appear either to be one or many. Why not? Because *others* cannot in any respect have any communication with things which are not, nor can any thing of non-beings be present with *others*; for no part subsists with non-beings. True. Neither, therefore, is there any opinion of that which is not, inherent in *others*, nor any phantasm; nor can that which is not become in any respect the subject of opinion to *others*. It cannot. *The one*, therefore, *if it is not*, cannot by opinion be conceived to be any certain one of *others*, nor yet many; for it is impossible to form an opinion of many without *the one*. It is impossible. If *the one*, therefore, *is not*, neither have *others* any subsistence; nor can *the one* or *the many* be conceived by opinion. It does not appear that they can. Neither, therefore, do similars nor dissimilars subsist. They do not. Nor *same* nor *different*, nor things in contact, nor  
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such as are separate from each other, nor other things, such as we have already discussed, as appearing to subsist; for no particular of these will have any existence, nor will others appear to be, *if the one is not*. True. If we should, therefore, summarily say, that *if the one is not, nothing is*, will not our assertion be right? Entirely so. Let this then be asserted by us, and this also: that whether *the one is* or *is not*, both itself, as it appears, and others, both with respect to themselves and to each other, are entirely all things, and at the same time are not all, and appear to be, and at the same time do not appear. It is most true.

THE END OF THE PARMENIDES.

THE

THE SOPHISTA;

A

DIALOGUE

ON BEING.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

PHYSICS 309

# INTRODUCTION

TO

## THE SOPHISTA.

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THE following is the preface of Proclus <sup>1</sup> to this dialogue, as preserved in the Greek Scholia on Plato, published by Ruhnkenius. “ Plato not only calls a certain man a Sophist, but also Love <sup>2</sup>, Pluto, and Jupiter, and says that the sophistical art is all-beautiful; whence we may conjecture that the dialogue has a more noble scope than it appears to possess. For, according to the great Jamblichus, its scope is concerning the sublunary demiurgus <sup>3</sup>; since this Divinity is the fabricator of images, and the purifier of souls, always separating them from contrary reasons, being a transmuter, and a mercenary hunter of rich young men. While he receives souls coming from on high replete with productive principles, he takes from them a reward, viz. the fabrication of animals, in such a way as is accommodated to the nature of mortals. This Deity gives himself to non-being, because he fabricates material beings, and embraces matter,—a thing which is truly false. At the same time, however, he looks to true being. He is also many-headed, hurling forth many essences and lives, through which he furnishes the variety of generation. The same power is likewise a magician, in consequence of alluring souls by natural reasons, so that they are with difficulty divulsed from generation. For Love, also, and Nature, are called by some magicians,

<sup>1</sup> Ficinus, who has given a version of this preface, ascribes it to Proclus, and doubtless from good authority.

<sup>2</sup> This word is wanting in Ruhnkenius, and is supplied from the version of Ficinus.

<sup>3</sup> Viz. Pluto.

on account of the sympathy and antipathy in things which have a natural subsistence. Now, therefore, Plato wishes to instruct us in an all-various sophist. For a philosopher is a sophist, as imitating the celestial and also the sublunary demiurgus: for the divisive art imitates the progression of things from *the one*, and the sublunary the celestial demiurgus; and on this account he is a sophist. A sophist also among men is so called, because he imitates great things: and hence Plato denominates the sophist many-headed. The Elean guest is analogous to the supercelestial and exempt father of the artificers of things, but his hearers to demiurgic intellections, one of these being analogous to the intellection of Jupiter, and the other to angelic intelligence, as being Mercurial and geometrical. And because fabrication proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect, on this account the Elean guest first converses with Theodorus, and afterwards converts himself to Socrates in particular<sup>1</sup>.” Thus far Proclus.

Plato in this dialogue presents us with six definitions of a sophist; but as definition cannot be obtained without division, for the latter is the principle of the former, hence he divides the genus of the sophist by its proper differences, from which, in conjunction with genus, species is composed and de-

<sup>1</sup> I give the original of this fragment of Proclus for the sake of the learned Platonic reader, who may not have these Greek Scholia in his possession: for, to a genuine Platonist, every thing written by Proclus must be invaluable. Ὅτι σοφιστήν καλεῖ ὁ Πλάτων καὶ τὸν . . . (supple Ἐρωτά) καὶ τὸν Αἰδῆν, καὶ τὸν Δία, καὶ παγκαλὴν λέγει εἶναι τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην· ὅθεν ὑπονοοῦμεν, ὅτι γλαφυρωτέρου σκοποῦ ἐχεται ὁ διάλογος. Ἔστι γὰρ κατὰ τὸν μέγαν Ἰαμβελίχον σκοπὸς νῦν περὶ τοῦ ὑποσεληνῆν δημιουργοῦ. Ὅυτος γὰρ εἰδωλοποιός, καὶ καθαρτὴς ψυχῶν, ἐναντιῶν λόγων αἰεὶ χωρίζων, μεταβλητικός, καὶ νεῶν πλουσιῶν ἐμμισθὸς θηρευτῆς, ψυχᾶς ὑποδεχομένης πληρεῖς λόγων ἀνωθεν ἰσθᾶς, καὶ μισθὸν λαμβανῶν παρ’ αὐτῶν, τὴν ζωοποιῶν τὴν κατὰ λόγον τῶν θνητῶν. Ὅυτος ἐνδεδεται τῷ μὴ οὐτι, τὰ ἐνυλὰ δημιουργῶν, καὶ τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ψευδὸς ἀσπαζόμενος, τὴν ὕλην. Βλέπει δὲ εἰς τὸ οὐτως οὐ. Ὅυτος ἐστὶν ὁ πολυκεφαλὸς, πολλὰς οὐσίας καὶ ζωᾶς προεβλημένος, δι’ ἧν κατασκευάζει τὴν ποικιλίαν τῆς γενεσεως. Ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς καὶ γῆς, ὡς θελῶν τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς φυσικοῖς λόγοις, ὡς δυσἀποσπαστῶς εἶχειν ἀπὸ τῆς γενεσεως. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐρῶς γῆς, καὶ ἡ φύσις ὑπο τινῶν μάγος κεκληται διὰ τὰς συμπάθειας καὶ ἀντιπάθειας τῶν φύσει. Νῦν οὖν τὸν παντοδαπὸν σοφιστὴν βουλεται διδασκεῖν. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος σοφιστῆς, ὡς μιμούμενος τὸν τε οὐρανοῦν δημιουργὸν καὶ τὸν γενεσιουργόν. Καὶ ἡ διαιρετικὴ μιμεῖται τὴν ἀπο τοῦ ἑνὸς τῶν οὐτῶν προοδόν, καὶ ὁ γενεσιουργὸς τὸν οὐρανοῦν δημιουργόν. διὸ καὶ σοφιστῆς, καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ σοφιστῆς ἀνθρώπος ὧν διὰ τὸ τὰ μεγάλα μιμεῖσθαι, σοφιστῆς καλεῖται· ὅθεν καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν πολυκεφαλὸν εἰρηκεν. Ὁ δὲ ξένος εἰς τύπον τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν δημιουργῶν νοεῖσθω ὑπερουρανοῦ καὶ ἐξηρημένος· οἱ δὲ ἀκροῦνται εἰς τὰς δημιουργικὰς νοήσεις, ὁ μὲν εἰς τὴν τοῦ Διὸς, ὁ δὲ εἰς τὴν ἀγγελικὴν, ὡς Ἑρμαῖκος καὶ γεωμετρικός. Καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ δημιουργία ἐκ τοῦ ἀτελοῦς εἰς τὸ τέλειον, διὰ τοῦτο πρῶτον ὁ ξένος τῷ Θεοδώρῳ συγγίνεται· εἶτα δι’ ἐπιστροφῆς τῷ Δίῳ (lege ιδίῳ) Σωκράτει.

finer. He also shows, conformably to what is delivered in the Parmenides, that *being* is subordinate to *the one*; and enumerates five genera of *being*, viz. *essence*, *same*, and *different*, *permanency* and *motion*. He likewise teaches us that true essence belongs to incorporeal, and imaginable to corporeal natures; and is indignant with those who deny that there are forms superior to sensibles, and also with those who contend that all things are either alone permanent, or alone in motion. Besides all this, he disputes concerning science and opinion, true and false discourse, verb and noun, so far as they appear to pertain to the discussion of *being*. He likewise observes, that the sophist is concealed from our view, because he is involved in the darkness of non-entity, and that a philosopher also is not easily discerned on account of the splendor of being with which he is surrounded: "for the eyes of vulgar souls (says he) are unable to support the view of that which is divine."

In order, however, to understand the most abstruse part of this dialogue, it is necessary to refer the reader to our copious Notes and Introduction to the Parmenides: for he whose mental eye has gained a glimpse of the ineffable light of *supereffential unity*, will more easily perceive the splendors of *being*.

I only add, that Plato in this dialogue has given a most beautiful specimen of that part of his dialectic <sup>1</sup> called division; a branch of the master science in which he and the most illustrious of his disciples were eminently skilled, and by which they were enabled to discover all the connecting media in the vast series of being, and to ascend from that which is last in the universe to the ineffable principle of all things.

<sup>1</sup> For an ample account of this master science see the Introduction to the Parmenides.

# THE SOPHISTA.

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## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

THEODORUS,		An ELEAN GUEST, or STRANGER,
SOCRATES,		And THEÆTETUS.

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WE are come, Socrates, according to our agreement yesterday, as good manners require, and have brought with us this guest, who is an Elean by birth, but very different from the associates of Parmenides and Zeno: he is however a great philosopher.

Soc. Perhaps, therefore, Theodorus, according to the assertion of Homer<sup>r</sup>, you are conducting a certain God, and not a stranger. For he says, that both other Gods, and especially the hospitable deity, are conversant with men who participate of just shame, and that they inspect the insolent and the equitable conduct of men. So that perhaps he who now follows you, is one of the natures superior to man, who attends you in order to behold and confute us who dispute badly, as being himself a certain reprehending God.

THEO. This is not the manner of this guest, Socrates, but he is more modest than those that are studious of contention. And he appears to me, as being a man, not to be a God, but to be divine: for so I denominate all philosophers.

<sup>r</sup> Odyss. lib. vii. ver. 485, &c. See the Apology for the Fables of Homer, vol. i. p. 163 of this work. It is well observed by the Greek Scholiast on this place, that Socrates now, consistently with what he asserts in the Republic, reprobates these verses of Homer, but in a milder manner, in consequence of becoming an associate with the Elean guest.

Soc. And you do well in calling them so, my friend. But indeed the genus of philosophers is not much more easily distinguished, as I may say, than that of divinity. For those who are not fictitiously but truly philosophers, appear through the ignorance of others to be of an all-various nature, while they wander about cities, and behold from on high the life of inferior natures. And to some they appear to deserve no honour, but by others they are considered as worthy of all honour. And sometimes they appear to be politicians, but at other times Sophists; and sometimes, in the opinion of certain persons, they are considered to be perfectly insane. I would gladly, therefore, inquire of this our guest, if agreeable to him, what his familiars the Eleans think of these things, and how they denominate them.

THEO. What things do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. The sophist, politician, and philosopher.

THEO. What, and of what kind, is the doubt about these, which you would wish to have dissolved?

Soc. This: Whether they denominate all these, one or two. Or as there are three names, whether they also make a distribution into three genera, and ascribe the respective names to the respective genera.

THEO. But I think that he will not enviously refuse to discuss these things. Or how shall we say, guest?

GUEST. In this manner, Theodorus: For I shall not enviously refuse, nor is it difficult to inform you, that they think these are three genera: but to define clearly what each of them is, is not a small nor an easy work.

THEO. You have perhaps, Socrates, fallen upon questions similar to those which we were asking this our guest before we came hither. But he then gave us the same answers as he just now gave you: for he said, that he had sufficiently heard, and did not forget them.

Soc. You ought, therefore, to gratify us, O guest, with respect to our first question: But tell us thus much, whether you are accustomed to discuss by yourself in a long discourse, that which you wish to evince, or by interrogations, which I once heard Parmenides employing, and at the same time delivering all-beautiful arguments, I being then a young and he a very elderly man.

GUEST. If any one answers, Socrates, without difficulty, and in a placid manner

manner, it is more easy to discourse with such a one by interrogating; but if not, it is better to discourse by oneself.

SOC. You are at liberty, therefore, to choose whichever of these you please: for we shall all of us obey you without reluctance. But I would advise you to choose some young man for this purpose, either Theætetus here, or any other that you may think proper.

GUEST. I am ashamed, Socrates, that, conversing with you now for the first time, I have not given word for word, but, making a long discourse either by myself or to another, I have acted as if I had been framing a demonstration. For in reality no one should expect that the present question can be solved with the greatest facility: for it requires a very long discussion. On the contrary, not to gratify you, and those that are now assembled, especially since you have asked in so modest a manner; would, as it appears to me, be inhospitable and rustic; since, from what I have before said, and from what you have now urged me to do, I shall have Theætetus here as my associate in the discussion.

THEÆ. By thus acting indeed, O guest, as Socrates says, you will gratify all of us.

GUEST. It appears then, Theætetus, that nothing further must be said against these things. And as it seems, after this, I must address myself to you. But if being weary through the length of the discourse you should become indignant, do not blame me, but these your companions, as the cause of this.

THEÆ. I am far from thinking that this will be the case: but if a thing of this kind should take place, then we can call upon the namesake of Socrates here, who is of the same age with me, and is my associate in gymnastic exercises, and who is not unaccustomed to accomplish many laborious things in conjunction with me.

GUEST. You speak well. Deliberate, therefore, about these things by yourself, in the course of the disputation: but now consider in common with me, beginning in the first place (as it appears to me) from the sophist; and let us evince by our discourse what he is. For now both you and I have only the name in common respecting this thing: but perhaps each of us thinks differently as to the thing denominated. But it is always requisite respecting every thing, rather to consent through reasons to the thing itself, than to the name alone without reason. However, with respect to the tribe  
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which we now take upon us to investigate, it is by no means easy to apprehend what a sophist is. It appears however to all men, and is an antient opinion, that whoever wishes to labour through great things well, should exercise himself in such as are small and more easy, before he attempts such as are the greatest. Now, therefore, as we are of opinion that the genius of a sophist is difficult to investigate, I would advise, Theætetus, that we should first of all consider the method of this investigation, in something more easy: unless you are able to show a more expeditious way.

THEÆ. But I am not able.

GUEST. Are you willing, therefore, that, adducing a vile thing, we should establish it as a paradigm of a greater thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. But what if we propose a thing well known, and of a trifling nature, but which will contribute as well as any thing to the apprehension of greater things? as for instance a fisherman. Is he not known to every one? and is it not likewise certain, that he does not deserve much serious consideration?

THEÆ. It is so.

GUEST. Yet I suspect he will furnish us with a method, and reasoning process, not unadapted to our design.

THEÆ. In this case, therefore, it will be well.

GUEST. Come then, let us begin from this: and inform me, whether we should consider a fisherman, as one endued with art, or as without art, but possessing another power.

THEÆ. We must by no means consider him as without art.

GUEST. But there are nearly two species of all arts.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. Agriculture, and the care respecting every mortal body, together with that pertaining to every thing composite and plastic, which we denominate an utensil, and in conjunction with these the imitative power, all which may be justly called by one name.

THEÆ. How so? and by what name?

GUEST. When any one afterwards leads into existence that which was not before; then we say that he who leads makes, and that the thing led is made.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But all the particulars which we just now mentioned possess a power adapted to this.

THEÆ. They do.

GUEST. In a summary way, therefore, we shall denominate them effective.

THEÆ. Be it so.

GUEST. But after this, the whole species of discipline and knowledge, together with the species of gain, contest and hunting, may be called a certain art of acquiring, since no one of these fabricates any thing, but procures things which are and have been, partly subjecting them to its power by words and actions, and partly conceding them to those by whom they are received.

THEÆ. They may be so called: for it is proper.

GUEST. Since all arts, therefore, consist either in acquiring or in effecting, in which of these, Theætetus, shall we place the art of fishing?

THEÆ. Doubtless in the art of acquiring.

GUEST. But are there not two species of the art of acquiring? the one being a commutation between those that are willing, through gifts, buying, and wages? But the other will be a mancipation, effected either by deeds or words.

THEÆ. It appears this must be the case, from what has been said.

GUEST. But what? Must not mancipation also receive a twofold division?

THEÆ. After what manner?

GUEST. The one being apparent, and wholly agonistic; but the other being occult, and wholly consisting in hunting.

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. It is likewise absurd, not to give hunting a twofold division.

THEÆ. Inform me how.

GUEST. One member of the division consists of the inanimate, and the other of the animated kind.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly: for there are both these.

GUEST. How, indeed, is it possible there should not? And it is requisite that we should leave the hunting of inanimate things without a name, and that we should likewise dismiss the consideration of certain parts of the art of swimming, and other trifling things of this kind; and denominate  
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the other part, which is the hunting of animated natures, the hunting of animals.

THEÆ. Be it so.

GUEST. But is it not justly said, that there is a twofold species of the hunting of animals? one being the hunting of the pedestrian kind, which is distinguished by many species and names, but the other of every swimming animal, and which is denominated hunting in water?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But of the swimming division, we see that one kind cuts the air with wings, and that the other is aquatic.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But all the hunting of the winged tribe is called fowling.

THEÆ. It is so.

GUEST. But nearly that of all the aquatic tribe, fishing.

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. But what? Must we not divide this hunting into two greatest parts?

THEÆ. What are these parts?

GUEST. According to which we either fish with nets, or by percussive.

THEÆ. How do you say? And how do you divide each?

GUEST. That every thing which on all sides enclosing restrains any thing for the sake of impediment, is fitly denominated a net.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But do you call a bow-net, *dictuon*<sup>1</sup>, a snare, and a casting-net, any thing else than nets?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

GUEST. We must say, therefore, that this hunting with nets is a part of fishing, or something of this kind.

THEÆ. We must.

GUEST. But that which is accomplished with hooks and darts, by percussive, and which is different from the other kind of fishing, it will be proper that we should now call by one word, percutient-hunting, unless you, Theætetus, have any thing better to say.

<sup>1</sup> The *dictuon* was a larger and wider kind of net.

THEÆ. Let us pay no attention to the name: for this is sufficient.

GUEST. Of percutient-hunting, therefore, one kind is I think nocturnal, being effected by the light of fire; and on this account it happens to be called igniferous.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But the other kind is diurnal, and is effected with tridents hooked on the extremities of rods; the whole of this being aduncous fishing.

THEÆ. It is indeed so called.

GUEST. Of aduncous-percutient-fishing, therefore, that kind which is effected by darting the tridents into the water from on high, is I think called by some tridental fishing.

THEÆ. So certain persons say.

GUEST. Only one species then, as I may say, remains.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. A percussive contrary to this, effected indeed with a hook, but not casually striking any part of the body, as in fishing with tridents, but piercing only the head and mouth of the fish, and drawing it upwards with rods and reeds. By what name, Theætetus, shall we say this ought to be called?

THEÆ. By that of aduncous fishing with rods: and we now appear to have accomplished that which we proposed to discuss.

GUEST. Now, therefore, you and I have not only accorded in giving a name to fishing, but we have likewise sufficiently explained the manner in which it is conducted. For, of the whole art, one half we said consisted in acquiring; and the half of this in manual subjugation; and again the half of this in hunting. Likewise that the half of hunting consisted in the capture of animals; and that the half of the capture of animals was hunting in water. That again, of hunting in water, the downward division of the whole was fishing; that the half of fishing was percutient; that the half of percutient fishing was performed with a hook: and lastly, that the half of this consisted in drawing that which is downwards upwards; and that, thence deriving its name, it is called aduncous fishing with rods.

THEÆ. This, therefore, has been in every respect sufficiently shown.

GUEST. Come then, let us endeavour according to this paradigm to discover what a sophist is.

THEÆ. By all means.

GUEST. And this indeed was the first object of inquiry in the example just adduced, whether a fisherman is to be considered as a rude character, or as one endued with a certain art.

THEÆ. It was.

GUEST. And now, Theætetus, shall we call a sophist a rude character, or one in every respect skilful?

THEÆ. We must by no means call him a rude character. For I understand what you say, that he who is so called ought not to be unskilful, but endued with a certain art.

GUEST. But with what art ought we to consider him endued?

THEÆ. I ask you the same question.

GUEST. By the Gods, then, are we ignorant that one of these men is allied to the other?

THEÆ. Which men?

GUEST. The fisherman and the sophist.

THEÆ. In what respect are they allied?

GUEST. Both of them appear to me to be hunters.

THEÆ. Of what is this latter character a hunter? for we have spoken of the other.

GUEST. We divided the whole of hunting into the swimming and the pedestrian.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. And we discussed, indeed, the particulars respecting the swimming part of aquatic natures; but we omitted the pedestrian division, and said that it was multiform.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Thus far, therefore, the sophist and the fisherman equally proceed from the art of acquiring.

THEÆ. They appear so indeed.

GUEST. Some however, abandoning the hunting of land animals, betake themselves to the sea, to rivers and lakes, and hunt animals in these.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But some subjugate animals on the earth, and in rivers, as in meadows abounding with riches and youthfulness.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. How do you say?

GUEST. Of pedestrian hunting there are two greatest parts.

THEÆ. Of what kind is each of these parts?

GUEST. One is the hunting of tame, and the other of savage animals.

THEÆ. Is there any hunting then of tame animals?

GUEST. Either man is a tame animal, (adopt what I say as you please,) or no animal is tame; or some other animal is tame, but man is a savage animal: or you may say that man indeed is a tame animal, but you may think that there is no hunting of men. Adopt whichever of these divisions is most agreeable to you.

THEÆ. But I think, O guest, that we are a tame animal, and I say that there is a hunting of men.

GUEST. We must say then that there is also a twofold hunting of tame animals.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. By defining prædatory hunting, that which reduces into bondage, and tyrannic hunting, to be all of them violent hunting.

THEÆ. Well defined.

GUEST. But that which pertains to judicial cases, popular harangues, and discourse, may summarily be called a certain art of persuasion.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But of this art of persuasion we say there are two kinds.

THEÆ. What are they?

GUEST. One of them is private, and the other public.

THEÆ. There are these two species.

GUEST. Again, with respect to the hunting of private persuasion, one kind is effected by wages, and another by gifts.

THEÆ. I do not understand you.

GUEST. It seems you have never attended to the hunting of lovers.

THEÆ. In what respect?

GUEST. In this, that besides other things they bestow gifts on those they have caught.

THEÆ. You speak most true.

GUEST. Let this then be a species of the amatory art.

THEÆ. By all means.

**GUEST.** But with respect to that species of the hunting of persuasion which is effected by wages, that part of it which converses with others through favour, and entirely procures enchantments through pleasure, that it may thence alone receive aliment as its reward, this I think we all of us call adulation, or a certain art administering to pleasure.

**THEÆ.** Undoubtedly.

**GUEST.** But another part of it professes to converse for the sake of virtue, and requires money for its reward. Ought not this part, therefore, to be called by another name?

**THEÆ.** Undoubtedly.

**GUEST.** Endeavour to tell me this name.

**THEÆ.** It is evident. For we appear to me to have found a sophist; and I think this name is adapted to this other part of the object of our investigation.

**GUEST.** According to the present reasoning, as it seems, Theætetus, the profession of a sophist must be called an art, servile, subjugating, and venatic; hunting pedestrian, terrestrial, and tame animals; or, in other words, privately bringing men into captivity for pecuniary rewards, and ensnaring rich and noble young men, through an opinion of erudition.

**THEÆ.** Entirely so.

**GUEST.** Further still, let us consider as follows:—For the object of our present investigation does not participate of a certain vile art, but of one various in the extreme. For, from what has been before said, we may conjecture that it does not belong to that kind of art which we just now mentioned, but to another kind.

**THEÆ.** What is that kind?

**GUEST.** There were in a certain respect two species of the art of acquiring, the one consisting in hunting, and the other flowing from contracts.

**THEÆ.** There were.

**GUEST.** We say, therefore, that there are two species of contracts, the one consisting in bestowing, and the other in buying and selling.

**THEÆ.** There are so.

**GUEST.** And again, we say that the species of contracts which consists in buying and selling, must receive a twofold division.

**THEÆ.** How?

**GUEST.**

GUEST. He who exposes his own works to sale may be called a feller of his own property ; but he who sells the works of others, an exchanger.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But what ? Is not that exchange which takes place in the same city, and which is nearly the half of the whole of exchange, denominated cauponary ?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And is not the other half that which takes place by buying and selling in different cities, and which we call emporic ?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And do we not perceive, that of emporic exchange, one part pertains to the nutriment of the body, and the other to the discipline of the soul, exchanging erudition for money ?

THEÆ. How do you say ?

GUEST. That part which pertains to the soul we are, perhaps, unacquainted with : for the other part we understand.

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. But we say that he who buys music in one city by learning, and sells it in another by teaching, and who acts in a similar manner with respect to painting, enchantment, and many other things pertaining to the soul, as well serious as jocose,—we say that such a one traffics no less than he who sells meats and drinks.

THEÆ. You speak most true.

GUEST. Will you not, therefore, similarly denominate him who wanders about different cities in order to exchange disciplines for money ?

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. But of this merchandize pertaining to the soul, may not one part be most justly called demonstrative ; and may not the other part, though ridiculous, yet, since it is no less the selling of disciplines than the former, be called by a name which is the brother to that of selling ?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But in this traffic of disciplines, he who sells the disciplines of other arts must be called by a name different from him who sells the disciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST.

GUEST. For he who sells the disciplines of other arts may be aptly called a feller of arts; but consider by what name he should be called who sells the disciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. By what other name can he be called without error, except that which is the object of our investigation at present, a sophist?

GUEST. By no other. We may, therefore, now collect as follows: that, by a second investigation, a sophist has appeared to us to be an exchanger, a buyer and feller, a merchant respecting discourses, and one who sells the disciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. In the third place, I think that you in like manner will call him a sophist, who being settled in a city, partly buys and partly himself fabricates disciplines, which he sells in order to procure the necessaries of life.

THEÆ. Why, indeed, should I not?

GUEST. You will, therefore, call him a sophist who is conversant in acquiring, who traffics, and sells either his own inventions, or those of others, about the disciplines of virtue.

THEÆ. Necessarily so. For it is requisite to assent to reason.

GUEST. Let us still further consider, whether the genus which we are at present investigating is similar to a certain thing of this kind.

THEÆ. Of what kind?

GUEST. Of the art of acquiring, a certain part appeared to us to be agonistic.

THEÆ. It did.

GUEST. It will not, therefore, be improper to give it a twofold division.

THEÆ. Inform me how you divide it.

GUEST. One part is defensive, and the other offensive.

THEÆ. It is so.

GUEST. Of the offensive part, therefore, that which takes place when bodies fight against bodies may be fitly called violence.

THEÆ. It may.

GUEST. But what else, Theætetus, can that which takes place when arguments oppose arguments be called, except contention?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

GUEST. But as to contentions, there must be a twofold division.

THEÆ. In what respect?

GUEST. For, so far as contention takes place through employing prolix arguments against prolix arguments in public concerning things just and unjust, it is judicial.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. But when it takes place in private, by a distribution into minute parts, through question and answer, are we accustomed to call it any thing else than contradiction?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

GUEST. But of contradiction, that part which is employed about contracts, and which subsists casually, and without art, is to be placed as a separate species, since reason distinguishes it from other kinds of contradiction; but it has neither been assigned a name by any of the ancients, nor does it deserve to be denominated by us at present.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. For it is divided into parts extremely small and all-various. But that which proceeds according to art, and disputes about things just and unjust, and universally about other particulars, we are accustomed to call contentious.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But of the contentious division, one part dissipates possessions, and the other accumulates wealth.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. We should, therefore, endeavour to discover by what name each of these ought to be called.

THEÆ. It is proper to do so.

GUEST. It appears then to me, that he who, through delighting in the study of contention, neglects his affairs, and is always hunting after trifling questions, cannot be called any thing else than a man of words.

THEÆ. He may, indeed, be called so.

GUEST. But do you now, in your turn, endeavour to inform me how he is to be denominated who endeavours to acquire wealth from private contention.

THEÆ. Can any one with rectitude call him any thing else than that wonderful character the sophist, which we investigate, and who now again for the fourth time presents himself to our view?

GUEST. As reason, therefore, again shows us, a sophist is nothing else than that pecuniary genus which is conversant with the art of contention, with contradiction, controversy, hostile opposition, and with the agonistic art, and that of acquiring.

THEÆ. He is altogether so.

GUEST. Do you not perceive, therefore, that it is truly said, this wild beast is a various animal, and that, according to the proverb, he is not to be caught with the other hand?

THEÆ. It will, therefore, be proper to use both hands.

GUEST. It will be proper, and we must do so to the utmost of our power. But inform me, whether we have any servile names?

THEÆ. We have many. But respecting which of the many do you ask me?

GUEST. Such as when we say to wash, to distribute, to boil, and to separate.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And besides these, to card wool, to draw down, to comb, and ten thousand other such-like words which we meet with in the arts. Or do we not?

THEÆ. Which among these do you wish to serve throughout, as an instance of what you mean to evince?

GUEST. All the names that have been mentioned are in a certain respect divisive.

THEÆ. They are.

GUEST. According to my reasoning, therefore, since there is one art in all these, we should call them by one name.

THEÆ. By what name?

GUEST. Segregative.

THEÆ. Be it so.

GUEST. Consider, again, whether we are able to perceive two species of this?

THEÆ. You seem to urge me to a rapid consideration.

GUEST. And, indeed, in all these segregations, the worse was separated from the better, and the similar from the similar.

THEÆ. It appears that it was nearly so said.

GUEST. Of the latter of these segregations, therefore, I cannot tell the name; but I can of that which leaves the better and rejects the worse.

THEÆ. Inform me what it is.

GUEST. The whole of this separation (as I conjecture) is called by all men a certain purification.

THEÆ. It is so called.

GUEST. Does not, therefore, every one see that the cathartic species is twofold?

THEÆ. Yes. If any one, perhaps, thinks about it at leisure; for I do not see it at present.

GUEST. And, indeed, it is proper to comprehend in one name the many species of purgations pertaining to the body.

THEÆ. What kind of purgations do you mean? and by what name ought they to be called?

GUEST. The inward purgations of the bodies of animals, by gymnastic and medicine, which purify by rightly separating; and those which operate externally, and which it is vile to mention, viz. such as baths afford; and likewise the purgations of inanimate bodies, by means of the fuller's art, and the whole art of adorning the body, which occasions attention to things of a trifling nature,—all these appear to be allotted many and ridiculous names.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. Entirely so, indeed, Theætetus. But the order of reasoning cares neither more nor less, whether wiping with a sponge purifies in a small degree, but the drinking a medicine is more advantageous to us, by the purification it affords. For, that it may understand all arts, by endeavouring to apprehend what is allied, and what not, it equally honours the several arts, and is of opinion that some are not more ridiculous than others according to similitude. It likewise considers hunting, effected through military discipline, as in no respect more venerable than searching after vermin, but for the most part more futile. And now, indeed, which was what you asked, we have comprehended in one name all the powers which are allotted the purification either of an animated or inanimate body; but it is of no consequence to the present disputation what name may appear to be more becoming, if it be only placed separate from the purgations of the soul, and include

in itself all such things as purify the body. For the order of reasoning now endeavours to separate the purification of the dianoëtic part from other purgations, if we understand what it wishes to accomplish.

THEÆ. But I do understand, and I grant that there are two species of purification; one species respecting the soul, and the other, which is separate from this, respecting the body.

GUEST. You speak in the most beautiful manner. Attend to me, therefore, in what follows, and endeavour to give a twofold division to what has been said.

THEÆ. Wherever you may lead, I will endeavour to distribute in conjunction with you.

GUEST. Do we not say, then, that depravity in the soul is something different from virtue?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And we likewise said, that purification consists in rejecting what is depraved, and preserving what remains.

THEÆ. We did say so.

GUEST. So far, therefore, as we shall discover an ablation of depravity in the soul, we ought to call it purification.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. Two species of depravity in the soul must be established.

THEÆ. What are they?

GUEST. The one is like disease in the body, but the other resembles inherent baseness.

THEÆ. I do not understand you.

GUEST. Perhaps you do not think that disease is the same with sedition.

THEÆ. Again, I am not able to answer this question.

GUEST. Whether do you think sedition is any thing else than the corruption of natural alliance through a certain discord?

THEÆ. It is nothing else.

GUEST. And is baseness any thing else than entire deformity, arising from the immoderation of things of one kind?

THEÆ. It is nothing else.

GUEST. What then, do we not see in the soul of the depraved that opinions

nions differ from desires, anger from pleasures, reason from pain, and all these from each other?

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. But all these are necessarily allied to each other.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. We shall speak rightly, therefore, in calling depravity the feditio and disease of the soul.

THEÆ. We shall speak most rightly.

GUEST. But what, when we see such things as participate of motion, and propose to themselves a certain end, wander from and miss the mark according to every impulse, do we say that they are affected in this manner through symmetry to each other, or, on the contrary, through a privation of symmetry?

THEÆ. It is evident that this happens through a privation of symmetry.

GUEST. But we know that every soul is involuntarily ignorant of any thing.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. But ignorance is nothing else than a delirium of the soul, which, while it is impelled to truth, wanders in its apprehension of things.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. We must consider, therefore, a soul involved in ignorance as base and deformed.

THEÆ. So it appears.

GUEST. It seems, therefore, that there are these two genera of evils in the soul; one of which is called by the multitude depravity, and is most evidently a disease.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. But the other the multitude call ignorance, but they are unwilling to acknowledge that this is a vice in the soul.

THEÆ. It must by all means be granted, though when you just now spoke I was doubtful of it, that there are two genera of vice or depravity in the soul; and that we ought to consider timidity, intemperance, injustice, and every thing else of this kind, as a disease in us; but the passion of abundant and all-various ignorance as baseness.

GUEST.

GUEST. In the body, therefore, are there not two certain arts about these two passions?

THEÆ. What are these arts?

GUEST. About baseness, gymnastic; but about disease, medicine.

THEÆ. It appears so.

GUEST. About insolence, therefore, injustice, and timidity, is not chastizing justice naturally the most adapted of all arts?

THEÆ. It is likely, as I may say, according to human opinion.

GUEST. But, can any one say that there is a more proper remedy for all ignorance than erudition?

THEÆ. No one can.

GUEST. Must we say, therefore, that there is only one kind of erudition, or that there are more kinds than one? But take notice, that there are two greatest genera of it.

THEÆ. I do take notice.

GUEST. And it appears to me that we shall very rapidly discover this.

THEÆ. In what manner?

GUEST. By perceiving that ignorance has a certain twofold division. For, being twofold, it is evident that it necessarily requires a twofold mode of instruction, corresponding to the members of its division.

THEÆ. What then? Is that apparent which is the object of your present investigation?

GUEST. I perceive, indeed, a great and ponderous species of ignorance, which outweighs all its other parts.

THEÆ. Of what kind is it?

GUEST. When he who is ignorant of a thing appears to himself to know it. For it appears that through this all the deceptions in our dianoëtic part take place.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. And I think that to this species of ignorance alone the name of rusticity should be given.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. How, therefore, do you think that part of erudition should be called which liberates from this species of ignorance?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. I think, indeed, O guest, that the other part is denominated demiurgic erudition, but that this is called by us discipline.

GUEST. It is nearly so denominated, Theætetus, by all the Greeks. But this also must be considered by us, whether the whole of this is indivisible, or possesses a certain division which deserves to be named.

THEÆ. It is requisite to consider this.

GUEST. It appears, therefore, to me, that this may be still further divided.

THEÆ. According to what?

GUEST. Of the erudition which is effected by discourse, one way appears to be more rough, and another part of it more smooth.

THEÆ. Of what kind do we call each of these?

GUEST. The one ancient and paternal, which men formerly adopted towards their children, and many use at present, viz. as often as children do wrong, partly severely reproofing, and partly mildly admonishing them. But the whole of this may be called with the utmost propriety admonition.

THEÆ. It may so.

GUEST. But some are of opinion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn those things in which he considers himself as skilled; but that the admonitory species of discipline makes very small advances with great labour.

THEÆ. And they think right.

GUEST. They likewise adopt another mode in order to disclose this opinion.

THEÆ. What mode?

GUEST. By inquiring into those particulars about which a man thinks he says something to the purpose, when at the same time this is far from being the case. In the next place, they easily explore the opinions of those that err, and, collecting them together by a reasoning process, render them the same with each other: and after this they evince that these opinions are contrary to themselves, respecting the same things, with reference to the same, and according to the same. But those whose opinions are thus explored, on seeing this, are indignant with themselves, and become milder to others; and after this manner are liberated from mighty and rigid opinions; which liberation is of all others the most pleasant to hear, and the most firm to him who is the subject of it. For, O beloved youth, those that purify  
these

these think in the same manner as physicians with respect to bodies. For physicians are of opinion, that the body cannot enjoy salubrious food till some one removes the impediments it contains. In like manner, these mental purifiers think that the soul can derive no advantage from disciplines accommodated to its nature, till he who is confuted is ashamed of his error, and, the impediments of disciplines being expelled, viz. false opinions, he becomes pure, and alone thinks that he knows the things which he does know, and not more than he knows.

THEÆ. This is the best and the most modest of habits.

GUEST. Hence, Theætetus, we must say, that confutation<sup>1</sup> is the greatest and the chief of all purifications; and that he who is not confuted, even though he should be the great king himself, since he would be unpurified in things of the greatest consequence, will be rude and base with respect to those things in which it is fit he should be most pure and beautiful, who wishes to become truly happy.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But by whom shall we say this art is employed? For I am afraid to say it is used by the sophists.

THEÆ. On what account?

GUEST. Lest we should honour them more than is fit.

THEÆ. But yet what has been just now said appears to be adapted to a certain character of this kind.

GUEST. So likewise a wolf resembles a dog, a most savage a most mild animal. But he who wishes to be free from deception ought to guard against similitude above all things: for it is a genus of the greatest lubricity. But, at the same time, let these things be admitted; for I think it is not proper to dispute about small terms, at a time when these ought to be carefully avoided.

THEÆ. It is not proper.

GUEST. Let, therefore, a species of the separating art be cathartic: and let a part of the cathartic species be limited to the soul. But of this let a part be doctrinal; and of the doctrinal let discipline be a part. But of discipline,

<sup>1</sup> Plato here alludes to the third energy of the dialectic method, the end of which is a purification from twofold ignorance. See the Introduction to the Parmenides.

that confutation which takes place about a vain opinion of wisdom should be called, as it appears from our present discourse, nothing else than that sophistical art which is of a noble race.

THEÆ. It should be so called. But I am dubious, what, out of many things which present themselves, it is fit truly and strenuously to call a sophist.

GUEST. You are very properly dubious. But indeed it is proper to think, that even a sophist himself will now very much doubt, by what means he may escape our arguments. For the proverb rightly says, It is not easy to avoid all things. Now, therefore, let us attack him with all our might.

THEÆ. You speak well.

GUEST. But, in the first place, let us stop as it were to take breath, and reason among ourselves, at the same time mutually resting when we are weary. Let us consider, then, how many forms the sophist assumes. For we appear from our first investigation to have discovered, that he is a mercenary hunter of the youthful and rich.

THEÆ. We do so.

GUEST. But from our second investigation it appears, that he is a certain merchant in the disciplines of the soul.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. And did he not, in the third place, appear to be a huckster about these same things?

THEÆ. He did. And did we not, in the fourth place, find him to be one who sells us his own inventions?

GUEST. You properly remind me. But I will endeavour to remember the fifth particular. For, in the next place, we found him to be one who strives in the agonistical exercise about discourses, and who is defined from the art of contention.

THEÆ. We did so.

GUEST. The sixth form is indeed ambiguous; but at the same time we must admit it, and grant that a sophist is a purifier of such opinions as are an impediment to disciplines respecting the soul.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Do you therefore perceive, that, when any one appears to possess  
a scientific

a scientific knowledge of many things, and is called by the name of one art, this is not a sound phantasm? It is indeed evident, that he who is thus affected with respect to any art cannot behold that particular thing to which all these disciplines look. Hence he who possesses a multitude of disciplines should be called by many names, instead of one name.

THEÆ. This appears to be in the highest degree natural.

GUEST. Left, therefore, the same thing should happen to us through indolence in this investigation, let us repeat, in the first place, one of the things which we said respecting the sophist: for one of these appears to me especially to indicate him.

THEÆ. Which of them?

GUEST. We said that he was in a certain respect a contradictor.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. And does he not also become a teacher of this to others?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Let us now, therefore, consider, about what it is that sophists say they make others contradictors. But let our consideration from the beginning be as follows. With respect to divine things which are unapparent to the many, do sophists sufficiently impart the power of contradiction?

THEÆ. This is indeed asserted of them.

GUEST. But what with respect to things apparent, such as earth and heaven, and the particulars pertaining to these?

THEÆ. What of them?

GUEST. For, in private conversations, when any thing is asserted in general respecting generation and essence, we say that the sophists are skilled in contradicting, and that they are able to render others like themselves.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But what, with respect to laws, and all political concerns, do they not also promise to make men contentious in these?

THEÆ. No one, as I may say, would discourse with them unless they promised this.

GUEST. But writings containing such contradictions as ought to be urged  
2 G 2
against

against the professors of the several arts, may every where be procured by him who wishes to learn the art of contradiction.

THEÆ. You appear to me to allude to the writings of Protagoras respecting wrestling and the other arts.

GUEST. And to the writings of many others, O blessed man. But is not the art of contradicting, summarily a certain power, sufficient to bring all things into controversy?

THEÆ. It appears, therefore, that nearly nothing is omitted.

GUEST. But by the Gods, O boy, do you think this is possible? For perhaps you young men behold this more acutely, but we more dully.

THEÆ. In what respect? and why do you particularly assert this? For I do not understand your present question.

GUEST. I asked, if it were possible for any one man to know all things.

THEÆ. If it were possible, our race, O guest, would be blessed.

GUEST. How, therefore, can any one destitute of science be able, by contradicting, to urge any thing found against him who is endued with science?

THEÆ. He cannot in any respect.

GUEST. What then is it which will be wonderful in the sophistic power?

THEÆ. About what?

GUEST. The manner by which sophists are able to produce an opinion in young men, that they are the wisest of all men in all things? For it is evident that, unless they contradicted rightly, or at least appeared to do so to young men, and, when appearing to do so, unless they were considered to be more wise through their contentions, they would be without employment, and, as you said, no one would give them money to become their disciple.

THEÆ. Doubtless no one would.

GUEST. But now men are willing to do this.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. For I think the sophists appear to have a scientific knowledge of those particulars about which they employ contradiction.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But do they employ contradiction in all things? Shall we say so?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. They appear, therefore, to their disciples to be wise in all things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But yet they are not: for this seems to be impossible.

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. A sophist, therefore, appears to us to possess doxastic, and not true science, about all things.

THEÆ. Entirely so. And what has been now said, respecting sophists, seems to be most rightly said.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, assume a clearer paradigm respecting them.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. This. But endeavour to attend to what I say, and answer me in the best manner you are able.

THEÆ. Of what kind is the paradigm?

GUEST. Just as if any one should assert that he neither says any thing, nor contradicts, but that he makes and causes all things to be known by one art.

THEÆ. What is your meaning in all this?

GUEST. You are obviously ignorant of the beginning of what is said: for, as it seems, you do not understand the word *all*.

THEÆ. I do not.

GUEST. I say then that you and I are in the number of all things, and besides us, other animals and trees.

THEÆ. How do you say?

GUEST. If any one should assert that he would make you and me, and all other living things.

THEÆ. Of what making do you speak? For you do not mean a husbandman, because the artificer you mention is a maker of animals.

GUEST. I do say so. And besides this, he is the maker of the sea, the earth, the heavens, the Gods, and all other things. And as he rapidly makes each of these, so he sells each for a small price.

THEÆ. You speak in jest.

GUEST. What then? May not he also be said to jest, who asserts that he knows all things, and professes himself able to teach another all things, for a small sum of money, and in a short time?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But have you any species of jesting more artificial and agreeable than the imitative?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. I have not. For you have mentioned a very ample species, which comprehends all things in one, and is nearly most various.

GUEST. Do we not, therefore, know that he who professes himself able to make all things by one art, in consequence of fabricating imitations and homonyms of things, by the art of painting, is able to deceive stupid young men and boys, by showing them his pictures at a distance, and induce them to believe that he is sufficient to effect whatever he pleases?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But what as to discourses, will it not appear to us that there is another certain art respecting these, by which seducers, as if employing certain incantations, are able to draw young men far away from the truth, by bewitching their ears with their discourses, and exhibiting to them images of every thing, instead of realities; so as to cause themselves to appear to speak the truth, and to be the wisest of all men in all things?

THEÆ. Why should there not be another certain art of this kind?

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, necessary, Theætetus, that many of those who then hear these things, after through the course of time they have arrived at the perfection of manhood, and consider the things themselves nigh at hand, and are compelled through passions clearly to handle realities, will then abandon their former opinions, and be induced to consider those things as small, which once appeared to them to be great, those things difficult which they once considered easy, and thus at length entirely subvert all the phantasms produced by discourse, through the works which take place in actions?

THEÆ. It appears so to me, as far as my age is capable of judging. For I am of opinion, that as yet I rank among those who are far distant from the truth.

GUEST. All we, therefore, who are present will endeavour to assist you. And now we shall endeavour, free from passion, to approach as near as possible to the truth. With respect to a sophist, then, inform me whether this is clear, that he ranks among enchanters, being an imitator of things? or must we yet doubt whether he possesses in reality the sciences of those things respecting which he appears able to contradict?

THEÆ. But how can we doubt this, O guest? For it is nearly evident from what has been said that he is one of those who participate parts of erudition.

GUEST.

GUEST. He must be considered, therefore, as a certain enchanter and mimic.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Come then: for we must now no longer drop our prey; as we have now nearly enclosed the sophist in a certain net of reasoning; so that he cannot hereafter escape from this.

THEÆ. From what?

GUEST. That he is one of those who work miracles.

THEÆ. This also is my opinion respecting him.

GUEST. It seems, therefore, that we should divide with the utmost celerity the image producing art; and that, entering into it, if the sophist evidently waits for us, we should apprehend him conformably to the royal mandate, and, delivering him up, exhibit our prey to the king: but that, if he enters into the parts of the imitative art, we should follow him, always dividing the part which receives him, till we apprehend him. For neither will he, nor any other genus, ever be able to fly from him who can pursue every particular through all things according to method.

THEÆ. You speak well. And in this manner, therefore, we must act.

GUEST. According to the superior mode of division, I now appear to myself to see two species of the imitative art; but in which of these we should place the idea which is the object of our investigation, it does not yet appear to me possible to know.

THEÆ. But first of all inform me by division what these two species are.

GUEST. I see that one indeed is the assimilative<sup>1</sup> art. But this especially takes place, when any one according to the commensurations of a paradigm, in length, depth, and breadth, and besides this by the addition of convenient colours, gives birth to a resemblance.

THEÆ. What then, do not all those that imitate any thing endeavour to do this?

GUEST. Not such as fashion or paint any great work. For, if they should impart the true symmetry of things beautiful, you know that the upper parts would appear smaller than is fit, and the lower parts greater, in consequence of the former being seen by us at a distance, and the latter nigh at hand.

<sup>1</sup> See the Notes to the tenth book of the Republic.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Do not therefore artists, bidding farewell to truth, neglect real symmetry, and accommodate to images such commensurations as are only apparently beautiful?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, just to call the one species, since it is a likeness, an image?

THEÆ. Perfectly so.

GUEST. And is it not just to call the other species assimilative?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. We must, therefore, call the other part of the imitative art, as we said above, assimilative.

THEÆ. We must so call it.

GUEST. But what shall we call that which appears indeed similar to the beautiful, but, when inspected by him who is endued with a power sufficient for the purpose, is found not to resemble that to which it appears to be similar? Must we not call it a phantasm, since it appears to be but is not similar?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Is not this part abundantly to be found in painting, and in the whole of the imitative art?

THEÆ. It is impossible it should not.

GUEST. But may we not with the greatest rectitude call that art which produces a phantasm, and not an image, phantastic?

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. I have already, therefore, said that these were two species of the image-producing art, viz. the assimilative and phantastic.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But neither am I able now to see clearly, that of which I was then dubious, viz. in which of these species the sophist is to be placed. For this is truly a wonderful man; and it is extremely difficult to discern him; since even now, in a very excellent and elegant manner, he has fled into a species which it is almost impossible to investigate.

THEÆ. It seems so.

GUEST. Do you then assent to this in consequence of understanding it?

or

or does a certain usual impetus arising from discourse induce you to a rapid coincidence of sentiment ?

THEÆ. How, and with a view to what, do you say this ?

GUEST. O blessed man, we are truly engaged in a speculation perfectly difficult. For that this thing should appear and seem to be, and yet is not ; and that a man should assert certain things, and yet not such as are true,—all these things have always been subjects of the greatest doubt in former times, and are so at present. For it follows, that he who speaks in this manner must either speak falsely, or be of opinion that such things truly are ; and thus speaking, Theætetus, it is extremely difficult for him not to contradict himself.

THEÆ. Why so ?

GUEST. Because such a mode of speaking dares to admit that non-being is : for otherwise it would not be false, which it is. But the great Parmenides, O boy, while we were yet boys, both from the first and to the end, rejected this mode of speaking. For, both in prose and verse, he every where speaks as follows : “ Non-beings can never, nor by any means, be. But do thou, when inquiring, restrain thy conceptions from this path.” The truth of this, therefore, is testified by him, and this assertion will the most of all things become evident, if moderately discussed. Let us, therefore, if it is not disagreeable to you, consider this in the first place.

THEÆ. You may do as you please with respect to me. But do you consider what it is best to investigate, and in this path lead me.

GUEST. It will be proper so to do. Tell me, then : Dare we to pronounce that which in no respect is ?

THEÆ. How is it possible we should not ?

GUEST. Not for the sake of contention, therefore, nor jesting, but seriously, every one who hears us ought to join with us in considering the import of this word *non-being*. But can we think that he who is asked this question would know where to turn himself, or how to show what non-being is ?

THEÆ. You ask a difficult question, and to me, as I may say, entirely impervious.

GUEST. This, however, is evident, that non-being cannot be attributed to any thing which ranks among beings.

THEÆ. For how could it?

GUEST. Since, therefore, it cannot be attributed to being, neither can any one rightly attribute it to any thing.

THEÆ. Certainly not.

GUEST. This also is evident to us, that this word *something* is every where predicated of a certain being. For it is impossible to speak of it alone, as if it were naked and solitary with respect to all beings.

THEÆ. It is impossible.

GUEST. Thus considering, therefore, must you not agree with me, that he who speaks of something must necessarily speak of one certain thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. For you would say, that the word *something* is a sign of one thing, and that *certain-things* is a sign of many things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But it is most necessary, as it appears, that he who speaks of that which is not something must entirely speak of nothing.

THEÆ. This is most necessary.

GUEST. Must it not therefore follow, that neither this is to be granted, that he who speaks of something speaks of that which is not even one thing; or nothing? But neither must we say that he speaks who endeavours to enunciate non-being.

THEÆ. The doubts, therefore, in which our discourse is involved should come to an end.

GUEST. You do not as yet speak of something great. For, O-blessed man, the greatest and first of doubts still remains about these things: for it is a doubt which takes place about the principle of non-being.

THEÆ. Tell me how, and do not be remiss.

GUEST. To that which is, something else belonging to beings may happen.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But shall we say, that any thing belonging to beings can ever be present to that which is not?

THEÆ. How can we?

GUEST. But do we not rank the whole of number among beings?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly, if we rank any thing else among beings.

GUEST. We should, therefore, neither attempt to attribute the multitude of number, nor *the one*, to non-being.

THEÆ. Reason shows that we cannot with propriety.

GUEST. How, therefore, can any one enunciate by the mouth, or altogether comprehend by the dianoëtic power, non-beings, or non-being separate from number?

THEÆ. Tell me why not.

GUEST. When we say non-beings, do we not endeavour to adjoin the multitude of number?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And when we say non-being, do we not endeavour to adjoin *the one*?

THEÆ. Most clearly so.

GUEST. And besides this we say, that it is neither just nor right to endeavour to adapt being to non-being.

THEÆ. You speak most truly.

GUEST. Do you not, therefore, perceive, that non-being can neither be rightly enunciated, nor spoken, nor yet be cogitated, itself by itself, but that it is incomprehensible by thought, ineffable, non-vocal, and irrational?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Did I, therefore, just now speak falsely when I said, that I could produce the greatest doubt respecting it?

THEÆ. What then, can we mention any doubt greater than this?

GUEST. Do you not see, O wonderful youth, from what has been said, that non-being leads him who confutes it into such perplexity, that in the very attempt to confute it he is compelled to contradict himself?

THEÆ. How do you say? Speak yet clearer.

GUEST. There is no occasion to consider any thing clearer in me. For, when I adopted the position, that non-being ought to participate neither of *the one*, nor of *many*, both a little before, and now, I employed the term *the one*. For I enunciated non-being. Do you perceive this?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And again, a little before, I said that non-being was non-vocal, ineffable, and irrational. Do you apprehend me?

THEÆ. I do. For how is it possible I should not?

GUEST. When, therefore, I endeavoured to adapt being to non-being, did I not assert things contrary to what I had before advanced?

THEÆ. It appears so.

GUEST. And in consequence of attributing this to it, did I not speak of it as one thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And besides this, while I called it irrational, ineffable, and non-vocal, did we not make these assertions as pertaining to one thing?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. For we have said, that he who speaks of non-being in a proper manner, ought neither to define it as one, nor many, nor give it any appellation whatever: for it is impossible to denominate it, without at the same time calling it one thing.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. What then will some one say of me? For, both formerly and now, he will find me vanquished in this contention respecting non-being. So that, as I have already said, you must not expect me to speak properly on this subject. But come, let us now consider this affair in you.

THEÆ. How do you say?

GUEST. Endeavour in a becoming and generous manner, as being a young man, and with all your might, to assert something about non-being, conformable to right reason, without adding to it either essence, or *the one*, or the multitude of number.

THEÆ. It certainly would be great rashness in me to engage in a contest in which you have been vanquished.

GUEST. But, if it is agreeable to you, we will dismiss you and me; and till we meet with some one who is able to accomplish this, we will say that a sophist more than any other person conceals himself in an impervious place.

THEÆ. Very much so, indeed.

GUEST. If, therefore, we should say that he possessed a certain phantastic art from this use of words, he would easily attack us, and turn the discourse to the very contrary of what is asserted. For, while we call him a maker of images,

images, he will immediately ask us what we assert an image to be. Consider therefore, Theætetus, what answer we should give to this question of the sophist.

THEÆ. It is evident we should say that images are such things as are seen in water and mirrors, and besides this, such things as are painted and carved, and every thing else of this kind.

GUEST. It seems, Theætetus, that you have never seen a sophist.

THEÆ. Why so?

GUEST. He would appear to you to wink, or to be entirely deprived of eyes.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. He would laugh at you for answering him by appearances in mirrors, and by pictures and carvings, when you speak to him as being yourself endued with sight; and he will pretend that he knows nothing about mirrors, or water, or even sight itself, but that he alone interrogates you about this one thing.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. That which in all the particulars you have mentioned you think fit to call by one name, pronouncing the word image in all of them, as being one thing. Speak, therefore, and give assistance, and do not yield to the man.

THEÆ. But what, O guest, can we say an image is, except that which, being itself something different, approaches to a true similitude to another thing?

GUEST. When you say an image is something different, do you mean that it is truly different, or do you assert this of something else?

THEÆ. It is by no means truly different, but only appears to be so, or is similar.

GUEST. Do you, therefore, call real being that which is true?

THEÆ. I do.

GUEST. But is not that which is not true contrary to the true?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. When, therefore, you say that which is similar is at the same time not true, you assert that it is not. It has however a being.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. You say that it truly *is* not.

THEÆ. It certainly *is* not ; but it is truly an image.

GUEST. That, therefore, which we called an image of being, is not truly being, and that which is not truly being, truly is.

THEÆ. Non-being appears to possess a certain connection of this kind with being, and that in a very wonderful manner.

GUEST. How is it possible it should not appear wonderful ? You now, therefore, perceive that the many-headed sophist, through this alternation, compels us unwillingly to confess that *non-being* in a certain respect *is*.

THEÆ. I see it, and very much so.

GUEST. How, then, shall we define this art, so that we may be consistent with ourselves ?

THEÆ. What is it you are afraid of, that you speak in this manner ?

GUEST. When we said that he was a deceiver about a phantasm, and that his art was a certain deception, whether shall we say that our soul then opined falsely, through his art ; or what shall we say ?

THEÆ. This very thing. For what else can we say ?

GUEST. But is false opinion that which opines things contrary to things which are ?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. You say, therefore, that false opinion opines things which are not.

THEÆ. It is necessary.

GUEST. Whether does it opine that non-beings are not, or that things which have no subsistence whatever, in a certain respect are ?

THEÆ. If any one is ever deceived, and in the smallest degree, it is necessary he should opine that non-beings in a certain respect are.

GUEST. And will he not also opine, that things which entirely are, in no respect are ?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And this also falsely ?

THEÆ. And this too.

GUEST. And false speech, in my opinion, will think after the same manner, asserting that beings are not, and that non-beings are.

THEÆ. For how can it otherwise become false ?

GUEST. Nearly, no otherwise. But the sophist will not say so. For by what possible device can any one of a sound mind admit the things which  
have

have been previously granted, since they are non-vocal, ineffable, irrational, and incomprehensible by the dianoëtic power? Do we understand what the sophist says, Theætetus?

THEÆ. How is it possible we should not? For he says that our former assertions are contrary to the present, since we have falsely dared to assert that non-being subsists in opinion and discourse. He likewise adds, that we have often been compelled to adapt being to non-being, though we have just now acknowledged, that this is in a certain respect the most impossible of all things.

GUEST. You rightly recollect. But we should now consult what we ought to do respecting the sophist. For, if we should attempt to investigate him, by placing him in the art of deceivers and enchanters, you see that many doubts will arise.

THEÆ. Many, indeed.

GUEST. We have, therefore, only discussed a small part of them, since they are, as I may say, innumerable.

THEÆ. But if this is the case, it appears to be impossible to apprehend a sophist.

GUEST. What then, shall we thus effeminately desist from our undertaking?

THEÆ. I say we ought not, if there is the least possibility of apprehending this man.

GUEST. You will, therefore, pardon, and, as you just now said, be satisfied, if we make but a small proficiency in so arduous an affair.

THEÆ. How is it possible I should not?

GUEST. I, therefore, in a still greater degree request this of you.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That you do not think I am become, as it were, a certain parricide.

THEÆ. Why do you request this?

GUEST. Because it will be necessary for us to examine with our opponents the discourse of our father Parmenides, and to compel non-being in a certain respect to be, and again being, in a certain respect not to be.

THEÆ. It appears that a thing of this kind must be contended for in our discourse.

GUEST. For how is it possible this should not appear, and, as it is said,  
even

even to a blind man? For, while these things are neither confuted, nor assented to, no one can speak either about false assertions, or about opinion, whether respecting resemblances, or images, or imitations, or phantasms, or of the arts conversant with these, without being ridiculous in consequence of being compelled to contradict himself.

THEÆ. Most true.

GUEST. Hence, we must dare to oppose the paternal discourse; or we must entirely dismiss it, if a certain sluggishness restrains us from opposing it.

THEÆ. But nothing will in any respect hinder us from opposing it.

GUEST. I still, therefore, request a third, and a trifling thing of you.

THEÆ. Only say what it is.

GUEST. I just now said that I was always wearied in the confutation of things of this kind, and that I am so at present.

THEÆ. You did say so.

GUEST. I am afraid lest I should appear to you to be insane, in consequence of what I have said, and from immediately transferring myself upwards and downwards. For we shall enter on the confutation of the paternal discourse, for your sake, if we happen to confute it.

THEÆ. As you will not, therefore, by any means be considered by me as acting in a disorderly manner by entering on this confutation, and demonstration, on this account engage boldly in this affair.

GUEST. Come then, whence shall we begin this very dangerous discourse? For it appears, O boy, to be most necessary for us to proceed in the following path.

THEÆ. What is that path?

GUEST. That we should first of all consider those things which now appear to be clear, lest we immediately desist from our undertaking, deterred by its difficulty; and that we should proceed in an easy manner, by mutually assenting to each other, as if we were engaged in a subject which may be easily discussed.

THEÆ. Speak more clearly.

GUEST. Parmenides appears to me to have spoken with ease, and whoever else has attempted to determine the number and quality of beings.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. It seems to me that each of them has related a fable to us, as being boys.

boys. One of them, by asserting that the things which have a subsistence are three<sup>1</sup>; but that some of them sometimes oppose each other in a hostile manner; and at other times becoming friends, unite in marriage, bring forth, and administer aliment to their offspring. But another of these says that beings are only two, viz. the moist and the dry, or the hot and the cold; and these he associates with each other. But the Eleatic sect among us, which derives its origin from Zenophanes, and from others still prior to him, by denominating all things one, discusses its doctrines in fables. But the Iades<sup>2</sup>, and certain Sicilian muses posterior to these, have thought it more safe to connect these with each other, and to say that being is both many and one, but is held together by strife and friendship<sup>3</sup>. For that which is discordant always unites with something else, as the more vehement muses assert. But the more effeminate muses always loosen *the many* from *the one*; and assert that the universe is alternately one, and in friendship with itself, through Venus; and many, and hostile to itself, through a certain strife. But with respect to all these assertions, whether they are true or false, to oppose such illustrious and antient men is difficult and rash. This, however, may be asserted without envy.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That they very much despised us who rank among the multitude. For each of them finishes his own work, without being at all concerned whether we can follow them in what they assert.

THEÆ. How do you say?

<sup>1</sup> Of the antient philosophers that physiologized, some said that the first beings were three in number, *the hot* and *the cold* as extremes, but *the moist* as the medium, which sometimes conciliates the extremes, and sometimes not; but they did not place *the dry* in the rank of a principle, because they thought it subsisted either from a privation or a concretion of moisture. On the other hand, the followers of Anaxagoras asserted that there were four elements, two of which, viz. *heat* and *cold*, ranked as agents, but the other two, *dryness* and *moisture*, as patients. Heraclitus and Empedocles asserted that there is one matter of the universe, but different qualities, with which this matter sometimes accords, and at others is dissonant. Heraclitus, however, was of opinion that the world, together with a certain discordant concord, was nearly always similar, though not entirely the same: for all things are in a continual flux. But Empedocles asserted that the substance of the world remained the same, but that in one age all things were dissolved into chaos through discord, and in another were adorned through concord.

<sup>2</sup> Viz. the Ionians.

<sup>3</sup> This was the doctrine of Empedocles.

GUEST. When any one of them asserts that *the many* is, or was, or is generated, or that this is the case with two or one, and that the hot is mingled with the cold, externally adducing for this purpose separations and concretions,—by the Gods, Theætetus, do you understand what they mean by each of these assertions? Indeed, when I was younger, I was confident that I accurately understood that of which we are now dubious, when any one spoke of non-being; but now you see in what difficulties we are involved through doubting about it.

THEÆ. I do see.

GUEST. Perhaps, therefore, receiving in no less a degree the same passion in our soul respecting being, we say that it is easy to understand it when it is enunciated by any one, but that this cannot be asserted of non-being, though we are similarly affected with respect to both.

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

GUEST. And this very same thing has been said by us respecting the other particulars which we mentioned before.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. We will consider, therefore, after this respecting many things, if it is agreeable to you; but let us now first speculate about that which is the greatest and principal thing.

THEÆ. Of what are you speaking? Or do you say that we ought in the first place to investigate being, and consider what they assert who are thought to evince something about it?

GUEST. You clearly apprehend me, Theætetus. For I say that we ought to proceed in the same manner as if those I just now mentioned were present, and to interrogate them as follows: Ye who assert that the hot and the cold, or any two such things, are all things, what is it you affirm to subsist in both these, when you say that both are, and that each is? What are we to understand by this term of yours *to be*? Is it a third thing different from those two, and are we to establish three things as constituting the all, and no longer two things, according to your hypothesis? For, while you call either of the two *being*, you cannot say that both similarly *are*. For each would nearly be one thing, and not two.

THEÆ. You speak the truth.

GUEST. Are you, therefore, willing to call both of them being?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

GUEST. But, O friends, we shall say, thus also you will most clearly call two things one.

THEÆ. You speak with the utmost rectitude.

GUEST. Since, therefore, we are thus involved in doubt, will you sufficiently unfold to us what you wish to signify when you pronounce *being*? For it is evident that you have had a knowledge of these things for some time past: but we, indeed, at first thought we knew them, but now we are dubious. Instruct us, therefore, first of all in this, that we may not think we learn the things asserted by you, when the very contrary to this takes place. By speaking in this manner, and making this request, both to these, and to such others as assert that *the all* is more than one thing, shall we, O boy, err?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But what with respect to those who assert that *the all* is one, ought we not to inquire of them, to the utmost of our power, what they call *being*?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. To this question, therefore, they may answer: Do you say there is one thing alone? We do say so. Or will they not speak in this manner?

THEÆ. They will.

GUEST. What then, do you call *being* any thing?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. Do you call it *the one*<sup>1</sup>, employing two names respecting the same thing? Or how do you say?

THEÆ.

<sup>1</sup> Plato here dividing *the one* and *being* from each other, and showing that the conception of *the one* is different from that of *being*, evinces that what is most properly and primarily one is exempt from *the one being*. For *the one being* does not abide purely in an unmultiplied and uniform hyparxis. But *the one* withdraws itself from all addition; since by adding any thing to it you diminish its supreme and ineffable union. It is necessary, therefore, to arrange *the one* prior to *the one being*, and to suspend the latter from the former. For, if *the one* in no respect differs from *the one being*, all things will be one, and there will not be multitude in beings, nor will it be possible to name things, lest there should be two things, the thing itself, and the name. For all multitude being taken away, and all division, there will neither be a name of any thing, nor any discourse about it, but the name will appear to be the same with the thing. Nor yet will a name be the name of a thing, but a name will be the name of a name, if a thing is the same with a name, and a name the

THEÆ. What answer will they give to these things, O guest?

GUEST. It is evident, Theætetus, that he who lays down this hypothesis will not be able with perfect ease to answer the present question, or any other whatever.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. To acknowledge that there are two names, while establishing nothing but one thing, is ridiculous.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And this also is ridiculous, to assent in every respect to him who asserts that there is a name to a thing of which no account can be given.

THEÆ. In what manner?

GUEST. He who establishes a name different from a thing, speaks of two certain things.

THEÆ. He does.

GUEST. And besides this, if he asserts that a name is the same with a thing, he is either compelled to say that it is the name of nothing; or, if he says it is the name of something, it must happen that a name is alone the name of a name, but of nothing else.

THEÆ. It must so.

GUEST. And *the one* must be *the one being* alone of *one*, and this must be *the one being* of a name.

THEÆ. It is necessary.

GUEST. But what, do they say that which is a whole is different from one being, or the same with it?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly, they will and do say so.

GUEST. If, therefore, a whole is, as Parmenides<sup>1</sup> says, "that which is every

same with a thing; and a thing also will be a thing of a thing. For all the same things will take place about a thing as about a name, through the union of thing and name. If these things, therefore, are absurd, both *the one* and *being* have a subsistence, and *being* participates of *the one*. And hence *the one* is not the same as *the one being*. See the Introduction and Notes to the Parmenides.

<sup>1</sup> The following extract from the Commentaries of Simplicius on Aristotle's Physics, p. 31, contains an admirable account of the doctrine of Parmenides concerning the first being:

"That Parmenides did not consider *the one being*, το ἐν ὄν, to be any thing among things generated and corrupted, is evident from his asserting that *the one* is unbegotten and incorruptible. And, in short, he was far from thinking that it is corporeal, since he says it is indivisible; for thus he

every where similar to the bulk of a perfect sphere, entirely possessing equal powers from the middle; for nothing is greater or more stable than this:”— if this be the case, it is necessary that being should have a middle and an extremity.

he speaks: ‘nor is it divisible, since the whole is similar.’ Hence, neither can what he says be adapted to the heavens, according to the assertions of some, as we are informed by Eudemus, who were led to this opinion from that verse of Parmenides,

παντοθεν ευκυκλου σφαιρης εναλιγκιον ογκω,

i. e. ‘on all sides similar to the bulk of a perfect sphere:’ for the heavens are not indivisible, nor a sphere similar to that which Parmenides mentions, though they form a sphere the most accurate of all such as are physical. It is also evident that neither does Parmenides call *the one being* psychical, because he says that it is immovable; for the psychical essence, according to the Eleatics, possesses motion. He likewise says, that the whole of this *one being* is present at once, *επει νυν εστιν ομου παν*, and that it subsists according to the same, and after the same manner.

Ταυτον εν ταυτω τε μενον, καθ’ εαυτο τε κειται.

‘Same in the same abides, and by itself subsists.’ And it is evident that it possesses the whole at once, and according to the same, in essence, power, and energy, since it is beyond a psychical hypostasis. Neither does he say that it is intellectual: for that which is intellectual subsists according to a separation from the intelligible, and a conversion to it. But, according to him, in *the one being* intellection, intelligible, and intellect, are the same: for thus he writes—

Ταυτον δε εστι νοειν τε, και ου ενεκεν εστι νοημα.

i. e. ‘Intellection, and that for the sake of which intellectual conception subsists, are the same.’ He adds, *ου γαρ ανευ του εντος*, ‘for it is not without *being*,’ i. e. the intelligible, in which, says he, you will find intellection has not a subsistence separate from being. Further still, the intellectual is separated into forms, as the intelligible pre-assumes unitedly, or, in other words, causally comprehends the separation of forms. But where there is separation, there difference subsists, and where this is, there non-being also is at the same time apparent. Parmenides however entirely exterminates non-being from being: for he says, ‘non-beings never are, nor do they subsist in any respect; but do thou, investigating in this path, restrain thy intellectual conception.’ Neither likewise, according to him, is *the one being* a thing of posterior origin, subsisting in our conceptions, from an ablation of sensibles; for this is neither unbegotten nor indestructible. Nor is it that which is common in things: for this is sensible, and belongs to things doxastic and deceitful, about which he afterwards speaks. Besides, how could it be true to assert of this, that it is at once all things, or that it contracts in itself intellect and the intelligible? Shall we say, therefore, that he calls *the one being* an individual substance? But this indeed is more dissonant. For an individual substance is generated, is distinguished by difference, is material and sensible, and is different from accident. It is also divisible and in motion. It remains, therefore, that the Parmenidean *one*

*being*

extremity. And having these, it must unavoidably have parts. Or how shall we say?

THEÆ. Just so.

GUEST. But, indeed, nothing hinders but that, when it is divided, it should have the passion of *the one*, in all its parts, and that thus *the one* should be every being, and a whole.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But is it not impossible that that which suffers these things should be *the one*?

THEÆ. Why?

GUEST. Because, according to right reason, that which is *truly one* should be said to be entirely without parts.

THEÆ. It must indeed necessarily be so.

GUEST. But such a thing as we have just now mentioned, in consequence of consisting of many parts, would not harmonize with *the one*.

THEÆ. I understand you.

GUEST. But whether will the whole having the passion of *the one*, be thus one, and a whole, or must we by no means say that *the one* is a whole?

THEÆ. You propose a difficult choice.

GUEST. You speak most true. *For, since in a certain respect being is passive*

*being* must be the intelligible, the cause of all things: and hence it is intellect and intellection, in which all things are unitedly and contractedly comprehended according to one union, in which also there is one nature of *the one* and *being*. Hence Zeno says, that he who demonstrates *the one* will likewise assign being, not as rejecting *the one*, but as subsisting together with being. But all the above-mentioned conclusions accord with *the one being*: for it is without generation and indestructible, entire and only-begotten. For that which is prior to all separation will not be secondary to any other being. To this likewise it pertains to be all things at once, and to have no connection with non-being. The undivided also, and the immovable according to every form of division and motion, a subsistence perfectly uniform, and *termination*, for it is the *end* of all things, accord with this *one being*. If besides it is that for the sake of which intellection subsists, it is evidently intelligible: for intellection and intellect are for the sake of the intelligible. And if intellection and the intelligible are the same in it, the transcendency of its union will be ineffable."

After this, Simplicius, in order to give credibility to what he has said of Parmenides, and on account of the books of that philosopher being very rare in his time, the sixth century, has preserved a considerable number of his verses, which are well worthy the attention of the learned and philosophical reader. He then adds as follows: "We must not wonder if Parmenides says that

*passive to the one, it does not appear to be the same with the one, and all things will be more than one. Is it not so?*

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. But likewise if *being* is a non-whole on account of its becoming passive to whole, but yet is whole itself, *being* in this case will happen to be indigent of itself.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. And *being*, according to this reasoning, since it is deprived of itself, will be *non-being*.

THEÆ. It will so.

GUEST. And thus again all things will be more than one, since being and the whole are allotted their proper nature, each separate from the other.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. And if the whole has in no respect a subsistence, these same things will take place with respect to *being*; and besides, *being* not having a subsistence, neither will it at any time have been generated.

THEÆ. Why not?

GUEST. Whatever is generated is always generated a whole. So that he who does not place in the rank of beings, *the one* or the *whole*, ought neither to denominate essence, nor generation, as that which has a being.

that *the one being* is similar to the bulk of a perfectly round sphere: for, on account of his poetry, he touches on a certain mythological fiction. In what, therefore, does this differ from that assertion of Orpheus, It is of a white texture? And it is evident that some of the assertions of Parmenides accord with other things posterior to being. Thus, for instance, the unbegotten and the indestructible are adapted to both soul and intellect; and the immovable and abiding in sameness to intellect. But all the assertions at once, and genuinely understood, accord with *the one being*. For though according to a certain signification the soul is unbegotten, and also intellect, yet they are produced by the intelligible. Likewise this one or first being is properly immovable, in which motion is not separated according to energy. An abiding in sameness also properly pertains to being. But soul and much-honoured intellect proceed from that which abides, and are converted to it. It is likewise evident that such things as are said to pertain to being pre-subsist in it unitedly, but are unfolded from it with separation. And it seems indeed that *the one being* is delivered by Parmenides as the first cause, since it is at once, one and all, and the last boundary. But if he does not simply call it *one*, but *the one being*, and only-begotten, and a boundary but finite, perhaps he indicates that the ineffable cause of all things is established above it." Simplicius concludes with observing, that the objections both of Plato and Aristotle to the assertions of Parmenides are philanthropic, and were made by those philosophers to prevent his doctrine from being perverted.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. It appears that this is entirely the case.

GUEST. Likewise, that which is not a whole ought not to be any quantum whatever. For, being a certain quantum, so far as it is so, it must necessarily be a whole.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. It appears, therefore, that every one will be involved in ten thousand other insoluble doubts, who says that *being* is alone either two or one.

THEÆ. This is nearly evident by the things which have just now been shown. For greater and more difficult doubts will always follow each other in a connected series, respecting what has been above asserted.

GUEST. But we have not yet discussed the assertions of those who accurately discourse about *being* and *non-being*. At the same time, what we have already said is sufficient. But let us again consider those who speak inaccurately about these, that we may perceive from all things, that it is in no respect more easy to say what *being* is, than what *non-being* is.

THEÆ. It will be, therefore, requisite to consider those.

GUEST. Indeed, there appears to be among these a certain gigantic war as it were, through the doubts in which they are mutually involved respecting essence.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. Some of these draw down all things from heaven and the invisible region to earth, seizing in *reality*, for this purpose, rocks and oaks. For, in consequence of touching all such things as these, they strenuously contend that that alone has a being which can be seen and handled<sup>1</sup>, and this they define to be body and essence. But if any one says that there are other things which are without a body, they perfectly despise the assertion, and are unwilling to hear of any thing that is not corporeal.

THEÆ. You speak of *dire* men: but I also have frequently met with such.

GUEST. On the contrary, the opponents of these men *very religiously* contend supernally from the invisible region, and compel certain intelligible and incorporeal species to be true essence: but by their arguments they

<sup>1</sup> Is not this the doctrine of those who are called experimental philosophers? If so, the fable of the Giants is unfolded in those men.

break into small pieces the bodies of the others, and that which is denominated by them truth, at the same time calling it flowing generation instead of essence. But *between these, Theætetus, an immense contest always subsisted.*

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. Let us now, therefore, receive from each a particular account of the essence established by each.

THEÆ. But how can we receive it?

GUEST. From those that place essence in forms we may easily receive it: for they are more mild. But from those who violently draw all things to body we shall receive it more difficultly. And perhaps it will be nearly impossible to do so. It appears to me, however, that we should act in the following manner with respect to them.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. It will be best, if possible, to make them in reality better: but if this is impossible, we must be content with making them so in our discourse, and suppose them to answer more equitably than at present they would be willing to do. For that which is assented to by better men possesses more authority than that which is assented to by worse men. However, we pay no attention to these things, but explore the truth.

THEÆ. Most right.

GUEST. Order them, therefore, as being made better to answer you, and to unfold the meaning of that which they assert.

THEÆ. Be it so.

GUEST. Do they, therefore, say, that what they call a mortal animal is any thing?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly they do.

GUEST. And do they not acknowledge that this is an animated body?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. And, admitting this, do they also acknowledge that soul is something?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. Do they likewise assert that one soul is just, and another unjust; and that one is wise, and another unwise?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But does not every soul become such through the habit and

presence of justice, and the contrary, through the habit and presence of the contraries to these :

THEÆ. These things also they will assent to.

GUEST. But will they say that that is altogether any thing, which is able to be present to and absent from any thing ?

THEÆ. They will.

GUEST. Since, therefore, justice is something, and likewise prudence, and every other virtue, and the contraries to the virtues, together with soul in which these subsist, whether will they say that each of these is visible and tangible, or that all of them are invisible ?

THEÆ. They will nearly assert that no one of these is visible.

GUEST. But what ? Will they say that any one of things of this kind has a body ?

THEÆ. They will not give the same answer to the whole of this question : but soul itself will appear to them to possess a certain body ; but with respect to prudence, and the other things about which you just now inquired, they will be restrained by shame from daring strenuously to assert, that they are either nothing, or that all of them are bodies.

GUEST. The men, Theætetus, are clearly become better. For such of them as are Spartans or natives would not be ashamed to assert this, but would contend that whatever cannot be grasped by the hands is altogether nothing.

THEÆ. You nearly speak their conceptions.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, again ask them. For, if they are willing to grant that even any trifling thing is incorporeal, it is sufficient. For we ask them respecting that which is connate with incorporeal, and at the same time with corporeal natures, what it is they look to, when they say that both of them have a being.

THEÆ. Perhaps they would not be able to give an answer, if they should suffer any thing of this kind.

GUEST. Consider whether, in consequence of our proposing this question, they will be willing to admit and acknowledge that being is a thing of this kind.

THEÆ. Of what kind ? Speak, and perhaps we shall understand.

GUEST. I say then that whatever possesses any power, whether of doing  
any

any thing naturally, or of suffering though in the least degree from the vilest thing, and though this takes place but once,—every thing of this kind truly is. For I define being to be nothing else than power.

THEÆ. But since they cannot at present say any thing better than this, they must admit it.

GUEST. It is well said: for perhaps afterwards both we and they may think differently. Let this then now remain acknowledged by them.

THEÆ. Let it remain.

GUEST. Let us now proceed to the others, the friends of forms. And do you unfold to us their sentiments.

THEÆ. Be it so.

GUEST. Do you then say that generation is one thing, and essence another, separating them from each other?

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. And do you admit that by our body we communicate with generation, through sense, but that by our soul we communicate with true essence, through the reasoning power? Do you likewise say, that true essence always subsists similarly according to the same, but that generation subsists differently at different times?

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. But, O best of men, what do you call the communion which subsists between these two? Is it that which we just now mentioned?

THEÆ. What was that?

GUEST. Passion or action arising from a certain power, from the concurrence of things with each other. Perhaps you, Theætetus, do not know what answer they would give to this question; but perhaps I do, through my familiarity with them.

THEÆ. What answer then would they give?

GUEST. They would not grant us that which was just now said to the earth-born men respecting essence.

THEÆ. What was that?

GUEST. We established this to be a sufficient definition of beings, viz. when a power though the smallest is present to any thing, either of acting or suffering.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. To this they will say, that a power of acting and suffering is present with generation, but that no power of this kind is adapted to essence.

THEÆ. They will, therefore, speak to the purpose.

GUEST. To this, however, we must say, that we require to hear from them still more clearly, whether they acknowledge that the soul knows, and that essence is known.

THEÆ. They certainly say so.

GUEST. But what? Do you say that to know, or to be known, is action, or passion, or both? Or do you say that action is one thing, and passion another? Or that neither of these participates in no respect of the other? It is evident, indeed, that neither participates of the other. For, if they admitted this, they would contradict what they asserted above.

THEÆ. I understand you.

GUEST. For if to know was to do something, it would necessarily happen that what is known would suffer, or become passive. And thus, according to this reasoning, essence being known by knowledge, would, so far as it is known, be moved, through becoming passive; which we say cannot take place about a thing at rest.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. What then, by Jupiter, shall we be easily persuaded that true motion, life, soul<sup>1</sup>, and prudence, are not present to that which is *perfectly being*, and that it neither lives, nor is wise, but abides immovable, not possessing a venerable and holy intellect?

THEÆ. But it would be a dire thing, O guest, to admit this.

GUEST. Shall we say then that it possesses intellect, but not life?

THEÆ. And how?

GUEST. Or shall we say that both these reside in it, but that it does not possess these in soul?

THEÆ. But after what other manner can it possess these?

GUEST. Shall we then say that it possesses intellect, life, and soul, but that, though animated, it abides perfectly immovable?

<sup>1</sup> All these are *causally* contained in the first being, because it is better than all these.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. All these things appear to me to be irrational.

GUEST. We must therefore grant, that both that which is moved, and motion, are beings.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. It follows therefore, Theætetus, that intellect will never in any respect be present to any thing immovable.

THEÆ. It does follow.

GUEST. But, indeed, if we grant that all things are borne along and moved, we shall by such an assertion take away sameness from beings.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. Does it appear to you that that which subsists according to the same, and in a similar manner, and about the same, can ever subsist without *permanency*?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But do you perceive that intellect ever was, or is, without these?

THEÆ. In the smallest degree.

GUEST. But besides this, we should oppose, by every possible argument, him who entirely taking away science, or prudence, or intellect, strenuously endeavours to introduce any thing else.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. But it is perfectly necessary, as it appears, that the philosopher, and he who honours these things in the highest degree, should not assent to those who, asserting that there is either one, or many species of things, consider the universe as standing still: nor yet should he by any means hear those who affirm that being is every where moved; but, according to the opinion even of boys, he should call things immovable, and things moved, considered as subsisting together, being, and the all.

THEÆ. Most true.

GUEST. Do we not, then, now appear to have equitably comprehended being in our discourse?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Now therefore, Theætetus, as it appears to me, we are strangely involved in doubt.

THEÆ. How so? and why do you assert this?

GUEST.

GUEST. Do you not perceive, O bleſſed man, that we are at preſent in the greateſt ignorance reſpecting being, and yet we have appeared to ourſelves to ſay ſomething about it ?

THEÆ. I do perceive it ; but I do not altogether underſtand in what reſpect we have deceived ourſelves.

GUEST. Conſider more clearly, whether, in conſequence of aſſenting to theſe things, any one may juſtly interrogate us, in the ſame manner as we interrogated thoſe who ſaid that the whole of things conſiſted of the hot and the cold.

THEÆ. Remind me what theſe interrogations were.

GUEST. By all means : and I will endeavour to do this by aſking you the ſame queſtion as I then aſked them, that we may at the ſame time make ſome advance in our inquiry.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Do you not then ſay, that motion and permanency are contrary to each other ?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And do you not likewiſe ſay, that both and each of them ſimilarly are ?

THEÆ. I do.

GUEST. Do you, therefore, ſay, that both and each are moved, when you admit that they are ?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But do you ſignify that they ſtand ſtill, when you ſay that both are ?

THEÆ. But how can I ?

GUEST. You may, therefore, place in your ſoul being, as a third thing different from theſe, conſidering it as comprehending under itſelf permanency and motion ; and looking to the communion of theſe with eſſence, you may thus aſſert that both of them are.

THEÆ. We ſeem to prophesy that being is a certain third thing, when we ſay that there are motion and permanency.

GUEST. Being, therefore, is not both motion and permanency, but ſomething different from theſe.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. It appears so.

GUEST. Hence being, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is moved.

THEÆ. It is nearly so.

GUEST. Where then ought he to turn his thoughts, who wishes to establish in himself any clear conceptions respecting being?

THEÆ. Where?

GUEST. I do not think it is yet easy for him to turn his thoughts any where. For, if being is not moved, why does it not stand still? Or how is it possible, if it in no respect stands still, that it should not be moved? But being has now appeared to us without both these. Is this, however, possible?

THEÆ. It is the most impossible of all things.

GUEST. In the next place, therefore, it will be just to call to mind this.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That being asked respecting the name of non-being, we were involved in the greatest doubt respecting what it ought to be. Do you remember?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Are we, therefore, now involved in less doubt respecting being?

THEÆ. If it be possible to say so, O guest, we appear to be involved in greater doubt.

GUEST. Let this ambiguity then rest here. But since both being and non-being equally participate of doubt, we may now hope, that if one of them shall appear to be more obscure, or more clear, the other likewise will appear to be the same: and again, that if we should not be able to perceive one of them, the other will also be invisible to us. And thus we shall pursue the discourse respecting both of them in the most becoming manner we are able.

THEÆ. It is well said.

GUEST. Let us relate, then, after what manner we denominate this same thing by many names.

THEÆ. Adduce for this purpose a certain paradigm.

GUEST. In speaking of man, we give him various appellations, and attribute to him colour, figure, magnitude, virtue, and vice; in all which, and

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ten thousand other particulars, we not only say that man is, but that he is good, and an infinity of other things: and we act in a similar manner with respect to other particulars; for, considering each as one thing, we again call it many things, and by many names.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. Whence, I think, we have given a feast to young men, and to those who study in old age. For it is easy for every one immediately to object, that it is impossible for *the many* to be *one*, and *the one many*. Hence, they will exult, not suffering us to say that a man is good, but that good is good, and man man. For I think, Theætetus, that you have often met with young men who seriously apply themselves to things of this kind, and sometimes with men advanced in years, who, through the poverty of their possessions with respect to wisdom, admire such things as these, and who think themselves all-wise for having discovered this.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. That our discourse, therefore, may extend to all who have ever asserted any thing respecting essence, let what we shall now say in the way of interrogation be understood as addressed as well to these as to those others whom we have above mentioned.

THEÆ. What is it you are now going to say?

GUEST. Whether we should neither conjoin essence with motion and permanency, nor any thing else with any thing else, but, as if things were unmingled, and it were impossible for them to communicate with each other, we should consider them as separate in our discourse? Or whether we should collect all things into the same, as if they were able to communicate with each other? Or consider this as the case with some things, but not with others? Which of these, Theætetus, shall we say is to be preferred?

THEÆ. I indeed have nothing to answer to these things. Why, therefore, do you not, by answering to each particular, consider what follows from each?

GUEST. You speak well. We will suppose them, therefore, if you please, to say, in the first place, that nothing has any power of communicating with any thing, in any respect. Will it not, therefore, follow, that motion and permanency in no respect participate of essence?

THEÆ.

THEÆ. They certainly will not.

GUEST. But what? Will any one of them be, and at the same time have no communication with essence?

THEÆ. It will not.

GUEST. From consenting to this, all things, as it seems, will become rapidly subverted, as well the doctrine of those who contend that all things are moved, as of those who contend that all things stand still, together with the dogmas of those who assert that such things as subsist according to forms or species subsist similarly according to the same. For all these conjoin being with their doctrines, some asserting that things are truly moved, and others that they truly stand still.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Such, likewise, as at one time unite all things, and at another time separate them, whether dividing from one thing into things infinite, or into things which have finite elements, and composing from these, and whether they consider this as partially, or as always taking place,—in all these cases they will say nothing to the purpose, if there is in no respect a mixture of things.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Further still, we ourselves shall have discoursed the most ridiculously of all men, who permitting nothing pertaining to the communion of the passion of *different*, have yet used the appellation *the other*.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. They are in a certain respect compelled to employ the term *to be*, about all things, likewise the terms *separate*, *others*, and *by itself*, and ten thousand others, from which being unable to abstain, and finding it necessary to insert these expressions in their discourses, they do not require any other confutation, but, as it is said, they have an enemy and an adversary at home, vociferating within, and always walk as if carrying about with them the absurd Eurycles<sup>1</sup>.

THEÆ. You very much speak of that which is like and true.

<sup>1</sup> "This is a proverb, says the Greek Scholiast on this dialogue, applied to those who prophesy evil to themselves. For Eurycles appeared to have a certain dæmon in his belly, exhorting him to speak concerning future events; whence he was called a ventriloquist."

GUEST. But what if we should permit all things to have the power of communicating with each other? This, indeed, I myself am able to dissolve.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. Because motion itself would entirely stand still, and again, permanency itself would be moved, if they were mingled with each other. But this indeed is impossible from the greatest necessity, that *motion* should stand still, and *permanency* be moved.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. The third thing, therefore, alone remains.

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. For one of these things is necessary, either that all things should be mingled together, or nothing; or that some things should be willing to be mingled with each other, and that other things should be unwilling.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And two of the members of this division cannot be found.

THEÆ. They cannot.

GUEST. Every one, therefore, who wishes to answer rightly should adopt that which remains of the three.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. But since some things are willing to be mingled, and others not, they will nearly be affected in the same manner as letters. For some of these are incongruous with respect to each other, but others mutually harmonize.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. For vowels being in a particular manner the bond, as it were, of the other letters, pervade through all of them, so that without some one of these it is impossible for any two of the others to accord with each other.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. Does every one, therefore, know what letters will communicate with each other? or is art requisite in order to accomplish this sufficiently?

THEÆ. Art is requisite.

GUEST. What kind of art?

THEÆ. The grammatic.

GUEST. And is not this the case with respect to sharp and flat sounds? I mean,

mean, Is not he who knows by art what sounds are consonant or dissonant, a musician, but he who is ignorant of this not so?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. And in other arts, and the privation of arts, we shall find other such circumstances take place.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Since then we have acknowledged, that the genera<sup>1</sup> of being are mixed

<sup>1</sup> Of the sciences, some look to one scientific object, as medicine to health, but others extend to more than one, as arithmetic to philosophy, to a polity, to the ætæonic art, and to many others; and others contribute to all arts, not the fabricative only, but also such as are theoretic, such as is the *divisive* art, of which Socrates speaks in the Philebus. As, therefore, in the sciences some are most total, and others partial, so in intelligible causes some are altogether partial, alone being the leaders of a peculiar number of one species, but others extend themselves to many, as *equal*, *similar*, and *whole*; for *whole* so far as *whole* is not common to all things, since a *part* so far as a *part* is not a *whole*: and others extend themselves to all things, because all things participate of them so far as they are beings, and not so far as they are vital, or animated, or possess any other idiom, but according to the appellation itself of being. Because, therefore, *being* is the first among intelligible causes, it has the most total order among the genera; and these are five in number, viz. *essence*, *same*, *different*, *motion*, *permanency*. For every being is *essentialized*, is *united* itself to itself, is *separated* from itself and other things, *proceeds* from itself, and its proper principle, and participates of a certain *permanency*, so far as it preserves its proper form. Whether, therefore, it be intelligible, or sensible, or a thing subsisting between these two, it is composed from these genera. For all things are not vital, or wholes, or parts, or animated; but of these genera all things participate. Likewise *essence* not subsisting about a thing, neither will any thing else be there; for essence is the receptacle of other things. Without the subsistence of *sameness*, that which is a whole will be dissipated; and *difference* being destroyed there will be one thing alone without multitude. In like manner, *motion* and *permanency* not subsisting; all things will be unenergetic and dead, without stability, and tending to non-entity. It is necessary, therefore, that each of these should be in all things, and that *essence* should rank as the first, being as it were the Vesta and monad of the genera, and arranged analogous to *the one*. After *essence*, *sameness* and *difference* must succeed, the former being analogous to *bound*, and the latter to *infinity*; and next to these *motion* and *permanency*. Of these genera too, some are particularly beheld about the *powers*, and others about the *energies* of beings. For every being so far as it is a being participates of a certain *essence*, as it is said in this dialogue, and in the Parmenides. But every essential power is either under *same*, or under *different*, or under both. Thus for instance heat, and every *separative* power, subsists under *different*, but coldness, and every *collective* power, is under *same*. And if there is any thing which subsists between these, it is under both *same* and *different*. For every energy is either *motion* or *permanency*, or in a certain respect both; since the energy of intellect may be rather said to be *permanency* than *motion*, and in like manner every energy which preserves the energizing nature in the same condition, or that about which it energizes. But the motion of bodies

mixed with each other, after the same manner, ought not he necessarily to proceed in his discourse scientifically, who is about to show what genera mutually accord, and what do not admit each other? Likewise, whether these genera so hold together through all things as to be capable of being mutually mingled? And again in their divisions, if there is another cause of division through wholes?

THEÆ. How is it possible science should not be requisite for this purpose, and nearly, perhaps, the greatest of all sciences?

GUEST. What then, again, Theætetus, shall we call this science? Or, by Jupiter, have we ignorantly fallen upon the science of the liberal? And do we appear, while investigating a sophist, to have first found a philosopher?

THEÆ. How do you say?

GUEST. Do we not say, that to divide according to genera, and neither to think the same species different, nor a different species the same, is the business of the dialectic science?

THEÆ. We do say so.

GUEST. He, therefore, who is able to do this, sufficiently perceives one idea<sup>1</sup> every way extended through many things, the individuals of which

bodies into each other does not abide in *same*, but departs from that in which it subsists; and that which changes the energizing nature in the *same* and about the *same*, is *stable motion*. Every thing, therefore, by its very being participates of this triad, *essence, power, and energy*, on account of these five genera.

<sup>1</sup> Here genus is signified by *one idea extended through many*: for genus is not an aggregate of species, as a whole of parts, but it is present to every species, to which it is at the same time prior. But every species subsisting separate from other species, and from genus itself, participates of genus. By *many ideas different from each other, but externally comprehended under one idea*, which is genus, species are signified: externally comprehended, indeed, genus being exempt from species, but comprehending the causes of species: for genera, truly so called, are both more antient and more essential than the species which are ranked under them. Of genera, also, some have a subsistence prior to species, but others subsist in them according to participation. To perceive these two, therefore, viz. one idea extended through many, the individuals of which subsist apart from each other, is the province of the *divisive* power of dialectic; but the other two pertain to the *definitive* power of this art: for definition perceives one idea through many wholes conjoined in one, and collects into one definitive conception many ideas, each subsisting as a whole. It also connects them with each other, and perfects one idea from the assumption of all wholes; conjoining the many in one. Besides this, it considers the many which it has collected in one, lying apart, and the whole which is produced from them.

are

are placed apart from each other, and many ideas different from each other externally comprehended under one, and one idea through many wholes conjoined in one; and lastly, many ideas, every way divided apart from each other. This is to know scientifically, how to distinguish according to genus, in what respect particulars communicate, and how far they do not communicate with each other.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But I think you do not give dialectic to any other than one who philosophizes purely and justly.

THEÆ. For how is it possible to give it to any other?

GUEST. If we seek, indeed, we shall find a philosopher in a place of this kind, both now and hereafter, though it is also difficult to see this character clearly; but the difficulty of perceiving a sophist is of a different kind from that with which the perceiving a philosopher is attended.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. The former flying into the darkness of non-being, and by use becoming adapted to it, is with difficulty perceived through the obscurity of the place. Is it not so?

THEÆ. So it seems.

GUEST. But the philosopher through reasoning, being always situated near the idea of being, is by no means easily discerned, on account of the splendor of the region. For the eyes of vulgar souls are unable to support the view of that which is divine.

THEÆ. It is likely that these things subsist in this manner, no less than those.

GUEST. About this particular, therefore, we shall perhaps at another time consider more clearly, if it be permitted us. But, with respect to the sophist, it is evident that we should not dismiss him till we have sufficiently surveyed him.

THEÆ. You speak well.

GUEST. Since then it is acknowledged by us, that some of the genera of being communicate with each other, and that some do not, and that some communicate with a few, and others with many things, and others again are not hindered from communicating through all things with all things;—this being the case, let us, in the next place, following the order of dis-  
course,

course, speculate not about all species, lest we should be confounded by their multitude,—but, choosing certain of those which are called the greatest, let us, in the first place, consider the qualities of each, and, in the next place, what communion of power they possess with each other, that we may not in any respect be indigent of discourse about being and non-being (though we may not be able to comprehend them with perfect perspicuity), as far as the condition of the present speculation admits. If, therefore, while we are assimilating non-being, we should say that it is truly non-being, we should be exculpated.

THEÆ. It would indeed be proper that we should.

GUEST. But the greatest of all the genera which we have now mentioned are, being itself, permanency, and motion.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. And we have said that the two latter are unmingled with each other.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. But being is mingled with both: for both after a manner are.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. These things then become three.

THEÆ. Certainly.

GUEST. Is not, therefore, each of these different from the other two, but the same with itself?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. What then shall we now say respecting sameness and difference? Shall we say that they are two certain genera, different from the other three, but yet always mingled with them from necessity? And thus are we to consider about five, and not three genera only? Or are we ignorant that we have denominated this sameness and difference, as something belonging to the other three?

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

GUEST. But, indeed, motion and permanency are neither different nor same.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. That which we in common call motion and permanency can be neither of these.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Why?

GUEST. Because motion would be permanent, and permanency be moved. For, with respect to both, the one becoming the other, would compel that other to change into the contrary to its nature, as participating of the contrary.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. But yet both participate of same and different.

THEÆ. They do.

GUEST. We must not, therefore, say that motion is either same or different, nor yet must we assert this of permanency.

THEÆ. We must not.

GUEST. Are, therefore, being and sameness to be considered by us as one certain thing?

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

GUEST. But if being and sameness signify that which is in no respect different, when we again assert of motion and permanency, that both are, we thus denominate both of them the same, as things which have a being.

THEÆ. But, indeed, this is impossible.

GUEST. It is impossible, therefore, that sameness and being should be one thing.

THEÆ. Nearly so.

GUEST. We must place sameness, therefore, as a fourth species, in addition to the former three.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But what? Must we not say that difference is a fifth species? Or is it proper to think that this, and being, are two names belonging to one genus?

THEÆ. Perhaps so.

GUEST. But I think you will grant, that of beings, some always subsist themselves by themselves, but others in relation to other things.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But different is always referred to different. Is it not?

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. But this would not be the case unless being and difference widely differed

differed from each other. But if difference participated of both species, as is the case with being, there would be some one among things different, which would be no longer different with reference to that which is different. But now it happens from necessity, that whatever is different is so from its relation to that which is different.

THEÆ. It is as you say.

GUEST. We must say, then, that the nature of different must be added as a fifth to the species of which we have already spoken.

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And we must likewise say that it pervades through all these. For each one of the others is different, not through its own nature, but through participating the idea of difference.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. But we may thus speak respecting each of the five genera.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. In the first place, that motion is entirely different from permanency. Or how shall we say?

THEÆ. That it is so.

GUEST. It is not, therefore, permanency.

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. But it *is*, through participating of being.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. Again, motion is different from sameness.

THEÆ. Nearly so.

GUEST. It is not, therefore, sameness.

THEÆ. It is not.

GUEST. And yet it is same, in consequence of all things participating of sameness.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. It must be confessed, therefore, that motion is both same, and not same, nor must we be indignant that it is so. For, when we say that it is both same, and not same, we do not speak of it in a similar manner; but when we say it is same, we call it so, through the participation of sameness with respect to itself; and when we say it is not same, we call it so through

its communion with different, through which, separating it from fame, it becomes not fame, but different. So that it is again rightly said to be not fame.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. If, therefore, motion itself should in any respect participate of permanency, there would be no absurdity in calling it stable.

THEÆ. Most right, since we have acknowledged that some of the genera are willing to be mingled with each other, and others not.

GUEST. And, indeed, we arrived at the demonstration of this prior to what we have evinced at present, by proving that the thing subsists after this manner.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But we may again say that motion is different from different, just as it is different from sameness and permanency.

THEÆ. It is necessary.

GUEST. It is, therefore, in a certain respect, not different and different, according to this reasoning.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. What then follows? Shall we say it is different from three of the genera, but not from the fourth? acknowledging that the genera are five, about which, and in which, we propose to speculate?

THEÆ. And how?

GUEST. For it is impossible to grant that they are fewer in number than they now appear to be. We may, therefore, safely contend, that motion is different from being.

THEÆ. We may, most safely.

GUEST. It clearly follows, therefore, that motion is truly non-being, and at the same time being, since it participates of being.

THEÆ. Most clearly.

GUEST. Non-being, therefore, is necessarily in motion, and in all the genera. For, in all of them, the nature of different rendering them different from being, makes each to be non-being. Hence, we rightly say that all of them are non-beings; and again, because they participate of being, that they are, and are beings.

THEÆ. It appears so.

GUEST. About each of the species, therefore, there is much of being, but there is also non-being infinite in multitude.

THEÆ. It appears so.

GUEST. Must not, therefore, being itself be said to be different from the others?

THEÆ. It is necessary.

GUEST. Being, therefore, is not so many in number as the others; for, not being them, it is itself one, but is not other things, which are infinite in number.

THEÆ. This is nearly the case.

GUEST. We ought not, therefore, to be indignant at these things, since the genera have naturally a mutual communion. But if some one does not admit these things, yet, as we have been persuaded by the former assertions, in like manner we ought to be persuaded by these.

THEÆ. You speak most justly.

GUEST. We may also see this.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. When we say non-being, we do not, as it appears, say any thing contrary to being, but only that which is different<sup>1</sup>.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. Just as when we say a thing is not great, do we then appear to you to evince by this word that which is small rather than that which is equal?

THEÆ. How is it possible we should?

GUEST. We must not, therefore, admit that the contrary to a thing is signified, when negation is spoken of; but thus much only must be asserted, that the terms not, and neither, signify something of other things, when placed before names, or rather before things, about which the names of the negations afterwards enunciated are distributed.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. This also we may consider by a dianoëtic energy, if it is agreeable to you.

<sup>1</sup> By *non-being*, therefore, in this place, Plato means *difference*, one of the five genera of being.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. The nature of different appears to me to be cut into small parts, in the same manner as science.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. This nature itself is one; but a part of it residing in any thing and being individually defined, possesses a private appellation of its own; on which account there are said to be many arts and sciences.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Do not, therefore, the parts of the nature of different, which is itself one thing, suffer this very same thing?

THEÆ. Perhaps so. But we must show how this takes place.

GUEST. Is there any part of different opposite to the beautiful?

THEÆ. There is.

GUEST. Must we say that this part is nameless, or that it has a certain name?

THEÆ. That it has a name. For every thing which we say is not beautiful, is not different from any thing else than the nature of the beautiful.

GUEST. Come, then, answer me the following question.

THEÆ. What question?

GUEST. When any thing is defined as belonging to one particular genus, and is again opposed to a certain essence, does it happen that thus it is not beautiful?

THEÆ. It does.

GUEST. But the opposition of being to being happens, as it seems, to be not beautiful.

THEÆ. Most right.

GUEST. What then? Does it follow from this reasoning that the beautiful belongs more to beings, and the non-beautiful less?

THEÆ. It does not.

GUEST. We must say, therefore, that the non-great and the great similarly are.

THEÆ. Similarly.

GUEST. Hence, too, we must assert of the just and the non-just, that the one in no respect is more than the other.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. And the same must be said of other things, since the nature of different appears to rank among beings. But difference having a subsistence, it is necessary to place the parts of it as no less having subsistence.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. As it appears, therefore, the opposition of a part of the nature of different, and of the parts of being, are no less essence, if it be lawful so to speak, than being itself; nor do they signify that which is contrary to being, but only something different from it.

THEÆ. It is most clear.

GUEST. What then shall we call it?

THEÆ. It is evident that non-being, which we have sought after on account of a sophist, is this very thing.

GUEST. Whether, therefore, as you say, is it no more deficient of essence than the others? And ought we now boldly to say, that non-being possesses its own nature firmly, in the same manner as the great was found to be great, and the beautiful beautiful, and the non-great to be non-great, and the non-beautiful non-beautiful? Shall we in like manner say, that non-being was and is non-being, as one species which must be numbered among many beings? Or must we still, Theætetus, be diffident about this?

THEÆ. By no means.

GUEST. Do you perceive, therefore, how disobedient we have been to the prohibition of Parmenides?

THEÆ. In what respect?

GUEST. We have wandered beyond the limits he appointed us, by thus continuing still further to explore and evince.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. Because he says, "Non-beings never, and by no means are; but do you, while investigating, restrain your conceptions from this path."

THEÆ. He does speak in this manner.

GUEST. But we have not only shown that non-beings are, but we have demonstrated what the form of non-being is. For, having evinced that the nature of different has a subsistence, and that it is divided into small parts, which are mutually distributed through all things, we then dared to say, that the part of it which is opposed to the being of every thing, is itself truly non-being.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. And to me, O guest, we appear to have spoken with the greatest truth.

GUEST. Let no one, therefore, say, that we, having evinced that non-being is contrary to being, dare to assert that it *is*. For we some time since bade farewell to him who asks whether that which is contrary to any thing has a subsistence, and possesses a certain reason, or is entirely irrational. But, with respect to that which we now call non-being, either some one who is not persuaded by our arguments should confute us, as not having spoken well; or, if he cannot do this, he must also say as we say, that the genera are mingled with each other, and that being and different pervading through all things, and through each other, different participating of being, *is* through this participation, not being that of which it participates, but something else. But, being different from being, it clearly follows that it is necessarily non-being. And again, *being*, in consequence of participating of difference, will be different from the other genera: but being different from all of them, it is not any one of them, nor all the others, nor any thing besides itself. So that, without doubt, being is not ten thousand things in ten thousand things: and, in like manner, each and all of the other genera are multifariously distributed, but are not themselves multifarious.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. And if any one does not believe in these contrarieties, he should consider, and assert something better than has been now said. Or if some one, in consequence of finding this to be a difficult speculation, rejoices, drawing the arguments from one side to another, such a one, as our present reasoning asserts, is not engaged in a pursuit which deserves much serious attention. For *this* neither possesses any thing elegant, nor is difficult to discover; but *that* is difficult, and at the same time beautiful.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. That of which we have spoken above; I mean that, omitting these particulars, we may be able to confute any one who asserts that different is same, or same different. For, to show that same is different, and different same, that the great is small, and the similar dissimilar, and to rejoice in thus introducing contraries in discourse, is not a true confutation, but is evidently the province of one who has but a slight apprehension of the thing, and is recently born.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. For, O excellent young man, to endeavour to separate every thing from every thing, is both inelegant, and the province of one rude and destitute of philosophy.

THEÆ. Why so?

GUEST. To dissolve each thing from all things, is the most perfect abolition of all discourse. For discourse subsists through the conjunction of species with each other.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. Consider, therefore, how opportunely we have now contended with men of this kind, and compelled them to permit one thing to be mingled with another.

THEÆ. With a view to what?

GUEST. To this, that discourse may be one certain thing belonging to the genera of being. For, if we are deprived of this, we shall, for the most part, be deprived of philosophy. And further still, it is requisite at present that we should mutually consent to determine what discourse is. But, if it is entirely taken away from us, we can no longer speak about any thing. And it will be taken away, if we admit that things are not in any respect mingled with each other.

THEÆ. Right. But I do not understand why we should now mutually consent to determine what discourse is.

GUEST. But, perhaps, you will easily understand by attending to this.

THEÆ. To what?

GUEST. Non-being has appeared to us to be one of the other genera, and to be dispersed through all beings.

THEÆ. It has so.

GUEST. After this, therefore, we should consider whether it is mingled with opinion and discourse.

THEÆ. On what account?

GUEST. Because, if it is not mingled with these, it must necessarily follow that all things are true: but, if it is mingled with these, false opinion and false discourse must be produced. For to opine, or speak of non-beings, is itself falsehood subsisting in the dianoëtic part and discourse.

THEÆ. It is so.

GUEST.

GUEST. But, being falsehood, it is deception.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. And deception subsisting, all things must necessarily be full of resemblances, images, and phantasy.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But we have said that the sophist flies into this place, while he denies that there is any such thing as falsehood. For he asserts that no one can either think or speak of non-being; because it in no respect participates of essence.

THEÆ. These things were said by us.

GUEST. But now it has appeared that non-being participates of being. So that in this respect perhaps he will no longer oppose us. Perhaps however he will say, that of species, some participate of non-being, and others not; and that discourse and opinion rank among those things which do not participate it. So that he will again contend with us, that the image-making and phantastic art, in which we have said he is concealed, has no subsistence; since opinion and discourse have no communion with non-being. He will likewise assert that falsehood has not any kind of subsistence, since this communion of things is no where to be found. Hence we must investigate the nature of discourse, opinion, and phantasy, that, these becoming apparent, we may perceive their communion with non-being; and, perceiving this, may evince that there is such a thing as falsehood; and, having evinced this, may bind the sophist in it, if he is found to be guilty; or, liberating him, investigate in some other genus.

THEÆ. That, O guest, which we said at first about the sophist, appears to be very true—I mean, that he is a genus difficult to apprehend. For he appears to be full of problems; nor can any one arrive at his retreats, till he has first vanquished the obstacle which he throws in the way. For now we have scarcely overcome the obstacle which he hurled forth, I mean that non-being is not, and he immediately throws in our way another. Hence it is requisite to show that there is falsehood, both in discourse and opinion, and after this perhaps something else, and another thing after that, and so on, as it appears, without end.

GUEST. He, O Theætetus, who is able to make advances continually,  
though

though in a small degree, ought to proceed boldly in this affair. For what will he be able to accomplish in other things, who is without ardor in these? For he who either effects nothing in these, or is repelled backwards, will scarcely (according to the proverb) ever take the city. But now, O good man, since as you say this is accomplished, we shall have captured the greatest wall, and the rest will be easy and trifling.

THEÆ. You speak well.

GUEST. Let us then now, in the first place, as we said, consider discourse and opinion, that we may more clearly show, whether non-being touches upon these, or whether both these are in every respect true, and neither of them at any time false.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Come then, let us again speculate about nouns, in the same manner as we did about species and letters. For that which is the object of our present investigation appears in a certain respect to have a similar subsistence.

THEÆ. What is it you wish to be conceived respecting nouns?

GUEST. Whether all of them harmonize with each other; or some accord, but others do not.

THEÆ. It is evident that some accord, and others do not.

GUEST. Perhaps your meaning is this, that such nouns as in an orderly succession assert and evince something, mutually accord; but that such as signify nothing by continuity, do not mutually accord.

THEÆ. How do you mean? and what is it you say?

GUEST. What I thought you would both understand and assent to. For there is a twofold genus of vocal declarations respecting essence.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. One, which is called nouns, and the other verbs.

THEÆ. Speak of each.

GUEST. That which is a declaration in actions, we call a verb.

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. But a mark or sign of voice imposed on the agents themselves, we call a noun.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST.

GUEST. From nouns, therefore, alone, enunciated in continued succession, a sentence is never produced; nor yet again from verbs enunciated without nouns.

THEÆ. These things I have not learned.

GUEST. But it is evident that you just now acknowledged this, when looking to something else. For this is what I wished to say, that when these are enunciated in continued succession, a sentence is not produced.

THEÆ. How so?

GUEST. As, for instance, walks, runs, sleeps, and such other words as signify actions, all which when any one enunciates in continued succession, he will not by this means produce a sentence.

THEÆ. For how can he?

GUEST. Again, therefore, when any one says, a lion, a stag, a horse, and such other nouns as signify agents themselves, a sentence will not yet be produced by this continuity. For the things enunciated do not evince action, or a privation of action, or the essence of a thing which is, or which is not, till verbs are mingled with nouns. But when they are harmonized, a sentence is immediately produced, and the first connection of these is nearly the first sentence, though it should be the shortest possible.

THEÆ. How is this?

GUEST. When any one says, A man learns, would you not say that this is the shortest and first sentence?

THEÆ. I should.

GUEST. For he then evinces something respecting things which actually are, or are rising into being, or have been, or will be. Nor does he denominate only, but he finishes something connecting verbs and nouns. Hence we say that he speaks, and does not alone denominate, and to this connection we give the name of discourse.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. And thus as we said respecting things, that some harmonized with each other, and that others did not, so likewise with respect to the signs of voice, some do not harmonize, but others do, and produce discourse.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Further still, attend to this trifling thing,

THEÆ. To what?

GUEST. That discourse when it takes place must necessarily be a discourse about something: for it is impossible that it can be about nothing.

THEÆ. It must.

GUEST. Ought it not, therefore, to be of some particular kind?

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Let us then give diligent attention.

THEÆ. For it is requisite.

GUEST. I will, therefore, enunciate to you a sentence, in which a thing is conjoined with action, through a noun and a verb: but do you inform me of what it is a sentence.

THEÆ. I will, as far as I am able.

GUEST. Theætetus sits:—is this a long sentence?

THEÆ. It is not; but a moderate one.

GUEST. It is now your business to say what it is about, and of whom it is a sentence.

THEÆ. It is evident that it is about me, and of me.

GUEST. But what again with respect to this?

THEÆ. To what?

GUEST. Theætetus, with whom I now discourse, flies.

THEÆ. Respecting this also, no one can say but that it is about me, and of me.

GUEST. But we said it was necessary that every sentence should be of some particular kind.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. But of what kind must each of the sentences just now mentioned be?

THEÆ. One must be false, and the other true.

GUEST. But that which is true asserts things respecting you as they are.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. But that which is false asserts things respecting you different from what they are.

THEÆ. It does:

GUEST. It speaks, therefore, of things which are not, as if they were.

THEÆ. Nearly so.

GUEST. And it speaks of things which have a subsistence, but which do

not belong to you. For we say, that about every thing there are many things which have a subsistence, and many things which have no subsistence.

THEÆ. Very much so.

GUEST. In the first place, therefore, it is most necessary, that the latter sentence which I enunciated respecting you should be one of the shortest, according to the definition we have given of a sentence.

THEÆ. This must now be acknowledged by us.

GUEST. In the next place, it must be confessed that it is a sentence of something.

THEÆ. It must.

GUEST. But if it is not of you, it is not of any thing else.

THEÆ. For how should it?

GUEST. But if it is not of any thing, it cannot in any respect be a sentence. For we have shown that it belongs to things impossible, that discourse should exist, and yet be a discourse of nothing.

THEÆ. Most right.

GUEST. When, therefore, *other* things are asserted of you, as if they were the *same*, and things which *are not*, as things which *are*, such a composition of verbs and nouns becomes altogether, as it appears, a really and truly false discourse.

THEÆ. Most true.

GUEST. But what with respect to the dianoëtic energy, opinion, and phantasy, is it not now evident that all these genera, as well the false as the true, are produced in our souls?

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. You will easily understand, if you first of all apprehend what each of them is, and in what they differ from each other.

THEÆ. Only inform me.

GUEST. Are not, therefore, the dianoëtic energy and discourse the same, except that the former is an inward dialogue without voice, of soul with itself?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But the fluxion from the dianoëtic energy through the mouth, proceeding with sound, is called discourse.

THEÆ. True.

GUEST. We perceive this also in discourse.

THEÆ. What?

GUEST. Affirmation and negation.

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. When, therefore, this takes place in the soul according to the dianoëtic energy, accompanied with silence, can you call it any thing else than opinion?

THEÆ. How can I?

GUEST. But, when again, a certain passion of this kind is present, not according to the dianoëtic energy, but through sense, can it be rightly denominated any thing else than phantasy?

THEÆ. Nothing else.

GUEST. Since, then, discourse is both true and false, and it appears that the dianoëtic energy is a dialogue of the soul with itself, but opinion the conclusion of the dianoëtic energy, and phantasy the mixture of sense and opinion with each other, it is necessary, since these are allied to discourse, that some of them should be sometimes true, and sometimes false.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST. Do you perceive, therefore, that we have found more easily than we expected, that opinion and discourse are sometimes false? For just now we were afraid, lest by investigating this matter we should attempt a work which it is perfectly impossible to accomplish.

THEÆ. I do perceive.

GUEST. Let us not, therefore, despair as to what remains; but, since these things are rendered apparent, let us recall into our memory those divisions according to species which we mentioned before.

THEÆ. Of what kind were they?

GUEST. We divided image-making into two species; the one assimilative, and the other phantastic.

THEÆ. We did.

GUEST. And we said we were dubious in which of these we should place the sophist.

THEÆ. These things were said by us.

GUEST. And while we were doubting about this, we were oppressed with a still darker vertigo, in consequence of that assertion which is dubious to all men,

men, that there can be no such thing as either a resemblance, or an image, because that which is false has never in any respect any subsistence whatever.

THEÆ. You speak the truth.

GUEST. But now since discourse has become apparent, and likewise false opinion, it is possible there may be imitations of things, and that from this disposition the art of deceiving may be produced.

THEÆ. It is possible.

GUEST. And was it not also acknowledged by us above, that the sophist is conversant with these?

THEÆ. It was.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, again endeavour, by always bisecting the proposed genus, to proceed to the right hand part of the section, attending to its communion with the sophist, till, having taken away all his common properties, and leaving the nature peculiar to him, we may be able especially to exhibit this to ourselves, and afterwards to those who are naturally most proximate to the genus of this method.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. Did we not, therefore, begin dividing the effective art, and the art of acquiring?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. And the art of acquiring presented itself to us in hunting, contests, merchandize, and such-like species.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But now, since the imitative art comprehends the sophist, it is evident that the effective art must first receive a twofold division. For imitation is a certain making. We said, indeed, it was the making of images, and not of things themselves. Did we not?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. But, in the first place, let there be two parts of the effective art.

THEÆ. What are they?

GUEST. The one is divine, the other human.

THEÆ. I do not yet understand you.

GUEST. If we remember what was said at first we asserted that the whole of the effective art was a power causing things to exist afterwards which were not before.

THEÆ.

THEÆ. We do remember.

GUEST. But, with respect to all mortal animals, and plants which are produced in the earth from seeds and roots, together with such inanimate natures as subsist on the earth, whether they are bodies which can be liquefied, or not, can we say that they were afterwards generated, when before they were not, by any other than a certain fabricating God? Or shall we employ the dogma and assertion of many?

THEÆ. What is that?

GUEST. That nature generates these from a certain fortuitous cause, and which operates without thought. Or shall we say that they are produced in conjunction with reason and divine science, originating from Deity itself?

THEÆ. I, perhaps, through my age, often change my opinion. However, at present looking to you, and apprehending that you think these things were produced by Divinity, I think so too.

GUEST. It is well, Theætetus. And if we thought that in some future time you would be of a different opinion, we should now endeavour to make you acknowledge this by the force of reason, in conjunction with necessary persuasion; but since I know your nature to be such, that, without any arguments from us, you would of yourself arrive at that conclusion to which I have drawn you, I shall dismiss the attempt; for it would be superfluous. But I adopt this position, that things which are said to subsist from nature are produced by a divine art: but that the things which are composed from these by men, are produced by human art: and that, according to this position, there are two genera of the effective art, one of which is human, and the other divine.

THEÆ. Right.

GUEST. But, since there are two genera, bisect each of them.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. Just as the whole of the effective art was then divided according to breadth, so now let it be divided according to length.

THEÆ. Let it be so divided.

GUEST. And thus all its parts will become four; two of which indeed, with reference to us, will be human; and two again, with reference to the Gods, divine.

THEÆ. They will.

GUEST.

GUEST. But with respect to these, as being again divided in a different manner, one part of each division is effective, but the remaining parts may be nearly called representative. And hence, again, the effective art receives a twofold division.

THEÆ. Inform me again how each is to be divided.

GUEST. With respect to ourselves and other animals, and the things from which they naturally consist, viz. fire and water, and the sisters of these, we know that each of these productions is the offspring of Divinity. Do we not?

THEÆ. We do.

GUEST. After these the images of each, and not the things themselves, follow; and these are produced by a dæmoniacal artifice.

THEÆ. What kind of images are these?

GUEST. Phantasms which occur in sleep, and such as appearing in the day are called spontaneous; as, for instance, shadow, when darkness is generated in fire: but this is twofold, when domestic and foreign light concurring in one about splendid<sup>1</sup> and smooth bodies, and producing a sensation of seeing contrary to accustomed vision, effect by these means a species.

THEÆ. These works, therefore, of divine making are two, viz. the things themselves, and the image which follows each.

GUEST. But what? Shall we not say that our art, by architecture, makes a house, but by painting, that other thing, the image of the house, which is, as it were, a human dream effected by men awake?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. Hence, by giving a twofold division after this manner to other things, we shall again find twofold works of our effective action, and we must call the one *auturgic*, or the thing itself effected, but the image, representative.

THEÆ. I now understand you better, and I admit these two species of the effective art, with a twofold division, viz. the divine and human according to one section; and the thing itself effected, and the offspring of certain imitations, according to the other.

GUEST. Let us, therefore, recollect, that of the image-producing art we

<sup>1</sup> See the latter part of the Introduction to the Timæus.

said, one kind would be affimilative, and the other phantastic, if it should appear that the false is truly false, and one certain thing belonging to beings.

THEÆ. We did say so.

GUEST. Is it not, therefore, apparent, that we have now indubitably enumerated two species?

THEÆ. Yes.

GUEST. We must, therefore, again give a twofold distribution to the phantastic species.

THEÆ. How?

GUEST. One kind being that which is effected through instruments, but the other being the phantasm of that which exhibits itself as the instrument of the efficient.

THEÆ. How do you say?

GUEST. I think, when any one employing your figure causes body to appear similar to body, or voice to voice, this is particularly called an imitation belonging to the phantastic species.

THEÆ. It is.

GUEST. Calling this then imitative, we will divide it; but we will dismiss the whole of the other member, as being now weary, and we will permit some other person to collect it into one, and give it a proper denomination.

THEÆ. Let the member then you speak of be divided, and let us dismiss the other.

GUEST. And indeed, Theætetus, it is fit to think that this also is twofold; but take notice on what account.

THEÆ. Say.

GUEST. Of those who imitate, some knowing that which they imitate do this, but others not knowing it. Though, can we place any division greater than that of ignorance and knowledge?

THEÆ. We cannot.

GUEST. Will not, therefore, that which we just now spoke of be an imitation of those that are endued with knowledge? For this man, knowing you, imitates your figure.

THEÆ. Undoubtedly.

GUEST.

GUEST. But what shall we say respecting the figure of justice, and, in short, of the whole of virtue? Do not many, though they are ignorant, think that they know this, and, while they imitate that which seems to them to be the figure of justice, endeavour, both in words and works, to make it appear that it is inherent in them?

THEÆ. Very many, indeed.

GUEST. Are they not, therefore, disappointed in their expectations of appearing to be just, as they are not so in any respect? Or does the very contrary to this take place?

THEÆ. The very contrary takes place.

GUEST. I think then we must say that this imitator is different from the other, he who is ignorant from him who knows.

THEÆ. We must.

GUEST. Whence, then, can any one derive a name adapted to each? Or is it evident that it is difficult? Because a certain antient cause of the division of genera into species was unknown to our ancestors, so that none of them attempted to divide; and on this account they were necessarily very much in want of names. But at the same time, though it may be a bolder assertion, for the sake of distinction, we shall call the imitation which subsists with opinion *doxomimetic*; but that which subsists in conjunction with science, a certain historic imitation.

THEÆ. Be it so.

GUEST. The other of these appellations, therefore, must be used: for a sophist was not found to be among the scientific, but among imitators.

THEÆ. And very much so.

GUEST. Let us then consider this *doxastic imitator*, or one who imitates from opinion, as if he were iron, and see whether he is found, or whether he contains in himself something twofold.

THEÆ. Let us consider.

GUEST. He is, therefore, very copious. For, of sophists, one is foolish, thinking that he knows the things which he opines: but the figure of another, through his rolling like a cylinder in discourse, is replete with abundance of suspicion and fear, that he is ignorant of those things which he feigns himself to know before others.

THEÆ. There are both these kinds of sophists, as you have said.

GUEST. May we not, therefore, place one of these as a simple, and the other as an ironical imitator?

THEÆ. It is proper so to do.

GUEST. And again, shall we say that the genus of this is one or two?

THEÆ. Do you see whether it is or not.

GUEST. I consider; and two imitators appear to me: one employing irony among the multitude publicly, and in prolix discourses; and the other compelling the person who converses with him to contradict himself, and this privately, and by short discourses.

THEÆ. You speak most rightly.

GUEST. What then did we evince the imitator to be who employs prolix discourses? Did we evince him to be a politician, or a popular speaker?

THEÆ. A popular speaker.

GUEST. But what did we call the other,—a wise man, or sophistic?

THEÆ. To call him a wise man is impossible, since we have placed him as one who is ignorant; but as he is an imitator of a wise man, he must evidently receive a similar appellation. And I now nearly understand that this character ought truly to be called one who is in every respect a real sophist.

GUEST. Shall we not, therefore, bind together his name, as we did before, connecting every thing from the end to the beginning?

THEÆ. Entirely so.

GUEST. He, therefore, who compels those that converse with him to contradict themselves, who is a part of the ironic genus, and a doxastic imitator, who likewise belongs to the phantastic genus, which proceeds from the representative art, who is to be defined to be not a divine but a human production, and who by the artifice of his discourses belongs to the wonder-working division; he who says that a real sophist is of this stock and consanguinity will, as it appears, speak most truly.

THEÆ. Entirely so.

THE END OF THE SOPHISTA.

THE

THE PHÆDRUS,

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE BEAUTIFUL.



# INTRODUCTION

TO

## THE PHÆDRUS.

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SOME, says Hermeas<sup>†</sup>, have endeavoured to show that this dialogue is concerning rhetoric, looking only to its beginning and end; others, that it is about the soul, since here especially Socrates demonstrates its immortality; and others, that it is about love, since the beginning and occasion of the dialogue originate from this. For Lyfias had written an oration in order to prove that it is not proper to gratify a lover, but one who is not a lover; he being vehemently in love with Phædrus, but pretending that he was not. Wishing, therefore, to withdraw him from other lovers, he viciously composed an oration, the design of which was to show that it is requisite rather to gratify one who is not a lover, than one who is; which gave occasion to Socrates to discourse concerning this intemperate love, together with temperate, divine, and enthusiastic love, because it is a love of this latter kind which should be embraced and followed. Others again assert that the dialogue is theological, on account of what is said in the middle of it. But, according to others, its subject is *the good*, because Socrates says that the supercelestial place has never been celebrated according to its desert, and that an uncoloured and unfigured essence there subsists. And, lastly, others assert that it is concerning the beautiful itself. All these, therefore, form their opinion of the whole scope of the dialogue from a certain part of it. For it is evident that the discourse concerning the soul is assumed for the sake of something else, and also that concerning the first beauty: for Socrates ascends from other beautiful things to this, and to the

<sup>†</sup> In Scholiis MSS. in Phædrum.

supercelestial place. It is also evident that the discourses about love are to be referred to the lover. It must not, therefore, be said that there are many scopes; for it is necessary that all of them should be extended to one thing, that the discourse may be as it were one animal. In short, Sócrates speaks concerning all-various beauty. Hence he begins from the apparent beauty in the form of Phædrus, with which Lyfias was enamoured, in consequence of falling off from the character of a true lover. But afterwards he proceeds to the beauty in discourses, of which Phædrus is represented as a lover. From this he ascends to the beauty in soul, viz. to the virtues and sciences; and thence, in his recantation, to the mundane Gods. After which he ascends to the intelligible fountain itself of beauty, to the God of love, and to the beautiful itself; whence he again descends through the divisive art to the beauty in soul, and in the virtues and sciences; and afterwards again to the beauty in discourses, thus conjoining the end with the beginning. In short, the whole intention of the dialogue may be divided into three parts, corresponding to three lives:—into the intemperate love, which is seen in the oration of Lyfias; into the temperate, which is seen in the first discourse of Socrates; and, in the third place, into the divinely inspired, which is seen in the recantation, and in the last discourse of Socrates. It may also be said that the lovers, the loves, and the objects of love, are analogous to these lives. Hence they do not much deviate from the design of the dialogue who assert that it is concerning love, since love is seen in a relation to the object of love: and it is necessary indeed not to be ignorant of kindred differences, since Plato himself does not deliver casual distinctions of love, and the object of love. However, it is evident that the leading scope of the dialogue is not concerning love; for neither does it discuss its essence, nor its power, but discourses concerning its energies in the world, and in souls. But if Plato any where makes love the leading scope of a dialogue, he discourses concerning its essence, power, and energy. Hence in *The Banquet*, where love is the leading object, he delivers its middle nature, and its order, calling it a mighty dæmon, as binding secondary to primary natures. But here, a discourse concerning the beautiful takes the lead, to which all things are elevated by love.

And here it is necessary to observe, that the first subsistence of *the beautiful*, the primary object of this dialogue, is in intelligible intellect, the extremity

of the intelligible triad, where it subsists as an intelligible idea. It is this beauty which, according to Orpheus, when it arose, astonished the intellectual Gods, and produced in them an admiration of their father Phanes: for thus the theologist sings concerning it;

Θαυμάζον καθορώντες εν αιθερι φεγγος αελπτου,  
Τῷ μεν απεστιλβε χρους αθανατοιο Φανητος.

i. e. “they wondered on beholding in æther an unexpected light, with which the body of the immortal Phanes glittered.” This beauty too, as we have observed in a note on the Parmenides, is a vital intellectual form, the source of symmetry <sup>1</sup> to all things,

With respect to the persons of the dialogue, they are Lyfias, or rather the oration of Lyfias, Phædrus, and Socrates; Lyfias and Phædrus being, as we have said, lovers of each other, but Socrates being the curator of youth, and the providential inspector of Phædrus, elevating him from the apparent and external beauty in words, to the beauty in soul and intellect. As some however have accused <sup>2</sup> the dialogue as inflated in its diction, on account of what is said in the recantation, it is necessary to observe, that Socrates employs words adapted to the things themselves. For, as he discourses about objects unapparent, and unknown to the many, he accordingly uses an elevated diction, and such as accords with an intelligible and divine essence.

Indeed, if human nature in this its degraded condition is capable of receiving the inspirations of divinity, and if a part of the present dialogue was composed under such an influence, an accusation of this kind is certainly its greatest commendation.

Hence it is justly observed by Proclus <sup>3</sup>, “that Plato in this dialogue being inspired by the Nymphs, and exchanging human intelligence for fury, which is a thing far more excellent, delivers many arcane dogmas concerning the

<sup>1</sup> Symmetry, according to the most accurate and philosophical definition of it, is the dominion of that which is naturally *more* over that which is naturally *less* excellent. Hence symmetry then subsists in body, when *form* vanquishes *matter*. Had Mr. Burke known and understood the above definition of beauty, he would not have given to the world such a crudity as his treatise On the Sublime and Beautiful.

<sup>2</sup> Dicæarchus, according to Cicero vi. 2. ad Atticum, is said to have reprehended this dialogue as too vehement, because it breathes of the dithyrambic character.

<sup>3</sup> In Plat. Theol. lib. i. p. 8.

intellectual Gods, and many concerning the liberated rulers of the universe, who elevate the multitude of mundane Gods to the intelligible monads, separate from the wholes which this universe contains. And still more does he deliver about the mundane Gods themselves, celebrating their intellections and fabrications about the world, their unpolluted providence, their government about souls, and other particulars which Socrates discloses in this dialogue according to a deific energy."

I only add, that though there are frequent allusions in this dialogue to that unnatural vice which was so fashionable among the Greeks, yet the reader will find it severely censured in the course of the dialogue by our divine philosopher. There can be no reason to fear, therefore, that the ears of the modest will be shocked by such allusions, since they are inserted with no other view than that they may be exploded as they deserve. But if, notwithstanding this, any one shall persist in reprobating certain parts of the dialogue as indecent, it may be fairly concluded, that such a one possesses the affectation of modesty without the reality; and that he is probably a bigot to some despicable and whining sect of religion, in which cant and grimace are the substitutes for genuine piety and worth.

# THE PHÆDRUS.

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PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND PHÆDRUS.

SCENE.—THE BANKS OF THE ILISSUS.

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SOCRATES.

WHITHER are you going, my dear Phædrus, and from whence came you?

PHÆDR. From Lyfias, the fon of Cephalus, Socrates; but I am going, for the fake of walking, beyond the walls of the city. For I have been fitting with him a long time, indeed from very early in the morning till now. But being perfuaded by Acumenus<sup>1</sup>, who is your affociate as well as mine, to take some exercife, I determined upon that of walking. For he faid that this kind of exercife was not fo laborious, and at the fame time was more healthful, than that of the courfe.

Soc. He fpeaks well, my friend, on this fubject: and fo Lyfias then, as it feems, was in the city.

PHÆDR. He was. For he dwells with Epicrates in this houfe of Morychus, which is next to that of Olympius.

Soc. But what was his employment there? Or did not Lyfias treat you with a banquet of orations?

PHÆDR. You fhall hear, if you have but leifure to walk along with me, and attend.

<sup>1</sup> This Acumenus the phyfician is alfo mentioned by Plato in the Protagoras, and by Xenophon in the third book of the Sayings and Deeds of Socrates.

Soc. But what, do you not think that I, according to Pindar, would consider as a thing superior to business, the relation of your conversation with Lyfias?

PHÆDR. Go on then.

Soc. Begin the relation then.

PHÆDR. And indeed, Socrates, the hearing of this is proper for you<sup>1</sup>. For I do not know how it happened so, but our discourse was amatory. For Lyfias, through the persuasion of some beautiful person, though not one of his lovers, had composed an oration on love, and this in a very elegant manner: in the course of which he asserts that one who does not love ought to be gratified rather than a lover.

Soc. Generous man! I wish he had likewise asserted that this should be the case with the poor rather than the rich, the old than the young, and so in all the rest, that thus I myself, and many more of us, might be gratified<sup>2</sup>: for then his discourse would have been both polite and publicly useful. I am therefore so desirous<sup>3</sup> of hearing his oration, that if you should even walk as far as to Megara, and, like Herodicus<sup>4</sup>, when you had reached the walls, immediately turn back again, I should not leave you.

PHÆDR. What do you say, most excellent Socrates? Do you think me so much of an idiot as to suppose myself capable of relating, in such a manner as it deserves, a discourse which Lyfias, the most skilful writer of the present age, was a long time in composing at his leisure? I am certainly very far from entertaining such a supposition: though I would rather be able to do this than be the possessor of a great quantity of gold.

Soc. O Phædrus, if I do not know Phædrus, I am likewise forgetful of myself; but neither of these happens to be the case. For I well know that

<sup>1</sup> Socrates acknowledges that he knew the three following things, viz. *the amatory art*, as in the Banquet he says concerning Diotima, "she taught me amatory affairs;" *the maieutic art*, as in the Theætetus he says, "divinity has ordered me to exercise obstetrication;" and *the dialectic art*, as in the Cratylus, "for I know nothing, says he, except to give and take words."

<sup>2</sup> It is scarcely necessary to observe that Socrates says this ironically.

<sup>3</sup> Socrates desires to hear, because he vehemently wishes, from his amatory disposition, to energize divinely, and to save the youth.

<sup>4</sup> This Herodicus, as we are informed by Hermeas, was a physician, who made gymnastic exercises beyond the walls, beginning from a certain commensurate interval at no great distance, as far as to the wall, and turning back again; and doing this often, he performed his exercises.

he has not only heard the discourse of Lysias once <sup>1</sup>, but that he has desired him to repeat it often: and that Lysias willingly complied with his request. But neither was this sufficient for Phædrus; but having at length obtained the book, he considered that which he most desired to see. And sitting down to peruse it very early in the morning, he continued his employment, till being fatigued, he went out for a walk; and, by the dog, as it appears to me committed it to memory, unless perhaps it was too long for this purpose. But he directed his course beyond the walls, that he might meditate on this oration. Meeting, however, with one who was madly fond of discourse, he rejoiced on beholding him, because he should have a partner in his corybantic fury; and desired him to walk on. But when that lover of discourse requested him to repeat the oration, he feigned as if he was unwilling to comply; but though he was unwilling that any one should hear him voluntarily, he was at length compelled to the relation. I therefore entreat, Phædrus, that you will quickly accomplish all I desire.

PHÆDR. Well then, I will endeavour to satisfy you in the best manner I am able; for I see you will not dismiss me till I have exerted my utmost abilities to please you.

SOC. You perfectly apprehend the truth respecting me.

PHÆDR. I will therefore gratify you; but, in reality, Socrates, I have not learned by heart the words of this oration, though I nearly retain the sense of all the arguments by which he shows the difference between a lover and one who does not love; and these I will summarily relate to you in order, beginning from the first.

SOC. But show me first, my friend, what you have got there in your left <sup>2</sup> hand,

<sup>1</sup> Not to hear once, but often, says Hermeas, manifests the unwearied labour of men about apparent beauty. The book here signifies that sensible beauties are images of images, as the letters in it are primarily indicative of the soul, but secondarily of the reasons proceeding from the soul. A dog is dedicated to Hermes, and is the last vestige of the Mercurial series. As the present hypothesis, therefore, is about the oration of Lysias, and Hermes is the inspective guardian of discourse, Socrates very properly swears by the dog. It may also be said that he thus swears as reverencing the extremity of this order, and through it calling the inspective Hermes himself as a witness.

<sup>2</sup> The left hand here manifests that a rhetoric of this kind is extended to the worse, or in other words, the passive part of the soul; and that it does not pertain to the pure power and summit

hand, under your cloak : for I suspect that you have got the oration itself. And if this be the case, think thus with yourself respecting me, that I perfectly esteem you ; but that, when Lysias is present, it is by no means my intention to listen to you. And therefore show it me.

PHÆDR. You ought to desist : for you have destroyed those hopes, Socrates, which I entertained respecting you ; the hopes I mean of contesting with you. But where are you willing we should sit, while we read ?

SOC. Let us, turning hither, direct our steps towards the river Iliffus : and afterwards, when you shall think proper to rest, we will sit down.

PHÆDR. And this will be very seasonable, as it appears, for I am at present without shoes<sup>1</sup> ; but this is always the case with you. It will be easy, therefore, for us to walk by the side of the brook, moistening our feet ; nor will it be unpleasant, especially at this season of the year, and this time of the day.

SOC. Go on then, and at the same time look out for a place where we may sit down.

PHÆDR. Do you see that most lofty plane tree ?

SOC. Why, what then ?

PHÆDR. For there, there is a cool shade, moderate breezes of wind, and soft grass, upon which we may either sit, or, if you are so disposed, lie down.

SOC. Let us go then.

PHÆDR. But inform me, Socrates, whether this is not the place in which Boreas is reported to have ravished Orithya from Iliffus.

of the rational soul, viz. to intellect, but rather to the doxastic and phantastic part. But the book being concealed under the garment of Phædrus, signifies that such rhetoric is involved in darkness, and is fallen from the light of science: for it is conversant with doxastic and material concerns, and with human trifles.

<sup>1</sup> The being without shoes here signifies promptitude, the unsuperfluous, and an aptitude to the anagogic, which indeed were always present with Socrates, but with Phædrus at that time, because he was about to be perfected by Socrates. The summer also, and mid-day, are adapted to re-elevation, conformably to that saying of Heraclitus, that the soul that has a dry splendour is the wisest. The dipping the feet in the brook signifies the touching on generation with the last and most abject powers of the soul; for these are indicated by the feet: the rational soul at the same time supernally contemplating generation. The breezes of wind also manifest the providential inspiration of the Gods: but the shade signifies an intelligible, unapparent, and elevating power; remote from that which is sensible and which agitates; for this latter is indicated by the light.

SOC.

Soc. It is reported so indeed.

PHÆDR. Was it not just here then? for the brooks hereabouts appear to be grateful to the view, pure and transparent, and very well adapted to the sports of virgins.

Soc. It was not, but two or three stadia lower down, where we meet with the temple of Diana <sup>1</sup>, and in that very place there is a certain altar sacred to Boreas <sup>2</sup>.

PHÆDR.

<sup>1</sup> The Athenians, says Hermeas, established a temple of Rural Diana, because this Goddess is the inspective guardian of every thing rural, and represses every thing rustic and uncultivated. But the altars and temples of the Gods, signify their allotments; as you may also call the altar and temple of the sun, and of the soul of the sun, this mundane body, or apparent solar orb. So that in this place the allotments and illuminations of the Gods themselves in temples will be the intelligible theory, and which investigates universal through particulars, and *being* through that which *appears to subsist*. But the temple of this theory will be intellect.

<sup>2</sup> A twofold solution, says Hermeas, may be given of this fable; one from history, more ethical, but the other transferring us to wholes. And the former of these is as follows: Orithya was the daughter of Erectheus, and the priestess of Boreas; for each of the winds has a presiding deity, which the telestic art, or the art pertaining to sacred mysteries, religiously cultivates. To this Orithya then, the God was so very propitious, that he sent the north wind for the safety of the country; and besides this, he is said to have assisted the Athenians in their naval battles. Orithya, therefore, becoming enthusiastic, being possessed by her proper God Boreas, and no longer energizing as man (for animals cease to energize according to their own idioms when possessed by superior causes), died under the inspiring influence, and thus was said to have been ravished by Boreas. And this is the more ethical explanation of the fable.

But the second which transfers the narration to wholes is as follows, and does not entirely subvert the former: for divine fables often employ transactions and histories in subserviency to the discipline of wholes. They say then, that Erectheus is the God that rules over the three elements, air, water, and earth. Sometimes, however, he is considered as alone the ruler of the earth, and sometimes as the presiding deity of Attica alone. Of this deity Orithya is the daughter; and she is the prolific power of the earth, which is, indeed, coextended with the word *Erectheus*, as the unfolding of the name signifies: for it is *the prolific power of the earth flourishing and restored according to the seasons*. But Boreas is the providence of the Gods supernally illuminating secondary natures: for they signify the providence of the Gods in the world by Boreas; because this Divinity blows from lofty places. But the anagogic power of the Gods is signified by the south wind, because this wind blows from low to lofty places; and besides this, things situated towards the south are more divine. The providence of the Gods, therefore, causes the prolific power of the earth, or of the Attic land, to *ascend*, and proceed into the apparent.

Orithya also, says Hermeas, may be said to be a soul\* aspiring after things above, from *ορως*

\* This is according to the psychical mode of interpreting fables. See the General Introduction, vol. 1, of this work.

and.

PHÆDR. I did not perfectly know this. But tell me, by Jupiter, Socrates, are you persuaded that this fabulous narration <sup>†</sup> is true?

Soc. If I should not believe in it, as is the case with the wife, I should not be absurd: and afterwards, speaking sophistically, I should say that the wind Boreas hurled from the neighbouring rocks Orithya, sporting with Pharmacia; and that she dying in consequence of this, was said to have been ravished by Boreas, or from the hill of Mars. There is also another report that she was not ravished from this place, but from that. But for my own part, Phædrus, I consider interpretations of this kind as pleasant enough, but at the same time, as the province of a man vehemently curious and laborious, and not entirely happy; and this for no other reason, than because after such an explanation, it is necessary for him to correct the shape of the Centaurs and Chimæra. And, besides this, a crowd of Gorgons and Pegafuses will pour upon him for an exposition of this kind, and of certain other prodigious.

and *θσιω*, according to the Attic custom of adding a letter at the end of a word, which letter is here an *ω*. Such a soul, therefore, is ravished by Boreas supernally blowing. But if Orithya was hurled from a precipice, this also is appropriate: for such a soul dies a philosophic, not receiving a physical death, and abandons a *proairetic* \*, at the same time that she lives a physical life. And philosophy, according to Socrates in the Phædo, is nothing else than a meditation of death. Let then Orithya be the soul of Phædrus, but Boreas Socrates ravishing and leading it to a *proairetic* death.

<sup>†</sup> According to some, Socrates in what he now says, does not admit the explanations of fables. It is evident, however, that he frequently does admit and employ fables. But he now blames those explanations which make fables to be nothing more than certain histories, and unfold them into material causes, airs, and earth, and winds, which do not revert to true beings, nor harmonize with divine concerns. Hence Socrates now says, If unfolding this fable I should recur to physical causes, and should assert that the wind Boreas, blowing vehemently, hurled Orithya as she was playing from the rock, and thus dying she was said to have been ravished by Boreas,—should I not speak absurdly? For this explanation which is adopted by the *wife*, viz. by those who are employed in physical speculations, is meagre and conjectural; since it does not recur to true beings, but to natures, and winds, and airs, and vortices, as he also says in the Phædo. He rejects, therefore, these naturalists, and those who thus explain the fable, as falling into the indefinite and infinite, and not recurring to soul, intellect, and the Gods. But when Socrates says that he considers such interpretations as the province of a man *very curious* and *laborious*, and *not entirely happy*, these words indicate the being conversant with things sensible and material. And the Centaurs, Chimæras, Gorgons, and Pegafuses are powers which preside over a material nature, and the region about the earth. But for an account of divine fables, and specimens of the mode in which they ought to be explained, see the Introduction to the second book of the Republic.

\* That is a life pertaining to her own will; for the soul in this case gives herself up to the will of divinity.  
natures,

natures, immense both in multitude and novelty. All which, if any one, not believing in their literal meaning, should draw to a probable sense, employing for this purpose a certain rustic wisdom, he will stand in need of most abundant leisure. With respect to myself indeed, I have not leisure for such an undertaking; and this because I am not yet able, according to the Delphic precept, to know <sup>1</sup> myself. But it appears to me to be ridiculous, while I am yet ignorant of this, to speculate things foreign from the knowledge of myself. Hence, bidding farewell to these, and being persuaded in the opinion which I have just now mentioned respecting them, I do not contemplate these, but myself, considering whether I am not a wild beast <sup>2</sup>, possessing more folds than Typhon, and far more raging and fierce; or whether I am a more mild and simple animal, naturally participating of a certain divine and modest condition. But are we not, my friend, in the midst of our discourse arrived at our destined feat? and is not yonder the oak to which you was to lead us?

PHÆDR. That indeed is it.

Soc. By Juno <sup>3</sup>, a beautiful retreat. For the plane-tree very widely spreads its shady branches, and is remarkably tall; and the height and opacity  
of

<sup>1</sup> If any man ever knew himself, this was certainly the case with Socrates. In what he now says, therefore, his meaning may be, either that he does not yet know himself as pure soul itself, but that as being in body he knows himself; or that he does not yet know himself, as he is known by divinity.

<sup>2</sup> For it is evident that he who knows himself knows all things: for, in consequence of the soul being *παιμορφον αγαλμα* an omniform image, he beholds all things in himself. By Typhon here we must understand that power which presides over the confused and disordered in the universe, or in other words the last procession of things. The term *manifold*, therefore, in this place must not be applied to the God Typhon, but to that over which he presides, as being in its own nature moved in a confused, disordered, and manifold manner. For it is usual with fables to refer the properties of the objects of providential care to the providing powers themselves.

<sup>3</sup> Socrates mentions Juno, says Hermeas, as generating and adorning the beauty of the mundane fabrication; and hence she is said to have received the Cestus from Venus. Employing, therefore, true praise, he first celebrates the place from the three elements air, water, and earth; and afterwards he triply divides the vegetable productions of the earth into first, middle, and last. For this is evident from what he says of the plane tree, the willow, and the grass. He shows, too, that all the senses were delighted except the taste. But Achelous is the deity who presides over the much-honoured power of water: for, by this mighty river, the God who is the  
inspective

of the willow, are perfectly beautiful, being now in the vigour of its vegetation, and, on this account, filling all the place with the most agreeable odour. Add too, that a most pleasant fountain of extreme cool water flows under the plane-tree, as may be inferred from its effect on our feet, and which appears to be sacred to certain nymphs, and to Achelous, from the virgins and statues with which it is adorned. Then again, if you are so disposed, take notice how lovely and very agreeable the air of the place is, and what a summer-like and sonorous singing resounds from the choir of grasshoppers. But the most elegant prospect of all is that of the grass, which in a manner so extremely beautiful, naturally adapts itself to receive on the gradual steep the reclining head. So that, my dear Phædrus, you have led me hither as a guest in the most excellent manner.

PHÆDR. But you, O wonderful man, appear to act most absurdly; for by your discourse one might judge you to be some stranger and not a native of the place. And, indeed, one might conclude that you had never passed beyond the bounds of the city, nor ever deserted its walls.

Soc. Pardon me, most excellent Phædrus, for I am a lover of learning: and, hence I consider that fields <sup>†</sup> and trees are not willing to teach me any thing; but that this can be effected by men residing in the city. You indeed appear to me to have discovered an enchantment capable of causing my departure from hence. For as they lead famished animals whither they please, by extending to them leaves or certain fruits; so you, by extending to me the discourses contained in books, may lead me about through all Attica, and indeed wherever you please. But now, for the present, since

we

inspective guardian of potable water is manifested. Nymphs are goddesses who preside over regeneration, and are ministrant to Bacchus the offspring of Semele. Hence they dwell near water, that is, they ascend into generation. But this Bacchus supplies the regeneration of the whole sensible world. *Αχελως δε εστι ο εφορος θεος της πολυτιμου δυναμεως υδατος· δια γαρ του μεγιστου τουτου ποταμου τον εφορον θεον δηλουσι του ποτιμου υδατος· νυμφαι δε εισιν εφοροι θεαι της παλιγγενεσιαις υπουργοι του εκ Σεμελης Διονυσου. Διο και παρα τω υδατι εισι, τουτεστι τη γενεσει επιβεβηκασιν· ουτος δε ο Διονυσος της παλιγγενεσιαις υπαρχει παντος του αισθητου.*

<sup>†</sup> This manifests, as it is beautifully observed by Hermeas, that Socrates always adhered to his proper principles and causes, and his own intelligible and proper divinities. For the true country of souls is the intelligible world. His discipline, therefore, was not derived from things sensible and resisting, but from rational and intellectual souls, and from intellect itself. The country is indeed

we are arrived hither, I for my part am disposed to lie down; but do you, assuming whatever position you think most convenient, begin to read.

PHÆDR. Hear then.—“ You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and you have heard, I think, that it is most conducive to my advantage for them to subsist in this manner. But it appears to me that I am not unworthy to be deprived of what I wish to obtain, because I am not one of your lovers: for lovers, when their desires cease, repent themselves of the benefits which they have bestowed; but there is no time in which it is proper for those void of love to repent their beneficence; since they do not consult from necessity, but voluntarily, and in the best manner about their own affairs, and do good as far as their circumstances will admit. Besides, lovers sometimes reflect how negligently they have attended, through love, to their own concerns, what benefits they have bestowed, to their own loss, and what labours they have undergone; and therefore think they have conferred favours worthy the objects of their love. But those void of love, neither blame themselves for neglecting their affairs, nor complain of past labours, or disagreement with their familiars, as produced by some beloved object. So that such mighty evils being removed, nothing else remains for them than to perform with willingness and alacrity whatever they think will be acceptable to the objects of their beneficent exertions. Besides, if it is said that lovers make much of the party beloved, because they love in the most eminent degree, and are always prepared, both in words and actions, to comply with the desires of their beloved, though they should offend others by so doing; it is easy to know that this is not the truth, because lovers far more esteem the posterior than the prior objects of their love; and if the more re-

indeed so far pleasant only to an intellectual man, as it is favourable to solitude, and this because solitude is favourable to contemplation; but to be delighted with trees, and meadows, and streams, merely for their own sakes, is the province of such as are capable of no other energies than those of sense and imagination. Socrates, in following Phædrus, likewise manifests his providential energy about youth, and his wish to save them. But his hearing in a reclined position, signifies his energizing about things of a more abject nature, such as were the opinions of Lysias about beauty. For it is necessary, as Hermeas well observes, to accommodate the figures also to the hypotheses. Hence, in his recantation, Socrates very properly uncovers his head, because he there discourses on divine love. As, therefore, now intending to energize about more abject beauty, he hears reclining; assimilating the apparent figure to the discourse. Thus also in the Phædo, he sat in an *upright* posture on the bed when he was about to speak concerning the philosopher.

cently beloved party thinks fit, they are even willing to treat injuriously the former subjects of their regard. But to what else is it proper to ascribe such a conduct, except that calamity, love; a conduct which he who had never experienced this passion would never suppose possible to exist. And besides this, lovers themselves confess that they are rather diseased than prudent, and that they know their ill condition with respect to prudence, but are unable to subdue it. But how can such as are properly prudent approve the desires of such as are thus diseased? Besides, if you should wish to choose among lovers the best associate, your choice must be confined to a few; but if you desire to find among others one most accommodated to yourself, you may choose out of many. And there are much more hopes of finding one worthy of your friendship among a many than a few. If, therefore, you reverence the established law, and are afraid lest the infamy of offenders should be your portion, it is proper to remember that lovers, who consider themselves as loved with a mutual regard, are accustomed to boast that they have not bestowed their labour in vain; but that such as are not infected with love, being better than these, content themselves with enjoying that which is best rather than the opinion of men. But still further, when the multitude perceive lovers following the objects of their affection, and bestowing all possible assiduity in this employment, they are necessarily persuaded that when they perceive them discoursing with each other, the desire of coition has either then taken place, or is about to do so: but they do not attempt to reproach the familiarity of such as are without love, as they know it is necessary that they must either discourse through friendship, or some other pleasure unconnected with coition. And, indeed, if in consequence of this doctrine you are afraid that it will be difficult for friendship to remain, and that disagreements, by some means or other arising, will become a common destruction to both; at the same time premising that you shall thus suffer a great injury in most of your transactions; if this is the case, you ought with much greater reason to be afraid of lovers. For there are many things afflictive to these, and they consider every thing as happening to their disadvantage. Hence, they prohibit the objects of their regard from associating with other lovers, dreading lest the wealthy should surpass them in wealth, and the learned in knowledge; and, as far as they are able, preserve them from the company of those who possess any thing good. And thus, by  
persuading

persuading them to abstain from such as these, they cause them to abandon their friends. If, therefore, you consider your own advantage, you will be wiser than these, and will entirely disagree with them in opinion. But such as are not your lovers, but who act in a becoming manner through virtue; will not envy your association with others, but will rather hate those who are unwilling to be your familiars; thinking that you are despised by such as these, but that you are benefited by your associates. So that there is much more reason to hope that friendship will be produced by this means, than that enmity will arise from such a connection. Add to this, that the most part of lovers desire the possession of the body before they know the manners, or have made trial of any thing else belonging to the beloved object: so that it is uncertain whether they will still wish to be friends to them, when the desire produced by love is no more. But it is probable that such as are without love, since from the commencement of their friendship they acted without regarding venereal delight,—it is probable that they will act with less ardour, but that they will leave their actions as monuments of their conduct in futurity. Besides, it will be more advantageous to you to be persuaded by me than by a lover. For lovers will praise both your sayings and actions beyond all measure; some through fear, lest they should offend you; but others, in consequence of being depraved in their judgment, through desire. For love will point you out to be such. It likewise compels the unfortunate to consider as calamitous things which cause no molestation to others, and obliges the fortunate to celebrate as pleasant, things which are not deserving of delight: so that it is much more proper to commiserate than emulate lovers. But if you will be persuaded by me, in the first place I will associate with you, without caring for present pleasure, but for the sake of future advantage; not vanquished by love, but subduing myself; nor for mere trifles exciting severe enmity, but indulging a very little anger, and this but slowly even for great offences: pardoning, indeed, involuntary faults, and endeavouring to turn you from the commission of such as are voluntary. For these are the marks of a friendship likely to endure for a very extended period of time. However, if it should appear to you that friendship cannot be firm unless it is united with the lover, you should consider that, according to this, we ought not to be very fond of our children or parents, nor reckon those friends faithful, who became such, not from desire, but from studies of a

different kind. But further still, if it is requisite to gratify in the most eminent degree those who are in want, it is proper to benefit, not the best of men, but the most needy : for, being liberated from the greatest evils, they will render them the most abundant thanks. And besides this, in the exertions of your own private benevolence, it is not proper to call your friends, but mendicants and those who stand in need of alimentary supplies. For these will delight in you, and follow you ; will stand before your doors, and testify the most abundant satisfaction ; render you the greatest thanks, and pray for your prosperity. But, perhaps, it is proper not to be pleased with those who are vehemently needy, but rather with those who are able to repay you with thanks, nor with lovers only but with those deserving your attention. Nor again, with those who enjoy the beauty of your youth, but with such as may participate your kindness when you are old. Nor with those who, when their desire is accomplished, are ambitious of obtaining others, but with those who through modesty are silent towards all men. Nor with those who officiously attend upon you for a short time, but with those who are similarly your friends through the whole of life. Nor, lastly, with those who, when desire is extinguished, seek after occasions of enmity ; but with those who, when the flower of your beauty is decayed, will then exhibit their virtue and regard. Do you, therefore, remember what I have said, and consider that friends admonish lovers, that they are engaged in a base pursuit ; but that those void of love are never blamed by any of their familiars, as improperly consulting about themselves, through a privation of love. Perhaps you will ask me whether I persuade you to gratify all who are not lovers. But I think that even a lover would not exhort you to be equally affected towards all your lovers : for neither would this deserve equal thanks from the receiver ; nor would you, who are desirous to conceal yourself from others, be able to accomplish this with equal facility towards all. It is, however, necessary that you should receive no injury from your lover ; but that some advantage should accrue to both. To me it appears, therefore, that I have said sufficient ; but if you think any thing should be added, inform me what it is."

How does this discourse appear to you, Socrates ? Is not the oration composed in a transcendent manner, both as to the sentiments and the structure of the words ?

Soc.

Soc. Divinely indeed, my friend, so as that I am astonished. And in the same transcendent manner am I affected towards you, Phædrus, while I behold you, because you appeared to me in the course of reading the oration to be transported with delight. As I considered, therefore, that you was more skilful in such affairs than myself, I followed you; and, in following, was agitated together with you, O divine head! with bacchic fury.

PHÆDR. Are you disposed to jest in this manner?

Soc. Do I appear then to you to jest, and not to speak seriously?

PHÆDR. You by no means appear to be serious, Socrates. But, by Jupiter, who presides over friendship, tell me whether you think that any one of the Greeks could say any thing greater and more copiously on this subject?

Soc. But what, do you think that a discourse ought to be praised by you and me, because its composer has said what is sufficient? and not for this alone, that he has artificially fashioned every word clear, and round, and accurate? For, if it is necessary, this must be granted for your sake: for it is concealed from me, through my nothingness. Hence, I only attended to the eloquence of the composer; for, as to the other particular, I do not believe that even Lysias will think himself sufficient. And indeed to me, Phædrus, it appears (unless you say otherwise) that he has twice and thrice repeated the same things, as if he did not possess a great copiousness of discourse upon the same subject: or, perhaps, he took no great care about a thing of this kind. And besides this, he seems to me to act in a juvenile manner, by showing that he can express the same thing in different ways, and yet at the same time, according to each mode, in the best manner possible.

PHÆDR. You speak nothing to the purpose, Socrates: for this oration possesses a copiousness of sentiment in the most eminent degree. For he has omitted nothing belonging to his subject, which he could with propriety introduce: so that, besides what has been said by him, no one could ever be able to discourse, either more abundantly or more to the purpose, on the same subject, than he has done.

Soc. I cannot grant you this: for the wise of old, both men and women, who have discoursed and written on this subject, would confute me, if I should admit this for the sake of gratifying you.

PHÆDR. Who are those antients? and where have you heard better things than these?

SOC. I do not sufficiently remember at present; but it is manifest that I have somewhere heard of some of these, such as the beautiful Sappho, or the wife Anacreon, or certain other writers. But from whence do I derive this conjecture? Because, O divine man! finding my breast full of conceptions, I perceive that I have something to say in addition to what has been already delivered, and this not of an inferior nature. I well know, indeed, that I understand nothing about such things from myself, as I am conscious of my own ignorance. It remains therefore, I think, that I myself, like a vessel, should be filled with knowledge, through hearing, from the fountains of others; but that, through my dulness of apprehension, I should again forget how, and from whom, I received the information.

PHÆDR. You speak, most generous man, in the most excellent manner: For you cannot inform me, though I should command you to do so, how, and from whom, you derived your knowledge; but this which you speak of you are able to accomplish, since you possess more abundant and more excellent conceptions than those contained in the oration of Lysias. And if you are but able to accomplish this, I promise you, after the manner of the nine Archons, to place a golden statue of an equal measure at Delphi, not of myself only, but likewise of you.

SOC. You are of a most friendly disposition, Phædrus, and truly golden, if you suppose me to have asserted that Lysias was perfectly faulty, and that something better might have been said than the whole of this: for I do not think that this can ever happen, even to the worst of writers. But to the point in hand, about this oration: Do you think that any one who asserts that it is more proper to gratify one who does not love than a lover can have any thing to say besides his assertion, if he omits to prove that he who is void of love is prudent, but the lover is not so; and praises the one, but blames the other? But I think that omissions of this kind are to be suffered, and even pardoned, in a writer; and that it is not the invention of these discourses, but the elegance of the composition, which ought to be praised. But in things which are not necessary, and which are difficult to discover, I think that not only the composition, but likewise the invention, should be praised.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. I assent to what you say : for you appear to me to speak modestly. I will therefore allow you to suppose that a lover is more diseased than one who is void of love ; but, if in what remains you speak more copiously and more to the purpose than Lysias, you shall stand in Olympia, artificially fabricated, near the Cypselidæ<sup>1</sup>.

Soc. You are serious, Phædrus, because I have found fault with a man who is exceedingly beloved by you ; and you think that I have in reality attempted to speak something more copious than what his wisdom has produced.

PHÆDR. In this affair, my friend, you have afforded me a similar handle to that which I some time since afforded you, and it is necessary for you to speak upon this subject in the best manner you are able. And that we may not be compelled to adopt that troublesome method of comedians, by answering one another, take care of yourself ; and do not oblige me to retort upon you “ If I, O Socrates ! am ignorant of Socrates, I am also forgetful of myself.” And, “ that he desires to speak, indeed, but feigns to be unwilling.” In short, assure yourself that we shall not depart from hence before you have disclosed to me that which you keep concealed in your breast. For there is none but us two ; we are in a solitary place ; and I am both stronger and younger than you. From all this, then, understand what I say ; and by no means dispose yourself to be forced to speak, rather than to discourse of your own accord.

Soc. But, O blessed Phædrus ! it would certainly be ridiculous in me, who am but an idiot, to contend with that excellent writer, and this too extemporary.

PHÆDR. Do you know how the case stands ? Cease your boasting before me : for I have nearly got a secret in my possession, which, when told, will force you to speak.

Soc. Do not tell it, therefore, I beseech you.

PHÆDR. Not tell it ? But indeed I shall. For my secret is an oath. And therefore I swear to you, by some one of the Gods, or, if you will, be

<sup>1</sup> The Cypselidæ were three princes who descended from Cypselus, a king of Corinth. This Cypselus reigned 73 years, and was succeeded by his son Periander, who left his kingdom, after a reign of 40 years, to Cypselus II.

this plane-tree, that unless you deliver to me a discourse the very contrary to that of Lyfias, I will never at any time either show or read to you another oration.

Soc. O you wicked man ! how well have you found out a method of compelling a lover of literature to act as you please !

PHÆDR. Why then, since it is so, do you hesitate about complying ?

Soc. I shall not indeed any longer, since you have sworn in this manner. For how is it possible for any one to abstain from such feasts as you are capable of supplying ?

PHÆDR. Begin then.

Soc. Do you know what I mean to do ?

PHÆDR. About what ?

Soc. Why, I mean to speak covered with my garment <sup>1</sup>, that I may rapidly run through my discourse, and that, by not looking at you, I may not be hindered through shame.

PHÆDR. Do but speak ; and as to the rest, you may act as you please.

Soc. Inspire me then, O ye Muses <sup>2</sup> ? whether you are so called from the melody of singing, or from the musical tribe of shrill sounds ; and so assist me in the discourse which this best of men compels me to deliver, that his associate, who formerly appeared to him to be wise, may now appear to him to be still more so.

There was a certain youth, or rather a delicate young man, extremely beautiful, and who possessed a multitude of lovers. Among these there was one of a fraudulent disposition ; who, though he did not love less than the rest, yet persuaded the youth that he was not one of his lovers. And asking him on a certain time to satisfy his desire, he endeavoured to convince him that one who was not a lover ought to be gratified before one who was. But he spoke to this effect : In every thing, young man, one prin-

<sup>1</sup> The modesty of Socrates in this place must sufficiently convince the most careless reader of Plato, that this divine philosopher was very far from being a friend to that unnatural connection of the male species, which is so frequently alluded to in this dialogue, and which was so common among the Greeks. He indeed who has in the least experienced that extreme purity of sentiment and conduct which is produced by a cultivation of the Platonic philosophy, will require no further conviction of the chastity of Socratic love ; but as this can never be the case with the vulgar, they can alone be convinced by external and popular proofs.

<sup>2</sup> For an account of the Muses, see the notes on the Cratylus.

ciple, to those who are about to consult in a becoming manner, is, to know that about which they consult, or else it is necessary that they should perfectly wander from the truth. But the multitude are ignorant that they do not know the essence of every particular. Hence in the beginning of their disquisitions, they do not trouble themselves to declare what the essence of a thing is, as if they were very knowing in matters of this kind; but in the course of their inquiry they exhibit nothing more than probable reasons; and thus they are neither consistent with themselves, nor with others. With respect to you and me, therefore, lest we should suffer that which we condemn in others, in our inquiry, whether the engagement of friendship ought to be entered upon with one who does not love, rather than with one who does, we ought to know what love is, and what power it possesses, mutually agreeing in our definition respecting it; and looking towards, and referring our discourse to this, we should consider whether it is the cause of advantage or detriment. That love, therefore, is a certain desire, is manifest to every one; and we are not ignorant that those who are void of love, are desirous of beautiful things. That we may be able, therefore, to distinguish a lover from one who is not so, it is requisite to know that there are two certain ideas in each of us, endued with a ruling and leading power, and which we follow wherever they conduct us. One of these is the innate desire of pleasures; but the other an acquired opinion, desirous of that which is best. But these sometimes subsist in us in a state of amity, and sometimes in a state of opposition and discord. And sometimes the one conquers, and sometimes the other. When opinion, therefore, is led by reason to that which is best, and vanquishes, it is denominated, from its vanquishing, temperance. But when desire irrationally allures to pleasure, and rules within us, it is called from its dominion, injury. But injury possesses a multitude of appellations: for it is multiform, and consists of many species. And of these ideas that which subsists in the most remarkable degree, causes that in which it resides to receive its appellation, and does not suffer it to be denominated any thing graceful or worthy. For when, with respect to food, desire of eating vanquishes the reason of that which is best, and rules over the other desires, then this desire is called gluttony; which likewise subjects its possessor to the same appellation. But that which tyrannizes about intoxication, and which through this leads

its possessor wherever it pleases, evidently confers on him its own appellation. And it is sufficiently manifest how the fifters of these, and the names of the fister-desires when they rule with absolute sway, ought to be called. But that for the sake of which all this has been said is now nearly evident: though it will certainly be in every respect more clear if enunciated, than if not. For the desire which without reason rules over opinion tending to that which is right, which draws it down towards the pleasure of beauty, and being vehemently invigorated by its kindred desires about the beauty of body, leads and subdues it: this desire, receiving an appellation from its strength, is called love. But, my dear Phædrus, do I appear to you, as I do to myself, to suffer a certain divine passion?

PHÆDR. Indeed, Socrates, you possess a certain fluency of expression, beyond what is usual to you.

SOC. Hear me then in silence. For in reality the place appears to be divine. If, therefore, during my discourse, I should be often hurried away by the inspiring influence of the Nymphs, you must not be surprised. For the words which burst from me at present are not very remote from dithyrambic verse.

PHÆDR. You speak most truly.

SOC. But of this you are the cause. However, hear the rest; for perhaps that which now possesses me may depart. But this will be taken care of by divinity. Let us, therefore, again direct our discourse to the young man. What that is then, which was the object of consultation, has been declared and defined. But looking towards this, let us consider with respect to what remains, what assistance or detriment will very properly happen to him who is gratified by a lover, and to him who is gratified by one who is not so.

It is necessary then that a man who is enslaved by desire, or who is in subjection to pleasure, should render the object of his love as agreeable to himself as possible. But to one diseased every thing is pleasant which does not oppose his disease; but that which is better and equal is troublesome. Hence the lover is never willing that the object of his love should possess any thing more excellent than himself, or any thing approaching to an equality with himself; but that, as much as possible, he should be inferior to, and more indigent than himself. Thus, he is desirous that through

ignorance he may become inferior to the wife, through timidity inferior to the bold, through inability to speak, to rhetoricians, and through dullness, to the acute. And when these, and far more numerous ills than these, according to the conceptions of the lover, are naturally inherent, or are produced in the beloved object, the lover rejoices, and even endeavours to introduce others, that he may not be deprived of his desired pleasure. Hence it is necessary that the lover should be envious of his beloved, and should endeavour by all possible means to exclude him from an association with others, through whom he may become a most excellent man; and thus in reality he is the cause of a mighty injury to his beloved. But the greatest injury, which he is the cause of, is that of depriving his beloved of the means of becoming eminently prudent. But he becomes most prudent through divine philosophy, from which the lover is necessarily compelled to withdraw his beloved, through the fear of being despised. And besides this, he is obliged to a variety of other artifices, that his beloved, by becoming ignorant of every thing, may place all his admiration upon him; and may thus become most acceptable to his lover, but most pernicious to himself. And thus with respect to things relating to the rational part, an association with a lover is by no means advantageous, but prejudicial to the party beloved.

But after this it is necessary to consider how he, who is compelled to prefer the pleasant to the good, would take care of the body of his beloved, if it was committed to his charge. Indeed he would endeavour that it should not become firm and vigorous, but effeminate and soft; and that it should not be nourished in the pure light of the sun, but under the mingled shade; and that he should be educated without having any experience of manly labours and dry sweats; but on the contrary should be continually accustomed to a delicate and effeminate mode of living, and be adorned with foreign colours and ornaments, through the want of his own proper decorations: and that he should be studious of every thing else, which is consequent to cares of this kind. All which, as they are unworthy of a longer narration, having summarily defined, we shall proceed to what remains of our discourse. Enemies, therefore, in battle, and other mighty necessities, will confidently assault such a body, but friends and lovers will be in fear for its safety. But this, as sufficiently evident, we shall dismiss. Let us then, in the next place, declare what advantage or detriment, with

respect to possessions, arises to us from the familiarity and guardianship of a lover. But this indeed is manifest to every one, but especially to a lover, that he desires above all things that his beloved may be deprived of the most friendly, most dear, and divine possessions: for he wishes to receive him destitute of parents, kindred and friends, thinking that these will impede and reprehend his most pleasant association with his beloved. Besides, he considers that the object of his love, if rich in gold, or any other possession, cannot be easily taken, and, if taken, will not be tractable to his desires. From all which it is necessary that a lover should envy his beloved the possession of abundance, and should rejoice in his adversity. Further yet, he will wish the youth to live for a long time without a wife, without children, and without a proper home, desiring for a very extended period to enjoy those pleasures which he is capable of affording. There are, indeed, other evils besides these, but a certain dæmon<sup>1</sup> immediately mingles pleasure with

<sup>1</sup> We have already in the notes on the first Alcibiades, given an ample account of dæmons from Proclus. I shall, therefore, only observe at present, that, according to the Platonic theology, there are three species of dæmons; the first of which is *rational* only, and the last *irrational* only; but the middle species is partly *rational* and partly *irrational*. And again, of these the first is perfectly beneficent, but many among the other two species are malevolent and noxious to mankind; not indeed essentially malevolent (for there is nothing in the universe, the ample abode of all-bountiful Jove, essentially evil), but only so from the office which they are destined to perform: for nothing which operates naturally, operates as to itself evilly. But the Platonic Hermeas, in his MS. Commentary on this dialogue, admirably observes on this passage as follows: "The distribution of good and evil originates from the dæmoniacal genus: for every genus, transcending that of dæmons, uniformly possesses good. There are, therefore, certain genera of dæmons, some of which adorn and administer certain parts of the world; but others certain species of animals. The dæmon, therefore, who is the inspective guardian of life, hastens souls into that condition, which he himself is allotted; as for instance, into injustice or intemperance, and continually mingles pleasure in them as a snare. But there are other dæmons transcending these, who are the punishers of souls, converting them to a more perfect and elevated life. And the first of these it is necessary to avoid; but the second sort we should render propitious. But there are other dæmons more excellent than these, who distribute good, in an uniform manner."—*Ἐπο τοῦ δαιμονίου γένους πρώτως ἀρχεται ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν διαιρέσις· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑπερδαιμονιον γένος, μονοειδῶς ἐχει τὸ ἀγαθόν. Ἔστιν οὖν τινὰ γένη δαιμονίων, τὰ μὲν μερίδας τινὰς τοῦ κόσμου κατακοσμοῦντα καὶ ἐπιτροπεύοντα· τὰ δὲ εἶδε τινὰ ζῶων· κατεχεῖν οὖν σπουδαζεῖν τὰς ψυχὰς εἰς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κληρὸν, οἷον εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ ἀκολασίαν· δελεᾶρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὴν ἐν τῷ παραυτικῷ ἀναμιγνύσιν ἐν αὐταῖς, ὁ εφορὸς τῆς δὲ τῆς ζωῆς δαιμον· ἄλλοι δὲ τινες εἰσὶ τούτων ἐπαναβεβηκότες δαίμονες, οἱ κολάσεις ἐπιπεμποῦσι ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ἐπιστρέφοντες αὐτὰς εἰς τελειωτέραν καὶ ὑπερτέραν ζῶν· καὶ τοὺς μὲν πρώτους ἀποτρεπεσθαι δεῖ· τοὺς δὲ δευτέρους ἐξευμενίζεσθαι· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι κρείττονες δαίμονες, τὰ ἀγαθὰ μονοειδῶς ἐπιπεμποῦντες.*

most

most of them: as in that dreadful beast, and mighty detriment, a flatterer, nature at the same time mingles a pleasure by no means inclegant and rude. And, indeed, some one may revile a harlot, and other cattle, and studies of this kind, which we are daily accustomed to delight in, as noxious; but he who is a lover of young men, besides his being detrimental, is in his familiar converse the most unpleasant of all men. For equal, according to the proverb, rejoices in equal. For, as it appears to me, since equality of time leads to equal pleasures, it produces also friendship, through similitude. But at the same time, the association of these is connected with satiety; and necessity is said to be grievous to every one in every concern. But this is most eminently the case in the dissimilitude of a lover towards his beloved. For an old man adhering to a young one, does not willingly leave him, either by night or by day, but is agitated by necessity and fury, which always affording him pleasure, lead him about, through seeing, hearing, touching, and in any manner apprehending his beloved; so that he assiduously follows him with unceasing delight. But what solace or pleasures can he afford his beloved, so as to prevent him, during the period of mutual converse, from suffering the most extreme molestation? And this when he beholds his countenance aged and deformed, together with other particulars consequent to this, which are not only unpleasant to be engaged with, but even to hear; necessity always proposing to him such a survey. For in order to oblige him to this, he is always watched by suspicious guards in all his actions; and is under a necessity of hearing the unseasonable and immoderate praises and reproaches of his lover; which when he is sober, are indeed intolerable, but when he is intoxicated, are not only intolerable, but base, through his employing confidence, satiety, and repetition in his discourse. Besides, while he loves, he is pernicious and importunate. But when he ceases to love, he is afterwards unfaithful to the former object of his love, whom he had persuaded to comply with his request, by employing many oaths, prayers, and promises; and whom, after all, he had scarcely been able to induce, by the hope of advantage, to bear with his troublesome familiarity. And, lastly, when he ought to repay him for his kindness, then receiving another ruler and patron in himself, viz. intellect and temperance, instead of love and fury, and thus becoming entirely changed, he deceives his once beloved object. And then the beloved calling to mind the former actions

and discourses of his lover, desires to be thanked for his kindness, as if he was discoursing with the same person as before. But the other, through shame, dares not say that he is changed, nor does he know how to free himself from the oaths and promises which his former stupid dominion over him produced, now he has acquired the possession of intellect and temperance; fearing lest, if he should act as formerly, he should again become such as he was before. Hence it necessarily comes to pass that he flies from the former object of his love, the shell being turned; but the other is compelled to pursue him, grievously enduring his change, and loading him with imprecations, as being ignorant from the beginning that a lover, and one who is necessarily insane, ought not to be gratified, but much rather one who does not love, and who is endued with intellect. For otherwise it would be necessary that he should give himself up to a man unfaithful, morose, envious, and unpleasant; detrimental with respect to the possession of things, and the habit of the body, but much more pernicious with respect to the discipline of the soul, than which nothing really is, or ever will be more venerable, both among Gods and men. It is necessary, therefore, my young friend, to consider all this, and to know that the friendship of a lover does not subsist with benevolence, but, like one who is hungry, is exerted only for the sake of being full. For,

The eager lover to the boy aspires,  
Just as the wolf the tender lamb desires.

This is that which I predicted to you, O Phædrus, nor will you hear me speak any further; for my discourse to you has now arrived at its conclusion.

PHÆDR. But to me it appears that you have accomplished no more than the half, and that you should speak equally as much concerning one who is not a lover; that he of the two ought rather to be gratified; and that, for this purpose, the advantages which he possesses should be enumerated. Why, therefore, Socrates, do you now desist from speaking?

Soc. Have you not taken notice, blessed man, that I now speak in verse, but that it is no longer dithyrambic; and that I have done this, though my discourse has been full of reproach? But what do you think I should be able to accomplish, if I should begin to praise the other? Do you not perceive that,

that, being then urged by you, and assisted by Providence, I should be most evidently agitated by the fury of the Nymphs? I say then, in one word, that as many goods are inherent in the one as we have numbered evils in the other. But what occasion is there of a long discourse? for enough has been said concerning both. And every thing proper to the oration has been introduced. I will; therefore, cross over the river and depart, before I am compelled by you to accomplish something greater than this.

PHÆDR. Not yet, Socrates, till the heat is over. Do you not see that mid-day, as it is called, stably remains almost, even now? Let us, therefore, stay here, and discourse together about what has been said, and immediately as it begins to grow cool, we will depart.

Soc. You are divine, Phædrus, with respect to discourse, and sincerely admirable. For I think that no one has been the occasion of more of the orations which exist at present, than yourself; whether by speaking of your own accord, or in some way or other by compelling others. I except only Simmias the Theban. For you far surpass all the rest. And now you appear to be the cause of my commencing another discourse, though you did not announce war, as the consequence of my refusal.

PHÆDR. But how have I been the cause? and what new discourse is this?

Soc. When I was about to pass over the river, excellent man, a dæmoniacal<sup>1</sup> and usual signal was given me; and whenever this takes place, it always prohibits me from accomplishing what I was about to do. And in the present instance I seemed to hear a certain voice, which would not suffer me to depart till I had made an expiation, as if I had offended in some particular a divine nature. I am therefore a prophet, indeed, but not such a one as is perfectly worthy; but just as those who know their letters in a very indifferent manner, alone sufficient for what concerns myself. I clearly, therefore, now understand my offence: for even yet, my friend, there is something prophetic in my soul, which disturbed me during my former discourse. And this caused me to fear lest, perhaps, according to Ibycus, I should offend the Gods, but acquire glory among men. But now I perceive in what I have offended.

PHÆDR. Will you not inform me what it is?

<sup>1</sup> For a full and every way satisfactory account of the dæmon of Socrates, see the note at the beginning of the First Alcibiades on dæmons, from Proclus.

Soc.

Soc. You, O Phædrus, have repeated a dire, dire discourse, and have compelled me to utter the same.

PHÆDR. But how?

Soc. The discourse has been foolish, and in a certain respect impious. And can any thing be more dire <sup>1</sup> than this?

PHÆDR. Nothing, if you speak the truth.

Soc. What then? Do you not think that Love <sup>2</sup> is the son of Venus and a certain God?

PHÆDR. So it is said.

Soc. Yet this was neither acknowledged by Lyfias, nor in your discourse, which was deduced by you, as by a certain charm, through my mouth. But if Love, as is really the case, is a God, or a certain something divine, he cannot be in any respect evil: and yet in our discourse about him he has been spoken of as evil. In this, therefore, we have offended against Love. But, besides this, our disputations, though polite, appear to have been very foolish: for though they asserted nothing sound or true, yet they boasted as if they did, and as if they should accomplish something considerable, by gaining the approbation of some trifling deluded men. It is necessary, therefore, my friend, that I should purify myself. But there is an antient purification for those who offend in matters respecting mythology, which Homer did not perceive, but which was known to Stesichorus. For, being deprived of his eyes through his accusation of Helen, he was not like Homer, ignorant of the cause of his blindness, but knew it, as being a musician. So that he immediately composed the following lines:

False was my tale; thou ne'er across the main  
In beauteous ships didst fly, Troy's lofty tow'rs to gain.

And thus having composed a poem directly contrary to what he had before published, and which is called a recantation, he immediately recovered his lost sight <sup>3</sup>. I am, therefore, in the present instance wiser than both these:  
for

<sup>1</sup> This is the language of true philosophy and *true religion*, that nothing can be more dire than impiety.

<sup>2</sup> For an account of Love considered as a Deity, see the notes on *The Banquet*.

<sup>3</sup> From hence it is evident that the narration of the rape of Helen, and of the Trojan war, is entirely

for before I suffer any damage through my accusation of love, I will endeavour to present him with my recantation, and this with my head uncovered, and not as before veiled through shame.

PHÆDR. You cannot, Socrates, say any thing which will be more pleasing to me than this.

SOC. For, my good friend, you must be sensible how imprudent the oration was which you repeated, and how shamefully I myself also spoke concerning a lover. For, if any one of a generous disposition and elegant manners, who either loves, or had formerly loved, such a one as himself, had heard us, when we said that lovers often excited the greatest enmities for the most trifling occasions, and that they were envious of, and injurious to, their beloved, would he not have thought that he was hearing men educated in ships, and who were perfectly unacquainted with liberal love? or do you think that he would by any means have assented to our accusation of love?

PHÆDR. By Jupiter, Socrates, perhaps he would not.

SOC. Reverencing, therefore, such a man as this, and fearing Love himself, I desire, as it were with a potable oration, to wash away that salt and

entirely mythological, concealing certain divine truths under the symbols of fable. But as this account of Stesichorus, and the fable of the Iliad, is beautifully explained by Proclus on Plato's Republic, p. 393, I shall present the reader with the following epitomized translation of his comment. "Stesichorus, who considered the whole fable of Helen as a true narration, who approved the consequent transactions, and established his poetry accordingly, with great propriety suffered the punishment of his folly, that is, ignorance: but at length, through the assistance of music, he is said to have acknowledged his error; and thus, through understanding the mysteries concerning Helen and the Trojan war, to have recovered his sight. But Homer is said to have been blind, not on account of his ignorance of these mysteries, as Stesichorus, but through a more perfect habit of the soul, i. e. by separating himself from sensible beauty, establishing his intelligence above all apparent harmony, and extending the intellect of his soul to unapparent and true harmony. Hence, he is said to have been blind, because divine beauty cannot be usurped by corporeal eyes. On this account, fables bordering upon tragedy represent Homer as deprived of sight, on account of his accusation of Helen. But fables, in my opinion, intend to signify by Helen all the beauty subsisting about generation, for which there is a perpetual battle of souls, till the more intellectual having vanquished the more irrational forms of life, return to that place from which they originally came. But, according to some, the period of their circulation about sensible forms consists of ten thousand years, since a thousand years produce one ambit as of one year. For nine years therefore, i. e. for nine thousand years, souls revolve about generation; but in the tenth having vanquished all the barbaric tumult, they are said to return to their paternal habitations."

bitter discourse which we have lately heard. And I would advise Lyfias himself, for similar reasons, to write as soon as possible that a lover ought rather to be gratified than one who is without love.

PHÆDR. You may be well assured that he will do so; for, after you have spoken in praise of a lover, it will be necessary that Lyfias should be compelled by me to do the same.

Soc. This indeed I believe, while you remain affected as you are at present.

PHÆDR. Speak then confidently.

Soc. But will you not permit me to suppose that the same young man is present, to whom I addressed my former discourse, left, in consequence of not hearing my recantation, he should rashly gratify one who is not a lover?

PHÆDR. He will always be very nearly present with you, when you are willing he should be so.

Soc. In this manner then, O beautiful young man, understand that the former discourse was that of Phædrus the Myrrhinusian, the offspring of Pythocles; but that this which I am now about to deliver is the discourse of Stesichorus the Imeræan, and the son of Euphemus. But he began his oration as follows:

“ The discourse is not true which asserts that, though a lover should be present, one who is not a lover ought to be gratified before him, because the one is agitated with fury, but the other is prudent in his conduct. For if it was simply true that mania is evil, this would be beautifully asserted. But now the greatest goods <sup>1</sup> are produced for us through mania, and are assigned  
to

<sup>1</sup> This is a most weighty testimony indeed in favour of the antient oracles, and prediction in general. I shall therefore observe, in answer to the followers of Van Dale, Fontenelle, and others who have endeavoured to prove that the oracles of the antients were nothing more than the tricks of fraudulent priests, that to suppose mankind should have been the dupes of such impositions for the space of three thousand years, would exceed the most extravagant fiction in romance. For how is it possible, even if these priests had been a thousand times more cunning and deceitful than they are supposed to have been, that they could have kept such a secret so impenetrable in every city and province where there were any oracles, as never to have given themselves the lie in any particular? Is it possible that there should never have been one man among them of so much worth as to abhor such impostures? that there should never have been any so inconsiderate as unluckily to discover all the mystery for want of some precautions? that no man should ever

to us by a divine gift. For the predicting prophets at Delphi, and the priestesses

have explored the sanctuaries, subterraneous passages, and caverns, where it is pretended they kept their machines? that they should never have had occasion for workmen to repair them? that only they should have had the secret of composing drugs proper to create extraordinary dreams? and, lastly, that they should have perpetually succeeded one another, and conveyed their machines and their juggling tricks to all those that were to follow them in the same employments from age to age, and from generation to generation, and yet no man have been ever able to detect the imposition?

Besides, who were these priests, that, as it is pretended, were monsters of cruelty, fraud, and malice? They were the most honourable men among the heathens\*, and such as were most esteemed for their piety and probity. They were sometimes magistrates and philosophers. Thus Plutarch † informs us in one of his treatises, that he was himself, to a very old age, the priest of Apollo of Delphi, and that he presided in this character over the oracle, the sacrifices, and all the other ceremonies of this deity for many years. Depraved as the age is, will any one be hardy enough to assert that a man of such probity, of such gravity of manners, of so much penetration, learning, and judgment as Plutarch, was a cheat and an impostor by profession? That he was capable of speaking through a hollow image to counterfeit the voice of Apollo? Or of suborning a female to act the part of one possessed, when she was seated on the Tripod? There is not surely any one so lost to shame, so devoid of common sense, as to make such an assertion.

Again, how could those clear and precise oracles have been produced by fraud, in which what was done in one place was foretold in another, as in that famous oracle which was delivered to the ambassadors of Cræsus. This most stupid of kings, and most unfortunate of cooks, as he is justly called by Maximus Tyrius, in order to try the veracity of the oracles, had determined, it seems, in a secret part of his palace to do something to which no one should be privy but himself, and sent to the oracle of Apollo to tell him what he was doing. His messengers returned with the following answer:

Οἶδα δ' ἐγὼ ψαμμου τ' ἀριθμον καὶ μετρά θαλάσσης,  
Καὶ κωφου συνήμι, καὶ οὐ λαλεόντος ἀκούω.

\* The pontiffs and other priests among the Greeks, as well as among the Romans, held the first rank of honour. They were usually taken from noble or patrician families. Plutarch asserts that in some parts of Greece their dignity was equal to that of kings. In the first ages, indeed, kings themselves were often priests; diviners, and augurs. This we may learn from Aristotle in the third book of his Politics, c. 10; from Cicero, de Divin. lib. i. and de leg. l. 2. where he speaks of Romulus and Numa; from Homer, Iliad vi. l. 76. and Virgil, Æn. l. 3. when they speak of Helenus, and from the latter also when he speaks of king Anius, Æn. iii. l. 80.

Rex Anius, rex idem hominum, Phœbique sacerdos.

Who can believe that kings, princes, and persons of the first quality were capable of carrying on the trade of jugglers, and amusing the people by delusions and tricks of legerdemain?

† Plutarch: lib. an seni gerenda sit Respublica:

priestesses in Dodona <sup>1</sup>, have, when insane procured many advantages, both  
privately

Οδμη δ'ες φρενας ηλθε κραταιρινοιο χελωνης  
Εφομενης εν χαλκω αμ' αρνειοισι κρεεσσιν  
'Η χαλκος μεν υπεστρωται, χαλκος δ'επισται.

i. e. The sand's amount, the measures of the sea,  
Tho' vast the number, are well known to me :  
I know the thoughts within the dumb concealed,  
And words I hear by language unrevealed.  
Even now, the odours to my sense that rise  
A tortoise boiling, with a lamb, supplies,  
Where brads below, and brads above it lies. }

Cræsus it seems was, at the very time when this oracle was delivered, boiling a lamb and tortoise together in a brazen vessel. This story is first related by Herodotus, Hist. lib. i. c. 8. and after him by various other writers, both heathen and christian, and among the rest by Basil, who, with the rest of the fathers, says that the devil was the author of it. Now the fact is as certain as any in antiquity. Besides, it is not the only one of this nature: Cicero, Valerius Maximus, Dionysius Halicarnassæus, Strabo, Florus, &c. relate several instances of predictions having been verified in one place of what was doing in another. Plutarch, in the life of Paulus Æmilius, and in that of Sylla, adds others also; but one especially that happened in the reign of Domitian, and of the truth of which he says no man doubted in his time. The circumstance, as related also by Augustine, lib. ii. de Civit. Dei, cap. 24. was, that a servant of one Lucius Pontius prophetically exclaimed, I come a messenger from Bellona, the victory Sylla is thine. He afterwards added, that the capitol would be in flames. Having said this, he immediately left the camp, and the next day returned more rapidly, and exclaimed that the capitol had been burnt. And the capitol it seems had in reality been on fire. Augustine adds that it was easy for the devil to foresee this, and most rapidly to tell it. Indeed, such predictions must have been the effect of inspiration, either from divinity, or from some of the genera between divinity and man; and hence Augustine, very consistently with his religion, ascribed them to an evil dæmon. The Platonic reader, however, will easily account for most of them more rationally, as he *scientifically* knows that divination has *deity* for its origin; and that, when the persons inspired are worthy characters, and the predictions beneficial, such inspiration cannot be the offspring of fraudulent spirits.

It is very justly indeed observed by Plutarch, in his treatise concerning the Pythian oracles, that with respect to cursory predictions, some one might foretel that a certain person should be victorious in battle, and he accordingly conquered; that such a city should be subverted, and it was accordingly destroyed; but, says he, *when not only the event is foretold, but how, and when, after what, and by whom, it shall be effected, this is no conjecture of things which may perhaps take place, but a premanifestation of things which will absolutely happen.* Τοιαυτα του Βοηθου διεληθοντος ο Σεραπιων, δικαιον (εφη) το αξιωμα περι των ουτως λεγει Βοηθος αοριστως και ανυποθετως λεγομενων· ει νικη στρατηγω προειρηται, γενικηκεν· ει πολεως αναρσεις, επολωθεν. Οπου δε ου μονον λεγεται το γενησομενον, αλλα και πως, και ποτε,

privately and publicly, to the Greeks; but when they have been in a prudent state, they have been the cause of very trifling benefits, or indeed of none

ΠΟΤΕ, ΚΑΙ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΙ, ΚΑΙ ΜΕΤΑ ΤΙΝΟΣ, ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙ ΕΙΚΑΣΜΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΤΑΧΑ ΓΕΝΗΣΟΜΕΝΩΝ, ΑΛΛΑ ΤΩΝ ΠΑΝΤΩΣ ΕΣΟΜΕΝΩΝ ΠΡΟΔΗΛΩΣΙΣ.

Should it be asked why such inspiration, if it once existed, no longer exists at present, I reply by repeating what I have said in my Notes on Pausanias (Vol. 3. p. 261), that when those circulations take place, mentioned in a note on the eighth book of the Republic, during which the parts of the earth subsist according to nature, and this is accompanied with a concurrence of proper *instruments, times, and places*, then divine illumination is abundantly and properly received. But when parts of the earth subsist contrary to nature as at present, and which has been the case ever since the oracles ceased, then as there is no longer an aptitude of *places, instruments, and times*, divine influence can no longer be received, though the illuminations of divine natures continue *immutably* the same; just, says Proclus, as if a face standing in the same position, a mirror should at one time receive a clear image of it, and at another, one obscure and debile, or indeed, no image at all. For, as the same incomparable man further observes, it is no more proper to refer the defect of divine inspiration to the Gods, than to accuse the sun as the cause of the moon being eclipsed, instead of the conical shadow of the earth into which the moon falls. The reader will find in the above-mentioned place, the theory of oracles scientifically unfolded.

Hermeas the philosopher, in his MS. Scholia on this dialogue, gives us the following very satisfactory information respecting the oracle in Dodona: ΠΕΡΙ ΔΕ ΤΟΥ ΔΩΔΩΝΑΙΟΥ ΜΑΝΤΕΙΟΥ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑ ΕΙΣΙ ΤΑ ΙΣΤΟΡΟΥΜΕΝΑ· ΕΣΤΙ ΜΕΝ ΓΑΡ ΠΑΛΑΙΟΤΑΤΟΝ ΤΩΝ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΩΝ ΜΑΝΤΕΙΩΝ· ΛΕΓΟΥΣΙ ΔΕ ΟΙ ΜΕΝ ΟΤΙ ΔΡΥΣ ΗΝ ΕΚΕΙ Η ΜΑΝΤΕΥΟΥΣΑ, ΟΙ ΔΕ ΟΤΙ ΠΕΡΙΣΤΕΡΑΙ· ΤΟ ΔΕ ΑΛΗΘΕΣ, ΟΤΙ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΕΣ ΗΣΑΝ ΙΕΡΕΙΑΙ ΑΙ ΜΑΝΤΕΥΟΥΣΑΙ, ΔΡΥΪ ΤΗ ΚΕΦΑΛΗ ΣΤΕΦΟΜΕΝΑΙ, ΑΙ ΤΙΝΕΣ ΕΠΑΛΟΥΝΤΟ ΠΕΛΕΙΑΔΕΣ· ΙΣΩΣ ΟΥΝ ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΟΣ ΤΙΝΕΣ ΠΛΑΝΘΗΝΤΕΣ, ΥΠΟΠΤΕΥΟΥΣΑΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΠΕΡΙΣΤΕΡΑΣ ΤΑΣ ΜΑΝΤΕΥΟΥΣΑΣ· ΕΠΕΙΔΗ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΚΕΦΑΛΗΝ ΔΡΥΪ ΚΑΤΕΣΤΡΕΦΟΝΤΟ, ΙΣΩΣ ΔΙΑ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΕΙΡΗΚΑΣΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΔΡΥΝ ΜΑΝΤΕΥΕΙΝ· ΕΣΤΙ ΔΕ ΔΙΟΣ ΤΟ ΜΑΝΤΕΙΟΝ· ΤΟ ΔΕ ΕΝ ΔΕΛΦΟΙΣ, ΑΠΟΛΛΩΝΟΣ· ΕΙΚΟΤΩΣ ΟΥΝ ΠΑΡΕΛΑΒΟΝ ΩΣ ΣΥΓΓΕΝΗ ΤΑ ΜΑΝΤΕΙΑ· ΚΑΙ ΓΑΡ Ο ΑΠΟΛΛΩΝ ΥΠΟΥΡΓΟΣ ΛΕΓΕΤΑΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΟΣ ΔΗΜΙΟΥΡΓΙΑΣ, ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΛΑΙΣ, ΕΙ ΕΔΟΞΕΝ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΑΣΑΦΗΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ Ο ΤΟΥ ΔΩΔΩΝΑΙΟΥ ΧΡΗΣΜΟΣ, ΑΠΗΡΣΑΝ ΕΙΣ ΤΟΝ ΕΝ ΔΕΛΦΟΙΣ, ΧΡΗΣΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΤΙ ΒΟΥΛΕΤΑΙ Ο ΤΟΥ ΔΙΟΣ ΧΡΗΣΜΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΛΛΟΥΣ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΕΞΗΓΗΣΑΤΟ ΠΟΛΛΑΚΙΣ Ο ΑΠΟΛΛΩΝ· ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙΩΤΑΙ ΜΕΝ ΟΥΝ ΚΑΙ ΜΑΝΤΕΥΟΜΕΝΑΙ ΑΙ ΙΕΡΕΙΑΙ, ΠΟΛΛΑ ΕΥΗΡΓΕΤΟΥΝ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ ΠΡΟΛΕΓΟΥΣΑΙ ΤΑ ΜΕΛΛΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΠΡΟΔΙΟΡΘΟΥΜΕΝΑΙ· ΣΩΦΡΟΝΟΥΣΙ ΔΕ ΟΜΟΙΑΙ ΗΣΑΝ ΤΑΙΣ ΑΛΛΑΙΣ ΓΥΝΑΙΞΙΝ i. e.

“ Different accounts are given of the Dodonæan oracle: for it is the most antient of the Grecian oracles. According to some an oak prophesied in Dodona; but according to others, doves. The truth however is, that priestesses whose heads were crowned with oak prophesied; and these women were called by some *peleïades*, or doves. Perhaps, therefore, certain persons being deceived by the name, suspected that doves prophesied in Dodona; and as the heads of these women were crowned with oak, perhaps from this circumstance they said that an oak prophesied. But this oracle belongs to Jupiter, and that at Delphi, to Apollo. Very properly, therefore, are these oracles considered as allied to each other. For Apollo is said to be ministrant to Jupiter in the administration of things: and often when the Dodonæan oracle appeared to be obscure, the oracle at Delphi has been consulted, in order to know the meaning of that of Jupiter. Often too, Apollo has interpreted many of the Dodonæan oracles. These priestesses, therefore, when in an enthusiastic

none at all. And if we should speak of the Sibyl<sup>1</sup>, and others who have employed deific prophecy, rightly predicting many things to many respecting futurity, we should be too prolix, and at the same time only speak of that which is manifest to every one. This indeed is worthy of being testified, that such of the antients as gave names to things, did not consider mania as either base or disgraceful. For they did not connect the appellation of mania with that most beautiful art, by which we are enabled to judge of the future, as if it was something noxious; but they gave it a name of this kind, as something beneficial, when it subsists through a divine allotment. But men of the present day, being ignorant of what is becoming, by the insertion of the letter τ, call it *μαντική*, or the art of divining. Indeed the investigations of futurity, by prudent men, which take place through birds, and a variety of other tokens, as proceeding from the dianoëtic part through human intelligence, they denominated intellect and *intellective opinion*; which the moderns, through a reverence of the ω, denominate *augurial*, or pertaining to augury. By how much more perfect and honourable, therefore, prophecy is than augury, and the name and operation of the one than the name and operation of the other, by so much did the antients testify

enthusiastic and prophetic condition, have greatly benefited mankind by predicting and previously correcting future events; but, when in a prudent state, they were similar to other women.”

<sup>2</sup> Hermeas, in his MS. Commentary on this dialogue, has the following remarkable passage on the Sibyl here mentioned: Περὶ δὲ τῆς Σιβύλλης, οὗτος ἐστὶ θαυμαστά τα λεγόμενα, ὥστε δοξάει μυθους εἶναι: πῶλλαι μὲντοι Σιβύλλαι γεγόνασι, πᾶσαι τούτου ἐλομεναι βίον· πᾶσαι μὲν διὰ τινὰ ἰσως λογικὴν αἰτίαν ἐλοντο. Σιβύλλαι προσαγορευεσθαι: ὡσπερ δὴ ὁ Τρισμηγιστος Ἑρμῆς λεγεται πολλὰκις ἐπιδημησας τῆ Αἰγυπτῶ, ἑαυτου ἀναμνησθαι, καὶ τρίτον κληθῆσθαι Ἑρμῆν· καὶ τρεῖς δὲ Ὀρφεῖς παρὰ Θραξί γενεσθαι· ἰσως οὖν καὶ αὐταὶ κατὰ τινὰ κοινωμίαν, καὶ ἀναμνησιν εἰλοντο ταυτάς τας προσηγορίας· ἐπεὶ αὐτὴ γέ ἡ Σιβύλλα ἢ Ἐρυθραία περὶ ἧς νῦν λέγει Ἐριφυλῆ ἐκαλεῖτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς· λέγουσι δὲ αὐτὴν εὐθύς προελθούσαν προσεῖπειν ἐξ ὀνοματος ἑκάστου, καὶ ἐμμετρά φθεγγεσθαι, καὶ εἰς βραχὺν χρόνον τελειὸν εἶδος ἀνθρώπου λαβεῖν. i. e. “The particulars which are reported about this Sibyl, are so wonderful, that they have the appearance of fables. But, indeed, there were many Sibyls, all of whom adopted the same life, and all of them, perhaps through a certain rational cause, were called Sibyls: just as Hermes Trismegistus, who often resided in Egypt, is said to have made mention of himself, and to have called himself the third Hermes. Three Orpheuses also are said to have existed among the Thracians. Perhaps, therefore, these Sibyls chose these appellations from a certain communication and recollection; since this very Erythraean Sibyl, of whom Plato now speaks, was from the first called Erophile. But they report that she called every one by his proper name, as soon as she was born, that she likewise spoke in verse, and that in a short time she arrived at the perfection of the human species.”

that

that mania proceeding from divinity is more beautiful than prudence which proceeds from men. But indeed, in the greatest diseases and labours to which certain persons are sometimes subject through the indignation of the Gods in consequence of guilt, mania when it takes place, predicting what they stand in need of, discovers a liberation from such evils, by flying to prayer and the worship of the Gods. Hence, obtaining by this means purifications and the advantages of initiation, it renders him who possesses it free from disasters, both for the present and future time, by discovering to him who is properly insane and possessed by divinity a solution of his present evils. But the third species is a possession and mania descending from the Muses, which receiving a soul tender and solitary, rouses and agitates it with Bacchic fury, according to odes and other species of poetry; in consequence of which, by adorning the infinite actions of antiquity, it becomes the means of instructing posterity. But he who approaches to the poetic gates without the mania of the Muses<sup>1</sup>, persuading himself that he can become a poet, in a manner perfectly sufficient from art alone, will, both as to himself and his poetry, be imperfect; since the poetry which is produced by prudence vanishes before that which is the progeny of mania. So many then are the beautiful works arising from divine mania, and still more than these, which, if it was requisite, I should relate. So that we ought not to be afraid of mania; nor should any reason disturb us, which endeavours to evince that we ought to prefer a prudent friend to one who is divinely agitated: for he who asserts this, ought likewise to show, in order to gain the victory, that love was not sent from the Gods for the utility of the lover and his beloved. But, on the contrary, it must now be shown by us that a mania of this kind was sent by the Gods, for the purpose of producing the greatest felicity. The demonstration, indeed, will be to the unworthy incredible, but to the wise, an object of belief. It is necessary, therefore, in the first place, that, beholding the passions and operations of the divine and human soul, we should understand the truth concerning the nature of each. Let this then be the beginning of the demonstration:

Every soul is immortal<sup>2</sup>: for that which is perpetually moved is eternal.

But

<sup>1</sup> See the Note on the tenth book of the Republic, concerning the different kinds of poetry.

<sup>2</sup> The discourse of Plato here, is as it were, analytical. Thus, for instance, the end of man is

But that which moves another and is moved by another, when it has a cessation of motion, has also a cessation of life. Hence that alone which moves itself, because it does not desert itself, never ceases to be moved; but this also is the fountain and principle of motion to other things which are moved. But a principle is unbegotten: for every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated from a principle, while the principle itself is incapable of being generated. For neither could it any longer be a principle, if it was generated from an external cause. Since then it is unbegotten, it is also necessary that it should be incorruptible: for, should the principle become extinct, it could neither renew its being from another, nor generate another from itself, since it is necessary that all things should be generated from that which is the principle. And thus the beginning of motion is derived from that which moves itself: and this can neither be destroyed nor generated. For, if this were admitted, all heaven and earth falling together must stop; nor could any force be found, whence being moved, they would be again generated. Since then it appears that a self-motive nature is immortal, he who asserts that this is the very essence and definition of soul, will have no occasion to blush. For every body to which motion externally accedes, is inanimate. But that to which motion is inherent from itself, is animated; as if this was the very nature of soul. And if there is nothing else which moves itself except soul, soul is necessarily without generation, and immortal. And thus much may suffice, concerning the immortality of the soul<sup>1</sup>.

But

is nothing else than felicity, and this is a union with the Gods; for Plato does not place felicity in externals. But the soul is conjoined with the Gods even in the present life, when, surveying the whole of sensible and celestial beauty, she acquires a reminiscence of intelligible beauty. But her reminiscence must be of that which she once beheld: for reminiscence is of things which some one has either heard of or seen. But the soul formerly beheld this beauty, when she revolved in conjunction with her proper God. She must, therefore, be immortal: for if not, she would neither have revolved nor have recovered her memory. Hence he first speaks concerning the immortality of the soul, her idea, and what follows; and afterwards he discourses concerning that to which Love conducts us, viz. an intelligible essence, and divine beauty, simple, and unmoved.

<sup>1</sup> This part contains one of the strongest demonstrations possible of the immortality of the soul, as will be evident to every one whose intellectual eye is not blinded by modern pursuits. But when Plato says every soul, the reader must not suppose that the souls of brutes are meant to be included,

But respecting its idea<sup>1</sup> we must speak after the following manner: To give a perfect description of its nature, would indeed be the employment of

included, for these, as is evident from the *Timæus*, are mortal; but every rational soul, as well human as divine. But this reasoning consists of two syllogisms, the parts of which Socrates, as being agitated with divine fury, does not altogether dispose into order; and these are as follows: Soul is self-motive. That which is self-motive is always moved, because it never forsakes itself, nor is ever deserted by motive power. But if it is always moved with an inward motion, it always lives. Soul, therefore, is immortal. This is the first syllogism. But the second: soul is self-motive, and is therefore the principle of motion. But the principle of motion is unbegotten. That which is unbegotten is immortal. Soul therefore is immortal.

<sup>1</sup> By the idea of the soul we are not to understand its supernal exemplar, but its intimate form, and the disposition, and as it were figure of its power. But by the chariots of the Gods, that is, of the mundane Gods and beneficent dæmons, are to be understood all the inward discursive powers of their souls, which pursue the intelligence of all things, and which can at the same time equally contemplate and provide for inferior concerns. And the horses signify the efficacy and motive vigour of these powers. But the horses and chariots of partial souls, such as ours when separated from the body, are mixed from good and evil. Our *principal part* is intellect. The better horse is anger, and the worse desire. The wings are anagogic or reductory powers, and particularly belong to the charioteer or intellect. An immortal animal is composed from soul and a celestial body; but a mortal animal from soul and an elementary body. For partial souls, such as ours, have three vehicles; one ethereal, derived from the heavens; the second aerial; and the third this gross terrestrial body. Jupiter here signifies the head of that order of Gods which subsists immediately above the mundane Gods, and is called *απολυτος*, liberated: for the term *mighty*, as is well observed by Proclus, is a symbol of exempt supremacy. The twelve Gods, therefore, which are divided into four triads, are Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan, Vesta, Minerva, Mars, Ceres, Juno, Diana, Mercury, Venus, Apollo. The first triad of these is *fabricative*; the second *defensive*; the third *vivific*; and the fourth *reductory*. And the chariots of these Gods are supermundane souls, in which they are proximately carried. By *the heavens*, to the contemplation of which the *liberated* and *mundane* Gods proceed, cannot be meant the sensible heavens: for what blessed spectacles do these contain, or how can Gods be converted to things posterior to themselves? It is evidently, therefore, the *heaven* which Plato in the *Cratylus* defines to be *οψις ες το ανω*, or *sight directed to that which is above*; and forms that order of Gods which is called by the Chaldean oracles *νοητος και νοερος*, *intelligible and intellectual*. There is a remarkable error here in the Greek text, for instead of *ουρανια αψιδα*, *celestial arch*, it should be read *υπουρανια αψιδα*, *subcelestial arch*, as is evident from Proclus in *Plat. Theol.* p. 217, who lays a particular stress upon the word *υπουρανια*, as a reading universally acknowledged. Our course is said to be difficult and hard, because the motion of the better horse verges to intelligibles, but of the worse to sensibles and generation; and because our soul is unable in the present life equally to contemplate, and providentially energize. By *ambrosia* is signified that power which renders the Gods separate from generation; but by *nectar* the immutable nature of their providential energies, which extend even to the last of things.

a narration every way prolix and divine ; but to describe a certain similitude of this idea is the business of a human and shorter discourse. Let it then be similar to the kindred power of a winged chariot and charioteer. All the horses and chariots of the Gods are indeed good, and composed from things good ; but those of other natures are mixed. And, in the first place, our principal part governs the reins of its two-yoked car. In the next place, one of the horses is good and beautiful, and is composed from things of this kind ; but the other is of a contrary nature, and is composed of contrary qualities : and on this account our course is necessarily difficult and hard. But we must endeavour to explain why it is called in a certain respect a mortal and immortal animal. Every soul takes care of every thing which is inanimate, and revolves about the whole of heaven, becoming situated at different times in different forms. While it is perfect, indeed, and winged, its course is sublime, and it governs the universe. But the soul whose wings suffer a defluxion verges downward, till something solid terminates its descent ; whence it receives a terrene body, as its destined receptacle, which appears to move itself through the power of the soul : and the whole is called an animal composed from soul and body, and is surnamed a mortal animal. But that which is immortal is perceived by no rational deduction, except that which is hypothetical and feigned : since we neither see, nor sufficiently understand, that a God is a certain immortal animal endued with a soul, and possessing a body naturally conjoined with soul, through the whole of time. These things however are asserted, and may exist, as it pleases divinity. But let us now declare the cause through which the wings were cast aside, and fell from the soul. And this is of the following kind : There is a natural power in the wings of the soul, to raise that which is weighty on high, where the genus of the Gods resides. But of every thing subsisting about body, the soul most participates of that which is divine. But that which is divine is beautiful, wise, and good, and whatever can be asserted of a similar kind. And with these indeed the *winged nature* of the soul is especially nourished and increased : but it departs from its integrity, and perishes, through that which is evil and base, and from contraries of a similar kind. Likewise Jupiter, the mighty leader in the heavens, driving his winged chariot, begins the divine procession, adorning and disposing all things with providential care. The army of Gods and dæmons, distributed into eleven parts, follows  
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his course: but Vesta alone remains in the habitation of the Gods. But each of the other Gods belonging to the twelve, presides over the office committed to his charge. There are many, therefore, and blessed spectacles and processions within the heavens; to which the genus of the blessed Gods is converted as each accomplishes the proper employment of his nature. But *will* and *power* are the perpetual attendants of their processions: for envy is far distant from the divine choir of Gods. But when they proceed to the banquet, and the enjoyment of delicious food, they sublimely ascend in their progression to the sub-celestial arch. And, indeed, the vehicles of the Gods being properly adapted to the guiding reins, and equally balanced, proceed with an easy motion: but the vehicles of other natures are attended in their progressions with difficulty and labour. For the horse, participating of depravity, becomes heavy; and when he has not been properly disciplined by the charioteers, verges and gravitates to the earth. And in this case labour, and an extreme contest, are proposed to the soul. But those who are denominated immortals, when they arrive at the summit, proceeding beyond the extremity of heaven, stand on its back: and while they are established in this eminence, the circumference carries them round, and they behold what the region beyond the heavens contains. But the supercelestial place has not yet been celebrated by any of our poets, nor will it ever be praised according to its dignity and worth. It subsists, however, in the following manner; for we should dare to affirm the truth, especially when speaking concerning the truth: without colour, without figure, and without contact, subsisting as true essence, it alone uses contemplative<sup>1</sup> intellect, the governor of the soul; about which essence, the genus of true science, resides. As the dianoëtic power, therefore, of divinity revolves with intellect and immaculate science, so likewise the dianoëtic power of every soul, when it receives a condition accommodated to its nature, perceiving being through time, it becomes enamoured with it, and contemplating truth, is nourished and filled with joy, till the circumference by a circular revolution brings it back again to its pristine situation. But in this circuit it beholds justice herself, it beholds temperance, and science herself: not that with which generation is present, nor in which one thing has a particular local residence in another, and to which we give the appellation of beings; but

<sup>1</sup> See the Additional Notes to the Timæus.

that which is science in *true being*. And, besides this, contemplating and banqueting on other true beings in the same manner, again entering within the heavens, it returns to its proper home. But, when it returns, the charioteer, stopping his horses at the manger, presents them with ambrosia, and together with it, nectar for drink. And this is the life of the Gods.

But, with respect to other souls, such as follow divinity in the best manner, and become similar to its nature, raise the head of the charioteer<sup>1</sup> into the supercelestial place; where he is borne along with the circumference; but is disturbed by the course of the horses, and scarcely obtains the vision of perfect realities. But other souls at one time raise, and at another time depress, the head of the charioteer: and, through the violence of the horses, they partly see indeed, and are partly destitute of vision. And again, other souls follow, all of them affecting the vision of this superior place: but from being unable to accomplish this design, they are carried round in a merged condition, spurning against and rushing on each other, through a contention of precedency in their course. Hence the tumult, contest, and perspiration, are extreme. And here, indeed, many become lame through the fault of the charioteers, many break many of their wings, and all of them, involved in mighty labour, depart destitute of the perception of reality; but after their departure they use an aliment composed from *opinion*; through which there is a great endeavour to behold where the *plain of truth* is situated. For, from a *meadow* of this kind, that which is best in the soul receives convenient nutriment; and from this the nature of the wing is nourished, by which the soul is enabled to ascend. And this is the law of Adrastia, that whatever soul attending on divinity has beheld any thing of reality shall be free from damage, till another period takes place: and that if she is always able to accomplish this, she shall be perpetually free from the incursions of evil. But if, through an impotency of accomplishing this end, she has not perceived reality, and from some misfortune, and being filled with oblivion and depravity, she becomes heavy and drowsy, breaks her wings, and falls again on the earth<sup>2</sup>, then this law prevents her in her first generation from

<sup>1</sup> The head of the charioteer is that unity of the soul, which she participates from a divine unity, and which is, as it were, the very summit and flower of her essence.

<sup>2</sup> The general cause of the soul's descent, is her neglecting, as it were, the universal form of the world, diligently contemplating a certain portion of it only, and ardently desiring a partial mode of subsistence; imagination and her vegetable power strongly alluring her to such a condition of being.

being implanted in some brutal nature, but commands the soul which has seen the most, to inform the body of a philosopher, or of one desirous of beauty; of a musician, or of one devoted to love <sup>1</sup>. But it orders the soul, whose perceptions rank in the second class, to descend into a legitimate king, or a man studious of empire and war. But it distributes a soul of the third order into the governor of a republic, or the ruler of a family, or the master of a trade. And again, it distributes a soul of the fourth rank into one engaged in gymnastic exercise, or in procuring remedies, and taking care of the body: but souls of the fifth order it distributes into prophets and mystics. In the sixth, it makes a distribution into a poetic life. In the seventh, into a geometrician or artificer. In the eighth, into a sophist or popular character. And in the ninth, into a tyrant. But in all these, he who passes his life justly will afterwards obtain a better condition of being: but he who acts unjustly will pass into a worse state of existence. For no soul will return to its pristine condition till the expiration of ten thousand years <sup>2</sup>: since it will not recover the use of its wings before this period; except it is the soul of one who has philosophized sincerely, or together with philosophy has

<sup>1</sup> As there are principally nine celestial souls, viz. the soul of the world, and the souls of the eight celestial spheres, to which our souls are at different times accommodated; hence, souls in their descent receive nine differences of character. But the philosophic genius has the first rank; because it is naturally adapted to the investigation of every thing human and divine. And as such a genius is studious of wisdom and truth, and the first beauty subsists in these; hence, with great propriety, it brings with it the pursuit of beauty. But we receive the image of beauty through the sight and hearing; and hence Plato connects with this character a musician and a lover: the former on account of audible, and the latter of visible beauty. But the next character is that of a king, who indeed extends a universal providence towards mankind, but whose contemplations are not so ample as those of the philosopher. The providential energies of those which follow, are still more contracted. But when he distributes prophets and mystics into the fifth order, we must not suppose that he means such as are divine, but mercenary and vulgar prophets, who do not operate from science and art, but from custom and chance.

<sup>2</sup> The numbers three and ten are called perfect; because the former is the first complete number, and the latter in a certain respect the whole of number; the consequent series of numbers being only a repetition of the numbers which this contains. Hence, as 10 multiplied into itself produces 100, a plain number, and this again multiplied by 10 produces 1000, a solid number; and as 1000 multiplied by 3 forms 3000, and 1000 by 10, 10,000; on this account Plato employs these numbers as symbols of the purgation of the soul, and her restitution to her proper perfection and felicity. I say, as symbols; for we must not suppose that this is accomplished in just so many years, but that the soul's restitution takes place in a perfect manner.

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loved beautiful forms. These, indeed, in the third period of a thousand years, if they have thrice chosen this mode of life in succession, and have thus restored their wings to their natural vigour, shall in the three thousandth year, fly away to their pristine abode. But other souls, having arrived at the end of their first life, shall be judged. And of those who are judged, some proceeding to a subterranean place of judgment, shall there sustain the punishments they have deserved. But others, in consequence of a favourable judgment, being elevated into a certain celestial place, shall pass their time in a manner becoming the life they have lived in a human shape. And in the thousandth year, both the kinds of those who have been judged, returning to the lot and election of a second life, shall each of them receive a life agreeable to his desire. Here also the human soul shall pass into the life of a beast<sup>1</sup>, and from that of a beast again into a man, if it has first been the soul of a man. For the soul which has never perceived the truth, cannot pass into the human form. Indeed it is necessary to understand man; denominated according to species, as a being proceeding from the information of many senses to a perception contracted into one by the reasoning power. But this is a recollection of what our soul formerly saw with divinity, when in a perfect condition of being; and when she despised what we now consider as realities, and was supernally elevated to the contemplation of that which is true. On this account, the dianoëtic power alone of the philosopher is justly winged. For the philosophic memory perpetually adheres as much as possible to those concerns, by an application to which even a God becomes divine. But he who properly uses meditations of this kind, being always initiated in perfect mysteries, alone acquires true perfection. And such a one being separated from human studies and pursuits, and adhering to that which is divine, is accused by the multitude as insane, while in the mean time, from being filled with divine enthusiasm, he is concealed from the multitude. This whole discourse, therefore, which respects the fourth kind of fury<sup>2</sup>, tends to the means by which any one, on perceiving a portion

<sup>1</sup> We not must understand by this, that the soul of a man becomes the soul of a brute; but that by way of punishment it is bound to the soul of a brute, or carried in it, just as dæmons reside in our souls. Hence all the energies of the rational soul are perfectly impeded, and its intellectual eye beholds nothing but the dark and tumultuous phantasms of a brutal life.

<sup>2</sup> The four kinds of fury are the prophetic, mystic, poetic, and amatory.

of terrene beauty, from a reminiscence of that which is true, may recover his wings, and, when he has recovered them, may struggle to fly away. But since he cannot accomplish this according to his wish, like a bird looking on high and despising inferior concerns, he is accused as one insanely affected. This enthusiasm<sup>1</sup>, therefore, is of all enthusiasms the best, and is composed from the best, both to the possessor and the participant: and he who is under the influence of this mania when he loves beautiful objects, is denominated a *lover*. For, as we have before observed, the soul of every man has from its nature perceived realities, or it could not have entered into the human form. But to recollect superior natures from objects of sense, is not easy to all men; neither to those who then were engaged but a short time in the contemplation of those divine objects; nor to those who descending hither have been unfortunate; nor to such as, turning to injustice from certain associations, have become oblivious of the sacred mysteries which they once beheld. And hence but a few remain whose memory is sufficient for this exalted purpose. But these, when they behold any similitude of supernal forms, they are astonished, and as it were rapt above themselves: and at the same time they are ignorant what this passion may be, because they are not endued with a sufficient perception. Indeed, we behold no splendour in similitudes which are here, of justice, temperance, and whatever else is precious in the soul; but very few are able, and even to these it is difficult, through certain dark instruments, to perceive from these images the genus of that which is represented. But we then saw splendid<sup>2</sup> beauty, when we obtained together with that happy choir, this blessed vision and contemplation. And we indeed beheld it together with Jupiter<sup>3</sup>, but others in  
 conjunction

<sup>1</sup> He who is agitated with this enthusiasm possesses that purification which is called by the Platonic philosophers *teletic*, because it is obtained by the exercise of mystic rites, and gives perfection to the soul.

<sup>2</sup> Plato every where speaks of the sun as analogous to the highest God. For as here the sun is the lord of the whole sensible world, so the first cause of the intelligible world. And as light is deduced from the lord the sun, which conjoins, connects, and unites that which is visible with that which is visible, after the same manner the light proceeding from the highest God, which light is truth, conjoins intellect with the intelligible. We may see, therefore, that beauty imitates this light: for it is as it were a light emitted from the fountain of intelligibles, to this world, which it calls upwards to itself, and becomes the source of union to lovers and the beloved.

<sup>3</sup> Plato, in the *Timæus*, says that the demiurgus, when he made the world, disseminated souls

conjunction with some other God; at the same time being initiated<sup>1</sup> in those mysteries which it is lawful to call the most blessed of all mysteries<sup>2</sup>.

And

equal in number to the stars, viz. as we have observed in the Introduction to that dialogue, equal according to analogy, and not as monadically considered. Now, therefore, in conformity to what is there asserted, he says, “we together with Jupiter,” as knowing his proper God. For this is the felicity of the human soul, to revolve in conjunction with its proper deities; since it is not possible to pass beyond the Gods.

<sup>1</sup> The word τελετη or *initiation*, says Hermeas, was so denominated from *rendering the soul perfect*, παρα το τελεαν ψυχην αποτελειν. The soul, therefore, was once perfect. But here it is divided, and is not able to energize wholly by itself. But it is necessary to know, says Hermeas, that *telete*, *muesis*, and *epopteia*, τελετη, μυησις and εποπτεια differ from each other. *Telete*, therefore, is analogous to that which is preparatory to purifications. But *muesis*, which is so called from closing the eyes, is more divine. For to close the eyes in *initiation* is no longer to receive by sense those divine mysteries, but with the pure soul itself. And *epopteia* is to be established in, and become a spectator of the mysteries. See more on this interesting subject in my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries.

<sup>2</sup> There is nothing belonging to antiquity more celebrated than the mysteries, and especially the Eleusinian, though the leading particulars of this august institution are perfectly unknown to the moderns, as I have shown in my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic mysteries. One circumstance in particular of the last importance, has been grossly misrepresented by that most consummate sophist Dr. Warburton, in his Divine Legation of Moses. The circumstance I allude to belongs to that part of the mysteries which is called εποπτεια, or *inspection*. For here the Gods themselves became actually apparent in splendid images to the eyes of the epoptæ, or initiated inspectors. And this, in the first place, is evident from the following passage of Proclus, in MS. Comment. on the first Alcibiades: Εν ταις αγιωταταις των τελετων, προ της θεου παρουσιας δαιμονων χθονιων τινων εκβολαι προφαινονται, και απο των αχραντων αγαθων εις την υλην προκαλουμεναι. i. e. “In the most holy of the mysteries, before the God appears, the impulses of certain terrestrial dæmons become visible, alluring (the initiated) from undefiled goods to matter.” And that by the most holy of mysteries he means the Eleusinian, is evident from his sixth book de Plat. Theol. p. 371. where he expressly calls them by this name. And still more expressly in his Commentary on Plato’s Republic, p. 380. Εν απασι ταις τελεταις και τοις μυστηριοις, οι θεοι πολλας μεν εαυτων προτεινουσι μορφας πολλα δε σχηματα εξαλλαττοντες φαινονται και τοτε μεν ατυπωτον αυτων προεβληται φως, τοτε δε εις ανθρωπειον μορφην εσχηματισμενον, τοτε δε εις αλλοιον τυπον προεληλυθως. i. e. “In all initiations and mysteries, the Gods exhibit many forms of themselves, and appear in a variety of shapes. And sometimes indeed an unfigured light of themselves is held forth to the view; sometimes this light is figured according to a human form, and sometimes it proceeds into a different shape.” And we are informed by Pfellus in a MS. on Dæmons that this evocation of divine natures formed one part of the sacerdotal office; though, says he, those who now preside over the mysteries, are ignorant of the incantation necessary to evocation. Αλλ’ οι γε νυν της τελετης προεξαρχον, την μεν της κλησεως ουκ ισασιν επωδην. This doctrine, too, of divine appearances in the mysteries is clearly confirmed by Plotinus, ennead. 1. lib. 6. p. 55. and ennead. 9. lib.

And these divine orgies were celebrated by us while we were perfect, and free from those evils which awaited us in a succeeding period of time. We likewise were initiated in, and became spectators of, entire <sup>1</sup>, simple, quietly stable <sup>2</sup>, and blessed visions, resident in a pure <sup>3</sup> light; being ourselves pure, and liberated from this surrounding vestment, which we denominate body, and to which we are now bound, like an oyster to its shell.

With these speculations, therefore, we should gratify our memory; for the sake of which, and through a desire of those realities which we once beheld, I have given such an extent to my discourse. But beauty, as we have said, shone upon us during our progressions with the Gods; but on our arrival hither we possessed the power of perceiving it, shining most perspicuously, through the clearest of our senses. For sight <sup>4</sup> is the most acute of all our corporeal senses; though even through this wisdom cannot be perceived. If indeed it could, what vehement love would it excite, by presenting to the eye some perspicuous image of itself! And the same may be

lib. 9. p. 770. From all this we may collect how egregiously Dr. Warburton was mistaken when, in page 231 of his *Divine Legation*, he asserts that the light beheld in the mysteries was nothing more than an illuminated image which the priest had purified. "This," says he, "which was all over illuminated, and which the priest had thoroughly purified, was *αγαλμα*, an image." But, indeed, his whole account of this divine institution is absurd, false, and ridiculous in the extreme. I only add, that the preceding observations plainly show to what Plato alludes in this part of the dialogue, by his *simple and blessed visions resident in a pure light*, and that we can no longer wonder why the initiated are reported to have been called *happy*.

<sup>1</sup> Viz. perfect.

<sup>2</sup> By this Plato indicates the firm and permanent nature of intelligibles.

<sup>3</sup> He says this because the light here is not pure, being mingled with the air.

<sup>4</sup> Plato now wishes to speak concerning the amatory character, and to show how it is led back from sensible to intelligible beauty. What he says, therefore, is this,—that intelligible beauty shines forth in an intelligible essence, together with the spectacles which are there, and that from this beauty, sensible beauty is unfolded into light. For, as the light proceeding from the sun illuminates the whole sensible world, so beauty, originating from intelligibles, pervades through the regions of sense. But he calls the sight the clearest of all the senses, because it is more acute than the rest. Hence, it is considered as analogous to fire by those who compare the senses to the elements. But its superior acuteness is evident from this, that when sound, and that which is visible, are produced together, as in the instance of thunder and lightning, we first see the lightning, and some time after the sound reaches our hearing. The reason of this is evident: for sight sees without time, or in an instant; but the other senses require time. Sight also is analogous to intellect: for as intellect sees all things indivisibly, so likewise sight. For it directly sees the interval which reaches from hence as far as to the heavens.

said of every thing else which is the object of love. But now beauty alone is allotted the privilege of being the most apparent and lovely of all things. He, therefore, who has not recently descended hither, or whose manners are depraved, will not very swiftly be excited from hence thither to a survey of the beautiful itself, by beholding that among sensible objects which receives the same appellation. Hence, he will not reverence it while he beholds it; but, giving himself up to pleasure, he will endeavour to walk about and generate after the manner of a quadruped: and, injuriously conversing with others, he will neither be afraid nor ashamed of pursuing pleasure contrary to nature. But he who has been recently initiated, and who formerly was a spectator of many blessed visions, when he beholds some deiform countenance, elegantly imitative of beauty, or some incorporeal idea, at first indeed he is struck with horror<sup>1</sup>, and feels something of that terror which formerly invaded him; but, from an after survey, he venerates it as a God: and if it was not for the dread of being thought vehemently insane, he would sacrifice to his beloved<sup>2</sup>, as to a statue and a God. But, in consequence of surveying this beautiful object, he experiences a mutation in his feelings, a perspiration and unaccustomed heat<sup>3</sup>, such as horror produces. For, receiving the influx of beauty through his eyes, he becomes hot, and this irrigates the nature of his wings; but when heated, whatever belongs to the germinating of his pinions liquefies, and which formerly being compressed through hardness restrained the vigour of their shoots. But an influx of nutriment

<sup>1</sup> It is well observed by Hermias, that it is necessary to consider what is here said vitally and intellectually. For, as we are seized with astonishment on beholding certain sensible particulars, so likewise in the vision of the Gods; not that it is such a terror as that which arises from the view of enemies approaching, but a terror better than a fear of this kind, through the transcendent fullness of the Gods. It is necessary, therefore, that the human soul should submit itself to the Gods, and to incorporeal forms which surpass our power, and should be seized with a terror better than human fear at the view of them, not as if they were dire, and dreadful, and resisting; for these are the indications of matter and earth-born natures. Plato, therefore, signifies by *horror*, an excitation from sensibles to intelligibles.

<sup>2</sup> That is, he would sacrifice to intelligible beauty, of which sensible beauty is the representation, similitude and image. For here, says Hermias, those who sacrifice to statues do not sacrifice to the matter itself, and the images, but to the Gods. *Και γὰρ ενταυθα οι τοις αγαλμασιν θυοντες ουκ αυτη ύλη θυουσι και ταις εικοσιν, αλλα τοις θεοις.*

<sup>3</sup> Heat here signifies the anagogic power of the soul, or that power which elevates her to intelligibles.

taking place, the quill of the wing swells, and endeavours to burst forth, through the whole form of the soul: for the whole was formerly winged. The whole, therefore, in this case, becomes fervid, and leaps upward. And as infants, during the growth of their teeth, are tormented with the friction and pain of their gums, in the same manner is the soul affected with respect to the shooting forth of its wings: for it becomes subject to an immoderate heat, titillation, and torment. When, therefore, it beholds the beauty of some human form, then imbibing the parts which flow from thence, and which is on this account called desire, it becomes irrigated and heated, ceases to be in pain, and rejoices. But when it is separated from this vision of beauty, and becomes dry through heat, then the orifices of the passages through which the feathers endeavoured to shoot forth, being closed, impede the offspring of the wing. But these being shut in together with desire, and leaping about like things subject to palpitation, strike against the avenues of their progression. Hence, the whole soul, becoming pierced on all sides in a circle, is agitated with fury, and tormented; but, through the memory of the beautiful, again exults with delight. But, from the mixture of both these, it is grievously tormented, through the novelty of the passion, and becomes dubious and raging; and, while it is thus furious, can neither sleep by night, nor abide any where by day; but runs about agitated by desire, wherever there is any probability of obtaining the vision of beauty. But beholding the beloved beautiful object, and deducing desire, as through a channel, it now frees from confinement what was before inclosed; and, by this means enjoying the benefit of respiration, is liberated from its incitements and parturitions. For the present, therefore, it reaps the advantage of this most delicious pleasure; by which it is so charmed, that it would never voluntarily depart from its allurements, nor does it esteem any thing so much as this beloved beauty, but delivers over to oblivion its parents, brethren, and friends; and, besides this, considers the dissipation of its possessions through negligence as a thing of no consequence, and perfectly despises those legal institutions and decencies in which it formerly gloried; and is always prepared for every kind of servitude and subjection, so that it may be near to the object of its desire. For, besides reverencing that which possesses beauty, it finds that this alone is the physician of its greatest diseases.

This passion therefore, O beautiful youth, which is the subject of my  
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present discourse, is called by men Love <sup>1</sup>: but if you should hear how it is denominated by the Gods, you would probably laugh, on account of your youth. But I think that certain Homeric affert, from some recondite verses, that there are two poems upon Love, one of which calls him perfectly injurious, and not very elegant; but they celebrate him as follows:

By men Love's *flying* called; but, forced to fly,  
He's named *the winged*, by the powers on high.

In these it is partly lawful to believe, and partly not. This however is the cause, and the passion of lovers. When any one, therefore, of the attendants upon Jupiter <sup>2</sup> is taken captive, such a one is able to bear with greater firmness the burthen of this winged God: but such as are subservient to Mars <sup>3</sup>, and revolve in conjunction with that deity, when they are ensnared by love, and think that they are in any respect treated unjustly by their beloved, they are easily incited to slaughter, and are ready to destroy both themselves and the objects of their regard. And thus every one honours the God, round whom he harmoniously revolves, and imitates his life as much

<sup>1</sup> Plato, says Hermeas, wishes to etymologize the name of Love, viz. the passion which is ingenerated in us from the beautiful. This passion is called by men *Love*, from *flowing inward*, but by the Gods winged, from its giving wings to the soul. But Plato, says Hermeas, calls Homeric those that sing the verses of Homer. He also denominates the above verses *recondite*, wishing to indicate the concealed, divine, and arcane nature of the assertion.

<sup>2</sup> For all the gifts of Jupiter, says Hermeas, are firm, stable, and always subsist after the same manner.

<sup>3</sup> For Mars is the source of division and motion. But it is necessary to know this universally, says Hermeas, that whatever is imparted by any divinity is received according to the peculiar aptitude of the recipient. Thus, for instance, says he, Venus bestows friendship and union; but since the illumination imparted by the Goddess is mingled with matter, the recipient often perverts her gift, and friendship becomes adultery, from being viciously received. For things are imparted in one way by the Gods, and are received in another by their participants. Thus also, when different substances become the recipients of the solar heat, one of these is liquefied as wax, and another is hardened as clay: for each receives what is given according to its proper essence, though the solar light has a uniform subsistence.

Hermeas adds, it may also be said, speaking more theoretically, that the *slaughter* which is here ascribed to Mars, signifies a divulsion from matter, through rapidly turning from it, and no longer energizing physically, but intellectually. For slaughter, when applied to the Gods, may be said to be an apostacy from secondary natures, just as slaughter here signifies a privation of the present life.

as possible, and as long as he remains free from corruption : and after this manner he lives here his first generation, and associates with, and conducts himself towards, his beloved and others. Every one, therefore, chooses the love of beauty after his own fashion, and, as if he considered it with respect to himself a God, he fabricates and adorns it like a statue, and as that which is the object of his adoration and sacrifice. Such, therefore, as are the followers of Jupiter seek after a soul belonging to this God for the object of their affection. Hence, they consider whether he is naturally philosophic, and adapted to command ; and when they find their beloved with such dispositions, they endeavour by all possible means to render him completely such. If, therefore, they have not already endeavoured to obtain what they desire, then, through the incitements of love, they anxiously strive for its possession ; learning by what means it may be acquired ; and investigating by themselves how to discover the nature of their proper deity, they at length find it, through being compelled to look with vehemence towards their presiding God. But when they become connected with him through memory, and are agitated by a divine influence, they receive from him manners and pursuits, as far it is possible for man to participate of divinity. And as they consider the object of their love as the cause of all this, their love becomes still more vehement. If, too, they draw their afflatus from Jupiter, then, like the female priestesses of Bacchus, they pour their enthusiasm into the soul of their beloved, and by this means become as much as possible most similar to their ruling God. But such as follow Juno<sup>1</sup> seek after a royal soul ; which when they have discovered, they act in every respect towards it in a manner similar to the attendant on Jupiter. But the followers of Apollo, and of each of the other Gods, imitating their several deities, seek after a beloved object who is naturally affected like themselves. This when they have obtained, both by imitation, persuasion, and elegant manners, they endeavour by all means to lead their beloved to the pursuits and idea of their peculiar God ; not, indeed, by employing envy and illiberal malevolence towards the objects of their affection, but by endeavouring to conduct them to a perfect similitude to the God whom they particularly adore.

<sup>1</sup> Of the two divinities, Juno and Apollo, that are here mentioned, says Hermeas, the former converts all things through empire, and the latter leads all things to symphony and union.

The willing desire, therefore, and end of true lovers, if they obtain the object of their pursuit, is such as I have described: and thus they become illustrious and blessed, through the fury of love towards the beloved, when the beloved object is once obtained.

But every one who is allured is captivated in the following manner. In the beginning of this fable<sup>1</sup>, we assigned a triple division to every soul; and we established two certain species as belonging to the form of the horses, and considered the charioteer as the third species. Let this division, therefore, remain the same for us at present. But one of the horses, we said, was good, and the other not. But we have not yet declared what the virtue is of the good horse, or the vice of the bad one; it is therefore proper that we should now declare it. The good horse<sup>2</sup>, therefore, subsists in a more beautiful

<sup>1</sup> Socrates having spoken concerning that love which subsists according to rectitude, and also concerning that which subsists according to a deviation from rectitude, and having, therefore, discussed the extremes, he now wishes to speak about the media, viz. temperate and intemperate love. As, therefore, he speaks of the soul considered as associating with the body, he very properly gives to it other horses: for, in proportion as the soul descends into generation, and approaches to these tempestuous realms, she receives a greater number of vestments. Hence, he discourses concerning other horses, viz. such as possess a habitude to this body, and participate of its vital passions. For the soul while she lives in the intelligible world has other horses, which are characterized by *sameness* and *difference*. This indeed is evident, for antient theology gives horses even to the Gods themselves. Now, therefore, he considers other horses, viz. anger and desire, and calls his discourse concerning them a *fable*, which he did not before, when speaking of the horses of divine natures, and of the human soul herself when liberated from this terrene body. The reason of this, as Hermeas beautifully observes, is, because the soul is in this body as in a *fiction*. For the whole apparent body with which we are surrounded, and all the visible order of things, is similar to a *fable*. Very properly, therefore, does Socrates, wishing to speak concerning the habitude, proximity, or alliance of the soul to this body, call his discourse a fable. But he did not call what he said prior to this a fable, because the soul while living on high with the Gods had other horses. He also here calls the rational soul *ννιοχιος*, of the nature of a charioteer, and not *ννιοχος*, a charioteer, as in what he said prior to this; signifying that the rational soul in the present body only imitates a charioteer. In speaking of the horses, too, he uses the word *ιππομορφω*, or *having the form of horses*, and not *ιπποι*, *horses*, as before. For the energies of the soul in conjunction with body are not such as when she is united with intelligibles.

<sup>2</sup> The divine Plato, says Hermeas, distributes the parts of the soul into different parts of the body. Hence, considering intellect and the reasoning power as analogous to the ruler of a city, he establishes them in the brain: for the brain is spherical, and man is a microcosm. He makes the brain, therefore, analogous to the heavens. In the next place, since *anger* is naturally more noble

beautiful condition, is erect, well-articulated, has its neck lofty, its nose somewhat aquiline, its colour white, and its eyes black. It is likewise a lover of honour <sup>1</sup>, together with temperance and modesty; is the companion of true opinion, is not whipped, and is only to be governed by exhortation and reason. But the bad one is crooked <sup>2</sup>, various, rash in its motions, stiff and

noble than *desire*, and is analogous to those in a city that fight for its defence, and repress whatever is disorderly and tumultuous in it, and whom he calls *auxiliaries*; since anger also reproves and opposes desire,—hence he fixes it in the heart, that it may be in the vestibules of reason, being only separated from the brain by that interval the neck. But the desiderative part, as being irrational and similar to the *mercenary* tribe and the multitude in a city, he places in the liver, as an ass at a manger. Anger, therefore, is more noble than desire, as being nearer to reason; and hence it has a better station, for it is arranged in a better region. He says, therefore, in the first place concerning anger, that it is more beautiful, and is impressed with forms, at one time from the body, and at another from the manners and the soul. He calls it *straight*, because it receives the measures of reason; *well-articulated*, i. e. of a distinct, and not of a mixed nature; and having its *neck lofty*, i. e. always extending itself, and despising things of a worse condition. He also says that it has an *aquiline nose*, indicating by this its royal nature: for the hooked or aquiline, says Hermeas, is always given by Plato to that which is royal and noble; and the aquiline is of a more elegant form than the flat nose. He adds, that it is *white* to the view; indicating that it is most splendid and shining with beauty; also, that its *eyes are black*, viz. investigating things profound, and wishing to survey unapparent and intelligible natures: for he calls the unapparent black.

<sup>1</sup> Plato having related the prerogatives which the better of the two horses possesses from the body, now enumerates those which it possesses from the soul. Honour, then, is the greatest of goods, as he says in the *Laws*; but nothing evil is honourable. On which account also we honour Divinity. The good horse, therefore, is a lover of honour; that is, it aspires after form and the good: But it also loves honour in conjunction with temperance, i. e. it possesses these prerogatives of the soul, performs things pertaining to itself, and is not willing to be filled with the contrary. It is likewise only to be governed by reason and exhortation, as being near to reason, and directing by its measures all the measures of its own life.

<sup>2</sup> Plato here speaks concerning the worse of the two horses, and imitates its mingled nature. For he no longer speaks first concerning the prerogatives of the body, and afterwards concerning those of the soul, but he confuses the order. In opposition, therefore, to what he had asserted of the more noble horse, he says of this, that it is *crooked*, as being characteristic of desire; for desire is similar to a wild beast: *various*, for this epithet also is accommodated to desire, which is multiform, and the friend of multitude; and *rash in its motions*, as being hurried along by casual impulse. He also adds, that it is *stiff*; indicating by this its *resisting* nature: that it is *short-necked*, as being abject, living according to desire, and not aspiring after honour: *flat-nosed*, as being vile, grovelling, and not royal: *of a black colour*, as being dark, and not clear and shining like the other: *having its eyes gray*, as being only superficially splendid, and possessing intellects only

and short-necked, flat-nosed, of a black colour, having its eyes gray, and being full of blood; is the companion of injury and arrogance, has its ears hairy and deaf, and is scarcely obedient to the whip and the spur. When, therefore, the charioteer beholds the amatory eye inflaming all the soul, through sensible perception, and filling it with the incentives of titillation and desire, then, as always, the horse which is obedient to the charioteer, violently checking its motions, through shame restrains itself from leaping on the beloved object. But the other cannot be held back, either by the spur or whip of the charioteer; but hurries along violently, leaping and exulting, and, fully employing the charioteer and its associate, compels both of them to rush along with it to venereal delight. Both these, however, resist its violence from the beginning, and indignantly endure to be thus compelled to such dire and lawless conduct. But at length, when there is no end of the malady, in consequence of being borne along by compulsion, they now give way, consent to do what they are ordered, and deliver themselves up to the survey of the splendid aspect of the beloved. But the charioteer, from a vision of this kind, recovers the memory of the nature of beauty, and again perceives it firmly established, together with temperance, in a pure and holy<sup>1</sup> feat. In consequence, however, of such a perception he is terrified, and through reverence falls supine, and at the same time is compelled to draw back the reins with such vehemence, that both the horses fall upon their hips; the one indeed willingly, through his not making any resistance; but the other with arrogant opposition, through his extreme unwillingness to comply. But when they have departed to a greater distance in their course, the one, through shame and astonishment, moistens all the soul with sweat; but the other, being liberated from the pain which he had suffered through the bridle and the fall, is scarcely able to breathe, and, full of anger, reviles the charioteer and his partner in the course, as deserting order and

only as far as to the phantasy: *being full of blood*, i. e. being most allied to generation: *the companion of injury and arrogance*, as possessing properties directly contrary to the other horse; for that was the associate of temperance and modesty: *has its ears hairy and deaf*, as being unobedient, and often hearing a thing without attending to it: and, lastly, *is scarcely obedient to the whip and the spur*, as not capable of being benefited by exhortation.

<sup>1</sup> i. e. In the intelligible; for such is the intelligible region, since the beauties which are here are not *genuinely* beautiful.

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the compact through effeminacy and fear; and again compelling them to proceed, though perfectly unwilling, he scarcely complies with them, requesting some delay. But when the appointed time for which the delay was granted arrives, and which they feign themselves to have forgotten, then the vicious horse, violently urging, neighing, and hurrying them away, compels them to address the beloved again in the same language as before. When, therefore, they approach near, then bending and extending his tail, and champing the bridle, he draws them along with importunate impudence. But the charioteer, being still more affected in this manner, and falling down as it were from the goal, pulls back the reins with still greater violence from the teeth of the injurious horse, represses his reviling tongue and bloody jaws, fixes his legs and hips on the ground, and thus torments him for his behaviour. But when the vicious horse has often endured a punishment of this kind, he is at length rendered humble and submissive, and follows the providential directions of the charioteer; so that he is lost as it were on seeing a beautiful object. Hence it sometimes happens, that the soul of a lover follows its beloved with reverence and fear, and that the lover pays it every kind of observance and attention as if it was equal to a God; and this not with any dissimulation, but in consequence of being really thus affected: so that, when the beloved happens to be naturally a friend, then his friendship conspires into one with that of his obsequious lover.

If, therefore, in some former period of time, he has been deceived by his associates, or by some other persons, asserting that it was base to be familiar with a lover, and has on this account rejected his lover; yet advancing age, and the wants of nature, lead him to the converse of love. For it was never decreed by fate, either that the evil should be a friend to the evil, or that the good should not be a friend to the good. When, therefore, the youth admits his lover to an intimate familiarity with him, then the benevolence of the lover astonishes the beloved, in consequence of perceiving that all other friends and associates exhibit no portion of friendship which can be compared with that of a friend divinely inspired. But when the lover continues to act in this manner for a long space of time, living with his beloved in high familiarity, frequently touching him in gymnastics and other associations, then the fountain of that effluxion which Jupiter, when enamoured with Ganymedes, denominated *desire*, streaming abundantly

towards the lover, is partly infused into him, and partly through its exuberance flows forth externally. And as air, or a certain echo, when received by smooth and solid bodies, is again impelled to the place from whence it proceeded; so this effluxion of beauty, flowing back again to the beautiful through the eyes, as it is naturally adapted to penetrate into the soul, and stimulate the avenues of the wings, now irrigates, and excites them to shoot forth their feathers, and fills the soul of the beloved with love. Hence he loves, but is doubtful concerning what he loves; and neither knows what he suffers, nor is able to relate it: but just like an eye infected with the vision of another eye which is diseased, he is unable to assign the cause of his malady, and is ignorant that he beholds himself in his lover, as in a mirror. Hence, when his lover is present, he, like him, ceases to be in pain; but, when he is absent, he desires in the same manner as he is desired, possessing, instead of love, nothing more than an image of love; and he denominates it, and thinks that it is not love, but friendship. He desires, therefore, in a manner similar to his lover, though more feebly, to see, to touch, to love, to sit together; and, as it is reasonable to suppose, he performs all this afterwards with the greatest celerity. Hence, in their most intimate associations, the intemperate horse of the lover calls on the charioteer, and tells him that he ought to be gratified with a small degree of pleasure, as the reward of such mighty labours: but the same horse of the beloved has, indeed, nothing to say; but, distended and dubious, it embraces the lover, full of vehement benevolence towards him, and is prepared to comply in every respect with the desires of the beloved. But the conjoined horse, together with the charioteer, resists this familiarity through reason and shame. If, therefore, the better parts of the dianoëtic power obtaining the victory lead the lovers to an orderly and philosophic mode of conduct, then they pass through the present life with felicity and concord, subduing themselves, and adorned with modest manners; the vicious part of the soul being in subjection, and the virtuous, free. But, arriving at the end of the present life, they become winged and light, in consequence of being victors in one of the truly Olympic contests<sup>1</sup>; a greater good than which, neither  
human

<sup>1</sup> These contests are denominated Olympic, not from the mountain Olympus, but from Olympus, heaven. But he who philosophizes truly becomes the victor in three contests. In the first place,

human temperance, nor divine fury, can extend to man. But if they lead a more arrogant and unphilosophic life, but at the same time united with ambition, their intemperate horse will perhaps lead their unguarded souls into intoxication, or some other indolent habits; cause them to embrace those delights which the multitude consider as the most blessed of all pleasures; and will fix them in continual endeavours to gain the object of their desire. They will, therefore, exercise themselves in these delights, but this, however, rarely; because the whole of the dianoëtic nature does not consent to such enjoyments. These too will live in friendship with each other, as well as the former, through the external effluxion of love, but in a less fervent degree; thinking that they ought both to give and receive from each other the greatest confidence, which it is unlawful to dissolve, and by this means become enemies instead of friends. But, in their exit from the present body, they will not be winged indeed, but will be excited to emit their pinions; so that they will carry with them no small reward of amatory fury. For the law forbids those who are now beginning the celestial progression, to enter into darkness, and the subterranean journey; but orders them, in consequence of leading a splendid life, to be happy with each other during their progressions; and that, when they are similarly winged, this shall take place for the sake of love. Such then, O young man, so numerous, and so divine are the benefits which the friendship of a lover will confer on you. But the familiarity of one who is void of love, being mingled with mortal temperance, and dispensing mortal and niggardly concerns, will generate in the soul of its friendly associate that illiberality which is considered as virtue by the vulgar, and will cause it to wander for nine thousand years with a rolling motion upon and under the earth.

place, he subjects all the inferior powers of his soul to intellect; in the second place, he obtains wisdom, in conjunction with divine fury; and, in the third place, recovering his wings, he flies away to his kindred star. But if any one, through the generosity of his nature, happens to be more propense to love, and yet has not been from the beginning philosophically and morally educated, and hence, after he has been ensnared by love, gives way perhaps to venereal delights; such a one, in consequence of a lapse of this kind, cannot recover his wings entire, yet, on account of the wonderful anagogic power of love, he will be prepared for their recovery. Hence, when in a course of time he has amputated his lust, and, retaining the sublimity of love, has formed a virtuous friendship, he will not after the present life be precipitated into the lowest region of punishment, but will be purified in the air, till he has philosophized in the highest degree.

And thus, O beloved Love, through the impulse of Phædrus, we have rendered and extended to thee a recantation, clothed in poetic figures and expressions, in the most beautiful and best manner we are able to accomplish. Wherefore, pardoning what we before asserted, and gratefully <sup>1</sup> receiving our present discourse, continue benignantly and propitiously the amatory art <sup>2</sup> which you have conferred on me, neither taking away nor diminishing its possession through avenging anger. But grant, that among such as are beautiful I may yet be more honoured than at present. And if Phædrus and I have formerly said any thing severe against thy divinity, grant that, accusing Lyfias as the author of such a discourse, we may desist from all such assertions in future; and besides this, graciously convert him to the study of philosophy, like his brother Polemarchus, so that this lover of his may no longer tend hither and thither, without any stability, as is the case at present, but may ingenuously pass his life in future, in conjunction with love and philosophic discourses.

PHÆDR. I unite with you in prayer, Socrates, if it is better that all this should happen to us. But I have some time since wondered at your discourse; as it so far surpasses that which was formerly delivered, that I am afraid, lest Lyfias himself should appear but mean, if he is desirous to enter the lists against another. And, indeed, but lately a very principal person in the commonwealth branded him with this very epithet; calling him, through the whole of his accusation, nothing more than a composer of orations. Perhaps, therefore, he will desist through ambition from writing any more.

Soc. You assert, O young man, a ridiculous opinion; and you very much wander from the intention of your associate, if you think him so extremely timid: but perhaps you think that his reviler has spoken the truth in what he has said against him.

<sup>1</sup> It is well observed here by Hermeas, that Socrates uses the word *gratefully*, not as if the Gods received any *favour* from us, but because we *gratify* ourselves through worshipping the divinities, in consequence of becoming allied to and familiar with them.

<sup>2</sup> Should it be asked why Socrates now calls that an *art* which he had before denominated *enthusiastic*, we reply with Hermeas, that he says this because it is necessary to excite the artificial theorems which we possess, and thus afterwards receive the illuminations from the Gods.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. To me it appears so indeed, Socrates: and you yourself know, that the most powerful and venerable in a city are ashamed to compose orations, and to leave their writings behind them, dreading the opinion of posterity, lest they should be called sophists.

Soc. You are ignorant, Phædrus, that the proverb, *A couch is pleasant*, is derived from that long curvature which is about the Nile<sup>1</sup>: and, besides this, you are ignorant that the most prudent of politicians particularly love to compose orations, and to leave their writings behind them; and are so fond of those who extol their works, as to give the first place in their writings to such as celebrate their productions every where.

PHÆDR. How do you mean? For I do not understand you.

Soc. What, do not you know that, in the beginning of a politician's book, the very first thing that makes its appearance is the person by whom the book is praised?

PHÆDR. How?

Soc. Why, it says, that it is approved by the council, or the people, or by both. And he who says this, says it, at the same time extremely reverencing and celebrating himself as the author. But after this he speaks in such a manner as to show his wisdom to his admirers, and sometimes accomplishes this in a very long discourse. Does this, therefore, appear to you to be any thing else than a written oration?

PHÆDR. It does not.

Soc. If, therefore, this happens to be approved, he departs rejoicing from the theatre, like a poet. But if it should be rejected, and he should be excluded from composing orations, and should be considered as unworthy to be an author, both he and his friends are afflicted on the account.

PHÆDR. And, indeed, very much so.

Soc. In this, therefore, it is sufficiently evident, that they do not despise a study of this kind, but hold it in the highest estimation.

PHÆDR. Entirely so.

Soc. But what, when a rhetorician, or a king, acquires an ability like

<sup>1</sup> This is said according to that figure in Rhetoric which is called *αντιφρασις*, or *opposition*: for this long curvature about the Nile, according to Hermeas, was a place where there was much molestation.

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that of Lycurgus, or Solon, or Darius, so as to be reckoned an immortal writer by the city, will he not think himself equal to a God, while he is yet alive? and will not posterity entertain the same opinion respecting him, upon surveying his writings?

PHÆDR. Very much so.

Soc. Do you think then that any such person, however malevolent he may be, would revile Lysias, merely because he is a writer?

PHÆDR. It does not seem probable from what you have said: for he would revile, as it appears, his own pursuit.

Soc. From hence, therefore, it must be evident to every one, that no one is scandalous merely from composing orations.

PHÆDR. For how should he?

Soc. But this I think is in reality shameful, not to write and speak in a becoming manner, but shamefully and viciously.

PHÆDR. Evidently so. What then is the mode of writing well and ill?

Soc. Have we not occasion, Phædrus, to inquire this of Lysias or of some other, who has either at any time written any thing, or is about to write; whether his composition is political, or on private subjects; whether it is in measure like the works of a poet, or without measure like those of a private person?

PHÆDR. Do you ask, if we have not occasion? For what purpose, as I may say, is our very life, but for the sake of pleasures of this kind? For, certainly, it is not for the sake of those pleasures which pain must necessarily antecede, or else no pleasure would subsist; which is nearly the case with all pleasures respecting the body. And, on this account, they are very justly denominated servile.

Soc. But we have leisure, as it appears: and the grasshoppers seem to me singing over our heads, as in the heat, and, discoursing with one another, to look also upon us. If, therefore, they should behold us, like the multitude, not discoursing in mid-day, but sleeping and allured by their singing, through the indolence of our dianoëtic power, they might very justly deride us; thinking that certain slaves had taken up their abode with them, in order to sleep like cattle by the side of the fountain during the fervour of the meridian sun. But if they perceive us engaged in discourse, and not captivated by  
 9 their

their allurements as if they were Syrens, but failing by them to our destined port, perhaps they will rejoice to bestow upon us that gift which, by the consent of the Gods, they are able to deliver to men.

PHÆDR. But what gift is this which they possess? For I do not recollect that I ever heard what it is <sup>1</sup>.

Soc. And yet it is not proper that a man studious of the Muses should be ignorant of things of this kind. But it is said that these insects were formerly men <sup>2</sup>, before the Muses had a being; that when the Muses made their appearance, and had given birth to the song, some of these were so ensnared by the pleasure which it produced, that through singing they neglected the proper sustenance of the body, and, thus wasting away, at length perished: but that from these the race of grasshoppers was produced, who received this

<sup>1</sup> According to Jamblichus and Hermeas, dæmons are signified by the grasshoppers in this fable; and this is by no means wonderful, since in the preceding part of this dialogue, which is full of allegory, something more divine than dæmons is implied by the horses of the Gods. Besides, the office which is here assigned to grasshoppers perfectly corresponds with the employment which Plato in the Banquet attributes to benevolent dæmons: for they stand as it were over our heads, discourse with each other, and in the mean time speculate our affairs, disapprove our evil deeds, and commend such as are good; all which is likewise confirmed by Hesiod in his Works and Days. Besides, they receive divine gifts, and deliver them to us, approach to the Muses, and relate our actions to the Gods. In consequence of this correspondence, Jamblichus and Hermeas conclude with great probability that aerial dæmons are signified in this place by grasshoppers. For, as these animals live perpetually singing, and imbibe the air through a found of this kind; so beneficent aerial dæmons live in the air, through perpetually celebrating divine natures.

<sup>2</sup> According to Hermeas, the interpretation of this place by the divine Jamblichus is as follows: Socrates calls men souls dwelling in the intelligible world: for souls before they live a mortal life abide on high in the intelligible, contemplating forms themselves together with the supermundane Gods. Thus then men were before the Muses had a being, that is, before the spheres and the sensible world; not that the term *before*, signifies here temporal precedency, but a subsistence \* prior to this apparent progression of the spheres. For this is the generation of the Muses, an apparent subsistence, proceeding from the demiurgus into the sensible world. The Muses, therefore, and the spheres, the sensible world, and the whole soul of the universe, and the partial souls of men, had a consubstitent progression. These souls, too, as being recently born, and remembering what they had seen in the intelligible region, were averse to generation, and were unwilling to eat and drink, i. e. were not willing to partake of sensible opinion; for they possessed intelligible nutriment. Hence, wasting away, they at length perished, i. e. they reascended to the intelligible.

\* Viz. an *unapparent* subsistence: for this is prior to an *apparent* subsistence; in the same way as every cause, so far as it is a cause, is prior to its effect, though it may be temporally consubstitent with it.

gift

gift<sup>1</sup> from the Muses, that they should never want nutriment, but should continue singing without meat or drink till they died; and that after death they should depart to the Muses, and inform them what Muse was honoured by some particular person among us. Hence that, by acquainting Terpsichore with those who reverence her in the dance<sup>2</sup>, they render her propitious to such. By informing Erato of her votaries, they render her favourable in amatory concerns; and the rest in a similar manner, according to the species of veneration belonging to each. But that they announce to the most antient Calliope, and after her to Urania, those who have lived in the exercise of philosophy, and have cultivated the music over which they preside; these Muses more than all the rest being conversant with the heavens, and with both divine and human discourse; and sending forth the

<sup>1</sup> He who lives according to intellect, says Hermeas, who is a lover of the Muses, and a philosopher, in consequence of wishing to reascend to the Gods, does not require the care of the body and of a corporeal life; but considers these as nothing, being desirous to be separated from them. For he meditates death, i. e. a departure from the present life, as he knows that the body molests and impedes the energies of intellect. But the *gift* which is here mentioned signifies the soul becoming the attendant of its proper God. Hermeas adds: It is however necessary to know that a divine nature is present to all things without a medium, but that we are incapable of being conjoined with divinity, without the medium of a dæmoniackal nature; just as we behold the light of the sun through the ministrant intervention of the air.

<sup>2</sup> Dancing here must not be understood literally, as if Terpsichore was propitious to those who engage in that kind of dancing which is the object of sense; for this would be ridiculous. We must say, therefore, as Hermeas beautifully observes, that there are divine dances: in the first place, that of the Gods; in the second place, that of divine souls: in the third place, the revolution of the celestial divinities, viz. of the seven planets, and the inerratic sphere, is called a dance: in the fourth place, those who are initiated in the mysteries\* perform a certain dance: and, in the last place, the whole life of a philosopher is a dance. Terpsichore, therefore, is the inspective guardian of all dancing. Who then are those that honour the goddesses in the dance? Not those who dance well, but those who live well through the whole of the present existence, elegantly arranging their life, and dancing in symphony with the universe. Erato, says Hermeas, is denominated from Love, and from making the works of Love, lovely: for she cooperates with Love. Calliope is denominated from the eye (*παρα την οπα*); and Urania presides over astronomy. Through these two goddesses we preserve our rational part from being in subjection to the irrational nature. For, through sight surveying the order of the celestial Gods, we properly arrange our irrational part. And further still, through rhythms, philosophy, and hearing, we elegantly dispose that which we contain of the disorderly and void of rhythm.

\* Επειτα και ενταυθα οι τελουμενοι τοις θεοις χορειαν τινα αποτελουσιν εν τοις μυστηριοις.

most beautiful voice. On many accounts, therefore, it is necessary to say something, and not to sleep in mid-day.

PHÆDR. It is necessary, indeed.

SOC. Let us, therefore, consider what we lately spoke of, viz. after what manner any one may both speak and write properly, or improperly.

PHÆDR. By all means.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, necessary, that he who is about to speak with propriety should possess a true <sup>1</sup> dianoëtic perception of that which is the subject of his discourse?

PHÆDR. I have heard, my dear Socrates, that it is not necessary that he who engages in the profession of an orator should learn what is truly just <sup>2</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> Plato here teaches how to write, and what the mode is of writing and speaking well or ill, making the problem more universal and scientific, after having referred the whole beginning of the discourse to the Muses and the Gods. But as that which is distorted is judged of by a rule, and that which is not straight by the straight, so that which is false can only be accurately known by truth. Hence, he says, in speaking or writing well, it is necessary that truth, and a knowledge of the subject, should precede as the leaders. For he who does not know the truth of a thing speaks conjecturally about it. Three things, therefore, are said to be present with those who speak or write. First, a knowledge of the truth. In the second place, an ability of making one thing many, which is the business of the divisive method: for by this we know the various significations of the thing proposed, if it should happen to be many, whether it is homonymous or synonymous, whether genus or species, and the like. There must necessarily, therefore, be the divisive method. In the third place, the many must be collected into one, which is the business of the analytic and definitive methods: for to be able to collect many things into one sentence, is to give the definition of a thing. Afterwards, the composition and ornament of the discourse must succeed. These, then, as the instruments of speaking and writing, ought to be known before every thing, viz. the nature and the essence, or, in other words, the truth of a thing. For thus we shall know how we ought to proceed, whether through such things as are true, or through such as are assimilated to the truth. For he who does not know the truth, but only has an opinion concerning it, like those who possess popular rhetoric, will often persuade his hearers to the contrary of what he wishes.

Afterwards, the philosopher relates how many goods are derived from true rhetoric, and how many evils happen from that which is falsely denominated.

<sup>2</sup> There are three parts of rhetoric, *that which counsels*, (*το συμβουλευτικον*), *the forensic*, (*το δικανικον*), and *the panegyric*, (*το πανηγυρικον*). And with respect to the ends of these three, the just is the end of the forensic; good, of that which counsels; and beauty, of the panegyric. According to opposition, likewise, the just and the unjust are the ends of the forensic; good and evil of that which counsels; and the beautiful and the base, of the panegyric. A certain duplicity also appears about each of these: about the forensic, accusation and defence; about that which counsels, exhortation and dehortation; and, about the panegyric, praise and blame.

but only that which appears so to the multitude, who undertake to judge ; nor, again, what is truly good or beautiful, but only what appears to be so : for that persuasion is derived from these, and not from truth.

Soc. The sayings of the wife, Phædrus, are by no means to be despised, but we should rather consider the meaning of their assertions ; and, consequently, we must not pass by what you have now said.

PHÆDR. You speak properly.

Soc. Let us then consider this matter as follows.

PHÆDR. How ?

Soc. Suppose I should persuade you to fight your enemies on horseback, but at the same time both of us should be ignorant what a horse is ; and that I only should know respecting you, that Phædrus thinks a horse is an animal which has the greatest ears of all domestic animals.

PHÆDR. This would be ridiculous indeed, Socrates.

Soc. Not yet ; but when I should earnestly persuade you to do this by a discourse composed in praise of an ass, calling him a horse, and asserting that he is a most excellent animal, useful for domestic and military purposes, able to carry burthens, and adapted for a variety of other employments.

PHÆDR. This, indeed, would be perfectly ridiculous.

Soc. Is it not, therefore, better that a friend should be ridiculous, than that he should be wicked, and an enemy ?

PHÆDR. It appears so.

Soc. When an orator, therefore, who is ignorant of good and evil, endeavours to persuade a city in a like condition, not indeed by praising the shadow of an ass, as if it was that of a horse, but by praising evil, as if it was good, being anxiously solicitous about the opinion of the multitude, and thus persuades them to do evil instead of good ; what crop do you think the orator can reap after such a sowing ?

PHÆDR. Not a very good one.

Soc. Have we not therefore, my friend, reviled the art of speaking in a more rustic manner than is becoming ? For the art itself will, perhaps, thus address us : “ What delirium, O wonderful men, has invaded you ? For I compel no one who is ignorant of truth to learn how to speak : but if any one will take my advice, he will then only employ me, when he has acquired the possession of truth. This, then, I assert as a thing of great consequence,

consequence, that without me even he who knows realities will not, for all this, be able to procure persuasion." Will not the art, therefore, speak justly, by making such a declaration?

PHÆDR. I confess it, if our subsequent reasons evince that rhetoric is an art. For I think I have heard some arguments, which assert that it deceives, and that it is not an art, but an unartificial exercise. But the true art of speaking, says Laco, never was, nor ever will be unaccompanied by truth. This then is what they say<sup>1</sup>, Socrates. But, bringing them hither, let us inquire of them what they assert, and in what manner.

Soc. Be present then, ye generous animals, and persuade the beautiful youth, Phædrus, that unless he philosophizes sufficiently, he will never sufficiently speak about any thing. But let Phædrus answer to the interrogations. Is not the whole rhetorical art that which leads the soul by discourses, not in judicial matters only, and other public concerns, but also in private affairs, and these whether trifling or important? And is there any thing more honourable than to act according to the true rules of this art, both in important and inconsiderable affairs? Or have you not heard that this is the case?

PHÆDR. I am not, by Jupiter, perfectly acquainted with all this. But it is spoken of, and written about, as an art for the most part conversant with judicial matters and speeches; but I have not heard that it extends any further.

Soc. What, have you heard of the rhetorical art which Nestor and Ulysses exercised at Troy, but have never heard about that of Palamedes?

PHÆDR. I have indeed, by Jupiter, heard about the orations of Nestor: unless you will prove that Gorgias is a certain Nestor, or Thrasymachus and Theodorus a certain Ulysses.

Soc. Perhaps they may be so; but let us drop any further discourse about these. And do you inform me what litigators do in judicial matters: do they not contradict? Or shall we say they do any thing else?

PHÆDR. Nothing else.

<sup>1</sup> Hermeas here asks whether rhetoricians are philosophic; and he says in reply, that good rhetoricians cannot be formed without philosophy. For the more celebrated among the antient rhetoricians were philosophic. Thus, Pericles was the associate of Anaxagoras, and Demosthenes of Plato.

SOC. But are not their contradictions about *just* and *unjust*?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. But does not he who accomplishes this by art, cause the same thing to appear to the same persons, whenever he pleases, at one time just, and at another time unjust?

PHÆDR. But what then?

SOC. And in his oration does he not cause the same things to appear to the city at one time good, and at another time just the contrary?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. And do we not know that the Eleatic Palamedes is reported to have been able by his art to cause the same things to appear to his hearers, both similar and dissimilar, one and many, abiding and borne along?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. The contradictory art, therefore, takes place, not only in judicial matters and orations, but, as it appears, about every thing which is the subject of discourse; since it is one art, enabling us to assimilate every thing to every thing, both such things as are capable of assimilation, and those to which they are able to be assimilated; and, besides this, to lead them into light, notwithstanding their being assimilated and concealed by something else.

PHÆDR. How do you mean?

SOC. My meaning will appear in the following inquiries: Does deception subsist in things which differ much, or but a little, from each other?

PHÆDR. In things which differ but a little.

SOC. But, by making a transition according to small advances, you will effect a greater concealment, while passing on to that which is contrary, than you will by a transition according to great advances.

PHÆDR. How should it not be so?

SOC. It is necessary, therefore, that he who is about to deceive another should accurately know the similitude and dissimilitude of things.

PHÆDR. It is necessary.

SOC. Is it possible, therefore, that he who is ignorant of the truth of every thing can judge concerning the similitude, whether great or small, which subsists in other things?

PHÆDR. It is impossible.

SOC.

Soc. It is evident, therefore, that such as conceive opinions contrary to the truth of things, and who are deceived, are thus affected through certain similitudes.

PHÆDR. The case is so.

Soc. Can, therefore, he who is ignorant about the nature of each particular, artificially deliver any thing, by passing according to small advances into its contrary, through similitudes? Or can such a one avoid falling into error?

PHÆDR. He cannot.

Soc. Hence then, my friend, he who is ignorant of truth, and is led by opinion, will, as it appears, exhibit a ridiculous and inartificial rhetoric.

PHÆDR. It appears so.

Soc. Are you willing, therefore, both in the oration of Lysias, which you now carry about you, and in that which we delivered, to see what we have asserted without art, and what is agreeable to art?

PHÆDR. I am above all things willing. For we speak at present in a trifling manner, as we are without sufficient examples.

Soc. But, indeed, as it appears, some reasons have been given, through the assistance of a certain fortune, which have all the force of examples, evincing that he who knows the truth will, even while he jests in his discourse, attract his auditors. And I consider, O Phædrus, the local Gods as the cause of this. Perhaps, also, the interpreters of the Muses, singing over our heads, have inspired us with this ability: for I myself participate of no art<sup>1</sup> belonging to discourse.

PHÆDR. Let it be as you say; only render what you assert evident.

Soc. Come then, read over the beginning of Lysias's oration.

PHÆDR. " You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs; and you

<sup>1</sup> It was usual with Socrates to deny that he possessed any invention of his own, and to refer all things to the Gods. But there is, says Hermias, a communion between us and the Gods, our soul being thence illuminated both without a medium, and through the middle genera of beings. Providence, therefore, says he, is twofold; for it is either that of the superior Gods themselves, or it takes place through the more excellent genera, such as angels, dæmons, and heroes, and the local Gods. Socrates, therefore, ascribes such an order and management of words to the local Gods. But he signifies by the singing over his head the more excellent genera, the attendants of the Gods: For it is always requisite to call that which transcends, a dæmon; as, for instance, the rational is the dæmon of the irrational part, and a God is the dæmon of intellect.

have

have heard, I think, that it is most conducive to my advantage for them to subsist in this manner. But it appears to me, that I am not unworthy to be deprived of what I wish to obtain, because I am not one of your lovers: for lovers, when their desires cease, repent themselves of the benefits which they have bestowed."

SOC. Stop there: are we not then to show, in what he is faulty, and in what respect he has acted without art?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. Is it not, therefore, manifest to every one, that when we speak upon certain subjects we are unanimous in our conceptions; but when upon others, that we are discordant in our opinions?

PHÆDR. I seem to understand what you say; but, notwithstanding this, speak more plainly.

SOC. When any one pronounces the name of iron or silver, do we not all understand the same thing?

PHÆDR. Entirely so.

SOC. But when we pronounce that of the just, or the good, are we not of different opinions? and do we not doubt both with others and ourselves?

PHÆDR. Very much so.

SOC. In some things, therefore, we agree in sentiments, and in others not.

PHÆDR. We do so.

SOC. Where, then, are we more easily deceived? And in which of these is rhetoric able to accomplish the most?

PHÆDR. Evidently in those about which we are dubious.

SOC. He, therefore, who is about to pursue the rhetorical art, ought first of all to distinguish these in order; to consider the character of each species; and to perceive in what the multitude must necessarily be dubious, and in what not.

PHÆDR. He who is able to accomplish this, Socrates, will understand a beautiful species.

SOC. Afterwards, I think, he ought not to be ignorant when he comes to particulars, but to perceive acutely to what genus the subject of his future discourse belongs.

PHÆDR. What then?

Soc.

Soc. With respect to Love, shall we say that it belongs to things dubious, or to such as are not so?

PHÆDR. To things dubious, certainly.

Soc. Do you think he would permit you to assert that respecting him which you have now asserted, that he is pernicious both to the beloved and the lover; and again, that he is the greatest of all goods?

PHÆDR. You speak in the best manner possible.

Soc. But inform me also of this (for, through the enthusiastic energy, I do not perfectly remember), whether I defined love in the beginning of my discourse.

PHÆDR. By Jupiter you did, and that in a most wonderful manner.

Soc. O how much more sagacious do you declare the Nymphs of Acheiloüs, and Pan the son of Mercury, to be, than Lyfias the son of Cephalus, with respect to orations! Or do I say nothing to the purpose? But did not Lyfias, in the beginning of his discourse, compel us to conceive of love, as a certain something such as he wished it to be, and, referring what followed to this, complete in this manner the whole of his oration? Are you willing that we should again read over the beginning of his oration?

PHÆDR. If you are so disposed; though you will not find what you seek for there.

Soc. Read, however, that I may again hear it.

PHÆDR. "You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and you have heard, I think, that it is most conducive to my advantage for them to subsist in this manner. But it appears to me, that I am not unworthy to be deprived of what I wish to obtain, because I am not one of your lovers: for lovers, when their desires cease, repent themselves of the benefits which they have bestowed."

Soc. He seems here to have been very far from accomplishing what we are now seeking after; since he endeavours to pass through his discourse, not commencing from the beginning, but from the end, after a certain contrary and resupine mode of proceeding; and begins from what the lover, now ceasing to be such, says to his once beloved. Or perhaps, my dear Phædrus, I say nothing to the purpose.

PHÆDR. But it is the end, Socrates, which is the subject of his discourse.

Soc. But what, do not all the other parts of the discourse appear to be promiscuously

promiscuously scattered? Or does it appear to you, that what is asserted in the second place ought to rank as second from a certain necessity; or any thing else which he says? For to me, as a person ignorant of every thing, it appears, that nothing ought to be carelessly asserted by a writer. But do you not possess a certain necessary method of composing orations, according to which he thus disposed the parts of his oration in succession to each other?

PHÆDR. You are pleasant, Socrates, in supposing that I am sufficient to judge concerning compositions so accurate as his.

SOC. But I think this is evident to you, that every discourse ought in its structure to resemble an animal, and should have something which can be called its body; so that it may be neither without a head, nor be destitute of feet, but may possess a middle and extremes, adapted to each other, and to the whole.

PHÆDR. How should it not be so?

SOC. Consider, therefore, the discourse of your associate, whether it subsists with these conditions, or otherwise; and you will find, that it is in no respect different from that epigram which certain persons report was composed on the Phrygian Midas.

PHÆDR. What was the epigram, and what are its peculiarities?

SOC. It was as follows;

A brazen virgin traveller am I,  
Whom fate decrees in Midas' tomb to lie:  
And while streams flow, and trees luxuriant bloom,  
I here shall stay within the mournful tomb;  
And this to every passenger attest,  
That here the ashes of king Midas rest.

But that it is of no consequence as to the connection, which part of it is read first or last, you yourself, I doubt not, perceive.

PHÆDR. You deride our oration, Socrates.

SOC. Lest you should be angry, therefore, let us drop it; though it appears that many examples might be found in it, from an inspection of which we might derive the advantage of not attempting to imitate them. But let us proceed to the discussion of other orations: for they contain something, as it appears to me, which it is proper for those to perceive who are willing to speculate about orations.

PHÆDR. But what is this something?

SOC. That they are in a certain respect contrary to each other. For one kind asserts that the lover, and the other that he who is void of love, ought to be gratified.

PHÆDR. And it asserts this, indeed, most strenuously.

SOC. I should have thought that you would have answered more truly, "and indeed furiously so." But what I inquire after is this—Do we say that love is a certain mania, or not?

PHÆDR. A mania, certainly.

SOC. But there are two species of mania; the one arising from human diseases; but the other from a divine mutation, taking place in a manner different from established customs.

PHÆDR. Entirely so.

SOC. But there are four parts of the divine mania, distributed according to the four divinities which preside over these parts. For we assign prophetic inspiration to Apollo, telestic or mystic to Bacchus, poetic to the Muses; and the fourth or amatory mania, which we assert to be the best of all, to Venus and Love. And I know not how, while we are representing by images the amatory passion, we perhaps touch upon a certain truth; and perhaps we are at the same time hurried away elsewhere. Hence, mingling together an oration not perfectly improbable, we have produced a certain fabulous hymn, and have with moderate abilities celebrated your lord and mine, Phædrus, viz. Love, who is the inspective guardian of beautiful youths.

PHÆDR. And this, indeed, so as to have rendered it far from unpleasant to me your auditor.

SOC. Let us, therefore, from this endeavour to understand how our discourse has passed from censure to praise.

PHÆDR. What do you mean by this?

SOC. To me we seem to have really been at play with respect to the other parts of our discourse: but I think that if any one is able to comprehend, according to art, these two species which we have spoken of, through a certain fortune, he will not be an ungraceful person.

PHÆDR. How do you mean?

SOC. By looking to one idea, to bring together things every way dispersed; that, by thus defining each, he may always render manifest that

which he is desirous to teach: just as we acted at present with respect to our definition of Love, whether good or bad. For certainly our discourse by this means became more clear, and more consistent with itself.

PHÆDR. But what do you say respecting the other species, Socrates?

Soc. That this again should be cut into species according to members, naturally; not by breaking any member, like an unskilful cook, but, as in the above discourse, receiving the foam of the dianoëtic energy, as one common species. But as, in one body, members which are double and synonymous are called right or left, so our discourse considered the species of delirium within us as naturally one. And dividing the one part into that which is on the left hand, and giving this another distribution, it did not cease till it there found a certain sinister Love, and, when found, reviled it, as it deserves. But the other part conducted us to the right hand of mania, where we found a certain divine Love synonymous to the former; and, extending our praise, we celebrated him as the cause of the greatest good to us.

PHÆDR. You speak most true.

Soc. But I, O Phædrus, am a lover of such divisions and compositions as may enable me both to speak and understand. And if I think that any other is able to behold the one and the many, according to the nature of things, this man I follow, pursuing his footsteps as if he were a God. But whether or not I properly denominate those who are able to accomplish this, Divinity knows. But I have hitherto called them men conversant with dialectic. Tell me, therefore, by what name it is proper to call them, according to your opinion and that of Lyfias. Or is this that art of speaking, which Thrasymachus and others employing, became themselves wise in oratory, and rendered others such, who were willing to bestow gifts on them, as if they had been kings?

PHÆDR. Those were indeed royal men, but yet not skilled in the particulars about which you inquire. But you appear to me to have properly denominated this species in calling it dialectic; but the rhetorical art appears as yet to have escaped us.

Soc. How do you say? Can there be any thing beautiful which is destitute of these particulars, and yet be comprehended by art? If this be the case, it is by no means to be despised by me and you; but we must relate what remains of the rhetorical art.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. And there are many things, Socrates, which are delivered in books about the art of speaking.

Soc. You have very opportunely reminded me. For I think you would say that the proœmium ought to be called the first part of the oration; and that things of this kind are the ornaments of the art.

PHÆDR. Certainly.

Soc. And, in the second place, a certain narration; and this accompanied with testimonies. In the third place, the reasoning. In the fourth, probable arguments: and besides this, I think that a certain Byzantine, the best artificer of orations, introduces confirmation and approbation.

PHÆDR. Do you not mean the illustrious Theodorus?

Soc. I do. For he discovered how confutation, both in accusation and defence, might not only take place, but also be increased. But why should we not introduce the most excellent Evenus, the Parian? For he first discovered sub-declarations, and the art of praising: and, according to the reports of some persons, he delivered his reprehensions in verse for the sake of assisting the memory. For he is a wise man. But shall we suffer Tifias<sup>1</sup> and Gorgias to sleep, who placed probabilities before realities; and, through the strength of their discourse, caused small things to appear large, and the large small; likewise old things new, and the new old; and who besides this discovered a concise method of speaking, and, again, an infinite prolixity of words? All which when Prodicus once heard me relate, he laughed, and asserted that he alone had discovered what words this art required; and that it required neither few nor many, but a moderate quantity.

PHÆDR. You was, therefore, most wise, O Prodicus.

Soc. But shall we not speak of Hippias? for I think that he will be of the same opinion with the Elean guest.

PHÆDR. Why should we not?

Soc. But what shall we say of the musical composition of Polus<sup>2</sup>, who employed the doubling of words, a collection of sentences, similitudes, and elegance of appellations, in order to give splendour to his orations, according to the instruction which he had received from Lycimnion?

<sup>1</sup> This Tifias is said by Cicero to have been the inventor of rhetoric.

<sup>2</sup> Polus was a disciple of Gorgias the Leontine. See the Gorgias.

PHÆDR. But were not the orations of Protagoras, Socrates, of this kind?

Soc. His diction was indeed proper, and contained besides this many other beautiful properties: but the Chalcedonian orator excelled in exciting commiseration from the distresses of poverty, and the infirmities of old age. He was besides most skilful in rousing the multitude to anger, and when enraged appeasing them, as he said, by enchantment; and highly excelled in framing and dissolving calumnies, from whence the greatest advantage might be derived. But all seem to agree in opinion with respect to the conclusion of the oration, which some call the repetition, but others give it a different denomination.

PHÆDR. Do you say that the conclusion summarily recalls into the memory of the auditors all that had been said before?

Soc. I do, and any thing else besides, which you may have to say about this art.

PHÆDR. What I have to say is but trifling, and not worth mentioning.

Soc. Let us, therefore, dismiss trifling observations, and rather behold in the clear light, in what particulars the power of this art prevails, and when it does so.

PHÆDR. Its power, Socrates, is most prevalent in the association of the multitude.

Soc. It is so. But, O dæmoniacal man, do you also see, whether their web appears to you, as it does to me, to have its parts separated from each other?

PHÆDR. Show me how you mean.

Soc. Tell me then: If any one addressing your associate Eryximachus, or his father Acumenus, should say, I know how to introduce certain things to the body, by which I can heat and cool it when I please; and besides this, when I think proper I can produce vomiting, and downward ejection, and a variety of other things of this kind, through the knowledge of which I profess myself a physician, and able to make any one else so, to whom I deliver the knowledge of these particulars;—what do you think he who heard him ought to reply?

PHÆDR. What else, than inquiring whether he knows to whom, when, and how far, each of these ought to be applied?

Soc.

Soc. If, therefore, he should say that he by no means understands all this, but that he who is instructed by him ought to do so and so; what then would be his answer?

PHÆDR. He would answer, I think, that the man was mad; and that, having heard from some book about things of this kind, or met with some remedies, he thought he might become a physician without knowing any thing about the art.

Soc. But what if any one, addressing Sophocles and Euripides, should say that he knew how to compose a prolix discourse on a very trifling subject, and a very short one on a great occasion; and that when he pleased he could excite pity, and its contrary, horror and threats, and other things of this kind; and that by teaching these he thought that he delivered the art of tragic poetry?

PHÆDR. And these also, I think, Socrates, would deride him, who should fancy that a tragedy was any thing else than the composition of all these, so disposed as to be adapted to each other, and to the whole.

Soc. And I think they would not rustically accuse him; but, just as if a musician should meet with a man who believes himself skilled in harmony, because he knows how to make a chord sound sharp and flat, he would not fiercely say to him, O miserable creature, you are mad; but, as being a musician, he would thus address him more mildly: O excellent man! it is necessary that he who is to be a musician should indeed know such things as these; but at the same time nothing hinders us from concluding, that a man affected as you are may not understand the least of harmony: for you may know what is necessary to be learned prior to harmony, without understanding harmony itself.

PHÆDR. Most right.

Soc. In like manner, Sophocles would reply to the person who addressed him, that he possessed things previous to tragedy, rather than tragedy itself: and Acumenus, that the medical pretender understood things previous to medicine, and not medicine itself.

PHÆDR. Entirely so.

Soc. But what if the mellifluous Adraftus, or Pericles, should hear those all-beautiful artificial inventions, concise discourses, similitudes, and other things which we said should be discussed in the light, do you think that they  
would

would be angry, as we were through our rusticity, with those who wrote about and taught such things as if they were the same with rhetoric? Or rather, as being wiser than us, would they not thus reprove us? It is not proper, Phædrus and Socrates, to be angry with such characters; but you ought rather to pardon those who, being ignorant of oratory, are unable to define what rhetoric is, and who in consequence of this passion, from possessing a knowledge of things previous to the art, think that they have discovered rhetoric itself; and, by teaching these to others, imagine that they teach rhetoric in perfection: but who at the same time leave to the proper industry of their disciples the art of disposing each of these, so as to produce persuasion, and of composing the whole oration, as if nothing of this kind was necessary for them to accomplish.

PHÆDR. Such indeed, Socrates, does that art appear to be which these men teach and write about as rhetoric; and you seem to me to have spoken the truth: but how and from whence shall we be able to acquire the art of true rhetoric and persuasion?

SOC. It is probable, Phædrus, and perhaps also necessary, that the perfect may be obtained in this as in other contests. For, if you naturally possess rhetorical abilities, you will become a celebrated orator, by the assistance of science and exercise: but if you are destitute of any one of these, you will be imperfect through this deficiency. But the method employed by Lysias and Thrasymachus does not appear to me to evince the magnitude of this art.

PHÆDR. But what method then does?

SOC. Pericles, most excellent man, appears with great propriety to have been the most perfect of all in the rhetorical art.

PHÆDR. Why?

SOC. All the great arts require continual meditation, and a discourse about the sublime parts of nature. For an elevation of intellect, and a perfectly efficacious power, appear in a certain respect to proceed from hence; which Pericles possessed in conjunction with his naturally good disposition. For meeting, I think, with Anaxagoras, who had these requisites, he was filled with elevated discourse, and comprehended the nature of intellect and folly, which Anaxagoras diffusely discussed: and from hence he transferred to the art of discourse whatever could contribute to its advantage.

PHÆDR. How is this?

Soc. In a certain respect the method of the rhetorical and medicinal art is the same.

PHÆDR. But how?

Soc. In both it is requisite that a distribution should be made, in one of the nature of body, in the other of the soul, if you are desirous in the first instance of giving health and strength by introducing medicine and nutriment according to art, and not by exercise and experience alone; and in the second instance, if you wish to introduce persuasion and virtue into the soul, by reason and legitimate institutions.

PHÆDR. It is probable it should be so, Socrates.

Soc. But do you think that the nature of the soul can be sufficiently known without the nature of the universe?

PHÆDR. If it is proper to be persuaded by Hippocrates, the successor of Æsculapius, even the nature of body cannot be known without this method.

Soc. He speaks in a becoming manner, my friend. But it is necessary, besides the authority of Hippocrates, to examine our discourse, and consider whether it is consistent.

PHÆDR. I agree with you.

Soc. Consider, then, what Hippocrates and true reason assert concerning nature. Is it not, therefore, necessary to think respecting the nature of every thing, in the first place, whether that is simple or multiform about which we are desirous, both that we ourselves should be artists, and that we should be able to render others so? And, in the next place, if it is simple, ought we not to investigate its power, with respect to producing any thing naturally, or being naturally passive? And if it possesses many species, having numbered these, ought we not to speculate in each, as in one, its natural power of becoming active and passive?

PHÆDR. It appears we should, Socrates.

Soc. The method, therefore, which proceeds without these, is similar to the progression of one blind. But he who operates according to art, ought not to be assimilated either to the blind or the deaf; but it is evident that whoever accommodates his discourses to any art, ought accurately to exhibit the essence of that nature to which he introduces discourses; and this is doubtless the soul.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. Without doubt.

SOC. Will not, therefore, all the attention of such a one be directed to this end, that he may produce persuasion in the soul?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. It is evident, therefore, that Thrasymachus, and any other person who applies himself to the study of the rhetorical art, ought first, with all possible accuracy, to describe, and cause the soul to perceive whether she is naturally one and similar, or multiform according to the form of body: for this is what we call evincing its nature.

PHÆDR. Entirely so.

SOC. But, in the second place, he ought to show what it is naturally capable of either acting or suffering.

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. In the third place, having orderly distinguished the genera of discourses and of the soul, and the passions of these, he should pass through all the causes, harmonizing each to each, and teaching what kind of soul will be necessarily persuaded by such particular discourses, and through what cause; and again, what kind of soul such discourses will be unable to persuade.

PHÆDR. Such a method of proceeding will, as it appears, be most beautiful.

SOC. He, therefore, who acts in a different manner will neither artificially write nor discourse upon this or any other subject. But writers on the art of rhetoric of the present day (whom you yourself have heard) are crafty, and conceal from us that their knowledge of the soul is most beautiful. However, till they both speak and write according to this method, we shall never be persuaded that they write according to art.

PHÆDR. What method do you mean?

SOC. It will not be easy to mention the very words themselves which ought to be employed on this occasion; but as far as I am able I am willing to tell you how it is proper to write, if we desire to write according to art.

PHÆDR. Tell me then.

SOC. Since the power of discourse is attractive of the soul, it is necessary that the future orator should know how many species soul contains: but these are various, and souls possess their variety from these. Souls, therefore,

of such a particular nature, in consequence of certain discourses, and through a certain cause, are easily persuaded to such and such particulars. But such as are differently affected are with difficulty persuaded through these means. It is necessary, therefore, that he who sufficiently understands all this, when he afterwards perceives these particulars taking place in actions, should be able to follow them with great celerity through sensible inspection; or, otherwise he will retain nothing more than the words which he once heard from his preceptor. But when he is sufficiently able to say, who will be persuaded by such and such discourses, and sagaciously perceives that the person present is such by nature as was spoken of before, and that he may be incited by certain discourses to certain actions; then, at length, such a one will be a perfect master of this art, when to his former attainments he adds the knowledge of opportunely speaking, or being silent, the use or abuse of concise discourse, of language plaintive and vehement, and of the other parts of rhetoric delivered by his masters; but never till this is accomplished. But he who fails in any of these particulars, either in speaking, teaching, or writing, and yet asserts that he speaks according to art, is vanquished by the person he is unable to persuade. But what then (perhaps a writer of orations will say to us); does it appear to you, Phædrus and Socrates, that the art of speaking is to be obtained by this method, or otherwise?

PHÆDR. It is impossible, Socrates, that it should be obtained otherwise, though the acquisition seems to be attended with no small labour.

SOC. You speak the truth. And, for the sake of this, it is necessary, by tossing upwards and downwards all discourses, to consider whether any easier and shorter way will present itself to our view for this purpose; lest we should in vain wander through a long and rough road, when we might have walked through one short and smooth. If, therefore, you can afford any assistance, in consequence of what you have heard from Lysias, or any other, endeavour to tell it me, by recalling it into your mind.

PHÆDR. I might indeed do this for the sake of experiment, but I cannot at present.

SOC. Are you willing, therefore, that I should relate to you the discourse which I once heard concerning things of this kind?

PHÆDR. How should I not?

Soc. It is said therefore, Phædrus, to be just, to tell what is reported of the wolf.

PHÆDR. Do you therefore act in the same manner.

Soc. They say, then, that there is no occasion to extol and magnify these particulars in such a manner, nor to deduce our discourse from on high, and afar off. For, as we said in the beginning of this discourse, he who intends to be sufficiently skilful in rhetoric ought not to participate the truth respecting *things* just and good, or *men* who are such, either from nature or education. For, in judicial matters, no attention whatever is paid to the truth of these, but to persuasion alone; and that this is the probable, which ought to be studied by him who is to speak according to art. For he ought never to speak of transactions, unless they are probable; but both in accusation and defence probabilities should always be introduced: and, in short, he who speaks should pursue the probable, and, if he speaks much, should bid farewell to truth. For, when this method is observed through the whole of a discourse, it causes all the perfection of the art.

PHÆDR. You have related those particulars, Socrates, which are asserted by the skilful in rhetoric; for I remember that we briefly touched upon this in the former part of our discourse. But to such as are conversant with these matters, this appears to be a thing of great consequence: but you have indeed severely reviled Tisias himself.

Soc. Let then Tisias himself tell us, whether he calls the probable any thing else than that which is apparent to the multitude.

PHÆDR. What else can he call it?

Soc. He also appears to have discovered and written about the following crafty and artificial method: that if some imbecil but bold man should knock down one who is robust but timid, taking from him at the same time a garment, or something else, and should be tried for the assault, then neither of these ought to speak the truth; but that the coward should say, the bold man was not alone when he gave the assault; and that the bold man should deny this, by asserting that he was alone when the pretended assault was given, and should at the same time artfully ask, How is it possible that a man so weak as I am could attack one so robust as he is? That then the other should not acknowledge his cowardice, but should endeavour, by devising some false allegation,

allegation, to accuse his opponent. And in other instances, things of this kind must be said according to art. Is not this the case, Phædrus?

PHÆDR. Entirely so.

Soc. O how craftily does Tisias appear to have discovered an abstruse art, or whoever else was the inventor, and in whatever other name he delights! But shall we, my friend, say this or not?

PHÆDR. What?

Soc. This: O Tisias, some time since, before your arrival, we affirmed that the probable, with which the multitude are conversant, subsisted through its similitude to truth: and we just now determined that similitudes might every where be found in the most beautiful manner, by him who was acquainted with truth. So that, if you assert any thing else about the art of discourse, we shall readily listen to you; but if not, we shall be persuaded by our present determinations, that unless a person enumerates the different dispositions of his auditors, and distributes things themselves into their species, and again is able to comprehend the several particulars in one idea, he will never be skilled in the art of speaking to that degree which it is possible for man to attain. But this degree of excellence can never be obtained without much labour and study; and a prudent man will not toil for its acquisition, that he may speak and act so as to be pleasing to men; but rather that, to the utmost of his ability, he may speak and act in such a manner as may be acceptable to the Gods. For men wiser than us, O Tisias, say that he who is endued with intellect ought not to make it the principal object of his study how he may gratify his fellow servants, but how he may please good masters, and this from good means. So that, if the circuit is long, you ought not to wonder: for it is not to be undertaken in the manner which seems proper to you, but for the sake of mighty concerns. And these, if any one is so disposed, will be most beautifully effected by this mean, as reason herself evinces.

PHÆDR. This appears to me, Socrates, to be most beautifully said, if there is but a possibility that any one can accomplish the arduous undertaking.

Soc. But to endeavour after beautiful attainments is beautiful, as likewise to endure whatever may happen to be the result of our endeavours.

PHÆDR. Very much so.

Soc. And thus much may suffice concerning a knowledge and ignorance of the art of rhetoric.

PHÆDR. Certainly.

Soc. Does it not therefore remain, that we should speak concerning the elegance and inelegance of writing?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

Soc. Do you know how you may in the highest degree please the divinity of discourse both in speaking and acting?

PHÆDR. Not at all. Do you?

Soc. I have heard certain particulars delivered by the antients, who were truly knowing. But if we ourselves should discover this, do you think we should afterwards be at all solicitous about human opinions?

PHÆDR. Your question is ridiculous; but relate what you say you have heard.

Soc. I have heard then, that about Naucratis, in Egypt, there was one of their antient Gods, to whom a bird was sacred, which they call Ibis; but the name of the dæmon himself was Theuth<sup>1</sup>. According to tradition, this God first discovered number and the art of reckoning, geometry and astronomy, the games of chess and hazard, and likewise letters. But Thamus was at that time king of all Egypt, and resided in that great city of the Upper  
Egypt

<sup>1</sup> The genus of disciplines belonging to Mercury contains gymnastics, music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and the art of speaking and writing. This God, as he is the source of invention, is called the son of Maia; because *investigation*, which is implied by *Maia*, produces *invention*: and as unfolding the will of Jupiter, who is an intellectual God, he is the cause of matheſis, or discipline. He first subsists in Jupiter, the artificer of the world; next, among the supermundane Gods; in the third place, among the liberated Gods; fourthly, in the planet Mercury; fifthly, in the Mercurial order of dæmons; sixthly, in human souls who are the attendants of this God; and in the seventh degree his properties subsist in certain animals, such as the ibis, the ape, and sagacious dogs. The narration of Socrates in this place is both allegorical and anagogic, or reductory. Naucratis is a region of Egypt eminently subject to the influence of Mercury, though the whole of Egypt is allotted to this divinity. Likewise in this city a certain man once flourished, full of the Mercurial power, because his soul formerly existed in the heavens of the Mercurial order. But he was first called Theuth, that is, Mercury, and a God, because his soul subsisted according to the perfect similitude of this divinity. But afterwards a dæmon, because from the God Mercury, through a Mercurial dæmon, gifts of this kind are transmitted to a Mercurial soul. This Mercurial

Egypt which the Greeks call Egyptian Thebes; but the God himself they denominate Ammon. Theuth, therefore, departing to Thamus, showed him his arts, and told him that he ought to distribute them amongst the other Egyptians. But Thamus asked him concerning the utility of each; and upon his informing him, he approved what appeared to him to be well said, but blamed that which had a contrary aspect. But Theuth is reported to have fully unfolded to Thamus many particulars respecting each art, which it would be too prolix to mention. But when they came to discourse upon letters, This discipline, O king, says Theuth, will render the Egyptians wiser, and increase their powers of memory. For this invention is the medicine of memory and wisdom. To this Thamus replied, O most artificial Theuth, one person is more adapted to artificial operations, but another to judging what detriment or advantage will arise from the use of these productions of art: and now you who are the father of letters, through the benevolence of your disposition, have affirmed just the contrary of what letters are able to effect. For these, through the negligence of recollection, will produce oblivion in the soul of the learner; because, through trusting to the external and foreign marks of writing, they will not exercise the internal powers of recollection. So that you have not discovered the medicine of memory, but of admonition. You will likewise deliver to your disciples an opinion of wisdom, and not truth. For, in consequence of having many readers without the instruction of a master, the multitude will appear to be knowing in many things of which they are at the same time ignorant; and

curial soul, and at the same time dæmon, relate their inventions to king Thamus. And though a man named Thamus once reigned in Egypt, yet anagogically Thamus is a Mercurial divinity either celestial or supercelestial. But Ammon is that superior Jupiter who comprehends the Mercurial gifts. Lastly, invention belongs to natural instinct and conception, but judgment and discrimination to reason and perfect intelligence, which are far more excellent. But each at the same time belongs to Jupiter Ammon; though, when taken separately, invention, and as it were the material form of art, must be referred to a dæmoniacal or human Mercury; but judgment and use, and that which leads to the end, to Thamus, who is superior both to a human and dæmoniacal Mercury. Though the narration seems to comprehend Thamus and Ammon under the same person, yet accurate reasoning is able to distinguish them. They relate that the Egyptian ibis was similar to a stork, that it had the figure of a heart, that it walked in a very unequal manner, and that it brought forth its eggs through its throat, just as Mercury delivers his progeny into light. And these and the other Mercurial symbols signify wisdom, geometry, eloquence, and interpretation.

will

will become troublesome associates, in consequence of possessing an opinion of wisdom, instead of wisdom itself.

PHÆDR. You with great facility, Socrates, compose Egyptian discourses, and those of any other nation, when you are so disposed.

Soc. But, my friend, those who reside in the temple of Dodonean Jupiter assert that the first prophetic discourses issued from the oak. It was sufficient, therefore, for those antients, as they were not so wise as you moderns, to listen to oaks and rocks, through their simplicity, if these inanimate things did but utter the truth. But you perhaps think it makes a difference who speaks, and to what country he belongs. For you do not alone consider, whether what is asserted is true or false.

PHÆDR. You have very properly reprov'd me; and I think the case with respect to letters is just as the Theban Thamus has stated it.

Soc. Hence, he who thinks to commit an art to writing, or to receive it, when delivered by this mean, so that something clear and firm may result from the letters, is endued with great simplicity, and is truly ignorant of the prophecy of Ammon; since he is of opinion, that something more is contained in the writing than what the things themselves contained in the letters admonish the scientific reader.

PHÆDR. Most right.

Soc. For that which is committed to writing contains something very weighty, and truly similar to a picture. For the offspring of a picture project as if they were alive; but, if you ask them any question, they are silent in a perfectly venerable manner. Just so with respect to written discourses, you would think that they spoke as if they possessed some portion of wisdom. But if, desirous to be instructed, you interrogate them about any thing which they assert, they signify one thing only, and this always the same. And every discourse, when it is once written, is every where similarly rolled among its auditors, and even among those by whom it ought not to be heard; and is perfectly ignorant, to whom it is proper to address itself, and to whom not. But when it is faulty or unjustly reviled, it always requires the assistance of its father. For, as to itself, it can neither resist its adversary, nor defend itself.

PHÆDR. And this, also, you appear to have most rightly asserted.

Soc. But what, shall we not consider another discourse, which is the  
genuine

genuine brother of this, how legitimate it is, and how much better and more powerful it is born than this?

PHÆDR. What is this? and how do you say it is produced?

Soc. That which, in conjunction with science, is written in the soul of the learner, which is able to defend itself, and which knows to whom it ought to speak, and before whom it ought to be silent.

PHÆDR. You speak of the living and animated discourse of one endued with knowledge; of which written discourse may be justly called a certain image.

Soc. Entirely so. But answer me with respect to this also: Will the husbandman, who is endued with intellect, scatter such seeds as are most dear to him, and from which he wishes fruit should arise? Will he scatter them in summer in the gardens of Adonis, with the greatest diligence and attention, rejoicing to behold them in beautiful perfection within the space of eight days? Or rather, when he acts in this manner, will he not do so for the sake of some festive day, or sport? But, when seriously applying himself to the business of agriculture, will he not sow where it is proper, and be sufficiently pleased, if his sowing receives its consummation within the space of eight months?

PHÆDR. He would doubtless act in this manner, Socrates, at one time sowing seriously, and at another time for diversion.

Soc. But shall we say that the man who possesses the science of things just, beautiful and good, is endued with less intellect than a husbandman, with respect to the seeds which he sows?

PHÆDR. By no means.

Soc. He will not, therefore, with anxious and hasty diligence write them in black water, sowing them by this mean with his pen in conjunction with discourses; since it is thus impossible to assist them through speech, and impossible sufficiently to exhibit the truth.

PHÆDR. This, therefore, is not proper.

Soc. Certainly not. He will, therefore, sow and write in the gardens which letters contain for the sake of sport, as it appears; and when he has written, having raised monuments as treasures to himself, with a view to the oblivion of old age, if he should arrive to it, and for the like benefit of others who tread in the same steps, he is delighted on beholding his delicate progeny  
of

of fruits; and while other men pursue other diversions, irrigating themselves with banquets, and other entertainments which are the sisters of these, he on the contrary passes his time in the delights which conversation produces.

PHÆDR. You speak, Socrates, of a most beautiful diversion, and not of a vile amusement, as the portion of him who is able to sport with discourse, and who can mythologize about justice, and other particulars which you speak of.

Soc. For it is indeed so, my dear Phædrus. But, in my opinion, a much more beautiful study will result from discourses, when some one employing the dialectic art, and receiving a soul properly adapted for his purpose, plants and sows in it discourses, in conjunction with science; discourses which are sufficiently able to assist both themselves and their planter, and which are not barren, but abound with seed; from whence others springing up in different manners, are always sufficient to extend this immortal benefit, and to render their possessor blessed in as high a degree as is possible to man.

PHÆDR. This which you speak of is still far more beautiful.

Soc. But now, Phædrus, this being granted, are we able to distinguish and judge about what follows?

PHÆDR. What is that?

Soc. Those particulars for the sake of knowing which we came hither; that we might inquire into the disgrace of Lysias in the art of writing; and that we might investigate those discourses which are either written with or without art. To me, therefore, it appears that we have moderately evinced that which is artificial, and that which is not so.

PHÆDR. It appears so.

Soc. But again we ought to remember that no one can acquire perfection in the art of speaking, either with respect to teaching or persuading, till he is well acquainted with the truth of the particulars about which he either speaks or writes: till he is able to define the whole of a thing; and when defined, again knows how to divide it according to species, as far as to an indivisible: and, according to this method, contemplating the soul, and discovering a species adapted to the nature of each, he thus disposes and adorns his discourse; accommodating various and all-harmonious discourses to a soul characterized by variety; but such as are simple, to one of a simple disposition.

PHÆDR.

PHÆDR. It appears to be so in every respect.

Soc. But what shall we say to the question, whether it is beautiful or base to speak and write orations; and in what respect this employment may be blameable or not? unless what we have said a little before is sufficient for this purpose.

PHÆDR. What was that?

Soc. That whether Lysias, or any other, has at any time written, or now writes, so as to establish laws, either privately or publicly, composing a political work, and thinking that it contains great stability and clearness; this is base in a writer, whether any one says so or not. For to be ignorant of the difference between true visions and the delusions of sleep, between just and unjust, evil and good, cannot fail of being really base, though the whole rout of the vulgar should unite in its praise.

PHÆDR. It cannot be otherwise.

Soc. But he who in a written oration thinks that there is a great necessity for amusement, and who considers no discourse, whether in prose or verse, deserving of much study in its composition or recital, like those rhapsodists who without judgment and learning recite verses for the sake of persuasion, while in reality the best of those discourses were written for the sake of admonishing the skilful; but who thinks, that the clear, the perfect, and the serious, ought only to take place in discourses which teach and are delivered for the sake of learning, and which are truly written in the soul, about the just, the beautiful and the good; and who judges that discourses of this kind ought to be called his legitimate offspring; that, in the first place, which is inherent in himself, if he should find it there, and afterwards whatever offspring, or brethren, spring in a becoming manner from this progeny of his own soul in the souls of others, bidding at the same time farewell to all others;—a man of this kind, Phædrus, appears to be such a one as you and I should pray that we may be.

PHÆDR. I perfectly desire and pray for the possession of what you speak of.

Soc. We have, therefore, moderately spoken thus much about discourses, as it were in play: it only remains that you tell Lysias, that, descending with intellect to the stream of the Nymphs and Muses, we heard certain discourses, which they ordered us to acquaint Lysias with, and every other

writer of orations, likewise Homer, and any other who may compose either naked poetry, or that which is adorned with the song; and in the third place Solon, and all who may commit political institutions to writing;—that if their compositions result from knowing the truth, and if they are able to defend their writings against the objections of adversaries who declare that they can evince the improbity of their discourses,—then, they ought not to be denominated from works of this kind, but from what they have seriously written.

PHÆDR. What appellations, then, will you assign them?

SOC. To call them wise, Phædrus, appears to me to be a mighty appellation, and adapted to a God alone; but to denominate them philosophers, or something of this kind, seems to be more convenient and proper.

PHÆDR. There is nothing indeed unbecoming in such an epithet.

SOC. He, therefore, who cannot exhibit any thing more honourable than what he has written, and who turns upwards and downwards his composition, for a considerable space of time, adding and taking away,—may not such a one be justly called a poet, or a writer of orations or laws?

PHÆDR. Certainly.

SOC. Relate these particulars, therefore, to your associate.

PHÆDR. But what will you do? For it is not proper that your companion should be neglected.

SOC. Who is he?

PHÆDR. The worthy Isocrates. What will you tell him, Socrates? and what character shall we assign him?

SOC. Isocrates as yet, Phædrus, is but a young man; but I am willing to tell you what I prophesy concerning him.

PHÆDR. What?

SOC. He appears to me to possess such excellent natural endowments, that his productions ought not to be compared with the orations of Lyfias. Besides this, his manners are more generous; so that it will be by no means wonderful, if, when he is more advanced in age, he should far surpass, in those orations which are now the objects of his study, all the other boys who ever meddled with orations; or, if he should not be content with a pursuit of this kind, I think that a more divine impulse will lead him to greater attainments: for there is naturally, my friend, a certain philosophy in the diano-

etic part of this man. Tell, therefore, my beloved Isocrates this, as a piece of information which I have received from the Gods of this place; and do you likewise acquaint Lyfias with the particulars which respect his character and pursuits, as a person who is the object of your warmest attachment.

PHÆDR. Be it so; but let us depart, since the heat has now abated its fervour.

Soc. But it is proper we should pray before we depart.

PHÆDR. Undoubtedly.

Soc. O beloved Pan, and all ye other Gods, who are residents of this place<sup>1</sup>, grant that I may become beautiful within, and that whatever I possess externally may be friendly to my inward attainments! Grant, also, that I may consider the wise man as one who abounds in wealth; and that I may enjoy that portion of gold, which no other than a prudent man is able either to bear, or properly manage! Do we require any thing else, Phædrus? for to me it appears that I have prayed tolerably well.

PHÆDR. Pray also in the same manner for me: for the possessions of friends are common.

Soc. Let us then depart.

<sup>1</sup> By Pan, and the other Gods, understand local deities under the moon. But Pan is denominated as it were *all*, because he possesses the most ample sway in the order of local Gods. For, as the supermundane Gods are referred to Jupiter, and the celestial to Bacchus, so all the sublunary local Gods and dæmons are referred to Pan.

THE END OF THE PHÆDRUS.



THE GREATER HIPPIAS,

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

THE BEAUTIFUL

CONSIDERED AS SUBSISTING IN SOUL.



# INTRODUCTION

TO

## THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

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THE design of this dialogue, which has the addition of *greater* to its name Hippias, in contradistinction to another of the same name which is shorter, is gradually to unfold the nature of *the beautiful* as subsisting in soul. That this is the real design of it will be at once evident by considering that logical methods are adapted to whatever pertains to soul, in consequence of its energies being naturally discursive, but do not accord with intellect, because its vision is simple, at once collected, and immediate. Hence this dialogue is replete with *trials*<sup>1</sup> and *confutations, definitions and demonstrations, divisions, compositions, and analyses*; but that part of the Phædrus in which *beauty* according to its first subsistence is discussed, has none of these, because its character is enthusiastic.

It is necessary however to remark, that in saying the design of the dialogue is concerning the beautiful as subsisting in soul, we do not merely mean the human soul, but soul in general:—in other words, it is concerning that beauty which first subsists in the soul of the universe, which in Platonic language is the monad of all souls, and is thence imparted to all the subsequent orders of souls.

It is well observed by Mr. Sydenham<sup>2</sup>, that Plato conceals the importance of his meaning in this dialogue, by a vein of humour and drollery which runs throughout the whole. The introductory part of the dialogue

<sup>1</sup> Πειραι και ελεγχοι, και ορισμοι, και αποδειξεις, και διαιρεσεις, συνθεσεις τε και αναλυσεις.

<sup>2</sup> I am sorry that I could not give the whole of his argument to this dialogue; but as he was not profoundly skilled in the philosophy of Plato, he is mistaken in many points, and particularly in the design of the dialogue, which according to him is concerning the highest or the sovereign beauty.

is purely ironical, and seems intended by deriding to purify the sophists from their twofold ignorance; exposing with this view their love of gain, their polymathy, or various knowledge, of itself useless to the prime purposes of life, and their total want of that true wisdom whose tendency is to make men virtuous and happy. Mr. Sydenham also observes, that the character of the composition of this dialogue is so perfectly dramatic, that, but for the want of fable, it might be presented on the stage by good comedians with great advantage. He adds: Nay, so highly picturesque is it in the manners which it imitates, as to be a worthy subject for the pencil of any moral painter. Some of the ancients, it seems, placed it among the dialogues which they called *anatreptic*, or *the subverting*; but it appears to me that it ought rather to be ranked among those of the *pirastic* and *maieutic*<sup>1</sup> kind.

Should it be asked, since it is by no means positively asserted in this dialogue, what *the beautiful* in soul is, we reply, that it is a vital *rational* form, the cause of symmetry to every thing in and posterior to soul. The propriety of this definition will be obvious by considering that the highest beauty is a vital *intellectual* form, the source of symmetry to all things posterior to the ineffable principle of all, as we have shown in the Notes on the Parmenides; and that consequently soul, in participating this beauty, will preserve all its characteristic properties entire, except the *intellectual* peculiarity, which in the participation will become rational.

<sup>1</sup> i. e. Among those which explore and obstetricate the conceptions of the soul.

# THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

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PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES AND HIPPIAS.

SCENE.—THE LYCÆUM.

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SOCRATES.

HIPPIAS, the fine <sup>2</sup> and the wife! what a long time it is since last you touched <sup>3</sup> at Athens!

HIP:

<sup>1</sup> The scene of this dialogue is clearly the Lycæum, a structure of astonishing grandeur and beauty, at a small distance from the city, by the side of the Ilyssus; the largest and most magnificent of those three built at the public cost for the purpose of bathing and the gymnastic exercises. The other two were within the city, lying convenient for the use of the ordinary citizens and men of business. But this was the most frequented by men of larger fortune and more leisure; with many of whom Socrates was intimately acquainted. Hither, as we learn from Plato's Symposium, it was his usual custom to resort, accompanied by his friends, and to spend here the greatest part of the day. That the Sophists, whenever they came to Athens, frequented the same place, appears from Isocrates in Orat. Panathen.; as indeed it is natural to suppose; the nobler part of the youth being daily there assembled: for these were extremely inquisitive after knowledge, and great admirers of philosophy; and the Sophists professed the teaching it, and the making, for a certain stipulated sum of money, any man a philosopher. To carry on this business of their profession, they were continually travelling about, like the Rhapsodists, from city to city, (*ταχως πανταχθι γιγνομενοι*, says Isocrates,) wherever philosophy and knowledge were in esteem; but visited Athens the ofteneft, where above all places those ornaments of the mind were highly valued.—S.

<sup>2</sup> Hippias was remarkable for the finery of his apparel, as we shall see further on. This striking the eyes of Socrates immediately on meeting him occasioned his addressing him first with this epithet.—S.

<sup>3</sup> Socrates in this sentence humorously makes use of a sea term to represent the life led by the Sophists, as resembling that of mariners; who are roving incessantly from port to port, and never

HIP. It is because I have not had leisure <sup>1</sup>, Socrates. For the Eleans, you are to know, whenever they have any public affairs to negotiate with any of the neighbouring cities, constantly apply to me, and appoint me their ambassador for that purpose, in preference to all others: because they consider me as a person the ablest to form a right judgment of what is argued and alleged by every one of the cities, and to make a proper report of it to them. My embassies <sup>2</sup>, therefore, have been frequent to many of those powers; but ofteneft, and upon points the most in number, as well as of the highest importance, have I gone to Sparta to treat with the Lacedæmonians. This is the reason, then, in answer to your question, why so seldom I visit these parts.

Soc. This it is, Hippias, to be a man truly wise and perfectly accomplished. For, being thus qualified, you have, in your private <sup>3</sup> capacity,  
great

continue long in one place. But possibly there is a further meaning; it may be intended to prepare us for observing that instability of Hippias himself, his notions and opinions, which is afterwards to appear throughout the dialogue; an instability arising from his want of the fixed principles of science, the only sure foundation of settled opinions. At the same time; there is a propriety in this expression from the mouth of an Athenian, to whom it must have been habitual; Athens being seated near the sea, the Athenians the principal merchants, and their state the greatest maritime power then in the world.—S.

<sup>1</sup> Plato acquaints us always as soon as possible with the character of his speakers. In this first speech of Hippias, the vain and ostentatious sophist, the solemn and formal orator, both appear in a strong light, and prepare us at once for all which is to follow, agreeably to those characters.—S.

<sup>2</sup> See Philostrat. p. 495. ed. Olear.—S.

<sup>3</sup> Hippias is here represented as being both a sophist and an orator. For the better apprehending this double character of his, and the more fully understanding those many passages of Plato where these professions are mentioned, it may be useful to give a summary account of their rise and nature. The Grecian wisdom then, or philosophy, in the most antient times of which any records are left us, included physics, ethics, and politics, until the time of Thales the Ionian; who giving himself up wholly to the study of Nature, of her principles and elements, with the causes of the several phænomena, became famous above all the antient sages for natural knowledge; and led the way to a succession of philosophers, from their founder and first master called Ionic. Addicted thus to the contemplation of things remote from the affairs of men, these all lived abstracted as much as possible from human society; revealing the secrets of nature only to a few select disciples, who sought them out in their retreat, and had a genius for the same abstruse inquiries, together with a taste for the same retired kind of life. As the fame of their wisdom spread, the curiosity of that whole inquisitive nation, the Grecians, was at length excited. This

great presents made you by the young men of the age; and are able to make them ample amends by the greater advantages which they derive from you: then, in your public character, you are able to do service to your country, as a man ought who would raise himself above contempt, and acquire reputation among the multitude. But, Hippias, what sort of reason can be given, why those in former days, who are so highly famed for wisdom, Pittacus, and Bias, and Thales the Milesian, with his disciples, successors, and followers, down to Anaxagoras, if not all, yet most of them, are found to have lived the lives of private men, declining to engage in public affairs?

HIP. What other reason, Socrates, can you imagine beside this, that they

gave occasion to the rise of a new profession, or sect, very different from that of those speculative sages. A set of men, smitten, not with the love of wisdom, but of fame and glory, men of great natural abilities, notable industry and boldness, appeared in Greece; and assuming the name of Sophists, a name hitherto highly honourable, and given only to those by whom mankind in general were supposed to be made wiser, to their ancient poets, legislators, and the Gods themselves, undertook to teach, by a few lessons, and in a short time, all the parts of philosophy to any person, of whatever kind was his disposition or turn of mind, and of whatever degree the capacity of it, so that he was but able to pay largely for his teaching. In the same age with Thales lived Solon the Athenian; who took the other part of philosophy to cultivate, and, applying himself chiefly to moral and political science, became so great a proficient in those studies, that he gave a new system of excellent laws to his country. Hence arose in Athens a race of politicians, studious of the laws, and of the art of government. During this succession, through force of natural genius, good polity, commerce and riches among the Athenians, great improvements were made in all the liberal arts: but that of oratory flourished above the rest, for this reason; because the Athenians lived under a popular government, where the art of ruling is only by persuasion. Eloquence then being one of the principal means of persuasion, and persuasion the only way to acquire and maintain power, all who were ambitious of any magistracy or office in the government studied to become eloquent orators: and the arts of rhetoric and polity were thus united in the same persons. Accordingly, we learn from the Attic writers of those days, that the most popular orators at Athens were appointed to embassies, to magistracies, to the command of armies, and the supreme administration of all civil affairs. See particularly Isocrates in *Orat. de Pace, & Panathen.* In this dialogue we find that the same spirit prevailed at Elis. Now in men of great abilities the predominant passion is ambition more frequently than avarice. Those of the Sophists, therefore, who excelled in quickness of understanding, compass of knowledge, and ingenuity, such as Hippias was, added to their other attainments the arts of popular oratory, and by those means got into the management of the state. Thus much for the present: the sequel and the supplement of this short history, so far as they are necessary to our purpose, will appear on fit occasions.—S.

had not a sufficient reach of prudence for the conduct of their own private affairs, and those of the public at the same time ?

Soc. Tell me then, in the name of Jupiter, whether, as all other arts are improved, and the workmen of former times are contemptible and mean in comparison with ours, shall we say that your art, that of the Sophists, hath in like manner received improvement ; and that such of the antients as applied themselves to the study of wisdom were nothing, compared to you of the present age ?

HIP. Perfectly right : that is the very case.

Soc. So that, were Bias to be restored to life again in our days, he would be liable to ridicule, appearing in competition with you Sophists : your case being parallel to that of our modern statuaries, who tell us that Dædalus, were he alive, and to execute such works as those to which he owed his great name, would but expose himself, and become ridiculous.

HIP. The truth of the matter, Socrates, exactly is what you say. I myself, however, make it my custom to bestow my commendations rather upon the antients, and upon all such as flourished in times precedent to our own ; giving them the preeminence and precedence <sup>1</sup> above ourselves ; in order to escape the envy of the living, and for fear of incurring the resentment of the dead <sup>2</sup>.

Soc.

<sup>1</sup> Adliterations, adnominations, and repetitions of the same word, were some of those prettinesses of style, or graces, where they are employed with judgment, which are said to have been invented by the rhetorical Sophists. Plato, therefore, frequently in his dialogues, with great propriety, puts them into the mouths of such speakers. On what occasions, and how differently from the use made of them by those sophistical orators, he introduces them into his own style at other times, will be observed elsewhere.—S.

<sup>2</sup> There was a law at Athens, the author of which was Solon, ordaining *μη λεγειν κακως τον τεθνηκοτα*, not to revile the dead : a law made, says Plutarch, partly from a political consideration, to hinder the perpetuating of enmities ; partly from a motive of justice, which forbids the attacking those who are not in a capacity of defending themselves ; and partly from a principle of religion, agreeably to which the departed are to be looked on as sacred : *και οσιον τους μεθεστωτας ιερους νομιζειν*. Plut. in Vit. Solon. p. 89. E. That this sentiment was of much earlier antiquity than the age of Solon, appears from the following passage of Archilochus, cited by Clemens Alex. Strom. l. vi. p. 619. ed. Sylburg.

Ου γαρ (inf. f. τὰδ') εσθλα, κατθανουσι κερτομειν  
Επ' ανδρασι.—

For

Soc. In my opinion, Hippias, you see the matter in a just light, and consider it thoroughly well. I myself can witness the truth of what you say. It is indeed certain, that your art is in this respect really improved, in that you are able to manage the concerns of the public, and at the same time give attention to your own private interests. For Gorgias<sup>1</sup>, that great sophist of Leontium, came hither on a public embassy from his country, as the ablest man among the Leontines to negotiate their affairs of state: and here he acquired glory by his fine harangues in the assembly of the people; at the same time that by his exhibitions before private companies<sup>2</sup>,  
and

For this is evil, with heart-biting taunt  
To persecute men dead:—

And from this of Homer still earlier,—

Οὐκ ὄσιον φθιμένοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσιν εὐχετασθᾶν.

Odyss. l. xxii. ver. 412.

With boastful speech to glory o'er the dead  
Is impious:—

This piece of antient religion arose partly from an opinion, that souls freed from their earthly bodies were in a state of being superior to that of mortals, and ought, therefore, to be honoured by them; and partly was owing to a belief that the shadowy ghosts, or spirits, (which they distinguished from the intellectual souls,) of dead persons had it in their power to hurt the living, by haunting and disturbing them at least, if no other way. It is on the foundation of this belief that Virgil represents Dido thus threatening Æneas,

Omnibus umbra locis adero: dabis, improbe, pœnas.

Æneid. l. iv. ver. 386.

Be where thou wilt, my shade shall still be there:—

Yes; thou shalt suffer for thy cruelty,

Base man!—

And hence likewise came to be instituted the religious rite of offering *θελυκτηρια*; pacificatory sacrifices, to the ghosts of those whom they were afraid of having offended. See Eurip. Iphigen. in Taur. ver. 166.—S.

<sup>1</sup> The character of Gorgias is painted by Plato at full length in a dialogue inscribed with his name. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to observe, that Gorgias was by profession, like Hippias, an orator as well as sophist; and set up for teaching both philosophy and the art of rhetoric: and that the price of his teaching was 100 *μναι*, which is of our money 32l. 18s. 4d. from each of his scholars.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The profession or business of a sophist consisted of three branches: one of which was to perfect and accomplish the fine gentleman, according to the idea which the Grecians had of such a character in that age of sophism: not to form him from the first rudiments throughout, or in  
any

and his teaching our young men, he collected and raised very considerable sums of money from this city. Or, if you would have another instance, there is my own friend, the famous Prodicus<sup>1</sup>; who has frequently been sent hither on several public embassies: but the last time, not long since, when he came as ambassador from Ceos, his speeches before the council gained him great honour; and his private exhibitions in the mean time, together with the tuition of our young men, procured him an immense heap of money. But not one of those antient sages ever thought proper to exact money by way of fee or reward for his teaching; or ever took it into his head to display his wisdom before a mixed multitude. So simple were they, and so much a secret was it to them, how valuable a thing was

any part, (for this task they thought beneath them,) but, after a course of liberal education had been gone through, and the studies and exercises of youth were ended, to give him then the finishing touches; qualifying him to speak plausibly upon all subjects, to support with specious arguments either side of any question or debate, and by false oratory and fallacious reasoning, afterwards from them called sophistical, to corrupt the hearers, silence the opposers, and govern all in all things. To attain these admired accomplishments, the young gentleman was constantly to attend, and follow them every where, as long as he thought fit himself; observing in what manner they disputed *de quolibet ente*, on any point which offered; and learning by degrees to imitate them. Hence, that which we translate tuition, or teaching, is every where in Plato termed *συνειναι τοις νεοις*, the being accompanied by the young men. Another part of the sophist's occupation, quite distinct from the former, though carried on at the same time, was to read lectures at a certain price to each auditor, before as many as they could procure beforehand to become subscribers to them. These lectures, the subjects of which were chosen indifferently, were in the way of declamations, dissertations, or what we commonly call essays, ready composed and written down. They were not contrived, however, for the purpose of teaching or instruction: nor could they indeed effectually serve that end; for long speeches and lectures are easily forgotten: but they were calculated merely for entertainment and ostentation; and properly enough, therefore, entitled by the Sophists themselves *επιδειξεις*, exhibitions. The third branch of their trade, the only one cultivated gratuitously, for the sake of fame, though probably with a view, besides, of gaining customers in those other the lucrative branches, was to answer all questions proposed to them; like the antient oracle at Delphi, or the authors of the Athenian oracle in the last age; allusions to which practice of theirs we shall meet with frequently in Plato. But in this passage he had occasion only to mention their other two employments, from which immediately accrued their gain.—S.

<sup>1</sup> In Prodicus also were united the two characters of orator and sophist: as Philostratus (in Vit. Sophist.) confirms. That Socrates condescended to attend his lectures, and contracted an intimacy with him, we learn from several of Plato's dialogues. The price paid by each of his auditors at those last exhibitions of his, here mentioned, was 50 δραχμας, or 11. 12s. 3½d. See Plat. in Cratyl. p. 384. and Aristot. Rhet. l. iii. c. 14.—S.

money.

money. Whereas each of the others, whom I mentioned, has made more money of his wisdom, than any other artificer <sup>1</sup> could ever earn from any art whatever: and prior to these Protagoras did the same.

HIP. You know nothing, Socrates, of what high advantages belong to our profession. If you knew but how great have been my own gains, you would be amazed. To give you only one instance: Going upon a certain time to Sicily, where Protagoras then resided, high in reputation and reverend in years; I, though at that time in age greatly his inferior, gained in a very short time more than a hundred and fifty minas <sup>2</sup>: nay, from one place only, and that a very little one, Inycum, I took above twenty <sup>3</sup>. This when I brought home with me, and presented to my father, it struck him and my other friends in the city with wonder and astonishment. To say the truth, I am inclined to think, that not any two of the sophists, name which you please, taken together, have acquired so much money as myself.

Soc. A fair and a notable evidence have you produced, Hippias, proving not only your own wisdom, but how wise the world, too, is become now-a-days; and what difference there is between the modern wisdom and the antient in point of excellence. For of these predecessors of yours there is reported great folly, according to your account of things <sup>4</sup>. To Anaxagoras, for instance, it is said, happened the contrary of that lucky fate which befel you. For, when great wealth had been left him, he through negligence,

<sup>1</sup> Άλλος δημιουργός. The reason why Plato uses this word, rather than τεχνικός, his usual term for artist, will appear in his dialogue named The Sophist; where he debases that profession below the rank of the meanest artificer in any useful or honest way.—S.

<sup>2</sup> Equal to 484l. 7s. 6d. English money.—S.

<sup>3</sup> Equal to 64l. 11s. 8d. In all our calculations we have followed the usual way of computing; in which an ounce of the silver coin of Athens is valued but at 5s. 2d. and the Attic δραχμή is supposed equal to the Roman denarius; though, as Dr. Arbuthnot judiciously observes, there is reason to think it was of greater value.—S.

<sup>4</sup> Των γὰρ προτερων περι Αναξαγορου. In our translation we have omitted this last word; apprehending it to have been at first one of those, so frequently of old written on the margin of books by way of explication or illustration, and so frequently, when those books came to be copied afterward, assumed into the text. For, if permitted to remain, it confounds or much disturbs the construction; and so greatly puzzled the old translators, that they have severally given this passage four different meanings, all of them, compared with what follows, evidently spoiling the sense. We should choose, therefore, to read των γὰρ προτερων περι, λεγεται κ. τ. λ.—S.

they

they say, lost it all : so silly was he with his wisdom. And of other antient sages they relate stories of the same kind. A clear proof, I think, therefore, this which you exhibit, in what a wise age we live ; and what disproportion the wisdom of it bears to that of former times. Many too, I know, are agreed in this opinion, that a wise man ought, in the first place, to be wise to himself. Now the standard of this kind of wisdom is, it seems, he who can get the most money. But so much for this. And now tell me, as to your own gains, from which of the cities whither you have travelled did you collect the largest sums ? Undoubtedly it must have been from Sparta, whither you have gone the ofteneft.

HIP. Not from thence, Socrates, by Jupiter.

Soc. How say you ? What, the least sum from thence ?

HIP. Never any thing at all.

Soc. It is a prodigy what you relate : and I am amazed at it, Hippias. But tell me, as to that wisdom of yours, has it not the power to improve in virtuous excellence all your followers who are conversant with it, and will learn ?

HIP. In the highest degree, Socrates.

Soc. Were you able then to improve the sons of the Inycians, yet wanted such ability with regard to the sons of Sparta ?

HIP. Far from it.

Soc. The Sicilians then, I warrant, have a desire of virtuous improvement ; but the Spartans not so.

HIP. Strongly so, Socrates, have the Spartans.

Soc. Was their want of money then the reason why they followed you not ?

HIP. By no means ; for of money they have plenty.

Soc. What account then can be given in such a case as this, when they were desirous of improvement, and in no want of money to purchase it ; and you able to furnish them with the highest degrees of it ; why they did not send you away loaded with riches ? What ; certainly the reason of it cannot be this, that the Spartans can educate their sons in a better manner than you could educate them ? Or shall we say they can ? and do you admit this to be true ?

HIP. By no means in the world.

Soc. Were you not able then to persuade the young men at Sparta that,  
by

by the help of your conversation, they might make greater advances in virtue than ever they could hope to do from the company and converse of their fathers? Or could you not persuade those fathers that they would do better to commit the instruction of their sons to your management, than to undertake that care themselves, if they had any affectionate regard for their offspring? For it could not be that they envied their children the attainment of the highest excellence in virtue.

HIP. I have no suspicion of their envying them such an attainment.

Soc. Well now; and Sparta is really governed by good laws.

HIP. Who makes a doubt of it?

Soc. Very well; and in cities governed by good laws the highest value is set on virtue.

HIP. Certainly.

Soc. And how to teach virtue to others you know best of all men.

HIP. By much, Socrates.

Soc. Now the man who knows best how to teach and impart to others the art of horsemanship, of all countries in Greece would not such a man meet with most honour, and acquire most wealth, in Thessaly<sup>1</sup>, and wherever else this art was cultivated most?

HIP. It is probable he would.

Soc. And will not the man who is capable of delivering the most valuable instructions with regard to virtue, meet with most honour, and pick up most money too, if he be that way inclined, in Sparta, and every other Grecian city governed by good laws? But in Sicily<sup>2</sup>, my friend, rather do you suppose, or at Inycum? Ought we, Hippias, to give credit to this? for, if you say it, we must believe.

HIP. The truth is, Socrates, that the Spartans hold it sacred<sup>3</sup> to make

<sup>1</sup> See the beginning of Plato's Meno.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The Sicilians were as infamous for luxury as the Spartans were illustrious for virtue. Whence the Greek proverb, *Σικελικὴ τραπέζα*; and the Latin, *Siculæ dapes*.—S.

<sup>3</sup> This sacred authority, which the Spartans attributed to the laws of their country, was owing partly to the sanction given to those laws by the Delphian oracle; as appears from Xenophon's short observations upon the Lacedæmonian polity; and partly to the sanction of an oath taken by their ancestors, through a stratagem of Lycurgus, to maintain his laws inviolable: for which see Plutarch's life of that legislator, towards the end.—S.

no innovation in their laws; and to educate their youth in no other way than what is agreeable to their antient usages<sup>1</sup>.

Soc. How say you? Do the Spartans hold it sacred not to do what is right, but to do the contrary?

HIP. I would not say any such thing, not I, Socrates.

Soc. Would not they do right then to educate their sons in the better way, and not in the worse?

HIP. It is true they would: but the laws do not permit them to have their youth educated by foreigners, or after a foreign mode<sup>2</sup>. For, be assured, if any foreigner ever acquired wealth at Sparta by teaching or instructing their youth, much more so should I; since they take great pleasure in hearing my dissertations, and give me high encomiums: but in the affair of education, the law, as I said, does not permit them the benefit of my instructions.

Soc. The law, Hippias, do you suppose mischievous to the public, or beneficial?

HIP. It is instituted, I presume, for the benefit of the public: but sometimes, where the frame of the law is bad, it proves a public mischief.

Soc. Well; but do not legislators always frame the law with a view of procuring for the public the greatest good? and because without law it were impossible to live in a state of order and good government.

HIP. Without doubt, they do.

Soc. When those, therefore, who undertake the making laws fail of procuring good, they have missed their end, and erred from good government and law. Or how say you otherwise?

HIP. Accurately speaking, Socrates, I must own the thing is so; but men are not used to affix such a meaning to the word *law*.

<sup>1</sup> The manner of the Spartan education may be seen at large in Cragius de Repub. Lacedæm. lib. iii.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The Spartans, above all people being attached to the antient constitution of their government and laws, were extremely jealous of having a taste introduced among them for foreign manners and fashions; because they were well aware, that by these means an essential change in their constitution would gradually follow and take place. This jealousy of theirs they carried to such a height, that they suffered no foreigner, or person of foreign education, to take up his constant residence in Sparta; nor any of their own people to reside for any considerable length of time in foreign countries.—S.

SOC. Do you speak of men who know what law means, or of men who want that knowledge?

HIP. I speak of the bulk of mankind, the multitude.

SOC. Are these such as know the truth of things, this multitude?

HIP. Certainly not.

SOC. But those who have that knowledge, the wise, hold that which is more beneficial, to be in reality, and according to the truth of things, more a law to all men than what is less beneficial. Do not you agree with them in this?

HIP. I agree that in reality so it is.

SOC. Is not the nature and the condition of every thing such as those hold it to be who are really knowing in the thing?

HIP. Undoubtedly.

SOC. Now to the Spartans, you say, an education under you a foreigner, and after a foreign manner, would be more beneficial than to be educated after the manner of their own country.

HIP. And I say what is true.

SOC. And that which is more beneficial is more a law. This you say likewise, Hippias.

HIP. I have admitted it so to be.

SOC. According, therefore, to your account, to have the sons of the Spartans educated under Hippias, is more agreeable to law; and their education under their fathers is more repugnant to law; supposing that from you they would receive advantages really greater.

HIP. And so indeed would they, Socrates.

SOC. Now from hence it follows, that the Spartans violate the law in not making you presents of money, and committing their sons to your care.

HIP. Be it so: for you seem to argue thus in my favour; and it is not my business to controvert your argument.

SOC. Violators of the law then, my friend, we find these Spartans, and that in the most important article too; these, who are thought to be the greatest observers of it. But, in the name of the Gods, Hippias, of what kind are those dissertations for which they give you those high encomiums? and upon what topics do they take that great pleasure in hearing you harangue?

No doubt, they must be the same in which you have so much excellent knowledge; those which relate to the stars and the phænomena of the sky.

HIP. They by no means endure to hear a word upon these subjects<sup>1</sup>.

Soc. But they take pleasure in hearing a lecture upon the subject of geometry.

HIP. Not at all: for many of the Spartans know not even the common rules of arithmetic; nay, scarcely, I may say, how to reckon.

Soc. They are far from enduring then to hear you discourse on the nature of numbers and accounts.

HIP. Very far from that, by Jupiter.

Soc. The subjects, then, I warrant you, are those upon which you are able to differ, divide, and distinguish, with the greatest accuracy of all men; concerning the power of letters and syllables, of harmonies and rhythms<sup>2</sup>.

HIP. What harmonies, or what letters, my good man, do they concern themselves about?

Soc. Well; what are the subjects, then, upon which they attend to you with so much pleasure to themselves, and so much commendation of you? Tell me yourself, since I cannot find it out.

HIP. Concerning the genealogies, O Socrates, of the heroes and of men;

<sup>1</sup> The polity of the Spartans was contrived with a view of making them a military people. For this reason, the mechanical and necessary arts were left to servants and slaves; and such part only of the liberal kind was admitted amongst them as contributed to military skill, or fitted them for the toils and the stratagems of war. But philosophy and the sciences are said to have been wholly excluded. Many passages from the antients in proof of this are collected by the annotators on Ælian. Var. Hist. l. xii. c. 50. and by Nic. Craig, in his treatise before cited, l. iii. Perhaps, however, it was only so in appearance. It may be worth while to examine and consider well what Plato says on this subject in his Protagoras.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The Spartans were not more remarkable for a contempt of grammar and mathematics, than was Hippias for his skill in those sciences, as appears from the shorter dialogue called by his name. This part of the Introduction, the third and last, receives much grace from both these circumstances. For the mention of the sciences here in this manner, with a mixture of compliment and humour, seems to arise naturally from the character of the person with whom Socrates is conversing, and from that of the people who are the present subject of this part of their conversation. Plato uses such exquisite art in the œconomy of his dialogues, that whatever is brought upon the carpet appears to fall in naturally: at the same time that all the circumstances of it harmonize together; and every particular contributes to carry on his designs, either the principal or subordinate; being indeed purposely introduced for the sake of these.—S.

concerning

concerning the migration of tribes, and settling of colonies; the antiquity and first foundation of cities; in a word, concerning every thing in antient story, they hearken to me with the utmost pleasure. So that I have been obliged to study those things myself for their sakes, and to perfect myself in all that sort of knowledge.

Soc. By Jupiter, Hippias, it was fortunate for you that the Spartans take no pleasure in hearing a man reckon up our archons from the time of Solon<sup>1</sup>. For, if they did, the perfecting yourself in such a catalogue would put you to no little trouble.

HIP. Why so, Socrates? Upon hearing fifty names repeated only once, I will undertake to remember them.

Soc. It is true; but I did not consider that you had an excellent memory. So now I conceive the reason why, in all probability, the Spartans are delighted with you: it is because you know such a multitude of things, and are of the same use to them that old women are to children, to entertain them with the recital of pretty fables and old stories.

HIP. And by Jupiter, Socrates, upon a manly subject too, that of beauty in manners. For, discoursing there lately of a complete rule of manners becoming a young man, I gained much applause. And I take this opportunity to inform you, that I have a dissertation upon this subject extremely beautiful, finely framed in every respect, but particularly admirable for the choice of words<sup>2</sup>. The occasion, or way of introducing my discourse, is this:—

<sup>1</sup> This was the æra of the Athenian greatness. For the lenity of Solon's laws, the limitation which they gave to the formidable power of a perpetual senate, and the popular liberty which they established, produced in the people such a spirit—the consequence always of lenity in the government, legal liberty, and a share of power—that Athens soon grew able to rival Sparta, and to be her competitor for the chief sway and leading in the general affairs of Greece. Plato here, therefore, intends a fine compliment to his country. That he could have no contrary view is evident; because the archons, or chief magistrates of Athens, had been elected annually, nine in number, eighty years before the archonship of Solon, when his laws were instituted. Plato would not have bounded his list of archons with the time of Solon, had his intention been to *satirize* the Athenian constitution; as it may seem to some, who imagine him in all things to be in jest, and always satirical.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The Sophists were remarkably curious upon this head. The words which they affected to use were the smooth, the soft, and the delicate; the pompous, and the highly-compound; the splendid, the florid, the figurative and poetical; the quaint, and the uncommon; the antique, and

this:—After the taking of Troy, Neoptolemus is supposed to ask advice of Nestor, and to inquire of him, what course of life a young man ought to follow in order to acquire renown and glory. Upon this Nestor speaks, and lays down a great many excellent precepts concerning the beauty of manners and a well-regulated life. This <sup>1</sup> dissertation I exhibited at Sparta; and three days hence am to exhibit the same here at Athens, in the school of Phidoftratus, together with several other pieces of mine worth the hearing. I do it at the request of Eudicus, the son of Apemantes. You will not fail, I hope, being present at it yourself, and bringing others with you to be of the audience, such as are capable judges of performances of this kind.

Soc. We shall do so, Hippias; if so it please God. But at present answer me a short question relating to your dissertation. For you have happily reminded me. You must know, my friend, that a certain person puzzled me lately in a conversation we had together <sup>2</sup>—after I had been inveighing against some things for their baseness and deformity, and praising some other things for their excellence and beauty—by attacking me with these questions in a very insolent manner.—“Whence came you, Socrates, said he, to know what things are beautiful, and what are otherwise? For can you tell me, now, what the beautiful is?” I, through the meanness of my knowledge, found myself at a loss, and had nothing to answer him with any propriety. So, quitting his company, I grew angry with myself, reproached myself, and threatened that, as soon as ever I could meet with any one of you wise men, I would hear what he had to say upon the subject, and learn and study it thoroughly; and, that done, would return to my questioner, and battle the point with him over again. Now, therefore, as I said, you are come hap-

and obsolete; with many new ones of their own invention; all, in short, which any way served to please the sense, or amuse the fancy, without informing the understanding. Instances of all which are recorded in the antient critics, and may be seen collected, many of them by Cresollus in *Theat. Rhet.* l. iii. c. 23. As to the diction of Hippias in particular, it is represented by Maximus Tyrius, c. 23. to have been empty and unmeaning, and his eloquence void of solidity.

<sup>1</sup> This boasted dissertation of Hippias was intitled *Τραινός*, as we learn from Philostratus, in whose time it appears to have been extant. The plan of manners which it laid down, if we may conjecture from the title, was taken from the characters of the heroes in Homer's *Iliad*, chiefly from that of Achilles, Hippias's favourite. See the shorter dialogue called by his name.—S.

<sup>2</sup> This certain person was no other than the dianoëtic part or power of the soul of Socrates: for it is this part which investigates truth, deriving its principles from intellect.—T.

pily

pily for me. Give me ample information then accordingly concerning the nature of the beautiful itself: and endeavour to be as accurate as possible in your answers to what I shall ask you; that I may not be confuted a second time, and deservedly again laughed at. For you understand the question, no doubt, perfectly well. To you such a piece of knowledge can be but a little one, amongst the multitude of those which you are master of.

HIP. Little enough, by Jupiter, Socrates; and scarcely of any value at all.

Soc. The more easily then shall I learn it; and not be confuted or puzzled any more upon that point by any man.

HIP. Not by any man. For otherwise would my skill be mean, and nothing beyond vulgar attainment.

Soc. It will be a brave thing, by Juno, Hippias, to get the better of the man, as you promise me we shall. But shall I be any obstacle to the victory if I imitate his manner, and, after you have answered some question of mine, make objections to your answer; for the sake only of more thorough information from you? for I have a tolerable share of experience in the practice of making objections. If it be no difference therefore to you, I should be glad to have the part of an objector allowed me, in order to be made a better master of the subject.

HIP. Take the part of an objector, then: for, as I said just now, it is no very knotty point, that which you inquire about. I could teach you to answer questions much more difficult than this, in such a manner that none should ever be able to refute you.

Soc. O rare! what good news you tell me! But come, since you bid me yourself, I will put myself in the place of my antagonist, try to be what he is, to the best of my power, and in his person begin to question you. Now, if he were of the audience, when you exhibited that dissertation which you talk of, concerning the beauty of manners, after he had heard it through, and you had done speaking, this point rather than any other would be uppermost in his mind to question you upon, this relating to the beautiful: for he has a certain habit of so doing; and thus would he introduce it.—“Elean stranger! I would ask you, whether it is not by having honesty that honest men are honest?” Answer now, Hippias, as if he proposed the question.

HIP. I shall answer—It is by their having honesty.

Soc. Is not this some certain thing then, this honesty?

HIP.

HIP. Clearly so.

SOC. And is it not likewise by their having wisdom that wise men are wise? and by having good in them that all good things are good?

HIP. Without dispute.

SOC. And are not these some certain real things<sup>1</sup>? for they are not purely non-entities, by whose intimate presence with other things those things are what they are.

HIP. Undoubtedly, real things.

SOC. I ask you then, whether all things which are beautiful are not in like manner beautiful by their having beauty?

HIP. They are, by their having beauty.

SOC. Some certain real thing, this beauty.

HIP. A real thing. But what is to come of all this?

SOC. Tell me now, friend stranger, will he say, what this thing is, this beauty, or the beautiful.

HIP. Does not the proposer of this question desire to have it told him, what is beautiful?

SOC. I think not, Hippias: but to have it told him what the beautiful is.

HIP. How does this differ from that?

SOC. Do you think there is no difference between them?

HIP. There is not any.

SOC. You certainly know better. Observe<sup>2</sup>, my good friend, what the question is. For he asks you, not what is beautiful, but what is the beautiful.

HIP. I apprehend you, honest friend. And to that question, What is the beautiful? I shall give an answer, such a one as can never be confuted. For be assured, Socrates, if the truth must be told, a beautiful maiden is the thing beautiful.

<sup>1</sup> This is levelled against those who maintained that mind and the objects of mind have no real being; attributing reality to nothing but that which they are able *απριξ ταιν χειροιν λαβεσθαι*, says Plato, (*Theætet.* p. 155.) "to take fast hold of with their hands;" or, at least, which is the object of one or other of their senses.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The Greek, as it is printed, is *ὁμως—αθρει*. But the sense, as we apprehend, not admitting an adversative adverb, the true reading probably is *ὁμοσε* or *ὁμου—αθρει*, that is, "Look close, or near:" for the Attic writers used the word *ὁμου* to signify the same with *εγγυς*. See Harpocrat. p. 130, 131. ed. Gronov.—S.

SOC.

Soc. An excellent answer, by the dog<sup>1</sup>, Hippias; and such a one as cannot fail of being applauded. Shall I then, in answering thus, have answered the question asked me? and that so well as not to be refuted?

Hip. How should you be refuted, Socrates, in avowing that which is the opinion of all the world; and the truth of which all who hear you will attest?

Soc. Be it so then, by all means. But now, Hippias, let me alone to resume the question, with your answer to it, by myself. The man will interrogate me after this manner: "Answer me, Socrates, and tell me, if there be any such thing as the beautiful itself<sup>2</sup>, to whose presence is owing the beauty of all those things which you call beautiful<sup>3</sup>?" Then shall I answer

<sup>1</sup> Plato has in his dialogues drawn the picture of his hero with an exactness so minute, that he seems not to have omitted the least peculiarity in the ordinary conversation of that great man. Of this we have here an instance very remarkable. Socrates, it seems, in common discourse used frequently to swear by brute animals. The different reasons which have been assigned for his so doing, and the various censures passed on him, may be seen collected by Menage in Not. ad Laërt. p. 92, 93.; M. Massieu in the first tome of Les Mem. de l'Acad. des Inscript. & Belles Lett. p. 205.; and by M. du Soul in Not. ad Lucian. vol. i. p. 556. ed. Hemsterhus. Thus much is evident, that the Cretans had a law or custom, introduced amongst them by Rhadamanthus, to use that very kind of oaths; on purpose to avoid naming on every trivial occasion the Gods in whom they believed. See the authors cited by Olearius in Not. ad Philostrat. p. 257. n. 22. That the great Athenian philosopher followed in this the example of the old Cretan judge and lawgiver, is the opinion of Porphyry, in l. iii. de Abstinent. § 16. and indeed is in the highest degree probable; because we find Socrates swearing by the very same species of animals adjured commonly by the Cretans. The dog is named the most frequently in the oaths of both; probably because domestic, and the most frequently in fight when they were talking. See the Scholiast on Aristoph. Av. ver. 521. and Suidas in voce 'Ραδαμανθυος ὄρκος.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The Greek is, *εἰ τι ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*. Among the Attic writers *εἰ* has often the force of an adverb of interrogation, signifying "whether;" like the English particle "if." This is one of the many idioms of our language, corresponding with those of the antient Attic Greek. But this idiom seems not to have been well known, or at least not here observed, by any of the translators: for they all interpret this part of the sentence in a conditional sense, making *εἰ* a conditional conjunction. Nor does it indeed appear to have been better known to those old transcribers of the original, from whose copies are printed the editions we have of Plato. For their ignorance in this point seems to have occasioned those corruptions of the text taken notice of in the two following notes.—S.

<sup>3</sup> The whole sentence in the present editions stands thus: *Ἰθὶ μοι, ὦ Σωκράτης, ἀποκρίσθαι ταῦτα πάντα ἃ φησὶ καλά εἶναι, εἰ τι ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, ταυτ' ἀν εἶη καλά*; In the latter part of this sentence there is undoubtedly an omission; which we ought to supply thus; *Δι' ὅ ταυτ' ἀν εἶη καλά*, as we

swer him thus: "A beautiful maiden is that beautiful, to whose presence those other things owe their beauty <sup>1</sup>."

HIP. Well. And do you imagine, after this, that he will ever think of refuting you? or attempt to prove your answer concerning the thing beautiful not a just answer? or, if he should attempt it, that he would not be ridiculous?

Soc. That he will attempt it, friend, I am well assured: but whether in so doing he will be ridiculous, will appear in the attempt itself. However, I'll tell you what he will say.

HIP. Tell me then.

Soc. "How pleasant you are, Socrates!" he will say. "Is not a beautiful mare then a thing beautiful? commended as such even by the divine oracle <sup>2</sup>." What shall we answer, Hippias? Shall we not acknowledge, that  
a mare

read in the sentence following, where Socrates repeats the terms of the question: or rather, Ω κ. τ. λ. the dative case having been used by Socrates just before, when he stated the question first.—S.

<sup>1</sup> The Greek is printed thus: Εγω δε δη ερω, οτι ει παρθενος καλη, καλον εστι δι' ο ταυτ' αν ειη καλα. But the sense evidently requires us to expunge the word ει before παρθενος, and to read οτι παρθενος καλη καλον εστι, κ. τ. λ. The author of this interpolation, no doubt, intended to make this sentence answer to the former; and thus completed the series of blunders, which arose gradually from that ignorance of the Attic idiom, used in the former sentence, of which we accused the transcribers in note <sup>2</sup>, p. 393. This last blunder has been the source of another, a most ridiculous one, made by Augustinus Niphus in a Latin treatise De Pulchro. His intention, in the former part of that work, is to illustrate the Greater Hippias of Plato. In pursuance of which he thinks it incumbent on him, in the first place, to prove the excellence of some particular beauty; such as may best show, we presume he means, the perfection of the ideal pattern. For this purpose, he politely and gallantly urges the following argument, manifestly borrowed from the error complained of in this note: "If the princess Joan of Arragon be beautiful without a fault, then there must be something absolutely beautiful in the nature of things: But none can deny the faultless beauty of the princess Joan: Therefore, &c." And in proof of this last position, he gives us a long detail of the charms of that princess; such as, besides the beauties of her mind and sweetness of her manners, her golden locks, blue eyes, dimpled chin, &c. &c. &c. from head to foot.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The oracle here meant is recorded at large by Jo. Tzetzes, chil. ix. cap. 291. of which only the following verse relates to the present subject—

Ἴπποι Θρήνιαι, Λακεδαιμονίαι τε γυναῖκες.

The dames of Sparta and the mares of Thrace  
Excel amongst the females of their kind.

Out of this the Grecians, with a little alteration, made a proverb, current amongst them,

Ἴπποι

a mare is beautiful likewise? meaning a beautiful mare. For, indeed, how should we dare deny that a beautiful thing is beautiful?

HIP. True, Socrates. And no doubt the God rightly gave that commendation: for with us, too, there are mares exceedingly beautiful<sup>1</sup>.

SOC. "Very well now," will he say: "but what, is not a beautiful lyre too a thing beautiful?" Shall we allow it, Hippias?

HIP. Certainly.

SOC. After this he will say, (for with tolerable certainty I can guess he will, from my knowledge of his character,) "But what think you of a beautiful soup-pan, you simpleton you? is not that a thing beautiful then?"

HIP. Who is this man, Socrates? I warrant, some unmannerly and ill-bred fellow, to dare to mention things so mean and contemptible, upon a subject so noble and so respectable.

SOC. Such is the man, Hippias; not nice and delicate; but a mean shabby fellow, without consideration or regard for aught except this, in every inquiry,—What is true?—The man, however, must have an answer: and in order to it, I thus premise—If the pan be made by a good workman,

*Ἴππον Θεσσαλικὴν, Λακεδαιμονίην τε γυναῖκα.*

A Spartan dame, and a Thessalian mare.

See Barthius on Claudian, de 4to Conf. Hon. ad ver. 543. pag. 697.

Hence it arose in time, that the words of the oracle itself suffered a change; and instead of *Θρηϊκίαι* was substituted *Θεσσαλικίαι*: with which alteration we find the oracle cited again by the same Tzetzes, chil. x. c. 330. That the former word is the true reading, and the latter a corruption, rather than the reverse of this, is probable from the authority of a writer, the most antient of those who cite this oracle, Eusebius, in Præp. Ev. l. v. c. xxvii. pag. 132. ed. R. Steph.—S.

<sup>1</sup> We learn from Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 303. that the people of Elis carried their mares into other countries to be covered. It is probable, therefore, that they encouraged only the female breed of that animal at home: especially if it be true, what Pliny and Servius write, that mares are better for a long race. See the annotators on Virgil, Georg. i. ver. 59. The Eleans were undoubtedly thus curious about the breed, on account of the chariot-races in the Olympic games; which were celebrated in their country, and from which they derived the advantage of being suffered to enjoy a constant peace, with liberty and honour—

*Et quas Elis opes ante parârat equis.*

PROPERT. l. i. el. 8. ver. 36.

And by her mares, so fleet in race to run,

The wealth which Elis antiently had won.—S.

smooth and round, and well-baked; like some of our handsome soup-pans with two handles, those which hold six coas<sup>1</sup>, exceedingly beautiful in truth; if he mean such a pan as these are, the pan must be confessed beautiful. For how, indeed, could we deny that to be beautiful which has real beauty?

HIP. By no means, Socrates.

Soc. "Is not a beautiful soup-pan, then," he will say, "a thing beautiful? Answer."

HIP. Well then, Socrates, my opinion of the case is this: Even this vessel, if well and handsomely made, is a beautiful thing likewise. But nothing of this kind deserves to be mentioned as beautiful, when we are speaking of a mare, and a maiden, or any other thing thus admirable for its beauty.

Soc. So; now I apprehend you, Hippias. When the man asks such a question as that, we are thus, it seems, to answer him:—"Honest man! are you ignorant how it was said well by Heraclitus, 'that the most beautiful ape, in comparison with the human<sup>2</sup> kind, is a creature far from beautiful?' Just so, the most beautiful soup-pan is a thing far from beautiful in comparison with the maiden kind; as it is said by Hippias the wise." Is it not thus, Hippias, that we must answer?

HIP. By all means, Socrates: your answer is perfectly right.

Soc. Mind me now: for upon this, I am well assured, he will say to me thus:—"But suppose, Socrates, the maiden kind were to be set in comparison with the Goddess kind; would not the same accident befall the maidens in that case, which happened to the soup-pans compared with them? Would

<sup>1</sup> According to the accurate Dr. Arbuthnot's computation, the Attic *χους*, or *χοα*, was a measure containing three quarts. So that the fine tureens here mentioned held  $4\frac{1}{2}$  gallons.—S.

<sup>2</sup> In the Greek we read *ἄλλω γενει*. But, that we ought to read *ἀνθρωπινῶ γενει*, there is no occasion, we presume, for any arguments to prove. It will sufficiently appear from what is quoted presently after from the same Heraclitus. For, however *dark* or *mysterious* his writings might have been, as we are told they were, yet there is no reason to think he wrote *absurdly*. But the absurdity was easily committed by the transcribers of Plato; who probably sometimes did not well understand his meaning, certainly were not always very attentive to it. For we learn from those who are much conversant with antient manuscripts, that *ἀνθρωπῶ* often, and *ἀνθρωπινῶ* sometimes, is written in this concise manner, *ἀνῶ*. And no error is more common in the editions of Greek authors, than such as are occasioned by this very abbreviation.—S.

not the fairest maiden appear far from being beautiful? Does not Heraclitus further teach this very doctrine, which you yourself must needs infer to be true<sup>1</sup>, that the wisest of men, compared with a God, will appear an ape in wisdom and beauty and every other excellence<sup>2</sup>?" Shall we own, Hippias, the fairest maiden far from beautiful, in comparison with a Goddess?

HIP. Who, Socrates, would presume to call this in question?

SOC. No sooner then shall I have agreed with him in this, than he will laugh at me, and say, "Do you remember, Socrates, what question you was asked?"—"I do," I shall tell him; "it was this: What kind of thing was the beautiful itself?"—"When the question then," he will say, "concerned the beautiful itself, your answer was concerning that which happens to be far from beautiful, according to your own confession, as beautiful as it is."—"So it seems," shall I say? Or what other reply, my friend, do you advise me to make him?

HIP. I think, for my part, you must reply in those very words. For<sup>3</sup>,  
when

<sup>1</sup> The Greek is thus printed, *ὃν σὺ επαγγη*; and by all the translators interpreted after this manner: "That Heraclitus, whose testimony you cite;" as if the word *μαρτυρα* was tacitly understood after *επαγγη*. Whether this interpretation be agreeable to the words of Plato, or not; we see it plainly repugnant to the matter of fact: for it was not Hippias, but Socrates himself, who had just before cited Heraclitus. Supposing, however, that the writings of this philosopher were cited frequently by Hippias; and that possibly, therefore, the meaning might be this: "He whose testimony you are used to cite;" yet the alteration of the word *ὃν* into *ὁ* AN will, we presume, to every attentive and judicious reader, appear to make better sense and reasoning. For the saying of Heraclitus, which follows, as this philosopher inferred the truth of it, by analogy, from his comparison between apes and men, is no less a proper inference, in the same way of reasoning, from what Hippias had just before admitted to be his own meaning, and the amount of what he had said concerning the soup-pan compared with a beautiful maiden. Our learned readers will also observe the construction to be much easier, and more natural, when the sentence is read thus: *ὃν καὶ Ἡρακλείτης ταῦτον τοῦτο λέγει, ὃ ἀνὸς επαγγη*.—S.

<sup>2</sup> In this quotation from Heraclitus every one will discern the original of that thought in Mr. Pope's Essay on Man—

Superior beings, when of late they saw  
A mortal man unfold all nature's law,  
Admired such wisdom in an earthly shape,  
And showed a Newton, as we show an ape.—S.

<sup>3</sup> We entirely agree with Monf. Maucroy, in assigning the following sentence to Hippias; though all the other translations, with the printed editions of the Greek, attribute it to Socrates.

when he says that the human kind compared with the divine is far from beautiful, without doubt he will have the truth on his side.

Soc. "But were I to have asked you at first this question," will he say, "What is beautiful, and at the same time far from beautiful?" and you were to have answered me in the manner you did; would not you in that case have answered rightly? And does the beautiful then itself, by which every other thing is ornamented, and looks beautiful, whenever this form of beauty supervenes and invests it, imparting thus the virtue of its presence,—does this still appear to you to be a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre?"

HIP. Truly, Socrates, if this be the question which he asks, it is the easiest thing imaginable to answer it; and to tell him what that beautiful thing is, by which other things are ornamented; and which, by supervening and investing them, makes them look beautiful. So that he must be a very simple fellow, and entirely a stranger to things elegant and fine. For, if you only answer him thus, "that the beautiful, which he inquires after, is nothing else than gold," he will have no more to say, nor attempt ever to refute such an answer. Because none of us can be insensible that, wherever gold be applied or superinduced, let the thing have looked ever so vile and fordid before, yet then it will look beautiful, when it is invested or ornamented with gold.

Soc. You have no experience of the man, Hippias, how unyielding he is, and how hard in admitting any assertion.

HIP. What signifies that, Socrates? He must of necessity admit what is rightly asserted; or, in not admitting it, expose himself to ridicule.

Soc. And yet will he be so far from admitting this answer, my friend, that he will treat me with open derision, and say to me, "You that are so puffed up with the opinion of your own skill and knowledge, do you think Phidias was a bad workman?" And I believe I shall answer, that he was far from being so.

HIP. You will answer rightly, Socrates.

Soc. Rightly, without dispute. But he, when I have agreed with him that Phidias was a good workman, will say, "Do you imagine, then, that Phidias

The error seems to have arisen from want of observing, that the particle *και* in Plato has frequently the force of *γαρ*; and that *και δε*, though oftener *και μεν δε*, answers to the Latin *enimvero*.—S.

was ignorant of that which you call the beautiful?"—"To what purpose do you ask this?" I shall say.—"Because Minerva's eyes," will he reply, "Phidias made not of gold, nor yet the rest of her face; nor the feet, nor the hands neither: though she would have looked handsomest, it seems, had she been a golden Goddess: but he made these all of ivory<sup>1</sup>. It is evident that he committed this error through ignorance; not knowing that gold it was which beautified all things, wherever it was applied." When he talks after this manner, what answer shall we make him, Hippias?

HIP. There is no difficulty at all in the matter. We shall answer, "Phidias was in the right; for things made of ivory are also, as I presume, beautiful."

SOC. "What was the reason, then," will he say, "why Phidias made not the pupil of the eyes out of ivory, but out of stone rather? choosing for that purpose such stone as (in colour) most resembled ivory. Is a beautiful stone then a thing beautiful too?" Shall we admit it so to be, Hippias?

HIP. We will; in a place where the stone is becoming.

SOC. But, where it is unbecoming, shall I allow it to be unhandsome, or not?

HIP. Allow it; where the stone becomes not the place.

SOC. "Well now; and is it not the same with ivory and gold, you wise man you?" will he say. "Do not these, where they are becoming, make things appear handsome; but far otherwise where they are unbecoming?" Shall we deny this, or acknowledge the man to be in the right?

HIP. We must acknowledge this, that whatever is becoming to any thing makes it appear handsome.

SOC. Upon this, he will say thus: "When that fine soup-pan, then, which we have been speaking of, is set upon the stove full of excellent soup<sup>2</sup>,  
whether

<sup>1</sup> All the other parts, not here mentioned, were of massive gold: as we collect from Pliny's Natural History, l. xxxvi. c. 6. compared with this place. For the Athenian Minerva was always painted or carved with martial habiliments. It became a Goddess to have these made of gold. And with equal propriety, no doubt, did Phidias make of ivory the parts supposed to be left naked. The Olympian Jupiter, and this admirable statue, the size of which far exceeded the human, were esteemed the capital works of that great master. See Plin. Hist. Nat. l. xxxiv. c. 8. The Minerva stood in the Παρθενων, or temple of that Goddess, at Athens.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The fine compound soups of the Athenians, to prevent spoiling the contexture of some of the ingredients,

whether is a golden spoon the most becoming and proper for it, or a fycamore spoon?"

HIP. Hercules! what a strange sort of man, Socrates, is he whom you are talking of! Will you not tell me who he is?

Soc. Should I tell you his name, you would not know him.

HIP. But I know already that he is some ignorant silly fellow.

Soc. He is a very troublesome questioner indeed, Hippias. But, however, what shall we answer? Which of the two spoons shall we say is most becoming and proper for the soup and for the pan? Is it not clearly the fycamore<sup>1</sup> spoon? For this gives a better scent and flavour to the soup; and at the same time, my friend, it would not break the pan, and spill the soup, and put out the fire, and, when the guests were come prepared for feasting, rob them of an excellent dish. But all these mischiefs would be done by that golden spoon. We must, I think, therefore, answer, that the fycamore spoon is more becoming and proper in this case than the golden spoon: unless you say otherwise.

HIP. Well, Socrates; more becoming and proper be it then: but, for

ingredients, and confounding the order of others, were, many of them, served up to table in the very stewing-pans in which they were made. See Aristoph. Eq. act. iv. sec. 1.; Athenæus, l. ix. p. 406.; and Casaubon. in Athen. p. 693. For this reason, that elegant people was very curious about the beauty of these pans or dishes. The matter of them seems to have been a kind of porcelain, and the form not unlike our tureens. If the curiosity of any of our readers should lead them to inquire into the composition of these soups, they may satisfy it in some measure by looking into Athenæus and Apicius Cælius, l. v. c. 3.—S.

<sup>1</sup> In the Greek *συκινη*. But that we ought to read *συκαμνη*, there is great reason to suspect. For the wood of the fig-tree was found so unfit a material in the making any domestic utensils, &c. that the Grecians in common speech metaphorically called whatever was useless, *συκινον*, a fig-tree thing, this or that. Upon which account Horace gives that wood the epithet of "*inutile*," l. i. sat. 8. Whereas the wood of the fycamore-tree, *συκαμινος*, is by Theophrastus said to be *ξύλον προς πολλα χρησιμον*, Hist. Plant. l. iv. c. 2. Not to insist on the extreme bitterness of fig-tree wood to the taste; and the offensiveness of its smoke, when burning, beyond that of any other tree: (see Plutarch, vol. ii. p. 684.) qualities which seem to indicate the scent and flavour of it not to be very agreeable. The alteration of this word is easily accounted for. The *συκαμινος*, or *συκαμορος*, being the same with the *συκη Αιγυπτια*, it is probable that the Alexandrian Platonists, to illustrate the word *συκαμνη*, wrote in the margin of their books *συκινη*: which afterwards the more easily took place of the other, because the fig-tree was well known to be the most common of any tree in Attica.—S.

my part, I would not hold discourse with a fellow who asked such sort of questions.

Soc. Right, my dear friend. For it would not be becoming or proper for you to be bespattered with such vile dirty words, so finely dressed<sup>1</sup> as you are from top to toe, and so illustrious for wisdom through all Greece. But for me—it is nothing to dirty<sup>2</sup> myself against the man. Give me my lesson, therefore, what I am to say; and answer in my name. For the man now will say thus: “If the fycamore spoon then be more becoming and proper than the golden one, must it not be handsomer?”

HIP. Yes. Since the proper and becoming, Socrates, you have granted to be handsomer than the improper and unbecoming.

Soc. What, Hippias; and shall we grant him too, that the fycamore spoon has more beauty in it than the golden spoon?

HIP. Shall I tell you, Socrates, what you shall say the beautiful is, so as to prevent him from all further cavilling and disputing?

Soc. By all means: but not before you tell me whether of the two spoons we have been talking of is the most beautiful, as well as the most proper and becoming.

HIP. Well then; if it pleases you, answer him, “It is that made of the fycamore tree.”

Soc. Now say what you was just going to say. For this answer, in which I pronounce gold to be the beautiful, will be refuted; and gold will be demonstrated, I find, not to be at all more beautiful than fycamore wood. But what, say you, is the beautiful now?

HIP. I will tell you. For when you ask me, “What is the beautiful?” you would have me, I perceive, give you for answer something which shall never, in any place, or to any person, appear otherwise than beautiful.

Soc. By all means, Hippias. And now you apprehend me perfectly well. But observe what I say: Be assured, that if any man shall be able to

<sup>1</sup> The fine dress in which Hippias appeared at the Olympic games, is related by Plato in the lesser dialogue of his name; and more at large by Apuleius, *Florida*. l. ii. Ælian also tells us, that the ordinary attire of that sophist, whenever he appeared abroad, was of a scarlet colour, such as in those days peculiarly belonged to persons of high dignity. *Var. Hist.* l. xii. c. 32.—S.

<sup>2</sup> Meaning, that he was accustomed to submit his fancies and passions to the severe discipline and rough treatment of his higher principle.—S.

controvert our new answer, I shall vow never more to praise any thing for its beauty. Now in the name of the Gods proceed, and tell it me without delay.

HIP. I say then, that always, and to every person, and in every place it will appear the most beautiful, lovely, and desirable thing in the world, to be rich, healthy, honoured by his country, to arrive at a good old age, to give his parents an honourable burial, and at length to have the last offices performed for himself honourably and magnificently by his own issue.

Soc. O brave! O rare! How admirable, how great, and how worthy of yourself, Hippias, is the speech you have now spoken! By Juno, I receive with much pleasure that hearty willingness of yours to give me all the assistance in your power. But we reach not the point yet. For now will the man laugh at us more than ever, you may be assured.

HIP. An ill-timed laugh, Socrates. For in laughing, when he has nothing to object, he will in reality laugh only at himself; and be the ridicule of all who happen to be present.

Soc. Perhaps so. But perhaps, also, as soon as I have thus answered, I shall be in danger, if I prophesy aright, of something besides the being laughed at.

HIP. What besides?

Soc. That, if he happens to have a cane in his hand, unless I run away and escape him, he will aim some very serious strokes at me.

HIP. How say you? What, is the man some master of yours then? for, otherwise, would he not be punished for the injury done you? Or, is there no justice in your city? but the citizens are permitted to assault and beat one another injuriously.

Soc. By no means are they permitted to do any such thing.

HIP. Will he not, therefore, be condemned to punishment, as having beaten you injuriously?

Soc. I should think he would not, Hippias; not having beaten me injuriously if I had made him such an answer; but very deservedly, as it seems to me.

HIP. It seems so then to me, Socrates; if you are of that opinion yourself.

Soc. Shall I tell you, why, in my own opinion, I should have deserved a beating, if I had so answered?—Will you condemn me too without trying the cause? or will you hear what I have to say?

HIP. It would be a hard case indeed, Socrates, should I deny you a hearing. But what have you to say then?

Soc. I will tell you; but in the same way as I talked with you just now, assuming his character, whilst you personate me. I shall do this, to avoid treating you in your own person with such language as he will use in reprimanding me, with harsh and out-of-the-way terms. For I assure you that he will say thus:—"Tell me, Socrates; think you not that you deserve a beating, for having sung that pompous strain, so foreign to the design of the music; spoiling thus the harmony, and wandering wide of the point proposed to you?"—"How so?" I shall ask him.—"How?" he will reply: "can you not remember that I asked you concerning the beautiful itself, that which makes every thing beautiful, wherever it comes and imparts the virtue of its presence; whether it communicates it to stone or wood, to man or God, to actions and manners, or to any part of science. Beauty itself, man, I ask you what it is: and I can no more beat into your head what I say, than if you were a stone lying by my side, nay a mill-stone too, without ears or brains." Now, Hippias, would not you be angry with me, if I, frightened with this reprimand, should say to him thus:—"Why, Hippias said, this was the beautiful; and I asked him, just as you ask me, what was beautiful to all persons, and at all times."—What say you? will you not be angry if I tell him thus?

HIP. That which I described, Socrates, is beautiful, I am very positive, in the eyes of all men<sup>1</sup>.

Soc. "And always will it be so?" he will say: "for the beautiful itself must be always beautiful."

HIP. To be sure.

Soc. "And always was it so in former times?" he will say.

HIP. It always was so.

Soc. "What? and to Achilles too," he will say, "did the Elean stranger affirm it was a beautiful and desirable thing to survive his progenitors? and that it was the same to his grandfather Æacus, and the rest

<sup>1</sup> At the end of this sentence, in the Greek, are added the words *και δεξει*. These we have omitted to translate; on a presumption that they were at first but a marginal various reading of the words which follow, *και εσται*, spoken by Socrates. For the difference between real and apparent beauty falls not under consideration in this part of the argument.—S.

of those who were the progeny of the Gods? nay, that it was so even to the Gods themselves?"

HIP. What a fellow is this! Away with him! Such questions as these are profane, and improper to be asked.

SOC. But is it not much more profane for any man, when these questions are asked him, to answer in the affirmative, and to maintain such propositions?

HIP. Perhaps it is.

SOC. "Perhaps then you are this man," will he say, "who affirm it to be a thing always, and to every person, beautiful and desirable, to be buried by his descendents, and to bury his parents. Was not Hercules one of these very persons? and those whom we just now mentioned, are not they also to be included in the number?"

HIP. But I did not affirm it was so to the Gods.

SOC. Nor to the heroes, I presume.

HIP. Not to such as were children of the Gods.

SOC. But to such only as were not so.

HIP. Right.

SOC. Amongst the number of heroes then, it seems, according to your account, to Tantalus, and Dardanus, and Zethus, it would have been a sad thing, a horrible profanation of deity, to suppose it, and a fatal blow to their own honour; but to Pelops, and others born of men like him, it was a glorious thing, beautiful and desirable.

HIP. So I think it to be.

SOC. "You think this then to be true, the contrary of which you maintained just now," will he say, "that to survive their ancestors, and to be buried

<sup>2</sup> The Greek is, βαλλ' ες μακαριαν. Various explications of this proverb are given us by Timæus, (in Lexic. Platonic.) Hesychius, Suidas, and others. But to us none of them are satisfactory. Erasmus, with his usual acuteness and sagacity, was the first, so far as we know, who discovered the most probable origin of it: though with his usual Socratic modesty he only says, It seems to be so; and after the accounts usually given of it, offers his own, which is this: that the particular spot of ground, where a great part of the Persian forces perished in the battle of Marathon, a deep marsh in which they sunk and were overwhelmed, being, as he observes from Pausanias, called Μακαρια, the Grecians used this proverbial speech by way of detestation, when they cursed any man, "Throw him into Macaria!" the place where our detested enemies lie perished. See Erasmi. Adag. chil. ii. cent. I. n. 98. Schottus gives the same interpretation, in the very words of Erasmus; but, like many other learned commentators, without acknowledging his author, Schol. in Zenobium, p. 42.—S.

by their descendants, is, in some cases <sup>1</sup>, and to some persons <sup>2</sup>, a dishonourable and a horrible thing: nay more, it seems not possible that such a thing should be, or ever become, beautiful and desirable to all. So that this which you now hold to be the beautiful, happens to be in the same case with those your former favourites, the maiden and the gold; sometimes it is beautiful, and sometimes otherwise: but a circumstance still more ridiculous attends this; it is beautiful only to some persons, whilst to others it is quite the contrary. And not yet," will he say, "not all this day long, are you able, Socrates, to answer the question which you were asked,—What the beautiful is." In terms such as these will he reproach me justly, should I answer him as you directed me. Much after the manner, Hippias, which I have now represented to you, proceed the conversations usually held between the man and me. But now and then, as if in pity to my ignorance and want of learning, he proposes to me himself some particular matter of inquiry; and asks me whether I think such or such a thing to be the beautiful; or whatever else be the general subject of the question which he has been pleased to put to me, or upon which the conversation happens at that time to turn.

HIP. How mean you, Socrates?

Soc. I will explain my meaning to you by an instance in the present subject.—"Friend Socrates," says he, "let us have done with disputing in this way: give me no more answers of this sort; for they are very silly, and easily confuted. But consider now, whether the beautiful be something of this kind; such as in our dispute just now we touched upon, when we said that gold, where it was proper and becoming, was beautiful; but otherwise, where it was improper and unbecoming: and that the beauty of all other things depended on the same principle; that is, they were beautiful only where they were becoming. Now this very thing, the proper and becoming, essential propriety and decorum itself, see whether this may not happen to be the beautiful." Now, for my part, I am used to give my assent, in such matters, to every thing proposed to me. For I find in myself nothing to object. But what think you of it? are you of opinion that the becoming is the beautiful?

HIP. Entirely am I, Socrates, of that opinion.

<sup>1</sup> Meaning the case of Achilles.—S.

<sup>2</sup> That is, to the heroes.—S.

SOC. Let us consider it, however; for fear we should be guilty of some mistake in this point.

HIP. I agree we ought so to do.

SOC. Observe then. That which we call the becoming, is it not either something whose presence, wherever it comes, gives all things a beautiful appearance; or something which gives them the reality of beauty; or something which bestows both<sup>1</sup>, and causes them not only to appear beautiful, but really so to be?

HIP. I think it must be one or other of these.

SOC. Whether of these then is the becoming? Is it that which only gives a beautiful appearance? as a man whose body is of a deformed make, when he has put on clothes or shoes which fit him, looks handsomer than he really is. Now, if the becoming causes every thing to look handsomer than it really is, the becoming must then be a kind of fraud or imposition with regard to beauty, and cannot be that which we are in search of, Hippias. For we were inquiring what that was by which all beautiful things are beautiful. As<sup>2</sup>, if we were asked what that was, by which all great things are great, we should answer, "it was by surpassing other things of the same kind<sup>3</sup>." For thus it is, that all things are great: and though they may not all appear great to us, yet, in as much as they surpass others, great of necessity they must be. So is it, we say, with the beautiful; it must be something by which things are beautiful, whether they appear to be so or not. Now this cannot be the becoming: for the becoming causes things to appear more beautiful than they really are, according to your account of it; concealing the truth

<sup>1</sup> A most egregious and gross blunder has corrupted the Greek text in this place; where we read *ουδετερα*: instead of which we ought to read *αμφοτερα*: as will appear clearly in the course of the argument. Yet, gross as the blunder is, all the translators have given into it.—S.

<sup>2</sup> In the Greek we read *ωσπερ ω παντα τα μεγαλα εστι μεγαλα, τω υπερεχοντι*. Stephens in his Annotations says, he had rather the word *ω* was omitted. Parallel places might be found in Plato, to justify in some measure the expression as it stands. But were it necessary to make any alteration, we should make no doubt of supposing the error lay in the last words; nor scruple to read them thus, *το υπερεχον τι*. For, in the sentence presently after, where this similitude (as to the manner of defining) is applied, Plato uses the same way of expressing himself, thus: *ουτω δη φαμιν και το καλον, ω καλα παντα εστι, — τι αν ειναι*.—S.

<sup>3</sup> *Magnitude itself*, as we have shown in the Notes on the Parmenides, is, according to Plato, the cause of *transcendency* to all things.—T.

of things, and not suffering this ever to appear. But that which causes them to be really beautiful, as I just now said, whether they appear to be so or not, this it is our business to find out, and declare the nature of it: for this it is which is the subject of our search, if we are searching for the beautiful.

HIP. But the becoming, Socrates, causes things both to be, and to appear beautiful, by virtue of its presence.

Soc. If so, then it is impossible for things really beautiful to appear otherwise; inasmuch as there is present with them the cause of beautiful appearance.

HIP. Admit it impossible.

Soc. Shall we admit this then, Hippias, that all laws, and rules of action, manners, or behaviour, truly beautiful, are beautiful in common estimation, and appear so always to all men? Or shall we not rather say quite the reverse, that men are ignorant of their beauty, and that above all things these are the subjects of controversy and contention, not only private but public, not only between man and man, but between different communities and civil states<sup>1</sup>?

<sup>1</sup> For a full explication of this passage we refer our readers to Plato's First Alcibiades, Vol. I. But more particularly we recommend to their perusal, upon this occasion, a conversation between Socrates and Hippias, related by Xenophon in his Memoirs of Socrates: because it confirms the truth of many circumstances in this dialogue; and, in particular, not only proves that Plato drew the character of Hippias such as it really was, but that he attributed to Socrates those sentiments which were truly his. Xenophon introduces it thus, with his usual simplicity: "I remember Socrates upon a certain time holding discourse with Hippias of Elis concerning the rule or standard of right. The occasion of it was this: Hippias, on his arrival at Athens, where he had not been for a long time before, happened to meet Socrates, at a time when he was in conference with some other persons," &c. The whole conversation is too long to be here inserted. But the following passage in it agrees with and illustrates this of Plato now before us. It follows a boast made by Hippias, that concerning the rule, by which to judge of right and wrong, he had some new things to deliver, which it was impossible for Socrates or any other person ever to controvert. *Νη την Ἑραν, εφη, μεγα λεγεις αγαθον ευρηκεναι, ει παυσονται μεν οι δικασται διχα ψηφισομενοι, παυσονται δ' οι πολιται περι των δικαιων αντιλεγοντες τε και αντιδικουντες και στασιαζοντες, παυσονται δ' αι πολεις διαφορομεναι περι των δικαιων και πολεμουσαι.* "By Juno (said Socrates), the discovery which you talk of having made, will be of great service to the world, if it will put an end to all diversity of opinions amongst the judges concerning what is agreeable to justice: if there shall be no more controversies, nor suits at law, nor factions among the citizens concerning what is right and what is wrong; nor any more differences or wars between the cities, occasioned by those very questions." *Ξενοφ. Απομνημ. βιβ. δ.—S.*

HIP.

HIP. Thus indeed rather, Socrates, that in those points men are ignorant of the beautiful.

SOC. But this would not be the case if those beautiful things had the appearance of beauty, added to the reality: and this appearance would they have, if the becoming were the beautiful, and caused things, as you say it does, both to be and to appear beautiful, bestowing on them real and apparent beauty at the same time. Hence it follows, that if the becoming should be that by which things are made truly beautiful, then the becoming must be the beautiful which we are in search of, not that by which things are only made beautiful in appearance. But if the becoming should be that by which things are made beautiful only in appearance, it cannot be the beautiful which we are in search of; for this bestows the reality of beauty. Nor is it in the power of the same thing to cause the appearance and the reality, both, not only in the case of beauty, but neither in any other instance whatever. Let us choose now, whether of these two we shall take for the becoming, that which causes the appearance of beauty, or that which causes the reality.

HIP. The becoming, Socrates, I take it, must be that which causes the appearance.

SOC. Fie upon it, Hippias! Our discovery of the beautiful is fled away, and hath escaped us. For the becoming has turned out to be a thing different from the beautiful.

HIP. So it seems; and very unaccountably too.

SOC. But however, my friend, we must not give it up for lost. I have still some hope left, that the nature of the beautiful may come forth into light, and show itself.

HIP. With great clearness, Socrates, beyond doubt: for it is by no means difficult to find. I am positive that, if I were to go aside for a little while, and consider by myself, I should describe it to you with an accuracy beyond that of any thing ever so accurate.

SOC. Ah! talk not, Hippias, in so high a tone. You see what trouble it has given us already; and I fear lest it should grow angry with us, and run away still further than before. But I talk idly: for you, I presume, will easily find it out, when you come to be alone. Yet, in the name of the Gods, I conjure you, make the discovery while I am with you: and, if it be agreeable

able to you, admit me, as you did before, your companion in the search. If we find it together, it will be best of all: and, if we miss it in this way of joint inquiry, I shall be contented, I hope, with my disappointment, and you will depart and find better success without any difficulty. Besides, if we now find it, I shall not, you know, be troublesome afterwards, teasing you to tell me what was the event of that inquiry by yourself, and what was the great discovery which you had made. Now therefore consider, if you think this to be the beautiful. I say then, that it is. But pray observe, and give me all your attention, for fear I should say any thing foolish, or foreign to the purpose. Let this then be in our account the beautiful, that which is useful. I was induced to think it might be so by these considerations. Beautiful, we say, are eyes; not those which look as if they had not the faculty of sight; but such as appear to have that faculty strong, and to be useful for the purpose of seeing. Do we not?

HIP. We do.

SOC. And the whole body also, do we not call it beautiful with a view to its utility; one for the race, another for wrestling? So further, through all the animal kind, as a beautiful horse, cock, and quail: in the same manner all sorts of domestic utensils, and all the conveniencies for carriage abroad, be they land vehicles, or ships and barges for the sea; instruments of music likewise, with the tools and instruments subservient to the other arts: to these you may please to add moral rules and laws. Every thing almost of any of these kinds we call beautiful upon the same account; respecting the end for which it was born, or framed, or instituted. In whatever way it be useful, to whatever purpose, and upon whatever occasion; agreeably to these circumstances we pronounce it beautiful. But that which is in every respect useless, we declare totally void of beauty. Are not you of this opinion, Hippias?

HIP. I am.

SOC. We are right, therefore, now in saying, that above all things the useful proves to be the beautiful.

HIP. Most certainly right, Socrates.

SOC. Now that which is able to operate or effect any thing, is it not useful so far as it has power, and is able? But that which is powerless and unable, is it not useless?

HIP. Without doubt.

Soc. Power then is beautiful, and want of power is the contrary.

HIP. Quite right. And many things there are, Socrates, which evince the truth of this conclusion: but particularly it holds good in politics. For the having ability in public affairs, and power in the state of which we are members, is of all things the most beautiful: and want of such power, with a total defect of any such ability, has of all things the meanest aspect.

Soc. You say well. In the name of the Gods then, Hippias, does it not follow from all this, that skill and knowledge are of all things the most beautiful, and want of them the contrary?

HIP. Ay, what think you of this, Socrates<sup>\*</sup>?

Soc. Softly, my dear friend: for I am under some fears about the rectitude of our present conclusions.

HIP. What are you afraid of, Socrates? For the business of our inquiry is now in a fair way, and goes on as we could wish.

Soc. I would it were so. But let you and I consider together upon this point. Could any man execute a work, of which he has neither knowledge nor any other kind of abilities for the performance?

HIP. By no means. For how should a man do that, for the doing of which he has no abilities?

Soc. Those people then who do wrong, and who err in the execution of any thing, without erroneous or wrong intention, would they ever have done or executed things wrong, had they not been able to do or execute them in that manner?

HIP. Clearly they would not.

Soc. But the able are able through their abilities: for it is not inability which any way enables them.

HIP. Certainly not.

Soc. And all who do any thing are able to do what they do.

HIP. True.

\* Hippias is much flattered, and highly elevated, by this whole description of the beautiful now drawn; presuming himself interested deeply in it, on account of his supposed political abilities, his various knowledge, and that skill in arts, as well the mechanic as the polite, for which he is celebrated in the Lesser Hippias.—S.

Soc.

Soc. And all men do many more wrong things than right; and commit errors from their infancy, without intending to do wrong, or to err.

HIP. The fact is so.

Soc. Well then: those abilities, and those means or instruments, which help and are useful in the doing or executing any thing wrong, whether shall we say they are beautiful? or are they not rather far from being so?

HIP. Far from it, in my opinion, Socrates.

Soc. The able and useful, therefore, Hippias, in our opinion, it seems, no longer is the beautiful.

HIP. Still it is so, Socrates, if it has power to do what is right, or is useful to a good purpose.

Soc. That account is then rejected, that the able and useful simply and absolutely is the beautiful. But the thought, Hippias, which our mind laboured with, and wanted to express, was this, that the useful and able for the producing of any good, that is the beautiful.

HIP. This indeed seems to be the case.

Soc. But the thing thus described is the profitable. Is it not?

HIP. It is.

Soc. From hence then is derived the beauty of bodies, the beauty of moral precepts, of knowledge and wisdom, and of all those things just now enumerated; they are beautiful, because profitable.

HIP. Evidently so.

Soc. The profitable, therefore, Hippias, should seem to be our beautiful.

HIP. Beyond all doubt, Socrates.

Soc. But the profitable is that which effects or produces good.

HIP. True.

Soc. And the efficient is no other thing than the cause. Is it?

HIP. Nothing else.

Soc. The cause of good, therefore, is the beautiful.

HIP. Right.

Soc. Now the cause, Hippias, is a thing different from that which it causes. For the cause can by no means be the cause of itself. Consider it thus: Did not the cause appear to be the efficient?

HIP. Clearly.

Soc. And by the efficient no other thing is effected than that which is produced or generated ; but this is not the efficient itself.

HIP. You are in the right.

Soc. Is not that then which is produced or generated one thing, and the efficient a thing different ?

HIP. It is.

Soc. The cause, therefore, is not the cause of itself ; but of that which is generated or produced by it.

HIP. Without doubt.

Soc. If the beautiful be then the cause of good, good itself must be produced or generated by the beautiful. And for this reason, it should seem, we cultivate and study prudence, and every other fair virtue, because their production and their issue are well worth our study and our care, as being good itself. Thus are we likely to find from our inquiries, that the beautiful, as it stands related to good, has the nature of a kind of father.

HIP. The very case, Socrates. You are perfectly right in what you say.

Soc. Am I not right also in this, that neither is the father the son, nor is the son the father ?

HIP. Right in that also.

Soc. Nor is the cause the production, nor the production, on the other hand, the cause.

HIP. Very right.

Soc. By Jupiter then, my friend, neither is the beautiful good, nor is the good beautiful. Do you think it is possible it should be so ? Is it consistent with what we have said, and are agreed in ?

HIP. By Jupiter, I think not.

Soc. Would this opinion please us then, and should we choose to abide by it, that the beautiful is not good, nor the good beautiful ?

HIP. By Jupiter, no ; it would not please me at all.

Soc. Well said <sup>1</sup>, by Jupiter, Hippias : and me it pleases the least of  
any.

<sup>1</sup> As the subject of this dialogue is, as we have observed in the Introduction to it, the beauty which subsists in soul, and as such beauty is consubstant with the good which also subsists in the soul, hence it follows, that every thing which is beautiful in the soul is good, and every thing there

any of those descriptions or accounts which we have hitherto given of the beautiful.

HIP. So I perceive.

Soc. That definition of it, therefore, which we thought just now the most excellent of all, that the profitable, the useful and able to produce some good or other, was that beautiful, is in danger of losing all its credit with us; and of appearing, if possible, more ridiculous than our former accounts of it, where we reckoned the maiden to be the beautiful, or any other particular whose defect we have before discovered.

HIP. It seems so, indeed.

Soc. And for my own part, Hippias, I see no way where to turn myself any more, but am absolutely at a loss. Have you any thing to say?

HIP. Not at present. But, as I said just now, after a little considering I am certain I shall find it out.

Soc. But I fear, so extreme is my desire of knowing it, that I shall not be able to wait your time. Besides, I have just met with, as I imagine, a fair kind of opening to the discovery. For consider that which gives us delight and joy, (I speak not of all kinds of pleasure, but of that only which arises in us through the hearing and the sight,) whether we should not call this the beautiful. And how, indeed, could we dispute it? seeing that it is the beautiful of our own species, Hippias, with the sight of whom we are so delighted: that we take pleasure in viewing all beautiful works of the loom or needle; and whatever is well painted, carved, or moulded. It is the same with the hearing: for well-measured sounds and all musical harmony, the beauties of profane composition also, with pretty fables and well-framed stories, have the like effect upon us, to be agreeable, to be

there which is good is beautiful. This reciprocation, however, does not take place between *the good*, the ineffable principle of things, and the beautiful itself, the source of every kind of beauty: for the former is superessential, but the latter is an intelligible idea. See the sixth book of the Republic, and p. 516 of the Additional Notes on the First Alcibiades. The assertion of Mr. Sydenham, therefore, in his note on this part, is very erroneous, "that, according to Socrates and Plato, the sovereign beauty is the source of *all* good."—T.

<sup>1</sup> In the Greek we read thus, Πως τι αρ' αν αγωνιζομεθα; But, since we know of no precedent in Plato for the use of two interrogatives in this manner, that is, without the conjunction η (or) between them; we suppose it ought to be read either Πως ΓΑΡ αν αγωνιζομεθα; or ΗΠΟΣ τι ΓΑΡ; &c. λ. "To what purpose should we contend about it?"—S.

delightful, and to charm. Were we to give, therefore, that petulant and saucy fellow this answer—"Noble sir, the beautiful is that which gives us pleasure through the hearing, and through the sight," do you think we should not restrain his insolence?

HIP. For my part, Socrates, I think the nature of the beautiful now truly well explained.

SOC. But what shall we say of the beauty of manners, and of laws, Hippias? Shall we say it gives us pleasure through the hearing, or through the sight? or is it to be ranked under some other kind?

HIP. Perhaps the man may not think of this.

SOC. By the Dog, Hippias, but that man would, of whom I stand in awe the most of all men; and before whom I should be most ashamed if I trifled, and pretended to utter something of great importance, when in reality I talked idly, and spoke nothing to the purpose.

HIP. Who is he?

SOC. Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus; who would no more suffer me to throw out such random speeches, or so readily decide on points which I had not thoroughly sifted, than he would allow me to talk of things which I am ignorant of, as if I knew them.

HIP. Why, really, I must own, that to me myself, since you have started the observation, the beauty of laws seems referable to another kind.

SOC. Softly, Hippias. For, though we have fallen into fresh difficulties, equal to our former ones, about the nature of the beautiful, we are in a fair way, I think, of extricating ourselves out of them.

HIP. How so, Socrates?

SOC. I will tell you how the matter appears to me: whether or no there be any thing material in what I say, you will consider. The beauty then of laws and of manners, I imagine, may possibly be found not altogether abstracted from that kind of sensation which arises in the soul through the senses of hearing and of sight. But let us abide awhile by this definition, that "what gives us pleasure through these senses is the beautiful," without bringing the beauty of laws the least into question. Suppose then, that either the man of whom I am speaking, or any other, should interrogate us after this manner: "For what reason, Hippias and Socrates, have you separated from the pleasant in general that species of it in which you say  
consists

consists the beautiful; denying the character of beautiful to those species of pleasure which belong to the other senses, to the pleasures of taste, the joys of Venus, and all others of the same class? Do you refuse them the character of pleasant also, and maintain that no pleasure neither is to be found in these sensations, or in any thing beside seeing and hearing?" Now, Hippias, what shall we say to this?

HIP. By all means, Socrates, we must allow pleasure to be found also in these sensations; a pleasure very exquisite.

Soc. "Since these sensations then afford pleasure," will he say, "no less than those others, why do you deprive them of the name of beautiful, and rob them of their proper share of beauty?" "Because there is no one who would not laugh at us," we shall answer, "were we to call eating a beautiful thing, instead of a pleasant; or the smelling sweet odours, were we to say, not that it was pleasant, but that it was beautiful. Above all, in amorous enjoyments, all the world would contend, there was the highest degree of the sweet and pleasant; but that whoever was engaged in them should take care not to be seen, the act of love being far from agreeable to the sight, or beautiful." Now, Hippias, when we have thus answered, he may reply, perhaps, in this manner:—"I apprehend perfectly well the reason why you have always been ashamed to call these pleasures beautiful; it is because they seem not so to men. But the question which I asked you was not, What seemed beautiful to the multitude; but, What was so in reality." Then shall we answer, I presume, only by repeating our last hypothesis, that "we ourselves give the name of beautiful to that part only of the pleasant which ariseth in us by means of our sight and hearing." But have you any thing to say which may be of service to our argument? Shall we answer aught besides, Hippias?

HIP. To what he has said, Socrates, it is unnecessary to make any further answer.

Soc. "Very well now," will he say. "If the pleasant then, arising through the sight and hearing, be the beautiful, whatever portion of the pleasant hap-

\* This sentence is ill pointed by H. Stephens in two places: in the first of which, at least, we think it was done with design; so as to give us this construction:—"What? Do you deprive," &c. That learned editor was fond of doing the same in many other sentences; and particularly in one, a little before this, he has in the margin proposed the like alteration.—S.

pens not to be this, it is clear it cannot be the beautiful." Shall we admit this?

HIP. Certainly.

Soc. "Is that portion of the pleasant then," he will say, "which arises through the sight, the same with that which arises through the sight and hearing? Or is that which arises through the hearing, the same with that which arises through the hearing and the sight?" "That which ariseth in us through either of those senses alone, and not through the other," we shall answer, "is by no means the same with that which arises through them both. For this seems to be the import of your question. But our meaning was, that each of these species of the pleasant was, by itself separately, the beautiful; and that they were also, both of them together, the same beautiful." Should we not answer so?

HIP. By all means.

Soc. "Does any species of the pleasant then," he will say, "differ from any other, whatever it be, so far as it is pleasant? Observe; I ask you not if one pleasure is greater or less than another, or whether it is more or less a pleasure: but whether there is any difference between the pleasures in this respect, that one of them is pleasure, the other not pleasure." In our opinion there is no difference between them, of this kind. Is there any?

HIP. I agree with you, there is not any.

Soc. "For some other reason, therefore," he will say it is, "than because they are pleasures, that you have selected these species of pleasure from the rest, and given them the preference. You have discerned that there is something or other in them by which they differ from the rest; with a view to which difference you distinguish them by the epithet of beautiful. Now the pleasure which ariseth in us through the sense of seeing, deriveth not its beauty from any thing peculiarly belonging to that sense<sup>1</sup>. For, if this were the cause of its being beautiful, that other pleasure which arises through the hearing never would be beautiful, as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of seeing." "You are in the right," shall we say?

HIP. We will.

<sup>1</sup> That is, not from colour, or from figure; but from the due degree and proper disposition of the colours; or from the just size, fit arrangement and proportion of the parts; in a word, from measure, harmony, and order.—S.

Soc.

Soc. "So neither, on the other hand, does the pleasure produced in us through the sense of hearing derive its beauty from any circumstance which peculiarly attends the hearing<sup>1</sup>. For, in that case, the pleasure produced through seeing would not be beautiful, as not partaking of that which is peculiar to the sense of hearing<sup>2</sup>." Shall we allow, Hippias, that the man is in the right when he says this?

HIP. Allow it.

Soc. "But both these pleasures now are beautiful, you say." For so we say: do we not?

HIP. We do.

Soc. "There is something in them, therefore, the same in both, to which they owe their beauty, a beauty common to them both. There is something, I say, which they have belonging to them both in common, and also in particular to each. For otherwise they would not, both and each of them, be beautiful." Answer now, as if you were speaking to him.

HIP. I answer then, that, in my opinion<sup>3</sup>, you give a true account of the matter.

Soc. Should there be any circumstance, therefore, attending on both these pleasures of the sight and hearing taken together; yet if the same circum-

<sup>1</sup> That is, not from sound, but from its just degree and proper tone; from the concord of sounds and their orderly succession; from those numbers and proportions by which sound is measured.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The Greek of this passage is thus printed, *ουκουν ετι γε δι' ακουης ηδουνη*. So, in the speech of Socrates, immediately preceding, where the reasoning is the same, only the terms inverted, we read *ουκουν ετι γε δι' οψεως ηδουνη*. In both passages the sense is thus very lame. Stephens proposes this reading, *ουκουν εστι γε κ. τ. λ.* which is found, he says, in some old manuscript. But the sense is very little amended by this alteration. Cornarius, whether from that manuscript in the Haffenstein library which he was favoured with the use of, or from his own sagacity, has recovered a part, at least, of the true reading; thus, *ουκ ουσα ετι γε κ. τ. λ.* For, that we ought to read *ουκ ουσα*, there can be no doubt; the argumentation shows it sufficiently: but this amendment may, we imagine, be improved by reading *ουκ ουσα ηγε δι' ακουης* (and in the former passage *δι' οψεως*) *ηδουνη*.—S.

<sup>3</sup> In the edition of Plato by Stephens we read the Greek of this passage thus, *εμοι δοκει εχειν, ως λεγει*; and by a marginal note we find, that it was so printed by design. But the editions of Aldus and of Walder give us the last word, *λεγεις*, which is certainly right: for, in reading *λεγει*, Hippias is made to speak of the man, not to him, contrary to the intention of Plato expressed in the preceding sentence.—S.

stance attend not on each taken separately; or should any attend on each separately <sup>1</sup>, yet not on both together; they cannot derive their beauty from this circumstance.

HIP. How is it possible, Socrates, that any circumstance whatever, which attends on neither of them, should ever attend on both?

Soc. Do you think this impossible?

HIP. I must be quite ignorant, I own, in things of this sort; as I am quite unused to such kind of disputes.

Soc. You jest, Hippias. But I am in danger, perhaps, of fancying that I see something, so circumstanced, as you aver to be impossible.

HIP. You are in no danger of any such fancy, Socrates; but are pleased to look askint purposely: that is all.

Soc. Many things, I assure you, of that kind appear to me very evident. But I give no credit to them; because they are not evident to you, who have raised a larger fortune than any man living, by the profession of philosophy; and because they appear only to me, who have never in that way earned a farthing. I have some suspicion, however, that possibly you are not in earnest with me, but design to impose upon me: so many things of that kind do I perceive so plainly.

HIP. No one will know better than yourself, Socrates, whether I am in earnest with you or not, if you will but begin and tell me, what those things are which you perceive so plainly. You will soon see that you talk idly. For you will never find a circumstance attending us both together, which attends separately neither you nor me.

Soc. How say you, Hippias? But perhaps you have reason on your side, and I may not apprehend it. Let me, therefore, explain to you my meaning more distinctly. To me then it appears, that some circumstance of being, which attends not my individual person, nor yours, something which belongs neither to me, nor to you, may yet possibly belong to both of us, and attend both our persons taken together: and, on the other hand <sup>2</sup>, that certain circumstances

<sup>1</sup> In the Greek text, after this first part of the sentence, *Εἰ ἄρα τι αὐταὶ αἰ ἴδοναι ἀμφοτέραι πεπον-  
θασιν, ἑκάτερα δὲ μὴ*, there is a manifest omission of the following words, *ἢ ἑκάτερα μὲν, ἀμφοτέραι δὲ  
μὴ*, as will appear afterwards, where Socrates refers to this very sentence.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The Greek of this passage is thus printed: *ἕτερα δ' αὖ, ἃ ἀμφοτέροι πεπονθαμεν εἶναι, ταῦτα οὐδε-*

cumstances of being, not attending us both taken together, may attend each of our separate and single persons.

HIP. You tell me of prodigies still greater, I think, now <sup>1</sup>, Socrates, than those which you told me of just before. For consider: if both of us are honest, man, must not each of us be honest? or, supposing each of us dishonest, must we not both be so? If both are sound and well, is not each also? Or, should each of us now be tired of any thing <sup>2</sup>, or come off ill in some combat between us, or be amazed and confounded, or be affected any other way, would not both of us be in the same plight? To go further: in case that we had, both of us, images of ourselves made of gold, or silver, or ivory; or that both of us, if you will give me leave to say it, were generous, or wise, or honourable; did both of us happen to be old or young; or to be possessed of any other human quality; or to be in any condition whatever incident to human life; must not each of us be, of absolute necessity, that very same kind of man, and in those very same circumstances?

Soc. Beyond all doubt.

HIP. But you, Socrates, with your companions and fellow disputants, consider not things universally, or in the whole. Thus you take the beau-

*τερον ειναι ημων.* By which the sense of this part of the sentence is made exactly the same with that of the former part. But the words *ετερα δ' αυ* plainly indicate, that something different is intended. And what this precisely is, will appear in the beginning of page 421; where this sentence of Socrates is repeated in other words, and ridiculed by Hippias. In conformity with which undoubted meaning of this passage, we are obliged to make an alteration here in the Greek text, and to read it thus, *ετερα δ' αυ, α μη αμφοτεροι πεπονθαμεν ειναι, ταυτα εκατερον ειναι ημων.*—S.

<sup>1</sup> Instead of *αυ*, we presume that we ought here to read *νυν*, as opposed to *ολιγον προτερον* at the end of the sentence.—S.

<sup>2</sup> Whoever has any taste for humour cannot fail of observing the drollery with which Hippias is here made to confess in what condition he finds himself; tired of the conversation upon a subject, the tendency of which he is ignorant of, confuted over and over, and at length quite puzzled with a seeming paradox. His sly insinuation also here, that Socrates was in the same condition with himself; and his other, just before, that Socrates reasoned unfairly, like himself and his brother sophists; these strokes of humour will be obvious to all who are acquainted with Plato's artful and humorous way of writing. But those who have a delicacy of taste to discern the several kinds of humour, will have an additional pleasure in distinguishing the coarse sarcasms and buffoon manner of Hippias, both in this speech and before in page 402, from the genteel and fine raillery always used by Socrates.—S.

tiful and chop it into pieces: and every thing in nature, which happens to be the subject of your discourse, you serve in the same manner, splitting and dividing it<sup>1</sup>. Hence you are unacquainted with the greatness of things<sup>2</sup>,  
with

<sup>1</sup> It was the manner of Socrates in conversation, whatever was the subject of it, to ascend to the consideration of the thing in general; to divide it into its several species; and to distinguish each species from the rest by some peculiar character, in order to come at the definite and precise nature of the very thing in question.—S.

<sup>2</sup> All things in nature, distinguished into their several kinds, general and specific, are, according to the Platonic doctrine, the unfolding of universal form and beauty. That this principle, which every where bounds every part of nature, may appear in a brighter light; that opposite principle, infinitude or the infinite, is here exhibited to view: and amongst the various representations given of it by the antient physiologists, that of Anaxagoras is singled out from the rest; probably for this reason, because it affords the strongest contrast: the infinite, according to his doctrine, being, if the expression may be allowed us, infinite the most of all; or, as Simplicius styles it, *απειραχis απειρον*, infinitely infinite. A summary account of which may be necessary to a full comprehension of the passage before us.—Down to the time of Anaxagoras, all the philosophers agreed in the doctrine of one infinite, material, principle of things. This was held by Pythagoras and his followers to be nothing else than a common subject-matter of the four elements, or primary forms of nature: from the various combinations of which four, in various proportions, are made all other natural bodies. By the disciples of Anaximander it was supposed to have form, though indistinct and indeterminate; out of which all contrarieties arose through separation. Others imagined the infinite to have some determinate and distinct form: and these again were divided. For some, at the head of whom was Thales, thought it a watery fluid, or moisture, replete with the seeds of all things; every thing being produced from some seminal principle by evolution and dilatation, through the action of the moist fluid. In the opinion of others, of Anaximenes and his school, it was a kind of air; from the rarefaction and condensation of which were produced other great and uniform kinds of body throughout the universe, by mixture making the lesser the composite. Such were the most antient accounts of the material cause of things, and their origin out of the one infinite. But Anaxagoras struck out a new road to the knowledge of nature. For, denying the origin of things from any infinite one, whether determinate or indeterminate, formed or unformed; denying the existence of any primary or elementary bodies; denying all essential change in nature, even any alteration in any thing, except such as arose from local motion, or the shifting of parts from one body to another; he taught, that the corpuscula, or component parts of things, were always what they are at present: for that the forms of nature, innumerable in their kinds, were composed of similar and homogeneous parts. Further he taught that each of these minute bodies, though homogeneous with that whole of which it was a part, was itself composed of parts dissimilar and heterogeneous, infinite in number; there being no bounds in nature to minuteness: that these heterogeneous bodies, infinitely minute, were of all kinds; so that all things, in some measure, were together every where; and each of those corpuscula, apparently so uniform, contained all the various principles of things; that the predo-

with bodies of infinite magnitude, through the natural continuity of being. And now so much are you a stranger to the vastness of this view of the universe, as to imagine that any thing, whether being or circumstance of being, can possibly belong to both those pleasures which we are speaking of, taken together, yet not belong to each of them; or, on the other hand, may belong to each, without belonging to both. So void of thought and

minance of some one of these principles, that is, the quantity of it exceeding that of the rest, constituted the nature of each minute body; fitting it also for union with bodies homogeneous to it, that is, with other bodies, where the same principle was predominant: that, all things being in perpetual motion, which first began, and is continued on by active mind, disposing all things; the predominance of each principle was continually fluctuating and changing; the destruction of the present predominance was the dissolution of each temporary being; and a new predominance, that of some other principle, was the generation of what we call a new being. For instance; whereas every drop of water contains aërial particles within it; as soon as these begin to predominate in any watery drop, it rises in air; and, receiving there an increase of the aërial principle, by degrees becomes united to the air. So, air refines into fire, and thickens into water, through the overpowering of the one or the other of these neighbour principles, with which it ever had maintained a secret correspondence. So the earthy particles, accumulated in the water, produce mud, by degrees hardening into earth; thence into various mineral bodies, stones, and metals, according to the kind of earth predominant in each place through motion. These again crumble into common earth: from which all the various vegetable beings arise in like manner, nourished and increased by the accumulation of particles homogeneous; and into which they fall, and are dissolved again, through the decay and diminution of those particles, whose superior number and strength to resist others of a different kind had before constituted the being. In the same manner all the parts of animals, whether muscular, membranous, bony, or any other, receive nourishment, or admit decay, by addition or subtraction of homogeneous particles. It will be easy for a thinking mind to pursue nature acting in this method, according to Anaxagoras, through all things. The principles of things are thus made infinite, not only in number and minuteness; but there being also a continuity of *ὁμοιομερειαί*, or homogeneous particles, *ἀφῆ συνεχιζόμεναι*, through the universe, every *ὁμοιομερεια*, that is, every kind of things, is a natural body, infinite in magnitude, and infinitely divisible into such parts as are wholly agreeing in their kind. Simplicius, in his commentary on the Physics of Aristotle, to which inestimable magazine of antient physiology we are indebted for the chief part of this note, draws the same conclusion: his words are these: *ἐκ τῶν βιημένων προχείρον συννοεῖν, ὅτι εἰ πᾶν ἐκ παντός ἐκκρίνεται, καὶ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστίν, οὐ μόνον τὸ πᾶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕκαστον, οὐ τῷ πληθεὶ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ μεγεθεὶ, ἀπειράκις ἀπειρον ἐστίν.* “From the account now given it is easy to conceive, that if every thing is made out of every thing by separation, and all things are in all, not only the universe, but every kind of things therein, is infinitely infinite, not only in the number of its parts, but also in magnitude.” See Aristot. Physic. l. i. c. 4. and l. iii. c. 4. Simplic. Com. fol. 6. and 105. b. 106. a.—S.

consideration,

consideration, so simple, and so narrow-minded are you and your companions.

Soc. Such is the lot of our condition, Hippias. It is not what a man will, says the common proverb, but what he can. However, you are always kind in assisting us with your instructions. For but just now, before you had taught me better, how simple my mind was, and how narrow my way of thinking, I shall give you still a plainer proof, by telling you what were my thoughts upon the present subject:—if you will give me leave.

HIP. You will tell them to one who knows them already, Socrates. For I am well acquainted with the different ways of thinking, and know the minds of all who philosophize. Notwithstanding, if it will give pleasure to yourself, you may tell me.

Soc. To me, I confess, it will. You must know then, my friend, that I was so foolish, till I had received from you better information, as to imagine of myself and you, that each of us was one person; and that this, which each of us was, both of us were not, as not being one, but two persons.—Such a simpleton was I!—But from you have I now learnt, that if both of us are two persons, each of us also by necessity is two; and that, if each of us be but one, it follows by the same necessity, that both of us are no more. For, by reason of the continuity of being, according to Hippias, it is impossible it should be otherwise; each of us being of necessity whatever both of us are, and both whatever each<sup>1</sup>. And now, persuaded by you to believe these things, here I sit me down and rest contented. But first inform me, Hippias, whether we are one person, you and I together; or whether you are two persons, and I two persons.

HIP. What mean you, Socrates?

Soc. The very thing which I say. For I am afraid of entering with you into a further discussion of the subject, because you fall into a passion with me, whenever you say any thing which you take to be important.

<sup>1</sup> The words of Anaxagoras, as cited by Simplicius, pag. 106. b. really favour such a conclusion. For he expressly says, that his system of the continuity of being included *τα παθη και τας εξεις*, every thing which any being had, or suffered: that is, in scholastic language, all the properties and accidents of being; or, in common speech, the condition and circumstances of things; which, as he tells us, inseparably follow and attend their several natures.—S.

To venture for once, however; tell me—Is not each of us one? and is not the being one a circumstance attendant upon our being?

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. If each of us then be one, each of us must be also odd. Or think you that one is not an odd number?

HIP. I think it is.

SOC. Are we odd both together then, notwithstanding that we are two?

HIP. That is absurd, Socrates.

SOC. But both together, we are even. Is it not so?

HIP. Certainly.

SOC. Now, because both of us together we are even, does it follow from thence that each of us singly too is even?

HIP. Certainly not.

SOC. There is not, therefore, such an absolute necessity, as you said just now there was, that, whatever both of us were, each should be the same; and that, whatever each of us was, the same must we be both.

HIP. Not in such cases as these, I acknowledge; but still it holds true in such as I enumerated before.

SOC. That suffices, Hippias. I am contented with this acknowledgment, that it appears to be so in some cases, but in others otherwise. For, if you remember from whence the present dispute arose, I said, that the pleasures of sight and hearing could not derive their beauty from any circumstance which attended on each, yet not on both; neither from any which attended on both, yet not on each: but that the beauty of them was derived from something which they had belonging to both of them in common, and in particular to each. And this I said, because you had admitted the beauty of them both together, and of each separately. From which I drew this consequence, that they were indebted for their beauty to some being, whose presence still followed and attended on them both; and not to such as fell short of either. And I continue still in the same mind. But answer me, as if we were now beginning this last inquiry afresh. Pleasure through the sight and pleasure through the hearing, then, being supposed beautiful, both of them and each; tell me, does not the cause of their beauty follow and attend on both of them taken together, and upon each also considered separate?

HIP.

HIP. Without doubt.

SOC. Is it then because they are pleasures, both and each of them, that they are beautiful? Or, if this were the cause, would not the pleasures of the other senses be beautiful, as well as these? For it appeared that they were pleasures as well as these:—if you remember.

HIP. I remember it well.

SOC. But because these pleasures arise in us through sight and hearing, this we assigned for the cause of their being beautiful.

HIP. It was so determined.

SOC. Observe now, whether I am right or not: for, as well as I can remember, we agreed that the pleasant was the beautiful; not the pleasant in general, but those species of it only which are produced through sight and hearing.

HIP. It is true.

SOC. Does not this circumstance then attend on both these pleasures taken together? and is it not wanting to each of them alone? For by no means is either of them alone, as was said before, produced through both those senses. Both of them are indeed through both, but not so is each. Is this true?

HIP. It is.

SOC. They are not beautiful, therefore, either of them, from any circumstance which attends on either by itself. For we cannot argue from either to both; nor, from what each is separately, infer what they both are jointly. So that we may assert the joint beauty of both these pleasures, according to our present hypothesis of the beautiful: but this hypothesis will not support us in asserting any beauty separate in either. Or how say we? Is it not of necessity so?

HIP. So it appears.

SOC. Say we then that both are beautiful, but deny that each is so?

HIP. What reason is there to the contrary?

SOC. This reason, my friend, as it seems to me; because we had supposed certain circumstances attendant upon things with this condition, that, if they appertained to any two things, both together, they appertained at the same time to each; and, if they appertained to each, that they appertained also to both. Of this kind are all such circumstances and attendants of things as were enumerated by you. Are they not?

HIP.

HIP. They are.

Soc. But such circumstances or appendages of being, as those related by me, are otherwise: and of this kind are the being each, and the being both. Have not I stated the case rightly?

HIP. You have.

Soc. Under which kind then, Hippias, do you rank the beautiful? Do you rank it among those mentioned by yourself? as when you inferred that if I was well and hearty, and you well and hearty, then both of us were well and hearty: or, if I was honest and you honest, then both of us were honest: or, if we both were so, it followed that so was each of us. Does the same kind of inference hold true in this case? If I am beautiful, and you are beautiful, then both of us are beautiful; and if both of us, then each. Or is there no reason why it should not here be as it is in numbers<sup>1</sup>? two of which, taken together, may be even; though each separately is perhaps odd, perhaps even: or, as it is in magnitudes<sup>2</sup>; where two of them, though each is incommensurable with some third, yet both together may perhaps be commensurable with it, perhaps incommensurable. A thousand such other things there are, which I perceived, as I said, with great clearness. Now, to whether of these two orders of being do you refer the beautiful? Does the proper rank of it appear as evident to you as it does to me? For to me it appears highly absurd, to suppose both of us beautiful, yet each of us not so; or each of us beautiful, yet not so both; no less absurd, than it is to suppose the same kind of difference between the natures of both and

<sup>1</sup> For instance; the two odd numbers, seven and three, together make the even number, ten: and the two even numbers, six and four, make the very same number.—S.

<sup>2</sup> For instance; let there be supposed a line ten inches in length, measured by whole inches: a line of three inches  $\frac{3}{4}$ , and another line of two inches  $\frac{1}{4}$ , are each of them incommensurable with the first given line; because neither of them can be measured completely by any line so long as a whole inch: yet both together making six inches, they are commensurable with the line of ten inches, by the inch-measure.—It is the same with the powers of two lines. The power of either may be incommensurable with that of the other, and also with some given magnitude: yet the power arising from both may be commensurable with that third magnitude. See Euclid. Elem. lib. x. prop. 35.—To the present purpose also is applicable the following theorem. The diameter of a square is demonstrated by Euclid (Elem. x. 97.) to be incommensurable with its side: and consequently so is a line twice as long as the diameter. Yet the rectangular space comprehended by that diameter and by a line of twice its length, is equal to a square, whose side is commensurable with the side of the given square.—S.

each in any of the cases put by you. Do you agree with me then in ranking the beautiful among these, or do you refer it to the opposite class of things?

HIP. I entirely agree with you, Socrates.

SOC. You do well, Hippias: because we shall thus be freed from any further inquiry upon this article. For, if the beautiful be in that class of things where we agree to place it, the pleasant then, which arises in us through sight and hearing, can no longer be supposed the beautiful. Because that which comes through both those senses jointly, may make the pleasures which arise from thence beautiful indeed both taken together; but cannot make either of them so, considered as separate from the other. But that the beautiful should have such an effect, or communicate itself in this manner, is absurd to suppose; as you and I have agreed, Hippias.

HIP. We agreed it was so, I own.

SOC. It is impossible, therefore, that the pleasant, arising in us through sight and hearing, should be the beautiful; because from this hypothesis an absurdity would follow.

HIP. You have reason on your side.

SOC. "Begin again then, and tell me," will he say, "for you have missed it now, what is that beautiful, the associate of both these pleasures, for the sake of which you give them the preference to all others, by honouring them with the name of beautiful?" It appears to me, Hippias, necessary for us to answer thus; that "these are of all pleasures the most innocent and good, as well both of them taken together, as each taken singly<sup>1</sup>." Or can you tell me of any circumstance beside, in which they differ from other pleasures?

HIP. I know of none beside: for they are indeed the best of all.

SOC. "This then," he will say, "do you now maintain to be the beautiful, pleasure profitable?"—"It is so in my opinion," I shall answer.—What answer would you make?

HIP. The same.

SOC. "Well then," will he say: "the profitable, you know, is that which is the efficient of good. And the efficient, as we agreed lately, is a thing

<sup>1</sup> See the latter part of the Philebus.

different from the effect. Our reasoning, therefore, has brought us round to the same point again : for thus neither would the good be beautiful, nor would the beautiful be good ; each of these being, upon this hypothesis, different from the other." " Most evidently so ;" is the answer we must make, Hippias, if we are of sound mind. For the sacredness of truth will never suffer us to oppose the man who has truth with him on his side.

HIP. But now, Socrates, what think you all these matters are which we have been disputing about ? They are the shreds and tatters of an argument, cut and torn, as I said before, into a thousand pieces. But the thing which is beautiful, as well as highly valuable, is this : to be able to exhibit a fine speech, in a becoming and handsome manner, before the council, or court of justice, or any other assembly or person in authority, to whom the speech is addressed ; such a speech as hath the power of persuasion ; and having ended to depart, not with mean and insignificant trophies of victory, but with a prize the noblest, the preservation of ourselves, our fortunes, and our friends. This you ought to be ambitious of, and bid adieu to such petty and paltry disputes ; or you will appear as if you had quite lost your senses, playing with straws and trifles, as you have been now doing.

Soc. O friend Hippias ! you are happy that you know what course of life it is best for a man to follow, and have followed it, according to your own account, so successfully yourself. But I seem fated to be under the power of a dæmoniacal nature, who keeps me wandering continually in search of truth, and still at a loss where to find it. And whenever I lay my difficulties and perplexities before you wise men, I meet with no other answer from you than contumely and reproach. For you all tell me the same thing which you tell me now, " That I busy myself about silly, minute, and insignificant matters." On the other hand, when, upon giving credit to what you all tell me, I say, as you do, " That to be able to exhibit a fine speech in a court of justice, or any other assembly, and to go through it in a proper and handsome manner, is the finest thing in the world ; and that no employment is so beautiful, or so well becomes a man ; I then meet with censure and obloquy from some who are here present <sup>1</sup>, but especially from that man who is always reproving me. For he is my nearest of kin, and lives with me in

<sup>1</sup> Meaning his philosophic friends.

the same house. So, whenever I return home, and am entered in, as soon as he hears me talking in this strain, he asks me if I am not ashamed to pronounce, with so much confidence, what professions and employments are fine, or beautiful, or becoming; when I have plainly shown myself so ignorant with regard to things beautiful, as not to know wherein the nature of beauty consists.—“And how can you judge,” says he, “who has spoken a beautiful or fine speech, or done any thing else in a handsome manner, and who not, ignorant as you are what the beautiful and handsome is? Such then being the disposition of your mind, is it possible that you can think life more eligible to you than death?” Thus have I had the ill fortune, as I told you, to suffer obloquy and reproach from you, to suffer obloquy also and reproach from him. But, perhaps, it is necessary to endure all this. If I have received benefit or improvement from it, there is no harm done. And I seem to myself, Hippias, improved and benefited by the conversation of you both. For the meaning of the proverb, “Things of beauty are things of difficulty,” if I am not mistaken in myself, I know.

THE END OF THE GREATER HIPPIAS.

THE

THE BANQUET,

A DIALOGUE

CONCERNING

LOVE.



## INTRODUCTION

TO

## THE BANQUET.

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THE composition, says Mr. Sydenham<sup>1</sup>, of this dialogue is of a singular cast, and different from that of any other. For the principal part of it consists of oratorical speeches, spoken at a certain banquet or entertainment, by some of the company in their turns, upon a subject proposed by one of their number.—The speakers are these six, Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agatho, and Socrates. Their several speeches are finely distinguished by different styles of oratory, and with great propriety display the peculiar character of each speaker.—The first of them, Phædrus, was a young gentleman of the most ingenuous disposition, modest, candid, and a lover of truth; refined, elevated, and heroic in his sentiments; the same person whose character Plato has thus drawn at large in a dialogue inscribed with his name. From thence also we learn that he was a great admirer of Lysias the orator: accordingly, the speech made by him in this Banquet favours much of the style of Lysias, such as it is characterized by Plato<sup>2</sup> himself; the diction being pure and elegant; the periods round and well turned; but expressing the same sentiments over and over again in variety of language; and where the sentiments are various, void of all method or order in the ranging them.—The next speech, reported in the dialogue, is that of Pausanias; who appears to have been a statesman or politician, a great admirer

<sup>1</sup> Nearly the whole of this Introduction is extracted from Mr. Sydenham's argument to this dialogue. As he is mistaken in certain parts of his argument, from the want of a more profound knowledge of Plato's philosophy, I found it impossible to give it entire.—T.

<sup>2</sup> See the Phædrus.

of both the Spartan and the Athenian laws, and an enemy to all other systems of government and manners. The style of his oratory corresponds exactly with the character which Hermogenes gives us of the style used by Isocrates: for he is clear and distinct, and divides his subject properly; is profuse in ornaments, and rather too nice and accurate; diffuse and ample in his sentiments, though not in his expression; and taking a large compass of argument in the coming to his point. We find him however free from those faults for which that critic justly reprehends Isocrates: for in the speech of Pausanias there is no languor nor tediousness; nor is he guilty of preaching, or of being didactic; vices in oratory which are the usual concomitants of old age, and in Isocrates perhaps were principally owing to that cause: certain it is, that most of his orations now extant were composed in the decline of his life, and that in the latest of them those blemishes are the most conspicuous. But at the time when the speeches, reported in this dialogue, were supposed to have been spoken, Isocrates was in the flower both of his age and of his eloquence. Add to this, that Pausanias here immoderately affects some of those little graces of style for which Isocrates was remarkable in his younger years most<sup>1</sup>; such as *αντιθεσεις*, or oppositions; *παρισωσεις*, or parities, where one member of a sentence answers either in sound or sentiment to another; and those merely verbal or literal similarities, of adnominations, adliterations, and the same beginnings or endings of two or more words near one another. One of these ornaments, improperly used, Plato ridicules in the way of mimicry, as soon as the speech of Pausanias is ended: which alone seems a sufficient evidence that Plato in framing that speech purposely imitated the style of Isocrates. His intention in so doing, as appears probable, we think, from the beginning of the speech itself, was to set in contrast those two celebrated orators, Lysias and Isocrates; and to exhibit the former as treating his subject in a general, indiscriminating, indeterminate way, copious in his language, but jejune in matter: the other, as distinguishing and methodical, full of matter, and ample in particulars, from having studied the nature of his subject more distinctly, philosophically, and minutely. It may be pertinent to observe, that Plato seems to have

<sup>1</sup> See Hermogenes *περι ιδεων*, l. i. c. 12. The same critic *περι μεθοδου*, c. 17. and 16. Vit. Homer. inter Opusc. Mytholog. ex ed. 2da, pag. 300, 301. Quintilian. Institut. Orat. l. ix. c. 3. and Demetrius Phaler. *περι ερμηνειας*, § 29.

had the same view in introducing the mention of Isocrates near the conclusion of his dialogue named Phædrus.—The next speaker to Pausanias is Eryximachus; whose profession was that of medicine: and his speech is suitable to his profession; for he considers the subject in a more extensive view; and, beginning from the human body, both in its sound and morbid state, goes on like a thorough naturalist, and pursues his instances through every part of nature, through earth, air and sky, up to that which is divine. His oratory, to the best of our little judgment in these matters, agrees with what Hermogenes<sup>1</sup> reports of Pericles, that of all the antient orators, meaning before the time of Demosthenes, he had in appearance, as well as in reality, the most of the *δεινότης*, that is, weight with his hearers, and power over their passions. For, according to that critic, the real *δεινότης* of an orator consists in a ready and apt use of his general knowledge, or an opportune and proper application of it, in managing his subject; and the *δεινότης* is most apparent, he says, when the *εννοιαί*, the thoughts and sentiments, are profound, curious, and out of the common road, yet striking and forcible. Now the real and the apparent *δεινότης*, as thus described, are both of them remarkable in the only oration of Pericles we have left, inserted by Thucydides in his history: and both seem affectedly used in the speech of Eryximachus; which we presume, therefore, Plato composed in imitation of Pericles.—Next after him speaks Aristophanes, the celebrated comic poet; through whose comedies, such at least as are still remaining, runs the same rich vein of humour, the same lively and redundant wit, which characterize his speech in the Banquet.—The next speech is made by Agatho, the donor of the feast. Agatho was at this time a young man of a large fortune, generous, magnificent, and polished in his manners; much admired by all for the comeliness of his person; and celebrated by Plato in the Protagoras for his fine parts and excellent natural disposition. His genius inclined him to poetry, and particularly to that of the tragic kind; in which he was so successful, as to win the prize from all his antagonists, in one of those competitions for excellence in writing tragedies annually held at the feast of Bacchus. Upon this occasion it was that he gave his friends that entertainment which Plato has immortalized by this fine dialogue. We have no

<sup>1</sup> See his treatise *περι ιδεων*, l. ii. c. 9.

piece of his writing extant; but it is highly probable that the speech here attributed to him gives a just representation of his style: for the language of it is extremely poetical, florid, and abounding with metaphors; and the sentiments are wonderfully elegant, ingenious, and full of fancy, but have not so much as an appearance of truth for their foundation.—The last speaker on the subject is Socrates: and his speech is in every respect worthy of the man. For in his whole conduct he was modest, and careful to avoid the least degree of ostentation; in all his discourse he was solicitous above all things for the truth in every subject<sup>1</sup>, and proposed to himself that as the principle end in all his disputes, inquiries, and researches; and whenever he took the lead in conversation, he began from things easy, common, and obvious, but gradually rose to speculations the most difficult, sublime, and excellent. Agreeably to this character, he delivers in his speech nothing as from himself; but introduces another person, assuming the magisterial airs of a teacher, yet condescending, gentle, and affable. This person is Diotima, a lady at that time in high reputation for her intercourse with the Gods, and her predictions of future events. The speech of Socrates contains the recital of a conversation between himself and this prophetic lady; into whose mouth he puts what he has a mind to teach, on purpose to insinuate that his speech was indisputably true, was worthy of being thought divinely inspired, and conveyed the knowledge of divine things. The eloquence of it exemplifies that doctrine taught by Plato in his *Phædrus* and his *Gorgias*, that the man who best knows the truth in every subject he treats of, and intends the good of those whom he endeavours to persuade, he who has the most knowledge of human nature, and of the various dispositions of men, and consequently can adapt his speech to the temper of his audience, he is likely to make the ablest and best speaker; the other qualifications requisite to form an orator being comparatively mean, and, so far as art is concerned in them, easily attainable. The truth of this doctrine was soon after abundantly confirmed in Demosthenes, who, forming himself upon the rules laid down by Plato, became at once the most perfect patriot, politician, and orator of his (I had almost said of any) age.—After these six speeches are ended, a new character is brought upon the

<sup>1</sup> See the *Greater Hippias*.

stage,—Alcibiades, a young nobleman of the first rank in Athens, of great natural and acquired abilities, chiefly those of the military kind, but of dissolute and thoroughly debauched manners. Being ambitious of power and government in the state too early, before he was qualified for them by knowledge and experience, he had for some time been a follower of Socrates, whose eloquence and reasoning he saw prevailing always over those of the Sophists: for he hoped to acquire, in his company and converse, the same superior power of persuasion; in order to employ that power with the people, and gratify the views of his ambition. He is introduced into the banquet-room, far from sober; and his behaviour and speech (for he is engaged by the company to make a speech) perfectly agree with the character of his manners. The subject on which he speaks is professedly, and in all appearance, foreign to the point spoken to by the rest, as the disorderly and unthinking condition which he is in requires it should be; but it is far from being so in reality. Plato has not only woven it into his design in this incomparable dialogue, but has made it one of the most essential parts, without which the work had been wholly defective in the end for which it was framed<sup>1</sup>. These speeches, with the conversation and occurrences at the banquet, make the principal part of this dialogue; and are introduced, not in a dramatic, but a narrative way. The introduction is partly narrative, and partly dramatic; by which means it is somewhat intricate. For the dialogue opens with a conversation between two persons only, Apollodorus and some friend of his, though in the presence of others, such as dramatic writers call mute persons. At the very beginning Apollodorus relates a short conversation lately held between himself and Glauco; and tells his friend, that he then gave Glauco an account of what had passed at the banquet given by Agatho; which account, repeated by him here again, constitutes all the rest of the dialogue. He says, it was delivered to him by Aristodemus, one of the company; who had begun his narrative with the recital of a short conversation held between Socrates and himself, and of some other occurrences previous to the banquet. The same recital here made by Apollodorus to his friend, and to the company at that friend's house, immediately introduces the narrative or history of that truly noble entertainment. Such is the manner, and such the method, in which this dialogue is composed. It is

<sup>1</sup> See the Notes on the Speech of Alcibiades.

usually and very properly intitled, "Concerning Love," because the speculation of love is its leading object.

With respect to the speeches, that of Phædrus takes the word *love* in a general sense, so as to comprehend love toward persons of the same sex, commonly called friendship, as well as that toward persons of a different sex, peculiarly and eminently styled love.—Pausanias distinguishes between love of the mind, and love merely of the body, proving them to be affections of very different kinds, because productive of very different effects.—Eryximachus considers love as that universal principle in nature which attracts, unites, or associates one thing to another in a regular way; the effect of whose operation is harmony or concord: that which heals also the breaches made by the opposite, the disuniting and dividing principle, the cause of irregular motions and of discord.—Aristophanes treats of love as other writers of comedy do, taking it only in the grossest sense of the word, as it means the passion common to man with all brute animals.—And Agatho talks about it in a vague manner, without any determinate or fixed meaning at all; taking it in various senses; commonly, indeed, for the refinement of that passion between the sexes, but sometimes for great liking or attachment of the mind to any object; and then, all at once, using the word, like Eryximachus, to signify concord and harmony, not only between rational beings, but even the unintelligent parts of nature. But when Socrates comes to speak upon the subject, he goes much deeper into it by degrees: in the first place, he premises certain universal truths relating to love; that the object of it is beauty; the essence of it desire; its aim or end the possession of beauty, or, if already possessed of it, the perpetuity of that possession. Next, he considers love as the desire of good; whatever is beautiful being also good, so far as it is beautiful; and love, peculiarly so called, being part of that universal love or desire of good, common to all beings, intelligent and sentient. He considers this universal love, or desire of good, as the link between the eternal nature and the mortal, between the plenitude of good and the total want of it. He considers, that the aim of this desire, agreeably to a certain property of it before observed, is not only to enjoy good, but to immortalize that enjoyment. The desire of immortality, therefore, is of necessity, he says, annexed to the desire of good, or love of beauty. But personal immortality being impossible to be attained by any being whose nature is mortal,

tal, every such being, prompted by nature, seeks to continue itself, and its enjoyment of good, in the only way possible, the propagation of its species, and the production of some being resembling itself, another self, to succeed, and to continue as it were the enjoyment of the same good. Hence, the love of that beauty, with which every animal is most smitten in the beautiful of its own kind, is accompanied with an instinct, or natural desire, to mix and unite with it, and thus to generate another animal of the same kind. From corporeal beauty, and that lower species of love regarding it, man, as his mind opens more and is improved, naturally proceeds further; attaining the sight of that beauty which is seen only by the eye of intellect, in the temper and disposition of some fellow-mind; and fired with that love which attends the sight of mental beauty. To this love also is annexed, says Socrates, the desire of generating, of stamping upon that other mind its own thoughts, and of raising up and nurturing between them an intellectual progeny, of generous sentiments and fair ideas. By means of this mixture and this enjoyment, that is, by converse, such as improves the understanding, the mind, he observes, rises higher, and attains to view beauty in those things themselves, the subjects of their conversation; first, in virtuous pursuits, studies, and employments; next, in the sciences, and every branch of knowledge. In the embraces of these beauties the mind generates an offspring of the fairest kind and the most durable; the poet, his immortal writings; the hero, through the force of his example, continual copies of his virtue; the founder of civil polities, through his institutions, a long succession of patriot actions; and the legislator, wise and beneficial laws, to bless the latest posterity. But if the soul be endowed with a genius of the highest kind, she rests not here, nor fixes her attachment on any one of these mental excellencies or beauties in particular: the genuine lover of truth rises from hence to the survey of that universal, original, and exemplar beauty from which every thing beautiful, both in the intelligible and sensible world, proceeds. The love and the pursuit of this supreme beauty Plato calls philosophy; and to the embraces or enjoyment of it, and to no other cause, does he here ascribe the generation and the growth of true virtue.

With respect to the speech of Alcibiades, it has been already observed, that it is one of the most essential parts of the dialogue. This will be at once evident, when it is considered that the intention of Plato in it was to exemplify

in the character of Socrates, as one who had been initiated in the mysteries of love, that perfection of virtue which such an initiation is capable of effecting. Mr. Sydenham, therefore, was very unfortunately persuaded to abandon the design of publishing his translation of this speech; and much was he mistaken in thinking that some part of it is so grossly indecent that it may offend the virtuous and encourage the vicious. For it will appear in our notes, that this apparent indecency is introduced conformably to the machinery of the mysteries, with no other view than to purify the reader from every thing indecent, and to liberate him, in short, from vulgar love, by exciting the amatory eye of intellect to the vision of objects ineffably beautiful and truly divine.

The ancients, not without reason, generally rank this dialogue among those of the ethic class<sup>1</sup>; but the character of it is of the mixed kind, that is, partly narrative and partly dramatic: and the genius of it takes its colour from the didactic part, the speech of Socrates; the reasoning of which is wholly analytical, resolving all love into its principles, and tracing all beauty upward to that source from whence it is derived to every order of being.

<sup>1</sup> Modern interpreters, with a view to the sublimer part of the speech of Socrates, but without regarding the drift of it, call this dialogue metaphysical or theological. And among the ancient Platonists, Albinus, as if he was attentive chiefly to the speech of Pausanias, and referred all the other speeches to that, calls it political.—S.

# THE BANQUET.

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## PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

APOLLODORUS<sup>2</sup>,  
FRIEND<sup>3</sup> OF APOLLODORUS,  
GLAUCO<sup>4</sup>,  
ARISTODEMUS<sup>5</sup>,  
SOCRATES<sup>6</sup>,  
AGATHO,

PAUSANIAS,  
ARISTOPHANES,  
ERYXIMACHUS,  
PHÆDRUS,  
DIOTIMA,  
ALCIBIADES.

SCENE 7.—*Principally within the City of ATHENS.*

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<sup>1</sup> The readers of Plato will observe, that before each of his dialogues the names of the speakers in it are recited, not in the order either of their real dignity, or of their importance to the dialogue, as the manner is of modern poets before their tragedies and comedies; but according to the order in which they severally make their first appearance; and, since in every scene of conversation two or more must appear at the same time together, these are named according to the order in which they first speak: after the manner we find the persons of the drama enumerated before all the dramatic writings of the antients.

<sup>2</sup> Apollodorus was a disciple of Socrates, but of no long standing at this time. His character, therefore, in the dialogue is properly marked by the vehemence of his attachment to philosophy, and admiration of his master.

<sup>3</sup> This friend is not mentioned by name: a circumstance which alone seems to have induced some to imagine, that by the friend of Apollodorus Plato here meant himself.

<sup>4</sup> If this be the same Glauco who was brother to Plato, and Plato be the friend here introduced, it seems strange that Apollodorus should speak of Plato's brother to Plato himself, as of one utterly unknown to Plato, mentioning his name, afterwards, only as it were by accident.

<sup>5</sup> Aristodemus was a constant, humble follower of Socrates.

<sup>6</sup> For the characters of all the following persons we refer to the first part of the preceding Introduction.

<sup>7</sup> The scene of conversation between Apollodorus and his friend, the only dramatic part of the dialogue, and where all the rest of it is introduced in the way of narrative, appears to be the house of this friend; as proper a place as any for so long a recital as Apollodorus had to make him; and the most proper where to come to him with that intention. The way from Phalerus to Athens, a long walk, is, with no less propriety, made the scene of the conversation related by Apollodorus between himself and Glauco; to whom, he says, he then made the same long recital. The scene of the short discourse next related between Aristodemus and Socrates is made the street; by which piece of conduct, the breaking it off so abruptly is suitable to the decorum of place. And Agatho's house is the grand scene of the principal part, the speeches at the entertainment.—S.

## APOLLODORUS.

THE affair concerning which ye inquire I think myself now not quite unprepared to relate to you. For it happened <sup>1</sup> a few days since, as I was walking up to the city from my house at Phalerus <sup>2</sup>, that an acquaintance of mine, who was going the same way, seeing me at a considerable distance before him, called out to me; and by way of joke <sup>3</sup> at the same time said, Apollodorus, you Phalerean, will not you stop a while till I come up to you? Upon which I stopped, and stayed for him. As soon as he had joined me, Apollodorus, said he, I was just now inquiring after you; from a desire I have to be thoroughly acquainted with what passed in the conversation between Agatho, and Socrates, and Alcibiades, and the rest who were of the party, at an entertainment where the subject of their discourse was Love. I should be glad to be informed by you what was said on the occasion. For the person who gave me some account of it, such as he received from Phoenix the son of Philippos, told me that you knew every particular: but that, as to himself, he did not pretend to be at all perfect or exact in his relation. Do you then give me an account of it yourself; for you have the best right to relate a conversation in which an intimate friend of your own had the most distinguished share. But first, said he, tell me, were you yourself one of the company?—It appears plainly, said I, indeed, that your author by no means gave you an exact account of the circumstances of that conversation, if you suppose it passed so lately as to admit a possibility of my being of the company.—Really I imagined so, replied he.—How could it be, said I,

<sup>1</sup> The word *πρωην*, which the older editions give us in this place, is, carelessly as it seems, omitted in that of Stephens: which error, as well as many others, we the rather take notice of, to prevent a repetition of the same in any future edition of Plato where the text of Stephens is likely to be made the standard.—S.

<sup>2</sup> Phalerus was a sea-port town, between four and five miles from the city of Athens; where frequently were furnished out, by way of spectacles of entertainment to the people, pompous cavalcades, issuing probably from thence, and marching to the city. See Xenophon in Hipparchic. p. 560. ed. 2da Steph.—S.

<sup>3</sup> What the joke is, will easily be discerned by help of the preceding note. For it lies in a humorous opposition between the haste with which Apollodorus seems to have been walking, agreeably to his character, and the slowness usual in cavalcades of pomp, with the frequent stopping of those who are foremost, till the more dilatory train behind them is come up.—S.

Glauco?

Glauco? Do you not know that Agatho has not been at Athens for these many years? whereas it is not yet three since I first became a follower of Socrates, and began, as I have continued ever since, daily to observe and study all his sayings and actions. Before that time, running about here and there, wherever chance led me, and fancying myself all the while well employed, no mortal was in so wretched a condition as I: it was such as you are in at present, who give every study and every pursuit the preference to that of philosophy.—Leave off railing, said he, and tell me when that conversation happened.—Before we wrote ourselves men, replied I. It was at the time when Agatho brought his first tragedy upon the stage, and won the prize with it. It was the very next day after that himself and his chrous-singers<sup>2</sup> had offered the usual thanksgiving-sacrifice for his victory.—It is then, said he, a long time since, it seems. But who was it, continued he, that related the conversation to you? Was it Socrates himself?—Not Socrates, by Jupiter, replied I; but the same person who related it to Phoenix. It was one Aristodemus, a Cydathenian<sup>2</sup>, a man of remarkably low stature<sup>3</sup>, who always

<sup>1</sup> Those who acted and sung the chorus parts in his play.—S.

<sup>2</sup> In all the editions of the Greek we here read Κυδαθηνευς; but it ought certainly to be printed Κυδαθηναιευς; as appears from Stephanus de Urb. and from an old inscription on a pillar at Athens published in Spon. de Pagis Attic. voce Κυδαθηναιου. See also Meursius de Pop. Attic. in eadem voce.—S.

<sup>3</sup> Xenophon informs us, that Aristodemus was surnamed *the Little*. This circumstance, therefore, serves to ascertain the man. From the same author we learn, that this little man was also one of the minute philosophers of that age, till better taught by Socrates. For Xenophon represents him as ουτε θυοντα τοις θεοις μηχανωμενον, ουτε μαντικη χρωμενον, αλλα και των ποιουντων ταυτα καταγελωντα. We quote the very words of this passage, for the sake of proposing to our learned readers an emendation of the word μηχανωμενον. For we are not satisfied with μητε ευχομενον, the conjecture of H. Stephens, nor with the ουτε ευχομενον of Leunclavius; because sacrifice to the Gods, we apprehend, always implied either petition or thanksgiving: nor can we acquiesce in retaining the word μηχανωμενον, making it to signify, *when he undertook any thing*, and accordingly supposing, with Ernestus, the word τι to be tacitly understood; because the supposition seems not agreeable to any idiom of the Greek language. We approve rather the prudence of Bessarion, who, in his Latin translation of this passage, took no notice at all of the word μηχανωμενον. But, as we must not make so bold with the original, we propose, instead of that word, to be read as in a parenthesis, μη εκοντα μεν ουν: by which alteration the sense will be this, that Aristodemus offered no sacrifices to the Gods, *no voluntary ones at least*, but in compliance only with custom, or in obedi-

ways went barefoot<sup>1</sup>. He was of the party; being one of those who at that time were the most attached to the person and company of Socrates. Not but that I asked Socrates himself concerning some of the particulars reported by Aristodemus; and he allowed they were reported justly.—Why then, said Glauco, should not you favour me with that relation? The way to the city is perfectly convenient for people to converse together, as they go along.—Upon which we resumed our walk, and entered into the relation which my friend desired. So that I am now, as I said, not quite unprepared upon the subject. If then I am to relate that affair over again to you, so it must be. Besides, I must own, that when I am discoursing myself, or hearing the discourse of others, upon philosophical subjects, abstracted from the consideration of improvement, I am beyond measure delighted. But when I hear conversation of any other kind, especially the usual discourse between you rich people, who are still contriving to heap up money, I feel a tediousness in myself, and a concern for you my friends, who imagine you are employing your time to good purpose, while you are only trifling. On the other hand, it is possible you may think that I lead an unhappy life; and I believe those thoughts of yours are just: but as to you, I do not say that I believe, for I know, the state which you are in to be unhappy.

FRIEND. You are always the same man, Apollodorus, always railing at yourself and the whole world. You seem to me as if you absolutely thought all men wretched, and yourself in the first place; excepting none but Socrates. Whence you acquired the surname of the madman<sup>2</sup>, for my part I know

ence to the laws. And this may appear to be the true meaning, when we consider that atheists in all ages are ready enough to join in public acts of divine worship; and, therefore, not the neglect of these, but of such as were *voluntary*, could be any indication to Socrates of the real sentiments of Aristodemus. See Xenophon in Memorabil. l. i. c. 4.—S.

<sup>1</sup> By this circumstance Aristodemus was distinguished, it seems, as much as by his littleness. It is probable that, like his fellow disciple Antisthenes the cynic, he imitated what appeared the most rigid and severe in his master's way of life, as being best suited to the natural roughness of his own temper, and the rudeness of his manners; which led him to entertain atheistical notions of the causes of things, and to ridicule those who paid real worship to what was divine in nature. This circumstance recalls to our mind those epithets of *rough, hard, and unyielding*, *τραχεια και ανπιτυπος*, given to atheism by Plutarch at the end of his treatise *περι δεισιδαιμον*—S.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon in his Apology, and Plato in his Phædo, near the beginning, and again toward the conclusion

know not: for, in your discourse, you are always the same as you are now, severe upon yourself and all other people,—Socrates alone excepted.

APOL. My dearest friend, it is evident enough now, that the entertaining such notions of myself, and of all you, proves me beyond question out of my senses and a madman.

FRIEND. It is not worth the while, Apollodorus, to dispute about this at present. Only do what I desired of you, and give me an account of the speeches made at that banquet.

APOL. The speeches then were as follows:—But I had better, I think, give you the whole history of that affair from the beginning, just as Aristodemus gave it me. For he told me, that he met Socrates fresh out of the bath, and perfectly clean, a condition which he was not in very often; wearing on his feet likewise a handsome pair of slippers<sup>1</sup>, a part of dress which he used only on rare occasions: and that upon asking him, whither he was going, that he had made himself so spruce and fine, Socrates told him, he was going to Agatho's house to sup with him. For yesterday at the sacrifice, said he, I quitted his company, for fear of the crowd; but promised to be with him to-day. Now thus fine have I made myself, that I may visit so honourable and fine a person in a manner not unbecoming. But what

conclusion of it, represent Apollodorus as a man simple and sincere, but with such a kind of weakness in his mind, as made him remarkably hasty, negligent of decorum, and apt to speak inconsiderately and without discretion.—S.

<sup>1</sup> Socrates, in his ordinary way of life, accustomed himself to endure voluntary hardships: from which he drew this advantage, that he suffered less than other men when called to bear hardships that were necessary. In like manner the Cynics and Stoics, in imitation probably of Socrates, did many things *ασκησεις ενεκα*, that is, for the sake of habituating, through exercise, their minds and bodies to endurance. But Socrates, unlike the Cynics, made all this consistent with a regard to the decencies of civil and social life, a due compliance with custom, and conformity to fashion. For he always readily relaxed from his severity, whenever, as on the present occasion, he deemed the practice of it unseasonable. This civility distinguishes the manners of Socrates from the savage rusticity of Aristodemus before mentioned. And we cannot help thinking, that these two seemingly slight circumstances, in the description of these two persons, were mentioned by Plato so near together, on purpose to make that distinction the more easy to be noted. We learn from Ælian, in Var. Hist. l. iv. c. 18. that Socrates was charged, probably by the Cynics, with being curious and nice about his house, and his bed, and his fine slippers. Which confirms the truth of our observation in this note.—S.

think you, said he, Aristodemus, of going to supper there yourself, without invitation? How do you find yourself disposed upon that point?—And I replied, said Aristodemus, that I was entirely at his disposal.—Follow me then, said Socrates; to corrupt the old proverb<sup>1</sup>, by altering it,—and proving, that

When made by worthy men are feasts,  
The worthy go, unbidden guests.

Homer, before us, seems not merely to have corrupted, but to have offered violence to the proverb, by reversing it. For, notwithstanding that he describes Agamemnon as a man excellent in all military virtues, and Menelaus as a man weak in arms, who

<sup>2</sup> ——— Failed of manly force  
To fling the well-aimed javelin;

yet, on occasion of a sacrifice and feast made by Agamemnon, he has brought  
Menelaus

<sup>1</sup> The proverb here alluded to, Athenæus, pag. 178. and Zenobius, c. 2. 19. have given us in this verse, which the latter quotes from Eupolis the comic poet,

*Αυτοματοι δ' αγαθοι δειλων επι δαιτας ιασιν.*

When made by meaner men are feasts,  
Their betters go, unbidden guests.

That is, when they are pleased to honour with their presence such as could not presume to invite them.—S.

<sup>2</sup> *Μαλθακον αιχητην*. Menelaus is so called in the 17th book of the Iliad, ver. 588. Athenæus is very angry with Plato for receiving this character of Menelaus as true; and for not considering that Homer puts it into the mouth of Apollo, a partial friend to the Trojans, and of consequence enemy to Menelaus. He, therefore, stands up very stoutly against Apollo and Plato, to prove, by many instances in Homer, that Menelaus was no coward. But in reality he only proves himself so inveterate an enemy to Plato, as, for the sake of abusing him, to misinterpret Homer; who, by the word *μαλθακον*, meant no more in that passage than, as the old scholiast rightly explains it, *ανειμενον τη ισχυι, ασθενη*; and just so much Athenæus himself confesses true of Menelaus, that he was *τη ρωμη καταδεστερος*, somewhat deficient in strength. Thus much may serve to vindicate Plato in this place against Athenæus. But a better critic than Athenæus, unless he were well versed in Plato's peculiar manner of writing, would, with more show of justice, reprehend him here for the seemingly cold and insipid length of this digression about the proverb. And, indeed, were this part merely a digression, the criticism would in reality be just. But Plato intended it for a part  
highly

Menelaus to the banquet uninvited <sup>1</sup>, a meaner man to the banquet of his betters.—Perhaps I too, replied Aristodemus, on hearing this, shall incur the imputation of a conduct, not, Socrates, such a one as you have supposed, but like that in Homer, if I go to the banquet of a man of great abilities, without being intitled to it either by merit or invitation. Will you, therefore, if you lead me thither, make an apology for so doing? for, as to myself, I shall not confess my coming without invitation, but shall plead that I was invited by you.—Well, says Socrates,

<sup>2</sup> With social steps, companions of the way,

as we walk along, we will consult together what speech to make. But come, let us be going.—After this little talk together, he said, on they went. But in the way, Socrates musing, and attentive to something in his own mind, was outwalked by him; and, observing him to stop, bid him walk on. When he was come to Agatho's house, the door of which was open, an incident, he said, happened, which put him into some confusion. For a servant, who was coming out, meeting him there upon the spot, led him directly to the banquet-room, where he found the company just going to supper. Immediately Agatho, on seeing him enter the room, said,—Aristo-

highly important to his dialogue; to guard it against the misconstruction to which it might be liable from men of severe, sour, and malignant tempers; to signify, that not all people were worthy, or properly qualified, to partake as it were of the banquet he had provided; and to point out, for whom it was particularly improper to be present, *τους μαλθακους*, *molles*, the voluptuous, or men of effeminate minds and manners: in which sense the word *μαλθακος* is often taken. See particularly Xenophon in Mem. l. iii. c. 11. § 10. where it is applied to libidinous love, and opposed to that which inspires the sentiments of friendship. Homer, it is true, had a different meaning, such as we have before explained; and Plato uses a kind of catachresis in adapting this passage to his purpose. But it was sufficient for him, if any way it was applicable. Some passage or other in Homer was here to be introduced, and the reader's mind to be detained on it for some time. For this observation will be found to hold true throughout all Plato's writings, that, whenever he cites a verse out of any poet, especially out of Homer, he does it not, like writers of a lower class, to embellish the plainness of prose with fine tags of poetry; but his view is always either to strike the mind of his reader more forcibly in the conveying some important meaning, and to make it sink the deeper in his memory; or else to prepare him for something of importance which is to follow, by ushering it in with the solemnity of verse, and, what in those days was of much weight, the authority of the poet.—S.

<sup>1</sup> See Homer's Iliad, b. ii. ver. 408.

<sup>2</sup> Iliad, b. x. ver. 224.

demus,

demus, you are come very opportunely to sup with us. But if any other purpose brings you hither, defer it to another time. I was looking about for you in the temple yesterday, with intention to desire your company, and could not see you. But how came you not to bring us Socrates with you?—Upon which I looked back, said he, but could no where see Socrates following me, as I had imagined. However, I declared I came along with Socrates, upon his invitation hither to supper.—You did well, said Agatho; but where is he then himself?—He was following me in but just now, said I; and for my part, I wonder where he can be.—Boy, said Agatho to one of his servants, will you go and see if you can find Socrates, and conduct him in?—Then, turning to me, Do you, Aristodemus, said he, take your place next to Eryximachus. And immediately he ordered a servant to come and wash my feet clean<sup>1</sup>, that I might take my place upon the couch<sup>2</sup>. Just then the  
boy

<sup>1</sup> Thus in the original: *Και εμε εφη απονιζειν τον παιδα, ινα που κατακειτο.* The remarkable enallage, or transition here, in speaking of himself, from the first person to the third, is no unusual thing in Plato; but is too bold, and would be a solecism in English. For, translated as literally as possible, the sentence runs in this manner: “Immediately he bid the [proper] servant to wash off [the dirt] from me, that [says he] he may lie down somewhere.” The words included within hooks, we have added to complete the sense. The first part of the sentence, we see, is merely narrative, and the latter part represents Agatho speaking. But the word *εφη*, having been used just before, though in a different sense, is here omitted, probably to avoid a repetition of it. Harry Stephens, not aware of this transition, has raised doubts about the right reading of this passage; and has endeavoured, without any necessity, to amend it, by altering *κατακειτο* into *κατακειμην*. The same learned printer and editor has, in a passage of the *Euthyphro*, where there is a like transition, proposed altering the text in the same manner, from want of observing this peculiarity in Plato’s style, as Dr. Forster has judiciously remarked in his notes on those five dialogues, published by him, pag. 328.—S.

<sup>2</sup> In that polite age, luxury and too great a delicacy and softness of manners had so far prevailed even amongst the brave Grecians, that when they made their evening meal, or supper, which was with them the principal meal of the day, as dinner is with us, they used not to sit on chairs, stools, or benches, at the table, like the modern Europeans; nor to sit or lie upon mats or carpets laid over the floor, like some of the Eastern nations; but their custom was to recline themselves on sofas, couches, or day-beds; the heads of which being placed at the sides of the table, an oblong square, were covered with cushions; and on these they leaned their elbows. It was necessary, therefore, that Aristodemus should have his dirty feet washed before he was fit to lie on one of those sofas. This little incident seems thrown in by Plato, to confirm the account before given of the manners of Aristodemus, and to exhibit them in a stronger light, as opposite in this particular to those of Socrates, about whom we see no such ceremony used, because unnecessary.  
Different

boy who had been sent out returned, and told us, that Socrates had withdrawn himself into the porch of some neighbouring house, and was there standing; and when I called to him, said the boy, he refused to come.—Abfurd! said Agatho: go and call him again; and do not leave him in that manner.—But Aristodemus told me, that he himself opposed it, and desired that Socrates might be let alone, for that it was usual with him so to do. As he goes along he will sometimes stop, said he, without regarding where, and stand still a while. I make no doubt but he will be here presently. Let me entreat you, therefore, not to disturb him, but leave him at quiet.—Be it so then, if you think it best, said Agatho; but let the rest of us, however, proceed to supper.—Then, turning to his servants, Boys, said he, serve us up something or other; it is left to you what, for there is nobody to give you any particular directions: you know it is not my way on these occasions.—You are now to suppose me and these gentlemen, my friends here, invited by you to supper: entertain us handsomely, therefore, that you may have our commendations.—Immediately upon this, he said, they went to supper; but Socrates was still missing. Agatho<sup>1</sup>, therefore, would every now and then

Different from either of these is the case of Alcibiades, further on in the dialogue. For, as he comes in drunk and dirty, in the midst of his rakehelly rambles about the town, slippers are ordered to be brought him, and not his feet to be washed, as he wore shoes. So minute is Plato in his detail of every circumstance that may contribute to throw light on the characters of those persons he introduces. Whatever weight there is in this observation, be it great or little, so much of importance is there in the blunder committed by all the Latin translators, and by the Italian after them, in making Agatho order water to wash the hands of Aristodemus instead of his feet: and in the same degree is praise due to the judgment and accuracy of *Monf. Racine*, who, in his translation of this dialogue into French, corrects this error; and though he might justly be supposed prejudiced in favour of washing the hands before meals, after the modern French fashion, as well as the antient Grecian, yet explains rightly the orders of Agatho; as being sensible, no doubt, that washing the feet of Aristodemus, not his hands, was a proper preparative for his laying up his legs on the sofa. But he omits this reason of Agatho's for giving those orders, though expressly mentioned by Plato; probably because he was at a loss how to translate the words, being puzzled by the doubts raised about them by *Stephens*, as mentioned in the preceding note.—S.

<sup>1</sup> There is none of Plato's dialogues in which Socrates is ushered in with so much ceremony as in this. In the first place, that recital of the conversation passed between *Apollodorus* and *Glaucō*, with which the piece sets out, seems introduced only for the sake of giving the reader a high opinion of the character of Socrates. To this purpose tend the reflections made by *Apollodorus* upon the singular wisdom of his master. To the same end is directed his account of the

alteration

then be giving orders to his people to call Socrates in ; but I, said he, constantly opposed it. At length Socrates, having staid away, as usual, not very long, entered ; about the time, at furthest, when supper was half over. Agatho then, who lay on the couch at the lower end of the table, alone, said, Come hither, Socrates, and lay yourself down by me ; that, by being close to you, I may have the benefit of that piece of wisdom <sup>1</sup>, which you made a new acquisition of in the porch. For it is plain that you found it, and are in possession ; otherwise you would never have desisted from the pursuit.— Socrates then, sitting down on the couch, said, It would be well, Agatho, if wisdom were a thing of such a nature, as to pass from those who abound with it into such as want it, when they sit close to one another, and are in contact ; like water running through the wool <sup>2</sup> out of the fuller vessel into the

alteration produced in him by studying that wisdom. And for the same reason is mention made of the many admirers of that truly admirable man. But all these circumstances are made to appear simple and artless, the more irresistibly to operate their intended effect upon the reader's mind. The short conversation which follows, between Apollodorus and his friend, carries on the same intention ; but goes greater lengths of praise in the character there given of Socrates. Then comes a narration of some little circumstances, immediately previous to the celebrated banquet, serving to prejudice the reader's mind with an idea of the excellence of the company assembled at Agatho's : of this kind is the extraordinary care which Socrates we see has taken of his person and dress, as a proper mark of respect to that assembly ; and another of the same kind is the argument which he politely urges to Aristodemus, when he is persuading him to be of the party. The circumstances subsequent, the profound meditation of Socrates in his way to Agatho's, his stealing aside immediately on his coming there, plainly with design to finish his speculations, his staying away till supper was half over, and, during that stay, the conversation turning on Socrates, as the principal person wanting, together with the impatience of Agatho at his absence, are all contrived on purpose to raise the expectation of that great figure Socrates is soon to make, and of that high part he is to bear in a conversation where all the speakers shine in their several characters, upon the finest and most interesting subject in human life.—S.

<sup>1</sup> In the Greek *ὁ σοὶ προσέστη*. Perhaps it should be *προσέτεθη*. Whether Cornarius found it so written in the Hessianstein manuscript, he has not told us ; but he here translates, as if he had, *quæ tibi accessit*.—S.

<sup>2</sup> *Δια τοῦ ἐρίου*. It is possible this may mean a woollen bag, made in the manner of our flannel jelly-bags, to strain and purify the liquor running through. Or perhaps it means a string of wool lightly twisted, fastened at one end about the mouth of the cock, in a ewer, or other vessel out of which the water is to run, and hanging down into some basin, or other receptacle ; that the water, as it runs along, may leave behind it in the nappinefs of the wool any dirt or impure particles with which it may be loaded. This latter conjecture is made the more probable by the information

the emptier. If this quality attend wisdom, I shall set a high value upon partaking of your couch : for I shall expect to have wisdom flow into me from you in great quantity, and of a kind which appears the fairest. As for the little which I have, it must be mean and trivial<sup>1</sup>, doubtful and questionable, seeming but a dream<sup>2</sup>. But the wisdom<sup>3</sup> you are master of is splendid, and promises a future great increase of brightness, having already in the morning of your age shone out with so much glory ; as more than thirty thousand Grecians, before whom it appeared<sup>4</sup> the other day, can witness.—You are a joker, Socrates, said Agatho. But this controversy between us about our wisdoms shall be tried by and by, and Bacchus shall decide the cause. At present, turn your thoughts to the table.—Upon this, he told me, Socrates

information we have from a certain friend, a man of credit and veracity, that in some parts of Wiltshire the like method is practised of purifying water, by letting it run down in the manner we have described, along twisted wool, which they there call accordingly *the twist*. Cornarius says in his *Eclogæ*, that he cannot conceive what wool could have to do in the affair ; and therefore he supposes, that instead of the word *επιου* should be read *οργανου*, meaning, he says, a conduit-pipe to convey water out of one cistern, when full, into another. But by this alteration of the word a very humorous part of the similitude is lost ; that which represents wisdom streaming out of one man into another, as it were, by a strong transpiration, through their woollen or cloth garments being in contact together.—S.

<sup>1</sup> See the Greater Hippias.

<sup>2</sup> Socrates taught that outward things, the objects of sense, were the images only of those general ideas which are the objects of mind or intellect ; though, like images in dreams, they seemed the very things themselves. The sophists of his time, on the other hand, agreed with the multitude in maintaining that objects of sense were the only realities, and that those ideal things which Socrates cried up for real and true were at best but shadows, outlines, or faint images of the former. So that each seemed to the other to be as it were in a dream, taking the image for the substance. Accordingly, it was questioned between them, who was the dreamer, and who had the perception of a man whose mind was truly awake. See a passage to this purpose in the *Theætetus*. See also the fifth book of the *Republic*.—S.

<sup>3</sup> Plato has in his writings used the word “ wisdom ” in two very different general senses : the one was the philosophical sense of it, as it signified the knowledge of nature, and of the principles of things, the science of mind, or science universal ; the other was the vulgar one ; the word being at that time commonly used, as it is in this place, to signify excellence in every particular science or art, any knowledge or skill beyond vulgar attainment. See the former part of Plato's *Theages*, and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, l. vi. c. 7. After this observation made, it will every where be easy to determine, which meaning is intended.—S.

<sup>4</sup> Those who were spectators at the acting of his tragedy.

reclined himself, and made his supper. After he and the rest of them had done, performed their libations, sung the praises of the God, and gone through the other usual ceremonies, they were beginning to sit-in to drinking; when Pausanias, he said, opened the conversation thus:—Well, gentlemen, said he, what method shall we take to find most pleasure in our bottles to-night? For my own part, I confess to you that last night's debauch sits very heavy upon me, and I want a little respite. I imagine too that many more of us are in the same condition, such as were here at the entertainment yesterday. Consider, therefore, what way is the best to make drinking agreeable and easy to us.—Aristophanes then said, It is a good proposal of yours, Pausanias, in my opinion, this, that we should by all means procure ourselves an easy drinking-bout. For I am one of those who were well soaked yesterday.—Upon hearing this, Eryximachus the son of Acumenus said, Both of you say well. But I should be glad to be informed about one other person, and that is Agatho; in what condition of strength he finds himself with regard to drinking.—I am by no means very strong at present myself neither, said Agatho.—It is lucky for us, said Eryximachus, for me, and Aristodemus, and Phædrus, and the rest of us here, if you fail and are disabled, you stout men at the bottle. For we are at all times weak in that respect. Socrates, indeed, I except; for he is equally well qualified to drink, or to let it alone. So that he will be satisfied, and ready to comply, whichever course we take. Since none of the company, therefore, seem inclined to drink hard, I may be the less displeasing, perhaps, if I speak the truth about this matter in plain terms. For I have been convinced myself, from the experience acquired in our profession, that hard drinking is usually attended with ill consequences. For which reason, I should neither choose to venture far in drinking myself, nor advise it to any other person, especially when oppressed with the load of the last night's debauch.—As for me, said Phædrus, addressing himself to Eryximachus, I am accustomed to hearken to your advice in every thing, especially in what relates to your own profession: but now I find all the rest of the company are in the same complying disposition.—This they all assented to, and agreed not to make the present meeting a debauch; but to drink, every man, just as much as might be agreeable to him.—This point then being determined, said Eryximachus,  
that

that we are to drink at our own pleasure, and that no compulsion is to be used; the next thing I have to offer is this, that the piper-girl<sup>1</sup>, who has

<sup>1</sup> It was customary with the ancients, at or after their feasts and banquets, to entertain their minds, without the laborious exercise of thinking, through those nobler senses which have a near affinity with the mind; regaling their ears with vocal and instrumental music, and their eyes with spectacles either beautiful or wonderful. The performers, therefore, and exhibitors in these several ways used to attend on these occasions. Accordingly in the banquet of Xenophon one of each kind is introduced; and after they have all performed their parts the conversation begins.—Plato has been accused of want of elegance and politeness in not taking the same method in his banquet, but dismissing the female musician so roughly. Those who make this objection seem not to discern the difference between the banquets described by these two excellent writers; nor to be sensible that they framed these, as well as other of their works, on different plans, though on the same subjects. The guests at the entertainment given by Callias, and described by Xenophon, were a mixed company, composed partly of Autolycus and his friends, who either themselves excelled in bodily exercises, or admired most the excellencies of that kind in others; and partly of Socrates and his friends, whose abilities and excellencies lay rather another way, in the exercises of the mind. Such a promiscuous assembly it was proper to entertain in the usual manner. But the guests of Agatho were a select party, who had all a high relish for the rational pleasures of conversation, good sense, wit and humour; and every one of whom probably expected the enjoyment of those pleasures only that evening, and to be able afterward to say to each other, like our poet Cowley to his friend Harvey,

We spent it not in toys, in lust, or wine,  
But search of deep philosophy,  
Wit, eloquence, and poetry,  
Arts which I loved, for they, my friend, were thine.

It seems also as if Agatho had assembled them for that very purpose; for he had the day before made his grand feast, (as it was the custom to do after a thanksgiving sacrifice,) to which not only his friends and intimates, but a crowd of acquaintance, all such as were known to him, had been invited; and where, as it appears, they had drunk hard, and consequently conversed little. Further; at Callias's entertainment, in order to furnish matter for some little talk, a proposal was made, that each of the company should declare, on what he most valued himself, and why. This gave occasion to much pleasantry, to many ingenious and shrewd sayings and repartees, on various subjects, in few words: after which, Socrates alone made a discourse, of no considerable length, on the subject of Love; to give time for some short preparations, making without, for playing an interlude of Bacchus and Ariadne. The whole is short, and ends early enough for some of the company to take their accustomed evening walk. But the conversation at Agatho's had an air of solemnity and formality; as it consisted of oratorical speeches on one subject, but so ample and diversified in matter, so prolix, and protracted to so late an hour of the night, that a variety of other entertainments of a different kind would have been inconsistent, unnecessary, improper and absurd.—S.

just entered the room, may be dismissed, to pipe to herself, or, if she pleases, to the women in the inner rooms; and that we enjoy one another this evening in the way of conversation. The manner and the subject, I am ready, if you permit me, to propose.—To this they all unanimously gave consent, and desired him to propose accordingly.—Eryximachus then said, I shall begin my proposal after the manner of Euripides in his prologue to the Melanippe, for

The tale I have to tell is not my own<sup>1</sup>;

I have it from Phædrus here. For Phædrus is continually saying to me, with an air of indignation, Is it not astonishing, says he, Eryximachus, that

<sup>1</sup>The old Grecian tragedies were dramatic representations, each, of some single event, uncommon and important, chiefly such as had happened long before, and made a part of their fabulous or antient story; the whole of which, not being then recorded in any writings, but handed down through oral tradition, was subject to much variety in the telling. This not only permitted the tragic poets great latitude in the choice of their fables, or fabulous stories, to represent; but allowed room also for much invention of their own; especially with regard to circumstances, both of things and persons, and what had happened previous to those signal events celebrated in their tragedies. Of these circumstances, and these prior accidents, which the poet made the foundation of his fable, it was necessary to inform the audience; because they might possibly have heard those stories related with different circumstances; and must certainly have been ignorant of such as were *ignota indictaque*, or of the poet's own invention. This was the rise of prologues; in which the audience had the necessary information given them. The prologue was spoken now and then in the person of some deity, the secret cause or leader of the great event going to be represented, but more frequently in the dramatic character of one of the actors in the drama; in either of which cases the prologue made a part of the play itself. Sometimes the player spoke it in his own proper character of player, according to the modern custom: and very rarely, the author spoke it himself, appearing openly and professedly as author; or the player, appearing for him, as his representative. An instance of this kind is the case here cited by Plato: and the reason why Euripides chose such a prologue to his Melanippe probably was this. He had given, it seems, great offence to the ladies in that age, by drawing so many of his female characters bad, and making their infamous actions so frequently the subject of his plays. But none of his characters, except that of Phædra, were likely to be thought more injurious to the sex than this of Melanippe. And in fact so it proved; for we learn from Aristophanes in *Θεσμοφορ.* that Euripides incurred the displeasure of the fair by no plays more than by these two. When his Melanippe, therefore, was to be brought upon the stage, his business was to ward off this blow, as well as he was able, by an apology beforehand. Accordingly, as in his prologue to the Hippolytus, he had artfully made Venus take upon herself the whole blame of Phædra's

that the poets have made hymns and odes in honour of some other of the Deities; and yet not one poet, amongst so many in every age, has ever composed a panegyric upon Love; but the praises of a God so powerful, and of so excellent a nature, to this day remain un Sung? The same complaint I have to make against the sophists: the best of whom, as you will find, have, in their profane compositions, made encomiums on Hercules, and other great and illustrious persons; as the celebrated Prodicus<sup>1</sup> has done, for instance. This, however, is not greatly to be wondered at. But I have lately met with a treatise, written by one of those wise men, containing a high panegyric upon salt on account of its utility<sup>2</sup>. And many other

Phædra's unhappy conduct, so in his prologue to the Melanippe, as appears by the line here quoted, (for the prologue and the play are both lost,) he humorously excuses and exculpates himself, by declaring, with an air of simplicity, that the plot of the play was ready made to his hands, and that he had no finger in it; from whence it was to be concluded, that if Melanippe was a bad woman, he could not help it. The verse of Euripides seems to have been this,

Εμος γαρ ουκ ὁ μύθος, ὃν μελλῶ λεγειν...

Or, if the *γάρ* be added by Plato, to weave it into his own style, the verse probably was this,

Ὁ μύθος ουκ εμος εστιν, ὃν μελλῶ λεγειν.

The intended application of this passage out of the poet is as follows: Eryximachus, being of a grave profession, thought it incumbent on a man of his character to apologize in the same way for introducing such a proposal as this,—that Love should be the subject of discourse that evening; a proposal which would seem much more decent to be made by the youthful and handsome Phædrus; to whom, therefore, he is pleased to attribute it. That is, in fine, Plato himself with infinite address, as usual, apologizes in this manner for making Love the subject of his dialogue. For, as he always exhibits his subject in every light which it can possibly be viewed in, and thoroughly sifts the nature of it, he could not avoid introducing here, amongst the rest of the speeches, those which seemed the most exceptionable. At the same time, also, by beginning like one of the prologues of Euripides, and with a verse taken from thence, he signifies (to such as are acquainted with his manner) his intention, that this first speech of Eryximachus should be, or be taken for, the prologue to the following dramatic entertainment.—S.

<sup>1</sup> Plato here means the dissertation of Prodicus, intitled *Ὀρραι*, so often exhibited, and so much admired; as we learn from Philostratus in his Lives of the Sophists, and from Xenophon in his Memoirs of Socrates. The allegorical story, or fable, of the judgment of Hercules, related in that dissertation, is recorded by the last-mentioned excellent writer, though, as he tells us himself, not in the pompous words of the original author, but in his own simplicity of style, much more elegant. Concerning Prodicus, see notes to the Greater Hippias.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The Greek of this passage runs thus,—βιβλιῶ—εν ᾗ ενησαν ἄλεις, επαινον θαυμασιον εχοντες προς ωφελειαν.

other things of as little worth you may see set off with great encomiums<sup>1</sup>. That so much pains should be bestowed upon subjects so mean, and yet that no man should ever to this day have undertaken to give Love his due praises, but that so great a God has been neglected to such a degree, is it not astonishing? Now Phædrus, in all this, which I have repeated from his mouth, seems to me to plead well. I should be glad, therefore, to have him gratified, and to contribute my share to his gratification. Besides that I think it highly becoming this assembly to decorate with all possible honours the Deity of Love. If all of you then are of the same opinion with me, we may spend our time agreeably enough to-night in discoursing. For my proposal is, that every man of us should deliver an oration in praise of Love<sup>2</sup>, as proper and handsome a one as he is able, the right hand way down; and that Phædrus should take the lead, as he is at the upper end, and is, besides, the father and founder of the argument.—You may be assured, Eryxima-

*ωφελειαν*. In translating which words into English, we have thought it most advisable to follow all the translators before us into other languages, just as they seem to have followed one another, down from Ficinus; not because we approve their interpretation, for the Greek words will by no means bear such a one; but because we are at a loss for the true meaning, ourselves: the text in this place being apparently so much corrupted, as to require an abler critic than we deem ourselves to be, for the amendment of it.—S.

<sup>1</sup> Erasmus, in a long list, enumerates many such, some as antient as the time when Plato lived; which he cites as precedents, in the same manner, and for the same reason, that Plato speaks of some such here; that is, to introduce with the better grace, or perhaps to apologize for, a dissertation of his own of the like kind, A Panegyric on Folly: as may be seen in that incomparable piece of humour, near the beginning, and in his Epistle to Sir Thomas More prefixed to it.—S.

<sup>2</sup> *Ιστεον, οτι παντα οι Έλληνες, α δυναμιν εχοντα εωρων, ουκ ανευ επιστασιας θεων την δυναμιν αυτων ενεργειν νομιζον· ενι δε ονοματι το τε την δυναμιν εχον και τον επιστατουντα τουτω θεον ωνομαζον.* “It is proper to know that the Greeks held an opinion, that every thing in nature, in which they saw any power (force, or virtue) inherent, exercised not its power without the superintendence of the Gods: and also, that they called by one and the same name that thing which had the power and that Deity who presided over it.” This sentence, with which Moscopulus begins his commentary on Hesiod, will serve very properly instead of a preliminary note to all the following speeches concerning Love.—S.

It will be necessary to add in explanation of the above sentence from Moscopulus, that, according to the Grecian theologists every Deity is the leader of a series which possesses his characteristic properties, in consequence of originating from him, and which extends to the last of things, every link of this series (the golden chain of Homer) was very properly denominated by them after the same manner as its monad, or leader. This observation, when properly understood, is, as I have observed in my Notes on Pausanias, the true key to antient mythology.—T.

thus,

chus, said Socrates, that none of us will put a negative on your proposal. For by no means ever should I, who pretend not to the knowledge of any other matters than those which belong to Love<sup>1</sup>: neither would Agatho, nor Pausanias: no more will Aristophanes, without dispute; for his whole time is taken up about Bacchus and Venus: nor indeed will any other person whom I see present. We indeed, who sit lowest, and are to speak last, shall have the disadvantage. However, if the prior speakers speak well and fully to the point, we shall desire nothing more. Let Phædrus then, with our best wishes to attend him, begin, and make his panegyric upon Love.—To this all the rest of the company consented, and joined with Socrates in the encouraging Phædrus to begin. Now what was said by each of the several speakers Aristodemus did not perfectly remember; neither can I, indeed, all that he told me: but the speeches of those whom I looked on as the most considerable persons, and every thing which I thought most worth remembering, I will endeavour to relate to you distinctly.

He told me then, that Phædrus, in compliance with the request made him, spoke first; and began somewhat in this way, with saying—

## THE SPEECH OF PHÆDRUS:

That Love was powerful<sup>2</sup>, and wonderfully great, both on earth and amongst the Gods: that superior dignity belonged to him on many accounts, but especially with regard to his generation.—For to be one of the eldest of the Gods, said he, is a circumstance redounding highly to his honour. And that he enjoys this advantage, appears in that he had no parents<sup>3</sup>; and that never any writer, whether uninspired or poet, pretended that he had. But Hesiod says,

Chaos

<sup>1</sup> From the conclusion of the speech, hereafter spoken by Socrates, it will appear what his meaning is in this place.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The beginning of Phædrus's speech is not recited in the very words of it, but is related in the way of narration; by which means the transition from the narrative style to the oratorical, and from the preceding narration to the first formal speech, is made the more gentle, easy, and elegant.—S.

<sup>3</sup> Love considered according to his highest subsistence, i. e. as subsisting at the extremity of the intelligible triad, has not indeed Venus for his mother, because this Goddess first subsists in the supermundane which is subordinate to the intelligible order, as will be shown in our Notes on

Chaos was first produced ; Earth rose the next,  
Wide-bosom'd, a fix'd seat secure to all  
For ever yielding ; and with her rose Love.

Here the poet tells us, that next after Chaos were born these two, Earth and Love. Parmenides relates the generation thus,

First from th' eternal council forth came Love,  
First of the Gods.—

Acufilaus says the same thing with Hesiod. On so many different hands<sup>2</sup> is it agreed, that Love is among the most antient of the Gods. And as he is thus of highest antiquity in the nature of things, so is he the cause of the greatest good to human kind. For to young persons, at their first setting out in life, I know no greater good than love ; to the party beloved, if she has a worthy lover ; or to the lover himself, if his mistress be worthy : because that, which should be our leading principle in order to right conduct in every circumstance of life, constancy has not the power to excite in us, neither have honours, nor riches, nor aught else, so effectually as love. The principle I mean is the sense of shame attending a base conduct, together with a sense of honour in the doing what is honourable. For, without such a principle, no civil community nor private person can execute any thing great or noble. In confirmation of this, I take upon me to assert that if a man in love be found committing a base action, or suffering base usage from any, through cowardice, or without taking his revenge, he is not in so much pain at being seen by his father, by his intimates, or by any

the Cratylus ; but he derives his subsistence from the first and second monads of the intelligible triad, and prior to these from the ineffable principle of all things. For a full account of Love see the notes on the speech of Socrates.—T.

<sup>2</sup> This expression may seem strange, when only three writers have been cited. But each of them, on account of his excellence, stands as at the head of a numerous tribe ; and may, therefore, justly be supposed, and taken for, the representative of that tribe to which he belongs. Hesiod is singled out from amongst all the poets, to be cited, as being the best of those who composed poems *περι θεογονίας*, or concerning the generation of the Gods. His beautiful poem on that subject, from whence the quotation here is made, is still extant.—Parmenides, a philosopher of the Italic sect, wrote in verse, as did also most of the disciples of the same school ; but, on account of his superior reputation, is chosen to represent all his brother philosophers who taught the principles of things.—And Acufilaus, a writer unfortunately lost, treated of the first or most remote antiquities, and the genealogies of the Gods and Heroes.—S.

other person, as at being seen by his mistress. The same effect we see it has upon the party beloved, to be more ashamed of her lover's fight than of the eyes of the whole world, if she be discovered doing aught dishonourable. If, therefore, there could be any contrivance to have a city or an army composed of lovers and their beloved, the interest of the whole could not be promoted by any better way than this; in which every individual would have a care not to behave basely, and a zeal to behave nobly, excited by a desire to gain the good opinion of some other. Such a people fighting side by side in battle, a handful of them would conquer, I could almost say, the world. For a lover deserting his rank, or throwing down his arms, would less endure to be seen by his beloved than by all mankind. Rather than bear this, he would choose to die a thousand deaths: so would he, rather than forsake the defence of his beloved<sup>1</sup>, or rather than forbear flying to her aid, if she had fallen into danger. There is not any man such a dastard, whom Love himself would not inspire, and make an enthusiast in virtue: so that he should become equal to a man born with a disposition the most excellent. For what Homer says of certain of his heroes, that some God inspired them with a force resistless<sup>2</sup>, this in reality Love does to lovers; such an effect being produced in them by Love alone. And then to die for another, only lovers are ready; not only men, but women too. A signal instance of this appears in the daughter of Pelias, Alcestis; who, as the story goes among the Grecians, undertook to relieve her husband's life by her own death, when no other mortal could be found, willing to die for him<sup>3</sup>, though he had

<sup>1</sup> In the Greek text of this passage, *και μιν εγκαταλιπειν*, there is a manifest omission of the very material word *η*; or some other equivalent to it, immediately before the word *εγκαταλιπειν*.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The passage particularly alluded to, *εμπνευσε μενος*, is in the twentieth book of the Iliad, ver. 110. But expressions of the same import occur in many other places of Homer, such as *ημε μενος*, *ωρσε μενος*, &c.—S.

<sup>3</sup> The thought in this sentence is evidently taken from the Alcestis of Euripides; in the prologue to which are these lines,

Παντας δ' ελεγχας και διεξελθων φιλους,  
 Πατερα, γεραιαν δ' η σφ' ετιμτε μητερα,  
 Ουχ' ευρε πλην γυναικος, ητις ηθελε  
 Θανειν προ κεινου——

He try'd his friends all round, their love profess

had both a father and a mother then living. But Love wrought in her heart an affection for him so far surpassing theirs, that she proved them to be, in comparison with herself, strangers to his blood, and in name only his relations. When, therefore, she had executed her undertaking, the Gods themselves, as well as men, deemed the achievement so singularly noble, that out of many persons, eminent for many virtues, she was added to the number of those select few distinguished by being restored to life again after death as a reward for their distinguished excellence: for to her also was her departed soul sent back again by the Gods, admiring at the heroic greatness of her resolution. So much do they encourage us to make love our care, by bestowing superior honours on all such as exercise upon that subject in particular superior virtue. But Orpheus the son of Oeager the Gods dismissed from those invisible regions, without granting him to succeed in the purpose of his journey thither; showing him only the phantom of his wife, but not restoring to him the reality: for that he appeared effeminate and cowardly, suitable to his profession, that of a mere fidler; not daring to die for the sake of love, like Alceſtis; but contriving actually to go alive to the other world. For this did the Gods assign him an adequate punishment, ordaining his death to be by women. In a very different way disposed they of Achilles, the son of Thetis, in sending him to the islands of the bleſt: because, though he had heard from the goddess his mother<sup>1</sup>, that he must soon die himself after he had slain Hector—but that, if he slew not Hector, he should return home and live to a good old age,—he dared to make death his choice; not only hazarding his life in aid of his friend Patroclus, as ready to die that he might save him, but afterwards avenging his death at the expence of his own life, as resolute not to survive him. This exalted

Proving how real; his father who begat,  
His mother fond who bore him; yet found none,  
None but the faithful partner of his bed,  
Content to die, his dearer life to save.

The next sentence alludes to some passages in the scene between Admetus and his father Pheres in the same play: to which we refer such of our readers as study oratory, and know the usefulness of comparing together passages in fine writers, where different turns are given to a thought fundamentally the same.—S.

<sup>1</sup> See Homer's Iliad, book 18th.

virtue of his the Gods paid a singular regard to; and rewarded with their choicest favours the regard which he had shown to friendship, in setting so high a value on the man who admired and loved him. For Æschylus talks idly, when he says that Achilles was the admirer of Patroclus; Achilles, whose excellence, though he was but in the dawn of manhood, surpassed not only Patroclus, but all the other Grecian heroes. True it is, that the Gods confer superior honours on all virtue, to the exercise of which love and friendship minister occasion: but they more wonder, more approve, and bestow greater rewards, where the person admired feels all the force of friendship and affection for the admirer, than where the noblest offices of friendship are performed by the other party. For the admirer has more of divinity in him than the person admired, as being full of the God who inspires and possesses him. For this cause did the Gods reward Achilles with a higher degree of happiness than they did Alcestis; for to her they gave only a second life on earth, but to the hero they assigned his mansion in the islands of the blest. Thus have I performed my part, in asserting Love to be the eldest in age and of highest dignity amongst the Gods; and to be in a peculiar manner the author of virtue and happiness to all of human kind, whilst they continue in life, and when departed.

Such, Aristodemus told me, was the discourse made by Phædrus. After Phædrus, spoke some others, whose speeches, he said, he did not well remember: omitting these, therefore, he repeated next that of Pausanias, who began thus:—

#### THE SPEECH OF PAUSANIAS.

IN my opinion, Phædrus, the subject was not fairly and distinctly set before us, when it was proposed in general terms, that we should make encomiums upon Love. This, indeed, would have been right, were there but one Love, or if Love were but of one kind. But since the truth is otherwise, the better way is to declare first, which Love it is our present business to praise. To put this matter, therefore, on a right footing, I shall, in the first place, distinguish that Love whose praises we ought to celebrate; and then do my best to celebrate them myself, in a manner worthy of his Deity. We all know that it is the office of Love to attend always upon Venus. If then there

were only one Venus, there had been no occasion for more than one Love. But since there are two Venuses, there must of necessity be two Loves. For it is undeniable, that two different Goddeffes<sup>1</sup> there are, each of whom is a Venus: one of them elder, who had no mother, and was born only from Uranus, or Heaven, her father; she is called the celestial Venus: the other, younger, daughter of Jupiter and Dione; and to her we give the name of the vulgar Venus. Agreeably to this account, it is proper to call that Love who attends on the latter Venus by the name of the vulgar Love, the other by the name of the celestial. All the Gods, indeed, it is our duty to honour with our praises: but we ought to distinguish, as well as we are able, each by his peculiar attributes; that we may give to each his due praise. For every action or operation is attended with this condition: the doing it, considered simply in itself, is neither base nor honourable: as for instance, every one of the things<sup>2</sup> we are now doing, drinking, singing, or discoursing, is in itself a matter of indifference; but the manner of doing it determines the nature of the thing. Rightly performed, it is right and honourable; performed in a wrong manner, it is wrong and dishonourable. So

<sup>1</sup> This distinction between the two Venuses, laid down by Pausanias as the foundation of his argument throughout his speech, is not a fanciful one of his own; but is a part of antient mythology. It is sufficiently confirmed and illustrated by the following passage in Xenophon's Symposium; a sentence which he puts into the mouth of Socrates. *Εἰ μὲν οὖν μία ἐστὶν Ἀφροδίτη, ἢ διτταί, οὐρανια τε καὶ πανδημος, οὐκ οἶδα· (καὶ γὰρ Ζεὺς, ὁ αὐτὸς δοκῶν εἶναι, πολλὰς ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει) ὅτι γε μὲντοι χωρὶς ἑκατέρᾳ βωμοὶ τε εἰσὶ καὶ ναοὶ καὶ θυσιαι, τῇ μὲν πανδημῇ ῥαδιουργοτέραί, τῇ δ' οὐρανια ἀγνοτέραί, οἶδα. εἰκασαὶ δ' ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἐρωτάς τὴν μὲν πανδημὸν τῶν σωματῶν ἐπιπεμπειν, τὴν δ' οὐρανιαὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἐργῶν.* "Now, whether in reality there be one Venus only, or whether there be two, a celestial Venus and a vulgar one, I know not: (for Jupiter also, whom I presume to be but one and the same being, has many surnames given him:) but this I know, that altars are raised, temples built, and sacrifices offered to each of these two Venuses distinctly; to the vulgar one, such as are common, trivial, and of little worth; to the celestial one, such as are more valuable, pure, and holy. Agreeably to this, it may be supposed of the different Loves, that those of the corporeal or sensual kind are inspired by the vulgar Venus; but that love of the mind, and friendship, a delight in fair and comely deeds, and a desire of performing such ourselves, are inspired by Venus the celestial."—S. For a theological account of these two Venuses, see the notes on the Cratylus.—T.

<sup>2</sup> In the Greek, instead of *οἶον, ὃ νῦν ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν*, we suppose it ought to be read, *οἶον, ὡν νῦν η. π.* For the sentence thus proceeds, *ἢ πίνειν, ἢ ἀδεῖν, ἢ διαλεγέσθαι*, (in every one of which verbs the article *του* seems to be implied,) *οὐκ ἐστὶ τούτων αὐτο καθ' αὐτο καλὸν οὐδέν.*—S.

likewise,

likewise, not every Love is generous or noble, or merits high encomiums; but that Love only who prompts and impels men to love generously and nobly. The attendant of the vulgar Venus is a Love truly vulgar, suffering himself to be employed in any the meanest actions: and this Love it is who inspires the mean and the worthless. Those who are the most addicted to this love, are, in the first place, the least disposed to friendship; in the next place, they are more enamoured of the bodies than of the minds of their paramours; and besides, they choose from the objects of their passion the silliest creatures they can light on: for, confining their views to the gratification of their passion by the act of enjoyment, they are regardless in what manner they gratify it, whether basely or honourably. Hence it comes, that in the pursuit of their loves, and afterwards in the enjoyment, they are equally ready for any action which offers itself, whether good or bad, indifferently. For the Love who inspires them is born of that younger Venus, in whose generation there is a mixture of the male and the female; whence it is that she partakes of both. But the other Love is sprung from the celestial Venus; from her whose properties are these:—in the first place, she partakes not of the female, but of the male only; whence she is the parent of friendship: then, she is in age the elder, and a stranger to brutal lust; and hence it happens, that as many as are inspired by this love addict themselves to friendship, conceiving an affection for that which by nature is of greater strength and understanding. Now, whether the man who is under the influence of love feels the genuine impulse of this generous affection, is easy to discern. For, if so, he fixes not his love on any person who is not arrived at the maturity of her understanding. But, commencing their loves from this date, one may well presume them duly qualified, both of them, to live together throughout life, partners in all things. Nor is the lover likely in this case to act like one who, after discovering some childish folly in the person he has chosen, exposes her, and turns her into ridicule, forfeits his faith to her and forsakes her, and attaches himself to a new mistress. To prevent this, there ought to be a law, that no man should make choice of too young a person for the partner of his bed; because, what so young a person may hereafter prove, whether good or bad, either in mind or body, the event is so uncertain. Men of virtue indeed themselves to themselves make  
this

this a law : but upon those vulgar lovers we should put a public restraint of this kind ; in the same manner as we restrain them, as much as possible, from entering into amorous intrigues with any women above the rank of servitude. For they are of this sort of lovers, they who bring upon their mistresses reproach and shame ; and have given occasion to that verse of one of the poets, in which he has dared to vilify the power of Love, by pronouncing,

'Tis loss of honour to the fair  
To yield, and grant the lover's prayer.

But he said this only with a view to lovers of this kind, from seeing their untimely haste and eagerness, their ingratitude and injustice. For certainly no action governed by the rules of justice and of decency can any way merit blame. Now, the rules concerning love established in other states are easy to be understood, as being plain and simple ; but our own laws, and those of Sparta upon this head, are complex and intricate. For in Elis<sup>1</sup>, and amongst the Bœotians, and in every other Grecian state where the arts of speaking flourish not, the law<sup>2</sup> in such places absolutely makes it honourable to gratify the lover ; nor can any person there, whether young or old, stain such a piece of conduct with dishonour : the reason of which law, I presume, is to prevent the great trouble they would otherwise have in courting the fair, and trying to win them by the arts of oratory, arts in which they have no abili-

<sup>1</sup> It is remarkable that Xenophon, in his Banquet, where he distinguishes between the virtuous friendship established among the Spartans, and the libidinous commerce authorized by fashion and common practice amongst the Bœotians and Eleans, cites this Pausanias as one who had confounded them together, and given them equal praises. He there likewise attributes to Pausanias some of the same sentiments, and those of the most striking kind, which Plato records as delivered by Phædrus in his speech. We cannot help imagining that Xenophon, in citing Pausanias, alludes to what was said at Agatho's entertainment : and if our conjecture be true, that little circumstantial difference confirms the account given by Plato in the main, and argues it to have some foundation at least in real fact.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The word *law* here, and wherever else it occurs in this speech, from hence to the end of it, means not a written law, a positive precept or prohibition in express terms, but custom and fashion. For the general acceptance of any rule of conduct, whether rational or not, obtains by length of time the authority of law with the people who follow it ; as it receives the essence of law in a civil sense, from the common consent which first established it.—S.

ties. But in Ionia, and many other places <sup>1</sup>, and in all barbarian countries universally, the same conduct is ordained and held to be dishonourable. For the tyrannical governments under which the people of those countries live, discountenance that way of mutual love, and bring it into disrepute. But the same fate in those countries attends philosophy, or the love of wisdom; as it does no less the love of manly exercises. And the reason, I presume, in all these cases is the same; it is not the interest of the rulers there to have their subjects high-spirited or high-minded; nor to suffer strong friendships to be formed amongst them, or any other ties of a common or joint interest: and these are the usual and natural effects of love, as well as of those other studies and practices prohibited by tyrants. Those who formerly tyrannized over Athens experienced this to be true. For the firm and stable friendship between Aristogiton <sup>2</sup> and Harmodius was the destruction of their tyranny. Thus we find, that wherever the stricter ties of love and friendship are forbidden or discouraged, it is owing to vice, to lust of power, and of whatever is the private interest of the governor; to want of spirit and courage, and every other virtue, in the governed: and that wherever they are enjoined or encouraged simply and without restriction, it is owing to a littleness and laziness of soul in those who have the making of the laws. But in our own state the laws relating to this point are put upon a better footing; though, as I said before, it is not obvious or easy to comprehend their meaning. For, when we consider, that with us it is reputed honourable for men openly to profess love, rather than to make a secret of it; and to fix their best affections on such as excel in the accomplishments of mind, though inferior to others of their sex in outward beauty; that every one highly favours and

<sup>1</sup> The Greek text in this place is greatly corrupted. Stephens has tried to amend it by some alterations, but without success: for it is probable that more than a few words are wanting. We have, therefore, contented ourselves with the sense of this passage; which we think misrepresented by the former translators. For, by the "many other places," we imagine that Plato means, besides Sicily, (where in those days tyranny or arbitrary sway commonly prevailed,) all those northern parts of Greece likewise, where the government was absolutely monarchical. For Ionia, Sicily, and all places where the Greek language was spoken by the people, Plato would certainly distinguish from those countries where the vulgar language was different; these last being by the Grecians termed barbarians.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The story is told by Thucydides, and many other antient writers; but in a manner the most agreeable to the mind of our author in this place by Herodotus.—S.

applauds

applauds the lover, as not thinking him engaged in any designs which are base or unbecoming a man ; that success in love is held an honour to the lover ; disappointment, a dishonour ; and that the law allows the lover liberty to do his utmost for the accomplishing his end ; and permits such strange actions to be commended in him, such, as were a man to be guilty of in any other pursuit than that of love, and as the means of succeeding in any other design, he would be sure of meeting with the highest reproaches from philosophy. For if, with a view either of getting money out of any person, or of attaining to any share in the government, or of acquiring power of any other kind, a man should submit to do such things as lovers ordinarily practise to gain their mistresses, supplicating and begging in the humblest manner, making vows and oaths, keeping nightly vigils at their doors, and voluntarily stooping to such slavery as no slave would undergo, both his friends and his enemies would prevent him from so doing ; his enemies reproaching him for his servility and illiberality ; his friends admonishing him and ashamed for him. But in a lover all this is graceful ; and the law grants him free leave to do it uncensured, as a business highly commendable for him to undertake and execute. But that which is more than all the rest prodigious is, that the Gods, though they pardon not the crime of perjury in any besides, yet excuse in a lover the violation of his oath, if the opinion of the multitude be true ; for oaths in love, they say, are not binding. Thus the Gods, as well as men, give all kinds of licence to the lover ; as says the law established in our state. Viewing now the affair in this light, a man would imagine that among us not only love in the lover, but a grateful return likewise from the beloved party, was reputed honourable. But when we see the parents of the youthful fair appointing governesses and guardians over them, who have it in their instructions not to suffer them to hold discourse in private with their lovers ; when we see their acquaintance, and their equals in age, and other people besides, censuring them, if they are guilty of such a piece of imprudence, and the old folks not opposing the censurers, nor reprehending them as guilty of unjust censures ; in this view, a man would be apt to think that, on the contrary, we condemned those very things which he might otherwise suppose we had approved of. But, upon the whole, the case, I believe, stands thus : The affair of love, as I said at first, considered simply and generally, is neither right nor wrong ; but, carried on and accomplished with  
honour,

honour, is fair and honourable; transacted in a dishonourable manner, is base and dishonourable. Now, it is a dishonour to a maiden to gratify a vicious and bad lover, or to yield to him from base and unworthy motives: but in granting favours to a good and virtuous lover, and complying with his love from generous and noble views, she does herself an honour. The vicious lover is he of the vulgar sort, who is in love with the body rather than the mind. For he is not a lasting lover, being in love with a thing which is not lasting; since, with the flower of youth<sup>1</sup> when that is gone which he admired, the lover himself too takes wing and flies away, shaming all his fine speeches and fair promises. But the man who is in love with his mistress's moral character, when her disposition and manners are settled in what is right, he is a lover who abides through life, as being united with that which is durable and abiding. Our law wills accordingly, that all lovers should be well and fairly proved; and that, after such probation, upon some the favours of the fair should be bestowed, to others they should be constantly refused. It encourages, therefore, the lover to pursue, but bids the beloved party fly: by all ways of trial, and in every kind of combat, making it appear of which sort the lover is, and of which sort his mistress. For this reason it is that the law deems it dishonourable, in the first place, to be won soon or easily; in order that time may be gained; for of the truth of many things time seems to be the fairest test: in the next place, it is held dishonourable for the fair one to be won by considerations of profit or power; whether she be used ill, or terrified, and therefore yield, through want of noble endurance; or whether she be flattered with riches or rank, and despise not such kind of obligations. For none of these things appear fixed or durable; much less can they give rise to any generous friendship. There remains then one only way, in which, according to our law, the fair one may honourably yield, and consent to her lover's passion. For, as any kind of servitude which the lover undergoes of his own free choice in the service

<sup>1</sup> The Greek of this passage, *ἀμα γὰρ τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἀνθὲι ληγοντι, ὕπερ ἡρα*, we have translated according to the following minute alteration of only one word, *ἀμα γὰρ—ἀνθὲι, ληγοντος ὕπερ ἡρα*. The very next words, *οἰχίσται ἀποπταμενος*, allude to a verse of Homer's, the 71st in the second book of the Iliad; where he speaks of the departure of the dream sent to Agamemnon. By which allusion Plato teaches the fair and young, that the promises of such lovers as are here spoken of are flattering and deceitful, and, like that false dream, tend only to delude and ruin.—S.

of his mistress is not by our law deemed adulation, nor accounted a matter of disgrace; so, on the other part, there is left only one other servitude or compliance not disgraceful in the fair; and this is that which is for the sake of virtue. For it is a settled rule with us, that whoever pays any court or attendance, whoever yields any service or compliance to another, in expectation of receiving by his means improvement in wisdom, or in any other branch of virtue, is not by such voluntary subjection guilty of servility or base adulation. Now these two rules are to correspond one with the other, and must concur to the same end, the rule relating to lovers, and this which concerns philosophy and every other part of virtue, in order to make it honourable in the fair one to comply with her lover's passion. For, when the lover and his mistress meet together, bringing with them their respective rules, each of them; the lover, his—that it is right to minister any way to the service of his mistress; the fair one, hers—that it is right to yield any service or compliance to the person who improves her in wisdom and in virtue; the one also, with abilities to teach and to make better; the other, with a desire of instruction and the being bettered;—then, both those rules thus corresponding and conspiring, in these circumstances only, and in no other, it falls out, by a concurrence of all the necessary requisites, to be honourable in the fair one to gratify her lover. Besides, in this case it is no dishonour to her to be deceived: but, in the case of compliance on any other terms, she incurs shame equally, whether she be deceived or not. For if, on a supposition of her lover's being wealthy, she yields to him with a view of enriching herself, but is disappointed, and gets nothing from her paramour, whom at length she discovers to be poor, it is not at all the less dishonourable to her: because such a woman discovers openly her own heart, and makes it appear, that for the sake of wealth she would yield any thing to any person: and this is highly dishonourable and base. But if, imagining her lover to be a good man, and with a view to her own improvement in virtue through the friendship of her lover, she yields to him, and is deceived, finding him a bad man, unpossessed of virtue, her disappointment, however, is still honourable to her: for a discovery has been also made of her aims; and it has appeared evident, that as a means to acquire virtue, and to be made better, she was ready to resign to any man her all: and this is of all things the most generous and noble. So entirely and absolutely honourable is it in the fair one to comply for the sake  
of

of virtue. This is that Love, the offspring of the celestial Venus, himself celestial; of high importance to the public interest, and no less valuable to private persons; compelling as well the lover, as the beloved, with the utmost care to cultivate virtue. All the other Loves hold of the other Venus, of her the vulgar. Thus much, Phædrus, have I to contribute on this sudden call to the subject you have proposed to us, the praise of Love.

Pausanias here pausing,—for I learn from the wise to use parities<sup>1</sup> in speaking, and words of similar sound; Aristodemus told me, it came next in turn to Aristophanes to speak: but whether from repletion, or whatever else was the cause, he happened to be seized with a fit of the hiccups<sup>2</sup>, and consequently became unfit for speech-making. Upon which, as he sat next to Eryximachus the physician, he addressed him thus: Eryximachus, says he, you must either drive away my hiccups, or speak in my turn till they have left me.—To which Eryximachus replied, Well; I will do both. I will speak in your turn, and you, when your hiccups are gone, shall speak in mine: and while I am speaking, if you hold your breath for a considerable time, your hiccups, perhaps, will have an end. Should they continue, notwithstanding, then gargle your throat with water. But if they are very obstinate, take some such thing as this feather, and tickle your nose till you provoke a sneezing. When you have sneezed once or twice<sup>3</sup>, your hiccups will cease, be they ever

<sup>1</sup> These little ornaments of style were introduced into oratory, and taught first by Gorgias; who, it is probable, had observed them there, where every beauty and ornament of speech, great or little, is to be found, that is, in Homer. Isocrates, who had studied the art of oratory under Gorgias, seems to have received from him what his own judgment when mature afterwards rejected, the immoderate and ill-timed use of those superficial ornaments. The foregoing speech of Pausanias, in imitation of Isocrates, abounds with various kinds of them, and those the most puerile and petty; which it was impossible for us to preserve or imitate, in translating those passages into English; because, though all languages admit them, yet every language varies from every other in the signification of almost all those words where they are found. An instance of this appears in the passage now before us, where the Greek Πausανίου δε παυσάμενου, translated justly, runs thus, “When Pausanias had ceased speaking,” that is, had ended his speech. But all similarity of sound would thus entirely be destroyed. As, therefore, it was necessary in this place to preserve it in some measure, however imperfectly, we found ourselves obliged here to make sense give way to sound.—S.

<sup>2</sup> See the Life of Plato by Olympiodorus, in Vol. I. of this work.—T.

<sup>3</sup> Hippocrates, in Aphorism. sect. vi. n. 13. and Celsus, in lib. ii. c. 8. assure us, that “if sneez-

ever so violent.—As soon as you begin your speech, says Aristophanes, I shall set about doing what you bid me.—Eryximachus then began in this manner :

THE SPEECH OF ERYXIMACHUS.

SINCE Pausanias, after setting out so excellently well, ended his discourse imperfectly, it seems a task incumbent on me, to finish the argument which he began. For, in distinguishing two different kinds of Love, he made, I think, a very proper and just distinction. But that Love gives us an attraction not only to beautiful persons, but to many other things beside ; and that he dwells not only in human hearts, but has also his seat in other beings, in the bodies of all animals, and in the vegetable productions of the earth ; in fine, that he lives throughout all nature ; my own art, that of medicine, has given me occasion to observe ; and to remark, how great and wonderful a God is Love, stretching every where his attractive power, and reaching at all things, whether human or divine. I shall instance first in medicine ; that I may pay my first regards to my own profession. I say then, that our bodies partake of this twofold love. For bodily health and disease bear an analogy to the two different dispositions of the soul mentioned by Pausanias. And as the body in a state of health, and the body when diseased, are in themselves very different one from the other, so they love and long for very different things. The love in a healthy body is of one kind ; the love in a diseased body is of another kind, quite different. Now, as Pausanias says, it is honourable to comply with a good lover, but dishonourable to yield to one who is vicious : so is it with respect to the body : whatever is in a sound and healthy state, it is commendable and right to please ; it is the physician's duty so to do, and the effectual doing of it

ing comes upon a man in a fit of the hiccups, it puts an end to the disorder." Upon this general rule, no doubt, was founded the present prescription of Eryximachus. Dr. G. E. Stahl, however, used to tell his pupils, as appears from his *Collegium minus*, *cap. 53.* that the rule indeed was true, where the sneezing was spontaneous, or the work of nature ; but that a sneezing procured by art, or forced, was never recommended. "Sternutationes," says he, "sponte singultui supervenientes, solvunt quidem singultum ; sed arte productæ non commendantur." But we must remark, that this great modern is here putting the case, not of the hiccups when they are the only disorder ; but of a malignant fever, and those symptomatic hiccups which are often the concomitants of that and other dangerous diseases.—S.

denotes him truly a physician <sup>1</sup>. But to gratify that which is diseased and bad, is blameable <sup>2</sup>; and the physician, who would practise agreeably to the rules of art, must deny it the gratification which it demands <sup>3</sup>. For medical science, to give a summary and brief account of it, is the knowledge of those amorous passions of the body, which tend to filling and emptying <sup>4</sup>. Accordingly, the man who in these passions or appetites can distinguish the right love from that which is wrong, he has most of all men the science belonging to a physician. And the man who is able to effect a change, so as in the place of one of those loves to introduce the other; and knows how to infuse love into those bodies which have it not, yet ought to have it; and how to expell a love with which they are but ought not to be

<sup>1</sup> The words used by Plato, in this place, are still stronger, and signify—"denominates him a physician." For the preservation of health, through a right use of the non-naturals, that is, such a one as is agreeable to nature, respecting the difference of sex, age, temperament of body, climate, season of the year, and other circumstances, was accounted in the days of Plato not only a part, but the principal one too, of the art of medicine; and was by the old Greek physicians carried to a degree of accuracy and perfection absolutely unknown or totally neglected in after-ages.—S.

<sup>2</sup> This passage is illustrated by that of Hippocrates, near the end of his treatise de Morbo Sacro. *Χρη—μη αυξειν τα νοσηματα, αλλα σπευδειν τρυχειν, προσφροντας τη νοση το πολεμιωτατον εκαστη, μη το φιλον και συνηθες υπο μεν γαρ της συνηθειας θαλλει και αυζεται, υπο δε του πολεμου φθινει και αμαυρουται.* Having spoken of nourishment, he says, that "the physician should take care not to nourish and increase diseases, but as soon as possible to exhaust and wear them out; applying to every disease that which is hostile and repugnant to it the most, not that which is friendly, of the same temper with it, or habitual to it: for by the latter it acquires growth and vigour; by the former it decays and is extinguished." This, by the way, is the foundation of an excellent practice rule; and that is, in chronical diseases sometimes to change the medicines, though at first found ever so beneficial, when they are become too familiar, and the disease is habituated to bear them; for they would then by degrees lose their efficacy.—S.

<sup>3</sup> To administer proper remedies, says our great master, is to counteract the genius or nature of the disease; and never to concur or correspond with it. *Ιησις αντινοον, [f. και] μη ομονοειν τω παθει.* Hippoc. Epidem. l. vi. § 5. n. 7.—S.

<sup>4</sup> What follows, when stript of the metaphor necessary on the occasion, is the same thing with this of Hippocrates, *Τα εναντια των εναντιων εστιν ιηματα. Ιατρικη γαρ εστι προσθεσις και αφαιρεσις· αφαιρεσις μεν των υπερβαλλοντων, προσθεσις δε των ελλειποντων. ο δε καλλιστα τουτο ποιων, αριστος ιητρος.* Lib. de Flatibus, not far from the beginning. "Contraries are a cure one for the other. For the practice of the art of medicine consists of two operations, adding and subtracting; or supplying and drawing off; a drawing off of that which is over-abundant, a supplying of that which is deficient. Whoever can perform these in the best manner, he is the best physician."—S.

possessed;

possessed; he is a skilful practiser of his art. For those things in the body which are most at variance must he be able to reconcile to each other<sup>1</sup>, and to conciliate amity between them and mutual love. The things most at variance are such as are the most contrary one to the other; as the cold is to the hot, the bitter to the sweet, the dry to the moist, and all others of that sort<sup>2</sup>. Into these things, thus at variance, our ancestor Æsculapius had power to inspire a spirit of love and concord; and, as our friends here the poets tell us, and as I believe, framing into a system the rules for so doing, was properly the author of our art. So that medicine, in the manner I have described, is all under the direction and management of Love. So is the gymnastic art in like manner<sup>3</sup>; and so is the art of agriculture<sup>4</sup>. And that music is so too, is evident to every man who considers the nature of this art with the least attention; and is perhaps the very thing which Heraclitus meant to say: for his way of expressing himself is inaccurate and obscure. “The one<sup>5</sup>,” says he, “disagreeing with itself, yet proceeds in amicable concord; like the harmony made by the bow and lyre.” Now it

<sup>1</sup> See Hippocrates, throughout his treatise de Naturâ Hominis.—S.

<sup>2</sup> That is, all such contrary qualities in the humours of the body as are distinguishable by sense.—S.

<sup>3</sup> The end of the medical art is health; that of the gymnastic is strength, or an athletic habit of body. But in the means they make use of to gain their several ends, favouring and indulging the disposition of body which is right, counteracting and correcting such as are wrong, these arts are exactly analogous one to the other.—S.

<sup>4</sup> The genius and condition of the soil bear an analogy to the temperament and present state of the body; the different kinds of manure and other cultivation are analogous to food and medicine. A good soil is improved by a manure homogeneous to it; a bad soil meliorated by an opposite method of cultivation, altering its nature and condition. As to the metaphor, the same has been always used in agriculture to this day. We say, that such a soil loves such a manure; and that such a tree, plant, or other vegetable, loves and delights in such a soil; when they are correspondent, when the nature of the one is fitted to that of the other, and is favourable to it in making it thrive and flourish.—S.

<sup>5</sup> The author of the treatise *Περὶ κόσμου*, *Concerning the world*, printed among the works of Aristotle, and usually ascribed to him, though not from any decisive authority, cites the following passage from the same Heraclitus, which may serve to illustrate the present: *συναψείας οὐλα καὶ οὐχὶ οὐλα, συμφερομενον καὶ διαφερομενον, συναδον καὶ διαδον, καὶ ἐκ παντων ἐν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνος παντα.* i. e. “You must connect the perfect and the imperfect, the agreeing and the disagreeing, the consonant and the dissonant, and from all things one, and from one all things.” In which passage, by *the one from all things* he means the universe; and by *all things from one*, he intimates the subsistence of all things from *the one*, the ineffable principle of all.—T.

is very absurd to say, that in harmony any disagreement can find place; or that the component parts of harmony can ever disagree. But his meaning perhaps was this; that things in their own nature disagreeing, that is, sounds, some shrill and others deep, at length brought to an agreement by the musical art, compose harmony. For harmony cannot consist of shrill and deep sounds, whilst they remain in disagreement: because harmony is consonance, or a conspiracy of sounds; and consonance is one kind of agreement: but it is impossible that any agreement should be between disagreeing things, so long as they disagree: and no less impossible is it, that things between which there is no agreement should at the same time harmonize together, so as to produce harmony. And as it is with sound so is it with motion; the quick measures and the slow ones, by nature disagreeing, but afterwards brought to agree together, compose rhythm. In both these cases <sup>1</sup>, where things differ and are opposite to one another, it is the art of music which brings about the reconciliation and agreement; just as the art of medicine does in the former case <sup>2</sup>; inspiring them in the same manner with the spirit of love and concord. And thus musical science is the knowledge of those amorous conjunctions whose offspring are harmony and rhythm. Now in the systems themselves, whether of harmony or of rhythm, there is no difficulty at all in knowing the amorous conjunctions: for here love is not distinguished into two kinds. But when the intention is to apply rhythm and harmony to the ears of some audience, then comes the difficulty; then is there need of a skilful artist, whether in composing the odes, and setting them to music, or in making a right choice of those ready composed and set <sup>3</sup>, and properly adapting them to the geniuses of youth. For here that distinction takes place; here must we recur again to that rule of Pausanias, that the decent, the well-ordered, and the virtuous it is right to gratify,

<sup>1</sup> That of disagreeing sounds, and that of disagreeing measures of time.—S.

<sup>2</sup> That of the disagreeing qualities of the humours in a human body.—S.

<sup>3</sup> Poetry and music were employed by the Grecian masters of education as a principal means to form the manners of their youth, to inspire them with becoming sentiments, and excite them to worthy actions. In the choice, therefore, of poetry and music, proper for this purpose, great judgment was used, and much care taken. It was not left, as now-a-days, to the fancy or humour of men, whose profession is only to teach words, or musical notes, with their several combinations. Legislators and magistrates then thought it an object the most worthy of their own attention: and the

gratify, for the sake of preserving their love, and of improving such as are yet deficient in virtue. The Love by whom these are inspired is the noble, the celestial; that Love who attends the celestial muse. But the attendant of Polyhymnia, and the follower of every muse at random, is the other Love, he of the vulgar kind: whom we ought cautiously to indulge, whenever we indulge him; that he may enjoy his own pleasures without introducing disorder and debauchery. And this is an affair of no less difficulty than in our art it is to manage prudently the appetites which regard the table; so as to permit them the enjoyment of their proper pleasures, without danger of diseases. Thus, in the practice of music, and of medicine, and in every other employment, whether human or divine, we are to preserve, as far as consistently we may, both Loves: for both are to be found in all things<sup>1</sup>. Full of both is the constitution of the annual seasons. And when those contraries in nature before mentioned, the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, under the influence of the modest Love, admit a sober correspondence together, and temperate commixture; they bring along with them, when they come, fair seasons, fine weather, and health to men, brute animals, and plants, doing injury to none. But when that Love who inspires lawless and ungoverned passion prevails in the constitution of the season, he corrupts, injures and ruins many of the fair forms of nature. For the usual fruits of this Love are plagues, and other preter-natural diseases, which come upon animals, and vegetables too; mildews, hail-storms, and blights being generated from the irregular state of the amorous affections in those elementary beings, and the want of temperance in their conjunctions: the knowledge of which their amorous affections, and consequent conjunctions, considered as owing to the aspects of the heavenly bodies, and as respecting the seasons of the year, is called astronomy. Further, all kinds of sacrifice, and all the subjects of the diviner's art<sup>2</sup>, those agents employed in carrying on

the greatest philosophers, who framed models of government according to ideal perfection, or laid down maxims fit to be observed by every wise state, treat it as a subject of highest importance; and accordingly are very exact and particular in explaining the natural effects of every species of music, or musical poetry, on the mind. See Plato's Republic, b. ii. and iii. his Laws, b. ii. and vii. and Aristotle's Politics, b. viii.—S.

<sup>1</sup> That is, the rational, the regular, and the sober, together with the sensual, the lawless, and the wild or infinite. See Plato's Philebus, throughout.

<sup>2</sup> Such as dreams, omens, the flight of birds, &c.

a reciprocal

a reciprocal intercourse between the Gods and mortals, are employed with no other view than to preserve the right love, and cure that which is wrong. For every species of impiety is the usual consequence of not yielding to and gratifying the better Love, the regular; and of not paying to him, but to the other Love<sup>1</sup>, our principal regards, in every thing we do relating to our parents, whether living or deceased, and in every thing relating to the Gods. In all such cases, to superintend the Loves, to cherish the right, and cure the wrong, is the business of divination. And thus Divination is an artist, skilled in procuring and promoting friendliness and good correspondence between the Gods and men, through her knowledge of what amorous affections in men tend to piety and justice, and what are opposite to these, and lead the contrary way. So widely extensive, so highly predominant, or rather all-prevailing, is the power of Love. Of all love in general this is true; but especially, and the most true is it, of that Love who attains his ends in the attainment of good things, and enjoys them without ever exceeding the bounds of temperance, or violating the laws of justice. For it is this Love who bears the chief sway both in the human nature and the divine; it is this Love who procures for us every kind of happiness; enabling us to live in social converse one with another, and in friendship with beings so much superior to ourselves, the Gods. It is possible now after all, that, in the panegyric I have made on Love, I may have omitted, as well as Pausanias, many topics of his due praise: it has not, however, been done designedly; and if I have left aught unsaid, it is your business, Aristophanes, to supply that deficiency: or, if your intentions are to celebrate the God in a different way, now that your hiccups are over, you may begin.

To this Aristophanes replied, I am now indeed no longer troubled with my hiccups: but they would not be easy before I brought the sneezings to them. I wonder that a modest and decent part of the body should be in love with and long for these ticklings, or be pleased with such boisterous

<sup>1</sup> In the Greek text some corruption has here crept in. Stephens has endeavoured to amend it in a manner agreeable to Plato's style in other places, it must be confessed. Yet we must prefer the omission of the word *περι* before *τον ἑτερον*, because the sentence is made much easier by this alteration; and because the accidental insertion of the word *περι* may easily be accounted for; as will appear to any good critic in this way, who will be pleased to consult the original.—S.

roaring noises, such as sneezing is: for, as soon as I had procured it a good sneezing, immediately it was quiet.—Eryximachus upon this said, Friend Aristophanes, consider what you are about: you are raising up a spirit of ridicule here, just as you are going to begin your speech; and put me upon the watch, to lay hold of something or other in it for the company to laugh at, when you might, if you pleased, have spoken in quiet.—To which Aristophanes in a good-humoured way replied, You are in the right, Eryximachus: what I said just now, let it be looked on as unsaid. But, pray, do not watch me. For I am in pain for the speech I am going to make; not for fear there should be any thing in it to laugh at; for a laugh would be an advantage gained to me, and the natural product of my muse; but for fear it should be really in itself ridiculous.—You shoot your bolt, Aristophanes, said Eryximachus, and then think to march off. But take care of what you say, and expect to be called to a strict account for it. Perhaps, however, I shall be gracious enough to spare you.—Aristophanes then began:

#### THE SPEECH OF ARISTOPHANES.

MY intentions, Eryximachus, are to speak in a way very different, I assure you, from the way taken by you and Pausanias in your speeches. To men seem utterly insensible what the power of Love is. For, were they sensible of it, they would build temples and erect altars to him the most magnificent, and would offer to him the noblest sacrifices. He would not be neglected as he is now, when none of these honours are paid him, though, of all the Gods, Love ought the most to be thus honoured. For, of all the Gods, Love is the most friendly to man, his relief<sup>1</sup> and remedy in those evils the perfect cure of which would be productive of the highest happiness to the whole human race. I will do my best, therefore, to make his power known to you, and you shall teach it to others. But you must first be informed what the human nature is, and what changes it has undergone. For our nature of old was different from what it is at present. In the first place,

<sup>1</sup> *Ιατρος τουτων*, that is, *κακων*, not *ανθρωπων*, as Racine, and all the former translators except Cornarius, erroneously imagined. Their mistake was owing plainly to the wrong punctuation in all editions of the original in this place.—S.

there

there were antiently three sorts <sup>1</sup>, or subordinate species, of the human kind; not as at present, only two, male and female; there being, then, a third species beside, which partook of both the others: the name only of which species now remains, the species itself being extinct and lost. For then existed actually and flourished hermaphrodites, who partook of both the other species, the male and the female. But they are now become merely a name, a name of abuse and of reproach. In the next place, the entire form of every individual of the human kind was cylindrical; for their bodies, back and sides together, were every where, from top to bottom, circular. Every one had four hands, and the same number of legs. They had two faces, each, upon their round necks, every way both alike: but these two faces belonged but to one head; on the sides of which were placed these faces, opposite one to the other. Each had also four ears, and two distinctions of the sex. From this description, it is easy to conceive how all the other parts of the human body were doubled. They walked upon whichever legs they pleased, on any side; and, as they walk now, upright. But when any one wanted to go with expedition; then, as tumblers, after pitching on their hands, throw their legs upward, and bring them over, and thus tumble themselves round; in the same manner did the people of those days, supported by their eight limbs alternately, and wheeled along with great dispatch. Now you are to know, that these three species of the human race were precisely so many in number, and their bodies made in such a form, for this reason,—because the male kind was produced originally by the sun, the female rose from the earth, and the third, which partook of the other two, was the offspring of the moon;

<sup>1</sup> Plato is so far from being a careless writer, that he has always some concealed and important meaning, even in things apparently the most trivial and absurd. For what can be apparently more absurd than this account which Aristophanes gives of the changes which the human nature has undergone? And yet it occultly insinuates a very important truth, that kindred human souls, both of a male and female characteristic, were in a more perfect state of existence united with each other, much more profoundly than they can be in the present state. However, though it insinuates a more perfect condition of being, yet it is by no means that of the soul in its highest state of felicity. For the *cylindric* bodies indicate its being still conversant with, or *rolling* about, generation, i. e. the regions under the moon. Plato, therefore, probably indicates in this fable an aerial condition of being. For though the soul, while living there in a descending condition, is in reality in a fallen state, yet she is more perfect than when resident on the earth. Agreeably, and perhaps with allusion to this fable, which I doubt not is of greater antiquity than Plato, Pythagoras defined a friend to be a *man's other self*.—T.

for the moon, you know, partakes of both the others, the sun and the earth. The bodies, therefore, of each kind were round, and the manner of their running was circular, in resemblance of their first parents. Their force and strength were prodigious; their minds elevated and haughty; so they undertook to invade heaven. And of them is related the same fact which Homer relates of Ephialtus and Otus, that they set about raising an ascent up to the skies, with intention to attack the Gods. Upon which Jupiter and the other Deities consulted together what they should do to these rebels<sup>1</sup>; but could come to no determination about the punishment proper to be inflicted on them. They could not resolve upon destroying them by thunder, as they did the giants; for thus the whole human race would be extinct; and then the honours paid them by that race would be extinct together with it, and their temples come to ruin. Nor yet could they suffer those mortals to continue in their insolence. At length Jupiter, after much consideration of so difficult a case, said, I have a device, by which the race of men may be preserved, and yet an end put to their insolence; as my device will much diminish the greatness of their strength. For I intend, you must know, to divide every one of them into two: by which means their strength will be much abated, and at the same time their number much increased, to our advantage and the increase of our honour. They shall walk upright upon two legs; and if any remains of insolence shall ever appear in them, and they resolve not to be at quiet, I will again divide them, each into two; and they shall go upon one leg, hopping. As he said, so did he; he cut all the human race in twain, as people cut eggs<sup>2</sup> to salt them for keeping. The face, together with the half-

<sup>1</sup> Human souls, though in a more excellent condition of being when living in the air than when inhabitants of the earth, yet when they are descending, or gravitating to earth, they may be justly called rebels, because they not only abandon their true country, but are hostile to its manners and laws. Hence, as they no longer cherish, but oppose, legitimate conceptions of divine natures, they may be justly said to be hostile to the Gods.—T.

<sup>2</sup> The Greek original in this place stands at full length thus: *ὡσπερ οἱ ταῦα τεμνοντες καὶ μελλον-  
τες ταριχεύειν, ἢ ὡσπερ οἱ ταῦα ταῖς θριξίν.* Now the absurdity of supposing eggs ever to have been cut with hairs, when knives, much better instruments for that purpose, were at hand, first led us to imagine that the passage might be corrupt. On a little examination, it appeared probable to us, from the repetition of the words *ὡσπερ οἱ ταῦα*, that the latter part of this sentence was nothing more than a various reading in the margin of some antient copy. Trying, then, the two last words,

half-neck of every half-body, he ordered Apollo to turn half round, and fix it on that side where the other half of the body was cut off; with intention that all people, viewing themselves on that side where they had suffered the loss of half themselves, might be brought to a sober way of thinking, and learn to behave with more modesty. For what remained necessary to be done, he bid him exercise his own healing art.—Accordingly, Apollo turned the face of every one about to the reverse of its former situation: and drawing the skin together, like a purse, from all parts of the body, over that which is now called the belly, up to one orifice or opening, he tied up at the middle of the belly this orifice, now called the navel. He then smoothed most part of the wrinkles of the skin, after having framed the bones of the breast under it; in the same manner as shoemakers smooth the wrinkles of the leather, when they have stretched it upon the last. But a few wrinkles, those on the belly and navel, he let remain, for a memorial of their old crime and punishment. Now, when all the human race were thus bisected, every section longed for its fellow half. And when these happened to meet together, they mutually embraced, folded in each other's arms, and wishing they could grow together and be united. The consequence of this was, that they both died, through famine, and the other evils naturally brought on by idleness. And if one of these halves died, and left the other behind, the surviving half was immediately employed in looking about for another partner; and whether it happened to meet with the half of a whole woman, (which half we now call a woman,) or with the half of a whole man, they were continually embracing. After all, Jupiter, seeing them thus in danger of destruction, took pity on them, and contrived another device; which was, to place the distinction of sex before: for till then this had still remained on the other side; and

*ταις θριξιν*, by the abbreviations common in old manuscripts, we made our conjecture still more probable (to ourselves at least) by reading the latter part of the sentence thus:—*ἢ, ὡσπερ τα ωα τεμνοντες εις ταριχευειν*, which words we suppose written in the margin after this manner, *ἢ ὡσπερ οἱ τα ωα τ. εις ταριχευειν*. the initial letter of *τεμνοντες* being put for the whole word, as usual in such cases. Thus the last words, being read (as it was common to do for the greater expedition) by some ignorant librarian to the new copyist, literally as they were written, were easily mistaken by a writer unattentive to the sense, and made *ταις θριξιν*. That it was customary with the ancients to salt and pickle eggs for keeping, after boiling them hard, (it is to be supposed,) and cutting them in two, we learn from Alexis the comic poet, as cited by Athenæus, pag. 57 and 60, as also from Columella: which last-mentioned author tells us further, that sometimes they were hardened for that purpose in a pickle heated over the fire.—S.

they

they had engendered, not one with another, but with the earth, like grasshoppers. This scheme Jupiter carried into execution; and thus made the work of generation to be thenceforth carried on by both sexes jointly, the female conceiving from the male. Now, in making this the sole way of generating, Jupiter had these ends in view: that, if a man should meet with a woman, they might, in the embrace, generate together, and the human kind be thus continued; but if he met with another man, that then both might be surfeited with such commixture; and that, immediately ceasing from their embraces, they might apply themselves to business, and turn their studies and pursuits to the other affairs of life. From all this it appears how deeply mutual love is implanted by nature in all of the human race; bringing them again to their pristine form; coupling them together; endeavouring out of two to make one, and thus to remedy the evils introduced into the human nature. So that every one of us at present is but the tally of a human creature; which has been cut like a polypus<sup>1</sup>, and out of one made two. Hence it comes, that we are all in continual search of our several counterparts, to tally with us. As many men, accordingly, as are sections of that double form called the hermaphrodite, are lovers of women: and of this species are the multitude of rakes. So, on the other hand, as many women as are addicted to the love of men are sprung from the same amphibious race. But such women as are sections of the female form are not much inclined to men; their affections tend rather to their own sex: and of this kind are the Sapphic lovers. Men, in like manner, such as are sections of the male form, follow the males: and whilst they are children, being originally fragments of men, it is men they love, and it is in men's company and caresses they are most delighted. Those children and those youths who are of this sort are the best, as being the most manly in their temper and disposition. Some people, I know, say, they are shameless and impudent: but in this they wrong them; for it is not impudence and want of modesty, but it is manly assurance, with a manly temper and turn of mind, by which

<sup>1</sup> All learned naturalists know the great uncertainty we are in now-a-days concerning the rarer animals of all kinds mentioned by the ancients. Under this difficulty of ascertaining what animal is meant by the  $\psi\eta\tau\tau\alpha$  mentioned here by Plato, we have translated it a polypus, because the wonderful property ascribed here to the  $\psi\eta\tau\tau\alpha$  is the same with that in the polypus, which a few years since afforded great entertainment to the virtuosi in many parts of Europe.—S.

they

they are led to associate with those whom they resemble. A shrewd conjecture may hence be formed, from what race they originally spring; a conjecture justified by their conduct afterwards. For only boys of this manly kind, when they arrive at the age of maturity, apply themselves to political affairs<sup>1</sup>; and as they advance further in the age of manhood, they delight to encourage and forward the youth of their own sex in manly studies and employments; but have naturally no inclination to marry and beget children: they do it only in conformity to the laws, and would choose to live unmarried, in a state of friendship. Such persons as these are indeed by nature formed for friendship solely, and to embrace always whatever is congenial with themselves. Now, whenever it fortunes that a man meets with that very counterpart of himself, his other half, they are both smitten with love in a wondrous manner; they recognise their antient intimacy; they are strongly attracted together by a consciousness that they belong to each other; and are unwilling to be parted, or become separate again, though for ever so short a time. Those pairs who of free choice live together throughout life, are such as have met with this good fortune. Yet are none of them able to tell what it is they would have one from the other. For it does not seem to be the venereal congress. In all appearance, it is not merely for the sake of this that they feel such extreme delight in the company of each other; and seek it, when they have it not, with so eager a desire. It is evident, that their souls long for some other thing, which neither can explain; something which they can only give obscure hints of, in the way of ænigmas; and each party can only guess at in the other, as it were, by divination. But when they are together, and caressing each other, were Vulcan to stand by with his tools in his hand, and say, “Mortals! what is it ye want, and would have, one from the other?”—and finding them at a loss what to answer, were he to demand of them again, and say, “Is this what ye long for; to be united together with the most entire union, so as never, either by night or day, to be separate from each other? If ye long for this, I will melt you down, both of you together, and together form you both again; that, instead of two, ye may become one; whilst ye live, living a joint life, as one person; and when ye

<sup>1</sup> Aristophanes in this sentence hints at Pausanias: but for fear his hint should not be apprehended by the company, he takes care to explain it to them himself, near the conclusion of his speech, by an ironical and affected caution in guarding against the being so understood.—S.

come to die, dying at once one death ; and afterwards, in the state of souls departed, continuing still undivided. Consider now within yourselves, whether ye like the proposal, and whether ye would be glad to have it carried into execution."—I am certain, that not a single mortal to whom Vulcan should make this offer would reject it. It would appear that none had any other wish ; and every man would be conscious to himself, that the secret desire which he had of old conceived in his heart, was at length brought to light and expressed in clear language, that is, to be mingled and melted in with his beloved, and out of two to be made one. The cause of which desire in us all is this, that our pristine nature was such as I have described it ; we were once whole. The desire and pursuit of this wholeness of our nature, our becoming whole again, is called Love. For, as I said, we were antiently one : but now, as a punishment for our breach of the laws of justice, the Gods have compelled us to live asunder in separate bodies : just as the people of Arcady are treated by the Spartans<sup>1</sup>. If, therefore, we behave not to the Gods with reverence and decency, there is reason to fear we shall be again cleft in sunder, and go about with our guilt delineated in our figure, like those who have their crimes engraven on pillars, our noses slit, and our bodies split in two. The consideration of this should engage every man to promote the universal practice of piety toward the Gods ; that we may escape this misfortune, and attain to that better state, as it shall please Love to guide and lead us. Above all, let none of us act in opposition to this benign Deity ; whom none oppose but such as are at enmity with the Gods. For, if we are reconciled to Love, and gain his favour, we shall find out and meet with our naturally beloved, the other half of ourselves ; which

<sup>1</sup> As Arcadia consisted chiefly of plains and pasture lands, the people of that country had for many ages led a pastoral kind of life, dispersed in small villages ; and lived in the enjoyment of perfect peace and liberty. But in process of time, when they were in danger of falling under the yoke of the Spartans, their neighbours, whom they observed a warlike people, growing in greatness, and aspiring to the dominion of all the Peloponnesus, they began to build and fortify cities, where they assembled and consulted together for their common interests. This union gave them courage, not only to be auxiliaries in war to the enemies of the Spartans, but at length, as principals themselves, to make frequent inroads into the Spartan territories. The Spartans, therefore, carrying the war into the country of the Arcadians, compelled them to demolish the fortifications of their chief cities, and even to quit their habitations there, and return to their antient manner of living in villages.—S.

at present is the good fortune but of few. Eryximachus now must not carp at what I say, on a suspicion that I mean Pausanias and Agatho: though perhaps they may be of the fortunate few: but I say it of all in general, whether men or women, through the whole human race, that every one of us might be happy, had we the perfection of Love, and were to meet with our own proper paramours, recovering thus the similitude of our pristine nature. If this fortune then be the best absolutely, it follows, that the best in our present circumstances must be that which approaches to it the nearest; and that is, to meet with partners in love, whose temper and disposition are the most agreeable and similar to our own. In giving glory to the divine cause of this similarity and mutual fitness, we celebrate in a proper manner the praise of Love; a deity who gives us in our present condition so much relief and consolation, by leading us to our own again; and further, gives us the fairest hopes, that, if we pay due regard and reverence to the Gods, he will hereafter, in recovering to us our antient nature, and curing the evils we now endure, make us blest and happy.

Thus, Eryximachus, you have my speech concerning Love, a speech of a different kind from yours, and no way interfering with what you have said. Therefore, as I desired of you before, do not, I pray you, make a jest of it; that we may hear, peaceably and quietly, all the speeches which remain to be spoken; or rather both the speeches; for I think only those of Agatho and Socrates are yet behind.—Well; I shall not disobey you, said Eryximachus: for I must acknowledge that I have been highly entertained and pleased with your speech. If I was not perfectly well assured that Socrates and Agatho were deeply versed in the science of Love, I should much fear they would be at a loss for something to say, so copiously and so variously has the subject been already handled. But now, notwithstanding this, I am under no concern about the success of those great masters.—I do not wonder, said Socrates, that you are free from all concern, Eryximachus, about the matter; since you have come off so honourably yourself, and are out of all danger. But if you were in the circumstances I am in, much more in those which I shall be in when Agatho shall have made his speech, your fears would be not a few, and your distresses, like mine at present, no trifles.—I see, said Agatho, you have a mind, Socrates, by such suggestions, to do as enchanters do with their drugs, that is, to disorder and disturb my thoughts,

thoughts, with imagining this company here to be big with expectations of hearing some fine speech from me.—I must have forgotten then, Agatho, said Socrates, the courage and greatness of mind which you discovered lately, and of which I was a spectator, when you came upon the stage, together with the actors just going to exhibit your compositions; when you looked so large an audience in the face without being in the least daunted; I must have forgotten this, if I thought you could be now disturbed on account of us, who are comparatively so few in number.—I hope, Socrates, said Agatho, you do not imagine me so full of a theatre, as not to know that a few men of sense make an assembly more respectable and awful to a man who thinks justly, than a multitude of fools.—I should be greatly mistaken indeed, said Socrates, if I imagined in you, Agatho, any thing which favoured of rusticity or ill breeding. I am satisfied enough, that if you met with any whom you supposed wise, you would regard them more than you would the multitude. But I doubt we have no pretensions to any such particular regard, because we were at the theatre, and made a part of that multitude. The case, I suppose, is in truth this: Were you in the presence of other sort of men, that is, the wise; in reverence to them, perhaps, you would be ashamed if you were then employed in any action you thought unbecoming or dishonourable. Is it not so? or how say you?—It is true, said Agatho.—And would you not, said Socrates to him again, revere the multitude too, and be ashamed even in their presence, if you were seen by them doing any thing you thought base or wrong?—Phædrus here interposed; and said, My friend Agatho, if you go on giving answers to all the questions put to you by Socrates, he will be under no manner of concern, what becomes of our affair of the speeches, or what the rest of us here are doing in the mean time. It is sufficient for him, if he has but somebody to talk with in his own way, especially if it be a person who is handsome. I must confess I take much pleasure myself in hearing Socrates dispute: but it is necessary for me to look to the affair I set on foot myself, that of the panegyrics on Love, and to take care that I have a speech from every person in this assembly. When you have, each of you, paid your tribute to the God, you may then dispute, with all my heart, at your own pleasure.—You say well, Phædrus, said Agatho; and nothing hinders but that I begin my speech. For I shall not want frequent opportunities of disputing again with Socrates.

## THE SPEECH OF AGATHO.

I SHALL begin by showing in what way a panegyric on Love ought to be made <sup>1</sup>, and then proceed that way in making one myself. For none of those who have gone before me have, in my opinion, celebrated the praise of Love; but all have made it their sole business to felicitate human kind upon the good they enjoy through the beneficence of that God. For what he is in himself, he from whom all this happiness is derived, none of them has shown. Now, whatever the subject of our panegyric be, there is but one right way to take in the composing it: and that is, the showing how excellent is the nature, and how good are the operations or effects, of that person or thing we are to praise. In this way it is that we ought to make our panegyrics on Love; praising, first, the excellence and absolute goodness of his own nature, and then his relative goodness to us in the blessings he bestows. According to this method, I take upon me, in the first place, to say, if without offence to what is sacred and divine I may be allowed to say it, that, though all the Gods enjoy a state of blessedness, yet Love is blest above all others, as he excels them all in beauty and in virtue. The most beautiful he must be, for these reasons: first, in that he is the youngest of the Gods, my Phædrus! Of this he himself gives us a convincing proof, by his running away from Old Age, and outrunning him who is evidently so swift-footed. For Old Age, you know, arrives and is with us sooner than we desire. Between Love and him there is a natural antipathy: so that Love comes not within a wide distance of him <sup>2</sup>; but makes his abode with

<sup>1</sup> The following speech abounds with wit; but it is wit of a rambling and inconsistent kind, without any fixed idea; so far is it from aiming at truth. The beginning of it is a just specimen of the whole. For after Agatho has undertaken to give a description of the person and qualities of Love under the very first article of this description, the youthfulness of Love, he uses the word *love*, in no fewer than four different senses. In the first place, he means, as Socrates afterwards observes of him, that which is loved, rather than that which loves; that is, outward beauty, rather than the passion which it excites. Immediately he changes this idea for that of the passion itself. Then at once, without giving notice, he takes a flight to the first cause of orderly motion in the universe. And this he immediately confounds with the harmony of nature, the complete effect of that cause.

<sup>2</sup> We have taken the liberty of translating here, as if in the Greek it was printed *οὐδ' ἐρως πολλοῦ πλησιάζειν*, and not *οὐδ' ὄντος*, π. π.—S.

youth, and is always found in company with the young. For, as the old proverb rightly has it, "Like always goes to like." I must own, therefore, though I agree with Phædrus in many other of his opinions, I cannot agree with him in this, that Love is elder than Saturn and Japetus. Of all the Gods, I affirm, he is the youngest, and enjoys perpetual youth. Accordingly I contend, that, if any such events happened among the Gods as Hesioid and Parmenides report, they were occasioned by the power of Necessity, not that of Love. For, had Love been with them, there had been no castrations<sup>1</sup>, no chains, none of those many other acts of violence had been done or suffered amongst them: but friendship and peace had flourished in heaven, as they now do, and have ever done, since Love began his reign, and became chief amongst the Gods. Thus then it appears that Love is young. Nor is he less delicate and tender. But he wants a poet, such as Homer was, to express in fit terms how great his tenderness. Now Homer, where he tells us that Ate or Mischievous was a goddess, of a subtle and fine frame, thus describes the tenderness and delicacy of her feet;

The tender-footed Goddess shuns the ground;  
 With airy step, upon the heads of men  
 Sets her fine treading, and from head to head  
 Trips it along full nimbly.—

The poet here produces a fair proof, I think, of her tenderness, her going on the soft place rather than the hard. The same argument shall I make use of, to prove the tenderness of Love. For he neither walks on the ground, nor goes upon human heads (which in truth are places not altogether soft); but the softest places possible to be found does Love make the places of his range, and of his dwelling too. For in the manners and in the souls of Gods and men he fixes his abode: not in all souls indiscriminately; for, if he lights on any whose manners are rough, away he marches, and takes up his residence in tender souls, whose manners are the softest. Since, therefore, with his feet, and all over his fine frame, he endures not to touch any but the softest persons, nor in any but their softest parts, he cannot but be extremely delicate and tender. Thus have we seen that Love is full of

<sup>1</sup> For the proper manner in which these things are to be understood, see the apology for the fables of Homer, in Vol. I. of this work.—T.

youth, delicacy and tenderness. He is, besides, of a soft and yielding substance. For it would be impossible for him to diffuse himself through every part of us, and penetrate into our inmost soul, or to make his first entry and his final exit unperceived by us, if his substance were hard and resisting to the touch. But a clear proof of his yielding, easy and pliant form is that gracefulness of person, which it is certain belongs to him in the highest degree by the acknowledgment of all: for Ungracefulness and Love never agree, but are always visibly at variance. That he excels in beauty of colour, is evident from his way of life, in that he is continually conversant with flowers, his own likenesses. For Love resides not in a body, or in a soul, or any other place, where flowers never sprung; or, if they did, where they are all fallen, and the place quite deflowered. But wherever a spot is to be found flowery and fragrant, he there seats himself and settles his abode. Concerning the beauty of this deity thus much is sufficient<sup>1</sup>; though much still remains unsaid. I am to speak next on the subject of his virtue<sup>2</sup>. And here the highest praise which can be attributed to any being is justly due to Love; that he does no injury to God or man; nor by God or man can he be injured. He never acts through compulsion or force himself; for compulsion or force cannot reach Love: nor ever forces he or compels others; for every being obeys freely and willingly every dictate and command of Love: where both parties then are willing, and each is freely consenting to the other, those in the city who are kings, the laws, say there is no injustice done. But not only the perfection of justice belongs to Love; he is equally endued with consummate temperance. For to be superior to pleasure, and to govern the desires of it, is every where called temperance. Now it is universally agreed, that no pleasure is superior to Love; but, on the contrary, that all pleasures are his inferiors. If so, they must be subjects and servants, all of them, to Love; and he must rule, and be the master. Having dominion thus over all pleasures and all desires, in

<sup>1</sup> Thus far Agatho has confounded the object of Love, the amiable, with the passion itself, considered as refined, and peculiarly belonging to the human species.—S.

<sup>2</sup> From allegory, and metaphor, and true wit, Agatho descends to pun and quibble, and playing on words, with scarce a semblance of just thought. In this next part of his description he means, by Love, that grosser part of the passion, common to all animals: and this too he confounds with the satisfaction of it through enjoyment.—S.

the highest degree must he be temperate. Then, in point of valour, not Mars himself can pretend to vie with Love. For it is not, Mars has Love, but Love has Mars<sup>1</sup>; the Love, as fame says, of Venus. Now the person who has another in his possession must have the mastery over that person whom he possesses. The subduer and master then of him who in valour excels all others, must himself in that virtue excel without exception all. Thus we have already shown the justice, temperance, and fortitude of this God. To show his wisdom is yet wanting: and I must do my best to be no way wanting to my subject. In the first place then, that I may honour my own art, like Eryximachus, with my first regards, in the wisdom of poetry Love is so great a master, that he is able to make any one a poet<sup>2</sup>. For, though a man be ever so much a stranger to the Muses, yet, as soon as his soul is touched by Love, he becomes a poet. It concerns me to lay a particular stress on this argument, to prove Love an excellent poet<sup>3</sup>, in all that kind of creative power<sup>4</sup> which is the proper province of the Muses. For no being can impart to another that which itself has not, or teach another

<sup>1</sup> To apprehend the wit of this passage, we must observe, that the word *has* is here used in two senses: in the first part of the sentence, it means the soul being affected with the passion; in the next, it means the passion possessing the soul. There is the same double meaning of the word *habeo* in the Latin, and every modern language derived from it; and it is no solecism in English. But there seems to be more wit and smartness in a repartee of Aristippus, in which he played on the same word, though somewhat differently; when, on his being reproached with having Laïs, a celebrated courtesan, for his mistress, he replied, *Εχω, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἶχομαι*. True, I have her, that is, enjoy her; but she has not me; that is, has me not in her power.—S.

<sup>2</sup> Agatho, in this part of his description, uses the word Love in three different senses: first, as it means that fine passion in the human species only, which, by rousing and improving the faculties of the soul, supplies the want and does the office of genius: next, as it means the passion, whose power is exerted chiefly in the body, and, by exciting every animal to the work of generation, executes the ends for which nature implanted it in them all: lastly, as it means a particular genius or strong bent of the mind from nature to some particular study, which seldom fails of improving and perfecting every art.—S.

<sup>3</sup> In this sentence Agatho justifies the character which Socrates had given of him just before, and shows himself a truly polite and well-bred man. For, upon his mention of the art of poetry, in which he had lately appeared so excellent, he here modestly declines the attributing any merit in that respect to his own poetic genius, as if he was a favourite of the Muses; and with great gallantry transfers the praise, bestowed upon himself, to Love; as if Love, and not the Muses, had inspired him.—S.

<sup>4</sup> Plato has here contrived an opportunity for Agatho to play upon a word, or use it in more senses

other that which itself knows not. In the other kind of the creative power, the making of animals, it is undeniably to the wisdom of this deity that all living things owe their generation and production. Then, for the works of the mechanic arts, know we not that every artist who hath Love for his teacher becomes eminent and illustrious; but that the artist whom Love inspires not and animates never rises from obscurity? The bowman's art, the art of healing, and that of divination, were the inventions of Apollo, under the guidance of Love, and the influence of his auspicious power. So that the God of Wisdom himself, we see, was the disciple of the God of Love. Prompted by Love, the Muses invented the art of music, Vulcan the art of working metals, Minerva the art of weaving, and Jupiter the art of well governing the Gods and mortals. From the beginning of that æra were the affairs of the Gods well settled; from the time when Love arose and interposed among them,—the Love certainly of beauty; for disorder and deformity are by no means the objects of Love. Antecedent to that time it was, as I observed before, that those many sad and strange accidents, they tell us, befell the Gods: it was when Necessity reigned and ruled in all things. But as soon as the charms of beauty gave birth to the God whom we celebrate, with him rose every good which blesses either Gods or mortals.—Thus, Phædrus, in the first place Love, as he appears to me, is most excellent himself in beauty and in virtue; in the next place, he is the cause of the like excellencies in other beings. I feel within me an inclination to make a verse or two on this subject, on the effects which Love produces:—

senses than one. For the Greek word *ποίησις*, which we have translated creative power, signifies not only making or creation, but poetry too: as the word *ποιητής* signifies both creator and poet. Taking advantage of these different meanings, Agatho attributes *ποίησις*, or creation, to each of the three kinds of Love mentioned in note 2, p. 486, as the work or effect of each. To the first he attributes poetry, an art which creates, as it were, or makes out of nothing real, out of the mere imagination of the poet, its own subject. To the next he justly ascribes the making or generating of animals in a way peculiar to Nature; who, beginning from the smallest materials, and collecting all the rest by insensible degrees from all neighbouring quarters, forming all the while, and animating whilst she forms, seems to create out of nothing too. And Love, in the sense in which he uses the word last, he no less justly supposes to have the principal hand in making the most excellent works of every art, where the artist hath his subject-matter ready created, and lying all at once before him, and apparently, therefore, creates nothing but the form.—S.

The

The rugged main he smooths, the rage of men  
 He softens; thro' the troubled air he spreads  
 A calm, and lulls the unquiet soul to rest.

It is he who frees us from reserve and strangeness; and who procures us openness and intimacy: it is he who establishes social meetings and assemblies, such as this of ours: in festival entertainments, in dances, and in feasts, he is the manager, the leader, and the founder; introducing courtesy and sweetness, banishing rusticity and savageness; dispensing abroad benevolence and kindness, restraining malignity and ill-will: propitious, gracious, and good to all: the admired spectacle of wise men, the heart-felt delight of Gods: the envy of those to whose lot he falls not, the acquisition of such only as are fortunate: the parent of delicacy and tenderness, of elegance and grace, of attractive charms and amorous desires: observant of good, overlooking evil: in difficulties, in fears, in silent wishes, and in soft addresses, the protector, the encourager, the patron, and the inspirer: of Gods and men, of all linked together, the beauty and the ornament: a guide to all which is good and amiable, the best and the most charming: whom it is the duty of every one to follow; joining in chorus to his praise, or bearing part in that sweet song sung by Love himself, with which he softens the heart and soothes the mind of every God and mortal.—This is my speech, Phædrus, which I consecrate to Love; a speech; partly jocular and partly serious, such as the best of my poor abilities in wit and eloquence are able to furnish out.

When Agatho had done speaking, Aristodemus told me, the room rang with the applauses of the company; all of them loudly declaring, that Agatho's speech on Love was worthy of himself, and worthy of the God in whose honour it was spoken.—Upon which Socrates, directing his eyes to Eryximachus, said, Well, what think you now, you son of Acumenus? Think you not that I had good grounds for those fears I told you I was under? and that I spake prophetically, when I said that Agatho would make an admirable speech, and that I should be driven to distress?—The first thing, replied Eryximachus, I think you foretold truly, “that Agatho's speech would be excellent;”—but the other, that “yourself would be driven to distress,” I do not believe was a true prophecy.—How, my good friend,  
 said

said Socrates, should I avoid being at a loss, and distressed for something to say? or how, indeed, could any other person, who was to speak, after a speech on the same subject so full of beauty and variety? It was not, I must acknowledge, in all respects, and in all the parts of it, equally admirable: but who, that heard the conclusion, could help being astonished at the elegant choice of words, and beauty of the diction? For my part, when I consider how little I shall be able to say any thing that will not fall far short of it, I should be tempted to run away for very shame, had I any possibility of making my escape. For, whilst he was speaking, he put me in mind of Gorgias: and, to say the truth, that which Homer relates struck me at that time very sensibly. Now, thought I, what if Agatho should at the last send forth the head of that formidable speaker Gorgias<sup>1</sup> to assault my imagination; and thus

<sup>1</sup> This passage in the Greek runs this:—*Εφοβουμην μη μοι τελευτων ο Αγαθων Γοργιου κεφαλην δεινου λεγειν εν τω λογω επι τον εμον λογον πεμφας, κ. τ. λ.* In this, as also in the preceding sentence, where Gorgias is mentioned, Cornarius would have us read *Γοργους*, instead of *Γοργιου*, and consequently, in this last, *δεινος* instead of *δεινου*, referring this attribute to Agatho; and quite insensible, as it seems, to the many strokes of humour in this passage: for he gravely gives this notable reason for his alteration,—that the head of Gorgias, truly, had no such power as is here attributed to it. But he has forgotten to clear up a small difficulty which attends his alteration; and that is, how Agatho the Handsome, for so he was commonly called, or Agatho's handsome speech, should immediately put Socrates in mind of the Gorgon's head. The train of thought here is evidently this: Agatho put Socrates in mind of Gorgias, through the similitude of their styles; the thought of Gorgias put him in mind of Gorgon, through the similitude of their names; and, perhaps, because he thought them both alike *πελωρα*, prodigies; and the thought of Gorgon brought to his mind the following passage in Homer's *Odyssæy*, l. xi.

————— *εμε δε χλωρον δεος ηρει,  
Μη μοι Γοργειης κεφαλην δεινοιο πελωρου,  
Εξ αιδος πεμφειεν αγαυη Περσεφονεια.*

Pale fear then seized me, and the dreadful thought,—  
—Now should the Gorgon's head, that prodigy  
Terrific, by stern Proserpine be sent,  
Forth from her viewless realm, to assault my eyes,  
Visible in all its horrors!—

It is easy to observe, that Socrates not only alludes humorously to Homer's thought in this passage, but, to heighten the humour, has used several of Homer's words. We have followed him in so doing, where it was possible for us; adapting these passages one to the other in the translation.

thus should, by the conclusion of his speech, stop my speech, and turn into stone my speaking faculties!—I considered, how ridiculous it was in me to profess myself a great master in love matters, and consent to bear a part with you in making panegyrics on Love, when at the same time I was entirely ignorant of the affair we undertook, and knew not the right way to celebrate the praise of any thing. For I was so silly<sup>1</sup> as to imagine that we ought never to say any thing but what was true in our encomiums on any subject whatever; that the real properties of it were the materials which lay before us, as it were, to work on; and that the business of a panegyrist was nothing more than out of these materials to select the handsomest and best, and frame them together in the most skilful and the best manner. Prepossessed with this imagination, I had entertained a strong opinion that I should speak well on the subject proposed, because I well knew what praises were with truth to be ascribed to Love. Whereas I now find that this is not the right way of making a panegyric; but that, when we praise, we are to attribute to our subject all qualities which are great and good, whether they truly belong to it or not. Should our encomiums happen to be false, the

doing, where it was possible for us; adapting these passages one to the other in the translation. But in one of the words, an important one to the humour, we found it scarcely possible. For the word *δεινός*, here in Homer, signifies terrible, or frightful; and the same word as used here by Plato signifies great, weighty, or powerful. Now in English both these meanings are not to be expressed fully and exactly by the same word. The word “formidable,” however, though it would weaken the sense in Homer, may serve to express the allusion in Plato to Homer’s “terrific.” This double meaning of the word *δεινός*, and the similitude of sound between Gorgon and Gorgias, or between *Γοργεῖν* [*κεφαλή*] and *Γοργεῖν*, seem to be humorous imitations of the style of Agatho and Gorgias, who were, both of them, fond of such puns and puerilities. It is necessary to take notice of some other words in this passage, because Stephens has thrown in a suspicion of their not being genuine, the words *ἐν τῷ λόγῳ*,—probably imagining them to be a marginal gloss on the word *λεγεῖν*: whereas they are in truth absolutely necessary to the sense; *λόγῳ* here being opposed to *εργῳ*, to the actual sending forth, and presenting visibly, the head of Gorgias. Besides that the omission of those words would much diminish the glare of another Gorgiaism, which seems intended in *λεγεῖν*, *λόγῳ*, and *λόγον*, the repetition of the words “speak” and “speech.”—S.

<sup>1</sup> Socrates, having satirized Agatho’s style, with regard to the affected ornaments of it, and its want of simplicity; but doing it with that delicate and fine humour in which he led the way to all the politer satirists, particularly to the Roman poet Horace, and our own Addison; proceeds now, in that ironical way peculiar to himself, to satirize the sentiments in Agatho’s speech, with regard to their want of truth, justness of thought, and pertinence to the subject.—S.

falsehood of them, to be sure, is not material. For the proposal, it seems, was this, that each of us should make a panegyric, which, by common consent, was to pass and be taken for a panegyric made on Love; and not to make a panegyric properly belonging to Love, or such a one as he truly merited. Hence it is, I presume, that you gather from all quarters every topic of praise, and attribute to Love all kinds of perfection; representing him and his operations to be of such a nature, that he cannot fail of appearing in the highest degree beautiful and good—to all those I mean who are unacquainted with him—for he certainly can never be deemed so by those who know him: and thus the panegyric is made fine and pompous. But, for my part, I was an utter stranger to the composing of panegyrics after this manner; and in my ignorance it was that I agreed to be one of the composers. Only with my tongue, therefore, did I engage myself: my mind was no party to the agreement. And so farewell to it; for I shall never make panegyrics in this way: I should not, indeed, know how. Not but that I am ready to speak the truth concerning the subject proposed, if you have any inclination to hear it, and if I may be allowed to speak after my own manner; for I mean not to set my speech in competition with any of yours, and so run the risk of being deservedly laughed at. Consider, therefore, Phædrus, for it is your affair, whether such a kind of speech as you have to expect from me would be agreeable to you; and whether you would like to hear the truth spoken concerning Love in terms no higher than are adequate and fitting, and with such a disposition of the several particulars as shall happen to arise from the nature of the subject. Phædrus, then, and the rest of the company, made it their joint request to him, that he would speak in the manner which he himself judged to be the most proper.—But stay, said Socrates; give me leave first to propose to Agatho a few questions; that, after we have agreed together on some necessary premises, I may the better proceed to what I have to say. You have my consent, said Phædrus; so propose your questions.—Socrates then, as Aristodemus told me, began in this manner:—

#### INTRODUCTION TO THE SPEECH OF SOCRATES.

IN my opinion, my friend Agatho, you began your speech well, in saying that we ought in the first place to set forth the nature of Love, what he

is in himself, and afterward to show his effects, and what he operates in others. This introduction of yours I much approve of. Now, then, tell me further concerning Love: and since you have so fairly and amply displayed the other parts of his nature and character, answer me also to this question, whether Love is a being of such a kind as to be of something<sup>1</sup>; or whether he is of nothing? I ask you not, whether he is of some father or mother; for the question, whether Love is the love of father or mother, would be ridiculous; but I mean it in the same sense as if the subject of my question was the very thing now mentioned, that is, a father; and the question itself was, whether a father was the father of something, or not: in this case you would certainly answer, if you answered rightly, that a father was the father of a son or of a daughter:—would you not?—Certainly I should, said Agatho.—And an answer of the same kind you would give me, said Socrates, if I asked you concerning a mother.—Agatho again assented.—Answer me now, said Socrates, to a question or two more, that you may the better apprehend my meaning. Suppose I were to ask you concerning a brother, with regard to that very circumstance, his being a brother, is he brother to some person or not?—Agatho answered in the affirmative.—And is not this person, said Socrates, either a brother or a sister?—To which when Agatho had assented, Try then, said Socrates, to tell me concerning Love; is it the love of nothing, or of something?—Of something, by all means, replied Agatho.—Whatever you think that something to be, said Socrates, for the present keep your thought to yourself; only remember it. And let me ask you this question further, relating to Love: Does Love desire that something of which it is the love, or does it not?—Desires it, answered Agatho, without doubt.—Whether, when possessed of that which it desires, of that which it is in love with, does it then desire it? or only when not possessed of it?—Only when not possessed of it, it is probable, replied Agatho.—Instead of being probable, said Socrates, consider if it be not necessary that every being which feels any desire should desire only that which it is in want of; and that as far as any being is free from want, so far it must be free also from desire. Now to me, Agatho, this appears in the highest

<sup>1</sup> That is, whether his nature is absolute, not of necessity inferring the coexistence of any other being; or whether it is relative, in which the being of some correlative is implied.—S.

degree necessary. But how does it appear to you?—To me in the same manner, replied Agatho.—You say well, said Socrates. I ask you then, Can a man whose size is large wish to be a man of large size? or a man who is strong, can he wish to be strong?—The impossibility of this, replied Agatho, follows from what we have just now agreed in. For the man who is what he would wish to be, must in that respect, and so far, be free from want.—True, said Socrates: for, if it were possible that the strong could wish to be strong, the swift wish to be swift, and the healthy wish to be healthy, one might then perhaps imagine it equally possible in all cases of the like kind, that such as are possessed of any thing good or advantageous could desire that which they already have. I mention this in general, to prevent our being imposed upon. For the person who enjoys any of these advantages, if you consider, Agatho, must appear to you to have of necessity at present that which he has, whether he wills it, or not: and how can this ever be the object of his desire? Should any man, therefore, say thus: I, who am now in health, desire to be healthy; or, I, who now have riches, desire to be rich, and long for those very things which I have; we should make him this reply:—You mean, friend, you that are at present possessed of riches, or health, or strength, would be glad to continue in possession of them always: for at this present you possess them, whether you will or not. When you say, therefore, that you desire what is present with you, consider, whether you mean any other thing than this; you would be glad that what is present with you now might be present with you for the time to come. Would he not acknowledge, think you, that this was his only meaning<sup>1</sup>?—Agatho agreed that he would.—This then, said Socrates, is to love and desire that from which he is now at some distance, neither as yet has he; and that is, the preserving of what he possesses at the present, and his continuing in possession of it for the future.—It certainly is so, replied Agatho.—This man, therefore, said Socrates, and every one who feels desire, desires that which lies not ready for his enjoyment, that which is not present with him,

<sup>1</sup> In Stephens's edition of the original we here read, *αλλο τι ὁμολογοί' αν*; as if the confession was demanded from Agatho in his own person. In all the former editions, however, it is rightly printed, *ὁμολογοίτ' αν*. But we presume they are all wrong in giving us *αλλο τι [δια δυοιν]* instead of *αλλοτι [δι' ενος]* *whether*; misled probably by the preceding sentence, where *αλλο τι* signifies *any other thing*, and is therefore rightly there divided into two words.—S.

that

that which he has not, that which he himself is not, and that which he is in want of; such things only being the objects of love and of desire.—Agatho to this entirely assented.—Come then, said Socrates, let us agree upon these conclusions: Is not Love, in the first place, love of something? in the next place, is it not love of that which is wanting?—Clearly so, replied Agatho.—Now then, said Socrates, recollect what it was you told us in your speech was the proper object of Love. But I, if you please, will remind you of it. I think you said something like this, “that the affairs of the Gods were put in good order, and well established, through love of things beautiful: for that things of opposite kind to these could never be the objects of love.” Did you not tell us some such thing?—I own it, answered Agatho.—You own the truth, my good friend, replied Socrates. Now, if this be as you say, must not Love be love of beauty, and not of deformity?—I agree, said Agatho.—And have you not agreed too, said Socrates, that Love is love of something which is wanting, and not of any thing possessed already?—True, replied Agatho.—It follows then, said Socrates, that Love is not in possession, but in want, of beauty.—It follows of necessity, said Agatho.—Well then, said Socrates, that to which beauty is absolutely wanting, that which is totally unpossessed of beauty, do you call that beautiful?—Certainly not, replied Agatho.—Are you still then, said Socrates, of the same opinion, that Love is beautiful, if we have reasoned rightly?—Agatho then made answer: I am in danger, Socrates, of being found ignorant in the subject I undertook to praise.—You have honestly and fairly spoken, said Socrates. And now answer me to this little question more: Think you not that every thing good is also fair and beautiful?—I do, replied Agatho.—If then, said Socrates, Love be in want of beauty, and if every thing good be fair and beautiful, Love must be in want of good too.—I am not able, replied Agatho, to argue against you, Socrates; and therefore I admit it to be true what you say.—You are not able, my beloved Agatho, said Socrates, to argue against the truth: for to argue against Socrates is nothing difficult. And here shall I dismiss you from being further questioned. But the discourse concerning Love, which I heard formerly from Diotima the prophetess, a woman wise and knowing in these and many other subjects; so profoundly knowing, that when the plague seemed to be approaching Athens, and when the people offered sacrifice to avert it, she caused the coming of that distemper  
to

to be delayed for the space of ten years; (she it was who instructed me in the knowledge of all things that appertain to Love;) a discourse, I say, on this subject, which I once heard from her, I will try if I can relate again to you; laying down, for the foundation of it, those points agreed on just now between me and Agatho; but purposing, however, to relate the whole of this by myself, as well as I am able.

## THE SPEECH OF SOCRATES.

RIGHT and proper is it, Agatho, to follow the method marked out by you; in the first place, to declare what kind of a being Love is, and afterwards to show what are the effects produced by him. Now I think the easiest way that I can take, in executing this plan, will be to lay before you the whole of this doctrine in the very manner and order in which I myself was examined and lectured on the subject by Diotima. She began with me, on my saying to her much the same things that were asserted just now by Agatho; that Love was a deity excellent in goodness, and was also one of those who were fair and beautiful. And she refuted me with the same arguments I have made use of to refute Agatho; proving to me that Love, according to my own account of him, was neither beautiful nor good. How say you, Diotima? then said I. Is Love an ugly and an evil being?—Soft, replied she; no abusive language: do you imagine that every being who is not beautiful, must of course be ugly?—Without doubt, answered I.—And every being who is not wise, said she, do you conclude it must be ignorant? Do you not see there is something between wisdom and ignorance<sup>1</sup>?—I asked her, what that could be.—To think of things rightly, as being what they really are, without being able to assign a reason why they are such. Do you not perceive, said she, that this is not to have the science or true knowledge of them? For, where the cause or reason of a thing remains unknown<sup>2</sup>, how can there be science? Nor yet is it ignorance: for that  
which

<sup>1</sup> See the Meno near the conclusion, and the fifth and seventh books of the Republic. It may suffice for the present to observe, that true opinion is a medium between wisdom properly so called, i. e. an intellectual knowledge of the causes and principles of things, and ignorance.—T.

<sup>2</sup> We have here taken the liberty to paraphrase a little, for the sake of rendering this passage more

which errs not from the truth, how should that be ignorance? Such then is right opinion, something between wisdom and ignorance.—You are certainly in the right, said I.—Deem it not necessary then, said she, that what is not beautiful should be ugly; or that what is not good must of consequence be evil. To apply this to the case of Love; though you have agreed, he is neither good nor beautiful, yet imagine not he must ever the more on that account be ugly and evil; but something between those opposites.—Well, said I, but he is acknowledged by all to be a powerful God, however.—By all who know him, do you mean, said she, or by all who know him not?—By all universally, replied I.—Upon which she smiled, and said, How, Socrates, should he be acknowledged a powerful God by those who absolutely deny his divinity?—Who are they? said I.—You yourself, replied she, are one of them, and I am another.—Explain your meaning, said I.—My meaning, said she, is easy to be explained. For answer me to this question: Say you not that the Gods are, all of them, blest and happy? or would you offer to say of any one of the Gods, that he was not a blest and happy being?—Not I, for my part, said I, by Jupiter.—By a happy being, said she, do you not mean a being possessed of things fair, beautiful and good?—It is granted, answered I.—And you granted before, said she, that Love, from his indigence and want of things good and beautiful, desired those things of which he was destitute.—I allowed it.—How then, said she, can he be a God, he who is destitute of things fair, beautiful and good?—It appears, said I, that he by no means can.—You see then, said she, that, even in your own judgment, Love is no God.—What! said I, must Love then be a mortal?—Far from that, replied she.—Of what nature was he then? I asked her.—Of like kind, answered she, with those natures we have just now been speaking of, an intermediate one, between the mortal and

more easy to be understood. In the Greek it runs thus, *αλογον γαρ πραγμα πως αν ειη επιστημη*; Aristotle expresses the same meaning in the same concise way, thus, *μετα λογου γαρ η επιστημη*. Ethic. Nicomach. lib. vi. cap. 6. where *λογος* is the same thing with that which Plato in his Meno calls *λογισμος αιτιας*, that is, the rational account of a thing, deriving it from its cause. For the cause [the formal cause] of every particular truth is some general truth, in which that particular is virtually included. Accordingly, in a perfect syllogism we may see the truth of the conclusion virtually included in the truth of the major proposition. Nor can we properly be said to know any one truth, till we see the whole of that higher truth, in which the particular one is contained.—S.

the immortal.—But what in particular, O Diotima?—A great dæmon<sup>1</sup>,  
replied

<sup>1</sup> The following admirable account of Love, in which it is shown why he is called by Plato a great dæmon, is from the MS. commentary of Proclus on the First Alcibiades:

There are different properties of different Gods: for some are artificers of wholes, of the form of beings, and of their essential ornament: but others are the suppliers of life, and are the sources of its various genera: but others preserve the unchangeable order, and guard the indissoluble connection of things: and others, lastly, who are allotted a different power, preserve all things by their beneficent energies. In like manner every amatory order is the cause to all things of conversion to divine beauty, leading back, conjoining, and establishing all secondary natures in the beautiful, replenishing them from thence, and irradiating all things with the gifts of its light. On this account it is asserted in The Banquet that *Love* is a great dæmon, because Love first demonstrates in itself a power of this kind, and is the medium between the object of desire and the desiring nature, and is the cause of the conversion of subsequent to prior natures. The whole amatory series, therefore, being established in the vestibule of the cause of beauty, calls upwards all things to this cause, and forms a middle progression between the object of Love and the natures which are recalled by Love. Hence it pre-establishes in itself the exemplar of the whole dæmoniacal order, obtaining the same middle situation among the Gods as dæmons between divine and mortal natures. Since, therefore, every amatory series possesses this property among the Gods, we must consider its uniform and occult summit as ineffably established in the first orders of the Gods, and conjoined with the first and intelligible beauty; but its middle process as shining forth among the supermundane Gods, with an intellectual condition; but its third progression as possessing an exempt power among the liberated Gods; and its fourth as multifariously distributed about the world, producing many orders and powers from itself, and distributing gifts of this kind to the different parts of the world. But after the unific and first principle of Love, and after the tripartite essence perfected from thence, a various multitude of Loves shines forth with divine light, from whence the choirs of angels are filled with Love; and the herds of dæmons full of this God attend on the Gods who are recalled to intelligible beauty. Add too, that the army of heroes, together with dæmons and angels, are agitated about the participation of the beautiful with divine bacchanalian fury. Lastly, all things are excited, revive and flourish, through the influx of the beautiful. But the souls of such men as receive an inspiration of this kind, and are naturally allied to the God, assiduously move about beauty, and fall into the realms of generation, for the purpose of benefiting more imperfect souls, and providing for those natures which require to be saved. The Gods indeed and the attendants on the Gods, abiding in their proper habits, benefit all following natures, and convert them to themselves: but the souls of men descending, and touching on the coast of generation, imitate the beneficent providence of the Gods. As, therefore, souls established according to some other God descend with purity into the regions of mortality, and benefit souls that revolve in it; and some indeed benefit more imperfect souls by prophecy, others by mystic ceremonies, and others by divine medicinal skill: so likewise souls that choose an amatory life are moved about the deity who presides over beautiful natures, for the purpose of taking care of well-born souls. But from apparent beauty they are led back to divine beauty, and together with themselves elevate those who are the objects of their love.

replied she. For the dæmon-kind<sup>1</sup> is of an intermediate nature between the divine and the human.—What is the power and virtue, said I, of this  
intermediate

And this also divine Love primarily effects in intelligibles: for he unites himself to the object of love, extends to it the participants of his power, and inserts in all things one bond, and one indissoluble friendship with each other, and with the beautiful itself. Souls, therefore, possessed with love, and participating the inspiration thence derived, in consequence of using an undefiled vehicle, are led from apparent to intelligible beauty, and make this the end of their energy. Likewise enkindling a light in more imperfect souls, they also lead these back to a divine nature, and are divinely agitated together with them about the fountain of all-perfect beauty.

But such souls as from a perverse education fall from the gift which is thence derived, but are allotted an amatory nature, these, through their ignorance of true beauty, are busily employed about that which is material and divisible, at which also they are astonished in consequence of not knowing the passion which they suffer. Hence they abandon every thing divine, and gradually decline into impiety and the darkness of matter. They appear indeed to hasten to a union with the beautiful, in the same manner as perfectly amatory souls; but they are ignorant of the union, and tend to a dissipated condition of life, and to the sea of dissimilitude. They are also conjoined with the base itself, and material privation of form. For where are material natures able to pervade through each other? Or where is apparent beauty, pure and genuine, being thus mingled with matter, and replete with the deformity of its subject? Some souls, therefore, genuinely participate the gifts of Love, and by others these gifts are perverted. For as according to Plotinus the defluxion of intellect produces craft, and an erroneous participation of wisdom sophistry, so likewise the illumination of Love, when it meets with a depraved recipient, produces a tyrannic and intemperate life.

After this, in another part of the same admirable commentary, he presents us, as he says, with some of the more arcane assertions concerning Love; and these are as follow:

Love is neither to be placed in the first nor among the last of beings. Not in the first, because the object of Love is superior to Love: nor yet among the last, because the lover participates of Love. It is requisite, therefore, that Love should be established between the object of love and the lover, and that it should be posterior to the beautiful, but prior to every nature endued with love. Where then does it first subsist? How does it extend itself through the universe, and with what monads does it leap forth?

There are three hypostases, therefore, among the intelligible and occult Gods; and the first indeed is characterized by *the good*, understanding *the good itself*, and residing in that place where according to the oracle the paternal monad abides: but the second is characterized by wisdom, where the first intelligence flourishes; and the third by *the beautiful*, where, as Timæus says, the most beautiful of intelligibles abides. But there are three monads according to these intelligible causes subsisting uniformly according to cause in intelligibles, but first unfolding themselves into light  
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<sup>1</sup> For a copious account of dæmons, their nature, species, and employments, see the second Note on the First Alcibiades.

intermediate kind of being :—To transmit and to interpret to the Gods, said she,

in the ineffable order\* of the Gods, I mean *faith*, *truth*, and *love*. And *faith* indeed establishes all things in good ; but *truth* unfolds all the knowledge in beings ; and lastly, *love* converts all things, and congregates them into the nature of the beautiful. This triad indeed thence proceeds through all the orders of the Gods, and imparts to all things by its light a union with intelligible itself. It also unfolds itself differently in different orders, every where combining its powers with the idioms of the Gods. And among some it subsists ineffably, incomprehensibly, and unifically ; but among others, as the cause of connecting and binding ; and among others, as endued with a perfective and forming power. Here again it subsists intellectually and paternally ; there, in a manner entirely motive, vivific, and effective : here, as governing and assimilating ; there, in a liberated and undefiled manner ; and elsewhere, according to a multiplied and divisive mode. Love, therefore, supernally descends from intelligibles to mundane concerns, calling all things upwards to divine beauty. Truth also proceeds through all things, illuminating all things with knowledge. And lastly, faith proceeds through the universe, establishing all things unically in good. Hence the oracles assert that all things are governed by, and abide in, these. And on this account they order Theurgists to conjoin themselves to divinity through this triad. Intelligibles themselves, indeed, do not require the amatory medium, on account of their ineffable union. But where there is a union and separation of beings, there also Love abides. For it is the binder and conciliator of natures posterior and prior to itself ; but the convertor of subsequent into prior, and the anagogic and perfecting cause of imperfect natures.

The oracles, therefore, speak of Love as binding, and residing in all things : and hence, if it connects all things, it also copulates us with the governments of dæmons. But Diotima calls Love a great dæmon, because it every where fills up the medium between desiring and desirable natures. And, indeed, that which is the object of Love vindicates to itself the first order, but that which loves is in the third order from the beloved object. Lastly, Love usurps a middle situation between each, congregating and collecting together that which desires and that which is desired, and filling subordinate from better natures. But among the intelligible and occult Gods it unites intelligible intellect to the first and secret beauty by a certain life better than intelligence. Hence, the theologist of the Greeks calls this Love blind ; for he says “ feeding in his breast blind, rapid Love :” ποιμαίνων πραπεδεσσειν ανομματον ωκων ερωτα. But in natures posterior to intelligibles, it imparts by illumination an indissoluble bond to all things perfected by itself : for a bond is a certain union, but accompanied with much separation. On this account the oracles are accustomed to call the fire of this Love a copulator : for, proceeding from intelligible intellect, it binds all following natures with each other, and with itself. Hence, it conjoins all the Gods with intelligible beauty, and dæmons with Gods ; but it conjoins us with both Gods and dæmons. In the Gods, indeed, it has a primary subsistence, in dæmons a secondary one, and in partial souls a subsistence through a certain third procession from principles. Again, in the Gods it subsists above essence : for every genus of Gods is superessential. But in dæmons it subsists according to essence ; and in souls according to illumination. And this triple order appears similar to

\* i. e. In the summit of that order which is called intelligible and at the same time intellectual.

she, what comes from men; and to men, in like manner, what comes from the Gods; from men their petitions and their sacrifices; from the Gods, in return, the revelation of their will. Thus these beings, standing in the middle rank between divine and human, fill up the vacant space, and link together all intelligent nature. Through their intervention proceeds every kind of divination, and the priestly art relating to sacrifices, and the mysteries and incantations, with the whole of divination and magic. For divinity is not mingled with man; but by means of that middle nature is carried on all converse and communication between the Gods and mortals, whether in sleep or waking. Whoever has wisdom and skill in things of this kind is a dæmoniacal man: the knowing and skilful in any other thing, whether in the arts, or certain manual operations, are illiberal and sordid. These dæmons are many and various. One of them is Love.—But, said I, from what parents was he born?—The history of his parentage, replied she, is somewhat long to relate: however, I will give you the relation. At the birth of Venus, the Gods, to celebrate that event, made a feast; at which was present, amongst the rest, Plenty<sup>1</sup>, the son

the triple power of intellect. For one intellect subsists as imparticipable, being exempt from all partial genera; but another as participated, of which also the souls of the Gods participate as of a better nature; and another is from this ingenerated in souls, and which is, indeed, their perfection. And these three distinctions of intellect Timæus himself signifies. That Love, therefore, which subsists in the Gods must be considered as analogous to imparticipable intellect: for this is exempt from all the beings which receive and are illuminated by its nature. But dæmoniacal Love is analogous to participated intellect: for this is essential, and is perfected from itself, in the same manner as participated intellect is proximately resident in souls. And the third Love is analogous to intellect which subsists as a habit, and which infers an illumination in souls. Nor is it unjustly that we consider Love as coordinate with this intellectual difference: for in intelligible intellect it possesses its first and occult hypostasis: and if it thence leaps forth, it is also established there according to cause. And it appears to me that Plato, finding that intelligible intellect was called by Orpheus both Love and a great Dæmon, was himself pleased to celebrate Love in a similar manner. Very properly, therefore, does Diotima call it a great dæmon; and Socrates conjoins the discourse about Love with that concerning Dæmons. For, as every thing dæmoniacal is suspended from the amatory medium, so also the discourse concerning a dæmoniacal nature is conjoined with that concerning Love, and is allied to it. For Love is a medium between the object of love and the lover; and a dæmon is a medium between man and divinity.—T.

<sup>1</sup> By *Plenty*, the son of Counsel, we must understand that divine cause of abundance which subsists in Jupiter the demiurgus of the world. For Jupiter is called *Μητις*, or Counsel, by Orpheus, as we are informed by Proclus in *Tim.* p. 102. *Poverty* is Matter, which in itself is destitute of

son of Counsel. After they had supped, Poverty came a-begging, an abundance of dainties being there, and loitered about the door. Just then Plenty, intoxicated with nectar<sup>1</sup>, (for as yet wine<sup>2</sup> was not) went out into the gardens of Jupiter; and oppressed with the load of liquor that he had drunk, fell asleep<sup>3</sup>. Poverty, therefore, desiring through her indigence to have a child from Plenty, artfully lay down by him, and became with child of Love. Hence it is that Love is the constant follower and attendant of Venus, as having been begotten on the birth-day of that Goddess: being also, by his natural disposition, fond of all beauty, he is the more attached to Venus herself on account of her being beautiful. Now, as Love is the son of Plenty and of Poverty, the condition of his life and fortune is as follows: In the first place, he is always poor; and is far from being either fair or tender, as the multitude imagine him; for he is rough, and hard, and dry, without shoes to his feet, and without a house or any covering to his head; always grovelling on the earth, and lying on the bare ground, at doors, and in the streets, in the open air; partaking thus of his mother's disposition, and living in perpetual want. On the other hand, he derives from his father's side qualities very different from those others: for hence it is that he is full of designs upon the good and the fair: hence it is that he is courageous, sprightly, and prompt to action; a mighty sportsman, always contriving some new device to entrap his game: much addicted to thought, and fruitful in expedients; all his life philosophizing; powerful in magic and enchantment, nor less so in sophistry. His nature is not mortal, in the common

all things, but is filled as far as it can be filled from *Plenty*, whose overflowing fullness terminates in its dark and rebounding seat. Plato, therefore, in calling Love the offspring of *Plenty* and *Poverty*, appears to comprehend its whole series. For Love, considered as the same with Desire, is, according to its subsistence in Jupiter, the son of *Plenty*; but, according to its ultimate subsistence, it is the offspring of Matter: for Matter also desires good, though her desire is most debile and evanescent. But by *Poverty* being pregnant with Love at the birth of Venus, Plato occultly intimates that the divine abundance in the demiurgus of the world proceeds into matter in conjunction with the illuminations of divine beauty.—T.

<sup>1</sup> Intoxication with nectar signifies that divine energy through which divine natures are enabled to provide immutably for all things.—T.

<sup>2</sup> This signifies nothing more than that wine belongs to the sensible, and not to the intelligible world. By the gardens of Jupiter, we may conceive that the splendour, grace, and empyrean beauty of the demiurgic illuminations of the maker of the universe are signified.—T.

<sup>3</sup> Sleep, when applied to divine natures, signifies an energy separate from sensibles.—T.

way of mortality, nor yet is it immortal, after the manner of the immortal Gods; for sometimes, in one and the same day, he lives and flourishes, when he happens to fare well; and presently afterwards he dies; and soon after that revives again, as partaking of his father's nature. Whatever abundance flows in upon him is continually stealing away from him: so that Love is never absolutely in a state either of affluence or of indigence. Again, he is seated in the midst between Wisdom and Ignorance. For the case is this with regard to wisdom:—None of the Gods philosophize, or desire to become wise; for they are so; and if there be any other being beside the Gods who is truly wise, neither does such a being philosophize. Nor yet does philosophy, or the search of Wisdom, belong to the Ignorant<sup>1</sup>. For on this very account is the condition of Ignorance so wretched, that notwithstanding she is neither fair, good, nor wise, yet she thinks she has no need of any kind of amendment or improvement. So that the ignorant, not imagining themselves in need, neither seek nor desire that which they think they want not.—Who are they then, O Diotima, said I, who philosophize, if they are neither the wise nor the ignorant?—That is evident, said she: even a child may now discover that they must be such as stand in the middle rank of being; in the number of whom is Love. For wisdom is among the things of highest beauty; and all beauty is the object of love. It follows therefore of necessity, that Love is a philosopher, or a lover of wisdom; and that, as such, he stands between the adept in wisdom and the wholly ignorant. This, as well as all the rest of his condition, is owing to his parentage; as he derives his birth from a father wise and rich in all things, and from a mother unwise and in want of all things. Such, dear Socrates, is the nature of this dæmon. But that you had other thoughts of that being, whom you took for Love, is not at all surprising. For, if I may guess from the description you gave of him yourself, you seem to have taken for Love that which is beloved, not that which loves: and from this mistake it arose, as I imagine, that Love appeared to you in all respects so beautiful. For the object of love, the amiable, is truly beautiful and delicate, is perfect and completely blest. But to the subject of love, the lover, belongs a different nature, such a

<sup>1</sup> This passage in the Greek original is thus printed: *αυτο γαρ τουτο εστι χαλεπον αμαθια*; but we presume that either the last word of these should be printed *αμαθια*, figuratively meaning *αμαθει*, or else, that the first words should be thus printed, *αυτω γαρ τουτω*.—S.

one as I have described to you.—Be it granted such, Diotima, said I; for what you tell me bids fair to be the truth. But now, such being his nature, of what advantage is he to human kind?—This, Socrates, said she, in the next place, I shall do my best to teach you. Already then it appears what kind of being Love is, and of what parents he was born: and that his object is beauty you yourself have asserted. Now what answer shall we make should we be asked this question, “O Socrates and Diotima! how or in what respect mean ye, when ye say that beauty is the object of Love?”—To express the meaning of my question in plainer terms, said she, What is it which the lover of beauty longs for?—To be in possession, said I, of the beloved beauty.—Your answer, said she, draws on a further question: What will be the state or condition of that man who is in possession of his beloved beauty?—I told her, I could by no means answer readily to such a question.—Suppose then, said she, that changing the subject of the question, and putting good in the place of beauty, one were to ask you thus, and say, Answer me, Socrates, to this question, What is it which the lover of good longs for?—To be in possession of that good, answered I.—And what, she asked me again, will be the state of that man who is in possession of good?—This, said I, is a question I can answer with much less difficulty, thus: that such a man will be happy.—Right, said she; for by the possessing of good things it is that the happy are in that happy state which they enjoy. Nor is there any room to question further, and ask, Why, or for the sake of what, a man wishes to be happy; but a conclusive answer appears to have been given, fully satisfactory.—True, said I, without dispute.—Now this wishing and this longing, said she, let me ask you, whether in your opinion it is common to all men; whether you think that all wish to be always in possession of things good; or how otherwise?—I think just so, replied I, that such a wish is common to all.—Well then, Socrates, said she, must we not acknowledge that all men are in love; seeing that the affections of them all are always fixed on the same things? or shall we say that some are in love, and some are not?—It is a thought, said I, which, I confess, a little surprises me.—Be not surprised, said she; for the case is nothing more than this, that the name of love, which belongs to all love in general, we appropriate to one particular kind of love, singled out from the others, which we distinguish by other names.—To make me conceive your meaning more perfectly, said I, can-

I, cannot you produce some other case parallel to this?—I can, said she. The following case is parallel: Making or creating, you know, comprehends many kinds of operation. For all cause by which any thing proceeds out of non-being into being<sup>r</sup> is creation. So that all the operations and all the works executed through any of the arts, are indeed so many creations: and all the artists and the workmen are real creators, makers, or poets.—True, said I.—And yet you know, continued she, they are not all of them called poets or makers, but are distinguished by different names: whilst one particular kind of creation, that which is performed in metre through the Muse's art, is singled out from the other kinds; and the name, to which they have all an equal right, is given to that alone. For that alone is called poesy or making: and the artists in this species of creation only are peculiarly distinguished by the name of poets or makers.—Perfectly right, said I.—Just so is it then in the case of Love, said she. Universally all desire of things good, and all that longing after happiness, which is in every individual of human kind, is the mighty Deity of Love, who by secret ways and stratagems subdues and governs the hearts of all. His votaries in many various ways, such as those engaged in the pursuit of wealth, or strength of body, or wisdom, are not said to be in love; nor is the name of lover allowed to any such. But to those only who are devoted to Love in one particular way, and addict themselves to one certain species of love, we appropriate those terms of love, and lovers, and the being in love, which ought to be considered as general terms, applicable in common to all the different kinds.—In all appearance, said I, you are entirely in the right.—She proceeded, however, to confirm the truth of what she had said, in the following manner:—There is a saying, continued she, that lovers are in search of the other half of themselves. But my doctrine is, that we love neither the half, nor even the whole of ourselves, if it happen not, my friend<sup>d</sup>, some way or other to be

<sup>r</sup> *Being* does not here signify being or entity in general, but the particular form or essence of any thing, the being what it is. So non-being, just before, does not signify absolute non-entity, but the non-being of some particular thing, or the want of some form, which is afterwards introduced into existence. Accordingly *creation*, immediately after, signifies not what is now-a-days generally understood by that term, a making of something out of mere nothing; for Plato seems to have had no notion of the possibility of this; but here is to be understood the making some form or being, in the sense just now mentioned, newly to exist, a particular one, which existed not before.—S.

good.

good. For we are willing to have our feet and our hands cut off, though our own, if we deem them incurably and absolutely evil. It is not to what is their own that men have so strong an attachment, nor do they treat it so tenderly on that account, unless there be a man who thinks good to be his own, and properly belonging to him, but evil to be foreign to his nature. So true is it, that there is no other object of love to man than good alone. Or do you think there is?—By Jupiter, said I, there appears to me no other.—Is this now sufficient for us? said she: and have we done justice to our argument if we finish it with this simple and slender conclusion, that all men love what is good?—Why not?, said I.—What? said she; must we not add this, that they long to have possession of the loved good?—This, said I, must be added.—And not only now to have possession of it, said she again, but to have possession of it for ever too; must not this be added further?—This further, said I.—Love then, in fine, said she, is the desire of having good in perpetual possession.—Most true, said I; in every tittle you are right.—Since then, said she, this general desire is found always to subsist and to operate in all, can you tell me in what particular way it operates on those who are commonly said to be in love? what the aim is of such lovers, and what the work or effect of this kind of love?—Were I able to tell, O Diotima, replied I, I should not have been so full of admiration at your wisdom; nor should I have applied myself to you to be taught these very things, if I already knew them.—Well, said she, I will teach you then. The aim of these lovers, and the work of this love, is to generate upon the beautiful as well in a mental way as in that which is corporeal.—Your words, said I, have need of some diviner to interpret them: I confess I do not apprehend their meaning.—I will express myself then, said she, in plainer language. All of human race, O Socrates, are full of the seeds of generation, both in their bodies and in their minds: and when they arrive at maturity of age, they naturally long to generate. But generate they cannot upon the ugly or uncomely, and only upon the fair and the agreeable. For the work of generation is carried on, you know, by means of the natural commerce between the two sexes: and this is a work above human art, it is divine. For to conceive and to impregnate is to immortalize the kind: it is producing immortality out of an animal which is mortal. In each of the sexes, therefore, is some immortal and divine principle, the cause of conception in the one, and of impregnation in

the other. But in neither of them can this principle operate effectually, unless the subject on which it operates be suitable to it and corresponding. Now deformity and ugliness but ill suit with aught which is divine. Beauty alone agrees with it and corresponds. For Beauty is that celestial influence which favours, and that goddess who patronizes, the work of generation. Hence, whenever that which teems with generative power approaches that which is beautiful, it smiles benignly; and through the delight it feels, opening and diffusing itself abroad, breeds or generates. But whenever it meets with that which is deformed or ugly, it grows morose, saddens, and contracts itself; it turns away, retires back, and generates not; but, restraining the swollen power within, which is ready to burst forth, it bears the burthen with uneasiness. Hence it is that they who are full of this, and long to generate, employ much of their creative power upon that which is beautiful: it is because the beautiful frees them from those generative throes with which they labour. But, Socrates, this is not, as you imagined, the love of beauty.—What is it then? said I.—It is the love, replied she, of generating and begetting issue, there where we find beauty.—Be it so, said I.—It certainly is so, she replied.—But, said I, what has Love to do with generating?—Because generating, answered she, perpetuates and in some manner immortalizes that which is mortal. Now, that the desire of immortality must always accompany the love of good, follows from what we before agreed in, that love was the desire of having good in perpetual possession. For the necessary consequence of that position is this, that Love desires immortality.

All these things learned I formerly in a conversation with Diotima, discoursing upon Love. At another time she thus questioned me: What do you imagine, Socrates, to be the cause of that love, and that desire which lately was the subject of conversation between you and me? Do you not observe, how vehement are the passions of all brute animals<sup>1</sup> when the season  
comes

<sup>1</sup> The following account of the generation of animals and their succession in a continued series of individuals, by which the kind is for ever kept up in existence, gives us a just representation of all outward nature: for it is in the same manner that the world itself, though continually passing away, and changing in every part, yet remains for ever the same in its whole and entire form; life continually arising, and repairing the ruins made by death in every kind of things; and

comes in which they couple? Birds as well as beasts, you may perceive them all sick with love: so intense is their desire, in the first place, to generate and breed. Nor is their ardour less afterwards in the rearing of their young. In defence of these, you see them ready to engage in fight, the weakest animals with the strongest. To support these, you see them willingly themselves perishing with famine; in short, doing and suffering for their sakes the utmost possible. Those indeed of human kind, continued she, one might imagine acted thus from a motive of reason in themselves: but, in brute animals, can you assign the cause why the affections of love should be so deep and strong?—I told her, I was at a loss to account for it.—And do you think, said she, ever to become a thorough adept in the science of love, if you are at a loss in a case so easy?—It is for this very reason, said I, Diotima, as I lately told you, that I come to you for instruction: it is because I am sensible how much I want it. Do you, therefore, teach me what the cause is of those vehement affections you mentioned just now, and of every other sentiment and passion incident to love.—Upon which she said, If you believe that love is, what you have often owned it to be, the desire of having good in perpetual possession, you will be at no loss to conceive what the cause is of those affections. For the case of brute animals and that of the human kind are in this respect exactly the same; in both the same principle prevails; the mortal nature seeks to be perpetuated, and, as far as possible, immortalized. Now this is possible in one only way, that is, by generation; in which some new living thing is constantly produced to supply the place of the deceased old one. And in no other manner than this is life continued to any individual being, of which we say that it lives still, and pronounce it to be the same being. Thus every man, for instance, from his infancy on to old age, is called the same person; though he never has any thing in him which abides with him, and is continually a new man; having lost the man he was in his hair, in his flesh, in his bones, in his blood, in fine in his whole body. Nor in his body only, but in his soul

and the fresh growth keeping pace with the decay. To preserve this living beauty in such its immortality and unfading youth, animals have those affections, impulses or instincts, here described, given to them, as imparted from the mundane soul: analogous to which are the powers of gravitation, attraction, mixture, cohesion, and others of like kind, which are indeed so many vital powers given to the insensible parts of the universe, as partaking of the life of nature.—S.

too, does he undergo incessant change. His ways, his manners, his opinions, his desires and pleasures; his fears and sorrows; none of these ever continue in any man the same; but new ones are generated and spring up in him, whilst the former fade and die away. But a paradox much greater than any yet mentioned is with regard to knowledge: not only some new portions of knowledge we acquire<sup>1</sup>, whilst we lose others, of which we had before been masters; and never continue long the same persons as to the sum of our present knowledge; but we suffer also the like change in every particular article of that knowledge. For what we call meditation supposes some knowledge to have actually, as it were, left us; and indeed oblivion is the departure of this knowledge: meditation then, raising up in the room of this departed knowledge a fresh remembrance in our minds, preserves in some manner and continues to us that which we had lost; so as to make the memory of it, the likenesses, seem the very same thing. Indeed every thing mortal is preserved in this only way, not by the absolute sameness of it for ever, like things divine, but by leaving behind it, when it departs, dies, or vanishes, another in its room, a new being, bearing its resemblance. By this contrivance in nature, Socrates, does body, and every other thing naturally mortal, partake of immortality. Immortal after a different manner is that which naturally is immortal. Wonder not, therefore, that all beings are by nature lovingly affected towards their offspring. For this affectionate regard, this love, follows every being for the sake of immortality.—These things, said I, O Diotima, wisest of women! undoubtedly are so.—To which she, in the language of the most accomplished sophists, replied, You may be assured, Socrates, it is the truth. Nor is it less plain, from instances of a different kind, that immortality is the great aim and end of all. For, if you observe how the love of fame and glory operates on men, and what effect it has upon their conduct, you must wonder at their folly in labouring so much and suffering so greatly in the pursuit of it, unless you consider the mighty power of that passion which possesses them, a zeal to become illustrious in after-ages, and to acquire a fame that may last for ever and be immortal. For this, more than for the sake of their families or friends, are

<sup>1</sup> All this necessarily follows from the nature of the human soul; all her *energies* being *temporal*, though her *essence* is eternal. She is however able to energize super-temporally through a union with an intellect superior to her own.—T.

they

they ready to encounter dangers, to expend their treasures, to undergo the severest hardships, and to meet death itself. Do you think, continued she, that Alcestis would have died for her husband Admetus to preserve his life? or that Achilles would have died for his friend Patroclus to avenge his death? or that your Athenian Codrus would have died for his children's sake to secure to them the succession of his kingdom? had they not imagined their virtue would live for ever in the remembrance of posterity, as it actually does throughout all Greece at this very day. Assure yourself their conduct had been quite different, had they not been full of this imagination. For, with a view to the immortality of virtue, and the never-dying glory which attends it, have all great actions ever been performed; a view which inspires and animates the performers, in proportion to the degree of their own personal worth and excellence. For they are governed by that universal passion, the desire of immortality. But though immortality be thus sought by all men, yet men of different dispositions seek it by different ways. In men of certain constitutions, the generative power lies chiefly and eminently in their bodies. Such persons are particularly fond of the other sex, and court intimacies chiefly with the fair: they are easily enamoured in the vulgar way of love; and procure to themselves, by begetting children, the preservation of their names, a remembrance of themselves which they hope will be immortal, a happiness to endure for ever. In men of another stamp, the faculties of generation are, in as eminent a degree, of the mental kind. For those there are who are more prolific in their souls than in their bodies; and are full of the seeds of such an offspring as it peculiarly belongs to the human soul to conceive and to generate. And what offspring is this, but wisdom and every other virtue? Those who generate most, and who are parents of the most numerous progeny in this way, are the poets, and such artists of other kinds as are said to have been the inventors of their respective arts. But by far the most excellent and beautiful part of wisdom is that which is conversant in the founding and well-ordering of cities and other habitations of men; a part of wisdom distinguished by the names of temperance and justice. When the soul of any man has been teeming with the seeds of this wisdom from his youth (and of divine souls it is the native property thus to teem), as soon as he arrives at maturity of age, and those seeds are fully ripened, he longs to  
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flow them in the souls of others, and thus to propagate wisdom. In this situation of his mind, his whole employment, I suppose, is to look about and search for beauty, where he may generate; for never can he generate on aught which is ugly or uncomely. Meeting first then with outward beauty, that of the body, he welcomes and embraces it; but turns away from where he sees deformity in the body; for his soul is full of love. But if, in his further and deeper search, he has the good fortune to meet with the inward and hidden beauty of a well-natured and generous soul, he then entirely attaches himself, and adheres closely to the whole person in whom it is found, the compound of soul and body. He now finds in himself a facility and a copiousness of expression when he entertains this partner of his soul with discourses concerning virtue; by what means it is acquired; what is a character completely good; what studies should be pursued; what arts be learnt; and how time should be employed in order to the forming such a character. Desirous, therefore, thus to form and perfect the object of his love, he undertakes the office of preceptor. Indeed, whilst he is conversing intimately with that which is fair, those seeds of wisdom, which he was before big with, burst forth spontaneous, and he generates. From this time, whether in the presence or absence of his mistress, his mind and memory become prompt and active; and he readily produces all his mental store. Both the parents then join in cherishing, rearing up, and cultivating the fruits of their love and amorous converse. Hence it is that a friendship of the firmest kind cements such a pair; and they are held together by a much stricter band of union than by an offspring of their bodies; having a common and joint interest in an offspring from themselves more beautiful and more immortal. Who would not choose to be the father of such children, rather than of mortals sprung from his body? Who that considers Homer, Hesiod, and other excellent poets, with the admiration they deserve, would not wish for such an issue as they left behind them, an issue of this mental kind, such as perpetuates their memory with the highest honour, and procures for them an immortality of fame? Or such a posterity, said she, as that whose foundation Lycurgus laid at Lacedæmon, a race of which himself was the first father, the preservers of their country and of all Greece? Amongst yourselves, what honours are paid to the memory of Solon, who begat the Laws! And abroad as well as at home how illustrious  
are

are the names of many others, Barbarians as well as Grecians, who have exhibited to the world many noble actions, and have thus begotten all kinds of virtue! To men like these have temples often been erected, on account of such their progeny: but never was any man thus honoured on account of his mortal merely human offspring. In the mysteries of Love thus far perhaps, Socrates, you may be initiated and advanced.<sup>1</sup> But to be perfected, and to attain the intuition of what is secret and inmost<sup>2</sup>, introductory to which is all the rest, if undertaken and performed with a mind rightly disposed, I doubt whether you may be able. However, said she, not to be wanting in a readiness to give you thorough information, I will do my best to conduct you till we have reached the end. Do but you your best to follow me. Whoever then enters upon this great affair in a proper manner, and begins according to a right method, must have been from his earliest youth conversant with bodies that are beautiful. Prepared by this acquaintance with beauty, he must, in the first place, if his leader<sup>3</sup> lead aright, fall in love with some one particular person, fair and beautiful; and on her beget fine sentiments and fair discourse. He must afterwards consider, that the beauty of outward form, that which he admires so highly in his favourite fair one, is sister to a beauty of the same kind, which he cannot but see in some other fair. If he can then pursue this corporeal beauty, and trace it wherever it is to be found, throughout the human species, he must want

<sup>1</sup> We have here a pause, or break, more solemn and awful than any to be met with elsewhere in Plato. But it has great propriety in this place, as it becomes the sublime and mysterious character of Diotima; and as it is necessary, besides, for ushering in with the greater solemnity those very sublime and mysterious speculations which follow it.—S.

<sup>2</sup> Great decorum of character is here observed in putting into the mouth of the prophetess a metaphor, taken from the method of initiation into those religious mysteries which at that time were held in the highest reverence. For, to make this initiation perfect, three orderly steps or degrees were to be taken. The first was called purgation, the second illumination, and the third intuition; to which last but few persons were ever deemed worthy to be raised.—Agreeable to this gradation is the method observed by Diotima in her initiation of Socrates into the mysteries of wisdom. Her confutation of his pretended former notions, but, in reality, of the preceding speeches in this dialogue, answers to the purgative part of initiation into the religious mysteries. Her succeeding positive instructions in the true doctrine of Love answer to the illuminative part. And what remains of her discourse, as she herself here plainly gives us to understand, alludes to the last part of the religious initiation, the intuitive.—S.

<sup>3</sup> That is, his dæmon.—T.

understanding

understanding not to conceive, that beauty is one and the same thing in all beauteous bodies. With this conception in his mind, he must become a lover of all visible forms, which are partakers of this beauty; and in consequence of this general love, he must moderate the excess of that passion for one only female form, which had hitherto engrossed him wholly: for he cannot now entertain thoughts extravagantly high of the beauty of any particular fair one, a beauty not peculiar to her, but which she partakes of in common with all other corporeal forms that are beauteous. After this, if he thinks rightly, and knows to estimate the value of things justly, he will esteem that beauty which is inward, and lies deep in the soul, to be of greater value and worthy of more regard than that which is outward, and adorns only the body. As soon, therefore, as he meets with a person of a beauteous soul and generous nature, though flowering forth but a little in superficial beauty, with this little he is satisfied; he has all he wants; he truly loves, and assiduously employs all his thoughts and all his care on the object of his affection. Researching in his mind and memory, he draws forth, he generates such notions of things, such reasonings and discourses, as may best improve his beloved in virtue. Thus he arrives, of course, to view beauty in the arts<sup>1</sup>, the subjects of discipline and study; and comes to discover, that beauty is congenial in them all. He now, therefore, accounts all beauty corporeal to be of mean and inconsiderable value, as being but a small and inconsiderable part of beauty. From the arts he proceeds further to the sciences, and beholds beauty no less in these<sup>2</sup>. And by this time hav-

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<sup>1</sup> The word here used by Plato is *επιτηδεύμασι*, in which he means to include all the particulars of right discipline; every study, and every exercise enjoined or recommended by ancient policy to the youth of good families and fortunes; in a word, all the accomplishments formed by a liberal education. These may all be reduced to three kinds; habits of regular and polite behaviour, knowledge of the liberal arts, and practice of the liberal exercises of the body. But as all of them depend on principles of art, and are acquired by study and discipline, we have used these very words *art*, *study*, and *discipline*, in translating Plato's *επιτηδεύματα*, as the most expressive of his whole meaning.—S.

<sup>2</sup> The sciences here meant are those by the Platonists termed mathematical, as being the *μαθηματικά*, the learning, which they deemed a necessary preparation for the study of true philosophy. These were arithmetic, geometry, music in its theory, and astronomy. In these sciences every step which the mind takes is from beauty to beauty: for every theorem new to the mind in any of these

these

ing seen, and now considering within himself, that beauty is manifold and various, he is no longer, like one of our domestics who has conceived a particular affection for some child of the family, a mean and illiberal slave to the beauty of any one particular, whether person or art, study or practice; but betaking himself to the ample sea of beauty, and surveying it with the eye of intellect, he begets many beautiful and magnificent reasonings, and diacœtic conceptions in prolific philosophy, till thus being strengthened and increased, he perceives what that one<sup>1</sup> science is which is so singularly great, as to be the science of so singularly great a beauty.<sup>2</sup> But now try, continued she, to give me all the attention you are master of. Whoever then is advanced thus far in the mysteries of Love by a right and regular progress of contemplation, approaching now to perfect intuition, suddenly he will discover, bursting into view, a beauty astonishingly admirable; that very beauty, to the gaining a sight of which the aim of all his preceding studies and labours had been directed: a beauty, whose peculiar characters are these: In the first place, it never had a beginning, nor will ever have an end, but always is, and always flourishes in perfection, unsusceptible of growth or of decay. In the next place, it is not beautiful only when looked at one way, or seen in one light; at the same time that, viewed another way, or seen in some other light, it is far from being beautiful: it is not beautiful only at certain times, or with reference only to certain circumstances of things; being at other times, or when things are otherwise circumstanced, quite the contrary: nor is it beautiful only in some

these sciences opens to her view some proportion or symmetry, some harmony or order, undiscovered before. Each different science seems a different world of beauty, still enlarging on the mind's eye, as her views become more and more extensive in the science. For proportion in arithmetic differs from proportion in geometry; musical proportion differs from them both; and the science of the celestial orbs, of their several revolutions, their mutual aspects, and their distances from each other, and from their common centre, is conversant in each of those three different proportions, and comprehends them all.—S.

<sup>1</sup> This one science is comprehended in Plato's dialectic, concerning which see the Introduction to the Parmenides.—T.

<sup>2</sup> This, which is the last pause in the speech, intended to renew and invigorate the attention, is very requisite in this place; for it precedes a description as admirable and as full of wonder as the being which it describes: and accordingly the strongest attention is here expressly demanded.—S.

places, or as it appears to some persons; whilst in other places, and to other persons, its appearance is the reverse of beautiful. Nor can this beauty, which is indeed no other than the beautiful itself, ever be the object of imagination; as if it had some face or hands of its own, or any other parts belonging to body: nor is it some particular reason, nor some particular science. It resides not in any other being, not in any animal, for instance; nor in the earth, nor in the heavens, nor in any other part of the universe: but, simple and separate from other things, it subsists alone with itself, and possesses an essence eternally uniform. All other forms which are beautiful participate of this; but in such a manner they participate, that by their generation or destruction this suffers no diminution, receives no addition, nor undergoes any kind of alteration. When from those lower beauties, ascending by the right way of Love, a man begins to gain a sight of this supreme beauty, he must have almost attained somewhat of his end. Now to go, or to be led by another, along the right way of Love, is this: beginning from those beauties of lower rank, to proceed in a continual ascent, all the way proposing this highest beauty as the end; and using the rest but as so many steps in the ascent; to proceed from one to two, from two<sup>1</sup> to all beautiful bodies; from the beauty of bodies to that of souls<sup>2</sup>; from the beauty of souls to that of arts; from the beauty of arts to that of disciplines; until at length from the disciplines he arrives at that discipline which is the discipline of no other thing than of that supreme beauty; and thus finally attains to know what is the beautiful itself.—Here is to be found, dear Socrates, said the stranger-prophetess<sup>3</sup>, here if any where, the happy life, the

<sup>1</sup> Plato, in speaking of the ascent in corporeal beauty, very properly says, that after passing from *one* to *two*, we must proceed to *all* beautiful bodies: for it is necessary to ascend rapidly from the beauty of body to a higher beauty. Mr. Sydenham, therefore, by changing the word *two* (though used by Plato) for *many* in his translation, has, I conceive, entirely perverted the accurate sense of the present passage.—T.

<sup>2</sup> In the Greek original there seems here to be a considerable omission, which we have endeavoured to supply as follows: the supplemental words being those included between these marks []; *απο των καλων σωματος [επι τας καλας ψυχας, και απο των καλων ψυχων] επι τα καλα επιτηδευματα, κ. τ. λ.* Some such words are plainly necessary to make this recapitulation agreeable to the account at large given before.—S.

<sup>3</sup> In all editions of the Greek original we here read *Μαντιμη*. This seems to have been the ground

the ultimate object of desire to man: it is to live in beholding this consummate beauty; the sight of which if ever you attain, it will appear not to be in gold<sup>1</sup>, nor in magnificent attire, nor in beautiful youths or damsels: with such, however, at present, many of you are so entirely taken up, and with the sight of them so absolutely charmed, that you would rejoice to spend your whole lives, were it possible, in the presence of those enchanting objects, without any thoughts of eating or drinking, but feasting your eyes only with their beauty, and living always in the bare sight of it. If this be so, what effect, think you, would the sight of beauty itself have upon a man, were he to see it pure and genuine, not corrupted and stained all over with the mixture of flesh, and colours, and much more of like perishing and fading trash; but were able to view that divine essence, the beautiful itself, in its own simplicity of form? Think you, said she, that the life of such a man would be contemptible or mean; of the man who always directed his eye toward the right object, who looked always at real beauty, and was conversant with it continually? Perceive you not, said she, that in beholding the beautiful with that eye, with which alone it is possible to behold it, thus, and thus only, could a man ever attain to generate, not the images or semblances of virtue, as not having his intimate commerce with an image or a semblance; but virtue true, real, and substantial, from the converse and embraces of that which is real and true. Thus begetting true virtue, and bringing her up till she is grown mature, he would become a favourite of

ground on which Harry Stephens and Dr. Davis built their supposition, that the word *μαντική*, where it occurred in a prior passage, was a corrupt reading, and should be changed into *Μαντιτική*. But we are inclined to think, that the passage now before us ought to be accommodated to that, rather than to this; especially since the reading of *μαντική* in this place, as well as in that other, is favoured by the Latin translation of Ficinus; a translation which has always had the authority of a manuscript allowed it, as having been made from a manuscript copy, not consulted by any of the editors, with an exactness almost verbal, and accordingly with very little regard to style, and with no great attention to the sense.—S.

<sup>1</sup> I am sorry to say that nothing can be more absurd than the notes of Mr. Sydenham on this part of the dialogue. In consequence of being perfectly ignorant of the polytheism of the Greeks, he is continually offering violence to the meaning of Plato, in order to make that philosopher join with him in ridiculing the religion of Greece. Hence, according to Mr. Sydenham, Plato, when he here says that the beautiful itself is not in gold, nor in beautiful youths or damsels, intends by it to ridicule gilt statues, and the notion that such beautiful forms as those of Ganymede and Hebe were the ornaments of the court of heaven, and the delight of Jupiter himself!—T.

the Gods; and at length would be, if any man ever be, himself one of the immortals.—The doctrines which I have now delivered to you, Phædrus, and to the rest of my friends here, I was taught by Diotima, and am persuaded they are true. Full of this persuasion myself, I endeavour to persuade others, and to show them, that it is difficult for any man to find a better guide or assistant to him than Love, in his way to happiness. And on this account, I further contend, that every man ought to pay all due honours to that patron of human nature. For my own part, I make it my chief study to cultivate the art which Love teaches, and employ myself upon the subjects proper for the exercise of that art with a particular attention; encouraging others to follow my example, and at all times, as well as now, celebrating the power and virtue of Love as far as I am able.—This speech, Phædrus, you may accept, if you are so pleased, for a panegyric in praise of Love: or if you choose to call it by any other name, and to take it in any other sense, be that its right name, and that its proper acceptance.

#### THE SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES.

SOCRATES having thus spoken, the rest praised his oration; but Aristophanes endeavoured to say something, because Socrates in his speech had mentioned him. On a sudden, however, a loud knocking was heard at the door of the porch, together with the voices of the intoxicated, and the sound of the pipe. Upon this Agatho said to the servants, See who are there; and if there is any one among them fit for this company, call him in: if not, say that we are no longer drinking. Not long after this the voice of Alcibiades, who was very much intoxicated, was heard in the court, asking where Agatho was, and commanding to be led to him. The flute-player, therefore, and some other of his companions, brought him to Agatho, and stood with him at the doors, he being crowned with a garland of ivy and violets, having many fillets on his head, and exclaiming, All hail, my friends! Either receive as your associate in drinking a man very much intoxicated, or let us depart, crowning Agatho alone, for whose sake we came. For I could not, says he, be with you yesterday; but now I come with fillets on my head, that, from my own, I may crown the head of the wisest and the most beautiful person, if I may be allowed so to speak. Do you, therefore, laugh at

me as one intoxicated? However, though you may laugh, I well know that I speak the truth. But tell me immediately, whether I may come in to him or not; and whether you continue drinking or not? All the company, therefore, was in an uproar, and ordered him to enter and seat himself; which he accordingly did, and called for Agatho. Agatho, therefore, came, led by his companions; and Alcibiades at the same time taking off his fillets, that he might crown him, did not see Socrates, though he sat before him, but sat near Agatho, and between him and Socrates: for Socrates had made way for him that he might sit. Alcibiades, therefore, being seated, saluted and crowned Agatho: and then Agatho said, Boys, take off the shoes of Alcibiades, that he may recline as the third among us. Alcibiades said, By all means, but asked, Who is this third drinking companion of ours? and at the same time turning himself round saw Socrates; but seeing him, he started, and exclaimed, O Hercules! what is this? Are you again fitting here to ensnare me? as it is usual with you to appear suddenly where I least expected to find you. And now for what purpose are you here? And why do you sit in this place, and not with Aristophanes, or with some other who is ridiculous, and wishes to be so? But you have contrived to sit with the most beautiful of the guests. Then Socrates said to Agatho, See if you can assist me; for the love of this man is not to me a vile thing; since from the time in which I began to love him I am no longer at liberty either to behold or speak to any beautiful person. Or does not he, in consequence of emulating and envying me in amatory affairs, contrive wonderful devices, and also revile and scarcely keep his hands from me? See, therefore, that he does not do this now, but conciliate us; or, if he should attempt violence, assist me: for the mania of this man, and his amatory impulse, very much terrify me.—Alcibiades then said, There is no occasion for any conciliation between you and me. I shall, however, at some other time take vengeance on you for these things. But now, Agatho, says he, give me some of the fillets, that I may crown the wonderful head of this man, that he may not blame me that I have crowned you, but not him who vanquishes all men in discourse, not only lately as you have done, but at all times. And at the same time receiving the fillets, he crowned Socrates, and seated himself. Being seated, therefore, he said, Come, gentlemen, drink, for you appear to me to be sober. This, however, is not to be allowed; for it was agreed that we should drink. I therefore engage to be  
your

your leader in drinking, till you have drunk enough. But, Agatho, pass the cup, if there is any large one. Or, rather, there is no occasion for this; but Bring hither, boy, said he, that cooling vessel, which seems to hold more than eight cotylæ<sup>1</sup>. Having filled this vessel, he first drank himself, and afterwards ordered them to pour out of it for Socrates, and at the same time said, This stratagem of mine, gentlemen, is nothing to Socrates; for, let him drink as much as any one may command, he will not be in the least intoxicated<sup>2</sup>. Socrates, therefore, the boy having poured out of the large vessel, drank. But then Eryximachus said, How shall we do, Alcibiades? Shall we neither say any thing, nor sing any thing, over the cup; but act exactly like those that are thirsty? Upon this Alcibiades said, Hail, Eryximachus! best of men, sprung from the best and most prudent of fathers. And hail to you, said Eryximachus. But what shall we do? That which you order us; for it is necessary to be obedient to you. For a man who is a physician is equivalent to many others. Command, therefore, whatever you please. Hear then, said Eryximachus. Before you entered, it seemed to us to be proper that every one, beginning at the right hand, should deliver an oration in praise of Love, to the best of his ability. All the rest of us, therefore, have delivered our orations; and it is just, since you have not spoken, but have drunk, that you also should deliver one: and when you have spoken, you may order Socrates to do whatever you please, and he may also order him on his right hand, and in a similar manner with respect to the rest. Eryximachus then said, You speak well, Alcibiades; but it is not equitable that a man intoxicated should engage in a verbal competition with those that are sober. But, O blessed man, has Socrates persuaded you with respect to any

<sup>1</sup> That is,  $\frac{8}{12}$ ths of a peck.

<sup>2</sup> What Plato says near the end of his first book of Laws concerning drinking largely, may serve as a comment on what is here, and in other parts of this oration, related of Socrates: "If some one," says he, "confiding in his own nature, and being properly prepared by meditation, should not refuse to exercise himself with many drinking associates, and should evince, in the necessary consumption of the liquor, a power so transcendent and strong, as neither greatly to err through impudence, nor to be changed through virtue; but towards the end of the liquor should depart without being intoxicated, fearing any human potion the least of all things;—in this case, he would do something well." And to this Clinias, one of the persons of the dialogue, replies: "Certainly. For such a one, by thus acting, would conduct himself with temperance and modesty." Plato, doubtless, alluded to Socrates in writing this.

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thing which he just now said? Or do you know that every thing which he said is just the contrary? For if I, he being present, should praise any one, whether God or man, except himself, he would not keep his hands from me. Will you not predict better things? said Socrates. By Neptune, said Alcibiades, say nothing to these things; for I shall praise no other person when you are present. Do so then, said Eryximachus: if you will, praise Socrates. How do you say? said Alcibiades. Does it seem to you fit, O Eryximachus, that I should attack this man, and revenge myself before you? So then, said Socrates, what have you in your mind? Will you praise me for things ridiculous? or what will you do? I shall speak the truth. But see if you permit me. Indeed, said Socrates, I not only permit, but order you to speak the truth. I shall by all means do so, said Alcibiades. But observe, if I should assert any thing that is not true, stop me when you please, and say that in this I have spoken falsely; for I shall not willingly lie in any thing. And do not wonder if, in consequence of recollecting, I narrate different circumstances from different places; for it is not an easy thing for a man in my condition to enumerate readily, and in succession, thy wonderful nature. But, gentlemen, I will thus endeavour to praise Socrates through images. He indeed will, perhaps, suspect that I shall turn my discourse to things ridiculous; but the image will be for the sake of truth, and not for the sake of the ridiculous.

I say, then, that Socrates is most similar to those Silenuses that are seated in the workshops of statuaries, which the artists have fabricated with pipes or flutes in their hands; and which, when they are bisected, appear to contain within statues<sup>1</sup> of the Gods. And I again say, that he resembles the

<sup>1</sup> Corresponding with this is the following passage from the Scholia of Maximus on the works of the Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite: Επεινοι γαρ (i. e. Γραικοι) δια τινας ανδριαντας εποιουν, μητε χειρας, μητε ποδας εχοντας, ους ερμας εκαλουν. εποιουν δε αυτους διακειους θυρας εχοντας, καθαπερ τοιχοπηρυγισκους. εσωθεν ουν αυτων επιθεσαν αγαλματα, αν εσεβον θεων, εξωθεν δε απεκλειον τους ερμας; εφαινοντο ουν οι ερμαι ευτελεις, εσωθεν δε τουτων, θεων αυτων καλλωπισμους ειχον. Dionysii Opera, tom. ii. p. 209. i. c. "The Greeks made certain statues, having neither hands nor feet, which they called Hermæ. They fashioned these with avenues, like turrets on a wall. Within these, therefore, they placed the statues of the Gods whom they worshipped; but they closed the Hermæ externally. Hence these Hermæ appeared to be things of no value; but inwardly they contained the ornaments of the Gods themselves."

satyr Marsyas. That your outward form, therefore, is similar to these, O Socrates, even you yourself will not deny; but that you also resemble them in other things, hear in the next place. You are contumelious: or are you not? For, if you do not acknowledge it, I will bring witnesses. Are you not also a piper much more wonderful than Marsyas<sup>1</sup>? For he charmed men through instruments, by a power proceeding from the mouth; and he also accomplishes this even now, when any one uses that modulation. For I call the modulation of Olympus<sup>2</sup> that of Marsyas, because he instructed Olympus in it. That harmony, therefore, whether it is produced by a good piper, or by a bad female player on the pipe, alone detains the hearers, and manifests, because it is divine, those that stand in need<sup>3</sup> of the Gods and the mysteries; but you in this respect only differ from that harmony, that you effect this very same thing by mere words without instruments. We, therefore, when we hear some other person relating the discourse of another, though he that relates it should be a very good rhetorician, yet we pay, as I may say, no attention to it; but when any one hears you, or another person, relating your discourses, though he that repeats them should be a bad speaker, and whether it be a woman, or a man, or a lad, that is the auditor, we are astonished and possessed. I therefore, my friends, unless I should appear to be very much intoxicated, will tell you upon oath in what manner I have been affected by the discourses of this man, and how I am even now affected.

<sup>1</sup> A celebrated piper of Celæne in Phrygia. He was so skilful in playing on the flute, that he is generally considered as the inventor of it. It is fabled of him, that he challenged Apollo to a trial of his skill as a musician; and, being vanquished, the God flayed him alive.

<sup>2</sup> Olympus was both a poet and a musician: he was the disciple of Marsyas, and flourished before the Trojan war.

<sup>3</sup> Proclus, in his MS. Commentary on the First Alcibiades, where he makes a division of musical instruments, observes, that those of an exciting nature were most adapted to enthusiastic energy. Hence, says he, in the mysteries, and in the greatest of mystic sacrifices, the pipe is useful: for they employ its motive power in order to excite the dianoëtic part to divinity. *Ἐὰ δὲ κίνητικα πρὸς ἐνθουσιαστικὰ οἰκειοτάτα· διὸ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μυστηρίοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς τελεταῖς χρηστέος αὐλός· χρωνταὶ γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῆ κίνητικῃ πρὸς τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἐγερσιν ἐπὶ τὸ θεῖον.* Such, therefore, as were excited by the melody of the pipe in a very small degree, may be supposed to be implied by those that stand in need of the Gods and mysteries; as the other machinery of the mysteries, in conjunction with the pipe, would necessarily produce that excitation which the pipe alone was, in such as these, incapable of effecting.

For

For when I hear him, my heart leaps much more than that of those who celebrate the mysteries of the Corybantes; and my tears flow from his discourses. I also see many others affected in the same manner. But when I hear Pericles, and other good rhetoricians, I think, indeed, that they speak well, but I suffer nothing of this kind; nor is my soul agitated with tumult, nor is it indignant, as if it were in a fervile condition. But by this Marfyas I am often so affected, that it appears to me I ought not to live while I lead such a life as I do. You will not, Socrates, say that these things are not true. And even now I perceive that, if I were willing to listen to him, I could not bear it, but should be affected in the very same manner. For he would compel me to acknowledge, that, being yet deficient in many things, I neglect myself, but attend to the affairs of the Athenians<sup>1</sup>. By violence, therefore, restraining my ears, I depart from him, flying, as it were, from the Syrens, lest I should sit with him till I became old. From him alone likewise, of all men, I suffer that which no one would think to be in me, to be ashamed of something. But I am abashed before him alone. For I am conscious that I am unable to deny that what he exhorts me to do ought not to be done; but when I depart from him, I am vanquished by the honour which I receive from the multitude. I therefore avoid, and fly from him; and when I see him I am ashamed, in consequence of what I had consented to do. And often, indeed, it would be a pleasure to me no longer to see him among men: and yet again, if this should happen, I well know that I should be in a much greater degree afflicted; so that I am ignorant in what manner I should use this man. And from the modulations, indeed, of this satyr, both I and many others have suffered such-like things.

But hear from me how much he resembles such things as I shall assimilate him to, and what a wonderful power he possesses. For be well assured of this, that no one of you knows him; but I will manifest him, since I have begun to speak. You see then that he is disposed in a very amatory manner towards beautiful things; and that he is always conversant with and astonished about these. And again, he knows all things, and yet knows nothing<sup>2</sup>; so that this figure of him is very Silenical; for he is externally

invested

<sup>1</sup> See the First Alcibiades.

<sup>2</sup> Very few have penetrated the profound meaning of Socrates when he said that he knew nothing.

invested with it, like a carved Silenus. But when he is opened inwardly, would you think, O my fellow guests, how replete he is with temperance? Know also, that neither if any one is beautiful, does he pay any attention to his beauty, but despises it far beyond what you would suppose; nor does he esteem any one for being rich, or for possessing any other honour from the things which are considered as blessed by the multitude. But he thinks that all these possessions are of no worth, and that we are nothing. He also passes the whole of his life among men in irony and jest; but when he is serious and is opened, I know not whether any one of you has seen the images which are within. I however once saw them, and they appeared to me to be so divine, golden, all-beautiful and wonderful, that I was determined to act in every respect conformably to the advice of Socrates. Thinking too that he paid great attention to my beauty, I considered this as my gain, and as a circumstance wonderfully fortunate, as I conceived that by gratifying Socrates I should hear from him all that he knew. For I formed a great opinion of my beauty, and thought it admirable. Thus conceiving, as prior to this I had never been with him alone without an attendant, I then dismissed my attendant, and remained with him alone: for it is necessary to narrate every thing to you truly.

But now attend to me; and if I lie, do you, Socrates, confute me. I was with him, O my fellow guests, I alone with him alone, and expected that he would immediately speak to me in such a manner as lovers are accustomed to speak to the objects of their love in solitude; and I was delighted with the expectation. Nothing however of this kind took place; but he discoursed with me as usual till evening, and then departed. After this, I incited him to engage with me in gymnastic exercises, expecting that I should effect something by this mean. We engaged, therefore, in these exercises, and often wrestled together, no one being present. But what occasion is there to say more? I did not in the least accomplish my purpose. Not succeeding, therefore, in this in any respect, it appeared to me that I should attack the man more strenuously, since it was my determination to ensnare him. Hear now then what the thing was. I invited him to sup

thing. But he doubtless intended to signify by this the nothingness of human compared with divine knowledge. For to *know* that this is the true condition of human knowledge, it is necessary to know previously all the natures superior to man.

with.

with me, in reality forming the same stratagem as a lover would for the objects of his love. He did not readily accept my invitation: however, some time after he accepted it. But when he came, as soon as he had supped, he wished to depart; and then I being ashamed consented to his going away. Again however attacking him, after supper, I discoursed with him a considerable part of the night; and when he again wished to depart, observing that it was late, I compelled him to stay. He reposed, therefore, in a bed next to mine, and in which he had supped; and no other person besides us slept in the house. Thus far then, what I have said is well, and might have been said to any one; but you must not hear me narrate what follows without first admitting the proverb, that wine without childhood<sup>f</sup> and with childhood is true. Besides, to leave in obscurity the proud deed of Socrates appears to me unjust in one who undertakes to praise him. To which I may add, that I am affected in the same manner as he is who is bitten by a viper: for they say he is not willing to tell his feelings except to those that are in a similar condition, as they alone can know them, and will pardon every thing which he may dare to do and say through the pain. I, therefore, have been bit by that which gives more pain, and which indeed causes the most acute of all pains. For those who have the heart or soul, or whatever else it may be proper to call it, bit and wounded by philosophic discourses, find the pain to be much more acute than that produced by the bite of the viper, and are impelled by it to do and say any thing; when such discourses are received in a soul juvenile and not ignoble. Again, therefore, looking at Phædrus, Agatho, Eryximachus, Pausanias, Aristodemus, Aristophanes, and, in short, Socrates, and the rest of the company; Since all of you, said he, partake with me of the mania and Bacchic fury of philosophy, on this account let all hear me. For you will pardon what I then did, and what I now say. But let the servants, or any other profane<sup>2</sup> and rustic person that may be present, close their ears with mighty gates.

<sup>1</sup> Meaning that wine makes both children and others speak the truth.

<sup>2</sup> Plato when he wrote this had doubtless that Orphic verse in his mind,

Φθεζομαι οἷς θεμις ἐστί, θύρας δ' ἐπιθεσθε βεβηλοί.

i. e. "I speak to those to whom it is lawful; shut your gates, ye profane." And Proclus informs

gates. When, therefore, the lamp was extinguished, and the servants had left the room, it appeared to me requisite to employ no dissimulation towards him, but freely to tell him my sentiments. And I said, moving him, Socrates, are you asleep? Not yet, he replied. Do you know then, what I conceive? About what particularly? said he. You appear to me, I replied, to be the only lover worthy of me, though you are not forward in courting me. But, as I am thus affected, I think it would be very stupid, not to gratify you in this particular, and in any thing else of which you may be in want, whether it be my property, or my friends: for nothing is to me more honourable than to become the best of men. But I think that no one can give me more assistance in this than you. And I should much more fear the reprehensions of the wife, in not gratifying such a man, than I should fear the many and the unwise by gratifying him. Socrates, having heard me, said, very ironically, and very much after his usual manner, O beloved Alcibiades, you appear in reality to be no vile person, if what you say concerning me is true, and there is in me a certain power, through which you can be made better, and if also you perceive in me an immense beauty, and very much excelling the elegance of your form. If, therefore, perceiving this, you endeavour to have communion with me, and to change beauty for beauty, you strive to possess much more than I do; for instead of the opinion you endeavour to obtain the truth of beauty, and conceive that you shall in reality exchange brass for gold. But, O blessed youth, consider more maturely, nor let me be concealed from you, who am nothing. For then indeed the  
fight

us in his MS. Commentary on the First Alcibiades, that there was an inscription in the Eleusinian grove forbidding the uninitiated to enter into the adyta or secret recesses of the temple. *Τοις γὰρ εἰς τὸ τῶν Ἐλευσινίων τεμενος εἰσιουσιν, ἐδήλον τὸ προγράμμα μὴ χωρεῖν εἰς τὰ ἀδυτὰ, ἀμνητοὺς οὐσι καὶ ἀτελεστοῖς.*

Alcibiades, therefore, as he is about to relate a circumstance which, considered independently of the design with which it is mentioned, is indecent, very properly forbids the profane to be auditors of it. For in this he follows the mysteries, in which, as I have shown in my Dissertation on them, p. 123, the indecent was introduced. In the mysteries too, as exhibitions of this kind were designed to free the initiated from licentious passions by gratifying the sight, and at the same time vanquishing desire through the awful sanctity with which these rites were accompanied, so what is now related by Alcibiades is introduced by Plato, in order to liberate his countrymen from an unnatural vice. So that it benefits the reader at the same time that it exalts the character

fight of the dianoëtic power begins to perceive acutely, when that of the eye loses its acme. You, however, are as yet at a distance from these things. Having heard him, I replied, With respect to myself the particulars are such as I have told you, nor have I said any thing different from what I conceive ; but do you advise in such a manner as you may think best both for you and me. This, said he, you say well : for in future let us, consulting together, do that which appears to be best for us, both about these and other particulars. Having heard and replied to these things, and ceasing to speak, as if I had thought that he was wounded with a dart, I rose, and would not suffer him to speak any more ; and wrapping myself round with this old garment (for it was winter), I reclined in it, embracing in my arms this truly divine and wonderful man, and thus lay the whole night. And again, Socrates, neither will you say that I have asserted these things falsely. But though I acted in this manner, yet he was victorious, and despised, ridiculed, and even insulted my beauty. And as, O my fellow guests, you are judges of the haughtiness of Socrates, I call the Gods and Goddesses to witness, that I rose from Socrates no otherwise than if I had slept with my father, or my elder brother.

What then do you suppose were my thoughts after this, conceiving that I had been despised, but admiring the nature, the temperance and fortitude of this man ? conceiving that I had met with such a man for prudence and fortitude, as I should never have expected to find ? Hence I could not be in any respect angry with him, nor could I abandon his conversation, nor discover any means of alluring him. For I well knew that it is much more difficult to subdue him by money, than it was to vanquish Ajax by the

character of Socrates. Admirably, therefore, is it observed by Jamblichus, (De Myst. p. 22.) “ that as in comedies and tragedies, on beholding the passions of others we repress our own, render them moderate, and are purified from them ; in like manner in the mysteries, by seeing and hearing things indecent, we are liberated from the injury with which the performance of them is attended.” He adds, “ Things of this kind, therefore, are introduced for the sake of healing our soul, moderating the maladies which adhere to it through generation, and freeing it from its bonds ; and hence Heraclitus very properly called them *remedies*. Δια τουτο εν τη κωμωδια και τραγωδια αλλοτρια παθη θεωρουντες ισταμεν τα οικεια παθη, και μετριωτερα απεργαζομεθα, και αποκαθαιρομεν εν τε τοις ιεροις, θεαμασι τισι και ακουσμασι των αισχρων, απολυμεθα της επι των εργαων απ’ αυτων συμπιπτουσης βλαβης. Θεραπειαι ουν ενεκα της εν ημιν ψυχης, και μετριότητος των δια την γενεσιν προσφυομενων αυτη κακων, λυσεως τε απο των δεσμων, και απαλλαγης χαριν, τα τριαντα προσαγεται’ και δια τουτα εικοτως αυτα ακεα’ Ηρακλειτος προσειπεν.

sword; and that by which alone I thought he might be ensnared deceived me. Hence I wandered about dubious, and more enslaved by this man than any one by any other. All these things, therefore, were at that time effected by me. After this, he was my associate and my daily guest in the military expedition against Potidæa. And here, in the first place, he not only surpassed me, but all others, in labours. Hence, when we were compelled through a deficiency of provisions to fast, as is sometimes the case in armies, the rest were nothing to him with respect to endurance. Again, in feasts at the military table, he alone was the only person that appeared to enjoy them; and though he was unwilling to drink, yet when compelled he vanquished all the rest. And what is the most wonderful of all, no one ever saw Socrates intoxicated. However, it seems to me that a confutation of this will immediately follow <sup>1</sup>. But with respect to endurance in the severity of the winter (for the winter there is very severe), he performed wonders; and once, the cold being so dreadful that no one could venture out of his tent, or, if he did venture, he was very abundantly clothed, and had his feet bound and wrapt in wool and sheep-skins, Socrates then went out with just the same clothing as before this he was accustomed to wear. He likewise marched through the ice without shoes, more easily than others with shoes. But the soldiers beheld him as one who despised them. And thus much for these particulars.

Again, what this strenuous man did and endured in that army, it is worth while to hear. For thinking deeply about something one morning, he stood considering it; and though he was not able to discover what he was investigating, he did not desist, but stood exploring. It was now too mid-day, and the soldiers perceived him, and wondering, said one to the other, that Socrates had stood from the morning cogitating <sup>2</sup>. At length some of the  
Ionian

<sup>1</sup> Alcibiades says this as being intoxicated himself.

<sup>2</sup> Socrates is not the only instance of this dominion of the rational soul over the body, but a similar abstraction is related of other philosophers. It is said of Xenocrates, the disciple of Plato, that he was for one hour every day abstracted from body. Archimedes was so intent on geometrical figures that he was insensible to the capture of his country, and to the enemy standing before him. Plotinus, as his disciple Porphyry informs us, was often so abstracted from body, as to be united by an ineffable energy with the highest God; and this also once happened to Porphyry. Heraclitus and Democritus, in order to obtain this abstraction in perfection, withdrew into solitude.

Ionian foldiers when it was evening, having fupped (for it was then fummer), laid themfelves down on the bare ground, that they might obferve whether he continued in the fame pofture through the night. But he flood till it was morning and the fun rofe; after which he departed, having firft adored the fun. If you are alfo willing, hear how he conducted himfelf in battle; for it is but juft to relate this. For in that engagement in which the commanders of the army conferred on me thofe rewards which are ufually given to fuch as have conducted themfelves beft in battle, no other man faved me than Socrates; for, as I was wounded, he was not willing to leave me, but preferved both my arms and me. And I indeed, O Socrates, at that time urged the commanders to give you the rewards which are beftowed on the moft valiant; and for faying this, you neither blame me, nor accufe me of fpeaking falfe. The commanders, however, looking to my dignity, wifhed to give me thofe rewards, you alfo being more defirous that I fhould receive them than yourfelf.

Further ftill, O fellow guefts, it was well worth while to behold Socrates when our army fled from Delium; for I happened to be in that battle among the cavalry, but Socrates was among the foot. The ranks, therefore, being broken, he and Laches retreated; and I meeting with and feeing the troops, immediately exhorted them to take courage, and faid that I would not abandon them. Here then I could fee Socrates better than at Potidæa; for I was in lefs fear, becaufe I was on horfeback. In the firft place, therefore, he greatly furpaffed Laches in prudent caution; and, in the next place, he appeared to me, O Ariftophanes, to carry himfelf loftily, as you alfo fay he does here, and darting his eye around calmly to furvey both friends and enemies; fo that it was manifefit to every one, and even to him that was at a confiderable diftance, that he who touched this man.

tude. Hence the former of thefe through intenfè ftudy was of a forrowful afpect; and the latter, when he began to recall his intellect from the fenfes, and was impeded by his eyes, blinded himfelf. In fhort, all thofe who have made great difcoveries in the regions of fcience have accomplifhed this by retiring from body into the fublime tower of intellect. Hence Plato fays in the Phædrus, that the intellects of philofophers efpecially recover the wings of the foul, becaufe they are always attentive to divine concerns; and on this account he at one time calls fuch philofophers divine, and at another fons of the Gods. Hence too Ariftotle fays, in his Problems; that all who have excelled in any art have been melancholy, whether they were born fuch, or whether they became fuch by continued meditation.

would

would be very strenuously resisted. Hence both he and his companion retreated with security; for scarcely was any one attacked who thus conducted himself in the battle, but they pursued those that fled rapidly and in disorder.

There are many other things, indeed, in which Socrates is admirable, and for which he might be praised. And in other pursuits, others perhaps may merit the same praise; but to resemble no man, neither of the ancients nor the moderns, this is a circumstance worthy of all wonder. For such as Achilles was, such also it may be conjectured was Brasidas<sup>1</sup> and others: and again, such as Pericles was, such also it may be said were Antenor and Nestor. And there are likewise others that after the same manner may be compared with others. But such a prodigy is this man, both as to himself and his discourses, that no one by searching will find any man that nearly resembles him, neither among those of the present age nor among the ancients. He can, therefore, only be said to resemble, both in himself and his discourses, those things to which I have compared him, viz. no one among men, but the Silenuses and Satyrs. For I omitted to mention this before, that his discourses are most similar to the Silenuses when opened. For the discourses of Socrates, to him who is willing to hear them, will at first appear to be perfectly ridiculous; since the nouns and verbs which he employs externally enfold a certain gift of a reviling Satyr. For he speaks of asses and their burthens, of copper-smiths, shoe-makers and tanners, and he always appears to say the same things through the same; so that every unskilful and ignorant man will ridicule his words. But he who beholds his discourses when opened, and penetrates into their depth, will, in the first place, find that they alone of all other discourses contain intellect within them; and, in the next place, that they are most divine, are replete with numerous images of virtue, and have a very ample extent, or rather extend themselves to every thing which it is fit he should consider who intends to become a truly worthy man. These then are the things, my fellow guests, for which I praise and also for which I blame Socrates. I have likewise inserted in them the injuries which he has done me. Nor has he alone acted in this manner towards me, but also towards Charmides the son of Glauco, Euthydemus the

<sup>1</sup> Brasidas was a famous Spartan general, who, after many great victories obtained over Athens and other Grecian states, died of a wound at Amphipolis, which Cleon the Athenian had besieged.  
son

son of Diocles, and very many others; for he has deceived these, as if he had been their lover, when at the same time he rather became the beloved object himself. Hence, I caution you, O Agatho, not to be deceived by this man, but, knowing what I have suffered, take care, and do not, as the proverb says of fools, become wise by experience.

Aristodemus related, that when Alcibiades had thus spoken, the freedom of his speech excited a general laugh, because he appeared to have for Socrates an amatory regard. Socrates, therefore, said, You seem to me, O Alcibiades, to be sober; for, otherwise, you would not have attempted in so elegant and circuitous a manner to conceal that for the sake of which you have said all these things, nor would you have asserted that which, as if foreign from the purpose, you have added at the end; as if the intention of all that you have said was not to separate me and Agatho. For you think that I ought to love you and no other, and that Agatho ought to be loved by you, and by no one besides. Neither is this Satyric and Silenic drama of yours concealed from, but is perfectly evident to, us. But, dear Agatho, may none of these his contrivances succeed! and let us endeavour that nothing may separate you and me. To this Agatho replied, Indeed, Socrates, you appear to speak the truth; and I infer that he sits between you and me, that he may separate us. He will, however, derive no advantage from this; for I will come and sit next to you. By all means, said Socrates, come hither, and sit below me. O Jupiter! Alcibiades exclaimed, how much do I suffer from this man! He thinks it is necessary to surpass me in every thing; but, O wonderful man, suffer Agatho, if no one else, to sit between us. It is impossible, said Socrates: for you have praised me, and it is necessary that I should now praise him sitting at my right hand. If, therefore, Agatho reclines under you, he certainly will not again praise me before he has been praised by me. But cease, O dæmoniacal man, and do not envy my praise of the lad; for I very much desire to pass an encomium on him. Excellent! excellent! said Agatho to Alcibiades: there is no reason why I should stay here, but there is every reason that I should change my seat, that I may be praised by Socrates. These things, said Alcibiades, are usual: when Socrates is present, it is impossible for any other to share the favours of the beautiful. And now observe how easily, and with what persuasive language, he draws this youth to him. After this Agatho rose, that he might sit by Socrates: but on a sud-

den many revellers came to the gates, and, finding them open, in consequence of some one having gone out, they entered and feated themselves. Hence, all things were full of tumult; and as there was no longer any order observed, every one was compelled to drink a great quantity of wine. Aristodemus therefore said, that Eryximachus and Phædrus, and some others, went home to take some sleep; but that he slept there very abundantly, the nights being long, and rose about daybreak, the cocks then crowing. When, therefore, he had risen, he saw that some of the guests were asleep, and that others had departed; but that Agatho, Aristophanes, and Socrates, were the only persons awake, and were drinking to the right hand out of a great bowl. He also added, that Socrates was discoursing with them; but that he did not recollect what the discourse was, because he was not present at the beginning of it, as he was then asleep. However, the sum of it, he said, was this, that Socrates compelled them to acknowledge that it was the province of the same person to compose comedy and tragedy; and that he who was by art a tragic, was also a comic poet. When they had assented to these things by compulsion, and not very readily, Aristodemus said, they fell asleep; and that Aristophanes fell asleep first, and afterwards, it being now day, Agatho; but that Socrates, they being asleep, rising, went out, he as usual following him. And lastly, that Socrates went to the Lyceum, and, having washed himself as at another time, conversed there the whole day, and in the evening went home to rest.

THE END OF THE BANQUET.

ADDITIONAL

ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

THE PARMENIDES

AND

PHÆDRUS.



## ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

## THE PARMENIDES.

FROM THE MS. COMMENTARY\* OF PROCLUS ON THAT DIALOGUE.

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**T**HE beginning of this admirable Commentary, which is dedicated to Asclepiodotus the physician, is as follows:—"I beseech all the Gods and Goddeffes to lead my intellect to the proposed theory, and, enkindling in me the splendid light of truth, to expand my dianoëtic power to the science of beings, to open the gates of my soul to the reception of the divine narration of Plato, and, conducting, as to a port, my knowledge to the most splendid of being, to liberate me from an abundance of false wisdom, and the wandering about non-beings, by a more intellectual converse with real beings, through which alone the eye of the soul is nourished and watered, as Socrates says in the Phædrus. And may the intelligible Gods impart to me a perfect intellect; the intellectual, an anagogic power; the supermundane rulers, an energy indissoluble and liberated from material knowledge; the governors of the world, a winged life;

\* Though I have already cited largely from this admirable Commentary, yet I rejoice in the opportunity which is afforded me of making the following additions from it. There is not, perhaps, among the writings of the antients any one which, on the whole, is so well calculated to lead the lover of wisdom gradually to a knowledge of the most sublime, arduous, and felicitous doctrines of the philosophy of Plato. Indefinably great are the benefits which I have derived from the study of it; and it is my earnest wish that the reader of these and the preceding extracts may be able to strengthen this testimony of its excellence by his own experience. For, if I may be allowed to prophesy, this Work, if not at present, will at some future period be the source of the greatest good to mankind, and will be admired and studied as it deserves, while the duration of writings of a different kind, though now so popular, will, when compared with the extent of this, be fleeting like that of morning dreams.

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the angelic choirs, a true unfolding into light of divine concerns; beneficent dæmons, a plenitude of inspiration from the Gods; and heroes, a magnanimity permanently venerable and elevated! And, in short, may all the divine genera perfectly prepare me for the participation of the most inspective and mystic theory which Plato unfolds to us in the Parmenides, with a profundity adapted to the things themselves! And mayest thou\*, who art truly agitated with divine fury, in conjunction with Plato, who wert my associate in the restoration of divine truth, my leader in this theory, and the true hierophant of these divine doctrines, fill me with thy most pure intellectual conceptions! FOR, WITH RESPECT TO THIS TYPE OF PHILOSOPHY, I SHOULD SAY, THAT IT CAME TO MEN FOR THE BENEFIT OF TERRESTRIAL SOULS; THAT IT MIGHT BE INSTEAD OF STATUES, INSTEAD OF TEMPLES, INSTEAD OF THE WHOLE OF SACRED INSTITUTIONS, AND THE LEADER OF SAFETY BOTH TO THE MEN THAT NOW ARE, AND TO THOSE THAT SHALL EXIST HEREAFTER †.—*Ευχομαι τοις Θεοις πασι και πασαις, ποδηγησαι μου τον νουν εις την προκειμενην θεωριαν, και φως εν εμοι στιλπνον της αληθειας αναφαντας αναπλωσαι την εμην διανοιαν επ' αυτην την των οντων επιστημην, ανοιξαιτε τας της ψυχης της εμης πυλας εις υποδοχην της ενθεου του Πλατωνος υφηγησεως, και ορμισαντας μου την γνωσιν εις το φανοτατον του οντος, παυσαιμε της πολλης δοξοσοφιας, και της περι τα μη οντα πλανης, τη περι τα οντα νοερωτατη διατριβη, παρ' ων μονον το της ψυχης ομμα τρεφεται τε και αρδεεται καθαπερ φησιν ο εν τω Φαιδρω Σωκρατης. ενδουναι τε μοι, νουν μεν τελειον, τοις νοητοις Θεοις δυναμιν δε αναγωγον, τοις νοεροις ενεργειαν δε αλυτον και αφειμενην των υλικων γνωσεων, τοις υπερ των οντων όλων ηγεμοναις ζων δε επτερωμενην, τοις τον κοσμον λαχονταις εκφανσιν δε των Θεων αληθην, τοις αγγελικοις χοροις αποπληρωσιν δε της παρα, Θεων επιπνοιας, τοις αγαθοις δαιμοναις μεγαλοφρονα δε και σεμνην και υψηλην κατα στασιν, τοις ηρωσι παντα δε απλως Θεια γενη, παρασκευην ενθηναι μοι τελειαν εις την μετουσιαν της εποπτικωτατης του Πλατωνος και μυστικωτατης θεωριας, ην εκφαινει μεν ημιν αυτος εν τω Παρμενιδη μετα της προσηκουσης τοις πραγμασι βαθυτητος. ανηπλωσε δε ταις εαυτου καθαρωταταις επιβολαις ο τω Πλατωνι μεν συ βακχευσας ως αληθως και ομοστιος καταστας (lege ομοστοιχος καταταστατης) της Θειας αληθειας, της δε θεωριας ημιν γενομενος ταυτης ηγεμων, και των Θεων*

\* Proclus here invokes his preceptor Syrianus; by which it appears that this Commentary was written after the death of that great philosopher.

† This concluding sentence forms the motto to this translation of Plato's works.

τουτων λογων ουτως εεροφαντης. ον εγω φαιην αν φιλοσοφιας τυπον εις ανθρωπους ελθειν επ' ευεργεσια των τηδε ψυχων, αντι των αγαλματων, αντι των ιερων, αντι της ολης αγιστειας αυτης, και σωτηριας αρχηγον τοις γε νυν ουσιν ανθρωποις και τοις εισαυθις γενησομενοις.

Page 37. *When we arrived at Athens from Clazomenia, &c.*

The Italic philosophers, says Proclus, being conversant with the speculation of the forms of beings, concerned themselves but little with the philosophy of objects of opinion; but those of Ionia paid little attention to the theory of intelligibles, but minutely considered nature, and the works of nature. Socrates and Plato, however, participating of both these philosophies, gave perfection to the subordinate, and unfolded the more elevated. This, indeed, Socrates manifests in the Phædo, when he says, that formerly he was a lover of physiology, but that afterwards he recurred to forms and the divine causes of beings. Hence, that which they demonstrate in their philosophy, by giving perfection both to the Ionic and Italic doctrines, this Plato appears to me to have indicated by the present circumstance; and what is wonderful in it, and sufficiently explanatory of the things which are here discussed, those from Ionia come to Athens, that they may partake of more perfect dogmas: but those from Athens do not for the same reason go to Italy, that they may partake of the Italic philosophy; but, on the contrary, being at Athens, they there communicate their proper dogmas. Thus, also, those who are able to look to beings themselves, will perceive that things first are every where present with unimpeded energy, as far as to the last of things, through such as are middles; that such as are last are perfected through middles; and that middles receive into themselves that which is imparted by first natures, but move and convert to themselves such as are last. Let, therefore, Ionia be a symbol of nature; but Italy of an intellectual essence; and Athens of that which has a middle subsistence, through which, to excited souls, there is an ascent from nature to intellect. This, therefore, Cephalus immediately says in the Introduction, that coming from Clazomenia to Athens for the sake of hearing the discourses of Parmenides, he met in the forum with Adimantus and Glaucō, and through these becoming acquainted with Antiphon, heard the discourses, which he related as he had learnt them from Pythodorus, who had heard them from Parmenides. Through this also it is indicated, that

that he who is to be led back to an intelligible essence ought, in the first place, to be excited from body, and to fly from a communion with it: for the body is the habitation of the soul. In the next place, that he should connect himself with the allotment of Minerva among wholes, through the participation of which allotment, it is no longer wonderful that the soul should become a spectator of first entities, and through these arrive at the inspection of the unities of beings. But if you are not only willing to speak in this manner, but still more universally, you may say, that the Gods who govern nature, and the all-various powers of material forms, and who also contain the whole of indivisible and sensible reasons, are suspended from the first cause, and, being illuminated by Minerva, are converted to the intellectual region, and hastily withdraw themselves from the mundane system; for this also is said to be the habitation of the Gods which it contains. By this conversion, also, they are led to the united multitude of beings, and there, through divine power, proceed to the monad of all multitude. For what is here said by Plato affords an image of these things to those that are not entirely unacquainted with such-like speculations. For every physical form is worse than multitude; but the multitude above this is, indeed, as it is said to be, multitude, but also participates of a coordinate unity. But prior to this is the exempt one, to which there is an ascent through the duad as a medium. The departure, therefore, from Clazomenia evinces an energy exempt from physical reasons; but the meeting with Adimantus and Glauco in the forum indicates the dominion of the duad in united multitude; and the association with Antiphon through these, the returning to their unity, by which they derive perfection, and a plenitude of divine goods. For in every order of Gods there is a monad, and the dominion of the duad, and the whole of distributed is conjoined with the monad, through united multitude, and the duad it contains, which is the mother, and, as it were, root of this multitude.

These things, as I have said, afford an image of the Gods themselves, and will present to those who are willing to follow the analogy, an abundance of conception. For you may observe that the Clazomenians are many, but that Adimantus and Glauco are two; and through these two the many communicate with Antiphon, who is one. And it is evident that every where the multiplied enjoys the monad through the duad; that things secondary are always suspended from the natures prior to them; and that

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all are extended to the one Parmenidean intellect. For the Clazomenians are in want of Adimantus and Glauco; these lead the Clazomenians to Antiphon; Antiphon fills them with the discourses of Pythodorus; and Pythodorus is the messenger of the conversation of Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates. These two again are united to Parmenides, and wish to adhere to his doctrine; Socrates, indeed, looking to the multitude of forms, but Zeno uniting this multitude, and hastening to *the one* itself. We may also contemplate their order as follows:—Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates, preserve an image of the whole of the divine order; but those that follow are assimilated to the secondary genera. And Pythodorus, indeed, may be ranked according to the summit of dæmons, announcing and transmitting to secondary such things as proceed from primary natures. For both these pertain to this summit; the one as to that which is filled, the other as to that which fills. But Antiphon may be ranked according to the dæmoniacal order itself. For this order uses appetite and impulses, and, in short, assumes a secondary life. Hence, he is represented as skilled in the equestrian art. He, therefore, is filled from those that are first, but fills those after him with an analogic conversation from more elevated natures. But the Clazomenians are analogous to souls conversant with generation, who require, indeed, the assistance of proximate dæmons, but all of them aspire after that which is on high, and the participation of divine discourse. Hence, leaving their habitation the body, they proceed from ignorance to intellectual prudence, for this is Athens, and, in the first place, are united to the dæmons above them, to whom the forum and the duad pertain, and an ascent through the duad to the monad. But, in the second place, they are extended through these to certain angels and Gods: for all association and converse between men and Gods, both when asleep and when awake, are through dæmons, as Diotima says in *The Banquet*. Again, therefore, according to another mode, we may transfer the analogy from things to persons: and it is necessary, prior to the mystic theory of things themselves, to exercise our dianoëtic power in these as in images. For the men also immediately meeting with Adimantus and Glauco, the brothers of Antiphon, on their coming to Athens, possess an image of another theological conception, that ascending souls derive much assistance from good fortune, which coarranges them with such things as are proper, and where, and in such a manner as is proper; and also that we

do not alone require the gifts of good fortune in externals, but in the anagogic energies of the soul. Hence Socrates says in the *Phædrus* that mania about the objects of love is given to the lover by the Gods with the greatest good fortune. And deducing souls from the intelligible, he says that different souls descend into bodies with different fortunes. Prior to bodies, therefore, they experience the gifts of fortune, and are governed by it, and led to that which is adapted to their nature. Very properly, therefore, are returning souls here said to be conjoined with the causes which give perfection to them through a certain fortune. And you may again see how here also the order of the persons is preserved: for they meet with Adimantus and Glauco. But that of these men Glauco was the more perfect, Socrates manifests in *The Republic*; for he there says, that he always admired the nature of Glauco. So that, if Adimantus was the inferior, he very properly says that they met with Adimantus and Glauco: for the imperfect is first connected with the more imperfect, and through these partakes of the more perfect.

The very first sentence also manifests the character of the dialogue; for it is void of the superfluous, is accurate and pure. And indeed concise, pure, and spontaneous language is adapted to intellectual projections. Nor does Plato alone preserve this propriety of diction, but Parmenides also in his poetry, though the poetic form of composition is accustomed to use metaphors, figures, and tropes; but at the same time he embraces the unadorned, the simple, and the pure form of enunciation. This is evident from such-like expressions, as “being approaches to being” (*εὖν γὰρ εὖντι πελαζέι*); and again, “since they now subsist together (*ἐπεὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ὁμοῦ*); likewise, “it is not fit that there should be any thing, either greater or smaller;” (*οὔτε τι μείζον, οὔτε τι βραϊότερον πέλεν χρεῶν ἐστὶ*;) and every thing else of this kind. So that it rather appears to be prose than poetical language. It is evident, therefore, in this Introduction of Plato, first, that he has chosen a rapid form of diction; for this is adapted to the things themselves. In the second place, he has attended to conciseness, together with the figure of the impetuous, which entirely binds together the diction, and rapidly gives completion to the conception. And, in the third place, he proceeds through the most necessary words, cutting off all such particulars from the narration, as some one for the sake of ornament might sophistically add.

P. 38. *And upon our begging him to relate the discourses, &c.*

The request of the Clazomenians represents the genuine adherence of souls to their proper leaders. For they can no otherwise obtain a union and revolve in conjunction with the Gods, than through these dæmons. But a knowledge of them, in the first place, precedes the request: for how can they make a request of those of whose nature they are ignorant, and also of the benefits of which they are the leaders? In the next place, a desire of the participation of them succeeds. For it is necessary to aspire after the things of which we are in want, since without aspiring we shall not be in the order of those that are indigent. But the unwillingness of Antiphon to comply, presents us with an image of the occult and ineffable power of divine causes. For a divine nature, wherever it may be, is with difficulty apprehended and known, and is scarcely unfolded to souls, even when they genuinely receive its participation, and a communion with it. For they require to be accustomed to the divine splendour which divine dæmons exhibit to souls extended to them, and hastening through them to perceive every thing divine. But to souls firmly and stably receiving them, these dæmons expand and unfold divine truth. And this is the narration: an expanding and unfolding of things concealed, and an anagogic perfection imparted to souls from divine dæmons.

P. 38. *Antiphon, therefore, said that Pythodorus related, &c.*

It appears to me, says Proclus, that the reduction of all the persons to Parmenides, indicates much of the truth of the things themselves. For all the multitude and all the orders of beings are united about their divine cause. And this is indicated to the more sagacious, by saying in succession, Antiphon, Pythodorus, Zeno, Parmenides. The mention also of the Panathenæa contributes to the whole design of the dialogue: for we learn from history, that in the celebration of this festival the Athenians dwelt together. Again, therefore, here also the multitude is united and coarranged about the Goddess who presides over the city. But this was the end of the dialogue, to suspend all things from *the one*, and clearly to show that every thing is thence derived. The assertion too, that these men did not come to Athens, but to the Panathenæa, is no small praise. They came, therefore, for the sake of the Goddess and the festival,

and not for ostentation, nor to philosophize in a popular way, which is rejected by the Pythagoreans. For a thing of this kind is the business of a sophist, and of men intent on gain.

P. 38. *That Parmenides was very much advanced in years, &c.*

An elderly man among the Greeks was limited by seventy years. Parmenides, therefore, was very elderly. But he was called an old man who passed beyond this decad. The countenance also of Parmenides was graceful through his life: for a certain elegance and venerableness descends from the soul in worthy men, and extends as far as to the body. These things, however, may be much more perfectly surveyed in the soul itself. Thus, for instance, the soul possesses the elderly, from being full of intellect and science. For it is usual to call intellectual disciplines, and those which embrace the whole of nature, hoary, as it is evident from the *Timæus*, in which those souls are called juvenile with whom there is no hoary discipline, viz. who do not according to their summit participate of intellectual light. For the black belongs to the worse, as the white to the better coordination. But the soul is καλη δε και αγαθη την εψην\*, as extending its eye to intelligible *beauty*, and to the *goodness* which gives subsistence to all things, and through the participation of which all things are *good*. We may still, however, more perfectly survey these things in the Gods, according to analogy. For where do the *elderly* and the *hoary* subsist in such a manner as in them? Which are likewise celebrated by theologians among the paternal Gods. Where, also, are *the beautiful* and *the good*, such as they possess? Plato also, in saying unitedly καλον αγαθον, speaks in a manner the most adapted to those natures in whom *the one* and *the good* are the same.

P. 38. *But that Zeno was nearly forty years old, &c.*

Such was Zeno, perhaps indeed *graceful* and *tall* in his person, but much more so in his discourses. For such things as Parmenides delivered in an intorted and contracted manner, these Zeno evolved, and extended into *long* discussions. And hence the scurrilous Timon calls him either-tongued, as being at the same time skilled in confutation and narration. If also he is said to have been beloved by Parmenides, the

\* i. e. Literally of a *beautiful* and *good* aspect.

ascend indeed to both was to one and the same divinity: for this is the peculiarity of the truly amatory art. But if you are willing to speak more perfectly, and to say that in the Gods themselves things secondary are contained in such as are first, and that all things, in short, are conjoined to being itself from which the progression and extension to beings are derived, you will not, I think, be very remote from the truth.

P. 38. *He likewise said that he met with them together with Pythodorus, &c.*

Let their meeting with Pythodorus be a symbol to those who look to paradigms, of the Gods becoming first unfolded into light through angels, and in the order of angels: for a house is a symbol of the order of each. But this meeting being beyond the walls, signifies the exempt and incomprehensible nature of the Gods. As, therefore, all appear collected in the house of Pythodorus, some from the city, and others elsewhere, so also the governors of the world and the intelligible Gods become apparent in angels, and are known by us through the essence of these.

P. 38. *Where also Socrates came, &c.*

Here we may perceive how Socrates, through a disposition naturally good in the extreme, earnestly follows these divine men, and how he does not associate with sophists and the wife for the same causes. For he associates with the former in order to confute their ignorance and pride, but with the latter in order to call forth their science and intellect. Here, therefore, he becomes the leader of the lovers of philosophy: for all of them desire to hear, but they obtain their desire together with and through him. But these things as well as the former are images of the Gods. Socrates was young, a young leader, Plato all but repeating what he says in the Phædrus, "the mighty leader Jupiter first proceeds, and the army of Gods and dæmons follows him." For intellect being every where allotted a convertive order, leads upwards, and together with itself converts all the multitude suspended from it. Socrates also being young is a symbol of the youthfulness which is celebrated in the Gods. For theology calls Jupiter himself and Bacchus *boys* and *young*; and, in short, theologians thus call the intellectual when compared with the intelligible and paternal. But the desire of the writings of Zeno symbolically manifests how

here those which are the third in order, first participate of the powers which are emitted in those of the middle rank, but afterwards are conjoined with their summits, and have communion with their intelligibles.

P. 38. *Zeno himself read to them, &c.*

Plato here affords us a wonderful indication of divine concerns; and he who is not asleep to analogies will see in these images a sublime theory. For, in the first place, Parmenides not being present at the beginning, but when the discourse was finished, is a symbol of more divine causes unfolding themselves to subordinate, after a perfect participation of proximate natures, but not before. The discourse of Zeno therefore, being completed, the great Parmenides appears; and together with him Pythodorus and Aristotle enter, of which two the former is Zenonic, but Aristotle is in a certain respect coarranged with Parmenides; for he disposes, together with him, the hypotheses, doing nothing else than answering. But here Parmenides, as we have often said, is analogous to that which is every where first among divine natures, whether it be the first being, or the intelligible, or in whatever other way you may think fit to denominate it: for this is in all the divine orders, and in each of the Gods. Hence he fills all that hear him with divine conceptions, imitating that order which adorns all things, first, middle, and last: for he gives perfection to Zeno, the middle being every where from that summit: but he perfects Socrates through both himself and Zeno; just as there the progression of third is through first and middle natures. He also perfects Pythodorus, but not simply from himself alone, but in conjunction with Zeno and Socrates. But he gives perfection to Aristotle last of all, and from himself alone. For something is imparted from Parmenides as far as to the last habit, to which the energy and power of Zeno do not proceed. Just as the production of the first being naturally extends further than that of life. But Zeno is himself filled from Parmenides, but fills in one way Pythodorus as his disciple, but in another way Socrates as one that explores together with him. Pythodorus, too, is not only able to participate of Zeno, but also of Socrates. For, in divine natures, the middle extends its energy to that which is posterior to itself, and proceeds through all things, imparting mere aptitude to the last of its participants, which  
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it again perfects in conjunction with the natures proximately suspended from it. So that the former participation indicates the imperfect representation of things first, which it imparts energizing prior to secondary natures. But the second participation indicates a perfection of representation subsisting through things proximate. And Socrates, who is the third, gives completion to the triad which pervades through all numbers, and subsists analogous to the intellect which is there, or in whatever other way you may be willing to denominate it. Hence he first participates of the doctrines of Zeno, and is conjoined through him with Parmenides; just as in the Gods, the intellect in each is proximately filled with a certain divine life, but through this is united with the intelligible itself, and its proper hyparxis. But Pythodorus, as being arranged according to the unfolding genus, is the disciple of Zeno, and participates of the prolific doubts of Socrates. For the Gods give subsistence to angels from middle and third powers, and not from such as are first; for these are generative of Gods. And Aristotle is analogously arranged to souls which through a divine afflatus are often conjoined with the most divine natures, but afterwards fall from this blessedness. For it is nothing wonderful, that a soul which is now enthusiastically disposed should again choose an atheistical and dark life. But he is filled from Parmenides alone; since in the Gods also, it is the property of such as are first to impart to souls of this kind a certain participation of divine light, through transcendency of power. Thus theologians denominate an intellectual life Saturnian; but not Jovian, though the ascent is through the mighty Jupiter. But as Jupiter, being filled from his father, and ascending to him as to his proper intelligible, elevates also that which is posterior to himself; in like manner souls, though they make their ascent together with Jupiter, yet that intellectual life fills the middle and third orders of them, and, in the last place, souls which energize enthusiastically about it. Nor should you wonder if divine natures have such an order with respect to each other, since you may also behold in philosophers themselves, how he who among these is more perfect is also more powerful, and benefits a greater number. Thus Cebes or Simmias benefits himself alone, or some other similar to himself; but Socrates benefits himself, and these, and Thrasymachus. In like manner Parmenides, being more powerful, benefits him who has the least aptitude of those that are assembled. But he manifests the obscurity of the participation by calling him the youngest of those that are present; which is a  
symbol

symbol of an imperfect habit ; and by adding that he afterwards became one of the thirty tyrants ; whence also we justly considered him as analogous to those souls that once lived enthusiastically, and in conjunction with angels, just as he makes his entrance together with Pythodorus, but who afterwards fall from this power. For Pythodorus remains in his proper habits, so that he also partakes of another conversation ; just as the angelic tribe always remains wholly beneficent, and fills secondary with the participation of divine natures. But Aristotle instead of a philosopher becomes a tyrant. For souls which possess a life of this kind according to habitude and not essentially, sometimes depart from this order, and descend into the realms of generation : for a tyranny is a symbol of the life in generation ; since such a life becomes situated under the throne of Necessity, in consequence of being led under passive, unstable and disordered appetite. For Aristotle having been one of the thirty tyrants that governed Athens, contains a representation of a gigantic and earth-born life, which rules over Minerval and Olympian goods. When reason and intellect take the lead in such souls, then Olympian benefits and those of Minerva have dominion, and the whole life is royal and philosophic ; but when multitude, or in short that which is worse and earth-born, holds the reins of empire, then the whole life is a tyranny. If, therefore, Plato says that Aristotle was one of the thirty tyrants, it will appear to be the same as if he had said, that he is analogous to souls who at one time energize enthusiastically, and at another rank among the earth-born race, and who, by submitting their life to those most bitter tyrants the passions, become themselves tyrants over themselves. And perhaps the philosopher manifests through these things, that it is not impossible for the same soul to evolve different lives, and at one time to philosophize, and at another to live tyrannically ; and again to pass from a tyrannic to a philosophic life.

P. 38. *If beings are many, it is requisite that the same things should be both similar and dissimilar, &c.*

Through these and the other arguments of Zeno it is shown that it is impossible for the many to have a subsistence when deprived of *the one*. Beginning from hence too, we shall find a concise way to the first principle of things. It is necessary, therefore, that there should either be many principles not participating of a certain one, or that there

here should be one principle only void of multitude, or many principles participating of *the one*, or one containing multitude in itself. But if there are many principles destitute of *the one*, all such absurdities will happen, as the arguments of Zeno adduce to those who assert that beings are many without *the one*. If there are many principles, but which participate of a certain one, i. e. which have a certain one consubstant with them, that participated one must proceed to its participants from another one which has a prior subsistence: for every one which is something belonging to other things proceeds from that which is simply one. But if there is one principle possessing in itself multitude, it will be a whole, and will consist from the many parts or elements which it contains. And this will not be the truly one, but a passive one, as we learn from the Sophists. In consequence of this, too, it will neither be simple nor sufficient, things which it is necessary the principle should possess. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be one principle of all things void of multitude. And thus much we may collect from all the arguments of Zeno.

We may also observe that Socrates again imitates his paradigm intellect, expanding himself and his intellects to Zeno, and calling forth his science. For in the paradigms of these men the subordinate suspend the whole of their energy from the middle natures, and, through an expansion of their proper powers, are supernally filled with more perfect goods.

P. 39. *Is it not then the sole intention of your discourses to evince by contesting, &c.*

Parmenides, establishing himself in *the one*, and surveying the monad of all beings, does not convert himself to multitude and its dissipated subsistence; but Zeno flies from multitude to *the one*, and takes away multitude. For the former of these two is similar to one purified, elevated, and having laid aside the multitude in himself; but the latter to one ascending, and laying aside multitude, and this because he is not entirely separated from it. Hence contention (*το διαμαχεσθαι*) is adapted to him; for he does not yet possess a tranquil life, separated from impediments; nor, as it opposes multitude, does it yet end in *the one* alone. But this contention, and this ending through many arguments in the same negative conclusion, manifest to Socrates that the many do not subsist separate from *the one*: for Plato assimilates the path

through negations to a battle. Thus in the Republic he exhorts to discourse about *the good*, as if piercing through a battle, thinking it fit to speak of it in no other way than through negative conclusions. And here it is necessary, indeed, not to consider the word *contending* carelessly; but through this we should make it known, that both in this place, and in the Republic, *contention* is intended by Plato to signify *negations*. As each of the arguments too of Zeno is self-perfect, and demonstrative of the conclusion, this is the peculiarity of scientific power.

P. 40. *Do you think that there is a certain form of similitude, &c.*

Parmenides leading upwards all beings to the exempt one being, or being itself, and withdrawing his conceptions from that which is multiplied and distributed; to the one monad of all the multitude of beings, the many on the contrary give the multitude of beings a precedency to intellect and union, and do not even consider being itself as the principle; but they assert that distributed multitude simply subsists, and receives a progression into being separate from being itself. That thus thinking, however, they defame the doctrine of Parmenides, is evident. For, Parmenides being of opinion that being should be considered as alone characterized by unity, separate from multitude, they on the contrary establish multitude deprived of unity; though indeed it is impossible that multitude should not participate of *the one*: for every multitude is of *the one*. All multitudes, therefore, and all the bulks of bodies, are vanquished by the participation of unity. Hence if multitude requires *the one*, but *the one* is unindigent of multitude, it is better to call being one, than the many alone subsisting by themselves separate from the participation of *the one*. And Parmenides indeed, evincing that being is one, gives subsistence also to the multitude of beings, not only to that of sensibles, but likewise to the multitude of intelligibles: for in these there is a divine number of all things united to each other. Empedocles also afterwards perceiving this, as being himself a Pythagorean, calls the whole of an intelligible nature a sphere, as being united to itself, and asserts that it attracts to itself, through beauty, the beautifying and uniting God. For all things there, loving and desiring each other, are eternally united to each other. Their love also is intelligible, and their association and mixture are ineffable. But the many being exiles from union, and the monad of beings, and  
through

through their life, which is divisible and distributed, being drawn down to multitude, to multiform opinions, to indefinite phantasies, to passive senses and material appetites, consider the many themselves separate from their union, and do not see in what manner these many are vanquished, through the coordinated monads which they contain, how things indefinite are subject to definite measures, and how dissipated natures subsist in sympathy and in union through the participation of things common; and not perceiving this, they wander from the truth, and basely revile and deride the doctrine of Parmenides. Zeno, therefore, knowing that they were thus affected, becomes indeed a corrector of multitude, but a leader to intellect from folly, and a guardian of the doctrine of his preceptor. And at first he persuades to recur from these multitudes to the unities in the many, and to behold how this multitude, though tending to infinity, is at the same time vanquished by the monad of beings, and is held together by a certain unity which it contains. But he persuades, assuming an hypothesis pleasing to the vulgar, viz. the subsistence of multitude deprived of unity: for thus their assertion is easily confuted; since, if they had established the many together with *the one*, they would not as yet be confuted through his arguments. Parmenides also himself manifests in his hypothesis, that he is accustomed to show that the same thing is similar and dissimilar, no otherwise than by receiving *the many* separate from *the one*.

Zeno, therefore, as we have said, considers these many deprived of *the one*, which accedes to, and is contained in them. Nor yet does he consider intelligibles alone, nor sensibles alone, but, in short, all such things as are said to be many in the intelligible and sensible orders. For it is the province of a more perfect and principal science to extend the same method to all things of a similar form, and to survey in all things that which is analogous. Whether, therefore, there is intelligible, or sensible, or intellectual, or dianoëtic multitude, all this is assumed at present. Hence it is requisite to discover how multitudes are no where to be found deprived of *the one*. For, if they were deprived of *the one*, they would be at the same time similar and dissimilar; since things which do not participate of *one* and the same are dissimilar to each other; and again, according to this very thing, they communicate with each other, viz. by not participating of *the one*. But things which possess something common and the same are similar; so that the same things are both similar and dissimilar. If, therefore, the many are without a participation of *the one*, according to this one thing, the non-participation

ticipation of *the one*, they will be both similar and dissimilar; viz. considered as possessing this in common they will be similar, but considered as not possessing *the one* they will be dissimilar: for, because they are passive to this very thing, the non-participation of *the one*, they are similar; so that the same things are both similar and dissimilar. For, in short, the possession of nothing common is itself common to them: and hence the assertion subverts itself. Indeed, the things which are shown to be both similar and dissimilar are again shown to be neither similar nor dissimilar. For, if they do not participate of *the one*, they are, in short, not similar; since similars are similar by the participation of a certain one; for similitude is a certain oneness. And again, if they do not participate of *the one*, this is common to them; but things of which there is something common, these according to this very thing are not dissimilar. So that the many are neither similar nor dissimilar. It is impossible, therefore, that multitude can subsist deprived of *the one*, because so many absurdities happen to those who adopt such an hypothesis. For it is a dire thing that contradiction should concur; but more dire that this should be the case with contraries; and it is the most dire of all things that both contraries and contradictions should be consequent to the assertion. By showing, therefore, that the same thing is similar and dissimilar, we have collected contraries; but by showing that the same thing is similar and not similar, and neither of these, we have collected contradictions. For the similar is a contradiction to the not similar, and the dissimilar to the non-dissimilar.

Hence also we may be able to evince that it is impossible there should be many first principles. For, with respect to these many principles, whether do they participate of one thing, or not of one thing? For, if they participate, that which they participate will be prior to them, and there will no longer be many principles, but one principle. But if they do not participate, they will be similar to each other, in consequence of this non-participation being common to them, and dissimilar so far as they do not participate of a certain common one. But this is impossible, that the same things according to the same should be both similars and dissimilars. In like manner we may collect that these many principles are neither similars nor dissimilars. But if they were participants of a certain one, we could not collect that they are dissimilars according to the participation of this one, but only that they are similars: and thus we shall subvert the subsistence of many first principles.

Through this method, therefore, Zeno evinces that it is impossible to separate the  
many

many from *the one*, and rises from multitude to the monads of the many, that we may perceive what the nature is of the exempt unities of things. For the coordinated monads are images of those that are uncoordinated. But Socrates agitating the discourse about ideas; supposing things common to have a subsistence themselves by themselves, and surveying another multitude in them, thinks it proper that Zeno should also transfer this method to forms, and make it apparent in these, how the similar is dissimilar, and the dissimilar similar. And shortly after Proclus further observes as follows :

Socrates, before he enters on the doubts in which a formal essence is involved, asks Zeno whether he admits that forms have a subsistence, and whether or not he is among those who embrace this cause as well as himself; and, in short, what opinion he has concerning them. For the Pythagoreans were contemplators of forms; and Socrates himself manifests this in the Sophista, calling the wise men in Italy, the friends of forms. But he who especially venerates and clearly establishes forms is Socrates, from the investigation concerning definitions discovering the nature of the things defined; and passing from these as images to formal causes themselves. He, therefore, in the first place, asks if Zeno also himself admits that there are forms, and venerates this essence of all things, subsisting from and established in itself, and not requiring any other seat, which he characterizes by the words *itself by itself* (*αυτο καθ' αυτο*), conceiving that these words are properly adapted to this essence. For they indicate the unmingled, simple, and pure nature of forms. Thus, through the word *itself*, he signifies the simplicity of those things; but, through the words *by itself*, their purity unmingled with secondary natures. And indeed, through the words *by itself*, he separates forms from the things predicated of the many. For which among these is *by itself*? since it possesses its subsistence in a habitude to subjects, is collected from sensible perception, is the object of opinion, and is accommodated to the conceptions\* of the phantasy. But by the word *itself* he separates forms from that which is common in particulars, and which is definable: for this is contained in

\* A thing of this kind is in modern language *an abstract idea*. Such ideas as they are of an origin posterior, must also be subordinate to sensibles; and the soul, if she has no higher conceptions, must even be viler than matter itself; matter being the recipient of essential forms, and the soul of such as are generated from these.

something

something different from itself, and subsists together with matter; whence also it is filled with internal change, and is in a certain respect mortal, through communion with that which is material. By no means, therefore, must it be said, that forms which subsist by themselves, which are established on a sacred foundation, and are immaterial and eternal, are the same with material forms of posterior origin, and which are full of variety and habitude. For the former are unmingled, undefiled and simple, and are eternally established in the demiurgus of the universe; possessing the undefiled and the pure from inflexible deity, which proceeds together with the demiurgus, but the simple from the demiurgic intellectual essence, which is single and impartible, and, as the Chaldæan theologists would say, has a fontal subsistence. You may also say that the term *itself* separates form from those conceptions which are derived from sensibles (εὐνοήματα). For no one of these is *itself*; since they accord with the things of which they are the conceptions, belong to and subsist in others. But the words *by itself* separate form from that which subsists in particulars, and which is in something different from itself.

Neither, therefore, must we admit their opinion who say that idea is the same with that which is common in the many: for ideas subsist prior to the things which are common in sensibles, and the latter derive their subsistence from the former. Nor must we assent to those who consider ideas as the same with those conceptions which we derive from sensibles, and who, in consequence of this, inquire how there are not also ideas of individuals, and of things which are contrary to nature. For the conceptions of these things are entirely secondary to the particulars from which they are excited, and are in us, and not in the power that adorned the universe, and in whom we say ideas subsist. Nor yet must we admit the opinion of those who connect ideas with spermatric reasons. For the reasons or productive principles in seeds are imperfect; and those in nature, which generates seeds, are destitute of knowledge. But ideas subsist in energy always the same, and are essentially intellectual. If, therefore, we wish to define their idiom through things which are more known, we must receive from physical reasons, the producing that which they produce, by their very being; but from the reasons of art, the being gnostic of the things which they make, though they do not make by their very being. Hence we say that ideas are demiurgic, and at the same time intellectual causes of all things which are perfected according to nature,

nature, being immovable, prior to things moved, simple prior to composites, and separate prior to the things which are inseparable from matter. On this account, Parmenides does not cease discoursing concerning them, till at the end of his arguments he says that they are Gods; through this signifying all that we have previously observed.

With respect to the similar and the dissimilar, these subsist primarily in the demiurgus, or, to speak more clearly, they have in him a fontal subsistence; since they subsist more conspicuously in the assimilative Gods, and especially in the paternal Deities of that order, as is evident from the second hypothesis of this dialogue. But since the demiurgus possesses the one fountain of these, the form of similitude is also contained in him, presubstisting in the one monad of ideas. The demiurgus, therefore, is a monad comprehensive of many divine monads, which impart to each other their proper idioms: one, the idiom of purity; another, of an assimilative essence; and another of something else, according to which they are allotted their proper hyparxis. For it must not be thought that forms indeed presubstist, as the causes of things which are generated according to them, but that there is not a different idea by which generated natures become similar and dissimilar to forms. Both similitude, however, and dissimilitude, are immaterial, pure, simple, uniform, and eternal essences; the former being collective, unific, the cause of bound, and uniform; and the latter, the source of division, internal change, and infinity. But the order of these ideas is neither in the most generic nor in the most specific of forms. For the most generic are such forms as are participated by all beings, so that there is not any thing whatever which does not subsist from the participation of these, such as *essence*, *sameness*, *difference*; since these pervade to all beings. For what is there void of essence? what of difference? what of sameness? Do not all things possess a certain hyparxis? And are they not essentially separated from other things; and do they not also communicate with them? If this be the case, this triad is the common cause of all beings. But the most specific ideas are such as are naturally adapted to be participated by individual forms, such as man, horse, dog; and each of this kind. For these proximately generate the monads in individuals, such as man in particulars, and dog and horse in the many, and in a similar manner each of the rest. But the forms which subsist between these, have indeed a very extended subsistence, but do not energize in all beings.

Thus,

Thus, for instance, justice subsists in souls, but not in wood and stones. Among these middle forms, therefore, similitude and dissimilitude must be ranked: for though they are participated by most, yet not by all things; since, as Proclus well observes, where is there either similitude or dissimilitude among infinities?

P. 40. *For if any one should show that similars themselves become dissimilar, &c.*

Forms are not to be considered as entirely unmingled, and without communication with each other, but each is that which it is, preserving its idiom pure; and at the same time it participates of others without confusion, not as becoming something belonging to them, but as receiving the idiom of that which it participates, and to this imparting its own idiom. Thus, for instance, sameness participates of difference, not being difference, and difference participates of sameness, so far as they communicate with each other. Thus also similitude and dissimilitude participate of each other; but neither is similitude dissimilitude, nor dissimilitude similitude. Nor, so far as the one is similitude, is it dissimilar, nor, so far as the other is dissimilitude, similar. For the expression *so far as*, is twofold. In the first place, it is used when one thing is always accompanied with another; as if some one should say, So far as there is air, according to this there is also light; and so far as there is light, according to this there is also air. But admitting that there is illuminated air, yet neither is air light, nor light air, but air is in light, and light in air; because the parts of air and light are situated near each other, and there is no one of these according to which the other is not also beheld. But this expression is also used after another manner, when it is applied to any thing which always essentially introduces another thing; as when we say, Man is a recipient of science. For it is not true that light is in the air, or air in light, according to this signification, since air does not entirely cointroduce light, as we say man cointroduces a recipient of science; since the essence of air is different from that of light. Similitude, therefore, participates of dissimilitude according to the former of these modes; for there is nothing belonging to it which does not participate of dissimilitude; and yet the being of the former is different from that of the latter. For it does not participate in one part and not in another, since nothing impedes its pervading through dissimilitude; nor is its impartible nature of such a kind that it participates of it in one respect,

respect, and in another remains unmingled with it. For the whole proceeds through the whole, similitude through dissimilitude, and in like manner dissimilitude through similitude. Not, indeed, that each, in consequence of being that which it is, participates of the other; but while it participates it preserves its own essence pure. This, therefore, is the peculiarity of incorporeal forms: to pervade through each other without confusion; to be distinct from each other without separation; and to be more united than things which are corrupted together, through their impartible nature; and to be more distinct from each other than things which are here separated, through their unmingled purity.

Socrates, therefore, says Proclus, doubting whether forms subsist in conjunction with each other, calling on Zeno to assist him in the solution of this doubt, and apprehending that forms are not so mingled that the similar itself is the dissimilar, calls a dogma of this kind a *prodigy*, and rejects any such mixture. But again, suspecting that forms, through the union of intelligibles, participate in a certain respect of each other, he says he should *wonder* if any one were able to show that this is the case, employing for this purpose the language of one suspecting. And at length inferring that they may be both united and separated, he calls him who is able to demonstrate this *admirable*. And here you see the order of ascent: for Socrates in the first place denies; in the second place, he has a suspicion of the truth; and in the third place, he is firmly convinced of the truth through demonstration. And neither is his negation of the mixture of forms blamable; for, according to the mode which he alludes to, they are unmingled: nor is his suspicion false; for in one respect they are able to participate of each other, and in another they do not mutually communicate. And his last decision is most true; for they are both united with and separated from each other.

P. 41. *Does it also appear to you that there is a certain species or form of justice, &c.*

A divine and demiurgic intellect comprehends things multiplied unitedly, things partible impartibly, and things divided indivisibly. But it is soul which first divides things which presubstist in intellect according to supreme union; and this is not only true of our soul, but likewise of that which is divine. For, because it is not allotted intellections which are alone established in eternity, but desires to comprehend the

collected energy of intellect, aspiring after the perfection which it contains, and its simple form of intelligence,—hence, it runs round intellect, and by the transitions of its projective energies divides the impartible nature of forms, perceiving the beautiful itself, the just itself, and every other form separately, and understanding all things by surveying one at a time, and not all things at once. For, in short, as it ranks in the third order from *the one*, it very properly possesses an energy of this kind. For that is one alone, and is prior to intellection. But intellect understands all things as one; and soul understands all things by surveying one at a time. Division, therefore, first subsists in soul; and hence theologians say, that in the lacerations of Bacchus the intellect of the God was preserved undivided by the providence of Minerva. But soul is that which is first distributed into parts; and to this a section into seven parts first pertains. It is, therefore, no longer wonderful, that, divine forms presubsisting unitedly in the demiurgic intellect, our soul should apply herself to them divisibly, and should at one time survey the first and most common forms; at another, those which possess a middle form; and at another time, the most partial and as it were individual forms. For, since even a divine soul divides that which is impartible by its transitive adhesions and contacts, what ought we to say concerning a partial soul such as ours? Must it not, much prior to this, apprehend partly and divisibly things which subsist together and in each other? It is, therefore, by no means wonderful that inquiries and answers should at different times apprehend different forms; just as external discourse divides the one and simple conception of the soul, and temporally passes through the united conceptions of intellect.

The forms, however, which were before mentioned by Socrates are most generic and common, viz. unity, multitude, similitude, dissimilitude, permanency, motion; but those which are now presented to our view are partly secondary to these, and partly not; just as, with respect to human virtue, we say that it is partly subordinate to, and partly better than, the soul: for, so far as it is perfective of it is better than the soul, but, so far as it is something belonging to, and subsisting in, the soul, it is subordinate to it. In like manner the good\*, the beautiful, and the just, are partly more excellent than forms which produce essences, and are partly inferior to them. For, so

\* Viz. the good, considered as subsisting among ideas, and not as that good which is superessential, and the principle of all things.

far as they are most generic, these also communicate with them; but the latter are the primary causes of being to sensibles, and the former are the sources of their perfection; the just proceeding as far as to souls, and adorning and perfecting these, but the beautiful extending its illuminations even as far as to bodies. Hence Socrates in the Phædrus says, that beauty has the prerogative of being the most apparent and the most lovely of all things; but that the splendour of justice is not visible in the imitations of it which are here. Again, the good perfects all things according to the peculiar essence of each. For the beautiful perfects according to the symmetry of form with respect to matter; and symmetry then subsists when that which is naturally more excellent rules over that which is naturally inferior. According to this symmetry, therefore, the beautiful shines in bodies. But the good illuminates according to the perfect; and is present to every thing invested with form, when it possesses perfection from nature. In this triad, therefore, the first is the good, the second the beautiful, and the third the just.

But that there are forms or ideas of these, and of all such as these, as, for instance, of temperance, fortitude, prudence, we shall find, by considering that every virtue, and every perfection according to virtue, assimilates us to a divine nature, and that, by how much the more it is inherent in us, by so much the nearer do we approach to an intellectual life. If, therefore, the beautiful and the good, and every virtue, assimilate us to intellect, intellect will entirely possess the intellectual paradigms of these. For, with respect to the similar, when it is said to be similar to that which is more excellent, then, that which is more excellent possesses that primarily which the subordinate nature receiving becomes similar to it. The forms of the virtues, therefore, must necessarily subsist in intellect prior to soul. Each of these, however, must be considered in a twofold respect, viz. as a divine unity, and as an intellectual form. Thus, for instance, the just which subsists in forms is not the same with that which subsists in the Gods. For the former is one particular idea, is a part of another, and possesses intelligence proceeding as far as to souls; but the latter is a certain whole, and proceeds in its providential energies as far as to the last of things. It also originates from the first intellectual Gods; for there it is first apparent. But the former is an idea contained in the demiurgic intellect. Thus also, with respect to the beautiful, that which subsists as a form is different from that which is the unity of divine beauty. And

the energy of the latter; indeed, is directed to the Gods so far as they are Gods, and first originates from the first intelligible; but the former is in ideas, and is beheld about ideas. And lastly, with respect to the good, one is essential, and the other, as we have before observed, is supereffential.

P. 42. *I mean hair, clay, and mud, or any thing else which is vile and abject, &c.*

It is necessary, says Proclus, either that there should only be ideas of things which subsist according to nature, or also of things which are contrary to these; and if only of things according to nature, that there should alone be ideas of things perpetual, or also of each of the things which are not perpetual. And if there are alone ideas of things perpetual, they must either be of such as are essential, or also of such as are unessential. And if of the essential, they must either be alone confined to wholes, or also extend to parts; and if to wholes alone, either to such as are alone simple, or also to such as are composed from these. Such then being the division of ideas, we say, that of intellects proceeding from one intellectual essence it is not proper to establish paradigms: for that of which there is a paradigm must necessarily be an image. But to call an intellectual essence an image, is of all things the most absurd: for every image is the idol (*ειδωλον*) or resemblance of that of which it is the image; and the Elean guest in the Sophista expressly denominates an idol *not true being*. If, therefore, every intellectual essence belongs to true being, it will not be proper to denominate it either an image or an idol. For, indeed, every intellectual nature is impartible, and the progression of it is effected through sameness; whence also secondary intellects subsist in unproceeding union in such as are first, and are partially what the intellect which ranks as a whole is totally. But it is necessary in the image that dissimilitude should be mingled with similitude; through the latter of which the image is converted to its paradigm. In intellectual essences, therefore, there are not image and paradigm, but cause alone, and things proceeding from cause. Whence also theologians, placing many fountains in the demiurgic intellect, assert that there is one of the multitude of ideas. Hence, not every thing which proceeds from the demiurgus proceeds according to a formal cause; but such things as make a more extended progression, and such as possess a partible essence, these subsist from an ideal cause. But the other

fountains are generative of intellectual and divine hypostases. We must not, therefore, establish in intellect a paradigmatic cause of every intellectual essence, but a cause alone which is characterized by unity, and is divine.

In the next place, it is requisite to consider if there is a primary cause of souls in forms, and whether there is one or many. But that there is, indeed, a certain monad of them in the demiurgus, in which monad every number of souls is comprehended monadically, is evident from the nature of things, and from the doctrine of Plato. For, if soul is the first generated nature, and that which is primarily partible, it is necessary that the impartible form should precede things partible, and the eternal, things which are in any way generated. And if, as time is to eternity, so is soul to intellect, but time is the image of eternity, it is also necessary that soul should be the image of intellect. And if in being there is not only life, as Socrates says in the Philebus, but also soul, it is necessary to consider the soul which is there as the paradigm of the multitude of souls proceeding from intellect, and as comprehending, after the manner of unity, both their order and their number. But if there is not one form of rational souls alone, but there are also many forms after the one, since all of them are immortal, it is necessary that there should be a paradigm of each. Again, however, it is impossible that the proceeding multitude should be just as numerous as that which abides: for progression increases quantity, but diminishes power. We must therefore say, that there is a monad in the divine intellect, which is paradigmatic of all souls, from which the multitude of them flows, and which unitedly comprehends the measure that bounds their number. But with this monad a second number is connate, divided, and paradigmatic of divine souls, containing the proper paradigm of each, and one form, from which divine souls proceed first, and afterwards the multitude coordinate with each. Thus, from the paradigm of the soul of the sun, the divine soul of the sun first proceeds; in the next place, all such angelic souls as are of a solar characteristic; in the third place, such as are of a dæmoniacal rank about the sun; and, in the last place, such as are partial: on which account also there are coordinations of parts to wholes, and of attendants to their leaders; the one intellectual cause of them imparting union and connection to their progression. In like manner, also, the paradigm of the lunar soul first generates the divine soul about the moon, afterwards the angelic, then the dæmoniacal, and then that which is partial; and the  
intellectual

intellectual monad comprehends all the number of these. The like also takes place in other divine souls; for each has a separate idea: but the orders of angelic, dæmoniacal, or partial souls, which follow them, participate of the one idea. And as the one monad of the paradigms of souls which are there, gives subsistence to the one soul of the world, so the many monads produce the multitude of souls; and the former comprehends the whole multitude uniformly, but the latter, the measures of their proper series. The demiurgic intellect, therefore, primarily comprehends the forms of divine souls, which it first generates; but each of these forms is one and at the same time many; for it *causally* contains all the multitude of the souls subsisting under it. And thus every soul subsists according to a certain proper paradigm; but all do not after the same manner participate of the same form. Antient theologians also having the same conceptions on this subject say, that the total causes of souls, which generate the whole series of them, are different from the partial causes, through which they derive a separation according to species, and a division as it were into individual souls.

In the next place, with respect to irrational souls. it is evident that there is also an intelligible paradigm of these; if we consider irrational souls to be all secondary lives, and which are divisible about bodies. Whence then do these derive their perpetuity? It must necessarily indeed be from a certain immovable and intellectual cause: and it appears that this is accomplished as follows:

Again then, one monad and one idea must be arranged prior to these, whether it be fontal or sensitive nature, or in whatever other way you may be willing to call it. For it may be said that irrational souls derive their subsistence from the one demiurgic sense, through a gnostic idiom; but through orexis or appetite, from the highest or fontal nature, which subsists prior to the multitude of natures. From these causes, therefore, the multitude of perpetual but naturally irrational souls proceeds; this multitude subsisting partly in eternal vehicles, in which also it is established according to a certain number, and the formal measure which is there. For every perpetual multitude is bounded; and prior to every bounded multitude *that* subsists which bounds and numbers this multitude. These irrational also proceed from rational souls, or rather from the paradigms which they contain: for, through these, here also they are suspended from rational souls, because there the one measure of them, together with

the multitude of forms, at the same time generates this number of these. Divine souls indeed, and such as are pure, preserve also their irrational nature undefiled; but partial employ irrational souls, as they have a composite life, the more excellent part having dominion in some, and being frequently in a state of subjection in others. From these perpetual irrational souls, such as are mortal are allotted their generation; these also being preserved according to species, through their intellectual paradigm, but the individuals perishing, because they derive their subsistence from the junior \* Gods, as the irrational prior to these are generated from those supernal souls whose fabricating energy is complicated with the monad of the whole of their series. Souls that perish, therefore, have a certain analogy to the divine causes from which they derive their subsistence, and immortal souls to their formal causes.

In the third place, let us consider how we are to admit a paradigm of Nature. For we must not, as Plato says, establish forms of fire, water, and motion, but deprive nature, which is the source of these, of an intellectual cause. Theologians indeed place the fountain of it in the vivific Goddess Rhea; for they say that immense Nature is suspended from the shoulders of the goddess. But, according to Plato, we must say that the form of it subsists in the demiurgic intellect, which form is the origin of every natural vehicle. Timæus also says, that the demiurgus pointed out to souls the *nature* of the universe, and the laws of fate: for in him the one nature of all things, and the comprehension of those fatal decrees according to which he arranges and divides the universe, subsist. For, if it is the demiurgus who speaks, he converts souls to himself: but, if this be the case, he also shows to them the nature of the universe, and the laws of fate, subsisting in himself. Hence the one form of nature is there; but the souls also that use, produce the natures which are inspired from them; and these perpetual natures again generate partial and temporal natures. It may be concluded, therefore, that the paradigm of natures unitedly comprehends in the demiurgic intellect the number of such as have a perpetual subsistence; but that the separated causes of perpetual natures are contained in Vulcan, who according to theologians is the fabricator of the form of body alone. For from this divinity every physical order, and the number of natures, proximately subsist and are revived.

\* See the Timæus.

In the fourth place, with respect to bodies, must we not admit that the one and total cause of these is in the first demiurgus, which cause comprehends all the number of the bodies that rank as wholes? but, after this monad, that the separated causes of bodies which rank as parts subsist in the fabricating cause of a corporal nature? This, indeed, must necessarily be the case: for he who comprehends the one mundane form is the first father of the universe; and those things which are generated through necessity must consequently be parts; and these require the providence of that power which fabricates bodies. Besides, this also is evident, that, as we said of souls, it is here likewise requisite to assert that there are intellectual and formal causes of divine bodies; for the vehicles of dæmons and partial souls participate of these causes in a second and third gradation. Thus, for instance, the form of the solar body generates also the solar vehicles of dæmons and partial souls; and hence, as soul is to soul, so is vehicle to its proper sphere. And, in short, since there is a multitude of divine causes, the causes of bodies must be considered as subsisting differently in different divinities. Thus, in Vulcan, the fabricator of body, the separated causes of bodies, so far as bodies, subsist; but in the generative principles of souls they subsist psychically; and in Jupiter, the demiurgus of wholes, they subsist as animals, thence deriving their hypostasis both according to souls and bodies.

It now remains that we consider, with respect to matter, whether there is also a form of this. And here perhaps it is necessary, that as in souls, natures, and bodies, fabrication does not begin from the imperfect; so likewise in matter, prior to that which is formless, and which has an evanescent being, that which is in a certain respect form, and which is beheld in one boundary and permanency, will be the paradigm of matter. This likewise will possess a twofold generation. viz. from its paradigm, and from a divine cause alone: for every thing intellectual produces in conjunction with divinity; but divinity proceeds by itself, and as far as to things which do not possess their generation from intellectual form.

After having, therefore, considered the simple hypostases of beings, let us direct our attention to the things composed from these,—I mean animals and plants. For there will be intellectual paradigms of all these; because not the genus alone but likewise the species of each gives completion to the universe, and makes it more similar to its paradigm. For the intelligible world comprehends all such animals intelligibly

as the apparent world contains sensibly. Each therefore of these is assimilated to a certain intellectual form: but animal itself, or the extremity of the intelligible triad, comprehends unitedly and intelligibly the causes of souls, bodies, and animals. For, as it contracts in the tetrad of ideas all the number of them, so it preassumes according to union the distributed causes of things which are as it were simple, and also of such which are as it were composite in intellectuals. For, in short, the universal and the essential are thence derived. Or whence do things possess the never-failing, if there is no eternal cause? Whence that which is common, and which extends to a multitude of things? For whatever is derived from the circular motion of the heavens is partial, since the motion itself of the heavens is in a certain respect partial. But that universal should be generated from that which is partial, is among the number of things impossible. Every form, therefore, both of plants and animals, thence subsists according to a certain intellectual paradigm. For every thing generated, and every thing which has in any respect a subsistence, has its being from a cause. Whence then are these visible forms, and from what cause? Shall we say, from one that is mutable? But this is impossible. They must, therefore, derive their subsistence from an immovable cause, since they are perpetual. And we say that an intellectual is a cause of this kind: for it abides perfectly in eternity. Shall we admit, therefore, that there are not only forms of species, but also of particulars? as, for instance, of Socrates, and of every individual, not so far as he is a man, but so far as he is a particular individual. But if this be the case, must not the mortal be necessarily immortal? For, if every thing which is generated according to idea is generated according to an immovable cause, and every thing which subsists according to an immovable cause is immutable in essence, Socrates, and each individual of the human species, will be established according to a perpetual sameness of essence; which is impossible. It is likewise absurd that idea should at one time be the paradigm of something, and at another not. For eternal being possesses whatever it does possess eternally; and hence, that which is paradigmatic will either not possess form, or will always possess it; since it would be absurd to assert that there is any thing accidental among ideas. If therefore it is a paradigm, it is necessary that the image of it also should be perpetual: for every paradigm is the paradigm of an image. But if it is at one time essential, and at another not, it will also at one time be a paradigm, and at

another not. Besides, is it not necessary to be persuaded by Socrates, who says that we are led to admit the subsistence of ideas, that we may have the one prior to the many? For, if there are ideas of particulars, there will be one prior to one, or rather infinites prior to finites; since, sensible natures being finite, ideas will be infinite. Nothing, however, can be more absurd than this: for things nearer to *the one* are more bounded, according to number, than such as are more remote from it. And hence it appears that there can be no ideas of individuals. Since, however, every thing which is generated is generated from a certain cause, we must also admit that there are causes of individuals; the one general cause being the order of the universe, but the many causes, the motion of the heavens, partial natures, the characteristic peculiarities of the seasons, climates, and the inspective guardians of these. For, the cause being moved moves together with itself, in a certain respect, that which is generated from it. Hence, from the idioms of the presiding causes, different appropriate figures, colours, voices, and motions are imparted to different animals. For the generations are various in different places, and partial natures not only proceed from the whole of nature, but receive something from the idiom of seeds, and are fashioned by verging to bodies, and becoming as it were eminently corporeal, through departing from themselves. We see, therefore, that they do not subsist from a paradigmatic cause: for it is not the same thing to subsist from a cause, and to be generated according to a paradigm. For cause is multifariously predicated, one of which is the paradigmatic.

Again, with respect to parts, shall we say that there are also ideas of these, so that there is not only a paradigm of man, but also of finger and eye, and every thing of this kind! Indeed, because each of these is universal and essence, it subsists from a certain stable cause; but because they are parts, and not wholes, they are subordinate to an impartible and intellectual essence. For there is no absurdity in admitting that such things as are not only parts, but wholes, subsist according to that essence; but it is absurd to admit this of such things as are parts only. For the generation of wholes is from thence, since the uniform, prior to the multiplied, and the whole, prior to part, is thence derived. Will it not, therefore, be right to assert of all such things, that the causes of them are not intellectual, (for every intellect is impartible, and consequently wholes subsist in it prior to parts, and impartible prior to partible natures,) but that they are psychical and physical. For that which is primarily partible is in souls, and

after these in natures. Here, therefore, there is a reason and form of finger and tooth, and of each of these. And the wholeness of these, indeed, presubsists in intellect, but that which in the one also comprehends multitude is in souls. That which vitally distributes the one from the multitude is in natures; and that which makes a division accompanied with interval is in bodies. In short, it must not be denied that there are definite dæmoniacal causes of these, as invocations upon the finger, eye, and heart evince: but of the wholes which comprehend these parts there are divine causes.

In the next place let us consider accidents. Have these then also ideas, or is there also a twofold consideration about these? For some of them are perfective of, and give completion to, essences, such as similitude, beauty, health, and virtue; but others subsist indeed in essences, yet do not give completion to, nor perfect them, such as whiteness, blackness, and every thing of this kind. Things, therefore, which give completion to, and are perfective of, essences have paradigmatic causes precedentaneously; but things which are ingenerated in bodies are indeed produced according to reason, and the temperament of bodies is not sufficient to their generation, but form is derived inwardly from nature, yet they are not produced according to a certain definite intellectual cause. For the essential, the perfective, and the common, pertain to forms; but that which is deprived of all these subsists from some other cause, and not from the first forms. For nature, receiving the order of forms proceeding into corporal masses, divides wholes from parts, and essences from accidents, which prior to this were united and impartible; expanding these by her divisive powers. It is not indeed possible, that things perfectly divided should immediately subsist from things united, and things most partial from such as are most common; but a division must necessarily be produced from the condition of subjection in the natures which subsist between. We must therefore admit, that there is a cause of figure which is the prolific source of all figures, and one monad of numbers which is generative of all numbers; since even the monad which is with us evinces that it contains unitedly the even and the odd, and all the forms of numbers. What then ought we to think concerning the monad which is there? Must it not be, that it is uniformly the cause of all things, and that its infinite power generates also in us infinite number? Indeed, this must necessarily be the case, since the monad which is here proceeds as the image of that.

In the next place, with respect to things artificial, shall we say that there are ideas

also of these? Socrates, indeed, in the Republic, does not refuse to speak of the idea of a bed, and of a table; but there he calls the productive principle in the dianoëtic part of the artist, idea, and says that this productive principle is the progeny of divinity, because he was of opinion that the artificial itself is imparted to souls from divinity. For, if it should be said that the forms of these are in intellect, whether do these pervade to the sensible world immediately, or through nature as a medium? For, if immediately, it will be absurd, since a progression of this kind no where subsists in other forms, but such things as are nearer to intellect are the first participants of ideas. But if through nature as a medium, because the arts are said to imitate nature, much prior to art nature will possess the forms of things artificial. But all things which are generated from nature live, and undergo generation and increase, if they belong to things which are generated in matter: for nature is a certain life, and the cause of things vital. It is however impossible that a bed, or any thing else which is the production of art, should live and be increased. And hence things artificial will not have presubfisting ideas, nor intellectual paradigms of their subsistence. If, however, some one should be willing to call the sciences arts, we must make the following division:—Of arts, such as lead back the soul, and assimilate it to intellect, of these we must admit that there are ideas, to which they assimilate us: for figure, and the intelligence of figure, are similar, and also number, and the intelligence of number. We must admit, therefore, that there are ideas of arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy, not indeed so far as they are applied to practical purposes, but so far as they are intellectual, and inspective of divine forms. For these indeed conjoin us with intellect, when, like the Coryphæan philosopher in the Theætetus, we astronomize above the heavens, survey the intellectual harmony according to which the demiurgus generated souls and this universe, and contemplate that number which subsists in all forms occultly and separately, and the intellectual figure, which is generative of all figures, and according to which the father of the universe convolves the world, and gives to each of the elements its proper figure. Of these, therefore, we must establish ideas, and of such other sciences as elevate souls to intellect, and the assistance of which we require in running back to the intelligible. But, with respect to such sciences as pertain to the soul while sporting and employing herself about mortal concerns, and administering to human indigence, of these there are no intellectual forms, but the soul possesses a power in opinion,

nion, which is the fruitful source of theorems, and is naturally adapted to generate and judge of such-like particulars. There are, however, by no means separate forms of the arts, or of things artificial. But it is not wonderful that the causes of these should subsist in dæmons, who are said to be the inspective guardians of arts, and to impart them to men; or that they should also be symbolically in the Gods. Thus, for instance, a certain dæmon of the order of Vulcan is said to preside over the brazier's art, and to contain the form of this art; but the mighty Vulcan himself is said symbolically to fabricate the heavens from brass. In a similar manner, there is a certain Minerval dæmon who presides over the weaver's art, Minerva herself being celebrated as weaving in a different and demiurgic manner the order of intellectual forms.

In the next place, with respect to evil, must we say that there is such thing as evil itself, the idea of evils? or shall we say, that as the form of things endued with interval is impartible, and of things multiplied, monadic, so the paradigm of things evil is good? For the assertion is by no means sane, which admits that evil itself subsists among ideas, lest we should be compelled to say that divinity himself is the cause of those evils of which he contains the paradigms; though we, when we look to those paradigms, become better than we were before. But if some one should say that the form of evils is good, we ask, whether it is alone good in its essence, or also in its energy? For, if in its essence alone, it will be productive of evil by its energy, which it is not lawful to assert; but if in its energy also, it is evident that what is generated by it will be good. For the effect of beneficent power and energy is good, no less than the effect of fire is hot. Evil, therefore, so far as evil, is not generated according to a certain paradigm. But if, as Parmenides also says, every idea is a God, and no God, as we learn from the Republic, is the cause of evil, neither must we say, that ideas being Gods are the causes of evil. But paradigms are the causes of the things of which they are paradigms; and hence, no idea is the cause of evil.

From all that has been said, we may summarily collect that ideas are of universal essences, and of the perfections in these. For the good, the essential, and the perpetual, are most adapted to forms; the first of these pervading from the first cause, the second from the highest being, and the third from eternity, to the first order of forms. From these three elements, therefore, we may define what things are generated according to a certain paradigmatic intellectual cause, and what subsist from other principles,

and not from an intellectual paradigm. For hair, though it should be a leading part, will not be there; for it has been shown that other things are there, and not parts. But clay is an indefinite mixture of two elements not subsisting according to a physical reason; since we are also accustomed to connect together ten thousand other particulars for our use. We do not however refer any thing of this kind to form: for these works are either the offspring of art, or of a deliberative tendency to things in our power. And as to mud, since it is a certain evil of that with which it subsists, it cannot subsist from ideas, because, as we have shown, nothing evil is generated from thence. On this account these things, because they are exits and privations of ideas, do not from them derive their origin. For darkness is a privation of light; but the sun, being the cause of light, is not also the cause of its privation. In like manner, intellect, being the cause of knowledge, does not also give subsistence to ignorance, which is the privation of knowledge; and soul, being the supplier of life, does not also impart a privation of life. But if some one should say that intellect knowing good knows also evil, and on this account should place evil in intellect, to this we must reply, that there is no paradigm of evil in intellect, but that it possesses a knowledge of evil; and that this is the paradigm of all the knowledge of evil, which he who receives is benefited. For ignorance is evil, but not the knowledge of ignorance, this being one knowledge both of itself and of ignorance. For, if we thus speak, we shall neither introduce ideas of things evil, as some of the Platonists have, nor shall we say that intellect alone knows things of a more excellent nature, as others have asserted; but, ranking between both, we shall admit that it has a knowledge of evils, but we shall not introduce a paradigmatic cause of these, since it would be evil.

The following translation of extracts from the beginning of the MS. of Damascius *περι αρχων*, or CONCERNING PRINCIPLES, may be considered as an admirable comment on the concluding part of the first hypothesis of this dialogue, where it is inferred (p. 160.) that *the one* neither *is* one, nor *is*; and that it can neither be named, nor spoken of, nor conceived by opinion, nor be known, nor perceived by any being. The extracts are taken and translated from the MS. in the Bodleian library. The difficulty of translating these extracts, like the sublimity which they contain, can be known only to a few.

Whether

Whether shall we say that the one principle of all things is beyond all things? or that it is something belonging to all things, being as it were the summit of the things proceeding from it? And shall we say that all things subsist together with it, or that they are posterior to and originate from it? For if some one should assert this, how will the principle be something external to all things? For, those things are in short all, of which no one whatever is absent. But the principle is absent, as not ranking among all things. All things, therefore, are not simply posterior to the principle, but besides the principle. Further still, all things must be considered as many finite things: for things infinite will plainly not be all. Nothing, therefore, will be external to all things. For *allness* (*παντοτης*) is a certain boundary and comprehension, in which the principle is the boundary upwards, and that which is the ultimate procession from the principle, the boundary downwards. All things, therefore, subsist together with the boundaries. Again, the principle is coordinated with the things which proceed from the principle; for it is said to be and is the principle of them. The cause also is coordinated with the things caused, and that which is first with the things posterior to the first. But things of which there is one coordination, being many, are said to be all; so that the principle also is among all things. And, in short, we call such things as we conceive to subsist in any way whatever, all things; and we also conceive the principle to subsist. Hence we are accustomed to call all the city, the governor and the governed, and all the race, the begetter and the begotten. But if all things subsist together with the principle, will not the principle be something belonging to all things, the principle also being assumed in conjunction with all things? The one coordination, therefore, of all things, which we say is all, is without a principle, and without a cause, lest we should ascend to infinity. It is however necessary that every thing should either be the principle, or from the principle. All things, therefore, are either the principle, or from the principle. But if the latter be the case, the principle will not subsist together with all things, but will be external to all things, as the principle of the things proceeding from it. If the former be admitted, what will that be which will proceed from all things, as from the principle? All things, therefore, are neither the principle, nor from the principle\*. Further still, all things are in a certain respect beheld subsisting in multitude, and a certain separa-

\* For the principle so far as it is the principle ranks among all things.

ion. For we cannot conceive the all without these. How, therefore, do a certain separation and multitude directly appear? Or are not all things every where in separation and multitude? But is *the one* the summit of the many, and *the monad* the united subsistence of things which are separated from each other? And, still further, is *the one* more simple than *the monad*? In the first place, however, if this be said, every monad is number, though subsisting contractedly and in profound union; and thus the monad also is all things. And, in the next place, *the one* is not something belonging to *the many*; for thus it would give completion to *the many*, in the same manner as each of other things. But as numerous as are the many according to a certain division, so numerous also will *the one* be prior to division, according to the every way impartible. For it is not *the one* as that which is smallest, as Speusippus appears to say, but it is *the one* as all things. For by its own simplicity it accedes to all things, and makes all things to be one. Hence all things proceed from it, because it is itself all things prior to all. And as that which has an united subsistence is prior to things which are separated from each other, so *the one* is *many* prior to *the many*. But when we expand every conception belonging to our nature to all things, then we do not predicate all things after the same manner, but in a triple respect at least; viz. *unically*, *unitedly*, and in a *multiplied* manner. All things, therefore, are from *the one*, and with reference to *the one*, as we are accustomed to say. If then, according to a more usual manner of speaking, we call things which consist in multitude and separation all things, we must admit that *the united*, and in a still greater degree *the one*, are the principles of these. But if we consider these two as all things, and assume them in conjunction with all other things, according to habitude and coordination with them, as we have before said, we must then investigate another principle prior to all things, which it is no longer proper to consider as in any way all things, nor to co-arrange with its progeny. For if some one should say that *the one*, though it is all things which have in any respect a subsistence, yet is *one* prior to *all things*, and is more *one* than *all things*; since it is *one* by itself, but *all things* as the cause of all, and according to a coordination with all things;—if this should be said, *the one* will thus be doubled, and we ourselves shall become doubled, and multiplied about its simplicity. For by being *the one* it is all things after the most simple manner. At the same time also, though this should be said, it is necessary that the principle of all things should

should be exempt from all things, and consequently that it should be exempt from the most simple *allness*, and from a simplicity absorbing all things, such as is that of *the one*. Our soul, therefore, prophesies that the principle which is beyond all things that can in any respect be conceived, is uncoordinated with all things. Neither, therefore, must it be called principle, nor cause, nor that which is first, nor prior to all things, nor beyond all things. By no means, therefore, must we celebrate it as all things, nor, in short, is it to be celebrated, nor recalled into memory. For, whatever we conceive or consider is either something belonging to all things, or is all things, although analysing we should ascend to that which is most simple, which is the most comprehensive of all things, being as it were the ultimate circumference, not of beings, but of non-beings: for, of beings, that which has an united subsistence, and is perfectly without separation, is the extremity, since every being is mingled from elements which are either *bound* and *infinity*, or the progeny of these. But *the one* is simply the last boundary of *the many*. For we cannot conceive any thing more simple than that which is perfectly one; which if we denominate the principle, and cause, the first and the most simple, these and all other things are there only according to *the one*. But we not being able to contract our conceptions into profound union, are divided about it, and predicate of *the one* the distributed multitude which is in ourselves; unless we despise these appellations also, because *the many* cannot be adapted to *the one*. Hence it can neither be known nor named; for, if it could, it would in this respect be *many*. Or these things also will be contained in it, according to *the one*. For the nature of *the one* is all-receptive, or rather all-producing, and there is not any thing whatever which *the one* is not. Hence all things are as it were evolved from it. It is, therefore, properly cause, and the first, the end, and the last, the defensive enclosure of all things, and the one nature of all things; not that nature which is in things, and which proceeds from *the one*, but that which is prior to them, which is the most impartible summit of all things whatever, and the greatest comprehension of all things which in any respect are said to have a being.

But if *the one* is the cause of all things, and is comprehensive of all things, what ascent will there be for us beyond this also? For we do not strive in vain, extending ourselves to that which is nothing. For that which is not even *one*, is not according to the most just mode of speaking. Whence then do we conceive that there is

something beyond *the one*? for *the many* require nothing else than *the one*. And hence *the one* alone is the cause of *the many*. Hence also *the one* is entirely cause, because it is necessary that the cause of the many should alone be *the one*. For it cannot be nothing; since nothing is the cause of nothing. Nor can it be *the many*: for so far as *many* they are uncoordinated; and *the many* will not be one cause. But if there are many causes, they will not be causes of each other, through being uncoordinated, and through a progression in a circle, the same things being causes and the things caused. Each, therefore, will be the cause of itself, and thus there will be no cause of the many. Hence it is necessary that *the one* should be the cause of the many, and which is also the cause of their coordination: for there is a certain conspiring coordination, and a union with each other.

If, therefore, some one thus doubting should say that *the one* is a sufficient principle; and should add as the summit that we have not any conception or suspicion more simple than that of *the one*, and should therefore ask how we can suspect any thing beyond the last suspicion and conception we are able to frame;—if some one should thus speak, we must pardon the doubt. For a speculation of this kind is as it seems inaccessible and immense: at the same time, however, from things more known to us we must extend the ineffable parturitions of our soul, to the ineffable co-sensation of this sublime truth. For, as that which subsists without is in every respect more honourable than that which subsists with habitude, and the uncoordinated than the coordinated, as the theoretic than the political life, and Saturn for instance than Jupiter; being than forms, and *the one* than *the many*, of which *the one* is the principle; so, in short, that which transcends every thing of this kind is more honourable than all causes and principles, and is not to be considered as subsisting in any co-arrangement and habitude; since *the one* is naturally prior to *the many*, that which is most simple to things more composite, and that which is most comprehensive to the things which it comprehends. So that, if you are willing thus to speak, *the first* is beyond all such opposition, not only that which is in things coordinate, but even that which takes place from its subsistence as the first. *The one*, therefore, and the united are posterior to the first: for these causally contain multitude as numerous as that which is unfolded from them. *The one*, however, is no less one, if indeed it is not more so, because separate multitude is posterior to and not in it; and the united is no less united because it contracted in

one

one things separated prior to separation. Each of these, therefore, is all things, whether according to coordination, or according to their own nature. But all things cannot be things first, nor the principle. Nor yet one of them alone, because this one will be at the same time all things, according to *the one*; but we shall not yet have discovered that which is beyond all things. To which we may also add, that *the one* is the summit of *the many*, as the cause of the things proceeding from it. We may likewise say that we form a conception of *the one* according to a purified suspicion extended to that which is most simple and most comprehensive. But that which is most venerable must necessarily be incomprehensible by all conceptions and suspicions; since also, in other things, that which always soars beyond our conceptions is more honourable than that which is more obvious: so that what flies from all our suspicions will be most honourable. But, if this be the case, it is *nothing*. Let however nothing be twofold, one better than *the one*, the other posterior to sensibles. If also we strive in vain in asserting these things, striving in vain is likewise twofold; the one falling into the ineffable, the other into that which in no respect whatever has any subsistence. For *this* also is ineffable, as Plato says, but according to the worse, but *that* according to the better. If, too, we search for a certain advantage arising from it, this is the most necessary advantage of all others, that all things thence proceed as from an adytum, from the ineffable, and in an ineffable manner. For neither do they proceed as *the one* produces *the many*, nor as *the united* things *separated*, but as the ineffable similarly produces all things, ineffably. But if in asserting these things concerning it, that it is ineffable, that it is no one of all things, that it is incomprehensible, we subvert what we say, it is proper to know that these are the names and words of our parturitions, daring anxiously to explore it, and which, standing in the vestibules of the adytum, announce indeed nothing pertaining to the ineffable, but signify the manner in which we are affected about it, our doubts and disappointment; nor yet this clearly, but through indications to such as are able to understand these investigations. We also see that our parturitions suffer these things about *the one*, and that in a similar manner they are solicitous and subverted. For *the one*, says Plato, if it is, is not *the one*. But if it is not, no assertion can be adapted to it: so that neither can there be a negation of it, nor can any name be given to it; for neither is a name

simple. Nor is there any opinion nor science of it; for neither are these simple: nor is intellect itself simple. So that *the one* is in every respect unknown and ineffable.

What then? Shall we investigate something else beyond the ineffable? Or, perhaps, indeed, Plato leads us ineffably through *the one* as a medium, to the ineffable beyond *the one*, which is now the subject of discussion; and this by an ablation of *the one*, in the same manner as he leads us to *the one* by an ablation of other things. For, that he gives to *the one* a certain position is evident from his *Sophista*, where he demonstrates that it subsists prior to being, itself by itself. But if, having ascended as far as to *the one*, he is silent, this also is becoming in Plato to be perfectly silent, after the manner of the ancients, concerning things in every respect unspeakable: for the discourse was, indeed, most dangerous, in consequence of falling on idiotical ears. Indeed, when discoursing concerning that which in no respect has any subsistence, he subverts his assertions, and is fearful of falling into the sea of dissimilitude, or, rather, of unsubsisting void. But if demonstrations do not accord with *the one*, it is by no means wonderful: for they are human and divisible, and more composite than is fit. Indeed, they are not even adapted to being, since they are formal, or rather they are neither adapted to forms nor essences. Or, is it not Plato himself, who in his *Epistles*\* evinces that we have nothing which is significant of form, no type, nor name, nor discourse, nor opinion, nor science? For it is intellect alone which can apprehend ideas by its projecting energies, which we cannot possess while busily engaged in discourse. If, therefore, we even energize intellectually, since in this case our intellection is characterized by form, we shall not accord with *the united* and with being. And if at any time we are able to project a contracted intelligence, even this is unadapted and discordant with *the one*. If, also, we energize according to the most profoundly united intelligence, and through this occultly perceive *the one itself*, yet even this is expanded only as far as to *the one*, if there is a knowledge of *the one*; for this we have not yet determined. At the same time, however, let us now apply ourselves to the discussion of things of such great importance, through indications and suspicions, being purified, with respect to unusual conceptions, and led through analogies and negations, despising what we possess with respect to these, and advancing from things more dishonour-

\* See the seventh *Epistle* of Plato.

able with us to things more honourable. Shall we therefore say, that the nature which we now investigate as the first, is so perfectly ineffable, that it must not even be admitted concerning it that it is thus ineffable; but that *the one* is ineffable, as flying from all composition of words and names, and all distinction of that which is known from that which knows, and is to be apprehended in a manner the most simple and comprehensive, and that it is not one alone as the idiom of one, but as *one all things*, and one prior to all things, and not one which is something belonging to all things? These, indeed, are the parturitions of the soul, and are thus purified with respect to *the simply one*, and that which is truly the one cause of all things. But, in short, we thus form a conception of *the one* which we contain as the summit or flower of our essence, as being more proximate and allied to us, and more prompt to such a suspicion of that which nearly leaves all things behind it. But, from some particular thing which is made the subject of hypothesis, the transition is easy to that which is simply supposed, though we should in no respect accede to it, but, being carried in that which is most simple in us, should form a suspicion concerning that which is prior to all things. *The one*, therefore, is thus effable, and thus ineffable; but that which is beyond it is to be honoured in the most perfect silence, and, prior to this, by the most perfect ignorance\*, which despises all knowledge.

Let us, therefore, now consider, in the second place, how it is said to be perfectly unknown. For, if this be true, how do we assert all these things concerning it? For we do not elucidate by much discussion about things of which we are ignorant. But if it is in reality uncoordinated with all things, and without habitude to all things, and is nothing of all things, nor even *the one itself*, these very things are the nature of it. Besides, with respect to its being unknown, we either know that it is unknown, or we are ignorant of this. But if the latter, how do we say that it is perfectly unknown? And if we know this, in this respect therefore it is known. Or shall we say that it is known, that the unknown is unknown? We cannot therefore deny one thing of another, not knowing that which is the subject of the negation; nor can we say that

\* As that which is below all knowledge is an ignorance worse than knowledge, so the silence in which our ascent to the ineffable terminates is succeeded by an ignorance superior to all knowledge. Let it, however, be carefully remembered, that such an ignorance is only to be obtained after the most scientific and intellectual energies.

it is not this or that, when we can in no respect reach it. How, therefore, can we deny of that of which we are perfectly ignorant the things which we know? For this is just as if some one who was blind from his birth should assert that heat is not in colour. Or perhaps, indeed, he also will justly say, that colour is not hot. For he knows this by the touch; but he knows nothing of colour, except that it is not tangible: for he knows that he does not know it. Such a knowledge, indeed, is not a knowledge of colour, but of his own ignorance. And we also, when we say that the first is unknown, do not announce any thing of it, but we confess the manner in which we are affected about it. For the non-perception of the blind man is not in the colour, nor yet his blindness, but in him. The ignorance, therefore, of that of which we are ignorant is in us. For the knowledge of that which is known, is in him that knows, and not in the thing known. But if knowledge is in that which is known, being as it were the splendour of it, so some one should say ignorance is in that which is unknown, being as it were the darkness of it, or obscurity, according to which it is unknown by, and is unapparent to, all things,—he who says this is ignorant, that as blindness is a privation, so likewise all ignorance, and that as is the invisible, so that of which we are ignorant, and which is unknown. In other things, therefore, the privation of this or that leaves something else. For that which is incorporeal, though invisible, yet is intelligible: and that which is not intelligible by a certain intelligence, leaves at the same time something else. But if we take away every conception and suspicion, this also we must say is perfectly unknown by us, about which we close every eye\*. Nor must we assert any thing of it, as we do of the intelligible, that it is not adapted to be seen by the eyes, or as we do of *the one*, that it is not naturally adapted to be understood by an essential and abundant intellection: for it imparts nothing by which it can be apprehended, nothing which can lead to a suspicion of its nature. For neither do we only say that it is unknown, that being something else it may naturally possess the unknown, but we do not think it fit to predicate of it either *being*, or *the one*, or *all things*, or *the principle of all things*, or, in short, *any thing*. Neither, therefore, are these things the nature of it, viz. *the nothing*, *the being beyond all things*, *supercausal subsistence*, and *the uncoordinated with all things*; but these are only ablations of things posterior to it. How, therefore, do we speak concerning it? Shall we say,

\* Παν ομμα μνομεν.

that,

that, knowing these posterior things, we despise them with respect to the position, if I may so speak, of that which is in every respect ineffable? For, as that which is beyond some particular knowledge is better than that which is apprehended by such knowledge, so that which is beyond all suspicion must necessarily be most venerable; not that it is known to be so, but possessing the most venerable as in us, and as the consequence of the manner in which we are affected about it. We also call this a prodigy, from its being entirely incomprehensible by our conceptions: for it is through analogy, if that which in a certain respect is unknown, according to a more excellent subsistence, is superior to that which is in every respect known. Hence, that which is in every respect unknown according to a more excellent subsistence, must necessarily be acknowledged to be supreme, though it indeed has neither the supreme, nor the most excellent; nor the most venerable: for these things are our confessions about that, which entirely flies from all our conceptions and suspicions. For by this very assertion, that we can form no suspicion of it, we acknowledge that it is most wonderful; since, if we should suspect any thing concerning it, we must also investigate something else prior to this suspicion, and either proceed to infinity in our search, or stop at that which is perfectly ineffable. Can we, therefore, demonstrate any thing concerning it? and is that demonstrable which we do not think fit to consider as a thing whose subsistence we can even suspect? Or, when we assert these things, do we not indeed demonstrate *concerning* it, but not *it*? For neither does it contain the demonstrable, nor any thing else. What then? Do we not opine concerning it these things which we now assert? But if there is an opinion of it, it is also the object of opinion. Or shall we say we opine that it is not these things? for Aristotle also says that there is true opinion. If, therefore, the opinion is true, the thing likewise is to which opinion being adapted becomes true. For, in consequence of the thing subsisting, the opinion also is true. Though, indeed, how will it be, or how will that be true which is perfectly unknown? Or shall we say this is true, that it is not these things, and that it is not known? Is it therefore truly false, that it is these things, and that it is known? Or shall we say that these things are to be referred to privations, and to that which in a certain respect is not, in which there may be a falling from the hypostasis of form? Just as we call the absence of light darkness. For, light not existing, neither is there any darkness. But to that which is never and in no respect being, nothing among beings

can,

can, as Plato says, accede. Neither, therefore, is it non-being, nor, in short, privation; and even the expression *never in no respect* (το μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς) is incapable of signifying its nature. For this expression is being, and *signification* is something belonging to beings. Likewise, though we should opine that it is not in any respect, yet at the same time since it thus becomes the object of opinion, it belongs to beings. Hence, Plato very properly calls that which never and in no respect is, ineffable and incapable of being opined, and this according to the worse than the effable and opinion, in the same manner as we say the supreme is according to that which is better than these. What then, do we not think and are we not persuaded that the supreme thus subsists? Or, as we have often said, do not these things express the manner in which we are affected about it? But we possess in ourselves this opinion, which is therefore empty, as is the opinion of a vacuum and the infinite. As therefore we form a phantastic and fictitious opinion of these, though they are not, as if they were, just as we opine the sun to be no larger than a sphere whose diameter is but a foot, though this is far from being the case;—so, if we opine any thing concerning that which never and in no respect is, or concerning that of which we write these things, the opinion is our own, and the vain attempt is in us, in apprehending which we think that we apprehend the supreme. It is, however, nothing pertaining to us, so much does it transcend our conceptions. How, therefore, do we demonstrate that there is such an ignorance in us concerning it? And how do we say that it is unknown? We reply, in one word, Because we always find that what is above knowledge is more honourable; so that what is above all knowledge, if it were to be found, would be found to be most honourable. But it is sufficient to the demonstration that it cannot be found. We also say that it is above all things; because, if it were any thing known, it would rank among all things; and there would be something common to it with all things, viz. the being known. But there is one coordination of things in which there is something common; so that in consequence of this it will subsist together with all things. Hence it is necessary that it should be unknown.

In the third place, the unknown is inherent in beings as well as the known, though they are relatively inherent at the same time. As, therefore, we say that the same thing is relatively large and small, so also we say, that a thing is known and unknown with reference to different things. And as the same thing, by participating of the

two forms, the great and the small, is at the same time both great and small, so that which at the same time participates of the known and the unknown is both these. Thus, the intelligible is unknown to sense, but is known to intellect. For the more excellent will not be privation, the inferior at the same time being form; since every absence, and a privation of this kind, is either in matter or in soul; but all things are present in intellect, and still more in a certain respect in the intelligible. Unless, indeed, we denominate privation according to a more excellent subsistence, as we say that is not form which is above form; and that is not being which is superessential; and that is nothing which is truly unknown, according to a transcendence which surpasses all things. If, therefore, *the one* is the last known of things which are in any respect whatever known or suspected, that which is beyond *the one* is primarily and perfectly unknown; which also is so unknown, that neither has it an unknown nature, nor can we accede to it as to the unknown, but it is even unknown to us whether it is unknown. For there is an all-perfect ignorance about it, nor can we know it, neither as known, nor as unknown. Hence, we are on all sides subverted, in consequence of not being able to reach it in any respect, because it is not even one thing; or rather, it is not that which is not even one thing. Hence, it is that which in no respect whatever has any subsistence; or it is even beyond this, since this is a negation of being, and that which is not even one thing is a negation of *the one*. But that which is not one thing, or, in other words, that which is nothing, is a void, and a falling from all things. We do not, however, thus conceive concerning the ineffable. Or shall we say that *nothing* is twofold, the one being beyond, and the other below, all things? For *the one* also is twofold, *this* being the extreme, as *the one* of matter, and *that* the first, as that which is more ancient than being. So that with respect to *nothing* also, *this* will be as that which is not even the last one, but *that*, as neither being the first one. In this way, therefore, that which is unknown and ineffable is twofold, *this*, as not even possessing the last suspicion of subsistence, and *that*, as not even being the first of things. Must we, therefore, consider it as that which is unknown to us? Or this indeed is nothing paradoxical: for it will be unknown even to much-honoured intellect, if it be lawful so to speak. For every intellect looks to the intelligible; and the intelligible is either *form* or *being*. But may not divine knowledge know it; and may it not be known to this superessentially? This knowledge, however, applies itself

to *the one*, but that which we are now investigating is beyond *the one*. In short, if it also is known, in conjunction with others, it will also be something belonging to all things; for it will be common to it with others to be known, and thus far it will be coordinated with others. Further still, if it is known, divine knowledge will comprehend it. It will, therefore, define it. Every boundary, however, ascends ultimately as far as to *the one*; but *that* is beyond *the one*. It is, therefore, perfectly incomprehensible and invisible, and consequently is not to be apprehended by any kind of knowledge. To which we may add, that knowledge is of things which may be known, as beings, or as having a subsistence, or as participating of *the one*. But this is beyond all these. Further still, *the one* also appears to be unknown, if it is necessary that what is known should be one thing, and that which knows another, though both should be in the same thing. So that *the truly one* will not know itself: for it does not possess a certain duplicity. There will not, therefore, be in it that which knows, and that which is known. Hence, neither will a God, considered according to *the one itself* alone, and as being conjoined with *the one*, be united with that which is simple, according to duplicity. For how can the double be conjoined with the simple? But if he knows *the one* by *the one*, that which knows, and also that which is known, will be *one*, and in each the nature of *the one* will be shown, subsisting alone and being *one*. So that he will not be conjoined as different with that which is different, or as that which is gnostic with that which is known, since this very thing is one alone; so that neither will he be conjoined according to knowledge. Much more, therefore, is that which is not even *the one* unknown. But if *the one* is the last thing known, we know nothing of that which is beyond *the one*; so that the present rhapsody is vain. Or shall we say we know that these things are unworthy to be asserted, if it be lawful so to speak, of the first hypothesis, since, not yet knowing even intelligible forms, we despise the images which subsist in us of their eternal and impartible nature; since these images are partible, and multifariously mutable. Further still, being ignorant of the contracted subsistence of intelligible species and genera, but possessing an image of this, which is a contraction of the genera and species in us, we suspect that being itself resembles this contraction, but is at the same time something more excellent; and this must be especially the case with that which has an united subsistence. But now we are ignorant of *the one*, not contracting, but expanding all things to it;

and in us simplicity itself consists, with relation to the all which we contain, but is very far from coming into contact with the all-perfect nature of *the one*. For *the one* and *the simple* in our nature, are in the smallest degree that which they are said to be, except that they are a sign or indication of the nature which is there. Thus also assuming in intellect every thing which can be in any respect known or suspected, we think fit to ascribe it as far as to *the one*; if it be requisite to speak of things unspeakable, and to conceive things which are inconceivable. At the same time, also, we think fit to make that the subject of hypothesis, which cannot be compared, and is uncoordinated with all things, and which is so exempt, that neither in reality does it possess the exempt. For that which is exempt is always exempt from something, and is not in every respect exempt, as possessing habitude to that from which it is exempt, and, in short, preceding in a certain coordination. If, therefore, we intend to make that which is truly exempt the subject of hypothesis, we must not even suppose it to be exempt. For, accurately speaking, its proper name will not be verified when ascribed to *the exempt*; for in this case it would at the same time be coordinated; so that it is necessary even to deny this of it. Likewise, negation is a certain sentence, and that which is denied is a certain thing; but that of which we are now endeavouring to speak is not any thing. Neither, therefore, can it be denied, nor spoken of, nor be in any way known: so that neither is it possible to deny the negation; but that which appears to us to be a demonstration of what we say, is a perfect subversion of language and conceptions. What end, therefore, will there be of the discourse, except the most profound silence, and an acknowledgment that we know nothing of that which it is not lawful, since impossible, to lead into knowledge?

May it not, therefore, be said by some one who ventures to make such-like inquiries, if we assert something concerning it from things of a posterior nature, since in these the monad is every where the leader of a certain proper number; for there is one first soul and many souls, one first intellect and many intellects, one first being and many beings, and one first unity and many unities;—if this be the case, may it not be said that in a similar manner it is requisite there should be one ineffable and many ineffables? If this then be admitted, it will be necessary to say that the ineffable is ineffably prolific. It will, therefore, generate a proper multitude. Or may we not say, that these and such-like conceptions arise from forgetting what has been before asserted?

For there is nothing common between it and other things; nor will there be any thing pertaining to it among things which are spoken of, or conceived, or suspected. Neither, therefore, can *the one* nor *the many*, neither *the prolific* nor *the productive*, nor that which is in any respect a cause, neither any analogy nor similitude can be ascribed to it. For it is especially necessary to induce quiet, in that which is arcane, firmly abiding in the adytum of the soul. But if it be necessary to indicate something concerning it by negations, we must say that it is neither one nor many, neither prolific nor unprolific, neither cause nor causeless; thus in reality subverting ourselves, I know not how, by negations to infinity. Shall we, therefore, thus trifling adduce that which in no respect has any subsistence whatever? For to this all these assertions are adapted, and after all these the very subversion itself, as the Elean philosopher teaches us. This question indeed is not difficult to solve; for we have before said that all these things apply to that which is not in any respect, in consequence of its being worse than all these, but they apply to the first, in consequence of admitting it to be better than all these. For the things denied are not denied of each after the same manner; but upwards things less, if it be lawful so to speak, are denied of that which is more excellent; and downwards, things better of that which is worse, if it be possible so to speak. For we deny things both of matter and *the one*, but in a twofold respect, after the above-mentioned manner. This question then, as I have said, is easily solved.

Again, therefore, it may be said, Does not something proceed from it to the things which are here? Or how indeed should this not be the case, if all things are from it? For every thing participates of that from which it proceeds. For, if nothing else, it thence possesses that which it is, respiring its proper principle, and converting itself to it as much as possible. What indeed should hinder it from imparting something of itself to its progeny? What other medium is there? And how is it not necessary that the second should always be nearer to the one principle than the third? and the third than the fourth? And if this be the case, must it not also less depart from it? If this too be the case, must it not also more abide in the boundary of its nature? Hence, too, must it not also be more assimilated to it, so that it likewise will be adapted to participate of it, and so that it will participate of it? How also could we suspect these things concerning it, unless we contained a certain vestige of it,—a vestige

hastening as it were to be conjoined with it? Shall we, therefore, say that being arcane it bestows an arcane participation on all things, through which there is in every thing something arcane? For we acknowledge that some things are more arcane than others, *the one* than *being*, *being* than *life*, *life* than *intellect*, and thus always in succession after the same manner; or rather inversely; from matter as far as to a rational essence, these things subsist according to the worse, but those according to the better, if it be lawful so to speak. May we not however say that he who admits this will also make a progression from the first, and a certain arcane order of things proceeding, and that thus we shall introduce all such effables to the arcane, as we have condistributed with the effable? We shall therefore make three monads and three numbers, and no longer two; viz. the essential, the unical, or that which is characterized by unity, and the arcane. And thus we shall admit what we formerly rejected, i. e. multitude in the arcane, and an order of things first, middle, and last. There will also be permanency, progression and regression; and, in short, we shall mingle much of the effable with the ineffable. But if, as we have said, the term *it* or *those* can not be introduced to that arcane nature which we consider as above *the one* and *the many* neither must any thing else besides *the one* be admitted as prior to the many, nor any thing else be condistributed with the many in participation. Neither, therefore, is it participated, nor does it impart any thing of itself to its progeny; nor is every God arcane prior to its being one, as it is one prior to its being essence. May we not say, therefore, that language here being subverted evinces that this nature is arcane by conceiving contraries according to every mode from things posterior to it? And why is this wonderful, since we are also involved in similar doubts concerning *the one*? Indeed, is not this also the case concerning being and that which is perfectly united?

In another part, near the beginning of the same admirable work, he remarks that *the one* in every thing is the mere true thing itself. Thus, for instance, *the one* of man is the mere true man, that of soul is the mere true soul, and that of body the mere true body. Thus also *the one* of the sun, and *the one* of the moon, are the mere true sun and moon. After which he observes as follows: Neither *the one* nor all things accords with the nature of *the one*. For these are opposed to each other, and distribute our conceptions. For, if we look to the simple and *the one*, we destroy its immensely great perfection: and if we conceive all things subsisting together, we abolish

abolish *the one* and the simple. But this is because we are divided, and look to divided idioms. At the same time, however, aspiring after the knowledge of it, we connect all things together, that we may thus be able to apprehend this mighty nature. But fearing the introduction of all multitudes, or contracting the peculiar nature of *the one*, and rejoicing in that which is simple and the first in speaking of the most ancient principle, we thus introduce *the one itself* as a symbol of simplicity; since we likewise introduce *all things* as a symbol of the comprehension of all things. But that which is above or prior to both we can neither conceive nor denominate. And why is it wonderful that we should suffer these things about it, since the distinct knowledge of it is unical, which we cannot perceive? Other things too of this kind we suffer about *being*. For, endeavouring to perceive *being*, we dismiss it, but run round the elements of it, bound and infinity. But if we form a more true conception of it, that it is an united plenitude of all things, in this case the conception of *all things* draws us down to multitude, and the conception of *the united* abolishes that of all things. Neither however is this yet wonderful. For, with respect to forms also, when we wish to survey any one of these, we run round the elements of it, and, striving to perceive its unity, we obliterate its elements. At the same time, however, every form is one and many; not indeed partly one, and partly many, but the whole of it is through the whole a thing of this kind. Not being able, therefore, to apprehend this collectively, we rejoice in acceding to it with a distribution of our conceptions. But always adhering in our ascent, like those who climb clinging with their hands and feet to things which extend us to a more impartible nature, we obtain in a certain respect a consolation in the distribution, of that which is uniform. We despise, therefore, this with respect to the collected apprehension of it, which we cannot obtain, unless a certain vestige of collected intelligence in our nature is agitated. And this is the light of truth, which is suddenly enkindled, as if from the collision of fire stones. For our greatest conceptions, when exercised with each other, verge to a uniform and simple summit as their end, like the extremities of lines in a circle hastening to the centre. And though even thus they subsist indeed with distribution, yet a certain vestige of the knowledge of form which we contain is pre-excited; just as the equal tendency of all the lines in a circle to terminate in the middle affords a certain obscure representation of the centre. After the same manner

manner also we ascend to being, in the first place, by understanding every form which falls upon us as distributed, not only as impartible, but also as united, and this by confounding, if it be proper so to speak, the multitude in each. In the next place, we must collect every thing separated together, and take away the circumscriptions, just as if making many streams of water to be one collection of water, except that we must not understand that which is united from all things, as one collection of water, but we must conceive that which is prior to all things, as the form of water prior to divided streams of water. Thus, therefore, we must expand ourselves to *the one*, first collecting and afterwards dismissing what we have collected, for the super-expanded transcendency of *the one*. Ascending, therefore, shall we meet with it as that which is known? Or, wishing to meet with it as such, shall we arrive at the unknown? Or may we not say that each of these is true? For we meet with it afar off as that which is known; and when we are united to it from afar, passing beyond that in our nature which is gnostic of *the one*, then are we brought to be one, that is, to be unknown instead of being gnostic. This contact, therefore, as of one with one, is above knowledge, but the other is as of that which is gnostic with that which is known. As however the crooked is known by the straight, so we form a conjecture of the unknown by the known. And this indeed is a mode of knowledge. *The one*, therefore, is so far known, that it does not admit of an approximating knowledge, but appears afar off as known, and imparts a gnostic indication of itself. Unlike other things, however, the nearer we approach to it, it is not the more, but, on the contrary, less known; knowledge being dissolved by *the one* into ignorance, since, as we have before observed, where there is knowledge there also is separation. But separation approaching to *the one* is inclosed in union; so that knowledge also is refunded into ignorance. Thus, too, the analogy of Plato requires. For first we endeavour to see the sun, and we do indeed see it afar off; but by how much the nearer we approach to it, by so much the less do we see it; and at length we neither see other things, nor it, the eye becoming spontaneously dazzled by its light. Is, therefore, *the one* in its proper nature unknown, though there is something else unknown besides *the one*? *The one* indeed wills to be by itself, but with no other; but the unknown beyond *the one* is perfectly ineffable, which we acknowledge neither knows nor is ignorant, but has with respect to itself super-ignorance. Hence by proximity to this *the one*  
itself

itself is darkened: for, being very near to the immense principle, if it be lawful so to speak, it remains as it were in the adytum of that truly mystic silence. On this account, Plato in speaking of it finds all his assertions subverted: for it is near to the subversion of every thing, which takes place about the first. It differs from it however in this, that it is *one* simply, and that according to *the one* it is also at the same time all things. But the first is above *the one* and all things, being more simple than both these.

P. 166. *Note. Such then is the intelligible triad.*

In order to convince the reader that the doctrine here delivered of the intelligible triad is not a fiction devised by the latter Platonists, I shall present him with the following translation from the same excellent work of Damascius (Περὶ ἀρχῶν,) *Concerning principles*\*, in which the agreement of all the antient theologists concerning this triad is most admirably evinced.

The theology contained in the Orphic rhapsodies concerning the intelligible Gods is as follows:—*Time* is symbolically placed for the one principle of the universe; but *æther* and *chaos*, for the two posterior to this one: and *being*, simply considered, is represented under the symbol of an egg. And this is the first triad of the intelligible Gods. But for the perfection of the second triad they establish either a conceiving and a conceived egg as a God, or a white garment, or a cloud: because from these Phanes leaps forth into light. For, indeed, they philosophize variously concerning the middle triad. But Phanes here represents intellect. But conceiving him over and above this, as father and power, contributes nothing to Orpheus. But they call the third triad Metis as *intellect* †, Ericapæus as *power*, and Phanes as *father*. But whether or not are we to consider the middle triad according to the three-shaped God, while conceived in the egg ‡? for the middle always represents each of the extremes; as in this instance, where the egg and the three-shaped God subsist together. And here you may perceive that the egg is that which is united; but that the three-shaped and really multiform God is the separating and discriminating cause of that which is

\* Vide Wolfii Anecd. Græc. tom. iii. p. 252.

† Ὁς νοῦς is omitted in the original.

‡ This is not an interrogative sentence in the original, but certainly ought to be so.

intelligible. Likewise, the middle triad subsists according to the egg, as yet united; but the third\* according to the God who separates and distributes the whole intelligible order. And this is the common and familiar Orphic theology. But that delivered by Hieronymus and Hellanius is as follows. According to them *water* and *matter* were the first productions from which earth was secretly drawn forth: so that water and earth are established as the two first principles: the latter of these having a *dispersed* subsistence, but the former conglutinating and connecting the latter. But they are silent concerning the principle prior to these two, as being ineffable: for, as there are no illuminations about him, his arcane and ineffable nature is from hence sufficiently evinced. But the third principle posterior to these two, *water* and *earth*, and which is generated from them, is a *dragon*, naturally endued with the heads of a bull and a lion, but in the middle having the countenance of the God himself. They add, likewise, that he has wings on his shoulders, and that he is called *undecaying Time*, and *Hercules*; that *Necessity* resides with him, which is the same as *Nature*, and incorporeal *Adrastia*, which is extended throughout the universe, whose limits she binds in amicable conjunction. But, as it appears to me, they denominate this third principle as established according to essence, and assert, besides this, that it subsists as male and female, for the purpose of exhibiting the generative causes of all things.

I likewise find in the Orphic rhapsodies, that, neglecting the two first principles, together with the one principle who is delivered in silence, the third principle, posterior to the two, is established by the theology as the original; because this first of all possesses something effable and commensurate to human discourse. For, in the former hypothesis, the highly revered and undecaying *Time*, the father of æther and chaos, was the principle: but in this *Time* is neglected, and the principle becomes a *dragon*. It likewise says that there was a triple offspring; moist æther, an infinite chaos, and cloudy and dark Erebus; delivering this second triad analogous to the first: this being potential, as that was paternal. Hence, the third procession of this triad is dark Erebus: its paternal and summit æther, not according to a simple but intellectual subsistence; but its middle, infinite chaos, considered as a progeny or procession, and among these parturient, because from these the third intelligible triad proceeds. What then is the third intelligible triad? I answer, The egg; the duad of the natures of male and female

\* Το τρίτον is, I conceive, erroneously omitted in the original.

which it contains, and the multitude of all-various seeds, residing in the middle of this triad: and the third among these is an incorporeal God, bearing golden wings on his shoulders; but in his inward parts naturally possessing the heads of bulls, upon which heads a mighty dragon appears, invested with the all-various forms of wild beasts. This last then must be considered as the *intellect* of the triad; but the middle progeny, which are *many* as well as *two*, correspond to *power*, and the egg itself is the *paternal principle* of the third triad: but the third God of this third triad, this theology celebrates as *Protogonus*, and calls him *Jupiter*, the disposer of all things and of the whole world; and on this account denominates him *Pan*. And such is the information which this theology affords us, concerning the genealogy of the intelligible principles of things.

But in the writings of the Peripatetic Eudemus, containing the theology of Orpheus, the whole intelligible order is passed over in silence, as being every way ineffable and unknown, and incapable of verbal enunciation. Eudemus, therefore, commences his genealogy from *Night*, from which also Homer begins: though Eudemus is far from making the Homeric genealogy consistent and connected, for he asserts that Homer begins from Ocean and Tethys. It is however apparent that *Night* is according to Homer the greatest divinity, since she is revered even by Jupiter himself. For the poet says of Jupiter—"that he feared lest he should act in a manner displeasing to swift *Night* \*." So that Homer begins his genealogy of the Gods from *Night*. But it appears to me that Hesiod, when he asserts that *Chaos* was first generated, signifies by *Chaos* the incomprehensible and perfectly united nature of that which is intelligible: but that he produces *Earth* † the first from thence, as a certain principle of the whole procession of the Gods. Unless perhaps *Chaos* is the second of the two principles: but *Earth* ‡, *Tartarus*, and *Love* form the triple intelligible. So that

\* Ἀΐετο γὰρ μη νοκτι δει ἀποθύμια βεζνι. Iliad. lib. ξ. ver. 261.

† Την is printed instead of Γην.

‡ As the whole of the Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic traditions of Orpheus, it is evident that the Gods which Hesiod celebrates by the epithets of *Earth*, *Heaven*, &c. cannot be the visible *Heaven* and *Earth*: for Plato in the *Cratylus*, following the Orphic doctrine concerning the Gods, as will appear in our notes on that dialogue, plainly shows, in explaining the name of Jupiter, that this divinity, who is subordinate to *Saturn*, *Heaven*, *Earth*, &c. is the artificer of the sensible universe; and consequently *Saturn*,  
*Heaven*,

that *Love* is to be placed for the third monad of the intelligible order, considered according to its convertive nature; for it is thus denominated by Orpheus in his rhapsodies. But *Earth* for the first, as being first established in a certain firm and essential permanency. And *Tartarus* for the middle, as in a certain respect exciting and moving forms into distribution. But *Acusilaus* appears to me to establish *Chaos* for the first principle, as entirely unknown; and after this, two principles, *Erebus* as male, and *Night* as female; placing the latter for *infinity*, but the former for *bound*. But from the mixture of these, he says\* that *Æther*, *Love*, and *Counsel* are generated forming three intelligible hypostases. And he places *Æther* as the summit; but *Love* in the middle, according to its naturally middle subsistence; but *Metis* or *Counsel* as the third, and the same as highly-reverenced intellect. And, according to the history of *Eudemus*, from these he produces a great number of other Gods. But *Epimenides* establishes *Air* and *Night* as the two first principles; manifestly reverencing in silence the one principle prior to these two. But from *Air* and *Night* *Tartarus* is generated, forming, as it appears to me, the third principle, as a certain mixed temperature from the two. And this mixture is called by some an intelligible medium, because it extends itself to both the summit and the end. But from the mixture of the extremes with each other an egg is generated, which is truly an intelligible animal: and from this again another progeny proceeds. But according to *Phercydes* *Syrius*, the three first principles are, a *Perpetually-abiding Vital Nature*, *Time* †, and an *Earthly Nature*: one of these subsisting, as I conceive, prior to the other two. But

*Heaven*, *Earth*, &c. are much superior to the mundane deities. Indeed, if this be not admitted, the *Theogony* of *Hesiod* must be perfectly absurd and inexplicable. For why does he call *Jupiter*, agreeably to *Homer*, (*πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*), “*father of Gods and men?*” Shall we say that he means literally that *Jupiter* is the father of *all* the Gods? But this is impossible; for he delivers the generation of Gods who are the parents of *Jupiter*. He can, therefore, only mean that *Jupiter* is the parent of all the mundane Gods: and his *Theogony*, when considered according to this exposition, will be found to be beautifully consistent and sublime; whereas, according to modern interpretations, the whole is a mere chaos, more wild than the delirious visions of *Swedenborg*, and more unconnected than the filthy rant of the stool-preaching methodist. I only add, that *την* is erroneously printed in the *Excerpta* of *Wolfius* for *γγν*.

\* *Φημι* in the original should doubtless be *φησι*.

† *Χθονον* is printed for *χρονον*.

he asserts that *Time* generates from the progeny of itself, *Fire*, *Spirit*, and *Water*: which signify, as it appears to me, the triple nature of that which is intelligible. But from these, distributed into five profound recesses, a numerous progeny of Gods is constituted, which he calls *five-times animated* (πεντεμψυχος); and which is, perhaps, the same as if he had said πεντεκόσμος, or a *five-fold world*. But we may probably discourse on this subject at some other opportunity. And thus much may suffice at present concerning the hypothesis derived from the Grecian fables, which are both many and various.

But with respect to the theology of the barbarians, the Babylonians seem to pass over in silence the one principle of the universe. But they establish two principles, *Tauthe* and *Apasoon*. And they consider *Apasoon* as the husband of *Tauthe*, whom they denominate the mother of the Gods; from whom an only-begotten son *Mooumis* was produced: which, as it appears to me, is no other than the intelligible world deduced from two principles\*. But from these another procession is derived, *Dache* and *Dachus*. And likewise a third from these, *Kiffare* and *Affoorus*. And from these again three deities are produced, *Anus*, *Illinus*, and *Aus*. But from *Aus* and *Dache* a son called *Belus* is produced, who they say is the demiurgus of the world. But with respect to the Magi, and all the Arion race, as we are informed by Eudemus, some of them call all the intelligible and united world *Place*, and some of them *Time*: from which a good divinity and an evil daemon are distributed; *Light* and *Darkness* subsisting prior to these, according to the assertions of others. However, both the one and the other, after an undistributed nature, consider that nature as having a subsistence which distributes the twofold coordination of better natures: one of which coordinations *Orosmades* presides over, and the other *Arimanius*. But the Sidonians, according to the same historian, place before all things *Time*, *Desire*, and *Cloudy Darkness*. And they assert, that from the mingling of *Desire* and *Darkness* as two principles, *Air* and a gentle *Wind* were produced: *Air* evincing the summit of the intelligible triad; but the gentle *Wind* raised and proceeding from this, the vital prototype of the intelligible. And again, that from both these the bird *Otus*, similar to a night raven, was produced; representing, as it appears to me, intelligible intellect. But as we find (with-

\* That is, from bound and infinite.

out the assistance of Eudemus) the Phœnician mythology, according to Moschus, places *Æther* and *Air* as the two first principles, from which the intelligible God *Oulomus* was produced; who, as it appears to me, is the summit of the intelligible order. But from this God (yet proceeding together with him) they assert that *Chousforus* was produced, being the first unfolding procession. And after this *an egg* succeeds; which I think must be called intelligible intellect. But the unfolding *Chousforus* is intelligible power, because this is the first nature which distributes an undistributed subsistence: unless, perhaps, after the two principles *Æther* and *Air*, the summit is *one Wind*; but the middle *two Winds*, the *south-west* and the *south*; for in a certain respect they place these prior to *Oulomus*. But *Oulomus* himself is intelligible intellect: and unfolding *Chousforus*\* the first order after the intelligible series. And the *egg itself* is heaven: from the bursting of which into two parts, the sections are said to have become heaven and earth. But with respect to the Egyptians, nothing accurately is related of them by Eudemus. According to certain Egyptian philosophers, however, among us, *an unknown Darkness* is celebrated in some Egyptian writings as the one principle of the universe, and this *thrice pronounced as such*: but for the two principles after the first, they place *water* and *sand*, according to Heraiscus; but according to the more ancient writer Asclepiades, *sand* and *water*; from which, and after which, the first *Kamephis* is generated. But after this *a second*, and from this again *a third*; by all which the whole intelligible distribution is accomplished. For thus Asclepiades determines. But the more modern Heraiscus says, that the Egyptians, denominating the third *Kamephis* from his father and grandfather, assert that he is *the Sun*; which, doubtless, signifies in this case intelligible intellect. But a more accurate knowledge of these affairs must be received from the above-mentioned authors themselves. It must, however, be observed, that with the Egyptians there are many distributions of things according to union; because they unfold an intelligible nature into characteristics, or peculiarities of many Gods, as may be learned from such as are desirous of consulting their writings on this subject.

Thus far Damascius; from which curious and interesting relation the reader may not only perceive at one view the agreement of the ancient theologians with each other

\* *Χουσωπος* should be read instead of *Χουσωρον*.

in celebrating the intelligible triad, and venerating in silence the ineffable principle of things, but may likewise behold the origin of the christian trinity, its deviation from truth, and the absurdity, and even impiety, with which a belief in it is unavoidably attended. Consonant too with the above relation is the doctrine of the Chaldæans concerning the intelligible order, as delivered by Johannes Picus, in his *Conclusions according to the opinion of the Chaldæan theologists* \*. “ The intelligible coordination (says he) is not in the intellectual coordination, as Amasis the Egyptian asserts, but is above every intellectual hierarchy, imparticipably concealed in the abyss of the first unity, and under the obscurity of the first darkness.” *Coordinatio intelligibilis non est in intellectuali coordinatione, ut dixit Amasis Ægyptius, sed est super omnem intellectualem hierarchiam, in abyfso primæ unitatis, et sub caligine primarum tenebrarum imparticipaliter abscondita.*

But from this triad it may be demonstrated, that all the processions of the Gods may be comprehended in six orders, viz. the *intelligible order*, the *intelligible and at the same time intellectual*, the *intellectual*, the *supermundane*, the *liberated*, and the *mundane* †. For the *intelligible*, as we have already observed, must hold the first rank, and must consist of *being*, *life*, and *intellect*, i. e. must *abide*, *proceed*, and *return*, and this super-essentially; at the same time that it is characterized, or subsists principally according to *being*. But, in the next place, that which is both *intelligible* and *intellectual* succeeds, which must likewise be triple, but must principally subsist according to *life*, or *intelligence*. And, in the third place, the *intellectual* order must succeed, which is *triplely convertible*. But as, in consequence of the existence of the sensible world, it is necessary that there should be some demiurgic cause of its existence, this cause can only be found in *intellect*, and in the last hypostasis of the *intellectual triad*. For all forms in this hypostasis subsist according to all-various and perfect divisions; and forms can only fabricate when they have a perfect intellectual separation from each other. But since *fabrication* is nothing more than *procession*, the demiurgus will be to the posterior order of the Gods what *the one* is to the orders prior to the *demiurgus*; and consequently he will be that secondarily which the first cause of all is primarily. Hence, his

\* Vid. Pici Opera, tom. i. p. 54.

† i. e. Θεοὶ νοητοὶ, νοητοὶ καὶ νοεροὶ, νοεροὶ, ὑπερκosμιοὶ, ἀπολυτοὶ ἢ ὑπερουρανοὶ, ἐτ' εὐκοσμιοὶ.

first production will be an order of Gods analogous to the *intelligible* order, and which is denominated *supermundane*. After this he must produce an order of Gods similar to the *intelligible* and *intellectual* order, and which are denominated *liberated* Gods. And in the last place, a procession correspondent to the *intellectual* order, and which can be no other than the *mundane* Gods. For the demiurgus is chiefly characterized according to diversity, and is allotted the boundary of all universal hypostases.

ADDITIONAL

## ADDITIONAL NOTES

ON

## THE PHÆDRUS.

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Page 323. *It alone uses contemplative intellect, &c.*

**BY** the governor of the soul in this place a partial intellect is meant. For this intellect is proximately established above our essence, which it also elevates and perfects; and to which we convert ourselves, when we are purified through philosophy, and conjoin our intellectual power with its intelligence. This partial intellect is participated by all other proximate dæmoniacal souls, and illuminates ours, when we convert ourselves to it, and render our reason intellectual. In short, as every partial soul is essentially suspended from a certain dæmon, and every dæmon has a dæmoniacal intellect above itself, hence, every partial soul will have this intellect ranked prior to itself as an impartible essence. Of this intellect, therefore, the first participant will be a dæmoniacal soul, but the second, the partial souls under this, which also makes them to be partial. It also appears that the intellect immediately above every dæmon, so far as it is a whole and one, is the intellect of the dæmon which proximately participates it, but that it also comprehends the number of the souls which are under it, and the intellectual paradigms of these. Every partial soul, therefore, will have as an indivisible essence its proper paradigm, which this intellect contains, and not simply the whole intellect, in the same manner as the dæmon which is essentially its leader. Hence the impartible belonging to every partial soul may be accurately defined to be the idea of that soul, comprehended in the one intellect which is destined to be the leader of the dæmoniacal series under which every such soul is arranged. And thus it will be true, that the intellect of every partial soul is alone  
supernally

supernally established among eternal entities, and that every such soul is a medium between the impartible above it, and the impartible nature below it. This, then, is the intelligence prior to the soul, and which the soul participates, when its intellectual part energizes intellectually. This also is the intellect which Plato in the *Timæus* indicates under the appellation of *intelligence*, when he says “that true being is apprehended by *intelligence* in conjunction with reason; and to which he likewise alludes in the latter part of the same dialogue, where he says, “that this intelligence is in the Gods, but that it is participated by a few only of the human race.”

P. 322. *Likewise Jupiter the mighty leader, &c.*

IT is said by Plato\* in the *Phædrus*, that there are twelve leaders who preside over the universe, who govern all the mundane Gods, and all the companies of dæmons, and who sublimely march to an intelligible nature. It is likewise asserted that Jupiter presides over these twelve Gods, who drives a winged chariot, who distributes all things in order, takes care of and leads all the attendant army, first to an *elevated place of speculation* within the heavens, and to those blessed contemplations and evolutions of intelligibles which it contains; but afterwards to that *subcelestial arch* which proximately embraces the heavens, and which the heavens contain: and after this arch they proceed into heaven and to the *back of heaven*. And in this place divine souls are said to stand, and, whilst they are carried along with the heavens, to contemplate every superior essence. But prior to the heavens there is said to be a *place* which is called *supercelestial*, in which *true essence*, the *plain of truth*, the *kingdom of Akrastia*, and the *divine choir of virtues*, reside: and it is asserted that by the intelligence of these monads souls are nourished and benefited, while they follow the revolution of the heavens.

And thus much is asserted in the *Phædrus*, where Socrates clearly speaks, as one agitated by a divine impulse, and touches on mystical concerns. But it is requisite to consider, in the first place, what this *heaven* may be, which Socrates speaks of, and in what order of beings it is placed. For, having discovered this, we may then con-

\* This account of that divine order which was denominated by ancient theologians *intelligille*, and at the same time *intellectual*, is extracted from the fourth book of Proclus on the *Theology of Plato*.

template the subcelestial arch, and the back of heaven; since each of these is assumed according to an habitude, or alliance to heaven; the one, indeed, being primarily situated above, and the other primarily placed under heaven.

What then is that heaven to which Jupiter brings the Gods? If we call it sensible, after the manner of some, it will be necessary that the more excellent genera should naturally be converted to things subordinate. For Jupiter, that great leader in the heavens, if he is himself carried to this sensible heaven, and leads to this all the attendant Gods, he must himself have a conversion to things inferior and posterior to himself. And this, together with Jupiter, must be the case with all the deities and dæmons that are suspended from him; though the same Soerates in the Phædrus asserts, that even a partial soul, when in a perfect state, revolves on high, and governs the universe. How, then, can the leaders of total souls be converted to this sensible heaven, and exchange their intelligible place of survey for a worse condition?—they, who through these souls preside over the universe, that they may illuminate mundane natures, with an absolute and liberated power! Besides, what blessed intellections can the Gods obtain by contemplating this sensible heaven? And what evolutions can there be there of the whole knowledge of sensible concerns? since on this hypothesis Plato must be condemned for producing a relation of no value with respect to the knowledge of the intelligible Gods. For the Gods perfectly know things subsisting in this sensible region, not by a conversion to them, but because they contain the causes of them in themselves. Hence, in consequence of knowing themselves, they likewise know in a causal manner and govern these sensible concerns, not surveying them, and verging to things which are governed, but through love converting subordinate natures to themselves. It is not, therefore, lawful for the Gods, by whom all heaven is governed, and who consider it as worthy their providential care, ever to subsist under its revolution. Nor, indeed, is there any beatitude in the contemplation of things situated under the heavens. Nor are the souls who are converted to a contemplation of this kind in the number of the blessed, and among such as follow the Gods; but they rank among those who exchange intelligible aliment for the food of opinion, and such as Soerates represents those lame souls, who have broken their wings, and are in a merged condition. Since, then, circumstances of this kind belong to partial souls, who do not rank in the number of the blessed, how can we refer a conversion

version to this sensible heaven to the leading Gods? Besides, Socrates asserts, that souls standing on the back of heaven are carried round by the celestial revolution. But Timæus and the Athenian guest say, that souls perform all things in the heavens from their own motions, and externally invest bodies by their powers; and that in consequence of living their own life, through the whole of time, they impart to bodies secondary powers of motion. How, then, can these things accord with those who consider this heaven as sensible? For souls do not contemplate, and, as it were, dance round intelligibles, in consequence of the revolution of the heavens: but, through the unapparent circumvolution of souls, bodies themselves are carried round in a circle, and about these perform their revolutions. If any one, therefore, should say that this is the sensible heaven, and that souls are at the same time carried round with its revolutions, and are distributed according to its back, profundity, and subcelestial arch, it is necessary to admit that many absurdities will ensue.

But if any one asserts, that the heaven to which Jupiter leads all his attendant Gods and dæmons is intelligible, he will unfold the divine narrations of Plato, in a manner agreeable to the nature of things, and will follow his most celebrated interpreters. For both Plotinus and Jamblichus consider this as a certain intelligible heaven. And prior to these, Plato himself in the Cratylus, following the Orphic theogony, calls Saturn indeed the father of Jupiter, and Heaven the father of Saturn. And he unfolds the Demiurgus of the universe by certain appellations, investigating the truth which names contain. And he denominates the Demiurgus as one who contains a divine intellect: but Heaven as the intelligence of first intelligibles. For Heaven, says he, is sight looking to things on high. And hence, Heaven subsists prior to every divine intellect with which the mighty Saturn is said to be replete; but it understands superior natures, and whatever is situated beyond the celestial order. The mighty Heaven, therefore, is allotted a middle kingdom between intelligibles and intellectuals.

For, indeed, the celestial revolution in the Phædrus is *intelligence*, by which all the Gods, and their attendant souls, obtain the contemplation of intelligibles. For intelligence is between intellect and the intelligible. In this medium, therefore, we must establish the whole Heaven; and we must assert that it contains one bond of the divine orders; being, indeed, the father of the intellectual race, but generated by the

kings prior to itself, whom it is said to behold. We must also consider it as situated between the supercelestial place and subcelestial arch.

Again, therefore, if the supercelestial place is indeed that imparticipable and occult genus of the intelligible Gods, how can we establish there so great a divine multitude, and this separated, viz. truth, science, justice, temperance, the meadow, and *Adrastia*? For neither are the fountains of virtues proper to the intelligible Gods, nor separation and variety of forms. For such things as are first and most characterized by unity, extend the demiurgic intellect of wholes to an intelligible exemplar, and to the comprehension of forms which there subsist. But, in the *Phædrus*, Socrates asserts that a partial intellect contemplates the supercelestial place. For this (as it is beautifully said by our ancestors) is the governor of the soul. If, then, it is requisite to investigate the difference of intelligibles from this analogy, as the demiurgic intellect is imparticipable, but that which is partial is participable; so with respect to that which is intelligible, the intelligible of the demiurgus is the first paradigm of first intelligibles, but the intelligible of a partial intellect is the paradigm of secondary intelligibles, which are indeed intelligibles, but are allotted an intelligible supremacy as among intellectuals. But if the supercelestial place is situated above the celestial revolution, but is inferior to the intelligible triads, because it is more expanded; for it is the plain of truth, but is not unknown, and is divided according to a multitude of forms, and contains a variety of powers, and the meadow which is there nourishes souls, and is visible to their natures, the first intelligibles illuminating souls with an ineffable union, at the same time that they are not known by them, through intelligence:—if this be the case, it is necessary that the supercelestial place should be situated between the intelligible nature and the celestial revolution. But also, if Plato himself establishes true essence in this place, must he not consider this place as intelligible, and as participating first intelligibles? For, because it is essence, it is intelligible; but, because it is true essence, it participates of being. And if it contains in itself a multitude of intelligibles, it cannot be placed in the first triad. For *one being* is there, and not a multitude of beings. But if it possesses a various life, which the *meadow* evinces, it is inferior to the second triad. For intelligible life is one, and without separation. And from its shining with divided forms, all-various orders, and prolific powers, it is inferior to the third or all-perfect triad. If, therefore, the supercelestial place is posterior to these in antiquity

antiquity and power, but is placed above the celestial order, it is indeed intelligible, but is the summit of the intellectual Gods. And on this account aliment is thence derived to souls. For that which is intelligible is aliment, because first intelligibles are said to nourish souls; and these are the beautiful, the wise, and the good. For with these, according to Plato, the winged nature of the soul is nourished, but is corrupted, and perishes through things of a contrary nature. These things, however, subsist there in an exempt manner, and through union and silence. But the supercelestial place is said to nourish through intelligence and energy, and to fill the blessed choir of souls with intelligible light, and the prolific rivers of life.

But after the supercelestial place, and Heaven itself, the subcelestial arch is situated, which, as is evident to every one, is placed under, and not in the Heavens: for it is not called by Plato a *celestial*, but a *subcelestial* arch. And that it is likewise proximately situated under the celestial revolution, is evident from what is said concerning it. But if it is requisite that the subcelestial arch, thus subsisting, should be established as the same with the summit of intellectuals, and not as the same with the extremity of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, it will be necessary to contemplate what remains. For the intellectual summit separates itself from the celestial kingdom: but the extremity of the intelligible and intellectual Gods is conjoined, and every way surrounded with this kingdom. And this *summit* establishes the whole of intellect and intellectual multitude, and (as Socrates says) the blessed transitions of the Gods. But the *extremity* bounds alone the celestial series, and supplies to the Gods an ascent to Heaven. For when the Gods ascend to the banquet, and delicious food, and to the plenitude of intelligible good, then they proceed on high to the subcelestial arch, and through this to the celestial revolution. Hence, if you assert that the subcelestial arch perfects the Gods, and converts them to the whole of heaven, and to the supercelestial place, you will not wander from the conceptions of Plato. For the Gods are nourished with the intelligible, with the meadow, and the divine forms which the supercelestial place contains. But they are replenished with this aliment through the subcelestial arch: for through this they participate of the celestial revolution. They revolve, therefore, through the subcelestial arch; but they receive a vigorous intelligence from the celestial order, and they are replenished with intelligible goods from the supercelestial place. It is evident, therefore, that the supercelestial  
place

place is allotted an intelligible summit; but the celestial revolution obtains a middle extent, and the subcelestial arch possesses an intelligible extremity. For all things are contained in this. And intellect indeed is endued with a convertive power; but the intelligible is the object of desire. And divine intelligence fills up the middle; perfecting indeed the conversions of divine natures, and conjoining them with such as are first; but rendering the desires of intelligibles apparent, and replenishing secondary natures with preceding goods. And thus I think we have sufficiently treated concerning the order of these three.

Perhaps, however, some one may inquire, why we characterize according to this medium the whole progression of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual Gods; and why of the extremes we call one supercelestial, but the other subcelestial, from its habitude to the middle; demonstrating of the one exempt transcendency, but of the other a proximate and conjoined hypobasis (i. e. subject basis, or foundation). To this then we shall briefly answer, that this whole genus of the intelligible and intellectual Gods is connective of both these extremes, to some things indeed being the cause of conversion, but to others of an unfolding into light, and a presence extended to secondary natures. As, therefore, we call all the intelligible Gods paternal and unical, characterizing them from the summit, and assert that they are the boundaries of wholes, the fabricators of essence, the causes of perpetuity, and the authors of the production of form; in the same manner we evince that these middle Gods, from the medium which they contain, are the leaders of the bonds of wholes. For this whole middle order is vivific, connective, and perfective. But its summit indeed unfolds the impressions of intelligibles, and their ineffable union. But its termination converts the intellectual Gods, and conjoins them with intelligibles. And its middle leads this order as to a centre, and establishes the total genera of the Gods. For, through a tendency to the middle, we attribute also to the extremes a habitude of transcendency and subjection; denominating the one above, and the other beneath the middle.

Let us now consider what the negations are by which Plato celebrates this middle order of Gods. Those sacred genera, therefore, the connective, the perfective, and the paternal, of those divine natures which are properly called intellectual, are proximately established after the intelligible summit of all intellectuals. For this summit,

being exempt from these, also transcends all the intellectual Gods. For what every genus of Gods is to *the one*, that the three orders posterior to, are to this summit. Plato, therefore, denominates the celestial order, which connects wholes, and illuminates them with intelligible light, *colour*; because this apparent beauty of the heavens is resplendent with all-various colours and light. Hence he calls *that* Heaven intellectual colour and light. For the light proceeding from *the good* is in the order superior to this unknown and occult, abiding in the adyta of the Gods; but it is unfolded in this order, and from the unapparent becomes apparent. And on this account it is assimilated to colour, the offspring of light. Further still: if Heaven is first looking to things on high, according to the definition of Socrates in the Cratylus, the intelligible of it is very properly called colour, which is conjoined with light.

The cause, therefore, of the intelligibles in *Heaven* is *without colour*, and is exempt from them. For sensible colour is the offspring of the solar light. But the sub-celestial arch, which proximately subsists after the celestial order, is called by Plato *figure*: for the arch itself is the name of a figure. And, in short, in this order Parmenides also places intellectual figure; but first attributes *contact* to the summit of intellectuals, as is evident from the conclusions of the Parmenides. For, in the first hypothesis, taking away *figure* from *the one*, he uses this as a medium, that *the one* does not *touch* itself. *Contact*, therefore, here first subsists, and is here according to cause. For of such things as the demiurgus is proximately the cause, of these the father prior to him is paradigmatically the cause. Hence contact here is the paradigm of the liberated Gods. These three orders, therefore, are successive, viz. *colour*, *figure*, and *contact*. And of these the supercelestial place is essentially exempt. Hence it is *without colour*, *without figure*, and *without contact*.

In the next place, let us consider the triad which is celebrated by Socrates as pre-subsisting in the supercelestial place, viz. *the plain of truth*, *the meadow*, and *the aliment of the Gods*. The *plain of truth*, therefore, is intellectually expanded to intelligible light, and is illuminated with the splendours which thence proceed. But *the meadow* is the prolific power of life, and of all-various reasons, and is the comprehension of the primary causes of life, and the cause of the variety and the procreation of forms. For meadows in this sensible region are fertile with forms and productive powers, and  
contain

contain water, which is a symbol of vivific energy. But the nourishing cause of the Gods is a certain intelligible union, comprehending in itself the whole perfection of the Gods, and filling them with vigour and power, that they may provide for secondary natures, and possess an immutable intelligence of such as are first. The Gods, however, participate of these uniformly on high, but with separation in their progressions. Of the aliment, also, one kind is called by Plato ambrosia, and the other nectar. Here, too, we may observe, that the charioteer who is nourished with intelligibles participates of the perfection illuminated from the Gods unically, but the horses divisibly; first of ambrosia, and afterwards of nectar. For it is necessary that they should remain firmly and immovably in more excellent natures, from ambrosia; but that they should immutably provide for secondary natures, through nectar; since they say that ambrosia is a solid, but nectar a liquid nutriment. Hence, the nutriment of nectar signifies that in providence which is unrestrained, indissoluble, and which proceeds to all things with perfect purity. But the nutriment of ambrosia signifies that which is permanent, and which is firmly established in more excellent natures. But from both it is implied, that the Gods are permanent, and at the same time proceed to all things; and that neither their undeviating energy, and which is unconverted to subordinate natures, is unprolific, nor their prolific power and progression, without stability: but, being permanent, they proceed, and, being established in prior natures, provide for things secondary with consummate purity.

THE END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

E R R A T A.

Vol. III. p. 35, in the last line, for *infinite, multitude*, read *infinite multitude*.

———— p. 581, lines 26, 27, 28, 29, for the word *mere*, in each of these lines, read *more*.

